GUIDE TO THE MH1 IRAQ FILE

[The MH1 Iraq file is concerned with modern Iraq and its sedentary inhabitants. Data on the Bedouins and Kurds of Iraq will be found in the MJ4 and MA11 files. Modern Iraq is the area known in its early history as Mesopotamia. It is bordered on the east by Iran, on the south by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, on the west by Jordan and Syria and on the north by Turkey. The 1974 population estimate was 10,765,000, 75% of which is Arab. Over 95% of the population is Moslem. The capital is Baghdad. The valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are very fertile and agriculture is the chief economic activity. Iraq supplies about 80% of the world's dates. About two thirds of the population live in rural villages. Only about 20% of the arable land is actually cultivated. Crude oil accounted for 93% of Iraq's exports in 1972. Industry is poorly developed. After several centuries of competition between Turkey and Persia for rule, Iraq was under Turkish domination from 1638 until World War I. Britain was given a mandate in 1920 which it terminated in 1932. From then until 1955, Iraq was allied by treaty with Britain. Since that time, government has been quite chaotic. Since the coup d'etat of 1968 Iraq has been governed by the Socialist Party. In 1972 Iraq made a 15-year treaty of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

There are eight sources in the Iraq file, all of which were processed in 1955. These sources concentrate on economic development and political history. Many of them were written by government officials or are reports of missions investigating economic problems. 8: Campbell is an anthology of entertaining stories told by Arab tribes of the Lower Euphrates. 6: Ireland discusses British interest in Iraq and political development from 1914 to 1932. 1: Longrigg is a comprehensive account of internal and international politics, economy, and minority problems in Iraq from 1900-1950. 4: Wilson is a discussion of ethnic groups in two northern provinces. 2: Dowson is a report to the Iraqi government on land tenure. 3: Clark is a UNESCO report on education in Iraq. 5: Al Dalli is a discussion development of industry. 7: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is a report to the Iraqi government on recommendations for economic development.]

NORTHERN 'IRAQ AND ITS PEOPLES

By MAJOR W. C. F. WILSON, O.B.E.

114 A lecture given before the Society on March 10, 1937, Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have much pleasure in introducing Major Wilson, who is going to speak to us on the subject of Northern 'Iraq and its peoples. He first served in 'Iraq under that very great officer, Sir Percy Cox, who recently passed away. Major Wilson rebuilt Kut after our victory over the Turks, and of recent years he has been administrative officer at Mosul; and can give us very up-to-date accounts of the Assyrian problem in Northern 'Iraq, and can also speak from first-hand knowledge of the Kurds and the other minorities of the country.

101 TO many who have never been to 'Iraq, the name, or its old alternative, Mesopotamia, possibly conjures up visions of flat, featureless plains, strips of cultivation along the banks of the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, sandstorms and a torrid climate. Such visions are in a fair measure true of central and southern 'Iraq, but are very far from applying to the two northern provinces of Arbil and Mosul.

Geography

133 From the Lesser Zab river northwards the country is undulating and intersected with watercourses or wādis, which after rain flow down to the Tigris and its half-dozen tributaries. This type of country extends right up to the foothills which fringe the mighty mountain mass of Kurdistan. Over this area, irrigation, except on the rivers for summer crops, is unnecessary, and the rainfall which comes between November and May is in most years sufficient for the cultivation of large crops of wheat and barley. In the spring, grazing for animals is plentiful and a wonderful assortment of wild flowers appear.

In the mountains, during the same period, heavy rain and snow fill the underground sources and provide water for the summer growing of rice, tobacco and other crops, and for good summer grazing for animals. These mountains contain several ranges 6,000 to 8,000 feet high and one peak near the Iranian frontier over 10,000 feet.

Population

144 The inhabitants of the two provinces consist of an extraordinarily heterogeneous collection of creeds and races with all the problems produced by such a collection.

I 162 The population of Mosul and Arbil provinces exceeds 630,000, of which 530,000 are Muslims. Of these Muslims, all but 10,000 are Sunnis. There are 60,000 Christians, 32,000 Yezidis and 10,000 Jews. The minorities therefore total only one-fifth of the whole. The Muslims consist of Arabs and Kurds in approximately equal parts, together with some 16,000 Turkomans.

I [162] 438 439 496 Mosul itself is mainly an Arab town with a population of 100,000. It is a great entrepôt for trade in sheep, cattle, wool, grain, hides, intestines, galls and eggs with the thickly populated districts round and also with Syria and Turkey. Its importance in this respect will certainly increase when at long last it is linked by rail with the Syrian frontier at Tel Kuchik and with Baghdad via Baa'iji. Work on this linking is now proceeding, and it is interesting to remember that when it is completed in a couple of years it will form the last stage in the famous Baghdad-Berlin Railway which was the Kaiser's fondest dream. The circumstances under which it will be completed are likely, however, to be very different to those which he visualized.

Arabs

I B 101 Apart from forming the majority of the inhabitants of Mosul itself, Arabs are found as cultivators on the Tigris both north and south of the town and to the south of the Jebal Sinjar (Sinjar mountain) and as bedouin who range the uncultivated areas to the south-west, west and north-west.

B 619 221 721 233 The bedouin consist of more than one tribe, but by far the most important is the Shammar. This great tribe is of Arabian origin and has in the past been pushed steadily northwards by economic forces and the search for new grazing grounds. With the great improvement in public security during recent years, cultivation has extended further and further from the towns and villages and encroached on the haunts of the Shammar. Formerly the means of livelihood of these bedouin were varied if not all respectable. They included the raiding of the flocks and herds of their weaker neighbours and the extortion of "khuwa" or safe-conduct money from merchants, travellers and others. At the same time they made a perfectly legitimate living from acting as shepherds for the flocks of townsmen and by breeding and selling camels. Nowadays raiding and safe-conduct money have been abolished and motor transport has to a great extent ousted the camel as a carrier in 'Iraq and the neighbouring countries and caused a severe slump in the camel market.

PREFACE

000 IN Victorian days it was customary to preface a translated work with an apology for imperfections in the translation. I would say that I am not an interpreter such as those of the United Nations, who can listen to a long speech in one language and who afterwards can render it accurately and with perfect memory in another language. I am also conscious that these stories when told with a wealth of gesture and expression of face and voice were things of vivid beauty like rare butterflies, and in reducing them to paper it is as if they have been killed and pinned in a collector's cabinet.

101 361 233 These stories belong to the great Shia tribes of Southern Iraq. I first came into contact with these tribes when, coming over from the Western Desert in the winter of 1942, I halted on the road near Ur, and engaged a couple of likely-looking tribesmen to show me what local shooting there was, and to act as guides. The next day we drove far into the desert after bustard, and coming over a rise in the ground we saw before us a group of long, low, black tents; in my ignorance I turned to my two guides and asked them what the tribe of these bedouin was. Their faces registered horror and surprise, and they said: 'Those are not bedouin; they are Arabs.' Not having been previously aware of this distinction, I asked them how they told the difference between bedouin and Arab. They replied: 'We thought because you speak Arabic you

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a con- 262
stant current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat compli- 173
cated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

489 deck cargo, and the goods would be liable to damage by rain or spray
439 if otherwise packed.

13. THE STORY OF SHEIKH MIZEIL EL QURNACHI, A MAN OF A NOBLE FAMILY, THOUGH HIS LAND WAS POOR

804 Page 185, Line 15. 'and ordered fifty mithkals of them.'

The mithkal is a small weight used by goldsmiths.

192 Page 188, Line 20. 'Take soldiers and go to Qasr Qurnachi.'

Qasr—castle. 'Qurnachi Castle.'

Page 191, Line 11. 'Can then the hawk fly without wings.'

539 I was told that this quotation was from a famous Arab poet, but
192 regret that I was unable to place it, and nobody could remember the name of the poet. The quotation as put into the mouth of Sheikh Aqab is particularly apt, as Aqab, though its literal translation is 'eagle,' is a name often given to hawks.

Page 198, Line 24. 'She was clad in an ataq and bag trousers.'

The ataq is a kind of blouse.

14. THE STORY OF DAOUD THE CAMEL AND OF HIS MISFORTUNES

Page 204, Line 4. 'The Shammar of the Jezira.'

103 The area in Mosul Liwa which lies to the west of the Tigris, that is,
101 between the Tigris and the Euphrates, is known as the Jezira, or Island. The Shammar in this area are the famous tribe of the late Sheikh Ajil el Yawar.

15. BETWEEN TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD LIE FOUR FINGERS

551 Page 214, Line 14. 'The name of this girl was Leila for she was born in the night.'

Leila, 'Night,' is a popular girl's name in South Iraq. I do not think it is restricted only to those girls born at night.

CHAPTER VI

THE ARABS OF MESOPOTAMIA

131 MESOPOTAMIA does not belong to Arabia
101 geographically. It lies to the north of the
peninsula and includes the territory between
the mountains of Asia Minor on the north, the mountains
of Persia on the east, the Syrian desert on the west and
the Persian Gulf on the south. The area enclosed between
these limits is enormous. These are its natural
boundaries, but politically the territory included takes
in certain districts that belong to Persia and Turkey as
104 well as the kingdom of Mesopotamia. It is of interest
101 to include Mesopotamia in any discussion of Arab life,
for although the Mesopotamians are not in Arabia geographically,
nor even politically, racially they are Arabs
as truly as the inhabitants of Nejd or the dwellers in the
197 valleys of Oman. Practically all of the inhabitants of
162 Mesopotamia are Arabic speaking and Arabic in origin,
101 the chief exceptions being the numerous Jews who have
come into the country from the north and the small community
of Sabaeans, or fire-worshippers, who are a remnant
of the people that the Arabs found inhabiting the
country. The Arab is the dominant element, and the
others together would probably not amount to five per
cent of the whole.

133 The character of the country is most easily understood
if we start by saying that Mesopotamia is the enormous

Iraq MH1
Turkish Period M2

with, but even the admittedly great difficulties of her 000
task do not excuse her utter failure. Although she has had hundreds of years of opportunity to exert her abilities in harmonizing the different races which make up her population, they are now more discordant than ever, and we had during the war the hideous spectacle of the dominant race deliberately attempting to exterminate one of the insubordinate subject races in cold blood, certainly a sufficient confession of failure.

The Sabaeans or fire-worshippers of Mesopotamia furnish a notable example of Turkish ineptitude in facing this difficult problem of assimilating alien races.
The Sabaeans are the remnants of the pre-Islamic population I
of Mesopotamia who refused to become Moslems 101
in the days of the Moslem conquest. They have been, 795
and so far as their diminished numbers permit they 162
still are, a most valuable asset to the country. They are 463
by far the best artisans in the Arab world. Some of their silver work surpasses the best that India can offer. This community, which is absolutely peaceable and knows nothing of the arts of war, has been harried and persecuted until now there remains only the smallest fraction of their original numbers. They now number less than ten thousand, if their own estimates can be trusted, and their complete disappearance is apparently a matter of only a short time.

Another indictment that must be brought against the T 185
Turk in the Arab world is the fact that he failed utterly as a civilizing force. This was his fault and not simply his misfortune, as might be argued of an Arab ruler who has never seen the vision of the government as a force working to uplift society. In Hasa sanitation was not improved even in the most elementary way. No

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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496
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631


N O R
Oil pipe line
D E
52
JORDAN
BULGARIA
Istanbul
U. S. S. R.
Tbilisi
Batum
Ankara
TURKEY
Aleppo
Euphrates
SYRIA
O.P.L.
CRETE
CYPRUS
Beirut
LEBANON
Damascus
Tigris
Bag
O.P.L.
IRAQ
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv
Alexandria
JORDAN
Amman
Jerusalem
O.P.L.
Cairo
Suez
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA

End Map (A)

In Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

102
496
315
631


D
Khan Baghdadi
EUPHRATES
Hit
Kubaysa
Ramadi
Habbaniya
Faluja
Sumaykah
Daltawa
Ba'quba
DIYA
Baghdad
Ctesiphon
Mahmudiyah
KUT A
T H E R N
Rutba
I
R
A
Musaiyib
Hindiya Barrage
Rahaliya
BAHR AL MILH
Karbala
Babylon
Shithatha
Hilla
Hashimi
Khan Hammad
HILLA
S E R T
K A R B A L A
Kifl
Kufa
Najf
Shamiya
Abu Sukhair
Faysaliya
Kharm
Shinafiya
D I W
Baku
Tabriz
Teheran
Hamadan
P E R S I A
Baghdad
Basra
0
200
M.
Railways
Oil pipe lines
Oil pipe line
S O U T H E R N
Salma
D E S E R T
44

End map (B)

102
496
315
631


KUT AL AMARA
Badra
Jassan
'Aziziya
Bughayla (Nu'maniya)
Kut al Amara
Shaykh Sa'ad
'Ali al-Gharbi
Hai
Hashimiya
Daghghara
'Afak
Kumayt
'Amara
Qal'at Sikr
Karradi
Rifa'i
Qal'at Salih
'Uzayr
Shatra
Suq
Rumaytha
Samawa
Khidhr
MUNTAFIQ
Nasiriya
Ur
Suq al-Shuyukh
Qurna
Quasayr
Salman
abu Ghar
BASRA
Busaiya
Shu'aiba
Zubayr
Basra
Abadan
JABAL SANAM
Umm Qasr
Fao
Bubiyan Is.
KUWAYT
Kuwayt
PERSIAN
GULF
NEUTRAL ZONE
NEUTRAL ZONE
Dizful
Shushtar
Masjid Sulaiman
Ahwaz
KARUN
KHUZISTAN
Bandar Shapur
32
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46
48
R. W. FORD

End map (c)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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496
315
631


36
38
40
38
36
34
TURKE
Diyarbakr
Alexandretta
Banyas
Dayr al-Zur
SYRIA
Oil pipe line
Ab
KHA

End Map (d)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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496
315
631


42
44
LAKE VAN
E
Y
Tall Kochek
'Ain Zala
Dohuk
Tall 'Uwaynat
JABAL
Tall Kayf
Mosul
Zibar
GREATER ZAB
Arbil
Quwayr
MOSUL
ARBIL
Koi Sanjaq
Makhmur
Qaiyara
Altun Kopri
Chamchamal
Shargat
Kirkuk
LESSER ZAB
HAWIJA
Taza Khurmatu
Daquq (Tauq)
KIRKUK
Tuz Khurmatu
THARTHAR
Baiji
JABAL HAMRIN
Kifri
Kingarban
Qara Tepe
Takrit
TIGRIS
BAGHDAD
Samarra
Deli 'Abbas
DIYALA
Khalis
Daltawa
Sumayka
Ba'aubah
abu Kamal
'Ana
al-Qa'im
Rawa
Haditha
DULAIM

End Map (E)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

102
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315
631


46
48
50
CASPIAN
SEA
38
36
34
Tabriz
PERSIA
Hamadan
Kirmanshah
Karind
Qasr-i-Shirin
Khaniqin
Qizil Ribat
Naft Khana
Naft-i-shah
Mandali
Balad Ruz
Panjwin
0
100
MILES
International frontiers
Provincial boundaries
Land above 1500 ft.
" " 6000 ft.
Railways

End Map (F)

10a

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MII Iraq MII


URMIA GÖL
Jazirat ibn 'Omar
Zakho
Faish Khabur
Amadia
Dohuk
Simel
Aqra
Ruwandiz
Eski Mosul
Tall Afar
Jabal Sinjar
Balad Sinjar
MOSUL
Kelek
Erbil
Koi Sanjaq
Quwair
Shura
Qal'at Shergat
Altun Köpri
Kirkuk
Chemchamal
Sulaimaniya
Hadhar
Neri
Ushnu
Mamakulan
Renia
Penjwin
Marivan
Rezaieh (Urmia)
Maragha
Mianduab
Sauj Bulak
Saqqiz
Sardasht
Banah
Surdash
Taktak
Ushnu
Kani Rash
Gawar
Mergasur
Gt. Zab
Little Zab
Makhmur
Dibaga
Garagosh
Hamam Ali
Arij
Tel Kaif
Bardarash
Zibar
Rania
Balak
Baradost
Harir
Agra
I R A Q
P E R S I A

p. 689

102

30


OUTLINE MAP OF PERSIAN GULF
Scale of Miles
100
0
100
'IRAQ
BASRA
Mohammerah
Abadan
Fao
Bubiyan I.
AL KUWAIT
Kharag I.
Bandar Rig
BUSHIRE
SHIRAZ
L. TASHT
L. NIRIZ
I R A N
KERMAN
Mand R.
Ras al Misha'ab
Ras al Badya
PERSIAN GULF
Al Qatif
Bahrain
QATAR
Ras Rakan
Al Bidda
Sh. Shuaib I.
Kais I.
Lingeh
BANDAR ABBAS
Kishm I.
Henjam I.
STRAIT OF HORMUZ
Ras Musandam
Ras al Khaimah
Sharjah
JASK
GULF OF OMAN
O M A N

6:Ireland S-5 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

● 102



BASRA AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY.
Scale of Miles
50
0
50
Shustar
OIL FIELDS
Maidan-i-Naftun
Amara
Band-i-Qir
R. Kharkha
R. Tigris
Qal'a Salih
Shatra
IRAQI-IRANIAN FRONTIER
Ahwaz
IRAN
OIL PIPE LINE
An Nasiriya
Al Qurna
Kabaish
Akaika
Euphrates
OLD CHANNEL
Suq ash Shuyukh
Mazliq
HAMMAR LAKE
Nahr Umar
Euphrates
NEW CHANNEL
Al Khamisiya
Luqait
Nukhaila
Maqil
Mohammerah
BASRA
Shatt al Arab
Shuaiba
Az Zubair
Abadan
IRAQ
Khor Musa
Fao
Khor 'Abdullah
Bubiyan I.
PERSIAN GULF
AL KUWAIT
Jahra

62

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East M1
Iraq MH1

I
102
ME
102


TURKEY
KURDISTAN
IRAN
SYRIA
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
Mosul
MOSUL
IRBIL
Kirkuk
KIRKUK
BAGHDAD
DIALA
Baghdad
DULAIM
KUT AL AMARA
HILLA
KERBELA
AMARA
DIWANIYA
BASRA
MUNTAFIQ
Basra
International Boundaries
Provincial Boundaries
Land over 1000 metres
Scale in Miles
0
40
80
120
160
200

Iraq

p. 129

K

63;Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954

M1 Middle East

IRAQ MH 1

102
315
133


TURKEY
SYRIA
KURDISTAN ALPS
Desert
Marshes
0 MILES 100
Mosul
Erbil
Sulaimaniya
Kirkuk
JABAL HAMRIN
Tigris
Euphrates
TO TRIPOLI
TO HAIFA
Diyala
Diyala Weir
I R A Q
IRAN
DULAIM
Baghdad
SYRIAN DESERT
Hindiyah Dam
Kerbela
Hille
Kut Barrage
Diwaniya
Amarah
MUNTAFIK
Al Qurnah
Basra
Shatt al Arab
KUWAIT
SAUDI ARABIA
NEUTRAL TERRITORY
Persian Gulf
Raisz

IRAQ MHI

312
102


SYRIA
Mosul
Bekhme
Dokan
Lesser Zab
Kirkuk
Derbendi-Khan
Ana
Samarra
IRAN
BAGHDAD
Ramadi
Habbaniya
Abu Dibis
Hindiya
Diwaniya
Kut
Amara
Gharraf
Basra
NEUTRAL ZONE
KUWAIT
SAUDI ARABIA
IRAQ
FLOOD CONTROL AND IRRIGATION
International boundary
Proposed dam site
Dam and barrage under construction
Existing barrage
Existing canal
Proposed canal
NEW IRRIGATION PROJECTS
1 Mussayib
2 Hilla
3 Babil
4 Shamiya
5 Tikrit
6 Ishaqi
7 Makhmur
8 Hawija
9 Adhaim
10 Lower Nahrawan
11 Dujaila
12 Gharraf
0 30 60 90 120 150
MILES
0 30 60 90 120 150
KILOMETRES

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8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

originates from Africa, possibly as one told by Negroes themselves. 136 There are sharks in the Shatt el Arab and in the Karun River in Arabistan which occasionally take off the leg of a bather as far as eighty miles from the sea and the shark is far better known to the Iraqi than is the crocodile.

4. THE STORY OF THE PRINCE OF KERMANSHAH AND OF HIS MISFORTUNES

Peacock. Page 29, Line 25. 'A thousand peacocks.'

I think this bird is only included to give an exotic flavour to the 000 feast. I remember once mentioning that I had shot and eaten peafowl in the Punjab, a statement which was received with much surprise and, I am afraid, some lack of belief, and on a subsequent occasion when someone was describing a feast one of those present shouted, 'Put in a peacock for the Sahib'. In India the peacock is not normally killed by Moslems on the grounds that it is a bird of Paradise. In Iraq, however, I do not doubt that the learned doctors of religion could give the answer straight away if asked. Pigeons which roost on mosques are exempt 137 from molestation, even when destroying crops outside villages. There 825 is incidentally a pretty Iraqi story which explains the large feet of a pigeon. It describes how the pride and arrogance of peacocks offended King Solomon, so to punish them he took away their feet and gave them the feet of the pigeons, that they might always be shamed by their smallness, while the peacocks' large and beautiful feet he gave of course to the pigeons.

5. THE STORY OF THE YOUTH JAMIL, THE SON OF A MERCHANT IN BAGHDAD

Page 43, Line 3. 'The City of Peace.'

Medinat es Salaam or 'City of Peace' is one of the names used in 103 poetry for Baghdad. The city, when first built, was originally named Medinat es Salaam, but it appears that people persisted in referring to it as Baghdad, or Dad's Garden, from some older name for the site of the present city. Arabs love these poetical names, differing from those in normal use. Iraq is sometimes known as Bilad er Rafidain, or Country of the Two Rivers, Jerusalem (Al Quds or the Holy in

103 Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

582 The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still maintained in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

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[619]

6. The Story of the Lost Soul

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

764 The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for burial in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

788

489 deck cargo, and the goods would be liable to damage by rain or spray
439 if otherwise packed.

13. The Story of Sheikh Mizhil el Qurnachi, a Man of a Noble Family, though His Land Was Poor

804 Page 185, Line 15. 'and ordered fifty mithkals of them.'
The mithkal is a small weight used by goldsmiths.

192 Page 188, Line 20. 'Take soldiers and go to Qasr Qurnachi.'
Qasr—castle. 'Qurnachi Castle.'

Page 191, Line 11. 'Can then the hawk fly without wings.'
539 I was told that this quotation was from a famous Arab poet, but
192 regret that I was unable to place it, and nobody could remember the
name of the poet. The quotation as put into the mouth of Sheikh
Aqab is particularly apt, as Aqab, though its literal translation is
'eagle,' is a name often given to hawks.

Page 198, Line 24. 'She was clad in an ataq and bag trousers.'
The ataq is a kind of blouse.

14. The Story of Daoud the Camel and of his Misfortunes

Page 204, Line 4. 'The Shammar of the Jezira.'
103 The area in Mosul Liwa which lies to the west of the Tigris, that is,
101 between the Tigris and the Euphrates, is known as the Jezira, or Island.
The Shammar in this area are the famous tribe of the late Sheikh Ajil
el Yawar.

15. Between Truth and Falsehood Lie Four Fingers

551 Page 214, Line 14. 'The name of this girl was Leila for she was born in the night.'
Leila, 'Night,' is a popular girl's name in South Iraq. I do not think it is restricted only to those girls born at night.

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SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

In transliterating Arabic words into English, the inevitable problem has arisen of adopting a system which would accurately represent the nearest English equivalent of each Arabic letter or diacritical mark and which would not, at the same time, confuse the reader with unfamiliar words and place-names or with a bewildering array of diacritical marks.

The writer, although not unmindful of the merits of other systems, as for instance that followed by Professor D. S. Margoliouth, of Oxford, has adopted the system employed by the Royal Geographical Society[1] although occasional lapses from it may be discovered. This system, although perhaps not so exact as others, has the advantage of employing single English letters, without distinguishing diacritical marks, for the Arabic letters of which the sounds seem to be duplications in most European ears. Thus Dāl (د) and Dād (ض) are here represented by the English letter D, Zāi (ز) and Zā (ظ) by Z, Tā (ت) and Ṭā (ط) by T, Sīn (س) and Sād (ص) by S, and Ḥā (ح) and Ha (ه) by H, except that the 'silent' final Hā is rendered as A or E.

'Ain (ع) is represented by '. Hamza Alif and Wasla Alif when transliterated are rendered as '. The two sequences Fat-ha Yā and Fat-ha Wāw are treated as AI and AU instead of AY and AW, respectively. This is perhaps open to objections since the two sequences are properly not diphthongs but combinations of a vowel and a consonant. The forms adopted by the R.G.S. II system have been retained, however, in the belief that AY and AW would result unnecessarily in un-

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[1] Gleichen, Major-General Lord Edward, and Reynolds, J. H., *Alphabets of Foreign Languages transcribed into English according to the R.G.S. II System* (1921)

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

104 familiar spellings, as for example in Faisal, Husain, Saiyid, Beirut, etc.

Place-names follow the lists prepared by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names[1] with a few exceptions, as Dair az-Zūr and Kūt al-'Amāra. Long vowels have been indicated by ¯ except in the case of 'Irāq and Baghdād. These names appear so frequently in the text that the distinguishing marks have been omitted on the grounds of convenience.

Arabic words in titles of books or reports and in citations have been given exactly as they appear, no attempt having been made to bring the Arabic words into conformity with the R.G.S. II System.

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[1] *First List of Names in 'Iraq (Mesopotamia)*, (1932); *First List of Names in Syria* (1927), Royal Geographical Society.

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ALPHABETICAL LIST OF NATIVE NAMES WITH LATIN EQUIVALENTS

Aabb-el-harar (Teh.)	*Juniperus excelsa* Bieb.
Abhil (Teh.)	*Juniperus excelsa* Bieb.
Abir (Pers.)	*Crocus sativus* L.
Ab-i-sham (Teh.)	*Zataria multiflora* Boiss.
Abrisham (Teh.)	*Bombyx fortunatus* Hutton
Abu Suwaif (Ar.)	*Hordeum* sp.
Acoron (Gr.)	*Acorus Calamus* L.
Adas (Turk.)	*Lens esculenta* Moench (also p. 194)
‘Adas-i-talkh (Teh.)	*Indigofera Roxburghii* Jaume
Adas mar (Bagh.)	*Lens esculenta* Moench
‘Adasu ’l-mulk (Teh.)	*Nummulites* sp.
Adhafir-aj-jian (Iraq)	*Astragalus hamosus* L.
Adhafir-ash-shaitan (Iraq)	*Astragalus hamosus* L.
Affaz (Teh.)	*Quercus infectoria* Olivier
Afsant-el-bahara (Ar.)	*Artemisia maritima* L.
Afsantin (Teh.)	*Artemisia vulgaris* L.
Afsantin-i-hindi (Ar.)	*Artemisia vulgaris* L.
Afs-el-batum (Tri.)	*Pistacia Khinjuk* Stocks
Afsin (Teh.)	*Zataria multiflora* Boiss.
Aftāb gardan (Teh.)	*Helianthus annuus* L.
Aftimūn	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Afyun (Iraq)	*Papaver somniferum* L.
Agalactie (Schl.)	*Lecanora esculenta* Eversm.
Agirgarhā (Teh., Isf.)	*Anacyclus Pyrethrum* DC.
Ajees-aafs (Ar.)	*Quercus infectoria* Olivier
‘Ajibah (Punj.)	*Triticum vulgare* Vill.
Ajibak	*Triticum* sp.
Ajil-i-turki (Teh.)	*Acorus Calamus* L.
Ajmud (Hind.)	*Apium graveolens* L.
Ajowan (Hind.)	*Carum copticum* Benth. & Hook.
Ajwain (Hind.)	*Carum copticum* Benth. & Hook.
Ajwain-ka-phul (Ind.)	See *Carum copticum* Benth. & Hook.
Akalkara (Hind.)	*Anacyclus Pyrethrum* DC.
Akar (Bal.)	*Sesbania aculeata* Poir.
Aketi (Ham.)	*Astragalus hamosus* L.
Akhrot (Hind.)	*Juglans regia* L.
Aksir-i-turki (Teh.)	*Acorus Calamus* L.
Akulla (Ar.)	*Commiphora opobalsamum* Kunth
Alaf-khareg (Afg.)	*Crataegus orientalis* Bieb.
Alashi (Ind.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Alfabaca (Port.)	*Ocimum Basilicum* L.
Al-kanna (Ar.)	See *Onosma echioides* L.
Alkikenji (Ar.)	*Physalis Alkekengi* L.
Alsi (Ind.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Alū (Teh.)	*Prunus insititia* L. var. *bokharensis*
Alū-bokhara (Teh.)	*Prunus insititia* L. var. *bokharensis*
Alucha (Hind.)	*Prunus domestica* L. var. *Juliana*
Alūchah (Teh.)	*Prunus domestica* L. var. *Juliana*
Ambari (Duk.)	*Hibiscus cannabinus* L.
Amlaj (Ar.)	*Phyllanthus Emblica* L.
Amla morabba (Turk.)	*Phyllanthus Emblica* L.

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Ammeos (Ph. Pers.)	*Carum copticum* Benth. & Hook.
Amulah-i-suftah (Teh.)	*Phyllanthus Emblica* L.
Amulah-mugashshar (Isf.)	*Phyllanthus Emblica* L.
Andiz otu (Turk.)	*Inula Helenium* L.
Andus (Ham.)	*Inula Helenium* L.
Anghinar (Turk.)	*Cynara Scolymus* L.
Angul Drakh (Ind.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Angūm (Teh.)	*Acacia Senegal* Willd.
Angur (Hind.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Angur-i-kauli or kawali (Iraq, Pers.)	*Loranthus Grewinkii* Boiss. & Bunge
Anila-ghnaka (Sans.)	*Terminalia bellerica* Roxb.
Anisūn (Teh.)	*Pimpinella Anisum* L.
Anitum (Yunani)	*Peucedanum graveolens* Benth. & Hook.
Anjabar-i-rumi (Pers.)	*Polygonum Bistorta* L.
Anjar (Iraq)	*Prunus domestica* L. var. *Juliana*
Année (Fr.)	*Inula Helenium* L.
Antchibun (Tab.)	*Pimpinella Anisum* L.
Anzarut (Ar.)	*Astragalus fasciculaefolius* Boiss.
Aola amla (Hind.)	*Phyllanthus Emblica* L.
Arab qosi (Turk.)	*Glossostemon Bruguieri* Desf.
Arak-badiani (Schl.)	*Pimpinella Anisum* L.
Arak Hail (Bagh.)	*Elettaria Cardamomum* Maton.
Arakta chandana (Sans.)	*Pterocarpus santalinus* L.
Ardi-shauki (Ar.)	*Cynara Scolymus* L.
Arjan (Hind.)	*Antimonium Sulphidum*
Arpā (Turk.)	*Hordeum* sp.
Arwah-i-kunjad (Pers.)	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Arzan (Pers.)	*Panicum miliaceum* L.
Asal-alsus	*Glycyrrhiza glabra* L.
Asalia (Bom.)	*Lepidium sativum* L.
Asārūn (Teh.)	*Asarum europaeum* L.
Asbaghul (Pers.)	*Plantago ovata* Forsk.
Asbarg (Iran)	*Delphinium Zalil* Ait. & Hemsl.
Aschna (Ar.)	See *Roccella Montagnei* Bél.
Asfar-i-makki (Teh.)	*Cymbopogon Schoenanthus* Spreng.
Asgandh (Hind., Guz.)	*Withania somnifera* Dunal
Asil-a-kraab (Afg.)	*Apium graveolens* L.
Aspand (Kurd.)	*Peganum Harmala* L.
Asphaltum Persicum	Mummy
Asphaltum Punjabinum	Mummy
Aspust (Bal.)	*Medicago sativa* L.
Aswarg (Iran)	*Delphinium Zalil* Ait. & Hemsl.
Atasi (Ind.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Atractus (Gr.)	*Carthamus tinctorius* L.
Avartin (Sans.)	*Helicteres Isora* L.
Azaraki (Ind.)	*Strychnos Nux Vomica* L.
Azkar (Teh.)	*Cymbopogon Schoenanthus* Spreng.
Baberang (Hind.)	*Embelia Ribes* Burm.
Bābūna	*Anthemis Wiedemanniana* Fisch. & Mey.
Bābūnah (Teh.)	*Matricaria Chamomilla* L.
Babunaj	*Anthemis Wiedemanniana* Fisch. & Mey.
Babunaj (Pers.)	*Matricaria Chamomilla* L.
Bach (Punj.)	*Acorus Calamus* L.
Bādām-i-talkh (Teh.)	*Prunus Amygdalus* Stokes var. *amara* Baill.

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Badian (Pers.)	See *Foeniculum vulgare* Mill.
Badian (Ar.)	See *Pimpinella Anisum* L.
Badian-i-rumi (Teh.)	*Pimpinella Anisum* L.
Bād-i-ranjah bōyah (Teh.)	*Dracocephalum Moldavica* L.
Bād-i-ranjah-būyah (Teh.)	*Asparagus procumbens* L.
Bādiyān-i-khatā'i (Pers.)	*Illicium verum* Hook. f.
Badiyān-i-sabz (Teh., Ham.)	*Foeniculum vulgare* Mill.
Badrandj-boia	See *Asparagus procumbens* L.
Badrendj-bou-yih (Schl.)	*Dracocephalum Moldavica* L.
Badriah-bu (Tab.)	*Dracocephalum Moldavica* L.
Badroudge ibiane (Schl.)	*Ocimum canum* Sims
Badyan (Afg.)	*Foeniculum vulgare* Mill.
Bāghalā (Iraq)	*Vicia Faba* L.
Bahār-i-nāranj (Teh.)	*Citrus sinensis* (L.) Osbeck
Bahman-i-pich (Teh.)	*Helicteres Isora* L.
Baibun (Mosul)	*Matricaria Chamomilla* L.
Bajindak (Afg., Hind.)	*Lepidium Draba* L.
Bakayan (Hind.)	*Melia Azedarach* L.
Bakla (Hind.)	*Vicia Faba* L.
Balādur (Teh., Isf.)	*Semecarpus Anacardium* L.
Balasan (Ar.)	*Commiphora opobalsamum* Kunth
Balchar (Afg.)	*Nardostachys Jatamansi* DC.
Balera (Hind.)	*Terminalia bellerica* Roxb.
Balilah (Teh., Isf.)	*Terminalia bellerica* Roxb.
Bālingū (Ham.)	*Lallemantia Royleana* Benth.
Bālingū shahri (Teh.)	*Lallemantia iberica* F. & M.
Bālingū-shīrāzī (Teh.)	*Lallemantia Royleana* Benth.
Balūt (Teh.)	*Quercus persica* Jaub. & Spach
Bango (Port.)	*Hyoscyamus reticulatus* L.
Banj barri (Iraq)	*Hyoscyamus reticulatus* L.
Banklent (Bal.)	*Vicia Faba* L.
Banoi	*Anthemis Wiedemanniana* Fisch. & Mey
Bans lochan (Hind.)	*Bambusa arundinacea* L.
Baphalli (Hind.)	*Corchorus olitorius* L.
Baqilla (Turk.)	*Vicia Faba* L.
Baqlah (Turk.)	*Vicia Faba* L.
Barambi (Hind.)	*Taxus baccata* L.
Barbati (Beng.)	*Vigna Catjang* Walp.
Bardane (Teh.)	*Arctium Lappa* L.
Barg-i-gāv-zabān (Teh.)	*Echium sericeum* Vahl
Barg-i-hind irān (Teh.)	*Butea frondosa* Roxb.
Barg-i-livās (Isf.)	*Rheum Ribes* L.
Barg-i-mūrd (Teh.)	*Myrtus communis* L.
Barg-i-nāranj (Isf.)	*Citrus sinensis* (L.) Osbeck
Barg-i-quitarān (Teh.)	*Chrozophora verbascifolia* Juss.
Barg-i-sādhaj (Teh.)	*Cinnamomum Cassia* Blume
Barg-i-unnāb (Teh.)	*Zizyphus vulgaris* L.
Barg tiol (Teh.)	*Tilia rubra* DC.
Bārhang (Teh.)	*Plantago major* L.
Barhi	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Bārījah (Teh.)	*Ferula galbaniflua* Boiss.
Bar-i-tang (Bal.)	*Plantago major* L.
Bariz (Teh.)	*Ferula galbaniflua* Boiss.
Barmakiyā (Pers.)	*Vetiveria zizanioides* Stapf
Bār ranjābah (Teh.)	*Asparagus procumbens* L.

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Barsim (Iraq)	*Trifolium alexandrinum* L.
Baryadh dari (Turk.)	*Sorghum vulgare* Pers.
Basal (Ar.)	*Allium Cepa* L.
Basarak Katrin (Pers.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Basfaij (Ind. bazaars)	*Polypodium vulgare* L.
Bas-fāyij (Teh.)	*Polypodium vulgare* L.
Basilikon Kuminon (Gr.)	*Carum copticum* Benth. & Hook.
Bazbaz (Pers.)	*Myristica fragrans* Houtt.
Baz-i-tamar-hindi (Ar.)	*Tamarindus indica* L.
Bazrak (Ham.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Bazr-el-fujl (Ar.)	*Raphanus sativus* L.
Bazr-i-banj (Teh., Ham.)	*Hyoscyamus reticulatus* L.
Bazr ul Kattan (Achundow)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Bazrul khass (Ar.)	*Lactuca sativa* L.
Bdellium (Hind.)	*Commiphora Mukul* Engl.
Bedanjir	*Ricinus communis* L.
Bekh (Ait.)	*Gypsophila paniculata* L.
Bekh-i-sumbul (Pers.)	*Nardostachys Jatamansi* DC.
Bekh-sus	*Glycyrrhiza glabra* L.
Benj (Ar.)	*Hyoscyamus reticulatus* L.
Ber (Hind.)	*Zizyphus vulgaris* L.
Berengue Kaboli (Schl.)	*Embelia Ribes* Burm.
Berij sadri Gilan (Teh.)	*Oryza sativa* L.
Bernooty (Iraq)	See *Nicotiana Tabacum* L. and *N. rustica* L.
Bhela (Hind.)	*Semecarpus Anacardium* L.
Bhilava (Hind.)	*Semecarpus Anacardium* L.
Bibi (Bal.)	*Pyrus Cydonia* L.
Bid-anjubin (Afg.)	*Salix fragilis* L.
Bide Knecht (Achundow)	*Salix fragilis* L.
Bidend jireh khatai	*Croton Tiglium* L.
Bid-khisht (Teh.)	*Salix fragilis* L.
Bihidana (Pers.)	*Pyrus Cydonia* L.
Bikh-anjubar (Punj.)	*Polygonum Bistorta* L.
Bikh-i-banafshah (Teh.)	*Iris spuria* Pall.
Bikh-i-halimun (Teh.)	*Asparagus officinalis* L.
Bikh-i-shankarān (Isf.)	*Conium maculatum* L.
Bikh-i-wala (Pers.)	*Vetiveria zizanioides* Stapf
Bin-i-talkh (Isf.)	*Indigofera Roxburghii* Jaume
Biranj mishk	*Calamintha graveolens* Benth.
Birinjasaf (Ind. bazaars)	*Achillea Santolina* L.
Birinj-i-kābulī (Teh., Isf.)	*Embelia Ribes* Burm.
Birinj-i-sadri (Teh.)	*Oryza sativa* L.
Bizousha dishi and erkek (Turk.)	*Plantago major* L.
Bizr dinbil (Iraq)	*Plantago major* L.
Bizre Kattane (Schl.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Bol (Hind., Bom.)	*Commiphora Molmol* Engl.
Bol shiah (Hind.)	*Aloe Perryi* Baker
Bonduk-i-hindi (Ar.)	*Caesalpinia Bonducella* Roxb.
Bon tamaku (Ar.)	*Verbascum Thapsus* L.
Bughdāi (Turk.)	*Triticum* sp.
Bui madaran (Punj.)	*Achillea Santolina* L.
Bundāq (Iraq)	*Corylus Colurna* L.
Būqnāq (Teh.)	*Glossostemon Bruguieri* Desf.
Burghul (Kurd.)	*Triticum durum* Desf. (p 182)
Buski (Bal.)	*Lepidium Draba* L.

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Bussud (Ar.)	*Corallium rubrum* Lam.
Butinak (Teh.)	*Saussurea Lappa* C. B. Clarke
Bughanj (Ham., Isf.)	*Pistacia Khinjuk* Stocks
Būzīdān (Ham., Teh.)	*Withania somnifera* Dunal
Buzr-ul-karaphs (Ar.)	*Apium graveolens* L.
C'a (N. Chin.)	*Thea sinensis* L.
Cai (Russian)	*Thea sinensis* L.
Camphire (Syr.)	*Lawsonia alba* Lam.
Chā (Hind.)	*Thea sinensis* L.
Chab roman (Bagh.)	*Punica Granatum* L.
Chagzī (Iraq)	*Juglans regia* L.
Chahār tankhūah (Teh.)	*Pistacia integerrima* Stew.
Chahār-tukhmah (i.e. four seeds)	*Plantago major, Alyssum campestre, Cordia Myxa, Pyrus Cydonia* (p. 98)
Chā'ī sabz (Teh.)	*Thea sinensis* L.
Chakha-khoul (Turk.)	*Trachydium Lehmanni* Benth.
Chaltuk (Kurd.)	*Oryza sativa* L.
Chana (Hind.)	*Cicer-arietinum* L.
Charmaghy (Pers.)	*Juglans regia* L.
Chasm (Ham., Teh.)	*Cassia Absus* L.
Chasm-i-khurūs (Pers.)	*Abrus precatorius* L.
Chatlanguch (Ham.)	*Pistacia integerrima* Stew.
Chighaghole metri (Schl.)	*Trachydium Lehmanni* Benth.
China (Hind., Sans.)	*Panicum miliaceum* L.
Chinai-katha (Bom.)	*Uncaria Gambier* Roxb.
Chini (Chin.)	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Chiresh	*Eremurus Aucherianus* Boiss.
Chir zadi (Schl.)	*Lecanora esculenta* Eversm.
Chitra (Bom.)	*Plumbago rosea* L.
Chitrak (Hind.)	*Plumbago rosea* L.
Chitraka (Sans.)	*Plumbago rosea* L.
Chob-i-kut (Afg.)	*Saussurea Lappa* C. B. Clarke
Chota gokhru (Hind.)	*Tribulus terrestris* L.
Chowli (Hind.)	*Vigna Catjang* Walp.
Chūb Chini (Ind. bazaars)	*Smilax China* L. and *S. glabra* Roxb.
Chughak	*Prosopis Stephaniana* Kunth
Chuk-andar (Hind.)	*Beta vulgaris* L.
Chukundar (Turk.)	*Beta vulgaris* L.
Chuli (Botes)	*Prunus Armeniaca* L.
Chunniah	Sigillated Earth
Costum amarum (Ph. Pers.)	*Saussurea Lappa* C. B. Clarke
Cowri (Hind.)	*Cypraea moneta* L.
Cummun (Syr.)	*Cuminum Cyminum* L.
Cuscuta (Lat.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Dahan-bastah (Teh.)	*Zanthoxylum Rhetsa* DC.
Dahan bastah-bāz (Teh.)	*Zanthoxylum Rhetsa* DC.
Dairi	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Dalik (Ar.)	*Rosa hemisphaerica* Herm.
Dall (Ind. bazaars)	*Lens esculenta* Moench
Damaverah (Ham.)	*Rosa hemisphaerica* Herm.
Dam-el-akhwain (Ar.)	*Dracaena Cinnabari* Balf.
Dam-i-ālbālū (Teh.)	*Prunus Cerasus* L.
Daramanah (Teh.)	*Artemisia maritima* L.
Dārasīni (Ar.)	*Cinnamomum Cassia* Blume

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Dār-chīnī (Isf.)	*Cinnamomum Cassia* Blume
Dari (Hind.)	*Sorghum vulgare* Pers.
Darūnaj-i-akrabī (Teh., Ham.)	*Doronicum Pardalianches* L.
Darvunedge eghrebi (Schl.)	*Doronicum Pardalianches* L.
Datura (Hind.)	*Datura Stramonium* L.
Davālah (Ham.)	*Roccella Montagnei* Bél.
Dawalak (Achundow)	See *Roccella Montagnei* Bél.
Dhanya (Hind.)	*Coriandrum sativum* L.
Dhupa	*Boswellia Carterii* Bird.
Dhurah (Ar.)	*Sorghum vulgare* Pers.
Dibk (Ar.)	*Loranthus Grewinkii* Boiss. & Bunge
Digal	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Digh-dighane (Isf.)	*Celtis australis* L.
Djūshā (Pers.)	*Thymus Serpyllum* L.
Doronic (Gr.)	*Doronicum Pardalianches* L.
Doronicum Graeci (Ph. Pers.)	*Doronicum Pardalianches* L.
Drakh (Hind.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Draksha (Sans.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Dudhi (Ind. bazaars)	See *Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.
Dugre bore (Bom.)	*Cidaris* sp.
Dukhn (Iraq)	*Panicum miliaceum* L.
Dulm-ul-hasak	See *Tribulus terrestris* L.
Dža (Chin.)	*Thea sinensis* L.

Ela (Sans.)	*Amomum subulatum* Roxb.
El-sābūniyeh (Ar.)	*Gypsophila paniculata* L.
Enula Campana (Med. Lat.)	*Inula Helenium* L.
Epitymon (Gr.)	See *Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. & *C. hyalina* R
Erok Chatma (Achundow)	*Althaea ficifolia* Cav.
Erok Chatma (Bagh.)	*Althaea rosea* L. (p. 83)
Erok Hail (Bagh.)	*Elettaria Cardamomum* Maton.
Erok orab kuzzi (Iraq)	*Glossostemon Bruguieri* Desf.
Erva doe (Dymock)	*Pimpinella Anisum* L.

Fadschre heyvani (Schl.)	*Capra aegagrus* Gmel.
Faranj mishk	*Calamintha graveolens* Benth.
Fāsūliyah (Iraq)	*Phaseolus vulgaris* L.
Filfil ahmer (Ar.)	*Capsicum frutescens* L.
Filfil-i-surkh (Teh.)	*Capsicum frutescens* L.
Filfil mūyeh (Teh.)	*Capsicum frutescens* L.
Findak (Hind.)	*Corylus Colurna* L.
Findaq (Iraq)	*Corylus Colurna* L.
Flores Punicae granati (Ph. Pers.)	*Punica Granatum* L.
Folusi (Yark.)	*Cassia Fistula* L.
Foveh (?) (Ham.)	*Cirsium lanceolatum* L.
Fraiyōnah (Iraq)	*Tulipa montana* Lindl.
Fudanaj (Ar.)	*Mentha sylvestris* L.
Fūfal (Teh., Ar.)	*Areca Catechu* L.
Fulūs (Isf.)	*Cassia Fistula* L.
Fuluz mahi (Pers.)	*Strychnos Nux-vomica* L.
Funduk (Teh.)	*Corylus Colurna* L.
Fūtfūteh (Teh.)	*Adansonia digitata* Juss.
Fuwwah (Ar.)	*Rubia Cordifolia* L. and *R. tinctorium* L.

Gach-i-kāshān (Teh.)	Calcium Sulphate
Gaiwuzh (Turk.)	*Crataegus orientalis* Bieb.

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Gaizar (Iraq)	*Daucus Carota* L.
Gajur (Hind.)	*Daucus Carota* L.
Gandhak (Hind.)	Sulphur
Gandum-ābī (Teh.)	*Triticum vulgare* Vill.
Gandum-i-safīd (Teh.)	*Triticum vulgare* Vill.
Ganim (Kurd.)	*Triticum* sp.
Gaoshira (Teh.)	*Ferula galbaniflua* Boiss.
Garabi (Hind.)	*Entada gigas* (L.) Fawc. & Rendle
Gara tschorek oti (Tab.)	*Nigella arvensis* L. (p. 144)
Gara za'rak (Tab.)	*Lallemantia iberica* F. & M.
Garchak farangi (Teh.)	*Ricinus communis* L.
Gashnish (Turk.)	*Coriandrum sativum* L.
Gaz-alafī (Teh.)	*Tamarix gallica* L. var. *mannifera* Ehrenb.
Gaz-anjabin (Teh.)	*Tamarix gallica* L. var. *mannifera* Ehrenb. (also p. 162)
Gaz-i-khūnsār (Teh.)	*Tamarix gallica* L. var. *mannifera* Ehrenb.
Gaz-i-shakar	*Tamarix gallica* L. var. *mannifera* Ehrenb.
Gehun (Hind.)	*Triticum vulgare* Vill.
Gentar	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Gharekum (Hind., Bom.)	*Polyporus officinalis* Fries
Ghārīgūn (Teh.)	*Polyporus officinalis* Fries
Gharikun (Ind. bazaars)	*Polyporus officinalis* Fries
Ghariqun (Gr.)	See *Agaric*
Ghartsche (Schl.)	*Agaric*
Ghaza gouzanah (Teh.)	*Inula Helenium* L.
Ghich (Ham.)	*Crataegus orientalis* Bieb.
Ghodaoumche chirazi (Schl.)	*Alyssum campestre* L.
Ghya ke bij (Hind.)	*Lagenaria vulgaris* Ser.
Giafari (Schl.)	*Heracleum persicum* Desf.
Giash mashi (Ham.)	*Quercus* sp.
Gidar tamaku (Hind.)	*Verbascum Thapsus* L.
Gila (Beng.)	*Entada gigas* (L.) Fawc. & Rendle
Gil-i-armani (Pers., Hind.)	Armenian Earth
Gil-i-batuni	Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-berz	Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-dāghistān (Isf., Teh.)	Russian Clay
Gil-i-dechar (Achundow, Ph. Pers.)	Calcium Sulphate
Gil-i-gaswin	Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-gubrasi	Cyprus Clay, Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-igritus	Cretan Earth, Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-khurasani	Edible Chalk, Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-makhdūm (Teh.)	Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-misri	Egyptian Earth, Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-sarshūr (Teh., Afg.)	Edible Clay
Gil-i-shamus	Samian Earth, Sigillated Earth
Gil-i-zard	Yellow Clay, Sigillated Earth
Gil-khwar (Laufer)	See Armenian Earth
Gingelly (Hind.)	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Girdū (Teh.)	*Juglans regia* L.
Gisar Gia (Kurd.)	*Hordeum* sp.
Glans Quercus Ballotae (Ph. Pers.)	*Quercus persica* Jaub. & Spach
Godumai (Tam.)	*Triticum vulgare* Vill.
Gogut (Yark.)	Sulphur
Goi-zira (Tab.)	*Cuminum Cyminum* L.
Gole hinnaicheh beher (Schl.)	*Calendula officinalis* L.

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Golepar (Kerm.)	*Heracleum persicum* Desf.
Gole sarde (Schl.)	*Rosa foetida* Herm.
Gol tighal (Royle)	*Echinops persicus* Stev.
Goondina (Pers.)	*Allium Cepa* L.
Gora vach (Hind.)	*Acorus Calamus* L.
Gorochan (Hind.)	*Capra aegagrus* Gmel.
Goulpere (Boiss.)	See *Heracleum persicum* Desf.
Govarikh (Bal.)	*Tulipa montana* Lindl.
Goz (Turk.)	*Juglans regia* L.
Gosharik (Kurd.)	*Citrullus Colocynthis* Schrad.
Granati Cortex (Ph. Pers.)	*Punica Granatum* L.
Guda (Hind.)	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Gudānah (Teh.)	*Alyssum campestre* L.
Gudānah-i-shahri (Teh.)	*Alyssum campestre* L.
Gudānah-i-shārai (Teh.)	*Alyssum campestre* L.
Gustcha (Schl.)	Calcium Sulphate
Guzm-elsū (Schl.)	*Quercus* sp. (p. 162)
Guzm elsū (Teh.)	*Quercus Vallonea* Kotschy
Guzmazedj (Teh.)	*Tamarix pentandra* Pall.
Gugal (Hind.)	*Commiphora Mukul* Engl.
Gūgird-i-akhmar (Teh.)	Sulphur
Gūgird-i-zard (Teh.)	Sulphur
Guize khouneur (Schl.)	*Tamarix pentandra* Pall.
Gujar (Bom.)	*Astragalus fasciculaefolius* Boiss.
Gul gaindo (Bal.)	*Tagetes erecta* L.
Gul-i-abbasa (Pers.)	*Mirabilis Jalapa* L.
Gul-i-anār (Teh.)	*Punica Granatum* L.
Gul-i-arbore(?) (Teh.)	*Salvia Hydrangea* DC.
Gul-i-bābūna (Ham.)	*Anthemis Wiedemanniana* F. & M.
Gul-i-banafshah (Teh.)	*Viola* sp.
Gul-i-būmādarān	*Achillea Santolina* L.
Gul-i-chaman (Teh.)	*Lolium rigidum* Gaud.
Gul-i-gāv-zabān (Teh.)	*Echium amoenum* Fisch. & Mey. and other spp.
Gul-i-gushus (Ham.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Gul-i-halvā (Isf.)	*Celosia argentea* L.
Gul-i-hamaz (Dymock)	*Rumex vesicarius* L. (p. 167)
Gul-i-ja'fari (Teh.)	*Tagetes erecta* L.
Gul-i-jaux	*Myristica fragrans* Houtt.
Gul-i-kadū (Teh., Ham.)	*Cucurbita Pepo* DC.
Gul-i-kajira (Ar.)	*Carthamus tinctorius* L.
Gul-i-kākanj	*Physalis Alkekengi* L.
Gul-i-kashus (Pers.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Gul-i-khatmi	*Althaea lavateraefolia* DC.
Gul-i-khatmi (Teh.)	*Althaea* sp.
Gul-i-khatmi (Ait.)	*Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Gul-i-livās (Ham., Teh.)	*Rheum Ribes* L.
Gul-i-nilūfar (Teh.)	*Nymphaea alba* L.
Gul-i-panirak (Teh.)	*Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Gul-i-parr (Isf.)	*Heracleum persicum* Desf.
Gul-i-pisteh (Bom.)	*Pistacia Khinjuk* Stocks.
Gul-i-pūnah (Isf.)	*Mentha sylvestris* L.
Gul-i-pūnah (Teh.)	*Hyssopus officinalis* L. var. *angustifolia* Boiss.
Gul-i-raman-zeba (Ait.)	*Rosa foetida* Herm.
Gul-i-rang (Teh.)	*Carthamus tinctorius* L.
Gul-i-sarnigūn (Teh.)	*Fritillaria imperialis* L.

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Gul-i-sarv (Teh.)	*Cupressus sempervirens* L.
Gul-i-serwaj (Pers.)	*Hymenocrater elegans* Br. (p. 168)
Gul-i-shirper (Pers.)	*Fritillaria imperialis* L.
Gul-i-sipar (Teh.)	*Heracleum persicum* Desf.
Gul-i-surkh (Teh.)	*Rosa damascena* Mill.
Gul-i-zard (Teh.)	*Rosa foetida* Herm.
Gul-jafari (Hind.)	*Tagetes erecta* L.
Gulkhand	See *Rosa damascena* Mill.
Gul naro-farsi (Schl.)	*Punica Granatum* L.
Gulnār-i-farsī (Teh.)	*Punica Granatum* L.
Gur (Leh).	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Gurfah (Teh.)	*Cinnamomum Cassia* Blume
Gusk (Kurd.)	*Juglans regia* L.
Habbat Halwah (Iraq)	*Peucedanum graveolens* Benth. & Hook.
Habb-dilmaluk (Ait.)	*Croton Tiglium* L.
Habb-el-khatai	*Croton Tiglium* L.
Habb-el-nil (Ham.)	*Ipomoea hederacea* Jacq.
Habb-el-salatin (Ham.)	*Croton Tiglium* L.
Habb-i-balsān (Inf.)	*Commiphora opobalsamum* Kunth
Habbu'l ghār (Inf.)	*Pistacia Khinjuk* Stocks.
Habbu'l-ma'lab (Teh.)	*Prunus Mahaleb* L.
Hab-el-ass (Ar.)	*Myrtus communis* L.
Hab-el-a'ra'r (Ind. bazaars)	*Juniperus excelsa* Bieb.
Hab-el-balasana (Ar.)	*Commiphora opobalsamum* Kunth
Hab-el-salim (Ar.)	*Hibiscus cannabinus* L.
Hab-es-souda (Ar., Egy., Iraq)	*Nigella sativa* Sibth.
Hab-safarjal	*Pyrus Cydonia* L.
Habul-khazra (Teh.)	*Pistacia Khinjuk* Stocks.
Hab-ul-mahaliba (Ar.)	*Prunus Mahaleb* L.
Hab-us-sudan (Ar.)	*Cassia Absus* L.
Hajarat el dib (Ar.)	*Withania somnifera* Dunal
Hajaru'l-yahūd (Pers.)	*Cidaris* sp.
Hajr-el-armeni (Ar.)	Armenian Earth
Halawi (Iraq)	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Haldi (Hind.)	*Curcuma domestica* Val. and *C. longa* Trim.
Halīlah-i-kābulī (Teh., Inf.)	*Terminalia Chebula* Retz.
Halīlah-i-siyāh (Teh., Inf.)	*Terminalia Chebula* Retz.
Halīlah-i-zard (Teh., Inf.)	*Terminalia Chebula* Retz.
Halim (Hind.)	*Lepidium sativum* L.
Haliyūn (Teh.)	*Asparagus officinalis* L.
Halu shgarh (Kurd.)	*Prunus domestica* L. var. *Juliana*
Hamam Komandji (Turk.)	*Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Hamīshah bahār (Teh., Iraq)	*Calendula officinalis* L.
Handhal (Kurd.)	*Citrullus Colocynthis* Schrad.
Hanzal (Ar.)	*Citrullus Colocynthis* Schrad.
Har (Hind.)	*Terminalia Chebula* Retz.
Hara (Hind.)	*Terminalia Chebula* Retz.
Harbār-kohi (Afg.)	*Juniperus excelsa* Bieb.
Haritaki (Beng.)	*Terminalia Chebula* Retz.
Haritala (Sans.)	Arsenic Trisulphide
Harmal (Ar., Iraq)	*Peganum Harmala* L.
Harmal rutbah (Ar., Iraq)	*Peganum Harmala* L.
Hartal (Hind.)	Arsenic Trisulphide
Hasach (Iraq)	*Tribulus terrestris* L.
Hasawi	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.

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Hastah-i-ālbālū (Teh.)	*Prunus Cerasus* L.
Hastah-i-nāranj (Teh.)	*Citrus sinensis* (L.) Osbeck
Hasta-i-zard ālū (Pers.)	*Prunus Armeniaca* L.
Havāh-i-chūbah (Teh.)	*Onosma echioides* L.
Hawuch (Turk.)	*Daucus Carota* L.
Hebbel asle (Schl.)	*Tamarix pentandra* Pall.
Hebbul-bemeh (Ar.)	*Pistacia Khinjuk* Stocks.
Helenion (Gr.)	*Inula Helenium* L.
Hermodactyl (Gr.)	*Colchicum luteum* Baker and *C. speciosum* Stev.
Hil (Ar.)	*Amomum subulatum* Roxb.
Hil (Iraq)	*Elettaria Cardamomum* Maton.
Hil-i-qurāb (Teh., Isf.)	*Amomum subulatum* Roxb.
Hinna (Iraq)	*Lawsonia alba* Lam.
Hinnāy-i-barg (Teh.)	*Lawsonia alba* Lam.
Hintah	*Triticum* sp.
Hintah Khushnah	*Triticum durum* Desf. (p. 182)
Hintah Qandahāri	*Triticum vulgare* Vill.
Hintah walwal	*Triticum* sp.
Hira dukhi (Hind.)	*Dracaena Cinnabari* Balf.
Hirda (Bom.)	*Terminalia Chebula* Retz.
Hishwarg (Bal.)	*Delphinium Zalil* Ait. & Hemsl.
Hsiang fu (Chin.)	*Cyperus rotundus* L.
Hulbah (Iraq)	*Trigonella Foenum-graecum* L.
Hurtāmān (Iraq)	*Lathyrus sativus* L.
Idhrah baidha (Ar.)	*Sorghum vulgare* Pers.
Ighir iggur (Ar.)	*Acorus Calamus* L.
Ignatia Amara	*Strychnos Ignatii* Berg.
Iklil (Teh.)	*Astragalus hamosus* L.
Iklil-ul-malik (Ar.)	*Astragalus hamosus* L.
Iklil-ul-mulk (Bom.)	*Astragalus hamosus* L.
Ilachi (Hind.)	*Elettaria Cardamomum* Maton.
Imm-harmal	*Punica Granatum* L.
'Inab (Iraq)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Inab-ath-thalab (Teh.)	*Solanum nigrum* L.
Inab-ed-dib (Ar.)	*Solanum nigrum* L.
Indrajaou (Hind.)	*Holarrhena antidysenterica* Wall.
Indrazana (Hind.)	*Citrullus Colocynthis* Schrad.
Intubus (Lat.)	*Cichorium Intybus* L.
Irisha (Ind. bazaars)	*Iris spuria* Pall.
Isbaghol (Bal.)	*Plantago ciliata* Desf. (p. 155)
Isband (Bom.)	*Corchorus olitorius* L.
Isfedaj (Ar.)	Plumbi Carbonas
Isghand (Bal.)	*Zataria multiflora* Boiss.
Ish-hony	*Gossypium peruvianum* (p. 123)
Ishkar (Ind. bazaars)	See *Cymbopogon Schoenanthus* Spreng.
Iskhir (Ar.)	*Cymbopogon Schoenanthus* Spreng.
Ispaghul (Pers.)	*Plantago ovata* Forsk.
Isparak (Teh.)	*Delphinium Zalil* Ait. & Hemsl.
Isparna (Yark.)	See Chahār-tukhmah
Isparzah (Teh.)	*Plantago ovata* Forsk.
Ispinākh (Iraq)	*Spinacia oleracea* L.
Issikuttuz (Turk.)	*Salvia Hydrangea* DC.
Izgun (Bal.)	*Zataria multiflora* Boiss.
Izkhir-i-jami (Ar.)	*Vetiveria zizanioides* Stapf (also p. 111)

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Ja (Chin.)	*Thea sinensis* L.
Jaʻad (Iraq)	*Teucrium Polium* L.
Jaephal (Hind.)	*Myristica fragrans* Houtt.
Jaʻfari (Iraq)	*Tagetes erecta* L.
Jamalgota (Punj.)	*Croton Tiglium* L.
Jangali-haladi (Hind.)	*Curcuma aromatica* Salisb.
Jāv (Sind)	*Hordeum vulgare* L.
Jāta-māsi (Sans., Hind.)	*Nardostachys Jatamansi* DC.
Jatt (Ar.)	*Medicago sativa* L.
Jau (Iraq)	*Hordeum vulgare* L.
Jauz-i-būyā (Teh., Ar.)	*Myristica fragrans* Houtt.
Jav (Hind.)	*Hordeum vulgare* L.
Jawz-i-rumi (Afg.)	*Juglans regia* L.
Jayanti (Beng.)	*Sesbania aculeata* Poir.
Jazar (Iraq)	*Daucus Carota* L.
Jazr-ul-bostani (Ar.)	*Daucus Carota* L.
Jequirity (Tupi, Brasil)	*Abrus precatorius* L.
Jift (Teh.)	*Pistacia integerrima* Stew.
Jiljil (Iraq)	*Hibiscus cannabinus* L.
Jinjili (Hind.)	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Jira (Beng., Bom.)	*Cuminum Cyminum* L.
Jira-shak (N.E.Pers.)	*Carum Bulbocastanum* Koch
Jōshan Shīrāzī (Teh.)	*Thymus Serpyllum* L. var. *Kotschyanus* Boiss.
Jouj macel (Ar.)	*Datura Stramonium* L.
Jowar (Hind.)	*Sorghum vulgare* Pers.
Jūyi safīd (Iraq)	*Hordeum vulgare* L.
Jūyi siyāh (Iraq)	*Hordeum vulgare* L.
Joz (Turk.)	*Juglans regia* L.
Ju (Kurd.)	*Hordeum vulgare* L.
Juft (Teh.)	*Pistacia integerrima* Stew.
Juntiyana (Duk.)	*Gentiana lutea* L.
Jupha (Hind.)	*Hyssopus officinalis* L. var. *angustifolia* Boiss.
Jūtiyānā (Isf.)	*Gentiana lutea* L.
Kabābah-i-chīnī (Teh., Isf.)	*Piper Cubeba* L.
Kababah-i-dahan kushadeh (Pers.)	*Zanthoxylum Rhetsa* DC.
Kabab-chini (Hind.)	*Piper Cubeba* L.
Kabar (Pers., Iraq)	*Capparis spinosa* L.
Kabiste talkh (Pers.)	*Citrullus Colocynthis* Schrad.
Kachola (Pers.)	See *Datura Stramonium* L.
Kachura (Hind.)	*Curcuma Zedoaria* Roxb. and *C. Zerumbet* Roxb.
Kadu (Hind.)	*Cucurbita Pepo* DC.
Kaf-i-daryā (Ar.)	*Sepia officinalis* L.
Kāfshah (Teh., Ham.)	*Carthamus tinctorius* L.
Kahkuti (Bal.)	*Ziziphora tenuior* L.
Kahu-khaskabija (Hind.)	*Lactuca sativa* L.
Kaik-vāsh (Isf.)	*Crataegus orientalis* Bieb.
Kakanj (Isf., Teh.)	*Physalis Alkekengi* L.
Kākil-i-zard (Teh.)	*Nannorrhops Ritchieana* Wendl.
Kākūti (Teh.)	*Ziziphora tenuior* L.
Kaladanah (Hind.)	*Ipomoea hederacea* Jacq.
Kala Drakh (Ind.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Kala jira (Hind.)	*Nigella sativa* Sibth.
Kalamb-ki-jar (Hind.)	*Jateorhiza Columba* Miers
Kala-zirah (Afg.)	*Carum Bulbocastanum* Koch

Kalpah (Bom.)	*Cinnamomum Cassia* Blume
Kalpora (Bal.)	*Teucrium Stocksianum* Boiss. (p. 178)
Kamal (Ind.)	*Nymphaea* sp. (p. 144)
Kamela (Hind., Bom.)	*Mallotus philippinensis* Muell. Arg.
Kam-parah (Punj., Yark.)	See Chahār-tukhmah
Kandal (Afg.)	*Dorema Ammoniacum* Don
Kangar (Isf., Teh.)	*Cynara Scolymus* L.
Kangar-i-dahri (Isf., Teh.)	*Cynara Scolymus* L.
Kanim (Kurd.)	*Triticum vulgare* Vill.
Kanocha (Isf.)	*Salvia macrosiphon* Boiss.
Kansburaj (Ind. bazaars)	*Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L.
Kapila (Mad.)	*Mallotus philippinensis* Muell. Arg.
Karafs (Iraq)	*Apium graveolens* L.
Karanaphal (Ar.)	*Eugenia aromatica* Baill.
Karasza (Hind.)	*Prunus Cerasus* L.
Karawyah (Iraq)	See *Peucedanum graveolens* Benth. & Hook.
Karaz (Ar.)	*Prunus Cerasus* L.
Karbasu (Achundow)	See *Roccella Montagnei* Bél.
Karchak (Ham.)	*Ricinus communis* L.
Karedemonah (Ham.)	*Conium maculatum* L.
Karezgi (Bal.)	*Solanum nigrum* L.
Karkooti	Egyptian Earth, Sigillated Earth
Karkum (Pers.)	*Crocus sativus* L.
Karkum (Teh.)	*Curcuma domestica* Val. and *C. longa* Trim.
Karni Yarikh (Tab.)	*Plantago* sp.
Kār shūtur (Pers.)	*Alhagi camelorum* Fisch.
Karūt (Afg.)	*Bos indicus*
Karvaya-i-dashti (Pers.)	*Conium maculatum* L.
Kashburat (Teh.)	*Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L.
Kashburat-el-bir (Pers.)	*Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L.
Kashi (Hind., Bom., Beng.)	*Cichorium Intybus* L.
Kashi (Leh)	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Kashir (Bal.)	*Erysimum repandum* L.
Kashk Kashk (Kurd.)	*Bos indicus*
Kashus (Pers.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Kashūth (Ar.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Kasis (Pers.)	*Lepidium Iberis* L. (p. 171)
Kassutha (Gr.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Katan (Ait., Afg.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Katek bah(?) (Teh.)	*Pyrethrum* sp.(?)
Kathirā (Teh.)	*Astragalus gummifer* Labill.
Kāt-i-gulābī (Teh.)	*Uncaria Gambier* Roxb.
Katira gond (Hind.)	*Astragalus gummifer* Labill.
Kat karanj (Hind.)	*Caesalpinia Bonducella* Roxb.
Katun (Ait., Afg.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Kavl-a-kūknār (Pers., Afg.)	*Papaver somniferum* L.
Kawich (Isf.)	*Crataegus orientalis* Bieb.
Keruwiah (Isf.)	*Chaerophyllum* sp.
Kesa	*Quercus* sp.
Kesar (Kash.)	*Crocus sativus* L.
Kesara (Hind.)	*Crocus sativus* L.
Kesari (Hind.)	*Lathyrus sativus* L.
Keshus (Pers.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Khabazi (Ar.)	*Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Khadrawi (Iraq)	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Khakschi (Schl.)	*Erysimum repandum* L.

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Khāk-i-mugl (Teh.)	*Commiphora Molmol* Engl.
Khākshīr (Teh.)	*Sisymbrium Sophia* L. (also p. 118)
Khākshīr-i-shīrīn (Teh.)	*Sisymbrium Sophia* L.
Khakshir-talkh (Isf.)	*Erysimum repandum* L.
Khaksi (Hind.)	*Sisymbrium Sophia* L.
Khalal	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Khalal-i-nāranj (Teh.)	*Citrus sinensis* (L.) Osbeck
Khand (Leh)	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Kharbus (Ind. bazaars)	See *Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.
Kharbūzah-rūbāh (Pers.)	*Citrullus Colocynthis* Schrad.
Khardal	*Brassica nigra* (L.) Koch
Khardal-i-shahrī (Teh., Ham.)	*Salvia* sp.
Khar-danick (Bal.)	*Plantago ovata* Forsk.
Khār-khasak (Teh.)	*Tribulus terrestris* L.
Khar mahra (Pers.)	*Cypraea moneta* L.
Kharnūbān (Isf.)	*Prosopis Stephaniana* Kunth
Khar-shnai (Kash.)	*Pistacia integerrima* Stew.
Khas Khas (Hind.)	*Vetiveria zizanioides* Stapf
Khasib	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Khatmi	See *Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Khatmolt (Bal.)	See Mummy
Khavi (Hind.)	*Cymbopogon Schoenanthus* Spreng.
Khaza-i-iblīs	*Caesalpinia Bonducella* Roxb.
Khib-base (Schl.)	*Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Khili-wili (Tab.)	*Lepidium Draba* L.
Khira (Punj.)	*Cucumis sativus* L.
Khitmi	See *Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Khitmi-i-kuchak (Pers.)	*Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Khorassain-ajwan (Ind. bazaars)	*Conium maculatum* L.
Khove (Afg.)	*Nannorrhops Ritchieana* Wendl.
Khū (Afg.)	*Nannorrhops Ritchieana* Wendl.
Khubah (Ar.)	*Erysimum repandum* L.
Khūbani (Hind.)	*Prunus Armeniaca* L.
Khub-kalan (Hind.)	*Sisymbrium Sophia* L.
Khūlanjān (Teh.)	*Languas officinarum* Burkill
Khūn-i-siyāvash (Isf.)	*Dracaena Cinnabari* Balf.
Khurmā	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Khushak (Ham.)	*Asparagus adscendens* Roxb.
Khushk-horāk (Afg.)	*Bos indicus*
Kinguere (Schl.)	*Cynara Scolymus* L.
Kira (Hind.)	*Cucumis sativus* L.
Kirmani (Isf.)	*Carum Bulbocastanum* Koch
Kisa	*Quercus* sp.
Kishah-i-kasni (Ham., Teh.)	*Cichorium Intybus* L.
Kisher Kundur	*Boswellia Carterii* Bird.
Kish-kash (Ar.)	*Papaver somniferum* L.
Kishmish (Pers.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Kishmish-askari (Bagh.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Kishmish-i-dūgh (Bagh.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Kishmish-i-kūlī (Teh.)	*Loranthus Grewinkii* Boiss. & Bunge
Kishmish-i-sabzah (Bagh.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Kishmish-kawali (Ind. bazaars)	*Loranthus Grewinkii* Boiss. & Bunge
Kisht bar Kisht (Pers.)	*Helicteres Isora* L.
Kodu (Ind. bazaars)	See *Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.

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Kohi bang (Bal.)	*Hyoscyamus reticulatus* L.
Kohl Farsi (Pers.)	*Astragalus fasciculaefolius* Boiss.
Kohl Kirmani	*Astragalus fasciculaefolius* Boiss.
Kondochi (Schl.)	*Veratrum album* L.
Koriyan (Gr.)	*Coriandrum sativum* L.
Kornub (Isf.)	*Prosopis Stephaniana* Kunth
Kora-i-kamar (Ait.)	*Entada gigas* (L.) Fawc. & Rendle
Koshataki (Sans.)	*Luffa acutangula* Roxb.
Krafas-al-bir (Iraq)	*Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L.
Kriwarik (Turk.)	Agaric
Krüt (Afg.)	*Bos indicus*
Kuchila (Hind.)	*Strychnos Nux Vomica* L.
Kuchülah (Teh.)	*Strychnos Nux Vomica* L.
Kübän-i-shutur (Teh.)	*Camelus dromedarius* L.
Kuhl (Pers.)	Antimonium Sulphidum
Kukil-i-pol (Kash.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Kulambû (Teh.)	*Jateorhiza Columba* Miers
Kumbut (Syr.)	*Prosopis Stephaniana* Kunth
Kundij (Turk.)	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Kundur (Achundow)	*Gypsophila paniculata* L.
Kundur (Teh.)	*Boswellia Carterii* Bird.
Kundura unsa and zakara	*Boswellia Carterii* Bird.
Kundusch (Achundow)	*Gypsophila paniculata* L.
Kundush (Ham., Teh.)	*Veratrum album* L.
Kunjad (Bom.)	*Astragalus fasciculaefolius* Boiss.
Kunjad (Kurd.)	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Kunjada (Ait.)	*Astragalus fasciculaefolius* Boiss.
Kunjidah-i-surkh u safid (Teh.)	*Astragalus fasciculaefolius* Boiss.
Kurdumana (Hind.)	*Conium maculatum* L.
Kurk amla (Turk.)	*Phyllanthus Emblica* L.
Kurwa (Ar., Iraq)	*Ricinus communis* L.
Kusum (Hind.)	*Carthamus tinctorius* L.
Kusa misri (Leh)	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Kust (Ham.)	*Saussurea Lappa* C. B. Clarke
Kutha Kushta patchuk (Hind.)	*Saussurea Lappa* C. B. Clarke
Kuzbara (Ar., Iraq)	*Coriandrum sativum* L.
Lachyat-as-sheikh	See *Lecanora esculenta* Eversm.
Lakh (Bom.)	*Lathyrus sativus* L.
Läla (Afg.)	*Tulipa montana* Lindl.
Lal-chandan (Hind.)	*Pterocarpus santalinus* L.
Lal mirch (Hind.)	*Capsicum frutescens* L.
Lang (Guz.)	*Lathyrus sativus* L.
Lapis jadaicus (Ph. Pers.)	*Cidaris* sp.
Lär (Kash.)	*Cucumis sativus* L.
Lâsurkh (Teh., Isf.)	Cupri oxidum
Laung (Hind.)	*Eugenia aromatica* Baill.
Leeka (Iraq)	*Rhodymenia* sp.
Lehsan (Hind.)	*Allium sativum* L.
Lek-poshte (Schl.)	*Testudo horsfieldii* Grey and *T. graeca*
Lesan ul Lamal (Ar.)	*Plantago ovata* Forsk.
Liane vermifuge (Fr.)	*Quisqualis indica* L.
Lihayat as-shäyib (Bagh.)	*Roccella Montagnei* Bél.
Lihayat as-shäyib (Iraq)	*Cladophora* sp. (p. 165)
Lihur	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Limmon Basra (raq)	*Citrus aurantifolia* (Christm.) Swingle

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Limon (Iraq)	*Citrus aurantifolia* (Christm.) Swingle
Limon-amman (Iraq)	*Citrus aurantifolia* (Christm.) Swingle
Livās (Pers., Ar.)	*Rheum Ribes* L.
Lisan ul usafir (Achundow)	*Holarrhena antidysenterica* Wall.
Lubia (Iraq)	*Vigna Catjang* Walp.
Lubia (Teh.)	*Phaseolus vulgaris* L.
Lubia-kermiz (Teh.)	*Phaseolus vulgaris* L.
Lūbiyā-gul (Teh.)	*Dolichos Lablab* L.
Lukah (Kurd.)	*Gossypium* sp. (p. 123)
Lyka (Iraq)	*Rhodymenia* sp.
Mah-ul-dan (Ar.)	*Melia Azederach* L.
Maghdunes (Iraq)	*Carum Petroselinum* Benth. & Hook.
Maglah	*Matricaria* sp.
Mahizahraj (Ar.)	*Verbascum Thapsus* L.
Māhris (Kash.)	See *Lecanora esculenta* Eversm.
Maiphala (Hind.)	*Quercus infectoria* Olivier
Majandri (Bal.)	*Sesbania aculeata* Poir.
Mak (Bal.),	*Vigna Catjang* Walp.
Māmīrān (Teh.)	*Coptis Teeta* Wall.
Māmiz (Teh.)	*Capra* sp.
Māmiz-i-kiri (Teh.)	*Capra* sp.
Manjit (Hind.)	*Rubia Cordifolia* L. and *R. tinctorium*
Mānsaril (Kash.)	*Polygonum amplexicaule* Don (p. 156)
Mārchūbah (Ham.)	*Asparagus adscendens* Roxb.
Mardan gusht	*Stachys lavandulaefolia* Vahl
Marg-i-māhī (Teh.)	*Anamirta paniculata* Colebr.
Marjanjūsh (Achundow)	*Origanum Majorana* L. (p. 174)
Māranūt (Ait.)	*Boucerosia Aucheri*(?) (p. 135)
Marorphali (Hind.)	*Helicteres Isora* L.
Marv (Isf.)	*Salvia macrosiphon* Boiss.
Marva (Yark.)	See Chahār-tukhmah
Maryam nukhūdi (Teh.)	*Teucrium Polium* L.
Marzanjūsh (Tab.)	*Stachys lavandulaefolia* Vahl
Marzangūsh (Teh.)	*Zataria multiflora* Boiss.
Māsh (Iraq, Pers.)	*Phaseolus radiatus* L.
Masha (Sans.)	*Phaseolus radiatus* L.
Mashana churro (Bal.)	Mummy
Mash-i-maha (Afg.)	*Phaseolus radiatus* L.
Masūr (Hind.)	*Lens esculenta* Moench
Maur (Bal.)	*Salvia aegyptica* L. (p. 163)
Māyah-i-barrah (Isf.)	*Ovis* sp.
Māzaryūn (Teh.)	*Verbascum Thapsus* L.
Māzū (Isf.)	*Quercus infectoria* Olivier
Meriam Nekhodi (Teh.)	*Teucrium scordioides* Schreb. (p. 177)
Mētahk (Iraq)	*Juglans regia* L.
Methi (Hind., Bom.)	*Trigonella Foenum-graecum* L.
Mishi	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Mishk-i-taramashia (Ind. bazaars)	*Ziziphora tenuior* L.
Mishmish (Iraq)	*Prunus Armeniaca* L.
Misri (Egy.)	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Mīvah-i-zabān-i-gunjishk (Pers.)	*Holarrhena antidysenterica* Wall.
Moghl-azregh (Schl.)	*Commiphora Mukul* Engl.
Moma (Hind.)	*Hymenoptera, Apoidea*

Moohar-khas (Ind. bazaars)	*Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L.
Motha (Hind.)	*Cyperus rotundus* L.
Muchchah (Isf.)	*Lepidium Draba* L.
Mughat (Egy.)	*Glossostemon Bruguieri* Desf.
Mugrila (Hind.)	*Nigella sativa* Sibth.
Mukhlisah	*Matricaria* sp.
Mukul, See muql	
Mula (Hind.)	*Raphanus sativus* L.
Mulukhiyah (Iraq)	*Corchorus olitorius* L.
Mūm (Teh.)	*Hymenoptera, Apoidea*
Mūm-i-kāfūri	*Hymenoptera, Apoidea*
Mūmiyā (Pers.)	Mummy
Mūmiyāī (Pers.)	Mummy
Munakka (Pers.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Mur-e-makki (Teh.)	*Commiphora Molmol* Engl.
Muql (Ar.)	See *Commiphora Mukul* Engl.
Muql-i-abair (Teh.)	*Commiphora Mukul* Engl.
Muql-i-azrāq (Teh.)	*Commiphora Mukul* Engl.
Muql-i-yahud (Teh.)	*Commiphora Mukul* Engl.
Mur (Hind., Bom.)	*Commiphora Molmol* Engl.
Murda sang (Teh.)	Plumbi Oxidum
Murdā sang-i-nugra'ī (Teh.)	Plumbi Oxidum
Murdā sang-i-tilā'ī (Teh.)	Plumbi Oxidum
Murd-i-sabz	*Myrtus communis* L.
Muro (Hind.)	*Raphanus sativus* L.
Musabbar (Ar.)	*Aloe Perryi* Baker
Muschk-i-zemin	*Cyperus rotundus* L.
Myrrha mechensis (Ph. Pers.)	*Commiphora Molmol* Engl.

Nafal (Iraq)	*Trifolium repens* L.
Nafil (Iraq)	*Trifolium repens* L.
Nakhl	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Nakhūd (Teh., Punj., Turk.)	*Cicer arietinum* L.
Namak (Teh.)	Sodium carbonate
Naphae flores (Schl.)	*Citrus sinensis* (L.) Osbeck
Nar (Turk.)	*Punica Granatum* L.
Nasābidah-i-kirmani (Teh.)	*Indigofera tinctoria* L.
Nashwar (Pers.)	*Nicotiana* sp.
Nenuphar (Ph. Pers.)	*Nymphaea alba* L.
Nil (Hind.)	*Indigofera tinctoria* L.
Nil-kanthe (Punj.)	*Chrozophora verbascifolia* Juss.
Nīlūfar	See *Nymphaea alba* L.
Nīlūfar-i-kirmānshāhī (Teh.)	*Nymphaea alba* L.
Nishāstah (Teh.)	*Triticum vulgare* Vill.
Nisik (Kurd. in Iraq)	*Lens esculenta* Moench
Nok (Kurd.)	*Cicer arietinum* L.
Normuah (Ham.)	*Ochrocarpus longifolius* Benth. & Hook.
Nukhūd-i-alvand (Teh., Isf.)	*Aristolochia rotunda* L.
Nukhund-i-alavandī (Ar.)	*Aristolochia rotunda* L.
Numi Basra	*Citrus aurantifolia* (Christm.) Swingle
Nūr-mūs (Ham.)	*Ochrocarpus longifolius* Benth. & Hook.

Omum (Tam.)	*Carum copticum* Benth. & Hook.
Orisa (Afg.)	*Iris spuria* Pall.
Osteocolla (Lat.)	Mummy
Osthoukhodonce (Schl.)	*Lavandula dentata* L.

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Pachman-i-pah (Teh.)	*Helicteres Isora* L.
Pādzahr (Pers.)	*Capra aegagrus* Gmel.
Paglah (Kurd.)	*Vicia Faba* L.
Paiwand-e-maryam (Pers.)	*Prunus Mahaleb* L.
Pāla-mangy (Kash.)	See *Lecanora esculenta* Eversm.
Palas Keby (Hind.)	*Butea frondosa* Roxb.
Palaspapado (Duk.)	*Butea frondosa* Roxb.
Palsan (Hind.)	*Hibiscus cannabinus* L.
Pambu (Kurd.)	*Gossypium* sp. (p. 123)
Pambuq (Turk.)	*Gossypium* sp. (p. 123)
Panirak	See *Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Panir māyeh	*Ovis* sp.
Papal (Pers.)	*Areca Catechu* L.
Papita (Ar., Hind., Bom.)	*Strychnos Ignatii* Berg.
Pāptiyāl (Teh.)	*Strychnos Ignatii* Berg.
Parakah-i-hindī (Teh.)	*Butea frondosa* Roxb.
Parr-i-siyāvash	*Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L.
Pat (Beng.)	*Bombyx fortunatus* Hutton
Patchak (Beng.)	*Saussurea Lappa* C. B. Clarke
Pathar-ka-ber (Hind.)	*Cidaris* sp.
Pating (Afg.)	*Prunus Armeniaca* L.
Pechak (Hind.)	*Helicteres Isora* L.
Peganon (Scripture)	*Ruta graveolens* L.
Penirak (Schl.)	*Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Phataki (Hind.)	Alum
Phitkari (Hind.)	Alum
Piaz (Kurd.)	*Allium Cepa* L.
Pīlah abrīsham (Teh.)	*Bombyx fortunatus* Hutton
Pīleh	*Bombyx fortunatus* Hutton
Pil gush	*Inula Helenium* L.
Pinang (Mal.)	*Areca Catechu* L.
Pirinj (Turk.)	*Oryza sativa* L.
Pistah (Teh.)	*Pistacia vera* L.
Pitar saleri (Hind.)	*Carum Petroselinum* Benth. & Hook.
Pōst-e-kūknār (Pers., Afg.)	*Papaver somniferum* L.
Post-i-limon (Afg.)	*Citrus aurantifolia* (Christm.) Swingle
Post-i-nāranj	*Citrus sinensis* (L.) Osbeck
Prabala (Sans.)	*Corallium rubrum* Lam.
Psylli semina (Ph. Pers.)	*Plantago ovata* Forsk.
Podina (Hind., Pers.)	*Mentha sylvestris* L.
Pūnah (Teh.)	*Mentha sylvestris* L.
Pune (Teh.)	*Quercus Vallonea* Kotschy
Punir-mayeh-shutur (Pers.)	*Camelus dromedarius* L.
Punjāh-i-salaba	*Orchis latifolia* L.
Pūst-i-kinah-kinah (Teh.)	*Cinchona Calisaya* Wedd.
Pust-i-pistah (Teh.)	*Pistacia vera* L.
Pust-i-utruj (Teh.)	*Citrus sinensis* (L.) Osbeck
Qalyāb (Teh.)	Sodium Carbonate
Qamr-ad-din	*Prunus Armeniaca* L.
Qanaqinah (Iraq)	*Cinchona Calisaya* Wedd.
Qantaryūn (Teh.)	*Equisetum ramosissimum* Desf.
Qarah Koz (Turk.)	*Calendula officinalis* L.
Qaranful (Iraq)	*Eugenia aromatica* Baill.
Qaranful-aswad (Iraq)	*Eugenia aromatica* Baill.
Qārch (Teh.)	Agaric

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Qar-i-qurūt (Teh.)	*Bos indicus*
Qarpuz (Turk.)	*Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.
Qatera (Hind.)	*Astragalus gummifer* Labill.
Qatt (Ar.)	*Medicago sativa* L.
Qodumah (Ar.)	*Alyssum campestre* L.
Qunah baqan (Turk.)	*Helianthus annuus* L.
Qunbalīlah (Teh.)	*Mallotus philippinensis* Muell. Arg.
Qunnab	*Hibiscus cannabinus* L. (p. 125)
Qurdumānā (Teh.)	*Chaerophyllum* sp.
Qurs-i-kamar (Teh.)	*Entada gigas* (L.) Fawc. & Rendle
Qurtum (Ar.)	*Carthamus tinctorius* L.
Qurunbād (Teh.)	*Curcuma aromatica* Salisb.
Qurūt (Teh.)	*Bos indicus*
Qust-i-talkh (Teh.)	*Saussurea Lappa* C. B. Clarke
Qutn (Ar.)	*Gossypium* sp.
Qutn Amerikani	*Gossypium hirsutum* L. (p. 122)
Qutn Iraqi	*Gossypium herbaceum* L. (p. 122)
Qutn Misri	*Gossypium* sp. (p. 123)
Rad. Junci odorati (Ph. Pers.)	*Cyperus rotundus* L.
Rahishi (Ar.)	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Raihan (Ar.)	*Ocimum Basilicum* L.
Raihan (Yark.)	See Chahār-tukhmah
Raiz de China (Port.)	*Smilax China* L. and *S. glabra* Roxb.
Rajajira (Bom.)	*Corchorus olitorius* L.
Rakta Chandana (Sans.)	*Pterocarpus santalinus* L.
Rangan-ki-bel (Hind.)	*Quisqualis indica* L.
Rángh (Ar., Hind.)	*Lawsonia alba* Lam.
Rang-i-kirmānī (Teh.)	*Indigofera tinctoria* L.
Rang-i-sabīdah (Teh.)	*Indigofera tinctoria* L.
Rang-i-vasmah (Teh.)	*Indigofera tinctoria* L.
Rang-mehndi (Hind.)	*Lawsonia alba* Lam.
Ranj-i-badshah	*Onosma* sp.
Rasan	*Inula Helenium* L.
Rashi (Bagh.)	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Ra's-i-hindī (Teh.)	*Inula Helenium* L.
Rasin (Hind.)	*Sesbania aculeata* Poir.
Rasna (Hind.)	*Inula Helenium* L.
Ratanjali (Guz.)	*Pterocarpus santalinus* L.
Ratanjot (Hind.)	*Onosma echioides* L.
Rati (Hind.)	*Abrus precatorius* L.
Rātiyanah (Teh.)	*Pterocarpus santalinus* L.
Razmah (Kash.)	*Phaseolus vulgaris* L.
Resha-i-kishvar (Ham., Isf., Teh.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Resham	*Bombyx fortunatus* Hutton
Resham-ki-keri (Duk.)	*Bombyx fortunatus* Hutton
Reyhane Kouhi (Schl.)	*Ocimum canum* Sims
Risha Baba Adam (Schl.)	*Arctium Lappa* L.
Rīshah havah-i-chūbah (Ham.)	*Onosma echioides* L.
Rīshah-i-anār (Teh.)	*Punica Granatum* L.
Rīshah-i-anjabār (Teh.)	*Polygonum Bistorta* L.
Rīshah-i-arīsa (Teh.)	*Iris spuria* Pall.
Rīshah-i-asl-i-sūs (Teh.)	*Glycyrrhiza glabra* L.
Rīshah-i-bābā-Adam (Teh.)	*Arctium Lappa* L.
Rīshah-i-kabar (Teh.)	*Capparis spinosa* L.
Rīshah-i-kalafs (Teh.)	*Ferula Sumbul* Hook. f.

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Rishah-i-khatmi (Ham.)	*Althaea lavateraefolia* DC.
Rishah-i-rāziyānah (Teh.)	*Foeniculum vulgare* Mill.
Rishah-shāh-tūt (Teh.)	*Morus nigra* L.
Rishah tamesh (Teh.)	*Plumbago rosea* L.
Rish-char (Teh.)	*Ferula galbaniflua* Boiss.
Rivand-i-chini (Isf., Teh.)	*Rheum palmatum* L.
Riwas (Punj.)	*Rheum Ribes* L.
Roghan-i-khash khāsh	*Papaver somniferum* L.
Roghan-i-sagher (Ait., Afg.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Rojia (Port.)	*Tagetes erecta* L.
Rounace (Schl.)	*Rubia Cordifolia* L. and *R. tinctorium* L.
Rubb-i-sūs	*Glycyrrhiza glabra* L.
Rughan-i-char-i-cherak	See *Tribulus terrestris* L.
Ruhan (Kurd.)	*Ocimum Basilicum* L.
Rūnās (Teh., Isf.)	*Rubia Cordifolia* L. and *R. tinctorium* L.
Rūniyās (Teh., Isf.)	*Rubia Cordifolia* L. and *R. tinctorium* L.
Rutab	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Ruzz (Ar.)	*Oryza sativa* L.
Sa'ad (Iraq)	*Cyperus rotundus* L.
Sa'atar (Ind. bazaars)	*Zataria multiflora* Boiss.
Sabr-i-zard (Teh.)	*Aloe Perryi* Baker
Sadaf (Ar.)	*Cypraea moneta* L.
Sādhaj-i-hindi (Isf.)	*Cinnamomum Cassia* Blume
Safid āb-i-shaikh (Teh.)	Plumbi Carbonas
Sag-anjar	*Solanum Dulcamara* L. (p. 172)
Sagez (Staff.)	*Pistacia Terebinthus* L.
Sagiz-i-safid (Teh.)	*Pistacia Terebinthus* L.
Sag Palak (Hind.)	*Spinacia oleracea* L.
Sa'ir	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Saisaban (Egy.)	*Sesbania aculeata* Poir.
Sajji mati	Sodium Carbonate
Saka-binaja (Ar.)	*Ferula persica* Willd.
Sakbinaj (Teh.)	*Ferula persica* Willd.
Sakulali (Teh.)	*Commiphora Mukul* Engl.
Sa'lab (Teh.)	*Orchis latifolia* L.
Salab-misri (Ar.)	*Orchis latifolia* L.
Samagh Hamama (Hind.)	*Dorema Ammoniacum* Don
Samgh Arabi (Ar., Pers.)	*Acacia Senegal* Willd.
Samgh-i-arzhan (Teh.)	*Acacia Senegal* Willd.
Samgh nadh (Punj.)	*Nummulites* sp.
Samudraphena (Sans.)	*Sepia officinalis* L.
Sanā (Teh.)	*Cassia acutifolia* Delile
Sana-hindi (Ar.)	*Cassia acutifolia* Delile
Sana-mukhi (Iraq)	*Cassia acutifolia* Delile
Sandal-i-safid (Teh.)	*Santalum album* L.
Sandal-i-surkh (Teh.)	*Pterocarpus santalinus* L.
Sandalūs (Ind. bazaars)	*Trachylobium Hornemannianum* Hayne
Sang-i-marjan (Hind.)	*Corallium rubrum* Lam.
Sang-i-sar-i-māhī (Ind.)	*Percomorphi, Sciaendae*
Sang-i-shadnaj (Afg.)	*Nummulites* sp.
Sang-i-yahuda (Pers.)	*Cidaris* sp.
Sanjirahut (Sans.)	Calcium Sulphate
Sansaq (Ar.)	*Stachys lavandulaefolia* Vahl
Saosafid (Ait.)	*Gypsophila paniculata* L.
Sapistan (Pers.)	*Cordia Myxa* L.

Sarcocolla (Gr.)	*Astragalus fasciculaefolius* Boiss.
Sarish	*Eremurus Aucherianus* Boiss.
Sarsand (Bal.)	*Salvia Hydrangea* DC.
Sarsun (Hind.)	*Brassica campestris* L. var. *Napus* Bab.
Sarwali (Hind.)	*Celosia argentea* L.
Satanj (Punj.)	*Nummulites* sp.
Satari (Hind.)	*Ruta graveolens* L.
Satarmul (Hind.)	*Asparagus adscendens* Roxb.
Satavar (Hind.)	*Asparagus adscendens* Roxb.
Sawa (Hind.)	*Peucedanum graveolens* Benth. & Hook. (p. 148)
Sebestan (Pers.)	*Cordia Myxa* L.
Sestere (Schl.)	*Thymus Serpyllum* L. var. *Kotschyanus* Boiss.
Seid (Sud.)	*Cyperus rotundus* L.
Sek binedge (Schl.)	*Ferula persica* Willd.
Sekran (Syr.)	*Withania Somnifera* Dunal
Semen Bardanae (English Herbal 1730)	*Arctium Lappa* L.
Semen Basilici (Old Herbals)	*Ocimum Basilicum* L.
Sem. Cichorii (Ph. Pers.)	*Cichorium Intybus* L.
Sepistān (Teh.)	*Cordia Myxa* L.
Sesbaniyah (Iraq)	*Sesbania aculeata* Poir.
Seta Kundura (Hind.)	*Boswellia Carterii* Bird.
Shabbit (Ar.)	*Peucedanum graveolens* Benth. & Hook. (p. 148)
Shāf-i-mamītā (Teh.)	Clyster
Shaftal (Punj., Bal.)	*Trifolium repens* L.
Shagāgi (Teh.)	*Trachydium Lehmanni* Benth.
Shāhdānej-i-ʿadasī (Teh.)	*Nummulites* sp.
Shahdeve (Hind.)	*Chrozophora verbascifolia* Juss.
Shahi (Leh)	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Shalna (Bal.)	*Pistacia vera* L.
Shahtarrah (Pers.)	*Fumaria parviflora* Lam.
Shāh-tūt (Pers.)	*Morus nigra* L.
Sha'ir	*Hordeum* sp.
Sha'ir Abū Sikkatain (Ar.)	*Hordeum* sp.
Sha'ir Abū Sūwaif (Ar.)	*Hordeum* sp.
Sha'irah	*Hordeum* sp.
Sha'ir Sparqalān (Ar.)	*Hordeum* sp.
Shakakula micari (Hind.)	*Asparagus adscendens* Roxb.
Shakar (Pers.)	*Saccharum officinarum* L.
Shakar-i-surkh (Teh.)	*Saccharum officinarum* L.
Shakar tīqāl (Teh.)	*Echinops persicus* Stev.
Shākhah-i-marjān (Teh.)	*Corallium rubrum* Lam.
Shakr-ul-ashar (Pers.)	*Cotoneaster nummularia* Fisch. & Mey.
Shambalīlah (Teh.)	*Trigonella Foenum-graecum* L.
Shami (Iraq)	*Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.
Shams-wa-qamar (Iraq)	*Helianthus annuus* L.
Shar-al-anat (Iraq)	*Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L.
Shātarrah (Teh., Isf.)	*Fumaria parviflora* Lam.
Sha'ur	*Hordeum* sp.
Sheb (Bagh., Iraq)	Alum
Shekakul (Teh.)	*Trachydium Lehmanni* Benth.
Shijar (Iraq)	*Cucurbita Pepo* DC.
Shilib (Turk.)	*Oryza sativa* L.
Shinah Azqhi (Bal.)	*Datura Stramonium* L.
Shingir gaz	*Tamarix pentandra* Pall.
Shiriss	*Eremurus Aucherianus* Boiss.

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Shir Kalan (Teh.)........................	*Acanthophyllum squarrosum* Boiss.
Shir Khisht (Teh.)........................	*Cotoneaster nummularia* Fisch. & Mey.
Shir-milk (Pers.)........................	*Cotoneaster nummularia* Fisch. & Mey.
Shir-sād (Teh.)........................	*Lecanora esculenta* Eversm.
Shitaraj (Teh.)........................	*Plumbago rosea* L.
Shivit (Isf.)........................	*Peucedanum graveolens* Benth. & Hook.
Shok (Ar.)........................	*Prosopis Stephaniana* Kunth
Shorah (Hind.)........................	Potassium Nitrate
Shudnuj udese (Ar.)........................	*Nummulites* sp.
Shūrah-i-qalam (Teh.)........................	Potassium Nitrate
Shuwairib........................	*Hordeum* sp.
Shuwandar sukari (Iraq)........................	*Beta vulgaris* L.
Siah gaz........................	*Tamarix articulata* Vahl (p. 176)
Sibar (Ar.)........................	*Aloe Perryi* Baker
Silsigah (Iraq)........................	*Beta vulgaris* L.
Silaijah (Iraq)........................	*Beta vulgaris* L.
Silajatu (Sans.)........................	Mummy
Silajit (Hind.)........................	Mummy
Siliq (Turk.)........................	*Beta vulgaris* L.
Sim (Hind.)........................	*Dolichos Lablab* L.
Simbi (Sans.)........................	*Dolichos Lablab* L.
Simsim (Iraq)........................	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Sindur (Bom.)........................	Plumbi Oxidum
Sinjad-i-talkh (Teh., Isf.)........................	*Melia Azedarach* L.
Sinn-aj-jamal........................	*Triticum* sp.
Sinn-al-fil........................	*Triticum* sp.
Sipand (Teh.)........................	*Peganum Harmala* L.
Sipi (Hind.)........................	*Cyperus* [illegible] L.
Sir (Teh., Iraq)........................	*Allium sativum* L.
Siris........................	*Eremurus Aucherianus* Boiss.
Sirish-i-narm........................	*Eremurus Aucherianus* Boiss.
Sirish-i-safid (Isf., Teh.)........................	*Eremurus Aucherianus* Boiss.
Siyāh-danah (Teh.)........................	*Nigella sativa* Sibth.
Siyāh-tukhmah (Teh.)........................	*Nigella sativa* Sibth.
So-ad (Ham.)........................	*Cyperus rotundus* L.
Som (Ar.)........................	*Allium sativum* L.
Soo'juch (Kurd.)	*Vitis vinifera* L.
Sopari (Hind.)........................	*Areca Catechu* L.
Soyah (Hind.)........................	*Peucedanum graveolens* Benth. & Hook.
Spati-kari (Sans.)........................	Alum
Spastha (Afg.)........................	*Medicago sativa* L.
Stigu (Afg.)........................	*Prunus Armeniaca* L.
Subs-i-gulanj (Teh.)........................	*Pistacia Khinjuk* Stocks.
Sudāb (Teh.)........................	*Ruta graveolens* L.
Sodabs (Ar.)........................	*Ruta graveolens* L.
Safeda (Hind.)........................	Plumbi Carbonas
Safed musli (Bom.)........................	*Asparagus adscendens* Roxb.
Safid pathar (Hind.)........................	Calcium Sulphate
Sukhur........................	*Pistacia Terebinthus* L.
Sumbul (Teh.)........................	*Ferula Sumbul* Hook. f.
Sumbul-i-latif (Teh., Isf.)........................	*Nardostachys Jatamansi* DC.
Sombul-jibali (Ar.)........................	*Nardostachys Jatamansi* DC.
Sumbulu'l-tib (Teh., Isf.)........................	*Nardostachys Jatamansi* DC.
Sumgh alucha (Pers.)........................	See *Prunus Cerasus* L.
Summāq (Teh.)........................	*Rhus coriaria* L.

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Summāq-i-shakki bi hastah (Teh.)	*Rhus coriaria* L.
Surinjan	See *Merendera persica* Boiss.
Surinjān-i-kirmānī (Teh.)	*Colchicum luteum* Baker and *C. speciosum* Stev.
Surinjan-i-shirin (Ind. bazaars)	See *Merendera persica* Boiss.
Sūrinjān-i-sufrah shudah (Teh.)	*Merendera persica* Boiss.
Surinjān-i-talkh (Pers.)	*Colchicum luteum* Baker and *C. speciosum* Stev.
Sur-kūk (Afg.)	*Testudo horsfieldii* Grey and *T. graeca*
Surmah (Pers.)	Antimonium Sulphidum
Surma-ka-pathar (Hind.)	Antimonium Sulphidum

Tabashir (Ind. bazaars)	*Bambusa arundinacea* L.
Tabashira (Ar.)	*Bambusa arundinacea* L.
Tabāshīr-i-qalamī (Teh.)	*Bambusa arundinacea* L.
Tāj-i-khurūs (Teh.)	*Amaranthus paniculatus* L.
Tāj-i-rīzī (Teh.)	*Solanum nigrum* L.
Takmeria (Bom.)	*Ocimum Basilicum* L.
Talispatra (Hind.)	*Taxus baccata* L.
Talkak (?) (Iraq)	*Quercus lusitanica* Lam. var. *tauricola*
Tambaku (Afg.)	*Nicotiana Tabacum* L. and *N. rustica* L.
Tambrā nagkeshur (Pers.)	*Ochrocarpus longifolius* Benth. & Hook.
Tamr	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Tannum (Ar.)	*Chrozophora verbascifolia* Juss.
Tāpālaq (Teh.)	*Cyperus rotundus* L.
Tar-anjubin (Pers.)	*Alhagi camelorum* Fisch. (also p. 162)
Tara tezak (Afg.)	*Lepidium sativum* L.
Tarbuz (Teh.)	*Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.
Tarrah (Pers.)	*Fumaria parviflora* Lam.
Tartak (Hind.)	*Rhus coriaria* L.
Tavi misri (Leh)	See *Saccharum officinarum* L.
Tawak (Kurd.)	*Celtis Tournefortii* Lam. (p. 97)
Terengamisk(?) (Teh.)	*Calamintha graveolens* Benth.
Thebba (Iraq)	See *Nicotiana Tabacum* L. and *N. rustica* L.
Thum (Turk.)	*Allium sativum* L.
Til (Hind.)	*Sesamum indicum* L.
Timan (Iraq)	*Oryza sativa* L.
Tin	*Ficus Carica* L.
Tirah (Kurd.)	*Rhus coriaria* L.
Tochme Kertchec (Schl.)	*Ricinus communis* L.
Towdri (Hind.)	*Sisymbrium Sophia* L.
Tribolia (modern Gr.)	*Tribulus terrestris* L.
Triorit (Sans.)	*Ipomoea Turpethum* R. Br.
Triputa (Sans.)	*Ipomoea Turpethum* R. Br.
Tuber Chinae	*Smilax China* L. and *S. glabra* Roxb.
Tu fu ling (Chin.)	*Smilax China* L. and *S. glabra* Roxb.
Tukhm-chirbati (Schl.)	*Ocimum canum* Sims
Tukhm-i-anjurah (Teh.)	*Salvia macrosiphon* Boiss.
Tukhm-i-bābūnāh (Teh.)	*Matricaria Chamomilla* L.
Tukhm-i-bādenjān (Teh.)	*Solanum xanthocarpum* Schr. & Wend. and *S. Melongena* L.
Tukhm-i-bārhang (Ham.)	*Plantago major* L.
Tukhm-i-bazrak (Ham.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Tukhm-i-bihdānah (Teh.)	*Pyrus Cydonia* L.
Tukhm-i-chuqundur (Teh.)	*Beta vulgaris* L.
Tukhm-i-garmak (Teh.)	*Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.
Tukhm-i-gishniz (Teh.)	*Coriandrum sativum* L.

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Tukhm-i-havīj (Teh.)	*Daucus Carota* L.
Tukhm-i-hummāz (Teh., Ham.)	*Rumex conglomeratus* L. and *R. obtusifolius* L.
Tukhm-i-iblīs (Teh.)	*Caesalpinia Bonducella* Roxb.
Tukhm-i-isfand (Teh.)	*Peganum Harmala* L.
Tukhm-i-ispanāj (Teh.)	*Spinacia oleracea* L.
Tukhm-i-jinjak (Ait.)	*Prosopis Stephaniana* Kunth
Tukhm-i-kadu (Teh.)	*Cucurbita Pepo* DC.
Tukhm-i-kadū qalyānī (Teh.)	*Lagenaria vulgaris* Ser.
Tukhm-i-kāfshah (Teh., Ham.)	*Carthamus tinctorius* L.
Tukhm-i-kāhū (Teh.)	*Lactuca sativa* L.
Tukhm-i-kalam (Teh.)	*Carum Petroselinum* Benth. & Hook.
Tukhm-i-karafs (Teh.)	*Apium graveolens* L.
Tukhm-i-kāsnī (Ham., Teh.)	*Cichorium Intybus* L.
Tukhm-i-katan (Ait.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Tukhm-i-kashus (Pers.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Tukhm-i-khābāzī (Teh.)	*Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss.
Tukhm-i-khāk-i-shīr (Ham.)	*Erysimum repandum* L.
Tukhm-i-khākshīr talkh	*Erysimum* sp. (p. 171)
Tukhm-i-khardal (Teh., Ham.)	*Salvia* sp.
Tukhm-i-khash khāsh	*Papaver somniferum* L.
Tukhm-i-khatmī (Isf.)	*Althaea* sp.
Tukhm-i-khatmī	*Althaea lavateraefolia* DC.
Tukhm-i-khiyār (Teh.)	*Cucumis sativus* L.
Tukhm-i-kishavar (Ham., Isf., Teh.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Tukhm-i-kushūth (Ham., Isf., Teh.)	*Cuscuta planifolia* Ten. and *C. hyalina* Roth
Tukhm-i-lāk-pusht (Teh.)	*Testudo horsfieldii* Grey and *T. graeca*
Tukhm-i-lāl'abbās (Teh.)	*Mirabilis Jalapa* L.
Tukhm-i-livās (Ham., Teh.)	*Rheum Ribes* L.
Tukhm-i-marv (Teh.)	*Salvia macrosiphon* Boiss.
Tukhm-i-mūrd (Teh.)	*Myrtus communis* L.
Tukhm-i-nīl	*Ipomoea hederacea* Jacq.
Tukhm-i-nīlūfar (Teh.)	*Ipomoea hederacea* Jacq.
Tukhm-i-piyāz (Teh.)	*Allium Cepa* L.
Tukhm-i-raihān (Ham., Teh.)	*Ocimum Basilicum* L.
Tukhm-i-rāziyānah (Teh., Ham.)	*Foeniculum vulgare* Mill.
Tukhm-i-shabdar (Teh.)	*Trifolium repens* L.
Tukhm-i-shaqā'iq (Ham.)	*Papaver somniferum* L.
Tukhm-i-shāhī (Teh.)	*Lepidium sativum* L.
Tukhm-i-shalgham (Teh.)	*Brassica campestris* L. var. *Napus* Bab.
Tukhm-i-shambalīlah (Teh., Ham.)	*Trigonella Foenum-graecum* L.
Tukhm-i-sharbatī (Ham., Teh.)	*Ocimum canum* Sims
Tukhm-i-shātarrah (Ham.)	*Fumaria parviflora* Lam.
Tukhm-i-shivīd (Teh.)	*Peucedanum graveolens* Benth. & Hook.
Tukhm-i-siyāh (Teh.)	*Nigella sativa* Sibth.
Tukhm-i-tamr (Teh.)	*Tamarindus indica* L.
Tukhm-i-tarrah (Teh.)	*Allium sativum* L.
Tukhm-i-turī (Afg.)	*Luffa acutangula* Roxb.
Tukhm-i-turubchah (Teh.)	*Raphanus sativus* L.
Tukhm-makhtum (Punj.)	Sigillated Earth
Tukhm-tāj-i-khurūs (Isf.)	*Amaranthus paniculatus* L.
Tukhm tartizak (Isf.)	*Lepidium sativum* L.
Tukhm-tātūrā (Pers.)	*Datura Stramonium* L.
Tukhm-zabān-i-gunjishk-i-talkh (Pers.)	*Holarrhena antidysenterica* Wall.

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Tukhm zardak (Teh.)	*Daucus Carota* L.
Tukhm zireh (Teh.)	*Carum Bulbocastanum* Koch
Tukiejah(?) (Ham.)	*Stachys germanica* L.
Tumaku	*Nicotiana Tabacum* L. and *N. rustica* L.
Tur (Kurd.)	*Raphanus sativus* L.
Turb (Pers.)	*Raphanus sativus* L.
Turbad (Leh)	*Ipomoea Turpethum* R. Br.
Turbud (Teh.)	*Ipomoea Turpethum* R. Br.
Tūri (Teh.)	*Luffa acutangula* Roxb.
Tut-i-dham (Pers.)	*Morus nigra* L.
Tūt-i-kushk (Teh.)	*Morus nigra* L.
Tūtūn (Iraq)	*Nicotiana Tabacum* L. and *N. rustica* L.
Udasaliyun (Gr.)	*Apium graveolens* L.
'Ūd-i-balsān (Isf.)	*Commiphora opobalsamum* Kunth
'Unnāb (Iraq)	*Zizyphus vulgaris* L.
'Unnāb (Teh.)	*Zizyphus vulgaris* L.
Urd (Ind.)	*Phaseolus radiatus* L.
Urid (Ind.)	*Phaseolus radiatus* L.
Uruk-el-kafur (Ar.)	*Curcuma Zedoaria* Roxb. and *C. Zerumbet* Roxb.
Ushna ushek (Pers.)	*Dorema Ammoniacum* Don
Ustūkhūdūs (Teh.)	*Lavandula dentata* L.
Uurd (Abu Mansur)	*Myrtus communis* L.
Uzarlik (Turk.)	*Peganum Harmala* L.
Vālik (Teh.)	*Allium Akaka* Gmel.
Vāshā (Teh.)	*Dorema Ammoniacum* Don
Vetiver (Tam.)	*Vetiveria zizanioides* Stapf
Vrishanasana (Sans.)	*Embelia Ribes* Burm.
Warch (Punj.)	*Acorus Calamus* L.
Ward (Ar.)	*Rosa damascena* Mill.
Ward (Ar.)	*Rosa hemisphaerica* Herm.
Ward-ash-shams (Iraq)	*Helianthus annuus* L.
Wasma (Punj., Pers., Turkey)	*Indigofera tinctoria* L.
Welec, See Valik	
Weleque, See Valik	
Winjah (Kurd.)	*Medicago sativa* L.
Wodak (Bal.)	*Tulipa montana* Lindl.
Wuda (Ar.)	*Cypraea moneta* L.
Yunjah (Kurd.)	*Medicago sativa* L.
Za'adi	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
Za'farān (Teh.)	*Crocus sativus* L.
Zaeteran (Boiss.)	*Thymus* sp.
Zafran (Ar.)	*Crocus sativus* L.
Zagher (Ait., Afg.)	*Linum usitatissimum* L.
Zahar (Iraq)	*Anamirta paniculata* Colebr.
Zaitūn	*Olea europea* L.
Zāj-u-safid (Teh.)	Alum
Zalil (Iran)	*Delphinium Zalil* Ait. & Hemsl.
Zamchi (Turk.)	Alum
Zanjabil chami	*Inula Helenium* L.
Zanjabil-i-shami	*Inula Helenium* L.
Zaravand-i-gird (Pers.)	*Aristolochia rotunda* L.

35c Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MNI

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Zarāvand-i-tavīl (Ham., Teh.)	*Aristolochia longa* L.
Zard ālū (Pers.)	*Prunus Armeniaca* L.
Zard chobah (Pers.)	*Curcuma domestica* Val. and *C. longa* Trim.
Zarishk (Hind., Bom.)	*Berberis vulgaris* L.
Zarnab (Isf., Ar.)	*Taxus baccata* L.
Zārnickh-i-dandan (Teh.)	Arsenic Trisulphide
Zarnīkh (Teh.)	Arsenic Trisulphide
Zārnikh-zard (Isf.)	Arsenic Trisulphide
Zatar (Syr., Iraq)	*Thymus Serpyllum* L. var. *Kotschyanus* Boiss.
Zatar (Teh.)	*Zataria multiflora* Boiss. (also pp. 174, 178)
Zatar farisi (Boiss.)	*Thymus* sp.
Ziniyān (Teh., Ham.)	*Carum copticum* Benth. & Hook.
Zira (Hind.)	*Cuminum Cyminum* L.
Zirah-i-sabz (Isf., Iraq)	*Cuminum Cyminum* L.
Zireh-siyah (Isf.)	*Carum Bulbocastanum* Koch
Zirishk (Bagh.)	*Berberis vulgaris* L.
Zirishk-i-guli (Ham., Teh.)	*Berberis vulgaris* L.
Zirishk-tursh (Punj.)	*Berberis vulgaris* L.
Ziwan (Iraq)	*Lolium rigidum* Gaud.
Zūfā (Teh.)	*Nepeta micrantha* Bunge and *N. ispahanica* Boiss.
Zufah-i-yabis (Ar.)	*Nepeta micrantha* Bunge and *N. ispahanica* Boiss.
Zuleh (Ham.)	*Gypsophila paniculata* L.
Zūnā (Teh.)	*Nepeta micrantha* Bungé and *N. ispahanica* Boiss.
Zunghari	*Pistacia Terebinthus* L.
Zupha-e-yabis (Ar.)	*Hyssopus officinalis* L. var. *angustifolia* Boiss.
Zuratapi (Kurd.)	*Sorghum vulgare* Pers.
Zurraij (Iraq)	*Chrozophora verbascifolia* Juss.
Zurunbād (Teh.)	*Curcuma Zedoaria* Roxb. and *C. Zerumbet* Roxb.

111 MH1 Iraq

1: Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley. Iraq, 1900 to 1950. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Pp. x, 436; 1 folding map; 3 appendices; 2 indexes.

HRAF copy.

[This is a very comprehensive account of developments in Iraq over a half-century by an Englishman who was a civil servant in Iraq for sixteen years. He has given a very objective review of Iraq's relations with her neighbors and other powers and of the internal political situation--the establishment of Iraq as an independent constitutional monarchy, the rise and fall of various ministries and the development and activities of various political parties. There is also detailed information, arranged chronologically covering the entire sphere of economic life--agriculture, industry, oil exploitation, finance, town development, etc. There is an excellent chronological account of minority problems and developments in Iraq. --Analyst]

Field date: 1915-1940
Analyst: Beverly Calsoyas

Evaluation: Government Official--4, 5
Processed in 1955

111 MH1 Iraq

2: Dowson, Ernest. An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions.
Bagdad: Government of Iraq, 1932.

Pp. 78; 2 maps

Copy of F. Qubain

[This is a report to the Iraqi government on land tenure in Iraq. The author, who made an extensive field research, describes here the evolution of the land tenure system in Iraq and its impact on agriculture and the economy of the country. After this informative survey the author presents his recommendations for improving the existing land tenure system. A comparison of the system in Iraq with that of Egypt, where the author was a financial Advisor to the Egyptian government, is attempted in the last chapter of the source. --Analyst]

Field date: 1929-1930
Analyst: Majed Elass

Evaluation: Government Official--5
Processed in 1955

111 MH1 Iraq

3: Clark, Victor. Compulsory Education in Iraq. Studies on Compulsory Education--IV. Paris: United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orgainization, 1951.

Pp. 76 .

On loan from Mr. Fahim Qubain.

[This study on the problem of compulsory education in Iraq is one of a series issued by UNESCO. The source contains information on the educational needs in Iraq, the present state of primary education, the administration of education, and the socio-economic factors affecting the program of compulsory education in Iraq. The author, who based his study on a visit to Iraq in 1950, devotes the last chapter of the source to suggestions for reforming the educational system in Iraq. --Analyst.]

Field date: 1950
Analyst: Majed Elass

Evaluation: Social Scientist - 5
Processed in 1955

111 MHl Iraq

4: Wilson, W.C.F. Northern 'Iraq and its Peoples. Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 24, pp. 287-299. London: The Royal Central Asian Society, 1937.

Yale: Bj23.17.24.

[This article by a military and administrative officer of Britain in northern Iraq characterizes briefly some of the heterogeneous peoples of the two northern provinces in Iraq and the Iraq government's policies towards them. The peoples discussed are: the Arabs, Turkomans, Kurds, Christians, Yezidis, and Jews. Included is a map of the northern provinces of Iraq--Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Beverly Meeker

Evaluation: Government Official-3
Processed in 1955

5: Al Dalli, Abdul Ghani. Problems of Industrial Enterprise in Iraq. Middle East Economic Papers, pp. 37-54. Beirut: Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, 1954.

On loan from Fahim I. Qubain, HRAF.

/The author, Member of the Iraqi Parliament and Minister of Agriculture, is a former Director General of the Industrial Bank of Iraq. In this paper he discusses the development of large-scale industry in Iraq from 1948 to 1952, and the part played by the government in this development. The discussion of problems standing in the way of further industrialization includes financial and entrepreneurial problems, supply of raw materials and power, concentration of industry, limitation of markets, labour, technical staff and management, foreign capital, and state assistance and control. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: Beverly Calsoyas

Evaluation: Social Scientist-5
Processed in 1955

6: Ireland, Philip Willard. 'Iraq, A Study in Political Development. London: Jonathan Cape, 1937.

Pp. 509; 3 maps, 4 illustrations.

Yale: Bj65j. 937i.

/The author, a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, begins this study with a review up to 1914 of the development of British interests--commercial and diplomatic--in that part of Turkish Arabia which became Iraq. There follows an account of the conquest of Southern Mesopotamia by the British in 1914-18. The major portion of the book contains a fully documented review of the subsequent occupation and administration of Iraqi territories by the British, a history of Iraqi nationalistic forces between 1914 and 1920, the growth of Iraqi opposition to British control after 1920 and the events which led to the establishment of Iraq as a constitutional monarchy. The author then traces in detail the development of the Organic Law and the structure of government in Iraq, the termination of British Mandate and closes with an appraisal of the evolution of political institutions and social conditions from 1925 to 1932. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: Beverly Calsoyas

Evaluation: Social Scientist--5
Processed in 1955

7: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Economic Development of Iraq. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952.

Pp. xix, 463; 5 appendices, 3 maps, 60 tables.

On loan from Fahim I. Qubain--HRAF

[This is the report of a Mission organized by the International Bank at the request of the government of Iraq. The Mission made its survey of Iraq in 1951. Part I of the report summarizes the major findings of the Mission and outlines the Mission's recommendations and suggestions for technical assistance from foreign countries. In Part II a detailed exposition of the basic factors considered in the Mission's recommendations is presented in a series of excellent monographs; the first is concerned with the basic factors and conditions in the economy of Iraq which the Mission has considered in framing its recommendation, and the others set forth in considerable detail the Mission's views on flood control, irrigation and drainage, agriculture and animal husbandry, industry, transport and communications, public health, education, and community planning and housing. --Analyst]

Field date: 1951
Analyst: Beverly Calsoyas

Evaluation: Social Scientist--4
Processed in 1955

8: Campbell, C. G. Tales from the Arab tribes, London: Lindsay Drummond Limited, 1949.

Pp. iii, 253

Yale: Nkh81. 949c.

/C. G. Campbell has translated and compiled an anthology of entertaining stories as told by the Arab tribes of the Lower Euphrates, namely the Muntafiq, the Al Fetla and the Beni Huchaim. Somewhat akin to the stories of "A Thousand and One Nights", these stories recreate much of the atmosphere and customs of the tribes with their sheikhs and princes. The tales are, at times, exaggerated for the sake of color and emphasis of plot and therefore Campbell has seen fit to include (as an appendix) a description of a marriage as it actually occurs in the tribes. There are, at the end of the book, many explanatory notes as to tribes, places, customs, names and vocabulary mentioned in the text. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: Olivia Maldonado

Evaluation: Traveler--5
Processed in 1955

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

APPENDIX C

Sources of the Present Work

000 The historian of a recent or contemporary period, whatever his conscientious industry, must find it beyond possibility to quote specific authority for every statement, or even to indicate, otherwise than in general terms, all the sources from which his information is derived. He will be compelled to use the daily, weekly, and monthly presses of a dozen countries: parliamentary and international debates: compilations of statistics, Regulations, dispatches and White Papers: studies and monographs in many languages and on many allied subjects, and the published records of travellers and observers; these, with all their repetitions and varying values and relevancies, are among the too copious sources from which such a writer must disengage his material. He can offer no equivalent to the comprehensive and meticulous source-lists of the historian of ancient or medieval times. He can in his own references never achieve completeness, and he will confer no benefit on students by multiplying references beyond the essential, the significant, or at least the interesting. The bibliographical suggestions here following are, therefore, representative only of what the writer has found, in the languages known to him, to be of value; a great quantity of more or less relevant material is omitted.

114 One source does not appear in these lists at all—the slowly acquired body of observation and information which the writer's many years of residence in and personal acquaintance with 'Iraq in various, including official, capacities has put at his disposal. Without this, the present history would not have been undertaken.

The writer has used:

113 (*a*) Notes provided generously by friends, both 'Iraqi and British, who have recent and special knowledge of specific phases of 'Iraqi life or the work of Government Departments. Some of the names of these appear in the Preface.

(*b*) Compilations, reports, and monographs printed in English or Arabic by various departments of the 'Iraq Government or by its predecessor the British Occupation authority. These[1] deal with public health, provincial administration (1915–20), agriculture, surveys, archaeology, trade, education, finance, geology, irrigation, jails, police, law courts, the 'Iraq Levies, meteorology, tribes, posts and telegraphs, Port of Basra, public works, &c.

(*c*) The '*Iraq Government Gazette*, from 1920: Compilations of Laws, Proclamations, &c. (Government Press, Baghdad).

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[1] Examples in A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. xxvii–xxxi, and P. W. Ireland, '*Iraq*, pp. 479–89. For the period later than 1935 it has not proved possible to compile lists of comparable completeness; a few such publications are quoted in sections (*i*) and (*k*) below. The Annual Reports of some departments, such as 'Iraq Railways, are invaluable.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

For the period prior to 1914, the official Turkish *Vilaiet Calendars*, for each of the three wilayas: various dates, not annual.

Statistical Abstract, published by the Ministry of Economics (Government Press, Baghdad) annually. This is invaluable.

(*d*) Cuttings from the British, French, and Italian presses, as maintained from 1921 onwards by the Press Archives of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

Extracts from 'Iraqi newspapers.

Before 1920, files of *The Times*.

(*e*) Magazine articles and news summaries[1] from (*inter alia*) the Royal Central Asian Society's *Journal**, *Oriente Moderno**, the *Near East*, *Great Britain and the East*, the *Geographical Journal*, *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain**, the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, the *Fortnightly Review*, *Contemporary Review*, *Correspondence d'Orient**, *Revue du Monde Musulman*, *National Review*, *World Affairs*, *International Affairs**, *Nineteenth Century*, *Asia*, *Foreign Affairs**, *Middle East Journal**, *Current History*, *International Labour Review*. A very few articles from these papers have been separately quoted in sections below.

Pamphlets and periodical publications of the Arab Offices (1946–9) in London and Washington, especially on the Arab League.

The series of brochures Facts and Prospects in 'Iraq (Arabic and English; New Publishers, 'Iraq, 1945).

(*f*) Parliamentary papers (Great Britain), for the period before 1914, under 'Turkey' and 'Asiatic Turkey': especially nos. 92, 495, 753, 779, 792, 814. Since 1914, Parliamentary debates.

(*g*) League of Nations proceedings and publications: *Official Journal*, especially for October 1924, February 1926, April 1926, March 1932, July 1932, November 1934, February 1935, June 1935, December 1937.

Minutes of the Assembly, and the Council.

Minutes of the Permanent Mandates Commission

(*h*) Command Papers (1914 and after) other than military dispatches.

Cmd. 7628 (1914): Rupture with Turkey.
Cmd. 8253 (1915): General Townshend's appreciation before Kut.
Cmd. 8610 (1917): Report of the Mesopotamia Commission.
Cmd. 675 (1920): San Remo Oil Agreement.
Cmd. 960 (1920): Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920.
Cmd. 1061 (1920): Review of the Civil Administration, 1914–20, by Gertrude L. Bell.
Cmd. 1176 (1921): Draft Mandate.
Cmd. 1195 (1921): Franco-British Convention, 23 December 1920.
Cmd. 1226 (1921): Correspondence with U.S.A. on economic rights.
Cmd. 1351 (1921): Petroleum in 'Iraq.
Cmd. 1500 (1921): Final draft of Mandates.
Cmd. 1757 (1922): Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty, 10 October 1922.
Cmd. 2217 (1922): Use of Air Force in 'Iraq.
Cmd. 1814 (1923): Lausanne Conference.

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[1] An asterisk denotes the most valuable of the journals listed.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Cmd. 1929 (1923): Treaty of Lausanne, 24 July 1923.
Cmd. 2120 (1924): Anglo-'Iraqi Protocol, 30 April 1924, and Agreements.
Cmd. 2317 (1924): Application to 'Iraq of Art. 22 of League Covenant.
Cmd. 2438 (1925): Hilton-Young-Vernon Report of Financial Mission.
Cmd. 2557 (1925): Laidover Report.
Cmd. 2562 (1925): Turco-'Iraqi frontier: decision.
Cmd. 2563 (1925): Incidents on Turkish Frontier.
Cmd. 2565 (1925): Agreement with Najd.
Cmd. 2587 (1926): Treaty, 13 January 1926.
Cmd. 2679 (1926): Anglo-'Iraqi-Turkish Treaty, 7 June 1926.
Cmd. 2998 (1927): Draft Revised Treaty, 14 December 1927.
Cmd. 3440 (1929): Statement of British policy in 'Iraq.
Cmds. 3627 and 3675 (1930): Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty and Exchange of Notes.
Cmd. 3797 (1930): Treaty of 30 June, and Financial Agreement.
Cmd. 3833 (1930): Anglo-'Iraqi-United States Convention on rights of United States citizens. Also Cmd. 3503.
Cmd. 3839 (1930): Judicial Agreement. Also Cmd. 3933.
Cmd. 4120 (1932): Anglo-'Iraqi Agreement on Extradition. Also Cmd. 4317.
Cmd. 4220 (1932): Transfer of French rights.
Cmd. 4986 (1935): Legal proceedings, civil and commercial. Also Cmd. 5369.
Cmd. 5173 (1936): Railway Agreement. Also Cmd. 5282.
Cmd. 5196 (1936): War cemeteries.
Cmd. 5373 (1937): Commercial relations, 'Iraq-Palestine, 14 December 1936.
Cmd. 6646 (1944): 'Iraq's foreign exchange needs.
Cmds. 6742 (1945) and 6803 (1946): prolongation of above agreement.
Cmd. 6918 (1946): Precedence of H.M.'s Ambassador, Baghdad.
Cmds. 7110, 7210, 7269 (1947): Foreign exchange.
Cmd. 7309 (1948): Treaty of Portsmouth, 15 January 1948.
Cmd. 7490 (1948): Financial Agreement, prolongation.

(*i*) British naval and military dispatches for war periods, notably:

(i) *1914–18:*

Reports by Commanders-in-Chief, issued as Supplements to the *London Gazette*:

General Sir J. Nixon: period April–September 1915 (5 April 1916, no. 29536).
——: period October–December 1915 (10 May 1916, no. 29576).
Sir P. H. N. Lake: period January–April 1916 (10 October 1916, no. 29782).
General Sir S. Maude: period 16 August 1916–17 March 1917 (10 July 1917, no. 30176).
——: period April–September 1917 (10 January 1918, no. 30469).
Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall: period October 1917–March 1918 (28 August 1918, no. 30874).
——: period April–September 1918 (20 February 1919, no. 31192).
——: period October–December 1918 (11 April 1919, no. 31287).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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(ii) *1920:*

Sir G. F. MacMunn: dispatches covering November 1919–January 1920.

Sir A. J. Haldane: dispatches covering January–June 1920, July–October 1920, October 1920–February 1921.

(iii) *1939–44:*

Reports by Commanders-in-Chief issued as Supplements to the *London Gazette*:

General Sir A. P. Wavell: *Operations in the Middle East from August 1939 to November 1940* (13 June 1946, no. 37609).

——: *Operations in the Middle East from 7 February 1941–15 July 1941* (3 July 1946, no. 37638).

——: *Dispatch on Operations in Iraq, East Syria and Iran, from 10 April 1941–12 January 1942* (14 August 1946, no. 37685).

General Sir Claude Auchinleck: *Operations in the Middle East, 5 July 1941–31 October 1941* (21 August 1946, no. 37695).

——: *Operations in the Middle East from 1 November 1941–15 August 1942* (15 January 1948, no. 38177).

General Sir H. Maitland Wilson: *Dispatch on the Persia and Iraq Command covering the period 21 August 1942–17 February 1943* (27 August 1948, no. 37703).

——: *Operations in the Middle East from 16 February 1943–8 January 1944* (12 November 1946, no. 37786).

Air Marshal Sir A. Longmore: *Air Operations in the Middle East, January 1941–May 1941* (17 September 1946, no. 37729).

Neither here nor in section (*l*) below is specific reference made to any but a small part of the copious literature of both world wars, the contribution of much of which to 'Iraq history is slight.

(*j*) Economic Reports.

(Many Governmental reports and notes printed in Baghdad—and many not printed—between 1918 and 1932 are covered by section (*b*) above.)

Djamalzadah, V. A. M. 'Economic and Social Development of Iraq', *Internat. Labour Review*, 1937.

G.B., Board of Trade. *Economic Conditions in Iraq*, 1933. By C. Empson. H.M.S.O., 1933.

—— *Economic Conditions in Iraq*, 1933–5. By J. P. Summerscale. H.M.S.O., 1936.

—— *Economic Conditions in Iraq*, 1935–7. By J. P. Summerscale. H.M.S.O., 1938.

—— *Iraq, June 1949*. By F. H. Gamble. H.M.S.O., 1949. (Overseas Economic Surveys).

Jewish Agency for Palestine, Economic Research Institute. *Statistical Handbook of Middle East Countries*. Jerusalem, 1945.

(See also in section (*l*) below, entries under Basri, Buckley, Byford, Dowson, Ghanima, Hammond, Himadeh, Jamil, Prest, Warriner.)

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

(*k*) Annual Reports by His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations, 1921–32:

October 1920–March 1922 (H.M.S.O., 1922), April 1922–March 1923 (H.M.S.O., 1924), April 1923–December 1924 (H.M.S.O., 1925), and thereafter for every calendar year, 1925–31 inclusive, and January–October 1932 (H.M.S.O., 1933).

Special Report on the Progress of Iraq, 1920–31 (H.M.S.O., 1931).

(*l*) Published Books.[1]

A. Background and general information relevant to political, economic, or social conditions.

(i) Geographical and General.

Baedeker, Karl. *Palestine and Syria, with routes through Mesopotamia and Babylon.* Leipzig, 1912.

Chiha, H. K. *La Province de Baghdad.* Cairo, 1908.

Cook, Thos. *Travellers' Handbook to Syria, Palestine, Iraq.* London, 1934.

Cuinet, V. *La Turquie d'Asie.* Vol. 2. Paris, 1892.

Damluji, S. *al-Yazidiya.* Baghdad, 1948.

Fisher, W. R. *The Middle East.* London, 1950.

Gazetteer of Baghdad. Delhi, 1889.

Grant, C. P. *The Syrian Desert.* London, 1937.

G.B., Admiralty, Intelligence Division. *Handbook of Mesopotamia.* London, 1916–17. 4 vols.

G.B., Foreign Office, Historical Section. Peace Handbooks, vol. 11: *Arabia, Mesopotamia,* &c. H.M.S.O., 1919.

G.B., General Staff, India. *Field Notes: Mesopotamia.* Calcutta, 1917.

Guide Bleu, *Syrie–Palestine–Iraq–Transjordanie.* Paris, 1932.

Hasani, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-. *Tarikh al-Buldan al-'Iraqiya.* Baghdad, 1930.

Hashimi, Ṭaha al-. *Jughrafiyat al-'Iraq.* Baghdad, 1929.

Hogarth, D. G. *The Nearer East.* Oxford, 1905.

Lorimer, J. G. *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf.* Calcutta, 1908. 4 vols.

Maps of 'Iraq, with Notes for Visitors, 1928. Baghdad, Government Press, 1929.

Rawi, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-. *al-Badiya.* Baghdad, 1947.

The *Statesman's Year Book* (annually).

(ii) Social.

Allen, H. B. *Rural Education and Welfare in the Middle East.* H.M.S.O., 1946.

The Arab of Mesopotamia. Basra, Government Press, 1917.

'Azzawi, 'Abbas al-. *'Asha'ir al-'Iraq.* Baghdad, 1937 and 1947. 2 vols.

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[1] The classification of these, here following, is inexact and perhaps inconvenient, especially for the travels in which the historical content varies greatly. Many works could be classified equally under, for instance, section *A* (i), *A* (ii), *B* (i), &c. To facilitate reference, the Index of Sources may be convenient.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

113 Chemlow, F. G. *Report on Sanitary Matters in Mesopotamia, &c.* (1913–14). Calcutta, 1916.

Dickson, H. P. R. *The Arab of the Desert.* London, 1949.

Drower, Lady (E. S. Stevens). *Folk Tales of 'Iraq.* London, 1931.

—— *Mandaeans of 'Iraq and Iran.* London, 1938.

—— *Peacock Angel.* London, 1941.

Stevens, E. S. (Lady Drower). *By Tigris and Euphrates.* London, 1923.

Emhardt, W. C. and G. M. Lamsa. *The Oldest Christian People.* New York, 1926.

Empson, R. H. W. *Cult of the Peacock Angel.* London, 1928.

Field, H. *The Arabs of Central Iraq.* Chicago, 1936. (And other anthropological material.)

Fulanain, [S. E. and M. G. Hedgcock]. *Haji Rikkan, Marsh Arab.* London, 1927.

Harrison, P. W. *The Arab at Home.* New York, 1924.

Hourani, A. H. *Minorities in the Arab World.* London, R.I.I.A., 1947.

'Iraq, Ministry of Education. *Aḥwal al-'Iraq al-ijtima'iya.* Cairo, 1949.

Jamali, M. Fadhil. *The New Iraq; its Problem of Bedouin Education.* Columbia University Press, 1934.

Luke, H. C. *An Eastern Chequerboard.* London, 1934.

—— *Mosul and its Minorities.* London, 1925.

Lyell, T. *Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia.* London, 1923.

Matthews, R. D. and M. Akrawi. *Education in Arab Countries of the Near East.* Washington, 1949.

Morton, H. V. *Middle East.* London, 1941.

—— *Through Lands of the Bible.* London, 1938.

Musil, A. *The Middle Euphrates.* New York, 1927.

Parfit, J. T. *Marvellous Mesopotamia.* London, 1920.

—— *Mesopotamia, the Key to the Future.* London, 1917.

—— *Twenty Years in Baghdad and Syria.* London, 1916.

Parrot, A. *Archéologie mésopotamienne.* Paris, 1946.

Ross, F. A., and others. *The Near East and American Philanthropy* (pp. 177–200). New York, 1929.

Stark, Freya. *Beyond Euphrates.* London, 1951. (Period 1929–33.)

Van Ess, J. *Meet the Arab.* New York, 1943.

Weulersse, J. *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche Orient.* Paris, 1946.

(iii) Political.

Achkar, J. *Évolution politique de la Syrie et de l'Irak.* Lyon, 1934.

'Alami, Musā al-. *'Ibrat Filistin.* Beirut, 1949.

Antonius, G. *The Arab Awakening.* London, 1938. (King–Crane Report forms, Appendix H.)

Azuri, N. *Le Réveil de la nation arabe dans l'Asie turque.* Paris, 1905.

Bentwich, N. *The Mandates System.* London, 1930.

Brookings Institute. *The Security of the Middle East.* Washington, 1950.

Bullard, Sir R. W. *Britain and the Middle East.* London, 1950.

CATALUCCIO, F. *Storia del nazionalismo arabo.* Milan, 1939.

CUMMING, H. H. *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-war Near East.* London, 1938.

DAVIS, HELEN M. *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, &c., in the Near and the Middle East.* Durham, N.C., 1947.

DJEMAL PASHA, AHMAD. *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman.* London, 1922.

FRYE, R. N., ed. *The Near East and the Great Powers.* Cambridge, Mass., 1952.

GERIG, B. *The Open Door and the Mandates System.* London, 1930.

GIANNINI, A. *L'Ultima fase della questione orientale.* Rome, 1933.

GOOCH, G. P. and H. W. V. TEMPERLEY. *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898 to 1914.* Vol. 10, pt. 2. London, 1938.

HAMILTON, A. *Problems of the Middle East.* London, 1909.

HINDUS, M. *In Search of a Future.* London, 1949.

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—— *Constitutional Law of 'Iraq.* Baghdad, 1928.

HOSKINS, H. L. *British Routes to India.* London, 1928.

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IRELAND, P. W., ed. *The Near East, Problems and Prospects.* Chicago, 1942.

JUNG, E. *La Révolte arabe.* Paris, 1924–5. 2 vols.

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KHAIRALLAH, K. T. *Les Régions libérées arabes.* Paris, 1919.

KING, H. C. and C. B. CRANE. *Report* (*see under* Antonius, G.).

KIRK, G. E. *Short History of the Middle East.* London, 1948.

KOHN, H. *History of Nationalism in the East.* London, 1929.

—— *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East.* London, 1932.

—— *Western Civilization in the Near East.* London, 1936.

(All translated from the German)

LANZONI, A. *Il Nuovo regime turco e l'avvenire della Mesopotamia.* Rome, 1912.

LE TOURNEAU, R. *L'Islam contemporain.* Paris, 1950.

LLOYD, SETON. *Twin Rivers.* Oxford University Press, 1943.

LODER, J. DE V. *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria.* London, 1923.

NEWMAN, E. W. P. *Middle East.* London, 1926.

NOLDE, E. *L'Irak, origines historiques, &c.* Paris, 1934.

PERNOT, M. *L'Inquiétude de l'Orient.* Paris, 1927. 2 vols.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *The Middle East.* London, 1950.

SETON-WILLIAMS, M. V. *Britain and the Arab States.* London, 1948.

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STEINER, M. J. *Inside Pan-Arabia.* Chicago, 1947.

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This study has been based upon the source materials enumerated below.

1. Unpublished Official Telegrams, Dispatches, Memoranda and Minutes

Most of these unpublished documents have been made available for the first time for study through the kindness of the India Office, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. Citations from them have been noted in the text of this study.

2. Published Documents, Treaties, Reports

A partial list of the published documents are given below. The writer believes that he has seen every report concerning 'Iraq. These include

(*a*) Interdepartmental and other reports made by the British Administration and by the 'Iraq Government.

(*b*) Reports of H.M. Government to the League of Nations.

(*c*) Reports of special Commissions, as those sent by the League of Nations.

(*d*) Minutes, in Arabic, of the Constituent Assembly, 1924.

Some of these Reports, especially those concerning the early days of the British Occupations, have been seen in manuscript form through the kindness of H.M. Ambassador at Baghdad. Where possible the writer has cited these and the Interdepartmental Reports, many of which were originally secret or confidential, rather than the reports prepared for general circulations, although many of the latter are extremely valuable for facts and statistics concerning 'Iraq, 1914-32.

3. Newspapers

During his residence in Baghdad, the writer was able to draw upon the files of the *Baghhad Times* (now the *'Iraq Times*) and of nearly all vernacular newspapers published in 'Iraq from 1921. Newspapers and periodicals of Great Britain, France, Italy and of other countries have also been used.

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4. **Books and Articles**

In so far as possible this study is based on original sources but a large number of works in English, French, Arabic, etc., on 'Iraq and the Middle East have been used, principally to confirm or amplify those facts obtained at first hand or the writer's own judgments. A selected list of works is given below.

5. **Interviews**

These have included an audience with His Majesty King Ghazi, interviews with practically every 'Iraqī statesman and dignitary who has taken part in the creation of modern 'Iraq, with the former High Commissioners of His Britannic Majesty in 'Iraq and with many of the British Officials who from 1915 to the present have participated in the affairs of government and administration of 'Iraq.

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preserved through being burnt, are difficult to identify with regard to their species. A summary of this discussion has been published by Henry Field, "Ancient Wheat and Barley from Kish, Mesopotamia," *Amer. Anthr.*, 34, No. 2, pp. 308–309. For further information on this subject the reader is referred to various publications by Nikolai Vavilov, Institute of Plant Industry, Leningrad, U.S.S.R.

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Tulipa montana Lindl. (Liliaceae)

فريونه

Fraiyōnah (Iraq); Lāla (Afg.); Govarikh, Wodak (Bal.); bulbs.

Field 54.

The bulbs of this tulip of Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan have brown, coppery skins. They are sold in the Mosul market as food (G.). The bulbs are eaten also in Baluchistan, where the leaves are a fodder for goats.

824*
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Uncaria Gambier Roxb. (Rubiaceae)

كات كلابى

Kāt-i-gulābī (Teh.); Chinai-katha (Bom.); extract, pale catechu.

Field 208.

This is a specimen of the pale catechu of commerce obtained from Singapore. In the form of cubes, 1 inch across, it is prepared from the leaves and stalks of the plant grown in the Malay States. It is very astringent, as it contains both catechin and tannin. In Tehran it is prescribed for coughs.

Veratrum album L. (Liliaceae)

كندش

Kundush (Ham., Teh.); Kondochi (Schl.); hellebore root.

Boiss. 5: 171.

Field 221; K.B. 343.

White hellebore is a plant of Europe, Central Asia, and Japan. The root is mentioned as a drug in the herbals of Hippocrates and Galen. The rhizome is dark brown, cylindrical or slightly tapering, 2.5 cm. in diameter, with numerous scars of broken rootlets, whitish within. It contains a poisonous alkaloid, jervine. The root is one of the Irani poisons, and is used only externally, as a paste for headache and facial neuralgia.—It is also applied as a relief from nasal catarrh (H.F.).

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823*
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843

Caucasus, and is used with other medicaments and applied to infected parts of the body. It is also taken internally as a tonic in pregnancy, or, as Schlimmer remarks, to satisfy the "appétit des femmes enceintes."

Shāf-i-mamitā (Teh.)

شاف ما میتا

W.H.M.M. 150725.

These are small rolls of a mineral preparation about 2.5 to 3.5 cm. in length, pointed at one end. They consist of chalk, which dissolves in acid, and a quantity of red clay left insoluble. From the name Shāf, meaning suppository or clyster, they are probably used for this purpose.

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Sigillated earth

گل مخدوم

Gil-i-makhdūm (Teh.); Tukhm-makhtum (Punj.).

Field 246; 86 (Iraq).

These are two forms of sigillated earth, sealed clay or Lemnian earth. The sample from Tehran is a rounded cake of light reddish clay with white specks, 2 cm. in diameter and 1.5 cm. thick; on the upper portion there is a depression in the center made by a stamp. The clay is smooth to the touch and contains no carbonate of lime. For use in medicine it is moistened with water and applied to purulent wounds.

The samples from Iraq are circular lumps of white clay of a larger size, 3.2 cm. in diameter and 1.2 cm. thick. Each is marked above by three thumb impressions, with checkered lines below. The powdered clay is used as a desiccant for dusting abraded surfaces.

• [118] The literature on the Sacred Sealed Earth of Lemnos is very extensive. The earth is described by Dioscorides (A.D. 40) and Galen (A.D. 131–201), and was used in Europe until the 17th century. An interesting account is given in Pomet's "Histoire des Druges" (1694), and perhaps the most recent review of the subject is "Terra Sigillata: a Famous Medicament of Ancient Times," by C. J. S. Thompson (1914). Laufer ("Geophagy," pp. 164–166) gives an account of terra sigillata from Lemnos (cf. Armenian earth).

Other medicinal clays represented in the Field collection are: Gil-i-berz (263), a cosmetic used to counteract excessive perspiration;

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Gil-i-gazwin (247), a clay eaten by pregnant women; and Gil-i-batuni (258), a siliceous powder used by painters. 278* 261

The following is a list from other sources of edible and medicinal clays met with in Iran and India. 843 823*

Gil-i-gubrasi. Cyprus clay.

Gil-i-igritus. Cretan earth.

Gil-i-khurasani. Edible chalk.

Gil-i-misri or *Karkooti.* Egyptian earth or Nile mud taken from bed of river.

Gil-i-shamus. Samian earth (according to Dioscorides the Greeks used the earth of Samos as a means of stopping the vomiting of blood—Laufer, "Geophagy," p. 109).

Gil-i-zard. Yellow clay from Istanbul.

Chunniah (from China, lime). A soap-like, earthy substance obtained from lakes near Halla, eaten by women of Sind.

The subject of eating clays is of ethnological as well as medicinal interest. An attempt to deal with the subject from these points of view will be found in a paper on "Earth-eating and the Earth-eating Habit in India," by D. Hooper and H. H. Mann (*Mem. Asiatic Soc. Bengal,* Calcutta, 1906, pp. 240–270). [113] •

Sodium carbonate (crude) 278*

نمک قلیاب 317

Namak, Qalyāb (Teh.); washing soda. 823*

W.H.M.M. 150843.

This is a white, alkaline salt, either thrown up as an efflorescent deposit on the soil (Sajji mati), or prepared from the ashes of marine plants. It consists of sodium carbonate, containing much chloride and sulphate of sodium, and insoluble matter.

Sulphur

کوکرد زرد

Gūgird-i-zard, Gūgird-i-akhmar (Teh.); Gogut (Yark.); Gandhak (Hind.).

Field 218, 241; W.H.M.M. 150731.

Yellow sulphur in powder and crystalline masses is said to come from the Mount Demavend district in Iran.—Sulphur ointment is used for skin complaints and for secondary syphilis (H.F.).

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

PREFACE

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MORE than a quarter of a century has passed since, a young official of the 'Iraq Government, I published an account of the four centuries of that country's history ending in 1900. That tentative and imperfect work has not, to my knowledge, been superseded; and as it seems now to call for a continuation into more recent times I have tried in the volume now offered to carry out this task. My own connexion with the territory, which has been continuous since 1915, has included some sixteen years of residence there followed by annual or more than annual visits, and has been favoured by the friendship of many scores of 'Iraqis at all levels, including perhaps two-thirds of those mentioned in these pages.

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The interest which 'Iraq offered formerly to the world—that of history, archaeology, strategy, economics, and social structure—has grown not less but greater during the last generation. Apart from the personal and affectionate interest felt by many friends of the 'Iraqis, the circumstances of the foundation of their nation, its era of tutelage and emancipation, its varying fortunes as an independent State, its social and cultural development as illustrating the familiar but uneasy impact of West on East, its revelation of national character, its share in Arab politics and in world groupings, its material development, its possible future: all these should contribute to a story well worth the telling, if it can be rightly told. At the same time I, and probably some readers, must regret the absence from these pages of many or most of the figures—tribal or village chiefs, town 'notables' and professional men, the humble as well as the eminent in officialdom and the general public—so long and so well known to residents in 'Iraq in this or that part of a wide, varied, and deeply interesting country. It is indeed regrettable that so little of this element of social life, enriched by many picturesque, responsive, and often eminent personalities of the country, will appear in this history; indeed much of the best that 'Iraq has to offer in courtesy, humour, and kindliness must be here unrecorded.

The need for a general account of the last half-century in 'Iraq has not hitherto been met. There are diplomatic papers, military histories and dispatches, travellers' tales, 'Iraqi political writings and a voluminous press, biographies of the eminent, and a few scholars' and specialists' monographs: but there seems to be no single work attempting to be both as comprehensive and as reliable as the variety and the too close proximity of the events will permit. I have hoped to be of use in helping both the contemporary reader

APPENDIX C

Sources of the Present Work

000 THE historian of a recent or contemporary period, whatever his conscientious industry, must find it beyond possibility to quote specific authority for every statement, or even to indicate, otherwise than in general terms, all the sources from which his information is derived. He will be compelled to use the daily, weekly, and monthly presses of a dozen countries: parliamentary and international debates: compilations of statistics, Regulations, dispatches and White Papers: studies and monographs in many languages and on many allied subjects, and the published records of travellers and observers; these, with all their repetitions and varying values and relevancies, are among the too copious sources from which such a writer must disengage his material. He can offer no equivalent to the comprehensive and meticulous source-lists of the historian of ancient or medieval times. He can in his own references never achieve completeness, and he will confer no benefit on students by multiplying references beyond the essential, the significant, or at least the interesting. The bibliographical suggestions here following are, therefore, representative only of what the writer has found, in the languages known to him, to be of value; a great quantity of more or less relevant material is omitted.

114 One source does not appear in these lists at all—the slowly acquired body of observation and information which the writer's many years of residence in and personal acquaintance with 'Iraq in various, including official, capacities has put at his disposal. Without this, the present history would not have been undertaken.

The writer has used:

113 (*a*) Notes provided generously by friends, both 'Iraqi and British, who have recent and special knowledge of specific phases of 'Iraqi life or the work of Government Departments. Some of the names of these appear in the Preface.

(*b*) Compilations, reports, and monographs printed in English or Arabic by various departments of the 'Iraq Government or by its predecessor the British Occupation authority. These[1] deal with public health, provincial administration (1915–20), agriculture, surveys, archaeology, trade, education, finance, geology, irrigation, jails, police, law courts, the 'Iraq Levies, meteorology, tribes, posts and telegraphs, Port of Baṣra, public works, &c.

(*c*) The *'Iraq Government Gazette*, from 1920: Compilations of Laws, Proclamations, &c. (Government Press, Baghdad).

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[1] Examples in A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. xxvii–xxxi, and P. W. Ireland, *'Iraq*, pp. 479–89. For the period later than 1935 it has not proved possible to compile lists of comparable completeness; a few such publications are quoted in sections (*i*) and (*k*) below. The Annual Reports of some departments, such as 'Iraq Railways, are invaluable.

is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated 423
by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman ad- 184
ministration present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts.

The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. 423
For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon.

8. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers 122
dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were 114
unobtainable, while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape.

A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of 114
reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" 185
written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform.

4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the 121
Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country.

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry 124
of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the

124 compilation of a map indicating the existing distribution of various categories of land in the liwa, (ii) for the preparation of numerical returns relating to population, to the various categories of land, etc., and (iii) a hundred important questions covering the main field of the investigation.

● 114 Thirdly, I studied at Headquarters the working of the Central Government services primarily concerned, as thoroughly as my immediate purpose required and the time at my disposal permitted.

124 114 Fourthly, I visited each of the fourteen liwas in turn and (i) discussed the main problems thoroughly with the Governor (Mutasarrif), (ii) was taken to typical or specially instructive places, and (iii) met and questioned a number of other provincial officers, local notables, land holders and peasants. Owing to the previous circulation of the questionnaire, all provincial officers were well prepared for these discussions, while I also received very full written replies in all but every case.

124 Fifthly, I had the honour to be accorded several audiences by H.M. King Feisal as well as numerous interviews with Ministers, Deputies and others. And I also interviewed in Baghdad a number of experienced persons both European and 'Iraqi, with special knowledge and experience of land questions. Unfortunately owing to prolonged bad weather, which interfered with my touring programme and severely curtailed the time available for supplementing my information after its initial collection, it was not found possible to arrange meetings with some of those whom I was particularly anxious to see. I regret this very much, but greatly as they would have assisted me, I venture to believe that nothing they might have said would have seriously modified the main conclusions drawn from the mass of evidence collected.

000 5. Owing to the wideness of the field to be covered the five months that I spent in el 'Iraq were entirely occupied in collecting material which could not be digested until I got back to England. The records of the investigations fill more than forty dossiers. Naturally many gaps and uncertainties were discovered during the examination of this large body of material. This necessitated correspondence with Baghdad extending almost continuously over another six months. The attempt to obtain intelligible and consistent statistics was particularly troublesome.

It must not be thought that even this considerable volume of data covers the field wholly or unimpeachably, or that I can have escaped misinterpretations and errors. No such improvised body of information can be a satisfactory substitute for systematic public records and the accumulated experience of a competent and well organised public service able to concentrate on land problems. But the information and opinions collected, read in the light of experience elsewhere, do none the less enable the main evils to be diagnosed with confidence and the essential elements of constructive reform to be trustworthily indicated.

121 I have thought it advisable to explain the widening of the scope of my investigation and to outline the procedure adopted, so that the character and origin of my information is on record. But I have not attempted to reproduce the mass of conclusions which the material collected has yielded. This would fill volumes. And I have expressly excluded from consideration in this report many questions of the highest importance, which I have had to inquire about owing to their reaction on land tenure (e.g. methods of cultivation, of remuneration of labour, etc.), but which did not themselves directly constitute the subject of the inquiry. Again although it was necessary to study the special problems of each province (liwa) as far as time permitted, so as to get a

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

114 At the invitation of Unesco I visited Iraq during the autumn of 1950 to undertake a study of the problem of compulsory education. It was soon discovered, however, that although the terms of reference were relatively simple, the problem is enormous. Rapid educational progress in certain directions has been made since Iraq became an independent State, but there exist major economic, political and social problems which constitute serious obstacles to the promotion of compulsory education.

122 The study of the problems and the difficulties which need to be surmounted before realistic progress in the direction of compulsory education can be made was greatly assisted by the facilities which were provided in Iraq. Immediately on my arrival the Minister of Education stated that every assistance would be afforded by himself and his colleagues at the Ministry, that free access would be given to relevant reports and records, and that he had made arrangements for the Provincial Governors and Provincial Directors of Education to provide unrestricted means of visiting schools and seeing the conditions of the country.

With such generous facilities it proved possible to visit some 150 primary schools and a number of secondary schools and training institutions, in nine out of the fourteen provinces of Iraq. Visits were also paid to towns, villages, private homes, teachers' clubs, farms, irrigation projects, land settlement schemes and industrial and commercial concerns. A significant feature of these visits, and of the many discussions with teachers, Government officials, sheikhs, farmers, agricultural workers and others was the great courtesy, frankness and generous hospitality that was shown. Thanks to the assistance of so many friendly people it was possible to venture as far north as the provinces of Mosul, Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk, to see much of the educational and social arrangements in Baghdad, and to travel through the southern provinces of Kut, Hilla, Amara and Basra. To see schools and meet people of all ranks in the mountains of Kurdistan, the northern desert and uplands, the great southern plain and the marshes of Amara was in itself an education, and provided realistic evidence

ways in which some of these are being overcome. This suggested /21 that there would be some value in then attempting to outline a policy of advance in the direction of compulsory education which would go hand in hand with the economic, political and social changes that are taking place. But although it proved possible to outline suggestions for such a policy of development, it also became abundantly clear that, until the major obstacle of the land tenure system can be overcome, ambitious progress towards compulsory education must continue to be frustrated.

So the study took the shape which appears in the following chapters. It would have been an impertinence to try to cover so much ground had it not been that the generous facilities given by the Minister of Education and the others already mentioned enabled me to use information, figures and opinion which have accumulated over a long period as a result of the efforts of people in the educational and other public services of Iraq. Nevertheless, although much of what is written in this study is a result of the thought and labours of others, any opinions expressed and conclusions drawn are, unless otherwise stated, my own responsibility. The same applies to the inevitable inaccuracies which are bound to be discovered by others who have long been associated with the educational affairs of Iraq. This acceptance of personal responsibility for opinions, conclusions and inaccuracies does, of course, draw attention to what may be regarded as a fundamental weakness in the whole study. Although every effort was made to undertake an objective enquiry, this cannot disguise the fact that the study is the work of an educational administrator whose knowledge of the Near and Middle East is limited and whose experience is based mainly on western systems.

At least two other defects or omissions are obvious. Firstly, in 114 relation to a country where most of the adult population remains /21 illiterate, suggestions for advance towards compulsory education cannot be dissociated from measures for combating general illiteracy. It will be seen that some reference is made both to the problem of adult illiteracy and to the need for associating day schools with realistic projects of fundamental education. Reference to this problem is only sketchy, partly because time pressed hard but mainly because, at the time of writing, a Unesco team is about to investigate materials and techniques for fundamental education in Iraq. Secondly, an account of the educational system beyond the primary stage is not given. This omission is deliberate—it is not necessary to duplicate the excellent information given by Dr. Matta Akrawi and Professor Roderic Matthews in their current book *Education in Arab Countries of the Near East.*

An attempt has been made to be reasonably frank. The 000

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

NORTHERN 'IRAQ AND ITS PEOPLES

By MAJOR W. C. F. WILSON, O.B.E.

114 A lecture given before the Society on March 10, 1937, Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., in the Chair.

The Chairman: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have much pleasure in introducing Major Wilson, who is going to speak to us on the subject of Northern 'Iraq and its peoples. He first served in 'Iraq under that very great officer, Sir Percy Cox, who recently passed away. Major Wilson rebuilt Kut after our victory over the Turks, and of recent years he has been administrative officer at Mosul; and can give us very up-to-date accounts of the Assyrian problem in Northern 'Iraq, and can also speak from first-hand knowledge of the Kurds and the other minorities of the country.

101 TO many who have never been to 'Iraq, the name, or its old alternative, Mesopotamia, possibly conjures up visions of flat, featureless plains, strips of cultivation along the banks of the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, sandstorms and a torrid climate. Such visions are in a fair measure true of central and southern 'Iraq, but are very far from applying to the two northern provinces of Arbil and Mosul.

Geography

133 From the Lesser Zab river northwards the country is undulating and intersected with watercourses or wādis, which after rain flow down to the Tigris and its half-dozen tributaries. This type of country extends right up to the foothills which fringe the mighty mountain mass of Kurdistan. Over this area, irrigation, except on the rivers for summer crops, is unnecessary, and the rainfall which comes between November and May is in most years sufficient for the cultivation of large crops of wheat and barley. In the spring, grazing for animals is plentiful and a wonderful assortment of wild flowers appear.

In the mountains, during the same period, heavy rain and snow fill the underground sources and provide water for the summer growing of rice, tobacco and other crops, and for good summer grazing for animals. These mountains contain several ranges 6,000 to 8,000 feet high and one peak near the Iranian frontier over 10,000 feet.

Population

144 The inhabitants of the two provinces consist of an extraordinarily heterogeneous collection of creeds and races with all the problems produced by such a collection.

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN IRAQ

ABDUL GHANI AL DALLI *

433 Modern industry in Iraq, as in many other underdeveloped countries, has made significant progress in recent years and especially since the end of World War II. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the causes of this movement in their relation to over-all industrial development and industrialisation in Iraq. The discussion in this paper will, on the whole, be restricted to the problems of industrial enterprise in the private sector of the economy. Consequently, Government industrial plans, as well as the oil industry have not been discussed. Likewise, the paper does not deal with the wider regional aspects of modern industry. As far as Iraq is concerned, the main causes for the progress of industry are to be found in the abundance of natural wealth, especially in the form of oil, the relative plentifulness of cheap labour in urban centers, the hardships suffered by the population during the war owing to the shortage of essential industrial products, the exceptional profits made during the war by proprietors of such modern industries as then existed (e.g. woollen textiles, cigarettes, soap, etc.), the accumulation of large sums of liquid capital in relatively few hands as a result of war and post-war inflation, and finally, the positively helpful attitude of Government towards industrial development.
654 The Iraqi Government has always tried to encourage industry, and
652 has granted it various exemptions from taxation under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, passed in 1929, and its amendments. In 1946 - 47, however, it took a more effective step in the creation of the Industrial Bank, with a capital of I.D. 500,000 wholly contributed by the Government. The Bank's function is to grant loans for the establishment of new industries and the expansion and improvement of existing industries, to participate in joint-stock companies formed for industrial purposes, to start new industrial enterprises on its own account if need be, and to offer various services connected with the import of machinery, materials, and the export

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114 * Abdul Ghani Al Dalli is Member of the Iraqi Parliament and Minister of Agriculture, and a former Director General of the Industrial Bank of Iraq.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

THE MISSION

[FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BANK]

IVAR ROOTH
Chief of Mission

JOHN C. DE WILDE
Chief Economist

JEAN R. DE FARGUES	*Adviser on Irrigation, Flood Control and Drainage*
CARL FLESHER	*Adviser on Industry and Power*
E. R. HONDELINK	*Adviser on Transportation*
LUTHER G. JONES	*Agronomist*
ANTONIO KAYANAN	*Adviser on Community Planning and Housing*
BENJAMIN B. KING	*Economist*
MIROSLAV A. KRIZ	*Adviser on Public Finance, Money and Banking*
ALBERT LORENZEN	*Adviser on Public Health*
C. H. J. MALIEPAARD	*Agricultural Economist*
K. G. SAIYIDAIN	*Adviser on Education*
C. W. SCHULLER	*Adviser on Public Administration*
T. THRELKELD	*Adviser on Animal Husbandry*

EUGENE TROY
Administrative Assistant

ROSE DILIBERTO
EUNICE O. DOREY
Secretaries

p. v

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

PREFACE

121 On October 10, 1950, the Government of Iraq officially requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a mission to Iraq to undertake a general review of the country's economic potentialities and make recommendations for a development program. After an exchange of views it was agreed that a mission would be sent with the following terms of reference:

> "The Mission will be expected to undertake a general review of Iraq's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the Government of Iraq to formulate a long-term program for the further development of the country's productive resources. Specifically, the report of the Mission is to include recommendations concerning:
>
> (1) investment priorities as among different sectors of the Iraqi economy and as among types of undertakings within each important sector;
>
> (2) the approximate rate of investment which can appropriately be undertaken without inflationary or other disruptive effects;
>
> (3) measures apart from capital investment which appear necessary or desirable for improving and increasing production;
>
> (4) economic and fiscal policies which may be important to accelerate the pace of Iraq's development; and
>
> (5) governmental organization and practices having an important effect on development."

114 A number of United Nations agencies cooperated in the selection of the personnel of the Mission. The agricultural economist, the agronomist and the expert on animal husbandry were nominated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which also undertook to pay a portion of their salaries

[p. viii is blank]

and expenses. The World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization nominated the specialists in health and education, respectively.

The Mission arrived in Iraq on February 25, 1951, and the last members left the country on May 27, 1951. During this period members of the Mission travelled widely about the country in order to study conditions and problems at first hand. The Mission worked generally under the auspices of the Development Board, whose members and staff provided valuable assistance. The Principal Liaison Officer to the Mission, Mr. Naim Bashoo, greatly facilitated the Mission's work. In the course of its work, the Mission also drew on the resources of many other government departments and agencies whose cooperation was generously given. The Mission takes this opportunity to express its gratitude to the many people both in public and in private life who gave freely of their time and effort to help the Mission.

In the following report the Mission submits a series of recommendations over a broad field. In making these recommendations the Mission has taken into account the Development Board's five-year program without, however, attempting to arrive at a judgment on every one of the projects included in this program. The many conclusions and recommendations of the Mission may well be subject to modification in the light of additional information or of future developments. While the Mission enjoyed generous cooperation in obtaining data essential to its work, it was inevitably handicapped to some extent by the same lack of adequate, reliable information which is generally encountered in varying degrees in all underdeveloped countries. For example, the absence of dependable data on agricultural and livestock yields and on the location, extent and quality of cultivable but idle land made it difficult to assess the impact of various measures in the field of irrigation, drainage and agriculture. Similarly, lack of statistical data has made it difficult to determine, except in general terms, the repercussions which increased public expenditures might have on production, incomes, consumption and imports. The Mission does not believe, however, that these factors significantly affect the validity of its recommendations.

I-1 To conform to current practice Iran has been substituted for Persia and Irani for Persian except in historical references.

114 In Iraq Dr. Hydari, Director of the Rustam Agricultural Experimental Farm at Hinaidi near Baghdad, presented to Field Museum a number of varieties of *Gossypium*, *Hordeum*, and *Triticum*. Dr. Calvin K. Staudt, Director of the American School for Boys in Baghdad, contributed information regarding local drugs.

As a result of Dr. Laufer's death, arrangements had to be made for the study and publication of the material desired by him without the benefit of his collaboration. Other collections of drugs from southwestern Asia had been studied by Dr. David Hooper of the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum in London. I therefore visited him to discuss the question of the identification of the collections from Iran and Iraq. Dr. Hooper, who a few years previously had published an account of the drugs of Iran, consented to prepare a report on the Field Museum material and this publication is the result. To his account, I have in certain cases added some notes (H.F.) and, from sources indicated in each instance, mostly from Evan Guest, a mention of some of the more important useful plants not a part of the collection studied by Dr. Hooper. Dr. Casey A. Wood has published a translation of the "Tadhkirat" of Ali ibn Isa of Baghdad (circa A.D. 940–1010) under the title "Memorandum Book of a Tenth-Century Oculist," Chicago, 1936. This publication contains (pp. 47–78) a list of drugs and other remedial agents which can be compared with the data in this report.

126 Because of the difficulties involved in recording the colloquial names for the various plants and drugs and their transliterations, there are inevitably certain discrepancies, but I believe that the list of native names in alphabetical order with their Latin equivalents should be of value to other collectors. If the native name is not in the list, the reader should refer to tukhm (seeds), gul-i (flowers), gil-i (earth), or rishah (root), as the name may appear in these forms.

121 The useful plants and materia medica of southwestern Asia may be considered to be fairly well known and no new drug plants are included in the list, but it is hoped that this report will be of value in making existing information even more accessible and in encouraging medical officers to publish additional information.

The rapid advance of westernization in Iran under Reza Shah Pahlevi and in Iraq under King Ghazi necessitates the accurate recording of rapidly disappearing primitive medical folklore.

HENRY FIELD

35a Hooper and Field 3-6 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MK1

USEFUL PLANTS AND DRUGS OF IRAN AND IRAQ

DAVID HOOPER

INTRODUCTION

I-I
128

The material embodied in the present catalogue is the result of three collections made in Iran and Iraq during the past eight years. The first was made by Henry Field, leader of the Field Museum Anthropological Expedition to the Near East, 1934. These specimens were obtained mostly from the bazaars of Tehran, Isfahan, and Baghdad, while some were gathered in fields and gardens where medicinal plants were cultivated. Lists accompanied these plants, stating their vernacular names and local properties and uses. The second collection was made in 1933 by Captain P. Johnston-Saint, of the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum in London; this consisted of 200 vegetable, animal, and mineral medicines from the markets of Putrus and Tehran.

The third collection was made by Dr. J. M. Cowan and Dr. C. D. Darlington in the spring of 1929 (*Kew Bulletin*, 1930, pp. 49–63). The drugs were all of vegetable origin and were found in the bazaars of Tehran, Hamadan, and Kermanshah.

The specimens of the first-named collection are specified in the catalogue under the name of "Field" followed by the number of the drug in the list. The numbers in the Field collection not followed by place names are from Tehran. Those followed by the letter A were obtained in Baghdad, Iraq. The specimens in the second collection are marked by "W.H.M.M." (Wellcome Historical Medical Museum) followed by the registered number. Those collected by Cowan and Darlington are distinguished by the letters "K.B." followed by a number referring to the page in the *Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information*, No. 6, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 1931, pp. 299–344, where the drug is described.

114

An opportunity is thus given of studying crude drugs and comparing them with the names of those found in the ancient literature of Iran where materia medica has long been a special science. One of the first and most important of the Persian works on pharmacology is the "Kitabulabnyat an haqa 'iq-uladviyat," or "Book of the Foundations of the True Properties of the Remedies," written about A.D. 970 by the physician Abu Mansur, who during one of his journeys visited India. B. Laufer ("Sino-Iranica," 1919) says, "This is not only the earliest Persian work on the subject but the oldest production in prose of the Neo-Persian literature. The text has been examined by R. Seligmann from a unique manuscript of Vienna dated 1055, the oldest extant Persian manuscript." There is a translation by Abdul-Chaliq Achundow from Baku. This has been rendered into German and published by Dr. R. Kobert in his "Historische: Die pharmacologischen Grundsätze des Abu Mansur Muwaffak, 1893." References to this work are noted under the name "Achundow."

In the year 1681 there was published in Paris the "Pharmacopoeia Persica, ex idiomate Persico in Latinum conversa, opus missionariis, mercatoribus, caeterisque Regionum Orientalium, Lustratoribus necessarium nec non Europaeis Nationibus perutile." This was written by a Carmelite monk, Frater Angelus. There is a short list of a few raw drugs, but the work contains chiefly prescriptions for pharmaceutical preparations, many of which are made up of fifteen to twenty ingredients.

A valuable work of more recent date is one published in Tehran in 1874. It was compiled by Professor J. L. Schlimmer, of the Polytechnic College of Persia, Chief Medical Officer to the Persian Army, and Sanitary Officer, Tehran. It is written in French, and entitled "Terminologie Médico-Pharmaceutique et Anthropologique Française-Persane." This contains a very full list of medicinal plants of Iran with identifications made by Boissier, de Candolle, Hausknecht, and other eminent European pharmacologists and botanists.

Dr. J. E. T. Aitchison has botanically explored portions of Iran and the neighboring regions, and his "Notes on the Products of Western Afghanistan and of North-Eastern Persia," published in Edinburgh in 1890, has been most useful for reference. Dr. William Dymock, for many years Medical Storekeeper for Bombay, had exceptional opportunities of studying the drugs coming into India from the Persian Gulf, and his great knowledge of Oriental languages, in addition to his medical and botanical training, placed him in the front rank of Indian pharmacognosists. His "Vegetable Materia Medica of Western India" (1885) and, later, his "Pharmacographia Indica" are storehouses of information on the trade, natural history, and composition of Oriental drugs. Use has also been made of the "Flora of Syria, Palestine and Sinai" by the Reverend G. E. Post (1896), Boissier's "Flora Orientalis," and "A Working List of the Flowering Plants of Baluchistan," by Mr. I. H. Burkill (1909).

I-I
114 •

Many useful notes on drugs and Persian and Turki names of North Persian plants occur in a series of articles by B. Gilliat-Smith and W. B. Turrill in *K.B.* 1930, Nos. 7–10, entitled "On the Flora of the Nearer East: A Contribution to Our Knowledge of the Flora of Azerbaidjan, North Persia."

Iran
000

ABBREVIATIONS AND PUBLICATION REFERENCES

Abu Mansur—"Book of the Foundations of the True Properties of the Remedies" (970).
Achundow—Translation of Abu Mansur's work, rendered into German by R. Kobert (1893).
Acosta, Christobal, of Burgundy—Traveler in the East; d. 1580.
Afg.—Afghanistan.
Ait.—Aitchison, J. E. T. "Notes on the Products of Western Afghanistan and N. E. Persia," Edinburgh (1890).
Amoen. Exot.—1712; see Kämpfer.
Ar.—Arabic.
Bagh.—Baghdad.
Bal.—Baluchistan.
Bellew—"From the Indus to the Tigris," London (1874).
Beng.—Bengal.
Boiss.—Boissier. "Flora Orientalis," Geneva (1867–84).
Bom.—Bombay.
B. P.—"British Pharmacopoeia" (1914).
Brissemoret, A.—Chemical investigator (1907–26).
C.—See Cowan.
Chin.—Chinese.
Colloquios—Orta, Garcia da, edited by Sir Clements Markham (1913).
Connold—"British Oak Galls" (1922).
Cowan—Cowan, J. M. Collected plants in Persia (1929).
Duk.—Dukani, language of the Deccan, India.
Dymock—Dymock, William. "Vegetable Materia Medica of Western India" (1885); "Pharmacographia Indica" (1891).
Eber.—Ebert, A. E. (1840–1906). American pharmacist.
Egy.—Egypt.
Field—Field collection in Field Museum of Natural History.
Fl. Br. Ind.—"Flora of British India" (1875–98).
Fr.—French.
G.—See Guest.
Gilliat-Smith—Gilliat-Smith, B. and Turrill, W. B. "On the Flora of the Nearer East," K. B. 1930, Nos. 7–10.
Gr.—Greek.
Guest—Guest, Evan. "Plants and Plant Products of Iraq" (1933).
Guz.—Guzerati.
Ham.—Hamadan.
Hind.—Hindustani.
Honigberger—Honigberger, J. M. "Thirty-five Years in the East," London (1852).
Houard—Houard, C. "Les Zoocécidies des Plantes d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Océanie" (1923).
Hughes-Buller—Collected plants in Baluchistan (1908).
Ibn Baitar—Great Arabian traveler and botanist (1197–1248).

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIETY

565 Something of the composition of society in Rowanduz has been seen in the preceding pages, as well as the distinction between "wealthier" and "poorer" families, but the social structure of the town is much more complex than its cleavages along lines of occupation or of wealth, and requires more extended discussion, of particular importance inasmuch as this has proven the most significant area of change in recent decades. To approach this problem it is again necessary to have initial reference to the country as a whole, for in this larger province certain things of relevance to the life of the town must be appreciated. [114] The sociology of Iraq does not appear to have had any single, adequate exposition in recent years, although much of what will be said in this connection can be found scattered in a wide variety of publications, and is commonplace to residents and travelers in the region.

779 582 Of the several divisions of the society of Iraq, the first is that between Muslims and non-Muslims. The adherents of Islam represent by far the greater part of the population, and, according to Quranic law, a Muslim girl cannot marry outside this group unless the suitor, if accepted, becomes a convert himself, a rule which is rigidly

PREFACE

I-1
121

During 1934 as leader of the Field Museum Anthropological Expedition to the Near East, in addition to about 10,000 herbarium specimens from Trans-Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, I collected a number of useful plants and drugs in Iran and Iraq.

The late Dr. Berthold Laufer, then Curator of Anthropology, had requested me to make this collection and to obtain such information as could be had regarding their use in the treatment of diseases and in prescriptions for various ailments.

In Iran specimens were purchased in the native markets of Tehran and Isfahan. In each case the Persian name with its English transliteration and the use of the drug or herb was recorded. While guests of Dr. Erich Schmidt at Rayy during September, 1934, we obtained specimens in Tehran. Dr. Walter P. Kennedy of the Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad and Mr. George Miles, member of the archaeological expedition staff at Rayy, assisted in this work.

115 At Isfahan Mirza Muhammad Ali Khan, ninety-five-year-old doctor, very kindly consented to dictate his prescriptions (pp. 200–216) for various ailments. He began to practice medicine at the age of twenty after spending about five years in a local school. His father, several uncles, and his grandfather were medical practitioners using the oral tradition and two large handwritten volumes of prescriptions, which I examined at his home in the depths of the labyrinthine Ghetto. At Isfahan the dictation in Persian was recorded by Juda Rabbi Hedvat of the Alliance Israélite.

000 The translation was prepared in part by Dr. A. H. Mookree and by Dr. A. H. K. Sassani, Iran Government scholar at the University of Chicago. Dr. H. W. Bailey of the School of Oriental Studies, University of London, revised the Persian characters and the transliterations.

The assistance of Mr. Paul C. Standley, Associate Curator of Botany in Field Museum, who checked the botanical names in the text, and of Miss Elizabeth Reniff in the preparation of the report is gratefully acknowledged.

Mr. A. R. Horwood of Kew Herbarium very kindly identified some of the specimens.

The spelling of place names conforms to the system adopted by the British Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, published in London by the Royal Geographical Society.

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ʿIRAQ, 1900 TO 1950

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ʿIRAQ, 1900 TO 1950

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A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC HISTORY

BY

STEPHEN HEMSLEY LONGRIGG

Ay me! ay me! with what another heart
In days far-off, and with what other eyes
I used to watch—if I be he that watch'd—
The lucid outline forming round thee . . . .
TENNYSON: *Tithonus*

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PREFACE

MORE than a quarter of a century has passed since, a young official of the 'Iraq Government, I published an account of the four centuries of that country's history ending in 1900. That tentative and imperfect work has not, to my knowledge, been superseded; and as it seems now to call for a continuation into more recent times I have tried in the volume now offered to carry out this task. My own connexion with the territory, which has been continuous since 1915, has included some sixteen years of residence there followed by annual or more than annual visits, and has been favoured by the friendship of many scores of 'Iraqis at all levels, including perhaps two-thirds of those mentioned in these pages. 114

The interest which 'Iraq offered formerly to the world—that of history, archaeology, strategy, economics, and social structure—has grown not less but greater during the last generation. Apart from the personal and affectionate interest felt by many friends of the 'Iraqis, the circumstances of the foundation of their nation, its era of tutelage and emancipation, its varying fortunes as an independent State, its social and cultural development as illustrating the familiar but uneasy impact of West on East, its revelation of national character, its share in Arab politics and in world groupings, its material development, its possible future: all these should contribute to a story well worth the telling, if it can be rightly told. At the same time I, and probably some readers, must regret the absence from these pages of many or most of the figures—tribal or village chiefs, town 'notables' and professional men, the humble as well as the eminent in officialdom and the general public—so long and so well known to residents in 'Iraq in this or that part of a wide, varied, and deeply interesting country. It is indeed regrettable that so little of this element of social life, enriched by many picturesque, responsive, and often eminent personalities of the country, will appear in this history; indeed much of the best that 'Iraq has to offer in courtesy, humour, and kindliness must be here unrecorded. 000

The need for a general account of the last half-century in 'Iraq has not hitherto been met. There are diplomatic papers, military histories and dispatches, travellers' tales, 'Iraqi political writings and a voluminous press, biographies of the eminent, and a few scholars' and specialists' monographs: but there seems to be no single work attempting to be both as comprehensive and as reliable as the variety and the too close proximity of the events will permit. I have hoped to be of use in helping both the contemporary reader

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and the future historian in the formation of just judgements and the avoidance of factual errors, by giving them access to an objective version of what 'Iraq has done and suffered, received and contributed, during these fifty years.

The decision which I made in 1925, to close my narrative of *Four Centuries* at 1900, was wise in its avoidance of the need to refer to actors on the 'Iraqi stage who were still living and in many cases my friends. I am not this time able to avoid the dangers of such references, and I anticipate the pained surprise of those whom, as they may feel, I have misrepresented or misjudged. Others, including some of my own countrymen, will regret that their names, in spite of admirable services rendered—of which I am not ignorant—find no place in these pages. This, whatever one's efforts to be just, cannot in practice be otherwise, as long as a fallible historian is forced, as he is, to assess and to omit. It is certain that much valuable service to 'Iraq is here unrecorded, and that another writer might well judge differently of the acts and motives of many individuals, movements, or factors which play their parts in these pages. To no reader, I am certain, will the shortcomings of this work be as apparent as they are to me; the necessity to compress and to over-simplify—often with imperfect knowledge—has led to results which, in page after page, I must condemn as inadequate to the interest of the subject-matter.

The 'Iraq of 1951 is a country which, with an increasing though still imperfect sense of unity and nationhood, neither has any reasonable claims or grievances against any other, nor is itself the subject of others' demands. Its boundaries are fixed, its climate healthy, its people increasing and progressive. It possesses abundance of fertile land and controllable water, and the certainty that these together can produce, as they did in earlier ages, great material wealth; and it has a well-exploited mineral resource of exceptional richness to provide funds, meanwhile, for works of development and for social services. Few territories can be more blessed by nature with materials for 'the good life' of its citizens, who are themselves unusually intelligent and by no means incapable of progress, and for whose manifold increase room and to spare will be available. The highest hopes for the future of 'Iraq can not unreasonably be formed by its people and by its foreign friends, who are many and sincere. With what pleasure would these latter, who include myself, watch the progress and happiness of this nation! To achieve these, stability and continuity are indispensable conditions; all must depend, it seems, on the ability of its leaders, and behind them of the public, to turn their backs on selfish faction and wearisome rhetoric: to keep the goodwill of strong friends among the Powers: and, choosing as their main or sole

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objective 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' of their 000 own people, to conduct their affairs with good sense and moderation.

No historian of current or very recent events can feel confident that he has seen *all* the published sources of information about them. I have no such confidence, and can only hope that the bibliography given, which aims at brevity rather than at the portentousness of the thesis-writer, omits no really valuable work. I have used to a varied and selective extent the contemporary newspaper and periodical press of 'Iraq, Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy, as well as histories and monographs published in these countries; have had the advantage of close personal acquaintance with the 'Iraqi scene during most of the period covered; and have been exceptionally fortunate in the generous help I have received from 'Iraqi and British friends with expert and recent knowledge. Among these I should wish to thank in particular Sayid Tawfiq al-Naqib, of the Port Directorate at Baṣra: Sayid Salman Juwayda, of the Date Association: Mr. R. C. Kelt, the Port Director: H. E. Sayid Khalil Kunna, Minister of Education: Mr. A. H. Ditchburn, Chief Administrative Inspector: Mr. F. Stoakes, of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company: Mr. C. C. Aston, formerly of the 'Iraq Government and latterly chief of the (war-time) Political Adviserate: Mr. F. H. Gamble, of the Commercial Section of the British Embassy in Baghdad: Mr. J. J. Page and the late Mr. A. J. B. Chapman, both of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company: Mr. F. S. Hardy and Mr. J. D. Atkinson, each in turn Director of Irrigation: Sir Harry Sinderson, veteran of the 'Iraq Health Services in many capacities: Dr. M. Critchley, of the same service: Mr. J. Battey, of 'Mespers' and E. and T. S. N. Co.: and Professor M. E. L. Mallowan, Field Director of the British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq.

The typescript of the book has been read through, and most valuable comments and corrections made, by Sir Reader Bullard, Mr. C. J. Edmonds, and Mr. R. S. M. Sturges, all of whom spent years in positions of responsibility in 'Iraq. It was read also, not without critical comment, by both my sons. I have had kind help from the heads of missionary or religious bodies in 'Iraq, notably Father J. P. Merrick, S.J., and Father S. G. Tunmer of the Dominicans at Mosul, from the Secretary-General of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris, and from spokesmen or correspondents of the American Protestant Missions represented in 'Iraq. Information, verbal or written, has been kindly given by many other friends, who include Mr. W. Allard, formerly Director of Irrigation: Mr. L. M. Swan, formerly Adviser to the Ministry of Finance: Mr. D. W. Gumbley, formerly Inspector-General of Posts and Telegraphs: Mr. E. C. Caparne, formerly Technical Adviser to the Ministry of Communications and Works: Dr.

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Ahmad Susa, the irrigation engineer and author: Sir John Prichard, President until 1951 of the Court of Appeal: Sayid Darwish Haydar, Director-General of Agriculture: Sayid Tariq al-'Askari, now pioneering in 'Iraq scientific agriculture: H. E. Sayid Tawfiq Wahbi, ex-Minister and deeply learned in Kurdish affairs: Judge 'Abd al-Ḥafidh Ṭaha, now of the Baṣra Petroleum Company: Mr. F. F. Haigh, lately head of the Irrigation Commission of 1946–9: my son, Mr. J. S. Longrigg, of the British Embassy in Baghdad, and Mr. P. Mallet of the same: Mr. W. S. Bailey, formerly of the 'Iraqi Department of Telegraphs.

Confronted with the usual problems of transliteration from Arabic, I have knowingly fallen into some perhaps objectionable compromises and inconsistencies. With most words, I hope, accurately transliterated, I have yielded to the greater comfort of the general reader—or to the mere habit of a lifetime—in retaining Mosul for al-Mawṣil, Mecca for Makka, Kupri for Köprü, 'Abdullah for 'Abd-Allah, Haifa for Ḥayfa, Alamein for 'Alamayn, and similarly for a number of other names. In some place-names there are alternative spellings, where Arabic and Kurdish versions of the word are not identical: in others a final spelling seems to be not yet established. I have omitted *hamza*, except where medial.

May 1952. S. H. L.

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I

THE 'IRAQ OF 1900

I. THE THREE WILAYAS

'To the lover, Baghdad is not far off', 'A (false) account will come back even from Baghdad'; by these and suchlike proverbs the Turk of Istanbul, half a century ago, confessed the remoteness of the sunbaked lands of Tigris and Euphrates. The three wilayas (vilayets) one day to become the 'Iraq Kingdom lay indeed upon the very borderland of Turkish possessions. At no time inhabited by Turks, they belonged rather to the northern extension of the Arabian peninsula, and formed the eastern half of its Fertile Crescent. The country had in older days formed the 'Abbasid province of 'Iraq 'Arabi and part of Jazira. In the first three centuries of Turkish rule it had been united as the single eyalet of Baghdad, one of the great provinces of the Empire ruled by a three-tailed Pasha. Thanks to its ancient fame, its strategic position and present scale, Baghdad had always held easy primacy over the two other renowned cities of 'Iraq, Mosul and Baṣra; and even in 1900, after Mosul had emerged finally as a wilaya in 1879 and Baṣra in 1884, the Wali of Baghdad was by every standard the senior of the three governors. 175"

The tripartite territory was bounded on the north, amid wild mountains, by the Ḥakkari sanjaq of Van wilaya: on the north-west, by a short face of the Jazira-ibn-'Umar qadhā of Diyarbakr wilaya: on the west, by the newly created 'independent' sanjaq of Dayr al-Zur. Farther south the boundary lay at the mid-desert frontier of the wilaya of Damascus and, south again, crossed the deserts of north Arabia, beyond which lay the Arab oasis principalities. To the south also lay the waters of the Persian Gulf and, along its western shores, a stretch of maritime Arabia which was claimed as Turkish and grouped officially under the Baṣra wilaya. To the east, bordering all three provinces, lay Persia.

These boundaries were those of modern 'Iraq save in three particulars. The Persian frontier was still undemarcated; the line observed or flouted in 1900 was in places to be amended by the Commission of 1914. The boundary with the Turkish provinces of Van and Diyarbakr was to be fixed in 1926, that with later Syria in 1920 and 1933, that with the Arabian rulers in 1922. The territories of al-Aḥsā, Qaṭar, and Kuwayt ceased to be Turkish before or during the First World War, and do not concern the historian of 'Iraq. 131

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1752 'Iraq's place in the Empire was determined by various factors. Its remoteness, its non-Turkish inhabitants, its fierce climate were all considerations which made service in it the dread of most Turkish officials; and little was in practice contributed to correct this ill repute by the prestige and past glories of Baghdad, its history of struggles with Persian armies, its almost successful attempts to secede. The progress which Turkish culture had made in some 'Iraqi circles detracted little from the Arab character which it shared equally with the backward provinces of the Ḥijaz, the Yaman, and North Africa, and with those, more sophisticated, of the Levant. The whole block of Arab territory exceeded in area the rest of Turkey, possessed great cultural solidarity, and differed from the Turkish dominions in race and history, in language, social atmosphere, and manners. And as the Arab provinces in general, so 'Iraq in particular brought the Sultan's Government into touch with foreign issues of particular delicacy. The Caliph could not disinterest himself in the loyalty of a race which controlled the Holy Cities of the Ḥijaz, the Shi'i shrines of the Euphrates, the tomb of the Sunni saint 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani (Jilani): who spoke the unique language of Islam and, inhabiting its lands of origin, must control much of its living sentiment in Islamic countries. To this realization, as well as to mere vainglory, were due the ceaseless efforts of the Turks to complete what in the end they never achieved, the conquest of Arabia: a conquest which on the Red Sea coasts, in al-Aḥsā and 'Uman and later in Najd, finally eluded them after weary and weakening aggressive efforts, of which 'Iraqis had been and were to be the spectators. The sight did nothing to diminish the abiding mutual antipathy which in general marked the attitudes of Turk and Arab.

The 'Iraq wilayas, viewed with however scanty favour, were yet held as vital to the Caliph's position. Beyond their fame in Islamic history and religion, they had another claim. From these most neglected and remote of provinces came stories of vast potential riches and the expectation of important future development. In the later years of the century not only foreign travellers and diplomats but Turks at the Sublime Porte itself, and incoming Walis hot for progress, spoke of railways, canal schemes, minerals, extended river navigation, bridges, and town-planning. Such designs had not advanced in 1900 beyond the stage of idle speculation or vaguest project; the impediments of sheer poverty, governmental ignorance, and pervading insecurity had prevented realization of any part of the schemes. But they existed still, in diwan and coffee-shop, and gained for 'Iraq a measure of interest and respect.

To Europeans the country had for a century past become familiar, to some extent, through these same dreams or projects of 175x development, projects whose proportions were better appreciated perhaps in London or Petersburg than in Istanbul, and not without a flavour of international competition. The territory had held for many years its place in world trade, with its interest for steamship lines and market-seekers reorientated by the opening of the Suez Canal. It had long fascinated students of ancient, biblical, and Islamic history. It had astonished the world by the revelation of its excavated sites, Assyrian, Babylonian, Sumerian; it had provided for three centuries an outlet for missionary enterprise by Catholic and Protestant: and it was valued by strategists then as now as the only land approach to the Gulf and, more generally, as the traditional land-bridge of East and West.

To Britain the territory, or its southern half, formed part of the 648x Persian Gulf 'sphere of interest' in which British diplomacy had for two centuries built up a unique position. The suppression of the arms- and slave-traffic and piracy, chart-making and the buoying and lighting of channels, were achievements of high value; and British statesmen felt that a fair reward would be freedom from rivalry in the Gulf waters and coasts and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab hinterland. Trade interests, ocean navigation, a strategic route to India, were all involved. A high proportion of the traffic of Baṣra was in British hands, with nine-tenths of the steamer-tonnage which used that port. Inland, the oldest-established river steamers on the Tigris were British; British and British-Indian firms plied their business at Baghdad and Baṣra. Indian pilgrims arrived in hundreds to visit the 'Iraqi shrines; and money bequeathed long since by a pious King of Oudh was handed twice yearly by the British Resident at Baghdad for charitable distribution by the Mujtahids of Najf and Karbalā—a task which their sanctity, their refusal of supervision, and (as some alleged) their avarice rendered sadly embarrassing. Englishmen had been pioneers of 'Iraqi archaeology, as the names of Layard, Rawlinson, Loftus, and Taylor attested for the earliest period, those of Budge and King for the later. A mission of the Church Missionary Society had been established with its church and hospital at Baghdad in 1882, and extended its work later to Mosul. Watchful over all these enterprises, the British Resident and Consul-General at Baghdad presided over a far more considerable establishment than other foreign representatives. With their own residency surgeon and dispensary, their river steamer the *Comet* of the Royal Indian Marine, their guard of sepoys and their extraterritorial Indian Post Offices, successive Residents had been forced by the jealous disfavour of Walis to fight hard for their privileges. The Resident belonged normally to the Indian Political Service, the Consul at Baṣra, after 1898, to

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the Levant Consular Service. A Consular Agent of Indian nationality had since 1893 watched the interests of Indian pilgrims at Karbalā and the Oudh Bequest distributions. A similar post at Mosul was revived in 1893, to be held by a local Christian.

The attitude of officialdom in the 'Iraq of the 'nineties to British or any foreign enterprise—though by no means to all individuals, for socially many were accepted—was suspicious or hostile. The days of 'the Great Elchi', when Britain had no rival at Istanbul, were long forgotten. The occupation of Cyprus and Egypt, the British attitude to the Armenian massacres, and the bitter words of Gladstone had cost the friendship of the Porte and led to an attitude founded upon jealousy, with a colouring of Muslim feeling, against the alien interloper. The frequent appeals of 'Iraqi tribesmen for British support, though always correctly repulsed by the Resident or Consul, were specially irritating to the Pashas who, with some part of the public, appeared to believe in British covetousness of 'Iraq territory itself; and constructed a ridiculous mud fort at Fao against the invader.

The interest of Russia in the 'Iraqi wilayas followed at a considerable distance that of Great Britain. Well informed, through its Armenian agents, the Russian Consulate refounded at Baghdad in 1889 was at least aware of his nation's persistent penetration of north-western Persia, of the fringes of the Van wilaya, and even of the mountain qaḍhās of Mosul itself; for the Consul and his Vice-Consul at Baṣra, with their total of three-score Persians claimed as nominal Russian subjects, had few other duties. Russian 'protection' of Orthodox Christians was scarcely in question, since these were few in 'Iraq. In projects, however, and hopes of extending the Tsar's influence towards further goals the Russians were only less active in 'Iraq than in Persia. It was the application of Count Kapnist for a Mediterranean–Persian Gulf railway concession that hastened, as will later appear, the Anglo-Kuwayt Agreement of 1899.

The French had anticipated all others in their consular appointments in 'Iraq, naming a Consul to Baṣra in the seventeenth and to Baghdad in the eighteenth centuries. In 1900 there survived only a Vice-Consul at Baghdad. Their commercial interests were in fact slight, and political objectives scarcely existed. It was to them a territory of two activities. The first was archaeological research in which French scholars, Place, Fresnel, and Oppert had played an early, and de Sarzec an outstanding part. The second was the field of Catholicism. They played resolutely the part of Protector to all local Catholics and Uniates, and through their missions and bishops and the Papal Delegate resident at Mosul had powerful influence over the most numerous and wealthy of the Christian

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communities: an influence in which observers found an element of Gallic nationalism accompanied by rancour against non-Catholics and the Powers who might support these. The French missions were ancient and active. Their long-established Carmelites maintained two boys' schools at Baghdad, a press, an orphanage, and a dispensary. At Mosul the Dominican fathers, formerly Italian but French since 1859, maintained their urban and village schools, their dispensaries, their priests' training college, their church, and their prolific and polyglot printing-press; while, from the same Order, the Sisters of the Presentation had maintained their elementary and needle-work schools for girls at Mosul since the eighteen-seventies, and extended their work to Baghdad in 1881. These efforts had gone far to popularize the French language, enrich the culture of the Uniates, and contribute an element of real education to the local world. 'Iraq, in fact, and particularly the Mosul wilaya, formed part of the French sphere of cultural predominance. The missionary work of French Jewry will be mentioned later.

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A Consul of the United States had been replaced in 1894 by a Vice-Consul, who resided intermittently in Baghdad; for American interest in 'Iraq was slight. An ambitious archaeological survey was carried out in the 'eighties, followed by a season of excavation; and a branch of the Arabian mission of the Dutch Reformed Church of America was started in the 'nineties with a school, dispensary, and hospital at Baṣra, with later work also at 'Amara and Naṣiriya. The effort met with strong Turkish opposition, which it survived. A number of converts to Protestantism were made from local Christians.

Other nations of Europe pretended at this period to little or no concern in the 'Iraq wilayas. Greek subjects had had recourse until 1897 to the British Resident, Austrian until 1900 to the French Consul. The German Empire had entrusted its slight interests in 'Iraq to Great Britain until 1894, when a German resident in Baghdad was appointed Consul. Late in the century their archaeologists had appeared—Sachau in 1879 and the great Koldewey first in 1889, then from 1898 onwards; but they showed no other concern with the territory until the eastward march of German policy was to raise, at the end of the century, the burning question of the Baghdad Railway. Meanwhile the penetration of Turkey by a mission of German military officers, their railway enterprises in Anatolia, the Kaiser's State visits, the abstention of his Government alone among the Powers from condemnation of the Armenian atrocities, were confirming Germany in the empty place of Great Britain as the leading Western nation in the Ottoman Empire.

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2. COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

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The zones of land surface into which the territory divides itself, though they belong less to history than to geography, may be briefly mentioned since they deeply affect the life of the inhabitants and reflect their ethnology.

First comes the mountain belt in the north and north-east. A part of the main Armenian and Zagros system, it formed in 1900 the sanjaq of Sulaymaniya and a large part of those of Mosul and Shahrizur. This terrain is wholly un-Arabian, the population solidly Kurdish. Its mountains, mainly barren but carrying also areas of forest, are divided by deep valleys sometimes widening into plains. The hardy inhabitants of its hundreds of villages produce crops of grain, rice, vegetables, fruit, and tobacco, grown on the water of springs and rivulets and the relatively abundant rain. The climate is equable in summer, harsh in winter, the landscape commonly of striking beauty.

In the flattish submontane area of Mosul and Shahrizur sanjaqs lie treeless uplands and the lower courses of the Greater and Lesser Zabs. Here, in ancient Assyria, village-dwelling cultivators grow spring grain crops on rain and, in places, by water-lift from the rivers. The country is intermediate in environment and race between the mountain zone and the hot flatlands of central ʽIraq. The latter, the most extensive and most characteristic region of the country, covered the sanjaqs of Baghdad and Karbalā and most of Ḥilla. Everywhere dead flat and stoneless, it is unblessed, save in rare seasons, by rainfall sufficient for crop-growing, and must needs be cultivated by lift or flow from controlled canals or flood-channels. The crops are winter and summer grain and vegetables, locally some rice, and vast gardens of dates. The population, entirely Arab, lives in mud-built villages or in clusters of hair tents or reed huts.

The equally flat silt-country of the lower Tigris–Euphrates delta, astride and below the prehistoric coast-line, covered the southern part of the Ḥilla sanjaq and almost the whole of the three sanjaqs of ʽAmara, Muntafiq, and Baṣra. It was characterized by a higher proportion of reed dwellings, fewer mud villages: by lesser crops of wheat and barley, but extensive rice-growing in the flooded areas: by miles of date gardens, and by a special way of life developed by the buffalo breeders, mat weavers, and fishermen in the great marshes.

Ignoring the Arabian dependencies of Baṣra, two other zones remain to be mentioned. One is that of the Shaṭṭ al-ʽArab in the Baṣra sanjaq, with its miles of ordered date gardens in a lean strip between river and desert: the other is that of the arid steppe

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It li[illegible] equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Araḅ nomads; their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-dwellers, 162
then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 181
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 159
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking ''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

184 the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged
795 generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i,
[578] while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated.
Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government itself.

563 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of
162 the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—
perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of
563 which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear
621 racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement
and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled them in a social organization which represented an identical response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes; but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization. About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur.
563 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds
795 of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their
homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of
197 the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan
Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan (Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary status.

563 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long
been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroach-
621 ment by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil,
and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for
563 the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley
dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

established at every qadhā and naḥiya; and the Kurds, in turn, 563 supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in 563 type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, 181 fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been 795 reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal 563 organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, 621 Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Ṭuz 181 Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shiʿism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined 563 almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with 162 184

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of 162 the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, 184 Kadhimiya, Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar, from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more [795] unmanageable because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to 'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These [465] hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk, with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boatbuilders in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever running water was available for their rites. Their origins and beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants 563
had been largely driven from the field. Western education was 162
widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish
progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The 184
community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was
treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities
and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying
avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position
and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little 563
from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to 795
official Millets headed locally by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch.
Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous 162
in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nestorians, 184
few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Amadiya
qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a
few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites
catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek
Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and
finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nestorians,
had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its
villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians,
whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless
to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but
below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented
and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian
nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and
bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq.
The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but
not in lower 'Iraq, specialized in retail commerce, hotel-keeping,
artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number
of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had 463
long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All
the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually
schools, served for long years past by the missions of European
churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi
standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls'
schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military
service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both
religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of
their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, 563
were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by 162
families whose property or politics constrained them to live there,
by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

563 perhaps a fifth part of the military forces and a tenth of the gen-
162 darmerie. But this minority was disproportionately powerful by dint of the authority of Government, and by the contact of its leaders with the ante-rooms of Istanbul and with Turkish culture
[177] It followed that some 'Iraqis, but not many, were thus attracted to the prestige of Turkish circles and all they signified, and, before the day of an Arab nationalism—or even after it—identified themselves with that element. Turkish was everywhere the language of Government, the courts, and the State schools.

3. PERSIAN AND ARABIAN NEIGHBOURS

648 With their Persian neighbour, Turkey and 'Iraq had a long tradition of discord. If, by the nineteenth century, the days of major aggressive war were over, there remained material for ill will between two unsympathetic peoples who differed in language culture, and character. This was not diminished by the Persian Consular representatives—some of dubious status—at a dozen of the 'Iraq cities. The two Empires, devoted respectively to the Sunni and Shi'i faiths, were passing also through different stages of their evolution: Turkey struggling with modernism and western aspirations, Persia still medieval and uneasy with half-independent vassals in her midst. Reaction in its crudest forms was in the ascendant at Teheran since the accession in 1896 of the amiable spendthrift Mudhaffar al-Din Shah.

The frontier itself had proved a major irritant. Its line had been settled by nothing more stable than the fortunes of many wars and the fickle adherences of tribes. It cut through the featureless flatlands east of the lower Tigris and across the tumbled mountains of Kurdistan; it divided homogeneous peoples, often migratory and always incapable of loyalty to a distant throne. The 1847 Treaty of Erzerum had been followed by thirty years of conventions, commissions, and map-making, and by as many, in the last quarter of the century, of minor forays, counter-interventions, and angry protests. The close of the century found the Turks still claiming Persian-occupied towns and valleys—Urmiya, Wazna, Bana, Sardasht, Zuhab—and the Persians demanding the Gul'ambar Plain the Hawraman Mountain, and lands near Khaniqin. These squabbles, which forbade all border tranquillity, were echoed in the extreme south by the pretensions of both to possess the shoals and islands of the Shaṭṭ. Turkish claims to Muhammara had indeed by now been abandoned; but jealousies and reprisals on the Shaṭṭ offered a fertile field for piracy, which led in turn to British intervention, the threat of a British Consul at Fao, and the stationing of a gunboat on the river in 1898.

The great pilgrimages by Persians to Najf, Karbalā, Kadhimiya

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Samarrā, productive as these were of mutual ill-feeling, were as rich in occasions for governmental stiffness and private extortion, with demands for visa and quarantine fees. The carrying of Persian corpses for burial at holy Najf was charged at £1 per body, and produced frontier fraud and evasion in a dozen forms. Everywhere on the roads and at the cities the pilgrims were at the mercy of Khan-keepers, carriers, and the privileged parasites of the shrines.

The transit trade between the countries consisted of Persian goods conveyed through ʿIraq to Baṣra and the far more important carrying of foreign goods into Persia through Baṣra, Baghdad, and Khaniqin. Interruption of this major element in ʿIraq trade was habitual through insecurity on the Tigris and on the Kirmanshah highway. It formed a recurring subject of recrimination, as did the delays and venality of Turkish Customs officers.

Of the Persian provinces which marched with the frontier, each had its own character and none was effectively administered. On the flank of Baṣra, across the Shaṭṭ, lay ʿArabistan. Its southern half, Arab in population, had been left by the Persians for sixty years to the care of a hereditary Shaykh of the Muḥaysin (Arab) tribe; and under this administration, unpretentious but enormously superior to the monstrous corruptions of Teheran, Muḥammara at the Karun mouth had developed into a port and market of importance, all the greater since in 1888 steamship navigation had been inaugurated on the Karun by British enterprise. Irrigation and even railway projects were contemplated, archaeological work was pursued under a French monopoly, foreign Consuls and Agencies appeared. The ruler, Shaykh Khazʿal, showed a flexible astuteness in his position as the independent Arab ruler over Persian territory; he accepted an imperial Delegate at his capital, dispatched tribute to Teheran, accepted Persian titles, and maintained an uneasy peace with the Wali of Baṣra. Khazʿal and his adviser, Ḥajj Muḥammad ʿAli, familiar to many European friends as Ḥajji Raʾis, were modernistic in matters of education and development, but traditional in tribal administration. Muḥammara was a city of refuge for the Shiʿi Shaykhs of the lower Tigris when in trouble with their own governors.

North of ʿArabistan and almost equally independent of the Qajar dynasty lay Luristan, the province of the Lurs, who are racially and dialectically distinct from Persians. It fell into two areas, the Greater and the Lesser. The Pusht-i-Kuh, western zone of the latter and home of the Fayliya Lurs, formed its boundary with Baṣra and Baghdad wilayas. It had remained for three centuries under a single line of Walis. The obligations of the governorship were confined to a small tribute to the central Government, 648* its powers unlimited within Pusht-i-Kuh, its influence considerable in eastern 'Iraq. Ghulam Ridhā Khan, fourteenth of his line, was respected for his pomp and his religious observances, but hated for his morbid avarice.

Northward from his domain, along the frontier, lay more of the ungoverned no-man's-land of the Kurdish tribesmen. Of the province of Kirmanshah, the western half was wholly Kurdish and, in effect, ungoverned. North of it lay Ardalan (or officially 'Kurdistan') with its capital at Sinna; and north again lay the borders of Adharbayjan, which rich and famous province—the normal appanage of the Persian heir-apparent—included the areas south and west of Urmiya of the Turkish frontier.

Throughout this deep belt of Persian Kurdistan it was hard rigidly to distinguish the tribesmen or the terrain attributable to the one or to the other Power. The Kurdish areas of Mosul wilaya, as of Van beyond it, resembled Ardalan and Kirmanshah in the complete dominance of the Kurdish race, language, and way of life, and between them all there was constant intercourse, traffic, intermarriage, feuds or alliances in which nominal nationality was unconsidered. Caravan routes ran everywhere across the frontier zone. Many of the tribes were either physically divided between the two national territories, such as the Hawraman tribesmen, the Bilbas, or Bajlan, or by seasonal habit migrated across the frontier for grazing as did the Sinjabi, Jaf, and Harki: or considered themselves free, when hunted like the Hamawand, to take convenient refuge in either country.

In the Kurdish districts of Kirmanshah province, through which passed the brigand-haunted trunk road, dwelt the powerful Kalhur group, the Sinjabi and the Guran. The Bajlan were divided by the frontier; their Pasha lived at Khaniqin, most of the tribe around disputed Zuhab. Northward, across the upper Diyalā, here called the Sirwan, were the settled sections of the nomadic Jaf. This greatest of migratory Kurdish tribes was faithful to its habit of trans-frontier movement. Astride the Hawraman lay the tribe of that name, divided in allegiance; beyond these the Persian Marivan and a tract of settled Ardalan country depending on Bana, Sardasht, and Saqiz. Farther north, on the confines of Adharbayjan, lay the ancient and famous Mukri tribe-group. Finally, in the lowlands opposite Urmiya, beyond the border villages of the Shirwan and Baradost tribesmen, lay settled Kurds and Turkoman villages.

The tract of Kurdish mountain country north of Mosul wilaya differed in nothing from the Persian-Kurdish zone, unless in the greater wildness of the Hakkari Mountains. It belonged to Van wilaya, faced eastward towards Salmas and the Shikak tribesmen in Persian Adharbayjan, and ran westward from Shamdinan—the home, at Neri village, of Sayid Muḥammad Sadīq, son of the 648x notorious Christian-murderer, Shaykh 'Ubaydullah—to the Tigris at Jazira-ibn-'Umar. This zone, governed from Julamark the capital of Ḥakkari, was inhabited or was traversed in their migrations by tribes of great renown—the Goyan, Sharnakhi, and Artushi, whose chiefs twenty years earlier had welcomed the prestige and profit of raising Ḥamidiya cavalry regiments for their Caliph.

In place of the free Kurdish dynasties at Bitlis, Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and Julamark of half a century earlier, there straggled now on both sides of the Mosul frontier a régime of fragmented tribal life and feudal authority penetrated, sometimes half-effectively sometimes nominally, by the agencies of the Turkish Government. Scattered amid the Kurdish villages in both wilayas were communities of Armenians, Chaldaeans, Jews, and Assyrians.

The last-mentioned community was a generation later to play, 563 transplanted and half-destroyed, a dismal part in 'Iraq history. 795 These East Syrian or Nestorian or Assyrian shepherds and cultivators 648x were an ancient Christian Millet, Syriac in speech, uncertain of origin and of blood, and hardly distinguishable in their manner of life, dress, and custom from the Kurds, in whose truculent or tolerant midst they had existed for many centuries. They were protected by their resolute character and jealous loyalty to their own faith and leadership. The Mar Sham'un of the time, their spiritual head and community ruler, resident at Kuchanis, had been for half a generation supported by a mission of the Church of England. This divided its efforts between the Ḥakkari Assyrian clans, with their fighting maliks and rough illiterate bishops, and the more peaceful, less harassed branch of the people who had settled at Urmiya. The former group, Turkish subjects, were in part *'ashiret*—tribute-paying tribes—and in part *ra'ayā*, peasantry. The nation contained perhaps one hundred thousand souls in Turkish territory. Faithful to an ancient Church, isolated in savage mountains, poor and threatened by every whim of powerful neighbours, though capable of a virile resistance and even of harsh aggression, its plight was watched by anxious eyes in Europe.

To the west of 'Iraq lay the steppe-desert where roamed the bedouin tribe-group of the 'Aniza. Southward of these, beyond the D̲hafir and Muṭayr nomads, lay the communities of true Arabia: the small harbour State of Kuwayt, established a century earlier under the house of Ṣubaḥ; the coastlands of al-Aḥsā with its oases and its vigorous life of nomadic tribes; and, finally, central Arabia where for years past two dynasties had disputed for supremacy.

Of these districts, Kuwayt and the Wahhabi Amirate of ibn 648x Sa'ud were static Arab sultanates; al-Aḥsā (part of the Sa'udi

648 empire until 1871) was a tract unified only by dominance from without; the Amirate of ibn Rashid was a purely tribal organism of the southern Shammar. Common to them all was their primitive governmental and social level; save partially in al-Aḥsā, it was the aboriginal Arabia, undisturbed and unaltered in its statecraft, its economics, its ignorance. The revolution of the next half-century, already well begun in 'Iraq, had as yet cast no shadow in eastern Arabia.

Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt had gained the throne by fratricide in 1896 and, like his two predecessors, acknowledged Turkish authority. His first years of power were a struggle for survival, which he achieved by rough justice at home and discreet bribes placed in Istanbul and Baṣra; by the end of the century he had gained the Sultan's recognition. But his fame and the later special interest were due to other causes. In 1897 and again in 1898 he begged the 'protection' of the British Government. His advances were rejected; but later in 1898 the position changed suddenly. There were rumours of Turkish military occupation, of a Russian railway from the Mediterranean, and of the German Bagdadbahn itself (p. 33) threatening to reach the shores of the Gulf. The British Resident was sent from Bushire to Kuwayt and in January 1899 signed an agreement with Mubarak, whereunder the Shaykh would alienate no territory without British concurrence. Renewed Turkish pressure reproved his independent airs; but Mubarak stood by his British agreement, and yet remained titular Qa'immaqam of Kuwayt.

Since 1897 his court had sheltered distinguished exiles in the persons of the head of the Wahhabi ruling family, 'Abd al-Raḥman ibn Sa'ud and his young son. These had fled from their home when in 1891 the dynasty of Jabal Shammar, under its famous Amir Muḥammad whom Doughty visited, had overwhelmed their forces and installed viceroys in their oases. The last decade of the century showed Sa'udi power almost extinguished, that of ibn Rashid triumphant and professing a profitable loyalty to the Turks. But the death of Muḥammad and the dynastic struggles which followed suggested possibilities of a reversal.

In al-Aḥsā, the 'Sanjaq of Najd' of Turkish officialdom, the thirty-year Turkish occupation had not attempted normal government, nor greatly affected the life of the people. But, in contrast to Kuwayt, it was in part effective. Turkish officials came and went, troops were stationed in the towns, taxes were collected, government schools opened though little attended. The Saniya Administration (p. 38) owned valuable properties in the Sanjaq, which from time to time 'Iraqi Mutaṣarrifs—a Muntafiq tribesman, a Baṣra notable—had governed.

4. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TOWNS

During the span of a single lifetime, from 1830 to 1900, profound 178
changes had come to pass in the urban society of 'Iraq. Most 369
marked in the upper classes, but perceptible in the lower, they radiated from both outwards into a countryside still socially primeval.

Early in the nineteenth century 'Iraq town society had remained 181
almost wholly isolated from Western influences. There was no 177
acquaintance with the outside world. The tempo of life was that of earlier ages, traditional manners held the field, and life in every relationship was based on Islam. No restless progressiveness had appeared: the evils of the times were accepted by all with submissive fatalism. The impact of Western conceptions and activities upon this society was in the Levant gradual, in 'Iraq relatively sudden. Such ideas and phenomena came first to 'Iraq by way of the New Army which had, in a day, superseded Janissaries and Hayta bands: an army with Europeanized officers, soon followed by doctors, engineers, and the whole body of Westernized effendis. The senior officials, Turkish in speech and half-European in education, were accompanied by wives of Istanbul and children fresh from modern-fashioned schools. Posts and telegraphs, foreign trade and enterprise began to operate. The Christian and Jewish minorities, with their European leanings, continued to set a higher standard of education, aided by the missions which served them.

The cumulative effect of these influences had produced by 1900 178
an 'Iraqi urban society far removed from that of a lifetime earlier. 181
Fed by the telegraph, an incipient press, and the resident foreigners, the talk amongst officials in the Saray, merchants and agents in the coffee-shop, notables in their diwans, could for the first time embrace wider interests. Literacy had become commoner, changes had appeared in domestic and social habit, European clothes were worn by an increasing minority, the tempo of life accelerated. The wealthy class increased in numbers as in possessions, and found fresh ways of spending. Social leadership was still on patriarchal or plutocratic lines; an intelligentsia scarcely existed; but among a widening circle the old acquiescence had begun to yield to dissatisfaction and questioning. An excessive confidence was felt in 'science' and modern knowledge, conceived always as a set of formulae with miraculous efficacy. Except where devotion to orthodox Islam and its endowments was a vested interest, there had been signs of diminished respect for that doctrine and for its professors; but this was still very far from a landslide to atheism, nor had the old standards of behaviour been yet abandoned even by the *évolués*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The social development which these processes entailed repre- 177
sented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue.

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the 181
merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by 511
serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and [164]
combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied.

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 361
changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building 363
materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Baṣra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Baṣra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen-contractors whose

technique included blackmail. Rickety boat-bridges served a 361
dozen of the riverain towns. Street lighting consisted, at the best, 363
of a few battered oil-lamps. Water was supplied by donkey-borne [365]
waterskins from the river, or from polluted wells in private courtyards; only in Baghdad was a single quarter of the town furnished by pipes with silt-laden untreated water. Municipal street-sweepers maintained some appearance of decency in the main lanes and bazaars, while filth and stenches abounded in the rest. Every town and larger village had cemeteries in its midst or on its fringes. Khans for caravans or wayfarers were found everywhere; hotels approaching the lowest European standard existed only in Baghdad.

Municipal administration was entrusted, save in unorganized 632
villages, to a Mayor and his council. These functionaries, elected by procedures which could amount to Government nomination, enjoyed some local prestige; but their powers in practice were limited so rigidly that the local Governor in fact controlled all projects and all expenditure. Baghdad in the 'nineties was divided into three *baladiyas*, two for the left bank and one for the right. The Mayor was a member or nominee of one of its leading families or, rarely, a Government official. Municipal law was not inadequate, the code of taxation and procedure meticulous, its sphere of nominal activity reasonable. But in practice these administrations were corrupt and futile, and effective chiefly in providing a salary for a city notable and free servants for the local Governor. Nevertheless, pride of city was not lacking and schemes of town improvement were popular topics throughout decades of inactivity.

The picture of urban society of the period must embrace varying 361
scenes. Baṣra with its miles of date gardens and network of tidal 621
creeks, the activity of its riverain suburb—the sole seaport of 'Iraq—its daily contacts with Najd and Muḥammara, its rich garden-owning notables, its cosmopolitan merchants and agents, had a character unique in 'Iraq. Of the other towns of Baṣra sanjaq, Qurna was tribe-dominated, the growing village of Abu al-Khaṣib non-tribal, and Zubayr a desert-fringe town ruled by a hereditary Shaykh. Among Baṣra's leading families were those of the Naqib, and the houses of Basha'yan, Mandil, and Ṣani'.

Baghdad city with a mainly Sunni right bank and an all-Shi'i and largely Persian left, and its important suburbs of Kad͟himiya, Mu'ad͟hd͟ham, and Qarara formed by far the greatest commercial centre in the wilayas. It was industrially important, administratively and militarily dominant. The city was mean, without modern improvements, without protection against river floods; it was adorned only by two or three monuments and mosques of interest and by the great shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani. With

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

36/ 62/ its greater society of high officials, its circle of famous Sunni Muslim families, its half-Europeanized wealthy Jews—the houses of Daniel and Sasun (Sassoon)—its doctors and lawyers, its men of affairs and their busy agents, Baghdad could claim at least equality with Baṣra in the vanguard of 'Iraqi progress. In both cities a small European society, led by the Consulates and predominantly British, maintained its comfortable homes, its clubs and sports, and found life pleasant.

Mosul fell far behind; lesser in status and remoter from Westernizing influences save those of French Catholicism, the city acted as entrepôt for the Jazira and the Kurdish highlands, and maintained a restless yet unprogressive atmosphere among its mixed population. Despite the dignity of the leading families—Pashas of the province in bygone days, the houses of the Jalilis and 'Umaris—and some Christian families of repute, it was ill famed for its criminal brawling, its fanaticism, and its dirt. Its dusty and treeless glare, subdued only by the smoke of lime-kilns, attracted few visitors.

In the lesser cities of 'Iraq, Arab or Kurdish, the atmosphere and condition of society varied widely with the environment. Many towns had no interest but that of staging-post for caravans, produce market for an agricultural area, fuelling point for river steamers, or cantonment for troops. Others had more individual character. Such were Hit with its industry of bitumen: Kirkuk and Arbil as main entrepôts for Kurdistan and nurseries of Turkish-speaking effendis: Khaniqin as the frontier post for Persia. Mandali and Badra looked east to Pusht-i-Kuh in much of their sentiment and interests. Sulaymaniya was the capital of the southern Kurds, and dominated by its oppressive 'holy' family of the Barzinji Sayids. Ḥalabja was the urban centre of the great Jaf tribe, as was 'Amara of the Tigris marshmen and Naṣiriya of the Muntafiq. Kadhimiya and Samarrā were eminent as Shi'i shrines and pilgrim-places, Ba'quba, Shahroban, and Daltawa as centres for the estates of the landed gentry. The mid-Euphrates Shi'i towns were suffering at the time from a tragic disturbance of Euphrates irrigation. On the upper Euphrates, settlements of the Dulaym were turning into villages or miniature townships. In the qadhā headquarter towns of Mosul province—'Aqra, Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, Raniya, Rawanduz, Keui Sanjaq—urban life was developing and a class of town notables, sometimes religious, was holding its own against the tribal Aghās.

Yet more particular was the function of the Euphrates Holy Cities, Karbalā and Najf. These were at once the twin hearts of 'Iraqi Shi'ism (the greatest non-Turkish influence in the territory) and centres of the pilgrim and corpse-burial industries. The power

The power

wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formidable not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish, anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd and Shumurd of Najf were notorious. 793 565

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of information regarding the world, past or present, and that of æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remembered Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmelite), and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans, Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing, book production, or generally readable literary output there was nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excavation, 'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to 'Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery. The professional classes—lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost nothing to show. 517 181

Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion, this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the 812 779 793

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

812 stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who
779 claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

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5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

369 If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded, on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The
619 tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of
795 intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects. Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some, notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy. Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence and embarrassment.

619 The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but
621 its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muḥammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the
619 vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal 619
memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis, well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original 619
kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread 602
wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great confederacies 619 embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities, birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable. The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in 619
the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, 369
their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk; and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' 619
material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer 178
fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had 631
been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*dhabṭiya*) could appear

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 178 631 from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads [423] had become a Government function; more and more the local Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

619 178 349 Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

619 579 The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

of Naṣir Pasha and later of his son Faliḥ to turn the tribesmen into docile tenants on the Sa'dun estates (which Ottoman land-registration policy had demarcated and bestowed under the feet of the age-long cultivators), and the attempt of Manṣur Pasha and later of his son, Sa'dun, to maintain all their old independence. Thus personal ambition and hatred joined with a clear issue of policy, with Government playing a rôle of vacillating opportunism. Year after year tribal war went on, with Turkish forces sometimes participating; civil government was almost wholly inoperative; yet settlement and tribe-breaking were all the time half-visibly proceeding. The day of a quiet tithe-paying Muntafiq peasantry was still distant; the fear of a united Muntafiq army was long past.

The middle-Euphrates tribes present for this period a confused picture of intricate local history. Typical of them are the Bani Ḥuchaym (Ḥukaym), the Shibil, Fatla, Khaza'il, Bani Ḥasan, and the tribes of 'Afak and Daghara, most of whom had been lately converted to Shi'ism and fell thereby under Mujtahid influence. Their records for the later nineteenth century show the increasing settlement of their shepherd sections, and the gradual introduction of rapacious yet feeble Turkish tax-gatherers. They show the endless bickering between tribes, accompanied by the bluster, looting, and unaimed rifle-fire which passes for tribal warfare; and the bitterer strife for the vacant headship of tribes, in which Mudir or Qa'immaqam would interfere when he could. In spite of the rare emergence of a unifying leader, the tendency was towards levelling, division, disunity. This was aided by the spread of the new land-registry system and by the purchase of whole estates by the Saniya Administration which could develop its lands without tribal agency. The shifting of the Euphrates waters from the eastern to the western channel (p. 32) had profound effects in displacing the tribes, led to clashes, secessions, and invasions, and added to the immediate authority of Government as the only possible controller of Euphrates waters.

On the lower Tigris the close of the century was stormy with civil war. With lesser marsh tribes and the new non-tribal townships, the dominant groups were those of the camel-owning, grain-growing Bani Lam and the rice-growing Albu Muḥammad. The prosperity of both tribes depended on the Government allotment of the *muqaṭa'as*,[1] whose periodical distribution led to bitter quarrelling. To the normal causes of tribal war was thus added a perpetual irritant, and to its normal practices that of preying on the Tigris river traffic. Armed attacks on this were a common

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[1] The *muqaṭa'a* was (and is) a defined area (in some cases of great extent and productive value) of irrigable land, leased for a cash annual rent to a tribal shaykh; possession of a better *muqaṭa'a* was an object of the keenest rivalry.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

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feature of 'Amara life, involving *Zaptié* escorts on the paddle-boats, protests to the Wali, telegrams to London by the Lynch managers, and punitive expeditions, often unsuccessful. Shaykh Bunaya was by wealth and guile paramount in the Bani Lam for twenty years, till his death in 1903. Power among the Albu Muḥammad lay, subject to endless rivalries, in the ruling house of Khalifa.

The central Tigris groups of the Rabi'a and Zubayd had outlived their days of united insurgence. They were fully settled since the mid-century, and the Zubayd had suffered the secession of large elements to the Ḥilla district. The growth of the steamer-fuelling townships—'Aziziya, Ṣuwayra, Bughayla, and Kut itself—had brought a measure of Government control and economic opportunity.

Across the Jabal Ḥamrin in the submontane region of Mosul wilaya, Government had at all times been relatively strong and the tribes—Bayat, Da'udiya, Diza'i—in general unaggressive if pettily lawless. In the higher foothills and the true mountain country of the southern and central Kurds, which included wide patches of non-tribal territory, dwelt under their hereditary Aghās such strong communities as the Zangana, Jabbari, Ṭalabani, Shaykh Bizayni, Girdi, Surchi, Khushnau, Piran, Pishdar, Baradost, and a score of lesser names. These, generally homogeneous in speech and habit, were well armed and mounted, proud of their traditions, not unprosperous, suspicious or scornful of Turkish pretension; and the authority of their Aghās far exceeded that of the unhappy Mudir or Qa'immaqam sent to govern them. Their lawless self-centred life was still that of a millennium of ungoverned valley lordship; Turkish claims were in great part unenforceable, and strife endemic; yet the penetration of more modern ways had been for fifty years insistent, and with many a local setback and humiliation continued to gain ground.

Turkish control, at its best in the accessible flatter lands, was at its feeblest, to vanishing point, in the mountains. The Hamawand of Bazyan district, most famous of robber tribes, had raided as far afield as Russian territory, terrorized the Kirkuk countryside, returned intact from distant banishment, and lived on varying terms with the venerated Barzinji Sayids. The Jaf, with settled sections in Persia and the Gul'anbar Plain, were still nomadic between the two countries. Under united leadership—that of Maḥmud Pasha over the nomads and his brother 'Uthman Pasha in Ḥalabja, which he and his emancipated Persian wife 'Adila Khanim had largely built and wholly controlled—they could defy Government, refuse taxation, uproot telegraph lines, and recall the ways of the ancient Dere Beys. Attitudes no more amenable prevailed in the frontier territory of the Pishdar, who since 1893, when

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been 619
formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irre- 579
placeable as Qa'immaqam. The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it 511
has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. 135
Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya 315
Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Nafṭchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Nafṭkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, [471]
significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. 433
There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver ''Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

433 made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-[501] craft, of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These, with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq distillation and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the meagre list.

439 The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). 457 To it as an 'invisible export' should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—life-blood of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

439 Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory consisted of the import of those needed commodities which the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed through Baṣra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales, coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France, and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes, were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

436 The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper qirsh (piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a stable coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian rupee in Baṣra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns and Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. 804 A multitude of local weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district. 453 Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by the shrewd operations of many local *ṣarrafs*.

Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most 433 consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high 439 percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered 137 a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one- 313 fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of 185 improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and 241 the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 [312] advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallaḥ*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

511 In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of 511 423 the *badu* and their hungry camels. Even where tenure was reasonably secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving productivity; [476] wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

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[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[311] [2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north.

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the 511
resources to initiate new methods or improve the old. 423

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and dis- 511
couraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the 241
lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both 241
of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal 312
functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains
and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are 312
evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage 185
of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

312 185 Although by 1900 these conditions were not unrealized either in Baghdad or Istanbul, they had not been formulated as connected problems for solution. Governmental activity in this sphere had consisted, at the caprice of Pashas, in no more than some measure of organization of petty local works. The Administration had in fact neither the knowledge nor control nor finance necessary to formulate or organize a comprehensive irrigation system. Heedless alike of present evils and of rich possibilities, the governors of 'Iraq were doing and planning nothing while irrigation in Egypt and India was making great and fruitful progress. Nor was the contribution of the public more promising; the shiftless tribal cultivators carried out with low efficiency such minimum of silt-clearance and flood-dyke repairs as was forced upon them, erected temporary canal-heads of reed-bundles or brushwood, multiplied their primeval devices of water-lift, wastefully prolonged or resited their canals, and ruined area after area with neglected salting.

An outstanding case of deterioration in irrigation conditions was occurring in these years on the middle Euphrates. Up to 1880 the Ḥilla branch had been maintained as the principal waterway, the Hindiya branch being a canal deriving from it. But the closing of the Ṣaqlawiya head up-stream, and the operation of natural forces of silting and scouring, allowed the Hindiya branch to gain in width and discharge. The problem of maintaining the flow of the Ḥilla branch had become first critically difficult and finally impossible. French engineers in 1891 completed a masonry dam which still held precariously in 1900, but failed to arrest the increasing ruin of Ḥilla branch irrigation.

487 The ancient land routes of the territory had remained constant since many centuries. Camel caravans used the desert ways of Damascus and Aleppo, mule-trains the time-worn hill tracks into Luristan, Kirmanshah, Persian Kurdistan, and the Van wilaya. 491 Within 'Iraq the routes were fixed by custom based on convenience; but here there were signs of recent progress in the provision of wayside Khans, new toll-bridges of stone or brick or resting on fragile pontoons. The roads, varying by districts in surface and security, were everywhere unsurfaced and neglected, deep in summer dust or flooded to seas of mud by rain or the overflow of canals.

499 Railways had, for many years, been hailed from a distance by 'Iraqis of every class as the bringers of ease and progress, and schemes in plenty had been propounded—those of Chesney in the eighteen-thirties, of Andrew in the 'fifties, and later of the Austrian von Pressel, the Italian Tonetti, the Frenchman Cottard, the Russian Kapnist. A local company had been formed in the 'eighties to construct a Khaniqin–Baghdad line, which lack of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

capital rendered abortive; and a successor enterprise in 1890 was 499 no more fortunate. At the close of the century talk of the 'Baghdad Railway' was more than ever persistent since, from the year 1888, the Germans had begun their career of Eastern ambition. The completion by the 'Ottoman Company of Anatolian Railways' of its line to Ankara in 1893 was followed by its prolongation to Konia in 1896; and in the same year permission was obtained for an extension to Diyarbakr, and ultimately through 'Iraq. But immediate Russian objection was raised, the proposed alignment by Diyarbakr was abandoned, and a pause of two years followed. Thereafter the Kaiser paid the second of his visits to the Ottoman dominions, swore devotion to the Caliph and to Islam, and secured in 1899 the arrangement of a draft concession for a line from Konia to Mosul, Baghdad, and the Persian Gulf. A German envoy visited 'Iraq to report on routes, a German cruiser appeared in the Gulf, and a technical Commission in 1900 toured the probable alignment through 'Iraq to Kuwayt, where British suspicions were abruptly aroused. Meanwhile the diplomats of Turkey and Germany met to prepare a definitive convention, watched with interest from Whitehall and Delhi. The public of 'Iraq, far from these conclaves, had as yet seen no enterprise on steel rails more imposing than the Baghdad–Kadhimiya horse tramway, relic of Midhat Pasha.

The natural highways of 'Iraq had been, since the dawn of 505 history, its great rivers, and on these the dozen types of sailing-boat and skiff, raft and coracle still plied. But since the eighteen-forties steam navigation on the rivers had played its part in 'Iraq economics. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, formed in 1861 by the Lynch family and managed in Baghdad and Basra by companies bearing their name, had maintained a Tigris service for two generations, interrupted only by the obstructions of an officialdom dully resentful of foreign enterprise, by the low-water difficulties of navigation, and by the rifle-fire of riverain tribesmen. The Firman of authority, dating from 1834, seemed to limit the Company to simultaneous use of two steamers,[1] and the Lynch efforts were ceaseless for authority to increase this number and to employ barges. Their interests were, from 1879 onwards, closely associated with the British India Steam Navigation Company. Various Turkish or 'Iraqi single-ship enterprises had been amalgamated, a generation earlier, into a single 'Oman-Ottoman Administration', under the Turkish Ministry of Marine. Its fleet of small, barely river-worthy steamers took about half of the total

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[1] The *City of London* launched in 1862 was lost in 1881, the *Dijla* launched in 1865 was lost in 1876. The *Blosse Lynch* (1878), *Khalifa* (1880), and *Mejidieh* (1882) were in service in 1900.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

505 traffic. One or two free-lance enterprises were additional to these—a Basra-owned steamer plying to Baghdad, another weekly from Baghdad to Samarrā; many abortive projects had been formed for larger development. The Saniya Administration had advanced plans, in 1890, for an extended service to include voyages to Mosul and even to Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and a new survey of the Euphrates was ordered in preparation for free navigation from Maskana or Jarablus to Basra. Nothing resulted from these projects, but the advancing shadow of the Baghdad Railway, with which their authors loved to connect them, gave encouragement. A shipbuilding yard was established at Baghdad in 1890.

304 The port of Basra, sole sea gateway of 'Iraq, carried by far the greatest part of its trade and traffic, of which in 1900 a negligible part was other than British or British-Indian. Russian and German trade was not yet established, while the 'Iraqis contributed little to the movements of the port. The Shatt al-'Arab waterway, thanks to survey and buoying by British hands, gave access and security to anchorages opposite the 'Ashar and Khandaq creeks which connected it with Basra city. The management of the port was primitive, quarantine and customs provisions inept, vexatious, and venal. No wharves, cranes, sheds or other port equipment were provided; loading and discharging overside to and from lighters in midstream were slow and costly operations.

206 Since the 'sixties of the century 'Iraq had had its place in the
world's telegraphic system. It was connected through Fao with
India, through Mosul and Jazira-ibn-'Umar with the rest of Turkey,
through Khaniqin (or through Fao and Bushire) with Persia.
The handling of traffic was slow and unreliable. But the extension
of the system to most parts of 'Iraq, vulnerable and faltering as it
was, and with Kurdish districts still unpenetrated, had yet done
205 much to assist administration and to modernize society. Postal
services dated in some form from the eighteenth century. In the
'sixties of the nineteenth, British-Indian steamers began to carry
the Indian and European mails to Basra, where the service connected
with the river steamers. The Indian Post Offices opened in
1868. The British camel mail to Damascus, discontinued in 1886
after a century of service, was replaced by a Turkish mail along the
same route, carried by 'Aniza tribal riders. The time-honoured
horse-borne Tatar mail left Baghdad every Monday for Istanbul,
by way of Mosul and Diyarbakr.

7. THE GOVERNMENT

631 The enormous difficulties of governing the three wilayas arose, it is now clear, from a complex of elements. The territory was ill provided with means of communication, and much of it was

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631
foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of
the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the
greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The
'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, 181
unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal
warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between 579
town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration;
to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. 182
Such was the territory which for four centuries the
Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western
opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642
these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631
generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which
was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood
at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and
was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule
was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the
Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the
local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including
those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642
dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, 185
which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And
while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the
conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law
and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing
agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational
foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and
a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the
attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe
to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached
from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern,
pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government
of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had
enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its
Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every
new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya
system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565
a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the
effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647
were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by
race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part
of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

565 647 661 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan, every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent 662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land [623] revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish representa- 625 tives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardihood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

631 647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendiya -- Analysis]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded
civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of
French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession
and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated
State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the
shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties
of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired
mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments. 647
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the
Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

647 and sale of tobacco products; the Customs Department; all these likewise were of no direct concern to the Wali. The same applies to the rare public works entrusted to the wilaya engineer, and to the Department of Pious Bequests (Awqaf) The Wali could venture on no official interference in the Oman-Ottoman Administration, none in the favoured Saniya. The last-named had, by 1900, acquired for its master by favourable 'purchase' almost one-third of the cultivable lands of Baghdad wilaya, and very large estates in Baṣra and Mosul.

701 The VIth Army, whose territorial area was coterminus with 'Iraq, was reckoned as the least excellent of the main Turkish formations. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, a cavalry division, and a formation of artillery. The units of every arm were widely scattered, and constantly changed station according to the needs of the tribal warfare. Transport was hired for the occasion, supply and medical arrangements were primitive, equipment was shabby and deficient. The staffs and organization of the Army were in general those of modern forces; but the troops were misused, discipline was lax, pay irregular. Service with the Army was
702 by conscription, from which non-Muslims and many classes of Muslims were free on payment; tribesmen were wholly exempt. Compulsory service was commonly prolonged beyond the legal three-year period, and this, with the liability to be sent to a grave in the Yaman or Europe, combined to make conscription of all Turkish institutions the most resented. Nevertheless, no Arab province supplied more officers to the Turkish Army, or of higher standard, than did 'Iraq.

706 The Navy at Baṣra, a puny and decayed service, was commanded by a commodore. Its ostensible duty was that of river police, in which it signally failed. With a shore establishment of some two hundred, its only craft in 1900 were an ancient corvette unable to leave its moorings, the *Kilid al-Bahr*, and a small armed paddle-steamer, the *Alus*.

642 This Turkish Government of 'Iraq, at whose task, evolution, and organization we have now glanced, had irreproachable nominal objectives—order, progress, and public advantage. Its regulations were comprehensive and repeatedly revised: its administrators contained men of education, experience, and knowledge of local conditions. It was, nevertheless, severely criticized by its own servants and not less by outside observers. Excessively centralized, it was bound by a thousand ill-applicable rules which precluded local initiative; it was ill-served, ill-housed, ill-equipped, and incapable of maintaining forces adequate to its clearest needs. It lacked a breed of loyal and vigorous men able to grasp the essentials of ruling a backward tribal territory, and trusted by their superiors.

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the 642
example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self- 661
interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all,
'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards:
'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in
1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant
alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by
adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with
corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz
alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by
playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with
false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of
which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking.
From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its
ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and
to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 643
'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the 185
important town families—and notably those of religious pretension
—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and
charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as
planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic
preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal
bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which 631
any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the 619
impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom,
and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power
permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of
direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by
nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own
favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless
struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the
shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and
the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was
it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful
punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook
flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to
name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and
sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his
requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and
the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could 668
not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature
of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the
Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

668 but fatalistic acceptance, which was mixed in Shi'i quarters with theocratic as well as emotional repugnance, and in Sunni often with genuine if paradoxical respect for the Caliph. To none at this [18b] time was an alternative conceivable. At the best, reform of some present abuses could be hoped, and the persistence of Arab race-consciousness and the slow growth of a critical spirit were already bringing such hopes to birth. But there was heard in 'Iraq no echo yet of the literary and political movements in the Lebanon and Egypt, where even now an Arab Movement was coming to birth.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

II

THE LAST OF TURKISH 'IRAQ

I. TURKISH POLITICS AND ARAB NATIONALISM

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LITTLE in the fortunes of Turkey from 1900 to 1914 could encourage the world, or its own 'Iraqi subjects, to hope for better administration or better lives. Already in the eighteen-nineties there had been signs—disturbances in Crete, followed by a Greco-Turkish War—that the long respite since 1878 in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire would not last for ever. In the new century conditions in Macedonia led to Western Powers' intervention and restrictions on Turkish authority; and the advent of a new régime in Turkish government precipitated further losses. In 1908 Bulgaria declared its independence and Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1911 Italy invaded the two Libyan wilayas; in 1912 a league of Balkan States declared war, and defeated Turkish armies with ignominy; but quarrels over the spoils led to a renewal of hostilities, the Second Balkan War. The period was thus, with but momentary successes, one of humiliating defeats, dismemberment, and distraction from the domestic reforms for which the need was paramount.

Internally, the picture contains newer features. The Ḥamidiyan régime, indeed, earned the further execration of all Europe (except Germany) for the Armenian massacres of the 'nineties, divorced the personal rule of the monarch more than ever from that of his ministers, and intensified the spy system; but the reforming forces which, a generation earlier, 'Abd al-Ḥamid had first flattered and then ruthlessly suppressed, had never entirely perished. Strengthened from year to year by the foreign education of the military officers, they found recruits among modernized Levantines and Salonika Jews, as well as genuine Turkish patriots. A second wave of political activity was inevitable, though delayed by the attractiveness of the old régime to powerful interests and by the astuteness of the ruler. From a committee of exiles in Geneva in the 'nineties, the Reform movement spread back into Turkey and installed itself in the Macedonia of 1906 to 1908. The emergence of the Young Turks and their Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) in August 1908 availed to compel the Sultan to re-establish the Constitution, order the holding of immediate elections—the first for thirty years—decree the abolition of espionage, and dismiss the more notorious of his officials. The reactionary counter-revolution of April 1909 ended with his deposition in favour of a

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

000 grotesquely incompetent brother and the control of Government by the Young Turks almost continuously from 1909 to 1914 by their influence over elections, their instructions to high officials everywhere through party agents and political clubs, and their courts martial which practically suspended the normal course of justice and administration during these years. The high hopes with which Western nations, especially Great Britain, had greeted the new order in 1908 were doomed to disappointment. It is true that repeated crises did much to deprive the C.U.P. of a fair chance and, equally, that the desperate needs of Turkey seemed to call emphatically for a militarily efficient régime: considerations which largely explain the Young Turks' failure to fulfil the expectations evoked, in every subject race, by their early protestations. But there was a deeper reason; the conception of devolution, decentralization, was foreign to even the most enlightened Turkish thought of the time; the 'freedom' offered was freedom as Ottomans, equality as Ottomans. The call to a single Ottoman loyalty, greater centralization, and firmer discipline was the Young Turks' formula for regenerating their country; Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks had hoped for the very opposite. The policy of the governing clique as it developed represented the victory of the more ruthless element in the C.U.P. which sought only in standardization and efficiency the means to rescue the Empire, and which was soon to restore Germany to a privileged, almost to a monopolist, position in Turkish counsels.

722 648 In the 'Iraq wilayas, news of the foreign struggles and defeats of the Turkish Empire excited slight interest even in the towns and among the half-Turkish effendis. The Italian war induced the opening of subscriptions in Baghdad for warlike or war-charitable purposes, with derisory results; some gestures of patriotism were attempted, unreal offers of personal service made, prayers for victory offered; but the ignorance and almost total apathy of the 'Iraq peoples (except the Government hierarchy), their indifference to the grotesquely false communiqués of the Agence Ottomane, their satisfaction rather than dismay at the embarrassments of their masters, made a practical loyalty inconceivable. Some troops were drafted to Europe, recruiting was intensified, full mobilization proclaimed, taxation increased by cesses, officials' salaries diminished by a war levy, and subscriptions invited for warships, aircraft, the Army, the wounded. An internal loan was floated, but evoked a minimum of response.

668 The political revolution in the capital was not, however, without practical results in 'Iraq. Some high officials were at once removed, some political exiles could now return to Istanbul. The telegram of July 1908, announcing immediate elections, created intense

excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of 668 the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P.[1] committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, [646] followed four months later by another for the accession of Muḥammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sultan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 665 1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable 186 as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and 668 frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

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[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Bey (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Bey: Fu'ad Bey al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1 [Turkish Committee of Union & Progress -- analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

186 668 Egypt, hints of a claim to nationhood itself put forward by Arab *émigrés* in Paris—all these, with developing intercommunication and greater awareness of world thought, had prepared the ground for nationalism in 'Iraq even before the final impetus of the Turkish revolution.

The 1908 revolution, while it created an active Turkish-political life in 'Iraq, soon indicated also the gulf between Turkish and Arab aspirations. An 'Arab Brotherhood' group, formed in the first Turkish Chamber, was summarily suppressed by the Young Turks; the proportion of Arab to Turkish deputies and senators in Parliament was unjustly low. Incoming Walis of the 'Iraq wilayas showed less sympathy than ever with decentralization or the suggested use of Arabic; more 'Iraqis than ever groaned at the hateful prospect of conscription in Turkish armies—perhaps to fight brother Arabs in the endless warfare of the Yaman. It followed that the politicians of 'Iraq soon after 1908 began to mix various strains of Arab separatism with their pro- or anti-C.U.P. polemics: and to treat seriously tentative ideas of greater local privilege, a higher proportion of appointments, wider local powers and, finally, local autonomy itself.

For such claims there was basis in Arab character and culture, in 'Iraq's geographical separateness, and perhaps still more in the personal aspirations of ambitious 'Iraqis, who could imagine a great career in an Arab or 'Iraqi State more easily than in a Turkish. Meanwhile there were the beginnings of contact with coteries formed abroad to foster Arab ambitions and to frame demands. Such were the secret but short-lived Qaḥṭaniya in Istanbul, whose members favoured an Arab Kingdom within the Turkish Empire, and such the Young Arab Society which, moved from Paris to Beirut in 1913, was to play a heroic part in 1915. More important in 'Iraq were the local circles in contact with the Ottoman Decentralization Party of Cairo: a society which, founded in 1912 with its conception of local autonomy within the Empire, came nearest to expressing the political ambitions of the 'Iraqis of the day, and took root in Baghdad and Baṣra. The relations of Arab officers in Turkish regiments with their brother officers became strained, and 'Iraqi Qa'immaqams found odious 204 the task of applying Turkish repressive measures. From 1910 to 186 1914 a surprising development of the press in 'Iraq marked the 668 new political age. In place of the half-dozen colourless official newspapers of the wilaya capitals and Najf in Ḥamidiyan times, sheets of every colouring appeared in Arabic or Turkish month by month, to a final total of some fifty; they advocated various programmes—brilliant or foolish and always irresponsible—of pan-Islam, local or pan-Arab nationalism, Turkish patriotism or anti-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Government, were active in these politics before 1914.

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Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

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Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to independent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Ahsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'ḏham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

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In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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In May some results appeared, induced perhaps more by the Beirut than the Baṣra pressure. A new Wilaya Law ordained the increased use of Arabic in Arab wilayas, and the formation of a not ineffective General Council in each. Sayid Ṭalib telegraphed vainly to Istanbul in protest against so hollow a concession and informed Mr. Crow, the British Consul, that a trial of strength was now inevitable. The Consul thought it prudent to summon a British warship, H.M.S. *Alert*, which anchored for a time off 'Ashar; but Sayid Ṭalib decided after all on a policy of moderate pressure, until the resounding murder of the local general, Farid Bey—a crime inevitably ascribed to Sayid Ṭalib—diverted attention from less vivid politics. In the same month, June 1913, the Wali of Baghdad arrested four leading nationalist spokesmen, including Yusif al-Suwaydi, for the excessive freedom of their anti-Turkish expressions; but all save one were promptly released. In July and August hopeful-seeming Turko-Arab negotiations took place in Istanbul after the Arabs had organized a meeting in June in Paris which, attended by two 'Iraqis, pressed for decentralization; and in August a decree promulgated in all wilayas seemed to grant a substantial part of Arab demands. Military service was to be performed only within the Inspectorate; the schools would teach in Arabic, with higher education in Turkish; officials in Arab territory would be Arab-speaking, and all but the highest appointments would be made locally; progressive foreign experts would be employed, grants of funds could be expected, the resolutions of the General Wilaya Councils would be executed, three ministers of the Central Government, five Walis, ten Mutaṣarrifs were to be Arabs. But these provisions, felt with excellent reason to be a mere placation of Arab demands, evoked more of 'Iraqi scepticism than confidence.

The gulf between Arab and Turkish views was by now profound and explicit. Most foreigners, not unsympathetic to Arab demands, still felt their nationalism to be a premature and unreliable candidate for support; they distrusted Arab administrative powers even as compared with Turkish, and noted the mutually hostile groups into which the Arab nationalist world was already divided, and in which no one spoke for 'Iraq, since such a unit was not yet imagined. But, on whatever level, agitation in every form continued, and interchanges with the movements in the Levant increased. A secret society, al-'Ahd—the Covenant—was from early in 1914 to embrace scores of 'Iraqi officers in the Turkish Army. The Baṣra 'Reform Committee' with Sayid Ṭalib as President, published an inflammatory pamphlet. Telegrams still poured from 'Iraq to Istanbul, demanding Arab autonomy. Writers in the newspapers abandoned restraint, nationalist clubs were formed

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, 136
to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn 668
Sa‘ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and ‘Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an ‘Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The ‘Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the ‘Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha‘yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif‘at Bey and his son Ra’uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma‘il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khuḍhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some 090
well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks ‘. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*’, and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that ‘the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.’ These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the 185
efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee 661
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1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

185 for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the
661 civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced
by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intru-
647 sion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Bequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Ḥilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

701 The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal 701 parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained 706 decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this 499 period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to 206 most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert 205 postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of 647 this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq 661 today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MH1

647 661 capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

635 663 Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just Ṭahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Riḏhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 1912: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Basra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the 635 661 aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

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[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Fayḏhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated 635 secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming 661 C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim 635 Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of 663 ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the 185 town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless 369 showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew 132 rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their 668 reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be 369 different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

192 668 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

563 369 The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unimportant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Ḥilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenaçing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

579 674 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained, and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation [731] of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913) the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the 579
period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of
Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It 674
was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest
eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq
of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg,
General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in
June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant
of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings 368
of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in
the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra.
The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast.
Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja
under its Jāf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals 743
and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The
Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building
for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their
Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrange- 744
ments in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely
a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to
combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels 368
appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enter- 185
prise, a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple 439
exports of the territory still varied annually according to the
harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates,
grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and
the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage
and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The
increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly
the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin,
partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater
demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate
inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are else-
where mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the
former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch,
Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with
the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At
Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of
Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found
[453] a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at
Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the
Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being
unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank
opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable,
paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much
damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the
direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of food-
stuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing
stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of
178 tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the
579 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that
standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly
repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had
been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police
posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse)
greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from
the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading
that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the
country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too,
with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign
interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or
bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed
as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and
thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was
ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town
life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its
eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of
the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was
reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud
721 with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete
picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of
Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour;
the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza
alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful rob-
beries did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the
Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

619
721

Dulaym in 1909 brought columns under Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha against them. Two years later a settlement with the tribe was reached by Nadhim Pasha's chief of staff, Ḥasan Ridhā Bey, accompanied as usual by recovery of loot and oaths of obedience. But the new order did not long survive; outrages on the roads recommenced, strife and rivalry for the proud and lucrative shaykhship persisted.

The Dulaym, all-powerful from 'Ana to Faluja, gave little trouble to Government or to travellers after the accession of the stalwart 'Ali Sulayman to shaykhship in 1903. New Khans were built along the route—al-Qa'im in 1907, Khan Baghdadi in 1908. Episodes of disorder in 1909 were followed by one of Nadhim Pasha's negotiated settlements; the region was one in which evident advance had been made by Government in the last generation.

The far-flung 'Aniza underwent no visible change. The two groups of the 'Amarat, with ibn Mijlad the resentful rival of ibn Hadhdhal, remained on bad terms, and raids against ibn Rashid in Najd, against Kurdish villagers in the northernmost Jazira, and against the Euphrates tribes show the range of 'Aniza activity. Fahad ibn Hadhdhal, Shaykh of the Jabal section of the 'Amarat, was still in 1914 nominal Qa'immaqam of Razaza.

Conditions in the lower Delta were as bad as Turkish 'Iraq could show. The tribes of the Ḥilla and Hindiya rivers, profoundly disturbed by the changes in the river levels elsewhere described, showed all the lawlessness of a society unpenetrated by modern communications and unstable in its loyalties as between Government, tribalism, and a reactionary priesthood. The feuds of tribe against tribe furnished sometimes the occasion for a Turkish military intervention, not rarely a fiasco and capable of dragging on into months of war. Passing through these territories was risky for the wayfarer, and the German professors digging at Babylon felt themselves to be surrounded by anarchy. On the lower Tigris the period perpetuated the internecine shaykhly struggles within both the Bani Lam and Albu Muḥammad, with rivals' appeals for Turkish aid and on occasion for British 'protection'; rare but bloody interventions by Turkish troops could not end the recurrent wars between the two tribes, with their volleys of cross-river shooting and refuge sought by the Albu Muḥammad shaykhs at Muḥammara. Interruption of the river steamers by these conditions reached its height in 1908. Nadhim Pasha in 1911 attempted a pacification; but the causes of unrest were too deep for easy removal and the outbreak of world war in 1914 found the two tribe-groups still bitterly hostile, while the outstanding personalities in each, rivals for paramountcy, still led irreconcilable factions in their remote rice-swamps and on Tigris-side.

619 721 The lower Euphrates country of the Muntafiq owed little during these years to Turkish administration. The record of the time is of strife and intrigue connected, to a remarkable degree, with the personalities of the wilaya capital. From 1900 until 1908 the allegiance of the tribe was divided between Sa'dun Pasha and Faliḥ Pasha, the former as heir to his father's policy of resistance to Turkish pretension, the latter inclined to Ottoman service. Turkish military intervention led to a remembered massacre of their troops at Shaṭra in 1904; but the author, Sa'dun Pasha, found pardon and a way to Government favour by ostentatious backing of the C.U.P. Supported in 1910 by Nadhim Pasha, Sa'dun by his oppression involved himself in a general revolt of the tribesmen, followed by the visit of a Turkish commission of inquiry which led to a reversal of policy against him. Military operations ensued for the hundredth time. Sa'dun himself was decoyed on board a gunboat at Baṣra and sent in exile to Aleppo, there to die in suspicious circumstances. This gave the signal for a general rallying of the Muntafiq to his gallant but shallow and unstable son, 'Ujaymi, who succeeded to the precarious headship of a tribe from which unity and loyalty had been by now for ever banished. This alignment of forces on the lower Euphrates remained, not without sudden and bloody vicissitudes, until 1914. The temporary eclipse of the C.U.P. late in 1912 led to the outlawing of 'Ujaymi and the brief ascendancy of the sons of Faliḥ. But the tide turned; 'Ujaymi was again recognized as paramount, could again lead Muntafiq forces against the Dhafir, support the Amir of Ḥa'il, and create panic in Baṣra. The outbreak of war found him encamped near Zubayr, menacing but undecided.

619 721 423 Areas of maximum unsettlement were not only those by their terrain the least accessible to Government and to the penetration of modern forces, but those also where a fair economic background was precluded by a vicious system of landholding. The annual reallotment of the *muqaṭa'as* in 'Amara sanjaq, with its many examples of Turkish clumsiness and venality: the unreal and tribally repugnant landlord-tenant relationship in the Muntafiq: the tangle of rights or claims in the Shamiya and Hindiya areas as between the Sayid families, the heads of warring tribes and the absentee Baghdadi tapu-owners: in these lay the roots of a profound social uneasiness which provided the Turks and their successors with the most baffling and costly of their problems.

619 Central 'Iraq outside the Diwaniya sanjaq had little tribal history from 1900 to 1914. The Rabi'a were settled and accessible, the Zubayd reduced by secession and no longer bellicose, the fragmented tribes of the Diyalā and upper Tigris calling at most for occasional police action. These were areas where living stood at,

or just above, a fair subsistence level, taxation was not too irregularly collected, and Baghdadi landlords could make some show of administering their estates. 619

In the Persian border areas of Badra, Mandali, and Khaniqin, distracted as they were at times by trans-frontier disturbance and bickering, these parochial troubles were no general menace to peace. The submontane Kurdish areas of Mosul wilaya passed a half-generation of comparative peace and the slow decay of tribalism. Feuds between rival Aghās or occasional raiding parties of the 'young bloods' need call for no more than a patrol of *Zaptié* or a half-company of the local garrison. In the mountains 619 the case was otherwise. All the elements of a tradition of brigandage, difficult terrain, easy crossings to Persia, and Kurdish resentment of increasing Turkish pretension combined to maintain areas 721 of aggressive independence. The chief of these were those of the Hamawand, the Jaf, and the Barzan tribesmen. The Hamawand during these years more than confirmed their position as a pestilent affliction to all society but their own. With intervals of quietness, their young tribesmen continued to prefer raiding to the dull virtues of cultivation, and for months on end flouted Government orders, grossly insulted Turkish officials, refused to pay revenue, and terrorized the roads. In 1908 their condition of revolt became chronic, and the years following were passed in resistance to, or in eluding, military expeditions which brought no laurels to the Turkish generals. In 1910 a number of the lesser Hamawand Aghās were pardoned; but the truce was brief, their forces besieged Chamchamal, and wider disorders were prevented only by a face-saving settlement by Nadhim Pasha. It lasted for two years. From 1912 to the mid-summer of 1914 conditions in the Bazyan and Qaradagh areas were intermittently as bad as ever, and the passage of most of their tribal force into Persia added there to the confusion in the area of Salar al-Dawla's occupation (p. 72).

The Jaf were less savage but scarcely more amenable than the Hamawand. The death of 'Uthman Pasha in 1910 did not diminish Jaf supremacy in Ḥalabja, which 'Adila Khanim continued to administer; Turkish interference was not permitted, despite the harmless presence of a Qa'immaqam. The nomadic sections under Maḥmud Pasha—accounted in Baghdad as the greatest of Kurdish chieftains, though in person an insignificant, spectacled figure—had no outside contacts save with the settled folk through whose villages they passed, dreaded and unwelcome. The Pasha, after spending months in Mosul arranging the revenue-assessments on his tribe, visited Baghdad in 1911 to be lionized by Nadhim Pasha. Jaf forces were among those fighting in western Kirmanshah in 1912. The period closed without suggesting a *modus vivendi* as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 721 between Turkish claims to govern and Jaf adherence to their traditional way of life.

The religious Shaykh of Barzan, true latter-day Dere Bey, still held his inaccessible and lawless court across the Greater Zab from the Zibari country. He failed regularly to render to Government even the demanded minimum of respect, and annually embroiled himself with the savage Harki in their migrations. The dispatch of Turkish forces was met by mere retirement to the higher mountains, and the authorities' use of the Harki as agents of punishment was dangerous. Conditions worsened with the half-crazy oppression and Christian-baiting of the young Shaykh, 'Abd al-Salīm, who succeeded in 1908; an expedition of Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha was inconclusive; and it was left to Nadhim again prudently to accept the Shaykh's excuses and restore him to a short-lived favour. He was again outlawed in 1911 and 1912, crossed to Urmiya to join the Russians, and from there survived major operations against his tribesmen in 1913 and 1914.

Rival of the Barzani Shaykh dwelt, across the Van border, the equally holy and not less tyrannous lord of Shamdinan, Shaykh Ṣadiq of Neri. His brother, 'Abd al-Qadir, was high in the politics of Istanbul; he himself, detested for his greed and cruelty, lived on robbery and the odour of sanctity, reduced his Christian villagers to serfdom, murdered a bishop, and escaped all but occasional chastisement by Turkish armies. His death in 1911 brought Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir hotfoot to claim the inheritance, in vain. Shaykh Ṣadiq's son, Sayid Ṭaha, famed for his obesity, made good his succession and consolidated his family's position on both sides of the Turco-Persian border.

563 In the heart of Ḥakkari country the Assyrian clans still held their own, still attracted the interest of Protestant Europe. Benjamin, a weak unenterprising Mar Sham'un, succeeded in 1903 to the harassed patriarchate and headship of the Millet. Supported by the loyalty and hardihood of his people and notably that of his cultured and resolute sister, Surma, he was yet assailed by the intrigues of jealous cousins and by Turkish suspicions of disaffection. The Archbishop of Canterbury's mission, based on Urmiya and later also on Mosul, could do something for the spiritual, nothing for the temporal standing of the community. The protection offered by Russia at Urmiya was, as the event proved, neither a reliable standby in trouble nor acceptable to the Wali of Van; yet the Assyrians in their plight were ready to turn anywhere for support, and must have turned ever more definitely to the Russians had not war come to apply to their problem the most terrible of solutions.

619 The grim Yazidis gained some ground during this period

towards equality of treatment. Their own savagery had been in 619 part tamed by the severities of the 'nineties, and their shrine of Shaykh 'Adi was restored to them in 1907. Their Mir retained his authority and the friendless community their half-secret cult and practices; but there were signs of closer Government penetration after 1909. The application of conscription produced armed resistance in 1913, but a corrective visit of Turkish troops was not seriously opposed.

4. PROJECTS, BY LAND AND WATER

Far away from shabby, backward, and turbulent 'Iraq, Baghdad 499 Railway negotiations vitally affecting it continued as the century 649 opened. The results reached between the Deutsche Bank, the [471] Anatolian Railways, and the Turkish Government were contained in the Royal Irada of January 1902. This, re-cast in March 1903, revealed that the Germans had obtained excellent terms. A railway was to be built from Konia to the Persian Gulf, branches within 'Iraq were envisaged, financial provisions were generous, and a new Turkish company, the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, was to be formed.

The publication of the concession excited world-wide interest. The French, who in 1899 had agreed in principle to participate, now showed little enthusiasm. British co-operation was eagerly sought by the German promoters; but opinion in London, formerly indifferent or favourable to the project, was shocked now at the threat to India and to British interests in 'Iraq and the Gulf. The tide of opinion turned decisively against it, and Mr. Balfour was compelled, unwillingly, to announce British abstention. The Germans were bitterly disappointed. In Turkey itself the scheme had many critics; others favoured the project as one of hopeful development far beyond unaided Turkish capacity. In 'Iraq awareness of the enterprise grew slowly, and the same two bodies of opinion declared themselves: the one welcomed progress in any guise, the other dreaded foreign and Christian penetration.

The section Konia–Eregli was finished by October 1904 and the line prolonged to Bulgurlu, where it halted until 1909. In 1914 the Amanus tunnel was begun, the Euphrates bridged, and earth-work was proceeding towards Ras al-'Ayn. In the meanwhile other railway schemes had been propounded: a British line to run by Port Said, 'Aqaba, and Jawf to Başra, a French line to pass by Homs, Palmyra, and Dayr al-Zur to Baghdad and Mosul. Both were rejected by the Ottoman Government. German attempts to secure British support for their Bagdadbahn continued, only to be met by the reply, given in 1907, that opposition would cease if and when a Baghdad–Başra line was under all-British construction.

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The Turkish revolution had immediate effects. The Germans became unpopular, their railway was bitterly opposed, not least by Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey, a Kurdish deputy from Baghdad; and the British enjoyed a brief return of popularity. But by 1911 the old positions were resumed, with Germany again as the acceptable Power and the railway tolerated. Great Britain still refused participation and declined equally to agree to a requested raising of Turkish Customs rates. Suggestions in 1910 for a British-dominated southern section of the railway came to nothing, and early in 1911 a Turkish plan for a Turkish-French-British Company to construct the Baṣra–Baghdad section was again rejected. But a Convention was drafted soon afterwards, in March 1911, on the basis of German renunciation of its Company's exclusive rights in southern 'Iraq, in return for assurance of participation in whatever other non-Turkish company might undertake these works.

Meanwhile by the Potsdam Agreement of 1910 Germany had accepted Russia's position in north Persia, and agreed not to oppose a Russian railway from Teheran to Khaniqin. France, disturbed by this Agreement, was pacified; and her favour to the Baghdad Railway was secured by a Franco-German arrangement which admitted a French privileged position in Syria, and removed other causes of friction or suspicion.

Before the conclusion of this Agreement, further Anglo-Turkish talks in 1911 and 1912 had dealt with the construction of the railway through southern 'Iraq, and in May 1913 terms were at last agreed though in fact never ratified. They covered, besides the railway, the quasi-independent status of Kuwayt within the Ottoman Empire, and the special British position in the Gulf. The Baghdad Railway terminus was to be at Baṣra itself, unless and until Great Britain should agree to its prolongation to the coast. The Company's Board was to be increased by two British Directors; the British position in river navigation was secured; and, in exchange, an increase of the Turkish Customs duties to 15 per cent. was to be allowed.

To consolidate all these results an Anglo-German Convention was initialed on 15 June 1914, by Sir Edward Grey and Lichnowsky, and but for the War would have been signed in August. It confirmed the cessation of British opposition to the railway with its terminal at Baṣra, established an open-door policy in 'Iraq with acknowledgement of British interests in the sphere of irrigation, and confirmed the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of May 1913. Southern Persia was accepted by the Germans as a British area for oil development, and to aid this a Kut–Mandali railway would not be opposed. These provisions, against which many voices were raised among Turkish patriots, offered neverthe-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

less a prospect of the completion of the railway, object of so many 499
hopes and fears for twenty years. 648x

Meissner Pasha, brilliant and dynamic, polished Orientalist and 499
courtier, appeared in Baghdad in July 1911 and opened his offices in the house of Kadhim Pasha, destined but ten years later to accommodate the British High Commission and later Embassy. The site of the future railway station was selected on the right bank, and the first sod for the projected first section of the line, from Baghdad to Samarrā, was cut in the Wali's presence in July 1912. Difficulties of labour and of river transport, of docks and barges were somehow overcome. The hair of Meissner Pasha turned, as Lorimer reported, from black to white in three years of struggle; but forty-one miles of line to Sumayka were finished in May 1914, and eighty to Samarrā a few weeks after the declaration of war.

The history of river steam-navigation in this period is closely 505
tied to that of the Railway. A clause in the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1903 alarmed both the Lynchs' Euphrates and Tigris Company and the Oman-Ottoman Administration by its threat of privileged competition; but it was never applied. In 1904 the Saniya Administration, for a derisory payment, took over from the Oman-Ottoman their whole fleet and equipment which included four passenger steamers—*Baghdadi*, *Furat*, *Rasafa*, *Mosul*—and a number of smaller craft. The Ḥamidiya Navigation Administration, now so named, proceeded next to bring into service two new and relatively palatial Scottish-built paddle-steamers, the *Hamidiya* and *Burhaniya*, which Oman-Ottoman had ordered three years before, and four new barges. It operated during its five years of life with a greater efficiency than its predecessor; an English visitor, indeed, pronounced it in 1908 'wonderfully well run', and prophesied its final displacement of the Lynch boats, unless the Railway should first displace both. The Lynch Company meanwhile strove continually for greater freedom of development, which was tenaciously withheld, though a third steamer was permitted to sail regularly after 1907. The difficulties of low-water Tigris navigation and the tribal insecurity above and below 'Amara at times stopped all traffic and distracted the Lynch managers, Mr. Parry and Mr. Tod. The *Julnar*, the most pretentious of their fleet, was acquired in 1908; the other Lynch steamers already time-honoured (*Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*) continued in service under their tough veteran officers and Tall Kayfi crews. Free lances on the river—two Shi'i merchants and a head of the rich Khudhayri (Khedery) family—continued to take a share of the traffic, and schemes for further competition, such as that of an Anglo-Greek combine in 1905, were not infrequent. The Turkish revolution led to a retransfer of the Ḥamidiya Administration steamers from the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

505 Privy Purse to an organization of the central Government, the Ottoman River (Nahriya) Administration; but the service deteriorated in spite of new and important units acquired in 1912, the *Basra* and the *Baghdad*. Negotiations for a merger between Lynch and the Nahriya were persistent after 1909, but were long delayed by strong hostile outcry, both locally and in Istanbul, against such an example of foreign dominance, and were incomplete on the outbreak of war.

505 648x The subject, indeed, was among those covered by the never-ratified Anglo-Turkish Agreement of May 1913. This provided that, in the interests of the steamers, no 'navigable streams' were to be diverted from their courses; navigation rights were to be awarded for sixty years to a new Ottoman River Navigation Company, to be formed upon a basis of equal participation by Turkish and British interests. A fourth steamer (but under the Turkish flag) was to be allowed to the Euphrates Company. But while this arrangement was acceptable to the Baghdad Railway Company, which guaranteed the new Company a high minimum of tonnage, the damage to Lynch interests was clear. This in turn was met by a further agreement of March 1914 which was to bring the Lynch interest itself into the Ottoman Navigation Company. The Railway's rights of port-construction at Baṣra were to be passed to an Ottoman Port Company with participation for each of Lynch, Lord Inchcape, and the British India interests, and the Baghdad Railway. World events, however, were to prevent any of these arrangements from coming into force; before the end of 1914 German and Turkish interest in Tigris steam navigation was for ever extinguished.

Meanwhile, the immediate task of moving the Baghdad Railway materials from Baṣra led to the formation in 1912 of an *ad hoc* company, the Société de Transports Fluviaux en Orient, with equal participation of the Lynch Company and the Deutsche Bank; it acquired suitable small craft for its purposes, and was controlled locally by the Euphrates and Tigris management.

312 In the all-important sphere of irrigation, the new century was to see great and promising developments. The year 1900 and succeeding years found, indeed, the same evils as ever flourishing unchecked: disastrous annual flooding, deficiency of irrigation water in the season of greatest need, lack of control, lack of drainage. The same helplessness of the unled and unrecognized cultivators, the same archaic methods, the same vague and abortive projects formed in high circles, continued to provide no practical cure. Conditions in the mid-Euphrates area turned from bad to worse, with lands abandoned, canals drying, and tribes fighting for existence. The Hindiya Barrage again partially collapsed in 1903

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and progressively deteriorated. The river now adopted its Hindiya channel to an extent of nine-tenths, leaving desolation at Ḥilla, Diwaniya, and Daghara. Government organized repair works, but without adequate funds or energy, and the greater efforts made under M. Cugnin in early 1909 proved unavailing. The Euphrates irrigation position remained menacing or disastrous. 312

But help was, after all, at hand. The veteran irrigation engineer of Egypt, Sir William Willcocks, had studied the problems of 'Iraq water-control from 1902 onwards, and had submitted proposals to Istanbul through the British Ambassador. Late in 1908 he was appointed Consultant for 'Iraq irrigation, reached Baghdad in December and toured and studied with boundless energy, resolution, and intolerance, while the Mesopotamia Irrigation Survey pursued its work. By 1910 he had solved his problems. From the proposals in his report, most of which still held the field almost intact forty years later, there emerged the necessity for immediate large-scale works. To prevent flooding he demanded regulated flood escapes at key points, with strong embankments and the closing of existing breaches. The Euphrates escape would be at or near Ramadi, into Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Abu Dibis depression. The Tigris escape would be from the Samarrā area through miles of high ground into the Tharthar depression, unless the cost of so vast a scheme proved prohibitive. To raise low-season water-levels and provide reliable supplies to the off-taking canals, a barrage would be erected near Balad above Baghdad, and another at Kut al-Amara to restore the irrigable Gharraf (Ḥai) lands. The ancient Nahrwan canal was, by one of alternative methods, to be restored, and the waters of the Diyalā—and some of the Tigris—to be poured into it. The lower Euphrates swamps would be reclaimed by re-forming the main channels and by providing for flood escape. A barrage at Qarmat 'Ali would give controlled irrigation in Baṣra area. Large-scale drainage would be provided throughout the country by utilizing existing depressions, Tigris navigation would be safeguarded by controlling the great flood channels of the 'Amara district, the Buṭayra; Chahla, Majr Kabir, and Musharra. 312 185 653

Of this programme, grandiose and costly by any standards, criticism was not lacking on the grounds of deficient finances, tribal insecurity, lack of man-power, and chronic Turkish maladministration. But it was boldly adopted by the Turkish Government, with preference for the Hindiya Barrage as the first step. Willcocks witnessed from 1909 to 1911 the failure of further stop-gap attempts to repair the existing barrage, and was soon to experience his first taste of the greatest of all his problems—that of obtaining funds from the Turkish Government. Nevertheless

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

312 185 653 work on the new Barrage began. Tenders for the complete construction were called for in September 1910, and the contract awarded to the British firm of Sir John Jackson & Co.

The construction of the Barrage, then and now one of the greatest works in 'Iraq, was carried out with extraordinary speed by a staff which included Turks, Indians, Armenians, and some 3,500 'Iraqis. The suspicion of certain elements in Turkish officialdom usually turned to gratified encouragement after a personal visit to Hindiya. Labour troubles were few. Transport, especially that on the Euphrates routes from Baṣra, presented extreme difficulties, with tribal blackmail and navigational obstacles: and the continual struggles needed to obtain funds from an empty Treasury in Istanbul and a harassed Daftardar in Baghdad were successful only after actual stoppage of the work seemed inevitable. The iron gates arrived in the late summer of 1913, and a crowded and triumphant ceremonial opening of the whole work was held in November of that year. Although the Barrage, which had cost less than £500,000, still lacked the canalization which it was designed to support downstream, it conferred immediately enormous benefits on the countryside which it served. These would have been a hundredfold greater if they could have included public security, an equitable land system, and some hope of new agricultural methods.

Elsewhere in 'Iraq, much of the earth-work of the Ḥabbaniya Escape in its first phase was completed, and digging of the Ṣaqlawiya Canal was begun but abandoned. Further surveys produced information of great future value, though no other major enterprise belongs to this period. A scheme for watering the Ḥawija, north-west of Kirkuk, from the Lesser Zab was begun without study and ended in fiasco and scandal. More important, and prophetic of a major development of the future, was the growing riverside use of oil engines for irrigation purposes. These increased from a mere dozen in 1900 to some scores in 1914. Meanwhile, flood-bank protection annually renewed followed its unsure and expensive course, rarely effective and always burdensome. The 'bunds' built by Nadhim Pasha for the safeguarding of Baghdad, though they failed partially in their first year, were an important work.

433 These last years of Turkish rule were marked by little industrial development. Some increase in local shipbuilding and the use of irrigation pumps, ice machines, wool and liquorice-presses called for the first time for mechanical repair facilities. The first motor-
494 car appeared in 'Iraq in 1908 from Aleppo; by 1914 less than a dozen were in use. These included a motor-bus service on the Ba'quba road, and the private cars of a few notables. Efforts to mechanize the Kufa tramway had failed.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The infant oil industry in neighbouring Persia will be mentioned 315
later (p. 71). In 'Iraq, in spite of some enlargement of the primitive 471
extraction and refining plants at Qaiyara and elsewhere, no modern oilfield enterprise appeared. Nevertheless, the presence of important oil deposits in the Mosul and Baghdad wilayas was universally believed, and was affirmed by German visitors in 1907. The first move was the allotment of a twenty-metre strip of territory, athwart the railway alignment, to the Anatolian Railway in its 1902 and 1903 Conventions; the Sultan reaffirmed in December 1903 his previous Iradas declaring the Privy Purse to be sole owner of 'Iraq oil; and in July 1904 an option for exploration was given by that administration to the Baghdad Railway who passed it to the Deutsche Bank. It was not pursued, and after two renewals the option was treated by the Turks (though never by the Bank) as having lapsed.

Meanwhile W. K. D'Arcy, after gaining his Persian Concession 315
(p. 71), had sent a representative to Istanbul in 1901 and after 471
three years of negotiation and a ministerial promise that a concession would later be forthcoming, firm application was made 648x
by his new-formed Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate. Success was almost achieved in 1908; but the revolution interfered, Royal Iradas retransferred Turkish oil rights to the Treasury, and all negotiators perforce started again. The latter by now included another British group associated with Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian, an able and progressive Armenian, and representatives of Admiral Chester, an American ex-officer with long-standing Turkish connexions and now a candidate for railway and mineral privileges.

The aspirants for 'Iraq oil development—for this was chiefly though not exclusively in question—regrouped and returned to the attack in 1910. In January 1911 Mr. Gulbenkian's group formed African and Eastern Concessions Ltd., with substantial holdings by the newly founded (British) National Bank of Turkey, the Shell interests, the Deutsche Bank, and Mr. Gulbenkian himself. The Company was late in 1912 renamed the Turkish Petroleum Company, with doubled capital, and the Deutsche Bank agreed to transfer to it the options which it claimed for railway-strip exploration. The D'Arcy interests, merged in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company since 1909, continued to press its candidature, which in 1913 again narrowly failed of success. Meanwhile, late in 1909, a Turkish Parliamentary Committee had voted for the grant of mineral rights on a 900 mile railway strip to Admiral Chester; and strong German opposition was needed to thwart his efforts to achieve ratification.

By 1913 the desirability of reconciling the rival applicants and enabling field work to commence was clear to all. Anglo-German

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

315 agreement on the diplomatic level was added to that of the Companies. 471 The Turkish Petroleum Company was again reorganized. A quarter of its capital was allotted to the Deutsche Bank, a quarter 648r to the Shell group, and a half to Anglo-Persian, with an interest of 5 per cent. to Gulbenkian. Confident application could now be made to the Grand Vizier, with the backing of both British and German Ambassadors. The result was a letter to these from Sa'id Ḥalim Pasha on 28 June 1914. It stated that the Minister of Finance agreed to lease to the T.P.C. all oil deposits discovered or to be discovered in the Mosul and Baghdad wilayas, and 'reserved the right later on to fix its own share, as well as the general terms of the Agreement'. Upon this letter, precisely, was based the application of the T.P.C. to the 'Iraq Government in 1923 for an oil concession to cover northern and central 'Iraq.

5. NEIGHBOURS AND FOREIGNERS

648r The increase in foreign interest and interests in 'Iraq during this period was rapid beyond precedent. It is explained by 'Iraq's more active participation in the nationalist movement, in Istanbul politics, and in educational foundations such as the Tribal College and the American University of Beirut; and it was aided by the railway and irrigation works projected and under execution, and the considerations of strategy and development suggested by them.

The Germans had, from 1900, included 'Iraq in their area of eastern expansion. They had taken the lead in archaeological work by nearly two decades of excavation by Koldewey at Babylon, and initiated excavation elsewhere in 'Iraq, for which their Consuls alleged the personal interest of the Kaiser. They founded a German school in Baghdad, and invited the French Carmelite fathers to teach German. They appointed a regular Consul in Baghdad in 1905 with his Vice-Consul at Baṣra, and planned a German-dominated quarter of the town with the Consulate, railway station, wharves, and Customs house. Since the earliest arrivals of German steamers at Baṣra in 1899, the subsidized traffic of these had steadily increased. The Hamburg-Amerika Line started regular sailings in 1906, to be followed by an influx of German commercial travellers and resident agents—notably the firm of Wonckhaus at Baṣra—and by the appearance of their goods in the Baghdad shops. 'Iraq, in fact, seemed destined to afford a stage for full German penetration.

Russian enterprise still kept to limited and uncommercial lines. Having failed at Kuwayt, they felt their way towards acquiring rights in a Persian port, and projected a trans-Persian railway; but the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 1907 helped to remove from these projects the element of menace to British interests in the

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Gulf. The occasional visits of their steamers, plying from Odessa to Baṣra, attempted no serious inroads into the market except in petroleum and wood; and Russian naval officers on their rare visits to the Shaṭṭ amused the foreign community by their high-handed treatment of the port regulations. It was rather to northern 'Iraq that their Consul-General and his deputy at Mosul directed their attention, even though most of the gradual Russian penetration of Kurdistan was arranged from Van and from the Russian dominated city of Urmiya. Increasingly from 1910 the frontier Aghās looked to Russia for support. The Sayids of Neri, Shaykh 'Abd al-Salīm of Barzan, the Jaf leaders, and the Assyrian maliks and bishops were not alone in maintaining touch with them. This creeping Russian expansion seemed, however, to envisage no specific, certainly no immediate, objectives.

French interest in 'Iraq was, as ever, cultural. Their Consul in Baghdad followed with passion the controversy of Catholic against Nestorian in northern 'Iraq: supported the Alliance, the Dominicans, and the Carmelites, all of whom notably extended their institutions and charities between 1900 and 1914: and received in the 'French Garden' or Club in Baghdad his compatriot archaeologists, who were excavating from 1903 onwards. Commercial France was represented by the French-controlled Ottoman Bank, but by little else. Nothing came of their offer to contract for the carrying of mails from Baghdad to Syria, or to extend French railways from the Levant to the Euphrates.

The concern of the United States did not by 1914 yet extend to more than Protestant missionary enterprise and its developing schools, and the export of dates and liquorice to America. That of Great Britain had increased and consolidated. British interest in irrigation, in oil, in commerce, and river steamers has been already described. The strategic interest of southern 'Iraq and the Gulf approaches was jealously reassessed when the Russian threat gave way to the German, and the implications of this were discussed at high levels in London and Delhi. Lord Curzon's visit to Gulf ports in 1903, the parliamentary pronouncements of Lord Lansdowne in the same year, the determined preservation of all his privileges by the British Resident in Baghdad, all showed the value placed on the 'Iraq connexion. British sloops still sailed the Gulf and enlivened the British community at Baṣra (which trebled during the period) by occasional visits to 'Ashar. A new British Consulate finished in Baṣra in 1903, a new Residency in Baghdad in 1905, were impressive by local standards. A commercial assistant was added to the Resident's staff in 1906, an English Vice-Consul appointed to Mosul in 1908 after a twenty-year interval. British visitors to 'Iraq included a dozen officers of the Indian Army

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1918-1940) MEI Iraq MEI

648x interested in Arab affairs—G. E. Leachman, Hubert Young, Trenchard Fowle, A. G. A. Hore-Ruthven, and others—and writers of distinction who included the gifted and scholarly traveller Gertrude Bell. Among private British residents were interesting or outstanding personalities: Dr. W. A. Wigram of the Archbishop's mission, Arthur Tod of Lynch's, Captain C. H. Cowley [186] of the river steamers. But even while personal relations with the Pashas remained cordial, a policy of pinpricks which reflected a jealous and suspicious xenophobia was at times directed against British interests. Expropriations without compensation, capricious refusal of the right to use commercial codes, baseless demands for registration fees, permission to practise withheld from British doctors, mean treatment of British employees recruited for technical functions: these were episodes of an intermittent campaign of petty malice. The refusal of British Consuls to listen to shaykhs or notables who begged for British 'protection', and their manifest sympathy with distracted Governors, availed little to overcome the suspicion that the British had, somehow, sinister designs on the 'Iraq wilayas. Nevertheless, life in 'Iraq was found pleasant enough by resident Englishmen, and many warm friendships were formed between them and 'Iraqis.

British Residents and their Consuls during the period maintained a high level of loyal and disinterested service. At Basra A. C. Wratislaw was Consul from 1898 to 1903, E. F. Crow from 1903 to 1914; both were loyal friends of successive Walis. At Baghdad Colonel L. S. Newmarch was Resident and Consul-General from 1902 to 1906, Colonel J. Ramsey and J. G. Lorimer from 1906 to 1909 and 1909 to 1913. These, and not these alone, were outstanding public servants and good friends of the 'Iraq peoples. The tragic death in 1914 of Lorimer, author of the encyclopædic *Persian Gulf Gazetteer*, was a grievous loss.

British-Indian interests did not diminish. The extraterritorial Post Offices continued to be resented by Turkish officialdom, the Indian pilgrim-agents at Samarrā and Kadhimiya served their visiting fellow countrymen in spite of official interference, trading firms developed their businesses. Visits to the Holy Cities by the rich and great of Indian Islam were events notable to the Indian communities which existed in most of the larger towns of central and southern 'Iraq; but these, with partial assimilation into the local population, had little community organization and few eminent members.

To turn now to 'Iraq's Arabian and Persian neighbours, Shaykh 000 Mubarak at Kuwayt maintained his delicate triple position of nominal Qa'immaqam, treaty-bound British protégé, and effectively independent ruler. He survived the embarrassing visit of

1z Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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the German Railway Commission, to which he refused all facilities, and was visited by French and by Russian warships; the British sloops called frequently. Mubarak's first attempts to serve and repatriate his now impatient Najdi guest, 'Abd al-Raḥman ibn Sa'ud, were discouraged by the British Government and forbidden by the Wali of Baṣra, who detached Sa'dun Pasha of the Muntafiq from his forces. He persisted, was defeated with loss in March 1901, and again barely survived Turkish wrath, thanks to the reasserted agreement of Istanbul and London to maintain the Ḳuwayt *status quo*. In October 1901 Kuwayt was threatened by the forces of ibn Rashid, but the attack was not pressed. In December further Turkish pressure was used, in vain, to lead him to abandon his claims to special status; Turkish forces occupied points on the confines of Kuwayt territory, the Shaykh's flocks were raided, his house in Baṣra looted, his Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date gardens sequestrated. Finally in September 1902 a surprise attack on the town, organized by his enemies with Turkish support, was thwarted only by the intervention of H.M.S. *Lapwing*. Thereafter no direct attempts were made to evict Mubarak or to upset his British engagements. In 1904 the Turks released his Baṣra and Fao properties with a clear title; a British Agent was installed at Kuwayt in the same year. Towards Istanbul and the Wali of Baṣra he continued until 1914 to express the most correct of attitudes; but his effective independence was admitted in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913.

The defeat of Sa'udi forces in March 1901 did not deter the exiled Amir of that dynasty from continuing to plan for a restoration. The famous sortie of his son, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, from Kuwayt to Riyadh in January 1902, his entry into the city by night and subsequent expulsion of Rashidi garrisons from all Kharaj and Ḥariq, do not belong to the history of 'Iraq; but they firmly re-established the rule of the house of Sa'ud in Najd, a rule extended by further operations against the Ḥa'il Amirate in 1902 to 1904; and in these increasingly the young 'Abd al-'Aziz represented his father as the active head of the State. The appeals of ibn Rashid to the Turks for support against such aggression were not, however, always to be ignored. The command of the 6th Army was instructed early in 1904 to launch from 'Iraq an invasion of Arabia. A force marched or crawled south-westward from Samawa in May and was in time to save Ḥa'il from Wahhabi attack. The forces of ibn Sa'ud were defeated by those of his rival; but the latter refused to permit the entry of the Turks into Ḥa'il. The defeated Sa'udi ruler, having made acceptable apologies to Istanbul and met the Wali of Baṣra, was appointed Qa'immaqam of Najd independently of ibn Rashid.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

000 Later in the year 1904 a second Najd expedition from 'Iraq was mustered under the command of the aged and notorious Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha. Although ill-prepared and weakened by desertion, it reached Burayda unopposed. A military parade was organized, the official prayers offered in the name of the Sultan-Caliph, and a final comedy of Turkish administration was reached by the inscription of the central Arabian oases as qaḍhās and naḥiyas of the Empire.

Turkish forces from 'Iraq, wholly ineffective and wasted by constant desertions to Kuwayt and Baṣra, remained in central Arabia until the last weeks of 1906, when evacuation was carried out. Thereafter it seemed that a tolerable *modus vivendi* in central and eastern Arabia had been found. But, to complete the ruin of age-long Turkish hopes of a conquered Arabia, one more blow awaited them. In May 1913 forces under 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud occupied the sanjaq of al-Aḥsā and, welcomed by tribe and oasis alike, compelled the withdrawal to Baṣra of Turkish civil officials and military garrisons. The Amir announced that he held the province from and for the Sultan as a loyal subject, but that direct Turkish occupation could not again be accepted. Baṣra wilaya lost a sanjaq, and the blow to Turkish prestige was severe. al-Aḥsā ceased in effect to be Turkish; Qaṭar, overlooked or uninteresting, retained a wretched Turkish garrison until the War removed it. In June 1914 ibn Sa'ud accepted from the Turks the title of Wali of Najd and al-Aḥsā.

648 In 'Iraqi-Persian relations, there has been reference elsewhere to the transit trade of the Kirmanshah road, to the Persian pilgrims to the Shi'i shrines and the burials of the Faithful, and to the resented influence of the Persian Mujtahids. Persian diplomatic representatives remained widespread in 'Iraq, headed by their Consul-General at Baghdad. For the rest, apart from normal trans-frontier traffic, there was active but rarely cordial contact at four points on the long frontier—the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, the Pusht-i-Kuh, the Kirmanshah road, and the province of Kurdistan.

000 At all these points was reflected the tragic depth of Persian corruption and impotence, and the beginnings of efforts, after 1905, to improve them. In 1907 the promise of a representative Chamber was extracted from Shah Mudhaffar al-Din, but his despotic successor, Muḥammad 'Ali, continued until his abdication in 1909 to ignore both popular feeling and his own sworn undertakings. There followed twenty months of disturbance and Russian intervention, succeeded by the futile efforts of Muḥammad 'Ali to regain the throne from his child successor, Aḥmad Shah. To every evil of central misgovernment and provincial tyranny was added the misfortune of a decadent and avaricious royal house and an aggressive

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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northern neighbour. It was small wonder that the rulers and public of 'Iraq thought poorly of their eastern neighbours, sunk in miseries to which 'Iraq was paradise.

On the Shaṭṭ, the Turkish Government increasingly insisted upon that control of the whole river which the Erzerum Treaty, it was claimed, had awarded them. Episodes of smuggling, evasion of quarantine, and neighbourly obstruction multiplied. Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara continued far to outshine the Persian Government's Resident at his court, and dominated all southern 'Arabistan. His capital increased after 1900 in size and amenities, aided by the oil development, the thriving trade, and the good local security which attracted British, Persian, and German firms. The Shaykh befriended exiled rice-shaykhs of the 'Amara marshes, and was leagued with Sayid Ṭalib at Baṣra and Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt. He survived bitter quarrels with successive Walis of Baṣra, who resented his independence and prosperity. A Turkish encroachment on his territory in Ḥawiza district was frustrated by British intervention after Turkish guns had bombarded his palace. His relations with Teheran were coloured by jealous suspicion, and his friendship with the oil pioneers disliked. The Shaykh's children and those of Ḥajj Ra'is were educated at mission schools at Baṣra.

The plan for a trans-Persian railway with a terminus on the Gulf died hard. When it ceased to be all-Russian, it was adopted by an Anglo-Franco-Russian 'Société d'Études' which planned a Russian-controlled section from the Caucasus to Teheran with further British-dominated sections to the Gulf coast. These projects were debated in the House of Commons in 1912. Meanwhile an all-British group, including the Lynch interests, had other plans for south Persian railways, with Muḥammara or Khur Musā as terminal; and detailed surveys (under a young Indian Army officer, Lieutenant A. T. Wilson) were carried out through wild tribal territory.

Such threats to the supremacy of Baṣra as chief Gulf port were matched by other developments in 'Arabistan. In May 1901 W. K. D'Arcy, an Englishman enriched by a fortune made in Australia, obtained from the Shah an oil concession covering all central and southern Persia. After eighteen months of geological survey, drilling began at Chiah Surkh, a site just inside Persia according to the then recognized frontier, near Qaṣr-i-Shirin on the Khaniqin–Kirmanshah road. In spite of transport and supply difficulties and tribal and official interference, oil in commercially uninteresting quantities was struck early in 1904. Since these could never justify the projected pipeline to Muḥammara, Chiah Surkh was temporarily abandoned. D'Arcy, undeterred, transferred his

000 operations far south to the Bakhtiari country, whose approaches lay through Muḥammara. A well at Mamatain was unsuccessful; then, on the very eve of abandoning the enterprise, oil was struck at Masjid-i-Sulayman on 26 May 1908. The success was followed up, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company formed in 1909, and a site for a refinery chosen on the barren desolate Jazirat al-Khidhr, or Abadan Island, on the Shaṭṭ some miles south of Muḥammara. The period from 1909 to 1914 in 'Arabistan was one of immense activity, of which a considerable effect was felt at Baṣra. The first installations were completed by 1912, and the export of oil at a rate which had reached 250,000 tons a year was in operation at the outbreak of war: a development which substantially increased the strategic interest of the Gulf-head area, the Shaṭṭ approaches, and southern 'Iraq. In the spring of 1914 the British Government, on the initiative of Mr. Winston Churchill, acquired a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The relations between the Shaykh of Muḥammara and the Company were consistently cordial.

648[1] In the Pusht-i-Kuh zone of the frontier relations were normal in their squabbles over tribal and grazing matters, the shared Mandali water-courses, and the Badra Customs house. The pious and avaricious Wali, Ghulam Ridhā Khan, grew ever richer, acquired a house in Baghdad, and supported the persistent claims to the throne by the half-insane Salar al-Dawla, brother of the Muḥammad 'Ali Shah deposed in 1909. The bloody and futile antics of this prince form indeed a main part of the history of the frontier area astride the Kirmanshah road in the last five years of our present period. His annual appearance in the field, his seduction of some of the frontier tribes, his threats to Kirmanshah and Hamadan, his relapses into mere looting, blackmail, and voluptuous living on the harassed countryside, became the normal régime in a fertile and delightful territory. If he could make no headway against the official forces of Prince Firman Firmā, representing the central Government and royal family, neither could the latter pacify the country or expel him. D'Arcy's drillers were among the sufferers from the general disorder. The road was frequently closed, goods accumulated at Baghdad, pilgrims and corpse-caravans could not move. The pretensions of Salar al-Dawla were added as an irritant to the habitual factions and warfare of the Persian-Kurdish tribes, and to these the raids by—and exiled residence sought for—the 'Iraqi-Kurdish tribes of Hamawand, Zangana, Jaf, and Ṭalabani. The leaders of these joined in the mêlée with forces fitfully assembled and dispersed for and against the wretched pretender; who, with difficulty persuaded to leave Kurdistan in 1914, was nevertheless destined to appear yet again on the 'Iraq frontier.

[1] [Iraq-Persian frontier -- analyst]

Farther north, the history of Shaykh 'Ubaydullah's great raid of 1880 was repeating itself. The last frontier crisis around Wazna in 1889 had never been settled, and in 1906 Persian forces continued to hold territory claimed by the Turks under the vague terms of the 1847 treaty. The internal distractions of Persia, aided by bribery, now opened the door to a long-prepared Turkish invasion of the disputed area. Ḥamidiya battalions accompanied the Turkish regulars, and tribal bands joined in. Sardasht and Bana were occupied, Urmiya threatened, its plain devastated. Persian countermeasures under Firman Firmā prevented further advance; but in 1907 strong Turkish forces, refusing to parley with protesting Persian Governors, converged on Ṣawj Bulaq. The town was barely saved as a result of pressing Anglo-Russian representations, and the Turks withdrew a short distance from it and from Urmiya. But in 1909 the deposition of Muḥammad 'Ali Shah and the helplessness of Persia again invited Turkish ambition. Their troops reoccupied the disputed area and planted garrisons in the districts of Qutur, Khoi, Salmas, Margawar, Targawar, and Baradost. Ṣawj Bulaq was occupied as part of a wide and deep strip of borderland which, whatever ancient claims might allege, had not been Turkish for some generations. The Turks failed, however, to seduce the Persian Kurds of Marivan and Hawraman areas, Sunni though they were, and made little headway in the Shi'i tribes of Kirmanshah province. Vivid pictures of the assembly of the Turkish forces from Anatolia at frontier posts, and the asperities and absurdities of the Frontier Commissioners dispatched to the spot, ignorant of all history and topography but fervid in patriotism, are given by European travellers of the time.

Such episodes could possibly be obviated by diplomacy, never by border warfare. The frontier had now become a direct British interest by reason of the oil at Chiah Surkh and on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab; and since 1907 joint Anglo-Russian action had become easier. These Powers succeeded in 1912 in reassembling the 65-year-old Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission in Istanbul. In 1913 it was reconstituted with British and Russian membership and power to arbitrate, and a copy of the old 'Carte identique' was with difficulty unearthed. Each Power named its representatives. The British with wise forethought secured an undertaking that, should any Persian territory be transferred to Turkey, the D'Arcy oil rights therein should be honoured. The four Commissioners met at Muḥammara in December 1913, Great Britain being represented by Wratislaw and A. T. Wilson. Their delimitation work proceeded with remarkable amity. The line fixed involved Turkish withdrawal from most of the newly occupied region, but assigned to them two strips of territory in the Khaniqin–Mandali zone and

648* north of the Sirwan—the future 'Transferred Territories'. The Commission reached Mount Ararat late in September 1914. Their work proved to be an important contribution to Turko-Persian relations, and established, by concrete pillars and accurate maps, an 'Iraq-Persian frontier which Persian repudiation twenty years later (p. 267) could not discredit, and which in 1950 was still accepted.

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

1. MIDSUMMER 1914

To few countries in the world were greater changes brought by 178 the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Government 511 by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was 178 clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, confined 186 as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile 642 to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater 619 efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

642 distant, hated, interfering bugbear and, to the shaykhs, the enemy
619 whose every advance must be at the cost of their power and
livelihood. This was no less true among the Kurds, who, hating
the Turks, were unlikely to welcome the substitution of Arabs as
rulers; indeed, a national consciousness of their own had already
come, feebly, to birth. And on the Euphrates the theocratic Shi'i
priesthood were likely under any régime to maintain their own pre-
tensions, incompatible as these were with any secular Govern-
ment. Nevertheless, the tendency of the period prior to 1914
642 had been on the whole towards extension of the authority of
185 Government, a process likely or certain to continue under the
newer-fashioned post-1909 Administration: for this, tactless and over-centralizing, was nevertheless more vital and more modern-minded than any previous Ottoman Government. Its administrative record even in the excessively embarrassed period of 1908 to 1914 contained creditable features: better attention was being paid to education, health services, town planning; the gendarmerie had been improved, town police perfected, the Army reorganized, the judicial system in part revised. And the international agreements of 1913 and 1914 between Turkey, Great Britain, and Germany seemed to clear away many obstacles to development.

In the latter field, indeed, there was room for fair hopes. Though many problems were untackled—those of improved agriculture, use of water resources, land tenure—yet a notable beginning had been made with irrigation works, and the Baghdad Railway was at last, it seemed, to be completed. River navigation was likely to be improved under the 1913 arrangements. The eventual opening up of productive areas and markets would encourage trade and agriculture, and perhaps create industry. A concession for the oil of Baghdad and Mosul wilayas had been promised, and that to parties well able to develop that wealth, if it existed.

000 Thus a prudent observer of 'Iraq in the midsummer of 1914 might have prophesied a future of increasing development of resources and communications. These, directed by a vigorous Government free at last from international strife, might have produced by degrees the wealth necessary to maintain stronger forces, to impose security, to pay an improving civil service, to remedy, in fact, the more glaring evils of the Administration. Society would almost inevitably progress towards higher standards. The movement of local nationalism was likely to gain further ground in the direction of a privileged, even an autonomous, status in the Empire; but a complete secession of the Arab provinces was unlikely because it was backed neither by any military force, nor by any especial sympathy of Europe such as the Balkan Christians had enjoyed, nor by any unity of aim among the Arabs.

The action of Germany in precipitating a world war in August 1914, and of Turkey in entering it, swept all these considerations and speculations aside for ever.

2. THE CAMPAIGN IN LOWER 'IRAQ

The intervention of British armed forces in the 'Iraq of 1914 was a stroke universally unexpected. The Indian Army had been weakened by curtailment ever since the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. The dispatch of a column to the mouth of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab on a minimum scale had, indeed, been considered in staff conferences at Simla as a conceivable operation, but never seriously planned. All Indian forces which could be spared from an India itself insecure were dispatched to France on the outbreak of war; and hostilities with Turkey had always been feared as likely to produce dismay among Indian Muslims. The physical acquisition of territory on the Tigris or Euphrates had at no time been considered in responsible British circles. The immediate military value of a diversion at Fao or Baṣra could not be considerable. There were, in fact, abundant reasons against any such expedition.

But there were counter-arguments. Even before their declaration of war, the attitude of the Turks in 'Iraq was pointedly hostile. British property was requisitioned without ceremony. Turkish and German agents left for Persia to stimulate anti-foreign emotion, and sought even to seduce the Shaykh of Muḥammara. The Army was mobilized and supplied, martial law was proclaimed. Troop movements, if mainly northward to Anatolia, were reported also southward to Baṣra. There was reason to fear that Turkish authority at the head of the Gulf, if asserted with truculence and left unchallenged, would weaken the British position there, bring ruin to the Anglophil Shaykhs of Muḥammara and Kuwayt and in some degree ibn Sa'ud also, encourage malevolent elements in Persia, and be used indeed by the Germans as a disquieting threat to India itself. Finally, it would place in danger, or immediate ruin, the British oil enterprise in 'Arabistan.

Throughout August, September, and October 1914 intensive consultations took place between London and Delhi. Military and political views, British and British-Indian, were explored. Weight was given to the sage and balanced opinion of Sir Percy Cox, now Foreign Secretary in India after twelve years' service in the Gulf. Feeling in favour of an expedition to 'Iraq grew slowly in strength, without unanimity or enthusiasm, as the probability grew to certainty that Turkey would enter the War. On 2 October a positive decision was reached. The mission of the Expeditionary Force would be to protect the Abadan oil installations, cover the potential landing of reinforcements, and reassure the Arab

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1918-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

potentates. A Brigade of the 6th (Poona) Division sailed with sealed orders under Brigadier W. S. Delamain on 16 October, and arrived a week later at Bahrayn. After a fortnight its transports moved northward. War became certain on 29 October, and was declared on 5 November. Cox, as Chief Political Officer to the force, proclaimed that the British Government, while it 'had no quarrel with the Arab inhabitants of the river banks, as long as they showed themselves friendly', had been forced by Turkish hostility to take this step to protect its friends and interests. At dawn on 6 November the Fao fort was silenced by naval guns. Troops were landed at Abadan and soon reinforced, to be brought progressively up to divisional strength under the command of Major-General Sir A. A. Barrett. Turkish resistance led to two sharp actions, at Sayḥan and at Saḥil on 15 and 17 November; attempts to block the Shaṭṭ by sunken ships (including the *Kilid al-Baḥr*) failed of their object. Baṣra lay open and was entered on the 22nd. Pillage and arson by the town riff-raff were immediately suppressed, order established, the British flag hoisted, and gestures of welcome made by the notables and people. Cox announced again by proclamation that no ill will was felt against the civil population, justice and liberty would be respected, troops would behave 'with complete consideration and friendliness'. The British occupation of 'Iraq had begun.

The objectives of Indian Expeditionary Force 'D' had been achieved in full. Abadan was secure, the Turks discomfited, the friendly shaykhs complacent. Was this the end? No decision would have been more natural than one to remain in strong possession of Baṣra and its suburbs, and to advance no farther. But, impressed by the feebleness of Turkish resistance and the hope of enhancing British prestige, the C.P.O. telegraphed on 22 November to the Viceroy that he 'found it difficult to see how we can well avoid taking over Baghdad'; and, indeed, the lure of Baghdad was to continue, till its capture in March 1917, to lead the Army into advances and adventures never indicated by its essential rôle—though this too, thanks to the divided councils of the War Office, Foreign Office, India Office, Viceroy, and local commanders, was never clearly formulated. The military command was needlessly ill informed of 'Iraq conditions; its Intelligence and Political officers were almost all unacquainted with the territory, as was Cox himself. The Turkish Army was underrated, the deficiencies of the Indian military machine only gradually revealed; but these considerations hardly explain a persistent lack of precision in the objectives of I.E.F. 'D'. To the defeat of the Turco-German armies the Expedition made from first to last, and in spite of all its successes, a contribution quite unequal to its own cost and grievous losses.

1a Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Meanwhile, the first suggestion to advance on Baghdad was 000 rejected by London and Delhi. Qurna was occupied late in December, the Wali of Baṣra, Subḥi Bey and his staff captured, the ancient gunboat *Marmaris* sunk. A few miles of territory west and north-west of Baṣra, including Shu'ayba, were occupied, though a more ambitious proposal to advance on Naṣiriya and thus to control the Muntafiq was refused. The beginning of 1915 found the British forces firmly rooted on both banks of the Shaṭṭ. For the civil government of Baṣra city and suburbs a Military Governor was appointed, with an officer of the Levant Consular Service, R. W. Bullard, who had been acting as Consul at Baṣra, to assist him as Civil Adviser. Rupee currency was introduced and a party of Indian and Somali police brought in. Contact was made with the leading Baṣrawis and rural notables, who took the initiative of telegraphing complacent greetings to King George V. The Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, visited Baṣra in February 1915. Sayid Ṭalib had approached the Chief Political Officer through Shaykh Khaz'al in October, to offer his services in return for recognition as Amir of the territory; but his suggestion was rejected and he was seen in 'Iraq no more until 1920. Many leading citizens and nearly all responsible officials had accompanied the retreating Turks; but with the date-village folk, the Shaykh of Zubayr, and the riverain tribesmen friendly terms were established. 'Ujaymi, lurking on the desert fringe, offered his services, refused to appear, bargained, and finally withdrew, thenceforward a profitless ally of the Turks.

Early in 1915 signs appeared that the Turks would not lightly accept invasion. By suitable counter-measures they could strike southward by the Tigris at Qurna, by the Euphrates at the Shu'ayba outposts, or in 'Arabistan by way of attack on the oilfields and pipelines. The last-mentioned plan was the first to be adopted. The loyalty of a part of the tribes of 'Arabistan, subjects of Muḥammara, was perverted, and the pipeline cut. A small British force was promptly detached and placed at Ahwaz; but weeks of keen anxiety were to pass and more forces to be dispatched before the oil territory was secure. On the Shu'ayba front, where the spring flooding created the acutest difficulties of supply, attack by major Turkish forces and Arab auxiliaries was reported in March as probable, and as imminent in early April, at the moment when a newly formed Indian division, the 12th, was disembarking at Baṣra. The four-day battle of Shu'ayba, 12–15 April, was critical and desperately fought. It ended with the withdrawal of the Turks, harassed murderously by their Arab allies, and the suicide of Sulayman Bey al-'Askari, their commander.

I.E.F. 'D' had been reorganized as from 8 April as a Corps (the

600 2nd Indian Army Corps) under Lieutenant-General Sir John Nixon. The instructions conveyed to him were to 'control the Baṣra wilaya . . . and those portions of neighbouring territory which may affect its security; to ensure the safety of the oilfields, pipeline and refineries; and . . . to submit plans for effective occupation . . . and for a further advance to Baghdad.' These orders, in the eyes of a highly confident Commander, seemed not to exclude limited offensives which would take his arms deeper into 'Iraq and achieve Cox's political objectives, including the control of major tribes and routes. He dispatched in April a strong column under Brigadier-General G. F. Gorringe, who in three months restored the position in 'Arabistan, punished insurgent tribesmen, and secured the oil supply. Next, late in May, he directed Major-General C. V. Townshend and the 6th Indian Division with improvised transport of local river-craft—'Townshend's regatta'—to advance with naval support northward from flood-surrounded Qurna. His objective was 'Amara. The operation, thanks to Turkish withdrawal in panic, was completely successful. 'Amara was occupied on 2 June. Nixon then, with the reluctant permission of Simla, ordered a force under Gorringe to occupy Naṣiriya. The task was completed on 25 July after heroic struggles against heat and swamp conditions at their deadliest. This achieved the occupation of the triangle Fao–'Amara–Naṣiriya, and left the 2nd Corps distributed, apart from its lines-of-communication posts, in five main groups: at Baṣra, Qurna, Ahwaz, 'Amara, and Naṣiriya. At this stage and this degree of dispersal, it was able, but barely able, to maintain and supply itself.

But much more was to be attempted; considerations of prestige and the lure of Baghdad beckoned the Army onward in spite of all orthodox military considerations, partly as a counterblast to recent failure at Gallipoli, partly to forestall a not impossible Russian occupation. The Secretary of State for India, still responsible for the campaign, was induced to agree to the 150-mile increase of communications necessary to reach Kut and the Gharraf–Tigris junction. Townshend on 1 September began to concentrate his division and the 6th Cavalry Brigade at 'Ali al-Gharbi above 'Amara. He reached and forced the Ṣana'iyat position, scored a decisive victory on 27–28 September over the forces of Nur al-Din Bey, and enforced it by a vigorous pursuit through and beyond Kut. On 5 October his cavalry had reached 'Aziziya. Within the next few days, after exchanges of telegrams with India and London, the surprising decision was reached to attempt the capture of Baghdad without more ado: that is, with wholly inadequate transport and no reserves. The forward concentration at 'Aziziya was complete by 14 November—just as, unknown to Townshend, two fresh divisions under Khalil Pasha, the 45th and 51st, released from Gallipoli by the withdrawal of the British forces, had arrived to strengthen the Turkish 6th Army. The advance of the 6th Indian Division, its initial successes and later Pyrrhic victory at Ctesiphon, followed by enforced retreat by way of Lajj and 'Aziziya to Kut, belong to British military history and have been amply recorded by other writers. Kut was reached on 3 November. Instead of falling farther back, Townshend and his tired and weakened troops were ordered to halt the retreat and to hold Kut. The siege began; it was to last for 140 days, until 29 April 1916, and to end in the unconditional surrender of the garrison.

3. BRITISH AND TURKISH 'IRAQ, 1915–16

The impact of the Mesopotamian scene and people upon the invaders was generally unfavourable. The troops of every rank were impressed equally by the repellent desolation of the desert, and by the poverty and filth of the villages. Low standards of life and, as they judged it, low types of humanity confronted them. Idlers, beggars, pimps, sneak-thieves, haunted the fringes of the camps. These impressions were not improved by the physically inferior workers of the Arab Labour Corps, which were quickly established, nor by greedy bazaar shopkeepers, shameless and often murderous pilfering, and the ghoulish stripping of corpses on the battlefield itself by riverain tribesmen. Only Political Officers had opportunity of meeting the better elements, the respectable citizens and headmen of tribe or village, who, with their qualities of self-respect, humour, and intelligence remained regrettably unknown to the vast majority of the forces. If the Indian soldier and follower, especially if a Muslim, was not too incomprehensible to the southern 'Iraqi, the British officer and soldier were wholly strange in the difference of their manners, their prejudices, their tempo, and standards from those of the Turkish soldiery. When common tasks or interests—in river craft, fatigue parties, or coffee-shop meetings—brought fair types of the two races together, friendly relations were easily established; but such cases were too rare, and mutual non-comprehension and inhibition between 'the Army' and the population were to prove sadly permanent. Even though troops behaved well, abundant money was paid for all goods and services, and requisitioning was never harsh, yet billeting in the towns, blockade measures to keep supplies from the enemy, irksome sanitary and veterinary restrictions, control of movement and travel, road-making across canal beds, and military damage to crops and gardens were all ever-recurrent grievances. Moreover, the early contacts of the infant

000 Civil Administration[1] under Cox and his loyal indefatigable assistant, A. T. Wilson, were shadowed by the absence of all assurance that the occupation would be permanent. Imposed by caution and by French susceptibilities, the silence of the British on this matter must effectively preclude whole-hearted 'Iraqi co-operation. The Turks might yet return! But many or most of the town and tribal notables seemed willing to make the best of an occupation well conducted—and immensely profitable.

The honesty and inexperienced zeal of the incoming Political Officers—in almost every way the strangest of contrasts to their Turkish predecessors—did not preclude minor trouble with tribal communities unused to the new tranquillity or eager for loot or seduced by Turkish propaganda. Many punitive columns, sometimes unsuccessful, sought to chastise offenders. Meanwhile, the cramped and ill furnished Political Offices, staffed with Indian clerks and thronged with petitioners, witnessed from morning to night the rough-and-ready disposal of land and revenue and tribal cases, criminal trials, municipal and police business, and attempts to meet ever-increasing military demands for information, billets, labour, and supplies.

The occupation of 'Amara brought the Albu Muḥammad and Bani Lam within the field of the new administration, that of Naṣiriya the Muntafiq. Relations were established gradually: many tribal leaders were shy of a novel and a Christian government, some shunned contact and refused submission. In the Muntafiq, the increase of control was slow and difficult. A *modus vivendi* was arranged between the patrician Sa'duns and their nominal tenants, the machinery of a simple administration appeared, revenue collection began, countryside government by tribal Mudirs could be introduced, blood feuds were composed, a force of mounted police—forerunner of the 'Iraq Levies—was recruited. In Baṣra and Qurna tranquillity was unbroken. In the desert the D͟hafir were made responsible for the frontier marches;

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[1] Among the British officials, with Cox and Wilson, to serve the 'Civil Administration of Mesopotamia' in 1915–16 were: in 1915, S. G. Knox (Judicial), Drs. D. F. Borrie and N. E. H. Scott (Medical); C. R. Watkins (Customs); E. G. Gregson (Police): and as 'Politicals', C. C. J. Barrett, H. R. P. Dickson, C. J. Edmonds, T. C. W. Fowle, R. E. Holland, G. E. Leachman, C. F. Mackenzie, C. F. Macpherson, R. Marrs, E. W. C. Noel, H. St. J. B. Philby. In 1916 the Administration was joined by H. F. Forbes (Judicial), Drs. T. H. Bishop, G. Finch, T. H. Wood (Medical), F. W. Gerrard and F. C. Bright (Police), C. F. Weakford (Government Press), T. C. Wilson (Hostile Trading Concerns), H. R. C. Dobbs and C. C. Garbett (Revenue), and as 'Politicals' and in miscellaneous duties, H. M. Bloomfield, R. W. Bullard, H. A. Goldsmith, F. S. Greenhouse, M. Hiles, E. B. Howell, J. B. Mackie, S. G. C. Murray, E. B. Soane, A. L. Gordon-Walker, W. F. C. A. Wilson, and Miss G. L. Bell. These officers belonged to the Indian or Sudan Civil or Levant Consular or Indian Political services, or to the commercial houses established in 'Iraq before the War. See the last words of the footnote on p. 101.

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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but ibn Rashid, invited by Cox to make his peace, preferred to remain well subsidized in the Turkish orbit. In 'Amara Division, the *muqata'a* system was retained, for lack of any feasible alternative, and taxation was handled with discretion. After the occupation of Kut, the pro-Turkish shaykhs were attracted in, one after another, after a number of abrupt changes of attitude. The Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh maintained a watchful neutrality. The Zubayd and Rab'iya, upstream, waited on events.

Relations with Shaykh Khaz'al remained close and cordial. His tribal control in 'Arabistan, badly shaken in early 1915, was soon wholly recovered. Mubarak of Kuwayt, loyal to the last, died in November 1915. His son Jabir, surviving him by a single year, left the principality to his brother, Salim, whose pro-Turkish attitude called for the presence of a British force at Kuwayt. To 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud an envoy of goodwill, Captain W. H. I. Shakespeare, of the Indian Political Department, was sent at the outbreak of war, only to be killed by a tragic accident in the course of a Sa'udi–Rashidi battle in January 1915. Ibn Sa'ud was thereafter preoccupied by a rising among his own tribes. In December 1915 a formal treaty of mutual recognition and friendship between him and the British Government was arranged by Cox, and in November 1916, after a stately durbar at Baṣra, he was granted a supply of arms and a subvention of £60,000 a year. Postponing his own settlement with ibn Rashid, he viewed with suspicion from afar the uprising and pretensions of the astute and ambitious Amir of Mecca, the Sharif Husayn bin 'Ali, but himself, for reasons arising from Arabian politics, took no part in the War.

The retreating Turks had removed from southern 'Iraq all senior officials while looters (and defaulting taxpayers) destroyed the records; the new Administration must start from nothing. Substituting Arabic for Turkish, it retained many forms of Turkish procedure, including those of revenue assessment, for lack of better available. Customs duties, at a standard 10 per cent., were collected on incoming civilian goods. Criminal justice remained in the hands of the Military Governor, Political Officers, and their Assistants. Of Capitulations, abolished by Turkish decree throughout their Empire on the outbreak of war, there was for the time no need or question. For cases among tribesmen a special code—the Tribal Disputes Regulations—was evolved, and was destined to hold force for many years. Normal civil cases were tried by Courts newly established at successive headquarters, working in Arabic. Bodies of police, local constables under British officers, were established in 'Amara and Naṣiriya. Less formal gendarmerie forces, the Shabana, kept order under the Political Officers and performed a host of miscellaneous services in the smaller riverain

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

000 towns and country districts. The Shabana of 'Amara Division were provided by the chief shaykhs themselves; in Qurna and the marshes they were non-tribal. At Naṣiriya and Suq al Shuyukh the police were supplemented by bodies of tribal horse under direct military command.

Such attention as was possible was paid, thus early, to civil health requirements in the form of dispensaries and hospitals serving the local population, insistence on sanitation, control of urban water supplies, anti-malarial and anti-epidemic measures. A modest news service was inaugurated at Baṣra, where a newspaper was published in Arabic and English. The Eastern and the Imperial Ottoman Banks opened branches in Baṣra, soon followed by the Imperial Bank of Persia. A few primary schools were started in 1915 and 1916, and grants were made to the American Mission School at Baṣra and those of the Christian and Jewish communities.

But the British occupation covered, at this stage, only a small fraction of 'Iraq. The rest remained under a Turkish Government increasingly militarized, harsh, and disillusioned. Some of the foreign residents in Baghdad had left for Baṣra and Muḥammara before the declaration of war; of the British community, almost intact when war broke out, the men were then marched to Syria when the intervention of Jamal Pasha, formerly Wali of Baghdad (p. 50) and personally acquainted with most, secured their release without parole, and some, including E. B. Soane and Arthur Tod, returned by way of Egypt to Baṣra: the women stayed in Baghdad until March 1917 when they were sent to Istanbul, there to remain for the rest of the war. Foreign interests and all but the most privileged of 'Iraqis suffered heavily from restrictions, rarely-paid requisitions, and sheer confiscation. Turkish ill will towards the population had increased with the growth of Arab nationalism, and was now exasperated by Arab indifference, or worse, towards their rulers' war effort. The Liberal Committee in Baghdad was dissolved in 1916, the work of the foreign missions—Carmelite, Jewish, and Protestant in Baghdad, Dominican in Mosul—was suppressed and forbidden. Conscription was rigorously enforced on formerly exempted classes, and general mobilization created many hardships. The early proclamation of Holy War against the infidel had been reinforced by every Mosque preacher, Sunni or Shi'i, whom the Turks could influence. It created little popular or religious feeling, unless for a short phase at Baṣra in 1915; but it proved possible under this guise to mobilize some thousands of loot-hungry tribesmen from central 'Iraq, and some hundreds from southern Kurdistan, to join the Turkish forces opposite Shu'ayba and in 'Arabistan. Their military value was negligible, and the outcome an added bitterness between Turk and Arab and the final failure of the Jihad. The tribesmen returned home confident, with reason, that their escapade would not prejudice them with eventual British occupiers. Many shaykhs changed their loyalties—if their naïve and futile professions of adherence deserve the name—more times than once. The Turks continued to subsidize 'Ujaymi and ibn Rashid and, on the middle Euphrates, to preach resistance to the invading infidel: efforts which, neutralized in part by sheer indifference and in part by British propaganda and tribal contacts already made up-stream, produced no military results.

Meanwhile a situation dangerous to the Turks had developed in the Holy Cities. Turkish rancour did not spare the priestly circles of Karbalā and Najf. Deserters from their forces took refuge in the latter city and the attempt to recover these, added to harsh requisitions, led to riots, reprisals, and damage to the sacred buildings. The enraged mob overcame the troops, pillaged Government offices, and installed a 'Government' of leading citizens. The movement of violent revolt spread, with wide tribal backing, to Karbalā and elsewhere. Turkish garrisons and officials were expelled, their houses burnt, their property destroyed. But no unity developed in the movement; it died feebly down and the Turks, after a course of appeasing conciliation, could return to restore a nominal authority. A correspondence developed in September 1915 between spokesmen of the Holy Cities and Sir Percy Cox in which the former offered, on highly imaginative terms, to renounce Turkish allegiance, and the latter sent gifts of money. Six months later further disorders broke out at Karbalā; an attempted arrest led to violence whereby the Turks were again evicted. The same followed at Najf and Ḥilla. The latter place was the scene of further long-remembered tragedy: Turkish troops appearing outside it in November 1916 arrested a deputation of townsmen, hanged a number of them, then wrecked and looted parts of the town. To such depths of folly and crime did the Caliph's Government descend in its last months of life in the Shi'ī areas of 'Iraq.

In the north, economic life and the Persian transit-route suffered catastrophe by the closing of the Baṣra supply-line. Surpluses of exportable grain and dates accumulated, with increasing shortages of textiles, hardware, and imported necessities, and a general paralysis of trade. The introduction of valueless paper-money was accompanied by brutal seizures of gold and valuables. Civil life became ever less normal and less tolerable. It was complicated by increasing pressure on the minority communities, and by the appearance of Armenian refugees in hundreds from the abominable

000 massacres of 1915–16 in Anatolia. Some lurked in the towns, some were scattered among the tribes. Outlying tribal disobedience must perforce be ignored by the weakened and harassed governors; but occasional blows could still be struck. Shaykh Salim of Barzan was caught and hanged, to be succeeded by the half-idiot Shaykh Aḥmad. Sayid Ṭaha of Neri contrived to escape. The Rawanduz area, invaded in 1915–16 by Russian troops detached from their western Persian operations, was devastated by their barbarous exactions and indiscipline.

4. KUT–BAGHDAD–MOSUL

Townshend's retirement to Kut early in December was followed by its complete investment by the end of that month. Cox left, under orders, before the siege closed in. Some 6,000 'Iraqis were inside, the suggestion to evict them having been rejected. The siege began with an impetuous Turkish attack on 24 December; it was unsuccessful and never repeated. The forces of Khalil Pasha consisted, from this time onward, of strong elements of the Turkish 13th Corps (35th and 36th Divisions) and 18th Corps (45th and 51st Divisions), with the 52nd and 2nd Divisions arriving soon afterwards. His army was, throughout, more numerous and far more easily supplied than the relieving forces. The latter, the Tigris Corps, consisted of the 7th and shortly afterwards the 3rd Indian Divisions, the 6th Cavalry Brigade, and miscellaneous Corps troops, and was commanded as from 12 December by Lieutenant-General F. Aylmer. They concentrated at 'Ali al-Gharbi from the first days of 1916, moved up-river and successfully occupied Shaykh Sa'ad, but failed to carry the Umm Ḥanna position on 21 January. Conditions of flooding, mud, sickness, and deficient transport and supplies hampered their operations to the verge of immobility.

A week earlier General Nixon, whose health had collapsed, had been relieved by Sir Percy Lake in the highest command. His earliest care was to plan improvement of the port facilities of Baṣra, where congestion and confusion were indescribable, and simultaneously to augment the pitifully inadequate river fleet and to build roads and railways. This gave promise of future improvement, but all too late for the Kut operations. The dispatch of the (British) 13th Division from Europe, and the tardy transfer of control of the British and British-Indian Army—I.E.F. 'D' now renamed the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force—from India Office to direct War Office control, were other favourable elements. The Russian capture of Erzerum on 17 February, and the advance of their forces southward to Kirmanshah on the road to Baghdad, could also seem encouraging.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

But the stars in their courses, with the powerful alliance of sheer military inferiority and heart-breaking conditions, fought against the Tigris Corps. A promising offensive on the right bank, at the Dujayla Redoubt, was turned into fiasco by misunderstanding among the generals. The appeals of Townshend for relief indicated ever-varying dates as his limit of endurance. Gorringe succeeded Aylmer in command of the Corps, and was able with the fresh troops of the 13th Division under Major-General Stanley Maude to carry the Ḥanna and Fallaḥiya positions on 5 April; but the Ṣana'iyat line proved impregnable. That of Bayt 'Isā on the right bank was captured, but another attack on Ṣana'iyat on 22 April was unsuccessful and grievously costly. Tigris Corps casualties had amounted in four months to over 23,000 men; further frontal attacks were out of the question, and floods covered the flanks. Supplies dropped by aircraft could not long avert the end. A hopeless and unworthy attempt to buy the safety of the garrison for cash from the Turkish Commander was made and rejected; T. E. Lawrence and Aubrey Herbert had been sent to 'Iraq to make the effort, of which Cox disapproved. A last heroic venture to run the blockade by river with the Lynch paddle-steamer *Julnar* under Captain Cowley failed. On 29 April Townshend and his garrison of 2,750 British and 6,500 Indian troops surrendered.

The abominable treatment in 'Iraq and Turkey of the Kut prisoners in Turkish hands, and the proceedings and Report of the Mesopotamia Commission, which allotted blame for the débâcle to all concerned with a generous but discriminating hand, belong rather to the history of the British Army than to that of 'Iraq. The local effects of the Kut defeat, however, were appreciable. Many tribal waverers again changed sides or withdrew from sight; little could be done to develop the civil administration or to extend it beyond the river banks; and the reluctance of townsfolk to identify themselves with the British was increased, though less than could have been expected.

The Turks re-entering Kut in triumph behaved with gross indiscipline, and hanged or tortured 'Iraqi civilians who had committed 'treason' by enduring the siege: a lesson not lost upon the 'Iraqi public elsewhere. Thereafter Khalil Pasha consolidated his position athwart the Tigris, held Ṣana'iyat with his 18th Corps (45th, 51st, and 52nd Divisions) and could send his 13th Corps into Persia to oppose the Russians, whom it decisively drove back after General Baratoff had already occupied Karind and threatened Khaniqin. The British Commander-in-Chief received on 30 April instructions to adopt a defensive rôle but to maintain his forward positions with the hope of Russian co-operation and to minimize

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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loss of prestige. His forces entered a period of regrouping and rebuilding. One more division, the 14th, joined the forward troops opposite Kut. The summer of 1916 set in.

The period from April to December 1916, unmarked by military operations, witnessed nevertheless the gradual transition of the British forces from a position of inadequacy in supplies, transport, services, and reinforcements to one of abundance and sound organization. This, in spite of the utmost efforts of General Lake, was achieved only painfully and gradually; even in August it was necessary for supply reasons to withdraw the 13th Division to the rear. Arms, ammunition, equipment, railway material, land and river transport arrived week by week. The port of Baṣra was created on extensive modern lines by Sir George Buchanan, with the construction of wharves, provision of equipment, and operations of dredging and buoying. Roads and light railways were built to serve it, protected by 'bunds' from the ever-threatening floods. The river fleet, augmented fiftyfold by miscellaneous craft from all quarters, was organized into a Directorate of Inland Water Transport which, controlling a fleet without parallel on the world's rivers for number of craft and tonnage handled, played thereafter a part of immense importance. Straightening of channels, conservancy and lighting operations were carried out on the Tigris and Shaṭṭ al-'Arab to facilitate navigation, and a deep channel was dredged at vast cost through the Ḥammar Lake—only to be abandoned unused and unwanted. On the roads, mechanical transport was introduced on a major scale during 1916, with the network of depots and repair shops indispensable to it. It changed, in a day and for ever, 'Iraqi conceptions of movement by land. Aircraft, which did not exist at the outset of the campaign and mustered only three machines in the autumn of 1915, were multiplied, with improved types, to a level of superiority over the enemy for the first time. The medical services, hitherto inadequate to the point of grave scandal, were overhauled and greatly increased. The labour organization, which provided well-paid and well-found employment for many thousands of Arabs and Kurds, was unified into a competent Directorate; that of Local Resources vastly extended its operations in all controlled areas, and worked through innumerable local contractors and suppliers. These various and interlocking services, which multiplied the ration strength of the Expedition and filled Base and lines-of-communications areas with an infinity of camps, buildings, depots, workshops, and roads, were co-ordinated by an incoming Inspector-General of Communications, Major-General G. McMunn.

Railway construction, apart from light lines at the Port, was begun in April 1916. A metre-gauge line from Baṣra to Naṣiriya

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

was completed in December, a narrow-gauge line from Qurna to ʿAmara was begun in July and opened in November. In August a light line in the forward area connected Shaykh Saʿad and al-Sinn, and was later prolonged to Imam Manṣur. The Qurna–ʿAmara line was converted in 1917 to metre-gauge, and a similar line was constructed in the summer of that year from Kut to Baghdad. The gap between Baṣra and Qurna was later filled, that of ʿAmara–Kut never. All these lines, save that of Baṣra–Naṣiriya, were dismantled after the war; they had served their war-time purpose and had no economic rôle in civilian life.

In the autumn of 1916 it was possible to consider further operations. Sir Percy Lake, a sick and ageing Commander, had given place to the vigorous and competent Maude late in August. The Tigris Corps was now divided into a 1st and 3rd Corps. Major-General A. S. Cobbe replaced Gorringe as Commander of the 1st Corps (3rd and 7th Divisions). Lieutenant-General W. R. Marshall commanded the 3rd Corps (13th and 14th Divisions), while the 15th Division under Major-General H. T. Brooking occupied the lower Euphrates. Two cavalry brigades and a multiplicity of Army troops were available for offensive operations without robbing communications defences, now fully secure. The case for action was the stronger since the Russian retreat and the Turkish penetration in Persia, which if unchecked might again threaten the oilfields. The British Cabinet's War Committee began to favour at least a semi-offensive policy; 'British influence in the Baghdad wilaya' was at last to be established. To this end Maude was instructed to strengthen his forward positions, and he felt free to consider the possibility of an advance to synchronize with greater Russian efforts in Persia and Kurdistan. Of the forces confronting each other in the Kut positions, the British was by now the stronger. Maude, deciding on a plan calculated to operate by successive limited phases, intended the defeat of the enemy forces without regard to Baghdad or to any political considerations. His operations began on 10 December. The details of these belong to military history; it must here suffice to record that the stages by which Maude's advance was organized, each patiently and logically following the last, led in spite of strong resistance and moderate losses to the clearing of Turkish forces from the Tigris right bank as far as the Gharraf (Ḥai) by 4 February, the capture of the Daḥra Bend by mid-February and of the Ṣanaʿiyat position by the 24th. The passage of the Tigris from right bank to left was achieved on that day: and thereafter the dislodged and defeated Turkish forces were pursued along the Tigris left bank towards Baghdad. After a pause for supply and reorganization, and a momentary check at the Diyalā crossing, no serious resistance was offered by the Turks

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

000 to prevent what the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London now by telegram authorized—the full exploitation of Maude's success and the occupation of Baghdad. The city was entered on 11 March.

Politically the objective of the campaign—if such it was—had now been gained; but Baghdad was strategically untenable without the occupation of considerable further ground to the north and west. The routes converging on it must be held, the danger of malicious flooding prevented. Columns vigorously pushed forward secured by the end of March, after a series of successful actions on the Tigris and on both sides of the Diyalā, a line Shahroban–Sumayka–Faluja, though the 'Aqar Quf depression and tracks west of Baghdad were flooded by Turkish dyke-cutting on the Euphrates. Not until late April when actions had been fought to gain Samarrā and the Jabal Ḥamrin approaches was the position accounted fully secure, and a pause permitted.

Russian troops, though the revolution had broken out on 11 March with unpredictable results, had again advanced through north-west Persia to Kirmanshah against strong resistance by the Turkish 13th Corps. The latter finally disengaged and retired towards Kifri; the Russians occupied Qaṣr-i-Shirin, Khaniqin, and finally Qizil Rubaṭ where they could join hands with the British. But hopes of Russian assistance farther north against Mosul, or in holding Baghdad, were to prove abortive; the Tsar's forces henceforward slowly disintegrated, and their presence on the 'Iraq borders to the east and north-east became no asset but a grave embarrassment.

The autumn and winter of 1917 and spring of 1918 passed without major military operations. The expectation of a serious Turkish counter-move in 'Iraq—the boasted Yilderim Army, to sweep the British back to the Gulf—was disappointed, since the Turks preferred to make such effort as they could in Syria–Palestine. The British, while maintaining forces now important by any standard and in admirable order, could plan for no resounding success for lack of powerful enemy forces to defeat or strategic object to pursue.

In September General Maude made, by one of his few errors of military judgement, a premature and unsuccessful attempt to take Ramadi. Two months later, in better weather, he attacked again and was able to advance his positions not only to Ramadi but to the Jabal Ḥamrin gorge on the Diyalā, and to Takrit on the Tigris. It was his last operation. He died of cholera, universally admired and regretted, on 19 November. He was succeeded by Marshall, from 3rd Corps, with Major-General W. Gillman as his Chief of Staff.

The new Commander-in-Chief lost no time in carrying out the policy communicated to him on his assumption of command. It was to be that of a steadily maintained pressure with local offensives, and while consolidating the British positions throughout the Baghdad wilaya would develop the country's resources, and as much as possible of its man-power, for the war effort. An operation by the 13th and 14th Divisions late in November ended with the seizure of the Ṣaqalṭuṭan Pass on the Jabal Ḥamrin and the Turkoman town of Qara Tepe in the Kifri plain. In March troops advancing up the Euphrates occupied Hit, Alus, Ḥaditha, and 'Ana, and after a light reconnaissance 75 miles beyond, finally stabilized their advanced posts at Ḥaditha. A month later a forward move on the right flank occupied Kifri on 28 April, Ṭuz Khurmatu a day later and then, under War Office instructions, Kirkuk on 7 May. A raid on Altun Kupri was made simultaneously by cavalry across the Ḥawija from the Tigris. Kirkuk was not held, by reason of military supply difficulties: tragic as it was from the viewpoint of local relations, British forces evacuated the town a fortnight after the promising and applauded occupation, accompanied by some hundreds of despairing local Christians and Jews. Ṭuz Khurmatu became the most forward position. So passed the summer of 1918.

Late in October an armistice with Turkey was known to be imminent; and, with the diminished and disheartened forces of 'Ali Iḥsan Pasha concentrated at Fatḥa Gorge and the Kirkuk area, the British made simultaneous advances towards Kirkuk and Altun Kupri on the eastern flank, and up the Tigris on the western. The former was but lightly opposed, and Kirkuk was reoccupied; the latter, after gaining ground, met stiff opposition at the Jabal Makḥul astride the Tigris, where severe fighting took place. Mobile but fiercely disputed operations followed, to end with the destruction or surrender on 30 October of almost all the surviving elements of the Turkish 6th Army, save the few hundred men and guns in Mosul city. Qaiyara was reached on 31 October, and on the following day British cavalry under Major-General Cassels were met by a flag of truce and news of the Armistice. It had been signed at Mudros on 30 October, to be effective at noon 31 October. Article 16 of the Armistice terms, which reached Baghdad on 2 November, provided that all the 'Turkish garrisons in Mesopotamia . . . should forthwith surrender to the nearest Allied Commander'; and Article 7, that the Allies had the right 'to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies'. 'Ali Iḥsan nevertheless, in communication with Cassels, requested the withdrawal of British troops to Qaiyara, the farthest point occupied at the moment of the Armistice. The British Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand, interpreted the Armistice terms very differently and directed the immediate occupation of Mosul and full compliance with Article 16. An exchange of messages, with Colonel Leachman as go-between, failed to dislodge the Pasha and his forces from the city; he claimed that Mosul was not in 'Mesopotamia' and his troops not a 'garrison' but a field army. At a conference at Mosul on 7 November, attended by General Marshall and the Acting Civil Commissioner, 'Ali Iḥsan signed under protest the terms dictated to him, whereunder he must evacuate all parts of Mosul wilaya within ten days. This condition, and others attached in the interests of the Mosul public, was carried out.

To the resolute and successful attitude of Marshall in these exchanges was due, it would appear, the effective establishment of the Mosul wilaya as a *de facto* part of 'Iraq; if an Armistice line had been accepted such as to include in Turkish-held territory that city and its fringe of Kurdish qaḏhās, these would form part today, in all probability, of Turkey and not of 'Iraq.

5. BRITISH WAR-TIME ADMINISTRATION, 1917–18

The last twenty months of the War, while British forces occupied central 'Iraq and established relations with and an Administration[1] for the public in every area, were a profoundly formative period in Anglo-'Iraqi relations. Conditions of life and Government were obviously abnormal; the Turkish Administration had disappeared; many leading 'Iraqis of the urban Sunni upper class and most senior officials were absent; local politics were inactive, military needs had unquestioned priority, and communications were largely closed to civilians. Nevertheless, the close terms upon which in many relationships 'Iraqis and British officers and troops found themselves, and the resulting mutual appraisal and the shared necessity to restart the functions of Government and society, led inevitably to the making of many decisions which, directly or by reaction, were to contribute to shaping the public life of the territory for a generation: decisions regarding the law, the adoption or modification of Turkish procedures, tribal policy, the structure and units of the Administration, and the currency.

In southern 'Iraq the all-pervading British military forces dominated the scene within all riverain areas. The fostering of local resources for Army use, employment of 'Iraqi labour, railway construction, efforts to improve Tigris navigation, were examples of military activity which had civilian consequences; and from them all arose thousands of claims, grievances, petitions from the humble and the great among the public to the ever-accessible

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[1] For officers of the Administration 1915–16 see p. 82, n. 1: for period 1917–20, p. 100, n. 1.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Political Officers. The patient disposal of these cases established the tone of the infant Administration and marked its remoteness from Turkish standards. The Baṣra townspeople, vastly enriched and led by progressive men, seemed for the moment heedful rather of the material future of their city than of the nascent nationalism of pre-1914. From 'Amara, scene of immense military activity and correspondingly prosperous, were administered the Bani Lam and Albu Muḥammad; it was sad that on a dozen of its citizens, convicted of correspondence with the Turks, fell the sentence of exile to India. The Political Officers, helped by the comparative stability of southern 'Iraq and its remoteness from the firing line, were able to extend their contacts, levy taxation, administer the Shabana, compose feuds and punish crimes with a fund of enthusiasm, goodwill, and daily acquired experience. They learnt soon to distinguish the reliable from the shifty among the shaykhs, and on occasion saw need to remove the worst of these from their places. Security was generally good on main routes, and inter-tribal fighting almost suspended. Only on the fringes of the Pusht-i-Kuh and in the further areas of the Muntafiq and Bani Ḥuchaym was control still unestablished. Political Officers or their Assistants were in residence during 1917–18 at nearly all other qadhā headquarters in Baṣra wilaya.

The proclamation of General Maude upon his occupation of Baghdad, drafted in London in the flamboyant prose of Sir Mark Sykes, assured the public of British benevolence, suggested an Arab future of 'greatness and renown among the peoples of the earth', and invited the public 'through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs'. It made no great impression; more immediately pressing matters called for the urgent attention of the Chief Political Officer. The innumerable visitors to his office included all the notables of the city and inlying areas, with the aged Naqib Sayid 'Abd al-Raḥman at their head, and scores or hundreds of tribal shaykhs from every part of the country. A telegram to King George V from the leading 'Ulamā of Karbalā and Najf was courteously acknowledged. Euphrates shaykhs from areas where no British soldier had trodden, nor would tread for some months, were received by Cox with honour and returned home with instructions to keep order and to till their fields.

In Baghdad city the climax of two years of scarcely tolerable misery had been reached by the requisitions and destructions of the last few weeks of Turkish occupation. Public buildings had been wantonly damaged, the barely completed German wireless station was left in ruins. Conditions were deplorable in the jails and hospitals and in the streets, where a new main thoroughfare had

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been abandoned half-finished and rubble-strewn. Food in some quarters was deficient to the point of starvation, economic life was dead, the public services had ceased to exist, and a cowed population looked forward to the rumoured blessings of British rule. These now appeared in the form of unprecedented activity and traffic, abundant money and a sound currency, the opening or reopening of the British banks within a few weeks of the occupation, full employment, a high standard of security, and public services quickly developing to the limit of war-time practicability. Insistence on sanitation, the requisitioning of houses, searches for arms, movement restrictions, and a host of miscellaneous regulations were less popular features. In general, the Baghdad of 1917–18 was bewildered, optimistic, and highly receptive of new ideas and methods; and nowhere was it more difficult for the Administration to content itself, as it was bidden to do, with 'the minimum administrative efficiency necessary to preserve order'.

In the Kut, 'Aziziya, and Ba'quba areas a number of the shaykhs, expecting a Turkish return and victory, had accompanied the army of 'Ali Ihsan; but restoration of normal conditions was rapid on the Tigris, where the immediate rebuilding of Kut was hailed as symbolic and the Shammar Tawqa, Rabi'a, and Zubayd returned early to their ploughs. On the Diyalā, progress was rapid as soon as the retirement of the Turks from the Jabal Ḥamrin permitted access to the vital canal-heads. The Euphrates tribes above Hindiya—Zawba' and Dulaym—offered a hesitating allegiance when Ramadi and other of the Dulaym centres were occupied.

The urgent need to increase food production in a war-harried territory and thereby to save military shipping led in 1917 to the establishment of an Agricultural Development Scheme under C. C. Garbett, head of the Revenue Board. It aimed at the production of some 300,000 tons of grain, and as its means employed seed advances, supply of plough-cattle, and assistance with canal clearance. The co-operation of the shaykhs was gained by the promise of revenue privileges and by the enthusiastic propaganda of Political Officers. In spite of such varied difficulties as untimely tribal disturbance, the disappointing performance of some canals, thefts of seed, and misleading surveys, the Scheme secured a large part of its objectives; and it presented a wild tribal public with the unprecedented spectacle of a Government planning and spending to increase production from which its subjects must directly gain.

In the Euphrates districts, main scene of the Agricultural Development Scheme and habitually unquiet, no troops were available for some months to establish the prestige of the new Power, nor had the British any detailed knowledge of the personalities of the region. Every tribal leader was resolute to aggran-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

dize his own position, to secure privileges, to pay off old scores. 000 Every town, headed by Najf and Karbalā, had its town roughs as well as its holy men and their factions. The first stage was to send a Political Officer to Ḥilla in May 1917. He was able without force to assert some authority in that area and in Hindiya, but none in Diwaniya, where a Turkish force maintained itself under a truculent Circassian lieutenant until August, and none farther south. The Shamiya, Samawa, and Rumaytha folk were perforce left to their own devices. At Karbalā the Kammuna family, in touch with Cox since 1916, were confirmed by him in authority till further notice. Resented by rival families, Muḥammad 'Ali and Fakhr al-Din Kammuna maintained order of a sort for some months; but as wholesale blockade running to the Turks was tolerated or even organized by a régime already flagrantly abusing its power, it could not long continue. First one brother, then the other, was removed and to the general relief a British officer was sent to administer the town and district. In Najf power was conferred on (or taken by) one 'Aṭiya abu Qulal, a powerful half-crazed ex-outlaw who was head of the Zuqurt gang and had formed the 'interim Government' of Najf in 1915–16. But such a régime could never last. In July 1917 an authorized Government Agent, Ḥamid Khan (a cousin of the Aghā Khan), was sent there from Baghdad, still without forces, to do his best. Rioting in Najf in October, caused by resentment against 'Aniza visitors, led to an ugly situation and was followed by the resignation of Ḥamid Khan, and the arrival of a Political Officer for the Shamiya District. 'Aṭiya was still able to create chaos in Najf, with riots and arson in Kufa and Abu Ṣukhayr, though order was restored by Mujtahid intervention; but these conditions were too clearly inconsistent with the essential functions of Government, and in December 1917 small military garrisons were posted to the mid-Euphrates towns, accompanied by Political Officers and the beginnings of a normal administration. 'Aṭiya stayed in Najf, and opened relations with 'Ujaymi and the Turks. Conditions in Samawa area and among the powerful Bani Ḥuchaym remained anarchic.

An incident early in 1918 provided a test of the authority of Government in those middle-Euphrates areas, which had for months sustained the penetration of well-financed propaganda from German and Turkish sources. Although ungarrisoned, Najf had by then been administered for some weeks from Kufa, with a new police force, a restored municipality, town services, and timely distributions of Oudh Bequest money. In January shots maliciously fired at Indian troops from the walls of Najf led to the imposition of a fine on the town; and on 19 March Captain W. M. Marshall, the Assistant Political Officer, who lived in a khan

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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outside the walls, was cold-bloodedly murdered as the opening move of a German-organized programme for a series of such crimes. The sanctity of Najf must, it seemed to Cox and the Army Commander, protect it from vigorous punishment; but evident weakness could have yet graver effects. With no shot fired, the city was closely besieged. The chief Mujtahid himself condemned the crime and kept contact with the besiegers. By 10 April the known murderers and their accomplices began to be handed over, soon to the number of 102 wanted persons. A dozen proved offenders were sentenced to death, eight to transportation for life, and others for lesser periods. A few days later elaborate receptions were being organized for the Commander-in-Chief who visited the town. But the atmosphere within, and radiating from, the Shi'i shrines remained sinister, obscurantist, and anti-Government, as successive authorities in the Dawla were to find. The sensitiveness of the Persian 'Ulamā to events affecting Islam or Persia was shown by their visible uneasiness at the mission of British troops into Persia in 1918—the beginning of the 'Dunsterforce' fiasco.

In desert areas west and north-west of 'Iraq relations were opened with the nomads by Colonel Leachman and his colleagues soon after the occupation. Among the 'Aniza the aged ibn Hadhdhal readily made his terms and secured a food supply for his tribe. The Shammar, divided as ever, entered British territory for a time, then withdrew to the north where in Turkish territory lay their chief grazing-grounds.

With the Kurds the Political Officers of the advancing army had had no contact before the fall of Baghdad, and the first relations after March 1917 were unfortunate. Letters exchanged with Kurds of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya could not be followed up; Khaniqin, the only Kurdish area open to British penetration, was suffering the horrors of Russian occupation. The behaviour of the latter, for all their ingratiating Kurdish contacts before the War, resulted inevitably in driving all Kurds of the neighbourhood back to the milder Turks, with tragic loss of goodwill. The Russian withdrawal in June of forces now disintegrated and half-mutinous permitted the Turks to return and to complete the ruin of the frontier regions; but the operations of the autumn of 1917 allowed, finally, the installation of a British Political Officer at Khaniqin, after nine months of heart-rending petitions from Muṣṭafā Pasha Bajlan and every class in the ruined countryside. Kifri was occupied in April 1918, and in both areas the restoration of tolerable conditions was immediately attempted. The tribes of both, except for the trans-frontier Sinjabi, behaved well in their adversity.

The advance to Kirkuk in the spring of 1918 promised at last open access to southern Kurdistan. It was greeted by a warm

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

welcome in Kirkuk and by the Hamawand. A meeting of Kurdish leaders in Sulaymaniya was convened, at which they decided to offer the rule of their country to the British. The abandonment of Kirkuk (p. 91) led to the miseries of Turkish re-occupation of that district and of Sulaymaniya; but it was possible for the Political Officers of Kifri and Ṭuz to retain touch with the Kurdish Aghās, and notably with Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji, their acknowledged spokesman. He was the son of the Shaykh Sa'id, murdered in Mosul in 1908.

The penetration of a British mission, followed by the light British forces which formed Dunsterforce, into north-west Persia early in 1918, besides weakening the Army in 'Iraq by excessive extension, found touch in Urmiya district with a Christian community, of which earlier mention (p. 15) has been made: the Assyrians. The ruin of this small nation was already imminent, and was shortly to be consummated. On the outbreak of war the Turkish attitude to it had been one of reassurance; and while in Persia the Urmiya Assyrians were decimated by the departure of the protecting Russians and by subsequent Persian brutality, their cousins the Ḥakkari mountaineers survived unmolested during the Armenian massacres of 1915 and the proclamation of Jihad. Russian forces, however, invaded Turkish Armenia, reached Van and Bashqal'a, and invited the Assyrians to rise against their hated rulers. By a rash and fatal decision they accepted and declared their apostacy from Turkish allegiance—only to find themselves abandoned by a sudden Russian retirement. Thereafter every Kurdish tribe of the region—Barwari, Artushi, Chal, Oramar—had the best of pretexts to combine under Turkish instigation to assail them. Kuchanis and other villages were pillaged, the Mar Sham'un's brother put to death in Mosul. The first assaults indeed did not avail to dislodge the Assyrian villagers; but in a second series, in the midsummer of 1915, their territory was ravaged and themselves driven to their highest inaccessible pastures. Winter rendered this refuge uninhabitable. The Russians could not respond to a supreme appeal; and the whole community managed, with astonishing fortitude, to climb and fight its way to Urmiya. Based here, where they were highly unwelcome, they raided the westward hill villages of their Kurdish enemies.

But this tolerable period of 1916 and 1917 was ended by the Russian collapse. Allied efforts to unite all anti-Turkish elements in Adharbayjan led to a short-lived alliance of Armenian and Assyrian elements with Kurdish tribesmen; but the feeble and fickle attitude of the Persian Government left the field open to intrigue and violence by all, and inspired the brutal murder of the Mar Sham'un himself by Simko, Kurdish chief of the Shiqaq.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

600 Pressure from every side, Turkish and Kurdish, grew against the beleaguered community. In these conditions the landing of a British aircraft, revealing the presence of British troops at Sayn Qalʿa, appeared as the harbinger of deliverance. The decision to break out from Urmiya led to an operation of withdrawal which, mistimed and over-hopeful, ended inevitably in a routed, headlong, and massacre-haunted straggle by the entire community through the mountains to Sayn Qalʿa and, thereafter partly escorted by British troops, onward to Hamadan. The remnant of the nation, perhaps one-third of its original strength, was collected, fed and re-equipped by the British, moved into ʿIraq and settled finally, with some 20,000 Armenians, in a vast refugee camp at Baʿquba on the Diyalā in September 1918. From here they expected—and soon began to demand as a right—an early restoration to their homes. To the British in ʿIraq, who had no responsibility whatever for their plight but had spared neither effort nor expense to save them from destruction, they were long to remain a liability and an embarrassment.

IV

MANDATE AND MONARCHY

1. AFTER THE ARMISTICE

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THE months following the Armistice in 'Iraq were to witness a period of general public relief and confidence, followed too soon by the accumulation, at first invisibly then openly, of elements of discontent and disorder. These, widespread in various sections of the public, were to be temporarily united and moved to action by an ardent and aggressive nationalist movement among the political element, and were in 1920 to create tribal lawlessness and insurgence over a wide area, calling for suppression by major military operations. The British policy of establishing an 'Iraq State, which had been announced before this insurgence began was, after the interruption, able to be fulfilled by the installation first of a Provisional Government, then of an elected 'Iraqi monarchy. Throughout the period the administration of the territory, at first British and later 'Iraqi-British, continued to develop and, except where interrupted by disorder, generally to improve.

Events full of significance to 'Iraq were taking place in adjoining countries. An Arab Government of Syria was set up late in 1918 with British support in Damascus and Aleppo under the Amir Fayṣal bin Ḥusayn, a Turkish-educated prince of the Prophet-descended family of the Amirs of Mecca, who had achieved an outstanding place in the Arab world by his statesmanship and personality; but the increasing conflict of his Administration, both as a political conception and as a physical organization on the spot, with eager French claims to rule Syria—and the powerlessness of British or American policy to modify this—led in July 1920 to the fall and disappearance of the Arab principality: an event which released the Amir, a year later, for other destinies. In Turkey a ruined and seemingly demoralized population and army, powerful only to harass its 'Iraqi neighbour by border menaces, were revived and reinspired by Muṣṭafā Kamal and could by 1921 present a formidable threat to the Mosul wilaya. In war-torn and enfeebled Persia an agreement with the British Government made in August 1919 for the restoration and advancement of the country with British help failed to secure ratification by the Majlis in 1921, though a treaty with the new Soviet State was duly ratified; and this was in turn followed by the rapid rise to supreme power, and later to the throne, of a ruthless and efficient dictator.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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In Great Britain the problem of 'Iraq's future occupied a remarkable share of official and parliamentary time. The territory's status as an ex-Ottoman province must involve peace with Turkey as a preliminary to its own disposal; war-time commitments to the French (the Sykes–Picot agreement), promises to the Arab ruler of the Ḥijaz, the pressure of President Wilson for popular self-determination, British middle-eastern strategic interests, and responsibility in 'Iraq for order and progress among a public with whom close personal bonds by now existed: all these were elements to be reconciled. Since mere old-fashioned annexation was advocated by no responsible voice and evacuation by few, the problem resolved itself into one of formulating the constitution and status of the future 'Iraq State; and upon this conflicting views were held both in Baghdad and in Whitehall. If the British Government, all-powerful, amply informed, and far from illiberal, had made its decisions with more resolution and more speed: if a plan for 'Iraqi self-government could have been produced and progressively implemented early in 1919: if committee procedures had been shortened, the protests and arguments of A. T. Wilson overruled, and Cox, perhaps, retained in Baghdad: then many troubles, losses, and legacies of bitterness could have been avoided.

Meanwhile, the War was over; and the occupation of Kirkuk, Arbil, and Mosul, and the terms of the Armistice as these were interpreted, involved the Army through its Civil Administration[1]

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[1] Among British officers who joined the Civil Administration between the fall of Baghdad and the Armistice were: J. Parlby and W. S. R. May (Finance), A. G. H. Sievwright (Customs), H. E. Bowman (Education): as Judicial Officers, E. Bonham-Carter, E. M. Drower, B. H. Bell, and E. L. Norten: as Levy Officers, C. A. Boyle, M. S. Channing-Pearce, W. G. Buttolph, and F. W. Hall: as Medical Officers, Drs. W. R. Battye, T. J. Carey Evans, T. B. Heggs; in the 'Iraq Police, H. M. A. Cones, T. W. G. Davis, H. C. Prescott, and J. F. Wilkins: in the Land Registry, G. F. Royds: and as Political Officers and in various administrative duties, F. C. C. Balfour, E. S. Berry, B. H. Bourdillon, L. N. Brown, R. S. Cooke, C. K. Daly, A. H. Ditchburn, G. V. B. Gillan, C. J. Hawker, W. R. Hay, S. E. Hedgcock, R. F. Jardine, J. F. D. Jeffreys, H. I. Lloyd, S. H. Longrigg, A. S. Meek, L. F. Nalder, P. F. Norbury, H. C. Pulley, J. Skliros, J. S. Thomson, H. H. F. M. Tyler, R. E. L. Wingate, and L. M. Yetts. This list, irrespective of merit, omits some dozens of officers who held charges less than that of Political Officer of a Division.

In the period between the Armistice and the formation of the Provisional Government of October 1920, the (military) Agricultural Department was transferred to the Civil Administration, with G. S. Cameron, R. J. D. Graham (Director), J. F. Webster, R. E. Cheeseman, and R. Thomas: that of Irrigation, with L. W. Lewis (Director), P. L. Bowers, R. G. Garrow, P. J. Sellier, A. B. Aitken, G. O. Sharpe, and J. Strachan: the Port of Baṣra, with J. C. Ward (Director): Posts and Telegraphs, with E. Clerici, G. E. O. de Smidt, and D. W. Gumbley: and Railways, with G. Lubbock (Director), J. R. Tainsh, P. Rothera, and O. G. Kiernander. F. Cunliffe-Owen entered the service as head of Repatriation (Refugees), F. W. Pirrie of Surveys, C. R. Chadwick of Veterinary Services. Recruits to Public Works included E. H. de V. Atkinson (Director), A. B. Carey, A. S. Clay, C. T. Lynam, H. H. Wheatley, and J. M. Wilson: in the Government Press, D. W. Cameron and A. S. Parry: in the Finance Department,

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

in the immediate government of the whole Mosul wilaya, a territory sharply contrasting geographically and ethnically with lower and central 'Iraq, a land of mountain and mountaineer, roadless and little explored, with which there had been at any time little British contact and for four years none at all. The Kurds preserved all their characteristics of wildness and rapacity, dislike of submission, and scorn of Arabs. War conditions had everywhere produced grave dislocation in supplies, abandonment of villages, and in places famine; but tribal loyalties were strong, man-power intact, the patriarchal dominion of the Aghās still unshaken.

To these age-old elements, partly concealed from the newcomer by facile professions of devotion, others were added as 1918 drew to an end. The Aghās found it inconceivable that the Caliph's government could vanish for ever from qadhā and valley; and what of the incoming Christian English, allies of the detested Russians? It suited many to spread a pan-Islamic propaganda, for which the long delay in peace-making with Turkey was to give ample time; nor was the new rule likely to be more popular from its legend of efficiency and its Arab friendships. From Syria came stories of an Arab State of Damascus, to encourage vague and fragmentary but persistent conceptions of 'Kurdish independence': a possibility which had already occurred not only to the Kurdish *émigrés* of Paris and to Kurdish intellectuals or would-be princelings in the northern Jazira towns, but more plausibly to a Kurdish Committee in Istanbul itself under Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Shamdinan, to his nephew Sayid Ṭaha, watchful at Neri, to the cut-throat Isma'il Aghā (Simko) of the Persian borderland, and to Shaykh Maḥmud in Sulaymaniya. Such ideas were well developed by the disturbing propaganda which was blown ceaselessly across the Turkish frontier—and, it was said, by Bolshevik agents also. To appeals and invitations from Persian Kurds scornful of their own Government, British representatives could but reply negatively; and this, with the almost total absence of British troops in Kurdistan, and stories of their early withdrawal from 'Iraq itself, must further weaken British prestige. Added to all these, the

S. H. Slater, L. M. Swan, and N. F. Smith: in the Judicial Branch, G. Alexander, J. Prichard, and J. Woodman: in Customs, H. L. Cooper and H. M. Monk: in Education, W. J. Farrell and A. L. F. Smith: in the Police, C. E. Corry, T. E. Furneaux, A. I. Sargon, and H. J. Todd: in the Medical Services, Drs. G. N. Braham, T. P. Buist, W. Dunlop, J. D. Graham (Director), T. J. Hallinan, E. A. Mills, A. C. Norman, H. C. Sinderson, G. W. Spencer, and G. S. Woodman: in Civil Jails, W. B. Lane: in Levies, C. R. Barke: and among Political Officers, R. E. Alderman, C. C. Aston, J. H. H. Bill, J. S. L. Dacres, G. F. Eadie, and W. A. Lyon.

These names, like those on p. 82, n. 1, are chosen by a—not wholly consistent—criterion of seniority of post, and omit many officers of first-class merit. Complete lists of British and Indian officials from 1914 to 1920 are to be found on pp. 343–400 of A. T. Wilson's *Mesopotamia, 1917–1920*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

000 Turks at Jazira-ibn-'Umar, Van, and Bashqal'a, and the Aghās' own guilty consciences, could suggest other stimulants to Kurdish suspicion. What of the Armenians, survivors of massacre and pillage, whom as Christians the British would doubtless reinstate in their former or other homes, amid the hated sound of church bells and the rule of bishops? What of the Assyrians, who too would soon reoccupy their lands and claim the punishment of their old oppressors? Such fears, added to the age-long qualities and defects of the Kurds, could ensure that the task of an incoming Government should be unenviable.

In fact, the attitude of the new administrators, young and enthusiastic, was one of a guileless confidence. Strong in goodwill and in a British prestige which they took for granted, they greatly underrated the dangers of the place and time. They were prepared to like and be liked; and in fact, despite the tragic episodes which marked the next few months, many loyal friendships were made between Kurdish chieftains and British officers. With the early restoration of normal living and better than normal security, much quiet effective administration was carried out, and some at least of the Aghās realized for the first time the possibilities of honest disinterested government, even though this could not but involve some detriment to their own position.

The period was marked by an accelerated penetration of Western conceptions and modern transport into Kurdistan, increased traffic with Mosul and Baghdad on reopened roads, the active encouragement of crop-growing—tobacco, vines, grain, rice, and fruit—the re-stocking of bazaars and the diffusion of comparative wealth. Political Officers were posted from the earliest days of Occupation to Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, and Arbil: to Mosul itself, whither Leachman was transferred from the desert: and to the Kurdish qadhās, where the Qa'immaqams handed over an administration still in being. It was prescribed by Whitehall that the Government of Mosul should, in deference to the French, avoid assimilation to that of lower 'Iraq; the distinction, however, had no practical effect and was unrealized by the public, except for some French-protected Christians in Mosul, who used it to make trouble. Small garrisons were posted at Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, Arbil, Mosul, Zakho, and Dohuk, but none within the higher mountains.

But even as the improvised Administration was making its amicable contacts and giving such limited assurances as were possible, there were soon signs that intensive propaganda from the nearer areas of Turkey was fermenting effectively. The Assistant Political Officer at Zakho, Captain A. C. Pearson, was ambushed and shot by a party of the Goyan in March 1919, and his death unavenged. Three months later Captain D. Willey, with two

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

police officers, Captain H. Macdonald and Sapper R. Troup, was murdered by a party of malcontent chiefs in 'Amadiya town; but on this occasion punitive measures were organized, the Barwari, Guli, and other implicated tribes were punished, and the death penalty imposed on the guilty. Military columns penetrated, not without casualties, and marched and countermarched in the most difficult and rugged country, including that of the Goyan. But it seemed prudent to withdraw the A.P.O. to Dohuk from 'Amadiya, where authority was entrusted to a local Kurdish magnate. 000

A similar set-back occurred at 'Aqra late in 1919. The decision to administer from 'Aqra the Barzan area jointly with that of Zibar was resented by the half-mad Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan. He was already in fiery correspondence with the Turks at Van and the trans-frontier chiefs; and when the Political Officer of Mosul, Leachman's successor, J. H. Bill, for sufficient reason imposed a fine on two Zibari chiefs in October 1919, these, friendly for the moment with Shaykh Aḥmad, accepted his support in a concerted attack on the Political Officer and Captain K. R. Scott his assistant, who were on tour near Bira Kapra in Zibar country. Both the officers and two gendarmes were killed, and 'Aqra looted. The tribal alliance rapidly broke up, the Barzanis turned for home, and the 'Aqra townspeople rallied and begged successfully for the return of a British officer to protect them. A punitive column burnt the houses of the Zibari leaders, whose efforts to raise a general anti-British revolt were unavailing; nor, across the frontier, could the Qa'immaqam of Neri move Sayid Ṭaha, or the Oramar, to rally to their support.

In the Sulaymaniya province the troubles of the year arose from the making, and the failure, of a large-scale experiment not lacking in imagination and appeal. The problem of southern Kurdistan in November 1918 was that of installing a régime better than anarchy, and harmless to its Persian and 'Iraqi neighbours, without the use of troops—since none were available. Major E. W. C. Noel, a Persian-speaking officer of exceptional capacity, was sent to Sulaymaniya first to install, later to assist, Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji as Governor, and to invite but not to force the chiefs of all or any tribes from the Greater Zab to the Diyalā to place themselves under him. This régime, inaugurated in full session of the Beys, the Aghās, and the Shaykhs at Sulaymaniya on 1 December, started with widespread adhesions to Shaykh Maḥmud. The Persian Kurds were debarred by their nationality from joining; those of Kirkuk, Kifri, and Arbil districts, where the domination of a mountain tribal Ḥukumdar (Governor) was unthinkable, held aloof; but from Ḥalabja to the confines of Rawanduz a score of leaders rallied—with whatever tacit reservations—to Shaykh

000 Maḥmud, and even in the districts of Keui Sanjaq, Raniya, and Rawanduz his authority was for a brief period acclaimed. In Sulaymaniya town the ruins and ravages of war were, under British initiative, rapidly made good. Food and seed were imported, buildings repaired; salaries were distributed, caravans came and went. Kurdish was the only official language and none but Kurdish officials were appointed.

563 The dream of Kurdistan for the Kurds, under British patronage, seemed for a few weeks to have come true as the Aghās flocked to and from Sulaymaniya, the Turks had vanished, the British were encouraging, tactful, and generous. But it was not to be. The experiment lacked in fact all the substance of practical success. Shaykh Maḥmud was, with his personal following and prestige, the only candidate for south Kurdish Government; but he was unbalanced, violent-tempered, and childish. His alleged subjects—that is, their chieftains—were willing enough to receive gifts and honours, but not to accept obligations or to subordinate themselves to the Shaykh's or any other authority. Their political conceptions and experience, their social background, their character and level of evolution all forbade the possibility that Shaykh Maḥmud's empire could, even at the lowest and loosest standard of government, be coherent or lasting. Within a few weeks the interest of the outlying tribes had cooled, the claims of the Ḥukumdar were reconsidered, and as the novelty faded returning prosperity led to a general revulsion against him. The Jaf at Ḥalabja were allowed to secede, and a British officer was installed there; and the place of Noel at Sulaymaniya was taken by E. B. Soane, cynical realist and disillusioned critic of the Shaykh. Relations grew difficult, the ruler had neither wisdom nor knowledge to oppose to his bad counsellors. A crisis could not be long postponed. Late in May 1919 the Shaykh suddenly invoked a band of supporters from across the Persian frontier, imprisoned the British officers in Sulaymaniya, cut all communications, and proclaimed the independence of Kurdistan. The Political Officer at Ḥalabja escaped with the aid of the ruling Lady, 'Adila Khanim; the prisoners at Sulaymaniya were held but not ill-treated. An improvised relief force of Indian troops and armoured cars was immediately dispatched from Kirkuk but at Tasluja Pass was forced to retire. The Shaykh's forces, however, did not increase; no major tribe rallied to him. The collection of more effective British forces, from depleted garrisons in Mosul division, took a month. It was followed by a second advance by two brigades from Kirkuk. Battle was joined on 17 June at the Bazyan Pass, and ended in the rout of Shaykh Maḥmud's forces and his own capture, severely wounded. He was taken to Baghdad and there, recovered from his wound, was sentenced to death; but

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

this was commuted by the Commander-in-Chief to a long term of imprisonment. The British force in Kurdistan broke up into a number of columns which visited many unpenetrated areas, restoring order and confidence. A normal administration with its departments and services was installed at Sulaymaniya under Soane. The area was now to enjoy a tranquil period of revival and progress, with gratifying security produced by a new police force and trade assisted by pioneer road construction. The main bodies of opinion in the area, however, still dreaded unification with 'Iraq.

In the turbulent Rawanduz district, where a Political Officer was first appointed in December 1918, it proved impossible to maintain him without military backing. He was withdrawn in July 1919 to Batas, and a Kurdish aristocrat left to do his best at Rawanduz. The district, under the baleful influence of tribal aspirants to power and an outlawed ex-officer, grew even more lawless and distracted after the 'Aqra disturbances in October. Early in 1920 it revealed conditions of chaos. The Political Officer at Arbil, on a dangerous visit designed to rescue it from these, considered the least of evils to be the installation of a young educated Kurd, Isma'il Bey, as Government representative.

The picture of 'Iraqi Kurdistan in 1919 is, therefore, in spite of incidents of violence, one of restoration in most districts to social and economic normality, and fair hopes of progress. The year ended with the outer areas—'Amadiya, Barzan, Rawanduz—beyond control, while the inner—those of Kifri and Kirkuk, Arbil and Keui Sanjaq, the Mosul plain and foothills, and Sulaymaniya—were peaceably and normally administered. The charm of the Kurdish countryside, its pure air and beauty, its wealth of striking personalities, greatly impressed the officers called to administer or visit it.

The Arab, Christian, or Yazidi villagers of the Mosul plain settled down easily under British rule. Security was good, and surviving Turkish police forces could be largely utilized. Prosperity soon returned to a city and countryside desolated by wartime famine and misery. New hopes and signs of progress were abroad. Rivalries among the Mosul Yazidis were composed, while those of Jabal Sinjar were placed under their aged but forceful Headman-of-the-Mountain, Ḥamu Sharu. The squabbles and intrigues of local Christian elements taxed sorely the patience of their Political Officers. The best of the village headmen were reappointed, encouraged, and subsidized. Destitute Armenian refugees from Turkey, who abounded in Mosul, were collected in a camp in southern 'Iraq. The missionary enterprise of the Dominicans, whose devoted work the War had interrupted, was eagerly restarted.

000 The Shammar attitude was, as ever, shifty and incalculable; some of their many warring shaykhs correctly visited the new Government at Mosul, others seized the chance of interregnum to loot the riverain Jubur and passing caravans. The elusive veteran al-'Aṣi, nominal head of the tribe, failed to appear. For a large-scale Shammar road robbery in September 1919 a heavy fine was levied and a successful Government counter-raid carried out. The few cultivating sections were confirmed in their lands. The nomad majority remained divided, and a major section led by Daham al-Hadi, grandson of al-'Aṣi, remained beyond control in Syrian territory.

The upper Euphrates area in 1919 showed more than mere tribal restlessness. Its troubles derived from the thrusting trespasses of its neighbours in Syria, now Arab-governed with British subsidy and help. The absence of the Amir Fayṣal in Europe, and the impatience of his 'Iraqi officers, led directly to frontier aggression with a political motive. In December 1918 a British Political Officer had been sent to fill the vacuum at Dayr al-Zur, without military support. An Arab Mutaṣarrif appointed simultaneously by the Government of Aleppo to the same post was withdrawn, but Sharifian propaganda—that of the revived 'Ahd al-'Iraqi, Covenant of 'Iraq, led by General Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, ex-Corps Commander and now Chief of Staff to Fayṣal at Damascus—poured into the area, with its call to Arab nationalism and anti-foreign uprising. Attempts made in the summer of 1919 to agree a Syro-'Iraqi boundary ended in an unwise compromise—that of treating the Khabur river itself as the frontier. To this arrangement, made with the French, the Amir Fayṣal was said to have agreed; but it was unworkable, and the impression prevailed that the British would next evacuate the whole Dayr sanjaq, as their forces were in fact at the moment evacuating Syria. And by the close of 1919 tribal rumours and the abortive appointment of Qa'immaqams by the Syrian authorities to British-occupied towns gave yet more evident signs that a Sharifian offensive was about to be launched.

Among the tribes of central and lower 'Iraq the year following the Armistice brought little change. A few replacements were made in tribal headship, some outlaws were taken back into favour, exiles returned from Turkish territory or from India. Movement was freer with the disappearance of war-imposed restrictions, the resumption of normal marketing, increasing familiarity with the railway and with motor vehicles. Some resounding cases of tribal murder, a few raids of traditional type, the persistence of age-long neighbourly disputes, a mood of growing post-war disillusion, the radiation of anti-foreign influences from the Holy Cities; these were among the phenomena of the tribal world during the year—

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca, 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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which, however, with them all, witnessed a greater measure of outward peace than living memory could recall. On the frontiers, the Lurish cultivators and the Mandali folk continued to dispute the rights over the hill-stream water. The Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh still claimed, and at times forcibly exacted, grazing fees from Bani Lam flocks sojourning in his territory. Peace between the south-western 'Iraqi nomads and the subjects of ibn Sa'ud was precarious, though the Amir of Najd was from 1917 onwards deeply involved in Arabian hostilities.

In the cities the changes wrought by the new Administration were more obvious. Politics apart, these lay in the direction of street widening and bazaar cleaning, both well exemplified at Mosul: in the construction of new bridges as at Baghdad, Ḥilla, and 'Ashar; in a conspicuous rise in the standard of town police work, visibly in the smartness of drilled constables and effectively in the maintenance of good order and the lessening of crime. Other phenomena were the complete transformation of the civil prisons, the erection of a dozen new buildings and the repair of old, a wide extension of the telegraph and telephone service, and medical facilities available for all who came. In municipal administration 'Iraqis were called to an important though not yet a fully responsible share; town pride at least was encouraged, some cherished improvements made possible. But if war-time restrictions and requisitions seemed at last to be relaxing, and the vast camps and store-parks, offices and transport fleets of the all-pervading Army to be diminishing, yet the setting of civilian life was still abnormal and the preponderance of a foreign and military element, however profitable, was to be increasingly resented as the months went by.

2. BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, 1919–20

The administration of occupied 'Iraq remained, until October 1920, the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces exercised through his subordinate, the Civil Commissioner; but in practice the former had no frequent occasion to interfere in civil affairs. Sir Percy Cox, Civil Commissioner until his posting as British Minister to Teheran in May 1918, then handed over his responsibilities to Lieutenant-Colonel Arnold Wilson as Acting Civil Commissioner for the next thirty months.

With the separate status of Mosul soon to become no more than nominal, the whole territory was, from early 1919 onwards, administered from Baghdad on generally uniform lines. At the headquarters of the Administration, which grew with each assumption of new responsibilities, the elements of a Secretariat were formed and something of the formality of organized Government

1r Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

000 appeared. Apart from his personal staff, which included Miss G. L. Bell, the Civil Commissioner relied upon five Secretariats. That of 'Revenue', under Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. Howell, I.C.S., covered the varied field of land and many miscellaneous Revenues, land registry, land questions, surveys, agriculture, irrigation, and municipalities. The Financial Secretariat, of which Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Slater, I.C.S., assumed charge from Major W. S. R. May, S.C.S., in 1919, included all matters of expenditure, budgets, currency, audit, customs, hostile trading concerns, and Government presses. The Judicial Secretary, Sir E. Bonham-Carter, S.C.S., who replaced Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Knox in 1919, directed legislation, the Courts, and the Awqaf. The Secretariat of Health under Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Battye, whom Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Graham relieved in 1920, dealt with questions of health, sanitation, and allied subjects, quarantine and the corpse and pilgrim traffic, lunacy, the civil jails, and the Weather Bureau. The first Secretary for Public Works was Major-General E. H. Atkinson, who stayed but a few months in 'Iraq; his branch was intended to cover the Railways, the Port of Baṣra, Irrigation, Public Works, and all means of Communication. A number of departments not covered by any secretariat, notably those of the Police and of Education, were grouped under the Civil Commissioner directly.

The administration of tribal, 'political', security and in general social matters, the collection of revenue, and relations with the Army were main functions of the Civil Commissioner's personal office, acting in the provinces through his Political Officers.

Among departments of Government operating with pioneer enthusiasm before and for two years after the Armistice were those of Tapu (Land Registry) under G. F. Royds: of the Awqaf under R. S. Cooke, supported by a strong committee of religious notables: of Surveys under Colonel F. M. Pirrie: of the Government Press under C. F. Weakford. The departments of Posts and Telegraphs, first under E. Clerici and G. E. O. de Smidt respectively and later combined under D. W. Gumbley, were the responsibility of the Civil Administration from June 1919: that of Works was formed as a civil department by Major-General Atkinson late in 1919, and directed by J. M. Wilson from 1920 till 1925. The Courts, administering Turkish civil law and, except for the wider bestowal of magisterial powers on administrative officers, generally following Turkish procedure, were conducted to the general satisfaction in Arabic and, alone of Government departments, used senior 'Iraqi personnel from the first. For criminal cases, a new and well-adapted code—the Baghdad Penal Code—was compiled and introduced.

More must be said of other major departments of the improvised

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and often over-strained Administration. That of Agriculture was, 000 for the first time in 'Iraq, scientifically conceived and served by specialists in botany, soil chemistry, cotton-growing, wool, cattle-breeding, and other branches. Directed by Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. D. Graham in 1920, and thereafter by Roger Thomas, it conducted demonstrations, published research pamphlets, distributed seed, imported animals; but the times did not permit the development of a department—or indeed the tenth part of one—adequate to 'Iraq's agricultural needs. The Irrigation service, under Brigadier L. W. Lewis and later Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. Aitken till 1921, was deep in the study of its problems and in the practical tasks of flood protection and major water distribution, but was equally prevented by the demand for post-war economy from undertaking important works, however desirable; it was perforce contented with some headworks and regulators erected, canal reaches re-aligned or cleared, the Hindiya Barrage in part repaired. These two departments, and that of Surveys, were transferred, with diminished staffs and funds, from Army to civil control in 1919.

The Police, built up by Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Prescott as successor in 1918 to Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Gregson, soon extended their control throughout 'Iraq and gained by their honesty and prowess a general respect such as no *Zaptié* or *polis* had ever known. The 'Iraq Levies, successors of the earlier Shabana forces, were like them military striking-forces organized in the Divisions from varying local material under British officers, with a common headquarters in Baghdad; their function was to relieve the outgoing Army of many duties and to reinforce the Police. A civil Veterinary Department under Major C. R. Chadwick was established in January 1920.

The costly administration of the Assyrian and Armenian refugees 563 devolved upon a separate civil department, at Ba'quba camp, under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Cunliffe-Owen. Repatriation, desired by all, seemed sadly impracticable for any: for the Urmiya families by reason of Persian resistance and anti-Christian bitterness, and for the ex-Turkish mountaineers because their homes were in Turkish territory and the future of Mosul itself still doubtful. Signs of divided leadership among the clansmen appeared, and threatened the general allegiance to the Mar Sham'un; and with the passing months of idle waiting, moral deterioration increased. Nevertheless, a strong battalion was raised under British officers from the excellent fighting material in the Camp, and could be used effectively in the 'Amadiya operations of September 1919. This revived hopes of some measure of repatriation, for which the Civil Commissioner and Assyrian well-wishers pleaded; but the vacillations and silences of Whitehall policy led to the disbanding of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 battalion, and to the men's return to the sluggish pauperization of Ba'quba.

871 The Education branch, founded and first inspired by Major H. E. Bowman, was faced with the problem of providing schooling for the youth of 'Iraq in the absence of funds, buildings, books, equipment or teachers in a tithe of sufficient quantities. At a pace always disappointing, but the fastest financially or functionally practicable, primary schools aiming at fair standards were opened to a total of seventy-five by the end of 1919. Fifty-six of these taught in Arabic, eleven in Turkish, seven in Kurdish, one in Persian. The new-founded Teachers' Training College could supply but a part of their urgent needs, and the scale of secondary classes, confined to the three principal cities, was regrettably humble; nor was the country-wide penetration of 'politics' into the schools, thus early, less to be deplored. Means were found to reopen the Law School, and a commercial and a technical school. The many privately-conducted Mullās' schools, archaic in method, scope, and equipment, continued to produce a bare literacy in their thousands of pupils; but the temptation to multiply inferior Government schools was resisted, and the teaching of English almost wholly withheld in spite of a general clamour for it. Upon the desirability of girls' schools, Muslim opinion was at first divided; five, all primary, had been opened by the first weeks of 1920. The schools of the local Christian and Jewish minorities and those of the foreign missions were fostered by support and subsidy; some of these were of high standard. Some archaeological work was carried out by R. Campbell Thompson at Abu Shahrayn (Eridu) in the spring of 1918, and more under H. R. Hall at Ur and elsewhere in 1919.

204 Printing-presses were operating at Najf in 1918, at Sulaymaniya in 1919, and in Baṣra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the occupation of these places. Newspapers in English were published at Baghdad and Baṣra, in Arabic at those cities and Mosul, in Turkish at Kirkuk, in Kurdish at Sulaymaniya.

439 The great increase of goods entering 'Iraq in 1918–19 taxed
the young Customs administration of C. R. Watkins and Major
A. G. H. Sievwright to the utmost. It was due to cessation of
imports into north Persia from Russia, to the increase of 'Iraq's
own spending power, and to the general depletion of stocks by war
[436] interruption. The Indian rupee, now the universal currency of
'Iraq, supplied an adequate medium; and the rising volume of
[504] civilian traffic could be handled easily by the now fully developed
Port of Baṣra, which as such came into existence under Colonel J. C.
Ward in the autumn of 1919 and was soon afterwards transferred
[illegible] to the Civil Administration. The Railways, when at their greatest

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The railways, when at their greatest

extent they were handed over by the Army in April 1920, consisted 496 of nearly 1,000 miles of track.[1] The absorption into the 'Iraq economy of this rapidly constructed and ill-equipped system, with its decrepit engines and rolling-stock and an alignment designed to serve military purposes, was to be no easy task. The Director in 1919–20 was Colonel G. Lubbock. The labour which the Railway used was, at this stage, almost entirely Indian.

The financial procedures for handing over to a Civil Administra- 000 tion the capital works constructed from Army funds were the subject of a mission sent to 'Iraq under Sir John Hewitt; the assets were valued at £2 million, excluding the Railway, and had mostly taken forms unrelated to civilian needs. The giant river fleet of the 505 (military) Inland Water Transport, on the other hand, was never 471 transferred to the Administration nor were its units sold locally by auction, as was the great mass of unneeded military stores. They were instead, amid storms of protest from the Civil Commissioner and 'Iraqi and British commercial interests, disposed of at Bombay by Lord Inchcape on behalf of the British Government. The civilian Tigris fleet was thereafter by degrees reduced to its pre-war scale. The Lynch (Euphrates and Tigris) Company had lost the *Julnar* and some minor craft, but in 1920 acquired the imposing *Zenobia* and *Zobaida* (both built in 1916), modernized its equipment and installations, and retained in operation the veteran *Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*, and the *Malamir* from their pre-war Karun service. The Lynch management of the E.T.S.N. Company's fleet was after 1919 merged in a fusion of their interests with those of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., forming the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation—'Mespers'—at Baghdad and Baṣra. Local competition on the river was no longer Government-organized, and most of the pre-war vessels had disappeared;[2] but it still handled an appreciable share of the traffic.

In the provincial Government, a close approximation to the 635 Turkish administrative units was retained. The Division repre- 631 sented usually the former sanjaq or liwā, and the District the qadhā, while the naḥiyas were little changed. The sixteen Divisions

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[1] The mileages of metre-gauge line were: Baghdad–Baṣra 352 miles, Baghdad–Persian frontier 130, Baghdad–Kut 158, Zubayr–Jabal Sanam 23, Ur–Naṣiriya 10, Qaraghan (on the Khaniqin line) to Kinqarban (outside Kifri) 23, with 36 miles in the port area of Baṣra and Ma'qil. The standard-gauge line, Baghdad–Sharqat, was of 186 miles; the narrow-gauge, Baghdad–Kifl 21, and Baghdad–Faluja 38.

[2] The *Baghdadi*, Asfar's *Étoile de l'Orient*, the *Furat*, the *Risafa*, and a number of German-owned launches of the Société de Transports Fluviaux, had been sunk by the Turks to block waterways and impede British operations. The *Basra* was sent to Europe but did not get farther than Malta. The *Barhamiya* and *Hamidiya* were blown up by the Turks to avoid capture. The *Baghdad* reached Mosul—the first steamer to do so—and was there captured by the British.

635 in 1919 were those of 'Amara, Baghdad, Ba'quba, Baṣra, Dayr
631 al-Zur, Diwaniya, Dulaym, Ḥilla (including Karbalā), Khaniqin, Kirkuk, Kut al-Amara, Mosul, Muntafiq, Samarrā, Shamiya (including Najf), Sulaymaniya. Of these, Dayr was soon to pass from 'Iraqi to Syrian keeping, Khaniqin and Ba'quba were later to form a single liwā, Kut was to lose its divisional status (but to regain it in 1922), Shamiya to be degraded into a district of Diwaniya, and Samarrā into one of Baghdad; but Karbalā with Najf was later to form a separate Division, as was Arbil. Each Division was the command of a Political Officer, and within it under his Assistants were grouped two or more districts, within which the familiar naḥiyas under 'Iraqi Mudirs preserved the routine and
631 nomenclature of their predecessors. At Divisional headquarters the formation of nominated advisory Divisional Councils of notables and officials, under the Political Officer's chairmanship, was a step taken in early post-war days. It intended to associate the public, to some formal and limited extent, with the Administration; but the Councils, however well chosen, were too powerless to be of effective service, and did not survive the stormy days of 1920. The Political Officer represented the authority of the Civil Commissioner (indeed, that of His Majesty's Government itself) and controlled all departments. His powers—administrative, financial, and judicial—were delegated in a suitable measure to his Assistants in districts, whose primary functions were to keep the peace, to know and to handle the tribes, and to collect the revenues.

000 The merits and shortcomings of this improvised Administration form a study of some interest. To an unusual extent its tone was determined by the high-minded, dominating character of A. T. Wilson, which imposed itself upon the small body of officers who essayed to carry out his policy: a policy of forthright, efficient, paternal Government in the interest of the masses—and especially of the tribesmen—but unsympathetic to local politics or nationalist aspirations. The problem created for his Administration by post-war demobilization and the claims of other services was solved by retaining some but not all of his best officers, and borrowing others from other Arabic-speaking territories, or from regiments leaving 'Iraq. The resulting standard, while not unmixed with inferior elements, was generally high in energy, personal integrity, and good intentions. The complexities of their tasks, and the deeper currents of opposition which developed, were commonly underrated—often with immediately tragic results—by these light-hearted amateur administrators, and even by the few experienced veterans eminent among them. The day-by-day attitude of the Administration was neither illiberal nor repressive, the establishment of cordial relations between governor and governed was

habitual, and much admirable work was done by the departments. Few indeed could deny the improvement in the honesty and justice of the Administration, its prevailing security, its achieved and expected progress in material matters, over the familiar Turkish standards. Nevertheless, the charge that the type or tone of this Administration were among the causes of the lawless outbreaks so soon and so disappointingly to follow cannot completely be denied. 000

It[1] was, first, that of a Christian Power. To some indifferent, [186 795] this fact was objectionable to many, and not least to the Shiʻi hierarchy whose status and powers would be lost for ever if a foreign secular Power were to be installed. In Sunni minds a nostalgic feeling for the Califate as the true and sole legitimate source of power, even in its temporary defeat, was nearly allied to their religion; and the indulgence of such feelings was the easier, and the new régime must remain the more rootless and untrusted, while peace with Turkey was delayed. Religion and Ottoman loyalties apart, the British régime was foreign and unfamiliar. Its spokesmen, often weak in Arabic, differed from their predecessors, to the point of strangeness, in dress, manner, and social customs. The use of Indians as clerks and departmental subordinates was universal, and was resented. The efficiency at which the Administration aimed was no desideratum of the governed, and its ranking as a paramount objective has been alleged as a chief defect of the régime. The charge is doubtfully true; but in fact little was done to render the machinery of Government easy or acceptable to its public. It tended to rigidity of standard, mixed little tolerance with its uncomfortable and not always desired justice, and was pitiless to long-familiar laxities.

The disappearance of many restrictions with the Armistice still left the military occupation of notables' houses, military roads or camps which blocked canals, and other galling inconveniences. These grievances increased with time. With them came the disappointment and disillusion of post-war retrenchment; projects were abandoned, departments restricted, military expenditure greatly reduced. After all, it seemed, no golden age had arrived! The Railway, Indian-staffed, was slow and expensive. The outcry for schools and English lessons was unmet. The agricultural experts had not transformed agriculture, those of irrigation had cured neither drought nor floods. The Land Registry settled few disputes. And the insistence on full revenue collection on every crop and garden was galling alike to rich and poor, who, in spite of lowered demand-rates, found themselves paying more taxation than ever before, with little or no improvement in the old and evil assessment methods.

In the towns the Administration, desperately short of subordinate

[1- British civil administration following World War I -- Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

000 staff, insisted nevertheless on standards of education and knowledge of English necessarily lacking in the hundreds of unemployed 'Iraqi ex-officials. These, idle and aggrieved, crowded the coffee shops; and the return of many more from Turkey increased the body of malcontents. Wilson's Administration in fact made little effective effort to use in senior or even junior posts the considerable experience and goodwill possessed by the available 'Iraqis.

186 668 Such are among the considerations which can explain the willingness of large elements of the fickle and disillusioned 'Iraqi public, by the end of 1919, to support any anti-British movement which might appear. The leadership which such movement was in fact to follow was that of nationalism: that Arab nationalism which the Wilson Administration, and notably its head, largely through too local and too limited an experience of Arabs and ignorance of the political conceptions now new-born or coming to birth in Europe, belittled and distrusted. The development of this movement, and the successive uneasy stages by which 'Iraq was to advance to a new constitutional status, are next to be recorded.

3. OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH

000 The Ḥijaz correspondence of 1915–16 between the Sharif Ḥusayn and Sir Henry McMahon had accepted the idea of a post-war Arab State to embrace, with named exceptions, all Arab territories in Asia. It could indeed be argued that 'Iraq stood apart from other Arab lands, with differing needs and conditions; it could be shown that the McMahon letters called for 'special administrative arrangements in Baṣra and Baghdad'. But such exclusion from the Arab State could, the Sharif had replied, be only temporary 'for a period to be settled by negotiation': 'Iraq was a historic and sacred Arab land. A British policy of mere selfish acquisition of 'Iraq was after this, to any serious statesman, unthinkable; and in fact War Office instructions of March 1917 had already visualized specifically an Arab Amirate of Baṣra and Baghdad. The formation of an Arab State or States was an objective of idealists and realists alike, in Syria and in London; it was visibly realized under the Amir Fayṣal in Damascus before the end of 1918; and a policy of self-determination for the ex-Ottoman Arab countries had by that time been clearly expressed by the British Prime Minister in January 1918, again by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, yet again in the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November 1918. The last quoted declared 'the goal envisaged by France and Great Britain' to be 'the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of National Governments and administrations

1a Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.' 000

The 'Iraq public, among whom this hopeful declaration raised high and immediate hopes, had throughout the War shown no visible signs of nationalist feeling. The political leaders of the period 1911–14 were scattered, Sayid Ṭalib abroad, the Clubs dead or inactive, the press non-existent, communications with other countries severed. But the movement was not dead; the end of the War, it might have been anticipated, must inevitably revive it with greater vitality than ever. Meanwhile no British act or speech in 'Iraq, save only the vague flamboyance of the Maude speech of March 1917, had given any indication of future self-government. Surprisingly, no use had been made in 'Iraq of Arab forces against the Turks, in spite of the success of these in the Ḥijaz and Syria, and the tentative prompting of the War Office itself. The British Military Command was deterred, it seemed, by the impossibility of guaranteeing the finality of Turkish disappearance, by the difficulty of equipping and training Arab recruits for serious warfare, by its lack of contact with the best 'Iraqi material such as the officers then fighting with the Amir Fayṣal: and perhaps not least by the attitude of the Government of India, which frankly disapproved of Arab national ambitions and of any movement which would encourage them. 186 668

The provisions of the administratively absurd and morally lamentable Sykes–Picot Agreement, signed by France and Great Britain in May 1916 and revealed to the world by the Russians in October 1917, seemed indeed if taken literally to weigh heavily against a self-determined régime for 'Iraq. It had provided that Mosul and part of its wilaya should be reserved for French exploitation, under Arab suzerainty, and that most of western 'Iraq should be of similar status but under British domination, with the body of central and southern districts placed under direct British rule. These provisions, which the French did not lightly abandon, were patently incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Sharifian commitments; and indeed the need to conciliate French feeling, especially in Syria, was a main and inescapable British post-war embarrassment. 7:7 x

Meanwhile the Anglo-French Declaration, the relaxing of many war-time restrictions, the return of 'Iraqis from abroad, the prospect of security and development in the territory, all raised its future as an immediate issue, and brought 'Iraqi nationalism back to life in a day. 186 668

Nourished from various sources, it was to grow rapidly during the first half of 1919, and thereafter. The central core of the movement was, no doubt, the claim of a part of the 'Iraqi educated

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

186 668 classes to 'complete independence', and resentment that this was withheld. Contributory to it as anti-Government—that is, anti-British—forces were at this stage the strains of propaganda entering the country from Turkey, from Bolshevik Russia, and from the eagerly nationalistic 'Iraqis with Fayṣal in Syria. Contributory also were the fears of the Mujtahids for their own position, since nothing could be more damaging to the Shi'i theocracy than a British Administration, and the specifically anti-British and anti-Christian exhortations which radiated from Karbalā and Najf from 1918 onwards. The real or fancied shortcomings of the Administration itself, elsewhere described, could add to a growing dissatisfaction: every frustration, every delay or disappointment was the fault of the British, and created new nationalists. Among the tribes, the shaykhs' rivals in every group were ready always to join an insurgent movement and to dethrone a British-supported leader; and the hunger for loot and inveterate pleasure in raiding, the dislike of revenue payment, and the conviction that British forces were withdrawing, combined to prepare the way for wholesale non-obedience or worse. The history of 1919 and early 1920 is, therefore, one of the increase and coalescence of malcontent elements until the climax of July 1920.

727 Colonel Wilson, horrified by the Anglo-French Declaration, pronounced it wholly unsuitable as a basis for government in 'Iraq. He urged that nothing but firm British administration of whatever State might be created could keep the country from anarchy; and he reacted no less strongly against suggestions by his *bête noire*, T. E. Lawrence, for the facile establishment of a group of States, 'Iraqi and Syrian, under Sharifian princes. His own earliest proposal to Whitehall was for the cautious formation of an Arab State of 'Iraq to include Mosul and, placed under an Arab Amir, to be fortified by a British High Commission and a full complement of advisers. But the difficulty of choosing an Amir was at once obvious, and the Acting Civil Commissioner reviewed in vain the claims of a Mosul notable, of the Naqib of Baghdad, of an unspecified Egyptian prince, and of a son of King Ḥusayn. Finding serious objection to all or any of these he ended by preferring that the State should for five years be ruled by Sir Percy Cox, with no Amir at all; this if anything, he felt, should both ensure efficiency and keep nationalism within bounds.

In London, Middle Eastern affairs were at this time handled by an Interdepartmental Committee presided over by Lord Curzon. In this body the Western school of British doctrine on Arab affairs prevailed over the rival Eastern or Indian school: and in it the clashing temperaments and views of Lord Curzon and Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary for India, had ample play. The Committee

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reaffirmed the Anglo-French Declaration, but showed little intention for the moment of abandoning direct control. Nevertheless, it authorized Wilson to conduct a plebiscite, division by division, to answer the following questions: first, was there approval for a single Arab State of 'Iraq, including Mosul, under British tutelage? Second, should it be ruled by an Arab titular head? Third, who would be preferred as its Amir?

From the public of the 'Iraq of 1918–19 no clear answer to such questions could well be expected. The existing all-British administrative machine, the lack of representative institutions, and the whole structure of society precluded it. But the attempt was made. Meetings were convened in all divisions. The Civil Commissioner hinted in his instructions that only 'satisfactory' replies would be welcome; and these, as received, favoured by considerable majority a united 'Iraq under an Amir whom none could specify, with the continuance of British control. The meetings were doubtfully representative, especially in Baghdad city; the attitude of the Holy Cities was in part negative; some Kurdish districts rejected all Arab rule. A fair semblance of majority preference nevertheless emerged, especially on the inclusion of Mosul; but the inference, too readily drawn, that British control was the wish of all but a handful of 'ungrateful politicians' was not wholly justified.

These results led the Curzon Committee to call next on the Civil Commissioner for specific proposals for the 'constitution of an Arab State or group of States on the basis of the wishes of the inhabitants . . . and of indisputable British control.' Due account was to be taken of the Anglo-French Declaration; the State's Constitution should be flexible, with room 'as time goes on' for increased Arab participation. It appeared from this that the desideratum of British policy, as so far formulated, was a blend of the liberality of the Declaration with the firm reality of British control. The growing murmurs of Arab nationalism in Baghdad, on the Euphrates, and in Syria were unheeded.

Wilson, summoned to London in February 1919, found the Mosul difficulty at least partly solved, since M. Clemenceau in December 1918 had agreed to surrender it from his share of the Sykes–Picot spoils. On this basis, with the French still insisting on their full Syrian sphere of future Government, and the Amir Fayṣal still endeavouring to secure acceptance of his own and his father's once-encouraged aspirations, Wilson could propose his comprehensive 'Iraq State. With no Amir but a British High Commissioner, and with effective British dominance in its administration, it would include Mosul, Dayr al-Zur, and all of Kurdistan that was not destined for inclusion in the Kurdish State for which the

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1918-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

727× Treaty of Sèvres was to provide. Arab governors and Arab district councils would be appointed, British military and financial help would be made available. Curzon, resolute to postpone any British Government commitment over Mosul, preferred that that wilaya should form a separate Amirate ringed by 'independent' Kurdish principalities. The debate continued. The clash of French and Arab ambitions in Syria: the long failure to make peace with Turkey: American pressure in Paris for a free right of choice by the Arab populations, as exemplified by their King-Crane fact-finding commission which visited Syria in 1919: the attitude of the Council of Ten in Paris, who in January 1919 had decided on the detachment of 'Iraq from Turkey, and in March were near to agreeing on the distribution of Mandates: the wide differences of view among the British Government's own advisers on Arab affairs: the increasing call for post-war economy—or even for bag-and-baggage evacuation, or retreat to Baṣra—in the British press and Parliament: all these were scarcely reconcilable elements in reaching a clear solution of 'Iraq's future. The Baghdad Administration had as yet no clear guidance from the peace-makers in Europe on the new Mandatory idea which, propounded at Versailles by General Smuts, was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations coming to birth early in 1919, and was held especially applicable—as Article 22 of the Covenant provided—to the ex-Ottoman territories. Acceptance of this conception by Powers concerned was implicit in the Versailles Treaty, which was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified on 10 January 1920.

728× In 'Iraq, meanwhile, the Army visibly diminished. Garrisoned
647× posts were abandoned, camps shrunk, effective mobile forces were fewer and ever smaller. The Civil Administration retained, indeed, always a very considerable body of popular acceptance in town and country among moderate unpolitical elements and the general
186 public. But, as 1919 advanced, signs were not lacking that opposi-
668 tion to Government in its present form, so unsatisfying to nationalist aspirations, was on the increase. The local disorders in Kurdistan were reported and exaggerated. Messengers and considerable funds reached Baghdad and the Euphrates from the 'Iraqi officers now in Damascus and Aleppo, and these addressed a memorandum to the British Command in Syria, and another to the Foreign Secretary, on the need for an early national régime in 'Iraq. A distinguished Baghdadi lawyer and administrator, Naji Bey al-Suwaydi, invited from Damascus by Wilson to accept an advisory post in Baghdad, found the atmosphere uncongenial and returned unhappy to Syria. Other 'Iraqi visitors from the West reported a 'colonial' attitude in Wilson's Administration, which seemed to belittle or ignore 'Iraqi abilities. Rumours grew in

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Baghdad of the proposed Mandate over 'Iraq, soon to be allotted by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. British women and children were reported as pouring into the country as into a British colony, and in fact over 500 so entered late in 1919. The work and plans of the British civil departments seemed to suggest permanence of occupation. There had been arrests and deportations of trouble-makers—that is, said the nationalists, of patriots. Month by month the ranks of the politically-conscious were swollen. The national secondary school was established as a centre of propaganda. With the autumn the results of political preaching emanating from Syria, from Baghdad, and with increasing violence from Najf and Karbalā, became more obvious among the Euphrates tribes; and in Baghdad, where secret meetings and societies began to be reported, new and significant contacts were observed between the Sunni and Shi'i communities, with joint politico-religious conclaves and exchanges of courtesies without precedent. So passed the winter of 1919.

In spite of the wide extent by this time of a potentially violent political movement, a precarious outward peace was kept throughout these months save in one district, the upper Euphrates. Threats and rumours re-echoed here from the Turks at Mardin as well as from agents of the Arab Government at Aleppo; and in mid-December 1919 Dayr al-Zur was occupied by excited Syrian tribesmen escorting a Sharifian 'Governor of the Euphrates'. A critical and humiliating situation in the town, where the Assistant Political Officer was held prisoner, ended only on Christmas Day by an arrangement between representatives of the Civil Commissioner and those of Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, Governor of Aleppo, whereby Dayr was abandoned by the British. It became a centre for propaganda, for raids, and for loud threats to annex Mosul itself. Tribesmen entered and looted Albu Kamal, Syrian tax-collectors operated far into 'Iraq. The next Governor at Dayr, himself a Mosulawi, maintained a violent and well-subsidized campaign of Sharifian propaganda, and refused all suggestions for a diplomatic settlement of the frontier. The British authorities, physically powerless in the whole area, could do no more than protest and threaten reprisals by air. The return of the Amir Fayṣal to Syria from Europe in March 1920 led to the withdrawal of the invaders, and early in May a frontier conference, convened at 'Ashara, agreed on a boundary line immediately west of al-Qa'im. But this settlement wholly failed to improve conditions. The Syrian-inspired looting parties and demonstrations spread over all Dulaym and Shammar territory. The belief in British apathy and impending withdrawal was universal, the Mosul–Baghdad road and railway became unsafe, and violent propaganda posters of the

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'Ahd al-'Iraqi appeared in Mosul city. The efforts of Turkish agents based on Jazira-ibn-'Umar aided those of the Sharifian officers and envoys—whose funds, as the Civil Commissioner complained, were from those supplied by the British Government itself to the Sharifian ruler of Syria. How far the Amir was aware of his too zealous supporters' activities in 'Iraq can never be known; his own attitude was correct. In the first week of June a tribal force under an 'Iraqi officer, Jamil al-Madfa'i, entered Tall 'Afar, murdered two British officers, Captain J. E. Barlow and Captain B. Stuart, and two sergeants, and moved on to threaten Mosul; but a small British column from that garrison dispersed the tribesmen and re-occupied Tall 'Afar. A precarious calm settled thereafter on the upper Euphrates and the Jazira, the Damascus Government prudently disassociating itself from this and other acts of its agents.

The situation in Baghdad and central 'Iraq had by the late spring of 1920 further deteriorated. The significant Sunni-Shi'i meetings continued, with rivalry only in inflammatory speeches. Turkish and Bolshevik agents were reputed to be at work in addition to those of Arab nationalism, of Mujtahid reaction, of tribal lawlessness, of anti-British venom. Security in Baghdad itself was affected, the bazaars closed intermittently, ugly episodes occurred. Warnings to political leaders—two Shi'i nationalists, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr and Ja'far abu al-Timman, and two Sunnis, Yusif al-Suwaydi (p. 46) and 'Ali al-Bazirgan—were unavailing, and the arrest of a petty agitator provoked angry crowds and rifle shots. Fuel was added to these flames by the Resolution of a group of 'Iraqis in Damascus which elected Fayṣal King of Syria; it resolved that the 'Iraq throne be forthwith offered to Fayṣal's elder brother, the Amir 'Abdullah. The tone and substance of House of Commons debates on Middle Eastern matters was keenly studied by 'Iraq politicians. The unpopular features of the local Administration, and its exclusion of 'Iraqi elements, continued unimproved. Finally came the news, confirming persistent rumours, that at San Remo on 28 April a Mandate for 'Iraq had been offered to Great Britain by the victorious Powers in conclave. This seeming death-blow to 'Iraqi hopes of immediate 'complete independence' was announced in Baghdad early in May with vague reassurances by the Civil Commissioner. The effect of these was not increased by the known, though unannounced, recommendations of the Bonham-Carter Committee, which Wilson had set up in March to draft a future 'Iraq Constitution: recommendations which, while well in advance of Wilson's own original views, were, with their insistence on continued British control over a structure of 'Iraqi deputies and officials, cautious and grudging to

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the point of complete unacceptability in the eyes of 'Iraqi nation- 186
alists. 668

An interview on 2 June, two days before the Tall 'Afar murders, between Wilson and a body of fifteen self-appointed nationalist delegates—to whom he added twenty-five more notables, selected by himself—served only to make clearer the gap between Wilsonian and nationalist views. The latter were unsatisfied by his explanations and assurances, while he continued to treat their demands for immediate independent 'Iraq nationhood as those of a malcontent clique, and to affirm that the main public of 'Iraq would be tolerant of, and safest under, what amounted to direct British rule.

The Curzon Committee, less cautious or more liberal than 727x
Wilson, had meanwhile considered the Bonham-Carter proposals 186
and criticisms of them, and had decided that the time was ripe for 668
an announcement on 'Iraqi constitutional advance. Under instructions from London, accordingly, the Civil Commissioner proclaimed on 17 June that a general Elective Assembly would be convened, and early progress sought towards the Constitution of an Arab State whose self-government would, while incomplete, be real and effective. But the announcement came too late. Nationalist emotion and expectation had gone too far, and forces in town and tribe were in motion that no suave phrases of a proclamation could now arrest. A few days spent in Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, now leaving the post of British Minister in Teheran, made little impression, for all his personal prestige. A Mandate, hated word, had been awarded; British rule effectively continued; of true independence there was neither sign nor early hope; and a committee of ex-Turkish deputies, headed by Sayid Ṭalib, who had returned to 'Iraq in February 1920, pursued without effect on public opinion its labours on the machinery for holding the promised elections.

Meanwhile the drift of British armies out of 'Iraq had proceeded far. Effective troops were few and scattered. Lines of communication in 'Iraq and in Persia were long and barely defensible; and the static duties of guarding stores, Turkish prisoners, and Christian ex-Turkish refugees were calculated to employ nearly the whole surviving force. The British soldiers' families, recently arrived, were now concentrated at Karind in Persia. The military command had been held since March 1920 by an elderly General new to 'Iraq, Sir Aylmer Haldane, who showed from the first little confidence in the warnings of the Civil Commissioner and his officers: warnings which by now were those of an imminent outbreak.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

4. INSURRECTION, 1920

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The disorders which broke out among the 'Iraq tribes in the midsummer of 1920 were immediately caused by elements partly long familiar in 'Iraq—tribal recalcitrance, love of freedom and loot, self-interested Mujtahid promptings, local shaykhly ambitions or rancours, dislike of taxation, grievances against Government as such—and partly by vigorous and well-financed nationalist propaganda and devotion to that cause. They were facilitated by the dispersal, paucity, and static preoccupations of the British forces, and by a military command sometimes clumsily or tardily exercised, sometimes, rightly or wrongly, unsympathetic to the needs or pleas of the Administration. The resulting insurgence reduced the territory for three months to conditions reminiscent of the Turkish régime in one of its more anarchic periods. These conditions affected in all about one-third of the 'Iraq countryside outside the major towns. They were marked by interruption of communications, refusal of revenue payment, reverses to Government forces, bloodthirsty local assaults, looting of buildings and property. No serious urban disorder occurred.

To the officers of the Administration the episode of the *Thawra* —Insurrection—was one of disillusion and disappointment, the partial undoing of two years of devoted work. To them, as to the military commanders, it was from day to day a period of intense strain, with life and survival immediately at stake. To the British Government it was a reminder that its formulation of policy had, less in itself than by its delays and psychological maladroitness, taken too little account of local discontent, or of the force of 'Iraqi nationalism and its power of popular appeal: a reminder also, if such had been needed, of the need for such a régime in 'Iraq as would, by satisfying major elements in that country, lighten the financial burden devolving on the British taxpayer. To the tribesmen of 'Iraq, who suffered severe casualties without recompense of any kind, it offered, not for the first or last time, a sobering lesson in the thankless consequences of serving the purposes of urban politicians and a Persian priesthood.

The town populations and their political leaders, for all the sincerity and zeal of many, took no physical or practical part in the strife, but profited undisturbed from the security which the Administration was able, in spite of them, to maintain in the cities. They were to claim nevertheless, as their successors a generation later still claim, that this 'National War of Liberation', to which heroic proportions have been assigned, had essentially modified British policy and compelled the creation of an 'Iraqi State. An objective comparison of the constitutional arrangements formulated and, on 17 June 1920, announced *before* the insurrection—arrangements in fact preparatory to an Arab State acting through elected assemblies, 'Iraqi ministers and high officials—and those introduced by Cox in the autumn of the year, does not support this view. The *Thawra*, besides inflicting tragic losses on its participants, delayed by some months the inauguration of the new State. It may, on the other hand, be argued that in some measure it modified the manner of implementation of British policy, and strengthened the case for the approach by treaty rather than by direct mandatory government.

Although operations by the Euphrates tribesmen showed at times signs of tuition or leadership by trained officers—ex-Turkish officers from the Amir Fayṣal's forces—yet in general the course of events was but little co-ordinated. It followed no strategy or synchronization more precise than the mere creation of the maximum disturbance, by tribal agency, whenever and wherever possible. This permitted the Administration to remain in being continuously and in most districts. Even a minimum of unified control over the insurgents' operations must have made the British position untenable, and thus rallied the main body of waverers to the cause of nationalism or of anarchy. The lack of cohesion indicates not only the failure of the political element to provide it, but equally the parochial objectives of the shaykhs, the variety of their motives, their lack of the sense of service to a common cause. More generally the differing viewpoints of Kurd, Turk, Turkoman, and Arab, the irreconcilably varying objectives of Persian Mujtahid, 'Iraqi nationalist, and peace-loving merchant or landlord precluded, as did the essential cleavage of town or tribe, any effective unity of effort. Nor can it be forgotten that throughout 'Iraq a high proportion of leading shaykhs and of urban notables withheld all support from the movement, while throughout the period the loyalty of 'Iraqi forces—police and Shabana—to the Administration was outstanding.

The restoration of peaceful conditions in the territory cost some months of exhausting British military efforts, marked not only by some tragic misadventures but also by episodes of great gallantry and brilliant military prowess. These efforts, which included the summoning of important reinforcements from India, cost hundreds of casualties, great quantities of military stores, the erection of hundreds of blockhouses and scores of miles of barbed-wire fencing, and an expenditure calculated at some £40 million: a greater sum by far than had been spent throughout the War on Arab allies in the Ḥijaz and Syria.

Throughout June 1920 peace throughout 'Iraq was, except for some aftermath of the Tall 'Afar murders, still undisturbed. It was thought indeed by some observers to be assured by the failure of the tribal forces outside Mosul, the announcement of British policy in Baghdad on 17 June, the forthcoming return of Cox, and the timely arrest of patriot-agitators at Baghdad, Karbalā, Ḥilla, and Diwaniya, whence in some numbers they were dispatched to Hanjam Island in the Persian Gulf. But such hopes were to be falsified; an eruption of violent lawlessness—one of so many in 'Iraq's long history—was not now avoidable. A petty episode at Rumaytha on the lower Euphrates, unconnected at first with nationalist or any other politics, led in the first week of July to the cutting of the Baghdad–Baṣra railway near this town and near Samawa. Both towns, or the Government buildings in them, were closely besieged by tribesmen. The first and determined efforts of British troops to reach Rumaytha were unsuccessful. It was relieved on 20 July only after serious fighting, and immediately abandoned. The Mishkhab marsh area tribes attacked Abu Ṣukhayr on 13 July, and a week later besieged Kufa, when Captain J. S. Mann was killed by tribesmen. Kifl was assailed and a column of the Manchester Regiment, sent hastily from Ḥilla to its relief, by ill fortune and its own unpreparedness sustained heavy losses in killed and prisoners which raised the spirit and hopes of the insurgent tribes. The Hindiya Barrage and Musayib were evacuated, to be reoccupied in mid-August. British troops were withdrawn with great difficulty from Diwaniya to Ḥilla, south of which the Euphrates channels and townships passed for some weeks out of control. In the Muntafiq, the political offices at Shaṭra, Qal'at Sikr, and Suq al-Shuyukh were perforce abandoned during August, and except at the liwā headquarters, Naṣiriya, a régime of non-Government, but never of concerted insurgent action, prevailed for some weeks. The railway was interrupted, a train looted, two military river steamers (the *Greenfly* and the *S.9*) were destroyed and their crews cold-bloodedly murdered; nevertheless, nuclei of loyalty to the Administration remained under the most powerful of the Muntafiq shaykhs, and conditions could return without military action to something like normality in mid-October.

Disorder at no time spread to the Kut or the 'Amara areas of the lower Tigris, nor, save for isolated episodes which included the destruction by sabotage of the main Motor Transport Stores, to Baghdad city and suburbs; nor, in spite of agitators' efforts, to Baṣra. Mosul and its dependent Kurdish districts were untroubled, in spite of violent trans-frontier propaganda and some formidable tribal raiding. Sulaymaniya, a stranger to 'Iraqi nationalism and chastened by the events of 1919, held aloof. In Kirkuk liwā there was keen tension but no outbreak, except at

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Kifri, which tribesmen occupied for a few days late in August, and whose Assistant Political Officer, Captain G. H. Salmon, they imprisoned and then murdered. In Arbil liwā the Administration under Turkish-fomented pressure withdrew from outlying qadhās, Raniya, Keui Sanjaq, Baṭas; but, aided by the loyalty of leading Aghās, it could maintain itself in the city and surrounding country. The upper Euphrates was held secure by the influence of the Dulaym and 'Aniza shaykhs, until the sordidly treacherous murder of Leachman on 12 August led to local risings, the looting and isolation of 'Ana and other villages, and the withdrawal of the Administration for a time from Hit. The position was restored with the arrival of small military columns and the re-occupation of Hit on 8 October; but the Dulaym area remained partly disorganized for a further half-year.

Around Samarrā propaganda emanating from that Holy City led to a measure of tribal uprising and, late in August, to an unsuccessful assault on the city. In other areas north and east of Baghdad the forces of violence were for a time dominant and rewarded. The liwā headquarters, Ba'quba, and the qadhā towns of Shahroban and Daltawa were successively attacked, occupied, and partially looted by tribesmen under politicians' inspiration in mid-August, and British officers cold-bloodedly murdered—Captain W. T. Wrigley, Lieutenant J. T. Bradfield, Captain E. L. Buchanan, and two British Levy instructors—or politely imprisoned. Here and at Mandali on the frontier hopeful Provisional Governments were set up. The Turkoman-Kurdish towns of Qizil Rubaṭ and Khaniqin were entered and occupied in the same week by the local Kurdish tribesmen. Attacks on the Assyrian refugee camp at Ba'quba were hotly repulsed, by far better fighters than the attackers.

In these accessible areas of central 'Iraq it was easy for the military command, which by the later weeks of September disposed of stronger forces and had regained the initiative, to restore the Administration and to punish the insurgents by the visitations of mobile columns. Disorder here, to the general relief of the public and, not least, of the Baghdad landlords, languished and died; but the agitation and internecine quarrels among the Diyalā tribes remained largely unappeased for a further year. The 'government' of Mandali disappeared early in 1921, the tribal invaders of Kifri and Khaniqin were reduced to hunted outlaws, and calm returned to the urban and suburban populations of the Diyalā and Baghdad townships.

On the middle and lower Euphrates British troops could show themselves in respectable force in the first weeks of October. It was possible to restore the prestige of the Administration in Najf and Karbalā and to relieve besieged Samawa and Kufa, where a

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669 Provisional Government had existed for some weeks and from which the British prisoners captured in July, of the Manchesters and other regiments, were recovered in good condition.

A variety of minor punitive expeditions were led in the little-visited marsh country, and military marches and demonstrations carried out throughout the winter of 1920–1. Communications including the Baghdad–Basra railway were progressively restored. Loyal tribal leaders were thanked and rewarded. The submission of ex-insurgents was accepted, save for some few who, through fear or principle, fled to Syria or the Hijaz. Fines of rifles imposed on tribes by the Commander-in-Chief were effectively collected; some 70,000, including 21,000 of modern type, were handed in within six months by mid-Euphrates tribesmen alone. From the Muntafiq, exceptionally, no arms were collected, and only one expedition in January 1921 visited the Gharraf.

In mid-October Sir Percy Cox returned to 'Iraq as planned to relieve Wilson, his deputy, and to carry out the constitutional programme announced four months earlier. After consultations in southern 'Iraq, he reached Baghdad on 11 October and could rightly wonder, in a proclamation issued on 17 October, what aims the few still active insurgent tribesmen could be seeking. The attempt of the Mujtahids to regain a seriously though but temporarily shaken position by claiming to act as mediators between the Government and the Shi'i tribesmen was frustrated by Cox's refusal. Week by week conditions normalized, and the deferred progress in State-building could be resumed.

5. THE KING

642 Immediate 'complete independence' for 'Iraq formed no part of the programme which Cox was to carry out; after the failure of the insurrectionist movement organized to obtain it, and the collapse in July 1920 of the Amir Faysal's Government in Syria, even its warmest advocate could now scarcely expect it. A Mandate for 'Iraq had been accepted by Great Britain, with all the tutelage which that, however interpreted, must involve; the belated Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, signed on 10 August 1920, was to permit the 'Iraqi Kurds to adhere, if they wished, to the State into which central Kurdistan might or might not evolve. Cox himself and his advisers, however sympathetic to 'Iraqi aspirations, were convinced that the intended substitution of 'Iraqi for British government, must, for soundness and permanence, be gradual and progressive; indeed, the actual British Administration visibly operating in every department, liwā, and qadhā was a reality which no politics could, for the moment, dissipate. At the same time the more prudent programme of erecting an 'Iraqi Administration,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

sketchy at first but to gain increasing reality, on the intended lines 642
of the Bonham-Carter proposals as considerably modified by Whitehall and by Cox himself, could expect support from the body of moderate or non-political opinion now consolidated by the frightening experiences of July and August, as well as from the British officers who were by a great majority willing and indeed eager to help in establishing a new régime. Extremism was, for the moment, under a cloud with some of its exponents abroad, others temporarily silent. Many or most sincere nationalists were willing for a time to participate in a new order which, incompletely as it could satisfy them, at least represented a substantial advance.

Within a week of reaching Baghdad, where as throughout 'Iraq 642
his reception was cordial, Cox with his advisers—Bonham-Carter, 645
Howell, Philby, Slater, Bullard, Miss Bell—elaborated plans for an interim 'Iraq Government. A Council of responsible ministers was to be assisted by British advisers, and a comprehensive 'Iraqi civil service to assume the reins of Government in the provinces. For the post of President of the Council, Cox was able to overcome the genuine reluctance of the venerable Naqib of Baghdad, Sayid 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani; and the latter on 25 October issued invitations to eminent fellow countrymen selected by himself and Cox for Cabinet positions. The Council which, after only two refusals to serve in it, met on 2 November, contained Sayid Ṭalib Pasha who, but for his too evident personal ambitions, would have been considered for the Presidency: Ja'far al-'Askari, a Baghdadi ex-Turkish officer of unusual personality, who had left the Turkish for the Arab armies during the War and attained high rank under Fayṣal (p. 119): and Sasun Ḥasqayl, a Jewish financier and ex-deputy who had held high positions in Istanbul. The other ministers were a Baṣra landowner notable, 'Abd al-Laṭif al-Mandil, at the Ministry of Commerce; a retired Turkish General from Kirkuk, 'Izzat Pasha, at that of Works; an ex-Mayor of Mosul, Muḥammad 'Ali Fadhil, at that of Awqaf; a former Qadhi of Baghdad and Mecca, Muṣṭafā al-Alusi, as Minister of Justice; with these, who were all Sunnis, the Naqib was persuaded to appoint a Shi'i divine, Sayid Muḥammad Mahdi Ṭabaṭaba'i, as Minister of Education and Health; and to them were added, without portfolio, a half-dozen[1] of the leading notables of the three cities, including two Christians and a Shi'i, and three outstanding Shi'i tribal leaders. A Kurd of the Baban family refused to take part.

The earliest meetings of the Council discussed and agreed on its

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[1] These were: 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Ḥaydari: 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Khayyaṭ: Fakhri al-Jamil: Ḥajj 'Abd al-Ghani Kubba: Shaykh 'Ajil al-Samarmad: 'Abd al-Majid al-Shawi: Shaykh Muḥammad al-Sayhud, the Amir of the Rabi'a: Da'ud al-Yusifani: Shaykh Sālim al-Khayyun: Aḥmad Pasha al-Ṣani' of Baṣra: Ḥajj Najm al-Badrawi: and Shaykh Dhari al-Sa'dun.

642 own status and procedure. The supreme authority of the High 645× Commissioner was recognized, and was required for confirmation of almost all Acts of State and the higher administrative appointments. The rôle of the ministerial British Advisers was heavy and all-pervasive. Nevertheless, Cox could announce on 11 November 1920 that, pending the calling of the General Elective Assembly authorized by the Notification of 17 June, a provisional National Government had been established: that its Council of State consisted of a President and Ministers for Interior, Finance, Justice, Education and Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce, and Awqaf, and other ministers without portfolio: and that 'until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect the Council of State Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations, and in general military affairs except as concerned solely the locally recruited forces'.

The British Advisers to the Ministries were appointed at the same time: H. St. J. B. Philby to Interior, S. H. Slater to Finance and to act in Commerce, Major-General Atkinson to Communications and Works, Major G. F. Eadie to act in Defence, Sir E. Bonham-Carter in Justice, E. L. Norton in Health and Education, and R. S. Cooke in Awqaf.

645× The Council of Ministers, dignified and deliberate, proceeded to the dispatch of business. Arrangements were made under pressure from Ja'far Pasha for the organized repatriation from Syria of Fayṣal's 'Iraqi officers, who, hotly nationalist and as yet doubtfully disposed towards the new British-sponsored compromise régime, could not but form an important element in 'Iraq politics. A number of politicians deported in 1920 from 'Iraq to Hanjam Island in the Persian Gulf for subversive agitation were permitted to return; the remainder were to be released under the general amnesty proclaimed in June 1921. Work was begun in Committee on a revision of the all-important Electoral Law, a task begun by Sayid Ṭalib Pasha's conclave of ex-deputies in August. It proved intractable; the High Commissioner favoured, the ministers disliked, separate representation for the tribes. These, though they formed a great majority of the population, would without such a provision secure no parliamentary spokesmen at all. A first draft of the revised law was unsatisfactory, if only because, among other defects, it ignored the special rights of the Kurds under the Sèvres Treaty. The completion of the draft was willingly postponed by the Minister of the Interior, Sayid Ṭalib, whose own ambitions, it seemed to some, made him reluctant for elections to be held at all until his own plans were mature.

631 The reorganization of the provincial government on a plan

Jr Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

published in December 1920 involved a general restoration of Turkish administrative units, with the temporary loss of improvements made in 1918 to 1920. It involved also the complete separation of judicial from executive functions, an innovation—or restoration of Turkish methods, in this case salutary—which led to the immediate need at all levels for more judges and magistrates; and these the Ministry of Justice, progressive from the first in the use of responsible 'Iraqis, was not unsuccessful in supplying. The 'Iraqi Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams who, except in Sulaymaniya liwā and with caution on the middle Euphrates, were now everywhere substituted for British Political Officers and their Assistants as the effective governors of the provinces, represented all types, all ages, and all degrees of merit and honesty among ex-Turkish officialdom. The almost exclusively Sunni Government followed Turkish tradition by making, it was remarked, no Shi'i appointments save, inevitably, in the Holy Cities. The new provincial régime which allowed initially for 10 liwās, 35 qadhās, and 85 naḥiyas, was the most obvious indication to the public that an 'Iraq Government was now a reality. It incorporated in each liwā one or more British officers as Advisers (later, Administrative Inspectors), an arrangement which promised to work on the whole satisfactorily and to the credit of both elements. There were in places regrettable lapses to Turkish standards, and elsewhere signs of administration on lines of political partiality; at Mosul the incoming Mutaṣarrif was promptly murdered; and in some cases the 'Iraqi executive, more experienced and not less able than his British supervisory colleague, resented the relationship. But on the whole the new machine worked with general acceptance and little friction. 631

Progress was made early in 1921 towards the construction of an 'Iraq Army. It was intended firstly for the defence functions which must devolve upon it with the withdrawal of British forces which, already in progress, was vociferously urged by press and politicians in Great Britain; and, secondly, to offer employment to the potentially dangerous military caste. To absorb the existing Levies, now a force over 2,000 strong with excellent discipline and record, into the 'Iraq Army would involve fundamental changes in the former, with the replacement of almost all its officers by newcomers. This plan was rejected; the Levies were instead placed temporarily under the Minister of the Interior, and retained a separate existence. The Ministry of Defence spent the first half of 1921 in elaborating departments, a staff, terms of service, and all other preliminaries for the Army. Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id, brother-in-law of Ja'far Pasha and himself a brilliant officer and pre-1914 'Iraqi patriot, returned from Syria to become its Chief of Staff. A Military College was opened in July 1921. 701

642 By the early weeks of that year the situation in 'Iraq had vastly improved; there was now time and opportunity to proceed further with constitutional and administrative development, and not least with the selection of a ruler. The insurrection was over, though tribal disquiet persisted in the Muntafiq and in various degrees elsewhere. In spite of obvious imperfections, a Government by 'Iraqis was operating. Ministers were showing goodwill and patience, and the lone hand evidently played by Sayid Ṭalib was 648x not for the moment menacing. A frontier agreement had been made with the French in Syria in December 1920; and though it fixed a boundary which, since it appeared to bisect both the Jabal Sinjar and Albu Kamal, was in fact ignored, frontier relations were by now at least non-violent. The persistent propaganda and trouble-making from across the Turkish frontier had not seriously perverted the 'Iraqi-Kurdish or the Euphrates tribes. Peace between the Allies and Turkey had been made, even though the new conditions now supervening in that country already condemned the Sèvres Treaty to nullity.

008 In London 'Iraq affairs from 1921 onwards were handled by a newly created Middle Eastern department of the Colonial Office; and the first action of Mr. Winston Churchill, transferred from the War Office as Colonial Secretary, was to convene a Conference at Cairo which should decide, once and for all, the many outstanding Middle Eastern questions. It met on 12 March 1921, attended by the highest Service personalities, Foreign Office and Treasury experts, Churchill's Eastern advisers including Lawrence, and, from 'Iraq, Sir Percy Cox accompanied by General Haldane, Ja'far al-'Askari, Sasun Ḥasqayl, Gertrude Bell, and two of the ministerial Advisers. The agenda, as far as concerned 'Iraq, included the selection of a ruler, the treatment of the 'Iraqi Kurds, the early reduction of British expenditure, and the composition of the forces designed to secure the defence of 'Iraq after the withdrawal of British garrisons.

643 For the post of Amir or King of 'Iraq, no local candidate had commanded anything approaching adequate support. The Naqib was advanced in age, nor could his family produce an acceptable successor; Sayid Ṭalib with his past record and cynically unscrupulous character was more feared than accepted; a Turkish prince, probably Burhan al-Din, suggested in some quarters of Baghdad or Kirkuk, could scarcely be welcome to the British Government; the Agha Khan, gravely proposed, could not be a serious candidate, and the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh still less; the Shaykh of Muḥammara, a self-proposed pretender, was unthinkable, and the Najdi Amir, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, scarcely less so. But the Amir Fayṣal was now available. His candidature had been suggested by A. T.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Wilson in July 1920, when Damascus fell to the French; and Colonel K. Cornwallis, an ex-Sudan officer and Arabist who had served in Syria with Fayṣal and gained his close friendship, had been authorized by Curzon in December to offer him the 'Iraq throne. The Prince had refused it, alleging the higher claim of the Amir 'Abdullah, his elder brother. But to the king-seekers of Cairo he remained the only tolerable choice, and a programme whereunder his candidature and election should proceed was forthwith elaborated. The rôle of Great Britain was to encourage him to visit 'Iraq and offer himself as King, and thereafter to 'raise no objection' to his election; but while no forcible imposition was contemplated, such an experiment could, it was evident, scarcely be allowed to fail. 643

Regarding the Kurds, no decision was reached. It was already clear that the Kurdish State visualized at Sèvres would never exist, and that the Treaty itself had been rendered inoperative by Kamal's unimagined national revival in Turkey. The Kurds of Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya, too obviously unfit for self-government, might yet be ill at ease in an Arab State; but the High Commissioner's willingness in that event to govern them directly did not appeal to the 'Iraqi ministers, in whose view the Kurds must form an integral part of 'Iraq. No expedient remained but that which was tacitly accepted, both in Cairo and on the spot: to admit the distinctness of Kurd from Arab by a measure of administrative variation, to treat them with sympathy, and to hope for their ultimate willing adhesion to the 'Iraq State, to which in any case they could not but be economically united. Kirkuk had in fact accepted a Mutaṣarrif in February 1921, and Arbil became a sub-liwā of it under a Deputy Mutaṣarrif; Mosul since the murder of December 1920 remained under a British Political Officer, though unity with 'Iraq had been accepted. Sulaymaniya liwā refused, for the moment, any rule but that of the High Commissioner. 563

Important decisions were reached at Cairo on defence questions. The British forces were to be further reduced; the Royal Air Force was in 1922 to take over control from the Army. The Levies, increased by the addition not of further Arab but of Assyrian and Kurdish units, were to be handed over by the Minister of the Interior to the High Commissioner and therefrom later to the British Military Command, which would support the expenses of the force. 000

The Cairo Conference broke up on 25 March. Cox was back in Baghdad by mid-April, to find that the selection of a ruler now dominated all political thought. The lesser local candidates faded from the picture. The Naqib, whose own following was 643

Iz Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

considerable but heterogeneous, had no personal ambition and veered gradually from an attitude of opposition to one of support for a Sharifian ruler, since the British seemed so to desire. The foreign candidates other than Fayṣal made no general appeal. The conduct of Sayid Ṭalib in Interior, with his many unguarded remarks and profuse expenditure of public money, seemed to indicate a determination somehow to secure the throne, either immediately or as successor to the Naqib. His increasingly intemperate attitude could not be longer ignored; a personality which could have been valuable to 'Iraq, and had been so in fact during the bad days of 1920, seemed too likely to be used for selfish and dangerous ends. After the Pasha had, at a dinner party, threatened to mobilize and use tribal forces in their thousands 'to prevent British influence being used in favour of one of the candidates' (that is, Fayṣal), Cox thought it expedient to have him removed from the scene. He was arrested by the military authorities and deported to Ceylon. The attitude of the High Commission and of British officers in the Government became more openly favourable to the cause of the Sharifian Amir; Philby, Ṭalib's intimate, remained staunchly republican. The expected general amnesty for political prisoners was published on 30 May.

The Amir, synchronizing his arrangements with the British plan, left Jidda with Cornwallis and a small party of supporters on 12 June. Friendly telegrams were exchanged with the Naqib, and even with a possible opponent, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud. Cox suggested to the public of 'Iraq, by communiqué on 17 June, that the British Government would, in the best interests of Iraq, 'place no obstacle in the way' of the election of a Sharifian ruler. Organized by the Naqib and the Mayor of Baghdad, a strong reception committee from the capital proceeded to Baṣra. At this city, which had recently petitioned Cox for a separate and half-independent régime, the Amir's reception on 23 June was reasonably cordial. At the Euphrates towns, especially Karbalā and Najf, it was tepid, but at Baghdad enthusiastic. The Amir's own personality and attitude were, it was soon obvious, his greatest assets, and won him support even from previous partisans of the Naqib or Sayid Ṭalib. He gained ground everywhere. The question became one scarcely of the probability, but only of the mode of his election and enthronement.

It would have been unreasonable and in practice irrelevant to await a second and still distant peace treaty with the ex-suzerain, Turkey, or to prolong exchanges of views with the interested Governments of France and of India. It was possible also to pass over the complaints of the United States spokesmen at Geneva, that their Government had been less than properly consulted on the terms of Mandates. Cox's intention had been to convene a Constituent Assembly for the King's election, but this must lead to a delay of some months, during which the possibility of an extremist coup d'état—no good beginning for a constitutional reign—could not be ignored. It was decided to shorten the procedure. On 11 July, a few days after Philby had left a service from whose policy he differed, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution declaring the Amir to be King of 'Iraq 'provided that His Highness's Government shall be constitutional, representative, and liberal and limited by law.' Accepting the resolution, Cox declared that to obtain due validity it must be confirmed by popular consent evoked by referendum.

This was held late in July. The formula of approval provided by the Government was in some liwās modified or supplemented, and in one words were added demanding complete freedom from foreign control; in another, a Constituent Assembly within three months was demanded. Mosul declarations, generally favourable, spoke of safeguarding Kurdish and other minority rights. Euphrates liwās asked for continued British control. The Kurds of Sulaymaniya abstained from voting. Kirkuk rejected, but Arbil accepted, the Amir. But on the whole a large majority—substantially less, it may be, than the 96 per cent. claimed officially—accepted the new King, and such leading tribesmen as ibn Hadhdhal of the 'Amarat and 'Alī Sulayman of the Dulaym offered their oaths of allegiance even before the enthronement.

Whitehall's last-minute and remarkably maladroit instruction that the Amir, in his very speech of acceptance of the throne, should emphasize the ultimate authority of the High Commissioner, was fortunately withdrawn. No further obstacles remained to the official enthronement. It took place with due ceremony in the early morning of 23 August 1921, at the height of the summer heat, in the Saray courtyard in Baghdad. Fayṣal I ruled in 'Iraq, inheriting from Sir Percy Cox the official headship of the State.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

V

THE 'IRAQ KINGDOM

I. A REIGN BEGINS

643 THE new King was to reign in 'Iraq for twelve years. Aged 36 at the time of his accession, he possessed unusual qualities of dignity, leadership, and sympathy; and his political adroitness, which reflected a high intelligence used always devotedly, sometimes perilously, in the service of his adopted country, enabled him and it to survive grave dangers and to establish, in so few years, the structure of a State both more imposing and more promising than most observers could have expected. The British decision to encourage the candidature of this dethroned and non-'Iraqi prince for the 'Iraq throne had contained, indeed, the seeds of many blessings for that country.

The King's family joined him at Baghdad from Mecca. His young half-brother the Amir Zayd, then aged 21, was earliest with him, before going, a year later, to spend three years at Oxford. The material surroundings of a throne were soon, humbly enough, provided, and the royal figure became the unquestioned centre of all 'Iraqi political and social life. His name was used in the Khuṭba—official prayers—on and after his first Friday as King. By his tours in all areas and his accessibility he quickly became known to thousands of his subjects; indeed, no contributions made by Fayṣal were greater or more personal than his equal appeal to town and tribe—a reflection of his own half-urban half-desert background and education—and his power (which at moments failed him) to balance the forces of extreme 'Iraqi nationalism with the exigencies of the British connexion. His relations with the High Commission—now established on the Tigris right bank, physically and officially separated from the Government of 'Iraq across the river—and with the British element inevitably preponderant in Government during the early months, were cordial and appreciative, though his 'Iraqi entourage contained, as was soon to appear, some elements of a less realistic or more fanatical nationalism, which could be damaging. Cornwallis, Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior since August 1921, acted also as the King's personal Adviser.

642 The constitutional position of the territory was yet singularly unclear. Its elements were a Turkish sovereignty still existing, though dormant: an unratified Mandate, accepted by Great Britain but unwelcome to 'Iraq itself: a constitutional monarchy,

with no Constitution; and an intended treaty relationship with 642 Great Britain, but as yet no treaty. These features, however, did not disturb the administration of the country, which in Faysal's first half-year proceeded without interruption. The Naqib and his Council, correctly resigning on the King's accession, were reinstated with changes. The new Cabinet formed on 10 September included Naji al-Suwaydi, a lawyer and patriot of distinguished 645* name and record, as Minister of Justice: a Mosul Christian doctor Ḥanna Khayyaṭ as Minister (later Director-General) of Health: and most of the former Ministers, including Ja'far Pasha in Defence and Sasun Ḥasqayl in Finance. Ḥajj Ramzi, a nonentity who had succeeded Sayid Ṭalib at Interior, retained that office. The Ministers of Justice, Works, and Awqaf were unchanged. The now separate Ministry of Education was entrusted to the learned Shi'i divine Sayid Muḥammad 'Ali al-Shahristani. This Cabinet was unaltered till March 1922. Among the Advisers, Cornwallis was to remain in Interior for the next fourteen years; Bonham-Carter retired in May 1921, replaced for a year by Nigel Davidson also from the Sudan and thereafter by E. M. Drower: Atkinson, leaving for India, was succeeded by his deputy H. H. Wheatley. Lionel Smith became adviser to Education, Colonel P. Joyce—a colleague of the Amir Fayṣal and of Lawrence in the Arabian campaign—to Defence. Slater and Cooke were unchanged.

The grouping of departments differed widely from that practised 647 under the Secretariats of the Wilson régime (p. 108). The Ministry 645 of Interior covered, besides tribal, 'political', and municipal affairs, the 'Iraq Police, the civil prisons, the Agricultural and Veterinary departments, the Health service (when it ceased to be a Ministry), the Press Bureau and the department of Revenue until its transfer to Finance in October 1921. The Ministry of Finance dealt with its normal revenue, expenditure, accounting, budgeting, currency, and establishment functions, and controlled the Port of Baṣra; that of Communications and Works covered the departments of Irrigation, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys, and the Railways.

The Ministry's task of governing was embarrassed by a financial 652 stringency which was aggravated by the disorders of the last year, by the continuance of post-war economic depression, and by the need to provide funds for the Ministry of Defence and for the Throne itself; nor, with a press and public outcry in Great Britain demanding ruthless economy in 'Iraq—or indeed outright evacuation from it—could funds be expected from that quarter. The new State started without debts, but with such liquid assets only as it could earn. The public services of Health, Education, Works, and the rest were confronted with unavoidable reductions at a

1[1921----Amalgst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager development. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained: schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

631 In the liwās,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwā early in 1922. Arbil, a sub-liwā of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Ḥilla. No more was heard of Baṣra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwā and qadhā. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

632 In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1922 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative —cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three 204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq 747 *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable 814 institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

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[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwās or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* S. G. C. Murray, H. M. Flaxman, E. C. H. Alban,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. S. Berry,* L. Kettlewell, S. E. Hedgcock, H. C. Pulley, R. E. Alderman,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. D. Jeffreys, L. W. Reed, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Grice, A. J. B. Chapman, J. B. Glubb (p. 291). Gillan, Murray, Flaxman, Kettlewell, Reed, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Pulley had died, and Longrigg and Hedgcock had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928–33), from the Sudan.

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic 747
Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary 814
clubs.

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil 619
period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land 166
communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyalā tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi D͟hafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the D͟hafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions 648*
in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdi- 721
stan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 721 25 January 1920 had asserted that non-Arab Muslim territories whether enemy-occupied or not, 'could not be divided' from Turkey; Kurdistan was the obvious reference. From this followed the propaganda campaign of 1920: the absurd pretensions to a throne in Baghdad put forward on behalf of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Sanusi, who was brought by the Turks to Diyarbakr in 1921: their resumed control of the border districts and tribes of Van and Julamark: their seduction of the Kurdish chieftains of Rawanduz area, and their mission thither of a civil official with troops. With the wild Surchi predominantly pro-Turkish, and the Pishdar divided, Turkish penetration made progress in the summer of 1921. It was checked by the Royal Air Force, the 'Iraq Police, and loyal tribal Levies in the autumn, only to restart with a sudden murderous stroke by 'Ubaydullah of the Surchi, who ambushed a Levy party and was repulsed again by major operations of the 'Iraq Levies and R.A.F. in mid-winter. But the tribal submission which followed was precarious; 'Ubaydullah remained at large; and early in 1922 Turkish troop movements on the frontier, based on Nisibin and Jazira, presaged a further offensive. Meanwhile the Sulaymaniya area was relatively quiet in the absence of Shaykh Maḥmud and his near relations; but a group of Persian Kurds from the frontier were able to range the Ḥalabja plain, collect 'taxes', ambush a Levy force, and threaten the town until Air Force reprisals scattered them.

563 657 A further problem of desperate difficulty, and closely connected with the Turkish claims, was that of the Assyrians. Their recruitment, first reluctant then eager, into the 'Iraq Levies did not solve the riddle of their ever-demanded repatriation, nor even of their settlement as a compact community in 'Iraq. The death of Paulus Mar Sham'un in 1920 left the succession to a feeble boy of eleven, Ishai. It led to the rapid loss of much of his house's authority to such livelier adventurers as the notorious Āghā Petros of Baz, an international 'crook' with murder, blackmail, and fraud to his credit in both hemispheres—and a brave man. The latter's plan, a desperate *pis aller* reluctantly authorized by the British, was to lead his rabble of vindictive tribesmen in their thousands across hill and dale by 'Aqra to Urmiya. The project ended late in 1920 in wayside looting, savage reprisals, and final débâcle; and the Assyrian community were reconcentrated in their camp at Shaykh Mindan outside Mosul. From here the Urmiya sections of the nation decided early in 1921 to attempt to make their own way back to Persia by way of Baghdad; but of thousands who drew money and departed, the great majority were kept from reaching their homes by the cruel hardships of the road and by Persian opposition. They scattered and disappeared, or returned to seek

work in Baghdad. The Ḥakkari clans were settled, as far as great 563 efforts and British expenditure could effect it, in the Government- 657 owned villages of Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, while hundreds of their more optimistic households passed over—ill-led, distraught by faction, and weakened by malaria—into their native hills across the border. Aghā Petros, their evil genius, was thankfully dispatched to Europe where he died in Paris soon afterwards. The Patriarchal household settled at Baybad, near 'Amadiya, sustained by the vigour and loyalty of Surma Khanim, the boy Patriarch's aunt. But the troubles of the hapless Assyrians, due so largely to their own fierce indiscipline, folly, and disunion, were not at or near their end.

For the Armenian refugees, who numbered some 15,000 at the time of their dispatch late in 1920 from Ba'quba to camp at Nahr 'Umar near Baṣra, other means of dispersal were sought. But their passive non-co-operation and sullen refusal to accept work in 'Iraq long defeated all the efforts made for them. Some measure of absorption in the cities or into Persia or among the Assyrians reduced their numbers, and most of the surviving main body of some 8,000 could at last be transported by ship to Batum—at the cost, as ever, of the British Government—by agreement with the new Armenian Government in Transcaucasia. The residue, still resisting all suggested forms of self-help, were induced by March 1922 to leave Nahr 'Umar, and the camp was closed.

2. THE FIRST TREATY

The proposal of the British Government to express the Anglo- 648x 'Iraq relationship by treaty, rather than by undisguised mandatory 186 Government, was approved by the Amir before his arrival in 'Iraq, and seemed not to be opposed, initially, by nationalist spokesmen there. To both sides it appeared likely to minimize the odium of a humiliating guardian–ward relationship, and to invest 'Iraq from the outset with the dignity of an independent treaty-making State. It was, in fact, unquestionably the most prudent and most imaginative way to handle a situation which lacked all precedent; but, to the resentment of 'Iraqi patriots and the poisoning of Anglo-'Iraq relations for the next ten years, the Mandate itself remained. Unmentioned in the draft Treaty, it had nevertheless notoriously been awarded to and accepted by Great Britain, and was even now in draft and awaiting League ratification in the last days of 1921. The remoteness of such a situation from the 'Complete Independence' claimed by the nationalists was all too obvious, however the Mandate be interpreted, excused, or kept out of sight.

A view hostile to the Mandate, and suspicious of a Treaty however otherwise generous which merely veiled it, was inevitably

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x 186 adopted by the King and his entourage from the first. He had been led by Mr. Churchill in London, he complained, to envisage a very different form of Treaty: the Mandate must go, disappear, be repudiated! And if it be urged that a debatable nicety of constitutional or international law was an unrealistic or scarcely sufficient basis—and one important only to a tiny minority of 'Iraqis—on which to found, as did the political 'Iraqis of 1921 to 1930, a ten-year campaign of political struggle, marked by civil resistance, murder, and intended insurrection, it remains true that the Mandate did in fact involve an imperfect independence and an affront to national pride damaging, it was claimed, to 'Iraq in Islamic eyes everywhere.

648x 186 As Treaty discussions in the Cabinet proceeded early in 1922, the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the Shi'i 'Ulamā and leading supporters and even intimates of the King, cried out against mandated 'slavery' and demanded complete British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by reaction an 'English' party of notables and shaykhs favourable, they said, to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists, whose views the King personally shared, stood for abrogation of the Mandate, a friendly and equal Treaty, and continued British support. The cleavage in opinion grew more specific after a conference called at Karbalā in April 1922, nominally to protest against Ikhwan raiding, by Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi, a Shi'i 'Alim devoted to politics. The conference, attended by some 200 Shi'i notables, 'Ulamā, and tribesmen, was watched with uneasiness by the moderate parties, and, in spite of the colourless resolution finally passed, was effective in rallying anti-Treaty opinion; it was productive also of indiscipline and near-anarchy in the sensitive 631 Muntafiq and Shamiya districts. A further evil now clearly visible and likely to increase was the 'political' administration in some of 186 the Euphrates areas, by strongly nationalistic Mutaṣarrifs and 668 Qa'immaqams. These, ignoring their advisory British colleagues, openly favoured the 'patriot' shaykhs in their land disputes and revenue assessments, and frowned upon the 'English' faction. Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad, deputations waited x645 upon the King. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922, by the resignation of five ministers, who included Naji al-Suwaydi, 'Izzat Pasha of Kirkuk, and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil of Baṣra. The ministers who replaced these included Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi, a senior official of superior type who had been a Turkish deputy and lately Mayor of Baghdad: Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, a Turko-Kurd of outstanding energy and rich humour: 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey al-Sa'dun,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

a Baṣra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a 645* Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajj Ja'far abu al-Timman. 648x This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al-Timman, accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet 666 approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of 668 electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited, 186 to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaṣarrif. Conditions elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British) politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i 665 political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani 668 (Nationalist) and the Nahdha (Awakening); these were matched by 648x the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot' meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate in elections. al-Khaliṣi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence. The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The 668 King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification 648x with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening. Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23 August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 648x demonstrators, led by a Court official, on the steps of the palace. An apology was demanded and given, but the King refused to take action against the offenders. Public order hung in the balance; no Cabinet existed. At this moment King Fayṣal was prostrated by an acute attack of appendicitis. The urgently necessary operation was performed by Dr. Noel Braham on 25 August; but, in advance of the King's recovery, Cox felt bound to take drastic action. He explained to the public the attitude and the responsibilities of the British Government, condemned the dangerous sedition of the extremists, suppressed the two parties and the worst of the newspapers, arrested and banished a number of the more violent politicians. The effect was instantaneous, the relief of quiet-loving elements throughout 'Iraq to all appearances profound. The gradual restoration of the tribal position was aided by the removal of Mutaṣarrifs whose patriotism had been shown by partial and discriminating administration, and by punitive bombing of actual insurgents in Diwaniya and the Muntafiq.

The King, whose operation was successful—and certified as such by doctors sent from the Ḥijaz by his father—on his complete recovery by 10 September publicly thanked the High Commissioner for the measures taken; they had, in fact, saved the State from anarchy and himself, it is probable, from a second throneless exile. x 645 648x The Naqib was asked in the improved atmosphere to form another Cabinet, in which he included Khalidi at Justice, 'Abd al-Muḥsin at Interior, Sasun Ḥasqayl, Ja'far al-'Askari, 'Ali Fadhil, and Ṣubiḥ Nasha't at their former Ministries, and a rich Najf banker, Ḥajj Muḥsin al-Shallash at Education. The Ministry of Commerce was abolished. The Cabinet, reassured at last by the argument that entry to the League of Nations—'Iraq's next goal—would of itself end the unpopular Mandate, reaffirmed its acceptance of the Treaty, which was signed at last by the Naqib and Sir Percy Cox on 10 October 1922.

648x The Treaty, which was to last for twenty years after ratification by the Constituent Assembly, reproduced, without direct reference to the Mandate, most of its provisions. It covered the obligation to respect constitutional procedure, freedom of religion and education and missionary enterprise. It included safeguards for the rights of foreigners, equal economic opportunities for all States (whether League members or not; an echo of the Colby-Curzon 'Open Door' correspondence), co-operation with League of Nations international Health measures, and a modern régime for Antiquities. The terms of the Treaty were open to periodical agreed revision, and Great Britain agreed to press the candidature of 'Iraq for the League of Nations 'as soon as possible'. Separate and subsidiary agreements were to be made—and were in fact thereafter drafted—

covering military co-operation, judicial and financial matters, and 648* the position of the British officials of the Government. In general, the responsibilities assumed by Great Britain for 'Iraq *vis-à-vis* the League of Nations were thus passed to the 'Iraq Government itself for fulfilment, while the fields in which, and the modes by which, Great Britain would continue to assist and fortify the young State were defined.

The Military Agreement provided that 'Iraq should within four years become entirely self-defending, from both internal disorder and external assault. To this end the Government would devote not less than a quarter of its revenue to Defence. In the meantime the British Government, besides retaining forces in 'Iraq at its own expense, would provide that State also with officers, instructors, arms and equipment; and the movements of the 'Iraq Army were to be open to the inspection and advice of the High Commissioner. The consent of America and other Powers to the abolition of the Capitulations was secured, certain judicial guarantees being given in return: for instance, that the subjects of these were to be tried by Courts containing one or more British judges, and their houses searched only with safeguards. British legal experts would be employed by the 'Iraq Government, and all legal provisions affecting foreigners were to be agreed by the High Commissioner before presentation to Parliament. Under the Financial Agreement, the Kingdom of 'Iraq agreed to contract no external debts without the agreement of Great Britain: recognized its liability to assume its due share of the Ottoman Public Debt; accepted the transfer to itself of certain British-owned public works (at a value of some £700,000) and, in principle, that of the Railways and of the Port of Baṣra. Material for the British forces were exempted from Customs duty and taxes.

The general though by no means universal satisfaction of the 645* 'Iraq public at the signature of the Treaty was disturbed, only four weeks later, by the next move of the irreconcilable Shi'i 'Ulamā, who issued Fatwas (religious judgments) against participation in elections for the Constituent Assembly. The effect of these, slight enough in most of 'Iraq, could not but be powerful in the middle Euphrates, where the election machinery which had been set in motion by Royal Irada on 21 October was brought abruptly to a halt; and in northern 'Iraq, simultaneously, the threats and pressure of the Turks had for different reasons a similar effect. Faced with these difficulties, and especially that of Turkish aggression, the Naqib, old and weary and at heart pro-Turkish, resigned an office which he had filled with disinterested devotion. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey succeeded him as Prime Minister, and formed a Cabinet on 20 November. It retained Sasun Ḥasqayl, brought

'645 Naji al-Suwaydi to Interior and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil to Awqaf, found room for the usual single Sh'i in the person of 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi at the Ministry of Education, and gave the portfolios of Works and Defence respectively to the outstanding ex-Generals, Yasin al-Hashimi and Nuri Sa'id. A few days later Suwaydi moved to Justice, and the Premier abandoned that portfolio in favour of that of Interior. The new Government was committed to acceptance of the Treaty, to the convening of the Constituent Assembly, and to the defence of 'Iraq's integrity against the Turkish claims now clamorously asserted.

3. THE THREAT TO MOSUL

648' 721 The early spring of 1922 had brought indeed no comforting news from the Kurdish districts and the Turkish frontier. In Sulaymaniya a faction demanded the return of Shaykh Maḥmud; among the Pishdar the stable element under an outstanding personality, Babakr Àghā, was still opposed by a pro-Turkish section; and in mid-March a new Turkish Qa'immaqam appeared in Rawanduz, followed by forces under the notorious 'Ali Shafiq—'Euz Demir', or Iron-shoulder—to proclaim the coming Turkish reconquest of the wilaya.

Late in May troubles in the Zangana spread to the still smouldering Hamawand. Their chief, Kārim Fattaḥ, arranged for the callous murder of two British officers, Captain R. K. Makant and Captain S. S. Bond, and bolted for the Turks at Rawanduz. The attempt of these to extend an anti-British or anti-Baghdad movement was checked momentarily by the dispatch of a Levy column and aircraft of the Royal Air Force, while Simko of the Shikak and Sayid Ṭaha of Neri for their own purposes restrained would-be insurgents on the frontier. But as the British forces withdrew the Turks advanced. They occupied Raniya, were joined by the dissident Pishdar, and the conditions which resulted forced the evacuation by air of British personnel from Sulaymaniya, where a Council under Shaykh Maḥmud's brother, Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir, was left in charge. The Turks could now occupy Keui Sanjaq and threaten 'Aqra, while British and 'Iraqi forces held only the inner line of Arbil, Kirkuk, Kifri. But a simultaneous Turkish thrust in September 1922 to 'Amadiya in the far north, where Assyrian resettlement had been proceeding, was repelled by Kurdish tribesmen and by the quickly rallying Assyrians themselves.

Under pressure of these events the High Commissioner, erring perhaps for once in judgement, arranged for the return of Shaykh Maḥmud to Sulaymaniya to fill the vacuum of Government. King Fayṣal supported the appointment, and lent Kurdish officers from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

his Army; Major Noel accompanied the Shaykh. But the latter, 648x contrary to the most solemn promises, began immediately to correspond 721 with Euz Demir (who despised him as a savage), to intrigue with the active Turkish Committee formed in Kirkuk by the Naftchi family and other irreconcilable Turkophiles, and to claim the title first of Ḥukumdar (Governor) and then of King of all Kurdistan. The prestige and control of the 'Iraq Government in southern Kurdistan was at this moment, November 1922, at its lowest point, even though Sayid Ṭaha, now a refugee from his home, could with Government help rally something of a tribal force, and British aircraft could disperse the Turks in Raniya. In Sulaymaniya a fantastic régime of extortion and oppression represented 'Kurdish Government', and a mission sent by it to Baghdad proffered highly unrealistic claims.

The first move of Turkish aggression on the northern frontier had been met by a strengthening of British and 'Iraqi forces in Mosul area, and by a temporary residence of the Amir Zayd at Mosul. His popularity, and a visit by the King himself, rallied 'Iraqi and anti-Turkish feeling; but nervousness remained as the extent and actuality of Turkish claims revealed itself. In Europe, 648x meanwhile, the Armistice of Mudania, which in November 1922 closed the Greco-Turkish war and a critical phase of Anglo-Turkish relations, was followed by the first Conference at Lausanne. Lord Curzon here confronted in Ismet Pasha the spokesman of a resurgent and self-confident Turkey, triumphant over disaster and all its enemies. The Turks claimed the Mosul wilaya on grounds of race, alleging that Arabs in Mosul were few, Turks were many, and Kurd and Turk scarcely to be differentiated; on grounds of economics, since most of Mosul trade was with Anatolia: of right, since it had been improperly occupied by the British *after* the Armistice of November 1918: of self-determination, since the population of the wilaya themselves demanded Turkish return. It was indeed essential to Turkey to prevent the detachment from them, under another and perhaps more liberal Government, of a large part of the Kurdish people for whom they themselves proposed (and were later to carry out) a policy of strict assimilation and repression. Curzon refuted the population figures produced, which indeed were ludicrous. He explained objectively the racial groups and their relationships, corrected the economic fictions alleged—since in fact Mosul trade was predominantly with Syria and Baghdad—and reversed the argument based on self-determination; he asserted the claim of a whole and integrated 'Iraq Kingdom with every right to its Mosul province, and reminded Ismet of the Mandate for 'Iraq which had been already allotted and covered Mosul. Nor, in view of the wild terrain and wilder

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 inhabitants, could Curzon agree to the value or feasibility of a plebiscite. The Conference broke up on 2 February 1923, with every difficulty unsolved and with the Turks resolutely rejecting Curzon's offer or threat to refer the matter to the arbitration of the League.

The Turkish National Assembly proceeded, early in April, to award to the veteran American concession-seeker, Admiral Chester, a railway and mineral concession stretching far into 'Iraq; but at the second Lausanne Conference, which was convened on 23 April, wiser councils were manifest. British pressure for reference of the Mosul issue to League decision, a step wholly consonant with world opinion at the time, could no longer be resisted. Ismet maintained all his claims but agreed that, failing direct Anglo-Turkish agreement within twelve months (later reduced to nine), the Council of the League should be asked to arbitrate the dispute. The search for such agreement, pursued in conferences which Sir Percy Cox attended in Istanbul in May and June 1924, remained fruitless. Neither side yielded, and the problem was referred by Great Britain, in face of great Turkish reluctance, back to the League Council. This was to meet on 20 September.

721 These moves of diplomacy in Europe did nothing, meanwhile, to allay movement and violence in Kurdistan. Shaykh Mahmud, 648 supporting his band of cut-throat followers by looting the helpless, welcomed Turkish officers at Sulaymaniya, sent delegates to Kirkuk to consult the local Turkophiles, and dispatched envoys even to Karbalā and Najf to enlist support. Refusing the order of the High Commissioner to report himself in Baghdad, he was finally evicted from Sulaymaniya by the bombs of the Royal Air Force and made for temporary refuge at Sardasht with whatever funds and followers he could collect. The vigilance of the Air Force prevented a reoccupation of Sulaymaniya by his bands, and touch was kept with his more reasonable brother Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir. The Jaf and other tribes showed every eagerness to be detached effectively from the orbit of the Sulaymaniya 'Government'.

On the northern frontier the Turks' treatment of their own Kurds was confirming, within the 'Iraq border, Kurdish resistance to their return. Their troop concentrations at Nisibin and Jazira-ibn-'Umar remained alarming, and their occupation of Rawanduz left, while it lasted, a centre for aggressive intrigue within 'Iraq. 563 [66] In the debated land, astride the frontier, Assyrian resettlement had proceeded. Hundreds of their houses had been established in the areas of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, and Zakho. Others had attained their original homes in Tiyari and neighbouring country, and more, seeking to do the same early in 1923, had met the resistance of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Oramar Aghās and returned to 'Amadiya in time to help in repelling Zibari and Turkish attacks on it. 563 The frontier line of the future was still unknown. Some Assyrians were content to stay in new homes in 'Iraq, a few had already returned to Persia, others had proved resolute and successful in regaining their ancestral mountains. All were intensely community-conscious, although the unifying authority of the Mar Sham'un, now resident at Baybad, was sadly weakened. Service in the 'Iraq Levies provided employment for 3,000 to 4,000 Assyrians whose families accompanied them, and whose military prowess under British and Assyrian officers, who were often their own tribal Maliks, was admired. It was the more unfortunate that stories of a vast Greater Assyria to be achieved by French assistance gained credence and helped to poison Assyrian-'Iraqi relations, which the apparent British favour to a foreign and Christian community made anyhow delicate, and which was unassisted by any pretence of Assyrian devotion to Arab and Muslim 'Iraq. A riot in Mosul in August 1923 between Mosulawis and Assyrians was a visible danger-signal; the general 'Iraqi resentment at the arrival of 800 Assyrian refugees from Turkey by way of Syria was another. The warnings of both King Fayṣal and Sir Percy Cox on the need for mutual restraint and discipline did not prevent further animosity, and in May 1924 a petty squabble in Kirkuk bazaar led to a murderous stampede of Assyrian Levy troops there, with great loss of Muslim life and a legacy of bitter anti-Assyrian feeling.

The recovery of Rawanduz from the Turks, by a well-conducted military operation of the 'Iraq Army, the Levies, and the 648x 721 Police in April 1923 marked a stage in the fall of Turkish influence. Sayid Ṭaha of Neri was installed as Qa'immaqam with a garrison of the Levies. The same military column proceeded next to Sulaymaniya where, since the reduction of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty period by the Protocol to four years (p. 148), it was now essential to make early arrangements for this region's future place in the 'Iraq State. Sulaymaniya was entered in mid-May 1923, and the future discussed with Aghās and townsfolk eager for peace and a secure Government; but since no troops, it was alleged, could be maintained there, the authority of the local Council, left in charge by the retiring column, was short-lived. It was possible to transfer outlying districts of Sulaymaniya liwā—Chamchamal, Ḥalabja, Sangau—to the direct care of the Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk, leaving but a narrow area still exposed to the brutal follies of Shaykh Maḥmud; but the latter, heralded by a few days of Hamawand looting, returned in July. Ignoring again the order of the High Commissioner to come to Baghdad, he terrorized the countryside, trespassed into areas now under 'Iraq Government authority,

648 where electoral rolls for the Constituent Assembly were already
721 under preparation, and provoked punitive missions of the Air Force. By autumn, still protesting his devotion to the British Government, he was again in hopeful correspondence with the Turks and, supported by money looted from the tobacco merchants, planned an attack on Kirkuk and collected 'taxes' from the Ḥalabja and Chamchamal villages. So passed the winter of 1923–4.

4. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The signature of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty on 10 October 1922 was followed by further drafting and redrafting, in Baghdad and London, of the promised Organic Law; by the completion, and ultimate signature on 4 March 1924, of the four subsidiary Agreements: and, months before these were ready, by the acceptance of a Protocol to the Treaty itself. The Protocol resulted in part from increased British realization of 'Iraqi sentiment on mandatory matters, but still more from pressure by the press and public of the United Kingdom on its Government—and particularly on Bonar Law, the incoming Prime Minister—to diminish British expenditure and commitments in 'Iraq. It was brought back to Baghdad by Cox from London in March 1923, and signed by himself and 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey on the last day of April. Reducing the Treaty period from twenty to four years, it could not fail of a warm reception by King and politicians alike: only the 'Inglizi' party among the shaykhs and notables, still distrustful of the young Government and fearful of their own rivals, pronounced it a betrayal. The signature of the Protocol, Sir Percy Cox's last act in 'Iraq, was followed on 5 May by his departure. He had, by his intelligence, patience, and benevolent firmness rendered outstanding services to the State. The post of High Commissioner was assumed by no unworthy successor in Sir Henry Dobbs, who had served at Baṣra in the earliest occupation days and returned from India to 'Iraq as Sir Percy's Counsellor late in 1923.

793 The improved atmosphere and the enthusiastic welcome ac-
668 corded to the King on his triumphant tours in both northern and southern 'Iraq availed in no way to conciliate the Shi'i 'Ulamā. Their anti-British fulminations, in which a pro-Turkish element was at times strangely visible, were coupled with a renewal in June 1923 of the anti-election Fatwas. The clash between their policy and their Government's was explicit; and when, late in June, a bazaar episode brought the sons of Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi into conflict with the police, the King was willing to authorize the arrest of both sons and father. Brought to Baṣra, they left the country and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. In Najf

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the bazaars were closed in condemnation of this outrage to the 793
men of learning, a party of whom gathered to withdraw in dudgeon 668
from ungrateful 'Iraq. These proceeded to Karbalā, were deaf to Government reassurances, and with diminished numbers left 'Iraq for Kirmanshah. Here the holy men awaited with complete confidence the results of so striking a gesture. But there were none. Even in the Holy Cities no commotion followed; Sunni observers were delighted; to the Government it was a veritable answer to prayer, and the dutiful protests of the Persian Government fell on deaf ears in Baghdad. A mediating visit to 'Iraq by the British Minister in Teheran was fruitless. Only after a formal approach to the Prime Minister by spokesmen of the 'Ulamā in November 1923, with protestations of a change of heart and policy, were their self-exiled colleagues permitted to return on the condition of abstention from politics henceforward. The main body re-entered 'Iraq in April 1924, still influential but never to regain their old dominion in the country's affairs.

The field thus clear, election machinery could start to operate. 666
Uneasiness among the Kurds and Turkomans of Kirkuk and Arbil at the prospect of 'Arab Government' was calmed by the High Commissioner. Some ambiguity in the legal provisions for tribal representation was cleared up; tribesmen, it was ruled by the Ministry of Justice, could register as ordinary voters in addition to enjoying their specific representation by twenty deputies. So novel a concession to the tribes, for whom Turkish conceptions had provided no voice at all, was obnoxious to the conservatives of Sayid Maḥmud's Free Party, and disrupted it to vanishing-point. The voters of Sulaymaniya liwā, of whom numbers had perforce registered in Kirkuk while their own headquarter town was beyond control, completed their own liwā rolls and could choose their own deputies when in 1924 it was reoccupied (p. 152). By the mid-March of that year the procedure of primary and secondary election was complete.

The Cabinet of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey had by November 1923 645*
reached a stage of *malaise* which presaged the end. It was due to discord with the Shi'i element and to some disagreements with the King. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, who had returned from Geneva to spend a few valuable days as Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, was invited by the King to form the Cabinet which should face the Constituent Assembly. Accepting the charge, he retained two Shi'i ministers including Muḥsin al-Shallash at Finance, brought to Interior 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi (a modern-minded ex-officer who had acted as Mutaṣarrif of Ḥilla), and completed his team with Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, Nuri Sa'id, and the eminent Mosul and Baṣra notables, Sayid Aḥmad al-Fakhri and Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan, in other

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645 Ministries; Sasun Ḥasqayl was omitted for the first time. A State visit by the King to Karbalā and Najf in December was an outstanding success. The substitution in March 1924 of the name of King Ḥusayn, newly self-styled Caliph, for that of the Sultan of Turkey in the Khuṭba when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished, raised the prestige of the royal family, and was accepted with surprising willingness by Sunni and Shi'i alike.

646 The Constituent Assembly was opened with due ceremonial
648* by the King on 27 March 1924. Under the presidency of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey it proceeded to its first task, ratification of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty and its Protocol. A favourable majority seemed assured, and initially was in fact present; but the atmosphere quickly changed. The 'severity' of some of the Treaty conditions, notably those of the Financial Agreement, was emphasized by Opposition orators, and the whole force of anti-Mandate sentiment was rapidly remobilized. Kurdish deputies for their own reasons withdrew from the proceedings; those of Mosul could think of nothing but the danger threatening their wilaya. The tribal shaykhs, moving in a world wholly strange to them, saw and seized the chance of bargaining their support on the Treaty issue for personal or tribal advantages. The nationalist lawyer-politicians, who soon emerged as the most convinced and active element in the Assembly, launched a campaign first of insistence upon major or indeed basic changes in the Treaty, then of vicious intimidation, and finally of actual violence; two pro-Treaty deputies were severely wounded in the streets, others threatened
664] with death. Deliberately fostered terrorism outside the Assembly building itself reached proportions beyond police control, and necessitated the presence of troops to maintain order.

618* The constant efforts of the High Commissioner were devoted, with little success, to exposition of the basic nature of the Treaty and the facts of 'Iraq's situation. He pointed out Great Britain's accepted obligations to the League, and gave assurances of later modification of the Treaty in 'Iraq's favour. A score of interviews between the High Commissioner, the King, the Prime Minister, ministers, Cornwallis, Yasin Pasha, and Opposition leaders produced no formula which could reconcile the 'Waṭanis' to ratification. Dobbs announced finally that 'Iraqi rejection of the Treaty, such as now appeared inevitable, must with all regret be reported to the League Council at its forthcoming meeting, unless ratification had occurred by 10 June; after that date Great Britain must seek means other than a friendly and generous Treaty to fulfil its mandatory functions. From this and from his refusal to bargain or to consider amendments Sir Henry was immovable. Like every preceding day, 10 June was filled with conclaves, submissions, exhortations, refusals. By late afternoon there was no result, and Dobbs categorically refused a twenty-four hour postponement. Before midnight, however, the Prime Minister, Ja'far Pasha, succeeded in convening 69 out of the 100 delegates in the Assembly Hall. Thirty-seven votes for the unamended Treaty were in the end obtained, with 24 in opposition; the 8 abstentions were due, beyond doubt, to intimidation. Acceptance of the Treaty, even ratified in this sadly abnormal manner, was hedged with conditions which Ja'far Pasha found it necessary to specify—that the British Government should honour its reassurances by amending the Financial Agreement in 'Iraq's favour: that the King of 'Iraq should hasten to negotiate with the British Government to this end: and that the whole Treaty should be null and void 'if the British Government fail to safeguard the rights of 'Iraq in the Mosul wilaya in its entirety'. 648x

The stormy days and nights of Treaty ratification were followed in 'Iraq at large by a period of relative peace; a peace in which every anti-Treaty or anti-British element remained dormant but alive. In the Assembly, a peaceful passage of the Organic and the Electoral Laws marked the jaded weariness of deputies.

The Organic Law, a reasonably adequate result of repeated redrafting, endowed 'Iraq with a semi-rigid Constitution which, proclaiming it 'a sovereign State, independent and free' with a constitutional hereditary monarchy and a representative Government, set forth the rights of the people and the Crown, the legislature and the ministers, established the Courts, and regulated financial and administrative responsibilities. The Electoral Law enfranchised every adult male tax-paying 'Iraqi, and provided for a procedure of primary and secondary election, whereby the secondary electors, one for every 250 primary, elected a deputy to represent every 20,000 voters. The deputy must belong to the same electoral circle, consisting of a group of liwās, as the voter. Separate representation was enjoyed by tribesmen and by the Christian and Jewish minority communities of the liwās of Baghdad, Baṣra, and Mosul. 642 666

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly gave Ja'far Pasha the opportunity, which he had been seeking, to resign from the premiership. A new Cabinet was formed on 2 August under Yasin Pasha, to be confronted by pressing questions of the northern frontier and of financial stringency. 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun was called to the Ministry of the Interior, Sasun Ḥasqayl to Finance. To the Ministry of Justice came a young and clever, but unstable and hasty lawyer of good family, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani; and to that of Communications and Works an imposing and not incompetent younger member of the Pachachi house, Muzaḥim Bey. 645*

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 Education was entrusted to a learned Shi'i politician, Muhammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, and Awqaf to a venerable ex-Shaykh al-Islam lately returned from Istanbul, Ibrahim Effendi al-Ḥaydari. The Prime Minister held the portfolio of Defence, and with it that of a new Ministry which he created as a timely gesture, that of Foreign Affairs. Nuri Pasha Sa'id became deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, of which the King was titular head.

648* The British Government submitted to the Council of the League on 17 July an Instrument embodying the terms of all the documents now ratified as between itself and 'Iraq. This was adopted on 27 September 1924, in terms which provided for the submission of an annual Report by Great Britain to the Council on its 'Iraq trusteeship: for the assumption by His Majesty's Government of full responsibility for the carrying out of the Treaty: and for abstention from all modification of it by the British or by 'Iraq without League of Nations consent. The Treaty was ratified by King George on 10 November, and by King Fayṣal on 12 December 1924.

5. THE MOSUL SETTLEMENT

635 In the liwā of Sulaymaniya, far from the stresses of Baghdad State-building, the régime of 'Kurdish Government' under Shaykh Maḥmud, which had ruined the countryside and depopulated the town, was by the spring of 1924 drawing to its close. The Chamchamal and Ḥalabja qadhās, now loosely administered from Kirkuk, elected to the Constituent Assembly deputies who included Shaykh Maḥmud's own brother; but the Shaykh himself, after ignoring one more ultimatum and a warning of impending punishment—the warning which was invariably given, on humanitarian grounds, to the people of all villages where as a last resort bombing was to take place—was visited by aircraft of the Royal Air Force in May 1924 and was finally evicted from the town. Sulaymaniya was entered in July by ground troops, cavalry of the 'Iraq Army, and a force of Levies. The administration was thenceforward assumed by the 'Iraq Government, which provided funds to remedy the miserable conditions prevailing. The population of the almost uninhabited city could return with infinite relief to their homes, and by the end of the year had increased to 20,000. Shaykh Maḥmud, skulking in the mountain villages and crossing to and from Persian territory, maintained the hunted existence of a bandit.

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721 On the northern frontier the re-establishment in their old mountain homes of some thousands of returning Assyrians was to lead to trouble after two years of peaceful resettlement. The district concerned lay just north of the old wilaya frontier, but

within the area now claimed by the British Government for 'Iraq 563 as an indispensable safeguard for Assyrian resettlement. The provocative 721 arrest and release by Assyrians of the Turkish Wali of Julamark, while visiting Chal in July 1924, abruptly embittered trans-frontier feeling. It was followed by the advance of considerable and long-prepared Turkish forces across the Hazil river into 'Iraq. They were evicted for the moment by Air Force action, helped by Assyrian irregulars gallantly mustered and led—but only to sweep back to attack and burn Assyrian villages and 'Iraqi police posts. Assyrian settlers, to a number of some 8,000 and largely destitute, were driven from their homes to seek safety around 'Amadiya. Neither the usual exchange of protests nor the debates of Geneva could prevent reprisals and repetitions, which achieved all too thoroughly the devastation of Kurdish as well as Assyrian areas of the frontier. Relief work and ultimately house-by-house [657] resettlement, with Government help and taxation remissions for settlers, were provided in 'Iraq for the hapless refugees.

In Geneva the 30th Session of the League Council listened on 648K and after 20 September to the now familiar arguments of the Turkish and British spokesmen, Fathi Bey and Lord Parmoor. The same historical, ethnological, economic, strategic, and political claims were advanced, to meet the same rebuttals and counter-claims. No line of agreement or compromise appeared. The decision accepted in the end by both sides provided for the mission to Mosul of a League Commission of Inquiry, whose verdict, if endorsed by the Council, was to be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile telegrams reaching Geneva and containing mutual charges of frontier violation compelled the establishment of an interim frontier line. This was fixed at a meeting held at Brussels on 29 October, to be known thenceforward as the 'Brussels Line'. It ran somewhat to the south of the alignment claimed by Great Britain, and thereby excluded some Assyrian areas; nevertheless, it was destined to form, scarcely amended, the permanent national frontier.

The Mosul Commission consisted of M. de Wirsen, a Swedish diplomat, as President, and as members Count Teleki, a former Prime Minister of Hungary and distinguished jurist and geographer, and Colonel Paulis, a retired officer of the Belgian Army. After visiting Istanbul and London it arrived in Baghdad in mid-January 1925, and was there joined by its secretariat, by assessors from both sides and—to the dismay of 'Iraqis and British—by two renegade ex-'Iraqis in the guise of Turkish experts, one a Kirkukli of the Naftchi family, the other a brother-in-law of Shaykh Mahmud.

The Commission and its assessors and staff spent some days in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 Baghdad, interviewing leading citizens and distracted by foolish and provocative demonstrations. In Mosul, their next stopping place, popular feeling ran high. Police protection was offered to the Commissioners, but refused. The maintenance of public order, threatened by the emotions of an excited and demonstrative population, of many heterogeneous elements and predilections, was difficult. Much of the Commission's inquiry was held in secret. Witnesses, often self-contradictory in their replies to questions, were in some cases reluctant to speak or, fearing reprisals, would speak to the Commissioners only in strict privacy; in others, appeared to be largely animated by personal ambitions or animosities; in others again, were little appreciative of the alternatives involved. Some were influenced by racial, others by tribal, others by economic considerations, and many evidently by personal frustrations or by the aspiration not for a better but for an ineffective government. The Commission passed in all two months in the disputed wilaya, and spent themselves freely in painstaking and discreet inquiry from every source and class.

The Report, a creditable and enlightening document, was handed to the Council of the League in July 1925, and debated in the first days of September. The Commissioners dismissed the possibility of partition of the wilaya. They reviewed the racial content of the disputed area, accepting generally, though not without reserve, the facts and figures proffered by the British. They found that economic considerations on the whole bound Mosul to 'Iraq. They approved the Brussels Line as being strategically tenable, and, to the dismay of Assyrian well-wishers, disallowed the claim to attach part of the Ḥakkari territory to Mosul. They described conditions in 'Iraq as still unstable, in spite of progress made under the mandated Government, rejected the claim to possession founded upon right of conquest or upon international law: but admitted finally that the bulk of the inhabitants appeared to favour inclusion in 'Iraq as at present constituted and governed, rather than return to Turkey. The Commission's recommendation was, therefore, for the continued union with 'Iraq of the whole territory south of the Brussels Line, on two conditions: the one, 563 that 'Iraq should remain under Mandate for twenty-five years, the other that the racial distinctness and self-consciousness of the Kurds should be recognized by the official use of their own language and by the employment of Kurds in the Kurdish qadhās as administrators, judges, and teachers.

The Turkish representatives at Geneva, hotly nationalist and self-confident, and unimpressed by the Commissioners' facts or judgments, rejected the Report *in toto*, withdrew their promise to accept it as binding if approved by the Council of the League, and

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questioned the status of the Commission itself. An urgent request was addressed, therefore, to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague on 19 September, to pronounce whether the Report, after approval, ought to be considered as an act merely of mediation, or as a recommendation, or as an award. The Turks refused to attend the Court, which met a month later, but were willing to provide documents and to reply to questions. The Court ruled on 21 November that the decision to be taken by the Council would be a binding award and would definitely determine the Mosul frontier, provided that, except for the votes of the interested parties, it be unanimous.

While the International Court still sat, complaints of serious violation of the *status quo* reached Europe from the area intersected by the Brussels Line. An Esthonian officer, General F. Laidoner, was appointed by the Council of the League to proceed to the spot with a small staff—a Czechoslovak and a Spaniard—and from there urgently to report. He spent the month of November 1925 in investigation, always south of the Line since the Turks refused all access north of it. Most of the violations reported were, it appeared, trivial or normal episodes; but north of the Line gross abuses on the part of the Turkish soldiery were confirmed, followed or accompanied by wholesale deportations of Christian villagers, thousands of whom had staggered into 'Iraq. The Laidoner Report describing these outrages was laid before the Council on 10 December, and could not fail powerfully to affect it.

The Turkish representative, Munir Bey, continued to treat the Council's decision, yet to be made, as a mere recommendation which his Government would at best consider. Meanwhile, he claimed Mosul to be still held by law under Turkish sovereignty, and bound so to remain until this was renounced. Meetings of the Council and of its *ad hoc* sub-committee went on, in the absence, at times, of the Turkish spokesmen. On 16 December a specific resolution was submitted and unanimously adopted. It provided for confirmation of the Brussels Line, and for the submission by Great Britain within six months, first of a new Anglo-'Iraq Treaty with a duration of twenty-five years (unless 'Iraq should earlier become a League member), and secondly of proposals to carry out the Commission's recommendations for specially adapted forms of Kurdish administration. This resolution ended the task of the League of Nations in connexion with the Mosul dispute, and became its final decision under Article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty.

The verdict was received in 'Iraq with a profound satisfaction, which, as do few issues in 'Iraq, united all classes and elements of opinion. It was beyond question a wise and just decision, and an instructive example of international co-operation for the settling of

1z Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

disputes. To all who were cognisant of the distribution, characteristics, and interests of the races and communities within the wilaya, and the progress made in the past six years in administration and economics, the alternative of handing the territory back from a comparatively liberal 'Iraqi or Anglo-'Iraqi orbit of Government to the rancorous and rigorously centralizing Turkish Government of the time had appeared intolerable, and might well, if adopted, have disrupted the 'Iraq State.

Action in 'Iraq to implement the decision was taken with all speed. Ministers were instructed by the Prime Minister (himself half-Kurd) to effect in full the policy of distinguishing Kurdish from Arab areas by the appointment thereto of Kurdish officials in all departments. The new Treaty with Great Britain, passed by Parliament on 19 January 1926, not without the bitter resentment of Yasin Pasha and his People's Party at the longer period of tutelage, provided for 'active consideration' by the Mandatary in 1928, and thereafter at four-yearly intervals up to the end of the twenty-five year period, of the possibility of recommending 'Iraq for admission to the League, which would end its mandated status. It provided also for revising 'on account of the progress made by the Kingdom of 'Iraq or for any other reason' the provisions of the much criticized subsidiary Agreements.

It remained for the British Government to secure what Geneva had failed to gain, the agreement and co-operation of the Turkish Republic. The Mosul decision was hailed there with a savage outburst in the press, with which Muṣṭafā Kamal did not hesitate to identify himself. Even the idea of war between Turkey and Great Britain was not ignored by his Supreme Military Council when it met at Ankara on Christmas Day 1925. But less disastrous Councils prevailed; they were induced by the conciliatory influence of Rushdi Bey and of the British Ambassador, and indeed by prevailing conditions in Turkey itself. On 18 July 1926 the Republic ratified a tripartite Anglo-Turkish-'Iraqi Treaty whereby the Brussels Line was accepted as the frontier of 'Iraq and Turkey. A policy of good relations athwart a neutralized frontier, with a permanent Frontier Commission to maintain them, was adopted. 'Iraq at the same time undertook to pay to its neighbour, for twenty-five years, a tenth part of whatever royalties it might obtain from its oil deposits, if these should be found to exist. The Mosul Question was at an end.

Conditions in the Kurdish areas of the wilaya itself in 1925 and early 1926 were more peaceful than for some years past. In Sulaymaniya liwā the opening of communications and the construction of police posts and blockhouses restricted the movements of Shaykh Maḥmud and his outlaws. 'Iraq Army and Police action

kept him from trespassing into Halabja and other 'Iraq-administered 648x
districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to
secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in
robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to
maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no
direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended
by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern 563
frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's
visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from 167
Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which 657
the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 563
'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising 631
and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an 185
elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army, Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 563
still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least 657
passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to 166

563 657 166 Turkey. The frontier was now established, and the impossibility of settlement in their old homes was cruelly manifest. Schemes for the establishment of the Assyrians in Canada or elsewhere overseas had been considered in London, and abandoned. In spite of 'Iraqi frowns at the self-conscious, ever discontented, and hardly manageable community, it seemed that they must settle in 'Iraq or nowhere. The surviving community of some 20,000 souls could never be concentrated in a single enclave, since 'Iraq afforded none which was sufficient, cultivable, and unoccupied. Hundreds of households of the Baz and Jelu clans had dispersed over the Mosul plain, the upper Tiyari and Takhuma in Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, the lower Tiyari around Barwari Bala. It was hoped next to find room for a thousand households in the Baradost area of Rawanduz qadhā, and for more again in Barwari Zayr. Money was collected in England to assist them, seed and cattle were supplied. Pay earned in the Levies kept many families together; but the preservation of their communal identity, their pride of religion and tradition must devolve upon themselves, as it had devolved for so long on others of the Christian minorities in 'Iraq.

6. THE OTHER NEIGHBOURS

648* The relations of 'Iraq with its eastern neighbour were unsatisfactory; with persistent Persian denial of recognition of the new Kingdom, and with habitual bickering across a thousand-mile open frontier, they could not be otherwise. They grew worse with the controversy arising from the self-exile from 'Iraq of the Persian Mujtahids in 1923 (p. 149), and so persisted after their return next year and after the reopening in 1925 of the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Cities, in its new railway-borne fashion. They were not improved by the frontier tergiversations of Simko and the Persian Kurds, nor by quarrels, reminiscent of the days before 1914, between Persian and Baṣrawi Customs authorities on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab: nor by the relations of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh with the Bani Lam, though these improved in 1924: nor by the perennial squabble over the Mandali water.

The supersession of the effete Qajar dynasty of Persia in the last days of 1924 by the virile but savage and uneducated adventurer and autocrat Ridhā Shah Pahlavi at once revolutionized Persian public life in every region, and closely affected its neighbours. The lord of Pusht-i-Kuh, after a panic flight to 'Iraq, returned home to make the best terms he could with the rigidly centralizing dictator. The Shaykh of Muḥammara, Khaz'al Khan, so long the close friend of the British and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, unwisely failed to adapt himself to the new exigencies, and quarrelled with the Persian Government in conditions which gave the British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Government no ground even for diplomatic representations; he rebelled feebly, only to be crushed, superseded, and removed to Teheran. After an abortive uprising by the local Arab tribesmen—Cha'ab and Muḥaysin—and the usual sequence of protests and counter-protests between Baghdad and Teheran, 'Arabistan—henceforward Khuzistan—became a normal province of Persia. 648

Minor cross-frontier raiding was thereafter settled normally between the nearest officials of the two States. More serious trouble in the areas of Khaniqin and Qaṣr-i-Shirin late in 1925 was composed by a more formal joint meeting in March 1926. A hopeful sign of co-operation was the Persian request (conveyed, as was habitual, through the British Minister in Teheran and High Commissioner in Baghdad) for 'Iraqi help in establishing a new trade route from the Kirkuk railhead to Tabriz. It was necessitated by the Kurdish rebellion in eastern Anatolia, and would involve a mountain road by way of Ṣawj Bulaq and Rawanduz. The 'Iraq Government began its surveys and ordered bridging material from Europe. Farther south, an old disturber of the peace reappeared, Salar al-Dawla. This unbalanced but persistent royal pretender, basing new hopes on the change of dynasty, entered and crossed 'Iraq disguised in the spring of 1925, made for his old haunts in the Kirmanshah province, and sought to raise the Persian Kurdish tribesmen once again to his threadbare standard. The outlaw band of Shaykh Maḥmud was the first to join him, but they had few imitators. The High Commissioner was able by messages to dissuade all but a handful from so hopeless an enterprise, and the Air Officer Commanding flew to concert plans with the Persians at Teheran to prevent a rising. It lacked all serious support, and Salar al-Dawla retired to Syria. But in August 1926 he returned, again reached the Hawraman area, and raised some force of hungry riff-raff which looted a few villages before dispersing. No other help was forthcoming. The Prince re-entered 'Iraq in disguise, was recognized and arrested at Arbil, and was detained at Baghdad while his disposal was considered. [499 653]

Towards Syria the attitude of the 'Iraqi political public was one of resentment against the French Mandatary; it led to sympathy for all Syrian nationalists and for such rebels against the régime as the Druz in 1925, but it was certainly without ideas, such as have been sometimes ascribed to King Fayṣal, of armed intervention. Syrian doctors and teachers were employed in 'Iraq, and Syrians were well represented on the King's personal staff. The reopening of the routes from 'Iraq, whether by Euphrates-side to Dayr al-Zur or across the Jazira from Mosul, was a desideratum which led to a series of conferences at Mosul, Dayr, al-Qa'im, and Albu Kamal between 'Iraqi and Syrian, French and British representatives from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 1921 to 1924. These were in effect successful in reopening the routes, with fair security, and in composing a part of the age-long feuds of the 'Amarat, 'Uqaydat, and Dulaym. Within 'Iraq responsibility was fixed on the Dulaym villages, under the supervision of Shaykh 'Ali Sulayman and patrols of the Dulaym Camel Corps. In safeguarding the Nairn route (p. 172), from the autumn of 1923 onwards, full French co-operation was enjoyed, though the events of 1925 found them powerless to keep order. A transit-trade agreement made in 1925 regulated the commerce of the new route. Mutual assistance over anti-locust measures was ensured in and after 1926.

648-721 The least favourable feature of 'Iraqi-Syrian relations was the continued lack of an agreed frontier, since the impracticable boundary of 1920, still nominally in force, was in fact necessarily ignored. Worse than this was the persistent tribal raiding. Ṭai and Yazidi, Dulaym and 'Uqaydat mutual offensives were frequent; but the most conspicuous offender was Daḥam al-Hadi, a dissident shaykh of the Shammar who, at feud with 'Ajil al-Yawar the 'Iraqi-recognized paramount chief, had moved into Syria and from there raided both the main body of the Shammar and the 'Amarat of ibn Hadhdhal. It proved impossible in 1925 to arrange a tribal conference—the decisions of the Albu Kamal meeting of 1924 had not yet been honoured; and in the year following a major raid by Daḥam was repelled by combined action of 'Ajil, the Royal Air Force, and a squadron of armoured cars. 'Ajil pursued his fleeing rival, looted his flocks, and was in turn repaid by the continuance of guerrilla warfare, with no end in sight.

The hope of good-neighbourly relations between 'Iraq and Najd was long to be disappointed. The Hashimite monarchy in 'Iraq and the resulting 'Iraqi sympathies could not be cordial to a Sultan of Najd who was both Wahhabi by religion and hostile to King Ḥusayn and the house of Hashim to the point, ultimately, of war and triumph over them. These elements could perhaps be palliated by diplomacy; but to impose peace on the tribesmen in their deserts was far more difficult. A major raid by the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish of the Muṭayr, and his allies on the Abu al-Ghar post and the Muntafiq shepherds in March 1922 was repelled by Air Force action; but in spite of ibn Sa'ud's apology and the chastisement of Ḥumud al-Suwayṭ of the Dhafir, it added to the alarm felt in 'Iraq, which in turn was exploited for internal political purposes. A result was the assembly of a conference between the two States at Muḥammara. This succeeded on 1 May 1922 in drafting a Treaty which was signed by representatives of both. It laid down the principles of tribal allegiance, assigned the Muntafiq, Dhafir, and 'Amarat to 'Iraq, provided for a later Commission to define the ownership of border wells, and agreed on means for 648 the prevention of raids and safeguarding of pilgrim routes. The 721 detailed provisions thereafter agreed were embodied in a Protocol signed at 'Ujayr ('Uqayr) on 2 December 1922. This provided for the first time an 'Iraq–Najd frontier intended to be definite, with a Neutral Zone for shared grazing rights.

But these improved relations did not endure. The Najdi refugees in 'Iraq continued to provoke reprisals by raiding into Najd, an inveterate habit which no Governmental action could correct. To practise it with complete irresponsibility, and to ignore both territorial boundaries and would-be superior authority, was a part of the desert way of life which no new age had yet amended. After the failure of British efforts to assemble a conference of the two rulers themselves, a meeting of 'Iraqi and Najdi spokesmen at last met at Kuwayt, under a British chairman, in December 1923. It proved powerless to reconcile differences, adjourned, resumed its debates, and still failed to agree; and its last hopes were dissipated by a raid on the 'Iraqi tribes on the fullest scale by ibn Dawish in March 1924. The death-roll of tribesmen approached 200, the looted animals 30,000. The aggression was repeated on a lesser scale by another two months later, by two more in December, and yet another in January 1925. At the same time the prestige of ibn Sa'ud had been greatly enhanced by his victories in the Ḥijaz, which were to end in the elimination there of the Sharifian monarchy and a Wahhabi guardianship of the two Holy Places.

But better times on the frontier lay ahead. A garrison of the 'Iraq Army, with armoured cars and wireless, moved out to the desert post of Abu al-Ghar. Air reconnaissance was provided. In May 1925 the provocative refugee tribes were moved into the 'Iraq hinterland farther from temptation, and others who would follow them into 'Iraq were turned back. An Ikhwan raid on the D͟hafir in June was declared to be contrary to the orders of ibn Sa'ud, then busy in the Ḥijaz. British representatives on behalf of 'Iraq took council with Sa'udi delegates at Baḥra in the Ḥijaz, and a Treaty was signed on 1 November at that village. Sir Gilbert Clayton who negotiated it, visited Baghdad and explained the agreement in person to the King and Cabinet, by whom it was approved. If implemented with intelligence and goodwill, its provisions could cover reasonably, it seemed, the problems of mutual raiding, compensation, trans-frontier migration, exchange of information, and the channels of official communication. The extradition of tribal offenders was not agreed.

The Baḥra treaty did much for 'Iraqi-Najd relations, but could not avail to stop all inter-territorial raiding. Caravans between the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x 721 Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1931–6

642 186 These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a naḥiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-
642 178 twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroitness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

644 There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Ḥaydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners simi-
648x larly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic
Loss

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[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

loss. In the 'Iraq Government service 'Iraqis of goodwill and 647 sometimes of admirable gifts—not unmixed, inevitably, with 663 others of less ability or less integrity—were found to fill the higher as well as lower positions in provincial and central government. The body of British officials, mainly advisory but in a few cases still executive, included some figures of outstanding merit—and many who offered years, twenty or more, of quiet efficient service to 'Iraq.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its portfolio held always in the 648x early period by the Prime Minister himself, was the creation of Yasin Pasha in 1925. Under the overriding responsibility of Great Britain to the League for the fulfilment of 'Iraqi international obligations, the Ministry could have but limited scope. It was at first represented only in London, and intermittently at Geneva, by Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari. Foreign Consuls, however, began early to be posted to Baghdad, where their presence implied recognition of the 'Iraq State by France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Greece. The 'Iraq Government as such subscribed to various international conventions. Persia, though represented in 'Iraq by a number of Consuls and bound to it by the closest interests, withheld official recognition of the Kingdom, to the damage of both.

Successive Cabinets up to that of Yasin Pasha in 1924 have been 645* elsewhere mentioned. Yasin's was a Ministry of all the talents, and since no alternative programmes backed by parties existed in the 'Iraq politics of the time, it like others must fall or survive by virtue of its own unanimity and the royal approval, or lack of these. Its months of power were marked by preoccupation with 652 the politics of the Mosul Question, and by the frustrations of an empty Treasury. This poverty, the common misfortune of nascent Governments, was accentuated in the 'Iraq of 1925 by depressed trade conditions, the loss of part of the date market, the diminished Persian transit trade, and the bad harvest and low revenue of the year; and the times called insistently for more, not less, expenditure. It was necessary to find funds for an Army now under formation and soon to be called to vital responsibilities: for the acquisition of assets from the British Government, which itself was in no mood for munificent gestures: for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, of which a substantial fraction devolved upon 'Iraq: and for public services conceived on a scale reputed the minimum tolerable, but still far in advance of financial capacity. The arithmetical impossibilities thus involved led to the advent by invitation in March 1924 of a financial mission from Whitehall, consisting of Commander E. Hilton-Young and R. V. Vernon. The mission studied and reviewed, advocated limited economies, strove to palliate the resented blow of Public Debt obligations, and

1-[1921-26--Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 recommended higher Customs-duty rates. A large part of its suggestions, especially as regards new taxation and reorganization, was not adopted. The 'Iraq Government was destined, indeed, to remain solvent but impecunious for years to come. The country was visited in the same period by Cabinet Ministers from England, Mr. L. S. Amery and Sir Samuel Hoare.

*645 The Hashimi Ministry, the last to govern without a Parliament, served with valuable results for a year. Among other measures it legislated for the Fao bar-dredging scheme, the 1925 oil concessions, a trade agreement with Syria, and the regularization of the position of British officials. Promulgation of the Organic Law was postponed from July 1924 to March 1925, to permit the preparation of election rolls, a lengthy and difficult task, and the liquidation of the Mosul Question before the new régime, awaited as a great stride forward from mere Cabinet government, was attempted. Preparations for the assembly of Parliament in Extraordinary Session (since an Ordinary Session could open only in November) were completed by late June 1925, and a change of Ministry due to differences between Yasin Pasha and his Minister of Interior, 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, gave to a new Government the task of inaugurating the parliamentary régime.

The premiership was entrusted to 'Abd al-Muḥsin. His Ministry included Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, the shrewd cosmopolitan lawyer Ra'uf al-Chadirchi for a short period, Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, the worthy Shi'i 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, Naji al-Suwaydi, Ḥikmat Sulayman (younger brother of the Turkish General Maḥmud Shawkat Pasha), the keen nationalist Ḥamdi al-Pachachi, and by later substitution Nuri Sa'id and the Kurdish artillery officer and writer, Muḥammad Amin Zaki. The elections completed, and the twenty senators duly appointed by the King, Parliament was opened with ceremony on 16 July 1925. The selection of Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani as President of the Chamber brought Ḥikmat Sulayman to his place in Interior. The veteran nationalist Yusif al-Suwaydi, father of Naji and Tawfiq, became President of the Senate.

646 Parliamentary government, in the procedures of which the British had no part, began creditably. The standard of debate was respectable, the Opposition, headed by Yasin Pasha, not immoderate. The life of Parliament in this its first session was twice prolonged, and lasted until June 1926. It dealt with a heavy programme of legislation, including a first amendment to the Organic Law designed to provide for a possible Regency and for extraordinary sittings. The budget was adopted and passed. An altercation in the Chamber led to the retirement from the Presidency of Rashid 'Āli, to be succeeded by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The latter's place in Interior was taken by the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

wise and moderate 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab. By the summer of 646
1926 the routine of parliamentary procedure was established; but
it was already clear that the backwardness of the electorate, and the
freely used power of the Government to secure the election of
deputies of its own choice, could not but preclude any early
possibility of genuine democracy.

The Administration, on lines half inherited from the Turks and 645
half established by the British, had well begun. With many short- 63
comings and omissions it operated already more widely and more 647
effectively than had any Turkish Government, and aimed at a
superior standard of service. In Baghdad the departments under
each Ministry improved their organization, sifted their staffs,
advanced towards complete 'Iraqi control. By 1926 not only were
all Ministries in effective 'Iraqi control but most of the larger
departments had been handed to 'Iraqi directors, notably those of
Health, Education, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Govern-
ment Accounts, Police, Prisons, the Census; those of Irrigation,
Tapu, Customs, Revenue and State Domains, Veterinary services,
Public Works, the Port of Baṣra, and 'Iraq Railways remained for
a further period under British executive control. In the provinces,
new qadhās and nahiyas were formed or regrouped. The position
of the British 'Administrative Inspectorate' was satisfactorily de-
fined by law. A Standing Board selected 'Iraqi officials for higher
posts, and the formation of a regulated civil service on modern
lines was taken in hand. The Ministry of Finance, where R. V.
Vernon assumed the Advisership in 1925 after an interregnum
under L. M. Swan, had developed and specialized its organization,
reduced its non-'Iraqi staff to a minimum, and founded a Finance
Inspectorate. The post of Auditor-General, reporting to the
Cabinet direct, was created in 1924 and held by J. Parlby, who had
worked in 'Iraqi finances since 1917. The Advisership of Com-
munications and Works was held by Wheatley until the arrival of
L. E. Bury in 1925, and again after the latter's departure three
years later. In Interior, Cornwallis was assisted by a senior mem-
ber of his Administrative Inspectorate—Pulley, Wilson, or Ed-
monds—and by one or more juniors.

The Courts offered justice and accessibility to an extent far 692
superior to that of alien and corrupt Ottoman tribunals; during
these years both civil and criminal courts multiplied at liwā and
qadhā headquarters as need declared itself, and the statistics of
cases heard showed an increasing recourse to law. Civil jurisdiction
lay with the Peace Courts of the Qadhis—who after 1923 included
Shi'i Qadhis—and junior judges, the Courts of First Instance at
three or four liwā headquarters, and a single Court of Appeal and
Cassation, with a British President, at Baghdad. This President

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

692 was H. F. Forbes, I.C.S., in 1920–1, B. H. Bell in 1921–2, and thereafter G. Alexander until 1934. Davidson on transfer to the staff of the High Commission handed the Advisership of Justice in [671] 1922 to E. M. Drower, who held it till 1946. The Turkish Majalla, Code of Civil Procedure, and Commercial and Maritime Codes remained in force. Criminal justice was in the hands of single magistrates with first, second or third-class powers, and Courts of Sessions which possessed also appeal jurisdiction, while limited magisterial powers were still possessed by certain administrative officials and municipal bodies. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, beloved of administrative officials but disliked by the legally-minded. The rights of foreigners, preferential though no longer Capitulatory, were defined in the Judicial Agreement. 693 Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a Bar Association for the body of excitable, ill-disciplined advocates, into whose numbers the Law School poured annual recruits.

701 The forces of law and order were at this period four in number: the 'Iraq Army, British forces of ground and air, the 'Iraq Levies, and the Police. The 'Iraq Army, based on voluntary recruitment from 1921 onwards and within its limits conceived on the most modern lines, by 1925 rose in strength to 7,500 men. It remained constant at about this establishment for the next eight years. There were six infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, two mountain and one field battery, and all necessary services. The officers had almost all served in the Turkish Army, but in the lower ranks at least were adaptable to new standards. Units of the Army took part in many small operations against tribal enemies and saw more serious service in Kurdistan, not without losses. Great attention was paid to its Training Centre and its Royal Military College. The British Military Mission was re-formed and increased in 1925.[1] By this date the Army's rôle of successor, for all ground purposes, of the British forces was clearly indicated. 000 The latter were progressively reduced, actually to vanishing point in 1929. In March 1921 there were 33 infantry battalions, 6 cavalry regiments, 16 batteries, and Sapper and armoured-car companies: these by 1926 were reduced to three battalions, two by 1927, one by 1928, and vanished entirely in 1929. The British military element, so characteristic of 'Iraq under the Occupation, was thenceforward to be absent until 1941. The Royal Air Force—under successive commanders of high rank, nearly all of whom were

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[1] Successive heads of the British Military Mission, and Advisers to the Ministry of Defence, were: Colonel P. Joyce, 1921; Major-General A. C. Daly, 1925; Major-General G. G. Loch, 1928; Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, 1931; Major-General C. J. Bruce-Hay, 1934; Major-General H. W. M. Watson, 1937; Major-General G. G. Waterhouse, 1938; Major-General D. G. Bromilow, 1941; Major-General J. M. L. Renton, 1944.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

destined to attain fame in the Second World War—remained to 600 render invaluable help to the 'Iraqi authorities on many occasions. These willing services, and the personalities of the Air Officers Commanding,[1] were largely invisible to, and unthanked by, the 'Iraq public. The strength rose from four squadrons in 1921 to six and then eight in the period 1922 to 1926, then was reduced again to five and to four squadrons in 1928 and 1930. Their most fre- 701 quent collaboration was with the Levies.

This latter force which, with changes of location and organization since its scattered early beginnings, had shown remarkable steadfastness in the dark days of 1920, took its place early in 1922 as a British-paid and British-commanded force[2] at the disposal, for all purposes helpful to the 'Iraqi authorities, of the General Officer (later Air Officer) Commanding. Late in 1922 the Levies contained three cavalry regiments, two Kurdish and one Assyrian; one Kurdish, two Assyrian and marsh-Arab infantry battalions, and an Assyrian pack-battery. The total strength of the force was some 7,500, its officers British, Arab, Assyrian, and Kurdish, its record already creditable in tribal and mountain war, and its value obvious as a relief for outgoing British garrisons in northern 'Iraq. It was unfortunate that, through differences of loyalty and character, feeling between the Assyrian element in the Levies, which became largely predominant in its later years, and the 'Iraqi authorities was never cordial. But their services to 'Iraq were in fact valuable and respected, and the economic advantage of Levy service to the Assyrian community was important.

The 'Iraq Police grew during these years into a force generally 625 admired for their high efficiency and good morale. Everywhere under 'Iraqi executive command, assisted and inspected by Prescott and his excellent officers, they were well selected, equipped, trained, and officered; and though crime might still occur almost unchecked in outlying tribes, the Police assumed the duties of the old Shabana, penetrated more deeply than ever before into rural districts, patrolled the routes, supported administrative officials, and collaborated on active service with the military. Specially adapted forces, camel-riding or equipped with armoured cars as need dictated, were organized for desert work in the Jazira, the

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[1] The commanders of British forces in 'Iraq from 1922, when Royal Air Force was substituted for Army command, until the Second World War were: Air Vice-Marshals Sir J. Salmond, 1922; Sir F. A. Higgins, 1925; Sir E. L. Ellington, 1927; Sir R. Brooke-Popham, 1929; E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt, 1931; C. S. Burnett, 1933; W. G. S. Mitchell, 1935; C. L. Courtney, 1937; J. H. S. Tyssen, 1939; H. G. Smart, 1940.

[2] Successive commanders of the Levies, from their first organization as a single formation, were: Major C. A. Boyle, 1920; Colonel-Commandant G. R. Frith, 1921; Brigadier-General L. W. de V. Sadleir-Jackson, 1921; Colonel H. T. Dobbin, 1922; Brigadier J. G. Browne, 1926.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investiga-
tion, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great pro-
697 gress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-
'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its develop-
ment by poverty. This limited the activities both of the munici-
palities and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
291 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and pro-
fessional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was trans-
185 formed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public build-
366 ings, and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-'Aṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dis-
pensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources com-
pared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor pro-
jects for which local pride was clamoring.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administration 361 was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and 185 a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old 632 abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans [3/23] were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise.

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and 871 showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way 658 haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Baṣra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed-Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeological 172 wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

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In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

1z Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal
Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the
British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of 'Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group,
651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an
ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving
the construction of the Ḥabbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and
a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable
success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton
Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards
called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist
nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale
which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method,
came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated
in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable
harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness,
654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small
Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with
231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it
could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi
flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual
losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility
of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship
494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay
in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in
mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The
mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased
threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars
plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying
repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much
491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by
Ramadi and Ruṭba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated
in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters
was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's
foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian)
competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the
victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The
Ruṭba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in
the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year
thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through
205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails
by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services
superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi
administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive
and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

reconstructed, offices multiplied, and a mid-desert wireless-station 206
was installed at Ruṭba.[6]

Tigris river navigation did not, and was unlikely to, exceed 505
substantially its pre-1914 scale. The pace was slow, navigation
difficult and the Railway in powerful rivalry. The 'Euphrates and
Tigris' fleet, managed by 'Mespers', still handled the bulk of the
traffic, with its three ancient and two modern paddle-steamers
(p. 111). These were increased in 1924 by the acquisition of two
stern-wheelers, the *Kadri* and the *Ihsan* both built in 1918, and of
the 1908-built *Baghdad*, originally owned by the Idara Nahriya.
These three had belonged to the long-established Khudhayri
company which was absorbed by 'Euphrates and Tigris' in 1924.
A few other Khudhayri boats remained in commission, and the
Royal Air Force maintained both the Inland Water Transport
dockyard at Baṣra and a few vessels for their own supplies. The 504
Port of Baṣra, administered by J. C. Ward as Port Director under
the Finance Ministry of the 'Iraq Government since 1920, was
still in 1926 owned by the British Government pending completion
of capital repayment by instalments and the creation of a Port
Trust. From 1922 onwards the Port was organized on a permanent
and self-supporting peace-time basis and supplied all normal
facilities both for 'Iraqi trade and for the oil-tanker fleet of Abadan.
In 1923 it undertook, by a loan from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,
the dredging of a deep channel through the Fao bar which
before 1920 was impassable at high water by any ship drawing
more than 20 feet. The agreement provided for a channel of
28-foot depth at high water and 300-foot width, and 12 miles long.
Work began in 1924, and the Rooka Channel of these dimensions
was opened for traffic in 1926.

The status of 'Iraq Railways, directed by J. R. Tainsh since 1921, 496
was similar to that of the Port: they were British-owned and after
1923 'Iraqi-administered with the aid of British executives and
technicians, in anticipation of future purchase and adjustment.
The Baṣra–Baghdad line was reopened in April 1921, and thereafter
a Musaiyib–Karbalā extension, a line from Mafraq to the
Hindiya Barrage and spurs giving access to Khaniqin and to
Baṣra city were completed between 1921 and 1924. The Kut–Baghdad
line, the Jabal Sanam quarry line south of Zubayr, and
that from near Khaniqin to the Persian frontier at Tiaruq (Qurait)
were closed in the same period. Permanent bridges were built
in 1924 and 1925 at the Euphrates crossings and an extension
from the Khaniqin line across the Diyalā to Kifri and Kirkuk
was finished in 1925. The main workshops were brought from
Shu'ayba to Shalchiya, in the western outskirts of Baghdad, in the
same year. The Tigris wagon-ferry link at Baghdad between the

1-[1920-25--Analyst

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

496 two-metre-gauge systems (Baghdad–Baṣra and Baghdad–Kirkuk) remained a source of delay and trouble, and the floods of 1926 destroyed much railway property. But the reopening of Persian [464] pilgrim traffic after 1924 brought welcome revenue to the railway. The Indian labour disappeared in thousands year by year, replaced by 'Iraqis.

433 Industry in modern guise was slow to appear. Cotton-ginning and mechanical transport maintenance, ancillary to other forms of enterprise, have been mentioned. Of modern manufacture there was none, though various possibilities were often discussed. The future source, however, of the country's greatest single enterprise 315 and wealth advanced during these years from the conference-room 471 into the open: mineral oil.

648 The Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913–14 had allotted to Turkey, and therefore ultimately to 'Iraq, the western half of the Naftkhana border area south of Khaniqin; and the Turkish, and thus by inheritance the 'Iraqi, Government had accepted that this Transferred Territory should be treated as still included in the grant made to D'Arcy in 1901. Negotiations on this basis between the Anglo-Persian Company and the 'Iraqi Ministry of Works were concluded in 1925, and later reopened to produce a revised and modernized agreement in May 1926. Drilling had early located a producing well, followed by others, and it was decided to convey the crude oil by pipeline the twenty-mile distance to Khaniqin. The refinery which, with Government encouragement, the Company decided to erect at Alwand outside the town, but still within the Transferred Territory, was begun in June 1926. 'Iraq seemed thus assured of its own petroleum supply, with all the importance of this to mechanical transport, pump-irrigation, and perhaps future industries.

The Vizirial promise given to the Turkish Petroleum Company on 28 June 1914 had in the seven years following been first doubted but later affirmed by the Foreign Office. It was questioned but later accepted by the French who in 1920, under the Cadman–Berthelot agreement at San Remo, inherited the Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent. shareholding in the Company; and it was viewed askance by the Americans who demanded an Open Door to 'Iraqi development with no complication of old unratified promises. This diplomatic obstacle was removed by the allotment of half the Anglo-Persian share to a group of American companies by an agreement reached in principle in 1923, but not implemented formally until 1928. Thus the shares of the Company in its final form were held as to 5 per cent. as ever by Mr. Gulbenkian, and as to 95 per cent. equally between the Shell Group (as the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company), the Anglo-Persian (as the

Lt Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

D'Arcy Exploration Company), the French Government-sponsored 315
Compagnie Française des Pétroles, and the American companies 471
grouped *ad hoc* into the Near East Development Corporation. This
shareholding was unchanged thirty years later, except in the 648
internal holdings within the American group, where the six early participants narrowed finally to two, the Standard Oil (New Jersey) and the Socony. The Turkish Petroleum Company approached the successor Government first in 1924 for a suitable implementation of Sa'id Halim Pasha's promise. Discussions were prolonged, Government a hard bargainer, and the Company's ideal of an all-'Iraq 'blanket' concession impossible of realization. The agreement signed in March 1925 covered the whole of Mosul and Baghdad wilayas and, since Parliament did not yet exist, was ratified by the Council of Ministers and the King. It provided for exploration by the T.P.C. within a time limit, for the selection of limited plots for the Company's own exploitation, with the obligation to let the remaining territory pass for development into the hands of the highest bidders. The royalty payable on petroleum obtained was to be four shillings (gold) per ton. Upon these bases, later to be revised, geological work in the field could begin, with great energy and expense, before the end of 1925. Concentrating first upon the known seepages and visible surface structures of the southern districts of Mosul wilaya, the Company devoted 1926 to extensive exploration. It was accompanied by the making of roads, the laying of water and fuel pipelines, and the erection of buildings. Fifty British and 2,500 'Iraqis took part. Drilling sites were selected in the Jabal Ḥamrin, near Ṭuz Khurmatu, in the neighbourhood of Kirkuk, and near Qaiyara and south of Sharqaṭ on the right bank of the Tigris. Drilling was to begin early in 1927. The claims put forward by the heirs of the late Sultan Abd al-Ḥamid, a formidable body of Turkish princes and princesses, to the ownership of all the oil of the old Ottoman Empire, and much besides, were not then or later taken seriously in 'Iraq.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

I. TREATY DEADLOCK

648 THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds; it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations. Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands 563 developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of 619 Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Mean-185 while, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These 459 661 665 progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi

economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady 439
diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they 661
correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq 665
public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, 644
all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness. The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate. Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 665
'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925, were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925 until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, suppressed almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—Ḥizb al-Nahḍha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new 648"
Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Baṣra aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927. This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927. It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The 665
first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indica- 565
tions, of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscurantist leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

665 ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals
565 in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical
superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small
minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the
Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now
growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of
mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and
highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was
not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927,
the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni school-
master, began a sequence of events which involved ministerial
intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the
665 Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day,
565 by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for
182 Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened
668 by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the
Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost
exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned, and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i 'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between 'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January 1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

702 The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the
668 time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its
claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect 'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

by British troops, who will decline the task.' The National Service 702
Bill, introduced into Parliament, met the urgent Shi'i and Kurdish 668
opposition already described. Detested by Shi'ism and dreaded by the little-considered man-in-the-street, the project became the darling of the 'Iraqi press which saw in British caution a proof of their sinister desire to keep 'Iraq weak and helpless. Successive Cabinets were in doubt whether to drop the project amid the scorn of newspaper patriots and the Army itself, or to press it to the point of probable explosion with Shi'i and Kurd.

Under the Treaty of January 1926 the question of 'Iraq's mem- 648*
bership of the League was to be reviewed in January 1928 and thereafter four-yearly. The British Government notified 'Iraq in July 1927 that it would consider a recommendation for such membership in 1932, but not in 1928; but this, disappointing as it was to eager 'Iraqi statesmen, did not preclude attempts to obtain a better interim status. Conversations were held in London late in 1927. The King, the Prime Minister and other ministers, and the High Commissioner participated in these with Colonial Office spokesmen; and, after a position approaching deadlock had been reached, terms were agreed. A new Treaty was signed by Ja'far Pasha and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on 14 December. Its validity, subject to approval by the League Council as well as by the 'Iraq Parliament, was dependent also on a revision of the Military and Financial Agreements.

The new Treaty marked a certain, but no great, advance. It admitted that the 1922 and 1926 Treaties had been already in a measure superseded by events, notably that of 'Iraq's own progress; it treated 'Iraq explicitly as an independent sovereign State, and dealt with its internal and international obligations as such; and by its terms the British Government undertook to support 'Iraq's candidature for League membership in 1932 'provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval'. It was largely by reason of this proviso that the draft Treaty was coldly greeted in 'Iraq by almost all political elements.

It formed, nevertheless, part of the inheritance assumed by the 645
Ministry which, under 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, succeeded that 648*
of Ja'far Pasha on 14 January 1928: a Ministry which included two Shi'is, a Christian, and a body of experienced politicians. The moderate and experienced ex-Mutaṣarrif 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab was at Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman at Justice, the Christian economist and business man Yusif Ghanima at Finance, the Najf banker Muḥsin al-Shallash at Works, and another shrewd and experienced Shi'i, Salman Barrak of Ḥilla, as Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture. Naji al-Suwaydi's clever and progressive younger brother, Tawfiq, came to the Ministry of Education, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645 a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The 648* former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called [665] for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

665 668 186 The Sunni–Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahdha Party lost support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

*645 'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

645* Shallash, Barrak—were unchanged, Da'ud al-Ḥaydari (son of the venerable Ibrahim Effendi) came to Justice, Khalid Sulayman (brother of Ḥikmat) to Education, and Amin Zaki to Defence. The Ministry of Awqaf ceased as such to exist, and became a department under the Prime Minister. The replacement or re-selection of half the senators, now due, was carried out by Royal Irada.

648× But events were at hand to resolve the Treaty deadlock. The replacement as High Commissioner of that able and loyal friend of 'Iraq, Sir Henry Dobbs, by Sir Gilbert Clayton who had already represented 'Iraqi interests in Arabia and stood high in Arab esteem, was thought (perhaps mistakenly) to presage a more pronounced 'pro-'Iraqi' attitude; in fact he repeated his predecessor's advice to Whitehall for the adoption of a liberal policy. The advent of the first Labour Government to power in the United Kingdom, and its early pronouncement on British policy towards Egypt, were more significant and raised not unjustified hopes in Baghdad. These were redoubled when, in response to its appeal, the 'Iraq Government was informed that the limiting provisos of the 1927 draft Treaty were no more; His Britannic Majesty's Government, resolved to support 'Iraq's League candidature without condition in 1932, would be glad meanwhile to regulate future Anglo-'Iraqi relations by a new Treaty to be arranged forthwith. The League Council was informed accordingly.

2. PROGRESS TO GENEVA

645* 648× But the course of Treaty-making, from which the main difficulties seemed now to be removed, was interrupted by tragic events. The sudden death of Clayton in Baghdad on 11 September, greatly regretted, was followed by an interregnum of three months in the High Commission until Sir Francis Humphrys, of the Indian Political Service and lately British Minister at Kabul, took his place. In the meanwhile the Ministry of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi fell late in August, and a new Government was formed by 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun. Consisting of strong Progressive and non-party elements, it included Naji al-Suwaydi at Interior, Nuri Sa'id at Defence, Amin Zaki at Works, Naji Shawkat, an able if impulsive administrator and lawyer-politician of good family, at Justice; 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab came to Irrigation and Agriculture, 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Chalabi to Education, and Yasin Pasha, the head of the People's Party, to Finance. But the Prime Minister had long been under heavy strain: he had experienced ingratitude and disappointment. The conscription issue was bitterly controversial, and the Treaty negotiations to which he next proceeded were embarrassed for him equally by British caution and by 'Iraqi impatience. Unexpectedly, and to the universal regret, he *b45 committed suicide on 13 November. 'Iraq lost in him a leader and true aristocrat of high character and gifts.

b48< He was succeeded on 18 November, three weeks before Humphrys's arrival, by a Ministry of closely similar composition, with the addition of Khalid Sulayman. It was headed this time by Naji al-Suwaydi. This eager nationalist devoted his first energies to the transfer into 'Iraqi hands of the remaining executive powers in Government, as the country's new position, when achieved, would demand. The public, the King, and the press looked for immediate *carte blanche* for all 'Iraqi officials in everything; and from the contrary insistence of the High Commissioner on a slower and ordered transfer of duties re-arose the sadly habitual ill-feeling of the *Wadha' al-Shadh*. Some progress indeed was made, reductions of British staff were effected—at times by mere refusal of budget allotment—and new Regulations for the changed times proposed in every Ministry; but party back-sliding, the oncoming economic crisis, and lack of immediate Treaty progress, which was attributed as ever to British obstruction and was the subject of angry student street-demonstrations, led to the resignation of the Suwaydi Cabinet after a mere four months of life.

The succeeding Ministry was formed on 23 March 1930. Headed by Nuri Sa'id, who enjoyed the confidence of both parties, it included Jamil al-Madfa'i—hero or villain of the Tall 'Afar incident of 1920 and by now a sober and experienced administrator —at Interior: 'Ali Jawdat at Finance: Ja'far al-'Askari at Defence: Jamil al-Rawi, a senior official of good type and family, at Communications and Works: Jamal Baban, a lawyer who claimed Kurdish origin and some right to use the famous Baban name: and 'Abd al-Husayn al-Chalabi again at Education. Under this Ministry a direct attempt at Treaty agreement was made, and three months' negotiations, from April to June, sufficed to produce agreement. The text was signed on 30 June.

*b48 The 1930 Treaty, with its attached Annexure and Exchange of Letters, was one of close alliance between friendly nations. It carried the promise of mutual war-time help and the obligation of close consultation; but, except as thus specified, the defence of 'Iraq was to be its own affair. 'Iraq acknowledged the importance to Great Britain of its 'essential communications' through the country, and permitted British occupation of two air bases by forces of agreed strength, the one near Basra and the other west of Euphrates: in effect, Shu'ayba and Habbaniya. These were to be guarded by 'Iraqi forces at British expense. Their occupation was to begin within five years from the signature of the Treaty, and until then the camps and air-fields of Hinaydi and Mosul would be retained. The presence of these forces was not to 'constitute in any manner an occupation', and 'in no way prejudice the sovereign 648x rights of 'Iraq'. The latter's forces were to be aided by Great Britain with arms, equipment, and training: in time of war British forces were to enjoy 'all facilities and assistance' in 'Iraq's power to give, and free movement by land, air, and water. The British representative at Baghdad was to hold ambassadorial rank and to enjoy precedence over other diplomats. The Treaty was to have a life of twenty years.

A new Financial Agreement, for which the Treaty provided, arranged for the cession of abandoned British camps and aerodromes to 'Iraq within five years, for the transfer of the 'Iraq Railways to an *ad hoc* Corporation, and for that of the Port of Baṣra to a Port Trust. Foreign officials needed by the 'Iraq Government were to be British, and the conditions of service of those already employed would remain unaffected.

Even before Treaty revision had reached its final stage, negotiations had been in progress for the replacement of the 1924 Judicial Agreement, in which the surviving remnants of the old Turkish Capitulatory régime ill accorded with 'Iraq's future status. The new Agreement, initialed by Nuri Pasha and the High Commissioner on the same day as the Treaty and ratified on 4 March 1931, provided for 'a uniform system of justice . . . applicable to all 'Iraqis and foreigners alike'. To facilitate this a number of British lawyers, later determined as nine, were to be employed for a period in the Courts and the Ministry of Justice. Certain alterations in the Criminal Code and in the rules of evidence were to be made (and were made in fact) before the Agreement took effect. Communicated to the League of Nations, this Agreement was approved on condition that all ex-Capitulatory Powers accepted the new position of their subjects in 'Iraq under it. They did so without exception within a few months: an acceptance which went far to render 'Iraq's new status acceptable to other nations.

Even accompanied as it was by an understanding with the High Commissioner for the immediate reduction of British officials, whereunder the ubiquitous Administrative Inspectors were in fact diminished in number and largely recalled from the provinces to Baghdad, the Treaty was received without enthusiasm in 'Iraq, and was, for opposite reasons, sternly criticized by many spokesmen in Great Britain. By the 'Iraq minorities immediate alarm was felt, as will appear later; by the ultra-nationalist politicians it was hailed, by reason of such British privileges as were to survive, as a mere continuance of 'slavery'. The Prime Minister decided upon a general election to strengthen his Ministry's position and to 648x determine, at least ostensibly, the nation's attitude. The National- 668 ist Party, not content with an attempted boycott of the elections, 666

648 and the fullest activity of their press articles, hand-bills, and
668 oratory, did not hesitate to invoke the authority of the Shi'i
Mujtahids in condemnation of the new Treaty. These, however,
666 declined for once to intervene, except partially at Samarrā, and the elections were peacefully conducted in the districts; only at Sulaymaniya a major clash between violent demonstrators and the police resulted in bloodshed and the loss of a score of lives. All results were known by the end of October 1930, and showed a sweeping victory of the Government party. The ratification of the Treaty by Parliament, which met as usual on 1 November, could not now be prevented by the fierce denunciations of die-hard patriots; the voting was in favour by 69 against 13 in the Chamber, 11 against 5 in the Senate.

648 But much remained to be done, both in Baghdad and in Geneva.
Parliament sat on, immersed in legislation and in vehement
646 politics, until the midsummer of 1931. The opposition to the Sa'idi Ministry had by that time been reorganized in a grouping more formidable than the isolated Nationalist Party which, thanks to the usual control exercised by the liwā officials, had made so poor
648 a showing in the elections. Political leaders hostile to Nuri and,
with reservations, to the Treaty—Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-
665 Suwaydi, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, and 'Ali Jawdat who had
668 resigned from the Cabinet in September and been succeeded by Rustum Ḥaydar from the Palace—formed from the Nationalist and the People's Parties and like-thinking elements a Party of National Brotherhood—Ḥizb al-Ikhā al-Waṭani. At its inaugural meeting in March 1931 its objects were stated to include the dissolution of a flagrantly unrepresentative Parliament and the formation of a new Government 'pledged to reconsider the external relations of 'Iraq'. Certain of its members as a gesture thought fit to resign their seats in the Chamber; all resolved to pursue their campaign in the press and country. Nuri Pasha on his side had already formed, from deputies favourable to him, the 'Ahd (Covenant) Party, with an appeal to the great days of al-'Ahd and a programme of Treaty implementation.

Among the first acts of the Ikhā was the organization in July 1931 of a series of strikes in the 'Iraq townships without precedent for their concerted timing and wide extent. They had little object but the embarrassment of Government. The trades' organizations in the bazaars took fright—or were maliciously alarmed—at a clause in the newly passed Municipal Taxation Law which could be read as unfavourable to them. The misunderstanding, which was easily elucidated by Government, was encouraged to persist, and it was not until late in July, after attempts had been made to spread unrest to northern 'Iraq, and disorder in Baṣra and the

Euphrates towns had led to bloodshed and police intervention, 648
that the agitation died down: the product, it seemed, of a new and 665
sinister type of 'Iraqi politics. The Brotherhood, successful in this 668
effort, proceeded next (said its enemies) to make what capital it
could from the dangerous uneasiness of Kurd–Arab and Assyrian–Kurd relationships.

The attitude of the minorities to the forthcoming emancipation 563
of 'Iraq and withdrawal of British control could not, indeed, be 648
other than a serious preoccupation of the 'Iraq Government as well as of Great Britain and of the League itself. In Baghdad the privileges claimed by or on behalf of the Kurdish districts, and the future of the Assyrians, were questions the more insistent as the attention of the League was concentrated on these aspects of 'Iraq life. The Government did its best at reassurance by repeated tours of the King and his Ministers in the Kurdish areas, by legislation on the use of the Kurdish language, by promises to honour all pledges given in the past, and by such practical gestures of goodwill as were available; but the whispers of the ill disposed were effective, nevertheless, in increasing the alarm of Kurd and Assyrian alike.

With minor Cabinet changes—the loss of Madfa'i to preside in 645
the Deputies, and the addition of Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs—and a re-formation in October 1930, the Ministry of Nuri Pasha maintained itself, in spite of Brotherhood intrigues and assaults, from its formation in March 1930 until November 1932. His second Cabinet, which took office on 19 October, brought Naji Shawkat to Interior, Rustum to Finance, Jamal Baban to Justice, Ja'far to Foreign Affairs, Amin Zaki and Chalabi to Works and Education. Little was heard for the moment of Sunni–Shi'i friction, save implicitly in minor disorders: and nothing of the threat or hope of conscription, which the Sa'idi Government
wisely postponed until the obligation to listen to High
Commissioners was no more. The major interest of the time was, 648
evidently, that of securing 'Iraq's admission to the League, for which 1932 was the appointed year.

The intention of His Majesty's Government to make this recommendation had been communicated to the League Council in September 1929, and was likely thenceforward to raise questions of procedure for which no precedent existed. The Permanent Mandates Commission, to which annually since 1921 spokesmen of the mandatory Power had presented its Report with full verbal explanations, had never relaxed its interest in 'Iraqi affairs and the British trusteeship. It now scrutinized the 1929 Report for signs of 'Iraq's adequacy or inadequacy for emancipation, closely questioned the British 'accredited representative' at Geneva, and

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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accepted gladly a *Special Report on the Progress of 'Iraq* for the period from 1921 to 1930. The Commission was requested by the Council in June 1930 to formulate the conditions which should be fulfilled by a mandated territory for which the claim of emancipation was made. In the debates which followed, extending over two years, the part of the British spokesmen at Geneva was consistently to emphasize 'Iraqi progress, to explain observed deficiencies, and to adopt towards the future an attitude of optimism which reflected a sincere desire (whether believed or not by the political world of Baghdad) to be rid finally of mandatory responsibilities; nor was it unrealized in Whitehall that a League refusal to accept 'Iraq as a member would infallibly be ascribed by the latter to British contrary intrigues.

The many petitions received at Geneva from the 'Iraq minorities offered the clearest field in which 'Iraqi pretensions could be questioned: that is, the probable fate of the Kurds and the Assyrians—most persistent of petitioners—after British withdrawal. 'Iraqi policy on these matters seemed in fact at this time to be correct and reasonable, and the High Commissioner, cross-questioned, could specify the favourable steps already taken, could expect their continuance, and could accept British (as distinct from corporate League) 'moral responsibility' in this field should 'Iraq prove after all unworthy. The Mandates Commission reported accordingly to the Council in June 1931 that the conditions for emancipation seemed to be fulfilled—a settled and self-defending Government, good public security, sound finance, a respectable judiciary, a competent Administration—but that certain specific guarantees should still be given by the liberated nation. These were to concern the rights of minorities and of foreigners, freedom of conscience and religion, the honouring of financial obligations assumed for it by the Mandatary, the protection of previously acquired foreign rights, the observance of international Conventions, and most-favoured-nation treatment for all States-members of the League. A draft Declaration containing these guarantees was in due course prepared at Geneva and handed to the 'Iraq Government, whose Parliament debated and ratified it, with surprising complacence, in its session of 1931–2.

Satisfied by these provisions and procedures, with whatever tacit doubts, the League Council expressed on 28 January 1932 its readiness to terminate the Mandate as soon as the 'Iraq Declaration had been received. It was transmitted to Geneva in the summer of 1932 and, duly binding 'Iraq to correct and liberal treatment of all its nationality, minority, religious, and linguistic problems, it included a series of specific obligations assumed by 'Iraq towards the League. These assurances were accepted by a Committee of

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the League in October 1932 and in turn satisfied the Assembly, still inclined as it was to uneasiness on the Assyrians' behalf, that no further formalities were needed. Those nations who had formerly benefited by Ottoman Capitulations and who had accepted the 1930 Anglo-'Iraq Judicial Agreement as safeguarding their subjects during its validity were now asked, and agreed, to renounce such rights henceforward permanently. With the continuing pressure of Great Britain, and the evident impatience of 'Iraq, no opposition remained to be faced; a unanimous vote of the Assembly, with the participation of fifty-two States, approved 'Iraq's membership of the League on 3 October 1932. Speeches of welcome and appreciation marked an occasion of great cordiality and some historic interest. Nuri Sa'id Pasha spoke for 'Iraq to the British representative, Sir John Simon, of the 'sincere and abiding gratitude to the British people': which indeed he, his King, and a number of the more responsible 'Iraqis may, not without reason, have briefly felt.

3. REFLECTIONS ON A MANDATE

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The termination of the Mandate, popular with the main body of British opinion, had also its critics in the United Kingdom. It was by these pronounced to be premature, to represent a precedent for the abandonment of imperial interests, to fail fully to secure all-important strategic communications, and to be dangerous or fatal to the 'Iraq minorities. Such criticisms, freely ventilated in press and Parliament, were shared in part by other European and American opinion, especially in so far as they suggested that confidence in an unaided 'Iraq Government's treatment of its smaller communities was misplaced. Observers in France regretted that an internationally supervised sphere was to become an all-British preserve, while this emancipation of Arab ex-Ottoman wilayas could not but react lamentably in Syria, where French policy was following very different lines. The world's verdict, however, not only on the British abandonment of this Mandate but retrospectively on their conduct of it, was by majority eulogistic. Life and reality seemed to have been given for the first time to the ideas which had inspired the mandatory conception; a politically backward population had indeed been formed into a nation, helped with its Constitution-building and administration, advised by experts, protected by armed forces, and at the earliest moment freed from tutelage. Such a record, in praise of which many of the great and good, and many 'Iraqi and non-'Iraqi Arabs, have joined, was hailed as representing something of a 'reversal of imperialism'. Scarcely conceivable before the twentieth century, it belonged characteristically to the climate of the Western political thought

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which followed the Armistice of 1918. Idealism was not absent from the motives which dictated British policy; respect for the rights of the weak, and scrupulous trusteeship, were no novelty in the best British statesmanship. But other motives were also present: that, especially, of retaining the bulk of the advantages which 'Iraq could offer (East–West communications, strategic listening-posts, and an open field for commercial activity) without continuing to bear the strains and responsibilities of diarchy, or the odium of seeming in some degree to oppose the force of a local nationalism which had itself owed much to British precept and example.

Working through a body of British officers, advisory or technical, many if not most of whom gave years of service to 'Iraq as loyal and effective as that of any 'Iraqi, the outgoing mandatory Power had in fact shown a praiseworthy zeal and sympathy in twelve years of co-operation with an 'Iraq Government which Britain itself had called into being, and with a public with many individuals in which relations were those of cordial friendship. Not the least contribution of the British staff was the continuity which, free from the too frequent vicissitudes of 'Iraqi politics and officialdom, they could ensure to the Administration.

Few nations in this mandatory position would, perhaps, have asked so little by way of commercial or any other privilege, easy as this would have been in spite of all League of Nations Open Doors. Not only were public services, Courts of Justice, and defence forces installed as good as could be created with available personnel and funds, and no doubt superior to those of contemporary neighbours, but the essential duty of training 'Iraqi administrators to readiness for independence had received a successful attention unknown either in French Syria or in British Palestine. Relations with neighbours had been regularized, frontiers defined. Northern 'Iraq had been saved by British efforts from detachment to Turkey; and, for all the easy cynicism which imputes British efforts to safeguard Mosul for 'Iraq solely to hunger for its oil resources, it is the plain truth that British motives in this matter were rather those of a conscientious trustee and a lover of right and reason. Nor was any discovery of oil made in northern 'Iraq until a year after the Mosul settlement had been concluded.

There is no great validity in 'Iraqi reproaches that under the Mandate education or the Health services or the Army, according to the predilection of the critic, were starved. Funds were rigidly limited, none could or can suggest how they might be increased. Accusations of British political maladroitness, errors of timing and too hesitant advances must be judged according to the viewpoint of the observer: the verdict presumably will depend on the assess-

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ment, from phase to phase, of 'Iraqi reliability and prowess in government. It is untenable that the British were at all times perfect in tact or judgement, or were wholly uninfluenced by their obvious interest in 'Iraqi stability and good order. But it is none the less regrettable that, though the realist looks admittedly for no more than rarest glimpses of 'national gratitude', the end of the Mandate left much of the 'Iraqi political world and most of the young intelligentsia still persistently rancorous against the British connexion, to which all the shortcomings of their State and the frustrations of their own class were ascribed. Most of the press was consistent in this indiscriminate Anglophobia.

In 'Iraq, as in all British-guided territories of Asia and Africa, the educated class had brooked no delay in its demand for political power and the removal of restraints, even while it exhibited, apart from its normal anti-British attitude, a dangerous immaturity and irresponsibility. Why then, it is sometimes asked, do or did the British continue to favour the education of a class—lawyers, writers, politicians—which will not only, all too probably, miss the best essentials of Western culture but will inevitably turn against its educators? If it were possible, in the close-knit modern world, to keep a territory in happy isolation and to deal paternally with placidly backward populations for their own good, the question might be difficult to answer; such a public might well be happier before the emergence of a political life of its own than after it. But such isolation or willing humility does not in practice nowadays exist; nationalism and political ambition cross every frontier; nor can a denial of education in the forms which will inevitably be demanded—the 'modern' or Western forms—be reconciled today with the function expected of a trustee. Still less would this denial be possible if, as in 'Iraq, such education had already well begun under Ottoman rule and a self-governing national State was the clear objective. If the British were certainly at times inept in their handling of the local intelligentsia, a policy of stifling or deliberately frustrating such a class was in practice inconceivable.

The Mandatary indeed, concerned above all with security and continuity, saw no alternative to accepting the existing governing class of landowners, senior hierarchs, and urban notables in their pre-eminence in public affairs: it did little to press the advance to ministerial level of the emerging, younger middle class. That this attitude, and the willing acquiescence of the present power-holders in it, led the young and would-be more progressive elements by reaction into the ways of extremism and subversion is partly true, and is confirmed by some of the groupings soon to appear. But this was probably not in practice avoidable, nor could a short-term tutelary Power be well expected to force an inexperienced and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 numerically small element, without rural or tribal roots, upon the country as its governing class.

A similar charge of ultra-conservatism is based on the mandatory régime's inability to solve the basic practical problems of the territory: those of insecurity, chaotic land tenure, backward agriculture, undeveloped irrigation, general poverty and disease. It can but be replied that funds were limited, that much technical progress was in fact made, and that the field lay always open to such 'Iraqi initiative as conditions and funds available might permit: moreover, a new land tenure system or settlement policy so comprehensive and so effective as to alter the face of 'Iraq must involve such fundamental measures and so deep an integration with the very roots of 'Iraqi society that its initiation would come better, or indeed necessarily, from the representatives of the nation itself than from those of an alien Mandatary.

Behind all thoughts of the merits or demerits of Great Britain as a Mandatary must lurk the deeper question of what measure of success is likely ever to attend the effort of any Western Power, with its strong prepossessions grown from its own evolution, character, and environment, to mould an eastern and Islamic population into something resembling itself. Left to themselves, such peoples have long been used to borrow from Western resources and techniques those items which appeal to them—too often the unessential, the trivial or the vicious, and those of which they see the need for self-preservation—while retaining, by habit or preference, their own basic ideas, methods, and tempo. The resulting régime—that for instance of nineteenth-century Turkey or Persia—is still their own; the Western elements are absorbed, accepted; the old social and political evils (as the reforming West sees them to be) are endured fatalistically, with discontent confined at most to a narrow questioning class. But the case is otherwise when, with whatever motives, a European Power installs itself in the territory of a backward country and, to reform and develop it, sets up Western forms, insists on Western methods and objectives, and amid a puzzled and soon resentful population seeks justice and efficiency as conceived in Europe. In a better world the relieved population might realize all the blessings of improved law courts, security, developing agriculture, schools and hospitals, and be correspondingly grateful; in practice it is otherwise. The mandatory conception, as applied to any but primitive unselfconscious peoples, in itself implies a belittling of national status, a blow to pride; nor has a Mandatary been found whose local representatives have managed to produce these blessings without offence to local leaders and vested interests, or without incurring the odium of being uncomfortable strangers with exacting and unfamiliar

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standards—and non-Muslims at that!—and without, perhaps quite involuntarily, adopting something of the airs of superiority and social exclusiveness which are of all things the least tolerable to the educated society of the modern East. These dangers the British were ill equipped to avoid; it followed that their unpopularity in 'Iraq, after years of Mandate, was widespread. It prevailed, with many individual exceptions, not only in ministerial and official circles but also among the very classes to whom their work had been the most advantageous. 000

It is certain that some measure of reform and reorganization was, in the clear interests of human welfare, desirable in the 'Iraq of 1918; certain too that it could never have been carried out without damage to the immediate interests of some loudly protesting class, be they Shi'i 'Ulamā, intellectuals, landlords or tribal shaykhs. Could such reforms have come from within, without Mandate or imposed foreign help? Only, one may judge, too slowly, too uncertainly, and in the end inadequately. Or would a Mandateless 'Iraq State, with its 'full independence' from the outset, have been willing of itself to employ foreign helpers and give them adequate authority and continuity? It is improbable; but if so, such a method might have yielded better results than a Mandate, if genuine popular goodwill is, as it must be, the true criterion. But to neither the excited spokesmen of nationalist 'Iraq in the Baghdad or the Damascus of 1919, nor to a British Government then harassed with the stresses and counter-claims of inexpert peace-making, was such a solution likely to occur. The Mandate was inevitable; its administration had had great merits, with real but less tangible defects; and its conclusion was welcome to all.

4. THE MINORITIES

The problem presented to the Sunni government and governing class by the Shi'i element, a minority in political status though a majority in numbers and containing eminent men of religion, landlords, business men, and the most militant tribes, was little considered at Geneva. Nevertheless, it equalled that of the Kurds in delicacy and in its need of a solution, and its dangers were to be notably shown within a few months of 'Iraq's attainment of independence. But as the Shi'is were 'Iraqis, lived in the heart of its territory and included no elements of obvious interest to any outside Power save Persia, the Shi'i problem lay beyond the observation of the world's statesmen. It was indeed a question less of minority rights than of a temptation which 'Iraqi politicians found irresistible: that of using the weight of Shi'i religion and tribal power as a weapon, fatally dangerous, in domestic politics. 795

The lesser true minorities—the Christian sects, Yazidis, Jews, 563 795

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563 and Turkomans—made little history. The first-mentioned were
795 accepted as equals in 'Iraqi society and administration as completely as any non-Muslim could expect; and when the announcement of British withdrawal led in 1929 to some heart-searching among the timorous, the heads of the communities had no difficulty in reassuring their flocks and urging continued loyalty to their King. A ministerial tour among them in 1931 led to great cordiality and the official thanks of the Apostolic Delegate. It was found not too difficult in 1930 to draft and pass into law new statutes for some of these Christian minorities, defining the powers of their priesthoods and councils. The measure of self-management which they accepted was bound, in a modern State, to fall far short of old millet autarchy.

The tiny community of inoffensive Baha'is in Baghdad was in these years the victim of an episode—that of the long-famous case of the Baha'i Houses—sadly destructive of confidence in 'Iraqi justice. They had begun in the middle 'twenties to repair their properties in the city. Fanatical Shi'i neighbours resisted this, petitioned the King and obtained from him, although the case was still *sub judice* in the Baghdad Peace Court (which later gave judgement for the Baha'is), a direct order for the eviction of the owners and confiscation of the keys. This action and the subsequent majority verdict of the Court of Appeal in favour of the Shi'i aggressors represented to objective observers an apparent overruling of justice by the rancours of local politics. It was ventilated at Geneva and was the subject of repeated protest by the High Commissioner, but in vain. The case, in itself petty and embarrassing enough to the 'Iraqi authorities, was a sinister warning to other non-Muslim elements.

563 The unselfconscious Turkomans of Kirkuk, Kifri, and their villages made no efforts to emerge from a useful and honest obscurity; they created no problems since the Mosul settlement, and were represented in 'Iraqi officialdom far beyond their numerical proportion. The Jews were still compact, assiduous, self-sufficient, and unambitious. They had had their outstanding Finance Minister, kept their place in the Government offices, dominated many of the markets, owned property, and supported their own schools and hospitals; and when 'Iraq approached its independence, were not so foolish as to compromise their future by open protest. The art of living in 'Iraq, and surviving bad times, was no new one to them. It was true that 'Iraqi, like all Arab, feeling was strong against the Zionist movement in Palestine; ugly and violent street demonstrations, accompanied by the usual marshalled schoolboys and armed roughs, greeted Sir Alfred Mond when he visited Baghdad on business in February 1928; and in the

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year following demonstrations in the mosques and city, a two- 563 minute silence in Parliament, black-edged newspapers, and telegrams to London marked 'Iraqi disapproval of the 'pro-Jewish' policy of Great Britain. But the day when these feelings would descend with personal violence on the heads of the timid and law-abiding Baghdadi Jews, anxious only to find a secure place in the State and to dissociate themselves from Zionism, lay still some years ahead.

The Yazidis, no longer eminent as of old either as harriers or as harried in tribal warfare, turned to restlessness towards the end of this period through the heedless and dissolute ways of their Mir, Sa'id Bey. He was accused of misusing the revenues and neglecting the shrine of Shaykh 'Adi and its pilgrims. A meeting of the Yazidi notables was held in Mosul in 1931, attended by the High Commissioner. Government attempted to produce a satisfactory statute for the outlandish community; but it proved intractable, and the Yazidi elders reported after full deliberation that no way could be devised to change their Mir except assassination. Rival Mirs nevertheless claimed support, and faction tore their settlements in the Mosul plain and Sinjar, to be settled only by time, intrigue, and murder.

The Kurds were a far more formidable minority. Added to the 563 668 other elements making for separatism—those of locality, character, culture, and tradition—their specific nationalism, which flourished in a restricted circle centred in Sulaymaniya town, had survived their incorporation in the 'Iraq State, the failure of successive campaigns, the stern suppression of their Kurdish brothers in Turkey and Persia, and even their own profound disunion. The 'Iraq Government had made meanwhile a not discreditable effort to honour in their favour the League of Nations recommendations of 1925. They were given a generous share of Government appointments, a minister in the Baghdad Cabinet, and their quota of Deputies delighted to serve as such. Nevertheless, a petition submitted by some of the last-mentioned in 1929, asking for increased expenditure in Kurdistan and the formation of an all-Kurdish four-liwā province of their own, showed their determination to maintain all of their special claims; nor did their spokesmen forget that the twenty-year prolongation of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty of 1922—a specific condition of the Mosul settlement—was largely on their account.

Meanwhile it was possible in 1927 to arrange tolerable terms of surrender with Shaykh Maḥmud. But he refused, after all, to honour them, and it proved necessary to dislodge him from his last stronghold in Panjwin by forces of the 'Iraq Army and the Levies, and by bombing and cavalry patrols to disperse his widely-ranging

563 murderous Hamawand allies. The Shaykh's retirement to Persia 668 removed for a time the greatest obstacle to orderly government in Sulaymaniya liwā. It could now be resumed, with improved roads and rebuilt police posts. His son, Baba 'Ali, was brought to school in Baghdad—and later to Victoria College, Alexandria—as part of the terms of settlement; he was, years later, to become a graduate of Columbia, and a minister of the Government. The place of Shaykh Maḥmud as leading Kurdish disturber of the peace was taken in the same year, 1927, by Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan in whose territory 'Iraqi troops had recently manœuvred. This half-witted Dere Bey, obscurely prompted by some resentful megalomania, now proclaimed himself Almighty and gained some converts by the preaching of a devoted Mullā. But the reaction of horrified listeners led to a scuffle in which lives, including his brother's, were lost. It was followed by an intervention of police and the reinforcement of the Army garrison at Bilih, near Barzan. The new religion died out; but the Shaykh, talking and writing war and sedition to all who would listen and spreading rumours of Assyrian trespass, remained a menacing figure.

The Kurdish reaction in 1929–30 to threatened British withdrawal was one of apprehension. The elections of September 1929 produced, as has been recorded, a riot in Sulaymaniya; questions had been asked already by the Kurds in the 'Iraq Parliament as to safeguarding in the new Treaty the 'rights of the Kurdish areas', and had been answered only by the Treaty's silence on the subject. 563 Expecting support based on the same claims, Shaykh Maḥmud in September 1930 again invaded 'Iraq territory, in spite of specific 669 warnings to desist. He established himself, addressed the High 721 Commissioner to demand a united Kurdistan under British Mandate to stretch from Zakho to Khaniqin, and again occupied Panjwin. Troops of the 'Iraq Army, with Royal Air Force bombers, dislodged him successively from Panjwin and Sardasht, but failed for some months to encircle or drive him across the frontier. Guerrilla war continued through the winter of 1930–1. In March his movement to raise the tribes of Kifri and Khaniqin was stopped by a concerted operation of the Army, Police, and Air Force, and a major engagement took place at Au-i-Barika twenty miles north-east of Ṭuz Khurmatu, leaving a score of dead. The Shaykh fled into Persia, but thanks to preventive action by the Persian Government failed to find there his usual refuge. At an interview at Panjwin terms were once more arranged. His life was spared, an allowance granted, and his place of residence fixed at Naṣiriya on the lower Euphrates.

Between 1928 and 1931 an uneasy peace reigned in Barzan country, where the Shaykh was visited by an Administrative

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Inspector and received the admonitions of Baghdad. In July of 563
the latter year he again lost his wits, accepted and imposed 'Chris- 669
tianity', and ordered his scared followers to conform to his new
faith by roasting and eating pork. A number of the horrified 721
retinue obeyed; but a neighbour, Shaykh Rashid of Baradost, expressed his disapproval by raids which kindled all the fires of tribal warfare. Shaykh Aḥmad's brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, and other well-wishers tried in vain by diplomacy to extinguish them: but he himself, restored to the Muslim faith, led forays of unusual savagery into Baradost country. By December intervention by regular troops was ordered, in spite of the wintry conditions. An 'Iraq Army column, penetrating the mountains as far as the Shaykh's village, was there severely defeated and indeed rescued from débâcle only by Air Force intervention. Aḥmad, chastened by severe bombing, released the prisoners he had taken, protested humble obedience, and withdrew from Baradost country. But he remained unsubdued. In the early spring of 1932, after warnings from the High Commissioner which he ignored, 'Iraqi troops again advanced into his country, occupied Margasur, and threatened Barzan; but a sudden assault on them by tribesmen in difficult country involved them in a second defeat and heavy losses. The R.A.F. was again able decisively to intervene, and a second 'Iraqi column, with strong air support, now occupied Barzan and much of its dependent territory. After a pause for the release of a captured pilot, and further attempts at peace-making on generous terms, land and air operations were resumed. In midsummer the Shaykh, driven finally to bay, crossed into Turkish territory, where he was arrested and removed from the frontier. It was then possible to install a normal or nearly normal administration in Barzan country, with police posts and patrols, and to pardon the miserable remnant of the Shaykh's followers who trickled back.

If these warlike interludes were of a type normal in Kurdistan 563
for millennia, the same is less true of the political action now taken 668
by Kurdish leaders. A petition to Geneva by ten notables of Sulaymaniya in July 1930 demanded a League-supervised Kurdish Government. The Permanent Mandates Commission commented that the League had never envisaged a Kurdish Government but merely a measure of 'special treatment', of which it urged the Mandatary to ensure full application before it be too late. A series of further and similar Kurdish petitions, written in 1930 to 1931, were considered at Geneva in the latter year. They led to the recommendation that Britain should impress on the 'Iraq Government the need of tolerance to evoke the loyalty of its Kurdish subjects: who in turn, however, should earn respect and the League's consideration by a correct attitude to the 'Iraqi Kingdom.

563 657 182

Government had in fact, not without lapses, maintained the principle of employing Kurdish officials, other than technical, in Kurdish areas. It now proceeded to reaffirm this and to enact a Language Law in the interests of Kurdish-speakers, to set up a translation bureau, to appoint a Kurdish Inspector of Education for north-eastern 'Iraq, and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior. Local committees were next formed to determine the language of instruction to be used in each school, to specify the dialect of Kurdish required, and to replace non-Kurdish-speaking staff. Repeated visits were paid to north and north-east 'Iraq by the King, the Amir Ghazi, the High Commissioner, and 'Iraqi ministers with the purpose of allaying suspicion, increasing personal contact, and collecting such information as would satisfy the still uneasy Mandates Commission. It was possible, at this stage, to hope for increasing coalescence of the Kurdish areas of 'Iraq, and that their nationalism, wisely handled, would weaken: hopes not impossible but unduly optimistic, since the high statesmanship which could have achieved these ends was not in sight. Yet, in adopting a hesitant attitude to Kurdish claims, the 'Iraq Government was not always unreasonable. These claims were at times frankly separatist, incompatible with an 'Iraq State as constituted, exacerbated by the abiding antipathy felt mutually between the two races, and not lessened by the signs of a more sympathetic or more generous attitude towards the Kurds by the British advisers than by 'Iraqi statesmen. The fear existed, in addition, that privileges granted to the Kurds would be demanded immediately by the Shi'is of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question. It resulted that the entry of 'Iraq into the League was unmarked by any true solution of the problem of its unassimilated Kurdish minority. The Government, the British sponsors, and the League itself had to be content with palliatives and hopes.

[illegible] 165 657

The same is true of that far smaller, more alien, and still less assimilable community, the Assyrians. Substantial numbers of these had by 1926 been settled in scattered Kurd-surrounded villages in Mosul liwā (p. 158). The completion of this process, further resettlement of the less satisfied, and improvement of the settlements were the tasks of the years 1927 to 1930. The High Commissioner's interest was shown by visits to the areas, by many conferences, and by invitations to Government to show all reasonable favour to the Assyrians, even though these, by their attitude of grumbling non-cooperation, in part frustrated the efforts of their well-wishers. A well-qualified Settlement Officer was employed, more villages cleared and reoccupied in the Ḥarir area of Rawanduz qadhā, advances of seed and money given to the reluctant settlers.

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Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for 563
a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions. 166

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was
said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. 657
The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Ḥarir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian 563
—continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in 701
Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Maḥmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition
for self-protection in their new homes. The Levies, besides the [157]
contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

563 repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retro-
701 spect, to be regretted.

The announcement of the impending end of the Mandate pro-
563 foundly disturbed the Assyrian community, which under the 1930
668 Treaty was so shortly to be left at the sole mercy of the 'Iraq Government. The latter's attitude, though still correct, was growing less favourable. Taxation remissions were granted on a decreasing scale; normal minor taxation, outrageous to the long-pampered settlers, was beginning to be demanded; and Government action in admitting parties of destitute Assyrians from Russia was reluctant and unpopular. Persistent British support for Assyrian claims, or part of them, was galling to successive Cabinets. Worse than this, the exploitation of bad relations between Kurd and Assyrian appealed to certain Baghdad politicians as an easy method of trouble-making. It bore fruit in a series of untraced murders and revived anti-Assyrian outcry among the Kurds. Nevertheless, if the Assyrian community had, with patience and avoidance of provocation, accepted its new position in 'Iraq—which was that or better than that of the Chaldaeans or Armenians—its future could have been peaceful if inglorious, its ecclesiastical and social individuality preserved, and its homes secure and happy. But its leaders chose other paths, which led to tragedy. They clung to every point of their reiterated case: that they had been officially 'allies' in the 1914–18 War, but as such never rewarded; that their Levies had performed outstanding services—indeed had acquired and saved southern Kurdistan; that the League had in 1925 recommended rebestowal of their 'ancient privileges', now still withheld; that the British had ruined their hopes of Turkish favour and resettlement in Ḥakkari, and had betrayed them at Geneva. The twenty-year-old Ishai Mar Sham'un, at school in England from 1925 to 1929 and wholly ignorant of 'Iraq realities, was unfitted to guide the community and obsessed by unrealistic conceptions. Chief among these was that of the 'temporal power' which he felt to belong to the headship of a Millet almost self-governing in olden days, however unacceptable and unconstitutional it must be in modern 'Iraq. His father was ultra-conservative; in his aunt, Surma Khanim, the fervour of community feeling had by now vanquished judgement; the bishops and maliks failed in wisdom or pursued sectional aims, and in conspicuous cases even led factions against their Patriarch. Enthusiastic well-wishers from outside—one an Anglicized grandson of Layard's assistant, Hormuzd Rassam, and one an Englishman, Matthew Cope—misused their well-meant influence to organize petitions, to raise false hopes, and further to prejudice Assyrian-'Iraqi relations.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The High Commissioner's deputy at Geneva in November 1930 563
gave reassurances, which he believed to be justified, on the future 668
prospects of this and the other minorities. In the same year Sir Francis Humphrys dealt with the Rassam petitions and pledged the 'moral responsibility' of Great Britain for the future attitude of the 'Iraq Government. Returned to 'Iraq, and faced with a situation deteriorating largely through the Assyrians' own activities, he again recommended the Government to show all possible goodwill by resuming its taxation-remission policy. This was done, with good effect. It would have been followed by re-attempting, on attractive terms, the long postponed Baradost settlement, had not the outbreak of Barzan–Baradost hostilities precluded it.

In October 1931 a conference of Assyrians convened at Mosul by the Mar Sham'un dispatched petitions to Geneva. They requested that since the community could not face conditions in 'Iraq after termination of the Mandate, it should be transferred *en bloc* to some Western-governed territory elsewhere, or to Syria. These petitions, however, were not considered by the Mandates Commission for thirteen months, and meanwhile the alarmed Assyrians decided on direct action. The Mar Sham'un prepared in May 1932 a plan to concentrate the whole community in the area of Dohuk–'Amadiya in July, and a general 'cessation of service' by all the Levies on 1 June was threatened in a memorial handed at Hinaydi to their Commander, Brigadier J. G. Browne, himself a tireless upholder of Assyrian rights and later historian of the Levies. The intervention of the High Commissioner postponed a crisis, and yet another petition to Geneva was prepared; but the threat of mass resignation was repeated in the event of its having no early or favourable issue. This petition demanded recognition of an Assyrian Millet and of its Patriarch's temporal and spiritual authority, with an Assyrian deputy in Parliament, community schools, and a subsidy for the Patriarch himself and for his Church. It asked also for the annexation of Ḥakkari territory to 'Iraq, or alternatively the formation in 'Iraq of an all-Assyrian liwā to the north of Mosul, with a new and well-considered Settlement and clear land-titles.

The Levy strike was in fact averted by the arrival by air—an operation then hailed as remarkable—of a battalion of British troops from Egypt. Its four companies were posted to the four main Levy stations. The Mar Sham'un, influenced by this step and by Humphrys's representations, agreed to order the Levies to remain at duty until the petition of 17 June should have been considered at Geneva. The Levy personnel at Hinaydi, who alone continued insubordinate, were reduced by the release of some 250 men; elsewhere the impending reductions of Levy strength

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 were postponed at the Mar Sham'un's request. The Northamptonshires returned to Egypt.
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In partial compliance with requests in the petition, the 'Iraq Government set up a further land-finding committee. It discovered but little land both cultivable and available, but recommended expenditure on an irrigation scheme to produce more. The Cabinet accepted this report, which was sent to Geneva. The King visited 'Amadiya, talked at length with the Mar Sham'un, and used every means to win his confidence; but the young and intransigent Patriarch would commit himself to nothing in advance of the League's answer, and himself left for Switzerland. He was followed there by a counter-petition of those Assyrians whose original homes had been in Barwari Bala (that is, in present 'Iraq territory), expressing their complete satisfaction with present arrangements.

The final debates of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council on the Assyrian issue, after rehearsing that community's well-known grievances and the desirability (but impossibility) of providing the homogeneous group-settlement which they demanded, could result in no more than hopes for the best. The gap between the full Millet autonomy demanded by the Mar Sham'un, and the favourable minority treatment available at best from the 'Iraq Government, was a wide one. The League Council formally rejected the Millet proposal, 'noted with satisfaction' the impending appointment of a foreign settlement expert, and left the subject with misgivings which were soon to be tragically justified.

5. GOVERNORS AND GOVERNED

642 In a community at 'Iraq's current stage of evolution the central
647 Administration was both significant of and powerful in the society of the territory; and great and not unsuccessful efforts were made from 1925 to 1932 by the 'Iraqi and British elements alike to improve it. The reduction of the British part,[1] though accompanied by a variously assessed loss of efficiency and authority, was clearly necessary as part of 'Iraq's planned evolution; and it proceeded so far that the steps taken towards 'Iraqi administrative independence in these years left relatively little for the post-
647 mandatory period. By 1932 further departments had been taken over by 'Iraqi directors—those of Revenue and State Domains

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[1] The number of Administrative Inspectors fell from 24 in 1923 to 18 in 1925, 14 in 1930, 10 in 1933. The total of British officials of 'gazetted' status in 1920 was 364, in 1923: 181, in 1926: 148, in 1929: 130, in 1931: 118 (38 advisory, 80 executive). For British 'non-gazetted' staff the corresponding numbers were: for 1920: 484; for 1923: 361; for 1926: 52; for 1929: 34; for 1931: 28; for Indian officials, in 1920: 2,035, in 1923: 1,270, in 1926: 250, in 1929: 53, and in 1931: 36.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of 647 Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman, who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. Progress towards 647. raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards, commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one 661 minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn 692 general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhās and nahiyas—were formed 631 by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years 1929 to 1932.

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq 652 into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Advisership to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 Acting Adviser, and thereafter by E. G. Hogg, from the Sudan, in
1931. Hedgcock and the present writer left the Ministry in 1930
and 1931. Provision for Capital Works under a five-year plan
was separated from the current budget, and a main part of the oil
revenues, which first accrued in 1932, was allotted to this object.
An Economic Advisory Board was set up. Chambers of Commerce
were founded in Baghdad and Basra. A second advisory visit by
Hilton Young, the 'Iraqis' financial consultant of 1925, was paid in
1930, and other foreign experts—notably A. Sainsbury, expert in
income tax—assisted in the institution of new taxation and the
[651] fixing of civil service establishments. Income tax in modern form
was first imposed in 1928, but proved relatively unproductive; in
effect it was paid mainly by officials and foreign companies. A
major change in the taxation of agricultural produce was made in
1931, based on a new system of tax collection at markets—the
'place of consumption' method—without the need to assess or
measure the growing crops. A financial Inspectorate was introduced.
Efforts both resolute and skilful were made in 1927 to free
'Iraq from the burden of its share of the Ottoman Debt, of which
£ (Turkish) 7 million had fallen to its share, with a further
£T2,500,000 of accumulated interest. The Minister of Finance
arranged to buy Ottoman Debt securities in the open market and,
after handing these to the Debt authority to an extent of £1,228,000
sterling, could arrange to pay off the small remainder by instalments.
Thus, at the cost of finding funds from current revenue for
debt extinction, the State could enter the League happily unencumbered.

652 The proposed foundation of a National Bank, often discussed,
431 was still postponed. The Indian rupee currency, which had served
'Iraq well for fifteen years, was superseded early in 1932 by an
'Iraqi currency employing the dinar (equivalent to a pound sterling),
divided into a thousand fils. Currency resources and the note issue
were supervised by a Board in London, and rested on a basis of
sterling assets. The confident reception of the new currency was
the more gratifying as 'Iraq suffered not only temporarily from a
number of 'slump' bankruptcies, but chronically from an adverse
437 trade balance. A wide visible gap existed between the value of its
439 exports and that of its unavoidable imports of fuel, manufactured
articles, and some foods. The invisible exports which were assumed
to fill the gap were the expenditure by the British forces, diplomatic
and archaeological missions, charities and foreign schools,
pilgrims, tourists and foreign companies, and the profits of the
Persian transit trade. The progressive slackening of the last mentioned,
in spite of lowered transit dues, was a serious feature of the
times. Persian restrictions, Russian competition, the diversion of

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors. Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation, in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making; the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equip- 331
ment, the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

291 European dress was ever more generally adopted in the larger towns, and spread significantly to urbanized tribesmen. Among upper-class women, though the veil was still almost universal among Muslims, Western 556 clothing was worn increasingly. The desire for material progress was reflected in the eagerness of the rich to acquire motor-cars, gramophones, and the toys and amenities of Europe; but inability to pay for these gave rise to demands for limitless credit.

466 Interest at the International Labour Office in conditions among 'Iraq's industrial workers led to some answering efforts to produce suitable legislation; but the smallness of this class in an unindustrialized country made European criteria and standards largely inapplicable. The first seeds were sown, however, of a social interest in labour matters.

744 To the whole community and to urban society in particular with its still prevalent poverty and low purchasing power the Government's Health and Education services contributed valuably. The former improved its quarantine and pilgrim services, multiplied its countryside dispensaries, improved its specialist institutes, and dealt well with the cholera epidemics of 1927 and 1931. It was significant that out-patient attendances, less than 750,000 in 1921, had more than doubled by 1926 and quadrupled by 1930. In response to foreign purchasers' outcry, the Health Department imposed measures of cleanliness in the date industry. In 1927 it founded the Royal Medical College; this, a medical school of good standards, took at once a high place in 'Iraq's higher and professional education. A School of Pharmacy had existed since 1922. The Government adhered during these years to a number of international conventions on medical as on many other matters.

871 The 'Iraqi schools seemed to foreign observers at this period—and indeed at others—to lack something of the best spirit of education. There was criticism of lax discipline, uncritical self-flattery, a worship of modernity and materialism; politics pervaded too many of the schools, always in the form of a crude xenophobia eager for street demonstrations. Nevertheless, an educational system grew and multiplied its facilities, fought for budget allotments, developed an Inspectorate, codified its Regulations. A Hygiene Directorate was formed in the Education Ministry, later [562] greatly to develop. The year 1930 saw the first Government secondary schools for girls; the days of Muslim hesitation over female education were almost over. For boys the secondary period was prolonged from four to five years, three 'intermediate' and two 'senior'. The dispatch of students for higher education abroad grew commoner. Technical education remained unpopular: it did not lead quickly enough to the goal chiefly envisaged, a Govern-

ment appointment. A School of Agriculture, founded hastily and 871 inefficiently in 1928, was perforce discontinued for lack of pupils two years later—to be afterwards refounded. A Health Officials' school, in connexion with the College of Medicine, in 1932 replaced the existing Pharmaceutical School: a year later a Nursing school was inaugurated, to which a midwifery section was to be added in 1936. The training of rural teachers at the primary teachers' stage was [875] discontinued; but its necessity, urged by the American mission which visited 'Iraq under Dr. Paul Monroe in 1932, was later to be recognized. The provisional plan of 1923 for higher teacher-training was also discontinued, for later amendment. Another American secondary school, this time a Jesuit enterprise, was founded in Baghdad in 1932, and accepted pupils of all faiths. Government secondary schools by 1930 numbered fifteen, primary nearly 300. The theological college of Al al-Bayt closed its doors in 1929. The Law School, 'Iraq's nearest approach to a university course, kept all its popularity and produced civil servants as well as advocates. Separate Assyrian schools taught little but their own brand of religion. Kurdish schools, thirty in number by 1930, included one intermediate, and one for girls. Annual grants were 658 made to the schools of the minority communities and foreign missions; their standard, not least in European languages, was generally higher than in those of the State. About 8 per cent. of all Government revenues was at this time spent on education. Lionel Smith retired from the Advisership to Education in 1930, and was not replaced.

Greater sums than this were needed for the services of security: 701 a fifth or more of Government income maintained the 'Iraq Army, [832] and nearly a sixth the Police Force. Since the Levies, reduced to two battalions in 1928, were used decreasingly on operations, and the Royal Air Force, reduced from eight squadrons in the period 1922 to 1926 to four in 1930, was soon to be no longer available for internal operations, reliance must be on the Police and the 'Iraq Army; no pains, therefore, were spared to augment and improve these. The Royal 'Iraqi Air Force came into existence in 1930, with five light aircraft. The Army, to which Great Britain contributed a grant until 1932, was developed with the close guidance of a British Military Mission which, increased from six officers in 1921 to forty-six in 1930, was then reduced to twenty-six. It trained its own officers at military and staff colleges, and by the dispatch of selected men to Sandhurst or Quetta. Recruiting in the period 1926 to 1932 was voluntary, numbers sufficient, training and maintenance adequate, discipline good. The strength of the Army by 1932 approximated to two brigades. It was unfortunate that its most frequent operations, against Kurdish insurgents, were in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

701 the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

625 The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services. Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force, some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security. In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrongdoers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely 697 policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

499 Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inaccessible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechaniza-619 tion of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance 656 on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

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the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater 656 freedom of Turkish times.

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that 72 archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Ḥilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Lu', and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and co-ordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell.

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily de- 494 veloped during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern 499 Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Fayṣal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders.

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

494 were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into
499 the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at
Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty &
Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed
in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad
and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932.
A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable
engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the
'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The
'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed
through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the
Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to
divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was
doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a
direct Baghdad–'Amman route, and the first experiments in
developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

505 The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their
local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and
road competition, and had little scope for development. The
veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927,
Mejidieh in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S*.16 and
S.14 were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be
renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris*
in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after
503 1929. At Baṣra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally
completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928–30.
They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead
of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 20 feet in 1920)
and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port
505 traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from
Abadan, but the Shaṭṭ was used regularly also by the Strick,
British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German)
Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of
504 Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most
imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the
Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi
for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port
administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was
normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the
years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual
instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation
of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930
Treaty, was not yet in sight.

496 The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful.
471 Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1925-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Airways.
In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air communications—the
'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was completed
in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for packages;
communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold concession
granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

185 Ruṭba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of
654 bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial develop-
135 ment proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every
Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its
favour. 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled
433 artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

382 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil
export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in
471 1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

the earning of royalties. The agreement once passed by Parliament, 382 at the cost of one ministerial resignation, the Company could 471 plan and execute its twofold desert pipeline and its mid-desert pump-stations: works which called for its utmost efforts, human and financial, for the next three years. These and the continuing field operations in Kirkuk area constituted by far the most important man-made enterprise of 'Iraq's long history and, it could be hoped, the most advantageous to its Treasury and public.

The internal structure of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was completed by the definite admission of its American shareholders, the Near East Development Corporation, in 1928. The I.P.C. fields headquarters in 'Iraq moved from Ṭuz Khurmatu to Kirkuk in 1931, while that of its pipelines was established at Haifa. The annual payments, of which Turkey received 10 per cent. under the 1926 Treaty (p. 156), were made in sterling at the Bank of England exchange rate as between gold and sterling.

The area of north-western 'Iraq released by the I.P.C. in 1931 was next year allotted by Government to the B.O.D. Company, a British group, with considerable Italian, German, and other foreign shareholding, which had tried vainly to acquire 'plots' under the I.P.C. Concession of 1925, and in 1929 had protested at Geneva against its exclusion. Inheriting the test-drilling results of the I.P.C. west of Tigris, the B.O.D. bound itself to pay in advance of production an annual dead rent of £100,000 (gold), rising to £200,000: to export a stated minimum of 1 million tons per year within a seven-year time limit: and to allot to Government without charge a fifth of its crude production in addition to the royalty of 4 shillings (gold) per ton. The Company proceeded forthwith to the further exploration of its territory, forming an operating company, Mosul Oil Fields, for the purpose.

The Anglo-Persian meanwhile, with its smaller concession in the Transferred Territories and its revised 1926 agreement (p. 174), formed the Khaniqin Oil Company as its subsidiary for production within 'Iraq, and completed its Alwand refinery near Khaniqin in May 1927, when King Fayṣal opened it. Thereafter north and central 'Iraq were supplied at favourable prices with petroleum products from this source; southern 'Iraq still drew from Abadan. A network of distribution facilities soon covered the territory; it was managed by the Rafidain Oil Company, an Anglo-Persian distribution company formed for the purpose. Drilling at the Nafṭkhana field was limited hereafter by the K.O.C. to its actual needs, and at Chiah Surkh, where it had been abandoned in 1904, 1912, and 1924, it was resumed in 1930; but production still proved impracticable.

The daily lives of more 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in 000

312 The daily lives of more 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in agriculture than by even the greatest industry, and such progress in 653 this period was not negligible. The grandiose irrigation schemes for which the press and public called were not, indeed, at once attainable; maintenance, minor improvement, and research were rather the order of the day. Nevertheless, some works of fair magnitude were carried out. New headworks and canalization on the Diwaniya and Daghara branches of the Euphrates were undertaken, and improvements in the water-supply to the Suq rice-lands. Swamp-drainage at Karbalā was primarily a public health measure. A permanent weir across the Diyalā replaced annually renewed antiquated works and secured supplies for the Ruz, Khurasan, and Maḥrut canals. The Laṭifiya Canal, the new Iskandariya, the Shayshubar were dug or re-aligned. A clearance of the Baṣra creeks and a major regulator, opened by the King in 1930, on the Bad'a in Muntafiq country were works of great local value. With them went continuous researches, surveys, experiments in desalination and drainage, and efforts to maintain and improve the 'bunds', breaches of which could ruin a countryside as they did in the disastrous floods of 1926 and 1929, and the necessity for which only the completion of the long-standing flood-diversion schemes could remove. Such was the Ḥabbaniya project, conceived by Willcocks twenty years earlier and closely restudied from 1927 to 1932; in the last of these years tenders were called for and the work seemed imminent. Other major plans, postponed by lack of funds and incomplete data, were the Tigris barrage at Kut al-Amara to restore the Gharraf and to control the 'Amara rice-lands: the smaller Abu Ghurayb canal from the Euphrates left bank, begun in 1932: an 'Aqar Quf drainage project near Baghdad: a proposed reservoir at or near Qizil Rubaṭ to conserve Diyalā water for summer use: a new head for the Ḥilla branch: the Isḥaqi Canal, to take Tigris water from opposite Samarrā: and work on the main Euphrates channel near Shinafiya. The Irrigation Department was administered from 1925 to 1928 by L. E. Bury, who acted also as Adviser to the Ministry of Works and after 1927 to that also of Irrigation and Agriculture. W. Allard succeeded as Director of Irrigation from 1928 to 1933, and as Chief Engineer under an 'Iraqi director in 1933–4. Wheatley resumed the advisership of Communications and Works in 1929, and held it for the next eight years.

241 Of the need to improve agricultural methods, if these canal 654 works were to yield all their value, the public was little aware. In spite of continued research and experiment, the main agricultural problems of the territory were yet unsolved—those of soil deterioration, antiquated techniques, inferior crop varieties, low and impure yields, and harvests endangered by flood or drought.

Their solution must depend on the simultaneous and widespread 241 working of forces of rural education, reliable security, sound land 654 tenure and properly financed enterprise. Meanwhile, the annual locust campaigns in northern 'Iraq were developed jointly with neighbouring countries. Progress was made in hill-country tobacco-growing and treatment of the leaf on modern lines. Silk experiments continued, though with scant success. Cotton-growing was still restricted by unskilled cultivation and by pests. The produce of the great date-groves of southern 'Iraq was bringing difficult problems not only of improved culture but of organization and disposal, and civil war raged between growers and packers. Of the attempts at modern estate development (p. 17) none had yet succeeded. The projected Agricultural Bank could not, it was found, be inaugurated until clearer land-titles gave security for loans. The Aṣfar Concession was limited and revised to provide for the acquisition and development by the Company of the Laṭifiya estate, south of Baghdad; the Irrigation Department constructed the main canal at the Company's expense, and promising operations on the 65,000-acre area began under European management.

The main agricultural development of the time was that of riverside 312 pump irrigation. This had been initiated before 1914 and moderately extended between 1920 and 1925. Aided by important fiscal privileges, it began thereafter to show remarkable increase, to the point of becoming a main feature of 'Iraq's economy. Installations in the liwās of Baghdad, Diwaniya, Kut, 'Amara, and Diyalā had by the end of 1930 brought the number of pumps to over 2,000, representing a million-acre increase of cultivable area. There was evident value in thus attracting capital to agriculture, utilizing the cheap oil available, exploiting the high-lying virgin lands, and avoiding the precarious chances of flood irrigation. But the development 3 was not free from trouble. The attraction of cultivators to 472 new lands rather diverted them from old than increased their numbers; improvement in yields, due to fresh lands and secure irrigation, was not matched by superior type or purity of crops. Estate management attempted by townsmen was sometimes short-sighted and uneconomic, and the hard times and low prices of 1930–1 brought ruin to many hopeful enterprises. These, moreover, 423 jointly undertaken by an urban capitalist—often a Deputy or city notable—and a tribal shaykh or *sirkal*, were productive of puzzling difficulties of land tenure and rights. Neither the traditional occupancy of the tribe, nor the share claimed by the incoming capitalist, had any basis in law. Agreements between the parties often proved unworkable, and in practice did not always bring blessings to the cultivators. These conditions indicated, yet

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

423 again, 'Iraq's imperative need not only of a land settlement but of new thinking on the subject of land-holding; the connexion of the pervasive instability and frequent injustice of land tenure with the level of security, with progress in agriculture, with social development, and with fiscal methods was long established. The formation of a State Domains Department, the bringing of old land records from Istanbul, the appointment in 1929 of an abortive Muntafiq Land Commission, the uncounted hours spent by every Qa'immaqam and Mutaṣarrif in the piecemeal 'settlement' of land cases were all signs that Government was aware of this, its greatest, problem. In 1929 an expert from the Egyptian Service, Sir Ernest Dowson, was invited to study and report comprehensively on 'Iraqi land settlement. His report, submitted in 1932, contained a full analysis of present evils and their cure. It led to the establishment of a Settlement Department under the Ministry of Finance, the passage of a law recognizing and regularizing rights of *lazma*—heritable occupancy—over Government land, and the appointment of Settlement officers—Ditchburn, Aston, Lyon, and Jardine, all from the ranks of the Administration Inspectorate—as Presidents of Land Settlement Committees to start operations in the field. These were steps of great significance to 'Iraq's economic history.

7. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1927–32

648ˣ The 'Iraq Kingdom during the last years of the Mandate was able, with the help of its ally, to extend and normalize its foreign relations. This was done by adherence to many international conventions,[1] by bilateral treaties or agreements, by consular or diplomatic representation, by stabilization of frontiers and by exchanges of State visits. While much of this represented normal international co-operation or courtesy, some, on the part of a State on the verge of emancipation, indicated eagerness to see and be seen in world circles. The sensitivity of adolescence in matters of prestige was enhanced by Arab pride and the assertion of an Arab national individuality new to the modern world; indeed, the move towards Arab Unity in more than the sphere of mere culture and sentiment was already implicit.

Until 1931 the duties of Foreign Minister were nominal, and the portfolio held always by the Prime Minister. The 'Iraqi representative in London became Minister in 1928, and the dispatch of Ministers to Ankara and Teheran followed the regularization of

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[1] The subjects covered thereby, from 1926 to 1939, included Customs and transit, the rules of war, sea and air navigation, electric and water power, posts and telecommunications, health and drugs, locust control, cinematograph films, and workers' conditions.

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

relations with Turkey and Persia, shortly to be described. These appointments were reciprocated. Consuls-General were posted to Cairo in 1928, Beirut in 1932, and Consuls in the same years to other cities in the Middle East. Foreign representatives, welcome as signs of their countries' recognition of 'Iraq, appeared in Baghdad and Baṣra from 1926 onwards from a dozen European nations—Ministers from Turkey, Persia, France, and Germany, and Consuls from Poland, Italy, Belgium, Egypt, the United States, Sweden, Norway, Greece, Holland, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and Afghaniṣtan. The tripartite British-American-'Iraqi Pact of 1931 gave American recognition, and secured to American citizens the privileges of League members. With Egypt an Extradition Treaty was made in 1931. Official visits, ending with a Treaty of Friendship, were exchanged with the Yaman in 1931 and 1932. With the mandated Amirate of Transjordan visits of the two fraternal rulers were exchanged before and after the death of King Ḥusayn at 'Amman in 1931. A Treaty of Friendship was signed in that year, and in 1932 the mid-desert frontier, from the Najd border to Jabal Tanf, was amicably defined.

Of 'Iraq's closer neighbours more must be said. With Persia, now fast advancing materially and administratively under its Pahlavi dictator, good progress was made in these years in direct frontier contacts and by the Shah's official recognition of the 'Iraq Kingdom; but pretexts enough for further quarrelling remained. It was possible in 1927 to end the futile nuisance of Salar al-Dawla's annual visitations, by his dispatch on an allowance to Palestine. The Mandali water dispute was arranged by a Mixed Commission, frontier cases in the Khaniqin sector were settled by the neighbouring governors, Simko lurked quiescent in 'Iraq till his migration to Turkey in 1928. The trans-frontier migrations of the Pishdar and their behaviour in Persia were handled, at the instance of the High Commissioner, by meetings of the neighbouring authorities. In the Baṣra area trouble arose in 1927 among the Muḥaysin tribe, who live on both sides of the border. It sprang from the activities of the 'Iraqi Census Department. The Muḥaysin tribesmen in 'Iraq, their Persian passports (as they complained) confiscated and the menace of 'Iraqi conscription looming nearer, fled into Persia and were joined there by other tribesmen of 'Iraqi nationality. The latter Government, moved by the protests of the Shah's officials, ordered Muḥaysin registration to cease; but it was restarted vindictively by the local Persian Consul who, offering Persian nationality to scores of 'Iraqis, emboldened these to defy their Government. Angry demonstrations were checked by police intervention and the arrest of ringleaders, but peace was restored

648 only by the receipt of Persian orders to their Consul to desist. The traditional and resented Shaṭṭ al-'Arab boundary remained a source of Persian rancour. British diplomatic intervention was [439] effective in 1928 in preventing the imposition of maximum Persian import duties on goods from 'Iraq, a measure which threatened ruin to the transit trade; but the presence and grievances of many thousands of Persian subjects in 'Iraq—and of those also who, to escape 'Iraqi obligations, claimed that status when convenient—could not fail to supply endless material for dispute and protest.

563 648 The humiliating refusal of Persian recognition of the 'Iraq State was due in fact less to petty disputes and neighbourly jealousies than to the anomalous position of this large expatriate colony. It had long claimed the privileged status accorded in 'Iraq to the subjects of some Powers of Europe. But Persia had never been a Capitulatory Power in the Ottoman Empire, and was unlikely to grant 'Iraqis in Persia corresponding treatment: and the demand for special rights denied to 'Iraqis themselves was unwelcome to the 'Iraq Government, the more so by reason of the numbers involved. Persia would withhold recognition until its claim be granted: 'Iraq refused to consider such claim until after recognition. Deadlock was complete, and all governmental negotiation between the two States remained perforce in British hands. The revision in 1929–30 of the Anglo-'Iraq Judicial Agreement of 1924 offered, however, an opportunity for removing the root of the trouble. The Persian delegate at Geneva applauded the principle of the new Agreement, which was one of equality for all, and the British Minister in Teheran could assure the Shah's Government that in this and all matters—notably the Shaṭṭ boundary—British good offices were available to remove causes of dissension. The effect was instantaneous. In May 1929 full recognition of the 'Iraq Kingdom was accorded by the Persian Government, whose Minister appeared in Baghdad. A 'Provisonal Agreement', covering most-favoured-nation treatment, consular and diplomatic representation, and trade and transit was signed in August, and 'Iraqi Consuls were posted to the Persian cities. Thenceforward the treatment of common interests and problems proceeded with fair success by direct 'Iraqi-Persian approaches. The 'Provisional Agreement' was annually renewed while drafting of the permanent Treaty proceeded slowly. The troublesome Pishdar movements were kept under control. Kurdish Aghās seeking refuge across frontiers in this or that territory were removed to safety from border districts. The Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh and his sons, dispossessed anachronisms now exiled in 'Iraq, were brought to Baghdad in 1929 when a foolish revolutionary attempt on Persian soil drew attention to them. Joint military operations by forces of the two

1z Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

countries were directed with good results in 1931 and 1932 against 648K the veteran trouble-makers of the Hawraman, Maḥmud Khan 563 Dizli and Ja'far Sulṭan. The annual movement of the Jaf migrants from the Ḥalabja and Kifri plains into Persia met in 1931 with tightened control from the Shah's modernizing officials; taxation and attempted arms-control caused outcry which a reasonable inter-governmental compromise was able to placate. No source of justifiable trouble, it seemed, was now outstanding except—a major exception—the river boundary below Baṣra. A visit by the High Commissioner to Teheran early in 1932 was followed by another, made with full formality, by King Fayṣal and his Prime Minister in April of that year.

Relations far more cordial than could have been expected were 648K maintained with the Turkish Republic. The now feasible re-establishment of social contacts restored many friendships and offered much familiar common ground; nor, once the settlement of 1926 was loyally accepted, was there any substantial clash of interest. The rehabilitation of trans-frontier trade and communications was, however, a slow process in the disturbed condition of eastern Turkey.

The standing Frontier Commission was first convened in the autumn of 1926, and thenceforward met six-monthly in great amity for some years; later meetings were infrequent, since there was little to be done. A joint Delimitation Committee, under a Swiss president, worked for six months in 1927 and, with its careful mapping and its hundred concrete boundary pillars implanted, produced acceptable results. Ministers were exchanged between Baghdad and Ankara; the genial Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, early among these, died in the Turkish capital. The trans-frontier raiding of Kurdish tribes, the safety-seeking manœuvres of Simko (whose type of, and fortunes in, Kurdish nationalism matched those of Shaykh Maḥmud), the incursion of Turkish tribal subjects in search of refuge in 'Iraq's most inaccessible corners: none of these affected Turco-'Iraqi goodwill, nor disturbed what passed for security in central Kurdistan. The King and Ministers visited the Turkish capital in state in July 1931, escorted by his own Air Force; and early in 1932 Nuri Pasha revisited it for the signing of Turco-'Iraqi treaties of Residence, Commerce, and Extradition. The Amir Zayd accepted the post of 'Iraqi Minister to Turkey and stayed there for some years.

'Iraqi-Syrian relations were on two levels: those of neighbouring Arab countries, and those of the French and British Mandataries. The latter had much improved since the strains and ill-feeling of the period from 1918 to 1921; common interests in the carriage of mails, desert security, extradition, transport and transit, and

648x locust-control had grown, though the discrepancy of the two policies towards their wards was manifest. Desert life was characterized by the usual hostilities between the Ṭai, the Yazidis of Jabal Sinjar and the Shammar, which were composed in 1927, and those of the warring Shammar factions themselves—'Ajil against Daḥam—and their tax-avoiding migrations. A successful large-scale assembly of tribal and Government representatives met at 'Aqra in the spring of 1927 and agreed to the cancellation of a score of outstanding claims. Such meetings were repeated in and after 1931. [221] The mass movements of the great 'Aniza sections ignored, as ever, the frontiers assumed by their nominal Governments; in 1929 the bulk of the Ruwalla and Saba'a poured into 'Iraq for grazing and passed across the desert motor route, but tribal fighting, for which the 'Iraqi 'Amarat were all too ready, was avoided by their withdrawal. In 1931 progress in Paris conversations on the still undetermined frontier had so far advanced that application could be made to the League Council to appoint a Commission to trace a boundary based on that of 1920. A Swiss president, with a Spanish and a Swedish member, were appointed for the task. The first of these, Colonel de Reynier, lost his life in an aircraft accident on his way eastward, and was replaced by a fellow countryman, Colonel Iselin. The Commission finished their task in May 1932 and offered their recommendations, which were not unanimous, in September. These were adopted by the League. They involved the inclusion of the whole Jabal Sinjar within 'Iraq, with compensating transfer of territory to Syria elsewhere. The subsequent Delimitation Committee, with the same Chairman, finished its work in 1933. It was notable that in frontier dealings thereafter, as well as before, 'Iraqi tribal and other interests were defended by 'Iraqis, Syrian by Frenchmen.

The grievous events of the 'Iraqi–Najd border in 1927–9 illustrated, all too typically, the effects of confronting the proud but primitive and fanatical bedouin of north-eastern Arabia with a territorial frontier, which they could neither locate nor comprehend, as opposed to one tribally indicated; with an attempt at national discipline in their own country, which they resisted with savage individualism: and with modern weapons, which they resented as evil and unjust. With the penetration of Western conceptions into Arabia, the erection there of a relatively formidable central Government, and habituation to guns and aircraft, the same conditions are unlikely to recur; indeed, they may have passed for ever from the world.

648x 721 The good effect of the Baḥra agreement lasted for two years, and although the establishment of the frontier tribunal envisaged in it was for many months delayed, the peace was kept in the wastes

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

south-west of the lower Euphrates and Kuwait. But these hopes 643 × were to be dashed. The Muṭayr were led by the truculent Fayṣal ibn Dawish, already insubordinate to his overlord. They attacked 731 in November 1927 the 'Iraqi outpost at Buṣaya, seventy-five miles inside the 'Iraq border. This tiny mud fort and that of Abu Ghar, ninety miles inland, were held each by a platoon of troops. At least a score of 'Iraqis were slaughtered by the Muṭayr, who were convinced that these outposts were provocative. Strong protest was made to Riyadh, and the Muṭayr pursued by Air Force machines; but they rallied and returned to penetrate yet farther into 'Iraq territory and slaughter riverain shepherds and their children at Jumayma in mid-December. The effect on 'Iraq tribes as remote as the 'Aniza was profound and deplorable; nor would ibn Sa'ud admit, in the correspondence which followed, the legitimacy of the 'Iraqi forts, even though the raids had been made not under but in defiance of his orders. The R.A.F. flew repeatedly over Najdi camps, the 'Iraq Government garrisoned the desert posts of Salman and Shabicha; but the Muṭayr again in February 1928 attacked 'Iraqi and Kuwayti tribes, south and south-west of Baṣra. Ibn Sa'ud was divided between anger at his subjects' indiscipline and resentment at their punishment by foreign arms. Successful in preventing the repetition of major raids, he declined a meeting with the Political Resident in the Gulf, and showed himself intractable regarding the desert forts when visited at Jidda, in May 1928, by Cornwallis and Sir Gilbert Clayton. These abortive conversations were resumed in August, after the pilgrimage, with Tawfiq al-Suwaydi now attending as 'Iraqi representative. They failed again, and the frontier continued to live under the menace of Najdi ferocity. In January 1929 a raid by the 'Ajman killed twenty 'Iraqis in Kuwayt territory, and attacked a motor convoy in which Americans were travelling, killing one of its passengers, Dr. Bilkert, a missionary. This was followed by a greater assault on 'Iraqi tribesmen by 'Uṭayba, with wholesale looting and the slaughter of over seventy people: and this again by Muṭayr and 'Ajman raids with heavy loss of life, still on 'Iraq tribes (the Bani Malik) and still in Kuwayt territory. The activity of the R.A.F., the steadfastness of the 'Iraqi posts at Salman, Buṣaya, Shabicha, and Nukhayb alone saved south-western 'Iraq during these weeks from the same submerging waves of bloodthirsty Wahhabis as had flowed over the Kuwayt principality.

The ruler of Najd again asserted, and no doubt with truth, that 648 × the raids were unauthorized, and turned his arms at last against his own disloyal lieutenants. In March 1929 his forces heavily defeated ibn Dawish. The rest of the year was passed by the royal and the rebellious Wahhabi forces in civil war, in which those of the Sa'udi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

[illegible] sovereign gradually isolated and finally crushed the rebel Muṭayr, 'Ajman, and 'Uṭayba. This marked the end of a movement of fanaticism and disobedience among the north-eastern Sa'udi tribes which had greatly embarrassed their King and cost 'Iraq dearly in life and property.

The way was now open for the consolidation of the better relations promised at Baḥra. In January 1930 ibn Sa'ud met the Political Resident, and sat in conference with the King of 'Iraq on board H.M.S. *Lupin* in Gulf waters. The meeting was successful; courtesy and good sense triumphed over deep dynastic and cultural divisions. The vexed question of the 'Iraqi desert posts was to be settled by later talks or by arbitration. A treaty was to be drafted. The destruction and bloodshed which the rebel Wahhabis had caused would be compensated: and in fact a quarter of the sum ultimately assessed, £30,000, was quickly paid. The potentates parted with a cordiality not wholly insincere, and raiding ceased. In April 1931 the 'Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Sa'id, with Ṭaha al-Hashimi, brother of Yasin Pasha, visited Mecca for the signature of a combined Treaty of Bon Voisinage, Friendship, and Extradition. The visit was returned in 1932 by the Amir Fayṣal, the second surviving son of the Arabian ruler. 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, on whom the highest 'Iraqi order was bestowed, adopted the royal title in the autumn of the year, and announced the renaming of his territories of Najd, al-Aḥsā, and the Ḥijaz combined as the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia.

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

I. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

182 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development,
563 and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding
795 differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses
511 were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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tures; and the introduction of these, with the gradual rescue of agriculture from primitive method and low yield, was a certain feature of the future. 'Iraq's irrigation problems—flood-protection, conservation of dry-season water, distribution, drainage—had been partly solved at least on paper, and more than one important scheme was formulated in readiness for execution; smaller works had been carried out, others were imminent. The complex problem of stultifying and perverse forms of land tenure had been unravelled, the way was open for clearance and rebuilding, and Settlement Committees were already in the field. Mineral wealth had been sought—but found wanting, save in the vastly important presence of a single asset, petroleum. The development of this had begun well, its potentialities were unlimited, and its contribution to 'Iraq's finances could already be foreseen as essential to all its hopes. Industry, willingly fostered, had indeed lagged behind for lack of raw materials, markets, and aptitudes, but could be expected to find a modestly increasing place in 'Iraqi economy. Trade was at the level, and on the lines, indicated by tradition and by present needs, and had well survived a world-wide depression. The means of communication of every type had immensely developed in the last half-generation, and would certainly be improved to meet the needs of an expanding economy and social and international needs. At least the elements of well-conceived public services already existed, and if funds permitted would gradually increase the social area of their activity.

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This security and these beneficent developments and social services had called and would call firstly for a reasonably efficient and comprehensive Administration, and secondly, for a sound and benevolent authority in the State itself, with a political life based on stable foundations. As to the first, the Administration which existed in 1932, while imperfect and in places rudimentary, not only was far superior to its Turkish predecessor, but seemed likely with time to shed the features which at present depressed it below the level of which the best 'Iraqi officials—keen, intelligent, honourable—were certainly capable. As to the second, the main bases of public life and legislation, there is more to be said.

'Iraq had adopted, as its form of government, representative parliamentary democracy. The choice could be criticized; but there had been no alternative. 'Iraq was no Najd, with full consent to a patriarchal tyranny: and no Persia or Turkey, which could throw up an efficient military dictator. It had as its only guide a political class which claimed to be liberal, wished to go on where the revolution of 1908 had left off, and was scornful of earlier forms; nor did it contain a personality capable of single rule, or a group capable of acceptable oligarchy. Neither to the British,

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions. 181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradi- 665 tion of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free 204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations' in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe. The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in 646 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the 666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions, that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of 662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

bility, for some other power to intervene with decision; a part 642
which, in the event, was to be that of the Army. 662

It may be asked, would a frankly authoritarian government— 000
dictatorship, acknowledged oligarchy or mere Arab patriarchy—have been preferable? It would in all likelihood have been still less acceptable to its public than the pseudo-democracy actually imposed; the procedures of democracy, however ill conducted, were at least educative and might later show a narrowing gulf between form and spirit. Even a semi-nominated Chamber contained enough of intelligence, experience, and public spirit to be a valuable deliberative and critical body; politics and press at least provided an arena of action for the intelligentsia, whose suppression would be dangerous as well as improper. The only alternative to 'democracy' might well prove to be a tyranny oppressive within and, by its probable international adhesions, dangerous without. 'Iraqi political history for the ten years following its achievement of independence was to be one of the alternation in short cycles of the imposition and the relaxation of authority: the former accompanied by protests and violent intrigues against 'slavery', the latter always abused by licence turning to anarchy.

There was reference above to a ruling class. In fact, claimants 665
to leadership were more than one, and their claims if permitted 184
could be scarcely consistent with a democratic régime. In tribal society the position of the shaykhs, with all their intestine rivalries and schisms, was still unchallenged though no longer State-sponsored. Among the Shi'i population, and especially among the tribes of the Euphrates, the influence of the 'Ulamā was still considerable and rarely exercised in the direction favoured by Government. Officialdom, an alternative source of leadership and itself a main social element, was now broadened by full admission of the Shi'is, and its standard of education, conduct, and efficiency had risen markedly since Turkish times; but nothing in its position or allegiances could lead it to a sense of solidarity with the masses. The same is true of the non-official part of that important middle class whose upper edges touched the ministerial, the lower the proletariat class, and which included the lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shop-keepers, commercial employees, higher technicians, middlemen, and ex-officers. Extending from bare literacy to some learned pretensions, the class was self-conscious as the evolved and progressive element in their country; but it was frustrated by lack of active outlets in public life and especially by failure to break into the ruling circle. From it were arising, already before 1932, the new politicians and publicists. Not without quick intelligence and shrewdness, and often effective

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as speakers and writers, this element which aspired increasingly to the leadership of the nation contained a number of able, sincere, and progressive men; but too large a proportion showed also the defects of the 'Iraqi political character—emotional hastiness, irresponsibility, egoism—and in spite of their claim to be the 'enlightened' they seemed at present not greatly to excel the 'old school' in disinterestedness or in wisdom. The 'old school', meanwhile, the ruling and minister-providing order which held most of the power in 1932, derived from the wealthier Sunni families of the greater cities, landowning or otherwise: from the ranks of senior ex-officials, who often belonged also to these families, and from the higher ex-officers, who rarely did so: and from a small class of rich Shi'i notables. These in all formed a body of established and experienced men of the world. Devoted often to sectional interests, they were not incapable of transcending them, and while willing to accept democratic forms they were reluctant to welcome disturbing elements from outside or from below.

182 Such elements composed the 'Iraqi political public of 1932, or claimed to lead it. Future years must reveal how far they could be reconciled, absorbed, or proved capable of self-subordination. Meanwhile, with material enough for divided councils, intrigue and faction, and for personal interests and ambitions, there were important unifying factors also, in addition to the general bonds of common religion, culture, and citizenship. All the public alike had been subject to the mandatory régime, with its control and its well-intentioned counsels—and almost all had, to some degree, reacted against it. In the future, with the passing of the direct control which Great Britain had exercised, the services of a few British servants of the 'Iraq Government would remain to be used in whatever manner and degree 'Iraqis might approve. The help of the British Ambassador,[1] successor to the High Commissioner, was equally to be available to future 'Iraqi Prime Ministers. These were and had long been factors of stability and continuity. Another had been the monarchy itself; and there was in 1932 no expectation

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[1] British Ambassadors to 'Iraq in the period 1932–51 (all of whom are mentioned in the text) were: Sir Francis Humphrys, 1932–5, having been High Commissioner since 1929: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 1935–8: Sir Maurice Peterson, 1938–9: Sir Basil Newton, 1939–41: Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (ex-Adviser to Interior, 1921–35), 1941–5: Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird, 1945–7: Sir Henry Mack, 1947–50: Sir John Troutbeck, 1951.

The services rendered to 'Iraq by senior members of their staffs were in some cases very appreciable, though entirely unknown to the public. Those who held the position of Counsellor—and usually acted for considerable periods as chargé d'affaires—were: G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, 1932–5: C. H. Bateman, 1935–8: W. E. Houstoun-Boswall, 1938–40: A. Holman, 1940–2: G. H. Thompson, 1942–5: D. L. Busk, 1946–8: H. Trevelyan, 1948–50: H. Beeley, 1950. Oriental Secretaries of the period were V. Holt, 1932–44, S. H. Perowne, 1945–7, J. C. B. Richmond, 1948–51.

that the incomparable services of King Fayṣal would not be available 182 for another twenty years, capable as they were of neutralizing many of the conflicts and unstable features of 'Iraqi public life. That this was not to be was mercifully concealed at the hour of Independence; equally, it could not be foreseen that one of the agencies of security and national unity—the promising and hitherto correctly subordinate Army—was to take the lead in revolution and embitterment.

The most effective of unifying features—though in fact one of 186 division also, since it was espoused by different factions with very different degrees of passion—was that of nationalism, the strongest single force in contemporary 'Iraqi politics. It had taken the form usual in 'new' nations, who adopt with enthusiasm the attitudes of which older, disillusioned countries have already wearied. Pride of country and desire for its political freedom have been generally hailed as laudable emotions, and by 1932 many 'Iraqis had shown ardours of patriotism as respectable as any in any country. But, in common with that of other countries, 'Iraqi nationalism had been in some measure vitiated by elements less respectable. Their friends would have wished to purge it of features morally and materially damaging to it, and to diffuse conscious pride of country throughout the public rather than see it concentrated in a small political class. They would have preferred political aspiration, which used nationalism as its war-cry, directed towards securing a better life for the masses rather than towards political goals as ends in themselves. If strident xenophobic nationalism had been less crudely in evidence, and a broader-based, more tolerant patriotism had taken its place, hopes for sound progress could have been the brighter. It was a defect of this nationalism, reacting against the country's social backwardness and resenting the material and international superiority of Europeans (and, often enough, their airs of social superiority also) to indulge in uncritical self-flattery and distorted history; and it added, as a unifying element, the encouragement of common hatreds directed sometimes against internal minorities, sometimes against 'the foreigner'. The local nationalism showed, save in a few individuals, little appreciation of what Western European civilization had at its best to offer—in tolerance, generosity, true freedom, and equality of opportunity—and little sense of the practical self-preserving wisdom, for small nations, of accepting a friendly place beside stronger Powers. An excessive or morbid sensitiveness reacted instead against imagined insults, fears of interference or suspected moves of 'imperialism'. Wrongly identified with patriotism, nationalism in fact was a field for political competition: the more anti-foreign the politician, the greater patriot. This persistent feature of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

186 politics cost the careers and sometimes the lives of some of its best sons, and deprived its people of real advantages.

648× In the international field, three main tasks would devolve after 1932 on the 'Iraqi nation: the first, to profit to the full from the support and help which its ally was prepared, without interference or self-seeking, to offer it: the second, so to align itself in world politics as to secure its own safety in whatever power-struggles might lie ahead: and thirdly, to take such steps as popular feeling might indicate in the direction of closer relations with the rest of the Arab world. The first of these tasks, which called for nothing more than the maintenance of mutually friendly relations with the British, was no arduous one; there was indeed no field of clashing interest between the two allies, and the anti-foreign extravagances of the press could no doubt be rightly assessed by both parties. In world affairs outside 'Iraq, its Government had no choice to make until the rise of Nazi power in Germany, and the attractiveness to many 'Iraqis of its forms and methods, created the temptation of a move of 'Iraqi policy away from Great Britain and towards her probable enemies: a temptation which an 'Iraq Government, a decade later, failed to resist. In the Arab world, forward movement was inevitable and was likely to be viewed with general sympathy. 'Arab Unity' had made its appearance in ministerial programmes before the end of the Mandate and, though not all statesmen gave it identical interpretations or priority, to none did it fail to appeal. Unity of a sort, indeed, was implicit in the shared linguistic and cultural environment of Arabs, their common traditions, religion, and pride, from 'Iraq to Morocco; and politically it both reflected the inspiring memory of the medieval Islamic (though in fact mainly non-Arab) empires and was the heir of the generalized Arab nationalism of the early years of the twentieth century. 'Iraqis were mindful, more particularly, of the war-time promises to King Ḥusayn, when a single Arab State seemed to be envisaged, and of the urge to weld a greater Arab nation as a heavier counterpoise to the dominance of Europe, to correct the resented post-war parcellation of the Arab lands, and to enjoy a wider economic and social life. But there were factors, not easily to be dissipated, which must be expected to render political unity difficult to achieve. Such were the effects not only of sheer geographical separation but of the distinct local loyalties which, with the fullest encouragement of their respective Governments, had developed since 1918. Such were the differences in orientation, commercial interests, personal leaderships of dynasty or statesmen, and stages of evolution reached in the various Arab lands: and such the difference, in general, between inherited but untested fraternal sympathy, and the uneasy and exacting demands of political unity today. A further obstacle must be the intolerant 648x individualism of the Arab character, so recalcitrant to self-subordination and compromise. These difficulties were all to be faced when twelve years later Arab Unity was to become, largely under 'Iraqi inspiration, a formal political reality; and they were to prove formidable.

2. ASSYRIAN CLIMAX

The administrative and political features of 'Iraq life as these 665 existed in 1932 had been current already for three years or more; 668 there was consequently little sign of sudden change in the autumn of that year to indicate the removal of restraints and growth of dangerous tendencies which the last pages have described. Nuri Pasha Sa'id was not anxious to prolong his premiership; his position, strong in Parliament, had been heavily attacked outside by the Ikhā and the Nationalist Party. Their newspapers, repeatedly suppressed and as often reappearing, assailed the Treaty, the British, and the Cabinet, until a 'Law for the prohibition of harmful propaganda' was passed to restrain them. The Liberal or Reformist group now forming among the lawyers, the journalists, and the impatient 'enlightened' elements, who were turning for the first time to social questions as the background of politics, hoped to range itself and its newspaper, the *Ahali* (People), with a more progressive Government. The King and his advisers thought in terms of specific advances, adapted to the new times: advances towards greater national unity—Sunni–Shi'i, landlord–tenant, tribe–town, and Kurd–Arab—better administration, more devolution, and a stronger Army. Such a programme could best be realized by an all-party Administration, and this must indicate a Cabinet of the Ikhā with 'Ahd and independent elements. Moreover, ill-feeling based on personal and private matters, perhaps even on some tinge of royal jealousy at Nuri's successes, had rendered the Pasha's position barely tenable.

But the Ikhā–Nationalist pact was still recent, and the King 646x could not admit the only condition on which Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Āli, now Chief of the Royal Diwan, and their associates would accept office: that of Treaty revision. The compromise adopted, therefore, was that of a neutral Government headed by Naji Shawkat. It included eminent lawyers—the cautious and able Naṣrat al-Farsi, Jamil al-Wadi, and Jalal Baban—a distant cousin of Jamal Baban, and like him a Kurd for ministerial purposes—in the Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Works: Rashid al-Khawja, an able ex-officer who had been Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad, in Defence: a competent and moderate Shi'i, 'Abbas Mahdi, in Education: and the prudent 'Abd al-Qadir Rashid in Foreign Affairs. The

*645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

*648 661 The formation of a Government under Rashid 'Āli, in the presence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-Ikhā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Āli began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Ḥikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Ḥaydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muḥammad Zaki al-Baṣri, in Justice.

*645 668 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national cooperation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

arrived in London on 20 June accompanied by three ministers, 643
Yasin Pasha, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Ḥaydar. The visit was completely successful. The King, after his stay at Buckingham Palace, visited Scotland and Devonshire, then spent some days in London and some in Switzerland. But his health appeared to be seriously affected by the strains of the last twenty years, and he would willingly have rested for a further period in Europe, had not grave events recalled him urgently to Baghdad.

These events arose from the small, alien, unhappy Assyrian 553
community of whose dilemma and attempted settlement much has 657
been said in these pages. The Mar Sham'un, who spent the last six months of 1932 at Geneva but could accomplish nothing, returned in January 1933 to his restless and divided flock. Assyrian Levy officers, notably Yaqu son of Isma'il, had conducted a strong campaign in the Mar Sham'un's favour in the Dohuk–'Amadiya area. The 'Iraqi authorities had, on the contrary, weakened his prestige by their strict limitation of his powers to the spiritual field, and their treatment of Assyrians as normal members of the public. A strong anti-Patriarchal faction led by a Malik Khoshaba, with bishops and other Maliks, had secured the appointment of Khoshaba himself as President of the Advisory Committee for land settlement. The Mar Sham'un on his return, with his position weakened and all prospect of national migration or local consolidation dissipated, assumed an attitude of total refusal to co-operate with the Government-sponsored settlement, to conduct which the expected 'foreign expert', Major Thompson, arrived in Mosul in May 1933. The Patriarch, not content with spreading false suggestions regarding the settlement itself, threatened excommunication to any Assyrian who might participate in it; he was ready, some observers could not but feel, to sacrifice the interests of the community to the claims of his personal or hierarchical ambitions and resentments. In Mosul city Muslim-Assyrian feeling showed no improvement. An incident of stone-throwing at the windows of 'Iraqi Army officers was attributed to the Assyrians.

The Minister of Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, at this point wisely invited the Mar Sham'un to Baghdad, hoping for a personal understanding. But the antagonism was irremovable. The Minister, intelligibly if perhaps on the broadest view needlessly, bade his visitor surrender all claims to temporal power, even in the form urged by the Patriarch, which was that of adherence to the 'traditional customs of his people'. The Mar Sham'un addressed a letter full of complaints to the King on the eve of his departure for Europe, accusing both 'Iraqis and British of persecution. Three weeks of vain conversations and waiting ended with irritation on both sides and the order of Ḥikmat Sulayman on 24 June that the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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Patriarch should not leave Baghdad until further notice. He remained accordingly at the Y.M.C.A. hostel. Telegraphed directions from King Fayṣal in London on and after 19 June ('under British pressure', as Baghdad statesmen averred) bade his ministers pacify and release the prelate; but these were not merely set aside as being too clearly destructive of Government prestige, but aroused anger in Baghdad at so misplaced an intervention. The Ikhā Government was in fact already gaining credit even from its critics for firmness against the 'Assyrian menace'. Moderating suggestions for the removal of General Bakr Ṣidqi from the military command at Mosul had been refused. This officer, a harsh and ambitious egoist not destitute of some social and considerable military gifts, had long been bitterly anti-Assyrian and already saw himself, perhaps, as their authorized destroyer.

The situation in the Assyrian areas and in Mosul deteriorated as summer set in. Yaqu and his friends had for months been touring with a formidable armed party, flouting Government's authority and orders and urging non-cooperation with the Settlement. Only after the dispatch of ʿIraqi troops to posts in the Dohuk area, with the object of assuring order and discouraging Yaqu, was it possible for Lieutenant-Colonel Stafford, the Administrative Inspector of Mosul liwā (and subsequent historian of these events) to make contact with Yaqu and with friendly firmness bring him to Mosul. News of this submission was telegraphed to the King in London, who again suggested the release of the Mar Shamʿun, to be again refused. Yaqu's submission, however hesitating and insincere, was clinched at Mosul by a written promise to desist from agitation. This was followed by a meeting on 10 July at which a full statement of the Assyrian position in ʿIraq, and the difficulties which confronted their emigration from it, was made to them by the acting Mutaṣarrif and by Stafford. The next day all was cordiality between Government representatives and those of the party opposed to the Mar Shamʿun. The latter's following, to whom the reasons for his detention in Baghdad were patiently re-explained, agreed to send spokesmen to visit him there. They left Mosul, Yaqu and Luqo among them.

They proceeded, however, not as expected to Baghdad but forthwith across the Tigris into Syria, there to demand permission to enter from the French officer at ʿAyn Diwar post; nor can it now be certainly established whether this decision was a sudden unpremeditated gesture of despair (as upholders of the Assyrians allege) or part of a plan inspired by, or at least known to, either the Mar Shamʿun (who denied it) or his family in Mosul. Without waiting for permission, for which the frontier officer telegraphed to Beirut, the impetuous leaders sent word back to their villages alleging, with patent falsity, that the French welcome to Syria had been cordial, land was available, taxes on crops would be remitted. The clansmen, to a number of some 1,000, leaving their homes and families unprotected—certain sign that no act of violence was at that time contemplated—swarmed across the river at Faysh Khabur and below it, at a point where frontier rectification was presently intended (p. 218) in accordance with the recent delimitation.

The news of these moves reached Mosul on 20 July. It was received with suspicion, not unmixed with hopes that riddance of the Assyrians was in sight. Reports of river crossings multiplied, and qadhā officials did nothing to check the welcome exodus. The Army command, who not unwillingly saw in these movements a menace by the redoubtable Assyrian fighting men, dispatched troops to the Tigris to watch events from forward posts, and to deal, by disarmament, with any parties who might return into 'Iraq.

A new phase opened with information, on 27 July, that the French were allowing no more Assyrians to enter: if indeed any had yet entered Syria, since the western river bank was at the moment still 'Iraqi territory, untransferred. They declined also to apply, as might have been possible and as the 'Iraqi Foreign Minister specifically requested from the French chargé d'affaires, the Syro-'Iraqi Frontier Agreement whereunder tribal immigrants would be disarmed and moved inland from the border. A meeting between French and 'Iraqi officers was held at Faysh Khabur on 26 July, another on 2 August. At the latter, the French officer declared that the Assyrians would not be accepted in Syria, and that 336 rifles had been taken from the 415 armed men who had approached the frontier; and he took note of the emphatic 'Iraqi request that no armed Assyrians should recross into 'Iraq or that, if recross they must, sufficient notice should be given to the 'Iraqi authorities. The failure to observe this agreement, due rather to inefficiency than to malice, was a main factor in the tragedy which followed, and caused much of the 'Iraqi bitterness against the French.

News of these events, represented as a dangerous movement, aroused violent anti-Assyrian and anti-Christian feeling in Baghdad. The Government, delighted to play the rôle of protector of 'Iraqi interests against a grave danger, did not minimize 'the menace', did not contradict whispers that Great Britain was behind this plot of their protégés, and let the public offer an indifferent welcome to the King as he returned alarmed and apprehensive from Europe on 2 August. He was to stay for a month in his capital, powerless to influence a position whose facts he never appreciated, and whose emotional violence swept all before it.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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During the first three days of August a few individual Assyrians recrossed the river to 'Iraq to surrender their arms after angry quarrelling with their too hopeful leaders. On the afternoon of the 4th considerable parties, to whom the French had restored their arms, began unannounced to recross, determined to regain their unguarded families. Animated by whatever disastrous folly or malice, some individuals from among them discharged shots at 'Iraqi troops whose pickets faced the river and who were prepared to receive the surrendered arms. The scale of the fighting increased as more of the excitable mountaineers hurried to the front; the Army replied with spirit and substantially held their positions; and a hotly contested combat continued all night and until long after sunrise. The losses of the Army were some thirty killed and forty wounded, those of the Assyrians about half these numbers. In the early morning some 200 of the Assyrians made for the hills in small parties, seeking their homes; the rest with Yaqu and Luqo again crossed to the Syrian side where they were bombed by the 'Iraqi Air Force and, to a number of 533, were interned by the French. The broken stragglers together with villagers and wayfarers on the left bank were rounded up over a wide area and shot by the Army out of hand.

At no time, it is certain, could any Assyrian movement, however widespread and determined, have in any degree threatened the 'Iraqi State; yet such was the feeling aroused by past rancours, by fear and present anger, and by stories (not, it is probable, all untrue) of Assyrian atrocities to the dead or captured, that the 'Iraq Army launched from this point onwards a campaign of singular truculence. It was accompanied by a wave of unprecedented bitterness against the British. Anti-Assyrian measures taken during the following days included the hasty arming of Kurdish irregulars, the search of all roads and tracks for stray Assyrians who were shot at sight, the raising of a force of supernumerary police, and the terrorization by the Army of civil officials who might attempt (as some did) to interfere. The Minister of Defence, Jalal Baban, and the Director-General of Police, Ṣubiḥ Najib, on a flying visit on the 7th showed their zeal by projects to arm and inflame the Kurds against the Christians. Patrols of the R.I.A.F. vied with each other in reports of 'dangerous concentrations' of the now terrified Assyrian villagers. 'Iraq Army troops in Dohuk and Zakho massacred in cold blood not fewer than 100 Christian peasants in those villages. The Kurdish and Arab tribes —of the Kurds, the Sindi, Quli, Sulayvani: of the Arabs, the Jubur, Shammar, Ḥadidiyin—and parties of Yazidis were allowed to understand that the Assyrian settlements would not be protected; and looting, wholesale and unchecked, stripped and ruined almost

all their villages in Dohuk, Shaykhan, and Zakho qadhās. Those in 563
the qadhās of 'Amadiya, 'Aqra, Zibar, and Rawanduz, where the 721
civil Government could maintain its powers, were unmolested. Refugees, penniless and hungry, poured into Mosul and into the large central villages of Al Qush and Simayl (Simmel).

The Minister of the Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, toured the affected areas from 11–15 August. He became aware that the immediate requirement of policy was not to continue the current butcheries and lootings but to conceal from the world the truth, which with horror he learnt for the first time; for he had visited Simayl. Here, from 8–11 August, Assyrians belonging to the village and from outside it had clustered for safety round the police station, disarmed but solemnly reassured by the sergeant. Their terror increased when tribesmen were allowed unchecked to enter and loot their homes, their priest was removed, and their Arab fellow villagers moved out with the flocks. On the morning of 11 August, a motor machine-gun company of the 'Iraq Army entered the village in good order under its officers, and proceeded methodically to the massacre of every man in the village. The work was complete by early afternoon, and the troops withdrew in their vehicles. They returned next day to bury the dead, some 315 in number, including 4 women and 6 children.

It is not doubtful that this operation, revolting in its senseless cruelty, was planned and ordered by the Commanding General, Bakr Ṣidqi Pasha, though he had arranged himself to be absent in Mosul on that day. He intended, it was believed, a similar exploit at Al Qush, but was dissuaded. The 'Iraqi official account of the Simayl massacre as the work of tribesmen is contrary to the facts.

The historian has neither need nor wish to pass judgement upon 563
the series of events—not without their parallels, of St. Bartholomew or Glencoe—which began with the foolish and provocative manœuvres of, or indeed the actual attack launched by, Assyrian fanatics and ended with the shocking climax of the Simayl massacre. With their motives of folly, falsehood, hatred, and brutality they show humanity at its lowest. The attitude of the 'Iraqi authorities, central and local, to the Assyrian problem and people had been up to 4 August forbearing and indeed generous: the conduct of the 'Iraq Army thereafter was, in its sustained brutality, beyond defence. These actions were in large part concealed from the public, who were instead deceived by stories of widespread Assyrian rebellion, the gallantry of 'Iraqi troops, and the treacherous designs of Great Britain. This must explain the failure by Government or the public to give expression to any feeling of regret more forthright than the half-excuses of Yasin

563 Pasha at Geneva, or to any condemnation of the guilty officers. These were, on the contrary, fêted and promoted amid acclamation. The Mar Sham'un, on his side, was successful in disseminating an almost equally false picture of the Assyrian part and of his own misleading of his community; he sustained with complete success in Europe and America the part of an injured martyr.

As the storm passed gradually from the Mosul hills, troops withdrew and the villagers counted their dead and surveyed their ruined homes, a camp was opened at Government expense at Mosul for the destitute—strange reversion to the conditions of Ba'quba in 1919! Hundreds of Assyrian Levy dependants were transported to their lines at Hinaydi. Mosul filled with unemployed and unemployable refugees. Restoration of the villages was slow, the fields unsown, the population cowed and spiritless. Official orders for restoration of the loot by tribesmen were almost wholly ignored, promised compensation was never forthcoming. The rift between the Assyrians and the 'Iraq Government was complete; hatred and distrust had triumphed. In Mosul anti-Assyrian popular feeling was rabid, and leading members of the now terrified community, including the father, brother, and aunt of the Mar Sham'un, were deported from the town. Fantastic rumours of impending British or French action were believed, and the press surpassed all previous exploits. The Amir Ghazi, visiting the town on 27 August, was hailed enthusiastically by the exponents of an anti-British bitterness without precedent. In the Kirkuk oilfield there was tension but no demonstrations; at Bayji some anti-Assyrian rioting cost lives and property. The political public of central and southern 'Iraq, fed on stories of rebellion gallantly mastered, raged against the British and the expectation that they would intervene on their protégés' behalf. The Army soared heavenward in popular enthusiasm, its units and commanders returning to Baghdad were accorded the welcome of war-scarred heroes. The ministers indeed, rescued by this unifying enthusiasm from serious trouble on the Euphrates, dared adopt no other policy. The King, whose intervention on behalf of the Mar Sham'un in July was not forgiven, and from whom much of the ugly truth was concealed, found himself almost ignored amid the plaudits for his son and the generals; he returned, ill and dispirited, on 2 September to Europe for medical treatment.

The Mar Sham'un, whose personal safety in Baghdad could no longer be assured and was indeed hourly threatened, was removed to security in Cyprus by the Royal Air Force, to be there joined by his family. The 'Iraq Government granted him a monthly living-allowance on the condition of abstention from further provocative politics, a condition which he contravened from the first hour of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

accepting it. From Cyprus he continued to bombard the League 563 of Nations with petitions.

The return of Sir Francis Humphrys to Baghdad on 23 August, with the realization that [illegible] British pro-Assyrian intervention was imminent, gave some relief, not least to the uneasy but defiant Cabinet. The tension and emotion of mid-August gradually died down. Then, on 8 September, the news reached Baghdad that 645 King Fayṣal, with King 'Ali, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Ḥaydar at his bedside, had died suddenly of heart failure at Berne.

3. THE HASHIMI MINISTRY

The shock of this irreparable loss, dramatically sudden and coinciding with a wave of ungrateful depreciation, transformed public opinion in an hour. The late King regained, and deservedly, all his place in 'Iraqi esteem: esteem which was indicated, on the arrival of his body from Trieste and Haifa on 14 September, by a funeral without precedent in 'Iraq in its expression of nation-wide grief. His services had indeed been beyond price to the State of which he was both the spirit and the embodiment; and in days to come they were to prove irreplaceable. None could take his place as balancer of forces, nor preserve his equal relations with his own extremists and with the British, with town intelligentsia and with wild tribesmen; none could control, by personal prestige, the ruling class and its factious ministers. Many of the troubles of the period from 1933 to 1941 would, it may be, have been avoided if his wisdom and experience had been spared to the 'Iraq State for those years.

The heir apparent, succeeding to the throne as Ghazi I, swore his oath of office, exchanged telegrams with King George V, and received the resignation of the Cabinet. He was twenty-one. Active, warmly patriotic, and not unamiable, he was popular with the public and with the young 'Iraqi officers with whom, after an unsuccessful period at Harrow, he had been educated; but his lack of intellectual equipment and of interest in public affairs, and his devotion to pleasure and to sport, forbade the hope that he would prove adequate to the royal functions in 'Iraq.

Rashid 'Āli Gaylani, reinstated as Premier without change of 645* ministers, could profit by the Sunni–Shi'i peace which, following the Assyrian crisis, had descended upon the Euphrates, and from the return of Anglo-'Iraqi relations to normal after the savage press attacks and public demonstrations of August. But, whatever his past commitments, he could not now do other than reaffirm 'Fayṣal's policy', which was that of the Treaty and friendship with Great Britain. Abu al-Timman's Nationalist Party, persistent even in these circumstances, issued on the third day of the new reign yet another manifesto hostile to the Ikhā Government. The Premier decided to strengthen his position by an appeal to the electorate: that is, by the installation of a new and more amenable Chamber. But the King, advised by ʿAli Jawdat al-Ayubi, President of the Royal Diwan, refused a dissolution: a rebuff at which two of the ministers resigned, followed on 28 October by the fall of the Cabinet.

The incoming Premier, Jamil al-Madfaʿi, a sound and loyal but uninspiring figure unlikely long to survive, claimed general support and did not press for elections. His ministers included Jamal Baban at Justice, Nuri Saʿid at Foreign Affairs, Naji Shawkat at Interior, Rustum Ḥaydar at Works, Naṣrat al-Farsi at Finance, and a young Shiʿi newcomer of high quality, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, at Education. Starting with the usual changes among the higher officials, Madfaʿi restrained as best he could the mutual bickering of his uneasy team, and directed the arrangements for the wedding on 25 January 1934 of King Ghazi with his first cousin, Princess ʿAliya, daughter of King ʿAli. His Ministers survived the month-long boycott in Baghdad of the Electric Light Company's current, organized by coffee-shop proprietors, Jewish profiteers, and 'direct-action' politicians. But the acrimony created in ministerial circles—and the resulting cleavage on significant Sunni–Shiʿi lines—by discussions of the Kut barrage project led to the resignation first of Rustum Ḥaydar, then of the Prime Minister himself on 10 February 1934.

The King, under advice, still refused to order the holding of general elections, the sole condition on which the Ikhā would reassume office. Instead, he thought it prudent to call again upon Madfaʿi. The latter dropped the ministers whose disagreements had upset his former Cabinet—Nuri Saʿid, Rustum Ḥaydar, Naji Shawkat, Ṣaliḥ Jabr—and introduced Naji al-Suwaydi, ʿAbbas Mahdi, Rashid al-Khawja, Jalal Baban, and for a time Dr. ʿAbdullah Damluji, who had been Foreign Minister in 1930–1. The re-formed Ministry, however, was little more successful than the last. The decline of the Administration since the late nineteen-twenties was widely asserted, and was blamed unjustly on the Prime Minister by his opponents; the Ikhā press was, as usual, virulent in attack; and even the anniversary celebrations organized in June 1934 in honour of the 'Iraq Rebellion' of 1920 were unsuccessful as a diversion. Support from the Palace was tepid, and the extent to which the young King was by now recognized to fall short of his father must anyhow have lessened the value of such backing. The Cabinet's unpopularity was increased by its inclusion of a second Suwaydi when Tawfiq replaced ʿAbdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs; and intrigue against the Prime Minister in high opposition circles near the Throne was not lacking. The

Ir Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

passage of a law authorizing conscription, at long last, was received 645* with seeming indifference.

Late in August Madfa'i offered his resignation. The Chief of the Royal Diwan, 'Ali Jawdat, whose favourable position to influence the King and to arrange suitable alliances had not been neglected, himself accepted the premiership and the Ministry of the Interior on 28 August. His place in the Palace was taken by Rustum Ḥaydar. Nuri Sa'id re-entered the Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Madfa'i in that of Defence. To the Ministry of Works came Arshad al-'Umari, a Turkish-trained civil engineer of the famous Mosul family, to Finance the Christian economist, Yusif Ghanima, and to Education 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi.

The first act of 'Ali Jawdat was to dissolve Parliament—a step 646 doubtfully constitutional and condemned by the Ikhā, but neces- 668 sary to secure parliamentary support. He went to lengths unusual 666 even in 'Iraq, it was claimed by his opponents, in instructing the liwā officials on the personalities to be returned to the Chamber. The resulting Parliament met in the first week of 1934. Packed with the Premier's nominees, it was unrepresentative of the Ikhā opposition, poor in tribal spokesmen, and proportionately unjust to the Shi'is; nor did 'Ali Jawdat's initiative in founding a Party of National Unity, which barely attained life before expiring, produce the desired co-operation. The election procedure was strongly criticized in the Chamber of Deputies; the Senate opposed the régime to the extent of absenting themselves from their House; Baghdad political circles raged at their own exclusion and at the many illegalities alleged; hostile posters and pamphlets appeared on walls and in coffee-shops. All administrative shortcomings were once again, and unreasonably, attributed to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet itself was unhappy, Madfa'i and 'Umari were felt to be doubtfully loyal, Yusif Ghanima a political nonentity. Far 668 more sinister, however, was the stream of subversive propaganda which poured insistently from the capital, inciting tribesmen to emotions bound to end in anti-Government violence. It was understood to emanate from a group of opposition statesmen, bitter in their frustration and led by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The propaganda was addressed to potentially malcontent Kurds in the far north, and more regularly to the Najf-dominated tribes of the Euphrates, where such shaykhly politicians as 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr of the Fatla had been unwisely excluded from Parliament and had everything, private and public, to hope from a change of Government. With 'Abd al-Waḥid were men of similar stamp, Sayid Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh, 'Alwan al-Yasiri, and others. Simultaneously, and by reaction against the claim of these to leadership, another half of the tribal world, not less unquiet and

669 not less hot for 'Shi'i rights', sought the favours of the present Ministry. Without, for the moment, overt violence a dangerous mood was gaining possession of the tribes of Diwaniya liwā and spreading to Ḥilla. It was shown by excited meetings, tribal war-dances, the flourishing of arms. Appeals reached the Najf 'Ulamā, notably Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kashif al-Ghaṭā, the leading Arab Mujtahid, for unifying support. Telegrams were dispatched to the King, a monster petition organized, and finally in January 1935 an audience with him was obtained. These moves produced no result. 'Ali Jawdat laboured to restore order by persuasion, by censorship, by prohibition of meetings and suppression of newspapers; but such measures and the distractions provided by the ceremonial opening at Kirkuk of the Mediterranean pipeline, by disastrous spring floods, by the funeral of King 'Ali, and by crises in the negotiations with Persia were all in vain. The ineffective Ministry resigned on 23 February 1935.

*645 To replace it, the King's advisers recommended the formation
668 of an Ikhā Ministry, without further elections and without the inclusion of Yasin Pasha or Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, whose intrigues it was believed had largely created the present near-anarchy. But the Ikhā having refused these conditions, no alternative appeared to the formation of another Madfa'i Ministry. Formed on 4 March, it contained respected personalities—Nuri Sa'id, 'Abd al-'Aziz Qaṣṣab, Amin Zaki, Ghanima, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, Rashid al-Khawja—but had no substantial advantage over its predecessors. It commanded little royal or popular support, and could work neither by inspired diplomacy nor ruthless firmness. Jamil al-Madfa'i hoped for the pacification of the Euphrates by 'legal' means, sent ministers to tour the distracted area, tried vainly to persuade the senators to resume their duties, and appealed to the Opposition and the press for 'unity'. When the tribal position had further deteriorated, with actual insurgence in the Daghara and the Fayṣaliya areas of Diwaniya and among the 'Azza north of Baghdad, he sent troops to the Euphrates districts; but these were too few, ineffectively directed, and thereby merely provocative. The tribal political leaders and their mentor Kashif al-Ghaṭā—sadly embarrassed by rival claims to his support and glad to take refuge in pious platitudes—produced in the end a not immoderate statement of Shi'i claims, bearing scores of personal seals. Organization of the counter-faction among the Euphrates shaykhs was attempted, but could do little in immediate relief. Stronger military steps were deprecated in favour of a 'political solution' by the Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, nor would the King permit them. After a mere thirteen days of office the unhappy Madfa'i Ministry resigned.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

It was succeeded immediately by a diluted Ikhā Ministry under 645* Yasin Pasha, summoned to power this time, on 17 March 1935, without conditions. Destined to rule 'Iraq for twenty months, it included Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ja'far Pasha at Defence, Nuri at Foreign Affairs, two Shi'is—Ra'uf Baḥrani, a former Finance Inspector, at Finance, and Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, a figure in the learned and literary world, at Education—and Amin Zaki at Works. There was no representative of the left-wing group (that of the *Ahali* newspaper) under Abu al-Timman; and the omission of Ḥikmat Sulayman, to his keen resentment, was to lead later to serious results.

The tribal situation to which, from Ḥilla to Naṣiriya, the new 619 Ministry had forthwith to address itself, was in large measure 645 significant of the mere anti-Government lawlessness of tribes and of the patriarchal feudalism always preferred by the Shi'i leadership. 664 As such it was a familiar 'Iraqi phenomenon from Ottoman times. But in so far as it had been produced by intrigue from Baghdad and from Najf in support of the 'political' aims of statesmen—themselves but little concerned with tribal or Shi'i advantage—it recalled the similarly evoked anti-British *Thawra* of 1920. Indeed, the history of the Euphrates in 1935 and 1936 reproduces faithfully the episodes of 1920 on a smaller but important scale. It shows again the ease with which the shaykhs were willing to follow, as they followed in 1920, any movement which seemed to offer them personal or tribal advantage—Government-appointed paramountcy in the tribe, a seat in the Chamber, a reopened land dispute, or a grant of rice-lands—with motives of no wider a patriotism than those similarly exploited by the Baghdadis fifteen years earlier.

Yasin Pasha achieved, by an air-dropped Proclamation to the tribes, a substantial immediate pacification. It was followed by visits to Baghdad by the Ikhā-favoured shaykhs. Their car-loads of festive armed followers filled the capital, with the complacent permission of the Minister of the Interior but to the alarm of onlookers. Eager for some immediate gain from their recent 'patriotic' uprisings, they mingled in street and ante-room with the Kurdish deputations from the northern liwās which, organized by the Ikhā to protest against the misdeeds of the Ayubi and Madfa'i Ministries, arrived in time to congratulate their successors. A serious episode at Kadhimiya, in which bloodshed resulted from a clash between police and a crowd demonstrating against the desecration of a graveyard, was without political meaning and could be composed without wider repercussions. The King, whose mother died in March, was acclaimed as father of a son and heir apparent—the later Fayṣal II—on 2 May. Parliament adjourned early in April and general elections were ordered in May.

619 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one
645 major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its
668 rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near
619 Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests
[687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

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[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

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cessions to their peculiar beliefs and customs, and met their active and passive resistance by sending a brigade of troops in September 1935. This bloodless operation was followed by the institution of courts martial which, with savage severity and no adequate trials, hanged nine of their leaders, including two Christians, and imprisoned 350 alleged resisters. These were later progressively released: but Da'ud al-Da'ud remained a fugitive in Syria, where numbers of his followers tried persistently to join him. The Barzani Kurds, subdued by joint 'Iraqi-Turkish operations in 1933 which captured Shaykh Aḥmad, gave further trouble in 1934 and 1935 under the truculent leader of a considerable force, Khalil Khushawi. This bandit, who for long defied the combined operations of 'Iraqis and Turks, dodged across frontiers from valley to valley and destroyed the villages of all who denounced him. Later in 1935 most of his followers were rounded up, and a dozen hanged; he himself vanished, to reappear in mid-winter and to be caught and shot in March 1936. In Sulaymaniya liwā a similar character, Sayid Muḥammad Píchkola, led looting parties in 'Iraq from a base in Persia. After long-drawn police operations he surrendered in August 1935, and was pardoned. In the same weeks, deep in southern 'Iraq, resistance to conscription was leading the Mudayna village of Qurna to armed protest which called for military suppression.

The year 1936 brought no peace to rural 'Iraq. The incitements to lawlessness first set afoot in 1934, the rancour of never-settled land disputes, the fear and hatred of conscription, and maladroit or corrupt local administration were added to the endemic causes of tribal restlessness. In February insurgence among the Shaṭra tribes brought troops to the Gharraf, and the usual measures quelled the rising in a few weeks. In the Muntafiq an assault on a police post in the Suq area was punished by fines and prison-sentences. In April a section of the Bani Ḥuchaym in Rumaytha district cut the railway, rallied a force of 1,200 armed tribesmen, and heavily engaged troops sent to suppress them. Casualties were heavy, the Army lost ninety men and two aircraft. Reprisals of corresponding severity, with the hanging of rebel leaders after little or no trial and the burning of villages, were reported in Baghdad, there to distress the squeamish and help the Opposition. The 'Akra district of Diwaniya witnessed a rising of the notorious Sha'lan al-'Aṭiya, unsatisfied by his rewards for opposing the Ministry of 'Ali Jawdat. It was not less brutally suppressed by Bakr Ṣidqi in June 1936; and in August a force of the Ṣafwan tribe, near Khidhr in Samawa qadhā, attacked the Government office and, though dispersed, were still unsubdued in the autumn of the year.

*645 The failure of Yasin Pasha to impose the peace and security which he had promised was due to causes already analysed, and in some measure to the hasty ineptitude of his Minister of Interior. But, as in 1920, disturbance on the Euphrates and locally and temporarily elsewhere did not greatly affect the rest of the territory. The cities were secure and tranquil, the northern liwās and the whole of Tigris-side untroubled. The period of Yasin Pasha's premiership was indeed by ‘Iraqi standards one of firm and reasonable government, and seemed, even in the late summer of 1936, likely to be prolonged. The coming event of violent military intervention cast no shadow before it.

646 [659] The general election ordered in April 1935 produced in August a Chamber swollen from 88 to 108 members: the additional seats arose from increased population-figures revealed by the Census Department, and were useful in placating more shaykhs and partisans. Early sessions of Parliament were disturbed by fierce recriminations between factions for the crime of inciting the tribes—a crime peculiar, in fact, to no single party. The Administration proceeded to a general amnesty of the political offenders of recent months, to a purge of suspect officials, and to the preferment, as the spoils of office, of more reliable personnel.

647 Genuine efforts were made, indeed, to arrest the deterioration of the Administration, though the further reduction of senior British officials may have told in the opposite sense. It cost ‘Iraq in 1935 the services of Sir K. Cornwallis, whose work for Fayṣal and for ‘Iraq had been outstanding; Edmonds, profoundly versed in ‘Iraqi and especially Kurdish affairs, succeeded him. In the same year Prescott, the creator of the ‘Iraq Police, resigned from the service and left Cones for a further ten years as Inspector of Constabulary. Sievwright, veteran of the Customs, retired and was succeeded until 1941 by Swan of Finance. Parlby, Auditor-General, returned to India. Hallinan had ceased in 1933 to be Inspector-General of Health Services, and was replaced by an ‘Iraqi doctor. The Tapu Department dispensed with British help after the death of Alderman (himself successor of Royds in 1930) in 1934. The same is true of the Department of Agriculture, which Webster left in the same year. B. C. Newland, Director of Surveys, relinquished his post in 1935 to his deputy, A. J. Booth, who still held it sixteen years later. Chadwick left the Veterinary Department in 1934, but was to have a second tenure of the Directorship in 1942 to 1947. The Government Geologist Dr. Macfadyen left ‘Iraq in 1937 after two years' service there, and was not immediately replaced. Allard retired in 1934 from Irrigation, in which an ‘Iraqi had already succeeded him as Director-General; a British Chief Engineer and British regional staff still served there, and the

same was true of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs. 647 'Fainah after fifteen years as Director left the Railways, handing over to Ward who combined the post for three years with the Port Directorate. Wheatley left the Advisership to Communications and Works early in 1937.

The relation of Yasin Pasha to the British Embassy, where Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had succeeded Humphrys in March 1935, were close and cordial. The Census Department was strengthened, that of Publicity represented a development of the old Press Bureau. The Courts, with their complement of British judges 192 under the Agreement of 1930, were well maintained. The general 871 desire for a more comprehensive educational system could be met only in part. Primary and secondary schools showed a limited development, with increased use of borrowed Egyptian teachers, and the beginning of book publication by the Ministry. Technical education, studied by visiting foreign experts, advanced little. The university project stood still. The Higher Teachers' Training- 875 College was reopened in 1935. A Directorate of Female Education was formed in 1934, but abolished next year. A Rural Teachers' College—a recommendation of the Monroe Report—was established in 1934 at Shatra on the Gharraf, and later moved to Rustumiya outside Baghdad. An Elementary Teachers' College for Women was opened at Diwaniya in 1934, but did not survive. The College of Pharmacy was founded in 1936. The schools of 871 the minority communities and of the missions, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, flourished. The proposal for a public school on the British pattern was not yet realized, and a British adviser to the Minister of Education ceased to be employed. German teaching increased. School books in use became increasingly nationalist and xenophobe in tone. Military instruction was first given in the schools in 1935, and grew thereafter to be a popular feature of school life, with a developed Youth Movement in uniform.

Ancient sites of 'Iraq continued each winter to attract foreign 172 archaeological missions. Valuable excavations were carried out by the representatives of university, museum, or other learned bodies, American, German, British, French, and Italian, from 1933 to 1939 at sites in northern 'Iraq—Gawra, Nineveh, Saydawa, and Khorsabad; in the Baghdad area, at Khafaja on the Diyala, and at Seleucia: and in the centre and south at the Sumerian cities of Warqa and Larsa. A setback to this activity was caused, indeed, by the intervention in 1933 of the Shi'i Minister of Education, who produced a draft Antiquities Law calculated by its one-sided severities to discourage all future excavation; but under the Hashimi Ministry an improved draft was accepted, and work could proceed in reasonable conditions.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply,
improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyat*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pâsha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
184 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was
not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission
constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq
Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong,
was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab Companies.

by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies. The 'Iraq 625
Police, with diminished British participation, remained a smart and
reliable service adapted well to its increasing duties. It contained,
during those years, rather less than 9,000 men, including a mobile
force of some 750. The Royal Air Force, which since 1932 played 707
no part in 'Iraq's internal security in spite of occasional requests by
Government to do so, maintained its own bases and training
installations. Mosul and Hinaydi camps and airports and former
R.A.F. landing-grounds throughout 'Iraq were handed to the
'Iraq authorities at the close of this period, and the R.A.F. began
to install itself, late in 1936, at Dhibban camp by Lake Ḥabbaniya.

Financial administration continued to show the prudence and 652
orthodoxy with which 'Iraqi finances had been handled from the
first. This was the easier since the period of depression ended with
1933, and the years following showed a relatively prosperous
situation. Improvements were introduced into income-tax and
land-revenue procedure and Customs administration. The cur-
rency was stable and respected. The last remnant of foreign debt
was extinguished; but discussions on a new loan, to be obtained in
London through Baring Bros., had up to 1937 no practical issue.
The oil dead-rents first received in 1932, and later the royalties,
were allotted to capital works—irrigation projects, buildings,
roads—included in a programme of which the items were revised
in 1931, 1935, and almost annually thereafter. A law establishing 453
an Agricultural and Industrial Bank was passed in 1935; it com-
menced operations, humbly at first, in the following year.

4. BAKR ṢIDQI

The Hashimi Ministry, more forceful than any 'Iraq Govern- 645*
ment since 1932, appeared by midsummer 1935 likely to endure
for a long spell of office. Yasin Pasha openly anticipated ten years
of power, though, little as he esteemed democracy, he had no
thought of dictatorship. The tribes were frightened, the Palace
weak, the opposition outwardly subdued.

But less obvious forces were at work. The King, his own position enfeebled by his personal shortcomings and the misalliance and flight of his sister with a Rhodian hotel servant and her conversion to Christianity, was willing to see a change of Ministry and even hinted at this to Yasin through intermediaries. In the Cabinet, though a scarcely anticipated harmony reigned between Yasin and Nuri Sa'id, his Foreign Minister, the latter was at constant loggerheads with the Minister of Interior. Rashid 'Āli, indeed, gave offence by his impetuous decisions, his favouritism, and the avarice which in defiance of precedent led him, when Sayid Maḥmud the Naqib died in 1936, himself to assume the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 lucrative trusteeship of the Qadiri Awqaf. The Shi'i Minister of
648× Education, Ridhā al-Shabibi, resigned in September 1935 and was replaced by a Shi'i of different type, the lawyer Ṣādiq al-Baṣṣam. Relations with the other Arab States were notably extended by a Treaty with Sa'udi Arabia, exchanges of princely and ministerial visits, and missions received from Syria, the Yaman, and Egypt; and 'Iraqi statesmen, particularly Nuri Sa'id, responding to strong public opinion, took in 1936 jointly with Ibn Sa'ud a leading part in intervening in the long-drawn Palestine Arab strike. Nevertheless, critics in Baghdad were not wanting who called for stronger anti-Zionist action than the telegrams, deputations, and appeals of the Hashimi Ministry; and they recalled that Yasin Pasha in opposition, in 1932 and since, had led an anti-Treaty and anti-British policy very different from his present complacence.

×645 Other gestures of Opposition politicians, embittered by long
665 exclusion from office, were those of horror at the brutality of the Euphrates tribal suppressions, and disapproval of the recurring use of the Army for police measures. They pointed at the private
[661] fortunes which, mysteriously, certain ministers were said to be amassing; and they execrated the alleged spy system which was one of the ministerial means of control, and the suppression of newspapers inclined to criticize them. From the left-wing Ahali group a particular dissatisfaction arose. They saw, under Yasin Pasha, no hope of carrying out the reforms which they advocated. Shedding an extremist and in certain cases Communist or near-Communist minority, the group grew with the adhesion of other unemployed politicians. Though never formed as a party, they stood for social reform and land reform on lines which, while excluding class warfare, must yet include some measure of redistribution of wealth, some improvement in the conditions of the working class, and some trespass on feudal and plutocratic privilege. Prominent in the movement were Ja'far abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi (a young half-brother of Ra'uf), Yusif 'Izz al-Din a financial expert of Kurdish descent, and a half-dozen of English- or American-educated intellectuals. Government lack of sympathy with their efforts, and the arrest of their less discreet members, led them finally to oppose the régime with a bitterness which would accept allies from any source.

665 No statesman felt more impatiently his exclusion from power
668 than Ḥikmat Sulayman. Of excellent ability and generally popular, he assessed shrewdly the strength of the various anti-Hashimi forces, and admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics, which country he revisited in 1935. In Baghdad he was allied with the left wing, and resentful at newspaper suppressions which affected him personally; and he placed himself increasingly in con-

1st Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tact with leaders of the Army. The latter, its morale uplifted by 668
triumphs over Assyrian villagers and Euphrates tribesmen, was 665
asking whether to serve the intrigues and ambitions of the Baghdad politicians was, after all, the ideal: whether direct dominance of the State by its armed force, as in Turkey or Persia, would not be more congenial? The stages by which Ḥikmat Sulayman and the forceful sinister Bakr Ṣidqi came into closer agreement, and the latter abandoned his loyalty to Yasin Pasha and his brother Ṭaha, cannot now be traced. To Ḥikmat the immediate desideratum was a change of Government in his own favour, and only the Army could produce this; Bakr Ṣidqi's ambition was to effect a stroke which would assure the Army of a paramount position and himself the headship of the Army. Neither at any time sought, it seems, a personal or formal dictatorship.

In October 1936 Ṭaha left 'Iraq to visit Turkey, leaving Ṣidqi, 665
then commanding the 1st Division, to act in his place. The 669
autumn manœuvres on the middle Diyalā gave occasion to concentrate almost all of the armed forces outside the capital. The plot concerted by Bakr with Ḥikmat Sulayman was communicated to a few officers at Qaraghan, notably 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, the general commanding the 2nd Division. The two generals drafted a letter to the King, demanding the formation of a new Ministry under Ḥikmat, and handed it to the latter. Leaders of the left-wing group were admitted to the secret. The Air Force under its Commander, Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, a close friend of Ṣidqi, was concentrated at Qaraghan and was provided with leaflets to scatter over Baghdad at the appropriate moment. On the night of 28 October the Army, renamed the National Defence Force for the occasion, began its 'march on Baghdad'.

By early morning of the 29th leaflets rained from the sky over Baghdad, and Ḥikmat conveyed the agreed letter to the palace. Yasin Pasha and his colleagues, amazed at a turn of events wholly unexpected, made their way to the King's ante-room, where Ghazi had already summoned the British Ambassador. The latter advised His Majesty to consult his Cabinet, to ascertain the intentions of Ḥikmat, and to proceed, above all, constitutionally. The ministers, now joined by all their colleagues except Rashid 'Āli, were ready to resign. Bombs fell on Baghdad in the mid-morning, a three-hour time limit for the Cabinet's surrender having expired, and some civilians killed and wounded showed the zeal of the Royal 'Iraqi Air Force. After a discussion which could end but one way, the Cabinet resigned, and a Royal Irada appointed Ḥikmat Sulayman to form a new Ministry.

One shocking incident distressed the public, horrified the British Ambassador, and disgusted Ḥikmat himself—the brutal murder of

665 669 Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari by Army officers half-way between Baghdad and Ba'quba, under the direct orders, it was believed, of Bakr Ṣidqi. Ja'far as Minister of Defence had left Baghdad by car with a letter to Bakr from the King, intending to meet the Commander, inform him of the change of Government and arrange for a cessation of violence. His body, that of a sincere and devoted patriot and an honest man, was hastily buried by the roadside while the Army pursued its triumphant march to the capital. The troops entered the city ceremonially in the early evening, with Bakr Ṣidqi at their head.

*645 The Cabinet formed and announced by Ḥikmat on the same day reserved the Ministry of Interior to himself, brought three members of the Ahali group, Abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi, and Yusif 'Izz al-Din to Finance, Works, and Education, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Justice, Naji al-Aṣil to Foreign Affairs. Ṣidqi's fellow conspirator 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri was rewarded with the Ministry of Defence, while Bakr himself superseded Ṭaha al-Hashimi as Chief of Staff. Great enthusiasm, real or feigned, greeted the new Government. The announced programme, and a broadcast by Abu al-Timman, were rich in optimism and promises. Giant demonstrations were arranged in Baghdad, and the capital's main streets were a stage for the dancing and singing of crowds of tribesmen and workers. The outgoing Ministry was everywhere denigrated. Its members, whom Bakr would have preferred to assassinate with other likely opponents, vanished temporarily from public life: Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Āli to Syria under escort, Nuri Sa'id by R.A.F. aircraft to Egypt. Other ex-ministers and some high officials retired amid the many changes made in personnel by the incoming ministers.

The Prime Minister, who kept at all times correctly in contact with the British Ambassador—and lost some nationalist following by so doing—assured him and the world that this was no military dictatorship; it was merely parliamentary and democratic government supported by a devoted Army. Bakr Ṣidqi, in fact, interfered little in current administration. He had no obvious policy save a crude Anglophobia, and limited his exigencies to nomination of his friends to certain appointments and insistence on priority for the Army's needs. A vindictive proposal to inquire into the private fortunes of ex-ministers was at first accepted but finally abandoned.

*645 665 Opposition nevertheless was not slow to organize, and could muster effective elements. Moderate opinion everywhere saw with consternation the open assumption of power by a selfish and short-sighted military movement. The new Government in its proclaimed programme had said little of anti-Treaty proposals—indeed, had spoken of friendship with all countries and was pledged to maintain the Treaty. In spite of some self-justifying gestures to

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the contrary, it was criticized by anti-Zionist enthusiasts, by ardent members of the pan-Arab Muthannā Club in Baghdad, and at times in Egypt and Syrian newspapers, as being less than whole-hearted on the question of Arab unity. Bakr Ṣidqi was a Kurd, Ḥikmat Sulayman by sympathy more Turk than Arab, and the Ahali group cared little for international politics. The tone of its early programme and of the speeches of Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman were equalitarian and easily labelled Communistic, and they alarmed the established classes. The Reformist group had indeed assumed its share of power with high hopes; but for all their newspaper and their 'People's Reform League', to which four ministers belonged, they found little popular support. They were opposed by the shaykhs who feared for their own positions, and thwarted by the Army who distrusted or despised them. The efforts of the group, laudable as they were as appreciating something of the real weaknesses and evils of 'Iraq society, were politically unprofitable to a Ministry dominated by the Army and by reaction. [656] The freedom of the press and of politics promised for all, in contrast to Yasin's régime, ceased to be permitted as soon as opponents grew active. Political and tribal prisoners including the Yazidis were released and a general amnesty proclaimed; but not long afterwards measures of suppression were taken as severe as those of a year earlier. Meanwhile friends of Ja'far Pasha—and notably his brother-in-law, Nuri Sa'id, tirelessly manœuvring and writing from Egypt and Syria—would forgive neither the murder nor its perpetrators, nor the willingness of the King and the present Cabinet to leave it unpunished. And, with all these elements of criticism and discontent, those endemic on the middle Euphrates were still alive, and soon to burst into violent activity.

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Nowhere indeed were the embarrassments of Ḥikmat's position clearer than in his attempts to solve the insoluble Euphrates problem. He must placate malcontents without offending their enemies: he must pardon the already condemned, but not show weakness: must keep order, but without a harshness which would be resented. Starting with all confidence in his own good intentions and diplomatic skill, he signally failed. The ferment of self-seeking and vengeful faction which was the normal life of Euphrates shaykhly and religious circles refused to cool at his bidding. A notorious land dispute among the Bani Zurayj of Samawa qadhā was the occasion to rally once again the forces supporting and opposed to 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr and Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh. These flouted the orders of the Ministry to a point which made inevitable a return to the severity with which Ḥikmat Sulayman had hoped to dispense, the two inveterate trouble-makers were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, arrested, and sentenced to detention in

*645 668 northern 'Iraq. In June 1937 continued lawlessness at Samawa led to military operations on the habitual pattern, with destruction of villages, tribal attacks on the qadhā town, and (it was said) the shooting of hostages by the Army. Deep as was the impression made on the tribes by this treatment, peace never returned to these troubled regions during the life-time of the Sulaymani Ministry. In the towns, security was reasonably maintained, and isolated acts of anti-Jewish violence which had occurred in Baghdad in 1936 were not repeated.

646 665 The Ministry remained unhappy in the political sphere. The general elections ordered in November 1936 and completed in February 1937 produced a Chamber from which indispensable compliance with Ṣidqi's wishes had excluded the bulk of former Deputies and all but twelve of the Reformists; but had admitted, as a conciliatory favour, some ill-chosen wildlings from the Euphrates tribes. In the four months of the Extraordinary Session from February to June 1937 the Chamber was uneasy and divided, with painful friction between the Ministry's own ill-assorted followers. This, and the frustrations of their minority position, and their dislike of the re-adopted harsh policy at Samawa, led in June to the resignation of the four Reformist ministers. While still in 468 office their influence, especially that of Chadirchi, had inspired, perhaps encouraged, serious strikes among industrial workers. So were explained the successive strikes at the Kut barrage, in the drilling-areas of the B.O.D. Company, in the Railway workshops, among the Port workers, and the Najf weavers, and among the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk. These strikes, whether industrially justified or not, reflected a new spirit of labour self-consciousness not necessarily unhealthy—and a new political weapon.

*645 665 Ḥikmat's hopes of strengthening his Cabinet by the inclusion in it of leading statesmen—Nuri Sa'id himself, or Jamil al-Madfa'i—could not but fail since few now trusted Bakr or the uneasy régime itself. Of the four new ministers, two, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, were Sunni lawyer-politicians and functionaries, and two, 'Abbas Mahdi and Ja'far Ḥamandi, were Shi'is of similar background. They were posted to the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Works, and Education respectively; but they were politically of little weight. The breach between the Reform movement and the Government was now complete; the People's Reform League was suppressed, and prominent Communists, real or alleged, were arrested. Two of the most active, 'Abd al-Qadir and Yusif, sons of Isma'il, fled to Paris. The Army dominated, ever more obviously, the Prime Minister and his Government.

645 The position was one which Bakr Ṣidqi could not but abuse. He

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and his entourage, further corrupted by greater power, lost the b45*
respect of the better elements by their drunkenness and arrogance. His marriage to a Viennese dancing girl was frowned upon. His part in the murder of Dhiyā' Yunis, ex-Secretary of the Council of Ministers and friend of the exiled Yasin Pasha, was everywhere believed, and not less his directing hand in an assault made on a veteran Arab patriot and fighter (but critic of Bakr) Mawlud Pasha Mukhliṣ. The death in Damascus of Yasin himself in June 1937 rallied popular feeling to the side of this strong and sincere half-sinister, half-charming personality, whose services his country had so ill requited. The suicide of Ja'far Pasha's brother, the death of other friends simultaneously with that of Yasin, and the murder of a Baghdad notable, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Sinawi by a Kurd whom Bakr protected, led to grim jests at the General's expense.

The impatient demands for Army expansion were financially b45+
embarrassing to the Government, and much unwise spending, b52
accompanied by the raising of funds 'for the forces' by public subscription, did not make them more popular with the political public. All officers concerned in the coup d'état of October 1936 were indemnified under a law of April 1937; but the sycophantic suggestion to erect a statue to Bakr Ṣidqi, as Hero of the Revolution, was not adopted. The conscription machinery still worked largely amiss, though against less resistance; and most units were below strength. Relations with the British Military Mission were b48x
for a time uncordial. The provision by Great Britain of armaments and equipment raised questions of particular difficulty; the time coincided with large-scale rearmament in the United Kingdom, and many 'Iraqi demands for guns, aircraft, and equipment remained, to their angry impatience, unsatisfied. This failure, exploited by the adroit propaganda of Herr Grobba, the German Minister, and on a passing visit by Dr. Schacht himself, was in pointed contrast to the flattering offers of German and Czech arms manufacturers, and led to the placing of 'Iraqi orders for armaments with the Krupp and Skoda Companies and elsewhere, and for aircraft—of types wholly unsuitable—with Italian suppliers. Some of the material so ordered was delivered; the rest, to a value of some £500,000, was countermanded when the Ministry fell.

It was not for the Army alone that funds were needed; Ḥikmat's b45*
ambition was to signalize his 'revolution' by the initiation of the 185
important works so long projected—roads, buildings, the railway extension, and completion of the Kut Barrage. Messrs. Baring b52
Bros., again approached, could offer £3 million on favourable terms, and Parliament in the spring of 1937 authorized this borrowing. The 'Iraq Petroleum Company, however, whose royalties were the proffered security, declined on principle to pay

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 these to any party other than the 'Iraq Government itself. A much less favourable offer, of a loan of £1 million only, was the result. It was duly negotiated, but neither the Government nor the British lenders escaped criticism. This was 'Iraq's first self-incurred external debt.

*645 The presence of forces hostile to the régime did not materially interfere with an Administration equal in quality to its predecessors but, in disappointment of early hopes, not superior to them. In foreign affairs and in some internal developments, which later
563 pages will describe, some progress was made. But to one problem
648x no approach to a solution appeared—that of the Assyrians. Their case, after the massacre of August 1933, had been hurried on to the agenda of the League Council by the Mar Sham'un's telegrams from Cyprus; and in October the 'Iraq Government, through the mouth of Yasin Pasha, offered a disarming admission of 'unjustifiable severity' by the Army and regrettable tribal looting. He pleaded for a fresh start for the Assyrians—in another country! The British attitude, disappointing to the more fervid partisans of the Assyrians, was determined by the desire to preserve and support the independent 'Iraq State: by realization of the grave consequences of any physical intervention, to which anyhow British opinion could never be reconciled: and by awareness that the faults were far from being all on one side. The Council agreed, accordingly, that a Committee of six, composed of representatives of Great Britain, Italy, France, Denmark, Mexico, and Spain, should by every means seek alternative accommodation, somewhere in the world, for the Assyrian community.

This Committee's attempts were immediate and vigorous, but sadly unsuccessful. A project for settlement in Brazil seemed promising, but fell to the ground when the Brazilian Government reversed its welcoming attitude. A British plan for settlement in Guiana, and a French project for the banks of the Niger, came equally to nothing after League missions, with Brigadier Browne, had visited the territories. By the end of 1934 no progress had been made.

563 In 'Iraq their resettlement on the land proceeded with weary
657 slowness in spite of Government encouragement and the offer of a house-by-house subsidy. The great majority of the community favoured withdrawal from 'Iraq; and false hopes of this were kept alive by the Mar Sham'un's partisans, while the anti-Patriarchal party declared roundly that they would never settle in the same territory as the Mar Sham'un and his following. The camp at Mosul was, with increasing reluctance, kept in existence at Government expense, but was reduced by encouraged departures; its inmates fell from 1,250 to 650 during 1934. More hopeful was

the French reception in Syria of the families of the 550 Assyrians 563 interned there since August 1933. Aided by a grant of money from 657 'Iraq, these women and children joined their men on the upper Khabur in September 1934 to a number of over 1,500. Movement from the Mosul camp and streets to the Khabur continued in 1935 to a number of some 1,500, and a more grandiose scheme for a large-scale settlement in the Ghab lands on the Orontes in Syria was formulated by the League Committee. A project for its finances, with 'Iraq and Great Britain as main contributors, was established and a Trustee Board appointed. In 1936 an immediate transfer of 15,000 Assyrians was planned, which would dispose of almost the whole remaining community except those native to 'Iraq; but the difficulties of the Ghab project were found insurmountable, and its abandonment made possible a move only of smaller numbers, 2,500 in all, to the Khabur settlements. No further progress was made under the Ḥikmat–Ṣidqi régime, and the permanence of the Assyrian remnant in 'Iraq was perforce accepted. Their economic rehabilitation was by now fairly advanced, and their final adaptation to 'Iraqi conditions and citizenship could be hoped.

The event which caused the fall of the Sulaymani Ministry after 645* less than nine months of uneasy life was due neither to constitutional procedures, which rarely operated to change Governments in 'Iraq, nor to any grouping of the Opposition forces. Its origin lay in rancour within the Army itself, where careers had been ruined and malevolence excited by the abused omnipotence of Bakr. The bodyguard by which at all times he went surrounded [669] had saved him from previous attempts on his life during 1937; but when on 8 August, *en route* for a visit to Turkish manœuvres, he waited on the Mosul airport, his murderers, by whomever instructed, could carry out one of the alternative plans prepared. He was shot dead at point-blank range by an 'Iraqi soldier, and his companion Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, chief of the R.I.A.F., lived but a minute longer.

The bodies were taken to Baghdad and buried with full military honours. Little regret, but rather the almost unanimous relief of public and press, accompanied the General to his grave: not unjustly, since the pages of 'Iraq history which he had written were in all ways deplorable. In Mosul the Military Commander, General Amin al-'Umari, arrested the murderer, cordoned the airport, and assumed sole charge of the city. Ordered by Baghdad to arrest further named individuals as accomplices, he at first complied, then realized the dangerous possibilities of a general purge of Bakr's known opponents. Six days after the murder he took the grave step of publishing a proclamation in which he

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

* 645 accused the Government of a policy of unjust reprisals and, for himself and his troops, repudiated all Baghdad authority. The Army units in Baghdad were largely favourable to Bakr's faction; 'Umari had, by messages, secured the support of the Diwaniya, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya garrisons; civil war seemed inevitable. But Colonel Sa'id Takriti, commanding the troops stationed at Wishash outside Baghdad West, by siding with 'Umari and the evident majority of the forces, ensured the ascendancy of the element hostile to Bakr. The proclamation which he issued asserted loyalty to the King (who himself favoured the same side), support to Amin al-'Umari and the policy of no reprisals, removal of Bakr's nominees from command, and—vain words!—Army abstention thenceforward from politics. The Prime Minister, who had designated 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri to succeed as Chief of Staff and Madfa'i, hastening home from Syria, as Minister of Defence, realized the preponderance of feeling hostile to his régime and could turn nowhere for support. He resigned office on 17 August. The Royal Irada appointing Jamil al-Madfa'i as Prime Minister was issued on the same day.

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5. LAND, AIR, AND WATER

The foreign trade of the territory, limited in scale as it was, showed in these years a healthy and indeed encouraging picture. The abiding adverse trade balance was still redressed by other elements. The volume of exports increased notably from 1935 to 1937, and steps were taken by the improvement of date-packing, grain-cleaning, and wool-dipping to remove some of the features which damaged the reputation of 'Iraqi produce; but the fluctuation of both quantities and prices of the country's staple exports from year to year was still pronounced. The export of crude oil began late in 1934. That of gold bullion, thanks to high gold prices abroad, continued and largely depleted 'Iraq's stocks. The small exportable cotton crop went regularly, after 1936, *en bloc* to Japan. Imports, generally constant or increasing in volume, were subject to the revised Customs tariff drawn up in 1933 by League of Nations experts on lines favourable to local industry. Great Britain easily maintained its lead as supplier, with the United States almost monopolizing the import of motor vehicles. Germany, with its alert credit-giving marketers and the ubiquitous German-Jewish Haavareh Agency, perceptibly increased its share in chemicals and machinery. Japan by conspicuous efforts raised its proportion of the import market, between 1930 and 1936, from 2 to 20 per cent. This was made up of cotton, woollen, and artificial silk piece-goods and some hardware, and its extent led the 'Iraq Government to insist on Japan's acceptance of 'Iraqi produce

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439 Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453 varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656 shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436 in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. 652 The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern 135 multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291 served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi *sidara* in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned 433 on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382 significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

382 opening at Kirkuk in January 1935, its twin 12-inch pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli came into operation. This achievement marked the end of ten years of patient and well-directed work since the grant of the first concession, and by its employment of 'Iraqis in their thousands, its expansion of communications and the example which it offered of successful large-scale modern industry, it added great advantages for the 'Iraqi public to the direct enrichment of their Treasury. The gradually developing works in Kirkuk oilfields, the main depots at Bayji and Ḥaditha, the mid-desert pump-station townships with their connecting roads, pipeline, and telegraphs became a characteristic feature of the modern 'Iraqi scene, while its production, of 4 million tons of crude oil a year from 1935 onwards, placed the country immediately as the eighth oil-producing country of the world. The B.O.D. Company, whose shareholding was in these years predominantly Italian, German, and Franco-Swiss, soon found itself embarrassed by its obligation of annual payment to Government, and by its failure, in spite of an active drilling campaign from 1933 onwards, to discover other than viscous, scarcely marketable oil. The Company's plan in 1935 of diminishing their cash payments by building a Qaiyara–Tall Kochek railway, which could convey their oil to seaboard and link 'Iraq with the Turkish railway system, was after hesitation rejected by Government. Their financial position grew 491 desperate, and a reconstruction of their Board in 1936 marked the transfer of control of the Company to the I.P.C. group; and the latter emerged soon afterwards as outright owners of the B.O.D. and Mosul Oil Fields, with the disappearance of all non-British shareholding in it other than that of the I.P.C., French, and American constituents themselves. The problem of its viscous and sulphurous oil remained to be solved. The smaller Rafidain and Khaniqin Companies (p. 211) continued respectively their work of producing and refining oil in the Transferred Territories, and of marketing it throughout 'Iraq. The project of a Government-owned refinery, for which the I.P.C. concession provided, was conceived during this period but was to prove slow of realization.

490 Road-surfacing was among the uses of oil products in 'Iraq, but 491 neither this nor the too limited funds available could do much at present to provide the country with roads of high or even tolerable standard. Some further sections such as that from Ramadi to Ruṭba were metalled, others were indifferently or barely maintained, all were at worst passable; road maintenance, costly and inconspicuous, was given habitually a low priority in Government allotments. Traffic on the Najf–Madina route increased. The route from the Euphrates to 'Amman and Haifa developed as a powerful rival of the northern track to Beirut. The Rawanduz road, dis-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

appointingly, carried little traffic other than some oil supplies to 499 northern Persia. [494] Following completion of the great Faluja bridge (p. 208) other steel bridges were constructed: on the Lesser Zab at Altun Kupri, the Greater Zab at Aski Kellek, and elsewhere. In Baghdad the replacement of the two pontoon crossings by permanent steel bridges was at last decided, and contracts were awarded to Messrs. Holloway Bros. in 1936, a major step in the development of the capital. The new spans of the Mosul bridge were finished. Municipal street-making proceeded everywhere, and not least in Baghdad.

Little changed in the field of Tigris river navigation. 505 Fears that the Kut barrage would make steamship navigation impossible 504 were aroused but could be allayed; a move made in 1934 by local rivals to question the rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Company led to nothing. River traffic on the whole diminished. The *Zobaida* was sold to India in 1935, the *Blosse Lynch* and *Tigris* as scrap in the same year and the *Khalifa* in 1937. In 1936 the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation split again into its original components, the Lynch Company and Messrs. Gray Mackenzie. Four small gunboats were acquired by Government in 1937 for riverain police work, but were little used. The Port of Baṣra rendered steady service to the country. Its volume of traffic permitted it to pay regularly its capital instalments to the British Government, and by 1937 a debt of only £300,000 remained. The Port Trust, to be set up under the 1930 Treaty, did not appear; the Port was still administered by a Directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Its bar-dredging scheme operated with great success, repaid its loans, and kept open and improved the deep channel.[1] Two new dredgers were acquired. The Port administration completed a modern airport at Baṣra, furnished with a hotel and all facilities, and provided Baṣra city and suburbs with electric power and a modern water-supply. The ocean traffic using the Port increased substantially after 1935: first two, and later four, Japanese lines appeared, with one each of German, Indian, and Italian ownership and an occasional Russian, Swedish, and Greek steamer. The great bulk of the tonnage remained, as of old, British and British-Indian.

The ʿIraq Railways maintained their solvency and functions in 496 spite of tribal interference, fluctuating traffic, largely obsolescent equipment, and serious road competition. The operation of the system was modernized as far as was practicable, and a rapid Baghdad–Baṣra daily service introduced. Negotiations with the

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[1] The low-water depths in the Rooka channel (p. 208), achieved by successive phases of the bar-dredging scheme, were in 1926, 18 ft., in 1928–9, 20ft., in 1935–8, 23 or 24 ft.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

49½ British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership,
as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In
the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern
became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment
of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the
responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with
British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on
these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without
some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest.
499 The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for
the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development
northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late
in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo-Nisibin
line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier
at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek,
all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Baṣra–Baghdad–Istanbul
system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to
construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken
by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed
forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq
Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began,
the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest
of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qadhās.

509 Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch
trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing
frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself
to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment
came into being at Baghdad and Baṣra, and British flying-boats
after 1937 used also Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A
French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and
Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested
Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation
was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry
205 of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land
line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public
services from Baghdad and Baṣra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and
Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and
kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broad-
207 casting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to
1937 still experimental and occasional.

425 Good progress was made during these five years in the all-
185 important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up
under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked
excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and
others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as 425
too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land-developers, 185
and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding [423]
was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallah, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes [166
to construct model villages, good in conception but at present 654]
trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increasing 241
official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 473 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. A Committee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and [656] found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 312 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new [45[illegible]] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural [185] affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first 312 653 stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

from the Lesser Zab west of Altun Kupri and irrigating land in the 312
Ḥawija was begun in the same year. Schemes for a Diyalā dam, 653
and for a restoration of the ancient Isḥaqi canal were studied, but the long-favoured Ḥabbaniya scheme seemed unable to come to life. It was re-formulated in 1932; tenders were invited next year but none accepted; and in 1934 the project seemed likely to be reduced to the scale of a mere flood reservoir, whereafter, for a time, no progress in the scheme was made. Its place as first favourite was taken by the Tigris barrage, to control the Gharraf river from its point of bifurcation opposite Kut. This project, which allowed by means of locks for continued Tigris navigation and for fish movement, was put to tender in 1934. Work was begun by the chosen contractors, Messrs. Balfour Beatty & Co., and by mid-1937 it approached completion—the second of the great Willcocks schemes to be realized; but the dependent canalization necessary to ensure its full value would require much further time and effort. The collapse in 1935 of the Diyalā weir, built in 1928, was a setback which called for large-scale restoration, and steps to this end were taken in 1936–7. The upkeep and improvement of existing canals continued with increasing use of 'Iraqi technical personnel, and with it further study of the abiding problems of flood protection, drainage, water economy, and silting. There was little money to spend.

6. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Both events within 'Iraq and the external contacts natural to a 648×
modern State led during these years,[1] to greatly widened relations between Baghdad and the world outside. The process of establishing these was continuous; prestige and strategy both played their part; and no sphere of Government activity was freer from party politics. The system continued whereunder 'Iraqi representation abroad was entrusted to the diplomats and consuls of Great Britain, save only at Geneva and at the small but increasing number of capitals to which 'Iraqi Ministers were appointed. The Soviet Union alone refused to accept this system, or to recognize 'Iraq.

Italy, to which a State visit of King Fayṣal had been planned before his death, courted 'Iraqi goodwill. In spite of Sanctions, in which 'Iraq conformed to the British attitude towards the aggression against Ethiopia in 1935, Italy secured 'Iraqi armament orders in 1936 and later fêted and decorated 'Iraqi visitors to Rome (where a Legation had been opened in 1934) and subsidized in Baghdad a newspaper Fascist in tone, the *Sha'ab*. On the whole, however, Italian activity was less evident in 'Iraq than in the Levant States, and foreshadowed the assignment of that territory, with Persia, to

[1] - [Mid-nineteen-thirties--Analyst].

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

the intended German, not Italian, share of the Middle East. Germany itself gladly paid for teachers of German in the 'Iraq capital, hoped to supply arms and offered long-term credits, signed a commercial treaty in 1935, and increased its shipping and trading efforts. The Nazi Government welcomed the Amir Zayd as 'Iraqi Minister in Berlin, presented a German decoration to King Ghazi, and in Baghdad brought the more discreet resources of Nazi propaganda into use. These processes were ably directed by the charm and duplicity of the German Minister, Dr. Grobba, aided for a time by Dr. Jordan, the Inspector of Antiquities and an ardent Nazi.

The Soviet Union had no diplomatic exchanges with 'Iraq, though Communist elements perceptible there, which were denounced with violence by the Ḥikmat–Ṣidqi régime, may have been subsidized from Moscow. Russian attempts in 1932–4 to penetrate into 'Iraqi markets were discontinued. Relations with France, which had little direct interest in 'Iraq other than cultural, were uncordial; the seeming reluctance of the French to emancipate the Levant States from Mandate led 'Iraqi publicists to favour all forms of Syrian anti-French nationalism, and to ask the Vatican, with success, to remove the Apostolic Delegate, a Frenchman, from Mosul. With other Powers of Europe—Austria, Sweden, Spain—missions or diplomats were exchanged. The slight increases of contact with the United States were marked by the appointment of an 'Iraqi Vice-Consul to New York, and by some talk of a commercial treaty; American mission schools flourished in Baṣra and Baghdad, their archaeologists excavated, their drillers and welders served irreplaceably in the oilfields. The Japanese appeared only in the commercial field (p. 203).

The status of 'Iraq in the Arab world was conspicuously enhanced by its new independent rank and visible advance; and in no Arab territory, as an earlier page has indicated, was more thought or more cordial approval given to Arab Unity or pan-Arabism. Even in 1932 King Fayṣal had projected an Arab conference in Baghdad, and plans for an Arab Federation were formulated on lines then thought practicable, notably by its protagonist Nuri Sa'id. No 'Iraqi politician could afford to be backward in service to this cause, with its gratifying appeals to history, to Islam, and to racial pride—and with its anti-Western connotation. It resulted that active or passive moves in this field were made in this period, with the effect of strengthening the bonds of Middle Eastern Arabism.

As they saw a rapid growth of anti-Zionism in 'Iraq, so these years involved the Baghdad statesmen increasingly in the outskirts of the tragic and tragically mishandled 'Palestine Question'. The Arab strike in that country in 1936 led to days of mourning in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Baghdad, collections for Palestine martyrs, and deputations to the British Ambassador. Individual 'Iraqis, notably an ex-officer of Syrian origin, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, sought guerrilla service in Palestine and returned as heroes; and it was an appeal by 'Iraq jointly with Sa'udi Arabia and Transjordan that brought the Palestine strike to an end. The same States persuaded the Palestine Arabs in 1937 to state their cause to, instead of boycotting, the Peel Commission. The latter and its report, which advocated Partition, evoked further warnings from 'Iraq to the British Ambassador and the League of Nations, and specific protests against Partition from the Premier and his colleagues. These feelings, shared by so many Englishmen, were unquestionably sincere and affected all politically conscious 'Iraqis; but the Palestine Question as a rallying ground for all-party nationalist sentiment was, at the same time, a boon to successive 'Iraq Ministries. There were, in quieter periods, many exchanges of visits between 'Iraq and Palestine in the social and educational fields; the Mufti, Ḥajj Amin al-Ḥusayni, was a discreet visitor to Baghdad in 1933. The direct Baghdad–Haifa road was opened and improved, telephonic communication established, and Customs arrangements at Haifa adjusted in 'Iraqi interest.

Relations with Syria were, in sentiment, all cordiality and sympathy for a not-yet-liberated Arab sister nation; 'Iraqi publicists found many occasions to criticize French tenacity and to preach the unity of Arabs. In the administrative field the frontier was demarcated on the ground, not without friction, in midsummer 1933, and subsequent agreements covered matters of *bon voisinage*, tribal raiding and the like. Meetings of the frontier authorities of the two States were held at Palmyra in 1934 and at 'Aqra in 1936. 'Iraqi insistence was on negotiating with Syrians rather than with Frenchmen, particularly after the grim episodes of the Damascus riots and bombardment of 1936.

From Egypt a number of teachers were obtained for 'Iraq's higher education, and visiting Egyptian engineers reviewed 'Iraqi irrigation projects. The conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was hailed in 'Iraq as aligning Egypt with herself as an ally, and the presence in Baghdad of the persuasive 'Abd al-Raḥman 'Azzam as Egyptian Minister further improved relations. A direct telephone service between Baghdad and Cairo was opened, and a commercial treaty projected.

With the mandated Amirate of Transjordan 'Iraqi relations were strengthened by the completion in 1934 of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's trans-desert pipeline and road, and the augmented trans-frontier traffic. Royal visits were exchanged between the Hashimite rulers, though the Amir 'Abdullah was at times criticized in Baghdad for seeming lack of anti-Zionist fervour. His southern neighbour, ibn Sa'ud, enjoyed calm and normal relations with 'Iraq, in contrast to the storms and bloodshed of earlier years. Royal and ministerial delegations passed between Baghdad and Riyadh, pilgrims travelled from Najf directly across Najd to the Holy Places, the two States concerted measures for intervention in Palestine, and a treaty of alliance between them was signed in 1936. The Imam of the Yaman, who had received a distinguished 'Iraqi mission and sent pupils to the Baghdad schools and Military College, adhered in 1937 with caution—but with no prospect of practical results—to the 'Iraqi-Sa'udi Treaty.

A sad condition of mutual recrimination prevailed between 'Iraq and the small independent shaykhdom of Kuwayt. The Shaykh's title to certain date-garden estates on the Shaṭṭ was questioned, his claimed exemption from taxation of their produce gave rise to dispute; and the mediation of the British Ambassador and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf failed to produce an amicable settlement. Yet more irritating was the continuance of large-scale smuggling from Kuwayt into 'Iraq—the staple industry, with pearl fishing, of the Kuwayt of the pre-oil period. The Shaykh, not indifferent to the rich gains of this traffic, would accept none of the suggested measures to stop it. The pursuit of smugglers by the 'Iraq Police led them at times, it was claimed, into Kuwayt territory; every year had its tale of border affrays, with bitterness and outcry on both sides. The Baghdad press found here another subject for invective and, to the Shaykh's alarm, even asserted 'Iraq's claim to Kuwayt itself as a sometime appendage of the Baṣra wilaya.

The Turko-'Iraqi Commercial Treaty signed in 1932 was ratified two years later. Frontier liaison was well maintained. 'Iraq maintained a legation at Ankara and a Consul-General at Istanbul. The Mosul crisis faded into the past. The tithe of oil royalties was paid regularly to the Turkish Treasury. The popularity of Turkey in 'Iraq, with a long tradition of social intercourse and cultural borrowing, stood high; the achievements of its Government and President were impressive; and individual 'Iraqis of all parties returned from their visits to Ankara filled with admiration [illegible] Turkish pattern of progress and authority. The approach [illegible] railway to the 'Iraqi frontier, common signature of the S[illegible] Pact (p. 268), common interest in the European movements of the time, and a visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Rüstü Aras to Baghdad in 1937, were all events making for yet closer relations.

With Persia—officially 'Iran' in and after 1935—the case was otherwise. In spite of the Accord of 1929, periodically renewed, and the royal visit of 1932 and the 'Frontier Settlement' Agree-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

ment of that year, contacts between the two Powers did not cease to be uncordial. Every month brought cases of alleged non-co-operation among frontier officials, trespass by armed forces, tampering with border waters or estates, or misconduct on the reaches of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. No progress was made towards ratifying the Treaties—of Frontier relations, Commerce, Neutrality, Navigation, Residence—prepared in 1932. The Government of Teheran continued at first tacitly and later specifically to withhold recognition of the results of the 1914 Boundary Commission. It denied, on the 'Talweg' principle elsewhere usual in river frontiers, the claim of 'Iraq to own the whole Shaṭṭ waterway from bank to bank: a claim based on the Erzerum Treaty of 1847 and on much subsequent history, and one the more important to 'Iraq since, in contrast to Persia's long coastline, she possessed no access to the sea save by the Shaṭṭ. A British plan for an Anglo-Persian-'Iraqi joint Conservancy Board for the navigation and control of the river was unacceptable to Persia. Bilateral conversations having failed, 'Iraq in November 1934 carried the matter to Geneva. The case was heard on 14 January 1935 by the Council of the League, before whom all legal, historical, and geographical arguments on both sides were rehearsed. 'Iraq's offer to refer the case to the International Court of Justice was declined by Persia. The efforts of the Italian rapporteur, Baron Aloisi, failed to bring the two parties together, though talks were renewed in Rome, Geneva, Teheran, and Baghdad in 1935. In the year following, the proposal for a Shaṭṭ Conservancy Board was revived; but Persia remained suspicious of the participation of Great Britain, who, as owner of nine-tenths of the shipping concerned, expected to be a party and signatory. Nevertheless, the anxiety of Turkey that the difference between these neighbours should be adjusted, and the nervousness at Italian aggression felt currently by all the less powerful nations, inclined both sides towards agreement; and an 'Iraqi note to Teheran in November 1936 was found to provide a basis for this. On 4 July 1937 a treaty was signed at Teheran providing for specific acceptance of the 1914 boundary, with the grant to Persia of a four-mile anchorage area, from east bank to Talweg, in the Shaṭṭ reaches opposite Abadan: a solution, at long last, of the most persistent of 'Iraqi-Persian differences. A protocol was signed providing for upkeep of the navigable channel, dredging, port dues, quarantine, and smuggling; but no authority was set up to perform these duties, Persian suspicions reappeared and increased, and the administration of the river remained in the hands of the Port of Baṣra.

The way was now clear, for the first time, for the consummation of another project. Alarm at Italian ambitions had, as early as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

summer of 1935, driven Turkey and Persia, joined by 'Iraq, to consult at Geneva on the formation of a Middle Eastern Pact for their mutual support. A draft was initialed in October, but signature necessarily awaited the long-deferred solution of 'Iraqi-Persian difficulties. The five-year Pact in its final form embraced also Afghanistan, with whom 'Iraq had ratified a treaty in 1934. It was signed by its four participants at the Sa'dabad Palace at Teheran four days after the 'Iraqi-Persian Treaty. Of value, if any, rather moral than material, it could be thought to represent at least a first step in regional security in western Asia, and linked 'Iraq with the non-Arab world. The Pact covered abstention from mutual interference, joint consultation, the sanctity of frontiers, and pledges of non-aggression. It reaffirmed loyalty to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the Briand–Kellogg Pact. A permanent council was set up for the carrying out of the Pact, and this, at its first meeting, on the day of signature, resolved on steps of mutual assistance towards obtaining seats for its members, each in turn, on the Council of the League.

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VIII

PRELUDE TO WAR

I. THE FOURTH MADFA'I MINISTRY

THE Cabinet which Jamil al-Madfa'i chose and announced on the day of his own appointment, 17 August 1937, was to hold office for sixteen months; and, under the moderate if uninspired leadership of this blunt and honest statesman, it was not unsuccessful in restoring confidence and normality. He retained the Ministry of Defence temporarily in his own hands, installed experienced administrators—Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, Ibrahim Kamal, Jalal Baban—at Interior, Finance, and Works. Two Shi'is, Riḍhā al-Shabibi and 'Abbas Mahdi, were appointed to Education and Justice, and the subtle and vigorous Tawfiq al-Suwaydi to Foreign Affairs. The names were well received. The Mosul garrison announced their withdrawal from politics. The statesmen exiled by Bakr Ṣidqi returned to Baghdad, one by one, from Syria and Egypt. But though social and business circles, the tribes, and even the general public seemed little agitated by this and other crises, the political and military coteries, in which guilty consciences were frequent and reprisals habitual, were not to be so easily reassured. The coup d'état of Bakr, the unavenged murder of Ja'far Pasha, and the factions and rancorous intrigues of 1934 and 1935 had left sinister legacies of bitterness among civilian and military careerists and their followers. Peace and unity were neither probable nor universally desired. 645

Aware of the evils of Army dominance, Madfa'i pensioned 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, found non-military appointments or retirement for Bakr's less tractable partisans, and in General Ḥusayn Fawzi appointed a Chief of Staff apparently free from supra-military ambitions. The greater weight of authority in the Army swung to the anti-Ṣidqi faction; but in spite of protestations all the materials for another military coup remained, and Madfa'i was as powerless to disperse these as he was unwilling to use them.

His policy was one of appeasement. The general sympathy with his reburial of Ja'far Pasha in the Royal Mausoleum, an obvious act of piety, did not commit him to the exclusive support of the parties which had approved the Hashimi Ministry. He refused all vindictive action, pardoned and restored the Diwaniya shaykhs exiled by his predecessor, announced the Utopian programme which, with but slight variations, was common to all incoming Ministries, and called for general elections.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

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Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of [668] Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

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Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

563
The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to 563 whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which 439 had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Produce 435 prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent, and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was 471 awarded by the Baṣra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs. Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil refinery. A concession for the oil of Baṣra wilaya—more strictly, of all 'Iraq territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—was granted in 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc* creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a [453] branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited 647 for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience, J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in 1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from the Financial Advisership in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on 648x bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial treaty was signed with the United States, though American Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman. Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary. The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

'Iraqis sent engineers and pilots to Italy to study the aircraft which they had over-hastily acquired. Far more significant than any of this was the progress of Hitler's Germany in the minds and counsels of the 'Iraqi people during these years. More Germans appeared in Baghdad, full of long-credit commercial offers and sympathies for Arab Palestine; their wireless transmissions were increasingly heard, their invitations to high officials to visit Berlin were accepted, their Youth Rally in Germany was attended by 'Iraqi schoolboys. Among the intelligentsia and politicians, and even more among Army officers to whom Nazi philosophy was congenial, the German influence spread notably during the period. Among the young the wearing of uniform in and out of school, the organization of summer camps and the success of the Nazi-spirited 'Iraqi Youth Movement, the Futuwwa, all led directly away from democratic and towards Hitlerite sympathy.

The treaty with Persia was ratified in March 1938, not without unexpected demonstrations of 'Iraqi public disapproval, and the agreed Commission for frontier definition was set in motion. A weekly Baghdad–Teheran air-line began to operate, under Persian ownership. Annoyance with Kuwayti non-cooperation over smuggling, and the desire for an alternative Gulf port, led to a claim by the 'Iraqi Foreign Minister for annexation of the principality to 'Iraq; and the demand was repeated insistently by an unusual instrument of statecraft, King Ghazi's private and personal broadcasting service. An intervention of the British Ambassador deprecated both the claim, which was historically baseless, and the means of enforcing it.

But the shadow of Palestine fell more heavily over 'Iraq than all other foreign interests. Zionism and the threatened partition of Palestine had long been the concern not only of Government and the politicians, but of a fair proportion of the urban public at large. 'Iraqi delegates led by Tawfiq Suwaydi attended the League of Nations meeting in the autumn of 1937, and foregathered in October with other Arab representatives at Bludan in Syria. The 'Palestine Defence League' was active in Baghdad with demonstrations, prayers, and money collections. The Arab rebellion and terrorist campaign in Palestine, which began late in 1937, were followed in 'Iraq with sympathy, embellished as they were by the crude propaganda of the German wireless. The evolution of pan-Arab feeling, which the plight of Palestine had notably evoked, was aided by such events as the holding of an Arab Medical Conference in Baghdad, another of veterinary surgeons, the visit of an athletic team from Damascus to Baghdad, and an excursion of 'Iraqi boy scouts to the Lebanon. There were joint Syro-'Iraqi celebrations of the anniversary of Yasin Pasha's death, and distinguished Arab visitors made their appearance at the Muthannā Club, which had 648✓ been founded in 1935 as a pan-Arab centre and the home of the Palestine Defence League. Nevertheless, the *fatwas* of 'Iraqi divines favouring immediate Jihad in Palestine were discredited by their Government, the more violent demonstrations dispersed and later forbidden, and bomb-throwing in the Jewish quarters, reported in August 1938, was suppressed. Mawlud Mukhliṣ represented 'Iraq at the Parliamentary Conference on Palestine in Cairo in October; Nuri Sa'id handed proposals of his own, conceived with moderation and good sense, to the British Government; and Tawfiq Suwaydi was not less active in Geneva and London. In the London Conference, which met on 7 February 1939—its composition clearly foreshadowing the future Arab League—Nuri, by that time again Prime Minister, was as ever prominent through his constructive proposals and authoritative by the contacts he had maintained in the Arab capitals and with the now exiled Mufti. The British White Paper of May 1939, the initial Arab opposition to which must soon have turned (and in fact turned) to acceptance, was for the time unable to appease the powerful Arab sentiment against Zionism and its supporters. No element in all 'Iraqi-British relations of the period 1937 to 1941 was more powerful in poisoning them than the tragically mishandled Palestine Question.

In the Munich crisis of September 1938 the attitude of Madfa'i 648✓ and his Cabinet was strictly correct to their ally and stern towards 665 Dr. Grobba and his countrymen. The event indicated nevertheless to 'Iraq, in a new light, the menacing cleavages of Europe, and evoked from sections of the public and Army the admiration for German ruthlessness and successes to which the last few years had predisposed them: and, with that admiration, the beginnings of reluctance to support a pacific and reputedly pro-British Prime Minister. The orientation of 'Iraq towards or away from the Axis Powers became, from Munich onwards, one of the questions dividing the Baghdad politicians, to whom respect for the 1930 Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty, in spirit or letter, was no matter of course. This division contributed an element to the weakness of Madfa'i's position, which by the autumn was apparent. Major changes in the Cabinet 645✓ were necessitated in October by a series of personal attacks on Muṣṭafā al-'Umari; he was transferred to Justice and 'Abbas Mahdi to Works, the Prime Minister himself taking the portfolio of Interior. To Defence was appointed Ṣubiḥ Najib, an ex-officer who had served for some years as Director-General of Police, and more recently as Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he was however junior in rank to many of the serving generals, who resented his promotion as minister.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

665 The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of
668 political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest
against the Baṣra concession, others—Rashid ʿĀli and Ḥikmat
Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies
of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the
Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression
of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it
had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an outbreak
[656 of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with
661] justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to
the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto
invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number
of their more violent opponents. These included officers
known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and
politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis
drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid ʿĀli led to
his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no
time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one
side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group
later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute
and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding
the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil
Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of
the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized
forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a
parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and
dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old
Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present
Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an
approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—
and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at
al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting
the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri,
and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal
Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview
them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms,
occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of
Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and
banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime
Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that
neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement.
Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained,
Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties,
and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter
006 to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

Nuri Pash, perhaps with the reluctance which he professed, accepted the premiership for the fifth time on Christmas Day 1938. 645x

2. DEATH OF THE KING

The new Ministry was greeted by the usual hopes for a firm and stable régime at last, the usual apprehension of faction, reprisal, and further military intervention. A Cabinet of average merit was announced; but once again no firm basis of shared principles was present to unite the ministers. Naji Shawkat was summoned from the 'Iraqi Legation at Ankara to be Minister of the Interior, Rustum Ḥaydar went to Finance, the capable Turkoman, 'Umar Nadhmi, to Works, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari to Justice, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Education, Ṭaha al-Hashimi to Defence. Rashid 'Āli was taken to preside over the Royal Diwan. The Prime Minister's inaugural speech was admirably balanced, wise, and high-minded; it deprecated military adventures and urged all parties to accept the rule of law and true democracy. The banned newspapers were relicensed, the exiled politicians returned. Postal censorship was abolished, dismissed officials were reinstated, and permission was given for the formation of political parties, though these failed for the moment to take shape. Words of mingled reproof and encouragement were addressed to assembled Euphrates shaykhs.

In Parliament, however, the usual asperities were not slow to 646
repeat themselves, and redoubled after the departure of Nuri 665
Pasha to London early in 1939. The exiled victims of the Madfa'i Ministry demanded vengeance for its high-handed illegalities, and as a first step pressed for reference of disputed points of law to the Special Court provided by the Organic Law; and the Ministry, itself indifferently united, decided to reinforce its position by general elections which might produce a more amenable Chamber. The Irada ordering the dissolution of Parliament appeared on 22 February, a few days before the State visit paid to Baghdad by the Crown Prince of Persia.

The return of the Prime Minister from London late in February 645x
was followed by the issue of a ministerial programme on the habitual 669
lines. A few days later the discovery of a conspiracy was announced, understood to involve not only Ḥikmat Sulayman—the *bête noire* of Nuri Pasha—but a formidable list of other politicians and officers. The plot, it was revealed, had aimed at the murder of no less than fifty leading personalities, the assassination of the King, and the enthronement of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah—or, as some preferred, of the Amir Zayd. A State of Emergency was immediately proclaimed at al-Rashid Camp, a number of arrests were made, and a special court martial was convened with civilian judges as equal members with the military. On the strength of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 567 confessions made by alleged participants, death sentences were passed on five of the accused, including Ḥikmat, and long terms of imprisonment on others, while some were acquitted. The commutation of the death sentence for one of imprisonment on four of the condemned was soon afterwards announced by Royal Irada; that of Ḥikmat Sulayman was mitigated only after persuasive pressure by the British Ambassador and by private British as well as 'Iraqi friends. There remained—and remain today—among persons well qualified to judge, many who, in spite of the confessions, believed and believe the whole plot to be fictitious and its 'discovery' designed merely to serve political or personal ends.

643 A part of the objects of the alleged conspiracy was after all to be achieved, and this by a tragic accident. The King, driving his car with habitual recklessness late in the night of 3 April, crashed into an electric-power standard near his palace, and died a few hours later of the severe fractures of the skull which he had sustained. The announcement of his death was made early on the 4th. The Council of Ministers, urgently convened, received the written testimony of Queen 'Aliya that Ghazi had wished to be succeeded, should the case ever arise during the infancy of his son, by a Regency of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah, son of the late King 'Ali. A sufficient number of members of the dissolved Chamber were gathered to ratify this in accordance with the Constitution; and the succession of King Fayṣal II, then aged almost four years, and the Regency of the Amir were proclaimed.

King Ghazi was twenty-seven. He had reigned for nearly six years. Little interested in the formal functions of his office, and barely persuaded to fulfil them, his faults of heedlessness and frivolity, his impatience of protocol and of advice, had been embarrassing to his successive Governments, and at times discourteous to his subjects. But at his best he lacked neither intelligence nor charm. He was a good sportsman, a brilliant high-speed motor driver, and popular with the young Army officers who were his chosen and natural associates. He was beloved, at a distance, by many of his subjects for his youth, vitality, and evident patriotism. The little Fayṣal II, attended always by an English nurse and later an English governness, was known to be an intelligent and attractive child. The new Regent, brother of Queen 'Aliya and uncle of the King, was now aged twenty-seven. He had been educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and although hitherto unversed in public affairs was considered serious and intelligent, and likely to turn his personal charm and excellent social gifts to good account.

643 579 The King's funeral at the Royal Mausoleum was attended by many Arab visitors from abroad and by tens of thousands of his

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

own subjects. It evoked extraordinary emotion. The fantastic 643
story that his death had been 'arranged' by the British Secret 579
Service was propagated by the German wireless, and perhaps also by Dr. Grobba. It was believed by the more feeble-minded part of the hysterical city mob, and was responsible for a shameful and brutal attack, immediately following a memorial service to King Ghazi, on the British Consul at Mosul, Mr. G. E. A. C. Monck-Mason. Surrounded by a rabble of excited demonstrators, he was stoned and then struck fatally on the head, on the veranda of his own Consulate. The Prime Minister, deeply afflicted by this outrage, offered apologies to the British Ambassador and ordered compensation to be paid to the Consul's widow. His funeral at Mosul was public and impressive; 'Iraqi officialdom and the Army were well represented. Severe sentences were passed on a small number of the participants in the attack, in which as usual students had been prominent; the murderer himself was not discovered.

3. FIRST MONTHS OF WAR

The five months preceding the outbreak of the Second World 645
War were a period of outward tranquillity in 'Iraq. The King's funeral visitors returned home, the Regent settled to his task. The Sa'idi Ministry, resigning office on 4 April in accordance with the Constitution, was reinstated by Royal Irada two days later, without change of personnel. The Minister of Interior, Naji Shawkat, whose tepid support on the conspiracy case and on others had created a breach between him and the Premier, resigned late in April. Nuri Pasha himself took the portfolio of Interior, and brought 'Ali Jawdat to Foreign Affairs. The elections were completed in May, though martial law was still in force until August in Mosul and Baghdad. Parliament was opened by the Regent on 12 June. His Speech from the Throne appealed to all for tranquillity and restraint. Chosen by the habitual procedures, the Chamber included a large majority of Nuri Pasha's supporters and, contrary to all precedent, was destined for a life of four years. Nevertheless, the shadow of the Army still lay heavily over 'Iraqi politics, and the Chamber itself contained deputies enough willing to renew all the old animosities. Among them were followers of the German lead which was still ceaselessly offered, convinced Anglophobes still resentful of the 1930 Treaty and its alleged limitations on 'Iraqi freedom, thwarted members of the intelligentsia, and pan-Arabs bitter at the Palestine White Paper which
'Iraq, at this stage, rejected. The cause of the Palestinian Arabs 648
was not visibly advanced by the journeys of the Prime Minister to 'Amman, Beirut, and Cairo in August, ever seeking a formula

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 to ensure Arab rights in the Holy Land, or by that of the Foreign Minister 'Ali Jawdat to Sa'udi Arabia in June.

The child-King was taken to the Lebanon for the summer, and there hailed by village enthusiasts by the roadside as 'King of Syria'. In Baghdad a new British Ambassador, Sir Basil Newton, to whom the Middle East and its problems were unfamiliar, succeeded Peterson in March 1939.

652 The financial needs of the State, which thanks to over-spending were now serious, were met by a grant of credits by the British Government for the pressing needs of the Railway, and equipment for the Army. Nearly £4 million was thus made available on the security of 'Iraq's oil revenues and with conditions of moderate interest and repayment spaced over seventeen years. An interest-free loan was granted at the same time by the 'Iraq Petroleum Company in return for a seven-year postponement of its export obligation under the B.O.D. Company's concession; it was payable in six half-yearly instalments of £500,000 each, and repayable at leisure out of royalties.

653 [496 312 The Railway section from Tall Kochek to Mosul was completed, at unexpectedly high cost, and trains could now run from that city to Istanbul. The Kut barrage and Gharraf headworks were completed in March 1939: the official opening had been King Ghazi's last public act. With its fifty-six mechanically-operated gates, overall width of 1,615 feet, lock, and fish-ladder, this important work had cost £1,200,000 and, given full dependent canalization (at present lacking), was capable of the controlled irrigation of a million acres. The seven-gate Yau regulator, at the end of that branch of the Kufa channel, was erected in 1939–40, also by Messrs. Balfour Beatty. A new and improved Diyalā weir (p. 263) was undertaken in 1939 and completed by the end of 1940. Execution of the Ḥabbaniya project, which had been revived urgently after the Euphrates floods of 1938, was entrusted in June 1939 by contract to Messrs. Balfour Beatty for £700,000 for the first phase, that of the intake canal to the lake at Ramadi and the controlled outlet from the lake to the vast Abu Dibis depression. Work on these was pressed forward. The first of the two steel bridges at Baghdad, built under contract by Messrs. Holloway Bros., was completed; it formed an imposing structure, 700 ft. long and 50 ft. wide, and, named al-Ma'mun Bridge, was opened with ceremony by the Regent. Bridge tolls were abolished throughout the country. 652 A long-standing project drew nearer to realization when a Government bank, to be known as the Rafidain Bank, was established by law though not yet opened; its initial capital was fixed at £500,000, subscribed in part by the State. A revised version of the capital works programme was evolved by Rustum

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Haydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated 652
expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great
loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 731
27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished
only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack
demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained 647
to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) 473
and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association
in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a
field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of
growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service
as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early
act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed
dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevit- 722
ably to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension 458
of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources' with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would 648
fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

48 The 'Iraq Government hailed with pleasure the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Agreement of 19 October, which provided for joint military action by the signatories in the event of 'a European Power'—which, said the Turks, could never be Russia—'bringing war to the eastern Mediterranean'.

In spite, then, of the pronounced German leanings in the Army and in a number of statesmen, and of deep and general resentment over the Palestine Arab plight and the withheld emancipation of Syria, the tone of the Government remained, during these weeks, cordially favourable. The arrival of the Mufti, Ḥajj Amin al-Ḥusayni, in Baghdad in October as the honoured—but, it was asserted, non-political—guest of the Government had no immediate ill effects. The position was unaltered by Cabinet changes in mid-October, when 'Umar Nadhmi was appointed to Interior, 'Ali Jawdat to Foreign Affairs, the Futuwwa enthusiast, Dr. Sami Shawkat (brother of Naji) and Sādiq al-Baṣṣam to the two newly created Ministries of Social Affairs and Economics, and Jalal Baban to Works. The 'Iraqi broadcaster in Berlin, Yunis Baḥri, was condemned to death in absence, but was in fact to live and flourish for many years to come. Parliament met on 1 November and moved, once again, to press Great Britain towards a better realization of the Arab case in Palestine; the Prime Minister paid a rapid visit to Cairo for more talks on the same subject. No adverse importance could attach to the arrival of the first Japanese Minister in Baghdad in December, his task being merely to develop commerce between the two countries.

With the new year, 1940, 'Iraqi conditions were outwardly unchanged. The cleavage of its politicians on pro-Axis and anti-Axis lines was not yet fully explicit, their own feuds were unappeased, and all alike were watchful of developments in Europe. The coalescence of the anti-British elements into an active military and civil faction resolute to construe the 1930 Treaty as consistent with 'complete neutrality'—and, if need be, to leave the Allied for the Axis camp—did not occur until after the German victories of mid-1940 and the fall of France; but the influence of the Palestine and Syrian questions and the efforts of the Mufti, who played a part ever less concealed in inspiring anti-British sentiment, were in play throughout the year. The Russian agents and propaganda observed and condemned 'imperialism' in Great Britain's relations with 'Iraq; and German money as well as encouragement was received by willing hands in Baghdad, including those of the Golden Square.

+145 A severe and, as it transpired, a fatal blow was struck at the Sa'idi Ministry on 18 January. This was the murder, by an ex-police inspector of German sympathies, of Rustum Ḥaydar, the

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1918-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645

Minister of Finance, who by long and devoted service deserved as well as any man of his adopted country. He was buried with the fullest honours at the side of Ja'far al-'Askari. The murderer, Ḥusayn Fawzi Ibrahim, at first denied all accomplices but later changed his story to incriminate leading personalities alleged to be hostile to the dead minister: Ibrahim Kamal, who had been Minister of Finance under Madfa'i, Ṣubiḥ Najib, the late Minister of Defence, two leading lawyers, an ex-Mutaṣarrif and a former Director-General of Police. Nuri's Cabinet, weakened by the loss of Rustum's calm and confident ability, was torn by instant dissension. Its Shi'i members pressed for a court martial and the full rigour of the law; others would limit proceedings to the normal Courts and the actual criminal. To fail to meet the stronger demand would outrage Shi'i feeling; to meet it with vigour would invite the charge of pursuing personal feuds under cover of the crime. In this dilemma Nuri Pasha resigned office on 18 February.

The succession was widely expected to fall to Rashid 'Āli, Director of the Royal Diwan since April 1939; he had as yet taken no open part in forming 'Iraq's war policy. But the moment seemed auspicious to the Army Chiefs once more to intervene. The group led by the Chief of Staff Ḥusayn Fawzi and Amin al-'Umari, who were generally opposed to Nuri and Ṭaha al-Hashimi, requested Rashid 'Āli to accept the premiership, and addressed the Regent with the same proposal. But the rival and stronger senior-officer faction, that of the Golden Square, heard of the manœuvre. They met and invoked Nuri, and stood the troops at al-Rashid Camp to arms as their rivals had already done at Wishash. Nuri and Ṭaha were able by night to reach the young Regent, now facing his first of many crises, and advised immediate action against the Chief of Staff and his following. Rashid 'Āli declined to attempt the formation of a Ministry, and pressure by the Golden Square, as well as the Regent's own inclination, led Nuri Sa'id back into office on 21 February. The crisis of military intervention thus passed; the all-powerful Four were momentarily satisfied, and their rivals in the higher command were dismissed from military employment. But the affair of Rustum's murder remained to be faced.

The reconstructed Cabinet, to the bewilderment of the public, differed from the old only in an exchange of portfolios between Sami Shawkat and Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and the appointment of Ra'uf Baḥrani to the Ministry of Finance. The inaugural speech of Nuri was correct but banal; ministerial and public attention concentrated on the Ḥaydar case, which was referred to a court martial. The murderer himself was found guilty and hanged; Ṣubiḥ Najib, perhaps as a sop to Shi'i opinion, was sentenced to a year's

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 imprisonment for 'exciting hatred against the Government'; all the other accused were acquitted for lack of evidence.

Ṣaliḥ Jabr, dissatisfied, resigned from the Cabinet; nor was this the only evidence of Cabinet disunion. Tired and ill at ease, and likely to be pressed by public opinion and the Army clique further from his policy acclaimed as 'pro-British', Nuri was more than willing to relinquish the premiership, and on 17 March again resigned office.

619 These vicissitudes of Baghdad politics had, as usual, no great effect on events outside the council chambers. Tribal life was scarcely conscious of the current crises—or, indeed, of the World War itself. A violent tribal battle between two sections of the 'Aniza cost, it was said, 200 lives. Hostilities between the 'Ubayd and Shammar, which flared up late in 1939, were not prolonged. 'Ajil al-Yawir, Paramount Chief of the Shammar, great in stature and shaykhly qualities, died late in 1940 and was succeeded by his son, Sufuk. Northern 'Iraq watched with head-shakings a scandal among the Yazidis, where the child-wife of Sa'id Bey, their Mir, fled in dudgeon to Syria. A military mission of 'Iraqi officers left Baghdad for the Yaman, at the Imam's request. The second of the 499 Baghdad steel bridges built by Holloways, 900 feet in length and named after King Fayṣal, was completed.

4. GAYLANI AND HASHIMI

*645 The advice of Rashid 'Āli, as head of the Royal Diwan, to the Regent was to install, if he could, an all-party Ministry capable of uniting loyalties and avoiding the pressures of the Army. A meeting at the palace was attended by all ex-Prime Ministers—Nuri Sa'id, both the Suwaydis, Madfa'i, Naji Shawkat, 'Ali Jawdat. These offered the Regent their promise to support whatever constitutional Government should be appointed. Nuri himself proposed the appointment of Rashid 'Āli, to which the Regent agreed; and thus was formed the first Ministry for four years to assume office in 'Iraq without military pressure. It carried high hopes of stability. The Cabinet announced by the new Prime Minister on 31 March contained Naji Shawkat at the Ministry of Justice, Naji al-Suwaydi at Finance, Nuri Sa'id at Foreign Affairs, Ṭaha al-Hashimi at Defence, 'Umr Nadhmi at Works, Muḥammad Amin Zaki at Economics, and the two Shi'is, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam and Ra'uf Baḥrani, at Social Affairs and Education. Rashid 'Āli retained the portfolio of Interior in his own hands. The reappointment of Nuri and Ṭaha seemed to stand for continuity, and suggested the united front of a 'National Coalition Government' which it claimed to be. The ministerial programme declared an attitude of perfect correctness towards the British alliance.

1t Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped. A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp, in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality, shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy-French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company, and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according
to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country. The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt; trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

185 657 The Ministry of Social Affairs, inspired by Dr. Sami Shawkat on the orthodox lines of Axis philosophy, pressed for a higher birth-rate and legislated for the encouragement of lower dowries and earlier marriages. It urged the fuller development of trade unionism, and for the first time enforced the law which restricted certain trades (p. 246) to 'Iraqis. A bill was introduced to compel landowners in successive zones to build cottages for their cultivators. 172 The Department of Antiquities, with Seton Lloyd as its Adviser from 1939, conducted excavations at Samarrā and at Jabal Sinjar in 1939, and at the site of Wasit in 1939–41; a German expedition dug at Warqa also in 1939.

648✓ In politics the movement, from the early summer of 1940 onwards, was from doubt towards decision, from a pretended unity towards evident faction. As the war of inaction in Europe gave place to a series of German successes, with the collapse of France and the entry of Italy, many 'Iraqis could see in adhesion to Great Britain little but self-condemnation to the losing side. The Army leaders, pro-Axis by temperament and by absorbed propaganda, saw no case for hesitation; in every Anglophobe old rancours found anew the support of logic and of national interest; and the prudent or uneasy of most political colourings admitted the value of at least a tacit reinsurance with the probable victors. The failure of final efforts in the summer of 1940 to wring from the British some reassurance over Palestine, or some hopeful countenance to the 'liberation' of Syria, was exploited by the Mufti and his many friends. Syrian ministers visiting Baghdad late in the year—Jamil Mardam Bey, Sa'dullah Jabri, and Lutfi Haffar—were fêted with enthusiasm as partners in the struggle against imperialism. Diplomatic relations with Denmark had been dutifully broken off when it was overrun by Hitler; but with Italy, whose Legation in Baghdad was now the centre of Axis activity, no breach was enforced when Mussolini entered the war on 10 June, and the British Ambassador's remonstrances went unheeded; the few Italians interned were soon liberated and returned to Italy. Nuri's influence failed on this and similar issues to carry the Cabinet with him, and one minister, Amin Zaki, resigned. The tone of the press passed from dubious neutrality to overt favour of the Axis, rather encouraged than restrained by the Prime Minister. Later in the year the difficulty or indeed impossibility found by Great Britain in supplying military equipment to 'Iraq, and her reluctance to provide dollars to buy arms for an ally so half-hearted, led to angry resentment in 'Iraq officialdom and the Army, and to the dispatch of an 'Iraqi purchasing mission to the United States.

The joint visit to Ankara of Nuri Sa'id and Naji Shawkat late in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

June enabled the former to report on his return that the Turks 648* advised solidarity with Great Britain. Naji Shawkat, however, now leader of the impatient anti-British party in the Cabinet, was far from accepting this advice as final; he stayed longer in the Turkish capital, visited Istanbul, and was received by von Papen himself, with the motive, no doubt, of inquiring into the German attitude to the Arab world in the probable event of an Axis victory. The result of these conversations was a German declaration of its pro-Arab sympathies, which was broadcast on 23 October 1940 and many times repeated. Meanwhile, telegraphic communication between Baghdad and Rome and Berlin was pointedly re-opened.

By the end of 1940 the cleavage both in public feeling and in the Cabinet was clear to all. The party of Nuri Sa'id, Madfa'i, and the Treaty-keepers had lost ground; that of Naji Shawkat, the Generals, and the press was in the ascendant. Naji again visited Ankara in September and stayed for some weeks 'for health reasons'. The Italian Legation in Baghdad, which had been merely tolerated, became popular, and the time seemed to be near when efforts should be made to establish a detailed basis for German collaboration. The Prime Minister, still anxious to keep a foot in either camp, was in close relations of sympathy and policy with the Axis party, and his position must assign him in some measure the leadership of it; but, faced with the unconcealed displeasure of Whitehall at his shortcomings as an ally and his more than suspected German contacts, he continued to profess loyalty to 'Iraq's Treaty obligations and pain at the unjust suspicions of Sir Basil Newton and Mr. Eden; and he was in fact far from wishing at present to precipitate a crisis with Great Britain. Nuri, who contemplated 645* resignation from the Ministry in protest, was checked for the moment by his fear, which the Regent shared, that in his absence worse influences would prevail. A hint conveyed from the Regent to the Premier that his own resignation was desirable was countered by a visit of three ministers to the Palace—Ṭaha, Naji al-Suwaydi, and Rashid 'Āli himself—to protest, correctly enough, that in 'Īraq the monarch had no right to dismiss Ministries—least of all at the bidding of a foreign Power! Gaylani refused to resign; the Regent, in turn, refused to attend his office or to sign State papers.

Further Palace talks evolved the suggestion that, Rashid 'Āli remaining as Premier, Cabinet unity might be achieved by the simultaneous resignation of Nuri Sa'id and Naji Shawkat. In pursuan~~ce of~~ this Nuri resigned on 21 January 1941, and Naji four days later. They were replaced by 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh, a lawyer and extreme nationalist, and Yunis al-Sab'awi, a young

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645* Mosulawi politician–journalist. But the uneasiness of the Regent had meanwhile increased, Rashid 'Āli showed a rising confidence based on his ever closer relations with the Generals, and it was clear that no palliatives could meet the case. On 26 January the Cabinet, in spite of the Premier, decided by majority that, to avoid a crisis, its remaining members should resign and thus dissolve the Ministry. The resignations were prepared; but General Maḥmud Salman, on behalf of the Golden Square, assured the Regent in audience that the Army was resolved on maintenance of the Gaylani Government, on pain of direct military action which he urgently threatened. The Amir, yielding to force, agreed to refuse the resignations and by filling the vacant places in the Cabinet to keep it alive. On 28 January he issued Iradas appointing a lawyer deputy, Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, and a wealthy and widely travelled ex-official of Foreign Affairs, Mūsā al-Shahbandar, to ministerial rank.

But the Gaylani Ministry had after all but three more days of troubled life. The tone of the Chamber at its meeting on 30 January was highly critical of the Prime Minister, and the latter demanded from the Regent an Irada to dissolve it. The Amir, to gain time and to escape the duress under which the Army had placed him, left Baghdad for Diwaniya and lodged there with the loyal Commander of the 4th Division, General Ibrahim al-Rawi. This move evoked the telegraphed resignation of Rashid 'Āli, in terms of barely suppressed impatience. The Regent thereon summoned elder statesmen to Diwaniya, and learned from these that the alternatives open were those of civil war or a Ministry under Ṭaha al-Hashimi, whom alone the Golden Square would accept in lieu of Gaylani. An Irada for the new Ministry was issued on 1 February, and the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah returned to Baghdad three days later. All now depended, it was clear, on the loyalty of the Army chiefs to Ṭaha, and his power to control them.

The new Prime Minister retained the portfolio of Defence in his own hands. He gave those of Interior and Justice to 'Umar Nadhmi, of Finance to an able financier, 'Ali Mumtaz al-Daftari, of Economics to Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, of Education to Ṣādiq Baṣṣam, and of Social Affairs to the veteran nationalist and landowner, Ḥamdi al-Pachachi. The portfolio of Foreign Affairs was entrusted to Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. Through the visit of the last-named to Cairo late in February to meet Anthony Eden the Ministry might, had time allowed, have received some further infusion of pro-British sentiment, which prevailed already in some of the Ministers as well as at the Palace; and advice in this sense was given by the American Minister, Paul Knabenshue, and by President Roosevelt's visiting envoy, Colonel Donovan. The

Ministry itself was well received by Parliament, gained some popularity by increasing officials' salaries, and worked acceptably at salvage and relief works necessitated by the disastrous floods which had breached the railway and inundated farm lands. It felt strong enough to refuse the application of Rashid 'Āli and his band of close associates—Naji Shawkat, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh, Muhammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Yunis al-Sab'awi, Da'ud al-Sa'di—for the formation of a People's Party. 645+

But the task of conciliating the Army leaders, the Gaylani group 645+ of politicians hungry for power and embittered against the Regent, 669 and the Amir himself with his moderate and orthodox advisers, proved impossible of achievement. The Prime Minister could not or would not adopt a determined policy in either sense. The Golden Square, who had already abandoned their loyalty to Nuri, now abandoned it to Ṭaha equally, and were identified ever more closely with Rashid 'Āli's faction. They felt their own position to be threatened; and the first stroke they had been led to fear fell on 26 March with the announced transfer of one of them, Kamil Shabib, away from Baghdad; other repostings were no doubt to follow, and the Regent's campaign to break the Square would develop. The order of transfer was ignored; Ṭaha was powerless to enforce it; and the solemn promise of the Generals on the last day of the Parliamentary session, 31 March, that 'on their military honour' they would abstain from political intervention, was obviously valueless.

On the night of 1 April the four Generals and the acting Chief of Staff, Amin Zaki Sulayman, met to proclaim a State of Emergency at al-Rashid cantonment, and marched troops to points in Baghdad city and around the Palace. Their spokesmen, visiting Ṭaha by night, demanded his resignation; but he refused to join a movement now frankly revolutionary, and his Cabinet remained in being for one further day. Events, however, swept it aside; the Regent escaped from his palace on the night of 1 April and took refuge for some hours with Knabenshue, who drove him to Ḥabbaniya in an American Legation car next day. Here he met for a few minutes Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, arriving at this most uneasy of moments to assume the post of British Ambassador, and from Ḥabbaniya was flown to Baṣra. There were hopes that a strong base of support might be found at the Port, and the Amir issued a manifesto calling for this. But the Baṣra garrison, hesitant at first, received orders from Baghdad to detain him, and arrested and replaced the Mutaṣarrif, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, who had loyally received him. He was forced to embark for safety in a British warship anchored in the Shaṭṭ, and was later flown, with 'Ali Jawdat and Madfa'i, to 'Amman.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

5. THIRTY-DAY WAR

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In Baghdad the Golden Square and its forces assumed control. Once fully dominant, the Generals proclaimed the formation of a Government of National Defence, embodied in a Council which included their own four members and the Chief of Staff, with Rashid 'Āli as its nominal head, accompanied by two of his close followers. General Amin Zaki issued on 3 April, in terms strongly hostile to the Regent, a broadcast appealing for universal support. He was followed by Rashid 'Āli, who justified his position and the Army's and stated his policy to be one of 'refraining from exposing the country to the dangers of war', while also 'fulfilling all the international obligations of 'Iraq'.

The legislation of the new régime was less easy. Parliament was summoned by one of its Vice-Presidents, 'Alwan al-Yasiri: a step in itself illegal, since under the Constitution a Royal Irada was required. At the meeting of the Chamber on 10 April Rashid 'Āli obtained from the frightened deputies (many in fact strongly favourable to the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah) their votes for the deposition of the Regent, and for the appointment in his place of an elderly but respectable poor relation of the Hashimite family, the Amir Sharaf. The Prime Minister swore henceforward to observe the Constitution, the new Regent took his oath of office, and the régime announced itself as now legally constituted. The Amir Sharaf accepted the resignation of Ṭaha, three days old, and called formally upon Rashid 'Āli to form a Ministry. The portfolio of Finance was allotted to Naji al-Suwaydi, that of Defence to Naji Shawkat, Justice, Economics, and Foreign Affairs were given to Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Yunis al-Ṣab'awi, and Musā al-Shahbandar, and Education to Dr. Ḥasan al-Salman. The Prime Minister did not fail to announce, in the strict tradition of incoming Premiers, that a new age of all the public virtues and blessings had begun. Of the normality of his own position he admitted no doubt; there had been, at the worst, just one more coup d'état, a purely domestic affair! In the eyes of his supporters, of the Youth Movement, and of part of the urban public, a strong Government free from lingering commitments, hotly patriotic and backed by the Army, had at last been established. In the tribes, apathy and vague uneasiness prevailed. The more critical or conservative townsmen and most older politicians viewed with alarm the implied flouting of the British, the commitment to Germans and Italians, the precipitate flight of the Regent, and the present crude domination by Army leaders always disliked and feared by the civil public. The release of convicts serving sentences for their share in the Monck-Mason murder was significant. Leading statesmen loyal to the

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Hay- 645 dari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their col- 669 leagues in Palestine. The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained invisible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Ali personally there was little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert. The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful [722] factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it.

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey 721 and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy 648 × the reverse of their own. In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya.

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid 'Ali first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

brigade strength. A second unsatisfactory interview took place between Premier and Ambassador; each maintained his position; and Rashid 'Āli, hinting at serious consequences, laid all blame in advance upon the British. The troops landed, not without signs of popular and military disfavour which stopped short of serious physical opposition. They occupied the Port area and power-station, and prepared for the advent of greater forces. The 'Iraqi garrison of Baṣra moved out, under pressure, to the river bank fifteen miles north of the Qarmat 'Ali river junction.

In spite of the efforts of the British community and most 'Iraqis to maintain normal activities, the position in Baghdad was by these events so strained that British women and children were dispatched on 29 April, by the Ambassador's instructions and with the Prime Minister's specific guarantee of safety, to Ḥabbaniya, whence in the days following they were taken by air to Baṣra and out of 'Iraq. All other British and United States citizens, with some few exceptions—who were to fare badly in the succeeding weeks—were collected on 30 April for safety at the British Embassy on the right bank of the river, at the American Legation in the 'Alwiya suburb, and in Mosul at the British Consulate. Some 360, joined by a few local Jews and Indians, were to spend the next month within the Embassy precincts, which were barricaded and controlled. Official records and cyphers were destroyed. The captives continued precariously to enjoy the Government services of electricity and light, telephone (with interruptions), and water, and to obtain food and other articles from the town. A further 150 were kept, not without 'Iraqi protest at an unneutral act, under the protection of Knabenshue but were unable to communicate with the Embassy. The King and his mother remained for three weeks at their palace outside Baghdad, and thereafter made their way in safety to a hill-station in northern 'Iraq. The British banks in Baghdad were forced to hand over their keys and balances.

During the night of 29–30 April the 'Iraq Army Command moved troops—an Infantry Brigade, an Artillery Brigade, and a Machine Gun Company—by a measure described as precautionary, from al-Rashid camp to the high ground immediately dominating Ḥabbaniya. This force grew, in the two days following, to one of nearly 10,000 men, fully armed and equipped and provided with 50 guns and a number of tanks. The Ḥabbaniya cantonment contained, besides some thousands of civilian workers, 1,200 of the Levies—half Assyrian, half Arab and Kurd—an Armoured Car Company, 80 aircraft of various and mostly obsolete types, 30 trained pilots and as many pupils, about 1,000 other R.A.F. personnel, the infantry half-battalion flown from Baṣra, and two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

ancient howitzers. The camp itself, containing maintenance installations, stores, and a Flying Training School, was militarily indefensible.

The British position in 'Iraq, it was now clear, was more than precarious; it could be sustained only by immediate military reinforcement. The flooded countryside and the 'Iraq Army's control of the Baṣra–Baghdad railway precluded the dispatch of land forces northward from the Port; and none, indeed, reached Baghdad by that route until mid-June. But the resolution of Churchill and the British Cabinet to hold their position and insist on their Treaty rights in 'Iraq never faltered. General Wavell in Cairo was directed to dispatch forces from Palestine to the relief of Ḥabbaniya and for the restoration of the situation: instructions which were received with dismay, since the Commander-in-Chief was already distraught by wide and varied commitments in Greece, Crete, Syria, the Western Desert of Egypt, and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, a force consisting of a brigade of mechanized cavalry, armoured cars, field and anti-tank artillery, a battalion of the Essex Regiment, three squadrons of the Transjordan Frontier Force, 200 heavy lorries to supply Ḥabbaniya, and a mechanized Desert Regiment of the (Transjordan) Arab Legion under Brigadier J. B. Glubb, was collected and placed under Major-General J. G. W. Clark. His task was to open and hold the lines of communication to 'Iraq, and in that country to relieve Ḥabbaniya, restore the British position, and make possible the restoration of a legal and friendly Government. Moving eastwards by the 'Amman–Baghdad road, a part of this force, formed as 'Kingcol' under Brigadier J. Kingstone, crossed the borders of 'Iraq on 10 May. With Glubb's detachment acting as a forward screen, the column was able to occupy Rūṭba, which the 'Iraqis abandoned with little resistance, and to reach the Euphrates. The desert pumping-stations of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company, two of which had been heavily looted, could thereby be brought again under control. 'Aniza tribesmen had done much damage to the works proceeding at Lake Ḥabbaniya, and to the machinery in use there.

The fortunes of war at Ḥabbaniya, meanwhile, had bordered on the miraculous. On 1 May the Air Force Commander there, Air Vice-Marshal H. G. Smart, summarily rejected the request of the 'Iraq Commander that all flying should cease; he demanded, on the contrary, the withdrawal of the 'Iraqi forces from positions which were clearly hostile and must place his camp at their mercy. No reply was given; the 'Iraq Army held its ground; and at dawn on 2 May it was bombed by British aircraft. The 'Iraqi artillery replied by shelling the buildings of the Ḥabbaniya camp. For three days this bombardment continued, half-hearted and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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ill-aimed, and failed[1] to hit the vital water-tower on which the garrison depended, or to prevent the evacuation by air of the women and children. British aircraft meanwhile constantly attacked the 'Iraqi forces and gun positions, and destroyed wherever they found it the greatest part of the small but not despicable R.I.A.F., which had consisted of some fifty first-line aircraft, including American bombers and fast Italian fighters. Small reinforcements of aircraft, notably Blenheims, reached the British at Ḥabbaniya from Egypt, and a detachment of Gurkhas were flown from Baṣra. R.A.F. losses in effective aircraft were heavy. Vigorous patrols from the British land forces operated at night against outposts on the plateau, and were little opposed. The 'Iraqi troops made no ground attack at any point on the seven miles of scarcely defended perimeter, which with their numbers and weapons they could have penetrated almost at will. Before dawn on 6 May they withdrew from the plateau, moved eastwards, and halted at Sinn al-Dhibban athwart the Ramadi–Baghdad road, offering the easiest of bombing targets. A sortie from Ḥabbaniya here attacked and dislodged them, taking 26 officer prisoners and over 400 other ranks, with vehicles, guns, and war material. The remainder retired to Faluja. The troops at Ḥabbaniya rested and reorganized, kept watch on the 'Iraq Army garrison behind them at Ramadi, and harassed the enemy with their aircraft.

At Baṣra, meanwhile, the public were sullen and hostile. The newly installed acting Mutaṣarrif was instigated to active unfriendliness by orders from Baghdad, but from fear of reprisals felt unable to carry out his instructions to intern the whole British community. In spite of resistance from the police, which led to the necessity of disarming them, General Fraser was compelled to occupy part of 'Ashar on 7 May. In the unoccupied quarters of this suburb and of Baṣra city, looting by hooligans was widespread. The Mutaṣarrif abruptly left Baṣra on 16 May and anarchy reigned until the formation of a temporary Committee of Notables under Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan a week later secured some sort of order. In Mosul the Mutaṣarrif, Taḥsin 'Ali, was removed by the Gaylani Government and the local general substituted, but not until British wives and children had been evacuated to Turkey or, in the case of the B.O.D. Company's families, to Syria. The internment of Englishmen and (to their indignation) Americans in the British Consulate was accompanied by offensive restrictions and complete isolation: by the sight of German aircraft overhead and rumours of Axis military stores arriving by train: and by an ugly attitude on the part of the truculent Mosul townsmen. Officialdom, as usual, was divided. British personnel of the I.P.C. at Kirkuk were interned, sometimes amicably sometimes rigorously, in various premises of Kirkuk town and fields headquarters. All active operations ceased at Kirkuk, Qaiyara, 'Ayn Zala, and elsewhere, while control of the installations was assumed by 'Iraqi staff until Germans should arrive to take charge. Looting of vehicles, stores, and domestic effects was considerable and at certain pumping stations wholesale. The Khaniqin Oil Company's personnel at Nafṭkhana and at Alwand Refinery were brought in some cases to Baghdad, in others to Ba'quba where they endured a sordid and dangerous captivity.

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[1] In the opinion of some observers, the ineffectiveness of the shooting was intentional.

The 'Iraq Government, as was apparent after a week of 'war', had evolved no military or political plan to meet an emergency which it had itself precipitated. Security was generally maintained throughout the territory, but the rigid censorship, administrative obstruction, military control, and clashing authority slowed the pulse of all national life. Railway communication was interrupted or ceased. The Army, itself far from single-minded, was handled without grasp or resolution; its Intelligence Services were lamentable, its movements uncoordinated, and the great bulk of its effectives never brought into action, or near it. Its unit commanders took varying views of the situation; many would have refused orders to fight, had they been given. The bombs of the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm, from the head of the Persian Gulf, descended daily or nightly upon garrisons, barracks, and airports at Qurmat 'Ali, Naṣiriya, 'Amara, Samawa, Diwaniya, Ramadi, Qaraghan, and Mosul. The black-out and camouflage operations in Baghdad created more public alarm than confidence, rumours were wild and alarming, and official communiqués of a grotesque falsity were daily issued. The press seethed with its usual diatribes and exhortations. The Mufti, Ḥajj Amin, emerged to proclaim Jihad against oppressive and infidel Britain, and was supported by other divines. Diplomatic recognition of 'Iraq by the U.S.S.R. was, indeed, announced by the Russians on 12 May, but this move, foreshadowed already by negotiations of some months' duration, was of no helpful significance to 'Iraq. The Axis Powers made no gesture of recognition for the new régime in 'Iraq, though their wireless was ceaseless in its blandishments and encouragements.

But to Gaylani and his ministers this was no substitute for material aid, for which no prior arrangement had been made unless in the vaguest terms, and no concerted time-table prepared. A Turkish offer on 4 May to mediate had been rejected off-hand by the British Government. Naji Shawkat hurried to Turkey on the 8th, failed to convince the Foreign Minister at Ankara of his claims to support, and waited for some days till the return of von Papen from Europe. But he could accomplish nothing, and the attitude

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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of Egypt and of Sa'udi Arabia, to which Naji al-Suwaydi proceeded on urgent mission, was equally comfortless for the Baghdad Government. Only behind the scenes and beyond 'Iraqi vision were plans being formulated between German, French, and Italian spokesmen—Abetz and Darlan in Paris, Darlan and Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Ciano and Ribbentrop in Rome—for the use by Axis forces of the Syrian aerodromes, ports and railways, and for the dispatch of French military stores and expert helpers to 'Iraq. For this purpose the Turkish railway was in fact used, to the extent of a few train-loads late in May, with the acquiescence of the Turks which von Papen had secured. But these materials played no part in the campaign; the arrangements, like all those for the German help for which the harassed ministers in Baghdad now prayed, were improvised only after the adventure in usurpation had begun, and without direct German-'Iraqi contact at staff levels. All were inadequate, all too late.

Nevertheless, the German and Italian aircraft and technicians who began in small numbers to arrive in 'Iraq in the second week of May, were of greater and could have been of decisive value. They made their base on the Mosul airfield, were seen at Kirkuk where oil technicians were shortly to follow them, and took part in the operations now impending at Faluja. It was a matter of course that all acts of the German aircraft, which included frequent bombing of Ḥabbaniya, were claimed in 'Iraqi communiqués as feats of the R.I.A.F. A Messerschmidt circling Baghdad airport was in error attacked by 'Iraqi rifle-fire and on landing was found to contain the body, shot through the head, of the son of Marshal von Blomberg.

'Kingcol', the main reinforcement to the British forces, arrived at Ḥabbaniya from the desert on 18 May, in time to join in a concerted attack on Faluja, which the 'Iraqis had lost but retaken ten days earlier. The town was outflanked by airborne troops and by detachments ferried over the Euphrates; and, after a short bombardment, was entered and held with its great bridge undamaged. Assyrian Levies took a conspicuous part in the operation. An 'Iraqi counter-attack in strength was repelled. Major-General Clark was now free to order an advance on Baghdad, where fantastic stories of the strength—and tanks—of the British forces were accepted; but widespread flooding across the direct route, and the tactical desirability of first cutting the approaches to Baghdad from Mosul, led to a delay of some days. A party of the Arab Legion under Glubb crossed the Jazira, cut the Mosul railway near Samarrā, and returned; later, joined by the Household Cavalry, they crossed again to the Tigris, occupied Mushahida, and turned south towards Baghdad. The force encountered enemy troops near Taji, and took up a position in brickfields near Kadhimiya.

The Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad was captured, released, and sent home. The main body of Clark's force now advanced due east by way of Khan Nuqṭa. Scarcely 1,300 strong, and incomparably weaker in guns, equipment, and supply resources than the opposing 'Iraqi units, it was yet scarcely opposed and, after ferrying across flooded areas, reached the outskirts of Baghdad on 29 May. Its weakness, its flood-restricted movements, and its long and vulnerable communications rendered its position precarious, or indeed alarming; not only was Baghdad easily defensible, but a determined move by a mere fraction of 'Iraq's available forces could not have failed to dislodge and destroy an invader whose only strength was in determination, bluff, and high spirits. In fact, the short war was almost over; the 'Iraq Government and its resistance simultaneously disintegrated and collapsed.

The public had become aware that its Government's challenge to Great Britain had been taken up, that actual war was in progress, and that British forces had appeared, in the air, at a score of places. The Army, never popular and not greatly respected, had done nothing to restore confidence. Communications were cut everywhere, commerce dead, prices soaring, the capital three-quarters isolated. At the Port, British-Indian troops were pouring in, and opposition was already changing to indifference or pleasure. Lieutenant-General E. P. Quinan, accompanied by Brigadier W. Slim (the future C.I.G.S.), arrived to take command on 7 May. 'Iraqi troops at Mosul and Kirkuk seemed generally to support the Government, but made no move; a part of those in Baghdad were in sentiment favourable rather to the banished Regent, and the Golden Square, who had perverted their loyalty, were now powerless to lead them. Desertions were increasing, and became a menace to security. Most townsmen and villagers in the provinces were anxious only to see peace and order restored, though support to the Gaylani régime had been at first not inconsiderable. The youths of Baghdad, armed during May by orders of Rashid 'Āli, boasted and strutted in uniform but were no military asset. No tribal leaders placed themselves behind the Ministry; Shaykh Maḥmud escaped from Baghdad, reached Sulaymaniya, and essayed to raise forces to 'support the British'. There was neither time nor need for Glubb Pasha to fulfil the mission charged with which he had led his men to 'Iraq, that of raising the tribes against the usurping Government.

Early in the last week of May the ministers, preceded by their families, started to leave the capital. Naji Shawkat, Shahbandar, 'Ali Maḥmud, and Suwaydi left for Persia or Turkey. The Mufti hastened to Teheran. On the 28th Rashid 'Āli himself fled from the city. German and Italian subjects—among them Dr. Grobba,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

721 lately back in Baghdad triumphant—left hurriedly for Syria, pre-
648x ceded by such of their aircraft as could fly. The Regent Sharaf
accompanied ministers to Persia. Yunis Sab'awi, Minister of Economics, appointed himself Military Governor of the capital, and exhorted the demoralized public to organize a final resistance; but his power, if any, lasted barely a day. He fled; and the Generals were not far behind, abandoning their posts and duties as their ill-judged and mischievous adventure ended in fiasco. The steadfast Mayor, Arshad al-'Umari, alone remained to preserve what order he could, to direct dissolution of the armed gangs of the Youth Movement, and on 30 May to form a Committee of Internal Security with the strong support of law-abiding opinion. On the evening of that day, sponsored by Knabenshue, he appeared at the British Embassy. Cornwallis at his instance sent a wireless message to the G.O.C. at Ḥabbaniya to receive, if he would, a flag
728 of truce that night. Terms of armistice—not of peace, since war
had never been declared—were without difficulty arranged between
648x the Ambassador and the Security Committee. They provided for
a cease-fire, the continued independence of the country and retention of its Army intact, release of prisoners, arrest of enemy (German or Italian) forces, and the opening of all communications in 'Iraq in accordance with the Treaty: conditions which showed both magnanimity and good sense. A detachment of British troops entered Baghdad on the following day, and British residents in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk could emerge from a month-long captivity which, not without its humours, had been galling, humiliating, and anxious, to find many of their houses looted. The attitude of the Baghdad crowds was sullen and bitter; the effects of dashed expectations and the aftermath of long-drawn Axis propaganda were slow to disappear.

727 The Regent had passed three weeks in Palestine and Jordan. He
returned to 'Iraq on 22 May escorted by his faithful ministers and
579 by a British representative, Colonel G. de Gaury, and broadcast
once more to his people. The Guard of Honour which welcomed him to Ḥabbaniya was composed of 'Iraqi troops and officers who had surrendered to the British at Sinn al-Dhibban while fighting for his enemies and supplanters, and who now without effort changed sides again. The Amir entered Baghdad on 1 June, welcomed by the British Ambassador and by crowds of his own well-wishers. But the sinister possibilities of the hour, and the urgent need to install a Government, were overlooked in the glow of acclamation and victory; the night of 1 June and part of 2 June were disgraced by serious bloodshed and looting in quarters of Baghdad, with violent hooliganism directed against the Jews. The outbreak had in large part been organized by the fugitive military

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

officers on the scale, they hoped, of a counter-revolution; it repre- 727
sented partly also reprisals by the Youth Movement, of whom 579
many were caught red-handed, and partly the brutality and avarice of the lowest mob elements. The Committee of Internal Security was caught unawares, the Police proved unreliable and impotent, and order was restored only by troops brought in from outside. At noon on 2 June Jamil al-Madfa'i assumed with reluctance the task of forming a Ministry, and set himself to the restoration of normal tranquillity. A reliable Mutaṣarrif assumed charge at Baṣra.

The movement thus overcome will long bear, in obloquy or 721
praise, the name of Rashid 'Āli. His part in it was in fact both
unsought and limited. Willing himself to keep in good outward 648x
relations with Britain, at least until her defeat was certain, and never as rabidly xenophobe as many another, he was forced first to specific disagreement and then to actual hostilities with the ex-Mandatary by the pressure of his military backers, whom in spite of all precedent he had hoped to control, and by the impatience of his own closest followers. Unmoved by any principle of loyalty to treaties, basically unfriendly to Great Britain, and impetuous and self-confident by nature, he had yet never committed himself to Germany, as had the Generals and Naji Shawkat; he had hoped always to achieve a subtle neutrality and to gain, if possible, for his country from both sides. Rashid 'Āli's acts in his last premiership represent no settled conviction or resolute policy; he drifted or was forced from step to step. Whoever, indeed, had assumed the premiership on 1 April, in conditions which made the Army leaders all-powerful, must either have played a part not unlike Gaylani's, or soon made way for another to do so. There were other policies, other convictions in the 'Iraq of the moment—but no other power than the Army.

If timing had been concerted with the Germans, and their help punctual, the movement, however achieved, could scarcely have failed. A few hundred German troops, a few score of aircraft, could have occupied 'Iraq and vitalized its Army, could have dominated Persia and its oil, closed the southern doors to Russia, and threatened the Levant from the east. That such was not the outcome followed from three factors: the feeble irresolution of the 'Iraq Army at Ḥabbaniya and thereafter; the failure of the Axis to provide timely help, thanks to the British resistance in Crete and to Hitler's plans for the invasion of Russia; and the rapidity and successful bluff of the light British forces. The British intervention, still today condemned by 'Iraqi irreconcilables as unjustifiable 'interference', in fact saved the country first from military dictatorship, then from certain German occupation, and finally from identification with the losing side in the War.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

IX

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

I. PAIFORCE

721 THE directive with which General Quinan landed at Baṣra bade him develop that port as a major military base, secure lines of communication through 'Iraq, and safeguard oil supplies. The first of these duties occupied his forces for some weeks in isolation, except for nightly air convoys to Ḥabbaniya, from the campaign up-country; all routes were cut by the 'Iraq Army, wide areas were flooded, and the need was urgent to organize facilities in the Baṣra and Shu'ayba neighbourhood to accommodate the incoming troops and supplies. The Commanders-in-Chief of India and of Middle East, Generals Sir Claude Auchinlek and Sir A. Wavell, met at Baṣra on 23 May to concert plans. On the 27th a column left Shu'ayba for the north and, after meeting slight opposition at Ur and repairing the railway as it went, arrived outside Baghdad on 12 June; and on the latter day a second force embarked at 'Ashar in an improvised fleet of river craft, and reached Baghdad a week later. On the 18th Quinan with his reopened communications could assume control of all troops in 'Iraq, and the command, hitherto handled operationally from Cairo, reverted to the orbit of the Commander-in-Chief, India.

Its urgent tasks during the summer of 1941 were to place and maintain small garrisons at Kirkuk, Mosul, Faluja, Ḥaditha, Ruṭba, and elsewhere: to be prepared to aid the 'Iraq Police in the maintenance of order: to increase immediately the capacity of the already congested Port: and to develop, for use by major forces, base areas at Baṣra, Shu'ayba, Kut, and Musayib. New air-fields were sited in northern 'Iraq, and steps taken to improve the means of communication by rail, river, road, and telegraph. In June and July small forces were sent to take part in General Maitland Wilson's campaign in Syria against the Vichy French; and in August, with the increased forces then available, it was possible for Quinan to undertake by way of Baṣra and Khaniqin the almost bloodless invasion of Persia which ended with a change of Government and policy in that country, and swung it from dangerous sympathy with the Axis to friendly co-operation with the Allies.

The winter of 1941–2 was of exceptional severity. After a plenary conference in Baghdad in September of the British Ambassadors and Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East it was decided to devote the ensuing months to continued development of the

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territory as a communication and defensive area. This was 72! achieved by the expansion of inland bases and of the Port, where new wharves were constructed, cranes erected, roads and buildings provided: by assuming control of and greatly extending the Inland Water Transport services (on lines reminiscent of the First World War), with the import of a score of small steamers and many barges from India and America, and the requisition of the bulk of existing 'Iraqi resources: by perfected telegraphic and wireless networks: and by the improvement and local duplication of the railway line, and the construction of a new line from Kut to Ba'quba. A German threat, against which these preparations were designed, could come by way of Anatolia or, after Hitler's invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, by the Caucasus and Adharbayjan. The whole of northern 'Iraq must, therefore, be strengthened, and General Quinan prepared positions for this purpose within the triangle contained by the Turkish frontier, the Diyalā, and the Tigris. These works involved great efforts and no small hardship; they called for the use of large forces of local labour and for the provision of the camps, transport and equipment, and the feeding and medical arrangements necessary to maintain them; and they absorbed the two weak Indian divisions—the 8th and 10th, after the departure of the 6th for Persia—which with miscellaneous units formed the 'Iraq garrison at the time. The decision to assist the supply of the Russian armies by supplies conveyed from the Gulf across Persia demanded a formidable organization for procurement and forwarding, based on Baṣra; and in this the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the British companies at Baṣra played an invaluable pioneer part. It [499] led to a great expansion in the Persian railway and road systems, not least in the close neighbourhood of Baṣra and the 'Iraq frontier where the teak-built 1,150-ft. Hull Bridge across the Shaṭṭ-al-'Arab was the first bridge in history to span this river. The railway terminal at Khaniqin became simultaneously an important forwarding base.

So passed the winter of 1941–2. The British forces in 'Iraq and Persia, then as always predominantly Indian in composition, were regrouped in the early days of January 1942 as the Xth Army, and passed again to the Middle East Command. During the spring the tasks of the winter were continued, with the scale of traffic constantly increasing on rail and river, on the desert highway to Palestine, and in base and advanced areas. If the invasion of Egypt by Axis forces in the spring of 1942 led to the dispatch of some combatant units from the Xth Army to the Levant, the deeper penetration of Nazi forces into south Russia in the summer, with the threat of access to Persia and 'Iraq by the Caucasus, seemed to

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721 increase the danger to these countries. This serious situation led early in August to the British decision to reinforce the Xth Army; it was to become an effective fighting formation instead of one specialized for defensive and forwarding functions, and thereafter as the 'Persia–'Iraq Force', or familiarly 'Paiforce', was to be the responsibility of a Commander-in-Chief of its own, directly subordinate to the War Office. General Sir H. Maitland Wilson was selected for the command, and reached Baghdad in August. The fresh troops destined for 'Iraq–Persia started to disembark at Baṣra in and after September 1942. They were the 5th and 56th British Divisions, soon to be followed by the 7th British Armoured Brigade from India, and the 5th Indian and 3rd (Carpathian) Polish Divisions from Middle East. These troops were as far as possible moved to areas in northern 'Iraq and northern Persia, though retirement to the vicinity of rail-heads was inevitable for supply reasons in the winter. The Poles, who were arriving at Khaniqin as refugees in increasing numbers from Persia, were placed under military training and later added to the Polish formations created in Middle East under General Anders.

Two Corps, the 3rd and 21st Indian, were organized from the troops available in Paiforce: they consisted in all, by the end of 1942, of two British divisions and a British armoured brigade, three Indian divisions and an Indian armoured brigade, and one Polish division with the expectation of another still under formation. The 'Iraq Army for its part was prepared, should the threat from the north-east materialize, to take its place with these in the defence of the passes leading from the Urmiya district. The successful defence of Stalingrad, however, gave time for the preparations in 'Iraq and Persia to be perfected; and in the early months of 1943 the final blunting of the German menace absolved Paiforce, after all, from a fighting rôle. It was possible before the middle of that year to transfer a number of formations and units to North Africa, there to join in the pursuit of a beaten enemy. General Wilson was transferred in February 1943 as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, under which Headquarters Paiforce was thenceforward grouped for the remainder of its lifetime. He was succeeded in Baghdad by Lieutenant-General Sir H. P. Pownall, who was in turn relieved a year later by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Smith. These officers, as it fortunately happened, each possessed the qualities of comprehension and sympathy which the location of their forces in the heart of an allied country demanded.

The tasks of Paiforce during its later career were the maintenance of communications and stability in the area, and the training of troops, especially the Poles, for use in other theatres. Its further duty in Persia was the increase of supplies to Russia by the

721 trans-Persian route. In the latter function the American Army had, from the early days of 1943, the major part to play and, with the deployment of its vast resources, took charge of the arrangements for improving the railway and road network of the Shah's empire and forwarding thereby millions of tons of supplies, transport, and equipment to the depots of the sullen and ungrateful Russians.

722 The peaceful history of this 'Second Occupation of 'Iraq'—so called by one school of 'Iraqi thought—could not but affect the political background of the territory during these years by its guarantee of comprehensive security, its frustration of any further attempt to involve 'Iraq in the downfall of the doomed Axis, and its living proof that accepted garrisons of well-disciplined and well-disposed foreign troops could be far from a scourge to town and countryside. If the British forces by their immense local disbursements for goods and services, their employment of labour, their competition for the services of the few skilled artisans, and their shipment of grain and animals to other theatres of war inevitably contributed to the inflation and the connected economic evils of war-time 'Iraq, they created also the remarkable prosperity which most classes of the population enjoyed. Nor could observers fail to recognize the excellence of the relations maintained, during five years of mental strain and physical propinquity, between these troops and the civil population. Under the inspiration of the Ambassador and his staff every consideration was shown to the 'Iraqi authorities and public, and these for their part wisely acquiesced in the temporary presence of British troops in their territory. Neither the conduct of troops nor the military authorities' use of their predominant power could be the subject of complaint; indeed, the slight extent to which the normal administration was affected by, or needed to take account of, the British forces was surprising. Relations with the 'Iraq Army varied from outwardly correct to nearly cordial; with the Regent they were excellent. He accepted in 1943 the honorary rank of Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force, and a dozen high officials of Government were awarded, for valuable war-time services, various (honorary) grades of the Order of the British Empire.

721 64 x The British position in 'Iraq during these years was, by force of circumstances, as different effectively from what it had been from 1932 to 1941 as it was different constitutionally from mandatory times. It was clearly dominant, had dominance been desired; but in fact it was more concerned to strengthen the hand of the 'Iraq Government than to supersede it. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, from whose character and experience the nation was thus able again to benefit, remained at the Embassy until 1945 to link amicably the British military and the 'Iraqi civil worlds, and to offer objective

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and benevolent advice to the Government. He was helped in keeping touch with all parts of the country by a small staff of Political Advisers resident, as observers only, in north, central, and southern 'Iraq. While an element of Anglophobe bitterness persisted among disappointed Army officers, ex-internees, and rancorous intelligentsia, the general tone of the public, especially in village, tribal, and non-political circles, was complacent or friendly to the British 'occupation'. Many joined Miss Freya Stark's 'Brotherhood of Freedom', a movement which claimed 600 committees and stood for a broad sympathetic support of democratic values; and many were receptive of direct British information and propaganda, realized the help which the Army was able repeatedly to give in civilian needs and interests, and heard with pleasure of the foundation in London of an Anglo-'Iraq Society in March 1944.

The Ambassador was relieved by Sir Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, formerly British Minister in Jidda, in the spring of 1945. The reduction of Paiforce was by that time well advanced. It had diminished the scale of its construction works (with resulting local unemployment), had removed most of its emergency railway lines, had parted with control of the river transport, and narrowed the perimeters of its vast Shu'ayba and Musayib camps. It was to disappear finally in 1947, after disposing locally of vast quantities of stores, and to leave behind it a considerable legacy of permanent improvement in the form of buildings and equipment in the Port, railways, and roads of the territory.

2. THE MIDDLE WAR YEARS

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The crisis through which 'Iraq had passed in May 1941 justified, when once the position was restored, the firmest of Governments. The sullen disaffection of the Army, the weakening of the Administration, the muttering among members of the disbanded Youth Organizations, the threats of fugitive Gaylani partisans that their struggle was but beginning: these features increased the dislocations and abnormalities of national life and, as war conditions began to assert themselves, called for a strong and a skilful hand.

It was not forthcoming. Madfa'i, whom patriotic duty alone had induced again to accept power, treated the situation as merely the aftermath of one more political episode and adopted easily the rôle which had fallen to him after Ṣidqi's murder—that of 'dropping the curtain' on past misdeeds. The gap between the measures which he took and those indicated by 'Iraq's position and needs was indeed so clear that his early supersession was inevitable.

The Cabinet which he installed was one of experienced politicians, with no new blood. Nuri Sa'id, whose presence in the capital could have been embarrassing to Madfa'i, betook himself to Egypt

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as Minister. The portfolio of Foreign Affairs was given to 'Ali Jawdat, Interior to the tough and experienced Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, Works to Jalal Baban, Finance and temporarily Justice to Ibrahim Kamal—in whom many saw a future Prime Minister—and Economics to Naṣrat al-Farsi. The two Shi'i Ministers were Ridhā al-Shabibi at Education, and Ja'far Ḥamandi at Social Affairs. This Ministry met cordially the suggestions of its ally as regards the stationing of troops at strategic points, the acceptance of joint control at the Port, and a censorship suited to war conditions. The Italian Legation was expelled, a few subversive Palestinian and Syrian teachers repatriated, and the enemy propaganda machine thereby seriously dislocated. Normal administration was everywhere restored, and local authorities encouraged to initiate progressive works. The tribes were quiet, the Kurds for the moment inactive. The accidental shooting of their Qa'immaqam by the Yazidis had no repercussions. But the Ministry failed in a firm orientation of war policy, and notably in its half-hearted attitude to the known trouble-makers, indulgence to whom among the menaces of war was dangerous folly. The policy of the Cabinet was appeasement. Few arrests were made, although those few included 'Abd al-Wahid and others of the incorrigible Euphrates shaykhs. Mutaṣarrifs through misguided clemency were discouraged by ministers from firm action, and too little was done to purge the Administration itself. Preparations for an internment camp at Fao were allowed to drag on.

The resignation of Ibrahim Kamal in September seemed likely to be followed by the formation of a Ministry by this able, impatient statesman; but he commanded insufficient support, and the Regent preferred, since a change was necessary, to send to Egypt for Nuri Sa'id whose qualities were those which the times demanded. Jamil al-Madfa'i resigned on 7 October, and two days later a Royal Irada announced that Nuri had formed a Cabinet, his sixth. He brought the vigorous and competent Shi'i, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, to the Ministry of the Interior—the first Shi'i ever to fill this post—and to act also in Foreign Affairs. 'Ali Mumtaz went to Finance, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam to Justice, Taḥsin 'Ali to Education, Muḥammad Amin Zaki to Works, 'Abd al-Mahdi to Economics, Jamal Babaṇ to Social Affairs. It was upon the two first-named of these ministers that the chief burden of administration must fall.

Cabinet changes occurred in February 1942 when Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for four months only), and in April when Da'ud al-Ḥaydari replaced Baṣṣam at Justice, and 'Abd al-Mahdi took from Amin Zaki the portfolio of Works. The Prime Minister retained that of Defence and pressed on the British Ambassador his desire and that of the Army for a

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specific rôle to play in the defeat of Hitler; but his offer of two brigades for North Africa was not accepted. With the Regent's support he showed, nevertheless, appropriate vigour in the arrest of the disloyal, though certain well-protected Nazi sympathizers remained untouched (and even retained high office) and zeal was for a time diminished in mid-1942 by the successes of General Rommel in the Western Desert. The camp at Fao was soon in use. It was followed later by another at the desert post of Salman, and yet another on the riverside at 'Amara, to which all the detained were ultimately transferred; the number of these rose at its greatest to some 350. A number of 'Iraqi fugitives captured by the British in Persia were held for a time at Ahwaz, and later taken for trial to Baghdad or for internment to Rhodesia. The Ministry of Education was submitted to a complete and much needed overhaul. Some dozens of the less efficient officers of the 'Iraq Army—or, said his enemies, of those unfriendly to Nuri—were removed, and conscription applied with a wiser indulgence in tribal areas.

Relations with Japan and with Vichy France were broken off soon after the Sa'idi Ministry took office. A Minister, 'Ali Jawdat, was sent for the first time to Washington in March 1942, soon after the regretted death of Paul Knabenshue in Baghdad; and the benefits of American lend-lease supplies were enjoyed from May onwards. The Prime Minister was able late in the same year to obtain a resolution of the Chamber in favour of adhesion to the United Nations Declaration of 2 January 1942, and was known already to be contemplating a declaration of war against the Axis, a condition of such adhesion. A treaty was concluded with China, whose Minister to 'Iraq resided at Teheran.

The Axis press and propaganda-machine continued to paint 'Iraqi conditions as those of brutal British domination, slave labour, daily conspiracies, sabotage, and tribal ferment: grotesque perversions which were supported by the presence in Europe of Rashid 'Āli (who broke his parole by leaving Turkey), Naji Shawkat, Fawzi Qawuqchi, the Mufti, and others. These fugitives were received by Mussolini, Ribbentrop, and Hitler himself, and broadcast their version of the 'Iraqi situation on demand. Meanwhile, their former colleagues in 'Iraq fared less well. A special Court was set up by the Sa'idi Ministry late in 1941 and in March 1942 sentenced to death, in absence, Rashid 'Āli and two of his ministers, Yunis al-Sab'awi and 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh, and three of the Golden Square, Fahmi Sa'id, Maḥmud Salman, and Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh. Long sentences of imprisonment were passed on Naji Shawkat and the Chief of Staff, Amin Zaki Sulayman, and shorter on the former Minister of Education, Dr. Ḥasan Salman, and the Director of Propaganda, Ṣādiq Shanshal. The trial of other and similar offenders was postponed until they could be produced before a Court; these were Naji al-Suwaydi (who died soon afterwards in Rhodesia), three other ministers—Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Musā al-Shahbandar, and Ra'uf Baḥrani—Kamil Shabib, the fourth member of the Square, and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani, the late Prime Minister's cousin. The delivery to 'Iraqi justice of a number of offenders caught by the British in Persia led to the re-trial of some of those already condemned in absence. The death sentence was now passed and executed on Yunis al-Sab'awi, Fahmi Sa'id, and Maḥmud Salman; prison sentences of seven and five years respectively were passed on 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and General Amin Zaki. Ṣādiq Shanshal was acquitted, and the other sentences confirmed. Many attempts, of familiar type, were made during the trials to influence the course of justice.

The personal stresses arising from these measures, and more generally from Nuri's policy of whole-hearted support of Great Britain even in the darkest days, led to ministerial uneasiness which was increased by differences on the measures demanded by the now serious economic situation. It was shown by the attempted resignation during the summer of 'Ali Mumtaz and 'Abdullah Damluji, and produced an effect of partial paralysis of the administration. The Ministry resigned on 8 October 1942 after exactly a year of life, and was succeeded by another, the seventh, under the same premiership. Retaining Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and 'Abd al-Mahdi at Works, Nuri Pasha allotted Interior to his brother-in-law Taḥsin al-'Askari (brother of Ja'far), Foreign Affairs to Dr. 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh—a graduate in economics and dentistry—Justice to Da'ud al-Ḥaydari, Education to Taḥsin 'Ali, Economics to the Najfi business man Muḥsin al-Shallash, and Social Affairs to another ex-Mutaṣarrif and judge, Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban, a Kurd only in name. This composition was shortly afterwards modified by the retirement of 'Abd al-Mahdi and Shallash in favour of Salman Barrak of Ḥilla in Economics and the young Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Uzri, in Social Affairs.

The establishment of this Ministry was followed by a State visit of the Regent to Cairo where he was royally received by King Faruq, revisited Victoria College, and passed on to inspect the field of Alamein. His nephew, King Fayṣal II, now growing into an intelligent and promising boy, broadcast in English and Arabic on his eighth birthday, 2 May 1943.

Among the Ministry's first acts was to declare war on Germany, Italy, and Japan, alleging the sinister interventions of these Powers in its affairs, and issuing a Green Book in support of its policy. The Turkish Minister assumed charge of French and Japanese, the Swiss Consul of German interests. Cordial telegrams were

721 exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important
practical results could be expected from this move, which at
645 best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the
Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the
Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor
dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of
obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent
of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of
foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the
Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi
officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under
Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse,
did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship.
Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the
722 Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were
offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition
without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British
advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or
surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system
accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements,
the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and
grain supplies provided.

361 Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which
was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such
185 major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development
could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be
planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with
working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud
and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great
changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves
were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the
resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled
during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of
London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of
744 office to the Amin al-'Asima. The Health services continued to
develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private
practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the
Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had
served the country and their science now for twenty years, still
played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far
871 from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was
passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls,
and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools
were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few
during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

secondary boarding school on European lines was founded in 871 Baghdad in 1941, the King Fayṣal College. Mosul Technical School was reopened in 1942, and another in Kirkuk in 1945. The Queen 'Aliya Institute for the higher training of women teachers was founded in 1945, and a higher Engineering College in 1942; but a College for Physical Education, opened in the latter year, survived only four years. The Institute of Fine Arts, with separate faculties of Music, Painting, Sculpture, and Dramatic Art, was founded in 1941. Professor H. R. Hamley served as Adviser to the Ministry of Education—the first after a lapse of ten years—in 1942–3, K. J. Ritchie in 1944–5, and C. H. Scaife of Cairo University thereafter for two years. The Department of Antiquities 172 was fully active; it carried out excavation at Tall 'Uqayr, fifty miles south of Baghdad, in 1940–1: at Dayr on the Yusifiya Canal in 1941; at the 'Aqar Quf in 1942–4; at Tall Ḥasuna near Mosul in 1943–4: at Ḥira near Kufa and Tall Harmal near Baghdad in 1945. The greatest part of these works was carried out by 'Iraqi scholars, who had acquired high qualifications.

The Administration itself, gravely shaken by the events of 1941 645 and the strains which followed, and confronted with new tasks and new temptations, lapsed perceptibly both in efficiency and integrity. Neither ministerial unity nor the administrative grasp required to correct this weakness was forthcoming, and resulting conditions led to renewed complaints against 'the old gang' by critics who pressed for the infusion of new blood into the Cabinet, preferably their own. The middle and later periods of the war gave, indeed, no scope for military coups, the incitement of tribesmen, or inspired strikes; but they permitted all too much of the personal intrigues, the intemperate mutual criticism, and the irritated frustrations of normal times.

The inspiring war news from Libya and Tunis in the winter of 721 1942–3 was greeted by public holidays and the renaming of streets, and extinguished the lingering hopes of Nazi sympathizers: hopes which the capture in July of three German officers, dropped near Mosul by parachute with a Kurdish guide, did nothing to restore. The improved atmosphere led to a turn of ministerial policy towards increased indulgence to the internees of the 'Amara camp and Rhodesia; the resulting releases, considered sadly premature by the British Embassy, were followed by the reinstatement in public functions of men known for violent anti-British and anti-Hashimite sympathies.

Useful non-political work had been done meanwhile by a Com- 642 mittee of Senators and Jurists, with Drower and Edmonds as advisers, on an amendment to the Constitution designed to correct some evident present inadequacies. The Committee met early in

642 1943 and the draft law resulting from their efforts was passed by the deputies and Senate in May and June. Requiring, under the Constitution, ratification by a new Parliament, it was accordingly re-presented to and passed by the Chamber which after general elections—the first since 1939—met on 9 October. The amendment provided that, for the succession to the Throne in the absence of an heir apparent, a male heir presumptive from the family of the late King Ḥusayn—in this case the Regent himself—should be nominated. The prerogative of the King was increased by empowering him to dismiss a Prime Minister, a provision the previous lack of which had led repeatedly to violent and illegal changes of Government. The number of Cabinet Ministers could be increased without limit, and could include a Deputy Premier and ministers without portfolio; but it could not be less than seven. Senators ceased to be limited to twenty, but were not to exceed a quarter of the deputies. Parliament was deprived of the power to pardon persons convicted of crimes against the State. Meetings of the Chamber could be held, if need be, outside the capital—a clear echo of the Regent's sojourn in Diwaniya and Baṣra in 1941. Finally, it provided that constitutional practices current in other countries, could, if not contrary to the Constitution, be adopted by resolution of both Chambers.

645 The general election of mid-1943, which followed the dissolution of the Chamber in June, had been preceded by yet another reconstruction of the Cabinet. Ṣaliḥ Jabr moved to Interior, Taḥsin al-'Askari to Works; the Ministers of Economics and Social Affairs, al-Uzri and al-Barrak, were unchanged; Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban came to Justice, vacated by Da'ud al-Ḥaydari. The able lawyer Naṣrat al-Farsi was appointed to Foreign Affairs, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Education, and Jalal Baban to Finance. Taḥsin 'Ali went to the Royal Diwan. But the reformed Cabinet was from the first uneasy; with the heat of summer, the frequent absences of the Prime Minister in Syria and Egypt, and a Palace attitude of little confidence, it could do little. It was further weakened in September by disagreements both among ministers themselves and between the Premier and the Regent as to the personnel of the new Parliament, in whose selection the executive was to play, as usual, a major part. The first week of October witnessed the resignation of Naṣrat, whose portfolio was assumed temporarily by al-'Askari: of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, who was replaced by a competent Mutaṣarrif, Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab, nephew of 'Abd al-'Aziz Qaṣṣab; and of Jalal Baban,
646 whose duties fell to 'Abd al-Ila Ḥafidh. The new Chamber contained sixty-five of the former deputies, some of doubtful quality but none notably Anglophobe; fifty-one of its members had in April 1941 voted, under whatever pressures, for the deposition of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the Regent. The opening of Parliament and passage of the Constitutional Amendment was followed by the departure of the Prime Minister once again to Egypt, in pursuance of his now absorbed interest in the pursuit of Arab Unity. 646

Late in October, just as news was reaching Baghdad of incipient trouble in the Barzan mountains (p. 324), the Regent (now also Crown Prince) left for Britain in response to an invitation from King George VI. He had been preceded there by Da'ud al-Ḥaydari as Minister, and was accompanied by Dr. Sinderson Pasha and a military staff. He was met by the Duke of Gloucester, stayed for two days at Buckingham Palace and later elsewhere in London before returning to Baghdad in mid-December by way of Lisbon. He both received and created an excellent impression. 645X

At his capital he faced immediately the task of installing a Ministry more united and more competent. But his relations with Nuri Pasha were passing through an unusual phase of impatience or mistrust, and their conversations were uneasy. Ibrahim Kamal, whose abilities had been too little used, was unwilling or unable to accept the premiership, of which it was believed that he had the offer; and Nuri, who had resigned office, was after [illegible] invited to form another Cabinet, his eighth. Announcing it on Christmas Day 1943, he was supported for the first time by a Deputy Prime Minister, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and by new ministers in the person of Mājid Mustafā, an influential Kurdish ex-official, as Minister without portfolio for Kurdish affairs, and by Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba, a Shi'i judge. The other ministers were all, to the dismay of reformists, stalwart representatives of the long-established governing clique. They included two Shi'is besides Kubba—Salman Barrak at Economics and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Works—'Umar Nadhmi the Turkoman at Interior and Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari, 'Ali Mumtaz, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh at Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Education respectively. Nuri's offer of the Cabinet post of Social Affairs to Kamil al-Chadirchi, and on his refusal to Muhammad Ḥadid, was declined.

3. THE PACHACHI MINISTRY

The eighth Sa'idi Ministry was from the first an unhappy one. Its leader, never interested for long in domestic administration, was now exhausted by his many cares and frequently absented himself on visits to the Arab countries. His team included personalities doubtfully acceptable to the Regent, and Court circles led by Taḥsin 'Ali joined the opposition in a policy of pin-pricks. The appointment of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as deputy to Nuri Pasha was questioned, and he resigned in March 1944. Arab Unity, the visits of Arab statesmen from abroad, and the increasing threat of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

American-sponsored Zionism in Palestine, continued to rally all Cabinet personalities, and indeed all strata of opinion; but the dilemma of policy presented by the Kurdish question had the opposite effect, and the more liberal attitude of Nuri Sa'id—and his British advisers—found hot opposition elsewhere. Even the necessary and overdue creation of a Ministry of Supply (with which no senior minister could be found willing to be saddled) was criticized by the many who prospered on the lack of economic control. At the same time the personal strains and economic perplexities of the times doubled the normal difficulties of administration.

Amid these currents of uneasiness, which were manifest in growing criticism and angry scenes in Parliament, the policy of clemency towards internees was continued. More were released from 'Amara in February 1943; and the journalists among them immediately relieved their feelings by Nazi-praising press articles until threatened with rearrest. In the next two months more internees were set free, and a score of 'Iraqi exiles were escorted home from Southern Rhodesia. A number of these were sent for trial; and four months later sentence was passed on General Kamil Shabib of the Golden Square, of death by hanging: on the puppet Regent, the Sharif Sharaf, of three years' imprisonment: on the ex-ministers Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud and Musā Shahbandar, of five years each: on Ra'uf Baḥrani, of two years: and on 'Abd al-Qadir Gaylani, of three months to be followed by reinternment. The bulk of the released internees resumed their campaign of opposition to their country's policy and to the British connexion—and were in many cases reinstated unchastened in their old posts. The state of the Army, though perceptibly improved, was still far from satisfactory and offered a fair field for the reforming zeal of the incoming Inspector-General, Major-General Renton, who succeeded Bromilow in May 1944.

By the early summer of that year the position of Nuri's Ministry had become untenable. His appeals to the Regent for support unheeded, he resigned on 3 June. As his successor the Regent chose the elderly and half-invalid but respected Ḥamdi al-Pachachi. A Cabinet selected in detail (it was said) by the Amir himself and known thereafter as 'the Regent's Cabinet', retained two members of the last Sa'idi Cabinet, Aḥmad Mukhtar at Justice and Kubba at Social Affairs. Foreign Affairs and (temporarily) Supply were allotted to Arshad al-'Umari, an outstandingly successful Mayor of the Capital. Economics went to the Kurdish specialist, Colonel Tawfiq Wahbi, Defence to Taḥsin 'Ali from the Palace, Works to 'Abd al-Amir al-Uzri, an American-educated engineer who had been Director of Irrigation, Interior to Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, Finance to Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and Education to Dr. Ibrahim 'Akif al-Alusi. The

Cabinet thus contained two Shi'is and two Kurds, one real and one nominal. Nuri himself felt the need of rest and declined to join the Ministry; Ibrahim Kamal would accept nothing but the premiership. The Cabinet's announced programme included the purging of officialdom, the improvement of supply arrangements and of public security, the undertaking of new works—especially in northern 'Iraq—the development of the social services, and full support of Arab Union.

The early weeks of the Pachachi Ministry were unpromising. The Prime Minister was ailing, and at his best no administrator. Arshad al-'Umari sought, it seemed, to dominate his colleagues and to control appointments. Taḥsin 'Ali resisted, while his colleagues approved, a scheme of Army reform produced by Renton, involving a regrouping of the Army and its reduction in strength from four to three divisions. The Cabinet was from the outset divided in its Kurdish policy, with Taḥsin 'Ali and Muṣṭafā al-'Umari notably suspicious of the devolutionary concessions promised by Nuri Pasha and now supported by Arshad and the Prime Minister. In August, two months after its appointment, the dissensions of the Ministry compelled it to resign: but only to re-form immediately with personnel unchanged save by the omission of Taḥsin 'Ali. Acting charge of the Defence Ministry was given to Arshad until the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff, General Isma'il Namiq, to that post in December; and that of Supply to Ṣaliḥ Jabr, the Minister of Finance, until the Christian Director-General of Finance, Yusif Ghanima—himself a former Finance Minister, and latterly Director of Antiquities—accepted the unenvied post in September. Kubba was replaced at Social Affairs by a fellow Shi'i, the lawyer 'Abd al-Majid al-'Alawi, in December.

The Ministry thus revised was to remain in office for a further eighteen months, a long tenure by 'Iraqi standards. It survived the last year of the war and the first six months of peace; but distant armistices, though celebrated by public holidays and largesse to officials, little affected the course of politics or administration at home; the world war, when once the possibility of fighting in western Asia had receded, was by no means the chief factor in Baghdadi preoccupations.

The period, whose chief external interest is that of eager 'Iraqi participation in the movement towards Arab Unity and in that of post-war world organization, was at home one of nearly normal administration and of well-kept internal security. The only breach of this, the rebellion in Kurdistan, attracted little interest among the general public. The Pachachi Ministry encouraged a continuance of the already active municipal development. A Committee to consider post-war problems was set up, but, being

645 composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began 466 to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemploy- 467 ment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and 468 conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

635 An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would [661] call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945 701 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active opera- 625 tions could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the 625 Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards 657 such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining ʿAmara internees in mid-1944 and 665 at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Salaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid ʿĀli, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Saʿudi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplica- 204 tion of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with ʿIraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when out- 668 lawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid ʿĀli in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of ʿIraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the ʿIraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qaʿida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

668 eager for any ally who would help to overthrow a régime which seemed to bring them only poverty and hopelessness; and many who had acclaimed such an ally in Nazi Germany now looked instead to Soviet Russia. This Communism of the 'Iraq of 1944–5 had little intellectual background, although it attracted the intelligentsia, and showed scarcely a link with the doctrine, or even with the agents, of Moscow. It was organized by secret meetings, leaflets, the still untraced news-sheet of Comrade Fahad, and busy talkers among the railway and oil company workers. The application of Kamil al-Chadirchi and his friends in April 1944 for permission to form a People's Party was refused by Nuri Pasha; they addressed their protest significantly to the Russian Consul at
668 Kirmanshah. The opening of official 'Iraqi-Russian relations in
648× September of that year was as welcome to the local Communists and Reformists as it was alarming to the conservatives. M. Krikori Titovitch Zaitzev, an inoffensive personality, was appointed first Russian Minister in Baghdad in November, and came into residence early in 1945; the first 'Iraq Minister to Moscow, 'Abbas Mahdi, assumed his post late in that year. At the same period the Communist Party ventured with new confidence to address the Prime Minister—with copies to many authorities outside 'Iraq—demanding the 'abolition of all reactionary laws' and pardon for all imprisoned Communists and Kurdish rebels.

648× Emerging from the war undamaged and enriched, 'Iraq could look to play in international affairs a much more confident part than in the 'thirties, and would expect the treatment due to a State with all the appearance of present stability and hopeful promise. From the French its Foreign Ministry was estranged by 'the events' of Syria and the Lebanon; a mission from the French Committee of National Liberation was coldly received, and no French representative was now found in Baghdad. The United States, whose interest in future markets and civil airports was undisguised, still occupied but a small place in the 'Iraqi purview, and one for the moment discredited by the American attitude to Zionism. Nevertheless, their future part in Middle Eastern affairs was already foreshadowed, and the invitation of President Roosevelt to the Regent to visit America was welcomed. Delayed by the President's death, the Amir, accompanied by Nuri Pasha and Da'ud al-Haydari, and leaving his uncle the Amir Zayd as Regent, arrived in America in the midsummer of 1945 as the guest of President Truman. He toured the country, visited the Governor-General of Canada, and concluded a successful journey by visits to London, Paris, Rome, Istanbul, Ankara, and Beirut.

The nation's participation, as of right, in the important international conferences of the period tended to widen the views of at least some of her statesmen. Her delegates attended the Food Conference at Hot Springs in May 1943, and the Bretton Woods meeting on Currency and Exchange questions in August 1944, the resulting agreement being ratified by Parliament late next year. The meetings at Atlantic City and at Chicago on Trade and on Civil Aviation respectively included 'Iraqi spokesmen, as well as the more important Conference at San Francisco in April 1945 at which the bases of the United Nations organization were laid. It was attended by Arshad al-'Umari, Foreign Minister, accompanied by Naṣrat al-Farsi, and by a young American-educated Shi'i official, Fadhil al-Jamali. The part taken by the delegation was creditable; but on the refusal of Arshad to subscribe to certain phraseology in the Charter (in which 'self-government' as distinct from 'independence' was given as the goal of countries under tutelage) Fadhil was authorized to sign instead, and his persistence cost Arshad his position as Foreign Minister. The World Security Charter was ratified by Parliament in October and in the Preparatory Commission which met in London late in the year the 'Iraqi chargé d'affaires, Shakir al-Wadi, a former staff officer of Bakr Ṣidqi, represented his country. It was contemporary with the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Cultural and Educational Organization, also held in London, at which Dr. Naji al-Aṣil, now Director of Antiquities, was present. 648*

The Regent, a developing personality, generally popular, keenly interested in affairs and willing to play his full part in them, was now exercising an influence on Government greater than any Palace influence since the death of Fayṣal I. The Administration, whose continuity he helped to ensure, kept the peace, allowed wide latitude to the press and the bitter tirades of the ex-internees, and played a leading part in the Arab Unity movement; but it did little for social reform and refused, until its last month of power, to authorize the formation of political parties now struggling to birth. The Regent's speech at the opening of Parliament in December 1945, however, foreshadowed a new policy in this regard by promising the readmission of parties, the development of 'true democracy', a greater measure of equality and social justice, and the training of a younger element of citizens for power. This speech, welcome to the eager and half-thwarted political world—and disturbing to the elderly and privileged—led to increased criticism of the Pachachi Ministry in Parliament, and to clashes between the left wing of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the extreme right, or ex-Nazi, following of Sami Shawkat. The latter now abandoned his appointment as Director-General of Social Affairs to form a National Revival Party. The Pachachi Ministry resigned at the end of January 1946. 643 645* 665

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically, the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

British forces for their own needs, in part acquired by the United 433
Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to Great Britain or 439
other territories, and in part exported by normal trade channels now regulated by export control. The date crop was still handled for export by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. The cotton which Japan ceased to take after 1941 was sent to India, but in quantities which high grain prices had much reduced; production touched 26,000 bales in 1940, but thereafter dropped for the next nine years to a fifth or even a tenth of that amount. Wool was sent to America, but with this and all other commodities both internal movement by land and water and the provision of shipping space from Baṣra presented difficult problems. A quantity of produce went by rail to the Levant and Turkey, and animals on the hoof, in years of good grazing, were sent to the British forces in Syria.
The prices of all commodities were fixed in terms of imperious [435]
war necessity and of ever-growing 'Iraqi inflation, to which these prices contributed.

The import of manufactured articles and certain foodstuffs was 722
limited to quantities below the level of satisfaction, thanks to 434
reduced outputs in the supplying countries and to pressure on shipping space. Help was forthcoming more than once from American lend-lease stocks of drugs, metal goods, tyres, chemicals, and agricultural implements; Paiforce at times could help to meet an urgent shortage, and the British Government organized an emergency grain supply in 1942 from India and Canada; but, as in every country, abiding and irksome shortages remained, aggravated by maldistribution and by a habit of hoarding against which the law and public opinion strove equally in vain. The need at all costs to obtain supplies led to the urgent search for sources to replace Japan and other belligerents. An import licence system was established which, vastly profitable to some, worked with its share of imperfections and abuses; a price-fixing procedure was applied over a wide range of articles, with an attempted control of stocks enforced by occasional raids and prosecutions, but avoided by widespread black-market trading; and a rationing system, first applied to sugar in 1942, was extended next year to coffee and tea and later to cotton and woollen textiles. This control by ration-cards, based on imperfect tribal and urban lists, was a matter of extreme difficulty and gladly abandoned at the earliest moment; nor were the resulting stocks ever sufficient to admit an adequate allowance to the tribal public. Nevertheless, the rationing of essentials was both indispensable and attended with fair success. Late in 1944, in expectation of the war's end and by reaction from the attempted régime of universal close control in 1943–4, a policy of decontrol was substituted, and one commodity after another

722 was exempted from licensing and price-fixing. During 1945 all 434 controls were discontinued as far as sterling-area commerce was concerned, and traders with one accord sought supplies from every quarter; but freedom of traffic was still hampered by shipping shortages, currency restrictions, and world-wide dearth of goods. 457 The country's requirements in 'hard' currencies, chiefly dollars, were met by an arrangement with Great Britain in March 1945, whereby sums up to the equivalent of $14 million could be converted from 'Iraq's accumulated sterling balances, an arrangement which was to be annually re-negotiated. The restricted convertibility of 'Iraq's own dinars into dollars remained incomprehensible to the public, as to publics everywhere.

722 In the task of economic control, which fell ultimately to the lot of local officials, helped, it might be, by the municipality or 647 Chamber of Commerce, more than moderate results could not be expected from improvised systems based on no adequate statistics or machinery, and applied by unspecialized and impecunious officials to a puzzled and resentful public. The higher economic control of the territory, under a law repeatedly revised and productive of innumerable regulations, was placed originally in the hands of a Central Supply Committee, later in those of a smaller ministerial body, the High Supply Committee, which long survived the war. Many problems called for resolution at Cabinet level, where they multiplied disagreement between ministers. Departments of Transport, Imports and Local Resources, founded early in the war and served by British as well as 'Iraqi officials—Lloyd, Grice, le Blanc—were grouped early in 1944 under the Ministry of Supply established for the purpose; its first Adviser, Colonel P. Bayliss, after a few months of dynamic and impatient activity, retired through disagreement with his colleagues. An Anglo-American-'Iraqi Co-ordinating Committee lasted for a few months from midsummer 1944. Outside the territory, but concerned with its output and controlling foreign supplies to it, was the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, of which a conference attended by 'Iraqi delegates was held in Cairo in April 1944; and 'Iraq had in 1943 been toured, under M.E.S.C. auspices, by a Scientific Advisory Mission which produced the valuable reports of Dr. B. A. Keen and Dr. E. B. Worthington. The Centre performed important services in conditions where benevolent interterritory control was indispensable; it was, nevertheless, commonly blamed in 'Iraq for its meagre allocation of supplies, and its abolition late in 1945 was unregretted by 'Iraqis to whom their own country's needs were paramount, those of the Allies and of the War remote and meaningless. It was succeeded until 1947 by a Supply Mission which kept control of a few scarce items of supply.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic 722
internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable 647
lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of
M.E.S.C.

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the 722
abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living 511
standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was 435
almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly deteriorated. A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Government had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939.
The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then six- 652
fold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, 435
happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation, or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement, thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs, already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society scarcely healthier.

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. 652
The three years 1941–3, in spite of high costs, showed useful surpluses; foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully. But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied. Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Baṣra were highly prosperous throughout the war.

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years. The loans, regarded as experimental, were well received but too small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year and handled Government accounts; by 1945 its trading began to show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry, was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch in Baghdad in the same year.

722 The material development of the territory, which proceeded
496 hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the end of the war. But 'Iraq was at least fortunate in that, far from a record of destruction or retrogression—the common fate of Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented by war-time loans from the military authorities, current maintenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for movement to Baṣra—were amicably handled. The military Kut–
499 'Aziziya–Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge (in replacement of the old waggon-ferry), a bridge at Musayib to give access to Karbalā, a modern station and office block and new marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lesser Zab bridge.[1]

722 The important developments at the Port of Baṣra and its vicinity
504 carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and approaches, storage facilities, the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab bridge, and a Ma'qil–Ahwaz railway line. Considerable parts of these additions survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties at Umm Qaṣr on the Khawr 'Abdullah, and the railway joining these to Baṣra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance
505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

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[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–Homs line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Karbalā–Najf–Kufa line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–Diyarbakr connexion. None of these materialized.

The Lynch fleet had been diminished in 1938 by the loss of the 505 *Mejidieh*, sold to Anglo-Iranian, and in 1941 by that of the *Malamir* and the *al-Kadri*, burnt out and scrapped respectively. Their rivals, notably Ḥannā al-Shaykh and 'Abd al-Karim Khudhayri (Khedery), were more than holding their own: but the competition of the railway and the roads must grow rather than diminish. To the road system, indeed, Paiforce contributed much, 491 notably in the completed trans-desert highway to Jordan, in the re-surfacing of many road stretches, and in the maintenance in being of 'Iraqi transport fleets by the provision of tyres. Nevertheless, 494 the upkeep of civil motor vehicles in war-time proved most difficult, and the numbers in use decreased. The air communications of the territory were not improved during the war; but before 509 its end projects for a national air line were under formation. The European services crossing and visiting 'Iraq recommenced in 1945 after war-time curtailments, and the Egyptian Misr Airways restarted its Cairo–Baghdad service. A contract was given in 1945 to the Marconi Company for the erection of a new wireless transmitting station.

The course of foreign trade was notably deflected from its usual 439 channels by the war. In 1939 the United Kingdom was its principal customer, followed by the United States, each of these countries taking approximately one-third of the total visible exports; but by 1944 the principal buyer was Palestine with Transjordan, followed by Persia. Visible exports, amounting to ID 4 million before the war, reached through enhanced prices ID 9 million before its end. The transit trade, reduced in 1939 to a value of some ID 3 million, reached ID 13 million five years later, thanks to the passage of goods to Russia. Imports rose from a value of ID 9 million before the war to ID 14 million in its last year; the United Kingdom's share in these fell from 33 to 11 per cent., that of Japan from 18 per cent. to nothing, while India's share rose from 8 to 30 per cent., Syria's from 2 to 16, the United States' from 8 to 12.

The desire for industrial expansion, always a cherished ambition, 433 was stimulated by the war-time shortages and an increased local market; contrary factors were the shortage of raw materials, competition for skilled workers, and the impossibility of importing factory equipment. Of the seventy enterprises benefiting in 1944 from the law of 1929 most were on the humblest scale, with the importance only of pilot projects which could indicate to the middle class the possibility of a career outside Government service, the professions, or politics. Some war-time progress was made in brick manufacture; workshops produced hand-tools from scrap metal; the crushing of oil-seeds—cotton, sesame, and linseed—

433 increased on a small scale: the tanning industry was partly mechanized and the quality of its output improved. The two existing mechanically operated wool factories, the unmodernized distilleries, the three cotton ginneries, the small soap-works and cigarette factories, were increased during the war by an attempt at brewing, a primitive glass-works, a factory for paint and another for wax matches. The long-planned cement factory was not yet in production. An important cotton-spinning and weaving project had been initiated, but had not yet begun to operate. A plan to create a cinema studio in Baghdad was in 1945 the object of a visit by a British expert.

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722 The necessity of postponing further oil development was, equally to the British companies and to the Government, the more regrettable as it seemed not to apply to comparable enterprises in Persia or Arabia; in the former, aviation spirit and other products were produced on a vast scale for war purposes, and in the latter American industry could find abundant equipment when British could not, and could secure for Sa'udi Arabia a long lead in production. The I.P.C. was forced to renounce until after the war the additional pipelines and consequent additional production which it had planned in 1938; indeed, its output was forced down by events in the Levant in 1941–2 from four to two million tons, and restored to full capacity only in 1944. The damage done to its installations in May 1941 was soon repaired, and it was able to assist the British forces by the provision of quarters and air-fields, loan of personnel, communications facilities, and the supply of refined products. The output of these was increased for war purposes, and plant at Kirkuk was improvised for the supply of motor spirit additional to that from Alwand. Factories for making tins were opened at Kirkuk and Mosul, and the two centres connected by pipeline. In Baṣra area a pipeline was built to connect Abadan and Shu'ayba. The destruction of many wells at Kirkuk as a precautionary measure against enemy invasion was ordered by the Army in 1942, but fortunately did not interfere with current production. Drilling was suspended from mid-1941 until the latter part of the war. In the area of the Mosul Petroleum Company (formerly B.O.D.) no operations were possible during the war at 'Ayn Zala or elsewhere, though at Baṣra exploration continued. These postponements, unavoidable in conditions which made engineering supplies unobtainable, were formally authorized by an agreement between the Companies and the Government in March 1943, whereby in return for a loan of ID 1,500,000 the Government granted a 'period of suspension' to begin in May 1941 and to run until two years after the armistice. Meanwhile the project of a Government refinery remained alive, though at present untimely; and to question the terms—or

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241
was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce
and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease
supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās
and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors,
mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation,
with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities.
Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the
educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had
been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the [166
establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of
these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in 464]
their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time
employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423
committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185
since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout
the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq,
and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās;
but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of
Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was
made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries,
and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now
approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for
model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government
land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant
insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized.
On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425
a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166
sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be
gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions
and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and
a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The
Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen
families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused
keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312
continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their 653
studies and planning, though the intended major projects could
not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on
the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the
intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the
return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken.
Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1918-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

5. KURDISH ALARMS

563 668 During the bad days of 1941 and throughout 1942 the Kurds did nothing to add to the anxieties of Government, though close observers were aware of the lack of loyalty, sometimes of scornful dislike, still felt towards Baghdad in the Kurdish mountains. Since nothing would induce them to forget their un-Arab distinctness and racial pride, the preservation of peaceful administration would depend, it seemed, on minimizing friction, on ensuring for the Kurds a maximum of sympathetic discrimination, and on the power to strike effectively at need. Nothing occurred to simplify dealing with this greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, and the near presence of a disturbing influence in north-west Persia was to prove an added embarrassment.

Shaykh Maḥmud, whose foolish movement of defiance continued even after the restoration of the lawful Regent and constitutional government, had been allowed to live in one of his own villages. In Persian Kurdistan the Anglo-Russian invasion of Persia in that year led to collapse of the central authority; and the vacuum of power was soon filled by the self-appointment of Kurdish chiefs to local rule, with the enforced acquiescence of Teheran. Among many old unwanted trouble-makers who returned from exile was Ḥama Rashid Khan, an 'Iraqi by birth but now claiming dual nationality; he achieved a brief independence at Saqiz until 1942 when he was driven out, re-crossed to 'Iraq, and submitted to detention at Kirkuk. Approaches from Persian Kurdish leaders to the British Embassy in Baghdad for inclusion in a 'British Zone' were (as so often before) refused, to the bewilderment of the chieftains, who found incomprehensible the British support of Persian or 'Iraqi Governments; but after some months the endless squabbles among the Aghās enabled Persian troops to re-enter most of the towns, assert some sort of authority, and drive a number of leaders into 'Iraq. Mahabad (Ṣawj Bulaq) alone the Persians failed to enter, and it became the centre of an all-Kurdish enclave. A vigorous Kurdish society, the Jiyana Kurd or Kurdish Resurrection (called also simply the Komalla Kurd), was formed in Mahabad, and its publication, the *Nishtman* (Homeland) magazine, reached 'Iraq. Similar clubs were founded in the northern liwās, and the Kurdish intelligentsia had formed a Hewa (Hope) Society, later to be joined or superseded by a Rezgari (Rescue) Group, insistent on 'national rights' against all oppressors.

No overt trouble, however, arose for a time, and the Barzani leaders, Shaykh Aḥmad and his younger brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, who were living on allowances away from their homes, gave no offence until the midsummer of 1943. In that month Mullā

Muṣṭafā, always unbalanced and now inflamed by new grievances at the cost of living, escaped from Sulaymaniya, regained Barzan, and raised a force to join that of a Turkish-Kurdish outlaw, Sa'id Birokhi. The latter was captured by a Turkish column, but the Mullā, waxing in strength, successfully attacked Government posts and carried out profitable raids. A message from Nuri Pasha, conveyed through the still detained Shaykh Aḥmad, urged him to surrender. He refused, flouted all authority, and tampered with the loyalty of Kurdish officers of the Army. A column of the latter, accompanied by the Chief of Staff, left Margasur to deal with the rebels, but poor leadership and many desertions led to ignominious failure, and a column of Indian troops occupied Diyana as a precaution against further loss. The Government, forced now to prefer negotiations to force, offered Mullā Muṣṭafā the chance to cross into Persia, or to live with the Pishdar; he declined both offers, again demanded 'Kurdish rights', and was warned by the British Ambassador (to whom as usual he appealed) that British support would be given not to him but to the Government he was offending.

A visit in January 1944 by the Kurdish Minister without portfolio, Mājid Muṣṭafā, was successful in restoring some sort of relations, and the Mullā was claimed in Baghdad communiqués to have 'submitted unconditionally to the Regent'. Thereafter, Mājid Muṣṭafā toured the Kurdish area, removed unpopular officials, arranged for a distribution of barley, and installed an able Kurdish General and graduate of the British Staff College, Baha al-Din Nuri, as Mutaṣarrif of Sulaymaniya.

But a policy of sympathy in the Kurdish liwās, supported generally by the Premier, was opposed by some of his colleagues; the undertakings given to the Mullā were likely to be lost in delays and evasions, and the Barzani leader in his frustration again demanded British intervention. The last ministerial tour of Nuri Pasha, in May 1944, was to Kurdistan, where threats of renewed trouble were now persistent and Kurdish-Arab feeling ran high in the Army. He proposed the establishment of an all-Kurdish liwā formed from the Kurdish qadhās of Mosul, and the appointment of officials to it by the Kurdish representative minister in the Cabinet; he added the offer of a Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Education, the improvement of social services in the north, the grant of agricultural loans, and reconsideration of the unpopular tobacco monopoly. But his Cabinet colleagues refused to support him, the plan for the liwā of Dohuk was unacceptable to the Regent, and the Sa'idi Ministry fell amid doubt and disunity. The anti-Kurdish feeling in much of the Baghdad political world had again prevailed: it was based, as ever, on the fear of separatism,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 668 on the certainty that indulgence in the north would be followed by equal or greater Shi'i demands, and on the crudely selfish ambitions of the Kurdish leaders. The Kurds were, moreover, represented in the Cabinet only by individuals long denationalized, and in the Chamber by deputies selected for their tractability.

The Pachachi Ministry did little to honour the undertakings of Nuri Pasha, though the Prime Minister and Arshad approved them against the opposition of Muṣṭafā al-'Umari and Taḥsin 'Alī. Baha al-Din was removed from Sulaymaniya; but after a meeting of Kurdish leaders there in July 1944, the Cabinet sent up two Kurdish Mutaṣarrifs to take charge of that liwā and Arbil, and dispatched the Minister of Economics, Tawfiq Wahbi, on a goodwill mission in Kurdistan. He was forced to realize the extent of ill will towards Baghdad, and found that Barzani power had redoubled by a recent marriage alliance with Zibar. On the Minister's departure Mullā Muṣṭafā helped himself to Government grain stores, looted police posts, conducted a futile correspondence with the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, and demanded from Baghdad the fulfilment of Nuri Pasha's promises—and a loan for himself. In November, four 'Iraqis were dropped in Mosul liwā by parachute from a German plane; two were captured, two escaped. The year closed with uneasiness at the likely prospect of another Kurdish campaign, this time in midwinter: a blow which the Government attempted to forestall by free distributions of grain and cloth.

These fears proved in part groundless. Peace was outwardly undisturbed throughout the winter of 1944–5, though Kurdish restless dissatisfaction and the increase of Russian influence precluded confidence. A connexion between Kurdish nationalism—of the type favoured by the intelligentsia rather than that of the feudal leaders—and some type of Communism became more evident; two Kurdish-language Communist magazines, later combined into one (the *Azadi*, or Freedom), appeared in 'Iraq in 1934 produced, like *al-Qa'ida*, by the Communist Party; and some of the organizers, who included Army officers, were no doubt in touch with the Russians. The forms taken by both nationalism and Communism were various; *Azadi* was purely Communist and advocated a united front with the Arabs against reaction and feudalism, while the Persian or Adharbayjani *Nishtman* spoke for exclusive Kurdish unity and rights, and bade the feudal leaders modernize themselves.

563 669 In March 1945 an Amnesty Bill was placed before Parliament, and passed with the reluctance of many deputies; it pardoned all Kurdish offenders up to February 1944, the date of the Mullā's submission. He himself visited Mosul, and was received there by

the Minister of the Interior; and Barzan area was transferred from 563
Mosul liwā to Arbil. But the restless ambition of the Barzani was
incorrigible. Alleging British support—a fantastic fiction believed 669
by many both in Barzan and in Baghdad—he harried the valleys far beyond his own area, seized Government stores at Margasur, and occupied police posts. Forced to act, the Army advanced in September in three columns towards his fastnesses, while the R.I.A.F. bombed his followers and properties. A police column advanced from 'Amadiya, and the Turks aided by closing their frontier. The Army column from 'Aqra was soon in trouble and its line of retreat threatened. It was rescued, and the position restored, only by the success of the Minister of Interior in raising, for ready money, irregular tribal forces under such of the Barzani's neighbours as welcomed the chance to pay off old scores and be subsidized for doing it. Mullā Muṣṭafā and his army, hard pressed from every side, crossed now 2,000 strong into Persia, there to find ready welcome and support. He could now drink deep of Russian-sponsored Kurdish nationalism in its active centre at Mahabad: could consult with the ambitious Qadhi Muḥammad, leader of the movement, with open Russian support: and could concert plans with him and his Democratic Party for a Kurdish State astride the frontier, a State to be closely associated with the Adharbayjan Republic now similarly forming under the Russians at Tabriz. On 15 December 1945 a Kurdish People's Government was inaugurated at Mahabad by Qadhi Muḥammad in the honoured presence of Mullā Muṣṭafā and Soviet officers. A week later Qadhi Muḥammad was elected President, a Parliament was formed, and the Mullā with other supporting tribal leaders was promoted Field-Marshal and decked in full Russian uniform.

It was natural that Baghdad's request for the disarming and 563
extradition of its rebel subjects should be unheeded. But at least 657
the campaign was over and the enemy, by whatever means, dispersed; the Army could be thanked for its efforts and decorated by the Regent, while the Prime Minister himself toured the north. All efforts were made to re-establish administration and show goodwill by the early erection of schools, dispensaries, and police posts. A court martial was convened at Arbil for the trial of Barzani rebels, and summoned more than a hundred, including Mullā Muṣṭafā and Shaykh Aḥmad, to appear before it. The two brothers and thirty of their followers, including three Army officers, were condemned to death in absence, and seventy more to life imprisonment.

Though a period of peace followed, no part of the Kurdish 563
problem had been solved. With their social structure, ideas of 'Government', and feudal leadership, any early prospect of a real national autonomy must be fanciful, unless total anarchy be

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 tolerated; but much, it seemed, could yet be gained in goodwill, and thereby in tranquillity, by a greater sympathy in Baghdad for Kurdish prejudices and their more innocuous demands. But the policy of the Cabinet seemed, on the contrary, to be one of assimilation and claimed obedience: the attitude of the C.U.P. to the Arab territories a generation earlier! The Kurds, reached now by waves of suitably adapted Communist-Nationalist propaganda from north-west Persia, and unhappy as ever in their subjection to an Arab Government, represented a profoundly unsatisfactory and even a menacing element in the national life.

6. THE ARAB LEAGUE

648 The connexion between 'Iraq and Persia was, throughout the war, less one of peoples or of Governments than of military forces and communications common to both. For the vast Paiforce traffic of men and supplies, the Perso-'Iraqi frontier did not exist; the two territories formed a single unit for defence and for affording access to the Russian forces. Contact between the States and peoples was restricted by limited movement, communications almost monopolized by military needs, and diminished pilgrimages: only in north-eastern 'Iraq the Kurdish cross-frontier movements brought subjects of the two countries closely together. A futile gesture of revolution in Khuzistan in 1943, by a son of the deposed Shaykh Khaz'al of Muhammara, was easily quelled and its author brought back to Basra. The Sa'dabad Pact, under which there had been talk of action early in the war, was in fact inoperative, though it formed an official bond not only with Persia but with Turkey.

'Iraq's connexions with the latter were, as ever, close in the social and considerable in the commercial fields, but slight in the political. Frontier dealings were friendly, neighbourly co-operation frequent. Both desired to maintain trans-frontier trade in spite of wagon shortage on the railway and the dearth of goods, and a Turkish commercial mission visited Baghdad in 1945. Arab displeasure at the loss of Alexandretta in 1938 lessened with time. The presence of the Amir Zayd, with a Turkish wife, as Minister at Ankara, and the frequent visits to that capital and to Istanbul of 'Iraqi personalities, made for good relations. The Regent, whose impending marriage to a daughter of President Inünü was a picturesque if absurd rumour of 1945, visited Turkey more than once.

But the heart of the political world was engaged far more with its Arab sister-States. Contacts with Transjordan were slight but cordial, with exchange of royal and ministerial visits and a link of British military traffic. Towards Sa'udi Arabia, feeling was cool; the ruling houses were mutually repugnant, the Sa'udi conception of Arab Unity was not the 'Iraqi, and the safe refuge of Rashid 'Āli

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

at Mecca was resented. With Egypt, equally visited by the Regent and his statesmen, there was common ground (with some rivalry for the leadership) in their ambition for Arab Unity; Egyptian experts and teachers were borrowed; a 'Bureau for Intellectual Co-operation' was established at Cairo and a branch of the Egyptian Ittiḥad al-'Arabi Society at Baghdad. Social relations were slight, sentiment tepid or critical.

The Arab Unity movement had before 1944 reached a stage where formal realization must be the proximate step. All the justifications for it were, in the judgement of its enthusiasts, more than ever forceful; the General Islamic Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem, the Bludan Conference of 1937, the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Congress at Cairo in 1938, the meeting of representative Arabs at the London Conference in 1939: all these were precedents for formal meetings of their statesmen, and practical work for an Arab Confederacy (or League, or State) to handle would not be lacking. In 1941 Anthony Eden, for Great Britain, expressed his country's general sympathy with any move towards closer association which Arab leaders themselves might make.

In Palestine the White Paper of 1939 was still the British policy and must have attracted general Arab support as soon as (or if ever) it showed signs of being resolutely carried out. But the first two years of the war, though the 'Arab Rebellion' was over and the Mufti a discredited exile, gave signs enough that the Palestine question was still unsolved and Arab fears justified. Jewish opposition to the White Paper was unabated, illegal immigration grew formidable, and Jewish terrorism increased. The attitude in Baghdad was until early 1942 one of nervous watchfulness, though Balfour Day was still the signal for anti-Zionist demonstrations. In the latter year news from New York of Jewish acclamation of their Biltmore Programme—one of a Jewish Commonwealth and Army, with unrestricted immigration—dismayed the Baghdad publicists, and led to consultations among Arab spokesmen on the renewed menace, of which the most sinister feature was the evident signs of support for Jewish claims in America and Europe; indications of this were given by Wendell Willkie in 1942, by Lloyd George in 1943, and by twice-repeated resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress favouring free immigration and a Jewish State. Arab protests against these resolutions, addressed to Washington and London, were met by vague reassurances by President Roosevelt, who affirmed, to the Regent among others, that any Palestine solution would be evolved only after 'consultation with both Arabs and Jews'. Visits by 'Iraqi statesmen to Jerusalem were frequent; the connexion of the Palestine question with a closer Arab Unity grew more obvious;

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 and the 'Iraq press spoke henceforward in a tone of alarmed anti-Zionism. Nervousness could not but increase among the thousands of Baghdadi Jews, to whom Zionism was distasteful and potentially ruinous. To fight the battles of Arab Palestine in the field of world opinion was the motive for the establishment in that year of the Arab Bureaux in London and Washington, to which the Government at the instance of Musā al-'Alami subscribed £100,000. In November 1945, the war over and some sort of solution now inescapably necessary, news arrived of the appointment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The views of the British Labour Party, now in power, were known to be hostile to the White Paper and substantially pro-Zionist; President Truman, in advance of all inquiry, was pressing the British to admit more Jews to Palestine; and the World Zionist Council in August had endorsed the extreme Biltmore demands. Little optimism could be felt in 'Iraq or elsewhere that the rights of the Palestine people, whose homes, country, and very lives were at stake, would be respected. A boycott in 'Iraq of all goods from Palestine was announced to take effect on 1 January 1946.

Events in Syria had evoked an interest scarcely less than those of Palestine; indeed, at every stage in Syrian history since the fall of its brief Sharifian monarchy 'Iraqi statesmen had shown warm fraternal feeling. The suppression of the Syrian Constitution before the outbreak of war, and of the Lebanese immediately after it, and the administration of both by nominated Governments, had been criticized in Baghdad. The collapse of French power in Europe was followed by the arrival of the Italian Armistice Commission in the Levant, and a period of uneasy waiting upon events with all political activities forbidden. The future of the Levant States was freely discussed in 'Iraq and Cairo, and Nuri Sa'id as Foreign Minister had visited their capitals in July 1940. Local disturbances in Syria led early in 1941 only to a change of administrators, and hopes based on the movement of Rashid 'Āli (whom a number of exiled or locally-employed Syrians in Baghdad had supported) were doomed to failure. But the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by British and Free French forces, beginning on 9 June 1941, was the occasion of a Declaration by General Catroux of the independence of the two Republics, and with this the British Government specifically associated itself. The declaration, with the use of the words 'an independent Sovereign State', was repeated late in September; but functionaries amenable to French wishes were meanwhile installed in power, and 'Iraq and other Arab Governments throughout 1942 withheld recognition until the reality of the promised new status should be assured by the establishment of free constitutional government.

This took place in the late summer of 1943, and 'Iraqi recognition of the two States was marked by the appointment of their Consul-General Taḥsin Qadiri as Minister. Imperfect as was in fact the 'independence' enjoyed, its defects might have passed without protest but for 'the events' in Beirut on 11 November, when the French Delegate-General arrested the Lebanese President and his Cabinet, dissolved the Chamber, and suspended the Constitution. The press and politicians of Baghdad, sincerely dismayed, excelled themselves in telegraphic protests to Paris and London, and the storm died down only with the reversal of the Delegate-General's action and his recall. Exchanges of visits between Lebanese, Syrian, and 'Iraqi statesmen provided fresh chances for consultation not only on their own affairs, but more broadly on Arab Union; which at this stage 'Iraqis—and their pioneer in this field, Nuri Sa'id, in his Blue Book in 1943—conceived as a drawing together in some form, as a first and immediately realizable step, of the whole Fertile Crescent with the Jews as a semi-autonomous community within it. This conception, designed to solve the Palestine question as well as that of Arab Unity, was in fact later modified and indeed repudiated.

But others outside the Fertile Crescent were no less partisans of Union. The project of which Nuri had been the chief apostle, and to which Ḥamdi al-Pachachi, Jamil al-Madfa'i, and other leaders were hardly less devoted, had been accepted also by rich and populous Egypt in spite of her clear differences of culture, race, and history from the other Arab countries; and the Wafd leader, Muṣṭafā Naḥḥas Pasha, now Prime Minister, was after all to be the organizer of the first formal steps. He invited the Arab States to send delegates to Alexandria in the autumn of 1944. A General Conference met at the Antoniades Palace late in September, when delegates of seven independent Governments—Egypt, 'Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Sa'udi Arabia, and Yaman—were joined by Musā al-'Alami from Palestine. The 'Iraqi representatives were Ḥamdi al-Pachachi, Nuri Sa'id, and Arshad al-'Umari.

The Alexandria Protocol, which resulted from this meeting, visualized a League of Independent Arab States. The function of its Council, which was to meet periodically, would be to execute the agreements reached by States among themselves, to co-ordinate their policies, and in general to care for all common interests. The use of force as between members was forbidden. Dealings between member States and the outside world must not be contrary to the text or spirit of the League Constitution nor detrimental to any member. The Council would offer its mediation in disputes between members. Co-operation in economic and social problems was not forgotten, and commissions of experts in these fields would elaborate programmes of joint action. Full support for the Arabs of Palestine was pledged.

The Protocol, though destined to be superseded eight months later, was a significant document in its suggestion of a closer union subsequently, its insistence on common and equal policies—such as would preclude, for example, a special position for France in the Levant—and its treatment of Palestine as a responsibility of the whole Arab world. The text was favourably received in 'Iraq, and the Regent in his Speech from the Throne in December 1944 could acclaim a long step forward in Arab co-operation. The Preparatory Committee which had drafted the Protocol proceeded next to appoint a subcommittee to prepare a final Constitution. This body had completed its work by March 1946, and on the 22nd of that month representatives of all member Governments, who included Arshad al-'Umari, 'Ali Jawdat, and Taḥsin al-'Askari for 'Iraq, signed the final Pact of the League, which was to come into force as soon as ratified by four States. It provided for a permanent headquarters at Cairo, a Secretary-General, a Presidency passing between the States-members in turn, a Council with equal representation for all to meet twice yearly or more often, and admission in the future for any independent Arab State in addition to the present signatories. Suitable provisions covered withdrawal from the League and 'consideration' by the Council of any State which failed in its obligations. Members were to respect each other's domestic systems and concerns, and any could, if they wished, reach closer bilateral agreements than those which bound members in general. The provisions of the Protocol regarding the objects of the League and abstention from the use of force were repeated; decisions, unless unanimous, would bind only those States which had accepted them, except in certain-named administrative matters. In the enforceability of Council decisions regarding the *inter se* disputes of members, the Pact was less binding than the Protocol; such decisions would be valid only if the State concerned had sought mediation, and only if its independence, sovereignty, and territory were not involved. The Protocol limitations on the foreign policies of States-members were omitted, as was the article which anticipated closer future union. Special Standing Committees were to be formed—with the possible co-operation of the other Arab countries—for economic and financial affairs, communications, nationality and extradition, social and cultural affairs, and public health. If the Pact in general represented a weakening of the mutual ties formulated in the Protocol, such a development was due to the hesitation of certain of the Governments, which 'Iraqi spokesmen did not share.

Nevertheless, the signature of the Pact, which the 'Iraq Parlia-

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

ment ratified on 28 May, was an event of great importance to that country, the interest of whose statesmen in inter-Arab policy had long led the Arab world. The League in its present purely consultative form was far from the earlier proposal to integrate the Fertile Crescent, and from much of the enthusiastic, unrealistic thinking and propaganda of the inter-war period; but, being based on the independence of the various States, it thereby met most of the considerations (p. 228) adverse to a unitary or federated Arab State. At the same time its formulation of a political type of modern and reasonable pan-Arabism and its provision for joint consideration and action by the fraternal States, confronted the outside world with a new international phenomenon, and both gave a new inspiration to, and imposed new limitations on, the Foreign Offices of its members. The League, which during its first years was to be sorely tried and largely to fail, was nevertheless conceived with wise and realistic moderation, and could be capable, if shrewdly and opportunely used, of strengthening the hand of 'Iraq and the other States in their foreign dealings. The initiative of Egypt in the foundation of the League, its Cairo headquarters, and its Egyptian Secretary-General deprived 'Iraq of its position as the foremost champion of Arab Unity.

The events in Syria and the Lebanon, which had been considered in conference by the Hashimite rulers and statesmen at Shuna in February 1945, provided topics for the first meeting of the League Council. The position of deadlock reached in 1944 between the French claims to a 'special position' in the Levant and the local demand for the full independence already promised deteriorated in the spring of 1945; fighting occurred in May at points in Syria, Damascus was bombarded by French guns, and only a British intervention, bitterly resented by the French, prevented widespread disorder. The Council of the Arab League was urgently convened on 4 June, and later meetings, attended by the 'Iraqi Premier and colleagues, were held in July and November. The Secretary-General, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-'Azzam, visited Baghdad in September. Feeling in 'Iraq was strong and sincere; the atmosphere in the Chamber of Deputies was one of passion, fiery telegrams were dispatched to all parts, and a 'Tribal Conference' was convened under a Sa'dun chairman. Though Government forbade disorderly demonstrations it is probable that only the decisive British action in Damascus on 30 May prevented an attempt at 'Iraqi armed intervention there, which would have had universal support. The year 1945 ended with the centring of attention on the Anglo-French Statement of Policy of 13 December, which provided for the early withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Levant Republics.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

X

END OF THE HALF-CENTURY

I. GATHERING STORM

*645 THE resignation of the Pachachi Government was followed by a month of uneasiness while the choice of a successor Cabinet was delayed. Despite the alleged misgivings of the Regent, the premiership fell on 23 February 1946 to Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, a statesman whose many gifts did not include that of creating confidence. He retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, brought the able and vigorous 'Ali Mumtaz to Works, General Isma'il Namiq to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Justice, and Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban to Social Affairs. To the three all-important Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Supply he appointed respectively Sa'd Ṣaliḥ, a Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif hostile to Ṣaliḥ Jabr: 'Abd al-Wahhab Maḥmud, a Baṣra lawyer with a stormy political past: and another Shi'i, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Chalabi, of American education and unusual ability. Two more newcomers assumed duty at the Ministries of Economics and Education: 'Abd al-Hadi al-Dhahir—a third Shi'i and ex-official—and Najib al-Rawi. The composition of this Cabinet was modified in April by the substitution of Dr. Shawkat al-Zahawi, a Kurdish pathologist, for Baban at Social Affairs; and, in the last days of its short life, by the move of 'Ali Mumtaz to Foreign Affairs and Chalabi to Works.

652 Inspired by liberal views, the Ministry started with fair hopes. Although, surprisingly, no budget for 1946–7 was submitted, the State finances were still treated as giving no cause for immediate alarm. The 'hard currency' agreement made with the British in 1945 was renewed for a year, and a British trade mission under [666] Lord Davidson was welcomed in Baghdad. The new Electoral Law long under preparation was passed; substantially improving and liberalizing the existing procedures, it provided for the giving of due notice and publicity to forthcoming elections and to the candidates who offered themselves, and for the fragmentation of liwās into constituencies which would produce 138 instead of 115 deputies. It did not, however, introduce direct one-stage election, for which the Opposition parties combined to press as likely to be 'freer'. The Liwā Administration Law, passed in February, gave promise of greater zeal and initiative in local government, and of independent action in case of disorder.

668 Countryside security was well maintained. Winter passed into spring without the appearance of the expected trouble in Kurdistan,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

though streams of unwelcome propaganda were flowing in from the Republic of Mahabad (with Marshal Muṣṭafā high in its councils), Army units were stationed in readiness in frontier qadhās, and a memorandum of Kurdish appeal and protest had been handed to the Anglo-American Palestine Committee. An Army column visited Sinjar, but only minor clashes resulted. The air of dissatisfaction or menace which hung over the Holy Cities led to no overt trouble. Elsewhere in the towns, efforts made by the progressive or malicious to create labour unrest were successful in inspiring a railway strike in March, and a political general strike and demonstration was organized in May in protest against the Anglo-American report. It led to no breach of the peace; indeed the deputies themselves had cabled in February a protest to London against continued Jewish immigration into Palestine, and Fadhil Jamali had testified similarly to the Anglo-American Commission in Cairo. The Cabinet and the Regent sent further protests in May to the British Government, King George VI, and the American President. 668

That political demonstrations were now possible was owed to the Suwaydi (or the Regent's) policy of removing restrictions and permitting the rebirth of parties. The 'Amara concentration camp was closed; martial law, imposed in Baghdad and neighbouring districts in 1941, was at last removed; the Public Security Ordinance of 1940 was revoked, and press censorship abolished. This liberality was repaid by journalist ex-internees in the form of savage attacks on the Suwaydi Ministry, attacks reflecting both personal bitterness and the militant attitudes of the parties which plunged forthwith into full activity. If they were representative as ever rather of the dissatisfied and power-seeking than the satisfied and power-holding political and social groups, this was least true of the Liberal Party which, dormant since its foundation in 1939, now revived with a modest reform programme made attractive by an anti-British colouring; its members, not numerous, included Kamil al-Khudhayri, President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, and Sa'd Ṣaliḥ. It published the *Ṣawt al-Aḥrar* as its daily newspaper. The Independence Party, based on the old côterie of Rashid 'Āli and Yasin Pasha, brought up to date by accretions of students and malcontent intelligentsia, passed for right-wing nationalist and was guided by the Muthannā Club founder-member and Nazi sympathizer, Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba, and by the bitter xenophobes Fa'iq al-Samarrā'i and Ṣādiq Shanshal. The party, well organized and comparatively stable, based its foreign policy on unfriendliness to Turkey and to Great Britain but 'neutrality' towards Russia, with an anti-Hashimite and pro-Mufti leaning, and aspirations at home towards social reform; the 66 5 668

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

665 *Liwā al-Istiqlal* was its press organ. Dr. Sami Shawkat's National 668 Revival Party, with its paper *al-Iṣlah*, was similar but less stable in its views, and even more violent in tone. The last of the left-wing parties was the National Democratic of Kamil al-Chadirchi, an ineffective leader but veteran left-wing champion, with Muḥammad Ḥadid, London-educated left-wing socialist of good standing, and Ḥusayn Jamil, an ex-judge of good family and reformist views; its newspaper was the *Ṣawt al-Ahali*, later *Ṣadā al-Ahali*. A party of social reform deriving from the old Ahali group of 1934, it drew its support largely from wealthy townsmen and young enthusiasts and directed its fire principally against the Western Powers and against the 'old gang' in ruling circles. Its official anti-Communist attitude did not preclude some approval of Russian policies, nor its national loyalties an anti-Hashimite bias. The party of National Union, which was dissolved in 1947, was on the borderline of Communism, and its paper *al-Siyasa* frankly subversive; its stalwarts were the American-educated printing-press proprietor, 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim, and Nadhim al-Zahawi. In the same category fell the People's Party of the Communist 'Aziz Sharif, with its papers *al-Sha'b* and later *al-Waṭn*, suppressed in 1946 and 1947 respectively. The two parties last named amalgamated before their suppression into a Party of National Union. The avowedly Communist party of National Liberation under Muḥammad al-Shabibi and a group of Jewish Communists was refused the right to legalize itself but remained, with other groups of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh, fully active underground. Their members were drawn from industrial workers, from rich young men hiding behind ministers, and in general from the discontented or visionary of all classes. Their organization was widespread and efficient; it included cells in Government offices—though officials were forbidden by law to participate openly in politics—and in industrial enterprises. Sulaymaniya was their principal centre, where contact was easy with the trans-frontier Communists and the merging of Communism with Kurdish nationalism was an effective device.

648x Relations with 'Iraq's northern neighbour, always cordial with reservations, were amicably restated by a mission of Nuri Sa'id to Ankara in February 1946. He initialed a draft treaty of friendship which confirmed the 1926 boundary, provided a mutual policy of brotherhood, non-interference, and free consultation, and looked forward to joint handling of such shared problems as the Kurds and the Euphrates waters. The ratification of this in Baghdad in June 1947 was to prove no matter of course; some deputies remembered the old grievance of Alexandretta, others felt that to draw closer to Ankara must be disloyal to Arab interests, or that an

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

'Iraqi-Turkish bloc would be—worst of all crimes—acceptable to Great Britain. Nevertheless it was ratified, and a State visit by the Turkish President was anticipated. Some urged revival of the Sa'dabad Pact, others disliked it as un-Arab. The Treaty of Brotherhood with the Jordan Kingdom was duly approved, amid the black looks and street demonstrations of the anti-Hashimite factions. 648×

The early fall of the Suwaydi Ministry, due to opposition in the Chamber and Senate and lack of Palace support, occurred on 3 May. In spite of popular hopes for a neutral or all-party Government, perhaps under the Amir Zayd, to hold elections and consolidate the structure of Government, it was followed on 1 June by a Ministry of indifferent quality led by the forceful authoritarian Arshad al-'Umari. He was to remain in office for six months, with a marked personal domination of his colleagues and of all departments, and to deal characteristically with the political freedoms permitted by his predecessor. He named 'Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab to Interior, Yusif Ghanima to Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba to Justice. The other ministers were all newcomers to Cabinet position: the Shi'i 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi (son of old 'Abd al-Ḥusayn) at Works, Babā 'Ali, the modernized and Americanized son of Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji, at Economics, Sa'id Ḥaqqi, another Kurd, at Defence, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, Dr. 'Abd al-Hadi al-Pachachi—cousin of Ḥamdi and Muzaḥim—at Social Affairs, and Nuri al-Qadhi, a lawyer and judge of the old school, at Education. In August Qaṣṣab resigned his portfolio, which the Prime Minister assumed, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh took that of Supplies. 645×

In spite of Arshad's will to impose discipline and peace, his period of office was troubled. In the tribes an unusually bloody clash occurred in August between the Shammar and the Albu Muṭaywit, with the loss of 200 lives. Danger in Kurdistan seemed to diminish as the Russian attempt to consolidate its puppet Republics across the frontier failed, and disillusioned and starving Barzani families trickled homewards to be disarmed. Many of the rebels in Persian Kurdistan, including Qadhi Muḥammad, were hanged by their Government on re-entry; but Mullā Muṣṭafā refused all terms, escaped capture, and after failing to re-enter 'Iraq reached Soviet territory. The Government accepted the unconditional surrender of his brother Shaykh Aḥmad and of his son Shaykh 'Ubaydullah. Four Kurdish officers who had fought for the Mullā and a few other ex-ringleaders were sentenced to death, and the need to deal with the armed insurgence of Muḥammad Khalid, the son of Shaykh Aḥmad, forced Government to keep troops in the neighbourhood. In Sulaymaniya liwā hostilities 619 668

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely 668 kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan, where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the [468] Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to blame the Company itself.

669 In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy 661 of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some 3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question. In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker* *645 was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps, which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry, approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan (at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the Panjwin earthquake victims.

*645 In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status 648 which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946, and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views'; and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings designed to obtain (by steps undecided and unspecified) Arab 645x rights in Palestine and the French evacuation of Syria, the two 648x States were feeling their way to a closer understanding in the political, cultural, and military fields. On the 'Greater Syria' plan of King 'Abdullah, which he urged with increasing openness after the War, 'Iraq's attitude was one of cautious avoidance of commitment, though individual statesmen in Baghdad were frank in their support. A visit by the King to Baghdad and Mosul late in 1946 advanced the cause of 'Iraq–Jordan solidarity, but not that of Greater Syria. 'Iraq meanwhile had taken its place at meetings at Cairo and at Bludan, and in the late summer of 1946 had dispatched its representatives to London for the would-be Round Table Conference on Palestine. Their attitude at it could not be in doubt; the general strike organized throughout 'Iraq on 2 November (Balfour Day) showed the continuing popular fervour against Zionism. A Legation was opened in the Yaman and wireless communication established between Baghdad and Ṣan'ā. The Government recognized the Indonesian Republic, had views on the disposal of ex-Italian North Africa, cordially supported an Egypt now in the throes of post-war negotiation with Britain, and was gratified by the election of a representative on the Trusteeship Council of United Nations. The Legation in London was raised to the status of an Embassy, to which the Amir Zayd was appointed. The British Ambassador at Baghdad announced his willing abandonment of his special right, under the 1930 Treaty, of precedence over other diplomats. The United States Legation became an Embassy.

An unexpected appeal repeated insistently during later 1946 reached Baghdad from the Arab tribes of Khuzistan. The low prestige of the Persian Government after the war in its outlying provinces, the conditions of near-anarchy produced by the Tudeh Party, and a resurgence of Arabism led the long-expatriated tribesmen of that Persian province to beg, in petitions addressed to Baṣra, Baghdad, and the Arab League, for the grant of 'Iraqi citizenship. An Arab State of Kuzistan was visualized, and the woes of these rightless Arabs became a theme of the parties in Baghdad; but no more was heard of the movement after the winter of 1946–7, and Perso-'Iraqi relations remained suspicious and irritable in spite of common interest in the menace of Communism and the safeguarding of peace in Kurdistan and on the frontiers.

The forces hostile to 'Umari had by mid-November gained 645* a strength which compelled his resignation. The formation of 665 a coalition Ministry to conduct the elections was entrusted on 21 November to Nuri Sa'id. He formed his Cabinet, dissolved Parliament, and prepared for elections under the new procedure

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq [illegible]

x645 665 with the promise of full freedom of choice. But his hopes of securing a strong Chamber and satisfied parties by inviting their co-operation were but partially gratified; the Liberals and National Democrats, invited to name representatives for Cabinet posts, did so in the persons of 'Ali Mumtaz at the Ministry of Works and Muḥammad Ḥadid at that of Supply; but both these and two Shi'i ministers, Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Education, resigned their offices in the following month to devote themselves to an election campaign. Most of the parties, including Ṣaliḥ Jabr's parliamentary Political Bloc, took part and one, the unauthorized National Liberation Party, was the cause of a scuffle with the police at Kadhimiya. The Cabinet was, with consequent changes, re-formed to include 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi at Works, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh at Supply and temporarily at Finance, Shakir al-Wadi (reputed to be in the close confidence of the Regent) at Defence, Babā 'Ali at Economics, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab at Social Affairs and for a time at Education, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, and 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice.

665 661 The conduct of the elections, which began in February, did not prevent Nuri Pasha from locating hotbeds of Communism and claiming by his arrests and searches to have suppressed them. The followers of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh were involved, and from these or other groups such leaders as Ibrahim Naji Shummal, Zaki Muḥammad Baṣim, and two score of their associates were arrested. With the exposure of the Communist cells in every liwā, the Premier could hope that a fatal blow had been dealt to the movement; but gratitude for this did little to diminish the fury of press attacks on himself and on targets provided by the British, notably Reuter's Agency and local branches of the British Council.

646 665 The Chamber of Deputies which, amid the usual outcries against 'Government interference', emerged from the elections, showed a large majority of independent members or supporters of Nuri and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr. The National Democratic Party secured five seats, x645 the other parties none. When Parliament opened Nuri, who had accepted the premiership on this understanding, now made way for Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and was ready to support a Ministry led by him—the first to be formed under a Shi'i Premier. Ṣaliḥ reserved for himself the Ministry of the Interior and relied upon experienced colleagues in the other appointments: he retained Jamali, Shakir al-Wadi, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh, and Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab in their former posts, and brought Jamal Baban to Justice and temporarily to Economics, Ghanima to Finance, the Kurdish scholar Tawfiq Wahbi to Education, the Shi'i Dhiyā' Ja'far—a Birmingham graduate in oil engineering—to Works. The Opposition, itself fragmentary, was formed mainly by the five parties not represented

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

in Government and notably by the Liberal Party under Sa'd Ṣaliḥ: their programme was generally one of neutrality (or, as some said, friendship) towards Russia, armed intervention in Palestine, and comprehensive hostility to the British. The Prime Minister spoke of revision of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty, help to local industry, a State-owned oil refinery, a National Bank, more and better education and a university, public works, greater administrative devolution, encouragement to trade unionism, and the firmest resistance to Communism. He could count upon the Regent's support and that of Nuri Sa'id, and could well hope thereby for a successful term of office. 645*

But, politics apart, he was faced by serious difficulties. One of these was the deterioration of the administration, which little was done to restore. Another and more pressing was the worsening financial position. A budget submitted tardily for 1947–8 showed that the main revenues had since 1944 been far from keeping pace with increasing costs, and represented a proportion of the national wealth far smaller than before the war; many fixed dues and charges remained at their old levels, neither land-revenue nor customs receipts had moved upward proportionately to costs, and the social services had been allowed to develop since the war with more generosity than prudence. The year opened with but a small residue of the war-time surplus, and a clear deficit in the year's estimates. A galling shortage of hard currency was felt by merchants eager to import, and the year's harvest was so far below average that it was necessary to take thought for the import of grain; hoarding and unwise exporting had by the later months of 1947 led already to a serious deficiency of food stocks. The flotation of an internal loan of ID 1 million at 3 per cent., ostensibly for capital works, could serve only for current exigencies, and the issue of a second million at 3½ per cent., reluctantly subscribed in January 1948, did no more. The sensitive question of 'Iraqi sterling balances in Britain (which amounted currently to some £60 million) was settled after long consultations by an agreement of 13 August 1947 whereby a sum of £15 million, with further releases for special purposes, was to be made available in instalments between that date and July 1952. In November a supplementary agreement, replacing various interim arrangements, regulated Iraq's allowance of hard currencies, and permitted an expenditure in hard currency of £5,500,000 for the twelve months from June 1948. 645* 652

The withdrawal of the last British troops in October, with large transfers of war material to the 'Iraq Army, left only the Shu'ayba and Ḥabbaniya garrisons authorized by the 1930 Treaty. But the Treaty itself was under heavy political fire throughout the year. Talks proceeded in the Embassy, Ministries, and the Palace, and 648*

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

648 the Prime Minister and the Regent both visited London during the year. The objectives of all politicians (save only the vehement minority who would break every form of British connexion) were the removal of all limitation to their independence and free choice, the end of all treatment of the country as a junior partner, and the abolition of provisions which, offensively to their *amour propre*, left Ḥabbaniya and Shu'ayba as British cantonments in the heart of 'Iraq. The early negotiations with the British Ambassador appeared to run smoothly, and the Ministry could hope that early 1948 would see a happy solution. Newspaper attacks on Great Britain, unhelpful in these circumstances, were as ever the commonplace of every journalist, and were suspended only in part and temporarily in the summer of 1947, when a party of 'Iraqi editors visited London.

647 In the two years following the armistice most of the remaining British officials of the Administration—a tiny remnant of the body so active and so hopeful in 1919–20—left 'Iraq. Edmonds had retired in 1945, succeeded in Interior by A. H. Ditchburn. In 1946 Drower of Justice, Sinderson of the Medical Services, Atkinson of Irrigation, Caparn of Communications and Works, H. I. Lloyd of the Date Board, and Grice of Interior were among the losses sustained by the Government. They were followed next year by Swan of Finance, Seton Lloyd of Antiquities, and Chadwick of the Veterinary Department.

645 665 661 It was regrettable that Ṣaliḥ Jabr's best-meaning of Governments was compelled, like its predecessors, to take steps against press and party agitation which passed all reasonable limits. Its Palestine policy was more than correct, its moves towards Treaty revision active and popular; but this was not enough. Exclusion from power and sheer hatred of the 'old gang'—and of the British allegedly behind them—still led the parties to frenzies of anti-Government zeal. A newspaper was suppressed in April, and two more in June. Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim were charged with sedition. The premises of the People's Party were seized and 'Aziz Sharif arrested, but released. Trials of Communists detained under the last Sa'idi Ministry, some months ago, led to a score of long sentences of imprisonment and to death sentences[1] on Yusif Salman, Zaki Baṣim, and Naji Shummal for inciting troops and police against the State; these were later commuted to long terms of imprisonment. Baghdad bookshops were raided and the premises of the more extreme parties searched.

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[1] The *Daily Worker*'s later (17 February 1949) description of the 'Iraq Government was that of a 'corrupt and murderous puppet of British imperialism'; *L'Humanité* (8 February 1949) attributed 'Iraq's anti-Communist steps to 'the Anglo-American millionaires who are preparing war'.

The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed 645ˣ
in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was 665
notorious that the strike in the Port of Baṣra during the summer 661
had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but
vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist
League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 186
1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed Zionism, backed by American money and competing political interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of
anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn 000
of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan' which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, 668
a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some 665
sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious
Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent
and potential violence which were actually present and
were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December [731]
the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were
approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks. Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western, narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

668 judged them; nor were they incapable of temporary union with 665 each other or, in some eventualities, with the Communists. General disillusion created by the divided post-war world, the uneasy relations between East and West from China to Morocco, and the doubtful progress of 'democracy', had descended upon the conscious elements of the 'Iraq cities; and the destructive emotions it had produced were to find their readiest outlet in two fields: one, the Palestine situation now going from bad to worse: the other, the relations of 'Iraq with Great Britain now on the eve of restatement. All the latent menaces of 1947, a year of seeming progress and hope, were to be realized with tragic results in the year following.

2. PORTSMOUTH AND PALESTINE

648 During the weeks following the opening of Parliament on 1 December 1947 all was ready, it seemed, for the signature of a new Treaty; not only its principles but most of a new text had been agreed by the statesmen consulted in Baghdad and by the Regent. In the last days of the year it was announced that the Premier and his Foreign Minister—to be accompanied, in the event, by Nuri Sa'id and Shakir al-Wadi—would proceed to London for final talks and probable signature. Jamal Baban was left as acting Prime Minister. The Treaty was in fact agreed and initialed on 12 January 1948, and was signed at Portsmouth by the 'Iraqi deputation and Ernest Bevin on the 15th.

Praised by the latter as an inspiring example and precedent for other similar undertakings, the Treaty and its annex included the hope of co-operation in matters of technical and economic development; but primarily it was one of mutual defence. It provided for consultation in time of danger, and for immediate help, each to each, in time of war. The Air Force bases of Habbaniya and Shu'ayba were to be handed to 'Iraq, with the retention only of limited British personnel, at British expense but under 'Iraqi command, to ensure readiness for immediate use; British combatant forces could reoccupy them only in case of war. The British Military Mission was to disappear, a mixed Anglo-'Iraqi Council would undertake the development of strategic plans and offer recommendations on the equipment of the 'Iraqi forces. Standardization of equipment as between the two armies would be assured, help would be given by the R.A.F. to the R.I.A.F. in training abroad, arms of the latest pattern would be made available. The Treaty would come into force as soon as the post-war world had returned to peace conditions: as soon, that is, as all peace treaties with ex-enemy countries had come into force and occupying armies had been withdrawn.

The Treaty as published was welcomed in Great Britain, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

was judged satisfactory in Baghdad by the responsible elements 648K which had already approved it, and by the Regent. The latter in an exchange of telegrams with King George VI held that the new Treaty was 'in the interests of both countries, and would consolidate their friendship'. The 'Iraqi delegation in Great Britain, passing a few days of holiday, felt no suspicion that their own countrymen would not accept an agreement which represented so obvious and advantageous an advance on the 1930 Treaty, and which seemed in no way calculated to offend national *amour propre*.

They were rapidly undeceived. The absence of the principal 648K ministers from Baghdad, and their failure to explain and defend the 668 new Treaty on or in advance of its publication, afforded a welcome opportunity for an attitude of emphatic 'patriotic' rejection to the parties and the town mob, who, directed by able organizers, had for weeks or months past been prepared for this event. The particular clauses of the new Treaty were little in question; nor was the upheaval more specifically anti-British than was necessary to afford a common rallying call, of proved efficacy, to diverse elements. If to some politicians and malcontents the continued British connexion and the presence even of British technicians was offensive, to far more the occasion was a suitable one to relieve their feelings of dismay at the now serious food shortage, the economic inequalities, an unpopular Prime Minister, an Administration with obvious shortcomings and much suspected corruption, and the resented exclusion from power of young politicians and publicists and of the old embittered adherents of Rashid 'Āli and his Generals.

The immediate reaction of the Baghdad public to the announcement of the Treaty was a three-day strike of Law and Engineering students, and the holding of demonstrations, impressive in their size and fervour, organized by the National Democratic, Independence, Liberal, and Communist Parties. Strikes were called in offices and workshops, and violent attacks made on the premises of British or suspected-British concerns, notably those of the *'Iraq Times*. Marches and countermarches, with ugly clashes with the police, filled the streets of the capital. Demonstrations, which early firmness might have controlled, were soon beyond discipline, the mob joined in with enthusiasm, and the communiqués of the Deputy Premier, Jamal Baban, and his now frightened ministers were unheeded. Police action in opening fire to restore a semblance of order was both unsuccessful and savagely resented. Not less than fifty persons were killed and between 100 and 200 injured, including many of the police. Mass movements which started on 16 January grew in scale on every succeeding day. The restoration of order must, it appeared, devolve on the Army, if on anyone; and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

it was found by ministers and perhaps by the Regent imprudent to invoke this force, whose attitude was incalculable and whose leadership was in parts rancorously Anglophobe. The morale of the police themselves, execrated by the mob and unsupported by their superiors, fell rapidly. In the provinces, farther from the inspirers of the trouble, the Mutaṣarrifs were usually able to control or at least to limit the organized street marches, and in most centres they preserved nearly normal conditions. In Sulaymaniya the demonstrators praised the Russians, detested all Arabs, abused the British, chased an English teacher from the town, and burnt the British Institute.

The Regent, against whom as a reputed Treaty advocate a part of the disorder was aimed—and indeed talk of a Republic was not lacking—convened a Crown Council on 21 January and, after five hours of discussion, felt the necessity of reversing his attitude and disclaiming the Treaty. He issued at its conclusion a statement that the Treaty was found to be unsatisfactory: that it did not 'realize the national aspirations of 'Iraq or consolidate the friendship between the two countries': and that he would ratify nothing that failed to secure for the country all its objectives. Notwithstanding this volte-face, the demonstrations continued unabated, with decreased police control and clear signs of the disintegration or disappearance of a part of the force. Public funerals attended by thousands were given to students who had fallen. The return of the Prime Minister to Baghdad, still convinced that all was the work of a few agitators and a misled public, availed nothing; his personal safety was with difficulty assured by a roof-top garrison at his private house. The press and crowd raged against him unchecked by police rifle-fire or by the arrest of Communist firebrands; and his public statement, still confident in tone, fell on deaf ears. The street riots and marches reached a climax on 27 January, with many deaths and injuries; a crowd demanded at the palace the resignation, or even the death, of the Prime Minister. Ṣaliḥ Jabr was compelled to yield. He resigned office and fled for his life to his tribal home country on the Euphrates, and thence later to Jordan and to England. A hundred thousand people attended the funerals of 'the Martyrs' and the party spokesmen demanded the final abrogation of the Treaty. The days following showed little improvement in public order. Mass meetings in the streets continued and dominated the town with patriotic banners, threats of death to their enemies, the cry for free lands for all, and destruction to foreigners. Parties from the provinces, among them Kurds demanding the release of Barzani leaders, joined the crowds in the capital; business and social life were completely disrupted and the police largely disappeared from the streets. Throughout

these proceedings there was no hope of freedom for the expression, 648K
much less for the acceptance, of the opinions of the many who 668
believed the Portsmouth Treaty to be a realistic and beneficent measure, of great advantage to the State.

On the disappearance of Ṣaliḥ Jabr the task of forming a Govern- 645a
ment was entrusted to the 66-year-old Shi'i nationalist, Sayid 648K
Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. Ignoring the claims of all save one of the party chiefs who had created the present troubles, he surrounded himself with tried statesmen of former Cabinets. With three Shi'i ministers—Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba at Supply, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Finance, and Ridhā al-Shabibi at Education—he secured the services of Madfa'i (for a short time) at Interior, Arshad al-'Umari at Defence, Ḥamdi al-Pachachi (a sick man who died three months later) at Foreign Affairs, Muṣṭafā al-'Umari at Economics, 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice, Najib al-Rawi and Jalal Baban at Social Affairs and Works. Naṣrat al-Farsi, Mawlud al-Mukhliṣ, Ḥikmat Sulayman, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh had been expected to be members; the first-named with Da'ud al-Ḥaydari and for a few weeks the Amir of the Rabi'a, Muḥammad al-Sayhud, became ministers without portfolio. The team was strong in experience and personalities but, though supported by most of the parties, it lacked both cohesion and any policy save mere appeasement. After an early Cabinet meeting it announced that the Treaty would not be ratified; it was 'not a fit instrument for strengthening the ties with Great Britain'; but another Treaty might perhaps be considered. Parliament was prorogued for fifty days, and on 25 February the Chamber, pronounced unrepresentative and illegally elected, was dissolved and new elections were ordered. Sir Henry Mack succeeded Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird as British Ambassador in the same month.

The period during which the rolls of voters were completed and 645K
primary elections carried out was disturbed and unhappy, with 668
erratic Government intervention which reflected individual ministers' predilections but no plan. The parties, unsure of success, already protested at 'Government interference', and two of them announced a boycott. Ministers vied with each other in disclaiming any part in opposing the rioters' violence during 'the revolution' on 20 January and appointed a committee to inquire into police action. Student parades and outcries continued, to the wearied disgust of quiet-loving citizens. Meetings, flag-wavings, and rifle-shooting in Sulaymaniya and other centres led again to violent clashes and disorder. The British Consulate at Kirkuk was attacked. The announcement that the British Military Mission was (in fact, at its own suggestion) to be withdrawn in May was hailed as a national triumph. The Anglo-Jordan Treaty on 29 March was another

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

x645 theme for hostile schoolboy agitation in the streets of the capital. 668 The Ministry's appeal for unity and tranquillity, and another by al-Ṣadr in person, were alike unheeded, and the work of administration, in which the Prime Minister had neither interest nor competence, was largely ignored. [731] The near-famine conditions among the poorer classes could not be cured until after the harvest, which itself promised to be scanty; meanwhile an Australian grain ship was by British initiative diverted to Baṣra and its urgently needed stores distributed.

x645 The death of Ḥamdi al-Pachachi on 27 March led to changes among the uneasy ministers. 'Umar Nadhmi had resigned and been replaced at Justice by Najib al-Rawi, who handed his portfolio of Social Affairs to Ḥaydari. Naṣrat had succeeded Madfa'i at Interior when the latter became President of the Senate, and was himself succeeded when he moved to Foreign Affairs by Muṣṭafā al-'Umari who could thus 'control' the forthcoming elections. The Amir al-Rabi'a resigned and went home in April. Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba left the Ministry early in June. The frequent absences of the Ministers of Finance and Justice at Arab League meetings led to constant interchange of ministerial duties, from which the shaken and demoralized Administration suffered.

646 The Chamber met on 26 June, after elections in which legal and illegal parties alike had put forth all their efforts, and which had produced street fighting in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniya. The Independence Party secured four seats, the National Democrats two, the Liberals one. All other deputies were free of party attachment and as such were likely to vote for any Ministry in power; it was clear that the enthusiasm, or the leadership, of the parties had still too little appeal to seduce the electorate from the familiar candidates of local importance in their constituencies or to resist the conservative influence of controlling officialdom. A Chamber—or an electorate—divided on true party lines was still an unrealizable conception.

648x 721 The new Parliament was confronted, to its dismay, with a situation containing new and alarming features which events in Palestine had created. The United Nations decision for Partition, taken in November 1947, had led in 'Iraq as elsewhere to angry remonstrance, and in the Arab League to emergency meetings. But no hopeful measures could be taken or planned at these; the lines of cleavage within the League were already too clear, and most of the States members too doubtful of their own stability. The earlier decision to encourage the infiltration of guerrilla fighters from each country into Palestine, for the stiffening of local resistance, was carried out to a limited extent. Some hundreds—or, as some said, two battalions—of young and a few veteran

'Iraqis, recruited by the Palestine Defence League, entered 648× Palestine and served or offered to serve with Fawzi al-Qawuqchi 721 and the Palestine leaders; they were inspired perhaps by genuine devotion but were of negligible fighting capacity. The inefficacy of this force, and the collapse of Arab resistance in the face of Jewish terrorism and their resolute forces, led the League to decide, before the official end of the Mandate, upon the intervention of Arab regular armies. In April the Regent, whose leadership and vitality regained him much of his popularity, visited 'Amman and Cairo with the Ministers of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Student hunger strikes were called in Baghdad to urge the dispatch of the Army to Palestine, the closure of the Haifa pipeline, and a welcome for the Palestine exiles; and the Government of al-Ṣadr saw no alternative to following the League policy of large-scale intervention, however sketchily co-ordinated. 'Iraqi forces under General Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib—forces ill prepared, ill equipped, and with clearly inadequate supplies and reserves—moved from their home stations some ten to twelve thousand strong in mechanized or lorry-borne units, and took up positions on the western fringes of the Jordan Kingdom. They crossed into their allotted sector of Palestine on 15 May, immediately after the State of Israel had been proclaimed.

The outbreak of this war—the first occasion upon which its 722- troops were used abroad—was the signal for the imposition of 656 martial law throughout 'Iraq: a step happy only in its immediate restoration of outward tranquillity, but indicative of no real solution of any of the nation's problems. The emergency régime, which facilitated Government control over the elections, was marked by strict censorship, the opening of a concentration camp in the southern desert for the many arrested trouble-makers, the subordination of civil to military officials in all areas, and the establishment of military courts. It prohibited the carrying of firearms and the use of cypher codes, and by the supersession of many existing laws it involved a close restriction of civil rights. The clash between civil and military authorities increased as weeks went by with irritation, jealousy, and charges and counter-charges of indiscriminate severity or weak indulgence: Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams were soon heard to ask 'Which is the worse, government by students or by Army officers?' The press, swollen to an extraordinary number of daily sheets of trifling circulation but irresponsible violence, lost in a day the worst of its venom (except such as could be safely directed against the British or the Jews), and the few papers which refused compliance were suppressed. A ceremonial parade of the police in Baghdad did something to restore their morale. The Palestine war aroused enthusiastic

722 verbal support in every quarter and the Baghdad Jews vied ostentatiously with Muslims in anti-Zionist fervour and subscribed heavily to funds for the refugees.

But the campaign was from the first feebly and unfortunately
721 conducted. The higher leadership was uninspiring, supply arrange-
648 ments inadequate, and the discipline and bearing of the 'Iraqi troops, though judged to be superior to those of other Arab States except Jordan, carried them to little glory. Units entered Palestine on 15 May between Geshen and Wadi Yabis and marched on Tul Karm and Nablus, areas unoccupied by the Jews; their attempt on Tiberias was unsuccessful, but they effectively occupied the Nablus–Tiberias–Janin triangle and advanced to within twelve miles of Tel Aviv. This hopeful move was frustrated by Jewish resistance in front of Nathaniya and by counter-pressure which forced the 'Iraqis to abandon Bayt Tima and give ground in the occupied triangle. The Security Council's cease-fire order of 22 May had been at first ignored by all, but both sides accepted a four-weeks' truce operative on 11 June. The impetus of Arab invasion had by that time been lost, their weakness exposed, and their initial superiority in heavy arms, which was never to recur, had availed them little; and during the truce period equipment poured into the Jewish Army, none into the Arab. After the rejection of proposals evolved by the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, and his Truce Commission for a federation of Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and Jordan, fighting was renewed on 9 July. A further 'Iraqi attempt to take Nathaniya was foiled, the Jews swept into Galilee, and their deeper advance was stopped only by the second truce which was observed from 18 July. This at the Arab League meeting at Aley was rejected only by the 'Iraq Government, and that for reasons of pride and policy; but it was in fact operative and the war, for 'Iraq, was over.

The many attempts to restore peace to Palestine and solve its insoluble problems, the murder of Bernadotte by the Jews, the renewal of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities from October to the end of 1948, form no part of the history of 'Iraq. 'Iraq Army units remained in occupation of the east Palestine triangle for some months, dependent as ever on their long line of communications through Jordan and receiving their pay irregularly from the almost empty Treasury at home. Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib was recalled to 'Iraq as Chief of Staff, to return again to Palestine later as Commander-in-Chief of the combined 'Iraqi-Jordan forces; but this experiment in joint command lasted but a few weeks, and the wider project of a unified command for all League forces—a clear military necessity—was frustrated by division among the States and by Egyptian refusal. No real effect was given to the resolution of the 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

deputies and Senate in November that 'unified military and 721 political plans for the redemption of Palestine' should be adopted; 648x the idea was already unrealistic before the end of the year. Units in Palestine and Jordan were visited repeatedly by the Regent, who did more than the ministers of his bewildered and irresolute Government to inspire such national effort as was possible. The nominal and absentee 'Government of all Palestine' announced by the Mufti, Ḥajj Amin—an irritant certain to envenom inter-Arab relations—was recognized by 'Iraq to please the Egyptians.

3. *PLUS ÇA CHANGE . . .*

The general elections were carried out four days after the first 645x truce in Palestine had become effective, and when Parliament met on 21 June the resignation of Muḥammad al-Ṣadr's Ministry was offered and accepted; it had possessed little authority, had failed to restore order save by imposing martial law, had neglected current administration, had allowed an alarming financial deterioration, and now bequeathed a disheartening legacy at home and abroad.

The Regent's choice of a successor fell unexpectedly upon a statesman formerly prominent but, through long residence in Europe, now in imperfect touch with current politics: Muzaḥim al-Pachachi. He claimed to be of no party and selected a Cabinet of long-familiar figures; Muṣṭafā al-'Umari was to serve at Interior, 'Ali Mumtaz at Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba at Justice, Baṣṣam at Defence, Jalal Baban at Works and Social Affairs, Rawi at Education, and a single newcomer, 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, a young Ḥilla landowner, at Economics. 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, a Beirut-educated Kurdish deputy from Ruwanduz, who had been interned in 1941, relieved Jalal Baban in Social Affairs in August. These ministers, whose appointment showed once more the small part played by party affiliations in the making of Ministries, were with changes to remain in office for half a year, and could achieve something but not much towards redressing 'Iraq's present misfortunes of penury, insecurity, and foreign entanglement.

The finances of the State went from bad to worse. No budget 652 for 1948–9 was submitted until the end of the financial year; normal revenues fell off through bad trade, another bad harvest, tax evasion, and feeble administration; and a certain deficit on the year's work could not prevent the allotment to the Army of nearly 40 per cent. of available funds, and a substantial contribution for the care of the Palestine refugees. Oil royalties were halved by the stoppage of the Haifa pipeline, which, whatever the resulting losses to the Treasury, no Cabinet would dare to reopen in spite of approaches made by the British, French, and American Governments

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 and by the Company itself; the Ministry and the parties, on the contrary, launched a demand for higher royalties on such oil as was still exported, and negotiations with the 'Iraq Petroleum Company on this and other issues[1] were begun. A loan from Egypt was discussed and a visit received from Ḥafidh 'Afifi Pasha; another internal loan was proposed but not issued; and late in the year experts of the International Bank, to whom application for a Development Loan had been made, were welcomed in Baghdad. An extended scarce currency agreement concluded with the British Government in July 1948 allotted $25 million for a twelve-month period. An import licensing system, intended to relieve the highly adverse trade balance and exchange position, was imposed in the autumn. With all this, the Treasury remained empty, was subjected to abnormal demands by the Army, and, without hope of paying its debts, faced the further necessity to import and distribute grain. Reductions in officialdom, a partial standstill in public works, royalty advances from the I.P.C., were expedients which barely maintained its solvency. The stronger remedies proposed by 'Ali Mumtaz were not supported by his colleagues, and he resigned. The depression and general indigence led to food riots in Baghdad, Baṣra, Kirkuk, Arbil, and Khaniqin, and to strikes which included one among the oil workers and another among railwaymen. The contribution of these conditions to the political restlessness of 1948–9 was considerable.

648* Meanwhile a large part of the Army remained in Palestine and Jordan. To restart active operations was altogether impracticable; but to recall the forces would have clashed dangerously with the emotional patriotism of the students who, having suffered no inconvenience from the war, pressed by demonstrations for further fighting and especially for help to the still-engaged Egyptian Army. The Palestine position was indeed the greatest of Muzaḥim's problems, and not least by its exposure of the sad disunity of the League in its first severe trial; the Arab States' varying attitudes to the war and the truce, to armistice proposals, to a unified military command, to the Mufti's absurd 'Government of all Palestine' and to Jordan's administration of eastern Palestine, showed how little of unity save its bare façade had survived. Nor did unanimity exist even at home; the pro-Mufti and pro-Hashimite groups could not agree; realists and visionaries saw the whole Palestine issue with different eyes; the problem of the refugees, indifferent to some, cried aloud to others; the Kurds, and not they alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of 648 an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

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[1] The other demands were for the payment of royalties, expressed in 'shillings (gold)', at the free-market conversion rate of gold as opposed to the Bank of England rate (p. 211): 'Iraqi participation in the enterprise: and the allotment of more and higher posts in it to 'Iraqis.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it 722 was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the dis- 656 turbing hostilities between civil and military authorities continued, and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street [668] demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective 563 alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish 579 separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

563 Mutaṣarrifs protested to the Minister of Interior at the military
579 reign of terror in their liwās and forced the resignation of the Minister of Defence, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam. The arrest of the Chief Rabbi and the conviction and hanging of a rich Jewish merchant, Shafiq Adis—but not of his Muslim associates—was disapproved by much of the public. The press was allowed full freedom to attack the British as having created all the troubles of Palestine as well as of 'Iraq: to call the oil companies truculently to account: and to assail with rage the well-reasoned pamphlet which Nuri Sa'id issued, on his return home at midsummer, in justification of the Portsmouth Treaty.

x645 The reinstatement of the Treaty supporters was, indeed, a feature of these months; Ṣaliḥ Jabr was welcomed back to Baghdad in July, Nuri could re-enter politics in the same summer, Shakir al-Wadi succeeded Baṣṣam as Minister of Defence in October, Jamali was sent as Minister to Cairo, and all were once again
665 candidates for high office by the end of the year. Party activity was limited by the abnormal conditions, and the National Democrat and the Liberal Parties, both handicapped by shortage of funds, complained of undue restriction and ceased active operation in December. The Independence Party remained vigorous. A series
x645 of Cabinet changes was made in October, after months in which portfolios passed from hand to hand among acting ministers. Shakir al-Wadi came to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Interior, and 'Ali Jawdat from Washington to Foreign Affairs. Muḥammad al-Sayhud, Amir al-Rabi'a, rejoined the Cabinet as minister without portfolio, and Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, who while under medical treatment in London gave up his post at Interior but remained in the Cabinet, resigned a month later. 'Ali Mumtaz, resigning from Finance in November, was replaced after an interval by the experienced Director-General of Customs, Khalil Isma'il, and 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan on becoming President of the Chamber was succeeded at Economics by 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, the Minister of Social Affairs. Najib al-Rawi, Minister of Education and 'Iraqi representative at Lake Success, returned home. The Speech from the Throne on 1 December, when Parliament met, was politically colourless.

The Pachachi Ministry, clearly unable to master its manifold problems, survived the last weeks of 1948 only by the support of the Portsmouth Treaty-makers, Nuri Sa'id and Ṣaliḥ Jabr. Muzaḥim's favour of Egypt as the strongest Arab Power and his favourable response to interventionist demonstrations on 30 and 31 December clashed with Army views—indeed, with those of every realist—and created an impasse from which a change of Government was the only outlet. He resigned office on 6 January 1949.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645× The Regent, himself indefatigable in touring the country and visiting the Army and the Arab capitals, called upon Nuri Saʻid to form a new Ministry. He did so on the same day by retaining four of the outgoing ministers—Kubba at Justice, Rawi at Education, Jalal Baban at Works, Shakir at Defence—and by bringing Bahā al-Din Nuri to Social Affairs, Ḍhiya' Jaʻfar to Economics, and ʻAbd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Foreign Affairs. He retained Interior himself, and asked Jalal Baban to act temporarily in Finance until Khalil Ismaʻil reassumed the post.

Mainly through lack of mutual confidence between the Premier, some of the ministers, and the Throne, the ministerial history of 1949 was troubled in spite of improved leadership. The Cabinet, initially weak, was little strengthened by changes made two months later when ʻUmar Nadhmi entered the Cabinet as Deputy Premier, Fadhil Jamali came from Cairo to Foreign Affairs on the appointment of ʻAbd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to direct the National Bank, and Tawfiq al-Na'ib, a former judge and Mutaṣarrif and a supporter of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, became Minister of the Interior. The Prime Minister hoped at midsummer to secure further strength in support of a Ministry which its own dissensions were destroying. He consulted Jamil al-Madfaʻi, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and ʻAli Mumtaz, of whom the last two were expected to join him; but agreement on the appointments was not forthcoming and the Cabinet barely survived into the winter of 1949–50. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior, not being deputies, were forced under the Constitution to resign office after six months, and their places were taken in September by Shakir and ʻUmar Nadhmi.

665 Taking advantage of the partial lull in party activity while only the Independence Party was in full operation, Nuri Pasha decided late in the year to found his own party, that of Constitutional Union. With an unexceptional programme of Arab brotherhood, friendship to all nations, anti-Communism, Treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at home and abroad, the party was composed of various elements of conservatism and vested interest, tribal and urban, and found cohesion in a common devotion to Nuri himself—as long as he remained powerful; and, taking its place as by far the largest and most amenable of the parties, it could not but dominate the Chamber as long as it held together. It was joined by an imposing array of ex-ministers and *ministrables*.

668 661 The last act of the Pachachi Ministry had been to arrange yet another drive against the Communists, and the first of the Saʻidi Cabinet was to continue it. Some hundreds of arrests were made, and led to scores of severe sentences for sedition and treason. Four notorious Communists—Yusif Salman, Yahuda Ṣadiq, Zaki Baṣim, and Ḥusayn Muḥammad Shabibi (a Christian, a Jew, and two

668 Muslims) were condemned to death and, this time, executed amid
661 the angry protests of the world's Communist press; another suffered the same fate in May. The Central Committee and records of the Communist Party were, it was claimed, located and disrupted, and the Government were satisfied that the back of the movement was at last broken. Lesser offenders against the State—or, as the malicious murmured, against the Prime Minister—received varying sentences. Kamil al-Chadirchi was sent to prison for four months. Demonstrations on the anniversary of the Portsmouth Treaty were strictly controlled, but led nevertheless to some rioting and many arrests. The procedures of martial law worked with less friction during the year, but Nuri felt still unable, in such times, to restore a normal régime. In spite of alarming rumours in the spring the return of Mullā Muṣṭafā from Russia and his expected invasion of 'Iraq were still delayed.

648 Relations with Great Britain, which in 1948 had deteriorated more over Palestine than over the Treaty issue, and most of all over the British refusal to provide arms, improved in 1949 with a less Anglophobe Ministry and with the resumption of the supply of modern weapons to the Army as soon as it had left Palestine. Visits to London were paid by the Regent, the Prime Minister, and ministers during the year, loans were gladly received and British experts recruited; but it remained inconceivable that any younger politician, or indeed any party except the Prime Minister's, should not, by conviction or mere habit or 'patriotic' duty, blame Great Britain for all the evils of the State.

652 If a substantial reassertion of Government authority was one of the Pasha's achievements in his tenth premiership, he was able also to prevent further financial deterioration. The rate of annual deficit was checked, borrowing for current needs was avoided, and after a precarious year the latter months of 1949 showed less anxious prospects. A budget for 1949–50, balancing at ID 25 million of revenue and expenditure, was produced without excessive delay and provided for enhanced Customs revenues and for some economies in administration. Proposals made for higher taxation or for greater retrenchment were, for political reasons, not pursued, and the trade and economic position, in spite of a good 1949 harvest which permitted the resumption of grain exports, remained unfavourable; but military expenditure on account of Palestine ended in July, and help was forthcoming from the sale of Government stores and from oil royalties received in advance. The promise of loans from London and from the International Bank for development purposes was obtained by negotiations in Europe in the summer of 1949, and an advance of £3 million from the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was offered conditionally upon the

reopening of the Haifa pipeline; but this to 'Iraqi ministers (whatever their own views as expressed in private) was a political impossibility, and the loan was withheld. The dinar followed the pound sterling in its devaluation. The National Bank of 'Iraq opened its doors on 1 July 1949 and assumed charge of the note issue from the Currency Board which, now disappearing, had given 'Iraq good service for twenty years. 652

Successful extraction of 'Iraq from its costly, dangerous, and ineffective position in Palestine was by now urgently necessary, and the bellicose enthusiasm of the last days of the Pachachi Ministry gave no lead towards a reasonable policy. Militarily, the war was lost and over; politically, the need was to save for the Palestine Arabs as much as possible from an Israel now firmly established and possibly expansionist. Nuri Pasha was prepared to accept Partition in the form proposed in November 1947, but not as modified by later Jewish conquests. He postulated an Arab Jerusalem, a disarmed Israel, an internationalized Haifa, and the repatriation of the refugees. These terms were unobtainable; and a visit by Madfa'i to Arab capitals to secure unity in demanding them revealed disunity instead, and could not prevent one Arab State after another signing separate armistices with Israel and going their separate ways. By March the Prime Minister saw the position as hopeless; by April the removal of 'Iraqi troops had begun, by July it was complete, and the reabsorption of the army into 'Iraq and its distribution to peace-time stations was carried out without mishap. It was thereafter 'Iraqi policy to shun the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne, and to hope for an internationally imposed settlement more tolerable than the present. The nation stood alone with Jordan in demanding an all-Arab Jerusalem but joined other States in November in their approach to Washington to compel Israel to carry out the 1947 territorial arrangements which the Lausanne protocol of May 1949 confirmed. 648x

With Palestine lost and its lessons partly learned, and Greater Syria—the *bête noire* of Egypt, Sa'udi Arabia, and two-thirds of Syria itself—now a dead issue save in the tenacious mind of King 'Abdullah, 'Iraqi thoughts turned again to the unity of the Fertile Crescent, or at least of 'Iraq with neighbouring Syria. A memorable booklet, *The Warning of Palestine*, published by Musā al-'Alami, and popular enthusiasm for the young Faysal II when he passed through Syria in 1948, had brought the old project again into prominence. The coup d'état of Colonel Ḥusni Za'im in Damascus on 30 March removed a chief opponent of the plan, President Shukri Quwatli, and Za'im's need of support might lead him, it was thought, to welcome a fraternal 'Iraq. But a rapid visit by Nuri Pasha to Damascus produced only a strong mutual antipathy;

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 the new and unbalanced dictator turned violently against his eastern neighbour, looked successfully for support in Egypt and Sa'udi Arabia, and propagated false stories of 'Iraqi troop concentrations. A second Syrian coup, which substituted Colonel Hinawi for Za'im, permitted further and friendlier contacts, and revealed a fair body of support in Syria for a Syro-'Iraqi rapprochement in some form. But it advanced no further; Great Britain and America did not desire at this time that the risks of a major constitutional change should be run, and refused either to approve or disapprove; and Egypt as a counter-move proposed an 'Arab Collective Security Pact' alleged to be preferable, in Syrian and every interest, to a mere bilateral unity. 'Iraq, whose devotion to its favoured project seemed to exceed that of Syria, resented the Egyptian intervention; a peace-making visit of delegates to Cairo effected nothing; and the League cleavage into two groups, one the Hashimite and one the Syro-Egyptian-Arabian, became by mid-1949 more conspicuous. The controversy among members, indeed, after Jordan's absorption of eastern Palestine in April seemed likely to precipitate a crisis. Whispers were heard of 'Iraq's as well as Jordan's retirement from the League, and pointed criticism of its Egyptian Secretary-General, 'Abd al-Raḥman 'Azzam, were expressed in Baghdad.

A State visit by the Regent to Teheran in June 1949 could effect no permanent improvement in relations with Persia, though a treaty of mutual assistance and good relations was signed on the 23rd of that month and the respective Legations were raised to the rank of Embassies. Steps were taken later in the year to set up the awaited Frontier Commission, but a suddenly announced Persian decision to expel all resident 'Iraqis (largely Jewish) led to a crisis in March 1950. In spite of suggestions made in 1947, and some body of present favourable opinion, no steps were taken to revive the Sa'dabad Pact. A Pakistani Minister had arrived in Baghdad late in 1948, and a treaty of friendship between the two countries was ratified early in 1950. The Turkish attitude of toleration to Israel, her general detachment from the squabbles of the Arab States, and her support of Ḥusni Za'im who antagonized and insulted 'Iraq, diminished for a period the 'Iraqi public's cordiality towards Turkey; but the change of Government at Ankara early in 1950 aroused great interest in Baghdad.

'645 The fall of the Sa'idi Ministry was foreshadowed by the early autumn of 1949, when ministerial differences on Arab inter-statal affairs, financial embarrassment, and still more the restlessness and fatigue of the Prime Minister himself and his preoccupation with his new party, pointed to an impending change. When Parliament met on 1 December the Regent's consultations with possible successors as premier had already gone far but indecisively; as usual a broad Government of co-operation or coalition was desired, but could not be formed. On 12 December the offered resignation of Nuri Sa'id was at last accepted and an Irada appointed 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi to succeed him—without, as ever, any visible regard to parties, policies, or the deputies.

The Ayubi Ministry now formed contained Muzaḥim al-Pachachi as Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, a sure sign that the Egyptian school of thought would temporarily prevail. An experienced minister 'Umar Nadhmi was brought to Interior and to act in Defence, 'Ali Mumtaz to Finance, and Najib al-Rawi to Education. 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Ḍhahir came to Economics, the Kurd 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman to Works, and newcomers, Sa'd 'Umar, a young Shi'i lawyer from Karbalā, and Ḥusayn Jamil to Justice and Social Affairs. 'Ali al-Sharqi, an elderly Shi'i senator, became minister without portfolio. The Cabinet, whose members were by majority opposed to the policies of Nuri Sa'id, depended nevertheless on the votes of his Constitutional Union Party which dominated the Chamber; and it could not but be short lived. By putting an end without mishap to martial law throughout 'Iraq it succeeded where others had failed, but for the rest it upheld and announced no policy, and invited severe criticism by adjourning the Chamber for forty-five days. When Pachachi had visited Egypt and there agreeed to abstain for a term of years from all plans for union with Syria, the Ministry found itself deeply divided and resigned office; the Foreign Minister and his leader had completely misjudged their own colleagues' opinion, and Muzaḥim's policy was rejected no less by the council of elder statesmen whom the Regent convened on his return.

Before Nuri Sa'id returned from his health cruise in Gulf waters the Cabinet had given place, in the first week of February 1950, to a successor Ministry under Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, who himself retained the post of Foreign Affairs. His Cabinet represented mainly the followings of Nuri Sa'id and Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and included the latter as Minister of Interior. Strong in appearance, the Ministry was after seven months of office to prove disappointing in achievement. It used the services of the Kurdish savant, Tawfiq Wahbi, Shakir al-Wadi, and Ḍhiya' Ja'far at Social Affairs, Defence, and Economics respectively, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi at Works, Sa'd 'Umar at Education, the able London-educated 'Abd al-Karim al-Uzri (brother of 'Abd al-Amir) at Finance, and Ḥasan Sami Tatar, a Kirkuk lawyer, at Justice; the last-named, not a deputy, retired in August under the six months rule, and was succeeded by Jamil al-Urfali, a lawyer and economist. Three ministers held office without portfolio: Ḥazim Shamdin Aghā,

Ls Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

x645 a Kurdish deputy from Zakho with long parliamentary experience: Jamil al-Urfali and Khalil Kunna, an internee of 1941 days but now related by marriage with Nuri Sa'id.

The Suwaydi policy was announced as one of Arab fraternity, closer relations with other eastern Powers, internal and legal reform, and industrial and economic development. In fact the 652 year 1950 was one of marked material improvement; the financial year 1949–50, itself better than its predecessor, had ended with a smaller deficit and during 1950 the Treasury began to refill. Considerable economies were made in the costs of administration, elsewhere than in the social services. New taxation and Customs revenue began to be productive, and by the end of the year the Minister of Finance could announce that the bad times were over; and in fact the financial year 1950–1 was to end, thanks to increased oil royalties, with comfortable balances in both current and capital works budgets. The loss, nevertheless, of Jewish skill and enterprise in the field of trade and banking, and the new and onerous obligations under the Banking Law of January 1950, proved economically a handicap. More import licences could not at present be allowed and stocks in the country remained short. Prices of imports, including food, rose with the outbreak of the Korean war. The harvest of 1950 was good in spite of disastrous floods and a phenomenal hurricane at Baṣra in May; the value of exports nearly doubled as compared with 1949, and greatly increased oil revenues were now in imminent prospect (p. 365). A new hard currency agreement was made with Great Britain in August 1950, and negotiations reopened shortly afterwards for its prolongation or amendment. A substantial loan in dollars was granted by the International Bank in July towards the Tharthar scheme (p. 370) and another by London in sterling for railway works already in progress.

6487 The Suwaydi and its successor the eleventh Sa'idi Ministries found the Arab inter-statal position no less baffling than before. In addition to the normal clashes of interest and sentiment between the nations, special features of embarrassment were present in the fact of Israeli establishment and consolidation, the disposal of eastern Palestine, the usurpation of power in Syria (where a third coup d'état early in 1950 removed Colonel Hinawi to install Colonel Shishakli), and in the strained relations between Egypt and Great Britain arising from their unfruitful negotiations. No decisive steps were taken towards union with Syria in 1950, though the Syrian Prime Minister visited Baghdad during the year; the 'Iraqi attitude was one of 'We are ready, whenever you are. . . .!' The prime cause of the country's uneasy position in the League was her support of Jordan, with whose ruler further visits were

3s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

exchanged; and even this support had to be limited when, at the 648x League meeting in April, the member States indicted Jordan for alleged negotiations with the Jews. The task of justifying the incorporation of the Arab remainder of Palestine into the Jordan Kingdom (a step to which in practice no alternative appeared) was difficult to reconcile with the desirability of placating Egypt. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the League meeting in April voted for a resolution declaring Palestine to be a 'trust territory of the whole League', and in May for another which declared Jordan's act of unification a breach of the principle thus established. He then with difficulty secured postponement of the decision to expel the Hashimite Kingdom, and succeeded in substituting a compromise formula acceptable to all save Jordan herself, asserting that Palestine should, after complete liberation, be disposed of by a collective decision of the League.

Disunity was not less evident in connexion with the Collective Security Pact proposed by Egypt in 1949. The Pact was not for many months accepted by 'Iraq, whose spokesmen saw little value in an agreement which did not include Jordan; but this clash of views, unresolved by the end of 1950, did not prevent the 'Iraqi Premier from offering his verbal support to Egypt in her current diplomatic struggle with Britain. With Israel the successive Governments in Baghdad continued to refuse all negotiation; and the Cabinet, with the implacable politicians of other States, professed to see a new threat of 'imperialism' in the would-be sedative declaration of Britain, the United States, and France on 25 May that they were opposed to the use of aggressive force by any Middle Eastern State, including Israel, and would supply thenceforward only the armaments necessary to each country's defence. The declaration was accepted by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with reserves which he was at pains to indicate to the British and American Ambassadors.

The year 1950 was peaceful in Kurdistan. There was no sign of 563 Mullā (or Marshal) Muṣṭafā's return, though the wireless campaign from the Soviet Armenian 'Post of the Kurdish Democratic Party' persisted; and 'Iraqi policy in Kurdistan, where Nuri Sa'id in conciliatory mood toured in September 1950, seemed to show increased sympathy with its wayward Kurdish subjects, and there were less frequent schoolboy outbursts in Sulaymaniya. In the Police the former Director-General, 'Alwan Ḥusayn, had resumed 625 command after an attempted coup (it was said) had led to the dismissal of 'Ali Khalid, and the force regained their discipline and prowess. The Army, still dissatisfied with the equipment provided 701 for it and with the fewness of cadet vacancies made available in England, tried genuinely to improve its efficiency, sought in vain

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

701 American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow
631 start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers
which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial
administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth
a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available.
665 Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when
668 they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality
was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

563 If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

1: Longrigg G-4; 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

eminent; and many who reached Palestine bitterly regretted their 563
change of home.

An episode in the Chamber on 7 March, early in the Suwaydi 645
Ministry's life, led to the resignation—in despair, they said, of fair 665
parliamentary treatment—of the whole body of deputies opposed to Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party who in fact maintained the Ministry in power and dominated the Chamber. The gesture was regrettable as ending all pretence of government on party lines; but the sympathy accorded to the retiring members did not survive their own squabbles and evident lack of common purpose, and the elections held early in June to fill their places produced amenable members. No considerable Opposition elements remained thereafter in the Chamber, before which stretched a life of two or three more years. But within the Cabinet a tripartite balance of power was uneasily maintained between the Prime Minister, the supporters of Nuri Pasha (himself absent), and those of Ṣaliḥ Jabr; between the latter two statesmen the old cordiality was fast disappearing, and Ṣaliḥ Jabr's share in building the party itself was little remembered. The Prime Minister was by midsummer maintaining himself with difficulty; favourite projects of his own, such as a new press law, were frustrated by his colleagues. The absence of the Regent and of Nuri in London precluded a change of Ministry until the autumn, but on 12 September Suwaydi was forced to resign.

Four days later the formation of an eleventh Sa'idi Ministry was proclaimed. Even in the process of its establishment Nuri found something of Suwaydi's difficulty in reconciling personalities each in itself valuable; he could not use simultaneously both Tawfiq and Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and preferred for the moment to be content with a skeleton Cabinet which he proposed to strengthen and broaden as opportunity might offer into a real Ministry of National Union intended, as he announced, for urgent economic and administrative work. As it was, he kept the post of Interior in his own hands, combined Defence and Foreign Affairs under Shakir al-Wadi, Works and Finance under 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, and gave the Ministries of Justice, Education, Social Affairs, and Economics respectively to Ḥasan Sami Tatar, Khalil Kunna, Mājid Muṣṭafā, and Ḍhiya' Ja'far. But it became early apparent that the breach with the followers of Ṣaliḥ Jabr was widening; and the latter, in whom many observers recognized Nuri's ultimate successor, founded early in 1951 his own Socialist Party of the Nation, a group generally conservative (in spite of its singularly ill-chosen name) and, while largely personal to Ṣaliḥ, relying also on organized Shi'ism and seeking Kurdish support. The Iṣlaḥ Party of Sami Shawkat merged itself in the new group. At the same time

x645 665 opposition leaders of various records and tendencies—Ṭaha al-Hashimi, Muzaḥim al-Pachachi, Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, Naṣrat al-Farsi, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Ḍhahir, Ja'far Ḥamandi, and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam—were drawing together towards a fragile but imposing Popular Front whose formation with a vague programme they announced towards the middle of 1951. The National Democrat Party returned to full activity during 1950. There seemed, however, no reason why, with his parliamentary majority and with a personal authority which for years past had exceeded that of any other 'Iraqi, Nuri Sa'id should not, subject to unforeseeable changes and chances, remain in power as long as his health and restless nature might permit. In the last days of 1950 he brought 'Umar Nadhmi, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba, and Baṣṣam to the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio, appointed 'Abd al-Majid Maḥmud, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, to the Ministry of Economics, moved Ḍhiya' Ja'far to Works, and retained 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan at Finance. But no real coalition had emerged, and internal politics showed no sign of rising above the habitual strife of rival personalities. A formidable range of unsolved problems, inter-Arab and international, political and financial, confronted Nuri Sa'id, none more conspicuously than those of Israel and the Palestine refugees, revision of the 1930 Treaty, and the extraction of greater oil profits. To these the veteran statesman now turned.

643 King Fayṣal II, whose fifteenth birthday fell on 2 May 1950, had completed his preparatory school days in England and since the spring of 1949 had been a happy and successful Harrow schoolboy. He was to attain his majority on 2 May 1953. His family had acquired a house near Staines where the Queen Mother 'Aliya spent most of the year. Her health, however, began to cause alarm in 1949 and after a long illness and operation she returned home to die in Baghdad in September 1950, aged only thirty-nine; a tragic loss to the King and to her devoted brother, the Regent.

4. WEALTH OF A NATION

652 There have been references on earlier pages to the serious position of the State finances in the period 1947–9 and to the substantial recovery therefrom by the end of 1950. It could be foreseen by the latter date that, so far from financial stringency, the resources at the Government's disposal would in future be ample not only for normal purposes of the public services as hitherto conceived but also for an expanding programme of development. Provided that control of expenditure were maintained as efficiently as it had been (except in 1948) in the past, which there was no reason to doubt: that the probity and efficiency of Government personnel did not deteriorate: that the efforts made to perfect the

assessment and collection of the main customary sources of revenue 652
—Customs and Excise, taxation on natural commodities, the tobacco monopoly, income and property taxes—were continued with the full use of improved records, techniques, and expert advice: it was probable that, even apart from the expected oil revenues, the position of the Treasury need not again cause anxiety. From this should follow the liquidation of Government debts and loans, the better housing and payment of the Administration itself, and the possibility of a gratifying expansion of the social services.

The estimates for 1950–1 allotted, out of a total ordinary expenditure of ID 24 million, 30 per cent. to the Army and R.I.A.F., 16 per cent. to education, 13 to general administration purposes, 11 to the Police, 8 to health services, and 22 in all to other departments and functions. Capital works expenditure in that year was to amount to just under ID 4 million.

Receipts from the territory's greatest single source of wealth, its oil deposits and the industry developing them, had since their first appearance normally been allotted to capital development. This 647
rule, partly broken in lean times, was reinforced by the structure
of the Development Board set up in 1950 under a law which called 652
for the diversion to it of all revenues from oil.[1] These receipts, amounting to less than ID 4 million in 1949 and little more than 6 million in 1950, would, it was already clear, be more than doubled, more than quadrupled, in future years (p. 376). The division of the State estimates into an ordinary and a capital-works budget ceased with the establishment of the Development Board.

The Board, disliked by some 'Iraqis as an irremovable Government-within-Government, seemed to others and to most foreign observers to offer hopes of a continuity, efficiency, and freedom from political considerations which had scarcely existed before.[2] It consisted of eight members, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the time, and six non-official salaried members to be named by Royal Irada and to hold office for five years. Three of these were to be expert in Finance, Irrigation, and another (unspecified) field and, in defiance of anti-foreign prejudice, a British Secretary-General and Finance expert, Sir E. Miller, and an American irrigation engineer were recruited. The Board, in which Arshad al-'Umari seemed likely to be the leading figure, was in

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[1] This was modified in 1952 by amending legislation which provided for the Board's retention of 70 per cent. of oil revenues and the allotment of 30 per cent. to 'general revenues': an arrangement which wisely permitted the devolution to provincial authorities of many smaller development works and services.

[2] The Board, however, was soon under attack by part of the press, irresponsible and malicious as ever, for having failed in a few weeks to 'raise the standard of life of the masses'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 647 1951 establishing its programme for the ensuing five years and allotting an expenditure of some ID 155 million[1] within that period; but it became apparent soon afterwards that revenues in excess of this would, under revised oil agreements (p. 376) be available. It was at this stage clear to all that the acquisition of this copious revenue, which in the absence of some suicidal folly or grave misfortune would accrue punctually and reliably for many years, must completely transform 'Iraq's economy and rate of evolution. Its history indeed from 1951 onwards should be that of a territory extraordinarily favoured in all that appertains to, or can flow from, the resources at the disposal of its Government. Its curse had for centuries been poverty; thanks to its discovered and exploited oil deposits, it stood now at the threshold of an era of abundant wealth; and this must, besides its blessings, bring accompanying responsibilities, stresses and dangers, both moral and economic.

432 [457] The territory's immediate trade balance, which future opulence would doubtless affect, still showed in 1951 its habitual deficit. This was compensated partly by drawing upon the war-time sterling balances, and partly by invisible items as of old. The country's imports were, as ever, principally those of cotton, woollen, and silk textiles: iron, steel, and machinery: electrical goods: vehicles: tea, coffee, and sugar: chemicals, cement, and timber. Nearly half of these were provided by Great Britain, with India, the United States, and Belgium as other main suppliers and to a lesser extent Italy, Holland, and France; Germany and Japan had disappeared from the list of providers. Exports, which the country's evolution had left little changed over many years, were still those almost exclusively of its agricultural and natural products. Exported barley amounted to a yearly average of some 250,000 tons, wheat was shipped occasionally but irregularly—and not at all between 1940 and 1949; maize, millet, and oil-seeds (cotton, sesame, and linseed) were usually available in small quantities. The co-ordinating authority for all grain exports was the para-statal Grain Board and, working with it, an Agricultural Export and Import Company. Dates, to the important yearly extent of some 250,000 tons, were dispatched to more than forty countries. Cotton had disappeared after 1941, but crept back into the export list in 1947. Other items in the slight volume of exports were animals driven to the Levant countries, wool sent to France and America, and hides and skins, gums and gall-nuts consigned to various countries. Hopes that tobacco might be added to this list depended upon improvement in the structure and products of the local tobacco industry. New

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[1] The provision for 1951 was to be (in thousands of dinars) 9,364: of 1952, 20,460: of 1953, 28,390: of 1954, 31,600: of 1955, 32,335: of 1956, 33,225.

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 439
'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry, and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the 453
exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies, and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the 436
National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and 241
was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. [162]
Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi
farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to 185
solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting. New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in
185 operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize
and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those
473 of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of
export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices,
throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension
granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the
last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year
would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist.
Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the
Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers
and exporters.

654 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-year
242 course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for
agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya
185 (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at
Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry
station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected,
tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield,
quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust campaigns
in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world:
caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another
and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many
centres. The department was in touch with local industry which
could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley,
beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments
in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would
diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intolerably
[474] wasteful. It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative
societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspectorate,
and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself
in rural education and established agricultural schools in every
[381] liwā. It was promoting village settlement, in which field the interesting
and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323)
was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the
Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board
allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six
years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechanization
of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of
depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly
under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all
the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties
of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of
a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under
controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

power as its chief limiting factor. Attention was being given to 154 the increase and improvement of livestock, a major asset of the 242 country; Ayrshire and Friesian bulls were imported and distributed, rams from a selected herd were sold to reliable farmers, 185 laboratory work on wool was carried out. Yet other lines of progress were dairying, with experiments in cheese production, the breeding of improved mules and donkeys, the increase of egg production by improving poultry breeds. The allotment by the Development Board for the period 1951–6 was nearly 2 million dinars for agricultural research, 3½ million for small-scale reclamation schemes, 1¼ million for animal husbandry, and a million for swamp reclamation. The need for a measure of integration between animal husbandry and crop production, hitherto divorced, was realized, as well as the broad essential singleness of the effort which must be made in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, land settlement, rural education, and the provision of capital. It seemed certain as the nineteen-fifties opened that if this effort were made and sustained by public and Government, and in the absence of any general calamity, the prospects for agricultural development in this wide and favoured territory, within the ultimately fixed limits of its river-water and rainfall resources, exceeded those not only of any Middle Eastern country, but of any territory of comparable size elsewhere in the world; the growing of food for less fortunate nations could prove, indeed, to be the main part of 'Iraq's material contribution to humanity.

In the care of its forests not much had yet been accomplished 313 beyond the limits of study, experiment, and the establishment of 185 tree-nurseries; the wide but neglected forest areas (p. 29) of the north still lay untended and unimproved, lacking notably a modern forest code, a staff of trained foresters, and even detailed exploration. Some steps had indeed been taken to provide fire protection and to carry out by helicopter and air photography the first forest surveys, but few to prevent uncontrolled cutting, grazing, and trespass by the villagers. One million dinars were allotted by the Development Board for forestry development in 1951–6. The significance of these areas to soil erosion, silt deposit, and river flooding was understood, and plans were being prepared on these and allied matters; but only a beginning had been made to solve these problems or to move towards the large-scale action which must be involved, or to provide the 'Iraqi public with sources of fuel and timber at present lacking.

Although sea fishing, based on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, was but a 226 limited resource, the rivers and swamps of the territory were the source of a fish catch estimated at many thousands of tons a year, and export of fish to the Levant—and in particular to the Jews in

226 Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shatt al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

312 The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of
rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long
desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable.
[731] The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous
floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory
of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the
[647] resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were
supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

312 The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the
653 Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis
185 project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in
two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Duḳan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Isḥaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Board[1] at its early meetings in 1951 and they were, with possible 312
modifications, to form the basis of 'Iraq's future irrigation activity, 653
whose full realization, however, must, for all the impatience of the 185
public and the press, occupy not less than fifty years.

Works actually completed before the end of 1951 were the realigned Ḥabbaniya inlet (Warrar channel) and the return outlet to the river (Sinn al-Ḍhibban channel), ensuring flood protection and making possible the use of stored flood water. The Wadi Tharthar inlet channel—a work of very great magnitude—was put to tender by the Development Board in 1951; the Samarrā barrage and headworks, and the greater Ḥabbaniya scheme, were to follow later. Much detailed planning and designing remained to be done, even for the immediately following five years, before a programme, especially in lower 'Iraq—'Amara, Baṣra, and the Gharraf—could be established. The extent, however, to which the Willcocks plans of forty years earlier had stood all tests was indeed remarkable. Only the Faluja and Balad barrages (p. 63) had been abandoned, and development in the Baṣra–Ḥammar area might or might not in the end follow Willcocks's plans. The abiding problem of silt deposit appeared partly soluble, by improved headwork design and by mechanical clearance. Pump irrigation seemed by now to have reached its economic limit in much of the territory, but there was ample room for more intensive cultivation of the pump-lands.

The connexion of reasonable and stable forms of land tenure 423
had long been recognized by Government in its land-settlement 565
activity, and the latter had a creditable volume of achievement to show after eighteen years of sustained effort. Early criticism of the procedures adopted (p. 261) and the progress of the work itself throughout 'Iraq (p. 323) have been elsewhere described. Five more years' work since the end of the war had defined, delimited, and recorded the personal rights in other wide areas. The abiding problem of Muntafiq land rights had not yet been solved; in 'Amara an answer not very different from the *status quo*, but with longer-term security for the shaykhs and greater fragmentation was likely to be found. Elsewhere the hard case of the landless fallaḥ was little changed wherever he had been unable to establish a basis of title and, at the opposite extreme, the good fortune of

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[1] The Board's six-year plan, legalized early in 1952, provided for year-by-year expenditure, from 1951–6 inclusive, on the Tharthar project, to a total of (in thousands of ID) 10,300: on the Ḥabbaniya, 2,200: on the Diyalā dams and canalization, 6,750: on the Dukan dam, Ḥawija barrage, 'Ud̲h̲aym barrage and canalization, 6,750: on the Bakhma dam, 8,700: on irrigation works in Mosul and Arbil liwās, 1,900: Tigris barrage and canalization, south of 'Ud̲h̲aym mouth, 1,800: and main drainage, 4,100. New and re-formed canalization on the middle and lower Euphrates, lower Tigris and Gharraf, and Baṣra area were allotted 10,425.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

423 those to whom mere shaykhly birth or recent business enterprise
565 had brought title-deeds was obvious and envied. There was indeed room for criticism on various lines. The Government had parted with its right of free disposal of wide lands hitherto legally unencumbered though in fact occupied; this might obstruct later development plans. Vested interests had been over-generously recognized: land reform on an equalitarian pattern was, as the left wing of Baghdad politicians (and some foreign observers) insisted, as far off as ever. Nevertheless, within the limits of society and economics as they were, a great work of stabilization had been done. Disputes were few, confidence had been increased, and a return to the pre-settlement conditions of agrarian jungle law was unthinkable. For both the small and the large holding, for peasant-proprietorship, the capitalist's scientific farm, the Land Development Company and large-scale Government enterprise on its own vast unencumbered estates, there was clearly room in the 'Iraq of the future.

433 Though the limits within which industry was likely to develop were by the mid-century well understood, not least by the Director-General and the Committee for Industrial Research, there had been a measure of expansion during the last five years. The legal basis for its encouragement, which was the policy of every successive Ministry, had been altered by the cancellation of the 1929 law and of licences issued under it in favour of a new law of 1950. The latter granted important privileges to undertakings which were power-operated, employed 90 per cent. or more of local workers, cost at least ID 5,000 to erect, and used more than half 'Iraqi capital. By 1951 thirty-five projects had been accepted as fulfilling these conditions, and the Industrial Bank made loans to a number of them. Of the industrial output of such enterprises some was on the humblest scale and of slight interest; such was the production of sweets, macaroni, date-treacle, articles made in Kurdish marble, ceramics, wax matches, buttons, reprocessed glass, unglazed tiles, and aluminium pots. Manufactures on a less inconsiderable scale were those of flour, vegetable oils, cardboard and wrapping paper (made from wheat and rice stalks), soap, knitted goods, sausages and preserved meat, methylated spirits, 'araq, concrete pipes, plastics, steel windows, and tubular furniture. An earlier brewery having failed, a modern brewery using local barley began the production of excellent beer in 1949. An ambitious enterprise for the manufacture of jute gunny-bags was in course of establishment. Brickworks had continued to develop on modern lines, and were capable of meeting all local needs. 'Iraqi cigarettes had gone far to supply the country's smokers, from modernized as well as hand-operated workshops; only Kurdish-grown tobacco was used.

Much progress had been made, under the care of a Hides Association, in the better treatment of local hides and skins, and well-tanned leather was produced. 433
Boot and shoe manufacture, largely by electrically-operated machinery, had increased in scale and quality. The cement factory outside Bahgdad, using lime brought from near Ṭuz Khurmatu, came into important production in 1949 and was soon selling 250 tons a day. The three cotton ginneries erected before the war—one of them an Agricultural Bank enterprise at 'Aziziya—remained in being, with capacity to deal with much more than the available cotton crop. Printing presses, all small except one European-owned and that of the Government, remained substantially as before the war, save in their modernized equipment. The spinning and weaving industry, which in some cases also dyed and finished its fabrics, had by 1950 greatly increased its pre-war development and used in part local cotton; a factory in Mosul made also rayon cloth.

Other industrial projects more or less near to realization in 1950 were for rayon production from straw, for local production of fertilizers, and for sugar-refining. The treatment of tobacco leaf had been intensively studied, but remained defective. The industries likely, it was thought, to develop further, using 'Iraqi raw materials and diminishing the need for import, were those producing cement, soap, alcohol, vegetable oil, leather and shoes, cigarettes, beer, and textiles. The other industries would in all probability keep a lesser though perhaps a useful place; none was likely to produce a considerable surplus for export, unless, as some hoped, an industry could be founded to use, for fertilizers or otherwise, the abundant by-products of petroleum. The Development 185
Board intended considerable expenditure on 'industrial and mining 316]
schemes' in the period 1951 to 1956, upon lines to be later revealed.

'Iraq's poverty in minerals other than petroleum seemed in part 135
to have been corrected by the discovery, in the later forties, of 317
interesting copper and copper pyrites deposits in the mountainous Qal'a Diza area, and by reports from the Government geologist of an outcrop of excellent marble near Rayat and supplies elsewhere of chromite, iron ore, magnesite. These, or some of them, were thought capable of commercial development. A hard limestone suitable for barrage building was sought and found. Local salt, gypsum, brick clay, Mosul building-stone, and cement-making materials were in use as before, and it was planned to renew the activity which during the war had produced up to 15,000 tons a year of Kifri 'coal'.

In spite of the imposed delays and frustrations of the war period 382
the position achieved in the petroleum industry by 1950 was such as to place 'Iraq in the forefront of oil-producing countries, with

the promise or certainty that still greater developments were closely at hand. The project of a Government-built refinery, revived in 1945, was by the end of 1950 near to fulfilment with plans completed and funds available. The Khaniqin Oil Company's oilfield and small refinery, at Naftkhana and Khaniqin, were still in use on the restricted scale suited to the supply of products to northern and central 'Iraq; distribution of these throughout the country by the Rafidain Company showed no new feature until in 1951 supplies from Abadan ceased to arrive at Baṣra, and others from the north had, with difficulty and cost, to be improvised. The development work of the Mosul Petroleum Company—former B.O.D. reborn as a twin brother of the Iraq Petroleum Company—on the Upper Tigris right bank was pursued from 1947 onwards by the drilling of further wells at 'Ayn Zala and its neighbourhood, but revealed only a field of moderate dimensions and uncertain performance: it had not yet led—but under the B.O.D. concession must shortly lead—to commercial production. A pipeline from 'Ayn Zala to the I.P.C. pump station K.2 near Bayji was in 1950–1 under construction with a view to the export of M.P.C. oil thereby. In the Baṣra area, on the other hand, the B.P.C. had eagerly resumed its exploration after the war; after geophysical operations it started drilling at Nahr 'Umar and Zubayr with immediate success, and concentrated its exploitation upon the latter site, which was situated twelve miles south-west of Baṣra. Further wells were drilled, field installations erected, a pipeline to Fao laid in 1950, and the export of oil, at an initial rate of 2 million tons a year, became possible in the last days of 1951. The Zubayr oilfield, which might well be reinforced by others in the same province, would take its place as a valuable part of 'Iraq's resources.

The operations of the Iraq Petroleum Company itself after the war were still more impressive. The later war years witnessed no more than limited production under restricted war-time conditions and the resumption after 1943 of export to the Mediterranean was on the pre-war level barely exceeding 4 million tons a year. After the armistice, with the gradual removal of restrictions on supplies and man-power, the Company could effectively revive its 1938 project for multiplying its pipeline through-put, and in 1946 it began construction of a 16-inch pipeline[1] parallel to the existing 12-inch line from Kirkuk to Haifa, and another a few months later to Tripoli. The former, complete by early 1948 save for the section through Palestine, was perforce left unfinished in the conditions of war and future uncertainty which followed the establishment of the State of Israel in May of that year, and, with the 12-inch line, could not be operated; the cost to the 'Iraq Government was a loss of nearly 7 million tons of through-put annually and a corresponding loss of royalty revenue. 382 On the northern line to Tripoli, the construction of the 16-inch line was completed in mid-1949; export from Tripoli was thereby trebled and raised 'Iraqi export production to nearly 7 million tons a year. Less than a year later the Company undertook the building of a much greater pipeline, of 30-inch diameter. Designed to run from Kirkuk to the sea coast at Banyas in Syria (an alignment parallel to that of the 12- and 16-inch lines except at its western extremity) it would deliver 'Iraqi oil to the world's markets at a rate of some 14 million tons a year at its lowest rate of through-put, or much more with increased pumping installations.[1]

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[1] The largest-diameter pipe then obtainable from sterling sources.

These extensions of the pipeline system were accompanied by important increases to the pumping plant and facilities at seven pumping stations on both sides of the point of bifurcation near Ḥaditha, and in the Kirkuk field itself. The development of the latter was carried out in its northern extension in Arbil liwā, beyond the Lesser Zab, by an active drilling campaign and the manifold operations which accompany it. With drilling went the provision of gathering lines, tankage, additional de-gassing stations, new units in the Stabilization Plant, new administrative and domestic buildings, workshops, stores, depots, laboratories, electric-power plant, and water lines. 'Iraqis were fortunate in their certainty that, in the development of the great wealth in their soil, the most modern and economic methods were being adopted without waste of or danger to its resources. The needs of the labour [466] force were met by the initiation of a modern housing estate for 'Iraqi employees, canteens, sports grounds, transport to and from work, allowances and pay-revisions to meet the high cost of living, a savings fund, hospital extensions, and technical education both in 'Iraq and in the United Kingdom. In spite of the psychological, the material, and the (artificially fostered) 'political' difficulties inseparable from the presence of an advanced industrial enclave in a primitive economy of peasants, the living and working conditions of the oil workers were, while less than perfect, undoubtedly the best in contemporary 'Iraqi industry: and they were undeserving of the blatantly mendacious attacks, common in Baghdad newspapers, on the horrors of oil company employment and the brutality of the foreign exploiter. The industry brought also sub- [511] stantial indirect benefits to the public in local purchases and contracts, the increase of purchasing power, the provision of foreign exchange, the teaching of industrial skill, and the performance of valuable and costly services to Kirkuk municipality. It could in

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[1] The 30-inch line, constructed at great speed, came into initial operation in the late spring of 1952.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

382 1951 be anticipated that the continued presence and enlarged operations of the oil companies would remain an outstanding economic and social advantage to the 'Iraqi people: that, especially after the destruction of the great oil industry of Persia by the action of its Government, 'Iraq's position as a supplier of crude petroleum must give it an international importance greater than ever before: but also that the minds and emotions of local patriots, for whom the Persian tragedy had no terrors and no lesson, would not abandon the demand for a 'nationalization' which might or might not (according to its form and manner) permit the continuance of the industry. It was indeed clear that the presence in 'Iraq of successful, wealthy, and well-organized European enterprises with their foreign control, high living standards, and concession-granted privileges must, however correct their conduct and however enlightened their policy, be offensive to the nationalist sentiment of at least one school of local politicians; and the period during which oil development on these lines might be able to continue could not, for all its enormous advantages to the country, be confidently foreseen.

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Meanwhile, to the 'Iraqi Treasury its receipts from oil sources were no longer a mere helpful supplement to other revenues but a main pillar of the Government itself and the foundation of all its hopes of development and improvement. The anxiety of 'Iraqi statesmen to derive still greater revenues from the oil industry than those provided in the 1925 or 1931 concessions—4 shillings (gold) per ton—and their claim that 'gold' should be translated into sterling at unofficial open-market rates led from 1947 to 1951 to repeated discussions between Government and Company. The gold question of which the Company, at 'Iraq's request, agreed in 1949 to allow settlement by a British Court rather than by arbitration, remained still unsettled when the period closed, with indications that the Baghdad Government intended still to press its full claims.[1] The question of royalty revision resulted in 1950 in a partly retroactive and conditional agreement to raise the 4 shillings gold per ton to 6 shillings gold; but this increase, immediately helpful as it was to the 'Iraq Treasury, was in turn to be superseded by further and long-drawn negotiations based on a new principle of half-and-half division of the profits: a principle which, first announced by the Arabian-American Company in Sau'di Arabia on the last day of 1950, could not but abruptly supersede all less favourable terms enjoyed by neighbouring countries. Conversations on this basis were in progress in Baghdad between Company

[1] These might amount to some £20 million sterling. Agreement upon a compromise figure (£5 million) was reached by the negotiators in 1951, but did not form part of the settlement ratified by Parliament early in 1952.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Government throughout the first half of 1951 and were to 651
embrace the production obligations of all the companies operating 648
in 'Iraq and the royalties or taxes expected from them.[1] Under the 471
influence of the 'nationalization' movement—but in more moderate form than the brutal self-mutilation of Persia—the 'Iraq Government decided in 1951 to nationalize the refining and distribution of its oil in so far as this was consumed in 'Iraq itself: the operation, that is, of the Khaniqin and Rafidain Oil Companies. Negotiations with these and with Anglo-Iranian, their parent, led to agreement on the basis that the Companies were to transfer their plant and assets to the State at a valuation, and to remain for ten years as operating agents on its behalf.

The Port of Baṣra in the period 1946–50 maintained and sub- 504
stantially improved its services—wharves and sheds, cranes and machinery—and, in spite of the increased cost of labour and supplies, could show a profit on each year's operations. It continued annually to pay off its capital debt, completing that process in 1951. It maintained and largely increased its electric-power and water supplies to Baṣra city. The airport, with its wireless service and its enlarged hotel, remained Port property. The dredging-depot at Fao was extended, an all-weather road constructed to link it by land to Baṣra. A shore depot was built at Ḥarmaq, opposite Abadan. The traffic using Ma'qil wharves decreased abruptly from the level of the previous five war years, but the tanker traffic of the Anglo-Iranian increased, until the spring of 1951, more than sufficiently to compensate for this. The development of a subsidiary port at Umm Qaṣr, on the Khur 'Abdullah, was a

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[1] The new Oil Agreement, based on acceptance in August 1951 of the principle of equal division of profits between Government and Company, was ratified by Parliament in February 1952, and made retroactive to 1 January 1951. With the probable initial through-put (in a full year) of the 30-inch line (some 14 to 15 million tons a year) additional to the existing through-put (nearly 8 million) of the 12-inch and 16-inch lines to Tripoli, 'Iraq's revenues from this source were expected—on existing cost and price bases—to surpass £30 million in 1952 and to reach £60 million in 1955. Minimum production was agreed at 22 million tons a year (for I.P.C. and M.P.C. combined) from 1954 onwards, and 8 million from B.P.C. from the end of 1955. Government was assured that its receipts would be not less than a quarter of the seaboard value of I.P.C. and M.P.C. crude oil, and a third of that of B.P.C. Fluctuation of costs and of world oil prices was to be taken into account in ascertaining the divisible 'profits', and Government might, if it wished, take in kind 12½ per cent. of the crude produced, and either dispose of it or sell it back to the Companies. A large part of the balance of Government's revenue was to be received in the form of income tax. Minimum receipts to Government, guaranteed subject only to *force majeure*, were to be £20 million sterling in 1953 and 1954, and £25 million in 1955 and thereafter; in the event of a physically unavoidable failure in production a smaller minimum would be payable for two years. The Agreement covered in addition the doubling of 'Iraqi representation on the Boards of the Companies, restrictions on the appointment of non-'Iraqis to positions in the Companies, an increase (up to fifty per year) of 'Iraqis maintained in British universities for higher studies, and the extension of technical education organized by the Company in Kirkuk fields.

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

504 [503] considered project; and meanwhile, Fao bar-dredging operations, designed to maintain a low-water depth of 23 feet in a substantially widened Rooka channel, proceeded throughout 1943 to 1950. But heavy floods and consequent silt movement caused serious difficulties and, the existing channel proving barely maintainable, the project of a new channel re-aligned in terms of the changed sea-bed conditions was in 1951 under close consideration. To its realization—the more necessary since 'Iraq's own oil traffic from the Zubayr field was likely to increase many-fold—the loss of the rich Abadan tanker revenue was a serious impediment;[1] but in general the future of the vital Fao channel, and indeed that of the Port in general, was under wise and far-sighted review.

505 The tonnage of steamers using the Port was more than half—and in some years more than two-thirds—British, with Dutch, American, Greek, Swedish, and Norwegian shipping well represented. The establishment of an all-'Iraqi Shipping Company continued to be an object of ambition among the interested and the nationally-minded, as a means of undercutting the freight rates charged by foreign lines. The post of Port Director was assumed, after two short tenures, in 1947 by Colonel G. T. Johnson, and in 1951 by R. C. Kelt. Accelerated steps were taken from 1948 onwards for the training, largely in Europe, of 'Iraqis for all posts in the administration, including the highest: an 'Iraqi Port Director was a probability of the near future.

Though transport by the 'Iraq waterways had as ever its irreplaceable part both in the lives of the riverain towns and as a main Baṣra–Baghdad artery, available traffic did not permit—as for a generation it had not permitted, save in war-time—any considerable development of the Tigris steamships. Military transport ceasing with the war, and competition by road and rail and air ever increasing, the Euphrates and Tigris Company in 1946 disposed of most of its surviving fleet, including the *Zenobia*; and early in 1951 it went into voluntary liquidation and sold the bulk of its towing-units and barges to its principal local competitor, Ḥannā al-Shaykh. The latter and members of the Khudhayri family remained active on the river to fill the place which, after ninety years, was now abandoned as unprofitable by the Lynch enterprise.

496 499 The 'Iraq Railways, which had embarked in 1945 (p. 320) on important projects of construction, were faced also by a heavy programme of needed rehabilitation, improvement of services, and addition to rolling-stock. The five following years saw the com-

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[1] The action of the Persian Government in bringing its oil industry to a standstill involved, besides its own ruin, a loss of at least £1 million a year to the finances of Baṣra Port and its dredging scheme.

pletion of the Kirkuk–Arbil extension and its Lesser Zab bridge: 496
of the railway and road bridge[1] at Baghdad, opened late in 1950: 499
of the Musayib bridge leading to Karbalā: and of new stations at Ba'quba, Diwaniya, Naṣiriya and elsewhere. New rolling stock was ordered and by 1950 delivered. Progress was made in erecting a grandiose combined station and administrative headquarters at Baghdad West, and in redesigning the yards and depots there; but the high cost of these projects, the diminution of receipts by road and air competition (in spite of good traffic in grain and oilfield materials), and losses due to repeated river flooding rapidly exhausted the war-time surplus and led to the need to borrow first from Government in 1946, then from London—a loan of £3 million—in 1950, before supplies and contractors could be paid and work could proceed. [468] Working conditions in the railway system were disturbed by the strikes elsewhere mentioned in 1945, 1946, and 1949. [464] The Jewish employees of the traffic branch were replaced in 1949 by imported Pakistani staff, and the training of 'Iraqis to replace these and the few remaining British executives was accelerated. The status and composition of the Railway Board was unchanged, though criticized by the press as outdated and insufficiently 'national'. The post of Director-General was passed by H. C. Smith to W. J. Moffat in 1950, and an 'Iraqi, General Isma'il Ṣafwat, assumed the post in 1952.

'Iraq Airways was initiated by the Railway as a subordinate 509
enterprise in 1945, and started service in 1946 with five light aircraft hired from Great Britain. In the following year the hired aircraft were replaced by its own machines, and it extended its range from Baghdad–Baṣra outwards to Mosul, Cairo, and Damascus, and by 1948 could, thanks to reciprocal agreements, offer transport weekly or monthly to Teheran, Karachi, and Ankara. The service, to which British Overseas Airways Corporation acted as technical advisers and agents, was efficiently maintained but, thanks to competition and high costs, financially unprofitable. British, American, Dutch, French and other foreign airlines continued to use 'Iraqi airports. An expenditure of over ID 2 million on aerodromes formed part of the six-year development plan. The meteorological service, begun in 1936 in a single room, now maintained under the Ministry of Defence a dozen stations and many rainfall-observation posts, used its own wireless links, and broadcast weather reports for Baghdad area half-hourly.

Telecommunications had, by the close of the period, reached a 206
high standard. Trunk land-lines had been overhauled, often duplicated and widely extended; automatic telephone exchanges

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[1] The bridges were built by Messrs. Holloway Bros.; earthwork on the Kirkuk–Arbil line was handled by Messrs. Balfour Beatty.

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

206 existed in Baṣra and Baghdad and their suburbs; and the telephone and telegraph had become familiar or indispensable to all classes save the most backward. The new wireless transmitting station completed in 1951 at Abu Ghurayb, with the most modern design and range, secured communication with Europe and America and was used for the national broadcasting. The Development Board planned an expenditure of ID 2 million on telecommunications between 1951 and 1956.

499 Progress in road improvement was delayed during 1946–50 by the financial narrowness of the post-war years. This and bridge-building formed an important part of the projects[1] intended for realization in 1951–6 through the Development Board. The completion of this programme would fundamentally transform the conditions of transport and travel in 'Iraq, with far-reaching economic consequences. The 'Nairn route' to Damascus was still 491 in regular use; its traffic was highly organized, with air-conditioned vehicles, by the original company and its imitators. The Rawanduz road was little used; the tracks leading into Najd and Persia carried no important traffic; and the trunk route to Jordan or Palestine (p. 321) lost its value when the State of Israel blocked the sea-outlet it had offered.

5. TOWN AND COUNTRY, MID-CENTURY

161 The population of 'Iraq, declared by the census of 1947 to be 162 4,800,000, had by then doubled since the century opened. Its distribution[2] was in general unchanged as between towns, inlying villages, tribal country districts, and nomads; about a quarter were town-dwellers, a fifteenth nomads, the remainder settled cultiva- 311 tors. Wide areas of steppe desert and of barren mountain remained, as for the foreseeable future they must, almost uninhabited; the widest of such regions, those of the administratively separated northern and southern provinces of the Shamiya desert, amounted 161 to some two-fifths of 'Iraq's whole surface. The average density of population for the whole territory was of the order of eleven persons to the square kilometre, or, omitting the desert provinces, eighteen. The liwā with the greatest population was that of Baghdad with 800,000 people; next came Diwaniya, Muntafiq, and 'Amara. The greatest density was of 49 persons to the square

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[1] The projects considered as 'main roads', with their bridges, were estimated to cost: Baṣra–'Amara–Kut–Baghdad, ID 2,800,000: Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil, 2,500,000: Baghdad–Sharqat, 3,450,00. Elsewhere, ID 4,450,000 was allotted for 'mountain roads', 6,176,000 for miscellaneous bridges, 1,550,000 for a Ḥilla–Najf road, 1,300,000 for Ḥilla–Diwaniya–Shamiya, and 5,250,000 for numerous other routes.

[2] For distribution of the population by administrative units, see Appendix B.

kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by 16
Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanageable public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some 132 795
progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt— [771]
gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities.

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial— 563
within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—
692 a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included
697 a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

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[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

and mountain units, seemed to be well suited to its probable 701 internal duties; for service abroad, other than token or ceremonial, it was not at present adapted. Whether the leading spirits of the Army would in future resist the temptation to assert themselves not as servants but as masters of the State remained to be seen. There had been, in the ten years since the adventure of the Golden Square, no sign of repeating the coups of 1935 to 1941, or of imitating the Syrian Dictator-Colonels of the day. But the danger was real; the Army leaders lacked a sincere sense of service and subordination to the State, felt little respect for its civil institutions or solidarity with the public, and could not but be aware that there was no power anywhere to withstand them.

We turn now to the various elements of which 'Iraqi society was 619 composed. Among the true bedouin, still leading their hard, 511 hungry and unenvied lives, the visitor to their tents would find every scene and circumstance seemingly unchanged for the last five or fifty decades. The 'Aniza, the remoter Shammar, the Dhafir had little of novelty to show. Their extreme poverty forbade them any less primitive material equipment, and their social organization and isolation precluded almost every means of cultural progress. It was true that some greater bedouin shaykhs now owned motor-cars, carried wireless sets, and frequented towns, while their sons on occasion adopted an expatriate life of Western ways. It was clear also that the mechanized forces of Government now could penetrate the farthest areas of the *badiya*, that the ease of contact with Government had, since Turkish times, been helped by the use, in the Administration, of the language of the country instead of a foreign tongue known to no tribesman: that the tendency to settle family by family on the desert fringes of cultivation was not less, perhaps was greater, than it had ever been, and that Kurdish mountain nomadism was now restricted partly by the seductions of a sedentary life, partly by more sophisticated and less feebly enforced frontier restrictions. All these elements were operative, and had much diminished the nomad chieftains' power to defy Government or harass neighbours; but they had changed neither the manner and fashion of their existence nor its social or economic bases. Among the true nomads the tribal organization provided still the essential rallying unit, and the shaykhs or aghās would still be followed.

In the countryside of sedentary tribesmen, the continuity of outward appearance—scene, dress, dwelling, dialect, and food—half concealed the changes which fifty years had wrought. If the area occupied by tribal life had been locally reduced by the weakening of tribalism in the inlying villages, yet for the rest a first glance reveals a world seemingly unaltered from that of fifty years earlier:

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their
511 tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting
backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the
sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnutrition,
disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty
619 years since Independence, there had been change in directions
179 which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first
511 was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and
private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there
had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards
[177 security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it
was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census, police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally, detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries, lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures, while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself transitional and unformed—of the country at large and of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in 1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both 78
economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 311

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361
the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change,
if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it
was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, air-
less, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same
goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet
in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and
unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public
State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the
sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved
approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole
areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and
modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman
Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been
forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363
labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well
maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible.
Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362
or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor
and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building
was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-
registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for
outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365
service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—
supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been,
imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere
abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the
ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363
Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and
Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366
shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide
buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered
a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well
established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown
in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368
services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified
themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365
power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

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[1] The mausoleum of King Fayṣal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Basra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

511 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the moderniza-
tion and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle
362 classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes
than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise
above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private
life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their
domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of
interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two
177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance
and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more
generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much
ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now
562 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women
learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law,
followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work,
and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the
franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded
were still considerable, and included the households of many
leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families,
by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western
type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop
[265] kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within
the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and
business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include
575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class profes-
526 sional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various
branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered [575] by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526 survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in 'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling, was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America. Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542 well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the 484 poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying 369 the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529 summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in 212 the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world 178 upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts, easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development, an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted, was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of 1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology 814 apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

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[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

814 antiquities, Kurdish lore and tribal traditions, some of whom had
produced monographs of interest and value. Returning graduates
from foreign universities had reached, at the least, the standard
indicated by their doctorates, but few had been attracted by the
deeper or more humane culture of the West. The study of Islamic
dogma and history was still practised in both Sunni and Shi'ī
circles of the professional divines, and still attracted pupils; but its
seeming divorce from the living world repelled the more active and
vital of the rising generation; it offered a career less interesting
than the professions or politics; and its appeal was without force to
a society in which Islam seemed to have lost much (and in politics
874 nearly all) of its hold. Professional standards, on the other hand, in
medicine, archaeology, police and military studies, engineering,
economics, and the applied sciences had risen beyond comparison
above those of a generation earlier, and gave scope for the best
qualities of the 'Iraqi mind.

538 The output of original literary work was small. The modern
(linotype) presses installed since the Second World War produced
[213] mainly governmental or institutional works or pamphlets, largely
educational. Western publishing methods were not in use; books
[214] were printed at the author's expense and sold with difficulty
through a bookseller; workmanship in book production, especially
in binding and illustration, was notably poor. The lack of demand
(especially after the Jewish exodus), the unwillingness of the rich
to patronize letters, and at times a capricious censorship, had discouraged
writers; there were but humble traces of creative effort,
and these confined to the fields of poetry (in which 'Iraq had always
held its own in the Arab world) and to a lesser extent of fiction
writing; women writers had earned a place in both. Interest in
contemporary Arabic literature other than newspapers was slight,
and the study of earlier Arabic works, though regarded as something
of a national asset, did not greatly attract a younger generation,
who preferred the writings of modern Europe. The dozen of
204 monthly or quarterly magazines, which appeared at Ḥilla, Mosul,
Baṣra, Najf, Arbil, and Kirkuk as well as at Baghdad, were in most
cases the organs of various societies or government departments,
and though competently written they had few subscribers and no
great literary pretension. Kurdish literary activity, though on a
diminutive scale, was of vitality and promise. 'Iraqi artists, on the
532 other hand, were producing work of some interest, if almost wholly
Western in inspiration; musical and dramatic studies were pursued
533 at the Institute of Fine Arts, and more than one 'Iraqi musician—
and at least one 'Iraqi cinema actress—had attained a creditable
place.

204 The circumstances of its public life and the lively intelligence of

its educated class should have made the 'Iraqi press both high in 204 quality and great in influence. It was, in fact, superabundant in quantity, with dozens of ephemeral sheets appearing and vanishing, and it was written not infrequently with point and humour; but [461] journalism had on the whole, it seemed, failed to attract the best minds and brains of the country, and as a profession was ill regarded by the public. With rare exceptions[1] inconsistency was habitual, and the selection and presentation of news capricious and unskilful and lacking in Western—or even Egyptian or Lebanese—technique. A news-service was scarcely attempted, and mere political rhetoric and the wearisome use of outworn phrases took the place of fact, analysis, or sober comment. Broadcasting from 207 Radio Baghdad, which after 1951 used the new and fully modern transmitting station of Abu Ghurayb, offered daily a ten-hour Arabic, a three-hour Kurdish, and a one-hour or half-hour English programme. The service, though still uneven, ~~had~~ improved materially in recent years in editing and in reliable audibility. It was aided by some of the best among 'Iraqi writers, and was rich in its Arabic musical programme; but frequent administrative changes had affected its quality and continuity, and many listeners preferred to hear foreign stations, notably London, Paris, and the *Sharq al-adnā* station of Cyprus.

The educational system operating in 1950 represented, with 871 whatever shortcomings, the considerable outcome of a sustained and meritorious effort. An immense work lay ahead: but the period of slow and difficult beginnings lay behind, and ground was being yearly gained. The faults of 'Iraqi education were those of superficiality, impatience, indifferent standards, and the persistent infusion—unchecked by legal prohibitions—of 'politics' in the schools. Its virtues were those of genuine enthusiasm, the use of modern techniques, and much improved teaching and supervisory staffs. Many and better school buildings were, it was hoped, soon to follow. Instruction was free at all levels, the governing Regulations modernized, and primary education in theory compulsory. The High Council of Instruction, representative of all the higher institutions of learning, assisted the Minister and his Directors-

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[1] The best of the papers were two or three independents, notably *al-Zaman* and *al-Sha'b* and those associated with the political parties. The latter were the moderate *al-Ittiḥad al-Dasturi*, *al-Akhbar*, and the evening *al-Ḥawadith* of the Constitutional Union Party: *al-Umma* and *al-Nabā*, of the Socialist Party of the Nation; *Liwā al-Istiqlal*, of the Independence Party: the near-Communist *Ṣadā al-Ahali*, of the National Democratic Party: and the *Jabha al-Sha'biya*, of the Popular Front. These papers appeared in 1951 to be fairly stable and self-supporting and, being party organs, relatively immune from Government suppression. Provincial daily papers included three (and often more) each at Baṣra and Mosul, and others at Sulaymaniya and Kirkuk, in the languages there spoken; they attained a fair standard.

871 General in policy and co-ordination. Female education had secured equal rights with male; of 6,000 primary teachers in the Government schools, nearly a third were women, and a similar proportion among the secondary and higher teachers. Between government and private (including foreign) schools of all grades not less than 200,000 children were being educated, a figure annually and rapidly increasing. A small remnant only of the Jewish schools remained in existence; that of the Alliance Israélite had been closed. The Tafayyudh Society, founded in 1919 as a popular non-political educational body, continued its work to combat illiteracy and maintained its printing-press. Students still enjoyed important exemptions and privileges in their military service obligation.
874 Vocational schools covered technical instruction, domestic science, agriculture, public health, and police duties. The teachers' training facilities had been increased in 1949 by additional training classes instituted at a number of existing secondary schools, and standards had been raised. The university, in spite of repeated
873 expert recommendations, was still an unrealized project; but higher education was available at the Law School, the Engineering College founded in 1942 and broadened in 1951, the Royal College of Medicine with its associated schools of Pharmacy and Nursing, the College of Agriculture, the College of Arts and Sciences founded in 1949, the Institute of Fine Arts, the College of Commerce and Economics founded in 1951, the Royal Military Academy and Royal Staff College, and the Higher Police Training School. Considerable numbers of pupils attended European or American universities; these would increase with the greater funds which were soon to become available and with the development of oil company programmes of technical and scientific training. Public libraries existed at every liwā headquarters.

172 The department of Antiquities had continued to develop its admirably enriched Museum (which it was soon to exchange for more adequate premises), to deal with the learned world, and to conduct or supervise the excavation of ancient sites. In the period from 1946–50 expeditions from the department were active at Tall Abu Shahrayn, near Ur: on the lower Diyalā: in the Arbil plain: in the neighbourhood of Chamchamal and of Sulaymaniya: and at Ḥadhr near Sharqaṭ. Expeditions from American seats of learning—Chicago, Pennsylvania, Harvard—dug at sites in the district of Kirkuk, in those of Chamchamal and Baradost in Kurdistan, and near 'Afak on the middle Euphrates, and a mission of the British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq excavated for three seasons at Nimrud. The work of these scholars of whatever nationality drew, with great goodwill, the attention of the academic world to 'Iraq's archaeological wealth and present fortunes. Both

the American School of Oriental Research founded in 1923 and the 172
British School founded in 1929 maintained headquarters in Baghdad,
and both published the results of their researches.

In the field of Public Health the Government services had 744
achieved much, but not the impossible. They had faced an immense 164
field to cover and to conquer, had started from nothing, and
had been always restricted by lack of funds and trained officials;
and meanwhile, inevitably, the disease- or weakness-producing
factors in the territory, and the apathy and conservatism of its
people, continued. The problem of general malnutrition and
resulting lack of physical vigour was, in fact, the problem of
poverty: the cure, still distant, lay as much or more in increased
wealth as in increased enlightenment; and the same was true, in
spite of active and multiplying maternity and child-welfare clinics,
of an infant death-rate still tragically high. Little, save increasingly
comprehensive and practical study, had yet been done to combat
the curse of hookworm, malaria, or bilharzia; a comprehensive
effort against these diseases and against tuberculosis, eye-disease,
and the typhoid group must call insistently for more time, more
funds, and more specialized staff. Steps taken against epidemic
disease had been successful; plague and cholera had scarcely
appeared for a quarter-century, and smallpox was well handled with
full modern resources. Urban sanitation had been improved, [364]
sewage schemes adopted, and sanitary inspector training developed;
but conditions in this respect over most of the territory remained
wholly primitive, and the majority of 'Iraqi doctors were little
interested in public health administration. The country at large 743
was served by some eighty hospitals, of which three-quarters were
general and a quarter specialized for fevers, mental and venereal
diseases, leprosy (at 'Amara), children's and chest and eye diseases;
a quarter of the whole were in Baghdad. Non-governmental
hospitals were those of the oil companies, foreign missions, and the
minority communities. The Jewish Mir Elias Hospital was still
open, for patients of all creeds; all other Jewish hospitals and dispensaries
had been closed. The Railways, the Port, the Police, and
the Army maintained their separate Medical services. The supply 759
of doctors, thanks to the Royal Medical College, had much
improved since the thirties, but some reliance on foreigners was
still necessary; some thirty of these were so employed in 1951 and
recruitment of more was in progress. Registered practitioners in
all numbered some 300 in 1945, 420 in 1949. The reluctance of
'Iraqi doctors to serve in the remoter regions—or, indeed, elsewhere
than in Baghdad—was still an embarrassment. Nevertheless, 743
the busy and valued hospitals and dispensaries maintained in
all parts of 'Iraq were playing a major stabilizing as well as a

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

743 humanitarian part, and high hopes for the future could reasonably be formed.

6. THE STATE

000 The closing pages of this work will be given to a review of 'Iraq's relations in the mid-twentieth century to its neighbours and to the world at large, and to the structure of its public life.

648 The record of the League of Arab States had by 1950 been written in terms sadly reminiscent of other Leagues based on international concord: like the League of Nations and the United Nations organization itself, it had shown the extreme difficulty of co-ordinating national differences and asperities. Previous pages have described both the general factors unhelpful to Arab Unity, and the particular issues which since 1945 had led to cleavages; nor was the situation at the close of our period hopeful of the recovery of a consistent united front between the Arab States. If generous single gestures could still be made—the dispatch, for instance, of 'Iraqi forces to Damascus in the spring of 1951—and pacts of collective defence could be drafted, the pressure of national loyalties and interests and persistent antipathies must preclude, in the foreseeable future, anything more than occasional co-operation and the preservation of some façade of unity. The Powers, especially Great Britain, were currently accused by some of desiring complete or regional Arab Unity, by others of working to destroy it; either attitude was somehow a manifestation of imperialism. In fact, nations of the West seemed generally favourable to League solidarity in so far as it could promise to produce cohesion and stability in western Asia; but they were otherwise willing, or indeed forced, to leave the issue in the hands of the concerned nations. 'Iraq's leading part in inter-League politics and her lively interest in '*Aruba*, Arabism, wherever involved, were likely to be permanent features of her foreign policy, at the risk of distracting her rulers from domestic interests and demands far more important to the 'Iraqi masses.

In relations with Persia there was no reason to expect any change in the actual attitude prevailing on either side of the Perso-'Iraqi frontier; it would doubtless continue for many years to be one of bickering, even of antipathy, but also of the recognition of a broad common interest. Nor need relations with the Turkish Republic deteriorate in the absence of any particular clash of interests such as might, indeed, come into existence through tension caused by frontier troubles, or by interference with upper Euphrates or upper Tigris waters, or by a differing international alignment; the attitude of 'Iraq was in 1950 one of guarded amity, least cordial among those pan-Arabists who feared the diversionary effect of non-Arab friendships.

The Middle East apart, the country had taken its place as a nation of the world,[1] and could not escape the responsibilities or dangers of such membership. Its attitude to the Soviet Union, behind a façade of correct diplomatic exchanges, was in fact determined by its rigorous attitude to local Communism, of which the Soviet Legation could not but be reckoned a main supporter. That Russia was powerful, expansionist, and a near neighbour was not unknown to the politicians, nor that Communism would be fatal to law and order as they conceived it, and to private property; but vigorous local anti-Communism did not prevent a substantial part of the political world from advocating strict neutrality as between Eastern and Western blocs. Indeed, an avowed pro-Western policy was not without its odium. The Palestine tragedy had seriously (and not surprisingly) lowered the respect in which the statesmanship, and even the honour, of the West was held by Arab peoples. The West included Great Britain, and to some political 'Iraqis rancour against that country was the mainspring of their policy, even while others, perhaps the more sober and experienced, felt that their country would be safest with powerful and familiar though regrettably imperfect friends. It included France, not forgiven for her twenty years of illiberal rule (as it was felt to be) in Syria, her surrender of Alexandretta and her alleged colonialism in North Africa. It included the United States, outstandingly the pro-Zionist Power and one who by her present commitments in the oil development of the Arab world could no longer claim as of old to be disinterested. It was natural that by reaction from a West thus constituted and thus suspected of 'imperialist' ambitions, many 'Iraqis were prepared to belittle the world dangers of the time, to assume that blameless neutrality would bring security in a third world war, and to shake their heads over offers of joint Defence Pacts with the Western bloc. Others, going further, found attraction in a specifically Eastern orientation; they took seriously the value of Arab League military unity, found inspiration in Islamic Economic Conferences at Karachi and Teheran, or wished

[1] 'Iraq in 1951 maintained Embassies at London, Washington, and Teheran: Legations at Delhi, Karachi, Paris, Brussels, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, 'Amman, Cairo, Rome, Kabul, Moscow, and Jidda: Consulates-General at Bombay, New York, and Istanbul: Consulates at Khorramshahr, Kirmanshah, and Aleppo.

Foreign Embassies in Baghdad were the British, United States, and Persian: Legations, the Afghan, Sa'udi Arabian, Egyptian, Spanish, French, Italian, Lebanese, and Russian. A Belgian and a Greek Minister accredited to 'Iraq were resident at Beirut, and 'National' Chinese, Danish, Swedish, and Czech Ministers at Teheran.

Outside Baghdad, British and Persian Consulates-General were maintained at Başra: a Persian Consulate-General at Sulaymania: British Consulates or Vice-Consulates at 'Amara, Kirkuk, and Mosul: French, Pakistani, and Sa'udi at Başra, and Turkish at Mosul.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 to join with Pakistan and the Sa'dabad Powers in an Eastern bloc securely Islamic and free from all Western exigencies and 'imperialism'. It could not but seem clear to contemporary observers that 'Iraqi thinking on these matters lacked realism, and that in its bewildered hesitations, its willing involvement of foreign policy with domestic factions, its patent inability to stand alone against the dangers of the time, it was typical of small nations who cried indignantly for a 'complete independence' which, in the modern world, could exist only on most precarious sufferance, unless firmly allied to the defending power of stronger friends.

642 647 In internal administration, whereas the Turkish Government had exercised rarely more than a partial control never at one time operative over the whole country, and the 'Iraq Government in its earlier years could claim a wider but still not truly pervasive authority, in 1950 no surviving enclaves of non-government remained in desert or marsh or mountain. From Mudir to minister, from clerk to Director-General, the administration as an operating and governing machine could by that date face comparison with that of any comparable country, and might be thought superior to those of many longer-established nations. The period from 1930 to 1950 had done less than might have been feared to weaken or corrupt it, and had been survived with a lowering of standards which though considerable was not disastrous. If it had benefited from its three years of British rule and twelve more of discreet tutelage, yet it derived its merits primarily from the qualities of its own personnel: qualities which, common as it was for visitors and many 'Iraqis to deride them, were most appreciated by those who knew them best. The faults endemic in all bureaucracies, the relative newness of the machine, the discontinuity of its guiding Ministries, the paucity of experienced high executives, and occasional moral lapses: all these together failed to outweigh the good intentions, the intelligence and the honesty of the majority of civil servants. And the machine itself, the interrelation and subdivision of its parts, the control of departments and their relation to the district Governors, and of the latter to their Ministries and publics: all these had, after a mere thirty years, reached a state of tolerable efficiency adapted, as the Turkish régime never was, to the conditions of the territory.

642 With 'Iraq's remarkable natural advantages and resources, coming at last within sight of full development: with its benevolent and generally popular monarchy vested in an ancient royal house and its not inadequate governmental machine: and with the efforts of its society to evolve on modern lines by manifold borrowing from Western thought and method as well as technology, there was, indeed, a fair measure of hope for a stable as well as a pros-

perous future. To those who contrasted the space, life, wealth, and potentiality of the country with the misfortunes of some of its neighbours—the stark economic misery of Israel, the tragic self-destruction of Persia, the brief dictatorships of Syria, the corrupting wealth and now failing ruler of Sa'udi Arabia, the menace of over-population and the mob-brutality of Egypt—it seemed indeed that 'Iraq, its troubles in part surmounted, was well set in the way of security and advance. It could by an optimistic prophet be foreseen that, given a few years of tranquillity, a measure of harmony, and no unforeseen blows of fortune—in fact 'if all went well', as an earlier Treaty had stipulated—the nation would take without rival the lead among the Arab countries, and a respectable place in the wider international world.

But there was an alternative and less pleasing probability. It was, that the instability of which the last twenty years had given almost continuous illustration, might not after all be surmounted, but would continue to pervade the structure of 'Iraqi nationhood and prove the ruin of its people. In an age when Government can be seized and held by a dominant armed minority, it is the more necessary for a 'democratic' régime to base itself firmly upon a loyal and politically integrated public. In 'Iraq this had not been done: the merits of its Administration, and even the good intentions of much of its ruling and political class, could not, it was felt by the less hopeful observers, secure it from pervasive instability.

The phenomena of political life which seemed likely for many years to come to preclude the hope of a genuine democracy, have been elsewhere mentioned (p. 224) as prevailing in 1932; they prevailed scarcely less in 1950. The deputies were inadequately representative of the electorate, while the Ministry itself could and did ignore the deputies. The Cabinet, whose members were chosen by the Prime Minister and the Regent on lines of personal acceptability, was indeed normally a body of capable and eminent men; but it represented neither a parliamentary majority nor a stable body of principles, and the forty-seven Ministries for which the first thirty years of constitutional life had found room had fallen always by reason of internal quarrels, deadlock, or royal disfavour, never through organized public or parliamentary withdrawal of support. This was not parliamentary democracy, but Cabinet Government. The Chamber of Deputies was itself a body competent in debate, and full of experienced and intelligent members[1] but it was concerned to excess with factious controversy and, as regarded the majority of 'independent' deputies, was accustomed to conform to the wishes of the Government of the

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[1] All Jewish deputies and senators had resigned by 1950: a Governmental Committee was early in 1952 considering their future representation, if any.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 day. It did not regard itself as the battleground of rival policies, nor, as under the Constitution it should be, as the arbiter of Ministries which, on the contrary, enjoyed an almost independent existence. At the same time by their manner of two-stage Government-controlled election, and by the wide gulf between most of the deputies and their constituents, the activity of the former was almost independent of the electorate: a position reflecting not so much defects in the Constitution as the backwardness of an illiterate electorate capable neither of exercising an enlightened free choice in selecting its spokesmen, nor of controlling them when selected. And even should the political parties occupy the Mutaṣarrif's place as the effective selectors of deputies, and electoral processes be basically altered (as opposition parties ceased not to demand), this situation in its essentials must still subsist for many years.

665 The working of parliamentary democracy which had been imposed on 'Iraq in its political infancy has seemed everywhere to demand responsible parties to represent rival policies and therewith to contend for power. But these in 'Iraq, in a form adequate to their task, did not exist. These pages have indeed made many references to the parties which, after some years' intermission, came into existence in 1946 or thereafter. They were, by 1951, responsible for the greatest part of specifically political activity in the country, and their scale and perhaps their permanence had to some degree increased by comparison with their predecessors of a generation earlier. The parties active at the mid-century, if we ignore the illegal Communist Party still working in the shadows, were five in number. One[1] of these, a party in little more than name, seemed to stand less for a policy or principle than for the personalities and hopes of a miscellaneous group of ex-ministers not unwilling to reappear in office. Two[2] of the parties, appealing to the more progressive elements in urban educated or intelligentsia circles, advocated rapid advance along many lines, with emphasis as ever on complete independence, neutrality, and social and cultural reform; they had a militant and indeed an over-violent press, and were able at times to arouse, but not to control, the emotion of the mob; but they had no considerable support from the mass of citizens. The two remaining parties were those of Nuri Sa'id (p. 355) and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr (p. 363), both standing for a mixed and various body of the possessing and substantially satisfied classes including notables, landowners, shaykhs, and their respec-

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[1] The United Popular Front of Ṭaha al-Hashimi (pp. 364 and 389). It showed, late in 1951, signs of disintegration.

[2] The National Democratic Party of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the Independence Party of Muḥammad Mahdi Kubba and Fa'iq Samarrā'i (pp. 335 and 336).

tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively 665
responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it 642
appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism 181
as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local 642
nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over- 186
sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the
186 chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses.
642 The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its
182 widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its
648x strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or 'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature: the loss of Fayṣal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young State, and had gravely unsettled it.

178 Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as
182 between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing, and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise, frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement,
000 tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-standards of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of which they were inescapably members, might allow.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

APPENDIX A

Comparative Table of Islamic (Hijra) and Christian Years, 1890–1955.

805

The 1st Muḥarram of each year of the Hijra (A.H.)—shown in col. I—falls on the Christian date shown in col. II.

I	*II*	*I*	*II*	*I*	*II*
A.H.	A.D.	A.H.	A.D.	A.H.	A.D.
1308	17 Aug. 1890	1331	11 Dec. 1912	1354	5 Apr. 1935
1309	7 Aug. 1891	1332	30 Nov. 1913	1355	24 Mar. 1936
1310	26 July 1892	1333	19 Nov. 1914	1356	14 Mar. 1937
1311	15 July 1893	1334	9 Nov. 1915	1357	3 Mar. 1938
1312	5 July 1894	1335	28 Oct. 1916	1358	21 Feb. 1939
1313	24 June 1895	1336	17 Oct. 1917	1359	10 Feb. 1940
1314	12 June 1896	1337	7 Oct. 1918	1360	29 Jan. 1941
1315	2 June 1897	1338	26 Sept. 1919	1361	19 Jan. 1942
1316	22 May 1898	1339	15 Sept. 1920	1362	8 Jan. 1943
1317	12 May 1899	1340	4 Sept. 1921	1363	28 Dec. 1943
1318	1 May 1900	1341	24 Aug. 1922	1364	17 Dec. 1944
1319	20 Apr. 1901	1342	15 Aug. 1923	1365	6 Dec. 1945
1320	10 Apr. 1902	1343	2 Aug. 1924	1366	25 Nov. 1946
1321	30 Mar. 1903	1344	22 July 1925	1367	15 Nov. 1947
1322	18 Mar. 1904	1345	12 July 1926	1368	3 Nov. 1948
1323	8 Mar. 1905	1346	1 July 1927	1369	24 Oct. 1949
1324	25 Feb. 1906	1347	20 June 1928	1370	13 Oct. 1950
1325	14 Feb. 1907	1348	9 June 1929	1371	2 Oct. 1951
1326	4 Feb. 1908	1349	29 May 1930	1372	21 Sept. 1952
1327	23 Jan. 1909	1350	19 May 1931	1373	10 Sept. 1953
1328	13 Jan. 1910	1351	7 May 1932	1374	30 Aug. 1954
1329	2 Jan. 1911	1352	26 Apr. 1933	1375	20 Aug. 1955
1330	22 Dec. 1911	1353	16 Apr. 1934		

Ramadhan, the month of fasting, is the ninth month of the Islamic year. The year has 354 days.

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1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

APPENDIX B

Table showing (1) *area and population of each liwā;* (2) *qadhās of each liwā, including H.Q. area;* (3) *area* (*sq. km.*) *of each qadhā;* (4) *population of each qadhā.*

631
162
361

Liwā	*Area in sq. km.*	*Population*	*Qadhās with* (1) *area,* (2) *population*
Baghdad	20,000	805,000	Baghdad (1,900: 552,000); Kadhimiya (1,100: 114,000); Samarrā (15,600: 91,000); Maḥmudiya (1,450: 48,500).
Mosul	48,000	602,000	Mosul (12,900: 340,000); 'Amadiya (2,700: 50,000); Zakho (2,250: 37,000); Dohuk (2,250: 40,000); 'Aqra (1,950: 32,000); Sinjar (16,900: 32,000); Shaykhan (1,400: 24,700); Tall 'Afar (8,250: 45,500).
Baṣra	12,300	352,000	Baṣra (4,700: 206,000); Abu al-Khaṣib (4,000: 81,000); Qurna (3,650: 65,000).
Kirkuk	19,900	286,000	Kirkuk (7,000: 148,000); Kifri (5,300: 48,000); Chamchamal (2,400: 30,000); Ta'uq (5,200: 59,000).
Arbil	18,400	240,000	Arbil (3,500: 86,000); Makhmur (3,500: 44,000); Keui Sanjaq (1,900: 31,000); Rawanduz (5,500: 46,000); Raniya (2,100: 27,000); Zibar (1,950: 6,600).
Sulaymaniya	9,400	223,000	Sulaymaniya (3,000: 77,600); Ḥalabja (3,100: 71,000); Shahribazar (2,000: 38,000); Pishdar (1,250: 35,600).
Dulaym (H.Q., Ramadi)	45,400	193,000	Ramadi (15,600: 111,000); Faluja (4,750: 49,000); 'Ana (25,000: 33,600).
Ḥilla	5,300	262,000	Ḥilla (960: 81,000); Hashimiya (1,900: 52,000); Hindiya (1,200: 82,000); Musayib (1,200: 46,000).
Kut	16,000	225,000	Kut (4,000: 82,000); Ḥai (3,000: 67,500); Badra (3,800: 16,200); Ṣuwayra (5,250: 59,250).
Karbalā	6,000	277,000	Karbalā (5,600: 150,000); Najf (400: 127,000).
Diwaniya	14,900	384,000	Diwaniya (1,800: 63,000); Samawa (4,700: 82,000); Shamiya (2,900: 114,000); Abu Ṣukhayr (1,300: 79,000); 'Afaq (4,200: 46,000).
Muntafiq (H.Q., Naṣiriya)	14,150	370,000	Naṣiriya (5,500: 111,000); Rifa'i (3,200: 82,000); Suq al-Shuyukh (3,800: 109,000); Shaṭra (1,600: 68,000).
Diyalā (H.Q., Ba'quba)	16,000	273,500	Ba'quba (2,050: 94,500); Khaliṣ (3,600: 69,000); Khaniqin (3,750: 57,000); Mandali (6,500: 53,000).
'Amara	18,750	308,000	'Amara (8,650: 184,000); 'Ali al-Gharbi (5,750: 36,000); Qal'at Ṣaliḥ (4,350: 88,500).
Northern desert province	94,700		Population nomadic, and included in adjacent liwās.
Southern desert province	75,700		

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

APPENDIX C

Sources of the Present Work

The historian of a recent or contemporary period, whatever his conscientious industry, must find it beyond possibility to quote specific authority for every statement, or even to indicate, otherwise than in general terms, all the sources from which his information is derived. He will be compelled to use the daily, weekly, and monthly presses of a dozen countries: parliamentary and international debates: compilations of statistics, Regulations, dispatches and White Papers: studies and monographs in many languages and on many allied subjects, and the published records of travellers and observers; these, with all their repetitions and varying values and relevancies, are among the too copious sources from which such a writer must disengage his material. He can offer no equivalent to the comprehensive and meticulous source-lists of the historian of ancient or medieval times. He can in his own references never achieve completeness, and he will confer no benefit on students by multiplying references beyond the essential, the significant, or at least the interesting. The bibliographical suggestions here following are, therefore, representative only of what the writer has found, in the languages known to him, to be of value; a great quantity of more or less relevant material is omitted. 000

One source does not appear in these lists at all—the slowly acquired body of observation and information which the writer's many years of residence in and personal acquaintance with 'Iraq in various, including official, capacities has put at his disposal. Without this, the present history would not have been undertaken. 114

The writer has used:

(*a*) Notes provided generously by friends, both 'Iraqi and British, who have recent and special knowledge of specific phases of 'Iraqi life or the work of Government Departments. Some of the names of these appear in the Preface. 113

(*b*) Compilations, reports, and monographs printed in English or Arabic by various departments of the 'Iraq Government or by its predecessor the British Occupation authority. These[1] deal with public health, provincial administration (1915–20), agriculture, surveys, archaeology, trade, education, finance, geology, irrigation, jails, police, law courts, the 'Iraq Levies, meteorology, tribes, posts and telegraphs, Port of Baṣra, public works, &c.

(*c*) The *'Iraq Government Gazette*, from 1920: Compilations of Laws, Proclamations, &c. (Government Press, Baghdad).

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[1] Examples in A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. xxvii–xxxi, and P. W. Ireland, *'Iraq*, pp. 479–89. For the period later than 1935 it has not proved possible to compile lists of comparable completeness; a few such publications are quoted in sections (*i*) and (*k*) below. The Annual Reports of some departments, such as 'Iraq Railways, are invaluable.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

113 For the period prior to 1914, the official Turkish *Vilayet Calendars*, for each of the three wilayas: various dates, not annual.

Statistical Abstract, published by the Ministry of Economics (Government Press, Baghdad) annually. This is invaluable.

(*d*) Cuttings from the British, French, and Italian presses, as maintained from 1921 onwards by the Press Archives of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

Extracts from 'Iraqi newspapers.

Before 1920, files of *The Times*.

(*e*) Magazine articles and news summaries[1] from (*inter alia*) the Royal Central Asian Society's *Journal**, *Oriente Moderno**, the *Near East*, *Great Britain and the East*, the *Geographical Journal*, *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain**, the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, the *Fortnightly Review*, *Contemporary Review*, *Correspondence d'Orient**, *Revue du Monde Musulman*, *National Review*, *World Affairs*, *International Affairs**, *Nineteenth Century*, *Asia*, *Foreign Affairs**, *Middle East Journal**, *Current History*, *International Labour Review*. A very few articles from these papers have been separately quoted in sections below.

Pamphlets and periodical publications of the Arab Offices (1946–9) in London and Washington, especially on the Arab League.

The series of brochures Facts and Prospects in 'Iraq (Arabic and English; New Publishers, 'Iraq, 1945).

(*f*) Parliamentary papers (Great Britain), for the period before 1914, under 'Turkey' and 'Asiatic Turkey': especially nos. 92, 495, 753, 779, 792, 814. Since 1914, Parliamentary debates.

(*g*) League of Nations proceedings and publications: *Official Journal*, especially for October 1924, February 1926, April 1926, March 1932, July 1932, November 1934, February 1935, June 1935, December 1937.

Minutes of the Assembly, and the Council.

Minutes of the Permanent Mandates Commission

(*h*) Command Papers (1914 and after) other than military dispatches.

Cmd. 7628 (1914): Rupture with Turkey.
Cmd. 8253 (1915): General Townshend's appreciation before Kut.
Cmd. 8610 (1917): Report of the Mesopotamia Commission.
Cmd. 675 (1920): San Remo Oil Agreement.
Cmd. 960 (1920): Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920.
Cmd. 1061 (1920): Review of the Civil Administration, 1914–20, by Gertrude L. Bell.
Cmd. 1176 (1921): Draft Mandate.
Cmd. 1195 (1921): Franco-British Convention, 23 December 1920.
Cmd. 1226 (1921): Correspondence with U.S.A. on economic rights.
Cmd. 1351 (1921): Petroleum in 'Iraq.
Cmd. 1500 (1921): Final draft of Mandates.
Cmd. 1757 (1922): Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty, 10 October 1922.
Cmd. 2217 (1922): Use of Air Force in 'Iraq.
Cmd. 1814 (1923): Lausanne Conference.

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[1] An asterisk denotes the most valuable of the journals listed.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Cmd. 1929 (1923): Treaty of Lausanne, 24 July 1923.
Cmd. 21[illegible]0 (1924): Anglo-'Iraqi Protocol, 30 April 1924, and Agreements.
Cmd. 2317 (1924): Application to 'Iraq of Art. 22 of League Covenant.
Cmd. 2438 (1925): Hilton-Young-Vernon Report of Financial Mission.
Cmd. 2557 (1925): Laidover Report.
Cmd. 2562 (1925): Turco-'Iraqi frontier: decision.
Cmd. 2563 (1925): Incidents on Turkish Frontier.
Cmd. 2565 (1925): Agreement with Najd.
Cmd. 2587 (1926): Treaty, 13 January 1926.
Cmd. 2679 (1926): Anglo-'Iraqi-Turkish Treaty, 7 June 1926.
Cmd. 2998 (1927): Draft Revised Treaty, 14 December 1927.
Cmd. 3440 (1929): Statement of British policy in 'Iraq.
Cmds. 3627 and 3675 (1930): Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty and Exchange of Notes.
Cmd. 3797 (1930): Treaty of 30 June, and Financial Agreement.
Cmd. 3833 (1930): Anglo-'Iraqi-United States Convention on rights of United States citizens. Also Cmd. 3503.
Cmd. 3839 (1930): Judicial Agreement. Also Cmd. 3933.
Cmd. 4120 (1932): Anglo-'Iraqi Agreement on Extradition. Also Cmd. 4317.
Cmd. 4220 (1932): Transfer of French rights.
Cmd. 4986 (1935): Legal proceedings, civil and commercial. Also Cmd. 5369.
Cmd. 5173 (1936): Railway Agreement. Also Cmd. 5282.
Cmd. 5196 (1936): War cemeteries.
Cmd. 5373 (1937): Commercial relations, 'Iraq-Palestine, 14 December 1936.
Cmd. 6646 (1944): 'Iraq's foreign exchange needs.
Cmds. 6742 (1945) and 6803 (1946): prolongation of above agreement.
Cmd. 6918 (1946): Precedence of H.M.'s Ambassador, Baghdad.
Cmds. 7110, 7210, 7269 (1947): Foreign exchange.
Cmd. 7309 (1948): Treaty of Portsmouth, 15 January 1948.
Cmd. 7490 (1948): Financial Agreement, prolongation.

(*i*) British naval and military dispatches for war periods, notably:

(i) *1914-18:*

Reports by Commanders-in-Chief, issued as Supplements to the *London Gazette*:

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
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DE
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Batum
U. S. S. R.
Tbilisi
Ankara
TURKEY
Aleppo
SYRIA
O.P.L.
CRETE
CYPRUS
Beirut
LEBANON
Damascus
O.P.L.
IRAQ
Bag
Tel Aviv
Amman
Jerusalem
JORDAN
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Cairo
Suez
EGYPT
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End Map (A)

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
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Ramadi
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Falluja
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Samarra
Baghdad
DIYA
KUT A
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BAHR AL MILH
Shithatha
Karbala
Khan Hammad
HILLA
Kifl
Kufa
Najf
Feysaliya
Shinafiya
D I W
S E R T
K A R B A L A
Tabriz
Tehran
Hamadan
P E R S I A
Baghdad
Basra
0
200 M.
Railways
Oil pipe lines
Oil pipe line
S O U T H E R N
Salma
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End map (B)

Iz Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1815-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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
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Shushtar
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'Ali al-Gharbi
Kumait
'Amara
Qal'at Salih
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Ahwaz
Qurna
MUNTAFIQ
ARABISTAN
Salman
Qusayr
abu Ghar
Busaiya
B A S R A
JABAL SANAM
Zubair
Fao
Bubiyan Is.
Kuwait
KUWAIT
PERSIAN
GULF
NEUTRAL ZONE
NEUTRAL ZONE
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R. W. FORD

End map (c)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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

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Diyarbakr
KHA
Alexandretta
Banyas
G.A.L.
Dayr al-Zur
S Y R I A
Oil pipe line
Ab

End Map (d)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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
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Tall Kochek
'Ayn Zala
Dohuk
Barzan
Zibar
'Aqra
Rawanduz
Tall 'Umaynat
JABAL SINJAR
Tall 'Afar
Balad Sinjar
Tall Kayf
Mosul
GREATER ZAB
Arbil
Ranya
Quwayr
Koi Sanjaq
Makhmur
Qaiyara
Altun Kupri
Cham chamal
Shargat
LESSER ZAB
HAWIJA
Kirkuk
Taza Khurmatu
Daquq (Tauq)
Tuz Khurmatu
Kifri
Baiji
Takrit
TIGRIS
JABAL HAMRIN
WADI THARTHAR
Kingarban
Qara Tepe
Samarra
Deli 'Abbas
Khalis
Daltawa
Sumayka
Ba'quba
Abu Kamal
'Ana
al-Qa'im
Rawa
Haditha
M O S U L
A R B I L
K I R K U K
B A G H D A D
D U L A I M
Urmia
Ushnu

End Map (E)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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631


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CASPIAN
SEA
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Tabriz
PERSIA
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100
MILES
International frontiers
Provincial boundaries
Land above 1500 ft.
" " 6000 ft.
Railways
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Qizil Ribat
Naft Khana
Shahroban
Mandali
Balad Ruz

End Map (F)

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MHl Iraq MHl

The map following page 436 has been reproduced according to the following schedule:

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a	b	c

1: Longrigg
645, 175

MHl Iraq MHl

[For the rise and fall of various ministries, their policies and internal politics from 1900 to 1950 in Iraq, see category 116, entire source.]

1: Longrigg
648

MHl Iraq MHl

[For an account of the relations of Iraq with Great Britain, the Arab League nations, and with Turkey from 1900 to 1950, see category 116, entire source.]

1: Longrigg
647, 721, 727, 728

MHl Iraq MHl

[For an account of the British invasion and campaign in Iraq in 1914, the subsequent occupation and the British war-time administration of Iraq in 1917-18, the civil administration by the British from the end of the war in 1918 to 1920, see category 116, pp. 77-121.]

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Ira

Government of el 'Iraq

000

An Inquiry

INTO

LAND TENURE AND RELATED QUESTIONS.

Proposals for the Initiation of Reform.

BY

SIR ERNEST DOWSON, K.B.E.

Formerly Surveyor-General of Egypt, and later successively
Under-Secretary of State for Finance, and Financial Adviser
to the Egyptian Government.

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BOWYERS FIELD,
WROTHAM,
KENT.

December, 1931.

HIS EXCELLENCY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,
BAGHDAD.

EXCELLENCY,

121 I have the honour to submit herewith my definite report on land tenure and related questions in el 'Iraq, in accordance with the invitation extended to me by Government and embodied in resolutions of the Council of Ministers, dated July 4th and December 22nd, 1929, and previous correspondence.

This report should entirely replace the series of provisional reports containing recommendations for the commencement of settlement of rights to land, which were forwarded at the special request of Government at the beginning of this year. Unfortunately the early action then hoped for, was not realised. But since the recommendations in the present report on the subject follow the same lines, this advance series may have served a useful purpose if they facilitate fuller consideration of these measures now.

The preparation of these provisional reports and a certain number of other current demands have helped to delay the presentation of this report: but the decisive reasons why it has taken much longer than I originally anticipated have been the time needed to study adequately the great mass of material ultimately collected and to formulate measures that would both achieve their object and be within the country's resources.

The necessity to put land tenure and land revenue on to a more stable basis has long been recognised. The ways and means of doing so have been continuously discussed throughout the last decade; but without any effective or sustained action having so far resulted. As mentioned in due course, el 'Iraq is not unusual in this respect; but, none the less, until effective measures are taken to remedy these long-standing evils, they must continue to impede the development of the country and the well-being of the people.

It appears from past discussions that the hesitation of successive governments to attack these evils resolutely is largely to be ascribed to lack of conviction both as to the real character of the problems and as to the practical remedies to be applied. It has therefore appeared to me essential to fulfil two governing requirements if I was to provide Government with assistance of a useful nature and in a useful form. I must probe the problem thoroughly and present it comprehensively, whatever time and effort was involved. And in formulating my recommendations, I must pay the closest attention to the practicability of the measures proposed, having regard to the country's capacity and resources. While it would be too much to hope that I have satisfied these conditions

121 fully, I believe that I have been able to furnish Government with a fundamentally reliable foundation for attainable measures of reform.

000 If I have been able to do so it is due in the first place to the unstinted co-operation that I received from everyone to whom I applied for information or help during my stay in the country, and in the second to having been able to treat the question as a continuous comprehensive study throughout.

In conclusion I wish to express my gratitude to Your Excellency and to all those to whom I am indebted for the unfailing courtesy and generous assistance that I everywhere received.

I have the honour to be,
Excellency,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) ERNEST M. DOWSON.

An Inquiry

INTO

LAND TENURE AND RELATED QUESTIONS

PART I.—SCOPE AND PROCEDURE OF INQUIRY

185 1. The considerations which led Government to ask me to visit el 'Iraq in the winter-spring season 1929-30 were briefly summarised at the time. The necessity of setting up a sound system of settlement and registration of rights to land as an essential preliminary to agricultural development was urged. It was represented that until effective measures to achieve these ends had been devised and put into operation, agricultural development must either be delayed or based on unstable foundations. It was emphasised that while the country was full of agricultural possibilities and only required development on sound lines, it lacked the necessary basis of a sound system of land registration. And it was explained that the Departments of Revenue, of Land Registration and of State Domains were pursuing reform without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan.

The main objective was the promotion of agricultural development. The particular needs were adjudged to be (i) the execution of a settlement of rights to land throughout the country, (ii) the establishment of an efficient system of book-keeping of those rights, and (iii) the unification of divergent and disconnected Departmental efforts. I was asked to study the problem as a whole and to advise how it should be attacked. As outlined that problem appeared to be essentially one of organisation and procedure for attaining two accepted objectives: a just settlement, and an efficient register, of rights to land. I anticipated that the requisite information regarding existing conditions would be readily available: and I expected that the discussions of previous years would have produced clearly defined issues. But I had not allowed for the peculiar fluidity and diversity of methods of land tenure practised.

423
427 It proved to be common knowledge that the tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all. It was also common knowledge that the land law was defective and uncertain in its application to the other fifth. And it soon appeared that there was an almost complete lack of precise, authoritative and systematic information in the Headquarter Offices of Government in regard to land conditions generally and to the methods of holding, transferring and transmitting land actually practised from day to day by the great mass of landholders and agricultural peasantry throughout all parts of the country.

121 It therefore became necessary to extend the scope of my inquiry to include an investigation of the conditions of land tenure actually operating throughout the country, as distinct (for the most part) from those

121 enshrined in the Statute Books of Government. And since the taxation imposed on agricultural production is one of the most important practical conditions attaching to the utilisation of land, a study of such taxation had to enter into the inquiry. Nor could any investigation of conditions of landholding in el 'Iraq be intelligible or real which did not pay careful regard to the methods of irrigation, public and private, the prevalent forms and standards of cultivation, the distribution and remuneration of agricultural labour. It was not of course possible within the period of a few months to cover this vast field of investigation as thoroughly and completely as the occasion demanded: but owing to the widespread and generous collaboration aroused, the results provide an adequate basis for immediately useful measures.

121
185 This general study of existing conditions had to precede consideration of the three objectives originally indicated, if Government was to be sure of its ground and to be provided with a trustworthy foundation for progressively constructive reform. For settlement of rights to land pre-supposes and requires some stable bases of land law, or at least of legalised custom, on which such rights can be founded. And so far, by common admission, such bases rarely exist, nor do the discussions of previous years appear to have advanced agreement as to the remedy. Again although an efficient Land Register is indispensable in due course, both for the operation of the statutorily registered tenures, and for any orderly regulation of the enormous residue of (so-called) State Domain, yet the execution of a settlement of rights to land must precede the establishment of such a Register. For an effective Land Register is nothing but an intelligible and dependable record. Its function is simply to mirror clearly and faithfully rights to land existing at any and every moment. It is useless to devote money and effort to rectifying and burnishing the mirror, so long as it will only have an unintelligible tangle to reflect. Attention must first be directed to unravelling the tangle.

185 Further, while it is certainly true that no united effort had been made, and no connected plan pursued, by the three public services mentioned, yet it will be recognised that, as subordinate Departments of three separate Ministries, they were not in a position themselves to adopt any general scheme of reform. This is clearly the responsibility of Government as a whole. And, as will appear later, if any well-concerted and effective measures are to be undertaken, the better co-operation and coordination of the efforts of these services will not be enough.

423 2. The lack of a well-documented collection of information about existing conditions of land tenure throughout the country was not on consideration surprising, having regard to the vicissitudes of modern el 'Iraq's short history. There must have been an enormous amount of spade work to be done in establishing orderly government throughout the country during the last ten years: and the current needs of administration no doubt completely absorbed the time and energies of those who might otherwise have undertaken a systematic collection of trustworthy information. The collection of such information, particularly in statistical form, is apt to be a slow development in any country. It requires time, a scientific appreciation of the value of exact data, and the resources of a well-established and experienced public service. And in connection with land it requires a more comprehensive and far-sighted outlook than a number of disunited Departments can reasonably be expected to produce.

423
184 The collection of a representative volume of trustworthy information was also attended by peculiar difficulty, owing to the extreme diversity of conditions prevailing throughout the country. This diversity

423 184 is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman administration present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts.

423 The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon.

122 114 3. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were unobtainable, while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape.

114 185 A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform.

121 4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country.

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

124 Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the

B

124 compilation of a map indicating the existing distribution of various categories of land in the liwa, (ii) for the preparation of numerical returns relating to population, to the various categories of land, etc., and (iii) a hundred important questions covering the main field of the investigation.

114 Thirdly, I studied at Headquarters the working of the Central Government services primarily concerned, as thoroughly as my immediate purpose required and the time at my disposal permitted.

124 114 Fourthly, I visited each of the fourteen liwas in turn and (i) discussed the main problems thoroughly with the Governor (Mutasarrif), (ii) was taken to typical or specially instructive places, and (iii) met and questioned a number of other provincial officers, local notables, land holders and peasants. Owing to the previous circulation of the questionnaire, all provincial officers were well prepared for these discussions, while I also received very full written replies in all but every case.

124 Fifthly, I had the honour to be accorded several audiences by H.M. King Feisal as well as numerous interviews with Ministers, Deputies and others. And I also interviewed in Baghdad a number of experienced persons both European and 'Iraqi, with special knowledge and experience of land questions. Unfortunately owing to prolonged bad weather, which interfered with my touring programme and severely curtailed the time available for supplementing my information after its initial collection, it was not found possible to arrange meetings with some of those whom I was particularly anxious to see. I regret this very much, but greatly as they would have assisted me, I venture to believe that nothing they might have said would have seriously modified the main conclusions drawn from the mass of evidence collected.

000 5. Owing to the wideness of the field to be covered the five months that I spent in el 'Iraq were entirely occupied in collecting material which could not be digested until I got back to England. The records of the investigations fill more than forty dossiers. Naturally many gaps and uncertainties were discovered during the examination of this large body of material. This necessitated correspondence with Baghdad extending almost continuously over another six months. The attempt to obtain intelligible and consistent statistics was particularly troublesome.

It must not be thought that even this considerable volume of data covers the field wholly or unimpeachably, or that I can have escaped misinterpretations and errors. No such improvised body of information can be a satisfactory substitute for systematic public records and the accumulated experience of a competent and well organised public service able to concentrate on land problems. But the information and opinions collected, read in the light of experience elsewhere, do none the less enable the main evils to be diagnosed with confidence and the essential elements of constructive reform to be trustworthily indicated.

121 I have thought it advisable to explain the widening of the scope of my investigation and to outline the procedure adopted, so that the character and origin of my information is on record. But I have not attempted to reproduce the mass of conclusions which the material collected has yielded. This would fill volumes. And I have expressly excluded from consideration in this report many questions of the highest importance, which I have had to inquire about owing to their reaction on land tenure (e.g. methods of cultivation, of remuneration of labour, etc.), but which did not themselves directly constitute the subject of the inquiry. Again although it was necessary to study the special problems of each province (liwa) as far as time permitted, so as to get a

proper picture of the whole, I have confined myself in these pages t 121 what may be described as the general aspects of the question as distinc from those of particular localities. Nor has anything like the attention [233] the subject deserves been given to pastoral rights. For while settlement of rights to grazing and pasture is also required, they do not call for such rigid definition, nor is settlement of such rights so urgently needed as of rights to cultivable land, unless the two conflict. Consideration of the Land Revenue system in force when I visited the country has also been omitted, as this system has since been superseded (see ii, 4).

In pursuance of the attempt to restrict attention at this stage to 121 those phases of the problem which call for action first, I have also avoided 423 consideration here of many features or incidentals of existing land tenure, which may be intrinsically of as great importance as others that are examined. Among matters which are not examined in this report for this reason may be mentioned: the various forms of dedication in *waqf*, the conditions of *mulk* tenure, the escheat of tapu tenure for failure to cultivate or failure of heirs, known as *mahlul*, the charge known as *uqr*, the position of newly formed land in a river termed *shati*, the old and new forms of hypothec or mortgage. These almost exclusively affect the registered tenures, and are best considered in the general study and amendment of the land law which is advocated (see vii, 1). Similarly the much-debated question of the conditions under which acquisitive prescription of tapu tenure should come into effect, can have little practical value, until the Government is in a position to implement its statutory tenures. Important established customs affecting State Domain, which are not entered into for the same reason are the *mugharisa* and *ta'aba* systems of planting and tending gardens and groves.

Finally, I have thought it best, on these grounds also, to restrict detailed discussion of proposed measures to those required for the initial execution of reform. While the character of measures that would be required subsequently to conserve the benefits attained by reform have had to be indicated, no attempt is made to formulate them in detail.

Even generalised and truncated in these ways the main problem 000 remains a difficult one either to present or to master; but it has not appeared to me possible to simplify it further without distortion. The study of the land tenure of any country, with a view to practical and realisable reform, is no light undertaking; and that undertaking is attended with peculiar difficulties in el 'Iraq for reasons which are explained.

To facilitate reading and reference I have divided this report into nine parts, which I have endeavoured to make as self-contained as possible. This necessitates some repetition and discontinuity on consecutive reading; but it is impossible to present this intricate question in any readily digestible form. The subject matter of each of these parts is given on the contents page and need not be repeated. The last alone calls for explanation. It has been written in response to numerous inquiries, official and otherwise, when I was in el 'Iraq, regarding the wider setting of the problems of land tenure in relation to the general development of the country as a whole and to the other great ameliorative movements needed. It concludes with a summary of the main recommendations made. It is hoped that this part of the report may be of assistance to those who, while impressed with the critical importance of a constructive reform of land tenure, may be unable to study the whole of this report textually.

PART II.—EXISTING CONDITIONS. THE LAND AND THE LAND SURVEY

123 1. The conditions of land tenure throughout el 'Iraq may be described generally as in various stages of divorce from innumerable primitive practices, but still rarely wedded to law. These conditions vary so much not only from province to province, but from locality to locality and from community to community, that no picture of them can be presented which combines fidelity of detail with a comprehensive view. Those who are familiar with the variations, even within one province, will appreciate the extreme difficulty of focussing the whole kaleidoscopic panorama into one generally intelligible picture. And yet it is impossible to plan or proceed with any sober and reasoned national attack on the unhealthy situation prevailing, without some dependable general diagnosis of that situation.

Neither effort nor time has been spared to secure this indispensable foundation for land reform and it is believed that the general analysis of existing conditions is fundamentally reliable; but it must always be remembered that no generalised statement can faithfully reflect the multitudinous local variations which exist everywhere. This does not matter provided the broad outlines of the analysis are sound, its limitations are understood and the need for some latitude in the application of reform later is recognised.

2. Area and Distribution of Cultivated Land

128 2. The data needed to compile a general map of the country showing the distribution of the land by its physical situation and agricultural potentialities not being available in the Headquarter Offices of Government, an attempt was made to remedy this deficiency. In response to a request already mentioned the Provincial authorities compiled a diagrammatic map on a scale of 1:250,000 showing the distribution of the land in each Province (Liwa) in certain broad classes. The Irrigation Department gave invaluable assistance in collecting the information on which the classification was based in the southern liwas, and the Survey Department in the preparation of the maps and the extraction of areas. The Land Registry (*Dairet el Tapu*) spared no effort to contribute, so far as their records allowed, the location of registered holdings. The original map sheets were left for consultation in Baghdad. The broad results are illustrated in Plates I and II, so far as the smaller scale used therein permits. The areas of the different varieties of land shown are given in Table I.

The compilation was a much more difficult and laborious task than the final simplified results suggest. The greatest trouble was taken by all those who collaborated to ensure that the maps represented the facts as faithfully as the conditions permitted. But it will be appreciated that the details given must not be regarded as reliable. This is due to the impossibility of analysing and classifying the land surface of the whole country with any approach to accuracy either in the time, or on the basis of the unavoidably defective general map series, which was alone available for the purpose. But poor as the component detail must be expected to be, the broad conclusions represented on the maps and in the table should constitute a sufficiently reliable analysis of the character of the land surface of the country as a whole, for immediate purposes.

About four-fifths of the country consists of unproductive or slightly productive desert, steppe, marsh and hill masses. The productive core is divided broadly into two regions within which cultivation is practised regularly. The northern region is fed by rainfall supplemented by perennial streams rising in the mountains and, to a limited extent, by lift from the rivers. The southern region largely depends upon irrigation, supplied by canals drawn from the river system, following winter rainfall. The former may be appropriately called the Rainfall Zone, and the latter the Irrigation Zone. Actually the southward extension of the northern rainfall varies annually, while the date gardens of the Basra Liwa constitute a distinct (and of course economically a very important) study. But this does not affect the correctness of the broad picture presented. 311 132 312

Reference to Table I will show that the region of cultivated and cultivable land within the Rainfall Zone covers about 41,000 square kilometres, and that within the Irrigation Zone about 51,000 square kilometres. These figures represent 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total land surface of the country respectively. The cultivation is preponderantly of an extensive character. Only a fraction of these zones, possibly from a fifth to a tenth, appears to be actually cultivated in any given year. So that land is available for a very great development of agriculture, when other factors are favourable.

TABLE I. APPROXIMATE CLASSIFICATION OF LAND SURFACE, 1930

Expressed in square kilometres

[423]

Liwa	Total area of land	Hill masses	Cultivated Region				Additional potentially cultivable territory	Total cultivated and cultivable region	Territory containing tapu holdings	Size of holdings in mishara*			
			Rainfall Zone		Irrigation Zone								
			[illegible] hill masses	Plains	Canal fed territory†	Machine fed territory†				1-100	101 to 500	501 to 1,000	Over 1,001
Mosul	45,800	9,350	190	14,580	—	—	270	15,040	7,870	—	—	—	—
Arbil	16,600	7,620	150	7,010	—	—	—	7,160	2,420	7,418	728	500	—
Sulimani	9,500	6,400	130	2,420	—	—	—	2,550	2,280	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	20,800	—	—	12,090	—	—	3,240	15,360	6,280	—	—	—	—
Diyala	16,300	—	—	710	2,760	90	260	3,820	3,410	4,092	—	546	—
Baghdad	22,100	—	—	—	1,710	2,270	880	4,870	1,500	162	220	120	360
Dulaim	124,500	—	—	—	920	630	20	1,570	920	2,344	109	121	3
Karbala	21,300	—	—	—	680	—	20	680	620	—	—	—	—
Hilla	8,100	—	—	—	4,570	330	1,630	6,530	2,380	402	384	98	83
Kut	16,400	—	—	—	4,680	3,880	2,170	10,710	2,580	—	—	—	—
Diwaniya	82,000	—	—	—	3,770	2,180	5,520	11,470	2,270	8,378	—	155	69
Muntafiq	36,700	—	—	—	4,440	270	370	5,080	6,260	—	—	—	—
Amara	19,700	—	—	—	3,670	1,010	—	6,080	110	—	10	5	50
Basra	10,900	—	—	—	610‡	60	110	780	1,190	—	—	—	—
Totals	453,800	23,370	470	36,740	29,790	10,700	14,300	92,200	40,090	—	—	—	—

*Where information was available. Such information must not be presumed to be exhaustive. A mishara = 2,500 sq. metres or thereabouts.

†Territories so classified are at present very incompletely irrigated.

‡Tidally watered date gardens.

The information given in the table regarding the size of holdings is derived from fiscal returns. Although the classification of these holdings by area cannot be expected to be accurate, the figures possibly give some indication of the frequency of larger and smaller holdings in the districts actually concerned. The latter must not be taken to coincide with the cultivated areas of the liwas themselves.

8. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION

8. In any general study of the land tenure of a country it is desirable to know the numbers and distribution of the agricultural population. Thus it would greatly assist in planning development in el 'Iraq if trust- 161 162

161 worthy information was available as to the rural population, their main occupations (e.g. cultivation with type of crops, stock-keeping, fishing,
162 reed cutting, the numbers of the sedentary, semi-nomadic and truly nomadic population, etc.). The figures need not be closely accurate, but they should necessarily be sufficiently reliable relative approximations to allow dependable deductions to be drawn from them. But although continuous and painstaking efforts were made to satisfy this need by the liwa authorities, it has to be admitted that no basis exists for arriving at figures that can be utilised with any confidence. Table II contains the best estimates that the liwa authorities were able to furnish; and the Census Department was not in a position to give me any better material. I include the table, because it at least represents the best local opinion of the position under the various heads cited. It should perhaps be noted more particularly that it was found impossible to separate in any systematic way those engaged in urban, from those engaged in rural, pursuits. Finally, only the populations of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were excluded from the latter. This explains the misleading density figure for the Karbala Liwa. It should also be noted that the figures given for the agricultural population include all those engaged in rural occupations, other than genuine nomads.

TABLE II. APPROXIMATE POPULATION, 1930

Expressed in thousands

Liwa	Total estimated population	Three principal towns	Nomadic tribal sections	Rural Population			Mean Density per sq. kilom. cultivated region
				Settled	Tribal	Total	
Mosul ..	320	79	45	176	20	196	22
Arbil ..	106	—	3	47	56	103	15
Sulimani ..	94	—	15	51	28	79	37
Kirkuk ..	160	—	19	63	78	141	13
Diyala ..	240	—	1	79	160	239	47
Baghdad ..	388	219	2	93	74	167	98
Dulaim ..	147	—	59	39	49	88	95
Karbala ..	90	—	2	83	5	88	136
Hilla ..	103	—	—	30	73	103	21
Kut ..	170	—	—	60	110	170	20
Diwaniya ..	238	—	58	79	101	180	40
Muntafiq ..	340	—	20	25	295	320	73
Amara ..	238	—	—	36	202	238	36
Basra ..	190	46	10	34	100	134	284
Totals ..	2,824	344	234	895	1,351	2,246	30*

* Mean density total 75,000 sq. km. cultivated region.

So far as the figures can be accepted the mean density of the rural population per square kilometre of the cultivated region works out at about 19 in the four liwas of the Rainfall Zone, and at about 35 in the five most typical liwas of the Irrigation Zone. These figures are very low, especially for the potentially fertile irrigable lands of the latter; but there is no reason to think that they err on this side. However, it will be appreciated that dependable statistics of the agricultural population are needed to enable development of the country to be pursued to the greatest advantage and with the greatest economy.

166 The extreme mobility of the majority of the population, especially throughout the Irrigation Zone, is an important factor in the considera-
185 tion of development schemes of all sorts, having regard to the general sparsity of the population and the limited resources of the country. If work can be concentrated on such schemes in a few of the most suitable areas, and facilities can be given to the population to colonise them as opportunity and occasion justify, much more rapid and satisfactory results will be obtained for the same effort and expenditure in a given

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING PROGRESS OF TRIANGULATION SYSTEM IN 'IRAQ

PLATE III


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time, than if attempts have to be made to carry out development in a scattered and incomplete manner throughout the whole country at once.

4. Land Revenue Returns

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4. It was my original intention to devote one part of this report entirely to a study of land revenue questions. For although in some respects a matter for independent consideration, the effect upon all tenures of land of the burden of any land revenue demand (whether in cash or kind) and the methods by which it is imposed, is profound. But since I left el 'Iraq a drastic change in the land revenue system has been enacted.* It will clearly not be helpful to comment on land revenue methods that have been superseded. And I understand that the new laws are of a specifically provisional nature and that their imperfections are realised, so that it seems of equally little use to comment on them. But although no useful purpose seems likely to be served by the discussion of the displaced land revenue system now, the three accompany-

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* Law for the collection of Istihlak (Consumption) Tax. No. 80 of 1931. *Law for the collection of* Land Rent. No. 85 of 1931.

TABLE III. ANNUAL COLLECTIONS OF LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

In lakhs of rupees

Year	Summer Crops	Winter Crops	Dates	Vegetables	Other fruits	Tobacco	Miscellaneous	Totals
1923	34·20	44·75	16·73	9·63		1·30	2·24	108·84
1924	34·15	47·24	19·34	6·00	2·23	3·70	0·02	112·67
1925	46·13	69·20	22·79	6·03	2·44	1·96	0·04	148·59
1926	42·16	59·94	18·25	5·38	2·47	2·67	0·02	130·89
1927	39·32	59·07	21·60	4·70	3·46	2·98	0·01	131·14
1928	40·94	59·92	23·30	4·63	3·76	2·91	0·04	135·50
1929	87·77		18·92	3·88	3·11	1·67	0·07	115·42
Totals	273·22	391·57	140·93	36·63	21·07	17·39	2·44	883·25
Averages	39·04	55·94	20·13	5·23	3·01	2·48	0·35	126·18

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

Under forms of assessment prescribed by Law 40 of 1920

Crops	Average receipts 1923-9		Percentage distribution under various forms of assessment prescribed									
	In lakhs of rupees	Per cent. of total	By unit of area Art. 6	Estimation Art. 9	Rope measurement Art. 10	Tree counting Art. 11	By plough units Art. 12	At market centres Art. 14	At Customs and Excise Offices Art. 15	By unit of lift Art. 17	Lease by auction Art. 20	Three, four, or five-year agreements Art. 21
Summer crops	39·04	30·6	6·1*	8·5	7·7§	—	—	—	—	4·6	0·6	3·1
Winter crops	55·94	45·9	6·4	12·4	2·3	—	9·2	—	—	6·9	0·5	8·2
Dates ..	20·13	15·3	9·2†	0·3	—	5·8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vegetables	5·23	3·8	1·2‡	—	—	—	—	2·3	—	0·3	—	—
Other fruits	3·01	2·3	0·1	0·1	—	1·6	—	0·1	—	—	—	0·4
Tobacco ..	2·48	1·9	—	—	—	—	—	—	1·9	—	—	—
Miscellaneous	0·35	0·2	—	—	—	—	—	—	0·2	—	—	—
Totals ...	126·18	100·0	23·0	21·3	10·0	7·4	9·2	2·4	2·1	11·8	1·1	11·7

This table is intended to illustrate the operation of Law 40, applied during an average year under conditions existing in 1929. Actually estimation was principally resorted to before 1926, the various new methods of assessment having been increasingly used subsequently.

* Largely Amara rice, Baghdad and Kut summer crops and rice included in Basra jarib tax.
† Basra jarib tax.
‡ 1930 figures, previously under Art. 14.
§ Mostly Diwaniya rice.

651 TABLE V. NUMBERS OF SEPARATE LAND REVENUE PAYMENTS, 1929

Expressed in thousands

	Summer crops	Winter crops	Dates	Other fruits	Tobacco	Totals
Mosul	10·2	38·7	—	14·6	1·3	64·8
Arbil	2·1	9·6	—	3·6	—	15·3
Sulimani ..	4·0	5·0	—	4·3	3·9	17·2
Kirkuk	1·0	9·1	0·1	0·7	—	10·9
Diyala	1·4	6·0	10·6	6·8	—	24·8
Baghdad ..	2·0	7·6	2·1	1·3	0·5	13·5
Dulaim	2·3	4·5	3·0	0·8	—	10·6
Karbala ..	0·4	1·5	8·7	3·6	—	14·2
Hilla	2·5	8·6	9·8	2·3	—	23·2
Kut	0·4	0·6	1·5	0·8	—	3·3
Diwaniya ..	10·0	9·6	16·3	3·6	—	39·5
Muntafiq ..	1·6	1·9	15·5	0·7	a few	19·7
Amara	0·1	0·2	0·2	0·1	a few	0·6
Basra	0·2	0·4	15·4	0·2	—	16·2
Totals	38·2	103·3	83·2	43·4	5·7	273·8

ing tables, which were prepared with a view to such discussion, are still of interest and value. And it should be added that the great difficulty experienced in obtaining precise information about the land, did not refer to the financial statistics of land revenue or to the nature of the methods in force. For a number of past years full and clear reports of the working of the Revenue Department have been published.

The three tables explain themselves: but it should not be overlooked that Table V is concerned with the number of land revenue payments made, not with the number of land revenue payers. Thus the same payer (or group of payers) may pay on a summer crop, on a winter crop and on a date grove. And each payment may represent more than a single parcel. Fuller study of the original returns should enable some idea to be obtained of the total number of holdings in the country.

5. The Land Survey

423 5. Before turning to a consideration of the methods of land tenure in force it is desirable to consider briefly the existing position and prospects of the national land survey. It is the duty of such a survey to provide exact and detailed knowledge of the land surface of the country, primarily—but far from exclusively—in the readily assimilable form of the graphic miniatures of the ground which we term maps. The critical importance of the survey in relation to all measures of land reform, whether of tenure or development, cannot be stressed too emphatically. A scientifically dependable and functionally suitable survey is an indispensable condition of the successful execution and maintenance of any comprehensive measures of land reform. All experience shows that to attempt such reforms in the absence of an adequate survey is to build without a foundation in the dark. The intricacy and magnitude of the task of executing and maintaining a national survey is not usually realised, probably because of the deceptive simplicity of the form in which the mass of information collected is presented to the public. The great gulf between a trustworthy and an untrustworthy survey, and the conditions necessary to secure the latter are even less commonly appreciated. It is most desirable that this should be rectified; for while a trustworthy survey is indispensable to all comprehensive measures of land reform, an untrustworthy survey is a dangerous misuse of public funds.

000 The first and most important condition to be satisfied is the provision and maintenance of a thoroughly dependable framework, on

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING SURVEYS IN 'IRAQ

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PLATE IV


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000 which the maps can be built up and by which their accuracy can be controlled. The main components of a survey framework are normally, and preferably, furnished by a network of accurately determined points, arranged for purposes of mathematical control in several series of well-shaped triangles of decreasing size. It is essential that these points should be well marked on the ground and that the marks should be carefully preserved and safeguarded against disturbance. Subsidiary points in such a framework differ according to the nature of the ground, the character of the work and the scale on which it is to be mapped. Such subsidiary points may be added in conjunction with, or just prior to the execution of the detail work.

The selection of the sites of the major, or largest series, of triangulation points calls for special aptitude and experience, while the determination of their geographical positions demands highly skilled observation and mathematical computation. It is only when the major triangulation network has been constructed, observed, computed and linked up as a whole, with the corresponding networks in neighbouring countries, that a finally satisfactory foundation for a national survey has been laid. But this may take a long time; and for immediate practical purposes the important steps are to get (i) the major triangulation completed in large blocks well in advance of all other work, and (ii) the ground marks protected. The subordinate series of triangulation, any subsidiary systems of reference points, and the ultimate detailed survey, are then progressively controlled, so that the land survey is consistent and dependable as a whole and no serious error can pass undetected.

423 Plate III illustrates the progress of the major and minor triangulations in el 'Iraq. It will be seen that the survey framework of the country is in a very unsatisfactory condition. It is absent in the north, while in the south the minor triangulation has preceded the modest backbone of major triangulation projected. And unfortunately the permanence and reliability of the work is being continuously undermined by the removal of the indispensable ground marks by mischievous or ignorant persons. Plate IV illustrates the position of the detail survey throughout the country. It will be seen that several solid blocks of map work mainly on a scale of 1:10,000 have been done in the south on a framework of minor triangulation. The maps are purely topographical maps, sometimes contoured to meet the requirements of the Irrigation Department. The quality of the field work so far as I was able to see it was good; but the publication of the maps is in a very backward state.

The progress as well as the general value of the work has been very adversely affected in the past by uncertainty in programme and in resources, and by continual diversions of survey staff to meet scattered and often ephemeral demands anywhere and everywhere. The number and insistence of these demands emphasises how widely the need for a complete national survey is felt. And it was doubtless impossible to avoid and difficult to restrict these sporadic demands, when endeavouring to introduce modern administrative and technical methods in a country that was virtually unmapped. But nothing has retarded the land survey of the whole country so much as the obstacles to steady and economical progress that have been imposed by continual variations in programme, in general objectives and in resources.

According to the present programme, work on the 1:10,000 scale should be completed throughout the Irrigation Zone by the end of 1933 or 1934. At the same rate of progress the extension of the work over the plain area of the Rainfall Zone may be expected to take another six years. But this forecast will only be realised if a steady programme is adhered to, and if effective measures can be taken to prevent the removal of ground marks. Important weaknesses in the organisation of the Survey Department are considered in Part VIII of this report.

PART III.—EXISTING CONDITIONS. STATUTORY TENURES

1 AND 2. STATUTE LAW

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1. The foundations of the statute law governing the tenure of land in el 'Iraq are the (old) Ottoman Land Code of 1274 (1858), and the Land Registration (Tapu)* Law of the following year. These laws were supplemented, amended, modified, amplified and curtailed by subsequent Ottoman legislation, or orders deemed to have the force of law, while the country remained under Ottoman jurisdiction. And there has also been a certain amount of recent el 'Iraqi legislation applying to land tenure. The basic concepts of the two first laws are for the most part generally recognised, although the position of the statute law on land tenure is far from clear on many points and although, as will appear more fully later, throughout the majority of the land, these laws have been largely disregarded.

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The Land Code recognises five legal categories of land :

(1) Mulk (El arazi el mumluka). Land held in undiluted ownership assimilated to that of chattels. Such ownership is governed by the provisions of the Sacred Law and not by those of the Civil Statute Law.†

(2) Miri (El arazi el amiriya). State land the usufructuary possession (tesaruf) of which is granted out on the registered tenure prescribed in Book I of the Land Code.

(3) Waqf (El arazi el muqufa). Land, some right over which has been dedicated to a pious purpose.

(4) Matruka (El arazi el matruka). Land "left" or specially reserved for some public purpose.

(5) Mewat (El arazi el mewat). Dead or unreclaimed land.

This classification has never been applied as a whole in el 'Iraq and is not applicable as it stands. The third category (Waqf or Dedicated Land) is redundant. Land must belong to the first category (mulk) to be truly dedicated in waqf in accordance with the Sacred law. The untrue dedication, known as takhsisat (appropriated) waqf, is restricted to interests in the revenue arising from the land (tithe, fees, etc.) and leaves the category of the land unaffected. For practical purposes untrue waqf is confined to dedication of interests arising from land of the second category, but takhsisat waqf in mulk interests (e.g. tithe) may exist.

While the third category is unnecessary no provision is included for cultivated and cultivable land that is retained in the legal possession, as well as the legal ownership, of the State. State land of the second category (miri) is confined to land of which the legal possession is granted out on registered tenure to third parties for exploitation. State land of the fourth category (matruka) is land reserved for public purposes. State land of the fifth category (mewat) is waste unexploited land.

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* Turkish dictionaries derive this word from the verb tap-mak to worship, whence an act of homage, an acknowledgment of oneself a vassal, especially by the acceptance of a feudal fief. Hence a title deed, etc.

† Mulk means property. Everything that is owned, whether movable or immovable, is mulk. Immovables classified as mulk (i.e. property) are in the absolute ownership of the proprietor. "Every man can deal as he likes with his mulk," Mejelle Art. 1192.

Even the terminology of the law is generally misunderstood and misapplied. Thus, by a curious but comprehensible reversal, the term miri used in the Land Code to denote State land of the second legal category (granted out on registered tenure) is applied in el 'Iraq to land retained in the legal possession of the State. On the other hand, land conforming to the second legal category is loosely described as tapu, or as arazi mafuwida,* or even sometimes as mulk, in contradistinction to the local use of the term miri just mentioned.

Again the distinction made in law between State land of the second, the fourth and the fifth categories is ignored. Indeed I found the words matruka and mewat, and even mahlul (loosed), used purely descriptively and interchangeably for waste lands. But the formal connotation of the last term was recognised if specifically raised.

Evidently a classification of land that is to constitute a useful basis for the land law should conform to, and comprehend, all real differences which require different treatment. Subject to consideration of points still awaiting decision, four categories may be provisionally suggested as necessary and sufficient to enable present law, present practice and present requirements to be reconciled :

(*a*) Mulk or land held in private ownership as at present.

(*b*) Miri or State land retained in the full legal ownership and possession of the State which may be exploited directly or indirectly at its discretion, subject to due recognition of established occupancy rights.

(*c*) Tapu or State land, the legal possession (tesaruf) of which is granted out on the registered tenure laid down in Book I of the Land Code.

(*d*) Matruka or State land specifically reserved by law for public purposes. This corresponds to the fourth existing legal category but some more readily understood term (e.g. manafa' umumiya) would be preferable.

While this provisional classification recognises two categories of State land (*b* and *c*) since the State retains the full legal ownership (raqaba) in both cases, the term miri is in current practice restricted to State land of which the usufructuary possession (tesaruf) has not been granted out. The term tapu or arazi mafuwida is applied to State land the tesaruf of which has been granted out. Although not in conformity with the terminology of the law, the terms miri and tapu used in this way are clear and understood in the country. They are consequently adhered to throughout the remainder of this report unless otherwise stated.

The utility of category (*d*) may not at present be recognised. As the country develops it should become an extremely important class of land, which may not be leased or granted out or exploited in any way except in accordance with the public purpose enacted. Public utility land should only be created and annulled by law and should receive special protection from encroachment, damage and improper use. Timely provision of this nature will save the loss of many valuable public rights and much public expenditure later if the country develops. As instances of such public utility lands may be cited (i) all widths occupied by or reserved for the service of public roads, railways and waterways of all sorts, (ii) sites of historic importance or public interest, (iii) areas required for reservoir or flood storage, for public buildings or for other innumerable national purposes.

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*This term seems to have no legal basis. It appears to have been adopted as an equivalent of the expression "alienated lands."

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2. The introduction of the Ottoman Land Code, and more particularly of tapu tenure, by Midhat Pasha about 1870, was a serious attempt at land reform in el 'Iraq which failed through no want of perseverance or sincerity of purpose. It failed for two reasons, either of which would have been decisive. It was foredoomed to fail, as it failed generally throughout the Ottoman dominions, because the administrative experience and machinery, the technical knowledge and the qualified staff needed to accomplish so formidable a task, were lacking. It was also foredoomed to fail because it attempted prematurely to cast in a rigid (and an alien) mould the fluid practices of a still preponderantly primitive society. Land reform cannot be imposed on a country as an exotic by any outside agency. To be successful it must be suited to local needs, conform to local ideas and conditions and be established gradually by Government and people together. Essential preliminaries to success were a sympathetic adaptation of the Code to meet these requirements and a sympathetic initial investigation and stabilisation of existing occupancy and other customary rights. Moreover the construction and maintenance of a reliable Land register would have been indispensable. These were not the only essentials of success, but they are those that chiefly concern us here. Probably none of them were sufficiently understood at the time. Certainly none of them were satisfied. While the causes of the failure must be analysed if a repetition of these old errors is to be avoided in a modern and better managed effort now, they must be recognised to have been not unusual ones at the time. And although the Ottoman Land Code has never been properly assimilated or generally applied in el 'Iraq, yet it has gradually affected both local concepts and local practice deeply. It would therefore in my opinion be an error resembling that originally made, to abandon this Code now for an entirely strange one as Turkey herself has done. The old Ottoman Land Code is no longer an entirely foreign code and it can be more readily and more closely adapted to local needs than any new importation. It unquestionably requires to be drastically mended, but it certainly should not be ended.

3-5. REGISTERED TENURE

3. Outside of the towns and certain garden reaches the private ownership of land (mulk) is rare in the country. As already noted true waqf land can only be constituted from mulk and is correspondingly limited, while untrue waqf is restricted to a dedication of some financial interest in the land affected. There is little differentiation in the Sacred law between movables and immovables held as private property (mulk). But an Ottoman law of 28 Rajab 1291 (September, 1874) required that the latter (including trees and buildings on miri land) should all be registered and forbade the unregistered ownership of such property subsequently. A certain amount of mulk immovable property is registered in el 'Iraq, but the compulsory registration of such property has never been practicable or systematically attempted.

Land reserved for public or communal use (matruka) is not registered as such. It constitutes a small fraction of the whole and, as noted earlier, the distinction between such land and ordinary State Domain is rarely recognised.

With the relatively minor exceptions mentioned the whole land surface of the country—cultivated land, pasture, waste, forest, mountain, desert, steppe, marsh—is in law State Domain of one or other of the two categories (miri or mewat) laid down in the Ottoman Land Code. The legal ownership (raqaba) of all this land is vested in the State; but, as noted, subject to certain important conditions its usufructuary possession (tesaruf) may be granted out on a permanent, heritable,

assignable tenure, in accordance with the provisions of Book I of the Land Code and connected legislation. This tenure can only exist in virtue of an express grant from the State. To be valid such a grant must be registered in the Land Registry and be vouched for by a certificate of such registration (tapu sanad). A prescriptive right to a grant of State land in tapu tenure (known as haq el qarar) is recognised by the Ottoman Code, although the exact meaning of certain important conditions of such recognition is still debated. 423

Under the regular operation of the Land Code all State land held and used by the public should be acquired and possessed in tapu tenure. The rights and obligations of this tenure are for the most part admirable. But, as already emphasised, its operation depends upon (i) a systematic initial granting of State land under this form of tenure to those judged best entitled to it, and (ii) the construction and subsequent maintenance to date of an exact and reliable Land Register of the rights conferred or derived thereunder. No systematic initial grant of tapu tenure was made or indeed can have been practicable when the Code was introduced. Consequently tapu tenure remained an occasional and imperfectly realised privilege of the few, instead of the regular tenure of State land it was intended to be. In many cases grants in tapu tenure were no doubt made to those best entitled to enjoy its rights and best able to discharge its obligations. But as a rule grants were made without any satisfactory investigation of conflicting claims. And in nearly all cases the definition of the land, which was purported to be affected, was incredibly ambiguous and vague.

Under these circumstances it would have been impossible to construct and maintain an intelligible and reliable Register of tapu tenure, even if the methods of doing so had been better understood. Actually a study of the working of the Ottoman Land Registries both in el 'Iraq and elsewhere demonstrates that this knowledge was lacking. Indeed the wider experience of the world shows that the construction and maintenance of a reliable Land Register has presented serious difficulties even to the best organised and equipped administrations.

The Ottoman Government had recognised before the war their failure to apply tapu tenure throughout their territories, as well as the basic causes of that failure. And they had enacted legislation empowering a systematic re-investigation and settlement of rights to land to be made vilayet by vilayet. It was intended that this settlement of rights should be based on a cadastral survey and be accompanied by a comprehensive valuation of the land and the establishment of an entirely new Land Register.*

4. The granting of tapu tenure in so many cases throughout el 'Iraq, [579] without proper investigation and settlement either (i) of the rights of those already attached to the soil or (ii) of the boundaries of the parcels which were purported to be affected, sowed a crop of conflicting claims throughout the country, which bore the seed of perpetual discontent and hardship, and in some districts periodically produced violent outbursts of lawlessness. The registered tapu holder (mutasarrif), who [427] possibly had family or economic ties with the land, who probably had conformed with the formalities prescribed by a Land Registry Official, and who no doubt acquired his uncertain rights for valuable or other consideration, claimed the position of landowner (mallak).† As such he demanded the landowner's share (mallakiya) in the produce, and asserted his right to mortgage the land and to bring in new cultivators if he wished.

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* Ottoman Provisional Law of Survey and Registration of Immovable Property, 1 Rabi Awal, 1331.

† Mallak should properly be restricted to mulk property. A tapu holder is not an owner, but a mutasarrif or the holder of registered usufructuary possession (tasarruf).

423 579 But occupying cultivators in the South, while recognising tribal allegiance and the State's legal ownership (raqaba) of the land, commonly regarded their tribal group as possessors of the soil by immemorial right, whatever the period of its occupancy of the land might in fact be. They frequently resented any demand for mallakiya, and indeed any claims to overlordship other than those of the State. It should not be assumed that in such disputes one side was invariably unjustly acquisitive or the other side obstinately recalcitrant. Each party doubtless thought that substantial justice lay on its side. Circumstances alter cases and it is neither possible nor useful to generalise on the point. It is the removal of the injury caused by these longstanding differences, alike to agricultural prosperity and to public peace, that is the objective, not the justification or satisfaction of particular disputants. As is well known this need was so strongly impressed on Government by recurring violence along the Hai and in the Muntafiq, occasioned by the perennial disputes arising out of the differences mentioned, that a law regulating the investigation and settlement of the conflicting claims in these areas was enacted two years ago and is now in course of application.*

621 622 423 178 In the northern rainfall zone the people generally lived in regular villages, under the shadow of a local *agha* or other notable, and cultivated the soil and pastured their flocks round about. As there was ordinarily more land than men to till it, land was brought under cultivation as required and successive generations commonly tilled the same groups of parcels, alternating fallow with sown. When necessary, the local leader became the intermediary between the people and any central Government that could make itself felt. Thus he compounded for the village tithe ('ushr) and collected appropriate contributions from the cultivators. He settled land disputes in village conclave or otherwise, and his jurisdiction to do so was of no material importance so long as these mediaeval conditions prevailed. As civilisation developed, towns became more attractive and communications improved, such local leadership sometimes tended to become absentee landlordship; while with the introduction of tapu tenure many village areas appear to have been wholly or partially registered as the personal possessions of local notables, without any consideration of the immemorial rights of those who had regularly occupied and tilled the land or pastured their flocks thereon. The pinch in these cases seems to have been mainly felt when the lands were pledged, and forfeited, to town-dwelling merchants for debt. The personal touch and interdependence that existed between even the most arbitrary local chieftain and the village cultivators appears not infrequently then to have been replaced by more mechanical efforts to exploit the land from outside and by obstruction to such efforts from within.

423 These generalised instances are only intended to serve as illustrations of the evil effects of granting tapu tenure in the past without a thorough study and due safeguard of previously existing rights. No comprehensive or detailed study of these cases is possible here.

5. When the maps from which Plates I and II were prepared were in process of compilation the Tapu Department did its best to show the location and extent of all land held under tapu tenure. Partly owing to the destruction of records by the retreating Turks, but much more owing to the inherent defects of their Land Registry methods, it was not found possible generally to do more than indicate approximately the outside limits of patches of territory thought to be affected. The maximum limits of these groups of territory will be seen, on reference to Table I, to cover about 40,000 square kilometres. It is impossible to say what proportion of the areas included would prove upon due investigation to be reasonably entitled to be held in tapu tenure.

*Law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq Lands. No. 23 of April 4, 1929.

As already observed the Ottoman Land Code provides that all land other than mulk brought under cultivation shall be held on tapu tenure directly from the State. The actual limitation of tapu tenure throughout the one time vilayets of Baghdad and Basra to a fraction of such land is commonly attributed to two Imperial Ottoman Iradas,* respectively issued about the years 1296 (1880) and 1307 (1891). I was not able to obtain copies of these Iradas; but I understand that the first prohibited further grants in tapu tenure either on payment of valuation fees (bedl mithl) or by auction, and that the second abrogated the right of acquisitive prescription of tapu tenure (haq el qarar) on the ostensible ground that the lands of el 'Iraq were being cultivated on terms of muzara'a (i.e. cultivation in partnership with land labourers). It was held that haq el qarar could only be claimed by persons directly and personally cultivating the lands; while the land labourers were barred because they worked for others. But the practical importance of these Iradas was probably slight. They appear in fact to have been little more than early recognitions by the Ottoman Government of the impracticability of applying tapu tenure under the conditions existing in these vilayets. Reference to Plates I and II and to Table I indicate, so far as the available information goes, that claims to tapu tenure are not appreciably more extensive in the old Deir el Zohr district (corresponding broadly to modern Kirkuk), in which its prescriptive acquisition continued under another Irada expressly to apply, than in the two vilayets in which such prescription was as expressly abolished. In short these legislative decrees were dead letters. Whatever their purport they could not alter, and should not disguise, the failure to apply tapu tenure throughout the country either generally or effectively. This failure still persists and is demonstrated by the well-known inability of Government to-day either to safeguard the rights or to enforce the obligations attaching in law to tapu tenure. The absence or unreliability of the information regarding the position and extent of the majority of the parcels claimed to be held on that tenure is indisputable. This is partially illustrated by the gross uncertainties of the location of such land on Plates I and II.

Nor is the unreliability of the Land Registry records confined to this crucial weakness. They are commonly out of date, and/or incomplete, and/or conflicting, and/or unintelligible, and/or of questionable validity. These defects apply to both forms of registered tenure (mulk and tapu). This state of affairs is generally and rightly realised to be mainly a heritage from the past. It is not due to any ignorance of existing defects or lack of zeal on the part of officers of the present service. On the contrary, I found among them a refreshingly realistic appreciation of past and present weaknesses; while during recent years a sustained and conscientious effort has been made to put the records steadily on to a better basis. There are also excellent features in the Department's procedure which should facilitate the root and branch reform that is needed to enable the Land Registry to discharge its statutory functions satisfactorily, if and when such a reform can be undertaken.

But although a warm measure of appreciation is justly due to the efforts that have been, or are still being, made to improve matters, the important facts that require to be recognised in summing up the existing position dispassionately are: -

(i) that tapu tenure as at present nominally applied, neither accords the security, nor ensures the discharge of the obligations, of that tenure as prescribed by law.

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* Sometimes termed Sultanic *Firmans.*

(ii) that the operation of tapu tenure depends upon the existence, and maintenance to date, of an efficient Land Register recording clear and unimpeachable rights to definite and locatable parcels of land.

(iii) that such a Register has never existed, does not exist, and cannot be quickly, easily or cheaply created.

And it has further to be recognised that the existing Land Registry necessarily confines its attention to mulk and tapu tenures. It is not in any sense a General Land Registry.

PART IV.—EXISTING CONDITIONS.

MIRI LAND (STATE DOMAIN)

1-4. General Situation

1. As ordinarily used in el 'Iraq the term miri land, or State Domain, 423 embraces the entire land surface of the country with the exception of land registered as owned in mulk or held on tapu tenure, the extent 471 of which is unknown. Of the compound total some 78,000 square kilometres is estimated to be occupied by scattered cultivation, and about another 15,000 square kilometres to be capable of cultivation (see Plates I and II and Table I). In the former figure are included the previous Ottoman Crown Estates, which comprised some of the most valuable land in the country. These estates were originally managed by a special estate service (El Dairet el Saniya). The administration, by common repute that has survived both in Palestine and el 'Iraq, was good. These estates were subsequently termed mudawara Lands, apparently because they were "turned over" to the civil administration after the Turkish revolution of 1908. They have since lost their separate identity and become merged in the general category of cultivated miri land, although, of course, their previous circumstances may have to be taken into account when considering the position of the present holders of such lands.

It is desirable at the outset to recognise that the huge agglomeration thus grouped under the name miri, or State Domain, reflects no real uniformity in legal status, customary practice, or actual treatment. Thus, while it is accurate and informative to speak of mulk ownership or of tapu tenure, there is no such thing as miri* tenure in law and an unknown variety of things in practice. Miri land simply represents the overwhelming residue of the country not held in mulk or on tapu tenure. It is none the less reasonable and convenient to maintain this elastic, if negative, category at least provisionally. For it accords with accepted tradition and statutory law (*a*) to regard the State as the basic landlord of all land other than mulk (and its derivative true waqf) and (*b*) to recognise that, whatever the rights of holders of miri land may be, they fall short of those of a duly registered mutasarrif of tapu land. But the powers of the State as such a landlord must evidently be exercised with most careful regard to the history of the land and to over-riding considerations of an equitable, economic and administrative nature, if they are to prove admissible in practice.

The general management and control of miri land, legally vested in 647 the State, is nominally entrusted to the State Domains Section (qism 423 el amlak el amiriya) of the Ministry of Finance, until recently the State Domains Department of the late Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture. Some such central State Domains Office is essential; while the keenness and public spirit that I encountered in this service cannot be too fully recognised. But the Department was quite inadequately staffed and equipped to discharge even the practicable part of its colossal titular duties. Actually in the prevailing absence of intelligible maps and

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* Using the term in its customary local, as opposed to the legal, connotation (see III. 1).

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647 423 records of miri land, such management and control as is possible of these heterogeneous and extensive territories must be carried out primarily in the district by persons in direct touch with the people and the parcels affected. Many questions are no doubt settled by the customary social leaders as elsewhere (e.g. tribal sheikhs) and never reach the administration. Those that do may in some cases be dealt with by one of the few local officers of the State Domains or even by another Department (e.g. on the Yusefiya by the Irrigation). But ordinarily the effective agents of Government in the control of miri lands are the officers of the provincial administration on the spot, who must act for the most part according to their individual judgment or on the instructions of their provincial superiors in each case. This local control is naturally subject to the direction, and occasionally to the intervention, of the State Domains service or the Ministry to which it is responsible. It is also necessarily subject to intervention by the Ministry of the Interior or of any other Ministry, whose public responsibilities may be affected by some action taken. It is further subject to intervention by any Deputy or influential private person who may be concerned or interested.

423 682 In a limited number of cases, disputes affecting the holding of miri land are decided under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, because of their reaction on tribal peace and public security. But since such disputes in theory merely concern the domestic management by Government of its own estates, they do not as a rule fall within the jurisdiction of any regular Court of Justice. Reference has already been made to the general failure to introduce the Land Code and more particularly tapu tenure effectively. Consequently by the side of a truncated and semi-atrophied Statute Law there have survived throughout the greater majority of the land, methods of acquiring and holding land which have never been regulated by law at all.

423 427 2. An attempt has already been made to illustrate in broad outline the conditions under which land has been for the most part occupied and cultivated in the rainfall zone. There are commonly two classes of people concerned. Firstly (*a*) the larger man, who may be the local Agha or a small capitalist who has helped to develop the land by providing funds, seed, etc. Secondly (*b*) the actual cultivator who, in the mountainous districts, has tamed the wilderness by building terraces, constructing water channels, clearing the ground, etc., and who, in the plains, has similarly, if less laboriously, reclaimed the land by regular tillage and fallow. It is evident that in actual fact a partnership commonly existed or exists between these two classes.

Now it is generally accepted that the intention of the Ottoman legislator, when promulgating the Land Code, was to establish the actual cultivator on the land; and when that cultivator has remained on the same land and effected improvements of a capital nature by his labour, his claim is clear. But the claim of the larger man instanced, who will almost invariably have co-operated in some indispensable way (e.g. by according protection, providing capital or essential assistance), who has very likely been acknowledged as landlord (mallak) and perhaps regularly received mallakiya, cannot be equitably or advisedly disregarded. Investigation on the spot would be needed to weigh the respective claims in each case; but it can be seen that, broadly speaking, local conditions have often produced an association in the development and cultivation of the land between local overlord and cultivating holder in these regions, in which both have rights that should be recognised in their mutual interest as well as that of the country at large.

423 619 In the Irrigation Zone and throughout the desert borders the Turks found the land for the most part in the hands of tribal confederations.

The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el 'Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country. 423 619

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised. 423 233

All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use. 423

8. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the 166 178

166 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick
178 building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer
(mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district
423 (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended,
651 wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of
miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many
619 liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective: but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent
619 years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants
at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual
427 terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

Government Department, certainly beyond the power of the organisation and resources so far devoted to the purpose. 423 427

This is not to say that no systematic efforts have been made to put the tenure of miri land on to a more secure and orderly basis. Many such efforts have been made throughout the country by Provincial Officers, the Irrigation Department, the Survey and others. Foremost among them must be mentioned the periodic revenue settlements in Amara, which not only defined the limits of the various tribal interests there, but have also tended to stabilise many lesser holdings. A valuable fiscal survey of a large part of the Basra Date Gardens has been done. A business-like survey, allotment and record of land accompanied the construction of the Yusefiya, and other canals: and pains have been taken to keep these records up to date. In the Dulaim liwa a careful list of all the holders of recognised parcels of land has been compiled and subsequent changes noted. Other instances could be given. Naturally, all the resulting compilations have serious imperfections regarded as permanent records of the rights admitted to miri land: but this was not usually their primary purpose and such imperfections were inevitable in the conditions under which the investigations had to be made. And whatever the imperfections of such undertakings may be, they deserve grateful recognition and they should materially facilitate further stabilisation of tenure. 427 185

But it must none the less be admitted that these were all detached uncorrelated efforts owing no inspiration to any concerted attempt of the Central Government to improve the position of the mass of holders of miri land. Broadly speaking, those who occupy and cultivate miri land are allowed to do so in the absence of more influential opposition. Possession is ordinarily nine points of the law: but neither long possession nor any other mode of acquisition confers security. Personal influence with the most effective arbiter is commonly the decisive factor at any moment in any particular land dispute: and anyone may find the most convincing claims set aside. Moreover, any dispute may be reopened at any time if circumstances promise a more favourable consideration of a disappointed party's case.

Having regard to the history of the land, the widespread acceptance of tribal rather than individual rights, and the extensive and ill-defined areas affected, this state of affairs is not really remarkable: but it none the less calls for recognition and progressive remedy.

5-7. PUMP DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIVERAIN TRACTS

5. As is well known there has been a rapid and extensive development of irrigation by privately owned pumps during the last ten years throughout the high level tracts bordering the main waterways (see Plates I and II). As is also well known, the confident expectations of an early and profitable return on the considerable sums sunk in this development have been largely disappointed. 312

Persevering efforts have been made to obtain consistent and comprehensive statistics of the numbers of pumps erected, of the horse power of those pumps and of the areas irrigable by them: but owing to the records having been differently dealt with at different times and in the various liwas and departments concerned, it has not been found possible to do so. Although this is disappointing, in view of the interest and importance of this development, it is not surprising. And I have none the less been enabled to illustrate the rapidity and extent of the

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private [439] pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 18, 157, 157, 288, 288, 463 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort [166] made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 464 465 439 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour, (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

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* A mishara is reckoned =2,500 sq. metres.

TABLE VI. PUMP DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIVERAIN TRACTS, 1921-9

NUMBERS AND AGGREGATE HORSE-POWER OF PUMPS EXISTING

Liwa	1921		1922		1923		1924		1925		1926		1927		1928		1929	
	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.
Mosul	(1)		(1)		(1)		(1)		(2)		(4)		(6)		9*		13*	
Kirkuk									(1)		(2)		(3)		4*		5*	
Diyala			3	41	4	48	8	102	17	336	32	683	37	1,009	54	1,427	85	1,445
Baghdad	103		111		102		107		196		(380)		(490)		856*		1,022*	
Dulaim	1		2	25	2	35	4	69	6	119	9	200	16	371	41	1,060	90	2,633
Karbala	1		1		1		1		1		1		1		2		3	
Hilla	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(6)		(12)		(18)		24*		34*	
Kut			2	15	6	51	14	136	27	364	32	140	73	1,512	166	3,508	390	10,904
Diwaniya	6	52	12	160	16*	239	34	669	97	2,206	143	3,434	177	4,606	216	6,044	243	7,165
Muntafiq									4	46	4	46	15	406	20	636	34	1,268
Amara	30	337	35	403	44	504	48	587	51	609	54	604	56	741	90	2,113	139	4,256
Total number of pumps	143		169		179		221		407		673		892		1,481		2,031	
Average horse-power returned‡		10·8		11·9		12·0		14·2		18·4		16·8		23·0		25·2		29·1
Approx. total area served in square kilometres†	190		250		270		390		940		1,580		2,560		4,670		7,320	

* Figures supplied by the Irrigation Department. All other figures supplied by Liwas.
Figures in brackets are guesses founded on such information as was available.
When not given, the horse-power figures were not returned or are too doubtful to use.
† The approximate areas served are based on an allowance of 50 misharas (0·126 sq. km.) per horse-power.

‡ The Irrigation records indicate that the average horse-power of all the pumps installed is somewhat lower than that of those returned here, e.g. 24 in 1928 and 20·8 in 1929. This would reduce the areas served in those years to 4,480 and 5,460 sq. km., on the basis given. The Department's 1930 figures show an increase in average horse-power to 28·1, a reduction of about 100 pump installations in the Baghdad liwa and of about 30 in the whole country. The principal increases are in the Amara and Kut liwas.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

312 seriously, many a decisively, injurious effect on the success of pump development as a whole. These difficulties all call for careful study and for steady and carefully considered ameliorative measures. They are, however, for the most part outside of the scope of this report. But underlying and aggravating all other difficulties there is a widely prevailing uncertainty of rights to hold and to exploit the land affected. This has in many cases poisoned the relations between the two classes mainly interested in the majority of these enterprises and reduced to a minimum the prospects of their successful co-operation. And it has nearly always left the rights and the obligations of those concerned injuriously indefinite towards both the Government and to those associated with them. Consequently the bulk of these pump-fed areas have never received the single-minded and unified agricultural management that was, and is, an essential condition of success. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the other adverse conditions recited would in any case have prevented the general and widespread success anticipated. But a number of instances have been given me of pump ventures that have proved profitable in spite of these handicaps, because unified management was, for one reason or another, possible and realised.

427 311 Be this as it may, it is indisputable that the prospects of general success would have been increased if in all cases the rights to the land affected had been authoritatively settled and the requisite unification of agricultural control had been secured, before capital and energy had been so lavishly expended on these ventures. It was most unfortunate that this remarkable agricultural development should have coincided with the singularly unstable economic period that has followed the war. But it can also be recognised now, in the light of experience, that the rush to develop these riverain tracts was carried out without sufficient preparation and foresight, and at a rate and to an extent which made too drastic demands upon the adaptability and the numbers of the primitive agricultural population upon whose efforts success ultimately depended.

311 312 The riverain tracts, which are primarily affected, are among the most valuable agricultural areas in the country, because (*a*) of their contiguity to the main waterways and roadways, (*b*) of the natural fertility of the alluvium deposited along the river ridges which contain them, and (*c*) of their relatively high levels, which facilitate drainage and minimise the dangers of high floods. But owing to the last quality any regular cultivation of these tracts necessitates the installation of some artificial means of lifting the water from the adjacent waterway on to the land.

312 Prior to the recent pump development such artificial means of water lifting were virtually confined to the local water wheel (kerid) or to other simple devices, operated by animal or man power. Where kerid cultivation exists to-day it seems not infrequently to be more efficient than pump cultivation, since the more laboriously acquired water tends to be more carefully used and the land to be more carefully tilled to receive it. So it may be accepted that where cultivation by kerid or other simple lifting devices existed previously, such cultivation was usually good of its kind.

311 [464] It therefore appears that until recent years cultivation in these valuable tracts was restricted to certain fringes watered by the simple types of lift mentioned, supplemented by rain in good years, and by flood water, through flood channels, when and where conditions permitted. And since land was comparatively plentiful and cultivators comparatively scarce, the parcels of land actually cultivated varied incessantly to meet soil impoverishment, flood devastations, river

changes, canal silting, tribal movements, Central Government action, or 311
other circumstances.

7. With relatively little exception the riverain tracts affected are 311
miri land. It has been noted how the cultivation previously shifted 423
therein in response to changing circumstances. The prescriptive claims
to pasture were naturally even more variable and indeterminate. It is 427
consequently not surprising that as the pump development movement
extended, these riverain tracts were found so closely interpenetrated by 312
prescriptive claims (lazma) of one sort or another, that few areas suitable for pump development were unaffected. These claims constituted a serious obstacle to the general development of the riverain tracts by pump installations. For at first the claimants as a whole had neither the desire, nor the enterprise, nor the ability to raise the capital needed to undertake this development themselves.

In discussing these prescriptive claims earlier their primarily tribal 427
origin was mentioned : and it appears that the prescriptive rights recog- 312
nised by the provincial authorities in pump agreements are preponder-
antly of such origin and character. These pump agreements may be 622
made in the name of a sheikh or sirkal, but he stands as the tribal or sub-tribal, representative. No doubt when the sheikh or sirkal is a forcible person, he may engulf in his own person the rights of his tribal associates. Alternatively when the sheikh or sirkal is a man of straw, unable to lead his section or keep it together, he may be displaced, and even lose his strictly tribal share in the common holding. In a number of cases, after the movement started and its potentialities had become more apparent, a sheikh or other leading member of a tribal section which claimed prescriptive rights over a promising area, himself erected a pump and cultivated the area with the labour of the other members of the section. Under these circumstances the difficulties of divided interests and divided control, so frequently attending these pump ventures, may not arise. And so far as my information goes it is pump ventures inaugurated and worked by a capable tribal leader under these conditions that promise to be the most successful.

But enterprising townsmen and others with tribal affiliations, who 427
wished to participate in the movement usually had to search for a suit- 312
able stretch of miri land and enter into an agreement with some group of
claimants to prescriptive rights over it. No very definite procedure was 311
required. The process may be loosely generalised somewhat as follows. An enterprising individual, having some miri land of uncertain limits and subject to uncertain prescriptive claims in mind, decided to buy a pump and engine, the capacity of which usually depended as much on his financial resources as the situation and extent of the land to be watered. He applied to the Governor of the Province for permission to erect the installation. This always necessitated a permit from the Irrigation Department (under the Irrigation and Embankments Law), and when the land was miri (as it usually was) the approval of the State Domains Department and the issue of a lease by them.

The Irrigation Department checked the suitability of the installation to the extent of land, according to the information given; and if they had the means tried to locate the land and check the area on a map. Otherwise the figures had to be accepted as notified. And even when the capacity of the installation and the area of the land (as quoted) were discrepant, it was often found that the pump had already been bought. The Department also tried to ensure that the site of the pumping plant was wisely chosen in regard to flood and low stage river conditions, as well as the distribution of the water for cultivation.

The State Domains Department acted through the provincial authorities, who necessarily had no better information as to the situation

427 and extent of the land affected than could be furnished to, or provided
311 by, the Irrigation Department.

312 But probably the two most unsatisfactory features of the proceedings were (i) the failure to settle the rights of prescriptive claimants definitely before allowing agreements to be made with them as *de facto* landholders, and (ii) the loose and unsatisfactory agreements, commonly entered into, between these claimants and the pump owners.

It is apparent now that it would have saved time, money and a great deal of trouble in the long run to have investigated and settled all prescriptive claims at the outset. It was reasonable and equitable that prescriptive claims based on effective exploitation of the soil should be recognised. But such recognition should have been coupled with an equally definite limitation of the claimants' rights to these specifically recognised areas. It was clearly unreasonable and contrary to the public interest that, in addition to such properly recognisable rights, a vague mass of indefinite and shifting claims should be allowed to persist and to interfere with the economic development of these tracts as a whole. It was desirable when the opportunity occurred to define alike the rights of prescriptive holders and the balance of unincumbered miri land free for exploitation by other parties under lease or grant from the State. And since the object of pump development was a much greater extension of cultivation it was evident that the necessarily restricted limits of previously existing cultivation would tend to be obliterated thereby. Consequently, if prescriptive claims were to be recognised on the only clear and equitable basis possible—that of effective exploitation of the land—it was important to investigate and record the existing limits of such exploitation before these limits were effaced.

If this had been more evident at the time, such claimants could no doubt have been justly accorded considerably smaller areas than are now claimed, while the Government would have secured a balance of free miri land irrigable by pump which might have been leased directly to those desirous of erecting pumps. No doubt in these circumstances the areas available for lease to pump owners would often have been awkwardly interspersed with the recognised prescriptive holdings; but this was unavoidable unless such claims had been repudiated. And if both parties had known exactly where they were at the outset, agreements between them could have been entered into on a much more satisfactory basis than was as a rule actually possible.

As it is the peculiar difficulties that have arisen in the tenure of these riverain holdings have been primarily occasioned by the uncertainty of the respective rights of pump owner and prescriptive holder, when these are different parties. When they are united in one person, or in a tribal or other group that displays effective cohesion, current difficulties for the most part resolve into those commonly attaching to the holding of miri land elsewhere. It is true that certain obligations are due to the situation of these holdings in proximity to the main waterways (e.g. the maintenance of flood protection) but these can be separately considered and were neither new nor unexpected.

So the problem of the riverain holdings in which pump development has taken place may be regarded essentially as a particular case of the general problem of the tenure of miri land. But this merely makes at least a provisional solution of this larger question the more imperative. And any such solution, when applied to the pump areas, must also provide for the definition and reconciliation of the respective rights of pump owners and prescriptive holders, when separate parties in a joint undertaking.

PART V.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS,

LAND REGISTER AND LAND SURVEY

1-5. Preliminary Considerations

1. The growth and maintenance of agricultural prosperity will primarily depend upon the intensification and multiplication of well-directed individual effort and enterprise on the part of the numerous body of persons, large and small, who effectively possess and manage for the time being, the holdings scattered throughout the 90,000 square kilometres of agriculturally productive land in the country. These landholders are the indispensable builders of national prosperity. The legislative and administrative policy of Government should be directed to strengthening, guiding and encouraging them as a body in their struggle on their innumerable estates and holdings to erect the fabric of a stable and progressive agricultural economy. And such an economy can only be established on the foundation of a stable land tenure. 000

No man engaged in the management and cultivation of a landholding, large or small, can be expected to sink his capital in the land and devote his energies unreservedly to its development, if he is uncertain whether he and his heirs will benefit by his husbandry. And the evils of such insecurity are aggravated if taxation of the land is uncertain, may be heavy and is variably assessed. When the development and cultivation of a holding is beyond the unaided powers of the landholder and his family (or is a group interest of any sort) it is no less essential to have unity of control coupled with willing and effective collaboration. In other words, conflicting rights and interests in the land must be reconciled wherever they occur, and adequate remuneration and satisfactory working conditions for agricultural capital, management and labour all be forthcoming.

The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Everyone directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent enquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole. And since the cultivation of the soil and the grazing of flocks comprises the livelihood and well-being of the vast majority of the population, the greater part of the time of officers of the provincial administration is taken up with attempts to regulate spasmodically and 423 427

423 427 ephemerally the unceasing stream of disputes concerning or arising out of the possession and use of land.

The confusion of land tenure throughout the country generally is not confined to one category of land. While it may be more general in the case of miri land, it is also common in the case of tapu land. The long-standing and bitter disputes in the Muntafiq area regarding land claimed to be held by tapu sanad are the most notorious, but far from the only, illustration of this. Similar uncertainties are common throughout the country, in regard to land claimed in tapu tenure, to land and trees claimed to be mulk possessions, and to land dedicated, or claimed to have been dedicated, under the various forms of waqf.

185 The execution of an effective reform of land tenure throughout el 'Iraq is a formidable undertaking and one which under the most favourable conditions is bound to take a great many years to complete. It is easy enough to draft bills designed to bring about academic reforms and to get these passed into law: but it is a very difficult matter to ensure that such enactments are beneficial and workable in sober practice and even more difficult to ensure their steady, intelligent and impartial application over the long term of years that must intervene between the introduction and the accomplishment throughout the whole country of the thorough-going reforms that are needed. But serious as the difficulties to be encountered are, they will yield, as they have done elsewhere, to intelligent, sincere and persevering attack.

185 423 2. The late State Domains Department warmly espoused and steadfastly advocated the implementation of the original attempt of the Ottoman administration to grant out all cultivated miri land on tapu tenure. This policy was loosely and, I venture to think, misleadingly termed the alienation of miri land. For alienation denotes an estrangement of legal ownership whereas such ownership (el raqaba) is specifically reserved to the State under tapu tenure. The correction has more than legal significance; because the expression "alienation of State land" connoted, both to the Department itself and to the public, the adoption of a new, a beneficial, and a feasible policy of distributing land hitherto held by the State to private, and for the most part to peasant, proprietors. Tapu tenure, as already noted, was expressly intended in the country of its origin to promote a body of industrious peasant proprietors and taxpayers.

423 427 In sober fact the overwhelming majority of the cultivated holdings, classified as miri in el 'Iraq, has for generations been in the hands of the people. Its possession is sufficiently subject to local or central interference to cause great individual insecurity of tenure, and all the evils resulting therefrom, as we have noticed. But while the legal ownership of the State is indisputable, its exercise of such ownership is, for the most part ineffective, uncertain and spasmodic. This is inevitable under existing conditions and is bound to remain so until they have been remedied.

The reform attempted by the Turks, and advocated again by the State Domains Department, was not, therefore, in any real sense, a substitution of private for public ownership of land. It was essentially no more than the legal regularisation in a prescribed form of the already widely existing private or communal holding of miri land. Some such reconciliation of actual with lawful tenure of miri land is indispensable if general security of tenure is to be established at all: and the greatest sympathy must be felt with the desire to effect this reconciliation through the medium of an established statutory tenure.

But the failure of the Ottoman Government to apply tapu tenure, either generally or effectively, alone constitutes a weighty warning against the adoption of this course. For there is no doubt about the earnestness or the persistence of the Turkish efforts, and nothing to show that el 'Iraq is better situated or equipped to succeed to-day. It has already been noted that even where tapu tenure is nominally in force at present in the country, neither its rights nor its obligations are secured; while the limits to which it purports to apply are rarely known. To a lesser extent the same is true of mulk.

Again, admirable as the underlying principles of tapu tenure for the most part are, the greater part of el 'Iraq is not yet ripe for the complete freedom of individual dealing with and mortgaging land that it confers. So long as tribal and other communal divisions remain strong, unrestricted individual freedom to dispose of land would be dangerous to public peace and contentment. And, until the great mass of smaller holders have gained much greater economic stability and experience than at present they possess, any general freedom to mortgage holdings would merely be an incitement to the piling up of unproductive debt. Moreover, a thorough and carefully considered review of the future needs of the country in the way of public works, of areas to be utilised as extensive pasture, or developed as forests, fisheries, etc., of territories to be otherwise specially ear-marked for communal or other reasons, should precede any appreciable extension of tapu tenure.

8. If the general introduction of tapu tenure of cultivated miri land must, on sober consideration, be dismissed as neither practicable nor desirable under present conditions, what is the alternative? In the first place, no single stereotyped tenure is applicable throughout the whole country or probably ever will be.

Thus, since a considerable part of the country is recognised as lawfully, if loosely and indefinitely, held in tapu tenure already, that tenure can no more be abrogated forthwith than it can be generally extended. Any comprehensive reform of land tenure in the country must include a rigid scrutiny of all existing claims to tapu tenure, the precise definition of the areas affected, and a thorough revision and clarification of the provisions of that tenure to make it workable and consequently recordable. But fresh grants in tapu tenure should be prohibited or very severely restricted, until this had been done.

Again, specific undertakings have been given by successive Governments in respect of the conversion of miri groves and gardens into either tapu or mulk tenure. Owing to the inexactness of the terminology commonly employed, the undertakings have been interpreted in both senses. These undertakings must clearly be honoured in one way or the other. But if the Government's promises permit, it would at least be advisable to restrict mulk proprietorship to the physical limits of well-established groves and gardens. In any case, here again, a systematic investigation of claims, definition of areas and formulation of clearer and more practicable conditions are needed. The areas affected are scattered all over the country.

Yet again, it has been foreshadowed that parcels of miri land—at least within the municipal limits of the more important towns—occupied by buildings which are classed as of a permanent character, shall be regularly recognised as mulk. And there are many other demands of urban tenure requiring attention, which cannot be entered into here.

There also exist numerous stretches of miri land already utilised

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for public purposes (e.g. as public waterways, railways, roads) which should be formally reserved forthwith as public utility areas.

It thus appears, on a most cursory examination, that there is a large, a pressing, and a complicated programme of practical reform waiting to be done in the existing legal categories of mulk, tapu and matruka (or manafa' umumiya) land alone. The complementary task of establishing the overwhelming balance of miri land on a securer and economically sounder basis is even more formidable. This balance, it will be remembered, includes the riverain tracts, the settlement of whose complex problems is probably the most imperative agrarian question of all.

185 The conclusion is inevitable that if any effective reform of existing land tenure is to be established at all throughout the country as a whole within the life-time of the present generation, it must be initiated and maintained on the simplest lines that will satisfy the bare essentials of equitable settlement of existing claims, of substantial security of subsequent tenure, and of even and economical taxation. Simplification of the land law and of the practical working of all tenures; simplification of the procedure of cadastral survey, of settlement and record of rights; simplification of fiscal assessment and collection, must be given the utmost possible consideration throughout.

4. It will be easier to see what simplifications of tapu tenure are desirable and justly possible when the existing provisions of that tenure have been analysed as applied or applicable in el 'Iraq to-day (see vii, 1). But from the point of view of the national interest the necessity of securing a fair and proper valuation of tapu acquisition payments (e.g. tapu mithl or bedl mithl) on all initial grants in this tenure is probably the most important. The enormous territories of miri land now existing constitute the principal capital of the nation and any transfer of rights over such land to individuals should be accompanied by equivalent advantages to the public purse. Timely provision against excessive shareholding, and for the nomination of authorised representatives when there are more than two or three shareholders, should also not be overlooked.

But since the vast majority of the cultivated land in el 'Iraq is miri, the necessity for the general simplification just emphasised applies with greatest force to this category of land. In general the simplest, the quickest and probably the only feasible method of placing the tenure of miri land on to a more satisfactory basis, is to accept to the utmost possible extent the present simple concepts and practices and to concentrate upon making their application more systematic, more equitable and more sure. It is evident that for many years to come at least, the tenure of the great mass of miri land throughout the country must be regulated locally, if it is to be governed by law at all. It is always possible for the central Government to intervene in particular cases here and there: but in the overwhelming majority of cases the questions that arise from day to day must continue to be decided on the spot by the people among themselves, or by the authority of a local public officer (e.g. mudir el nahiya) who is familiar with both the people and the land concerned. Consequently any tenure that is to be operative in practice must be understood by, and commend itself to, the judgment of the mass of actual landholders, social leaders and provincial authorities. Simple principles and simple procedure thus understood and accepted can be made to provide the foundation for an attainable reform which, modest though it may be, is preferable to the pursuit of more theoretically perfect tenures, which will inevitably sleep in the statute books because neither people, nor effective authority, nor conditions are ripe for their application. But desirable as it is to put the land tenure as rapidly as

possible on to a firm and complete basis of law and of fuller economic 185 freedom everywhere, it has to be recognised that the process must be gradual, particularly in the remoter and more backward parts of the country.

Some measure of discretionary control will require to be exercised 4023 in regard to the persons accepted as lawful holders of miri land, for two 185 reasons. In the first place, so long as there are tribal areas (dira) which must continue to be recognised, it may be necessary to restrict the holding 4028 of miri land within those areas to members of the tribal group concerned. In the second place holdings of miri land are not transmissible on death, and this would be inconsistent with that tenure as outlined. So that on the death of a miri holder a suitable successor has to be agreed upon. As we have seen the claims of the deceased holder's family to such succession are commonly admitted by prevailing custom. This is unquestionably in the public interest, provided the recognised representatives of the family are willing and able to discharge their obligations as miri holders to the community and the State. But it is necessary for the secure and economical working of miri, as of tapu tenure, that the number of representatives of a group of holders of a parcel of miri land shall be limited. In my provisional report I suggested that the number should not exceed three. In the case of holdings below a certain size (e.g. 10 misharas) limitation to a single recognised representative or holder might be advisable.

Such recognised representatives or holders should be in actual control 4023 of the land on the spot and thus effectively responsible for its 185 cultivation and management. He or they should preferably be chosen by the deceased holder's family (or the group concerned) with the assistance, if necessary, of the local authority. Commonly he or they would have taken a leading part in the cultivation and management of the holding previously. The responsibility of a recognised holder of miri land to his family must primarily be a matter between himself and that family, as it is now. Complaints of abuse could always, also as now, be brought before the local authority, and possibly in future in certain cases before the *qadi*. Again, when the size and productivity of a miri holding permits it could, if desired, be divided on the death of a previous holder. No mortgage direct or indirect of miri land is reconcilable with the tenure as outlined, nor (for reasons given above) does this appear to me desirable (v, 2). Possibly some restriction should also be exercised over the pledging of produce and of agricultural animals and implements.

In the interests of the nation and the agricultural community as a whole, it is essential to recognise in a practical way, from the first, the economic limitation set on both the fragmentation of holdings and the multiplication of shareholding. The capacity of a parcel of land to provide a livelihood is necessarily restricted, and those who actually develop and work on it, with their immediate households, must evidently have the first call on its production. Moreover, unless there is a surplus of profit to put back into the land the general advance in the standard of agriculture, which is so greatly needed, will be retarded, if not prevented. Security of tenure is one of the primary conditions of such an advance. But security of tenure must be coupled with a wide-spread and general opportunity to make agriculture provide more than a bare and narrow livelihood for the greater mass of the population engaged in it, if any sustained national advance is to be realised. Owing to the sparsity and mobility of the country's existing population and to the backward state of its agricultural development there should be no difficulty for very many years in preventing any uneconomical congestion of the agricultural community on the land. But excessive shareholding

4/23/85 already occurs in more intensive holdings (e.g. gardens) and in house property.

5. When considering the position in the riverain tracts, in my provisional report I suggested (iii, 24) that the simplest and the most appropriate means of regularising the holding of miri land was by standard leasehold agreements in accordance with prevailing theory and partially prevailing practice. It never appears to be contested, even by the most firmly entrenched holders of miri land, that the ownership of such land belongs to the State. Nor is it contended that this ownership is titular. But while the effective ownership of the State is recognised, it is claimed that this ownership does not carry the right to evict at will well-established holders from their holdings of miri land. Subject to good behaviour, to maintaining cultivation, to payment to Government of its revenue contribution, and to the satisfactory discharge of certain public duties, such holders of miri land claim a right of undisturbed possession, which in principle is universally admitted.

There will probably be no difficulty in formulating the main rights and obligations of miri holders in standard terms, if and when Government decide to maintain and systematise miri tenure. But within the main framework of this tenure considerable elasticity would have to be allowed for supplementary or even exceptional provisions required to meet varieties of local circumstances, of local customs and of agricultural needs. The rain-watered plains of the north, the valley cultivation of the hills, the pump-fed riverain tracts, the rice-growing fringes of the marshes, the areas supplied with regular free flow irrigation, are instances of such variations which will occur to all.

[651] At first sight the contingent obligations now customarily imposed on miri holders in the form of public duties appear to be impracticably onerous. But the obligation that needs definition most of all is the nature, the method of assessment and the method of payment of the revenue contribution, which represents the miri holder's amalgamated rent and tax to the nation, for the land he holds. General public duties should not fall on miri holders as such. They would more reasonably be discharged by some unpaid local dignitary, who could be accorded appropriate privileges.

In pursuance of the need to establish greater security of tenure and in conformity with customary doctrine, miri leaseholds held by long-established miri holders or their descendants, should normally be renewable in practice, although terminable in form. The duration of miri leaseholds might as a matter of regular routine be fixed at ten years. While such leaseholds should ordinarily be renewable to previous holders, if they had previously discharged their obligations satisfactorily, yet renewal should require a formal act on both sides. This would keep the nature of the tenure in the public mind; and the existing records up to date and reliable. Standard fees should be charged for all issues and renewals of miri leaseholds. These fees should in principle be limited to covering the aggregate cost of the simple administrative and technical procedure needed to maintain the necessary records satisfactorily.

6. THE LAND REGISTER

4/23 6. As already noted the Land Code only recognises the private holding of land in two ways. Such a holding must either be private [625] property (mulk) or it must be State property* held in tapu tenure. And the acquisition of all private holdings in either of these categories must be registered to be valid.

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* Miri in law including all cultivated land not owned in mulk.

be registered to be valid. Thus the Ottoman legislators intended and 423 provided that all holdings of cultivated land should be recorded in the Land Register. The inability of the Ottoman administration to put the land law into force, has left the greater part of the cultivated land of the country in parcels occupied on loose and irregular tenures unrecognised by the Statute law and unrecorded in the present limited Land Register. Instead of comprising, as intended, a record of all cultivated holdings that Register probably excludes from its purview between three-quarters and four-fifths of the cultivated zones. To permit the Land 185 Registry to perform its intended national function and constitute the 647 general and dependable custodian of land tenure that is needed, not only must its administration and procedure be drastically reformed, but the scope of its operations must be steadily extended until they include at least all privately held land of every recognised category. It should in fact become a General Land Registry (Daftarkhana umumiya el arazi) instead of being, as at present, a Department of tapu and mulk registration only. (Dairet el tapu.)

There are three points to which reform must more particularly be directed before the Land Registry can perform its functions. The Land Register is at present a register of transactions or deeds. Registration of deeds is an unreliable and incomplete method of recording rights to land. It should be converted into registration of title. There are also at present two decisive external obstacles to the construction and maintenance of an effective register of title. The first of these is the absence of a dependable cadastral survey. The existing service recognises this need and carries out scattered property surveys itself to the best of its ability: but this is no substitute for a properly controlled survey conducted by the technically competent Department. The second obstacle is the absence of practical provision to make the extreme multiplication and sub-division of shares upon inheritance of mulk property and tapu holdings economically workable. Such extreme shareholding may possibly still be rare, but it occurs*; and it would be fostered by the introduction of an efficient record until the position became unmanageable.

Since the major defects of the existing Land Registry are due for the most part to circumstances outside of the control of the Department itself, no useful purpose will be served by examining its internal procedure in detail now. Nor does space permit here of any explanation of the necessary conversion of the Register into a Register of Title. When the immediate questions of constructive reform have been decided the requisite modifications in the methods and machinery of record that should supplement them can be considered in detail if desired.

7. LAND SURVEY

7. Reference to Part II will recall to mind the position and prospects 423 of the national land survey, which it will be remembered is of a purely 647 topographical nature. So far as can be foreseen it will take about another 185 ten years to complete and map this survey on a scale of 1:10,000 throughout the cultivated area of the country, if the staff and efficiency of the Survey Department are sufficiently strengthened to enable them to push ahead with their general framework and to make good certain other weaknesses while continuing detail survey on the present lines. It may be hoped that Government will be able to afford the Department the necessary financial and administrative support to enable at least this modest forecast to be fulfilled.

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* E.g. see "A Report on el 'Iraq," page 22(b), by Ahmed Fehmi Beg, Director-General of Revenue, Government Press, Baghdad, 1926.

423 647 185 This forecast could be halved at relatively slight additional expense if a minor expansion of staff of all grades and of resources could be authorised, if land marks could be regularly safeguarded, and if an uninterrupted programme of work could be maintained. This would make a regular and equitable valuation of the Land for purposes of land revenue practicable within a reasonable period (see vi, 9).

But I see no prospect of any general programme of more detailed or larger scale survey being realisable, nor could it be recommended at present.

423 185 It has already been stressed that the execution of a methodical and trustworthy land survey of the country is a requisite condition of all effective land reform. It is a requisite condition not only of the establishment of a stable and secure land tenure and of an equitable assessment of land revenue, but also of any efficient system of irrigation and indeed of any reliable and systematic knowledge, development and use of the territorial resources of the country. It was, for example, to provide essential information for the Irrigation Department that the Survey has concentrated on work in the Irrigation Zone hitherto. It is, therefore, imperative that while devoting closer and more considered attention to the needs of land tenure in future, the Survey should call no halt in meeting these other primary needs.

Unquestionably a detailed cadastral survey, which reliably locates the limits of all individual holdings, is required to place land tenure and land revenue on to a thoroughly satisfactory basis. Only on the basis of such a survey can the unqualified stability and security of tenure be attained which is required to stimulate the development and productive capacity of the country fully. But the change from pronounced confusion now characteristic of land tenure to detailed order, is too great to be effected at a single step. The requisite detailed cadastral survey would be a lengthy and onerous undertaking for a much richer, better prepared and better equipped country. It should not be attempted in el 'Iraq at present.

[651] Doubtless in the vicinity of the larger towns and in other places, in which the higher value of land brings in commensurate receipts in higher fees or in increased rentals or other revenues to Government, true large scale cadastral surveys may be justified exceptionally. And the ultimate extension of a proper cadastral survey elsewhere, as development proceeds and land values increase, should always be kept in view.

But the hopes of establishing orderly record, secure tenure, and fair and dependable taxation of land throughout the overwhelming mass of the cultivated territories of the country within the next ten or fifteen years, must be based on a foundation of simpler and less detailed survey. To be precise, the measures of attainable land reform within any period worth envisaging at present should be such as are applicable, and can be maintained, in conjunction with a 1:10,000 topographical survey of the cultivated terrain of broadly the same character and accuracy as is now being produced. The work should be converted into (what has been aptly termed elsewhere) a topo-cadastral survey, without markedly increasing the complexity and closeness of the detail. The parcels or sub-divisions of the land adopted as cadastral units for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment, must be of considerable size and bounded (at least ordinarily and preponderantly) by easily recognisable physical features. The placing, and still more the subsequent maintenance and control by Government, of a host of artificial boundary beacons outlining individual holdings must be dismissed as entirely impracticable. It will be as much as the country can do to establish and

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl

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PLATE V

OUTLINE PLAN OF

MAHĀWĪL VILLAGE, HILLA LIWA

ILLUSTRATING SUBDIVISIONS INTO MAQATA'AS



[facing p. 41]

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protect the framework of survey reference points, which constitutes the one and only indispensable collection of ground marks.

The landed subdivision, cultivation unit, or estate, commonly known as *muqata'a*, which exists in one form or another throughout the greater part of the country, affords an admirable general instance of the type of topo-cadastral unit needed. Plate V shows the actual grouping of land in muqata'as in a village selected at random as well as their considerable variations in size. The term muqata'a itself is usually, if not invariably, applied to large existing agricultural holdings regardless of the method of tenure or the legal category or categories of land included therein. Existing muqata'as should not, of course, be surveyed and accepted as cadastral units without proper scrutiny of their history and tenure, while in some cases they may require subdivision and in others grouping. But subject to necessary investigation and adaptation to the practical requirements of survey and record, they constitute a series of major territorial units of the greatest economical importance agriculturally and the greatest practical importance administratively for the handling and maintenance of land reform. Where muqata'as do not exist, a similar artificial grouping of agricultural land for purposes of survey and record can be substituted. All the more important rights to land can be recorded with respect to some one or other of a series of such major territorial units, not as precisely as if a detailed cadastral survey could be carried out, but with a sufficiently substantial degree of exactness and reliability to provide a solid foundation for the most necessary reforms.

It can, therefore, be concluded that the main objective of survey during the next ten or fifteen years should be the execution of a topo-cadastral survey of the cultivated surface of the country on a scale of 1:10,000 of the existing muqata'as, or of similar artificial territorial groupings of land on the same general lines as at present. In principle this survey should be conducted in association with a preliminary settlement and subsequent record of rights, which will be next considered. And it must be embodied in accurately reproduced published maps, if it is to be of general value and use.

But an extent of territory that would occupy settlement for a number of years has already been mapped on 1:10,000 or some larger scale. So that the survey would be working in advance of settlement for a long time. None the less the co-operation of the Survey staff would be needed on the ground to embody in the maps revisions and additions required during the progress of settlement. The necessary association between the two branches of the work could be secured in this way, although probably not as conveniently or as economically as if the original survey had been done in conjunction with settlement. However, as experience is gained the character of the original survey could be increasingly suited to the later requirements of settlement.

Some reference to surveying from air photographs should be made in view of the discouraging outcome of the work done recently. The difficulties met with appear to have been occasioned by some failure by Government to ensure effective co-operation between the Survey Department and the air work. This should not prevent careful study of the advisability of again utilising air photography under more carefully considered arrangements at least in less accessible areas. The exclusion of all but bold topo-cadastral boundaries should facilitate the use of air photographs in the original survey : but the simplicity of detail, the quality of contouring needed for irrigation purposes and the scale adopted may be expected to continue to make the use of the plane table economical, and of the level necessary, throughout the cultivated terrain. But

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recent advances in the use of air photographs have been great, and further advances should be carefully followed by the Survey Department because of the great acceleration in the rate of survey which the utilisation of air photography secures. But while air work can unquestionably be carried out best by a specialist organisation, such work should be done as part and parcel of the national survey and not as an independent operation.

Finally, emphasis should perhaps again be laid on the necessity of basing all methods of detail survey on a mathematically sound and physically adequate framework of reference points. The provision and the maintenance of such a framework is the first and most important requirement of a dependable survey. It is just as dangerous and short-sighted to build up a survey on an unreliable foundation as a house, or to fail to maintain that foundation subsequently.

PART VI.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. SETTLEMENT OF RIGHTS TO LAND AND LAND VALUATION

1-5. Settlement of Rights to Land

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1. The injurious uncertainty and insecurity of tenure now so widely prevailing throughout el 'Iraq can only be terminated by a progressive settlement of rights to all individual holdings throughout the length and breadth of the country. This process may be left to the chances of a gradual consolidation over an indefinite future of the results brought about by the interplay of the innumerable social and economic forces operating among the population; or it may be brought about by the conscious statesmanship of Government aiming at the establishment of a sound basis for the development of national prosperity within as short a period as possible. It is such a deliberately planned settlement of rights to land alone that is considered here. Henceforward for brevity the process will frequently be called settlement of rights or simply settlement.

There are two radically different methods by which a settlement of rights may be undertaken throughout a territory. These may be termed respectively Sporadic settlement and Systematic settlement.

Sporadic settlement aims at allowing the work to be carried out piecemeal here and there as the circumstances of the particular settlement require, until it has been completed throughout the territory concerned. Thus any optional settlement must be sporadic, or any settlement which is compulsory on a specified occasion (e.g. when land changes hands).

Systematic settlement is effected methodically parcel by parcel until the work has been completed throughout the territory dealt with. A systematic settlement must be compulsory.

Sporadic settlement is the more attractive at first sight, because it appears to offer the same opportunity of settlement to all landholders in the country or even the possibility of an entirely voluntary operation. It has indeed been warmly advocated in el 'Iraq on the ground that it would be inequitable not to accord the same facilities to all those claiming rights to land. Actually, it is a delusion to suppose that by any method or expedient the same opportunities for settlement can be provided for all landholders everywhere at the same time. This is unquestionably desirable: but it is unfortunately impossible. Under the most favourable conditions any settlement of rights to land is bound to take many years to complete throughout the country. Consequently somehow or another a drastic selection or restriction must be exercised as to the holdings to be settled in any given period. A voluntary settlement would be unworkable. Applications might be made at the outset which would occupy the Settlement staff for years, or they might be so uncertain and irregular as to dislocate the work completely. Moreover, a voluntary settlement might drag on indefinitely everywhere. Again, a settlement effected when any land changed hands, or upon some such specific occasion, would demand staff and resources greatly beyond the country's means.

A sporadic settlement is sometimes possible in countries in which a great part of the necessary work of defining holdings, tenures and holders has been previously done, or in new countries in which the number of properties to be defined and recorded annually is relatively small. But a sporadic settlement is inevitably more difficult, more protracted and more costly—ordinarily very much more so—simply because it is essentially a settlement conducted in a haphazard and unmethodical manner.

But there are also more concrete obstacles which render any general sporadic settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq impracticable. It would require a numerous and competent staff capable of visiting at short notice over a long period of years an unknown number of holdings indiscriminately scattered throughout the country, and of authoritatively deciding their rightful limits, tenures, holders and many important ancillary details. It would require a Survey Department sufficiently well staffed and equipped, and with its work sufficiently well advanced everywhere, to enable all these scattered holdings to be concurrently mapped and incorporated piecemeal in a national cadastral survey. And it would also require in operation throughout the whole country a General Land Registry capable of recording efficiently the results of each separate settlement as it occurred and of all subsequent changes affecting the land concerned. For unless such changes were regularly recorded the work would rapidly get out of date again and the settlement would never be finished.

Even if it is thought that the first of these three requirements might be satisfied, the second and third unquestionably could not. It is a technically difficult and a prohibitively costly proceeding to build up the cadastral survey of a mosaic of holdings throughout any large territory in a piecemeal way. In el 'Iraq it is impossible to do so, for the basic framework of triangulation on which such a survey must depend is for the most part lacking and will take many years to provide. Moreover, it has been shown already that the execution of a genuine cadastral survey is beyond the capacity of the country, even if it was carried out in an effective and economical manner. A sporadic settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq is also impracticable because no General Land Register exists in which the results could be effectively recorded and subsequently kept up-to-date. Nor could such a General Land Register be readily established, even if the necessary financial provision could be made, as the history of the Tapu Land Register amply demonstrates.

There are further difficulties which need not be entered into. For it should be evident that it is impossible to attack the formidable task of effecting a settlement of rights to land in every part of the country at once. It is very much to be regretted that the long-standing disabilities of landholders cannot be remedied everywhere without delay. But since this is so, it is best to face the fact and at least to make a start at remedying them somewhere. The sporadic settlement of a limited number of parcels selected for some special reason is, of course, feasible, and may even be necessary. Thus the Government appears to be committed to the sporadic settlement of the miri groves and gardens, while the Tapu Department can hardly avoid continuing to seek to reconcile its records with fact whenever occasion demands. And there may be other cases in which public policy may require sporadic operations occasionally and exceptionally. But the main contention that a general sporadic settlement is impracticable holds true none the less, and however unavoidable and even justifiable a limited amount of privileged sporadic settlement may be, it is bound to be costly and to delay the progress of any general settlement out of all proportion to the extent of the territories specially dealt with in this way.

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2. A systematic settlement offers the only realisable prospect of establishing any general certainty and security of land tenure throughout the country. Even a systematic settlement would take many years to accomplish. It is evidently more urgently needed in some parts of the country and under some conditions than others. But, gradually and systematically, settlement of rights to hold or use land under any form of legal tenure should be extended over the whole land surface of the country. And concurrently, as such extension proceeds, measures should be taken to prevent the territory that has been dealt with from reverting again to the confusion of rights and uncertainty of tenure now commonly prevailing. For although a complete survey and settlement would be most beneficial irrespective of subsequent measures, since an immense obstacle to progress would be removed by merely clearing up existing uncertainties and providing a sure starting point for title even for the next few generations alone; yet the full benefits of a settlement will evidently be thrown away if the stability and security of tenure gained thereby are not subsequently maintained.

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The record (or General Land Register) of all holdings and their lawful holders that is needed for this purpose has been mentioned earlier (v, 6). It can be progressively compiled as survey and settlement are carried through the country. This is a very different thing to endeavouring to introduce it everywhere at once. As the compilation extends it can be kept up-to-date in conjunction with the survey by quite simple routine measures, provided the land law and current practice have been reconciled. Settlement should be undertaken, and the General Land Register arranged, geographically and follow the administrative divisions of the country—nahiya, qadha, liwa. When the boundaries of these divisions are doubtful they should be decided before or during settlement and survey. The necessity of adopting large territorial units of the muqata'a type as the main unit of survey and record has already been explained. It will be among the earliest, and not the least important, functions of settlement to subdivide each nahiya into these requisite units. Although existing muqata'as would naturally be adopted as such units when of suitable size and satisfactorily defined physically, yet these units need not in principle be units of property. Indeed, if they are to facilitate simplified operations as intended, they must frequently include a number of smaller parcels of property on the one hand, or they may represent portions of larger properties on the other. They should in short, primarily be chosen as convenient permanent subdivisions of the nahiya for the purposes mentioned, and be carefully distinguished as such from the units of property with whose boundaries they may coincide. To differentiate clearly between the two these units of survey, record and assessment, should be given a distinctive name. For convenience in this report they are provisionally termed Sections of the Nahiya (aqsam el nahiya), or more briefly referred to simply as sections.

3. When a settlement of rights has to be conducted under conditions similar to those in el 'Iraq—particularly in the general absence of a previous survey and reliable records—it must be conducted parcel by parcel in the field in the presence of the rival claimants, landholders and tenants, of their neighbours, and of the members of the local community generally. Only in the local setting can the Settlement Authority (whoever he be) get to understand the many-sided local problems on which he will be called upon to adjudicate. And only in that setting will he be able to obtain and weigh properly all the available evidence. A peasant who becomes befogged or lies in a Court-house or Government office will do so less readily when in local surroundings and in the presence of his neighbours who live on the land affected. His errors will also be more evident and be more easily rectified. Indeed,

185 deficiencies in the information presented and mistakes of all sorts, which might escape detection elsewhere, are often obvious on the spot. Moreover, it is impossible to transport to a distance (or even to discover in advance) all the local inhabitants who have knowledge of the past history of the land, any one of whom may supply important information at any stage of an inquiry conducted in the locality. Only in this manner can a settlement of rights be secured which will be understood and considered equitable by the general body of the agricultural community and thereby give them the confidence and the stimulus needed to get the best out of the land.

Provision must, of course, be made to ensure the attendance of all witnesses and the submission of all documents, whose evidence may prove useful in investigating the rights to any parcel of land. But special knowledge and care should be exercised before admitting the validity of documents, particularly if torn, dirty and hoary, or if uncorroborated by independent records, or if in conflict with the consistent evidence of accredited local witnesses. The fabrication of specious documentary evidence presents no great difficulty and is the obvious expedient of an unscrupulous claimant. But a little practical knowledge of the composition of inks and papers and of the forger's customary tricks will enable spurious documents to be fairly readily detected, while in more difficult cases recourse should be had to suitable chemical and physical tests in a scientific laboratory.

Whatever justification there may be elsewhere for composite bodies and elaborate procedure in the conduct of an initial settlement of rights, it has already been shown that the possibilities of any effective reform in el 'Iraq entirely depend upon the use of the simplest methods and procedure possible. Anything of the character of Settlement Commissions, consisting of three or more members, would be far too costly and slow to be practicable. Nor are there available in the judiciary anything like the number of judges with the necessary standing and knowledge of the Land Law and the land, who could be spared from the bench to sit on such Commissions. Nor even if such judges were available would it be either economical or advantageous to employ them in this manner. It can be said with confidence that if settlement is conducted in the field on the general lines recommended there should be no serious dispute or uncertainty in regard to the rightful holders of 80 to 90 per cent. of the holdings. And only a proportion of the remainder are likely to present problems of a nature to call for high judicial consideration. Such consideration will be needed in a small proportion of cases and it should be devoted to them alone, after all possible preliminary elucidation of facts has been carried out in the field by the routine processes of settlement. The cases that require high judicial consideration are unlikely to exceed 5 per cent. of the total at the outside, if the previous work has been properly done. Indeed, they should fall considerably below this figure. But even consideration of 1 or 2 per cent. of the total cases presented to the Settlement Authorities in the field might constitute a heavy additional demand upon the regular judiciary if settlement proceeded at all vigorously.

The best course would be to establish a special Land Court to operate in conjunction with settlement and to hear appeals from, or cases referred to it by, the settlement authorities. Careful provision would have to be made to limit these cases to the minimum strictly justified and necessary. Such a special Land Court would soon acquire unrivalled experience of the operation of the land law and accumulate a mass of valuable precedents. It would be able to deal with the cases submitted to it more rapidly and consistently and with much greater insight than the ordinary courts. The jurisdiction of this Land Court

might embrace all land cases, whether arising from the settlement or not: but if any considered programme of settlement is undertaken, probably more than one Land Court would be required. 185

4. The conduct of settlement operations in the field will be carried out more rapidly, more economically and more effectively by suitable individual executive officers than by Commissions of any sort or by officers with preponderantly judicial experience and training. Executive officers entrusted with the conduct of settlement operations (henceforward called Settlement Officers) should be very carefully selected for qualities of independence, integrity, judgment and experience of the people and the land, as well as for administrative capacity. And they must be capable of conducting simple cases in a judicial manner and exercising simple judicial powers with competence and dignity. For there are bound to be a number of marginal cases on which a minor dispute arises which requires investigation in a judicial manner, but which can most appropriately and economically be dealt with by the Settlement Officer acting in a judicial capacity on the spot.

The regular reference of such minor disputes to the suggested Land Court (or other competent Court) would make settlement impracticable by imposing innumerable delays on its progress and greatly increasing its cost. Such reference would also greatly augment the volume of formal court work. Nor is any gain in justice or efficiency to be expected thereby. A competent officer on the spot is in a much better position to decide the majority of such disputes equitably than a distant court. He will certainly do so more speedily and economically. The majority of more difficult and more doubtful cases alone should be referred to the regular court designated, whose proceedings will gain in value from being able to devote attention exclusively to them.

It is well known that experienced and capable Iraqi officials are at present far too few for the multifarious needs of the country. This is sufficiently evidenced by the enactment of the recent Discipline Law and the proceedings taken under it. Every first class Iraqi will be needed for some time ahead in the regular grades and for the regular work of Government. Settlement of rights is a temporary need apart from the current administration, and Government could not do better than entrust its conduct to some of the present Administrative Inspectors, who are being released from their current duties. It would be impossible to find anywhere a body of officers better fitted to discharge these onerous and responsible functions. They have served the Government of el 'Iraq devotedly for a number of years. They are familiar with the working of the various public services and have long been accustomed to collaborate with them. They have, for the most part, long since shown their knowledge of, and their interest in, the land problems with which they would be required to deal. They are familiar with the fundamental provisions of the current Ottoman Land Code, with post-war legislation affecting land and with the customary practices of the country. They have already had considerable judicial experience as magistrates. They know the country and the language of the people. They know, and are known by, all leading Iraqis. They understand and sympathise with the difficulties of landholders and cultivators, and they would spare no pains to help them. 647 185

5. It would occupy too much space to outline the procedure of settlement in any detail here. Nor will it serve any useful purpose to do so, until the Government have reached a decision on their general policy. But certain broad features of the work may perhaps be usefully indicated. 185

Each Settlement Officer should be entirely responsible for the conduct of settlement operations within a specified Settlement Area and be given the necessary judicial powers for the purpose, subject to such

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl

ERRATUM

p. 49, line 28 (second new paragraph), "reorganise" should be "recognise"

[Facing p. 48]

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provisions for reference and appeal to the suggested Land Court or other Court of Law as may be judged proper.

Work should be taken up nahiya by nahiya in collaboration with the local authorities and with the Survey. Every effort should be made to arrange proceedings so that the survey and settlement staff work independently, and thus are not delayed by each other. This should present exceptionally little difficulty in view of the large units to which it is suggested survey operations should be principally confined. Collaboration will be needed in the selection and definition of these units (Sections of Nahiyas) in the first place: but the survey staff will probably be able to undertake this part of the work with the assistance of the local officer (Mudir) in most cases, as soon as they have gained a little experience.

While the work is new to the people and while the procedure is being initially tested, it would be advisable for Settlement Officers to investigate all cases throughout themselves; but as soon as possible all preliminary investigations should be entrusted to Assistant Settlement Officers drawn from the junior ranks of the provincial administration. The speed, and consequently the economy, of the settlement could be greatly increased by this means. The permanent value of the work, as well as its future prospects, would depend very much on the quality of these Assistant Settlement Officers. As time passes and local difficulties are surmounted the operations of settlement could be increasingly undertaken by them. They should consequently be carefully chosen and the importance of their work be publicly recognised. Officers with the requisite qualities and experience should be specially selected in consultation with the Settlement Officer concerned. It would be a valuable recognition of their status if they could be given the rank of Qaimmaqam.

While I am clear that the formation of Commissions to conduct settlement operations would be inadvisable, Settlement Officers should be enabled to utilise the services of men of standing and experience in the country as Assessors in difficult cases when this is desired by all parties concerned. Care would have to be taken to ensure (i) that no one was nominated Assessor in a case in which he himself was in any way interested, and (ii) that no undue demands should be made on the time of any particular person. Perhaps a panel of suitable persons to act as Assessors in each Settlement Area might be drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior in consultation with the Settlement Officer concerned, from which the actual choice might in each case be made.

Due and sufficient notice should be given to the public before settlement of rights is begun in a nahiya. When begun it should be undertaken section by section in an orderly manner. All claimants to rights to hold or use or benefit from the use of land in a section should present themselves in person or by suitable deputy to the Settlement Officer on the day notified, irrespective of tenure or form of occupation. The settlement should embrace all forms of tenure and in all cases define the tenure recognised. Lawful charges on the land (e.g. mortgages of tapu land) should also be investigated. If different forms of tenure exist within the same section the limits between them should be surveyed. Otherwise, scientific survey should be strictly confined at the outset to the definition of the boundaries of sections. When the area of a section is sub-divided internally into a number of separate holdings, the record of the limits of these holdings within the section and of their superficial areas must be of a rough and ready nature based on local knowledge and local practice. Since a valuable control will be furnished by the survey limits and surveyed area of each section, the weaknesses of the interior survey and record will not affect other sections. And I am confident that with a little care and patience local men and local means will be found sufficiently adaptable to meet this need with the advice and general collaboration of the Survey.

In the process of settlement all claims to hold land on tapu tenure or in mulk, and the limits of land so held, will require to be thoroughly investigated and authoritatively decided in conjunction with other claims; but although such cases will be important when they arise, they will be a small proportion of the whole and they should present fewer difficulties. But it must be appreciated at the outset that here again a wide discrepancy will commonly be found between law and fact. In law mulk is only valid if registered, while the root of title of all lands granted on tapu tenure exists, and exists solely, in the Land Registers of the Government and in the certificates of registration (tapu sanads) issued by the Land Registry Department (Dairet el Tapu) in conformity with those registers. Now the general imperfection of the Land Registers is well known, and it can be anticipated with confidence that titles to hold land in mulk or tapu would suffer very severely if the legal basis for those titles was solely considered and demanded. Ordinarily under the operation of the Land Code hardships arising from such investigations of legal title to tapu tenure would be mitigated by the recognition of haq el qarar (acquisitive prescription of tapu tenure); but since haq el qarar has long been inoperative this safeguard will be unavailable. Similar difficulties will occur in establishing waqf.

Here, as generally, the solution is to reorganise[1] fact and discount fiction. Suitable provisions should be included in any enactment providing for settlement of rights to land, to allow any claims to mulk or tapu or waqf rights to be adjudged on all the evidence of the facts available, and not merely, or necessarily at all, on the basis of the admittedly unreliable, and often unintelligible, existing Land Registers.

As settlement proceeds a schedule embodying the results should be prepared by the Settlement Officer for each section of each nahiya. In this should be set forth all the more important details. Among these may be mentioned:

(i) The total area of the section.
(ii) The uncultivated area included.
(iii) A list of the separate holdings recognised.
(iv) The location and area (cultivable and uncultivable) of such holdings given with such precision as is possible.
(v) The names of the accepted holders, tenants or holders of other rights with a statement of the nature of all such rights.

Separate holdings should be numbered consecutively throughout the section for convenience of reference.

After suitable periods for publicity and amendment resulting therefrom, and also for appeal as previously suggested, this Schedule would become the record of the settlement of rights to land in the section concerned, and would constitute with the Survey map and documents the authority and basis of the new General Land Register required.

6–8. Selection of Settlement Areas

6. Although settlement of rights is gravely needed throughout the whole country it can evidently only be undertaken in a limited number of places at a time, and it must be expected to take a number of years to complete. If work is to proceed it is therefore a matter of some moment to decide the places in which it shall be commenced. The area of practicable and useful choice is restricted to the districts in which detail survey has been carried out or in which the triangulation framework can be completed in time to allow the suggested topo-cadastral survey to be

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[1] "reorganize" should be "recognize"

185 pushed forward in conjunction with settlement operations without delaying the latter. Broadly speaking this means that settlement can be carried out as extensively as men and resources permit in the Irrigation Zone, but must be limited in the Rainfall Zone to the immediate vicinity of Mosul town (see Plates III and IV).

423 185 In this neighbourhood the land is widely held, or claimed, in tapu tenure (see Plate II) and special efforts have been made by the Tapu Department during recent years to clear up uncertainties and define the parcels justly affected. It was primarily on this account that a considerable block of isolated detailed survey has been completed here. Settlement of this block of territory therefore appears preponderantly to involve an investigation and definition of the parcels held in tapu tenure and, so far as such parcels are concerned, to have been in progress for some time. But rights to tapu tenure should be systematically reviewed and if possible rights to miri land concurrently settled, throughout this area by an independent Settlement Officer in collaboration with the Survey at an early date.

In the Irrigation Zone a considerable amount of detailed survey has been completed in every liwa and there is a wide range of territory in various stages of readiness for systematic settlement.

423 185 651 In el Amara, as is well known, the political and administrative conditions have been retained on an almost exclusively tribal basis, the miri lands (of which the liwa is almost exclusively composed) being farmed out to various tribal sheikhs for triennially assessed payments. It is impossible to discuss the details of these methods here; nor is there any need, since the agrarian conditions of no liwa have been investigated and reported on so regularly or so fully, owing to these periodic assessments. Each successive assessment has built on that which preceded it, but has been carried out in greater detail with increasing attention to the smaller men who hold from the leading sheikhs and really manage and work the land. If public security and genuine national consciousness continue to grow these periodic assessments should crystallise steadily into an effective settlement of rights to land. But the conditions under which the work had to be done in the past were extremely difficult, and if this end is to be obtained (and even if the revenue assessments are to be as equitable and reliable as is now reasonable and practicable) the work must be more closely based upon trustworthy detailed survey and rights be investigated more thoroughly than has so far been possible. A reassessment of the Amara estates (muqata'as) was due, and has doubtless been undertaken, this year. And under the agreements in force with the leading sheikhs the prevailing system terminates and is open to review in 1934. The consideration of fuller and more permanent settlement of rights in this district can therefore properly be left over until this termination approaches, or a further reassessment is arranged.

In the Basra liwa, as already observed, an excellent fiscal survey of the date gardens was carried out several years ago. And the principle of a regular Land Tax has long been familiar through the operation of Midhat Pasha's enlightened *jarib* tax.* The tenure of these gardens (mulk or miri) appears to be rarely, if at all, disputed. For the most part the mulk owners are well known, or could readily be determined.
185 Consequently a relatively minor effort would enable titles to be authoritatively reviewed and, when necessary, settled throughout the Basra reach on the basis of the existing survey. The respective responsibilities of garden owners and the State for the maintenance of the tidal
[312] creeks off the Shatt el Arab, from which the gardens are largely watered,

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* A commutation of the Government crop share on date gardens into a tax assessed by quality and area, carried out in 1871. A jarib=3967 square metres, or 0·98 of an acre.

should also be decided on grounds of common interest and common sense, not by expositions of the law. 185

The management of the miri, or State Domain, date gardens must be mentioned as it has been the subject of controversy for some time and calls for some consistent policy. But interesting and important intrinsically as the points of principle and practice involved are, space does not allow of their consideration here. In its relation to the major problems of the land tenure of the country as a whole, this is a domestic question for the separate consideration of Government in its capacity as one landholder among many. 423

In the Muntafiq liwa, as we have noted, an authoritative settlement of disputes arising out of important and long-standing claims to hold land in tapu tenure was initiated recently under a special law (see iii, 4). But the work appears to be limited to investigations into claims to this tenure alone and thus to fall considerably short of the general settlement of rights to land that is needed throughout the country. If land is declared free of tapu rights it is, I believe, simply recorded as miri without any settlement of the rights of those in occupation of it. Even a successful settlement of tapu rights alone in this, or in any, area is no doubt a valuable contribution to the general introduction of secure land tenure needed: but when all the cost of carrying out investigation of tapu claims is being incurred in a district so honeycombed with them, it would be a great pity to miss the opportunity to effect a thorough and complete settlement. 123 185

And although it was natural, and very possibly desirable, to entrust this particular piece of settlement originally to a Commission, it is permissible to doubt whether the diversion of three important members of the judiciary and two important members of the administration from their normal duties will continue to be justified by any persistent delicacy or difficulty in the investigation of tapu rights in this particular district. The general widespread need of settlement in all parts of the country is commonly admitted. I have represented earlier that the only hope of satisfying this need within the lifetime of the present generation is to adopt the simplest and cheapest procedure and machinery possible everywhere. No doubt the size and composition of the Muntafiq Commission helped to inspire confidence among the disputants with whom it had to deal, but with all its qualities and advantages a Commission of this nature is bound to be costly and deliberate, and unduly to absorb for the benefit of one locality, public service and public funds which can be ill spared from the much wider general national effort that is needed. At a suitable opportunity (of which the Commission itself would be the appropriate judge) the work which they have initiated might be transferred to an organisation of the simpler character that I have recommended for adoption elsewhere, without breach of continuity, authority or efficiency. 123 185 647

In the remaining liwas of the Irrigation Zone there are several canal areas already mentioned (e.g. the Yusefiya canal area) which were settled by the Irrigation Department, when the canals irrigating them were remodelled or constructed. The work that I saw appeared to have been well done and was certainly well recorded. It should not be allowed to fall into confusion. Owing to various chances I did not succeed in visiting the Latifiya estate, which I very much regret, as the lessons to be derived from its methods and experience in the field of agricultural development should be extremely valuable; but in respect of land tenure it can no doubt be regarded as a specially granted and administered canal area.

The Dulaim reach is ripe for settlement because of much good investigatory work already done and recorded; but largely for this very reason, settlement (except possibly in its lower portion) can, I think, 123 185

be delayed with less disadvantage here than in areas in which the unsolved pump problems cluster more thickly.

7. Throughout the Irrigation Zone as a whole it is the riverain tracts watered by pump installations which appear to me to call most insistently for early and authoritative settlement of rights. Economically it is these mechanically watered territories (whose approximate extent is indicated on Plate II and embraces about 10,000 square kilometres) that present the most urgent as well as the most intricate problems. And it is these territories that the most progressive elements in the nation are particularly endeavouring to develop.

It can be recognised now without reproach or fault-finding that the interests alike of the nation as a whole, of the claimants to prescriptive rights, and of members of the public willing to invest money and energy in the development of these riverain tracts, would have been immeasurably better served if all pre-existing rights had been properly investigated and settled, and if the parcels of land affected had been satisfactorily defined and recorded, before pump permits were granted in increased numbers and before agreements with reputed holders of prescriptive rights had been recognised.

The systematic settlement of rights to land throughout these tracts, that I have already recommended, affords a second opportunity of putting matters on to a stable footing; but it need hardly be repeated that the position of prescriptive holders has been appreciably strengthened and the extent of their claims appreciably increased in the interval. When such holders (corporate or individual) have in effect themselves invested money and effort in pump works, etc., this may be accepted without regret, provided their holdings promise to be effectively developed. Where, what may perhaps be briefly called, dual enterprises are in operation, it is impossible to formulate any general conclusions having regard to the great varieties of conditions in the terms of the agreements made and in the personalities concerned. But it can be said with assurance that a definition of existing rights still remains the first step to a clarification of the relative positions of those associated in these dual enterprises and that such clarification is, in its turn, the doorway towards improvement. Whatever mistakes have been made in the past, whether by the Government itself or by the parties concerned, there will be no hesitation in agreeing that it is in the common interest now, wherever and however reasonably possible, either to reconcile or to separate the interests of those unsuccessfully associated in these joint enterprises.

The complication of conflicting claims and rights in these riverain tracts is very great, but the conditions differ so much from one pump area to the next that there is no general decision that can clear up the existing tangle. This can only be done by a patient investigation and settlement parcel by parcel conducted by a competent and impartial officer equipped with the necessary powers. While I do not pretend that such a settlement of rights in these areas would be easy, I am quite confident that it is practicable. And there can be no doubt that it is most necessary both in the interests of the country as a whole and of the particular parties concerned in each case.

The normally convenient section of survey and record throughout these riverain tracts will tend to conform to the limits worked by a pump, or battery of pumps, as a unified agricultural holding. Sections so indicated will probably be fairly stable; but they may frequently require subdivision for fiscal assessment. High ground not commanded by the pump, or not worth cultivating, would be included or constituted part of an adjoining section, as best suited the general requirements of the work.

The first objective of any settlement of rights in the pump areas should therefore be a systematic investigation and detailed settlement of the prescriptive claims admitted as the basis of existing agreements. This is undeniably difficult because the indications of earlier cultivation, in the light of which this settlement might have been previously carried out, have now been submerged by the great extension of cultivation. It has consequently been suggested that the only practicable course is to allow a specific area per adult male cultivator whose right to participate is recognised. This area would naturally vary according to the locality and the general conditions prevailing. Under certain conditions this expedient may be the best, or indeed the only practicable, course; but it savours of a new allotment of land rather than of a recognition of a claim based upon previous use. As a general rule, and wherever possible, it is preferable that the physical recognition of the limits affected by a prescriptive claim, as well as the equitable recognition of the claim itself, should be based upon reasonably attested previous exploitation of the soil. I believe that a painstaking, experienced and impartial officer studying local features and hearing local evidence on the spot, will even now generally be able to arrive at very dependable conclusions regarding both (i) the limits of old effective occupation and use and (ii) the present-day representatives of the previous occupants and users.

It has been mentioned earlier that the prior rights recognised by the provincial authorities as the basis of so many pump agreements were largely of tribal origin and character. During settlement the exact nature of all holdings should be carefully investigated and recorded in a manner that is compatible with their origin and character. This should present no undue difficulty in the cases referred to, if the leasehold form of miri tenure is systematically applied in future. It would probably be sufficient if the lease was made with the accepted head of the tribal section (reis-el-firqa) as such. Or legislative provision might be made to recognise tribal sections as juristic persons represented in each case by a duly appointed head or a small council (lujna), when preferred. In the event of the death of the accepted head, or other representative, of a tribal section a substitute would need to be forthwith nominated. When there was no disagreement, such nomination would no doubt be a matter for the tribal section concerned, but the local authorities should be empowered to make the nomination, after consultation with the members of such a section, when the latter were unable to agree.

8. On a general review it is evident that the prospective field of settlement is very large. But it is unfortunately no less evident that, under existing conditions, any immediate commencement can only be on a very small scale. I suggest for consideration the appointment of three small settlement parties under the charge of three of the present Administrative Inspectors as Settlement Officers. One of these Settlement Officers might take over the work in the Muntafiq if and as circumstances and occasion permit. The development of this work into a general settlement of miri holdings as well should be considered. Such a development is very desirable if it can be reconciled with the primary need to terminate promptly the long-standing disputes regarding tapu tenure in this district. Alternatively the miri areas could be revisited and settled in detail subsequently; but this would necessarily be slower, more costly and probably less satisfactory in the long run.

The selection of the other two areas in which settlement could most advantageously be initiated is inevitably difficult, when there is so much work waiting to be done everywhere. In my opinion it is at least clear that the settlement of the difficulties that have occurred in the development of the riverain tracts by pump is the most pressing of

185 many pressing problems. I therefore suggest that two settlement areas should be constituted in these tracts, preferably one situated on the Tigris and the other on the Euphrates. From these as starting points, settlement of these tracts could progressively be extended up and down the two rivers until they had been completed.

The above is no doubt an extremely modest programme; but it is better to begin modestly than to continue to postpone these greatly needed land reforms indefinitely. After six months practical experience in the field, and of the cost and speed of the work in three different settlement areas, there would be solid grounds on which to base plans for an extension of operations.

185 423 It will not have escaped attention that the completion of the work already partly done in the Mosul and Basra liwas is not included in this initial programme. This is not because such exclusion can be contentedly acquiesced in, even temporarily, but because it appears to me that a cessation of the appeasement that has been started in the Muntafiq, or still further delay in placing pump cultivation along the river reaches on to a healthy basis, would be even more deplorable.

9. LAND VALUATION

651 185 1. For reasons given earlier (ii, 4) it has not appeared useful to comment either on the recently superseded land revenue methods or on the two new laws But the old and the new appear mutually to envisage the eventual establishment of a regular land tax or Government rental, if this term is preferable. By this I mean the valuation of the land by appropriate means and the assessment and imposition of an annual payment based thereon. Thus, in the explanation issued with the displaced land tax assessment law,* the Land Revenue policy of Government was described as "the imposition of a fixed assessment in cash per unit of area of land," while the universal application of this method ultimately was foreshadowed. And Article 6 of the law required that the process of assessment should include survey, the classification of the land into grades according to the quantity and value of the produce, and the resulting assessment per unit of area of each grade.

And I understand Article 6 of the second of the new laws to provide for the early completion of the survey and valuation of all cultivated miri land and all irrigated tapu land with a view to the assessment and imposition of an annual rental thereon.

The ultimate objective in this important sphere of reform therefore appears essentially to be unchanged, and it is an objective which, in my opinion, alone offers any prospect of escape from the inequalities, irregularities, uncertainties and hardships inseparable from the wisest and most carefully considered combinations of stop-gap methods lacking a uniform and systematic basis. For pending a methodical valuation of the land there are bound to be seriously unsatisfactory features in any land revenue expedients adopted.

185 The section of the nahiya (qism el nahiya) suggested earlier as the land unit of immediate topo-cadastral survey and record (v, 7, and vi, 2) should also constitute a suitable land unit for revenue purposes, if carefully selected with this further object also in view. No doubt the quality of the land within the limits of such sections will not be strictly uniform, and may frequently include salty or other uncultivable patches on the one hand, and possibly gardens or other exceptionally fertile pieces on the other. When the conditions really justify it, areas differing markedly from the general quality of the land within the section can be excluded or specially treated; but so far as practicable an average valuation of the section should be aimed at, taking the good with the

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* *"Law prescribing the methods of assessment of land tax and rent due to Government."* No. 40 *of* 1929.

bad, especially when the section coincides with an estate (muqata'a) owned or managed as a cultivation unit. Such general averaging of the land value throughout each section may add a little to the difficulty of initial valuation, but it will enormously facilitate subsequent collection and administration of the tax and the prevention of abuse. When series of small holdings occur in a section of markedly irregular quality, subdivision of the section and more careful detailed valuation will no doubt be necessary; but such cases should be a small proportion of the whole, although in certain districts they may predominate. But having regard to the supreme importance, both to Government and to landholders and peasantry, of getting the taxation of the agricultural industry on to a better basis throughout the whole country with the utmost dispatch, a bold policy of general averaging of value throughout each section of a nahiya should, I suggest, be adopted in the first place. Some, even considerable, unevennesses there would unquestionably be; but only by accepting such imperfections can a generally tolerable and workable system of land tax be introduced without excessive delay. And the results should be compared, not with the ideally assessed taxation of selected parcels of land that could be obtained by slow and careful work; but with the degree of solid improvement on existing conditions attainable for the nation at large and the great mass of land revenue payers within the shortest possible period. Once such a basis of general valuation existed throughout the country a progressive improvement could be undertaken.

Selection, definition and valuation of sections of nahiyas need not wait upon settlement. Wherever the detail survey has been completed, the former work could be put in hand and pressed forward independently. Lack or uncertainty of ownership does not prevent taxation now, and should be no bar to putting assessment on to an orderly and carefully considered basis in advance of a settlement of legal rights. And such a definition and valuation of sections ahead of settlement, accompanied as it should be by a roll of land taxpayers compiled section by section throughout nahiyas, would immensely facilitate and accelerate the subsequent slower march of settlement.

The detail survey is sufficiently advanced throughout the Irrigation Zone to enable this work to be taken up promptly and pressed forward as vigorously as staff and funds permit for a few years; but a gradual expansion of the Survey staff would be needed throughout those same years to allow survey and land valuation to proceed with the speed desirable afterwards. For it will be remembered that in accordance with the present programme another ten years may be expected to be required to complete the detailed survey of the cultivated area of the country. A delay of another ten years, in putting the Land Revenue system of the country on to a better basis, could hardly be accepted with equanimity.

In this connection I should again emphasise the extreme importance of carefully considering, and then steadfastly maintaining, the authorised programme of survey. Nothing has dissipated the efforts and the value of public expenditure provided for the Survey Department more than the continually varying demands made upon it during the last ten years. Small occasional special demands there must be; but if important national objectives, such as those under consideration, are to be secured in reasonable time and at reasonable cost, continuity of the main programme of survey work must be maintained.

No attempt is made here to consider the qualifications of the staff or the nature of the methods that would be necessary to carry out the systematic valuation of land for fiscal purposes suggested. These could be decided more usefully later should Government adopt some such procedure as outlined.

PART VII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. LEGISLATION, INITIAL FEES, GENERAL CO-OPERATION

1 AND 2. LEGISLATION

185 1. I have neither thought it possible nor useful to endeavour to catalogue the many ambiguities, omissions, contradictions and redundancies of the Statute Law as it stands. The existence of serious defects in all these respects is not likely to be contested; nor that the law must be made consistent, intelligible and adequate, if the tenure of land is to be put on a clear and stable legal basis. But two conditions must be satisfied before any constructive amendment of the law can be advantageously undertaken.

In the first place we should know where we stand. In the second we should know where we are going. The first demands a careful study and authoritative statement of the existing law with a view to as complete an elucidation as possible of the points on which it is ambiguous or defective, in preparation for comprehensive clarification and amendment, as well as as a guide to those dealing with land questions in the meantime. A similar need arose in Palestine and was met by a most valuable "Statement of the Land Law of Palestine" prepared by Messrs. Goadby and Dukhan in 1927. Copies of this work were supplied to the 'Iraqi Government at the time. For although recent legislation in the two countries is different the foundation of their land law is, of course, the same. The preparation of a similar statement of the existing Land Law of el 'Iraq should be greatly facilitated by this previous work. But in el 'Iraq custom and administrative practice exercise so much wider and more powerful an influence on land dealings than the statute law, that special provision should be made to include them in an appropriate manner in such a statement. [423]

I recommend that two competent officers shall be nominated by Government to undertake this important preparatory work. I suggest that one of these shall be an officer with legal training and knowledge of the existing land law and of its administration in the Courts, and that the other shall be an officer with personal knowledge and experience of the actual practices prevailing in the holding, use and transfer of land throughout the country These officers should be instructed to make specific recommendations in due course for the progressive amendment and codification of the Land Law.

The second requisite preliminary is a decision by Government on the critical questions of principle or policy, which occasioned the present inquiry, and on points of law which are presented in the suggested statement.

2. The direct object of a general settlement of rights is the establishment of land tenure progressively throughout the country on a firm foundation of legal right determined in a judicial manner on the spot with reference to actual and physically defined parcels of land. Moreover, to perpetuate the definition and security of tenure thereby obtained, the results should be suitably incorporated in an effective record (or Land Register) which thereafter is continuously kept up-to-date. The whole

process calls for a body of carefully considered and carefully co-ordinated legislation.

By whatever methods the initial settlement is conducted there must be a lengthy period during which land holdings are in one of three distinct conditions: (*a*) their initial unsettled condition, (*b*) a transitory condition while undergoing settlement, (*c*) an ultimately settled condition. A similar distinction should be preserved in the legislation applying to the three. The first stage is intended to disappear finally, if gradually, so that legislative provisions applying to it alone should disappear with it. The second is also a transitory stage, which should be governed by a special law for the settlement of rights to land. This law should provide the necessary authority for, and prescribe the general conduct of, the settlement. The character of the process and the nature of the procedure have already been discussed. The third stage requires legislation designed to place the land law and land tenure of the country permanently on a sound footing. The detailed elucidation of the existing land law and operative practice recommended above should furnish the necessary foundation for the progressive amendment and re-enactment of the whole land law that is needed. This should include a new law providing for the regular registration of rights to land subsequent to settlement, which would replace the various Ottoman laws and regulations on the subject now in force.

The preparation of the full body of legislation needed will demand a good deal of study, effort and time. It is useless to enact it unless the Government have carefully weighed the need and have given the requisite measures their considered approval. They are unlikely to do this unreservedly or finally on the strength of even the most careful and thorough preliminary study alone. And even if they did so the legislation would be sterile until some simple organisation for the general conduct and co-ordination of the work had been established, suitable settlement officers appointed, effective investigationary and technical procedure adopted.

It therefore appears on all grounds advisable to pass legislation of a provisional nature in the first place, providing for the abrogation of the existing law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq lands, if and when deemed advisable, and for the execution of settlement on the general lines recommended and in such areas as Government may decide. This would have the advantage of combining a practical test of these recommendations with an immediate and realistic attempt to settle the problems of the pump areas in a methodical way. Concurrently the preparation of the legislation needed to continue the work on a more fully considered and permanent basis could be prepared thoroughly and carefully.

In preparing legislation it must never be forgotten that settlement of rights to land and the establishment of a stable land tenure in el 'Iraq are practical operations of an intricate nature dependent upon the conscientious execution of a steady programme of investigation and survey carried out day by day in the field for a great many years in co-operation with landholders and people. The quality of the officers entrusted with the work, the suitability of the procedure employed and the degree of co-operation obtained will be the critical determinants of failure or success. Bad laws may readily retard, multiply the cost of, jeopardise, or even prevent the attainment of reform: although a considerable degree of success can sometimes be obtained by good officers operating good investigatory and technical methods in spite of defective laws. But failing these essential agents and methods the best laws would remain idle instruments or be viciously misapplied. Suitable legislation

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is, of course, required to empower and consolidate success : but it cannot do more. And it will only be suitable if it is designed to give statutory endorsement to very carefully considered and thoroughly well-tested detailed procedure.

But while general knowledge of the practicable requirements of land reform, applied in the light of local conditions and local experience, can alone supply the material for the planning and execution of the necessary measures, this material can only be transmuted into successful legislation by a skilled legal draftsman, himself thoroughly conversant with the existing land law, working in consultation with accredited representatives of the public services responsible for the execution of reform.

I emphasise these points because the history of land reform in el 'Iraq is punctuated by abortive measures which appear to have been drawn by various executive officers without adequate legal assistance and without proper previous discussion. In a matter of such far-reaching importance and complexity, as the measures of land reform now projected, personal ability and the individual view point of even the most important Departments of State, are insufficient. Successful legislation will demand the careful preparatory team work of all the public services primarily concerned and the skilled expression of a trained legal draftsman, or at least of a professional lawyer.

There seems to be an inclination to feel that something of positive value has been achieved if a law purporting to give effect to some benevolent or public-spirited intention has been placed on the Statute Book, however unworkable such a law may be. But this feeling will not stand intelligent examination or satisfy any patriotic legislator who seeks more than documentary results and facile applause. In sober fact, academic aspirations and indifferent legislation appear to me to have been the worst enemies of practically realisable reform in the country hitherto.

3. Considerations of Initial Cost and Fees

8. The principal difficulty in carrying out a settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq will no doubt be the initial cost. It is impossible to make any useful estimate of this cost on the basis of the numerous hypotheses that would be inevitable at present. But it will be evident that work on the modest lines proposed above could be initiated at a very small cost, particularly having regard to the importance, both to the nation at large and to the parties immediately concerned, of making an early effort to secure a more satisfactory return from the capital and effort sunk in the pump development of the riverain tracts during the last ten years. The financial provision needed for the first year's work would amount to little more than the cost (i) of equipping and maintaining the three suggested Settlement parties possibly for eight months in the field and for the remaining four at Headquarters, or elsewhere, and (ii) of establishing a Land Court a few months later. As against this the cost of the present Muntafiq Commission might be saved. The requirements of the Survey would not be materially affected. The introduction of the General Land Register could advisedly await the conclusion of the initial year's work. Although the speed and cost of the work in such an initiatory stage would be gravely misleading as an index of future progress, since both would rapidly improve from year to year, yet a considerably better forecast could be made in the light of the experience gained by actual trial than by the most elaborate estimates that could be furnished now.

Although public funds will benefit directly by methodical and equitable assessment and imposition of land revenue, and indirectly by the steady increase in prosperity which should follow if settlement is accompanied by complementary developments in irrigation and agricultural conditions, yet these financial returns will not be immediate. The immediate problem of finding the funds needed to initiate settlement would be lightened or removed, if the cost could be promptly recovered from the individuals whose rights to land are thereby recognised and secured. Now settlement is essentially the clearing up of disputes and uncertainties inherited from an indefinite past. It has been necessitated in el 'Iraq by the failure of past governments to keep their records of mulk, tapu and miri land properly. It is now required in the interests of the nation as a whole, and the national budget will benefit generously by it in the future if it is accompanied by appropriate complementary measures. While therefore it is proper that individuals and corporate bodies should pay fees for the recognition of their rights in mulk, in tapu and in waqf (just as they would legally have been required to do if the existing Land Registers had been functioning properly hitherto and registration of all changes had been required, as they occurred): it is not equitable that they should repeat any payments they themselves have already made to the existing Land Registry or pay on a higher scale than may be needed to maintain the General Land Register in the future. It will, of course, be understood that the fees referred to here are genuine registration fees only, not acquisition payments on obtaining land in tapu tenure initially. 185 651

The settlement and record of rights to hold and use miri land stands on a different footing. It would not intrinsically be in any way inequitable to charge a suitable fee upon recognition and record of these rights also: but it would, I think, be inexpedient and inadvisable to do so upon initial settlement. If settlement is to be carried out with the utmost practicable speed and economy it is essential that everything possible should be done to encourage and ensure the presentation of all claims promptly at the appropriate moment. The degree of smooth and punctual co-operation secured between the great mass of claimants and the Settlement parties will primarily determine the speed and success of the work, while these in turn will primarily govern its cost. The bulk of mulk and tapu claimants and of custodians of waqf interests may reasonably be relied upon to appreciate the advantage of assisting the settlement and of consolidating their recognised rights by due and proper record: but the bulk of holders and users of miri land may be expected to be illiterate and very possibly suspicious of ulterior designs on the part of Government. Nothing will facilitate, accelerate and therefore cheapen, settlement so much as waiving all fees on the initial settlement of miri land. The poverty of the majority of such land is too great to admit of any really adequate scale of fees being imposed. And it may be predicted with some confidence that the saving in the cost of the work occasioned by foregoing such fees will more than compensate for any effective revenue lost thereby. 185

4. General Co-operation

4. In previous sections attention has been primarily devoted to the objectives, methods and procedure of the various agents directly concerned in one way or another with the conduct of reform. But a really national effort will be required if success is to be achieved. The necessity of winning the confidence and securing the prompt and willing co-operation of the great mass of landholders and cultivators has probably been sufficiently stressed already. The necessity of ensuring the continuous and effective co-operation of all branches of the public service,

185 and more particularly of the provincial administration, is as great. Provincial officers can assist the settlement in more ways than can possibly be mentioned without in the least interfering with the independence either of its judgments or of its progress. They above all others could prepare and educate public opinion by explaining beforehand the objects of the work and the character of the procedure to those with whom they are brought in daily contact. This would go far towards preparing men's minds and making them ready to participate promptly and effectively when their turn came. And it is only provincial officers who, by patient influence and persistent firmness, will be able gradually to enlist the assistance of landholders and cultivators in the protection of survey reference marks and in the regular notification of those that are displaced. The possibility of survey and provincial officers working in conjunction in advance of settlement to subdivide nahiyas into sections suitable for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment has been previously mentioned. It would also facilitate, and consequently accelerate, the work very materially if each local officer (mudir el nahiya) could provisionally collect and tabulate all claims to each of such sections of his nahiya in preparation for the settlement officer. I saw in Kut liwa schedules of information concerning pump areas and other estates which would be most helpful. Analogous records exist in other liwas.

The co-operation of the provincial authorities, as well as of other interested services, would also be needed to define provisionally in advance of settlement the areas that should be reserved (*a*) for public utility waterways, roads, railways, historic sites, (*b*) for particular tribes or communities, (*c*) for projected national forests, pastures, etc. etc. But such examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

The importance of general and sustained co-operation from all national elements who are in a position to do so cannot be exaggerated. The degree to which it was secured might readily decide success or failure. It would certainly affect decisively the quality and cost of the proposed settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq and the period taken to complete it.

PART VIII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

1–3. UNIFIED PLANNING AND DIRECTION OF REFORM

1. It will be remembered that among the defects which Government expressly sought to cure was the pursuit of reform by three independent Departments of State without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan. I have ventured earlier to express the view that these Departments were not in a position to adopt a suitable common plan or to pursue it unitedly. But it is also important to realise that their Departmental duties are not properly reconcilable with the conduct of the requisite reforms. 185 641

In considering the administrative organisation of reform it is desirable to distinguish clearly between the men, measures and machinery needed : (i) to produce order initially out of the chaos inherited from past centuries, and (ii) to consolidate and perpetuate this order as it is secured. These two processes may be conveniently called the execution, and the conservation, of reform. 185

The executive programme of reform should co-ordinate in one carefully balanced and united effort :

(i) The study and revision of the land law.
(ii) The completion of the topo-cadastral survey.
(iii) The systematic valuation of the land for revenue purposes.
(iv) The general settlement of rights to land.

The economy, speed and quality of the results will depend upon the efficiency of the combination secured. But although the importance of the initial execution of reform is supreme, and although it will necessarily occupy many years, yet administratively, legally and financially it should be recognised to be a special, terminable, capital effort.

The conservation subsequently of the benefits secured by this initial capital effort would necessitate administratively

(i) The progressive establishment, and maintenance up-to-date thereafter, of a General Land Register or Land Book.
(ii) The corresponding maintenance up-to-date of the complementary topo-cadastral survey.
(iii) The establishment of suitable ancillary land revenue records based on the above.

Throughout this Report I have avoided any detailed discussion of these conservancy measures : because the execution of initial reform is a sufficiently complex matter and is independently justified. And it seems more reasonable to defer consideration of methods of conserving reform, until it has been decided whether such reform will be undertaken. It may, however, be observed that if the requisite reforms are carried out successfully, there should be no intrinsic difficulty about subsequent conservation of the results ; although it will demand a thoroughly efficient

183 organisation. Moreover, the current cost of such conservation should be balanced by current fees.

But if it is reasonable and proper to defer consideration of conservancy measures which may or may not be needed, consideration of the administrative organisation best suited to give effect to these measures can also be deferred.

2. If the activities to be co-ordinated in the execution of the initial programme of reform are again referred to, it will be seen how slight is any functional aptitude of any of the three specified Departments to undertake this work, and how strong are the reasons of public policy that should preclude them from participation in its conduct. The necessary study and revision of the land law must in any case be taken up by specially selected individuals. The completion of the land survey is the express business of quite another department. Land valuation could no doubt be undertaken by the Revenue Department and the Survey Departments in co-operation, if this was a solitary measure; but it will be more easily, cheaply and satisfactorily effected as part of the general programme of reform. Moreover, it is really preferable that this valuation should be carried out by an organisation occupying a midway position between the fisc and the taxpayer, and not functionally concerned with raising revenue. Again a general settlement of rights is a process that none of the three departments mentioned are in any way organised or equipped to undertake. Such a settlement will necessitate a special staff and special arrangements in any event; while it is imperative that the judicial character and independence of the proceedings shall be unchallengeable. This dominant consideration should preclude all idea of settlement being conducted by either the State Domains or the Tapu Departments. For the State Domains should be responsible for presenting the State's rights as a landholder throughout the whole course of settlement and will thus occupy a partisan position, although most rightly and properly. And during the course of the work the settlement authorities will be continuously required to scrutinise, interpret and adjudicate on Tapu documents and records. It will be the duty of the officials of the Tapu Department to do their best to expound and explain such material to the settlement officers; but the latter must be open to no charge of departmental bias influencing their decisions.

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But although the Departments of Revenue, of State Domains and of Tapu should be dissociated from any participation in the execution of reform, and although they cannot be justly held responsible for failure to unite to produce and promote a programme of such reform in the past, yet the serious character of the defect in organisation indicated by Government, is only emphasised thereby. It is to the lack of a competent executive authority charged with the unified study and conduct of the necessary reforms, that the persistent failure of successive governments throughout the last decade to proceed from discussion to action must be primarily attributed. For the volume of memoranda and correspondence on the subject from the early days of the administration onwards, shows a constant and clearly understood appreciation of the need to put the systems of land tenure and land revenue on to a healthier basis. In the early days settlement of rights indeed appears to have been actually started in one or more districts. But during the latter half of the period the discussions have been characterised by uncertainty and disagreement as to the methods and means whereby the necessary objectives might be attained.

185 If a single central authority, possessing vigour and initiative, had been responsible to Government for the planning and general direction of the requisite reforms, a mass of sterile interdepartmental discussions

would have been avoided and some practical effort to discharge this responsibility must have been made. And no sincere, sensible and united effort could have failed to benefit by the lessons of experience and to have achieved a considerable degree of success by now. If my assistance had still been necessary I should hardly have had to devote time and energy to unearthing and collating details of elementary information needed to arrive at trustworthy primary deductions. This was work which an established organ of Government would have done gradually and methodically year by year, with fuller and more reliable results. But neither organised preparation for, nor organised execution of, these vitally important national reforms was to be expected as the bye-product of the unrelated activities of three public services charged with other primary responsibilities.

3. Organically therefore the imperative need is to establish as soon as possible in the central administration of Government, a service expressly and exclusively charged with the continued study, preparation and general direction of the measures of executive reform named a little earlier. All that is needed at this stage, and all that is desirable under present conditions, is quite a small office to act as the thinking and directing organ of executive reform. For here again reform must be initiated on the simplest lines that will satisfy bare essentials. But, although the Central Lands Office can be small, its influence and authority within the wide field of its responsibility must be effective. And although every effort has to be made to initiate reform cheaply, this Office must be made efficient if it is to fulfil its purpose and replace in the counsels of Government all unco-ordinated sectional advice.

The main functions of the Central Lands Office may be summarised as follows. It should be the central clearing house, depository and advisory office of Government on all matters of public policy regarding the tenure and use of land. It should have general administrative direction and control of the procedure and operations of settlement and land valuation, which should be treated as a conjoint enterprise. This direction and control should include that of any unavoidable sporadic operations. In the case of such sporadic investigations into existing registered tenures, any necessary measures should be concerted by the Tapu Department and the Central Lands Office in consultation. The Central Lands Office should also have the necessary authority to secure the complete and fully co-ordinated co-operation of the Survey Department in the execution of the programme of settlement and land valuation adopted. The necessary legal assistance should be placed at its disposal, to enable the requisite legislation (and orders thereunder) to be properly drafted, and the progressive amendment of the Land Law to proceed steadily. It should also, with the least possible delay, make a start to ensure the regular collection, tabulation and mathematical scrutiny of all important statistics relating to the land. Such statistics could be collected by the most appropriate or most convenient branch of the public service in each case, but their tabulation and mathematical scrutiny will be carried out most economically and efficiently by the Mathematical Office of the Survey with the assistance of calculating machines.

It should perhaps be emphasised again that the general administrative direction and control of settlement and land valuation exercised by the Central Lands Office must not confer or permit any power to review, criticise or alter any actual decisions of settlement or valuation. The independence of such decisions of all administrative modification must be absolute and indisputable. On due and proper occasion the former will be subject to appeal to the proposed Land Court, while some independent expert body qualified to review and revise land valuations when required would also be necessary.

4 AND 5. LAND SURVEY

185 4. The general direction and control of all survey work should be left to the technical head of that service. Any administrative subordination of the Survey Department to the small Central Lands Office would only be an inconvenience to both sides and nothing is to be gained by it, if it is clearly recognised that the Survey Department's primary duty is to co-operate as closely and effectively as possible with the Lands Office in carrying out the Government's general plan of land reform. For purposes of the programme of land survey, that plan must provide for the progressive requirements of concurrent development in other branches of work, notably of irrigation; but no departures from the approved national programme of survey should be permitted without the concurrence of the Central Lands Office, as the plan of general land reform, its cost and its speed, will be dependent upon a steady and punctual performance of that programme.

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The Survey Department is rightly recognised to be a specialist scientific service; and good work has been done in organising and equipping it for its duties. But its importance as an agent of economic progress appears to me to be insufficiently appreciated, while circumstances have interfered with its vigorous use in the steady execution of a national programme of land survey drawn up in consultation with the public services primarily concerned. It also possesses serious weaknesses which must be cured if it is to play its essential part in the well-co-ordinated effort without which the successful development of the country will remain a dream.

The land survey of a large, varied and previously unmapped country, like el 'Iraq, is a formidable scientific operation. It would be wasteful and short-sighted to an extreme degree to grudge the few additional specialist officers and the gradual addition to its accommodation and resources that are needed to enable this indispensable service to carry out its work punctually, reliably and to proper general advantage. A first-class Observer to push on with the primary triangulation is long overdue. Effective measures must be taken to protect survey reference marks. Additional specialist assistance is greatly needed in the Mathematical Office and in the performance of the chain of scientific processes whereby the surveyors' field work is reproduced and published as series of national maps. Map drawing, map reproduction by modern photo-metal processes and map printing, under the difficult climatic conditions existing in Baghdad, call for great skill, knowledge and experience, if they are to be successfully and economically performed. The publication of the Department's maps is very much in arrear, as has been already noted. And yet the value of national expenditure on survey operations is seriously minimised if the work remains locked away in the Department's cupboards in the form of original drawings, instead of being published in printed maps available to all. More systematic provision for the training of Iraqi staff in the technical operations of survey is also very necessary.

And timely consideration should be given to the whole question of the situation of the Survey Department and the arrangements for its present and future accommodation. The present site of the Department is, or is likely to become, valuable; and it is by no means the most suitable for the delicate processes of map reproduction. Again a fireproof map store is badly needed. The original field sheets and records of the Survey (and to a lesser extent its eventually published map series) represent the capitalised value of all the expenditure of past years on this branch of work. The set back to the country if all these records were destroyed as development of all sorts was at length getting well

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under way, would take many years and a large expenditure of money to retrieve. And such wholesale destructions of valuable public documents have quite frequently occurred elsewhere. Perhaps an opportunity might be found to transfer the whole Department to less valuable, less busy and less dusty, but more commodious precincts, where its map reproduction offices, its map stores, etc., might be planned for gradual expansion as the Land Survey of the country extends. Scientific organisations, such as this, depending upon the punctual co-operation of numerous specialist branches are wasteful to administer if badly arranged and they are costly to move after they have been long established. A central urban situation is neither necessary nor desirable, for the Headquarter Offices of a national land survey.

5. Another matter calling for early consideration is the amalgamation of the two existing organisations charged with the conduct of land survey—the Survey Department proper and the Survey branch of the Tapu Department. The Survey Department has had a somewhat chequered career; but two important steps in the direction of constituting it the single unified national service that is required for the economical and effective conduct of land surveys, appear to have been previously taken. In 1922 about half of the survey staff of the Tapu Department were absorbed by the Survey Department proper; while in 1925 the Irrigation Department, which had previously carried out its own surveys, transferred its Survey Division to the Survey Department. The process should now be completed.

When I was in el 'Iraq the comparable field staff of these two existing land survey services were returned to me as follows:

Survey Department	*Tapu Survey Branch*
8 Survey Officers	1 Director (Mudir)
14 Inspectors	4 Inspectors
100 Surveyors	58 Surveyors

I wish to make it clear that the development of its own little Survey Department by the Tapu Department is a matter for commendation: not for reproach. That Department realised acutely the need to define with some approach to accuracy the parcels of land which were purported to be held on tapu tenure. The National Survey were either non-existent or too weak at the time to assist, so that two parallel survey organisations were established.

The arrangement is none the less indefensible and absurd from the national standpoint. If the land surveys carried out by the smaller organisation are necessary in the public interest they should be carried out under the technical direction and control of the competent public service. In the course of this report various weaknesses in the Survey Department proper have been indicated. Of the lesser service it may be briefly said that, in spite of much keenness and appreciation of technical needs it is not, and cannot be, either properly organised and equipped or adequately directed technically to execute land surveys of the quality and permanence which expenditure of public funds should secure. No country, and particularly no country which requires the utmost economy and efficiency of effort to promote its primary development, should attempt to maintain two organisations to carry out the indivisible task of a national land survey. It is otherwise with what may be called engineering surveying or lay-outs for railways, roads, etc. These are sectional operations which can be best performed by the Engineering services concerned; but even these services should, and no

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185 doubt would, make the fullest use of the National Land Survey and leave all genuine land survey operations to it.

I do not advocate any hasty change. That would probably do more harm than good. But I venture to urge that it should be accepted in principle that this duality must be terminated as rapidly as the mutual convenience of the Survey Department proper and the Tapu Department permit. And among the duties of the proposed Central Lands Office should be the examination at an early date, in consultation with the Tapu Department and the Survey Department, of the comparative public advantages (i) of continuing to carry out the Tapu Department's special programme unabated, or (ii) of employing a portion of the resulting addition to the Survey Department's resources on the greatly needed acceleration of the national programme. I am not questioning the intrinsic value of the former, and so far as it meets specific Land Registry needs which are covered by fees received, it should doubtless be continued; but it may well be that on mature and comprehensive consideration the acceleration of the national programme of survey may justify some sacrifice of the more purely departmental work.

6. ADMINISTRATION OF AREAS AWAITING SETTLEMENT

6. However intensively, and by whatsoever methods, a general settlement of rights to land is conducted, there will for many years be a large balance of unsettled holdings, which balance can only be very gradually redressed. The satisfactory administration of these unsettled holdings pending their turn for settlement, is one of the most serious problems of the transition period; but it is clearly one that will be more manageable and better understood, if homogeneous settled and unsettled areas are maintained so far as possible. Any attempts to effect a general settlement sporadically would not only dissipate energy and resources (as previously pointed out), but also further complicate the administration of unsettled land by causing settled and unsettled holdings to occur increasingly intermixed side by side. It has already been recognised that sporadic settlement of some special holdings will be necessary; but this should not occasion undue difficulty if it is restricted to really necessary cases.

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647 It is the current mangement of the enormous extent of miri land during the years preceding settlement that is however the main problem. This must in practice be conducted for the most part, as at present, by the local officers of the provincial administration, except in areas under some form of tribal or sectional occupation. Some measure of central supervision and control must be maintained. This can continue to be exercised most suitably by the State Domains Section, which, I believe, is now administered in association with Land Revenue, under the Ministry of Finance. In advance of settlement this association of functions appears to me to be both an economical and a convenient 185 arrangement. If land valuation is undertaken methodically in the manner suggested, there will gradually be formed in advance of settlement a national roll of land revenue payers who will also for the most part be claimants to prescriptive rights to hold and use miri land. So that the connection between the supervision of miri land and of land revenue will throughout the pre-settlement stage be close. After settlement the work of both services should be greatly simplified and new arrangements would probably be required; but these can be more usefully discussed after the measures of executive reform to be undertaken have been decided.

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In advance of settlement, and pending the establishment subsequently of a General Land Register, map records should be constituted showing the position of all land authoritatively reserved for public purposes, or forming the subject of special concessions. These should be kept in duplicate through the agency of the Survey Department at the Headquarters of each liwa and in the capital. All Departments should be instructed to collaborate in the preparation and maintenance of these records, whereby the waste of public funds and the injury to public interests occasioned by conflicting arrangements and authorisations to utilise land might be quickly eliminated, without waiting for the gradual advance of settlement.

All proposed reservations of miri land, all proposed concessions and all proposed expropriations of mulk or tapu land should be examined by a small committee representing the bodies principally concerned in the administration of land or of its use for public purposes. These proposals might then be submitted with the committee's recommendations to the proper Minister, who I take it would normally be the Minister of Finance as custodian both of the public purse and of miri land. In this way all important public interests would receive consideration before land was reserved, conceded or expropriated for any special purpose. To make the record as complete as possible the location of all existing reservations, concessions, etc., should be examined and defined, so far as available information permits. In the case of urban areas the local record would most conveniently be kept in the town concerned.

Since the proposed record is in the form of maps indicating specific locations of land, the work of constructing and maintaining it should be entrusted to the Survey Department. The Headquarter Offices of the Survey would also be the best place to keep the authorised duplicates of the local maps, so that all changes could be regularly and easily incorporated. A Survey Officer might also conveniently act as the Secretary of the suggested Examining Committee.

7 AND 8. MINISTERIAL GROUPING OF SERVICES

7. If settlement of rights and land valuation are undertaken on the lines recommended, four Departments of State will be required to perform important functions; but there is a sharp division in the nature of those functions, as already noted.

Two Departments will be charged with the execution of these reforms, viz. the Central Lands Office (with its settlement and valuation field parties) and the Survey Department. Two other Departments, viz. the combined Land Revenue and State Domains Department, and the Tapu Department will be charged respectively with the presentation and support during settlement and valuation (*a*) of the interests of the State as the largest landowner and the collector of land revenue and (*b*) of the registered rights to mulk, tapu and waqf interests.

The two former will be called upon to discharge the functions of impartial and disinterested investigators and recorders of duly established rights. The two latter will be called upon to expound and support as strongly and ably as possible the particular public interests or private rights for which they are responsible.

The first of these services has still to be created and attached to some Ministry. The other three are already in existence, attached respectively to the Ministries of Economics, Communications and Works, of Finance and of Justice. In pursuance of the general inadvisability of

making avoidable changes at this stage these existing arrangements should not be disturbed. The Central Lands Office would in my opinion be most advantageously attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The supreme importance, for speedy and economical working, of the general and widespread co-operation of the provincial staff of the Ministry of the Interior, both during and in advance of settlement, has previously been emphasised. Indeed, the conduct of settlement, which so closely affects the security, contentment and peacefulness of the whole mass of landholders and peasantry throughout the country, must in any case be a dominant interest and responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. It is better that this interest should be directly safeguarded and this responsibility directly discharged, by the Ministry most intimately concerned. The arrangements in the field for securing the attendance of claimants and witnesses, as well as for orderly conduct of operations would in any case have to be made by the provincial staff of this Ministry. Settlement Officers and their principal assistants must also for the most part be drawn from the same staff, for that staff constitutes the only body of public servants who combine the necessary qualifications with the necessary experience. Moreover if the Ministry of the Interior undertakes administrative charge of the work, it will be a simpler matter to make changes in the personnel, than it would be if such changes involved transfers to and from another Ministry each time. For while it can be said with confidence that Settlement Officers and Assistant Settlement Officers should normally be recruited from the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, it is not to be expected that all those selected will find the work congenial or will prove successful.

8. I understand that the Ministry of Finance incline to the view that the general administration of settlement and land valuation operations might more appropriately be undertaken by that Ministry. This course would, in my opinion, be inadvisable both in the financial interests of the State and in those of the proposed reforms.

It must, I think, be recognised that the Ministry of Finance occupies an essentially different position and performs essentially different functions to, all other Ministries of State. It is the primary duty of all other Ministries to administer efficiently the specific branches of the public service, executive or judicial, allotted to their control. On the other hand, the distinctive and all-important duties of the Ministry of Finance are (i) to inspire, supervise and control all the operations of Government in so far as they affect the financial position of the State, and (ii) to nurse the economic resources of the country, to study all potential sources of revenue and to make these contribute fairly and without injurious reaction to the income of the State.

The Ministry of Finance must necessarily administer its own financial services; but I venture to think that, otherwise it should aim at as complete a detachment as possible from those administrative and executive functions of Government, which it is its duty to criticise impartially and control closely from a financial standpoint. Not only do the Ministry of Finance's wide and supremely important range of financial and economic functions demand its exclusive and fullest attention, if they are to be performed with any approach to the high standard needed; but the Ministry's duty as the financial watchdog of the State cannot be discharged with the same detachment, and is unlikely to be credited with the same disinterestedness, when applied to its own proceedings.

On these grounds alone it appears to me highly undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should itself assume administrative conduct and control of a new and formidable undertaking which is no part of its financial duties.

I also believe that the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the public purse, regards itself as the natural trustee and manager of State land and I imagine that it was on this account that the duties of the late State Domains Department were resumed by the Ministry of Finance. Subject to the considerations just urged, no exception to this view is called for, and the transfer was logical. But it should be recognised that (*a*) the current management of, what may be termed, the national estate (miri) and (*b*) the proposed systematic settlement of rights and valuation of land, are not only different but mutually incompatible, undertakings.

During the process of settlement innumerable cases are bound to arise in which the immediate and direct interests of the State, as landowner, will conflict with those of private individuals. It is essential that the former shall be presented as wholeheartedly and singlemindedly as the latter, at every stage of settlement operations. This is a duty which very properly pertains to the Ministry of Finance as custodian of the public purse. For the vast territories of the national estate (miri) represent by far the most important capital asset which el 'Iraq possesses, not excepting her petroliferous deposits. As custodian and advocate of the landed interests of the State in its capacity as landowner, the Ministry of Finance occupies the position, and should be free to act without distraction, as a profoundly interested party. Subject to the general conditions of the settlement law, it should, as a general matter of principle during settlement, offer a healthy opposition through its appropriate Department to all claims to rights over land statutorily in the ownership of the State.

And similar considerations apply to the general methodical valuation of land for fiscal purposes. Here again the organisation charged with execution of the task should occupy a position of cold scientific detachment. Here again there should be provision for appeal from the decisions of the settlement authorities under proper safeguards against obstruction or frivolous abuse. Here again the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the financial interests of the State, should act as the vigilant and unhampered exponent of those interests. And here again landholders and other parties directly concerned may be relied on to exercise no less vigilance in their endeavours to ensure that the approved results do not unduly favour at their expense, either their neighbours or the State.

In short, the successful and satisfactory execution of settlement of rights and valuation of land for fiscal purposes, requires complete freedom on the part of the Ministry of Finance to defend the financial interests of the State, whether represented by its capital assets in land or its prospective revenue. And such a successful and satisfactory execution also requires a position of recognised and unchallengeable impartiality on the part of the Ministry responsible for the administrative conduct of these operations. On these further grounds also it appears to me most undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should undertake this part of the general task.

PART IX.—GENERAL REVIEW OF PROBLEM

1. OLD CONDITIONS AND NEW

000 In conclusion it may be useful to review the problem in the wider setting of the general agricultural development which it is the main purpose to stimulate and serve. The land traversed by the historic rivers of el 'Iraq was one of the cradles of civilisation. It has been the seat of a succession of famous kingdoms. It was one of the birthplaces of artificial irrigation. If not the earliest, it was the best known, source of mineral fuel. And from time immemorial it has been recognised as one of the most fertile areas in the world. The country thus played a part second to none in earlier days and still possesses exceptional natural resources. Unfortunately these initial advantages have been nullified by centuries of unprogressive administration and by the unprecedented progress in human organisation and scientific advance made in the meanwhile elsewhere.

439 In ancient days bursting granaries represented prosperity and constituted wealth. The old world was small and its good grain lands scarce; while those of el 'Iraq were productive and accessible by the leisurely transport of the time. To-day the grain lands of civilised man circle the globe; while science and organisation have enabled him everywhere to enhance quality and yield many fold, as well as to obliterate distance. Moreover, with increasing individual well-being and vastly increased control of the earth's resources, mankind is eating a smaller proportion of bread and demanding a greater proportion of other commodities. And since he has the whole world competing to meet his requirements, everywhere he is selecting higher quality, cleaner, better graded, better packed produce and rejecting inferior supplies. There is a belief prevalent in el 'Iraq, as in other countries, that combines, rings and other marketing associations have power to affect the nation's trade critically. Temporary and restricted effects they may have: but the modern world is too closely knit together and the volume of its trade far too large and too complex to allow such manœuvres to prevent any reliable supply of satisfactory goods from finding its proper market before long. And since solid and efficient trading associations are partners in the nation's prosperity, it is to the interest of all such associations to promote the expansion of the country's trade and the reputation of its goods in the world's markets.

185 But el 'Iraq to-day must be recognised as being in the position of an old estate, previously rich, still very valuable potentially, but now derelict through long bad management, accentuated by changing needs and progress elsewhere. And its difficulties have been enhanced by its unfavourable transport connections with the outside world, as judged by modern requirements. Subject to the over-riding necessity of preserving public order and contentment and to the steady improvement of communications, the country's primary need is the reclamation of its derelict national estate and the regeneration of its agriculture. No intelligent and progressive person inheriting such an estate would fail to recognise the wisdom of spending on it the capital sums needed to bring it to a high pitch of prosperity again. Such expenditure planned on well-considered lines, carefully managed financially, and devoted

solely to the productive regeneration of the estate, should soon prove a profitable investment. If the accompanying returns of Budgetary Revenue and Expenditure during the nine years 1921-29 are referred to, it will be seen how small a sum, both absolutely and relatively, the Government has been able so far to allot to land development services. And 185 652 651

TABLE VII. TOTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE, 1921-1929

Nature of Service	Expenditure in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total expenditure
General National Charges*	325·5	6·9
Finance	619·4	13·1
Interior	1,068·3	22·7
Health	221·9	4·7
Defence	980·1	20·9
Justice	125·2	2·6
Education	223·2	5·0
Communications and works ..	680·6	14·5
Lands Services†	454·0	9·6
Total ..	4,698·2	100·0

*Civil List of H.M. the King, Parliament, Council of Ministers, Comptroller and Auditor-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Debt and Pensions, Antiquities and Census Departments.

†Departments of Irrigation, Agriculture, Veterinary Service, Land Survey, Tapu, State Domains and Ministerial Services of the Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture during its existence.

necessarily only a modicum of that sum could be utilised for capital improvements. If expenditure on capital development continues to be limited to what can be spared from current resources, it is to be feared that the economic revival of the country must be indefinitely retarded.

TABLE VIII. TOTAL BUDGETARY REVENUE, 1921-1929

Nature of Revenue	Revenue in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total revenue
Direct Revenues from land*	1,619·3	32·7
Customs and Excise	2,248·4	45·4
Post and Telegraph Receipts ..	287·1	5·8
Other revenues	795·7	16·1
Total ..	4,950·5	100·0

*Land revenue, animal tax, receipts of land services, mines, rents of Government property, etc.

2. Three Spheres of Reform

2. In the northern Rainfall Zone the effects of past neglect are less obvious and the problem of agricultural development less intricate owing to this area being predominantly independent of irrigation: but otherwise there is just as great a need for a steady programme of agrarian reform here as in the South. 185

The three great obstacles to the agricultural development, and, therefore, to the economic advance of el 'Iraq may be summarised as:

in the south (*a*) the absence of an adequate irrigation system, and throughout the country

(*b*) the rude methods of cultivation and stock-keeping practised, and

(*c*) the chaotic state of land tenure.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

312 The inadequacy of the existing irrigation system is generally recognised in so far as it relates to the great incompleteness of the network of engineering works needed, such as storage reservoirs, flood embankments, regulator constructions, delivery and drainage channels: but it appears at present to be insufficiently appreciated in the country that the proper utilisation and maintenance of these expensive works is even more important than their construction and probably calls for greater technical skill at the outset. It is a serious mistake to suppose that the management of a great engineering undertaking, such as a national irrigation system, is a simpler problem than its design and construction, or that such management can be economically and wisely left to inexpert hands or to officials primarily occupied with other duties.

242 The primitive methods of cultivation, stock-keeping and disposal of produce prevalently practised, as well as their marked effect on the quantity and quality of the country's output and on its reputation in the world's markets, have been repeatedly emphasised and need only be mentioned here.

439 To build up her prosperity el 'Iraq must evidently develop her export trade both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is therefore of great importance to follow the statistics of external trade continuously and to endeavour to adjust the country's agricultural output unceasingly to world demand. Unlike the various land statistics, which have proved so difficult to collect and so unreliable when collected, the Trade statistics kept by the Customs and Excise Department appear not only to be in excellent order but to be used. No attempt will be made to discuss these valuable figures here: but the nature, quantity and value of the principal exports of agricultural products during the five years 1925-6 to 1929-30 in the accompanying table should be noted.

TABLE IX. MAIN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS DURING FIVE YEARS 1925-6 TO 1929-30

Product	Quantity in thousands of tons	Value in lakhs of rupees
Living animals (horses, camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc.)	836·6*	67·7
Raw cotton	3·2	32·7
Dates	624·3	902·1
Grain, etc. (barley, pulse, rice, wheat, etc.)	566·2	449·1
Hides (cow, sheep, goats, wild animal, etc.)	9·3	171·9
Intestines (casings)	0·6	70·1
Raw silk	0·005	0·7
Tobacco	0·8	9·2
Raw wool	32·4	368·2

*Thousands of animals.

242 It is in experimenting in the culture of new or improved products required by the world, in adapting them to local environment, in multiplying them for local growth, and in demonstrating their successful cultivation and disposal on a commercial scale, that scientific agricultural research stations, progressive landed estates and well-managed marketing bodies, have such an indispensable part to play in the general development of the country's agriculture.

185 The establishment of an efficient national irrigation system and the application of the lessons of progressive scientific research and experience elsewhere must be recognised as two of the fundamental conditions of

Egypt MRI

any solid economic advance in el 'Iraq. The third is the introduction and maintenance of a simple, secure and equitable land tenure, which term should be understood to include an even and readily met revenue demand. This report is only directly concerned with the last need: but in studying it, its inter-relation to the other two must be continuously kept in mind. No development of the country's agricultural resources can expect to be successful which does not take all these three needs into consideration together.

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3. COMPARISON WITH EGYPT

8. During the progress of my inquiry comparisons were frequently instituted with Egypt, a country with many parallels to el 'Iraq both in its history and its natural conditions. Owing to the courtesy of the Egyptian Government I am able to compare in Table X the respective positions on certain salient points of el 'Iraq in 1929 and of Egypt in successive decades from 1882 onwards. It will be noted that during the last fifty years Egypt has more than doubled her population, added 50 per cent. to her cropped area, quadrupled her trade, and her budget, built up a substantial budgetary reserve, and largely absorbed her original external debt.

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TABLE X. COMPARATIVE FIGURES, EL 'IRAQ AND EGYPT

		EL 'IRAQ	EGYPT					
		1929	1882	1890	1900	1910	1920	1929
Population in millions		2·8	6·8	8·2	10·1	11·8	13·2	14·4
Gross cultivable area, sq. km.		90,000	32,000					
Area cropped yearly, sq. km.		10,000	24,000*	27,000*	30,000*	32,000*	34,000*	36,000*
Imports	In lakhs of rupees	980	1,100	1,100	1,900	3,200	14,000	7,200
Exports		560	1,800	1,700	2,400	4,000	11,800	7,800
Re-exports		310†	14	40	80	60	350	190
Land Revenue		168	680‡	700‡	600‡	700‡	700‡	720‡
Customs Revenue		274	80	190	330	480	1,370	1,620
Total Budgetary Revenue		570	1,300	1,650	1,630	2,280	4,700	3,790
Total Budgetary Expenditure		560	1,230	1,560	1,500	2,340	4,000	3,690
Budgetary Reserve Fund				200	1,150	790	2,370	5,540
Debt §			10,900	13,100	13,000	13,100	12,900	12,400

*From ⅓ to ½ cropped twice. Net area cultivated in 1929 was 23,000 sq. km.

†Goods in transit, not included in imports.

‡Yield maintained constant on re-assessment following revenue settlement. Fluctuations due to remissions to unwatered land followed by extensions of irrigation.

§Mostly held in Egypt now.

Egypt is more favourably situated geographically than el 'Iraq; while Mahommed Ali Pasha did much to initiate early in the last century the reform of her land tenure which has proceeded since. And it will be seen that even fifty years ago Egypt was considerably more populous and wealthier than el 'Iraq is to-day. But el 'Iraq is by no means devoid of advantages also. She has Egypt's established success before her. Her cultivable area is larger and more diverse, so that she is in a better position to develop a varied export trade. She is free of unproductive debt and can devote all funds not absorbed by current needs, to productive purposes. And her petroliferous deposits provide her with special financial aid at the most useful moment. So that a comparable advance to that made by Egypt may be hoped for, if a comparable effort can be made.

The unavoidably lengthy duration of a general settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq has been emphasised several times in this report: although no precise estimate of the period required is practicable in the 000

000 E 651 absence of all data on which such an estimate could be dependably based. But the lessons of the Egyptian experience in the conduct of its parallel revenue settlement should not be overlooked. The Egyptian revenue settlement was initiated by Decree dated February 9th, 1879. It was not completed until 1906. The statistics of the progress achieved during these twenty-seven years are instructive. In the first nine the work was an entire failure because it was attempted without a proper basis of land survey. During the following four years it was abandoned in despair. In the next seven years a quarter of the country was done with the aid of an indifferent sectional survey. In 1898 a unified and effective national Survey was at length recognised as indispensable. In the succeeding eight years the remaining three-quarters of the country was finished, and the quality of the work improved even more than the speed, as sound technical methods were introduced and enabled improvements in the general procedure of the settlement to be adopted. It will thus be seen that owing to the initial failure to appreciate the fundamental necessity of a scientifically sound and appropriate cadastral survey, the revenue settlement of Egypt occupied twenty-seven years whereas its final progress shows that it could have been completed in ten.* It will be remembered that the Turkish legislators had also recognised before the war the necessity of a foundation of reliable cadastral survey for land tenure throughout the Ottoman Empire (iii, 8).

E 651 471 I 651 471 Now while the land surface to be dealt with in el 'Iraq is much greater than in Egypt the individual parcels requiring investigation and settlement will be many fewer although no doubt appreciably larger in extent on the average. Thus three and one third million individual holdings were recorded during the revenue settlement of Egypt, a number which considerably exceeds the tot[illegible]opulation of el 'Iraq. On a comparable basis the number of individual holdings in the latter might be expected to be about 800,000. As the population is still so largely nomadic half a million is probably nearer the true figure. (See also ii, 4 and Table V).

000 Although the fuller benefit of a settlement of rights was not practicable in Egypt at the time, owing to various reasons, the procedure was similar: but unfortunately no deductions can be drawn therefrom as to the speed of settlement of rights in el 'Iraq, because all the conditions in Egypt were so different.

4. THE MAIN PROBLEM OF TENURE

I 423 471 4. As we have already seen, the land surface of el 'Iraq is more literally than in most similar cases a vast national estate. The extent of land held in private ownership (mulk) is small, and although it is intrinsically important, its legal position is clear and its regulation presents few difficulties. Probably four-fifths of the cultivable area of the country is in law fully and freely owned by the State and when cultivated held in practice under the general administrative control of its representatives. And even the legal ownership (raqaba) of the balance is vested in the State although, subject to important conditions, its usufructuary possession is held on a permanent heritable and assignable tenure. This tenure (known commonly as tapu) is that applicable under the provisions of the Land Code to all State land. The Ottoman Administration persistently sought to give effect to these provisions, but failed to do so because the successful operation of this tenure is impossible without an accompaniment of effective survey and land registration,

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* See Paper 5. Egyptian Government Commission on Registration of Title to Land. 1917-21. Government Press. Cairo.

1123 1171 which the Administration were unable to provide. And even if this radical defect had been remedied the application of this advanced tenure would have been premature throughout the majority of the country. So that to-day—more than half a century after the introduction of the Ottoman Land Code in the country—only a fraction of the cultivated region is somewhat uncertainly held on tapu tenure, while throughout the overwhelming balance, land is for the most part occupied and cultivated on no legal tenure at all.

185 The injurious effects of the prevailing welter of insecurity and confusion both on agricultural productivity and on public order have been emphasised in the body of this report and are too well known to need repetition. The main problem of land tenure may therefore be summarised as the need to establish security and clarity of tenure everywhere by a general definition and settlement on a clear legal basis of both statutory and equitable rights to land. The broad objective should be to confirm and maintain beneficial occupation and use, whenever this is reconcilable with the equitable treatment of third parties and the just interests of the public.

It is very understandably urged that the proper course is to extend tapu tenure generally throughout the cultivated territory, subject of course to the requisite clarification of that tenure and its adaptation to national requirements. Excellent as the chief characteristics of tapu tenure are, and advantageous as the suggested course may prove ultimately to be, this is too ambitious a plan to be practicable at present. It is what the Ottoman Government attempted and failed to do, and the causes for their failure must be remedied before that attempt can be successfully repeated. This was implicitly recognised by the Turks themselves some years before the war in a provisional law already cited. No useful purpose will be served by examining here the prospects of practical success of this now defunct measure. But it is certain that it is beyond the present capacity of el 'Iraq to establish the detailed cadastral survey and land register of the requisite accuracy and authority. And without these accompaniments any ostensible general introduction of tapu tenure would be to grasp an attractive shadow in preference to the substance of a solid and attainable reform. To place even the admitted rights to tapu tenure on an intelligible and proper basis will be a most difficult and lengthy undertaking.

Occasional and sporadic grants of miri land in tapu tenure can, of course, be made and implemented in due course if special justification arises and special efforts are taken. But no general grant of tapu tenure can be made effective for many years to come. And while islands of secure tenure and good culture are most valuable, it is the establishment of a general reform giving security of tenure to the mass of existing landholders and cultivating tenants, which is needed to stimulate enterprise and development throughout the length and breadth of the country and thereby promote economic revival on a national scale.

A hardly less important accompanying reform is the establishment of a uniform and equitable basis for land revenue collection. Here again the Turkish administrator perseveringly sought to establish in his land tax (werko) a measure admirable in principle and conception. But here again he was unable to translate his measure effectively and generally from the Statute book to the land. And here again no far-reaching or solid success is practicable in the absence of a reliable land survey, or without a general settlement of rights and a methodical valuation of the land, as was also ultimately recognised by the Ottoman Government.

5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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3. The dominant facts to be taken into consideration in planning these reforms are the magnitude of the task and the poverty of el 'Iraq's resources at present in experienced public servants, in money and in equipment. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the simplest measures that will secure the main essentials shall be adopted. Anything less will be waste of money and effort. Anything more, at this stage, will divert money, effort and equipment from complementary productive reforms.

The simplest form of tenure that can be adopted at present for miri land is the effective application of the leasehold, under which it is already in theory commonly supposed to be held. This will be immeasurably easier to operate than tapu tenure. And leaseholds which work successfully can give the great body of landholders a clarity and security of tenure in practice, which will not be realisable under tapu tenure until a proper cadastral survey of the country has been executed and an efficient system of registration of title to land is in general operation.

It would also seem wiser for the State to retain the residuary freedom it would still possess under the leasehold system to occupy and use miri land for national purposes, until the land surface of a district has been mapped and contoured, and the irrigation and communications systems projected therein have been planned in detail. For many years to come el 'Iraq will possess a superabundance of potentially valuable agricultural land, so that in planning new works it should always be possible to re-arrange holdings to the common advantage of the holders and the State. But if a general policy of granting land in tapu tenure is adopted in advance of the planning of the national estate, expropriation would have to be resorted to, to resume land so granted. And expropriation would be more troublesome, slower and more costly, all of which would ultimately re-act on the general taxpayers and on the progress of development as a whole.

000 The principal measures recommended in the main body of this report may now be summarised very briefly :

(i) The establishment of a small Central Lands Office attached to the Ministry of the Interior. This office would be responsible for the continued study of land tenure and allied questions and for the general direction of the executive programme of reform recommended (viii, 3 and 7).

(ii) The Survey Department, the State Domains service, and the Tapu Department to remain attached to their present Ministries (viii, 7).

(iii) The remedy of a number of important weaknesses in the organisation and equipment of the Survey Department and the unification of all land survey required by the State under this service (ii, 5 and viii, 4 and 5).

(iv) A combined programme of a skeleton form of cadastral survey, of settlement of rights to land, and of land valuation, on the simplest lines to be carried methodically through the country (v, 7, vi, 1-5 and 9).

(v) Land survey operations to be conducted under the unfettered technical direction of the Survey Department, but in accordance with the general programme adopted, after due consultation, by the Central Lands Office (viii, 3 and 4).

(vi) The parallel operations of settlement of rights to land and of land valuation in the field to be undertaken by selected Administrative Officers working under the general administration of the Central Lands Office, and helped by suitable assistant officers (vi, 4 and 5, viii, 8). 000

(vii) The comprehensive study and progressive amendment of the Land Code and supplementary legislation, so as to make the statutory land law clear, consistent, and workable and better adapted to local needs and conditions (vii, 1).

(viii) The establishment of a special Land Court to hear due and proper appeals from the decisions of Settlement Officers in regard to rights to land (vi, 8).

(ix) The establishment of a suitable independent body to hear similar due and proper appeals in regard to the valuation of land (viii, 8).

(x) The general policy animating settlement of rights to land to be the confirmation and maintenance of beneficial occupation and use whenever reconcilable with the equitable treatment of third parties and the just interests of the public. Existing legal tenures to be duly recognised: but the possession of miri land to be granted out on leasehold, which it is suggested might normally be for ten-year periods.

The above are all measures for the initial execution of the reforms. Owing to the complexity and many-sidedness of the problem, it is better to defer detailed consideration of the measures of conservation that would be subsequently needed, until Government has decided whether to proceed with the programme of initial reforms or not. The nature of these subsequent measures of conservation, have been indicated in previous parts of this report (e.g., viii, 1).

The greatest pains have been taken throughout to suggest the simplest and cheapest measures which are capable, if steadily and effectively applied, of establishing the land tenure and land revenue of the country on a generally acceptable and economically sound foundation. It is earnestly hoped that the interdependence of these measures will be recognised and that the scheme put forward will be considered as a united whole. And I venture more particularly here to emphasise the desirability of entrusting the conduct of settlement and land valuation operations in the field to selected Administrative Inspectors, at least during the earlier years of the work. As has been represented earlier (vi, 4) the qualifications that these officers possess make them exceptionally fitted for the execution of this most onerous, greatly needed, but essentially transitory, task.

6 and 7. CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

6. But the central question for Government to decide is whether to undertake a comprehensive programme of practical reform or to leave things as they are. As has been noted more fully earlier in this report, the importance of putting the land tenure of the country on to a clear, equitable and stable basis was appreciated at the very outset of the establishment of modern el 'Iraq. It has received most earnest consideration ever since. And yet it has to be recognised that more than a decade has passed without any effective steps in the desired direction having been taken. The times have been troubled, the pre-occupations of Government great, while a decade is a brief space in the lifetime of a 185

people. So there is nothing unusual in the failure so far to attack this evil effectively. Richer and more experienced countries have done no better. Indeed it is remarkable that the importance of the question was realised so quickly and appears to be understood so generally throughout the country.

But attention has to be directed to the past as a guide to the future. For this reason it should be realised that ten years, during which a great deal of thought and labour have been devoted to the subject, have elapsed without any constructive measure for the general improvement of the tenure of land by the mass of landowners and cultivators having been carried out. And although ten years is a short span in a country's history it is a considerable portion of a man's life. Resolute and well-directed effort during the next ten years could put the tenure of land throughout the bulk of the country on to an essentially sound and satisfactory footing ; whereas the next ten, twenty, or a hundred years will find the prevailing evils still uncured if they are not attacked on more practical lines than hitherto. And it should perhaps again be stressed that few countries exhibit such deplorably unstable and confused conditions of land tenure, or are so dependent for the creation of the wealth they need, upon stimulating the energy of the whole agricultural population and safeguarding their attachment to the land. For while no proper development of the country's resources is possible without a well planned and well regulated system of irrigation or without assimilating and applying the lessons of scientific and economic advance elsewhere, yet the fruitfulness of these measures will ultimately depend upon the individual efforts of the great mass of landholders and cultivators throughout the country.

7. And the past history of the land should also help the public to realise that the present long established and deep-seated evils cannot be cured by edict or in a year or two. The establishment in practice throughout the country of a secure legal land tenure will not be brought about by a vote in the Legislative Chamber nor by any official actions alone. A considerable amount of preparatory work must precede any useful legislation : and such preparatory work must be well conceived and thorough if it is to yield satisfactory, economical and assured results. For even the most appropriate legislation is only the national authority to proceed. Before such legislation can be implemented attention must be directed to providing the necessary working organisation, to securing suitable officers, and to formulating investigatory and technical procedure which will both satisfy the practical requirements of the work and ensure the co-operation of the agricultural population. For success must be gauged by its ultimate effects, and it will be decisively determined in the open fields by the confidence felt by the general body of landholders and cultivators in the integrity and competence of the settlement staff, by the reasonableness and dispatch of the procedure adopted, and by the equity and stability of the findings.

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PREFACE

121 The present study on the Problem of *Compulsory Education in Iraq* is one of a series issued by Unesco in preparation for the 14th Conference on Public Education, organized jointly by Unesco and the International Bureau of Education in Geneva, in July 1951.

A major part of that conference is being devoted to the discussion of the problems of compulsory education, and it was thought that apart from the study conducted by the International Bureau of Education, based on a questionnaire sent to governments, Unesco would undertake six type-studies. Of these, three have been devoted to countries that have already achieved compulsory education, but whose method of execution differ one from the other: England as a country whose educational administration is decentralized; France as a country whose administration of education is centralized, and Australia as a country whose educational administration is decentralized on the federal, but centralized on the State level.

Another three type-studies have to do with countries that have reached different stages, leading to the achievement of compulsory education. For this purpose, one country in Latin America—Ecuador; in South East Asia—Thailand, and in the Middle East—Iraq, have been chosen.

In addition, two other studies have been undertaken; one a comparative study on the *Prolongation of Compulsory School Age* by Professor I. L. Kandel, and another on *Child Labour and Compulsory Education*, kindly being undertaken by the International Labour Office.

The present study on Iraq derives its main significance from the fact that it brings out very clearly the relation of compulsory education to other economic political and social factors, whether operating as agents, facilitating its realization, or putting obstacles in its way. The author has succeeded in sizing up the actual situation, of setting out the problem of land tenure, the poverty of the average farmer, tribal organization and various others factors which now impede the expansion of the primary school system. On the other hand, the great Arabic tradition and respect for learning and the impulse of the national movement

/21 are among the factors acting for the continuous expansion of primary education.

It is hoped that this study, along with the others, will help to bring out the most important points necessary for a realistic discussion of compulsory education problems.

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AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

At the invitation of Unesco I visited Iraq during the autumn 114 of 1950 to undertake a study of the problem of compulsory education. It was soon discovered, however, that although the terms of reference were relatively simple, the problem is enormous. Rapid educational progress in certain directions has been made since Iraq became an independent State, but there exist major economic, political and social problems which constitute serious obstacles to the promotion of compulsory education.

The study of the problems and the difficulties which need to 122 be surmounted before realistic progress in the direction of compulsory education can be made was greatly assisted by the facilities which were provided in Iraq. Immediately on my arrival the Minister of Education stated that every assistance would be afforded by himself and his colleagues at the Ministry, that free access would be given to relevant reports and records, and that he had made arrangements for the Provincial Governors and Provincial Directors of Education to provide unrestricted means of visiting schools and seeing the conditions of the country.

With such generous facilities it proved possible to visit some 150 primary schools and a number of secondary schools and training institutions, in nine out of the fourteen provinces of Iraq. Visits were also paid to towns, villages, private homes, teachers' clubs, farms, irrigation projects, land settlement schemes and industrial and commercial concerns. A significant feature of these visits, and of the many discussions with teachers, Government officials, sheikhs, farmers, agricultural workers and others was the great courtesy, frankness and generous hospitality that was shown. Thanks to the assistance of so many friendly people it was possible to venture as far north as the provinces of Mosul, Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk, to see much of the educational and social arrangements in Baghdad, and to travel through the southern provinces of Kut, Hilla, Amara and Basra. To see schools and meet people of all ranks in the mountains of Kurdistan, the northern desert and uplands, the great southern plain and the marshes of Amara was in itself an education, and provided realistic evidence

122 both of educational progress already made and the great obstacles which still have to be overcome.

121 While these visits were being made, a decision had to be taken as to the best means of using the limited time available. It seemed that the report on the study should take one of two forms. It could be a strictly limited account of the administrative action which would need to be taken to apply some measure of compulsory education in the fairly immediate future, together with detailed statistical data concerning towns and villages in each province in which the completion of primary school provision would enable compulsory education to be declared. This form of report was not, however, considered desirable for two reasons. First, it would have meant that, instead of visiting schools, seeing the general conditions of the country and meeting people representative of the different aspects of Iraqi life, most of the time would have had to be spent sitting at a desk in the provincial education offices and at the Ministry of Education itself. This is not the best means of attempting to feel the educational pulse of a country. Secondly, such a report was made a few years ago by the 'Ten-Year Plan Committee' referred to in the following pages. But little achievement in the direction of compulsory education arose from that most valuable report, mainly because certain major administrative reforms essential to its application were never carried out.

Consequently, it was decided that the study would probably be more valid, although more general, if it were based on the continuance of personal visits to schools and the other places indicated. It was felt that it would then be possible to consider prospects of compulsory education in the wider setting of the changes and developments that are taking place or need to take place. Administrative and other recommendations for practical action would have to be made, but these would arise from actual evidence and not from notions derived from the academic study of not entirely reliable statistics.

After many such visits up and down the country, during which impressions both of a general and particular nature were accumulated, it became clear that the report on the investigation could conveniently follow the sequence of a brief survey of the conditions of the country, an analysis of the educational needs of Iraq, an impression of the extent to which these needs are being met in the existing system, and an appreciation of the economic, political and social factors assisting or impeding educational advance. It soon became evident, however, that although there are many serious obstacles to the development of compulsory education, the study would be incomplete without reference to the significant

ways in which some of these are being overcome. This suggested /21 that there would be some value in then attempting to outline a policy of advance in the direction of compulsory education which would go hand in hand with the economic, political and social changes that are taking place. But although it proved possible to outline suggestions for such a policy of development, it also became abundantly clear that, until the major obstacle of the land tenure system can be overcome, ambitious progress towards compulsory education must continue to be frustrated.

So the study took the shape which appears in the following chapters. It would have been an impertinence to try to cover so much ground had it not been that the generous facilities given by the Minister of Education and the others already mentioned enabled me to use information, figures and opinion which have accumulated over a long period as a result of the efforts of people in the educational and other public services of Iraq. Nevertheless, although much of what is written in this study is a result of the thought and labours of others, any opinions expressed and conclusions drawn are, unless otherwise stated, my own responsibility. The same applies to the inevitable inaccuracies which are bound to be discovered by others who have long been associated with the educational affairs of Iraq. This acceptance of personal responsibility for opinions, conclusions and inaccuracies does, of course, draw attention to what may be regarded as a fundamental weakness in the whole study. Although every effort was made to undertake an objective enquiry, this cannot disguise the fact that the study is the work of an educational administrator whose knowledge of the Near and Middle East is limited and whose experience is based mainly on western systems.

At least two other defects or omissions are obvious. Firstly, in 114 relation to a country where most of the adult population remains /21 illiterate, suggestions for advance towards compulsory education cannot be dissociated from measures for combating general illiteracy. It will be seen that some reference is made both to the problem of adult illiteracy and to the need for associating day schools with realistic projects of fundamental education. Reference to this problem is only sketchy, partly because time pressed hard but mainly because, at the time of writing, a Unesco team is about to investigate materials and techniques for fundamental education in Iraq. Secondly, an account of the educational system beyond the primary stage is not given. This omission is deliberate—it is not necessary to duplicate the excellent information given by Dr. Matta Akrawi and Professor Roderic Matthews in their current book *Education in Arab Countries of the Near East*.

An attempt has been made to be reasonably frank. The 000

Minister of Education requested that, although the study has been made on behalf of Unesco, and for consideration along with others at an international conference on compulsory education, he should be provided with a copy of the report for his own purposes. He added that it would be of little value to him unless it was completely frank.

Finally, thanks are expressed to the East Riding of Yorkshire Education Authority for giving me leave of absence to undertake the study, and to Unesco for affording the opportunity of seeing educational and other conditions in Iraq and something of the other Near and Middle East countries through which I passed. Experiences of this kind are most valuable to educational administrators both in widening their horizon and in enabling them to view their own problems in better perspective. They also help to promote personal friendships between people who live in different countries yet share common interests. This in itself helps in a simple yet human way to foster those educational and cultural purposes which it is part of the function of Unesco to assist.

VICTOR CLARK

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CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648 the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education is not possible without some reference to the history and present 186 circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. 185 Administrative reforms and some social advance were attempted during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became 735 an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164 ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 642 of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent 212 years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131] stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to 361 the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is
311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it
is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only
312 twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country
is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians. The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims, three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians,
871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed
into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some
153 important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

through institutions of higher education, seems to develop into an 181
extraordinary mental agility. Those who are politically articulate 153
share a high concern for the future of Iraq as a nation.

A visitor to the country is also struck by a number of contradictions. 000 Iraq has a brilliant cultural inheritance, yet the bulk of the population is illiterate. It is a country of great economic possibilities, yet the majority of the people exist at a meagre standard of life. The soil is of high fertility, yet it continues to be farmed by primitive methods. Above all, although the future prosperity of the country depends upon the application of science and power to the land, agricultural development is inhibited by a most unsatisfactory system of land tenure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Primary education on any large scale in Iraq is of recent growth. 872
It began with the traditional Arabic mullah school, in which small groups of boys under the direction of a religious teacher memorized religious lore in a monotonous and repetitive manner. Traces of this verbal technique are still obvious in many of the primary schools.

Under the Ottoman régime the nucleus of a schools system was introduced, and it is said that by 1913 there were some 6,000 children attending primary schools of a sort. Soon after the next military conquest the British promoted some further educational development and, in particular, substituted Arabic instead of the alien Turkish language as the medium of instruction. By 1921 there were reputed to be more than 15,000 children attending public primary schools.

It is significant, however, that no real approach to a system of public primary schooling was made until the nation took its educational affairs into its own hands. Since the meeting of the first Iraqi Parliament in 1925 a real impetus appears to have been given to the development of primary education. By 1931 there existed 316 public primary schools with an enrolment of some 35,000 pupils. By 1950 extraordinary quantitative progress had been made, for by that year 175,000 children were enrolled in over 1,000 public primary schools.

THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

By 1940 the development of primary education, and of higher 872
education, had gone on at such a pace that it was necessary to 645

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872 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General
645 Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The
Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound
in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education
was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age
of admission to the primary school should not be less than six
and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that
'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out
in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when
[681] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this
Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

871 By this time the administration of education had been highly
systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of
645 Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration
is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of
Education controlling and supervising the most minute details
both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education
himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in
other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed
by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the
fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education
who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is
in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

872 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was
made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does
658 not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out
of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age,
not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940
an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education
provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the
declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed
in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty
[464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with
the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of
the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the
[362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where
housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is
also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other
[696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the
legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

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powerful local landowners operated as effective obstacles to compulsory schooling. 872 658

Despite this initial failure of a modest attempt to apply compulsory education in certain parts of the country, enlightened opinion in Iraq is strongly in favour of educational development. Because of the economic, political and social obstacles which will have to be overcome before a real approach to universal compulsory education can be made, few if any of the country's educators feel that this desirable objective is likely to be achieved in a short time. As educators, however, and for educational reasons, they are anxious that the practicability of achieving a realistic approach towards compulsory education should be soberly investigated. This enlightened minority are likely to be assisted in their demands by pressure of nationalist opinion, which sees in the development of education a means of spreading national culture and national sentiments among the people. 871 185

There are other important reasons why the time is ripe for assessing the ways and means by which compulsory education can be approached. Although Iraq, like many other countries is, economically, passing through a difficult stage, rapid development in thought and ways of life is taking place. The country is at present at the cross-roads between traditional and modern or western civilization. Change and development, in one direction or another, seem to be the order of the day. It is for this reason that a contemporary Iraqi educator urges that the present time 'affords a unique opportunity for making a good start in education'. 500

Before, however, considering the practicability of making a 'good start' or at any rate a new start in the direction of compulsory education, consideration must be given to the educational needs of the country at its present stage of development and the extent to which these needs are being met by the existing system. It will then be possible to consider, in the light of prevailing economic, political and social conditions, ways and means of achieving further advance.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE EDUCATIONAL NEEDS OF IRAQ

GENERAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

The Needs of the Individual Child. The young Iraqi, like his brothers and sisters the world over, needs that assistance to develop those elementary skills, aptitudes and habits which can only come through participation in the life of a good school. He needs mastery of the written and spoken language of his own country, arithmetic, knowledge of his country's geography and history in relation to the outside world, an understanding of the elementary rules of health and social conduct, and opportunity to practise art and handicraft. In addition he needs facilities in school, if his parents wish it, for religious education.

The Needs of Society. These are the fundamental educational needs of all children, irrespective of their habitat. Each country, however, according to its peculiar circumstances and stage of growth, needs to develop its system of education with due emphasis on its particular requirements. In other words, the universal educational needs of all children have to be conditioned by the needs of the society in which they live. At the present time Iraqi society has four main educational needs. The first is the need for sound character training, including a realization that education is not simply a collection of skills and aids in preparation for a Government or clerical job, but the acquisition of sound values which need to be applied in all walks of life whether professional or manual. The second important need is a knowledge of the practice and principles of good husbandry by those who work on the land. An equally important requirement in a minority of the population is the acquisition of technical skills necessary in local industries and in the growing demand for maintenance work. Finally, as is to be expected in a young country which is still engaged in the process of welding diverse racial and religious groups into conscious nationhood, it is considered that one of the most important needs is the promotion of knowledge and qualities necessary to the furtherance of national unity.

Some of these qualities and skills can only be obtained at

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higher levels of education but, in general, the basis for most of them is acquired in the primary school. Before considering, therefore, ways and means of advance towards compulsory primary education for all children, it will be desirable to ascertain to what extent these general educational needs are met in the existing primary schools system. If it should be found that the primary schools do not adequately meet these needs, it may be wise to advocate qualitative reform in primary schooling before ambitious quantitative advance. 000

SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

In addition to these general educational needs, and partly arising from them, there are two outstanding needs which are connected with the economy of the country and the transitional stage through which an important section of the population is passing.

The Need for Realistic Rural Education. The first outstanding need is that of realistic rural education. In a country whose future development and prosperity is so bound up with the necessity for agricultural improvement, it is important that the schools of the countryside should relate their activities to rural pursuits. As the following extract from the report of the Monroe Commission, issued in 1932, indicates, there is nothing novel in directing attention to this vital educational requirement in Iraq: 874 871

> Agriculture as a science is comparatively recent. As a science it has not yet entered Iraq to any great extent. Here it is still predominantly a rude craft; most of those who live by agriculture use primitive methods of farming and stock-keeping of generations or centuries ago. If these out-worn methods are to be replaced by better ones the change must be worked through education, and largely through the village school. . . . [242]
>
> If the work of the village schools is to be determined by the actual and present needs of the people they are set up to serve, then they should first of all become a means of teaching the people how to make a better living from the land. The village school should provide more vital instruction and training in improved agricultural methods; manual arts; the importance of native industries; the proper breeding and selection of seeds. . .

With certain modifications, due mainly to the efforts of the Directorate of Agriculture, these observations of the Monroe Commission are as valid in 1950 as they were in 1932. They will need to be taken into account at a later stage of this study when the type of advance towards compulsory education in the countryside is being considered. 874

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871 369 *The Need for Realistic Tribal Education.* Apart from this great need for the right type of village school for the forty per cent of the population who are living in settled rural communities, there should be educational provision related to the special needs of the thirty-eight per cent of the population living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions and participating in a partial or fully tribal life.

Here again attention was drawn to this important educational need by the Monroe Commission which stated that 'practically [212] all tribal members are illiterate with the exception of some sheikhs who were sent early in their lives to towns or had a special mullah or sayyid, who lived with the tribe, to teach them reading the Koran and writing'. Again with certain modifications, due to the efforts of a minority of tribal heads who have provided their own school buildings, the comments of the Monroe Commission apply equally to conditions in 1950.

The Monroe Commission, mainly on the advice of an Iraqi educator who had made a special study of the educational needs of tribal adults and children, stressed the great importance of both preventive and constructive education for tribal dwellers during the difficult period of transition from the nomadic to the more settled agricultural life. They advocated novel educational devices to meet these special educational needs, including the provision of peripatetic teachers-cum-social advisers who would ultimately promote realistic rural schools which would provide primary education for the children and simple community centres for the adults.

These then, are the general and the outstanding educational needs of Iraq. It is now necessary, in so far as these relate to children of primary school age, to enquire to what extent they are being met in the existing primary schools system, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE BEING MET

TYPICAL PRIMARY SCHOOLS

Before attempting to draw general conclusions as to the extent 872
to which the educational needs indicated in the previous chapter are being met, it may be useful to give a general picture of typical primary schools in Iraq. To speak of a 'typical' school is, of course, misleading, for every school has or should have its individual character. In general, however, most of the Iraqi primary schools have certain common characteristics which make it possible to venture a description of types.

A Typical Town Primary School. In each of the provincial capitals and most of the smaller towns are to be found large schools which may provide for between 300 and 500 pupils. The great majority of the urban primary schools are single sex schools. Such a school [345]
may have from ten to twelve rooms of varying sizes. The numbers in each class may vary from sixty to thirty, the smaller usually being the sixth or top class. The class-rooms are frequently overcrowded, with sometimes three children sitting on a desk built for two. Lighting and sanitary arrangements are generally not of a high standard. In some schools where available accommodation has not kept pace with the local demand for primary education, there may be as many as seventy children in one of the lower classes. Desks are not well constructed and generally show lack of maintenance.

In such a school, as in every other full-range primary school, there are six grades of class, the children being promoted from class to class each year provided they pass an examination indicating that they have satisfied the requirements of the centrally prescribed programme of studies. Those who do not pass the promotion examination are required to repeat the previous year's work.

The teachers seem to work very hard, they occupy the centre [876]
of the stage and either lecture to their pupils or follow the common technique of verbal question and answer. There is little activity on the part of the children apart from incredibly quick oral

872 response, and there is not much evidence of handicraft or art.
[876] Outdoor physical education follows the prescribed syllabus which,
however, seems to be more modern in technique than some of
the other subjects.

[346] Generally speaking, the older buildings look as depressing as their counterparts in some of the western countries. Unfortunately there are not many very recent buildings.

While these conditions apply to many of the schools, however, in the larger towns there are some noteworthy exceptions to which reference will be made later.

[346] *A Typical Village School.* A village school may consist of two or three rooms housing from twenty to seventy pupils of both sexes, but it is rarely a complete six-class school. Lighting and sanitation are usually inferior to that of the town schools. In the northern provinces some of the schools are built of stone, but mostly they are made of dried mud bricks. In parts of the south, especially in the marsh districts, the buildings are reed huts.

The curriculum and teaching techniques in the village school are identical with those of the town school. The children rarely enjoy activity methods, and sit in their desks most of the time.

In many of the village schools children cannot complete their full period of primary schooling because the numbers are too small to permit the organization of the full six classes. In a minority of these schools, however, an increasing number of teachers are learning the technique of simultaneously teaching more than one attainment group and are thus able to provide a complete primary school course in an incomplete school.

Most of the village schools have no garden, handicraft or livestock. But the newly established agricultural primary schools, to which detailed reference will be made later, provide exceptions to this rule.

Because of the absence of compulsory school attendance and
the consequent late admission to school of a number of pupils,
there is a great variety of age-range in both urban and village
schools. Within the limits of the curriculum, however, the teachers
meet these difficulties with commendable patience, and both the
older and the younger children in any one class are usually a
[565] happy family. Another happy feature of the Iraqi primary school
is the absence of social distinctions within the class-room. A wealthy
sheikh's son may rub shoulders with a poorly clad lad from a
very humble home.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE MET QUANTITATIVELY

The Rapid Growth of the Primary Schools System. As will have been

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gathered from the above inevitably over-simplified account of typical primary schools, while some of the educational needs of the children and of society are met, others are neglected. This is due to the very rapid growth of a primary schools system in a new country faced with the task of promoting educational development almost from scratch and with limited financial resources.

The following table, which represents an extraordinary tribute both to the public demand for primary education and to the efforts of the Ministry of Education to meet this demand over a comparatively short period, illustrates the rapid extension of primary schooling between 1920 and 1949:

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN IRAQ

Year	*No. of schools*		*No. of enrolments*				*No. of teachers*	
			Government		*Private*			
	Government	*Private*	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Government*	*Private*
1920–21	88	—	—	—	—	—	485	—
1930–31	316	—	27467	7046	—	—	1325	—
1938–39	739	—	69505	27115	—	—	3149	—
1939–40	713	73	64240	25242	13872	6083	3304	577
1940–41	735	76	64112	26682	13386	6161	3525	608
1941–42	761	77	62441	26423	12823	6299	3752	591
1942–43	788	77	61697	25748	10997	7008	3979	532
1943–44	861	80	67297	22261	12256	6642	4340	607
1944–45	902	81	76960	24017	12828	7059	4491	607
1945–46	944	83	90419	28068	13693	7977	4779	650
1946–47	967	90	98540	30225	14136	7718	4970	657
1947–48	1016	90	106904	32350	15318	7808	5417	779
1948–49	1044	106	114669	35145	16998	8062	5733	776

By the end of the year 1949, therefore, some 175,000 children were enrolled in primary schools. It is estimated that the total number of children of primary school age in Iraq is 750,000. Thus, discounting the rising population, schools and teachers for another 575,000 children would have to be provided before universal compulsory primary education could be achieved.

Wastage in the Primary School. While, however, the figures quoted in the preceding table represent considerable quantitative progress, they do not show the important fact that the great majority of children who enter the primary school fail to complete the full course, and that many do not receive more than one, two or

872 three years of primary schooling. Attention was directed to this striking educational phenomenon by a prominent Iraqi educator in 1942, in the following words:

> Iraq has not yet reached the stage where a compulsory education law is practicable. There are therefore no legal provisions that compel parents to send their children to school within specified age limits. Hence not only do the majority of children of school age enter no primary school, but of those who enter only a fraction remain to complete their primary education. The rest drop out of school at any point from the first to the sixth grade. This constitutes one of the major problems of primary education in Iraq and involves the waste of a great deal of money and effort.

More recent figures provided by another competent Iraqi educational researcher indicate that out of some 22,000 pupils who enrolled in the first classes of primary schools in the year 1940–41, some 16,000 reached the second class, 14,000 the third class, with numbers continuing to dwindle until 10,000 entered the sixth class. Of the 10,000 who stayed on at school until their last year, less than half officially completed the primary school course by gaining the primary school-leaving certificate in the year 1946.

This elimination of pupils, grade by grade, in the primary school represents a serious defect in the present system. There are several contributory reasons. One is obviously economic, parents in poor financial circumstances find that they cannot afford to dispense with the labour of their children. Other reasons for this [876] dropping out of school are the disillusionment of parents who find that their children cannot surmount the repeated examination hurdles, and the fact that some of the village schools are incomplete. But perhaps a more significant reason, at any rate in the villages, is that it is felt, perhaps unconsciously, that the somewhat over-academic and excessively oral type of education is not sufficiently related to the future life of pupils, whose livelihood depends not so much upon bookishness as upon things more practical and related to real life situations. It is clear, however, that until compulsory education can be applied and enforced, the educational life of the minority who do attend primary schools is likely to be short and incomplete.

Demands that are not being met. Despite the rapid growth both in the number of schools and in the number of children attending them, and although this great quantitative increase is badly offset by the number of children who do not complete the course, there can be no doubt that there is a public demand for more primary

schools and that this demand is either inadequately met or not 872
being met at all.

In Baghdad and the other large towns a number of primary school buildings have to be used on a double-shift basis because the demand for education exceeds existing school accommodation. In province after province the Directors of Education quote instances where children have had to be turned away from school because there is no room for them. In travelling through the majority of the provinces the writer met several sheikhs and other local notables who maintained that they were prepared to provide school premises if the Ministry of Education could supply the teaching staff.

So far as tribal education is concerned, the position remains generally as was described by the Monroe Commission. As an example, the Shammar tribe with a population of roughly 60,000 has no school of any kind.

The conclusion must be drawn, therefore, that although the numbers of primary schools and the children attending them have grown considerably during the last thirty years, and despite the fact that many children do not stay the whole course, quantitatively the existing public demand for primary education is not being met. It is now necessary to enquire to what extent the educational needs of the children and of the country are being met qualitatively.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE BEING MET QUALITATIVELY

An Impression of 150 Primary Schools. During the course of this investigation visits were paid to some 150 primary schools, to a smaller number of secondary schools and to most of the institutions of teacher training. It is never safe to judge the quality of any school by a brief acquaintance but, for what they are worth, the following impressions are noted.

In practically every school visited a noteworthy feature was 872
the energy which the teachers, especially the younger ones, put
into their work. They seem to teach incessantly and with little 875
in the way of breaks. The women especially have a great sense of vocation, and are unsparing in their efforts on behalf of their pupils. In many of the girls' schools the teachers had adopted all sorts of devices to provide neat and tidy uniforms for their children. Practically all the teachers appear to spend more time marking and correcting exercises than do their colleagues in some of the western countries. These qualities were apparent throughout the provinces, and are particularly commendable in the villages,

872 where many of the teachers maintain their educational faith
875 despite the fact that they are by no means over-paid and have to live under poor domestic conditions with few amenities.

On the other hand, the general impression gained was that
872 the curriculum of the primary school is seriously overloaded on the bookish and verbal side. This is confirmed by a glance at the official Programme of Studies for the primary schools:

Subject	*Periods per week*					
	1st Class	*2nd Class*	*3rd Class*	*4th Class*	*5th Class*	*6th Class*
Religion and Koran . .	4	4	3	3	2	2
Arabic	11	12	10	10	6	6
English	—	—	—	—	6	6
Arithmetic	6	6	6	6	5	5
Object lesson and hygiene	2	2	2	2	2	2
Geography and history	—	—	4	4	4	4
Morals and Civics . .	—	—	—	1	1	1
Drawing and handicraft	3	3	4	4	4	4
Physical education and singing	4	3	3	2	2	2

This programme, although it looks somewhat scholarly for young children is not, when one examines it in full detail as published by the Ministry of Education, illiberal. It does not, however, allow for much for experiment and flexibility in relation to the
872 varying needs of growing children. The programme of studies is interpreted very literally and the method of learning is by class
876 lectures and memorization. There is little in the way of active learning on the part of the pupils, and they do not appear to have opportunities of acquiring a sense of individual responsibility through the exercise of their own initiative.

One distinctive feature is the teaching of English by a very modern 'direct method' technique. But this, by its excellence, affords a striking contrast to the teaching of some of the other subjects. Although drawing and handicraft are included in the programme of studies, these subjects are mainly limited to copying designs or simple models, and the pupils gain very little experience in the use of tools.

872 It would obviously be unfair, after fleeting visits to a number of schools, to venture criticism of this kind, were it not for the fact that stronger objections to the over-academic conduct of most

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of the primary schools are sometimes made both by officers of 874 the Ministry of Education and by the teachers themselves. The result seems to be a vicious circle, however, because while the teachers blame the centrally imposed programme of studies, the officers of the Ministry maintain that it is not the programme but the narrow interpretation of it by the teachers which is the trouble.

Reasons for the Existing Quality of Primary Schooling. Although there is much to praise in the conscientiousness and zeal of the primary school teachers, and a good deal to be said against the existing overloaded, excessively oral and bookish curriculum, such deficiencies as exist in the quality of primary schooling are understandable when one recalls the very rapid growth of primary education in Iraq from such limited beginnings over a short period.

With such rapid expansion one of the main tasks of the Ministry 875 of Education has had to be that of providing the maximum number of teachers in the minimum of time. And, necessary though this rapid production of more or less trained teachers has been, the consequent training devices have not been calculated to produce the best teachers.

It is estimated that the output of teachers from training institutions during the present year will be 754 men and women. This represents a considerable achievement and, numerically, is one of which the Ministry of Education has reason to be proud. Enquiry into the educational background of these trainees, however, reveals that nearly half of them did not have the advantage of a full secondary education before they entered training institutions. The majority of those who did complete their secondary education before they took up training are simply undergoing an attenuated one-year training course attached to a secondary school. It will be appreciated, therefore, that much needs to be done both in ensuring a sounder educational background for teacher trainees and in providing a longer period of really professional training before the schools can be served by teachers of the quality they need.

It is perhaps not within the scope of this study to evaluate teacher training methods in Iraq in any detail. Yet there are still other inadequacies which need to be met if the quality of primary education is to be improved along the right lines. This applies especially to subjects such as handicraft and to the proper training of teachers for rural schools. With one or two exceptions, little in the way of vigorous and realistic handicraft is practised in the teacher training institutions.

There have been rural teacher training colleges, but these have had a chequered history and the two that still continue have little

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875 in the way of land for practical agriculture and very limited facilities for the actual practice of handicrafts. The type of village school envisaged by the Monroe Commission, and which is so badly needed in rural Iraq, is never likely to materialize until teacher training is directed to turning out the right type of teacher for such schools.

872 In concluding these observations upon the extent to which the educational needs of the children of Iraq are being met in the existing primary schools system, therefore, it is fair to say that although great quantitative progress has been achieved during the last thirty years, existing needs are not being adequately met. Further, public pressure for primary education exceeds existing provision. Qualitatively, advance is desirable in the direction of a more realistic curriculum, especially in the rural areas. The time is undoubtedly ripe for a vigorous policy of educational advance. Such an advance, however, is bound up with problems related to the economic, political and social life of the country. It is these which must now be considered.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS

As was suggested in the previous chapter, although a long road will have to be traversed before the ideal of universal compulsory primary education can be achieved in Iraq, the time is ripe for further advance towards that objective. Pressure on existing school accommodation in the urban areas is acute, most of the villages are without schools, and large areas lack primary school provision of any kind. Yet quantitative advance has by no means been halted, and although many more children would be attending school at the present time if there were schools and teachers for them, new schools are being opened both in new buildings and in rented premises. 872

The Ministry of Education and all who have a concern for education in Iraq are well aware of these circumstances. A small minority feel that quantitative advance has gone far enough for the present and advocate that, before further large-scale development takes place, existing qualitative deficiencies in primary education should be put right. This will take time. In the meantime, it would be difficult to refuse to provide primary school places for the many who are clamouring for them.

While, however, thinking educators in Iraq wish for further advance in the direction of compulsory education, they know that this ideal can never be realized until serious economic, political and social obstacles which impede educational and other desirable social development can be overcome. As the Minister of Education in office at the time of writing put it: 'An emotional desire for more and better schools is not in itself sufficient. Sensible educational development can only take place if it is related to our current economic and financial problems.'

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The Financing of Education. The first of these problems is finance. Little is to be gained from considering proposals for further advance unless they are accompanied by a realistic understanding as to how and where the money for them is to be found. The extent to 658

658 which the Government have been prepared to find money for education is shown by the following table of national educational expenditure compared with total budget expenditure:

[652] EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION

Year	*For all purposes*	*For all education*	*Per cent of education to all purposes*
	£	£	
1920–21	5,556,574	130,360	2.35
1930–31	3,994,337	294,262	7.37
1938–39	5,469,813	708,056	12.94
1939–40	6,369,148	810,477	12.72
1940–41	7,144,910	848,168	11.87
1941–42	7,701,178	855,540	11.11
1942–43	10,620,822	1,131,414	10.65
1943–44	13,749,321	1,515,542	11.02
1944–45	15,484,752	1,335,475	8.62
1945–46	17,563,230	1,611,843	9.18
1946–47	18,428,567	1,737,604	9.43
1947–48	18,742,657	2,157,315	11.51
1948–49	21,947,994	2,572,625	11.72
1949–50	24,095,300	3,783,309	15.70

When one attempts to compare present national expenditure on education with what it would cost to finance compulsory education for all children, however, it cannot be suggested with even the most realistic optimism that there is much prospect of the money being available for some time to come. It is estimated that, at the present time, the cost of providing primary education is £8 per pupil per year. Thus the cost of providing compulsory primary education for the 750,000 children of primary school age, even at the existing level, would amount to considerably more than £6,000,000 per annum, i.e., probably twice as much as the total current educational budget. And this estimate does not take into account the cost of providing the new schools, of bringing existing school buildings up to better standards and of training the many more teachers who would be necessary. It also ignores the fact of the rapidly growing school population.

For this reason many responsible educators, when confronted with the cost, feel that no serious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. This may or may not be true. There is always a need for financial realism, but there

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may be danger in holding up consideration of radical educational reforms until all the necessary financial provision is within sight. Those who wish for advance towards compulsory education but who are fearful of the consequent financial commitments could well be reminded that experience in some other countries has shown that, when the desire for educational advance really exists, the money necessary for its realization is likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, it is quite possible that in Iraq there exist monies which could be made available for educational purposes if means could be devised of extracting them into the public purse. This view may be the more valid when it is remembered that public education in Iraq is financed almost entirely from the central Government budget and that primary education, which is essentially a local service, makes little demand on local financial resources. More will be said later about the possibility of augmenting existing educational revenues from local sources.

Apart from the possibility of raising local revenue for educational purposes, before educational and other social services can be greatly extended, there will need to be larger contributions from the national budget. Some consideration must, therefore, be given to the wider question of the practicability of increasing the country's taxable wealth from which more money for public services may be derived. This inevitably leads to some discussion of two other important economic problems, the potential revenue capacity of the country and the related problem of land tenure.

651

The Potential Revenue Capacity of the Country. It is beyond the scope of this particular study to attempt to assess the potential revenue capacity of Iraq. This is a matter for fiscal experts. Some of the more authoritative of these maintain that the task of considerably augmenting the budget so that additional monies could be devoted to educational and other social services is not insuperable. They feel that, although in the early years of the creation of Iraq as an independent State the Government might not have felt itself sufficiently strong to make too many taxation demands, it is now able to do so. They suggest that it is now possible both to tighten up existing fiscal arrangements and also to obtain more revenue by increased or new taxes. These financial experts hold the view that, despite minor fiscal reforms in recent years, the taxation system remains traditional and too rigid and that effective attempts have not been made to increase revenue by bringing taxation into line with higher prices and the changed economic conditions of the post-war period.

One fiscal change advocated by these would-be revenue reformers is that income tax, which is practically confined to

651 Government officials whose incomes are known and to a minority of the merchants, should be extended to other forms of income, and that provision should also be made for an inheritance tax. There can be no doubt that, if income tax were extended to other forms of income, a wealthy section of the community who at present derive large incomes from land ownership and other sources would contribute much more than they do at present to the national revenue. Another suggestion put forward is that customs and excise duties should be adjusted to *ad valorem* rates to bring them more into accord with post-war prices. They also recommend that the consumption or sales tax, which is at present a fixed rate of 12.5 per cent on produce sold, should be replaced by a form of sliding scale tax related both to land values and to the use made of land. In advocating this important change the reformers maintain that this would produce more revenue, would prevent existing evasions and would also serve as an incentive to increased agricultural production.

It is not within the competence of the writer to comment on the validity or practicability of revenue reforms of this kind. It is clear, however, that there is a fertile field for intelligent enquiry into methods for producing that additional budget revenue without which educational and other advance will be slower than is desirable.

311 *The Problem of Land Tenure.* While it is possible that measures such as those indicated would produce valuable additions to the national revenue, the fact remains that the main source of Iraq's future wealth must be the proper exploitation of the land. Upon this depends that higher standard of life for the bulk of the population, and the concomitant increase of wealth for both private and public use, without which the country will never be able to enjoy that abundant life which the rich natural agricultural resources of Iraq make possible. Unfortunately the country's enormous agricultural potential is greatly hindered by the system of land tenure.

423 The land tenure system of Iraq is far too complicated a subject fully to be examined in this study, but the following extract from Sir Ernest Dowson's classic report on this problem gives some idea of its effects and ramifications:

> The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity

and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would 423
be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, small or large, held in undisputed possession and free from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole.

Put very briefly, with the exception of small areas, mainly in 423
Northern Iraq, together with some smaller areas of a few yet 471
hopefully significant State-sponsored schemes of land settlement, the bulk of the cultivated land of Iraq is in the possession of large landowners. Some of them may not enjoy the holding of this land by confirmed legal right but, to all intents and purposes, they own it and derive immense incomes from it. Others, by legal process, the validity of which is disputed by land reformers, have gained possession of lands which were formerly held in common tribal use.

These landowners, or landholders, are usually sheikhs or 471
absentee urban landlords who let the land to share-tenants through 427
a hierarchy of lessees or agents, at the bottom of which is the landless cultivator who gets an incredibly small share of the produce of his labour. Indeed, the actual cultivator under this invidious system of share-cropping may get anything from ten per cent to thirty per cent of the produce of the land which he works, most of the remainder going to the large landowners, agents or owners of irrigation pumps. The situation may vary from landlord to landlord, and very occasionally the actual cultivator is said to
share fifty per cent of the produce. In general, however, the [565]
position of the Iraqi countryside is one of great extremes of wealth and poverty. The landowner may live in a sumptuous style with a town house and country palace, while the peasant cultivator may live under conditions of poverty or near-destitution.

It is not possible in this study to attempt more than an outline 471
of the causes and effects of this situation. It arose partly out of 423
ancient confusion of titles which meant that, with the break-up 425
of the tribal system, the most powerful member of the tribe was able to appropriate for his own purposes land which was originally intended for the common good of the tribe. It is due partly to the faulty application of the Ottoman Land Code under which, because the small cultivator was not strong enough to establish his rights of title, these rights fell to the sheikh. The profits derived from the Persian Gulf grain trade in the late 19th and early 20th centuries gave a further impetus to what has been described as 'this wholesale land grabbing'. Finally, with the development

471 423 425 of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of [565] cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

511 642 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

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POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS

Although the main obstacle to further educational development 871
in Iraq is that of finance, and although it is difficult to see how sufficient money will be forthcoming for this and other social purposes until fiscal and land reforms are undertaken, there exist other obstacles to educational progress which are more of a political and administrative nature.

Lack of Continuity in Educational Policy. An undoubted obstacle to 871
the pursuance of a consistent and steady development in the 645
direction of compulsory education is a lack of continuity and positive direction in educational policy. This seems to have obtained for a long time. It is a somewhat delicate matter to discuss but, looking back over the history of educational administration since the formation of the first Iraqi Government, one is confronted with very frequent changes of Minister of Education, less frequent but still too frequent changes both of officials and in the organization of the Ministry of Education, and lack of consistency in policy with constantly fluctuating emphasis on this or that aspect of educational development. One type of school or administration may be here one year and gone the next. This is particularly true of devices for the training of rural teachers; institutions have been started and then discarded before an evaluation of their real usefulness has been possible.

These changes of policy and of personnel have been due to both political and sectarian factors which it is not possible fully to discuss in this investigation, but of which those concerned with them or affected by them are only too well aware.

Circumstances of this kind tend to produce even in the best officials and educators a sense of frustration. They also make it extremely difficult for the most able Minister of Education to promote a well-founded policy with any assurance that it will be carried out by his successors.

The Problem of the Administration of Education. Administration of [642]
the public services in Iraq is generally characterized by its high degree of centralization. This was perhaps inevitable when Iraq as an independent nation was still young and had neither the time nor the resources to work out new arrangements whereby the localities might participate more in the business of government. Further, a somewhat 'tight' central administration was part of the process of ensuring national unity.

Educational administration provides no exception to this practice of centralization. Curricula are laid down by the Ministry of

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645 871 Education, as are textbooks and the conduct of examinations. The central authority trains the teachers, appoints and dismisses them. Salaries are paid from the central treasury. Apparently no Government school or training institution has funds of its own, and the schools appear to have little freedom in the choice of books and equipment. The daily time-table of the school is determined by the national Primary School Regulations. As has been stated earlier, there are Provincial Directors of Education, but these are direct employees of the Ministry of Education and are their local representatives.

Such a highly centralized system was, of course, indispensable in the early stages when administrative talent was at a premium and when local government institutions did not exist. But it is accompanied by disadvantages and may, in the long run, as schools increase and the amount of detailed central administration grows, have the adverse effect of hindering the Ministry of Education from concentrating on their essential task of promoting a broad policy of national educational development. From conversations with senior officials of the Ministry of Education, the writer gained the impression that, through sheer pressure of daily detail, they were prevented from devoting sufficient of their time and talents to consideration of major issues.

This degree of centralization in a capital city which is so distant from many of the provincial centres and schools, and under which schools must inevitably be treated *en masse*, is also possibly a contributory factor in maintaining the over-rigidity which applies in many of the schools. Schools which are required to work in detail according to central regulations may fail to develop individuality and personality.

871 *The Problem of Differing Regional Needs.* Another feature which suggests that the time is arriving when it will be necessary to decentralize some of the administration of education is that, although the total population of Iraq is relatively small, there exist great regional differences. The needs of urban Baghdad and its surrounding province differ greatly from those of the nomads in Muntifiq and Northern Mosul. The problems of the Marsh Arabs of Amara are not those of the Kurds in Erbil and Sulaimaniya.

000 National unity is an imperative consideration, but it would be unfortunate if the requirements of conformity to a centrally conceived educational system had the effect in any way of conflicting with regional cultures and distinctively local ways of life. If this were so it might, in the long run, not serve the cause of unity.

SOCIAL FACTORS

Alongside these economic and administrative problems are a number of social factors which inhibit educational development. 000

Illiteracy and Health Problems. For many years it is likely that illiteracy among the adult population, and the state of the public health, will constitute obstacles to the extension of primary education, especially in the rural areas. The reasons for this are obvious. Parents who are themselves illiterate and living at a low standard of life are not easily persuaded that schooling is a worthwhile substitute for the work of their children. Neither are they able to provide in their homes those standards and values which, if the training of the schoolroom is not be negatived, are such necessary reinforcements to public education. Similarly, the prevalence of epidemic and endemic disease, together with inadequate sanitation, also contributes to a major health problem which must be taken into account in attempting to ensure regular school attendance. 212 164 871

Yet while obstacles of this kind exist, they are diminishing. The Public Health Service is developing slowly but surely, and one has only to see a doctor at work in a remote rural area to appreciate the devoted service which is beginning to contribute to a solution of some of the health problems. Again, although illiteracy and poverty are not the best friends of education, one has only to visit remote little village schools to realize that some of the poorest parents are making sacrifices to send their children to school. 657 212

Before compulsory education can be achieved, however, even assuming that the money for it will be forthcoming, a vigorous attack on adult illiteracy will be essential. To this end, what is needed in the rural areas is a type of school which, in addition to meeting the needs of the children, provides in a practical and non-academic fashion realistic fundamental education for the parents. The teacher training institutions would make a most valuable contribution if, quite apart from training the future teachers to attend to the needs of children, they also initiated them into the more practical techniques of teaching illiterates the fundamentals of better living. 871

The Position of Women and Children. Another obstacle to educational and social development which is often quoted is the position of women in a society which is predominantly Muslim. Traditionally women are discouraged from taking part in public life, and this attitude is bound to be reflected in education. 562

562 872 But this obstacle can be exaggerated. As a glance at the figures showing the growth of primary education in Iraq indicates, the proportion of girls to boys attending primary schools is not high, but their enrolment is steadily increasing. Although most of the large urban schools are single sex schools, Iraq has the distinction of having many co-educational village schools. The growing number of kindergartens are co-educational. In all the institutions of higher education young men and women work together.

The emancipation of women in Iraq still has a long way to go, but convincing signs of it are evident. It would, nevertheless, be a considerable advance if the Ministry of Education were to encourage the recruitment of a number of women to the staffs of the boys' primary schools. From visits to many Iraqi primary schools it is evident that the standards of the women teachers in matters of personal cleanliness of the children, care and decoration of the school premises, general decorum and pleasant social conduct are higher than those of their men colleagues. Their influence in boys' schools would be most salutary.

464 872 The position of children is, of course, difficult when parents, especially in the rural areas, are dependent upon the labour of even very young children. Yet an increasing number of poor parents appear to be sending their children to school. It would be a great inducement to more and regular school attendance if means could be devised of providing free midday meals for some of the children, especially in the village schools. At one of the more modern primary schools in Baghdad attractively cooked and served midday meals are provided, but this is a school attended mainly by children from comfortable homes where the parents can afford to pay for this service. In the rural areas, however, simple food is not expensive, cooking devices and service are cheap, and it should be possible to provide free meals for the needy children at relatively low cost.

It should be noted that effective child labour legislation does not exist in Iraq. Until the time comes when such legislation can be enacted and enforced, compulsory education will be most difficult to apply.

162 166 871 *Tribal Organization and Mobility of Population.* But the most formidable obstacles of all are those related to tribal organization and mobility of population. There are two particular sets of problems, those of the tribes who are still in a nomadic state, and those of the people who are in the transitional stage of semi-settlement. Between them, it is estimated that these nomadic and semi-settled peoples number nearly 2,000,000 persons, roughly 300,000 of whom are children of primary school age.

Some eight per cent of these tribal dwellers are still nomadic, 162
and educational arrangements for them will obviously be most 166
difficult to apply. People who are on the move, even if this be in
regular seasonal cycles or over more or less fixed areas, are never 871
susceptible to organized education. Even in countries where
compulsory education laws have been in effect for several years
and where school accommodation for the entire child population
exists, it is not easy to make arrangements for the schooling of
the children of mobile persons such as caravan and boat dwellers.
Clearly, in a country like Iraq where the problem of mobility of
population is of much greater magnitude, the conventional type
of fixed village school is useless for these peoples. Some of them
are not averse to education, and, especially in places where a
sheikh is anxious that his own children shall be educated, there
is an opportunity for providing educational facilities which would
be shared by the other children of the tribal group. It is suggested,
therefore, that the time is opportune for giving serious consideration
to the training of peripatetic teachers of the kind recommended
by the Monroe Commission in 1932.

The more urgent problem of tribal education relates to that 166
majority of the tribal peoples who are in the stage of transition 871
from nomadism to a more settled agricultural life. People who
are passing through this transitional stage present great problems 619
but also great opportunities to the educator. They are alleged to
lose some of the simpler virtues of people who are forced to submit
to the strict tribal laws and codes while they are still wandering
in the desert. Be that as it may, they undoubtedly need practical
education in the amenities of the more settled life, particularly
in matters of health, child care under primitive housing conditions
and agricultural practice. Their children also need schooling.
These educational needs are becoming more acute because, as
has been indicated in a previous chapter when discussing the
problem of land tenure, the tribal peoples are losing their former
wholesome relationship with the sheikh, who is becoming more
of a landlord interested in the produce of his tenants and less
of a leader with a responsibility for their welfare.

These needs of the tribal dwellers, therefore, and especially 876
those who are in the semi-settled stage, present a formidable 166
challenge to the Iraqi educator. What is probably needed to meet
their peculiar requirements is a team of peripatetic teachers who
could travel with the tribes while they are on the move, and who
could establish simple schools-cum-community-centres in the places
where the tribesmen and their families are gradually settling. So
far as is known, devices of this kind are as yet untried; it would
be well if a few young men and women of ingenuity and a practical

876 166 turn of mind, and preferably from the tribal areas themselves, could be specially trained as intensely practical teachers and then appointed to establish pilot projects of tribal education.

871 619 Some people with whom these possibilities have been discussed are not optimistic about such attempts to meet the educational needs of the tribes. They maintain that the tribal dweller has a strong suspicion of anything that smacks of Government interference and that he would have nothing to do with publicly-provided education. There is, however, another point of view. The writer and an Iraqi inspector of schools were sitting in a Bedouin guest tent one evening recently, together with two sheikhs, one of whom is reputed to be amassing land for his own purposes and the other who is the more liberal minded son of a sheikh who once established two schools. The following conversation was heard and, for what it is worth, is quoted verbatim:

First sheikh: 'I hear that you have offered to provide a school building if the Government will provide teachers.'
Second sheikh: 'Yes, I would like a school for my son Silah and for the other boys of his age.'
First sheikh: 'If your people become educated they will be demanding more rights. You will be laying up trouble for the future.'
Second sheikh: 'I want my people to be educated so that they may become better human beings. The future is with those who are educated.'

There is, of course, always more than one point of view about educational matters. The point of view of the second sheikh is expressed in another way by an Iraqi educator who writes, 'The problem which the Iraq Government faces as regards the tribes, the solution of which should form one of the main civic aims of education in Iraq, is the broadening of the outlook and allegiance of the tribesmen from their narrow tribal limits to a national horizon'.

000 These then, are some of the economic, political and social problems which must be taken into consideration before any ambitious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. It is only against this background that the realism of possible solutions to present educational difficulties can be judged. But these problems are not new and, despite the obstacles which they constitute, definite quantitative progress in the field of primary education has undoubtedly been achieved in recent years.

The next step must be to consider the practicability of making

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further advance in the light of these economic, political and social obstacles. Before examining possible ways and means of further educational progress, however, it is well to look at some of the more significant advances which have been made in Iraq in recent years towards the solution of some of the problems which have been outlined in this chapter. OOO

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CHAPTER FIVE

SIGNIFICANT RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY ADVANCE IN IRAQ

000 Although the various obstacles outlined in the previous chapter are serious ones, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that certain of them are being at any rate partly overcome; some of them in ways which are significant pointers to the directions along which positive advance towards compulsory education may be possible.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCE FAVOURABLE TO EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Certain economic and social advances are taking place which are likely to be favourable to the development of education, both as regards producing more revenue and in improving the standard of life of parents so that they can afford to allow their children to attend school.

241
407 *Evidence of Improved Agricultural Practice.* A few of the more enlightened landowners, especially those who are not absentee landlords and take an active interest in their farms, are engaged in the important business of applying power and science to the land. Large tracts of land in the rainfall region which have not previously been cultivated are being opened up by the mechanical plough. Indeed, it has been fascinating to see land which was hitherto regarded as desert being ploughed at night by modern tractors with headlights. Other landowners and farmers are experimenting, with considerable success, in the growing of relatively new crops such as American cotton of high quality. In some of the northern provinces there are cattle bred to considerably higher standards than formerly. The writer was present at a lively discussion between farmers who were suggesting ways of conserving by modern silage the nutritious spring vegetation most of which is at present only scantily cropped and then left to be burnt up by the summer sun.

654 It has also been gratifying to observe the growing interest which is being taken in certain of the experimental farms organized by the Directorate of Agriculture.

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If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, 185
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultiv- 425
ation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intellig-
ently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract 185
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

166 must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land
185 must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting.
He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

425 (4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and
provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

427 (5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders.
So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila
area, and the total population of adults and children is between
871 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with
a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing
185 for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good
design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of
Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for
a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to
avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish
intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village
which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of
the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the
intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural
streams'.

427 It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which
425 has been in operation for only four years and is still in process
of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it
241 appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless
185 cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average
465 income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of
the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced
from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators. Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which, by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed, it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

427 The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants,
apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging
185 and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they
make a certain contribution to the public purse through the sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

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with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 423
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 511
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 565
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of 166
living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

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000 the area. If the project continues to progress at its present rate, it must undoubtedly be regarded as one of the most significant and far-reaching contributions to rural, social and ultimately educational progress in Iraq. Incidentally, it is understood that the Dujaila Committee which controls this and related schemes has, at present, no educational representative on it. It is desirable that such representation should be provided for, so that the economic and social changes which are taking place in the new communities may go hand in hand with consistent educational development. Further, the educators who are associated with the scheme would do well at all times to enlist the advice of the working farmers and agricultural advisers, so that the new schools to be provided there serve the needs of the local community more realistically than do most of the village schools.

SIGNIFICANT EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES

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There are other developments which provide pointers towards progress in the right direction, educational movements which provide most hopeful clues to the lines along which future educational advance may proceed.

Some Progressive Primary Schools. Although most of the primary schools are uniform in their conformity to an over-bookish curriculum, a small minority of them are escaping into a freer educational environment with less rigid teaching and learning techniques.

Some of the demonstration primary schools attached to or used by the better training institutions are adopting methods which are much more in accord with the real educational needs of growing children. Similar developments are being encouraged by a small body of progressive primary school teachers both in Baghdad and in some of the provinces. In these schools there is less of rote and verbal memorization, and more activity on the part of the children themselves. In such schools the teacher is not so much a lecturer working according to a narrow interpretation of a centrally prescribed curriculum, but is rather a less obtrusive helper who aids the children to learn by their own initiative and enquiry. In some of these schools there are gardens made and enjoyed by the pupils; physical education is not so much 'drill' as the enjoyment of natural movement; attractive wall illustrations make the internal environment more cheerful; the spirit of play is harnessed to the process of learning.

Some of these schools, because of their experimental nature, are

allowed a greater choice of textbooks than those prescribed in the 872 official programme of studies. It is to be hoped that they will use their freedom to encourage the use of more colourful books for, 876 although some of the textbooks prescribed by the central body are illustrated, most of them are devoid of colour.

These schools are bound to spread their influence to others, especially if some of the assistant teachers are prepared to leave the capital city and provincial centres for a time and are promoted to headships in some of the more remote schools.

The Kindergarten Movement. Side by side with this practice of livelier and more modern techniques in this limited minority of primary schools is the growth of a small but steadily extending kindergarten movement. One of these schools is attached to the [875] primary teachers' training college for girls in Baghdad, and affords the teacher trainees the opportunity of seeing in a practical and vivid fashion the pursuit of modern educational methods in a way which they would never derive from the books they use. Others have been established in the large towns and provincial capitals, mainly through local effort and self-help.

These kindergarten schools are perhaps the liveliest and happiest educational institutions in Iraq. Generally they are in well-designed buildings which have been furnished carefully and pleasantly. Teaching aids, apparatus and wall illustrations are sometimes the best that could be found in any kindergarten school, even in countries whose educational systems are much older and supported by more public money. Fortunately also the teachers in such schools have considerable freedom to work in accordance with a curriculum based not on prescribed syllabuses but upon the observed needs of young children.

In the opinion of the writer the kindergarten movement is one of the most hopeful indications of real educational advance in Iraq. If the spirit and methods of these schools could be gradually embodied in the life of the primary schools and the primary schools left with a greater degree of freedom, there is a probability that this would be the beginning of a most wholesome revolution in educational method throughout the country.

A few of the primary schools have, indeed, within the limits of the prescribed syllabuses that they must follow, tried to embody some of the activity methods of the kindergarten school into their lower forms. Some attempt free drawing as apart from the almost universal copy drawing. Others not only have school magazines but encourage the pupils to edit them and contribute to them. That it is not easy, however, to persuade the teacher that education is something for its own sake and not merely an avenue to

872 promotion, is indicated by the following extract from a teacher's
876 introduction to the first issue of a primary school magazine:

> 'Our Magazine.
> Dear Pupils,
>
> This is the first number of our school magazine. I want every pupil to read it very carefully because it is for you, not for the teacher.
>
> Please read this paper carefully and ask me any question about it. If you do as I say, you will succeed in the examination.
>
> Your Teacher,
> Signed ....'

874 *The Agricultural Primary Schools.* The need for realistic village
654 schools in Iraq has been advocated in the Report of the Monroe Commission and elsewhere. They have taken a long time to materialize, but there are now signs of progress.

In 1948 the Ministry of Education requested the Provincial Directors of Education to establish an experimental primary school in each province. One such school has since been provided in most of the provinces, not as an entirely new project but as an extension of an existing primary school. Several acres of land have been attached to these schools and some of them keep a limited amount of livestock. Some have modest dairy equipment, a stock of hand tools for the pupils and an agricultural machine such as a power-driven cultivator. One or two have a tractor. In the irrigation districts some possess their own water pump.

Unfortunately these schools were established during a period of retrenchment, and although the Ministry of Education launched this important experiment it was apparently unable to provide the money for other essential buildings and equipment such as handicraft shops, simple laboratories and materials for experiment. It was also unable to provide every such school with a teacher acquainted with the basic practice and principles of farming. Despite these initial handicaps, some of the agricultural primary schools have started courageously and have attempted to free
[177] themselves from a purely academic curriculum. In certain of the schools, apart from teaching methods of normal cultivation, experiments are being made in the growth of crops hitherto unfamiliar to the local economy. Indeed one teacher claims that, through his introduction of American cotton on to the school farm, the local landowner has since grown this crop on a large scale and has made a substantial profit from it. If this is so, it certainly illustrates the extra-mural influence of a village school which adjusts its curriculum to real life situations.

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The starting of these agricultural primary schools is, in itself, of considerable significance because it does show that, after an over-long attachment to a bookish syllabus, the Ministry of Education is becoming alive to the need for the sort of village school which is so badly needed in Iraq but which has been so slow to develop. If, by improved training methods for rural teachers, together with more generous provision for practical subjects, buildings and equipment, these schools could be adequately staffed and equipped, they would probably serve as a model for the village school of the future. At present, although they have made a good beginning, they are in an experimental stage, and it is unfortunate that this important venture should have to be tried out under such hampering conditions. It is to be hoped that failure to make the necessary provision in the way of agricultural staff and equipment will not cause these hopefully experimental village schools to revert to the restricted and less realistic pursuits of the conventional Iraqi rural school.

These experimental agricultural schools are, in the opinion of the writer, so important for the future that the Ministry of Education would be well advised, as an urgent measure, to assist them in three ways. Firstly, an attempt should be made to secure the services of an experienced teacher-cum-agriculturalist who would be Adviser in Rural Education and take a special interest in these schools, particularly with a view to assisting them to integrate agricultural subjects with the rest of the school activities and not simply regard agriculture as 'an extra'. Secondly, even if this means a minor economy in another direction, these schools should be liberally provided with equipment so that they do not, through inanition, wither back to their bookish ways. Finally, opportunity should be given to the heads and agricultural teachers in these schools to meet their colleagues from other schools, so that they may learn from one another's successes and failures. In several of these agricultural primary schools the teachers exhibit commendable keenness, but are still groping their way without the material help and advice which they need.

Courses for Serving Teachers. Another sign of educational advance is the preparedness of serving teachers to attend professional courses. Still more encouraging is the obvious value they have derived from the courses which it has been possible to organize for them. A few years ago, with a view to promoting the teaching of English in a livelier way, some enthusiastic officers of the Ministry of Education organized regional residential courses in this subject. It is understood that the response of the teachers was excellent. More important, the improved methods of oral English

875 teaching which are now appearing in the top classes of the primary schools suggest that the Iraqi teacher is by no means rigidly conservative in method, and is quick to apply new techniques when his eyes have been opened to them.

During the last year or two, however, possibly because of the need to find money to cope with the additional numbers of children who are presenting themselves for admission into primary schools, it has apparently been difficult to finance courses for teachers. It is to be hoped that the time will soon come when it is possible to organize courses for serving teachers, not only in specific subjects, but also of a more general nature. The necessarily brief and restricted training which has had to be provided for many of the teachers in the past means that the educational horizons of some of the serving teachers are not as broad as they might well be. If it is still felt that the cost of many residential courses of a general nature cannot yet be met, consideration might be given to the possibility of taking short courses to the teachers themselves in the teachers' clubs which exist up and down the country.

THE ADVANCE OF EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVE IN THE PROVINCES

871 In addition to these evidences of advance in the schools and among
645 the teachers, there are also signs of certain trends in the provinces
which, as will be seen later, may be highly significant as aids to
the ultimate implementation of plans for the promotion of
compulsory education.

The Beginnings of Local Educational Administration. Until very recently, the impetus for educational development in Iraq has, as already pointed out, come from the centre. The Ministry of Education has not only supervised the national system but has also provided most of the schools and most of the money. It has also taken the administrative initiative. There are now indications, even in the remoter provinces, that the people are wanting to have their share in educational development. If these trends, as some of the people in the provinces maintain, are real evidence of the beginnings of a public concern about education they are, indeed, most important.

One hopeful sign is that, despite their very limited powers and the fact that certain of the Provincial Directors of Education are afraid to take any initiative without previous sanction from the Ministry of Education, some of the Directors are exhibiting considerable energy and initiative in promoting local educational advance. In some of the provinces the Directors complain about

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the lack of suitable school buildings and the fact that they have to refuse children admission to schools, but pessimistically maintain that no progress can be made because the Ministry of Education cannot or will not find the money for them. But others are showing real enterprise and, in co-operation with the Provincial Governor, are building new schools with money obtained from local contributions. 871 645

In one province, through the initiative and persistence of an energetic Director of Education who has that commendable combination of qualities desirable in an educational administrator, namely a sense of vocation and a love of children, five well-designed new primary schools and three similar intermediate schools are being built at the time of writing, mainly out of local contributions. In the same province the Director of Education has built a new and well furnished kindergarten school, and has provided a central playing field and changing rooms through money collected locally. When he came to the province some four years ago there were twenty-eight primary schools. There are now fifty-four and the number will soon have increased to sixty. 871

Local initiative of this kind is of great significance. It suggests that the way to advance is not only through schemes that may be produced in the Ministry of Education itself, but also through the energies of people on the spot who know local needs and the ways and means of meeting them. This provincial effort also suggests that, despite limitations imposed by the central budget, money for educational development on no modest scale can be obtained from local resources when there is local initiative and enterprise. True, local voluntary contributions towards the building of new schools are not in the long run the best means of financing local educational provision, because such sources may not be regular and may dry up with changes in the circumstances of the charitable donors. Ultimately, such contributions will need to be supplemented by more regularly and equitably distributed local taxes. But these attempts to meet locally some of the costs of the educational provision are likely to be important future means of financing educational advance at a greater pace than appears to be practicable by reliance on central exchequer sources alone. Extra taxes are of course never popular but, when additional monies for educational purposes have to be found, it may prove that the levying of local taxes by a local administration is likely to prove less obnoxious to the psychology of people of tribal origin who have an inherent dislike of distant central government.

Awakening Educational Consciousness in the Localities. After travelling through most of the provinces of Iraq, and discussing possibilities

871 of educational advance with many people in the localities, the writer is persuaded that there is a growing consciousness of the need for more primary schools. In province after province, and village after village, there were local notabilities who had provided school buildings from their own resources and others who were prepared to find the money for schools and furniture if the Ministry of Education would provide the teachers.

871 Significantly, some of these local people complained about what 876 they described as 'absence of reality' in the work of the primary schools. They maintained that, while they are anxious that the children should learn to read and write, they would prefer that they were also taught in the schools how to handle tools, how to keep healthy, and how to till the soil. One parent complained that 'present day education is divorced from life and only goes skin deep'. He quoted an instance of an urban trained teacher who was giving a hygiene lecture in school, complete with a vivid illustration of the intestinal system, but was oblivious of the fact that flies were crawling over the faces of some of his listeners! The few women with whom it was possible to discuss educational affairs urged that cookery and homecraft should play an important part in the education of the older girls in the primary school. One farmer's wife said: 'I would prefer that my daughter learned how to sew rather than do geometry in school'.

871 Enough has perhaps been said by now to indicate that, although Iraq still has a long way to go before any realistic attempt to bridge the gap between the existing primary schools system and a complete system of compulsory education will be fruitful, changes of an economic, social and educational nature are taking place which give cause for sober optimism. It is now possible, in the light of these advances and changes in attitude and public opinion, to consider ways and means of promoting further advance in the educational field.

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CHAPTER SIX

A POLICY OF ADVANCE TOWARDS COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

So far in this study an attempt has been made to ascertain the 000
main educational needs of Iraq, to evaluate recent developments in primary education both quantitatively and qualitatively, to demonstrate the enormous obstacles to further advance and to illustrate, from examples, the ways in which some of these obstacles are being overcome. It is clear, however, that while some circumstances and conditions exist which suggest that the time for further advance is propitious, such advance will only be possible by the adoption and persistent implementation of a policy which takes into account both the desired objective and the obstacles which still have to be surmounted. The obstacles are clear enough. The desired objective is also clear, always provided it is appreciated that quantitative advance is not in itself sufficient. What is needed is not only a policy of advance which will get more children into school, but one which will ensure that children enjoy forms of primary education which are related to their individual needs and to the special needs of Iraq.

Before considering possible lines of advance towards compulsory 871
education for all children in schools of the right type, it is necessary to call to mind the magnitude of the task quantitatively. With a potential primary school population of 750,000 children which is rising daily, with not more than twenty-four per cent of this number now attending school for periods of varying duration, with a national budget which is barely balanced, with a country which is badly in need of other public services, it would appear to be unrealistically idealistic to assume that any effective advance towards universal compulsory education could be achieved over any short period of years. The present total education budget would have to be more than doubled to provide primary education for all children at existing standards, some 15,000 additional teachers would have to be trained, and a sum of money which it is not possible to estimate would be required for capital expenditure on school buildings.

The magnitude of the problem, however, is not new to the 871
Ministry of Education. In 1946 a special committee of the Ministry 645
drew up a 'Ten-Year Plan' in which it was suggested that, provided
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871 certain administrative reforms were introduced into the Ministry
645 itself, and provided a vigorous educational drive was made, it
185 should prove possible within ten years to achieve a total school attendance of fifty per cent of all children of primary school age. Under this plan it was hoped that it would be possible to train 400 additional teachers in the first year and provide for an increased school attendance of some 12,000 children. At this rate of progress some 42,000 additional children should have been attending primary schools by the end of 1949. Actually the total increased primary school attendance between 1946 and 1949 amounted to some 34,000 children. This increase took place despite the fact that, apart from some not too satisfactory measures for the short-term training of teachers, the reforms advocated by the special committee of the Ministry of Education were never put into operation. In other words, the recent quantitative advance appears to have resulted not so much through any 'Ten-Year Plan' as because of continued public pressure.

871 There is no doubt that this public pressure for more schools will
185 continue and that, unless a more vigorous policy of coping with the demand is initiated, quantitative demand will continue for some years to outstrip primary school provision. Indeed, when one looks back over a period of years and realizes that, whereas in 1931 there were not more than 35,000 children attending primary schools, there are now 175,000 children, there is little cause for any immediate pessimism so far as numerical advance is concerned. It is for this reason that some Iraqi educational reformers maintain that, on the assumption that quantitative development goes on at the same total pace, i.e., another five-fold increase over the next twenty years, compulsory education of a type could be achieved by 1970. It is not possible, however, to predict the future rate of progress even in general terms because, although quantitative growth has been rapid since 1930, it cannot go on beyond a certain point until some of the economic, political and social obstacles already outlined have been solved. Although numerical development has increased five-fold since 1930, that rate of increase will undoubtedly drop when the children of the relatively higher income groups are in school and when the Ministry of Education is confronted with the task of meeting the needs of the children of very poor parents and those who are living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions.

If these suppositions are valid, the broad lines of a policy of genuine advance towards compulsory education become clearer. First, steps must be taken to cope with the present unsatisfied demand for primary education. Secondly, consideration will sooner or later have to be given to the measures which will need to be

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taken to provide both for the children whose parents cannot yet afford to send them to school and those who are living under partly or entirely nomadic conditions. Equally important, preparations will need to be made for ensuring that qualitative accompanies quantitative progress. If real advance towards compulsory education is desired, some of these measures will have to be taken immediately; others will have to be developed more gradually. Consideration must, therefore, now be given to a policy of advance towards compulsory education which includes both immediate and long-term measures.

A SHORT-TERM POLICY

COPING WITH EXISTING DEMANDS

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The most immediate necessity is that measures should be taken to meet the demands of parents who wish to send their children to primary schools. Some advocates of educational advance do not recommend this immediate action, urging that the more important task is to improve the quality of the existing schools. It is doubtful whether this view could be sustained: it would provoke further parental disillusionment and deprive many children of a fair start in life.

An attempt should, therefore, be made to ascertain the extent of this immediate problem by asking every Provincial Director of Education to give, from his local knowledge, details of the number of children in the province who would attend school under existing conditions if accommodation were available for them, the number of new schools needed and the extra teachers required. The results would probably be surprising in that they would demonstrate a public desire for education in the provinces of which the Ministry of Education may not be entirely aware.

These needs should be met forthwith and financed by a special allocation from the central budget in the next financial year. The extra teachers could be found partly by abandoning uneconomic rented premises which are wasteful of teaching staff, but mainly by 'stepping-up' existing teacher training provision as an emergency measure. Some new buildings would be necessary but many of these, at any rate in the smaller towns and villages, would be provided voluntarily from local resources. In the larger towns, consideration should be given to a suggestion made by an Iraqi economist that new school buildings could be provided through

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000 the floating of local public loans which could be partly redeemed by the gradual release of the large sums of 'dead money' which are at present being spent on rented premises which cannot be used economically.

In other words, what is needed at the present time is a vigorous administrative gesture which would assure the public that the Ministry of Education is controlling the existing pressure for primary schools rather than being jockeyed along by it.

REFORM OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

871 But perhaps before the Ministry of Education can itself promote
185 immediate measures of this kind with the vigour required, consideration will have to be given once more to two major
645 administrative reforms which were advocated by the special committee appointed to draw up the 'Ten-Year Plan' in 1946.

The Minister as a Trustee of the Public Educational Interest. Until very recently the advent of a new Minister of Education has tended to be accompanied by abrupt changes and reverses of educational policy, and sometimes by changes in official personnel. This is certainly not calculated to assist that continuity and persistence in educational policy which is so essential at the present time.

Some maintain that this unfortunate tendency has been due to the intrusion of party politics and sectarian interests into the Ministry. If this is true, it should be emphasized that a Ministry of Education, while being responsive to sound educational opinion, should always endeavour independently to attach itself to national educational policy which is free from these non-educational considerations.

It is probably nearer the truth to suggest that these fluctuations in educational policy are due as much to the influence of the individual opinions and plans of the Ministers themselves. It is perhaps natural in a young and rapidly developing country that Ministers should wish to leave their own impress on the country's educational affairs. It is not desirable, however, that they should have the unrestricted power to do this, and in any event they should be required to justify proposed changes before men who have had long experience of education and educational administration. It is refreshing, therefore, to gather from conversations with some of the recent holders of this important office that the time may be approaching when the Minister tends more and more to regard himself, not as one who is entitled to control

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educational policy in the light of opinions and schemes based on 871
his own inevitably limited educational experience, or by con- 185
siderations of his own political group or sect, but as a trustee of
the educational interest of the whole country. 645

The Formation of a National Council of Education. It was also suggested [647] by the special committee referred to that a means of assisting successive Ministers to pursue a consistent policy of educational advance would be the creation of a National Council of Education which would be composed of Directors-General of Education, the Deans of Institutions of Higher Education, representatives from other Ministries whose co-operation is essential in educational progress, representatives appointed by Parliament, and other leading personalities in the country. It was suggested that 'the principle function of this National Council of Education should be to ensure that educational policy is well-founded and that there is stability in its application'. In other words, the National Council of Education would be a continuing body pledged to an agreed national policy of educational development from which successive Ministers of Education would find it difficult to depart.

It appears that a properly constituted National Council of Education has never been formed. Some such bodies have been established and abolished from time to time at the discretion of successive Ministers. One reason given for failure to maintain a National Council of Education is that the Minister should justify himself, not to a Committee of 'experts' but to public opinion. Theoretically there is much to be said for such an explanation but, in a country where the bulk of the population have not had educational opportunity and cannot therefore be articulate in public affairs, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a sound public opinion in matters educational.

A new Education Law giving the Ministry of Education the necessary powers and duties to cope with present pressing demands and needs is overdue. Such a law should include categorical provision for the establishment of a well-balanced National Council of Education with a dignified status. It should have definite powers and duties and meet at regular and legally stipulated intervals. The Minister should be required to consult the Council on major changes of policy, and should not make changes without a majority decision by it. The Council should approve all major plans and developments and regulations of the Ministry before they become effective. Most important, the National Council should have the power of initiating discussion and enquiry as it thinks fit, and should not necessarily await the invitation of the Minister before so doing.

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871 185 645 There are signs that the present time is opportune for the formation of this body. The writer had the privilege of being present at a recent *ad hoc* gathering of men prominent in the educational affairs of Iraq, presided over by the Minister of Education. The level of discussion was exceptionally high, and one advantage of the meeting was that the Minister was both able to be made aware of trends of opinion and in turn to bring to the notice of the 'experts' practical administrative considerations which might prevent him from applying all their advice. If such a body could be transformed into a regularly meeting National Council of Education and given the powers indicated, it is likely that that consistent policy without which advance in the direction of compulsory education cannot be achieved would be considerably assisted.

871 645 *Concentration of the Ministry of Education on Major Issues of National Educational Policy.* If the Minister were guided in the formation of policy by a properly constituted National Council of Education, the way to consideration of an agreed national policy of educational advance would be facilitated. However, before these reforms could achieve their object, they would need to be accompanied by a reformed conception of the Ministry of Education itself. At the present time, the Ministry is more in the nature of a national administrative office than a policy-making body. In addition to controlling all forms of education and exercising most minute financial control in small matters, the senior officials of the Ministry appear to be occupied with a mass of detailed administration, much of which could very well be left to the Provincial Directors of Education.

It is suggested that, at any rate in the sphere of primary education, many of the existing administrative tasks performed by officers of the Ministry of Education should be transferred to the offices of the Provincial Directors of Education. If this were done it would enable the senior officials of the Ministry to concentrate their talents on major issues of national policy which, at the present time, need considerable thought and investigation. If compulsory education of quality is ever to become a reality, matters of major policy which at present receive insufficient consideration must be investigated by officers of the Ministry before the facts concerning them can be adequately considered by the Minister and the National Council of Education which it is hoped he may soon have to assist him. Plans for improved training and distribution of teachers badly need mature consideration, as do investigations into the most suitable types of school building for a country with the climatic conditions of Iraq, Programmes of study, especially those for the rural and agricultural schools, need much thought and study by those who administer them. Ultimately, local development plans for advance towards compulsory schooling will need most careful consideration. These vital tasks cannot be undertaken adequately until the Ministry of Education is relieved of much of its present stifling day-to-day detail. 871/645

THE CREATION OF LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITIES

As was indicated in the preceding chapter, one of the significant social and educational developments in Iraq is the growth of local interest in education which is accompanied by some vigorous local administrative initiative and a preparedness to find money for local development. This suggests that, quite apart from the Ministry of Education being able to clear its own decks for action by passing on much of the details of administration to the provincial education officers, there exist in the localities valuable means by which a policy of advance towards compulsory education could be facilitated. 871/635

A movement in the direction of enlisting the aid of the provinces in the increase of educational provision was considered a few years ago. Under the Provincial Administration Law of 1945, a General Provincial Council was established in each province. It was empowered, in a limited way, to levy local taxes to support various local services, including some aspects of education. For one reason or another, the exercise of these local taxing powers in relation to education appears to have been restricted by the administrative action of the central Government departments. It is understood, however, that a more vigorous attempt is about to be made to give the General Provincial Council in every province wider powers of control over education up to and including the primary schools.

It is to be hoped that, when this transfer of certain powers to the General Provincial Councils takes place, it will be done in such a way that local interest in education is given full opportunity. It would be a great aid to local desire for educational powers and advance if each General Provincial Council were instructed to create amongst its members a Provincial Education Committee to which would be delegated the task both of controlling local primary schools and of developing primary education. There can be no doubt from conversations which have taken place that local people are anxious to exercise these powers. There is equally no doubt that, with some exceptions, the Provincial Directors of

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871/635 Education would, if the transfer of control from the centre were effected by stages and with adequate advice, be able to serve their Provincial Education Committees well.

One great advantage of giving local representatives control of their primary schools would be that it would enhance the increasing local interest which is being taken in educational affairs. Increased local control, with the power both to levy local taxes in addition to the existing voluntary contributions, would also help to spread the burden of educational expenditure which is so essential to development. Further, as will be suggested later, these Provincial Education Committees might after a time provide the machinery for preparing detailed plans for local provision of compulsory education.

It is very much to be hoped that this opportunity of establishing Local Education Authorities will be neither lost nor frustrated, because it may well be that it will provide the only suitable arrangement both for ascertaining local needs and for raising the additional monies which will be required from local sources before compulsory education can ever become a reality. This hope needs to be reiterated because it is understood that although the Government have the proposal under active consideration, it is not popular in certain sections of the Ministry of Education. Apparently some of the senior officials fear that the transfer of primary education functions from the centre to the localities would jeopardize existing educational arrangements. Such fears may or may not be justified. It is, however, part of the democratic process to provide local governing bodies with the opportunity of learning from the mistakes they may make. In any event, if one of the main sources of additional revenues for education is to be found in the provinces, it is only appropriate that those who are to find the money should have their say as to the way it is to be used.

THE FINANCING OF THE NEW EDUCATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

000 *Sharing of National and Local Expenditure—a Grants System.* On the assumption that the proposed transfer of powers in respect of primary education from the Ministry of Education to Local Education Authorities will take place, early consideration will have to be given to the financing of education under the new arrangement. If the Provincial Education Committees are to be created, it is essential that, through the General Provincial Councils, they should be given the power to levy local taxes for education, both to augment existing voluntary contributions and

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as a means of spreading the burden of local educational provision equitably amongst the community. 003

This will create a dual or complementary system of educational finance, partly national and partly local. The most satisfactory system of fairly distributing educational expenditure as between the national and the local budgets would be the devising of a grants system. Under this grants system each Provincial Education Committee would annually receive monies from the national education budget to supplement the taxes and other contributions raised locally. If the amount of the annual Ministry of Education grant for each province could, subject to the limitations of the national budget, be increased—for a time at any rate—proportionately to the local monies raised, this would probably act as a strong incentive to local self-help.

The Financing of School Building. Under existing arrangements for the public use of royalties received from the oil companies, money from this important and steadily increasing source is wisely devoted to the Capital Works Budget. In the past it has apparently not been considered possible to devote monies from this Capital Works Budget on any large scale to capital works for educational purposes such as schools and teachers' houses. Indeed, as during the last financial year this Capital Works Budget showed a deficit, it would have been difficult to impose educational demands on it. As, however, it is understood that the revenue from oil royalties is likely to increase three-fold during the next few years, a shrewd Minister of Education with an eye to future progress towards compulsory education would doubtless do his utmost to persuade Parliament to earmark a fair share of this additional revenue for capital works of an educational nature. 652
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Financing Material Inducements to School Attendance. Although during the first period of this short-term policy of advance towards compulsory education the task will be mainly that of coping with existing and potential demands for admission into primary schools, some financial provision will need to be made for assisting the children of the very low income groups. It would be desirable, therefore, if powers could be given to the Provincial Education Committees to devote part of the money derived from local taxes or contributions towards the provision of meals and clothes for really needy children. This would enable the Provincial Education Committees to gain experience of what will be an important aspect of educational administration when the time comes to compel the attendance at school of the many children whose parents are too poor to take advantage of educational provision unless it is accompanied by material assistance. 000

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COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

THE DECLARATION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION AREAS

871 The initial tasks during this period of the operation of the suggested short-term policy will be those of coping with existing pressure on the primary schools, undertaking the essential reforms of the central administration, creating a system of local educational administration and devising a scheme of educational finance which will stimulate the provision of money for primary education from local sources. But it should also be possible during this period to take practical steps towards the completion of provision for compulsory education in specific areas.

It will take a very long time before it is possible to declare any one province as a complete compulsory education area with any hope that the declaration will be effective. It will also be several years before compulsory education can be effectively declared in the large towns. For instance, in Baghdad schools will have to be established for another sixty per cent of the primary school population before an attempt can be made to enforce compulsory education.

There are, however, a number of smaller towns and large villages where, with the provision of a few more schools, primary school places could be provided for all the local child population. For instance, in one of the northern provincial towns, out of a total estimated primary school population of 4,500 children, some 2,700 pupils are already attending fourteen primary schools. The provision of six additional primary schools each with accommodation for 300 pupils would complete provision for primary education in that town. There are many smaller towns where, even if existing primary school accommodation is limited, the provision of but a few schools would enable all the children of primary school age to be educated. In addition, many villages, both large and small, exist where the establishment of one or two more schools and the completion of existing incomplete schools would provide the necessary accommodation within a year or two.

If, therefore, the suggested administrative reforms outlined took place so that the Ministry of Education, on the advice of the National Council of Education, could devote adequate time and thought to the issue of the necessary directions and guidance, the newly created Provincial Education Committees could, as one of their early tasks, concentrate on the provision of schools in those towns and villages where the establishment of a few extra schools would mean the completion of primary education within a few years. So soon as any town or village has sufficient primary schools for the total child population, the Ministry of Education should then declare that town or village a compulsory education area.

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To achieve this end the Provincial Education Committees would, in addition to establishing the additional schools, need to give assistance to very poor children in the way of meals and clothing. They would also have to add to the Provincial Director's staff one or more School Attendance Officers whose task it would be both to act as liaison officer between home and school and to bring defaulting parents before the courts.

Declaration of specific towns and villages as compulsory education areas would, of course, mean that for a number of years compulsory education up and down the country would be piecemeal and uneven; but it will never be possible to jump from the existing situation to complete compulsory school attendance. Gradual provision of compulsory education, town by town and village by village is the only practical way of working towards the ultimate goal. During this period of piecemeal establishment of compulsory education, however, both the Ministry of Education and the Provincial Education Committees would gain realistic experience of the problems associated with promoting, assisting and enforcing compulsory education, and would accumulate a most valuable body of practical evidence in readiness for the time when it is possible to apply compulsory education on a much larger scale.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PILOT PROJECT IN TRIBAL EDUCATION

Short-term measures such as those indicated should both get more children into primary schools and enable compulsory education to be declared in certain towns and villages throughout Iraq. These provisions, however, will rarely reach the children of parents who are still living a nomadic or semi-nomadic life. Interim educational arrangements badly need to be made for this large section of the population until they are settled and thus become more amenable to conventional types of schooling.

Much has been written about the need for tribal education, but little or no actual experience has been gained of the problems and techniques involved. It is suggested, therefore, that immediate consideration should be given to the establishment of a pilot project in tribal education in an area where tribal organization is likely to continue for some time. Such a project would probably take the form of a semi-mobile primary school to which should be attached a 'Fundamental Education Unit' for adults who have never attended school. Application might well be made to Unesco to enquire whether that agency, partly from experience which is being derived elsewhere, could give the necessary assistance in connexion with such a project. It is understood that there is a

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It is understood that there is a

871 185 possibility that one of the most enlightened sheikhs of one of the largest tribal groups in Iraq would be prepared to co-operate by providing premises, together with accommodation for the team consisting possibly of teachers, an agriculturalist and health officer.

A LONG-TERM POLICY

000 These then are some of the short-term measures which it is suggested should be considered as the basis of a practical policy leading towards the establishment of compulsory education. They are, of course, only 'short-term' in the sense that they constitute lines of fairly immediate action, most of which will need to be carried forward and embodied within a more long-term policy. It is now necessary to discuss other measures, more of a qualitative nature, which will take longer to materialize but which must be put into operation over a much longer period if quantitative advance is to result in the provision of the right type or types of school.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE TEACHER

The Training of Teachers. The establishment of more schools must be accompanied by the training of more and better qualified teachers. If the Ministry of Education could be freed from its serious overload of administrative detail on the lines indicated, one of its most important tasks would be the development and gradual transformation of existing arrangements for the training of teachers.

As was indicated in Chapter Three, the output of teachers from training institutions during the current year is likely to be 754. Some of the training institutions are doing excellent and lively work. They are handicapped by the fact, however, that many of the students did not complete a full secondary education before they entered the training institution. This means that the period of training for these teachers has to be devoted too much to the task of repairing deficiencies in educational background, and is not sufficiently a professional college course. Many of those who had the advantage of a full secondary education before they took up training do not enter a training college proper but attend a one-year course attached to a secondary school with limited facilities.

Training devices of this kind were essential if the output of teachers was to keep pace with the rapidly growing demand for more schools. The effects of inadequate training are, however,

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writ large in the schools. A minority of the teachers do extraordinarily well and illustrate how qualities of personality can overcome training deficiencies. But many are able to do little more than slavishly adhere to their narrow interpretation of the centrally prescribed syllabuses. It is only to be expected that, under such conditions, some of the primary schools are not the robust and adventurous places that they could be.

It is accordingly suggested that the Ministry of Education should re-consider their policy of training teachers. Measures that need to be taken may be summarized as follows:

(1) Over a period of years the existing courses for ex-primary or intermediate school pupils should be abandoned, and replaced by professional courses for which the entry qualification should be at least the intermediate school-leaving certificate and, at a future time when more secondary school graduates exist, the secondary school-leaving certificate.

(2) The one-year post secondary school training courses should be removed from the secondary schools and transformed into two-year professional courses.

(3) The programmes of study for all training institutions should be re-considered and, bearing in mind that the majority of the future school population will come from rural communities, all future primary school teachers should have a good deal of practical training in handicrafts and rural science.

(4) The two existing rural teachers' colleges should be transformed into professional courses, with a strong agricultural bias, for students whose entry qualification should be at least the intermediate school-leaving certificate. One of the colleges should be removed from its present unsatisfactory premises and transferred to a part of the country where progressive rural and agricultural development is taking place, preferably in the Dujaila area or one of the related schemes. [1]

(5) As the demand for rural schools increases, further training colleges for rural teachers should be established in close association with one or other of the progressive land settlement schemes.

Houses for Teachers. Alongside attempts to improve the training of teachers who have had a sounder educational background, it

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[1] This recommendation concerning the entry qualification for rural teachers' training colleges must be read in conjunction with a later suggestion about the need for 'Intermediate Rural Life Schools'. The over-academic curriculum of the existing type of intermediate school is completely unsuitable for students who are ultimately to work and live in the rural areas. It is most desirable, therefore, that early attention should be given to the establishment of the newly conceived 'Intermediate Rural Life Schools' of the type later discussed, so that some of the future rural teacher trainees may be drawn from such realistic schools. Later, although this is beyond the scope of this study, it is to be hoped that there will be 'Secondary Rural Life Schools' from which future rural teacher trainees can also be drawn.

000 875 362 will be necessary to consider improved arrangements for the housing of teachers, especially in the rural areas. Because of the limited housing facilities in many of the villages, the majority of the teachers in the rural areas live under most unsatisfactory domestic conditions. Some live in the staff-rooms or school store. Others dwell in improvized buildings which are inadequate both for their personal needs and the status they should occupy in local society. It is because of circumstances of this kind that some of the teachers who work in the villages feel that they are undertaking penance, from which they will only escape when they can secure transfer to a town.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF PRIMARY SCHOOLING

871 875 *The Corporate Life of the Primary School.* Apart from some of the more established town schools where staffs have served in the same school for a number of years, many of the schools seem to lack that corporate life which is essential to the success of any school community. This is partly due to the fact that, because of unsatisfactory living conditions outside the larger centres of population, many teachers stay in the rural schools for only very short periods. They hardly get to know their pupils as individuals and do not stay long enough to assimilate the life of the surrounding community or to influence it. These conditions, when remedied by the provision of teachers' houses, possibly accompanied by 'rural teachers' allowances', will do much to improve the quality of the school as a community.

871 *Greater Freedom for Teachers.* As the teaching profession becomes better trained and housed, it is to be expected that they will be allowed greater freedom in the preparation of their own programmes of study and activity. Complaints are frequently made that, because the existing programmes of study are centrally prepared and prescribed, they restrict the freedom of the teachers. This is only partly true because, although the primary school programme is overloaded and does not provide for sufficient differentiation either as between urban and rural schools or as between the sexes, it is not perhaps so illiberal in conception as some of those who interpret it.

Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the time will come when, with a better qualified primary school teaching cadre, it will be possible for the Ministry of Education to abandon centrally prescribed syllabuses in favour of something in the way of 'A
000 Programme of Suggestions for Teachers'. If such a programme

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were issued and each school required to produce its own schemes of work based generally on the suggestions, this would help to promote school programmes more related to the needs of the schools in their local environment. Such an arrangement would throw greater responsibility on the teachers themselves and would promote greater educational thought and experiment in place of the all-too rigid adherence to existing syllabuses. 000

If the Ministry of Education feel that they cannot go so far in granting freedom to the schools to prepare their own schemes of work, an approach to greater local freedom in this direction would be achieved if the task of preparing programmes could be delegated to a committee of teachers in each province who would prepare provincial programmes of study for approval by the Ministry.

Courses for Serving Teachers. Whether or not arrangements can be made for teachers to get together to prepare provincial programmes of study, there is a great need for continuous provision of courses for serving teachers. This applies more particularly to the rural teachers, many of whom live in conditions of great isolation and need that stimulus to thought and those wider professional contacts that they cannot have in their immediate locality. 875

AN APPROACH TO A NEW STRUCTURE OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Two Stages of Schooling for All. As the quality of the teachers and an accompanying greater degree of freedom grow, it is probable that it will be found that the existing structure of primary education, namely six years of schooling for all in one school, does not meet all the educational needs of the children. At the present time the primary schools, with their great variation in age groups, are trying to perform two functions. They both initiate young children into the business of schooling and, because most of the pupils leave at an early age and undergo no period of secondary education, are also expected to give the older pupils some preparation for adult life. This is certainly the intention of the agricultural primary schools which some educators hope will become the model of the village school of the future. 871

It is not really possible to undertake both tasks in the one school. It is suggested, therefore, that the Ministry of Education and the proposed National Council of Education should begin to give some thought to a future alteration of the structure of primary education on the following lines: 872

(1) The first stage of education should last six years and, especially in the lower classes, should continue the activity techniques

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872 of the kindergarten schools. This would mean that young children would be receiving education of a type more related to their growing needs. If this could be accompanied by an abandonment of the existing primary school examinations, and the children promoted year by year instead of some of them repeating their work for another year, the Iraqi primary school would certainly develop into a freer and more valid educational institution for young children.

(2) After this first stage of education, children would then automatically proceed at the age of eleven or twelve to a common second stage school or intermediate school, which should differ radically from the existing academic intermediate schools. These second stage or newly conceived intermediate schools would need to be of two types. In the villages there should be 'Intermediate Rural Life Schools' of the type recommended by the Monroe Commission. In the towns they should be schools in which a technical bias related to local industries and pursuits is included.

The Intermediate Rural Life School and Fundamental Education. If the present experimental agricultural primary schools develop the activities of their upper forms along sound and realistic lines, the Intermediate Rural Life Schools, when the time comes for them to be established, will have much to learn from their achievements.

The Intermediate Rural Life Schools should not, however, be regarded simply as schools for children. With better qualified teachers from the new or remodelled rural teachers' training colleges, and ample land and agricultural equipment, they should be designed also to serve as fundamental education centres both for the education of illiterate adults and as a means of providing further education in agriculture, health and child care. They would thus become realistic community centres designed both to serve those who have left school and to provide education in the processes of better living for those who have had no previous schooling.

A Pilot Project for an Intermediate Rural Life School. Application might also be made to Unesco for technical assistance towards the establishment of an Intermediate Rural Life School which would also serve as an experimental fundamental education centre. If such a pilot project could be established on the site of the Dujaila Land Settlement Scheme, or one of the related projects, it would serve a useful present purpose and provide invaluable material for use in connexion with future educational and social developments.

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DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES IN PREPARATION FOR ULTIMATE LARGE-SCALE PROVISION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

Nothing has so far been said in this study about the final achievement of the ultimate goal—the establishment of universal compulsory education throughout Iraq. The reasons for this are obvious. Until most of the obstacles, and particularly that deeply entrenched impediment of the land tenure system, outlined in the fourth chapter of this study have been solved, there is no prospect whatever of compulsory education for all being considered as a practical possibility.

By the time that the combined short-term and long-term policies of educational development outlined are well on the way, however, it is to be expected that Iraq will be in a position where successive governments will have removed the most formidable of these economic, political and social obstacles. Then will be the time for the Ministry of Education, in co-operation with the Provincial Education Committees, to make a real drive for the completion of compulsory education.

But it must be emphasized that, in a country with the great regional variations of Iraq, it would never be possible for the Ministry of Education alone to attempt to promote a national scheme of compulsory education. This is why it is important that Provincial Education Committees should be established as soon as possible, so that they may get into their working stride in time to undertake their share of the task of establishing machinery for the wholesale extension of compulsory education. Then, when general economic, political and social conditions have sufficiently advanced, will be the time for the Government to pass a Universal Compulsory Education Law under which every Provincial Education Committee would be required, within a specified time, to prepare compulsory education development plans. Under such a law each Provincial Education Committee would be required to submit to the Ministry of Education a comprehensive plan showing the educational needs of every town and village in the province, existing educational provision, and additional schools necessary to provide for all the children of compulsory school age, together with estimated costs of providing the necessary schools. When these development plans have been prepared, and modified after consideration by the Ministry of Education according to general principles laid down by the National Council of Education, it would then be possible for the Ministry of Education to specify the number of years within which the completion of provision for compulsory education should be made throughout the length and breadth of Iraq.

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The time for the preparation of comprehensive compulsory education development plans for all the provinces of Iraq has, of course, not yet arrived. Nevertheless, it would serve a most useful purpose if two of the more outstanding Provincial Directors of Education, one in the north and the other in the south, could be requested to prepare such plans now. Two such draft plans, intelligently prepared and accompanied by information about social conditions and parental attitudes in each town and village in the two provinces, would be valuable in two ways. They would demonstrate the action which would have to be taken and the financial implications involved in completing the full complement of primary schools in certain towns and villages, so that these places could be declared compulsory education areas within a few years. They would serve as realistic 'model proposals' which, when approved by the Ministry of Education, could be issued to every province to illustrate in a practical way what could be done within the next few years along the lines already indicated under the heading 'The Declaration of Compulsory Education Areas'. The Ministry of Education and the two selected Provincial Directors of Education might, in the preparation of these plans, welcome advice from administrators who had faced similar problems in recent years. Such advice might take the form of technical assistance given by an administrator from a young country where the application of compulsory education is comparatively recent. It is estimated that the preparation of these model plans would take about six months.

SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED POLICY

It now remains for the practicability of these suggestions to be considered by those concerned. To that end, this study concludes with the following summary of this short-term and long-term policy which, if all or part of it could be put into operation, might contribute towards realistic progress in the direction of universal compulsory education.

SHORT-TERM POLICY

(1) *Coping with Existing Demands.* A vigorous effort should be made to provide primary schools for the children who at present cannot be accommodated. Provincial Directors of

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Education should submit to the Ministry of Education data showing the number of additional schools and teachers now needed. Immediate needs should be financed by a special allocation from the central budget; teachers should be provided partly by abandoning uneconomic rented premises, and partly by 'stepping up' teacher training; premises should be provided by voluntary means in small communities, and consideration given to local public loans for school building in large towns.

(2) *Reform of the Central Administration.* The conception of the Minister of Education as a trustee of the public educational interest should be fostered. This, combined with the creation of a National Council of Education established by law with rights of its own, should be considered as an important means of ensuring that continuity of policy without which consistent educational advance will be difficult. Administrative detail should be transferred from the Ministry of Education to the provincial education offices so that the Ministry may be free to concentrate on major issues of educational policy and development.

(3) *The Creation of Local Education Authorities.* As a means of encouraging further local interest in the development of primary education, promoting local taxation for educational purposes and providing machinery for the ultimate establishment of compulsory education, Provincial Education Committees should be established.

(4) *Financing the New Educational Arrangements.* When Provincial Education Committees with local taxation powers have been established, primary education should be financed partly through the national budget and partly from local sources. A Grants System, operating in such a way as to provide incentive to increased local financing of primary education, should be devised. An attempt should be made to secure an allocation from the Capital Works Budget for the financing of school building. Provincial Education Committees should be given power to devote some of the proceeds from local taxes to material inducements to school attendance.

(5) *The Declaration of Compulsory Education Areas.* Although the declaration and enforcement of compulsory education in whole provinces or large towns cannot at present be contemplated, the Ministry of Education should direct Provincial Education Committees to complete the provision of primary schools in the smaller towns and some of the villages so that compulsory education may be declared in certain areas within a few years. School Attendance Officers should be appointed

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to assist and enforce school attendance in such towns and villages.

(6) *The Establishment of a Pilot Project in Tribal Education.* An attempt should be made to gain actual experience of the educational problems and techniques involved in tribal education. Unesco might be asked whether assistance could be given in establishing a Pilot Project in Tribal Education in Iraq.

LONG-TERM POLICY

(7) *Improving the Quality of the Teacher.* The Ministry of Education should give consideration to an improved policy of training teachers, which would include the general requirement of a complete secondary education before training, the conversion of existing one-year post secondary school training courses into full professional courses, and the inclusion of handicraft and rural science in all programmes of study. Rural teacher training institutions should be considerably improved, and new training colleges established in association with land and settlement schemes. Teachers' houses should be provided, especially in the villages.

(8) *Improving the Quality of Primary Schooling.* Living conditions of rural teachers should be improved so that they are encouraged to remain longer in the villages and promote more corporate life in the schools. Teachers, as their quality improves, should be allowed greater freedom in the preparation of their own schemes of work. The preparation of programmes of study should at any rate be decentralized. Courses for serving teachers, especially for those living in isolated villages, should be encouraged.

(9) *An Approach to a New Structure of Primary Education.* Consideration should be given to the reorientation of primary education into two stages. The first stage should be six years of simpler primary schooling, to which should be added kindergarten techniques. The second stage should develop into two kinds of newly conceived intermediate schools, urban schools including a technical bias and rural schools developing into Intermediate Rural Life Schools. The Intermediate Rural Life School should serve a dual purpose and include the provision of fundamental education for illiterate adults. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a pilot project for an Intermediate Rural Life School.

(10) *Development Schemes in Preparation for Ultimate Large-Scale Provision*

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of Compulsory Education. Universal compulsory education is never likely to be established in Iraq until the serious economic, political and social obstacles outlined in Chapter Four are wholly or partly solved. This applies particularly to the problem of land tenure. Ultimately the Provincial Education Committees will provide the machinery for preparing and implementing wholesale schemes of compulsory education. For this reason it is important that the Provincial Education Committees should be established forthwith. Model Compulsory Education Development Plans should be prepared in two selected provinces, one in the north and the other in the south of Iraq, realistic advice could thus be given as to the practical steps needing to be taken in connexion with the declaration, within the next few years, of compulsory education in certain areas in all provinces.

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NORTHERN 'IRAQ AND ITS PEOPLES

By MAJOR W. C. F. WILSON, O.B.E.

114 A lecture given before the Society on March 10, 1937, Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., in the Chair.

The Chairman: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have much pleasure in introducing Major Wilson, who is going to speak to us on the subject of Northern 'Iraq and its peoples. He first served in 'Iraq under that very great officer, Sir Percy Cox, who recently passed away. Major Wilson rebuilt Kut after our victory over the Turks, and of recent years he has been administrative officer at Mosul; and can give us very up-to-date accounts of the Assyrian problem in Northern 'Iraq, and can also speak from first-hand knowledge of the Kurds and the other minorities of the country.

101 TO many who have never been to 'Iraq, the name, or its old alternative, Mesopotamia, possibly conjures up visions of flat, featureless plains, strips of cultivation along the banks of the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, sandstorms and a torrid climate. Such visions are in a fair measure true of central and southern 'Iraq, but are very far from applying to the two northern provinces of Arbil and Mosul.

Geography

133 From the Lesser Zab river northwards the country is undulating and intersected with watercourses or wādis, which after rain flow down to the Tigris and its half-dozen tributaries. This type of country extends right up to the foothills which fringe the mighty mountain mass of Kurdistan. Over this area, irrigation, except on the rivers for summer crops, is unnecessary, and the rainfall which comes between November and May is in most years sufficient for the cultivation of large crops of wheat and barley. In the spring, grazing for animals is plentiful and a wonderful assortment of wild flowers appear.

In the mountains, during the same period, heavy rain and snow fill the underground sources and provide water for the summer growing of rice, tobacco and other crops, and for good summer grazing for animals. These mountains contain several ranges 6,000 to 8,000 feet high and one peak near the Iranian frontier over 10,000 feet.

Population

144 The inhabitants of the two provinces consist of an extraordinarily heterogeneous collection of creeds and races with all the problems produced by such a collection.

4a Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Iraq Bedouin MHI

I The population of Mosul and Arbil provinces exceeds 630,000, of
162 which 530,000 are Muslims. Of these Muslims, all but 10,000 are Sunnis. There are 60,000 Christians, 32,000 Yezidis and 10,000 Jews. The minorities therefore total only one-fifth of the whole. The Muslims consist of Arabs and Kurds in approximately equal parts, together with some 16,000 Turkomans.

I Mosul itself is mainly an Arab town with a population of 100,000.
[162] It is a great entrepôt for trade in sheep, cattle, wool, grain, hides,
438 intestines, galls and eggs with the thickly populated districts round
439 and also with Syria and Turkey. Its importance in this respect will
496 certainly increase when at long last it is linked by rail with the Syrian frontier at Tel Kuchik and with Baghdad via Baa'iji. Work on this linking is now proceeding, and it is interesting to remember that when it is completed in a couple of years it will form the last stage in the famous Baghdad-Berlin Railway which was the Kaiser's fondest dream. The circumstances under which it will be completed are likely, however, to be very different to those which he visualized.

Arabs

I
B Apart from forming the majority of the inhabitants of Mosul itself,
101 Arabs are found as cultivators on the Tigris both north and south of the town and to the south of the Jebal Sinjar (Sinjar mountain) and as bedouin who range the uncultivated areas to the south-west, west and north-west.

B The bedouin consist of more than one tribe, but by far the most
619 important is the Shammar. This great tribe is of Arabian origin and
221 has in the past been pushed steadily northwards by economic forces
721 and the search for new grazing grounds. With the great improve-
233 ment in public security during recent years, cultivation has extended further and further from the towns and villages and encroached on the haunts of the Shammar. Formerly the means of livelihood of these bedouin were varied if not all respectable. They included the raiding of the flocks and herds of their weaker neighbours and the extortion of "khuwa" or safe-conduct money from merchants, travellers and others. At the same time they made a perfectly legitimate living from acting as shepherds for the flocks of townsmen and by breeding and selling camels. Nowadays raiding and safe-conduct money have been abolished and motor transport has to a great extent ousted the camel as a carrier in 'Iraq and the neighbouring countries and caused a severe slump in the camel market.

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
Jezirat ibn 'Omar
Zakho
Amadia
Feish Khabur
Tell Abu Dhahir
Simel
Dohuk
Sheikh Adi
Alqosh
Aqra
Memerk
Diza Gewar
Rezaieh (Urmia)
URMIA GÖL
Maraghe
Orama
Neri
Kani Resh
Ushnu
Miandoab
Sauj Bulak
Ruwandiz
Eski Mosul
Tall 'Afar
Balad Sinjar
MOSUL
Kelek
Erbil
Koi Sanjaq
Rania
Sardasht
Saqqiz
Baneh
Surdash
Altun Köpri
Kirkuk
Chemchemal
Sulaimaniya
Qal'ah Sherqat
Little Zab
Great Zab
Tel Kaif
Qaraqosh
Hammam Ali
Shura
Makhmur
Tall Afar
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A. Wilson G-3 (no date) 1927 MII Iraq MII

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4a Wilson G-8 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Iraq Bedouin MH8
Kurd MA "

B a severe slump in the camel market. Slowly and very reluctantly the
619 bedouin are turning to cultivation and feel themselves immeasurably
558 178 lowered in the process. Strangely enough, they are also to be found in
461 greasy overalls, working on the rigs of the Mosul Oil Companies. In
this work they do not lose caste as they do if they become cultivators.

B Shaikh Ajil al Yawar is the paramount Shaikh of the 'Iraqi
622 Shammar. He is an outstanding personality possessing a fine presence
and a wonderful charm of manner. With singular astuteness he has
managed to control his tribesmen, keep on the right side of successive
governments and at the same time amass a considerable fortune for
himself. During recent years his figure has perhaps suffered somewhat from the use of motor-cars instead of riding a fiery Arab steed
or liver-shaking "dhillool" (trotting camel).

Turkomans

I Leaving the Arabs, we come to the Turkomans. They are the
173 remnants of ancient immigration and are to be found in Tel Affar
162 town between Mosul and Sinjar and in a string of villages across to
Altun Keupri and Kirkuk. Arbil is also largely a Turkoman town.
The village of Nainawa, the ancient Nineveh, just across the Tigris
from Mosul, is Turkoman. In a mosque built on unexcavated
Assyrian remains it contains the reputed tomb of the prophet Jonah.
The mosque is also said to contain a portion of the vertebræ of the
whale!

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Kurds

K Next we come to the Kurds, who form by far the majority of the
101 population of the mountain areas and who are also to be found in a
144 large number of villages well south of the mountains. The Kurds are
619 Aryan in origin and Sunni Muslims by religion. The mountain Kurds
and in fact all the mountaineers of Kurdistan bear a close resemblance
K to the Scottish clans of two hundred years ago. They are still organ-
622 ized on a tribal or clan basis, though the increase in government control
657 and influence is naturally tending to destroy this organization and
644 undermine the power of the chiefs, or Aghas as they are called.
276 Aghas may, however, still be seen proceeding to town or market with
619 a "tail" of armed henchmen and even a pipebearer. The Kurdish
pipebearer is, however, concerned with the Agha's tobacco pipe and
000 not with music. Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe

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Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe 534
resembling the chanter of a bagpipe and has often a pleasant lilt. 535
Kurdish dancing, however, is by no means as strenuous as Scottish.
Kurds and all other mountain dwellers in Kurdistan dance what is
known as the chain-dance, similar to that which is, I believe, commonly
seen in the Balkans. The dancers join hands and form a ring. The
piper and a drummer with a sort of tenor drum stand in the middle,
and the dance consists of fairly intricate footwork while the circle
moves slowly round. Often star dancers who fancy themselves as K
budding Nijinskys do solo dances inside the circle. Amongst the [562]
Kurds the men and women dance separately, but with the Christian
sects the two sexes dance together. This does not mean, however, that
Kurdish women are completely segregated or kept by themselves. As
a matter of fact, they possess considerable freedom and may be seen
gathering firewood, tending animals or engaged in other tasks on the
mountainside, often far from their villages.

Up to five years ago the Barzan district of Kurdistan retained all K
of its savage and primitive features. Government had not penetrated 619
and Shaikh Ahmed, a religious fanatic, was dictator. With the help 643
of his brothers and a standing army of several hundred men he com- 641
pletely dominated the impoverished inhabitants, who had the shaikh's 726
bodyguard perpetually billeted on them and who had to provide them 792
with food, clothing and tobacco and anything else they might fancy.
Any protests on the part of the villagers were discouraged by the K
strongest methods. Such complete ascendancy did Shaikh Ahmed gain [212]
over his savage and illiterate people that they began to look upon him
as a god and, though Muslims in name, turned their faces towards him K
in prayer rather than towards Mecca, as tradition demands. There 792
was a Mullah in the district called Mullah Juj, who represented himself 779
to be the prophet of this new god. The Mullah was a very fiery and 682
eloquent speaker and, unfortunately for himself, his fame began to 784
surpass even that of the deity. This could not of course be tolerated, 661
and one of Shaikh Ahmed's brothers "bumped off" the presumptuous 671
prophet. Up to that time the Koran had been revered, but now the K
Shaikh issued orders for the destruction of all copies to be found. He [136]
also withdrew the ban on the eating of pork, for wild pig were plenti- I
ful in Barzan. Armed missionaries were sent out beyond the Barzan K
bounds, and villages which refused to accept the Shaikh were burned 721
and a number of the male inhabitants put to death. This state of 657
affairs could not be allowed to continue, and the 'Iraq Government 648
was forced to take action in conjunction with the British Royal K
Air Force. 697

I
K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I
168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

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653 What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
563 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
K Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
221 where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
648] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradition at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

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The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

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The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

4g Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Kurd MH II

000 of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

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137 Kurdistan is a beautiful country. It is in the main well wooded, with scrub or stunted oak on the hillsides and poplars, walnuts and mulberries near the villages. Pines grow in two areas only and chinārs (planes) along the streams. Unfortunately, deforestation is proceeding apace, and unless immediate and drastic steps are taken by the 'Iraq Government, heavy soil erosion and a tremendous decrease in grazing facilities will take place. Few new walnut trees are to be found owing to a prevalent superstition that the planter of a walnut tree will die with the appearance of the first nuts. It might be supposed that the oldest inhabitants could be employed in planting, but apparently the grandfathers look askance at this suggestion!

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181 The Kurds are a virile and cheerful people. They have been called treacherous, and undoubtedly stories can be quoted in support of this accusation. Yet it must be remembered that the annals of our own Scottish highlands are by no means clean in this respect.

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342 In the summer the valleys of Kurdistan are, unfortunately, very malarial, and this is fostered by the cultivation of rice with its invariable accompaniment of mosquitoes. During this season most of the flock-owners move to their "zōzāns" or summer sheilings on the mountain tops, where, in shelters of oak branches, they pass the time pleasantly enough.

Christians

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795 The Christians of the northern provinces are divided into numerous sects, several of which are relics of the old schismatic divisions of the Eastern Communion. They include Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics, who are under the control of Rome, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians and Seventh Day Adventists.

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162 Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics and Jacobites are found in Mosul and many villages on the left bank of the Tigris. Chaldeans are also found in the Supna valley near Amadia and in one large village near Arbil. Seventh Day Adventists only flourish in Mosul. Many people in England know something of the Assyrians and their recent history. The Assyrians themselves claim to be descendants of the famous kingdom of Nineveh and are certainly semitic. The term "Assyrian" now includes ex-Ottoman members of the Nestorian Church who were domiciled either within what is now the 'Iraq state or who were ejected from Hakkari by the Turks during the Great War and refused

readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects I 795
belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their 167
Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the
Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace 648
terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it 563
was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of 162
the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous
unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large
number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands
as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some
of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred
which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in
'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil,
British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however,
proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council
of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have
been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the
remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria
include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may [I
be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers 463]
of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks,
etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All
these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed
as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are
shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, I
hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are 147
liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught
up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

The Yezidis

The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This Y 101
is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct.
They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock 776
Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the 779
lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is 871
incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that 771
he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult
to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education,
save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

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Yazidis MH10

Y scriptures, which are reputed to be concealed in a place known only
101 to the highest religious authorities of the sect. Most Yezidis are therefore
776 illiterate and appear to know very little about their religion. It
779 is uncertain, however, whether this is due to ignorance of their religion
871 or to secretiveness resulting from past persecution. The religion is
771 certainly a queer jumble of tenets taken from Christianity, Islam and
from pagan survivals.

Y Shaikh Ādi, the central shrine of the sect, forty miles north-east of
Mosul, is situated at the head of a wooded valley in the mountains
778 fringing the plains. A pleasant stream runs from the shrine. Yezidis
maintain that this stream is connected underground with the sacred
stream Zem-Zem at Mecca!

The shrine itself is adorned with graceful white fluted cones, and close by stand several similar smaller shrines, including one to Shaikh Shems, the Sun.

The origin of the Shaikh Ādi is unknown. The building has been
claimed as Muslim, but is more probably Christian. The interior
Y certainly resembles an ancient Nestorian church rather than a mosque.
[825] By the side of the door is a large black stone snake, which is kissed
by the devout. Visitors take off their shoes and are careful not to step
on the threshold, as this apparently angers Mālik Tāūs. The tomb
itself is covered with a rather disreputable cloth. In an adjacent room
are huge jars reminiscent of "The Forty Thieves," holding oil presented
by faithful Yezidis, and used for the small earthenware lamps
which twinkle in myriads during festivals. In the courtyard is a stone
trough which receives water from the sacred stream and which contains
numbers of curious black and white spotted newts.

Y The hereditary attendants at the shrine are known as Faqirs. They
778 always wear black and are perhaps a relic of monks who lived at
793 Shaikh Ādi before the advent of the Yezidi religion. The religious
head is the *Mir*, a debauched degenerate, largely under the influence
Y of his strong-minded mother. Formerly *Mirs* enjoyed considerable
power, though it must be admitted that the appointment lacked
[682] security of tenure as the seven Mirs previous to the present incumbent
were all murdered.

Y The revenues for the upkeep of the shrine and the emoluments of
794 the *Mir* are collected from the people by the "Qowwāls," who tour
twice yearly with the sacred brass peacocks, emblems of Mālik Tāūs.
Y All Yezidis visit these emblems and make suitable contributions and
788 so ensure their health and prosperity until the next tour.

The Yezidis in 'Iraq practically all dwell either in the Sinjār or I 162
Shaikhān districts. Each of these districts has a brass peacock and that Y
belonging to Shaikhān must never cross the Tigris. If it did so the 101
world would come to an end! Non-Yezidis cannot view the peacocks 778
or the other sacred emblems, which include the "shema'dan" or
candlestick and the "bairaqs" or banners. When not touring, all Y
emblems are kept at the residence of the *Mir* at Baa'dhra in Shaikhān, [793
though a few years ago the Sinjār Yezidis, who were at variance with 795
the *Mir*, seized their peacock and collected subscriptions on their I
account until compelled by Government to return it to its lawful 659]
keeper. Yezidis object strongly to the use of the word "Shaitān" Y
(Satan) or any word resembling it. Terms meaning "curse" are also 776
never used less Satan construes them as a tactless reminder of his fall. 784

Owing to these difficulties and restrictions, Yezidis are not "good Y
mixers" and rarely enter Government service. A few were formerly 186
employed by the British Government in the transport company of the 463
'Iraq Levies, but did not prove very satisfactory. Occasionally they 669
have enlisted in the 'Iraq army, but an attempt to apply a light measure I
of conscription to the Sinjār Yezidis resulted in an armed revolt by 563 781
five villages. This necessitated punitive action with, unfortunately, 702 649
heavy casualties on both sides. The Yezidis speak a form of Kurdish, Y [197]
but many also know Arabic. Ain Sifni or Ain-i-Safina (Spring of the 174
Boat) is the chief market town of the Shaikhān Yezidis. It derives its 438
name from a tradition that the Ark touched ground there.

Yezidis are to be found outside 'Iraq in the Caucasus and also a Y
few thousand north of Aleppo. 101

It is difficult to believe that this curious religion can long survive Y
in 'Iraq under present-day conditions. The *Mir* is unpopular and 793
there is no better successor amongst his in-bred and degenerate rela- 794
tives. The Yezidis have recently refused to yield him many of his 578
former rights and have severely criticised his squandering of the re-
ligious revenues. Most of the members of the hierarchy have concen-
trated their energies on trying to divert funds to their own pockets and
have quarrelled furiously. A certain number of stalwarts have defied Y
the priests and attended schools. In the Sinjār prior to the Great War 771
religious pressure induced a considerable number of Yezidis to adopt [871]
Islam, and it is within the bounds of possibility that ere long there 797
may be a regular landslide to either the Christian or Islamic faith or
both.

4. Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI ~~Iraq~~ MHI
Levantine
Jews MF4

Jews

J The Jews in 'Iraq are said to be the descendants of those taken
174 captive by Nebuchadnezzar and brought to Babylon, where they were
employed on the rebuilding of that city and on the upkeep of the
canals on which its wealth depended.

J In Mosul till recently the Jewish standard of education was lamentably
871 low and their religious observances entirely out of keeping with
176 those of modern Jewry. Even there, however, an astute Jewish brain
784 invented an instrument controlled by clockwork to turn on and off
403 electric switches at fixed hours and so avoid the sin of making fire on
the Sabbath.

J The very generous Jewish philanthropist Sir Elly Khaduri, has in
871 recent years provided funds to build excellent schools for the community,
and it is hoped that a great improvement in the education of
the Jewish children will result.

I 162 In Kurdistan, Jews of whom many are weavers are found in all the
563 J small towns and also in many otherwise purely Kurdish villages,
286 101 where they live in perfect amity with their Muslim neighbours. In
142 463 dress they are practically indistinguishable from the Kurds but easily
J recognizable by their facial features. In the most remote mountain
101 areas Jewish villages exist the inhabitants of which are cultivators and
463 possess vineyards and orchards. The reason for the survival of these
631 villages in the lawless past is that they and their inhabitants were the
property of powerful Kurdish Aghas who were strong to protect their
serfs as they would have protected their sheep, cattle or mules.
Throughout Kurdistan the ubiquitous itinerant Jewish pedlar may be
met who, quite unarmed, is surprisingly immune from molestation.
J 181 The Jews of northern 'Iraq are not at all interested in Zionism and
186 form a very useful, law-abiding, hard-working section of the population.

I 182 It is difficult, if not impossible, within the compass of a short
I lecture, to give an adequate description of the curious elements who
563 657 make up the attractive mosaic of northern 'Iraq. In the not very
distant past the 'Iraq Government has incurred, and rightly incurred,
strong criticism of its treatment of some of the peoples who go to
make up this mosaic. It should be realized, however, that the administration
of the Mosul and Arbil provinces and the solution of the
diverse and difficult problems they present is a matter which might
well test the skill and patience of any government, even if far more
experienced than that of the new state of 'Iraq.

DISCUSSION

Mrs. Soane-Ellis: Might I ask if the lecturer has any information as to the whereabouts of Sheikh Mahmud? The last time I saw him he was a prisoner at Ramadi. 000

Major Wilson: I cannot say whether he is exactly a prisoner now, but he certainly would not be allowed to go back to Sulaimaniyyeh.

Brigadier J. G. Browne: May I ask what is the position of the Pizhder Kurds under the present Government? 657 563

Major Wilson: There has been a slight extension of police control, but, as far as I know, real administration has not yet been established over the Pizhder.

The Chairman: It remains, I think, only for me to sum up what we have learnt. We see here again the extraordinary importance of the question of roads in establishing the authority of the Government among mountain peoples. We are building roads on the North-West Frontier of India. And here we have seen the roads that are being built through Kurdistan, like Mr. Hamilton's very fine achievement, the making of the road through the Rowanduz Gorge. I believe the account of the building of that road is going to be published shortly, and it should make a book well worth reading. 653 657

We have seen some extraordinarily interesting slides. And we have learnt some valuable information about the present position of the Assyrians. From what the lecturer says, the best plan now would appear to be rather to leave them alone where they are. The other plan was to have been to move them to an extremely suitable site on the Orontes River. But unfortunately the lands chosen had been sequestrated from their original owner, who had been in trouble. When M. Blum came into office, he decided he could deal with this case, reinstated the man in question, and restored his lands. So that scheme necessarily came to nothing, and it is quite impossible on other grounds now for the Assyrians to go there. But one gathers that it is wisest not to agitate on their behalf, nor to stir them up, for that only makes them very unpopular in the country. They are finding employment to some extent in the oil-fields, and as guards and station masters on the railways and in similar employment, and one can hope things may settle down and that they will stay in their own country. 186 463

We must thank our lecturer, not only for the good work he has obviously done in 'Iraq, but also for the excellent and informative lecture he has given us this evening. 000

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN IRAQ

ABDUL GHANI AL DALLI *

433 Modern industry in Iraq, as in many other underdeveloped countries, has made significant progress in recent years and especially since the end of World War II. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the causes of this movement in their relation to over-all industrial development and industrialisation in Iraq. The discussion in this paper will, on the whole, be restricted to the problems of industrial enterprise in the private sector of the economy. Consequently, Government industrial plans, as well as the oil industry have not been discussed. Likewise, the paper does not deal with the wider regional aspects of modern industry. As far as Iraq is concerned, the main causes for the progress of industry are to be found in the abundance of natural wealth, especially in the form of oil, the relative plentifulness of cheap labour in urban centers, the hardships suffered by the population during the war owing to the shortage of essential industrial products, the exceptional profits made during the war by proprietors of such modern industries as then existed (e.g. woollen textiles, cigarettes, soap, etc.), the accumulation of large sums of liquid capital in relatively few hands as a result of war and post-war inflation, and finally, the positively helpful attitude of Government towards industrial development.
654 The Iraqi Government has always tried to encourage industry, and
652 has granted it various exemptions from taxation under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, passed in 1929, and its amendments. In 1946 - 47, however, it took a more effective step in the creation of the Industrial Bank, with a capital of I.D. 500,000 wholly contributed by the Government. The Bank's function is to grant loans for the establishment of new industries and the expansion and improvement of existing industries, to participate in joint-stock companies formed for industrial purposes, to start new industrial enterprises on its own account if need be, and to offer various services connected with the import of machinery, materials, and the export

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114 * Abdul Ghani Al Dalli is Member of the Iraqi Parliament and Minister of Agriculture, and a former Director General of the Industrial Bank of Iraq.

654 of products.[1] Financial assistance thus provided by the Government,
652 together with the new Law for the Encouragement of Industry issued in 1950, proved of great potency in the development of industry. The capital of the Industrial Bank was increased in 1952, to I.D. 3,000,000 of which I.D. 1,200,000 have already been paid up.

433 These and other measures, such as increases in custom duties
656 and the restriction or prohibition of certain industrial imports, have produced marked progress in the establishment of new industries and the re-equipment and expansion of old ones, especially since the end of World War II.[2] This can be seen from the following table:

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Development of Large-Scale Industry in Iraq 1948 - 1952

Year (1st April - 31st March)	Capital Invested I.D. 1000	Value of Annual Output I.D. 1000	Number of Employees	Wages paid annually I.D. 1000
(Seven large Industries)				
1948 - 49	3,183	1,403	1649	
1949 - 50	3,194	1,555	2626	333
1950 - 51	4,206	2,631	3443	406
1951 - 52	4,415	3,600	3837	486
(Ten large Industries)[3]				
1951 - 52	4,835	4,424	4533	599

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[1] Industrial Bank, Compilation of Laws, Regulations, etc. Government Press, Baghdad 1951.

[2] For pre-World War II industrial development in Iraq see:- *A Handbook of Mesopotamia*, H.M.S.O., 1917. *A Report on the Progress of Iraq*, by H.M. Government to the League of Nations. H.M.S O.,1931. *The Iraq Directory*, Baghdad, 1935 (English Edition). *The Economic Organisation of Iraq* (In Arabic), Editor Said B. Himadeh, Beirut, 1937.

[3] See the *Annual Report of the Department of Industry 1951-52*, Ministry of National Economy,Baghdad. (In Arabic)
The Report of the National Bank of Iraq, 1949-50, p. 46 (in Arabic) states that national production of cement, beer, vegetable oil, soap, leather., etc., has been substituted for similar imports with the result that value of imports fell from I.D. 2,984,000 in 1948 to I.D. 1,298,000 in 1950, and the deficit in the balance of trade was reduced by I.D. 1,686,000 due to this reason alone during the same period.

The ten industries referred to in the table are: cotton spinning 433 and weaving (one establishment), cement (one establishment), wool spinning (two establishments), modern tanning (five establishments), beer (one establishment), alcohol (three establishments), vegetable oil (one establishment), modern soap making (one establishment), artificial and natural silk weaving (six establishments), jute spinning and weaving (one establishment still under construction). The total is 22 establishments all of which [654] enjoy government assistance under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, and practically all have received financial aid in the form of loans or capital participation from the Industrial Bank. None of them employs less than 20 workers, and the majority employ over a hundred workers. All use power-driven machinery. It is interesting to notice that most of these industries are [473] owned by joint-stock companies and that they have distributed profits during the last three years ranging from 9 per cent to 25 per cent.

Obviously the table does not cover the whole field of industrial development in Iraq. It has been constructed on the basis of a selected sample to show the rapid progress made in recent years. The unusual increase in ouput compared with the rate of capital investment as shown in the table is to be explained by the fact that most plants were still under construction or half-completed in the early years. A complete survey of the industrial sector in 654 the economy of Iraq is still to come. The Central Bureau of Statistics, 433 Ministry of National Economy, is expected soon to embark on this task. Such a survey will have to cover, in addition to those industries included in the above table, the following:

(a) Other modern industries in the private sector which represent a substantial portion of the whole, such as flour milling, workshops and agricultural machine repair shops, printing, cotton ginning, cigarette manufacture, the building materials industry, shoe-making, etc.

(b) The great oil industry owned and operated by powerful foreign [392] concerns holding concessions from the Government. The oil companies produced nearly 8 million tons of crude oil and 400,000 tons of refined products in 1951, and employ over 12,000 workers. Their production is expected to rise to 20 million tons of crude oil in 1955-56.

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[655] (c) Industrial enterprises being carried out directly by various Government departments and agencies such as the Iraqi State Railways, the Port of Basrah, the Ministry of Defence, the municipalities, and the recently set up State Oil Refinery Administration which has already undertaken the construction near Baghdad of an oil refinery with an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons of refined products, at an expected cost of about I.D. 7,000,000.

(d) Various handicrafts and semi-mechanised industries such as the date-packing industry.[1]

433 It need hardly be said that, although recent industrial development has been marked, it is still quite limited in relation to the economy as a whole and in comparison with industrial development in neighbouring areas. In Lebanon for instance, the industrial sector has been found to contribute approximately LL. 135 million, or 17 per cent of the total national income estimated at 434 LL. 830 million.[2] In our estimation, the industrial sector in Iraq contributes no more than 10 per cent of the total national income estimated at I.D. 150 million.[3]

000 The problems arising from, and the difficulties standing in the way of, industrialisation in Iraq, will now be discussed.

Industrialisation in general means the introduction of modern industry into an area which has been up to that time dependent for its livelihood on agriculture, trade and craftsmanship. Such an area would have had no experience of mechanised industrial processes, the organisation of modern factories, the division of labour inside such factories, nor would it have any clear idea of the material and human resources that such organisations would demand. Assuming that industrialisation of such a "new" or underdeveloped area is a desirable thing, two sets of problems seem likely to emerge. The first set of problems is connected with the ways and means of developing industry with reasonable speed. The second set of problems relates to the psychological, social and political effects that modern industry brings about.

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[1] For a brief but fairly comprehensive survey of industrial output and possibilities in Iraq see: *The Economic Development of Iraq.* Report of a mission organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. p. 148-50, also Annex D. p. 277 and following.

[2] *National Income of Lebanon, Monograph No. 3* by Albert Y. Badre, Ph. D., and Asad Y. Nasr, M.A., Beirut, Lebanon, May 1953. Especially p. 24.

[3] The ratio for more advanced countries is between 30 and 40 per cent.

In this paper we shall deal mainly with the first set of problems; that is, the problems that concern the establishment of an efficient and expanding industry in Iraq; we shall only touch casually upon the social and political problems arising therefrom. This limitation is necessary to simplify treatment of the subject and it in no way implies an underrating of the social effects of industrialisation. Further, I have limited this article to a consideration of the problems of only one out of three types of industry. These are: 000 471

(a) Industries wholly or partially owned and managed by private individuals.

(b) Publicly owned and managed industries, such as the Iraqi State Railway workshops, armament factories and workshops, and the various light, power and watersupply companies owned and run by local authorities.

(c) Industries owned and managed by foreign enterprise holding a concession or monopoly from the State. Outstanding examples of this type of activity are the oil companies and the Baghdad Light and Power Co. Ltd.

Our treatment will center round the first type of industrial activity, that is private competitive industry, but many of the observations made upon this type are likely to throw light on the problems of other types of industry. 000

(1) *Financial and Entrepreneurial Problems*: It is often said that the main obstacle to industrialisation of under-developed areas is the lack of financial resources and the scarcity of local capital. This is only partially true. Many under-developed areas own a great deal of liquid wealth held in the form of cash deposits, or gold and silver hoards.[1] The difficulty is to induce the *investment* of this wealth in *industry*. This difficulty can only be solved by first making industrial investment possible, and then more attractive than other avenues for investment. Unless the banking system and the money market are so organized as to make it relatively safe and remunerative, as well as possible, for capital to be invested in

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[1] It has been estimated for instance by the Clapp Mission in 1948 (The United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East - *Final Report*, Parts I and II, Lake Success, N.Y., 1949) that hoarded capital in Syria alone amounts to some $150,000,000. *No estimates are available for Iraq.*

000 industrial shares or bonds, local capital will continue to be held 455 in hoards, or invested in trade, agriculture and real estate. Speculation in land values, especially urban sites, has come to play a great part in the economy of Iraq, and incidently absorbs a great 000 deal of capital. The problem lies then not in the deficiency of capital resources, but in the utilization of these resources and above all in the creation of a suitable environment to induce private enterprise and capital into the industrial field. In the writer's view the creation of such an environment is the core of the industrialisation problem in under-developed areas. As things are, private enterprise is primarily absorbed in trade, agriculture and speculation — especially in real estate — where easy money can be made, and the whole economy remains stagnant. Once this problem is tackled both local and foreign capital will flow in. The State, that is the highest authority in a society, is called upon to take the initiative. Its action must include financial, technical, educational and administrative measures.

654 In Iraq the State has made attempts to deal with all these as- 433 pects. In the fiscal field it has afforded protection for industry in [439] the form of high tariff duties on most industrial products and in the exemption of power-driven machinery from such duties. It has prohibited or restricted the import of articles the like of which are being manufactured in Iraq, such as cement, cotton yarn, vegetable oil, soap, tanned leather, beer. Industrial schemes are given priority in the granting of import licences and the allocation of scarce currencies for purchases from abroad.

The new Law for the Encouragement of Industry passed in 1950 consolidated early legislation and made new concessions. Under this Law Iraq-owned industrial enterprises, that is enterprises in which 55 per cent of capital at least is held by Iraqi nationals, are granted exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions from import duties (not included in the tariff exemptions) on machinery, materials, equipment, spare parts and containers; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of Government land free of rent up to 25,000 square meters. Industries enjoy these concessions as long as they use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in cosiderable quantities. In any case they should use chiefly power-driven machinery in their works. These measures without doubt played a significant part in

the development of industry sketched above.[1] Industries which 654 433 existed then or have come into existence since have benefited considerably from these concessions. But private enterprise remained shy of industrial activity until the establishment of the Industrial Bank in 1946-47. Through this Bank, the State showed itself not 652 only willing to forgo some revenue in the interests of industry, 475 but to provide cash, and to share in the risks of industry. As mentioned above, the Industrial Bank could not only give loans (against real or personal security), but also participate in the capital of joint stock companies. Its greatest value in my view lies in the fact that it can become a founder or promoter of industries and thus lead the industrial community and the investing public into new fields. However, the Bank was handicapped in the early stages, 652 by the inadequacy of the financial resources at its disposal and the absence of economic and technical studies by which the feasibility of proposed industrial schemes might be judged. Moreover, the Bank lacked, and to some extent still lacks, a qualified technical staff. It has often to rely on the judgement of the Board of Directors or the advice of specialized Government departments such as the Directorate General of Industry and the Directorate General of Agriculture, which are not always fully equipped for the task. The Bank has continually asked for scientific surveys to be made 654 of the mineral, agricultural and animal resources of the country. 433 It has also called for an integrated economic plan covering indus- 652 try, agriculture and other economic activities, in which the Bank, like other institutions, will play its particular role.[2] There has been strong resistance on the part of the Board of Directors to the allocation of money for technical staff or technical studies by experts, and often when money was allocated, it could not be spent because the Board disagreed on the qualifications of such experts (foreign or national) or the need for inviting them to study particular problems. However, as years passed and the financial position of the Bank improved, a section for the study of industrial schemes was formed and members of it were charged with the study of certain problems at home or abroad. A number of ad hoc committees of specialists available in Iraq were set up to study and report on proposed industrial schemes. Contact was estab-

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[1] No provision was made, however, for direct subsidies to industry, and no legal preference in government contracts was given to home industry.

[2] See First Annual Report, Industrial Bank 1946-47/1947-48, Baghdad. (Arabic)

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654 lished with various Government departments, and data were collected, classified and sometimes published for the guidance of would-be entrepreneurs. A number of foreign experts were invited to study either particular schemes (such as paper, sugar, artificial silk fibre, the exploitation of salt, etc.) or to concern themselves with industrial development in general, and make recommendations for improvements in existing industries or for the establish-
652 ment of new industries. In addition to the absence of a general investment policy and planning, and the lack of economic and technical data to guide the activities of the Bank, there was, in the years 1947-50 the handicap of inadequate financial resources. When the Bank opened for business in 1946-47 its nominal capital, in accordance with a decision taken early in 1940, was fixed at I. D. 500,000. This figure was out of proportion with the changed level of prices and incomes, and the expansion of industry which had taken place meanwhile. Furthermore as the capital of the Bank was provided by the Treasury as a loan, it was up to the Treasury to decide what amounts to pay and when to pay them, and its decisions often did not coincide with the Bank's requirements either for funds or for making forward plans.

This situation, however, has completely changed as a result of increased Government revenue from oil in accordance with the Oil Agreement of 1951. The capital of the Bank was raised to I.D. 1,000,000 in 1951 and to I.D. 3,000,000 in 1952. Earlier, in 1948, 1949, and 1950, the Bank was forced to borrow from the reserves of certain Government departments, e.g. the Directorate General of Awqaf, Government Staff Guarantee Fund, and from other banks (especially the National Bank of Iraq). This form of borrowing was found to be less costly and more elastic than borrowing from the public. Another important source of capital which has developed in recent years is the annual net profits of the Bank. These have risen from I.D. 4,066 in 1948-49, to I.D. 7,745 in 1949-50, to I.D. 60,591 in 1950-51, and to I.D. 99,463 in 1951-52. The average rate of loans granted to industry in the last five years has been about I.D. 150,000 annually,[1] with an average loan period of three to four years. Hence a sum of I.D. 40,000 to I.D. 50,000 is repaid annually to the Bank. The paid-up capital of the Bank stood at I.D. 1,200,000

[1] The rate of interest was reduced from 7 per cent per annum to 5 per cent by decision of the Ministry of Finance in 1951.

in 1952, but it can safely count on an annual payment by the Treasury on capital account of no less than I.D. 200,000. The Bank therefore can be said to be now in a sufficiently liquid position to meet any legitimate demands made upon it. 652

The International Bank Mission[1] has recommended that "the Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital." This view is no doubt inspired by the shortage of capital from which the Industrial Bank, as well as other financial institutions, had suffered before the Oil Agreement of 1951. It is clear that the Bank must not, however, be hasty in disposing of shares if it is to perform its important function of encouraging enterprises and capital investment in industry. This can be seen more clearly from the following considerations. First, most of the industrial concerns in which the Bank participates are still under construction (a process which requires two to four years in Iraq), and the few which have gone into production and distributed profits have only done so in the last three or four years. Any large sell-out by the Bank, which holds between 25 and 40 per cent of their shares, is likely to shake confidence in these concerns and create unforseen difficulties for them. Secondly, there is no organised stock exchange in Iraq and the market for shares is so limited that any large sale of shares may lead to a fall in prices which would hit small investors and benefit speculators, while it might harm the credit of the Bank. Thirdly, the stake which the Government now has in the capital of so many industrial concerns helps to reassure private enterprise that it will not retreat from the generous policy it has so far adopted towards industry. Another important consideration in this respect is that Government participation in industry through the Bank gives it a useful instrument, if it wishes to make use of it, for the supervision and control of industry.[2] It seems obvious therefore that the Bank cannot easily use its capital as a revolving fund. 652 654 473

(2) *The Supply of Raw Materials and Power*: Iraq is potentially 000

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[1] See the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. *The Economic Development of Iraq*, Report by a Mission of the Bank. Washington 1952. Annex D, p. 286.

[2] During the past five years, the Bank has made, only one sale, 3,000 shares out of 24,000 shares it then held in the Iraq Cement Co., in 1951, by public auction.

135 (2) The Supply of Raw Materials and Power: Iraq is potentially
233 rich in many kinds of raw materials. In the first place it has abun-
241 dant supplies of oil and gas which provide a cheap source of both
433 raw material and fuel. Secondly, it has pastoral and agricultural products such as wool, camel hair, hides and skins, meat, fish, milk, animal fat. Thirdly, it has fertile land which, with the extension of irrigation, can be a rich source of such raw materials as sugar beets, sugar cane, soybeans and jute, in addition to products already available such as tobacco, cotton, sesame, linseed, and practically all types of grain, fruits and vegetables. Finally, recent geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. There are deposits of sulphurs, apparently of commercial value, in many parts of Iraq, and of salt, especially near Basrah. Yet each of these resources presents a different problem; none is easily exploitable (except oil); quantities available for industry are limited and the quality frequently poor. Agriculture has been kept at a low level of output because of the lack of irrigation schemes in most parts of the country; the difficulties caused by the present land tenure system and the agricultural techniques connected with the tribal system, which covers over 80 per cent of the cultivated area; the absence of an effective agricultural extension service and lack of modern storing facilities; these and other factors have held back both quantity and quality of agricultural and animal products. There was a noticeable extension in the cultivation of cotton in recent years, but the severe failure of the crop in 1951, owing to a pest attack, has been a great set-back. Difficulties in the supply of raw materials have held up many an industrial enterprise. The scheme for a sugar factory which has been under discussion since 1947 has had to be postponed from one year to another owing to the uncertainties connected with the
[281] cultivation of both sugar beet and sugar cane. The progress of the leather tanning industry, one of the oldest industries in Iraq, has been retarded due to the existing conditions in which hides and skins have been prepared and preserved, and great losses to this particularly native industry have resulted. The woollen textile
[288] mills have had to import certain qualities of Australian wool to mix with Iraqi wool which is of a coarse variety.

135 So far as mineral resources are concerned the surveys that have been made are insufficient.[1] Further exploration work is

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[1] As of writing, in July 1953.

needed to prove the extent and quality of the ores located. This 135 work has gone till now rather tardily, owing to the inadequate funds at the disposal of the Directorate General on Minerals. There also seems to be no clear policy as to how this wealth should be exploited: whether by the State directly or by concession to national or foreign enterprise.

Another factor delaying work in this field is the difficulty of [489] transport to and from the sites of the ore deposits which are remotely situated in desert and mountain.

Oil and gas are indeed plentiful in Iraq, and the exploitation 382 of oil resources has indirectly helped to finance the industrial development so far achieved. But the cost of oil fuel and other oil products for local consumption is not much lower than in other countries because of the high rate of taxes on consumption. This and the limited range of oil products so far made in Iraq by the Alwand refinery, owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., have led to the import of a number of oil products from abroad. But the situation should change when the State-owned refinery, now under construction, goes into production.

Another problem connected with the supply of fuel is the lack 371 of electric power. Power generation in Iraq is inefficiently organised and power rates, except in Basrah and Baghdad in recent years, are among the highest in the world. This has compelled most industries to generate their own power which has added a great deal to production cost. The recent reduction of power rates and the availability of electricity in Baghdad has been one of the major reasons for the concentration of industry in that city.

(3) **Concentration of Industry**: Industry in Iraq is heavily con- 438 centrated in the city of Baghdad which has a population of 550,000 inhabitants, in other words a little more than ten percent of the country's population. Excluding oil and one or two small textile, tanning, and grain-milling industries, all modern industry has been established in or near Baghdad, thus adding to the population and housing problems of the capital. There are many reasons for this concentration of industry. All routes converge on Baghdad; it has the largest population and, as the seat of Government, it offers easy access to the central authority. As an old trading centre Baghdad [366] has a well-organised market, large financial resources, and managerial and office staffs. Some of the factors that have made Baghdad

436 more attractive for industry than other areas can be corrected by
[366] proper action. First and foremost is the relative cheapness of power
and fuel in Baghdad. The cost of the electric power unit in most
cities is double that of Baghdad and rarely is a municipality-owned
plant able to supply sufficient power to industry. The cost of oil
fuel is at least ten percent higher outside Baghdad. The correction
of these factors, together with a more equal distribution of educational, housing, transport and social welfare facilities, could greatly relieve the situation. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry could also be amended so as to give additional concessions for industries established in other parts of the country. The cost of labour and land is already becoming burdensome for industry in Baghdad. This, in addition to the social evil of overcrowdedness, calls for immediate consideration.

434 (4) *Limitation of Markets* : A newly industrialised country can
hardly hope to find foreign markets for its finished products. It has
to depend on its home market. The market in Iraq, with its small
population (about 5 million inhabitants), of low purchasing power
(annual income per head is estimated at between £ 20 and £ 30
or $85), affords very limited scope for large-scale industry. Many
of the industries studied at one time by the Industrial Bank, such
as the making of artificial silk fibres, the manufacture of paper and
cardboard from straw, and the printing of cotton piece-goods, had
to be abandoned because the smallest economic unit of these plants
is much beyond the capacity of the Iraqi market to support. This
situation will no doubt improve as the whole economy of the coun-
439 try expands. But it should be possible to deal with this situation
649 more effectively by joint action on the part of the Arab States,
along lines already discussed at high political level. These discussions have had the object of reducing or abolishing inter-state tariff barriers so as to make the whole area one market. Such an action is indeed vital to the progress and prosperity of these countries and their peoples. It should be remembered that before World War I, these countries formed one economic and political unit under the Ottoman Empire.

464 (5) *Labour, Technical Staff and Management Problems*: The supply of ordinary labour, owing to the high rate of population increase (estimated to be one and a half per cent per annum) and emigration from country to town, is quite sufficient and will remain so

for some time. Women have been employed so far only in exceptional 464 cases. A new problem has been recently experienced in the high turnover of ordinary labour. Owing to the development of the oil industry in Kuweit and other Persian Gulf areas, and the high wages being paid there, many workers in Baghdad, and more still in the depressed farming areas, have been emigrating there. The turnover in the cotton textile industry of Iraq is estimated at 20 per cent of employed labour.

The main difficulty however lies in the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour. The vast amount of illiteracy among the [212] population, and the failure to make elementary education compulsory [871] has made it difficult to apply any system of apprenticeship successfully. Technical education provided by the State has [874] so far been on a very limited scale - indeed, there are only three technical secondary schools in the whole of Iraq. Therefore a new industry has often first to train its own labourers and technicians, and this of course adds to costs. In the meanwhile, most industries are dependent on foreign technicians, experts, constructors, heads of sections, and foremen. The employment of foreign technicians no doubt is inevitable in the early stages of development, but it has its own drawbacks and burdens. Foreign skill demands higher rewards abroad than it would accept at home, the standard of skill obtained is often not the highest, service is often interrupted either by ordinary leaves, or illness or inability to fit in with local conditions.

The lack of qualified labour also applies to the fields of administration, [658 accounts, and management. Efficient clerks, typists, 874] store-keepers, accountants and secretaries are in great demand and very few are available in Iraq. The inadequacy of State commercial education is no less than that of technical education. The scarcity of able management is a serious obstacle to the progress of industry. Those few who have entered the field of industry are 464 mostly of the type of proprietor-manager (even in joint-stock 472 companies managers are usually fairly large share-holders); while 473 the members of boards of directors of industrial companies, (about twenty to twenty-five men) mostly have their own business or profession to attend to. No wonder they show reluctance to go into new enterprises. For one reason or another salaried managers have not made their way into industry, except in very rare cases. On the other hand foreign management, especially on the

464 472 473 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary, sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country.[1]

648 457 471 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation :** Except where foreign enterprise has obtained a concession for the development of important resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enterprise. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipulates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi 648 656 471

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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

nationals in order that industry may qualify for the concessions 648
granted by that law. This may appear as a discrimination against [656]
foreign capital and some foreign industrialists have raised this 477
point. But considering the great concessions granted by the Law, including the appropriation of state land, and the smallness of the majority reserved for nationals, the "discrimination" is nominal. Past experience of foreign capital investment in the Middle East does not allow the removal of such safeguards. However, the writer believes that proper legislation on these three points mentioned above would give foreign industrialists sufficient assurance; and, given the proper information and contacts, many firms may be induced to establish branches in Iraq to the benefit of all concerned.[1]

7. **Other problems** : There are other less important industrial 433
problems which should be mentioned even though limitations of 471
space prevent full discussion of them.

(a) It should be realized that Iraqi industry labours under a heavy burden of over-capitalization which adds to its costs. There is a tendency to have completely integrated plants; most industries have to maintain a power generating plant either to provide electricity, or as a spare in case of failure in the city supply. Practically all industries have their own workshops. There is a strong desire on the part of all industry owners to be self-sufficient with regard to supply of materials, chemicals and spare parts. Many industries have been induced to purchase more land than they actually need in order to guard against future needs and also to profit from the expected rise in land values. This has led to an insufficient utilization of machinery and to a great amount of working capital, per unit of production, locked up. These facts are reflected in the balance sheets of many industries in the form of Loans from Banks (commercial banks) which in some cases reach 50 per cent of nominal capital and thus increase the fixed charges which industry has to meet. The reason for this desire on the part of industrials to be more or less completely self-sufficient lies in the fact that, owing to the country's industrial immaturity, it is often impossible to rely on efficient service from outside plants when required. The need to keep great stores of

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[1] In accordance with the economic boycott enforced by Arab States, firms having business relations with Israel are excluded.

433 materials and spare parts is due to many factors. First is past
471 experience of the difficulty of obtaining such materials, due either to Iraq's distance from international markets, or to the shortages of world supply, or to the arbitrary attitude of suppliers abroad. Secondly, the fear of interruption of supplies owing to international emergencies and restrictions in the countries of origin. Thirdly, the influence of directors or big share-holders who own agencies for such materials or spare parts.

432 (b) There is great scope in Iraqi industry for improvement in the layout of machinery, flow of material, lighting, noise abatement, and temperature control.

466 (c) The problems of labour recruitment and organisation, systems of wage payment, housing and workers' welfare in general, fall outside the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say that present labour legislation provides for weekly and annual holidays, for compensations in cases of injury or total loss of life, and prohibits the employment of children under twelve years. Industry is subject to inspection by officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs for the purpose of enforcing the labour laws. The formation of trade unions is permitted under the law, but so far labour organisations have played very small part in industry.

433 (8) **State Assistance and Control**: The main characteristics of in-
654 dustry in Iraq should by now be clear. It is of a recent development. It has developed largely under state protection and assistance. It has to operate within a very small market. The fact that industry is still in its infancy makes it hard to predict its future course. The part which government assistance has so far played in its development is of special importance and calls for examination. State assistance has taken various forms; tariff protection, exemptions from various taxes and duties, and financial aid through the Industrial Bank. Except possibly in the last case, government assistance to industry has not been based on any criteria of efficiency, or economic or social objectives. Any firm can obtain the benefits of state encouragement as long as it fulfills two conditions only; that it will use raw materials available in Iraq, or that it will produce goods imported in large quantities. It is necessary, if industry is not to grow lax behind the high walls of protection, to set up standards of efficiency, and to relax protective measures such as the prohibition of competitive imports, as soon as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized. Benefits under

the Law for the Encouragement of Industry are granted irrespec- 433
tive of the locality in which the Industry is to be established or the 654
type of industry embarked upon. Industries established in crowded, highly developed areas are given the same advantages as those established in remote, less developed districts. The manufacturer of producer's goods is treated equally with the manufacturer of consumers' goods and luxury goods. The criteria upon which an industry's claim to benefits is judged stand in need of drastic revaluation.

The limitation of the market in Iraq not only restricts the pos- 477
sibilities of large-scale development of most industries but it affords opportunities for monopoly control by one or two plants in certain fields. The danger of monopoly and exorbitant prices is already in sight in such industries as cement, beer, cotton and woollen textiles. The encouragement of new enterprise in these fields, or the relaxation of state protection to allow healthy competition, or direct intervention by the state to fix prices in relation to costs, is necessary to restrict monopoly power in the interests of the consumer and to preserve public confidence in industry. It is only on the basis of such confidence that the government can continue to give support and material aid to industry. The Iraqi Government has ample powers for dealing with the abuses of monopoly under the provisions of the Law for the Organisation of Economic Life of 1941.

The government can also extend its control over industry 473
and prevent abuses by proper amendments to the law governing joint-stock companies. There is need to restrict the grant of free-shares or "water" shares to promotors, the creation of founders' shares with special powers of voting or percentage of profits, the interlocking of directorships, and abuses on the part of management in respect of purchases of materials and equipment, and sales of finished products. In particular, managers of joint-stock companies should be prohibited from trading on their own account especially in goods related to firms under their management.

The Industrial Bank has often been urged, as a shareholder 652
in many industries, and with its representative on their boards, 473
to exercise control over their price and sales policies. This suggestion derives from the prestige which the Bank has acquired in relation to industrial development. It has undoubtedly helped to iron out many difficulties, to improve management, and prevent abuses. But it is going too far to suppose that the Bank can actual-

652 473 ly control the price, sales and purchases policies of such industries. In the first place, though the Bank holds a large proportion of the capital (varying between 20 and 40 per cent) of every industry, it is always in the minority on the Boards of Directors; moreover it appoints its own representatives and is excluded from taking part in the election of other directors by the articles of association of the companies concerned. This course has been deliberately taken so as to ensure private enterprise against arbitrary action on the part of the government. Secondly, the Bank itself is, in the last analysis, a profit seeking institution and therefore it is not likely to stand in the way of any measures likely to increase profits, unless they are of an obviously oppressive or abusive nature. Thirdly, the main duty of the Bank is to promote industry. Promotion and control are not always compatible.

656 475 For these reasons the State has to look for other ways, and to use more fully the legal powers which it already possesses, for effective control over industry. The fact that it owns a share in industry through the Industrial Bank puts it in a better position to exercise such control. But to rely mainly on the Industrial Bank for this purpose is to escape responsibility.

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H.M. KING GHAZI I

Frontpiece

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6 IRAQ

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A Study in Political Development

by

PHILIP WILLARD IRELAND

F.R.G.S., M.A. (Oxon), Ph.D.

JONATHAN CAPE
THIRTY BEDFORD SQUARE
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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

200 In preparing this study of the development of 'Iraq from being a remote and neglected portion of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 to her present position as a political unit possessing all the machinery of a modern state and standing on the aerial highway to the farther East, the author has had good reason to be grateful to a large number of persons who have permitted him to draw extensively on their time, knowledge and patience. He cannot hope to thank each by name. The complete list alone of those intimately connected with the creation of modern 'Iraq, both 'Iraqī and British, to whom the author is indebted would form a 'Who's Who of 'Iraq'. He must, however, acknowledge with particular gratitude the interest graciously shown by H.M. King Ghāzī I, who has given the author every possible encouragement; the valuable assistance of the former High Commissioners for 'Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, K.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., and Sir Francis Humphrys, G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.I.E., more recently H.B.M. Ambassador to 'Iraq, and the kindness of Sir Stephen Gaselee, K.C.M.G., Librarian of the Foreign Office, in facilitating the inspection of official papers.

For assistance in the collection and preparation of material, the author owes no less a debt of gratitude to Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., and to G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, Esq., C.M.G.; Counsellor, C. H. Bateman, Esq., M.C., First Secretary, and Captain Vyvyan Holt, M.V.O., Oriental Secretary of H.B.M. Embassy, Baghdad and to the following persons, now or at one time officials of the 'Iraq Government: Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., formerly Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior; Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, K.C.M.G., formerly Judicial Secretary and the first Adviser to the Ministry of Justice; E. M. Drower, Esq., O.B.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Justice; John Parlby, Esq., O.B.E., Comptroller and

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000 Auditor General; C. J. Edmonds, Esq., C.B.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Interior; E. G. Hogg, Esq., C.M.G., Adviser to the Ministry of Finance; and S. H. Longrigg, Esq., O.B.E., formerly Assistant Adviser to the Ministry of Finance.

Among the many 'Iraqī officials and statesmen who have rendered assistance, special thanks are due to the late Ja'far Pasha al-Askarī, C.M.G., D.S.O.; Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī; Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd, C.M.G., D.S.O.; Rustum Beg Haidar; Yāsīn Pasha al-Hāshimī; 'Alī Jaudat Beg Tahsin Beg al Qadri, O.B.E.; Yūsuf Ghanīma; Ra'uf Beg Chādarchī and Saiyid Husain al-Afnān. Thanks are also due to Dr. Fadhil Jamalī, Director of Education, and Dr. Sharif Ussyran for the many kindnesses shown by him, A. C. Mason, Esq., Superintendent of the Government Press, Baghdad, for suggestions on possible sources of Government Reports, and D. Cameron, Esq., editor of the *'Iraq Times*, for permission to make use of newspaper files.

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To his wife, Marjorie Webster Ireland, M.A., the author owes much more than these words can express, not merely for assistance with the tedious details of preparing the manuscript and the Index, but also for constant encouragement and unsparing criticism, without which the work would have never taken its present form.

PHILIP WILLARD IRELAND

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

In transliterating Arabic words into English, the inevitable problem has arisen of adopting a system which would accurately represent the nearest English equivalent of each Arabic letter or diacritical mark and which would not, at the same time, confuse the reader with unfamiliar words and place-names or with a bewildering array of diacritical marks.

The writer, although not unmindful of the merits of other systems, as for instance that followed by Professor D. S. Margoliouth, of Oxford, has adopted the system employed by the Royal Geographical Society[1] although occasional lapses from it may be discovered. This system, although perhaps not so exact as others, has the advantage of employing single English letters, without distinguishing diacritical marks, for the Arabic letters of which the sounds seem to be duplications in most European ears. Thus Dāl (د) and Dād (ض) are here represented by the English letter D, Zāi (ز) and Zā (ظ) by Z, Tā (ت) and Ṭā (ط) by T, Sīn (س) and Sād (ص) by S, and Ḥā (ح) and Ha (ه) by H, except that the 'silent' final Hā is rendered as A or E.

'Ain (ع) is represented by ʻ. Hamza Alif and Wasla Alif when transliterated are rendered as ʼ. The two sequences Fat-ha Yā and Fat-ha Wāw are treated as AI and AU instead of AY and AW, respectively. This is perhaps open to objections since the two sequences are properly not diphthongs but combinations of a vowel and a consonant. The forms adopted by the R.G.S. II system have been retained, however, in the belief that AY and AW would result unnecessarily in un-

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[1] Gleichen, Major-General Lord Edward, and Reynolds, J. H., *Alphabets of Foreign Languages transcribed into English according to the R.G.S. II System* (1921)

104 familiar spellings, as for example in Faisal, Husain, Saiyid, Beirut, etc.

Place-names follow the lists prepared by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names[1] with a few exceptions, as Dair az-Zūr and Kūt al-'Amāra. Long vowels have been indicated by ¯ except in the case of 'Irāq and Baghdād. These names appear so frequently in the text that the distinguishing marks have been omitted on the grounds of convenience.

Arabic words in titles of books or reports and in citations have been given exactly as they appear, no attempt having been made to bring the Arabic words into conformity with the R.G.S. II System.

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[1] *First List of Names in 'Iraq (Mesopotamia)*, (1932); *First List of Names in Syria* (1927), Royal Geographical Society.

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الى الوالد الحنون المستوجب كل الاكرام
تقدمة المحبة والشكر والاحترام

To the Hakim
in affection and gratitude

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‘IRAQ

A Study in Political Development

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CHAPTER I

175*

GREAT BRITAIN GOES TO WAR IN TURKISH ARABIA

LATE in the day of November 6th, 1914, a detachment of the 16th Infantry Brigade under the command of Brig.-General W. S. Delamain disembarked under the guns of H.M.S. *Odin* at Fao, the southernmost point of Turkish Arabia. The guns of the fort had been already silenced by the *Odin* and there was no further resistance. Within a few minutes the Union Jack replaced the Osmanli Crescent at the flagstaff.[1]

Thus began the campaign which eventually was to wrest from the Ottoman Empire the whole of Turkish Arabia, as the Turkish wilayets or provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul were then known in British official circles,[2] and to lay the foundations of the Kingdom of 'Iraq.

In this engagement at Fao stands revealed, in brief, British policy in the Middle East: the control, direct or indirect, of the Persian Gulf and its natural extensions, the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, as the outposts of India, which, if jeopardized, must be safeguarded by force of arms when peaceful means had failed. When, therefore, from August, 1914, Turkey had given almost unmistakable indication that she would join the Central Powers against the Allies, the significance of her

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[1] Brig.-General W. S. Delamain to Chief of General Staff, November 16th, 1914. See also, Moberley, Brig.-Gen. F. J. (*History of the Great War based on Official Documents*), *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, 1914-1918 (London, 1923-27), Vol. 1, p. 107. Hereafter referred to as *O.H.* (Official History).

[2] In referring to the regions now known as 'Iraq, the attempt has been made in this work to employ the term current in official usage at the time. Thus Turkish Arabia is used for the pre-war period, Mesopotamia for the war-time and 'Iraq for the post-war period, although the latter term did not entirely displace that of Mesopotamia until 1920-21.

175* potential menace in Turkish Arabia could not be ignored. Her obvious military preparations: the general mobilization, the movement of an unprecedented number of troops to Basra and below, ostensibly directed against Kuwait and against Arab uprisings, the seizing of coal and supplies at Baghdad and Basra, the fortification of the Shatt al-'Arab below Basra and Mohammerah could scarcely be dismissed as attempts, in time of universal war-fever, to set her house in order, as the Sublime Porte repeatedly assured Sir Louis Mallet, H.M. Ambassador in Constantinople.[1]

The possibility of war in the Middle East with Turkey alone or allied with Germany had been anticipated by General Sir Douglas Haig, when Commander-in-Chief in India in 1911, in a memorandum in which he proposed the reorganization of the Indian Army to meet such a contingency. The occupation of Fao and Basra from India was no new project. It had been formally proposed by a special committee, composed of Admiral Sir E. Slade, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies; Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake, Chief of Staff, India; Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. McMahon, Foreign Secretary, India; and Sir Percy Cox, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, on January 15th, 1912, as a measure whereby the British position in Turkish Arabia might be established in the face of unfriendly Turkish officials. The Government of India had not then approved of the plan except as part of widespread hostilities. The project had been revived again in January, 1914, in connection with the defence of the Anglo-Persian oilfields, but the reply of the Government of India, to which the matter had been referred, was not received until July 30th, 1914.[2] In preparation for possible hostilities, the movements and particulars of Turkish troops in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys had been carefully recorded by H.M. consuls at Baghdad, Mōsul and Basra. Military

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[1] See *Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey*, *Accounts and Papers*, 1914-16. (Cd. 7628), LXXXIV, 179, especially Dispatches Nos. 3, 6, 14, 18, 64, 84, 87, 94, 118, 121 and 164.

[2] *O.H.*, Vol. 1, pp. 72 ff.

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handbooks on Turkish Arabia had been published[1]; map and 175*
geographical surveys had been carried out over a considerable period.[2]

The hesitation in the autumn of 1914 attending the final decision to send an expeditionary force to the head of the Gulf in anticipation of the outbreak of war with Turkey must be attributed, not to any failure to recognize the importance of the threatened Imperial interests, but rather to a reluctance, in the face of the existing circumstances, to take the inevitable plunge. The Government of India, fearing that its internal strength had already been seriously weakened by the withdrawal of troops overseas, felt unwilling to spare further forces for the proposed expedition. It also feared the disastrous effects which the initiation of hostilities against Turkey and the 'Commander of the Faithful' might have on the Indian Muslims.[3] To appear blameless in the eyes of Islam became of greater importance, for the moment, than the gaining of immediate military and political advantages at the head of the Persian Gulf.

H.M. Government, on their part, although fully appreciating the proposals of the India Office and the Admiralty, formulated after numerous conferences, hesitated to dissipate men and energy on so distant a venture while every effort was being made to stem the German advance in France and Flanders, and while there was even a remote possibility that Turkey might not declare war.

By the middle of September, however, it became apparent to the Foreign Office, to the Naval authorities of the Admiralty and to the Military and Political staffs of the India Office that precautionary action at the head of the Gulf could no longer be delayed. The belief that war was imminent, a matter even

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[1] *Military Reports on Eastern Turkey in Asia* (Secret), War Office, in progress from 1904.

[2] Notably Lorimer's *Geographical and Statistical Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf.*

[3] For a critical view of the attitude of the Government of India to the Mesopotamia Expedition, see Minority Report by Cmdr. Wedgwood, in *Report of the Commissioners . . . to inquire into the operations of War in Mesopotamia*, (Cd. 8610).

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115* of a few days, and that immediate action should be taken, was expressed by General Barrow, Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, in an appreciation of the situation, dated September 26th, in which he declared that troops should be sent at once to the Shatt al-'Arab and landed on Persian soil, 'ostensibly to protect the oil installation, but in reality to notify the Turks we mean business and to the Arabs we are ready to support them.'[1]

On the basis of this appreciation, Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, with the concurrence of Lord Kitchener, warned the Viceroy on the same day: 'Situation as regards Turkey most menacing and it may be necessary to demonstrate at the head of the Gulf.' He further indicated that a secret expedition to Abadan was probable. On October 2nd, with Cabinet approval, the diversion of an infantry brigade, two mountain batteries, a company of sappers, and necessary medical and transport units was ordered to Abadan. In secret instructions it was stated that the whole of the 6th Division would follow as quickly as possible in the event of hostilities with Turkey.[2] The destination was later changed to Bahrain, where the expedition was to await further orders, in deference to the continued protests of the Viceroy and of the Government of India.[3]

The necessity of safeguarding Persian oil supplies for British consumption has been the usual reason given for the consent of H.M. Government to the dispatch of the expeditionary force to Basra,[4] but it was rather the reason which kept the expeditionary force in Turkish Arabia, than that which originally sent it there. Whatever part Persian oil eventually played in 'floating the Allies to victory on a wave of oil', to recall Lord Curzon's famous remark,[5] there appears to be little evidence to indicate that the necessity of its protection occupied so great a part in

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[1] *O.H.*, Vol. 1, pp. 86 ff. [2] Ibid., p. 99.

[3] Government of India to Secretary of State (hereafter S/S) for India, *O.H.*, Vol. 1, pp. 93 ff. Viceroy of India to S/S for India, ibid., pp. 93 ff.

[4] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th Series, Vol. XL (1920), p. 887.

[5] Speech made to the Inter-Allied Petroleum Council, November 21st, 1918.

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the final decision as has since been assigned to it. The immediate importance of the oil supplies was discounted by the Admiralty itself. Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote, on September 1st, in a minute on a memorandum by Admiral Slade urging the dispatch of an expedition: 'There is little likelihood of troops being available for this purpose. Indian troops must be used at the decisive point. We shall have to buy our oil from elsewhere.'[1]

The India Office itself did not take the view that oil was the chief objective to be gained in sending the expedition. General Barrow placed oil as the last of five objectives to be thus gained.[2] The Secretary of State for India, writing in a private letter to the Viceroy, after the expedition had been ordered to proceed, stated: 'Of the various objects to be attained by sending a force up the Gulf, I have always regarded the moral effect on the Arab chiefs as the primary and the protection of the oil stores as the secondary.'[3] The Government of India also held that oil was not so valuable as to outweigh the consequences of an attack on Persia.[4]

The menace of Basra as a fortified enemy port from which enemy ships or even submarines, transported piecemeal over the disjointed sections of the Baghdad Railway, would strike at Imperial communications in the Indian Ocean, might have carried more weight in the decision to send the expedition had the Baghdad Railway been completed or had Turkey, with the aid of Germany, had the opportunity before the outbreak of war to establish an adequate naval base and force in the Persian Gulf. Information that the *Emden* might take refuge in the Gulf was discounted by the Admiralty. Any attack on India from Basra was, under the circumstances, regarded as unfeasible.

The paramount danger, in the opinion of H.M. Government,

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[1] Cited *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 82. [2] Ibid., p. 88.

[3] Letter (private), Lord Crewe to Viceroy, October 9th, 1914, quoted in evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission. Also in *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 95.

[4] Telegram to S/S for India, October 7th, 1914, cited *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 94.

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125* from hostile powers in Turkish Arabia, athwart lines of communication to Persia, Afghanistan and beyond, and to eastern Arabia via Zubair and Kuwait, was not merely the military or naval action which the Central Powers might take there. It was rather the power of Turkey as the principal Islamic state, influenced and supported by German funds and by German officers who never wearied of proclaiming the pro-Islamic sympathies of the German Emperor, to unite the latent forces of religion, of political discontent and of unrest in the Near and Middle East against Great Britain, to undermine and probably destroy the position and the prestige which Great Britain had created and had maintained in the previous three hundred years.

In a memorandum of September 2nd, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Political Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, wrote:

> The political effect in the Persian Gulf and in India of leaving the head of the Gulf derelict will be disastrous, and we cannot afford, politically, to acquiesce in such a thing for an indefinite period while the main issues are being settled elsewhere. From the military point of view a Turkish diversion in that region is doubtless negligible, though under German officers it may not be wholly ineffective: but it will be worked for all it is worth for the sake of the political effect which the Turks and Germans hope to produce through it on Moslem feelings on India. Moreover . . . we cannot begin by sacrificing the Shaikh of Kuwait.[1]

General Barrow stated, in a minute on the above memorandum, that in the event of hostilities,

> British interests at Baghdad and Basra will be swept out of existence. Our allies the Shaikhs of Mohammerah and Kuwait will be threatened and may consequently be attacked or seduced, in which case all our prestige and all our labours of years will vanish into air and our position in the Gulf itself will become precarious. Can we avert this?[2]

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[1] *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 80.

[2] Ibid., pp. 80-1.

Even more serious was the prospect of Turco-Arab co-operation, and of a *Jihād* or Holy War which might be directed against the Suez Canal and Egypt and which might spread by means of Turkish and German encouragement through Persia and Afghanistan to India where, combined with latent sedition and rebellion, it might spread like wildfire at a time when India would be least able to cope with it. The conviction that these threats were real and were most potent reasons why the expedition should be sent was recorded by General Barrow in his memorandum of September 26th:

> Such a contingency (immediate war with Turkey) need not alarm us unless the Turks succeed in drawing the Arabs to their side. In that case they will proclaim a Jahad and endeavour to raise Afghanistan and the frontier tribes against us, which might be a serious danger to India and would most certainly add enormously to our difficulties and responsibilities. This shows how important it is to us to avert a Turco-Arab coalition. It is known that Turkey has been intriguing right and left to win over the Arabs, and it is even said that Ibn Saud, the leading Arab Chief, has been induced to join the Turks. If this is true we may expect serious trouble in Mesopotamia and in Egypt.[1]

Although events after the outbreak of the war were to prove that the dangers as well as the possibilities of effective Muslim co-operation had been greatly overstressed in London, the fear of German and Turkish propaganda and subversive activities had not been without foundation. A German mission composed of thirty-two members was known to be on its way in September, 1914, to Afghanistan by way of Aleppo and Kerman.[2] Other missions, sent to stir up the Muslims in India, in the Yemen and in Egypt, had been reported.[3] Attempts

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[1] *O.H.*, Vol. 1, pp. 86 ff.

[2] *Accts. and Papers*, 1914-16 (Cd. 7628), LXXXIV, 179; Dispatch No. 100, Sir E. Grey to Sir Louis Mallet, September 29th, 1914.

[3] Ibid., Dispatch No. 44, Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, August 28th, 1914; No. 59, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, September 5th, 1914; No. 127, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, October 14th, 1914; No. 150, Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, October 19th, 1914.

175* were being made to alienate the loyalty of the Shaikh of Mohammerah[1] and to induce Ibn Sa'ūd, Amīr of the Najd, to take up arms for Turkey.[2] In early October, Enver Pasha admitted that efforts were being made to enlist Bedouin sympathies for the Ottoman Empire.[3] Confirmation of this and other efforts to stir up anti-British and anti-Russian feeling among the Arabs had also been reported from all sections of Turkey's Arab dominions.[4]

A mission had been reported as destined for Persia,[5] where the future revelation of the activities of Wassmus,[6] Neidermayer, Zugmayer and others was to confirm the pre-war suspicion that every effort was being made not only to embarrass the British and Russians by sporadic hostilities, but also to force Persia, as the second Islamic state, into war against the Allies, and thus prove Germany's contention that Islam itself was on the side of the Central Powers.[7]

A British expedition into Turkish Arabia would not only neutralize such threats against British prestige and position, but would also enable Great Britain to consolidate her position at the head of the Persian Gulf. It would enable her to convert her special privileges in Turkish Arabia, laboriously won from the Sublime Porte and as tenaciously held, into rights by conquest as had been proposed in 1912. It was an opportunity too tempting to be allowed to slip, as earlier and more subtle opportunities had been allowed to pass, of settling in her favour, once and for all, the international rivalries which had, more than

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[1] Wilson, Sir A. T., *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, 1914-1917, p. 7 (Hereafter *Mesopotamia*, 1914-17).

[2] *Accts. and Papers*, 1914-16 (Cd. 7628), LXXXIV, 179; Dispatch No. 100, Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet, September 29th, 1914.

[3] Ibid., Dispatch No. 107, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, October 6th, 1914.

[4] Ibid., No. 129, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, October 15th, 1914; No. 163, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, October 23rd, 1914; No. 173, Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, October 28th, 1914.

[5] Ibid., No. 59, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, September 8th, 1914.

[6] For activities of Wassmus, see Sykes, C., *Wassmus, 'The German Lawrence'* (1936).

[7] Sykes, Sir Percy, *History of Persia* (2 vols., 1930, 3rd ed.), Vol. II, pp. 442-50. For extracts from the Diary of Zugmayer, see *O.H.*, Vol. I, App. I, pp. 344-5.

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once, threatened the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf, and, in turn, the peace of Europe. Once established at Basra, Great Britain, in the event of a successful outcome of the general struggle, could look forward to the maintenance of her time-honoured policy of keeping guard over India through her supremacy in the Gulf and its extensions, to the possible utilization of these same regions as links in speedier communications with India and to the restoration of her ancient trade and commercial supremacy in the Middle East. 175

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

OUTLINE MAP OF PERSIAN GULF

Scale of Miles
100
0
100
IRAQ
BASRA
Mohammerah
Abadan
Fao
Bubiyan I.
AL KUWAIT
Kharag I.
Bandar Rig
BUSHIRE
SHIRAZ
L. TASHT
L. NIRIZ
Mand R.
I R A N
KERMAN
Ras al Misha'ab
Ras al Badya
PERSIAN
Al Qatif
Bahrain
QATAR
Ras Rakan
Al Bidda
GULF
Sh. Shuaib I.
Kais I.
Lingeh
BANDAR ABBAS
Hormuz I.
Henjam I.
STRAIT OF HORMUZ
Ras Musandam
Ras al Khaimah
Sharjah
Dibah
JASK
GULF OF OMAN
O M A N

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CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES VALLEYS

It was trade which first brought the English to the Persian Gulf 175* and into the Tigris and Euphrates valleys,[1] as it had first taken 439 them to India, China and Japan. In 1616, the East India Company, hoping to find new markets for its woollen cloth, no longer a novelty in India, dispatched the *James* under the terms of the three *farmāns*[2] obtained by Richard Steele and John Crowther from Shah Abbas in September, 1615,[3] to Jask, just outside the Clarence Straits. A few years later, 1619, the monopoly of the silk trade through the Persian Gulf was granted to the Company[4] by Shah Abbas.

The Portuguese, for more than a century following a treaty with Shah Ismā'īl in 1515, had dominated trade from Hormuz, but after the capture of the island in 1622 by a combined force of Englishmen and Persians,[5] they speedily lost the ascendancy, not to the English, but to the Dutch. Not until 1766, when the Dutch factory on Kharag Island was destroyed by the Persians and the Dutch threats to sweep England from the seas had come to nothing, were the English merchants able to gain the mastery of trade in the Middle East, a supremacy which they have

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[1] John Newbery, Ralph Fitch and John Elred of the Turkey and Levant Co., founded in 1581, had already passed from Aleppo to Baghdad and thence down the Persian Gulf to India. See: Purchas, *His Pilgrimes* (ed. 1625), lib. viii, p. 449. Hakluyt, Tome II, i, pp. 245-71; also Birdwood, Sir G., *Report on Miscellaneous Old Records at the India Office* (1890), p. 196.

[2] *Farmān*, following the Persian فَرمان.

[3] Purchas *His Pilgrimes*, lib. IV, cap. xiii, p. 524. For an account of the opening of trade with Persia by the Moscovy Co., see *Early Voyages in Russia and Persia* (Hakluyt Society), edited by Morgan, E. D., and Coote, C. H. (2 vols., 1886).

[4] *State Papers* (East Indies), No. 753.

[5] Low, C. R., *History of the Indian Navy* (1877), Vol. 1, pp. 31-7. The terms of co-operation were never fully carried out by the Persians.

175 439 retained to the present time, in spite of acute rivalry from other Powers, notably Germany and Japan in the twentieth century.[1]

From the first, the East India Company had been obliged to undertake more than purely commercial activities. The pioneering nature of their ventures and the distance from the home government made it essential that they, in common with other trading companies of that age, should maintain their own armies and navies, provide their own charts and conduct most of their own political negotiations, activities which, in the end, were to overshadow the commercial origins of the companies. From the beginning, ships of the Company, and later of its Bombay Marine, were stationed in the Gulf to protect trade and on political missions.

Piracy for a time threatened to be a more serious obstacle to English trade than the hostility of European rivals.[2] The freebooters, the most numerous and troublesome of whom were the Jawasim (properly قواسم) tribes along the Gulf coast from Ras Musandum to Qatar peninsula, whose predatory habits had been stimulated by Wahhābī influence with its emphasis on the Muslim injunction of plunder and death to unbelievers, attacked not only merchant shipping but also Company cruisers. Aroused by the continued attacks, the Company dispatched a series of expeditions from Bombay in 1806, 1809,[3] and 1819,[4] which effectually broke the power of the Pirate Coast tribes,[5] whose chiefs were forced to sign a General Treaty of Peace, January 8th, 1820.[6]

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[1] British imports have declined, however, from 60 per cent of the total in the years immediately before 1914 to 32 per cent in 1934-5. Japanese imports rose from 1·83 per cent in 1930-1 to 20·04 per cent of the total in 1934-5: *Economic Conditions in 'Iraq*, 1933-35, Department of Overseas Trade, No. 627 (1936).

[2] Low, op. cit., pp. 79 ff. Also Miles, S. B., *Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf* (1919), Vol. 1, pp. 223, 266 ff.

[3] Low, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 325. [4] Ibid., p. 351.

[5] The section of coast inhabited by the Arab pirates was then so-called. After the treaty it became known as the Trucial Coast.

[6] Aitchison, C. U., *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Delhi, 1933, 5th ed.), Vol. XI, Persian Gulf, No. XIX.

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GROWTH OF BRITISH INTERESTS

From the Treaty of 1820, arising primarily from the necessity 175* of safety for commerce, dated the beginnings of the political supremacy of Great Britain over the Arabs of the Gulf. It was eventually replaced in 1853 by a Treaty of Peace in perpetuity which stipulated that 'perfect maritime truce' now established 'for evermore' should be enforced by the British Government. All acts of aggression were to be referred to the British authorities in the Persian Gulf.[1]

Traffic in slaves in the Gulf had been forbidden in Article 9 175* of the Treaty of 1820, but it had not been noticeably affected 439 by the prohibition. Additional treaties and agreements 567 attempted to deal with the traffic,[2] but only the presence of British men-of-war on patrol in the Gulf, with orders to seize all slaving ships, effectively suppressed it.

Experience gained from the early attempts to deal with the 175* pirates, especially after the expeditions of 1809 and 1819, had shown the necessity for charts of the Persian Gulf. Preliminary surveys had been undertaken in 1772 of the coast, and in 1785 of the Shatt al-'Arab as far as Basra, but not until 1820 was the work resumed under Captain Philip Maughan and later under Captain Guy.[3] The surveys continued for nine years, forming the basis of the present charts of the Gulf. Other surveys, principally in Turkish Arabia, were made throughout the century until the outbreak of the war in 1914.[4]

[1] Aitchison, *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Delhi, 1933, 5th ed.), Vol. xi, Persian Gulf, No. xxiv.

[2] Ibid., Vol. xiii (Calcutta, 1933, 5th ed.). Persia, Nos. xv, xvi, xix; ibid., Vol. xi, Persian Gulf Nos. ix, xx, xxiii, xxviii, xxix.

[3] Low, op. cit., Vol. i, pp. 185 ff.

[4] Chesney, in 1835-6, made surveys of the Tigris and Euphrates, a work carried on by Cmdr. Henry Blosse Lynch, from 1837 to 1842, when he surveyed the Tigris from Mōsul to Ctesiphon and sections of the Euphrates. Capt. J. C. Hawkins explored the Euphrates with great difficulty for some 500 miles above Basra in 1838. In 1840-2, the Tigris below Baghdad was surveyed by Lieutenant C. D. Campbell. Commander Felix Jones, 1843-54, explored the Persian hills from Baghdad to Mōsul, and made surveys from Mussaiyib to Baghdad. In 1841-2, and again in 1856, Captain W. S. Selby made surveys from Babylon to Sāmawa and up the Kārūn river. See: Wilson, Sir A. T., *Persian Gulf* (1928), pp. 281 ff. Low, op. cit., Vol. ii, pp. 31 ff., pp. 403 ff; also, Hoskins, H. L., *British Routes to India* (1928), pp. 180-2.

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175* The keeping of the peace, the suppression of piracy, the charting of the rivers and seas, the restriction of slave-trading and the control of the traffic in arms have often been claimed, and rightly so, as due entirely to the efforts of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. To go farther, however, and ascribe these self-imposed tasks to motives of disinterestedness or pure philanthropy, or to describe them as forming 'the most unselfish page in history',[1] and to adduce therefrom, as has so often been done, the right of Great Britain to supremacy in the Persian Gulf and its extensions, the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, is to disregard the true nature of Great Britain's activities in the Middle East.

000 Nations do not vie among themselves for control over lands and seas, primarily to give justice, to raise standards of living among the people, or to suppress disorder *per se*. If these blessings come, they come as secondary aspects or as by-products of men's efforts to enlarge their economic resources or to safeguard that which they have already won. It is a commonplace that where trading ventures have gone forth to new lands in search of wealth, fresh markets, new or cheaper sources of raw materials or commodities, the extension of the political authority of the mother country has eventually followed in direct proportion to the economic value of the territory concerned or to the degree of resistance which is offered by its inhabitants. Only political authority, with force at its disposal, can guard from external attack that which has already been won or break the opposition of the native peoples and pave the way for further extension of territory. Only by the assumption of authority can a continuity of administration be provided, without which commerce cannot flourish. It only can maintain order, establish legal security, regulate tariffs and imposts, under which the economic development of the territory can proceed on the most favourable conditions to the nationals of the mother country.

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[1] Lord Curzon, November 21st, 1903. See *Lord Curzon in India*, (1906), p. 502.

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If these benefits extend to the natives of the country it is because the latter cannot, in the very nature of the circumstances, help sharing them. If conscious efforts are made to extend improved conditions and to encourage the so-called arts of peace among the native population, it is because any increase of their well-being must lead to their increased productiveness and purchasing power and to less costly methods of control and of administration.

It cannot be denied that individual officials and even the mother country itself are often genuinely concerned for the well-being of the peoples they have taken in charge. The records of India, for instance, are crowded with the names of soldiers and administrators who have given full measure of devotion to the peoples under them. In a conflict of interests, and these must inevitably occur, it is only natural that those of the mother-country should come first, and that the good of the people themselves must, in reality, be subordinated to the expected material or political returns.

It is a further commonplace that once political authority has been established under such circumstances, it tends to forget the commercial origins which called it into being in the new territories. Its own maintenance becomes its chief objective. In extenuation of such diversion of aim, it might claim that only thus can it facilitate economic development, provide opportunities for the employment of its own nationals, and increase the prestige and power which are associated with the command of such territory.

The political authority is therefore constantly engaged in efforts to consolidate its control over the territory won, and to extend wherever possible, by conquest or peaceful penetration, its dominion. Its aim is not merely the increase of its own power and importance. It also seeks to bring the new territories to strategical frontiers or to develop them along strategical lines of communication so that they may act as buffers to the original spheres of interest, particularly if these original spheres, by

175 reason of their vastness and economic importance, have become vital to the continued well-being of the mother-country.

These observations seem to be borne out particularly by the history of the relation between the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia both to India and to the British Empire. In the promotion and protection of trade the East India Company was led, as has been related, into activities which, taking on the inevitable political aspect, were to overshadow its original aims.

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European Politics and Development of British Political Influence in the Persian Gulf

The increasing tendency, as the years passed, towards political sovereignty on a territorial or a quasi-territorial basis, while revealed early in the Company's attitude to India,[1] became fully apparent in the Gulf and in Turkish Arabia when, as one of the three Middle East corridors to India and as a flank to the other two routes, they were taken into the arena of European politics. The schemes of Napoleon to bring England to her knees by the invasion of India, to which the brilliancy of his military genius and his spectacular negotiations with Russia, Turkey and Persia lent more colour than substance, and the subsequent Russian expansion to the south aroused both official and public opinion to fear for the safety of India. From that time onward, Great Britain's interest in the Persian Gulf and in Turkish Arabia was, primarily, their importance as outposts of India, and as points from which Persia and the two other Middle East routes through Baluchistan and Afghanistan might be controlled, their passage by an unfriendly Power prohibited. The additional importance of the Gulf, together with the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, as an alternative or quicker route to India was realized first when the potentiality of steam as applied to river craft and railways became evident, and later, when the development of the internal combustion engine opened the way for Empire air communications.

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[1] On December 12th, 1687, the Company wrote to the President of Fort St. George: 'That which we promise ourselves in a most especial manner from our new President and council is that these will establish such a politic of civil and military power and create and secure a large revenue to maintain both at that place as may be the foundation of a large, well grounded, sure English Dominion in India for all time to come' (*Diary of Sir William Hedges*, p. 117). See also, Resolution passed by the Court of Directors, 1689, Birdwood, op. cit., p. 230.

The extension and consolidation of British political organization were among the first steps towards the conversion of the Persian Gulf into an Indian Lake. A number of the points at which the East India Company had set up its representatives had already exercised considerable extra-commercial influence. Their political importance was recognized by the British Government in the establishment of consulates, as at Basra in 1764. At Bushire, the centre of Great Britain's interests in the Gulf, a representative of H.M. Government replaced an official of the East India Company as Resident. Harford Jones, Resident at Basra, was sent, in 1798, to Baghdad as permanent Resident, with a double object: to arrange with the semi-independent Pasha for the transmission of official dispatches across the wilayet, and to observe and counteract the work of French agents believed to be active in that region.[1] Baghdad soon became the chief centre of British influence in Turkish Arabia. By 1822, the entire establishment of the East India Company had acquired a political status. Factors and brokers became Political Residents and native Agents. The relations between the Gulf and England had passed from the ledgers of merchants to the dispatches of statesmen.[2]

The Napoleonic menace to India, more dreaded than real, passed,[3] but the Russian pressure southward, begun in the later part of the eighteenth century, intensified. Russia's long

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[1] *India Office Records*, Vol. VI, Loose Papers, Packet II, Bundle I, Nos. 7, 8. Jones was created a baronet for his services.

[2] Curzon, G. N., *Persia and the Persian Question* (2 vols., 1892), Vol. II, p. 553. Until the war the Residents at Bushire and Baghdad, and the Consuls at Meshd, Shiraz, Mohammerah and Basra were nominated and paid by the Government of India, but reported both to it and to the Foreign Office. Ibid., p. 624.

[3] *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, I, 151-70.

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175* strides over the Caucasus, to the sea of Aral, 1844-8, into the valley of the Sir Darya, 1849-64, to Khiva, 1873, and Khokand, 1876, and, after the fall of Geok Teppe, the Turcomans' most formidable fortress, into Merv, February, 1884, brought her territories, consolidated by railroads, almost to India's Central Asian frontiers.[1] Her unceasing assimilation of territory in northern Persia and her acquisition of markets and influence over even larger areas confirmed British merchants and statesmen in their fear that Russia intended the subjection of Persia not merely for the sake of commerce but also to guarantee access to India by the Persian Gulf or by Central Asia.

These fears were not allayed by Russian efforts to obtain a coaling station in the Gulf at the end of the nineteenth century, by the establishment of Russian consulates at Bushire, Basra and Baghdad where few, if any, Russian subjects lived,[2] and by the steady infiltration over the mountains of Kurdistan towards Baghdad. Not less disturbing were the activities of Russian financiers with political backing, in the Banque d'Éscompte et des Prêts de Perse, in seeking concessions in Persia and in Turkey, such as Count Kapnist's project for a Mediterranean-Kuwait Railroad,[3] or in blocking concessions to other powers, as by the Russo-Persian Railway Agreement of November 12th, 1890.[4] All of these were regarded as manifestations of the Russian dream of a vast Oriental Empire including India and warm weather ports as revealed in the will of Peter the Great, which, even if spurious, 'enshrines with admirable fidelity the leading principles that have guided the Asiatic policy of his country ever since'.[5]

Persian attempts to counter-balance with conquests in the south-east what she had lost to Russia elsewhere,[1] brought her into collision with Great Britain, who by successful military and naval actions, launched from the Gulf in the war of 1856-7, demonstrated the possibility of controlling Persia from her flank.[2]

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[1] Sykes, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 354 ff.

[2] Wilson, Sir A. T., *Persian Gulf*, p. 259; Frazer, Lovat, *India under Curzon and After* (1911), p. 91.

[3] *The Times*, December 17th, 1898.

[4] Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. xiii, Persia, App. No. xxiii.

[5] Curzon, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 601. For English version of the alleged will, see Sykes, *Persia*, Vol. i, p. 245.

Consolidation of British Influence in the Persian Gulf

The advance of Russia, and at the end of the nineteenth century, the appearance of Germany, as a serious claimant for a place in Turkish Arabia and in the Persian Gulf, coincided with 'a deliberate but necessary consolidation of our (British) influence' in the 'quarters where trouble threatened or where rivalry was feared',[3] that is, in the Gulf and in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys.

In the Persian Gulf, veiled protectorates were established over the Arab chiefs, who agreed by treaties to enter into no other treaties, except with Great Britain, to admit no agents of other Powers and to alienate no territory save by permission of the British Government.[4] Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait, who possessed the finest natural harbour in the Persian Gulf and who had repeatedly asked for British protection was brought into treaty relations, January 23rd, 1899, at the direction of Lord Curzon.[5] His earlier requests had been refused as he was under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan[1] and he was, strictly speaking, a usurper. The prospect of Kuwait, however, as a Russian port or as the German terminus of the Baghdad railway overcame any scruples which may have been felt.

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[1] As by the Treaties of Turkomanchai, February 22nd, 1822: Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. xiii, Persia, App. No. vii; *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, xv, 669.

[2] *Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Outram's Persian Campaign in* 1857 (1860); Low, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 98; *Asiatic Jour.*, Vol. xxvi, n.s., Pt. ii; *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, xlvii, 282 ff.; Douglas, Sir G., and Ramsey, Sir G., *Panmure Papers* (2 vols., 1908), Vol. ii, p. 470.

[3] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), cxxv, 457; *Extract from a Despatch from the Government of India to S/S for India in Council, dated September 21st, 1899, referring to British Policy in Persia.* Paras. 42-89 of this dispatch are given more fully in *British Documents on Origin of the World War*, 1898-1914, Gooch and Temperley, eds., (13 vols., 1926——) (Hereafter *Brit. Docs.*).

[4] Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. xi. Persian Gulf, No. xii; Trucial Coast Agreement, March 6th, 1892: ibid., Persian Gulf, No. xxx; Bahrain Agreement, March 13th, 1892; ibid., Persian Gulf, No. xiii.

[5] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. vii (1911), p. 587. One of his first administrative acts had been to instruct Col. Meade, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to bring Shaikh Mubārak into treaty relations. For treaty, see Aitchison, op. cit., Persian Gulf, No. xxxvi.

Khaza'al, Shaikh of Mohammerah, owing allegiance to Persia and possessing immense power on both the Persian and Turkish sides of the lower Shatt al-'Arab, over which he exercised *de facto* control, was also brought on Lord Curzon's suggestion, into excellent understanding with the British Government.[3]

Throughout the later nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, it was Lord Curzon who, having taken India and the Middle East as his special interests, did more, both as a private citizen and as a public servant, than any other individual of his day[2] to direct attention to the rivalries of the Powers in the Middle East, and to the necessity of British control in the Persian Gulf and its extensions, and of strengthening India's defences against what he believed to be dangers of the greatest

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[1] Lord Curzon, in 1892, had recognized that Kuwait owed allegiance to Turkey. He wrote: 'Northward from Port Ujair, Ottoman dominion is established (on the Arab coast of the Gulf) without dispute as far as Fao.' Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 462. Kuwait was included in the territory thus described. Sir A. T. Wilson (*Persian Gulf*, p. 251) wrote, 1928, that until 1896, it was 'regarded at home as under the exclusive influence of Turkey'. It would appear that while Ottoman sovereignty had never been contested until 1899, its claim had rested lightly on the Shaikh. In the agreement between Great Britain and Turkey, 1913, never ratified, Kuwait was recognized as an autonomous *qadha* in which the British had a privileged position.

[2] Further agreements not to give pearl or sponge fishing concessions except by permission of the British Government, were signed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, July 29th, 1911, and later in the same year by the Shaikh of Bahrain and the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast. Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. XI, Persian Gulf, No. XXXIX. Agreements not to allow other post offices than those of India were signed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, February 28th, 1904, ibid., No. XXXVIII; by the Shaikh of Bahrain in 1911, not to grant oil concessions without permission of the British Government; by the Shaikh of Kuwait, October 27th, 1913, ibid., No. XIII; by the Shaikh of Bahrain, May 14th, 1914, ibid., No. XVI; by the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast in February and May, 1922, ibid., Nos. XXXIV, XXXV. The Shaikh of Qatar entered into an agreement on November 3rd, 1916, to observe all previous treaties with the shaikhs of the Persian Gulf, ibid., No. XXXIII.

[3] See tribute paid to him by Lovat Frazer, one time editor of the *Times of India*, in *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, January 8th, 1908, pp. 7 ff., and in *India under Curzon and After*, p. 9.

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magnitude.[1] He was convinced that Russian threats to south Persia and to Turkish Arabia could not, commercially, politically or strategically be tolerated. 'Are we prepared,' he asked,

> 'to surrender control of the Persian Gulf and divide that of the Indian Ocean? Are we prepared to make the construction of the Euphrates Valley Railroad or some kindred scheme an impossibility for England and an ultimate certainty for Russia? Is Baghdad to become a new Russian capital in the south? Lastly, are we content to see a naval station within a few days' sail of Kurrachi and to contemplate a hostile squadron battering Bombay?'[2]

In his official role as Under-Secretary of State for India, 1891-2, and later as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under Lord Salisbury, 1892-8, and more especially as Viceroy of India, 1899-1905, he put his convictions into practice. The Indian Frontiers were strengthened, the North-West Frontier Province was instituted and a frontier policy evolved.[3] The question of the defence of India against European rivals was reviewed at his instance and set forth at length in the now famous dispatch of September 21st, 1899.[4] The dispatch emphasized in detail that the *de facto* political situation reflected a more positive British predominance than the *de jure* position might indicate. The Viceroy in Council declared:

> Upon the question of allowing any European Power, and more especially Russia, to overrun Central and Southern Persia and so to reach the Gulf or to acquire naval facilities

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[1] Frazer, Lovat, op. cit., p. 8. Also Leslie, Shane, *Studies in Sublime Failures* (1932), p. 204. Curzon, G. N., *Russia in Central Asia* (1899). Also *Quarterly Review*, January, 1887.

[2] Curzon, op. cit., p. 378. Contrast his view of the Euphrates Valley Railroad here, with that expressed in *Persia and the Persian Question*, Vol. 1, pp. 635 ff.

[3] His views on frontier policy may be examined at length in his Budget speeches of March 27th, 1901, of March 26th, 1902, and March 30th, 1904; also in his speech at the Durbar at Peshawar, April 26th, 1902. Excerpts from all these may be found in *Lord Curzon in India*, pp. 415 ff., 418 ff., 428 ff., 422 ff., respectively.

[4] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), cxxv, 457; with additional material in *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 319, pp. 356-63.

> 175* in the latter even without such territorial connections, we do not conceive that any doubt whatever can be entertained; and we imagine that it will be accepted as a cardinal axiom of British policy that no such development would be acquiesced in by H.M. Government.[1]

To curb Russian rivalry, three possible policies were put forward. Of these the most favoured was that of partitioning Persia into spheres of influence along specific boundaries, as was eventually done by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. It was pointed out, however, at the time, that if the agreement were made as suggested, it

> would not for one moment retard, but might on the contrary accelerate her (Russia) advance to the same objective through Mesopotamia by way of Baghdad. This is an issue which we should regard with scarcely inferior repugnance.[2]

Lord Curzon's vigorous policy was capped by protection of the Shaikh of Kuwait from Turkish attempts to reassert authority. Twice in 1901 a British cruiser was sent to his aid. The threats of Amir Ibn Rashid against Kuwait at Turkish instigation were countered in the same year by the dispatch of three British cruisers to the harbour and of British troops to Jahara, eighteen miles inland. The attempt of the nephews of Mubārak to unseat him was also checked by H.M.S. *Lapwing*.[3]

To renew Arab confidence, already somewhat shaken by German propaganda, Lord Curzon, accompanied by eight ships of war, paid the first viceregal visit in history to the Gulf, in November and December, 1903.[4] Speaking to the assembled chiefs at Sharja, November 21st, he revealed his attitude to the

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[1] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), cxxv, 464.

[2] Ibid., p. 466.

[3] *Times History of the War* (22 vols., 1914-22), Vol. III, ch. lii. Also Fraser, op. cit., p. 10.

[4] Curzon's meeting at Kuwait with 'the late Mr. Reynolds, Mr. d'Arcy's oil engineer, who was on his way to England, led to his (Mr. Reynolds) return to examine the Maidan-i-Naptura area and the discovery of the Anglo-Persian oilfields'. Dane, Sir Louis, *The Times*, April 6th, 1935.

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question of Great Britain's place in India, the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East, a point of view which was to come to the front again when he dominated the Middle East policy of H.M. Government after the Armistice of 1918. He said in part to the shaikhs:

> The great Empire of India, which it is our duty to defend, lies almost at your gates. We saved you from extinction at the hands of your neighbours. We opened these seas to the ships of all nations and enabled their flags to fly in peace. We have not seized or held your territory. We have not destroyed your independence but have preserved it. We are not now going to throw away this century of costly and triumphant enterprise; we shall not wipe out the most unselfish page in history. The Peace of these waters must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme.[1]

Had any previous doubt existed as to British official policy for the Persian Gulf, none should have existed after the statement by Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for India, in the House of Lords, May 5th, 1903. He said in conclusion:

> It seems to me that our policy (with regard to the Persian Gulf) should be directed in the first place to protect and promote British trade in those waters. In the next place I do not think . . . that . . . those efforts should be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other powers. In the third place — I say it without hesitation — we should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal.[2]

British Interests in Turkish Arabia

In the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was less able to adopt the vigorous policy

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[1] *Lord Curzon in India*, p. 502.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 4th S., Vol. CXXI (1903), pp. 1347-8.

175 pursued in the Persian Gulf. For the most part[1] she continued to rely, for the maintenance of her interests, on her traditional prestige at the Sublime Porte and on the extension of her special position in Turkish Arabia, dating from the establishment of the first English factory at Basra in 1643, after the first venture of the East India Company there in 1635.[2]

Much of the British influence in the valleys had been the result of the political organization deliberately set up in recognition of their strategical importance. The Baghdad Residency, supplanting that of Basra, in 1810, as the chief political centre of Great Britain in Turkish Arabia, acquired considerable political influence with local Turkish authorities, who had not been averse to making use of British assistance against Persian or Arab disturbers of the peace.[3]

The development of canal and river navigation between 1820 and 1840 gave the Mesopotamian valleys a new importance to

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[1] Cf. proposals to occupy Basra in 1911, and in January, 1914, *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 73. Turkish authorities were aware of Great Britain's desire to increase her influence. Cf. Speech of a Member of the Committee of Union and Progress, Baghdad, April 18th, 1911: 'Listen, dear compatriots — For a number of years England has been endeavouring to increase her political influence in the Persian Gulf. This influence is being felt in Basra . . . We must be ready to resist any political aggression on our territories. We must awaken our Government to take immediate steps to protect Basra.' Also speech of the *Wali* of Baghdad, August 30th, 1911, cited *infra*, p. 70, and *Al-Misbah* (Baghdad), March 14th, 1913, which warned readers that Great Britain intended to do in Turkish 'Iraq what she had done in India, that the Lynch Company, supported by England, were 'harbingers of a vast colony here', and advised readers 'to arm themselves to fight the pioneers of the colonizing army'.

[2] For an able résumé of the early development of British trading interests in 'Iraq, see Longrigg, S. H., *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq*, 1925, pp. 107, 175, 188, 254-5 *passim*.

[3] In 1763, the Pasha of Baghdad asked for help against the Ka'ab, who were attacking towns and shipping around Basra. Six ships were eventually sent from Bombay, in 1766. Later, in 1774, when ships had been furnished to the Pasha, he requested the British to use them as they thought fit for Turkish interests. In 1778, the British aided the Turks to regain Basra from the Persians, while in 1798, the Resident at Bushire was called in to adjust claims between the Sultan of Oman and the Pasha of Baghdad. When there was a possibility, between 1835 and 1839, that Muhammad 'Ali's Egyptian army might advance from the head of the Gulf and attack Baghdad, it is reported that the Turkish Government asked for British intervention. Hogarth, D. G., *Penetration of Arabia* (1904), pp. 84-7, 104, *passim*.

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the British Government and to the Indian Presidencies when, in 175* the nineteenth century, they sought speedier communications between India and England.[1] The scheme to establish communications with India by means of a line of mail steamers running regularly on the Euphrates River, found its chief early protagonist in Captain F. R. Chesney, R.A., who, after preliminary surveys of both the Euphrates and the Egyptian routes,[2] undertook with Government assistance to make a thorough survey of the Euphrates route. Few of the results so confidently promised by Chesney were accomplished, although he did succeed under great difficulties in launching two small steamers at Miskine on the Euphrates, in reaching Basra and in obtaining much information.[3] In the meantime, the Near and Middle East had become comparatively quiet under the terms of the Protocol of London, 1841, by which Russian, French and Egyptian ambitions were checked for the time being.[4] The Mesopotamian route was neglected in favour of that lying across Egypt, already partially developed.[5]

The increase of Russian influence in Persia and in Turkey with its supposed menace to the security of India coincided with a wave of railway expansion in England and in Europe. British interest was renewed in the project, originally proposed in 1850,[6] to build a British-owned Euphrates Valley Railway along the Mesopotamian route to India. Plans for the financing and construction of the railroad had made considerable pro-

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, 3rd S., Vol. xxvi (1834), p. 142; *Parl. Papers*, 1831-2 (735-11), x. Pt. ii, App. 25, 675 ff.; 1834 (478), xiv, 369 ff.; 1837 (540), xliii, 223; 1837-8 (356), xli, 365.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1834 (478), xiv, App. 16; *Reports on the Navigation of the Red Sea and the River Euphrates, submitted to Government by Capt. Chesney, F.R.S., of the Royal Artillery.* Chesney had at first, because of marshes, difficulties of navigation and unfriendliness of the Arabs, taken an unfavourable view of the Euphrates route (ibid., p. 51).

[3] *Parl. Papers*, 1837 (540), xliii, 235 ff.; Chesney, F. R., *Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition* (1368), pp. 172 ff.; Poole, S. L., (ed.), *Life of General F. R. Chesney* (1885), pp. 293 ff.

[4] *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, xxiv, 703 ff.

[5] Hoskins, op. cit., ch. ix, x, for growth of Egyptian route.

[6] By R. M. Stephenson. See article in *Calcutta Review*, Vol. xxv, pp. 145 ff.

195 gress[1] and Lord Palmerston's promise of Government support for political reasons seems to have been obtained,[2] when suddenly, on August 14th, 1857, Lord Palmerston withdrew the support of the Government.[3] The whole project fell through.

British public opinion had not been unanimously in favour of the Mesopotamian route to India. The objection was raised that the British fleet could not be used to protect the route. Its strategical value, either to convey troops to India or to counteract Russian influence, was not a subject of agreement even among military experts.[4] It was contended, even as it was of the Suez Canal, that the construction of the new highway would facilitate aggression rather than discourage it.[5] It would seem, moreover, that the British Government believed that if the railway ever became a necessity it could, because of its longstanding prestige and influence at the Sublime Porte, obtain permission at any time to proceed with the project — a doubtful supposition in view of the gradual change in its relations with Turkey — a change not yet generally realized in Great Britain.

Of even greater importance was Great Britain's belief that by

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[1] *The Times*, January 10th, January 22nd, February 17th, June 23rd, 1857. Also *Parl. Debates*, 3rd S., Vol. CXLVII (1857), pp. 1226, 1652, 1658, 1662.

[2] The possibility of checking French influence, again in the ascendancy in Egypt and Syria, of providing a diversion to the projected Suez Canal and of forestalling Russian designs on the Persian Gulf were among some of the political arguments put forward for the railroad — Andrew, W. P., *A Letter to Viscount Palmerston on the Practical Advantages of the Euphrates Valley Railway and the Necessity of the Financial Support of H.M. Government* (1857); *The Times*, June 23rd, 1857.

[3] *Parl. Debates*, 3rd S., Vol. CXLVII (1857), pp. 1676-7. Various reasons for Palmerston's *volte-face* have been given. Pressure may have been put on him by Napoleon III, then visiting in England. Palmerston may have deemed it wiser to give up the railway than accept the Suez Canal, in order to preserve the nominal alliance with France. It has also been suggested that the sacrifice of the railway was in exchange for French consent to use the overland (Egyptian) route for the dispatch of troops to India at a critical stage in the mutiny. See *The Times* for August 8th, 10th, 11th, 1857; May 4th, 1858; also *Quarterly Review*, CXX, pp. 354-397; *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. XXI (1934), p. 376.

[4] *Jour. E. India Ass'n.*, Vol. X, p. 250; Curzon, *Persia*, Vol. I, pp. 633-5.

[5] Viscount Palmerston, *Parl. Debates*, 3rd S., Vol. CXLVI (1857), pp. 10, 1385-91.

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manipulating the political situation in Europe, she could safeguard the routes to India. She had not yet fully realized that political control, direct or indirect, would have to be assumed over territories through which lay actual and potential highways to her indispensable Eastern possessions. 175

Protection of the Indians engaged in trade at Basra and Baghdad and of the Indian Muslims on pilgrimage to the four Holy Cities of Turkish Arabia, concern for the sanitary conditions at Basra and the Holy Cities, the distribution of the Oudh bequest, the administration of the India Postal System, established in 1868 at Basra and Baghdad, the irrigation schemes projected by Sir William Willcocks in 1911,[1] and executed by British companies, and, above all, the encouragement and protection of commerce and river navigation continued to be the methods by which British influence and position were maintained and extended. British prestige centred largely about the Residency at Baghdad with its guard of Indian troops,[2] and the armed sloop attached to it, yet so strong was it among the tribes that on a number of occasions British representatives were approached by Arabs who desired Great Britain to establish a protectorate over them.[3]

Great Britain's early interest in communications with India, however, had not been without some valuable results. The expeditions sent out from 1834 onwards and the presence of armed steamers on the Tigris[4] paved the way for the initiation of a 175 [illegible]

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[1] Willcocks, Sir William, *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, Revised Ed.).

[2] 'Our maintenance of troops as far north as Baghdad . . . could not have been actuated by hope of commercial gain. It must have been due to our strategic position in those regions.' Lord Lamington, former Governor of Bombay, 1903-7, *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1908, p. 17.

[3] In 1899, 1902, 1912; *Official Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, September, 1911; October, 1911; February, 1912.

[4] In 1840 and 1841, four armed steamers of the East India Company, the *Assyria*, *Nitocris*, *Nimrod*, and *Euphrates*, designed to establish further British influence, made periodic trips from Basra to Baghdad with goods, mail and passengers. Surveys were also made on both the Tigris and Euphrates (*supra*, p. 33). All but the *Nitocris* were withdrawn in 1842. *Parl. Papers*, 1840 (323), Pt. II, 299-300.

175* 439 British mercantile line on the Tigris[1] and for a further expansion of British commerce which, advancing far beyond the days when Basra had first been a centre for part of the Gulf trade, contributed not a little to the predominant position and influence which Great Britain exercised in Turkish Arabia. In 1911 and 1912, imports through Basra and Baghdad averaged for each of the two years, £3,100,000, of which the great proportion were British and Indian goods destined for re-export to Persia by way of Kermanshah. Exports by sea for the same years averaged £3,247,500.[2]

175* 525 The transportation of practically all of these commodities was in British or Anglo-Indian bottoms, while the handling of the largest proportion of the entire river transport had come into the hands of the firm of Lynch Brothers, who from 1860 had assumed the local management of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. It had enjoyed a virtual monopoly until the advent of Midhat Pasha's river service. In spite of constant interference from the Turkish authorities,[3] the company carried on a comparatively efficient service, although at high rates. It also maintained, with a Government subsidy, a line of steamers on the Kārūn River, after it had been opened by the Shah of Persia in 1888.

175* So strategically placed were the river valleys, so firmly was external trade regarded as a British monopoly, so paramount was British influence that British statesmen had come to regard

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[1] This mercantile service was maintained from 1836 on the Tigris, ostensibly under the *firmān* (following the Arabic فرمان) originally granted in 1834 to the British Government for the operation of two steamers for commercial purposes on the Euphrates in connection with the Euphrates Expedition of that year. (Herslet, *Commercial Treaties* (1820-1925), Vol. XIII, pp. 838-9). Just how this *firmān* could be applied to the Tigris is not easily understood. Neither the subsequent one of 1842 (ibid., p. 839) nor the Vizierial Letter of 1861 (ibid., p. 845) defined clearly the rights and privileges which the company exercised and claimed.

[2] *Report on the Conditions of Trade in Mesopotamia* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 13.

[3] Other than purely political reports, the difficulties of the company with Turkish officials occupied more dispatches from the Resident at Baghdad to the Foreign Office than any other subject.

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them as commercial and political as well as geographical extensions of the Persian Gulf, in whose politics, as Lord Curzon declared in the House of Lords, were 'involved the security, integrity and safety of India itself'.[1] Lord Curzon had stated in 1892, alluding to the commercial importance of Baghdad, 'Baghdad, in fine, falls under the category of the Gulf Ports, and must be included in the zone of indisputable British supremacy'.[2] He amplified this statement in the House of Lords, in 1911, saying:

> It would be a mistake to suppose that our political interests are confined to the Gulf. They are not confined to the Gulf; they are not confined to the region between Basra and Baghdad; they extend right away up to Baghdad.[3]

Any change in the *status quo* in Turkish Arabia became, therefore, as objectionable as any alteration in that of the Persian Gulf itself. The interest of H.M. Government in the early trans-Mesopotamian schemes of communication had been stimulated by the realization of this fact. Lord Salisbury, in 1878, had made the attitude of H.M. Government quite clear upon the subject, when he said: 'Whatever happens, whatever Ministry may be in power, the people of this country will never allow Russian influence to be supreme in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris.'[4] This attitude was again reflected in the dispatch of September 21st, 1899, from the Viceroy of India in Council,[5] when it was declared that Russian movement towards Baghdad would be as distasteful as Russian penetration into South Persia.

Germany's 'Drang Nach Osten'

If Russia was Great Britain's chief rival in Asia during the nineteenth century, Germany became her rival of the twentieth century. The entry of Germany into Turkey and the Persian Gulf, although ostensibly based on commercial ventures[1] and on concessions from the Porte to build a railroad through Anatolia to the Persian Gulf,[2] came to be regarded as a greater threat than Russia to the *status quo* in those areas which Great Britain had come to look upon as her own special spheres. Lord Lansdowne's official statement of policy was directed as much at Germany as at Russia, although Germany chose to regard it as applicable only to Russia.

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), p. 587.
[2] Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, Vol. II, p. 578.
[3] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), p. 586.
[4] Cited Hoskins, op. cit., p. 446.
[5] *Supra*, pp. 41-2.

Germany's early interest in Turkey had not been regarded with alarm. The decision of 'Abdul Hamid, in 1899, to grant the concession for a railroad to the Persian Gulf had been welcomed in England as a check to both Russian and French

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[1] Details cannot be given here of the activities of the firm of Wonckhaus in the Persian Gulf, of the negotiations for the railroad concessions, of the political significance attached to the railway project both in Germany and elsewhere, and of the increase of German prestige and influence in Turkey generally. Of the mass of literature existing on this whole subject, the following may be consulted: *The Times History of the World War*, Vol. III, ch. lii; *Report on the Condition and Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia*, Lloyd, George, 1908 (confidential). Rohrbach, P., *Die Bagdadbahn* (Berlin, 1903); Helfferich, K., *Die deutsche Türkenpolitik* (Berlin, 1921); Schaefer, C. A., *Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik* (Weimar, 1916); Muller, K. H., *Die Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn* (Hamburg, 1916); Cheradame, André, *La Question d'Orient: la Macédoine, le chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Paris, 1903); also, *The Baghdad Railway, Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, 1911; Lewin, Evans, *The German Road to the East* (New York, 1917); Earle, Edward M., *Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923). See also Lynch, H. F. B., 'The Bagdad Railway', *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1911; *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917, pp. 491-528 (by Sir Alwyn Parker, Foreign Office).

[2] For texts of the concessions: *Actes de la concession du chemin de fer Eski Shehr-Konia* (Constantinople, 1893); also, *Report of the Anatolian Railway Company* (1896), pp. 4, 9, preliminary concession, 1899; Young, G., *Corps de droit Ottoman*, Vol. III, pp. 342-51; cf. *Report of the Anatolian Railway Company*, 1902, p. 8; provisional convention, 1902: Lecoq, R., *Un chemin de fer en Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1907), appendix; definitive convention, March 5th, 1903: *Parl. Papers*, 1911 (Cd. 5635), CIII, 1. This also contains the additional convention of 1908, as well as the Statutes of the Imperial Bagdad Railroad Company, Specifications, the Loan Contract, First Series, 1903; Loan Contract, Second and Third Series, 1908; third and fourth additional conventions, March 21st, 1911: *troisième convention additionelle et quatrième convention additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars, 1903, relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Constantinople, 1911).

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ambitions.[1] The phenomenal expansion of Germany's industries and of her overseas commerce, the penetration of markets hitherto regarded as Britain's own, the sudden growth of Germany's mercantile marine, her Navy bills of 1899 and 1900, the colonial demands and aspirations of German diplomatists, the noisy anti-British demonstrations at the time of the Boer War, however, led the English public, stimulated by the Press, to believe that not only Great Britain's markets but also her political prestige in the East and in Africa were being seriously challenged.

The possibility of curbing German political expansion in Turkish Arabia by means of British participation in the Baghdad Railway had, at first, seemed likely, but the suggestion of the Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur Balfour, April 7th and 8th, 1903,[2] that H.M. Government should approve of the investment of British capital in the railway at the invitation of the German financiers,[3] providing such participation were on the basis of equality with any other Power, raised a storm of disapproval in the House and in the press.[4] Protests of the shipping companies serving India, of the owners of the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company, and of the British-owned Railways in Asia Minor may have also added to the opposition[1] which, without doubt, extended to his own cabinet. Mr. Balfour was forced to declare to the House of Commons, April 23rd, 1903, that H.M. Government would give no support to British financial participation in the project.[2]

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[1] Lord Salisbury is reported to have said in 1900: 'We are in no way unfavourably impressed by the grant of the concessions in question. On the contrary we welcome them for in this way Germany comes into line with our interests in the Persian Gulf.' *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, 1871-1914 (hereafter *G.P.*), (Berlin, 1922-7), Vol. xvii, No. 5212, p. 373. Also Lord Lansdowne to F. Lascelles, March 18th, 1902, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, No. 204, pp. 177-8; *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. ci (1902), pp. 129, 597, 628, 669; Vol. cxxiii (1903), p. 1371.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. cxx (1903), pp. 1207-8, 1358-78.

[3] von Gwinner, A., 'The Baghdad Railway and the Question of British Co-operation', *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1909.

[4] *The Times*, April 9th, 14th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 24th; *Daily Mail*, April 9th, 18th, 22nd; *The Daily Telegraph*, April 8th, 9th; *Pall Mall Gazette*, April 9th, 11th, 22nd, 24th; *Spectator*, April 4th, 11th, 18th, 25th; *Manchester Guardian*, April 15th, 1903. Yate, Col. A. C., *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, May 22nd, 1911, p. 19; Johnson, Sir H. H., *Common Sense in Foreign Policy* (London, 1913), pp. v-vii. Cf., also, Lord Curzon, *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. vii (1911), pp. 583-7, 589.

What the British Government had failed to secure by financial participation, it attempted to secure through diplomatic negotiations. The *rapprochement* between England and France already in the air soon became a reality.[3] The three agreements signed on April 8th, 1904,[4] settled the outstanding points of friction, initiated the *Entente Cordiale* and paved the way for the defensive alliance between the two countries.[5]

The period of 'splendid isolation' for Great Britain had come to an end. Instead there was inaugurated an era of diplomacy among the Powers which aimed, on the one hand, at securing on the basis of compensations[6] a recognition of spheres of interest in Asia and in Africa, thus avoiding points of conflict, and, on the other hand, at providing for collective security in the event that rival ambitions, either commercial or territorial, could not be reconciled.

Tentative negotiations towards an Anglo-Russian *rapproche-*

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[1] *The Times*, April 18th, 19th, 24th, 1903.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. cxxi (1903), pp. 271-2. Lord Lansdowne seems to have believed that 'the scuttle of British financiers' at the newspaper opposition made it impossible for the Government to give assurances of its support. *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, Minute on No. 224, p. 196. Cf., Earle, op. cit., p. 186.

[3] For early indications of the *rapprochement*, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français* (hereafter *Docs. Fr.*) (Paris, 1922-9), 2nd Series, Vol. ii, No. 524 (December 12th, 1902), p. 653; Vol. iii, No. 138 (March 14th, 1903), p. 186; Vol. iii, No. 192 (April 23rd, 1903), p. 258. Also, Tardieu, A., *La France et les Alliances* (Paris, 1908), pp. 51-72.

[4] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, Nos. 356-416, pp. 292-373; *Docs. Fr.*, 2nd Series, Vol. iii, Nos. 362, 363, 381, 384, 387, 392, 419; Vol. iv, Secs. ii, iiiA, viD, viiB. Texts of the three agreements: *Accts. and Papers*, 1904 (Cd. 1952), cx, 323-4, 340-1, 1905 (Cd. 2383), ciii, 241; 1905 (Cmd. 2384), ciii, 265; 1905 (Cmd. 2385), ciii, 285. Secret articles of Egyptian Declaration; ibid., 1911 (Cd. 5969), ciii, 353 ff. Also in *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, pp. 374-98, with earlier drafts in parallel columns.

[5] On discussions from 1906, on the Anglo-French defensive alliance, see *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. iii, Nos. 210-21, pp. 170-203.

[6] A 'give and take arrangement', as Lord Lansdowne expressed it, July 2nd, 1903, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, No. 356, p. 293.

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ment had been interrupted by the Russo-Japanese war.[1] Russia's 175*
defeat and her domestic difficulties in 1905 made her more 648
amenable to settlement of her Middle East differences with Great Britain on August 31st, 1907, when an Anglo-Russian Convention was signed.[2] By it Persia, without her consent, was partitioned into spheres of influence, as foreshadowed by the suggestion of the Government of India in 1899.[3] No reference was made, however, to the Persian Gulf or to Turkish Arabia, although Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had pressed urgently for the inclusion of a clause recognizing the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf.[4] To remedy the omission, Sir Edward, in a dispatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 27th, 1907, noted, on behalf of H.M. Government, that the Russian Government had explicitly stated that they did not deny the special interest of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. He added: 'H.M. Government think it advisable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy and to affirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them.'[5]

The Convention was not so much an attempt at territorial expansion as an attempt to recognize the *status quo*, to check

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[1] Lansdowne to P. Cambon, October 26th, 1903; ibid., Vol. II, No. 250, pp. 217-18. Also: ibid., Vol. IV, Nos. 181-8, pp. 183-94, especially, Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, November 17th, 1903, No. 181a, p. 183.

[2] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 339, p. 388; Nos. 341-517, pp. 389-576; *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CLVII (1906), p. 1416, Sir E. Grey's statement, May 24th, 1906. For part played by Baghdad Railway, Driault, E., *La Question d'Orient depuis ses Origines* (Paris, 1921), pp. 273 ff. For text: Treaty Series, No. 34 (1907), in *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3753), CXXV, 489; also, ibid., 1908 (Cd. 3750), CXXV, 477; *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, C, 276-7.

[3] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), CXXV, 465. But cf.: Hardinge to Grey, December 23rd, 1905, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 322, 276-7.

[4] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 417, p. 465; No. 421, p. 470; No. 425, p. 473; Minutes on No. 428, pp. 476-7; Enclosure to No. 429, pp. 480-1; No. 430, pp. 481-2; No. 434, p. 484.

[5] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3750), CXXV, 477, Dispatch No. 1, Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, August 27th, 1907. For previous declarations of policy, see Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty* (4 vols., 1875-91), Vol. IV, pp. 2615-17, 2624-7; Lord Lansdowne, *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXXI (1903), pp. 1347-8; Lord Salisbury, July, 1878; Hoskins, op. cit., p. 446.

175* 648 further Russian advances and to free England to deal with Germany's 'Drang nach Osten'. It was received in England, however, with great disapproval. Of those opposed to the Convention, some alleged that it needlessly sacrificed British interests. Others voiced their misgivings lest Persian opinion, hitherto friendly to Great Britain, should be alienated. These apprehensions were not unjustified, the ill-feeling which the partition aroused in Persia being exploited to the fullest extent by Germany during the Great War. Nevertheless, the Convention served its purpose, particularly in relieving pressure on India and the Persian Gulf at a time when it was most needed.[1]

Early attempts at an Anglo-German understanding had failed.[2] Following, however, the Anglo-Russian Convention, Great Britain turned to negotiations with Germany and with Turkey on the question of the Baghdad Railroad which had continued to grow in international importance. To Turkey, consent to the increase in customs was held out in return for concessions which would both safeguard and consolidate England's acquired position in Turkish Arabia. To Germany, Great Britain was willing to make concessions in order to secure her original demands as stated by Lord Haldane to Emperor William II at Windsor in November, 1907:[3] the right to construct and control the section of the Baghdad Railway

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[1] Sir E. Grey to Committee of Imperial Defence, May 26th, 1911; *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, App. 5, pp. 788-9. Also, MacCaulay, Capt. D. I., *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, October 10th, 1909. The convention was probably not sincerely observed by either Russia or England. See, *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), p. 605; Vol. 10, pp. 678, 694, 697; Cox to Grey, September 28th, 1913; Minute by H. G. Chick, Commercial Adviser to the Persian Gulf Residency; Government of India to Marquess of Crewe (Confidential), January 22nd, 1914, cited in *Behind the Veil in Persia* (Amsterdam, 1917), pp. 148-57.

[2] For these early negotiations, see: *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. I, No. 122 (August 21st, 1898), pp. 100-1; Vol. II, No. 77 (March 18th, 1901), pp. 60-1 and documents ff.; Vol. III, No. 1 (May 18th, 1904), p. 1; *G.P.*, Vol. XIV, ch. XCI; Vol. XVII, ch. CIX. For an official review of Anglo-German relations, see *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. III, App. A, pp. 397 ff.

[3] Haldane, Viscount R. B., *Before the War* (1920), p. 48; *Autobiography* (1929), p. 220; also, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, Nos. 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, pp. 91-9. From the German side: *G.P.*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 17-22; Baron von Schoen, *Memoirs of an Ambassador* (1922), pp. 59-63.

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from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, thereby securing 'the gate 175
to India'.[1] In 1909 she was prepared to grant Germany a free 6:48
hand in Turkey north of Baghdad in return for the recognition of similar privileges for Great Britain in southern Mesopotamia.[2]

A settlement along these lines was not out of keeping with the attitude of the Powers, including Austria and Italy, during the period 1907 to 1914,[3] in which there 'was an approach to a general agreement among the European nations with reference to their interests',[4] i.e. the creation of special economic and political spheres of influence. Russia and England had already partitioned Persia in 1907. By the Potsdam Agreement, August 19th, 1911, Germany and Russia recognized each other's special interests in Asia Minor and in Persia.[5] France and Germany brought their commercial interests in the Near and

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[1] This arrangement, proposed to Dr. A. von Gwinner, December 13th, 1903, was accepted by him as far as the financial interests were concerned. Nothing came of it, however: *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 224, p. 195. It was put forward officially as the basis of British policy, April 25th, 1907, Grey to Bertie, ibid., Vol. VI, No. 249, p. 355. Also, Grey to Cambon and to Benckdorf, June 4th, 1907; ibid., No. 250, p. 355. For the renewal of the proposals: Grey to Goschen, October 28th, 1909, ibid., No. 277, p. 379; Marling to Grey, ibid., No. 282, pp. 384-5; and Memo. by Sir H. Babington Smith, ibid., App. 7, pp. 793-4 Enclosure to No. 309, p. 410.

[2] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, No. 277, p. 379; No. 287, p. 388. Also, the confidential letter from the Russian Ambassador, Constantinople, to Iswolsky, November 25th, 1909, de Siebert, B., *Entente Diplomacy and the World War*, 1909-1914 (New York, 1922), No. 576, p. 510: 'The projected treaty is equivalent to partition of Turkey into a British and a German sphere of interest: England granting Germany freedom of action in Turkey, in Europe and Asia Minor, and claiming such for herself only in the Turkish territories in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. The projected treaty with Germany completes England's sovereignty in the Persian Gulf.' Also, Russian Ambassador, London, to Iswolsky, ibid., No. 570, p. 507.

[3] For an able account of these pre-war aspirations: Howard, H. N., *Partition of Turkey* (Norman, 1931), pp. 50-60.

[4] *Official Report on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913.

[5] Text: *Die Kriegschuldfrage*, March, 1924, p. 63. The Potsdam Agreement undoubtedly had its origin in fear of an Anglo-German understanding. In such an event, as the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople wrote to Iswolsky, November 25th, 1909: 'France and Russia would stand alone, which has to be prevented . . . Hence there remains only direct though parallel negotiations between . . . Germany and Russia and Germany and France.' de Siebert, op. cit., No. 576, p. 510. Also, ibid., No. 582, p. 515; No. 619, p. 543. For negotiations, see *G.P.*, Vol. XXVII, Nos. 10218-25, pp. 950-62; *Un Livre Noir* (R. Marchand, ed., 3 vols., Paris, 1922-27), Vol. II, pp. 501-76.

175 Middle East into agreement between 1910 and 1914.[1] From 648 Great Britain, France had secured in 1912 a pledge of disinterestedness in Syria.[2]

Negotiations with Turkey had been opened in 1909 but not until 1913 was an agreement possible, Great Britain having been forced to give way on many of her original proposals.[3] By Agreements signed July 29th, 1913, Great Britain secured the recognition of her special position in the Persian Gulf and of the validity of her existing treaties with Kuwait and Bahrain. The terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, beyond which the railway was not to extend without the consent of Great Britain. Two British subjects were to be appointed to the Board of the railway. Equal charges, dues and treatment on the railway were guaranteed to all nations. The development and future of the port of Basra were to be partially entrusted to British hands. Exclusive rights of navigation were secured for a new company, eventually formed by Lord Inchcape and the existing Lynch Line, whose privileges were extended.[4] Turkey recognized the right of Great Britain to buoy, light and police the Shatt al-'Arab and the Persian Gulf.[5]

During this period of negotiations, both the Foreign Office[6] and British representatives in Turkish Arabia were concerned

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[1] The Franco-German Agreement was signed February 15th, 1914. See Earle, op. cit., p. 248, also *Docs. Fr.*, 3rd Series, Vol. III, No. 239, p. 317.

[2] M. Pichon at Secret Meeting of the Four Powers, Paris, March 20th, 1919: Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (3 vols., 1922-3), Vol. III, p. 5.

[3] A long series of drafts and counter-drafts had been made as on March 1st, 1911, April 15, 1912, etc. Various sections of the Agreements had been initialed on May 6th and June 11th, 1913.

[4] Hakki Pasha and Lord Inchcape signed a concession, December 12th, 1913. Lord Inchcape and the Lynch Line came to an agreement, March 27th, 1914.

[5] Great Britain, however, made its adherence to the Agreements and consent to the increase in Custom dues, sought by Turkey, contingent on the removal of the Ottoman veto on Egyptian borrowing powers, on further railway concessions and on recognition of the D'Arcy Concession to Turkish oil fields. *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917, pp. 517-21; *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. LIII (1913), pp. 392-5; de Siebert, op. cit., ch. XX; *The Times*, May 17th and 31st, 1913.

[6] Minute by Sir E. Grey, March 12, 1910, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, No. 325, p. 433.

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with increasing Great Britain's influence and prestige, not only 175+ to counteract the importance of the Baghdad Railway, but also 648 to provide a greater claim to Mesopotamia as her sphere of influence in the event of the break-up of Turkey. The Resident of Baghdad had telegraphed, June 23rd, 1913, to the Government of India and to H.M. Ambassador at Constantinople:

> In view of the possible break-up of Turkey and in the meantime the development of preparatory foreign spheres of interest, it seems incumbent on the British Government to preserve every kind of priority which they already possessed in Mesopotamia, their natural sphere in the Ottoman dominions. Hence any abolition of British Post Offices in Turkey should not extend to those at Baghdad and Basra. The Residency guard and the R.I.M.S. *Comet* are appurtenances to be jealously guarded, for the present.[1]

A month later, the Acting Resident in Baghdad presented a full plan for extending Great Britain's position.[2] He advocated an extension of the irrigation system under British auspices, as one of the most important means to that end, saying: 'To gain control of this system and create an *imperium imperio* is important. Control of water will give control of revenue assessment, perhaps control of collection.' As to railways, they would be auxiliary to irrigation and to the agriculture which it would encourage,[3] while steam navigation, he believed, would have to give way both to irrigation and to the railways. The importance of oil, in his opinion, had not been proven.[4]

Germany was not unwilling that Great Britain should possess these special interests in Turkish Arabia, although she was not willing to recognize the full British claims. The process of reconciling the differences between the two Powers was restricted by the necessity of bringing Germany and Turkey into agreement, of considering the wishes of France, Italy and Russia, and of finding compensations for them in order to avoid that obsession of the early twentieth century: a general European war. Not until June 15th, 1914, was a treaty initialled, subject to ratification, following the conclusion of separate Turco-German negotiations.

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[1] Cited: *Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, June, 1913.

[2] He had already urged that increased efforts should be made to add Mosul, not then belonging to any sphere of influence, to Great Britain's sphere. He had suggested that the Church Missionary Society might be aided financially and that Sir Edward Grey should approach the Jewish Colonization Society to subvent schools where English would be taught. Nestorians should also be encouraged. Ibid., February, 1913.

[3] 'Give the Tigris and Euphrates escapes into the deserts, and Babylon will again rival Egypt and the railways will be one of the best paying concerns in the world.' Willcocks, Sir W., *Near East*, June 6th, 1913.

[4] *Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913.

By the terms of the agreement,[1] Germany abandoned all hope of a port in her own name on the Persian Gulf. She secured, however, cessation of obstruction to the Baghdad Railway, the recognition of her own special spheres in Anatolia, North Syria and northern Mesopotamia, in exchange for recognition of Great Britain's dominant position in southern Mesopotamia and in the Persian Gulf. The terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, any further construction to be made only after a complete agreement had been previously reached by the Ottoman, German and British Governments. Both Powers were to observe strictly the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July 29th, 1913, together with the agreement between Lord Inchcape and the Baghdad Railway Company regarding important navigation rights, port and terminal facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates and the agreement between the Smyrna-Aidin Railway and the Baghdad Railway regarding important extensions to the former line. As an essential preliminary to the negotiations regarding the transfer of the Turkish oilfields to a British controlled company, the German Government was forced, in March, 1914, to recognize southern Mesopotamia as well as central and southern Persia as the exclusive fields of operation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and, in addition, to agree to the construction of a railway from Kūt al-'Amāra to Mandalī in order to facilitate the shipment of petroleum. Both Germany and Great Britain undertook to observe their respective interests in the irrigation of the Cilician plain and lower Mesopotamian valley.

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[1] *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1923, pp. 29 ff.

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Thus, on the eve of the World War, Great Britain's long tenure as the dominant European Power in Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf was about to enter a new phase. Three centuries of British efforts to extend and to protect trade had culminated, through the new concessions contained in the negotiated Agreements, in fresh opportunities for British capital, talent and products in the development of irrigation, of navigation, of the ports of Basra and Baghdad and in the anticipated increase in prosperity of Turkish Arabia. A share of the potential riches of the petroleum fields of Kirkūk had also been won for British exploitation.

Even more important, the long series of British activities in the Persian Gulf and in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys: the suppression of pirates, the establishment of suzerainty over Arab chiefs of the Gulf, the surveys and investigations for river and railway communication projects, and the initiation of diplomatic and military measures, all of which had been successfully directed towards protecting trade and forestalling other powers from reaching the Gulf and thus menacing India, had broken the force of the latest and most dangerous of the attempts to disturb the *status quo* in Persian Gulf regions. Great Britain's claim to special consideration and position in south-west Asia had achieved recognition both by the Powers and by Turkey itself. She had, in effect, with their consent, completed the peaceful annexation of the Persian Gulf as an Indian Lake and the establishment of her special position in the Mesopotamian wilayets of the Ottoman Empire.

The agreements, however, had not been all pure gain for Great Britain. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway was to have its outlet to the Gulf. Germany, although greatly restricted, was to be admitted into the hitherto jealously guarded Garden of Eden. Nor was there any guarantee as to how long the new relations could be expected to last. In the face of previous successes in hitherto British markets already won by German commercial rivals and of the bellicose attitude and unfriendly actions of Germans, within the few months following the initialling of the Anglo-German Agreement, it is not too much to conjecture that the agreement might have been, in reality, only an uneasy truce.

It may be reasonably doubted whether these breaches in Great Britain's traditional policy would ever have taken place, whether the negotiations themselves would ever have been necessary, or whether Great Britain would have been forced to suffer nearly 100,000 casualties[1] or to sacrifice £200,000,000[2] in a war in Turkish Arabia had she taken the early opportunities repeatedly offered her of building the trans-Mesopotamian railroad. Had she built the railroad, the wilayets of Baghdad and Basra would probably have taken on the status of Egypt before the war, owing nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan but under the protection of Great Britain. Had there not been the opportunity for economic and political expansion in Turkish Arabia to draw Germany onwards, the latter might never have sought and acquired her predominating influence at the Sublime Porte, without which Turkey would have never entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Without the stimulus of Allied war-time promises of independence, Arab nationalism would not have risen in such power for at least another decade, the Sharifians would not have gained their chance at leadership, and the creation of the kingdom of 'Iraq might have been delayed to the dim future.

Whatever the new relations between Turkey, Germany and Great Britain in Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf might have been as the result of their agreements, it was clear, immediately on the outbreak of war in Europe that the whole

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[1] Casualties from all sources in the Mesopotamia Campaign were 92,501, according to *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 331; 98,258, according to Robertson, Sir William, *Soldiers and Statesmen* (2 vols., 1926), Vol. II, p. 82.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1546.

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situation had been thrown once again into the melting pot. All for which Great Britain had striven, consciously or unconsciously, for nearly three hundred years was now in danger of being swept away. The whole history of the part played by Great Britain in the Middle East made it inevitable, once resort to arms had begun, that she should make some effort, not only to maintain that which she had won but also to secure, once and for all, by the establishment of political control, the Mesopotamian portion of the land route to India.

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

BASRA AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY.

Scale of Miles
50
0
50
Shustar
OIL FIELDS
Maidan-i-Naftun
Amara
Band-i-Qir
R. Kharkha
IRAQI-IRANIAN FRONTIER
Qala Salih
R. Tigris
Shatra
Ahwaz
I R A N
OIL PIPE LINE
An Nasiriya
Al Qurna
Kabaish
Akaika
Euphrates
OLD CHANNEL
Suq ash Shuyukh
Mazliq
HAMMAR LAKE
Euphrates
NEW CHANNEL
Nahr Umar
Al Khamisiya
Luqait
Nukhaila
Maqil
BASRA
Mohammerah
Shuaiba
Az Zubair
Shatt al Arab
Abadan
'I R A Q
Khor Musa
Fao
Khor 'Abdullah
Bubiyan I.
PERSIAN GULF
AL KUWAIT
Jahra

CHAPTER III

THE CONQUEST OF SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

In the four years, 1914 to 1918, British arms completed what /175* three centuries of British commerce and diplomacy had begun. 121 The military operations which resulted in the occupation of Basra, then of Baghdad in 1917, and finally of the whole of Turkish Arabia as far north as Mōsul, have been ably recounted elsewhere.[1] It is germane here only to indicate how the motives which lay behind the forward movements and the administration of the occupied territories arose partly from immediate circumstances and partly from the long established Middle East policy of Great Britain.

Consideration of Baghdad as an objective of the Expeditionary Force had come before its military and political officials early in the campaign. On November 23rd, the day after the occupation of Basra, Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer to the Force, telegraphed privately to the Viceroy that the General Officer Commanding had been considering the question of the advance to Baghdad and that he (Cox) did not see how 'we can well avoid taking over Baghdad'.[2] Officials on the spot, in India and at Whitehall as well as representatives of commercial interests in the country continued to give expression to similar views,[3] but neither H.M. Government nor the Government of

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[1] *History of the Great War based on Official Documents:* (a) Moberly, Brig.-Gen., F. J., op. cit. (*O.H.*); (b) Corbett, Sir Julian, *Naval Operations*, Vol. II (1922); VI (1923); (c) Macpherson, *Medical Services, General History*, Vol. IV (1924). *Survey of India, Records of the*, Vol. XX. *The War Record* (1920). Candler, Edmund, *The Long Road to Baghdad* (2 vols., 1919). Personal accounts by Sir Arnold Wilson, Lieut.-Col. J. E. Tennant, C. V. Townshend and others.

[2] *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 134. His telegram 'was specifically prompted by urgent representations from the Heads of the British Mercantile community'. Sir Percy Cox to the writer, July 16th, 1936.

[3] *Mes. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610, p. 97; Bolitho, H., *Lord Inchcape* (1936), pp. 122-4.

175* 721 India were ready, at the time, to support such a far-reaching objective.[1] Indeed the attitude of the latter towards the expedition until the middle of 1915 had been that of niggardly, even unwilling compliance with the policy laid down by H.M. Government.[2]

The sudden reversal of this attitude by the Government of India came after the appointment of General Sir John Nixon to the command in Mesopotamia, April 9th, 1915, when it assumed, with his support, the initiative for the advance to Baghdad.[3] Occurring almost at the same moment that the India Office, with a new concern for oil supplies, opposed any extension of objective beyond the hinterland of Basra, a deliberate and concerted policy was rendered impossible. The criticism of the Mesopotamia Commission of 1917: 'The scope of the objective of the expedition was never sufficiently defined in advance, so as to make each successive move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan,'[4] was never more pertinent than in the days before the first march on Baghdad.

The degree to which the reversal of the attitude of the Government of India and the sanction of H.M. Government to the advance on Baghdad were influenced by the realization that India's permanent interests would be best served by the inclusion of Baghdad under the direct control of India cannot be fully known until the evidence in state archives is available. In the late autumn of 1915 the Government of India stated clearly that it expected to annex at least Baghdad and Basra[5] but it would seem that considerations of the moment played as large a part in the authorization of the advance as did deliberate consideration of past and future policy.

Early successes around Basra had elated the military command in India, increasing their desire for further victories in

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[1] *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610, p. 20; Asquith, H. A., *Memories and Reflections* (2 vols., 1928), Vol. II, p. 69; Bolitho, op. cit., p. 123.

[2] Cd. 8610, pp. 97, 105, 106, 123-31.

[3] Ibid., pp. 16, 97, 125.

[4] Ibid., p. 111; *O.H.*, Vol. III, preface.

[5] *Infra*, p. 96.

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order to demonstrate their importance, unduly cast in the shade in their own opinion, by the larger and more striking operations in Europe.[1] The advance to Baghdad would not only give these opportunities but would, as the Viceroy pointed out to the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Austen Chamberlain,

> create an immense impression in the Middle East, especially in Persia, Afghanistan, and on our frontier, and would counteract the unfortunate impression in the Middle East created by want of success in the Dardanelles. It would also isolate German parties in Persia,[2] probably produce a pacifying effect in that country, and frustrate the German plan of raising Afghanistan and the tribes, while the impression throughout Arabia would be striking. In India, the effect would be undoubtedly good.[3]

The Chief of General Staff, India, on October 5th, emphasized in addition, that the possession of Baghdad would

> deprive the Turks of a well-equipped place of concentration; place us in a good position to defeat them in detail as they moved down the rivers from Asia Minor or Syria; deprive the Turks of steamers, material and resources, and increase our prestige.[4]

In the arguments put forward by the Government of India, H.M. Government fully concurred.[5] Indeed so convinced was the War Cabinet by 'Nixon's attitude and by opportunities within our grasp for a great success such as we have not yet achieved in any quarter, and the political (and even military) advantages which would follow from it throughout the East',

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[1] Cd. 8610, p. 131.

[2] For German activities in Persia, Afghanistan and India in August and September, 1915, see *O.H.*, Vol. I, pp. 309 ff.

[3] Telegram (Private) Lord Hardinge to Chamberlain, October 6th, 1915, cited *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 11; also, Letter, Viceroy to Chamberlain, October 15th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 21.

[4] Appreciation, Sir Percy Lake, October 5th, 1915, cited ibid., pp. 9-10.

[5] Letter (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, October 7th, cited ibid., p. 8; Telegram S/S for India to Viceroy, October 6th, cited ibid., p. 11; Interdepartmental Comm. Report, October 16, cited ibid., p. 17.

175* 721 not easily overrated,[1] that it authorized General Nixon to 'march on Baghdad if he is satisfied that the force he has available is sufficient for operations' and promised reinforcements from France.[2]

The disasters which followed, ending in the surrender, April 29th, of 13,309 British officers and other ranks at Kūt al-'Amāra, after a siege of five months, now form part of history. The Commission appointed by Parliament in 1916 to make inquiry into the conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia,[3] placed 'the weightiest share of responsibility for the first attempt on Baghdad' on Sir John Nixon, whose 'confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance'.[4] It must not be overlooked, however, that both he and those who advocated the advance at the time were not unnaturally influenced by immediate ends which outweighed military conditions, to meet which little or no adequate preparation had been made.

In the period after the unsuccessful attempts to relieve Kūt, and its surrender, when the Force lay inert, concerned mainly with renewing its strength and reorganizing its vital services,[5] the ultimate desirability of extending British influence to Baghdad was not entirely forgotten. Not until February 3rd, 1917, however, when the Russians were expected to converge on Mōsul and perhaps Baghdad, did Sir William Robertson ask General Maude for his views regarding another advance towards Baghdad, it being considered desirable for political reasons that British forces should occupy the city before the Russians.[6]

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Viceroy, October 6th, cited ibid., p. 11.

[2] Ibid., October 23rd, cited ibid., p. 28.

[3] *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610.

[4] Ibid., p. 111. General Nixon had repeatedly shown his confidence that he had enough troops to capture the city; Telegrams, Nixon to Government of India and India Office, October 6th, 1915, cited *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 12; Nixon to Chamberlain, October 8th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 15; Viceroy to Chamberlain, October 6th, 1915, cited ibid., p.11. Telegram (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, October 5th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 9.

[5] *O.H.*, Vol. III, pp. 7, 20-3, 30-6, 62-70.

[6] Ibid., pp. 125, 126 and 204 ff

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SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

The inquiry, followed by definite instructions on February 28th, 1917, to capture Baghdad[1] were not influenced merely by the traditional opposition to the installation of Russia in Turkish Arabia. Circumstances arising from more deeply rooted aspirations, together with the same general considerations which had prompted the advance of 1915, were also at work.[2]

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The pre-war aspirations of the powers for economic and political expansion in Asia had taken on a concrete form as important war objectives of the Allies on the basis of the so-called Secret Agreements. These, as far as they affected the Ottoman Empire, were as follows: (1) Constantinople Agreement, March 18th, 1915, by Russia, France and Great Britain concerning Constantinople, the Straits and Persia;[3] (2) Pact of London, April 26th, 1915, between Great Britain, Russia and Italy regarding compensation to Italy for joining the Allies against Germany;[4] (3) Husain-McMahon Correspondence, August, 1914, to January, 1916, concerning Arab independence in return for Arab co-operation against the Turks;[5] (4) Agreements of the spring of 1916, between Great Britain, France and

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[1] *O.H.*, Vol. III, p. 205.

[2] The Government of India again pressed for the capture of Baghdad on the grounds that it would relieve the increasing tension on the North West Frontier, *O.H.*, Vol. III, p. 207.

[3] Text, de Martens, C., *Recueil des Traites*, 3rd Series (Leipzig, 1922), Vol. X, p. 347. Also, Temperley, H. W. V., *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (hereafter *H.P.C.P.*) (6 vols., 1920-4), Vol. VI, pp. 2-10; *Manchester Guardian*, February 22nd, 1918.

[4] *Accts. and Papers*, Misc. Papers, 1920, No. 7 (Cmd. 671), LI, 261. Text: de Martens, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 329; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. V, pp. 384 ff.; also, Vol. VI, pp. 10-13.

[5] The complete text of the correspondence has never been officially revealed, but summaries of substantial portions have been published: MacMunn, Sir G., and Falls, C., *Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine* (Official History of the World War, hereafter cited as *O.H., E. and Pal.*) (2 vols., 1928-30), Vol. I, pp. 213 ff.; *Le Temps* (Paris), September 19th, 1919; Cocks, Seymour, *The Secret Treaties* (1918); *Note on the Arab Question*, submitted by Amir Faisal to H.M. Government and cited *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CXXXVI (1929), pp. 735-6; *Al-Manār* (Arabic journal, Cairo), January 5th, 1924. The summaries given here have been taken from the original Arabic text of the letters.

'IRAQ

175* 721 Russia—(*a*) Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 16th, 1916, between Great Britain and France, concerning the division of Syria and Mesopotamia between themselves and the Arabs;[1] (*b*) Russia's assent to an agreement which assigned her northern Kurdistan and portions of Eastern Anatolia;[2] (5) The Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, April 17th, 1917, between Great Britain, France and Italy, concerning Italy's share of Asia Minor.[3]

The Ottoman Empire, from which Germany was to be excluded, was, by the Agreements, divided among the Allies in accordance with their long-standing ambitions. In addition, large sections of the Empire were assigned to potential allies to draw them into the war against the Central Powers. Thus, Italy demanded and received recognition, by the Pact of London, April 26th, 1915, of her claims to an 'equitable' section of Asia Minor. In return for his revolt against the Turks, Husain, Sharif of Mecca, received promises through the so-called Husain-McMahon Correspondence of British aid for the establishment of Arab independence in a large portion of the Arabic-speaking provinces of Turkey.[4]

In the Correspondence, however, Sir Henry McMahon made reservations safeguarding the interests of Great Britain

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[1] Text: de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 350; *L'Asie Française*, xvii (August-November, 1919), pp. 243 ff.; Samné, G., *La Syrie* (Paris, 1920), p. 638 ff.; Loder, J. de V., *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria* (1923), pp. 161-4. The Foreign Office 'version' in Leslie, Shane, *Mark Sykes; His Life and Letters* (1923), pp. 250-8, is nothing more than an explanation of the circumstances under which the Agreement was made.

[2] See Memorandum of March 6th, 1917 (first printed in *Isvesta*, November 12th, 1917); *Manchester Guardian*, January 19th, 1918; de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 353; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. vi, p. 16. For negotiations in which Russia participated, see documents in *Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei Während des Weltkrieges: Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei* (Adamoff, E., ed., Dresden, 1932) (hereafter *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*), especially Nos. 56, 60, 74-8, 99, 103, 104.

[3] Reputed text: *Manchester Guardian*, January 9th, 1920; *Current History* (New York), Vol. xi (March, 1920), pp. 499 ff.; see also *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. vi, pp. 18 ff.

[4] Letters, Sir H. McMahon, Cairo, to Husain, Sharif of Mecca, October 24th, December 14th, 1915; also, August 30th, 1915. See also, Young, Major Sir H. W., *The Independent Arab* (1933), pp. 276-7.

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and those of her ally, France.[1] Previous agreements which Great Britain had with the Arab chiefs were to be unaltered.[2] Basra was to be placed under British control[3] while Baghdad, concerning which it was declared that a stable government was demanded by the very special British interests in the region,[4] was to be the subject of future negotiations.[5] It was also stipulated that the prospective Arab state should receive only British aid and assistance, and should employ, exclusively, British advisers.[6] The Sharif had, at first, protested at the conditions concerning 'Iraq, which, he declared, by history and religion, formed an integral part of Arab territory.[7] It was agreed, however, to leave the final decision to the future, the British to pay an indemnity for any part of 'Iraq which they occupied, even temporarily.[8]

The Sykes-Picot Agreement[9] was to regulate future Anglo-French territorial relations in the eastern Mediterranean and to govern future British policy in points of conflict arising from the interpretation of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence and the Agreement. It confirmed the arrangements made by the Anglo-Arab correspondence by assigning Basra and

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[1] Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, December 14th, 1915; also, January 25th, 1916. The reservation of territory along the eastern Mediterranean in the interests of France were not recognized by the Sharif, who agreed, however, to postpone the decision until the end of the war. Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, January 1st, 1915. The claim of an existing secret treaty giving all of Arab-Asia to Sharif Husain has never been proven. *Infra*, p. 177.

[2] Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, Section 1; Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915.

[3] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, 1915.

[4] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, December 14th, 1915.

[5] Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915; Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, January 25th, 1916.

[6] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, 1915.

[7] Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915.

[8] Ibid., Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, January 25th, 1916.

[9] The frequent assertion that T. E. Lawrence, 'had much to do with the Sykes-Picot Agreement' (Main, '*Iraq*, p. 58) is scarcely accurate. The first intimation received by Sir Henry McMahon, or anyone else in Cairo, of the agreement seems to have been when Sir Mark Sykes, 'in conversation, producing a map, remarked, "What do you think of my treaty?",' Hart, H. B. Liddell, *T. E. Lawrence* (1934), p. 70. See also Leslie, op. cit., pp. 244, 245, 249, 287, 288.

175* 721

Baghdad to British control, and by designating a strip of territory lying between Baghdad and the zone of territory around Mōsul, assigned to French influence, as a zone to be given to the Arabs, subject to British influence.

The necessity of capturing Baghdad as a preliminary to the application of these secret agreements thus became one of the primary political arguments in favour of the renewed advance towards Baghdad. Its capture would also restore British prestige, seriously shaken by the surrender of Kūt and by the attempt, suggested by General Townshend himself, April 23rd,[1] and sanctioned by the War Cabinet,[2] to purchase the freedom of the besieged army for a sum of £2,000,000. The capture would, in addition, encourage the Allied Powers and dishearten the Central Powers.[3]

The occupation of Baghdad would present a better opportunity to organize Arab co-operation, a step which H.M. Government had repeatedly stressed from the inception of the campaign and to facilitate which the War Cabinet was to sanction the Proclamation of March 19th, 1917, issued under the name of General Maude, following the capture of Baghdad, March 11th, 1917.[4]

Among the reasons originally urged for the dispatch of the Expedition, it will be remembered, was the hope that it would secure the assistance of the Arabs against the Turks and prevent them from joining in a *Jihād*.[5] With these ends in view, proclamations had been addressed to the Shaikhs of the Gulf and to the Arabs of Turkish Arabia by H.M. Political

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[1] *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 450.

[2] Ibid., p. 452.

[3] The tremendous store set by Germany and Turkey on Baghdad and the plans which they elaborated for its recapture have been well described by Djemal (Jamal) Pasha in *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* (n.d.). During the war, he, himself, regarded Palestine and Syria as more important centres, although he had once, when Pasha of Baghdad, described 'Iraq as 'an iron gate against the great power to the south, that is, India'. Speech on the Inauguration of Jamal Bey as Pasha of Baghdad, August 30, 1911.

[4] For text see Appendix I.

[5] *Supra*, pp. 27-8.

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Officers, both before and after the occupation of Basra.[1] It 1754 was emphasized that 'this War has nothing to do with religion'.[2] 721 The Shaikhs were urged not to 'allow the foolish people to be led away by foolish talk of "Jehad".' The Arabs were assured that the British Government bore 'no enmity or ill-will against the populace';[3] that it had 'no desire to treat them as enemies so long as they themselves remain friendly and neutral and refrain from taking up arms against her (British) troops'.[4] On the contrary, the British Government hoped 'to prove good friends and protectors'. The inhabitants were assured that, under the British flag, they would 'enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice both in regard to your religious and your secular affairs'.[5] They were warned, however, that while it was 'the wish of the British Government to free the Arabs from the oppression of the Turks and bring them advancement and increase of prosperity and trade', yet, 'in the case of those departing from the the path of friendship and neutrality and taking up arms in co-operation with the enemy, their properties lying within the sphere of British control will be considered sequestrated to the British Government'.[6] This warning had already been conveyed to them in an emphatic notice on the outbreak of war and dated November 5th, 1914.[7]

Neither the assurances nor the warnings conveyed in these proclamations nor the personal efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his assistant Political Officers were sufficient to win over the Arabs as a whole to the British side. The problem of gaining Arab co-operation in accepting responsible posts in the Administration or in fighting the Turks hung largely on the ability of Great Britain to give the Arabs tangible evidence that the Turks would never return to the country. Confiscation of property would be the least of the reprisals which the Turks would inflict if they ever returned, as the Arabs well knew; a knowledge confirmed by Turkish treatment of the Arabs of Kūt al-'Amāra after its surrender.

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[1] *Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc. . . . Relating to . . . Mesopotamia, October 31st, 1914 to August 31st*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919) (hereafter, *Proclamations*, 1914-19). Notices and Proclamations, Nos. 1-5, 7, 8. An interesting parallel to the Proclamations of 1914 may be seen in the instructions to Captain Seton, Political Officer to the expeditions against pirates of the Persian Gulf, 1809. See Low, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 325.

[2] *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Notice No. 1, October 31st, 1914; Proclamation No. 2, November 1st, 1914; Proclamation No. 3, November 1st, 1914.

[3] Ibid., Proclamation No. 5, November 22nd, 1914.

[4] Ibid., Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1915; cf. also, Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914.

[5] Ibid., Proclamation No. 5, November 22nd, 1914.

[6] Ibid., Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1914.

[7] Ibid., Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914.

Such assurance could not be given, however, not only for fear of giving umbrage to the allies of Great Britain, but also because the question of the advance on Baghdad was still in the air, and the future status of the country was still in doubt in official quarters.[1] Not even those familiar with the intimate relationship which Turkish Arabia bore to India or responsible for the administrative policy of the country could make reassuring public announcements, although they confidently expected Mesopotamia to be 'an Indian appendage' as Sir Valentine Chirol wrote in 1915, while accompanying the Viceroy of India on an official visit to Basra.[2] The Viceroy himself on the occasion of the visit had made a speech, interpreted by many as foreshadowing annexation to India.[3]

Private assurances as given by Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, on behalf of H.M. Government to various individuals, such as the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Shaikh of Mohammerah, had limited credence. To the former, in a letter dated November 3rd, 1914, three days before the landing at Fao, Sir Percy Cox had declared that if the British succeeded at Basra, 'we will not return Basra to the Turkish Government and will not surrender it back to them at all'.[4]

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[1] Asquith, Herbert, wrote in his diary, March 25th, 1915: 'Grey and I . . . both think that in the real interests of our own future the best thing would be if at the end of the War we could say that we had taken and gained nothing . . . Mesopotamia for instance.' Asquith, H. A., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 69.

[2] *Behind the Veil*, pp. 91-2 (facsimile, p. 119).

[3] *Proclamations*, 1914-19. Speech No. 6, February 6th, 1915, p. 3.

[4] Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. xi, Persian Gulf No. xlii.

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SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

Lacking definite and public assurances, the great majority 175*
of the Arabs, both townsmen and tribesmen, while feathering 721
their nests at every opportunity, refused to commit themselves.
They preferred to let time and circumstances decide the
question on whom their permanent allegiance should be
bestowed.

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CHAPTER IV

INITIATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

115* 727 WHILE the extension of the campaign to Baghdad and the future of the country were being discussed in official circles, the practical problem of the administration of the occupied areas was forced upon those in command of the Expeditionary Force. Even had there been no obligation under international usage, as the Hague Conventions of 1890 and of 1907;[1] the needs of the Force and the necessity of replacing the vacuum left by the departure of the Turks rendered the initiation of some form of administration imperative.

175* 722 727 The local requirements of the troops were wide and varied. Such needs as were not met by direct intervention of the military authorities necessitated an intricate mass of detailed orders, proclamations and notices issued under the authority of the General Officer Commanding and enforced for the most part by military police and military courts. These regulations supervised the direct relations between the inhabitants and the army, ranging from the control of rents[2] and foodstuffs,[3] the restriction of movement of persons and of rivercraft,[4] to orders that carriage drivers and boatmen 'shall in all cases give preference to British Officers, European ladies and Government

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[1] Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Hague Convention, July 29th, 1899, affirmed in a similar Convention of the Hague, October 18th, 1907. Texts: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. XCI (1898–9), 988; Vol. C (1906–7), 338.

[2] *Compilation of Proclamations and Notifications Affecting Civil Inhabitants of Mesopotamia in Basrah* (Baghdad, 1919), Notification No. 2 (hereafter *Procs. Basrah*).

[3] Ibid., Notif. No. 5; *Proclamations and Notifications, 'Amarah* (Baghdad, 1919), No. 1, Sec. 14 (hereafter *Procs. 'Amarah*).

[4] *Procs. Basrah*, Notif. No. 6, Regulation Nos. 12, 13; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Secs. 2, 3, and 9.

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

SIR PERCY COX, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

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175* servants'.[1] Regulations governed indirect relations, from
722 the control of the carrying of arms among the inhabitants,[2] the
727* sale of liquors and drugs[3] to minute sanitary regulations prescribing floor space per animal in stables or rewards for bringing in dogs for destruction.[4]

In all these relations between the civil population and the military authorities, the fact was never lost sight of that it was a military occupation and that a war had to be won. From the first to the last, the needs of the inhabitants were subordinated to those of the occupying Forces. Food, in certain cases, was admitted to market for sale only when the requirements of the military authorities had been met.[5] Access to piped water was forbidden.[6] Families were evicted from their houses and land requisitioned, sometimes without payment of rent.[7] Restrictions on persons and goods were carried to unnecessary lengths,
[464] even after the danger from spies had vanished.[8] Labourers in ever-increasing quantities were taken from their fields and villages and from their families and forced to work on military works, such forced labour becoming, as in Egypt, one of the outstanding grievances of the inhabitants against the British authorities.[9]

Delicate handling by the Political Officers was necessary in order to enforce the orders and regulations, harsh and exacting as many of them were, and at the same time to keep the

[1] *Procs. Basrah*, Reg. No. 12, Sec. 11.

[2] Ibid., Reg. No. 12; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 4.

[3] Ibid., Reg. No. 12, Sec. 9; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 7; Notice No. 5.

[4] Ibid., Notice No. 1, No. 10; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.

[5] *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.

[6] Ibid., Notice No. 3.

[7] No rent was paid from the time of the Occupation on the four or five miles of river frontage occupied by the British at 'Amâra. *Monthly Reports, Political Officers*, December, 1918, 'Amâra, p. 2.

[8] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., pp. 144, 242; *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (1920), Cmd. No. 1061, p. 24 (hereafter *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920).

[9] Telegram No. 7520, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, July 13th, 1919. The telegram indicates that by that date both the Civil Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding were 'fully alive to the importance of abolishing forced labour at the earliest possible moment'.

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populace friendly, an avowed aim of the Expedition which from its inception placed the British officials in a peculiar position.

The entire situation was a contradiction in terms. The Expeditionary Force was invading enemy territory with the population of which the British Government was not at war, according to the proclamations issued after Fao.[1] Indeed, the British Government had declared that it had come to co-operate with the Arabs for their liberation from Turkish oppressors.[2] In spite of these declarations, however, the restrictions placed on the inhabitants differed little, if any, from the treatment accorded to an enemy population. The situation was no doubt complicated by the refusal of many of the Arabs to be considered friendly and by the necessity of combating by rigorous measures the low standards of sanitation, housing and morality prevailing in Mesopotamia.

The fact that the military regime was accepted as long as it was without protest may be attributed to a variety of factors. Prompt payment for all supplies, cash rent for billets and land, although not invariably nor always in strict proportion to prevailing rates, non-interference with such religious or local customs as did not hamper military or administrative policy, and the marked increase in general economic prosperity did much to mitigate its rigours. While the attitude of the army as a whole was distinctly hostile to the native population, not without good reason, yet there was a genuine and general desire on the part of all responsible officers to be just and fair in all their dealings with the native population. The untiring efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his assistants in establishing personal relations at the same time that subsidies and remissions of taxations were distributed among the shaikhs and local dignitaries, won many of the notables to benevolent neutrality.

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914; Proc. No. 5, November 22nd, 1914; also *supra*, pp. 71-2.

[2] Ibid., Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1915.

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The high integrity and efficiency of the new administration, /75' once it had got into its stride, as contrasted with the former 72T* Turkish administration, did even more to create a general feeling of confidence and belief that the coming of Great Britain was for good rather than for evil.

Why the Turks Failed to Give Good Government to 'Iraq

It has been the habit among many writers on pre-war and /75* war-time 'Iraq to disparage its administration by the Turks. Much of this attitude may be due to the not unnatural desire to paint the Turkish picture black in order that the scene, after Great Britain had reconstituted the administration, might appear brighter in contrast. Undoubtedly these views are somewhat exaggerated, yet there can be no question that the Turkish system, both in conception and in application, was lamentably deficient.

The principal reason for the failure of the Ottomans to give good government in 'Iraq or elsewhere in their dominions, lay in their fundamental political concepts. From the foundation of the Empire, Ottoman subjects, their lives and property were regarded as existing only for the benefit and glory of the rulers. Thus, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from the Sultan downwards, every member of the official hierarchy looked on each person lower than himself in the scale as providing the wherewithal for his own profit and advancement until the accumulated burden finally rested on the great mass of peasantry and common people who, having no means of resistance, might be maltreated and starved with impunity. A wider concept of government as well as other reforms seemed imminent after the Revolution of 1908, but the Young Turk movement produced little but confusion and disappointed hopes.

The Ottomans, moreover, in all their political activities could not forget that they had come to power by conquest, a

175* fact which bore particularly upon the non-Ottoman sections, such as 'Iraq and Syria and upon the non-Muslim peoples of the Empire. They looked with ingrained aversion on all occupations except those of soldiering and governing. The potential wealth of the Empire was thus left undeveloped, additional sources of revenue were untouched, and, in the face of extravagant and ill-advised expenditure, the country was forced to seek for financial relief from abroad.

Another reason for the failure of the Turks to give good government lay in the hiatus between statute book and practice, between a principle and its application. Every reforming movement had seen new laws and regulations, often copied bodily from European models, added to the statute books.[1] Rarely, however, was the will or the ability present to enforce the measures. Every innovation had to face opposition not only from a poorly paid, badly educated, often indolent officialdom, but also from traditional usage, from religious custom and prejudice and, not infrequently, from vested interests of the European Powers.

Although the civil bureaucracy might blindly struggle to apply the regulations as imposed by the central authorities, the impartial application of such measures varied in direct proportion to the energy and honesty of the pashas of the wilayets, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the distance of the wilayets from the central supervising authority at Constantinople.

175* In all these respects, Turkish Arabia suffered badly. Its remoteness from Constantinople, its lack of amenities, and its

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[1] A general résumé of Turkish laws, regulations, etc., may be found in Young, George, *Corps de droit ottoman, Recueil des codes, lois règlements, ordonnances, et actes les plus importants du droit intérieur, et d'études sur le droit coutumier de l'Empire Ottoman*, (7 vols., Oxford, 1905-6). Also Biliotti, A., and Sedad, Ahmed, *Legislation Ottomane depuis le rétablissement de la constitution, 24 Djemazi ul-akhir*, 1326 (10 *juillet*, 1908, 1er *Novembre*, 1909). *Recueil des lois, décrets, règlements, conventions, actes internationaux, etc., de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1912). English translations of various Turkish laws made by the Judicial Department during the British occupation are listed in the bibliography under *Official Publications, 'Iraq Government, Judicial.*

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unfavourable climate made officials reluctant to take office 175x there. The wilayets were staffed, for the most part, by incompetent officials or by those in political exile from Constantinople. Proper supervision was almost impossible.

Salaries of most of the government officials from *Walis* to gendarmes were small and irregularly paid. Opportunities for peculation and corruption seem to have been rarely overlooked.[1] Substantial sums, exceeding the annual salaries were often paid for offices, from which holders rarely retired without having privately reimbursed themselves. Judges' salaries in the Baghdad wilayet ranged from £T.7½ to £T.35 per month,[2] but occupants of these positions had been frequently known to advance from extreme poverty to wealth within the space of a few years.

Whatever its faults, and they were many, the Turkish regime 175*
had been the only Government known to Turkish Arabia. Its 727'
vagaries had become familiar. Its defects and shortcomings the populace both knew and made use of for their own ends. Its disappearance with the complete withdrawal of the Turks as far north as Kūt al-'Amāra by September, 1915, the flight of all but minor Arab officials, the destruction or removal of records both by fleeing Turks and by interested inhabitants and the looting and pillaging of government buildings and equipment,[3] made it imperative that an administration should be re-established. As soon as the first confusion had settled into routine and the population of the occupied territories had

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[1] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 7, cites 'an authentic story of a Turkish *Mutasarrif* in Syria, popular with his superiors if not with the people he governed, who boasted that his budget showed no expenditure at all. It consisted entirely of receipts. All the officials, from the *Mutasarrif* himself downwards, drew no pay, but lived on questionable perquisites, while repairs, maintenance, public works, etc., were simply neglected'.

[2] *Report on the Admin. of Civil Justice, from the Occupation of Baghdad to 31st December*, 1917, in *Admin. Report of the Baghdad Wilayet*, 1917 (Calcutta, 1918), p. 182 (hereafter *Admin. Report*, *Baghdad*, 1917).

[3] Within forty-eight hours of the departure of the Turks, not a single government building outside Basra possessed doors or windows. Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 13.

175 727 become somewhat accustomed to British troops and their unfamiliar demands and regulations, the setting-up of the Civil Administration was taken in hand.

For the purposes of Civil Administration[1] and control of the tribes, the General Officer Commanding had attached to his staff a Chief Political Officer (Sir Percy Cox) who appointed officers, wherever they could be diverted from their military units, as Assistant Political Officers to take charge of the occupied territories, divided for political purposes along Indian lines. At the time Kūt al-'Amāra was taken, they had been established at Basra, Qurna, Nāsiriya, Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, 'Amāra, Qal 'at Sālih, and 'Alī Gharbī. To the Chief Political Officer, they were responsible for the maintenance of law and order, the settlement of disputes both of townsmen and tribesmen, the administration and collection of revenue and the creation of friendly relations with the tribes. To the military authorities, they were responsible for the collection of labour and local supplies, for estimates for compensation of damages caused by military operations and for the local protection of lines of communication.[2] In the towns Military Governors were appointed, with full control under the senior Military Officer.

From the outset, the primary question had to be decided whether the existing Turkish system, either as a whole or in part, should be adopted and utilized, or whether new systems based on Indian methods should be set up. Although the Hague Conventions of 1899 and of 1907, of which Great Britain was a signatory, stated that the occupant of a country '. . . shall take all the measure in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country',[3] the

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[1] The administration until November, 1920, was actually Military Government, whether called Civil or Military Administration. It was imposed by the military authorities under the necessities of war. The laws of war alone determined the legality of its acts.

[2] *Admin. Report, Basra Sanjak*, 1916-1917 (Calcutta, 1917), pp. 1-2.

[3] Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Sec. III, Art. 43: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. XCI (1898-9), 999; Vol. C (1906-7), 350.

choice between the two alternatives was not difficult. Both the 175
magnitude of the task and the military situation demanded 727
immediate returns and a maximum of efficiency with a minimum of effort from those delegated to the initiation of the civil aspect of administration. None of the responsible officials of the Turkish regime remained. Few of the British officers of the Army of Occupation possessed any specialized knowledge of the previous administration. Such little administrative experience as existed had been gained in Indian systems which, from the British point of view, were vastly preferable to the inefficient and clumsy Turkish methods. In addition, the confident expectation within inner circles that the Government of India would assume the future permanent control of Basra and its hinterland at least, stimulated the adoption of the Indian administrative methods and practices which would aid in the assimilation of the occupied territories.

Within a week of the occupation of Basra, a Civil Police 625
service modelled on Indian lines replaced the Military Police, 175
under the supervision of Mr. E. G. Gregson of the Indian Police 727
Service, who had had wide experience on the North-West Frontier and in the Persian Gulf. Employment of the ex-Turkish police, even had they been available, was not desirable. Constables were therefore imported from India and Aden. A similar force was organized at 'Amāra, and a little later at Nāsiriya and at Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, but not with great success.[1] Local police, or *Shabana*, for use in the outlying villages and districts, were recruited from the Arabs themselves.

Foundations were thus laid on which later officials from India, including Colonel H. C. Prescott, I.A., Late Inspector-General of 'Iraq Police, were to construct the present 'Iraq Police system, in which the *Shabana* provided the nucleus of the native element.

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[1] *Administration Report, Suq ash-Shuyukh*, in *Reports of Political Officers in Occupied Territories of 'Iraq*, 1916-1917 (March 31). Submitted by Sir P. Cox under No. 8850, Baghdad, November 18th, 1917 (hereafter *P.O. Reports*, 1916-17).

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175* 727* 434 The introduction of Indian currency followed naturally on the coming of the Expeditionary Force, whose needs were paid for in rupees. A proclamation forbade the use of depreciated Turkish paper money[1], and the inadequate supply of small Turkish coins was driven from the bazaars. Turkish gold *liras*, however, continued to circulate, but their import and export were regulated.

Establishment of a Judicial System

175* 727* 671 For the administration of civil and criminal justice, a special code, known as the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code,[2] was created largely from laws in force in India.[3] The Code, promulgated August 1st, 1915, from which time the legal system of the Occupied Territories may be said to date,[4] established courts for the enforcement of civil rights by legal action, hitherto in abeyance, and criminal courts to supplement the military courts. These courts, functioning under the authority of the General Officer Commanding, were supervised by Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, and by Captain C. F. Mackenzie, Junior Judicial Officer, both of whom were members of the Indian Political Department.

Among the reasons put forward for the substitution of the Anglo-Indian Judicial system for that of the Turkish system, were the impossibility of reproducing within a limited time the hierarchy of courts culminating in the Court of Cassation at Constantinople, the inability to find judges and officials familiar with the Turkish system, as well as other reasons already given

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[1] *Proclamations, notices, etc., relating to the Civil Admin. . . . issued between December 22, 1916, and July 1st,* 1918 (Baghdad, 1918), Proc. No. 1, December 22nd, 1916.

[2] *'Iraq Occupied Territories Code*, 1915 (Bombay, 1915). Also six supplements to December 31st, 1918 (hereafter *'I.O.T. Code*).

[3] A preliminary schedule of thirty-four Indian Acts to be applied in the Occupied Territories was annexed to the Code.

[4] Arrangements to reconstitute the courts had begun shortly after the appointment of the Senior Judicial Officer, April 7, 1915.

1-[British Expeditionary Force in 1915 - Analyst]

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above. It was also held that the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 175th 1890[1] could not be applied and that any laws made or ad- 727th ministered must take the form of orders issued by the Army 671 Commander who could, by notification, depute his powers to Civil Judicial Officers and regularize the exercise of the orders so made in the form of a code[2] such as the one actually promulgated.

Under the Code, the Senior Judicial Officer exercised the civil and criminal powers normally assigned in India to the District and the Sessions Judge, respectively. The Junior Judicial Officer possessed the powers of an Assistant Judge and a District Magistrate. In addition, the Junior and the Assistant Judicial Officers were invested, as in India, with powers of Small Cause Court Judges.[3]

Powers were given under the Code to enforce any Indian Law, which might be amended to meet local conditions,[4] a provision which was freely used,[5] as was also the power to make rules of procedure for the better execution of any matter arising in the course of any civil or criminal case.[6]

Although provision was made for the application, subject to stated exceptions,[7] of Turkish Civil Law,[8] the exceptions included in practice the bulk of suits coming before the courts.[9] Thus, for all intents and purposes, Turkish Civil Law disappeared. Turkish Criminal Law, the Law of evidence and the Laws of Civil Procedure were expressly excluded from operation.[10]

The 'Iraq Code in its provisions and in the manner of its application seems to have made little distinction between India and 'Iraq. Indeed, Section 8 explicitly stated 'the Code of Criminal Procedure and other enactments for administration

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[1] 53-54 Victoria cap. 37.

[2] *Administration Report, Judicial Department*, 1915 (Calcutta, 1916), p. 1 (hereafter *Judicial Report*, 1915).

[3] Order by the General Officer Commanding, August 1st, 1915, in '*I.O.T. Code*, p. 25.

[4] '*I.O.T. Code*, Sections 6 and 55.

[5] *Judicial Report*, 1915, p. 1.

[6] '*I.O.T. Code*, Section 51.

[7] Ibid., Sections 49, 50.

[8] Ibid., Sections 6, 32, 50.

[9] *Judicial Report*, 1915, p. 1.

[10] '*I.O.T. Code*, Section 48.

175 of criminal justice in British India shall have effect as if the 727 Occupied Territories were a district in the Presidency of 671 Bombay'. This section, taken with the Code as a whole, tends to confirm the impression that valid as were some of the reasons advanced at the time for the introduction of the new legal system, the most cogent reason was the underlying desire to pave the way for the painless absorption of lower Mesopotamia to India.

The belief, apparently held at this time, that the Indian system introduced by the Code was no more foreign to Turkish Arabia than the Turkish system which it replaced,[1] and that therefore the change was acceptable, seems scarcely in accordance with the facts. As Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, head of the Judicial system in Mesopotamia, 1917-21, has pointed out:

> The present organization of these Courts and the Codes (of the Turks) have been in force for more than a generation, and indeed some of the Codes date back to a much earlier date. The people are accustomed to them, and are accustomed to regulate their transactions by them. This is especially true of the Baghdad mercantile community . . . Lawyers and Government officials have been trained in the procedure of the Courts and use of the Codes.[2]

The same statement could hardly be made concerning the Indian Laws, none of which were available either in Arabic or in Turkish when introduced. Even the Code was not translated into Arabic for some time following its introduction. Only four of the several score of Indian Laws had been translated into Arabic at the end of 1917, a fact which called forth a protest from the retiring Senior Judicial Officer, Lieut.-Colonel 671 S. G. Knox.[3] With the introduction of the Code, Arabic became 177 the official language in the Courts, a measure popular to the 115 people. Its use, however, was not entirely new. A circular from 727

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[1] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 68.

[2] *Report on the Admin. of Justice, Baghdad*, 1917, in *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 184.

[3] *Review of the Reports of the Administration of Basrah Wilayet from April to December*, 1917 (Calcutta, 1918), (hereafter *Admin. Rep., Basrah*, 1917): *Report on the Admin. of Justice*, 1917, p. 108.

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the Turkish Ministry of Interior in April, 1913, had directed 175*
that the use of Arabic should be allowed in the Courts of 671
Justice and in public offices. In spite of the failure to carry out 197
this concession literally, the use of Turkish was more of an 727*
affront to Arab sentiment than a handicap to litigation. Turkish was, and in many centres still is, the polite language, much as French was at the Courts of Prussia and Russia in the eighteenth century.

Although criminal cases could be tried in these newly 692
established civil courts,[1] the bulk of such cases was not sent to 175*
them. Serious cases, mainly robbery under arms, continued to 727*
be tried by military courts, under a highly summary procedure.[1] In Basra, 'Ashar, 'Amāra and Nāsirīya, the Military or Deputy Military Governors decided disputes of all kinds, while in the districts the same powers were exercised by Political Officers. Until after the fall of Baghdad no civil courts existed outside of Basra town.

Justice in Tribal Areas

It was soon evident that the 'Iraq Code could not be applied in its entirety to the tribal areas, comprising practically all of the Occupied Territories outside the towns. It was also clear that special powers were needed by the Political Officers to dispose of civil and criminal cases in their districts. To meet the situation, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation was drawn up by Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs,[2] on the lines of the Indian

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[1] *Admin. Rep., Basrah*, 1917: *Rep. Military Governor of Basrah*, 1917, p. 199.

[2] Henry Robert Conway Dobbs, G.B.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E. (1871-1934), may be rightfully called one of the makers of modern 'Iraq. He saw wide and distinguished service in India, Persia and Afghanistan. As Revenue and Judicial Commissioner to Baluchistan, 1909, 1911 and 1917, he came into direct contact with the 'Sandeman System'. He was under orders as Resident to Turkish Arabia when war broke out in 1914, but it was as Revenue Commissioner that he supervised the organization of administration, 1915-16, while Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, enlarged political relations with the Arabs. Versatile in talents, but essentially an administrator, he brought to the difficult period, 1923-9, when he served as High Commissioner to 'Iraq, a great capacity for realistic thinking, a highly developed sense of duty, and a deep loyalty to the Empire which dominated all his relations with the Arabs.

[1] [Under British Military administration ca 1917]

175* 927* 692 Frontier Crimes Regulation and was promulgated in February, 1916. It gave authority to the Political Officers to invoke a tribal *majlis* or other arbitrating body to deal, in accordance with tribal custom, with all cases in which any of the parties concerned was a tribesman.[1]

In all arbitration procedure, the Political Officer had the final word, although the Chief Political Officer might review the case. The Political Officer had to confirm the findings of the *majlis*, and he might set aside or add to the sentences imposed.[2] He was also invested with magisterial power to try cases which did not lend themselves to the application of tribal arbitration.[3]

The Regulation in its application proved congenial to the tribes, for it enabled them to settle disputes in ways long familiar to themselves. It also aided in tribal settlement and pacification by giving effect to tribal opinion obtained by arbitration, and it raised the importance of the shaikhs by giving them a recognized place in the political and legal system. The Political Officers, on their side, found that considerable work was taken off their shoulders.[4]

175* 927* 628 681 Over one point of tribal justice the views of the tribesmen and of the Political Officers often clashed. In cases of murder arising out of a blood-feud, the tribesmen were accustomed to regard *fasl*[5] or payments of money and usually, of women, as sufficient to settle the score and to end the feud. Imprisonment or capital punishment was thus considered not only harsh but unnecessary. In many cases where a woman violated or had been even accused of violating the desert code of morality, the death of the offender was demanded by the code in the name

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[1] *Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation*, G.O.C. Proclamation No. 2 of 1916, ch. iii, Sec. 7.

[2] Ibid., Sections 10, 11, 13.

[3] Ibid., ch. iv and v.

[4] *Reports of Admin. for* 1918 *of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia* (Calcutta, n.d.): Qurna Report, p. 306 (hereafter *Admin. Report*, 1918).

[5] For valuable first-hand observations on *fasl*: *Monthly Reports of Political Officers of the Occupied Territories, November*, 1919 (hereafter *Monthly Rep'ts*): Nâsiriya, pp. 94-5.

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of honour (*namūs*).[1] Capital punishment for such murders, 175*
which were frequent and usually premeditated and brutal, 727*
cut across tribal justice. The Political Officers, on their side, 628
found such customs abhorrent and contrary to their ideas of 681
justice.[2] Their natural tendency was to override the decisions of the tribal *majlis* and to impose imprisonment or death penalties. The problem was partially solved by the gradual recognition of the tribal point of view by the British authorities, but the modification of tribal custom has taken longer. At the present, it still constitutes one of the major problems in the administration of the tribal areas of 'Iraq.

The Revenue Department

No single task of greater magnitude faced the British ad- 175*
ministrators of the Occupied Territories than that of organizing 727*
the Revenue Department. The collection and administration 652
of revenue in accordance with the Turkish system but freed from abuse and corruption were not the only problems. Associated problems of land tenure, of revenue assessment, of *Auqāf* administration, in all their strangeness and complexity, had to be studied and solved. Responsibility for other activities, such as Excise and Customs, control of Hostile Trading Concerns, of the Public Debt, and of Education had to be assumed. To render the task more difficult, papers and records where they had not been destroyed, were out of date and, with the exception of land-registration, in confusion, requiring weeks of careful sorting.[3] Responsible officials had fled, and although

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[1] See Thomas, Bertram, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, 1931, pp. 86-7.

[2] *Admin. Report*, 1918: Hilla Division, pp. 126, 133; *Monthly Rep'ts, December*, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 59; Ibid., *August*, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 74.

[3] Cf. the excellent unsigned article (by C. C. Garbett, I.C.S.): *Turkish Rule and British Administration in Mesopotamia* in *Quarterly Review*, Vol. CCXXX, pp. 403 ff. The claim made there (p. 411), however, that demand-statements for the annual tax on date trees as prepared by the Turks, were found intact and collection of this as well as other revenue were begun within a few days of the occupation of Basra, is not borne out by the records of the period, as *Revenue Admin. Report, January-March*, 1915 (confidential), nor by personal testimony of the officials on the spot at the time.

175 important aid was rendered by residents of Basra and 'Amāra
227 and later by the discovery of old registers, the essential informa-
652 tion concerning the complicated and often inconsistent system
had to be gleaned by investigation and experience.

British Military authorities had at first no time to deal with Revenue or Fiscal matters except Customs. With the arrival, however, of Mr. Dobbs in January, 1915, as Revenue Commissioner, the work was taken in hand. The taxes demanded by the Turks had to be ascertained, the proportion paid before the arrival of the Expeditionary Force had to be discovered, and a collecting agency improvised.[1] Methods of assessment had to be learned. In the first months, the process of learning was by trial and error, tempered by the desire to win the confidence and goodwill of the Arabs and to impress them with the difference between the Turkish and the British methods of government. In some sections, as around 'Amāra, the revenue was farmed out to great landowners on terms which kept them loyal to the British. In other sections it was remitted in part,[2] and in still others, entirely, as at Qurna in 1915.[3] In some districts the tax on date trees alone was collected, and this in small proportion to former Turkish demands.[4] In other districts where the landowners were obviously paying on too few trees, the number was raised, with the alternative that owners might demand a recount. No such demands occurred. Considering the difficulties, it is not surprising that only Rs. 20,000 (approximately £1400) in land revenue was collected in the five months of the first fiscal year (ending March 31st, 1915) following the British occupation.[5]

Full development of the Revenue Department was to come after Baghdad wilayet had been taken over.[6] Nevertheless,

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[1] *Revenue Administration Report*, 1915, p. 1. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917: *Hammar Lake Area*, 1916-1917, p. 57.

[5] *Revenue Admin. Report*, 1915.

[6] The Turkish system and the British methods in the various aspects of the Revenue Department will be described in greater detail in a later section dealing with the development of the Administration from 1917 onwards. *Infra*, pp. 112 ff.

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by October, 1916, when Mr. Dobbs was invalided to India, a 175"
working administrative machinery had been set up, not only 727+
for revenue but also for other branches of administration 652
which had been taken under the wing of the Revenue Department. A certain amount of confidence in the British regime had been gained. Data and information on revenue, land tenure and other subjects had been embodied for future guidance in a series of notes which for clarity of judgment and succinctness have probably never been surpassed in the history of 'Iraq Administration.

Administration of Tribal Areas

To the establishment of a government for the tribal areas, 175+
both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs gave particular attention. 727+
The greatest need of the moment was for peace and order in 619
tribal areas and for the restriction of all assistance to the Turks from the Arabs, in order that the Expeditionary Force might devote itself to its main objective of defeating the Turks.

Both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs believed that these conditions might be attained by making use of the natural leaders of the tribes: the shaikhs. The alternative of direct government, either by a British or Arab staff, was calculated to be contrary to immediate ends if not impossible, due to the lack of a suitable staff and to the semi-barbaric character of the tribes. Their efforts were, therefore, directed towards building up forms of administration and of justice which, while conforming as far as possible to Western standards, were based on tribal organization, on recognition of tribal habits and customs and on support of the shaikhs as instruments of government.

The policy adopted was, in reality, an adaptation of the system so successfully developed and applied in Baluchistan by Sir Robert Sandeman, of whom it has been said: 'Every great

175+ colonial administrator has, wittingly or unwittingly, taken 727+ him as their example or followed in his footsteps.'[1]

619 When Sir Robert Sandeman first began to develop his system in Baluchistan, about 1875, he had found 'the tribal organization in a state of rapid decay and the power and influence of the tribal leaders much diminished'.[2] In 'Iraq, at the outbreak of the war, the tribes, especially those on the lower Euphrates, were in much the same state as a result of Ottoman attempts alternately to crush or settle them and to break or conciliate their leaders. The Turkish Government had at all times regarded the tribal Arabs as savages who, from sheer maliciousness, opposed the Government while in reality they were primitive communities still leading an existence so untouched by the benefits of civilized government that they could comprehend no other form of life than that postulated by their own codes and customs. The Government policy until the appointment of Midhat Pasha as *Wali* of Baghdad in 1869 aimed at the forcible conversion of the tribesmen from outlaws to obedient citizens without providing the means to live as such, or without arousing even a spark of the respect by which tribal obedience might be secured.

175+ 727 617 Midhat Pasha[3] approached the tribal problem from the standpoint of the land. His method was to sell *miri* or state lands for small periodical payments, giving *miri tapu sanads* (state-land title-deeds) which, while not conferring actual ownership, gave security of tenure. These *tapu sanads* were to be open to holders of doubtful titles, to villagers who cleaned a canal or planted a garden and to all shaikhs of tribes for their

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[1] Bruce, Col. C. E., *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1932, p. 60. For details of Sir Robert Sandeman and his system, see the article cited; Thornton, T. H., *Sir R. Sandeman; his Life* (1895); Hittu Ram, *Sandeman in Baluchistan* (Calcutta, 1916); *The Times*, February 26th, 1935; and *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, April, 1935.

[2] *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1932, p. 51.

[3] For the career of this noted Turkish official, whose reforming influence extended throughout the Ottoman Empire, and to whom the Turkish Constitution of 1878 owed much, see the interesting but uncritical *Life of Midhat Pasha* (1903), by his son, 'Ali Haydar Midhat.

tribal area. He intended thereby to reclaim wide tracts for the 175*
plough, to increase revenue and to subdue tribal 'Iraq by 727*
giving the tribesmen new interests and relations in agricultural 619
life. The shaikhs, to whom the grants were to be made, would be won to the government in self-interest, and would therefore lose their terror as rallying-points of anti-government forces. As chiefs of agricultural communities, they would be accessible because rooted to the land, taxable because crops could not be hidden, vulnerable because of government control of water, and dependent on the government as guarantor of their acquired rights to collect the landlord's share of crops.

This agrarian policy, although the only one which could permanently solve the tribal problem, never achieved more than partial success, either during Midhat Pasha's regime, 1869-72, or during those of his successors previous to 1908, who, while nominally committed to land settlement, followed their own devices in dealing with the tribes.[1] The machinery for registering the land was inadequate and tended to become corrupt. The majority of the tribal leaders feared the new policy and shunned the new status as a machination of government to rob them of freedom and to impose conscription. Urban speculators, friendly with *tāpū* officers, forestalled other would-be tribal purchasers.[2]

The attempt to settle the tribes had one definite result. It 175*
split the shaikhs as in the case of the Sa'dūns of the Muntafiq 727*
into groups, one hostile to the innovations, the other, willing 619
tools of the Government, bought by gifts of land. Between the two groups the Government vacillated. It was easier at times to acquiesce in the domination of the countryside by powerful, reactionary shaikhs and in the consequent nullification of their

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[1] After the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks reaffirmed the policy of settling such tribes as were still nomad, such as the *firmān* appointing Jamal Bey (better known as Djemal Pasha) as *Wālī* of Baghdad, August, 1911: 'The *Wālī* is to formulate a scheme with the least possible delay for the settlement of the nomad tribes on the land.'

[2] *Revenue Circulars*, Nos. 1-22 (Baghdad, 1920), No. 15, p. 25.

175 land policy rather than to maintain its own partisans. What-
727 ever plan for winning over the shaikhs had existed, it was soon
619 abandoned by the Young Turks who, desiring to stamp out all other power than their own, sought to establish direct relations between the Government and tribesmen. Great shaikhs were struck down wherever possible, as was Sa‘dūn Pasha in June, 1911, when he was treacherously captured and imprisoned in Aleppo where he died suddenly. The authorities went deliberately 'out of their way to break the power of the individual shaikhs by multiplying their number everywhere to a bewildering degree. Anarchy reigned and nothing could be done to prevent it, owing to the lack of a strong hand in each tribe'.[1]

The struggle between the Government and the tribes in the lower Euphrates valley had been further complicated by the disruption of the prevailing feudal system, through the unskilful application to the Muntafiq country of Midhat Pasha's otherwise sound policy of land-settlement.[2] The whole of the arable land, although occupied and cultivated for many years by the tribes and therefore claimed as their own by prescriptive right, was parcelled out between the Turkish crown and the Sa‘dūns, *ṭāpū* title deeds being issued to the new landlords.[3] The degradation in status of the tribesmen to tenants, much as the Irish cultivators had been reduced on their own tribal lands by the English adventurers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, together with the necessity of paying both rent to the newly created Sa‘dūn landlords — who formerly had exercised only a form of lordship over the Muntafiq and had held none of the land as private property[4] — and revenue to the Government in the form of shares of their crops, stirred tribal feeling to revolt

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[1] *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, in *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917.

[2] Nāsir Pasha, the great Sa‘dūn and founder of Nāsiriya is credited with introducing the *ṭāpū* system into the Muntafiq, whereby the Sa‘dūns became great landlords. Note on the Sa‘dun Problem (confidential) by the Revenue Commissioner, 1916; *Admin. Report of the Muntafiq Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), pp. 1-2.

[3] Note on the Sa‘dun Problem; *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2.

[4] Ibid., also *Revenue Rep.*, 1919, p. 24.

in which they were joined by the party of landless Sa'dūn 175*
hostile to the Government.[1] An era of bitter strife ensued 727
between tribesmen and landlords, many of whom lived in the 617
towns, occasionally by choice but more often by necessity, and between tribesmen and the Government. In some areas, accessible to gunboats and troops, the tribesmen had begun to pay these dues regularly[2] until the weakening of the Government hold, due to the Revolution of 1908 and later to the Italian and Balkan wars. The tribes soon relapsed into their former state of truculence, expelling their landlords and paying scant attention to the Government.[3] In other districts revenue had not been paid by the tribes for years, as in the Hammār Lake area,[4] and in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh region which had been free of any government control for fifteen years or more.[5] In still others the Turkish writ did not run outside the towns.[6]

Thus, by the time that British Administrators appeared in the tribal areas, the only attempt to settle the tribes had failed for want of will and of means to execute it. Disputes over land and water had embittered relations between tribesmen and landlords on the one hand, and between tribesmen and the Government on the other. The authority of the shaikhs, where it had not been entirely destroyed by the Government, was antagonistic to it. Government had for the most part broken down. 'Iraq, in the words of one competent observer, which though written with reference to the situation in 1900, may be applied with equal force to that in 1914, was

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[1] *Revenue Circular No.* 15, p. 25; *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2.

[2] *Review of Civil Admin. of the Occupied Territories of al-'Iraq*, 1914-1918 (Baghdad, 1918), p. 44 (hereafter *Review C. Admin. O.T.*, 1914-1918).

[3] The disturbances eventually led the Turkish Government in 1911, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, which 'attributed the Muntafiq troubles to the fact that the arable lands of the tribes are in the hands of a few powerful shaikhs who oppress their fellow tribesmen and keep them at variance . . . The proper remedy is a thorough partition of the lands'. Cited: Note on Sa'dun Problem.

[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917; *Admin. Report Hammar Lake Area*, p. 56.

[5] Ibid., *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, p. 39.

[6] *Arab of Mesopotamia* (Basra, 1917). Hereafter this semi-official publication by Miss G. L. Bell: Bell, *Arab of Meso.*

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> 175 a country of tribesmen fast losing the old loyalties, less and
> 727 less able to revert to the old livelihood, attracting local
> 619 rather than tribal relations, more dependent on order and
> control . . . yet still tribal in material equipment, in speech,
> in ignorance, still easily inflamed to ruin their own interests,
> still resentful of government and all its works.[1]

The full application of the policy of rebuilding the tribal organization under competent shaikhs, advised, controlled and supervised by British Political Officers, which was the essence of Sandeman's policy, had to wait until the force of Turkish arms had been broken.[2] In the meantime, however, every means of strengthening the power of the shaikhs was undertaken, on the basis that 'both the attitude and action of a tribe depend almost entirely on its most influential chiefs'.[3]

[622] A single leading shaikh was recognized in every tribe, as in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh district where H. R. P. Dickson, Assistant Political Officer, reported that he had 'managed during 1916-17, more or less to get the power into the hands of one shaikh in the case of each of the 22 Suq tribes'.[4]

Each shaikh so selected was made responsible for peace and order in his tribe, for the apprehension of wrongdoers, for the protection of lines of communication and of British Government property, for the cutting off of supplies and aid to the Turks and for the collection of such revenue as was levied. In return, he was given the support of British officials, prestige and, if necessary, arms. Possession of his lands was confirmed, and his tribal boundaries were defined as closely as possible. His natural importance in the tribal *majlis* was enhanced by

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[1] Longrigg, S. H., *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq*, p. 309.

[2] For instance, Nāsiriya was occupied July, 1915, but not until 1918 was administrative progress possible among the tribes, because of their anti-British feeling. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2; *Revenue Report*, 1919, p. 24.

[3] *Provisional Note on the Tribes within and fringing Mesopotamian Boundaries, North of Latitude* 33° 20' (*Baghdad*). For official use only, General Staff, M.E.F. (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1 (hereafter *Note on Tribes for General Staff*). Although written in 1920 of tribes of Baghdad wilayet, it is generally applicable to practically all tribes from 1914.

[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917: *Admin. Rep., Suq esh-Shuyukh*, p. 43.

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the measures of the Tribal Disputes Regulations. Added to these 175*
was the policy of 'large doles, subsidies and no taxation',[1] which 727*
one Political Officer, at Nāsiriya, held to be 'chiefly responsible for 619
the remarkable state of law and order which now exists', since 'the shaikh . . . will obey any order than risk losing it (his subsidy)'.[2]

As advantageous for immediate military ends as was the policy of restoring the cohesion of the tribes and the patriarchal rule of their shaikhs and as well suited as it was to many aspects of tribal life, it was nevertheless fraught with difficulties for the future.

The tribal organization had so far deteriorated, especially among the rice-growing and date-producing tribes, that it could only be restored by supporting the shaikhs with force, and, as Sir Henry Dobbs said in 1916: 'Once a shaikh has to rely on Government for support, he has lost the sympathy of his tribesmen.'[3] Endowed with power as they were and motivated by self-interest no less than the meanest tribesmen, the shaikhs found it difficult to restrain themselves from even petty tyrannies, which, by 1920 had assumed such proportions in tribal eyes as to form a cause of the insurrection of that year.

From the standpoint of government, the efforts to restore tribal organization meant the reimposition of feudalism, contrary to the principle of the evolution of political institutions. Purely bureaucratic government, with its lack of flexibility and sympathetic contacts, was manifestly unsuited to tribes at the time, a fact which Mr. Dobbs realized and made every effort to combat. Nevertheless, the introduction of the Sandeman system, depending for its successful operation on maintenance of the tribal *status quo*, gave little opportunity for the operation of civilizing processes, for the growth of less primitive social codes and of more progressive forms of government. The system in 'Iraq tended to become a method of control rather than a system of government in its broadest sense.

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[1] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921 (confidential, Baghdad, 1922), p. 18.

[2] *Reports Admin.*, 1918: *Nasiriyah Division*, p. 351.

[3] Cited, *Admin. Report, Suq al-Shuyukh District*, in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 56.

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CHAPTER V

BRITISH POLICY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD

175* 127* Once Baghdad was in British hands and its future had been considered by a Committee of the War Cabinet, it was apparent that H.M. Government intended to follow a line of policy differing in many respects from that hitherto expected for the political control and administration of Basra, Baghdad and Arabia. The Government of India had declared in late 1915 that 'the minimum of annexation contemplated by us has always been the wilayets of Basra and Baghdad',[1] and it was still generally believed that the whole of the Occupied Territories if not actually annexed would be controlled from India. The views of H.M. Government, however, on this as well as other points were clearly stated in the summary of conclusions of the War Cabinet as telegraphed to Baghdad on March 29th, 1917:

> (1) Occupied territories to be administered by His Majesty's Government, not by Government of India. (2) Basrah with Nasiriyah, Shatt-el-Hai, Kut, Bedrai as its western and northern limits to remain permanently under British Administration. (3) Baghdad to be an Arab State with local ruler or government under British protectorate in everything but name. It will accordingly have no relations with Foreign Powers and Consuls will be accredited to His Majesty's Government. (4) Baghdad to be administered behind the Arab façades as far as possible as an Arab province by indigenous agency and in accordance with existing laws and institutions. In particular (a) Iraq Code not to be used but local judicial system maintained as regards both law and personnel; only with substitution of Arab for

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[1] Dispatch cited by Philby, H. St. J. B., *Arabia* (1928), p. 245.

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315


TURK
ALEXANDRETTA
ALEPPO
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LATAKIA
SYRIA
HAMA
HOMS
TRIPOLI
BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
HAIFA
JAFFA
AMMAN
Qasr Azraq
JERUSALEM
TRANSJORDANIA
PALESTINE

[following p. 96 (a)]

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

URKEY
RIA
'IRAQ
'A
LEPPO
PALMYRA
Deir az Zur
Euphrates
Abu Kamal
Al Qaim
Ana
HADITHA
Khan Baghdadi
Hit
Ramadi
J. TCHE
Rutba
Burqa
Tall Ziwan
Zakho
Amadia
Dohuk
Aqra
Tall Afar
Balad Sinjar
MOSUL
Erbil
Kol Sanjaq
Altun Kopri
KIRKUK
Qala Sherqat
Baiji
Tikrit
Samarra
Al Kadhamain
Al Falluja
Al Mahmudiya
Al Musaiyib
KARBALA
Tuwairij
Al Kifl
AN NAJAF
Abu Sukhair
Shabicha
Tigris
TRANS-DESERT ROUTES
RAILWAYS
BOUNDARIES
TRIBAL NAMES
OIL PIPE LINES
Scale of Miles
100
0
100
200

[following p. 96(b)]

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
I R A N
Rowanduz
Rania
Koi Sanjak
Sulaimaniya
RKUK
Chemchemal
Tauq
Tuz Khurmatli
Kifri
Khanaqin
Karind
KERMANSHAH
Qizil Ribat
Delli Abbas
Naft Khanah
Shahraban
BA'QUBA
Mandali
BAGHDAD
Salman Pak
Al Aziziya
Hindiya
HILLA
Bughaila
Kut al Amara
Ali Gharbi
Ali Sharqi
Kut al Hai
Afaq
Al Diwaniya
Kifl
JAF
Amara
Qala Sikar
Qala Salih
Rumaitha
Shatra
Euphrates
Al Khidhr
Samawa
An Nasiriya
Al Qurna
SUK ASH SHUYUKH
Al Khamisiya
BASRA
MOHAMMERAH
Shuaiba
Az Zubair
Safwan
Umm Qasr
As Sulman
Busaiya
Al Amghar
Ansab
Jahra
AL KUWAIT
KUWAIT

[following p. 96(c)]

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Turk. (*b*) Similarly with executive and administrative machinery. Tribal system of Government, provincial and local councils, etc., to be resuscitated and maintained. (*c*) No disturbance of present land revenue system. (*d*) Employment of Indians in all branches of Administration to be strictly discountenanced as being inconsistent with above principles. No Asiatics from outside to be employed unless of Persian or Arab descent or domicile. The same to apply to Basra wilayet as far as possible. (5) In the event of Basrah not being annexed, head of whole of Mesopotamian administration to be High Commissioner residing at Baghdad, Basrah being placed under the Governor subordinate to him. In the event of Basrah being annexed, head of administration to be styled Governor of Basrah and High Commissioner for Mesopotamia with titular headquarters at Basrah but residing generally at Baghdad. Deputy Governor and Deputy High Commissioner at Basrah and Baghdad, respectively, to act for him in his absence. (6) Amalgamation of British Civil Service, with that of Soudan, and possibly also of Levant, recruitment being carried on by same method and personnel interchangeable. British Officers of Indian Services, if required at first, to be lent temporarily under Foreign Service rules. Those now serving there to be permitted to volunteer for permanent transfer. (7) Shiah Holy Places to form separate enclave not under direct British control, care being taken not to include any important irrigated or irrigable areas in it. (8) Control of irrigation, navigation and conservancy of rivers in both vilayets to be under single British administration. (9) Koweit and whole of Arab littoral of Persian Gulf including Oman to be controlled by Basrah. (10) Aden, Hadramaut to be taken over by Foreign Office. (11) South Persia, including Arabistan and Fars to be sphere of influence of Government of India. (12) It is regarded as of utmost importance that administrative arrangements introduced into Baghdad Wilayet should strictly conform to above principles from the very outset.[1]

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Foreign Secretary, Simla, March 29th, 1917.

175 727 It was also apparent that the application of this policy as well as the continuation of the offensive against the Turks and the active extension of British political influence throughout the wilayet, which H.M. Government put forward as essential for success of the policy, did not meet the whole-hearted approval of the Commander-in-Chief in India, of the Imperial General Staff or of General Maude. The General Staff in particular wished to assume 'an active defensive' in order that men, equipment and shipping might be released for the needs of the Western Front.[1] With the political aspects of the policy, General Maude found it difficult to be in full accord. As a soldier he considered the destruction of Turkish arms to be his first duty, from which his energies should not be diverted, particularly since he believed that an early advance would have a substantial moral effect in Mesopotamia and in adjacent countries.[2] Moreover, an attempt by the Turks to retake Baghdad seemed almost certain.[3] He was reluctant therefore to assume new responsibilities.

In addition he could not regard as desirable the encouragement of the Arab Movement in Mesopotamia as now urged by the Foreign Office which held that it was unsound not to take advantage of the opportunity to exploit Great Britain's Arab policy[4] and to foster a Movement which had proved to be of

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[1] *O.H.*, Vol. IV, pp. 19 ff.

[2] Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Commander-in-Chief, India, July, 1917, cited, *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 27.

[3] See *O.H.*, Vol. IV, pp. 5, 7, 12, 38-41. For Enver Pasha's abortive Yilderim or 'Lightning' expedition to retake Baghdad: *O.H.*, Vol. IV, pp. 8-9, 13 ff., also Husain Husni Amin Bey, *Yilderim*, published by the Turkish General Staff, translated by Captain C. O. de R. Channer, I.A.; also Liman von Sanders, Gen. O. V. C., *Fünf Jahre Türkei* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 219-33.

[4] This policy, in a formula proposed by Sir Mark Sykes, was: 'Towards all Arabs . . . whether independent allies as Ibn Sa'ud or the Sherif, inhabitants of protectorates, spheres of influence, vassal states, we should show ourselves as pro-Arabs, and that wherever we are on Arab soil we are going to back the Arab language and Arab race, and that we shall support or protect Arabs against external oppression by force as much as we are able and from alien exploitation.' Cited Hart, H. B. Liddell, op. cit., p. 105 n.

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distinct military advantage in the past.[1] By thus making use 175* of the Movement, H.M. Government hoped to hasten the 727* defeat of the Turks and to acquire additional compensatory advantages in Mesopotamia, as well as in Palestine, to offset the possible stalemate in Europe. They were also anxious to achieve along the lines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the correspondence between the Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon,[2] an unchallengable position in the Middle East.[3]

General Maude had protested against the proclamation issued in accordance with this policy, but under his name, after the fall of Baghdad as being unnecessary and ill-timed. He had held that the proclamation as well as the policy would create confusion in the minds of the Arabs as to the future intentions of Great Britain, and would unduly arouse their hopes and ambitions at a time when the authority of the British Army must remain supreme and unquestioned in the Occupied Territories.

General Maude was also doubtful as to the military benefits to be derived from the application of the proposals of H.M. Government towards the Arabs,[4] although the Chief Political Officer, Sir Percy Cox, thought that Arab assistance in definite instances, as by the 'Amārāt section of the 'Anaiza tribe, numbering about 5000 rifles under Fahād Beg ibn Hadhdhal,[5]

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[1] Summary of telegram, Chief of Imperial General Staff to General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, May 16th, 1917. The reference to military advantages of the Movement is hardly a reference to Egypt, as suggested in *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 6, but more probably to operations in the Hijāz.

[2] Notably: Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th; December 14th, 1915; January 25th, 1916. Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915; January 1st, 1916.

[3] *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 42, 'In Mesopotamia one of our main guiding factors was our anxiety for the safety of India'.

[4] Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Chief of Imperial General Staff, June 1st, 1917, cited, *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 9.

[5] The 'Amārāt section ranged over the eastern half of the Syrian desert, from Karbalā as far north as Dair az-Zōr, and also shared with the Dulaim pastures between the Euphrates and the wells of Muhaiwir and al-Mat. *Arab Tribes of Baghdad Wilayet, July*, 1918 (Baghdad, 1918); *A Handbook of Mesopotamia* (prepared on behalf of the Admiralty and the War Office, by Naval Staff, Intelligence Department, 1918, 2nd ed., 5 vols.), Vol. I, p. 103 (hereafter *Handbook of Meso.*); *Note on Nomadic Arab Tribes* (Baghdad, 1919).

175 might achieve a wide and important effect apart from its
727 precise military value.[1]

On these points, General Maude was in full agreement with the views of the Government of India and with those of most of his fellow officers in Mesopotamia.[2]

Although one of the objectives of the expedition had been to win over the Arabs from their fellow-Muslims the Turks, the Government of India had made little effort other than with Ibn Sa'ūd, to induce the Arabs to take up arms against the Turks. Talib Pasha, the ambitious leader of Arab Nationalism, was not permitted to return to 'Iraq.[3] Favourably disposed shaikhs were given little active work except that of keeping supplies from the Turks, duties which made little appeal either to their pockets or to their dignity. In late 1915 and early 1916, Karbalā and Najaf had risen against the Turks, the Arab forces with Khalīl Pasha were openly rebellious and the tribes were ripe for a rising.[4] These opportunities had been allowed to pass, although Arab attacks on Turkish communications might have enabled the British forces to have dislodged the Turks before Kūt.

Even the Arab rising in the Hijāz had been deprecated. It had been, in the Viceroy's words, 'a displeasing surprise' and 'its collapse would be far less prejudicial to us in India and also in Afghanistan than would military intervention in support of the revolt'.[5] They feared that it would be regarded by 'very many Mohammedans in and on the borders of India as having been inspired by us and consequently as a Christian interference with religion'.[6]

The attitude of the Government of India may have been

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[1] Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Chief of Imperial General Staff, June 24th, 1917. Summarized in *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 20.

[2] *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 10.

[3] See also *infra*, pp. 231 ff., 239, 272, 305, 320 ff.

[4] Lawrence, T. E., *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1935), p. 60.

[5] Hart, op. cit., p. 107.

[6] *O.H.*, Vol. III, pp. 26-7. But cf. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. X (1923), p. 63.

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partially due to fear of the effect of an Arab revolt on Indian 175*
Muslims still loyal to the religious authority of the Ottoman 727*
Khalīfa. It seems more probable that it was due to the inherent disbelief of Anglo-Indian officials in native ability, to the desire to avoid using allies who might complicate the eventual settlement of the political status of Mesopotamia and to the antagonism to an Arab policy which did not originate in India.

For generations past the Government of India had assumed sole charge of Great Britain's relations with the Arabs. On March 31st, however, the High Commissioner for Egypt assumed charge of all Arab affairs, save those of the south and east coasts of Arabia.[1] In this action, in Foreign Office support of the Sharīf of Mecca rather than Ibn Sa'ūd, the protégé of the Government of India, and in the incitement of Arabs against their spiritual and temporal overlords — a dangerous precedent, according to Indian authorities — lay the fundamental differences of opinion which gave rise to the two so-called 'schools' of thought on Arab politics. The Anglo-Indian or Eastern Arabia or Sa'ūdī school viewed Arab politics from the standpoint of the immediate needs of India. It regarded the Wahhābī Amīr of the Najd as the proper Arab leader, and it aimed at the penetration of Arabia from the Persian Gulf and Aden, at the indirect control of Arabs in their own spheres and at the absorption, by the Government of India, of Turkish Arabia, that it might, as a western Burma, protect and extend Imperial interests.

The Anglo-Egyptian or Western Arabia or Hāshimī school, no less concerned for the welfare of India, adopted the line of action which, if successful, would place friendly Arabs in Damascus, barring a possible French expansion towards India, and in Western Arabia and in Turkish Arabia, facilitating the protection of both the Suez Canal and the land routes to India. Having selected the Sharīf of Mecca and his family as the fittest tools available, it aimed at Arab independence in strictly Arab lands and at only sufficient influence over the other Arab-

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[1] *O.H., E. and Pal.*, Vol. 1, p. 216.

175* speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire as might guarantee
127* their friendly relations with Great Britain.[1]

In Mesopotamia, the views of the Anglo-Indian school naturally prevailed. Moreover, the military authorities, trained in the conduct of war only by orthodox methods, had little desire for irregular allies, who, in their opinion, had proven both unreliable and unsuitable for conditions of modern warfare. Their own experiences were taken as justification for these views. The tribes in Mesopotamia had shifted from side to side, according to whichever at the moment seemed to be winning.[2] They turned at the first opportunity, against ally or enemy, forgetting all obligations, in order that they might plunder and loot: their 'clearest and strongest positive influence'.[3] The Turks had relinquished hope of using them after the battle of Shu'aiba, where the 10,000 tribal allies had not fired a single shot. Even Ibn Sa'ūd, from whom the Government of India had expected much, had failed to render effective aid against the Turks, although, when his enemies had been removed or weakened, he became the paramount figure of Arabia. He had entered into treaty relations with Great Britain, December 26th, 1915, after negotiations extending over fourteen months. He was also in receipt of a subsidy which, in proportion to his effective participation against the common enemy, the Turks, was far greater than that paid to Sharīf Husain,[4] although he constantly com-

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[1] See Hogarth, D. G., *Quarterly Review*, Vol. CCXXXIV (1920), pp. 411 ff.

[2] 'This is not treachery but the natural outcome of weakness and the struggle to exist.' Extract from *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, p. 2. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 56, cites the example of 'the carefully attested warrior, who, in an authentic tribal battle, changed sides on no less than five occasions eventually to be with the victors'.

[3] *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, p. 2. Arab uncertainty and their proneness to consider loot as the chief aim of their existence more than once threatened to suspend the operations on the other side of the desert; Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 128-9, 348, 368 ff. 470, 523, passim; Hart, op. cit., pp. 296-7.

[4] It has been estimated that the operations of the Hijāz Force accounted for 65,000 Turkish troops, at the cost of £100 per man. Ibn Sa'ūd, in receipt of £60,000 annually from the British Treasury alone, as well as of other sums from the Government of India, occupied the attention of not a single Turkish soldier. Nor did his pro-Turk rival, Ibn Rashid, have anything 'to fear from Ibn Sa'ud'. (*Cmd.* 1061, p. 25. See also *O.H., E. and Pal.*, Vol. II, p. 398.) It has

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plained of its smallness.[1] His failure to render aid in 1915 may have been one reason why the British authorities at Cairo turned to negotiations with the Sharif of Mecca.

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The military authorities could see little practical value in the Arabs as fighting forces unless they were carefully organized under officers with suitable knowledge and with military experience. They could be employed then only as part of a general campaign under a single direction. Otherwise, while they could harry and demoralize a retreating enemy, they would be entirely ineffective, although tiresome, against unbroken troops.[2]

With such views prevailing in India and in Mesopotamia, it is not surprising that T. E. Lawrence, on his visit to 'Iraq in 1916, with a three-fold mission, one of which was to foster, if possible, an Arab rising similar to that brewing in western Arabia, should be treated with scorn,[3] that subsequent events in Hijāz should be belittled[4] and that the policy of organizing Arab assistance should be rejected.

The historical fact remains that while many of the same obstacles to tribal co-operation existed in western Arabia, the effort was made there, with important results in the successful defeat of the common enemy, the Turk and his allies. The peculiar genius of T. E. Lawrence; the inspiring leadership and

[1] Memorandum No. 24, August 9th, 1917, from 'Iraq Section, Arab Bureau to Arab Bureau, Cairo. For Ibn Sa'ūd's own valuation of his services to Great Britain, see 'Amin Rihani, *Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia, his people and his land* (1928), p. 61.

[2] Summary of telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Chief of Imperial General Staff, June 1st, 1917, *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 10. Cf. the views of T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 104, 339-40. For the opinion of a Turkish Army commander on the military value of Arabs, see Djemal Pasha, op. cit., p. 153. For that of the head of the German Military Mission to Turkey, see Liman von Sanders, op. cit., p. 242.

[3] Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 59-60; Hart, op. cit., p. 101.

[4] 'Nothing that had been achieved in the direction of Arab co-operation on the Palestine front, up to this date (1917), gave those on the spot (Mesopotamia) any reason to advocate any change in policy.' Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia, 1917-20*, p. 4.

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been estimated that in the British Army's operations against the Turks, each Turkish casualty or prisoner cost from £1500 to £2000 per head. See Toynbee, A. J., *The Islamic World Since the Peace Settl*[illegible] (1927), p. 283; *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XLIX (1922), pp. 241-[illegible] ibid., H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CVIX (1922), p. 490.

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175* fervent belief in Arab Nationalism of the Amir Faisal ibn Husain;
727* the military experience of Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari[1]; the patient direction of Lieut.-Colonel P. C. Joyce and the organizing ability of Colonel A. G. Dawnay and of Major Hubert Young contributed not a little to the success of the Arab movement in the West. So also did the support of those officials in Whitehall and in Egypt, including Sir Gilbert Clayton, Commander D. G. Hogarth, Sir Reginald Wingate, Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis, who, while aware of the limitations of Arab character and temperament, believed in the military as well as the political value of Arab co-operation against the Turks.[2] This belief was not wholly unjustified; the Arabs did not rise in force against the Allied Powers, as had been predicted. The Sharifian activities in western Arabia from 1916 onwards against isolated Turkish posts and communications taxed the strength of the Turks and contributed almost as much to the defeat of the Central Powers as did the role which they played in the main operations in Palestine and Syria under the command of General Allenby.[3]

The failure to make the same effort in 'Iraq was not due to any lack of men of undoubted ability to lead and to work with the Arabs, although none would have claimed the special gifts of the late T. E. Lawrence. Outstanding men were Major H. R. P. Dickson[4] who, combining generous sympathy with unwearying patience, possessed an unrivalled psychological understanding of the tribal Arab; Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Leachman who, by his indomitable spirit, controlled vast areas of

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[1] Killed in the *coup d'état* in 'Iraq, October 29th, 1936. For an estimate of the services of this 'Iraqi patriot, soldier and statesman and the esteem with which he was held, see *The Times*, November 2nd, 1936; *J. R. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. XXIV (1937) pp. 194-6.

[2] Hogarth, Cmdr., D. G., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. x (1923), p. 63.

[3] Allenby, Field-Marshal Lord, *J. R. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. XXII (1935), p. 333; and *The Times*, May 20th, 1935; *O.H., E. and Pal.*, Vol. I, pp. v, 221, 372; Vol. II, pp. 401-3, 408-9; Lloyd, Lord, *The Daily Telegraph*, May 20th, 1935; Lloyd George, D., *The Times*, May 20th, 1930; Hart, op. cit., pp. 374-6, 437 ff., and *The Times*, May 20th, 1935; Liman von Sanders, op. cit., pp. 185-7, 260-1, 290-1, 345; Djemal Pasha, op. cit., pp. 168, 170, 191, 233.

[4] Now Lieut.-Col. Dickson, Political Officer, Kuwait.

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tribal country almost single-handed under most trying con- 175*
ditions;[1] Major H. W. Young, who later served under Law- 727*
rence in western Arabia;[2] Bertram Thomas, later to distinguish himself as an explorer;[3] H. St. John B. Philby, whose knowledge of Arabia and of Arabs is now probably unequalled;[4] and later, Major A. H. Ditchburn, much of whose work in the Muntafiq has endured to this day.[5]

The energies and talents of these men, as well as of others, instead of being utilized in organizing Arab co-operation as a means of winning the war as in western Arabia, were diverted to checking tribal quarrels, to preventing food and supplies reaching the Turks, to collecting revenue and laying the foundations of administration. Such activities, although no mean accomplishments in themselves and no small contributions to the eventual establishment of the Kingdom of 'Iraq, were in no way fully indicative of the capacity of the British officers nor of what might have been accomplished had the authorities ordered otherwise.

For whatever reasons deemed sufficient at the time, the failure of the military authorities to make full military use of the

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[1] For excellent summaries of his character and career, see Hogarth, *Geog. Jour.*, Vol. LVI (1920), pp. 325-6; also *Near East*, August 26th, 1920, and *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VIII (1921), pp. 70 ff. A highly coloured picture of Col. Leachman's career has been given by G. N. N. Bray, in *Shifting Sands* (1934), a book that is both inaccurate and unhistorical. His thesis, maintained also in his more recent biography of Leachman (1936), and by Main, E., op. cit., that Leachman actually contributed more to the success of Great Britain's Arab policy than any other individual is hardly tenable. Although a man of great gifts and a superb keeper of tribal peace, his work was less creative in character and less permanent in value than that accomplished in western Arabia. The thesis also confuses the Arab policy of H.M. Government and that pursued by the Anglo-Indian authorities in 'Iraq.

[2] Now Governor of Northern Rhodesia. He played a prominent part in the creation of the Kingdom of 'Iraq, and was Great Britain's first Minister to 'Iraq after the cessation of the Mandate. See his *Independent Arab.*

[3] See his *Arabia Felix: Across the Empty Quarter of Arabia* (1932). Also, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia* for a vivid and well-balanced account of his experiences in Mesopotamia and Muscat.

[4] See his *Heart of Arabia* (1922); *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (1928) and *The Empty Quarter* (1933).

[5] Administrative Inspector, 'Iraq, from 1922 until his recent appointment as Land Settlement Officer, 'Iraq.

175+ Arabs of Mesopotamia, notwithstanding the efforts of Sir Percy
727+ Cox and his associates to win Arab support in other directions[1] had far-reaching effects, not only during the period of hostilities but also long after the end of the war.

The British authorities in Mesopotamia lost thereby the war-time services of capable Arab leaders. Arabs of 'Iraq by the score, once in Turkish service, were gathered from the internment camps in India and Egypt, to serve as leaders and officers,
[186 not in the land of their birth, but in the Hijāz. In contact there
665] with the sources of the Arab Movement, they were to imbibe and to pass on to 'Iraq, in the days after the Armistice, an intensity of Arab Nationalism hitherto unknown in 'Iraq. On the western side of Arabia, they had come into contact with English officers who, no less sincere in their allegiance to British interests than those on the eastern side of Arabia, were nevertheless sympathetic to this awakening Arab Nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that these 'Iraqīs felt the difference between the official mind in Mesopotamia and that on the Mediterranean side of the desert, nor that, appreciating the difference, they were all the more impatient with the attitude of the Civil Administration which prevailed at Baghdad after Sir Percy Cox had been sent to Teheran in early 1918. Such impatience was none the less because they had little or no experience or knowledge of the difficulties of the military or administrative problems of Turkish Arabia, of which the British had gained an intimate, first-hand knowledge.

The military authorities in Mesopotamia also lost the opportunity to learn what British officers in western Arabia had already learned: that the Arabs might be more than treacherous, self-seeking, half-civilized peoples. The end of the war,

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[1] To the untimely death of Capt. W. H. I. Shakespear near Artawī, in January, 1915, has been ascribed the failure of Ibn Sa'ūd to take an active part in the war and the failure to develop in Mesopotamia an Arab Movement comparable to that in the Hijāz. See Philby, *The Heart of Arabia*, Vol. 1, p. 21; Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1914-1917, p. 161; also, Coke, Richard, *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 221.

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consequently, found few British officials in authority in 'Iraq who had any sympathy for Arab Nationalism or who had more than hearsay knowledge either of its strength or of the extent of the Movement on the other side of the desert. To the majority of the British officials in Mesopotamia, engrossed in creating an Anglo-Indian regime for the country and belonging, for the most part, to the 'Indian School' of Arab politics and, therefore, antagonistic to everything savouring of the rival 'Sharifian School', Arab Nationalism was something to be controlled at all costs and destroyed wherever possible.

Notwithstanding the reluctance of the military authorities to accept political responsibilities, the creation and maintenance of British influence in the Baghdad wilayet became the chief mission of the expedition, according to instructions issued by the Imperial General Staff,[1] following considerable interchange of views among the authorities concerned. General Maude's force, after Baghdad wilayet had been cleared of Turks, was to assume the defensive, but it was to be ready to seize the earliest opportunity to resume the offensive. Tribal co-operation against the Turks was to be encouraged as far as possible, but administrative expansion was to be limited to bare essentials. These activities were to be placed under the guidance of Sir

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[1] Cf. Orders issued to Sir William R. Marshall on his assumption of the command of British Forces in Mesopotamia. (Telegram, Chief of Imperial General Staff to General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, November 22nd, 1917), of which the pertinent sections are given here:

On your assumption of the command in Mesopotamia I think it advisable to recapitulate the instructions issued to your predecessor.

1. The prime mission of your force is the establishment and maintenance of British influence in the Baghdad Wilayet. Your mission is, therefore, primarily defensive, but, while making every possible preparation to meet attack, you should take advantage of your central position and of the superiority of your communications over those of the enemy to make your defence as active as possible and to strike at the enemy whenever he gives you an opportunity of doing so with success.

4. It is important to enlist the co-operation of the Arab tribes in your theatre, and induce them to harass the enemy's communications and refuse him supplies. For this an active propaganda, which should make the most of our recent successes in Palestine and Mesopotamia, should be undertaken. As to this you will consult and be guided by Sir Percy Cox.

175 Percy Cox as Civil Commissioner, subject to the supervision of
727 the General Officer Commanding, but with the right to correspond directly with the India Office. Sir Percy in his new role, replacing that of Chief Political Officer, was given responsibility of greater scope than hitherto permitted by General Maude, who had been loath to develop the civil machine.

The general principles by which H.M. Government wished Baghdad to be administered had been laid down in section 4 of the telegram of March 29th. They were again summarized in a telegram to Sir Percy Cox in August, 1917:

> The Civil Administration must be carried on under such military supervision as the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief considers essential, with due regard to local conditions and prejudices, if only to prevent disorder which might necessitate the detachment of troops urgently required elsewhere. . . . For the present only such minimum of administrative efficiency should be aimed at as is necessary for the maintenance of order and to meet the requirements of the force; the amendment of laws and the introduction of reforms should be kept within the narrowest possible limits. His Majesty's Government do not wish large or controversial administrative questions raised or referred to them until the danger of Turkish attack is passed. . . .[1]

The desirability of exploiting local resources for the prosecution of the war in accordance with these instructions and the necessity of at least partially satisfying the legitimate claims of the civil population for restoration of government in compliance with international law, were duly recognized by the political authorities on the spot. Other aspects of the instructions they held, however, to be not only impractical and out of touch with existing local conditions but also contrary to Great Britain's true interests in the Middle East. If British control were to be established in accordance with the avowed intentions of H.M. Government, it was essential in their opinion that there should

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[1] Cited *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 1.

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be provided from the outset an administration which from its extent and solidity of foundation would 'meet future as well as present requirements' and would furnish a firm basis for such control.[1] As Sir Arnold Wilson wrote later: 'Neither Sir Percy Cox nor, at a later stage, I myself, could subscribe to the view that we should aim only at "the minimum administrative efficiency necessary to preserve order". Much more was at stake than the preservation of order.'[2]

The proposed administrative and political differentiation between the wilayets of Baghdad and Basra, therefore, together with the erection of an Arab façade by the admission and encouragement of Arab participation in the administration of Baghdad Wilayet met with little favour in Mesopotamia. It was felt that it would hamper administrative efficiency, the *beau-idéal* of Anglo-Indian administrators and that it might lead to undesirable opposition from Arab opinion. Even more important were the obstacles it would place in the application of uniform British control in conformity with the Sykes-Picot Agreement rather than with the tenor of the promises made to the Arabs through the Sharif of Mecca. The Civil Commissioner from the first had advocated that Baghdad should be added to Basra[3] which, as he had reason to know, it had been the original intention of the Government of India to administer directly. He now viewed the policy of H.M. Government with misgivings, mainly on the grounds of expediency and of the inability to find suitable 'Iraqis willing to take part in the administration.

It was under the regime of the Acting Civil Commissioner, following the departure of Sir Percy Cox for Persia, March, 1918, that the gulf widened between the original instructions of H.M. Government and local administrative opinion. He held that the policy of H.M. Government was based on a

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[1] See *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 1.

[2] Wilson, op. cit., pp. 264-5. But cf. *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 1.

[3] *Supra*, p. 63.

175* series of misconceptions, fostered and disseminated by irres-
727* ponsible enthusiasts at the Foreign Office and in Egypt, concerning not only the ability of the Arabs to govern themselves, their desire for self-government and their willingness to serve in the administration of Mesopotamia, but also the best interests of Great Britain in the Near and Middle East. The account of the efforts to combat these misconceptions and to impose an administration which he believed best suited to the country belongs to succeeding pages.

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CHAPTER VI

INITIATION OF ADMINISTRATION IN BAGHDAD WILAYET

In view of the divergence of opinion, both between London and 175*
Baghdad, and, to a lesser extent, between the local military 727*
authorities and Sir Percy Cox, both as regards the policy and the character of the administration to be set up in Baghdad, it is not surprising that those in charge of the Civil Administration in 'Iraq did not strictly adhere to the instructions laid down for their guidance; that the administration should have taken on aspects beyond the limits prescribed by H.M. Government; and that the immediate differentiation between the administration of Basra and Baghdad should be confined to a separation of administrative organization rather than to any appreciable alteration of spirit or character of the administration except in the Judicial System.[1]

Administrative Organization

Under the organization adopted after the fall of Baghdad a 175*
Deputy Chief Political Officer remained in charge at Basra 727*
while Sir Percy Cox took up his headquarters at Baghdad. 631
Later, when Sir Percy became Civil Commissioner, September 1st, 1917, both wilayets were separated into divisions. Basra Wilayet, with the addition of Kūt, remained the same as in Turkish days. Its five divisions were: Basra, Qurna, Nāsiriya, 'Amāra and Kūt. Baghdad was divided into eight divisions: Baghdad, Sāmarrā, Ba'qūbā, Khānaqīn, Ramādī, Shāmiya, and Samāwa. To each of these a Political Officer was posted, as well as to 'Azīziya and to Karbalā. Under each Political

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[1] *Infra*, pp. 128 ff.

175* Officer, Assistant Political Officers administered subdivisions
727* or districts. A Deputy Civil Commissioner assumed control of
631 the Basra divisions until September, 1918, when the two
wilayets, largely for political reasons, were merged and the administration directed from Baghdad.

Political Control and Revenue Administration

175* As at Basra, military exigencies largely controlled the situa-
727* tion. General Maude's own attitude to the Civil Administration
had been in accordance with his views as to the necessity of establishing the unquestioned authority of the military authorities rather than with the spirit of the proclamation issued in his name after the fall of Baghdad. The appointment, often without reference to the Chief Political Officer, of military officials, many of whom knew nothing of Arab conditions or of Arabic, to civil administrative positions, gave no suggestion that he took seriously the statement 'I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army'.[1] The Government by proclamation, with its harassing and sometimes unnecessary regulations, gave as little hint to the people of Baghdad as earlier regulations had given to the people of Basra, that the armies had 'not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors or enemies but as Liberators'.[2]

652 Nevertheless, Sir Percy Cox, concerned with the future as
175 well as the present, deemed it essential to extend political con-
727 trol throughout the wilayet, as much as permitted by the
military authorities and by General Maude's centralization of authority into his own hands. Such control could be best attained, as had been discovered in Basra Wilayet, by extending

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Proc. No. 9, p. 5. Text: App. I.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

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the administration and collection of revenue, which, in the eyes 652
of the tribes, was regarded as a sign of government authority, 175+
similarly as revenue payment was considered an outward sign 727+
of their submission. Much of the confidence engendered by the Political Officers in Basra Wilayet had been the result of their revenue activities,[1] which included far more than the collection of taxes following the enforced assumption by the Revenue Board of a far wider range of responsibilities than merely financial duties. In addition, the extension of land-revenue collections in kind from the fertile areas of the middle Euphrates would produce local foodstuffs for the army and thereby release much precious tonnage. Hence, after the fall of Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox's chief efforts were directed, not only to the establishment of friendly relations with leading dignitaries, but also, through the First Revenue Officer, to the collection of information as to the customary rates of demand; the sorting of a mass of papers; the foundation of a Revenue system capable of extension; the inceptions of departments such as *Auqāf*, Education, etc., and the actual collection of revenue in Baghdad and surrounding districts.[2] The complexities and inconsistencies of the Turkish Revenue system, to which reference has already been made, proved, as in Basra Wilayet, one of the greatest obstacles in the way of a rapid establishment in Baghdad Wilayet of a system based on its principles.

The Turkish Revenue System

Under the Turks, general revenues in each wilayet had been 651
collected under the authority of the *Daftardar* (Provincial 175*
Director of Finance), either directly or through departments. Among the taxes collected directly were land revenue in its various aspects, *koda* (animal head-tax), *tamattū* (income or

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[1] 'I have been long convinced that Revenue work is the most important part of their duties.' Deputy Civil Commissioner in *Admin. Report, Basrah*, 1917, p. 8.

[2] *Administration Report, Revenue Board, Baghdad, March 22 to December* 31, 1917 (Baghdad, 1918), p. 1 (hereafter *Revenue Report*, 1917).

651 professional tax), conscription exemption tax and several minor
175* taxes. Tax-collecting Departments controlled by the *Defterdar* included the *Dairāt al Limān* (Marine Department) and the *Nufūs* or Statistical Department. Twelve other heads of revenue, together with one-quarter of three per cent of the customs receipts which had been assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, by the decree of Muharram, December 20th, 1881, following the default of the Ottoman Government on its European-held debts, were collected by a special Civil Service.[1]

A few other revenues, provincial in character,[2] were accredited to the *Muhāsiba al Khassiya* (Special Accounts Department) created by the Young Turks as a sop to the outcry that the Central Government drained the Arab provinces of all funds. Customs were also in charge of a special staff.

In any account of land revenue, the most important of the
651 general revenues, it must be clearly recognized that the Otto-
175* man Government made a distinction between its right over land as Sovereign and its right as actual possessor or owner of the soil as well as between the dues exacted in accordance with each right.

In 'Iraq, the Ottoman Government, by right of conquest, deemed itself in theory both Sovereign and sole owner of all land save in so far as it had divested itself of its rights of ownership by a specific act of alienation to individual owners. Lands so alienated absolutely, under the Land Code or *Qanūn Arādhī* of 7 Ramadhan, 1274 (1858)[3] were known as *Sirf Mulk.*[4] Those alienated conditionally by *tāpū sanads* were known as *Arādhī Amīrīya* under the Code but were more commonly called *tāpū* 651 lands in 'Iraq. Such alienated lands formed but a small pro- 125* portion of the arable of 'Iraq. Most of it, although great sections had been in the actual possession and cultivation of the tribes for years, had never been granted on *sanads*, and was, therefore, *Arādhī Amīrīya* or *mīrī* land in 'Iraq.[1] Other large sections had found their way to the personal possession of the Sultan or Ottoman royal family, and thence to *Arādhī Mudawwera*.[2]

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[1] For the decree, and full list of the assigned revenues, Young, Sir George, *Droit Ottoman*, Vol. v, pp. 69 ff.

[2] The 'public works' and 'education' cesses on land revenue; 5 per cent cess on *koda*; 10 per cent cess on income tax; half the proceeds of the slaughterhouse fees; rents and profits of education trust property.

[3] Text: Ongley, F., *Ottoman Land Code* (1892), Bk. I, pp. 1 ff; Young, Sir G., op. cit., Vol. vi, pp. 45 ff; Fisher, Stanley, *Ottoman Land Laws* (1919). Under the Code five legal categories of land were recognized:

1. *Arādhī Mumlūka*, land held in undiluted ownership.
2. *Arādhī Amīriya*, state land, the usufructuary possession of which is granted on a registered tenure.

In the case of the unalienated state lands, the Government was entitled to exact from the user both rent as landlord or owner, and revenue as accruing to it as Sovereign. The distinctions between these exactions had tended to become obscure since the two were usually paid as a single contribution.

In the case of *mulk* or *tāpū* land, the Government demanded revenue only since it possessed merely dominion. The possessors of the titles to such lands had the right to demand the landlord's share, normally the same as the revenue share, which was, on the principle of the 'Ashar, the tenth part of the fruits of the earth. On lands watered by flow irrigation, an additional tenth part of the crops was demanded as representing the fruits of the water.

Numerous graduations and variation of these shares had

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[1] 'The tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all.' Dowson, Sir E. M., *An Enquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth, 1932), p. 5.

[2] *Arādhī Saniya* or Crown Lands until 1909, when the Young Turks transferred them to general revenues.

3- *Arādhī Muqūfa*, land dedicated to pious purposes.
4- *Arādhī Matrūka*, land especially reserved for some public purpose.
5- *Arādhī Mawat*, waste land.

These classifications had never been applied as a whole to 'Iraq. Terms were also misapplied. Thus *Arādhī Amīrīya* is known as *tāpū* land in 'Iraq, while land held in legal possession of the state is called *mīrī*. Category 4 seems not to have been generally recognized in 'Iraq.

[4] See Howell, Sir E., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IX (19[illegible]), pp. 20 ff. for an authoritative article: *The Qanun al-Aradhi*.

grown up, however, in recognition of the general principle that
651 land taxation and rent were proportional to profits made on the
175 land, which varied yearly on account of faulty water control, weather vagaries, floods, pests, dust storms, and lack of security from marauding neighbours or nomadic tribes. Annual assessments were also made on most crops in accordance with the same principle. Such assessments were usually made by sight estimation of grain shortly before it was reaped, or on the threshing floor, or by a combination of these methods.[1] The measurement of small sample areas was another method commonly used in numerous sections of the Hilla and Shāmīya divisions.[2] Occasionally fixed assessment existed, as on the number of pumping engines or lift machines on an estate,[3] or where taxes were farmed for a period of years at a fixed sum.[4]

651 The Turkish theory of variation in rates of demand[5] and in
175 assessment[6] which took into account local conditions was, on the whole, well suited to a land of violent contrasts such as 'Iraq. Behind the variations also existed a substratum of custom and of habit so firmly entrenched in the life of the country that Turkish legislation often did no more than formalize or commit to paper the habit of ages, as for instance Midhat Pasha's *firmān* on '*Uqr*.[7] Even the Civil Administration and, later, the 'Iraq Government, although condemning the lack of uniformity of the Turks and aiming at fixed assessments, had to recognize the validity of the variations with constantly recurring rebates and

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[1] Outlines of Turkish Assessment methods in *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18, *Admin. Report of Revenue Department, Baghdad*, 1918 (hereafter *Revenue Report*, 1918), (Baghdad, 1919), pp. 6–7; ibid., 1919, p. 6.

[2] *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18.

[3] Ibid., p. 15; ibid., 1918, p. 7.

[4] Ibid., 1917, p. 18.

[5] A comprehensive list of Turkish demands, together with those adopted by the Civil Administration (never higher, often lower) in: *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 8; ibid., 1919, App. B., pp. 45–7; *Revenue Circular, No.* 7, 26 *February*, 1919; also *Report on Mesopotamian Spring Harvest* (Baghdad, 1919), p. 6.

[6] For instance, land irrigated by lift on the right bank of the Tigris, above Kādhimain, paid fixed assessments in cash. Land opposite on the left bank paid fluctuating demands, *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 15.

[7] Cited *Revenue Report*, 1917, pp. 11 ff.

remissions of taxes to meet difficulties caused by abnormal weather, flood or agricultural conditions. The system in application was not without its abuses. Once a variation had been made, either in increase or in reduction of demand, valid enough at the time it was made, it was often assumed to be permanent after the original circumstances had passed into oblivion. Thus inconsistencies had grown up side by side with elasticity. 651 175*

The right to collect the assessment was frequently put up to auction or sold by negotiation. In Basra Wilayet, the practice was also followed of making each shaikh responsible for the revenue of his tribe. In Baghdad Wilayet, however, the practice had been to make the *sarkars* (invariably pronounced *sarkals*) or sub-lessees directly responsible for cultivation, and also responsible for revenue payments.

The system of annual estimates no less than the method of collection had afforded opportunities for bribery and corruption. The assessors, without adequate supervision, varied the assessments according to the inducement offered them; auctioneers who sold the right of collection could be bought or intimidated into selling to particular bidders. Shaikhs had to be placated to permit collection, while official machinery had to be oiled in case it was necessary to employ gendarmes to overcome opposition by the tax-payers.

British Revenue Administration

From the occupation of Basra Wilayet onwards, British officials had deemed the opportunities for corruption, the lack of encouragement of agricultural development by means of fixed assessments and, above all, the inconsistencies of the system as sufficient reasons for frowning upon the system, particularly the fluctuations in assessments and the variations in demand. 'The ultimate aim', the Revenue Secretary wrote in 1918, 'of our revenue policy is to make a fixed assessment at equitable 651 727* 175*

65/ 727* 175* rates and payable in cash, instead of the present arrangement.[1] Fixed assessments, however, were found to be impossible for the time, as was the immediate creation of a revenue system which, while based on the familiar fiscal system in accordance with the instructions of H.M. Government, would embrace the improvement of the revenue staff, the settlement of 'Iraq's fundamental agricultural problem, that is, the definition of the rights of labourer, tenants, landowner and state over the land, and the resuscitation of agricultural prosperity in a manner that should be politically sound. Nevertheless, steps were taken in that direction. Consolidation of position occupied most of 1917. By the end of 1918 it was claimed by the Revenue Department that, although Turkish methods were still employed, the results were better than under the Turks, even after years of effort on their part.[2] In fact, in that year the British authorities issued demands for and collected more land revenues than had the Turks in any pre-war year. The latter in 1911-12 collected approximately Rs.96,97,000 or about £690,000 in tithes, *koda* and minor land taxes.[3] In 1918, similar categories of taxation produced Rs.157,47,430 or £1,124,817,[4] or one and two-thirds times the receipts of 1911. Even greater progress was made in 1919, the civil authorities collecting Rs.182,23,497 or £1,301,784,[5] or nearly double the 1911 receipts.[6]

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[1] Revenue Circular No. 7, February 26th, 1919. Cf. *Revenue Report*, 1917, pp. 5 and 42.

[2] *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 6.

[3] *Bulletin Annuel de Statistique*, 1327 (1911), Imperial Ottoman Ministry of Finance (Constantinople). Turkish piastres converted throughout at 7·5 per rupee and 110 per pound sterling.

[4] Exclusive of revenue grains supplied to the Army, valued at 60 lacs:—*Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118. Rupees converted throughout to sterling at fourteen to the pound.

[5] *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. ii.

[6] Notwithstanding the statement 'the land-revenue receipts for 1919-20 were substantially lower than in Turkish times', Wilson, op. cit., p. 264. Cf. statement in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 88, an official report prepared under the Acting Civil Commissioner's supervision: 'The country has paid more in taxation than it used to pay.' Also Telegram No. 8784, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to India Office, July 21st, 1920. For further comparison of revenue receipts see *infra*, p. 145.

Koda, the Turkish head-tax on camels, buffaloes, sheep and 651
goats from time immemorial, had been, at the time of the 727*
occupation of Basra, converted to a slaughter-house tax in order 175*
to lower the price of meat for the army. In other regions, as in lower 'Iraq, where the Turks had given up the attempt to collect the tax, the British made no effort to revive it until 1919.[1] Elsewhere, the tax was collected by a variety of methods at the rate of a rupee per camel or buffalo, and eight annas per sheep or goat. The most common method in the tribal areas was to assess the tribe and, in accordance with the policy of using the shaikhs to govern, lay the collection on the shaikhs and *sarkals*, giving them a percentage for their efforts. It was hoped to extend this method throughout the country.[2]

Other former Turkish sources of revenue, such as the military tax, fell into abeyance. Others, such as the income tax, *tamattü*, were abandoned.[3]

In Baghdad Wilayet, the Revenue Department included, as it
had in Basra, a number of duties other than purely revenue 727*
work. It dealt with Customs, Public Debt, *Waqf* Administra- 175*
tion, Land Regulation, Education and, under military supervision, with Irrigation and Agriculture. During 1918, however, as the staff increased and organization extended, each department tended to become a separate unit. Nevertheless, the Revenue Department continued to expand, dealing with seventeen varied aspects of administration in September, 1919.[4] By April, 1920, its activities had extended to some twenty-two branches of the Administration.[5]

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[1] *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 4.

[2] Ibid., p. 14.

[3] Dobbs, H. R. C., *Collection of Notes on Revenue Matters*, 1915-1916 (confidential).

[4] *Note on the Organisation of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, September 1st*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919).

[5] Ibid., *April 1st*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1920).

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'IRAQ

Irrigation and Agriculture

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In a country so predominantly agricultural as 'Iraq, where rainfall, generally speaking, is too slight for its needs, the provision of irrigation from the rivers, the traditional source of the country's prosperity, remains one of the major problems. The problem of irrigation, however, is more than one of mere extraction of water from the rivers. It is also the maintenance of the natural drainage of the country, its protection from floods and the preservation of navigable waterways.[1]

After the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the early irrigation systems, the remains of which can still be seen, collapsed. No government which assumed power was able to maintain canals or regulate the flow of water. Each man did what was good in his own eyes. Many canals silted up. Other canals, cut in the banks by the cultivators, without adequate knowledge or without regard for the future, came to carry more water than the parent river. In many cases, the abstracted water because of improper drainage ruined the land through salination or else filled vast marshes. The rivers, unable to scour their beds in the lower reaches, increased the dangers from floods and hampered navigation.[2]

Not until comparatively modern times were efforts made by the Turks to prevent flooding and to secure the services of engineers to study and to undertake irrigation works. The most prominent of the foreign engineers was Sir William Willcocks who, from his appointment in 1908, studied and proposed schemes for the irrigation and drainage of the country.[3]

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[1] *Note on Irrigation in Mesopotamia, December*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 9.

[2] Ibid., p. 7; *Brief Note on Irrigation Work in Mesopotamia and the operations of the Irrigation Directorate, M. E. F., up to November*, 1918 (Baghdad, 1919), p. 1.

[3] His programme, in brief, was: the construction of two barrages on the Euphrates at Hindiya and at Fallūja, and two on the Tigris at Kūt and Balad; the construction of a proper canal system from these barrages; the utilization of the Habbāniya-'Abū Dibbis depression as an escape for the flood waters of the Tigris; the regulation of the swamps above Basra; the rehabilitation of the Nahrwan Canal from the Diyālā; and the provision of drainage, escapes and afforestation in connection with the entire programme. Willcocks, Sir W., *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, 2nd ed.), pp. 15 ff.

The Turks, however, lacking both money and initiative for 175*
his whole programme,[1] undertook, with encouragement from 241
Great Britain and from Germany, the construction of the 312
Hindiya barrage and the Habbāniya escape of which only the
former was completed in 1914.

At the beginning of the Occupation, the interest of the 175*
military authorities in irrigation and in agriculture had been 727*
confined to restricting the former where it hindered navigation, 241
and encouraging the latter to meet the needs of the troops, 312
although a certain amount of flood prevention work was undertaken from late 1915 onwards. Urgent repairs of the Hindiya barrage and the completion of its canal were also carried out by military engineers in June, 1917, but not until a shortage of local food supplies for the army and later for the civil population was threatened,[2] was the extension of agriculture by means of irrigation taken seriously in hand through the Agricultural Development Scheme, put forward by Mr. C. C. Garbett, First Revenue Officer, July, 1917.[3] 'The plan was to complete canals left half finished by the Turks, dig new ones, improve old ones, to import and advance to the cultivators plough-cattle and seeds'.[4]

The Scheme was only partially successful, the new acreage brought under cultivation, 319,152 acres, being only a little more than half of the original estimate of 606,000 acres.[5] It had been calculated that 280,000 tons of grain would be produced.[6] Actually between 50,000 and 60,000 tons for the

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[1] Sir William Willcock's estimate for his programme was £T29,105,020 or about £26,537,000. He anticipated the return would be about nine per cent. *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, 2nd. ed.), p. 52.

[2] *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 2; Hewitt, Sir J. P., *Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia* (1919), pp. 4, 6, 9.

[3] See minutes of Conference, August 10th, 1917, which formally proposed Scheme. Hewitt, op. cit. App. 5, p. 44. The War Office approved of the Scheme on September 16th, 1917; ibid., p. 5. See also *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 28.

[4] Ibid., p. 3.

[5] *Brief Note on Irrigation Works in Mesopotamia to November*, 1918, pp. 3-4, 7.

[6] *Final Report of the Agricultural Development Scheme* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3.

175* army,[1] besides supplies for the civil population were obtained.
727* More valuable than the actual amount of the supplies and the
241 consequent reduction of prices and economy of shipping were
312 the political effects of averting a threatened famine, of the show of encouragement to agriculture and the hold acquired over the shaikhs and the tribes of the regions opened up by the Scheme.[2]

The Irrigation Department was taken over by the Civil Administration, April 1st, 1919.[3] The Acting High Commissioner, envisaging, no doubt, a long period of British control, advocated immediate caution and retrenchment. He recommended concentration of 'attention on securing and improving already existing systems where necessary' on the grounds that 'shortage of labour alike for construction and cultivation and financial stringency makes it impractical and inexpedient to open up considerable fresh areas for cultivation'.[4] The arguments of the Acting Civil Commissioner as well as the 'small and unambitious programme of minor works'[5] evolved under his direction and centring about the gradual establishment of the natural regime of the rivers,[6] were, no doubt, believed to be in accordance with the needs of the moment. Colonel R. G. Garrow, Officiating Director of Irrigation, had estimated that the existing population could cultivate approximately 1,500,000 acres of which approximately 1,320,000 acres were to be in cultivation by the end of 1919.[7]

Nevertheless, the policy as enunciated and the programme as

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[1] Hewitt, op. cit., p. 13, gives 56,472 tons. See also *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 80; *Revenue Report*, 1918, pp. 2-3.

[2] *Final Report*, p. 1; *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 2; Hewitt, op. cit., p. 9.

[3] *Irrigation Directorate, M. E. F., Admin. Report for period 1st April to 31st December*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 4.

[4] Memorandum, A.C.C. to D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, December 27th, 1918. Also *Draft Report Covering the Last Ten Years of the Work of the Irrigation Department, 'Iraq, dated Baghdad, 14 May*, 1931, para. 3 (hereafter, *Draft Report*, 1920-30).

[5] *Irrigation Directorate, Admin. Report*, 1919, p. 2.

[6] Memorandum, Col. R. G. Garrow to D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, in *Correspondence Regarding Post-War Irrigation Policy in Mesopotamia*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919), p. 9. Also, *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, p. 171.

[7] *Correspondence*, p. 2.

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evolved for one of the most essential departments of government for the country was unfortunate. They set up standards for works and expenditure which were to extend over into the Anglo-Arab regime.[1] They gave little or no encouragement to the department as constituted under that regime and tended to create a *non-possumus* attitude which was to add to the inherent difficulties of development of the country along progressive lines.

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Out of the military Agricultural Development Scheme and the Directorate of Agriculture established in connection with it,[2] also grew the Agricultural Department of the Civil Administration which took over from the Deputy Quarter-Master General on March 1st, 1919.[3] Until late 1920, the functions of the Department were threefold: the improvement of Agriculture by scientific research, demonstration and education; the supplying of seeds and advice to military units in connection with vegetables and fodder production; and the administration of the Military Farms Department[4] attached to the Expeditionary Force.[5]

The prospect of developing Mesopotamia as a cotton-growing country had from the first attracted the attention of India, which apparently had hopes that Mesopotamia might provide a possible outlet for her surplus population,[6] and of the British Cotton Growers Association, which anticipated that it would become an additional source of supply of Empire cotton. A cotton expert, Captain Roger Thomas, was engaged;[7] a cotton

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[1] The actual expenditure of the Department in 1919-20 was 8·4 per cent of the total, while in succeeding years the proportions to total expenditure were: 1921, 6·2 per cent; 1922, 7·1 per cent; 1923, 7·65 per cent; 1924, 6·26 per cent; 1925, 3·78 per cent; 1926, 5·35 per cent; 1927, 5·49 per cent; 1928, 5·27 per cent; 1929, 6·97 per cent; 1930, 4·07 per cent; 1931, 3·25 per cent.

[2] General Routine Order No. 800, July 30th, 1918.

[3] *Admin. Report Agricultural Directorate*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

[4] *Report Local Resources Depart.*, 1918, pp. 7, 9, 11.

[5] *Note on Organization of Civil Admin.*, 1 *September*, 1919, p. 2.

[6] Andrews, C. F., *Foreign Affairs*, *April*, 1930, p. 441; *infra*, p. 149.

[7] At the suggestion of the Trade Commissioners, Messrs. R. E. Holland and J. H. White, in their report, June 16th, 1917, *The Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf* (Delhi, 1917), (confidential). They pointed out that in view of the prospective importance of Mesopotamia as a cotton growing area, an expert should be appointed to conduct tests with Egyptian, American and Indian seed.

175 727 241 farm at Karrāda, near Baghdad, and other experimental plots established in the country. Captain Thomas made comprehensive experiments,[1] both in the growing of cotton and in the marketing of the product, which seemed to hold out bright prospects for the future of Mesopotamia as a cotton-growing country.[2]

The activities of the Department centred about this and other experimental work,[3] but attempts were also made to encourage better agricultural methods, both by the dissemination of information and by the demonstration of modern machinery.[4] The handicaps, however, of the long years of ignorance and of dependence on traditional methods, the consequent apathy of the actual cultivators, the lack of education, the weather vagaries, the uncertainty of water supplies and the uncontrolled pests as well as the scarcity of funds available hampered the Department on every side. Under such conditions, the pioneering activities of the Department, often discouraging in the lack of apparent results, laid the foundations of service which might have played a greater part in regenerating the country had its early efforts been maintained during the succeeding years.

Education

175 871 Under the Turkish Government, an excellent system of education, according to its own reports, existed for 'Iraq, with a

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[1] Thomas, R., *Possibilities of Mesopotamia as a Cotton Growing Country, Note I, June* 15, 1918 (Baghdad, 1918); *Note II, January* 15, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919); *Note III, November* 5, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919); *Report on Cotton Experimentation Work in Mesopotamia*, 1918 (Baghdad, 1919); Ibid., 1918-19, (Baghdad, 1920); *Report of Deputation to England* (Baghdad, 1919). Also, Philby, H. St. J. B., *Cultivation of Cotton in Mesopotamia* (Baghdad, 1919).

[2] Thomas, R., *Note III*, 1919, p. 10. Also, *Baghdad Times*, April 14, 1923.

[3] Results of the early studies of dates were embodied in Dowson, H. V., *Dates and Date Cultivation* (Cambridge, 1924); experiments with wheat in Garbett, C. C., *Note on Wheat Experiments, Mesopotamia*, 1917-18 (Baghdad, 1918) and those of other experiments in leaflets published by the Department.

[4] Most of the technical staff, both gazetted and non-gazetted, of the Department came from India as did most of the experimental equipment. *Admin. Report of the Department of Agriculture in Mesopotamia*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), pp. 2-3.

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Mudīr al-Muʿārif (Director of Education) in every wilayet, each 175* having a budget,[1] staff, syllabus and long list of schools. To 871 judge by results, however, the system was a 'whited sepulchre'. The schools were rarely as numerous nor as well attended as government statistics indicated; the teachers possessed little learning and even less moral character. Arabic was little stressed as a language. Shīʿis, comprising the majority of [795] the population, would not send their sons to government schools, invariably taught by Sunnis, nor were they encouraged to do so by the Sunnī Ottoman Government.

Mr. Dobbs, as Revenue Commissioner, had, in early 1915, 175* studied the educational problem and had written suggestions 227* for British policy.[2] He advocated extreme caution in initiating 871 a new system in order that the mistakes made in India might be avoided. The shortage of primary teachers led him to declare that if it were not for the urgent necessity of equipping Arabs for government service and for avoiding the imputation that the British Administration was not inclined to provide educational facilities, he 'should be inclined to advise that not a single school should be opened for the next two years'.[3] Under the circumstances, however, he recommended that one or two primary schools be opened and that subsidies be given to the American Mission Schools under Mr. John Van Ess and to the Carmelite Frères School. The opening of other schools would have to be left to the future.[4] Thus from the beginning, the necessity of encouraging education to provide youths for government service became a guiding factor and stimulated the establishment of educational facilities where the natural tendency on the part of the British authorities was to restrict

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[1] A pre-war Budget for Baghdad Wilayet was:

Law School and Secondary School	£T. 9,000
Other schools (from Local Revenue)	£T.25,000
Total	£T.34,000

Revenue Report, 1917, p. 45.

[2] Dobbs, H. R. C., Notes on Education, February 15th, 1915.

[3] Ibid., para. 2.

[4] Ibid., para. 11.

175* 727* 871 education or to regard it as of secondary importance in the work of regenerating the country. Nevertheless, only two primary schools were established by the end of 1915, although subsidies had been granted to the two institutions already mentioned.

TABLE I

Main Headings	1915–16	1916–17	1917–18	1918–19	1919–20
	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees
1. Headquarters Administrative Expenditure.*	5,54,230	11,83,425	24,18,253	33,90,100	73,60,714
2. Political Officers, Revenue Establishments	5,48,892	9,19,085	51,89,233	93,21,690	70,67,420
3. Customs	1,11,898	3,85,800	5,80,350	6,75,000	29,64,169
4. Transport	—	—	—	—	30,87,834
5. Judicial	1,20,207	1,27,295	2,14,983	3,73,000	8,21,145
6. Medical	61,345	87,180	1,39,887	4,63,750	20,31,542
7. Education	6,500	23,530	35,500	1,80,000	8,86,808
8. Police	1,99,146	2,86,975	8,90,163	12,04,080	22,71,389
9. Jails	20,126	44,460	98,517	1,67,400	5,44,304
10. Public Works	—	1,05,450	4,61,400	8,74,700	49,63,292
11. Posts	—	—	—	—	23,74,831
12. Telegraphs	—	—	—	—	8,19,868
13. Survey	—	—	—	—	94,859
14. Irrigation	—	—	—	—	38,78,605
15. Agriculture	—	—	—	—	3,81,738
16. Levies	—	—	—	—	66,49,490
Totals	16,22,344	31,63,200	100,28,286	166,49,720	461,98,008

* Includes Salaries, Secret Service, Subsistence Allowances, Sea Passages, Telegrams, Stationery, Press, etc.

Figures for all years, except 1919-20, based on *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119. Figures for 1919-20 based on actuals in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-21, p. iii.

658 871 175 727* During the same period only Rs.6,500 were spent on promoting education, or 0.4 per cent of the civil expenditure, Rs.16,22,344.[1] In the following fiscal year,[2] however, Rs.

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[1] Note by Financial Secretary in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119. For table of expenditures by heads, see Table I.

[2] April 1st to March 31st.

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23,530 or 0·74 per cent of the total civil expenditure were spent, entirely in Basra Wilayet. Nor did the situation improve after the taking of Baghdad, the attention of the authorities being almost exclusively taken up with consolidating the military and political situation. Expenditure on education in 1917-18 totalled but 0·35 per cent of the total civil expenditure.

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Not until the appointment of a Director of Education, Major H. E. Bowman,[1] in September, 1918, was a vigorous start made towards creating an educational system. By the end of 1918, twenty primary schools had been set up,[2] but expenditure still formed only 1·08 per cent of the total expenditure. The desire for schools and educational facilities, especially the opportunity to learn English, was everywhere manifest, petitions and requests coming from all parts of the Occupied Territories.[3] To meet these demands, twenty-one new primary schools were opened in 1919,[4] while a further fifteen were added in 1920, which, including twenty-four subsidized schools, brought the total number to eighty-five boys' schools of all types, and five girls' schools,[5] with a total enrolment of 6,182 pupils or one for every 462 of the population.[6] The proportion of the expenditure for Education to the entire expenditure in this year, the fifth of the British Occupation, had risen to 1·9 per cent.[7]

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[1] Egyptian Ministry of Education, 1903-1923; Director Palestine Education Department, 1920-36.

[2] *Administrative Report of Education*, 1918, p. 10 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918).

[3] *Fortnightly Reports of Political Officers, Baghdad Wilayet, 1st-15th June*, 1918: Mandali, p. 23 (hereafter *Fortnightly Rep'ts*); *Monthly Rep'ts, January*, 1919; Basra Sanjaq, p. 32; Qurna, p. 79; Ibid., *August*, 1919: Erbil, p. 45; Ibid., *November*, 1919: Dulaim, p. 14.

[4] *Administration of the Department of Education for the year* 1919 (Baghdad, 1920) (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1919).

[5] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 104.

[6] On the basis of the census, 1918-19, of 2,890,000 inhabitants.

Education	Rs. 8,86,808
Total Budget	Rs. 461,98,008

These figures are taken from actual expenditure given in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iii. They differ slightly from the estimates given in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119.

[7] See Table II.

175* The years of neglect of education, including the war years,
871 the lack of trained teachers and of equipment and the paucity
727* of the funds sanctioned by the Civil Administration which rendered it impossible to overcome adequately the lack of teachers by bringing them from Syria and Egypt, contributed to the slow creation of educational facilities. Nevertheless, the aims of the Department were kept high. These, as summarized by the Director of Education in 1918, were:

> to provide a sound elementary education, on which to base an edifice lasting, endurable and firm. To open new schools gradually as trained teachers become available. To select as teachers only the best candidates, socially, morally and mentally, and to pay them well. To never lose sight of the real object in view — the formation of character and the spirit of good citizenship.[1]

As long as British advisers played a decisive part in the educational affairs of 'Iraq, these aims formed the basis of their policy.

Judicial System

671 In accordance with Great Britain's policy of establishing an
175* Arab administration in Baghdad, of which the promise in
727* General Maude's Proclamation not to introduce alien institutions was a public intimation, the instructions of H.M. Government had made it clear that the Occupied Territories Code was not to be introduced into Baghdad Wilayet.[2] The policy adopted, therefore, was not 'to make a clean sweep of the Turkish legal system and to introduce a new system based on English models, as had been done in Basrah Wilayet', but rather 'to carry on the Turkish organization of Courts and system of law, making such immediate modifications only as are necessary to ensure justice and a reasonably efficient administration'.[3]

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918, p. 10.

[2] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917.

[3] *Administrative Report of Justice from the Occupation of Baghdad to* 31.12.17, p. 4 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1917).

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As at the occupation of Basra, most of the Turkish Judicial 671
personnel had fled. The more recent records had been removed 175*
or destroyed. Beyond the institution of a Court of Small 727*
Causes and a *Shara'* Court (Muslim Law Court) in July,[1] Civil Courts were in abeyance until the Courts' Proclamation of December 28th, 1917,[2] reconstituted the Civil Courts under Mr. (later Sir) Edgar Bonham-Carter as Senior Judicial Officer. He had arrived in October, and after studying the situation with the experience gained in his long and distinguished career in the Sudan Legal Department, had outlined the essential requirements to be embodied in the proclamation.

Under the Turks, First Instance Courts had existed at the 692
headquarters of each *Liwā* or District, and of each *Qādha* or 175*
Sub-district: a total of ten *Liwā* Courts of First Instance and 727*
forty *Qādha* Courts of First Instance in the three wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Obviously, from the standpoint of the prevailing poverty and the sparseness of the population, the number was excessive. In addition, most of the judges had been untrained if not actually incompetent. Under the new system, a Civil Court of First Instance, normally to be composed of a British judge and two Arab judges, was to be reopened at Baghdad and later, elsewhere, as deemed necessary.[3] Peace Courts which were also Small Cause Courts, such as had been established in Baghdad and a few other places just before the war, were to be reconstituted wherever required.[4] Elsewhere either Judges of Courts of First Instance, Political Officers or other officers were given the right to officiate.

In the days of the Turks, Appeals lay from the lower Courts to a Court of Appeals situated at the capital of each wilayet.[5] Decisions from these Courts could be revised by the Court of

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1916-1918: Proclamation No. 8, July 2nd, 1917.

[2] Ibid., Courts' Proclamation No. 17, December 28th, 1917. The date 'end of December, 1918' given for this Proclamation in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 94, is obviously a misprint.

[3] Ibid., Courts' Proclamation, Section 3 (1).

[4] Ibid., Section 5.

[5] Normally composed of a Turkish President and four Arab Judges. *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 1.

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692 Cassation at Constantinople. The Courts' Proclamation
175 abolished appeals to any Court outside 'Iraq,[1] and replaced all
727 other Courts of Appeal by a single Court of Appeal composed
of a British President and two Arab Judges.[2]

Religious Courts

698 The importance of reconstituting *Shara'* or Religious Law
175 Courts, as provided in the Proclamation,[3] had been recognized
727 in 1917 by Mr. Bonham-Carter. He had then pointed to the respect with which the Courts were regarded in Muslim countries, to the practical advantage of deciding certain classes of cases by Muslim Judges in accordance with Muslim Law, and to the immense additional political advantage of associating with the Government the influential religious class of the '*Ulamā* from which the *Qādhīs* were drawn.[4] He had indicated these alone as adequate reasons for continuing them.

Sunnī *Qādhīs*, therefore, were appointed with these ends in view to fourteen centres by the end of 1918, and to twelve additional ones by the end of 1920, as well as to the *Shara'* Court set up in Baghdad in July, 1917. A long standing grievance was partly remedied by permitting Shī'is to refer their cases to Shī'a *Qādhīs*. Under Turkish rule, the Shī'is had been forced to submit their personal status cases, if they took them to court, to the Sunnī *Shara'* Courts where the cases were decided in accordance with Sunnī Law. Shī'a religious Judges under the name of *Nayabat-al-Ja'farīya* were appointed in 1918 to six centres and to six others by the end of 1920.

Criminal Courts

692 The reorganization of the Criminal Courts was more difficult
175 than that of the Civil Courts. The Ottoman Criminal Pro-
727 cedure required a multitude of Courts, investigating magistrates

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[1] Courts' Proclamation, Section 9.
[2] Ibid., Section 6.
[3] Ibid., Section 10.
[4] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1917, p. 4 (12).

and procurators, which it would have been beyond the capacity 692
of the Civil Administration to supply. Nor would it have 175*
conduced to the effective administration of justice if the 727*
Magistrates, most of whom were English officers with little previous experience of the administration of law, attempted to follow the elaborate Ottoman Procedure.[1]

In addition, the Ottoman Penal Code presented difficulties 671
Although based on the French Penal Code, it had been sub- 175*
jected to so many amendments since it was issued in 1859 that 727*
it was, in the opinion of the Senior Judicial Officer, 'unscientific, ill-arranged and incomplete'.[2] The first difficulty was overcome by the creation of a special code known as the Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations,[3] brought into operation January 1st, 1919. Until then all criminal cases had been tried by Military Governors and Political Officers.

Although the Regulations adopted one or two sections from the Ottoman Criminal Procedure,[4] the ultimate origin of which was the French Criminal Procedure, its main provisions revealed the inability of those in the Civil Administration to dissociate themselves from Indian traditions or to escape from the application of British Military Law. Both of these formed the basis of the Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure from which the Regulations were drawn. The new Regulations were admittedly subject to the exigencies of war and of military occupation.[5] Offences committed by members of the Army of Occupation even against the inhabitants of the country were not to be tried under them. It was expected, however, that after the conclusion of hostilities, a permanent Code would be prepared.

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1920, p. 2 (7).

[2] *Memorandum on Baghdad Penal Code*, by the Senior Judicial Officer, November 21st, 1918. Also *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 2 (7).

[3] Promulgated by Proclamation of General Officer Commanding, November 15th, 1918. (These Regulations hereafter *Bd. C. P. Reg.*).

[4] Particularly Chapters iii and ix, concerning Procurators, and Chapter xi, concerning Civil Complaints and Civil Damages. For Ottoman Criminal Procedure, see Young, Sir G., op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 226 ff.

[5] *Bd. C. P. Reg.*, Sec. 2 (1).

727* Four classes of Criminal Courts were to be constituted: 175* 1. Courts of Session; 2. Courts of Magistrates of the First Class; 671 3. Courts of Magistrates of the Second Class. 4. Courts of 692 Magistrates of the Third Class.[1] A Court of Session was to be a Court consisting of three Magistrates, of whom one at least must be a Magistrate of the First Class.[2] Political Officers and British Judges were to be Magistrates of the First Class, Assistant Political Officers and Arab Judges were to be Magistrates of the Second Class.[3] The Civil Commissioners might appoint any person a Magistrate of the First, Second or Third Class.[4]

The Ottoman Penal Code was replaced on January 1st, 1919, by the Baghdad Penal Code,[5] based largely on the former, but with amendments and additions from Egyptian sources, in turn based on the French Penal Code.

Among the tribes, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation continued to be applied with considerable success.[6] It was regarded in the tribal areas as 'undoubtedly the most satisfactory' method of settling tribal disputes,[7] as the reason for decrease of crime[8] and as 'one of the props of the tribal system'.[9] Although doubt was cast on both the wisdom and ability of the Administration to continue the tribal system indefinitely,[10] only in 'Amāra Division was uncertainty felt as to the usefulness at that time of the Tribal Disputes Regulation.[11]

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[1] *Bd. C. P. Reg*, Sec. 4.

[2] Ibid., Sec. 5.

[3] Ibid., Sec. 6.

[4] Ibid., Sec. 5.

[5] Promulgated by Proclamation of the General Officer Commanding, November 21st, 1918.

[6] For views of Political Officers: *Admin. Reports*, 1918: *Shatrah* (*Nasiriyah*), p. 387; *Qurnah*, p. 306; *Kut*, p. 384; *Admin. Report*, *Hillah*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3; *'Amarah Division Admin. Report*, 1920-1921 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 7; *Monthly Rep'ts., January*, 1919, Basra Sanjaq, p. 32.

[7] *Admin. Reports*, 1918: *Hillah*, p. 127.

[8] Ibid., *Nasiriyah*, p. 355.

[9] Ibid., *Hillah District*, p. 144.

[10] Ibid., *'Amarah*, p. 336; *Hillah District*, p. 34; *Hillah Division*, pp. 120-1; *'Amarah Report*, 1919, p. 9; *'Amarah Report*, 1920-1921, p. 25.

[11] *'Amarah Report*, 1919, p. 11.

Amalgamation of Basra and Baghdad Courts and the Creation of the Judicial Department

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The political and administrative considerations which motivated the amalgamation of the administration of the Basra and Baghdad wilayets in September, 1918,[1] applied with equal force to the judicial systems which had not then been assimilated.[2] On January 1st, 1919, however, the two systems were finally consolidated,[3] the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code and all Indian and British Acts operative under it being repealed with the exception of nine Indian Laws and one English Law, set forth in a special schedule. 'The change was effected without difficulty and was welcomed by the population since it replaced a foreign system of law and procedure by one with which they were familiar.'[4]

The judicial system of Mōsul, the administration of which H.M. Government had at one time desired to organize separately, in anticipation of it being assigned to France at the Peace Settlement, was also assimilated, on the same date, to the system in operation throughout the Occupied Territories.

The number of Courts established under the Civil Administration, 1914-20, had been recognized as being as insufficient as the number under the Turks had been excessive.[5] Expansion and reform, however, had proved difficult owing to the necessity of subordinating the policy of the Department to that of the General Administration, owing to the lack of funds[6] and to the

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 111-112.

[2] Cogent reasons for amalgamating the two judicial systems were advanced in *Review Admin. Basrah*, 1917, p. 6.

[3] *Basrah Courts' Amalgamation Proclamation*, 1918, by the General Officer Commanding, December 24th, 1918.

[4] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 4 (12); *Admin Report*, 1918: *Nasiriyah*, p. 355.

[5] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 1; ibid., 1919, p. 2 (4).

[6] Ibid., 1920, p. 8 (16). The proportion of expenditure on Judicial services to total expenditure and to receipts, based on figures given in Table I, p. 152, is as follows:

127* 175* difficulty in finding suitable staff, whether 'Iraqi or English, to undertake them.[1]

671 622 Recognition was not lacking of the unsatisfactory nature of legislation which, during the whole period of the Occupation was by proclamation by the General Officer Commanding, or by regulations or orders issued by the chief civil authority and the Judicial Officer, under authority of the General Officer Commanding. Lieut.-Colonel Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, in his report for 1917 had commented:

> It is high time that he (Senior Judicial officer) be relieved of his legislative duties, which should be the special task of a legal Secretary . . . Assigning work to one such person would put an end to notices of spurious legality, threatening the public with dire and unspecified penalties for dubious offences.[2]

Mr. Bonham-Carter, on his side, believed that while considerable legislation would be necessary before the Courts could contribute to better conditions in 'Iraq, no radical legislative improvements could be undertaken without the coming of peace and without a Representative Legislative body.[3]

Under Mr. Bonham-Carter, the policy of employing 'Iraqis

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1920, p. 8 (16).

[2] *Review Admin. Basrah*, 1917: *Report on Admin. of Civil and Criminal Justice in Basrah Wilayet, by Courts established under the I.O.T. Code, during* 1917, p. 107.

[3] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 9 (23); ibid., 1920, p. 8 (16).

	1917–18	1918–19	1919–20
	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees
Percentage of Expenditure on Judicial services to total Expenditure	2·14%	2·24%	1·78%
Percentage of Expenditure on Judicial services to total Receipts	1·57%	1·41%	1·43%

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both as Judges and as clerical staff was applied from the first. Although difficulty was often experienced in making suitable selections of Judges and *Qāḍhīs*,[1] he 'had no hesitation in saying that the work had been done efficiently'[2] through the 'valuable services of the Arab Judges and staff', without whose 'help it would have been hardly possible . . . to carry out the policy of applying Turkish Law and Procedure'.[3]

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TABLE II

The following Table indicates the nationality of personnel of the Judicial Department, 1918-20.

	1918* (Baghdad Wilayet only)	1919†	1920‡
British	6	10	11
Indians	—	4	6
'Iraqis (Muslims)	82	197	247
„ (Christians)	1	9	12
„ (Jews)	9	9	12
Syrians	—	1	1
Egyptians	—	1	—
Armenians	2	1	—
Total non 'Iraqis (A)	8	17	19
Total 'Iraqis (B)	92	215	271
Percentage of (A)	8	7·3	6·6

* *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 5. † Ibid., 1919, p. 8.
‡ Ibid., 1920, p. 7.

To this policy of rendering more than lip-service to the principle of employing Arabs wherever possible may be attributed the comparative immunity of the Judicial Department from the criticism and hostility directed by 'Iraqi Nationalists, during the period before the establishment of the National Government, against the unsympathetic attitude in other Departments of the Civil Administration.

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 6 (15).
[2] Ibid., p. 2 (5).
[3] Ibid., p. 6 (15). Also ibid., 1920, p. 8 (15).

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CHAPTER VII

POLICY OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

175* 727* BEFORE the publication of the Anglo-French Declaration, November 7th, 1918,[1] those in authority in Mesopotamia apparently assumed 'that the policy envisaged by the British and the French Governments in the Middle East was one in which the principles and methods followed by Lord Cromer in Egypt would, with suitable modifications, find acceptance both on the spot and at home'.[2]

General Maude's Proclamation, the Prime Minister's Declaration of January 5th, 1918, concerning non-annexation of Turkish territory[3] and President Wilson's fourteen Points,[4] which had been accepted both by the Allied and the Central Powers as the basis of Peace,[5] had been regarded by those in charge in 'Iraq as merely introducing disturbing elements into the situation.[6] These utterances were held to be inconsistent with the traditional aims of British policy in the Middle East and with confidential information received concerning the Secret Agreements. They were therefore disregarded.

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[1] Released simultaneously in London, Paris, Washington and Cairo, November 7th, 1918. The Declaration when published in Baghdad bore the date of November 8th, 1918. For text, see Appendix IV.

[2] Thus wrote the Acting High Commissioner 12 years later; Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p. 110.

[3] *The Times*, January 7th, 1918.

[4] Made in an address to U.S. Congress, January 8th, 1918. Text: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, III (1918), 950 ff.; App. 3.

[5] November 5, 1918. See *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, p. 24. Turkey and Austria, who had signed their Armistices previously, were not legally bound by the agreement of November 5, but the Allies had propagandized the subject peoples of the two Empires on the basis of the Points and could not repudiate them entirely. Ibid., p. 24, also Wright, Quincy, *A.P.S.R.*, November, 1926, p. 744.

[6] President Wilson's 14 Points were withheld from publication in 'Iraq by the authorities until October 11th, 1918: *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 126.

The Anglo-French Declaration, however, placed a different 175* complexion on the situation. Issued after the Armistice of 727* Mudros, it was generally accepted throughout the East as a pronouncement of policy by victorious Powers no longer engaged in encouraging a non-Turkish population to hostilities against the Turks. In the eyes of the Acting Civil Commissioner, however, it was a 'disastrous error'.[1]

> Nothing in the political situation in Syria or 'Iraq rendered such a declaration necessary. Unfettered by such an announcement, France and Great Britain could have come to an agreement as regards their spheres of influence and have proceeded to endow the indigenous populations with institutions calculated to attain the objectives mentioned in the Declaration.[2]

So strongly convinced was he that nothing but ill could follow if H.M. Government persisted in a literal interpretation of the Declaration that he took the first opportunity to voice his disapproval, not only of the Declaration but also the policy it symbolized, in a telegram to the Secretary of State for India.[3] The telegram, in part, is given below:

> Your telegram Nov. 14.
>
> I should not be doing my duty if I did not first of all record my convictions that the Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, in so far as it refers to Mesopotamia, bids fair to involve us in difficulties as great as Sir A. H. MacMahon's [*sic*] early assurances to the Sharif of Mecca.
>
> It is for the representatives of H.M. Government on the spot to make the best of the situation created by this Declaration, and as Government is aware I am trying to do so, but unless the latter is superseded or modified by a pronouncement of the Peace Conference, I anticipate that in years to come we shall be faced with the alternatives of

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[1] Wilson, op. cit., p. 103.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Telegram, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, No. 9926, November 16th, 1918.

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175-* evading the spirit whilst perhaps keeping within the letter
727* of this Declaration, or of setting up a form of Government which will be the negation of orderly progress and will gravely embarrass the efforts of the European Powers to introduce stable institutions into the Middle East.

The Declaration involves us here on the spot in diplomatic insincerities which we have hitherto successfully avoided and places a potent weapon in the hands of those least fitted to control a nation's destinies.

I would emphasize the almost entire absence of political, racial or other connexion between Mesopotamia and the rest of Arabia.

If the future of this country is to be dealt with successfully it must, I am convinced, be treated independently of Arab problems elsewhere.

The Arabs of Mesopotamia will not tolerate that foreign Arabs should have any say in their affairs, whether those Arabs come from Syria or from the Hijaz. In practice they dislike and distrust both. National unity means for them unity of Mesopotamia, and not unity with either Syria or Hijaz. So, too, they resent the importation of social or administrative institutions or methods that savour of India.

The average Arab, as opposed to the handful of amateur politicians of Baghdad, sees the future as one of fair dealing and material and moral progress under the ægis of Great Britain, and is clear-sighted enough to realize that he would lose rather than gain in national unity if we were to relinquish effective control. He will learn more quickly than the Indian. But he is still behind him in education and experience.

Irrespective of this, the tribal element is a constant potential source of dissension and grave public insecurity. Nor can we afford to ignore the mutual contempt and jealousy that exist between townsmen and tribesmen.

With the experience of my Political Officers behind me, I can confidently declare that the country as a whole neither expects nor desires any such sweeping schemes of independence as is adumbrated, if not clearly denoted, in the Anglo-French Declaration.

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This reaction of the Acting Civil Commissioner to the policy 175
of the Declaration was only natural to one of his background, 727
training and experience. His services in the Indian Army, in Persia and in the Persian Gulf had confirmed him in what he believed to be the needs and interests of India and of the British Empire as a whole, in whose greatness he gloried. He was fully aware of all the reasons which had brought the Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia and for which such great sacrifices had been made. These interests of the Empire in the Middle East, which were paramount with him as he was frank to admit,[1] could be served but ill by relinquishing 'Iraq to an indigenous administration. On December 10th, 1918, he put forward his opinion in the following words:

> My view is that the strategical centres of the Middle East lie in Baghdad and the Caucasus, in both of which the Muhammadan population greatly predominates. If we encourage the idea of Arab, as opposed to European predominance in Arab-speaking countries which have been wrested from the Turk at the cost of British blood and British wealth, we shall without doubt excite latent religious hatreds between Sunni and Shi'ahs in 'Iraq, thereby depriving ourselves of some of the strategic advantages which the possession of this ganglion gives us.
>
> By occupying Mesopotamia during the war we drove a wedge into the Muhammadan World, thereby preventing the possibility of a combination of Muhammadans against us in the Middle East. I submit that it should be our policy under peace conditions to keep Mesopotamia as a wedge of British Controlled Territory. That it should not be assimilated politically to the rest of the Arab and Muhammadan World, but remain insulated as far as may be, presenting a model to the rest. . . .[2]

The importance of 'Iraq in the Middle East was again emphasized in a telegram of July 21st, 1919:

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[1] Wilson, op. cit., p. 322.

[2] Telegram No. 10973, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, December 10th, 1918.

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> It is impossible to install a real Arab Government in Mesopotamia and for us to make the attempt will be to abandon the Middle East to anarchy.
>
> If I may be permitted to say so, the declaration of 8th November took little account of the facts as they are in Mesopotamia, but it is not too late to give this pronouncement a fresh and virile interpretation such as will enable us to make Mesopotamia the keystone of our policy in the Middle East.[1]

The military importance of Baghdad was stressed in his note on Demobilization in Mesopotamia:

> If Baghdad is strongly held, and ample reserves of war materials and means of transportation be kept on the spot, military requirements for the frontier of India will be correspondingly reduced; the Middle East would be dominated, in a military sense, from Baghdad and our political influence would be proportionate to our potential military strength. Great Britain alone as trustee for the civilized nations of the world can ensure the peace of the Middle East, and Great Britain is the only Power who would be willingly accepted in this capacity by the Nations of the Middle East, who, our Treaty in 1907 with Russia notwithstanding, still see in British policy an altruism and tolerance which they fail to discern elsewhere.[2]

The Acting Civil Commissioner, however, did not fail to point to the value of the material resources in 'Iraq, in his telegram of July 21st, 1919, as additional reasons for altering the Anglo-French Declaration:

> Lastly, the capital value of the Oil Fields in Mesopotamia is £50,000,000 based on a conservative estimate and there are other sources of potential wealth such as ports, steamers, railways, roads and buildings, built by British capital whether private or public and which, at least, count for another ten millions.

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[1] Telegram No. 8169, Political, Baghdad to S/S for India, July 21st, 1919.

[2] Note on Demobilization in Mesopotamia, dated November 21st, 1919.

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> Imports this year are estimated at about ten millions, mainly British, although trade has not yet revived. 175* 727*
>
> The declaration of November 8th as it stands affords little guarantee for a stable government, upon the existence of which depends the retention and development of these assets.[1]

In common with other men of similar training, he believed in England's peculiar mission: to bestow its gifts of efficient administration, of impartial justice, of honest finance and of security on backward peoples who, in return for these services were to assume places in the economic and defensive system of the Empire.[2] His attitude was, apparently, one prevalent among British administrators in India: that as long as the material well-being of the subject peoples was being advanced, no other standard need be set up by which to judge the administration. As long as administrators spent the best of their bodily and mental vigour on the people, there was no need to justify the measures which kept them in authority. Political aspirations and the desire for self-government were to be dismissed as vagaries of ungrateful extremists or to be repressed as firmly as wayward thoughts in any adolescent youth.

Whether or not a liberal application of the Anglo-French Declaration was expected, it would seem that, following its appearance and a further divergence of opinion between London and Baghdad, traced in detail in succeeding pages, the policy in 'Iraq tended to develop in accordance with the views of the Acting Civil Commissioner. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the main efforts of the civil authorities, from the capture of Baghdad until the Insurrection of 1920, were increasingly directed, not merely at meeting the needs of the country but at establishing a regime so substantially British and so definitely dependent on the British Empire, on the one hand, so convincing in its show of machinery and of material

[1] Telegram No. 8169.

[2] 'I felt it to be in our power, as in that of no other people, to seek justice and ensure it – to protect minority interests – the fair treatment of which is the best rough test of any civilization.' Ibid., pp. x, 322.

75 progress, brought about by the British administration and so
127 ostensibly supported by local opinion on the other, that the influence of the 'Sharifian' school in Whitehall Councils might be checked and that H.M. Government might hesitate before wrecking the established administrative machinery by handing it over to the Arabs.[1]

That such was the aim of the Civil Administration seems to be borne out by the tendency to increase, from 1918 onwards, the size and extent of the Headquarters Administration, to the neglect of other services. Secretariats, Departments, Directorates, Bureaus, Circles and varieties of forms, reports, files and procedure were created in the best Indian administrative tradition to such a degree as to draw down the censure of even the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, formerly Viceroy of India.[2]

Examination of the annual expenditure from 19[illegible]4 also seems to indicate that even when the increase of occupied territories is taken into consideration, the steadily increasing funds devoted to Headquarters Administration expenditure, culminating in an approximate 220 per cent increase between 1918-19 and 1919-20,[3] and the stringency of funds for those branches of the administration which directly benefited the public, such as Education, Judicial and Medical Services were based on the aim of building up a machine for

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[1] Not all officials of the Civil Administration held these views. Miss Gertrude Bell, O.B.E., attached to the Administration on Intelligence work, never lost sight of the value of 'Iraq in the Imperial system but she looked forward to it taking its place as an Arab state. She was at no time sympathetic to the delay imposed by the Foreign Office and to the resistance of the Civil authorities to Arab participation in the Administration. Indeed, she actively opposed these attitudes. In a hitherto unpublished letter to Col. T. E. Lawrence, with whose views she was more in sympathy, she wrote, on July 10th, 1920, at the height of the political unrest: 'On the whole the wonder is that there are so many moderates and reasonable people among the inhabitants of this country. I try to count myself among them but I find it difficult to maintain a dispassionate calm when I reflect on the number of blunders we have made. Now at last we are making a beginning in the right direction.'

[2] *Sunday Times*, September 20th, 1920.

[3] See annexed table of expenditure: *supra*, p. 126.

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the future. Indeed, the explanation for the failure to create 175* adequate social services must be found, not in the lack of funds 127* or of suitable personnel, but rather in the will to create them.[1]

Further examination of the budgets for 1919 and for 1920 seems to indicate the intention, in anticipation of the continued extensive employment of British and Indian officials, to make provision for equipment such as motor transport, to acquire land and to build offices, billets and residential quarters such as the Alwiya cantonment. The transport budget for 1919-20 was set at Rs. 50,62,280; land acquisition at Rs. 12,01,250; while approximately 40 per cent of the Public Works budget was set aside for plans to promote the comfort of these British and Indian officials. The estimated amounts for 1919-20 were not entirely spent in that year,[2] but the estimates of 1920-21 provided for even larger budgets.[3] Transport was allotted Rs. 60,31,641 while Rs. 98,43,500 were set aside for Public Works, of which offices and residential quarters for officials compose the largest single item.[4]

It may be argued that the small proportion of revenue devoted to services which directly benefited the civil population was not a true index of the benefits accruing to them, as the Army undertook a number of services, such as irrigation, agricultural development, building of roads and bridges which would have normally fallen to civil revenues. These activities, executed and originally paid for by military authorities,

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[1] Surpluses occurred every year of the occupation:

* 1915-16	Rs.	29,46,298
* 1916-17	Rs.	49,45,050
* 1917-18	Rs.	52,23,762
† 1918-19	Rs.	94,61,745
† 1919-20	Rs.	110,73,932
Total	Rs.	336,51,777

* From Financial Secretary's Note, *Review C. Admin.* 1914-20, pp. 118-19.
† From Actuals in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-21, p. i.

[2] *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iii.

[3] Ibid., p. 91.

[4] Ibid., p. 112. Also *Budget Estimates of Expenditure for the Civil Administra-ion for the year* 1920-1921; *Directorate of Military and Civil Works* (Baghdad, 920).

175+ did undoubtedly confer great benefits on the country, causing 727' a development within a period of two or three years under the stimulus of war, such as it otherwise would not have gained in as many decades.

It must not be overlooked, however, that these works and expenditures were originally undertaken to facilitate winning the war to which they contributed no less than many manifold activities on which no other return had been demanded or expected, a fact recognized by Sir John Hewitt, who, in his report to the Army Council in 1919, stated:

> We are unanimously and emphatically of opinion that there is no ground for the suggestion that the expenditure of Army funds has been prompted by the desire to provide for afterpeace developments, and we consider that they have been uniformly expended with the primary object of securing the efficiency and comfort of the force.[1]

Nevertheless, the demands made by the military authorities for repayment of their expenditures, incurred at unprecedented rates, for objects which they considered, often arbitrarily, would prove useful to the civil population, and the enforced necessity of taking over unfinished programmes of Irrigation and other departments, conceived and executed on a war-time scale, often without proper supervision or trained personnel,[2] placed an undue strain on the budgets of the Occupied Territories.

175+ To meet these budgets, including the expenditure on those 727+ objects 'which could only be justified or explained' as Mr. 651 Asquith declared in the House of Commons, 'on the assumption that you are going to deal with 'Iraq as a province or

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[1] Hewitt, op. cit., p. 27.

[2] A typical example, cited Hewitt, op. cit., pp. 18-22 and App. 16-19, is that of the purchase of irrigation pumps by an inexperienced officer, dispatched to India without adequate instructions. Two hundred pumps were asked for, of which the pre-war price, in new condition, averaged £188, delivered in Basra. After months of delay 14 second-hand pumps were delivered, at a price averaging £1,177 in Bombay. The pumps were eventually resold by the Director of Agriculture at a considerable loss.

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district which is going to be governed in the Anglo-Indian fashion',[1] revenue collection was pressed forward on the basis of the former Turkish demands but with rigid insistence on the payment of the full demand wherever presented, such as the Turk had never been able to do. In the two years, 1918 and 1919, the Civil Administration collected Rs. 803,44,502,[2] or an average of twice the revenue collected in 1911, which had been equivalent to Rs. 206,57,000.[3] In 1920 the revenue receipts were Rs. 693,22,587, excluding railway revenue,[4] or three and a third times the Turkish receipts of 1911. The original estimate had been Rs. 760,65,698.[5] The surplus for 1919 alone was one-half the total receipts of the Turks in the pre-war year just mentioned, while the entire surplus accumulated in the period of the Military Occupation was one and a half times the revenue collected in the same pre-war year. These figures are all the more remarkable when the amounts remitted as subsidies or for political services, as in the 'Amāra and Dulaim Divisions, are taken into consideration.

It need not be supposed, however, that taxation was unduly oppressive, although it tended to press most heavily on the agricultural worker to whom the burden was eventually passed under the prevailing land tenure. Prosperity was general: trade was flourishing, the price of agricultural products was high, wages had risen beyond the bounds of imagination, and rents had soared. In addition, classes who had never paid taxes were no longer able to evade payment by bribery or force as in pre-war days.[6] Others who had paid little, escaping through faulty assess-

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1922), pp. 1554-5; also ibid., Vol. CXXX (1920), p. 2234.

[2] This total (exclusive of revenue grains supplied to the Army, valued at 60 lacs: *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118) is based on Actuals in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. 1.

[3] *Bulletin Annuel de Statistique*, 1327. For comparison of land-revenue receipts see *supra*, p. 118.

[4] *Admin. Rep.*, 1920-1922, pp. 23-4.

[5] *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. ii.

[6] *Handbook of Meso.*, Vol. I, p. 145, estimates that in pre-war days seven-tenths of the population of the Wilayet of Basra escaped scot-free of all taxation and paid nothing whatever except perhaps bribes.

175* ment or official discrimination, were now forced to pay in full.

787* The political unrest of 1920 was not primarily due to this
651 heavy taxation, as Lord Islington declared in the House of Lords,[1] but the fact remains that the taxation was harassing. The inability of the landlords, dignitaries, and tribes to evade taxation as they had once escaped it influenced them to throw their weight against a regime which was determined to collect what it demanded. Moreover, gratitude for the fact that for the first time in the lives of the tax-payers, tangible and concrete returns for their money were visible, was often lost in the knowledge that they had no voice in the initiation or incidence of taxation or in the choice of the objects of expenditure which, because they were essentially desirable in the eyes of the British administrators, were placed in the budget estimates regardless of whether or not the expenditure had corresponding value in the desires and standards of the tax-payers or whether it was necessary for the peculiar needs of the country.

175* Notwithstanding early instructions to the contrary, as on
727* March 29th, 1917, the Civil Administration employed com-
647 paratively few Arabs in responsible administrative positions. Arabs drawing Rs. 600 or more per month[2] on August 1st, 1920, numbered 20 and formed but 3·74 per cent of the 534 officers in the same category.[3] The remaining 514 officers were British or Indian officials. Nor were the various advisory Councils, of which so much has been made as indicating the participation of responsible Arabs in their own government,[4] of any practical value, having been so organized as to make their effect negligible on the conduct of the Administration except in minor local affairs.

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 850-1.

[2] Following the official division as in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 122.

[3] The Arabs so employed were distributed among the departments as follows: Judicial Department, 10; Divisional Political Staff, 4; Irrigation, 3; Tāpū, 2; Waqf, 1. Telegram No. 9804, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August 14th, 1920.

[4] *Review Civil Admin., O.T.*, 1914-1918, pp. 24-6. Ibid., 1914-1920, pp. 131-2.

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This situation was due partly to the lack of 'Iraqis who, by 175*
training, education and character, could stand comparison 727*
with the ability and efficiency of the British and Indian officials, 647
and partly to the view, in accordance with the local official policy that direct British control must be maintained, that 'the interests of the country will be served by having a large proportion of British personnel in all branches of the Administration'[1]. Indeed, it was from Indian rather than Arab sources that both administrative methods and officials were drawn. In 1917, 29 of the 59 officers serving in the Civil Administration of Baghdad Wilayet, came from services in India, either directly or on loan from the military authorities. The proportion, roughly, held good in Basra Wilayet as well.[2] In 1920, although only 79 of the 507 British Officers drawing over Rs. 600 per month were on the active lists of the Indian Government services, a much greater proportion of these as well as of the 515 British Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 had Indian training and experience. No less than 1280 of the Indian and British officials in the latter category came from the Civil Service of India.[3] A total of 2216 Indians was employed, who with the 1022 British officials, composed 50·5 per cent of the total administrative personnel, excluding the railroad staff and the non-administrative ranks of the Police and the Levies.[4] Of the railway personnel, numbering 24,928 of all grades on April 1st, 1920, 80 per cent were Indians, 3 per cent were Europeans and 17 per cent were inhabitants of the country, including Arabs, Kurds, and Jews.[5]

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[1] *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 3. The figures above, together with the Acting Civil Commissioner's persistent refusal to set up an Arab Government in Mosul, as ordered by H.M. Government, May 9th, 1919, make it difficult to understand his later statement (Wilson, op. cit., p: 313), 'from the outset I did my best to induce H.M. Government to allow me to introduce a very large Arab element into the Civil Administration'.

[2] *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 2.

[3] Telegram No. 9268, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, July 22nd, 1920.

[4] Table III. Also, Telegram No. [illegible], Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August 14th, 1920.

[5] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118.

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175 227 647 The Acting Civil Commissioner has disclaimed with perfect sincerity all intention on his part for thus organizing Mesopotamia along Anglo-Indian lines.[1] Nevertheless, the fact remains that whatever his personal intentions may have been, the great

TABLE III

Officers and Personnel
Employed by the Civil Administration, August 1st, 1920.*

		British	*Indian*	*Inhabitants Occupied Territory*
Part I	Officers and Personnel drawing over Rs. 600 per month			
	Central Administration	5	—	—
	Divisional ,,	106	—	4
	Other branches	396	7	16
	Total	507	7	20
Part II	Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 per month			
	Central Administration	55	62	123
	Divisional ,,	28	316	862
	Other branches	432	1,831	2,167
	Total	515	2,209	3,152
	Grand Total	1,022	2,216	3,172

Total non-Arab staff 3,238

Above does not include Railways or non-administrative rank and file of Police and Levies (less than Rs. 600).

* Based on *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 122, and on various monthly *Lists of Officers (Part I and II) Serving Under the Civil Commissioner, M.E.F.*

strides toward creating a bureaucracy, staffed and administered on Indian lines as has been indicated above, took place during his period of office. The early division of the country into political districts as in British India with a British officer at each key position, responsible to the central administration, to which voluminous reports and statistics were dispatched in

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[1] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 304.

accordance with Indian practice for every aspect of life within 175'
the division, was extended and the hierarchy of officials 727'
increased from 1918 to 1920. The very titles borne in India, 647
Civil Commissioner, Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Revenue Officer, Judicial Officer and others were reproduced in the 'Iraq administration.[1]

Whether or not the Acting Civil Commissioner desired to extend the Indian system or not, the shadow of India was over him at all times. Such administrative practices as he had learned by 1914, when at the age of thirty he was inducted into the political service in Mesopotamia, had been learned in India. His early assistants with a few notable exceptions, had been trained in Indian methods and with a tenacity characteristic of Indian Civil Servants, refused to acknowledge that methods applicable to Indians might not be suitable for Arabs. Officers came from other parts of the Empire but the Indian tradition remained.[2]

Much of the Indian influence on the character of the admin- 175*
istration in 'Iraq was undoubtedly due to the fact that India 727'
had provided both the motive and the personnel for the 648
Expeditionary Force. The original intention of making Mesopotamia a dependency of India had been given up but the rumour persisted and had to be officially denied.[3] The early suggestion that 'Iraq might provide an outlet for India's surplus population[4] had subsided but had not entirely died out even in official circles.[5] The strongest claim, however, which India

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[1] Political Officer H. R. P. Dickson had suggested in 1917 that familiar Arab titles be given to the British officers. *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, 1916-1917, p. 20.

[2] There has been a suggestion of a Civil Service on the lines of the Indian Civil Service, but comprising 'Iraq, the Sudan and the Levant generally Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917; also Ormsby Gore, W., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920).

[3] Telegram No. 3070, Balfour, Paris, to Political, Baghdad, February 10th, 1919.

[4] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IV (1917), p. 87.

[5] The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, writing in February, 1918, in *My Indian Diary* (1930), p. 250, seems to have had in mind some colonizing scheme for Mesopotamia.

175* and Indian methods had in 'Iraq lay in the interests of the
727* Indian Empire in the future of the country[1] to which it had
648 been bound so long by political and economic ties. The political relation might be severed but these interests had to be safeguarded, as none knew better than the Acting Civil Commissioner. To him, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for India, who had lent his support to the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force in 1914, wrote on March 12th, 1918:

> Entirely different currents are flowing now, and we must shape our course to them if we are to get what we want in 'Iraq. The old watchwords are obsolete, and the question is how we are to secure what is essential under the new ones. The thing can be done, but a certain re-orientation is necessary. The 'Arab façade' may have to be something rather more solid than we had originally contemplated.[2]

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[1] The recognition of the interests of India in the House of Commons, 'The matter cannot be settled without a great deal of careful study and conference with the Indian authorities and others' (*Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. cxx (1919), p. 1798), tended to confirm the Arabs in their belief that India might take over 'Iraq. Also *infra*, p. 240.

[2] Cited Wilson, op. cit., p. 166.

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CHAPTER VIII

PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

THE Armistice of Mudros, October 30th, 1918, terminated 175* hostilities between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.[1] 727* Its signature apparently found the British Government without 648* a clearly defined policy for 'Iraq other than that set forth in 1917, subsequently modified to include Basra as well as Baghdad, and that proclaimed generally for all Arab countries in the Anglo-French Declaration.[2] Nor could H.M. Government, although the Interdepartmental Committee on Near and Middle East affairs began almost at once to meet in an attempt to frame 'a policy for those territories likely to remain under British influence',[3] hope to bring immediate order to the complexity of aspirations, interests and viewpoints left in the wake of the war. Agreements, Declarations and Correspondence had piled up conflicting responsibilities. Promises and Proclamations, made under the stress of abnormal wartime conditions, had to be liquidated or England's prestige and reputation for fair dealing would be forfeited. It was essential to reconcile where possible the Husain-McMahon Correspondence with the Sykes-Picot Agreement among the three parties concerned, in order to satisfy the aspirations of the Arab Nationalists whose war services, in response to the encouragement of the Allies, gave substance to their demands, and to ensure that the interests of the British Empire, for which blood

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[1] *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, 111 (1918), 611 ff.; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. II, p. 496.

[2] 'The original intention of the Anglo-French Declaration was primarily to clear up the existing situation in Syria which Arab suspicion of French intentions had created'. Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 29th, 1918.

[3] Young, Major Sir H. W., op. cit., p. 279.

175* and treasure had been so lavishly expended, should not be 727* bartered for transitory gains or for momentary considerations.

648* The solution of these problems was rendered none the less difficult by the necessity of settling them to the satisfaction of the Allied Powers and of France in particular, of adjusting them in relation to European problems which for the first time since the days of Napoleon assumed a greater share of attention from H.M. Government than did those of the Empire. In addition the necessity existed for obtaining for such settlements the approval, not only of the Peace Conference at Paris, at which President Wilson's fourteen Points threatened to play a prominent part, but also of world opinion which, because of the constant appeals to it during the war, had acquired the authority of a super-tribunal.[1]

In formulating a policy for 'Iraq, the primary decision lay between direct control by Great Britain or indirect control through some form of indigenous government which would guarantee essential Imperial interests. The question was further complicated by uncertainty as to the area to be occupied. Was it to be Basra only, as foreshadowed at the outbreak of the war and as still urged in some quarters, or would it be Basra and Baghdad, as the amalgamation of the two wilayets in September, 1918, seemed to presage? Or would British control be extended, as the Anglo-French negotiations seemed to suggest, to Mōsul and on to Dair az-Zūr or even Jazīrat ibn 'Umar and Birejik as some military experts desired?[2]

Direct control of any area, save perhaps that of Basra Wilayet, would run counter to General Maude's Proclamation, to the Anglo-French Declaration, and to the general tenor of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence as well as to the Prime Minister's statement of January 5th, 1918, and to the twelfth of President Wilson's fourteen Points. It would, on the other hand,

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[1] For discussion of world-opinion and its influence on post-war diplomacy, see Nicolson, Harold, *Curzon, the last Phase* (1934), pp. 382 ff.

[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 116.

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meet the views of the Government of India,[1] of the officials of 175*
the 'Iraq Administration, many of whom were still on the active 727*
list of Indian services, and of the Imperialists in general who 648*
saw in the occupation of 'Iraq the logical climax of three centuries of British activity in the Middle East. It would ensure the safety of the alternative route to India, of which Baghdad was to be the Clapham Junction of the air, the protection of India from Bolshevik Russia, now more dangerous than ever before, her ambitions sustained by insidious social doctrines,[2] and the safeguarding of commercial interests, of which oil in Persia, in the Transferred Territories and at Kirkūk has assumed primary importance.

On the other hand, if Great Britain were to support an Arab Government, problems would immediately arise as to the type of Administration to be established and as to the degree of power and responsibility with which it was to be endowed, bearing in mind both the necessity of safeguarding British interests and the fact that the Arab State must be constructed almost from the foundations.

Among those who would restrict the participation of Arabs in the government of 'Iraq were those who favoured direct British control. At the other end of the scale, varying in their views as to the degree of responsibility to be given to an indigenous administration, were the Arabs themselves, having an unlimited belief in their rights and in their own untried abilities; the Englishmen who, like the late T. E. Lawrence, believed in the sanctity of Great Britain's pledged word; those who believed, as doctrinaires believe, in the rights of Arabs to a national existence; and those who held that the interests of the Empire could be as well served and at a much less cost by friendly Arabs supported by Great Britain, as by a direct administration of the country.

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[1] The Government of India, however, was somewhat perturbed by the prospect of the financial responsibilities involved; Ormsby-Gore, W., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920), p. 93.

[2] For Lord Curzon's views, see *infra*, pp. 178-9; also *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920), p. 98; Vol. VIII (1921), pp. 21, 33.

175* The possible alternative of complete withdrawal by Great
727* Britain was complicated by the undoubted fact that the Turks
648* would immediately return, against which she had long set her face as being inconsistent with her own interests. The British Government, however, from the first, had refused to make any reassuring announcements with the result that uncertainty, even fear of the future existed among many of the inhabitants, particularly in regard to the future of Mōsul.[1]

The creation of an independent Arab State following a British withdrawal was a distinct possibility if the Anglo-French Declaration were to be taken literally, of which the establishment of the Arab regime in Damascus gave some hope. This line of action the Arab Nationalists were to demand and the British Press[2] was to urge in the coming months, but apparently it was never seriously considered by H.M. Government. Nor did it meet the approval of those in 'Iraq who were bringing order where confusion had reigned before, those who were engaged in creating a complicated administrative machine, those who genuinely feared for the prospects of an Arab State in the presence of both internal and external dangers, and all those who saw in even partial withdrawal a complete disregard of Imperial interests.

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the dispatches of the next few months should give the impression that H.M. Government would welcome any inspiration which would point a way out of the maze in which they found themselves. Nor is it surprising that the inability to frame a straightforward policy in the presence of so many conflicting issues and then

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[1] A number of the inhabitants, especially ex-Turkish officers, regarded the return of the Turks with favour. The Acting Civil Commissioner drew attention to the influence of this class of inhabitants in Telegram No. 10025, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 19th, 1918.

[2] It is one of the curious phenomena of the day that the British Press, in keeping with its hysterical misinterpretation of the post-Armistice European situation, should vehemently demand the evacuation of the Middle East areas in which, during pre-war days, it had insisted in no uncertain tones that Great Britain should maintain, at all costs, her vital interests.

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the reluctance to give tangible evidence of British intentions towards 'Iraq until peace had been made, should, by coinciding with the earnest efforts of the Acting Civil Commissioner to impose his own views for direct British administration of the country, prolong the period of inaction, facilitate the growth of political unrest and dissatisfaction among the 'Iraqis and increase the difficulties of the eventual settlement for the country. 175* 727* 648*

In 'Iraq itself, only by the addition of Mōsul to the Occupied Territories was the *status quo* altered. General Marshall, whose troops had been within fourteen miles of Mōsul on October 31st, continued to advance under orders received from the War Office on November 1st and on the authority of Clauses VII and XVI of the Armistice. Mōsul itself was occupied on November 7th in spite of the indignant protests from 'Alī Insan Pasha, the Turkish Commander, who maintained that the terms of the Armistice did not cover the occupation of the city or the country beyond.[1] The administration of the wilayet, in deference to the Sykes-Picot Agreement which assigned it to France, was organized separately from that of Baghdad and Basra, with the exception of the Judicial system which was assimilated on January 1st, 1919, to that of the remainder of the Occupied Territories.[2]

The end of the war brought no other indication of the future save a proclamation by the General Officer Commanding and the Anglo-French Declaration. The Proclamation by General Marshall, on November 2nd, 1918,[3] stated: 'We are now in a position to show that the promises that have so often been made to you are to be kept at the first possible opportunity.' The Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, following closely

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[1] This contention formed one of the main arguments of the Turkish claim to Mōsul, not relinquished until the Treaty of Angora, June 5th, 1926: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, 123 (1926), Part 1, pp. 599 ff.

[2] Even separate postage stamps were issued: Turkish fiscal stamps overprinted I.E.F. 'D' with new values.

[3] *Proclamations*, 1914-1919, pp. 20-1: Proclamation No. 31. It was drafted by the Acting Civil Commissioner.

175* on the appearance in the 'Iraq Press of President Wilson's
727* fourteen Points, withheld from publication until October 11th by
649* the Civil Administration,[1] had introduced a new factor into the situation, although it was dismissed by the Acting Civil Commissioner and local official circles as being too idealistic to form the basis of official policy. Its publication, however, had 'thrown the whole town (of Baghdad) into a ferment.'[2] Local Officials believed that even worse consequences might follow if it were taken literally as an indication of the policy of H.M. Government.

175* Feeling as the Acting Civil Commissioner did concerning the
727* Declaration and the policy it implied,[3] he could have been in no happy frame of mind to receive the following telegram on November 19th, 1918, from the Secretary of State for India:[4]

> Colonel Lawrence, now home on leave from Syria, has submitted proposal to H.M. Government for dealing with Arab question. He advocates viz: 1. Lower Mesopotamia, 2. Upper Mesopotamia, 3. Syria, to be placed respectively under 'Abdullah, Zeid and Feisal, sons of King Hussain. Hussain himself would remain King of Hejaz and would ultimately be succeeded by his eldest son Ali. He would have no temporal authority in three states above-mentioned and in fact no position at all there save insertion of his name in Friday prayers in all mosques as Emir el Momenin . . . It is of course understood that both states would be in the British sphere and Lower Mesopotamia under effective British control. I recognize that these proposals as involving definite separation of Mosul from Baghdad conflict with recommendations in Baghdad telegram 8745 though interstatal boundary does not appear inconsistent with that suggested in Baghdad telegram 8744; also that importation 'Abdullah into Mesopo-

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[1] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 126.

[2] *Letters of Gertrude Bell* (2 vols., 1927), Vol. II, p. 463 (hereafter, Bell, *Letters*).

[3] Vide *supra*, pp. 137 ff.

[4] Telegram, S/S for India to Foreign, Delhi, repeated Political, Baghdad, November 18th, 1918.

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tamia would be in direct opposition to (Ibn Sa'ud).[1] But I should be glad if you would review whole question in light of existing conditions and let me have your views on Lawrence's proposals with as little delay as possible.

175
127

In the opinion of the Acting Civil Commissioner, the proposals not only failed utterly to meet the situation in 'Iraq but they also confirmed his fears of the degree to which H.M. Government were permitting themselves to be guided by the unpractical counsel of the Western Arabia school. He prefaced his reply with statements from shaikhs and notables of Dīwānīya, Rumaitha, Nāsirīya, Qal'at Sikar, Hai and Kūt, in which they expressed themselves as desiring British rule only.[2] He then proceeded, in a second telegram,[3] to answer the proposals. They were wholly impracticable. The introduction of the sons of the Sharif, however acceptable Faisal might be to the Syrians, was in the interests of neither the British nor the inhabitants of the country, nor to the wishes of the latter. Division of the country into Upper and Lower Mesopotamia had no historical, political or economic basis. The Wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mōsul were essentially one unit and should be administered as such under effective British control. He concluded by saying:

> I would therefore urge H.M. Government if they wish to promote the welfare of peoples of Mesopotamia and value aid to spirit underlying Anglo-French Declaration, to exclude this country definitely once for all from any contemplated Sharifian settlement and from further discussion in that connection, our past conversations with the Sharif notwithstanding. Our moves are being carefully watched by critical

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[1] But compare the frequent assertion, as found in Kohn, Hans, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (1928), p. 308, that Great Britain at no time considered the effect on Ibn Sa'ūd of the introduction of sons of Sharif Husain into Mesopotamia and Syria, in the light of the above telegram. See also, *infra*, ch. xvii.

[2] Telegram No. 10030, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 20th, 1918.

[3] Telegram No. 10031, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 20th, 1918.

> 175 audiences and any move capable of being attributed to political
> 727 motives rather than desire for welfare of Mesopotamia will evoke bitter criticism.

A few days later he telegraphed:

> Arab state under Arab Amir, including Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul is considered an ideal solution by all.
>
> British High Commissioner and British Advisers in all the ministries of the Arab State and throughout the country are unanimously desired.
>
> All agree in wishing Sir P. Cox to be the first incumbent of the post.[1]

He put forward the idea of a plebiscite to take the opinion of the country, saying:

> All agree that the opinion of the country must be taken before any decision can be rightly come to and on the clear understanding on which the inhabitants of the country themselves rely, that a protectorate will in due course be declared and that for the present military administration will continue. I am prepared to arrange for this in a manner consonant with educated opinion and not inconsistent with public order. I do not doubt that our confidence will be justified by results.[2]

Although he reported that none agreed as to the Amir to be chosen, four names had been put forward which he submitted 'in the order of public preference as far as can be ascertained'.[3] 1. Hadī Pasha al-'Umarī; 2. Member of family of Sultan of Egypt; 3. Son of Sharīf of Mecca; and 4. Naqīb of Baghdad. Of these, Hadī Pasha was suggested as the most eligible candidate. He would be especially welcomed in Mōsul, from which the family originally came. Concerning the second name, he pleaded that insufficient knowledge of Egyptian affairs excused him from expressing an opinion.[4]

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[1] Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918, paras. 4, 5, 6.

[2] Ibid., para. 7.

[3] Ibid., para. 8.

[4] Ibid., para. 8. Also, Telegrams: No. 10251, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918; S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 28th, 1918; No. 10465, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 29th, 1918.

In regard to a son of the Sharif, he stated:

> I am now convinced that the third proposal would meet with widespread acceptance in Baghdad, and that it would probably be well received outside because all know who the Sharif is. It is also considered that he would be acceptable to Shi'is on account of the Sharif's well-known latitude in religious views. I am, however, strongly opposed to it. For reasons connected with Persian Gulf and Central Arabian politics and on other grounds.[1]

The other candidate put forward, the venerable religious dignitary, 'Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī, Naqīb of Baghdad, he negatived as a possibility on account of his great age, his failing health and his lack of influence save in Sunni religious circles. In addition, the Naqīb was not known in Basra and Mōsul, which would be a further disadvantage in case Mōsul and Kurdistan were added to the prospective State. Nor were any of his family better qualified.[2]

Under the existing circumstances, it no doubt seemed to the Acting Civil Commissioner that the solution lay in another alternative candidate as head of the proposed new state, which he put in the same telegram:[3]

> A fifth alternative has not yet been discussed in Baghdad, but if I might be authorized to suggest it would probably meet with immediate acquiescence in Baghdad and would be even more acceptable to the rural districts, namely that

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[1] Telegram No. 10250, para. 8. Sir Arnold Wilson, writing in 1931, in reference to his sentiments towards a son of the Sharif as ruler of 'Iraq, transmutes 'strongly opposed' above to 'misgivings' (*Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p. 108) and also apparently forgets entirely his Telegram 10973, December 10th, 1918, in which he stated that he 'was in complete opposition to the nomination of a son of the Sharif as Amir'.

[2] The Acting Civil Commissioner also stated: 'The above appreciation differs fundamentally from that formed by Sir Percy Cox in 1917'. The latter's views at that date were those expressed in the *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, p. 128: 'Much the most influential Sunni in Mesopotamia is the Naqib of Baghdad, the official head of the Arab community in that town . . . It is worthy of note that extreme deference is paid to the Naqib of Baghdad and his family by many of the most influential and wealthy, as well as the humblest and poorest, of Indian and Afghan Moslems.'

[3] Telegram No. 10250, para. 12.

175* 727* Sir P. Cox should be appointed High Commissioner for the first five years without any Arab Amir or other head of the State, but with Arab Ministers backed by British Advisers. I earnestly hope that this course will be adopted if it is at all compatible with our national peace policy and the general scheme of things in Arabia.

Its adoption will save Government, the public in Mesopotamia and the representatives of His Majesty's Government on the spot from being rushed into a premature decision.

A solution along this line as proposed must have appealed to the Acting Civil Commissioner for reasons mentioned in his telegram,[1] but it must have also met his own personal views by supplying a check to the dangerous tendency towards Arab Nationalism by restricting the power to be placed in Arab hands, and by ensuring effective British control with the minimum of controlling machinery. The arrangement would secure, for a few years at least, a protected Arab National State with a maximum of protection and a minimum of Arab Nationalism.

No doubt he relied on the personal popularity of Sir P. Cox to overcome any threatened opposition arising from disappointment that an Arab Amir was not to be set up immediately, or that the Anglo-French Declaration was not to be given a more literal interpretation.

Authorization of the Plebiscite

175* 727* 648* In London, the Interdepartmental Committee on November 27th considered the views and suggestions of the Acting Civil Commissioner. Still unable to enunciate a concrete policy, the Committee resolved to formulate a general statement which might guide the Acting Civil Commissioner, and to request him to obtain expressions of public opinion.[2]

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[1] He returned to the attempt to influence H.M. Government to accept his views in Telegram No. 10465, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 29th, 1918.

[2] Young, op. cit., p. 280.

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PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

This statement of policy, the first which H.M. Government 175*
had enunciated for 'Iraq since the Armistice, was received in 727*
Baghdad with the order for the plebiscite on November 30th. 648*
After declaring that the final status of the Arab provinces would be settled at the Peace Conference, the statement did little more than reiterate the policy of the Anglo-French Declaration, although, in conclusion, it stated that H.M. Government had no intention of relinquishing control or of abandoning their friends. It also betrayed their indecision by stating: 'In the meantime our attention is being given to the question of the best form of Government to set up.'[1]

In authorizing the plebiscite, H.M. Government said in the same telegram:

> We are anxious in particular that you should render us an authoritative statement of the view held by the local population in the various areas affected on the following specific point.
>
> (1) Do they favour a single Arab State under British tutelage stretching from the northern boundary of the Mosul Wilayet to the Persian Gulf?
>
> (2) In this event, do they consider that a titular Arab head should be placed over this new State?
>
> (3) In that case, whom would they prefer as head?
>
> In our opinion it is of great importance to get a genuine expression of local opinion on these points, and one of such a kind that could be announced to the world as the unbiassed pronouncement of the population of Mesopotamia.

On the same day that the authorization was received, the Acting Civil Commissioner sent his orders to the Political Officers throughout the country. His instructions, which cited the salient points of the above telegram and of related correspondence, stated:

> In connection with the first point, you should ascertain whether the inhabitants of your area wish to form a part of an

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 28th, 1918.

175* 'Iraq state stretching from Raqqah on the Euphrates and 727* Jazir ibn 'Umar on Tigris to Basrah and the head waters of 648 the Greater and Lower Zab. This question only arises in Kurdistan, Mosul Wilayet and Dair uz-Zor. But it is of greatest importance. Alternative is establishment of separate state, roughly Mosul Wilayet not under British Protection.

As regards second point the correspondence annexed to this memorandum sufficiently indicates the arguments for and against and the possible alternatives.

As regards third point, answer is of course inseparable from the decision in point two. Here again the correspondence is sufficiently explicit as regards possible choices. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the importance of avoiding the exacerbation of religious differences which might follow upon an indiscreet selection in this connection. . . .

As soon as you conveniently can after the receipt of this letter, you should discuss the questions raised therein confidentially with the principal personalities in your area, and ascertain from them what the trend of public opinion is likely to be, and inform me accordingly.

When public opinion appears likely, under the guidance of the persons you have consulted, to take a definitely satisfactory line, you are authorized to convene an assembly of all leading notables and shaikhs with a view to placing before them the above questions, informing them that their answers will be communicated to me for submission to Government. When public opinion appears likely to be sharply divided or in the unlikely event of its being unfavourable, you should defer holding a meeting and report to me for instructions.

In such cases, it may be anticipated that the favourable verdict of neighbouring districts will tend to have a favourable effect in forming public opinion.

When opinion is favourable, it is desirable it should be reduced to writing and signed by as many as possible.[1]

The task of conducting the plebiscite presented grave difficulties, of which the Acting Civil Commissioner as Chief

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[1] Memorandum 27190, Civil Commissioner to Political Officers, Baghdad, November 30th, 1918.

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Political Officer and as the agent of H.M. Government in 175*
carrying out the plebiscite must have been fully aware from 727*
the time he suggested it to H.M. Government. To extract 647*
the desired information and, at the same time, to maintain public order and to prevent the exacerbation of religious and racial feeling would not be the least of these problems in a land where the two chief Islamic sections were highly antagonistic to each other; where the religious leaders of Najaf and Karbalā opposed any secular government as a matter of principle; where Christians and Jews live as uneasy minorities; where Arab, Kurd and Turcoman possessed racial antipathies; and where propagandists, Nationalist, Turkish and Bolshevist, were already at work.

He must have recognized also, although H.M. Government apparently did not, that the first of the three questions would be regarded by many, not merely as a choice between a single Arab State or several, but rather as a referendum between independence and British control. He may have felt, in spite of his confident assurances to H.M. Government, just six days before, that public opinion as he knew it was in favour of continued 'British advice, assistance and control', that a free expression of opinion, uncontrolled and unorganized, might result in such an outburst of feeling against British control that would undermine all the administrative work of the past two years and leave no basis, save that of arms, on which Great Britain might establish her claims to occupy and to control the country.

The most careful examination of the instructions fails to produce the impression that they were framed primarily to meet the difficulties of maintaining order and quiet in the land. The Political Officers had been instructed to convene assemblies not when they were likely to be orderly and peaceful, but when public opinion was 'likely to take a definitely satisfactory line'. They were ordered to report to headquarters for further instructions, not when the situation was likely to be disorderly but

175+ when public opinion was 'likely to be divided or unfavourable'.
127+ Nor does examination of the communications from the India
148+ Office to the Acting Civil Commissioner reveal that H.M. Government had given any indication of what they would consider 'favourable or unfavourable'. Nothing in the telegram ordering the plebiscite indicates that H.M. Government was not genuinely seeking for guidance in setting up the best forms of government in 'Iraq; that it had reached any definite conclusions concerning the questions it had sent to the Acting Civil Commissioner; or that its instructions were not to be followed literally. It would appear that as far as H.M. Government was concerned, any straightforward, authoritative statement of genuine and unbiased views would be welcomed as indicating the trend of public opinion, on which they might base the government of the new state.

The emphasis placed by the Acting Civil Commissioner on securing 'satisfactory opinion, together with the inclusion of his own strongly worded telegrams as guides as to what might be considered satisfactory, seem to point to a desire on the part of the Acting Civil Commissioner to make sure that the results of the plebiscite would be satisfactory to his own proposals. It is possible that he had seen, at the time he suggested a consultation of public opinion, the opportunity, in a well-controlled plebiscite, to confound and discredit, once and for all, the Western Arabia party and others of like ilk who sought to give independence to 'Iraq by demanding a literal interpretation of the clause in the Anglo-French Declaration, 'the establishment of national governments and administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations'. If this group could be confronted with the established fact that all sections of public opinion had been consulted and did not want independence but rather continued British control, he believed it would no longer be a menace in the councils of H.M. Government.

It may be also that he had seen from the first the opportunity

which a plebiscite presented to convince H.M. Government, 175*
palpably without strong convictions of its own, save the 927*
observations of the Anglo-French Declaration, that his own 648*
proposals drew 'their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations', and therefore afforded the only real bases on which H.M. Government, in safety and in self-interest, could establish the new government.

It must not be imputed to the Acting Civil Commissioner that he suggested the recourse to public opinion and then took steps to ensure answers favourable to his own proposals, because they were merely his own views. It may be suggested, rather, that he genuinely believed that his policy, founded on his own knowledge of the country, on his own background and training as a servant of the Indian Empire, and on a desire to promote its interests as well as those of the people of 'Iraq, presented the only way to draw H.M. Government away from the dangerous tendencies which they seemed to be following, and of combating the idealism of those who, from Cairo and from Whitehall, had encouraged and sympathized with the cause of Arab Nationalism.

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CHAPTER IX

THE PLEBISCITE OF 1918-1919

175 727 648 666 In obtaining 'the views held by the local population',[1] the Acting High Commissioner believed that the extension of the plebiscite to the rank and file of the inhabitants was both impracticable and unnecessary. The masses were too illiterate, too ignorant and dependent on their leaders to merit consideration. The garden cultivators and date growers of the Tigris and the Euphrates, the orange growers of Ba'qūbā, the shepherds of the Dulaim, the rice cultivators of Dīwānīya and Shāmīya, the marsh dwellers of 'Amāra and Qurna, the tribesmen throughout the land and the townsmen of little substance were regarded as having neither opinions of their own nor ability to form them other than as echoes at the behest of their religious and secular leaders. The attention of the Civil Administration was therefore directed to those elements of the population who by position and by character were presumed to be favourable to continued British control, and whose opinions might be put forward as representative.

In the tribal districts and in small towns the plebiscite was confined to the shaikhs and land-owning dignitaries, called together in assemblies where they gave their declarations under their seals and signatures. Among the shaikhs, dependent on the British for support of their position,[2] for possession of their lands, as at 'Amāra, or for their highly-prized subsidies,[3] and

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 29th, 1918. Cited, *supra*, p. 161.

[2] During the troubles of 1920, many shaikhs were forced into the towns, as they had no power to maintain themselves otherwise over their tribes.

[3] As in Dīwānīya Division, where every shaikh until 1920 received a subsidy from the Civil Administration.

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with whom the British Political Officers were usually on terms 175*
of friendship, the declarations or *madhibat* were almost 727*
unanimous for continued British rule. At a *majlis* in 'Amāra, 648*
at which the Acting Civil Commissioner was himself present,[1] 666
the shaikhs declared that they desired 'Englishmen speaking Arabic' and that they would not accept French, American or Arab officials. They requested that Sir Percy Cox become the governor of 'Iraq. In conclusion they asked that no higher offers for their lands be entertained and that they be protected in possession thereof as long as they were loyal to the Government.[2] The Qurna shaikhs replied in much the same vein.[3]

In Nāsiriya, a declaration or *madhbata*, signed by 271 tribal shaikhs, town notables and others, implied the continuance of the British administration; rejected the idea of an Amīr as not coinciding 'with our interests nor with the interests of 'Iraq in general';[4] and also requested that the management of their affairs should be undertaken by Sir Percy Cox.

The tribal shaikhs of Dīwānīya and of the Hilla Division in their declarations approved of continued British control. The former thanked the British Government for its desire to give them an Amīr which they agreed was in accordance with common sense and the dictates of their religion which enjoined them to appoint an *Imām*. They considered it premature, however, not only because of their own lack of experience in affairs, but also because no man seemed suitable for the office.[5] The tribal shaikhs around Karbalā, in which city the acute hostility of the *Mujtahids* made the suspension of inquiries desirable in accordance with the Acting Civil Commissioner's instructions, also declared for British administration and for Sir Percy Cox.[6] From Kūt al-'Amāra, Musaiyib and Khānaqīn

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[1] *Monthly Reports, December*, 1918: 'Amāra, p. 7.

[2] *Self-Determination in 'Iraq* (Secret compilation of Declarations in Arabic, with English translations) (Baghdad, May 17th, 1919): 'Amāra Declaration, p. 8.

[3] Ibid., Sec. 2, Qurna Declaration, p. 7.

[4] Ibid., Nāsiriya Declaration, p. 11.

[5] *Self-Determination*: Section 8, Hilla Declaration, No. 4 (Dīwānīya), p. 17.

[6] Ibid., Section 8, Hilla Declaration, No. 5, p. 18.

175* came similar pronouncements[1] of approval of British rule and
727* requests for British officers.

648* In larger centres, as in Basra, individuals of importance were
66 interviewed personally by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Political Officers.[2] At Basra, where most of the dignitaries so interviewed were landowners or had benefited personally by the British Occupation, the majority of the declarations were for British Control.[3] In Mōsul, the ten declarations[4] taken from representatives of religious communities, seven of them from non-Muslim groups,[5] asked for British rule directly or for British protection. Two of the Muslim groups, Kurds, asserted that they would never live under Arab rule, as did also the Yazīdīs of Jabal Sinjar. The other Muslim declaration, representative of nearly 65,000 Muslims of Mōsul city[6] and about 100,000 non-Kurdish Muslims of the wilayet, also asked for British protection.[7]

In other districts, notably the Holy Cities, Najaf, Karbalā and Kādhimain, and in Baghdad, the course of the plebiscite did not run so smoothly nor were the pronouncements so favourable. In Najaf, 'the subject passed through three stages as far as the Government officials responsible for conducting it were concerned. At first sight, it appeared to present no great

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[1] *Self-Determination*: Section 4, Kūt Declarations, pp. 9-10; Section 8, Hilla Declaration No. 3 (Musaiyib), p. 16; Section 10, Khānaqīn Declaration No. 1, p. 20.

[2] *Monthly Reports, December*, 1918: Basra, p. 10; Hilla, p. 14.

[3] *Self-Determination*: Section 1, Basra Declarations, pp. 1-5.

[4] Ibid., Section 14, Mōsul Declarations, pp. 15-28.

[5] Representing 18·3 per cent of the total population of the wilayet, according to the official estimates of 1918-19, which gave the figures for Mōsul Wilayet, excluding Kirkūk, as:

Muslims:		Non-Muslims:	
Sunnis	425,813	Christians	55,370
Shi'is	22,100	Jews	13,835
		Others	31,180
Total	447,913	Total	100,385

[6] *Report, Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 1919, *Part I, Mosul* (Calcutta, 1920), p. 28, estimated the population of the city at 80,000, of which four-fifths were Muslims, the remainder being Christians, with a negligible number of Jews.

[7] *Self-Determination*: Section 14, Mōsul Declaration, No. 2, p. 26.

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difficulty'.[1] The Acting Civil Commissioner, realizing the 175*
strategic importance of Najaf, appeared before the '*Ashraf*, 727'
representing the divines and tribal shaikhs, and explained to 648*
them that their opinion was to be asked on three questions. 666
The gathering was unanimously in favour of British protection from Mōsul to the Gulf without an Amīr. Two days later, however, a Shī'ī of some local reputation came from Baghdad to Najaf and persuaded the dignitaries not to send the original petition.[2] On learning of the difficulty, the authorities got in touch with the leading notables including Saiyid Kādhim Yazdī, with whose help 'the matter was brought to a successful conclusion',[3] a series of fourteen declarations from individuals and groups being secured.[4] Some of these asked for a British Protectorate and an Amīr when the country should be ready for him. Several asked outright, however, for an Arab Government with an Amīr, no mention whatever being made of Great Britain.

In the city of Karbalā, the religious leaders or *Mujtahids* issued a decree or *fatwā* that any person who desired other than a Muslim government was an infidel. Under this pronouncement the people of the town hesitated. When they did make a declaration,

> their opinions were not in accordance with those taken by the Najafis. Fortunately, in Najaf the step had been irrevocably taken, and there could be no turning back. The double effect was that in Karbala no progress was made and the opinion formulated was never expressed officially, while in Najaf the discussion was closed beyond reopening.[5]

In Kādhimain, anti-British feeling ran high. 'The *'Ulamā* threatened with excommunication and exclusion from the

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[1] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 30.

[2] *Memorandum on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia* (Secret Memorandum No. S24, by Miss G. L. Bell, February 22, 1919), p. 3. An abridged version appears in Wilson, Sir A. T.: *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, App. 3.

[3] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

[4] *Self-Determination*: Section 7, Shāmiya Declarations, pp. 14-15.

[5] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

175 mosque anyone who voted for British Occupation.'[1] A group
721 of inhabitants, however, was found which drew up a declara-
648 tion in which the question of protection was left until after the
666 Peace Conference.[2]

In Baghdad, the centre of anti-British agitation, the difficulties facing the Civil Administration were even greater than elsewhere. The plan of delaying the plebiscite in Baghdad to the last in the hope, as expressed in the instructions to the Political Officers, that favourable declarations in other districts might influence Baghdad opinion, would not, it was soon apparent, produce the desired results. The inhabitants of the city, more politically minded and less inarticulate than other sections of the country, would not be influenced or even controlled as in other towns or in the tribal areas.

The attempt to convene an assembly of local dignitaries, carefully selected by persons believed to be favourably inclined to British rule, also failed. The Acting Civil Commissioner had proposed that the twenty-five Sunnī delegates should be selected by the Sunnī *Qādhī*.[3] Similarly, the twenty-five Shī'a representatives were to be chosen by the Shī'a *Qādhī*, 'a creation of the British Administration, no Shī'a *Qādhī* having been recognized by the Turks . . . a weak and colourless individual whose self-effacing piety' was his 'best recommendation'.[4] The heads of the Christian communities were to nominate the Christian delegates, and the Grand Rabbi, the Jewish representatives.

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[1] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 4.

[2] *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, No. 8 (Kādhimain). A translation of the declaration, indicative of the trend of opinion in the Holy Cities, is as follows:

'In accordance with the liberty conferred on us by the Great Powers, the principal of which are the two esteemed Governments of Great Britain and France, we, being of the local Arab nation, choose a new Muslim Arab Government to be ruled by a Muhammadan King, one of the sons of our Lord the Sharīf, bound by a local *majlis*, and the question of protection will be considered after the Peace Conference. Dated 5th Rab'ath Thāni, 1337.' (Signed by 143 Muhammadan residents of Kādhimain.)

[3] The Naqīb, although asked to act with the *Qādhī*, had refused.

[4] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 4.

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In the selection of the Muslim delegates, on whom the 175 character of the declarations of Baghdad opinion would depend,[1] 727 the *Qādhīs*, 'either by intent or under religious or political 648 pressure, did not execute their task loyally'.[2] Instead of 666 selecting representatives, they called 'meetings of their communities for the purpose of selection. At both gatherings, extremely inflammatory language was used and the delegates chosen were bound down to ask for an Arab Government without European protection'.[3] Not all the Muslims so chosen would serve, however. Seven Sunnīs and one Shī'ī resigned and were replaced by five Sunnīs. The group, with whom the Christians and the Jews would not act, passed on January 22nd, 1919, a declaration of which the following is a translation:

> As it has been understood that the object of the Governments of Great Britain and France in the East is the liberation of the people and the constitution of local Governments and administration founded on a practical basis, according to the wishes of the inhabitants, we being of the Muslim Arab nation and representing the Muslims of the Shī'a and Sunnī Communities inhabiting Baghdad and its suburbs, resolve that the country extending from northern Mōsul to the Persian Gulf to be one Arab State, headed by a Muhammadan King, one of the sons of our Sharīf Husain, bound by a local Legislative Council sitting at Baghdad, the capital of 'Iraq.[4]

The anti-British declaration of the Muslim delegates may well have been a disappointment to the Civil Administration. The vehemence of the group, however, brought about a reaction among the landowners and the more sober-minded notables who, responding to the suggestions judiciously thrown out by

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[1] If friendly Muslim magnates were chosen as intended, the Assembly would almost surely give the desired declaration since the non-Muslims were known to be standing solidly for continued British rule.

[2] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 128.

[3] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 5; Telegram, No. 1077, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, January 26th, 1919.

[4] *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, No. 2, p. 23.

175 members of the Civil Administration, readily brought in
927 declarations formulated along the desired lines.[1]

648 Ostensibly the results of the plebiscite confirmed the views
666 put forward by the Acting Civil Commissioner to H.M. Government. An almost universal desire that Mōsul should be included in the new State had been expressed.[2] Notables, both individually and collectively, of seven Divisions[3] had indicated a desire for British administration without substantial changes. A majority of declarations in five Divisions had manifested a desire for an Arab Government but, as the Acting Civil Commissioner had predicted, admissions were made that no suitable person could be found and that consequently British protection was desirable. Two Divisions had specifically declared against a son of the Sharīf of Mecca. The Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion of Sir Percy Cox as head of the new State[4] had been supported by declarations from four Divisions.[5] The three declarations which had declared for an Arab Government with a son of the Sharīf as ruler[6] were discounted as being the opinion of irresponsible and fanatical elements aroused by Nationalists and by ex-Turkish malcontents.[7]

In reality, it seems certain that while the greater portion of public opinion at that moment, on the simple issue of con-

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[1] *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, Nos. 1, 3-9, pp. 23-5.

[2] The Nāsiriya Declaration (*Self-Determination*: Section 5, Declaration No. 5; p. 11) stated the common belief:

'Ever since our boyhood we have been hearing that 'Iraq is composed of these wilayets: Basra, Baghdad, and Mōsul, which as a whole are called 'Iraq. Their capital has always been Baghdad. Anyhow, Mōsul is attached to Baghdad, as Baghdad is watered by Mōsul and Mōsul gets food from Baghdad by the sea trade. We, therefore, can never agree that the 'Iraq country should be detached from the Mōsul Wilayet.

'In the beginning of Islām, when war was waged between 'Alī and Mu'awiyah, Syria and its dependencies were under Mu'awiyah, while 'Iraq, along with Mōsul, was controlled by 'Alī. This is a sufficient reason.'

[3] 'Amāra, Qurna, Mōsul, Kūt, Basra, Hilla and Khānaqīn.

[4] Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918, cited *supra*, pp. 159-160.

[5] 'Amara, Nāsiriya, Karbalā and Baghdad (two).

[6] *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad No. 2, p. 23 and Kādhimain (Baghdad No. 8), p. 25; Section 9, Ba'qūbā (town), No. 3, p. 19.

[7] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia.*

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tinuance of British Occupation, was in favour of such rule, 175*
either direct or in support of an Arab Government, the picture 727*
was not so definitely clear-cut; public opinion was not so one- 648*
sided; nor was pro-British sentiment so preponderant as the 666
declaration and the reports forwarded to the India Office might seem to indicate. The instructions issued by the Acting Civil Commissioner, the method of selecting those who signed the declarations, the personal interviews conducted by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Political Officers and the safeguards adopted so that none but favourable views might be registered, precluded a 'genuine expression of local opinion' in 'Iraq from ever finding its way to H.M. Government, unless the local opinion were satisfactory to the Civil Administration itself. The knowledge that all statements of opinion with signatures and seals would be forwarded to the Government by the Political Officers in accordance with instructions, made it certain from the beginning that most notables both tribal and urban, in order to keep themselves in the good books of the *Hakūma* or Government would make the protestations of loyalty and devotion which the British authorities so manifestly desired.

Not all of the measures taken to ensure favourable declarations were so indirect. Seven Arabs were deported from Baghdad for their activities in connection with the plebiscite. The declaration of the chosen representatives of the Baghdad Muslims, far from being accepted as the official declaration as originally intended, was dismissed as being unrepresentative of the politically and economically important inhabitants of Baghdad.[1] The opinion formulated by the city of Karbalā, the second most important of the Holy Cities of 'Iraq, was 'never expressed officially',[2] on account of the opposition to British rule which it contained. No declaration was obtained from

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[1] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 6.

[2] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30. Cf. *Admin. Report, Hillah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 17.

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175* Sāmarrā, the fourth of the Holy Cities. No declarations were
727* taken in the Dulaim Division, either from the tribes or from
648* Fallūja, Ramādī or other towns. One declaration signed by
666 twenty Muslims represented 160,000 Arab Muslims of Mōsul
Wilayet. Official pressure had to be brought to bear in Najaf[1]
before its notables produced satisfactory declarations.

666 The plebiscite as 'an authoritative statement of the views held
186 by the local population',[2] also failed to indicate the elements of
175* opposition in the country and to reveal their relative strength. 1
727* It gave no hint, for instance, of the large section of opinion,
648* particularly strong in Basra,[3] which, while recognizing the
benefits and the increased prosperity of British rule, found the constant growth of the military machine, including ports, camps and depots; the continuation of military regulations; the maintenance of demands for forced labour and the very efficiency of the administration with its insistence on promptness, probity and justice, too disturbing to their life-long habits of mind and of action and too much of a strain on their patience to be endured.[4]

The plebiscite gave no hint that the tribesmen, uncivilized, even barbarous, were already restive under the British tribal policy which gave the shaikhs relying on British support almost unlimited power over the details of tribal life, a power too often abused for the advancement of the shaikhs' own personal interests. It gave no inkling of such tribal feeling, which was to grow in intensity during the next eighteen months and which was to pave the way for the rebellion against both shaikhs and the British rule which maintained them in control.

The *Mujtahids* of the Shi'is and the other religious dignitaries who, firm in their opposition to any but a theocratic Muslim State, would allow no idols other than of their own making,

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[1] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

[2] See Telegram, cited *supra*, p. 161.

[3] See statement by the Rev. J. Van Ess, cited Wilson, op. cit., p. 112, confirmed to writer, in April, 1934.

[4] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 1.

1 [Then 1918-19 - Analysis]

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were dismissed, although their power over the masses was enormous, as too ignorant of modern state-craft, too self-centred and too alien to be allowed to influence the creation of a new state.

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The Nationalist elements, composed of those who had worked for Arab autonomy before the war, those who prided themselves on being the intelligentsia of 'Iraq, and the religious leaders, were brushed aside, although they were destined to grow in power and influence during the coming months, especially under the stimulus of Nationalism in Syria, as being too negligible, too irresponsible and too full of sound and fury to merit consideration. No inferences seem to have been drawn from the fact that the anti-British declarations, almost identical in tenor and phraseology, pointed to a carefully organized opposition, just as the close resemblance of many of the pro-British declarations indicated the care and attention which the Civil Administration had devoted to the conduct of the plebiscite.

The failure of the plebiscite to represent all these elements of current opinion in their relative importance and to reflect local opinion in its true proportions, was destined to mislead H.M. Government in its attempts to set up a new State satisfactory to the inhabitants of 'Iraq, and, by making it complacently unaware of the need for quick and decisive action in settling the future of the country, to prepare the ground for the disastrous events of 1920.

CHAPTER X

COMMITMENTS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, DELAYS

175* 727* 648* In the few months following the Armistice, it became increasingly evident that any original intention or desire which H.M. Government may have had of giving effect to their promises to guarantee Arab independence[1] would be circumscribed by the necessity of preserving the *Entente cordiale* in the face of more pressing problems arising in Europe and by imperial interests, held to be even more insistent than at any time before or during the war.

In Syria, it became clear that the Arab Government set up at Damascus chiefly by the efforts of Colonel Lawrence, with the concurrence of H.M. Government, in accordance with the promises of 1915-16 and the Declaration of Cairo, June 11th, 1918,[2] that Arabs should keep what Arabs could win, would be abandoned to French protection, in exchange for compensation elsewhere. The advice given to Amīr Faisal, both before and during his visit to Europe in the winter and spring of 1918 and 1919,[3] was but a warning of the application of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, revised along lines discussed by Lloyd George and Clemenceau in December, 1918,[4] and formalized at the Sán Remo Conference in April, 1920.

In return for British concurrence in the application of French

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[1] Lawrence, although one of the chief agents in convincing the Arabs that these promises were genuine, was sceptical throughout the war of the intention of H.M. Government to fulfil them. Op. cit., pp. 502, 545, 550-2, 556, 608. Also Philby, *Sunday Times*, July 21st, 1935. The reported understanding between Lloyd George and Clemenceau, December, 1918, *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, p. 141, also gives the same impression, although at the secret meeting of the Four Powers, March 20th, 1919 (Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. III, pp. 1-19), the former defended the British promises to the Arabs.

[2] Lawrence, op. cit., p. 555; Young, Sir H. W., op. cit., pp. 276-7.

[3] *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 142, 144.

[4] Tardieu, A., in *L'Illustration*, June 19th, 1920. His account seems confirmed by Baker, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 78-9.

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control[1] to Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, for British 175
support against American objections to such extension, and for 727
French participation in oil development in Mōsul Wilayet, the 648
French were to agree that Mōsul Wilayet was to become part, *de jure* as well as *de facto*, of the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia. France was also to relinquish her claim to administer Palestine. Great Britain, instead, was to assume direct control of all Palestine, essential for implementing the Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, regarding the establishment of a National Home for Jews,[2] and for securing the western base and springs of the two arches of land and water communications between the Eastern Mediterranean and India.[3] Palestine was to be withdrawn from the Arab sphere, thereby laying the basis for Arab bitterness, for whether or not Palestine was originally included in the lands promised to the Arabs, as they stoutly claim and as representatives of Great Britain as earnestly deny,[4] the Palestine Arabs had been without doubt propagandized into believing that they were fighting for their freedom from foreign rule.[5]

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[1] Statement of French policy in Near East: *Journal des Débats*, Dec. 29th, 1918.

[2] For text, see facsimile of Mr. Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild, Stein, L., *Zionism* (1926); also *The Times*, November 9th, 1917, and *infra*, App. II. For origins: *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 170 ff.; Stein, op. cit., ch. iv.

[3] Roughly speaking, one arch, resting on Egypt and on India, passes through Palestine, Transjordan, and the Syrian desert to Baghdad and thence down the Tigris and Euphrates valleys and the Persian Gulf to India. The other arch, inverted, based also on Egypt and on India, passes down the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and around Arabia to India.

[4] Palestine was never specifically reserved from territories guaranteed to the Arabs by any of the letters to Sharif Husain from Sir H. McMahon. The latter's explanation in a letter to the Colonial Office, March 12th, 1922, nearly seven years after the original correspondence, that he meant Palestine to be so excluded, although it was not mentioned, is hardly proof that it was excluded. On the other hand, the claim made by Amīn Rihānī, the Lebanese poet, of a secret treaty of January, 1916, granting to Sharif Husain all territory between the northern boundaries of Aleppo and Mōsul Wilayets and the Indian Ocean, and between Persia and the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, except Aden (*Kings of Arabia*, Vol. I, p. 60), which he maintains (*Manchester Guardian*, January 22nd, 1934) must be considered authentic until formally denied by the British Government, can scarcely be accepted as historical evidence that the treaty exists.

[5] *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August*, 1929 (Cmd. 3530), pp. 124-7, with documents. Also, Hogarth, D. G., *Quarterly Review*, Vol. CCXXXIV (October, 1920), p. 420.

'IRAQ

175* For 'Iraq, the keystone of the upper arch of the overland route
927* to the East, H.M. Government had evolved the policy of
648* creating a state or series of states as part of a chain of friendly countries between Europe and the borders of India. The new 'Iraq States, in accordance with the prevailing tendencies in political thought, with the desire to honour, as far as convenient, British pledges and with the fundamental necessity of easing the British taxpayers' burdens, for which the Northcliffe Press and other journals had taken up cudgels, were to be administered according to the wishes of the inhabitants of the country in so far as they coincided with strict British tutelage and control.

With the policy of creating a chain of friendly states Lord Curzon, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had been long in agreement.[1] In late 1917 and early 1918, he had urged their creation, particularly in Persia and in 'Iraq, in the occupation of which he saw the logical climax to three centuries of British activity in the Middle East. He had then held, in common with other members of the Cabinet, including Sir William Robertson,[2] that Germany, operating through prostrate Russia, was still the chief enemy of Great Britain in Asia, although concern had not been lacking that Bolshevik doctrines might reach India, a fear which was later to become paramount. He had proposed that neither Germany nor her allies should ever again be permitted to occupy Palestine or Mesopotamia. Every effort should be made to re-create Russia — 'even though it may take ten or twenty years' — as a bulwark against German

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[1] 'It was all part of a perfectly definite and logical policy which had taken shape with his first glance at the political map of Asia while still a boy at Eton, and had remained clear-cut in his mind ever since. It rested upon a single and quite simple conception – the creation of a chain of buffer states stretching from the northern confines of India to the Mediterranean sea, to serve as a screen, giving protection against attack to India and the arterial line of communication between Great Britain at one end and Australia, New Zealand, and the Far East at the other.' Ronaldshay, Lord, *The Life of Lord Curzon* (3 vols., 1928), Vol. III, p. 209.

[2] For Sir William Robertson's strongly worded appreciation to the War Cabinet, March 14th, 1918, see *O.H.*, Vol. IV., p. 138.

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penetration towards India, and finally, 'we must endeavour by 175*
any means in our power to secure a friendly Persia and a loyal 727*
Afghanistan'.[1] Sir Percy Cox's mission to Persia in 1918-20 648*
had been to bring Persia, rehabilitated by Great Britain, into treaty relations. The full success of British policy in Persia depended on possessing in 'Iraq what would be 'tantamount to a British frontier'.[2]

Bolshevik Russia replaced Germany, in Lord Curzon's opinion, as Great Britain's chief enemy in Asia, but his policy remained the same, as was indicated in his address to the Central Asian Society, October 12th, 1920. He said then, in part:

> Our aim is to give security to what we possess . . . I hold that what we have to do is to try to make islets in the ocean, peaceful spaces in the chaos, landing places in the storm; to elaborate palisades of stable and peaceful states around the fringe of India. It is for that object that I am working.
>
> We want . . . freedom from the contagion of Bolshevist misgovernment and anarchy, which will not only be injurious to the British Empire, but which will mean its ruin.[3]

Not until January, 1919, when he was Acting Secretary of State while Mr. Balfour was at the Peace Conference was he able to give effect to his policy. Even then he did not possess full responsibility, Mr. Balfour remaining titular Secretary of State until October, 1919. Nor had he a free hand. Mr. Lloyd George, assuming that the Foreign Office was but an extension of No. 10 Downing Street, kept his fingers on most affairs. Nevertheless, Lord Curzon, although circumscribed on most of the great problems of the day, placed his impress on Egypt and the Middle East. The Treaty of 1919 with Persia whereby it was to have become a link in the chain was due to his initiative. His influence on Middle East and 'Iraq affairs was facilitated

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[1] Extract from address by Lord Curzon to the Imperial War Cabinet, June 25th, 1918. Similar views had been put forward in a Memorandum of September 21st, 1917.

[2] Extract from address by Lord Curzon to Eastern Committee of War Cabinet, December 30th, 1918.

[3] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VIII (1921), pp. 8-9.

175* 727* 648* by his position as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs, sometimes called the Curzon Committee,[1] through which he practically took charge of matters concerning 'Iraq, in spite of the protests of Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, who was nominally responsible for its affairs.[2]

However desirous H.M. Government may have been to consolidate their position in 'Iraq that it might act as a British frontier in the Middle East, they were still unable to decide upon the method of giving effect to their policy and were still reluctant to take any action which might be assailed in the Peace Conference or which might prejudice them in world opinion. To H.M. Government in such a state of mind, the results of the 'Iraq plebiscite as sent to London must have been indeed welcome. In the trends of 'Iraqī public opinion as reported, they seemed to find sufficient promise of a solution of their difficulties to justify an advance towards setting up the new government and a further statement of policy. The India Office telegraphed to Baghdad on February 14th:

> They [H.M. Government] will be glad if you will telegraph outline of constitution of Arab State or group of States, which you would propose on basis of wishes of inhabitants, as disclosed in telegrams and of necessity of effective and indisputable British control. By Anglo-French Declaration we are committed to indigenous administration and we must adhere to this, not only in letter but in spirit. Our objective should be a flexible constitution, giving full play to different elements of population and recognizing and incorporating local peculiarities and idiosyncrasies such as will provide for Arab participation as the time goes on in the actual Government and Administration of country, and preventing Arab nationalists from being drawn into opposition to British control.

These general ideas may not be any great hindrance to

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1559.

[2] Letter, India Office to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, July 15th, 1919.

you in endeavouring to work out solutions of an extremely 175*
difficult problem, but they will serve to show you what is in 727*
the mind of H.M. Government.[1] 648*

The promises of the Anglo-French Declaration, thus, were not overlooked, but to any who might demand full independence on the basis of that document, H.M. Government could now point to the array of documents resulting from the plebiscite as proof positive of the concurrence of the population in the form of government proposed. To those who demanded that Great Britain should not forego her imperial interests, they could point to the 'effective and indisputable British control' which they proposed to maintain in accordance with the expressed wishes of the inhabitants. The difficulties of giving a tangible and workable expression to this dual-purpose policy were realized but, relying on the support of the more substantial elements of the population, which they understood to be behind them, H.M. Government might well have believed that a beginning could be made.

The acting Civil Commissioner's draft Constitution for which the India Office had asked was ready on February 20th.[2] Five days later, he left for Paris and London to discuss the situation in person. His constitutional proposals were based on the following assumptions:

(1) There will be no Arab Amir, but a British High Commissioner.

(2) Mosul Wilayet and Dair uz-Zur will be included in 'Iraq, as also those portions of Kurdistan which are now a part of Mosul Wilayet and which are not included in the future Armenian state, i.e., the whole of the basin of the Greater Zab. This is necessary in order to admit of inclusion of Assyrians.

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, February 14th, 1919.

[2] The draft proposals, in Secret Letter S/11, dated February 20th, 1919, were sent to Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Senior Judicial Officer, to Col. Evelyn Howell, Revenue and Financial Secretary, to Col. F. C. C. Balfour, Military Governor of Baghdad, and to the Political Officers of Divisions with the request that they discuss the proposals among themselves and with leading notables.

175* (3) British control, however expressed in words, will be
727* effective in practice and will be ensured by retention of
648* adequate military and air-forces distributed primarily with a
view to aid the civil power in the maintenance of order.

(4) Adequate British financial support for the 'Iraq State in its early stages, firstly by loan secured on revenue, secondly by allowing Civil Administration to take over surplus military assets such as railways, bridges, motor works, electric plant, etc., at a low valuation.

The proposals in an abridged form were:

(1) 'Iraq to be ruled by a High Commissioner having under him four Commissioners controlling provinces as follows: Basra, . . . Baghdad, . . . Euphrates, . . . Mosul . . . If Kurdistan is included there will be five Commissioners.

(2) Divisional Councils . . . to be made full use of as advisory and deliberative but not as legislative bodies. . . .

(3) Provincial Councils to be formed in each of the above provinces from members selected of their own choice by the Divisional Councils. The latter are nominated bodies. . . .

Carefully selected Arabs of good birth and education, especially from those in government posts in Syria,[1] were to be given, from the outset, positions of executive and administrative responsibility,[2] as

> Governors of Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and 'Amarah, with a specially chosen British official of ability and character as Municipal Commissioner and Adviser to the Governor, in which dual capacity he could control finances and mitigate inevitable inefficiency in early stages.

This draft constitution had been formed, the Acting Civil Commissioner declared, 'in consultation with the most experienced officers on my staff, on whom the responsibility of giving effect to it will fall. I am authorized by them to assure Government that it will have their whole-hearted, if cautious support.'[1] 175* 727* 648* All the proposals, however, did not have the whole-hearted support which was claimed for them. The division of the country into provinces, the erection of Provincial and subsidiary Councils, and the scheme of indirect election to the latter commanded general agreement, but other proposals, as the establishment of town Governors, found little support. The Revenue Secretary stated frankly: 'The more I think of Wilson's four town Governors the less I like them.'[2] The Military Governor of Baghdad was convinced of the 'impossibility of finding men who could run an administration so closely involved as that of Baghdad with military and technical departments, which will continue to be run by Englishmen'. There was also the 'difficulty of getting British officials to serve under natives'.[3]

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[1] Cf. his views here with those expressed in his Telegram No. 9926, November 16, 1918, cited *supra*, p. 138.

[2] The tribal districts were to be excluded from the operation of such a scheme, since it would not be welcome to the tribes or to the officials who, moreover, were not 'fit for responsible district work from any point of view'.

It was the Judicial Secretary, Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, whose ability and experience had established him as one of the outstanding senior officials, who offered the most trenchant criticisms. His familiarity with India, the Sudan and Egypt, and with the judicial and administrative practices there, and his store of experience and knowledge enabled him to approach the task with a more mature judgment and, perhaps, a more tolerant spirit than did some of the other officials.[4] In a letter to the Acting Civil Commissioner, March 11th, 1919, Sir Edgar pronounced himself strongly in favour of the proposed provinces. They would facilitate the adaptation of administrative measures to local sentiment and make it 'easier to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Shiyahs'. They

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[1] Draft Proposals, February 20th, 1919.

[2] Letter, Col. E. B. Howell, to Sir E. Bonham-Carter, February 21st, 1919.

[3] Secret Letter, C.9/1: Military Governor, Baghdad, to Acting Civil Commissioner, February 24th, 1919.

[4] He had already written a memorandum, 'The Place of the Arab in Administration' (Confidential prints are dated February 5th, 1919, but typescript versions exist dated February 8th, 1919), remarkable for its reasoned appreciation of the situation. For his achievements in reconstituting the Judicial system, employing Arabs both as Judges and staff, see *supra* pp. 128 ff.

175* might lead, also, to a federal form of Government, under which
727* 'self-government as regards internal affairs could be combined
648* most easily with the control of the protecting power'.

His main objection to the proposals, however, was that they did not

> go far enough, either to satisfy the declarations which had been made on behalf of the British Government nor to put the Arabs in a position to obtain a fair and increasing share in the administration . . . I think from the outset some Arabs should be employed as Assistant Political Officers and Deputy Assistant Political Officers . . . I consider also that the positions of importance should be given to Arabs in the Civil Administration either as Ministers or as Assistant Secretaries and that a Legislative Council should be formed, similar to the Council of Ministers in Egypt, consisting of the Arab Ministers or Assistant Secretaries and a rather larger number of the principal British heads of departments. Notwithstanding the impossibility of now finding men fitted for the position,[1] I think it wise to give the designation to these appointments of Ministers rather than Assistant Secretaries. To begin with, the Arab Ministers would be little more than figure-heads, but their position would be none the less valuable. It would maintain the social and political status of the Arabs and would encourage the employment of Arabs in lower posts and without any upheaval such as would be necessary to replace a British head of a department by an Arab. An Arab Minister of ability could, at any time, make his influence felt and exercise real powers. If all posts of importance in the Administration are reserved for the British, this must necessarily lower the status of the Arab, and make it increasingly difficult to introduce Arabs into the Administration.[2]

The Acting Civil Commissioner, on arriving in Paris, took part in the discussions for which he had been summoned. He also discussed the problems of 'Iraq and Arabia in general with

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[1] He had reviewed this difficulty in his Memorandum of February 5th, 1919.

[2] He embodied his suggestions in a 'Tentative Draft of Arab Institutions' (not dated); see App. v. There is no indication that it was ever submitted to the Acting Civil Commissioner.

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numerous individuals, English, American and French. The 175*
atmosphere, in his opinion, was dominated by the Western 727+
Arabia viewpoint, the experts being lamentably ignorant of 648*
conditions in 'Iraq and even in Persia.[1] On the other hand, he himself created the impression that he was out of touch with conditions under which the Peace Conference was proceeding, and that he had little conception of the strength of Arab Nationalism or of the forces which had given rise to it.

In London, his appeals for an official pronouncement of the intentions of H.M. Government regarding 'Iraq were not fruitful. It was felt that until further progress had been made toward the settlement of peace, the telegram of February 14th must suffice.[2] The Secretary of State for India agreed that the Acting Civil Commissioner should make specific proposals, and suggested that Lord Curzon might help him in formulating a policy and in obtaining sanction for his plans.

The Acting Civil Commissioner bespoke the aid of Lord Curzon in obtaining an agreed scheme on which to build and an accepted policy by which he might be guided. His constitutional proposals, drawn up in February, were placed, by the arrangement of Lord Curzon, before the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs on April 6th, at a meeting before which he appeared personally. His proposals for pro- [631]
vinces (five instead of four proposed) in ''Iraq proper' were sanctioned, together with Provincial Councils for each. Divisional and Municipal Councils were to be developed and consolidated. Arab Advisers were to be appointed to the British heads of three Departments of State: Revenue, Justice and Education. The Arab Secretaries of the Divisional Councils were sanctioned as Advisers to the Political Officers, and Arabs were to be appointed Presidents of the Municipal Councils of Baghdad, Basra, and 'Amāra.

In deference, however, to Lord Curzon's *idée fixe* that nothing should be done to anticipate the decisions of the Peace Con-

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[1] Wilson, op. cit., p. 116.

[2] Cited *supra*, p. 180.

175* ference, the appointment of a High Commissioner and the
227* Provincial Commissioners, as suggested by the Acting Civil
648* Commissioner, were not sanctioned, while the distinction
between Mōsul and 'Iraq proper was to be continued by giving the former an Arab administration.

The Acting Civil Commissioner left England armed with authority to proceed along these lines.[1] The formal official authorization which, however, reached Baghdad on May 10th, the day following his arrival there, read as follows:

> We authorize you to take in hand the construction of five provinces for 'Iraq proper on the same lines as recommended by Howell in enclosures five and six of your letter of April 6th. You will also proceed with the creation of the Arab province of Mosul fringed by autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish Chiefs who will be advised by British Political Officers.
>
> We also approve of the formation of Provincial Councils and the development and institution of Divisional and Municipal Councils.[2]

The references to ''Iraq proper' and to 'Arab province of Mosul' were undoubtedly disconcerting to the Acting Civil Commissioner. The inference, however, that the above telegram was his first intimation that H.M. Government intended to exclude Mōsul from the operations of the proposals, which he later claimed had 'been accepted almost without discussion',[3] and that his strenuous efforts of the next few months were due to his anxiety to counter this new and unexpected turn in policy, as he later implied,[4] seems hardly in accordance with the facts available. The Secretary of the Committee, in his account of the meeting of April 6th has stated: 'The meeting decided to make a start by creating five provinces in Mesopotamia proper and an "Arab" province of Mosul, etc.'[5] and that

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[1] Young, op. cit., p. 286; Wilson, op. cit., p. 122.

[2] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, May 9th, 1919.

[3] Wilson, op. cit., p. 122.

[4] Ibid., pp. 119, 123.

[5] Young, op. cit., p. 285.

the Acting Civil Commissioner had returned 'armed with 175*
authority to proceed on these lines'.[1] His continued efforts to 227*
influence the policy of H.M. Government were due more to his 648*
desire to make a final attempt to ensure the inclusion of Mōsul in the new state, his efforts in London having already proved unsuccessful, than to any reaction to what he has inferred was a novel policy suddenly put forward by H.M. Government.

The Acting Civil Commissioner had long considered the inclusion of Mōsul in 'Iraq as essential. Sir William Marshall's strong action in completing the conquest of the Wilayet after the Armistice had met with his approval.[2] It had rounded out 'Iraq geographically and had pushed back the Turks to a more natural frontier. It had brought under British protection the Christian population, including the Assyrians who, encouraged by the Allies, had taken up arms against the Turks. It had put the wilayet's economic resources, including its revenue, at the disposal of the rest of 'Iraq of whose autonomous existence without these potentialities, the Acting Civil Commissioner was inclined to be sceptical. It gave Great Britain control of oil resources which, if not wholly proven, were enough to disturb the chancelleries of several nations and to produce the petroleum clauses of the Anglo-German Agreement, 1914, the Oil Agreement, May 15th-17th, 1916, and the Berenger-Long Agreement, April 18th, 1919.[3]

He saw little reason, other than the Sykes-Picot Agreement, why 'Iraq and Great Britain should forego these advantages by any post-war settlement. Inasmuch as Lloyd George had given him to understand that the French claim to Mōsul, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, had been settled as far as France was concerned, he saw no justification for the non-extension of the proposed new regime to the wilayet. Any serious attempt to set up an Arab Administration would be followed by violent

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[1] Young, op. cit., p. 286.

[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 22.

[3] Also the San Remo Agreement, April 25th, 1920; *Brit. and For. St. Papers* CXIII (1923), 350; *Misc. No.* 11 (1920), Cmd. 675; see also *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 182-3; App. 2, Part I.

175* protests against such discrimination from Arab Nationalists of
727* Baghdad and lower 'Iraq, where little self-government had been
648+ authorized save Arab advisers, Municipal Presidents and local
Councils, stripped of any real authority or power. He also foresaw that when Mōsul was assimilated, as it would undoubtedly be, any attempt to bring its Arab Government into line with the rest of 'Iraq would be met by storms of opposition, not only from the Arab inhabitants of Mōsul but also from those of 'Iraq and of the entire Arab world, intent on demanding their rights in the face of the hostile Western Governments.

Accordingly, when an announcement was made of the impending changes on the occasion of the King's birthday celebration in Baghdad on May 29th, the Acting Civil Commissioner spoke only in generalities. No mention of Mōsul was made nor was any hint given as to the future administration which H.M. Government proposed to establish there.[1]

A few days later he renewed his efforts to win H.M. Government to his opinion. In answer to a telegram from H.M. Government, thanking him and his staff for their work and stating that his recommendations marked an important stage towards a definite form of administration, and that the ultimate Constitution must await the coming of peace,[2] the Acting Civil Commissioner declared on June 7th, that it was difficult, if not impossible, to proceed with constitutional organization, until the future of Mōsul had been settled. He asked that he be permitted to make an announcement regarding Mōsul in about a fortnight's time.[3]

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[1] Text: *Proclamations*, 1914-1919, No. 49, pp. 38-9. The speech was the combination of a draft prepared by Col. E. B. Howell, May 7th, and a draft prepared by the Acting Civil Commissioner, May 21st, 1919. In view of this announcement, reprinted in local papers and in official compilations, it is difficult to understand the Acting Civil Commissioner's statement: 'H.M. Government had firmly refused either to make any public announcement themselves in regard to Mesopotamia, in amplification of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, 1918, or permit me to do so.' Wilson, op. cit., p. 237.

[2] S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, June 6th, 1919.

[3] Telegram No. 6403, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 7th, 1919.

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Lord Curzon, on the receipt of the telegram, which did not 175* officially reach the Foreign Office until June 24th,[1] took the 727* position that the creation of the sanctioned provinces, councils 648* and advisory positions were steps in devolution and in decentralization from the temporary military administration. He could not understand, moreover, why the application of such steps should be dependent on the inclusion of Mōsul in 'Iraq or on any particular combination of provinces. The original sanction for the Acting Civil Commissioner's proposals had not implied that any combination of provinces or that even the guardianship of H.M. Government would be permanent. A telegram to this effect was dispatched to Baghdad, July 5th, which stated in conclusion: 'Any action which would give rise in Mosul Wilayet or elsewhere to the impression that the future political status of 'Iraq has already been decided upon should therefore be most scrupulously avoided.'[2]

Still unsatisfied, the Acting Civil Commissioner, instead of devoting his energies whole-heartedly to the execution of the proposals which he had himself drawn up, entered into further correspondence with H.M. Government, endeavouring to obtain their approval to the inclusion of Mōsul in the new regime.

Growth of 'Iraqī opposition

In the meantime, opposition to British control had continued 175* to grow both in 'Iraq and in Syria. A letter in January, 1919, 727* from the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, welcoming the Anglo-French 186 Declaration as an indication that no part of 'Iraq was to be 668 under foreign rule, had been followed in early June by another letter, supposed to have been written by Amīr Faisal himself, and addressed to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The letter suggested that the severity of the British officials in 'Iraq had begun to turn

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[1] Young, op. cit., pp. 287-8.
[2] Telegram S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 5th, 1919.

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away the regard of the people, and that if the Anglo-French Declaration signified anything, the time had come for a change. His own officers felt strongly the need for the acceleration of a National Government and fully understood that the longer the present system existed the greater would be the difficulty in changing the system later.

Lord Curzon, however, believed that no further action was necessary. He had already, two months before, sanctioned what he believed was the limit of Arab self-government compatible with a military occupation. No reply was sent.

The incident of Nājī Beg as-Sūwaidī, in addition, confirmed both the Arabs and the British officials of the hostility and bad faith of those on the opposite side. The Acting Civil Commissioner, on his journey from London to Baghdad, had interviewed two of the ‘Iraqī officers in Damascus. He had admitted that affairs in ‘Iraq were not perfect, and that he was ready to do what he could to meet their views. He had pointed out his difficulty in obtaining good men for positions in ‘Iraq. He had at once agreed when the two officers had asked whether he would consent to a representative being chosen from among their number to go to Baghdad and to make suggestions.

Accordingly, Nājī Beg, a capable and ardent Nationalist, of an old Baghdad family,[1] arrived in Baghdad, early in June. He soon found, contrary to the expectations which the interview with the Acting Civil Commissioner had aroused in himself and in his fellow ‘Iraqis, that he was to be merely a cog in the British machine and that his advice would not be heeded and was not even wanted.[2]

[1] Nājī Beg, now known as Nājī Pasha, was a son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī who, as a prominent Arab Nationalist in Baghdad before the war, had suffered imprisonment at the hands of the Turks (*Events in Turkish ‘Iraq*, July, 1913), and who took a large part in the post-war Nationalist movement in ‘Iraq. Nājī Pasha had been a popular *Qaimmaqām* of Najaf under the Turks (ibid., April, 1913). He was Acting Civil Governor of Aleppo under the Damascus Government, and has been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, etc., of ‘Iraq.

[2] In an interview with the writer, Nājī Pasha stated that he believed that he had been asked to come to Baghdad to assist and to advise in setting up a National Government. On discovering his mistake, he resigned.

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His subsequent resignation and return to Syria confirmed 175*
the opinion of the 'Iraqis in Syria that the British authorities in 727*
'Iraq regarded them as active enemies who were trying to 186
undermine British influence in the country, and that no real 668
opportunities would ever be given to the 'Iraqis to manage their own affairs. The Acting Civil Commissioner, in his turn, was convinced that his view of the Arab Nationalists was the correct one: that they were incapable and inconstant and that nothing constructive might be expected from them. When, therefore, the Acting Civil Commissioner's opinion was asked on a draft reply[1] to a Memorandum which the 'Iraqī officers had sent to the Foreign Office demanding the immediate establishment of a National Government, he gave way to a characteristic outburst, deprecating in no uncertain language that an important announcement should be drawn from H.M. Government by 'such small fry'. He suggested, however, that if a reply were believed to be necessary it 'should be restricted to an intimation that the writers appear to have been misinformed as to the progress of events in Mesopotamia, and that it is open to them to go to Mesopotamia to see things for themselves'.[2]

Some form of reassurance to the 'Iraqī officers was held to be necessary by both Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu. A new reply was drafted. After stating that 'pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to Mandatory power and nature of Mandate it would be premature to attempt constitutional experiments', it followed the Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion for a reply and pointed out that if the officers would visit the country they would find that Provincial and Divisional Councils were already being formed 'to ensure measure of Arab participation compatible with military occupation and mutual interest in political future'. The appointment of Nājī

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 15th, 1919.

[2] Telegram No. 8107, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, July 19th, 1919.

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175* Pasha was mentioned as evidence of the goodwill of 927* H.M. Government.[1]

186 668 Whatever the effect of the reply at the time on the Acting Civil Commissioner to whom it had been repeated for his information, he was later to claim that it came as 'a serious blow, not less serious because it was addressed to Cairo, for communication to a group of prominent 'Iraqī Officers in the Sharifian service, and was the outcome of telegraphic correspondence extending over four months'.[2] The evidence available makes it difficult to understand how he could have regarded the reply, drafted by H.M. Government on the lines he had himself put forward on July 19th, as the unexpected and disastrous result of his own efforts extending over four months of telegraphic correspondence.[3] His correspondence during that period had been concerned principally with persuading H.M. Government to limit Arab participation in the administration and not to extend it, and with urging the inclusion of Mōsul in a British-administered 'Iraq. Nor is it easy to understand just how the reply which he had assisted in drafting was a blow or check to the carrying out of the proposals with the execution of which he had been entrusted in May. The excerpt which he later extracted from the telegram and presented in a setting of his own fashioning in his *Clash of Loyalties*[4] might well give such an impression if it were not known that he had already been informed in the telegram of July 5th that constitutional experiments, other than those already sanctioned, could not be approved. The telegram of August 9th, taken as a whole and in its proper setting, can be considered only as a blow to the demand of the 'Iraqī officers for immediate National Government. Far from being a rebuff to him, the telegram

[1] Telegram, No. 249, Foreign Office to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Cairo, August 9th, 1919, repeated to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.

[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 124.

[3] Ibid.: 'I eventually elicited the following pronouncement from the Foreign Office (9th August) . . .'

[4] Ibid.

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indicated that the British Government stood behind him in his 175*
attempts to realize the measures he had proposed in April and 727*
should have been extremely welcome to him in his attempts to 186
combat any scheme of Arab Government as implied in the 668
Anglo-French Declaration. Indeed, so far was the Acting Civil Commissioner from being actually affected by the 'serious blow', as he has endeavoured to indicate, he was assuring H.M. Government within the following week that, while the constitutional proposals sanctioned in May would require a year to put into operation, they would meet the needs of the country for many years to come.[1]

In Syria, the agitation for a National Government at Baghdad continued, eventually overflowing into 'Iraq itself and swelling the local movement there until it broke into a flood of rebellion. The telegram of August 9th from the Foreign Office had not satisfied the 'Iraqī members of Faisal's staff. Nājī Pasha's appointment had been no answer to their aspirations; his resignation had been the confirmation of their fears. What they wanted, they declared, was assurance that the existing military administration was not to continue. They found

> the attitude of the British officials was more than that of administrators of a foreign population who were incapable, and would always remain incapable, of governing themselves than that to which the Baghdadi officers had become accustomed on the other side, of friendly advisers who started on the assumption that the Arabs were managing their own affairs, and that it was not for them to do more than make friendly suggestions for the improvement of their plans.[2]

The delay in setting up the various measures which had been sanctioned seemed to the inhabitants of 'Iraq no less than to the 'Iraqī officers in Syria to point to a lack of goodwill on the part of the Acting Civil Commissioner and to give substance

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[1] Young, op. cit., p. 294.

[2] Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd to Major Sir H. W. Young, cited ibid., p. 297. Confirmed by Nūrī Pasha to the writer, December 18th, 1934.

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175+ to the belief that no real aid to the achievement of their
727 aspirations could be expected from that quarter.[1] Rumours
186 were about that the mandate system was but annexation in a
668 new form, and that colonization by the British and by the Government of India had not been abandoned. The coming of 550 English women, wives and relatives of officials, pointed to the establishment of the British for a long stay. The establishment of farms for experimental work in cotton-growing was interpreted as further evidence of India's intentions towards 'Iraq. Confidence was difficult to maintain in the face of so many facts and rumours. The 'Iraqīs, like their fellow Arabs, lacked patience to await developments. They desired results, and these immediately and in a tangible form. Cool and far-sighted heads were not lacking, but they were not always in control. The majority believed, as Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī was to remark later to Miss Gertrude Bell: 'My lady, complete independence is never given, it is always taken.'[2]

The establishment of the Syrian State, immediately following the Armistice, encouraged the 'Iraqīs to look to their own country where direct British administration continued.[3] The growing insistence of the Syrians that posts in the Damascus Government be given to Syrians only made it necessary for the 'Iraqī officers there to seek new outlets and opportunities for their energies. 'Iraqī officers, disguised as Beduins, had already toured Mesopotamia during July. They had reported that the temper of the country was rising, and that active agitation and continuous propaganda, backed with funds, might win independence from Great Britain if it were not freely given.

Other propagandists began to slip over the desert. Societies

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[1] The attitude of the 'Iraqī Officers in Syria was ably reviewed by Gertrude Bell in her confidential note, *Syria in October*, 1919, pp. 3-4 *passim*.

[2] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 569. Lawrence had continually drilled the same principle into the leaders of the Movement in Western Arabia: 'I had preached to Faisal, from our first meeting, that freedom was taken not given.' Lawrence, op. cit., p. 274.

[3] *Syria in October*, 1919, p. 11.

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already existing throughout 'Iraq became the channels of 175* Nationalist agitation. Anti-Government and anti-British 727* sentiment and discontent in the towns, in the religious centres, 186 among the tribes and among the unemployed ex-officials, were 668 stimulated and then skilfully assimilated to the nucleus of Nationalist feeling already existing among those who believed in Arab and in 'Iraqī independence as desirable in themselves. Appeals to religious fervour and fanaticism, to pride of race, to Nationalist feeling, to cupidity, and to all the elemental instincts in each of the component groups which had been drawn into the movement, were working their spell during the days when politicians of the West, like Joshua of old, bade the East stand still until the battle at Paris over the spoils should be ended.

H.M. Government was not entirely unaware that public opinion in 'Iraq during the last months of 1919 was not the same as had prevailed in the final months of 1918. As early as August 23rd, when a police report of July 7th stated that

> every Moslem Arab of education in Baghdad was a member of a society, with branches in all the important towns in Mesopotamia, which was described as simply a pan-Arab and anti-foreign organization formed with a view to the expulsion of the British and the establishment of Arab rule.[1]

Mr. Montagu's suggestion that an announcement should be made that Great Britain would remain in the country, in some form or other, was negatived by the British delegation at Paris which deprecated such action as injudicious in view of the state of affairs at the Peace Conference.

In October and November, when even more disturbing news was received of the temper of the country, of the attitude of the 'Iraqī officers in Syria[2] and of the slowness with which the constitutional proposals were being executed,[3] Lord Curzon,

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[1] Cited Young, op. cit., p. 294.

[2] *Syria in October*, 1919.

[3] After six months, only four of the nine Divisional Councils and none of the Provincial Councils had been formed. On further inquiry, it was discovered that the Acting Civil Commissioner did not contemplate moving in the matter that year. Young, op. cit., p. 298.

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175* in alarm, called a meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee,
127* November 10th. The Committee agreed that the first condi-
186 tion for recovery of confidence and for the future settlement of
668 the country was the return of Sir Percy Cox. This would be difficult, however, until the Mandate was announced and he could act with complete authority.[1] The Mandate would probably not be given before the New Year, but an early announcement of his impending return was desirable. It was hardly possible that he could take up his new duties until the autumn.

In his turn, the Acting Civil Commissioner also realized that the temper of the country was altering. He assigned, correctly, much of the change to trans-desert sources but, considering the authors to be unimportant, he was inclined to underrate the necessity to take their views — a mistake which was to have serious consequences. Resentful of the Western Arabia policy, he was ready to believe that Sharif Husain's inordinate ambition, that England's golden sovereigns and the Arabs' love of plunder were the sole motives behind the movement in the West. He shut his eyes to the other factors. His contacts with the Middle East had hitherto been primarily in India, Persia and the Persian Gulf.[2] His first-hand acquaintance with Arabs and his knowledge of their character had been limited to the lower Tigris. He had no personal knowledge of the deep hold which Independence and Nationalism, as abstract ideas, had upon the 'Iraqī participants in the Arab Movement. He could not realize, therefore, that the motives which had helped to sustain them during months of desert warfare would continue to do so, even if their enemies were France or Britain.

He did not seem to realize that, however much the dignitaries of Baghdad might repudiate the officers as men of

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[1] Reference to Sir Percy Cox in Tehrān, found him unprepared to return without complete authority.

[2] He had spent about ten days in Baghdad, July, 1911: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1911.

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importance and position,[1] many of the latter had been the life 175*
of the pre-war Arab Movement and had been instigators of 727*
several disturbances in the Turkish army.[2] Moreover, they had 186
created positions for themselves by their ability, first in the 668
Turkish Army and then in the Arab Movement and, in consequence, had acquired a reputation in popular opinion equalling their actual importance. In addition, the 'Iraqīs had in Mōsul, Basra, Baghdad and outlying districts, families, relatives and friends who cast up, at their instigation, waves of increasing size in the sea of 'Iraqī Nationalism.

Outwardly paying lip-service to Arab participation, his 175*
real opinion, not only of Arabs but also of those who advocated 727*
their wide participation in the government and administration of 'Iraq, came out in his memorandum on Miss Bell's note on Syria.[3] He disagreed with her fundamental assumption that 'an Arab State in Mesopotamia . . . within a short period of years is a possibility, and that the recognition or creation of a logical scheme of government on these lines, in supersession of those on which we are now working in Mesopotamia, would be practical and popular'. He declared:

> My observations in this country and elsewhere have forced me to the conviction that this assumption is erroneous, and although I am aware that in holding this view I differ from authorities and observers both at home and abroad . . . I venture, probably for the last time in my present capacity, to lay before H.M.'s Government the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. . . .
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> I therefore regard the creation of an Arab Government

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[1] Practically every 'Iraqī who served under Faisal has occupied, upon his return to 'Iraq, positions of responsibility in the 'Iraq Government. Their enemies declare that this monopolization of high office has been due to British influence, and to the fact that they have constituted themselves a ruling clique. Their friends maintain their position has been due to their ability and experience.

[2] As in Baghdad, from March to July, 1913: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March, April and July, 1913.

[3] Letter No. 34436, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, November 15th, 1919.

> 175x on the lines advocated as inconsistent with effective British
> 727x Administration or indeed with effective control of any sort. For some years to come the appointment of Arab Governors or high officials except in an advisory capacity would involve the rapid decay of authority, law and order followed by anarchy and disorder . . . Effective British administration is vital to the continued existence of Mesopotamia as an independent state or administrative entity.[1]

He continued to express his conviction, both in this memorandum and in other dispatches to H.M. Government,[2] that he was working on right lines and that good administration would counteract serious political discontent — a characteristic belief of Anglo-Indian administrators.

In the end, however, he was forced to the reluctant conclusion that his 'right lines' were not those approved by H.M. Government nor those which would find acceptance in the country itself. The Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on February 23rd, 1920, reaffirming the Anglo-French Declaration; the discouraging attitude of the Foreign Office regarding his proposals for further administrative and financial measures (August and March); the seizing of the bit into their own teeth by the Arab Nationalists in Syria when Sharīf Faisal was declared King of Syria and Sharīf 'Abdullāh, King of 'Iraq;[3] and the rising temper in 'Iraq convinced him, as he had never been convinced before, that his views, as expressed in the dispatch of November 15th, were unacceptable to H.M. Government and untenable in the new situation. Sharifian influence was still his bugbear, however, and, in a last-hour attempt to exclude it, he approached H.M. Government in a series of telegrams, March 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st proposing measures which he had so long opposed, as for

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[1] Letter No. 34436, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 15th, 1919.

[2] As in telegrams: No. 750, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, January 18th, 1920; No. 1485, same to same, February 3rd, 1920.

[3] By Syrian and 'Iraqi Covenanters at Damascus, March 8th, 1920.

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instance, 'a Central Legislative Chamber . . . Arab members in 175* charge of Departments, with British Secretaries'.[1] In addition, 127* believing that the declaration of the Prime Minister, 'we shall claim the right as Mandatory Power of Mesopotamia including Mosul,'[2] signified the end of his long struggle for the inclusion of Mōsul and that the assignment of the Mandates was not far off, he set about to prepare a Constitution which would both satisfy H.M. Government and effectively block any Sharifian manifestos regarding 'Iraq, and at the same time would cast the administrative machinery in a mould of his own devising.[3] He therefore appointed a Committee, with Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter as Chairman, to formulate constitutional proposals.[4]

In London, Mr. Montagu, in the light of recent events, such as the Dair az-Zūr incidents,[5] of the Acting High Commissioner's telegrams and of the imminent announcement of the Mandate of 'Iraq for Great Britain, again suggested that a statement should be made at once of the intention of Great Britain to set up a National Government in an Arab State in 'Iraq.

The terms of the announcement, tentatively discussed by representatives of the Foreign Office and of the India Office, March 26th, were left to the Interdepartmental Committee. The Committee, on April 13th, agreed that 'Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu should formulate an announcement for immediate

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[1] Telegram No. 3599, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, March 20th, 1920.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXXVII (1920), p. 664. This view was confirmed by a telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, March 26th, 1920. The latter took advantage of the opportunity to urge that 'including Mosul' should mean 'all the Mosul Wilayet as administered by the Turks': Telegram No. 3883, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, March 28th, 1920.

[3] Telegram No. 3600, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to India Office, March, 21st, 1920.

[4] The committee, usually known as the Bonham-Carter Committee, was also composed of Col. E. B. Howell, Major H. H. F. M. Tyler, Col. F. C. C. Balfour, and Major R. W. Bullard.

[5] See *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, pp. 133-8. Also *infra.*, pp. 254 ff.

175 727 publication in Mesopotamia'. A telegram to this effect was dispatched to the Acting Civil Commissioner.[1]

Seeing that his plans would go awry if the announcement, preceding his new Constitution, left no opportunity for its application, and feeling that H.M. Government were still pursuing the wrong policy, he begged that the announcement should be deferred until they had seen and considered the answer which he would send on April 27th,[2] when the report of the Bonham-Carter Committee would be forwarded.

In the meantime, however, Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu had difficulty in reaching an agreement on the draft announcement. Mr. Montagu, in accordance with the personal conviction which impelled him to advocate Indian reforms and under the influence of Miss Bell and others, wished to announce that a representative National Government would be erected. Lord Curzon, although professing himself converted to the idea of self-governing native States, could not overcome his lifelong belief in England's mission to rule nor his mistrust of native ability. He hesitated to go as far as Mr. Montagu. The discussions were still in progress when Lord Curzon left London for the conference at San Remo. They were not resumed until after the Mandate for 'Iraq had been granted to Great Britain.

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, April 14th, 1920.

[2] Telegram, No. 4848, Civil Commissioner to India Office, April 21st, 1920.

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CHAPTER XI

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR 'IRAQ: PROPOSALS, COUNTERPROPOSALS, ANNOUNCEMENTS: APRIL-JUNE, 1920

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THE constitutional proposals of the Bonham-Carter Committee had been intended by the Acting Civil Commissioner to form the second stage in the transition from Civil Administration under Military Occupation to a peace-time Government. The Committee, therefore, had been instructed 'to frame specific proposals . . . for the establishment of constitutional Government in this country consistent with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Anglo-French Declaration and other public announcements'.[1] Its attention was called to the past correspondence between Baghdad and H.M. Government, especially to the India Office telegrams of November 28th, 1918, and February 14th, 1919.[2]

Although the Committee in preparing its Report apparently did not see the draft Mandate for 'Iraq[3] then in existence,[4] the proposals of the Committee represent the first embodiment of the principle of the mandatory system in a Constitution[5]

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[1] Telegram No. 5110, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, April 26th, 1920.

[2] Ibid.

[3] According to Sir E. Bonham-Carter, November 28th, 1935.

[4] Drawn up in the spring of 1919 by Commander D. G. Hogarth, Miss Gertrude Bell and Col. T. E. Lawrence, with the concurrence of the Acting Civil Commissioner.

[5] Several points of similarity exist between the draft mandatory document and the Committee's Proposals. Article I of the draft Mandate stated that the 'Organic Law (or Constitution) shall be framed in consultation with native authorities'. This principle formed the second of the three conditions which the Committee believed the Constitution should fulfil.

Article I also stipulated 'Provisions designed to facilitate the progressive development of Mesopotamia as an independent state'. Similar provisos in the Committee's Report were: (*a*) Initiation of the policy of employing natives of

175* and, as such, foreshadowed the 'Iraq Organic Law or Con-
727* stitution of 1924. The conditions which its constitutional proposals were to fulfil, therefore, were summarized by the Committee as follows:—

(*a*) Subject to the tutelage of a Mandatory Power, the Government must be an indigenous Government.

(*b*) The form of Government must be adopted by the free will of the inhabitants, subject to such powers as are necessary to enable the Mandatory Power to perform its mandate.

(*c*) The constitution must contain necessary securities to enable the Mandatory Power to perform the trust confided to it of ensuring the well-being and development of the people. This implies the maintenance of peace and order (Para. 3).[1]

The complete fulfilment of the second of these conditions — the form of the new government to be adopted by the free will of the inhabitants — was deemed to be impossible until the Mandate had been granted and until more settled conditions had been obtained when a consultation of public opinion could take place. The latter, the Committee suggested, might be accomplished by inviting the Legislative Assembly, which it was proposed to set up, to voice its opinion on the Constitution at not later than the Assembly's third session (Para. 9).[2]

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[1] Extracts and summaries here are from the official text in *Report of the Baghdad Committee on Constitution for 'Iraq* (Secret), dated Baghdad, April 26th, 1920 (India Office No. B. 343; Foreign Office No. E. 6011).

[2] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, is palpably in error when it states: 'Within a period limited to two years, the Legislative Assembly was to draw up an Organic Law for the Permanent settlement of the country' (p. 141). No such proviso was present in the proposals, nor was the duration of the sessions, referred to above, indicated in the Report. The failure to state the length of the sessions and to name a definite period in which the permanent constitution was to be considered drew down severe criticism, notably from Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs, *infra.*, pp. 213 ff.

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the country in preference to any other persons (Para. 4, Sec. 7). (*b*) The composition of the Council should be considered as tentative only (Para. 15, Sec. 5). (*c*) The Educational and Political progress of the country should be periodically re-examined (Para. 19).

Article III reserved foreign relations to the Mandatory Power. The proviso is reproduced in Para. 2 of the Report.

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Until that time the country was to be administered on the basis of its proposals for which the Committee claimed the sanction of such native authority as existed, since the proposals had been formulated after consultation with 'local notables of weight and standing'.[1] In lieu of a more extensive expression of 'free will' the Committee may have well believed that such opinion formed an adequate background for the provisional Constitution.

The Report indicated, in addition, that the Committee was not unaware of the grave difficulties inherent in the conditions of the country itself: the religious divisions, the antagonisms between townsmen and tribesmen, the deplorable lack of education and of political morality and the dearth of capable and honest indigenous administrative personnel (Para. 4). So strongly did the Committee feel that the gulf between the townsmen and tribesmen was, for the present, unbridgeable that it stated:

> We desire to place on record definitely that in the tribal area, for many years to come, direct control by the British Officers in charge of Divisions is a *sine qua non*, since no one else commands the confidence of the people to a degree which will ensure obedience to the orders of the Government without the presence and not infrequent use of armed force (Para. 4, Sec. 7).

With these observations and reservations, the Committee turned to the main problem: the devising of governmental machinery which might be called indigenous but which would ensure, as much as possible, the initiative and direction and the definite ultimate control remaining in British hands. The fact that the general problem had been faced and solved with varying degrees of success in Indian Native States and in Egypt did not make facing the specific task in 'Iraq any the less difficult.

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[1] Telegram No. 5110, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, April 26th, 1920.

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175* If insufficient responsibility were placed in the hands of the
127* Arabs or if the machinery was too transparently dependent on British officials, there would be no satisfaction of Arab aspirations and further agitation would continue. On the other hand, if sufficient means were not retained to ensure the acceptance of British direction in matters which the mandatory Power considered essential, not only for the 'well-being and development of the people' but also for the maintenance of its own position in the dual role of a Mandatary and of an Imperial Power, the mandatory principle would be defeated and the British position would be rendered intolerable. Its position in the country would then rest on the force of arms alone, an undesirable alternative, the ultimate necessity of which, however, had been recognized.[1] The expense of a large army would be objectionable to British taxpayers and its enforced use would proclaim the failure of Great Britain to govern by civil measures alone.

In the establishment of a Council of State under British control, fashioned much on the pattern of the Council employed in Egypt before the war, the Committee sought the solution of the problem. The Council was to be, ostensibly, the principal executive authority and also the Second Chamber to a representative Legislature (Para. 15, Secs. 1 and 8). In its name were to be promulgated 'state executive decisions, and executive decisions of the various departments issued to the public' (Para. 15, Sec. 8). It was to legislate and to impose taxes, normally with the concurrence of the Legislative Assembly (Para. 18, Sec. 2a). In cases of conflict or of necessity, however, the Council was to have power to legislate without the Assembly's concurrence (Para. 18, Sec. 2b). To the Council was also reserved the annual budget, on which advice only might be given by the Assembly (Para. 18, Sec. 6).

The President of the Council, who was not necessarily to have departmental duties, was to be an Arab of good social status and

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 578: 'No Government in this country, whether ours or an Arab administration, can carry on without force behind it.'

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prestige (Para. 15, Sec. 3). Associated with him were to be 175*
eleven Council members of which the majority, initially at 727*
least, were to be English[1] (Para. 15, Sec. 5). The British members of the Council, under the title of Secretaries of Departments, were stipulated as the Chief Executive Officials of such Departments, with the exception of that of *Auqāf* or Pious Bequests (Para. 15, Sec. 9). The Arab members were to be Advisers to the Departments. Each Adviser was 'to be consulted by the Secretary on all matters of importance and to have access to all departmental papers, and to have the right to refer to the Council of State any difference of opinion between themselves and the Secretaries' (Para. 15, Sec. 9).

The functions delegated to the Council appeared to give it extensive powers and to make ~~it~~ what the Committee had claimed for it, the Chief Executive Authority of the State. Nevertheless, final effective authority remained in British hands through the power of the High Commissioner to appoint and remove at his pleasure members of the Council[2] (Para. 15, Sec. 2), and through his power to overrule the decisions of a majority of the Council. His decision was 'to be deemed for all purposes the decision of the Council' (Para. 15, Sec. 7). Control was also effected, more indirectly, by the predominance of British members on the Council, the Arab President being excluded from voting save in equality of votes (Para. 15, Sec. 6). These

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[1] The composition tentatively proposed included six British members with votes and five Arab members with votes divided among the various departments as follows:

	English	*Arab*
President	–	1
Department of Interior	1	1
Department of Justice	1	1
Revenue (including lands)	1	1
Education	1	1
Finance	1	–
Public Works and Health	1	–
Auqāf	–	1
	6	6

[2] In practice this would probably apply to Arab members only.

175* 727* arrangements whereby British officials became titular as well as actual heads of departments with Arab Advisers, and whereby the former composed a majority of the Council, were not entirely in accordance with the views of the Chairman, Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, as expressed earlier in his Memorandum on the Place of the Arab in Administration of February 5th, 1919, and in his Tentative Draft of Arab Institutions, drawn up in the spring of the same year.[1] The arrangements suggested in the Report, furthermore, were not in accordance with those of the Egyptian pre-war Council on which the proposed Council had been professedly modelled. It was to them that H.M. Government took the greatest exception and which caused the eventual rejection of the Report as a whole.

The Council of State, under British direction and control, had been designed as the chief instrument of government. The Committee hoped, however, that the elective Legislative Assembly,[2] for which the body provided in the Egyptian Organic Law of 1913 was taken as a model,[3] would give the 'Iraqis the greatest impression that they were participating in the Government.

In the Assembly to which members, estimated at fifty, were to be elected from all classes, the Committee proposed that British Departmental heads should be given the right to attend, to speak and to introduce measures but not to vote (Para. 15, Sec. 10; Para. 17, Sec. 5). A British Joint-Secretary for the Assembly to assist in matters of procedure was also stipulated (Para. 17, Sec. 6).

For the election of members it was suggested that members for the larger towns should be elected by the Municipal 175* Councils; for the Divisions by the Divisional Councils and for 727* areas predominantly tribal, the tribal subsections would elect their headmen, who were in turn to elect the shaikh of the tribe, subject to confirmation of the Government (App. C).

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[1] But cf. views in his letter to the Acting Civil Commissioner, March 11th, 1919, cited *supra*, pp. 183 ff. For text of draft see App. v.

[2] The Committee used both 'Council' and 'Assembly' in reference to this legislative body. 'Assembly' is employed more frequently and in Paragraph headings, as in Para. 17, Secs. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7; Para. 18, Secs. 2b, 3, 5, 6; 'Council' is used in Para. 17, Secs. 2, 4, and Para. 18, Sec. 2a. 'Assembly' will be used here throughout in reference to this body.

[3] Organic Law of Egypt, July 21st, 1913, Parts II, III, IV. Text: *Acc'ts and Papers*, 1913 (Cd. 6878) lxxxi, 307.

Application of the elective principle to the Assembly removed, theoretically at least, one means of control which had been applied to the Council of State. The impotence of the Assembly as a legislative body, however, stripped it of any real power to oppose the will of the Council of State itself or of the Mandatory Power as expressed through the Council of State. Its greatest influence over the Government would be its power to ask questions in writing (Para. 18, Sec. 8) and in its reflection of public opinion of the country. As such an agency it could indirectly, especially when public opinion was too strong to be denied, influence the Government both through its power of passing resolutions on internal affairs[1] (Para. 18, Sec. 5) and its refusal to co-operate with the Government.

For all posts, other than those directly controlling the administration, who were to be British, the Committee advised that where an 'Iraqī could be found capable of filling a post, he should be employed in preference to any other person. It stated that 'on this canon, it would be possible to employ more natives than hithertofore and in higher posts' (Para. 4, Sec. 7).

In conclusion, the Committee expressed its opinion that periodic inquiries, perhaps every seven years, should be made into the state of the country and into the desirability of extending or restricting self-government (Para. 19).

Another period of stalemate in setting up constitutional government was to follow the submission of this Report on April 26th and 27th.[2] Two days before its reception in London, the principal Allied Powers, meeting at San Remo,

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[1] On these resolutions the Council was not obliged to take action, other than to give reasons for not accepting them.

[2] Summarized in Telegrams Nos. 5111, 5112, 5113, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, April 26th and 27th, 1920.

175* April 24th and 25th, had formally assigned the Mandates
727* for 'Iraq and Palestine to Great Britain and that for Syria to France.[1]

No official announcement of the action at San Remo for publication in 'Iraq was forthcoming, however, until after May 3rd, when Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu composed their differences concerning the form of the statement of policy sanctioned April 13th, which, they believed, should accompany the announcement that Great Britain had accepted the Mandate for 'Iraq.

In the meantime, the Acting Civil Commissioner, who had received the news through Reuter's, had withheld permission to publish it until May 3rd. It was then issued together with a *communiqué* of his own couched in general terms, the only reference to the future government being: 'The establishment of Civil Administration will give an ever-widening field to native energies.'[2]

Two days later, on May 5th, the Acting Civil Commissioner received the official announcement from H.M. Government with instructions that it was to be published immediately. The first part of the statement referred in vague generalities to the action of the Powers at San Remo. It called attention to the previous declarations of H.M. Government's 'firm intention to promote the creation of a form of civil administration based upon representative indigenous institutions which would prepare the way for the creation of an independent Arab State of 'Iraq' and to the important steps which had already been taken in this direction.[3]

In the second part it stated:

> The time has now arrived for 'Iraq to reap the fruits of this course, and for a further forward step to be taken in the development of national life of the people. His Majesty's

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[1] *The Times*, April 26th, 1920.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, May 3rd, 1920; also Wilson, op. cit., pp. 248-9.

[3] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, May 4th, 1920.

Government have accordingly directed the Civil Commissioner to take immediate measures in consultation with the Councils and with approval of local opinion in all parts of the country to frame definite proposals with above-named object.[1]

In conclusion, the Acting Civil Commissioner was notified hat the Bonham-Carter proposals were under consideration.

The proposed announcement met with immediate and open pposition from the Acting Civil Commissioner. The consultaion of opinion, he believed, would produce no proposals which ould guide H.M. Government[2] and would, in fact, be fraught ith danger. It would mean delay when speedy action was ssential. The issue in any such consultation would become gain, as in 1918-19, that of Arab independence versus British ontrol. He was well aware that since the time he had suggested nd carried out the earlier plebiscite, the temper of the country ad changed and that no amount of official control or organizaon, such as had been employed on that occasion, could prouce declarations for British control which would ring true, lthough many substantial elements of the population were ill pro-British. He voiced his opposition in a strongly worded eply, May 8th, stating in part:

> It is with great regret that I find myself compelled to ask His Majesty's Government to reconsider this portion of their announcement.
>
> I submit that it is for H.M.G. as Mandatory Power to prescribe what form of Government shall be set up in the immediate future.[3] To refer the question afresh to Divisional

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, May 4th, 1923.

[2] H.M. Government, in reality, had little expectation that proposals from the habitants of 'Iraq would be of value, even if the Bonham-Carter proposals ere submitted to the Councils as suggested. The consultation had been nctioned in order to avoid the appearance of imposing a constitution on the eople, and to comply with the conditions of the Mandate. Telegram No. 3797, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, May 12th, 1920. See so Young, op. cit., p. 309.

[3] But cf. his views, of three weeks later, on the imperative necessity of nsulting local opinion, cited *infra*, p. 218.

175* Councils and to 'local opinion' can have but one result. The
727* extremists who, following the example of their colleagues in Syria, are demanding absolute independence for 'Iraq with or without 'Abdullah will by threats and by appeals during the coming month of Ramadhan to religious fanaticism win over moderate men who have hitherto looked to Government for a scheme offering a reasonable chance of success and which they can support.[1]

It was not merely the danger of excitement of public opinion which aroused his opposition. The announcement, if made, would mean once again the ruin of his plans and desires for the future of 'Iraq. He had already abandoned, partly from necessity and partly from personal motives, his first constitutional proposals, ostensibly based on 'Iraqi opinion obtained in the plebiscite of 1918-19, but in reality carefully designed to preserve the pattern of the direct British administration which he had so diligently created. His original antipathy to Arab participation in the administration had been submerged in order to win the sympathetic attention of H.M. Government and of the moderates among the 'Iraqis for his second attempt at drafting a Constitution which incorporated his views on the future administration of 'Iraq.

The announcement, however, implied that H.M. Government without reference or consideration to the Bonham-Carter proposals, with which he was in full agreement,[2] had settled on a policy which, if published, would sweep away all his efforts to check Arab Nationalism and to maintain his administrative machinery, would destroy what he believed to be the immediate means to consolidate the moderate party behind British policy and would give the final victory to the Western Arabia party.

In addition, therefore, to his request that H.M. Government

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[1] Telegram No. 5559, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, May 8th, 1920.

[2] Telegram No. 5603, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, May 1st, 1920.

reconsider their announcement, he pressed for permission to 175*
announce as an alternative the Bonham-Carter proposals. He 727*
stated:

> If during the next seven days I can be authorized to announce that H.M.G. provisionally approve of the Constitutional proposals made by me and have instructed me to communicate them to leading inhabitants with a view to giving effect to them in the autumn, there are grounds for hoping that we shall be able to count on the support of a strong block of moderate opinion. Once this is done we shall be in a position to deal with extremists.
>
> An announcement that Sir Percy Cox will shortly return as High Commissioner would also be of great value in this connection.
>
> I beg for orders on these lines at the earliest possible date.[1]

Additional opinion from the Bonham-Carter Committee, repudiating the authority and the ability of the Councils, was also dispatched as confirming his viewpoint.[2] In putting forward their views the Committee seemed to forget, however, that the initiation and development of the Councils had been originally suggested 'to secure full benefit of co-operation by tribal leaders and large landowners in the administration of these territories', and in the expectation that 'the constitution of a future advisory or Legislative Assembly for the whole of Mesopotamia, when the time is ripe, will be much facilitated by the development of these bodies and of the Municipal Councils'.[3] The Councils had been sanctioned by H.M. Government, in April, 1919, with that end in view: a preliminary step towards an indigenous government. The Committee apparently overlooked the fact that the declaration by the Hilla Divisional Councils had already been used as evidence of

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[1] Telegram No. 5559.

[2] Telegram No. 5611, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, May 10th, 1920.

[3] Telegram No. 9696, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 10th, 1918.

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175* the country's desire for British control of the national destiny.[1]

227* The Acting Civil Commissioner's telegrams, including one received from him on May 15th,[2] and the Bonham-Carter Committee Report itself were considered by the Interdepartmental Committee on May 17th. In face of the strong objections made by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Baghdad Committee, the London Committee agreed that the second part of the announcement should be withheld.

The Committee was not so ready to recommend the Bonham-Carter proposals, which had been undergoing a close scrutiny in both the India Office and the Foreign Office, for immediate announcement in Baghdad as Great Britain's policy for constitutional government in 'Iraq, as the Acting Civil Commissioner urged.

The proposals, to the Interdepartmental Committee, seemed to set up a government based on an 'Anglo-Indian' ideal, whereas the Committee believed in something more approaching an 'Indian State' ideal. Lord Curzon pointed out that the 'proposed constitution was not an Arab Government inspired and helped by British advice, but a British Government infused with Arab elements to a gradually increasing extent'. Mr. Montagu went further and suggested that the Mandate should be exercised in the form of a treaty with the people of the country rather than in accordance with a mandate document.[3]

The criticisms were not from Whitehall officials who had no personal knowledge of the country, its people or its administrative difficulties. Major H. W. Young, Secretary to the Interdepartmental Committee, who had served both in Mesopotamia and in Western Arabia, believed that the necessary

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[1] Wilson, op. cit., p. 212; so also was regarded the later decision of the Basra Council, June 22nd, 1920; *Admin. Report, Basra Division*, 1920, pp. 2-3; Wilson, op. cit., p. 265.

[2] Telegram No. 5803, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, May 15th, 1920.

[3] Major Sir H. W. Young maintains that he himself had already proposed the policy a month and a half earlier: op. cit., p. 313.

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control in 'Iraq could be secured to Great Britain as effectively 175* through British advice and protection to the new State as by 127* the retention of direct executive control, as contemplated by the Bonham-Carter Committee.[1]

Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs who, as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, had examined the Report on behalf of the India Office,[2] believed that no great objection would be found to the general premises of the first fourteen paragraphs of the Report (Sec. 1). He maintained, however, that it would be

> hardly advisable to make the President or Members of the Council removable at the pleasure of the High Commissioner for that would make the Council too obviously the High Commissioner's passive instrument. If removable, they should be removable by the British Secretary of State. In any case a period should be fixed for holding of posts (Sec. 2).

He went on to point out that

> if a British Secretary has technically all the executive power and the Arab member is a mere adviser, the position of the Arab member will be so weak as to deceive no one. It would seem greatly preferable to make the Arab members technically responsible and to give the British Secretary the right to refer to the High Commissioner any important differences of opinion between themselves and their members (Sec. 2).

He declared, moreover, that the relation of the High Commissioner to the Council had been given only general definition. Only his power of overruling decisions and his power of appointment and dismissal bound him to the Council. No provisions were made for periodical reports from it to the High Commissioner. Room for criticism was also found in the failure

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 312-13.

[2] *Memorandum by H. R. Dobbs, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, on proposals of Bonham-Carter Committee* (India Office, B. 342).

176* to provide for specific representations of Indians,[1] Jews and
727* Christians on the Council and of Indians and of large commercial firms trading within the country in the Assembly (Secs. 2, 4); for adequate arrangements for appointment and dismissal of administrative officials (Sec. 2); and a definite statement regarding the length of the sessions of the Legislative Assembly (Sec. 1). In addition, Mr. Dobbs objected to the methods proposed for electing tribal representatives as impairing the power and prestige of the shaikhs who, he believed, should be given full support and backing (Sec. 2).

In view of these criticisms and of others made during the discussion of the Report in London, it seemed clear to the Interdepartmental Committee that the proposals were unsuitable; they did not grant the degree of self-government to 'Iraq which H.M. Government was now ready to give and they were also inadequate in other respects. It was agreed that permission to announce them immediately in Baghdad should be withheld.

The decisions of the Interdepartmental Committee were conveyed to the Acting Civil Commissioner on May 20th in the following terms:

> H.M. Government greatly appreciates the care and ability expended by Bonham-Carter's Committee in preparation of scheme. Their recommendation will receive fullest and most attentive consideration. Framing of the mandate for 'Iraq is now engaging the active attention of H.M.'s Government and as you have realized, orders on your proposal, which may have to take a different shape, cannot be passed until a decision has been reached on this point. Publication of the announcement conveyed in my telegram of 4th May may be postponed in view of your proclamation of May 3rd.

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[1] Mr. Dobbs's viewpoint as an official of the Government of India was stated in Section 2: 'In view of the very large part which Indian officials and personnel must, for a very long time to come, play in Mesopotamia, it would seem advisable to have at least one Indian Member of Council or at least one Indian Secretary.'

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Meanwhile, no further action should be taken on announce- 175*
ment made. I hope to be able to send you fuller instructions 727*
shortly.[1]

The reply of the Interdepartmental Committee filled the Acting Civil Commissioner with apprehension. The reference to 'framing the mandate' seemed to presage new and disheartening delays at a time when action was imperative. The failure to approve of the Bonham-Carter Report left him little with which to combat the growing unrest in 'Iraq. His telegrams to H.M. Government were, however, not without results. At the second of the two meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee to re-examine the draft Mandate in the light of recent developments, Mr. Montagu's suggestion of the establishment of a provisional Government with Sir Percy Cox in charge, on the lines proposed by the Bonham-Carter Committee but with increased Arab participation, was approved. The Interdepartmental Committee agreed that Mr. Montagu should draft the telegram along these lines.

Events had now begun to move more swiftly towards an announcement of intentions of the British Government towards 'Iraq. They were not swift enough, however, to prevent open conflict between the inhabitants of 'Iraq and the forces of Great Britain.

Excitement had been running high in Baghdad following the 175*
announcement of the Mandate. Meetings organized by the 727x
Nationalists had been held in the mosques where orators in the 186
name of independence, race and religion had urged their 665
listeners to rise against the British. Clashes between Nationalists and the authorities had already taken place, and it had been necessary to patrol the streets with armoured cars. The group of fifteen Baghdad Nationalists, known locally as the *Mandubīn* or Delegates, had approached the Acting Civil Commissioner asking for an opportunity to lay their proposals before

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[1] Telegram No. P. 3839, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad May 20th, 1920.

175* him for transmission to H.M. Government. He had tried to
727* avoid giving the interview. He did not wish to give any
186 opportunity for a demonstration and he felt that he had
668 nothing definite with which to counter their demands. He held, moreover, that the *Mandubīn* were unrepresentative, referring to them in his dispatches as self-elected Delegates, although they had received the approval of a public meeting held in one of the principal mosques. Realizing, however, that they had a large popular following and that they could sway great masses of public opinion, he finally gave them an appointment for the morning of June 2nd, at the Turkish *Sarai* or Government headquarters. He took the precaution, however, of inviting by name about forty other dignitaries of all religions, supposed to be favourably disposed to the British regime. To cope with possible demonstrations or disorder among the expected crowds, special police arrangements were made, troops were held in readiness at the barracks and R.I.M.S. *Comet* with steam up and trained guns was stationed on the Tigris opposite the *Sarai*.

At the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner explained the desire of H.M. Government to give a National Government and the difficulties which had been encountered. He declared that they were then about to make an announcement along the lines proposed in the Bonham-Carter Report of which he gave an outline. He reminded his hearers that nothing was to be gained by hasty action, and that with the best will in the world an indigenous National Government could not be set up at once. He warned them that any attempts at disorder or violence would be met with force and that the military authorities would be called in if necessary.[1]

The Delegates professed themselves unsatisfied with the proposals and presented their own petition asking for the immediate formation of a National Arab Convention for 'Iraq,

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[1] Text: Telegram No. 6583, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

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elected according to Turkish Electoral Law. The Convention 175*
would be empowered to draw up proposals for a National 727*
Government as promised in the Anglo-French Declaration. 184
They also asked for freedom of the Press. With these demands a 668
number of the invited notables, contrary to the Acting Civil Commissioner's expectations, associated themselves and declared that 'Iraqi independence was the concern of the entire Arab people.

The meeting itself, although feeling ran high, had been conducted with dignity. As those attending began to disperse, the immense crowd which filled the Court of the *Sarai* hissed and shouted abuse at the British officials. The *Mandubīn* were cheered and several of the leaders were carried out on the shoulders of the crowd. No clashes occurred, however, between the crowds and the police.

In forwarding the petition and an account of the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner threw the entire blame for the 'movement reaching its present uncompromising form, backed as it is by skilfully fomented public excitement' on the failure of H.M. Government to allow him to make the announcement of the Bonham-Carter proposals before the beginning of Ramadhan as he had requested on May 8th.

He then declared:

> It is probable that in the present temper a proposal that the country should submit even for a limited period to a provisional Constitution as to which they had not been consulted would be met on the part of the Nationalists by a Declaration of Independence. Such proposals would be represented as contrary to the Anglo-French Declaration, the real meaning of which is little understood and widely misrepresented, and would harden public opinion against us, while if the present temper continues the proposed Legislative Assembly would on being summoned convert itself into a Constituent Assembly though not so authorized.[1]

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[1] Telegram No. 6584, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

175* He submitted that the difficulty could be countered only by
727* calling a Constituent Assembly and by inviting Sir Percy Cox to spend a few days in Baghdad on his way to England from Tehran. His visit and the anticipation of his return would 'do much to restore public confidence, which has been shaken'.[1]

Five days later, on June 7th, authority[2] was sent from London to make an immediate announcement of Sir Percy Cox's return and of the general application of the Bonham-Carter proposals which, subject to reservations on points of details, were 'accepted in principle as furnishing a generally suitable basis on which to construct provisional institutions such as are postulated by Mandate'.[3] Permission to call a Constituent Assembly was withheld.

In his acknowledgment of the telegram, the Acting Civil Commissioner stated that the authorized announcement would be made at the end of Ramadhan, or about June 18th.[4]

Although H.M. Government was on the point of giving the Acting Civil Commissioner his immediate objective — a public announcement of Great Britain's intentions — the latter's long suppressed misgivings as to the direction in which the policy of H.M. Government was tending, could no longer be held back. He could not avoid seeing how his strenuous efforts of the past two years to determine policy in 'Iraq had failed. Step by step, he had been forced out of every position from which he had 175* attempted, on the one hand, to mould 'Iraq along the lines he 227* believed to be best, administered and staffed in the best Anglo-Indian traditions, and, on the other, to defeat the influence of Arab Nationalists, the Western Arabia party and other doctrinaires. In his opinion, H.M. Government, in weakly giving way to the policy advocated by such groups and in embracing a literal application of the Anglo-French Declaration and the League of Nation's mandatory system, had set out on a perilous path, illumined only by the broken lights of sentimentalism.

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[1] Telegram No. 6584, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

[2] Telegram No. P. 4216(1), S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, June 7th, 1920.

[3] It is somewhat surprising that the Secretary of State for India should have used the words 'subject to reservation on points of detail' when the differences of opinion between Baghdad and London were fundamental, as, for instance, in the matter of a Council of State. The Baghdad authorities advocated a predominantly British Council; the India Office, a predominantly Arab Council; and the Foreign Office a wholly Arab Council. Mr. Montagu, however, may have believed he was acting in the spirit of the decision of the Interdepartmental Committee, on June 1st, and that he was but recognizing the *fait accompli* of June 2nd, when the Acting Civil Commissioner outlined the proposals in Baghdad. In any case they were not to be applied until Sir Percy Cox had returned to Baghdad as High Commissioner.

[4] Telegram No. 6976, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 9th, 1920.

He gave vent to these views in a telegram of June 9th,[1] dispatched before receiving the telegram from the Secretary of State. In it he also pointed out that the failure of Great Britain to maintain adequate troops and administrative officers in 'Iraq had contributed to the growth of the opposition prevailing in the country.[2] He declared in conclusion:

> We cannot maintain our position as mandatory by a policy of conciliation of extremists. Having set our hand to the task of regenerating Mesopotamia, we must be prepared to furnish alike men and money and to maintain continuity of control for years to come. We must be prepared, regardless of the League of Nations, to go very slowly with constitutional or democratic institutions, the application of which to Eastern countries has been attempted of late years with such a little degree of success. If His Majesty's Government regard such a policy as impracticable or beyond our strength (as well they may) I submit that they would do better to face the alternative, formidable and, from the local point of view, terrible as it is, and evacuate Mesopotamia.

His telegram brought to an end, in effect, the long struggle between H.M. Government and the Acting Civil Commissioner over policy for 'Iraq. The alternatives he had proposed, control without reference to the League of Nations or immediate evacuation, were rejected as unacceptable by the Interdepartmental Committee, on June 16th. Lord Curzon believed that the middle course of maintaining Great Britain's position through the goodwill of the people could be maintained. He had sympathy and admiration for the Acting Civil Commissioner personally, but his latest telegram, together with previous indications of his attitude, proclaimed him as unable to bring himself to carry out the policy which H.M. Government, through the Interdepartmental Committee, had consistently advocated. Lord Curzon's views found support in the Committee, and following a Cabinet decision on the subject, June 17th, the text of an announcement to replace that sent on June 7th, and a request for Sir Percy Cox to come to England at once were telegraphed to Baghdad.[1]

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[1] Telegram No. 6948, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 9th, 1920.

[2] Cf. his views expressed later: 'A substantial reduction in the military forces in Mesopotamia during 1919 would have greatly facilitated the pacification of the country.' Wilson, op. cit., p. 44.

The text of the announcement made in Baghdad on June 20th, is as follows:

> His Majesty's Government, having been entrusted with the Mandate for Mesopotamia, anticipate that the Mandate will constitute Mesopotamia an Independent State under guarantee of the League of Nations and subject to the Mandate of Great Britain, that it will lay on them the responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and external security, and will require them to formulate an organic law to be framed in consultation with the people of Mesopotamia and with due regard to the rights, wishes and interests of all the communities of the country. The Mandate will contain provisions to facilitate the development of Mesopotamia as a self-governing state until such time as it can stand by itself, when the Mandate will come to an end.
>
> The inception of this task H.M. Government have decided to entrust to Sir P. Cox, who will accordingly return to Baghdad in the autumn, and will resume his position, on the termination of the existing Military Administration, as Chief British Representative in Mesopotamia.

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, June 18th, 1920.

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Sir P. Cox will be authorised to call into being, as provisional bodies, a Council of State under an Arab President and a General Elective Assembly, representative of and freely elected by the population of Mesopotamia. And it will be his duty to prepare in consultation with the General Elective Assembly, the permanent organic law.[1] 175* 727*

It was the first straightforward public announcement of a concrete and specific policy which H.M. Government had made in 'Iraq since the Armistice, a year and eight months before. Even so, another five months were to elapse before the policy could be put into effect. In the interval, the temper of Nationalism in 'Iraq was to rise to the point of armed rebellion which was to shake the country to its foundations.

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[1] *Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc. . . . Relating to . . . Mesopotamia, September 1st,* 1919, *to September 30th,* 1920 (Baghdad, 1920). (Hereafter *Proclamations,* 1919-1920). Announcement No. 49, dated June 17th, 1920.

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CHAPTER XII

ARAB NATIONALISM IN 'IRAQ BEFORE 1914

000 NATIONALISM as an organized movement in the name of the Arab peoples first arose in the Lebanon and in Syria. In Beirût, Damascus, Aleppo and Jaffa, the imaginative and volatile Syrians, influenced primarily by French education and political thought and, to a lesser extent, by the American theory of government by 'consent of the governed', inculcated by American missionary schools,[1] began to work for Arab separation from the Ottoman Empire. The Movement gathered converts throughout the Arabic-speaking world. In Arabia, the revolt of Imâm Mahmûd Yahiâ of Yemen, of Saiyid Idriss of Assîr in 1906, and the defeat of Turkey's ally, Amîr ibn Rashîd of the Shammar, by Ibn Sa'ûd in the same year, were taken as indicating the Arabs' desire for independence. The revolt at Port Said of 400 Syrian troops on their way to Yemen was also taken as evidence of the unity of the Arabs. In Paris, a group of Syrians, including Najîb Azûri who had been forced to leave Turkey in 1904 because of his pro-Arab activities, agitated for Arab independence through the French Press and through Arab committees in France and Egypt. Through the *Ligue de la Patrie Arabe*, founded in 1904 by Najîb Azûri and Eugéne Jung, an ex-official of the French Colonial Service, who saw the great benefits which would accrue to France through the Arab Movement,[2] stirring appeals were made to the Arabs[3] and to

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[1] Chief among these was the Syrian Protestant College, founded in 1866, now the American University at Beirût.

[2] His viewpoint is apparent in his works: *Les Puissances devant la Révolte Arabe* (Paris, 1906) and *La Révolte Arabe* (2 vols., Paris, 1924-5).

[3] Text: Najîb Azûri, *Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque* (Paris, 1905), pp. 1-3; Jung, E., *Les Puissances devant la Révolte Arabe*, pp. 24-9; Kampffmeyer, G., *Damaskus. Dokumente zum Kampf der Araber um ihre Unabhängigkeit* (Berlin, 1926), pp. 99-100.

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the peoples of Europe and America.[1] Najīb Azūri also founded, in April, 1907, with the collaboration of M. Jung, *L'Indépendence Arabe*, through which, as well as through other avenues, he continued to work for the Arab Nationalist cause.

By 1908, however, little remained of the once promising Arab Movement. In spite of its sudden flowering, it had not yet taken sufficient root. The gendarmes and troops of 'Abdul Hamīd, brought into operation against the rebellious chiefs and revolutionaries, had not been the only cause of its failure. The Young Turks by more subtle means had undermined it. The Committee of Union and Progress, by promising much in reforms and in privileges to every community, to be fulfilled once the Hamidian regime should be overturned, had obtained the support not only of Arab leaders but also of other non-Turkish groups, for the bloodless Revolution of July 24th, 1908.

The new regime did indeed seem to foreshadow a new era of liberty, fraternity and equality. The Committee, commonly known as the C.U.P., had proposed to consolidate the revolution by instituting parliamentary self-government in which all nationalities in the Empire were to participate in proportion to their numbers. Throughout the Empire, rival communities, bitter enemies and revolutionary leaders vied in praising the new order. Najīb Azūri, in a valedictory number of *L'Indépendence Arabe*, September, 1908, declared that all for which Arabs had been striving would be attained under the aegis of the Committee. His work for the Arab cause had therefore come to an end.[2]

The first auspicious augury, however, was short-lived. Within the Western concept of nationality, then in the ascendancy in the Near East and nowhere more so than within the C.U.P. itself, existed contradictions which produced irreconcilable antagonisms in the heterogeneous and polyglot Empire[3]

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[1] Text: Jung, op. cit., pp. 22-4; Kampffmeyer, op. cit., pp. 100-1.

[2] Declaration cited, Jung, *La Révolte Arabe*, p. 23.

[3] For political effect of language differences in the Ottoman Empire, see note by Mary Mills Patrick in Mears, E. G., *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), pp. 35 ff.

000 and which contributed to its final break-up. The non-Turkish groups could not and would not permanently renounce the ideal of an independent state for every nation: part and parcel of the Western concept. The Young Turks, on the other hand, could not abandon the ideal of sovereignty over the whole population and territory within the frontiers of the State, equally a part of the same concept.[1] Thus, while 'Ottomanism' in the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress meant in theory that all sections of the Empire were to enjoy equal cultural liberty and that all were to be represented in Parliament and in government services on a proportional basis, in reality it came to mean that the non-Turkish elements were to be enfranchised and tolerated only in so far as they accepted the Committee's programme in full. In Arab lands, the 'Ottomanizing' policy involved a ban on Arabic language and literature — the original basis of the Arab revival — the compulsory use of Turkish in official circles and in schools, and the abandonment of all institutions and customs which Arabs cherished.

In Syria, the effect of the programme of the C.U.P. was to revive the Arab Movement and to increase the resentment of the inhabitants against the Turks. A section, composed largely but not exclusively of Catholic Christians, turned to France, their traditional protector and cultural mentor, for support and intervention on their behalf. France, nothing loath to increase her influence in a region which she had long coveted, welcomed the overtures. Through her consuls and diplomatic officials, secret negotiations were carried on with the Nationalists, which, when discovered by the Turks after the outbreak of the war, brought death and imprisonment at the hands of Djemal Pasha to those involved.[2]

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[1] Toynbee, A. J., and Kirkwood, K. P., *Turkey*, (1926), p. 53.

[2] Thirty-four Syrians were sentenced to death, five to imprisonment and four to exile, largely on the evidence of documents taken from the French Consulate in Beirût. Facsimiles of some of the documents may be seen in the Turkish Red Book, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne* (Stambul, 1916). On Georges

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Another group composed principally of Druse and Muslims of the Lebanon and of Damascus, who since the massacres of 1860 had looked upon Great Britain as their protector, approached the British Consul-General in Beirût with the request that the British Government should assist the Arabs in their struggle against the Turks.[1] A delegation of Syrian Muslim notables visited Lord Kitchener, High Commissioner in Egypt, petitioning Great Britain to annex Syria to Egypt and to give Syria an independent administration.[2] Lord Kitchener, no less than H.M. Government, was aware of the ultimate importance of extending British influence in western Arabia as well as on the coast of the Persian Gulf and with Ibn Sa'ûd. Such influence was essential if a Khalifat independent of Ottoman control and of German influence was to be created,[3] and if the still nebulous project of a Trans-Arabia railway from Akaba to the Persian Gulf was to be realized. The advances of the Syrians and of the Arab Nationalists were, therefore, tactfully received although no action was taken. Sharîf 'Abdullâh on behalf of his father, Sharîf Husain of Mecca, also approached Lord Kitchener in February, 1914, concerning which incident the following statement for publication in this work has been authorized by Drs. G. P. Gooch and H. V. W. Temperley, editors of the *British Documents on Origin of the World War*, 1898-1914:

> The facts appear to be that Abdullah Pasha, on the way to Constantinople in February, 1914, asked Lord Kitchener

[1] *Figaro* and *Le Temps*, November 18th, 1912; *L'Eclair*, December 2nd, 1912.

[2] *Le Temps*, November 18th, 1912; *L'Echo de Paris*, February 28th, 1913; also Najib Azûri to Quai d'Orsay, March 16th, 1913, cited Jung, op. cit., pp. 60-1.

[3] For an indication of the influence of this policy on war-time negotiations see *Aufteiling der Asiatischen Türkei*, especially No. 32, Nicolson to Sasanov, March 20th, 1915, p. 30.

Picot, French Consul-General in Beirût, and a co-negotiator of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, must rest the onus for allowing these documents to fall into the hands of the Turks. On the declaration of war, M. Picot, unlike his British colleague who spent the night burning his Consular files, merely relied on American Consular seals placed on the safe containing the incriminating papers. The Turks, disregarding both the seals and American official protests, burst open the safe.

000 what would be the attitude of the British Government in case of a revolt of the Grand Sheriff against the Turks. Lord Kitchener gave him no encouragement but agreed to transmit the information to London, saying he thought it improbable that Sir Edward Grey would send any reply. On the day (February 14th) that Lord Kitchener's despatch on the subject arrived, a telegram from him reached Grey to the effect that the quarrel of the Grand Sheriff with the Turks had been amicably settled. Difficulties began again at the end of March, but the matter seems to have gone no further in London. Kitchener refused to see Abdullah on his return journey, but sent a message giving him no encouragement and saying that the only British interest in Arabia was the safety and comfort of the Indian pilgrims.

In Syria, still another group of Nationalisms hoped to obtain decentralization by means of agitation and by exerting pressure both locally and on the authorities at Constantinople. Another revolutionary group, for the most part Muslims of Damascus and the Syrian hinterland, aimed at complete independence and membership in a confederation of Arab states.

Behind the movement were ranged the Arabic Press and the Arabs domiciled in Egypt, in France, in the United States, in South America and in Australia.[1] In Syria, including the Lebanon and what is now Palestine, Arabic journals increased 850 per cent in the period 1904 to 1914 over the preceding ten years,[2] 33 journals being established from 1894 to 1904

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[1] Tarazi, Vicomte Philippe: *Arabic Periodicals* (Beirût, 1933).

[2] Newspapers and magazines established in Arab countries, during the periods, 1894-1904 and 1904-14, are given below, arranged according to their present political divisions:

	1894–1904		1904–14	
	Newspapers	*Magazines*	*Newspapers*	*Magazines*
Syria	1	2	73	14
Lebanon	15	14	117	51
Palestine	1	0	26	5
'Iraq	1	1	61	9
Hijāz	0	0	6	0
Total	18	17	283	79

and 286 in the period 1904 to 1914.[1] In Egypt and in the 000
United States, the Arabic press,[2] with a wide circulation even in the Ottoman Empire,[3] was a powerful agent, by its constant and bitter denunciation of the Turks, in arousing Nationalist sentiment among Arab peoples.[4]

In 'Iraq, no less than in Syria and Arabia, the 'Ottoman- 175*
izing' policy of the Young Turks stimulated the Nationalist 668*
Movement. It continued, however, to lag behind the Move- 186*
ment across the desert, even as it had been slower to develop. Cut off by its geographical position and by its lack of communication from the West, 'Iraq lay torpid, a potentially rich Turkish Siberia but lacking educational facilities and the stimulus of new ideas and of political thought such as prevailed along the Mediterranean coast. Conservative in thought, the Sunnī Muslims were slow to withdraw their political allegiance from the Sultan whom both religion and tradition had established as their religious head.[5] The Shī'a priesthood, Persian for the most part, hated the Osmanlis both as Sunnīs and as oppressors, but possessed little community of interest with the Arabs, although Arabs of the Shī'a sect formed a majority of the population of 'Iraq.

The social structure, based fundamentally on the soil, and 175*
not far removed from feudalism, was stony ground for National- 186*
ism. Landlords sought only relief from taxation. Shaikhs 668*
desired individual freedom for themselves and their tribes. 565
Merchants, principally Jews, perhaps the most progressive single element in the land, had little deep feeling for either

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[1] The life of a journal during the Turkish regime was often not long, particu- 204
larly if in opposition to the Government. Suppressed journals frequently 656
reappeared under new names.

[2] From 1904 to 1914, 385 Arabic newspapers and magazines were founded in Egypt, North and South America: Tarazi, op. cit.

[3] Although banned from Turkey, they were distributed through the foreign post offices.

[4] Djemal Pasha, in particular, resented the part played by the Arabic Press abroad: Turkish Red Book, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne*, pp. 12-13.

[5] *Infra*, p. 235, for typical view on the sanctity of the Ottoman regime.

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175* Turk or Arab except as productive of order, stable finance and
186* equity in the courts, essential for their commerce. There were
668 few professional men, such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and
565 civil officials, who formed the backbone of the Movement across the desert. Nevertheless, from them and from the Arab Army officers came the leaven of pre-war Nationalism in 'Iraq. Trained for the most part in the professional and technical schools of Constantinople, they had been touched by the Western political theories permeating the capital. They had been in contact with separatists from Syria and from other parts of the Empire. The Arab officers of the army, in particular, as members of the only numerous and organized class in the Empire which received a systematic Western training and which, therefore, was exposed to Western thought, assumed important roles in the Movement.

175* Not merely the policy of crushing Arab feeling and sentiment
668* and of turning Arabs into good Turks aroused the 'Iraqis.
186* The secularizing policy and the irreligiousness of the Young Turks had offended many religious dignitaries who wielded great power and influence. The Naqīb of Baghdad, Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī, for instance, found little to command his respect or obedience in the new regime. Although he himself habitually refrained from political activities, his son, Saiyid Mahmūd al-Gailānī, described as an Arab of the Arabs and knowing no Turkish, took a prominent part in the opposition to the C.U.P.

175* In spite of the discontent in 'Iraq, rife and acute as it was,
668* little trace appeared on the surface before late 1910. The
186* measures employed by the C.U.P. to stamp out disaffection were too vigorous and too harsh for opposition to show itself openly. In the Chamber of Deputies, however, from the midst of the group of Arab Deputies, to which all the 'Iraqī members, except Isma'īl Haqqi Beg Baban the Kurd, had attached themselves, 'Iraqī feeling was publicly voiced.

Underground, however, the Movement had taken on form

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and substance.[1] At Constantinople, Arab Army officers, among 176–* whom 'Iraqis were the most prominent, formed *Al-'Ahd*, a 668* secret group pledged to work for Arab independence. Its 186* membership throughout the Empire was said to number 4000.[2] Allied in purpose was the '*Assībat-al-Hamra*, the 'Iraqī counterpart of the Committee of Decentralization, with its headquarters in Cairo.[3]

The separatist tendencies shown by other non-Turkish portions of the Empire were not without influence on Nationalism in 'Iraq as well as in Syria. The detachment from the Empire of Bosnia, of Bulgaria and Crete, the demand for reforms and decentralization in Macedonia, supported by the Great Powers, the revolt of the Druses in the Hauran and of the Arabs in Transjordan in 1910-11 and the demand of the Albanians for fiscal reforms in 1909 and 1911, while regretted by Muslims as weakening the strength of Islam, encouraged the Arabs as a whole to demand decentralization for themselves. Rashīd al-'Umarī, head of the powerful 'Umarī family of Mōsul, a member of which was advocated by the Acting Civil Commissioner in 1918-19 as head of the 'Iraq state,[4] expressed the views of many Arabs with whose sentiments he was in close touch when he said, in October, 1911, to the British Vice-Consul: 'As the Albanians have demanded and got what they wanted, I hope we shall do the same'.[5] It was generally believed that the end of the Turko-Italian war would find the Arabs united in a protest against the Turks and in an attempt to set up an Arab dynasty and an Arab Khalifate.[6]

The convening of Parliament at Constantinople also en- 000

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[1] *La Question Syrienne*, p. 12. A fairly comprehensive history of several Arab secret societies is to be found in the same work, pp. 9-123.

[2] Ibid., Jung, op. cit., p. 32.

[3] Alleged to have had 10,000 members and 75 branches in Syria and Palestine alone, Jung, op. cit., p. 61.

[4] Telegram, No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November, 1918 cited *supra*, p. 158.

[5] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, October, 1911.

[6] Ibid., November, 1911.

The convening of Parliament at Constantinople also en-
175 couraged 'Iraqi Nationalists by bringing them into contact with
668 the ardent Nationalists of other parts of the Empire, who, in
186 spite of the great care with which the C.U.P. had conducted
665 the elections, found seats in the Chamber. With them the 'Iraqis made common cause in the Moderate Liberal party, founded by Prince Sabah-ed-Din in opposition to the C.U.P., and later in the *Itilāf* or Coalition party. These parties were not merely sectional groups, although the 'Iraqi branches of the former, founded in Basra and Baghdad in August and September, 1911, were known in 'Iraq as the *Hurr-i-Mu'tadil*, while branches of the *Itilāf* to which the Moderate Liberal party gave way in early 1912 were known as *Hurriya wa I'tilāf*. The organization of the parties extended throughout the Empire, the branch in Basra, for instance, being formed by Saiyid Talib Pasha in obedience to a telegram sent by a person unknown.

In the years 1910 and 1911, 'Iraqi feeling also sought means of outlet through the press. In these two years were established 36 Arabic newspapers or 60 per cent of the 61 founded in 'Iraq during the period 1904 to 1914; 22 or nearly 40 per cent being started in 1911 alone.[1] Of these, 19 were established in Baghdad. In the same 2 years, were founded 6 of the 9 magazines established in the same period of 1904 to 1914. A number of these papers were periodically suppressed by the Turks, after which the owners reissued them under new names.

175 In the years 1912 and 1913, the movement firmly established
665 itself in 'Iraq. The British Resident in Baghdad in an official
186 report in early 1912 stated:

> I have been much struck of late by the increasing freedom with which anti-C.U.P. and anti-Turkish sentiments are expressed here. Hitherto this was regarded as treason to the State . . . This growing political confidence of non-Turkish Muhammadan elements is noticeable even among officials. . . . It is clear also that the eldest son of the *Kiliddar* of Najaf

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[1] Based on Tarazi, op. cit.

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and 'Abdur Rahman Pachachi, welcome the formation of a 175
new party which would assert Arab interests. If political 668
developments here follow a normal course and if the people 186
of the country have any real political convictions and courage – two conditions of which the fulfilment is doubtful, the support of the Baghdad province will bye and bye be lost to any party which does not concede to the Arabs political equality with the Turks.[1]

Nowhere did the rising opposition show itself more clearly than in the local elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 1911 and in the following years. Pressure was used by the C.U.P. to secure the return of its candidates. Nevertheless, Saiyid Mahmūd al-Gailānī, whose anti-Turkish sentiments were well known, was elected as well as Fū'ād Effendi, a Baghdad lawyer, known to be in opposition to the C.U.P. In Basra, the elections represented both local opposition to the C.U.P. and the personal ascendancy of Saiyid Talib Pasha, son of the Naqīb of Basra. All the deputies elected, in addition to himself, were his partisans, being his cousin, his father's clerk, a friend of the Naqīb's family and another member of the *Hurrīya wa Itilāf*. According to the British Vice-Consul at Basra, 'no pressure was used, however, all the *Itilafjis* representing the free choice of united suffrage.'[2]

Saiyid Talib Pasha ibn Saiyid Rajab was one of the out- 175
standing figures in pre-war Turkish Arabia and, until his en- 668
forced removal from Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, April 16th, 186
1921,[3] played a prominent part in the creation of modern 'Iraq.[4] He came of an old family of Basra, doubly influential because of its wealth and its hereditary religious leadership. His native ability, enhanced and developed by a fair education, by residence at Constantinople and travel in Europe, found full scope in political activities. A vigorous personality, of great charm

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[1] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March-April, 1912.

[2] Ibid., October, 1912.

[3] *Infra*, p. 322.

[4] His interment at Zūbair, following his death in Munich, July, 1929, drew an immense crowd from every part of 'Iraq and was made the occasion of eloquent tributes to his work for Arab Nationalism.

175* and dignity, although given occasionally to tempestuous anger,
668* he had collected around him a band of followers and adherents,
176* bound to him both by fear and affection. His generosity to the
poor was proverbial, but it was the liberality of a Robin Hood: his funds for his benefactions and for his retinue, as he himself was not wealthy, were not infrequently obtained by levies, reminiscent of blackmail, on wealthy Arabs in southern 'Iraq.

His personal ambitions, not necessarily of an unworthy character, were undoubtedly strong. To 'Abdul Hamīd he had submitted a comprehensive scheme for the inclusion within the Empire and under his personal authority, of Al-Hasā of which he had been *Mutasarrif*, and of a large portion of central Arabia. The proposal was not unnaturally rejected at Constantinople.

After the Revolution in 1908, which he, in company with many other Arabs had hopefully supported, he turned against the C.U.P. and its programme. He assumed in the name of Arab Nationalism the leadership, both in the Chamber of Deputies and in southern 'Iraq, of the opposition to the Turks in Basra Wilayet. So closely did his efforts on behalf of Arab separation and his own ambitions seem to coincide, however, that even now it is debatable whether his actions were primarily designed to further the Arab cause or to carve out a portion of the Ottoman domain for himself, as the Shaikh of Kuwait had already done, and as Ibn Sa'ūd was in the process of carrying out in Al-Hasā. His many enemies, including Shaikh Ajaimī as-Sa'dūn, which his ruthlessness and his energy had made for him, subscribed to the latter view. They constituted one of the principal handicaps to the Nationalist Movement as led by Saiyid Talib, since they would not have acquiesced without a struggle in any measure of decentralization by which he profited. These charges of personal ambition were to be recalled and enmities rekindled in 1920-1 when Saiyid Talib put forward, with some justification, his claim to the headship of the 'Iraq state.

Whatever his motives, Saiyid Talib advanced Arab National-

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ism both in Basra Wilayet and throughout 'Iraq in the years 175*
immediately preceding the war. On February 20th, 1913, at a 668*
meeting in his house, attended by all the principal Arabs of 186*
Basra, a *madhbata* or petition was drawn up. It asked for permission to summon the Provincial Council with the view of elaborating a scheme of reforms needed in the wilayet, which, it was urged, should be similar to that recently sanctioned for Syria. It proposed that all taxes be devoted to local needs. Despite its veil of temperate and courteous language, the *madhbata*, to which about three hundred leading citizens of Basra added their signatures, was in reality a demand, the first to be made, for autonomous government for Basra.[1]

The future government and administration of 'Iraq were the primary subjects of discussion at an Arab Conference held at Mohammerah, March, 1913, attended by the Shaikh of Mohammerah, himself an Arab although a Persian subject, by the Shaikh of Kuwait, by Saiyid Talib and by a highly-placed Turkish official. It was agreed that each leader should do all in his power to advance the claim of 'Iraq to independence or, at least, to self-government. Emissaries were commissioned and dispatched to Karbalā and Najaf to stir the people there and to prepare them for further activity. The Arab Nationalists in Baghdad, Constantinople, Syria, Egypt and Arabia, with whom Saiyid Talib had already maintained correspondence,[2] were informed of the decision of the Conference.

In the following month Saiyid Talib made a test of his power. On April 23rd, a deputation of Basra notables headed by himself visited the Acting *Walī*. They demanded the dismissal of certain officers of the Gendarmerie who, they believed, belonged to an anti-Arab society. The demand was rejected by Constantinople, whereupon Saiyid Talib hinted that the Arabs might resort to force. The British Vice-Consul, in alarm,

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[1] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, February, 1913; ibid., March, 1913.

[2] For Saiyid Talib Pasha's relations with the Decentralization Committee in Syria and Egypt, see *La Question Syrienne*, pp. 102-3.

175 immediately asked for a ship of war for the protection of
668 British interests.[1] H.M.S. *Alert* arrived at Basra on May 4th.
180 Saiyid Talib, however, finding that Shaikh Ajaimi had moved
with his Muntafiq tribesmen towards Basra with the intention of supporting the Government and that a new Wilayet Law had been promulgated, agreed on May 12th to press Arab demands with moderation.

The new Wilayet Law, together with an official circular from the Ministry of Interior conceding wide official use of Arabic in 'Iraq, had supposedly granted self-government on paper, but neither Saiyid Talib nor other Arab leaders were misled as to its real nature. The new law, if ever applied, which they doubted, still kept real power in the hands of the *Walī* or Governor, while they had in mind actual participation by Arabs in the Government. In spite of the momentary check to the Nationalists at Basra, the Arabs elsewhere redoubled their efforts to obtain the full measure of their demands.

175 The Arab Movement had developed faster in Basra than in
668 Baghdad, due to the efforts of Talib Pasha, but Nationalism was
186 not lacking in strength in the latter city. In closer contact than
665 Basra with the Nationalist Movement at Constantinople and
among the Syrians and Egyptians, the Baghdad Nationalists had divided themselves into four groups. One section consisted of partisans of Saiyid Talib and the Basra Nationalists. Another looked to Syria for leadership and assistance. Still another group was in correspondence with Egypt, from which it was rumoured that the Khedive would be elected King and *Khalīfa* of the Muslims. The fourth group formed a separate Baghdad party, relying chiefly on their own efforts and on their own leaders. These groups, however, were without hard and fast lines, and in the spring of 1913, when a concerted effort was made to unite the Arabs of 'Iraq, Syria and Egypt in presenting demands to Constantinople, the groups apparently sank their differences and began to work together. The local secret

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[1] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, May, 1913.

Patriotic Society, formed in 1912 to expel the Turks and to 175*
establish autonomous government, had as members the principal 668*
Arabs, including more than a hundred Arab officers of all 186*
ranks. Manifestos and literature from Basra and Constantinople 665
attacking the Turkish Government circulated in the city. Placards appeared on the walls of Baghdad, as on March 18th, exhorting Arabs to rise against their oppressors and to demand autonomy or decentralization. The reforms announced in April and May were dismissed as being inadequate. The newspapers *Bain an-Nahrain* and *al-Misbāh*[1] took courage and demanded further reforms and decentralization. A delegate, Taufīq as-Sūwaidī, son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, an outstanding leader in the Movement, was nominated to the first Arab Congress held in Paris, June 18th, 1913. Even more significant was the growing hostility between the Turkish and the Arab officers of the 13th Army Corps in the Baghdad Barracks, and between the Turkish and Arab civil officials of the Wilayet.[2]

The Turks were not inactive in the face of these manifesta- 175*
tions of Arab feeling. Arab teachers and *mullas* were appointed 668*
to advocate faithfulness to the Government, inspired articles 186*
appeared in the Press,[3] and reforms were promised. Spies were increased and following a search in Baghdad by the police for a supposed emissary of Egyptian and Syrian Nationalists, a sudden arrest of Arab leaders was made, June 14th. Among them were: Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Kāmil Effendi, proprietor of the suppressed *Bain an-Nahrain*, Shukrī Effendi and Salmān Effendi. Mahmūd Effendi, editor of *Bain an-Nahrain*, was also

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[1] Founded in Baghdad by Muhammad Kāmil, December 9th, 1909, and by 'Abdul Husain al-'Uzrī, March 7th, 1911.

[2] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March to October, 1913, *passim*.

[3] *Al-Zuhūr* (Baghdad) published the following, March 14th, 1913, under the heading 'Decentralization':

'Some Muhammadans want decentralization. They ought to know that decentralization is not permissible according to the Muhammadan Law because the centre of the whole Islamic world is the town of the *Khalīfa*. Christians are said to be making great progress by means of decentralization, but Muslims must recollect that Christians have three Gods and can, therefore, have more than one centre. Muslims, having only one God, can have but one centre.'

175* arrested at 'Amāra. All were released two days later with the
668* exception of Saiyid Kāmil.[1]

186* The murder at Basra of Farid Beg, Gendarme Commander, who, it was reported, had come to Basra to kill Saiyid Talib and twelve other Arabs in opposition to the C.U.P.,[2] and of Badi' Nūri Beg, *Mutasarrif* of Muntafiq, by followers of Saiyid Talib, on June 20th, intensified the anti-Turkish aspect of Saiyid Talib's agitation in Basra. The failure of the Turkish Government to bring him to book emboldened Arabs, both at Basra and at Baghdad. The official circular from the Minister of Interior, extending special considerations to Arabs, such as three Ministers of State, five Waliships, ten Mutasarrifships, etc.,[3] was dismissed without confidence. In Basra, the Reform Committee with Saiyid Talib at its head published its programme[4] which, if realized, meant the transfer of the real authority from Constantinople to the Administrative Council of Basra Wilayet. In addition, the Reform Committee issued a long appeal to troops and Arab tribes in the wilayet, denouncing the Turkish Government, and calling upon all Arabs to arise and throw off the Turkish tyranny by asserting the independence of 'Iraq.

In Baghdad, all of the seven members elected by Baghdad city on September 8th, as its members to the first General Council of Baghdad Wilayet, were in opposition to the C.U.P. Manifestos, including especially virulent ones from Aleppo, demanding decentralization, continued to circulate. A new vernacular newspaper, *An-Nahdha* or 'The Awakening', published by Muzāhim Beg Pāchahjī, one of the Arab leaders began to appear in the first week of October.[5] The quarrel between the Turkish and Arab officers would have burst into open violence without the intervention of General Muhammad Daghistani, who appealed to their honour as soldiers.

[1] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, June, 1913.

[2] So 'Izzat Beg, sent as successor to Farid Beg, declared. Ibid., July, 1913.

[3] *The Times*, July 3rd and 4th, 1913.

[4] *Al-Dastūr* (Basra), August 22nd, 1913.

[5] Baghdad, October 3rd, 1913.

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In spite of arrests in the middle of October of leaders of the 175*
Arab Movement, including Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Shaikh Sa'īd 668*
Effendi, Hamdī Beg Pāchahjī, Mahmūd Beg, head of *Nadī* 186*
Watanī, or Native Land Club, and Bahjat Beg, fresh demands for decentralization were formulated. A general conference to meet at Kuwait in early 1914 to consider Arab questions was proposed in November. Representatives of Amīr Ibn Sa'ūd and of the Sharif of Mecca, with whom Saiyid Talib had long been in correspondence, and Amīr Ibn Rashīd of the Shammar, Shaikh 'Ajaimī of the Muntafiq, the Shaikh of Kuwait and Saiyid Talib were to be among the delegates. Ibn Sa'ūd, in response to the invitation, replied that when the time came to rise he would be ready, but that the moment had not come.[1] Neither he nor the other Arab potentates were as yet able to sink their personal ambitions and enmities in the common cause. The conference was never convened.

In this same inability to make common cause seems to lie the [181]
failure of Arab Nationalism to make even greater progress before 1914 than it had actually made. In no way did the essential individualism of the Arab character reveal itself more than in these early days of the Arab Movement. In spite of the correspondence and interchange of views between the various sections of the Arab world, in spite of the manifestos and literature issued in the name of the Arab peoples, in spite of the essential unity of the aims and purposes of Arab Nationalism, the Movement tended to break into sectionalism, limited by the horizons of immediate locality. The rank and file of the Movement, no less than the sectional leaders, regarded with mistrust any leaders whose ascendancy seemed to overshadow their own interests and to detract from their own importance. Personal rivalries, religious differences and sectional animosities thus hampered the progress of the Movement, stultifying its efforts and nullifying its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the Movement

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[1] The statement in *The Times*, December 27th, 1913, that the Arab chiefs had composed their differences proved to be unsubstantiated by facts.

175* was firmly established in 'Iraq no less than in other parts of the 668* Arab world. Nor was it without promise of success. In July, 186* 1914, the Central Government came to the decision that all other measures having failed, Saiyid Talib was to be appointed Wali of Basra:[1] a victory for the Reform Committee as well as for Saiyid Talib himself. Before the appointment could be made, however, Turkey had joined Germany in arms and the Indian Expeditionary Force had appeared in the Shatt al-'Arab.

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[1] So Ta'alat Beg informed H.B.M. Ambassador in Constantinople. *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, June-July, 1914.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM IN IRAQ, 1914–20

Nationalism in 'Iraq: 1914-18

DURING the war, Arab Nationalism flickered fitfully in 'Iraq. Talib Pasha proffered his services to the Indian authorities, offering to raise southern 'Iraq against the Turks. The military and political officials, however, trusting to their own resources and desiring no alliances which might complicate the eventual disposal of 'Iraq, made it known that his aid was not only unacceptable but that it would be wise for him to remain out of 'Iraq. He therefore went to Ceylon in 'voluntary exile'[1] until 1917, when he was permitted to go to Egypt. 'Iraqī officers in the Turkish Army, including Nūrī as-Sa'īd, 'Abdullāh Damlūjī[2] and others, who came to offer their services, were met with suspicion and sent into detention camps in India and in Egypt.

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186*
668*

The Turks, on their side, assigned the remaining Arab officers, in so far as it was possible, to posts presenting little opportunity for displaying their Nationalist sentiment. In Baghdad, by the end of 1916, they had deported or imprisoned all the educated Arabs and all notables suspected of possessing separatist opinions. Risings in 1915 and 1916 at Najaf, Karbalā, Hilla, Kūfa and Tūwairij, and appeals to the British for support against the Turks, nevertheless, indicated that the 'Iraqīs had lost nothing of the Nationalist feeling nor of their hatred of the Turks. Some of the disturbances, however, as at Najaf, in April, 1915, and at Karbalā, April, 1916, no doubt owed their

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[1] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 2.

[2] Dr. Damlūjī, finding that he was *persona non grata* to the British, made his way to Ibn Sa'ūd, whose service he entered. He later returned to 'Iraq, serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1930-1.

175* origin to the traditional intolerance of the Holy Cities to ex-
668* ternal secular authority, strained to a breaking point by Turkish
186* attempts to impose conscription and exactions, rather than to
any conscious Nationalist aspirations.

Turkish authority was reasserted in most cases only after great difficulty, the revolting cities being treated with considerable severity, as at Hilla in November, 1916, when the Turks further outraged 'Iraqi feeling by hanging notables suspected of being Arab Nationalists responsible for the revolt. Had the British authorities during 1915 and 1916 felt able to make a straightforward declaration of future policy and to give definite leadership and adequate support to the Arabs, in response to their requests, the 'Iraqis might have further asserted themselves in a general movement to expel the Turks who, at the time of the local risings, were in imminent danger of losing the Middle Euphrates, one of the Empire's richest granaries.

The revolt of the Arabs in the Hijāz had comparatively little effect in stimulating Arab Nationalism in 'Iraq during the war. In 1916, the news of the Sharīf of Mecca's revolt was circulated among the tribes by the British authorities in an effort to encourage them to rise against the Turks.[1] For the most part, however, and particularly after the British had captured Baghdad, news of the progress of the revolt was apparently withheld or minimized in 'Iraq, in accordance with the Arab policy of the Government of India and of General Maude.[2] The efforts of Sir Percy Cox, Miss Gertrude Bell and of other political officials were concentrated on establishing friendly relations with the Arabs and in consolidating British prestige and a commanding political position rather than on the development of further Arab Nationalism which might come into conflict with British policy. Nevertheless, through newspapers from Egypt, through letters from 'Iraqis serving with the Sharifian army and by word of mouth filtering across the desert,

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[1] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 30.

[2] *Supra*, ch. v.

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the Arabs in 'Iraq were kept in touch with the powerful forces 175*
operating among the Arabs in Syria and the Hijāz. 668*

The proclamation sent to Baghdad by H.M. Government and 186* issued by General Maude following the capture of the city inspired the Nationalists with hope for the success of their cause. Taken in conjunction with other statements which followed, it became one of the charters on which they based their claim to a national existence.

Post-War Nationalism: Factors leading to the Insurrection of 1920

Nationalism in 'Iraq after the war, as in every part of the world where it has manifested itself, has been compounded of varied elements, forces and influences, almost baffling in their complexity. Some of the participating elements have been unrelated and even antipathetic to each other, while others apparently homogeneous, have operated from entirely different motives. Some of the factors originated in the prosecution of a great war, others out of the post-war settlement among the victorious nations. Still others have been deeply rooted in the peculiar conditions and history of the country. Never has this variety and complexity been greater than in the period from the Armistice of Mudros to the Insurrection of 1920, when these elements and factors, whatever their previous relationships, coalesced for a time under the stress of Nationalism in an attempt to achieve freedom from external foreign control.

No single factor was more potent in stimulating the national aspirations of the Arabs than the war-time statements emanating from Great Britain and her Allies, defining their attitude to the Ottoman Empire and its non-Ottoman peoples. General Maude's Proclamation, Mr. Lloyd George's speech of January 5th, 1918, President Wilson's Twelfth Point and, above all, the Anglo-French Declaration, in conjunction with Allied propaganda freely employed in Arabia and in Syria and with the Husain-McMahon Correspondence, convinced the 'Iraqīs, both

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186 in the country and outside its borders, notwithstanding the
175 efforts of the Civil Administration to the contrary, that their
66 national aspirations were about to be realized at the hands of
Great Britain.[1]

Not until the post-armistice attempts of the Civil Administration to check demonstrations of Nationalist feeling in the plebiscite conducted by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the continued Government control over vernacular newspapers,[2] until the continued efforts of the Administration to consolidate its hold on the country and until the apparent reluctance of H.M. Government to give effect in 'Iraq to its declarations, at the same time that it was assisting in the establishment of the Damascus Government, seemed to indicate that Great Britain had no intention of keeping its promises, did Nationalist impatience give way to an organized opposition.

It has been maintained that the principal source of opposition to the British, discounted at the time because its authors were held to be unimportant, came from 'Iraqī officers serving in Damascus,[3] and that had it not been for the flood of Sharifian propaganda, backed by large sums from the Damascus Treasury,[4] filled by British subsidies, and by active hostilities at Dair-az-Zūr and in the upper Jazīra, 'Iraq would have settled

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[1] For effect of these declarations see *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, pp. 126-7; Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 463, also *supra*, pp. 137 ff.

[2] Until June 1st, 1920, when permission was given to Razzūq Dā'ūd Ghannām to start *Al-'Iraq*, all newspapers in 'Iraq were owned and controlled by the Civil Administration. *Al-'Iraq* was pro-British in policy and existed largely on the proceeds for printing Government notices.

[3] Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p. 260; *Baghdad Times*, February 25th, 1922.

[4] Whether sums sent from Syria to 'Iraq amounted to £160,000, stated to be the total by a well-informed ex-official in the Civil Administration or to the few thousands of pounds which participants in the Movement have stated to be the total, it seems certain that funds from Syria, together with sums from Najaf, Baghdad and other centres in 'Iraq, provided the sinews for Nationalist agitation, 1919-20. Faris Beg Khūri, Finance Minister to Amir Faisal, has categorically denied to the writer that any funds for use in 'Iraq were paid from the Treasury. Nevertheless, the funds from Syria may have come indirectly as through Sharif Zaid. The Bolshevists and the Turks are also alleged to have supplied funds. *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 144; Wilson, op. cit., p. 310.

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into contentment and peace. The collective effort of the 175*
'Iraqis abroad undoubtedly played a decisive part in arousing 186*
Nationalist feeling, as will be indicated later. They have been 668*
among the foremost, however, in denying the validity of the view that they formed the only effective element in opposition to British policy.[1] Such a view, in addition, ignores the history of 'Iraq Nationalism and disregards the fundamentals of Arab character.

The pre-war Nationalist Movement had been occasioned less by the evils of the Turkish administration, although these undoubtedly aggravated the discontent, than by the fact that the Turks, in spite of a common religion, were non-Arab rulers and that they barred the way to independence which for better or for worse, the Arabs desired. 'Iraq after the armistice had few of the administrative evils prevalent in pre-war days of which to complain; but the British regime was foreign and military. It was not Muslim, it was not Arab and, above all, it barred the way to autonomy which, more than ever before, stood as the goal of Arab aspirations. Under such circumstances, good administration which, according to the prevailing Anglo-Indian ideas, should have quieted all political discontent, counted for little. Indeed, in many districts, the very efficiency and thoroughness of the administration were regarded as sufficient justification for rebellion. The Arab saying, 'Better Jahannam of our own creation than Paradise of another's making', has its roots in Arab character.

Independence was desirable for its own sake, as Mr. H. St. J. Philby pointed out, in an address, June 23rd, 1920, to the Central Asian Society:

> What they [the 'Iraqis] want, like the people of Arabia and Syria, and want because they are Arabs, is complete independence, nothing more and nothing less, and that is exactly what the British Government promised them in the most unequivocal terms by joining with the French in the

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[1] So in interviews to writer, 1933-5; also *Al-'Iraq*, February 27th, 1922.

> 175* momentous proclamation of November, 1918 . . . Great as
> 186* the diversity of sentiment in various sections of the Arab
> 668* world in regard to many matters — religion, politics and
> the like — there is the completest unanimity in regard to one point, the passionate love of liberty which is characteristic of the Bedouin stock to which not only the people of Syria but the bulk of those of Mesopotamia belong by origin.[1]

It is not too much to believe that even if the 'Iraqī officers in Syria had stood aside from the post-war Nationalism in 'Iraq, the Movement under the leadership of those in the country and activated by internal forces would have eventually burst into open rebellion. It must not be overlooked that everywhere in the East the belief in the right of European Powers to govern and to dominate no longer carried the same weight as it had done previous to the war. Replacing it was the democratic theory of the consent of the governed which, largely through the efforts of the Great Powers themselves, had come to mean Self-Determination of all peoples. To the influence which the new theory exerted may be attributed the partial cause of the Nationalist outbursts in Egypt in 1919, the disturbances in India, the Anglo-Afghanistan Agreement of 1919, the risings in the Rīf, the resistance of the Turks under Mustafa Kamal to the Allies, as well as the insurrection of 1920 in 'Iraq.

Full use of the Arab's love of liberty, of his pride in his race, blood, language and history was made by the Nationalist leaders. These included, in addition to those who had taken part in the pre-war Movement, such as Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Shaikh Ahmad, Shaikh Dā'ūd, Muzāhim Beg and Hamdī Beg Pāchahjī, others whose Nationalism had been of a more recent growth. England's history as an imperial Power and every trace of evidence, relevant and irrelevant, pointing to India's desire to colonize 'Iraq, were recalled in opposition to the concept of a free Arab people, with a long and rich past,

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[1] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920), p. 114.

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once again the masters of the ancient city of the Abbasid 175*
Khalifs and possessing an honourable place among the nations 186*
of the modern world. It seemed to matter little to the Nationalists 668*
that two essentials, not to mention others, of a modern democratic state — a background of moderately well-informed and articulate public opinion and an adequate supply of trained and honest indigenous administrative personnel — were lacking and that the acquisition of such essentials would be a matter of years. Nor did they apparently take into consideration that the external dangers from Turkey, Persia and rival Arab states might be as great a threat to the future of the new state as the internal difficulties of maintaining it, once it had been created. The right to a national existence, the 'Iraqī Nationalists in company with their fellow Arabs elsewhere[1] considered to be indubitably theirs, both on the basis of the promises of the Allies and on that of the doctrine of self-determination. On these bases and not on any specific criteria of capacity, they rested their claims to independence.[2]

In a part of the world where differences of religion and of 175*
sect are synonymous with differences of race and of nationality, 186*
where religious fanaticism still lies close to the surface, and 668*
where allegiance to religious authority has still to be replaced by allegiance to the State, it is not surprising that Nationalism, begun as a political movement fostered by lawyers, teachers, writers and soldiers, should assume a religious aspect and acquire the support of the priesthood and of religious dignitaries. The latter recalled that the glories of the Arab past in Damascus, in Egypt, in North Africa and in the city of the Abbasids had been at their height in the days when Islam had been dominant and when the *Khalīfa* had been head of the

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[1] Amir Faisal when he appeared before the Peace Conference in Paris, February, 1919, stressed the right of self-determination of the Arab peoples: Miller, D. H., *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (22 vols. New York, 1926), Vol. xiv, pp. 227-34.

[2] For an excellent study of capacity for independence as opposed to rights to independence, see Ritsher, W. H., *Criteria of Capacity for Independence* (Jerusalem, 1934).

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175* State as well as of Islam. To them, particularly to the Shī'a
186* *'Ulamā*, Nationalism meant the erection once again of an
668* Islamic State, with the priesthood in their rightful dominant position. It meant a state freed from the contaminating influences of the West, purified from tendencies to exalt secularism and able to stamp out opposing sects and *millets*. The merging of political independence with theocratic independence and the co-operation of political and religious leaders were in reality identical with the post-war *rapprochement* of the Sunnī and the Shī'a sects, representing, generally speaking, the political and religious aspects respectively of the Nationalist Movement. The alliance, of which the first indication was in the summer of 1919, when Sunnīs attended two of the memorials held for the deceased Shī'a *Mujtahid*, Saiyid Muhammad Kādhim Yazdī, had not come easily. Between the two Muslim sects was a deep gulf of bitter differences and hatred as great as any which separated Protestant and Catholic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was bridged only by determined effort on the part of the Nationalist leaders, chief among whom were the Shī'īs, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr[1] and Ja'far abū Timman,[2] and the Sunnīs already mentioned.

The *rapprochement* undoubtedly increased the scope and the force of the Nationalist movement, drawing to it the Shī'a tribes and the masses in town and country whose fanaticism rose and fell in obedience to the almost unlimited authority of the divines over them. It was, however, not without its dangers to the Nationalist cause. At times it was almost impossible to discern whether the Movement was being directed by the priesthood of Najaf, Karbalā and Kādhimain or by the political leaders of Baghdad, Mōsul and Syria. Moreover, the *rapprochement* was ever precarious, the leaders failing to agree once the Insurrection had got under way. Indeed, even to-day, the

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[1] Member of well-known Shī'a family and the most active of the Baghdad Shī'a Nationalists. Now a Senator of 'Iraq.

[2] A Shī'a merchant of Kādhimain known for his uncompromising opposition to British policy in 'Iraq. Now Minister of Finance.

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Shīʻis of the Holy Cities and of the tribes of the Euphrates 175*
Valley maintain, in substantiation of their claims to a greater 186*
share in the Government of ʻIraq,[1] that it was they who brought 668*
about the Insurrection of 1920 and, therefore, brought independence to ʻIraq. It was also doubtful for a time whether the Movement would degenerate into a localized *Jihād*, such as actually occurred in the Muntafiq in 1920, or whether it would pave the way for the creation of an Arab state under a Hāshimī ruler as the political leaders desired.

To the tribes, as the most powerful single weapon at their 175*
disposal, the Nationalist leaders paid particular attention, 186*
although they, as townsmen, normally feared the tribesmen as 668*
much as they professed to despise them as uncivilized. The 619
tribes, north of Najaf, along the Euphrates and in the Jazīra, being more accessible to Damascus and Aleppo, were susceptible to Sharifian propaganda emanating from those centres. Among the tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, predominantly Shīʻa, the Nationalists from the Holy Cities and Baghdad found the most fertile ground for their politico-religious propaganda, although the Banī Tamīm, the ʻAzza and other tribes between Baghdad and Baʻqūbā were not unaffected.

Normally inter-tribal and inter-sectional politics dictate tribal attitude and behaviour. Concerted action among the tribes becomes possible only when they are moved by an idea or motive transcending their local and sectional interests, a rare occurrence. The ʻIraq tribes had not been untouched by pre-war National aspirations, which had, in fact, accentuated tribal antipathy to the Turks,[2] but a feeling of national consciousness had never taken firm hold among them or become a compelling motive of action. It is unlikely that Nationalist propaganda spread by Sharifian agents or from Shīʻa centres would have taken root in tribal minds had it not been for the

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[1] As in the tribal risings of the spring of 1935. See an illuminating article, MacDonald, A. D., *J. R. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xxiii (1936), Pt. 1, pp. 27 ff.

[2] *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, p. 3.

175¹ fact that the propagandists concentrated strongly and persuasively on matters nearer to their hearts and to their personal
186* advantage than the abstract concept of a national existence.
668*
619 National independence thus became attractive to the tribes
651 not because of any theory of indigenous administration or any hope of an Islamic state,[1] but because it promised an escape from Government, particularly one insistent on the payment of taxes. Their concept of the ideal government was one with bread in one hand and a club in the other: that is to say, dispensing benefits for which they were not called upon to pay, and maintaining a strong justice with impartiality. The Turks had in no way lived up to this conception. The British Administration at its inception had been promising, but it had gradually lost its ideal character. Tribal districts were now forced to pay revenue such as they had never paid before[2] and as they were never to pay again.[3] In the Muntafiq, for instance, the collection of revenue per capita had increased from less than one-fifth of a rupee (As.2 Ps.10 or 3d.) in 1916[4] to Rs.5 As. 10 in 1919 (about 8s. 6d. in sterling). It fell again to Rs.1 As.4 (about 1s. 11d.) in 1922,[5] rising to Rs.4 As.5 (6s. 6d.) in 1929, above which it has never risen. Nor did the tribesmen see

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[1] *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 4; ibid., 1921, p. 5.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 118, 145. The Bani Hûchaim paid heavy taxation for the first time in their history in 1919: *Admin. Report, Diwaniyah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

[3] The collection of Revenue in the Muntafiq, 1916 to 1928 was:

1916	Rs. 52,464 (*)	Only Nâsiriya and Sûq ash-Shuyûkh districts occupied.
1919	16,61,823 (*)	
1922	3,68,508 (†)	April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.
1926	10,02,659 (‡)	
1928	12,77,233 (§)	The peak year before fall in prices.

(*) *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 31; (†) *Report of the Accountant-General*, 1922-23 (Baghdad, 1924), pp. 11-12; (‡) *Report on the Operations of the Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance*, 1926-27 (Baghdad, 1927), p. 23; (§) Ibid., 1928-29 (Baghdad, 1929), p. 32.

[4] Based on a population of 295,537, the average of the estimate 320,000 in 1918-19 and that of 271,074, made in 1930-1 for the League of Nations. Ditchburn in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 1, estimated the Muntafiq population at 300,000.

[5] April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.

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benefits flowing directly to their districts in proportion to the 175*
taxation. The receipts for the great tribal Divisions of Muntafiq, 186*
Dīwāniya and Shāmiya in 1920 were estimated at Rs.55,33,100 668*
or nearly one-quarter of the total local revenue of the fourteen 619
divisions.[1] The purely divisional expenditures in the three [651]
divisions were Rs.19,29,440 or 18·8 per cent of the total
divisional expenditure.[2]

Another grievance dominated tribal feeling. The tribal policy adopted by the British authorities in 1915-16 for restoring the power of the shaikhs, largely for military reasons, had been extremely valuable but it had been carried beyond its original and logical conclusions. It had carried with it the necessity of supporting the paramount shaikh in all but the most flagrant uses of his power. Events had proved, however, that these shaikhs had abused their authority, using it for their personal aggrandizement. The other shaikhs and tribesmen, sullen and resentful of the growing autocracy of the Government shaikhs, found in Nationalism a promise of release both from the shaikhs and from the Government which supported them.[3] It is a fact that in the Insurrection of 1920 the enmity of the insurgent shaikhs and tribesmen in many centres was directed less against the British, in spite of Shi'a incitement, than at the paramount Government shaikhs[4] who, in many cases, were forced into the towns from which they dared not stir. In this atmosphere the exhortations of the religious firebrands to rise, slay and loot produced results far greater than the intrinsic merit of their Nationalist propaganda would justify.

Nevertheless, in spite of the undeniable power of fanatical religion among the turbulent tribesmen and in spite of the tribal grievances and hatreds which both Shi'a and Sharifian

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[1] *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iv.

[2] Ibid., p. v.

[3] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 143. But cf. *Ádmin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, pp. 2-3.

[4] Ibid., p. 9 (78); Shelswell, G. H., A.P.O. Samāwa: *Official Report on the Causes of the Tribal Disturbances in the Samāwah District*, August 9th, 1920.

175* propaganda fused into action, it was not until the rumours of a
186* weakening government seemed to be borne out by its inability
668* to control the situation, that the tribes were emboldened to
619 rise. To the tribal mind, it would have then been a mistake not
to have struck when there was a likelihood of the British being overwhelmed and folly to have supported the regime if it were falling. Until that time, however, little evidence of tribal disaffection was apparent. Thus, when reviewing the local political situation in 1919, the Political Officer of Hilla Division reported that a mild form of unrest, connected with the anti-British propaganda emanating from Karbalā, had passed over his Division. It had manifested itself in lawlessness, in murders, attacks on pilgrims and by desertion of Levies with rifles, but prompt action such as the deportation of the ringleaders, the operations of gunboats and the imposition of fines had brought peace.[1] He believed little genuine anti-British feeling existed, except at the Holy City. He warned the Civil Administration, however, that the 'whole series of episodes is instructive of what may recur any time until the future of 'Iraq is definitely announced'.[2] In Dīwānīya, Major C. K. Daly, the Political Officer, reported that an undercurrent of Sharifian propaganda had blown through the Division without leaving any appreciable effect,[3] but that the natural lawlessness and truculence of the Samāwa and Rumaitha tribes were causing difficulties in administration.[4] In the Shāmīya Division, in which Najaf was located, the annual report stated that while the religious authorities had co-operated thus far with the Government, the tribes obviously were 'marking time' with an eye on the future, and that they would act accordingly as the Government seemed strong enough to reach them.[5] In the Muntafiq, the influence of propaganda aided by Sharifian gold[6] had made itself felt. Certain of the

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[1] *Admin. Report, Hillah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.
[2] *Monthly Reports, August*, 1919, Hilla, p. 22.
[3] Ibid., Dīwānīya, p. 25.
[4] *Admin. Report, Diwaniyah*, 1919, p. 1.
[5] Ibid., *Shamiyah Division* 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.
[6] Ibid., *Muntafiq*, 1920.

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Political Officers, however, believed that the Sharifian influence 175*
would have little effect in the Muntafiq because of the self- 186*
interests of the *fallahin* and *sarkals*. The Officers stated, how- 668
ever, that it would take low taxation and firm treatment to 619
ensure the maintenance of these friendly relations, the Muntafiq Arabs being like gunpowder: the slightest spark would send them off. The tribes were reported as being quiet at that moment, but with arms at hand, their towers still standing and with a consciousness of their fighting ability, they were dangerous potentialities. They could be persuaded to do almost anything by agitators with a free hand and plenty of money.[1]

Opposed to the British for entirely different reasons but 175*
nevertheless joining actively in the agitation against them were 186+
the many ex-officials of the former regime repatriated in 'Iraq. 668*
Some of these, discontented with the pensions paid them from 565
the Civil Treasury, favoured any regime which would give them employment. Most of them, however, hated Great Britain and sought the return of the Turks or else desired a Muslim Government joined to a pan-Islamic Federation headed by Turkey.

The Nationalists could also count upon the support of many of the landlord class who, accustomed under the Turkish regime to exercise their privilege of collecting their rent to the last piastre without obligation either to the land or tenant, now found a strong arm imposed between them and the *fallahin*. Tenants, also, who had managed by devious means to escape payment of rent, had little reason to wish for the continuance of a Government which insisted on the payment of rent as well as of revenue. To them, as well as to many other classes, the insistence of the British Administration on its standards of justice, order, punctuality, the conduct of public business and sanitation, had little counterpart in their customs and in their habits of thought. Its unrelenting efficiency and thoroughness and even

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[1] Shatra District Report in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 92.

175* its probity were unfamiliar, irksome and unnecessary. The very 186* benefits of the British regime, although rightly and sincerely 668* appreciated in many quarters, were not uncommonly regarded as bribes, or folly or as things of unknown import.[1] The sudden and, in many instances, the complete change from the old to the new, in spite of all the good intentions of the administrative officials, undoubtedly left the Arabs often bewildered and aggrieved whereas in other circumstances they should have been grateful. It may also be questioned whether a greater adaptation of Western administrative methods to the existing conditions would not have been possible and whether a greater latitude between the spirit and the letter of the system employed could not have been permitted. It seems probable that had the Civil Administration been less anxious to justify its continued existence by proving its superiority over the previous regime and over all other possible regimes, as well as its efficiency and its ability to turn Arabs into good citizens along the lines favoured by the Acting Civil Commissioner; had it been staffed with men older and more experienced in dealing with Arab character and temperament;[2] or had the Civil Administration shown itself more sympathetic to the idea of an Arab Government, instead of merely paying it lip-service as a possibility in some remote and indefinite future, many of the classes who hardened their hearts against the once-popular British regime would have continued to support it.

Only gradually during 1919 did the National Movement take on shape and substance. In the Holy Cities, religious agitation against the British which had remained comparatively quiet during the lifetime of the Chief *Mujtahid*, Saiyid Kādhim Yazdī,

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[1] *Admin. Report, Kirkuk Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 7.

[2] On June 1st, 1920, according to the *Monthly List of Gazetted Officers, Part I* (Baghdad, 1920), 96.3 per cent of the Divisional Political Officers had not reached their fortieth birthday. Two-thirds of them had not reached their thirtieth birthday and 23 per cent were 25 years of age or younger. Of the entire administrative staff, 87.5 per cent were less than 40 years of age, and 42 per cent were less than 30 years old. The Acting Civil Commissioner himself was 35 years of age.

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who was in receipt of a large subsidy from the Administration, 175*
took on new virulence under Saiyid Muhammad Ridhā, son of 186*
Saiyid Muhammad Taqī Sharazī, the new Chief *Mujtahid*, who 668*
was entirely under his son's influence. Saiyid Mirza Muhammad Ridhā, it was alleged,[1] was in contact with the Bolshevists and with the Turks. He and his associates were arrested in Karbalā for fomenting disorders in September, 1919, but he was released under guarantee from his father. In Kādhimain, the hostility of the winter of 1918-19 had not abated.

In the south, as in Basra, sentiment remained in favour of the British.[2] In 'Amāra, the Political Officer reported that 'the year has been one of peace, nothing has occurred to belie the sentiments expressed by the shaikhs towards the British Government on the visit of the Civil Commissioner to 'Amarah in December, 1918, and one may suppose they were genuine.'[3]

In the north, in the Kirkūk district, elements of discontent were reported by the Political Officer of the Division, Captain S. H. Longrigg. He believed that within twelve months trouble might be expected if efforts were not made to placate the discontented sections of the population.[4]

In Baghdad, as in other districts, Nationalist agitation went on largely under cover. Public meetings could not be held except with government consent, although the mosques often were used in the later stages of the Movement for political meetings. Secret meetings were held in private houses. As no newspapers were permitted save those owned by the Government, placards and circulars were distributed in the city. Secret societies embracing practically all the educated Muslims were formed in every town. Nationalist agents were sent to towns and tribes to stir up the country and to collect funds, ostensibly for a National Secondary School in Baghdad but in reality to

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[1] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 144.

[2] *Admin. Report*, 1919, *Civil Administration, Mesopotamia*, (Calcutta, 1920), Part IV, Basra.

[3] *Admin. Report, 'Amarah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 2.

[4] *Admin. Report, Kirkūk Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 5.

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175x provide for propaganda.[1] The school was actually started in 186x January, 1920, the usual Government subsidy having been 668x requested and obtained. It was, however, less of an educational institution than a centre for disseminating anti-British propaganda and a forcing-house for young Nationalists.[2]

The chief encouragement to the Nationalist Movement, in late 1919 and early 1920, came from the incidents occurring at Dair az-Zūr and in the country between it and Mōsul where, as points fairly accessible to Syria and Turkey, Arab national sentiment was being stirred and cultivated from Syrian and Kamalist sources.

At the armistice, the definite boundaries between Turkey and Mesopotamia and between Mesopotamia and Syria had not been defined. In the middle of December, 1919, for reasons still obscure,[3] the Civil Administration took over the town of Dair az-Zūr and the region around it controlling the trade artery between Aleppo and the trans-Euphrates hinterland, although the Commander-in-Chief had refused military support for any point above al-Qaim on the Euphrates.

The town, from the outset, became a bone of contention between the Civil Administration and the Damascus Government. Captain F. E. Carver, sent to take over, found that an Arab *Mutasarrif* had been appointed under orders from the Governor of Aleppo, Shukrī Pasha al-'Ayyūbī. The latter, after pressure had been applied from Damascus, was constrained to withdraw the *Mutasarrif* and his Arab associates and to declare that they had acted contrary to instructions. Great Britain, following conversations with France in September, 1919, agreed that the line of the Khābūr valley should be the provisional frontier, in spite of protests from the Civil authorities

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[1] According to Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, in an interview with the writer.

[2] Ibid., also *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 140.

[3] The request of the inhabitants for a British Officer has been the only official reason (*Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 133), but Sir Arnold Wilson suggests that the undesirability of leaving a no-man's land for a possible invasion of the Turks was the motive (Wilson, op. cit., p. 229).

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in Baghdad that the line split tribal units. The subsequent 175*
evacuation of Dair az-Zūr on December 25th, 1919, under 184*
circumstances somewhat damaging to British prestige,[1] became 668*
the precursor of militant Arab Nationalism.

Propaganda at the hands of Ramadhan ash-Shallash, of Maulūd Pasha, a Mōsulī, formerly on Amīr Faisal's staff, of the *Mudīr* of Mayyādīn, situated below the provisional frontier, and of other Arab officers increased and became more and more threatening. Gendarmes were enrolled at higher rates than paid in 'Iraq; officials were appointed at high salaries; shaikhs were given gifts; and taxes were collected within British territory. Letters and incitements to *Jihād* were broadcast to shaikhs as far south as 'Amāra, with the aim of discrediting the British Administration. The tribes themselves were urged to violence against everything British. The Shammar, the 'Aqaidāt and other tribes, not loath to revert to their ancient ways, robbed caravans and attacked convoys. Throughout the period, the Damascus Government protested that the Dair az-Zūr officials were an embarrassment to it, but in reality they seemed to enjoy its support and approval. They persistently demanded that the British withdraw to Wādi Haurān, some miles below 'Āna. The proclamation in Damascus of 'Abdullāh Ibn Husain as King of 'Iraq, March 8th, by *Al-'Ahd al-'Irāqīya* or 'Iraqī Covenanters, augmented the vehemence of their demands. Only the British desire to avoid open conflict in which they could not be sure of success prevented hostilities. Sahitiya was evacuated early in May and Abū Kāmal a few days later, the frontier being set at just above al-Qaim, about fifty miles above 'Āna. These steps, including the original one of evacuating Dair az-Zūr, were construed by the 'Iraqī Nationalists as demonstrating the validity of the Arab demands as well as being signs of British military weakness which, in truth, had influenced British policy. Accounts of how the British army had been turned out of Dair az-Zūr and, in turn, out of Abū

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[1] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, pp. 134-6.

175x Kamāl and now awaited a final blow at 'Āna at the hands of
186x the Arabs led by the Sharīf 'Abdullāh, filled the Syrian news-
668x papers and circulated in the coffee shops of Baghdad, Mōsul and
every town in the land.

Nowhere was the anti-British feeling engendered by these activities more apparent than in Mōsul and in the surrounding country. In Mōsul during 1919, striking progress had been made under British administration. Public security was vastly improved, taxation equalized, the city so cleansed that the transformation appeared miraculous to those who had known it in pre-war days.[1] Education had been encouraged and medical treatment had been extended to all.[2] Trade had been stimulated and a return of prosperity seemed imminent. Nevertheless, it was evident that ready acquiescence by the Muslims in British Administration was being rendered extremely difficult by the general acceptance of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, by the delay in signing the peace treaty with Turkey, by the existence of an Arab State in Syria and by the
665 claims of Islam and of self-interest.[3] Indications had not been
175x lacking of the activities of the Nationalist society, *Al-'Ahd al-*
186x *'Irāqīya*, which had been introduced, it was said,[4] by Jamīl Beg
668x Midfai, a native of Mōsul and a member of Amīr Faisal's staff,[5]
and by 'Ibrāhīm Kamāl Beg when they visited Mōsul in March,
1919.

Following the occupation of Dair az-Zūr by the Damascus Government and the appointment of the violently anti-British *Mudīr* to Mayyādīn, the society gave open manifestation of its hostility to the British Administration in the form of meetings and in the posting of anti-government notices, ranging in subject from obscene abuse to well-written proclamations calling

[1] See Sykes, Sir Mark, *The Caliph's Last Heritage* (1915), p. 3389.

[2] *Admin. Report*, 1919, *Mesopotamia*, Part 1, Mōsul, p. 32.

[3] Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

[4] *Admin. Report*, *Mosul Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 3.

[5] As leader of the attack on Tall 'Afar, he was excluded from the amnesty of 1921. He was pardoned in April, 1922, and has been three times Prime Minister of 'Iraq as well as Minister of Interior, Minister of Defence, etc.

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upon Arabs to rise and die for their fatherland. For the most 665
part, *Al-'Ahd* seemed to be composed of young men: doctors, 175
lawyers, schoolmasters (a number of whom had been dismissed 186
in the winter of 1919 for too violently proclaiming their anti- 668
British sentiments) and the like. Nevertheless, while the members may have been unimportant individually, collectively they were important. The moderates, as is usually the case, held their peace and remained passive. *Al-'Ahd*, on the other hand, being well organized and having definite aims, gained the ear of the populace.[1]

It became evident that the society in Mōsul was in contact with members of the parent society in Dair az-Zūr and beyond, and that the Mōsulīs were prepared to rise should any opportunity be given them by the Sharifian forces. In late March, 1920, 175
the first definite reports that the Arab Government intended to 186
attack Mōsul were received and throughout April and May the 669
tension increased. Outside Mōsul, the Shammar Jarba under 'Ajīl al-Yawar, Michal al-Fāris Bunaiyan, Hamaidī and others, the Khābūr Jūbūr under Muslat, the 'Albū Nimr, the 'Aqaidāt and other tribes[2] were rendering life and property unsafe. From April onwards, the concentration of tribal raids on military supply-camps and on military convoys between the Shargat rail-head and Mōsul pointed to other purposes than mere desire for loot, and to a higher control than that of tribal shaikhs. The methods employed seemed to indicate that the former officers of Faisal's Arab Army had not forgotten the tactics used by Colonel Lawrence and his fellow officers against the Turkish lines of supply in the Hijāz and in Syria. Instead of

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[1] The Society was admitted by the authorities to be extremely well organised (Ibid., p. 5). Not until late May was the Government able to identify definitely even a few of the leading members. Of the other two patriotic societies, the *Haras* (the continuation of the pre-war secret society) and the *Hillal*, nothing was known to the authorities except the names.

[2] For locale and strength of these tribes: *Note on Nomad Tribes*, by Major J. I. Eadie; *Note on Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Anah-Albu Kamal Districts*, *Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayet*; *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, and *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, pp. 110 ff.

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175 Turkish garrisons being reduced by means of British arms and
186 funds, it was now British forces, isolated at Mōsul, which were
669 being rendered ineffective by means of Turkish arms and by forces stimulated by both Turkish and British funds.[1]

On May 30th, the British authorities at Mōsul sent to Baghdad a warning based on the information that an Arab Army under Jamīl Beg Midfai, styling himself 'Commander of the Northern 'Iraq Army', had gathered at Tall Fajāmī on the Khābūr, with Mōsul as its objective. The warning was disregarded by the military authorities at Baghdad.[2] Except for reconnaissances by aeroplanes and armoured cars which failed to locate the approaching Arabs, no other efforts to oppose them were made by the Mōsul military authorities until too late.[3] The only chance of checking the Arab forces lay in the hope that the Gendarmes at Tall 'Afar, considered as one of the most promising companies, could interpose themselves between the approaching army. Treachery had been at work, however. During the night of June 3rd, Captain Stuart, Commander of the Gendarmes, was murdered by Muhammad 'Alī Effendi, one of the Gendarme officers. It was then too much to hope that the men would rally to the support of the British. Early on the morning of June 4th, tribesmen rode into the town, followed by the Arab Army under Jamīl Beg Midfai and by a large force of the Jūbūr under Muslat, and of the Shammar under 'Ajīl, Bunaiyan and Hachīm. The three British other ranks, after defending themselves for several hours from the roof of their billet, were killed by bombs. Two armoured cars sent out from Mōsul were ambushed, overturned and their crews, numbering fourteen, were killed. A reconnoitring aeroplane was shot down and narrowly avoided capture. In the meantime, Captain Barlow, who had been out on reconnaissance

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[1] It seems certain that arms as well as funds came to the Sharifian officers at Dair az-Zūr from Turkish sources, and that the British subsidy to the Damascus Government also kept them in funds. *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, pp. 138-9.

[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 273.

[3] *Admin. Report, Mosul*, 1920, p. 1.

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had been captured by tribesmen and afterwards killed while 175×
trying to make his escape.[1] 186×

From Tall 'Afar, raiding parties from the tribes attacked 669
the Mōsul-Shargāt road and did considerable damage to the military convoys. Letters were sent to all the surrounding country, urging it to revolt and attack Mōsul, where a rising was expected. When, however, the outposts of the Arab army came in contact with the British column, sent out from Mōsul on June 5th, Jamīl Beg and his officers fled to Dair az-Zūr.

It was evident to British observers that the Movement had derived its strength from the general belief that either Sharīf 'Abdullāh or Sharīf Zaid were behind it in person. 'There is no reasonable doubt', the Political Officer for Mōsul wrote later, 'that the expedition was organized by the '*Ahd* organization in Syria, that it was armed from the Sharifian arsenal in Dair az-Zur, that Faisal deprecated it but was aware of it, and that it was actively encouraged and financed by Zaid'.[2]

The failure of the Arab Army to make a stand, the non-appearance of the expected Sharīf and the prompt action of the British troops convinced the countryside as well as most of the inhabitants of Mōsul that they had best stand by the existing order. Nevertheless, the '*Ahd* was too well organized to give up hope. On June 6th, the first notice bearing its five-pointed seal was published, predicting the immediate expulsion of the British. The notices continued until June 17th, when the last one appeared, repudiating the decision of the San Remo Conference and reiterating the kingship of 'Abdullāh. Rumours filled the air of a gathering of fresh forces for an attack on Mōsul. The fall of Damascus and the occupation of Syria by the French in late July ended the trans-Euphrates period of Nationalism. Its inspiration during the next few months came from Baghdad.

During July, letters were received from Baghdad, telling of the notable work achieved by the *Mandubīn*, and calling on the

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[1] *Admin. Report, Mosul*, 1920, pp. 1-2.

[2] Ibid., p. 2.

175ˣ patriots of Mōsul to do similar good work. On August 6th, at
186ˣ a *maulūd* held in the Nebī Jūrjis Mosque, the congregation, after
several highly patriotic speeches, was asked to name forty delegates to formulate and present demands to the Government. The following demands were submitted:

> (1) Preservation of personal rights and liberties, with special reference to deserters and to certain unfortunate incidents connected with the behaviour of the troops.
>
> (2) Freedom of speech and the Press.
>
> (3) Acceleration of the calling of the 'Iraq Constituent Council, the elections for which should be held in principle according to Turkish law.
>
> (4) That it should be recorded that the two ex-deputies, Dā'ūd Effendi Yūsufanī and Hasan Beg, who had been invited to serve on the Electoral Committee in Baghdad, were not to be considered as representatives of Mosul.[1]

The High Commissioner's reply, received on October 6th and declared to be satisfactory by the older members of the Forty, together with his later visit to Mōsul, did much to restore confidence. The period of the Baghdad Nationalist influence in the Mōsul area came to an end. Further stimulus for the region was to be received from Mardīn, Diyārbekr and other points over the Turkish frontier whither Arab officers had gone in the hope of receiving help. Some assistance had already been given, as to Jamīl Beg but other promises failed to materialize at opportune moments. In the end, many of the Arabs realized that any aid given by the Turks was in the furtherance of their own interests and was anti-British and anti-French rather than pro-Arab. Had the Turks given substantial assistance when it was most needed or had the various anti-British elements in Upper 'Iraq risen in unison, the situation might have got out of hand on several occasions when it was touch-and-go. As it was, Mōsul and the British forces there were so isolated and so difficult to keep supplied

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[1] *Admin. Report, Mosul,* 1920, p. 4.

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with necessities, that on July 14th, when the prospect of early 175
reinforcements from India to keep lines of communication open 186
and to meet the situation in lower 'Iraq seemed faint, the Acting Civil Commissioner actually put forward the proposal to give up the whole Wilayet of Mōsul.[1] The proposal was vetoed both in India and London and means were found to maintain the garrison.

In the remainder of 'Iraq and particularly in Baghdad, the incidents on the upper Euphrates and the news of Sharif 'Abdullāh's election, on March 8th, had spurred the Nationalists to renewed agitation[2] to which the Covenanters at Damascus continued to give their support. These activities led Miss Gertrude Bell, whose Intelligence work kept her in close touch with Arab sentiment, to write on April 10th:

> I think we're on the edge of a pretty considerable Arab nationalist demonstration with which I'm a good deal in sympathy. It will, however, force our hand and we shall have to see whether it will leave us with enough hold to carry on here. . . .[3]

The announcement, on May 3rd, that Great Britain had been assigned the Mandate for 'Iraq further agitated the Nationalists to whom it came as fresh proof that Great Britain had no intention of keeping her early promises. Their opposition was based on objections more fundamental than any failure to appreciate the concept of trusteeship originally implied in the mandate system.[4] That failure, it has been

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[1] Haldane, op. cit., p. 235. Also Telegrams: Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, No. 8785, July 21st, 1920; No. 9889, August 16th, 1920.

[2] A series of letters, dated 23 Rabjab (April 12th), 1920, and addressed to the King of Syria (Faisal) and to the King of 'Iraq ('Abdullāh), later fell into the hands of the authorities. The letters congratulated the two Amirs in their election, and assured the latter a welcome from his loyal subjects. They were signed by the Shaikhs and Saiyids of the Shāmīya, the Samāwa, the Rumaitha (Banī Hūchaim) and the Muntafiq tribes, and by the notables and Saiyids of Najaf, Kūfa, Hilla and of the Shāmīya. Every one of the signatories, with the exception of two, took leading parts in the Insurrection of 1920.

[3] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 486.

[4] Wright, Quincy, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930), pp. 314 ff.

175* 186* maintained, was aggravated by the unfortunate use of the Arabic words *'amr* for Mandate and *amīr* or *mamūr* for the Mandatory, with their connotations of subservience to a ruling person or power and of a ruler, respectively, instead of the words *intidāb* and *daulāt muntadibah*, from the root *nadaba*, to choose, or of other words implying trusteeship, from the root *'amīna*.[1] The latter view ignores Arab intelligence as well as the strength of Arab national sentiment. Whatever the Arabic word used, 'Iraqī Nationalists could only view the mandatory system, then as in after years when the course of events in Syria, Palestine, Africa and the Pacific gave substance to their contentions, as imperialism in a new guise and as colonization under a new name.[2] It meant subjection to a foreign power and the consequent loss of national independence. The Nationalist newspaper *Al-Istiqlāl* stated the feeling of Nationalists generally in 1920 as well as in 1922, when it said:

> We do not reject the mandate because of its name but because its meaning is destructive of independence . . . Words like *intidab*, *wusayah*, *himayah*, *itiman*, *musa'adah*, *muhalif*, *ishraf* and *musharafah* are used by the colonizers; they all translate mandate and are intended to deceive weak nations. The name only is changed, just in the same way as they talk of liberating humanity, helping the weak, etc.[3]

The attempt to make the Mandate more palatable by maintaining that it was an obligation laid on Great Britain by the League of Nations was countered by the refusal of the Nationalists both to recognize the authority of the League to give mandates[4] and to regard Great Britain's assumption of responsibility in 'Iraq as an altruistic response to the League.

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, May 26th, 29th, June 20th, 1922.

[2] ''Iraqis refuse foreign restriction of liberty, under whatever name.' *Al-Mufīd*, June 8th, 1922.

[3] *Al-Istiqlāl* (Baghdad), June 5th, 1922; *Al-Rāfidān* (Baghdad), June 5th, 1922; *Al-Mufīd*, June 8th, 1922.

[4] ''Iraq does not recognize authority of the League of Nations to give Mandates. Why have the mandates for 'Iraq, Syria and former German colonies been given while no one will take Armenia?' *Al-Mufīd*, June 8th, 1922.

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They, and Arabs in general, viewed the assignment of mandates in the same light as did Lord Curzon when, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he said in the House of Lords, June 25th, 1920: 175 186

> It is quite a mistake to suppose . . . that under the Covenant of the League, or any other instrument, the gift of the mandate rests with the League of Nations. It does not do so. It rests with the Powers who have conquered the territories, which it then falls to them to distribute, and it was in these circumstances that the mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia was conferred upon and accepted by us, and that the mandate for Syria was conferred upon and accepted by France.[1]

One of the first results of the announcement in Baghdad was a series of secret meetings of the Nationalist leaders who resolved on still stronger measures of propaganda and on a closer *rapprochement* between Shī'is and Sunnīs. Counter-demands to the Bonham-Carter proposals, well known in Baghdad at the time, were also to be formulated and presented to the British Government, by the *Mandubīn* or Delegates. This body of fifteen or seventeen Nationalists had been selected from the larger group and the list had then been submitted, in the autumn of 1919, for approval to a political gathering in one of the mosques. This had been given.[2]

To further the Shī'a-Sunnī *rapprochement*, religious services [175] known as *maulūds*, in honour of the birth of the Prophet, were organized in the month of Ramadhan, beginning May 19th. In these *maulūds*, held alternately in every Shī'a and Sunnī mosque, leading members of the two sects took part, by special invitation of the mosque authorities or of the secular heads of the city quarter in which the mosques were located. Following the religious ceremonies, which usually combined both Sunnī and Shī'a rites, were patriotic speeches and poems appealing to patriotism, to honor, and religion.

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), p. 877.

[2] According to Saiyid Muhammad al-Sadr.

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175x 186x to patriotism, to honour and to religion. So keenly was public feeling aroused by these nightly meetings that several clashes between the police and Nationalists took place. The turbulent gathering of Nationalists, on May 24th, to secure the release of one of their number, arrested because of a speech made at a *maulūd*, provoked such an alarming disturbance that armed cars patrolled the streets, firing shots over the heads of the crowd. General unrest settled on Baghdad. Bazaars closed on the slightest rumours. Attacks on solitary British officers and men were frequent. The presentation of the Nationalist demands by the *Mandubīn* to the Acting Civil Commissioner and his staff at the *Sarai* on June 2nd became, as already indicated,[1] a great Nationalist demonstration, the news of which was spread throughout the country. The announcement, on June 20th, that Sir Percy Cox would return to set up an Arab Government had a favourable reception among many influential 'Iraqis, but it was received with mistrust by Nationalists as a whole. The *Mandubīn* again demanded, on June 30th, 'the formation of a General Council for 'Iraq' which they expected to declare the immediate and complete independence of 'Iraq.[2]

While the agitation was increasing in Baghdad, Shī'a divines of the Holy Cities had also intensified their efforts among the tribes and the provincial towns. Broadsheets from their printing presses, letters and documents, some of them carrying the forged signature of the Chief *Mujtahid*, Saiyid Muhammad Taqī, were circulated. These exhorted true believers to defend Islam against the infidels and urged them to send delegates to Baghdad to form an Islamic Government. A covenant binding the tribes to a concerted rising was signed by a number of shaikhs.[3]

Plans for the rising seem to have been definitely formulated at Karbalā in the middle of June when groups of shaikhs and

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 216-17.

[3] *Admin. Report*, *Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 2.

[2] Letter, *Mandubin* to Military Governor and Political Officer of Baghdad, June 30th, 1920.

notables went there on pilgrimage. Later, at a tribal gathering 175×
at Shumali, the leading shaikhs between Shināfiya and Hilla 186×
unanimously determined to follow the lead of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī and Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. As a result of incitement from Baghdad, the Holy Cities and Syria, the tribes and towns became increasingly restless. A train was derailed above Baghdad in late May, and others below Hilla in early June. Petty crimes increased at an alarming rate. Arabs in government service began to resign. The collection of revenue on winter crops became more and more difficult. In Shatra, in the Muntafiq, it had already been intimated to Captain Mead, the Assistant Political Officer, on May 17th, that should he persist in carrying out chain or rope measurement of crops, he would be forcibly resisted.[1] The arrest of six agitators at Hilla[2] relaxed the tension there, but the arrest and deportation to Henjam[3] of Mirza Muhammad Ridhā and nine others at Karbalā on June 22nd added to the perilousness of the situation on the middle Euphrates. The arrest of Hājjī Muklūf, the principal agitator in Dīwānīya, did nothing to check the rising there. Signs of incipient unrest were manifest everywhere and a lapse into former lawlessness and anarchy seemed imminent. It was clear that only a spark would be needed to send off the train of insurrection.

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[1] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 2-3. This method of crop assessment, 651
introduced by the Turks, is described in detail in *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18. As late as 1929, rope measurement was employed in the Muntafiq and elsewhere in 'Iraq as a normal method of crop assessment: *Report of Revenue Department*, 1928-1929, pp. 11-13; also App. O. But cf. Wilson, op. cit., p. 282.

[2] Telegram No. 7289, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to P.O. Hilla, June 16th, 1920.

[3] According to the official *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf*, p. 629 ff., Henjam 131
is a small, rocky and dismal island in the Persian Gulf not far from the Clarence Straits. Its climate in summer is 'barely tolerable', the heat being terrific and aggravated by moisture, sandflies and other insects.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE INSURRECTION OF 1920

175* 669 At Rumaitha on the lower Euphrates, always a centre of unrest, the incident occurred which precipitated the Insurrection. On June 30th, the Dhawalīm section of the Banī Hūchaim broke into the Government *Sarai* to release their Shaikh who had been detained by the Assistant Political Officer, as the result of a dispute over an agricultural loan.[1] The local disturbance became the occasion of the general rising. The entire tribe, under orders from Najaf and Kūfa, besieged the Political staff and garrison from July 4th; cut the railroad above and below Rumaitha, while other tribes attacked the Government offices at Samāwa and besieged the two companies stationed there. The railroad was again cut above and below Samāwa.[2] The situation was not irreparable, however, and had prompt and effectively directed action been taken with sufficient troops, the rising might have been quickly suppressed, although the tribes appeared to be under the direction of 'Iraqī ex-officers from Baghdad and Syria. At Rumaitha and Samāwa, the British had definitely entered upon a trial of strength with the tribes. The tribal leaders were well aware of the essential objectives before the British: relief of the garrisons and the reinstatement of the Government. The immediate achievement of these two objectives was to be the determining factor either for peace or for insurrection in the rest of the country.

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[1] *London Gazette*, July 5th, 1921, p. 5330, Dispatch No. 3 (with Appendixes) from Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. A. L. Haldane, November 8th, 1920 (hereafter *London Gazette*). Also Report, Lieut. P. T. Hyatt, A.P.O., Rumaitha, August 10th, 1920; Note on Outbreak of Disturbances at Rumaitha, C. Daly, P.O., Dīwāniya, August 26th, 1920.

[2] Telegram No. 8233, Civil Commissioner to India Office, July 8th, 1920.

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Although the general situation had long been known to be threatening, only 4200 British troops and 30,000 Indian troops were available for active service out of the total force estimated at 133,000.[1] Nor were the necessary steps following the outbreak taken with the requisite speed and decision. Sir Aylmer Haldane, Commander-in-Chief, had returned on June 24th, to the Persian Hill station where the bulk of his Headquarters Staff was already in residence. Moreover, Military Headquarters tended to place little faith in the reports of the Political Officers regarding the seriousness of the situation.[2] The resultant lack of co-operation on this initial occasion, as on later occasions, was not without disastrous consequences.

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Two attempts to relieve Rumaitha were unsuccessful[3] and led to further encouragement of the tribes. Not until July 20th was a relief column, after severe fighting, able to reach the town which was evacuated the next day.[4] Samāwa was not relieved until October 14th. In the meantime, the Miskhab tribes below Najaf marched on Abu Sūkhair, on July 13th. The following day, the southern Banī Hasan tribe arose. On July 20th, Kūfa was besieged and was not relieved until October 17th. On the same day the Banī Hasan attacked Kifl, to relieve which, a force including three companies of the 3rd Manchesters was dispatched in intense heat and without adequate arrangements for water. The force met with overwhelming disaster, less than half the original number returning to Hilla. The incident was magnified by rumour. Practically the whole of the middle Euphrates rose. Rumaitha, Hindīya Barrage and Musaiyib had already been evacuated; Samāwa and Kūfa

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[1] *London Gazette*, p. 5330 (9); Appendix No. 1; Haldane, Sir J. A. L., *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia*, 1920, p. 325. Sir Aylmer estimated that of these troops only 500 British and 2500 to 3000 Indian troops were available as a mobile force; ibid., p. 72.

[2] For the Commander-in-Chief's attitude to Political Staff, Haldane, op. cit., p. 92; also Wilson, op. cit., pp. 275-6.

[3] The additional troops sent July 1st, 2nd and 3rd were insufficient to beat off the insurgents, and the relief expedition, sent July 7th, was forced to return after severe fighting: *London Gazette*, p. [illegible].

[4] Ibid., p. 5332 (28).

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175x were besieged and other points had been either cut off or 669 endangered. Withdrawal from Dīwānīya to Hilla, which had been repeatedly attacked, was deemed essential. It was effected under great difficulties, July 30th.[1] For a time, no order could be maintained outside the line of defences immediately about Baghdad.[2]

The British reverses on the middle Euphrates not unnaturally reacted on the situation on the lower Euphrates and in the Muntafiq. On July 30th, Saiyid Hādī al-Mūqutar from Najaf appeared in the Samāwa area, establishing himself at Khidhr. Supported, it was alleged, by 'an immense quantity of gold',[3] he became the leading figure among the insurgents, inflaming the tribes to a *Jihād* with but one aim: the overthrow of the Civil Administration in the lower Euphrates. Other Saiyids and *'Ulamā*, operating on the Gharrāf, at Shatra and at Khidhr, joined him in preaching the *Jihād* which was declared from Karbalā about August 6th.[4] These activities were doubly effective on the tribes in conjunction with what appeared to be continued British reverses. Musaiyib had been reoccupied on August 12th, and Hindīya Barrage on August 13th, but the evacuation of Qal'at Sikar on August 12th, following an attack on it, led the insurgents to believe that they had inflicted a military defeat on the Government and had driven it from a large portion of the country. The insurgents' belief in the success of the rising seemed confirmed by the British loss of Khidhr with two armoured trains on August 13th; by the isolation by land of Samāwa on the same day; by the loss of several British vessels on the upper Euphrates on August 15th; by the evacuation of Shatra on August 20th;[5] by the capture of the *S.9* with all on board, on August 28th; by the evacuation of

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[1] *London Gazette*, p. 5335 (50-8).

[2] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 147.

[3] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 20, 21.

[4] *London Gazette*, p. 5337 (66).

[5] Not August 27th as in Haldane: op. cit., p. 215. See *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 20, 21.

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Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, on September 1st; and by the annihilation of 175* a British force as it attempted to evacuate Samāwa railway 669 camp, on September 3rd. In Nāsiriya alone, no rising took place, although it often appeared to be dangerously near. The appearance in the Muntafiq of the relief column for Samāwa at the end of September lessened the anxiety, but not until after the relief of Samāwa, October 14th,[1] and the submission of the Rumaitha tribes, did the rising collapse in the Muntafiq.

In the meantime, northward and westward of Baghdad fresh risings had broken out. In Ba'qūbā Division, the Mahrut Revenue Office was raided by a section of the Kharkīya tribe, on August 8th. On the following day, the same tribesmen attacked Abū Hawā Station. Dīltāwa fell to the insurgents, August 12th. It had early come under the influence of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr who, after the attempt to arrest him at Baghdad, August 12th, made it his headquarters[2] from which he encouraged the insurgents, especially at Sāmarrā.[3] Ba'qūbā, which had always been anti-British, was evacuated by the British on the same day. Shahrābān, where a small but influential group of Nationalists had been in touch with the Baghdad leaders, was captured, August 13th,[4] by the tribes, who killed Captain W. T. Wrigley, Captain J. T. Bradfield, Captain E. L. Buchanan,[5] and two British Warrant Officers. A provisional Arab Government was then set up.[6]

Qizil Ribat and Khānaqīn, where the revolt was largely the work of the Dilo Kurds, without any trace of the national

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[1] *London Gazette*, p. 5342 (114).

[2] *Admin. Report, Diyalah Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 8; Haldane, op. cit., p. 233.

[3] *Admin. Report, Samarra Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), pp. 1, 3.

[4] See *Admin. Report, Diyalah*, 1920, pp. 2, 7. Haldane, op. cit., p. 164, gives date as August 15th.

[5] Mrs. Buchanan, who had been slightly wounded, was rescued and protected until the relief column reached Shahrābān. See Buchanan, Z., *In the Hands of the Arabs* (1921).

[6] For composition of this provisional government: *Admin. Report, Diyalah*, 1920, p. 6.

175x aspirations such as played a part in other districts, fell on
669 August 14th. In Mandalī, where the Naqīb, Saiyid 'Ilyas Agha, had enlarged on the Nationalist views held by Saiyid Talib Pasha with whom he was in close touch, a provisional government was also formed. It took over in an orderly manner from the Deputy Assistant Political Officer. Although not efficient, it succeeded in maintaining law and order until late October when it lost its authority. From Ba'qūbā the insurrection spread to Kirkūk Division, but only in Kifrī did open outbreaks occur. The tribes entered the town on August 26th, killing the Political Officer, Captain G. H. Salmon.

On August 27th, Ba'qūbā was reoccupied by British Forces. The next day, a force from Kirkūk entered Kifrī. On September 6th, a relief column reached Qizil Ribat,[1] another column occupying Shahrābān two days later.[2] Dīltāwa was reached September 24th. Not until November 20th, when a cavalry column occupied Mandalī, did that area come under control again.

Among the tribes west and north-west of Baghdad, Colonel G. E. Leachman, by his vigorous methods and with the aid of liberal subsidies[3] and the valuable assistance of Major J. I. Eadie, Assistant Political Officer at 'Āna,[4] of Shaikh 'Alī as-Sulaimān of the Dulaim and of Shaikh Fahād Beg of the 'Anaiza,[5] who remained loyal throughout, was able to preserve

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[1] During the Insurrection, the British Consul at Kermanshah arranged for the Sinjabī tribe in Persia to make extensive raids on the Dilo tribes in 'Iraq, who had been mainly responsible for the risings at Qizil Ribat and Khānaqīn. After the raids the tribe returned to Persia, *Admin. Report, Diyalah*, 1920, p. 5.

[2] *London Gazette*, p. 5338 (78).

[3] Subsidies to shaikhs and Secret Service allowances in the Dulaim Division, of which Colonel Leachman was Political Officer, increased from Rs. 50,000 or £3,750 in 1919 (*Budget Estimates*, 1919-1920, p. 10) to Rs. 279,000 or £21,000 in 1920 (*Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. 21). Cf. Main, E., op. cit., p. 75, for claim that Leachman 'had *single-handed* and without a penny to spend on bribes held the Upper Euphrates tribes in this time of full rebellion, all the troops having been withdrawn.'

[4] For tribute to Major Eadie's work on the Upper Euphrates during the Insurrection see Haldane, op. cit., pp. 106, 171.

[5] For value of these shaikhs' loyalty and support see *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 147.

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peace until his murder, on August 12th, by Shaikh Dharī of 175 ×
the Zoba' tribe. His death was the signal for risings from 669
Fallūja to 'Āna, the British forces being forced back from Hīt to Ramādī which, with Fallūja, were cut off from Baghdad. Relief reached Fallūja on September 24th and Ramādī two days later.[1] Hīt was not reoccupied until October 4th.

Around Sāmarrā, the fourth of the Holy Cities, the preaching of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, supported by an influential shaikh, the events in Ba'qūbā Division and the natural unrest among the tribes brought about a rising.[2] The town was unsuccessfully attacked on August 28th, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, it was reported, directing the insurgents himself.[3] Other points were also attacked, but by the middle of September order had been generally restored.

In the 'Arbīl area, the courage and strenuous efforts of the British officers, whose lives were in constant danger, saved the situation although several outlying posts had to be abandoned. Mōsul, as already indicated, and Sulaimānīya did not rise although much uneasiness existed.

In the south, the Tigris valley remained quiet.[4] Not a shot was fired either in 'Amāra or in Basra where the Nationalist agitation, conducted chiefly by Yūsuf Kamāl and his father-in-law, Saiyid 'Umarī of the Khudair Mosque, collapsed with the former's deportation.[5]

In Baghdad itself, practically no disturbance occurred[6] although an outbreak had been expected on August 12th. The comparative quietness of the city was partly due to the

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[1] *London Gazette*, p. 5339 (86).

[2] *Admin. Report, Samarra*, 1920, pp. 1, 3.

[3] Ibid., p. 3.

[4] Amīr ar-Rabī'a, when pressed for arrears in taxes in 1922, maintained that, in response to British promises in 1920 of remission of his taxes, he alone had prevented the Insurrection from spreading to the Tigris valley.

[5] *Admin. Report, Basra Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 1.

[6] The most serious disturbance occurred on August 3rd when the Mechanical Transport Depot was fired by young Nationalists who had mixed among the Arab labourers. The complete loss of petrol and other supplies threatened to paralyse transport. Other incendiary attempts on dumps and stores were thwarted. *London Gazette*, p. 5335 (49).

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continual presence of troops, partly to precautionary measures which, directly or indirectly, removed most of the Nationalist leaders from the capital,[1] and partly to restraining influences in the city. Moderate Nationalists, such as Saiyid Talib Pasha, who had been allowed to return to 'Iraq in February, 1920,[2] Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī and many others, held aloof from the Insurrection, seeing in it a poor foundation for the new State. Others who had urged forward the Movement both in town and tribe drew back in fear and dismay at the destruction and at the unleashed forces which, if they reached Baghdad, would respect neither friend nor enemy.

By the end of September, it was apparent that Government forces were in the ascendancy although the rising had not yet collapsed. British troops, reinforced from India,[3] had assumed the offensive everywhere, the knowledge of which cooled the ardour of many tribesmen whose expectation of dire punishment to be inflicted urged them to make speedy submission. The news of Sir Percy Cox's return, October 1st, brought a reaction among many of the Nationalists. In many areas, however, as about Samāwa, Rumaitha and Mandalī, the insurgents held on until punitive columns reached them. The end might have come much sooner had it not been for the intransigent anti-British divines at Najaf, who demanded that negotiations should be conducted only through them.

Indicative of their ambitions, two documents, one from the Middle Euphrates and one from the Gharraf, were forwarded to the Political Officer both couched in identically

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[1] The attempt to arrest Yūsaf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Ja'far abū Timman, 'Alī Bazirqan and Shaikh Ahmad Shaikh Dā'ūd, on August 12th, resulted in the apprehending of the last named only. Several Arabs were killed when the police fired into Nationalists obstructing the arrest of their leaders: Telegram No. 9752, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, August 13th, 1920.

[2] *The Mandubin* believed that he had been brought back to create a moderate Nationalist party dependent on Great Britain. He certainly gave great assistance to the Civil Administration for which it was, at the time, grateful: Letter, Political Officer, Basra, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, June 26th, 1920.

[3] A total of 4883 British and 24,508 Indian reinforcements besides an Air Force squadron and Medical units were brought to 'Iraq. *London Gazette*, App. 4, p. 5346.

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the same phrasing and language; they were a demand for the institution of a theocratic Government built up on one of the fundamental principles of the Shi'a doctrine. Signed by many prominent shaikhs and leaders, these letters were evidence of the power and hold of the Shi'a divines on the religious emotions of the uneducated tribes.[1]

The effect of the Insurrection has been variously judged. To the British Government, it was a revolt against authority, costing 426 British lives, 1228 wounded and 615 missing and prisoners,[2] as well as 8450 casualties among the insurgents.[3] It involved the expenditure of millions of pounds sterling from the British Treasury. It inflicted incalculable damage in the country itself. To the war-weary British public and to the Press, it was the occasion for the revival of the cry 'Evacuate Mesopotamia'. To the British officers and men in 'Iraq, it was a tragedy, wasting lives, spreading destruction and anarchy and sweeping away much of what they had achieved. It was a tragedy, however, in which, often isolated with violent death never far distant and frequently facing almost insuperable difficulties, they played their parts nobly and in accordance with the best traditions of their race for courage and devotion to duty and for heroic exertions in the cause to which they had given themselves. None excelled the Acting Civil Commissioner once the rising had begun, in Herculean labour and in meeting the exigencies of the situation or in devising means to bring the issue to a successful end. His unfaltering trust in and support of the men on whom responsibility devolved, his messages of encouragement and his apparently inexhaustible strength made him a leader to whom officers and men could look with assurance. The actions of these men as a whole and the individual performances of Colonel Leachman, Captain Bertram Thomas, Captain Salmon, Major Ditchburn, Captain

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[1] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 19.
[2] *London Gazette*, App. 4, p. 5346.
[3] Ibid., App. 5, p. 5347.

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Crawford, Captain J. S. Mann, Captain W. R. Hay and a host of others in the summer of 1920 added another chapter, no less splendid, no less inspiring than those which precede it and those which will follow it, in the history of British manhood serving in difficult times and against desperate odds.

To 'Iraqis, the Insurrection, although suppressed, has been a National War of Independence, directly responsible for forcing the British Government to set up an Arab Government and, eventually, to grant independence: an opinion shared by many writers.[1] Popular opinion has regarded as national heroes those who led the Insurrection or who took a conspicuous part in it; as martyrs, the 'Iraqis who lost their lives.[2] Political preferment has been given to those who, by their actions both before and during the Insurrection, had proven their attachment to the Nationalist cause.

No evidence is available to show that, because of the Insurrection, a wider measure of immediate Arab participation in the Government was given by the High Commissioner after his

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[1] Cf. Toynbee, A. J., *Islamic World*, p. 530; Coke, R., *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 193; Wright, Q., *A.P.S.R.*, November, 1926, p. 746.

[2] See *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 9th, 17th, 1922: *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufīd*, August 25th, 1922. The following lines appeared in *Al-Istiqlāl*, February 2nd, 1928, when Shaikh Dhari was convicted of the murder of Lieut.-Col. Leachman, August 12th, 1920:

> You shall be brought to book some day, you who waylaid Dhari!
> Oh ye! Set free the slayer of Leachman!
> He has shaken London with all her might.
> We are humiliated after you, Oh Dhari!
> The culprit's abode shall be swept away.
> Victorious is Dhari's standard!
> You have taken advantage of an opportune moment, Oh London;
> Time is treacherous, Oh Cousin!
> Why this long absence, ye moon of the world!
> We have grown weary in the slaying of so many British soldiers.
> Oh ye! Bow down in homage to the slayer of Leachman.
> Honour and Glory are thine, ye slayer of Leachman.
> Lie in peace, ye slayer of Leachman!
> Oh Shaikh, enjoy thy sleep.
> Throughout the land, ye have no like.
> Others before you have done it, Oh Cousin.
> Ye are equal to a state with all her might.
> Sing out hallelujah to the slayer of Leachman!

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arrival. There is evidence, rather, that because of the chaos /75x
and unsettled condition of the country, he was unable to give 669
as extensive powers to the Arab Government as he had hoped in June, 1920, when the announcement had been made of the provisional Government, the outlines of which had been foreshadowed in March, 1920,[1] formulated by the Interdepartmental Committee on June 1st, and sanctioned by the Cabinet in the middle of June. At the most, the Insurrection, by indicating the strength of Nationalist sentiment in 'Iraq and by arousing opposition in Great Britain to the retention of the Mandate, due to the fear of further heavy and unremunerative expenditure, stimulated the adoption of the policy of implementing the Mandate by means of a treaty and of bringing 'Iraq into the League of Nations more quickly than H.M. Government had originally contemplated when assuming the Mandate. It must be remembered, however, that the project of a treaty with an Arab Government in 'Iraq originated before the outbreak of the Insurrection. It was made as an official suggestion by Mr. Montagu, on May 17th, 1920, and it is even possible that it was proposed some weeks earlier by an official in the Foreign Office.[2]

While the immediate policy of H.M. Government was not changed and its future policy was altered more in method of procedure than in spirit as a result of the Insurrection, nevertheless the rising did exercise considerable influence on the people of 'Iraq themselves. The Insurrection can scarcely be called national in the strict sense of the word, yet it did indicate a certain national consciousness which in the next few years was to become more clearly defined. The consolidation of the divergent elements in the rising, although merging only temporarily and from different motives, indicated to the 'Iraqis the power of concerted action against which even the forces of the British Government were not invulnerable. The Insurrection revealed, at the same time, the weaknesses and

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 199-200, 212, 220-221.

[2] Young, op. cit., p. 313.

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175x inherent divisions in the people themselves, which their leaders
669 were later to make efforts to eliminate, not always with success or without friction. In addition, it brought forward leaders who were to assume increasingly important roles in the movement towards national independence either in co-operation with the British Government and its policy of gradual emancipation or in opposition as part of the Nationalist group which demanded immediate and complete independence.

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CHAPTER XV

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL ARAB GOVERNMENT

No conditions could have seemed more unfavourable for the 175x
establishment of a new government than those prevailing when 669
Sir Percy Cox, under a salute of seventeen guns, sailed up the 727x
Shatt al-'Arab to Basra, October 1st, as His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, with full authority to proceed along the lines indicated by H.M. Government in the proclamation dated June 17th, 1920.[1]

A good half of the country was still in active rebellion. The insurgents held Karbalā, Najaf, Tuwairij, Rumaitha, Hīt and a great portion of the Euphrates valley, including the middle sections of the railroad. In the Muntafiq, only one point, Nāsirīya, remained in the hands of the Civil Administration, Samāwa and Kūfa were still besieged. On the Diyālā, the most savage aspects of the Insurrection had passed, but authority had still to be established by the shaikhs and by the British. The provisional Government at Mandalī had not yet collapsed. In the 'Erbil area, British authority had practically vanished, In Mōsul, apprehension still persisted in the face of Kamalist propaganda. Raids and attacks on the Shargāt-Mōsul road continued, culminating in the raid by the Albū Hamad on October 24th, when the well-known Nationalist, Sharīf al-Farūqī, was killed, together with several others. Revenue payments had ceased in many parts of the country. Government offices and legal archives had been looted.[2] Buildings, bridges, railway lines and property[3] had been destroyed.

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[1] Issued June 20th, 1920. Text: *supra*, pp. 220-1.

[2] At Ba'qūbā, Dīltāwa, Hilla, Karbalā: *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, pp. 3-4.

[3] Damage to the railways, together with loss of commercial revenue during the Insurrection, has been estimated at Rs. 55,000,000 or £412,500: *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 24.

175x Private feuds had sprung up in their former vigour. Confidence
669 in British methods built up by many months of hard and
727x patient work, had been swept away. Habits of obedience to authority had been lost in the welter of anti-Government violence. Complete control was not to be thoroughly re-established until the spring of 1921.

175x Sir Percy Cox saw clearly that a complete consultation of the
727x wishes of the inhabitants by means of a representative Assembly as to the nature of the permanent Government was impossible for a time, at least three or four months being required to set up the machinery and to obtain a decision.[1] He deemed it essential, however, to initiate immediately some form of National government regardless of the unfavourable conditions and his own private misgivings.[2] Undue delay would mean disappointment and bitterness, arising from frustration of the hopes of a speedy amelioration of conditions which had been aroused in all classes. Confidence in the British Government and its good faith had to be established among the Nationalists and revived among Great Britain's friends. Pacification had to be furthered by removing, as far as possible, the causes which had given rise to the Insurrection. Not least, a start had to be made towards the reduction of British expenditure, so urgently demanded by H.M. Government at the behest of the British people.

Consultations with the notables of Basra, of Nāsirīya, which was visited by air on October 3rd, of Qurna, of Qal'at Sālih and of 'Amāra, undertaken with the view of restoring confidence and of acquainting himself with current opinion, aided the High Commissioner in formulating even before reaching Baghdad on October 11th, the procedure by which he hoped to give effect to H.M. Government's policy of instituting a National Government.[3]

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[1] *Note on Political Developments in Mesopotamia subsequent to October* 1, 1920 (League of Nations Publication No. C. 465, M. 341, 1921), p. 3 (hereafter *Political Developments in Meso.*).

[2] For his account of these misgivings see his 'Historical Summary' in Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 527.

[3] Ibid., p. 562. Sir Percy Cox's own statement (ibid., p. 527) that he arrived in Baghdad on October 5th, is obviously a misprint.

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In the strenuous days following his arrival, which had been 175-x
marked by a genuine welcome from all sections of the populace 727x
of the Baghdad area, he continued to take his bearings and to prepare for the establishment of the Council of State around which the new Government was to be constructed. Influential Baghdadis and shaikhs, individually, and lesser folk, collectively, marshalled with an unerring sense of proportion by Miss Gertrude Bell, now in her element, came to pay their respects and voice their hopes, complaints and opinions. British officials with whom Sir Percy was to work, many of them strangers to him, were consulted individually and in council. A substantial group, including Miss Bell, who became his Oriental Secretary, Major L. W. Yetts, M.C., Major S. G. C. Murray and Captain J. N. Clayton, aligned themselves, together with Mr. H. St. J. Philby and Mr. C. C. Garbett, who had come out with Sir Percy, in sympathetic support of his policy. Many of the other administrative officials, however, were sceptical of an Arab Cabinet, even opposed to it and did not disguise their feelings. Most of them, as loyal supporters of the Acting Civil Commissioner and of his view of the role of Great Britain in the country, could not bring themselves to accept at first the new viewpoint.[1] Sir Percy Cox, convinced that the situation demanded either Arab Government or British evacuation, went his way, in spite of the controversy aroused in official circles.

Sir Percy Cox's plans made no great claim to originality. They were but modifications of the Bonham-Carter Committee proposals, along the lines deemed more feasible by Lord Curzon, Mr. Montagu and the Interdepartmental Committee in the preceding May, but differing from the earlier proposals in the spirit in which they had been formulated and with which they were to be applied. This difference of spirit and Sir Percy

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[1] Lord Islington, June 25th, 1920, had prophesied just such opposition when he said in the House of Lords: 'Sir Percy Cox will, when he goes (to Baghdad) be opposed by a formidable and established bureaucracy.' *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 852-3.

Cox's reputation for dignity, wisdom and equitable dealing, won as Chief Political Officer before and during the war, and as Civil Commissioner before his departure to Persia, were his chief assets among the 'Iraqis. To them, his return, repeatedly requested,[1] was the augury of better days. His presence was a guarantee of sympathy for Arab aspirations, of consideration for their viewpoint and of a maturity of judgment in initiating the new Government. To these factors as well as to his methods of approach and of action and to the loyal service rendered by the British officials associated with him, many of whom subjected their personal convictions to their sense of duty, rather than to originality of plan or to the chastened spirit of the country, must be attributed the successful inauguration of the provisional Government, in the face of distinctly unfavourable circumstances. To the same factors may be attributed also the continued acceptance of the Government in spite of the fact that it only partially satisfied even the moderate Nationalists who, while appreciating the need for British assistance, sympathized with the strong current of feeling for complete independence, still running high in the country.[2]

175* No formal action was taken until October 21st, when at a
727* council composed of Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Colonel Evelyn
642* Howell, Colonel S. H. Slater, Major R. W. Bullard, Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, and Miss Gertrude Bell, he presented his scheme for a provisional Government: a Council of Arab Ministers, supervised by British Advisers and under the ultimate control of the High Commissioner. After three hours of strenuous discussion in which his proposals were vigorously countered, his scheme was finally carried with

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[1] *Self-Determination in 'Iraq*, pp. 8, 11, 18, 23-5; Bell, Miss Gertrude, *Memorandum on Political Views of the Naqib of Baghdad*, February 6th, 1919 (hereafter *Political Views of the Naqib*).

[2] *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 2. A British official, later intimately connected with the administration of 'Iraq, wrote on February 1st, 1921, concerning the provisional Government: 'The Arabs of Mesopotamia would be extraordinarily credulous if they thought they had really been given a "National" Government. But, from all I hear they are under no such illusion.'

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unimportant alterations.[1] This scheme, Sir Percy announced, 175
would be laid before the Naqīb of Baghdad, whom he had 727
resolved to ask to assume the presidency of the Council 642
of State.

The question regarding the head of the Provisional Government had been a vital one from the outset. Saiyid Talib Pasha, who had been active in British interests since his return to 'Iraq, had been originally in Sir Percy's mind for the position, but consultation with opinion in Baghdad and in Mōsul, which he had visited on October 16th, indicated such strong fear of Saiyid Talib's personal ambitions that Sir Percy felt obliged to turn elsewhere.

Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī, Naqīb al-'Ashraf, Baghdad, who had been repeatedly suggested by local notables, seemed to be a more logical choice. The high public prestige and religious standing of this venerable dignitary had led him to be considered, by H.M. Government, in November, 1918, as a possible Amīr of 'Iraq,[2] on the basis of a recommendation made by Sir Percy Cox as early as April, 1917. The Naqīb as the head of the Council of State would guarantee the most favourable reception possible for the new Government and would enable Sir Percy Cox 'to include Talib Pasha without making him President, a course which would have excited opposition in certain quarters.'[3]

It was doubtful, however, in view of the Naqīb's great age, ill-health and habitual seclusion, whether he would accept. He had voiced his determination to take no part in political activities to Miss Gertrude Bell in February, 1919, when he had said, in order to emphasize his decision: 'Not if it were to save 'Iraq from complete destruction would I alter what I have now spoken.'[4] Miss Bell who had kept in friendly contact with him

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[1] Bell, op. cit., pp. 567-8.

[2] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 22nd, 1918.

[3] Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, October 26th, 1920.

[4] Bell, *Political Views of the Naqib*, p. 11.

175 believed that his determination had not changed and wrote in
127 a letter of October 17th, 1920: 'I am convinced not only that
642 the Naqīb will refuse for himself but that he will also refuse to
recommend anyone else.'[1]

Friendly relations and mutual respect had always existed between Sir Percy Cox and the Naqīb. Of Sir Percy, the Naqīb had said in 1919, in the same interview quoted above:

> There are a hundred and a thousand men in England who could fill the post of Ambassador in Persia, but there is none but Sir Percy Cox who is suitable for 'Iraq. He is known, he is loved, and he is trusted by the people of 'Iraq. He is a man of sober years . . . I bear witness in God that if Sir Percy Cox had been in Baghdad we would have been spared the folly of asking the people to express their wishes as to the future.[2]

When Sir Percy Cox, therefore, formally asked the Naqīb on October 23rd to head the Council of State, urging on him his duty to 'Iraq and hinting of harm that might come from the personal ambitions of others, the Naqīb, influenced by his personal regard as much as by Sir Percy's arguments, consented after much hesitation and heart searching. The joy and satisfaction which his consent created has been well described by Miss Bell:

> In came Mr. Philby and others, and on top of them Sir Percy. Every one but Mr. Philby melted away, and we two turned to Sir Percy, breathless with excitement. 'Well,' he said, 'he has accepted.' He had come straight from the Naqib who had agreed to undertake the formation of the provisional government. So the first success is scored and no one but Sir Percy could have done it. Indeed, that even he should have induced the Naqib to take a hand in public affairs is nothing short of a miracle. Sir Percy's delight and satisfaction was only equal to ours and we all sat for half an hour

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 586.

[2] Bell, *Political Views of the Naqib*, pp. 8–9.

bubbling over with joy and alternatively glorifying the Naqib and the High Commissioner.[1] 175* 727* 642*

The High Commissioner had envisaged a Council consisting of a President and eight Ministers, each heading a Department of State, advised by the existing British Secretaries, and about ten members without portfolios, the whole to be representative of the former three wilayets and of the various communities.[2] He had already, by October 14th, drawn up a list of 'Iraqīs whom he considered desirable for the first Council but, in order that the new Government might have an 'Iraqī and not a British façade, it seemed important that the invitations, the distribution of posts and all kindred matters should emanate from the Naqīb and not from the High Commissioner. In this as well as in all subsequent steps in organizing the provisional Government, however, the essential points were either suggested or approved by the High Commissioner,[3] although every precaution was taken to avoid giving such an impression and thereby offending 'Iraqī sensibilities.

Invitations to the following 'Iraqīs, requesting them to participate in the establishment of the new Government as heads of departments, were issued on October 25th:[4]

President	The Naqīb
Minister of the Interior	Saiyid Talib Pasha
" of the Finance	Sasūn Effendi Haskail
" of Justice	Hasan Effendi Pāchahjī
" for Education	'Izzat Pasha
" for Defence	Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī
" for Public Works	Muhammād Effendi Fadhil
" for Commerce	'Abdul Latif Pasha Mandīl
" of Auqāf	Mustafā Effendi 'Alūsī

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 568.

[2] *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B. 363, November 30th, 1920, pp. 8-9.

[3] Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, October 26th 1920.

[4] Ibid.

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

175x
727x
642x

JA'FAR PASHA AL-ASKARĪ

[facing p. 284]

175* The names which carried most weight were those of the 727* Naqīb, Saiyid Talib Pasha and Sasūn Effendi. The last named, 612' a member of one of the leading Jewish families of Baghdad, having distinguished connections in India and England, had been a member of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies since 1908, and in 1913 had filled the post of Finance Minister of the Empire. His wisdom and integrity were widely esteemed, and rumour had suggested that he would have been offered the Ministry of Finance in the Independent Arab Government had it been inaugurated by Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī and Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. Hasan Effendi Pāchahjī was generally accounted as the ablest advocate in Baghdad. 'Izzat Pasha, of Turkish descent and a native of Kirkūk, had held high military rank under the Ottoman Government and had a considerable reputation throughout 'Iraq. Ja'far Pasha, a native of Baghdad had held military rank under the Turks and subsequently with Faisal, being awarded the D.S.O. and C.M.G. by the British Government. He had been Military Governor of Aleppo in the year before the fall of Damascus. Muhammad Effendi Fadhil, of Mōsul, was a former Turkish deputy and was acting Mayor of that city. 'Abdul Latif Pasha Mandīl, a wealthy landowner and merchant of Basra, had been active in the Basra Divisional Council. Mustafā Effendi 'Alūsī, who came from one of the leading families of Baghdad, had been *Qādhī* in many parts of the Ottoman Empire, including Mecca.

Those asked to join the Government without portfolios were: Hamdī Pasha Baban, a Kurd and head of the old ruling family of Sulaimānīya; 'Abdul Majīd Effendi Shawī, Mayor of Baghdad; 'Abdul Rahmān Pasha Haidarī and Fakrī Effendi Jamīl Zadah, notables of Baghdad; 'Ahmad Pasha Sanī, of Basra; 'Abdul Jabbar Pasha Khaiyat and Dā'ūd Yūsufanī, leading Christians of Baghdad and Mōsul respectively; and four Shī'is, namely 'Abdul Ghanī Kūbbah, head of the principal Shī'a family of Baghdad; Saiyid Hādī Qaswinī, of Hilla;

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175x 'Ajīl Pasha ibn 'Alī Samarmad, formerly paramount Shaikh of
727x the Zūbaid; and the Amīr Muhammad Saihūd, chief of the
642x Banī Rabī'a.[1]

Tension ran high within British official circles until support for the new Council became assured. Hasan Effendi Pāchahjī and Hamdī Pasha Baban sent refusals, not unexpectedly, to the invitations. Saiyid Hādī Qaswini excused himself on grounds of health. The refusal of Sasūn Effendi, whose absence from the Council would have been irreparable, caused consternation until he was persuaded to withdraw it.[2] Mustafā Effendi 'Alūsī accepted the vacant post of Minister of Justice, the Ministry of *Auqāf* remaining vacant for the moment. Acceptances from all others were received by the President who, in high spirits, was full of determination to work hand in hand with the High Commissioner yet not to allow his place as Prime Minister to be usurped by any other member of the Council.

The Council of State of the First Arab Government in Mesopotamia since the Abbassids' assembled for a preliminary meeting on November 2nd, but without all members present. Beyond a discussion of the relation between the Arab Ministers and their British Advisers,[3] little action was taken. This delicate problem, together with that of the position of the High Commissioner, formed the subject of a special Memorandum by Mr. Philby, which, after it had been discussed with the Naqīb, came before the second meeting of the Council, November 10th. At this meeting, at which all members were present, Mr. Philby's Memorandum was accepted save in small particulars. The Council also passed a resolution recommending the release, under suitable guarantees, of twelve of the deported Nationalists.[4] The Memorandum, finally issued as *Instructions for the Council of State*, following the

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[1] *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 4.

[2] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 570.

[3] Ibid.

[4] *Proceedings of informal Meeting of the Council of State, November* 10, 1920, in *Note on Council of State*, pp. 6-7.

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175x third meeting of the Council, its first formal session, on
727x November 13th, became the first Constitution of 'Iraq.[1]

642x The Instructions defined the Council of State (Sec. II) and the relations of Minister and Adviser (Secs. III, IV, V). They differed from the Bonham-Carter proposals in designating each Arab Minister as Head of a Department of State, for the administration of which he was to be responsible, subject to: (*a*) control of the Council of State; (*b*) the advice of the British Officer selected as his Adviser; and, in the last resort, (*c*) the supreme authority of the High Commissioner (Sec. III).

All official business was to be placed before the Council by the Minister through the Adviser, while all decisions of the Council were to be conveyed to a Minister through his Adviser (Sec. IV). Administrative appointments were to be made by the Council, on the recommendation of its members, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner (Sec. XIV). An Adviser could attend and could speak at any meeting of the Council at which matters concerning his Department were under consideration, but he could not vote (Sec. XI). The Instructions defined exactly the position of the High Commissioner and stated definitely that his decision was final on all matters (Sec. I) whether resolutions of the Council of State (Sec. X) or administrative questions (Secs. III *c* and XIV). In thus defining the authority of the High Commissioner, the Instructions avoided the omission for which the Bonham-Carter Committee Report had been so severely criticized.[2]

The following day, November 11th, two years after the war had ceased on all fronts, the provisional Government for 'Iraq came into judicial being by a proclamation of the High Commissioner to that effect.[3] It was as follows:

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[1] Text: Appendix VI.

[2] Particularly in the *Memorandum by H. R. C. Dobbs . . . on Proposals of Bonham-Carter Committee* (India Office, B. 342). See *supra*, pp. 213-4.

[3] *Note on Council of State*, pp. 3-4; *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 8; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, pp. 82-3.

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PROVISIONAL ARAB GOVERNMENT

Whereas by Notification, dated the 17th June, 1920, it was 175'
announced that His Majesty's Government had authorised 727*
the calling of a General Elective Assembly for the purpose of 642'
preparing an organic law for 'Iraq;

And whereas it is considered expedient that, pending the convocation of such General Assembly and the framing thereby of an organic law, the Government of the country should be conducted subject to my supervision and direction, by a provisional National Government;

Now, therefore, I, Major-General Sir P. Z. Cox, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., by virtue of the authority vested in me as High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, do hereby proclaim as follows:

1. There shall be constituted a Council of State consisting of a President, Ministers for the following Departments: Interior, Finance, Justice, Auqaf, Education and Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce, and such other members without portfolios as may be nominated.

2. Until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect, the Council of State and Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations and in general military affairs, except such military affairs as concerns solely the locally recruited forces.

Made at Baghdad this 11th day of November, 1920.

P. Z. COX,
High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

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CHAPTER XVI

ORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

175x 727x 642x SIR PERCY Cox had recognized the immediate necessity of establishing the provisional Council of State and, as a complementary step, the urgency for giving office to the 'Iraqis. It seems clear, however, that he had no intention of transferring actual administrative power either in the provincial or in the central administration any faster than practical conditions demanded. Until fuller confidence in the provisional Government had been established, until it was working comparatively smoothly and had consolidated its authority, he was content that the attention of the Council should be focused on considerations of measures for the pacification of the country, including a general amnesty; for the formulation of an electoral law; for the repatriation of Arab officers from Syria; for the formation of an 'Iraqī army and, finally, for the organization of the Administration throughout 'Iraq, subject to his ultimate control.

Pacification of the country was uppermost in the minds of both British and 'Iraqī officials. As Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī expressed it: 'The peasant must return to his plough, the shepherd to his flock. The blood of our people must cease to flow and the land must once more be rich with crops. Shall our tribes be wasted in battle and our towns die of starvation?'[1]

Sir Percy Cox had dropped all idea of extreme punishment as such for the tribes. He firmly believed, however, that they must be made to submit, by force if necessary. In no other way could they be disarmed or could the authority of the Government be re-established. He set his face resolutely, as had the Acting Civil Commissioner before him, against the

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 571.

repeated offers of the religious leaders of Najaf and Karbalā 175
to act as mediators with the tribes who themselves had asked 727
that the negotiations be conducted through the Chief *Mujtahid*, 642
at whose instance only they would lay down their arms.[1] In refusing to recognize the pretensions of the Shī'a divines, Sir Percy struck the first blow on behalf of the authority of the new Government, to the establishment of which the power of binding and loosing assumed by the '*Ulamā* constituted one of the most formidable obstacles.

The general amnesty, for which the council asked in order to facilitate pacification, had to wait for the submission of the tribes and the solution of other political problems. The High Commissioner, however, assented to the proposal of the Council, on November 29th, that sixteen of the forty-five deportees, sent to Henjam by order of the previous regime, be released under suitable guarantees.

Repatriation of the 'Iraqī officers who had served in the Hijāz and in Syria met with early consideration from both the Council and the High Commissioner. Ja'far Pasha, Minister of Defence, who had been the first to make his way back to 'Iraq,[2] pressed for Government aid to expedite the return of the expatriates, urging it on the grounds of their wretched condition and of the need for their services in 'Iraq. The High Commissioner telegraphed to H.M. Government, on November 27th, for permission to facilitate the return of the officers, of whom a list of 240 names had been obtained from the French Consul in Baghdad.[3]

The first group, including Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd, arrived in the middle of February. Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī and about

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[1] 'Abdul Wahīd, Shaikh of the Fatla section of the Banī Hasan, and Marzūq of the Humaidāt were among the chief shaikhs to make such a demand.

[2] Bell, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 568.

[3] It was considered significant at the time that Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimī, Jamīl Beg al-Midfai and Maulūd Pasha were omitted from the French Consul's list. The secret police reports stated that all three were in communication with Kan'an Beg of the Aintab-Urfa command. One prominent ex-Sharifian officer declared that Yāsin Pasha, if allowed to return, 'would play for his own hand as he did in Syria'.

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175x fifteen others arrived in Baghdad from Kubaisa on March 14th.
727x The main body of officers and their families, numbering 396
642x in all, sailed from Port Said in a special boat, on February 13th,
arriving in Baghdad in early March.

The return of these officers added to the heated atmosphere of Baghdad. Although the expectation of the British officials that they would render assistance in promoting the candidacy of a Sharifian Amir was not disappointed, a number became active partisans of other candidates, especially Saiyid Talib Pasha who made determined efforts to win their support. In addition, considerable jealousy was aroused by their return among 'Iraqi ex-officials formerly in Turkish service as well as local notables who regarded the officers with suspicion and fear, lest they appropriate all the best posts.

175x The High Commissioner had repeatedly stated that the
727x Council of State was to be provisional until it was possible to
646 set up a permanent government,[1] the precise form of which, he
642x declared, 'must be decided by the people themselves and this
can only be properly done by a convocation of a National Congress, fully representative of the people.'[2] He also awaited the convocation of the Assembly since he 'found himself confronted with questions of policy affecting the future of 'Iraq with which he did not feel justified in dealing without consultation with representatives of the people of the country.'[3]

Every reason seemed to exist for the inauguration of the National Assembly within the two or three months which Sir Percy had stated, on November 7th,[4] to be necessary to com-

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[1] *Communiqué* by the High Commissioner, November 7th, 1920: *Al-'Iraq*, November 15th, 1920: *Political Developments in Meso.*, pp. 7-8. Also Letter No. SD./170A, High Commissioner to All Officers of Civil Admin. in Mesopotamia, November 30th, 1920.

[2] *Communiqué*, November 7th, 1920. Also Telegram, High Commissioner to S/S for India, October 26th, 1920.

[3] *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 3. Also *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 3.

[4] *Communiqué*, November 7th, 1920. In his telegram to S/S for India, October 26th, however, he had stated: 'at least three or probably more months must elapse before the election can be completed and a decision reached on the fundamental issues.'

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plete the electoral law, to restore the country to peace and to 175ˣ
carry out the elections.[1] A draft law, adapted from the Ottoman 727ˣ
Electoral Law for use in 'Iraq was presented to the High 642ˣ
Commissioner on November 7th[2] by a Committee composed 646
of ex-deputies of the Ottoman Chamber and of co-opted members under the presidency of Saiyid Talib Pasha, set up according to instructions of the Acting Civil Commissioner, July 9th, 1920.[3] Both the High Commissioner and the Council of State gave their early attention to the draft, the latter referring it to a special Committee which first met on November 30th. The restoration of order, on which the elections were to depend, was accomplished by February, 1921.[4]

Nevertheless, the law was not promulgated until March 4th, 1922,[5] nor did the Assembly convene until March 27th, 1924, although an '*Irāda* convoking it had been issued on October 19th, 1922,[6] by which time Amīr Faisal had been placed on the throne and the main lines of the government and the principal questions of policy had been settled. Its deliberations, moreover, were specifically restricted, both by the '*Irāda* of 1922 and that of 1924, to the ratification of three documents to be placed before it: the Organic Law or Constitution, the Electoral Law for a Chamber of Deputies and the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty of 1922.[7]

The delay was due in part to difficulties incurred in formulating and in putting into operation a law suited to 'Iraq. One

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[1] The Nationalists, in this expectation, formed committees and began to work actively for their candidates during November and December, 1920.

[2] Letter, High Commissioner to members of the Electoral Law Committee, November 12th, 1920: *Note on Council of State*, pp. 5-6; *Political Developments in Meso.*, pp. 10-11.

[3] *Compilation*, 1919-1920, Notification No. 50, p. 101.

[4] Historical summary by Sir Percy Cox: Bell, op. cit., pp. 528-9.

[5] *Compilation of Proclamations, Laws and Regulations, issued between 1 October*, 1920, and 31 *December*, 1923 (Baghdad, 1924), (hereafter *Compilation*, 1920-1923), pp. 34-42.

[6] '*Irāda*, convoking the Constituent Assembly, October 19th, 1922; *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 82.

[7] Ibid.; '*Irāda* for the Opening of the Constituent Assembly, March 22nd, 1924: *Compilation of Laws and Regulations, issued between January 1st and December 31st*, 1924 (Baghdad, 1926) (hereafter *Compilation*, 1924), p. 7.

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175x of these difficulties arose early in December when the Council
642x disagreed violently over the provisions for tribal representation.
727x It had been originally proposed that thirty tribal representa-
646 tives should be present in the Assembly: twenty shaikhs of the major tribes and ten members for the smaller tribes, grouped together in each of the new *Liwās*. The Council (with the exception of five members), owing to the traditional fear of townsmen and landowners for the tribes, opposed any special tribal representation, although Sir Percy Cox pointed out that it was essential that every section of the population should be represented in the Assembly which was to decide upon the future of ʻIraq. Not until Jaʻfar Pasha proposed an alternative scheme of two tribal representatives for each *Liwā* with the proviso that tribesmen might register and vote as all other ʻIraqīs if they so desired, was the question settled.

It would appear, however, that these and other obstacles to the drafting and application of the law, including Saiyid Talib Pasha's opposition to it,[1] were used by the British authorities as excuses to postpone the inauguration of the Assembly, notwithstanding the official *communiqué* of May 30th, 1921,[2] assuring the ʻIraqīs that the elections would soon be held.
175x Evidence was not lacking that attempts would be made to
727x force the Assembly, if convened, to declare for a local and
642x unacceptable candidate such as Saiyid Talib Pasha and to
668 force it to make anti-British declarations. It was known that the Nationalist leaders, including some of the *Mandubīn*, were again active and that the National School party had been revived. It was also reported that several tribes, as those of the ʻAfaq district and the Shammar Dhafīr, were contemplating another revolt at Nationalist, Turkish and Bolshevist instigation. Letters had been intercepted in January from Muhammad Ridhā, outlining anti-British plans and giving instructions for

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920–1922, p. 5.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, May 30th, 1921. See also correspondence between the High Commissioner and the Council of State in *Lisān al'Arab* and in *Al-ʻIraq*, July 15th, 1921.

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their execution to the townsmen and to the tribes. Newspapers 175x
had become increasingly antagonistic in tone.[1] Violent anti- 727
British posters had appeared on the walls of Baghdad.[2] It is 642x
not surprising, therefore, that the High Commissioner was 668
convinced that any immediate attempt to convene the Assembly would not only be disastrous for British policy and for the installation of the Sharifian Amir on whom British official approval had already fallen,[3] but that it would also produce fresh unrest if not actual disturbances of the peace. His view met with corroboration at the Cairo Conference.[4]

Preliminary reorganization of the administration began 175x
officially on December 3rd, when by a proclamation of the 727x
High Commissioner all the rights, duties and powers formerly 642x
possessed by the Civil Commissioner, Judicial Secretary and Revenue Secretary were assigned to the High Commissioner, Minister of Justice and Minister of Interior respectively.[5] Several of the Ministers, however, had already entered upon their duties; Saiyid Talib Pasha beginning his work as Minister of Interior on November 15th. Conditions had been somewhat chaotic, and the fact that practically all the correspondence was in English proved a difficulty. Nevertheless a satisfactory *modus operandi* was slowly evolved.

The British administration officers had been informed of the changes and given instructions as to their part in the administration directly by the High Commissioner on November 30th. The circular stated in part:

> The officers and departments hitherto forming part of the British Civil Administration in 'Iraq will come directly under the orders of the Council of State, and the reorganization of

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed, February 10th, 1921, for publishing seditious articles. Its editor and those concerned were given sentences ranging from six to eighteen months and the paper was suspended for one year. *Baghdad Times*, May 9th, 1921.

[2] As on November 27th, 1920; January 17th; and February 2nd, 1921

[3] *Infra*, pp. 309-10.

[4] *Infra*, pp. 314 ff.

[5] *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 2. Also National Government (Transference of Powers) Proclamation, July 6th, 1921, ibid., p. 7.

175* 642* 727* the administrative machine will proceed under its direction, subject to the High Commissioner's general control as rapidly as it is expedient and possible.

Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers in the provinces, and Heads of Departments at Headquarters and elsewhere will henceforth report to and receive orders from the various Ministries.[1]

The proposed distribution of the administrative departments among the various Ministries was also communicated to the Political Officers,[2] who were ordered to address their correspondence accordingly.

The Council of State, in taking charge of the administration and in reorganizing it, showed a clearly marked aversion to the systems prevailing under the Civil Administration. Under that regime, British officials, while recognizing the good Eastern maxim that water from a much used water-skin tastes better than from a new one, had nevertheless attempted to replace the Ottoman administrative system in so far as possible with their own methods, in the name of efficient administration. The Council now evinced the desire, as far as the High Commissioner and the British Advisers would permit, to revert to the pre-war system and methods. In so doing, however, the Council effected, probably unconsciously, a compromise with the ideas and the political philosophy of the West which had given the country its stimulus towards Nationalism. Nationalism with its connotations of independence and of absolute sovereignty over the whole territory within its borders, they knew, appreciated and desired. The methods of administration, the fiscal systems and the form of democratic institutions which the West at that time insisted were inseparable from its concept of Nationalism and from its formula of 'Government by the consent of the governed', they were less ready to accept, in so far as they varied from the methods and institutions under the Ottoman regime. The refusal of the majority of the Council

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[1] Letter No. SD/170A, November 30th, 1920.

[2] See Table IV.

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and of 'Iraqis in general to forsake time-honoured systems and procedure may have risen from reluctance to abandon that which had been sanctified by usage and by religious sanction, as well as from an innate shrewdness in avoiding what had not yet been proven to their satisfaction. 175" 640" 327"

The immediate demands of practical administration may have required the British sponsors of the new Government to acquiesce to a great extent in this attitude. Nevertheless, the failure of the provisional council to consolidate such gains as had been made by the Civil Administration and to throw itself whole-heartedly into the task of creating a new state in accordance with the best examples before it, bound the new regime to antiquated systems at the very moment when they were being rejected by the lineal heirs of the Ottoman Empire as unsuitable for the new Turkish State. It marked the tendency of 'Iraq to

TABLE IV

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENTS AMONG MINISTRIES* 1[C45

- (*a*) Ministry of Interior:
  - General Administration
  - Police
  - Land Revenue and Excise
  - Agriculture
  - Jails
  - Printing and Publishing
- (*b*) Ministry of Finance:
  - Finance
  - Accounts
  - Audit
  - Ottoman Debt and special revenues
- (*c*) Ministry of Justice:
  - Judicial, etc.
  - Tapu
- (*d*) Ministry of Defence:
  - Levies
  - Gendarmes
  - Local Forces
- (*e*) Ministry of Education and Health:
  - Education
  - Health Services
  - Municipalities (as temporary measure)
- (*f*) Ministry of Works and Communications:
  - Buildings
  - Roads
  - Railways
  - Posts and Telegraphs
  - Irrigation
  - Surveys
- (*g*) Ministry of Commerce:
  - Commerce
  - Customs
  - Port
- (*h*) Ministry of Auqaf:
  - Waqfs
  - Trusts

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* *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B.363, p. 3.

1-[1921-Analyst]

175x 642x 727x become the residuary legatee of the Empire whereby its constitution, its electoral laws, its judicial system, its revenue system, its attitude to minorities and its very spirit approximated those of the former regime. In addition, the ground was laid for the continuous struggle within the administration itself between those who preferred the customary ways and those who, educated in the scientific atmosphere of the West, maintained that 'Iraq must break away from her Ottoman traditions and that more up-to-date forms, imbued with modern ideas and a progressive spirit, must dominate the administration if they and their fellow countrymen were to be 'able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world'.[1]

175x 612x 727x 631 In the re-division of the country into ten *Liwās*, thirty-five *Qādhas* and eighty-five *Nahiyas*, approximating the former Turkish divisions, the Council, on December 12th, exhibited one of its first tendencies to revert to the Ottoman system. The major new divisions, replacing the fourteen divisions of the British Civil Administration which, for the most part had been drawn on carefully considered tribal and ethnological lines, were: Mōsul, Kirkūk, Baghdad, Karbalā, Diyālā, Basra, 'Amāra, Dulaim, Hilla and Muntafiq.[2]

In accordance with the Turkish administrative system, the Council also proposed, on December 12th, that an 'Iraqī *Mutasarrif* should replace in each *Liwā* the British Political Officer who was to become the Divisional Adviser without executive functions. In each *Qādha* a *Qaimmāqam* was to become the responsible official, while a *Nahīya* was to be placed in charge of a *Mudīr*. To each larger *Liwā*, former Assistant Political Officers were to be appointed Assistant Advisers.

To this arrangement the High Commissioner agreed. He asked, however, that it be not applied to the Hilla *Liwā* until the return of the special Commission, headed by Ja'far Pasha, which

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[1] Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations.

[2] Kūt *Liwā*, formed of portions of surrounding *Liwās*, was added January, 1922.

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had been sent to the Euphrates area by the Council to study 175x
civil reorganization; to the Muntafiq *Liwā*, until the British 642x
troops had been withdrawn; and to the Kurdish districts until 727'
their future status had been decided. Sir Percy Cox had already 631
approved of the creation of the Baghdad Municipal Council which, although sanctioned under the previous regime, had been so mistrusted and so hedged with limitations as to be valueless as an instrument of government. The new Council had full executive and financial powers, subject to the general supervision of the *Mutasarrif* of the *Liwā*.

Appointments to administrative offices were vested in the 175'
Council of State, subject to the approval of the High Com- 642'
missioner, by Section XIV of the Instructions.[1] In practice, 727x
this arrangement was applied by the Council of State only to 647
those posts for which the Sultan's *firmān* had been required under the Ottoman regime. For other posts, appointments were made on the authority of the Minister concerned. In all cases, however, it was understood that no appointments involving the displacement of British or Indian officials were to be proposed to the Council without previous consultation with the High Commissioner.

The actual transfer of power in the provinces awaited the re-establishment of comparative peace and stability. Not until January 10th, therefore, following the return of Ja'far Pasha and the Commission from the Euphrates area, was the Minister of Interior permitted to put forward his first list of administrative appointments.[2]

The principal criticism of the list came from Shī'a sources. 175',
Their original grievances, other than inherent opposition to 642' 727x
the British-controlled provisional Government itself, had been 647
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[1] Appendix VI.

[2] Only four major administrative appointments had been made previously by the Council, all in Baghdad and vicinity; Mahmūd Nādim Beg Tabaqjalī, *Qaimmāqam* of Mandalī, November 19th, 1920; Mumtaz Beg al'Daftarī, *Qaimmāqam* of Kādhimain, November 21st, 1920; 'Ahmad Beg, *Qaimmāqam* of Sāmarrā, December 1st, 1920; Rashīd Beg al-Khojah, *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, December 11th, 1920.

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175 that no Shīʻī held a portfolio on the Council. Their resentment
642 was not decreased by the fact that of five *Mutasarrifs* and nine
727 *Qaimmāqams* on the list, only one, a *Qaimmāqam*, was of their
647 sect. The High Commissioner, however, realized the difficulty
795 of avoiding Sunnī appointments. Only a few trained and experienced Shīʻīs were available as a result both of their habitual boycott of Turkish service and professional schools and of official Turkish discouragement to the entrance of Shīʻīs into office and schools. The list with minor alterations was, therefore, approved in late January, 1921. When, however, the predominantly Sunnī Council continued to indicate, by appointing Sunnīs to the almost entirely Shīʻa districts along the Euphrates, that it was prepared to do little to conciliate hostile opinion of the sect, the High Commissioner felt obliged to make a firm stand for the appointment of Shīʻīs to such places, at least, where members of the sect predominated. After considerable persuasion, also, a place in the Council was found for a Shīʻī, the Ministry of Education being offered to Saiyid Muhammad Mahdī Tobatabai of Karbalā.

175 The reorganization of the Judicial Department under the
642 new administration entailed comparatively few changes.
727 Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who now became Adviser to the
692 Ministry of Justice, had early adopted the policy of making the fullest use of ʻIraqīs as judges and officials, and of making no alterations in the institutions and laws with which the people were familiar, except in cases of clear necessity. The idea itself of an Arab Minister was not new. Sir Edgar had suggested such an appointment in early 1919,[1] but it had been deemed premature.

Reorganization of the Criminal Courts became necessary, however, when the Council of State adopted its scheme of reconstructing provincial administration along the lines of the Turkish system. One of the essential features of that system was the complete separation of the executive from the judicial

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[1] Memorandum on Place of the Arab in Administration, February 5th, 1919.

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function, whereas under the system employed by the Civil 175
Administration, the British officials, who were now to assume 642
advisory functions only, had been given both executive and 727
judicial functions.[1] The plans for the reorganization of 692
Criminal Courts, when submitted to the Council of State on March 3rd, also included a scheme to strengthen the Court of Appeal by the addition of two judges and to vest in that Court the powers of confirmation and revision formerly exercised by the High Commissioner. Similarly, the powers of revision held by the Political Officers in their divisions were transferred to the Courts of First Instance in the *Liwās*.[2] In those *Liwās* where Judicial work was light, a Single Judge and an Assistant Judge with powers of a Court of First Instance was approved, in accordance with a scheme which had been brought into force by the Turks just before the outbreak of the war.[3] The scheme, as sanctioned by the Council, came into force on May 14th.[4]

Under the Civil Administration, the frequent and numerous appeals to Constantinople, a feature of the Ottoman Judicial System, had been abolished. The Court of Appeal as instituted instead had been also made the Court of Revision for all subordinate Courts. The Council of State now maintained that a Court of Revision or Cassation should be created, distinct from the Court of Appeal. The establishment of such a Court, it held, would be in accordance with Ottoman Law. It would relieve the Court of Appeal of much of its existing work and would in addition constitute a subordinate Court for appeals in important civil cases.[5] Although the desirability of exercising economy and of avoiding multiplicity of appeals appeared to weigh heavily against the Council's proposals, the policy of supporting the institutions to which popular ideas seemed

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[1] *Supra*, p. 129.

[2] *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 5.

[3] Ibid., p. 6.

[4] The Courts' (Revision) Proclamation, 1921: *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 4-6. The outline of the Courts as sanctioned is given in detail in *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 6.

[5] *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 7.

175x 642 wedded, triumphed. The erection of the Court was sanctioned.
727 Owing to financial and other reasons, it was not instituted,
692 however, until December 24th, 1925.[1]

175 The transfer of function and authority in financial matters
642 from the British Administration to the National Government,
727 perhaps the most complicated and difficult task of all, was
652 hampered not only by the abnormal conditions resulting from
the Insurrection, but also by the inheritance of a tangled web of financial transaction between the Military and the Civil authorities of the previous regime. This legacy conspired to unsettle the Ministry's operations even after the Cairo Conference, in March, 1921, at which the Finance Minister, Sasūn Effendi, himself taking part, had presumably settled the issues at stake among the various British authorities.[2]

An outstanding difficulty also lay in the fact that all matters pertaining to Finance were not placed under the supervision of the Ministry. This non-centralization of authority may have been due to the desire to establish checks on possible unsound administration. It is more probable that it came about as the result of the inherited British system which in this case had been taken over without great alteration. Following the system in vogue in India, the Civil Administration had introduced two secretariats, those of Revenue and of Finance, and eventually a third, that of Commerce, to deal with financial matters.[3] Upon the establishment of the provisional Government, the duties of the Finance Secretary were vested in the Minister of

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[1] Royal '*Irâda* for formation of a Court of Cassation, December 24th, 1925: *Compilation of Laws and Regulations from 1st January*, 1925, *to 31st December*, 1925 (Baghdad, 1926), p. 36.

[2] For résumé of financial arrangements reached at the Cairo Conference and their effect on 'Iraq finances, see *Note on the Administration of the Public Finances of 'Iraq, 1st April, to November*, 1924 (Baghdad, 1925), pp. 11-18.

[3] For the manifold duties of the Revenue Department, see *supra*, p. 119. The Finance Department had dealt with all expenditure, currency and resource matters, Budget estimates, accounts and audits. The Secretary for Commerce had been also Chief Collector of Customs until the abolition of the Secretaryship, August, 1920, brought Customs under the Finance Department. See *Note on Organization of Civil Admin. of Meso.*, April, 1920.

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Finance, but those of the Revenue Secretary were absorbed by 175
the Minister of Interior, and those of the Commerce Secretary 642
by the Minister of Commerce.[1] Not until March, 1931, did 727
Excise pass to the Ministry of Finance, and not until October, 652
1921, following the decision of the Council of State, September 28th, did land revenue, *koda* and other financial duties of the Ministry of Interior come under the control of the Minister of Finance. The result was that while the initial organization approximated that of the original Finance Department, the progressive absorption of additional duties, with the attendant periodic reorganization, produced considerable confusion particularly in the *Liwās*.

In addition to the difficulties of reorganization, the major problem of the Finance Minister was economy, all the more urgent in the face of the unconsidered enthusiasm of some of the Council members, who were ready to remake 'Iraq in the twinkling of an eye. The Ministry had to face a serious loss of revenue attendant on the Insurrection as well as on the fall of prices. The destruction of crops and of gardens and the inability to enforce payments in certain areas, as in the Muntafiq,[2] resulted in a deficit of 61 lacs of rupees of revenue from agricultural sources alone, while the almost complete stoppage of commercial traffic on the railways, together with the damage to its equipment, produced a deficit of nearly 55 lacs in the Railway Accounts.[3] The cost, however, of reorganization and the enforced assumption of the costly programmes already initiated under the policy of the Civil Administration,[4] much of which was a 'fruitless burden upon the revenue,'[5] largely negatived the expected saving for the year 1920-1. Expenditures, in fact, exceeded receipts by 183 lacs, although a

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[1] See Table IV.

[2] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, pp. 16-18, App. E, F; ibid., Report of Gharrāf Area, pp. 46-8; ibid., Report of Sūq ash-Shuyūkh District, pp. 57-8, App. A.

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 24.

[4] *Supra*, Ch. vii.

[5] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 22.

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175* surplus of 5 lacs was reported when items properly charge-
642* able to the two regimes existing in the financial year had been
727* taken into consideration.[1]
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The future was not brightened by the necessity of providing immediately for defence and for the maintenance of order, on a scale larger than anticipated at first, due to the unexpectedly rapid withdrawal of British troops. Defence forces in 1921-2, exclusive of Levies, the cost of which was assumed by H.M. Government, were to cost Rs. 127,09,455,[2] whereas in the previous year they had cost Rs. 88,50,000 inclusive of Levies.[3]

175* Although Defence Forces for the time being took the form of
642* Levies and Police, the Council had provided, on January 6th,
727* 1921, the nucleus of an 'Iraq General Staff, with Major J. I.
701 Eadie as temporary Adviser until the arrival of Col. P. C.
Joyce in April. The creation of a national army was stimulated by the necessity of absorbing as far as possible, the large and articulate group of unemployed and discontented ex-officers from the Turkish army. The problem was further aggravated by the acute jealousy between the ex-Sharifian and ex-Turkish officers. Many of the latter would take no office and publicly predicted the early return of the Turks.

The entire question of the development of the defence forces, together with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq were among the principal questions brought before the Cairo Conference in March, 1921.

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 23.

[2] *Budget of 'Iraq Government*, 1921-1922 (Baghdad, 1921), Ch. viA, viB, vii, pp. 10, 12.

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE SEARCH FOR A RULER

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In the coffee houses, in the tents of the shaikhs, wherever 'Iraqīs met in social and political gatherings during the winter of 1920 and the spring of 1921, the question as to the form of the permanent Government and of the person of its ruler was constantly under discussion. The problem of the ruler, both to 'Iraqīs and to the responsible British officials in Baghdad and in Whitehall, was much the same as it had been just after the Armistice of Mudros: the discovery of an individual who would command the greatest support among the inhabitants of 'Iraq.

The desire on the part of H.M. Government to set up a ruler who had the support of the people, as reiterated by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords, June 25th, 1920, when he said: 'No announcement would be more welcome to us than a genuine and general expression of opinion in favour of a particular system or even of a particular ruler,'[1] was something more than mere platitude calculated to win the goodwill of the 'Iraqīs. A candidate possessing popular support and willing to co-operate with Great Britain in maintaining her interests was inherent in the pattern of the State which H.M. Government had in mind for 'Iraq which, in spite of the implications of its public declarations, was still an 'indigenous government' under 'effective and indisputable British control'.[2] Without such a head, clothed with executive authority and ostensibly supported by the people, no façade could exist behind which ultimate British control might function without the open employment of armed force. All negotiations, whether unilateral or bilateral, unsupported by public opinion, would fall to the ground for

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), p. 880.

[2] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, February 14th, 1919, cited *supra*, pp. 180-1.

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175* 127* 643 lack of a contracting party, as occurred in the case of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, the Treaty of Sèvres, and as characterized by the early efforts of the French to set up a government in Syria.

No candidate who fulfilled these conditions had been revealed in the Acting Civil Commissioner's summary of 'Iraqī public opinion, in November, 1918,[1] or by the plebiscite of the winter of 1918-19, initiated and rigorously supervised by the Acting Civil Commissioner, who himself was bitterly opposed to an Arab Amīr. The plebiscite had revealed that while a strong desire for an Amīr existed, rival ambitions, local jealousies and lack of outstanding ability made it impossible for the country to settle on any one candidate.[2]

From that time, although the desire for an Amīr had steadily grown, the difficulty of settling on any single candidate had remained. One section of the ex-Turkish officials, practically all Sunnīs of Baghdad, afraid of being swamped by the Shī'a majority, was imbued with the idea that a Sunnī Turk, as found in the person of Prince Burhan ed-Dīn,[3] might better serve their interests than a local candidate or a Hāshimī known to be on comparatively friendly terms with the Shī'īs.[4] Opposing them, however, was an even larger element of ex-Turkish officials, both civil and military, concentrated largely in Baghdad, Mōsul and Kirkūk, who encouraged the belief, substantiated by persistent propaganda arising across the frontiers, that the return of the Turks was but a question of time.

Among the possible local candidates the Naqīb of Baghdad stood high, although his acceptance of the presidency of the Council and his seeming subservience to the British had earned the disapproval of the ardent Nationalists. In British circles, his great age, his feeble health and lack of suitable dynastic successors counted against him, although, according to members

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[1] Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 172 ff.

[3] *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 4.

[4] Bell, *Letters*, p. 585.

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of his family, the throne was offered him but under such 175x
conditions and limitations as would have made him, in his own 727x
words, no more than an ' 'Iraqī Rajah'. He himself did not seek 643
the throne, although he felt that if it were freely offered him by the people he would be obliged to accept the honour and the duties.

Saiyid Talib Pasha of Basra, Minister of Interior, by his ability, his energy and his influence, was the most outstanding local candidate. Since his return from Egypt, where he had rendered valuable services to the Allies in arousing the Arabs against the Turks, he had continued to work as before the war for 'Iraqī Nationalism. He had, however, stopped short of advocating violence to eject the British and during the Insurrection he had rendered further services to the British Authorities, both as intermediary with the insurgents and as Chairman of the Electoral Law Committee. His enemies maintained, nevertheless, that, as in the days of the Turks, his activities were directed primarily towards furthering his own ambitions. Indeed, he freely admitted to the High Commissioner his expectations of becoming Amīr of 'Iraq, which, he predicted in February, 1921, would be accomplished by the autumn of the same year. So great was the alarm and opposition aroused by Saiyid Talib Pasha that any original intention the High Commissioner may have had of using him as head of either provisional or permanent Government[1] was effectually checked by the knowledge that if Saiyid Talib had many followers who professed their willingness to die on his behalf, there were others who would go to the same lengths to prevent him from becoming head of the State.[2] The High Commissioner's disapproval of Saiyid Talib's activities was not lessened

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, p. 562.

[2] Much of the reluctance of Sasūn Effendi and others to support the provisional Government, has been explained by the fear that the British Government intended to support Talib Pasha. Ja'far Pasha is stated to have said in private that 'If he had not hesitated to enter the Cabinet, it was only with the object of defeating Talib Pasha, whose ambitions he regarded as a menace to the country'. *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 4.

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

H.M. KING FAISA'

[facing p. 306]

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175x by the knowledge that the Nationalists in many quarters
727x regarded him as the one strong candidate able to oppose
643 the British nor by the fact that his propaganda was ostensibly in favour of the Naqīb into whose place he expected to fall if the Naqīb refused the honour or when his death left it vacant.

Other candidates had been mentioned. The Shaikh of Mohammerah, whose name had been put forward in 1918-19, again announced his candidature on April 5th in a letter to the High Commissioner. Ibn Sa'ūd was also proposed, largely, it was believed in official circles, to offset the possible success of the sons of the Sharīf of Mecca, of whom both 'Abdullāh and Faisal were freely mentioned. The Agha Khan[1] and even the *Walī* of Push ti-Kuh were also suggested. In some circles, the possibility of a republic was also discussed.

Sentiment in favour of a Sharifian ruler had not been lacking in 'Iraq at the end of the war, as the Acting Civil Commissioner had noted in November, 1918,[2] and as the plebiscite had confirmed.[3] At that time it had been vigorously opposed by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by those who held the same opinions on the Arab question. His efforts to exclude and to counter Hāshimī influence, whether engendered locally or in London, as in Colonel T. E. Lawrence's proposal to divide Arab-Asia into four Hāshimī kingdoms under British influence,[4] had been negatived not only by H.M. Government but also by the efforts of the 'Iraqīs themselves. The establishment of the Arab Government at Damascus under British aegis and the activities of the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, in 1919 and 1920, to induce and finally to force Great Britain to keep her promises concerning 'Iraq, had, as already indicated[5] encouraged 'Iraqī Nationalism and, after the election of Sharīf 'Abdullāh as King

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[1] For the comments of the Agha Khan on the situation in 'Iraq in 1920, see Haldane, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[2] Telegram, No. 10250, November 24th, 1918.

[3] Three declarations, the most secured by any candidate, had demanded a son of the Sharīf of Mecca. See *supra*, p. 172.

[4] Telegram, S/S for India, to Political, Baghdad, November 18th, 1918.

[5] *Supra*, Ch. x, xiii.

175x of 'Iraq, had stimulated sentiment on behalf of the Sharif.
727x The fall of the Arab Government in Syria and the flight of
643 Faisal had taken the wind temporarily from Sharifian sails, as at Mōsul, where the agitation in favour of a Hāshimī candidate had subsided precipitately.[1] The sentiment had rapidly revived, however. By late December, the Shī'a *'Ulamā* were credited with saying 'The country will not be content until complete independence, under a son of the Sharif, is achieved'. Much of the support of the Shī'is who, in particular, seemed in favour of a son of the Sharif,[2] was due, it was held officially, to the fact that they believed that Sharif Husain, generally known to be of liberal religious views, was secretly a member of their sect. The Sharifian officers returning to 'Iraq in early 1921 had also given an impetus to public opinion in favour of a Hāshimī, although they were divided among themselves over the respective merits of 'Abdullāh and Faisal.

The movement towards a Hāshimī was not hindered by the knowledge that a number of the British officials, including the Adviser to the Minister of Justice, the Oriental Secretary and the Private Secretary to the High Commissioner, in private conversations had advocated a Hāshimī and Faisal in particular. As early as November, 1920, Miss Gertrude Bell wrote, as she had already urged upon the Acting Civil Commissioner in the previous July, that the only solution in her opinion was a son of the Sharif for whom, she believed, the Constituent Assembly when convened, would ask.[3] A little later, she again wrote: 'I feel quite clear in my own mind that there is only one workable solution, a son of the Sharif, and, for choice, Faisal: very much the first choice.'[4] The necessity for rapid action in setting up a king to check adverse currents against the new Government, she also recognized, as when she wrote: 'I believe if we could put up a son of the Sharif at once he might

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[1] *Admin. Report, Mōsul,* 1920, pp. 3-4.

[2] See letters cited *supra*, p. 261.

[3] Bell, op. cit., p. 574.

[4] Ibid., p. 581.

175ᶠ 127ˣ 643 yet sweep the board; if we hesitate the tide of public opinion may turn overwhelmingly to the Turks. . . .'[1]

The High Commissioner had maintained, however, the strictly official view that the provisional Government had been established with the aim of providing machinery whereby the wishes of the people as to the form of the permanent Government and the person of the ruler might be freely expressed. The plan, involving delay, found critics even among the 'Iraqis.

'You British wish to build the Government of 'Iraq in the usual solid English fashion,' an 'Iraqī high official, with a reputation for sagacity and insight, is reported to have said to Miss Bell at a dinner in the winter of 1920-1. 'You want to begin with the foundations and then follow with the walls, the roof and then the decorations. That is not my idea of the way to build now for 'Iraq.'

'What do you mean?' he was asked.

'Begin with a roof, supported by a few pillars. The roof will encourage us to continue. Otherwise the slowness of building may discourage us. Give us a king. He will be our roof and we will work downwards.'

From the events of the next few months it would seem that both the British officials in Baghdad, including the High Commissioner, and H.M. Government came to the same conclusion: that the roof could not wait for the walls and that the head of the permanent State must be installed before convoking the Assembly. The Assembly came to be considered as a body which was to ratify the choice by H.M. Government of a ruler and to approve of the steps which had already been taken by the provisional Government under British guidance.

Among the members of the Interdepartmental Committee in London, a Hāshimī candidate found the most favour, although the Naqīb and Saiyid Talib Pasha each had their supporters. Lord Curzon, although he strongly disapproved of the action of the 'Iraqī Covenanters in Damascus in March,

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[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 585.

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1920, had come to regard 'Abdullāh as the prospective Amīr 175
of 'Iraq. He had demurred, therefore, at the proposal which 727
the Acting Civil Commissioner had telegraphed following the 643
collapse of the Syrian Government. The telegram, in part, was as follows:

> 'Will His Majesty's Government consider possibility of offering him Amirate of Mesopotamia? Objections entertained on this side to creation of Amirate have hitherto been primarily that no suitable person could be found. We have always regarded Faisal as booked for Syria. Nothing that I have heard during the last few months has led me to modify my views of unsuitability of 'Abdullah and our experience of last few weeks in Baghdad makes it fairly clear that no local candidate will be successful in obtaining sufficient support here to enable him to make good.'[1]

Mr. Montagu, on behalf of the India Office, had favourably received the suggestion, but it was dropped[2] in deference to Lord Curzon and to the Quai d'Orsay which made it clear that Amīr Faisal's 'employment in Mesopotamia immediately after his expulsion from Syria, would be regarded by French opinion as an unfriendly act'.[3]

Lord Curzon in the following months experienced a change of heart. Once the provisional Government was well under way he adopted, with the approval of the Middle East Committee, the policy of installing Faisal in 'Iraq.

On December 17th, Lord Curzon, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs, deputed Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis, then attached to the Foreign Office, to call on the same day upon Amīr Faisal, who was then in London, and to offer him the throne of 'Iraq. Colonel Cornwallis had been in close touch with Arab affairs in general and had been closely

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[1] Cited Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p. 306.

[2] Nevertheless, Sharīf 'Abdullāh felt it necessary to deny in October, 1920, in *Al-Fallāh* (Mecca) that Faisal would take his place in 'Iraq.

[3] Telegram No. 1539, India Office to Viceroy, Simla, for Sir Percy Cox, September 10th, 1920.

175 associated with Amīr Faisal in Damascus, where a close
727 personal friendship had developed.[1]

643 Not until one o'clock in the morning, after the Amīr had returned from the theatre, did the interview take place. The offer from the Foreign Office was met with refusal although the conversation lasted until after three o'clock. Faisal remained obdurate. The throne, he declared, belonged to his brother 'Abdullāh and he, Faisal, could not and would not accept it.

Shortly afterwards, Colonel T. E. Lawrence was asked to approach Sharīf 'Abdullāh and to attempt to remove his objections to the installation of his younger brother in 'Iraq. Amīr 'Abdullāh has since stated that Colonel Lawrence went so far as to offer him a kingdom in Syria if he would renounce the throne of 'Iraq and that, on the basis of the promise, he, 'Abdullāh, was gathering his forces preparatory to taking over his kingdom when the British Government intervened, in February, 1921, and compelled him to accept only the southern portion of his brother's former kingdom, the Amīrate of Kerak or Transjordan.[2]

Following the report by Colonel Lawrence that Sharīf 'Abdullāh would offer no serious objections to the proposal that Faisal should take his place in 'Iraq,[3] Amīr Faisal was again approached. The conversations were continued after the conduct of 'Iraq affairs fell to the new Middle East Department, created in the early spring of 1921 through the initiative of Mr. Winston Churchill, who was transferred from the War Office to the Colonial Office for the purpose.[4] By the time of

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[1] Later Personal Adviser to King Faisal, 1921-33, and Adviser to Minister of Interior, 'Iraq, 1921-35.

[2] Colonel Lawrence was non-committal regarding this statement by Amīr Abdullāh. A search through his papers after his death revealed no reference to the episode.

[3] 'Abdullāh, however, held it against Faisal for a number of years that he had usurped the crown which was his ('Abdullāh's) by right.

[4] Mr. Churchill had formulated his plans for the Department by the middle of January (*Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1921), p. 268), but did not go from the War Office to the Colonial Office until February 14th. The Department formally assumed supervision of Middle East Affairs, March 2nd, *Colonial Office List*, 1921, p. 448.

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the Cairo Conference in March, most of the outstanding points 175x
between H.M. Government and the Amīr had been settled. 727x
It remained for the Cairo Conference to confirm his candida- 643
ture and to outline the procedure by which he was to be installed in 'Iraq.

The Cairo Conference, March 12th-24th, 1921

The Middle East Division of the Colonial Office had owed 175x
its creation to the necessity of devising a less costly British 727x
policy for the Near and Middle East and of replacing by unified 643
control the complicated and cumbersome system of divided 648
authority among the Foreign, the India and the Colonial Offices.[1] Mr. Churchill, in taking charge of Near and Middle East affairs, was faced, on the one hand, by the insistent demand of the British public for a radical reduction in expenditure[2] and, on the other hand, by the necessity, with which his whole political creed was in sympathy, of maintaining and consolidating the territorial gains and the strategical vantage points won in the East as the result of a vast outlay of British blood and treasure. To aid in formulating new lines of procedure in order to achieve these ends, he called a conference of the principal political and military officials of the areas concerned to meet in Cairo on March 12th, 1921.[3]

The questions considered by the Conference included as problems concerning 'Iraq: the immediate reduction of British expenditure with the consequent revision of policy involving (*a*) the future relationship of the new State to Great Britain;

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 268.

[2] Ibid., Vol. CXXVII (1920), pp. 644-5; Vol. CXXX (1920), pp. 2223-84; H. of L., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 848-94; *The Times*, April 5th, 1921, May 9th, 1921; *The Daily Telegraph*, June 25th, 1920.

[3] The representatives of 'Iraq who were summoned to the Conference were: the High Commissioner, accompanied by Sir Aylmer Haldane, K.C.M.G., K.C.B., the Commander-in-Chief; Sasūn Effendi, Minister of Finance; Ja'far Pasha, C.M.G., D.S.O., Minister of Defence; Maj.-Gen. E. H. de Vere Atkinson, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Works; Lt.-Col. S. H. Slater, C.I.E., Financial Adviser; Miss Gertrude Bell, C.B.E., Oriental Secretary.

175 (*b*) the person of the future ruler of 'Iraq; and (*c*) the nature
727 and composition of the defence forces of the new State which
643 was to assume an increasing share of its own defence. The
648 status of the Kurdish regions in their relations to 'Iraq was
also discussed.

It was apparent, in view of the decreasing revenue, of falling agricultural prices and of the large burdens to be assumed in taking over the Railways, the Port of Basra and other public works from the Army at the latter's own valuation, that the prospects were not bright for the immediate assumption by the new State of the cost of its defence. Anticipating a discussion of the question, vital from the British standpoint, at Cairo, the High Commissioner after consultation with Sir Aylmer Haldane and the Minister of Defence had, nevertheless, formulated proposals involving substantial saving for the ensuing year and further reductions in the future, consequent on 'Iraq assuming an increasing share in the responsibilities hitherto devolving on Great Britain.[1] Mr. Churchill was thus able to announce a preliminary reduction of the original estimate of British expenditure in the Middle East for 1921-2, from £35,000,000 to £27,500,000, a figure which was expected to fall to nine or ten million pounds in 1922-3.[2] The reduction in the British budget, however, necessitated a stipulation that the 'Iraq budget should provide not less than 55 lacs for the National Army, the strength of which should eventually amount to 15,000 men, and that ordinarily her contributions to defence should not fall below 15 per cent of her revenue,[3] a proportion later increased to 25 per cent.[4]

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[1] Cox, Sir P. Z, 'Historical Summary' in Bell, op. cit., p. 531.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 271. Also ibid., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1547. The actual expenditures in 'Iraq by the British Treasury, 1920-5 have been stated to be (ibid., Vol. CXCII (1926), p. 4):

1920-1	£32,000,000	1923-4	£5,740,358
1921-2	£23,355,950	1924-5	£4,479,754
1922-3	£7,807,384	1925-6	£4,118,400

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

[4] Article IV of Military Agreement and Article IV of Financial Agreement, subsidiary to the Treaty with King Faisal, October 10th, 1922, Cmd. 2120.

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In order to enable the High Commissioner to achieve the proposed economies for the relief of the British taxpayer, the Conference agreed that until the 'Iraqī Army could be recruited, equipped and trained, the Levies should be increased from 4000 to 7500 and that they were to be financed by H.M. Government and to be administered by the High Commissioner. The Levies, hitherto, had been composed for the most part of Arabs, with a small number of Kurds. Assyrians were now to be recruited.[1] In addition, six squadrons of the Air Force, stationed at strategic points, were to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order.[2]

The success of the proposed withdrawal of British troops from 'Iraq depended almost entirely on the creation and maintenance of friendly relations between the 'Iraqīs and the Mandatory Power, which had been temporarily improved by the establishment of the provisional Government. The continuance of strong Nationalist agitation, however, directed against the Mandate on the ground that the relationship which it created had no basis either in British promises or in Arab Nationalism, seemed to indicate that the mandatory regime, as originally conceived and outlined in the draft document, could not be imposed without prolonged military occupation on a scale which British public opinion rendered impossible. The mere prospect of increased hostility, leading inevitably in the absence of adequate military forces in the country to disturbances similar to those of 1920 or even worse, would not only paralyse the efforts of British officials to apply the Mandate and to develop the country but would also lead to an irresistible renewal of British public opinion for the complete evacuation of a country where the game was not worth the candle.

It had already been suggested to H.M. Government, in May, 1920, by Mr. Montagu, that if Nationalist agitation were to

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, pp. 44-5.

[2] Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xx (1933), p. 399.

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175x be cut at its roots and if a friendly government co-operating
727x with Great Britain were to be established in 'Iraq, a further
643 step in defining the relations between the two countries might
648 be necessary.[1] This step would consist of an attempt to satisfy national aspirations by disguising the relationship, sanctioned under the terms of the mandatory document then already in existence, by means of a treaty of alliance. Lord Curzon, who had difficulty in agreeing with Mr. Montagu on any subject, had rejected the suggestion at the time. Mr. Churchill took up the idea, all his conversations with Amīr Faisal being conducted on the basis of negotiating a treaty similar to that between Great Britain and Egypt, which would establish Faisal as King of an independent State in alliance with Great Britain. Under such a treaty, the scope of British authority might be more restricted than originally projected, but under skilful handling, the ultimate authority could be made not less effective. It would have the added merit of enabling Great Britain to maintain with less expense her position before the League of Nations without sacrificing her Imperial interests.

When Mr. Churchill arrived at Cairo for the Conference, he had made up his mind that Faisal was the only possible candidate with whom such a treaty might be negotiated. In agreement with him were Sir Percy Cox and many friends and supporters of the Amir at the Conference: T. E. Lawrence, Miss Bell, Ja'far Pasha, H. W. Young, and others. Amīr Faisal's high birth, as a son of Husain, Sharīf of Mecca and King of the Hijāz, assured his position among Arabs in general and gave his person a sanctity among the religiously minded, even among the Shī'is. He possessed experience in the ways of men and in diplomatic usage gleaned from his early life among the Turks at Istanbul, from his sojourn in the desert in the days of peace and of war against the Turks, from his participation at the Peace Conference at Versailles and from his brief day as King at Damascus. Among the Nationalists, his early

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[1] Young, Major Sir H. W., op. cit., p. 313.

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espousal of the Arab cause in Syria,[1] his leadership of the Arab 175ˣ
forces in the Hijāz and in Syria and his election as the first 727
Arab ruler of Damascus since the Ummayads, secured his 643
standing as an Arab patriot. His personality and his character 648
which had won and were to continue to win the affection of British officials with whom he associated, were expected to gain the adherence of the 'Iraqis among whom a strong sentiment in his favour already existed.

His short-lived kingship at Damascus, it was believed, had revealed to him the difficulties of a purely Arab administration and the danger of relying entirely on an Arab army.[2] British advice and assistance to the new kingdom would, therefore, it was hoped, be welcomed for their own sake and be regarded not merely as onerous conditions imposed by the Power which had given him his throne.

As a secondary consideration, it was felt that Faisal's nomination would, in part, redeem the promises made during the war to the Sharif in particular and to the Arabs in general and thus rehabilitate British prestige in the Arab world. It would, in addition, mitigate Faisal's bitterness against the British Government for what he believed to be its responsibility in his overthrow at Damascus.[3]

Mr. Churchill believed, moreover, that if Faisal were installed in 'Iraq, the British Government would acquire increased control both over him and over his father, the Sharif of Mecca, who was still proving intractable and exasperating in his relations with Great Britain. At a meeting of the Special

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[1] His efforts to secure the release of the Syrians accused of treason during the war nearly cost him his own life. See Djemal Pasha, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

[2] Amir Faisal, in his unpublished Memoirs, written during his sojourn in Italy in 1920, spoke, however, in glowing terms of his own Arab forces of the desert campaign, and declared that had they fought at Maisalun the French would not have won the engagement.

[3] In his *Memoirs*, Amir Faisal maintained, not always correctly, that he had followed faithfully the advice of his British Advisers in all his relations with the French, relying on the help which they promised; that they had discouraged his summoning of his Hijāzī followers; and that in the crucial hour of his need, they had abandoned him to the French.

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175 Committee dealing with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq, on
727 the opening day of the Conference, March 12th, Mr. Churchill
643 declared that Faisal should be made to realize that his father's
648 subsidy as well as the British guarantee to the Sharif of non-aggression from Wahhābī sources depended on Faisal's own behaviour.

Although the approval of Amīr Faisal's candidature was almost a foregone certainty, the merits of the other candidates were not overlooked at the Conference. The High Commissioner, speaking on March 12th, did not believe that any local candidate could be elected. The Agha Khan, whose interests had become European rather than Asiatic, would not accept the nomination. Sentiment for a Turkish Prince was not strong enough to be considered. By the process of elimination as well as by his own merits, Faisal appeared to be the only possible candidate.

The difficulties attending the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq were not ignored. Warning notes were sounded as to the undoubted opposition of Saiyid Talib Pasha to any nominee other than himself[1] and as to the probable effect on Ibn Sa'ūd, an ally of Great Britain, of the establishment of the two new Hāshimī kingdoms: 'Iraq on the north and Transjordan on the north-west. To counter possible active hostility from Ibn Sa'ūd who had already shown interest in the political situation in 'Iraq, the Conference resolved that he should be acquainted with the attitude of H.M. Government to Faisal's candidature. The High Commissioner, accordingly, telegraphed to the Wahhābī leader shortly after the Conference had adjourned. He received in reply a letter, dated May 7th, 1921, expressing Ibn Sa'ūd's thanks for the consideration shown him at the Conference.[2] After Faisal's departure for 'Iraq and Mr. Churchill's

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[1] Expected to take the form of anti-Mandate agitation.

[2] Kohn's statement, *History of Nationalism in the Near East*, p. 308, that the effect on Ibn Sa'ūd of the setting up of the Hāshimī princes was overlooked by the British Government, is not borne out by the records of the Cairo Conference. See *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 265 ff. Also *supra*, p. 157.

announcement, Ibn Sa'ûd again wrote, on June 21st, to the 175*
High Commissioner stating his willingness to accept the 727x
decision of the British Government, but asking that his own 643
position be determined and safeguarded. Some time afterwards 648
he replied in friendly terms to a message from Faisal.[1]

A further question arose at the Conference as to whether an 'Iraqî Congress or Assembly should propose Faisal as King. It was pointed out by a member of the special Committee that a concrete proposal must be placed before the Assembly if it were convened or the results of its deliberations would not be satisfactory. Mr. Churchill stated that he knew of no precedent for allowing a Constituent Assembly to choose its own ruler. It was eventually agreed that convocation of the Assembly before the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq was undesirable but that the High Commissioner should use his discretion according to the situation existing at the time. It was also agreed, in order that 'Iraq should appear to choose its own ruler, that a line of procedure should be followed which would give the 'Iraqis the opportunity of demanding Amîr Faisal. The following schedule was provisionally proposed:

April 18th — The High Commissioner would arrive in Baghdad.

April 18th to 21st — Announcement by the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs that H.M. Government approved of Amîr Faisal as a candidate for the throne of 'Iraq. This would be accompanied by a proclamation of a general amnesty issued by the High Commissioner.

April 23rd — Amîr Faisal would send telegrams to Nûrî Pasha as-Sa'îd, to Talib Pasha and to the Naqîb of Baghdad

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[1] Letter, Ibn Sa'ûd to Amîr Faisal, July 29th, 1921:

After compliments, etc., 'We thank God for your safety and beg that you will be always safe. May you prosper.

'There is no doubt that you are fit to be the foremost in good action as is proved by the capacity you have shown in solving difficulties and maintaining mutual support for the upkeep of the glory of the Arabs. You may be sure that your brother has no thought nor aspiration other than this.'

175 announcing his candidature and saying that he, Faisal, hoped
727 that he would have their co-operation.

643 April 23rd to May 8th — Nūrī Pasha and other 'Iraqīs
648 would send telegrams to Amīr Faisal, inviting him to come to 'Iraq as its prospective King.

May 8th to June 8th — Amīr Faisal would come to 'Iraq or would send his representatives, the arrival to take place about the middle of May. He or his representatives would be met by such a welcome and response from 'Iraqīs as to make it unnecessary to convene the Constituent Assembly, except to ratify or to confirm his election as King.

This schedule, finally adopted after minor alterations as to details and dates, implied that the Amīr should come to agreement with H.M. Government in regard to the future treaty, to Great Britain's position in 'Iraq and towards the League of Nations and to his own position generally.[1] It also implied that the Sharifian party in Baghdad, stimulated by the announcement of approval by H.M. Government and by judicious promptings emanating from the British Residency, would prove to be sufficiently representative and powerful to merit the invitation to the Amīr to come to 'Iraq where he could appear only when the ground had been carefully ploughed and harrowed.

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq during the Period* 1920-1931 (Special Report by H.M. Government to Council of League of Nations, Colonial No. 58 (1931) (hereafter *Progress of 'Iraq*), p. 14).

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE ACCESSION OF FAISAL

To the High Commissioner, on his return from Cairo, fell the 175
delicate task of ensuring that the choice of the 'Iraqis, when 727
expressed, should fall upon the candidate approved at Cairo. 643

The undertaking was to prove no sinecure. During his absence, the various candidates and their partisans had increased the intensity of their campaigns, their intrigues and their agitations. The Hāshimī party had not been idle, the most recently returned group of 'Iraqī officers adding new recruits. The Shī'is appeared to be increasingly in favour of a Hāshimī, although neither they nor the 'Iraqī officers had yet been able to come to a decision as to whether 'Abdullāh or Faisal was to be their nominee. Faisal had the greater reputation as a protagonist of Arab Nationalism, but many held that he was too pro-British. His frequent visits abroad also tended to show that he had become a foreigner. 'Abdullāh was regarded as more of a true Arab.[1]

The hostility of the pro-Turkish party had been somewhat decreased by the decisions of the London Conference in February and March.[2] Evidence was not lacking, however, that many of those who had been advocating a Turkish prince were now supporting the Naqīb, in order to prevent the election of a Hāshimī. 'Alī as-Sulaimān of the Dulaim had long been working for the Naqīb,[3] for whom, it was also reported, Ibn Sa'ūd was exercising his influence in order to oppose the Sharifians. The Shaikh of Mohammerah was still in the field

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, in a leading article, December 17th, 1920, maintained that 'Abdullāh's election at Damascus had been final and binding.

[2] *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. vi, pp. 32-3, 65-8, 89-96.

[3] See letter by 'Alī as-Sulaimān '*Al-Iraq*, April 19th, 1921.

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175x and did not withdraw his candidature or announce his support
727x of Faisal until Faisal's departure for 'Iraq.[1]
643 The Naqib himself had shown irreconcilable aversion to a son of the Sharif. As early as February 6th, 1919, he had expressed himself in no uncertain terms, saying:

> I am a relative of the Sharif. I come of the same stock and I share the same religious opinions. You will therefore understand that I am not actuated by difference of blood or of thought when I tell you that I would never consent to the appointment of the Sharif or of his son as Amir. The Hijaz is one and 'Iraq is one, there is no connection but that of the faith . . . I would rather a thousand times have the Turks back in 'Iraq than see the Sharif or his sons installed here.[2]

He now desired a public announcement definitely excluding sons of the Sharif. Failing that, he sought assurances that no ruler would be imposed on the people of 'Iraq contrary to their wishes. He professed himself, however, as satisfied with the High Commissioner's expressions of British official neutrality.

The candidature of Faisal, therefore, had to reckon on the combined opposition of the pro-Turks, the Naqib, Ibn Sa'ūd and Saiyid Talib Pasha who, of them all, was held to be the most formidable. The High Commissioner realized that Saiyid Talib Pasha, in his strategic position as Minister of Interior and as one of the most powerful and influential men in 'Iraq, might wreck Faisal's chances in 'Iraq and thus upset all the carefully laid plans of H.M. Government. Saiyid Talib had been undoubtedly gaining ground in Baghdad, where his extraordinary influence over the public mind had been increased by a series of murders, wrongfully ascribed to his revenge against his enemies.[3] In the absence of the High Commissioner at the Cairo Conference, which was popularly believed to have been

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[1] His letter was published in *Al-'Iraq*, June 14th, 1921.
[2] Bell, *Note on Political Views of the Naqib*, p. 10.
[3] *Admin. Report, Baghdad Liwa*, 1921 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 2.

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convened to declare Faisal as King,[1] Saiyid Talib had toured the *Liwās* below Baghdad as far south as Rumaitha and Dīwānī-ya, spending several thousand pounds on propaganda in the name of the Naqīb, but in reality with an eye to his own interests.[2] More of a realist than the Naqīb and therefore more sceptical of the High Commissioner's assurances, he had also encouraged the widespread belief that whether 'Iraqis wished for a son of the Sharīf or not, a Hāshimī would be set on the throne by Great Britain. Apprehension was felt in official circles lest his next move would be to stir up active opposition to the Mandate.

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It had been planned by the High Commissioner that the Arab Ministers should be suspended and their functions carried on by the British Advisers during the critical period when Faisal's candidature was in abeyance.[3] The Ministers who favoured Faisal could thus work unimpeded by their official position, Talib Pasha would be removed from a position where he could use official pressure on his own behalf and British officials would be placed in the vital points of control.

The High Commissioner saw, however, that this plan would not be a sufficient check on Saiyid Talib. The opportunity for removing him completely from the scene was found in remarks made by Saiyid Talib at a dinner, given in his own house, April 14th, to which he had invited the French and Persian Consuls, Mr. Percival Landon, of the *Daily Telegraph* of London, other British guests, the Amīr ar-Rabī'a, Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn and Saiyid Husain al-Afnan, Secretary of the Council of State, the whole gathering numbering thirteen. Following the dinner, Saiyid Talib addressed Mr. Landon in Arabic, his words being translated by a member of the party.

Saiyid Talib questioned Mr. Landon as to the measure of

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, p. 590.

[2] *Admin. Report*, *Hilla Liwa*, 1921 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 3; *Daily Mail*, March 12th, 1921.

[3] Bell, op. cit., pp. 590-1. Nūrī Pasha, Nājī Pasha and other Sharifians had previously suggested the plan.

175' confidence which could be placed in the undertaking of H.M.
727' Government to ensure the freedom of the coming elections. He
643 proceeded to point out that some of the British officers in the employment of the High Commissioner were exercising undue influence in favour of one of the candidates to the throne of 'Iraq. He inquired whether he should appeal to King George or to the High Commissioner for their removal.

Mr. Landon replied that there might also be officers who were known to be in favour of a local condidate, but that the removal of one group would involve that of another. On a whispered word of advice from the interpreter, Saiyid Talib pursued the subject no farther. He went on to say that should there be indications that the declared policy of the British Government was not being carried out, the Amīr ar-Rabī'a, with 20,000 rifles and Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn, with all his tribesmen, were ready to see it done. He added that the Naqīb would not hesitate to lodge complaints in India, Cairo, Constantinople and Paris.[1]

On receiving what he believed to be a well-substantiated report of Saiyid Talib's speech, the High Commissioner asked the General Officer Commanding to arrange for Saiyid Talib's removal. On the same day he was arrested by British soldiers and, under military guard, was removed to Basra and from there deported to Ceylon.[2]

The High Commissioner felt his drastic action to be necessary. No man, particularly one so prominent, could be allowed to call in question the sincerity of the promises of the British Government or to threaten it with force. Even more imperative, however, was the risk that the continued presence of Saiyid

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[1] See also *Communiqué*, April 18th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 6; also *Baghdad Times*, April 18th, 1921.

[2] *The Times* (London), April 23rd, 1921, published two versions of the incident; (*a*) from Tehran, dated April 20th, inaccurate and garbled; (*b*) from Allahabad, April 20th, based on the official *communiqué*. *Daily Telegraph*, April 23rd, also published the Allahabad version. Cf. statement, Coke, R.: *Heart of the Middle East*, p. 230, that owing to censorship, the incident 'was not reported in the London Press until many months had elapsed'.

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Talib might nullify the decision reached at Cairo: the final 175
effort of H.M. Government to settle the future status of 'Iraq. 727

The action of the High Commissioner convinced the great 643
mass of the 'Iraqis that the British authorities would not hesitate to use strong measures if the occasion demanded it. This widespread conviction probably did more to ensure the acquiescence of the masses of the population in Faisal's candidature, once it was announced, than the absence of Talib Pasha's opposition or the existence of any definite desire among them for a son of the Sharif of Mecca. In any case Faisal's prospects of success immediately improved. The Naqib withdrew his opposition to a Hāshimī, declaring that it would be best to follow the wishes of H.M. Government. A moderate Sharifian party having a definite programme was formed, with the approval of the High Commissioner who, while aware of the immense influence which the Sharifians could exert in creating and enlarging public opinion for Faisal, also realized the necessity of controlling them and of preventing the extremists from using Faisal for their own ends in opposition to the Mandate. Encouragement to the Sharifians was also extended [204]
by the vernacular press, particularly by *Ash-Sharq*, under the editorship of the Secretary to the Council of State;[1] by *Al-'Iraq* which took the most prominent part;[2] by *Lisān al-'Arab* which, under its editor, Ibrāhīm Hilmī al-'Umarī, was pro-Faisal and, for the moment, pro-British;[3] and by *Al-Auqāt al-'Irāqīya* of Basra and *Al-Mūsil* of Mōsul.[4] The *Baghdad Times*, the English newspaper owned by the Government, also published a few pro-Faisal articles.

In the creation of sentiment on behalf of Amir Faisal and in

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[1] Established August 30th, 1920, by Saiyid Husain al-Afnan.

[2] See particularly its issues of April 25th, 26th, 28th, 29th; May 4th, 7th, 9th to 13th, 21st, 23rd; June 4th, 13th, 14th.

[3] Originally published in Damascus, its editor had transferred it to Baghdad, its first number, 401, appearing on June 23rd, 1921. It had not always given its support to Faisal as King of 'Iraq. Cf. issue of November 13th, 1920.

[4] Founded in 1921 and on November 14th, 1918, respectively. Both were owned by the Government.

175x the encouragement of his partisans, the High Commissioner,
727x although obliged to maintain an outwardly neutral attitude,
643 could not in so important a question refrain from taking a hand behind the scenes. The eventual success of Faisal's candidature must be attributed in no small degree to his guiding direction. 'He is a master hand at the game of politics,' wrote Miss Bell on June 12th, 1921, 'it's an education to watch him playing it.'[1]

Members of his staff and the British Advisers throughout the country, although nominally neutral, were not so restricted in practice, as Saiyid Talib had pointed out on April 14th. It devolved particularly on Miss Bell, as an enthusiastic supporter of Amīr Faisal, rather than as Oriental Secretary, although the prestige of her position and the knowledge acquired through it contributed greatly to her effectiveness, to take the leading personal role in developing and organizing public opinion for Faisal.[2]

The early statement by H.M. Government of its approval of the candidature of Amīr Faisal, followed by Faisal's own announcement that he intended to present himself as a candidate, the declaration of a general amnesty and the efforts of the Amīr's supporters in 'Iraq had been expected, in accordance with the schedule approved of at Cairo, to start the ball rolling in his direction.

Neither the announcements nor the amnesty were immediately forthcoming, however, although they had been foreshadowed in the High Commissioner's *communiqué* of April 12th,[3] following his return from Cairo. H.M. Government had felt it inexpedient to make its announcement until it had secured the formal approval of the League of Nations for the Mandate. This was being delayed in deference to the inquiries of the United States Government as to Great Britain's intentions

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[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 598; also pp. 599, 602, 606-8.

[2] Miss Bell's letters during this period, ibid., pp. 582-624, partially indicate the decisive role she played in the installation of Faisal. According to Amin Rihānī, *Ibn Sa'oud*, p. 8, she later seemed to regret the role she had played.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, April 12th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 4.

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regarding the 'Open Door' in 'Iraq, where, the former main- 175x
tained, citing the San Remo Agreement as evidence, that 727x
Great Britain had assumed a position inconsistent with the 643
draft Mandate which was specific on the point of economic equality.[1] The amnesty did not appear until May 30th,[2] due to prolonged consultations with the Quai d'Orsay and the Government of India.

Without the announcements, the situation in 'Iraq hung fire in spite of the strenuous efforts made by Faisal's partisans in the expectation that the Cairo schedule would be followed. It was clear that many of the 'Iraqis were holding back for a definite lead. The answers of Sharīf Husain to the telegrams sent him by 'Iraqī notables, asking that he send one of his sons to 'Iraq, were too vague to give the desired stimulus, although they were regarded by many as having been inspired by H.M. Government — it was generally known that he had drawn a subsidy from the British Government.[3] In Mōsul, where strong sentiment existed in favour of Amīr Faisal, the efforts of the Baghdad Sharifian party to secure co-operation in sending letters to Sharīf Husain were deemed an attempt to force the issue, which should be left to the Constituent Assembly.

Not until early June did the official machinery begin to move, and then according to a modified form of the original Cairo schedule. In the first week of June, H.M. Government telegraphed permission to the Hijāz that Faisal might leave for 'Iraq. Accordingly telegrams from the Sharīf, announcing that he was sending his son Faisal to the Arabs of 'Iraq, were

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[1] Article 11 of the Draft Mandate for Mesopotamia, *Accts. and Papers*, 1921 (Cmd. 1176), xliii, 721. For this controversy, which aroused much ill feeling on both sides, see ibid., 1921 (Cmd. 1226) xliii, 481; 1921 (Cmd. 1351), xliii, 493. Also Gerig, B., *The Open Door and the Mandate System* (1930), Ch. vi; Secretary Hughes, *New York Times*, October 24th, 1924.

[2] Text: *Baghdad Times* and *Basrah Times*, May 30th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 5.

[3] His subsidy had ceased in February, 1920. It was renewed subsequent to Faisal's enthronement, but only a single payment of £5000 was made in August, 1921, as the Sharīf failed to live up to the conditions imposed: *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., Vol. XLIX (1922), pp. 241-3.

175 dispatched to 'Iraqī notables.[1] Accompanied by three A.D.C.s,
727 his private secretary, Colonel Cornwallis (his personal Adviser)
and a party of 'Iraqī notables,[2] Amīr Faisal left Jidda on
643 June 12th, on R.I.M.S. *Northbrook*.[3]

The Election of Faisal

The Amīr arrived at Basra on June 23rd. Three weeks later, the Council of State unanimously declared him King of 'Iraq.

In spite of the delays, the stage was well set for his reception. Mr. Churchill's long awaited statement in the House of Commons, June 14th,[4] was published in 'Iraq, June 17th.[5] The Naqīb and the Turkish party were disappointed at its pro-Sharifian tone. They held that Mr. Churchill's statement that:

> They [H.M. Government] wish to make it clear, however, as they have repeatedly stated, that there is no intention or desire whatever of forcing a particular ruler on the people. On the contrary, it is desired that there will be complete freedom of choice and expression of opinion,

hardly harmonized with his declaration:

> H.M. Government consider the Amīr Faisal a suitable candidate, indeed, the most suitable candidate in the field, and hope that he will secure the support of the majority of the people of 'Iraq.

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 13th and 21st, 1921. Sharīf Husain's telegram to the Naqīb is as follows:

'Having regard to the needs of the nation and the desire of the inhabitants, my son Faisal has left for your region. Owing to our relationship, I must say to you that it behoves us all to unite so as to give rest to the land, fulfilling its hopes and safeguarding its future. All this will come to pass through your good intentions and your religious and national sentiments. May God prosper you. – Husain.'

[2] These included a number of Nationalist leaders responsible for the Insurrection, as Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Saiyid Nūr, Saiyid Hādī Mūqutar, 'Alī Bazirgān, and 'Alī Jaudāt Beg. See *Al-'Iraq*, June 27th, 1921.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 18th, 1921.

[4] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 265 ff.

[5] *Al-'Iraq*. June 17th, 1921. The version as published in the official *communiqué*, which is cited above, differs somewhat from that appearing in *Parliamentary Debates* (q.v.). See also *Baghdad Times*, June 17th, 1921, and *Basrah Times*, June 19th, 1921.

Nor did his first statement agree with the intimation that no 175x
other candidate would be considered, since H.M. Government 727x
regarded a republic as unsuitable for 'Iraq and they would not 643
'tolerate the alternative of a Turkish Prince'.

The Sharifian party, on the other hand, was delighted and the public as a whole, it was believed, was glad to have a definite lead from the British Government.[1]

The Naqīb's attitude to the Amīr, however, was above reproach.[2] He led the Council in giving a national aspect to the Amīr's reception. Five Council members were appointed, on June 16th,[3] to arrange for ceremonies and for lodging befitting the distinguished visitor: the former King of Syria and the son of a King. A mass meeting of some five hundred people, on June 17th, held under the auspices of Nājī Pasha and the *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, at the suggestion of Miss Bell and with the approval of the High Commissioner, arranged for Baghdad's share in the Amīr's reception. It also selected sixty notables to go to Basra to welcome Faisal on his arrival there. In addition, the Mayor of Baghdad sent telegrams to the principal towns, suggesting that they send delegations to greet Faisal.

Amīr Faisal arrived at Baghdad, June 29th, somewhat shaken by the manner of his reception in the south. He and his entourage had been led to believe, before arriving at Basra, that the country was solidly supporting him. His reception at Basra by the notables of that city[4] and of Baghdad, headed by Ja'far

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 17th, 1921, and *Lisān al-'Arab*, June 24th, 1921. The latter wrote: 'The Arabs welcome it with great pleasure.'

[2] The Naqīb telegraphed the following welcome to Faisal:

'To the light of the Candle of the family of the Prophet, the Pearly Star in the heaven of honour, H. H. the Amīr Faisal.

'I have received with respect Your Highness' telegram which proves your Hāshimī sentiments towards me and gives me the happy news of your arrival. Our hearts have been filled with pleasure. We thank you for your speedy and safe arrival. The ministers and the nation welcome you.' (*Al-'Iraq*, June 24th, 1921).

[3] June 11th as recorded in *Political Developments in Méso.*, p. 5, is obviously erroneous.

[4] Three days before Faisal's arrival, the High Commissioner had been forced to discourage severely a petition from Basra bearing about 4500 signatures, asking that Basra be given a separate legislature and full independence in financial, military and police affairs, under the king chosen by 'Iraq.

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175* Pasha, Mr. Philby, representing the High Commissioner, Major
727* W. C. F. Wilson, Adviser of the Basra *Liwā* and Colonel J. H. F.
643 Lakin, representing the General Officer Commanding, had been excellent.[1] His reception elsewhere had been decidely disappointing. At Ur Junction, the gathering from Nāsirīya had been small and cold. At Samāwa, a large number of shaikhs and tribesmen had turned out and at Dīwānīya, the audience had been fair, but there had been little enthusiasm. At Karbalā, the Indian *Qaimmaqām*, who had little faith in Arab self-government, had left the town the day before Faisal's arrival, without indicating the official attitude towards the Amīr. After an interview with the High Commissioner, however, he had returned to Karbalā and attempted to make suitable preparations, but there had been no spontaneity and the '*Ulamā* stood markedly aloof. At Najaf, the '*Ulamā* had been reserved, if not hostile. At Tuwairiji and at Hilla, however, Faisal had been more cordially received.[2]

At the capital, however, where he was greeted on his arrival by the High Commissioner, his staff and a huge crowd of 'Iraqi notables, the enthusiasm of his welcome was reassuring. The dense and cheering crowds which filled the capital, bedecked with the Sharifian colours, green, red, and black, gave additional proof that the city accepted him.[3] The ovation given him the next day at Kādhimain, where he prayed in the mosque according to the Shī'a rite, was as remarkable as that of Baghdad.

The enthusiasm of these receptions, regarding which his

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[1] *Basrah Times*, June 24th, 25th; *Al-'Iraq* and *Baghdad Times*, June 27th, 1921. The Baghdad and Basra Committees were not present when Faisal arrived. They had gone down stream to meet the *Northbrook*, but they failed to recognize it until too late.

[2] The lack of enthusiasm and of adequate preparations in the Lower and Middle Euphrates areas was probably not unrelated to the predilection of the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, who was in charge of making arrangements, for a republic and with his subsequent relinquishment of office in early July. *Communiqué*, *Al-'Iraq*, July 7th, 1921; also Cox, Sir P. Z.: 'Historical Summary' in Bell, op. cit., p. 528.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 30th, 1921.

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supporters had been genuinely concerned, tended to simplify 175
the situation, but anxious moments were by no means over. 727
The failure of the inhabitants of the lower Euphrates to come 643
forward as expected and the aloofness of the Shī'a divines were disconcerting. It was believed that the Muntafiq tribes were preparing a great manifesto in favour of a republic. Rumours of the formal disapproval of the *Mujtahids* were in the air. The pro-Turks were coldly hostile; the supporters of Saiyid Talib Pasha were sullen; and many people outside the cities were still indifferent. Against these unfavourable manifestations, however, could be set the stream of delegates from the towns of northern 'Iraq, the approbation of Basra and Baghdad, the prospect of approval from Mōsul which had sent a strong and substantial delegation and the gradual winning over of the shaikhs and notables, including the Naqīb's strongest supporter, 'Alī as-Sulaimān, through the efforts of Sir Percy Cox, Miss Bell and Faisal himself. Of the latter Miss Bell wrote, on July 7th, 1922: 'What helps everything is that Faisal's personality goes three quarters of the way. He has been roping in adherents.'[1] His simple dignity, great personal charm and his eloquent speeches, heartwarming and full of wisdom, continued to win the confidence and support of the communities before which he appeared: Christians,[2] Jews,[3] Sunnīs,[4] and Shī'īs,[5] although his reception at Najaf and Karbalā had been markedly restrained.

Anxiety for the success of his candidature had not diminished the apprehension lest the more ardent Nationalists should

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[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 608.

[2] As at a reception given by the Catholic Christian Community, Baghdad, July 30th, 1921. For excerpts from his speech see Appendix VII (v).

[3] For excerpts of speech made at the House of the Grand Rabbi see Appendix VII (iii).

[4] For speech to the Mōsul delegation see Appendix VII (i); also various speeches, as at the Ja'fariya School, July 9th; *Al-Dijla*, July 11th, 1921. The outburst demanding complete independence at the latter meeting was toned down in *Al-Dijla*.

[5] As at Kādhimain, June 30th, and at the Husainiya School, July 4th, 1921. See *Al-Dijla*, July 10th, 1921.

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attempt to turn the popular enthusiasm into a *coup d'état*. Outbursts coupling complete independence and an immediate declaration of allegiance to Faisal as King of 'Iraq had already occurred, as at meetings held in Faisal's honour on July 4th and 9th.[1] Suggestions that Faisal might be immediately acclaimed King had also come to the ears of the High Commissioner.[2] Neither he nor Faisal wished it to be said in the future that Faisal owed his throne, not to the will of the people, constitutionally expressed, but rather to a *coup d'état* initiated by the Nationalists who, in return, would expect to influence policy in the direction of complete independence and to share in the administration of the kingdom. The Residency, moreover, had borne the brunt of the battle and it must enjoy the fruits of the victory. Faisal, on his side, had little wish to be placed so soon under obligations to any group, which, if its expectations were not fulfilled, would be the first to turn against him.

The agreement reached at the Cairo Conference that the country should be made, if possible, to declare itself without the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, found support with large groups of Faisal's more moderate adherents. It was now echoed, apparently without inspiration from the Residency, in the vernacular press which dropped its original insistence on the immediate convocation of the National Assembly in order to press for a referendum.[3] Faisal himself joined in the insistence for prompt action.

The High Commissioner, feeling that the propitious moment had arrived, took immediate steps. In reply to a letter, July 8th, from the Council of State, inquiring, at his suggestion,[4]

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[1] *Al-Dijla*, July 10th and 11th, 1921.

[2] Bell, op. cit., pp. 601, 602; also *Al-Dijla*, July 2nd, 1921. The Mayor of Mu'adhdham, on July 12th, called together the leading citizens and shaikhs, who declared Faisal to be their King, *Al-'Iraq*, July 13th, 1921.

[3] *Lisān al-'Arab*, on July 2nd and 5th, urged the convocation of the Assembly, but on July 6th, recommended a referendum, also on July 8th, 9th and 13th. *Al-'Iraq* insisted on a referendum on July 8th, 9th and 11th; also *Al-Fallāh*, July 10th, 1921.

[4] Bell, op. cit., pp. 607-8.

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as to the immediate cause of the delay in promulgating the 175ʸ
Election Law and as to whether he had any objection to its 727ˣ
immediate publication,[1] he stated that the delay had been due 643
to the difficulty 'in finding a formula which would cover the cases of several Kurdish Communities in 'Iraq'. In view of 'the cogent reasons' now before the Council, he was ready to promulgate the Law if suitable arrangements could be made for the Kurds. He feared, however, that the time required for convening the Assembly would be not less than three months. He then pointed out:

> There appears to be an increasingly insistent demand on the part of the public for an immediate opportunity to decide who shall be ruler.
>
> To obtain this early decision less centralized machinery will have to be devised and the High Commissioner, in so far as it rests with him, will be glad to facilitate any appropriate special measures which the Council may recommend for the purpose.[2]

Without further suggestion from the High Commissioner, the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the President, the Naqīb, on July 11th passed a unanimous resolution declaring:

> H.H. Amīr Faisal King of 'Iraq, provided that His Highness's Government shall be constitutional, representative and democratic and limited by law.[3]

The Council passed a further unanimous resolution to communicate its decision to the Minister of Interior in order that it might take necessary action.

Both the High Commissioner and Faisal were delighted with the Council's action, but they agreed that it was still necessary

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[1] Letter No. 131/S, Secretary, Council of Ministers, to Secretary to the High Commissioner, July 8th, 1921.

[2] Letter SD/1631, Secretary to the High Commissioner to Secretary, Council of State, July 8th, 1921.

[3] Extract from Minutes of Council of Ministers, July 11th, 1921: *Al-'Iraq* and *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 15th, 1921.

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to hold a referendum in order to prove to the world that Amīr Faisal really had the voice of the people. Using his prerogative of confirming resolutions of the Council,[1] the High Commissioner announced that the resolution of July 11th must be supported by the assent of the people, ascertained by a referendum, before he would grant his approval.

In initiating the referendum, every effort was taken to ensure the desired results. Opinion on the resolution was expressed in most *Liwās* by the *Mutasarrif* and the British Advisers. In other *Liwās*, as Karbalā, the meetings were summoned by the British Adviser or by trusted Government officials. In Basra *Liwā*, selected representatives of the population were called in groups to make their declarations in the presence of an Election Committee. Official *madhbatas* were printed, any deviation from which by the addition of Nationalist proposals, was punished,[2] while riders declaring for further British support were not only permitted but encouraged.[3] In addition, the manner of registering the decisions, whereby the vote of the majority of a town or district was counted as its unanimous vote and the 'politics running on wheels greased with extremely well-melted grease'[4] tended to produce the desired decision.

Nevertheless, the Government did not have its own way entirely. The official *madhbata* did not meet the approval of the Shī'īs. Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, a Shī'a *'Alim* of high standing drew up a formula strongly insisting on freedom from external control[5] and a party was formed to stir up agitation on its behalf. On July 28th, at a mass meeting in Baghdad, ostensibly summoned to sign the official *madhbata*, a modified declaration

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[1] Instructions for Council of State, Sec. 10.

[2] The *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad was forced to resign for permitting the additions to the *madhbatas*.

[3] The High Commissioner telegraphed permission for the addition of riders asking for continued British control. The Advisers, as at Diwānīya, used this permission to obtain such declarations.

[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 611.

[5] Cited in *Al-'Iraq*, July 16th, 1921.

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was presented and approved without a dissenting vote.[1] The altered form was presented to the voters of Baghdad, July 29th, with the result that sixty-six of the eighty declarations of Baghdad made the acceptance of Faisal conditional on two points: that 'Iraq should be independent of foreign sovereignty and that the Constituent Assembly should be convened in three months. Kirkūk *Liwā*, still hesitating between joining 'Iraq or the Kurdish enclaves, voted against Faisal. Sulaimāniya took no part in the referendum. In Mōsul, many of the declarations accepted Faisal on the condition that the rights of the Kurds and the minorities should be protected.

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Elsewhere, the referendum proceeded quietly. Both at Karbalā and at Najaf, through the skill and assiduity of the *Mutasarrif*, the official formula was signed without additions. In Hilla, many of the forty-one declarations contained a rider, added by permission telegraphed by the High Commissioner, that Faisal was accepted on condition that the British Mandate would continue. Sixteen of the twenty-six Dulaim declarations, five of the seven 'Amāra statements and a number of those from Mōsul added similar provisos. In the Shāmīya country, as at Dīwānīya, voters made a similar condition after the Adviser had informed them that they might add any words they liked. So certain was the result of the referendum that, before it was half completed and a month before his formal accession, Amīr Faisal, at Ramādī, August 25th, received the oath of allegiance as King of 'Iraq from the shaikhs and tribesmen of the Dulaim and the 'Anaiza and from the towns of the Upper Euphrates from Ramādī to Al-Qaim.[2] On August 15th the Naqīb was asked to undertake the formation of the first Cabinet for the new kingdom.[3]

The referendum, as it was carried out, was hardly a gauge

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[1] The altered declaration is given in *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 27th, 1921.

[2] *Al-Dijla*, August 1st; *Baghdad Times*, August 5th, 1921 (Fahād Beg's pro-British outburst was omitted); Bell, op. cit., pp. 613-15. For excerpts from Faisal's speech to the Shaikhs, see Appendix VII.

[3] Bell, op. cit., p. 618.

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175* 127* 643 of spontaneous popular support for Amīr Faisal, as official Reports would suggest,[1] nor was it entirely the 'hasty pretence' assumed by some popular writers.[2] It undoubtedly reflected the views of 'Iraq's leading inhabitants at the time, as had the plebiscite of 1918-19, which it resembled in a number of aspects. Its result, as published, however, did not constitute a true cross-section of 'Iraqī opinion, as might have been obtained at a general election or in a Constituent Assembly. It is quite probable that the anxiety of the High Commissioner and of Faisal for an immediate declaration, backed by a referendum, was not due only to the fear of a *coup d'état* or to the necessity of vindicating the assurances of H.M. Government. It may have been based on the knowledge that any election would increase the chances against Faisal, although the majority of the country's natural leaders, the shaikhs, the landlords and the notables, would probably have voted then for Faisal as they did in the referendum, either from a genuine regard for him or from the more likely desire to follow the lead of the Government, a factor on which the High Commissioner and his staff had steadfastly counted. In view of the altered tone of the country in the next few months, subsequent to the revelation that the proposed treaty did not mean abrogation of the Mandate, a fact hitherto suppressed, it seems possible that had the decision been left to an Assembly elected by the country, no verdict for Faisal as favourable as a 96 per cent majority vote of the population could have been announced.[3]

Not all the difficulties which faced the Residency in these crucial days had their origin in the state of public opinion in 'Iraq. The Colonial Office, in the middle of August, sent a

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 9; *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 14.

[2] Kohn, Hans: *Nationalism and Imperialism*, p. 212; *History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 309; Coke, R.: *The Arab's place in the Sun*, p. 245.

[3] It is difficult to understand how this figure was obtained. The population of Kirkūk, whether taken on the basis of the 1918-19 census or on that of 1930, forms approximately 6 per cent of the population of 'Iraq, exclusive of Sulaimāniya.

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cable to the High Commissioner stating that Faisal in his 175ˣ
coronation speech must declare that the ultimate authority in 727ˣ
'Iraq lay with the High Commissioner. 693

Faisal immediately protested that he could not go on if such a statement were required. He pointed out that in the conversations held in London, he had accepted the candidature for the throne on the understanding that a treaty of alliance to replace the Mandate would be negotiated and that his prestige and dignity as king would be safeguarded. It was essential that he appear as an independent sovereign in alliance with Great Britain if he were to win over the extreme Nationalists. The High Commissioner also pointed out to the Colonial Office the unfavourable effect which the announcement would have on the country as well as on Faisal. He submitted that sufficient control could be exercised by less obvious methods. The order was eventually modified, a few days before the enthronement on August 23rd, the day selected by Faisal.[1]

Long before the hour set for the ceremony of accession, six o'clock of the morning of August 23rd, all available space in the great *Sarai* Square was filled with tribal shaikhs, religious dignitaries, civil and military officials and notables from all parts of 'Iraq, save Kirkūk and Sulaimāniya. The *Sarai* itself had been decorated with multitudes of 'Iraqī flags of black, white, green and red, and with banners bearing loyal inscriptions. Smart recruits of the National Army were drawn up around the Square. The 1st Royal Berkshires furnished the guard of honour.[2]

Promptly at six o'clock, Amīr Faisal made his appearance, accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Colonel Cornwallis and A.D.C.s and proceeded across the Square to the raised dais. After Amīr Faisal's salutations to

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[1] This day was chosen by Faisal because it coincided with the Shī'a feast of Al-Ghadir, commemorating the nomination of 'Alī as master of the people by the Prophet Muhammad.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, August 24th, 1921; but cf. Bell, op. cit., pp. 620-1, where the Dorsets are mentioned.

175 the assembly, the party was seated, Sir Percy Cox on the right
643 and Sir Aylmer Haldane on the left of the Amir.

727 Saiyid Husain al-Afnan, Secretary to the Council of Ministers, read the High Commissioner's proclamation which stated that, in accordance with the referendum on the resolution of the Council of State of July 11th, the Amir Faisal had been elected King of ‘Iraq by 96 per cent of the people. He then cried ‘Long live the King’. The ‘Iraq standard was broken out, the military band played ‘God Save the King’ — there was no Arab National Anthem — and a royal salute of twenty-one guns was fired.

After a short oration by Saiyid Mahmūd, eldest son of the Naqīb, Faisal spoke with great dignity. He thanked the ‘Iraq nation for its generous and freely given allegiance and the British nation for its support of Arab independence, in which cause he called to mind the services of his father and of the Arabs associated with him. He also thanked

> the provisional Government for its zealous services and His Excellency the High Commissioner for his sincere friendship and the Great British Government for its reception of me as King of the Independent State of ‘Iraq, to which high office I am called by the direct will of the Nation.

He outlined the aims of the nation, to achieve which, unity among all classes and the assistance of the friendly British nation would be necessary. He then made known his policy as head of the kingdom:

> I will spare no effort to profit by the qualities of every man of the nation, irrespective of religion or class. All to me shall be equal. There shall be no distinction between townsman and Bedui; for me the sole distinction shall be that of knowledge and capacity. The whole nation is my party and I have no other. The interests of the country as a whole are my interest and I have no other.
>
> My first task will be to proceed with the elections and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The nation should

understand that it is this congress that will in consultation 175
with me draw up the Constitution of its independence on the 727
basis of democratic government and define the fundamental 643
principles of political and social life. Finally it will confirm the Treaty which I shall lay before it, regarding the relations which are to exist between our Government and the Great British Government. Furthermore, the Congress will establish the freedom of religion and worship so that all men may follow their own law and religion provided it does not conflict with security and public morals.

It will also enact certain Judicial Laws which will safeguard the interests of foreigners and insure them against any interference with their religion, race or language and will guarantee equity of commercial dealings with the foreign countries. In this connection I am confident that in consultation with Sir Percy Cox who has proved his friendship to the Arabs in a manner which will ever live in their affectionate memory, we shall, please God, reach our goal.

I appeal to you for union and co-operation, deep deliberation and insight. You must seek knowledge and must work. For the rest, it is for God to help us and grant us success.[1]

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, August 24th, 1921.

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CHAPTER XIX

INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY

175 THE accession of Faisal marked a step forward in the creation
727 of the new state. The next step was the negotiation of the
648 treaty which, since the Cairo Conference, had become the basis of Anglo-ʻIraqī relations. King Faisal himself had welcomed the proposed arrangement since only by representing ʻIraq as an independent nation, in treaty relationship with Great Britain, could he control the Nationalists. He had not been alone in advocating the treaty. *Lisān al-ʻArab* had made the suggestion in late 1920, while Nūrī Pasha had advocated a treaty to govern Anglo-ʻIraqī relations, in February 1921,[1] as had also Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī somewhat later.[2]

Between the British Government's concept of the treaty and that of the ʻIraqīs, however, lay an unbridgeable gulf. To the British Government, the treaty was a means of replacing the mandatory document in regulating its relationship to ʻIraq, at less cost and with less friction than under direct administration, but with no alteration in the position of Great Britain *vis-à-vis* the League of Nations. The Mandate from the League was to be retained as giving Great Britain the juridical right to remain in ʻIraq. The treaty was a method of establishing Amīr Faisal as a contracting party with sufficient power to enable him to administer the country but not to render him dangerous to British interests which the treaty was to safeguard. The treaty was, in short, a method of control.[3]

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, p. 589.

[2] Ibid., p. 602.

[3] It was officially stated by the Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, November 17th, 1921, that the Treaty would be designed to secure 'first, the control of His Majesty's Government over the foreign relations of Iraq; secondly, the due fulfilment of the international obligations incurred by His Majesty's Government by treaty, mandate or agreement; thirdly, such measure of financial control as may be necessary'. (*Official Journal*, League of Nations, No. 10-12 (1921), pp. 1216-17.)

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To the 'Iraqis, the treaty meant the disappearance of the 175*
detested Mandate, the very mention of which aroused bitter 727*
antagonism.[1] It signified nationhood and independence, since 648*
treaties could only be concluded between independent nations.[2] It was, moreover, the procedure whereby 'Iraq as an undeveloped and poverty-stricken nation was to receive at will support and assistance from Great Britain, as had the Arab State at Damascus, but not by necessity, as implied in the mandatory system which was held by 'Iraqis to be synonymous with colonization.[3] The treaty, in brief, meant national independence.

In these differences of view-point lay the roots of the future conflict between Great Britain and 'Iraq during the next decade.

Although Amīr Faisal seems to have fully understood that the British Government, in replacing the mandatory document by a treaty, had no intention of relinquishing the Mandate,[4] he gave no indication of the fact prior to his enthronement, either in statements to the Press[5] or in speeches to the 'Iraqis.[6] Indeed, in all his public utterances it was the independence of 'Iraq in alliance with a friendly Power, which was stressed, rather than any limitations to be imposed by the treaty.[7] H.M. Government, on its side, gave no discouragement to the widespread belief that the election of a ruler and the signing of the treaty meant abolition of the Mandate. The congratulatory telegram from H.M. King George to H.M. King Faisal on the occasion of his accession and King Faisal's reply[8] had con-

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[1] For the basis of this antagonism see *supra*, pp. 261-3.

[2] *Al-Mufid*, February 24th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 24th, 1922.

[3] Ibid., May 12th, 15th, June 8th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 7th, June 5th, 1922; *Al-Rāfidān*, June 5th, 1922; also *supra*, pp. 262-3.

[4] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 14.

[5] As in an interview at Cairo in early April, on his way to Mecca: *Morning Post*, April 12th, 1921.

[6] See Appendix VII and his Coronation speech, *supra*.

[7] Ibid., especially (i) Speech to Mōsul Delegation, (ii) Speech to Ministers, (v) Speech to Catholic Community and his Coronation speech, *supra*.

[8] See Appendix VIII.

175x firmed that belief.[1] Even after the enthronement, when
727x Reuter's telegram, stating that the draft Mandate for 'Iraq had
648x come before the League of Nations for approval, was published
in 'Iraq, on September 8th, it was accompanied by a lengthy official *communiqué* intended to quiet Nationalist apprehension.[2] The *communiqué* explained that the slow-moving machinery engaged in the production of the Mandate, once started, 'could not be stopped until its work was done . . . although it is common knowledge that the relations of the two Governments are now to be determined in another way'. It stated that its 'obligations to the people of this country and to the League of Nations, the British Government has no intention of repudiating', but the effect of the statement was neutralized by the emphasis on the fact that 'the Mandate as drafted . . . has now become an obsolete vehicle for the expression of relations that will exist between the Government of Great Britain and of 'Iraq from now onward'.

The newly aroused Nationalist suspicions were confirmed in the first unequivocal statement since June 17th, 1920, of the intentions of H.M. Government towards 'Iraq, made by the Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher at Geneva, November 17th, 1921. On that date, Mr. Fisher, after informing the League that Great Britain found it expedient to operate the Mandate by means of a treaty, stated:

> It will be understood that the proposed treaty will serve merely to regulate the relations between his Majesty's Government, as Mandatory Power, and the Arab Government of Irak. It is not intended as a substitute for the Mandate, which will remain the operation document defining the obligations undertaken by his Majesty's Government on behalf of the League of Nations.[3]

In spite of the efforts to minimize Mr. Fisher's statement

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[1] *Al-Mufid*, August 19th, 1922.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, September 8th, 1921.

[3] *Official Journal, League of Nations*, No. 10-12 (1921), p. 1217.

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by the insertion of articles in the 'Iraq local press,[1] the speech 175*
was followed by a revival of active anti-Mandate agitation.[2] 727*
Such feeling had for some time past lain more or less dormant 647*
due to the general desire to see if Great Britain would fulfil her promises; to the excitement incidental to the election of a ruler; to the depreciation of the mandatory relationship by partisans of the rival candidates, who had hoped thereby to win the goodwill of H.M. Government; and, above all, to the encouragement of the belief that the prospective treaty meant full independence. In the end, the anti-Mandate agitation was to show such vigour and strength as to imperil the peace of the country and to convince the High Commissioner of the necessity of taking the reins of power into his own hands once again.

Drafting of the Treaty

The actual drafting of the treaty in so far as it replaced the mandatory document was a 'straightforward though delicate problem', according to Major H. W. Young who arrived in Baghdad, October 15th, 1921,[3] to assist in the treaty negotiations. Following the example set by the Bonham-Carter Committee when it had incorporated principles of the Mandate in its abortive Constitution,[4] the specific obligations originally assumed by Great Britain in the mandatory document[5] were embodied, as far as possible, in articles in the treaty, King Faisal undertaking on behalf of the 'Iraq Government to carry out the obligations with British support and assistance.

The obligations laid on the mandatory Power to frame an

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[1] *Lisān al-'Arab*, December 2nd, 1921; *Baghdad Times*, November 28th, 1921; *Al-'Iraq*, December 2nd, 1921.

[2] On November 20th and 23rd, Nationalist leaders, including Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Shaikh Ahmad, Ja'far abū Timman, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, and others formulated a list of demands, which, if not granted, would be followed by a declaration deposing King Faisal. Police Report, Baghdad, November 26th, 1921.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, October 19th, 1921.

[4] *Supra*, pp. 201-2.

[5] *Accts. and Papers*, 1921 (Cmd. 1500), xliii, 731.

Organic Law and to ensure religious and educational freedom, contained in Articles One and Eight of the Mandate, were thus reproduced in Article III of the Treaty,[1] with the additional proviso that the Organic Law should prescribe constitutional procedure within the country.

Article V of the Treaty replaced Article Three of the Mandate providing, in terms suitable to the regime, for 'Iraqi representatives abroad, and for representation of foreign Powers in 'Iraq, subject to the approval of His Britannic Majesty. Article VIII of the Treaty reproduced Article Four of the Mandate, which had forbidden the ceding or leasing of 'Iraq territory; Article IX noted the non-application of immunities under the capitulations, which Article Five of the Mandate had definitely abrogated. Article VIII also contained the first section of Article Six, providing for the establishment of a judicial system to safeguard the interests of foreigners. The King of 'Iraq now agreed to 'accept and give effect to such reasonable provisions as His Britannic Majesty may consider necessary in judicial matters'. Article XI reproduced almost exactly that section of Article Eleven of the mandatory document which had ensured economic equality in the mandated territory to all members of the League. One important addition was made, however. A new clause extended economic equality to 'any State to which His Britannic Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same rights should be ensured as if it were a member of the said League'. This addition had its origin in the satisfactory termination of the Colby-Curzon correspondence over the 'Open Door' principle in mandated territories.[2]

The final section of Article Eleven, which had sanctioned the arrangement of a Customs union with other Arab States,

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[1] Numbers written in full are employed throughout in reference to the mandatory document (Cmd. 1500); Roman numerals refer to articles of the Treaty of 1922. Ibid., 1922 (Cmd. 1757), iv, 769.

[2] Ibid., 1921 (Cmd. 1226), xliii, 2181; 1921 (Cmd. 1351), xliii, 495; U.S. Senate Document No. 97, Oil Concessions in Foreign Countries, 68th Congress, 1st Session, p. 55; Gerig, op. cit., pp. 140-1, 143-4.

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was made into a separate Article, XVI, in the Treaty. Article Ten of the Mandate, which guaranteed freedom to missionary enterprise, found a place in the Treaty as Article XII. Article XII providing for co-operation by 'Iraq 'in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease' reproduced Article Thirteen in the mandatory document. The enactment of a Law of Antiquities, to replace the Ottoman Law and to ensure equality of treatment in archaeological research, was guaranteed by H.M. King Faisal in Article XIV of the Treaty, replacing Article Fourteen of the Mandate, in which the Mandatary had undertaken to enact the law.

Article XV of the Treaty reproduced that section of the correspondingly numbered Article in the Mandate, which had provided that the new Government should assume the cost of public works, the benefit of which would pass to the State. In addition, it provided for a separate financial agreement to regulate the transfer of such works and the progressive liquidation of the financial obligation for them, as well as for other financial assistance to 'Iraq. Article XVII, as had Article Nineteen of the Mandate, made provision for referring disputes arising from the interpretation of the Treaty to the Permanent Court of International Justice.[1] The English text was designated as the authoritative version.

Articles Two, Seven, Nine, Twelve, Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen of the mandatory document found no counterparts in the Treaty or else were so modified as to lose their original form. Several new articles, on the other hand, found their way into the Treaty.

Once these obligations had been reproduced in the Treaty, other difficulties arose. How were the terms of the Treaty and of subsequent laws to be ensured? If the King or his Ministers, individually or collectively, took steps contrary to good administration, for which Great Britain had become responsible

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[1] As provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

175 by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,[1] or
127 detrimental to British or international interests, what measures
648 of control were at the disposal of the High Commissioner? What was to be the position of the High Commissioner in the kingdom?

In addition, how were Great Britain's particular interests in 'Iraq's finances and military organization and her responsibility for the judicial system and for rendering administrative advice and assistance to be safeguarded under the new Treaty? The position of the British officials, both on the High Commissioner's staff and in the 'Iraq Government administrative services, had to be formulated and defined. The last question had already occupied the attention of several sessions of the Council of Ministers.

In reaching a solution of these problems, British experiences in Egypt and Palestine were drawn upon, Major Young having obtained numerous suggestions from Sir Gilbert Clayton, Sir Maurice Amos and Mr. E. S. Scott and from the Palestinian authorities on his way to Baghdad.[2] In consultation with the High Commissioner the conclusion was reached that, while the ultimate responsibility for ensuring observance of the Treaty rested on the High Commissioner, he should divest himself of executive authority, such as had tended to complicate the position of High Commissioners in Egypt. His control should be that of Adviser to the King of 'Iraq. The latter, by a special article incorporated in the Treaty, would recognize the High Commissioner's position as representing His Britannic Majesty and would promise to be guided by his advice. Sir Percy Cox had already been standing at King Faisal's elbow in such a role since the latter's arrival in 'Iraq and 'he was prepared to stake

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[1] The relevant passage in Article 22 is as follows:

'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.

[2] Young, Major Sir H. W., op. cit., pp. 328 ff.

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upon its effective continuance the due fulfilment by His 175x
Majesty's Government of their mandatory obligations'[1]. This 727
principle, which was to govern the High Commissioner's 648x
position in 'Iraq until 1932, was accordingly incorporated in the Treaty in Article IV.

Effective participation by British officials in the administration and in the judicial system, as well as definite safeguards for British financial and military interests, were eventually guaranteed by stipulating the acceptance and observance by the 'Iraq Government of definite conditions laid down in four subsidiary agreements governing the employment of British officials, military assistance, judicial and financial control.[2] Within these agreements, provided for in Articles II, VII, and XV of the Treaty, in the drafting of which the British Government was given almost a free hand, since they were completed after the Treaty had been signed, lay the heart of the Treaty. In them was revealed the real nature of 'Iraq's dependence on Great Britain.

In the agreement governing the employment of British officials, the Government of 'Iraq agreed to

> appoint a British Official approved by the High Commissioner as and when it may be requested to do so to any of the posts enumerated in Schedule I, hereto annexed.[3]

It also agreed to observe the conditions of appointment, dismissal, service and pay, which were minutely prescribed in other sections of the Agreement.

Although it was necessary to provide in the Military Agreement, subsidiary to Article VII, that 'Iraq should eventually accept full responsibility for its defence, in order to meet the demands of the British taxpayer, it was also essential that Great Britain should be in a position to guarantee peace and

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[1] Young, Major Sir H. W., op. cit., p. 334.

[2] The subsidiary Agreements, together with the Protocol of April 30th, 1923: *Accts. and Papers*, 1924 (Cmd. 2120), xxvi, 453.

[3] Ibid., British Officials' Agreement, Article I.

175 order on the road to India. The first principle was secured by
727 Article I in the Agreement, whereby 'Iraq undertook, not 'later
648 than four years from the conclusion of this agreement' to 'accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and for the defence of 'Iraq from external aggression'.[1] In order to create these necessary forces, the 'Iraq Government also undertook 'to devote not less than 25 per cent of the annual revenue of 'Iraq to defence'.[2]

In the meantime, in order that Great Britain should be in a position to guarantee that 'Iraq's military development should be on lines approved by H.B.M. Government, it was agreed that, in addition to the maintenance of British forces in 'Iraq, British assistance, at the cost of the 'Iraq Government, should take the form of:

1. Military and aeronautical instruction of 'Iraq officers in the United Kingdom so far as this may be possible.
2. The provision in sufficient quantities of arms, ammunition, equipment and aeroplanes of the latest available pattern for the 'Iraq Army.
3. The provision of British Officials whenever they may be required by the 'Iraq Government within the period of the Treaty.[3]

The Officer commanding the British Forces in 'Iraq was to be given authority to carry out inspection of the 'Iraq forces,[4] and to make recommendations concerning them. The 'Iraq Government also agreed to 'give effect to any of the recommendations of the High Commissioner regarding the movements and disposition of the 'Iraq Army',[5] and that in operations in which British-maintained forces took part, the command of the operations should be vested in a British Military Commander.[6] Other Articles provided for the application of Military Law,[1] Martial Law,[2] the protection of British Forces from disaffection or mutiny,[3] and the utilization of the railway, waterway and wireless facilities of 'Iraq.[4] 175* 727* 648*

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[1] Cmd. 2120, Military Agreement, Article I.

[2] Ibid., Article IV.

[3] Ibid., Article II.

[4] Ibid., Article VII.

[5] Ibid., Article VIII.

[6] Ibid., Article IX.

The Judicial Agreement, subsidiary to Article IX of the Treaty, re-established in a modified form the special judicial regime prevailing under the capitulations, although these were abolished in name. Foreigners, defined as 'nationals of any European or American State which formerly benefited by capitulations in Turkey'[5] and 'of any Asiatic State which is now permanently represented on the Council of the League of Nations' were to be tried by Courts containing one or more British Judges.[6] Provision was also made for right of search in the houses of foreigners.[7]

The King of 'Iraq also agreed to employ British legal experts,[8] the appointment and termination of appointments of whom were to be submitted beforehand to the High Commissioner.[9] The King undertook, as well:

> that every law affecting the jurisdiction, constitution or procedure of Courts or the appointment and discharge of Judges shall, before being presented to the legislature, be submitted in draft to the High Commissioner for his views and advice on such of its provisions as concern the interests of foreigners.[10]

Under the Financial Agreement, subsidiary to Article XV of the Treaty, the 'Iraq Government reaffirmed the financial provisions of the other Agreements;[11] accepted the transfer of public works at a valuation of Rs. 94,09,540;[12] agreed to special arrangements for the transfer of the Railways and of Basra Port;[13] and recognized its liability to assume the share of the

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[1] Cmd. 2120, Military Agreement, Article X.

[2] Ibid., Article XII.

[3] Ibid., Article XI.

[4] Ibid., Articles XIII, XIV, XV.

[5] Cmd. 2120, Judicial Agreement, Article I.

[6] Ibid., Article II.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., Article V.

[10] Ibid., Article III.

[11] Cmd. 2120, Financial Agreement, Articles II, III, IV.

[12] Ibid., Articles V, VI, VII.

[13] Ibid., Articles IX, X.

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175 Ottoman Public Debt assigned to it under the Treaty of Peace
727 with Turkey.[1] The 'Iraq Government also undertook to con-
648 tract no other financial obligations without the prior consent of
H.B.M. Government.[2]

The Agreement also provided for the acquisition of land and buildings by His Britannic Majesty[3] and for exemption from customs duties and taxes on His Britannic Majesty's property and that of British officials and forces.[4]

In determining the position of British officials employed by the 'Iraq Government, it was formally laid down that such officials should be responsible to that Government.[5] It was understood, however, that they stood in a peculiar relationship to the High Commissioner. The theory of this relationship is best summarized in the letter of appointment from the High Commissioner to all British officers entering 'Iraq service from 1921 to 1930. The relevant passages are:

> The members of the High Commissioner's staff will be the servants of His Britannic Majesty, and responsible for placing the High Commissioner in a position to offer his advice on all subjects referred to in the Treaty. You and your colleagues will be responsible to the 'Iraq Government and not to the High Commissioner, but His Majesty the King of 'Iraq has agreed that the High Commissioner should at all times be furnished with such information as he may require relating to your official duties in the 'Iraq Government; he has also agreed that the High Commissioner should be informed in advance of any step which the Government of 'Iraq proposes to take which may affect the international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty's Government. This information will be communicated through the Ministry to which you are responsible to the member of the High Commissioner's staff who is primarily concerned, and the 'Iraq Government will be

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[1] Cmd. 2120, Financial Agreement, Article XVII.

[2] Ibid., Article XII.

[3] Ibid., Article XI.

[4] Ibid., Articles XIV, XV.

[5] Cmd. 2120, British Officials' Agreement, Article VI.

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informed on each occasion that the information has been supplied. 175* 727*

The basic principle underlying the relations between the two Governments is co-operation towards a common end, namely, the establishment of an independent Government of 'Iraq, friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligation to His Britannic Majesty's Government. There is no question of His Britannic Majesty's Government pursuing a policy with any other object in view and, provided that the Treaty and its subsidiary agreements are duly observed,* the High Commissioner has been instructed that His Britannic Majesty's Government do not propose to criticize in detail or to influence in any way the detailed financial or administrative arrangements of the 'Iraq Government. 648*

The four principles upon which the co-operation of His Britannic Majesty's Government with the Government of 'Iraq must necessarily be conditional are:

(1) that the interests of foreigners are adequately protected;
(2) that the financial interests of His Britannic Majesty's Government are safeguarded;
(3) that the best possible use is made of the resources of the country; and
(4) that the administration should conform to the traditions and principles of progressive and enlightened government.

His Britannic Majesty's Government have left the fulfilment of the third and fourth of these principles to the 'Iraq Administration, since His Majesty King Faisal has agreed to employ a number of British officials which will, in the opinion of His Britannic Majesty's Government, ensure that the administration is not conducted in such a way as to prejudice their observance. The Secretary of State desires me to point out to you that although you and your colleagues will not be officially responsible to His Britannic Majesty's Government your appointment has only been approved in the full confidence that you will use your influence to secure the attainment of these objects. The Secretary of State feels that he may rely upon you to do your utmost to uphold British prestige and traditions, and that no occasion will

175* arise which will lead to the High Commissioner seeking his
227* authority to bring to the notice of His Majesty the King of
648* 'Iraq any action on your part which he may regard as detrimental thereto.

The terms of service upon which you are engaged have been set forth in a contract which has been given to you by His Majesty the King of 'Iraq.[1]

Ratification of the Treaty by the Council of Ministers

By the time of Major Young's departure for England, in early 1922, the main lines of the Treaty had been settled. The King and his Prime Minister had been consulted, but the task had remained throughout in British hands. Not until after the Council meeting of February 19th, 1922, when the Naqīb announced that neither H.M. King Faisal nor he felt able to continue the negotiations alone, was the Treaty, which had already received the approval of the Colonial Office, placed before the Council of Ministers. During the eight months the Treaty was before it, the Council suggested numerous amendments, but their main objection was that made by the King and the Nationalists: the Treaty did not specifically abrogate the Mandate relationship.

The Naqīb, in particular, agreed with the King that the interests of 'Iraq and of Great Britain required a treaty but he joined him in pointing out that the attempt of Great Britain to pose as an ally to 'Iraq and as the mandatory Power to the League of Nations was irreconcilable, as well as unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq. He hesitated to put his name to a treaty which did not satisfy national ambitions and which would displease the Muslims of India with whom he was intimately in touch and whose good opinion he valued greatly.

668 The evident reluctance of the King and his Ministers to
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175 ratify the Treaty as it stood was not uninfluenced by the increas-
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648 ing intensity of anti-Mandate sentiment, skilfully fostered by the

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[1] Cited *Progress of 'Iraq*, pp. 289-90.

Nationalists, to whom the King was inclined to turn for support. 175*
The great gathering of Sunnī and Shī'a Nationalists from all 727*
parts of 'Iraq, at Karbalā, April 12th and 13th, 1922, summoned 648*
by Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, ostensibly to consider measures of 668
defence against the Wahhābīs, whose raids in early March had 186
thrown 'Iraq into a furore of nervous excitement,[1] had been hailed as a body greater than the prospective National Assembly since it had met at the wish of the nation without the influence of the Government.[2]

Although the formal sessions actually came to little, moderate petitions replacing the original extreme demands,[3] the private meetings were more productive. From them developed the organization of much of the later agitation. The vernacular newspapers, which had steadily maintained during the spring that 'Iraq would not accept the Treaty so long as it contained a shadow of the Mandate,[4] were also to increase their virulence after the meetings.

The Residency attempted to counter this propaganda by inserting articles in the local English papers. These articles, placing the mandatory system in its most favourable light,[5] insisting that the misunderstandings of the Nationalists arose from the use of the wrong Arabic word for Mandate[6] and urging as a diversion, that 'Iraqīs should support their new army as a quick means of achieving independence,[7] merely stirred the Arabic press to fresh denunciations. The papers retorted, in unison, that the word Mandate, however translated, meant the same thing: subjection and colonization.[8] *Al-'Iraq*

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

[2] *Al-Mufīd*, April 17th, 1922. The King was believed to be giving his support to the Conference. See his telegram of thanks to the Conference, April 13th, 1922; *Al-Dijla*, April 16th, 1922; also *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, April 7th, 1922; but cf. *Al-Mufīd*, same date.

[4] *Lisān al-'Arab*, February 24th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 1st and 9th, 1922; *Al-'Iraq*, March 3rd, 1922; *Al-Jazīra* (Mōsul), April 4th, 1922.

[5] *Baghdad Times*, May 26th; July 5th, 6th, 1922.

[6] Ibid., May 27th, 29th; June 10th, 20th, 1922.

[7] Ibid., July 12th, 1922.

[8] *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-Rāfidan*, June 5th, 1922; also *supra*, pp. 261-3.

175 pointed to Syria as a typical example of what the Mandate de-
727 noted.[1] *Al-Mufīd* declared that the Mandate, 'even if veiled
648 under financial control, assistance to the army and 'Iraq repre-
668 sentatives abroad' must be abrogated.[2] 'Iraq must be created
186 independent before treaties could be made, since treaties were only possible between independent nations.[3] In answer to the statement that Great Britain could not, even if she wished, divest herself of her obligations to the League, *Al-Istiqlāl* replied:

> We cannot imagine that the League has power to force Great Britain to accept the yoke of the mandate. Everyone has the right to return any responsibility prejudicial to him and his friend. Suppose the League asked Great Britain to put her fleet at its disposal. Would Great Britain agree as she has agreed to the yoke of the mandate?[4]

Al-Mufīd declared:

> If weak nations are by terrorism and enticement to sign a document that means slavery and oppression, weak nations will find means to release themselves from responsibility.[5]

British officials themselves were not immune from newspaper criticisms; Major Yetts, Adviser for the Muntafiq *Liwā*, in particular being singled out for attack on account of his alleged pro-Mandate activities.[6]

Mr. Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons, May 23rd, 1921, to the effect that H.M. King Faisal and the 'Iraq Government had not refused to accept the Mandate,[7] added fresh fuel to the flames. At a gathering in Kādhimain, a programme of further meetings in the mosques, of monster petitions and of telegrams to the British Government and to all foreign governments was drawn up. A great gathering was planned for the evening of May 28th, in the Haidar Khāna

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 7th, 1922.

[2] *Al-Mufīd*, May 20th, 1922.

[3] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 24th, 1922.

[4] Ibid., June 23rd, 1922.

[5] *Al-Mufīd*, June 28th, 1922.

[6] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 18th; *Al-Mufīd*, June 19th; *Al-Rafidān*, June 21st, 1922.

[7] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLIII (1922), p. 995.

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mosque, a special edition of *Al-Istiqlāl* being published to urge 175*
the population to attend.[1] Prompt action by King Faisal 727
prevented disturbances at the mosque, but a committee was 648*
appointed to approach the King with protests against Mr. 668
Churchill's statement.[2] Telegrams of protest to foreign governments, 186
to the value of Rs. 1,500 (£115), were prepared but were held up at the instance of the High Commissioner, whose action was later confirmed by King Faisal.[3]

In the provinces, anti-Mandate and pro-Mandate petitions were producing a heated atmosphere, while revenue payment in the Euphrates area ceased, on the assurance of the Nationalists that the British would soon leave 'Iraq. In 'Amāra and Kūt, the great landowners viewed these assurances with great dissatisfaction. Many shaikhs, resenting the scant consideration already shown them by the Arab Government, feared the time when British control should be completely removed. On the other hand, a large body of shaikhs, including Shaikh 'Abdul Wahīd of the Fatla,[4] and tribesmen, mainly Shi'is and therefore under the influence of the '*Ulamā*, sought the overthrow of the British-controlled regime.

Tension was not lessened by the fact that in administrative circles, as early as the end of 1921, a distinction had been made, as by the *Qaimmaqām* of Abū Sukhair, between those who had taken part in the Insurrection of 1920 and those who had been and still were pro-British. The former, particularly in Hilla *Liwā*, by the special orders of the *Mutasarrif*,[5] were given light revenue assessments, facilities for payment and prompt attention to their complaints. The latter were faced with

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 28th, 1922. *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed July 7th, when the license of *Al-Tauhīd* (founded Baghdad, June 24th, 1922) was withdrawn.

[2] Ibid., May 31st, 1922; *Al-Mufīd*, June 1st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 4th, 1922. When the telegrams were held up in Baghdad, the Nationalists chartered a motor to take them to Persia, but the King was persuaded to bring pressure to bear on those concerned, to abandon the scheme.

[4] Chief instigator of the tribal revolt against the 'Iraq Government in 1935.

[5] The Mutasarrif's campaign, which he carried even into Karbalā *Liwā*, was based on (*a*) Rejection of the Treaty; (*b*) Resignation of the Cabinet; (*c*) Removal of the British provincial Advisers.

175ˣ unprecedented estimates and with demands for immediate
727 payment, while their petitions received scant consideration.

648ˣ In Baghdad, the division extended to the Council where
668 heated discussions occurred, as at its meetings of June 12th and
186 22nd. Ja'far abū Timman, Minister of Commerce, led the attack on the Treaty, declaring that all the Holy Saiyids and the pillars of Islam were opposed to it. His resignation, on June 26th, was taken as evidence of his sacrificial patriotism,[1] but in British official circles it was maintained that, realizing his post was about to be abolished, he resigned in order to win popularity among the Nationalists.[2]

Although the Council of Ministers resolved, on June 25th, to ratify the Treaty with a proviso which the High Commissioner had repeatedly urged them to drop, that the Treaty must be approved by the Constituent Assembly,[3] it was clear even before the critical days of August, that political antagonisms had received sharp definition. It was apparent that they were likely to increase in bitterness with the prospect of settlement by force only. Both sides had burned their bridges behind them. The '*Ulamā*, opposed to the Mandate, had spent heavily on propaganda and were in debt for their taxes. If they were unsuccessful in removing British control, they would be financially ruined. The moral forces on the side of the Government were stronger than in 1920 but the actual forces for repressing disorders were far smaller than two years before. Moreover, the forces included the 'Iraq army, which under the circumstances was an extremely doubtful element.

An early publication of the Treaty, together with a clear statement of the alternatives between which 'Iraqis would be forced to choose, would have cleared the air.[4] In the absence

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 27th, 1922; *Al-Tauhid*, July 2nd, 1922.

[2] *Report on 'Iraq Administration, April*, 1922—*March*, 1923, Colonial No. 4 (1924), p. 14.

[3] Ja'far abū Timman signed the resolution, dissenting, however, with most of the articles.

[4] Mr. Churchill's threat in the House of Commons, July 11th (*Parl. Debates*, Vol. CLVI (1922), p. 1121), 'to wash our hands of the whole business', only aggravated public feeling in 'Iraq. *Al-Mufid*, July 23rd, 1922.

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of a clear pronouncement of policy from H.M. Government, 175x
the demand for withdrawal from 'Iraq made by the British 127x
Press and by Parliament,[1] duly reported in 'Iraq, encouraged 648x
the Nationalists to believe that continued agitation would force 668
the British to withdraw. 186

The difficulties facing the High Commissioner and the 'Iraqis favouring the Treaty were not decreased by the attitude of H.M. King Faisal. He recognized the necessity for a treaty in accordance with the conditions of his enthronement, yet he continued to rely on the Nationalists for support in opposition to the terms of the Treaty as placed before him. Prominent Nationalists, such as Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī,[2] Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, and others had access to him. Within the palace, Fahmī al-Mudārris and Saiyid Mahdī al-Bāsīr had his private ear. Ja'far abū Timman had been his agent in reporting the Karbalā meetings.[3] Although differences of opinion had grown up between the King and the Naqīb, both of them had 'proclaimed to the listening Universe that they will never, so help them God, accept the Mandate'.[4] The undoubted opposition of the King, together with his telegram to the Karbalā Conference, his favourable reception to the Nationalists, on May 30th, and his relations with the leaders to whom presents of money were known to have been given, confirmed popular opinion that to oppose the Treaty was not to oppose the King.

As a result of his association with the Nationalists, it has since been maintained that the King had been won over to their side.[5] Such an assertion implies that he embraced Arab Nationalism

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CLI (1922), pp. 1554 ff.; Vol. CLVI (1922), pp. 1085, 1092, 1098-102, 1107 ff.

[2] By early August, however, a breach between Shaikh Mahdī and the King seems to have been complete. The latter regarded the former as pro-Turk.

[3] This did not prevent him from holding a meeting at his house, August 2nd, when the dethronement of King Faisal was put forward.

[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 643; also *Al-Mufid*, June 26th, 1922.

[5] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IX. (1922), pp. 235-7; Hooper, C. A.: *L'Iraq et la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1928), p. 33.

175* only at the instigation of the 'Iraqī Nationalists, overlooking the
727 fact that he had, in effect, early dedicated his life to the Arab
648* cause. It disregards his previous work for Arab independence
186 at every conceivable opportunity; at Constantinople; in Syria
668 after the outbreak of the war at the risk of his life; in the Arab revolt; in Damascus in the attempt to set up an Arab State; and at the Peace Conference in Paris. The rejection of Arab claims at Paris and his ejection from Syria had neither curbed nor broken his ardour, as his unpublished *Memoirs* amply confirm. He remained the Arab patriot with dreams of an Arab Federation stretching from the Taurus to the Indian Ocean.[1]

In 'Iraq he found himself the point of balance between his British mentors and his own subjects. To the former, he owed his throne, as well as support for it. To them, he owed the prospect of future development for the country, but on their own terms. To his fellow Arabs, from whom only could come the moral support and the sympathetic public opinion on which he hoped to build the 'Iraq nation, he owed loyalty to the Arab cause. Only by joining forces with the Nationalists, whose ideas rather than those of the British, more closely approximated his own, could he win from H.M. Government the concessions which would give 'Iraq real independence and would place more power in his hands to meet the responsibilities which had been thrust upon him by the Treaty.

If he turned to the extreme Nationalists and to the '*Ulamā*, therefore, it was because he sought to adjust the balance in favour of Arab Nationalism. If he descended to indirect methods of obtaining his ends, it was because he held that the end merited the means, and because his better judgment was at times swayed and warped by influences within his palace.

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[1] In spite of official denials of his anti-French sentiment, Faisal never renounced his ambition of recapturing Syria for the Arab Federation, making 'Iraq his base of attack.

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So definitely had the King's alliance with the extreme 175x
Nationalists affected the situation, that a prediction was made 727x
in British official circles in the middle of August that, unless he 648x
turned to the moderates, it would be impossible to foresee the 186
outcome of the next six weeks. 668

The Council of Ministers itself felt that the King, in allying himself with the Nationalists outside the Cabinet, and in apparently approving of their actions, which had included denunciations of the Council, had failed to give it his confidence. These misgivings the Council expressed in a resolution on August 9th, when it requested 'His Majesty to co-operate with this persevering Government in conducting affairs, in order to convince the people that the Government of His Majesty can rely on the confidence of His Majesty'. By stating in his reply that he saw no reason to alter his policy, the King indicated, contrary to the advice of the High Commissioner, that he personally wished the Cabinet to fall. The Ministers, therefore, resigned on August 14th.[1] Their fall was hailed as a blow to the pro-Treaty party, the extreme Nationalists openly declaring that Ja'far abū Timman, Hamdī Pāchahjī and Maulūd Pasha would replace the fallen Ministers, that Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr would be Prime Minister and that the Mandate would be abrogated. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr immediately issued a manifesto to the people, advising them, among other things, to persevere towards complete independence and to reject the British Mandate by all legal means.[2]

King Faisal himself added to the critical state of affairs by writing to the High Commissioner, on August 20th, and stating that, in view of the existing uncertainties of policy and lack of definition of responsibilities between himself and the High Commissioner on matters of internal administration, he felt compelled to inform the High Commissioner and through him the

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[1] The Naqīb remained in office for a few days longer.

[2] Full text of Manifesto: *Al-Mufīd*, August 19th, 1922; summary: *Baghdad Times*, August 23rd, 1922.

175x Colonial Office that, in the event of a rising, which was con-
729' fidentially to be expected, His Majesty disclaimed all responsi-
648 bility. He begged the High Commissioner either to assume the
18 conduct of administration or to give himself a free hand to
668 direct affairs on such lines as he saw fit.

The High Commissioner immediately drafted a strong reply, pointing out the responsibility of the King in the situation. The letter was withheld, however, in order that it might not mar the approaching anniversary of King Faisal's accession.

[665] The two Nationalist political parties, *Hizb al-Watani*,[1] (National Party), and *Hizb an-Nahdha*[2] (Renaissance Party), which, with the *Hizb al-Hurr*[3] (Independent Party), had been formed in early August to take part in the prospective elections,[4] thought the moment opportune to add their weight to the protests against the Mandate. At a joint meeting, on November 20th and 21st, under the presidency of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, the parties drew up an address which they presented to the King.[5] The address culminated in three demands:

1. Immediate termination of the present policy and of British influence.
2. Selection of a Cabinet, members of which were to be sincere patriots, possessing the confidence of the people.
3. Suspension of treaty negotiations until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, its members having been freely elected.[6]

Arrangements were also made by the parties for a joint public protest on August 23rd at the anniversary celebration.[7]

On the morning of the 23rd, when the High Commissioner

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[1] Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 8th, 1922.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, August 10th, 1922; Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 21st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, August 11th, 1922.

[4] The Law of Associations, under which the parties were strictly regulated had been approved, after much delay, by the Council on June 29th, and promulgated on July 2nd, 1922. *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 56-8.

[5] *Al-Mufid*, August 22nd, 1922.

[6] *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufid*, June 23rd, 1922.

[7] *Al-'Iraq* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922.

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and his staff arrived at the Palace, they found the courtyard 175*
packed and an address being delivered from a balcony. As the 727*
High Commissioner passed up the stairs, shouts from the 648*
crowd were heard, followed by loud applause. After the 186
audience at which the King appeared to be somewhat nervous,[1] 668
the High Commissioner, on inquiry, learned that the demonstration as arranged by the *Hizb al-Watanī* and *Hizb an-Nahdha* had been directed against the Mandate. The next day, he sent a strong protest, demanding an apology and the arrest of those responsible for the affair. The apology was immediate and ample.[2] Unfortunately the King, about noon on the same day, was stricken with appendicitis, an operation being performed early the following day. The necessary papers, however, had not been signed by him. The High Commissioner approached His Majesty shortly before the operation, but the King refused to sign, protesting that he would not put his signature to the condemnation of any of his subjects as an act which might well be his last.

The High Commissioner at once issued a proclamation, taking over the reins of government into his own hands and stating that the absence of a Cabinet, the King's illness and the seditious disturbances in the country left him no other alternative.[3] Hamdī Pāchahjī, Saiyid Mahdī al-Basīr, Amīn al-Chārchafī and 'Abdul Rasūl al-Kubba were deported to Henjam. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr and Shaikh Muhammad Māhdī al-Khālisī were advised by the High Commissioner that 'if they did not go, he would be forced to take measures which, out of respect to the '*Ulamā*, he did not want to take'. They crossed the Persian frontier, August 29th. Notice was served that any further attempts at sedition would be promptly and severely dealt with.[4]

From the provinces disquieting news had been reported. In

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[1] Cf. Bell, op. cit., p. 649.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, August 26th, 1922. No Arabic papers printed these letters.

[3] Ibid., Special Edition, August 26th, 1922.

[4] Ibid.

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175 Shamīya, the chiefs were defiant; in Dīwānīya, tribal lawless-
727 ness had broken out, while in Nāsirīya and Sūq ash-Shuyūkh,
648 public order trembled in the balance. In Diyālā, unrest had
186 increased to such an extent that had any rising taken place
668 elsewhere, the tribes of Dīltāwa, Shahrābān and Delli 'Abbās
would unquestionably have risen. Prompt and strong measures restored administrative authority on non-party lines, however, the Nationalist officials being summoned to Baghdad where the outstanding offender, the *Mutassarif* of Hilla, was tried and adjudged to be unworthy of future employment. Revenue was collected, land cases settled and incipient revolt checked, aerial action being necessary in four cases to re-establish the authority of the Government.

175 Whether or not the actual incident on August 23rd required
727 the stern and, in the case of the deportations, even harsh
648 measures employed, there can be no question that the High
Commissioner, as responsible for peace and order, considered his measures, vigorously and promptly taken, to be essential for the well-being of the country as well as for the eventual success of British policy. His actions restored prestige to the Government, the country as a whole settling down to 'an era of reconstruction'.[1]

In order that the measures taken by the High Commissioner should appear to be constitutional, it was essential that they should be ratified by the King. Both British and 'Iraqī officials were aware of the grave situation which might result if the King should refuse to give the required ratification. On September 10th, the High Commissioner approached King Faisal. His Majesty was told plainly that the British Government would not tolerate his connection with future Nationalist agitation nor any further delay in ratifying the Treaty. The King agreed to invite the Naqīb to form a new Cabinet, after the receipt of a declaration from the Secretary of State for the Colonies which would form the basis of an announcement of his

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, p. 21.

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own policy. In reply to the demand that he regulate his con- 175x
duct more closely on constitutional lines and refrain from undue 727x
interference in matters of detailed appointments and administra- 648x
tion, the King argued that there was no Constitution, the Cabinet was heterogeneous, and it was difficult for him not to do so, but that as soon as he had a Treaty and a Constitution, he would willingly do as required.

A letter, previously drafted, approving of the High Commissioner's measures was then submitted to him for his signature. This letter, dispatched by King Faisal on the following day, was as follows:[1]

> September 11, 1922.
>
> My dear Sir Percy,
>
> Now that by the will of Providence I am restored to health and permitted by my medical advisers to deal with affairs of state, I feel it is my duty before taking up the reins of affairs to tender to Your Excellency my cordial thanks and to express to you my appreciation for the prompt policy and necessary measures adopted by you as representative of His Majesty's Government in order to maintain public interests and preserve order and peace in that sudden coincidence of my sudden illness with the interval between the resignation of one Cabinet and the formation of another. In conclusion, I repeat my sincere thanks to Your Excellency for your valuable co-operation.
>
> Your sincere friend,
>
> Faisal.

In the new Cabinet formed by the Naqīb, on October 2nd, with the sole purpose of ratifying the Treaty, only the Minister of Education, Hājī Muhsin ash-Shālash of Najaf, was new. The Minister of Interior, ʻAbdul Muhsin Beg as-Saʻdūn, and the Minister of Justice, Taufīq Beg al-Khālidī, exchanged portfolios.[2]

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, September 12th, 1922.

[2] *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, p. 23.

175* On October 10th, the Council ratified the Treaty, reaffirm-
727* ing, however, in spite of the continued efforts of the High
618* Commissioner to the contrary, its resolution of June 25th, that the Treaty must be approved by the National Assembly. Three days later the Treaty was published, accompanied by a proclamation of future policy by His Majesty King Faisal.[1]

The Treaty ratified, his purpose fulfilled, and feeling unable to deal forcefully with the rising strength of the Turkish demands for Mōsul, the Naqīb resigned, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn succeeding him as Prime Minister. His retirement was made the occasion of messages from the British Government and from King Faisal thanking him for his loyal support and services to the 'Iraq State since its inception.[2]

Definition of the Position and Duties of British Officials

727* The attention of both the as-Sa'dūn Cabinet[3] and the High
175* Commissioner, following the ratification of the Treaty, turned
642* again to the development of administration, to the final drafting of the Organic Law and to preparations for holding the elections. No question, among those which faced them, loomed larger than the practical definition of the position and duties of the British officials in 'Iraq. The principles were, as already indicated, laid down in the Treaty, in the subsidiary agreements and in the letter of appointment from the High Com-

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[1] Text: *Baghdad Times*, October 14th, 1922, also *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, pp. 24-5. It was accompanied by an announcement by the S/S for Colonies, October 12th, 1922. Text: *Baghdad Times*, same date; *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, App. 3.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, November 26th, 1922.

[3] Members of his Cabinet, which took office November 20th, were: President of the Council: 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn; Minister of Interior: Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī; Minister of Finance: Sasūn Eff. Haskail; Minister of Communications and Works: Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimī; Minister of Education: 'Abdul Husain Chālabi; Minister of 'Auqāf: 'Abdul Latīf Pasha Mandīl; Minister of Defence: Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd. Nājī Pasha became Minister of Justice in January, 1923, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg taking the portfolio of Minister of Interior. *Baghdad Times*, November 22nd, 1922. For programme of his Ministry: ibid., November 25th, 1922.

missioner.[1] The High Commissioner was to stand as an Adviser 975
to the King, while the British officials in the employ of 'Iraq 727
were to be responsible to it, but were to stand in a special 642
relationship to the Residency. Although precedents had been created under the provisional Government, the practical application of the principles to the new regime was more complicated than the mere evolution of a theory and required painstaking care if British control were to be made effective without perpetual friction and deadlock between the British and 'Iraqī officials.

Under the provisional Government, resolutions of the Council of State had required the confirmation of the High Commissioner.[2] Under the monarchy, resolutions of the Council, if approved by the King, were issued as Royal '*Irādas* signed by the King, the Prime Minister and by the Minister concerned. In order that the High Commissioner might exercise his supervision, it had been arranged that all resolutions of the Council should be submitted in original to the King, with a copy to the High Commissioner. The King would not normally accord his assent until the High Commissioner had the opportunity of stating whether there was any point on which he desired to tender advice.

The procedure on the whole worked smoothly, although the King on several occasions interfered directly in administrative matters,[3] particularly in appointments, or exercised his veto on resolutions of the Council of State without waiting for the opinion or advice of the High Commissioner.[4]

The High Commissioner and his successors, on their side, normally refrained from interfering in interdepartmental affairs except through the King. Vigilant at all times, however, on

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 348-50.

[2] *Instructions for the Council of State*, Article X.

[3] His failure to act through the Cabinet as a whole had caused the fall of the Naqīb's first Cabinet, March 30th, 1922, as well as of his second, August 14th, 1922.

[4] As in June, 1923, when he vetoed the Council's resolution to increase burial fees on corpses for interment in the Holy Cities.

175x all matters affecting the Treaty and British interests, they kept 727x their fingers on the pulse of official life. On vital questions, such 642x as the ratification of the Treaty, they considered it expedient that the Ministers, singly and in groups, should be interviewed and favourable decisions secured.[1]

In the administrative services of the Government, the position of the advisory officials was similar to that of the High Commissioner. Every order and every measure within a Ministry, whether initiated in the Minister's or in the Adviser's office, had to pass through the hands of the Adviser before it received the final requirement, the Minister's signature. When a measure or action was proposed which seemed to the Adviser to be contrary to the Treaty or to good administration, he informed the Minister accordingly after providing alternative suggestions. He also forwarded to the High Commissioner, with the knowledge of the Minister concerned, full information regarding his protest. Unless the matter particularly affected Great Britain's position or was especially important, the High Commissioner took no immediate action until efforts to come to an understanding with the Ministry concerned had failed and the matter had been referred to the Council. The High Commissioner then either advised the King that the proposed measure would not be acceptable, thus leaving it to him to bring the Minister to book, or requested the King not to sign the resolution if it were passed by the Council.

In other cases, where British officers held posts complementary to those held by 'Iraqis, such as Inspector-General of Police or Adviser to the Postal Department, the position of the official was fundamentally the same although the tendency was for the British officer to assume more executive authority. In other posts, where British officials occupied executive positions, as Director of Health Services, Director of Customs and Excise, or definitely technical posts, as Directors of Agriculture, of

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[1] In 1922: Bell, op. cit., p. 643. In 1924, by Sir Henry Dobbs, on May 30th and other occasions.

1-[British officials, after the treaty of 1922]

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Public Works, of Irrigation and of Telegraphs, the officials 175
were usually in complete charge of their departments, subject 727
to the authority of their Minister and, through him, to the 642
supervision of the Adviser. Nevertheless, as recipients of the letter of appointment from the High Commissioner, they were required to keep the Adviser of their Ministry informed directly of matters particularly affecting Great Britain's special interests.

In *Liwā* administration, where, on the advent of Arab Government, the British Political Officers had become Advisers to the Arab officials, the system of dual responsibility had worked with varying success. During 1921 and 1922, when agitation against the Mandate was at its height, the Arab officials had often disregarded British advice and, owing to the temporary loss of central administrative authority, discipline was not immediately effected. In other *Liwās*, as in the Muntafiq, Arab officials endeavoured to demonstrate their capacity for independent action, often with disastrous results on tribal peace, general order and revenue payments.

Although the High Commissioner issued a confidential circular in early 1922 for the guidance of British officials and the Ministry of Interior gradually evolved a schedule of working arrangements between British and Arab officials, it was not until the formulation of the Administrative Inspectors Law,[1] approved by the Council of Ministers, January 23rd, 1923, that the functions of the provincial Advisers, now termed Administrative Inspectors, were defined. Drafted by the Ministry of Interior with the co-operation of the Ministries of Justice and Finance, the Law placed the Inspectors in a stronger position than the former Advisers had been, the widest powers of inspection being given them in all details of internal administration, Revenue collection, municipalities, police and public order. Although the Law was not immediately and universally applied, the clearer definition of their respective duties was welcomed both by the *Mutasarrifs* and the British Inspectors.

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[1] *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 95-7.

175x The working of the system of dual responsibility thus evolved
727x depended largely on the patience and tact of the British Ad-
642x visers, on their own personality and that of the 'Iraqī officials and on the mutual goodwill and confidence between them. In the case of the Ministries, if the Minister was energetic and anxious to show his ability, the pace might be forced faster than the Adviser thought expedient and restraint had to be applied. If the Minister showed a proclivity to appoint friends and relations without due consideration of their ability, the Adviser was obliged to curb his actions. On the other hand, the Adviser, part of whose duty was to initiate measures to facilitate administrative progress, sometimes found it necessary to employ means of stimulating his Minister in order to ensure the carrying out of the administration. The position of the Advisers was strengthened by their experience, prestige, and by the fact that, after the fashion of Permanent Under-Secretaries of State, they remained in office while Ministers came and went.

Although the system permitted the Government of 'Iraq to function without visible control by British officials, it was not without serious defects, of which the great expense of maintaining the two cadres of officials was not least. Side by side with the 'Iraqī officials, well paid in comparison to Turkish standards, were the corresponding British officials who, in every case, drew even higher salaries. Thus, in 1923, the average pay of the Ministers was Rs.2,112 (£141) per month,[1] that of the Advisers being Rs.2,575 (£172) per month,[2] plus special allowances up to 12 per cent of their salaries.[3] In the *Liwās*, the eleven *Mutasarriffs* received an average of Rs.1,100 (£74) per month,[4] while the twelve Administrative Inspectors received an average of Rs.1,610 (£108) per month,[5] plus the usual allowances prescribed in the British Officials' Agreement. In no case was the salary of any British officer employed under

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[1] *'Iraq Budget*, 1923-1924 (*Baghdad*, 1923).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Cmd. 2120, British Officials' Agreement, Schedules II and III.

[4] *'Iraq Budget*, 1923-1924, p. 61.

[5] Ibid., p. 59.

that Agreement less than Rs. 800 (£54) per month, plus 175x
allowances.[1] The larger pay was undoubtedly due to the 727x
British officials in consideration of their experience and of 642x
their foreign standard of living. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that British officials employed by the 'Iraq Government, numbering 569 in 1923,[2] while contributing invaluable aid to the Administration, drew heavily upon the resources of the Government which was forced at the same time to maintain a staff of its own nationals.

The greatest defect of the system, however, was the duality of responsibility, even after time and experience had created precedents and had defined spheres of duties. Friction and deadlock when officials did not see eye to eye often occurred, extending in some cases over a period of several months, impeding administration, checking initiative and providing confirmation for the belief held by 'Iraqīs that Great Britain was primarily interested in her own imperial policy rather than in the welfare of 'Iraq.[3] In time, the dualism became one of the most vexing questions in 'Iraq's political circles, a special term, *al-Wādha' al-Shādh* (perplexing predicament), being invented. It became the explanation of all the difficulties in administration. If innovations incurred the displeasure of 'Iraqīs, if revenue assessments rose, if revenue fell, if financial or judicial favours could not be obtained according to time-honoured practices or if there was not employment for 'Iraqīs, the 'Iraqī officials often put the blame on the British officials who, they

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[1] Cmd. 2120, British Officials' Agreement, Schedules II and III.

[2] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 292, gives the following table of British and Indian officials in 'Iraq Government Service.

	1920	1923	1926	1929	1931
British Gazetted Officers	364	181	148	130	118
British Nursing Sisters	23	27	23	17	14
British Non-Gazetted Officers	484	361	53	34	28
Indian Officials	2,035	1,270	250	53	36
Total	2,906	1,839	474	234	196

[3] For an account of the friction between British and 'Iraqī officers, see *J.C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. XI (1924), p. 73.

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175 declared, served England rather than 'Iraq. On the other
77 hand, when unsatisfactory appointments were made, when poor
642 work was done and when progress was slow, British officials attributed it to the fact that their position was only advisory. Too often, however, the dual responsibility became the whipping-boy for lack of initiative, for indolence and for, in some cases, even the lowering of standards.

To 'Iraqīs, dual responsibility represented even more than administrative dependence. Taken in conjunction with treaty obligations and the subsidiary Agreements, it became the reason why 'Iraq's efforts to win independence were thwarted at every turn. It covered the anomalous position of 'Iraq as an independent Kingdom under the Mandate of Great Britain. It explained the predicament of the Ministers, nominally responsible to the people of 'Iraq, but actually subject to the control of their British Advisers. It was the reason why the 'Iraq Government administered and paid the deficits of the railways and of Basra Port, but did not own them; why it could declare martial law, but under the Military Agreement, could not administer it; why it had an army, but could not move it without the consent of the High Commissioner. Officers of the 'Iraq Government, both British and 'Iraqī, were King Faisal's officials but they were selected for him with the High Commissioner's concurrence. Foreign Governments (members of the League) could discriminate in tariff and other matters against 'Iraqī subjects, but the 'Iraq Government had no power to retaliate; foreign subjects had special judicial privileges in 'Iraq while 'Iraqī subjects had no reciprocal advantages abroad. The 'Iraq Government was obliged to pay half the cost of the expenses of the British High Commissioner and his staff in 'Iraq, but had no control over the expenditure incurred on this account. Finally, although under the Military Agreement the 'Iraq Government should, not later than four years from the date of the conclusion of the Agreement, accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and for the

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defence of 'Iraq from external aggression, she had not up to the end of 1928 in practice assumed this responsibility.[1] 175x 727x

Out of the desire to rid themselves of the 'perplexing predicament' which 'Iraqis saw on every side, developed one of the strongest sources of national indignation and of opposition which, as time passed, Great Britain had to face in 'Iraq. 642x

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[1] Cf. *Report on Administration of 'Iraq for the Year* 1928, Colonial No. 44 [redacted] pp. 26-7. The report professes to see the 'perplexing predicament' as [redacted] in the imagination of the fervid patriots of 'Iraq.
existing only

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CHAPTER XX

INSTRUMENTS OF GOVERNMENT

175x THE formulation of the Treaty, the subsidiary Agreements and 642x other means of ensuring to Great Britain the successful main- 127x tenance of her dominant position in ‘Iraq was accompanied at the same time by measures to set up an Organic Law for the constitutional regulation of the political institutions already established, such as the King and the Council of Ministers, and of those which had yet to be created: an electoral system and a representative Parliament.

The need for the Organic Law or Constitution[1] and the establishment of these additional instruments of Government arose partly from the exigencies of the situation. King Faisal had steadfastly maintained, when confronted with the request to act in a more constitutional manner and to refrain from interference in administrative matters, that he could not do so until there was a Constitution.[2]

Even more compelling were the obligations laid on both Faisal and the British Government under the stimulus of the belief, both of ‘Iraqis and of the Western world, in the efficacy of ‘consent of the governed’, in democratic institutions and in written constitutions.[3] Faisal had been declared King of ‘Iraq

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[1] The term Organic Law was employed in the mandatory documents (Cmds. 1176, 1500) and in the Treaties of 1922 and of 1927 (Cmd. 2998) for what was, in reality, the Constitution of ‘Iraq. In the English translation, 1925 (*Compilation*, 1925, pp. 14-27), and in that forwarded to the League of Nations in 1928 (League of Nations publication C. 49. 1929. vi), the word Constitution is used.

[2] *Supra*, p. 360.

[3] In this connection a delightful story is told concerning the Naqīb (Bell, *Letters* (August 21st, 1921), p. 618):

‘It was the Naqib, to his huge delight – he’s by every instinct an aristocrat,– and an autocrat, if ever there was one – who gave currency to the word, by announcing in the Council that Faisal should be King of a constitutional democratic state . . . . The other day a Shammar Sheikh up from Hail, drops in to call. “Are you a Damakrati?” says the Naqib. “Wallahi, no!” says the Shammari, slightly offended.

by the Council of State, July 11th, 1921, 'provided that His 175'
Highness's Government should be a constitutional, representa- 642'
tive and democratic Government, limited by law'.[1] The con- 727'
fidence of the Western world in democracy had been similarly voiced in Article One of the mandatory document for 'Iraq, and in Article III of the Treaty, when the principles of the mandatory document had been reproduced in the Treaty.[2]

Thus, once the drafting of the Treaty had been successfully initiated, the formulation of the Organic Law was taken in hand, although in accordance with the wishes of H.M. Government and of King Faisal, it was not promulgated until March 21st, 1925, after the oil concession had been concluded.[3]

As the mandatory document had provided many of the provisions of the Treaty, so Article III of the Treaty outlined certain basic principles around which the Organic Law was to be framed. Throughout the entire period of drafting, which passed through six distinct stages before the draft Law came before the Constituent Assembly, June 14th, 1924,[4] those engaged in the task had to bear in mind, therefore, not only that the document was to regulate 'Iraq's political institutions and to prescribe 'the constitutional procedure, whether legislative or executive, by which decisions shall be taken on all matters of importance' but also that it should:

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[1] Extract from Minutes of Council of State, July 11th, 1921.

[2] *Supra*, Ch. xviii.

[3] Dispatch S/S for Colonies to High Commissioner, Baghdad, April 19th, 1923 (hereafter S/S to H.C., April 19th, 1923), Colonial Office File No. 19114/23.

[4] (1) Project of 1921; (2) Baghdad Draft, March 16th, 1922; (3) First Colonial Office Revise, April 16th, 1922; (4) Baghdad Redraft, February 15th, 1923; (5) Final Colonial Office Revise, April 19th, 1923 and (6) The Draft Law, September 20th, 1923.

"I'm not a Magrati. What is it?" "Well," says the Naqib enjoying himself thoroughly, "I'm Sheikh of the Damakratiyah" (the Democrats). "I take refuge in God!" replied the Sheikh, feeling he had gone wrong somewhere. "If you are the sheikh of the Magratiyah, then I must be one of them, for I'm altogether in your service. But what is it?" "Damakratiyah," says the Naqib, "is equality. There's no big man and no little, all are alike and equal." With which the bewildered Shammari plumped on to solid ground. "God is my witness," said he, seeing his tribal authority slipping from him, "if that's it I'm not a Magrati."

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175* 642* (i) contain nothing contrary to the provisions of the present Treaty;

727* (ii) take account of the rights, wishes and interests of all populations inhabiting 'Iraq;

(iii) ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals;

(iv) provide that no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of 'Iraq on the ground of race, religion or language;

(v) secure that the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Government of 'Iraq shall impose, shall not be denied or impaired.[1]

On the British drafters, however, lay more than the obligation to secure the inclusion of these conditions and of other Articles which would ensure the successful working of the machinery of State. It was incumbent on them, in accordance with the wishes of H.M. Government,[2] to secure by means of the Law additional support for the British position in 'Iraq. Thus, the Constitution tended to become not only an instrument of government but also an instrument of policy, safeguarding the Treaty and facilitating administration in accordance with the obligations assumed by Great Britain as mandatory Power.

Their aims seemed most easily achieved by reserving as much power as possible, including that of legislation, to the King and indirectly to the High Commissioner in his advisory capacity,[3] and by removing, as far as possible, opportunities for obstructive tactics from the elective Chamber, concerning

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[1] Cmd. 1757, Article III.

[2] Dispatch, Legal Secretary, Baghdad, to Middle East Department, August 17th, 1922, C.O. 43338/22.

[3] Letter, S/S for Colonies to Ormsby-Gore, F.O., April 24th, 1923, C.O. 19114/23.

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which Mr. Dobbs, when High Commissioner,[1] was later to write: 175* 642* 727*

> In light of experience of other Oriental Assemblies, there is to my mind real danger that irresponsible extremist majority may in early stages of Self-Government seek to paralyse state activities by refusing supplies for essential services . . . It is therefore essential to have provision for enabling the Executive to carry on.[2]

In addition, it was held necessary to embody within the Law all matters which the Ministers of the Chamber might be tempted to alter[3] and to make any amendment of the Law extremely difficult. In articles dealing with the administrative system, however, it seemed, as the Legal Secretary suggested:

> preferable to leave the whole administrative system to be dealt with by special law which, unlike the Organic Law, can be modified from time to time in the light of experience or of fresh circumstances, rather than adhere rigidly to the Turkish system and nomenclature.[4]

Along these lines a draft Project was drawn up in Baghdad in the late autumn of 1921 by Major H. W. Young of the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office and by Mr. M. E. Drower, Adviser to the Ministry of Justice.[5] This first draft, for which some provisions were taken from the constitutions of Australia, New Zealand and other countries[6] was later

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[1] H. R. C. Dobbs became Acting High Commissioner, January 19th, 1923, in the absence of Sir Percy Cox, and High Commissioner on the latter's retirement, May 3rd, 1923.

[2] Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, February 21st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

[3] Such as minority safeguards and salaries for Senators and Deputies.

[4] Memorandum on Position of Draft Organic Law, by Legal Secretary to High Commissioner, Baghdad, February 15th, 1923 (hereafter Position of Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23).

[5] Cf. Report on Draft O. Law, March 16th, 1922, C.O. 15296/23; Dispatch, Legal Adviser, Baghdad, to Middle East Dept., August 17th, 1922, C.O. 43338/22.

[6] Letter, S/S for Colonies to Ormsby-Gore, Foreign Office, April 24th, 1923, C.O. No. 19114/23.

175x amplified in consultation with Mr. Nigel Davidson, Legal
642x Secretary to the High Commissioner, with the High Commis-
727x sioner himself and with the Colonial Office.[1] After it had been accepted in principle by King Faisal, it was taken to London by Major Young on his return in early 1922.

The Project provided that all legislation had to obtain the King's preliminary approval and that legislation concerning treaty matters should rest with the King-in-Council (Article 30). The latter was to consist of thirty nominated members including the Ministers. The King-in-Council was also to have the power of modifying all legislation, except in the face of a two-thirds majority from a newly elected Chamber (Article 33).

These Articles met with the protests of the Committee in Baghdad, composed of Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī, Minister of Justice, Sasūn Effendi Haskail, Minister of Finance and Rustum Beg Haidar, Secretary to His Majesty, to which King Faisal had referred the Project.[2] The Committee maintained that while it recognized the necessity for some of the Articles despite their admittedly undemocratic nature[3] the Constituent Assembly would never accept them. It accordingly prepared a draft of its own. Constitutions of a number of countries, including Japan, were studied but the main provisions of the draft were admittedly drawn from the Ottoman Constitution with which the Committee members were most familiar. After consultations with the Judicial Adviser and the Legal Secretary to the High Commissioner, who suggested amendments to bring it into line with the wishes of H.M. Government, including those forwarded from the Colonial Office on February 23rd,[4] the draft, hereafter referred to as the Baghdad Draft, was forwarded to the Colonial Office, March 16th, 1922.[5]

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[1] Letter, S/S for Colonies to Ormsby-Gore, Position of Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23; also Nājī Pasha to writer, March 7th, 1934.

[2] Report on Draft Organic Law, by Legal Secretary, Baghdad, March 16th, 1922, C.O. 15296/22.

[3] According to Nājī Pasha, March 7th, 1934.

[4] Report on Draft O. Law, March 16th, 1922, C.O. 15296/22.

[5] Ibid.

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The Committee in its draft, which became the foundation of 175* all subsequent drafts, put forward a bicameral legislature on the 642* Ottoman plan. The Council of the Project became a Senate of 727* twenty Members.[1] Legislation, which with the exception of money bills could be initiated by any deputy supported by ten of his fellows, had to be accepted by both Houses (Article 62*c*). At the request of its British advisers, the Committee agreed to the inclusion of an Article (62), referring all disputes between the Senate and Deputies to a joint committee of forty, one half of which was to be deputies selected by lot, and the other half, the twenty Senators holding office at the King's pleasure — a feature essential to the scheme.[2]

In addition, the Baghdad Draft omitted the Article, included in the Project, validating the actions of the High Commissioner and of the King and Ministers prior to the promulgation of the Law. The Legal Secretary, however, stated that he proposed to reinsert the clause in the final draft. It was essential that Acts of previous regimes should not be called into question and that such measures as the forthcoming oil concessions should not be submitted to Parliament.[3]

In order that no alterations should be made to the Law, either to Articles contributing to good government[4] or to those affecting the Treaty, it was stipulated in the Baghdad Draft that no amendments should be made 'until 8 years from its date of coming into force' and then only after the amendments had been passed by two successive Parliaments.

Although the attention of official circles in 'Iraq during 1922 and early in 1923 was directed principally to the Treaty and to election difficulties, the Baghdad Draft and the First Colonial Office Revise which embodied the Colonial Office amendments to the unsatisfactory sections, mainly those which vitiated the power of the King to control legislation, had been referred by

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[1] Report on Draft O. Law, March 16th, 1922, C.O. 15296/22.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., also Dispatch, August 17th, 1922, C.O. 43338/22.

[4] Ibid.

175 the Council of State to a Committee of Nājī Pasha and the
642 Judicial Adviser, with power to co-opt local lawyers for assist-
727 ance.[1] The Committee's work which gradually assumed the form of a Redraft, was submitted to the Colonial Office, February 15th, 1923, with an explanatory note by the Legal Secretary.[2]

In this Baghdad Redraft, the drafters further reduced the powers which previous drafts had given to the King.[3] Ministers were to be made responsible to Parliament and not to the King (Article 24*c*).[4] The King had to obtain the approval of Parliament to declare war.[5] His right of approval of legislation, including financial measures, was withdrawn (Article 44). In other minor ways, his hands were tied more than in the original drafts.[6] Furthermore, it was proposed that the Senate, being a purely legislative body, should not be dismissed at the discretion of the King. Some diminution of the power given to the King by the early drafts had not been unexpected.[7] The last proposal, however, vitiated Article 62 which, in conjunction with Articles 24*c* and 24*f*, had become the most important sections in the Law,[8] since they had been designed to 'enable the King to control the Senate and to force through legislation in face of a hostile majority in the Chamber of Deputies.'[9]

To meet these difficulties, the Judicial Adviser proposed that in cases of necessity, as of obstruction, the King should legislate

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[1] Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, November 14th, 1922, C.O. 5647/22; Letter, Judicial Adviser, 'Iraq Government, to Legal Secretary, Baghdad, cited C.O. 6927/23.

[2] Position of O. Draft Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

[3] Note by Judicial Adviser, 'Iraq Government, to Legal Secretary, Baghdad, in Position of Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid. Later amended to 'Cabinet' at King Faisal's suggestion. Cf. C.O. 48656/23, 49583/23.

[6] Note by Judicial Adviser, 'Iraq Government, to Legal Secretary, Baghdad, C.O. 10606/23.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Report on Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23. Cf. Telegram H.C. to S/S for C., February 21st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

[9] Memo. on Organic Law by Legal Secretary, Baghdad, January 19th, 1923, C.O. 6927/23.

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by ordinance, Parliament having been prorogued or dissolved. 175x
Such ordinances if dealing with supplies or treaty obligations 642x
were to be exempted from subsequent validation by Parliament. 727x
The Acting High Commissioner, Mr. Dobbs, preferred,[1] however, to make use of Section 26 of the Government of India Act of 1919.[2]

Neither of these proposals found favour with the Baghdad Ministers, the Acting High Commissioner's suggestion being regarded as undemocratic. It rested, therefore, according to the Legal Secretary, on H.M. Government:

(i) To insist on the original draft of 16 March, 1922 (Baghdad Draft); or
(ii) To insist on the amendments proposed by the Judicial Adviser; or
(iii) To act along Indian lines.[3]

In the interval, however, between the signing of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty, October 10th, 1922, and the submission of the Baghdad Redraft, February 15th, 1923, H.M. Government had been obliged to reconsider its entire position in the Middle East, a step which had a profound effect on the Organic Law.

The evacuation of 'Iraq, 'bag and baggage', had been insistently demanded by a section of the British Press, particularly the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express*. Parliament had continued to press for the reduction of British expenditure.[4] At the General Election, following the fall of the Lloyd George Cabinet on October 23rd, 1922, withdrawal from 'Iraq became a prominent issue, a number of candidates, supported by a violent newspaper campaign, pledging themselves to work for that end. On coming into power, Mr. Bonar Law felt impelled to appoint in December, 1922, a special Cabinet Committee to

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[1] Memo. on Organic Law by Legal Secretary, Baghdad, January 19th, 1923, C.O. 6927/23. He apparently changed his mind, for in his telegram, February 21st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23, he declared his preference for the second alternative given in Report on Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

[2] 8 and 9 Geo. V, cap. 101.

[3] Report on Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

[4] *Supra*, pp. 311, 355.

175* study the British position in 'Iraq. In the meantime, the Treaty,
642* for which the Residency had so strenuously worked, hung in the
727* air without the ratification of the British Government, while at the first Lausanne Conference and on the Mōsul frontier the Turks gave every indication that they would never agree to cede Mōsul Wilayet to 'Iraq.[1]

It became apparent in the Cabinet Committee deliberations, which Sir Percy Cox attended,[2] that, while Great Britain could not abandon 'Iraq until the Turco-'Iraq frontier dispute had been settled, an immediate reduction might be made in the period over which British commitments were to extend. Accordingly, when the High Commissioner returned to Baghdad, March 31st, he brought a draft Protocol reducing the duration of the Treaty of 1922 from twenty years to four,[3] from the date of the ratification of peace with Turkey. The door was left open, however, for future negotiations.[4] The Protocol was subsequently signed, April 30th, 1923, but its publication met with less approval in 'Iraq than had been expected.[5]

Under the new policy adopted by H.M. Government, it is not surprising that the entire question of the degree to which

> it was necessary or desirable for the Organic Law to be so framed as to enable us to control the 'Iraq Parliament through the King in order to secure fulfilment of treaty relations,[6]

should be discussed from a new view-point at the Colonial Office, as well as the provisos dealing with other powers of the King, finance and amendments to the Constitution. This

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[1] For an admirable treatment of the Turco-'Iraq Frontier dispute, see Toynbee, A. J., *Islamic World*, pp. 471-531.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, February 13th, 1923; Bell, op. cit., p. 662.

[3] Text: Appendix IX. The available evidence gives no support to the view taken in the Memorandum on *The Termination of the Mandatory Régime in 'Iraq* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1932), p. 8, that the Protocol was made 'in order to put an end to the boycotting of the elections to the Constituent Assembly.' See *infra*, pp. 391-3.

[4] Last sentence of the Protocol: Appendix IX. Cf. *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 15.

[5] *Al-'Iraq*, May 5th; *Al-'Asima*, May 7th, 1923.

[6] Middle East Department, Minute, March 31st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

change of attitude, influenced by the High Commissioner's 175*
view that the Constituent Assembly could not meet until after 642*
the Mōsul frontier had been settled,[1] was expressed by the 727*
Secretary of State for Colonies as follows:

> It therefore appears unlikely that the Organic Law will come into effect until a year or more has elapsed from the date of the ratification of peace with Turkey. There may thus be not more than three years during which His Majesty as Mandatory will be responsible for the administration of 'Iraq under the Organic Law.[2]

In forwarding, therefore, to Baghdad the results of the deliberations of the Colonial Office in the form of a revised draft, April 19th, 1923 (hereafter called the April Revise), the Secretary of State pointed out that, in the question reserving legislative power to the King, neither the earlier stipulation of March 16th, 1922, nor the India Act nor the Judicial Adviser's proposals need be insisted upon. He declared:

> I have arrived at the conclusion that, in all the circumstances it will be sufficient if power is given to the King to legislate where necessary, by Ordinance, for the purpose of securing the fulfilment of treaty obligations of the 'Iraq Government, and if provision is made that Ordinances passed with that object shall not require subsequent validation by the 'Iraq Parliament.[3]

The earlier insistence that supply for essential services should be guaranteed was thus dropped, the Secretary of State for Colonies declaring:

> I see no reason from the viewpoint of H.M. Government why Ordinances (by the King to ensure supply of essential services) should be specifically exempted from validation by 'Iraq. If for fulfilment of treaty obligations, exemption will be secured by the provisions referred to in the foregoing paragraph.[4]

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[1] Dispatch S/S to H.C., April 19th, 1923, para. 3, C.O. 19114/23.
[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., para. 4. [4] Ibid., para. 5.

175× The principle that finance Bills were to be initiated only
127× by a Minister was, however, held to be still vital (Articles 44
642× and 104).[1]

It was agreed, moreover, that it was no longer necessary to stipulate, in accordance with earlier provisions and with the desires of the King himself, that Ministers should be responsible to the King. Article 65 now made them responsible to Parliament.[2] In addition, it was provided, again contrary to King Faisal's wish that he be allowed latitude in choosing his Ministers,[3] that they should be members of one of the two Houses (Article 63).[4]

On the question of protecting the Constitution from early amendments, as had been provided for in each previous draft, the Secretary of State now declared:

> In view of the policy outlined in paragraphs 2 to 6 of this dispatch,[5] H.M. Government have no special interest in recommending that provision should be made for no amendment to the Organic Law to conflict with treaty obligations since the existing treaty may be expected to have terminated before the end of the eight years mentioned in this article. At the same time it would greatly assist H.M. Government to secure the admission of 'Iraq to membership to the League of Nations if some provision were made in general terms for the sanctity of international engagements entered into by the Government of 'Iraq, not to be endangered by subsequent amendments to the Organic Law.[6]

Although the Colonial Office had thus dropped its original

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[1] Dispatch S/S to H.C., April 19th, 1923, note on Article 44.

[2] Ibid., note on Article 65.

[3] Letter, Middle East Department to Legal Secretary, Baghdad, April 4th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

[4] Dispatch, S/S to H. C., April 19th, 1923, note on Article 63, C.O. 19114/23. It was eventually provided in the draft law that Ministers could hold office for six months without belonging to Parliament: Minute on C.O. File 2324/23.

[5] Ibid., cited in part, *supra*.

[6] Ibid., note on Article 119. The Council of Ministers changed 8 years to 5 years in the Draft Law. In view of the Protocol, no objection was made to the change: Letter, Judicial Adviser, 'Iraq Government, to Counsellor to High Commissioner, September 19th, 1923, C.O. 48110/23.

insistence on these important aspects of the Law, once the new 175
proposals had been evolved and had received the concurrence 727
of the Foreign Office,[1] April 16th, 1923, it declared that its 642
revised draft must be accepted as final by the Council of Ministers in Baghdad.[2] The latter insisted, however, that it was impossible to adhere rigidly to this injunction. Throughout the summer of 1923, the April Revise was the subject of discussion in the Council of Ministers and between the Minister of Justice and his Adviser.[3] The Ministers accepted the first twenty-five Articles by September 5th,[4] and by September 20th, the whole of the Revise, with numerous amendments,[5] which, since they did not radically alter the force of the law, were agreed to for the most part by the Colonial Office.[6] The approved Draft Law, published in the Arabic newspapers of Baghdad in early November, 1923, was that presented for ratification to the Constituent Assembly, June 14th, 1924.

The fact that it had been necessary for most of the British drafters to work in English[7] and for the 'Iraqis to work in Arabic, requiring numerous translations and retranslations,

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[1] Letter, S/S for Foreign Affairs to S/S for Colonies, April 16th, 1923, C.O. 19114/23.

[2] Concerning the necessity for determined action, the Legal Secretary wrote on February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23: 'Only one way of getting the draft finally settled for submission to the Constituent Assembly and that is: for H.M. Government to say definitely what alterations in the new draft they consider to be essential and for your Excellency to inform the Prime Minister that unless these are accepted, H.M. Government refuses to go further in the matter.'

[3] Telegram, Acting High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, September 3rd, 1923, C.O. 44042/23.

[4] Letter, Bourdillion, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, September 5th 1923, C.O. 46074/23.

[5] The 'Iraqī Ministers in making their last-minute changes, were greatly influenced by the Egyptian Constitution of 1923 which had just come to their notice. From it were taken Article 2 and portions of Articles 12, 20, 24g, 28, 38, 43, 50, 51, 53, 55, 61, 63, 64 and 123.

[6] Letter No. C. 67/126, Judicial Adviser to Counsellor, Baghdad, September 19th, 1923; Minutes of M.E.D. Conference, September 20th and October 4th, 1923, C.O. 48110/23; Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, October 4th, 1923, C.O. 48656/23; S/S for Colonies to High Commissioner, Baghdad, October 16th, 1923, C.O. 49583/23.

[7] The Judicial Adviser was a notable exception. He worked with equal facility in both Arabic and English.

175* provided constant opportunity for misunderstandings and
727* errors to arise through a mutual lack of comprehension of each
642* other's language. Moreover, in spite of the counsel given by the Judicial Adviser to the 'Iraq drafters that precision of meaning was of primary consideration, the attraction of polished Arabic phraseology often triumphed over exact terminology,[1] a difficult attainment in Arabic, even under the most favourable circumstances.

The Organic Law in its Final Form[2]

642* The Organic Law as presented and ratified by the Constituent Assembly consisted of 123 Articles, divided into ten Parts with an Introduction.

The *Introduction*, in the form passed by the Assembly, declared 'Iraq to be a

> sovereign State, independent and free. Her territories are indivisible and no portion thereof may be given up. 'Iraq is a constitutional hereditary monarchy with a representative Government.[3]

It designated Baghdad as the capital (Article 3) and prescribed the form and design of the national flag (Article 4).

Part I, dealing with the Rights of the People, specified:

1. General rights, such as are inherent in almost every constitutional document influenced by French political thought. These included absolute rights, that is, those not subject to the terms of any law, and conditional rights, limited by law.
2. Specific rights, peculiar to 'Iraq as an Islamic State, both absolute and conditional.[4]

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[1] Position of Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

[2] All quotations are from the English translation transmitted to the League of Nations, November 28th, 1923. League of Nations Publication C. 49. 1929. (vi).

[3] The Colonial Office originally objected to this Article (adopted by the 'Iraqi Ministers from the Egyptian Constitution) as being inconsistent with the actual status of 'Iraq. It was finally accepted, however, as being harmless.

[4] Cf. analysis in Hooper, C. A.: *The Constitutional Law of 'Iraq* (Baghdad, 1928), pp. 33-7.

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The absolute general rights guaranteed to 'Iraqīs, whose nationality was to be defined by special law (Article 5), ensured equality 'before the law, whatever differences may exist in language, race or creed' (Article 6), forbade torture and deportation from the Kingdom of 'Iraq (Article 7),[1] guaranteed freedom of conscience (Article 13) and stipulated equality of status to all 'Iraqīs 'as regards the enjoyment of their rights and discharge of their obligations' (Article 18). 642

Rights of 'Iraqīs, conditional upon limitations imposed by law or by the Constitution itself included personal liberty (Article 7); the inviolability of all places of residence (Article 8); access to law courts (Article 9); freedom from forced loans and expropriation of property (Article 10); equality of taxation imposed only by law (Article 11); liberty of expression of opinion, of the press and of association (Article 12); freedom of worship (Article 13); freedom from postal, telegraphic and telephone censorship and detention (Article 15); and the right of the various communities 'of establishing and maintaining schools for the instruction of their members in their own tongues' (Article 16).

Absolute rights, peculiar to 'Iraq as an Islamic State, established Islam as the official religion of 'Iraq and the freedom to practise the rites of the different sects of that religion as observed in 'Iraq (Article 13). Conditional rights made Arabic the official language (Article 11) and gave to all 'Iraqīs, subject to law,

> the right of presenting petitions and memorials to the King, Parliament and the public authorities, setting forth complaints, whether relating to matters where they are personally concerned, or to matters of public interest. (Article 14).

Only 'Iraqīs were to be employed by the Government, except in accordance with law, treaties or special agreements (Article 18).

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[1] The Article forbidding deportation of 'Iraqis had its origin in the repeated deportations under the British regime. In 1933, when it was desired to deport Assyrians, the difficulty was evaded by a special law declaring them not to be 'Iraqis.

602* *Part II*, concerned with the Crown and its rights, stated in Article 19:

> The sovereignty of the constitutional Kingdom of 'Iraq resides in the people. It is a trust confided by them to King Faisal, son of Husain, and to his heirs after him.

The King, for whom the succession, his majority and a Regency were set forth in Articles 20 to 23, was to be the supreme head of the State (Article 25), safeguarded and not responsible. He was to confirm laws, order their promulgation and supervise their execution (Article 26, 1).[1] He was to order the convocation of Parliament, open it, adjourn it, prorogue or dissolve it. It was further stipulated:

> Should necessity arise, when Parliament is not sitting, for taking urgent measures for the maintenance of order and public security, or to ward off a public danger, or for the fulfilment of treaty obligations, the King shall have the right of issuing ordinances, with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers, having the force of law, directing that the necessary steps shall be taken according to circumstances, provided that they are not contrary to the provisions of this Constitution. Such ordinances must all be laid before Parliament at its first session, with the exception of those issued for the purpose of fulfilling treaty obligations approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly. Should Parliament not approve these ordinances, the Government must declare them to be no longer operative and they shall be considered to be abrogated as from the date of such declaration. Such ordinances shall be signed by all Ministers. (Article 26, 3).

The King was to conclude treaties subject to the approval of Parliament (Ibid., 4 and 8); choose the Prime Minister; appoint Ministers and accept their resignation (Ibid., 5); name Senators (Ibid., 6); and, on the recommendation of the

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[1] The sections of articles which had been designated by letters in all drafts and in the Law as passed, are designated by numbers in the 1928 translation.

Ministers, appoint and dismiss all officials, except where he had, by special regulation, delegated this authority to another. The King was also Commander-in-Chief, declaring war with the consent of the Ministers and proclaiming martial law. Death sentences were to be confirmed by the King, who also had power to reduce or remit other sentences.

Part III, concerning the Legislature, stated: 'Legislative power is vested in Parliament and the King. Parliament is composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies' (Article 28).[1] The King was to 'exercise his powers by means of Royal '*Irādas*', signed by the Prime Minister and the responsible Minister or Ministers (Article 27). It established the conditions for membership and for compensation of the members of the two Chambers, the number of Senators being set at twenty (Articles 30-6, 41-2, 47-51). Deputies, to be elected in proportion of one to every 20,000 males, were to be elected in accordance with 'a special law based on the principle of the secret ballot and the necessity for the representation of non-Islamic minorities' (Article 36).

Other Articles regulated the sessions (Articles 32-3, 38-40, 44, 52-3, 56-8), and the conduct of the Deputies (Articles 46, 49, 51). Still other Articles governed the internal procedure of the two Houses and the initiation of legislation (Articles 43, 45, 54-5, 59, 62-3). Free speech and immunity were guaranteed (Article 60). Rules to prevail in cases of conflict between the two Houses were laid down in Article 63.

Part IV defined the numbers and duties of the Ministers (Articles 64-5), who collectively, as the Cabinet, and individually were responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, which could force their resignation by a majority vote of no confidence (Article 66).[2]

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[1] The Constituent Assembly had great difficulty in conceiving of legislative power resting in a Parliament composed of 'King, Senate and Chamber of Deputies', as this article had read in the draft law, and had so modified the draft as above.

[2] No Cabinet has yet fallen in 'Iraq through the application of this Article.

642* *Part V* concerned the Judicature. Courts, whose freedom from all influence was guaranteed (Article 71), were divided into three classes (Article 69): Civil Courts, Religious Courts and Special Courts. It was provided that

> The manner of instituting the Courts, the places where they are to be established, the grades, divisions, jurisdiction and supervision thereof, and the execution of judgments, shall be determined by special laws (Article 70).

Civil Courts were to deal with civil, commercial and criminal matters (Article 74). Religious Courts included *Shara'* Courts of both sects (Article 77), which alone could deal with the personal status of Muslims and actions relating to *Waqf* foundations (Article 76) and Spiritual Councils of the Communities, Christian and Jewish, which were to be set up in accordance with special laws (Articles 78, 80).

Among the Special Courts were the High Court for trying Ministers, Members of Parliament and Judges, and for settling the validity of laws in relation to the Organic Law and the Treaty (Articles 81-3), and a *Dīwān Khāss*, a special Bench for the interpretation of other laws (Article 84).

Part VI was entitled *Financial Matters*. It laid down that taxes, which were to be collected from all classes, without distinction (Article 92), were to be imposed only in accordance with law. Monopolies, concessions and forms of taxes were to be regulated by law (Articles 93-4). Expenditure was to be sanctioned only in accordance with an annual Budget Law (Articles 98-101). Initiation of money bills in the Chamber was reserved exclusively to Ministers (Article 105). It was also stipulated that

> the Chamber of Deputies may not take any decision, nor propose any amendment to a draft law, involving the reduction of expenditure arising out of treaties approved by Parliament, or the Constituent Assembly, unless approved by the King (Article 106).

Part VII dealt with Administration of the Provinces. In accordance with the policy of the drafters,[1] it was provided 'that the administrative districts of 'Iraq, their classes, names, manner of institution, powers of officials and their titles' should be prescribed by a special law (Article 109), which was to

> provide that steps shall be taken in certain of the administrative divisions to ensure the performance of any obligations relating thereto, arising out of treaties concluded by the King and approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly. (Article 110).

Municipal affairs were to be administered by Municipal Councils, also in accordance with a special law (Article 111).

Part VIII provided, in Article 113, that

> Ottoman Laws published before November 5th, 1914, and laws published on or after that date and which have remained in force in 'Iraq so far as circumstances permit, subject to any modification or repeal in conformity with the proclamations, regulations and laws referred to in the following article, and until they are altered or repealed by the legislative power, or the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

Article 114 also provided that

> All proclamations, regulations and laws issued by the Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in 'Iraq, the Civil Commissioner, and the High Commissioner, and those issued by the Government of His Majesty King Faisal, during the period between November 5th, 1914, and the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, shall be considered to be valid as from the date on which they came into force. Any portion thereof still unrepealed by that date shall remain in force until changed or repealed by the legislative power, or until the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void, in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

In addition, it was stipulated that judgments in civil and criminal matters given by the Ottoman Courts before the

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[1] *Supra*, p. 373.

642x British Occupation and by all Courts including Courts-Martial and Military Courts and by all officials, constituted by authority as Judges, from the time of the Occupation until the coming into force of the Constitution were to 'be considered to have been given by the regularly constituted Courts of 'Iraq' (Articles 116 and 117). Indemnification for all persons for acts done under authority and in good faith, between November 5th, 1914, and the date of promulgation of the Constitution was also given in Article 115.

Part IX made provision for Constitutional Amendments. It stipulated that Parliament might amend by a two-thirds majority vote, within one year from the coming into force of the Law, any of the subsidiary matters, in order that the objects of the law might be given effect (Article 118).[1] Otherwise, no amendment might be made to the Constitution for a period of five years. After the expiration of that period, every amendment had to be approved by a two-thirds majority of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. When the amendment had been so approved, the Chamber of Deputies was to be dissolved and the amendment submitted to the newly elected Chamber which, with the Senate, had to approve again by a two-thirds majority. The amendment was then to be submitted to the King for his confirmation.

Part X, entitled *General Provisions*, dealt mainly with martial law, the King being given power, subject to the approval of the Council, to proclaim martial law and to suspend existing laws and regulations, subject to the important proviso that 'those charged with the execution of the proclamation shall be subject to any legal consequences of the acts, until a special law has been passed by Parliament exempting therefrom'.[2]

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[1] Articles 22, 23, 35, 39, 40, 50, 82 and 83 were slightly modified by the first Parliament, July 29th, 1925, in accordance with this proviso.

[2] The drafts prior to the April Revise had contained no such proviso, but the Colonial Office insisted on its inclusion, maintaining that martial law could not be legalized in advance: Minute, March 31st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23; Dispatch S/S to N. C., April 19th, 1923, C.O. 19114/23.

The Electoral Law by which the Parliament (the powers of 642[x] which had given the drafters of the Organic Law great concern) 646 was to be brought into being, had early occupied the attention 666 of British and 'Iraqi officials.

The draft law, as presented and passed by the Constituent Assembly,[1] provided for an indirect system of election in accordance with the Turkish model on which both it and the Constituent Assembly Election Regulations[2] had been based. Deputies, in accordance with Article 36 of the Constitution, were to be elected in the proportion of one to every 20,000 primary voters who, among other qualifications (Article 33), were to be every male 'Iraqi, 21 years of age, paying taxes to the Government. Additional deputies, representing the Christians and the Jews, were also to be elected in the *Liwās* of Mōsul, Baghdad and Basra, in the following numbers:

Mōsul *Liwā*	2 Christians, 1 Jew.
Baghdad *Liwā*	1 Christian, 2 Jews.
Basra *Liwā*	1 Christian, 1 Jew.[3]

Primary electors, inscribed in registers by the electoral authorities of their electoral districts, into which the country had been divided, were to elect by secret ballot (Chapter I) the secondary electors in proportion of one to every 250 primary voters (Article 7). The secondary electors, assembling at the headquarters of their district, were to elect the deputies who, in addition to the qualifications enumerated in Articles 30 and 42 of the Constitution, had to reside within the electoral circle for which they were elected (Article 8).[4] To provide for by-elections, the secondary electors were to retain their office from one election until the next, and were to reconvene whenever called upon to elect a new deputy (Article 42).

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[1] *Infra*, Ch. XXI. Text: *Compilation*, 1924, pp. 45-51.

[2] *Compilation*, 1923, pp. 34-42, 47, 83, 157.

[3] Article 6.

[4] First circle: *Liwās* of Mōsul, Kirkūk, Sulaimāniya and 'Arbil. Second circle: *Liwās* of Baghdad, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla, Karbalā, Kūt and Dīwāniyā. Third circle: *Liwās* of Muntafiq, 'Amara and Basra.

642ˣ Each step in the preparation of the registers, in the election
646 procedure, and in the certifying of deputies was minutely
666 prescribed by the law, penalties being laid down in accordance with modern practice for every possible contravention of the regulations.

642ˣ The actual setting up of Parliament and the institution of the constitutional system were to await the ratification and the promulgation of the Organic Law and the Electoral Law. Nevertheless, in the two laws, through the efforts of their drafters, ample provision had been made along liberal lines, with the exception perhaps of the articles imposed in the interests of British policy, for the machinery and paraphernalia of a modern democratic State: a Sovereign, limited by law, a Council of Ministers responsible to Parliament, a Parliament consisting of a Senate and a representative Chamber of Deputies, and Judicial, Financial and Administrative systems. Provision had been made for the regulation of each institution. An outline had been provided into which further developments could be fitted in conformity with law as new circumstances made them essential. Comprehensive safeguards had been imposed for the rights of all sections of the population. Whether the machinery, the outlines and the safeguards so provided, however, were to be equal to the task of regenerating the country, to the progressive development of the new Kingdom and to the assurance of justice and equity to each member of the State, regardless of 'language, race or creed',[1] or whether they were to remain, as their Turkish prototypes had often remained, paper principles, depended on future circumstances, on the spirit and on the efficient zeal with which they were to be applied.

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[1] Constitution, Article 6.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE WORK OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Convocation of the Constituent Assembly

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No subject, other than the employment of foreigners in government posts and the general anti-Mandate propaganda occupied more attention in the Arabic Press from 1920 onwards than the demand for the convocation of the promised Constituent Assembly in order that it might express the wishes of the country concerning its future Government. When, however, the '*Irāda* ordering the elections to the Constituent Assembly to begin on October 24th was issued, October 19th, 1922,[1] after a delay of nearly two years, it met with a far different response than had been anticipated. The Nationalists and the Shī'a '*Ulamā* united in opposition to its application. The '*Ulamā* of Najaf and of Kādhimain, including Shaikh Madhī al-Khālisī who had been among the Nationalists calling most loudly for the Constituent Assembly, were induced to issue *fatwās* in early November, forbidding any participation in the election.[2]

The immediate effect of the *fatwās* was to bring the elections to a standstill in Shī'a centres. In Najaf, Karbalā, Hilla and Kūfa, the Electoral Committees resigned. In Kādhimain, the officials declared themselves unable to form Election committees.[3] In Dulaim *Liwā*, however, the *fatwās* had no effect,

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[1] *Compilation*, 1920–1923, p. 82.

[2] The *fatwās* issued collectively by the '*Ulamā* of Najaf and Kādhimain, November 8th, were followed by others by individual '*Ulamā*. A translation of one of the latter is as follows:

'Yes, we have issued the order to prohibit the elections by the whole 'Iraqi nation.

'That whoever participates or gives assistance in them will disobey God and His Prophet. God has said in His glorious book that whoever disobeys God and His Prophet, fire shall be his lot. (*sd.*) Muhammad Mahdī al-Khālisī.'

[3] *Baghdad Times*, November 25th, 1922.

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but there, as in other tribal districts, little interest was taken in the elections until wider tribal representation was provided[1] at the insistence of the Residency which relied on its long-standing influence among the paramount Shaikhs to obtain their support in the Assembly. In addition, a large section of the public was reluctant to register, fearing that the election rolls would be used for conscription.[2]

Every effort was made to conciliate the '*Ulamā* but without success, the *fatwās* being reissued in June, 1923. It was maintained in British official circles that the only remedy lay in vigorous action against the leaders themselves. Only by their suppression would the opportunity be afforded of intimidating the rank and file to the extent that the elections could be continued without further active opposition. The Prime Minister favoured this policy, but King Faisal continued to hope for conciliation by other methods. When, however, collisions occurred on June 21st, between the police and the inhabitants of Kādhimain over the posting of *fatwās* at the door of the mosque and when demonstrations were subsequently organized against the Government in which Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī and his family took a prominent part, the Ministers, urged by their Advisers, felt it necessary to take strong action to vindicate the authority of the Government. Armed with an Ordinance, passed on June 9th, giving power to the Government to deport non-'Iraqīs for political offences, the Council ordered with the reluctant concurrence of H.M. the King, then visiting Basra,[3] the arrest and deportation of Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, his sons Hasan and 'Alī, and his nephew, all Persian subjects. A demonstration of protest was immediately organized by the religious leaders of Najaf, a group of nine important '*Ulamā*, also Persian

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[1] By means of a liberal interpretation of Article III (*a*) of the Election Regulations by the Ministers, in late August, 1923.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, December 2nd, 4th, 1922.

[3] Official *Communiqué*, *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-'Iraq*, June 25th, 1923, *Al-'Āsima*, June 27th, 1923. The Arabic Press generally approved of the deportations: *Al-'Iraq*, June 27th, 30th; *Al-'Āsima*, June 27th; July 2nd, 4th; *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 25th, 1923.

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subjects, with twenty-five followers leaving for Persia as a 666 gesture of their disapproval. The 'Iraq Government, although 667 deprecating the action of these '*Ulamā*, gave them every facility to expedite their departure.[1]

The elections were renewed on July 12th.[2] Difficulties and delays, however, still remained, due to the refusal of the Shī'is to form Electoral Committees, to the undiminished fear of conscription and to the resignation of the Sa'dun Cabinet and the formation of Ja'far Pasha's Ministry. The change of Ministries, although disturbing at this juncture, provided an opportunity for conciliating the Shī'is, which the King had been anxious to facilitate.[3] In spite of these difficulties, the registration of primary voters was concluded on December 16th; the secondary elections were completed on February 25th; and the elected representatives were summoned to Baghdad and given a great banquet by the King on March 4th.[4]

Ratification of the Treaty

In the presence of the High Commissioner and his staff, the 648 Air Officer Commanding and a large audience, the King, in an eloquent speech from the Throne, opened the Assembly, March 27th, eighty-four representatives being present.[5] He rendered thanks to God for the successful conduct of affairs of State and for the opportunity he now had of opening the *Majlis* which was to lay the foundations of the State. He then urged the

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, pp. 11-13.

[2] *Al-Istiqlāl*, July 13th, 1923.

[3] The new Cabinet was as follows: Prime Minister (without portfolio): Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari; Interior: 'Alī Jaudat Beg; Defence: Nūri Pasha as-Sa'id; Finance: Hājī Muhsin Chālabi ash-Shalash; Communications and Works: Sabih Beg; Justice: Shaikh Ahmad Effendi Fakhri; Auqāf: Shaikh Salih Bash'ayan; Education: Muhammad Hasan abū Mūhaisin. For its programme, see *Al-'Iraq*, December 3rd, 1923.

[4] *Al-'Iraq*, March 5th, 1924.

[5] *Majmū'a madhākurātu' l-majlisu't-t'asīsī'l-'Irāqī* (Complete Proceedings of the 'Iraq Constituent Assembly, 2 vols., Baghdad, 1924), (hereafter Madhākurāt, Proceedings), 1st Session, p. 5; Bell, op. cit., p. 692; *Baghdad Times*, March 28th, 1924.

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members of the Assembly to have courage and wisdom in carrying out the tasks confided to them by the nation:

1. To give their verdict on the Treaty.
2. To pass upon the Constitution of 'Iraq.
3. To pass upon the Electoral Law for the Parliament which was to represent the nation and guard its independence.

Reminding them of the injunction of the *Qur'ān*, 'it is for them to take counsel together', he asked for God's aid in all their deliberations.'[1]

'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn was elected president, receiving fifty votes and Yāsīn Pasha al-Hāshimī, twenty-three votes.[2] At the second sitting, Dā'ūd Beg al-Haidarī and Yāsīn Pasha were elected vice-presidents.[3]

Consideration of the Treaty and its connected documents, which were presented to the Assembly at its third session, March 31st,[4] and referred at the fifth session, April 7th, to a committee,[5] of which Yāsīn Pasha became Chairman, began under very favourable circumstances. Notwithstanding the reluctance of the 'Iraq Government to adopt the High Commissioner's suggestion that it openly support in the elections to the Assembly those candidates pledging themselves to vote for the Treaty, and in spite of the failure of many candidates for election to declare their views regarding the issues to be settled in the Assembly,[6] most of the 100 representatives who had been elected were believed to favour ratification of the Treaty. Only about fifteen were known to be definitely opposed to it. The forty tribal representatives, on whom the Residency counted as the backbone of the pro-Treaty group (they and the Kurdish representatives formed a majority of the Assembly), had drawn

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[1] *Madhākarāt*, pp. 5-7.

[2] Ibid., p. 8.

[3] Ibid., 2nd session, p. 15.

[4] Ibid., 3rd session, pp. 27 ff.

[5] Ibid., 5th session, pp. 90-3.

[6] *Al-'Iraq*, September 12th, 1923, in an inspired article, and *Al-'Istiqlāl*, January 12th, 1924, had urged the candidates to present their programmes to the electors.

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together and on March 24th had pledged themselves to support the Treaty and to take no other action without common consent.

Discordant elements, however, both inside and outside the Assembly, soon began to make themselves felt. In the Assembly, a group, of which Yāsīn Pasha, Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī and Muzāhim Pāchahjī were leaders, opposed the Treaty and the Agreements on the grounds that they limited independence, that the Agreements, particularly the British Official and Financial Agreements, were more than the country could bear, and that they did not in return assure adequate support for 'Iraq, especially in the Mōsul frontier dispute. The party's vigorous advocacy of these arguments, particularly the last two, with which even supporters of the Treaty were in sympathy, drew many of the wavering deputies to their side.

Another group was formed, theoretically in opposition to the Treaty but in reality, it was maintained in official circles, in opposition to the Cabinet, whose fall it hoped to bring about. Still another group, led by Ra'ūf Beg Chādarchī, opposed the Treaty on technical grounds, alleging that in form it was not a treaty which could be honourably signed by two nations. It was merely the Mandate re-written.[1]

In addition, a large section of the tribal representatives, led by Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn of the Muntafiq, broke away from the tribal group, declaring that it would not agree to ratification unless the Organic Law guaranteed the shaikhs special privileges: increased use of the Tribal Disputes Regulations, the perpetual lease of government lands then held by the shaikhs and consultation with a tribal *majlis* of twelve shaikhs of any *Liwā* where martial law was about to be declared.

Outside the Assembly, where the sole subject of conversation was the Treaty, the religious leaders, the lawyers and law students, school teachers and Nationalists generally, including the young leaders of the *Ma'hadu'l 'Ilmī* and the *Nadī'l 'Islah*,

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[1] Such was the tenor of Ra'ūf Beg's speech, June 2nd: *Madhākarāt*, 19th session, pp. 300 ff.

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with the support of several vernacular papers, united in incessant war against the Treaty. The principal attempt to bring the deputies under Nationalist influences, at a dinner organized by the Baghdad lawyers for April 11th, failed, the permission for the dinner having been revoked by the Minister of Interior. The incident, however, provided capital for the Nationalists and widened the breach already existing between the Assembly and the Cabinet.[1] The agitation was capped by the attempt on April 20th, following numerous threats, to assassinate in a Baghdad thoroughfare two tribal deputies from Hilla.[2]

Although the Government immediately made twenty-three arrests, suppressed *Al-Istiqlāl*, *Ash-Sha'b*[3] and *An-Nāshi'a*[4] and took other steps against the agitators in order to reassure the deputies, it was clear that many representatives, even those favouring the Treaty, had been adversely affected by these Nationalist demonstrations. Only fifty-three members attended the eleventh session, May 10th,[5] at which a number of resignations were recorded. These were due, it was openly declared by Mulla Muhammad of 'Arbīl, to constant threats from anonymous letters and notices in the bazaars.[6]

The High Commissioner and his staff, on their side, spent themselves in strengthening the hands of the Government and in inducing the Assembly to hasten its decision. The High Commissioner had been obliged to declare in a letter to the King, April 24th, in answer to persistent requests that the Treaty and subsidiary Agreements be amended before their ratification, that

> the British Government is unable to consent to any modifications either in the Treaty or Protocol or in the Agreements, and it remains for the Constituent Assembly either to accept

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[1] *Madhākurāt*, 6th session, pp. 123-37. Also *Al-'Iraq*, April 11th, 1924.

[2] Ibid., 8th session, p. 147.

[3] A Baghdad newspaper, founded April 10th, 1924.

[4] A Baghdad comic weekly, founded December 2nd, 1921.

[5] *Madhākurāt*, 11th session, p. 165.

[6] Ibid., p. 170.

or reject them as a whole, as they may consider best in the interests of 'Iraq.[1]

Nevertheless, he endeavoured in the same letter, in one of April 28th[2] and in other ways, to present the Treaty in its most favourable aspect. Questions from the Assembly for information were freely answered. Full publicity was given in the friendly newspapers to all possible reasons why the Treaty should be ratified, including the arguments that it was necessary in order to check pro-Turkish activities in Mōsul, to ensure successful frontier negotiations and to secure loans from English financiers.

In spite of these efforts, the dread of assuming the responsibility for ratification was apparent even among the Ministers who, in the face of agitated public opinion, hesitated to make any statement or to take any action which would subject them to personal criticism or to unpopularity from their own people. Influenced by the opprobrium heaped on the Cabinet, and believing that part of the opposition to the Treaty in the Assembly was due to the desire to dislodge his Cabinet, Ja'far Pasha offered his resignation in early May. Following consultation with the High Commissioner, the King requested Yāsīn Pasha to form a Cabinet, but after twenty-four hours' consideration the latter refused. At the same time, he gave a solemn assurance that the Treaty Committee, of which he was Chairman, would make a favourable report to the Assembly. Ja'far Pasha was induced to carry on until the Treaty had been ratified.[3]

Under these circumstances, H.M. Government, in concurrence with the High Commissioner, came to the conclusion, by the middle of May and before the Treaty Committee had made its report to the Assembly, that the situation, which they felt to be fraught with danger, must be terminated.[4] The

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, May 3rd, 1924.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Nevertheless, the President of the Assembly, Yāsīn Pasha, and Nājī Pasha, in an interview with the High Commissioner on May 23rd, reiterated their contention that the al-'Askarī Ministry had no hold over the Assembly.

[4] *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 22; Dobbs, H. R. C., in Bell, *Letters*, p. 547.

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648* Council of the League of Nations, therefore, was asked by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a letter dated May 21st, to place the question of 'Iraq on the agenda for its first meeting, June 11th.[1]

In a second letter of the same date from the Foreign Secretary, communicating the Treaty and its related documents, the Council was informed:

> The Treaty, Protocol, and the subsidiary Agreements are now under consideration in Baghdad by the Constituent Assembly referred to in Article 18 of the Treaty; and it is hoped that these documents, in which H.M. Government has announced they can accept no modification, will have been accepted by the Assembly before the next meeting of the Council of the League. The Treaty and the Agreements are the outcome of prolonged discussions and negotiations with the King of 'Iraq and his Government, and the Council will understand that they represent the conditions on which alone H.M. Government see their way to give effect to the policy set forth in Mr. Fisher's announcement of November, 1921. . . .
>
> There is, however, the possibility that the Treaty, Protocol and subsidiary Agreements will not have been accepted by the 'Iraq Constituent Assembly before the next meeting of the Assembly. In that event a new situation will arise, and H.M. Government may have no option but to obtain the authority of the Council for some alternative arrangement to ensure the carrying out of the provisions of Article XXII of the Covenant in so far as 'Iraq is concerned.[2]

A copy of this letter, together with an explanatory note, was sent by the High Commissioner to King Faisal, on May 26th, a fortnight before the date by which the Treaty, if it were not ratified, would be considered rejected. The letter read as follows:

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[1] *Official Journal, League of Nations*, No. 7 (1924), p. 1013. The date by which the Treaty should be ratified thus became June 10th.

[2] Ibid., pp. 1013-4; also *Baghdad Times*, May 29th, 1924.

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Your Majesty,

I have the honour to forward for Your Majesty's information a copy of a letter which has been addressed by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to the Secretary of the League of Nations regarding the relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq, together with a copy of the draft instrument which formed an enclosure to that letter.

I understand that the date of the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations is to be 11 June, and Your Majesty will see from paragraph 8 of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's letter that, if the 'Iraq Constituent Assembly have not accepted the Treaty, Protocol and Subsidiary Agreements before that date, H.B.M. Government contemplate placing an alternative arrangement for the treatment of 'Iraq before the Council of the League. It is important that this decision of the British Government shall be widely known in 'Iraq without delay, and I trust Your Majesty will give orders for its early publication.

(Sgd.) H. Dobbs.[1]

On May 20th,[2] eight days before the dispatch of the above letter, the Report of the Treaty Committee, a lengthy document of seventy-five pages, was submitted to the Assembly. In spite of Yāsin Pasha's assurance to the King, the Report recommended continued insistence on amendments both to the Treaty and the Agreements: the definite abolition of capitulations, the declaration of complete independence, the non-interference of the High Commissioner in the Budget, the immediate transference to 'Iraq of all works of public utility not yet transferred, and the cancellation of the last sentence of Article VIII in the Military Agreement. Nothing was said as to whether the amendments should be made before or after the Treaty was ratified.[3]

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, May 29th, 1924.

[2] *Mudhākarāt*, 14th session, pp. 429 ff. *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 21, erroneously gives the date as April 20th, thereby creating the impression that the Assembly considered the Report for seven weeks instead of twenty days.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 3rd, 1924.

648 The Report did nothing to lessen agitation against the Treaty or to facilitate the decision of the deputies, in whose debates the amendments put forward by the Committee became the issue. Little attention was paid to the High Commissioner's statement that no amendments could be made prior to ratification and that H.M. Government could give no positive assurance that it would agree to specific amendments following ratification.[1]

Outside the Assembly, the Nationalist agitation increased in intensity, culminating in demonstrations on May 29th and 31st. On the morning of May 29th, shops were closed in Baghdad. Huge crowds gathered in front of the Assembly building, vociferously demanding rejection of the Treaty. After several hours, the crowd grew threatening and attempted to force its way into the Assembly. Armed followers of Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn and other shaikhs actually invaded the building. Deputies coming from the Assembly were assaulted. The situation rapidly grew alarming, the cavalry, which had re-enforced the police, being unable to clear the streets with their lances. Not until the police, after firing over the heads of the demonstrators, were forced to fire into the crowd, was order restored.[2]

Little progress towards ratification was made in the Assembly in the next four sessions,[3] although the High Commissioner and the King exhausted every means of inducing it to give a favourable verdict. The deputies were appealed to, individually and collectively; the Ministers were interviewed by the High Commissioner who, on the occasion of a visit to the Assembly, May 31st, made an informal address to the deputies;[4] Yāsīn Pasha, who had interests in agricultural concessions, was repeatedly warned by Sir John Norton Griffiths that the concessions would be dropped if the Treaty were not ratified. The *Baghdad Times* was encouraged to publish articles urging ratification.[1]

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[1] This declaration was made by the High Commissioner in response to repeated requests from H.M. the King, the Prime Minister, Yāsīn Pasha and others for such assurances.

[2] Although a huge crowd of demonstrators gathered on May 31st, it was soon brought under control by the police.

[3] *Madhākarāt*, 19th to 22nd sessions, June 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 9th, pp. 277-416.

[4] *Baghdad Times*, June 2nd, 1924.

On the morning of June 10th, the final day set for ratification by H.M. Government, the session was attended by so much confusion, in spite of the previous determination of the 'Iraq Cabinet to force the Treaty through the Assembly, that the Prime Minister despaired of any clear decision.[2] With the concurrence of the King, whom he had consulted by telephone, he proposed an adjournment until the following day, 'on account of certain foreign political matters'.[3]

The subsequent request of the King to the High Commissioner that he arrange for an extension of time was refused. The High Commissioner recalled to His Majesty that the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations was taking place on the next day, and that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had already informed the League that if the 'Iraq Assembly had not accepted the Treaty before the meeting of the Council, the British Government might be forced to propose an alternative method for dealing with 'Iraq. The High Commissioner insisted that the Assembly be resummoned that afternoon and informed the King that he would himself come at four o'clock to communicate his views to His Majesty.

The visit of the Prime Minister and Yāsin Pasha to the High Commissioner that afternoon, just before his departure to see the King, found him obdurate. The High Commissioner informed them that he saw no hope for a decision and that he was about to advise the King to dissolve the *Majlis* if it had not reached a decision by midnight. The visitors put forward another form of resolution which neither accepted nor rejected the Treaty. The High Commissioner abruptly refused the proposal.

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[1] Although the *Baghdad Times* declared that Great Britain neither wanted the Treaty (May 19th) nor wished to stay in 'Iraq (May 20th and 21st) and had nothing to gain (May 22nd), it continued to urge ratification of the Treaty in every issue, from May 19th to June 10th. It went to extreme lengths to prove that Turkey had colonising designs on 'Iraq (June 19th), alleging that only fear of the pro-Turkish agents in Baghdad kept the deputies from voting (June 9th). See also issues of May 26th, June 2nd, 6th, 7th.

[2] So fearful were the deputies of making a decision that the Karbalā deputy actually proposed that a resolution be drafted and passed, neither accepting nor rejecting the Treaty. *Mudhākarāt*, 19th to 22nd session, p. 423.

[3] *Mudhākarāt*, 23rd session, p. 430.

At the Palace, the High Commissioner delivered to King Faisal in the presence of his Personal Adviser an unsigned memorandum. The memorandum reviewed the decision of the British Government to limit the period of discussion of the Treaty and Agreements. After summarizing the events leading up to the existing situation which was described as dangerous, it continued as follows:

> In these circumstances, H.B.M. Government cannot allow the present situation, so dangerous both to the internal and the external security of 'Iraq to continue. To-day's last proceedings of the Assembly have shown no approach to an agreement and no prospect of a clear and early decision. I have, therefore, been empowered to call upon Your Majesty, as a condition of further support by H.B.M. Government, to promulgate immediately, by and with the advice of Your Council of Ministers, an amendment to the law of the Constituent Assembly by which Your Majesty will take power to dissolve the Assembly at any time within four months of the commencement of its sessions and also an order under the said amendment, dissolving the Assembly with effect from 12 o'clock on the night between 10th and 11th June. This order I must ask Your Majesty to communicate officially through the Prime Minister to the President of the Constituent Assembly before seven o'clock on the morning of 11th June, and I must ask Your Majesty to give instructions through the Minister of Interior for the immediate closing of the Assembly building and for the occupation of its approaches by a number of police sufficient to enforce order for its closing.

King Faisal had no choice but to accede to the High Commissioner's wishes. Arrangements were made for the Judicial

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Adviser to bring a draft law of dissolution to the Palace that evening for promulgation if the Treaty were not passed by midnight.

At eight o'clock that night the Prime Minister telephoned the Palace that he had found it impossible to convene a quorum. He begged for a day's grace. The High Commissioner was adamant. The draft law for dissolving the Assembly was placed in the hands of the King.

At 10.30, however, the Prime Minister, by dint of great effort, had persuaded sixty-eight deputies to assemble.[1] The President, after explaining the circumstances of the special session, put to the Assembly the resolution, standing in the name of Yāsīn Pasha and his group, that ratification should be delayed until the amendments had been secured.[2] Forty-three voted against the resolution, twenty-four for it, one deputy refusing to vote.[3] The Prime Minister's resolution, which attempted to incorporate the fears, hopes and desires of both the anti-Treaty and the pro-Treaty groups, was then put to the vote. His formula read as follows:

> This Assembly considers that many of the Articles of the Treaty and Agreements are so severe that 'Iraq would be unable to discharge the responsibilities of the alliance desired by the people of 'Iraq. But 'Iraq relies upon and has full trust in the honour of the British Government and

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[1] *Madhākurāt*, 24th session, pp. 431-2.

[2] Ibid., p. 435. The translation is as follows:
The Constituent Assembly have seen the Treaty, Protocol and Agreements, and in spite of their strong desire for co-operation with the British Government and for the maintenance of friendship between the two peoples, they found that they (the documents) contain such severe articles as to render 'Iraq incapable of discharging the responsibilities of alliance . . . Therefore, out of a desire to establish the alliance on strong foundations, the Assembly do not agree to the ratification of the Treaty by the Government, unless the amendments and reservations contained in the Committee's Report are accepted. Further, negotiations for securing the said amendments should be entered into forthwith, as pointed out in the Committee's Report and should be submitted to the Constitutional Assembly in the form of a Protocol. Also an assurance should be obtained for the defence of the rights of 'Iraq in the Mōsul Wilayet in its entirety.

[3] Full lists of the deputies according to their votes are given, ibid., pp. 436-9.

the nobility of the British people and is confident that they will not permit 'Iraq to be overburdened nor its aspirations to be prejudiced. It is only this confidence and reliance on the part of 'Iraq which has induced the Assembly to accept the statements which have been received from His Excellency the High Commissioner on behalf of the British Government, to the effect that the British Government, after the passing of the Treaty, will endeavour to adjust the Financial Agreement, in the generous spirit characteristic of the noble British people. In view of this, the Assembly recommends that His Majesty the King should ratify the Treaty, Protocol and Agreements, provided that immediately after such ratification, His Majesty shall confer with the British Government for securing the amendments suggested by the Committee of the Assembly. This Treaty and its subsidiary Agreements shall become null and void if the British Government fails to preserve the rights of 'Iraq in the whole Mōsul Wilayet.[1]

Thirty-seven deputies voted for the resolution, while twenty-four (the identical group which had voted for Yāsīn Pasha's resolution) declared against it. Eight deputies abstained, including one who had arrived late and six of those who had voted against Yāsīn Pasha's resolution.[2] The Assembly adjourned shortly before midnight.[3]

The ratification of the Treaty was received throughout 'Iraq, according to the *Baghdad Times*,

> in the most stoical fashion. There were none of the rejoicings nor lamentations we had expected: we heard no loud huzzas, nor did we notice any of the gangs of roughs, armed with sticks, knives and revolvers, apparent much earlier.[4]

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[1] *Madhākurāt*, 24th session, pp. 440-1.

[2] Ibid., pp. 442-5. The fact that only 69 Deputies acted upon the Treaty has been the source of much adverse comment by Arab Nationalists. It must be remembered that the average attendance up to June 10th was 72, and that of the 23 scheduled sessions, less than 69 were present at 12 of them, less than a quorum appearing for the session of May 31st.

[3] Ibid., p. 446.

[4] *Baghdad Times*, June 13th, 1924.

WORK OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Al-'Ālam al-'Arabī stated:

> Now that the great question is settled it is the task of the 'Iraq Government to strive to gain the results foreshadowed by the statements and promises of Great Britain.[1]

Al-'Irāq wrote:

> The Assembly has by a majority resolved to ratify the Treaty. 'Iraq has passed from the old era into the new. In this new era her responsibilities will be greater, and her efforts to secure independence must be greater too.
>
> The Treaty does not secure the success which we desired, nor will the alliance with Great Britain place us in the position to which we aspire, unless we work to create in the Treaty period adequate forces to help us to complete independence and make steady steps towards progress and development.[2]

Apathy and indifference attended the remainder of the Assembly's labours. Discussion of the Organic Law occupied its attention from June 14th[3] to July 10th, when the Law was unanimously approved.[4] The Electoral Law was passed on August 2nd,[5] the Assembly being dissolved on the same day.[6]

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[1] *Al-'Ālam al-'Arabī*, June 13th, 1924.

[2] *Al-'Irāq*, June 12th, 1924.

[3] *Madhākarāt*, 25th session, pp. 446 ff.

[4] Ibid., 41st session, pp. 1079 ff.

[5] Ibid., 49th session, pp. 1300 ff.

[6] For '*Irāda* of Dissolution, see *Compilation*, 1924, p. 37.

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CHAPTER XXII

TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE

175x THE Protocol of April 30th, 1923, had provided that the Treaty 648x of 1922 should 'terminate upon 'Iraq becoming a member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey'.[1] A new situation arose, however, in the settlement of the Turco-'Iraq frontier dispute as the final step in establishing peace with Turkey. Under the terms of the Peace Treaty signed at Lausanne, July 24th, 1923, when Turkey had persisted in her refusal to abandon her claims to Mōsul Wilayet, the dispute had been referred to the Council of the League of Nations.[2] That body on December 16th, 1925, in agreement with the Report of its special Commission which it had sent to Mōsul, January to March, 1925, to investigate the rival claims[3] and in accordance with the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, November 21st, 1925,[4] decided, subject to three conditions, that Mōsul Wilayet south of the 'Brussels Line'[5] should be awarded to 'Iraq.

The two most important conditions were:

> The British Government is invited to submit to the Council a new Treaty with 'Iraq, ensuring the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory regime defined by the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and 'Iraq and by

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[1] *Infra*, Appendix IX.

[2] For proceedings of the Lausanne Conference, 1922-23: *Accts. and Papers*, 1923 (Cmd. 1814), XXVI, 1. Text of Treaty: ibid., 1923 (Cmd. 1947), XXV, 533.

[3] See *Report submitted to the Council by the Commission instituted by the Council Resolution of September 30th*, 1924 (League of Nations Document, C. 400, M. 147, 1925, VII) (hereafter *Commission Report*).

[4] Text in *Accts. and Papers*, 1924 (Cmd. 2565), XXXI, 563.

[5] So-called because formulated by the Council at Brussels, October 29th, 1924.

the British Government's undertaking, approved by the Council on the 27th September, 1924, unless 'Iraq is, in conformity with Article I of the Covenant, admitted as a Member of the League before the expiration of this period.

As soon as, within a period of six months from the present date, the execution of this stipulation has been brought to the knowledge of the Council, the Council shall declare that the present decision has become definitive and shall indicate the measures required to ensure the delimitation on the ground of the frontier line.

The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Inquiry the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the Commission in its final conclusions.[1]

Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies,[2] had already, on September 3rd, expressed to the League the willingness of the British Government to abide by the conditions put forward in the Frontier Commission's Report of July 16th if the League considered them necessary.[3] Mr. Amery and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary, immediately following the League's decision of December 16th, accepted the conditions on behalf of the British Government.[4]

'Iraqī public opinion had not been unprepared for the League's decision. The possibility of the extension of the Treaty of 1922 as the only means of retaining Mōsul had been in the air from the time of the Frontier Commission's visit to 'Iraq. In a speech, August 4th, to the Ministers, Senators and Deputies, King Faisal had definitely put forward such a prospect.[5]

Such fear of the consequences attending the return of the

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[1] Complete text: op. cit., loc. cit.

[2] Responsible for Anglo-'Iraq affairs.

[3] *Official Journal, League of Nations*, October, 1925, pp. 1313-14.

[4] Ibid., February, 1926, pp. 192-3.

[5] *Baghdad Times*, August 6th, 1925.

175 648 Turks to Mōsul and of the loss of the Wilayet had been aroused that the protests of sections of the British Press and Parliament against further British commitments in 'Iraq, reproduced in Baghdad newspapers, came as a shock to many 'Iraqis who realized that without Great Britain, 'Iraq would be helpless in the existing dispute.[1] Under the circumstances, the decision of the League, published in Baghdad, December 17th and 18th, was generally received with relief although the vernacular Press was guarded in comments on the conditions attached to it. *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-'Ālam al-'Arabī* went so far as to omit from the text the words 'over a period of twenty-five years'.

Although the prolongation of treaty relations was not entirely unpopular,[2] save among a group of Nationalists who held that the new Treaty must be accompanied by concessions to Nationalism, the unqualified prolongation of the Financial and Military Agreements met with general disfavour. It was held that the Report of Sir Hilton Young regarding financial conditions in 'Iraq[3] had confirmed the criticisms of the Constituent Assembly. When, therefore, the Council of Ministers, to whom the draft Treaty was presented on December 28th, manifested a strong desire for clauses stipulating the early amendment of the Financial and Military Agreements and the periodic review both of 'Iraq's readiness for the League of Nations and of the possibility of further amendment of the subsidiary Agreements, the Colonial Office gave its assent. The final text of the Treaty approved by the Council, January

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[1] Secret Police Report, Baghdad. In early September, after the Commission Report was received in Baghdad, the Prime Minister, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, telegraphed Mr. Amery: 'The 'Iraq nation, represented by its Chamber of Deputies, declares its strong friendship for Great Britain after the expiry of the present treaty'. *Official Journal*, October, 1925, p. 1314.

[2] *Al-Mufid*, however, declared, January 14th, 1926: 'H.M. Government is bent on frightening the 'Iraq Government into signing the Treaty with its eyes shut. Strange phantoms, colonization, Kurdistan, Goyan, decentralization, the loss of oil, etc., have arisen out of the welter of politics.' The paper was immediately suppressed.

[3] *Report of the Financial Mission Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to enquire into the Financial Position and Prospects of the Government of 'Iraq* (Confidential). (Baghdad, 1925.)

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11th, 1926, and signed by the King, January 13th, thus contained in addition to Articles fulfilling the conditions laid down by the League, the following Article:

> At the time when the Treaty of October 10th, 1922, would have expired under the Protocol of April 30th, 1923, and at subsequent successive intervals of four years until the expiry of the period of twenty-five years, or until the admission of 'Iraq into the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty undertakes that he will take into active consideration the following two questions, namely:
>
> (1) The question whether it is possible for him to press for the admission of 'Iraq into the League of Nations;
>
> (2) If it is not possible, the question of the amendment, on account of the progress made by the Kingdom of 'Iraq or for any other reason, of the agreements referred to in Article XVIII of the Treaty of October 10th, 1922 (Article III).[1]

The Chamber of Deputies ratified the Treaty, January 18th, 1926, but not without protest from the Opposition who, numbering nineteen and headed by Yāsīn Pasha, not only refused to vote but withdrew in a body from the Chamber.[2]

The Treaty of 1927

In the spring of 1927, examination of the two questions contained in Article III, cited above, was begun by H.B.M. Government. In a dispatch in the early summer of 1927, minutely covering in its thirty-five pages the arguments for and against the admission of 'Iraq to the League of Nations, the High Commissioner seemed to favour the view that 'Iraq, provided it gave certain guarantees, could be proposed for membership in 1928. H.B.M. Government, however, con-

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[1] Treaty Series No. 10 (1926), Cmd. 2662.

[2] Of the 88 deputies, 58 voted for the Treaty, 9, including 3 of the Opposition, were absent, while 19 walked out. One seat was vacant and one was held by the President who did not vote.

175 cluded in July that they could not recommend 'Iraq for 648 membership in 1928, giving as their reason that the necessary formalities could not be arranged in time. The High Commissioner was authorized, nevertheless, to announce that the question of 'Iraq's admission would be taken up again in 1932 'provided that all went well in the interval and that the present rate of progress in 'Iraq was maintained'.[1] In the meantime, negotiations would be continued for a new Treaty, incorporating the promised amendments to the Financial and Military Agreements.

Disappointment in 'Iraq at the declaration took the form of agitation for sweeping concessions in the new Treaty. *Al-'Iraq*, in its list of concessions, demanded:

1. The Announcement of absolute and complete independence.
2. Immediate negotiations for the entry of 'Iraq into the League of Nations.
3. Complete control by 'Iraq over every aspect of its Government, especially Finance. British help should be restricted to technical matters.
4. All capital works to be turned over to 'Iraq, at a valuation fixed by the Council of Ministers, with interest at three per cent.
5. 'Iraq should not pay for the expenses of the High Commissioner.
6. No exemption from custom dues on materials for the British forces in 'Iraq.[2]

In the negotiations in London, which King Faisal with Ja'far Pasha as Prime Minister had undertaken to conduct personally, His Majesty found himself opposed in every demand by the High Commissioner. The latter, in an *Aide Mémoire*, presented to King Faisal before the negotiations began,

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[1] The High Commissioner protested against the inclusion of these words as likely to give offence and cause exasperation.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, July 28th, 1927: also *Al-Istiqlāl*, July 27th and 28th, and by *Az-Zamān*, July 29th, 1927.

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pointed to official deficiencies and to the King's own shortcomings as indicative that further concessions to 'Iraq's independence were not justified. He also convinced H.B.M. Government that King Faisal and his Ministers alone desired treaty revision, citing in support of his statement the quiescence of the very newspapers which at one time had been foremost in demanding independence.[1]

As a result, the Treaty, signed in London, December 14th,[2] made little practical advance on the previous treaties. It did, however, formally recognize in the preamble the need for the revision of the Military and Financial Agreements 'no longer appropriate in view of the altered circumstances and of the progress made by the Kingdom of 'Iraq.'[3] It reiterated in Article VIII the promise already given in July:

> Provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval, His Britannic Majesty will support the candidature of 'Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932.

The new Treaty found little favour in 'Iraq. The resignation of two ministers, Yāsīn Pasha and Rashīd 'Alī al-Gailānī, soon after its publication, December 20th,[4] was followed by that of the Prime Minister, January 7th. On the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn undertook on January 19th, to form a new Ministry pledged to pass the Treaty and the revised Agreements. When, however, negotiations on the Agreements were resumed, a deadlock was reached. The High Commissioner would not accept the 'Iraq

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[1] The sudden and abrupt change in tone of the vernacular Press about this time is inexplicable, particularly in view of the enthusiastic welcome to King Faisal, unprecedented in the history of Baghdad, on his return from negotiating the Treaty. In 'Iraqī circles the change has been attributed to the distribution of sterling subsidies.

[2] *Accts. and Papers*, 1927 (Cmd. 2998), xxvi, 229.

[3] The Treaty had been signed with the understanding that it would not be ratified until these Agreements had been revised.

[4] *Al-'Iraq*, December 20th, 1927.

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proposals,[1] put forward on October 15th by the Cabinet Committee composed of the Ministers of Finance, Defence and Education. The British counter-proposals made in early December did not satisfy the 'Iraqis. When the High Commissioner indicated that H.B.M. Government had said its last word, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg sent his resignation to the King, January 20th, 1929, stating that he considered his honour pledged to that course. On the same day the *Taqaddam* Party met and, approving of their president's action, agreed to support no Prime Minister pledged to accept the Treaty. Although King Faisal approached the High Commissioner the following day, January 21st, pointing out that unless concessions could be made no Government could be found to take office, the High Commissioner was unperturbed. He declared that the British proposals were final.

So violently opposed was public opinion to the Treaty and the Agreements, that no Prime Minister could be persuaded to take office until more than three months had elapsed. On April 28th, Taufīq Beg as-Sūwaidī undertook to form a Ministry, on the understanding that his programme would not include the Treaty or Agreements.[2] In the meantime, Sir Gilbert Clayton had arrived as High Commissioner in Baghdad, March 3rd, Sir Henry Dobbs having left Baghdad, February 3rd, on his retirement from service.

The Declaration of September 14th, 1929

The advent of the second Labour Government facilitated a change in British policy towards 'Iraq no less than towards Egypt, exemplified in the announcement of a new Anglo-

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[1] Among these were: 1. Immediate assumption by 'Iraq of internal and external defence; 2. British control of the army to be relinquished; 3. Amendments to the Articles concerning the command of mixed British and 'Iraq forces; 4. Immunities and freedom from customs dues now enjoyed by the forces of H.M. Government in 'Iraq to be abolished.

[2] Cf. *Report . . . on Administration of 'Iraq*, 1929 (Colonial No. 55, 1930), p. 11.

Egyptian Treaty, August 3rd, 1929.[1] King Faisal, hopeful of a 175* change in policy, indicated in early June his wish for a more 648* aggressively National Cabinet in order to take advantage of the situation. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, when asked to take office, demurred. He declared that he had resigned in January because of the British attitude; in the meantime the country had given every indication that it would be satisfied with nothing less than complete independence. 'Only on condition that the unyielding attitude with which Great Britain had confronted him during his last term of office be softened',[2] would he consent to form a Ministry.

The new High Commissioner, whose sympathy with and understanding of Arab Nationalism had won Arab esteem and friendship during the war and afterwards in Damascus, had already urged, in presenting the 'Iraqi point of view, that H.B.M. Government make a declaration which would at least partially satisfy 'Iraqi aspirations.[3] His sudden death on September 11th in Baghdad, where he was sincerely mourned, had dashed 'Iraqi hopes.[4] On September 14th, however, the Acting High Commissioner, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham,[5] was instructed by H.B.M. Government to inform King Faisal:

(*a*) That the British Government were prepared to support 'Iraq's candidature for admission to the League of Nations in 1932.

(*b*) That the British Government would at the next Session of the League of Nations inform the Council that they had decided not to proceed with the Treaty of 1927.

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[1] *Accts. and Papers*, 1929-30 (Cmd. 3376), 85.

[2] Cited *Termination of Mandatory Regime in 'Iraq*, p. 13.

[3] *Memorandum on Policy in 'Iraq*, by Secretary of State for Colonies: *Accts. and Papers*, 1929-30 (Cmd. 3440), XXIII, 199.

[4] *Al-'Ālam al-'Arabī*, September 19th, 1929.

[5] Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the Air Officer Commanding in 'Iraq, acted as High Commissioner until the arrival of Major H. W. Young, September 30th. Major Young served tempotarily as High Commissioner until the arrival, December 10th, of Sir Francis H. Humphrys, who had been appointed High Commissioner on October 7th, following his outstanding services as H.M. representative in Kabūl.

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175^{d} 648^{n} (c) That the British Government would also at the same time inform the Council of the League of Nations that they proposed in 1932 to recommend 'Iraq for admission to the League of Nations.[1]

The King was also informed that the British Government hoped before 1932 to conclude with the 'Iraq Government a treaty based generally on the recent proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. This treaty would regulate 'the relations of Great Britain with 'Iraq after the admission of 'Iraq into the League.

Published on September 19th, the declaration evoked comments from the Baghdad Press, varying from a warm welcome to incredulity.[2] The Arabic Press united, however, in demanding that the treaty which was to govern Anglo-'Iraq relations should not be left until 1932 but should be put into operation immediately.[3] In a speech, September 19th, when he became Prime Minister, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg expressed the general viewpoint when he said, in part:

> My colleagues and I have carefully considered the offer embodied in the recent reply received from the British Government. We are now convinced that their new offer satisfies part of the aspirations of the 'Iraqi nation, which will accept in the long run nothing short of complete independence. In view of this conviction, we have responded to the call of the King, and have accepted, with complete satisfaction, His Majesty's invitation to us to take over the reins of government. We have also undertaken to do all that lies within our power to guide the ship of the State to the sublime goal aimed at by our national aspirations under the auspices of His Majesty's Throne, for the preservation of which we would all be willing to sacrifice our lives.[4]

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, September 19th, 1929.

[2] Cf. *Al-'Âlam al-'Arabi*; *Al-'Iraq*; *Nidâ' ash-Sha'b*; *As-Saut al-'Iraq*; *Baghdad Times*, September 19th, 1929.

[3] *Al-'Âlam al-'Arabi*; *Nidâ' ash-Sha'b*; *Al-'Iraq*; *As-Saut-al-'Iraq*, on December 19th and in subsequent issues.

[4] Cited *Admin. Report*, 1929, p. 15.

TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE

The Treaty, for which negotiations began on April 1st,[1] was 75x
approved by the Council of Ministers on June 28th and signed 6487
on June 30th by the High Commissioner and Nūrī Pasha as-Saʿid, Minister of Foreign Affairs.[2] Previously they had initialled a new Judicial Agreement[3] and an Annexure to the Treaty.

The new Treaty provided for 'a full and frank consultation in all matters of foreign policy' which might affect their common interests, each undertaking not to adopt a policy inconsistent with the alliance or which might create difficulties for the other party (Article 1).

In disputes between 'Iraq and a third State, the Contracting Parties were to concert together for a peaceful settlement (Article 3), but in the event of war,[4] each of them was to come to the other's assistance. The aid of H.M. the King of 'Iraq would 'consist in furnishing to His Britannic Majesty on 'Iraq territory all facilities and assistance . . . including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication' (Article 4). Air bases were to be leased to His Britannic Majesty on the terms set forth in the Annexure (Article 5). All responsibilities previously assumed by his Britannic Majesty in respect of 'Iraq were to devolve upon His Majesty the King of 'Iraq (Article 8). The Treaty was to come into force only when 'Iraq entered the League of Nations and was to continue for a period of twenty-five years from the date of her admission to membership.

The substance of the new relationship was, as in the previous treaties, contained in the subsidiary documents.[5] The Annexure regulated the leasing of the air bases and continued the 'immu-

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[1] *Communiqué*, *Al-'Iraq* and *Baghdad Times*, April 5th and 8th, 1920.

[2] *Accts. and Papers*, 1929-30 (Cmd. 3627) xxxi, 649.

[3] Signed, Baghdad, March 4th, 1929.

[4] Subject to the provisions of Article 9: 'Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris on the twenty-seventh day of August, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight'.

[5] Cmd. 3627.

175+ 648+ nities and privileges in jurisdictional and fiscal matters, including freedom from taxation, enjoyed by the British forces in 'Iraq'. It provided for the continuance of military assistance to 'Iraq[1] and gave His Britannic Majesty the right to move troops and supplies by all possible means across 'Iraq.

The first of the Notes signed and exchanged on the same day, June 30th, assured to the representatives of His Britannic Majesty precedence over representatives of other Powers at the Court of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq. Great Britain's privileged diplomatic position in 'Iraq was thereby maintained. The second Note provided for a separate Financial Agreement,[2] while the third stipulated that 'Iraq should normally engage British subjects for posts requiring foreign officials. The fourth Note stated the intention of the 'Iraq Government to ask for a 'British Advisory Military Mission . . . the conditions of service of which shall be similar to those of the existing Military Mission'.

The Judicial Agreement abolished the special judicial regime established in favour of certain foreigners under the Judicial Agreement of 1924, but guaranteed the employment of British legal experts in important specified posts.

Widespread opposition greeted the publication of the terms of the Treaty. *Al-'Iraq* alone had a good word for it.[3] *Al-Bilād* declared:

> The new Treaty is only fresh proof that the British Government has no sympathy with the struggling 'Iraqīs. It is a black spot in the history of the national struggle of this dominated country. The clauses of the Treaty are fetters mercilessly placed around the neck of the 'Iraqīs, to condemn them to servitude for a quarter of a century longer.[4]

Al-'Ālam al-'Arabī maintained: 'This is not the time to rejoice when there are still several 'Iraqī claims in collision with the British rock of obduracy and parsimony.'[5] *As-Saut al-'Iraq*

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[1] The text is practically identical with Article II of the Military Agreement of 1924, cf. Cmd. 2120.

[2] Signed August 19th, 1930.

[3] *Al-'Iraq*, July 22nd, 1930.

[4] *Al-Bilād*, July 22nd, 1930.

[5] *Al-'Ālam al-'Arabī*, cited *Baghdad Times*, July 3rd, 1930.

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declared that the Treaty made no advance over the former 175 treaties.[1] Objection was also taken to the fact that the Treaty 648 became operative only on the entrance of 'Iraq into the League.[2]

The Press continued to fulminate against the Treaty[3] but little difficulty attended its ratification and that of the new Agreements by Parliament. The Chamber of Deputies, newly elected with the special purpose in view, ratified the documents on November 16th by a vote of 69 to 12. The Senate, less compliant, passed them by a vote of 11 to 5.

In preparation for the anticipated termination of the Mandate in 1932, the progressive transfer of administration into the hands of 'Iraqīs was initiated in late 1929 and early 1930, a period which in reality marked the actual transition of power from British to 'Iraqī officials rather than that following the legal termination of the Mandate in October, 1932. The transfer continued from 1920 to 1932, although the necessity frequently arose for the High Commissioner to apply a restraining hand on the inclination of 'Iraqī officials to disregard British advice, which the 'Iraq Government was still under obligation to accept, and to cancel the contracts of British officials without adequate warning or explanation.

The League of Nations, following the receipt, on November 4th, of the British Government's communication stating its intention to recommend unconditionally the admission of 'Iraq as a member of the League in 1932, had begun consideration of the conditions under which the Mandate might be terminated.[4] The League evinced considerable doubt as to

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[1] *As-Saut al-'Iraq*, July 2nd, 1930.

[2] *An-Nahdha* and *Al-'Ālam al-'Arabī*, cited *Baghdad Times*, July 3rd, 1930.

[3] *Az-Zamān* was suppressed, October 27th, 1930, for suggesting that the Treaty might lead to the independence of 'Iraq in the same manner as the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 and the Treaty of Sèvres had led to the independence of Persia and Turkey respectively. See also *Al-'Akhbār*, November 11th, 16th, 1931; *Al-Istiqlāl*, November 16th, December 15th, 1931; *Al-Ikhā' al-Watani*, December 7th, 1931.

[4] *Official Journal*, February, 1930, pp. 74 ff; February, 1921, pp. 453 ff; November, 1931; March, 1932; July, 1932. *Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes*: Twentieth and Twenty-first Sessions.

175 648 'Iraq's administrative, political and social progress, as well as concern for the future of minorities in 'Iraq.[1] H.B.M. Government, however, steadfastly championed the cause of 'Iraq, foreseeing that if the League for any reason whatever refused to terminate the Mandate, Great Britain would be faced with a rebellious 'Iraq, alleging duplicity and bad faith. At the twentieth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the High Commissioner, Sir Francis Humphrys, was authorized to declare:

> His Majesty's Government fully realizes its responsibility in recommending that 'Iraq should be admitted to the League, which is, in its view, the only legal way of terminating the Mandate. Should 'Iraq prove herself unworthy of the confidence which has been placed in her, the moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty's Government. . . .[2]

This statement had a profound effect on the conclusion reached by the Commission. In its Report it stated:

> Had it not been for this declaration the Commission would, for its part, have been unable to contemplate the termination of a regime which appeared some years ago to be necessary in the interests of all sections of the community.[3]

The Council, on January 28th, 1932, agreed to the admission of 'Iraq provided that she gave a Declaration guaranteeing minority rights, administration of justice, international law and other safeguards.[4] On May 30th, 1932, 'Iraq signed the desired Declaration.[5] On October 3rd, by admission to membership of the League,[6] 'Iraq took her place among the community of nations.

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[1] *P.M.C. Minutes*, xx, pp. 115-16, 123, 130, 133-5, 140, 202.

[2] Ibid., June 19th, 1931, p. 134.

[3] *Official Journal*, March, 1932: Special Report of the Commission to the Council on the Proposal of the British Government with regard to the emancipation of 'Iraq.

[4] For text of draft Declaration: *Official Journal*, July, 1932, pp. 1342 ff.

[5] Ibid., September, 1932, p. 1552.

[6] Ibid., November, 1932, p. 1923.

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CHAPTER XXIII

PROGRESS OR RETROGRESSION?

WITHIN the period between the ratification by the Constituent 175 * Assembly of the Treaty of 1922, the subsidiary Agreements, the Constitution and the Electoral Law and the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations, October 3rd, 1932, two major problems faced 'Iraq. On the one hand lay the application of the documents implying the progressive development of the political and social institutions outlined in them. On the other, was the termination of the Mandate which, in spite of its partial dependence on the successful solution of the first problem, continued to be demanded by the majority of 'Iraqis on the basis of right rather than of capacity.

The process by which the Instruments of Policy and of Government for 'Iraq were formalized through the Treaties and other documents have been traced in some detail. It is not necessary here to indicate in such minuteness the various steps by which 'Iraq developed under these measures to the stage which satisfied the League of Nations that the Mandate could be successfully terminated. The evidence of 'Iraq's readiness for admission to the League as presented by the Mandatary to the Permanent Mandates Commission, and accepted by it, not altogether willingly,[1] is available in various official Reports.[2] It is pertinent here rather to summarize the developments in the light of their relation to the principles laid down in the Constitution and to indicate, in addition, the social conditions

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[1] *Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes*, xx, pp. 113 ff.

[2] *Report by His Majesty's Government . . . to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 'Iraq*, October, 1920, to March, 1922; April, 1922, to March, 1923 (Colonial No. 4); April, 1923, to December, 1924 (C. No. 13); 1925 (C. No. 21); 1926 (C. No. 29); 1927 (C. No. 35); 1928 (C. No. 44); 1929 (C. No. 55); 1930 (C. No. 62); 1931 (C. No. 74); 1932 (Foreign Office); and particularly *Progress of 'Iraq* (C. No. 58).

175x and the civic spirit in which the political institutions and the departments of State have evolved from 1925 to 1932. The Permanent Mandates Commission itself had been inclined to consider that these considerations were in reality far more indicative of 'Iraq's fitness for emancipation than the mere possession of the machinery of a modern State.[1]

The Crown

643 On the promulgation of the Constitution, King Faisal, in accordance with his declaration to the High Commissioner, September 10th,[2] privately announced his withdrawal from direct participation in the affairs of State. Although this self-denying ordinance was received with some scepticism in ministerial circles, the King did refrain for a period of time from his former active intervention in administrative affairs. As time passed, however, and acting on the advice of the British authorities, including that given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies,[3] King Faisal not only resumed his place as the actual executive of the State but even exceeded the powers explicitly assigned him by the Constitution. His natural tendency was not uninfluenced by the fact that, as the point of balance between Great Britain and his own people, he had every encouragement to concentrate power within himself. To him the High Commissioner looked for the assurance that the Treaty would be observed. Through him British control was to be exercised over the Council of Ministers, over Parliament and the conduct of administration. The necessity of strengthening the King's hands to enable the High Commissioner to achieve these ends had been recognized from the first by the British drafters of the Constitution.[4] Wide powers had been assured to the King by the provisions in the Constitution, in spite of the

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[1] *Official Journal*, League of Nations, November, 1931, pp. 2056 ff.

[2] *Supra*, p. 361.

[3] Dobbs, H. R. C., in Bell, *Letters*, p. 554.

[4] *Supra*, Ch. xix.

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insistence of the 'Iraqī ministers that the original proposals 643 be altered. In addition, in the practical application of the powers so assured him, it seems clear that the responsible British officials in 'Iraq, in their privileged position as guardians of the Constitution, not only acquiesced in but also encouraged the King to exercise his personal influence and prerogative beyond a strict interpretation of the Constitution in order that their own control might be made more complete. No clearer example of such action exists than the resignation of Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī in March, 1930, at the instigation of the Residency, due to the fact that his policy aimed at achieving 'complete independence' before 1932.

On the other hand, King Faisal himself, under the sustained stimulus of his own desire and that of the Nationalists for complete independence, made every effort to concentrate as much personal power as possible in his own hands. It need not be imputed that he sought power for its own sake. He desired it both because it would enable him to meet the responsibilities and obligations thrust upon him by the Treaties and also because it would place him in a stronger position to win concessions from Great Britain, thus bringing 'Iraq nearer to the goal of independence. By the concentration of power in his own hands he believed that he could command the support of the various sections and groups in 'Iraq which, by their quarrels and animosities, would otherwise mar 'Iraq's prospects for national development and ultimate independence. He was only too well aware of the slight foundation of public support on which his early authority had rested. It seems to have been his plan to identify himself with the nation's needs as far as his British Advisers would permit; to be sovereign in fact as well as in name; and to lead the country to prosperity and to independent Statehood. In the fulfilment of these objectives there can be no doubt that King Faisal made many mistakes, particularly in placing his confidence in Nationalist groups whose ambitions for 'Iraq were possibly less impersonal than

643 his own. Nevertheless, it is also true that had he not so identified himself with their programmes, he would not have won the esteem and regard of his subjects so markedly shown on his death.

643 645 In no field was King Faisal's assumption of power more evident than in the circumstances attending the formation and the fall of the Ministries. In spite of Article 66 of the Constitution which, contrary to the wishes of the King at the time of drafting, had made the Ministers collectively and individually responsible to the Chamber,[1] not one of the fifteen Ministries during his reign, 1921-33, owed its downfall to a direct vote of no confidence by the Chamber.[2] In almost every instance, the resignation of the Cabinet was due either to the direct wish of the King or to the belief that it no longer possessed His Majesty's confidence. Thus, in early April, 1922, the reorganization of the Naqīb's Cabinet was occasioned by the King's dislike of four Ministers and his determination to remove them from office. The fall of the Naqīb's second Cabinet, August 14th, 1922, was due to resentment on the part of the Ministers at the King's interference and his obvious desire for its resignation.[3] The retirement from office of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn, November 16th, 1923, was in large measure the result of His Majesty's objection to the strong line adopted by the Council, particularly aginst the '*Ulamā* in June of that year.[4] The King's desire for a more aggressive Cabinet was known to be directly responsible for the resignation of Taufīq Beg as-Sūwaidī, August 25th, 1929.[5] Nūrī Pasha's resignation, October 24th, 1932, although attributed to a number of causes, was in reality due to the King's wish for a change of Ministers, if not to more personal reasons.

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[1] It may be argued with reason that this article did not make the ministers exclusively responsible to the Chamber.

[2] 'Abdul Muhsin Beg resigned, however, November 1st, 1926, when the Chamber elected its President from the Opposition, as the result of a temporary defection of the Kurdish section of the *Taqăddam* or Government Party. Yāsīn Pasha has given as the reason for his resignation, June 26th, 1925, that he felt he could not command the confidence of Parliament.

[3] *Supra*, p. 357 [4] Ibid., pp. 392-3. [5] Ibid., p. 412

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Every Prime Minister in forming a Cabinet was faced with 643
the necessity of choosing Ministers compliant not only with the 645
High Commissioner's requirement that they 'deal sensibly with relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq' but also with His Majesty's personal wishes, likes and dislikes. It was generally recognized that Ja'far Pasha's first Cabinet, November 3rd, 1923, was composed of members in sympathy with the King's ideas and pledged to pass the Treaty of 1922. In January, 1928, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, who had been suggested by the High Commissioner as the only available Minister capable of bringing about the ratification of the Treaty of 1927, formed his Cabinet with great difficulty owing to the King's secret opposition to a strong Ministry for reasons connected with the Treaty.

In the Parliamentary elections, the King, not uninfluenced 643
by lessons learned from the intractability of the Constituent 666
Assembly, likewise exerted his influence. He insisted in some cases, as in the elections of 1925, on the addition to the list of official candidates the names of men he particularly desired to see in the Chamber, and on the deletion of others which were not acceptable to him personally.

In the second elections, during the spring of 1928, his interference took a curious form. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg had come to office, pledged to secure ratification of the Treaty of 1927, on the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, a step approved by the High Commissioner, as the Opposition in the Chamber had been steadily growing. The Prime Minister's suggestion that the usual confidential letters be sent to the *Mutasarrifs* to ensure the return of deputies favourable to the Treaty, was opposed by the King. By permitting free elections, His Majesty hoped to bring an anti-Treaty Chamber into opposition with the Cabinet to prove to H.B.M. Government that, contrary to the High Commissioner's contention in late 1927,[1] the Treaty and the new Agreements were unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq.

In the parliamentary elections of 1930, the King, seeking a

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 410-411.

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613 new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of
666 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory before candidates received government support.

643 In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the
[653] interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,[1] whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.[2]
[166] To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes on the land, and the development of residential amenities about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early inclination to find employment for those who had served him in western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion to its contribution to the welfare of 'Iraq enabled ~~him~~ to take a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although 'Iraqis universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly asserted their competence to run them, conditions in 'Iraq were
[565] far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

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[1] By the Prime Minister, Nūrī Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

[2] Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, 'Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years* 1930 *and* 1931 *and Capital Development Works Budget for* 5 *Years* 1931-35.

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embracing the State. Not yet had a sense of loyalty and duty 643
to the nation arisen to surmount the differences between tribes- [578
men and townsmen, between Sunnī and Shī'ī, and between 156]
Muslims and minority communities or to replace personal opportunism. Patriotism still denoted independence without obligations to the State.

In his impatience with these materials at hand for the 643
creation of the new State, King Faisal may have gone farther than he was justified in attempting to mould the political institutions to his own will. On the other hand, it seems possible that had he not assumed the role of a benevolent despot, the political system of 'Iraq might have faltered and even collapsed entirely and the stable government insisted upon by the League of Nations as one of its criteria of 'Iraq's readiness for independence[1] would have been absent in 1932. It is equally probable that without King Faisal's guiding influence, supported by Great Britain, the 'Iraqi people in their impatience would have refused to agree to the obligations imposed by Great Britain as the price of her assistance. In the latter circumstance, Great Britain would have been forced to resume direct control or to withdraw from 'Iraq. Either course would undoubtedly have retarded for many years the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations and her acceptance as a member of the international community.

Upon the accession of King Ghāzī I, September 9th, 1933, the young King, barely turned twenty-one and not less of a Nationalist nor less mindful of his position than his father, attempted to use the immense popularity he had acquired as the result of his openly displayed approval of the campaign against the Assyrians,[2] to exert the power of the crown and to take the reins of control into his own hands, after the example of his late father. The Prime Minister, Rashīd 'Alī al Gailānī, although

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[1] *Official Journal*, November, 1931, pp. 2057 ff.

[2] *The Times*, September 1st, 11th, 1933. 'Iraqi-Assyrian relations are held to be outside the scope of this study. See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (1935), pp. 135 ff.

643 requested to remain in office at the death of King Faisal, was speedily convinced by conversations with King Ghāzī that he did not enjoy His Majesty's confidence.[1] His resignation, tendered October 28th, was immediately accepted to the great surprise of political circles. It was apparent that the young monarch desired not only a Cabinet amenable to his wishes but also a Parliament of his own creation. He was persuaded, however, by his British and 'Iraqī advisers against this course. Parliament was not dissolved and the new ministry, although headed by Jamīl Beg Midfai, was less Nationalist in tinge than he had desired.

On the whole, during the reign of King Ghāzī the personal power and influence of the Crown has tended to be less than under the former regime. His Majesty's youth, his inexperience and lack of training in statecraft have made it natural that he should be forced to give more scope than his father to the men about him, in his Palace and in the Cabinet, and to rely upon their advice and that of His Britannic Majesty's representatives
[645] at his Court. Thus few if any of the seven ministerial crises of the reign seem directly traceable to His Majesty's influence but have been due rather to discord within the Cabinets, as when Jamīl Beg Midfai resigned, February 13th, 1934, to lack of confidence to meet emergencies, as at the time of the tribal revolts in March, 1935,[2] or to military intervention as in the *coup d'état* of October 29th, 1936.

669 On this last occasion, General Baqir Sidqī,[3] in charge of army manœuvres to the north-east of Baghdad, suddenly moved the troops with the Air Force on the capital. In manifestoes dropped from the air, he demanded in the name of the army the dismissal of the Yāsīn Pasha ministry, with which 'the army had lost patience' and the appointment of one 'composed of

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[1] See translation of Rashid 'Ali's letter of resignation, *The Times*, October 30th, 1933.

[2] *The Times*, March 17th, 1935.

[3] Baqir Sidqī led the 'Iraqī forces against the Assyrians in 1933, when he won great popularity and promotion. His campaigns in 1935 against the tribes added to his reputation for military ability and ruthlessness.

sincere citizens' under Hikmat Sulaimān.[1] Warning was given that the army might have to take action against those who did not conform to the manifestoes.[2] After the bombardment of Baghdad by the 'Iraqī Air Force and an attempt to negotiate during which Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī, Minister of Defence, was treacherously murdered, Yāsīn Pasha resigned. Hikmat Sulaimān took office with friends and nominees of Baqir Sidqī, few of them outstanding personalities.[3]

The various reasons put forward by the new government for the *coup d'état*, which seems to have come without warning to British and 'Iraqis alike, are not altogether convincing.[4] It is true that Yāsīn Pasha had suppressed newspapers, had heavily bribed the tribal leaders to keep the peace, had curbed opposition, had appointed friends to office and that his personal attitude as Prime Minister had offended many 'Iraqis. It is also true that a general feeling existed that 'Iraq had made little progress under his Government. These unsatisfactory conditions could have been ameliorated, however, by constitutional means. As justifications for military intervention they assume the appearance of pretexts rather than explanations. Facts not mentioned in the official statements, as that army appropriations had been reduced, that the organization of the army was not proceeding according to the ideas of General Sidqī and that many aspiring politicians were out of office, seem to come closer to the causes behind the *coup d'état*[5] and would make it appear

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[1] Formerly Minister of Interior in 1933 at the time of the campaign against the Assyrians. Educated in Turkey, he possesses great admiration for Turkey. His brother, Māhmud Shefket Pasha, was Grand Vizier of Turkey in 1913.

[2] *The Times*, October 31st, 1936. Also *Al-Ahrām* (Cairo), same date.

[3] *Waqayi al-'Iraqiya* (Government Gazette), No. 1542, October 29th, 1936. In addition to Hikmat Sulaimān as Prime Minister and Minister of Interior were: Nājī al-'Asīl, Foreign Affairs; Ja'far abū Timman, Finance; Kāmil al Chādarchī, Economics; Abdul Latīf Nūrī, Defence; Sālih Jābbur, Justice; Yūsuf 'Izz-ad-Din Ibrāhīm, Education.

[4] *The Times*, October 31st, November 2nd, 5th and 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh* (Cairo), November 2nd, 6th, 1936; *Al-Ahrām*, November 1st, 1936.

[5] The *coup d'état* has also been ascribed to the influence of Germany and Italy, of extreme 'Iraqī Nationalists, of Shī'is, of the Jews, and of Socialists by the *Daily Herald*, *Al-Balāgh*, *Palestine Post*, *Al-Liwā*, *Alif-Bā* (Damascus), and the *Daily Mail*, respectively, November 1st to 6th, 1936.

667 that personal ambition of the leaders had no small part in the events of October 29th and afterwards.

At one time it was suspected that King Ghāzī might have been cognizant of the plot, his impatience at the limitations placed on his power being well-known.[1] His assurances to the contrary appeared to be sincere, particularly in the light of subsequent events. Indeed, Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat Sulaimān, supported by the armed forces, may be regarded as possessing sole power in 'Iraq to-day despite published statements that General Sidqī would concern himself solely with the re-organization of the army, that the Government would work with a freely elected Parliament and that the rights of all section of the people would be respected.

Council of Ministers

645 Among the principal factors which have adversely affected the position and the functioning of the Council of State may be listed its susceptibility to outside influence, its instability, not altogether unrelated as has already been indicated, and the lack, of a sufficiently large class of 'Iraqīs of Cabinet rank.

In the period from August, 1921, to October, 1932, the average life of the fourteen Cabinets was less than ten months each. Four Ministries, the second of the Naqīb, that of Taufīq Beg, the fourth of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg and that of Nājī Pasha, lasted less than four months each. Nūrī Pasha's first Cabinet, by remaining in office from March 23rd, 1930,[2] to October 19th 1931, had the longest existence although its tenure was not undisturbed by internal dissensions. Such instability, due largely to the King's influence, to the conflict of British and

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[1] *Al-Ayyām* (Damascus), November 3rd, 1936, cites Baqir Sidqī, however, as saying: 'In no way have I proceeded in any action against the will of H.M. the King and of the Supreme Power.'

[2] *Waqayi' al-'Iraqiya* (Government Gazette), No. 844, March 27th, 1930.

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'Iraqī viewpoints[1] and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confidence by Parliament[2] had unfortunate consequences. On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased. 645

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects. [795]

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqis have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat 665 669

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[1] Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Iraqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Ab[illegible] Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nājī Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

[2] *Supra*, p. 422, note.

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645 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment
669 than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment
of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2] Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many 'Iraqis held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government
185 by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time
[307] in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been
648 won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other 'Iraqī Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

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[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 5th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *At-Tariq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936..

1-[1936 .. Analysi]

Complete support, however, of the country has yet to be won 645 by the new Government. It must count on the opposition of the 668 exiled 'Iraqis and of the adherents of the late Ja'far Pasha. It must count also on the potential opposition of all 'Iraqis who for motives of self-interest have kept a foot in both camps.[1] Its real test will come, therefore, in its inability to carry out its promises and to meet other problems which face the country: placating the shaikhs at the same time that the land is divided, applying conscription to the tribal areas, bringing Shi'is and Sunnis into harmony and of meeting the rising cost of living.

The Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies, although a dignified body meeting 646 regularly since its establishment in 1925 and conducting its deliberations as a rule with sobriety and moderation, has failed to take its full and rightful place in the political life of 'Iraq, as foreshadowed by the provisions of the Constitution. The failure seems directly due to its inability to command public confidence. The wave of scepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions which recently swept over 'Iraq, in common with other countries with a more substantial democratic tradition, prepared the way for the present military dictatorship. The slow progress of 'Iraq as compared with that of Turkey and Persia under dictatorial regimes was conveniently explained away as being due to the democratic institutions. The critics pointed out that the parliamentary system of 'Iraq was adopted from foreign models and was unsuited to conditions and needs of 'Iraq. They indicated and with more reason that the elections 646 to the Chamber, without exception, have been rigidly 666 controlled by the Government, often under pressure from the Residency as in 1928 and 1930.[2] In all districts except Baghdad

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[1] See Macdonald, A. D., *Euphrates Exile* (1936), pp. 53 ff. for a discussion of this characteristic in 'Iraqis.

[2] Principally because the Treaties of 1927 and of 1930 were to be ratified by the newly elected Chambers.

646 666 where the electoral body is not so amenable to control as elsewhere, the confidential orders of the Government to the provincial officials proved sufficient to secure the election of its candidates whether they were residents of the district or even known there. Thus in 1925, all but four of the government candidates were returned, two of these being from Baghdad *Liwā*.[1] In 1928 the deputies returned from Basra, 'Amāra, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla and 'Arbīl *Liwās* were government nominees.[2] Of the thirteen Baghdad deputies, all but five were Government candidates. In these two elections, as well as in that of 1930, a number of Opposition candidates were conscientiously included by the Government on the principle advocated by the King that talented members of the Opposition would raise more difficulties outside Parliament from feelings of personal dissatisfaction than if they were actually members. Thus in 1928, half of the twenty-two Opposition members returned to the Chamber had been previously given the government coupon.

646 661 The deputies, on the other hand, by their proneness to consider parliamentary office as a means to personal aggrandisement, persistently refused the opportunity to win the respect and confidence of the nation. In 1925, it had been somewhat difficult to secure candidates to come forward. It soon became apparent, however, that deputyship meant an assured income and, even more attractive, the exercise of influence. In 'Iraq, as in other countries, the principal value attached to official position has been its effectiveness in securing official favours and financial gain.

646 661 656 Examination of the statute books of 'Iraq, not only from 1925 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, June 10th, 1925. These four, with five others, were, according to a confidential report of the time, accounted to be 'unsatisfactory from the British standpoint'.

[2] Cf. *Baghdad Times*, May 10th, 1928.

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revenue[1] and of other financial legislation,[2] while passed by the 646
Chamber for the benefit of 'Iraq as a whole, particularly after 661
the agricultural crisis of 1931, have especially favoured the 656
land-owning class which has been predominant in Parliament. Other evidence seems to point to the exercise by the deputies of their influence outside of Parliament, either to secure preferential treatment from revenue officials or to obtain appointments for their protégés.

In spite of these deficiencies, Parliament, judged by its com- 646
plete record before 1932 as well as afterwards, has filled an important function in the political life of 'Iraq. It has attracted the most agile brains in the country; it has reflected although imperfectly, public opinion; and it has served as a brake on legislation which might otherwise have been forced on the country more quickly than it could be assimilated. It has served to curb the attempts of individual Ministers to assume a dictatorial attitude. Its right of interrogation, while sometimes checking the initiative of Ministers, has also served to reveal irregularities in administration. It has, moreover, furnished an outlet for Shi'a aspirations for participation in the Government and has given tribal opinion a limited means of expression through the tribal representatives, although discontent with the number of tribal representatives and the manner of their election was given by the leaders of the tribal revolt of 1935 as one of the primary reasons for that rising.[3]

The Chamber, together with the conservative Senate of twenty appointed notables, has, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, laid the foundations upon which democratic government, if it is to come to 'Iraq, must be built. If Parliament were to be given a broader base of an enlightened electorate, a reasonable degree of freedom of election, leadership and new

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[1] Particularly Laws: No. 38 of 1927; No. 55 of 1929; Nos. 38, 43, 69 of 1931; Nos. 1, 5, 10, 34, 35 of 1932; Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 of 1933.

[2] Particularly Pump Law of February 13th, 1926; No. 72 of 1926; No. 38 of 1929; No. 37 of 1930; No. 66 of 1931, etc.

[3] *Near East and India*, June 27th, 1935; also *The Times*, August 5th, 1936.

646 blood from the ranks of those who have absorbed with their education a modicum of civil spirit and a sense of duty to the State, it might yet prove to be the vital political institution of 'Iraq.

Whether these conditions will be attained or whether parliamentary institutions themselves will be retained under the present Government, it is too soon to determine.[1] It is not too much to believe, however, bearing in mind the historical pattern of other dictatorships based on military force, that should the Chamber attempt to take an independent attitude, or should an opposition party arise, the Chamber will have a short life, and that the eventual overthrow of the constitution must follow, together with the loss of such rights and liberties as are now valued by the people of 'Iraq and the destruction of all those conditions essential for the development and maintenance of democracy.

Administrative Services

647 A major difficulty which has faced 'Iraq in the development of her administration has been the lack of a regularly organized Civil Service with regulations governing cadres, appointments, promotions and conditions of service.

Attempts to organize cadres for the various branches of administration, made as early as 1923 when a Cadre Commission was appointed[2] and renewed from time to time, as in 1926[3] and 1928,[4] have not been productive of a systematic

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[1] Freedom of voting and introduction of new blood marked the elections to the new Chamber which convened on February 27th, 1937. It was apparent, however, even before the secondary elections had been held that the candidates, as in all past elections, had been selected so that there would be little or no opposition in the Chamber.

[2] By a decision of the Council of Ministers, March 5th, 1923: see also *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 124.

[3] Ibid., 1926, p. 70.

[4] The Cadre Commission was reorganized by the Council, October 6th, 1928. See also ibid., 1928, pp. 66-7.

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organization of the services. The Civil Service Law of 1931,[1] 647 although it attempted to provide detailed regulations for the Civil Service, has not produced adequate and satisfactory results, not even being generally applied before October, 1932. Its comparative lack of success has been due in part to the constant reorganization of departments and in part to the tendency, restrained as far as possible while the British officials were in authority, to provide posts, either by turning out former occupants or by creating new positions, for applicants whose qualifications were too often those of relationship or personal influence rather than those of ability and capacity.

The result has been a general feeling of insecurity among practically all appointed officials, even those who might be expected to occupy permanent posts, a feeling not appreciably altered by the manner in which the State Official Discipline Law of 1929[2] has been applied. The sense of insecurity, accentuated by dismissals on a large order which have frequently followed Ministerial changes or which have been made in the name of economy as in 1931 or in February 1936, when over 300 officials, many of them highly placed, were dismissed[3] has no doubt contributed to the aversion, amounting in individual cases to fear, which most officials have evinced towards the assumption of responsibility and initiative. All executive authority within departments of State tend to be centralized in the offices of the Ministers. This has been due partially to the system of dual control and responsibility between British and 'Iraqī officials and partially to practices inherited from the Ottoman regime. Every official, as a result, has looked to the official above him to assume the initiative and the responsibility for every action which he has performed, fearing to launch any new idea or plan or to risk any departure from routine for fear of censure and dismissal.

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[1] *Compilation*, 1931, p. 191: Civil Service Law No. 103 of 1931.

[2] State Officials Discipline Law No. 41 of 1929 in *Compilation*, 1929, p. 24.

[3] *Great Britain and the East*, March 5th, 26th, 1936.

647 As a result, officials, even those nominally responsible, have tended to become mere head clerks in their own departments, while Ministers have found themselves overburdened with work. The British Advisers, especially before October, 1932, were able to assist in reducing the burden of the Ministers but elsewhere the administration was retarded in pace and was lowered in quality.

[563] Among officials belonging to minority communities, as the Jews and Christians, the lack of security and the desire to avoid responsibility has been doubly apparent as the result of widespread opposition to the employment of any but 'Iraqis professing Islam. This opposition was evinced as early as 1921, when Jews and Christians were included in the outcry against the employment of foreigners. Although members of these communities have been employed especially in posts attached to the Financial and Technical departments and have even occupied Ministerial positions,[1] the tendency seems to have been to retard their advancement, as evinced in June, 1936, when promotions of Jewish employees as made by the Director of the 'Iraq Government Railway were cancelled by order of the Minister,[2] or to eliminate them as far as possible from Government service, a trend which has been more apparent in recent years.

Finance

652 In the development of 'Iraq's financial system from 1925, three major problems presented themselves: the reorganization of the land-revenue system including its purification from abuses and the development of land-settlement, the equalization of the

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[1] Sasūn Effendi Haskail, a Jew, and Yūsuf Ghanīma, a Christian, served repeatedly as Ministers of Finance.

[2] So vehement was the outcry in the vernacular press over the promotion of the Jewish employees that not only were the promotions cancelled, but disciplinary action had to be taken by the Bureau of Press and Propaganda and an order issued that no promotions should be made without prior sanction of the Minister. See *Great Britain and the East*, July 2nd, 16th, 1936.

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incidence of taxation, and the provision of financial means, not only for the Government's essential services but also for the discharge of the obligations laid on it by the various treaties and by the Financial Agreements.

Judged by its ability to meet this last problem, the financial history of the 'Iraq Government may be regarded as comparatively successful. Budget deficits occurred as in 1921 and 1922 and in the years from 1929 to 1931,[1] but the financial crises, including that of 1930-1 were safely weathered without resort to foreign loans. The accumulated deficits were reduced by the conversion of oil revenue, of which the first instalment was received in August, 1931,[2] from the Capital Development Works Scheme to which they had been originally assigned. In addition, the 'Iraq Government's share of the Ottoman Public Debt,[3] set at a nominal total of L.T.8,358,126,[4] was practically extinguished by an agreement, October, 1928, by which Ottoman Debt securities to the value of £1,228,000 sterling were

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[1] Summary of financial results, 1921-2 to 1931-2, in lacs of rupees:

	Expenditure	*Revenue*	*Deficit*	*Surplus*
1921–22	572·13	528·25	43·88	—
1922–23	485·82	474·67	11·15	—
1923–24	242·26	509·41	—	85·15
1924–25	464·85	527·33	—	62·48
1925–26	513·38	581·02	—	67·64
1926–27	536·72	567·00	—	30·28
1927–28	569·93	590·97	—	21·04
1928–29	599·93	594·44	4·57	—
1929–30	576·66	574·61	2·05	—
1930–31	464·57	511·58	47·01	—
1931–32	481·74	509·19	17·45	—
	63,88·47	60,68·47	126·11	266·59
		Net Surplus	140·48	

[2] The 'Iraq Petroleum Company's payments to the 'Iraq Government amounted to £866,814 in 1931-32, and to £524,397 in 1932-33. In 1932-33, the British Oil Development Company's payments amounted to £140,000. Cf. Empson, C.: *Economic Conditions in 'Iraq* (Dept. of Overseas Trade, No. 559, 1933).

[3] 'Iraq accepted the obligation by the Financial Agreement, Article XVII.

[4] This sum was set by the Ottoman Public Debt Commission in 1926, under the authority of Article 49 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

652 handed over to the Debt Commission. The balance of £383,009 sterling was to be spread over a period of seven years.

Examination of the method of balancing the budgets and of meeting the demands of the Ottoman Debt bondholders indicates, however, that the results have been secured by the wholesale reduction of salaries and by the reduction of appropriations to government services which vitally concern the regeneration of 'Iraq: Irrigation, Agriculture and Public Works. In 1923, salaries of 'Iraqī officials were reduced by amounts varying from 2½ to 25 per cent on the recommendation of the Economies Committee of 1922.[1] In March, 1926, following recommendations by Mr. Hilton Young,[2] additional reductions were made, while in November, 1930, following the financial crises arising from the fall in agricultural prices, salaries were further reduced by amounts varying from 5 to 8 per cent.[3] The result was that official salaries fell out of proportion to the cost of living; much dissatisfaction was produced, particularly since British officials under contract suffered no such reductions; and encouragement was given to the return to other methods of supplementing salaries which, prevalent under the Ottoman regime, had been severely discouraged by the British Advisers and Administrative Inspectors.

651 In the assessment and collection of land revenue, progress had been undoubtedly made by early Finance Ministers and their Advisers in removing some of the defects inherent in the Turkish system as adapted by Revenue Officers of the Civil Administration. Nevertheless, in 1925, the primary objectives before the 'Iraq Government were still those which had faced the Civil Administration in 1919.[4] These objectives were:

1. To organize the means of revenue collection, as, for example, the elimination of the tax-farmers, and to

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[1] *Report of the Economies Committee*, 1922 (Confidential), (Baghdad, 1922).

[2] *Report of Financial Commission*, 1925.

[3] Young, Sir E. Hilton, *Reports on Economic Conditions and Loan Policy* (Baghdad, 1930).

[4] *Supra*, Ch. vi.

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provide adequate methods of auditing and accounting in 651
order to remove as far as possible opportunities for speculation either by officials or private individuals.

2. To set a definite and fixed rate of demand, payable in cash, applicable to each type of land according to whether it was privately or State-owned, and to the method of irrigation employed on it.
3. To devise methods whereby it would be possible to dispense with the actual annual estimates of agricultural yields, a costly and vexatious task, disturbing to the cultivator as well as affording latitude for bribery and corruption.

These objectives meant that eventually fixed demands would be based upon cadastral units of the land itself, in relation to their potential or assumed average rate of production.

Four obstacles stood between existing conditions and the achievement of these desired aims:

1. The lack of a cadastral survey, the prime essential to any system of land-revenue administration.
2. The lack of knowledge of the taxing authorities as to exact agricultural and marketing conditions, and of the potentialities and the actual yields of agricultural produce.
3. The presence of an agricultural class, from landowners [565]
to cultivators, unwilling from motives of self-interest to co-operate with the Government in agricultural assessments.
4. The existence of official personnel, which in many cases was insufficiently trained and was susceptible to outside influence.

If many of the problems remained unsolved to-day as they were in 1932, it has not been for the lack of conscientious effort on the part of both 'Iraqī officials and their British Advisers. The long delayed cadastral survey has been pushed forward. Sir Ernest Dowson, formerly Surveyor-General of Egypt, was

651 asked in 1929 to study land-tenure and, on the basis of his recommendations,[1] a Land Settlement Department was created in the Ministry of Finance. The deep-rooted conservatism of town and tribe, the lack of experienced staff and the undesirability of sudden changes involving possible serious political consequences made sweeping changes impracticable. Nevertheless, from 1926 onwards, legislation aiming at the simplification of existing methods both of assessment and collection found their way on to the statute books[2] until a radical change was made by the introduction of the *Istihlak* or Consumption Tax, June 2nd, 1931.[3]

The *Istihlak* Law, based on the principle of collecting a fixed proportion of the value of a commodity at the time of its sale, has aroused sharp differences of opinion as to its merits. It has been regarded as costly, complicated and difficult of application, affording opportunities of evasion. On the other hand, in spite of its imperfections, it seems to be a step in the right direction towards the simplification of taxation and the relief of a portion of the burden on the small landowners. Although no ostensible effort seems to have been spared to make the incidence of taxation more equitable, there seems to have been a tendency for returns from land-revenue to decrease while other forms of receipts, particularly customs and excise duties, increase. In 1921, land-revenue produced 21.1 per cent of the total receipts, and customs and excise 38 per cent. In 1928, customs and excise returns rose to 45.5 per cent and in 1931, to 48.2 per cent, while land-revenue fell to 22.3 per cent in 1928 and to 9.5 per cent in 1931.

'Iraqi officials are apt to attribute this phenomenon, on the

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[1] Dowson, Sir E. M., *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth, 1932).

[2] Law No. 40 of 1929: *Compilation*, 1929, p. 65; Amendment of Assessment of Land Tax Law, No. 44 of 1929: ibid., p. 92; Law No. 25 of 1929: ibid, p. 30; Law No. 18 of 1927, ibid., 1927: p. 8.

[3] Istihlak Law No. 83 of 1931, ibid., 1931, p. 68. This Law after being repeatedly amended was repealed when a new Law, No. 59 of 1933, incorporating the amendments, was passed July 16th, 1933. Ibid., 1933, p. 123.

one hand, to recognition of the long existing necessity of 651
lightening the burdens on agricultural produce, and, on the other, to the fall in world prices. The former argument might be more effective if the principal benefit of the reduction of land-revenue had been widespread and not restricted thus far to the comparatively few large landowners. The fall in world prices did no doubt cause a tremendous decrease in land-revenue but the decrease has been out of all proportion to the fall in prices. It must be observed also that no proportionate decrease occurred in the animal head-tax although the price of animals fell as sharply in 1930 as that of agricultural produce. Thus, while *koda* produced 5.2 per cent of the total receipts in 1921, it produced 7 per cent in 1928 and 6.2 per cent in 1931. The comparatively steady returns are hardly explained by increasing efficiency in collections and by increase in flocks but rather by the fact that most of the animals were owned by tribes whose voices counted for little in official circles.

Less tangible evidence seems to exist for the success of the 651
attempts to eradicate corruption from revenue assessment and 661
collection and from financial administration than for any other aspect of administrative activity, although every British official in the Ministry of Finance has striven for that end. The existence of dishonesty and of jobbery for financial favours, which seems to have increased from 1929-30 onwards, has been one of the most unsatisfactory features of administrative life, as most 'Iraqis admit. The tendency has been to lay the blame upon Turkish ex-officials and upon practices inherited from Turkish days, but the evil seems to be too prevalent to be thus accounted for. The true explanation seems to lie in the fact that public spirit has not yet been able to rise above the natural desire to avoid taxation, no less strong in 'Iraq than in other countries. The attitude of Parliament to personal aggrandise- 661
ment at the expense of national interests has already been indicated. Even Ministers have been known to take advantage

661 of their position for their personal profit.[1] Lesser officials have too often followed the example of their superiors. Attempts have been made to impose checks, as by the auditing of government accounts by a British Comptroller and Auditor General responsible only to the Chamber of Deputies. This official has performed his task ably and efficiently,[2] but the results of his work have not been as extensive as might have been expected, due to the reluctance of Parliament to take action, particularly against highly placed or influential officials.

Justice

Two distinct tasks have fallen to the Minister of Justice in 'Iraq: the organization and the administrative supervision of the courts and the drafting and codifying of legislation not only for the assurance of public justice but also for the regulation and development of other administrative services.

692 In the period 1925 to 1932, the number of Civil Courts was extended until they were in operation in varying degrees at forty-eight centres. Criminal Justice continued to be administered by the Civil Judges of these courts and also, in certain cases, by Administrative Inspectors and other senior officials. *Shara'* or Muslim Religious Law Courts continued to be established, not only in all centres where Civil Courts were provided but also in other places. Spiritual Courts to enable the Jewish and Christian communities to deal with their own religious law were set up in 1931,[3] in accordance with Articles 78-80 and 112 of the Constitution.

In the creation and administration of the *Shara'* Courts, including those established for the Shī'a sect, a tendency has been noticed to assimilate them with the Civil Courts in order

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[1] An outstanding instance has been the passage of legislation, remitting revenue on lands irrigated by pumps, by a Minister of Finance, who, as one of the largest owners of such lands, saved himself £3000 in taxes annually.

[2] *Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on Accounts of the Government of 'Iraq*: 1922 . . . (Baghdad, 1924 . . .).

[3] *Compilation*, 1931, Armenian Orthodox Community Law, No. 70 of 1931: Jewish Community Law, No. 77 of 1931.

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that eventually all cases involving Religious Law will be heard 692 in the Civil Courts, along the lines of the Judicial system in force in present-day Turkey. Steps towards that end have been the appointment wherever possible of Civil Judges to act also as *Qādhīs* of the *Shara‘* Courts,[1] and the passing of a law legalizing the transfer of law cases from *Shara‘* Courts to Civil Courts. These steps have been facilitated both by the ability of the ‘Iraqī Civil Judges to administer the *Shara‘* Law and by the evident approval of a substantial portion of the public who have found in Turkey, both past and present, the model for ‘Iraqī statecraft.

In the administration of justice in tribal areas, the application 671 of the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations[2] has 619 continued but with much controversy. On the one hand, it has been held that the tribes represent a class unfamiliar with the laws and conventions applicable in a more highly civilized society, but possessing a code which, although harsh and even repellent, is definite and is recognized among themselves. The code, according to this view, should be applied to the tribes through the Tribal Disputes Regulations until such time as the normal system of justice can be brought into force among them. This has been the viewpoint of the Ministry of Interior charged with administering the Regulations. On the other hand, it is contended that two systems of justice should not exist side by side in ‘Iraq; that much evasion of justice has already occurred through non-tribesmen claiming the right to be tried under the Regulations; and that tribesmen must be assimilated by the body politic. This opinion, although it may not be put forward officially by the Ministry of Justice, has nevertheless influenced the policy of responsible ‘Iraqī officials in the Ministry. It has also been repeatedly presented in the Chamber, principally by urban deputies who in their speeches have voiced the prejudices of the greater part of the townsmen of ‘Iraq.

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[1] In 1931, Civil Court Judges were also *Shara‘ Qādhīs* in 24 places.

[2] As amended, December 28th, 1924. See *Compilation*, 1924, p. 63.

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671 There can be no escape from the fact that the Regulations 619 have been open to abuse and that revolting crimes have been committed by men who, in spite of their long familiarity with the legal codes, have taken advantage of almost untraceable tribal connections to escape punishment strictly due them.

It would seem, however, that now as in 1932 the Regulations represent the only equitable way of dealing with tribesmen. Reforms are no doubt needed, particularly in the definitions between tribesmen and townsmen, but it would also seem that the tribal viewpoint cannot be changed by the mere application of laws to the tribal areas. Until education, land settlement and a liberal-minded official class have brought greater knowledge and familiarity with the customs and conventions prevailing in the rest of 'Iraq, the extension of the legal system in its entirety will be fraught with injustice and with the gravest political and social dangers.

671 A great portion of the work of drafting and formulating the legislation which fell to the Ministry of Justice arose from the necessity both of filling in the outline set forth in the Constitution and of bringing into existence the special laws which by the express stipulations of that document were to govern the application of the principles contained in it.

Legislation of the first category which, after being drafted in the Ministry, was passed by Parliament, included the *Liwā* and Municipal Administration Laws;[1] the Jewish and Christian Communal Court Laws, cited above; the Currency Law;[2] and a series of Regulations for the various Ministries, as well as a number of other laws which put form and substance on the skeleton of the Constitution. Legislation implementing provisions of the Constitution included the Judges and *Qādhīs* Law;[3] Employment of Foreigners Law;[4] a Law for determining

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[1] *Compilation*, 1927, *Liwā* Administration Law, No. 58 of 1927; ibid., 1931 Municipalities Administration Law, No. 84 of 1931.

[2] Ibid., 1931, 'Iraq Currency Law, No. 44 of 1931.

[3] Ibid., 1929, No. 31 of 1929.

[4] Ibid., 1927, No. 36 of 1927.

Conflicts of Jurisdiction between Courts;[1] and other laws interpreting 671 Part V, The Judicature, of the Constitution; the Law of Associations[2] and the Press Law.[3]

A further heavy burden on the Ministry of Justice has been the constant necessity of reviewing and of preparing legislative amendments in accordance with the changing needs of the country, to the three forms of law in force in 'Iraq:

(1) the Ottoman Laws in force in 'Iraq before the British Military Occupation, in so far as they have not been amended or repealed by the enactments of the Army Commander during the Occupation or by the enactments of the successive Governments after the Occupation;

(2) the proclamations, regulations, or laws issued by the Army Commander, the Civil Commissioner, the High Commissioner, and the 'Iraqi Government, respectively, between the 5th November, 1914, and the 21st March, 1925;

(3) Laws enacted by the 'Iraqi Parliament since the 21st March, 1925.[4]

Such amending legislation has been of necessity slow and laborious, but it has resulted in the partial redrafting of the Penal Code, the Civil Procedure Code and other legislation inherited from previous regimes.

In the work of the Ministry, both in the Courts and in the 693 supervision of judicial administration and of legislation, the 671 British officials, never more than six in number from 1926 to late 1932, have played decisive parts. These officials in their various positions guaranteed under the Judicial Agreement of 1924, as Adviser to the Minister, as President of the Court of Appeal and as the four Judges of Courts of First Instance, have ensured speedy justice to 'Iraqis as well as to foreigners in so far as has lain within their power. They have also assisted their colleagues in the interpretation of the provisions of the Con-

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[1] *Compilation*, 1929, No. 8 of 1929.

[2] Ibid., 1931, No. 82 of 1931.

[3] Ibid., 1926, p. 3.

[4] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 83.

693 stitution. Their principal contribution, however, has been
671 their aid in creating a standard for the administration of justice and the conduct of the courts. Their insistence on justice without regard to distinctions of class or religion and their unfaltering rectitude in conformity with the best British traditions have left what may be hoped is an indelible imprint on the Judicial system of ‘Iraq. To them is due in a great degree the high standard of justice which prevailed in ‘Iraq before 1932. Their task has never been an easy one. The traditions inherited from Ottoman days that justice could be bought and that a Judgeship was a means of amassing a fortune, were too deeply ingrained to be eradicated easily and at once. As great an obstacle to equity in the courts was the unfortunate susceptibility of the Judges to outside influences, personal, official and religious. Thus the decisions of Judges of otherwise impeachable integrity have been known to be swayed by fear of public criticism, of the threatened displeasure of high officials or by political and religious motives.

Education

871 The British educational policy for ‘Iraq from the time of the Civil Administration largely centred around the provision of primary schools supplemented by denominational schools. The policy of the ‘Iraq Government, in brief, has been the extension of a system of national schools, primary and secondary, accompanied by the gradual elimination of denominational schools with their connotations of foreign and consequently undesirable influences.

Between these two policies has been waged incessant war, in which British officials employed by the Ministry usually gave way, particularly as they were rarely supported by the Residency to the same degree as were their colleagues in other Ministries. Moreover, control passed to ‘Iraqī officials throughout the Ministry earlier than in any other Ministry or

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department, no administrative order in the Ministry being 871
given by a British official after 1923.[1] The responsibility for the educational system thus has been largely 'Iraqī, in spite of the inclination both of 'Iraqī officials and of American educationalists to lay the blame for its deficiencies at the feet of the British officials. Indeed, more influence of foreign origin has been [177
exerted on the educational system by 'Iraqī students returning 871]
from American and English schools and Universities than by the British officials of the Ministry.

No government department has been a greater source of 658
optimism for the continued development of 'Iraq, both to 871
'Iraqī and to foreign observers, than has Education. No other department can point to budget appropriations which have steadily increased from 1921, the amount assigned in 1932 to Education being more than double the sum in 1921.[2] No other Ministry can show such concrete and progressively achieved results. The number of primary schools for boys has increased [872]
from 124 in 1921 to 247 in 1930, the enrolment increasing from 12,226 to 24,885. In the same period, girls' schools have increased from 27 to 44, with an increase in enrolment from 3849 to 6003. During this period, secondary and intermediate |
schools have grown from four, with an estimated attendance of

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 224.

[2] A summary of the expenditures of the Ministry of Education, 1921-32) in lacs of rupees) is as follows:

Year	*Expenditure*	*Percentage of Budget to total expenditure*
1921–22	19·36	3·3
1922–23	19·94	4·1
1923–24	18·15	4·0
1924–25	22·13	4·59
1925–26	23·48	4·43
1926–27	26·93*	5·2
1927–28	27·42	4·74
1928–29	32·01	5·33
1929–30	37·18	6·42
1930–31	38·41	7·5
1931–32	39·98	7·9

* The budget of the Antiquities Department and of the Engineering School was added to the Budget in this year and in subsequent years.

658 238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase
871 in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or
[875] quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of 'Iraqi students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to adapt Western methods to 'Iraq instead of blindly adopting them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

871 Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern has been expressed both by 'Iraqis and by others lest various tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and controversies; and the acquisition by students of the view that education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that government positions should be the reward of their school certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves, will depend much of the continued progress of 'Iraq.

744 In other fields, a health service has been in existence since
759 the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in out-
[758] lying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small
164 portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241
has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been
curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved
machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the
British Occupation have not been introduced generally and
are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton,
once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the
Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahīn* to
cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for
themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices.
Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market
being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing
dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective
co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 439
features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648
may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between
'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free
zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The
favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently
announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433
existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466
have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647
of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the
League of Nations has had few important matters to come into
its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against
foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175
economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185
of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.

[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

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175* so recent in origin and a people so recently brought into contact
185 with larger ideas than have motivated them for centuries past, that a relative standard of judgment should be applied. On such a standard the League of Nations itself was obliged to assess the readiness of 'Iraq for independence, in response to the firm insistence on the part of the Mandatary, which declared in its special report presented to the League in 1931:

> His Majesty's Government have never regarded the attainment of an ideal standard of administrative efficiency and stability as a necessary condition either of the termination of the Mandatory Regime or of the admission of 'Iraq to membership of the League of Nations. Nor has it been their conception that 'Iraq should from the first be able to challenge comparison with the most highly developed and civilised nations in the modern world.[1]

On the basis of a similar standard it can be confidently stated that 'Iraq not only achieved unprecedented development in the period from 1914 to 1932, and particularly since 1921, but much of the development has been maintained since 1932. The development at the time of 'Iraq's entrance into the League may not have been so great as put forward in the Official Reports or in the statements made by British representatives to the League of Nations, nevertheless it has been very real. Less than a score of years previous to 1932, 'Iraq was an isolated lethargic maladministered portion of the Ottoman Empire. In 1932, as since that time, 'Iraq has occupied a strategic position on the highway of air-communications. It possesses the machinery of a modern democratic state although the control is now centred in a Government backed by military force. It belongs by general acceptance to the international community, having assumed the obligations of a sovereign nation for international agreements.

175* In reaching this state of development, 'Iraq has undergone
227 a period of direct British control, first under military and then
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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 11.

under civil administration, followed by a period of tutelage. 175*
Under the first of these regimes, the administrative and 185
economic development took place according to the dictates of 727
an Anglo-Indian administration, apparently determined to make of 'Iraq an Indian province. Under the mandatory regime, extending from 1920 to 1932, 'Iraq was forced to accept the restricting hand of the mandatory Power but, at the same time, was able to count upon its support and assistance.

The British Government, as Mandatary, had assumed definite responsibilities from the League: the granting of assistance for the development of 'Iraq's political and social institutions, for its economic regeneration and for its protection from external enemies. These obligations it was not unprepared to honour but only on its own conditions, imposed in a manner which, as has been indicated, guaranteed its position in the country. These conditions do not seem to have been laid down because of any inherent lack of sympathy with 'Iraq's national aspirations. On the one hand, the British Government felt unable to relinquish the Mandate, for fear of losing prestige, until it had satisfied world opinion that as Mandatary its obligations had been fulfilled. On the other hand, the British Government was unwilling to give up its favoured position in 'Iraq until it had achieved the aims for which, in accordance with British policy in the Middle East for the past century and a half, it had occupied 'Iraq. These aims included the control of the land route to India, now vital to the British Empire as the result of the development of air-transport; the assurance of peace and order in the strategic centre of the Middle East; the extension and protection of British commerce; and the control of the existing and potential oil-producing districts of 'Iraq and Persia. Until these objectives were achieved, through the establishment of a stable government, 'friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligations to H.B.M. Government',[1] the 'Iraqī Nationalists seem to

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[1] Instructions of H.M. Government to the High Commissioner of 'Iraq, cited *Admin. Report*, 1927, p. 11.

176* have had little effect on British policy. Although agreeing to the
185 progressive restatement of its relations with 'Iraq, the British
727 Government diminished no whit of its insistence that its advice, through the High Commissioner and the British officials, be taken; that its assistance, as outlined in the Treaty and the Agreements, be employed; and that its will as the mandatory Power be the ultimate authority.

175* If the formal relinquishment, October, 1932, by Great
185 Britain of her right to control the affairs of 'Iraq except in accordance with the Treaty and Agreements still in force, marked another stage in 'Iraq's political existence, the work of development has not been completed. In the continued reorganization of finances, in the perfection of the Judicial system, in the raising of education standards, and in the extension of agriculture, irrigation and means of communication still lie much to be done. Hopeful signs of governmental action would seem to appear in the current version of the frequently altered Five Year Capital Works Plan with its provision for irrigation projects, roads, bridges, 130 schools and numerous health centres,[1] in the proposed Health Campaign,[2] and in the recently created Agricultural Bank,[3] and in the many new proposals laid before the Chamber by the new Government.
[248] 'Iraq's recent treaty of friendship with Sa'ūdī Arabia,
April 2nd, 1936,[4] and her amiable relations with Turkey seem to point to the removal of these two external dangers. Within the country still lie the problems of the creation of a social class of citizens, now beginning to appear, capable and willing to assume political duties from a sense of public duty and not of personal aggrandizement, the evolution of a free Press motivated by public spirit rather than by individual or party grievances, the assurance of free elections, and the elimination of sectarian and sectional animosities which will eradicate the antipathies between tribesmen and townsmen, will bring the Shī'īs into

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, April 9th, 23rd, 1936.
[2] *N.E. and I.*, August 8th, 22nd, 1935.
[3] *G.B. and E.*, March 26th, 1936.
[4] Text: ibid., April 23rd, 1936.

the body politic, will create a real bond between Kurds and 175*
Arabs, and provide adequate protection to all minorities within 185
the State.

If the past progress of 'Iraq has been a matter of concern to 000
a wider group than merely the people of 'Iraq, so also is the problem of its future. The first of the mandated territories to achieve the right 'to stand alone' as contemplated by the drafter of the League of Nations Covenant, 'Iraq, the model Mandate, has been the object of special interest to believers in the mandate system, to whom its future will bring additional proof of the success or failure of the Mandate idea. 'Iraq's progress, followed in the past as providing confirmation or refutation of Great Britain's assurances that she had fulfilled the obligations laid on her as Mandatary, will furnish new evidence concerning Great Britain's trusteeship. To the Arab Nationalists in Syria and Lebanon, whose demands for independence have been both stimulated and assisted by 'Iraq's achievements, 'Iraq's future will either provide new arguments for treaty revision or supply France with reasons for resisting Nationalist demands. Of even greater importance will be the effect of the future on the welfare of the 'Iraqis themselves: Kurds and Arabs; townsmen and tribesmen; *fallahīn* and landowners; and Muslims, Jews and Christians.

The future is not without its dark aspects, but if the new regime can provide stability with a much needed discipline, if it will be motivated by foresighted and courageous statesmanship, and if the people of 'Iraq can and will devote themselves to the tasks which lie before them with the same energy which they expended in achieving independence, the position of 'Iraq among the progressive states may yet be assured.

000 APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I

GENERAL MAUDE'S PROCLAMATION[1]

To the People of the Baghdad Vilayet

In the name of my King and in the name of the peoples over whom he rules, I address you as follows:

Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy and the driving of him from these territories. In order to complete this task I am charged with absolute and supreme control of all regions in which British Forces operate, but our Armies have not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors, or enemies, but as Liberators.

Since the days of Hulaku your Citizens have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunken in desolation and your forefathers and yourselves have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered in distant places.

Since the days of Midhat Pasha the Turks have talked of reforms yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify to the vanity of those promises?

It is the wish, not only of my King and his peoples, but is also the wish of the Great Nations with whom he is in alliance, that you should prosper, even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science and art and Baghdad was one of the wonders of the world.

Between your people and the Dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest and for 200 years have the Merchants of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks, who have despoiled you and yours, have for twenty years made Baghdad a centre of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British in Persia and Arabia. Therefore, the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your country, now or in the future, for, in duty to the interests of the British people and their Allies, the British Government cannot risk

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1914-1919, Proclamation No. 9, pp. 5-6.

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that being done in Baghdad again which has been done by the Turks and Germans during the war.

But you, the people of Baghdad, whose commercial professions and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government, to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realized once again. The people of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In the Hejaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them and have proclaimed Sharif Hussain as their King and His Lordship rules in independence and freedom and is the ally of the Nations who are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany. So, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of Nejd, Koweit and Asir.

Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of freedom at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the Great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the desire and hope of the British people and Nations in alliance with them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the peoples of the Earth and that it shall bind itself to this and in unity and concord.

O! People of Baghdad. Remember that for twenty-six generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the North, East, South and West in realizing the aspirations of your race.

Army Headquarters,
Baghdad

F. S. Maude, Lieut.-General,
Commanding British Forces
in 'Iraq

The 19th March, 1917
(24th Joma-al-Awal, 1335)

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APPENDIX II

BALFOUR DECLARATION[1]

2 November, 1917

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

APPENDIX III

PRESIDENT WILSON'S TWELFTH POINT[2]

8 January, 1918

POINT XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guaranties.

APPENDIX IV

THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION[3]

The end which France and Great Britain have in view in their prosecution in the East of the war let loose by German ambition is

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[1] From facsimile of original letter, Stein, op. cit.

[2] *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. cxi (1918), p. 950 ff.

[3] *Proclamation*, 1914-1919, Proclamation No. 32, November 8th, 1918, p. 21.

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648 the complete and definitive liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions France and Great Britain are agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, which have already in fact been liberated by the Allies, and in countries whose liberation they are endeavouring to effect, and to recognize the latter as soon as they shall be effectively established. Far from wishing to impose any particular institution on these lands, they have no other care but to assure by their support and effective aid the normal working of the Governments and Administrations, which they shall have adopted of their free will. To ensure impartial and equal justice, to facilitate economic development by evoking and encouraging indigenous initiative, to foster the spread of education and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy — such is the rôle which the two allied Governments assume in the liberated territories.

APPENDIX V

642 TENTATIVE DRAFT OF ARAB INSTITUTIONS[1]

Central Government

Arab Ministers with English Advisers.

Say: For Interior, Finance, Justice, Education, Public Works, Commerce or Agriculture(?), Waqf(?).

Council of Ministers

Consisting of Arab Ministers and Advisers.

To be the Supreme Legislative body for the whole country.

No elected legislative body at present.

Local Government

English Commissioners — Arab Deputy Commissioners or vice versa.

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[1] Memorandum by Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Baghdad, 1919.

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Provincial Council

General powers of legislation; exception of subjects reserved for Council of Ministers, e.g., cf. laws relating to India Local Councils.

All local laws to be submitted to this body, but Commissioners to have power not to accept their amendments or to issue law not withstanding their rejection.

I see no reason why this body should not be elected, special plans to be made for initial representation.

APPENDIX VI

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COUNCIL OF STATE[1]

I. The Council of State should realize that at any rate until the convening of a National Assembly for the purpose of deciding the future Constitution of 'Iraq, I, as High Commissioner, am personally and directly responsible to His Majesty's Government for the administration of the country. Accordingly, in the event of difference of opinion between myself and the Council of State in reference to matters under disposal, the final decision will rest with me.

II. In view of the fact that the elections for an Assembly and its convocation must necessarily take some time, I have decided upon taking preparatory measures for the conduct of the actual administration (with the exception of such questions as concern foreign policy and military considerations) under my supervision by the formation of a Council of State under the presidency of His Highness the Naqib as President. Such Council shall consist of Ministers, some of whom will preside over the various Departments of State, while the others will be Members of Council without portfolio.

III. The Head of each State Department will be the Minister in charge of it and the administration of such Department will vest in him subject —

(*a*) To the control of the Council over the action of the Ministers.

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[1] *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B. 363, November 30th, 1920, pp. 4-5.

b) To the hearing of the views expressed by the British officers selected by me as Advisers to the several Departments.

As regards the functions of these Advisers, they are to be not executive but advisory, but I trust that the Council and the members in charge of Departments will realize that the officers whom I select for the post of Adviser, having been so selected owing to their long experience of the working of the administration and their knowledge of the conduct of the departments attached to the said Ministries, it is necessary both that attention should be paid to their views and that the latter should be taken into careful consideration.

(*c*) To the fact that in the last resort supreme control will vest in my own person.

IV. It seems to me that the best method of conducting the affairs of the Departments of State will be by the reference of all matters concerning a particular Ministry to its Minister through his Adviser, and it will be incumbent on the latter to refer communications and papers received to his Minister without delay, in order that the Minister may be able to take action for the disposal of the matter after consulting the Adviser. Similarly, if a Minister desires to initiate action in regard to any matter concerning his Ministry, it is necessary either that he should call his Adviser into consultation in the first instance or that he should send his orders to the Department concerned through the Adviser so that the latter may be able to put forward his views before the matter takes final shape.

V. Such being the position, it is necessary to make provision for the contingency of a difference of opinion on any matter between the Minister and his Adviser, thus:

(*a*) If in any case the Adviser tenders advice to his Minister and the latter feels unable to accept such advice, the Minister should call the Adviser into consultation. If they are unable to arrive at an agreement after discussion of the matter, and if the Adviser considers the matter of sufficient importance to be pursued further, he will have the right to ask the Minister to refer the matter to the Council of State for consideration. It will then be incumbent on the Minister to suspend action on the matter until the next meeting of the Council, when the subject will be brought before it.

(*b*) In the interval which occurs while the matter is being referred to the Council the Minister and Adviser have full discretion to refer the matter to me as High Commissioner. I shall thus have an opportunity of conveying my views to the Council of State without the least prejudice to the procedure provided for in Article x of this programme.

vi. As regards the Council, it is necessary that it should hold regular meetings at least once a week or even more, as may be necessary.

vii. To facilitate the business of efficient administration the Council requires a competent Secretary and a clerical staff, for the appointment of whom steps should be taken without delay.

viii. All business to be brought before the Council meeting for discussion should be intimated by the Minister concerned to the Secretary of the Council, who will prepare a list of agenda for each meeting in time for circulation —

(*a*) To the High Commissioner,
(*b*) To all Ministers and Advisers,

at least twenty-four hours before the time fixed for the meeting. As a general rule no question not included on the agenda paper should be discussed at such meeting. At any rate, no formal resolution should be taken on it, except in the case of any matter of great urgency the prompt disposal of which is essential.

ix. The Secretary will attend all meetings of the Cabinet and will prepare a record of the proceedings of such meetings in the form of a list and statement of matters in respect of which resolutions have been passed. These lists will be circulated within twenty-four hours of such meeting under the Secretary's signature —

(*a*) To the High Commissioner.
(*b*) To all Ministers and Advisers.

Each Minister will be responsible to give effect to resolutions of the Council affecting it and to report such action to the Secretary for the information of the Council at subsequent meetings. In accordance with the usual practice the deliberations of the Council are to be considered confidential and it is not permitted to disclose them outside the Council.

x. All resolutions of the Council will be final, subject to their

642 confirmation by myself as Head of the Government. I must also reserve for myself the right inherent in me as High Commissioner to veto or modify on grounds of expediency any resolution passed by the Council.

XI. In order that the Council may be kept informed of all matters appertaining to the subjects included in the agenda, the presence of the Adviser will be necessary at the meetings of the Council while any matter affecting the Ministry to which he belongs is under discussion. He will have the right in the course of the proceedings to tender his advice regarding the matter under consideration, but he will not take part in the recording of votes.

XII. It is my confident hope that the instructions above set forth in regard to the working of the Council of State and the several Ministries and their relations with myself on the one hand and with the Advisers on the other will conduce to the smooth progress of the administrative machinery at Headquarters.

As regards the central departments at present engaged in the work of administration, in view of the fact that for several years past they have been working smoothly, the attachment of them to the new scheme of Government, after the necessary adjustments, should offer no serious difficulty. As regards the administration of the provinces, it is probable that we shall be confronted with a good many difficulties — but In'Shallah they will admit of solution.

XIII. As you all know, the administration of the various districts and sub-districts of 'Iraq is still, as it has been for some time past, conducted by an organization of British Political Officers, with suitable local personnel in minor administrative posts as D.A.P.O.s and Mudirs, etc.; some districts are still in a disturbed state and British troops are still present therein; consequently in such places it is difficult to make the change from British to indigenous personnel in the immediate circumstances; on the other hand, there are districts in which it is possible to take the necessary steps in the desired direction as soon as competent personnel is forthcoming.

XIV. And whereas it is among the duties of the Council of State to devise administrative measures to promote the speedy pacification of the provinces, the said Council should give their early attention to the selection of experienced and suitable candidates from indigen-

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ous elements of the population for appointment by degrees to those posts where such appointment is expedient. Having done so, they should formulate their proposals with the names of candidates recommended in each case for my consideration and orders.

APPENDIX VII

SPEECHES MADE BY AMĪR FAISAL

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(Excerpts from, after his arrival in Baghdad, 1921)[1]

(i) *Speech of Amīr Faisal to the Mōsul Delegation*

'I say to you that the British Government is taking a wise line and fully intends to fulfil the promises made to my father in order to make the Arab Nation a true ally in the Middle East. The painful events which took place between me and the French have forced me to persevere in my efforts in the cause for which we arose in some other Arab country. Whereas 'Iraq is of importance to us as well as to the Arabs, my father delegated me in accordance with the wishes of 'Iraqīs to perform this duty. I assure you that 'Iraq will remain independent with a constitutional government, free from all errors. Very shortly the national congress will be summoned and will introduce the constitutional law of this new Kingdom. I add, that in accordance with Mr. Churchill's declaration, 'Iraq will be an independent ally of Great Britain.'

(ii) *Speech at a Dinner given by Amīr Faisal to the Ministers and Notables of Baghdad, 16 July*[2]

'I assure you that the British Government has determined to assist the inhabitants to establish an Independent Constitutional Government, thus fulfilling the promise made to my father.

'Moreover, the British Government has declared its readiness to help you as a friend to a friend in accordance with its historical tradition. . . . I am certain that when the permanent government is established and the Congress held, that it will look on this matter as I do and that we will be able to establish friendship between Great

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, July 7th, 1921.

[2] *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 18th, 1921.

Britain and the Arabs on such foundation as cannot be shaken and on promises which will preserve our honour and independence and safeguard our material interests.

'Our duty is to maintain our independence on a strong basis that we may keep it forever.'

(iii) *Speech to the Jewish Community of Baghdad, 18 July*[1]

'There is no meaning in the words Jews, Muslims and Christians in the terminology of patriotism, there is simply a country called 'Iraq, and all are 'Iraqis.

'I ask my countrymen the 'Iraqīs to be only 'Iraqīs because we all belong to one stock, the stock of our ancestor Shem; we all belong to that noble race, and there is no distinction between Muslim, Christian and Jew. To-day we have but one means to our end: the race.'

(iv) *Speech to the Shaikhs, Ramadi, 25 July, 1921*[2]

'Brothers! my word is yours and I deal with you as brother towards his brother, and as a friend towards his friend and not as a ruler towards his subjects. I am not a foreigner to you. You may accept my word in all confidence. I came to you knowing you to be Arabs and Beduin, and for the last four years I have not been in similar surroundings. All Muslims should be brothers. I have no doubt that you approach me with requests as subjects approach their ruler. I, in turn, ask you, tribesmen, to keep the peace. I must ask the tribesmen like Fahād Beg and 'Alī as-Sulaimān each of whom is equal to a thousand, and those who are present to act on behalf of those who are absent. The past has passed away. In the future you and I will demand certain things from each other just as I now ask the Arabs to guard themselves and to be done with past evils and troubles. We have had enough of pillage and robbery. Now that God has granted us our wish, we should give our thoughts rest and devote ourselves to the promotion of our best interests and the building up of our country, which things are in the interests of both the ruler and the ruled. Such things are attainable only by peace and loyalty.

'In the future, when the tribes gather together, we will look into any differences existing between them. I shall call the tribal chiefs

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, July 19th, 1921.

[2] *Al-Dijla*, August 1st, 1921.

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and speak to them of the past. Muslims are brothers. They look up to no one but to me and the Government. Those present shall inform those who are absent. No one may raid another. This is what I want to tell you.'

At this point Fahād Beg rose and addressed the Shaikhs, saying: 'Do you want other than this?'

They all answered: 'No! No!'

Amīr Faisal then said: 'Will you be responsible to me for those who disobey?'

They replied: 'Your orders shall be obeyed and God shall bear witness to this.'

'What you order shall be done,' said 'Alī as-Sulaimān.

Fahād Beg added: 'We shall obey your orders because the British Government is your ally.'[1]

Amīr Faisal replied: 'We are in agreement with them [the British] and we must settle our affairs among ourselves.'

To this Fahād Beg replied: 'As to the Arabs, we will be responsible to you that 'Anaiza and Dulaim will be under your orders.'

'Alī as-Sulaimān then said: 'I undertake the same responsibility.'

Amīr Faisal said: 'There is another matter. Under a proper settlement, Arab traditions and the word of Arab rulers will be respected. I will be present among them, and will call together tribal chiefs and settle their disputes.'

(v) *Speech to the Catholic Christians of Baghdad, 30 July*[2]

'I thank this noble community which has given this reception. I make no difference between one community and another, because we are all noble 'Iraqis, and I, therefore, thank them for their confidence in my person, firstly, as an Arab and secondly, as an 'Iraqī. I desire to benefit from all the inhabitants of this country, whatever community or religion they belong to, and from every individual as well, so that we may regain our ancient glory. I also desire to make use of the qualifications and efficiency of each individual with-

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[1] Amīr Faisal was clearly taken aback by this frank definition of the situation. See also Bell, op. cit., p. 615.

[2] *Al-Fallah*, July 31st, 1921.

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out consideration of personality or religion. All present or absent, must know that this is my belief. All must know that there is neither majority nor minority in this country. The minority are the majority and vice versa. We must make use of any person whomsoever he may be and choose him to carry on the work which he can do; and I therefore desire the nation to help me by maintaining tranquillity and peace. All 'Iraq looks to independence and civilization, the Beduin and the villager alike. For I see the Beduin who never came before to the cities are now asking for a piece of ground to cultivate and a canal to irrigate it. This also makes me hope for success.

'We need two things: firstly, the maintenance of peace in all parts of 'Iraq and secondly, patience. Let me say that 'Iraq for eight hundred years has been governed by foreigners, passing from one tyranny to another till it reached its present stage. Give me one year for every hundred, or one for every two hundred — in four years time come and ask me for an account of what I have done. But you must not be in too great a hurry, you must not be rash: do not let the sentiments of race and patriotism boil in your blood. The nation is busy with the swearing of allegiance. There may be some difference of formulas but all aim at one goal — independence. We must work with tranquillity and not hurry, lest we fall before reaching fundamental needs.

'I, Faisal, say to you, that my desire is Arab independence. Who does not wish for independence? The very beasts of the field desire it. If I did not hope to attain it I would not be here. I am determined to overcome obstacles and I am certain the nation will support me.

'Let me say a word of a more general kind about the interrelation of states. All are busy with their own affairs and every nation that desires to live must form a part of the community of people so that the interests of all may be realized. We are wanting in men of learning and experts, and money, materials and all that is necessary to civilization. These will not drop from heaven but we must ask for them from one of the nations of the world. The nearest nation to us, geographically and economically, is Great Britain, and our interests agree with theirs. So we stretch out our hand for mutual support as a free independent people and ask

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assistance as a younger brother demands from an elder, as a freeman from a freeman, not as a slave from a master, but as a friend from a friend. 643

'I am the friend of the British, and I ask the nation to hold towards them the friendship of the free to the free.'

APPENDIX VIII

H.M. KING FAISAL'S ACCESSION

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(Telegrams Exchanged on the Occasion of)

(i) *Telegram from H.M. King George V to H.M. King Faisal*[1]

'I offer Your Majesty my sincere congratulations on this historical and moving occasion when by the overwhelming vote of the people of 'Iraq the ancient city of Baghdad has once again become the seat of an Arab Kingdom. It is a source of deep gratification to myself and my people that combined military effort of British and Arab forces and those of their Allies has culminated in this memorable event. The treaty which will shortly be concluded between us to consecrate the alliance into which we entered during the dark days of the war, will, I am confident, enable me to fulfil my solemn obligations by inaugurating an era of peace and renewed prosperity for 'Iraq.'

(Signed) GEORGE, R.I.

(ii) *Telegram in reply from H.M. King Faisal*

'I am profoundly touched and greatly rejoice at the Royal and gracious favour which you have extended towards me and towards my people in Your Majesty's message.

'On this auspicious day when Baghdad the city of the Khalifs has become for the second time the capital of an Arab Kingdom, I recall with pride how white has been the hand of Your Majesty and Your noble people in the achievement of Arab aspirations. I am confident that the Arab Nation will justify Your Majesty's

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[1] *Iraq Admin. Report, October*, 1920, *to March*, 1922, pp. 9-10.

643 reliance on the success of their efforts to regain their pristine glory
648 provided that they continue to enjoy the support and friendship of Great Britain. I doubt not that the treaty which will be concluded between us, will strengthen the bonds of alliance already cemented with the mingled blood of Briton and Arab on the battle-fields of the Great War and that it will be established on unshakeable foundation.

'Finally, I wish Your Majesty and your honoured Nation continued prosperity and enduring glory.'

(Signed) Faisal

APPENDIX IX

648 PROTOCOL OF 30 APRIL, 1923

(To the Treaty with King Faisal, Signed 10 October, 1922)[1]

We, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of His Britannic Majesty and of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq respectively, having been duly authorized, met together this 30th day of April, 1923, corresponding to the Ramazan, 1341, in order to sign the following Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Their Majesties aforesaid on the 10th of October, 1922, corresponding to 19th Sa'far, 1341, Hijrah, subject to ratification.

PROTOCOL

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 18, the present Treaty shall terminate upon 'Iraq becoming a Member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a fresh agreement from being concluded with a view to regulating the subsequent relations between them before the expiration of the above period.

In witness of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures thereto. Done at Baghdad in duplicate this

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[1] Cmd. 2120.

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thirtieth day of April; one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three of the Christian Era, corresponding with the fourteenth day of Ramazan, one thousand three hundred and forty-one, Hijrah.

P. Z. Cox
His Britannic Majesty's High
Commissioner in ‘Iraq

Abdul Muhsin al Sa‘adun
Prime Minister of the ‘Iraq
Government

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000 SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

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This study has been based upon the source materials enumerated below.

1. Unpublished Official Telegrams, Dispatches, Memoranda and Minutes

Most of these unpublished documents have been made available for the first time for study through the kindness of the India Office, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. Citations from them have been noted in the text of this study.

2. Published Documents, Treaties, Reports

A partial list of the published documents are given below. The writer believes that he has seen every report concerning 'Iraq. These include

(*a*) Interdepartmental and other reports made by the British Administration and by the 'Iraq Government.

(*b*) Reports of H.M. Government to the League of Nations.

(*c*) Reports of special Commissions, as those sent by the League of Nations.

(*d*) Minutes, in Arabic, of the Constituent Assembly, 1924.

Some of these Reports, especially those concerning the early days of the British Occupations, have been seen in manuscript form through the kindness of H.M. Ambassador at Baghdad. Where possible the writer has cited these and the Interdepartmental Reports, many of which were originally secret or confidential, rather than the reports prepared for general circulations, although many of the latter are extremely valuable for facts and statistics concerning 'Iraq, 1914-32.

3. Newspapers

During his residence in Baghdad, the writer was able to draw upon the files of the *Baghhad Times* (now the *'Iraq Times*) and of nearly all vernacular newspapers published in 'Iraq from 1921. Newspapers and periodicals of Great Britain, France, Italy and of other countries have also been used.

[Iraq, A Study in Political Development]

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113 4. Books and Articles

In so far as possible this study is based on original sources but a large number of works in English, French, Arabic, etc., on 'Iraq and the Middle East have been used, principally to confirm or amplify those facts obtained at first hand or the writer's own judgments. A selected list of works is given below.

5. Interviews

These have included an audience with His Majesty King Ghazi, interviews with practically every 'Iraqī statesman and dignitary who has taken part in the creation of modern 'Iraq, with the former High Commissioners of His Britannic Majesty in 'Iraq and with many of the British Officials who from 1915 to the present have participated in the affairs of government and administration of 'Iraq.

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[1] Published in London unless otherwise noted.

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/For an account of British occupation and administration of Iraqi territories during and after the First World War, see category 116, pp. 74-382./

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The Economic Development of Iraq

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MAP I


40°
42°
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
PROVINCIAL (LIWA) BOUNDARY
QADHA BOUNDARY
RAILWAYS
RIVERS
PROVINCIAL (LIWA) CENTER
QADHA CENTER
NOTE: THE PROVINCES HAVE THE SAME NAME AS THEIR CENTERS EXCEPT WHERE NAMED
SINJAR
TEL AFAR
MOSUL
SYRIA
DULAIM LIWA
RAMADI
NORTHERN DESERT
TRANS JORDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
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POLITICAL DIVISIONS

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

TURKEY
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30°
I R A N
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DIVALA LIWA
BAGHDAD
BEDRA
KERBELA
HILLA
KUT
AMARA
DIWANIYA
AFAK
RIFAI
SHATTRA
MUNTAFIQ LIWA
NASIRIYA
HAMMAR LAKE
QURNA
BASRA
SOUTHERN DESERT
KUWAIT
IRANIAN GULF

-ii (b)

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Economic Development
of
IRAQ

Report of a Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Iraq.

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Oxford University Press

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THE MISSION

[FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BANK]

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Chief of Mission

JOHN C. DE WILDE
Chief Economist

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CARL FLESHER	*Adviser on Industry and Power*
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EUNICE O. DOREY
Secretaries

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INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

February 11, 1952

His Excellency
Nuri Al Said
Prime Minister
Baghdad, Iraq

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I take pleasure in transmitting herewith the Report of the Mission to Iraq, organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Iraq.

The Bank hopes that the Report will contribute to an understanding and solution of Iraq's development problems and that it will be widely disseminated and discussed. You will understand, of course, that since the Executive Directors and the management of the Bank have not reviewed the Mission recommendations in detail, they are transmitted to you as the views of the Mission rather than positive recommendations of the Bank. We believe, however, that the Mission's Report deserves serious consideration and can be of substantial value in working out a development program and in framing the general economic policies relating thereto.

The Bank will follow with interest the action taken in connection with the Report. The Bank will be prepared, at the request of the Government of Iraq, to discuss any questions that might emerge from the study of the Report and to consider how the Bank can best help in the execution of the development program.

It is my sincere hope that the Report may be of positive and lasting benefit to Iraq.

Sincerely yours,

Eugene R Black

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

2800 ROWLAND PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

000

February 8, 1952

The Honorable Eugene R. Black, President
International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Black:

It gives me great pleasure to submit herewith the Report of the Mission to Iraq, organized by the International Bank at the request of the Government of Iraq. As you know, the conclusions and recommendations contained in the Report are based on studies made by the Mission in Iraq during the spring of 1951.

On behalf of the Mission, I would like to express our appreciation for the friendly cooperation which the Mission received from officials of the Iraq Government at every level and from Iraqi citizens in every walk of life. Without their generous assistance our task could not have been accomplished.

I am personally most grateful for the keen interest and wholehearted devotion which the individual members of the Mission brought to their work. They were at all times energetic and enterprising in the pursuit of their special studies. I am especially indebted to Mr. John C. de Wilde, my deputy, who was of invaluable assistance in the field and who, with the able collaboration of Mr. Benjamin B. King, carried so much of the burden of preparing the Report following our return. A word of appreciation is also due Miss Maxine MacKenzie for her untiring work in typing the manuscript of the Report.

It is the sincere hope of the Mission that the Report will contribute to the further development of the economy of Iraq and to a rise in the standard of living of its people.

Sincerely yours,

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

PREFACE

121 On October 10, 1950, the Government of Iraq officially requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a mission to Iraq to undertake a general review of the country's economic potentialities and make recommendations for a development program. After an exchange of views it was agreed that a mission would be sent with the following terms of reference:

> "The Mission will be expected to undertake a general review of Iraq's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the Government of Iraq to formulate a long-term program for the further development of the country's productive resources. Specifically, the report of the Mission is to include recommendations concerning:
>
> (1) investment priorities as among different sectors of the Iraqi economy and as among types of undertakings within each important sector;
>
> (2) the approximate rate of investment which can appropriately be undertaken without inflationary or other disruptive effects;
>
> (3) measures apart from capital investment which appear necessary or desirable for improving and increasing production;
>
> (4) economic and fiscal policies which may be important to accelerate the pace of Iraq's development; and
>
> (5) governmental organization and practices having an important effect on development."

114 A number of United Nations agencies cooperated in the selection of the personnel of the Mission. The agricultural economist, the agronomist and the expert on animal husbandry were nominated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which also undertook to pay a portion of their salaries

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114 and expenses. The World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization nominated the specialists in health and education, respectively.

The Mission arrived in Iraq on February 25, 1951, and the last members left the country on May 27, 1951. During this period members of the Mission travelled widely about the country in order 010 to study conditions and problems at first hand. The Mission worked generally under the auspices of the Development Board, whose members and staff provided valuable assistance. The Principal Liaison Officer to the Mission, Mr. Naim Bashoo, greatly facilitated the Mission's work. In the course of its work, the Mission also drew on the resources of many other government departments and agencies whose cooperation was generously given. The Mission takes this opportunity to express its gratitude to the many people both in public and in private life who gave freely of their time and effort to help the Mission.

In the following report the Mission submits a series of recommendations over a broad field. In making these recommendations the Mission has taken into account the Development Board's five-year program without, however, attempting to arrive at a judgment on every one of the projects included in this program. The many conclusions and recommendations of the Mission may well be subject to modification in the light of additional information or of future developments. While the Mission enjoyed generous cooperation in obtaining data essential to its work, it was inevitably handicapped to some extent by the same lack of adequate, reliable information which is generally encountered in varying degrees in all underdeveloped countries. For example, the absence of dependable data on agricultural and livestock yields and on the location, extent and quality of cultivable but idle land made it difficult to assess the impact of various measures in the field of irrigation, drainage and agriculture. Similarly, lack of statistical data has made it difficult to determine, except in general terms, the repercussions which increased public expenditures might have on production, incomes, consumption and imports. The Mission does not believe, however, that these factors significantly affect the validity of its recommendations.

The Mission's[1] report consists of two parts. The first part contains the major findings and recommendations of the Mission to which are attached appendices: one, listing the Mission's recommendations, one, sumarizing the Mission's suggestions for technical assistance; and a third on statistical organization. The second part consists of a series of monographs dealing with particular subjects. The first monograph is concerned with the basic factors and conditions in the economy of Iraq which the Mission has considered in framing its recommendations. The others set forth in greater detail the Mission's views on flood control, irrigation and drainage; agriculture and animal husbandry; industry; transport and communications; public health; education; and community planning and housing. 128 121

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[1] - [International Bank Mission to Iraq, 1951--Analyst]

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Dujaila Land Settlement Scheme........ 438-9

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development.
161 With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its
resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north
and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the
country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide
large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is
inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
[135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq
possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap
source of power and raw materials essential to the development of
industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other
mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is
little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger
population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast
to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the
people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most
ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and
many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm
and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[444] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment
exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await
reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the
available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
[731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas;
and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is
hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water,
but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and
quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

433 as 60,000 people are engaged in industrial production (other than oil), virtually all of these are employed in small undertakings where the work is largely done by hand and productivity is accordingly quite low. Probably only about 2,000 are working in what might be characterized as modern industrial plants.

654 651 382 Fortunately prospective increases in government revenues from oil now make it possible for the government to undertake a large-scale program for the development of the country. Past investments in the oil industry will in the future yield large dividends in the form of a rapidly increasing production of petroleum. [471] In accordance with an agreement reached in August 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq have undertaken to raise oil output, which amounted to only about six million tons in 1950, to 30 million tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraqi government half of the profits before the deduction of taxes. On this basis it is anticipated that, over the next five years, the governmen may receive net revenues amounting to as much as 214 million dinars from oil alone. Under the terms of a law passed in 1950 these revenues will be available to finance development. They will be assigned to the Development Board, an autonomous agency established in 1950 to ensure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs.

652 In the past, financial stringencies have severely limited public expenditures. The government has often had difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays had to be kept small; government salaries were not raised in accordance with the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds. In the future the situation will be reversed. The principal task will be to find ways and means of spending rapidly increasing revenues in a manner which will contribute most effectively to the permanent development of the country. It is with this task in view that the Mission has drawn up its recommendations.

110 Any program for realizing the economic potentialities of the country should be broad in conception and well balanced. Investment outlays in dams and irrigation works, transport facilities and industrial plants must be complemented by increased expenditures

of a recurrent nature on agriculture, health, education and other significant activities. In some cases expenditures for these purposes will be of even greater importance in improving productivity and conditions of life than large capital projects. The program should not concentrate on investment in new irrigation works while continuing to neglect, as in the past, maintenance of those works already in existence. It must not provide for new schools and hospitals without considering the need for funds and training facilities to staff these and already existing institutions. There must be a proper interrelationship between the development of industry and agriculture and of agriculture and irrigation; and the development of transport and power facilities will need to be geared to that of production. A balance should also be maintained between projects and measures which will be effective in raising standards of living in the longer run and those which can be expected to yield benefits in the more immediate future. One reason why the longer-run measures are of vital importance is that the population will probably increase rapidly as soon as there is a substantial improvement in health conditions. At the same time, there may well be little improvement in the condition of the population if current development is limited, for instance, to making more land and water available without attempting the long and difficult task of teaching the people how to use them more efficiently.

In this connection the critical importance of education should not be underestimated. Improvement in the quality of manpower is vital to government, agriculture and industry. There is little point in increasing the means of production unless people can learn how to make better use of the resources available to them. Fundamental and widespread knowledge of the means to higher production, better health and hygiene are often more important than capital investments. The dissemination of practical knowledge, and of literacy as a tool for acquiring this knowledge, is essential in the long run to an improvement in production and living standards.

Attention should be focussed not only on the content of the development program but also on the means for carrying it out. The achievement of development outlays commensurate with the expected rise in oil revenues represents an immensely difficult task. It can only be accomplished if full advantage is taken of the techni-

880 cal resources of other countries. It will be noted throughout this report that the Mission has made numerous recommendations for the procurement of foreign technical assistance. These recommendations are in no sense a disparagement of the talent and skills now available in Iraq. They represent rather a recognition that a country whose development has been severely handicapped by limited financial resources in the past cannot now suddenly expect to launch a development program involving rapid expansion in virtually every field without availing itself of the many opportunities to obtain technical help from abroad.

II. Agriculture

241 [162] Any development program for Iraq must obviously put primary emphasis on agriculture. Over 60 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, and both industry and commerce depend in turn largely upon farming and animal husbandry. Moreover, large increases in output can be realized both by raising the productivity of livestock and farm land already in use and by bringing under cultivation large areas presently idle.

Existing Conditions

Agriculture in Iraq is devoted largely to the cultivation of winter crops. Because of the lack of rain in the summer, during that season crops can be grown only under irrigation. In the rainfed zone of the North, summer crops can be grown only on a moderate scale in small irrigated areas. In the irrigated zone of central and southern Iraq the limited water supply restricts the area devoted to summer crops to only about one quarter of that grown to winter crops. Barley and wheat are the only significant winter crops, while rice and, more recently, cotton are the principal summer crops. The area sown to sesame, corn, millet and grain sorghum is comparatively insignificant. Tobacco assumes some importance in the mountainous areas of the North. Fruit and
241 vegetables are quite important. Iraq is the world's principal pro-
245 ducer and exporter of dates; excellent citrus fruit is grown, particularly in the Diyala Valley in east-central Iraq, for domestic con-

sumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the 241
North. 245

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an 231
integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive
despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as [262]
camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed.

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently 241
inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained
unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer [372]
is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop
rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for
soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has [134]
materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter.

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq 423
and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central 427
Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. 241
The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

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fellah or peasant generally changes from year to year so that the cultivator has virtually no incentive to improve it. Moreover, the sharecropping system discourages the cultivation of animal fodder crops since the customary apportionment of shares between landlord and tenant does not lend itself readily to such crops. Most of the landowners themselves show little interest in improving agriculture. Enjoying a large share of the crop with the expenditure of little or no effort on their part, they have little incentive to raise output. In recent years, however, an increasing number of landlords have been displaying a direct interest in improving crops and diversifying production. Some of them have been instrumental in raising production by installing pumps for irrigation, introducing new and more remunerative crops such as cotton, and investing in agricultural machinery.

The depressed economic condition of the fellah or sharecropper undoubtedly retards progress. It undermines the health and vigor of the rural population, limits the market for industrial products and may in the long run jeopardize the stability of the social order. The sharecropper's plight is attributable both to his poor economic bargaining position and to the low productivity of agriculture. In the irrigation zone the fellah generally gets only half of the crop even though the state has provided the irrigation works; and his share falls substantially below this percentage whenever the land is irrigated by privately-owned pumps or the landlord supplies seed, draft animals or machinery. In a country where capital is scarce in relation to manpower, the ability to provide the means of production—land, seed, animals and machinery—almost invariably also carries with it the ability to exact a high proportion of the return. In Iraq this is reinforced by a law which forbids the sharecropper to leave the land as long as he is indebted to his landlord, which is generally the case. In the long run the sharecropping system could be made quite tolerable if the productivity of the land were raised; and the economic bargaining power of the sharecropper could be increased by giving him access to the means of production—seeds, animals and implements—on more favorable terms through such institutions as cooperatives. In the shorter run, however, the sharecropper's position is likely to improve only as the landowner takes steps to improve his lot in order to keep him

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on the land. There is apt to be increasing pressure on the land- 423
owner to take such steps as a result of the growing opportunities 427
for alternative employment created by a large increase in public 241
expenditures on development, the expansion of industry and the opening of state lands to settlement. In fact, unless the sharecropper's status is improved, there is a great danger that there will be a continued flight of labor from the land, impairing the country's agricultural production.

The government itself has made only a modest contribution 654
to the advancement of agriculture. The Directorate-General of 242
Agriculture is only a subordinate department in the Ministry of Economics and has been severely handicapped by lack of funds and a shortage of competent agricultural officers. While it has had some success in combatting pests and diseases and in the extension of such crops as cotton and citrus fruit, too little attention has been devoted to practical research, and almost no field work has been carried out to assist cultivators in improving their crops and methods of cultivation. The expenditures of the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments were actually cut from ID 1,160,000 in 1948-49 to ID 540,000 in 1950-51 and, at the latter figure, represented only 1.8 percent of the total budget outlay. Expenditures on both agriculture and irrigation 1950-51 amounted to only 6.7 percent of the total.

Plans for the future now envisage large water storage and 654
irrigation projects to provide more water for land already in use 311
and to increase the area under cultivation and provide for the settlement of new land. These plans are in general quite sound. They will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time more stress is placed on arresting the deterioration of land already in use by extensive drainage schemes and on raising the productivity of agriculture by other means. The establishment of an efficient extension service and the provision of incentives to improve methods of cultivation are particularly important in this connection.

Expansion of Area under Cultivation: Irrigation 311

Extension of the area of land under cultivation is vitally important not only to an increase in production, but, above all, as

311 a means of establishing a class of independent peasant landowners capable of earning a decent livelihood. Official estimates indicate that the amount of "cultivable" land is almost three times that under cultivation. The criteria used in determining the cultivability of land have, however, probably varied widely. Thus part of the cultivable land in the so-called rain-fed zone in the north may well be in areas sub-marginal from the standpoint of rainfall. As soon as possible the government should classify the cultivable land which is not presently cultivated by types of soil and determine what measures are required in each instance to put the land under cultivation, e.g. whether the land must be reclaimed by drainage and whether, if the land needs to be irrigated, the irrigation should be by pump or by flow.

Most of the area which can be put under cultivation will
require water, yet, under current conditions, the supply of water
does not even permit the effective irrigation of the area already in
use. Projects for the storage of the excess water which pours down
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers during the spring flood season and
653 frequently unloosens destructive floods are clearly essential. The
312 government has already initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake
storage scheme for the Euphrates River and has let a contract for
the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the
Tigris River. The program of the Development Board also makes
provision for storage dams on two tributaries of the Tigris, the
Lesser Zab and the Diyala River. While the Derbend-i-Khan dam
on the Diyala River will provide primarily for the more effective
irrigation of land already under cultivation, completion of the
Dokan dam on the Lesser Zab and of the Habbaniya Lake project
should provide enough water to extend the cultivable area under
irrigation from about 11 million donums at present to approximately
15 million.

The Mission fully endorses these projects (see map), with the proviso that borings prove the soundness of the Dokan dam site. At the same time it recommends that they be complemented by the construction at an early date of the Bekhme dam on the Greater Zab River for which no provision has yet been made. This dam would compensate for the diversion of the Lesser Zab water from the Tigris by the Dokan dam. Without the Bekhme dam the


40°
42°
EXISTING IRRIGATION
FLOW
PUMP
MARSH AREAS
HIGH DAM SITES
EXISTING BARRAGES
PROPOSED BARRAGES
PROPOSED CANALS OR EXTENSIONS
EXISTING RIVERS OR CANALS
EUPHRATES
ANA
TIGRIS
HIT
RESERVOIR
RAMADI
HABBANIYA LAKE
ABU DIBIS RESERVOIR
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

IRRIGATION SYSTEM

FACING P. 8 (A)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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MAP II


44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
MOSUL
ERBIL
DOKAN
LESSER ZAB R.
SULEIMANIYA
DERBENDI-I-KHAN
SAMARRA
RESERVOIR
DIYALA WEIR
RAINFED ZONE
IRRIGATION ZONE
BAGHDAD
BENI SAAD BARRAGE
RAMADI
HABBANIYA LAKE
KERBELA
ABU DIBIS RESERVOIR
HINDIYA BARRAGE
KIFL BARRAGE
DIWANIYA
NASIRIYA
HAMMAR LAKE
BASRA

FACING P. 8 (B)

653 already existing water shortage in the Kut and Amara regions in
312 southern Iraq would become more acute. Its construction is all the more urgent because the Wadi Tharthar reservoir will not supply supplementary water for the Tigris for another decade at best. In fact, some geologists believe that loss of water in the reservoir may be such that little or no water for irrigation will ever be furnished by the Wadi Tharthar. Should the Wadi Tharthar ultimately prove able to supply water for irrigation, the water impounded by the Bekhme dam could be utilized for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in northern Iraq.

Completion of the final stage of the Habbaniya project calls for the storage in the Abu Dibis and related depressions of water in excess of the expanded capacity of Habbaniya Lake and, in theory, would also permit a substantial extension of irrigation in the Euphrates Valley. Further study is required before beginning this stage of that project, however, because there is great danger that the salt in the depression may make the water unfit for irrigation, or at least dangerous to use, until after the completion of drainage facilities for all the areas irrigated from the Euphrates. At the same time the technical possibility of providing alternative storage capacity through the erection of a dam on the upper Euphrates near Ana should be explored.

[648] The irrigation projects outlined above necessitate agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the conservation and utilization of the water of the Euphrates and the Tigris and their tributaries. An agreement with Syria is particularly urgent, since the extensive irrigation development possible in that country might adversely affect Iraq. With Turkey and Iran it is important to conclude understandings for joint afforestation and other water conservation measures in the watershed of the Tigris and its tributaries. Afforestation and other anti-erosion measures in the international watersheds of the two rivers will effectively complement the flood-control features of the water storage schemes.

080 In the monograph on irrigation the Mission has given a tentative selection of the irrigation projects which it believes should be initiated to utilize the waters of the new reservoirs. In view of the inadequacy of the information at its disposal, the Mission suggests, however, that its recommendations be reviewed in the light of a

180 number of factors including (1) the cost and the technical aspects of the irrigation works, (2) the agricultural potentialities of the land affected, (3) the location of the land in relation to the availability of potential settlers, and (4) the ownership of the land. The first three of these need no elaboration. The fourth is important primarily because, provided adequate consideration is given to the first three factors, it would presumably be desirable to give priority to the irrigation of those lands which are clearly part of the state domain and which therefore would be available for distribution to small-holders.

241 312 Before laying out new irrigation projects the basic premises on which such projects have been designed in the past should, we suggest, be re-examined. Hitherto such projects have been laid out on the assumption that half of the area devoted to the cultivation of winter crops would lie fallow annually. The area in summer crops has not been considered since, in the absence of water storage facilities, the amount of water available limited the area that could be devoted to summer cultivation to about 15 to 20 percent of that in winter crops. The fallow system was regarded as necessary to permit the soil to rest and recover its fertility and to enable the land to dry out and the water table to sink, thus minimizing to some extent the danger of salinity. In the future the government will have the opportunity, through organized settlement and development of the new land, to prescribe the use of better systems of crop rotation which will more effectively maintain soil fertility; and the simultaneous installation of drainage facilities, now universally acknowledged to be essential, will prevent salination. At the same time the completion of the large storage projects will presumably permit some control over the distribution of water for winter crops on the one hand and summer crops on the other. Thus it will be desirable to determine, within the limits of flexibility set by the available water supply, the proportion of winter to summer crops which promises the largest overall yield, having regard both to improved crop rotation and to better utilization of manpower on the land. Such a reexamination of the premises on which irrigation projects have been designed in the past may lead to the conclusion that the area to be covered by irrigation canals using a given quantity of water can in future planning be reduced.

Greater attention should also be paid to measures which would 241 insure more economical use of available water, thereby making possible 312 a further expansion of the area under cultivation in the irrigation zone. Among these are the installation of regulators on the Gharraf canal, for which provision has already been made in the Development Board's program, and more effective regulation of the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates to prevent the dissipation of water into the extensive marshes in the South. Leaks from canals, which are sometimes quite substantial, should be reduced to a minimum, if necessary by lining certain sections of the canals. Above all, the wasteful use of water in irrigation should be arrested. The amount of water used for each crop in Iraq is generally much greater than that in the irrigated areas of other countries. At present, water is used lavishly over wide areas in an effort to wash accumulating salt from the roots of crops. In the end this only accelerates the progressive salination by raising the water table which brings up and precipitates the salt. The installation of drainage facilities which will lower the water table will therefore be the most effective means of preventing wastage of water. There is also an urgent need, however, to ascertain through practical experimentation, carried out under the joint technical supervision of agricultural and irrigation experts, the optimum amount of water required for each crop and to disseminate these findings among the cultivators.

The completion of the water storage facilities and irrigation works mentioned above will undoubtedly create some problems of adjustment. In a few places pump-irrigated lands will have to be abandoned as the consequence of new flow-irrigation schemes, and the people affected will require resettlement. In an area of about 750,000 donums the natural flooding of rice lands practised in some districts will presumably no longer be possible, and new methods of rice culture will need to be introduced. Rice patches will have to be terraced to permit the progressive flow of water from one terrace to the next and fertilizers used in the place of silt to replenish the soil; alternatively, new crops may have to be introduced. In some cases, partial resettlement of the people affected may need to take place. Even under existing conditions, however, problems of readjustment arise. Natural inundation, for example,

241 312 has led to the progressive silting and raising of rice lands, thereby pushing rice culture deeper into the marshes.

312 Finally, the Mission wishes to emphasize the importance of improved operation and maintenance of existing irrigation works. To insure proper functioning of the irrigation system the canals must be equipped with an adequate system of regulator intakes and [4/23] distributors. Rational distribution of water is often impeded by ancient water rights which insure some landowners a disproportionately large share. In times of scarcity the apportionment of water is often hotly disputed and subject to favoritism. The right of access to water across the lands of other farmers is inadequately insured. A sufficient number of adequately compensated irrigation officials of acknowledged probity is necessary to a fair distribution of water. They should be assisted by local councils of farmers who would gradually learn to approach the problem of equitable distribution in a cooperative spirit.

Lack of maintenance has been a serious problem in the past. To facilitate maintenance, irrigation systems should be equipped from the very beginning with such works as roads along canals, canal crossings for people and livestock, water-holes and washing places. To insure adequate operation and maintenance in the future, the Mission recommends that the annual budget of the Irrigation Department, which has averaged only ID 270,000 over the last ten years, should be increased progressively to about ID 1,000,000. The technical supervisory and planning staff also needs to be strengthened

The Rain-fed Zone

Except for some areas west-northwest of Kirkuk and the possibility of ultimately irrigating part of the Erbil plain with the water stored behind the Bekhme dam, large-scale irrigation schemes for the North do not appear feasible. Lack of suitable dam sites and topographical difficulties militate against such schemes. Smaller projects, utilizing the water of small streams, springs or wells are possible, however, and these should not be neglected in favor of the more striking, larger schemes. In many parts small streams and springs are already being used, but with direction and stimulus provided by the government these could be improved and many

more brought into use. The government should take steps to survey the possibilities for small projects and to provide assistance in carrying them out, thus giving aid and security to the farm population of the North which now feels that its needs have been neglected and overlooked. 312

In general, however, the North will have to remain dependent on rain-fall to sustain its agriculture. There are apparently still considerable rain-fed areas which can be settled and put to the plow. Particular care should be exercised, however, to insure that the areas are not sub-marginal from the standpoint of either rainfall or fertility and that settlers are really available in the North, which is generally more sparsely settled than the central and southern portions of Iraq. For example, the Mission believes that the prospect of scanty and uncertain rainfall will probably make it undesirable to proceed, except on a very restricted, experimental basis, with the settlement scheme near Balad Sinjar in Mosul province which has been projected by the Agriculture Department. 311

Settlement of New Land

In the past much of the vacant land available for an expansion of crop production which ostensibly belonged to the state has fallen into the hands of big landowners. The so-called Land Settlement Law of 1932, which inaugurated a cadastral survey for the purpose of settling the past confusion regarding land titles and systems of tenure, facilitated this process. It permitted the land settlement committees appointed to administer the law to grant titles (so-called *lazmah* grants) to people who could demonstrate that they had made productive use of land within the previous fifteen years. In practice, it has been possible to obtain title on the presentation of proof that a crop was produced on the land in one year, and the land settlement committees have occasionally accepted even more tenuous proof of cultivation. In this way many sheikhs and other influential persons have managed to obtain title to large tracts of land without any payment whatsoever. Since the cadastral survey is only about half completed, more land may be preempted in this way unless a limit is set on such acquisitions. 425 421

Land definitely adjudged to be state (*miri sirf*) property by the land settlement committees has, however, been set aside for 425 166 421

425 421 166 distribution to selected settlers under the terms of a law passed by Parliament in the spring of 1951. This law reflects a growing realization that a class of independent small-holders needs to be created. Settlement areas ranging in size from 2,000 donums in the mountains to 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated land and 80,000 donums in the dry-farming zone are to be established. Units up to 20 donums in mountainous land, 100 donums in flow-irrigated lands, 200 donums in lands irrigated by low-lift pumps and 400 donums in dry-farming lands are to be distributed among farmers, with preference to be accorded to those living in or near the settlement areas. Up to 20 percent of each area may also be allotted to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 percent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates, provided that the committee responsible for the administration of the whole scheme is convinced of their agricultural capabilities. Settlers will be given the opportunity to participate in the work of preparing each area for settlement. The committee will plan the whole settlement, including the sites of houses and public buildings which are to be constructed in accordance with its specifications. The committee will also issue instructions regarding the type and method of cultivation. After ten years farmers who have made good will be granted title to their land without charge, and for a further period of ten years they will not be permitted to alienate their land in any way or to mortgage it except to the state Agricultural Bank. The only exception to this kind of distribution and settlement will be made in the case of state lands which can be irrigated only by high-lift pumps. Such lands may still be leased in tracts up to a maximum of 5,000 donums to a single individual.

425 421 This law, properly administered, will undoubtedly result in great benefit to Iraq. The Mission urges, however, that the government insist on the principle that settlers farm their land themselves without resort to sharecroppers. Otherwise there is a danger that a considerable number of minor landlords will be created, thus defeating the fundamental purpose of the scheme. This principle may be jeopardized both by the selection of non-farmers as beneficiaries and by the contemplated allotment of excessively large

plots to single individuals in the pump-irrigated and dry-farming areas.

While sympathizing with the desire to provide in some way for unemployed school graduates and retired civil servants, army and police personnel, the Mission believes there is serious danger that these types of beneficiaries will tend to become landlords who will entrust the farming of their plots to others. The success of the settlement schemes may easily be endangered if the land falls into the hands of absentee landlords or of people with little or no farming experience. In any event there are many farmers in relatively overcrowded rural areas with better claims to the new land.

The proposed allotments, particularly in the dry-farming and pump-irrigated areas, may well be too large unless there is assurance that the farmers will have access to adequate machinery to till their land. The relatively large allotment in pump-irrigated lands as well as the exemption of lands irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution to small-holders appear to be based on the assumption that only larger landholders can afford the necessary investment in pumps. In the past when capital was scarce, the installation of pumps was left to merchants and landowners who consequently were able to reap high returns in the form of a large proportion of the resulting agricultural output. Now that the government is assured of ample financial means in the future, it might consider financing the construction of pumping stations and providing pumps at cost to groups of settlers organized into cooperatives which would undertake to operate the pumps and gradually repay the government. Under such conditions the justification for larger allotments of pump-irrigated lands would tend to disappear. The Mission therefore suggests that the government review the size of the allocation to each farmer and that it reserve to itself the right to reassign a portion of the allotment if one farmer should prove incapable of cultivating it.

The Mission also makes two other recommendations. The first is that the right of sale after the initial period of 20 years be limited in such a way as to give the government an option to purchase for the purpose of preventing the land from falling into the hands of absentee landlords. The second is that the provision enabling settlers to acquire their land without cost be reconsidered.

425 421 The Mission believes that the settlers should, as a matter of general principle, be required to make some payment for the extensive benefits received. This is all the more necessary in order not to widen unduly the disparity between the economic status of the favored settlers and that of the great majority of cultivators who will continue to work under much less favorable conditions. Such payments need not be excessively burdensome, since they could be spread over a number of years.

241 425 [144] The new law will apply on a broad scale the basic principles of the Dujaila land settlement scheme in south-central Iraq. In the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled there on 100-donum plots allotted from state-owned irrigated land. The Mission was impressed by the results achieved through this scheme. The farmers, who used to be sharecroppers, are conscious of their new-won independence and dignity. By comparison with the fellahin in neighboring areas they appear prosperous and content. [477] Many of them are members of a cooperative—the only one of its kind in Iraq—which owns 10 tractors, two lorries, a flour mill and a club-house. Although the accounts of this cooperative leave much to be desired, its operations are generally along sound lines and indicative of what can be accomplished through state-assisted self-help. The Dujaila scheme is, however, not without defects. Its success as an agricultural venture is jeopardized by the progressive salination of the land because of failure to provide drainage facilities —an omission which should be promptly remedied. The administrative staff appears to be excessively large. Small-scale "landlordism" has crept in, since some farmers have brought in others to do a large part of their work on a sharecropping basis. The farmers were settled in a scattered fashion without regard to the need for community life. Most important, aside from insisting on small fruit gardens, the committee in charge of the project has effected no improvement in farming methods. The Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee, and there are no agricultural experts in the project capable of assisting farmers in raising their standards of cultivation. The improved economic position of the cultivators in the Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to a landlord. In the

new settlements the government will have a unique opportunity to remedy the shortcomings of the Dujaila project. 241 425

Improvement in Productivity

While expansion of land under cultivation, particularly through large irrigation schemes, is essential in the long run to provide for a growing population and to establish a socially desirable class of smallholders, it should not be undertaken without a simultaneous vigorous campaign to increase the productivity of agriculture and livestock. The temptation to neglect such an effort in favor of striking new irrigation schemes should be resisted. Among the measures upon which this campaign should concentrate are drainage, the provision of better tools, seeds and draft animals, the introduction of soil-building and forage crops, the use of fertilizers, the improvement of livestock, the planting of trees and the establishment of an effective extension or advisory service to farmers. 080

1. Drainage

The drainage of existing irrigated lands would make the most important single contribution to increasing the productivity of agriculture. Moreover, it will also have the most immediate effect since it can be carried out by the government while the success of virtually all other measures to raise productivity depends on the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation. 312

The Haigh Irrigation Commission, which made an extensive study of irrigation and flood control for the government, estimated a few years ago that about 60 percent of the land irrigated by flow had been seriously affected by salt. The Mission's own inquiries and observations indicate that as much as 20 to 30 percent of cultivated land has been abandoned over the last few decades because of salt accumulation, while on a large part of the remaining land yields have declined by 20 to 50 percent and even more. In a number of new irrigation projects such as Hawija and Dujaila salting forced abandonment of part of the land within two years after the schemes were initiated. Drainage, almost totally neglected in the past, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor in the future. 311 134

The main drainage canals for the whole irrigation zone have been projected, but it is now necessary to proceed with detailed 312

3/2 planning and execution. First priority should be given to the drainage of the areas irrigated by the canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates. A complete drainage network should be laid out as soon as possible for the Aggar Qub region, where drainage studies have already been carried out, in order to determine through practical experimentation the most appropriate design and spacing of the subsidiary drainage canals. Prompt attention should also be given to the drainage of the Dujaila area in order to halt the rapid deterioration of the land which may otherwise endanger the success of this important social experiment. Altogether the Mission believes that about ID 7,000,000 should be allotted to drainage over the next five years. This compares with a sum of ID 2,000,000 provided in the initial five-year program of the Development Board. So important is drainage that the Mission recommends that it be given priority over new irrigation schemes whenever a limitation of resources makes it impossible to carry out both simultaneously.

Since landowners will benefit greatly from drainage, they might reasonably be required to pay at least some part of the cost. Consideration might therefore be given to the imposition of a levy to pay the cost of subsidiary drainage canals. Construction of such subsidiary canals should not be optional with the landowners because failure to build them across one man's property might deny the benefits of drainage to adjoining properties.

2. Tools and Draft Animals

241 In the recent past much stress has been placed in Iraq on agricultural mechanization. In large parts of the country, particularly in the dry-farming zone, natural conditions are undoubtedly favorable to the use of tractors. The use of threshing machines or combines has also been shown to have the advantage of producing a far cleaner grain than that obtained through the customary method of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. For a long time to come, however, the great majority of Iraqi farmers will be unable to afford the purchase or rental of power machinery even on deferred payment; and many others will find mechanized farming unprofitable particularly as long as the cost of machinery remains so high in relation to the cost of labor. For most farmers the provision of simple tools as well as more and better draft ani-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

mals offers a more practical answer to their needs at this time. 241 Experience in Iraq shows that tractor plowing may increase yields by 20 to 50 percent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and partly also through better preparation of the soil. Much the same effect could, however, be achieved through better animal-drawn plows replacing those which now, for the most part, barely scratch the surface and fail to uproot the weeds. Means for the acquisition of such tools and improved draft animals should be created through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of better credit facilities.

Mechanization will nevertheless play an increasingly important role in the future, especially as labor becomes more scarce and additional land becomes available for cultivation. Mechanization has already facilitated the expansion of cultivation in the dry-farming areas of Mosul and the new pump-irrigated lands in central Iraq. While certain areas in the irrigation zone are undoubtedly overpopulated in relation to land currently available, in other areas, particularly in the rain-fed zone, labor is scarce relative to the supply of land. As development schemes are launched and new land is opened up for settlement, the available manpower on lands already under cultivation may well be reduced. The government will need therefore to take steps to insure that mechanization will keep pace with developing requirements. In the period immediately ahead, however, the government should be mindful of the possibility that mechanization initiated by landowners may result in a substantial reduction of the portion of the crop going to sharecroppers or in the displacement of sharecroppers before alternative means of employment or settlement become available. Through its control over the importation and distribution of machinery and the extension of credit for the purchase of such machinery, the government will have the power to influence the direction of mechanization and thus minimize to some extent possibly adverse social consequences.

At present only a small portion of Iraqi agriculture is mecha- 407
nized. Combines and tractors in operation are reported to number 475
320 and 750 respectively, with about half of the number concen- 427
trated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. Of these, 75 com- 647
bines and 81 tractors are owned by the Agricultural Machinery

407 Administration, an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Eco-
475 nomics. The AMA rents this machinery to farmers and, in addi-
427 tion, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery,
647 licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts in order to prevent black-marketing.

Some provision for rental of machinery, whether by the government or by private enterprise, will be necessary for some time, partly because it enables farmers to become acquainted with the value of such machinery and partly because many farmers do not have sufficient capital for outright purchase. As long as private enterprise is incapable of providing this service at reasonable rentals or until cooperatives can be established, continuation of the government rental service appears essential. On the whole, therefore, the AMA's three-year program to replace and expand its machinery park and to equip repair shops appears desirable despite the obvious drawbacks of government operation. At present, however, the AMA is operating at a substantial loss. In the calendar year 1951, for instance, its rental income will probably not exceed ID 50,000 compared with estimated operating costs, including depreciation, of about ID 150,000. Since the beginning of 1950, when it started operations as a fiscally autonomous agency, it has had to cover its deficits out of the ID 500,000 capital which the government undertook to provide. While the government should probably defray that part of the AMA's expenditures not directly attributable to the rental operations, the overall deficit should be reduced by gradually increasing rental charges. Rental charges on tractors, in particular, appear unduly low and may be depriving private persons of the incentive to purchase tractors either for their own use or for rental to others.

407 Since the overhead costs of the AMA's rental operations will
471 probably always remain rather high and its machinery must be
647 transported over considerable distances, it is important that the
government encourage as much as possible private purchase and
[452] operation of machinery. The extension of credit for this purpose
appears essential. At present, however, the Agricultural Bank cannot lend money on farm equipment partly because it is short of funds and partly because such loans would not afford sufficient security in the absence of any legal requirement to register title TO MACHINERY.

to machinery. In the future cooperative ownership and operation, 407
especially in the new settlement areas, should be encouraged as one 471
of the best means of extending the use of machinery on a practicable 647
and economical basis. The experience of the Dujaila cooperative, which, owing to low overhead and transport costs, rents machinery to its members at rates lower than those of the AMA and yet is apparently able to cover the cost of depreciation, seems promising in this respect.

Lack of repair facilities and spare parts have greatly handi- 407
capped mechanization. The government is seeking to overcome 445
this difficulty both by establishing its own repair shops and by requiring importers to provide repair facilities and maintain minimum stocks of spare parts. Such centrally located shops will be available, however, only for major repairs. Since local repair facilities are now almost wholly lacking, steps should also be taken to establish a considerable number of small shops equipped to undertake minor repairs. In addition, courses designed to train drivers in elementary maintenance are urgently needed. The cost of mechanization will remain discouragingly high unless the life of machinery is prolonged by more adequate maintenance and repair.

3. Soil-building and Forage Crops: Fertilizers 246

The cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is virtually unknown even though the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished and an improvement in feed supply would make the greatest single contribution to an increase in the low productivity of livestock. In the irrigation zone berseem clover, sown in the grain stubble in late summer, would provide a particularly good pasture, soiling and hay crop. In the rain-fed region winter oats and vetch, when cut and cured, would provide a good reserve feed. In the irrigation zone quick-growing crops such as millet could be grown for summer pasture; and more corn, sorghum and legumes such as cowpeas and mungo beans should be cultivated.

Little fertilizer is used and animal manure is generally col- 241
lected and dried for use as fuel. With the expanding cultivation of crops such as cotton, the use of fertilizer is becoming more urgent. There is need for soil analysis and extensive experimentation to ascertain the fertilizer requirement and the effect of fertilizer on

241 [387] yields. As will be indicated later, inorganic fertilizers could probably be produced cheaply in Iraq and organic fertilizers could be produced as by-products of the slaughtering industry.

231 4. Livestock Improvement

The productivity of livestock is extremely low, primarily because of inadequate feed supply. In addition to the production of fodder crops, measures should be taken to improve natural pasture lands, particularly in the northern mountains, which have generally suffered from over-grazing. Reseeding and rotational grazing are necessary. Productivity could be further raised by the establishment of shelters, better breeding methods, especially the introduction of new and improved sires and maintenance of stud stations, and by more effective control of parasitic diseases through an increase in the number of veterinarians and the provision of more extensive diagnostic facilities in the provinces.

The quality of livestock products could be raised considerably by a number of measures. One of these is an improvement in the practices and more stringent sanitary supervision of abattoirs. Others would be the establishment of a number of wool shearing and grading units under the guidance of an appropriate expert; appointment of a hides and skins expert to serve as general manager of the newly established Hides and Skins Association; and recruitment of an abattoir specialist to train local abattoir supervisors in improved methods of flaying and preserving hides and skins.

234 At present, even the major cities are without a clean, safe milk supply. The supply of milk could be substantially improved by better feeding of livestock, concentration of milking cattle in well-equipped settlements on the outskirts of cities, and central collection, transportation and processing of milk under strict sanitary controls. The possibility of cooperative collection and processing of milk should be explored.

231 [233] Since the nomads and semi-nomads, who may number from 200,000 to 500,000, account for a large proportion of the livestock in the country, particularly sheep and goats, their needs must receive special attention. Measures should be taken, for instance, to provide them with better watering facilities, sheep-dipping stations,

and trained medical and veterinary assistants to control disease. In 231
the North, livestock shelters would reduce the high mortality in the winter. In the long run, however, livestock raising is likely to become increasingly the preoccupation of settled farmers, particularly as the area under cultivation is gradually extended and natural pastures correspondingly restricted. Mixed farming, in which livestock raising based on the production of fodder crops would have its appropriate place, would greatly enhance incomes, especially because it would give more year-around employment to farmers who now, with the concentration on winter crop production, are underemployed for the greater part of the year.

5. Research and Education: Incentives

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While is it relatively easy to point out what should be done to improve agriculture and livestock, devising the means to accomplish the improvement is incomparably more difficult. The means available to the state for a direct attack on low productivity are necessarily limited. The government can, of course, lay out drainage schemes, make more water available, provide facilities for combatting plant and animal diseases and pests, establish livestock shelters, assist in organizing cooperatives, and furnish more ample credit facilities. However, except perhaps in the new settlement areas, the state cannot prescribe better crop rotation, the use of improved seeds, better methods of cultivation and the like. These depend on private initiative which can at best only be stimulated and encouraged by the government. In some circumstances farmers can be relied upon to seize the initiative, as in the case of cotton where high prices have stimulated a rapid expansion of production. In the main, however, greater productivity depends on the success of efforts to persuade large numbers of landowners and cultivators to change their time-hallowed methods and techniques. For this reason principal reliance will have to be placed on education, supported by practical research and supplemented where feasible by financial incentives provided by the government.

First of all, steps should be initiated immediately to organize 242
an effective extension or advisory service to farmers. At present 647
the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and much of their

242 attention is devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks. The
647 relatively small number of agricultural officers in the provinces are
engaged primarily in the distribution of seed, in the collection of
rather inadequate statistics and in administrative tasks. They lack
the time, the transport facilities, and, often, the ability to counsel
farmers on methods of improving their output. While shortages
of trained personnel will prevent the immediate establishment of a
full-time extension service, the Mission recommends the early
appointment of a director of extension and education whose first
responsibility would be the recruitment and training of personnel
for such a service. The need is for people well-grounded in practi-
[874] cal, general agriculture rather than specialists. The facilities of the
secondary agricultural school and the higher agricultural institute
at Abu Ghuraib might well be used to train the required people,
provided the quality of the staff is improved and the curriculum
revised, especially in the direction of giving more practical training
in agriculture. It will be impossible, however, to attract properly
qualified people to an extension service unless the status of agri-
cultural officers in the provinces is considerably raised and their
conditions of service, particularly housing and pay, are greatly
improved.

The effectiveness of such an extension service would be greatly enhanced by the organization of demonstration units on strategically located government and private farms. There, farmers could be brought to see with their own eyes the practical advantages of improved methods of raising livestock, poultry and farm crops. At the same time the extension service might work closely with the public schools in the rural areas and small towns to insure that a knowledge of the rudimentary principles of agriculture is instilled in children at an early age. Rural primary and secondary schools should give agriculture an appropriate place in their curriculum.

816 An extension service must be backed up by sound, practical
242 research which will develop new crops and more productive varie-
ties, improved livestock breeds, better methods of cultivation, and
more effective control of pests and diseases. At present there are
few people engaged in full-time research. Government farms are
devoted primarily to the commercial production of seed, serving
neither as demonstration farms nor as centers for extensive

research. The Mission recommends that in the future such farms 242
should be used primarily as experimental stations. Seed for distri- 816
bution to farmers could be produced on land surplus to the needs of the experimental stations or on a contract basis under appropriate government supervision on private farms. The Mission suggests that immediate steps be taken to secure a research director to coordinate all existing research and to recruit a gradually expanding staff of full-time research experts consisting partly of foreigners and partly of Iraqis.

These measures will bring about an improvement in agri- 242
culture only very gradually. In the short run they will need to be supplemented by positive financial incentives. Most farmers will probably prove unwilling or unable to invest money or time in the cultivation of fodder crops or the use of fertilizers unless they are convinced through practical experience that such an investment is really worthwhile. In order to induce farmers to experiment themselves, the government may wish to consider providing free seed for fodder crops and defraying part of the cost of fertilizer, or, alternatively, making a flat money payment per donum to those undertaking to use fertilizers or grow feed. Such incentives should, of course, be offered only as long as is necessary to demonstrate the value of improved methods. The provision of credit for the acquisition of machinery, fertilizers and other means of production will also be helpful in this respect.

It has already been pointed out that the existing sharecropping 242
system, coupled with the shifting nature of cultivation, militates 427
against the introduction of soil-building and forage crops. Under present conditions the landlord will find it difficult to compel the fellah to grow such crops unless the fellah is actually paid for doing so. The Mission therefore suggests that the difficulties inherent in the sharecropping system, as well as the advisability of changes in this system, be studied by an expert on land tenure.

Tobacco and the Tobacco Monopoly

The Mission has paid special attention to tobacco, not only 249
because cultivation of this crop is of considerable importance to the 655
Kurdish farmers of the North, but also because tobacco leaf is

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249 handled by a government monopoly, the operations of which have
665 been highly controversial.

The Tobacco Monopoly was established in 1939 in order (1) to improve the quality of tobacco, (2) to assure farmers stable and remunerative prices, and (3) to raise revenue for the government, although this objective was not explicit and was certainly subordinate to the other two. The Monopoly licenses the area which may be planted to tobacco, buys the tobacco produced thereon at fixed prices set each year and resells it to manufacturers at prices more than twice as high as those it pays.

It is generally recognized that the first objective has not been realized, for the quality of tobacco, which was never high, has probably declined still further. Neither the Monopoly nor the Department of Agriculture has had the personnel to assist farmers in improving the varieties or strains of tobacco grown or the methods of cultivating, picking, curing and sorting, all of which leave much to be desired. The Monopoly's rather haphazard and often arbitrary system of grading and its limitation on the amount of tobacco it will buy per licensed donum have discouraged the production of better quality tobacco and the achievement of higher yields. Storage of tobacco in inadequate warehouses contributes further to its deterioration.

The second objective appears to have been at least partly realized, at least insofar as farmers have been given remunerative prices for their tobacco and have received a fairly stable income in the last five years. During the war years farmers enjoyed a bonanza since the Monopoly had no effective limitations on output, classified most of the tobacco in top grades and bought it at very high prices. After the war, changes in grading, stricter limitations on output and lower prices inevitably created discontent, although prices were still remunerative and, until recently, the Monopoly continued to buy more tobacco than the licensed output. The wide disparity between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices has continued, however, to put a premium on the illicit growing and marketing of tobacco. Moreover, the merchant has managed to interpose himself to an increasing extent between the grower and the Monopoly because of his ability to advance money on crops, to transport tobacco to distant collection centers and to obtain a

higher classification for the tobacco than the grower is often able to get.

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The third objective has undoubtedly been achieved. During the period September 1, 1943 to March 31, 1950 the Monopoly's cash income exceeded its cash expenditures by almost 6.5 million dinars. In fact, contrary to original intentions, revenue would seem to have become the primary objective of the Monopoly.

Improvement in the quality of tobacco should be the primary aim in the future. The Mission therefore suggests that one or two foreign experts, together with a number of Iraqis, be engaged to work in the field in order to help farmers to better their methods of growing, picking, curing and sorting tobacco. At least one expert should be recruited to instruct graders in proper methods of classifying tobacco, and another expert with an Iraqi deputy should be appointed to approve all tobacco for final purchase by the Monopoly. The existing inadequate warehouses should be replaced by four or five new warehouses provided with dust extracting facilities and proper humidifying equipment.

The Mission believes that under existing circumstances the Monopoly should be retained. As long as the tobacco is not of such quality that it can be marketed abroad, there will need to be some agency to limit production. Moreover, in the absence of the Monopoly the large number of small growers would have inadequate bargaining power in the fixing of prices vis-a-vis the merchants and manufacturers. The Mission advises strongly, however, against the proposed extension of the Monopoly to the manufacture of tobacco products. Such a step seems hardly necessary, since manufacturing is generally in competent hands, and it would only divert the Monopoly's attention from the primary task of improving the quality of the tobacco. The Mission suggests that the Monopoly be reorganized as a fiscally autonomous agency within the Ministry of Agriculture recommended elsewhere in the report. The Monopoly should be headed by an Iraqi director-general assisted by an expert adviser and an advisory board which would include representatives of the growers. In order to discourage illicit marketing of tobacco, the difference between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices should be narrowed to an amount sufficient to cover operating costs and depreciation as well as the accumulation

655 249 of a small cash reserve. The resulting loss in revenue can be offset by an increase in the tobacco excises which are relatively easy to collect from the manufacturers. The reduction in illicit production and marketing thus achieved should make it possible to raise the existing limitation on output per donum. This would encourage the better farmers, yet probably would not necessitate a further restriction of the licensed area, which the Mission realizes would be politically impracticable.

The Introduction of Sugar

249 [439] In view of the government's desire to introduce the cultivation of sugar beets in northern Iraq, this subject has also been given special attention by the Mission. The possibility merits serious consideration because Iraq has imported over the last three years, on the average, 75,000 tons of sugar annually. There is, in addition, a serious need for new crops to diversify production and make more effective use of the manpower on the land. The Mission believes, however, that no decision on the production of sugar should be made until there is reasonable assurance that sugar can be produced at a cost competitive with the landed price of imported sugar (thus exclusive of import duty) and that the farmer will derive an income from sugar at least equal to that obtained from alternative crops, such as cotton, which can be grown on the same land. Moreover, before a decision is made in favor of sugar beets, the superiority of this crop over sugar cane, which could be grown in the South, must have been clearly established.

Sugar beets have been successfully grown in northern Iraq in test plantings carried out by the Department of Agriculture. Larger and more extensive test plantings are necessary, however, particularly to study the problems of insect control, yields and costs. The problems of labor supply and transport also need to be more thoroughly explored. The cultivation, transport and processing of sugar beets require close coordination and therefore careful organization. The production of beets is exacting, requiring considerable skill and labor. While preliminary evidence indicates that, on the basis of current price relationships, the yield per donum of sugar beets and cotton would not be significantly different, the balance of advantage may well prove to be on the side of cotton since, owing

to the greater amount of labor required for sugar beets, a single 249 family can probably cultivate a larger area in cotton. Up to the present, tests have not found a variety of sugar cane adapted to Iraq, but both the methods and the scale of the experiments have not been adequate enough to prove conclusive. If further experimentation does result in the discovery of a well- adapted variety, the production of cane may be preferable since cane yields are generally higher than beet sugar yields and cane production requires less skill. Moreover, the farmers in Amara in southern Iraq, where cane would be grown, are at least as much in need of a new crop as those in the North.

The Mission therefore believes that further investigation and experimentation over the next few years are required before a sound decision can be reached on the production of sugar. For this purpose it suggests that two experts be engaged to direct further research, one in beet and the other in sugar cane. During the period of experimentation it may also be desirable to invite a leading foreign sugar company, acquainted with the production and processing of both beet and cane, to make a study and recommendations on the best way of organizing the cultivation and processing of sugar.

Production Credit and Marketing

A considerable increase in farm income could ultimately be 452 achieved through the provision of more ample agricultural credit, the establishment of storage facilities for crops and the organization of cooperatives.

The resources of the state-owned Agricultural Bank, the only 452 agricultural credit institution, are insufficient to meet existing needs 453 for credit. In many cases farmers must either borrow money from private lenders at exorbitant rates of interest or sell their crops in advance of the harvest at substantial discounts. Although the Bank has an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000, the government has paid in only ID 550,000 and the Bank has been compelled to borrow ID 300,000 to supplement its slender resources. In November 1949 the Bank was forced to suspend lending execpt for small amounts and not until a year later was it able to resume credit operations on a modest scale. It is vital that farmers be

452 enabled to obtain sufficient credit to buy seeds, fertilizer, livestock, 453 machinery and other means of production and to make it unnecessary for them to sell their crops immediately after harvest at extremely low prices. The Mission therefore suggests that the Development Board provide sufficient funds to raise the paid-in capital of the Bank to about ID 2,000,000. This should permit the Bank to expand its credit operations and refund its borrowed resources. Action to enable the Bank to increase its lending will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time greater care is exercised to insure that loans are promptly repaid and that farmers, who are often improvident, borrow only for purposes which will increase their output. In the past a considerable portion of the Bank's capital has become frozen as the result of repeated extensions of the maturity dates on its loans.

343 488 Good storage facilities for grain and perhaps other crops would reduce losses due to infestation, improve the quality of grain, assist in the stabilization of prices and provide some assurance against famine. At present grain is often stored in the open or in inadequate buildings and sheds. A modern 5,000-ton grain elevator has recently been erected in Baghdad, and another of 40,000 tons is projected for Basra to serve the export trade. There is, however, an urgent need for less elaborate and smaller storage facilities throughout the grain-growing areas. These could be of simple concrete or corrugated steel construction and range in capacity from 1,000 to 3,000 tons. Simple cleaning machinery would be desirable in order to remove impurities from the grain. Such storage facilities, which might have a total capacity of about 75,000 tons, would presumably be owned and operated by the Grain Board, an autonomous government agency, and would need to be closely controlled so that the Agricultural Bank could with safety make loans against grain stored in them by farmers and merchants. Under such conditions, more merchants would probably enter the market to bid for grain at harvest time and farmers themselves would not be under the necessity of marketing their grain immediately after the harvest irrespective of the level of prices.

474 Although an impressive law on cooperatives has been put on the statute books, almost nothing has been done to organize effec-

tive cooperatives. As already indicated, the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project is the only promising venture in this field. The organization of cooperatives is at present entrusted to a department in the Ministry of Economics whose entire staff consists of a part-time director, one assistant and one clerk. About forty cooperatives are now registered with the department, but most of these are apparently inoperative and all but one are consumers' cooperatives for which there seems to be less need. The Mission urges that in the future efforts be concentrated on the organization of agricultural cooperatives and that therefore the responsibility for cooperatives be transferred to the Department of Agriculture. Such cooperatives can become an important means of self-help and saving by farmers. Gradually they may become an important vehicle for the extension of credit to small farmers by the Agricultural Bank.

Undoubtedly progress in inculcating farmers with the necessary cooperative spirit and a knowledge of the benefits of cooperation will be slow. Strong guidance and control will need to be provided initially by the government, and the cooperatives will have to be held to strict accountability in the use of their assets. Yet the experience with the Dujaila cooperative and, to some extent, with cooperatives in other Moslem countries, such as Egypt, indicates that beneficial results can be achieved by persistent, well-directed efforts. Cooperatives for the purchase and distribution of seeds, fertilizer and other tools of production and for the joint ownership and operation of machinery should be made an integral part of the new settlement schemes. While primary emphasis should be put on this task, efforts should also be made to organize cooperatives on a small, experimental scale among existing sharecroppers. Such cooperatives, assisted by the Agricultural Bank, might confine themselves initially to relatively modest operations such as the provision of seed and simple tools. Success in this field will depend on the existence of a small cadre of enthusiastic government officials properly trained in the organization and operation of cooperatives. It is therefore suggested that the government take prompt steps to have a number of such officials trained in a country like Cyprus where a well-developed cooperative movement exists.

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Forestry

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3/3 In a country where the plains are almost entirely devoid of trees and only the mountain valleys contain a few scattered forests, the importance of forests as a means of controlling erosion and floods and overcoming the acute shortage of timber needs no emphasis. The Mission did not give special attention to this problem because the government has already received an excellent detailed report and recommendations from a British expert. It wishes only ~~to stress~~ that it is important not only to protect and extend the forests in the mountain areas, but also to undertake the planting of trees in the plains to serve as windbreaks and as sources of fuel and building timber. In the Dujaila project an encouraging beginning has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundaries. In future settlement schemes it might be well to require farmers to plant and maintain small wood lots. To carry out a proper program the Forestry Department, which is now only a division within the Department of Agriculture, should be given an independent status and headed, as at present, by a well-trained foreigner. The training of an adequate number of foresters should also be undertaken.

Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture

647 Agriculture, livestock-raising and forestry are of such critical importance to Iraq that they merit a separate ministry in the government. The Mission recommends therefore the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use. Within this Ministry and directly under a permanent secretary, it is suggested that directorates-general be organized for each of the following subjects: agriculture and horticulture; animal husbandry; forestry and soil conservation; land settlement; and research. Special sections for administrative and personnel questions, legal affairs, economic research and statistics, and extension and education might form part of the immediate staff of a permanent secretary. Within the Ministry there should also be grouped the more or less autonomous organizations such as the Tobacco Monopoly, the Grain Board, the Agricultural Machinery Administration, the Date Association and the Chambers of Agriculture. The Mission believes that such a ministry would greatly facilitate more effective direction of the government's efforts to improve agriculture and related pursuits.

III. Industry

Industry is as yet little developed in Iraq. As already indi- 433
cated, apart from the oil industry which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 are working in modern industrial plants. These plants represent a total capital investment of approximately ID 4,000,000 and an annual gross income of about ID 3,000,000. Industry is largely confined to the processing of agricultural products, the production of building materials such as cement and bricks, and the manufacture of consumers' goods like textiles, soap, matches, cigarettes, shoes and beverages.

Conditions, however, are generally favorable to further industrial development. An expanding agriculture should provide more materials, such as fibres and oil seeds, for processing and when the standard of living among the rural population is raised there should be a growing domestic market for industrial products.
In oil and natural gas the country possesses a cheap source of [135]
power and fuel as well as an important source of raw materials. There are surface indications of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores, as well as of the existence of sulphur and salt deposits. The extent of such deposits should, however, be confirmed by core drilling before steps are taken to undertake their commercial exploitation.
In the cities there is adequate manpower for industry, and the [444]
Iraqi workman with proper training is generally adept at learning industrial processes. Skilled manpower, however, is very limited, and, naturally enough, there is little of the technical "know-how" which comes through experience and training. Other limiting factors in industrial development are the lack of sufficient private
capital and initiative. Much capital, particularly that accumulated [454]
from agriculture, is hoarded and the balance is generally invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce, where investors anticipate a higher rate of return. While there is a trend toward increased private investment in industry, particularly since the war, industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the initiative or financial assistance of the government.

000 The Mission has carefully considered what industries might be expanded and what new industries might be established. It has sought to confine its recommendations for industrial development to those industries where there is reasonable prospect of efficient production, competitive with imports, and where production is within the technical capacity available in Iraq, supplemented, where necessary, by outside technical and managerial assistance.

Petroleum and Refining

135 No recommendations need be made on the oil industry. The
oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field
amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons and those of the less well
382 explored fields near Basra offering perhaps equal promise. The
development of these resources by the oil companies is proceeding
[466] along sound lines. The oil companies have also been well in
advance of other enterprises in providing housing, health services,
and other amenities for their employees, in instituting labor training
schemes and providing better pay for workers. The Mission
realizes that there has been some criticism in Iraq of the rate of
development, particularly in the Basra field. The expenditure of
close to £90,000,000 by the oil companies on oil development in
Iraq is now, however, beginning to yield a rapidly rising output.
Production in recent years might have been much greater if the
outbreak of the war with Israel had not resulted in closing the pipeline
to Haifa and in preventing the completion of another pipeline
[315] to that city. The existing line has a capacity of 2,000,000 tons and
the projected line would have added another 4,000,000 tons. As already
indicated, the government has recently obtained a commitment
by the oil companies to increase output, which was a little less than
6,000,000 tons in 1950, to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of
1955. It would not be advantageous to Iraq, however, to have production
increased to such levels that the ensuing rise in oil revenues
cannot in fact be effectively spent. Oil in the ground is a reserve
for the future, and too rapid tapping of this reserve may entail a
partial waste of resources.

382 The government has decided to build a modern oil refinery
471 near Baghdad which it anticipates will cost about £7,000,000. This
refinery will use crude oil supplied from the Kirkuk fields at cost.
With an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons, it will be able to supply

all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for some time. This decision 382
reflects an understandable desire on the part of Iraq to have a 471
modern refinery of its own, replacing the somewhat inadequate and rather old Alwand refinery at Khanaqin which is owned by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and is capable of supplying not quite 70 percent of Iraq's current requirements.[8] Foreign management of the new refinery will probably be necessary, at least for an initial period. The project will make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery and probably also the small oil field near the Iranian border from which it draws its crude. This field probably cannot be developed on a scale large enough to warrant investment in the pipelines necessary to export the oil.

Expansion of Old Industries

Some industries are now expanding without government financial 433
assistance. The cement plant and the brewery are both doubling their capacity. Recent improvements and expansion have put the woolen industry abreast of the country's needs. Other industries do not for the present require expansion. Flour milling capacity, for instance, appears ample. The tanneries also appear to have sufficient capacity, but to raise the quality of their raw material supply, technical assistance is needed to improve methods of flaying and preserving hides.

Still other industries could usefully be expanded but do not have sufficient financial resources to do so without government assistance. The cotton and rayon textile factories in Baghdad and [288]
Mosul might well double their designed capacity and extend their facilities to make a wider range of products. At present cotton textile capacity can meet only about a quarter of the country's requirements. Since ample raw material is available and costs of production can become competitive with those abroad, further expansion would appear to be warranted. In its regular budget for [471]
1951-52 the government has provided ID 1,000,000 for a government textile mill. The Mission believes, however, that government ownership and operation would not be desirable and that it would be vastly preferable to extend capacity with the participation of private capital and enterprise.

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[8] By an agreement reached in December, 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

433 Further expansion of the vegetable oil extraction plant would be justified, the more so since increasing quantities of cotton seed will be available for crushing and the existing plant does not meet domestic requirements. Hydrogenation equipment for making cooking fats might also be added, and the capacity of the appurtenant soap plant might be enlarged so as to cover about half of Iraq's needs. The capacity of the country's only modern shoe factory, a small enterprise, might well be tripled to reach an output of about 100,000 pairs per year. Similarly, a plant producing aluminum utensils could well be expanded and complemented by facilities for melting and rolling aluminum scrap and pig, thereby substantially reducing costs of production.

Establishment of New Industries

Among the new industrial enterprises which could be advantageously launched are a jute mill, bonemeal fertilizer plants, an automobile tire factory, a small steel mill, a central machine shop, a concrete batching plant and a plant for the manufacture of date boxes. For all of these there is sufficient demand, and production could take place economically on a small scale. The small steel plant would smelt domestically available scrap and produce in a hand-operated mill such items as reinforcing bars, window frames [392] and small angles. The central machine shop would replace the numerous small shops now engaged primarily in maintaining the 3,000 irrigation pumps in Iraq. This shop would significantly reduce the cost of maintaining pumps and, since these pumps are of relatively simple construction, would also be able to manufacture them. Small bonemeal plants could be built at Mosul, Baghdad and Basra to convert bones and other offal of abattoirs into a valuable fertilizer for domestic use. The growing demand for jute bagging would justify the installation of a jute mill capable of making about 10,000 tons of jute products per year. A small tire plant to manufacture tires under foreign license and with foreign technical assistance might also be feasible in a few years, particularly since the demand for tires has been growing rapidly and the development of road transport is expected to receive considerable impetus in the future. A concrete batching plant with ready-mix trucks would be useful in providing poured concrete for many small construction projects.

433 [289] In addition to the above-mentioned enterprises, it may well be desirable to establish a paper mill as soon as there is an assured supply of pulp from abroad. As the demand for paper bagging for domestically produced fertilizers and cement increases, it will probably be more economical to produce such paper in Iraq than to import it. A plant for the manufacture of glass bottles, other containers and tumblers might also be started, provided the availability of the right type of sand can be confirmed.

339 387 The largest and perhaps the most promising industrial possibility lies in the utilization of the natural gas produced in conjunction with oil and now almost totally wasted. The Mission recommends therefore that early consideration be given to the erection, near Kirkuk, of a plant which, using natural gas and gypsum as raw materials, would be capable of producing annually 500,000 tons of ammonium sulphate fertilizer, 100,000 tons of elemental sulphur, 10,000 tons of carbon black and 300,000 tons of cement. Since the natural gas contains about 10.5 percent of hydrogen sulphide by volume, it would be worthwhile to establish a plant to recover sulphur from all of the gas produced. Part of the cleaned gas would then be cracked thermally, producing hydrogen after removal of the carbon black. In the most important part of the plant the hydrogen and nitrogen won by removing carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide from the flue gases would be synthesized under high pressure into ammonia. Ammonia and carbon dioxide would then be passed through a slurry of finely ground gypsum, yielding calcium carbonate and ammonium sulphate. The latter would be sold as fertilizer and the former used to make cement. Such a plant could produce fertilizer very cheaply, thereby stimulating its use in Iraq; and any fertilizer not consumed domestically would find a ready market abroad. Sulphur and carbon black could be used in the production of rubber tires in Iraq and would also be in great demand abroad; and there will undoubtedly be a growing demand for cement in Iraq. The plant would cost aproximately ID 25,000,000, of which the sulphur recovery plant would account for about ID 8,750,000 and the cement plant for ID 1,500,000. It should be attempted only if a reliable foreign chemical concern can be interested in designing and erecting it and undertaking its operation under a management contract.

317 The exploitation of salt deposits may ultimately prove to be another industrial possibility. A salt dome known to exist near Basra might provide large quantities of salt for both export and domestic consumption and might make possible the establishment of an alkali plant, for which the gas from the nearby oil field could furnish cheap power. The Mission therefore suggests that core drilling of this dome be undertaken in order to appraise its commercial possibilities.

433 In the process of industrial development the host of small enterprises which account in the aggregate for a considerable output should not be neglected. Among these are shops engaged in tire retreading, reclamation of lube oil, battery and electrical repair work, automotive and machinery repair, wood-working, etc. Many of them could be assisted to improve their production through installation of power-operated tools and other equipment.

In starting new plants and expanding old ones it is important that capital charges be kept at a minimum by arranging for maximum possible utilization of the installed equipment. This involves the employment of as many shifts as possible, the use of machines at maximum working speed and, above all, the use of purchased power. In the past, industrial plants have added unnecessarily to their capital overhead by installing their own power plants. Such plants usually prove costly since they operate only part of the time. Single plants catering to both industrial and lighting needs are
365 more economical because of a high and steady load factor. In order to induce industries to purchase power, however, the price of electricity for industrial use will need to be reduced. Such a reduction could be achieved in Baghdad, the principal industrial center, particularly if steps were taken to relieve the Baghdad Light and Power Company from the heavy burden of sharing its profits with the Iraq government and also having its profits taxed by the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, such as in Mosul, a reduction in power prices depends on more efficient management.

Financing of Industrial Development

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471 The Mission believes that complete government ownership of industry should be adopted only where absolutely necessary. In general it will prove necessary only where private capital is not available either because the contemplated investment is too large,

or because the investment is in a new and untried field which does 433
not for the moment appeal to private capital. For the chemical plant 471
proposed by the Mission the latter would probably be the case. The government apparently is also furnishing all of the capital for the oil refinery. Wherever complete government ownership is considered necessary, it would be desirable to have the Development Board act as the government's agent in putting up the necessary capital.

On the other hand, the existing Industrial Bank should be used 453
as the agency for giving needed assistance to industry in all cases 433
where the need is for expansion of present capacity or where there is a prospect of private participation in establishing new industries. This Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951 it had outstanding loans totaling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicaped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests therefore that the Development Board provide the means for gradually increasing the Bank's capital by about ID 5,000,000 which the Bank would be authorized to use for the making of loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an overall program approved by the Development Board.

Aside from making loans for production facilities, the Indus- 453
trial Bank could assist industry by financing the construction of a 488
bonded warehouse at Baghdad, so that credit could be extended on materials stored therein. The absence of such warehousing facilities has caused a chronic shortage of working capital in most industrial enterprises, for under existing conditions much of their capital is tied up in stocks of supplies.

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving 453
fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares 433
whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and therefore capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to maintain a reserve ~~against possible~~

453 losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to
433 inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

To prepare the Bank for its expanding operations, its staff needs to be strengthened by providing for the appointment of an expert with wide industrial experience to head its Industrial Schemes Section and for the establishment of a small-business branch to pay special attention to the needs of small enterprises. The Bank should, of course, have access to the corps of technical specialists which, at a later point in the report, the Mission recommends should be attached to the Development Board.

Dangers of Excessive Protection

654 Particular care should be taken that government assistance
433 does not foster inefficient industries at the expense of the country's standard of living. This danger is by no means unreal. A Law for the Encouragement of Industry, originally enacted in 1929 and replaced by a new act in 1950, provides limited but generous exemptions from income and surtaxes and customs duties, and government land free of rent for 10 years. Iraqi-owned industrial enterprises can qualify for these benefits as long as they primarily use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in considerable quantities. Neither of these conditions is necessarily relevant to efficient production; and it is therefore suggested that the law be amended to stipulate that, in general, such benefits should be accorded only to enterprises which have a reasonable prospect of becoming efficient enough to withstand foreign competition.

Industry is also protected in many cases by high import duties and in some cases, such as cotton yarn, beer and cement, by import prohibitions. In a small country like Iraq, where the limited market affords opportunities for only one or two plants in each field and where the entrepreneurial class is small, there is an acute danger of monopoly and attendant high prices. In Iraq this danger is aggravated by a tendency in some industries to emphasize limited production with high profits per unit rather than mass production with lower unit-profits. While the Mission recognizes the need for

temporary, moderate protection of certain industries, it wishes to 654
emphasize strongly the need for a rapid and progressive reduction 433
in special assistance.

Government Organization for Industry

Government activities relating to industry, except for the 654
Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in 647
the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present 433
director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. The Mission recommends that a Department of Industries be established to maintain adequate statistical records on industrial production, analyze economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and administer the laws concerning assistance to industry. The research and technical functions now being carried on would then be continued under a separate Department of Industrial Research and Standards.

These two departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future as compared to special measures of protection and assistance which tend to shield industry against competition. Much can be done in the long run to assist industry in better controlling the quality of its products, reducing waste through material salvage, analyzing production costs, making market surveys and increasing labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

Labor and Vocational Education

Finally, it should not be overlooked that a contented, well- 466
trained labor force is of the utmost importance to industrial development. An improvement in working conditions and more attention to the welfare of the worker would tend to increase labor productivity. Such an improvement can to a large extent be brought about only through a growing realization among employers that
it is to their own interest. The government should, of course, lay 467
down minimum standards in this respect, particularly since the 466
absence of real trade unions precludes workers from achieving

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466 467 greater benefits through collective bargaining. At present, labor laws set up certain requirements with respect to hours of work, periods of rest, vacations, employment of minors and compensation for disability. The Labor Department, however, is inadequately staffed to enforce the law and the many reported violations are generally allowed to go uncorrected. In 1949-50, of 1,228 enterprises inspected, only 136 were found to comply with the law. Of the remainder, 974 were simply warned and 118 cases were referred to courts. It would be desirable to enforce existing legislation before enacting other labor laws. Efforts are apparently being made to survey the possibility of introducing a social insurance system into Iraq. Under existing conditions, however, any social insurance law might tend to remain a dead letter.

874 464 [2/2] Training of labor is impeded by the prevailing illiteracy which makes instruction in writing largely impossible. Elementary schooling and adult education are therefore essential to the improvement of labor efficiency. There is in existence a secondary technical school which attempts to train intermediate school graduates in industry. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training; and the graduates of the school show a disinclination to work with their hands. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for the basic practical training, and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workers and foremen. Those who are trained in the shop or on the site through such apprenticeship systems can then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work. Large private companies and public enterprises like the Iraq Petroleum Company, the railways and the Basra port administration all possess large machine shops where varied training can be imparted to many more than at present. It is suggested, therefore, that the government enlist their cooperation in the training of skilled workers for Iraq's requirements generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Government, banking and commercial firms, and industrial concerns are all handicapped by a shortage of competent typists, stenographers, clerks, bookkeepers and accountants which has been aggravated by

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the exodus of the Jews. For industry the training of good cost accountants capable of checking the efficiency of various types of operations is especially vital. A single secondary commercial school, supplemented by a night school, and a higher College of Commerce and Economics have been established to meet the need for business training. The first appears to be functioning along sound lines, although it suffers from inadequate quarters and a shortage of teachers. As soon as competent teachers can be trained or recruited, secondary commercial schools should be opened in the other principal cities, particularly Basra and Mosul. On the other hand, the College leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of both the curriculum and the standard of instruction. It apparently produces neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants, nor people well-grounded in economics and finance, capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff must be strengthened, and more attention paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum, make provision for part-time apprenticeship training and check how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

IV. Transport and Communications

On the whole, the existing transport system serves the present 489
needs of the country adequately (see map). For the future the principal problems will be to make provision for essential renewals of track and rolling stock and to standardize the gauges on the railways; to develop an adequate network of metalled main roads, supplemented by feeder roads; and to establish effective control over road transport. If these problems are solved, transport capacity should have no difficulty in meeting the growing requirements of agriculture and industry.

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The Port

504 The Port of Basra, an autonomous public agency which also operates the civil airport, is efficiently run and capable of handling a considerable increase in traffic. In view of the adequacy of this port, the Mission sees no justification for the construction of another port at Umm Qasr as has been suggested from time to
503 time. The Port of Basra has been able to finance necessary capital improvements, as well as to pay off its debts, out of current surpluses and should be able to do so in the future except for the task of financing the dredging of a new and urgently needed channel across the Fao bar. The existing channel is subject to heavy silting which necessitates extensive dredging operations at a cost of ID 500,000 to ID 600,000 per year. Until recently it was expected that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would advance the funds necessary for this new channel, but recent developments in Iran, coupled with the fact that ample oil revenues will be available to Iraq for investment, appear to make it desirable that the Development Board finance this project.

The Railways

496 The state railways, which are the principal means of transport, are also well managed and have been fully able to meet traffic requirements. They have come in for considerable criticism, however, because of the serious financial difficulties in which they have become involved. The major source of these difficulties lies in the fact that, in 1944, the railways, with the full approval of the government, began a major capital development program without assurance of adequate financing. To defray the cost, the railways have had to use a fund of about ID 2,500,000 set aside for renewals and to borrow ID 1,000,000 from the government as well as £3,000,000 in the United Kingdom with the help of the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The program was for the most part soundly conceived and is now largely completed. However, it has left the railways without adequate funds not only for essential renewals but also for other construction pro-
499 jects. One of the major and more controversial projects affected
496 is the erection in Baghdad West of a rather imposing terminal station and railway headquarters together with relocation of railway

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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
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MOSUL
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RAMADI
TRANS JORDAN
NORTHERN DESERT
SAUDI ARABIA
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KILOMETERS

TRANSPORT SYSTEM

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MAP II


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SHARGAT
TEL ALI
KIRKUK
SULEIMANIYA
PENJWIN
HALABJA
TUZ
TIGRIS RIVER
JOULOULA JUNCTION
SAMARRA
BAQUBA
MENDALI
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
FALUJA
BAGHDAD
AZIZIYA
HINDIYA JUNCTION
KERBELA
HILLA
KUT
KUFA
NAJAF
ABU SUKHAIR
SHAMIYA
DIWANIYA
KADISIYA
SHATTRA
NASIRIYA
UR JUNCTION
AMARA
BASRA
ZUBAIR
FAO
SOUTHERN DESERT
KUWAIT
IRANIAN GULF

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496 498 lines and rebuilding and extension of railway goods and marshalling yards. Much of the latter project is really part of Baghdad town planning and its cost should therefore not be completely charged to the railways.

496 These problems, as well as that of tractive power on the railways, have recently been studied by a British engineering firm. With some modifications, the Mission endorses the conclusions contained in its report. The railways should be enabled to carry out a program involving essential renewals of track and rolling stock, gradual conversion to diesel traction and the completion of the Baghdad-West scheme on a drastically modified basis which would entail finishing the railway station but postponing most of the balance of this project. The Mission suggests, however, some modifications in the British firm's proposals on the latter scheme, the details of which are set forth in the monograph on transportation. The railway station when completed should serve also as the airport terminal and provide offices for the railway administration and the government.

Since the railways can finance only a small portion of this program out of their own resources, the Mission recommends that the Development Board supply the bulk of the required funds. In addition, the Board might take over amortization of the £3,000,000 loan contracted by the government on behalf of railway development. This must be repaid over a six-year period from June 30, 1952.

The Mission also urges that immediate consideration be given to the problem of standardizing the gauges on the railway lines. The Basra-Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil line and the branch line to Khanaqin are meter gauge while the line from Baghdad to Mosul, which links Iraq with the railway systems of Syria and Turkey, is standard gauge. The two gauges not only necessitate transshipment, but, above all, make the task of operation complicated and costly. They require a large amount of duplication in activities, of reserves, standbys and spares in all departments. The need for transshipment is likely to be a growing handicap to the railways as traffic requirements increase and the demand for more rapid transport grows.

It is particularly important to consider standardization at this time because the railways face the necessity of carrying out exten-

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496 sive renewals of track and rolling stock and must make decisions as to the type of traction. Final decisions on the Baghdad-West scheme can also be more intelligently taken if the issue of standardization is promptly settled. It is unlikely that such favorable circumstances for an economical conversion operation will ever recur.

Conversion of the meter-gauge lines should not be too costly because the construction gauge, formation and bridges of these lines were originally designed with a view to later conversion to standard gauge. Conversion could probably be accomplished within six years. Meanwhile meter-gauge renewals would be kept to an absolutely indispensable minimum. Within a preparatory five-year period detailed plans and cost estimates would be worked out, necessary standard-gauge track and rolling stock ordered and assembled, and diesel locomotives tested with a view to transfer to diesel traction at the end of the period. The actual conversion operation would take only a few days and could probably be carried out at the end of five years for the Basra-Baghdad line and at the end of another year for the Baghdad-Erbil line. It is possible that the total cost of conversion would not exceed ID 6,000,000. The Mission therefore recommends that the advisability of standardizing gauges, together with a program for such standardization, be promptly studied by the railway staff with the cooperation of outside experts.

Finally, in line with the recommendations of the British engineering firm, the Mission suggests that the services of an expert be obtained to make recommendations on the railway rate structure. A general rate increase of about 12½ percent, with some exceptions, was put into effect in the summer of 1951. This did not affect the rate structure which is characterized by certain anomalous differences in the charges made on various sections of the railway system as well as those imposed on various commodities.

Air Transport and Inland Navigation

501 With respect to air transport, the Mission recommends that the civil airports at Basra and Baghdad be built up to the specifications required by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of class B standard airports. This would involve longer runways and improvements in navigational aids, communications

and meteorological services. At the Baghdad airport it would be 508
desirable to build an entirely new runway and to use a wing of the
new railway building as the air terminal. The Port of Basra can
finance the necessary work there, but that at Baghdad, costing
probably between ID 250,000 and ID 300,000, will presumably
have to be financed out of Development Board funds. The Mission 509
has no specific recommendations to make on Iraqi Airways, which
assures some internal and international services with a small fleet
of four planes, except to suggest that its finances be completely
divorced from those of the railways. It is neither logical nor sound
financially to require the railways to defray the deficits of the airways. It would be desirable to carry out any future development
of the airways in cooperation with other Middle Eastern countries.

Inland water navigation has steadily declined in importance 503
and is now rather insignificant. While irrigation rather than navigation will always be the primary consideration in the use of available water resources, it is possible that the better regulation of the Tigris and Euphrates will ultimately result in some improvement in the navigability of these rivers. Limited but uninterrupted navigation might be insured if the river bed were trained by dams, locks and groynes into a narrow channel at low water and progressively wider channels at higher water levels. The feasibility and cost of such a scheme might ultimately be submitted for study to experts from the Netherlands where similar conditions have long been encountered.

Roads and Road Transport

Road transport has not assumed great importance in the past, 491
primarily because most roads are unsurfaced and impassible for a 499
large part of the year. Even large communities like Kut and Amara, although not situated on railway lines, are not served by all-weather roads. An interdepartmental committee worked out and presented in 1950 a 10-year program for the construction or improvement of 37 main surfaced roads involving a total length of 3,463 kilometers at an aggregate cost of ID 14,500,000. Both the program and the proposed specifications of the roads are sound. In addition, the building or improvement of about 8,000 kilometers of secondary or feeder roads, which do not need to be surfaced, will ultimately

491 499 be necessary. Such a program will need to be coordinated particularly with the development of new agricultural areas. Earth excavated in the construction of new irrigation and drainage canals can be used in the building of such roads. The surfaced roads should be constructed by contractors of repute capable of furnishing their own road-making plant. It is generally recognized that the Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra and the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul roads should have first priority. The first of these is at present only a dirt road but the latter has sections which are already surfaced.

494 As road transport develops, it will be vital to institute some controls, particularly since most of the operators now provide only irregular and unreliable service. Limitations on loads and regular inspection of vehicles should be instituted and enforced. Operators of transport services should be licensed to make sure that they are equipped to provide adequate and reliable service at reasonable rates and that they carry insurance.

The Mission has also given some attention to the municipal bus service in Baghdad. Operations at present are seriously handicapped by the diversity and age of its transport equipment and high maintenance costs. A sound decision has been made to standardize equipment. The central workshop should also be modernized and re-equipped and a central garage and four auxiliary garages provided. To carry out this program financial assistance from the Development Board will be necessary. It is also suggested that more efficient management of municipal transport might be achieved through the appointment of a single Director General in place of the present Board, and that a stricter control over the collection of passenger fares be instituted to improve revenues.

Communications

206 For communications, capital outlays will be required primarily in connection with the extension of the telephone system. The needs are well-known in Iraq and do not require elaboration here. Although the communications services are operated at a profit which is credited to the government budget, it is suggested that future capital expenditures be financed by the Development Board. This will not only make it easier to balance the government budget, but will enable the Board to insist on better synchronization of the

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procurement of equipment and the erection of structures to house 206
this equipment. In the past these functions have been carried out by two different sections of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works with little or no coordination.

V. Public Health

Considerable progress in public health has undoubtedly been 164
made over recent decades. The number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors has greatly increased, and there have been no epidemics of pestilential diseases in recent years. Yet infant mortality is still [165]
extremely high—perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births; and there is still a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and the dysenteries. Many of the prevailing diseases are the by-product of polluted water, and unsanitary, congested living conditions which in turn are traceable largely to poverty and ignorance. Thus an increase in production and standards of living brought about through the general development program will be an important complement to a direct attack upon the health problem through expansion and more effective organization of governmental health services.

The main attack will have to focus on those diseases which sap the vitality and undermine the productivity of the people. In some rural areas, for example, virtually the entire population is at certain times stricken with malaria. Malaria is said to cause 50,000 deaths every year, as well as much sickness and disability which results in great loss for the country. In the provinces of Amara, Muntafiq and Kut the incidence of bilharzia or schistosomiasis, another debilitating disease, is particularly high. The dysenteries and other intestinal ailments are also a prominent cause of low vitality. In 1948 no less than 5,656,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria, and 524,740 trachoma. These statistics are of twofold significance. On the one hand, they illustrate the great expansion which has taken place in facilities for treatment of disease. On the other hand, they indicate clearly the relative inadequacy of efforts to prevent disease. It is

164 therefore vitally important that more attention be devoted in the future to the preventive aspects of public health work.

Prevention of Disease

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751 Many measures could be taken to strengthen the preventive aspect of public health work. Doctors and nurses must, above all, be imbued with its importance, for they have countless opportunities to impress on their patients the need for proper hygiene and sanitation. Thus social medicine, involving the study of the environmental factors bearing on health and of appropriate measures for the prevention of disease, should be taught as part of the qualifying course in the medical school at Baghdad. Far more emphasis also needs to be placed on the teaching of hygiene in elementary and secondary schools. Children should be taught not only good personal habits, but also the importance of sanitation in and around the home. Special classes might be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases, by the school medical officer whenever possible. Health education must likewise be given an important place in the curriculum of teachers' training colleges and special courses in the prevention of diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be provided in the School of Agriculture and the School of Engineering. Hospitals should be an object lesson in hygiene and every effort made to impress on patients the importance of personal and domestic hygiene. The interest of adults in public health can be stimulated by visual education and by organizing "health weeks", the first of which was held in Diwaniya with conspicuous success during the Mission's stay. The army and police have an excellent opportunity to teach habits conducive to good health. Prospective farmers for new settlement projects should be medically examined to restrict, as far as possible, the introduction of endemic diseases into these settlements. To prevent water pollution it would be desirable to locate villages in such settlements away from irrigation canals wherever possible.

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759 The Mission strongly recommends that the number of village dispensaries, which is now over 400, be gradually increased and that they be equipped to serve as public health centers. Such centers would be simple in function, aimed primarily at providing elementary medical and health assistance to as many people as possi-

ble. As conditions permit, the scope of their services could be 743
expanded. At the present stage it will usually be sufficient to have 759
a specially trained medical assistant rather than a doctor in charge. At present there is no separate cadre of medical assistants. It is therefore suggested that the existing School for Health Officials be converted into a training school for such assistants or aides. The 744
medical assistant in charge of a dispensary will need to consider himself as the village sanitation officer and enlist the help of the village elder in organizing a cooperative effort to keep the village clean. He will also need the assistance of a village midwife and, at a later stage, of a public health nurse. The traditional midwife, if properly trained, could have great influence in improving the standards of personal and domestic hygiene, in combatting infant mortality and giving simple advice on the care of infants. Such midwives, when drawn from the ranks of the people whom they will serve, will have a ready entry into homes and will be able to speak in terms which will be readily understood. It is therefore recommended that a school for training such midwives, recruited from the villages, be established. A similar school should be set up for town midwives. It would be desirable to have three foreign midwives appointed to direct this training program.

In the cities a considerable improvement in sanitation could be effected through the creation of a sanitary corps. Such a corps should be charged with house-to-house inspection to detect health nuisances and prevent fly and mosquito breeding, with the inspection of eating-houses, foodstuffs and food handlers, and with the improvement of environmental hygiene in general. A foreign public health or sanitary engineer would be required to organize this service and establish the facilities and courses for training appropriate numbers of sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors who, in turn, would impart the necessary instruction to the house-to-house inspectors.

The prevention of hookworm, malaria and bilharzia warrants 164
special attention. These diseases are widely prevalent and through 744
their general debilitating effects materially lower productivity. The incidence of hookworm would be reduced by improvements in sewage disposal, the closing of open drains, provision of suitable latrines and the wearing of shoes. Bilharzia, which is transmitted

164 744 by a snail living in irrigation canals, can be combatted by elimination of stagnant, polluted water in which the snail thrives and by treating canals twice yearly with copper sulphate. DDT spraying and the elimination of stagnant water assist in the reduction of malaria. [312] In order to combat both malaria and bilharzia, major irrigation canals should be designed so as to maintain a rate of water flow no less than three miles per hour, and minor distributory canals so as to insure rapid drying-out after use. It is important that one complete "dry-out" per week be enforced in every section under irrigated cultivation.

Knowledge of such methods of combatting disease is already available in Iraq. What is needed is wider dissemination of the [742] knowledge and a vigorous campaign to give it effect. The Endemic Diseases Institute in Iraq has done much useful work in this field but it has been handicapped by insufficient transport, supplies and technical personnel. In the future there will be no justification for denying the Institute adequate funds for its work. It would be well to organize special campaigns in those provinces or districts where the incidence of a particular endemic disease has been especially high. Such a campaign would involve a simultaneous effort to treat the people already afflicted in the locality and to teach local officials and the local inhabitants in general the appropriate preventive measures. Mobile dispensaries and mobile vans equipped to show educational films would be especially useful for this purpose.

Curative Services

743 On the curative side, principal emphasis must first be placed on the improvement of existing hospitals and an expansion in the nursing service. In its five-year program the Development Board has allotted ID 3,800,000 for medical service buildings. The Mission believes that a large part of this sum should be used to modernize, extend or replace existing hospitals and improve their facilities for diagnosis and treatment rather than to construct additional hospitals. In the monograph on public health the Mission has listed the most urgent projects of this kind which it suggests should be undertaken in adition to those for which provision was made in the first annual budget of the Development Board. While the number

of hospitals may eventually have to be increased, it is of greater importance today to build more dispensaries. 743

Improvements in hospital administration are also desirable. As long as hospital administration remains in the hands of doctors, they should be given a course in this subject after qualifying.

There is at present one doctor to every 7,000 in the population. 759 With increased accommodations and laboratory facilities at the medical schools, the number of doctors qualifying annually can be increased from 35 to 80. While low, the number of doctors is not seriously inadequate provided they are well distributed and supplemented by sufficient well-trained medical auxiliaries. A large number are concentrated in Baghdad, however, and there is an excessive trend toward specialization. Far more general practitioners are needed in the provinces, but it is clear that better housing accommodations and higher pay will be necessary to attract them.

Among the medical auxiliaries the most serious shortage is that of qualified nurses. In one hospital, for instance, it was noted that there were only 12 trained nurses as compared with 21 doctors. The Mission recommends that a school for practical nurses be established in each province, beginning with Basra, Mosul and the Karkh hospital in Baghdad province. It would also be desirable to set up local schools for male "dressers" who are now largely self-taught. With proper training dressers can relieve nurses of many of their duties. The Mission suggests that two foreign nursing sisters be employed in each province to supervise nursing and give instruction, and that the staff at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad be strengthened by the addition of five more foreign nursing sisters. At present Moslem women are not attracted to nursing. The employment of more foreign nurses may help to demonstrate that nursing is a highly respected, skilled profession abroad. More women might also be inclined to adopt a nursing career if nurses were provided with better housing and given status comparable to that of school teachers.

Aside from nurses and dressers, hospitals lack enough well-trained laboratory assistants, radiographers, storekeepers, physiotherapists and operating room attendants. Special courses should be instituted to train personnel in each of these categories. Refer-

759 ence has already been made to the importance of special training for medical assistants who will generally be in charge of village dispensaries.

278 Many people will continue to be far removed from hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies. For these it is important to make available such simple "household remedies" as anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, tincture of iodine, DDT powder and Epsom salts. It is suggested that the government make arrangements to supply through village shops such drugs in suitable packets carrying simple directions for use. The general availability of these remedies at a reasonable price will also help to reduce the large number of visits to dispensaries for comparatively trivial ailments.

Organization of Public Health Administration

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647 The measures outlined above require a number of changes in the administration of the public health program. The present organization, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, does not lend itself to an effective attack on the problem of disease prevention. Like most of the other central administrations, it suffers from excessive centralization. There is too little contact with other ministries whose activities are of importance to public health. The Mission suggests that a public health administrator, together with an epidemiologist and a sanitary expert, be recruited abroad to advise the Minister on the organization and further development of the health services. The epidemiologist would concentrate on the principal endemic diseases and the sanitary expert would advise on measures to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene. While a detailed reorganization should await their advice, it would seem best to group health services according to two main divisions, one concerned with the curative, the other with the preventive services.

In the future the reorganized health services will need to work much more closely with the departments concerned with irrigation and agriculture and, on the problem of health education, with the Ministry of Education. In carrying out a much needed decentralization considerable responsibility must, above all, be placed on the chief medical officer in every province. This officer, who now also carries on a private practice, should be given more adequate pay so

that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also 744/
be important to provide both the provincial and district medical 647
officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather 361
haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great 166
congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have [362]
simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities. [364]

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. 362
They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly con- 342
structed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

362 however, they are poorly built and too small; and they are crowded
342 together on sites and under conditions which breed disease.

Need for Community Planning

361 In recent decades there has been a growing awareness of the need for community planning, better housing and community facilities. With respect to villages, little has as yet been done except for the planned development of the Dujaila project. Here some effort was made to have houses erected according to standard specifications and to depart from the village-type of settlement by requiring that houses be erected in groups of four on the adjoining corners of four land allotments. As an aid to town and city planning there has been created within the Department of Municipalities of the Ministry of Interior a small planning section to provide "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles". The municipalities themselves have been charged with "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specifications of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places and buildings in such areas". The final responsibility for planning has, however, remained unclear. The surveys, plans and partial plans have generally been hastily drawn and with little regard for the actual conditions prevailing in the community. In any event, municipalities have for the most part continued to develop without reference to any plans. In many towns new streets have been arbitrarily cut through residential and commercial districts with little concern for real needs or for the people affected. The various ministries concerned with the erection of schools, hospitals, public buildings and bridges generally locate their projects without reference to an overall plan and without consultation with each other.

361 There is today a real need for integrated community planning.
647 The Mission believes that it would be desirable to work towards the establishment of a genuine Community Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Such an office should ultimately be staffed with an adequate number of experts versed in architecture, engineering and other aspects of town planning. The first step might be to strengthen the existing planning section in the Department of

Municipalities by appointing a capable, experienced town planner 361
as director and giving him authority to build up a trained staff 647
gradually. It could serve both the Development Board and local authorities in coordinating development projects on the community level and in ascertaining whether the projects for schools, hospitals, and similar facilities in any given community are properly related to the needs and facilties of neighboring communities.

Housing Developments

Public and quasi-public housing has received increased attention 362
in recent years. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which is authorized to construct houses for workers, has built 204 units and has 185 units under construction. The low rentals on completed units constitute a definite subsidy to the occupants. The city of Basra is now building 750 low-cost houses in accordance with a plan that unfortunately was hastily and inexpertly prepared. Probably the best municipal housing project is near the old city of Bedra in Kut province where a new town site is being developed. The Railway Administration has provided housing for more than 2,400 of its employees, and the Port of Basra is also building accommodations, primarily for its junior officials.

Laws which require the construction of houses by industrial firms and large landowners have remained unenforced. Industrial housing is still little developed. The outstanding project of this kind is at Kirkuk where the Iraq Petroleum Company has been building a large housing development, consisting of 1,028 units, for its skilled artisans and officials. The cost of this project is such, however, that it is unlikely to be widely copied.

Most of the public and quasi-public housing is open to criticism on several counts. Use of poor materials, improper spacing and orientation, poor planning and site engineering have characterized some of these projects. The few public housing projects undertaken have been launched without adequate attention to the problem of how much rent the potential occupants could pay.

Establishment of a Housing Authority

In the light of these considerations, the Mission suggests that 362
the responsibility for planning and supervising housing be entrusted 647
ultimately to a Housing Authority located in the Ministry of Social

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362 647 Affairs and staffed by men trained in house design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, public health, housing and land economics, and project management. Initially a nucleus for such an Authority might be created by strengthening the existing housing section of the Department of Labor. At present the section is staffed only by one part-time architect with one part-time assistant, a superintendent, and a few clerks and accountants. The Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid. Maintenance and repairs could thus be financed without constant resort to the Treasury.

[816] The Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Industrial Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station would conduct research designed to develop improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing. In particular, it would experiment with the most economical and effective combination of locally available materials and try them in actual housing units. It would test, for example, such possibilities as the utilization of date-palm fronds for the manufacture of pressed boards, of rice husk and asphalt mixed and pressed into blocks or bricks for interior partitions, and of reed mats and bitumen to form waterproof sheets for roofing materials.

362 How much public housing should be undertaken is difficult to determine in the absence of sample surveys to ascertain the needs of different parts of the population, particularly in the light of what they can afford to pay for housing. Housing will, of course, automatically improve as the productivity and the incomes of the people rise, but this does not mean that some portion of the revenue from increased production of oil should not be used to provide housing for those in urgent need. Pending a more thorough study, an amount of about ID 400,000 annually might be taken as a provisional target for expenditures. Presumably public housing should cater primarily to the needs of low-paid employees and industrial workers. While a large public housing program is not a matter of high priority at present, it is vitally important that adequate accom-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 [redacted]

modations be built for government officials in the provinces in 362 order to make living conditions attractive enough for capable men.

Self-help in Housing

Any housing program under present conditions should lay primary stress on the encouragement of self-help measures. The great majority of the *sarifa* dwellers, for example, could probably not afford to live in houses built by the state unless really large subsidies were provided, which the Mission does not recommend. These people can best be assisted by setting aside suitable tracts of land for their resettlement and encouraging them to build their own houses of mud and other readily available materials in accordance with models provided by the government. To insure proper siting of structures the government might assist in staking out the foundations and in providing some of the needed materials such as cement for stabilizing the mud floor. As an incentive toward completion, it might also furnish one of the final elements of the self-built house such as the roof or roof timbers or window frames. A project of this kind is particularly needed for the *sarifa* dwellers of Baghdad. The site of such a project should be well-drained, provided with safe water, sanitary facilities, a school, market and health center and located not too far from places of employment. The government actually started a project of this type but it was unfortunately abandoned.

Similar self-help measures are contemplated in connection with 361 the new land settlement schemes. Here the government has a unique opportunity for new forms of community planning. The Mission has for this purpose developed a suggested pattern which seeks to combine most effectively the features to be desired in such a community. Details of this are set forth in the monograph on community planning. Self-help measures can, of course, also be stimulated in existing villages and small towns, particularly in the direction of constructing public latrines and baths, erecting needed community centers and planting shade trees.

Another means of assisting self-help would be the provision 452 of an adequate system of mortgage credit. Private building has always been handicapped by the lack of credit available on reasonable terms. At the end of 1950 the total mortgages outstanding

452 probably amounted to only ID 2,300,000 of which about 70 percent represented urban mortgages. Of the latter the greater part probably consisted of mortgages on buildings other than houses. [652] At the beginning of 1950 a government Mortgage Bank began operations. Only ID 100,000 of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000 has, however, been paid in; and the Bank has had to supplement its resources by borrowing. Moreover, it can make loans only for a maximum of four years and up to ID 2,000. To facilitate an expansion of its operations, the Mission suggests that the Development Board provide funds sufficient to increase its actual capital to about ID 1,500,000 and that the Bank be authorized to extend the duration of its mortgages to at least 15 years where warranted.

344 The Mission has given no special attention to the need for public buildings for which the Development Board has budgeted ID 3,350,000 in its five-year program. Undoubtedly the construction of new buildings for the accommodation of government offices is in certain cases desirable, for existing government buildings are for the most part scattered, overcrowded, poorly lighted and equipped and therefore not conducive to working efficiency. As already indicated, the new railway building in Baghdad should provide some space for government offices.

Water and Electricity Supply

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365 With respect to community facilities, the most urgent tasks appear to be the installation of sewage systems for the major cities, and the provision of safe water supplies and electricity.

It is suggested that a start be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rising level of the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. A plan for such a system has already been prepared by consultants to the government. The initial step might be to carry it out for that portion of the city on the east bank of the Tigris. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless there is a determination to make connections with the system compulsory for all property owners who are supplied with municipal water.

A safe water supply is, as was pointed out earlier, one of the keys to the health problem. While a number of cities and towns now have a reasonably safe water supply, the situation in the great

majority needs substantial improvement. The Department of 364 Municipalities has drawn up a five-year program to provide or 365 extend water supply systems for 114 municipalities with a total population of 943,000 people. Since such water systems are technically simple and the need is great, the Mission suggests that the Department be authorized to proceed with this program. Water supply systems for villages must, of course, be simple and inexpensive. In some cases, wells may prove to be the solution, although frequently brackish water is encountered; in other cases, water piped from a stream or canal with the help of a small pump and run through simple filters may be possible.

Outside of Baghdad and Basra municipal power plants are 365 generally inadequate, and a considerable number of municipalities 377 with a total population of 175,000 have no electricity at all. Baghdad and Basra, which together account for a generating capacity of 51,000 kilowatts, have a sufficient supply; and Kirkuk is adequately supplied from the large power plant of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Total generating capacity available in the remaining municipalities, however, is only 14,000 kw. A program for the expansion of this capacity and the provision of electricity for all municipalities would involve the installation of generators with an aggregate capacity of 10,000 kw. It would be desirable to proceed with such a program, provided simultaneous steps were taken to improve the management of municipally-owned power plants outside Baghdad and Basra. In these two cities the power plants are owned and managed [471] efficiently by a private company and the Port respectively. At present the machinery in the plants of other municipalities is poorly maintained and little or no attention is paid to depreciation. Power "losses" are as high as 36 percent compared to not more than eight percent in Baghdad and Basra; and the rates charged range from 30 to 55 fils[4] per kw-hr as contrasted with 18 fils and less in Baghdad and Basra. To remedy these evident deficiencies it is recommended that serious consideration be given to entrusting the management of such plants to a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company.

The Mission does not believe that it would be economic to 371 develop hydroelectric power at present. The capital cost of hydro-

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[4] One dinar equals one thousand fils.

371 electric plants is considerably greater than that of equivalent thermal capacity; and Iraq possesses very cheap fuel for the generation of power. [365] At present municipal power is used primarily for lighting, and even if industrial plants should turn increasingly to municipal stations for their power supply they would be able to obtain considerable amounts of "off-peak" power in such cities as Baghdad and Basra without any increase in generating capacity. In the judgment of the Mission hydroelectric power should be considered only if it does not need to be transmitted over long distances and then only if the demand is such as to insure a steady and high load factor. It is not yet clear that the Wadi Tharthar depression will actually store enough water to permit the generation of power, and the power which might be generated at the dams projected elsewhere is likely to be too far removed from major consuming centers.

VII. Education

371 Education is a basic condition for the agricultural, industrial and technological progress of the country as well as for the development of a fuller cultural life and the sound growth of democratic institutions. Its importance has received growing recognition and considerable progress has been made. In years of financial stringency the budget for education has usually continued to expand while other government expenditures were curtailed. In the last two decades, the number of schools rose from 262 to 1,100, the number of pupils from 32,750 to 175,000 and the number of primary school teachers increased from 1,325 to 6,588. During the same period, expenditures on education rose from about ID 300,000 per year to well over ID 4,000,000—a not inconsiderable advance even after taking into account the rise in prices.

Nevertheless, there are still only 175,000 children in schools out of about 750,000 of school age. Despite the increased emphasis on primary education, expenditures for this purpose still take only 51 percent of the education budget. The number of children in school declines sharply with each succeeding grade, so that only about half the children starting in primary school actually finish their

primary school education and much of the investment in their education accordingly bears little fruit. The facilities and quality of technical or vocational education are seriously deficient and adult education has been almost wholly neglected. Probably about 80 percent of the men and over 95 percent of the women remain illiterate. Moreover, educational concepts are far too narrow and too little related to the everyday problems of living. 871 [212]

As the result of its study of educational needs the Mission has come to the conclusion that the government should launch a three-part program involving (1) the improvement and extension of technical education, (2) the gradual introduction of compulsory primary school education, and (3) fundamental education for adults.

Technical Schooling

The question of technical or vocational education is not treated in detail here, partly because it has already been discussed in connection with agriculture and industry, partly because the government has requested UNESCO to send a special mission on vocational education. Although the number of students in technical schools—about 750—seems very inadequate, Iraq apparently has had difficulty in absorbing the graduates of these institutions largely because they lack sufficient practical training and they show a distaste for manual work. Obviously one of the first steps toward improved technical training will be to give the curriculum of the intermediate and secondary schools a greater vocational bias, with emphasis upon the dignity and value of manual labor. It is also worth emphasizing again that skilled labor and foremen can best be recruited from the ranks of active young workmen through on-the-job training programs, supplemented in some cases by technical schooling. Only the higher supervisory grades of personnel need to be trained in technical schools, and even for these there should be considerable emphasis on practical training in business, industry and agriculture as an integral part of the curriculum. 874 [461]

Introduction of Compulsory Primary Education 871

There is a general consensus both among Iraqi educators and foreign experts who have examined the problem that the time has come for a broad advance in the direction of compulsory education.

871 In India, where conditions are not dissimilar, a program for the gradual introduction of compulsory primary education has been approved. The only real question relates to the speed with which the objective should be accomplished. The Mission believes that a phased program covering a period of about 15 years may be feasible for Iraq. During the first five years of this period it would be necessary to establish and open the additional training colleges required for teachers, build the needed elementary schools and make all the essential administrative and organizational preparations. At the same time a comprehensive campaign to enlist public support of the objective would have to be launched and a careful survey made to determine the facilities needed in each locality and the order of priority in the introduction of compulsory education. The ensuing 10-year period would then be used for the progressive application of the principle of compulsory education.

875 It is estimated that from 18,000 to 20,000 new teachers will be required for this program. Urgent attention would therefore have to be given in the next three years to the establishment of new training colleges, probably one in each province, to insure that the first group of new teachers would be available by 1956. It is vitally important that competent young men and women imbued with enthusiasm and a sense of mission be attracted to the teaching profession. The local teacher should be equipped to work among adults as well as children and capable of becoming a leader in the community. The status and dignity of the teaching profession should therefore be raised and adequate provision made for teachers' compensation, as well as their housing, health and general welfare.

872 The number of schools will have to be greatly expanded. Moreover, many of the schools are now ill-housed and ill-equipped and will therefore need to be replaced. Many others are in inadequate rented structures. It is noted that the Development Board has already set aside almost four million dinars for school construction in its five-year program. The basis for this figure is not known to the Mission, but, since a considerable part of the program is evidently intended for the replacement of old and rented buildings, it is likely to fall somewhat short of the requirements set by

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

a program for the introduction of compulsory primary education over the next 15 years. 872

The introduction of compulsory primary schooling will have to take into account varying economic conditions. It is often argued that most parents are unable to afford to send their children to school because children must go to work at an early age to help support the family. The high proportion of children who leave primary schools before finishing appears to support this thesis. However, these economic pressures will tend to diminish as the development program gets under way and opens up larger and more remunerative oportunities for employment to adults. Experience indicates that one of the first desires of parents who have improved their economic status is to provide better education for their children. Such a desire, for example, has already become manifest among the settlers in the Dujaila project. This does not mean, of course, that economic limitations must be ignored. It would be best to apply the principle of compulsion first in cities and more prosperous communities where economic pressures for the employment of children are least evident. In rural areas there may well be resistance to compulsory school attendance unless the period of schooling is adjusted to permit the help of children in the sowing and harvesting seasons. Some discretion should be permitted in adjusting school vacations to the harvesting periods in different parts of the country; and where schools need to remain open during busy agricultural seasons, the period of instruction should be so scheduled as to permit children to work part of the day in the fields.

Special problems must be met in connection with the education of the children of nomadic tribes. Here teachers trained from the ranks of the nomads themselves will have to travel with the tribes. The teaching syllabus will need to be adapted and simplified in order to take into account their special needs.

Revisions of the School Curriculum

As part of the program there should be a marked reorientation of the curriculum and methods of teaching. Learning is largely by rote. The children passively absorb information and learn comparatively little by actually doing things. Almost no 876 871

876 871 attempt is made to develop their creative instincts. The curriculum is far too bookish and academic and there is a great gulf between what is taught in school and the exigencies of practical life. Dr. Fadhel Jamali, a distinguished Iraqi educator and political figure, has aptly remarked that "no educational system is justified that does not give relief from the scourge of diseases nor aim at raising the standard of living and inculcating new ideas and techniques".

871 The school curriculum should be revised in the light of four principal objectives which have been well-stated by Mr. Victor Clark in his report on Compulsory Education in Iraq:

> "The first is the need for sound character training, including a realization that education is not simply a collection of skills and aids in preparation for a government or clerical job, but the acquisition of sound values which need to be applied in all walks of life whether professional or manual. The second important need is a knowledge of the practice and principles of good husbandry by those who work on the land. An equally important requirement in a minority of the population is the acquisition of technical skills necessary in local industries and in the growing demand for maintenance work. Finally, as is to be expected in a young country which is still engaged in the process of welding diverse racial and religious groups into conscious nationhood, it is considered that one of the most important needs is the promotion of knowledge and qualities necessary to the furtherance of national unity."[5]

Although there has been some demand that education in the villages should be given a "rural" bias and education in the cities a "vocational" bias, only half-hearted experiments in that direction have actually been carried out. In the future there should be much more emphasis on crafts in all schools. Properly guided children, who are naturally creative, will find joy in working skillfully with their hands and develop a pride in craftsmanship which has seriously declined in Iraq. The crafts which are taught should be as varied and as closely linked to local occupations as possible. Rural schools, in particular, should have small gardening plots where children can learn simple agricultural processes, the care of live-

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[5] Victor Clark, *Compulsory Education in Iraq* (UNESCO, 1951), p. 18.

stock and the use of tools. Crafts should emphasize the best use 871
of cheap local materials in weaving and rug making, woodwork, simple building operations and the like. Urban schools might stress such crafts as leather work, woodwork, bookbinding and printing, brick-making, textiles, etc. For girls, lessons might be provided in sewing, cooking and other domestic pursuits. For all pupils, visits to hospitals, industrial plants, demonstration farms and the like would prove a useful supplement to training acquired at school.

As already indicated, health and hygiene should be given a 871
more important place in the curriculum. Children could not only 751
be taught useful facts regarding the causes and methods of treatment of endemic diseases like bilharzia, hookworm, malaria and eye infections, but could be persuaded to do something about them by helping to eliminate stagnant pools and showing others how to avoid water pollution. Similarly they could learn something about the qualities of different foods, the importance of personal hygiene and the value of cleanliness in the home.

In this type of educational program it would be desirable to enlist the cooperation of officials dealing with health, agriculture and local government problems. Through the children, more effective contacts with the parents would be established. Parents would learn to appreciate the practical value of education to their children and themselves, and a better link between school and community would be forged.

The inauguration of a revised curriculum and better teaching 875
methods will require a prior reorientation of the training given to teachers. The curricula of Training Colleges should be recast radically in order to reduce the present excessive number of subjects and to bring the training nearer to the realistic conditions of the rural or urban areas for which the teachers are being trained. Colleges for training rural teachers should be located in rural areas where students can study rural problems and can actively participate in rural community life. Every Training College should have a demonstration school in which it should have the latitude to work out new teaching methods. At present such Colleges tend to be omnibus educational institutions which give too little time to the professional training of teachers.

Intermediate and Secondary Education

873 The Mission has given great emphasis to primary schooling because it is convinced that the education base should be broadened. In the past education in Iraq has been too much like an inverted pyramid in which more attention has been paid to education at the higher stages than at the primary levels. This does not mean, of course, that intermediate and secondary education should not be allowed to develop at the same rate as in the past. As far as possible, however, the establishment of intermediate and secondary schools in rural areas should be given priority over those in urban areas, for such schools will be needed to produce candidates for the rural Training Colleges. The revision of the curriculum in these schools is of equal if not greater importance than in the case of primary schools. The present need is for a type of education which, in the words of Dr. Jamali, "prepares the citizens for better living and not one which produces men for white collar jobs with superficial learning, men who want to be government officials and clerks and not leaders and artisans in the fields of agriculture, commerce and social service."

Adult Education

871 Adult education has been largely neglected. There are some night schools operated by Teachers' Associations and the Ministry, but the syllabus of such schools is the same as that of corresponding schools for children. There are also a few adult literacy centers which concentrate on teaching adults to read and write.

The Mission urges that a program for adult education be drawn up and directed by a Special Division of Fundamental Education in the Ministry of Education. Such a program would be directed primarily to those groups in the population between 12 and 45 years of age. It would stress the acquisition of literacy, not as an end in itself but rather as a means to the acquisition of practical knowledge of the fundamental problems of better living. It is useless to teach people how to read and write unless by this means they can be shown how to work more effectively for their own good. For this reason a new and broader approach to education, different from the traditional schoolroom methods used to teach

children, is required. This approach has been characterized by UNESCO as "fundamental education":

> "The main purpose of fundamental education is to help people to understand their immediate problems and to give them the skills to solve them through their own efforts. It is an emergency solution designed to help masses of illiterate adults and children in countries whose educational facilities have been inadequate. It is an attempt to salvage a generation by giving it the minimum of education needed to improve its way of life, its health, its productivity and its social, economic and political organization."[6]

This concept of education lays emphasis not only on the dissemination of practical training in health, hygiene, civics, agriculture, etc., but also on the employment of more modern media of communication such as audio-visual aids.

In a properly phased program of adult education an initial period of at least two years will need to be devoted to preparatory work and pilot projects. A small group of selected and specially trained teachers will be needed to test various educational techniques in a few pilot projects. The localities in which the program will be started will have to be selected and the cooperation of local leaders and officials enlisted. The subject of fundamental education will need to be incorporated in the curriculum of teachers' training colleges. Above all, suitable materials including primers, books, folders and visual aids such as films, slides, charts and maps will have to be assembled. UNESCO could give valuable assistance. In fact, it has already conducted a pilot project in the Dujaila area. Materials could also be borrowed and adapted from other countries such as India.

In the following three-year period the actual program might be begun by utilizing about 120, or approximately 10 percent, of existing schools also as evening community centers for adult education. A few schools might initially be chosen in each province so that these could serve as models and observation centers for other teachers. The program would be feasible only if the existing teacher corps were used also for adult education. It is impor-

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[6] UNESCO *Courier*, June 1951.

171 tant therefore to enlist their enthusiastic cooperation, for it would presumably not be possible to pay them more than a nominal amount in supplementary compensation. The efforts of these teachers would need to be complemented by assistance from other local officials in giving talks, demonstrating techniques, and showing materials on health, agriculture, irrigation, etc. Finally, in the following 10-year period, all of the remaining schools would gradually come into use as adult education centers. In the end the schools should become genuine community centers. In the smaller towns and villages, in particular, they should serve as the focal point for all instruction and as a center for community social life.

Administration

The program outlined above could not be carried out without some revision in the administration of the educational system. The present administration is too highly centralized. Everything is directed in minute detail from the center. As a consequence courses of instruction and methods of teaching are stereotyped and there is little or no opportunity for experimentation. The Ministry at Baghdad is so burdened with administrative detail that it cannot give adequate attention to policy and planning. More of the administrative routine should be handled by the provincial officials of the Ministry and headmasters should be given greater discretion in adapting curricula to local needs. While the time is not ripe to entrust responsibility for education to the provinces and municipalities, it is important that every effort be made to enlist the active assistance and cooperation of local officials and leaders in agriculture, commerce, industry and religion. They could assist in stimulating interest in the program and mobilizing voluntary contributions to its success. They could help, for instance, in organizing local parent cooperation and interest, in contributing equipment to schools and in providing meals and clothing for needy school children.

Continuity in educational policy has been seriously impaired in the past not only by frequent ministerial changes but also by frequent replacement of leading officials in the Ministry. Such officials should in the future be assured more permanent tenure. The Mission also suggests that consideration be given to the establishment of a Statutory Board or Council of Education. Such a Coun-

cil, consisting of officials and non-officials conversant with different 871
types of educational problems, might give valuable assistance to the Ministry in formulating educational policies and programs and guarding against hasty and ill-considered changes in approved programs.

Training Abroad

A word should finally be said of the Ministry of Education's 871
program for educating Iraqis abroad. During the last 10 years no 658
less than 781 Iraqis were sent abroad for education at government expense. Of these, 234 studied engineering; 53, other technical and industrial subjects; 103, agriculture; 39, commercial subjects; 24, medicine; 56, law; and 272, education. Many of these will be returning over the next few years and will be capable, if given an opportunity, of playing an important role in carrying out the development program. This type of educational program undoubtedly merits further expansion. At present the fields of study are decided by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendations of the various ministries. In the future it is suggested that the Development Board also be consulted on the most important requirements in the light of its overall program.

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VIII. Problems of Execution

A development program of the type outlined above obviously assumes great magnitude. In making its recommendations on the content of such a program, the Mission has constantly been mindful of the cost involved. The cost is not merely to be measured in monetary terms. It has to be translated into the real resources which must be mobilized to carry out the program—the organizational and administrative skills needed to get it on its way; the foreign and domestic services, materials and equipment directly required for its execution; and the additional goods and services for which a great demand will indirectly be created through expenditures on the program. The demand on these resources cannot be accurately assessed in advance, and satisfaction of the demand must depend not only on circumstances within Iraq but also on rapidly changing conditions abroad. The Mission has, however, explored some of the problems involved and believes that success in carrying out the program will depend on whether or not there is a full understanding of the actual and potential obstacles in the way and a determination to take timely action to overcome them.

The Mission has estimated the cost of the development program it envisages over the next five years, beginning with the fiscal year 1952-53. These estimates do not, of course, rest on detailed cost calculations. These will need to be worked out and translated into actual budgets by the Development Board working in cooperation with other government departments and assisted by expert technical advisers. For the most part, the Mission's figures are based upon estimates already included in the program of the Development Board or otherwise available in Iraq. Wherever appropriate, rough adjustments have been made for recent price developments. The outlay involved has accordingly been projected at a total of approximately ID 168 million, apportioned roughly among the various fields of development, as shown in the following table.

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ESTIMATED OUTLAY OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
(millions of dinars)

Flood control, irrigation and drainage			55.2
Reservoirs		27.6	
New irrigation works		18.6	
Improved irrigation maintenance and operation		2.0	
Drainage		7.0	
Agriculture and forestry			7.5
Grain storage		2.9	
Tobacco warehouses		0.25	
Agricultural Machinery Administration		0.25	
Incentives		0.5	
Agricultural Bank		1.45	
Miscellaneous		1.4	
Forestry		0.75	
Industry			37.0
Refinery		7.0*	
Chemical plant		25.0	
Capital for Industrial Bank		5.0	
Transport and communications			31.0
Railways		15.1	
Renewals including diesel traction	6.3		
Gauge conversion	5.0		
Repayment of railway loan	2.5		
Miscellaneous projects	1.3		
Roads		11.0	
Main	7.0		
Feeder	4.0		
Port—new channel		2.0	
Airports		0.9	
Baghdad bus transport		0.5	
Telephone and telegraph		1.5	
Community facilities			23.2
Water supply		6.0	
Electricity supply		1.5	
Sewage system—Baghdad		9.0	
Housing and mortgage credit		3.4	
Public buildings		3.3	
Education			6.1
Schools		5.0	
Other		1.1	
Public health			5.0
Hospitals, dispensaries and equipment		3.8	
Other		1.2	
Miscellaneous			2.0
Development Board—administration, studies, etc.			1.5
		Total	168.5

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*Government estimate which may well be exceeded.

654* In this program, the Mission has not included the expenditures already provided for in the 1951-52 budget of the Development Board. For the period 1952-53 to 1956-57, inclusive, the Mission has, however, taken into account not only those projects which it has studied and recommended, but also certain others which it has not examined in detail and which the government has already decided to carry out. The latter include the oil refinery, and a variety of projects such as public buildings and summer resorts, for which the Development Board has provided in its five-year program.

The program includes not only investment expenditures, but also increases in recurrent outlays which the Mission considers important to development. Since the ordinary budget out of which these recurring expenditures are generally defrayed will remain tight for a number of years, the Mission strongly recommends that any increases be financed by Development Board funds. Pressures for a reallocation of a designated portion of the oil revenues might well become irresistible if the Development Board insisted on confining its expenditures to purely investment projects and allowed the activities which are normally financed out of the regular budget to become starved of funds, no matter how important they might be. Such a development would seriously impair the prospects of carrying out a coherent program. Although in principle the segregation of revenues for particular purposes is open to serious question and the allocation of oil income to the Development Board will probably give the latter, within a few years, more than twice as much revenue as that accruing to the ordinary budget, the Mission believes that the continuation of this arrangement will be, on the whole, beneficial. It provides more definite assurance that the oil revenues will actually be used in the interest of an integrated program of development rather than dispersed over the whole field of the government's operations without making an effective, permanent contribution to a rise in the standard of living.

Financing the Program

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654* As long as the oil revenues continue to be assigned to the Board, no serious difficulty in financing the contemplated development program should be encountered. As already indicated, the

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oil companies have assured the government an increase in the 657 x
annual rate of production to 30 million tons by the end of 1955 654 x
and a division of profits which, it is estimated, may increase the government's revenues from oil to ID 59,000,000 in 1956-57. After allowing for Iraq's obligation to surrender to the Turkish government 10 percent of its revenues from the output of the Kirkuk and Mosul fields and for the repayment of ID 2,400,000 of past oil royalty advances, the government's net income from oil over the five-year period, 1952-53 to 1956-57, may reach about ID 214,000,000. This sum, plus about ID 3,000,000 representing the increase in revenue for 1951-52 not programmed in the Development Board's first annual budget, may thus be available to the Board for financing its program. The total amount would be ID 49,000,000 in excess of the entire developmental outlay contemplated by the Mission.

The Mission would strongly advise against any attempt to program this potential "surplus" at this time. First of all, such an attempt would be highly unrealistic in view of the enormous difficulties already involved in the appropriate expenditure of the sum suggested by the Mission. Secondly, the income from oil may fall below estimates. Finally, the cost of the program may well increase substantially under the impact of world-wide inflationary pressures. To the first of these, the Mission will later revert in some detail. The second is worth emphasizing because the new arrangement with the oil companies provides a variable rather than a fixed rate of return in the form of half of the profits before taxes. The revenue estimates cited above apparently rest on the assumption that the current price of oil will be maintained and that wages and new equipment costs will not rise significantly. If the anticipated relationship between costs of production and the price of oil is upset in such a way that the former rises more rapidly, profits and therefore income will fall below the expected levels. Although the oil companies have already made the bulk of their investment, future increases in wages and in the cost of additional equipment are not unlikely and may make future costs of production somewhat higher than current estimates. Whether such an eventual increase in costs would be offset by higher prices for crude oil depends on developments in world production and demand for

651 654x oil. It is possible that the rapid rise in output which may be expected to take place in other Middle Eastern countries, with the possible exception of Iran, will tend to restrain prices. In any event, it would be imprudent to rely on the receipt of all the anticipated revenue. In addition, part of the income should be set aside to meet contingencies and emergencies, particularly further increases in costs. The present low level of wages will unquestionably rise as the development program gets under way and demand for labor increases. Moreover, the rearmament effort under way in the West may exert a constant upward pressure on the prices of materials and equipment.

654x 457 Since the oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling, Iraq should have ample foreign exchange to defray the cost of imports required for the development program. There should be no need for foreign loans except perhaps to meet part of the hard currency needs. As a member of the sterling area, Iraq is dependent on the sterling area dollar pool for allocations of dollars. Until 1951 Iraq received a fixed annual allocation of hard currencies, but under a new arrangement, effective provisionally for one year, the United Kingdom has undertaken simply to furnish sufficient dollars to cover Iraq's essential needs. For part of the extraordinary dollar import requirements arising out of a rapidly expanding development program, Iraq may still have to borrow abroad.

Obstacles to Development

654x While financing the program will present no difficulty, the rate of expenditures envisaged will pose serious problems. To carry out a five-year program involving an outlay of ID 168,000,000, the Development Board would have to spend ID 15,000,000 in 1952-53 and successively larger sums up to a total of ID 50,000,000 in 1956-57. The experience of other countries in process of development illustrates that it is not easy to spend money rapidly and efficiently on well-conceived projects. Expenditures in most cases tend to fall short of the targets. The International Bank, for example, has noted that disbursements on its loans to underdeveloped countries seldom conform to original schedules. In Iraq the development program will require the government to gear itself to an annual rate of expenditures which at the end of the next five years will need to be about two and a half times the combined outlays (ID 37,200,000) of the government, the railways and the Port of Basra in 1950-51. Moreover, actual development expenditures, which require proportionately far more technical and administrative organization and preparation than ordinary outlays, will need to rise to a rate about 10 times the total public capital expenditures (ID 5,200,000) in 1950-51. 654ˣ

Such a rate of expenditure will be achieved only with great effort and by careful planning. It will necessitate substantial improvement in the efficiency of public administration so that the government will be capable of coordinated planning and execution of the program. It will be necessary to take full advantage of technical assistance available abroad and to enlist experienced foreign firms for the purpose of planning and designing as well as executing major works.

Improvement in Public Administration

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Improvement in public administration is of key importance. The multiplicity of projects in the development program will require an enormous amount of detailed administrative and technical preparation, all of which must be properly coordinated. As indicated by the nature of the Mission's recommendations, the work involved will fall on many ministries and departments and not simply on the Development Board. Moreover, in order to avoid overburdening the Development Board, the latter should be in the position to decentralize as far as possible the detailed planning and execution, reserving to itself principally the task of overall planning and coordination. Decentralization would also contribute to morale by giving the entire government service a sense of participation in constructive endeavor which now appears to be lacking.

Public administration in Iraq, as in many other underdeveloped countries, requires improvement in many respects. Excessive centralization causes ministers and high officials to be overburdened with detail to the neglect of policy formulation and planning. Inadequate use is made of such talent and knowledge as is available elsewhere in the government, including the local administrations. Coordination of related activities is frequently lacking, so that, for instance, there is no cooperation in the planning and operation of

654x 647 irrigation works among agricultural officials in the Ministry of Economics, the Irrigation Department of the Ministry of Public Works and health officials in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The efficiency of civil servants seems to have declined since before the war. Certainly the increase in the number of government employees (excluding police) from about 11,000 before the war to almost 20,000 in 1950 has been considerably out of proportion to the expansion in the government's functions. Many government offices appear to be overstaffed, while others cannot obtain extra personnel for essential increases in services. Officials are frequently shifted from one position to another without regard for their qualifications and experience. Often government officials both in the provinces and in the capital do not enjoy sufficient continuity in office to enable them to become really useful. Promotion appears to be based almost entirely on seniority and other considerations rather than on merit. The morale among government servants is generally low.

647 465 The two most important factors contributing to inefficiency and morale are probably the low level of government salaries and the lack of any sense of real participation in constructive work. Since before the war salaries and allowances have risen only 20 percent for high government officials and 160 percent for the lowest paid officials, while the official cost-of-living index has increased by about 400 percent. To some extent, however, there has been an increase in salaries through shifts to higher grades, so that, judging from comparative total disbursements of salaries and allowances, it may be concluded that average salaries have risen by about 130 percent since before the war.[7] Nevertheless, salaries, particularly of officials in the higher classes of the civil service, are very [41] inadequate. The *probity of officials is thus put to a severe test* and to the extent that some successfully utilize their positions as opportunities for personal gain, the morale of others suffers. Moreover, many civil servants are compelled to supplement their salaries by engaging in business or accepting other employment with resulting neglect of their official duties.

654x 647 The lack of a real sense of participation in constructive tasks is conspicuous in the civil service. The Mission found a wide-

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[7] Total disbursements of ID 14,700,000 on salaries and allowances in 1949-50 compared with a sum of about ID 3,500,000 before the war.

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spread feeling that nothing was being accomplished. Although the 654x
establishment of the Development Board and the large prospective 647
increase in oil revenues appears to put Iraq on the threshold of an era of potentially great progress, the Mission discovered very little awareness of these developments among officials both at the center and in the provinces. Where this awareness existed, it was often accompanied by an inclination to disparage the results likely to be achieved. Thus it appears that the government has largely neglected the opportunity to acquaint its officials with its program for the future and to enlist their enthusiastic cooperation in lifting Iraq to a higher plane of economic development.

In order to remedy some of these shortcomings, the Mission urges that a small commission, consisting of high Iraqi officials assisted by two foreign experts in public administration and personnel, be appointed to make a complete survey of the system of public administration and recommend improvements therein. This commission should inquire into the training, classification and promotion of government officials and the appropriate staffing of government departments. It should devise a new and adequate pay scale which should take into account inequities in the existing salary structure and provide relatively higher pay and improved amenities for officials working in the provinces. It should examine also the measures which might be taken to improve the coordination of government activities and to bring about a gradual decentralization of administrative functions.

Pending the commission's study and recommendations, the government might take certain interim steps to improve its operations. One of these might be the appointment of a permanent Secretary in each ministry who would be responsible for the coordinated administration of the ministry. He would relieve the Minister of as much detail as possible and would brief the Minister on major policy questions requiring his decision. The other might be an interim, perhaps initially modest, general increase in the salaries or allowances of government officials. It might be desirable to cover at least part of the cost of the interim and final increase in salaries out of additional taxes, but some resort to the funds at the disposal of the Development Board may not be inappropriate in view of the importance of more efficient public administration to development.

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Finally, the Development Board should, as far as possible, 654* enlist the aid and cooperation of other government ministries and 647 agencies and of the provincial and municipal administrations in the task of planning and carrying out a development program. It should actively encourage them to submit suggestions and plans for development, integrate these plans with each other and the Board's own, and, to the maximum extent feasible, allocate money and responsibility for the execution of these plans and projects to other agencies. The establishment of a Community Planning Office and a Housing Authority, as proposed earlier by the Mission, would be in line with this suggestion.

In the last analysis the Development Board would, of course, retain the final responsibility for formulating the overall program, for coordinating those projects such as irrigation which concern many government departments, and for allocating the funds necessary to finance the various parts of the program. In order to enable the Board to carry out this overall coordinating and planning function, it is essential that all major development projects be brought within its purview, even though its financial assistance may not in all instances be necessary. At present, projects for a government petroleum refinery, a government textile mill and a new grain silo are all being kept outside of the Board's jurisdiction. The formulation of an integrated program with a well-conceived system of priorities is difficult as long as this remains the practice. In addition, coordination would be facilitated if the Board, of which only the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance are ex officio members, were to give the Ministers of Economics, Agriculture (a new Ministry proposed by the Mission), Public Works and Social Affairs facilities for attending Board sessions whenever matters of interest to them are being discussed. The possibility of making the Governor of the National Bank also an ex officio member of the Board might be considered.

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Technical Assistance

A substantial increase in the technical staff available to the 463 government will also be of critical importance to the success of the development program. No project should be approved under the program until evidence is submitted that it is technically sound in

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its conception and that technical skills are available to carry it to successful completion. It will not be possible actually to spend the mounting revenues available for development unless, in the period immediately ahead, the Development Board insures that the government is equipped with a staff capable of undertaking the detailed technical preparatory work required by numerous projects.

At present the government service is admittedly deficient in technical talent. In the long run this deficiency can only be overcome by training Iraqis, but in the short run it must be met by the employment of foreign experts for periods of varying duration.

For major projects it will be possible and usually necessary to enlist the assistance of foreign consulting engineering firms and foreign contractors. In general, such projects will be of two types. Most industrial projects will represent one type. Here it will be necessary to formulate basic specifications such as plant capacity, quality of products and production costs, but the plants involved will be based on standardized processes so that bids can be invited directly from manufacturers or contractors on an erected basis with all of the necessary engineering work to be done by the contractor. The contract in a case of this type would specify the details of the equipment to be furnished and would make definite guarantees as to quality of products and production costs. The second type of project involves those for which standardized designs are not available. and where a large amount of civil works is involved. In such cases the preliminary engineering work should be done, before inviting bids on construction, by qualified consulting engineers who will not bid on the construction work. In general it would be desirable to have the firm chosen to make the preliminary studies also prepare the specifications and conditions upon which bids will be invited, as well as select the qualified bidders, analyze the bids received, and later supervise the contractor.

For the large number of smaller projects, however, individual technicians will be needed to assist both in the planning and the implementation. In connection with its recommendations in the various fields of development, the Mission has indicated more specifically the kind and scope of technical assistance required. The government has already made many applications for technical assistance to agencies of the United Nations, and to the United

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Kingdom and the United States, but it is important that the government devise some means for coordinating such requests in the future so that priority will be given to those which will be most helpful to development. Competent foreign technicians are not unlimited in supply and the accommodations and facilities which such experts will require in Iraq are likewise restricted.

In some cases foreign experts will be required only for short periods to make surveys of particular problems or to look into the technical aspects of particular projects. In many other cases, however, technical assistance will be needed over longer periods to carry out specific programs. Qualities of patience and persistence as well as technical competence will be required of foreign experts engaged for such tasks. Frequently it will be desirable to give such experts positions of executive and administrative responsibility in order to insure that the job will be done within the allotted time. Appointments of this character need not be regarded as impairing national sovereignty, since the foreign expert will be carrying out programs approved by the government and arrangements can be made to provide each expert with an Iraqi deputy who would be trained to take his place as rapidly as feasible.

In addition to its recommendations for technical assistance in particular fields, the Mission suggests that a small corps of competent engineers be attached to the Development Board under conditions which would insure more or less autonomous administration. Such a group, which would have to be recruited primarily abroad and necessarily be highly paid, would operate as a pool of technicians who would be available for examining the technical soundness and preparation of projects originating both with the Board and with other government departments. A pool of this character would economize on the number of engineers needed throughout the government. It would also be equipped to find and help recruit foreign experts needed for short-term assignments and to check on the work done by contracting firms. Finally, by operating as a more or less autonomous group under the Development Board, it would relieve the Board of technical details and enable it to devote its attention to overall planning with the confidence that projects coming before it for final approval were technically sound.

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The technical advice thus available to the Board would usefully be 654*
complemented by an economic adviser to whom reference will be 463
made later.

Skilled Labor

Other difficulties may well emerge in the supply of foremen, 654*
skilled and semi-skilled workers. Even now it seems to be difficult 464
to find certain kinds of skilled workers in Iraq, and consequently they are able to command high wages compared with unskilled labor. If acute shortages are not to develop later on, it will be necessary for the Development Board to determine promptly what types of skills are likely to be in greatest demand as a result of the development program and to inquire how appropriate training can be instituted. So far as requirements for major public works are concerned, the Board will, no doubt, be able to obtain useful advice from local and foreign contracting firms with experience in Iraq. Information on requirements for other projects may be obtained from the appropriate organizations such as the railways and the Industrial Bank. Once even a rough idea of the requirements has been ascertained, the extent and quality of the available supply and the methods of training the necessary additional workers should be discussed with the Directorate of Labor, the Ministry of Education and such organizations as could be expected to cooperate in programs of training.

The Mission would not wish to suggest that this kind of manpower budgeting is an infallible way of solving all shortages. It is, however, well known that other countries, which are developing much more slowly than Iraq is likely to do within the next few years, have run up against shortages of skilled labor that might have been avoided with foresight and preparation. The Mission feels that there is sufficient evidence to show that the potential quality of Iraqi labor will not prove an obstacle. On a number of occasions the Mission members saw considerable mechanical ingenuity displayed by men with little training and inadequate tools; and these observations were confirmed by those with experience in Iraq. It would do less than justice to the Iraqi worker if the development of his innate skills were not encouraged in the directions where they are likely to be most urgently needed.

654x 464 Up to the present the Development Board has had no occasion to consider measures to avert particular labor shortages. Training does, however, take time and it is probably not too early to carry out at least a preliminary review of requirements. The Mission recommends that this be done in close cooperation with the Directorate of Labor, which, as recommended elsewhere, requires considerable strengthening.

Finally, where acute shortages do develop, the government could in the last analysis import labor. Thus among the large number of Arab refugees from Palestine there could be found many mechanics, carpenters, electricians, stoneworkers, plumbers, foremen, as well as a large number of unskilled construction workers. Contractors could also obtain foremen and some specialized workers from other countries in the Middle East.

Foreign Supplies

654x Now that defense programs in the United States and Western Europe are going into high gear, Iraq may experience difficulties in obtaining equipment and supplies, and this may retard the rate at which development expenditures can be increased. One limiting factor is likely to be steel, especially steel plates and sheets and certain specialty products. This may affect the deliveries of railway equipment, even though, as in Europe, there is open capacity for the manufacture of rolling stock.

Other obstacles may be encountered in the construction projects. The market for construction equipment, particularly for certain kinds of heavy equipment, is becoming increasingly tight and anticipated deliveries may be slow. As a considerable part of the production of this equipment is covered by priority orders in the United States, it may be difficult to obtain unless a priority rating can be secured. European sources of heavy construction equipment are also tight and, although there may be some capacity for manufacture of fairly large-size equipment, overall availability in Europe, especially for heavy types, is much less than in the United States. Accordingly, it may well be desirable to carry out large-scale construction projects, if possible, through those recognized international contractors who possess substantial pools of the necessary machinery. Such an arrangement frequently results in a reduction in the amount of new equipment to be procured. Conceivably, however, it may become difficult to find sufficient foreign contractors to undertake major construction projects.

The Problem of Priorities

In most developing countries the problem of determining relative priorities among various possible projects arises from the scarcity of financial resources. Iraq is fortunate in that this is hardly likely to be a limiting factor. The problem may, however, arise for other reasons. The burden of administrative responsibility on both the Development Board and the government departments may initially delay the preparatory work necessary for the efficient execution of the program. Some indication of relative priorities may from this point of view be desirable. The problem may also arise as a result of a shortage of those types of skilled labor, materials or equipment needed on more than one project. As it is impossible at this time to state just where such bottlenecks may arise, no hard and fast system of priorities can be laid down. The important thing is to watch for indications that they may arise, to avert them if possible and, if not, to decide in good time what steps must be taken as a consequence.

Although no definitive statement is possible, certain general observations as to the principles for deciding priorities can be made. In the first place, projects which are intended to conserve the existing resources of the country ought not to be delayed to the point where it becomes excessively costly to recover them or where the smooth working of the economy is endangered. This would apply particularly to the maintenance of existing irrigation systems and the drainage of existing irrigated areas as well as to the maintenance of the railways.

A second principle is that where competition between projects for scarce equipment or other resources arises, it is usually desirable to aim at the completion of one single project or group of connected projects in preference to the partial completion of several unrelated projects. This is largely a question of timing. The digging of a canal system should proceed in accordance with the construction schedule of the dam which is to assure its water supply. Similarly, it is clearly useless to engage in an extensive program of building schools or hospitals before an adequate staff of teachers,

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654 doctors and nurses becomes available. A less obvious example concerns the mechanization of agriculture. Earlier in the Report the Mission pointed out that, while mechanization is a fruitful method of increasing yields both per donum and per agricultural worker, comparatively little good will come of it so long as the fellahin who may be displaced can find no alternative occupation or so long as lack of repair facilities impedes the most economic use of existing machinery.

As a third principle the Mission would stress the need to avoid neglecting those parts of the program that are of a long run character. For example, the development of an agricultural extension service and the introduction of measures for the gradual improvement of livestock are of the highest importance. The temptation to put off such activities because they show no early visible or quick returns can be a strong and continuing one. The Mission is, however, strongly of the opinion that these are among the most vital parts of the program. In the future Iraq will have to depend as much on the more efficient use of water as on increasing the available supply. And it may be added that the inauguration of an accelerated program for training teachers and the modification of curricula in rural schools in order to bring them into closer touch with the everyday needs of the people will serve the same end.

Certain other factors may enter into the determination of priorities as a result of the repercussions of the program which are discussed below. If the pressure on the available manpower becomes severe and inflationary symptoms appear, it will be desirable to postpone or slow up those labor-intensive projects which are least urgent in the short run, such as part of the road-building program and the construction of public buildings, grain silos and public housing.

It is important that priorities be kept flexible in the light of changing circumstances. The Mission has indicated certain development targets, but the allocation of resources which is implicit in these targets cannot necessarily stand for the next five years. To keep the allocation of resources and the determination of priorities under constant review, the Mission strongly recommends that a competent economic adviser, preferably with experience in underdeveloped countries, be appointed to the Development Board. Such

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an adviser, who should be given a small staff, could assist in 654*
determining the impact on the economy of particular projects and the program as a whole and in watching for developing strains and bottlenecks. In view of the importance of economic considerations in the formation of the Board's policy, the economic adviser should have the right to participate in all meetings of the Board. His presence at meetings would also afford the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, who are ex officio members of the Board, an opportunity to receive a direct report on how the development program might affect matters of broad economic policy falling outside the immediate scope of the Board itself.

The adviser would also be able to indicate the types of additional information which should be developed in order that the economic repercussions of the program may be more carefully observed. For this reason the Mission suggests that the fact-finding agencies of the government be greatly strengthened and reorganized by merging into a single statistical organization the Directorate-General of the Census and the Principal Bureau of Statistics, establishing a special section on agricultural statistics within the Ministry charged with agriculture, and expanding the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Social Affairs.[8]

IX. Impact of the Program

The execution of a development program of the magnitude recommended by the Mission is bound to have great repercussions on the economy. The magnitude of the expenditure in comparison with the current rate of government spending has already been noted, but its effect on foreign trade, on national income and on employment can also be assessed in broad terms.

If the trade financed by the oil companies is excluded, imports 457
regularly exceed exports by a large margin. For example, in 1949 imports were valued at ID 30,000,000 and exports at ID 12,000,000, leaving a gap of ID 18,000,000. The gap was much larger in 1948 and much smaller in 1950, so that the figure for 1949 represents approximately the average for the last three years. To a

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[8] See Appendix C, *Statistical Organisation.*

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457 certain extent, this has been financed by a net drawing on Iraq's sterling balances, but the most important source of finance has been the oil companies. During the last three years they have transferred to Iraq an average of nearly £10,000,000 in sterling annually. Part of this consists of royalties and other contractual payments paid to the government and subsequently spent by it, mainly on projects in the capital budget. The larger part, however, has been transferred to pay for current expenses of the oil companies for production, construction projects and exploration. These expenditures have directly or indirectly provided income for the people, which in turn has created a demand for imported goods; the foreign exchange has provided the means to pay for them. Thus the activities of the oil companies can be said to have both caused and financed a large part of the gap.

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457 The same process will continue as expenditure by the Development Board rises. The Mission envisages that this may reach ID 50,000,000 in about five years' time. Some imports of materials or machinery will result directly from the requirements of the program. The balance of the Board's expenditures will, however, be for the most part made in Iraq. The large quantity of money, which will thereby be put into circulation, will pass from hand to hand and most of it will eventually be spent on imports. This means that in the next five years imports can be expected to increase by a large proportion of the ID 50,000,000 to be spent by the Development Board. At the least, the value of imports is likely to be double what it has been in the last few years.

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434 The magnitude of the program and its effect on the economy may also be illustrated by consideration of the national income. The national income of Iraq in 1949 was estimated by the Statistical Office of the United Nations at a figure in dollars equivalent to either ID 100,000,000 or ID 150,000,000, depending on the exchange rate. On the basis of some rough and incomplete calculations the Mission estimates that the actual figure probably fell near the middle of this range. It may now be nearer the upper end, since the price and the volume of production of some commodities, especially cotton, has greatly increased and some industrial expansion has taken place. Thus an increase in the government's annual income from oil of ID 50,000,000 would alone be equivalent to at

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least one third of the national income. Subsequently, of course, part of this income is used to pay for labor, transport and materials inside Iraq, and then spent again by those who receive these payments, thus generating a further increase in income among the people. The size of the total addition to the national income cannot be forecast, but it is certain to be substantial. 654x 434

The size of the program can also be gauged in terms of manpower. The Mission has not attempted to make a detailed estimate of the quantity of labor which will be required to fulfill the program, much less the numbers who will find employment as a result of the higher level of economic activity. But an example will serve to illustrate the orders of magnitude involved. If 100,000 additional workers found employment as a result of the program at an average annual wage of ID 100, this would mean an expenditure on labor of ID 10,000,000, which would be only one fifth of the ID 50,000,000 the Development Board may ultimately spend per year on the projects themselves. Since these Development Board expenditures would, in turn, generate expansion in activity and employment in transport, industry and commerce, a figure of 100,000 cannot be regarded as excessive. It is, of course, not intended as a forecast. The actual figure may be considerably higher or lower, depending, to some extent, on how much machinery is used on the construction projects. But it will serve as an order of magnitude for the number of new jobs which may be created and which would have to be filled by the unemployed, by new additions to the labor force such as the increase in population, or by people shifted from their existing occupations. As such it may be compared with the current labor force outside of agriculture, which, on the basis of the information available to it, the Mission believes is probably not more than half a million. 654x 464

Thus, on these various hypotheses, great changes can be expected which will affect the whole pattern of life. The national income will increase at a rate which, though not unparalleled, can certainly be considered exceptional. Large shifts in employment will occur as a consequence. The import trade will grow rapidly and with it, for example, customs revenues and the revenues of the Railways and the Port of Basra. It remains to examine the possible effects of these changes. 654x

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Effect on Incomes and Prices

458 During the war and for a short time afterwards, Iraq experienced a severe inflation. Since then, it has enjoyed a fair degree of monetary stability, largely as a result of the conservative financial policies of the government. In fact special local circumstances have lately induced a certain degree of deflation in spite of the strong inflationary influences prevailing in the world outside. The sharp rise in the level of employment and income which will ensue from the development program is bound to alter the whole structure of the economy. Upward movements in wages and prices can certainly be expected. In part, these will be the unavoidable concomitant of the process of development. In part, they may be the result of a general inflation in world prices, which would be beyond the control of Iraq.

654x 458 The principal task confronting the government is to prevent an inflation in any way comparable to the wartime one. It is most important to avoid a marked wage and price inflation which would not only make development far more expensive, but might also create serious discontent. The government has, however, ample means at its disposal to avert such a danger, if it allows liberal use of its sterling income from oil to pay for imports.

The principal reason for the wartime inflation was the large expenditure of money by the military forces in Iraq and the lack of imported goods—for obviously cogent reasons—to satisfy the ensuing demand. Given a sufficient supply of consumer goods from abroad, there should be no reason in peacetime to repeat this [51] experience. Accordingly the Mission would recommend that in due course a competent committee re-examine the customs tariff and the system of import licensing. Some of the restrictions in the present licensing system were imposed to meet a passing situation and could well be discarded. Certain objectives, for example, restriction of imports of "luxury" goods in favor of necessities, might be better accomplished by appropriate changes in the customs tariff. Efforts should also be made to discard, if only gradually, the present method of customs valuation for goods assessed ad valorem, whereby the domestic wholesale price is taken as the basis of valuation.

If these measures are taken to allow a free flow of imported 654x
goods, the possibility of a severe inflation should be remote. There 458
may, of course, be difficulty in obtaining consumer goods from abroad. If this contingency should arise, it will probably be even more difficult to obtain machinery. Thus the government will be confronted, on the one hand, with the need to use a large amount of labor on its construction projects and, on the other, with a lack of goods for them to buy. In this predicament, if inflation is to be avoided and the program is not to be delayed, the government will have to siphon off that part of the increased incomes for which there is no corresponding supply of goods. This can best be done by both direct and indirect taxation at a rate which will insure a budget surplus and by sterilization of this surplus. Initially these funds might be used to retire the public debt, which is for the most part held by the banks.

Nevertheless, even if these steps are followed and severe infla- 654x
tion avoided, some changes in wages and prices will occur. To a 464
large extent, movements in wages will depend on how easy it is to find the additional manpower required on development projects. Undoubtedly there is a reservoir of unemployed and underemployed people which could be tapped. As indicated earlier, considerable unemployment exists in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, and there are many people underemployed who would welcome opportunities for full-time work. The natural growth of population should add at least 15,000 to the labor force yearly. In the country the fellah would probably be unavailable for nonagricultural work even in the off season except perhaps in the immediate neighborhood of his home, but members of his family or relatives living with him might take advantage of new employment opportunities without a significant effect on farm output. The nomadic population may also prove to be a source of labor.

But the point will, no doubt, be reached when competition for manpower will start to drive up wages and to make agricultural workers increasingly scarce in certain districts. This would not necessarily be an unwholesome symptom. Many people are employed in a very unproductive manner, simply because labor is so cheap. Coolies carry heavy loads which should be carried by truck. Production methods in many industries and handicrafts are

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654x 464 exteremely primitive and new machines—sometimes merely a simple power tool—would greatly reduce the requirements for labor. On the land, especially, there are a number of areas where there is a heavy concentration of fellahin working small plots with the crudest tools. Mechanization, even of a simple kind, could easily make good the loss of a part of this labor. In fact, in some parts of the country, landlords are reluctant to mechanize for fear of displacing their fellahin. Thus a moderate rise in wages would improve the lot of those who take employment on the development projects and should also provide incentive to industrial and agricultural employers to give more productive and remunerative employment to those who remain.

One point should be stressed at this stage concerning the drain of manpower from the land. To the extent that this drain consists of "surplus" manpower which is already grossly underemployed, the drain can be considered a welcome change for the better. If conditions do not improve on the land, however, the drain might reach proportions which would endanger the future of agricultural production. It is notoriously easy to attract people away from the land with the promise of better opportunities and almost impossible to draw them back once they have left. Improvement in the lot of the fellah is therefore of vital importance.

654x 434 As wages may rise, so may certain prices. Demand will greatly increase, but it is as much its incidence as its volume that matters. If a liberal import policy is followed, there should be no pressure on the price of such imported goods as textiles and sugar, although, of course, changes in world prices cannot be avoided. As incomes increase, greater pressure can be expected on some local products, whose supply cannot be quickly increased and which can only be imported for considerably higher prices. In this category fall a number of foods, especially meat and other animal products such as milk and ghee. Some improvement in supply will occur as a result of diversion from exports, but this possibility is limited. In the short run, at least, somewhat higher prices for these commodities should be accepted as the price of a generally higher standard of living for the mass of the people. The same may be true of fruit (other than dates), the supply of which cannot increase until such time as newly planted trees come into bearing. The production of

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vegetables, on the other hand, can be increased more readily and a 654*
tendency for prices to rise will probably induce an increase in output 434
fairly quickly.

There will also be considerable changes in incomes. Increased or more remunerative employment would of course benefit a large number of workers. Many agricultural workers are likely to benefit. As a result of the greatly increased activity in the import trade, merchants are likely to be very prosperous. In certain localities housing shortages may develop, thus permitting landlords to raise their rents. On the other hand, some classes, particularly civil servants and others employed at fixed salaries, may stand to lose owing to higher prices of some of their essential needs.

It will be an important task of the government to insure that these changes do not result in an inequitable shift in the distribution of incomes. This may be achieved in various ways: by export taxes on agricultural commodities whenever prices rise substantially; by changes in the rates of import duties, the burden of which at present falls heavily on the poorer classes; by raising the exemption limit for income taxes and by enforcing stricter assessment and collection in the higher brackets; or by an increase in allowances to civil servants. The Mission does not recommend specific remedies for a situation whose nature can only be forecast in general terms. It would stress, however, the need to keep a careful watch on the nature of the changes that the economy is undergoing. The Mission therefore recommends strongly that a committee be formed consisting of the proposed economic adviser to the Development Board and high-level representatives of the National Bank and the Ministries of Finance and Economics. This group would recommend directly to the Council of Ministers the adoption of timely measures aimed at checking any dangerous inflationary trends and at offsetting any tendency toward gross inequities in the distribution of income.

No mention has yet been made of the possibility of loss of 654*
foreign exchange by the National Bank as a result of the development 457
program. In itself the program cannot cause an increase in expenditure on imports in excess of the outlay on the development program. In fact, as there will be some need on the part of individuals or organizations to hold larger cash balances, they will save

654* 457 part of their income in this form and there will be some net gain of foreign exchange by the National Bank.

The effect of the development program on the economy as a whole, however, has to be borne in mind. A general rise in the level of prices and wages will tend to increase consumption at the expense of savings. At the same time, there will be considerable incentive to make more investment outside the development program than in the past. Thus, quite apart from the effect of the program itself, there will be some pressure to expand imports. Whether this pressure could be sufficiently strong to cause an expansion of imports by more than the amount of foreign exchange used to finance the development program is uncertain, but the possibility exists. It will be important, therefore, to avoid any further pressure on the payments position by an excessive expansion of credit to business or by financing a large budget deficit through bank credit.

654* 652 As long as ordinary government expenditures not immediately related to development are kept down and tax income maintained, there should be no serious danger of ordinary budget deficits. In fact, as national income rises as a result of increased development expenditures, ordinary revenues will probably rise more rapidly than ordinary expenditure. The government, however, will have to incur some expenditures which were, in the past, covered by income accruing from oil. Now that this income has been earmarked for the purposes of development, the deficiency has to be made up from ordinary revenue. It may, therefore, be necessary in the first few years for the government to borrow from the Development Board a part of the funds accruing to them, repayment being made when ordinary revenues begin to rise substantially. This should not interfere unduly with development, as the pace of actual expenditure on development is likely to be slow initially.

Measures to curb credit expansion may prove more difficult as long as the banks are extraordinarily liquid. Statutory reserve requirements would have to be greatly increased to permit effective credit controls. The private banks, most of which are foreign-owned, have, in the past, however, concentrated almost exclusively on the financing of trade, particularly foreign trade. Even if increased opportunities arise in the future, they may show little dis-

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position to finance investment expenditures. The National Bank should operate essentially as a banker for the commercial banks and therefore should not finance long-term investment. To discourage credit expansion on the basis of the larger foreign income which will accrue from oil, the Mission suggests that, instead of selling sterling receipts to the National Bank, the government segregate them in a special account in London apart from the country's regular foreign exchange reserves until such time as they are spent abroad or the dinar equivalent is spent in Iraq.

Tax Reform

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Total tax revenues will probably not need to be increased provided any temporary ordinary budget deficit can be met by short-term borrowing of idle funds at the disposal of the Development Board. The only exception might be taxation to pay part of the cost of raising government salaries. On the other hand, some revision in the tax structure to provide a more equitable apportionment of the burden would be desirable. In common with many other underdeveloped countries Iraq relies strongly on indirect taxes which bear heavily on consumers without taking into account capacity to pay. Thus in the last three fiscal years indirect taxes contributed about 82 percent of all tax receipts and 71.5 percent of all budget income, while direct taxes accounted for only 18 percent of all tax revenues and 13 percent of total government receipts. While drastic changes in the tax structure may not be feasible, some decrease in the burden of indirect taxes appears desirable. There might well be a reduction in import duties on some essential goods such as sugar and cheap cotton and rayon textiles, offset, perhaps, by an excise tax on luxuries. Likewise it may be desirable to decrease and gradually abolish, except in its application to exports, the so-called *istihlak* tax which is levied on produce brought to market and at a rate varying in recent years between 10 and 12½ percent of approximate market prices. Except for the partial incidence of this tax, agriculture in Iraq is hardly taxed at all. The income tax which bears very heavily on the salaried classes, whose income is already comparatively low, does not apply to income from either agricultural land or urban property. Agricultural land in private hands has not been taxed since 1936 when a land and water

654* 651 [425] rent tax was abolished in return for certain payments to be made by the landholders over a maximum period of ten years. Thus the tax system discriminates in favor of those who have managed to obtain state lands in *lazmah* grant and against those who have regularly leased land from the state. The latter continue to be assessed for rent whereas the former, who have frequently secured large *lazmah* grants on the basis of rather tenuous proof of occupancy and cultivation, escape any tax or rent assessments on their land.

The application of a graduated income tax to agriculture, while equitable, may not be politically feasible at present and would certainly pose difficult problems of assessment. Consideration should be given, however, to the reintroduction of some type of land tax. The fact that the cadastral survey is only half completed would not be an insuperable obstacle. In most cases the land held by each individual will be well known in the locality where he resides. Landholders could be required to register for taxation all the land they claim with the provision that they would not be allowed to establish claims during the cadastral survey to any lands not so registered; and in case of conflicts between actual occupants and other claimants, the tax could provisionally be levied on the actual occupant. It would probably be desirable to levy the tax on cultivable land rather than land actually under cultivation in order to provide an incentive to production or, alternatively, to release idle land for resettlement. Tax rates would have to vary in accordance with productivity of the land, which could, as in some other countries, be ascertained through tests or control plots located in various parts of the country. The tax rate should presumably also take into account the government contribution to irrigation of the land. The adoption of such a land tax might be linked with the gradual reduction and perhaps ultimate abolition of the *istihlak*.

X. Conclusion

511 Today the people of Iraq for the most part suffer from dire poverty. Although a relatively small number of city merchants and landowners enjoy high incomes, the average standard of life is extremely low. The future would hold little prospect for relief if

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the only remedy available were a more equitable division of income. 511
Fortunately, the future does afford the promise of a large increase in national income as a whole. The country has the natural resources—land, water and oil—which can bring a much higher standard of living to all. The revenues from oil will provide the means for a potentially rapid development of other productive resources. The central objective must be the attainment of a much higher output in a manner that will benefit the people as a whole.

In a country like Iraq principal emphasis will inevitably need 654*
to be placed on the development of agriculture. For this reason 241
schemes for the storage of the flood waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris will be of key importance. They will prevent disastrous floods and control the flow of the rivers so as to bring more water to deficient areas and open up large new areas for settlement by land-hungry peasants. An increase in production, however, will not come simply from an expansion of the area under cultivation. The time will come when further expansion will not be possible except at great cost. This makes it all the more necessary to raise the present low productivity of agriculture. The drainage of lands which have deteriorated owing to salting has accordingly been emphasized by the Mission as one of the first objectives. Great importance is also attached to the early development of an adequate agricultural extension service, supported by an effective practical experimental organization, which would work directly with farmers in improving their methods of production. Other measures recommended to this end include the provision of incentives to use fertilizers and to cultivate soil-building and fodder crops, and the organization of cooperatives and more ample credit ~~facilities so~~ that farmers can have easier access to improved means of production—better plows and draft-animals, other agricultural machinery, seeds and fertilizers.

Industrial development can in many ways effectively comple- 654*
ment agriculture. The proposed chemical plant at Kirkuk, supple- 433
mented by bonemeal plants, could provide the cheap fertilizers needed to raise the productivity of Iraqi agriculture. Expansion of cotton textile and vegetable oil extraction capacity would capitalize on the growing output of cotton. The proposed modern machine shop would cater to agriculture by reducing the cost of irrigation

654x 433 pumps. In other respects industrial development would be geared to supply the growing demand for consumers goods, such as shoes, textiles and utensils, and for construction materials, such as cement, arising out of the development program itself.

654x 439 Rising agricultural and industrial output will necessitate a corresponding increase in transport capacity. Here the development of road transport and the replacement of wornout track, locomotives and rolling stock will be the principal tasks of the future.

654x 871 744 Since the relationship of health and education to production may appear more indirect, there is danger that these two subjects will be neglected in the emphasis on greater national output. Basically, however, it is the productivity of manpower which must be raised, and this can be achieved only if measures are taken to make people better educated and to free them from debilitating disease. In the future the public health effort must concentrate on the prevention of disease through such measures as increasing the number of village dispensaries, the training of midwives, the organization of a corps of sanitarians, elimination of stagnant and polluted water, provision of safe water supplies and sewage disposal, slum clearance and better housing. Community planning should focus largely on such improvements as will contribute to better public health. A great broadening of the educational effort is needed in the future to teach people how to cope more effectively with the problems of everyday living. To this end, compulsory primary education should be gradually introduced over the next 15 years and a vigorous campaign for the education of adults should be launched. At the same time, however, it is vitally important to adapt education to the practical needs of the people, helping them to improve their health and their methods of work.

654x The program which the Mission has outlined in this report is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission has thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a

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profound economic and social transformation, with far-reaching repercussions. 654*

Accomplishment of the greater part or all of the program will require the united energies of the nation. While foreign technical assistance and materials will be needed, success of the program will depend, above all, upon the people of Iraq. Development is not the function or prerogative solely of the Development Board. It will require not only the wholehearted cooperation of the entire government but, above all, a sustained and energetic effort by the Iraqi people as a whole. Throughout the government, standards of efficiency must be raised if the manifold organizational and technical problems involved in launching and carrying out a development program are to be solved. Furthermore, the government must be vigilant in anticipating and surmounting the many difficulties that will inevitably arise as economic development gets under way. To arouse the interest and mobilize the enthusiastic cooperation of the people at large, education must be greatly improved along the lines on which particular stress has been laid in this report, namely elementary education for the children, vocational education for the farmers, industrial workers and artisans, and fundamental education for as many adults as possible. Success is impossible with a passive population. Individual Iraqis must be given through the press, the radio, and other media an understanding of what the government is trying to accomplish and how they themselves can contribute to the attainment of the objectives. They must also realize their stake in the program in the form of a rising standard of living and a hope for a better future for their children. Development is a truly individual as well as a national effort. Only in this way is there a guaranty that it will redound to the national welfare.

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APPENDICES

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[Pp. 101-102 CONTAIN NO TEXTUAL MATERIAL.]

APPENDIX A

List of the Mission's Recommendations

A. *Irrigation and Drainage*

1. Construction of the Bekhme dam on the Greater Zab River in addition to the water reservoir and flood control schemes already comprised in the Development Board program, including the Habbaniya and Wadi Tharthar projects and the Derbend-i-Khan and Dokan dams.

2. Postponement of the final stage of the Habbaniya project until drainage facilities for the Lower Euphrates Valley have been installed and the possibility of alternative storage capacity on the upper Euphrates has been explored.

3. Negotiation of agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran on afforestation and other anti-erosion measures in the watersheds of the Euphrates and Tigris and their tributaries, and where appropriate, on the utilization of their waters.

4. Prompt execution of a comprehensive drainage program for existing irrigated areas, with priority for areas commanded by the Hindiya barrage and the Dujaila project; payment of part of the cost by beneficiaries of the scheme.

5. Reduction of wasteful use of existing water supplies not only by installing drainage facilities but also by providing the lower Tigris and Euphrates as well as the Gharraf canal with more control works and by ascertaining through experimentation the optimum amounts of water that should be used for every crop.

6. Substantial increases in the current expenditures of the Irrigation Department to insure improved maintenance and operation of existing irrigation systems.

7. Stricter control over the distribution of water by irrigation officials assisted by local committees of farmers.

8. Re-examination of ancient water rights belonging to particular lands and assurance through appropriate legislation of rights of water passage over lands of other property owners.

9. Encouragement of small irrigation schemes based on small streams, springs or wells, in the North.

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B. *Agriculture and Forestry*

1. Reservation of state lands for settlement by small-holders in accordance with announced intentions of the government, subject to (a) further review of proposed size of allotments and inclusion of certain non-farmer beneficiaries, and (b) a requirement that beneficiaries pay part of the cost of settlement.

2. Progressive organization of an extension or advisory service to farmers; immediate appointment of a director responsible for recruiting and training personnel for such a service.

3. Progressive organization of an adequate research and experimental department to support the extension service; immediate appointment of a director to coordinate existing research and lay the foundations for a full time research staff.

4. Encouragement of more extensive use of fertilizer and cultivation of soil-building and forage crops; adoption of appropriate temporary financial incentives to this end; study of extent to which existing sharecropping systems makes achievement of this end difficult.

5. Combatting livestock disease and mortality through provision of livestock shelters in the North, establishment of sheep-dipping stations, an increase in the number of veterinarians and diagnostic facilities, assignment of trained veterinarians to nomadic tribes, and provision of more water-holes.

6. Improvement of livestock through encouragement of better feeding, reseeding of natural pastures in the North and stipulation of rotational grazing, introduction of improved sires and establishment of government stud stations.

7. Increase in the paid-in capital of the Agricultural Bank to ID 2,000,000.

8. Active encouragement and promotion of agricultural cooperatives, supported by adequate credit facilities, in order to facilitate acquisition of better seeds, tools and draft animals and common ownership and operation of irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery; establishment of such cooperatives as an integral part of every new settlement scheme; transfer of responsibility for cooperatives to Department of Agriculture and prompt training abroad of a number of officials in cooperative techniques.

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9. Continuation of Agricultural Machinery Administration, but with some increase in machinery rentals in order to reduce existing budget deficits; state encouragement of local shops for repairs of agricultural machinery to supplement centrally located repair facilities.

10. Establishment of numerous small concrete or corrugated steel grain storage sheds with an aggregate capacity of about 75,000 tons in addition to projected Basra silo.

11. Improvement in the quality of tobacco by engaging a number of foreign experts (a) to work with farmers in bettering methods of growing, picking and curing, (b) to train tobacco graders, and (c) to approve tobacco for Monopoly purchase; replacement of existing tobacco warehouses with four or five new ones provided with dust-extracting plant and humidifying equipment; organization of the Tobacco Monopoly as a fiscally autonomous agency; virtual elimination of the spread between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices, compensated by higher excises payable by manufacturers; lifting of the restriction on the amount of Monopoly purchases per licensed unit of area.

12. Postponement of introduction of beet sugar cultivation until further testing of comparative merits of beet sugar and cane sugar and their merits in relation to other competitive crops.

13. Carrying out the recommendations of the British expert's report on forestry already received by the Iraq government; appropriate emphasis on the planting of windbreaks in the plains and on farmers' woodlots in the new land settlement schemes; establishment of a Department of Forestry independent of the Department of Agriculture.

14. Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use as a more effective means of organizing the government's activities respecting agriculture and forestry.

C. *Industry*

1. Early consideration of a government-financed chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce, from waste oil-field gas and gypsum, ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur and carbon black.

2. A gradual increase in the paid-in capital of the Industrial

654* Bank by ID 5,000,000 to enable it to assist private enterprise in (a) expanding existing industries such as cotton textiles, vegetable oil extraction and soap making, shoe manufacturing and the fabrication of aluminum utensils, and (b) establishing new plants for the production of bonemeal fertilizers, small steel products from scrap, irrigation pumps, automobile tires, date boxes and perhaps ultimately glass containers and paper; appointment of a foreign industrial expert as head of the Bank's Industrial Schemes section.

3. Encouragement of small industry; establishment of a small-business branch in the Industrial Bank to this end.

4. Core-drilling of indicated deposits of copper, iron, zinc, chrome and salt in order to establish their size and quality before undertaking commercial exploitation.

5. Review of existing legislation and practices with respect to the protection of industry to ensure that special protection and benefits are granted on a temporary and declining scale and are generally restricted to industries ultimately able to withstand foreign competition.

6. Organization of the government's promotional activities relating to industry into a Department of Industrial Research and Standards with responsibility for research and laboratory work, and a Department of Industries with responsibility for the commercial and economic aspects of industry.

7. Greater attention to workers' welfare as a means of increasing labor productivity; stricter enforcement by the government of existing minimum labor standards.

D. *Transport and Communications*

1. Execution of the ten-year highway construction and surfacing program recommended by an interdepartmental committee, with first priority to the Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra and the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Mosul roads.

2. Supplementing the main highway program with ultimately 8,000 kilometers of secondary and feeder roads.

3. Institution of controls over road transport, providing for regular inspection of vehicles, limiting permissible loads, requiring

insurance and licensing operators, to ensure regularity and reliability of service.

4. Gradual conversion to diesel traction on the railways; carrying out necessary replacement of track and rolling stock; completion of Baghdad-West railway station and new railway layout but on a drastically modified basis.

5. Early study of standardizing the railway gauge with a view to completing a standardization program within six years.

6. Study of the railway rate structure, particularly with a view to the removal of certain anomalies.

7. Dredging of a new channel across the Fao bar by the Port of Basra with the financial assistance of the Development Board.

8. Improvement of the Basra and Baghdad airports to meet the specifications of Class B airports.

9. Improvement of the municipal bus service in Baghdad through standardization of equipment, establishment of central garages and modernization and re-equipment of the central workshop with financial help from the Development Board.

10. Transfer of the capital outlays for telephone and telegraph communications to the budget of the Development Board.

E. *Public Health*

1. Greater emphasis on measures to prevent disease such as,
    - (a) Introduction of social medicine as a subject in the medical school and appropriate instruction of medical auxiliaries, particularly nurses;
    - (b) More effective teaching of personal hygiene and sanitation in schools, the army and the police, and by such means as films, lectures, "health weeks", and the like;
    - (c) Organization of a sanitary corps;
    - (d) Establishment of one school for training village midwives and another for training town midwives;
    - (e) Expansion in the number of village dispensaries and their use as health centers with specially trained medical assistants in charge.

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2. Energetic prosecution, in close cooperation with the Irrigation Department, of the campaign against malaria, bilharzia and hookworm; for this purpose, appropriation of adequate funds to the Institute for Endemic Diseases and equipment of a number of mobile dispensaries.

3. Modernization, extension and replacement of existing hospitals before construction of additional hospitals.

4. Expansion and improvement of the medical auxiliary staff in hospitals; establishment of schools for practical nurses in each province; inauguration of special training courses for medical assistants, radiographers, laboratory assistants, storekeepers and physiotherapists.

5. Packaging of "household remedies" for sale at reasonable prices in village shops remote from pharmacies and dispensaries.

6. Appointment of an experienced public health administrator, assisted by an epidemiologist and a sanitary expert, to advise the Minister of Social Affairs on the organization and further development of health services; greater decentralization of public health administration, with assignment of more responsibility to the chief medical officer in every province who would need to be a full-time, adequately paid official, equipped to carry out his duties.

F. *Community Planning and Facilities*

1. Ultimate establishment of a Community Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior, with the strengthening of the existing planning section in the Department of Municipalities as the initial step; use of this agency in coordinating development projects on the community level under the overall control of the Development Board.

2. Ultimate establishment of a Housing Authority in the Ministry of Social Affairs, with the strengthening of the housing section in the Department of Labor as the first step; provision of this Authority with a Housing Fund.

3. Establishment of an Applied Building Research Station under the proposed Department of Industrial Research and Standards to develop the best and most economical techniques and materials for housing.

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4. Rehousing of *sarifa* dwellers and other slum dwellers through self-help measures, with the government providing the site, water and other necessary facilities and one or two elements of the house and the people affected building their own houses or huts in accordance with specified models. 654x

5. A modest program for public housing pending a more careful survey of housing needs, with special emphasis on the accommodation of government employees in the provinces.

6. Improvement of mortgage credit facilities by increasing the paid-in capital of the Mortgage Bank to ID 1,500,000 and permitting the Bank to loan money for longer terms.

7. Location of new villages away from streams, wherever possible, to prevent water pollution; encouragement of self-help in building village latrines and community centres; allocation of funds to provide safe village water supplies.

8. Construction of a sewage system in Baghdad.

9. Carrying out the five-year program drafted by the Deparment of Municipalities to provide or extend urban water supply systems.

10. A program, involving the installation of 10,000 kw in thermal generating capacity, to provide or expand electricity to municipalities outside of Baghdad, Basra and Kirkuk, coupled with steps to insure the efficient management of such municipal plants through a competent private firm.

G. *Education*

1. Gradual introduction of compulsory primary education over the next 15 years, with emphasis on the training of the necessary teachers in the first five years; some increase in the present school building program with this in view.

2. Special emphasis, in the normal development of schools beyond the primary stage, on the establishment of intermediate and secondary schools in rural areas to provide candidates for rural teachers training colleges.

3. Establishment of a Division of Fundamental Education in the Ministry of Education to carry out a progressively expanding program for adult education over the next fifteen years.

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4. Fundamental revision of the content of education with more emphasis on practical instruction in health, agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, and similar subjects.

5. Improvement in the staff and revision in the curriculum of the government secondary agricultural school and the higher agricultural institute at Abu Ghuraib.

6. Establishment of apprenticeship programs to provide on-the-job training to labor and foremen from the ranks, with supplementary training to be supplied by technical schools.

7. Review of the curriculum and general adequacy of the secondary commercial school and the College of Commerce and Economics with the help of advisory committees of representatives of leading banks and business houses; establishment of additional secondary commercial schools as soon as more teachers can be found; greater emphasis on practical training and on cost accounting in the College of Commerce.

8. Participation by the Development Board in the framing of programs for educating Iraqis abroad.

9. Greater continuity in education policies and programs by ensuring more permanent tenure to high officials in the Ministry of Education and establishing a Statutory Board or Council of Education.

H. *General*

1. Appointment of a commission, assisted by two foreign experts, to make a complete survey of the sytem of public administration and recommend improvements.

2. Appointment of Secretaries to function as the permanent heads of the ministries immediately under the responsible ministers.

3. Interim increase in government salary scales pending final recommendations by the suggested commission on public administration.

4. Fullest possible use of foreign technical assistance in carrying out the development program; central coordination of requests for foreign technical assistance; attachment of a small corps of technicians to the Development Board.

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5. Fullest possible gearing of the entire government into the planning and execution of the development program under the overall coordination and direction of the Development Board.

6. Appointment of an economic adviser to the Development Board to assist the latter in analyzing the economic aspects of development projects and in determining priorities in the light of particular bottlenecks which may develop.

7. Early analysis of the labor requirements of the development program.

8. Mobilization of more and better information that would help in the allocation of resources, the choice of priorities and the determination of the economic impact of the development program; to this end merger of the Directorate-General of the Census and the Principal Bureau of Statistics into a single statistical agency, establishment of a special section on agricultural statistics in the Ministry of Agriculture and expansion of the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Social Affairs.

9. Consideration of ways and means of liberalizing imports as a means of curbing future price increases resulting from the impact of the development program.

10. Avoidance of ordinary government budget deficits, and curbs on expansion of bank credit except for the financing of growing trade.

11. Appointment of a high-level committee consisting of responsible representatives of the Development Board, the National Bank and the Ministries of Finance and Economics to watch the economic and financial repercussions of the program with a view to recommending timely measures to check dangerous inflationary trends.

12. Revisions in the tax structure in the direction of greater equity, principally by lowering import duties on necessities, offset by excises on luxuries, by gradually reducing and perhaps ultimately abolishing the *istihlak* except on exports and by reintroducing a tax on cultivable agricultural land.

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APPENDIX B

Suggestions for Technical Assistance*

FIELD OF OPERATION AND TYPE OF EXPERT	Minimum Number
I. Agriculture and Animal Husbandry	
Tobacco	
Specialists in production to work with farmers	2
Grader	1
Manipulators	2
Buyer	1
Adviser to head of Monopoly	1
Other Agriculture	
Director for proposed Extension Service, assistant and field supervisors	5
Director for proposed Research Department and director for section on field crops	2
Sugar beet research expert	1
Cane sugar research expert	1
Teachers for Abu Ghuraib agricultural school	2
Livestock	
Abattoir specialist	1
Expert for Hides and Skins Association	1
Wool-shearing and grading experts	2
Adviser to veterinary services	1
Veterinarians for field service	5
Director of Veterinary Serum Institute	1
Agricultural Machinery Administration	
Maintenance experts	3
II. Irrigation	
Additional supervisory engineers for drainage and irrigation	2

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* Exclusive of managerial and technical personnel for industrial enterprises.

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III. Industrial Bank	
Chief of Industrial Schemes Section	1
IV. Transport	
Railway rate expert	1
Experts to study and plan gauge conversion	Subject to examination
V. Public Health	
Midwives to set up training courses	3
Additional nurses	37
Expert to organize sanitary corps	1
Advisory group for Ministry (public health administrator, epidemiologist and expert on sanitation)	3
VI. General	
Experts on public administration and personnel	2
Economic adviser to Development Board	1
Corps of specialists for Development Board	6-8

APPENDIX C

Statistical Organization

In the body of its report, the Mission has advocated the strengthening and reorganization of the statistical organization of the government. Statistics have, on the whole, been a neglected function of the government, although foreign trade statistics have been collected and published efficiently by the Statistics Division of the Customs Department and a long step forward was taken in 1947 with the country's first census of population. When the Mission was in Iraq, the Principal Bureau of Statistics operated as hardly more than a collecting agency with no actual authority over the statistics it collected. Its staff, though willing and hard-working, was clearly inadequate to review critically the statistics it published or to take the initiative in developing new and useful sources of information. In fact, the senior staff of the Bureau have usually been transferred to more lucrative government posts or have themselves resigned to go into private business.

As a result, the annual Statistical Abstract is an unsatisfactory document. It omits useful information which could be collected without too much difficulty; it includes much unnecessary detail and some statistics of highly dubious value; and the same mistakes have tended to be perpetuated year after year. The Mission found a widespread and usually justifiable distrust of published statistics, especially agricultural statistics, which sometimes led those who had some use for statistical data to try to collect their own.

The Mission believes that the rapid improvement of the statistical organization is a task which should be undertaken without delay. In many fields individual judgment can be no substitute for carefully compiled statistical data. As the development program proceeds, more and more occasions will arise when such data will be needed by the Development Board, and especially by its prospective economic adviser. Without adequate statistics, it will be far more difficult to follow the progress of the program in fulfilling its ultimate objective, raising the standard of living of the people, and it will often be necessary to take decisions on the basis of guess-work. Lack of funds may have been the reason for neglect in the past, but it need be no obstacle in the future.

A detailed report on the statistical organization, with which the Mission is in general agreement, was published in 1948* and an experienced statistician has now been appointed to take charge of the Bureau. In these circumstances, the Mission does not wish to do more than note a few general recommendations and to stress the importance of building up the Bureau into an efficient service organization for the whole government, which can offer an attractive career for its staff.

The Need for Improvement

Perhaps the best way of illustrating the kind of improvement that is necessary is to consider the principal attributes which good statistics should have and to give examples of how statistics in Iraq meet these tests. Probably the most important quality is reliability. This does not mean 100 percent accuracy, which is normally impossible. There will be limits of accuracy, varying according to the subject matter, which can be aimed at but cannot reasonably be exceeded. What is important is that the degree of accuracy, which any particular group of statistics is believed to have, should be clearly and honestly stated. Even very rough statistics can be useful, provided that the user knows their limitations.

Since more than half of the people live off the land, data on the land and its vital complementary resource, water, are of paramount importance. Today, agricultural statistics are collected haphazardly by officials with little training and little transport. Even so, the existing statistics could easily be improved by using a few simple forms and by a little checking of the results from year to year. As it is, they are published without any qualification. The published statistics of the area under cultivation by crops may be cited as an example. These statistics are computed in several ways. Some, mainly those for pump-irrigated land, are supplied by the Irrigation Department. Others are calculated on the basis of seed sown which is often the only measure the fellah knows. However, the published statistics of seed sown and area cultivated are

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* John Murray, *A Report on Statistical Organization of the Kingdom of Iraq.* Government Press, Baghdad, 1948.

654* obviously based on a fixed rate of seed per donum (e.g. 15 kg. for wheat, 20 kg. for rice and barley) which has been applied regularly in almost every year. Yet the rate of seeding undoubtedly varies from one part of the country to another. An explanation of the methods of computation, of the reasons therefor and the degree of reliance that can be placed on them are certainly called for.

[659 162] Again, population statistics have been published for each province, based on a hand-count of the census results. The fact that these published figures contain an estimate for nomads might well be stated. A more important omission is an explanation of the very marked discrepancy between men and women. It is well-known that there is strong tendency in many parts of the country to record male children as female and the returns for the lower age groups confirm this in a striking manner. At least some preliminary note on how this affects the validity of the results would be advisable. A good example of an appropriate warning is the qualifying note introducing the vital statistics which have been published.

Closely allied to reliability is clarity of definition. It is not possible to use statistics properly, if it is not clear what they mean. As an example of this, the figures for cultivable land made available to the Mission and shown in Table 2 of Annex A may be cited. If definitions are not clear, a series of statistics may lack continuity. An example of this is the published figures for electricity consumption in the various provinces, which are divided into three groups—lighting, manufacturing and other purposes. It is not clear what "other purposes" means. Moreover, although the definition evidently changed in Mosul between 1945 and 1946, no explanation is given and no adjustment has been made. In general, too, a number of units of weight or capacity, such as the *mann* and the *hukka,* are used in the Abstract without stating their equivalent in more standard units. The fact that these units vary from one commodity to another and, it is said, from one city to another makes it all the more necessary to state the precise equivalent in the context used.

Statistics should also be properly selected. If statistical publications are not to become a mass of unwieldy detail, a proper balance has to be struck between what is to be included and what is to be excluded. The Abstract, at present, contains much detailed medical and legal data of a somewhat specialized nature. On agri-

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culture, on the other hand, there are only global figures for the country as a whole, although data by provinces and even by smaller units such as *qadhas* and *nahiyas* is available. In spite of the poor quality of these statistics, such detail might be extremely useful and would, incidentally, make it easier to assess their reliability. Again, the revealing data on landholdings available in the Directorate-General of Land Settlement, which appear in Table 4 of Annex A, have not been included. No attempt has been made to collect statistics of industrial production, although in the more modern industries, at least, this would be simple.

An example of another type of poor selection can be found in the long list of wholesale prices published in the Abstract, which are obtained from the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce. Prices are given for such commodities as cardamom and garlic, but none for cotton textiles, which are by far the most important commodity imported into Iraq and prices of which are regularly quoted by the Chamber of Commerce.

Statistics should be also as uniform as possible to insure comparability. For instance, common definitions should, as far as possible, be used by the Customs, the Directorate-General of Imports and the railways in classifying imported goods. In fact, the machine tabulation of the statistics of the Customs and import licensing department could easily be combined, thus saving time and gaining uniformity. As another example, when statistics of industrial production are available, industrial definitions and coverage should, as far as possible, be uniform with those of the Labor Department.

Finally, statistics should be made available as soon as possible, so that the earliest use can be made of them. Apart from printing delays, much of the latest information that is eventually published in the Abstract is held up until other information for the same year becomes available. ✓

Specific Recommendations

1. Full implementation should be given to the Law of Statistics—No. 42 of 1939, giving the Principal Bureau the right of supervision over all statistical data in the form it prescribes.

2. As recommended in the body of the Mission's report, the functions of the Directorate-General of the Census should be trans-

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ferred to the Principal Bureau of Statistics as soon as possible. The Principal Bureau of Statistics should then be made responsible for the execution, with the assistance of appropriate ministries, of all censuses, including agriculture, industry, distribution, etc. These are essentially statistical functions. Moreover, it is important to bring together the available talent so as to make the statistical organization as flexible as possible.

3. The Principal Bureau of Statistics with its Census division should be housed as soon as conveniently possible in the same building with the Statistics Division of the Customs. Apart from other obvious conveniences, this would bring all the tabulating machines together. At present, some machines are used to capacity, while others stand idle. In choosing the building due regard should be paid to the importance of a location close to the agricultural statistics section of the proposed Ministry of Agriculture.

4. In view of the importance of agricultural statistics, the agricultural statistician requested from FAO should be appointed for a period of not less than two years.

5. In order to make statistics available as quickly as possible, a new quarterly Bulletin of Statistics should be published in Arabic and English, if possible within the next year. The Bulletin would have two principal sections:

(i) regular statistics, principally for foreign trade, balance of payments, finance, prices, transport and production. Data would be included up to the latest date for which they were available at the time of publication.

(ii) occasional statistics or statistical studies. These should only be included as suitable opportunity occurred. Examples would be census data on particular provinces as they become available. A cumulative index should be provided for this part of the Bulletin.

The Bulletin need not, and, in fact, should not start on an ambitious scale. In the first instance, it should contain only such statistics as the Bureau has been able to analyze and for which it can give accurate definitions and a reasonable estimate of numerical accuracy. As other statistics meet these tests, they may be included. Such a bulletin should not require much additional

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work, as the statistics included would ordinarily be collected for the 654*
Abstract.

6. A schedule should be drawn up for the stage-by-stage growth of the staff and equipment of the Principal Bureau in accordance with the assumption of broader functions. In accordance with this schedule, efforts should be made to order equipment and to train or hire from abroad suitable staff.

7. Particular attention should be paid to the selection of a special assistant to the head of the Bureau to direct a small special section which would concentrate on developing and checking new sources of statistics. The Mission found that there was much untapped information in government files. As soon as new sources of data are developed satisfactorily, the collection and calculation, if any, could be turned over to appropriate sections of the Bureau. A particular task of this special section would be to lay the groundwork for future development of national income statistics. In this task as much advantage as possible should be taken of experience in other parts of the Middle and Far East, for example, in India and in Turkey. Much might also be learned from the research now being carried out on the agriculture income of Syria and the Lebanon at the American University at Beirut.

This assistant would require high qualifications and should have considerable personal initiative. It is essential that only a candidate of high caliber should be chosen. Preferably he should be of Iraqi nationality, but if one is not found within, say, a year, it would be better to hire a foreign statistician with suitable qualifications on a short contract than to appoint an unsuitable candidate.

A N N E X E S

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[Pp. 121-122 CONTAIN NO TEXTUAL MATERIAL]

ANNEX A

BASIC FACTORS AND CONDITIONS

I. The Regions

131 Iraq, a country with a population of approximately 5,000,000 and an area of 168,040 square miles, forms roughly a triangular area with the base running southwest to northeast and the apex 133 terminating at the Persian Gulf. It is dominated by two great river systems—the Tigris and the Euphrates. The Euphrates rises in the mountains of Turkey, flows across the Northern Syrian plateau and then meanders through Iraq, receiving little additional water from tributaries. The Tigris also rises in Turkey, but further to the east and north. It enters Iraq in Mosul province and receives important accessions from the Greater and Lesser Zab Rivers which are fed from the snows and the rains of the mountains along the Turkish and Iranian borders and, to a lesser degree, from the Diyala River. Downstream from Ramadi on the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris the two rivers form a single low-lying alluvial valley built up as a delta into the Persian Gulf. As they flow south, the rivers are virtually lost in the marshes and lakes of southern Iraq, their remaining waters uniting at Qurna to flow as the Shatt al Arab into the Persian Gulf.

311 Only a relatively narrow belt, lying north-northeast of a line roughly running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin near the Iranian border, has sufficient rainfall to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation. In the rest of the country, agriculture depends upon the water of the two rivers for irrigation, whether by pump, by flow or by natural inundation. With the exception of the large and remote southern and northern deserts and the greater part of the rolling uplands between the Tigris and the Euphrates known as the northern Jezireh, most of this region can be cultivated once water is made available. With storage and regulation of the river waters, a great extension of the area under cultivation is possible. Without regulation, on the other hand, the

311 waters of the twin rivers are largely wasted and periodically unloosen disastrous floods upon Baghdad and the alluvial plain to the south.

The Rain-fed Zone

241 438 In the upland plains of the rain-fed zone stretching from Northern Mosul to Suleimaniya, wheat and barley are the principal crops. Rainfall is generally inadequate for summer crops, although water from streams and springs permit cultivation of rice and cotton. In part of this area, especially Northern Mosul, there has been a rapid extension of cultivation with the help of modern agricultural machinery.

233 438 241 To the north and northeast lie the mountain massifs of Iraq. Here the raising of cattle, sheep and goats by Kurdish nomads is one of the principal occupations. The mountains are largely barren of trees but offer natural pasture for animals. In the valleys and on hillsides grain, tobacco, timber and fruit are grown. Tobacco, although small in area, is an important cash crop.

438 433 Except for some handicrafts, there is little native industry in this region. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, is principally a commercial center, and an outlet for exports to Syria and [315] Lebanon. Kirkuk, however, is the center of most of Iraq's petroleum production and one of the largest and richest oil fields in the world. Oil fields of subsidiary importance also exist at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin in Diyala province. The mountains of the North may ultimately yield other minerals such as copper, chrome and iron.

The Irrigation Zone

133 311 South of the rain-fed zone the river valleys may be divided into three major regions: the upper river valleys; the lower river valley down to Amara and Nasiriya; and the triangular area from Nasiriya and Amara to the mouth of the Shatt al Arab.

The first of these regions includes most of the northern Jezireh and the area north of Baghdad and east of the Tigris. The latter area still awaits irrigation for the most part, and the Jezireh is hardly susceptible to irrigation because of the elevation and configuration of the land. The Jezireh is an upland plateau

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relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major 133
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative
by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 244
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther
down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162]
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

438 country's foreign trade. Near it is the country's second largest oil field.

133 211 233 To the south and southwest of the irrigation zone lie the vast arid tracts known as the southern and northern deserts which comprise about 40 percent of the land area of Iraq. These are sparsely inhabited by roaming nomads who raise camels, goats and sheep and annually take their flocks into the river valleys in search of summer pasture.

II. The People

161 The first official census of the settled population in Iraq was taken in 1947 and preliminary statistics on the male and female population of each province have already been published.[1] The preliminary estimate of the enumerated population was approximately 4.6 million. This figure has been brought up to 4.8 million in the published statistics by adding a rough estimate of 200,000 for the nomads in Mosul province and in the provinces along the Euphrates. Like all other countries at a similar stage of development, Iraq has a very young population, about half being under the age of 20. Although no reliable vital statistics are available, all indications point on the one hand to a very high rate of mortality among infants and young children, and on the other, to a correspondingly high birth rate. Even under the present poor health conditions the population seems to have been increasing at a rate conjectured to be in the region of one to one and a half percent per annum. Whatever the present rate, however, it is clear that, if full advantage is taken of the ample opportunity to improve health

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[1] Considering the attendant difficulties, this census may be judged a success. The information about the people of Iraq which it has already yielded and, more especially, which it can yield when tabulation is completed, is without doubt far more reliable than any estimates previously made. However, as with most first attempts at census-taking, the results have to be interpreted with great caution. Besides the figures already published, the Mission had access to certain unpublished data on four provinces—Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra. Much of the description of the population which follows is based on this data, but it must be noted that, although allowance was made for the fact that these four provinces are a most imperfect cross-section of the country, this fact is an additional limitation to the validity of any but the broadest conclusions.

conditions in the future, the rate could rise to two percent per 161
annum or even higher within a comparatively short period. Obviously this possibility will have to be borne in mind in planning the development of social services such as education and housing. It also has important implications in agriculture. As the limited supply of water is more fully utilized, most of the increase in population may ultimately have to be absorbed in nonagricultural pursuits, unless water is used much more efficiently than it is now.

As the standard of social services such as health and education 162
is higher in the cities and the opportunities for employment are [369]
more varied, the distinction between urban and rural population is an important one in considering the age and sex distribution of the people, their occupations and their standard of living. About 550,000 people live in the municipality of Baghdad, another 300,000 in the next three largest cities of Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk and some 350,000 in other towns having a population of over 15,000. Thus about 1.2 million people or a quarter of the population live in sizeable urban communities. In addition, there are about a hundred smaller municipalities having an aggregate population of under half a million. These towns are usually the administrative 632
and market centers of the minor political subdivisions such as *qadhas* and *nahiyas* and many of them are little more than large villages; in many respects they form a semirural category intermediate between the larger towns and the villages.

There has been a strong migration from the country to the 166
cities in recent years, particularly during the last war. The most 369
striking examples of this can be seen in Baghdad and Basra where many thousands of "squatters" from Amara province are crowded together in makeshift huts under extremely unhygienic conditions. The peculiarly adverse conditions of life in Amara have made that province the principal source of migrants to the large cities and, indeed, to most parts of the country, but there has evidently been a substantial movement from the rural areas in general. As it is 162
prima facie likely that these migrants would consist principally of young adults or adolescents, especially men, it is not surprising to find that the census shows a much higher proportion of the very young (under 10) and the old (over 50) in the rural areas, the disparity being even more marked among men than among

162 women. The census returns, in fact, record an extraordinarily large excess of women over men in some parts of the country—e.g., 57 percent in the three rural *qadhas* of Muntafiq province—but there is good reason to believe that such figures, while indicative of the true position, are generally exaggerated.

Occupation

162 463 The major occupation is agriculture and animal husbandry. Nearly two thirds of the people live in the rural villages. As handicrafts are rarely found in the villages and only a few people are absorbed by such secondary occupations as trade and transport, it is likely that 85 to 90 percent of the rural population lives directly off the land.

Many of the inhabitants of the smaller and even some of the larger towns are also engaged in agriculture. In Tel Afar, a town of 20,000 in the principal grain-growing region of Mosul province, over three quarters of the male population whose occupation was recorded gave it as agriculture. This, however, is probably exceptional and the proportion would, no doubt, be considerably less than half in many smaller towns. Even in the largest cities, there is a smaller but far from negligible proportion of the population employed in agriculture, principally in the production of vegetables, dates and other fruits or in raising livestock for the city market.

In all, the number of people in families whose income is derived directly from work on the land is probably in the neighborhood of 60 percent of the total population. This method of expressing the percentage is used advisedly. A much higher figure could certainly be given for the number of people occupied since most [464] of the rural population is employed to some extent. Unemployment, as opposed to underemployment, is largely an urban problem. In the rural areas the number of men whose occupation was recorded by the census is often nearly as large as the number over [857 10 years of age. This, no doubt, corresponds closely to the facts, 889] since even young children tend flocks and perform other light work on the land while old men help with such tasks as threshing. [462] Women, too, are an important source of agricultural labor, particularly at harvest time, although this is inadequately reflected in the census.

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In the towns, on the other hand, the occupations of a much 162 smaller proportion of the males were recorded. And, moreover, 163 many of those that were recorded fell into various ill-defined categories, which very probably include a large number of the unemployed or the unproductive (e.g., school children). There is, also, [162] far less opportunity for work by women in the towns.

The estimate of 60 percent for the agricultural population would leave rather less than two million people in the families of those employed in other occupations. In this sector the labor force may be estimated at about 400,000 to 450,000 men and some 30,000 women or about 450,000 in all, with a considerable margin of error on either side. Some idea of the distribution of these workers is given in the following table.

TABLE 1

NONAGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE
(in thousands)

Commerce	110
Personal and public service	70
Manufacturing and handicraft	75
Transport	45
Government (including police)	55
	355
Other categories; errors and omissions	95
	450

This table, which is necessarily a compound of industrial and occupational classifications and consequently contains a few duplications, must be interpreted as only a rough estimate giving broad orders of magnitude.

After agriculture, commerce is certainly the most important occupational group; the census records nearly 50,000 (including a few women) in the four largest cities alone. There is probably at least an equal number in the rest of the country, since one of the main functions of the smaller towns is to serve as centers of retail

162 trade for the surrounding countryside and as collection centers for
163 its produce. Even in the smallest towns rows of small shopkeepers'
booths can be seen and the larger towns usually have extensive
bazaars.

Private and public service is another important group of occupations. Besides domestic service it includes such occupations as laundering and catering, the latter a not unimportant category in a country where the coffee-house is a center of social activity. In the four provinces for which data is available, there were 45,000 (of which 6,000 were women) in this group. The estimate given above does not seem excessive for the country as a whole.

A more detailed classification of workers employed in manufacturing will be found in Table 7. This table is based largely on statistics of workers employed in factories which have been compiled by the Labor Directorate from returns by factory inspectors. These figures are, however, acknowledged to be incomplete, particularly as regards the large numbers of handicraft workers who are self-employed with one or two assistants. From the census data it is evident that there are a large number of additional workers occupied in woodworking and allied occupations (e.g., working with palm leaves or reeds) and in tailoring or dressmaking; some addition would also have to be made for jewelry and textile workers. The figure of 75,000 given here includes an estimate for these additions.

The estimate for transportation, which includes all employees of the railways and the Port of Basra, is a particularly rough one. It is believed, however, to be of the right order of magnitude. The figure for government workers is reasonably accurate, although it may duplicate to some extent workers in other categories already specified. The residual figure, of course, is subject to an extremely wide margin of error. It includes all categories not mentioned elsewhere such as construction workers and the professions insofar as they are not employed by the government.

Literacy

212 The acquisition of skill is severely limited by lack of education. Education is, as the monograph on that subject shows, broader than the mere ability to read and write, but the degree of

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literacy in the country is a fair guide to the extent to which the 212
Iraqi can be considered educated. According to the census, which recorded the literacy of all those of five years of age or over, literacy in Baghdad among males over five was over 40 percent; in the smaller towns of the province it was about 30 percent and in the villages only 10 percent. These figures are probably well above the average. Cities like Basra and Kirkuk have a male literacy nearer 30 percent, but in many rural *nahiyas* it is five percent or less and in the remoter *nahiyas* of the North as low as two percent.

Literacy is much lower among women than among men. In the cities of Baghdad and Mosul, the proportion of literate females over five was about 20 percent (about half that of the males). Outside of the larger cities, however, female education hardly exists. The proportion of female literates in the rural areas and the smaller towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Basra and Baghdad provinces barely exceeds one percent.

It is not known how literacy was defined in the census, but even if these figures represent a real ability to read and understand rather than a smattering of education, it is clear that illiteracy is a great handicap to even the simplest form of written instruction. In industry this is apt to put a heavy burden of detailed work on the management of a factory. In agriculture it gives little possibility of supplementing the limited amount of oral instruction or visual demonstration which the present agricultural service can render.

III. The Standard of Living

No systematic estimate of the national income has yet been 434
made. A rough estimate by the Statistical Office of the United 511
Nations put the income per head in 1949 at $85. The equivalent in dinars would depend on the exchange rate chosen for conversion, which is necessarily an arbitrary choice; at the old rate, it would be about ID 20, at the new ID 30. The Mission attempted to make an estimate of the national product, but the information

424 511 available to it was often unreliable, if not actually conflicting, and, in certain fields, data were completely lacking. The attempt was, therefore, abandoned, but it was at least possible to draw the conclusion that the estimate quoted above was approximately correct and that the total income per head probably fell somewhere between ID 20 and ID 30.

511 In any event, a broad estimate of this kind which embraces both the very high incomes of the landowners and the very low incomes of the fellahin can do little more than convey a generalized impression of poverty. While it is not possible to give even a rough idea of the distribution of incomes in statistical terms, some description of the standard of living of the people may be of value.

Agriculture, which is the most important occupation in Iraq, is also the most difficult to describe, conditions being extremely varied and information virtually nonexistent. However, a hypothetical example of the condition of a fellah in the irrigation zone, where barley is the principal crop, may serve as a rough guide. In this zone a fellah, who cultivates 25 donums of winter crops annually, is probably above the average. Estimates of yields vary enormously, even apart from the annual variation due to water supply. Landowners tend to give a high estimate (e.g., 500 kilograms per donum), because they believe that the fellahin withhold part of the crop in order to obtain a larger share. This is probably true and accounts for the tendency of the fellah to give a low estimate (e.g., 200 kg). Apart from this, the land varies greatly in quality, pump-irrigated land being generally more productive. The fellah, however, gets a smaller share on pump land.

A yield of 300 kg on flow-irrigated land would probably not be much below average, if at all. The total crop on 25 donums would then be 7.5 tons. Of this the fellah would probably get as his share two fifths or three tons, out of which he has to retain seed for the next year and to pay for some help with the threshing and harvesting, in all amounting to one half to one ton more. The balance would thus be two to two and a half tons. His family might consist of five or six people, including himself, his wife and children, and one or two other relatives such as his parents or an unmarried sister. The minimum retained for food would be one ton and, in practice, it is probably more. He would thus have

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little more than one ton left to sell and he might even have to 511 keep part of this for his draft animals, if they are unable to find enough stubble and other natural fodder.

The price which a fellah gets for his grain is usually very much less than the wholesale market price in Basra or Baghdad. Although rail transport is very cheap for grains, the other costs such as local transport, bagging, weighing and storage are high; the merchants' profit and the *istihlak* tax also have to be deducted. Finally, the fellah's funds are usually exhausted before the harvest season and he frequently accepts a low forward price on his crop before it is gathered. For the 1950-51 crop, prices have been high (over ID 20 per ton), but many fellahin undoubtedly sold forward at prices little over ID 10. This would not be an unusual price in past seasons. Thus, ID 10 for the winter crop and perhaps another ID 10 for a small summer crop of sesame would constitute his total cash income for the year.

This income would usually be spent on food, clothing and possibly some low-grade domestic tobacco. Two of the most [262] important items in food expenditure are sugar and tea. Dates, particularly in the South, and a few vegetables such as onions are also purchased, but, on the whole, most fruit and vegetables are beyond the reach of the fellah and are sold in the towns. Meat is only eaten occasionally, although fish is available in the marsh areas of the South. Nor does the fellah who owns no animals other than his draft animals consume much milk or *leban* (sour milk). Clothing would consist of some cheap cotton sheeting sufficient for a few garments and occasionally a second-hand jacket; few fellahin wear shoes. Hardly anything is spent on housing or furniture, the living quarters being a small mud hut without windows and hardly any furnishing but a few mats and cooking utensils. Soap, for example, is undoubtedly a luxury. Life is not far above the subsistence level and must often be below it.

In the process of selling his surplus crop and making his small 511 purchases, the fellah is taxed. While with crops consumed in 651 Iraq the *istihlak* tax is largely borne by the buyer, in the case of an export crop such as barley, which is influenced by world prices, the tax falls most heavily on the producer. At the end of 1950, customs duties on sugar were about one fifth to one quarter of the

511 651 Baghdad retail price; on tea, about one sixth. Duties on textiles are also high, but cannot be so easily measured in terms of the retail price, while excise and other revenue collected on tobacco are also very large. In the case of barley, these indirect taxes on sale and purchase might reduce the fellah's real income from his saleable surplus by as much as one third.

511 Although the villager contributes to the revenue of the country, he receives little in the way of benefits from its expenditure. He is usually without any kind of education, which in itself militates against the improvement of his position. Thus the average fellah would not be able to read even the simplest leaflets, which might be published to improve his methods of cultivation. Government officials, who might impart this knowledge by personal contact, are too few or too hampered by lack of transport to be able to reach him. Much the same applies to his health, which is generally poor in the first instance because he is unable to afford an adequate diet.

Apart from a few generalizations, lack of information prevents comparison with other types of agriculture such as rice cultivation in the marsh areas of the South, date-gardening along the Euphrates and in Basra or grain-growing in the North. In general, the rice areas appear to be extremely congested and living standards are probably the lowest of all. Land in the North is more plentiful, the smallholder is more common, and, in any case, the share of the landlord is far lower, but rainfall is uncertain and yields vary disastrously from year to year.

There are, of course, fellahin who have additional sources of income. The principal source is livestock. A fellah, who, in addition to working the land, owns a few cows or water buffalo is, by comparison, a rich man, but such people are not common. The capital required to purchase an animal may be several times the annual cash income of the poor fellah. Some may seek casual work during the long off-season, but again these are the minority.

The condition of the settlers in the Dujaila project is in striking contrast to that of the average fellah. The principal reason for their improved standard of living is the fact that they do not have to pay any share to a landlord. Their income is for that reason alone more than double. In addition, they have been able to acquire cows, sheep, goats and chickens. Many of them have fruit gardens.

As a consequence they have a far healthier diet and are obviously 511
better dressed. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a farmer who himself employs a fellah. Although this is partly a consequence of the large size of his plot (100 donums including fallow), it is indicative of his much higher standard of living.

In the towns, workers with regular employment would be 511
much better off than the poor fellah, but in cities such as Basra 465
and Baghdad where there has been a great influx of people from the country, there is considerable underemployment in addition to unemployment. Although, at the current rate of wages for casual labor (about 200 to 250 fils a day) a man might theoretically earn an annual income of ID 75 or more, there must be many who work irregularly and earn less than ID 50. Bread and rice are comparatively costly and, together with the rent of a room for a man's family, might take nearly half his income.

Wages are probably not much higher in many of the smaller and more primitive industries, but artisans such as plumbers and electricians are scarce and can command much higher wages. In the more modern industries, such as the oil industry, the Port of Basra and the new factories in Baghdad, a skilled machinist can earn a dinar a day or more. On the clerical side, in the lowest grade of the regular civil service a married official with more than one child receives ID 13 per month.

The higher income of the city-dweller with regular employ- 511
ment enables him to purchase a reasonable diet, better clothing 369
and better housing. He also has access to educational and health services. Nevertheless, congestion and sanitary conditions are often very bad in certain parts of the cities and disease is common.

Above these various classes is the small rich group of land- 565
owners and merchants. No estimate of the proportion of the 511
national income accruing to this group is possible, but some indication can be gleaned from the fact that a landowner in the South normally gets at least half the net value of the output from the land, while, in industry, profits may exceed the total payroll.

IV. Natural Resources

Land and Water

312 Aside from oil, water and land may be said to be the principal natural resources of Iraq. Of the two, water is the more critical factor in the country's development. Underground water is generally plentiful, but in parts of the North it is frequently found only at considerable depth and in the central and southern portions, where the water table is high, it tends to be brackish and unfit for consumption. In the two major rivers, however, Iraq possesses a source of abundant water of a quality excellent for irrigation and, with purification, for human consumption. Here the chief problem lies in the marked variation of the flow of the rivers. On the Euphrates the mean monthly discharge of water varies from a low of 293 cubic meters per second in September to a high of 2,235 in May. On the Tigris the variation is even more marked, ranging from a low of 359 in October to a maximum of 2,951 in April. Thus periods of floods alternate with periods of acute scarcity. In the absence of storage facilities and a regulated flow, the limit on the cultivation of crops is set by the current low point in the water supply in the critical growing period for both winter and [134] summer crops. The water problem is further complicated by the fact that continuous use of water for irrigation, coupled with the effect of evaporation in a dry, hot climate, has saturated the subsoil waters with salt and raised the water table, thus precipitating salt which, in the absence of drainage, quickly makes the land infertile. More effective use of the water supply is thus the central problem of Iraq.

311 In relation both to the population and the land actually under cultivation, the amount of cultivable land available in the country is very large. Accurate statistics on the total cultivable area are lacking, but the following estimates based largely on data supplied by the Department of Agriculture give some conception of the magnitude:

TABLE 2 311 241

Cultivable Land, Cropped Land and Land in Agriculture Use
(in millions of donums)

Cultivable area		48.1
Irrigation zone	32.1	
Rain-fed zone	16.0	
Area actually in crops		11.1
By area		
Irrigation zone	7.6	
Rain-fed zone	3.5	
By type of crop		
Winter	8.4	
Summer	1.9	
Orchards	0.8	
Area under cultivation		17.5

These figures would indicate that the area under cultivation, 311 taking into account the assumption that almost half of the area devoted to winter crops is normally left fallow, is only about 36 percent of the total cultivable area. In the rain-fed zone the area under cultivation could theoretically be more than doubled; and in the irrigation zone it could be almost tripled. Unquestionably these figures give a somewhat exaggerated impression for it is likely that the criteria employed in classifying land as cultivable have been rather liberal, but there is little doubt that the area under cultivation can be greatly extended. What would be required in detail to put this additional cultivable land in actual use is not known, but, in the irrigation zone, water and drainage are undoubtedly the prime prerequisites while, in the rain-fed zone, more manpower and machinery may be the principal requirements.

Forms of Land Tenure

Land is held under a complicated system of tenure which has 423 471 given rise to much confusion and conflict. In accordance with traditional legal concepts the state has retained the ultimate legal title to nearly all the available land. Absolute private ownership, known as *mamloukah* or *mulk,* is confined to urban property and orchards. Rights to the permanent usufructuary possession of a large proportion of state or *miri* land have been acquired by private

423 471 individuals, however, under conditions which are virtually indistiguishable from full private ownership, since the holdings may be sold, mortgaged or transferred to successors. In the past, claims to land were established in most cases quite informally without the benefit of full legal sanction, i.e., by simply occupying the land. Tribal lands were generally regarded as being held in common. As, however, the tribes were converted from nomadic pursuits to settled agriculture, the sheikhs and sub-sheikhs of the tribe gradually established a claim to such lands as their own property and thus became landlords, with their tribesmen as sharecropping tenants.

423 In the 19th century the Turkish government sought to establish a single legal system of tenure, known as *tapu,* but in the end this effort only compounded the confusion. There were no systematic grants of *tapu* tenure. Grants were generally made without any examination of conflicting claims and were used as a means of rewarding the favored few. The grants that were made at that time to the Sadun clan and a few other influential persons in Muntafiq province remain contested to this day by the actual occupiers of the land. With the introduction of *tapu* tenure many village areas in the North apparently were registered in whole or in part as the personal possession of local notables or *aghas* who in the past had acted as tax farmers and served generally as intermediaries between the government and the cultivators. In the twentieth century a further complication was added by the rapid introduction of pump irrigation. City merchants financially able to buy pumps entered into arrangements with occupiers of *miri* land for the supply of water against specified shares in the crop, thus creating new claims to land without resolving the fate of any pre-existing claims.

423 651 Following a study of this question by Sir Ernest Dowson, a British land expert, the government decided in 1932 to end the confusion by inaugurating a cadastral survey to be carried out by a number of so-called Land Settlement Committees. The law of 1932 as well as the law which replaced it in 1938 recognized the following types of land tenure:

— *Mamloukah* or *mulk*—land held in absolute private ownership.

Matroukah—land reserved for public purposes.

Mawqufa or *waqf*—land which is administered in trust (1) for

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the benefit of religious institutions by the state Awqaf Administration, or (2) for the benefit of private persons by *mutawallis* appointed by religious courts. This type of *waqf* must be distinguished from so-called untrue *waqf*, namely property from which the taxes or revenue were in the past assigned to religious institutions by the Turkish government.

Miri tapu—land held in permanent tenure from the state under conditions enabling the holder to sell or mortgage it and leave it to his successors. Proof of such tenure may be supplied by documentary evidence or by factual evidence that the land has been used productively by the holder or his predecessor for 10 years during which no land rent was paid or that it has been planted with trees meeting specified conditions.

Miri lazmah—land held under generally the same conditions as *miri tapu*, but with the stipulation that the government may veto the transfer of such land if it tends to disturb the peace, a precaution designed to prevent, where necessary, the transfer of tribal lands to people outside the tribe. *Lazmah* grants are made upon proof that a person has made productive use of the land within the preceding 15 years.

Miri sirf—land, particularly vacant or idle land, definitely acknowledged as belonging de facto and de jure to the state.

Although *tapu* and *lazmah* land are still recognized as *miri* or state land, they are in fact hardly distinguishable from full private ownership. In theory, possession of these lands may lapse if they are not productively used for three successive years in the case of *lazmah* and for four years in the case of *tapu*, but this apparently happens rarely, if at all. Prior to 1939 holders of such land were generally required to make to the state a payment for rent and water rights which was lower for *tapu* than for *lazmah* land, but in that year these assessments were abolished in return for amortization of their capitalized value over a period of 10 years. With the abolition of these payments there now remains very little distinction between *tapu* and *lazmah*.

The cadastral survey has now been completed for about half of the land in the 14 provinces in Iraq. The progress achieved is set forth in the table below. It will be noted that 61 percent of the total land surveyed and 51 percent of the cultivable land sur-

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TABLE 3

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Land Classified According to Types of Tenure by Cadastral Survey*

(in donums)

	Cultivable	Uncultivable	Total
Total area to be classified	—	—	107,045,725
Total area classified by Feb. 8, 1951	38,188,575	12,268,459	50,457,034
Mamlukah (mulk)	150,601	22,366	172,967
Matroukah	9,296	1,686,912	1,696,208
Mawqufa (waqf)	549,198	36,538	585,736
Miri tapu	8,370,595	698,987	9,069,582
Miri lazma	7,371,720	485,291	7,857,011
Miri sirf	21,737,165	9,338,365	31,075,530

* For fuller details, see Table I in the appendix.

veyed has been definitely adjudged to be *miri sirf*. Only a small part of the land is actually being exploited today. About 1.6 million donums is let by the state on triennial leaseholds which may be renewed once by the same holder. Virtually all of the land in Amara province is also leased out by the state. Here, however, it is held under virtually permanent leaseholds by sheikhs who have been rewarded by rather large tracts of land in return for maintaining order and performing other services in this province which has a somewhat unruly past.[2] The remainder of cultivable *miri sirf* land is in theory still available for exploitation. Presumably most of the better and more accessible lands have been alienated to private holders, and that remaining to the state is in large part relatively poor, inaccessible, or not susceptible of irrigation. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a large reservoir of state land which can still be opened to cultivation, particularly if irrigation is provided.

425 A feature of the 1932 law inaugurating the cadastral survey was the introduction of *lazmah* tenure. This type of tenure was designed to recognize prescriptive rights to tribal lands. In practice, the sheikhs rather than the tribesmen have benefited from this provision of the law. *Lazmah* grants could be obtained on proof

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[2] In all there are 290 leaseholds of cultivated state land in Amara of which 13 are between 10,000 and 35,000 donums, 10 between 5,000 and 10,000 donums and 95 between 1,000 and 5,000 donums.

that the land was cultivated and a crop produced in any one year, 425 and the land settlement officers, who have sometimes been inexperienced and subject to influence, have on occasion accepted even more tenuous evidence as proof of a prescriptive claim. In this way a large portion of state land has been alienated to sheikhs and other influential persons, and the number of large landowners has multiplied.

Distribution of Land

Complete data on the distribution of landholdings are not 423 available. For the area covered by the cadastral survey, it is possible to classify private landholdings into various categories according to size. Such a classification, given in the accompanying table, shows that holdings of 1000 donums or less account for only 15.7 percent of the area. This is indicative of the small number of peasant proprietors. On the other hand, holdings of over 1,000 donums accounted for 67.1 percent of the total of privately owned land, while those of more than 10,000 donums comprised 24.3 percent of the area. Moreover, the importance of large holdings is undoubtedly underestimated by these figures. The cadastral survey has proceeded by areas known as *muqata'as*. In a number of cases landowners have holdings in several *muqata'as*, but these have been registered as separate holdings. Thus, according to the cadastral survey, there is only one holding in Kut in excess of 100,000 donums (namely 174.251 donums), although it is generally reported that there are actually several holdings well over 300,000 donums.

The accompanying table indicates that the highest proportion of small holdings is apparently in Basra, Dulaim, Kirkuk and Suleimaniya. The provinces of Kut, Amara, Mosul, Diyala and Kerbela have the highest percentage of large holdings.

The Sharecropping System

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Although the amount of land cultivated directly by the landowner has increased since the last war with the use of modern machinery, particularly in Mosul and Baghdad provinces, the great bulk of the land is tilled for the landholder by peasants or fellahin against a share in the crop. The sharecropper is not a tenant in the sense that this word is generally used in the western world. He has no discretion in the use of the land and does not lease a

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

TABLE 4

Distribution of Private Landholdings According to Cadastral Survey

(*mulk*, *tapu* and *lazmah* holdings)

Province	Percentage of Total Area by Cadastral Survey	Percentage of Area Covered by Cadastral Survey in Holdings of: 1-100 donums	101-500 donums	501-1000 donums	1001-10,000 donums	10,001-100,000 donums	100,001-200,000 donums	less than 501 donums	than less 1001 donums	over 1000 donums	over 10,000 donums
Mosul	64.2	17.1	4.1	2.8	48.8	27.2	—	21.2	24.0	76.0	27.2
Erbil	31.7	19.9	12.7	4.7	57.4	5.3	—	32.6	37.3	62.7	5.3
Kirkuk	44.4	32.4	13.9	5.0	29.8	18.9	—	46.3	51.3	48.7	18.9
Suleimaniya	14.3	24.7	18.1	8.9	42.4	5.9	—	42.8	51.7	48.3	5.9
Diyala	37.9	4.1	9.8	11.3	61.3	13.5	—	13.9	25.2	74.8	13.5
Dulaim	46.6	24.0	36.3	8.2	19.0	12.5	—	60.3	68.5	31.5	12.5
Baghdad	68.7	13.8	17.1	10.7	37.5	20.9	—	30.9	41.6	58.4	20.9
Kut	100.0	1.8	5.4	4.4	35.7	45.7	7.0	7.2	11.6	88.4	52.7
Hilla	94.7	18.4	13.7	9.4	4[illegible]0	17.5	—	32.1	41.5	58.5	17.5
Kerbela	42.5	15.7	7.6	1.6	43.8	31.3	—	23.3	24.9	75.1	31.3
Diwaniya	26.2	16.4	19.0	9.9	34.1	20.6	—	35.4	45.3	54.7	20.6
Basra	20.6	25.5	16.5	6.8	43.9	7.3	—	42.0	48.8	51.2	7.3
Amara	37.7	2.9	2.7	5.0	13.6	75.8	—	5.6	10.6	89.4	75.8
Total	50.0	15.7	11.0	6.2	42.8	23.2	1.1	26.7	32.9	67.1	24.3

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

specified piece of land for a definite period from the landholder 427
against a fixed rental. The landholder or his agent *(sirkal)* assigns 241
to the sharecropper each year the land to be cropped, determines the type and quantity of seed to be sown and prescribes the time and methods of plowing, watering, harvesting, etc. He generally makes an initial advance to the cultivator and often provides the fellah with seeds, draft animals and other means of production. Under the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators enacted in 1933, the landholder has the power to keep the fellah on the land as long as the latter is indebted to him. Thus the fellah is in reality a laborer who works with his family not for a fixed wage, but for a share of the crop.

The portion of the crop retained by the fellah varies rather widely. In the northern rain-fed zone it is higher than in the southern irrigation zone. In flow-irrigated areas it is half or two fifths but drops to about one third when the landholder provides the seed. Although, under the law, the landholder is not allowed to charge interest on his advances to cultivators, his share of the crop when he provides the seed increases out of proportion to the cost of the seed he furnishes. When the land is pump-irrigated, the fellah's share is generally only two sevenths or three sevenths of the crop. In date and fruit groves where the landowner must make a heavy investment and the value of the output is high, the fellah may only get a fifth to an eighth of the crop. In the rain-fed zone the fellah usually retains 90 percent of the winter crop and even more if the land is relatively remote from the town or city. His share of summer crops which can only be grown with water furnished by the landowner may range from two thirds to one half provided he supplies his own seeds and implements. In general the fellah's share is larger in the North because manpower is less plentiful in relation to available land, yields tend to be lower owing to uncertain rainfall and the fellah frequently has long-established rights to the cultivation of his land.

The amount of land cultivated by each fellah and his family varies widely. In the irrigation zone the fellah may on the average plant about 20 donums of winter crops, and, owing to the shortage of water, perhaps 15 percent of this area in summer crops. In rice areas, he generally has only about four to five donums on the

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average; and in date and fruit groves his allotment is likely to be equally small. In each of these cases, however, the output per donum is considerably more valuable. In the rain-fed plains of the North where land is more plentiful and yields more uncertain, he may on the average plant as much as 40 donums in winter crops. In most areas the fellah and his family can probably get as large a winter crop area as they can till, but their capacity is limited by lack of draft animals, primitive agricultural techniques and the debilitating effects of disease and a hot climate. In some areas of the irrigation ~~zone~~, however, particularly in parts of Hilla, Kerbela and Diwaniya, the fellah appears to get less land than he can till owing to the limited availability of good, irrigated land. The same applies to some rice-growing areas, particularly in Amara.

Lack of sufficient draft animals and implements, low yields and the necessity of turning over a share of the crop to the landlord or pump owner all combine to depress the economic status of the sharecropper. His position can only be improved by enabling him to raise his output or by increasing his bargaining power through the creation of alternative opportunities for employment and the opening up of new lands to settlement.

Minerals: Oil

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Iraq possesses considerable mineral resources. Of these by far the most important is petroleum. There are at present two major oil fields—one near Kirkuk in the North, the other near Basra in the South. The Kirkuk field is generally reputed to have reserves of over 1,000 million tons, while that near Basra, which is less well explored, seems to be almost equally promising. There are also minor oil fields at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin on the Iranian border.

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Although surface indications of the existence of copper, iron, chromite and other ores have been found in the mountainous belt adjoining Turkey and Iran, the existence of deposits of sufficient size to warrant commercial exploitation must first be confirmed by core drilling.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

V. Production

A considerable part of Iraq's potentially large resources are as 311
yet unutilized or ineffectively utilized. Most of the manpower on 433
the land is underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of flow. Oil reserves have as yet been tapped only in relatively modest quantities. The output of the country is therefore still very low and the standard of living correspondingly depressed.

Agriculture and Livestock

Estimates of the area and output of the principal crops are 241
given in the table below. Although the statistics are not very reliable, they give some indication of the relative importance of the various crops. Barley and wheat are clearly the dominant crops. Barley is one of the leading exports, and cereals altogether accounted for 43 percent by value of the country's exports other than oil in the period 1948-50. Rice is another important cereal. Cotton is now vying with rice as the leading summer crop. Stimulated by high prices and government encouragement, the area planted to cotton has risen rapidly in recent years. In 1951, probably about 580,000 donums were put in cotton—almost five times the amount in the preceding year. Other summer crops are comparatively insignificant. Some sesame is grown for oil, and some corn, millet and grain sorghum. Tobacco assumes importance only in the mountainous area of the North. Virtually no crops are grown for animal fodder, and the production of hay is unknown. The area devoted to soil-building crops such as legumes is rather small.

Next to cereals, dates are the most important crop. There 245
are about 20.2 million date trees, of which about 9.7 million are 439
along the Shatt al Arab near Basra and the balance in the central valley districts of the Tigris and the Euphrates and the Diyala River Valley. Dates are a staple food over most of Iraq and date exports, particularly from the Basra area, contributed 31 percent by

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TABLE 5

Estimated Area and Production of Principal Crops

	Area (in 1000 donums)				Production (in 1000 metric tons)			
	1935-39 Average	1946-50 Average	1949	1950	1935-39 Average	1946-50 Average	1949	1950
Winter crops								
Barley	3200	4156	3814	4000	583	703	750	800
Wheat	2940	3686	3493	3800	541	375	450	520
Lentils	n.a.[1]	41	43	45	n.a.	5	5	6
Vetch	n.a.	28	34	35	n.a.	2	3	3
Linseed	n.a.	6	6	8	n.a.	0.2	0.3	0.2
Summer crops								
Rice	636	970	617	870	148	273	212	242
Cotton	84	55	43	130	2.5	7	6	25
Sesame	n.a.	153	176	75	n.a.	10	9	10
Vegetables	n.a.	n.a.	100	110	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Corn	n.a.	106	61	130	150	16	10	21
Millet	n.a.	160	165	140	n.a.	13	18	19
Green gram	n.a.	86	111	70	n.a.	9	11	12
Tobacco	16	19[2]	15[2]	16[2]	5	4[3]	5[3]	3[3]
Dates	n.a.	750	750	750	300	275	170	250
Other fruits					n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Vegetables	n.a.	n.a.	100	110	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

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[1] Not available
[2] Licensed area
[3] Purchases by the Tobacco Monopoly

value of the country's total exports, other than oil, in the years 245
1948-1950. Citrus fruit, grown for domestic consumption, is of 439
considerable importance in the Diyala River valley and substantial quantities of other fruits and nuts, although of rather poor quality and marketability, are grown in the North, especially in Suleimaniya and Erbil. Vegetable culture is of particular importance in the neighborhood of large cities.

Agricultural yields are generally low, although most of the 241
soil is inherently quite fertile. Barley yields, for instance, are about 30 to 35 percent less than those in Canada and the United States and probably slightly less than those of Turkey and Iran. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Salinity attributable to poor drainage has materially lowered productivity of land in the irrigation zone. The soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Chief reliance is placed on the fallow system to restore soil fertility, but, since fallow land is often allowed to go up in weeds on which animals graze, its efficacy is limited.

The raising of livestock is an important industry. Sheep and 233
goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding.

TABLE 6

ESTIMATE OF LIVESTOCK POPULATION, 1949-50

Sheep	7,489,700
Goats	1,754,300
Cattle	1,034,600
Buffaloes	200,700
Camels	279,200
Horses	183,800
Mules	66,850
Donkeys	326,400

Sheep and goats, as well as camels, are kept primarily by 231
pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural

231 population. Livestock, however, are an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Many fellahin have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only the livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed. Livestock yields are generally very low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because [439] of poor breeding and disease. Yet livestock and livestock products —wool, hides and skins, and casings—accounted for about 13 percent of the total value of Iraq's exports, exclusive of oil, in the period 1948-1950.

Industrial Output

433 Industrial production is still very small. Reliable figures on industrial output and employment are unavailable. According to the Department of Labor, there are roughly 2,400 enterprises in industry, exclusive of service industries, employing over four persons. From Department of Labor data as well as certain supplementary sources, it is possible to give a breakdown for approximately 45,000 people engaged in industrial production. As already indicated, the actual number of people so employed is apparently considerably greater if account is taken of small handicraft enterprises. About 11,500 are employed in petroleum production and refining. The textile, apparel and footwear industries probably employ about 11,000 people. The processing of food, beverages, tobacco, other agricultural products and livestock products accounts for an employment of perhaps 9,000; the production of building materials, including bricks, tile and cement, for about 6,000; and wood processing, for approximately 2,000. Metal-working and machinery repair and maintenance account for most of the balance.

These employment figures tend to convey a rather exaggerated impression of possible industrial output. With the exception of those in the petroleum industry, virtually all are employed in small undertakings where the work is predominantly done by hand and productivity is accordingly very low. It is estimated that only about 2,000 people are engaged in what might be characterized as modern plants. Among these are one woolen and one cotton mill, one brewery, several distilleries, a cement plant, a vegetable oil and soap factory, and a number of flour mills.

7- International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 7

ESTIMATED INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT 433 464

Petroleum production and refining	11,500
Food and beverage	4,500
Tobacco	3,500
Wool and cotton processing, textiles, wearing apparel and footwear	11,000
Wood processing and wood products	2,000
Leather (other than footwear)	450
Chemicals (vegetable oils, soap, etc.)	550
Building materials	6,000
Metal-working, including jewelry	1,500
Machinery and machinery repair	2,700
Electricity and water supply	1,100
Miscellaneous	1,000
Total	45,800

Indications of output in the more primitive industries are very 433 scanty, but data on output in some of the more modern industries can be found in the monograph on Industry. Production is, in general, on a modest scale, although some industries such as cement fill most of the country's needs.

Petroleum Production and Refining

Although production of petroleum is now rising rapidly, it 315 has been relatively modest in the past. The exploitation of oil is 471 predominantly in the hands of three companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—all owned in equal shares, except for five percent controlled by Mr. Gulbenkian, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Royal Dutch-Shell, the *Compagnie Française des Petroles* and the Near East Development Corporation (owned jointly by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum). Of these three, the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is exploiting the large field near Kirkuk, is the only one in production. In addition, the Khanaqin Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, has a small concession adjoining the Iranian border.

Efforts to develop production have been concentrated mainly 315 on the Kirkuk field where oil is found at the depth of only between

315 2,500 and 2,800 feet and production costs are accordingly low. Production capacity has been increasing more rapidly than transport capacity. Until 1949 there were only two 12″ pipelines with an annual capacity of over 2,000,000 tons each—one to Tripoli in the Lebanon, the other to Haifa in Palestine. With the outbreak of war with Israel the Haifa pipeline was shut down and work on the completion of an additional 16″ pipeline to Haifa, which was to have an annual capacity of 4,000,000 tons, was halted. Output therefore had to be reduced from 4,354,000 tons in 1947 to 3,017,000 tons in 1948. With the completion of another 16″ line to Tripoli in 1949, it rose again to about 6,000,000 tons in 1950. Work has proceeded steadily on the construction of a new 30″ line, with an annual capacity of 13,000,000 tons, from Banias, Syria, and it is expected that this line will be linked in the spring of 1952 with the disused portions of the two lines to Haifa lying inside Iraq, thus permitting a partial use of the new capacity while the remainder of the line is finished in Iraq. Meanwhile the productive capacity of the Kirkuk field is being increased rapidly to an annual volume of over 20,000,000 tons.

In Mosul, where prospects are much less promising, production is not expected to begin until 1953 and then only at a rate of about 1,000,000 tons per year. Work on the fields near Basra, which are potentially very rich, was begun much later but is now rapidly proceeding. Production costs will be considerably higher than at Kirkuk because oil is found only at a depth of 10,000 feet or more. A pipeline with an annual capacity of about 2,500,000 tons has been completed to the port of Fao on the Persian Gulf, and oil is expected to start flowing early in 1952. The company has undertaken to increase production to 8,000,000 tons by 1955.

382 The output of the Khanaqin Oil Company is confined to two wells in the Naft Khaneh field and is used entirely in the company's Alwand refinery, a simple distillation plant which is the only refinery in Iraq. Although drilling is proceeding in the Chia Surkh field north of Khanaqin, it is unlikely that the company's total output will rise substantially. The company's Alwand refinery, which employs approximately 525 people, produces about 70 percent of the petroleum products consumed in Iraq, the remainder being supplied, until recently, from the Abadan refinery in Iran.

Petroleum products are distributed by the Rafidain Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and at prices, exclusive of taxes, which are among the lowest in the world. 382

TABLE 8

PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM AND REFINED PRODUCTS
(in thousand metric tons)

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	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951 (est'd.)
Crude oil					
Iraq Petroleum Company	4,354	3,017	3,671	5,986	7,500
Khanaqin Oil Company	339	367	365	384	350
Total	4,639	3,384	4,036	6,370	7,850
Refined products	n.a.	373	369	393	—

VI. Transport

The state-owned railway system is the principal means of transport, carrying about 2,000,000 tons of cargo and over 3,000,000 passengers annually. Part of it is standard and part meter gauge. The standard-gauge section is part of the original Berlin-Baghdad railway and runs from Baghdad northward via Mosul into Syria and Turkey. The meter-gauge line extends from the Port of Basra in the South to Baghdad and then beyond to Kirkuk and Erbil in the North, with a branch line to Khanaqin. Over recent years the railways have managed to carry out a considerable capital development program despite serious financial obstacles, but they now face the need of replacing, on a considerable scale, old track, rolling stock and locomotives. 496

Road transport has as yet primarily supplemented rather than replaced railway traffic. There are only about 11,000 passenger cars and a little over 9,000 trucks and buses in the country. Roads are generally inadequate. There are only about 2,500 kilometers of metalled and surfaced roads in all of Iraq. The remaining dirt roads quickly become impassable in bad weather. Some important 494 491

491 494 centers such as Amara and Kut are linked neither by rail nor by all-weather roads to Basra and Baghdad.

504 497 In Basra, Iraq possesses an excellent port capable of handling a considerable increase in traffic. Upcountry cargo into and out of the port is handled almost wholly by railway, for inland river traffic has declined greatly in importance owing to shallow water and other impediments to navigation.

The port and the railways are each run by an autonomous administration operating under a separate budget.

VII. Money and Banking

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The banking system consists of the National Bank, five commercial banks, a number of private banks or *sarrafs,* the post office savings bank, and three state-owned longer-term financing institutions, the Industrial Bank, the Agricultural Bank and the Mortgage Bank.

652 453 The National Bank succeeded the Iraq Currency Board as the currency-issuing authority in 1949. Iraq is a member of the sterling area, so that its currency is backed principally by sterling assets in London. Although the law permits the currency to be backed up to 30 percent by Iraqi government securities, as of March 31, 1951, the total amount of currency in circulation was more than covered by sterling assets. Aside from its note-issuing function, the Bank is charged with the administration of foreign exchange control and the supervision of the banking system in accordance with a bank control law which became effective at the beginning of 1950. This law requires banks to keep the equivalent of 15 percent of their time and demand deposits as a reserve with the National Bank and to keep 50 percent of these deposits in the form of cash and investments in Iraq. The National Bank is empowered to reduce the reserve requirement to 10 percent and to vary the second between 30 and 70 percent. Since the commercial banks have had no need for recourse to the National Bank in order to replenish their cash resources, the Bank's loans and advances have remained very small. As of March 31, 1951, they

stood at only ID 650,000, consisting almost wholly of advances to 452
the Baghdad Water Board and the Industrial, Agricultural and 453
Mortgage Banks. Almost all of the remaining assets of the Banking Department consist of Iraqi government securities valued at ID 5,490,000.[3]

There are five commercial banks in Iraq, of which three are 453
foreign banks. Of the two Iraqi banks, one, the Rafidain Bank, was organized and is controlled by the government and serves as the depository of government funds. These banks confine themselves principally to the short-term financing of foreign and domestic trade and have always kept themselves very liquid. Thus, as of March 31, 1951, their total liquid assets, including notes and coin, current accounts abroad, discounts and davances, but excluding the statutory 15 percent reserve maintained with the National Bank, amounted to about 87 percent of their current and short-term liabilities, and even 70 percent when advances which are primarily short-term are kept out of account.[4] The operations of the commercial banks are supplemented by the *sarrafs* which are principally engaged in financing small traders. Their number has been drastically reduced in the last year or two, owing partly to the exodus of the Jews and partly to their failure to meet the requirements of the bank control law that they submit their accounts and divorce their banking and trading operations.

The total foreign exchange assets of the banking system are 457
quite considerable. As of March 31, 1951, they amounted to about 458
ID 50,400,000. Total holdings tend to fluctuate primarily because of the influence of harvests upon exports. Thus a harvest failure in 1947, followed by another bad harvest in 1948, as well as the effect of the outbreak of war with Israel in 1948, were instrumental in reducing holdings from ID 64,900,000 at the end of 1946 to ID 43,400,000 in September 1949. As the result of two successive good harvests, reserves then rose in the ensuing year and a half by ID 7,100,000.

Part of Iraq's sterling assets have been frozen since the war, releases being governed by a five-year agreement effec-

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[3] See statement of the National Bank's assets and liabilities in Table II in Appendix.

[4] For a consolidated statement of the principal assets and liabilities of the commercial banks, see Table III in Appendix.

457 453 tive from July 15, 1947. In a supplementary agreement concluded in February 1951 the National Bank obtained an additional release of £2,000,000 and a guaranty of further releases up to £6,000,000 over the next two years, whenever necessary to maintain its free sterling working balances at a level of £6,000,000. As of March 31, 1951, the banking system still held £29,400,000 in blocked sterling out of total sterling assets of £49,700,000. Since Iraq's foreign exchange assets consist almost entirely of sterling, Iraq must apply to the British government for hard currency releases from the sterling area pool to meet dollar payments. Until February 1951 such releases were limited to specific periodic sums, but a new agreement for one year concluded at that time provided that sufficient releases would be made at all times to cover Iraq's essential requirements. There was no specific provision referring to the large requirements arising out of increasing investment outlays.

454 While short-term financing has not been a problem, the financing of the longer-term capital requirements of industry and agriculture has always been difficult. The amount of savings channeled into the banking system has always been small. Savings accounts in the commercial banks have varied between ID 1,700,000 and ID 2,400,000 over the last two years, and the total savings deposits with the postal system have been less than ID 900,000. Considerably more is undoubtedly saved, but much of it takes the form of hoarding. Thus it is generally assumed in Iraq that virtually all of the 100-dinar notes and a considerable part of the 10-dinar notes in circulation (ID 9,000,000 and ID 9,500,000 respectively as of March 31, 1951) are hoarded. There is a general preference for the investment of capital in urban and rural property, which are regarded as affording a high degree of security, and in commerce which yields a high return. Industry and agriculture have generally been starved of capital, although investments in these fields are slowly becoming more acceptable.

453 As a partial remedy for this shortage of capital, the government has established three institutions to finance industry, agriculture and building. Although each of these is capitalized at ID 1,000,000, the government has actually furnished only ID 550,000 to the Agricultural Bank, ID 600,000 to the Industrial Bank and ID 100,000 to the Mortgage Bank. While each bank has tried

to supplement its capital by borrowing and accepting time deposits 453
from certain institutions, their resources have been wholly inadequate to the need.

VIII. Domestic and Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments

As noted earlier, trade is probably the second most important 443
occupation. To all appearances, the system of distribution is extremely wasteful. Both in the small towns and in the larger cities there are numerous traders with very small stocks of goods, who cannot possibly earn more than an exiguous income, even if their margin of profit is high. The position is, however, not likely to be cured until the general level of incomes rises and there is alternative opportunity for employment.

Iraq produces most of its food, but apart from fuel, tobacco, 433
and some building materials, most of its other requirements must 439
be imported. Even the small local industries and handicrafts depend to some extent on imported raw materials. Much of the trade is therefore foreign trade. Baghdad is the principal center for the import trade and also has a considerable share in the export trade, although Mosul is the main center for the export of wool and Basra for dates and barley.

Although there are a number of large firms, among them sev- 439
eral foreign companies, engaged in the export-import business, 477
trade is by no means monopolized, as can be seen from the following table which shows the distribution of import licenses granted:

TABLE 9

Import Licenses: 1951

Import Quota (ID 000)	Number of Importers		Total Allocation (ID million)
	Baghdad	Other Cities	
100-180	36	18	6.6
50-80	60	24	4.9
20-40	344	147	13.1
5-10	1,015	502	10.4
	1,453	691	34.9

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[455]

Competition, in fact, is quite keen in bulk commodities like sugar, tea and textiles. There is no organized market, either in export or import commodities, so that, as speculation is rife, prices can swing rapidly upward on the basis of rumored or actual shortage.

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TABLE 10

IMPORTS INTO IRAQ (by value)
(in millions of dinars)

	1938	1947	1948	1949	1950
1. Sugar	0.5	1.7	3.7	2.2	4.8
2. Tea	0.4	2.3	2.1	2.8	2.9
3. Cereals and flour	—	0.2	2.3	1.1	—
4. Other food, beverages and tobacco	0.4	2.0	1.4	1.5	0.9
5. Cotton and rayon piece-goods	1.3	7.7	7.7	6.2	6.4
6. Other textiles and clothing[1]	0.9	4.0	3.4	2.9	3.0
7. Soap and matches	0.1	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.7
8. Cement and timber	0.5	1.6	1.6	1.0	0.4
9. Petroleum products	0.3	0.9	1.6	1.3	1.6
10. Iron and steel	1.1	4.8	5.0	4.9	3.7
11. Automobiles, trucks, and parts[2]	0.5	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.2
12. Machinery; electrical and other transport equipment	1.7	4.4	6.8	7.0	5.9
13. Miscellaneous	1.7	7.3	6.4	5.9	5.2
Total	9.4	40.0	45.5	40.5	37.6
Oil company imports[3]	1.0	5.1	9.5	10.3	8.4
Net	8.4	34.9	36.0	30.2	29.2

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[1] Excluding burlap bags, rope, etc.

[2] Including tires and tubes.

[3] The majority of these imports were in categories 9 to 12. For example, oil company imports in these categories were about ID 8,000,000 in 1948 and ID 9,000,000 in 1949, out of a total of ID 16,000,000 in each year. Except for petroleum products, these goods were virtually all for the companies' own use rather than for resale.

Imports

Table 10 gives a list of the principal imports for 1938 and for the last four years. Broadly speaking, categories 1 to 7 represent the principal consumer goods, categories 8 to 12 fuel, building materials and capital equipment, and category 13 some consumer goods and some industrial raw materials. As the footnote to

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the table indicates, however, the list as it stands includes imports by the oil companies for their own use, only a very small proportion of which are consumer goods. If these are eliminated, the breakdown in 1948 and 1949 would be roughly as follows:

TABLE 11

IMPORTS
(excluding oil company imports for their own use)

		1948		1949	
		(ID million)	(%)	(ID million)	(%)
1-7.	Principal consumer goods	21.5	59	17.6	56
8-12.	Fuel, capital goods, etc.	11.0	30	9.3	29
13.	Miscellaneous	5.0	13	4.6	15
		37.5	100	31.5	100

Thus about 60 percent of the imports other than those by the oil companies were consumer goods, of which textiles, sugar and tea, which are the bulk commodities purchased by the mass of the people, were much the most important. Quantities of these goods imported during the past years are shown in the following table:

TABLE 12

IMPORTS OF TEXTILES, SUGAR AND TEA
(by quantity)

	Piece-goods			Sugar	Tea
	Cotton	Art. silk	Woolen	(000 tons)	
	(in million square meters)				
1930-34 av.	62.2	11.4	1.2	37.6	2.1
1935-39 av.	60.6	17.3	2.2	40.5	3.0
1947	47.2	4.1	1.2	28.7	6.4
1948	56.0	1.5	2.0	85.8	6.2
1949	61.6	4.2	1.6	52.0	8.0
1950	54.3	10.1	1.4	87.2	6.9

It will be observed that imports of sugar and tea are now more than double what they were before the war, which, even after discounting an increase in population, must indicate a large rise in consumption per head. Imports of textiles, on the other hand, are

439 actually less than before the war, so that, although domestic production has increased, consumption per head must have fallen. Since the war, however, the government has encouraged the import of secondhand clothing, licenses being granted for imports from the United States.

433 439 Iraq usually produces sufficient cereals for its own use, imports in 1948 and 1949 being the consequence of two successive harvest failures. Apart from ghee, spices and some vegetables, most of the other foods are high-quality products consumed by the comparatively rich. Of these the import of beer has recently been prohibited, since a modern brewery now supplies the country's requirements.

Both soap and matches are made in Iraq, but soap manufacture was until recently a "backyard" industry and the quality of the product was poor. The sharp drop in imports of cement and timber in 1950 is a consequence of the new cement plant coming into full production. Imports of timber were also low owing to a depression in the building industry. Timber requirements are, however, likely to increase, as Iraq's own sources of supply are meager. Imports of iron and steel have also been affected by the slump in construction. This category, however, includes a wide range of other articles besides structural steel, the most important in recent years being pipelines for the oil companies. Other articles, such as household ware, should more properly be included with consumer goods.

As Iraq's output of refined petroleum products is limited to a small refinery and the requirements of motor transport, irrigation pumps, agricultural machinery and industry have steadily increased, a growing deficit has had to be made up by imports. The government plans to build a new refinery which should, when completed, remove the need to import virtually all of these products.

Among the most important categories of machinery are irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery, imports of the latter having greatly increased since the war. Other items include equipment for electricity production and distribution, and plants for the various new industries started since the war, such as textiles, distilling and the manufacture of ice.

The miscellaneous category includes such items as glassware, 433 ceramic products and pharmaceutical products. A number of raw 439 materials or other products used in industry are also included, for example: tanning material; leather for shoemaking; wooden boxes and other materials for packing dates (to the value of about half a million dinars in 1948); oils and oilseeds for the vegetable oil and soap industry; and non-ferrous metals for the small metal-working industries.

Exports 439

The three principal groups of exports are dates, cereals and animal products. Although there have been large fluctuations in the quantities exported, particularly of cereals, over the last 25 years their combined value has usually been at least 85 percent of the total value of exports other than oil, and has often been more. Of the remaining export products, cotton has usually been of some importance in the past and promises to be of much greater importance in the future. Prewar and postwar values of the groups of exports are shown in the following table:

TABLE 13

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS
(in millions of dinars)

	1931-35 Av.	1936-39 Av.	1947	1948	1949	1950
Dates	0.9	0.9	4.7	4.7	3.2	4.3
Cereals	0.7	1.3	6.7	0.2	5.8	10.8
Animal products	0.5	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.2	2.2
Other	0.4	0.5	1.2	1.1	1.0	3.1
Total	2.5	3.9	13.8	7.6	11.2	20.4

Dates. Iraq has long been the foremost exporter of dates in 433 the world. The quantity exported has increased steadily from an 439 average of 120,000 tons in the late twenties to 200,000 tons since the war. The crop may vary considerably from year to year. For example, the amount exported in the last quarter of 1949 and the first three quarters of 1950, which represents approximately the exportable surplus from the 1949-50 crop, was about 150,000 tons. The 1950-51 crop, on the other hand, was unprecedentedly large and a record amount of 340,000 tons was exported.

439 433 As Iraq has such a large share in the world's trade, variations in the size of the crop can cause large fluctuations in price and, in a prolific year, marketing difficulties. Since 1939 the burden of marketing the prime quality varieties (Khadrawi, Hallawi and Sayer), which are sold in the United Kingdom, Western Europe, North America and Australia, has been largely removed by a series of bulk contracts between the Date Association and a British company, under which the latter has agreed to purchase at a fixed price all dates of these varieties grown in Basra province.

No such scheme exists for the Zahdi and other lower quality dates. Their principal markets are in India, Egypt and other countries of the Far and Middle East to which much of the trade is carried in the traditional Persian Gulf sailing ships. Disposal of the extremely large 1950-51 crop through the normal channels proved impossible and the price of Zahdi dates fell during 1951 to a point where it was hardly remunerative to transport them to Basra. Faced with this situation, the government sent a trade mission to India and Pakistan and succeeded in making agreements with those countries which provided, among other things, for increased imports of dates.

Cereals. Barley is the only cereal now exported in large quantities, but the quantity is subject to extreme fluctuations owing to the great variability in the crop. On the average, exports have increased considerably over the years. In the latter half of the twenties, they averaged 100,000 tons and before the war 230,000 tons. From 1945 to 1947 they were around 250,000 tons annually, but successive bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 led to a temporary ban on exports in 1948, when less than 3,000 tons were exported. Two bumper crops followed, however, and in 1949 and 1950 exports, which had not before exceeded 300,000 tons, amounted to 326,000 and 462,000 tons respectively.

433 439 262 There was normally a surplus of wheat for export before the war; in 1937, the best year, over 100,000 tons were exported. Since the war, however, exports have been negligible except in 1950, while in 1948 and 1949 there were considerable imports as a consequence of the bad harvests. On balance, therefore, Iraq cannot at present be considered an exporter of wheat. This is, no doubt, due to the increasing consumption of wheat in the country, as a

consequence not only of the increase in population, but also of 438
the shift from the rural areas, where barley is often a staple ele- 439
ment in the diet. 262

Large quantities of rice are produced, but the surplus for export has always been very small. The only other cereal exported in any quantity is millet.

Animal Produce. The principal animal products exported 433
by Iraq are wool, live animals, hides and skins and casings (intes- 439
tines), usually in that order of importance. The sheep is the main source of these products, providing all the wool and usually the bulk of the other products. As with dates and cereals, the quantities exported vary greatly from year to year, sheep being vulnerable not only to disease, but also to extremes of winter cold and summer drought. In contrast with the other main exports, however, there has been no tendency for exports of animal products to increase. Exports of wool, hides and skins have, on the whole, been below prewar levels, while those of casings have fallen off badly. As animals are often taken across the frontier on the hoof, customs returns of live animals exported are not reliable. The recorded decrease since before the war, is, however, too large to be discounted.

Information on the animal population and on the domestic consumption of meat and other products is sketchy and unreliable. A rise in the consumption of meat could well explain the loss of exports of live animals, but this in turn would tend to make avail-
able a larger, not smaller, supply of most by-products. Part of the [233
explanation of the fall in export products may lie in a declining 162]
sheep population owing to the gradual shift from the pastoral life to settled agriculture and from agriculture to the towns. The monograph on agriculture and animal husbandry discusses the shortcomings of the livestock industry and recommends measures to improve livestock raising and the quality of livestock products. The value of exports of animal products is likely to continue its downward trend unless these measures are undertaken speedily and vigorously.

Sheep are especially important as a potential source of dollars. 439
Wool is the most important export to the United States, which 457
also takes all the casings exported and considerable quantities of

439 457 skins. Not all the dollar income accrues to Iraq, however, partly because invoices are regularly undervalued and also because some commodities are sold through intermediaries in the Lebanon.

439 **Other Products.** In the years 1947 to 1949 the remaining exports consisted of the following: bricks and sand exported for use by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the value of about ID 300,000 a year; a variety of agricultural products, whose total value did not exceed ID 500,000 in any one year; and cotton. Iraq has always exported a little cotton, but in the best years, just before the war and again in 1950, its value was only about five percent [248] of all export receipts. The position is now changing radically. Iraq, like several neighboring countries, is experiencing a cotton boom. Under the stimulus of high prices, the area under cultivation has increased rapidly in the last few years and predictions for the 1951 crop have ranged as high as 150,000 tons of seed-cotton, compared with 25,000 tons the year before. If the fellah's traditional aversion to a crop he cannot consume himself has been permanently overcome and if he can acquire the necessary knowledge for good cultivation, cotton could very soon become one of Iraq's most important exports, if not the most important. As a summer crop, however, its cultivation will be hazardous until the control of the rivers gives better assurance of a summer water supply.

Import Policy

459 656 457 All foreign transactions are, with certain exceptions, subject to exchange control. Imports from hard currency areas have been governed by licensing systems and have been limited to goods such as agricultural and industrial machinery, automobiles, trucks and drugs. Before 1948, imports from other areas were not subject to license, except for about 100 items, mainly luxuries. In that year, however, Iraq experienced a very large drain on her foreign exchange reserves and a more complex system was introduced.

Under the system now in force, all imported goods have been placed on one of several lists, the two longest consisting of "unlimited" and "limited" goods. Each merchant is given an annual quota in dinars, within which he can import unlimited goods without restriction, provided he obtains a license for each purchase. Alternatively, he can spend a small part of his quota on "limited" goods, but only up to a fixed amount.

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Unlimited goods consist mainly of the goods purchased by 439
the common people such as tea, sugar and cotton textiles, and a 656
variety of other goods considered essential, such as drugs and medi- 457
cal equipment, educational matter, industrial, electrical and agricultural machinery, transport equipment and raw materials for local industries such as gunny bags, certain vegetable oils, *mastika* (for *arak*), tanning extracts and non-ferrous metals. The principal object of the system, when it was introduced, was to prevent a shortage of these necessities—and hence high prices—at a time when imports as a whole had to be restricted to protect the country's exchange reserves. As an additional safeguard, each application for an import license was scrutinized to insure that the articles being purchased were not too highly priced. Since Iraq's foreign exchange position greatly improved in 1950, the import of unlimited goods is now permitted without any quota limitation.

The goods on the limited list, while not strictly luxuries, consist of goods considered less essential than those in the unlimited list. This includes, for example, ready-made clothing of various kinds, automobiles, matches, and certain types of household utensils and electric ware. Luxuries, such as bananas, confectionery, cosmetics, Persian rugs and nylon stockings, were placed on a third list of goods "without foreign exchange." These goods could be purchased only by merchants who held a special license to import "without foreign exchange," which meant that they had to acquire foreign exchange through other than the official channels. Such licenses also permitted them to purchase goods on the other two lists.

Foreign exchange can be acquired without official license in a number of ways, of which the following are probably the most important: by undervaluation of exports, especially wool, hides and skins; by the export of dates to neighboring countries in small craft (in this case retention of foreign exchange is legally permitted); by smuggling, although there is probably a net inflow of smuggled goods; by sale of dinar notes to foreign pilgrims to the Holy Cities; and by overvaluation of imports. The present system was introduced in order to compel merchants to use these resources instead of drawing on the national exchange reserves. Although the system has been successful in that there has been a very

439 656 457 extensive use of private exchange holdings, particularly in 1949 when licenses to the value of over ID 10,000,000 were issued, it may well be that it has also encouraged the illegal acquisition of foreign exchange.

A fourth list consists of prohibited goods. This is purely a protective device, almost all of the goods in this list being produced in Iraq. These include a variety of agricultural products such as sesame seeds and cottonseed or their oils. Several of the newer industries have also been protected by the prohibition of their products, for example, beer, cement, cotton yarn, aluminum ware, alcohol and hides.

Although the improvement in the foreign exchange situation has led to a relaxation of the quota limitation, the other restrictions remain. In particular, import licenses still have to be obtained for each purchase. Although it is maintained that licenses can now be obtained quickly, this appears to act as at least a psychological deterrent to merchants. One of the objects of the licensing system is to restrict importing to bona fide merchants, but if this is considered necessary, it could, of course, be achieved by the issue of a general importer's license, good for a period such as a year.

439 656 As the economy develops and the standard of living rises, which it may do rapidly in the near future, the demand for goods now on the limited and prohibited lists is likely to increase and restrictions on imports of these goods might easily have an inflationary effect on prices. This would hit the artisan, the clerk and the civil servant, and might increase the cost of the development program. Any extension of prohibition to textiles and other goods produced in Iraq would, of course, hurt the poorest classes. Under these circumstances, it will be very difficult to manage so rigid a system.

A much more flexible instrument would be the customs tariff, but little coordination of the import licensing system with the tariff [651] seems to have been achieved. At present the tariff is primarily a means for raising revenue and, as such, imposes the greatest burden on those who buy bulk commodities. It hardly conforms to the objectives of a licensing system that aims at a plentiful supply of these goods at low prices. The principal objection put forward to higher duties on luxuries is the increased premium

thereby put on smuggling which is difficult to control in a country 439
with long land frontiers, even with a large police force. On the 656
other hand, smuggled goods can now be purchased quite openly, and it is hard to believe that enforcement could not be made more effective.

In any event, outright restriction of imports could cause prices to rise and so put almost as great a premium on smuggling as a high tariff. The government has tried to prevent excessive mark-ups on certain goods such as radios by price control measures, but the control is by no means fully effective.

The government has also supplemented the system by entering [655]
the market itself. For example, arrangements have been made under the recent Trade Agreement with India for the import of cotton textiles and gunny bags, in part on government account. The government has also made direct purchases from abroad of its own requirements (e.g. tires). The effect has, however, not always been as intended, merchants being hesitant to buy with the prospect of large government stocks hanging over the market.

On the whole, a less complex system of import control would seem better suited to an economy like that of Iraq, whose requirements are likely to change in composition and to increase quite rapidly. Fewer regulations, more strictly enforced, are likely to serve better the two ends of social justice and public revenue.

Balance of Payments

The bulk of foreign transactions are carried out through the 457
commercial banks, which are subject to exchange controls, or [453]
through government channels such as the National Bank. However, numerous transactions pass through other channels and many of them are virtually impossible to estimate. For this reason the Mission has not attempted to construct a true balance of payments. Table 14 shows the foreign exchange transactions passing through the principal official channels, so far as they are known to the Mission. The other items which would enter into a complete balance of payments are discussed subsequently.

As will be seen, even this account, which it should ordinarily be possible to balance, is subject to a wide margin of error for which no explanation is available. The general significance of the

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TABLE 14

Official Exchange Transactions—1949 and 1950

(in millions of dinars)

	1949		1950	
I. Items not involving the oil companies				
A. Trade				
Exports	+14.9		+20.6	
Imports	−20.0		−24.8	
		−5.1		−4.2
B. Other Current Items				
Transfers by RAF and foreign companies	+ 1.1		+ 1.3	
Interest and profits (net)	+ 0.4		+ 0.8	
Payments to Crown Agents and foreign contractors	− 0.4		− 2.2	
Other items (net)	− 2.2		− 2.8	
		−1.1		−2.9
C. Capital Items				
Private transfers (net)	− 0.1		+ 0.5	
Public transfers	—		+ 2.5	
		−0.1		+3.0
II. Items involving the oil companies				
Transfer for local expenditure (IPC Group)	+ 6.7		+ 4.4	
Transfer for local expenditure (AIOC)	+ 1.1		+ 0.3	
Royalties, etc. (IPC group)	+ 2.1		+ 3.2	
Net advances (IPC group)	− 1.0		+ 1.0	
		+8.9		+8.9
		+2.7		+4.8
III. Errors and Omissions		−3.9		+1.8
IV. Increase (+) or Decrease (−) in foreign balances of the National and Commercial banks		−1.2		+6.6

table is, however, clear. The transfers made by the oil companies have financed a considerable deficit in trade and a smaller one on other items.

The accounts presented above, however, do not by any means

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include all foreign transactions. There are, in addition, three major self-balancing accounts. In the first place, there are the additional operations of the IPC group. Goods valued at ID 9,200,000 in 1949 and at ID 7,400,000 in 1950 were imported on their own account by the IPC group for use in their operations, while 3,700,000 and 6,000,000 tons respectively of oil were exported and a small quantity of equipment re-exported. Theoretically it would be possible to enter these items in a balance of payments as merchandise trade and, after subtracting local expenditure and royalties, offset them by appropriate entries for investment and profits. As they do not, in fact, affect the exchange position, it is simpler to omit them than to make what are necessarily arbitrary calculations.

Secondly, there is an important group of transactions by the AIOC and its associated distributing and producing companies, the ROC and the KOC. The ROC imported about ID 1,000,000 worth of goods, mainly petroleum products, in each year. The net proceeds of the sale in Iraq of imported and locally produced petroleum products, after deduction of local expenses and taxes, were for the most part placed in special local accounts on which the AIOC drew to pay for certain expenses in Iraq. The principal items were various shipping dues in the Shatt al Arab amounting to somewhat more than ID 1,000,000 and building materials exported from Basra. The final balancing item was an increase or decrease in the accumulated balances in the AIOC's or the ROC's local accounts, i.e., an increase or decrease in Iraq's liabilities in foreign dinar accounts. It is known that in 1950 there was a considerable accumulation of unused funds by the ROC.

Finally, there is a considerable body of transactions, mainly illegal, which do not pass through official channels. The approximate value of trade not accounted for in the items already discussed is shown in Table 15.

Part of the discrepancy may be explained on grounds of the difference in timing between receipt or dispatch of the goods themselves and payment therefor. Furthermore, the customs returns overestimate imports by recording the valuation of the major part of these goods c.i.f. Baghdad or Mosul, thus including transportation inside Iraq. Some items, which were really trade, may have been included under other headings (e.g. payments to the Crown

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TABLE 15

MERCHANDISE TRADE
(in millions of dinars)

	1949		1950	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Customs returns	12.4	40.5	22.0	37.6
Less				
Oil Companies trade	− 0.7	−10.3	− 0.8	− 8.4
"Officially" financed	−14.9	−20.0	−20.6	−24.8
Discrepancy	− 3.2	10.2	0.6	4.4

457 Agents). But the principal explanation of the large amount of residual imports is the import of goods "without foreign exchange." Licenses issued (but not necessarily used) amounted to ID 10,800,000 and 7,400,000 in 1949 and 1950. These were paid for with foreign exchange acquired by the methods already described. Part of this foreign exchange was, no doubt, also used for travel abroad, particularly in the Lebanon. Insofar as receipts and expenditures in "unofficial" foreign exchange did not balance in any one year, there must have been a balancing item in these transactions, representing capital export or import. No data is available on this, but it is generally believed that there has been a considerable export of capital in recent years.

IX. Government and the Economy

654 Until recently the goverment, handicapped primarily by a shortage of funds, played a comparatively modest role in promoting economic life. [242] In agriculture the main effort was confined to the production and distribution of seeds, the promotion of cotton and citrus culture and the combating of diseases and pests, particularly the locusts. Some help was given through the establishment of the Agricultural Bank and of a government organization for the rental of agricultural machinery. One project for the settlement of smallholders on newly irrigated government land in the Dujaila district near Kut was initiated. Outlays on irrigation and flood control,

however, had to be kept small. In the field of industry the government sought to stimulate private enterprise by according special tax benefits and protection and by establishing the Industrial Bank. 654

The Development Board

With the prospect of a rapid rise in oil production and therefore in government oil revenues, the promise of a much wider field of activity developed. Accordingly a law was enacted in 1950 establishing a Development Board and assigning to it all the oil revenues as well as the proceeds of any loans contracted by it or by the government on its behalf. The Board consists of two ex officio members—the Prime Minister, who functions as its president, and the Minister of Finance—and six executive members appointed for five years. The Board was directed to draw up a general program for the development of Iraq and, upon its approval by Parliament, to proceed with the detailed plans and specifications of the projects included in the program and with their execution in accordance with an approved order of priorities. Each year any revisions in the program, an annual budget and an annual report are to be presented to the Parliament. The Board is also to consider and coordinate development schemes which may originate in the various ministries of the government. 654 185 647

The establishment of this Board is evidence of the government's determination to see the extraordinary oil revenues used for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living and to insure some continuity in development which frequent changes in governments have made virtually impossible in the past.

The Board was constituted and began operations toward the end of 1950. The British and American governments each nominated one of the executive members in accordance with a request by Iraq. In the spring of 1951 the Board submitted its preliminary over-all program involving a total outlay of ID 65,674,000 over a five-year period beginning with the fiscal year 1951-52. About ID 29,401,000 of the Board's projected revenues, consisting of the income from oil anticipated at that time and nearly all of the proceeds of the $12.8 million loan obtained from the International Bank for the Wadi Tharthar flood control project, were reserved

654 for subsequent programming. Expenditures for the five-year period
185 were allocated by broad fields as follows (in dinars):[5]
647

Water storage and irrigation schemes	30,044,000
Roads	15,826,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	12,618,000
Miscellaneous projects	6,216,000
Administrative expenditures	970,000
Unprogrammed reserve	29,401,000

Because of the brief time devoted to its preparation, this program will necessarily undergo modification as more detailed study is given to requirements and the cost of individual projects and as some of the over-all allocations are programmed in detail.

652 The magnitude of this projected outlay is in startling contrast to the financial stringency which has characterized public expenditures in the past. The government has had great difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays were pared; government salaries were not increased despite the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds.

Government Budgets

The trend of government finances is indicated in Table 16.

It will be noted that, despite economies and tax increases, the government's total budget showed substantial deficit in 1948-49 and 1949-50, primarily because of the bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 and the effects of the war with Israel. Of the government's principal autonomous enterprises, the railways also ran considerable deficits on capital account which were defrayed only by using reserve funds, by borrowing ID 1,000,000 from the government and contracting a loan of ID 3,000,000 through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The Iraqi government borrowed at home to meet its own needs, its domestic debt rising from ID 4,500,000 on March 31, 1948, to ID 10,800,000 on March 31, 1951. Borrowing had to be limited, however, because the market for government securities was virtually restricted to the banking system. As of March 31, 1951, the National Bank and the commercial banks held ID 9,200,000 of the domestic debt.

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[5] For a more detailed breakdown, see Table V in Appendix.

TABLE 16

BUDGETS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES

(in millions of dinars)

	1947-48	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51 (provisional)	1951-52[1] (estimate)
GOVERNMENT BUDGET					
Ordinary					
Revenues	21.2	21.2	23.8	26.1	28.2
Expenditures	23.0	28.1	26.6	25.9	29.1[2]
Balance	−1.8	−6.9	−2.8	+0.2	−0.9
Capital					
Revenues	4.8	2.5	3.8	5.1	—
Expenditures	3.6	3.9	3.4	3.8	—
Balance	+1.2	−1.4	+0.4	+1.3	—
Total					
Revenues	26.0	23.7	27.6	31.2	28.2
Expenditures	26.6	32.0	30.0	29.7	29.1
Balance	−0.6	−8.3	−2.4	+1.5	−0.9
RAILWAYS BUDGET					
Revenues	3.8	3.6	4.0	4.0	4.2
Expenditures, (including capital)	5.3	6.4	4.8	4.3	5.2
Balance	−1.5	−2.8	−0.8	−0.3	−1.0
PORT AND FAO BAR BUDGETS					
Revenues	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.5
Expenditures, (including capital)	2.1	2.4	2.4	3.2	4.1
Balance	+0.2	+0.2	+0.2	−0.8	−1.6

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[1] With the establishment of the Development Board the latter's budget has replaced the government's regular capital budget. In its 1951-52 budget, however, the government has still incorporated income from oil produced in the first quarter of the calendar year 1951 and is planning to devote this revenue to a number of projects including a government spinning and weaving mill (ID 1,000,000), a small-loans bank (ID 250,000), establishment of a National Insurance Company (ID 50,000), army buildings and equipment (ID 464,000), and the initial cost of an oil refinery (ID 250,000).

[2] Since the original approval of the budget the government has apparently issued three ordinances raising total authorized expenditures by about ID 2.7 million.

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TABLE 17

GOVERNMENT DEBT

(in millions of dinars as of March 31)

	1948	1949	1950	1951
Domestic debt				
Treasury bills	1.5	4.6	4.3	4.8
Bonds	3.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Total	4.5	10.6	10.3	10.8
Foreign debt	—	—	—	3.0*
Grand Total	4.5	10.6	10.3	13.8

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* Contracted on behalf of the railways.

Features of Government Expenditures

Certain characteristic features of government expenditures in recent years are set forth in Table 18. Outlays on defense and police have absorbed well over one third of the total budget. On the other hand, expenditures on agriculture and irrigation which are of critical importance to the economy have been very small and in 1949-50 were even further reduced so that they represented only

TABLE 18

SOME GOVERNMENT OUTLAYS BY TYPE

(in millions of dinars)

	1948-49		1949-50		1950-51 (est.)	
	Amount	Percentage of total budget	Amount	Percentage of total budget	Amount	Percentage of total budget
Defense and police	11.4	35.6	11.1	37.0	10.9	36.7
Agriculture and irrigation	2.5	7.8	1.6	5.3	1.6	5.4
Education	2.6	8.1	2.6	8.7	3.8	12.8
Health and other social services	2.0	6.2	1.7	5.7	2.4	8.1
Public Works and housing*	1.8	5.7	1.2	4.0	2.0	6.8

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* Includes expenditures of Public Works Department in the ordinary budget and expenditures on public works, including communications, but excluding irrigation, in the capital budget.

a little over five percent of the total. Expenditures on education, health and other social services, although still very inadequate, rose slightly so that they absorbed almost 21 percent of the total budget in 1951. Capital outlays have been extremely modest. Total new government investment outlays for civilian purposes have averaged only ID 2,700,000 annually in the period 1948-49 to 1950-51. Expenditures on public works and housing, excluding irrigation, absorbed on the average less than six percent of total government outlays in this period. 652

Economies have also been effected in recent years at the expense of the municipal and provincial administrations. By law, these were supposed to have assigned to them, in equal shares, the proceeds of the property and petrol taxes less the expenses of collection incurred by the central government. Actually very little of these taxes has been turned over to the local and provincial governments. For example, in the three years 1947-48 to 1949-50 the provincial administrations received only ID 175,000 out of a total of ID 2,626,000 due to them. Municipalities were similarly handicapped. The ability of local governments to carry out improvements and even to maintain existing facilities was correspondingly curtailed. 631 652

Characteristic Features of Government Revenues

The fiscal system in the past has been characterized by (1) the high proportion of revenues derived from indirect taxation, (2) light taxation of agriculture, and (3) considerable tax evasion and poor tax collection. 651

Indirect taxation is generally predominant in all underdeveloped countries, and Iraq is no exception. In the three-year period 1948-49 to 1950-51 indirect taxes contributed about 82 percent of all tax income and 59 percent of total budget receipts. Customs duties and excises accounted during these years for 71.5 percent of total revenues from indirect taxes, while taxes on agricultural produce, fish, and livestock brought to market (the so-called *istihlak* and *koda* taxes) contributed most of the remainder. Direct taxes—the so-called land tax, the property tax and the income tax—accounted for only 18 percent of total tax revenues and 13 percent of all government receipts. Income and surtaxes

651 have yielded only about ID 2,400,000 annually in recent years because income from agriculture and urban property is exempt and rather sweeping exemptions or reductions have also been accorded to Iraqi-owned industrial enterprises. The three principal oil companies have also not been required to pay income taxes in return for annual payments in commutation of all taxes. Income and surtaxes thus bear primarily on salaried employees and individuals and companies engaged in commerce. In 1948-49 all Iraqi companies paid only ID 259,000 in income and surtaxes as compared with ID 488,000 paid by foreign companies.

Both land devoted to agriculture and income from agriculture largely escape taxation. A land tax, assessed in accordance with a very complicated set of criteria, was levied until 1931 when it was replaced by a 10 percent tax called *istihlak* on agricultural
651 produce brought to designated centers, presumably for sale. At the
427 same time, the government enacted a Law for the Collection of Land Rent which, after its revision in 1936, came to be called erroneously a land tax. Actually it was a compound of a rent charge on all lands except those alienated in *tapu* to which the state had retained the ultimate title, and a tax on water whether supplied by flow or by pump. The "rent" element was supposed to equal about five percent of the value of the crop and the "water" charge between two and 10 percent, depending on whether the land was irrigated by pump or by flow, and, if by flow, whether or not the flow was regular and assured. The total charges were assessed by various criteria. For government lands, which were regularly leased, they were set either by auction or by triennial assessment of the type and amount of crops grown on the land. This levy, which itself was circumscribed by a number of exemptions, was abolished in 1939, except for *miri* lands leased regularly by the government, in return for certain payments over a maximum period of 10 years. In view of the subsequent inflation these
651 proved to be rather light. Thus virtually the only remaining agricultural tax is the *istihlak*. During recent years this tax has varied from 10 to 12½ percent of the value of produce brought to market as fixed on the basis of market prices. The *istihlak*, however, is paid by the buyer rather than the seller, although the producer may actually bear it insofar as prices are set in the export market

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TABLE 19

Composition of Government Receipts

(in millions of dinars)

	Actual results			Estimates
	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51[1]	1951-52
A. Taxes				
Direct taxes:				
Land tax [2]	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4
Property tax	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6
Income tax	2.2	2.4	2.4	1.7
Total direct taxes	3.4	3.6	3.6	2.7
Indirect taxes:				
Turnover tax on agricultural produce and animals	3.2	3.6	4.6	4.7
Customs }	9.8	11.3	13.0	9.4
Excises }				3.1
Stamp duties	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
Tobacco Monopoly (net)[3]	0.3	0.4	n.a.	1.2
Total indirect taxes	13.8	15.8	18.1	19.0
Total tax receipts	17.2	19.4	21.7	21.7
B. Other receipts				
Share in National Bank's profits	—	—	0.6	0.7
Oil royalties	2.0	3.2	5.0	1.8[4]
Posts and telegraphs (gross)	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2
All other receipts	3.0	3.3	2.6	2.8
Total other receipts	6.0	7.6	9.4	6.5
Grand Total	23.2	27.0	21.1	28.2

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[1] Preliminary.

[2] Actually a tax in respect of land rent and water rights.

[3] The amount credited to the budget does not represent the actual surplus of the Monopoly's cash receipts over expenditures which amounted to ID 2,200,000 in 1948-49 and ID 1,200,000 in 1949-50. The Monopoly's "accounting" contribution to the budget is computed by (1) taking the difference between cash income and cash expenditures realized by the Monopoly in its transactions in tobacco, tombak and cigarette paper, (2) adding or subtracting the net charge in the value of the Monopoly's stocks during the year, and (3) adding sundry revenues from confiscated tobacco license fees, storage, etc.

[655]

[4] Represents only royalties to be received on oil production in the first quarter of the 1950 calendar year, the remainder being credited to the Development Board.

651 or prices cannot be correspondingly increased because domestic demand is too elastic.

At the same time, the tax system discriminates in favor of those who have managed to obtain state lands in *lazmah* grant and against those who have regularly leased land from the state. The latter continue to be assessed for rent whereas the former, who have frequently secured large *lazmah* grants on the basis of rather tenuous proof of occupancy and cultivation, escape any tax or rent assessments on their land.

Agriculture probably also profits to a greater extent than other sectors of the economy from tax evasion. It is generally acknowledged that only between 60 and 70 percent of the *istihlak* is actually collected and that part of the tax is collected at reduced rates by downgrading the produce subject to taxation. Moreover, many leaseholders of government land simply fail to pay the rent tax. Thus of the ID 874,552 assessed in 1949-50, only ID 185,715 was actually collected. The leaseholders in Amara province accounted for ID 669,000 of the arrears. Their failure to pay may reflect in part a feeling that they are the victims of the discrimination cited above.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE I-A

Land Classified According to Types of Tenure by Cadastral Survey up to February 8, 1951

CULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	Total
Baghdad	7,906,800	69,620	6,588	81,360	319,171	1,037,157	3,324,500	4,838,398
Kut	6,208,325	66	—	203	618,974	1,595,466	2,535,439	4,750,149
Kerbela	2,447,600	11	—	2,319	84,652	19,488	23,958	130,429
Basra	4,908,400	63,067	—	15,181	84,576	3,041	61,608	227,473
Amara	7,496,800	—	—	22	7,991	47,043	1,914,865	1,969,921
Diwaniya	5,981,600	28	92	—	187,791	840,588	307,405	1,335,905
Dulaim	18,428,400	6,669	—	13,840	123,181	432,201	3,579,990	4,155,882
Erbil	7,217,200	10	—	645	786,739	817,853	302,540	1,907,787
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	16	—	190	355,373	2,705	51,793	411,076
Mosul	20,129,200	56	913	170,914	2,979,610	1,099,525	7,775,652	12,026,669
Kirkuk	8,132,400	200	1,615	109,878	1,372,423	310,935	991,127	2,786,179
Hilla	2,100,000	3,489	37	27,976	573,148	758,091	262,092	1,624,834
Diyala	6,438,000	7,369	50	126,670	876,964	407,637	605,193	2,023,874
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	150,601	9,296	549,198	8,370,595	7,371,720	21,737,165	38,178,575

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1852 MHI Iraq MHI

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TABLE I-B

LAND CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TYPES OF TENURE BY CADASTRAL SURVEY UP TO FEBRUARY 8, 1951

UNCULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	Total
Baghdad	7,906,800	14,951	108,756	9,010	41,592	71,131	349,126	594,567
Kut	6,208,325	20	54,148	192	127,504	152,311	1,124,000	1,458,176
Kerbela	2,447,600	96	3,872	160	26,391	1,637	868,073	900,229
Basra	4,908,400	4,447	21,372	441	6,613	113	748,587	781,575
Amara	7,496,800	258	9,271	57	202	7,595	836,648	854,032
Diwaniya	5,981,600	8	23,924	2	31,578	98,093	75,474	229,081
Dulaim	18,428,400	435	81,074	550	7,490	26,693	4,320,580	4,436,823
Erbil	7,217,200	517	202,888	813	9,326	5,970	162,132	381,646
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	15	117,982	2	1,250	—	12,873	132,113
Mosul	20,129,200	116	354,692	4,442	213,207	4,274	324,210	900,942
Kirkuk	8,132,400	135	621,893	2,503	42,381	632	160,035	827,570
Hilla	2,100,000	182	37,821	3,158	65,532	65,442	192,575	364,711
Diyala	6,438,000	1,186	49,218	15,206	125,927	51,408	164,050	406,996
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	22,366	1,686,912	36,538	698,897	485,291	9,338,365	12,268,459

TABLE I-C

Land Classified According to Types of Tenure by Cadastral Survey up to February 8, 1951

TOTAL, CULTIVABLE AND UNCULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						Grand Total
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	
Baghdad	7,906,800	84,571	115,344	90,370	360,763	1,108,288	3,673,626	5,432,965
Kut	6,208,325	86	54,148	395	746,478	1,747,771	3,659,439	6,208,325
Kerbela	2,447,600	107	3,872	2,479	111,043	21,125	891,931	1,030,658
Basra	4,908,400	67,514	21,372	15,622	91,289	3,154	810,195	1,009,048
Amara	7,496,800	258	9,271	79	8,193	54,638	2,751,513	2,823,953
Diwaniya	5,981,600	36	24,016	2	219,369	938,681	382,879	1,564,986
Dulaim	18,428,400	7,104	81,074	14,390	130,671	458,894	7,900,570	8,592,705
Erbil	7,217,200	527	202,888	1,458	796,065	823,823	464,672	2,289,433
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	31	117,982	192	356,623	2,705	64,666	543,189
Mosul	20,129,200	172	355,605	175,356	3,192,817	1,103,799	8,099,862	12,927,611
Kirkuk	8,132,400	335	623,508	112,381	1,414,804	311,567	1,115,162	3,613,749
Hilla	2,100,000	3,671	37,858	31,134	638,680	823,532	454,667	1,989,545
Diyala	6,438,000	8,555	49,268	141,876	2,136,892	459,045	769,243	2,430,870
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	172,967	1,696,208	585,736	9,069,582	7,857,011	31,075,530	50,447,034

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

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7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

TABLE II

MONTHLY STATEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF IRAQ
(In thousands of dinars)

End of Month	Consolidated Accounts of Issue and Banking Departments[1]									
	Liabilities					Assets				
	Capital & Reserves	Currency in Circulation	Current Accounts	Other Accounts	Total	Sterling	Silver	Iraq Securities	Advances[2]	Other
Oct. 1949	2,500	35,913	354	1,863	40,630	34,707	157	5,620	55	91
Dec. 1949	2,500	36,356	338	1,891	41,085	35,137	151	5,620	125	53
Mar. 1950	2,500	38,634	3,160	2,109	46,403	39,843	152	6,120	225	63
June 1950	2,500	39,282	3,930	1,871	47,583	40,859	155	6,160	353	56
Sept. 1950	2,500	37,813	4,617	2,520	47,450	40,278	161	6,160	798	53
Dec. 1950	2,500	39,096	4,877	2,685	49,159	41,885	155	6,160	910	50
Mar. 1951	2,942	40,566	3,345	1,863	48,717	41,700	154	6,160	650	53

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[1] This table omits the currency held by the Banking Department, which appears in its accounts as an asset and in the Issue Department's accounts as a liability.

[2] Includes advances made to the Industrial Bank, Mortgage Bank, Baghdad Water Board. As of July 1950 advance of 1949 government share of National Bank profits also included.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE III

Consolidated Statement of Assets and Liabilities of Five Commercial Banks

(in dinars)

ASSETS	Feb. 28, 1950	Feb. 28, 1951
Notes and coin in Iraqi currency..	3,217,543	5,140,227
Credit balances with branches and licensed banks in Iraq	1,806,774	3,366,131
Deposits with National Bank	3,271,104	5,549,794
Investments, advances and discounts in Iraq:		
Government loans	2,578,083	2,176,315
Bills discounted	813,129	958,506
Advances	4,338,362	6,384,214
Investments	357,276	435,683
Sundry	31,650	57,188
Deposits and investments payable abroad:		
Foreign government securities	3,502,870	2,252,870
Other	7,418,652	9,169,608
All other	534,327	217,170
Total	27,869,770	35,707,706

LIABILITIES	Feb. 28, 1950	Feb. 28, 1951
Paid-up capital	1,650,000	1,800,000
Reserves and provisions	386,723	605,576
Balance profit and loss account	142,682	164,205
Debit balances with branches and licensed banks in Iraq	1,936,609	3,637,427
Liabilities against credits opened	2,659,820	5,344,375
Demand deposits	13,770,021	13,759,800
Time deposits	767,889	613,814
Sundry creditors	155,775	573,498
All other, including government and quasi-government deposits	6,400,251	9,209,011
Total	27,869,770	35,707,706

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TABLE IV

EXPENDITURES PROJECTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD

(in millions of dinars)

	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56	Total
Irrigation projects:						
Wadi Tharthar	1.3	3.6	3.1	1.5	0.2	9.6
Habbaniya	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	—	2.1
Diyala Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.1	2.2	1.9	6.1
Dokan Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.0	1.8	2.0	5.7
General drainage	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Other irrigation projects:						
New projects	0.4	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.9	4.2
Completion of projects begun previously	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.3
Total	3.0	6.6	7.4	7.5	5.5	30.0
Roads and bridges:						
Main roads across Iraq from south to north (Basra - Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc.)	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.6
Other roads	1.3	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	9.4
Total	2.1	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.5	15.9
Buildings:						
Hospitals	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Schools	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Other buildings	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.0
Total	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	12.6
Other projects:						
Small settlement projects	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Artesian wells and water for drinking purposes	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Special projects in northern Iraq	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.3
Reforestation and filling of swamps and marshes	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5
Telegraphs & telephones	0.5	—	—	—	—	0.5
Other projects	0.2	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.4
Expropriations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	—	1.1
Total	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	6.2
Administrative expenses	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0
Grand Total	9.4	13.7	14.8	15.0	12.8	65.7

Note—Totals do not necessarily add up because of rounding.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX B

FLOOD CONTROL, IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE

Effective and economical utilization of available water 3/2 resources is the central problem of Iraq.[1] In its study of this problem the Mission has addressed itself to (1) the storage of water for the purpose of controlling floods and increasing the regular supply of water for irrigation, (2) the expansion of irrigation, (3) the provision of drainage to prevent deterioration of irrigated lands by salt, and (4) questions of operation and maintenance of irrigation systems. The Mission has relied heavily on published materials ranging from the *Report on the Irrigation of Mesopotamia* by Sir William Willcocks, published in 1911, to more recent studies, particularly the monumental *Report on the Control of the Rivers of Iraq and the Utilization of their Waters* made in 1949 by the Irrigation Development Commission under the presidency of Mr. F. F. Haigh. In addition, however, the Mission conducted a field survey, in the course of which one or more of its members visited the sites of proposed dams and reservoirs, and examined the problems of irrigation at first hand. Its conclusions are therefore based on observation as well as the study of relevant documents.

I. Water Storage

Today the storage of the flood waters of the Euphrates and 3/2
Tigris and their tributaries is the foremost problem. The twin 133
rivers carry, on the average, almost 70 billion cubic meters of water per year—a quantity theoretically adequate to irrigate vast areas. Much of this comes, however, in the spring at a time too

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[1] See the Mission's main report, p. 7 *et seq.*; also Annex A, *Basic Factors and Conditions.*

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[731] late to benefit winter crops and too early for summer crops. Destructive spring floods are apt to occur just before the harvesting of the winter crops begins and as the planting of summer crops is in process. In the dry season—July to December—which is critical for both summer and winter crops, the mean discharge of the Euphrates at Hit and the Tigris at Baghdad is only 421 cumecs (cubic meters per second) and 559 cumecs, respectively, as compared with 1,765 cumecs and 2,572 cumecs during the three peak months of the spring.[2] The Haigh Commission has calculated that the mean discharge which can be relied upon for irrigation is only 280 cumecs for the Euphrates and 350 cumecs for the Tigris and its tributaries. This supply would appear to be barely equal to the water needed for existing irrigation systems when figured on the basis of the standards usually applied in Iraq. In fact, at present there is an acute shortage of water in the irrigated areas of the Diyala Valley and the Hilla canal system while in other areas water is wasted. Short of radical economies in the use of water, which can only be realized over the long term, no significant extension of the irrigated area can be undertaken without controlling and regulating the flow of the rivers. Nor can disastrous floods be controlled without schemes for the storage of the excess waters.

The Euphrates

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312 A project for the regulated diversion of the flood waters of the Euphrates into Lake Habbaniya is already under way. This project involves the construction of an inlet channel from the Euphrates near Ramadi to the lake as well as an outlet channel for the later release of the stored waters. A barrage will be built across the Euphrates at Warrar to raise the water level and thus permit an increase in the capacity of the lake reservoir. The outlet channel and regulator are already finished and work is we advanced on the inlet channel and its regulator. The project whe completed will reduce the flood discharge from a possible maximum of 5,200 cumecs to 2,000 cumecs and will increase the minimum supply of water available for irrigation from 280 cumecs to perhaps 440 cumecs. The total cost is estimated at ID 4,300,000.

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[2] See chart and also Tables I and II in the appendix.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Hydrographs of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers

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——— Average Mean Monthly Discharge
– – – Minimum Mean Monthly Discharge
——— Maximum Mean Monthly Discharge



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While the soundness of the scheme is beyond question, the Mission has serious reservations about extending the storage capacity of the project by evacuating part of the water in Lake Habbaniya to the nearby depressions of Bahr el Milh and Abu Dibis through the discharge channel of Mujarrah. The Haigh Commission contemplated that with the reservoir formed by these depressions the maximum flood discharge could be further reduced to 1,500 cumecs and the water available for irrigation could be raised to 510 cumecs. In the opinion of the Mission, however, the salt in these depressions would be a serious obstacle to their use as a reservoir for irrigation water. The use of the stored water of Lake Habbaniya would in itself tend to raise the salt content of the Euphrates to the maximum concentration considered usable for irrigation. Since the lake is said to contain about two million tons of salt, and the waters of the Euphrates entering the lake themselves contain some salt, the waters of the lake at the capacity set by the 49.5 meters contour may reach a salt content of 100 parts per 100,000. These waters when mixed half and half with those of the Euphrates, which have a maximum salinity of 40 parts per 100,000, will tend to have a salt concentration of 70 per 100,000 or approximately the maximum tolerance. The Bahr el Milh and Abu Dibis depressions, however, now contain about 44 million tons of salt. The 20.5 billion cubic meters of water which might be stored in these depressions would therefore have a salinity of 215 parts per 100,000. It would be necessary to remove 27 million tons of salt in order to reduce salinity to 80 parts per 100,000. The Haigh Commission thought it possible to achieve this lower salt content in approximately four years by progressively evacuating the stored water into the Euphrates, but at a rate which would not raise the salt in the Euphrates itself over 80 parts in 100,000. Even granting this possibility, the Mission believes, however, that the resulting salt content would still be too high for irrigation water.

As a minimum, the Mission strongly suggests that any project for storing water in these two depressions be deferred until the problem of salting, already acute, has been brought under control by the installation of drainage facilities in the irrigated areas of the Euphrates Valley. At the same time it would be advisable to explore the possibility of alternative storage capacity somewhere

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

along the Euphrates. Of several possible sites, the best appears to 312
be at Rawa, a few kilometers upstream from Ana. There a dam 653
35 to 40 meters in height could be erected to create a reservoir with a capacity of seven billion cubic meters and an area of 480 square kilometers. The water would be backed up over a distance of 200 kilometers of which 60 kilometers would be in Syria. No geologic study of this possible dam emplacement has been made. An examination of outcroppings shows a series of horizontal layers in which soft but fairly compact limestone alternates with layers of highly decomposed rock and layers of soluble gypsum. While these surface indications raise serious doubt concerning the watertightness of the possible reservoir, the Mission urges that a geologic study of the site, supported by soundings, be carried out in order to obtain a geologic cross-section in the neighborhood of the projected dam emplacement.

The Tigris

Flood control on the Tigris is to be assured by the Wadi Tharthar project. A contract for the work on part of this scheme was awarded in the fall of 1951. The project involves the erection of a barrage across the Tigris, north of Samarra, to limit the flood discharge of the river to about 3,500 cumecs and divert the excess waters via an inlet channel into the Wadi Tharthar depression. At a contour of 60 meters the depression is expected to hold about 68 billion cubic meters of water in a reservoir extending over 2,050 square kilometers. The total cost of this project, for which the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development provided a loan of $12,800,000 in June 1950, has been budgeted by the Development Board at a figure of ID 9,625,000.

The efficacy of the Wadi Tharthar as a flood control scheme is clear. That the depression is sufficiently watertight to store enough water for irrigation is less certain. The Haigh Commission and its geologist had no doubt on this score, but other experts, including the one who served as government geologist until recently, have raised serious questions regarding the tightness of the reservoir.[*] Two firms of consulting engineers—Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther, and Sir William Halcrows and Partners—have advised that the Wadi Tharthar project be considered exclusively for flood control. In any event, it would take about ten years for the reservoir to fill to the level at which water might be supplied for irrigation, and this water would then be available only for use in the Tigris Valley from Baghdad south. Thus other schemes for the storage of water for irrigation have to be considered.

From time to time storage dams for the Upper Tigris have been suggested, some with the obvious hope that they would cater to the needs of the North where rainfall is unreliable and does not permit the cultivation of summer crops. Among the sites proposed are two north of Mosul. One is near the village of Zumar about 115 kilometers from Mosul. The topographic features there would permit the creation of a storage basin, but geologic conditions appear to be very unfavorable. The soil consists of badly decomposed and fissured Lower Fars limestone and of marl which is also more or less decomposed. While no geologic investigation of the site has been made, borings made by the Mosul Petroleum Company about 10 kilometers away indicate the presence of numerous permeable layers in this area through which large amounts of water would probably be lost. Despite these prima facie doubts about the water tightness of the reservoir, the Mission believes that a complete geologic study, including borings, should be made of the site because of the understandable interest in this project in the North.

Conditions at the second site—Badosh, 25 kilometers above Mosul—are even less favorable. It has been suggested that with a dam 45 to 50 meters high a reservoir with a capacity of five billion cubic meters could be constituted. Outcroppings, however, disclose decomposed limestone with many caverns on this site. The dam would have to be built across a slight fold, cutting through various formations. Even with resort to costly and laborious injections of concrete, it is extremely doubtful that the proposed reservoir could be waterproofed.

Farther down the Tigris there is another possible dam site at Fatha where the river crosses a mountainous fold running northwest-southeast and known as Jebel Hamrin on the left bank and Jebel Mahul on the right bank. This site was studied in some detail by consulting engineers in 1940, and the investigation was resumed by the Haigh Commission in 1948. The Commission's geologist held that it would be impossible to build a gravity dam

in the gorge itself but that an earthen dam farther upstream might 312 be feasible. The dam would have to be about 3,500 meters long 653 and, with a height of 75 meters and a fall board of six meters, could be used to store 24 billion cubic meters of water up to a contour of 182 meters. It could therefore be considered as an alternative to Wadi Tharthar and even as preferable since it would be likely to make more water available for irrigation. However, the anticipated cost of construction—about ID 20,000,000—and the vulnerability of an earthen dam to enemy attacks in time of war caused it to be rejected. Now that there no longer is any question of its consideration as an alternative to Wadi Tharthar, the possibility of a more modest project at Fatha might well be examined. A dam only 40 meters high could create a reservoir of five billion cubic meters which might some time in the future become of critical importance to irrigation. At the same time it would be so much smaller than the original project that the same objections concerning its safety could hardly be entertained. The Mission would therefore recommend further geologic studies and, particularly, a series of borings to determine definitely a geologic cross-section along the axis of the site.

The Tigris Tributaries

The Development Board has already provided in its five-year program for the construction of the Derbend-i-Khan dam on the Diyala river and the Dokan dam on the Lesser Zab river. The Mission agrees that these dam sites are the best available but suggests, as will be indicated in greater detail later, that these two projects be supplemented by the construction of the Bekhme dam on the Greater Zab river.

The Derbend-i-Khan Dam on the Diyala

Originally the Haigh Commission recommended that a dam be built at a point called Gibraltar where the Jebel Hamrin crosses the river. In 1950, however, Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther and Sir William Halcrows and Partners expressed their preference for a dam at the Derbend-i-Khan defile farther upstream; and in 1951 the Development Board included this project at a total cost of ID 4,800,000 in its five-year program. The Mission considers this decision sound. The foundation soil at the

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Gibraltar site is soft sandstone sandwiched with layers of impermeable marl. The dam would have to be built of locally available sand and gravel, with an impervious facing in reinforced concrete or an impervious core; and it would be difficult to establish a watertight joint between the impervious facing and the impervious soil through the sandstone. The hills edging the reservoir show many low points where lines of seepage are so short as to create the risk of breaches. The presence of a lot of gypsum adds to the doubt about the watertightness of the reservoir. Moreover, its size and location are such that 128,000 masharas[3] of arable land would be submerged and 35 kilometers of railway detoured.

Borings have been made at the Derbend-i-Khan site and expert geologic opinion holds that the site provides a good foundation for a dam and has possibilities for a watertight reservoir. The rock-fill dam to be built will only close the breach, opened by centuries of erosion, in a solid rock sheath which, over long geologic periods, must have constituted the resistant part of a natural dam. The capacity of the dam will be only 0.87 billion cubic meters as compared with 1.56 billion for the Gibraltar dam. However, after allowing for losses, engineers believe that Derbend-i-Khan will provide a discharge of 80 cumecs at the Diyala weir, which governs the Diyala irrigation canals, as agaist 85 cumecs for Gibraltar. At present the usable mean discharge at the weir is only 38 cumecs.

The Dokan Dam on the Lesser Zab

A short distance from the Iranian border the Lesser Zab River passes through four gorges. According to competent geologic opinion, only the fourth of these, namely the Dokan Gorge, appears to offer a suitable dam site. The Dokan Gorge cuts through about 60 meters of Judean limestone covered by 40 meters of Shiranish limestone. Surface examination indicates that the former apparently consists of horizontal, generally sound beds, interspersed here and there, however, by caverns, while the Shiranish appears to be much more fissured. Up to the present only a brief geologic reconnaissance of the site has been carried out. Borings should be undertaken to confirm the surface indications and determine what special precautions should be taken in building the dam. The

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[3] A mashara is equal to a donum (0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres).

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

geologic investigation should extend to the Shiranish limestone, for 3/2 if this is found to be of adequate quality a higher dam and larger 653 reservoir would be possible.

The construction of an arch dam at this site would be more economical than a gravity dam, but the proper planning and execution of such a dam requires much more skill. The Mission suggests that, after a thorough program of borings have shown the geologic conditions that will be encountered, the design and engineering of the dam should be entrusted to several consulting engineering firms so that the Development Board will be enabled to judge the best of different conceptions. So far as possible, all risks should be eliminated before construction commences. Soundness of conception and safety should not be sacrificed in a desire to get things done rapidly.

An arch dam 60 meters in height would provide storage capacity for 1.99 million cubic meters at a level of 501 meters and for 2.21 million at a level of 508 meters. The usable mean discharge of the Lesser Zab would then be raised from about 63 cumecs to 108.5 and 149 cumecs at these respective levels.

The Bekhme Dam on the Greater Zab

The Haigh Commission made a complete geologic reconnaissance, including borings, of the possibilities of building a dam at two different sites in the Bekhme Gorge. It concluded that the Shiranish limestone at the upstream entrance to the gorge would provide a sound foundation for the construction of a high dam. The Commission was primarily interested in this dam as a flood control project, and, after deciding in favor of the Wadi Tharthar scheme, did not therefore include the dam in its program. The Development Board's five-year program also makes no provision for Bekhme.

The Mission urges, however, that construction of the Bekhme dam be undertaken as soon as possible. With the completion of the Dokan dam and related works it is planned to divert the waters of the Lesser Zab into the Adhaim River and use them for irrigating areas on the left bank of the Tigris and in the Diyala River Valley. Thus the Lesser Zab which has a usable flow of about 60 cumecs at present will no longer be supplying water to the Tigris.

312 653 As a result irrigation in the Lower Tigris basin, particularly in the area served by the Shatt al Gharraf where water is already acutely short, would inevitably suffer in consequence unless water were made available from some alternative source. Although the deficit may be made good from the Wadi Tharthar in the end, it is by no means certain, as has already been pointed out, that the Wadi Tharthar depression will be able to supply water for irrigation. If the Wadi Tharthar reservoir can ultimately supply the Lower Tigris, it will still be possible to use the water stored behind the Bekhme dam for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in the North.

Nor should the cost be regarded as out of proportion to the results that will be achieved. In 1948 Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther estimated the cost of a gravity dam in concrete at ID 9,000,000, but in 1950 they came to the conclusion that a buttress dam could be built at considerably lower cost, namely about ID 6,500,000. The dam would provide a net storage capacity of 1.66 billion cubic meters and would increase the usable discharge of the river from 128 cumecs to about 240 cumecs. This would furnish additional water sufficient to irrigate an area of two million masharas gross. On this area it would be possible to grow winter cereals on 828,000 masharas which might have a total value of ID 3,700,000, assuming conservatively a yield of one quarter of a ton per donum and a price of ID 18 per ton. If, in addition, summer crops were grown on one third of the area devoted to winter crops and yielded about the same value per mashara, the total value of the crops grown on the area of two million masharas gross could be put at about ID 5,000,000 per year. The resulting increase in national income would far outweigh the cost of the scheme. Even the tax yield would exceed the cost of amortization.

International Agreements

312 648 The construction of these reservoirs makes it necessary to reach agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the control of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris. For the Euphrates this is particularly urgent because half of the course of the river is in Turkish and Syrian territory and nearly all of its basin is in a foreign country. There are irrigation possibilities in Syria which could seriously reduce the flow of water into Iraq. Works which would raise the water level 10 to 20 meters upstream would com-

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mand an area for irrigation of 1,000,000 to 1,360,000 masharas in Syria. Irrigation of 1,000,000 masharas would require a flow of almost 60 cumecs. In Turkey and Iran the mountainous nature of the watershed of the rivers makes it much less likely that significant quantities of water will be diverted for irrigation. With these countries, however, it will be important to reach agreements regarding joint anti-erosion measures. Such measures will effectively complement water-storage schemes as means of flood control, the more so since silting will otherwise substantially reduce the effective life of reservoirs. Cooperation in afforestation of the watershed areas of these rivers is therefore highly desirable. 312 648

At present no such agreements exist. With Syria, there is no accord whatever. With Iran, there is only an old protocol of 1914 governing the use of the waters of a small stream, the Gangir. A protocol annexed to the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness, concluded with Turkey on March 29, 1946, set up a flood-warning service, permitted Iraq to investigate possible sites for flood-control dams in Turkey and gave agreement in principle, subject to confirmation in each case, for construction of works recognized to be necessary. Turkey also undertook to inform Iraq of any contemplated works on any of the two rivers. The scope of the agreement is thus rather limited.

II. Irrigation Works

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It is now necessary to consider what irrigation works will be needed to utilize the additional water that will ultimately be made available by the water reservoirs discussed above and what further works should be undertaken to ensure better utilization of water.

Aside from flood control, the most important consequence of the new reservoirs will be the expansion of the area under irrigation. As Table 1 indicates, the area now under irrigation has been estimated by the Haigh Commission at 12,696,000 masharas gross, of which 4,671,000 are irrigated by the waters of the Euphrates and 8,025,000 by those of the Tigris and its tributaries.

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TABLE 1

Area Within Irrigation Systems

(in 1000 masharas)

	Gross	Cultivated	Winter crop area irrigated	Mean discharge used for irrigation (in cumecs)
Euphrates				
Flow irrigation	3,109	2,666	1,160	161
Pump irrigation from				
canals	607	515	263	32
river	955	812	474	43
Total	4,671	3,993	1,897	236
Tigris*				
Flow irrigation	2,380	2,033	760	105
Pump irrigation from				
canals	1,060	901	400	49
river	3,020	2,567	1,280	115
Total	6,460	5,491	2,440	269
Diyala				
Flow irrigation	1,350	1,148	572	74
Pump irrigation	215	183	92	8
Total	1,565	1,331	665	82
Grand Total	12,696	10,815	5,002	587

* Including tributaries other than the Diyala.

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In considering the areas which might be provided with new irrigation systems, the Mission has adopted certain standards and practices which have been generally accepted in the past. Among these are:

1. The amount of cultivated land (in winter crops) which can be irrigated effectively by a constant flow of one cumec measured at the intake of an irrigation system (i.e. the so-called irrigation duty) is 7,200 masharas or donums;
2. Half of the cultivable area within an irrigation system is left fallow during the winter crop season; and, since a given amount of water can generally irrigate an area in winter crops about four times as large as in summer crops, the area of an irrigation system is conceived in terms of the winter crop;

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3. The cultivable area within an irrigation system is about 85 percent of the gross area which includes the surface occupied by roads, villages, canals, etc.

The Mission does not regard the first two criteria as immutable. The indicated irrigation duty is certainly very low; and the Mission will make some suggestions regarding it in the subsequent discussion of problems of operation. The present fallow system practiced in agriculture should also not be regarded as sacrosanct. Through the use of fertilizers and the introduction of soil-building crops the proportion of fallow might well be considerably reduced. Since almost all of the land which will be newly irrigated will be opened to settlement by small-holders under prescribed conditions, the state will be in a good position to insist on better agricultural practices in such areas. With water stored in reservoirs, it will also be possible to regulate the distribution of water as between winter and summer crops. In the past the amount of water which has flown down the rivers at critical parts of the growing seasons has set an automatic limit on the area both in winter and summer crops. In the future, however, this flow will be subject to control through the release of stored water. The Mission therefore suggests that the government make a special study to determine what combination of winter and summer crops using a given quantity of water would yield the highest output for the manpower employed on the land. The outcome of this study as well as a re-examination of the fallow system may in the end affect the calculations of the gross area which needs to be covered by irrigation works in order to use a given supply of water.

The sequence in which new areas are to be supplied with irrigation is governed partly by purely technical factors. Within the limits set by these technical factors, however, the selection of the areas to be irrigated should take into account the agricultural value of the land, its proximity to potential settlers and its ownership. In making its recommendations regarding new irrigation systems, the Mission has sought to give appropriate weight to all these factors. It was not always possible to arrive at a considered judgment of the agricultural potentialities of various areas, so that on this ground alone its suggestions may be subject to revision. Regarding the ownership of lands which could be irrigated, the Mission had no information. Presumably most of this land is in

3/1 3/12 state ownership. In any event, as long as it is technically feasible and not more costly, it will be desirable to give preference to the irrigation of good agricultural land remaining in state ownership because such land can be used for distribution among small-holders.

Expansion of Irrigation—the Euphrates

3/12 Except for a narrow band on both banks of the Euphrates between Hit and Hindiya and some smaller areas along the lower Euphrates, which are irrigated directly from the river by pumps, the irrigation systems of the Euphrates are served by a series of canals whose off-takes are above the Hindiya barrage. Nine of these canals serve the left bank of the Euphrates[4]; and only two[5], the right bank. The Hindiya barrage was built primarily to increase the intake into the most important of these canals—the Hilla. This canal, together with its three terminal branches—the Diwaniya, Dagharrah and Hurriyah canals, is supposed to irrigate a gross area of 2,333,000 masharas. The supply of water, however, is sufficient to irrigate only about 35 percent of the cultivable area commanded by the Hilla canal system. It has already been recognized, therefore, that the additional water made available from the Habbaniya should, in the first instance, be used to increase the irrigation intensity in the Hilla canal system to the standard 50 percent. The Development Board has already reserved ID 900,000 to remodel the Hilla canal in order to bring about the necessary increase in its capacity from 114 to 175 cumecs at its head and from 57 to 87 cumecs at its tail. As will be noted below, an additional enlargement of the canal's capacity will be necessitated by further expansion of irrigation. While the Haigh Commission contemplated carrying out the required increase in capacity in two phases and proposed to rely partly on erosion as a means of attaining the needed capacity, the Mission believes it desirable to give the Hilla canal its final outline from the very beginning and to avoid reliance upon the rather erratic effects of erosion. At the same time, the course of the canal should be straightened and precautions taken to reduce losses by infiltration at the resulting low points.

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[4] Saglawiyah, Abu Ghuraib, Yusufiyah, Latifiyah, Iskandiriyah, Musayib, Nasiriyah, Kifl and Hilla.

[5] Husseiniyah and Beni Hassan.

It has already been mentioned that upon the completion of the Habbaniya project the usable flow of the Euphrates will be raised from 280 to 440 cumecs. Since the Hilla canal area will absorb 30 cumecs, the balance of the increase, or 130 cumecs, will be available for the extension of irrigation to a gross area of 2,200,000 masharas. To use this quantity of water the following irrigation projects are recommended:

1. Extension and enlargement of the Musayib and Iskandiriyah canals to irrigate an additional gross area of 228,000 masharas. The Development Board has already earmarked ID 400,000 for these works.
2. Prolongation of the Babil canal, which is at present only a secondary canal branching off from the Hilla, and increasing its capacity from eight to 65 cumecs so as to provide water for 670,000 masharas gross. For this purpose the capacity of the Hilla canal at its head will have to be raised to 229 cumecs.
3. Construction of a barrage below Kifl on a deviation of the Kufa branch of the Euphrates which would govern, on the right bank, a new canal intended to serve the Bahr el Najaf and, on the left bank, the Shamiya, a branch of the Euphrates which would thereby become a controlled canal with an enlarged capacity of 272 cumecs at its head. This would extend irrigation to a gross area of 590,000 masharas.
4. Construction of a feeder canal connecting the Shamiya with the Diwaniya, one of the branches of the Hilla canal, in order to irrigate a gross area of 385,000 masharas between Shamiya and Diwaniya and deliver a flow of water which would release about 38 cumecs at the tail of the Hilla canal for use elsewhere. This feeder, which would have a capacity of 237 cumecs at its head and of 184 cumecs at its junction with the Diwaniya, would be extended to serve the new Khar canal.
5. Irrigation of a gross area of 108,000 masharas in and immediately south of the Dagharrah canal area by remodelling the Dagharrah Canal and constructing the head of the Khar canal. The additional water for the Gagharrah would come from that released at the tail of the Hilla Canal as a result of the building of the Shamiya-Diwaniya feeder; and that for the Khar canal would come from the expanded supply of the Diwaniya.
6. Additional construction of the Khar canal to irrigate about 220,000 masharas gross.

312 The Mission suggests that detailed plans of these irrigation works be made as soon as possible in order to make sure that this program is completed by the time the Habbaniya project is finished. Execution of this program will require some agricultural adjustments in the Shamiya area where rice is now grown under conditions of natural inundation. By controlling the Shamiya and installing a flow-irrigation system the area available for winter cultivation will be greatly increased, but at the same time rice cultivation may have to be curtailed. In any event, the fellahin will have to grow rice not on naturally flooded land, but on terraced plots watered successively from canals. At the same time fertilizer rather than silt brought by the floods will have to be used to maintain the productivity of the rice lands. As the Haigh Commission has already noted, these adjustments would in the end have to be made anyway, owing to the progressive silting of the rice lands which is gradually raising them to levels where they can no longer be flooded. The Department of Agriculture should take timely steps to assist the fellahin to adapt themselves to the new conditions.

Other Irrigation Works on the Euphrates

Aside from the works required to expand the area under irrigation, certain other irrigation works on the Euphrates appear to be necessary. The Development Board has already set aside ID 250,000 for improving the Shamiya, one of the branches into which the Euphrates divides below Kifl, and controlling the erosion phenomenon known as the *nagarah* which threatens to dry up the whole rice-growing district of Shamiya. In the Shamiya-Kufa district the flooding and silting caused by the diversion of the Euphrates waters into several branches and numerous canals has raised the river and canal beds above those of the downstream region of Shinafiyah where the waters are once more united in a single channel. During the dry season the remaining water, confined to a narrow channel, rapidly erodes the accumulated alluvium causing a series of falls which move up the canals and tend to lower them to a level where they can no longer be used for irrigation. Regulators to stop this erosive action have been installed on two of the principal canals, but more are needed.

A somewhat similar problem is encountered farther down the river in the rice-growing region above Lake Hammar. Here erosion keeps the river bed so low in relation to the silted rice lands that the distribution of water in the dry season has become very difficult. The Development Board has provided ID 1,000,000 in its program for necessary control structures on this part of the Euphrates. There has been no agreement as yet, however, on a plan for these works.

Expansion of Irrigation—the Tigris and its Tributaries

Along the Tigris and the Diyala, pump irrigation is much more prominent than along the Euphrates. A large part of the country's irrigation pumps are concentrated on the stretch of the Tigris between Baghdad and Kut.[6] The principal flow-irrigation areas are in the Diyala River and, farther south, along the Shatt al Gharraf. Both these areas suffer from an acute shortage of water. In the North there is a small flow-irrigated area known as Hawija and near Kut an area of similar size fed by the Dujaila canal.

The Derbend-i-Khan dam will not make possible any expansion of the area under irrigation. However, by assuring a usable flow of 80 cumecs, as compared with a present mean flow of only 38 cumecs, it will provide a really adequate water supply over the entire area covered by existing irrigation systems in the Diyala Valley.

The Dokan dam will supply enough water to irrigate about 2.5 million masharas gross. In general accordance with the Haigh Commission's recommendations and the contemplated program of the Development Board, the Mission believes that this water should be used to irrigate new areas on the left bank of the Tigris, both above and below Baghdad, as well as additional areas in the Diyala River Valley. For this purpose, that part of the water supply not used for the irrigation of areas along the Lesser Zab River should be diverted through a new feeder into the Adhaim River; this in turn would be linked by a new feeder to the Diyala River. The latter would then supply the new Nahrwan canal which would be constructed to serve a large area on the left bank of the Tigris below the confluence of the Diyala. The Adhaim feeder should allow for a flow of about 76 cumecs and the Diyala feeder for about 41 cumecs.

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[6] For a tabulation of the irrigation pumps in Iraq, see Table II in the appendix.

312 Irrigation projects for the following areas would then be necessary:

1. Along the Lesser Zab the Makhmur area on the right bank (400,000 masharas gross) and the Hawija area on the left bank (300,000 masharas gross). About 180,000 masharas in the Hawija project are already being irrigated, and work is proceeding on the extension of irrigation to the balance. Both areas would be served by canals governed by a new barrage (Hawija barrage) on the Lesser Zab River which would also control the intake into the Adhaim feeder.
2. On the left bank of the Adhaim River a gross area of 600,000 masharas. To raise the water level for the necessary new canals, as well as for the Diyala feeder, construction of a barrage across the Adhaim will be necessary.
3. Extension of the irrigation system of the Diyala by 540,000 masharas gross.
4. Irrigation of a gross area of 660,000 masharas on the left bank of the Tigris below the Diyala River through construction of the Nahrwan canal and of a regulating barrage just above Beni Saad to govern the take-off of the canal from the Diyala.

This program differs from that recommended by the Haigh Commission in that it does not provide for the irrigation (1) of a gross area of 560,000 masharas on the left bank of the Tigris below Fatha, and (2) of a gross area of 300,000 on the right bank of the Adhaim. The agricultural potentialities of these areas have not been surveyed. A decision to provide irrigation for them should accordingly not be made until it is established that their agricultural value is at least equal to that of the other areas.

[653] In its five-year program the Development Board has already included part of the works for the above projects. This program budgets ID 500,000 for the Hawija barrage on the Lesser Zab, ID 300,000 for the barrage on the Adhaim, ID 500,000 for the Beni Saad dam, ID 750,000 for the construction of part of the new Nahrwan canal and ID 2,600,000 for canal systems in the areas commanded by the Hawija and Adhaim barrages. On the other hand, no provision has yet been made for the Adhaim and Diyala feeders.

The Mission has not attempted to determine which new areas might be irrigated with the additional flow made available upon

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completion of the Bekhme dam. As already indicated, the ultimate choice will depend on whether or not the Wadi Tharthar reservoir will store sufficient water for use in irrigation. 3/2

Other Irrigation Works on the Tigris

Other works are required, particularly to insure more effective utilization of the available water supply. One of the more important problems along the lower Tigris is how to prevent the wastage of water which is sent through Shatt al Gharraf from the Tigris. The Shatt al Gharraf, a former branch of the Tigris, has been converted into a canal through construction of an intake works which in turn is governed by the barrage across the Tigris at Kut. For a distance of 150 kilometers, however, it has no regulators of any kind. This makes it necessary to send through the intake a flow about double what would otherwise be needed and causes a great loss of water at the tail end of the canal. The gross area irrigated from the Shatt al Gharraf is theoretically 2,350,000 masharas of which 1,950,000 are irrigated by flow and 400,000 by pumping. Actually, however, the area in winter crops is apparently only about 700,000 masharas which indicates an intensity of irrigation of only 35 percent as compared with the customary 50 percent. Chronic difficulties are therefore experienced in supplying the requisite volume of water. In order to insure the required supply even for the 700,000 masharas in winter crops it is often necessary in the dry season to close the gates of the Kut barrage for some time, thereby depriving the lower reaches of the Tigris of water and interrupting navigation. The installation of regulators at suitable intervals will make it possible to irrigate the same area with a much smaller volume of water.

The Haigh Commission contemplated the construction of one regulator on the Gharraf, but only for the purpose of governing a new canal which would extend the area under irrigation. The Development Board has set aside ID 450,000 for "construction of regulators on the Gharraf and reclamation of new regions". The Mission urges that the regulators be constructed as rapidly as possible, but suggests caution in undertaking any new reclamation until there is ample assurance that the existing area can be adequately irrigated. Ultimately, of course, expansion of the area

312 under irrigation may become possible when additional water becomes available either from the Bekhme dam or the Wadi Tharthar reservoir.

Another important project which should be undertaken is the better control of the lower Tigris in the vicinity of Amara. For a considerable distance above Amara and in the immediate neighborhood of that city, the Tigris is progressively impoverished by a series of outlets which can hardly be called canals but which, owing to inadequate control, divert a large portion of the river waters into the marshes. One of the largest of these outlets is the Musandaq on the right bank of the river. This outlet takes off the flood waters of the Tigris up to a maximum capacity of 2,000 cumecs and is normally sealed off in the dry season by a dike. After breaching by a flood, however, the dike cannot be rebuilt except at a time of low water long after the flood peak has subsided. In the intervening period much valuable water is lost. Near Amara the Buteira, Mushara and Kahala canals, with capacities of 1,000, 100 and 450 cumecs, respectively, further deplete the water supply in the Tigris. Farther downstream still more canals, of which the principal ones are the Tabar, the Majar el Kebir and the Michiriyah, deprive the Tigris of water. While all these outlets or canals benefit rice cultivation, they also submerge much land suitable for cultivation of other crops and result in immense losses of water. It is therefore necessary to devise a control program which will prevent the flooding of cultivable land, drain and make available for cultivation the extensive marshes on both banks of the Tigris below Amara, and keep enough water in the Tigris to maintain navigation. The Haigh Commission gave a brief study to such a program, the cost of which is estimated at about ID 3,000,000; and the Development Board has set aside ID 1,2000, 000 for the "construction of regulators on the Tigris at Amara".

The Mission urges that, as a first step, all the canals branching off the Tigris be equipped with effective intake regulators which would make it possible to control water diversion. First of all, the Musandaq should be provided with such a regulator and the temporary wooden regulator of the Buteira should be replaced. An intake regulator should also be constructed for the Mushara. In addition, dredging of the Tigris might be undertaken in an effort

3/12 to keep the river bed deep enough to prevent the formation of additional outlets at flood times. These measures should then be complemented by a series of small works to provide proper control of the canals themselves. The Mission suggests that no regulator barrages be built across the Tigris itself until the results of these control measures are known. Meanwhile, the program should improve the navigability of the river and assist in draining the marshes.

As in the case of the Shamiya district on the Euphrates, the program for controlling the lower reaches of the Tigris will make adjustments necessary in the rice-growing areas of Amara. Here, too, it is therefore important that the Department of Agriculture provide timely assistance and advice to cultivators in adapting to the new water regime.

III. Drainage

3/12 134 While new irrigation schemes always appeal to the popular imagination, it would be exceedingly unfortunate if they should continue to be carried out, as in the past, to the neglect of essential drainage. Lack of drainage facilities has resulted in progressive salination and deterioration of the soil. In such areas as Hawija and Dujaila salt has become a serious problem within only a few years from the time irrigation was begun. Almost all land irrigated by flow has become salty to some degree, resulting in declining crop yields. The only conspicuous exception is the land in the Diyala River Valley for which the river, which has cut a deep bed from the Jebel Hamrin range to its confluence with the Tigris, acts as a natural drain during the dry season. Pump-irrigated lands generally suffer less from salting, partly because they are higher and thus tend to have better natural drainage and partly because, owing to the cost of pumping, there is an incentive to avoid the lavish use of water which tends to waterlog the soil.

The Haigh Commission estimated that about 60 percent of the irrigated areas have been affected by salt. The Mission's own observations indicated that perhaps 20 to 30 percent of the cultivated land in the irrigated areas has been abandoned during recent decades owing to the accumulation of salt and that yields on the

312 134 land still being tilled may have declined by 20 to 50 percent. The situation appears to be worst in the regions fed by canals controlled by the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates. Thus about half of the lands irrigated by the Beni Hassan canal and 40 percent of those served by the Kifl canal have become too salty for winter cultivation.

The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates do not themselves contain excessive quantities of salt. Water is generally regarded as perfectly suitable for irrigation as long as the proportion of dissolved salts by weight does not exceed 70 parts in 100,000. Available analyses of the Tigris at Baghdad indicate that the proportion does not exceed 30 to 33 per 100,000 at most. For the upper reaches of the Euphrates the proportion is the same or even less, but in the lower Euphrates, which receives the drainage waters from the irrigated areas, the proportion may go as high as 90 parts per 100,000 in the fall of the year. (See Table III in the appendix.)

Salt has, however, become concentrated in the subsoil waters. The presence of some of the salt may be due to the fact that much of the land was originally under the sea. In the long run, however, it has been the continuous irrigation or flooding of the soil, combined with the effect of evaporation under the hot summer sun, which has led to a progressively greater concentration. Irrigation and flooding keep the water table high with the result that capillary action brings the water up into a zone where it evaporates under the heat of the sun and precipitates salt. Frequently cultivators resort to lavish use of irrigation water in order to wash the salt away from the roots of the crops. In the end, however, this practice has only worsened the situation by tending to raise the water table still further.

Salt accumulation can be prevented and existing salt evacuated only by digging drainage canals which will lower the water table to a level of 1.5 to 2 meters below the surface where capillary action can no longer be dangerous. Under such conditions water used in irrigation will wash away the salt deposited in the root zone and return it to the subsoil water which will be tapped by the drainage canals. Fortunately the salt found in the soil is not the sodium carbonate or "black alkali" type which cannot readily be washed away by water. Owing to the low level of the land the

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salty water accumulating in the drainage canals will in most cases have to be evacuated by pumps.

Up to the present, drainage has been the subject of little planning or experimentation in Iraq. Mr. J. S. Turcan, the drainage expert of the Haigh Commission, carried out a drainage study for the Aggar Qub region, which is irrigated by the Saglawiyah and Abu Ghuraib canals. It was found that of the total area of 320,000 masharas, 197,000 needed drainage. Experiments indicated that a flow of 1.0 cumec per 1,200 marsharas over a period of two and a half months rid the soil of salt to a depth of two meters provided drains were installed with a maximum spacing of two kilometers and sufficient depth to keep the water table from rising to a level higher than 1.75 meters from the surface of the soil. The cost of a drainage project for this region, inclusive of the cost of a pumping station to evacuate the drainage waters to the Tigris, was estimated at ID 279,000 per 150,000 masharas or ID 1.86 per mashara. Preliminary plans have also been made for the drainage of other areas. One of these was for the area served by the Beni Hassan canal where the drainage of 330,000 masharas was estimated to cost ID 750,000 or ID 2.26 per mashara. The Haigh Commission came to the conclusion that the cost of drainage would average ID 2.0 per mashara or a total of ID 8,160,000 for 60 percent of the area now under flow irrigation.

Drainage might be usefully complemented by steps to line canals at points where there appear to be excessive losses of water through seepage. Such losses may lead to waterlogging of the soil and a resulting rise in the water table. Since Iraq is rich in asphalt, a lining of bituminous concrete might be best.

Deterioriation of land through salting has become such a serious problem that immediate steps should be taken to initiate drainage on a large scale. The Mission urges that work on the main drains be begun as soon as plans can be completed. At the same time complete drainage systems should be laid out and constructed for areas where the salt problem is most acute, notably those irrigated by the canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage. A start might be made with a drainage system for the Aggar Qub region since it has already been carefully studied. Early steps should also be taken to drain the Hawija and Dujaila areas. The

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experience gained with the drainage systems first completed, particularly with respect to the depth and spacing of secondary drains, will be useful in planning subsequent schemes.

It is important also that drainage facilities be incorporated in any new irrigation schemes. It is always more costly to provide a drainage network for an already existing irrigation system, since it generally involves cutting across irrigation works and splitting up parcels of land. The installation of drainage facilities will be of vital importance for the rice-growing region of Kufa-Shamiya which the Mission recommends converting to a controlled flow-irrigated area. The same is true of the marshy region along the lower Tigris for which the Mission has suggested a number of control works.

The Development Board has allocated ID 2,000,000 to drainage in its five-year program. The Mission recommends, however, that at least ID 7,000,000 be devoted to this purpose over the next five years. Drainage works for the new irrigation projects alone would cost ID 5,600,000 on the assumption that about 60 percent of the area involved would require drainage. The Mission suggests that part of the cost of installing drainage facilities in existing irrigated areas be paid by the landholders who are benefited. This would be an equitable arrangement and need not be unduly burdensome if payments are spread over a number of years. Landowners, however, should not be given the option of participating in a drainage scheme, for the construction of an integrated drainage network requires the inclusion of all the land within a given area.

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IV. Operation and Maintenance

With attention focussed on the construction of reservoirs and new irrigation systems, there is a great danger that maintenance of existing irrigation works will continue to be neglected as in the past. There are many signs of such neglect today. Regulators have fallen into disrepair; canals have become silted and have developed bad leaks. False economies in the original construction and the use of poor materials have often made the task of maintenance more difficult. Thus frequently there has been no provision for roads

along the banks of main and secondary canals although roads 3/2 greatly facilitate inspection and maintenance. The facing of the canals adjoining the control structures is often too short for effective protection of both the canals and the control works. The turbulent water coming up against the earthen embankments may then undermine the embankments or even the control structures themselves. Brick, which lacks adequate resistance to shock and erosion, has sometimes been used as a construction material where concrete or precast concrete blocks would have been definitely preferable. In the future, it might also be desirable to try gabions of iron-wire net, weighted with stones and coarse gravel, in facing canals. These have given excellent and cheap protection against erosion in some countries.

Maintenance is also made more costly by failure to provide originally enough canal crossings for livestock and people, as well as places for washing and drinking. Under such conditions canal banks inevitably deteriorate with resulting leaks and the creation of pools of stagnant water. Crossings, which for the most part can be very simple in construction, should be installed near the villages and at points frequented by cattle. Paved fords will generally be best for cattle since they will provide facilities for drinking at the same time. There is also a need to regulate road crossings of small canals and ditches. Such crossings, which are built by the landowners, are often too short and constructed so poorly that considerable water escapes and the approaches to the crossings are reduced to quagmires.

The operation of the irrigation systems, involving the delivery of water to the actual users, could be considerably improved. Fair distribution is undoubtedly made difficult by chronic shortages of water. Whenever water is short, its distribution tends to be hotly disputed. Under such circumstances the influential landowner is [661] often successful in bringing pressure to bear on the poorly-paid irrigation official who is in charge of distribution. Sometimes landowners resort to more direct action by building temporary dams across canals in order to divert more water to their land. Equitable 3/2 distribution is also impeded by old water rights which are attached 423 to individual land parcels, particularly in the Diyala River Valley, and are transferred with such property. They often confer a right

312 423 to use a quantity of water out of proportion to the amount of land to be irrigated; and in times of water scarcity they must be taken into account in rationing the available supply even though an objective appraisal of relative requirements might produce quite a different distribution.

312 A larger supply of water would, of course, minimize the difficulties of distribution set forth above, but in the long run it is also vitally important that economies be effected in the amount of water used. The provision of drainage facilities and the installation of an adequate amount of regulators on canals will certainly bring about substantial economies of this character. The cultivators in Iraq, however, have for many years been accustomed to use water rather lavishly; only demonstration will convince them that they 312 651 can safely manage with a smaller supply. It has already been pointed out that the irrigation duty is very low compared to that in many other countries. For flow-irrigated lands it is about 16,950 masharas gross (equivalent to 7,200 masharas in crops); for land irrigated by pumps from canals, 19,500; and for that irrigated by pumps from rivers, 26,200. Pump-irrigated lands have a somewhat higher duty because they are generally better drained and therefore less salted and because the cost of pumping encourages economy in the use of water. As far as the Mission is aware, the problem of 312 raising the irrigation duty has not been systematically studied. The Mission recommends strongly that fields be set aside in each irrigation system for the purpose of determining through practical experimentation over a number of years the optimum quantity of water to be supplied to each crop. Such experiments should be carried out under the joint direction of the Agriculture and Irrigation Departments.

In the future it would be desirable to associate the landholders in each irrigation area as far as possible with the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. Irrigation should be a truly [476] cooperative venture. The Mission understands that councils of landowners already exist in some districts, notably along the Diyala, to assist irrigation officials in the distribution of water at times of shortage. Such councils might well be organized in all districts and with the broader function of advising on all problems of maintenance and distribution. They could sponsor the experiments in the best use of water mentioned earlier and could assist in disseminating the findings. They would be an important means of developing the concept of common responsibility for the efficient operation and upkeep of irrigation systems and might ultimately serve also to disseminate information on agriculture. 312

The legal situation with respect to water rights and the construction, maintenance and operation of irrigation and flood-control works is defined by Articles 1234 to 1238 of the Mejelle, or Ottoman Civil Code, and Law No. 23 of 1923 and its successive amendments. Repeated changes in this legislation have made it difficult to determine the validity of certain provisions. It would be desirable to codify and clarify the legislation and, in the course of such a review, to eliminate some of its defects. It would be advisable, for instance, to ensure a right of passage for canals across the property of third parties with compensation fixed by the Irrigation Department in accordance with defined criteria. At present such a right of passage is recognized but with the proviso that the interested party must buy or lease the necessary land, which, in practice, may lead to extortionate terms. There is also a need for a review of old water rights. While presumably such rights cannot be abolished, the right to use water might well be brought into closer accord with the amount of land to be irrigated. 312 671 423

The law makes the Directorate General for Irrigation in the Ministry of Communications and Public Works responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation and flood-control schemes. In 1949 the irrigation services had a staff of 1,330 persons, classified approximately as follows: 312 647

Engineers	26
Assistant engineers	20
Overseers	94
Office personnel	250
Bund personnel	820
Specialists	120

On the whole, there is an insufficient number of competent, experienced engineers; and pay scales are inadequate to retain able men in a service which often entails considerable hardship. The staff in the provinces is generally not large enough to cope with technical problems along with the many administrative questions

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centering particularly about the distribution of water. Young engineers are often sent as beginners to outlying posts where they work without adequate technical supervision. The service has lacked an experienced Chief Engineer who could, through frequent visits in the field, provide advice and guidance and support the staff with the weight of his authority. The Mission understands that such a Chief Engineer has now been appointed. It would be desirable to provide him with several experienced assistants specialized in drainage and irrigation questions.

In the past the planning of new works has been characterized by two defects: inadequate coordination with other government departments, particularly those dealing with agriculture and health, and failure to make full use of the knowledge and experience of the divisional irrigation engineers.

Although irrigation obviously serves agriculture, the Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Economics has been virtually ignored in the planning of new irrigation schemes. The same has been true of the health service which is vitally interested in the layout of irrigation projects in connection with its fight against malaria and bilharzia. In its capacity as an over-all planning and coordinating agency the Development Board will be able to insist that all interested government departments be consulted in the planning of projects. A committee consisting of representatives of the Irrigation, Agriculture and Health Departments might be established to pass on irrigation and drainage projects and advise on their priority.

This committee might be complemented by a technical committee which would direct the experiments to ascertain the optimum use of water, to which reference has already been made, and perhaps to study other technical operating problems.

In the future planning of irrigation works it would be desirable to make greater use of the divisional irrigation engineers in the provinces. These officials have often acquired an experience and knowledge of local conditions which could greatly aid realistic planning.

The cost of new flood-control and irrigation works will in the future be defrayed out of the budget of the Development Board.

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The cost of operation, however, will have to be met out of the ordinary budget. In the past the ordinary budget of the Irrigation Department has been wholly inadequate to insure efficient operation and maintenance of the existing irrigation systems. In the last ten years an average of only ID 270,000 has been spent annually under the ordinary budget.[7] Expenses for operation and maintenance should actually be about 150 fils per gross mashara under flow irrigation. With a gross area of approximately 6,800,000 masharas under flow irrigation, the appropriate total would therefore be about ID 1,000,000 per year, inclusive of the salaries of the requisite personnel. The Mission therefore suggests that the budget of the Irrigation Department be progressively increased to reach that sum within the next five years, with the additional cost to be borne by the Development Board. 312 647

V. Costs of the Program

The Mission estimates that the total cost of the over-all program it has recommended would amount over the next five years (1952-53 to 1956-57) to about ID 55,000,000. Of this ID 27,600,000 would be for water reservoirs, ID 7,000,000 for drainage, ID 2,000,000 for improved maintenance and the balance for new irrigation works. A more detailed breakdown is given in Table V of the appendix. These estimates are exclusive of the provision made in the first year's budget of the Development Board. They are based upon cost estimates made in Iraq by the Haigh Commission and others, but make allowances of 10 to 20 percent for intervening price increases. A further rise in prices in the future would, of course, raise the aggregate cost. 312

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[7] See Table IV in the appendix.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1

Mean Monthly Discharges of the Euphrates and the Tigris

(in cubic meters per second)

Month	The Euphrates at Hit[1]			The Tigris at Baghdad[2]		
	Mean monthly discharge	Maximum monthly discharge	Minimum monthly discharge	Mean monthly discharge	Maximum monthly discharge	Minimum monthly discharge
January	592	1,130	258	947	1,926	432
February	665	1,217	278	1,388	3,020	323
March	968	2,651	344	1,992	3,496	797
April	1,853	2,917	462	2,951	4,541	935
May	2,235	3,358	533	2,775	5,241	997
June	1,208	1,792	249	1,684	3,562	548
July	577	809	268	897	2,069	292
August	358	533	202	504	1,278	192
September	293	383	183	373	827	163
October	311	557	225	359	872	175
November	432	881	247	516	1,105	212
December	558	1,248	264	709	1,413	300

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[1] Based on observations over the years 1924-1946.

[2] Based on observations over the years 1906-1946.

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TABLE II

Number and Horsepower of Irrigation Pumps as of March 1, 1950

Average capacity of pumps: 1948-49 = 36.22 H.P.
1949-50 = 36.40 H.P.

Liwas	Euphrates and canals		Tigris and tributaries		Diyala and tributaries		Shatt al Gharraf		Shatt al Arab		Total 1949-50		Total 1948-49	
	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.
Mosul	—	—	74	2,394	—	—	—	—	—	—	74	2,394	71	2,209
Erbil	—	—	2	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	68	2	68
Suleimaniya	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	—	—	3	44	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	44	2	28
Diyala	—	—	54	2,518	68	3,277	—	—	—	—	122	5,795	115	5,386
Baghdad	139	4,453	1,084	33,475	92	3,852	—	—	—	—	1,315	41,780	1,313	41,849
Dulaim	265	7,904	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	265	7,904	268	7,974
Hilla	86	2,032	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	86	2,032	75	1,738
Kerbela	30	651	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	651	29	624
Diwaniya	570	22,610	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	570	22,610	477	18,705
Muntafiq	82	3,364	—	—	—	—	24	1,310	—	—	106	4,674	82	3,362
Kut	—	—	451	21,568	—	—	97	4,508	—	—	548	26,076	552	26,115
Amara	—	—	354	13,656	—	—	—	—	—	—	354	13,656	333	13,002
Basra	5	167	12	448	—	—	—	—	101	2,840	118	3,455	106	2,982
Total	1,177	41,181	2,034	74,171	160	7,129	121	5,818	101	2,840	3,593	131,139	3,425	124,042

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TABLE III

Salinity of the Euphrates and the Tigris[1]

(proportion of dissolved salts in parts per 100,000)

Month	Tigris At		Euphrates At		
	Baghdad	Hindiya	Hilla	Samawah	Ur Junction
January	26	9.5	16.7	19.7	20.0
February	26	7.2	16.9	22.6	23.5
March	22	10.7	20.5	21.1	20.7
April	19	7.4	18.0	13.9	20.0
May	19	5.8	18.5	10.3	10.0
June	19	8.3	10.8	10.9	8.0
July	23	9.1	10.2	16.5	14.0
August	28	22.1	22.5	69.0	70.9
September	30	20.7	26.6	90.7	97.6
October	32	26.8	27.0	69.8	82.2
November	33	17.5	19.1	53.3	57.2
December	27	17.1	21.4	57.2	74.4

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[1] Data for the Tigris are based on observations over the period 1924 to 1932, but those for the Euphrates on observations over only one year which was particularly dry.

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TABLE IV

EXPENDITURES OF THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF IRRIGATION

(in dinars)

Fiscal Year	CAPITAL WORKS BUDGET			ORDINARY BUDGET				TOTAL BUDGET
	Capital Works Other than Bunds	Bunds	Total	Irrigation and Drainage	Flood Control	Salaries Allowances Services	Total	
1941-42	247,396	53,295	300,691	63,986	32,566	75,332	171,884	472,575
1942-43	200,328	119,047	319,375	67,971	36,512	95,128	199,611	518,986
1943-44	355,461	152,830	508,291	82,606	22,842	118,598	224,046	732,337
1944-45	448,309	157,986	606,295	74,963	23,266	154,693	252,922	859,217
1945-46	326,975	124,756	451,731	68,077	28,093	157,981	254,151	705,882
1946-47	667,057	337,897	1,004,954	89,965	125,208	201,527	416,700	1,421,654
1947-48	783,139	363,020	1,146,159	86,628	13,318	187,781	287,727	1,433,886
1948-49	1,088,591	230,671	1,319,262	70,765	54,213	206,146	331,124	1,650,386
1949-50	726,224	159,084	885,308	69,924	32,608	189,418	291,950	1,177,258
1950-51	607,481	173,080	780,561	56,926	19,877	193,868	270,671	1,051,232
Total	5,450,961	1,871,666	7,322,627	731,811	388,503	1,580,472	2,700,786	10,023,413

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TABLE V

ESTIMATED COST OF THE PROGRAM
(in million dinars)

Project	Development Board Program 1951-52 to 1955-56	Mission Program 1952-53 to 1956-57
I. Dams and reservoirs		
Wadi Tharthar	9.62	10.30
Dokan	2.32	2.80
Bekhme	—	7.80
Derbend-i-Khan	4.80	5.10
Habbaniya	2.12	1.56
II. Irrigation works		
On the Tigris and its tributaries		
Hawija barrage	.50	.60
Adhaim barrage	.30	.36
Adhaim and Diyala feeders	—	1.50
Beni Saad barrage	.50	.60
Irrigation systems using Dokan reservoir supply	2.60	5.41
Regulators on the Gharraf	.45	.45
Control of the lower Tigris	1.20	1.20
On the Euphrates		
Remodelling of Hilla canal	.90	.90
Kifl barrage, regulation of the Shamiya, and Shamiya-Diwaniya feeder	.25	1.40
Irrigation systems using Habbaniya water supply	.40	5.18
Regulation of tails of the Euphrates	1.00	1.00
Other irrigation works	.32	—
III. Drainage	2.00	7.00
IV. Improved maintenance and operation	—	2.00
Total	29.28	55.16

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ANNEX C

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

I. Introduction

The main features of agriculture and animal husbandry in Iraq 241 have already been set forth elsewhere and are only briefly recapitulated 231 here.[1] Barley, wheat, rice, dates, other fruits and vegetables, and, more recently, cotton are the principal crops. Animal husbandry is of great importance but at present is really not integrated with agriculture. There is virtually no mixed farming. Crop and livestock yields are very low. Poor feeding is the principal cause of the low productivity of livestock. Low crop yields are attributable to poor drainage in the irrigation zone, to the failure to maintain soil fertility through the use of manure and fertilizer and the cultivation of soil-building crops, and to inadequate tools of production. Advances in agricultural techniques are seriously hampered by the poverty and ignorance of the fellahin who cultivate the soil and by the lack of interest displayed by most of the large landowners in improving agriculture. While there are extensive 311 lands that can be put to the plow, particularly if more water is 433 made available, a substantial portion of the land now in exploitation may be said to be overpopulated considering the present level of agricultural technique.

An increase in production is urgent. The standard of living 433 which now prevails on the land is deplorably low. At the same time the population is increasing at a rate that can be expected to grow more rapid as public health improves. Output can be greatly increased both by extending the area under cultivation and by raising the productivity of land already being exploited. Primary emphasis has hitherto been placed on the first of these, and large new water storage and irrigation schemes are being planned.[2]

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[1] See Annex A, *Basic Factors and Conditions.*

[2] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage.*

433 Undoubtedly this is important not simply as a means of raising production, but especially as a means of increasing the number of independent peasant proprietors, today so conspicuously few. In the future, however, more attention should be given to increasing productivity. It will take a long time to settle substantial numbers on new land. The living standard of the fellahin who will continue to work the land already in use can be improved only by a rise in productivity, unless there is a drastic redistribution of the output as between the landlord and the cultivator. Moreover, if output per man employed on the land cannot be raised, it may prove difficult to find the needed manpower to carry out the large development program for Iraq as a whole or even to settle newly opened lands without a significant curtailment of production in the existing agricultural areas.

000 This monograph is therefore chiefly concerned with measures to improve productivity. The first section discusses diversification of production, with emphasis on those crops which will bring animal husbandry into a more intimate relationship with agriculture. The second section deals with the possibilities of expanding the output of some of the crops already grown. The third section treats of some of the means by which productivity in general might be raised—better methods of cultivation and better tools, more effective control of pests and diseases and similar measures. In the next section the improvement of livestock and livestock products comes in for special attention. The succeeding section takes up the essential steps in a government program to improve agriculture and animal husbandry—the organization of an extension service, supported by adequate research and experimentation; the provision of more ample credit facilities; and the establishment of cooperatives. Following a brief discussion of forestry, the problems involved in the settlement of new land are examined, with special stress on the opportunities it offers to develop agriculture from the very beginning along more advanced lines. Finally, in the concluding section the organization of the government's agricultural services is considered.

II. Diversification of Production

Fodder and Pasture

Existing crop rotation is far too limited and does not make 241 effective use of the land. Wheat and barley are virtually the only winter crops. There are a considerable number of summer crops, but cotton and rice clearly predominate. Rice is really outside any crop rotation, since, for the most part, it is grown year after year on naturally inundated land. Fallow generally takes the place of good crop rotation. No doubt the large amount of water required for summer crops in relation to the available supply has hindered the introduction of new crops, but the water storage schemes that will be carried out over the next decade should bring a change in this respect. Moreover, economies in the use of water which may be effected may in the long run make more water available for summer cultivation.[3]

Basically the aim in the future must be to make fuller use of the land and the people who work it. The cultivator who grows wheat or barley in the winter does not have enough to occupy him except at sowing and harvest time and has still less to do in the summer. Conversely, the rice farmer has virtually nothing to do in the winter. On the average, cultivators keep little or no live- 231 stock outside of a draft animal or two and they grow no fodder and plant no pasture for their livestock. Hay-making is unknown. While in and around the towns grain, oil cake and cut legumes are used for feeding, in general the most important source of feed for sheep, goats, buffaloes and cattle alike are grain stubble and the uncultivated grasses and herbage. Thus the animals are left to forage for themselves. Under these conditions their food is adequate for only five to six months, barely sufficient for maintenance during three to four months and at starvation level for the remainder of the year.

Introduction of a mixed type of farming which will include 241 leguminous fodder crops in the rotation with cash crops would 231 mark a most important advance in Iraqi agriculture. Such crops will enrich the soil as well as provide feed for livestock. Better

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[3] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage*, pp. 208-09.

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241 feeding will make livestock far more productive and resistant to
231 disease and produce better and stronger draft animals. By making the keeping and systematic feeding of livestock an integral part of settled agriculture, the people on the land will be assured fuller employment and higher incomes. Livestock should play a more prominent part in the farm economy for still another reason. The great bulk of the sheep and goats, which constitute over 80 percent of the livestock, are the property of nomads and semi-nomads.
[221] Nomads from the northern and southern deserts regularly move into the riverine areas in search of summer pasture; and semi-nomadic shepherds move within the irrigated areas feeding their flocks on green barley, grain stubble and the grass and weeds of fallow land. Both are meeting with increased resistance from the settled farmers; and in any event the expansion of the area under irrigation will increasingly curtail the pasture available to the nomads. Thus the remaining nomadic tribes will need to be gradually settled, but they will adapt themselves readily to settled agriculture only if it will enable them also to maintain considerable livestock.

246 Among the forage crops berseem or Egyptian clover, a winter annual, is well-adapted to most of the irrigated area of Iraq and could be grown on a much larger scale. Sown in the grain stubble in late summer, it will provide a good pasture, soiling and hay crop. Alfalfa, a perennial, also makes a good forage crop capable of yielding 1.5 to 5 tons per donum for two to five years. However, in view of its deep roots, it cannot be recommended unless good cultivating equipment is available to kill it when necessary. For summer pasture, quick-growing crops such as millet or binder crops such as maize and sorghum should be grown. Summer legumes—cowpeas and mungo beans, and particularly the black mungo of India—can be recommended. The lack of water during the summer makes the problem of forage crops in the rain-fed zone more difficult. Large areas can, however, be planted to winter oats and vetch which, when cut cured and cocked, will provide a good reserve feed.

248 The increased production of cotton which has taken place recently should be an excellent source of livestock feed once ~~farmers learn to appreciate~~ the value of oil cake feeding. For this

reason the cultivation of more cotton as well as such crops as linseed and sunflower seed will be important to the livestock economy. 248

Sugar Beets and Cane

The value of beet tops and pulp for livestock feeding might 249 also be regarded as one of the principal reasons for introducing the cultivation of sugar beets. Similarly, one of the advantages of cane sugar might be the production of molasses which could also be used for livestock feed. These have been, of course, subordinate considerations in the minds of those who have advocated these crops for Iraq. The principal consideration has been to produce at [439] home the sugar now imported in a volume which averaged 75,000 tons per year in the three-year period 1948 to 1950.

Undoubtedly sugar beets could be cultivated in the northern provinces of Suleimaniya and Mosul and sugar cane in the South, particularly in Amara. The real question is, however, whether either or both of these crops could be grown economically and on a scale large enough to warrant the necessary investment in processing plant. It must be decided whether cane or beet is preferable and whether either of them can compete with cotton for the available land, water and labor. The data available at present do not make it possible to arrive at sound decisions on these questions.

Test plots grown over 10 years indicate that there are several varieties of beet well adapted to Iraq and capable of reasonably high yields in terms of sugar. Experiments on cane sugar production at Abu Ghuraib, Basra and Amara have yielded much less favorable results, although one variety under test held some promise of furnishing sugar at an economic cost. The experiments, however, have not been conducted in a way and on a scale that would permit a satisfactory conclusion. If further experiments prove the feasibility of growing cane, it is likely to be a more economic crop than sugar beet. Experience elsewhere demonstrates that cane yields are generally higher and that the production of cane is less difficult and less demanding of skilled and semi-skilled labor than that of sugar beets. It is suggested therefore that further experiments on a larger scale be undertaken under appropriate expert guidance. In each of the possible beet sugar areas five or more 10-donum plantings might be tried. Special attention

249 should be paid to the effect of fertilizers on yields and to the possibility of insect and disease damage. A careful record should be kept of production costs. Similar large scale experiments with sugar cane would have to be initiated at Amara on a comparable basis. A sugar beet expert should be engaged to direct research at Abu Ghuraib, with assistants at the Bakrajo and Nineveh substations. Another expert would be needed to take charge of the experimental work on cane. Both men would have to be given a sufficient field force to carry out the manual labor involved.

These field experiments should be supplemented by an economic inquiry into requirements for labor, farm equipment and transport and into comparative costs of production. In this connection the cost of producing cotton on the same land would have to be investigated. The value of the yield per donum, taking into account the by-products, would need to be compared on the basis of existing price relationships as well as the factors which may affect that relationship in the future. For example, it might be concluded that in the longer run the demand for cotton, and therefore its price, would be better maintained, especially in the sterling area. In any comparison of yields it would be necessary not only to consider the output per unit of area but also the area which an average family could be expected to cultivate in the particular crop. Thus it is probable that one family could grow a larger area in cotton than in sugar beets because the latter demand more labor, particularly heavy labor that could be performed only by adults. Finally, there must be a reasonable assurance that sugar can be produced and sold at a price which will prove competitive with that of imported sugar less the import duty.

III. Observations on Existing Crops

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No attempt is made in this monograph to comment on every crop grown in Iraq. Many crops could be improved through the introduction of varieties which are more productive and resistant to insects and disease. Only an adequate research and extension service, to which reference will be made later, will be able to capitalize on the many potentialities for improvement. Here, only a few of the more important crops are singled out for special mention.

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Dates

Dates, one of the principal foods of Iraq, are also a main export 245
crop. While Iraq's pre-eminence in the world date market will not
easily be threatened, the quality of dates has apparently declined
and replacement of old trees has been far from adequate. Not more
than 15 percent of the old gardens have under way a tree-planting
program sufficient to replace old and deteriorating stands. More
than 60 percent of the gardens are in poor condition owing to
inadequate cultivation. Halfa, Johnson and Bermuda grasses have
been allowed to become serious pests, causing considerable damage.
Yields could be improved by better cultivation, manuring, fertilization,
reduction of other fruit trees planted in date gardens and
improvement in irrigation through the cleaning of canals and the
installation of more pumps. Processing of the crop could also be
improved, for old packing sheds where primitive methods of handling
are employed are still in use.

Responsibility for promotion and improvement of the date 654
industry is entrusted to the Date Association under a law approved 246
in 1935. Ever since 1939 the Association has had a contract with 473
the Andrew Weir Company whereby the latter undertakes to buy
at fixed prices and export all the dates of the best varieties offered
for sale from the Basra district. There is general agreement among
the growers that this arrangement has helped to stabilize prices.
On the expiration of the current contract with Andrew Weir after
the 1952 season, the Association hopes to conclude a similar agreement
with a newly-formed Iraqi company. The Association, the
growers and the foreign companies engaged in the date trade are
each expected to subscribe one third of this company's capital of
ID 500,000. Consideration is also being given to extending its
price-support operations to the dates grown in the Tigris-Euphrates
valley. In addition, the Date Association is contemplating
a distillery to convert into alcohol dates which are surplus to
market needs.

There is considerable danger that in carrying out these ambitious 654
plans the Association will neglect the need for better cultural 245
practices stressed above. The Association has already been
criticized for doing little to improve the production of dates. It
would be unfortunate if it followed the precedent set by the Tobacco

654 245 Monopoly which seems to have lost sight of one of its primary objectives, namely, to raise the quality of tobacco. Moreover, before the Association and its Iraqi "marketing" company undertake the contemplated stabilization program, there must be reasonable assurance that prices are not fixed at excessively high levels owing to political pressures and that the company has ample financial resources. An operation of this character is likely to be highly speculative. While large profits may be earned in some years, severe losses will be incurred in others. With respect to the projected alcohol plant, caution should also be exercised. There is already one distillery making alcohol as well as arak. For the time being the demands for alcohol may make another plant appear attractive, but it is doubtful that in the long run dates can compete with other raw materials such as molasses as an economical source of alcohol.

Other Fruits

245 Iraq can grow a wide variety of fruits and nuts. Citrus fruit has been conspicuously successful in the Diyala River Valley and the number of plantings has increased greatly with the help of the Department of Agriculture which distributes the trees. A higher output could be achieved through the use of fertilizers, particularly nitrogen, and by better cultivation to discourage weeds and pests. Better storage facilities are also needed.

In some parts of the country, particularly in the North, conditions are quite favorable to the growing of deciduous fruits. The fruit, however, is poor in quality and seldom gets beyond local markets. The better grades of fruit are all imported from other Middle Eastern countries. Yet better care in pruning, cultivation, thinning and in the control of insects and diseases might well double the output of apricots, peaches and apples and greatly improve their quality. A rising standard of living should provide an incentive to higher production provided facilities are made available to can, dry and store the fruit. The proposed small-business section of the Industrial Bank might investigate the possibility of financing such facilities. The organization of transport to the market also requires attention.

Nut culture could also be expanded in the northern provinces. The possibility of top-working, budding or grafting improved

varieties of pistachio scions on established native pistachio trees 245
should be given particular attention. Almond orchards could be increased to advantage.

Vegetables and Potatoes

Vegetable culture is concentrated in the neighborhood of the 244
large cities where such products as radishes, lettuce, cabbage, cucumbers, 369
squash, tomatoes and others are in good supply during the season. Unfortunately vegetables do not figure prominently in the [262]
diet of most people. Outside of the big towns little or no vegetables are eaten. In part, this appears to be due to the fact that tribal tradition holds the cultivation of vegetables in low esteem. However, where the sharecropper is inclined to grow vegetables, he may be discouraged by the lack of available land or the shifting of the area assigned to him for cultivation. If a determined effort were made by the government to enlist the cooperation of the landowners, it might not be too difficult to overcome these obstacles.

It might be desirable to increase the production of potatoes 244
which are now imported to the value of about ID 100,000 per year. The lighter soils along the large streams in the provinces of Mosul, Erbil and Suleimaniya are particularly well adapted to the production of both Irish and sweet potatoes. With proper guidance in cultural practices and the use of fertilizers, planters in these areas could easily supply the country's needs. If it is demonstrated that potato yields compare favorably with other crops, the government might well encourage the planting of potatoes both by launching an educational campaign and by furnishing the necessary seed to planters. Special attention will need to be given to transport, however, and the growers will have to be shown how to build inexpensive potato bins or pits with sufficient ventilation, insulation and accessibility.

Tobacco

Tobacco has been grown to some extent in the North for centuries, 249
although it was not until the last few decades that its production 655
assumed importance. Even now, the value of the tobacco crop is probably no more than a tenth of that of wheat or barley. In the mountainous areas of Erbil and Suleimaniya, however, it is

247 655 the principal crop of the Kurdish farmers. Moreover, the way in which tobacco has been bought, sold and handled by the government Monopoly has created much controversy. At the same time the Monopoly's operations have yielded considerable profits to the Treasury. Finally, the government is hopeful of expanding the production of tobacco, which is at present grown only for home consumption, so that it will make a significant contribution to exports. For all these reasons tobacco has become an important and controversial subject.

The purchase and sale of raw tobacco and tombak was vested in the government by law No. 35 of 1939. This legislation also instituted government licensing of the manufacturing, importation, wholesaling and retailing of cigarettes and controls over the importation of cigarette paper, boxes and other requisites for the manufacture of cigarettes. Operation of the Monopoly was at first entrusted to the Customs Department but in 1943 it was transferred to a separate Directorate-General within the Ministry of Economics. The original law did not detail the objectives of the Monopoly beyond specifying that "one of its main objectives shall be the improvement of tobacco." Apparently, however, other objectives were (1) to assure the cultivators fixed and remunerative prices for their tobacco, and (2) to raise revenue for the government.

Quality of Tobacco

The principal objective of the Monopoly has certainly not been achieved. In fact, it is generally recognized that the quality of tobacco has deteriorated rather than improved during its existence. The reasons for this are many. First of all, neither the Monopoly nor the Department of Agriculture has given farmers any assistance in improving their crop even though the cultivation, picking and curing of tobacco require considerable knowledge and skill which has been largely lacking in Iraq. The tobacco now grown is a mixture of several varieties not at all uniform in type, time of maturity or quality. Instead of picking the leaves individually starting at the bottom of the stem, the whole plant is frequently harvested at once. Curing is haphazard, with immediate exposure of the leaves to the sun instead of retaining them in a wilting shed

for three or four days. In packing and grading, growers do not 249
separate the bottom, middle and top leaves or take care that pack- 655
ing takes place only when the moisture content and the pliability of
the leaves are just right.

The second reason for the poor quality is inadequate grading and manipulation by the Monopoly. Tobacco is graded for the Monopoly by committees whose members are generally untrained. Classification is by color only and a bale given a single grade often has tobacco ranging through all shades of green, yellow and brown. Influential cultivators, or merchants acting on their behalf, can often obtain grades for their tobacco unwarranted by its merits. Thus the grading system offers little or no incentive to the grower to produce the best possible tobacco. Finally, the Monopoly stores tobacco under conditions which contribute to its rapid deterioration. Warehouses are often exposed to the elements and are without [488]
temperature and humidity control so that tobacco may alternately ferment and dry out. Little re-grading or manipulation is done in warehouses.

Farmer Income from Tobacco

Whether the Kurdish farmers have on the whole obtained an 249
adequate income from tobacco is less easy to determine. Their 435
income from tobacco has depended on (1) the amount of tobacco 655
purchased from each year's crop by the Monopoly and the prices (less *istihlak* and land tax) paid, and (2) the amount of tobacco sold illicitly and the prices realized thereon. Unfortunately, not enough data are available to permit an estimate of the income of tobacco farmers. Data on prices paid by the Monopoly for the first three years of its operation are lacking; figures on total tobacco production, from which the amount marketed illicitly might be deduced, do not exist; and little or nothing is known about the prices realized on tobacco marketed illegally.

During the war the Monopoly, which was supposed to equate the supply of tobacco with demand by licensing the area under cultivation, apparently made no real effort to use licensing as an instrument for the restriction of production. The area licensed rose steadily from 28,014 donums in 1940 to a peak of 71,730 in 1944. In the period 1943-45 the income of farmers was also considerably

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increased by classifying a much larger proportion of their output as "extra" or "first" grades which, of course, fetched higher prices. At the same time the Monopoly boosted the prices paid for the 1944 crop to a level more than twice as high as those which had prevailed for the 1943 crop. For the 1945 crop it lowered its prices somewhat but still maintained them at a level approximately twice as high as in 1943. As a result the Kurdish farmers reaped a bonanza. Whereas the Monopoly paid only ID 634,005 for the 1943 crop, it disbursed ID 3,208,032 for the 1944 crop and ID 3,608,997 for the 1945 crop (see table).

TABLE 1

LICENSING AND PURCHASING OPERATIONS OF THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY

Year	Donums Licensed	Prices Paid for Each Grade (1943 = 100)				Total Purchases	
		Extra	First	Second	Third	Quantity (kg)	Value (dinars)
1943	57,747	100	100	100	100	4,080,787	634,005
1944	71,730	247	233	229	250	8,863,022	3,208,032
1945	34,797	210	198	194	211	12,582,734	3,608,997
1946	26,818	140	151	183	214	4,395,166	746,499
1947	19,225	154	167	202	236	4,231,320	757,152
1948	15,500	140	151	183	214	4,347,639	772,729
1949	15,500	140	151	183	214	6,621,905	1,326,291
1950	16,000	140	151	183	214	n.a.	n.a.

Beginning in 1946 the Monopoly began to retrench sharply. The area licensed was reduced successively to 19,225 donums in 1947 and 15,500 in 1948, and it has since been held to approximately this level. Prices were also lowered to some extent. Most important of all, a stricter grading policy was adopted, resulting since 1946 in the virtual elimination of purchases of the "extra" grade and substantial reduction in the proportion of "first" grade tobacco purchased. As a result the Monopoly's disbursements for purchases from the 1946 crop fell to only ID 746,499. They have since been maintained at approximately this annual level except for the amount paid for the 1949 crop which amounted to ID 1,326,291. The quantity purchased of each year's crop fell from a peak of 12,600,000 kilograms in 1945 to about 4,400,000 in 1946,

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4,200,000 in 1947, 4,300,000 in 1948, and rose again to 6,600,000 249
in 1949. Actually, the Monopoly by no means fully enforced its 435
announced policy of buying no more than the maximum amount 655
that the licensed area could ostensibly produce.[4] Its purchases exceeded the ostensible maximum by about 400,000 kilos for the 1947 crop, 1,200,000 for the 1948 crop and as much as 3,500,000 for the 1949 crop. Much of the 1946, 1947 and 1948 crops evidently found their way into the black market.

Because of the danger of growing stocks, the Director-General, supported by the Prime Minister, issued a warning in advance of the 1950 crop that in the future no more tobacco would be bought than could be produced on the licensed area. Evidently the Monopoly carried out this policy for, up to April 12, 1951, it had bought only 2,250,000 kilos from the 1950 crop out of a theoretical total of 3,200,000 kilos. Since the cultivators apparently did not take the government's declared intention seriously, the actual crop substantially exceeded the permissible total. However, farmers were apparently compelled to sell their surplus illicitly at very low prices, thus giving rise to an expectation that in the next years the limitation on production will be more generally observed. If so, it seems likely that farmers' receipts from tobacco will amount to between ID 600,000 and ID 700,000 per year at prevailing Monopoly prices.

In general, it can probably be said that farmers received more for their tobacco than they would have obtained in the absence of the Monopoly. Since the tobacco produced is generally poor and therefore is unable to find foreign outlets, it is likely that, in the absence of the Monopoly's price support and production control program, prices would have been substantially lower. At the same time, the farmers suffered from the rather erratic policies of the Monopoly which permitted them to realize very high incomes during some of the war years and let them down suddenly immediately after the war.

Tobacco Monopoly Revenues

The government has undoubtedly enjoyed considerable income 651
from the Monopoly. In any discussion of this subject a distinction 655

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[4] The Monopoly has operated on the assumption that each licensed donum would produce up to a maximum of 200 kg. of tobacco.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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must be made between (1) the actual cash income and cash expenditures of the Monopoly, which is of particular importance to the Treasury and (2) the Monopoly's accounting contribution to the budget. These two differ markedly, as is indicated below.

TABLE 2

CASH AND ACCOUNTING RETURNS OF THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY
(in dinars)

	Cash on Treasury Account			Contribution to the Budget
	Cash Income	Cash Expenditure	Balance	
Sept. 1, 1943-Mar. 31, 1946	6,760,878	5,692,965	+1,067,913	2,147,275
1946-47	3,518,655	3,807,628	−288,973	3,479,436
1947-48	3,580,232	1,340.388	+2,239,894	1,860,358
1948-49	3,061,214	844,814	+2,216,399	342,902
1949-50	2,240,234	1,036,028	+1,204,207	424,272
Total	19,161,213	12,721.773	+6.439,440	8,254,243

The accounting contribution to the budget is figured by (1) calculating the difference between cash income and cash expenditure realized by the Monopoly in its transactions in tobacco, tombak and cigarette paper, (2) adding or subtracting the net change in the value of the Monopoly's stocks during the year, and (3) adding sundry revenues from confiscated tobacco, license fees, storage, etc. Thus in 1946-47, the accounting contribution to the budget was large despite the cash deficit incurred by the Monopoly because stocks rose markedly. In 1948-49, on the other hand, the contribution to the budget was small in relation to the cash surplus of the Monopoly because stocks of tobacco and tombak during the year fell from 9,100,000 to 6,700,000 kilos. Finally, the contribution to the budget in 1949-50 was small because at the end of that year stocks were valued for the first time at purchase price instead of sales price as hitherto. As a result the valuation of stocks was substantially reduced despite the fact that the quantity of tobacco and tombak on hand had increased from 6,700,000 to 7,800,000 kilos.

By and large it certainly can be said that the Monopoly has yielded substantial revenues to the government. This revenue has

accrued despite rather inefficient operation because the Monopoly 651
has consistently charged tobacco manufacturers prices two to two 655
and a half times higher than those it paid for tobacco and it has been able to compel them to accept tobacco at the grade which it has specified, despite the marked deterioration of such tobacco in the Monopoly's warehouses.

Recommendations

In the future the first concern should be improvement in the 249
quality of tobacco. To accomplish this it would be desirable first of all to recruit abroad at least two or three experts on the growing of tobacco. These, assisted by a selected number of Iraqis, would work directly with the growers in a campaign to raise the standards of cultivation, picking and curing. In addition, a minimum of two leaf experts should be engaged to give instruction in the proper methods of grading or classifying tobacco. In order to provide a check on the work of the grading committees, the appointment of an expert buyer to approve all tobacco for final purchase by the Monopoly is recommended. He would presumably need to be a foreigner initially, but would have an Iraqi deputy who would be trained to take his place. In the warehouses, several experienced foremen-manipulators are needed to supervise and teach the staff correct methods of handling and storing the tobacco. The inadequate existing warehouses should be replaced with four to five new ones constructed of brick and concrete, equipped with dust extracting and humidifying plant and portable storage racks. Each of these new warehouses would have four floors, the first three devoted to storage and the fourth to manipulation.

The Monopoly itself might be retained, principally because 249
there will need to be some agency to limit production as long as 655
the tobacco is not of such quality that it can readily be sold abroad. Moreover, the large number of small tobacco growers might otherwise be at the mercy of the merchants and manufacturers who would have incomparably more bargaining power in the fixing of prices. It is suggested, however, that the Monopoly be reorganized into a financially autonomous agency with its own budget, its own accounts and its own funds. As an autonomous government enterprise it would be required to turn over annually to the Treasury

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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its profits, less a suitable reserve, determined in accordance with approved accounting practice. An expert accountant should be engaged to draw up a proper system of accounting for the agency. In this connection it would be desirable to revalue the stocks of the Monopoly realistically after destroying inferior and excessively deteriorated tobaccos. The Monopoly would be headed, as at present, by a Director-General who might usefully be assisted by an adviser of recognized competence in the production and handling of tobacco. It would be desirable also to have an advisory board on which both manufacturers and growers could be represented.

The existing wide disparity between the buying and selling prices of the Monopoly provides a powerful incentive to illicit production and marketing of tobacco. The Mission strongly urges that this differential be greatly narrowed to a point where it is sufficient only to cover the expenditures of the Monopoly, plus a reasonable reserve. The revenue lost in this way could be collected in the form of additional excises on the manufacturers whose output and sales can be controlled relatively easily.

The present limitation on the amount of tobacco which the Monopoly will purchase from each licensed donum discourages productivity and should accordingly be lifted. This would not necessarily mean a further contraction of the licensed area, for the curtailment of black marketing resulting from the reduction of the difference between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices should enable the Monopoly to buy and sell more tobacco.

The Mission believes it would be very unwise to adopt current proposals to extend the Monopoly's operations to the manufacture of tobacco products. The remedy for the poor quality of tobacco does not lie in government assumption of manufacturing operations. The present manufacturers turn out a reasonably good product considering the quality of their materials. Their production costs are also likely to compare favorably with those that could be achieved with government operation.

IV. Improved Methods of Cultivation

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Dry-farming Techniques

Following this discussion of specific crops, it will be appropriate to give some attention to the various improvements in cultivation which might raise the yields of agriculture in general. Many of these improvements will be of special benefit to wheat and barley which will continue to be the principal crops.

One important method of increasing the productivity of the land—namely drainage—has already been discussed elsewhere.[5] It is worth emphasizing again, however, that the excessive use of water which aggravates salting should be discouraged as far as possible. Farmers in both the irrigation and the rain-fed zone must be taught how to make the most of the available water. For this reason the methods of dry-land farming which have proven successful elsewhere could usefully be applied in Iraq. These stress the need to prepare a proper seedbed that will insure seedlings a good start, to plant when moisture conditions are right and to sow during overcast weather if possible. Second, they include a number of practices to reduce evaporation—furrow irrigation instead of flood irrigation whenever practicable; subsoiling to break the soil pan and permit better percolation of water to a greater depth; and mulching as soon as possible after irrigation. Finally, they seek to increase the water-holding capacity of the soil through the addition of organic manure in the form of green crops; by thorough cultivation to improve tilth and by less frequent irrigation, but with greater amounts of water.

Fallow Practices

The existing fallow practices could also be considerably improved. Fallow as practiced in Iraq does tend to restore soil fertility to some extent and lowers the water table in the irrigation zone, thereby reducing the danger of salinity. Improved crop rotation (including especially the cultivation of soil-building crops), the use of fertilizer, drainage and more economical use of water will all in the long run reduce the need to keep land fallow.

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[5] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage*, pp. 203-06.

241 For a considerable time to come, however, it will be an important factor in agriculture. Proper fallow will promote nitrification and store in the soil up to 30 percent of the precipitation during the fallow period. This is true, however, only where the fallow land is kept free of vegetation which depletes the soil moisture and uses up the accumulated plant food. In Iraq this is seldom done, either because fallow is used as pasture or because the available tools [407] are not adapted to destroy the deep-rooted perennial weeds. The typical wooden "nail" plow, drawn by ill-fed and ill-kept animals, reduces the annual weeds but only encourages the more persistent, deeper-rooted species which subsequently offer stiff competition for crops following the fallow period.

In the rain-fed zone considerable land is tilled where the rainfall is marginal. The yield on such land is usually very poor. During a 10-year period, for instance, there will generally be five fallow years, two crop failures, two fair crops and one good crop. Better results might on the average be obtained if grain were planted every year on rows two and a half to three feet apart. This would reduce the plant population per unit of area and permit intertillage to control weeds and conserve moisture. Tests of this sort might well be made.

Use of Fertilizers

Although soils are generally fertile and have sufficient potash, phosphorus and nitrogen for crop production under the existing fallow system, experiments have indicated that applications of nitrogen increase yields under certain conditions. This is true of vegetables, of green gram following wheat and barley in the rotation, of cotton following small grain, of dates and citrus fruits and of rice produced in areas where silt does not replenish the soil. On the other hand, in Iraq the application of fertilizer to wheat and barley in the fall has failed to increase yields materially, and its application to small grain frequently promotes excessive vegetative growth. Presumably this lack of response is due to the fact that grain is grown on fallow land which has had a chance to replenish its supply of nitrogen. It is possible, however, that even on such land nitrogen may be deficient in the spring, making a top dressing at that time beneficial. Experience elsewhere has demonstrated that proper crop rotation and use of fertilizers make

possible more intensive utilization of the land. Experiments conducted over a long period in the United States have shown the reaction of wheat yields to fallow, fertilizer and crop rotation. The results indicate that yields respond most favorably to fertilizers used in combination with a crop rotation scheme.[6] There is great need to do more experimental work in Iraq in order to determine the optimum rates of fertilizer applications for various crops, the best time of application and the effect of green manure on production.

The high cost of fertilizers may have deterred their use. This handicap may be overcome if steps are taken to carry out the Mission's proposals to establish a large nitrogen plant at Kirkuk as well as a number of small bonemeal plants.

Tools and Draft Power

In discussing the need for weed control, reference has already been made to the lack of adequate equipment and good draft animals. In some parts of Iraq hand cultivation without the use of draft power may still be seen. In other parts, however, one can see the most modern tractors and combines at work in the fields.

Better tools and draft power will no doubt help to improve the productivity of the land both by destroying weeds and by better preparation of the soil. Similarly, better threshing equipment will raise the quality of the grain. This does not mean, however, that mechanization of agriculture will necessarily be the appropriate solution. Most farmers do not have sufficient land or money to warrant the purchase of a tractor or combine, and cooperative ownership will inevitably develop rather slowly. Moreover, under existing conditions the cost of amortization, operation and maintenance may be too high in relation to the cost of labor. Better plows drawn by sturdy animals may have largely the same effect as tractor-drawn plows in destroying weeds and improving prep-

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[6] Yields under various conditions were as follows in terms of bushels per acre:

1. Continuous wheat, without fertilizer	12.33
2. Continuous wheat, with fertilizer	23.58
3. Wheat after one year of fallow	22.00
4. Wheat in a 4-year rotation, without fertilizer	24.00
5. Wheat in a 4-year rotation, with fertilizer	32.00

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

241 aration of the soil. Similarly, small stationary threshers may offer a better alternative than large harvesting combines to the present methods of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. The government should pay at least as much attention to the task of getting simple, inexpensive tools into the hands of the cultivators as to the much more ambitious program of agricultural mechanization. [412] Good hand tools, for example, are almost nonexistent. Improvement in draft animals is also necessary. While the supply of draft animals cannot be increased rapidly, it is possible to get animals of greater strength and endurance by better feeding and selection.

In the longer run, however, there is no doubt that mechanization of agriculture will assume growing importance. Physically, the country with its flat broad plains is ideally suited to mechanization although the canals and ditches in the irrigation zone offer [464] some impediments to the use of machinery. Moreover, even now there are labor shortages at sowing and harvest times in some parts of the country, particularly in the North. In the future such shortages may become really acute as manpower is drawn from the land to take advantage of the new employment opportunities created by the over-all development program and as some of the fellahin working on land now under cultivation leave to settle new land. Under such circumstances mechanization may become the principal means of maintaining and expanding agricultural output. In its policy respecting mechanization the government will need to steer a careful course. On the one hand, it will want to keep some check on mechanization as long and wherever there is danger of displacing fellahin before alternative means of employment become available; on the other hand, it will find it desirable to accelerate mechanization whenever labor shortages become serious. Through its control over imports and credit, the government possesses effective methods of influencing the rate of mechanization.

241 407 427 The United States Lend-Lease Program gave mechanization its first impetus. At present there are probably about 170 combines and 550 tractors in operation in the country, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. In addition, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned and made

available for rental by the Agricultural Machinery Administration, 244
an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Economics.[7] 407
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Further progress will be seriously impeded, however, unless means are found to prolong the life of machinery which is now less than half what it is in the United States. The shortage of spare parts and repair facilities has been very discouraging to machinery owners. The failure of private dealers to provide these largely [655
inspired the government's original decision to establish the Agricultural Machinery Administration as a monopoly for the importation and distribution of agricultural machinery. In accordance with suggestions made by an earlier International Bank Mission, the government has tried to meet the problem by different measures, namely by licensing dealers only on condition they agree to set up repair facilities and maintain an adequate stock of spare parts. The enforcement of these requirements, however, will not provide a complete solution, even if it is supplemented by completion of the AMA program for setting up its own repair facilities at Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Diwaniya and Kut. The AMA and private dealers should also cooperate in conducting courses in operation and elementary maintenance of machines for drivers. Moreover, simple local facilities to carry out all but major repairs are needed. An adequate number of mechanics both for the central and local repair shops must be trained, and for this purpose foreign shop supervisors and instructors will be necessary. The Industrial Bank may have to cooperate by providing small loans for equipping local shops.

The AMA now performs a number of useful functions. It 655
regulates imports and the distribution of spare parts and tests 407
different types of machinery for their adaptability to conditions in 427
Iraq. Most important, it maintains a pool of machinery for rental. In some respects its operations could undoubtedly be improved.

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[7] An official estimate given to the Mission gives a total of 320 combines and 750 tractors. Customs statistics for the years 1945 to 1950 inclusive, however, show that only 632 tractors and 262 combines were imported. Part of these are already out of commission. An on-the-spot survey in each province by a member of the Mission indicated that only 170 combines and 549 tractors, exclusive of government-owned machines, were in operation. Of the combines, Mosul had 75; Baghdad, 75; seven provinces, one to five each; and five provinces, none. Of the tractors, Baghdad had 250; Mosul, 150; Kut, 40; Kirkuk, 23; Erbil, 15; six provinces, less than 10 each; and three provinces, none.

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With a larger and more qualified staff it could do a better job in advising farmers on the type of machinery best suited to their needs and could undertake the tasks outlined in the preceding paragraph. It might also pay more attention to finding and testing the type of machinery that would be particularly useful on smaller holdings. Above all, in its rental service it should charge rates which will not cause it to run a large deficit or discourage private ownership of machinery.

The rental service itself performs a useful function and should be continued until private enterprise can provide the same service on the basis of a reasonable return or until sufficient cooperatives can be organized to provide machinery for their members. Many landowners cannot now afford to buy a machine, and others will not risk buying until they have had a chance to test its value by renting one. The AMA, however, now sustains heavy losses on its rental operation. For the calendar year 1951 its operating expenditures are expected to be ID 150,463 as compared with a projected rental income of only ID 50,000. For the two years 1950 and 1951, the total cash deficit of the Administration will probably amount to about ID 222,000.[8] It has been able to finance such deficits only by using up the balance of the capital contribution of ID 500,000 which the government originally made to the agency. Since ID 235,750 of this contribution consisted of machinery and buildings, very little of the remaining cash will have been left by the end of 1951. The AMA's financial situation is all the more acute because it now urgently needs funds to purchase new machinery and equipment at a rate of perhaps ID 250,000 per year. In the past there has been no depreciation reserve for the replacement of machinery. To meet this financial emergency it will be necessary to make the rental operation self-sustaining. In part this can be accomplished by reducing expenditures. Probably more important, however, will be an increase in rentals, especially those on tractors which are now relatively low. A continuing government contribution to the total budget of the AMA will probably be merited, but only to the approximate extent to which AMA expenditures are attributable to functions other than the rental of

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[8] For the 1950 and 1951 budgets of the AMA, see Tables I and II in the appendix.

machinery. At the same time the cost of new machinery and equip- 655
ment will need to be financed—possibly out of Development Board 407
funds if earlier plans to borrow for this purpose from the Inter- 427
national Bank do not materialize.

Government rental of machinery should at best be considered a temporary expedient. It is wasteful, primarily because overhead expenses are high. The transportation of machinery from central shops to the renters tends to be expensive and to expose the machinery to excessive wear and tear. Private and cooperative ownership of machinery should therefore be encouraged. One step in this direction would be to enable the Agricultural Bank to lend money for this purpose on the security of the machinery. In the past the absence of any provision for registering title to such machinery has prevented such loans. Another important measure would be to encourage the establishment of cooperatives for the collective ownership of machinery, especially in the new agricultural areas which are to be opened. At present the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project owns a number of tractors. [474] Because overhead costs are relatively low it is able to rent them out at lower rate than the AMA while still apparently covering the cost of operation and depreciation.

V. Control of Pests and Diseases

Livestock Pests and Mortality 232

More effective control of pests and diseases would also materially help to improve yields. This is particularly true of livestock. Because of lack of funds, equipment and trained personnel, no systematic campaigns for eradicating specific groups of diseases have been undertaken. Many livestock diseases, particularly of the parasitic type, are rife. Among the principal livestock diseases are foot and mouth disease; haemorrhagic septicaemia; anthrax; sheep pox; blackleg; parasitic gastritis; tick-borne diseases (anaplasmosis and piroplasmosis); fowl cholera; Newcastle disease; various manges; and dourine. The available staff is wholly insufficient to control, let alone eradicate, any epidemic which might break out. A serious outbreak of disease would endanger the livestock industry of neighboring countries as well as that of Iraq.

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The first requisite for an effective campaign against livestock diseases is a larger trained staff. The number of field veterinarians should be increased from 17 to 28 as rapidly as possible. A number of Iraqis should be sent to foreign veterinary schools, preferably in countries where comparable livestock conditions exist, such as India, Pakistan, Egypt or Turkey. Pending the training of Iraqis, it would be advisable to engage a number of veterinarians abroad. The field service should be augmented by trained assistants and dispensers. Graduates of the Abu Ghuraib agricultural school might be recruited for these positions and given a short concentrated course in the practical aspects of veterinary science at the veterinary school at Baghdad, with further instruction at the neighboring clinic, the Veterinary Service Institute and the abattoir. It would be highly advisable to take some of the candidates for such training from the nomadic tribes so that they can later help their own tribes in combatting the hundred and one ailments which beset their livestock. Organization of a competent veterinary field service is likely to prove impossible, however, unless the prevailing pay and other conditions of service are greatly improved.

Secondly, facilities for diagnosis and treatment should be improved. It is suggested that simple regional diagnostic laboratories be set up in all provinces. At present all laboratory work in connection with diagnosis is centered in the Veterinary Service Institute at Baghdad, thus causing much waste of time and effort. Decentralization might begin with the establishment of laboratories in Mosul and Kirkuk to serve the North and in Basra to serve the South. Such regional laboratories should not be established, however, at the expense of the quality of the staff and service of the Institute in Baghdad. Complicated diagnosis would continue to be handled by the Institute which also manufactures sera and vaccines. It would be advisable to reorganize and strengthen the Institute so that it can give adequate support to the veterinarians in the field and make an appropriate contribution to veterinary education. The quality of equipment must be improved and production methods modernized. A qualified foreign expert might be appointed to assist in making the necessary changes.

There is a great need for systematic remedial and prophylactic treatment to reduce widely prevalent parasitic infections by such means as flock treatment against internal worms, and cattle and sheep dipping against external parasites. A small campaign to control sheep pox and other external ailments was begun at one time, but abandoned because of lack of funds. In the future adequate funds should be set aside to carry out a well-planned campaign of dipping, particularly in the North. This will involve the establishment of dip-tanks at strategic points in relation to the grazing grounds of the herds and flocks, the location to be worked out by a ground survey undertaken by field officers. Another important prophylactic measure would be the establishment of quarantine stations at points used for international trade in livestock. 232

At present many livestock belonging to the nomadic tribes die from lack of water or exposure to severe weather, either directly or indirectly as the result of lowered resistance to disease. In the severe winter of 1949 about 1,500,000 sheep are said to have died in the mountains of Kurdistan. In the South the waterholes used by the tribes tend to dry up in dry years, thus necessitating great treks to reach water during which many animals are lost. Such losses would be greatly reduced by livestock shelters in the North and more wells in the South. The shelters, which should be built at strategic points on the migration routes, would be primarily for the protection of lambing ewes and would provide emergency feed supplies for migratory flocks. A three-walled mud structure, with a roof and accommodations for shepherds and some feedstuffs, will be sufficient. Although the government has dug some wells for the use of the southern tribes, much more could be done.

Plant Diseases and Pests

The pests and diseases affecting crops have not been as great a problem as those attacking livestock. The locust plague is a periodic menace, but has been kept rather successfully under control in recent years. The systematic distribution of poison bait in hatching areas during the spring has been the most effective method of combating the locust.[9] Since the bait will be scorned when succulent green food is available, it is important also that farmers 242

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[9] The best bait consists of mill-run bran, sawdust, sodium fluorsilicate and water and should be applied at the rate of 14 pounds of wet bait per donum.

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be made to realize that the eggs can be destroyed before hatching by cultivating infested areas to a depth of about two inches either in late fall or early spring. Once the locusts or grasshoppers begin to spread, their ravages can be arrested by applying chlordane or toxaphene as spray or dust. Sprays have the advantage of causing higher initial kills and they continue to kill over longer periods than dust. To control future outbreaks the Department of Agriculture should at all times have access to sufficient funds and have on hand an adequate amount of supplies, vehicles, spraying and dusting equipment. This has not always been true in the past.

The most destructive of several sucking insects is the Sunn pest *(Burygaster integriceps)* which does great damage to wheat and barley crops in several Middle East countries. Iraq has reported losses of 30 to 50 percent and in some sections almost total crop losses. The most common procedure used in control of this insect has been to plant early-maturing varieties of grain, since the insect does not attack after the seed has begun to harden.

Grain losses from rust and smut are sometimes quite substantial and could undoubtedly be reduced. Although the Mission made only a superficial survey, loose smut of wheat and barley and close smut of barley were noted over a considerable area. In certain sections as much as 10 to 20 percent of the seeds appeared to be smutted. Leaf rust of wheat and leaf and stem rust of barley, as well as powdery mildew, were also observed.

Cotton pests and diseases are not at present a factor in production. The pink boll worm, however, has been recorded from Basra and the boll worm *(Earia insulana)* is found throughout the cotton-growing region. *Laphygma exigua* is most common and does some damage. There are also a number of other pests. While, in the aggregate, these have not inflicted serious losses, agricultural officers should be prepared to recognize any new infestations and should be briefed on the most effective methods of control. It might be noted in this connection that the State University of Arizona at Tucson, Arizona, U.S.A., has published in pamphlet form a schedule for cotton insect control that is outstandingly good.[10]

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[10] *Cotton Insect Control*, Circular 179, Agricultural Extension Service, University of Arizona, Tucson.

In any discussion of pests the damage caused by weeds is 242 worth emphasizing again. Poor tillage and the tendency to use idle land as pasture has caused a rapid spread of Bermuda and Johnson grass in the irrigation zone. These pests have actually forced a considerable amount of crop land out of production and have lowered the yield of such summer crops as cotton, maize and sesame.

VI. Improvement in Livestock and Livestock Products

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Improvement in both the quality and quantity of livestock production is likely to be of growing importance in the future, particularly since the anticipated rapid increase in public expenditures on development as a whole will create an expanding and more discriminating market for animal products.

In general the types of livestock found in Iraq represent rather hardy animals which, through a process of natural selection, have become fairly resistant to the rigors imposed by a severe climate and inadequate feed supplies. This does not mean that improvements in breeding cannot be effected. At present breeding 232 is largely haphazard and uncontrolled, particularly as to timing and the selection of sires. It is a well-known scientific fact, however, that the evaluation of genetic factors influencing production in any direction—meat, milk, wool, work, and the like—cannot be properly assessed unless the nutritional level is first improved, thus permitting the full genetic development of the livestock to take place. Iraq is a particularly striking illustration of the truth of the old saying that "half the breed goes into the mouth."

One of the best methods of exploring the possibility of improved breeding and the results of better feeding and other livestock practices would be to establish a number of herds and flocks of indigenous breeds of livestock as well as poultry on government farms throughout Iraq. There careful records would be kept to discover for the first time what these animals can really produce with improved feeding, breeding and management. These livestock stations could also provide progeny-tested sires to farmers for

breeding. Above all, farmers could be brought there to see with their own eyes the benefits of better livestock practices and the value of mixed farming. A start toward establishing such herds and flocks has already been made.

The following expanded program might be carried out over the next few years in different parts of Iraq:

Southern Area:

1. A flock of purebred Arabi sheep should be kept at the government fa[illegible]t Basra, together with a herd of selected buffalo.
2. A herd of selecte[illegible]lo should be established at Amara either on govern[illegible] property or on private property where the owner will cooperate with the government in obtaining the necessary information on breeding, performance, feeding, etc.

Central Area:

1. At Abu Ghuraib Farm the selected flock of Awasi sheep should be more usefully adapted than at present to give information on breed performance, milk production, wool yield, etc. The herd of Jenubi dairy cows should follow a carefully planned program with respect to breeding, feeding and types of management to determine performance, influence of improved feeding, likely foundation dairy strains for country stations, and the like. At present the farm has no clearly defined livestock policy and lacks continuity of policy. This station might also usefully continue its work on Friesians as a town (Baghdad) cow, purely for urban milk supplies. It would be undesirable to continue with more than one imported breed of cows for this purpose, and the use of this breed should be strictly limited to urban requirements.
2. Work should also be done on buffalo in this central area but this can be readily carried out by controlling breeding and management on one or more of the buffalo settlements (e.g. Dora) in the neighborhood of Baghdad.
3. In the central area also, the work on Arab horse breeding should be maintained and expanded on a more realistic basis. The local racing organizations and the Turf Club would probably cooperate readily in a comprehensive breeding scheme to improve the quality of the local horses.
4. Finally, a small farm (300-500 donums) should be purchased in the Diyala province and organized on a mixed

farming basis, including crops, horticulture and livestock 232 in its program. From the livestock point of view it should be a demonstration of the production of milk, eggs and poultry under irrigation conditions to meet urban requirements in the Baquba and Baghdad areas; a lesson in improved feeding, breeding and management, and, above all, in mixed farming.

Northern Area:

1. Flocks of Karadi sheep should be established at Nineveh and Bakrajo, a herd of northern black cattle at Bakrajo, and a herd of Sharabi cattle at Nineveh. Improved foundation stock or even purebred sires of the black mountain breed of cattle might be brought in from Turkey.
2. For mule breeding, selected foundation stock (jacks) might be introduced from Cyprus to meet the mountain and hill requirements of this northern area.

Special measures will need to be taken to assist the nomads in improving their livestock. Aside from the veterinary assistants which might be attached to the tribes, it would be desirable to train a few members of each tribe in such a way that they can give advice and assistance on other livestock matters, including the development of better breeds with the help of selected sires procured from the government. Better pasturage is, however, the critical question. In view of the difficulty of increasing the feed supply for the livestock of the nomads in the South, their problem may be best met in the end by converting an increasing number to mixed farming as new areas are irrigated. Some help may be given by investigating the possibility of conserving existing desert forage plants and introducing new drought-resistant grasses and herbs. For the northern nomads better watered natural grazing lands are available. Unfortunately these lands have been badly [233] abused, and, in the Northeast in particular, a considerable portion has been overgrazed so severely that scarcely any palatable forage remains. Regulations to enforce rotational grazing are urgently needed. Reseeding of the worst areas would not be impossible and would certainly reap large dividends. Controlled grazing is particularly necessary to safeguard the scanty forest areas. For this purpose it is suggested that the migration routes for livestock in the North be fixed in consultation with the Forestry Department.

Quality of Livestock Products

237 Livestock products already play an important role in the economy. Demand for such products may well rise with the anticipated increase in the purchasing power of the population. With it will come an insistence on the improvement of quality which is now often very low. Better quality would also substantially raise the prices of export products.

Hides and Skins

281 Although there are a few modern plants, many tanneries are still extremely primitive and produce a poorly finished product. Their chief handicap, however, is the low quality of the hides they receive. Methods of flaying and preserving are generally poor. Even in the abattoirs which are supervised by the Veterinary Department the quality of the product leaves much to be desired. The prevailing methods of flaying—with the knife in the case of sheep and cattle, and with the axe in the case of buffalo—leave the hide lacerated, with hair, meat and blood adhering to the inside. Methods of preservation are also inadequate. Hides and skins collected outside of the abattoirs and many of those taken from the abattoirs are frequently improperly prepared to ensure keeping quality during storage and transportation until the time of their arrival at the tannery. The low-paid and poorly trained supervisors which the Veterinary Department assigns to the abattoirs are incapable of effecting any improvement.

In view of these conditions it would be advisable to appoint an experienced abattoir specialist to teach and direct the abattoir supervisors. The teaching could be done in the Veterinary School at Baghdad, with practical demonstrations at the Baghdad abattoir. Once an adequate number of supervisors are trained, the School might conduct simple courses for the abattoir workers themselves. This scheme of training could later be extended to village slaughterers.

The Hides and Skins Association established by a law enacted in 1951 affords another opportunity to raise the standards of the trade and industry. It is suggested that an experienced foreign expert be appointed to manage the Association in the initial period and establish its reputation as a constructive and modernizing

influence. He would need to work in close cooperation with the proposed abattoir specialist. The Association should also investigate the possibility of using more local materials in the hides and skins industry. Thus local valonia or oak bark might be employed for tanning and locally refined and sulphurated fish oils used in the leather industry. Efforts might also be made to procure better salt at reasonable prices from the government salt works at Fao and to organize more adequate local supplies of date syrup which small tanneries use as a glucose. 281

Casings

Most if not all the casings are obtained from the abattoirs in barrels. Initial cleaning and grading is usually done on the floor which is occasionally washed down with water. The casings examined appeared to be remarkably free of parasitic infection, particularly in the North. More hygienic casings could be produced under more efficient and comfortable working conditions if the work were raised from the floor to zinc-lined tables and improved drainage and piped water supplies were provided in the sections dealing with casings. 253

Other Improvements in Abattoirs

Many abattoir buildings are in need of repair, enlargement and alteration. Improvements such as an impervious floor, better drainage and water supplies can often be effected at small cost. At present abattoir offal is largely wasted even though the amount involved would warrant the installation of modern methods of converting it into glue, bone meal, blood meal, etc. In order to encourage more slaughtering at the government-supervised abattoirs, it might also be desirable to review the taxes assessed at the abattoir which encourage livestock owners to resort to illicit slaughter. 253 348

Wool

The wool collected from the various fat-tailed varieties of sheep makes a good carpet wool and a valuable export product. Little attention is given, however, to good shearing, perhaps because milk rather than wool is considered the main product of the flocks. Shearing is done with crude hand shears. Wool is frequently left on the head and neck region and around the root of 236

236 the tail, and in many cases not even all the "clippable" wool is taken from the body and legs. It is suggested, therefore, that one or more Australian wool clippers be recruited to teach several Iraqis, preferably shepherds, the proper way to secure a maximum clip. These trained clippers, who would be in government service, would then be assigned to clipping sheds which, with proper shearing equipment, should be established in one or two of the main sheep areas, starting, perhaps, with Samawa and Aqra. The tribes would be encouraged to bring their sheep to these sheds where they would be clipped for a small fee in cash or in kind. The sheds could at the same time be used as wool grading stations so that livestock owners could easily see which type of animals pays them best. They might also serve as centers for the collection of goat hair for export. In addition to the stationary clipping sheds, one mobile unit might be tried. The cost of these shearing units, which might be either hand or power driven, would be very small.

235 **Poultry and Eggs**

Poultry, which take a very secondary place in the livestock picture of the average village, are generally of nondescript breeds and feed themselves primarily through uncontrolled scavenging supplemented by an occasional handful of grain. No thought is given to breeding a better type bird or a bird which will produce larger eggs over a longer laying season. Yet the possibility of developing better and more productive poultry through proper feeding and management has already been demonstrated by work carried on by the government. In the future, poultry units should be established for demonstration and breeding purposes on all government agricultural stations. Experimental work on the control of parasites and on the construction of cheap poultry houses out of locally available materials should be carried on at Abu Ghuraib, Bakrajo and possibly Basra. Farmers should be asked to come and observe the results of good management and to draw better breeding stock from these agricultural stations. One or two of the larger farmers might be encouraged to undertake the raising of poultry on a large scale as an experiment. There will certainly be a growing domestic market for poultry and eggs, and it may ultimately be possible to cater to the markets of Gulf ports and the oil company settlements in the Middle East.

Dairy Products

The larger towns receive their milk and milk products from cows, buffalo, sheep and goats which are kept in backyards in town or on nearby farms and settlements. The dairy cattle among them are usually of mixed or nondescript breed. While they are surprisingly well fed, their housing and the methods of milking and processing the milk are extremely primitive. The majority of municipalities appear to have sufficient legislation to ensure clean milk production, but enforcement is poor and the livestock owner is not educated to the necessity for taking more care with the production of his commodity. Baghdad, for example, has regulations to remove livestock out of the city and locate them outside of the city boundaries. It has provided livestock settlements for the milking buffalo complete with walled paddocks, running water and feeding stalls, but unfortunately with no accommodation or living quarters for the workers. Despite these facilities many livestock owners continue to keep their animals in the poorer quarter of the city, and no attempt is made by the government to demonstrate clean milk production in these settlements.

The government has taken a step in the right direction in [744] installing a small milk pasteurizing plant in Baghdad (100-gallon flash pasteurizer), but the only milk passing through the plant is some 200-300 liters a day from the Abu Ghuraib agricultural station. Unfortunately many Baghdad residents do not even know of its existence. Some government officials have urged a larger pasteurizing plant even though the present plant is daily running considerably below capacity. The cleanliness of existing milk supplies must first be improved and producers persuaded to use the existing plant.

Another unfortunate feature of the present "backyard" herds is the fact that many dry cows and calves are sent to slaughter and only the milk producing animal is retained. Each year the dairy industry loses a great number of potentially good milk-producing animals in this way.

The following recommendations for the amelioration of the situation in Baghdad are put forward with the expectation that, if they are successfully applied there, they can be extended also to the other major cities:

(a) A survey of all the milk-producing animals in Baghdad and environs should be undertaken through the Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Department. This should include the number of animals, names of owners and approximate production of milk; disposal of milk, either as fluid milk or processed; estimates of seasonal variations in production; some general information on sources of feeding stuffs; list of retail dairies and details of the disposal of their products.

(b) On the basis of the information thus obtained the government should take the lead in forming a cowkeepers association or milk producers association, which will represent the trade and deal with the government in all matters affecting milk supplies. The association should have a voice in advising the government on any regulation of the retail prices of dairy products.

(c) Through the Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Department the milk producer should be shown and persuaded to adopt better feeding, breeding and management methods.

(d) Existing legislation to move the livestock out of the heart of the city to settlements and nearby farms outside the city boundaries should be enforced. Regulations forbidding adulteration of milk must also be made effective, which will presumably necessitate more adequate remuneration of medical department inspectors to prevent bribery. Adequate laboratory facilities, together with the necessary trained staff, ought to be made available for testing inspection samples.

(e) On existing or newly established livestock settlements, adequate provision must be made for housing the workers, storing feeding stuffs, and purchasing day-to-day requirements. From visits to these settlements and discussions held with the producers, it appears that they would lend themselves admirably to the formation of producers' cooperative societies. The milk could be individually produced, taken to a central collecting station on the settlement and communally transported to town for either pasteurizing or direct processing and retail to the public. The cooperative could also provide the producers with cheaper feeds bought in bulk, dairy utensils and other provisions.

(f) The existing government pasteurizing plant might also be turned into a producers' cooperative. As a first step, a government board, including selected members of the private trade, might be appointed to supervise the plant. In the second stage it might then become a complete cooperative, with the government retaining representation on the board only to the extent that its agricultural station contributed milk for pasteurization. The cooperative would of course be subject to government inspection from time to time to ensure efficient and hygienic operation. 234

(g) The government should explore the possibility of purchasing selected young calves and dry cows from the producers, keeping them on a selected irrigated farm outside of town, and rearing and breeding from these stock for resale to the milk producers.

(h) Measures to eliminate disease among dairy cattle, including testing for tuberculosis and brucellosis, should be inaugurated.

(i) The government should send two of its trained staff from the Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Department to see and examine the Bombay Milk Scheme, Bombay, India, in order to assist in solving the similar problems which confront the Baghdad milk industry.

If the government is prepared to carry out such an over-all campaign to organize adequate and safe milk supplies for Baghdad and later for other major cities, there is little doubt that UNICEF and FAO will be prepared to assist with machinery and technical assistance, providing a fair proportion of the resulting supplies of pasteurized milk were reserved for those groups in the population who particularly need them (children, nursing and pregnant mothers).

VII. Education and Research

It will be readily apparent that a program for the improvement of agricultural and livestock production does not necessarily involve large government investments. Most of all, it requires a well-directed, adequately staffed government service that can effectively assist the cultivator and the livestock keeper. Within this service the primary emphasis in the future must be on a field organization equipped to work directly with the producer in improving his methods and management and supported by a properly focussed, practical research program. 242

Such a service is unfortunately conspicuously lacking in Iraq. Within the Department of Agriculture there are less than 25

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242 trained agriculturists.[11] In each province there is an agricultural staff of five to 20 men, but the officers are not qualified to direct research or extension work. The trained staff of the Veterinary Department is correspondingly restricted. It has already been mentioned that there are only 17 trained veterinarians in its field [465] service. In 1950 the Agricultural and Veterinary Departments had only 108 and 40 officers respectively with a base pay of over ID 15 per month.[12]

The field services operate under great handicaps. The officers are underpaid and thus often supplement their income by engaging in other work or by extending special favors. Neither their pay nor their standing in the community is such as to attract promising talent. Transport or other equipment such as laboratory facilities is frequently lacking. Excessive centralization leaves little room for initiative. Even the taking of a field trip requires the consent of the central office. The staff is preoccupied with routine tasks, generally of a regulatory or control nature, to the virtual exclusion of real research or extension work. They grow and distribute seed and nursery stock, do some control work on pests and diseases, carry out inspections and collect rather inadequate information on production. Moreover, their work is rigidly compartmentalized. There is little or no contact between those dealing with livestock and those concerned with agronomy and no coordination between agriculture and irrigation.

Organization of an Extension Service

One of the principal tasks of the future should be to organize an extension or advisory service to farmers and livestock keepers. Such a service, adequately equipped with transport, would devote itself entirely to assisting the farmers and shepherds in the field. Its main emphasis would be on education through demonstration. For this purpose it would need to establish crop, livestock and poultry demonstration units in all parts of the country. Suggestions 242 for such livestock units have already been made. In many cases it will not be necessary to establish government-owned farms, for it should be possible to stimulate the more enlightened landowners to lead the way in adopting better methods and permitting those in the neighborhood to come and see for themselves the results achieved. The ultimate goal should be to make some practical demonstration of the value of such improved methods accessible to nearly all cultivators. In addition the officers of the extension service would need to work intimately with the rural primary and secondary schools in a program to bring children a knowledge of the principles of good agriculture and animal husbandry as early as possible. They should also play a prominent role in any adult education programs launched by the Ministry of Education. For this purpose they should be equipped with visual teaching aids.

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[11] These include in the Central Office at Baghdad, the director-general, two junior agricultural officers, one plant protection officer, one extension officer and one technical assistant; in the agricultural station at Abu Ghuraib, one senior livestock officer, two plant pathologists, one senior entomologist and four junior assistants; in the agricultural school at Abu Ghuraib, one director and two teachers; and in the horticultural station at Zafanaria, one director, two assistants and two junior officers.

[12] With living allowances, this ranges from ID 23.750 to ID 26.750.

Obviously, such an extension service cannot be created overnight. The first step should be to appoint an expert who has had considerable experience in extension work abroad to recruit and train the necessary staff and take other preparatory measures. His initial staff might consist of an assistant responsible for collecting materials for use in the service and two or three supervisors to direct the gradually increasing amount of advisory work in the field. A few people should be sent abroad each year to gain practical experience of extension work. The supervisory personnel would initially have to be obtained abroad. Those officers who would work directly with farmers and livestock keepers in the field should not be highly specialized. Rather they need a good general training in agriculture and animal husbandry. In the past too much stress has been placed on specialization.

Many of the candidates for the extension service could be 242 educated at the secondary agricultural school and the more 874 advanced institute at Abu Ghuraib. The first of these now gives a three-year course to students who have completed three years of secondary schooling while the latter provides a two-year advanced course to graduates of secondary schools. The institute's course has recently been extended to three years and will soon be increased to a full four years leading to a bachelor's degree in agriculture. Both these schools should be in the position to train

242 874 forward-looking men for actual farming as well as for posts in the agricultural administration and the extension and educational service. Unfortunately their teaching staff and curricula have been deficient in many respects. The teaching staffs should be strengthened by recruiting additional qualified teachers abroad and by using specialists engaged in agricultural research to teach their specialties. More practical agricultural work should be incorporated into the curriculum. Students in the institute, for instance, might be required to remain on the government farm at least one or two summers and complete a course in practical agriculture. This course would include the actual operation of farm machinery, the establishment of simple plots to demonstrate yield, crop adaptation and other agricultural techniques, and the care of livestock. It is important that students actually work with their hands during such a course, for there is no room in a field extension service for officers who consider manual work degrading. In addition to their regular instruction, both schools should be equipped to give brief courses from time to time in special subjects such as the operation and maintenance of machinery, animal husbandry, soil analysis, forestry, and techniques of extension work.

242 It will be some years before sufficient people can be recruited and trained for an adequate extension service. In the intervening period a complete separation between the extension service and the regulatory and inspection service cannot be carried out. Those newly trained would join the existing service and carry out both types of work, with the expectation, however, that growing emphasis would be placed on extension work. Consideration might be given, however, to establishing a full-time extension service as soon as possible within one or two areas limited to a few selected *qadhas,* so that different methods of working with farmers could be tested.

Ultimately it will be desirable to separate the extension service from the inspection and regulatory service. The latter might then be organized into two sections: one dealing with control of injurious pests and diseases, maintenance of standards for agricultural and livestock products, fertilizers and insecticides, and surveys of production and land use; the other concerned with the production, processing and distribution of pure agricultural seed

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and nursery stock. The first of these sections should have adequate laboratory facilities for identifying plants, insects and diseases and for analyzing chemicals, pesticides, fertilizers, feed and food products. The second section would need better equipment than is now available at Abu Ghuraib to test, clean and process seed. It would also require at least three nurseries—one each for the northern, central and southern parts of Iraq—to propagate needed fruit, nut and citrus stocks. Seed stocks of proven strains would have to be either imported or produced locally either on government farms or on private farms under contract. Experience indicates that soil and climatic conditions are favorable to the production of seed of the most important field crops, as well as alfalfa, berseem clover and many of the grasses. 242

The inspection and regulatory service in the field will presumably exist separately for agriculture and animal husbandry under the direction of the departments respectively responsible for these subjects at Baghdad. Ultimately, however, the extension service should be under the unified direction of a single director, particularly since it is so desirable in the future to integrate animal husbandry with agriculture.

Establishment of a Research Department

An extension service will need to be complemented by a staff engaged in practical research and experimental work and a small staff of agricultural statisticians and economists. The first will develop and test new and better strains of seeds and stock, experiment with different methods of soil cultivation and fertilization, explore means of improving livestock breeding and feeding, and the like in order to develop the most effective and best adapted agricultural and livestock practices for practical application through the extension service. The small staff of statisticians and economists will be concerned with developing a more accurate picture concerning farm and livestock production and land use. It will study marketing problems and provide advice on the pattern of agricultural and animal output that is likely to be most remunerative for the farmer in various sections of the country. 654 242

It is important that a Department of Research and Experimentation be established within the ministry charged with respon-

654 sibility for agriculture. Such a department should gradually be 242 staffed over the next five years with trained personnel able to devote full time to research and experimentation. At present those engaged in research are generally charged with other duties as well. Until more staff can be trained, the available personnel will presumably have to discharge several functions. It is strongly recommended, however, that immediate steps be taken to recruit a man with wide experience in research as the director of the new service. It would be his responsibility to coordinate such research as is now being carried on both in agriculture and animal husbandry and to build up a full-time staff. The research department should have ample facilities and therefore have jurisdiction over all experiment stations. Government farms are now primarily devoted to commercial production of seed and nursery stock rather than to research. In the future their principal task should be to serve as experimental and demonstration stations. Only such land as is surplus to these needs should be turned over to commercial seed or stock production. Under those circumstances part of the seed production may have to be contracted out or grown on newly established government farms.

The research department would concentrate on the following fields:

1. *Soil management and conservation.* This would include the initiation of a complete soil survey to determine the properties of different soils by field and laboratory studies, classify the soils by their properties and possible uses and summarize the information available on each type with respect to its tilth, fertility, adaptability to particular crops and the like. Such a survey would be extremely useful in planning land use, especially in the selection of land for irrigation and drainage projects. The first step would be to carry out a preliminary reconnaissance survey. The advantages of the intensive cropping system, involving proper crop rotation and the use of fertilizer, should also be studied in comparison with those of the crop-fallow system. Finally, the various methods of conserving moisture through better cultivation, timely destruction of weeds and the prevention of soil erosion could be tested.
2. *Introduction of new and better varieties of crops.* Among the subjects to be examined in this field would be the suitability of different types of forage crops, including

grasses and legumes; new grain sorghum varieties and hybrid maize strains; and the adaptability of sugar beets and sugar cane.

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3. *Horticulture.* This work, which should be centered at the Zafarania station, would cover vegetables, dates, nuts, citrus and other fruits. Tests should be carried out in the northern and southern as well as the central part of Iraq.
4. *Tools and machinery.* This type of work would test the suitability of various kinds of hand, animal-drawn and power tools for different conditions and jobs and especially seek to develop cheap but effective animal-drawn equipment and hand tools.
5. *Forestry.* Research on forestry should be developed with particular attention to experiments with controlled grazing on range and forest land and the selection and culture of trees suitable for various uses and sections of the country. It would be desirable to carry on this research not only at the forest nursery in Erbil, but also at the Abu Ghuraib and Bakrajo stations.
6. *Animal husbandry.* This would focus on the development of the most suitable pasture and feed crops and the best methods of preserving fodder for winter feeding. As already indicated, it would determine to what extent existing types of livestock could be improved by systematic breeding and feeding. The cost and results of feeding with different oilseed by-products and date by-products should be studied and a laboratory established to work on the relative value and digestibility of various feedstuffs. A research program on range development should also be carried out, but jointly with the forestry service. The government has already taken a constructive step by inaugurating a scheme near Chemchemal in the province of Kirkuk for experimenting with afforestation and rotational grazing. The site appears to be unsuited, however, for the production of low-priced fodder to aid in overwintering cattle. Experiments should also be conducted with the reseeding of pastures, using both foreign and indigenous grasses and clovers and with the possible use of fodder trees such as mesquites.

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VIII. Use of Incentives

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Through practical and realistic experimentation and demonstration much progress can undoubtedly be made in persuading farmers and livestock keepers of the value of more modern methods. Throughout the world, however, the farmer and shepherd tend to be conservative. Even though he sees other methods yield good results ~~on experimental~~ farms or even on his neighbor's land, he may still be reluctant to try them himself, particularly if it involves him in higher initial costs. The government cannot, after all, prescribe what he should do, except perhaps on land which it allots for settlement. If it cannot persuade him, the government may find it necessary to give him some financial incentive to induce him to experiment with new crops or fertilizer. Thus it might make seeds or stock of new and improved varieties available free of charge or at nominal prices or subsidize the cultivation of forage or soil-building crops or the use of fertilizer. The use of such incentives to bring about the adoption of new crops or better methods of cultivation has on occasion proved effective in other countries. Experience also indicates, however, that great care must be taken to prevent them from becoming permanent.

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427 The problem of incentives is particularly acute because the prevailing sharecropping system appears to offer a special obstacle to the introduction of forage and soil-building crops. Although the landlord can in theory direct his fellah to grow any crop, the fellah will in practice resist the cultivation of any crop which involves curtailing other crops he can consume himself or sell for cash. Generally able to eke out only a bare subsistence, the fellah is not likely to have any interest in growing fodder for which there is no cash market, especially when he has little or no livestock of his own. Similarly he is likely to oppose cultivation of a leguminous crop for green manure, especially since he himself may not get back the same parcel for farming the following year. He might ultimately be persuaded of the advantages of a given four-year crop rotation, but only if he were assured tenure of the same land over a sufficiently long period. The ways and means of overcoming these difficulties inherent in the existing tenancy system should be

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carefully studied by the government. In this study the possibility 241
of offering financial incentives directly to the fellah and of making 427
certain changes in the conditions of tenancy would need to be explored.

IX. Agricultural Credit

If farmers are to purchase fertilizer, more livestock and better 452
draft animals, tools and machinery, they will need access to credit facilities. The Agricultural Bank with a nominal capital of 453
ID 1,000,000 does not at present adequately serve their needs. First of all, its resources have been insufficient. As of March 31, 1950, the latest date for which a balance sheet was made available to the Mission, the capital actually paid in amounted to only ID 500,000. Its lending resources were supplemented to some extent by time deposits totalling ID 136,996. Total loans outstanding aggregated only ID 556,609. Since that date a further capital contribution of ID 50,000 has been made to the Bank, its time deposits have increased somewhat and a loan of ID 150,000, repayable in three annual installments, was obtained from the National Bank in April 1951. A shortage of liquid resources compelled the Bank virtually to suspend lending in November 1949. Not until a year later was it possible to resume credit operations and then only on a modest scale. The Bank has never been able to meet the demand for credit. Although authorized to lend up to ID 3,000 to any individual for a maximum term of 10 years, in practice it has limited the size of its loans to ID 1,000 and the duration to five years.

It would be desirable to increase the capital of the Bank substantially—to a total of perhaps ID 2,000,000. The Development Board would seem to be the logical and probably the only available source of funds for this purpose. The Bank would then be able to repay its debt to the National Bank and still extend its loan operations substantially. At the same time, however, there should be a careful review of the Bank's lending policies to make sure they are sound. In the past there has been a tendency for its loans to become frozen. In the fiscal year 1949-50, for example, only ID 108,333 of the total amount of ID 279,975 in loans falling due was actually received. Maturities were postponed on loans totalling

453 ID 50,507 and no arrangements for repayment had been made by the end of the year on loans amounting to ID 120,934. A sum of ID 53,303 was received on loans which had fallen due in 1948-49, but in that year the total loans for which due dates were postponed or for which no repayment arrangements were made aggregated ID 98,983. Although the Bank claims it will ultimately be able to collect on all its loans, there appears to be a need for much stricter and prompter collection and perhaps also for more careful scrutiny of loan applications to make sure that they are intended for productive purposes. The Bank must be quite free of any political pressures and capable of granting and collecting loans without fear or favor.

426 453 One of the most difficult problems is the provision of credit to the sharecropping fellah. Under present conditions he cannot get a loan from the Bank because he is unable to offer adequate security. The Bank generally makes loans only on the security of mortgages, although it can also accept as security tangible, nonperishable, movable property other than crops in the field or stored on the farm. To some extent it also grants loans on the guarantee of the government or on the joint guarantee of a number of recipients. Of the loans outstanding on March 31, 1950, ID 538,752 were secured by immovable property, ID 18,634 by joint guarantee
426 and ID 9,601 by government guarantee. The fellah must turn to the landlord or some private moneylender for credit. Under the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators enacted in 1933 any advances made by the landlord are in theory free of interest. Actually, however, the "advance" is generally in kind—i.e. in seed, draft animals, machinery, etc.—and the return to the landlord is in the form of a larger share of the crop which conceals a very heavy interest charge. One of the prime needs is to give the fellah access to better means of production and on much more reasonable terms. The organization of cooperatives among the fellahin would seem to be the best means of accomplishing this, since the Agricultural Bank is authorized to lend to cooperatives on the joint guarantee of its members.

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X. Cooperatives

Cooperatives have unfortunately made little progress. There 474 is an impressive law on cooperatives which provides, among other things, for their registration and the auditing of their accounts by the government. The government also received an excellent report on cooperative possibilities made by an expert in 1947. Neither the law nor the report have really been implemented. Responsibility for cooperatives is now vested in a Department of Cooperatives within the Ministry of Economics. Its entire staff consists of one part-time director, another officer and a clerk. By May 1951 it had registered 40 cooperatives of which all but one were consumers' cooperatives. Apparently nearly all of these are either dormant or of small importance. The Department has obviously been unable to give constructive, practical assistance in the organization and operation of cooperatives or even to take the initial step of sending some people abroad for training in cooperative management. It has neither received nor audited the financial accounts of any of the existing cooperatives.

The only really worthwhile cooperative in existence appears to be the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project where over 1,000 small-holders were settled at government expense. This cooperative, which was formed in 1947, owned in the spring of 1951 ten tractors with tillers, two trucks, a small flour mill and a clubhouse. The cooperative rents the tractors at a reasonable rate to its members and at a higher rate to nonmembers. Operation of the flour mill is contracted out under an arrangement which fixes the milling charges. The trucks provide transport for men and goods both within the settlement and to the nearby town of Kut. Although its accounts leave much to be desired, the cooperative appears to be in a sound financial condition. (See Note 13 on following page.) It needs expert advice, however, on the proper methods of setting up its books and controlling its expenditures, and its accounts should be subject periodically to an independent audit. A consumers' cooperative also operates in the Dujaila project, but it aparently runs at a loss owing to high selling expenses and low turnover. It would be advisable either to dis-

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474 continue it entirely or at least to replace its existing three shops with a mobile store which might sell more at lower cost in this scattered settlement.

The experience with the Dujaila producers' cooperative indicates that useful results can be obtained. Under existing conditions cooperatives will not, however, be organized spontaneously by the farmers themselves. They will need the impetus, assistance and supervision of the government. The cooperative is a rather advanced form of social organization and can therefore be expected to develop only at a slow rate. The necessary spirit of cooperation and sense of collective responsibility will have to be carefully nurtured in any program of adult education sponsored by the Ministry of Education and in any educational programs carried out by the proposed agricultural extension service.

The first step should be to transfer responsibility for cooperatives to the Department of Agriculture. It would be well to concentrate entirely on rural cooperatives for these are most urgently needed. The next step would be to recruit and train personnel. The staff need not be large initially, but should be sufficient to permit considerable field work. It should consist of people genuinely interested in cooperatives and preferably drawn from rural backgrounds. It must include one or two accountants equipped to draw up a standardized system of bookkeeping to be

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[18] The cooperative has not drawn up a balance sheet of its assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude from data made available by the Dujaila Committee in Baghdad that the cooperative has apparently not operated at a loss. From February 1, 1950 to April 20, 1951, its current revenues amounted to ID 6,024.991 and its current operating expenditures on salaries, wages fuel, and sundries to ID 3,955.695, so that the operating account showed a surplus of ID 2,069.296 which could be reinvested. A provisional balance sheet as of April 1951 could be struck about as follows:

Assets		Liabilities	
Property (at cost) ....ID	14,055.734	Capital paid-in ....ID	8,207.066
Accounts receivable	856.052	Debts owed	2,128.000
Cash (approximate)	260.000	Depreciation (balance)..	4,836.720
Total ....ID	15,171.786	Total ....ID	15,171.786

The depreciation allowance made above represents the difference between the known assets and liabilities. This amount corresponds in fact closely to an allowance of around ID 5,000 which should be allowed on the basis of sound accounting practice to cover actual depreciation on the various items in the capital inventory (20 percent annually on tractors and lorries; 10 percent on mill equipment and buildings).

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followed by cooperatives and to audit the accounts of cooperatives. 474 The necessary staff will have to be trained abroad, preferably in Cyprus where a diversified cooperative movement flourishes. It will also be desirable to give some instruction in cooperatives in the teachers' training colleges and the agricultural schools.

One of the logical places to start with the organization of cooperatives would be in new agricultural settlements as was done in fact in the Dujaila project. People who start afresh in a new settlement will generally be more receptive to new forms of organization. In these new settlements cooperative ownership of tools and machinery will probably be most important. Care must be taken not to overburden the cooperative with too many activities at the beginning. Operations should be expanded only as experience is acquired.

As already indicated, the need of the fellah who continues to farm on a sharecropping basis is the most urgent. He cannot therefore be neglected in the effort to establish cooperatives even though his poverty and his relations to his landlord may make the organization of cooperatives particularly difficult. Among those fellahin, one might begin with the organization of credit cooperatives which would make loans not on the security of the borrower's possessions but on his reputation for work, honesty and thrift. In this way the fellah might be able to obtain credit on more reasonable terms for the purchase of tools, seeds, animals and other requisites. Initially such credit cooperatives would probably need to be financed almost entirely by the Agricultural Bank, but the objective should be to base their operations increasingly on the regular savings of their members.

XI. Storage Facilities and Credit

Farmers are also in need of adequate facilities in which they 488 452 can store their produce and obtain credit against warehouse receipts. At present, prices tend to dip sharply at harvest time because the farmer is generally compelled to sell his crop immediately after or even before harvest in order to obtain needed cash. The merchants with money then reap the benefit of subsequent price advances. More storage and credit facilities would enable

488 the farmer to get a fairer share of the price and bring about
452 greater price stability. Even if the merchants primarily used these facilities, the farmer would still benefit indirectly because more merchants would be financially able to compete for his products.

488 Grain stores are especially needed. Cotton can at present be
256 stored at ginneries, and the Agricultural Bank is lending money on such cotton. Aside, however, from a 5,000 ton silo at Baghdad, which went into use with the 1951 harvest, the country possesses no modern grain storage facilities. The Grain Board which is charged with responsibility for storage projects is contemplating the construction of a 40,000 ton silo costing about ID 2,145,000 at Basra. This silo would primarily serve the export trade. It would be desirable to supplement these two with a number of smaller stores, less elaborately equipped and located nearer the centers of production. Such stores would afford necessary protection against grain pests and also help to mitigate the fear of famine which is ever present in a country with sharply fluctuating harvests. If equipped with simple cleaning plant they would help greatly to improve the quality of the grain. Grain thrashed by hand according to the prevailing custom contains from 15 to 40 percent foreign matter and from 5 to 15 percent dirt. The number, location and size could only be determined after a thorough survey. It is not unlikely, however, that from 12 to 18 such stores with an individual capacity ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 tons and a total capacity of about 75,000 tons would be needed. For the most part they will not have to be mechanized and can consist basically of simple steel or concrete sheds. The total cost would probably not exceed ID 750,000.

Two possible obstacles to the actual utilization of grain storage
[651] facilities should be considered. There may be a disinclination to use them for fear of giving the government knowledge of such stocks and thereby exposing them to taxation. Much grain now escapes taxation. To encourage people to take advantage of the stores it may therefore be necessary to reduce substantially or abolish the *istihlak* tax which is a type of sales or turnover tax. Other reasons for abolishing or reducing this tax have already been advanced elsewhere.[14] Another difficulty in the way of using such

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[14] See the Mission's main report, p. 95.

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storage facilities lies in the wide variation in the quality of the 488
grain. Those with better quality grain may refuse to store it except 256
under conditions which will ensure that it will be kept as a separate parcel. While this may be possible in the smaller, non-mechanized sheds, it will be impossible in the silos at Baghdad or Basra. There, however, it will be desirable at least to have means for weighing each parcel of grain after as well as before cleaning. At present there are no such facilities in the Baghdad silo and none are apparently contemplated for the Basra silo. Under such conditions there will be a premium on the storage of grain with a large percentage of foreign matter. Those with relatively clean grain harvested by combines will, on the other hand, refuse to use the silos.

If credit is to be extended on grain stored in silos, there must be adequate supervision to insure the issuance of proper warehouse receipts and to prevent the release of any stored grain except against the surrender of such receipts. Presumably any new facilities would be owned and supervised by the Grain Board. This Board, however, would hardly be in the position to finance all the proposed additional facilities. In 1950 the International Bank was approached with respect to the financing of the Basra silo, but now that Iraq is assured ample sterling revenue from oil and only a small part of the necessary expenditures is likely to be in dollars, the government may consider it undesirable to contract a loan for this purpose. Financing by the Development Board would then appear to be the only alternative. The Grain Board might even have difficulty in financing the smaller storage facilities. Although its assets as of March 31, 1951, amounted to ID 1,123,969, over 30 percent or ID 321,113 consisted of "fixed assets" and another item of ID 687,222 designated as "sundry debtors" represented almost entirely a claim on the Treasury. Over [651]
a number of years the government has levied a one percent tax on grain for the benefit of the Board but it has retained the proceeds provisionally for its own needs. As long as the ordinary budget remains tight, as is likely over the next few years, the government may find it difficult to convert this claim into cash. Under such circumstances the Development Board may find it necessary to give financial assistance for the smaller projects.

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XII. Forestry

311 Anyone who contemplates the treeless plains and the barren 137 mountains of Iraq is quickly persuaded of the need of afforestation. The forest area comprises only 25,500 square kilometers in the four northern provinces, and of this area only 17,000 square kilometers is covered by what may really be classified as forest. 313 The remainder is in forest pasture and sub-Alpine shrub. Yet forestry has received little attention. The only trained forester in Iraq is the foreign director of the Forestry Division which is subordinated to the Department of Agriculture. His staff is inadequate to provide proper protection of existing forests, let alone to undertake forest development. Only a small amount of afforestation, soil reclamation and propagation work is in progress. There is no modern forest law. Forests suffer severely from indiscriminate cutting for fuel and charcoal, overgrazing by livestock, shifting cultivation and fire. In the clearing of land for cultivation in the mountainous areas of the North, forest and pasture have been destroyed and land laid waste by erosion.

Afforestation is of vital importance not only to check erosion and help prevent floods but also ultimately to meet the acute shortage of timber for building and fuel. In the plains belts of trees are needed to serve as windbreaks. A detailed forestry program has already been set forth in a lengthy report by a British expert. The Mission can only urge that his recommendations be carried out.

The first step should be to build up an adequate forestry staff and to enact a satisfactory forest law. The Department of Forestry should be given a status equal to that of the present Department of Agriculture. Trained foresters will be required not only at headquarters and in the field but also at the forestry research stations at Abu Ghuraib, Bakrajo and Erbil. Initially some of the foresters, including the director, will have to be recruited abroad. A course in forestry might be given in the agricultural schools at Abu Ghuraib.

In the northern mountains the existing forest areas should be preserved primarily as a means of protecting the catchment of the Tigris and its principal tributaries. Controlled, rotational grazing will be necessary to protect these forests. To furnish a supply of

timber, at least 5,000 square kilometers in the valleys of the main 313
rivers in the north ought to be afforested by means of irrigated plantations of quick-growing species such as poplar, eucalyptus, tamarisk, ash, plane and shisham. Such forests should be able to furnish timber in growing amounts in 15 to 20 years.

It will be at least equally important, however, to plant trees in irrigated plains of central and southern Iraq. The ultimate goal should be to devote at least 10 percent of the irrigated areas to forestry in the form of farmers' woodlots, plantings along roads and canals, windbreaks and shelter belts. In the new settlement areas farmers might well be required to plant a specified area in trees. Measures such as these will make timber available in the immediate vicinity where it is sorely needed.

The Development Board has recognized the need for some additional expenditure on forestry by tentatively setting aside ID 250,000 for this purpose in its five-year program. It is urged that this amount be raised to a total of ID 750,000 over the next five years. More could probably not be spent in this period because staffing and organization will take time and attention. In the ensuing five-year period, however, the amount might well be doubled.

XIII. Settlement of New Land

In the future much of the increase in agricultural production 311
will inevitably come from the settlement of new land. Iraq is one of the few Middle Eastern countries which have large reserves of cultivable land. While the official estimates, which indicate that the area under cultivation can be almost tripled, may be questioned, there is no doubt that there are vast areas both in the rain-fed zone and in the irrigation zone which can be put to the plow. When water from the Habbaniya and Dokan reservoirs becomes available, for example, it will be possible to extend the area under cultivation from about 11 to 15 million donums; and if the Bekhme dam is built, still additional areas can be irrigated.

The way in which these new lands are settled and developed 423
will in many respects be critical for the future of Iraq. If reserved

423 for settlement by small-holders, they will make a significant contribution to the social and political stability of Iraq. They may make any strong demand for radical land reform unlikely in the areas now already under cultivation. If developed with the enlightened guidance of the government, the new settlements may ultimately furnish striking demonstrations of the value of more advanced techniques in agriculture and animal husbandry as well as in social organization.

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423 Under a law approved by the Parliament in 1951 land recognized as government-owned *(miri sirf)* in the cadastral survey will apparently be reserved in the main for settlement by small-holders. However, land which can only be irrigated by high-lift pumps can still be granted in tracts up to 5,000 donums to individual holders. Projects for the development of *miri sirf* land are to be drawn up and carried out by the Development Board. Selection of the settlers and administration of the finished projects will be the responsibility of a committee headed by an official with the status of a Director General. Two or three other members will be appointed by the Council of Ministers. The area of each project will be a minimum of 2,000 donums in mountainous lands, 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated lands and 80,000 donums in the rain-fed region. Each settler will be assigned up to 20 donums in the mountainous areas, 100 donums in flow-irrigated areas, 200 donums in pump-irrigated and 400 donums in rain-fed lands.

Under the law every settler must agree to refrain from granting his rights in the land to others and from injuring his fellow settlers in any way, to follow the committee's instructions with respect to the cultivation of the land and the planting of a garden, and to build a house in accordance with plans prepared by the [425] committee. If he fulfills this agreement, he receives title to his allotment after 10 years without payment. For a further period of 10 years he has no right to alienate it or mortgage it except to the Agricultural Bank.

The law does not confine the distribution of land to qualified and experienced farmers. In fact, it specifies that up to 20 percent of the land in each project shall be distributed to retired army and police officers, soldiers and policemen who have served at least four years, and graduates of agricultural schools, provided the

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committee is convinced of "their agricultural capabilities". Under 654
the same condition the committee is also to distribute up to 25 423
percent of the land to retired civil servants who have served at least eight years and to unemployed graduates of elementary, secondary and religious schools.

While the general intent of this law will meet with general endorsement, several of its provisions might well be reconsidered. First of all, it appears doubtful that the inclusion of the beneficiaries described in the preceding paragraph will advance the basic purpose of the law—namely, to establish a class of independent small farmers who till their own land. Most of these types of beneficiaries will have neither the ability nor the inclination to do the actual farming themselves. They will bring in others to do their work and may even become absentee landlords. Under such circumstances the evils of "petty landlordism" will tend to creep in.

Secondly, the size of the plots to be assigned to each settler seems in some cases to be too large. Fundamentally the allotment should not be bigger than that which can be managed by the average farm family without outside assistance. The size will, of course, depend on the machinery, tools and draft animals which can be placed at the settler's disposal from the very beginning. It is improbable, however, that a single family will be able to handle more than 100 donums. If a larger allotment is necessary in the rain-fed zone in view of the uncertain yields resulting from irregular rainfall, a special effort may have to be made to organize cooperatives to own and operate the machinery needed to till such units. The proposed assignment of 200 donums in pump-irrigated areas is presumably based on the assumption that some private person will provide the needed pumps against a substantial share in the crop, thus requiring each farmer to have a larger plot of land for a decent livelihood. Now that the government is likely to have ample financial means, there would seem to be no reason why it cannot either install and operate the pumping facilities itself for a nominal charge or finance the cooperative ownership and operation of such pumps.

Thirdly, the provision enabling settlers to acquire land without any payment whatsoever is open to question. In principle it is inequitable that no payment should be required for these exten-

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654 sive benefits, particularly in relationship to those who are not
423 fortunate enough to be selected as beneficiaries. Moreover, the value of the benefits conferred may be all the more appreciated if some charge, which need not be burdensome, is made for them.

Fourthly, it may be desirable to reconsider the provision exempting the areas irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution in accordance with the law. Apparently this provision was also dictated by the belief that the requisite pumping facilities would need to be provided by private investment and that such investment was unlikely ~~to be~~ forthcoming unless a comparatively large grant of land was made for development by high-lift pumping. In the future, however, public capital should be made available for the installation of such pumping facilities.

Finally, the safeguards against alienation of the land may need further strengthening. After the two consecutive periods of 10 years each, during which these safeguards would apply, it may still be desirable for the government to retain an option to purchase any of such land offered for sale. In this way it would be possible to prevent, if necessary, the gradual acquisition of excessively large landholdings in these newly developed areas.

A brief comment might be made regarding the settlement possibilities in the rain-fed zone. Much of the land available for such settlement may be submarginal from the standpoint of rainfall. Care must be taken, therefore, not to invest too much in the development of the lands the yield of which will be highly speculative. It is noted that the Department of Agriculture has drawn up an ambitious scheme involving the settlement of 1,000,000 donums and the establishment of 50 villages in northwestern Mosul near Balad Sinjar. There are indications, however, that the rainfall in this region may be insufficient to permit settlers to earn a good livelihood. If attempts are made to carry out this scheme, it is suggested that small-scale tests first be undertaken over a number of years.

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The law for the development of *miri sirf* lands which has been discussed at length above is basically modelled on the 1945 act under which the Dujaila settlement was established in south-central Iraq near Kut. During the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled in this area on 100 donum plots allotted from

state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is pre- 654
scribed. Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and 423
barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums 241
are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the 166
older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted.

On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously [511]
successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines.

The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified [34]
success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers.

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654 On the new settlements the government will have a unique
423 opportunity to improve on the Dujaila project. To ensure that it becomes a model project, the planning of each settlement should be carried out in close cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry charged with agriculture. There must be an integrated plan with appropriate provision for public health, schools and adult education, agricultural extension, cooperatives and the like.

800 XIV. Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use

The program outlined in this monograph does not involve large expenditures. Detailed estimates of the cost involved will need to be worked out, but it is unlikely that total expenditures over the next five years will be far from ID 7,500,000. The largest outlays—ID 2,900,000 and ID 1,450,000 respectively—would probably be for grain storage facilities and additional capital for the Agricultural Bank. Not much more than ID 250,000 may be needed for new tobacco warehouses. The continuing contribution to the Agricultural Machinery Administration has been assessed at ID 250,000, but more money would be required if plans to borrow from the International Bank for new equipment do not materialize. On forestry, probably not more than ID 750,000 could be spent in the initial five-year period. An arbitrary allowance of ID 500,000 might be made for financial incentives. The remainder of the total outlay would, however, really be the most important, for it would go, except for some miscellaneous projects, to expand and strengthen the agricultural and animal husbandry services which are vital to the future of Iraq.

The improvement of agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry along the lines indicated requires an energetic organizational effort by an agency well staffed and vigorously directed. Within the existing governmental organization in Iraq, agriculture and animal husbandry are not given sufficient importance. These subjects should not be handled by subordinate departments in the Ministry of Economics but by a separate Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use.

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Some suggestions for the organization of such a Ministry might be given here. It would be advisable to have a permanent secretary immediately under the Minister to direct the administration, ensure the coordination of all activities within the Ministry and brief the Minister on all policy questions requiring his decision. He might be assisted by a foreign adviser at least during the organizational period. Within the Ministry the various agencies, departments and sections could be grouped as follows:

1. The sections dealing with ministry-wide questions such as administrative and personnel questions, legal affairs, and economic research and statistics, all of which would be under the more immediate supervision of the permanent secretary. Within this grouping might also be included the sections under the director of research and experimental stations and the director of agricultural education and extension who would, at a later date, become directors-general of complete departments. The work in these fields will need to be closely coordinated.
2. The autonomous or quasi-autonomous boards and agencies such as the Tobacco Monopoly, the Agricultural Machinery Administration, the Grain Board, the Date Association and the Chambers of Agriculture. The character of these organizations is such that they do not fall readily under the regular departments of the Ministry.
3. Departments or directorates-general for animal husbandry, agriculture and horticulture, land settlement, and forestry. A section for agricultural cooperatives would be included in the Department of Agriculture. It is strongly urged that the committee that will administer the new land settlements under the law approved by Parliament in 1951 be integrated as a directorate into the Ministry of Agriculture which should, after all, be most directly concerned with the proper planning and operation of these projects.

On balance, the Mission does not think it desirable to bring the Department of Irrigation into the proposed Ministry of Agriculture. Both in the main report and in the monograph on irrigation it has stressed, however, the need to set up some machinery for coordinating the work on agriculture and irrigation and for consulting officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs on the health aspects of irrigation projects.

The organization of a Ministry of Agriculture will, of course, detract somewhat from the importance of the existing Ministry of

000 Economics. The latter, however, will retain control over industry, oil, mining, foreign and domestic commerce, and the central collection and publication of statistics. In connection with the latter the Mission has suggested elsewhere that the Directorate-General of the Census be transferred from the Ministry of Social Affairs and merged with the Principal Bureau of Statistics into a single fact-finding agency. Moreover, the Ministry of Economics might also retain control of inland and maritime fisheries, particularly since fishing has no necessary organic relationship to agriculture with which it is now allied organizationally.

The success of the new Ministry of Agriculture will depend above all on its field service. Little can be accomplished without continuous and intimate contact with those who actually till the soil and raise livestock. Much of the effort in the future must be concentrated on building up such a service and attracting to it people of high calibre. A prerequisite to the success of such an effort is a substantial improvement in the pay and conditions of service which now obtain.

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APPENDIX

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TABLE I

AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET FOR 1950
(actual results)

REVENUE		EXPENDITURES	
Rentals of machinery	ID 40,262	Salaries	ID 11,073
Sale of agricultural machinery and tools	7,267	Cost-of-living allowances	4,844
Sale of spare parts	317	Transport	117
Fines	195	Transfer	7
Repairs of agricultural machinery	106	Furniture	1,317
Transport charges	584	Printing & stationery	290
Interest on deposits	2,376	Postal, telegraph and telephone charges	276
Sundry	138	Rent	1,330
		Water and light	1,664
		Machines, cars & fuel	40,981
		Buildings	30,284
		Bonuses	399
		Temporary officials and employees	20,679
		Sundry	4,557
Total	ID 51,245	Total	ID 117,818

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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TABLE 11

AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET FOR 1951
(estimates)

I. ORDINARY OR OPERATING BUDGET

REVENUE		EXPENDITURES	
Rentals	ID 50,000	Operation of garages and repair shops	38,726
		Agricultural machinery operation	48,708
		General administration	25,884
		Total cash expenditures	113,318
		Depreciation allowance	37,145
		Total expenditures	ID 150,463

II. CAPITAL BUDGET

REVENUE		EXPENDITURES	
Sale of machinery, tools, etc.	ID 20,000	Purchase of agricultural machinery	54,000
		Purchase of trucks, jeeps and tractors	21,500
		Imports of spare parts for sale	25,000
		Diwaniya shop	3,000
		Requisites for completion of shops	7,500
		Sundry capital expenditures	1,000
		Total	ID 112,000

III. TOTAL BUDGET

Total cash revenue	ID 70,000	Total cash expenditures	ID 225,318
		Total expenditures	262,463

Total cash deficit	ID 155,318
Total deficit	192,463

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX D

INDUSTRY

I. Iraq's Potential for Industrial Development

The economy of Iraq is predominantly agricultural. In recent years, however, a national desire for industrialization has become increasingly evident and is being actively encouraged by the government. In 1929, the government took the first step to assist industry by passing a statute known as "A Law for the Encouragement of Industry". It proved to be of little significance, however, as it failed to provide industry with any financial assistance. It was not until seventeen years later, when the government created the Industrial Bank, that the problem of obtaining the necessary capital was partially solved. As a result, industry has since made some noticeable strides and should continue to do so. 433 654

On the whole, however, industry is as yet little developed. 433 Excluding the petroleum industry, modern industrial plants employ only 2,000 people and account for a total capital investment of only about ID 4,000,000 and an annual gross income of roughly ID 3,000,000. The very modern and important oil industry, on the other hand, provides employment for about 12,000 people. During the war a number of important industrial enterprises were started. Rising prices and difficulties in getting materials, however, retarded orderly progress, so that some of these new projects are still in the process of completion.

Natural Resources

There are ample resources for further industrial development. An abundance of oil and gas provides a cheap source of both fuel and raw material. Particularly as irrigation is extended, agriculture will become increasingly important as a source of raw materials such as cotton, sesame, linseed, and possibly sugar beets or sugar cane, soybeans and jute.

135 Several geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. The extent and quality of these ores, however, will not be known until further exploration work has been accomplished. There are surface indications of 30 percent elemental sulphur mixed with limestone but, as in the case of the ores, these deposits have never been adequately proven. Previous to the large-scale production of oil, some coal was mined, but actual reserves have never been fully ascertained. A large and potentially valuable salt dome was located near Basra when geophysical surveys were being conducted in connection with oil exploration. It would appear, therefore, that Iraq has a fairly broad range of minerals which might be worthy of exploitation.

Some Factors Affecting Industrial Growth

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454 Some of the basic causes of industry's retarded development are lack of private investment, technical inexperience and inadequate markets. In the past capital has often been hoarded or invested in rural or urban property or in commerce, where the security or rate of return was believed to be higher than in industry. To some extent this tendency has been overcome through tax exemptions, tariff protection and the financial assistance of the Industrial Bank.

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433 On the other hand, little is being done to increase the number of skilled workers and technicians through education and training. One of the biggest handicaps in apprentice training is the lack of elementary education. Employees who are unable to read and write obviously can neither receive written instructions, maintain material and inventory control, select proper repair parts nor attend advanced in-plant training classes. Until this is corrected, Iraq must continue to rely on skilled foreign technicians and, in some of the larger and more complicated industries, on foreign management.

The supply of common labor is now ample and will probably remain so for many years to come. A shortage of labor, should it occur, could be corrected by the employment of women in greater numbers and by further mechanization. Industry has not, however, reached the stage of development where this should be attempted, for a highly mechanized plant means high capital costs, greater

overhead, increased maintenance and the need for a higher level of 464
skilled workers. As long as labor is in sufficient supply, it will 433
be better to use the available amount of capital to mechanize a considerable number of plants to a limited degree rather than to establish a few highly mechanized plants.

Limited internal markets, because of a small population of 434
low purchasing power, restrict the number of industries which may be economically justified unless the product can be produced cheaply enough to find a foreign market. This condition, however, would be corrected to some extent through a rising standard of living, especially among the rural population. Improved methods of farming, increased irrigation, better sanitation and more intensive education should help to raise purchasing power gradually. As government measures to these ends begin to take hold, industry can expect the demand for consumer goods to increase at a much faster rate.

Iraq's geographic location is also a factor to be taken into 433
account in planning industrial development. High transportation costs handicap those industries requiring the importation of a high percentage of raw materials from Europe and America. The same obstacle will, of course, confront industries relying chiefly on European markets for their finished product. The best prospects for industrial growth are therefore found in those industries which, through advantageous production costs, are able to absorb the shipping costs or those in which shipping costs represent a very minor component of the market price of their product.

II. Possibilities for Industrial Development

Expansion of Existing Industries

Many industries, such as brewing, cement making and woolen textiles, are now in the process of expansion. Partly because of tax exemptions and reductions granted by the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, these enterprises are able to finance their expansion themselves. Other enterprises which can usefully be

433 expanded will, however, require financial assistance from the Industrial Bank. This should be arranged just as soon as plans can be formulated.

Petroleum Development

382 315 [471] The further development of the oil industry can safely be left to the internationally-owned companies now operating in Iraq. Under an agreement finalized early in October 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three major oil companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—undertook to increase their oil output to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraq Government 50 percent of the profit on their production before the deduction of taxes. Although output in 1950 amounted to only about 6,000,000 tons, there should be no difficulty about attaining the agreed target. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons, with the new fields near Basra offering equal promise. In the development of these fields and means of transport, the oil companies have already made an investment of close to ID 90,000,000, which is now beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Development in the Kirkuk and Mosul field has already proceeded on the assumption that a production capacity of at least 22,000,000 tons would be achieved in a few years, and with the completion of the pipeline to Banias, Syria, there should also be ample transport capacity. The balance of the projected output, namely 8,000,000 tons, will have to come from the newer fields near Basra. This may require some increase in drilling and will necessitate additional pipeline capacity to Fao, but neither of these will be difficult to accomplish.

382 466 The oil companies have been among the leaders in Iraq in providing better conditions and amenities for their employees and in instituting schemes for training skilled labor and technicians. They have been criticized, however, for their failure to appoint more Iraqis to leading positions. Under the agreement already cited they have undertaken to send 50 Iraqi students per year to British Universities to study various subjects relating to the oil industry, and also to establish a school in Kirkuk to train 60 Iraqis yearly in technical oil subjects.

By and large this new partnership between the oil companies 382
and the government should prove mutually beneficial.

The Government for several years has been considering the 382
building of a modern oil refinery near Baghdad. In recent months, 655
final plans were formulated and arrangements for its construction have apparently been made. This refinery, estimated to cost at least ID 7,000,000, is designed for an annual capacity of approximately 1,000,000 tons and when completed should be able to supply all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for refined petroleum products except for certain specialties.

The project will probably make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery, owned until recently by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,[1] now producing something less than 70 percent of Iraq's requirements. Likewise, the use of Kirkuk crude, which can be obtained by the Government at cost, will probably make it necessary to close down the small oil field near Khanaqin which supplies the Alwand refinery, since it is unlikely that the oil resources in and near this field can be developed to such an extent that investment in a pipeline for export of the crude would be warranted.

Cotton and Rayon Textiles

In 1947, a cotton spinning and weaving mill was started near 288
Baghdad, with a pilot plant consisting of 5,000 spindles and 84 automatic looms. The second stage, which is something over 70 percent complete, consists of 22,000 spindles and 500 automatic looms. The plant is modern in design and includes dyeing, printing and finishing equipment. About one half of the equipment has been in full operation for over a year, and shows good returns for an uncompleted plant which has not reached stabilized operation conditions. When completed and when operating on a full three-shift basis, it is expected that the spinning mill will produce 6,000,000 lbs. of yarn annually. Part of the spinning capacity is used in making yarn for sale to other small textile mills or even for home industries for weaving into cloth. In Mosul, for example, there are over 1,000 hand looms in various small home industries

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[1] By an agreement reached in December 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

288 which depend entirely upon yarn from the new spinning mill, now that importation of yarn from abroad is no longer permitted. The total consumption of cotton yarn by these smaller mills and home industries is in the neighborhood of 1,500,000 lbs. per year. They also make rayon cloth from imported yarn, imports in 1950 being about 500,000 lbs.

The weaving capacity of the plant, consisting of 584 automatic looms when completed, will produce approximately 15 million square yards of cotton and rayon cloth per year. This is, however, less than one quarter of Iraq's normal annual requirements for all classes of cotton and rayon piece goods.

The industry would be in a far better position to meet domestic requirements if the cotton mill at Baghdad as well as the cotton and rayon weaving plant in Mosul could double their designed capacity and extend their facilities to make a wider range of products such as shirting and poplin. The finishing, printing, and dyeing departments should also be expanded. To put these additional facilities into full operation would take approximately four years and even then it would still be necessary to import considerable quantities of various types of textiles.

The Mission recommends that such an expansion program be undertaken. The total cost would be about ID 1,300,000, of which approximately ID 900,000 would be in foreign exchange, mainly in pounds sterling. As before, the Industrial Bank, working in conjunction with private capital, should arrange to finance the additional facilities. Since private capital will be available for participation, there appears to be no need for a wholly-owned government plant for which ID 1,000,000 has been set aside in the ordinary budget for 1951-52. The new facilities will require the employment of approximately 1,500 additional workers in the textile industry.

Woolen Textiles

Woolen textiles have been made for many years. The first modern textile mill was started approximately 30 years ago. This mill, like the cotton textile mill, has a greater spinning than weaving capacity, so that yarn is available for local use both in knitting and in weaving by hand looms. The plant is equipped to make a broad range of fine fabrics and, along with other smaller mills, is

fully capable of meeting all of the requirements of domestic con- 288
sumption with the possible exception of minor items of a special nature. The plant's present capacity is 500,000 meters of cloth and 50,000 kilos of yarn. Recent improvements and expansion have brought the woolen textile industry abreast of the needs of the country.

Leather

Until recent years, there was little modern tanning of hides, 282
most of the hides being exported. Since the war, however, several tanneries have been constructed and are now producing leather of fair quality sufficient for most of Iraq's needs, with the exception of those grades required to make the higher quality shoes.

Tanneries are not showing the profits which were originally anticipated, largely because they have to use hides of very poor quality. In many cases, the hides have been cut during flaying, while in other cases they have not been well preserved. The tanneries also have not attempted to make use of waste products and in some cases do not split the hides, a practice which is essential to low cost production. However, once these various technical problems have been solved, the tanneries should be able to meet all of Iraq's needs.

Shoes

Nearly 90 percent of Iraq's shoes are made by hand in num- 295
erous small home industries. There is one fairly modern factory, however, which, using both local and imported leather, now makes over 30,000 pairs of high grade shoes per year. The company has also set up retail outlets in all of the provinces. An increase in the capacity of this plant would do much to reduce shoe prices to the ultimate consumer. Annual production could be raised to 100,000 pairs by the procurement of additional equipment costing approximately ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly in Swiss francs. These facilities could be put into operation within two years and would increase employment from approximately 40 to 120 workers.

Vegetable Oil and Soap 388

A vegetable oil extraction plant has been in successful operation for approximately three years. It is designed to extract oil

338 from the seeds of agricultural crops such as cotton, sesame and linseed. The linseed oil is blended and used in the making of paint, while the sesame and cotton seed oils are purified and distilled into light and heavy fractions, the light fractions being used as an edible oil, while the heavier are retained for soap-making. Although the expellers have a combined capacity of 20 tons of seed per day, the plant fails to satisfy present needs. Capacity should be increased by the installation of two additional mechanical expellers and a single solvent extraction unit to serve the entire plant. A washing plant should be installed for the purpose of reducing maintenance on the expellers. In addition to extending the capacity of the present facilities, new equipment is needed for the hydrogenation of oil for cooking fats.

Operating in conjunction with the oil plant is a soap plant with a capacity of 7.5 tons of laundry soap and 2.5 tons of toilet soap per day. This is estimated to be less than one third of present requirements. These facilities should be increased to take care of at least one half of the country's needs.

In all, the expansion program would cost an estimated ID 600,000, including ID 500,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in pounds sterling. It would probably require approximately two years before all of the facilities could be put into operation. Employment would be increased by approximately 60 workers.

Cement

339 Iraq's new cement plant is one of the more important projects sponsored by the Industrial Bank. The market for cement is expanding at a rapid rate and is well beyond the present plant's capacity of 220 tons per day. Additional equipment now scheduled for operation in 1952 will double the plant's output. Even so, production will fall short of domestic requirements. The larger plant should, however, reduce production costs and the cheaper cement should in turn open up many new markets in the construction and transport fields.

Brick and Tile

Brick is the prime building material. Over 30 private factories are engaged in the manufacture of bricks, and even though most of the plants are very antiquated, production costs are very rea-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

sonable. However, the quality of the brick, because of the type of clay available, is rather poor. The demand for brick is easily met by the present highly competitive industry. When, however, the cement plant is enlarged, it will tend to replace brick by offering better and cheaper material in such forms as concrete blocks. In view of this, there does not appear to be any justification for enlarging the brick industry. 339

At present, some tile is made, but it, too, is being replaced by cement.

Milling

Iraq possesses three fairly large flour mills. The older ones are now being modernized with the latest machinery. A very modern mill was recently constructed at Basra, with a capacity of 50 tons per day, for the purpose of making possible the exportation of flour rather than just wheat. So far, a shortage of grain has prevented the mill from operating as planned. When a sufficient supply of grain becomes available, however, the mill will be capable of serving the export market in addition to local requirements. 256

Aluminumware

Aluminumware is very popular. It is now being manufactured in a small plant in Baghdad from imported sheet, which represents more than 70 percent of the production cost of the finished article. Production is limited to about 480 tons per year because of the difficulty in getting aluminum; however, even with an ample supply of material, the present capacity of the plant (600 tons) is only sufficient to meet about one third of the country's requirements. Production costs could be greatly reduced, first, by increasing the capacity of the plant, and second, by installing facilities permitting the utilization of both scrap aluminum and pig. To double the plant's capacity and install equipment to melt and roll scrap and pig would cost approximately ID 200,000, of which ID 175,000 would be foreign exchange, mainly in pounds sterling. These new facilities would require about two years to construct and, when finished, would employ approximately 40 additional workers. 328

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Breweries

274 Iraq's only brewery, having a capacity of 50 barrels per day, is not adequate to meet market demands. The owners are therefore in the process of obtaining additional equipment to double the plant's output. The brewery, which has been in operation since 1945, is very modern in design and its product is of excellent quality.

Distillery

Iraq's only source of ethyl alcohol is a small, modern, well-designed distillery located in Baghdad. Surplus dates are used as raw material. Although they are not expensive, they are nevertheless more costly than the raw materials, such as molasses, which are used in the alcohol industry in other countries. Thus the distillery is operating at about one third capacity, since the market will not absorb its entire production at the prices it charges. Most of the current output is used in the making of the national alcoholic drink known as *arak*.

258 *Date Packing*

Date packing is probably one of the oldest industries in the country. Market requirements have kept the industry very modern and fully capable of meeting all demands on it.

Matches

372 There are two match manufacturing companies in Iraq, both producing matches of very good quality. One company utilizes paper, and the other wood. Their combined production is equivalent to about one half of Iraq's requirements.

Cigarettes

277 The bulk of Iraq's requirements of cigarettes are made in the country from home grown tobacco. The output of 12 factories in 1949 amounted to 2.25 billion cigarettes, but there were in addition many small producers of handmade cigarettes. Even in the factories much of the work is done by hand, but further mechanization cannot be expected until labor becomes more expensive.

Small Enterprises

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445 There are many small enterprises in Iraq which could be expanded, such as tire retreading, reclaiming of lube oil, wood-

working shops, battery and electrical repair work, shops for repair 433
of automotive and agricultural equipment, bakeries, confectioneries 445
and food processing establishments of various kinds. The amount of capital required in individual cases is quite small but, in the aggregate, it adds up to a considerable sum. The Industrial Bank should arrange for a small-enterprise section to make surveys of small industries in each community, advise them concerning ways of improving their methods of production and assist in getting proper financial help where it is justified. It is estimated that ID 400,000 would be sufficient to meet the needs of these industries over the next five years.

The assistance of small industries by the Industrial Bank is to be preferred to assistance or stimulation of so-called cottage industries. Cottage industries may be of benefit in the over-populated areas of Asia, but for Iraq they do not appear to be an appropriate solution to industrial growth. Iraq's population is small in relation to the resources available. Over the long term its problem is not primarily one of creating a maximum number of jobs with a minimum of capital but rather one of utilizing capital resources in ways which will make a permanent addition to the productive capacity of the country and to the building of modern industrial enterprises.

Establishment of New Industries

The entrance of industry into new fields would help to balance the over-all development of the country and to utilize its resources more fully. At the same time it would increase employment and thereby aid in raising the general standard of living.

Nitrate Fertilizer, Sulphur and Cement Plant

The largest and perhaps most promising possibility for new 382 387
industrial development lies in the utilization of the natural gas [316
produced in conjunction with oil. Upon completion of the 30-inch 339]
pipeline, oil production at the Kirkuk field will be at a rate which will make more than 25 billion cu. ft. of gas available per year. For the most part, this gas will be wasted until some means is found for its economic utilization. This gas contains, according

382 to information afforded the Mission, 10.5 percent by volume of
387 hydrogen sulphide with the remaining products being different types of hydrocarbons, chiefly methane. In the same area there are also large deposits of gypsum or hydrous calcium sulphate.

These waste gases and gypsum could be utilized for the economic manufacture of ammonium sulphate, a valuable fertilizer for agriculture; and, in the process, sulphur, carbon black and cement would become available as by-products. A plant of economic size and capable of satisfying approximately one half of Iraq's eventual needs should have an annual capacity of approximately 500,000 tons. In addition to ammonium sulphate, this plant would also produce approximately 100,000 tons of elemental sulphur and 300,000 tons of cement.

The most important part of such a plant would, of course, be that making ammonia. By this process, nitrogen and hydrogen under high pressure are synthesized into ammonia by means of a catalyst. Hydrogen for this process would be obtained by thermally cracking the gas and subsequently removing the carbon black, while nitrogen would be obtained by removing carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide from the flue gases.

The ammonia thus produced would then be combined with the sulphate radical from the gypsum. This is generally done by passing ammonia and carbon dioxide through a slurry of finely ground gypsum and mechanically separating the resultant products of ammonium sulphate and calcium carbonate. The ammonium sulphate which is in solution would be crystallized in evaporators while the calcium carbonate would be used in making cement.

Since the gas used in making ammonia must be free of sulphur, the plant would need to contain facilities for its removal. This could be accomplished in several ways, but a detailed study would probably show a combination of the Girbotal and Claus processes to be best suited for this particular project.

Facilities for the production of the required power and process steam would be conventional in every respect and would use gas for fuel.

In the first few years of operation, all of the products except cement would probably be exported. Later, however, only sulphur

and carbon black might be exported, with the ammonium sulphate 382
being utilized domestically as fertilizer. 387

The integrated plant is estimated to cost approximately ID 25,000,000, including foreign exchange estimated at ID 22,000,000 mainly in pounds sterling. The total estimated cost of the plant may be broken down as follows:

Ammonium Sulphate and Carbon Black	ID 14,750,000
Sulphur Recovery	8,750,000
Cement Plant	1,500,000
Total Cost	ID 25,000,000

Estimates indicate that the plant may show net earnings of 18.5 percent on the investment and may break even when approximately 40 percent of its capacity is utilized. In these estimates the gross income has been figured on the basis of c.i.f. prices currently prevailing in London and the plant has been amortized over 15 years with interest payable at 4½ percent per annum. The underlying calculation is summarized below:

Gross Annual Income				
Ammonium sulphate	500,000 tons	@ ID 15 per ton	ID 7,500,000	
Sulphur	100,000 tons	@ ID 16 per ton	1,600,000	
Carbon black	10,000 tons	@ ID 93 per ton	930,000	
Cement	300,000 tons	@ ID 5 per ton	1,500,000	
Total				ID 11,530,000
Annual Operation Costs				
Amortization and interest			2,310,000	
Freight (Rail and Ocean)			2,379,000	
Bags			650,000	
Maintenance			375,000	
Salaries			530,000	
Labor			146,000	
Material and Supplies			55,000	
Gas			135,000	
Contingency			300,000	
Total				ID 6,880,000
Estimated Net Profit				ID 4,650,000

The plant would probably need to be financed in its entirety by the Development Board, and it should be attempted only if a

382 387 reliable foreign chemical firm can be secured to design and construct it and, at least at the outset, operate it under a management contract.

The plant would give permanent employment to about 1,000 workers.

387 *Bone Meal Plants*

237 Another promising field for new industry is the conversion of the waste products from abattoirs to fertilizers for domestic use. Bone meal, for example, is a very valuable fertilizer. Yet at present Iraq, with no domestic plant to utilize them, is exporting approximately 15,000 tons of bones per year to Europe.

There would probably be sufficient demand for fertilizer to support three plants, located at Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Their combined cost would probably amount to roughly ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, principally pounds sterling. With help from the Industrial Bank, this could probably be financed by the abattoir owners. When completed the plants would give employment to about 60 workers.

Steel

327 Iraq is now producing about 5,000 tons of steel scrap per year. It is recommended that a small hand-operated mill and electric melting furnace be set up to convert this scrap into reinforcing bars, window shapes and small angles, all of which are in great demand. This mill ought to be located in Baghdad and arrangements made to obtain off-peak power from the Baghdad power plant or from the railroad shops. As an alternative to electric melting, crucibles might be considered. In either case, the cost of the plant would be approximately ID 300,000, including ID 200,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in hard currency. This mill could not satisfy the whole of Iraq's steel needs; nevertheless, it would furnish about 5,000 tons per year of certain types at probably half the cost of the imported steel it would replace.

The mill could be financed by private capital with help from the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required dur-

ing the first years of operation. Such a mill would give permanent 327 employment to approximately 50 workers.

Concrete Batching Plant

Iraq will probably undertake in the near future a considerable 339 number of construction projects for which poured concrete would appear to be the best material. It would therefore be desirable to locate in Baghdad a batching plant with ready-mix trucks to furnish the concrete. Standard steel forms would also be needed. A batching plant capable of producing cement for approximately 5,000 houses per year would cost about ID 125,000 in foreign exchange, mostly U. S. dollars. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank.

Glass Works 323

During the war, two plants at Mosul remelted broken glass to make glass tumblers, etc. These plants are now closed as they are no longer competitive with imported glass.

It has been stated that suitable sand for glass manufacture has been located near Mosul. If the Department of Industries verifies the adequacy and suitability of this sand, then a new glass factory might well be constructed to make bottles, white containers and tumblers for domestic consumption. No attempt, however, should be made to manufacture flat glass. No recommendation is made in regard to the construction of such a plant, however, until adequate sources of material are proven.

Date Packing Crates 322

The cost of wooden boxes for the shipping of dates has steadily increased and represents a considerable cost to the date industry. At present, the practice is to import the boxes in pieces for assembly in Iraq. It is recommended that a small box plant be constructed at Basra to make these boxes from imported timber. This factory would require only a few power-driven wood-working tools estimated to cost ID 10,000, primarily in pounds sterling, and should reduce the cost of date boxes by at least 50 percent. The plant could be financed by private capital and sponsored by the Date Association. It would employ about 30 full-time workers.

Machine Shop

392 There are about 150 very small machine shops in Baghdad. The total labor force in these shops is approximately 400. They do various types of metal work but by far the most important is the normal maintenance work on more than 3,000 diesel-driven irrigation pumps. While the workmanship is good, costs are very high because of the heavy overhead.

All of this work could be readily accomplished in one small, modern machine shop equipped with metal fabricating facilities, electric repair shops and including a modern foundry. With such facilities, not only could maintenance work on irrigation pumps and engines be carried out, but completely new diesel-driven pumps could be manufactured, replacing those now imported. It would, of course, be necessary to import special items such as fuel pumps, bearings and gears. Likewise, the design should be obtained through a license arrangement with some international firm. This plant would reduce the cost of present maintenance work by about one third and constitute the beginning of a modern equipment manufacturing concern. The shops thus replaced could be moved to rural areas to handle local automotive and agricultural machinery repairs.

The cost of such a machine shop would be about ID 600,000, including ID 500,000 of foreign exchange, mostly pounds sterling. It should be financed by private capital in conjunction with the Industrial Bank.

Jute Mill

288
[434] Jute products such as sacks, hessian cloth and twine are now being imported at the rate of about ID 384,000 per annum. The demand for such products is increasing and appears to be large enough to warrant establishment of a jute industry, even though the raw material will need to be imported. Ultimately it may even prove feasible to grow jute in Iraq.

The plant should be capable of making about 10,000 tons of jute products per year. The cost of such a mill would be about ID 500,000, including ID 400,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in pounds sterling. This mill could be financed by private capital and the Industrial Bank. It is recommended that it be located

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in Basra, close to both shipping and the agricultural area which 288 may prove suitable for the growing of jute. It would employ about 300 workers.

Automobile Tires

The importation of automobile and truck tires is increasing 383 at a rate of approximately 15 percent per annum, the value of all [[illegible]] tires imported in 1950 being ID 468,000.

A plant of economic size to manufacture tires could be justified with a market of approximately twice that which now exists. Such a market will probably be reached in 1955. Since it would require approximately two years to construct a tire plant, it is recommended that plans be formulated to start such a plant in 1953.

The plant would be so designed as to utilize the maximum amount of labor and, accordingly, should cost no more than ID 750,000, including foreign exchange of ID 600,000, mainly pounds sterling. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required during the first years of its operation.

Salt

Geophysical work gives conclusive evidence of a very large 135 salt dome near Basra. Unfortunately, the analysis is not known. This dome could be the source of very cheap salt for both export and domestic consumption. It might make feasible the establishment [385] of an alkali plant, particularly since the nearby oil field would be able to furnish gas as a source of cheap power. It is recommended, therefore, that core drilling of this dome be started as soon as possible to permit a proper evaluation of the possibilities of its use.

Sugar Mill

Considerable thought has been given to the recommendation 257 of a sugar refinery. Such an enterprise would, of course, have to depend on agriculture to supply the raw material, either in the form of sugar beets or sugar cane. Since this cannot be assured at this time, it is recommended that the development of this industry be held in abeyance for the present.

Paper Mill

289 Iraq does not have a suitable source of material for a pulp plant at this time. The development of a paper making industry would therefore require the importation of pulp to meet its various requirements. This procedure would ordinarily be both practicable and economical; however, the world market for pulp is now very critical and may remain so for several years. It is recommended, therefore, that the paper mill be held in abeyance until an adequate supply of pulp is assured.

III. State Assistance to Industry

Financial Assistance

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433 The widespread reluctance of private capital to venture into industry can be overcome only gradually as the profitability of industrial investment is demonstrated in various fields. In the meantime, it will be necessary for the government to furnish most of the capital for industrial development.

Plants which will require a large amount of capital and will need completely foreign management at least in their beginning may have to be financed completely by the government through the Development Board. The oil refinery and the fertilizer plant are projects which fall into this category. Other more modest undertakings will require relatively small amounts of capital and in most cases may be economically operated by Iraqi management even though some foreign technicians may be necessary. This combination lends itself to the use of private capital, which should be encouraged as much as possible by the government, by means of financial assistance where justified.

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433 The Industrial Bank is now the principal agency for rendering financial assistance to the development of private industry. The Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951, it had outstanding loans totalling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicapped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has

paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. 652 433 Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests, therefore, that the Development Board gradually supply the funds necessary to increase the Bank's capital by ID 5,000,000. The Bank would be authorized to use this sum for making loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an over-all program approved by the Development Board.

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to create a reserve against possible losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

The Bank at present is understaffed. The directors pass on projects without the benefit of expert assistance, and, as a result, some phases of a project may be completely overlooked. With a shortage of staff, the transaction of business with the Bank is also time-consuming and thus discourages applicants.

The Mission recommends that, first, the Bank's staff be both increased and strengthened and, second, that it be reorganized to give greater responsibility to the head of the Industrial Schemes Section who should be a properly qualified man with broad industrial experience. Members of the Industrial Schemes Section should have thorough training and practical experience in power and mechanical engineering with special reference to industrial planning and layout, and in operations, management and control of industry with special reference to cost accounting.

Protection of Industry

The "Law for the Encouragement of Industry" enacted in 654
1929 was replaced by new legislation in 1950 which grants limited 433
exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions 651

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654 from import duties on machinery, material, equipment and spare
433 parts; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of
651 rent-free government land not in excess of 25,000 square meters for a period of 10 years. Iraq-owned industrial enterprises can qualify for these benefits as long as they primarily use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in considerable quantities. Neither of these conditions is necessarily relevant to efficient production; and it is therefore suggested that the law be amended to stipulate that such benefits should be accorded only to enterprises which have a reasonable prospect of becoming efficient enough to withstand foreign competition.

Industry is protected in many cases by high import duties and in some cases, such as cotton yarn, beer and cement, by import prohibitions. Industrial enterprises have not so far taken full advantage of these restrictions, but if they should do so the demand for their products would undoubtedly diminish significantly.

Foreign competition is always a useful check on inefficiency. Its beneficial effects in bringing about lower production costs and a better product have been demonstrated many times in Iraq. For example, even industries protected by high tariffs have been forced to modernize in order to reduce costs and meet competition. To attempt to shut out foreign competition will, in general, retard, rather than foster, industrial growth. In some cases, it is true, new industries may need protection during the early years of operation. Protection should not, however, be allowed to become a permanent shield for inefficiency; as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized, protective measures should be greatly reduced.

In a country like Iraq where the limited market affords opportunities for only one or two plants in certain fields, there is an acute danger of monopoly and attendant high prices. This danger is aggravated further by a tendency in some industries to emphasize limited production with high profits per unit rather than mass production with lower unit-profits. Foreign competition would appear to be the proper means of restraining trends toward monopoly within a particular field, just as it operates to stimulate modernization in plants suffering from high costs because of obsolete methods.

Technical Education

If industrial growth is to be accelerated, it is essential that 464
measures be taken to provide industry with skilled labor. The 874
Industrial School at Baghdad was established to meet this need. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training and the graduates show a disinclination to work with their hands or to take secondary positions. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for basic practical training and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workmen and foremen. Those trained in the shop or on the site would then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work.

Apprenticeship systems have worked well for the Iraq Petroleum Company, for the national railways and the Basra Port Administration, all of whom have highly skilled workers trained in their own shops. Each of these organizations possesses large machine shops which could be used to train many more workers than at present. The Mission suggests that the government, through the agency of the Industrial School, enlist their cooperation in enlarging their programs to train workers for industry generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Bank- 443
ing, commercial and industrial firms, as well as the government, 874
are all handicapped by the shortage of competent typists, stenographers, bookkeepers, clerks and accountants. In industry the training of good cost accountants, capable of checking the efficiency of various types of operation, is especially vital. A single secondary commercial school, supplemented by a night school, and a higher College of Commerce and Economics have been established to meet the need for business training. The first appears to be functioning along sound lines, although it suffers from inadequate quarters and a limited teaching staff. As soon as competent teachers can be trained or recruited, secondary commercial schools should be opened in the other principal cities, particularly Basra and Mosul. The College, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of both the curriculum and the standard of instruction. It apparently produces neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants, nor people well grounded

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463 874 in economics and finance capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff should be strengthened; and more attention should be paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum. They could assist in arranging for part-time apprenticeship training and would provide a means for checking how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

Effective Government Organization for Industry

647 654 Government activities relating to industry, except for the Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. As industry expands both types of activity will become increasingly important. The Mission therefore recommends a realignment of the present organization to provide for two separate departments within the Ministry, a Department of Industrial Research and Standards and a Department of Industries. Research and technical functions now being carried on would be continued under the Department of Industrial Research and Standards. Its facilities need, however, to be expanded to meet industry's growing requirements for laboratory testing and quality control.

The newly organized Department of Industries would carry on economic research and analysis. Among its functions would be the maintenance of adequate statistical records of industrial production, the analysis of economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and the administration of the laws providing special protection to industry.

Both departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future, as compared to special mea-

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sures of production and assistance which tend to shield industry 647
against competition. There is much to be done to help industry 654
to achieve better control of the quality of its products, in reducing waste through material salvage, in analyzing production costs, in making market surveys and in raising labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

IV. Other Suggestions for the Improvement of Industry

Possibilities for Economies in the Use of Capital

Whenever the capital cost of a plant is an important determi- 433
nant of production costs, it becomes essential to utilize the plant to the fullest extent. This may be accomplished, for example, by increasing the number of shifts, by extending the work week and by stepping up machines to their maximum economic speed. Completely integrated plants seldom if ever offer the opportunity for this type of operation, because certain machines are never called upon for continuous use. This is, of course, very noticeable where the plant does all its own maintenance work, even to all of its foundry items. The solution is obviously one of resorting to contracting or sub-contracting with concerns specializing in particular operations. For example, a single finishing and dyeing concern might advantageously serve two or more textile mills, where the capacity of these mills is insufficient to load separate finishing departments to their economic limit.

In Iraq there is a tendency in industry to generate its own 433
power rather than to purchase it. This leads to the installation of 377
expensive facilities which are utilized only part of the day. While 365
industry is operating, many municipal power plants stand virtually idle because they serve primarily lighting needs and their peak load accordingly comes at night. In some cases, where large quantities of process steam are needed, industrial enterprises may be justified in generating their own power, but for the most part, the purchase of power is preferable. Unfortunately, power rates, 433
except in Basra and Baghdad, are so high that the purchase of 365

433 365 power by industry is out of the question. It is hoped, however, that in time this may be corrected.

Even in Baghdad the purchase of power by industry would be greatly stimulated by a reduction in the industrial rates of the Baghdad Light and Power Company. Profits, after depreciation 471] but before taxes, are now over half of gross receipts. Under the terms of its concession, the company pays a substantial part of these profits to the Iraq Government, the remainder being allocated to United Kingdom taxes, reserves for capital expenditure and dividends. The Iraq Government's share in the profits effectively constitutes a tax on electricity consumption, which it might be well advised to forego if it could thereby secure an equivalent reduction in power rates to Iraqi industry. The government might, therefore, explore with the Company and with the tax authorities in the United Kingdom the possibility of an equitable arrangement, whereby power rates would be reduced as far as possible, while still providing adequate funds for capital improvement and continuing a fair return to stockholders. A possible arrangement that has to be considered is the exercise by the government at the end of 1954 of its option to purchase the undertaking as a going concern. If such a course should be decided on, it would be desirable to enter into a management contract with the Company in order to ensure the continuance of efficient operation.

433 188 452 The amount of working capital required in Iraq per unit of production is exceedingly high, partly because enterprises want to be as self-sufficient as possible with respect to needed supplies and materials, partly because Iraq is relatively distant from international markets. Probably the best means of reducing the need for working capital would be through the erection and operation of a bonded warehouse which would provide all industries with facilities to store, until needed, supplies, material and chemicals of all types under conditions that would enable banks to extend credits on the stocks in bond. In this way the banks would have assurance that the stored material would not be released prior to full payment plus interest, storage and service charges. In effect, this would permit operations along lines very similar to those in highly developed countries where supplies and materials are obtained in accordance with production schedules.

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Measures to Improve Productivity and Quality of Output

1. Improved Lighting, Noise Abatement and Temperature Control

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Good lighting is important in reducing fatigue, improving the quality of work and increasing production. Light that glares has the same effect as too little illumination; in either circumstance workers tire easily and their efficiency is quickly lowered. In designing new industrial buildings care should be taken to avoid the direct rays of the sun and to arrange wherever possible for the light to come from the north through the roof. In many existing plants, especially in the two-story buildings, the amount of artificial lighting needs to be increased.

Tests have also shown conclusively that a continuous high level of noise quickly brings fatigue and boredom. The resulting loss in productivity fully justifies taking whatever steps are feasible, such as the installation of sound-absorbing ceilings, to reduce the noise level to generally acceptable limits.

While the average temperature in Iraq is high, the humidity is quite low. This greatly simplifies the conditioning of air for comfort, it being necessary only to increase the humidity to decrease the temperature. This practice, known as "desert cooling," is now being adopted with considerable success and should be extended in those industries (especially textile mills) where it is of distinct advantage.

2. Improvements in Flow of Material

With the exception of the new textile mill, industrial plants 348
are poorly arranged from the standpoint of material flow. Most buildings have two stories, requiring either stairs, conveyors or elevators to move material through the plant. Columns to support the upper floor interfere with operations on the lower floor. Such an arrangement requires duplicate handling of material and interferes with the use of modern equipment such as fork trucks. Similarly, the buildings which comprise a plant are frequently laid out without regard to the flow of materials from one to the other. There are, moreover, many cases of duplicate operations (for example, separate power plants). While it is difficult to correct existing conditions, the layout of any new plants should be

348 arranged so that the material flows through the plant with a minimum of handling.

000 3. Use of Time Studies and Cost Accounting

Time studies are indispensable in some industries. In textile and machine shops, for example, these studies are essential to break down production costs for proper evaluation. To illustrate, a large costly lathe might show a greater return by speeding up its operation through the use of a different design of cutting tool, or a planer might show such a low return that its replacement by a milling machine would be fully justified. In textiles, time studies might show that it is actually more costly to have one operator tending five looms than to have him tend only four looms; or the reverse could be true, depending on all of the related factors. There are numerous other examples which could be cited to show the need of time studies in certain sectors of industry.

Cost accounting is very important to good operations and must be practiced before an industry can expect to reach maximum operating efficiency. Without it, many losses, which could easily be avoided, go unnoticed by management.

433 464 4. Improved Administration

At present there is very little delegation of responsibility by management to foremen and supervisors. This limits the economic size of plants and tends to complicate the work of management. There are good reasons for this situation, chiefly the widespread lack of education, experience and training, which has already been described. While the basic problem can be overcome only in time, industry can take steps to alleviate the immediate situation through such measures as on-the-job training programs suggested earlier, special courses for supervisory personnel, and better organization of inventories and distribution of stores of spare parts. The result should be an increase in production and, at the same time, a reduction in per-unit cost.

180 5. Greater Emphasis on Workers' Welfare

To hire and train a worker requires time and money, and the investment is lost if, because of sickness, the worker is unable to hold his job or to turn out a full day's work. A physical examination prior to hire would insure that a worker is physically

fit. After hire, improved working conditions and the provision of simple health services and adequate sanitary facilities would help to maintain his efficiency. 000

Living conditions outside the plant must also be maintained in a manner which gives the worker some degree of contentment and satisfaction. This might require new housing, better food, improved sanitary conditions or other changes, depending on the locality and type of industry. Most of these will, of course, involve further capital investment. The increase in worker efficiency when such measures are properly planned and implemented should, however, fully justify their cost.

Improvement in the workers' welfare ought to be a matter of concern both to the employers and the government. Inside the plant it is the primary responsibility of the employer; outside, that of the government. In neither sphere, however, is the jurisdiction or interest exclusive. For example, while a considerable improvement in working conditions in the plant can be brought about only if the employer realizes it is to his own interest, the government can and should intervene to maintain certain minimum standards. Legislation[1] with respect to working hours, holidays, sick 466 leaves, disability compensation, child labor and the like, is already on the statute books, but the law has been poorly enforced. The staff of the Labor Department in the Ministry for Social Affairs needs to be strengthened to enable it to do an effective job. At the same time a special effort should be made to educate employers to the role of better working conditions in raising labor productivity.

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[1] [IN IRAQ -- ANALYST.]

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ANNEX E

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

489 Iraq's transport system, which is concentrated in the populated and cultivated eastern half of the country, converges on two points, Baghdad, the capital and trade center, and Basra, the country's only port.

504 The Port of Basra lies about 140 kilometers (85 miles) upstream from the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al Arab and is accessible to ocean-going ships of all sizes entering the Persian Gulf. Its site serves the economy of Iraq well, the junction of the cheaper ocean transport with the dearer inland transport being at the farthest practical point inland.

503 The Tigris and the Euphrates, together with their tributaries, offer natural transport routes. However, they have remained untrained and largely uncontrolled for centuries and, apart from a few short stretches on the rivers and their tributaries which are usable by local traffic, limited and restricted inland navigation is possible today only on the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad.

496 The railway system consists of three main lines, two of narrow gauge, one of standard gauge. One of the two meter-gauge lines is the main line from Baghdad to Basra, serving the most densely populated provinces besides connecting the two principal centers. The other links Baghdad with the northeastern provinces, east of the Tigris. The standard-gauge line runs from Baghdad on the right bank of the Tigris to Mosul, Iraq's second city, and beyond through a tip of Syria to Turkey, the Mediterranean and Europe. Until a year ago no physical junctions existed between the three main lines. Goods carried on both meter-gauge lines had to be ferried across the Tigris at Baghdad and then transshipped. The ferry has now been replaced by a bridge but the transshipment to and from the standard-gauge line remains necessary. Through passenger traffic between the three main lines is negligible.

491 A road system of approximately 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) covers the eastern half of the country, but most of the roads

491 are unsurfaced and impassable for long periods in wet weather. All-weather roads are at present found only in the Baghdad area and in the mountains in the North. The only passable trunk roads are those from Baghdad to Khanaqin, Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul, and Baghdad to Rutba and Syria. Even these have shorter or longer sections in very poor condition. There is no all-season road between Baghdad and Basra.

508 Two civilian airports, Baghdad and Basra, serve the principal
509 air routes between Europe, Asia and beyond. Internal air services are limited to one line between Baghdad and Basra. Military airfields and landing grounds and a few private air strips are available in certain places, but demand for internal air transport has so far been negligible.

509 One state air line, Iraqi Airways, operates services with
475 neighbor countries and Egypt through Baghdad and Basra with a small fleet of four aircraft. Administration and management of the airline are combined with those of the state railways.

315 Oil from the oil fields at Kirkuk is carried by pipelines across the country to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa, but the line to Haifa is now out of operation. A shorter pipeline connects the southern Iraq oilfield with the Shatt al Arab oil port at Fao.

489 Transport connections with the outside world are well served by the Port of Basra for ocean-going traffic, by the airports of Baghdad and Basra in international air traffic and by the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean. At present only one railway line, beginning at Baghdad, connects Iraq with Syria, and via Syria with Turkey and Europe. A desert road exists for through road traffic between Iraq and Syria and Lebanon. A private company, Nairn Transport, operates an international bus service on this route. There are two main roads for exchange of traffic with Iran, one from Baghdad via Khanaqin, and one from Erbil via the Rowanduz Valley and Rayat. Future economic developments may perhaps demand new traffic outlets to the Mediterranean, shorter and better equipped than the existing railway and road routes, but at present there are few signs of such a demand.

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On the whole the existing transport system serves the present needs of the country well, but there are certain shortcomings and problems. The principal difficulties are: 489

Insufficient means of transport in the Tigris valley between Baghdad and Basra, serving the Kut and Amara districts;

The lack of roads, shortage of surfaced trunk roads and non-existence of rural feeder roads;

The lack of control over road transport, urban as well as inter-urban and rural; and

The renewals and the gauge problems of the railways.

I. Ports

The Port of Basra was developed as a modern port from initial installations constructed during the first World War. During the second World War, the Port had to cope with a vast increase in traffic. Certain extensions, necessitated by military requirements, were carried out, including supply lines into Iran and through Iran to Russia, but normal maintenance, renewal and improvement works were severely restricted. The postwar period presented the problem of overcoming the arrears in maintenance and renewals, under an additional handicap of shortage of technical staff. Today the Port operates efficiently; it is equipped to handle all traffic, incoming and outgoing, without congestion and there is sufficient margin to cope with the increase in traffic to be expected from further economic development of the country. Particular credit must be given to the Directorate of the Port and a depleted but devoted staff for the results achieved. 504

The activities of the Port extend along the Shatt al Arab from the main wharves at Magil to the mouth at Fao. In addition to handling export and import traffic for Iraq, it also performs certain services for the Iranian oil port of Abadan; in recent years the number of ships calling at Abadan has been five to six times the number at Basra. The principal developments in the postwar period are set out in Table I. The activities of the Port cover a wide field. Besides actual port services such as harbor, wharves, sheds, pilotage, lighting and buoyage, civil, mechanical and elec-

trical engineering maintenance and works, the Port Directorate is responsible for the Magil airport and hotel and for radio communications, meteorological service, road construction and maintenance, power and light supply, fire service and water supply, health and education services over a wide area.

TABLE 1

Operations of the Port of Basra

Year[1]	Cargo in Transit[2]	Total Tonnage Through Port[3]	Number of Ships		Gross Tonnage of Ships		Number of Staff
			Abadan	Basra	Abadan	Basra	
1942-43	273,847	341,415	814	637	5,554,550	3,659,127	652
1943-44	983,779	1,232,233	728	517	5,172,650	3,153,025	805
1944-45	759,111	1,061,525	902	439	6,904,399	2,619,431	806
1945-46	725,265	1,002,437	1,321	218	10,359,785	1,273,878	909
1946-47	724,334	1,199,459	1,500	244	11,118,810	1,434.178	989
1947-48	796,811	1,161,865	1,716	275	12,305,896	1,639,490	1,090
1948-49	713,100	1.583,318	2,018	352	14,755,192	2,011,566	1,059
1949-50	1,290,444	2,002,789	2,082	403	16,117,210	2,234,405	1,030
1950-51	439,153[4]	1,358,200[4]	1,936[5]	338[5]	15,321,115[5]	1,823,017[5]	1,025[5]

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[1] Beginning April 1.
[2] Tonnage handled in the transit area at Magil.
[3] Total tonnage passed over wharf, overside and river.
[4] First 9 months.
[5] First 11 months.

The financial position of the Port is healthy in every respect. Practical economies have been pursued in the Port's operations; a general reserve has been built up; extensions, improvements, renewals and rehabilitation after the war have been carried out from revenues and properly maintained reserve accounts. Amortization and interest payments on the capital debt in respect of the Port's installations and equipment, supplied and financed by the British Government, have been made regularly, and the Port is now free from debt. The Port's dues and charges structure is well devised and, as shippers testified, reasonable in its levies on shipping.

A comparative statement of revenue and expenditure, covering all activities, for the war and postwar years is shown in the following table.

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TABLE 2

PORT OF BASRA BUDGET* 504

(in millions of dinars)

Year	Revenue	Expenditures			Balance
		Ordinary	Capital	Total	
1942-43	1.11	0.71	0.04	0.75	+0.36
1943-44	1.19	0.90	0.03	0.93	+0.26
1944-45	1.19	0.93	0.04	0.97	+0.22
1945-46	1.14	1.05	0.09	1.14	—
1946-47	1.25	1.14	0.10	1.24	+0.01
1947-48	1.51	1.27	0.22	1.49	+0.02
1948-49	1.66	1.50	0.18	1.68	−0.02
1949-50	1.62	1.43	0.19	1.62	—
1950-51	1.52	1.45	0.65	2.10	−0.58
1951-52	1.53	1.53	0.65	2.18	−0.65

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* Actual budget figures for the years up to and including 1949-50; revised estimates for 1950-51, and budget estimates for 1951-52.

It will be noted that until recent years there was a surplus of income over both ordinary and capital expenditures. Current deficits are being met from the cumulative surplus of the past.

Development programs of the Port now in progress consist of an extension to the power station, extensions and improvement of roads in the Port area, machinery and plant for road maintenance, improvements of the airport, an extension of the hotel, new buildings, staff quarters, laborers' dwellings, river conservation work, and extensions and improvements to wharves and warehouses, including handling equipment. For the financial year 1951-52 the cost of this capital budget program has been estimated at about ID 650,000. Similar expenditures will be required in the years to follow.

The Dredging Scheme 503

The Port's most important maintenance works program is concerned with the dredging of the entrance channel through the Fao Bar, so much so that a separate budget is maintained for the Bar Dredging Scheme with its own revenues from dredging dues levied on shipping. Up to four and a half million cubic yards must be dredged in a year to maintain the channel's width and depth, at a cost of from ID 500,000 to 600,000 per year covered

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by dues received from Abadan and Basra shipping. The budgets of the Dredging Scheme are summarized in Table 3. It will be noted that until the last two years surpluses accrued even after allowing for capital expenditures.

TABLE 3

FAO BAR DREDGING SCHEME BUDGET[1]
(in millions of dinars)

Year	Revenue	Expenditures			Balance
		Ordinary	Capital	Total	
1942-43	0.44	0.34	0.01	0.35	+0.09
1943-44	0.51	0.39	0.01	0.40	+0.11
1944-45	0.69	0.45	—[2]	0.45	+0.24
1945-46	0.73	0.49	0.04	0.53	+0.20
1946-47	0.70	0.48	0.05	0.53	+0.17
1947-48	0.76	0.54	0.07	0.61	+0.15
1948-49	0.91	0.54	0.17	0.71	+0.20
1949-50	0.95	0.61	0.19	0.80	+0.15
1950-51	0.94	0.73	0.36	1.09	−0.15
1951-52	0.95	0.79	1.10	1.89	−0.94

[1] Actual budget figures for the years up to and including 1949-50; revised estimates for 1950-51, and budget estimates for 1951-52.

[2] Negligible.

Thorough investigations and studies by the Port's engineers and consultants, supplemented by experiments on a tidal model of the river constructed by the National Physical Laboratory at Teddington, England, have now reasonably well established that the dredging of a new channel straight from the mouth of the river should ensure reduced maintenance dredging after completion. The present channel, though shorter, has a bend near the river mouth and now runs at right angles to cross currents which deposit more and more silt in the channel. There is no doubt that the new channel should be constructed.

The dredging of this new channel is the only major development facing the Port authorities. The cost would be at least ID 2,000,000 spread over a few years, but the ultimate savings in current dredging expeditures would make it a very worthwhile investment. Part of the cost is already reflected in the Dredging Scheme's capital budget for 1951-52 which, for instance, provides

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ID 400,000 for the purchase of a new dredger. The Port cannot, 503
however, be expected to finance the construction of a new channel out of its own resources. The combined current receipts of the Port and the Dredging Scheme, together with the surpluses of the past, should be sufficient to cover the cost of ordinary capital improvements, but not of a large project such as the channel. It was originally expected that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company might lend the necessary funds for the channel. Recent developments have made this possibility more remote, and in any event it may now be much more advisable to finance the project out of the oil revenues which will accrue to the Development Board.

Proposed Port at Umm Qasr

From time to time proposals have been put forward for the 504
construction of a new port at Umm Qasr, on an inlet from the Gulf, south of Basra. Temporary installations at this site and a military branch line of the railway from Basra were in operation during the war. The alternative was warranted in those exceptional years, in case war operations should impede the operation of Basra Port. The Umm Qasr port installations have since been abandoned and there is now nothing left which might be used as a nucleus for port development. The advantage of a shorter entrance channel which would require less dredging than the river to Basra is offset by the considerably greater cost of inland transport over sea-going transport. The entrance is not free from silting, and the Fao bar will still have to be kept passable for Shatt al Arab shipping.

For several other reasons this project should not be pursued further at present. Basra Port is capable of handling much larger volumes of traffic than at present. The construction of a new port would be expensive; a new town would have to be built; the port would duplicate, not supplement, existing facilities; and the port would require communications with the hinterland involving additional capital expenditures for railways and roads. As mentioned earlier the new port's site would be nearer the sea, thereby shortening the cheaper ocean haul and materially lengthening the expensive overland haul. Trade concerns now well established at Basra would be reluctant to duplicate their operations at the new port, let alone transfer their business there.

504 *Staff*

The Port Directorate has done its best to train Iraqi personnel in every level of employment. It takes time to develop the highly specialized skills required but the training process is well advanced. In May 1951 two senior and seven assistant posts of primary importance remained unoccupied in the Port Administration, and two senior and two assistant posts of the same urgency were unfilled in the Bar Dredging Scheme offices. These should be filled promptly for a period of years by qualified foreign nominees. The training of Iraqi staff members in the Port's own territory and abroad should be continued and extended as much as is practical.

In summary, the Mission's recommendations concerning the Port's development problems are:

1. The training program to overcome the shortage of technical staff experienced in port operation, administration, maintenance and construction should be continued and expanded as much as possible.
2. The dredging of the new entrance channel should be carried out.
3. Construction of a new port at Umm Qasr should not be undertaken.

II. Maritime Shipping

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The Port of Basra is extremely well served by many experienced world shipping lines. There is, therefore, no justification for the creation of an Iraq shipping line. Coastal shipping is nonexistent, since Iraq possesses only one port and neighboring countries can provide no traffic for such a venture.

III. Inland Water Transport

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Nature has provided Iraq with a number of important waterways in its two large rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and their many tributaries. Until a few years ago, the Tigris, in its lower reaches in the plains, was navigable at all seasons from

above Baghdad to Basra, but this is no longer so. The variations in the flow of water are wide, floods occur at high water, there is heavy silting at low water, the river bed steadily rises and the curvature increases more and more—features typical of the behavior of rivers which remain untrained for centuries. 503

The Port Directorate of Basra has control over inland navigation. The control is nominal, however, and is limited to the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad and the Gharraf canal, a tributary joining at Kut. There is a separate budget for the purpose but it amounts to only a few thousand dinars annually, spent on navigation aids, few and far apart. The last remaining regular navigation company, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, ceased operations in 1949, and only small private concerns continue to operate barges which are mostly propelled by low-powered motor launches. [505]

At the present time the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels up to four feet draught during the seven months from February to August, except for short flood periods in April and May in some years. Navigation during the remaining five months, September to January, is impeded for long periods by:

1. Low water in the Narrows in the lower reaches below Amara, for periods up to three weeks,
2. Low water at Amara, causing the floating bridge to ground, for periods up to six weeks,
3. Closure of the Kut barrage lock for irrigation requirements, for periods up to eight weeks.

Between seasons the water levels vary up to 25 feet at Baghdad, up to 35 feet south of Kut barrage and up to 7 feet at the Narrows.

Inland water transport has ceased to be a factor of importance in the country's transport system. The waters of the rivers are used primarily for irrigation and their flow is controlled only with a view to serving irrigation requirements. In the future irrigation will continue to have the principal claim on the available water supply. This does not mean, however, that a revival of inland navigation will be incompatible with irrigation. In the monograph on flood control and irrigation it has already been pointed out that measures to control the dissipation of water from the lower reaches

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503 of the Tigris into the marshes would leave more water in the river bed.[1] Navigability might be improved further if the river bed were trained by dams, locks, groins and cribs into a narrow channel at low water and progressively wider channels at higher water levels. Through such measures, limited but uninterrupted navigation could be made possible. It would be necessary, however, to consider whether the cost would not be such as to make river transport uneconomic. As a first step it might be advisable to have the feasibility and cost of training the river bed studied by engineers from the Netherlands who have had experience with similar problems.

IV. Railways

496 The railways are the principal means of inland transport, carrying by far the greater part of the country's imports, exports and internal traffic. The chief commodities carried in bulk are oil, bricks, cement and other building materials, grains and dates.

The total length of the railway system is 1,030 miles (1,648 kilometers) of which 330 route miles (529 kilometers) are standard gauge and 700 route miles (1,119 kilometers) meter gauge. The first railway line in Iraq was completed in 1914 and ran north from Baghdad to Samarra as part of the projected Berlin-Baghdad railway. The Iraqi portion of this standard-gauge railway was not fully completed until 1940 and it is now the only railway link between Iraq and neighboring countries. The balance of the railway network consists of meter-gauge lines, large portions of which were first constructed during World War I when only meter-gauge rolling stock was readily available. One of these lines runs from Basra to Baghdad, following the Euphrates River. The other extends from Baghdad to Erbil via Kirkuk, with a short spur to Khanaqin. The part from Kirkuk to Erbil was finished only in 1949. Until 1950 when a railway bridge was completed across the Tigris, the two meter-gauge lines were connected only by a wagon ferry. Even now there is virtually no through passenger traffic on the two lines. It should be noted that there is no longer a railway south of Baghdad serving the towns along or near the

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[1] See Annex B, *Flood Control; Irrigation and Drainage*, pp. 202-203.

Tigris, although during each of the two World Wars there was a temporary railway connection with Kut. 496

The railways are state-owned and operated under the management of a Director General who is responsible to a Railway Board appointed by the government. The administration is autonomous and has its own budget which must, however, be submitted annually to Parliament for approval. The administration is well organized, the management capable and the operation efficient and economical. [475]

Capacity

The railway system consists entirely of single track lines built to light standards, and the permitted axle loads are very low. This limits the capacity of the lines and increases the operation problems. There is no doubt, however, that the system's capacity is ample for present demands. During several war years it actually carried about twice the tonnage of goods transported in recent years, even though the length of the system was only about one third greater through the temporary construction of military branch lines (see Table 4). 496 489

Railway carrying capacity is in reality rather elastic. The railways could carry as a minimum 15 percent more goods, and, in a pinch, could probably carry considerably more. In consequence of the over-all development program, traffic requirements will undoubtedly increase quite rapidly. For example, the value of imports may double within about five years, and the amount of

TABLE 4

TRAFFIC ON STATE RAILWAYS

		PASSENGERS		GOODS	
Year	Route Kilometers	Passenger Journeys	Passenger Kilometers	Total Revenue Tonnage Carried	Total Revenue Ton Kilometers
1943-44	2,011	4,418,590	662,256,369	3,586,081	905,104,309
1944-45	1,555	4,869,523	669,987,674	2,390,402	648,482,848
1945-46	1,555	5,292,441	775,107,476	1,970,107	513,643,871
1946-47	1,555	4,300,413	630,705,454	1,860,296	600,138,802
1947-48	1,555	3,725,463	529,066,676	1,714,290	556,623,270
1948-49	1,555	3,340,034	473,075,056	1,674,289	497,306,309
1949-50	1,648	3,609,337	517,939,859	1,980,795	657,097,000

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496 489 internal traffic, particularly in building materials, will also rise substantially.[2] The burden on the main trunk line from Basra to Baghdad will increase especially. If steps are taken, however, to carry out the necessary replacement and rehabilitation measures outlined in this monograph, the railways should be able to handle much of the increased traffic. Part of the increase will presumably be absorbed by the roads.

496 The financial position of the railways has not been wholly satisfactory in recent years. To be sure, they have had a considerable operating surplus until the last few years, as is indicated in Table 5. Since 1945-46, however, this surplus would have actually disappeared or been converted into a deficit if it had not been for the fact that the sum set aside for renewals and depreciation was rather inadequate. In 1948-49 a small surplus was achieved only because the amount appropriated to the renewals account was cut from ID 400,000 to ID 250,000; and when the

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[2] See the Mission's main report, pp. 88 *et seq.*

TABLE 5

RAILWAY FINANCE
(in dinars)

Year	Operating or Ordinary Budget			Capital Expenditure
	Revenues	Expenditures	Balance	
1938-39	733,613	753,063	−19,450	938,115
1939-40	752,546	733,530	+29,016	559,492
1940-41	953,379	800,712	+152,667	176,866
1941-42	2,241,657	1,440,546	+801,111	159,937
1942-43	4,775,646	2,316,576	+2,459,070	161,905
1943-44	5,067,899	3,781,525	+1,286,374	137,258
1944-45	4,141,110	3,132,064	+1,009,046	112,366
1945-46	3,769,823	3,241,988	+537,835	387,684
1946-47	3,436,403	3,206,164	+230,239	789,095
1947-48	3,794,003	3,549,115	+244,888	1,761,123
1948-49	3,633,022	3,614,569	+18,453	2,778,902
1949-50	3,991,297	3,705,542	+285,755	1,068,558
1950-51*	3,949,200	4,041,400	−92,200	1,734,000
1951-52*	4,211,100	4,274,100	−63,000	902,500

* Budget estimates.

provision for renewals was raised to more adequate amounts in the 1950-51 and 1951-52 budgets (ID 600,000 and ID 875,000 respectively) deficits developed.

The primary cause of financial difficulties was the large post-war capital development program. Following the prosperous war years, the government authorized the Railway Administration by Law No. 25, 1944, to carry out a major capital development program at a cost of ID 5,250,000. The program itself was, on the whole, sound and necessary, with the exception of the ambitious project for Baghdad-West involving the construction of an imposing new station and an entirely new railway layout. In included, among other things, the extension of the railway from Kirkuk to Erbil and the building of several new railway bridges, including one at Baghdad. It proved extremely difficult, however, to finance these and other capital expenditures. When the program was authorized, it was established that the railways themselves would be able to defray only half the cost. The rest was presumably to come from future government and railway revenues. Railway traffic and revenues, however, fell off rather sharply after the war, and beginning in 1948 the government became involved in serious difficulties as a result of the outbreak of war with Israel, the closing of the Haifa pipeline and two successive poor harvests. After making an initial 15-year four percent loan of ID 1,000,000 to the railways in 1947, the government could give no further financial assistance. In order to finance the rest of the program, the railways used up such balances as were available in the general reserve fund as the result of past surpluses and then depleted the funds set aside for depreciation and renewals. The latter, by the end of the fiscal year 1949-50, amounted to almost ID 2,600,000. Even then it was necessary in 1950 to meet overdue bills by placing a loan of £3,000,000[3] through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. By the end of the 1950-51 fiscal year only £407,000 of this loan remained unutilized and this amount was earmarked for further payments to contractors for works already being executed.

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[3] The interest on this loan is four percent and the principal is repayable over six years from June 30, 1952.

496 As of the spring of 1951, when the Mission visited Iraq, the financial situation was about as follows. Capital expenditures had been reduced far below the amounts budgeted. Preliminary actual budget figures for the first half of 1950-51 indicated that total capital expenditures for the year might be only about one fourth of the amount authorized by the budget. For 1951-52, projected capital expenditures had been slashed well below the original estimates of the preceding year. The railways needed about ID 1,500,000 to meet commitments for the completion of capital works under way. More important, deferred renewals of locomotives, rolling stock and track were becoming more urgent just when no money was available to meet the cost.

The Palmer Report

Growing concern and anxiety about the railways' financial position led to a decision in 1950 to seek advice from independent consulting engineers. In May 1950 Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton, consulting engineers of Westminster, London, were invited to investigate and report on certain affairs of the railways in accordance with the following terms of reference:

1. To examine the railway accounts and ascertain the true financial position;
2. To examine and advise on the sanctioned Major Development Program in its economic aspects, with particular regard to the financial position of the Railways;
3. To advise on the rehabilitation and modernization of the system; and
4. To investigate and advise on the most suitable form of motive power for the system.

The investigations were completed and the Report issued in March 1951.

The Report is lucid and valuable, and its recommendations and suggestions should be implemented as far as practicable. Since it is clearly limited, however, to advice on developments with a view only to the economic and financial aspects of the railways, its recommendations may have to be supplemented and in some cases amended when considered in a wider framework.

The main conclusions of the Palmer Report can be briefly summarized. With respect to the accounts and financial position

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of the railways, the Report recommends that the renewals fund be restored and adequate allocations made for renewals in the future, that the financial department be reorganized to some extent and that the structure of rates and fares be studied and revised. On the Major Development Program the Report suggests completion of the Baghdad-West railway layout but on the basis of a revised plan. For the rehabilitation and modernization of the railways it proposes a detailed renewals program for a 10 year period and makes several minor recommendations. Finally, with respect to motive power, the Report recommends the conversion of the meter-gauge lines to diesel traction within 10 years.

The Mission approves these recommendations in general, but offers below a number of comments, amendments and additional recommendations so as to fit them into the wider field of coordinated economic development.

Financial Situation and Accounts

The Palmer Report envisages a renewals program costing ID 10,600,000 over an 11 year period. Of this sum it anticipates that the railways may be able to finance ID 8,175,000 out of current revenues on the assumption that the total set aside for this purpose from operating income can be gradually increased from ID 600,000 in the first year to ID 875,000 in the last year. A balance of ID 2,425,000 would therefore have to come from other sources. If it is decided, in accordance with a recommendation made later in this monograph, to standardize the railway gauge, the whole program of renewals will have to be considerably accelerated. The amount of financing required over the next five years will then be substantially increased.

The railways would undoubtedly be in a better position to finance these renewals out of their own resources if the administration were not burdened with expenses for other government operations, unconnected with the railways. For example, the railways have carried all the losses of the government airways throughout their existence, and the government has taken valuable railway land without compensation for projects entirely unconnected with railway operations while, at the same time, forcing the railways to pay high costs for new land required for railway use. The railways maintain at their own expense the many bridges used for the dual purpose of rail and road traffic, and they supply the necessary signalling and guarding services. The railway administration has built a costly rail and road crossing of the Tigris at Baghdad but must wait for the Road Department to contribute its share of the expense even though the latter requires the railways to pay for certain stores in advance of delivery. Finally, although the new Baghdad station with the elaborate new layout was conceived largelv in the interests of town planning, the railways are expected to finance the entire cost and are also blamed for extravagance.

Some financial readjustments are clearly necessary to enable the railways to carry out the proposed essential renewals program. Further financial difficulties in the future can be avoided only if advance provision is made for additional capital projects and if the railways are adequately repaid for services rendered. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that, unless these steps are taken, the railways will, in a few years, become incapable of coping with normal traffic demands and those imposed by the country's development schemes; and there will be no alternative transport agency available.

In the field of financial administration the Palmer Report recommends the establishment of a Financial Committee inside the railway organization and the appointment of a Financial Secretary in addition to the Chief Accountant and the Auditor already in service. The Mission believes, however, that for a railway administration of the present size this may require too many leading officials in a single department. It suggests that no more than two persons will be needed to assure the three services, namely financial secretariat, accounts and audit.

The prevailing structure of rates and fares is not unsound but it is characterized by certain anomalies. In 1948-49 average goods earnings were only 209 percent higher than a decade ago although the wholesale price index in Baghdad had risen by 363 percent from 1939 to 1949. Moreover, the rate increases have been somewhat haphazard, varying from 50 percent for dates to 530 percent for tea, sugar and piece goods. In the summer of 1951 a further general rate increase of 12½ percent, with some exceptions, was put into effect. The rate structure is also defective in that all fares

and rates per kilometer or ton-kilometer unit vary between the 496
different sections of the system. They should be standardized. The abnormally wide variations in rates between commodities should be adjusted. The Palmer Report recommends the appointment of a rates and fares expert to study the matter. The Mission agrees that a traffic research officer with expert knowledge of tariff structure should be appointed as a temporary consultant to the railways. It is particularly important that he be conversant with traffic research so that he may provide for rate adjustments when traffic in certain commodities declines or increases exceptionally. With increased road traffic competition such research will become imperative in the very near future.

Baghdad-West Railway Developments

The plan for this major development scheme consists of a new 498
terminal station building and railway headquarters to replace the 496
existing separate Baghdad-West meter-gauge and standard-gauge stations, and the rebuilding and extension of the goods and marshalling yards. The plan was inspired chiefly by two desires, one to provide Baghdad with a modern central station, the other to make room for a town extension in the southeastern area planned on modern principles free from railway level crossings. The plans would necessitate the realignment of the line to Basra, around the development area so that it enters Baghdad terminal station from the northwest.

The Palmer Report rejects the official scheme principally because (1) increased length of the line to Basra would mean increased operating costs for the Railway and higher rates and fares for the public and (2) the operation of Baghdad station as a terminal instead of a "through" station would further increase operating difficulties and reduce the station's capacity. The Report submits a revised scheme in which the passenger terminal station is retained for the Mosul and Kirkuk lines, and the Basra line is retained along its present alignment with its own platforms, connected with the new terminal building. A plan for a provisional Stage I to bring the new station building into operation is also submitted.

The Report is on sound ground in pointing out the disadvantages of the increased mileage on the Baghdad-Basra lines

and in stressing the disadvantages of operating the station as a terminal in so far as goods traffic is concerned. An additional major disadvantage of the plan would be that in the new alignments the two meter-gauge railway yards would be on opposite sides of the standard-gauge railway yard, thus presenting very serious operating difficulties. A terminal station for passenger traffic, however, presents a different case and would actually offer advantages in concentrated operations, safe and easy circulation of passengers, luggage, mail and parcels. But it is obviously out of the question to build a new passenger line outside the town and at the same time retain the existing line for goods traffic through the town.

It is obvious that a considerable time must elapse before a final decision as to the town planning, including government buildings, will be reached, and it is essential that at least the new terminal station, now nearing completion, be brought into operation. It is also desirable that no major reconstruction of yards be carried out until a final decision is reached. It is recommended, therefore, that a provisional plan be carried out, but on a modified, simpler scale than the Palmer Report Stage I. A modified plan is attached to this monograph as Appendix A. Its cost would be approximately one third of the Stage I project scheduled in the Palmer Report. In any case the Basra line platform should be sited immediately alongside the station building. It is indefensible to erect a terminal station costing ID 4,000,000 with the principal main-line platforms as appendices far away from the circulating area.

If future decisions for Baghdad town expansion demand the removal of the Basra line from its present alignment, the whole layout should be revised and the goods-marshalling yards constructed as a through yard, outside the present area, as indicated in outline on the plan attached to this Report as Appendix B. This layout would overcome the disadvantages of increased mileage and higher operating costs.

The Mission therefore recommends that the funds be made available for completing and bringing into operation the railway terminal station and headquarters and that an additional sum for a simplified provisional layout be also allocated. It suggests further that the new station building be used as follows:

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Ground Floor—half railway station, half airways terminal.[a] 496
First Floor —railway headquarters 498
Second Floor—non-railway offices

Other Developments

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The Baghdad-West layout is not the only development project for which financial provision is needed. As the Director General of Railways indicated in a memorandum of March 17, 1951 to the Minister of Communications and Public Works, there are in all 22 projects, which are either completed or too far advanced to be abandoned. A list of these is given in Appendix C. On some of those completed, payments are still due; and others cannot now be finished for lack of funds, even though their completion is in the interest of the country's economy as well as the railway's operating efficiency. It is important, therefore, that the necessary funds be made available to the railways.

On the other hand, it will not be necessary at this time to provide for extensions of the railway network. Projects have been studied or suggested for new railways lines and extensions between

Kerbela—Kufa,
Baghdad—Kut, on the right bank of the Tigris,
Kut—Nasiriya,
Kut—Amara,
Amara—Basra

All these projects are in principle worth studying, but no decision as to their usefulness can be reached until the effects of road building and organized road transport on general traffic flow has been further investigated.

Rehabilitation and Modernization

In principle the suggestions of the Palmer Report should be adopted, although the extent to which they can be implemented in practice can be determined only after further study and recommendations by the head of each department concerned. Undoubtedly some further allocation of Development Board funds will be needed to carry out the ultimate recommendations.

Diesel Traction

Iraq's oil resources favor diesel traction, especially in view of the problems involved in supplying the water that steam traction requires. The Palmer Report has proved the case for diesel trac-

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[a] See the subsequent section on airports.

496 tion, and it is recommended that the trial period be begun at the earliest possible date with due regard to considerations set out in the following paragraphs dealing with possible gauge conversion. The cost of converting to diesel traction, estimated in the Palmer Report at ID 4,155,000, has already been almost entirely included in the projected outlay on renewals given earlier.

Gauge Conversion

One major problem remains practically untouched, that of unification of the railways' gauge. The problem has never been studied in detail. At various times estimates have been produced, usually at short notice and always based on the assumption of the necessity of complete replacement of track and rolling stock. It has often been forgotten that the construction gauge, formation, bridges, etc., of the meter-gauge lines were originally designed with a view to ultimate conversion to standard gauge.

There is no doubt that the division of the railway system in two gauges with a transshipment point at the center is a handicap to full traffic development. The question is whether the cost of conversion and the temporary disturbance of the free flow of traffic can be reduced sufficiently to be outbalanced by the increased efficiency and cheaper operation that the unified system would bring.

There are several reasons why the problem should now be studied in minute detail.

1. The long-term general development program of the country will probably entail capital expenditures of about ID 160,000,000 over the next five years and perhaps even larger amounts in later periods. Such an expenditure must result in increased production and consumption and in consequence increased transport. With this in view it might be sound and reasonable to include in the capital program a project for rail gauge conversion which would make railway transport more efficient.
2. Although existing administration, operation, service of workshops, stores, etc., for the two gauges are admirably integrated, there exists, of necessity, a large amount of duplication in activities, of reserves, of stand-bys and spares, in all departments.
3. The developments contemplated in the areas now served by the standard-gauge line north of Baghdad will be handicapped by transshipment on the main export and import route.

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4. The meter-gauge system is completely isolated from the standard-gauge systems in all adjacent countries; and such isolation may become a growing handicap to Iraq if additional rail connections become desirable in the interest of security or international trade.
5. Serious consideration must be given from now on to road transport. The proper economic use of both road and rail transport facilities will be much more difficult as long as the railway system suffers from a transshipment handicap.

A decision on gauge conversion should be taken now, in view of the major developments contemplated in the next five or ten years. Once these major developments are achieved with retention of the existing system, an opportunity for conversion, however desirable, will not recur again under circumstances as favorable as the present.

The major developments contemplated and directly affected by possible gauge conversion are:

1. Diesel traction to replace steam;
2. The intensive renewal program of track and rolling stock, which is now required in view of the age of the railway, and which must be carried out in any event;
3. The Baghdad-West layout in conjunction with town development.

It is emphatically recommended that the problem of gauge conversion of all meter-gauge lines be made the subject of a serious and thorough study in all its details. The existing railway staff is fully capable of doing this work; its members know all the local possibilities and difficulties, but, already overburdened in their day-to-day duties, they cannot possibly find the time to carry out the study alone. They should therefore be assisted by consultants for a period of, say, three to six months; and the consultants Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton might accordingly be recalled to carry out the study under the direction of the Director General and in close cooperation with the railway staff.

Such a study should cover the following subjects:

1. Assessment of the principal reasons for conversion;
2. A possible conversion program, completely integrated with the programs for renewals, introduction of diesel traction and completion of the Baghdad-West scheme;

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3. A five-year program of preparation involving:
   a. An initial test period of diesel locomotives and final transfer to diesel traction at the end of the fifth year;
   b. A concentration into five years of the program for track and rolling stock renewals projected by the Palmer Report. All the renewals to be for standard gauge, and no meter-gauge renewals beyond absolutely essential replacements from now on;
   c. A careful calculation of the extra capital cost involved, due consideration being given to expenses to be met in any case under existing operations, within the next five years or at some later time;
   d. A careful estimate of the savings in administration, operation, maintenance and renewal expenditures the unified system would afford.

A technical essay on the actual conversion work is attached to this report as Appendix D.

It is difficult to estimate the cost of the conversion operation in advance of this proposed study, but it may not be far from ID 6,000,000. As already indicated, however, it will also necessitate compressing the projected renewals program in a much shorter period. Thus, prior to conversion it would be necessary to carry out not only the renewals projected in the Palmer Report for the first five years, but also those contemplated for the meter-gauge lines in the rest of the period. Under those circumstances the outlay in renewals would be approximately as follows:

Mechanical (other than traction)	ID 2,000,000
Civil	3,400,000
Diesel traction	4,155,000
Total	ID 9,555,000

During this five-year period the railways would be able to finance only about ID 3,250,000 out of their own resources, i.e., through allocations out of current operating revenue. An estimated renewals deficit of ID 6,300,000 would therefore have to be financed over the next five years. Part of this might later be repaid out of railway revenues.

V. Roads

Organization

Iraq's road system is controlled and maintained by the Public 491
Works Department under the Minister of Communications and 647
Public Works. It is headed by the Director General of Public Works and under his direction five divisional engineers assure the maintenance and works service in divisions centered in Baghdad (four provinces), Hilla (three provinces), Basra (three provinces), Kirkuk (two provinces) and Mosul (two provinces). A sixth divisional engineer is in charge of central operations in the capital. District engineers, usually stationed at the provincial capitals, are in charge of day-to-day maintenance. Planning is carried out at the headquarters of the Director General. There is a lack of technical staff to carry out surveys in the field. Except for this fact, the organization is efficient and effective. It may have to be expanded as the road construction program progresses. Provincial governments and municipalities control secondary and urban roads and streets.

At present the road system controlled and maintained by the 491
Public Works Department consists of approximately

2,500 kilometers metalled and surfaced,
500 kilometers metalled only,
5,000 kilometers earth roads.

Many of the metalled roads were built in the two war periods, and most of them are concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the capital, between Baghdad and the East and North, and in the North. All the roads in the southern plains are earth roads, and their maintenance and use suffers from the effects of rains on the salt-impregnated soil. Roads within municipal boundaries are gen- [363]
erally in a very poor state of repair, not excluding the streets in the capital. Roads in the Basra Port area are controlled and maintained by the Port Directorate and are in good repair.

Maintenance was, until a few years ago, extremely poor, but today every effort is being made, and with conspicuous success, at least to prevent further deterioration. Maintenance costs are allocated on the Ministry's budget and calculated at ID 40 per

491 kilometer treated. For the present this appears to be about sufficient, but costs will increase as the system expands and traffic develops. On the completion of a metalled system of 7,000 kilometers, as planned, the costs would rise to approximately ID 70 per kilometer per year, a total of ID 490,000.

Road Construction

449 A program was drawn up in 1950 by a Committee appointed by order of the Minister of Communications and Public Works on February 7, 1950. The Committee consisted of the Directors General of Public Works, State Railways, Irrigation, and Surveys, and the Chief Engineer, a British road expert from the London Ministry of Transport temporarily attached to the Public Works Department in Baghdad. This Committee is a laudable example of departmental coordination, and the plan drawn up by the Committee shows unmistakably the value of this cooperation.

The program schedules 37 roads, of a total length of 3,463 kilometers, to be built, or improved as the case may be, in a period of 10 years at a total cost estimated at ID 14,500,000. Construction costs are expected to vary from ID 3,500 to ID 7,500 per kilometer, including drainage, culverts, bridges and costs of supervision. The program assigns first priority to the main trunk road, Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra, now an earth road, and the trunk road, Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul, some sections of which are already metalled.

The roads are to be built to accommodate two traffic lanes, together six meters (20 feet) wide with verges for pedestrians, pack animals and cattle. Specifications drawn up by the Public Works Engineers provide for three types of foundation—stone blocks, broken stone or gravel, eight to nine inches thick; and for two types of surfacing—bituminous macadam or graveled macadam, three inches thick.

The program is sound and the specifications are effective. The Mission recommends that both be adopted as the basis of the future road construction plan, but with the following qualifications:

1. Although trunk roads like the Baghdad-Basra and Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul arteries and a few others should have a metalled width of six meters and wide verges on each side, the initial width of metalled surface on other

roads should be kept to four meters until traffic develops. 499 Even on the latter roads, however, space for six-meter lanes and wide verges should be set aside.

2. Earth roads with little or no traffic at present should initially be raised to 50 centimeters, or somewhat less than two feet, above surrounding levels, with proper grading but no metalling until traffic actually appears. In this category should be scheduled such sections as Baghdad-Kut on the right bank of the Tigris, Diwaniya-Ur and Samarra-Shargat. The materials used for foundations ought to be selected from those found in the area, so as to avoid long haulage Suitable stone or gravel or even broken brick of sufficient hardness appears to be found within at most 100 kilometers of any given road section.
3. All depressions styled "Irish Crossings" should be removed.
4. Railway bridges should be disallowed for use by road traffic in trunk roads. The first bridge to be duplicated should be the Baquba bridge.

Feeder Roads

Agricultural and forestry development areas need feeder roads to the nearest railway station or main road or both, and provision for them should be made in development schemes for these areas. For the most part this could probably be done by improving existing country roads or tracks by grading, draining, and sometimes raising them. Good maintenance of these feeder roads is essential and might appropriately be assured by the provincial governments; generally only hand labor and a grader would be required. No hard surface is recommended for these roads. Assuming a total length of 8,000 kilometers for this system of secondary country roads, construction and maintenance of such a network would probably demand an expenditure of ID 100 per kilometer per year, i.e., ID 800,000 per annum in the initial period of five years.

One problem remains to be solved. The Public Works Department has no trained or skilled technical staff to carry out detailed surveys of existing or new roads. It is all important that correct location, alignment, levels, gradients, transition curves, camber and cant, etc., be established and maintained. It is therefore recommended that competent consulting engineers be engaged to do the plans and surveys and supervise the first large-scale construction, and that a nucleus of Iraqi surveyors be recruited to carry on [464]

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499 the work in the future. The work should be carried out by contractors of repute. Since they will generally possess the appropriate plant, it should not be necessary for the government to purchase any large amount of roadbuilding machinery.

Traffic

494 Road traffic is still extremely light in the country. As Table 6 indicates, the number of motor vehicles operating in Iraq is still very modest, and of this number most operate in or around the large cities. The personal observation of Mission members confirms that traffic density even on the most travelled roads is very low.

TABLE 6

REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES

Year	Passenger Cars	Buses	Trucks	Motorcycles
1942	4,522	n.a.	1,942	82
1943	4,333	n.a.	1,900	100
1944	3,972	n.a.	1,720	116
1945	3,771	n.a.	2,017	127
1946	5,902	n.a.	3,497	524
1947	7,422	n.a.	5,136	1,015
1948	8,678	n.a.	6,088	577
1949	9,601	n.a.	7,262	1,029
1950	11,438	3,007	6,381	1,636

n.a.—not available.

Road Usage

The improvement and construction of roads will undoubtedly bring about a rapid increase in road traffic in the future. It will then become necessary to regulate the usage of the roads. At present both the condition of the vehicles using the roads and their loading can only be described as extremely dangerous. On the many tours made on Iraq's existing roads, far too many of the very few vehicles seen on the roads were observed to be overloaded both with respect to the weight and to the height of the load. Top-heavy vehicles are particularly dangerous, especially on the sharply curved roads in mountains and gorges. Many bridges have been heightened—often in a way which is unsound structurally—to accommodate such vehicles. Vehicles unfit to operate endanger the safety

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of all road users as well as their passengers and cargoes. The 494 expectation of increased road traffic makes it imperative that appropriate measures of control be devised without delay.

The following measures are suggested for adoption:

1. Construction of road weighbridges at suitable check points.
2. Compulsory inspection of all vehicles carrying passengers for payment and of all trucks before a periodic license is issued.
3. Appointment of qualified inspectors with sufficient authority and responsibility to ensure adequate enforcement of vehicle regulations.

With the development of traffic on the new highways it will be necessary to introduce and enforce proper traffic rules and regulations. The Mission, therefore, recommends that a highway code be drawn up and that traffic police be instructed and trained in the application and enforcement of the code.

Traffic conditions in the capital are at certain times of the day [363] chaotic, even though city traffic is by no means dense. It would [625] appear that, with training, the formidable force of traffic police now regulating the city's traffic could without expansion serve for traffic control on the country's highway system as well. It would pay the government to engage the services of a traffic expert, preferably from a metropolitan police such as London's, for a limited period, to design the highway code and to instruct the traffic police.

Public Road Transport

It will become increasingly necessary to regulate public road transport of passengers and goods by a licensing system. If this transport is left entirely free and uncontrolled, chaos will be the result; too many operators are likely to engage in public transport, run their services on borrowed money, find their vehicles run down before the loans are repaid and end in bankruptcy. The country's economy will suffer both from the waste of resources involved in such uneconomic ventures and from the probable need of protecting the railways by subsidies from the consequences of such wasteful operations. A reasonable number of capable private operators should provide healthy competition among themselves and with the railway.

494 Transport licenses should be granted only if the proposed operator appears responsible and sufficiently well equipped to perform the transport services and if there is evidence of present or prospective need. Operators should be required to take out insurance, to adhere to published rates, routes and schedules, and to conform to loading regulations.

Maintenance

491 The maintenance of the new road system when once completed is even more important than its initial construction. Service and funds must be assured to keep the roads in the condition in which they have been built. The Minister of Finance should budget for annual expenditures, to be estimated by the Public Works Department, for maintenance of the road systems and all accessories including sign posting, for improvements necessitated by increased traffic, for inspection and control of road traffic and for the traffic police required. The expenditures should, in general, be covered by revenue from those who actually use the roads.

Subsidiary Roads and Urban Streets

489 It is recommended that at the earliest opportunity a system of cooperation between the Public Works Department and provincial and municipal road departments be established to bring maintenance, traffic control and municipal licensing in line with the government's policy in these matters and that appropriate provision for this cooperation be made in the budget.

City Transport

365 An essential part of the country's transport system is passenger transport service in the capital. Baghdad and its suburbs form a city of a population of over half a million spread over an area with a radius of four to eight miles. In 1938 it was decided to establish a municipal passenger service to be operated with buses. The war intervened and limited services were brought into operation in 1942 with converted army trucks equipped with locally built bodies. A loan of ID 500,000 was raised, more vehicles purchased and workshops and garages of sorts installed. The services deteriorated with the poor equipment, which was all that was available in wartime, and the municipality was unable to carry the financial burden. Early in 1950 the service was taken over by

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the central government. Since then it has been operated by an Administrative Board under the Ministry of the Interior, consisting of a Director General, who is president, and four other members.

The Board operates bus lines in and to all parts of the city and suburbs with a fleet of 236 buses of sundry makes and types. They are in poor condition owing to excessive service and the poor equipment of workshops and garages. At the time of the transfer to the central government, 70 percent of the vehicles were under, awaiting or beyond repaid. With effort the proportion has been brought down to just over 50 percent at present. A wise decision has been taken to standardize the type of bus to be operated in the future, and 100 new vehicles have been purchased at a cost of ID 500,000 to be paid over a period of three years. This sum includes a generous supply of spare parts. The services of one traffic and one workshop expert have been obtained on loan from the London Transport Executive to take up duties in Baghdad in September 1951.

TABLE 7

Budget Summary for 1951-52

Revenues	
Passenger traffic	ID 590,000
Miscellaneous (chiefly sales)	5,000
	595,000
Expenditures	
Salaries and allowances	ID 47,150
Wages and allowances	227,600
Board, etc.	3,300
Administrative expenses	33,500
Maintenance and new buildings	16,000
Maintenance of vehicles	90,000
Fuel and oil	65,000
Loan service	61,662
	544,212
Capital Expenditure	
New buses	ID 205,000
Machinery and tools	7,000
	ID 212,000

365 The operating position may be judged from a summary of the sanctioned budget for the current financial year, ending March 31, 1952.

Administrative expenses include a contribution of ID 2,000 to the Baghdad Municipality for maintenance of roads. The ID 90,000 for maintenance of vehicles is alarming. This high figure is caused chiefly by the large number of different types, the difficulties of procuring parts, the high cost of manufacturing substitutes and the large number of breakages of vehicle springs, axles and other parts due in great measure to Baghdad's bad roads.

A program to put the service on a sound operating, administrative and financial basis would include the following features:

1. Modernization of the central workshop and equipment, preferably moved to a site in the industrial section of the town.
2. Establishment of one central garage and four auxiliary terminal garages, all largely open air compounds, the latter to accommodate early and late services.
3. A fleet of 180 to 200 standard buses, to allow for reasonable running shifts and sufficient time for maintenance and servicing.

The Mission suggests that the cost of this program, estimated at ID 500,000, be financed by the Development Board. At the same time, however, it might be considered whether economies in administration could not be achieved by entrusting management entirely to a Director General rather than a Board, and whether revenues could not be increased by a stricter check on the collection of passenger fares.

VI. Airports

508 Both Iraq's international airports are very favorably situated within the town limits of Baghdad and Basra Port (Magil). This great advantage should be preserved and any developments should be on the present sites. Climatic conditions are favorable, and only a runway in one direction is required to accommodate traffic at all seasons. Town developments need suffer no inconveniences from

the present sites, nor is surface transport by rail, road or water in any way hindered. Plans for removal of either airport away from the present site have been abandoned and ought not to be revived. 508

Development

Both airports are now scheduled to be built up to the specifications required for an International Civil Aviation Organization's Class B standard airport. The development projects embody the following works:

1. A runway of 2,500 meters to accommodate the newest heavy aircraft;
2. Navigation aids;
3. Communication, point to point, and ground to aircraft; and
4. Meteorological service.

It is recommended that these projects be carried out without delay. Some of the work is under way; equipment has been purchased, some has arrived on site. Work on the runways is still to begin. At the Baghdad airport an entirely new runway, parallel to the existing one, should be constructed and the existing runway, constructed as a temporary structure five years ago and now showing signs of deterioration, used as an aircraft taxi-way.

In addition to these projects already prepared and ready for execution, the present air terminal building at Baghdad, which has become too small, should be removed, and the wing of the new railway building facing the airport should be adapted for use as a new air terminal.

The capital expenditure involved in the projects may be estimated at between ID 250,000 and ID 300,000 for all works at Baghdad and between ID 100,000 and ID 150,000 at Basra airport. The latter expenditure appears to be within limits which can be financed from the Port's revenues. The former, however, will need to be financed out of the revenues of the Development Board.

VII. Air Transport

Since 1945 internal air transport has been assured as a part of air services to neighbor countries by the government-owned Iraqi Airways. The administration and management of Iraqi Airways are integrated with those of the State Railways, and for the sake 509

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of efficiency and economy this should remain so. The British Overseas Airways Corporation acts as technical adviser, deputizes personnel to the airways and trains Iraqi personnel.

Iraqi Airways operate regular services between:

Baghdad-Basra-Kuwait-Bahrein
Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut
Baghdad-Damascus-Cairo
Baghdad-Teheran.

The first route serves as an internal traffic link. The fleet consists of four aircraft: three Vikings and one Dove. In addition to the regular service, special flights with chartered aircraft assure seasonal traffic of pilgrims.

The first route serves as an internal traffic link. The fleet consists as is indicated in Table 8. The financial results, however, leave much to be desired. The operating accounts shown in Table 9 reveal substantial deficits which have been met from the State Railways' revenues. The Railways have also paid the initial capital outlay of ID 259,976 for aircraft and ground installations.

TABLE 8

Airways Traffic

Year	Regular Lines Traffic					
	Mileage	Passenger Journeys	Excess Baggage Ton Miles	Mail Ton Miles	Cargo Ton Miles	Pilgrims Charter Passenger Miles
1945-46	80,953	559	709	0	86	7,770
1946-47	669,083	6,386	11,456	2,495	12,757	104,072
1947-48	779,159	12,397	26,694	9,314	64,087	175,563
1948-49	846,810	15,237	30,838	8,774	98,792	608,957

TABLE 9

Airways Budget

(In dinars)

Year	Cash Revenue	Cash Expenditure	Deficit
1945-46	5,504	13,587	8,083
1946-47	89,130	133,719	44,589
1947-48	106,580	187,600	81,020
1948-49	265,024	302,470	37,446
1949-50	257,280	363,172	105,892

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Future Developments

It must be expected that Iraqi Airways will continue to 509
operate at a loss for some years to come. This should be accepted because the air services serve a real traffic need and there are reasonable prospects of reducing and perhaps ultimately eliminating operating deficits. The Airways Accounts are separate from the Railway Accounts and the steps recommended in the Palmer Report for complete separation of the finances of the Railways and the Airways should be adopted. There is no reason why the Railways should be expected to defray the deficits of the Airways.

There appears to be room for expansion of services in the area where Europe, Asia and Africa meet; and the government should encourage Iraqi Airways to play an increasingly important part in air traffic in this area. Internal demands appear to be negligible at present but may be expected to develop in conjunction with extended international services. These services appear to present an opportunity for far-reaching economies through closer cooperation between Middle Eastern airlines in their services, their administration and agencies outside the home countries.

VIII. Post, Telegraph, Telephone, Radio Communications

Organization

Responsibility for communications is concentrated in the 447
Directorate General of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services in 205
the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. Iraq is a 206
full member of the International Postal Union and the communications services of the country, including their tariffs, comply with the standards of the Union.

The number of post, telepragh and telephone offices has devel- 205
oped as follows: 206

TYPE OF OFFICE	1940	1951
24 hrs. service	14	46
16 hrs. service	12	37
12 hrs. service	18	4
7 hrs. service	42	54
Local and rural agencies	155	171

205 Mail is carried:

206

on regular railway routes	1,604 kilometers
on contractors' routes (road)	3,010 "
on occasional routes (roads, tracks)	1,214 "
by air	a maximum of 14 daily routes

The only recommendation to be made regarding these services is to speed up air conveyance by moving the sorting center at Basra from Basra town to Magil.

Communications with other countries are as follows:

Postal services to all Union countries.
Telegraph and telephone with:
  Iran by land lines,
  Turkey by land lines,
  Syria by wireless telegraph and land line telephone,
  Transjordan by land lines,
  Lebanon via Syria,
  Saudi-Arabia by wireless telegraph,
  Yemen by wireless telegraph,
  Egypt by wireless telegraph (two services, government and Marconi),
  Tangiers, relay point for wireless telegraph overseas,
  United Kingdom by direct wireless communication (projected).

A British submarine cable from Fao to Karachi-Bombay has been out of operation since 1950. Repairs are not contemplated, and wireless telegraph has been substituted.

206 *Internal Communications*

Trunk lines and carrier lines connect the towns and villages of any importance, and outlying villages and police posts are connected by wire from nearest exchanges. The telephone network is being continuously expanded, generally keeping up with demands. A new transmitter and a new broadcasting station have recently been installed near Baghdad.

The Mission suggests that an independent or at least auxiliary power plant be provided for the newly-built transmitter. A breakdown in the power supply, now assured by a long, open air transmission line, would have serious consequences.

The PTT service is a revenue earning department, but the revenues accrue to the government treasury so that all expenditures must be authorized by the government's annual budget. Operating revenue and capital expenditures are shown in the following table.

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TABLE 10

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF PTT
(in dinars)

Year	Operating Revenue	Operating Expenditures	Capital Expenditures
1940-41	434,979	243,684	84,590
1941-42	481,809	298,688	25,931
1942-43	626,356	250,161	10,171
1943-44	669,057	447,110	23,688
1944-45	712,865	392,764	3,445
1945-46	748,110	449,238	18,554
1946-47	857,200	522,078	42,810
1947-48	991,741	587,913	303,355
1948-49	992,049	596,720	349,046
1949-50	1,119,478	747,193	298,510
1950-51	1,154,000	799,675	600,000*

* sanctioned

Developments

Major development projects are chiefly directed toward extensions of telephone communications, increased trunklines and carrier lines between the large centers, telephone lines to rural areas, and telephone exchanges to cope with the increased number of subscribers. The telephone equipment is ordered abroad, and the buildings are provided by local action. However, coordination between the two is almost completely lacking. Equipment more often than not arrives in Iraq before buildings are ready to receive it. Equipment is stored and maintained, in some cases for more than a year, waiting for the buildings to be completed and even, on occasion, to be started.

This fact gives rise to the Mission's single important recommendation in the communications field. Basically the PTT service should be given responsibility for the proper coordination of capital expenditures on communications no matter how financed. It has sometimes been suggested that the best means to this end would be to make the PTT financially autonomous so that it can spend its operating surpluses on capital development at its discretion. The Mission does not believe, however, that this would be the appropriate solution. In the last analysis the amount and rate of investment in communications facilities should be determined by the

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206 Development Board which is responsible for coordinating the development program of the country as a whole. The Board should also provide the financial means but leave to the PTT responsibility for execution of communications projects.

IX. Pipelines

315 Inconspicuous, but most important, in Iraq's transport and communications systems are the oil pipelines. The existing lines are: a dual line, 12 inches and 16 inches, from the Kirkuk oilfields to Tripoli, the Lebanese Mediterranean port; a 12-inch line to Haifa in Israel, closed in 1948; and a new 30-inch line under construction between Kirkuk and the Syrian Mediterranean port of Banias. A short line runs from the Basra oilfields at Zubair to the shipping stage at Fao. The pipelines carry a tonnage of oil which far outstrips the total carried by the country's railways. They are operated, maintained and expanded by the oil companies, and need only be mentioned to complete the picture of Iraq's transport system.

X. Surveys

654 No development in any branch is possible without maps and surveys. The Directorate General of Surveys, which is under the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, has surveyed and mapped the southern part of the country aside from the desert to scales varying from 1:5,000 to 1:50,000. Few topographical surveys have been carried out in the rest of the country, and the existing maps are not very reliable. The education and training of competent surveyors is difficult. Terms of service are not attractive to young engineers and surveyors who find better prospects in engineering, planning and construction work. Air surveys can, to all practical purposes, solve the problem and progress with them is now being made in the North. The skilled surveyors who are available are at present employed in cadastral work, land settlement surveys and mapping to fix the demarcation of land ownership.

It is expected that once this work is completed, the personnel problem will ease somewhat. 654

The development program of the service provides for a survey and mapping to a scale of 1:20,000 at an estimated cost of ID 200,000. For the appropriate housing of the service, a new building with 10,000 square meters of floor space is now under construction and is expected to be completed in January or February 1952. This will facilitate administration of the service which is now scattered in three widely separated buildings. The new building will also house the up-to-date printing plant ordered in Great Britain. Funds for building and plant have already been sanctioned. Air surveys now in progress should be continued at an annual cost of approximately ID 40,000.

XI. General Observations

Teamwork

Not only the development of the transport services but also the general development program, with all its implications of temporary and seasonal demands for transport of construction materials and imports of machinery and plant, will materially affect the tasks before the transport managements. The teamwork in the existing transport departments is exemplary. It is therefore emphatically urged that no change be made in the present organizations and their leading personnel until after the main development programs are completed. 647 489

Intermediary Staff

In all the transport services there is a great dearth of intermediary staff—foremen, inspectors, surveyors, supervisors, and the like—for whom practical training in workshops and on construction sites is far more important than school or college education. In all transport development projects, special courses should be provided to train adaptable Iraqi apprentices under skilled teachers in shops, factories and on tracks and roads in the country. 489 464

These observations apply to all forms of transport, port, railways, roads, airways and communications. Unless continuity is maintained with a gradual, cautious transfer of responsibility from foreign to Iraqi personnel, efficiency will be seriously jeopardized.

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XII. Projected Cost of Proposed Programs

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The projects recommended for consideration are summarized below as to cost and time of realization. The total cost which the Development Board might have to defray over the next five years would be approximately ID 31,000,000.

TABLE 11

COST OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS SUGGESTED FOR DEVELOPMENT BOARD FINANCING

Project	Costs (in dinars)	Period (years)
PORT		
New channel	2,000,000	4
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT		
Study of river training by experts	Token	2
RAILWAYS		
Baghdad Station commitment	143,000	1
Baghdad new layout, provisional	100,000	1
22 continuation and completion projects		
under way	213,770	1
labor quarters	341,000	4
Rehabilitation and modernization projects	500,000	5
Renewals including diesel traction	6,300,000[a]	5
Extra for gauge conversion (tentative)	6,000,000	6
ROADS		
Trunk road system	14,500,000	10
Secondary road system	4,000,000	5
Road transport control	Token	1
URBAN TRANSPORT		
Baghdad transport services, workshops, garages and vehicles	500,000	3
AIRPORTS		
Baghdad development	300,000	2
Basra development	[b]	2
AIRLINES		
Iraqi Airways	600,000	4
POST, TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, RADIO		
Telephone extensions and buildings (if not financed from Communications budget)	300,000	Annually
Auxiliary power plant for transmitter	30,000	1
SURVEYS AND MAPPING		
Air surveys	40,000	Annually

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[a] On assumption of gauge conversion.
[b] To be financed by Port of Basra.

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
RAILROADS
ROADS
ROADS TO BE ABANDONED
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TO BAGHDAD NORTH EAST
LOCAL GOODS
NEW LAYOUT
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ACCESS
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P. 343 (a)

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
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EXISTING M.G. MAIN LINE
NEW PASSENGER LINE
S.G./M.G. CROSSING
EXISTING S.G. SIDINGS
EXISTING S.G. MAIN LINE
METRE GAUGE
STANDARD GAUGE
STANDARD GAUGE REMOVED
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0.1
0.2
MILES
0
0.1
0.2
KILOMETERS

FOLL. P. 343 (a)

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
KIRKUK
TIGRIS RIVER
PRESENT RAILWAY STATIONS AND YARDS TO BE ABANDONED
NEW MAIN LINE
MARSHALLING YARD

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
EXISTING S.G.
M.G. PLATFORMS
NEW PASSENGER STATION YARD
S.G. PLATFORMS
NEW
APRO
TAXI WAY FROM RUNWAY

FOLL. P. 343(b)

APPENDIX A

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IRAQI STATE RAILWAYS REVISED LAYOUT BAGHDAD RAILWAYS & ROADS IN NEW TOWN PLAN


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KILOMETERS

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APPENDIX B

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
EXISTING M.G. SIDINGS
FUTURE APPROACH ROAD
EXISTING S.G. SIDINGS
PROVISIONAL APPROACH ROAD
M.G. MAIN LINE MAQIL (NEW)
RAIL
PROJECTED BOULEVARD
ROUNDABOUT IN ORIGINAL PLAN
TRAFFIC ROUND
NEW APRON
NEW ROAD

IRAQI STATE RAILWAYS
BAGHDAD NEW DEVELOPMENT
SIMPLIFIED STAGE I

FOLL. P. 343 (c)

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APPENDIX C

499

Additional Railway Projects

1. Railroad bridge across Tigris at Baghdad—completed and financed.
2. Kirkuk-Erbil line—ID 100,000 required of which ID 85,000 for land already occupied.
3. Musayib bridge—ID 3,500 for land occupied, but not yet paid for.
4. Machinery for workshop—ID 11,000 for installation of plant already purchased and paid for.
5. Railway station and headquarters—ID 143,000 commitment plus ID 100,000 for provisional plan.
6. Rolling stock—no allocation required.
7. Crane—no allocation required.
8. Labor quarters—ID 341,000 required to be spread over three to four years.
9. Signalling—ID 4,620 for installation of equipment already procured.
10. Workshop extension—completed.
11. Power house—ID 4,700 for installation of plant already procured.
12. Aircraft to be provided for under air transport allocations.
13. Construction of stations—not urgent.
14. Construction of officials' quarters—not urgent.
15. Army assets—completed.
16. Land already purchased for station extensions—ID 41,000 for two years.
17. Shamiya station—scheme abandoned.
18. Electric plant—ID 12,000 for installation of plant already procured.
19. Accounting machines—ID 20,000.

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20. Electric plant—ID 6,050 for installation of plant already procured.
21. Permanent way—ID 5,000 for installation of plant already procured.
22. Weighbridges—ID 5,900 for installation of plant already procured.

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APPENDIX D

496

Notes on Conversion from Meter to Standard Gauge of the Basra-Baghdad-Erbil Main Line and Branches

The conversion plan, if carried out, should establish an approximate D-day of conversion for the Basra-Baghdad line five years ahead and a second D-day of conversion for the Baghdad-Erbil line in the following year, i.e. in six years' time.

As a preliminary step there should be a careful survey of the number of tracks in yards, loops and sidings in stations which are unused or in excess of requirements, so that the conversion can be concentrated on tracks and sidings truly necessary. The conversion mileage can thereupon be determined.

A further preliminary step would involve a study of revised timetables, which take account of the new form of traction and the reduction in motive power units and rolling stock resulting therefrom.

The conversion will require the substitution of standard-gauge sleepers for the entire length of track to be converted from meter gauge. On certain sections this will involve broadening of the existing earth or stone ballast bed. On some bridges slight structural alterations to longitudinal girders may also be necessary. No other substitution or expansion is required for the conversion since any strengthening of the track by new rails, new turnouts, stone ballast or earth, etc., should properly be considered a replacement or development requirement, not a conversion requirement.

The conversion will also require the substitution of standard-gauge rolling stock for existing meter-gauge stock. New diesel locomotives will in any case be required by the change-over to diesel traction, and since carriage and wagon bodies have been built to standard-gauge dimension, the only change rolling stock conversions will require is the substitution of standard-gauge undercarriages for the existing meter-gauge. Any replacement, renewal or expansion of rolling stock carried out at the same time should be considered, therefore, a development rather than a conversion requirement.

The raising of platforms and loading bank levels may be considered a conversion requirement, but it is not an essential part of conversion, and it may, in most stations, be postponed or even dispensed with. Buildings, fencing, signalling, communications system, water supply, power plant and machinery are, for the most part, not directly affected by the conversion. To the limited extent that they may be affected, as in the case of machinery and stores, there is a reduction, rather than an expansion, involved.

The two D-days for conversion should be determined inside two successive years' seasons of low traffic. The conversion program before and on D-day, and the completion program after D-day are scheduled in outline in the following paragraphs.

Standard-gauge sleepers in the existing track scheduled for conversion after the survey prescribed earlier should be substituted for meter-gauge sleepers, over as long a period as practicable, well in advance of D-day. This can be done by the ordinary maintenance gangs, strengthened where required, in slack periods.

Special gangs or contractors, or both, should proceed to put out of service approximately half the number of sidings in the yards and wharves, etc., at Magil and Baghdad, and at the most important intermediate stations bring these to standard gauge. At each crossing station which has more than one crossing loop, one or more loops would be put out of service and similarly converted, including the turn-outs at either end, in or by the side of the track.

If agreement is reached on remodelling of the yards in Baghdad-West, the new yards will need to be built for standard gauge, leaving the abandonment of the meter-gauge yards until after the conversion.

Some days before D-day a proportion of the rail fastenings in the remaining track would be loosened, and key turnouts at entrances and exits to stations and yards built at the side of their final position.

On D-day the conversion would be carried out with might and main over the entire length of the line, joining the already converted halves of yards and at least one loop at crossing stations, all within an allowed space of not more than 24 hours.

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The special gangs and contractors would then continue to convert the remaining halves of yards and loops and remove surplus sidings.

Rolling stock and locomotive requirements will have to be met as follows:

1. **Motive power.** Diesel engine types will have to be ordered forthwith for standard-gauge trial. After a suitable period of trials under all conditions and circumstances, including try-out of alterations resulting from the trials, the order for the full requirements must be placed so that delivery of the absolutely essential number of units can be made before the two D-days of conversion.
2. **New rolling stock.** No new rolling stock for meter-gauge lines should be ordered from the day the conversion is decided upon, and new units of coaching stock and wagons which would have been ordered under the meter-gauge renewal program will need to be ordered for standard gauge. The number should be increased so as to cover a renewal program of 10 years concentrated in a period of five years.
3. **Conversion of old rolling stock.** With due regard to the reduced number of coaching and wagon units as calculated by the preliminary survey, any deficiency remaining after the provisions outlined under paragraph 2, will have to be met by rebuilding of meter-gauge to standard-gauge stock from existing bodies on new undercarriages.

New standard-gauge rolling stock imported through Basra port should be held at Basra on the converted portions of wharves and yards in readiness for operation from D-day. Converted stock, handled at Baghdad workshops, plus the surplus now existing on the standard-gauge line, is to be similarly held ready at the Baghdad end.

Traffic must be interrupted for a few days before D-day, probably three days or less in the down direction and one day in the up direction. These days must be used to bring all meter-gauge stock, except the units to be sold or scrapped, under load or empty from Magil to Baghdad for use on the Erbil line. All units to be sold must be brought to Magil before D-day. This process will already have started several weeks before by a judiciously planned distribution operation. Both the public and the trade must be warned in advance so that traffic, though interrupted for a few days, need not suffer.

The same procedures, on a far smaller scale, would be repeated a year later on the Baghdad-Erbil line. In the planning arrangements outlined above the estimates of costs may be calculated in considerable detail.

The cost of conversion of track and accessories will consist of (1) the actual cost of labor, materials and supervisions involved in the operation of 800-plus miles of standard-gauge sleepers, less the cost of 10 years' replacement of meter-gauge sleepers and the scrap value of removed meter-gauge sleepers, and (2) the cost of widened earth or ballast section and of some structural alterations to bridges. The difference in cost between the 75-pound rails required for standard gauge and the 60-pound rails that would otherwise be used for renewals might also be included, although this item is not a real conversion cost. There is no doubt that developments in any case would demand heavier rail than 60-pounds even if the meter gauge is retained.

The conversion cost in terms of motive power and rolling stock will consist of (1) the difference in cost of standard-gauge and meter-gauge diesel locomotives; (2) the difference in cost of standard-gauge and meter-gauge coaching stock and wagons scheduled for renewal; and (3) the cost of extra standard-gauge rolling stock required to reach the numbers necessary for operation.

From the costs so calculated must be deducted the saving in new procurement resulting from the smaller numbers of locomotives, carriages and wagons as standard-gauge and former meter-gauge stocks are pooled. The resulting savings in maintenance and renewal costs will accrue over a period of 15 to 30 years during which old stock will be completely replaced by new stock.

Finally an attempt should be made to assess in some detail the savings in operation, maintenance, warehouses, stores and administration generally resulting from the conversion; also the saving in transshipment costs plus the increase in revenues from the larger traffic which will undoubtedly develop once transshipment has been abolished.

One further factor will affect the cost of rolling stock. Standard-gauge wagon stock should comply with the requirements of the European Wagons Union (RIV) but the designs should follow the existing simple standards of meter-gauge rolling stock.

496 The wagons of most European railways, including the present standard-gauge wagon stock of Iraq State Railways, are unnecessarily luxurious and far too heavy for Iraq's needs. The railways' traffic consists largely of smaller than bogie load consignments, and the four-wheeled wagon type should be retained in preference to a switch to bogies stock.

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ANNEX F

PUBLIC HEALTH

I. Introduction

Extent of Progress Made in Public Health

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In the past 30 years health services in Iraq have improved 743
considerably. In 1918 the country had only one hospital, con- 164
trasted with the present 89 hospitals (4,812 in-patient beds or one bed per 1,000 people) and 448 dispensaries. Control measures including the use of vaccines, particularly for smallpox, have cut down the incidence of epidemics during the last few years. Cholera has not occurred since 1931 and the plague not since 1935. Smallpox and louse-borne typhus also seem to be under control. An Institute of Endemic Diseases has been set up with headquarters in Baghdad. Steps have already been taken to control malaria and a good deal of information is being assembled on schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and ankylostomiasis. Nevertheless, the main endemic diseases—malaria, schistosomiasis, trachoma, and ankylostomiasis—are still very common.

In 1949 there were 797 doctors practicing in Iraq, of whom 759
419 or 53 percent were in Baghdad. There were about 387 government pharmacies and 252 pharmacists working in private pharmacies in the larger towns.

The doctors are supplemented by 265 health officials, originally trained primarily to staff village dispensaries, and 400 nurses and 659 dressers (male hospital attendants), about one to every four or five hospital beds. There are also private nurses, midwives and dressers, and 130 public vaccinators who are employed on a permanent basis. In 1948 and 1949, 3,061,955 and 2,080,777 smallpox [751]
vaccinations were made (the 1947 census showing a total population of 4,799,500).

Malaria, trachoma and bronchitis were the main hospital 164
cases; the dysenteries, anemias, wounds, syphilis and phthisis were 757

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757 also frequent causes for hospitalization. In 1949 there were 5,876,336 visits ~~to health institutions~~ for treatment.

Public Health Budget

744 In 1951-52, ID 2,089,180 (7.6 percent of the total budget)
662 were allocated to health services, as compared to ID 187,672 in
164 1931. Because of the prevalence of endemic diseases and the constant danger of epidemics, it would not be unreasonable to spend 10 percent of the total budget on health services.

759 Salaries ~~for personnel~~ in the medical service appear to be low in relation to the cost of living, although they are not low compared to other civil service salaries. The basic salaries, exclusive of cost-of-living allowances, range from ID 5.15 a month for a dresser, to ID 25 for a doctor and ID 80 for a director-general.

Current Health Conditions

165 In spite of the undeniable progress in health conditions, there is need for further improvement. Definitive data are lacking on total birth and death rates, but some figures are available on the infant mortality rate, which is probably the best index of the social circumstances of an area. For Baghdad, the recorded rate in 1949 was 128 deaths per thousand births. Iraqi doctors who have worked in different parts of the country consider the rate to be about 250 per thousand, on the average, compared with about 34 deaths per thousand live births in highly developed countries.

164 Among the people as a whole, malaria seems to be the chief killer, especially in country districts. In the main cities the leading causes of deaths were intestinal diseases, tuberculosis and respiratory diseases. These diseases and trachoma seriously affect the ability of men and women to work efficiently and are among the major causes of low productivity of labor in Iraq. For example, candidates for the police service are frequently rejected because of defective eyesight and what is characterized as "poor physique" associated with chronic malaria, schistosomiasis, etc. About 20 percent of the young men liable for military service are found to be unfit.

Heart trouble, cancer and other organic disturbances are far outnumbered by diseases which are essentially social in origin. Most of them can be traced to lack of hygiene, poor sanitation and

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monoton- 164
ous diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the
highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

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Ascaris, caused by round worms living in the intestinal tract, is found particularly in the North. Sewage disposal is the worst offender in this case; the custom of using the contents of cesspools as manure for vegetables is probably among the chief factors in spreading the disease.

In the case of the *dysenteries,* the incidence has been correlated with fly-breeding seasons, and is thus generally lower in winter and in August and September. Many Iraqi doctors maintain there are now fewer cases of dysentery in those cities in which pure water supply systems have been installed.

Unlike dysentery and typhoid fever, *enteritis*—common throughout the land and particularly among infants—is, in the opinion of Iraqi doctors, as common as it ever was in spite of some sanitary improvements in the cities.

Malaria

The desert climate prevailing over the greater part of the country is not in itself conducive to the breeding of mosquitoes. Man-made conditions, specifically irrigation projects, are largely responsible for the breeding of the disease-carrying mosquitoes, especially in the central plains where they thrive in seepage water, open pools and the small irrigation channels of the date palm gardens. There can be no doubt that every year malaria causes many deaths (estimated by Iraqi doctors at 50,000 a year), much sickness and permanent disability and, consequently, immense loss to the country. It must also be remembered that malaria is commonly associated with schistosomiasis (carried by the snail thriving in polluted water) and ankylostomiasis, causing widespread anemia and debility. Malaria is therefore of profound significance to the economy of Iraq.

Tuberculosis

Although the total population is not large, many parts of the country are, even in the villages, densely populated. In a poor district of Baghdad and in many villages an average of 4.5 persons live in one room. Iraqi doctors are generally of the opinion that tuberculosis is increasing in the country although there are no

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reliable figures on its true incidence. One real problem is that 164 the public has come to regard tuberculosis as a shameful disease [753] so that few people report to hospitals in the early stage of the illness. The government has applied to the World Health Organization for assistance in dealing with tuberculosis. It is understood that WHO will send a team consisting of a consultant, an epidemiologist, a bacteriologist and two nurses to begin a BCG campaign; and that, by arrangement with UNICEF, they will be assisted by two medical officers, two nurses, and one administrator. The government will build a suitable "chest center" in Baghdad where the WHO team will work and where local staff can be trained.

Eye Diseases

Eye diseases are common in Iraq, as in the rest of the Middle East. It has been estimated that there are 40,000 totally blind persons, most of whom cannot work and must be cared for, thereby becoming a burden to the community. About one in five of the total population have been treated annually for conjunctivitis or trachoma in the past six years. To a large extent these also are social diseases, although some doctors in Iraq think certain eye diseases may have a nutritional basis in the consumption of large quantities of polished rice.

II. The Curative Services

Hospitals and Dispensaries

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In general, the curative services have received more attention than preventive medicine. Iraq's 89 hospitals are unevenly distributed, however, since one third of them are in the Baghdad area and the remaining 59 are divided among the other 13 provinces. It is true, of course, that there is higher concentration of people in Baghdad.

Of the 89 hospitals, 58 are general and six are for infectious diseases, three for eye diseases, two for venereal diseases and one for lepers. There are also two hospitals for children, one for

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743 women and children and one for mental dieases. A new tuberculosis hospital and sanitarium has just been opened in Baghdad. The Army, Railways, Port of Basra, Police, Ministry of Education, and the oil companies maintain their own hospitals. There is also an American Mission hospital.

While some hospitals are adequately equipped and staffed, many of them are seriously in need of repair and equipment, especially dental equipment. Most of the hospitals suffer from an acute shortage of ~~trained~~ subordinate staff (medical aides or nurses). Hygienic conditions in some leave much to be desired. Hospital administration appears to be weak throughout the country, with a few notable exceptions such as the Royal Hospital in Baghdad. This is the teaching hospital of the Royal Medical Faculty and has practically all modern medical facilities. Several Iraqi doctors are now attending a course on hospital administration in foreign countries, but so far the number attending these courses is small. It would be desirable to give such a course in Iraq to young doctors after qualifying.

Simple conditions are treated in dispensaries of which there are 448—403 of them government institutions—fairly evenly distributed throughout the country. The physical facilities and staffs of such dispensaries vary widely. Some are in the charge of a doctor but the majority are run by health officials and dressers. Except for vaccination against smallpox, the dispensaries do very little preventive medical work. Since there is only about one dispensary to every 12,000 of the population, it is obvious that the number must be increased as additional staff can be trained.

654 743 The Development Board has planned an annual expenditure of ID 700,000 on medical service buildings in its five-year program extending over the period 1951-52 to 1955-56. A detailed breakdown of this expenditure was available only for the first year. On the whole the total outlay envisaged over the entire period would seem adequate. In the first instance, however, efforts should be concentrated on the replacement, repair and modernization of existing hospitals. In addition to the projects of this nature for which provision was made in the first budget of the Development Board, the following would appear to be most urgent:

Additional provision for reconstruction of the Karkh and Kut Hospitals ID	200,000	654 743
Repairs to the Maude Hospital (Basra), Amara Hospital, Erbil Hospital and Suleimaniya Hospital	250,000	
Infectious disease blocks for the Erbil and Mosul Hospitals	65,000	
Maternity block for the Hilla Hospital	25,000	
Laundry for Diwaniya Hospital	12,000	
Additional wards for Mosul and Kirkuk Hospitals	80,000	
Completion of Mental Diseases Hospital	250,000	
Additional provision for operating facilities at Royal Hospital	50,000	
Children's Ward at Royal Hospital	40,000	
Maternity block at Royal Hospital	40,000	
Dental equipment for hospitals	20,000	
Total ID	1,032,000	

As it becomes possible to devote more attention to increasing facilities for treatment, priority should be given generally to the construction of additional dispensaries in the rural areas.

Doctors

At present there is about one practicing doctor to every 7,000 759 [758] of the population, but many of the doctors are concentrated in Baghdad. Only about 35 doctors are now being registered annually, but with increased accommodations and more laboratory facilities, it will be possible to enroll more students so that at least 50 will qualify as doctors annually. This number may be sufficient for Iraq's needs, provided that an adequate number of suitably trained health officers are available for service in village dispensaries and that nurses and dressers receive more training.

Doctors receive their training at the Royal Faculty of Medicine [874 which was founded in 1927. The syllabus and teaching seem, on the whole, to be good. They emphasize adequately the study of the endemic diseases, although they do not give enough weight to the teaching of public health and preventive medicine. The recent appointment of a professor of public health should give a better balance to the program of instruction. Public health as such should probably be taught as a postgraduate course. It would include such subjects as public health administration, public he

75¶ legislation, water supplies, removal and treatment of waste matter, industrial health, ~~and maternity~~ and child welfare. In the qualifying course it would best be taught as social medicine which might be defined as "the study of those environmental factors which affect health, and the application of that study to the benefit of man with a view to the prevention of disease and promotion of health."

There appears to be an excessive trend towards specialization. In some hospitals specialists have been appointed where there is clearly not enough specialized work for them. Though specialization should by no means be overlooked, a specialist service must depend first upon an adequate supply of general practitioners. Probably the four most needed types of doctors, in addition to physicians, are surgeons, eye specialists, gynecologists and obstetricians.

75¶ 36¶ One of the more urgent requirements is to attract doctors to the provinces. Iraqi doctors have shown little inclination so far to work in villages, partly for financial reasons but not a little because of the great lack of amenities in rural areas. There are no suitable houses for the doctors and their families, few schools, and in many places neither lighting nor a pure water supply. Young doctors who have been trained to require and depend upon all the latest technical aids in diagnosis and to insist upon the use of the most modern forms of treatment generally find that in most villages they cannot practice the medicine they were taught. If the best use is to be made of the doctors available, as much emphasis must be put on improving village facilities as on training doctors for the provinces.

Medical Aides

75¶ The acute shortage of trained aides is almost more serious than the shortage of doctors. In one hospital there were 21 doctors but only 12 trained nurses. There is a general lack of specially trained laboratory assistants, operating room attendants, radiographers, hospital storekeepers or hospital dispensers, and the like. Health officials, trained primarily for service in village dispensaries, are frequently diverted to hospitals to act as special "medical auxiliaries".

In all, there are about 1,000 nurses and dressers for some 5,000 hospital beds. Trained nurses are few in number so that

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standards of nursing are not high. However, the three-year nurs- 759
ing course given at the Royal Hospital is comprehensive and includes all the common branches of nursing.

Unfortunately in Iraq, as in many other Moslem countries, [554]
nursing is not at present looked upon as a suitable career for Moslem girls of good family. Probably one of the best means of inducing girls to take up nursing is to demonstrate through the employment of foreign nursing sisters that nursing is regarded abroad as a highly qualified and reputable profession. More women might also be attracted to this profession if they were given suitable living quarters and accorded a position in the government service equivalent to that of elementary school teachers.

The one central nursing school in Baghdad will not supply 759
the needs of the country. Since many young girls will not leave 874
their homes to go to school, it will be necessary to set up local schools for nurses and also for dressers. Training for practical nurses should be started at Basra, Mosul and Karkh hospitals and eventually every province should have such a school. Candidates should have had at least six years of preliminary schooling and the course itself should last a year. It is suggested that two foreign nursing sisters, preferably English-speaking, be appointed to each province to act as nursing supervisor in the chief hospitals and as "principal" of the local nursing schools. It would also be desirable to assign to each school a sister-tutor—a graduate of the central school.

At the same time, nursing supervision needs strengthening in 759
the Royal Hospital where at present there are only three foreign nursing sisters for 680 beds. For efficient operation the Royal Hospital needs the following foreign nursing sisters:

1. One matron
2. One assistant matron
3. One sister tutor
4. One sister for the maternity block
5. One for the children's wards
6. One for infectious diseases hospital, and
7. Two for general duties.

It is most important that every foreign nursing sister should get to know, as quickly as possible, something of the language, mode of life and habits of the people.

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757 An estimate of the cost of the full scheme follows:

(a) CAPITAL

(1)	Quarters for women nurses	ID 125,000
(2)	Demonstration rooms	28,000
(3)	Quarters for foreign sisters[1]	80,000
(4)	Equipment, etc.	7,000
		ID 240,000

(b) RECURRENT

Salaries for foreign sisters (only)	ID 37,000

Training schools are also necessary for hospital storekeepers, laboratory assistants, radiographers and probably for physiotherapists and dispensers. Storekeepers should be appointed to every hospital to preserve equipment and to check the use of expendable items. Dressers, who are already familiar with the names of many articles used in hospital work, would probably be the most suitable candidates for training. The schools could be started with the existing staff and facilities of the Royal Hospital and of the Central Medical Stores, and as each trained group is ready to go to work an appropriate pay scale ought to be established for them.

Pharmacists and Medical Supplies

874 A School of Pharmacy and Chemistry was founded in 1936. The five-year pharmacy course is comprehensive and the facilities for teaching, including laboratories, are good.

278 So far 218 pharmacists have qualified from the school but many have gone into private work and only 64 remain in government service. Apparently the salary paid to a pharmacist working in a private shop is at least twice as high as that paid by the government. Further, a number of qualified pharmacists have recently left the country. With the existing accommodations the school can graduate about 20 pharmacists annually. Meanwhile there are only 64 pharmacists working in the 89 hospitals and in some hospitals the dispensing, including that of poisons, appears to be carried out entirely by health officials.

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[1] It is estimated that 37 foreign nursing sisters would be required: 27 for the 14 provinces (there is already one in Basra); five for the Royal Hospital at Baghdad; and five additional for replacements during sickness and leave.

278, 744 Pharmacists are licensed by the Director General of Health. An Inspector of Pharmacies inspects private pharmacies, although it would appear reasonable to place the supervision of these pharmacies more directly under the local chief medical officer.

278 Certain drugs, such as the anti-biotics and sulphonamides, are supplied in most countries only on a doctor's prescription. In Iraq, however, these drugs can be freely obtained at any pharmacy. Hospitals at times suffer from a shortage of drugs owing to the limited funds made available by the government. Thus patients admitted to hospitals sometimes have had to buy drugs for themselves from pharmacies in the towns. It is to be hoped that future budgetary provisions will be sufficient to supply hospitals with the drugs necessary for their work.

Under the present system, local hospitals send their requisitions to the Director General of Health, through the chief medical officer of the province. These requisitions are scrutinized by the Director of Supplies, who passes them on to the Director General of Health for authority to issue the supplies required. The issues are then made direct to the hospital concerned. It seems that most medical supplies—although by no means all—are purchased from the Crown Agents of the British Government. The central supplies are kept in Baghdad in what seems to be an orderly and well-run department. There is at present some congestion in the drugs and dressings section, and new buildings are required to provide adequate space for the many items stocked.

758 Because Iraq is a country of great distances with many scattered villages and hamlets, during certain seasons of the year small communities may be cut off from medical aid by snow, rain and mud. It is not possible to place hospitals and dispensaries within easy and certain reach of all people throughout the year. There are, however, many simple household remedies such as the anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, DDT powder, iodine and Epsom salts that could be put up in suitable packages with full directions for use. It is suggested that the government package such remedies for sale in village shops at a price within reach of the local people.

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III. The Preventive Services

144 While the curative services have developed rapidly, measures for the prevention of disease and the promotion of good health have not kept pace. There is a general appreciation among doctors—both senior and junior—as well as among responsible laymen that the time has come when greater emphasis should be placed on the need for preventive medicine and public health measures. However, there are as yet no Iraqi doctors who have received the special training necessary and who have had the opportunity to gain the experience required to organize and develop these services.

Although public health, as a subject, has been taught in the Royal Faculty of Medicine, there has apparently always been a leaning towards clinical medicine. Present conditions in the medical service do not encourage doctors to devote themselves to public health work. The low salaries paid and the permission to practice privately after government working hours encourage doctors to favor clinical medicine and to specialize if possible. Consequently the villages have been neglected and there is keen competition to work in the larger cities. A recent reorganization in the Ministry of Social Affairs, setting up special divisions for public health and social services in the towns and villages, was designed to promote and develop preventive measures. The first requirement, however, is a trained staff to carry out the work.

Among the measures which might be taken to strengthen the preventive services the following should be emphasized.

Organization of a Sanitation Corps

At present the health inspectors of towns are essentially sanitation orderlies who have learned something by apprenticeship and experience. Many of them work in hospitals to the detriment of the sanitation and public health side of their work. For the future Iraq needs three types of sanitation officers: house-to-house inspectors, sanitation overseers and sanitation inspectors. The sanitary condition of the towns is likely to remain unsatisfactory until some form of house-to-house inspection can be started, aimed

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chiefly at the prevention of mosquito and fly breeding and the cleaning up of conspicuously unsanitary conditions. 744

House-to-house inspectors are necessary only in towns with a population of over 25,000, which means some 250 inspectors would be required. The 134 health inspectors already employed could form the nucleus of this group and it should not be difficult to find recruits with at least elementary school training.

The *sanitation overseers* would supervise the work of the house-to-house group and would also undertake a wider range of sanitary inspection, including restaurants, foodstuffs supplies, etc. Probably 100 overseers would be enough, and a one-year course should be sufficient to train men for the job. Candidates for training should be drawn, as far as possible, from the ranks of the house-to-house inspectors.

A number of *sanitation inspectors,* about 50 in all, would be required to take charge of districts, to supervise the work of sanitation overseers and the house-to-house inspectors, and to advise on all matters concerned with environmental hygiene in their districts. Candidates for this job would need a sound, general education (i.e. completion of the full intermediate school course) and would require not less than two years of training which would include practical sanitation work of all sorts. Training schools for these inspectors should be set up by a foreign sanitation expert, preferably one with knowledge of and experience in the Middle East. Some buildings will also be necessary, at an estimated capital cost of about ID 10,000.[2]

Training of Midwives

Midwives, who by the nature of their work have free entry into village homes, are among the most important potential health workers. It is they who can give acceptable advice in the home and consequently they could do a great deal to improve health conditions in the villages. Although 803 midwives are licensed to practice, scarcely any of them in either cities or villages have 744

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[2] The recurrent cost of operating the school would be about ID 2,000 yearly. The recurrent cost of the sanitation service when fully organized might be approximately ID 75,000 annually.

844 received training of any sort. In Baghdad there is a government maternity home but it has had very little to do with the practicing midwives.

It is presently estimated that 900 midwives are needed in the villages, 300 in the towns and 80 in the hospitals. In order to take into account the great difference between conditions in the towns and villages, it would be desirable to institute two courses of training:

1. A ~~one-year~~ course for literate girls and women who will become midwives in urban populations and fill government posts; and—
2. A course lasting approximately six months for illiterate (or largely so) practicing midwives who, after training, will return to their own villages.

A few Iraqi women have taken a course in midwifery outside of Iraq and these women, together with three foreign midwives, could serve as the teaching staff at the outset.

An estimate of the staff and buildings required and their cost follows:

(*a*) SCHOOL FOR TOWN MIDWIVES:
  1. Staff: three staff midwives, one director, cook, etc.
  2. Buildings: quarters for 20 pupils, 10 maternity beds, etc.
  3. Capital cost: ID 40,500
     Output—20 trained midwives a year.

(*b*) SCHOOL FOR VILLAGE MIDWIVES:
  1. Staff: three staff midwives, one director, cook, etc.
  2. Buildings: quarters for 15 pupils, six maternity beds, etc.
  3. Capital cost: ID 31,500
     Output—30 village midwives annually.

(*c*) ONE PRINCIPAL FOR THE SCHOOLS

Establishment of Village Health Centers

743 Iraq is a country of scattered villages and hamlets and of great distances; to bring medical aid, however simple, to the greatest possible number of people it would seem wise to increase the number of dispensaries as staff becomes available. It might even be possible to attach some mobile dispensaries to the larger sections of the nomadic tribes.

The village dispensary should become a center for all health activities in the area. Not only should the health official (or medi-

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cal assistant) treat simple conditions—and he could well treat 743
cases of most of the major endemic diseases—but he should also be the village "sanitarian". The village midwives should be based at the health center and draw their supplies there. Vaccination against smallpox—of prime importance in Iraq—and other protective innoculations could, as required, be carried out in the centers. Later, public health nurses could be added to the center staffs.

The number of health centers must necessarily depend, among other things, upon local population density, distances and means of communication. Visiting doctors from the hospital to which the center is attached could call at regular intervals to see special cases referred to them by the health official. By such means as these, medical assistance and advice could be brought within reach of most of the people and the best use be made of the doctor's services. At present the district or *qadha* doctors have no means [758]
of transport to visit dispensaries.

The additional health officials who would staff these centers could be selected from among the hospital dressers. Since these men have already had considerable clinical experience, it should be possible to train them in about a year. Because they are much closer to the village people than the visiting doctors, they can do a great deal to help the local people. One Iraqi doctor stated that an experienced and happy health official can do better work in a village than an unhappy and disgruntled newly-qualified doctor.

There are about 400 dispensaries at present, some of which are staffed only by dressers. Assuming 20 medical assistants can be trained annually, it should be possible to staff all the present dispensaries and 200 new ones with medical assistants in less than 20 years. The buildings and staff now used by the School for Health Officials (founded in 1932) could equally well be used as a training school for medical assistants.

Training of Public Health Nurses

As soon as some midwives have been trained, a program 744
should be started for the training of public health nurses. These women would hold positions of considerable responsibility, and every candidate for the course should already be a trained nurse and a midwife.

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Expansion of Health Education

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Iraq has a small, wealthy upper class and a small middle class. The great majority of the people are poor and ignorant, most especially in regard to health measures. Health education is badly needed and there is no doubt that the people would respond readily to teaching. Large groups enthusiastically attended all the shows put on for the health week held in Diwaniya province; competitions for the best eating-house, butcher's shop and barber's shop were keenly contested and visitors thronged to see the model house and the medical exhibition. The oil company in Kirkuk employs a British sanitary inspector and the Railways Administration in Baghdad recently sent their Iraqi sanitary inspector to take a course of study in the United Kingdom. The response of the householders in these places to sanitary measures is striking; their pride in their homes is obvious and the absence of flies conspicuous.

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To begin with, every doctor should have a thorough understanding of the relation of environmental factors to disease. Greater emphasis on the teaching of preventive medicine and particularly of social medicine in the medical school, as has already been recommended, would help to inculcate a wider appreciation of the importance of the preventive outlook in all medical work. Like doctors, nurses have a unique opportunity to teach their patients, and personal and domestic hygiene should take their proper place in the training courses for nurses. Every hospital should be an object lesson in hygiene and every patient should learn by his stay in it.

Health education must be given an important place in the curriculum of the teachers' training schools, and special courses in the prevention of the diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be included in the syllabus of the School of Agriculture and of the School of Engineering.

Hygiene is already taught in the schools but ought to be given greater emphasis. Personal hygiene is essentially a matter of habit formation and young school children should be trained in good habits as a daily routine. Special classes could be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases—possibly, in some cases, by the school medical officer. It is for the Health Department to

decide what should be taught and then the educators can decide 751
how it should be taught. 871

In the villages, the school buildings could sometimes serve as models for house-building; in any case, every school should in itself be a lesson in hygiene. Well-balanced meals are provided in the boarding schools and serve as examples for the home. Possibly the elder girls could be taught some "mothercraft", the treatment of minor ailments (cuts, abrasions, etc.), some sewing and also some domestic economy.

At present the *School Medical Service* is administered by the Ministry of Education and has a staff of 20 doctors and four dentists. In the school year 1949-50, 147,084 pupils were examined revealing splenomegaly among two percent, schistosomiasis in five percent, and trachoma in 25 percent, while 40,767 attendances were made for dental treatments. To carry out an effective program for treatment of trachoma, more school nurses will be needed.

There are several *other groups* through which health educa- 697
tion can be disseminated. Police training schools and prisons, 751
including reformatories, offer good opportunities for teaching 702
health. The Central Prison in Baghdad is a good example of cleanliness and orderliness. The Army should teach in its officer training courses that the promotion and maintenance of the health of an officer's unit is his first duty.

A few voluntary societies are now undertaking some health 751
education, but the scope of their work could be greatly increased, particularly in maternal and child welfare and in the prevention of tuberculosis. Special pronouncements could be prepared by religious societies for reading in the mosques (e.g. against the pollution of water supplies as a measure to limit the spread of schistosomiasis). Simple health notes written in the vernacular would be of help where a local newspaper is published. Short talks could be given from the national broadcasting station.

There is a great opportunity for health teaching in the projected new settlements. The staff required for such work are medical assistants, sanitary overseers, midwives and possibly public health nurses who, after having received appropriate training, will work in and from one or more village health centers.

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744 751 The most important links with the people are, of course, those who belong to them and who work among them: that is, the dispensary *medical assistants* and *midwives* in villages and the midwives and public health nurses in the towns. *Maternal and child welfare centers* in towns could also provide health education. There are already a few centers operating in Baghdad but there is a great need to open more centers throughout the country as soon as trained staff are available. The proposed house-to-house inspectors, sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors could all be most valuable teachers.

There is no doubt that *health weeks* would stimulate great interest and health exhibits could be included in agricultural and other shows (e.g. to display measures designed to prevent the spread of malaria, schistosomiasis, etc.). Travelling vans giving film shows might also be of some use.

Elected *public health committees* of the village elders, advised by the medical assistant or visiting doctor, might do much to improve conditions in villages. *Mobile dispensaries* should include in their staff a sanitary inspector and a health visitor (public health nurse) who could go round the village while the doctor is seeing patients.

657 744 It should be noted that the government plans to inaugurate a rural health center at Abu Ghuraib, which is designed to provide curative and preventive services for the population of the area and at the same time serve as a practical field for training rural health workers, with particular emphasis on the control of communicable diseases and maternal and child health. It has requested advice from the World Health Organization on the planning and establishment of the center. Accordingly, in 1950, provision was made under the technical assistance budget of the World Health Organization for a rural health survey. Provision has been made under the 1952 technical assistance budget for one public health administrator with general experience in rural health, one epidemiologist, one sanitarian, and two public health nurses, one with general experience and one with the experience in midwifery. It is expected that the government will submit a request to UNICEF for appropriate supplies and equipment. At a later stage the program may be developed in cooperation with other specialized agencies.

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IV. Endemic Disease Prevention

One of the most important sectors of the entire public health program should be a well-planned attack on the leading endemic diseases, e.g. schistosomiasis, malaria and ankylostomiasis. 744

The need for better housing, sewage disposal systems and safe water supplies has already been mentioned. Measures to accomplish these improvements are discussed in detail in Annex H, on *Community Planning and Facilities.*

Schistosomiasis

It is clear from available records that at present relatively few persons suffering from schistosomiasis receive treatment. The Schistosomiasis Section of the Endemic Diseases Institute has carried out a survey which shows that the disease does not occur south of Basra and that, north of Basra, after reaching a peak in the Lakes Area, its incidence declines steadily up to the Kurdish mountains, where the disease does not occur at all. In Basra province the incidence reaches 23 percent, in Amara province 67 percent and in Baghdad province 35 percent. 164

Apart from its debilitating effects, the disease is complicated in a number of cases by bladder stones and calcification of the bladder. Associated as it commonly is with attacks of malaria and infestation with hookworms, schistosomiasis is of profound economic significance since it lowers the individual's capacity for work and his ability to overcome intercurrent infections.

The intermediate host is a snail which lives in stagnant water. Irrigation therefore provides conditions which may cause an increase in the prevalence of the disease, as has been shown in Egypt where schistosomiasis is a major public health problem. Investigations made up to the present indicate that the only fresh water snail which carries the disease in Iraq is the *Bulinus truncatus.* It does not appear to occur in either the Euphrates or the Tigris, or in streams in which water flows at a rate of three or more miles an hour. The cold winter weather inhibits the snail's activity and it is able to multiply freely only during the months of June and July.

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Spread of the disease[1] may be limited by:

1. Destruction of the snail through the use of copper sulphate (or other compounds) and the elimination of stagnant water. The rapid lowering of water levels will also destroy the snail by desiccation, and in irrigation canals a free flow of water makes conditions unsuitable for the snail.
2. Prevention of infection of the snail by the human host. This can be effected by treating the human carriers and by preventing the pollution of water.

In new irrigation projects it is strongly recommended that steps be taken:

1. To design major canals so that they maintain a flow of three miles an hour or more and minor distributory canals so that they dry out rapidly.
2. To site villages and canals, wherever possible, at a distance not less than a mile apart.
3. To provide villages with a separate, protected water supply so that water is not drawn by the inhabitants direct from canals. Where the underground water is unfit for use, water could be drawn from the closest canal by pipe and be passed through a simple filter. The filtered water (it could in some cases by chlorinated) could then be raised by "hydrohoist" or by semi-rotary pump into a gravity tank—if so required. Another important measure would be the installation of village baths.
4. To provide suitable village latrines, some of which should be on the side of the village towards the canal. Experiments should be made to test the feasibility of using pit or bore hole latrines. Public water supplies, baths, and latrines require, of course, attendants to keep them in order. Householders should install their own latrines.
5. To examine, as far as possible, the people who will live and work in the project. If necessary, they should be treated for schistosomiasis before irrigation begins.
6. To treat the canals and all collections of water that harbor the snail with copper sulphate twice a year.
7. To examine annually representative groups such as school children to determine whether the measures taken are effective.
8. To educate the people not to foul water and to promulgate regulations to provide for the protection of water from pollution.

[1] [SCHISTOSOMIASIS -- ANALYST.]

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Shitwi (winter) cultivation is, on account of the low temperature, far less likely to spread schistosomiasis than *saifi* (summer) cultivation. In considering any expansion of summer cultivation, therefore, the attendant health hazards should be carefully considered. 164 744

To carry out mass treatment of the people an expansion of the dispensary system is necessary together with the provision of mobile dispensaries. Initially four of these mobile dispensaries might be put into operation in the provinces having the highest incidence of schistosomiasis. The cost of each, including three motor vehicles, tents, 20 beds and supplies, would probably not exceed ID 5,000. In addition, an increase is required in the number of vehicles available to the Endemic Diseases Institute and provision must be made for an adequate and constant supply of copper salts.

Malaria

There can be no doubt that irrigation has been associated with a considerable increase in the malaria of the plains. Gravity or flow irrigation may lead to flooding of land or to seepage due to the faulty construction of canal banks. Water is precious where irrigation is carried out by lift and is not commonly wasted; consequently, flooding of land is rare. A third form of irrigation employed—namely that by natural inundation—is only seasonal. 164

Much work has been done in the Endemic Diseases Institute on studies of malaria in Iraq and also on the bionomics of the chief vectors of the disease. It has been discovered that in the North the mosquito *A. sacharovi* is associated with high endemicity. It breeds mostly in seepage water, open pools and in rice cultivation, and appears to be associated with sharp outbreaks of malaria when it descends occasionally into the plains. [742]

In the South and spreading as far north as 34°N., *A. stephensi* breeds in similar conditions to those in which *A. sacharovi* develops in the North; it favors particularly water in small borrow pits, seepage water and the small irrigation channels of the date palm gardens. The *A. stephensi* mosquito is generally found in those areas where the level of the subsoil water is high. It is a highly efficient carrier of malaria and used to be found in the houses of Baghdad during the summer.

164 744 Control measures[1] include larvicidal treatment and the residual spraying of dwelling houses for the destruction of adult mosquitoes. In Basra, weeding of the small irrigation channels in the date gardens to promote the free flow of water is followed by the application of one percent DDT in oil and also by the spraying of the scattered huts at the fringe of the town. After the British Army left Iraq, there was a gradual but progressive relaxation of control measures which, coupled with the high river flood, culminated in a sharp outbreak in 1946. Spleen rates rose to 90 percent in some parts of the town but have since fallen rapidly with the reinstitution of control measures.

Measures designed to reduce the incidence of malaria include the following:

1. Expansion and extension of present control measures to insure:
    - (a) An ample and constant supply of the various forms of DDT required.
    - (b) An increase in the number of motor vehicles available to the Endemic Diseases Institute for its work.
    - (c) An increase in special technical staff as rapidly as personnel can be trained.
2. Drainage in those areas where the level of the subsoil water is high in order to lower the level. Every proposed drainage scheme must, however, be carefully examined and judged on its merits. The drainage of established swamps is not likely to reduce the incidence of malaria; indeed, it may even increase it by providing suitable breeding places for dangerous mosquitos in drains. Amara province, for example, has extensive swamps but the mosquito breeding in them is predominantly the harmless *A. pulcherrimus* and the incidence of malaria is not high.
3. Expansion and extension of the village dispensary system, including mobile and movable dispensaries, to make treatment more freely available to the sick. The sale of antimalarial drugs in village shops would also help those living in hamlets remote from hospital and dispensary.
4. The approval of every new proposed irrigation scheme however large or small and whether government or private, by both the local and central medical authorities.
5. Comprehensive legislation, with effective means to enforce it, to insure the absence from irrigation schemes of conditions prejudicial to health.

[1] [AGAINST MALARIA -- ANALYST.]

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6. Well-trained sanitary staff in sufficient numbers to keep up a continuous inspection of irrigation schemes.
7. Recognition by officials of the Irrigation and Agriculture Departments of those conditions falling within the sphere of their own work that are prejudicial to health. They should also know how to remedy such conditions.
8. Cooperation of various departments. It is of primary importance that irrigation schemes be submitted for approval by the provincial administrative council, on which sits the chief medical officer.
9. The introduction of different crops or new methods of cultivation of existing crops which might have profound effects on the incidence of malaria. Possible examples are the substitution of potatoes for rice or the cultivation of "dry land" rice in the northern mountainous area.

It is understood that the government has sought advice from the World Health Organization on malaria control and that provision has been made under the technical assistance budget for one malariologist, one entomologist and one sanitation expert. The work is timed to begin in the second half of 1951 and to continue throughout 1952.

Ankylostomiasis

A good deal of work has been done in recent years to ascertain the prevalence and effects of hookworm disease. Improvements in sewage disposal, the closing of open drains, the provision of suitable latrines and the wearing of shoes are all measures that will assist in reducing the incidence of hookworm disease. Until such permanent improvements can be effected, much can be done by making treatment more freely available through extension of the village dispensary system and special treatment teams in mobile or movable dispensaries. These treatment teams should also undertake simple treatment for other conditions, especially schistosomiasis.

V. Organization of Health Services

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647 It is most important that a properly organized program should be established to carry out the suggested medical services and preventive health measures.

The existing organization for the health services is highly centralized—first within the Ministry of Social Affairs in Baghdad, then in the hands of the Chief Medical Officers of each province. The whole system appears to be too rigid throughout, without sufficient delegation of responsibility and without enough consultation among departments of the Ministry or with those of other Ministries. Certain medical problems (e.g. health in irrigation schemes, nutrition, etc.) concern other ministries or departments (irrigation, agriculture, education, etc.). To be really effective, boards or committees should include representatives of all groups concerned.

There is no general board of public health but there are various committees with different functions. The Director General of Health is responsible for the licensing of private practitioners and pharmacists, and he has a committee to assist him. But it is the Minister who sets up a committee to consider disciplinary Cases brought against practitioners or pharmacists by the Director General of Health. There is also a committee consisting of three Directors General and two other members nominated by the Minister who act in an advisory capacity to the Minister. It would be reasonable to expect the Directors General to be given wide powers without need for frequent reference to the Minister.

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747 The health services have been repeatedly reorganized. The latest reorganization still does not appear to have defined very clearly the principal lines of responsibility. The Director General of Health is to be largely responsible for the curative services; a Director General of Health Affairs, for the public health services of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk, for the mobile dispensaries, and for health projects in cities, villages, and the countryside; and a Director General of Social Services, for the supervision of the administration of the institutions for the disabled and the blind, supervision of reformatories and health conditions in prisons and

for the promotion of 'social centers'. It is understood he will also 744 647
"take an interest" in the numerous voluntary societies that undertake 732
work of a social and medical nature. 747

While this organization does not seem satisfactory, no alternative 744
can be suggested at the moment without further study. The 647
Mission would recommend that a foreign public health administrator be appointed to advise the Minister of Social Affairs on the organization and further development of the health services. His appointment, incidentally, would enable the Professor of Preventive Medicine in the Royal Faculty of Medicine, who is at present also acting as adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs, to devote his full time to teaching and research.

The public health administrator should have had wide experience in the Middle East or in a tropical or sub-tropical country. He should have a good knowledge of the English language. To assist him he will require the services on temporary appointment of a foreign epidemiologist and a public health or sanitary engineer. The epidemiologist would undertake a study of the most prevalent diseases and recommend the best methods of attacking them. The public health engineer should have had considerable experience, preferably in a state medical service in a tropical or sub-tropical country, and be able to speak English. He would advise on measures to be taken to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene throughout Iraq and assist, if necessary, in teaching at the Royal Faculty of Medicine.

The public health administrator would require sufficient and suitable transport for himself and his staff; he would also need adequate office accommodation and office staff for himself and his own expert staff (epidemiologist and public health engineer). He should have at all times direct access to the Minister of Social Affairs.

As a result of the studies made by this team of advisers, it may be possible to give the organization of the health services a clearer focus. In any such scheme the preventive aspects of public health will need to be featured much more prominently. Although the borderline between curative and prophylactic measures may not always be clear, it may prove feasible to have one division responsible for all the services primarily curative

and another division responsible for those characterized as principally preventive.

Meanwhile one important improvement could be effected by delegating more responsibility to the chief medical officer in each province and enabling him to devote his entire time to his public duties. The chief medical officer is responsible for all medical work, both preventive and curative, within the boundaries of the province. As such, his main duties should be to inspect the health institutions, to appraise the state of public health and to guide, advise and encourage his subordinate staff. To carry out this task effectively he needs to devote his full time to the job and should be free to travel freely about the province. At present, however, the chief medical officer usually has a private practice on the side. Without means of transportation at his disposal and, in fact, unable to travel without express permission from the Director General, he seldom leaves his headquarters. It is strongly recommended that these officers be paid salaries commensurate with their responsibilities and the importance of their post. Further, they should be provided with suitable transport and be required to submit a monthly report on the inspection work undertaken throughout the province. When necessary, a director (or medical superintendent) should be appointed to the hospital of the chief town of the province to free the chief medical officer for general inspection of all medical facilities under his direction. Similarly, doctors in charge of districts or *qadhas* should be provided with suitable transport to enable them to visit the dispensaries in their area. In certain districts they should also be provided with suitable housing.

It should be remembered, however, that without qualified personnel no reorganization, no matter how effective on paper, will succeed. In the health service, as in many other branches of the administration, conditions of employment must be considerably improved, particularly outside of Baghdad. Unless adequate salaries and accommodations are provided for the health services staff, doctors and trained personnel will continue to prefer private practice and specialized work in Baghdad and other cities.

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APPENDIX

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TABLE 1

Hospitals, Hospital Beds, Dispensaries and Doctors
(by provinces, with populations)

Provinces	Hospitals	Beds	Dispensaries	Doctors	Population
Baghdad	30	1,988	56	419	805,293
Mosul	8	303	47	67	601,589
Basra	7	539	21	65	352,039
Hilla	5	264	21	25	261,903
Diyala	3	87	29	24	273,336
Diwaniya	3	117	25	22	333,787
Dulaim	4	181	18	12	193,294
Erbil	4	100	23	17	240,273
Kirkuk	5	207	28	58	285,878
Suleimaniya	3	103	15	14	222,732
Kerbela	3	228	14	22	276,670
Muntafiq	5	205	17	18	369,806
Kut	4	127	22	14	224,792
Amara	5	353	12	20	308,108
Totals	89	4,802	348	797	4,749,500

TABLE 2

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Number of Visits to Health Institutions for Treatment
(by provinces)

Provinces	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Baghdad	1,004,856	1,255,348	1,523,935	1,471,621	1,553,020	1,664,023
Basra	306,612	312,842	378,903	373,735	381,907	382,241
Mosul	423,819	455,584	509,410	541,881	576,291	644,647
Amara	269,536	291,722	336,025	345,873	297,987	279,273
Erbil	144,453	155,649	147,164	165,704	150,572	168,980
Diwaniya	324,148	351,092	319,131	361,368	364,949	380,720
Diyala	288,912	284,181	319,518	343,626	322,715	357,198
Dulaim	199,063	199,996	239,952	248,285	227,797	222,030
Hilla	320,087	364,942	306,319	436,523	434,789	408,278
Kerbela	375,591	308,693	397,757	356,427	428,911	431,666
Kirkuk	133,571	168,809	229,044	209,588	202,219	206,556
Kut	188,978	230,255	202,970	211,061	234,522	257,991
Muntafiq	247,293	255,185	297,433	327,114	277,494	285,306
Suleimaniya	141,406	146,185	194,126	193,919	203,251	187,427
Totals	4,368,325	4,780,483	5,401,687	5,586,725	5,656,424	5,876,336

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TABLE 3

Classification of Hospitals in 1949

Kind	Number	Beds 1st Class	 2nd Class	 3rd Class
I. Hospitals of the Ministry of Social Affairs				
General	39	53	185	2,720
For Eye Diseases	2			61
For Venereal Diseases	2			37
For Infectious Diseases	6	13	9	563
For Leprosy	1			240
For Children	1			89
For Children (Welfare Hospital)	1			35
For Women & Children	1			25
For Mental Diseases	1			85
Prison	6	4	2	105
	60	70	196	3,960
II. Other Government Hospitals				
Railways	1	3	14	40
Ministry of Education	1		26	
Police	1		5	25
Port	1	5	6	14
	4	8	51	79
III. Non-Government Hospitals				
General	4	57	26	147
For Eye Diseases	1	2	2	8
Oil Companies	4	18	16	109
American Mission	1			38
	10	77	44	302

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TABLE 4

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THE CHIEF INFECTIOUS DISEASES TREATED AT ALL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS

Diseases	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Malaria	540,333	556,613	742,921	717,831	603,698	492,602
Trachoma	533,089	501,280	558,323	532,310	524,940	510,668
Venereal Diseases:						
Syphilis	19,372	27,550	33,104	25,625	23,168	25,255
Soft Chancre	3,802	3,510	3,025	3,753	1,428	3,283
Gonorrhoea	7,690	9,492	11,415	9,859	11,090	11,310
Dysentery	19,360	24,456	34,046	33,384	27,394	28,570
Schistosomiasis	15,852	18,744	21,029	24,923	24,272	27,388
Tuberculosis:						
Pulmonary	3,804	3,436	6,521	4,183	6,752	6,807
Other Forms	1,386	2,622	2,139	1,837	1,719	3,127
Influenza	13,906	18,070	26,291	24,882	29,572	29,993
Small Pox	178	59	1,468	62	2,025	736
Whooping Cough	1,957	2,329	2,968	5,344	4,452	4,175
Ankylostomiasis	6,332	7,319	13,992	12,041	8,927	10,754
Mumps	6,110	5,030	6,360	8,621	10,041	11,570
Sandfly Fever	2,070	842	4,688	3,711	1,248	1,521
Measles	809	657	1,468	2,147	1,812	1,936
Cancer	658	483	611	783	649	913
Typhoid Fever (group)	1,257	1,245	1,347	1,712	987	1,288
Erysipelas	314	284	288	304	337	306
Leprosy	217	279	240	223	270	179
Puerperal Fever	169	41	50	34	169	453
Plague	—	16	—	—	—	—
Diphtheria	210	237	283	406	903	612
Tetanus	160	171	136	141	239	236
Anthrax	133	178	170	213	206	186
Typhus Fever	791	491	170	379	154	72
Cerebro Spinal Fever	396	325	196	151	135	191
Scarlet Fever	1	11	31	6	185	6
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—
All Other Infectious Diseases	707	4,031	7,682	5,631	4,352	4,533
Total	1,181,053	1,189,801	1,480,962	1,420,496	1,291,225	1,178,670

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TABLE 5

CASES OF EYE DISEASES

Diseases	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Trachoma	533,089	501,280	558,323	532,310	524,940	452,084
Conjunctivitis	410,522	422,572	481,877	447,425	445,376	510,668
Tumors of the Eye	5,806	7,699	7,371	9,460	10,258	6,575
Other Eye Diseases	65,615	71,626	60,428	58,256	51,985	70,392
Total	1,015,032	1.003.177	1,107,999	1.047,451	1,032,559	1,039,719

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TABLE 6

TREATMENTS FOR MALARIA AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TREATMENTS AT HEALTH INSTITUTIONS

(By provinces: 1943-48)

Province	Total Treatments	Treatments for Malaria	Percentage
Baghdad	7,751,167	306,139	4
Basra	2,041,579	394,039	19
Mosul	2,909,256	475,065	16
Amara	1,769,157	102,172	6
Erbil	903,520	140,748	16
Diwaniya	2,000,261	300,043	15
Diyala	1,850,371	301,318	16
Dulaim	1,283,546	124,965	10
Hilla	2,131,928	487,170	23
Kerbela	2,180.664	487,886	22
Kirkuk	1,032,349	123,341	12
Kut	1,254,617	89,506	7
Muntafiq	1,624,345	240,525	15
Suleimaniya	1,005,355	97,714	10

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TABLE 7

Treatments for Malaria as Percentage of Total Treatments at Health Institutions

(By years)

Year	Total Treatments	Treatments for Malaria	Percentage
1923	317,615	57,552	18.1
1924	396,466	63,939	16.1
1925	501,925	86,688	17.3
*1926	645,392	175,923	27.3
1927	597,367	103,477	17.3
1928	636,861	87,467	13.7
*1929	1,035,524	158,902	15.3
1930	1,232,020	151,063	12.3
*1931	1,461,627	189,218	13.0
1932	1,600,933	178,871	11.2
*1933	2,113,273	239,629	11.3
1934	2,462,181	272,770	11.1
1935	3,882,079	338,804	8.7
*1936	3,780,982	640,967	17.0
1937	3,986,437	582,973	14.6
1938	4,093,753	524,292	12.8
1939	3,496,946	490,310	14.0
*1940	3,292,618	663,432	20.1
*1941	3,733,303	726,339	19.5
1942	3,875,657	575,780	14.9
1943	4,024,421	509,545	12.7
1944	4,368,327	540,333	12.4
1945	4,780,483	556,613	11.6
*1946	5,401,687	742,921	13.8
1947	5,586,725	717,831	12.8
1948	5,656,424	603,698	10.7
1949	5,876,336	492,602	8.4

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* Flood year

TABLE 8

INCIDENCE OF SCHISTOSOMIASIS
(By provinces)

Province	Percentage of Incidence of Schistosomiasis
Baghdad	35
Basra	23
Mosul	0
Amara	67
Erbil	0
Diwaniya	26
Diyala	28
*Dulaim	36
Hilla	15
Kerbela	28
Kirkuk	0
Kut	48
Muntafiq	47
Suleimaniya	0

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* Survey for all the districts of the province not yet completed.

TABLE 9

CASES OF SCHISTOSOMIASIS TREATED
(By provinces)

Province	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Baghdad	4,544	4,920	6,986	6,175	5,358	6,733
Basra	1,527	1,922	1,836	1,934	2,384	4,508
Mosul	83	92	110	85	90	59
Amara	865	973	1,300	1,518	1,680	843
Erbil	15	27	10	45	16	25
Diwaniya	1,546	2,142	2,035	2,024	2,756	3,166
Diyala	611	288	259	243	238	357
Dulaim	74	375	283	704	622	838
Hilla	594	2,158	802	2,381	1,514	1,113
Kerbela	1,077	930	1,471	1,567	1,544	1,458
Kirkuk	14	26	5	12	27	5
Kut	1,868	1,976	1,616	2,346	3,099	2,482
Muntafiq	2,969	2,909	4,310	5,890	4,942	5,801
Suleimaniya	5	6	6	2	2	—
Total	15,792	18,744	21,029	24,926	24,272	27,388

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TABLE 10

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FORMS OF TUBERCULOSIS TREATED AT ALL INSTITUTIONS

Form	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
1. Respiratory (Lungs & Larynx)	3,844	3,438	6,521	4,183	6,752	6,807
2. Meninges	2	922	44	52	19	56
3. Intestine, etc.	83	101	148	79	92	141
4. Spinal Cord	83	71	189	133	158	184
5. Bones and Joints	396	324	331	304	353	592
6. Skin	317	187	1,005	887	639	911
7. Glands	303	318	302	294	324	923
8. Genito-urinary System	7	19	21	10	15	12
9. Other Organs	138	659	61	71	107	212
10. Disseminated	17	21	38	7	12	96
Total	5,190	6,060	8,660	6,020	8,471	9,934

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ANNEX G

EDUCATION

I. Introduction

000 Educational reform and reconstruction is a basic condition for the physical, mental and social health of the people and for the agricultural, industrial and technological progress of the country. Even from the limited point of view of improving material standards, it is necessary not only to expand the educational facilities but also to evolve a better and more suitable type of education which will help to provide trained and efficient personnel for carrying out the various development projects that may be undertaken by the government. Without the availability of such personnel in adequate numbers, the projects, however perfect on paper, are likely to come to grief.

This, however, is not the only justification for launching a program of radical educational reconstruction. As long as almost 90 percent of the population remains illiterate and deprived of the barest elements of what is aptly known as Fundamental Education, the benefits of national economic development are unlikely to be diffused widely enough to make a real contribution to stable social and political conditions. Nor can democratic institutions be expected to thrive unless people are educated, not in the limited and unsatisfactory sense of merely being able to read and write, but in a proper understanding of their civic rights and obligations and the implications of community life in the modern world.

Above all, the supreme object of all increase in national wealth which may be brought about through wise investment in productive enterprises is to increase social well-being and happiness and to enrich and improve the life of the common man, relieving him from the bondage of poverty, ill-health, ignorance and cramping superstition. In the attainment of this objective, education—of both children and adults—obviously has to play a dynamic and decisive role. Development cannot simply be imposed from the top upon a passive population. It requires a thorough-going mobilization of the energies of the entire population. People must be awakened to a full appreciation and understanding of their problems. Only in this way can they be brought to a realization that without well-directed cooperative self-help on their part the government's development program cannot succeed.

Since the whole process and system of education—from the primary school to the university—must be visualized as an integral whole and its different stages intelligently dovetailed into one another, it is to be hoped that the government will give due attention to educational needs at all stages. During the last two decades, these problems of education have been studied and reported upon by several committees and educational experts; e.g., in the Report of the Monroe Commission, Allen's Report on Rural Education and Welfare in the Middle East, the Report of the Higher Committee of the Ministry on the Revision of Courses, the Report of the Departmental Committee on the Ten Year Plan, Morgan's Report on the University of Iraq, and Clark's Report on the Introduction of Compulsory Education in Iraq. These reports contain a number of excellent suggestions and proposals which are almost as pertinent today as they were when they were originally made. It is a matter of regret that circumstances should have stood in the way of their implementation. The Ministry of Education should make a careful study of these documents and take their recommendations into account in formulating an over-all policy of educational development.

The present Mission, however, is primarily interested in the part which education can play to facilitate and support the development program as a whole. Its studies have been directed therefore to the establishment of "priorities" with a view to concentrating on those aspects of education which are most directly and immediately connected with the economic development of the country. It has thus come to the conclusion that the following three aspects of education impinge directly on the improvement of productive capacity:

1. Compulsory, universal, primary education for children;
2. Fundamental education for adults; and
3. Vocational and technical education related to development needs.

Compulsory primary education is the only way to broaden the educational base. Without it illiteracy can never really be stamped out and the people given the means of acquiring the practical knowledge which will enable them to raise their standard of living through their own efforts. Similarly, adult education is necessary if nearly the whole of the present generation beyond primary school age is not to remain illiterate and be denied the opportunity to learn ways and means of improving their living conditions. The need for vocational and technical education should require no detailed justification in a country where the lack of technical skills seems to be one of the most serious obstacles to rapid development. 170

II. Introduction of Compulsory Primary Education 871

It is sometimes argued that the country is not yet ripe for the introduction of compulsory primary education and also that, if the government provides the educational facilities, it will be sufficient to rely on voluntary school attendance. Judging from the testimony not only of educational officers, but of many men in public and private life, the Mission believes that there is a widespread conviction that the time is ripe for a big advance in the direction of compulsory education. This opinion is also reflected in a number of recent reports and educational publications, including the Report of the Committee appointed by the Ministry of Education in 1946 to draw up a Ten Year Plan for Education, and Clark's Report prepared in 1950. A striking testimony to this awakened public consciousness is provided by the fact, revealed by Directors of Education in several provinces, that in many villages without schools, local people (and the local landholders in some cases) were prepared to construct school buildings provided the Ministry of Education was willing to find the teachers.

Compulsory vs. Voluntary Attendance

This does not mean, however, that the problem of universal education will be solved simply by creating adequate educational facilities. First of all, the government must plan a school-building and teacher-training program in advance, and this can take place

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871 only in relation to some predetermined goal. The Mission considers that this goal should be to bring primary education to all children of school age; currently they number about 750,000 but only 175,000 are actually in school. Despite the growing recognition of the value of education, it would be unrealistic to suppose that this goal could be achieved without compulsory attendance. In many cases the value of education will be appreciated only after children are brought into contact with it through some measure of compulsion. This will be true particularly of education in rural [562] areas and of education of girls. In 1948-49, for instance, there were only 43,000 girls in primary schools as compared with about 132,000 boys. Moreover, compulsory attendance is necessary not merely to get children into school initially but also to make sure they will stay there long enough to acquire permanent literacy and the modicum of basic education necessary to improve and enrich their lives. In the cities educational facilities have been much more easily available than in the country, but without compulsion there has been a sharp drop in attendance with each successive school grade. Dr. Akrawi in his work, *Education in the Arab Countries,* presents figures showing the following distribution of enrollment in primary schools in 1944-45:

Grade I	Grade II	Grade III	Grade IV	Grade V	Grade VI
32%	18.3%	14.9%	12.8%	11.7%	10.1%

This suggests that there is a high percentage of wastage in the first year and that the roll in Grade VI is less than one third of that in Grade I. In fact, there were only 9,500 children in Grade VI as compared with 22,000 in Grade I six years before. More recent figures for certain specific areas show some improvement but it is not so marked as to alter the general situation. Thus, in the city of Baghdad where educational awakening is greatest and educational facilities most generous, out of 6,970 children in Grade I in 1945-46, only 5,315 passed on to Grade II in 1947-48 and 3,587 to Grade VI in 1950-51; i.e., about 50 percent dropped out before completing the primary stage. In the city of Kerbela only 209 out of 645 children in Grade I reached Grade VI, a wastage of about 66 percent.

The investment in the education of children who remain in school no more than three years represents a dead loss. Even that

devoted to children who drop out in the last three years must be 871 regarded as at least a partial loss. Enlightened educational opinion all over the world is agreed that six to seven years is the minimum period in which a child can acquire the basic modicum of knowledge, skills, habits, interests and social attitudes necessary for civilized living in a modern community. The Iraq Government has prescribed six years as the period of primary schooling, but the objective is obviously not being achieved if more than half the children are eliminated, for one reason or another, before completing this period.

The Quality and Orientation of Education 871

It is sometimes contended that a program of nation-wide education should be postponed until the quality of education is considerably improved. 876 While the Mission does not support this contention, it is firmly convinced that education will not win the support of the people or have any perceptible impact on their lives unless it is given a new orientation. It is, therefore, necessary to take simultaneous measures for the improvement of education—its methods and techniques, its curricula, its organization and administration and, above all, its personnel and their ideology and outlook. Education, as it is provided at present, is concerned with only a part of the child's development. It leaves a large area of his aptitudes and his mental and emotional make-up untouched.

In the proposed reconstruction of education, it will be most important to give it a more practical, realistic and rural bias in order to relate it intelligently to the psychological and social needs of the individual child and the adult society. It is a well-known fact of child psychology that the child is by nature an active, pragmatic person who delights in doing, creating, playing and generally expressing himself in various practical ways which grow increasingly purposeful with age. Unfortunately, the primary and secondary schools as well as training colleges at present seem to be hardly aware of the basic importance of bringing education into harmony with this crucial fact of child psychology. In fact, with the exception of a school handwork exhibition at Baquba, a promising display of handwork specimens in the Primary Teachers' Training College in Baghdad and some quite good examples of stitching and embroidery and the like in a few girls' schools, the schools were

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871 found to be entirely preoccupied with the classical and literary
876 tradition. It is true that the Arab mind has a flair for language and
[517 literature and delights in oral self-expression, and young children
181] learn to read and write quickly and speak with a fluency and feeling for words which children of other lands would find difficult to emulate. But with the increased importance of science and technology and the need of improving productive efficiency in industry, agriculture and other occupations, the people of Iraq cannot afford to remain content with a system of education which does not equip the younger generation to play its part in the projected plans of development.

Once educational authorities clearly recognize that the introduction of activity-centered methods and curricula and of craft work is basic to the whole idea of educational reconstruction, it should not be difficult to work out the necessary measures. In many other countries, such a reorientation of education has been actually achieved, and not only detailed theoretical discussion but records of concrete, practically worked-out schemes are available for consultation and guidance. It will, of course, not be possible—and even if it were possible, it would not be desirable—to copy these methods and schemes mechanically, because education is a creative field in which ideas have to be applied to the particular situation in which one is working. It will be necessary for Iraqi educators to work out their own pattern of "activity schools" and their appropriate forms of craft work. In fact, some gifted educators have already envisaged this problem in its true perspective. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis on *Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of Iraq* (published in 1942) is an effective presentation of the case for reorganized methods and curricula breaking with the narrow academic tradition. What is more, it gives concrete instances of how units in social studies and health education can be worked out in such a way as to break down the barriers between schooling and life.

What kind of crafts can be introduced in the village and city schools which will appeal to the children and will also be related to their environment so that they can leave school with trained skill and aptitudes and participate effectively in the work of their communities? The answer to this question can be given only after

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study, but two important considerations should be kept in mind. 871
The crafts should be as varied as possible and linked to local occu- 876
pations, and they should make maximum use of cheap local materials so that the cost of their introduction will not be too high. The object would not be to produce trained craftsmen, but to make children adept at working with their hands, to give them an opportunity for creative expression and to inculcate an appreciation of the value of manual labor. For the same reason the teachers need not be specialists in individual crafts, but people who are handy with tools, can work with different materials and in different media, and have a general understanding of the principles, objectives and methods of craft work by children.

In rural schools in particular, it is important to have small plots of land for gardening and agriculture where children can learn simple agricultural processes and the care of livestock as well as the use of tools. They should also have the opportunity to visit any government demonstration farms in the neighborhood. In order to insure that rural schools really cater to rural needs it will be necessary to draw more teachers from rural areas and to establish more rural training colleges where effective practical as well as theoretical training is given in agricultural subjects. More rural secondary schools with a dominantly agricultural bias in their curricula are also needed. They can serve the dual function of providing teacher candidates with suitable education and background and also of providing centers for agricultural extension work in the neighborhood.

One of the primary objectives of the reorientation of education should be to challenge children to meet the problems of their environment squarely instead of running away from them. A school is not just a place for academic learning or even a combination of academic and practical work. It is essentially a community where young people should learn the basic art of living through actual experience. It should afford opportunities for cooperative and group work, for leadership and discipline, and at the same time place before the children projects and activities which will enable them to understand the problems which dominate the life of their local, and later national, community. The school should inculcate an appreciation of the value and dignity of hard, manual work. Th

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this way the school can contribute to a much needed spirit of social service among children and youth at various stages of education. Thus a school lesson will become a living experience and bridges will be thrown across the gulf that exists between education and life to their mutual advantage and enrichment. These may appear, to the layman or the traditionally minded teacher, to be rather theoretical and remote considerations. But unless school problems are envisaged in these broad terms, the school will never become a dynamic and life-giving agency for the nation. And in fact, these considerations have been incorporated to varying degrees in the educational systems of many advanced countries and in many progressive schools.

In any reorientation of educational methods there must also be a simplification of the syllabus. The tendency has been to overload the syllabus with many subjects, all of which the child is expected to memorize primarily for the purpose of passing examinations. In the primary schools there are nine or ten subjects; in the secondary schools the total goes to 10-12; and in the training colleges as many as 15 different subjects are taught in one year. The contents of the existing syllabus in each subject and at each stage of education must be critically re-examined in the light of individual and social needs, and curricular cargo which is merely traditional and outdated must be thrown overboard. The Ministry is itself aware of this situation, and well-informed educators and some committees appointed in recent years to examine primary and secondary school curricula have drawn attention to this urgent problem. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis, to which reference has already been made, formulates comprehensively and soundly the principles which should guide workers in this field and provides practical illustration of what can be done. Care must be taken to vary the syllabus in accordance with local needs and to leave the teachers some opportunity for experimentation. For example, in bringing educational facilities to the nomads and the remote villagers, it must be remembered that the needs of the children and the adults living in these more primitive communities are different and in many ways more limited than those of the more sophisticated urban residents on whom the impact of modern civilization has been more direct and greater. It is, therefore, essential that the

Ministry prepare a simplified syllabus and curriculum for such 871 rural areas. It should concentrate on the basic essentials of knowledge and skills related to everyday living that can be easily grasped. 876 This applies both to the school program for children in schools and to the program of fundamental education for adults.

Steps Toward Compulsory Primary Education

872 Many problems and difficulties will undoubtedly arise in enforcing compulsory education, but once the need is recognized and the policy agreed upon, attention can be concentrated on solving them. Public opinion in certain regions and groups will have to be educated; a careful survey of each locality will be needed to assess the existing educational provision as well as future needs; an effective administrative and supervisory organization will have to be established; some special provision will have to be made for children who cannot afford books or midday meals or whose parents want their help in work on their farms; and, most of all, the type of education to be provided will have to be related intelligently to the real needs of rural or urban life so that the children, as well as their parents, may feel that it is really worth their while and perceptibly useful. The special problems and difficulties of Bedouin education will have to be carefully examined.

Fortunately, a good deal of exploratory work of a theoretical nature has been done and, as already pointed out, a number of valuable studies are available which offer useful suggestions in all these fields. The Report of the Monroe Commission lays down general principles of educational reorganization, some of which have special relevance for primary education; Clark's Report is a good and careful, if rather unduly cautious, study of the issues involved in the introduction of compulsion; Dr. Jamali's book, *The Education of the Bedouins,* is a sympathetic and penetrating study of the whole sociological and psychological background of this problem; Dr. Akrawi's thesis on curriculum construction tackles competently the question of how the curriculum can be related dynamically to "the political, economic, social, hygienic and educational conditions and problems of the country;" and the Departmental Ten Year Plan and certain reports of other government committees endorse to some extent the various suggestions made in these studies. Theory has yet to be translated into practice,

872 however, and there is little evidence to show that a majority of educational officers and administrators have even successfully assimilated the ideas in theory. In fact, the Ten Year Plan Committee complains that even the officials of the Ministry have not had access to many of these documents and, therefore, are obviously not conversant with the suggestions for reorganization made from time to time. It would be advisable to give due publicity to them among teachers and educational officials.

The Mission makes the following proposals in connection with the initiation of a program for the expansion of primary education and the introduction of compulsion:

1. A careful survey should be made of each locality in order to determine the requirements which must be met in carrying out the program. If possible, senior students should assist in making the survey. This will have the incidental advantage of giving them a close and useful contact with the life and educational needs of the local community.
2. The Ministry of Education should organize an effective campaign in favor of compulsory education through the traditional as well as the modern media of mass communication, e.g., religious leaders and organizations, tribal chiefs, public platform, drama, press, film, radio, publicity vans, and the like.
3. As the program is carried out through the construction and opening of new schools, a continuing and imaginative effort must be made to enlist the support of the local community and give it a definite sense of participation. Thus the opening of a new school might well be made an important community event in a manner which will make the local people realize that something of real value is being added to their life, something which does not "belong to the government" but really belongs to them and which can succeed only with their cooperation.
4. Arrangements should be made for the proper administration and supervision of the program both through departmental and local agencies, with an intelligent demarcation of the functions of each. The general organization and control of this and other large schemes of educational expansion should, at this stage, remain in the hands of the Ministry which will, however, need to be strengthened to handle them properly. The role of the local authorities, while undoubtedly important, should be advisory in the early stages.

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5. It would be well to introduce the scheme gradually in different areas according to a carefully considered order of priority, preference being given to places where there is a strong demand or where other factors are favorable.
6. Pending the introduction of full-fledged compulsion it might be advisable to experiment in some localities with a legal requirement that parents who have once enrolled their children in school keep them there until they complete the primary school course or, in the event of failure in any grade, complete the six years' period of schooling. This would mean that, while admission would be voluntary initially, continued attendance for six years would be compulsory for every child admitted. This suggestion can be more profitably enforced in the larger towns and cities, where there is greater realization of the need for education; it might also be tried out in localities where wastage is most marked.
7. In order to minimize as much as possible the difficulties of the rural parents in sending their children to school, it will be desirable to adjust the school schedule and the school holidays to the requirements of agricultural seasons as far as possible. The time of harvesting, for instance, varies in different parts of the country and there is no reason why the school vacations should not take that important factor into account. Again, even when the school has to remain open in the busy agricultural season, the hours can be shortened during that period to enable children to help their parents in their work.
8. Steps should be taken for an immediate expansion of training facilities for teachers as discussed later. At the same time there should be an improvement in the quality of training imparted.
9. The school construction program must be geared to the requirements implicit in the introduction of compulsory primary education; and, simultaneously, efforts ought to be made to improve the equipment of the schools.

It is not necessary to discuss at length the administrative questions involved in the introduction of compulsion since they are known to the Ministry and have also been elucidated in Clark's Report. It is desirable, however, to treat in somewhat greater detail the problems of the training and conditions of employment of teachers and the construction and equipment of the necessary schools.

Requirements for Teachers

875 The Mission has estimated, as will be indicated in detail later, that about 18,750 additional teachers will be required for the introduction of compulsory primary education. If it is proposed to bring all children of school age into school within 10 years, an average annual output of approximately 1,800 additional teachers would be necessary. In view of the many administrative, social and economic difficulties which are to be expected, it may be necessary to accept an annual target of about 1,500 new teachers. In any event, prompt measures must be taken to establish new teachers' training colleges. The following tentative time schedule is suggested in this connection on the assumption that the average period of training for primary school teachers—with perhaps somewhat higher academic qualifications for admission than those prescribed at present—will be about three years.

1952 —Preparation of plans for the opening of new training colleges so as to insure the requisite number of teachers.

1953-1954—Opening of additional training colleges which may take two years. (In view of the fact that most of the existing institutions are overcrowded, it would be inadvisable to increase admissions in them.)

1956 —The first group of trainees will complete its training.

1957 —The full annual quota of additional teachers will become available for the opening of new schools.

During these five years, 1953-57, compulsory attendance should be introduced in some suitable localities with the help of the teachers being trained in the existing colleges and the first group of new trainees under this scheme. This period should also be utilized, as suggested in the preceding paragraphs, for survey work and for preparation of public opinion, as well as for getting underway a systematic program of school construction. The bulk of the plan can then be put into effect during the next 10 years, i.e., 1958-67, with the determined object of bringing almost all children of school age into school. Even then it is likely that there will be many children in remote and comparatively inaccessible areas and scattered nomadic groups for whom schooling may not have been arranged by that time. The next five years, 1968-72, should therefore be utilized for taking education to such children, for tying up loose ends, for checking and assessing results

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and generally making sure that educational provision of a reasonably good quality is available to every child in the country. By 1970 the program should thus be fully and adequately implemented.

Quality of Teacher Training

As more teachers are trained, the quality of their professional education also needs to be raised. In many respects their training is now deficient:

> The present size of most of the training colleges appears to be too big to allow for adequate personal contact between the teachers and students or to make satisfactory arrangements for teaching practice possible. The proper concept of a training college is that of a small, well-knit social community, living, learning and working together. This is difficult to achieve when several hundred teachers are being trained in a single, overcrowded institution. A reduction of numbers is, therefore, desirable in the case of the bigger colleges and should be gradually brought about.
>
> The members of the staff of the training colleges have often lacked not only the requisite technical skill but the personal qualities necessary to inspire young teachers. Unless each teacher goes out of the college with a real sense of mission, he will not be able to play his part in the proposed educational transformation.
>
> At present the colleges have to give too much attention to general education at the expense of professional education. As soon as the Iraq University begins to function and its Arts and Science Colleges are properly organized, institutions like the Higher Teachers' Training College and the Queen Alia College should become centers of professional education for teachers. The possibility of a similar change should be explored in the case of primary training colleges which are also at present providing partly secondary and partly professional education.
>
> The courses prescribed in these colleges are too crowded and miscellaneous. They are not related closely enough to the real teaching problems and situations in rural and urban areas, nor are the methods and techniques of teaching irradiated by modern and progressive educational ideas. The whole problem of making the courses and methods more dynamic and realistic should be examined by a competent committee.
>
> Except in one or two institutions, practical work and crafts are conspicuous by their absence. Even the members of the staff do not recognize clearly enough that no far-reaching

> change can be brought about in the schools unless a place of honor is given to hand work and crafts in the education of teachers. The committee suggested in the preceding paragraph should examine this problem also.
>
> No training college has a "Demonstration School," in the real sense of the word, attached to it. The practicing schools of the colleges are dull and uninspiring and do not generally differ from the routine of ordinary primary or secondary schools. They enjoy no special freedom and apparently have no special facilities to work out new techniques or to pioneer in curriculum or organization. This is a very serious defect which should be remedied as early as possible.
>
> There are only a few rural training colleges, established with the laudable idea of educating teachers in a rural milieu and with special reference to rural needs and problems. But they do not appear so far to have been given a real opportunity to prove themselves, and the conditions necessary for their success—material as well as those relating to personnel—have not been satisfied. Given a fair chance, these institutions can play an important role in the reorientation of teachers' education.

A determined effort to overcome these defects of the training colleges should be made. It is necessary to recast their curricula radically, to reduce the overcrowding of subjects, to simplify the syllabus, to find proper place in it for practical and productive work and to bring the whole training nearer to the realistic conditions of the rural or urban areas for which teachers are being trained. All the rural training colleges—whether existing or to be established—should, in the first instance, be located in rural areas, should work under rural conditions and should study rural problems. They should develop as leadership centers for the reconstruction of the neighboring community life. Their extension work should spread into the neighboring villages and they should take the lead in working out methods and contents of education suited to village schools. Such things have been done, with varying degrees of success, in other countries and there is no reason why they should not be attempted in Iraq.

It is also important to develop a spirit of self-help and resourcefulness in the teachers under training. At present they rely for almost everything on government help and finances. A community of several hundred teachers, all resident in hostels, should have enough talent and productive capacity to work out practical

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projects in agriculture, craft work, social service and methods of self-help in meeting many needs for which the government may not provide. In one training college there was evidence of such an approach; teachers had constructed temporary shelters for their needs and were actually using them for residence, for doing practical work and as dining rooms. There is need to make this kind of work a normal feature of training colleges, for it is only teachers who are resourceful and handy with tools and willing to face problems as they arise who will be able to build up the kind of schools envisaged and provide educational leadership in villages.

Attractiveness of the Teaching Profession

The government will have to consider seriously whether an adequate number of properly qualified people will be attracted to the teaching profession on the basis of the present salaries and prospects. This question is, undoubtedly, linked up with the grades and salaries offered in other government departments and services but there are some special factors which must be taken into account. Education is, in a very real sense, an essential social service. If the state is anxious to secure a large and contented personnel for its schemes of expansion, it must offer salaries and other conditions of service which will attract promising and suitable young men and women to the teaching profession and not the "left-overs" of other departments or those who have no other recourse open to them. Moreover, teachers do not have the same opportunity as many other civil servants of obtaining special privileges or income in addition to their salaries. In the coming years—with schemes of compulsion and adult education, teaching of crafts and the like in the offing—they will have to bear additional and exacting responsibilities. Teachers must have enough not only to meet their material needs—food, clothing, medical care and tolerable housing accommodations—but also to educate their children and leave some margin to lead a cultured life in which books and magazines play an important part. There is, apparently, considerable discontent among teachers of all grades with their present financial position. However, teachers' salaries and grades were recently revised, and it has been stated that they now compare somewhat favorably with corresponding posts in other departments. The Mission is not, however, in a position to judge whethe

875 this meets the needs of the situation fully and would strongly recommend a careful and sympathetic examination of the whole problem in the light of existing conditions. Such an examination should include also the question of providing housing accommodation for teachers, particularly women teachers, in villages.

The question is not, however, merely one of salaries but rather of raising the whole dignity and status of the profession. [554] In Iraq teachers do not, as a whole, apparently suffer from a sense of social inferiority as is the case in some other countries. This is good but not good enough. It is necessary to insure for them a position of honor and prestige and to accord conspicuous recognition to any meritorious work done by them. The government should endeavor to have the public realize the basic value of their work as nation builders.

School Construction and Equipment

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872 Whether or not there is an immediate extension of primary education, school construction has to be tackled urgently. The number of schools is inadequate even for existing needs and they are ill-planned and overcrowded. About 40 percent of the schools are said to be housed in rented buildings, which are generally poorly constructed and lighted. Many of the government buildings and those built out of public subscriptions are only a little better. Almost all of the schools, whether government or rented, have now become too small for the number of students enrolled, and the introduction of the compulsory principle will bring a large further increase in enrollment. It will, therefore, be necessary to undertake without delay a carefully planned and large-scale program involving the construction of new school buildings and the improvement and extension of existing buildings.

Much of the new building will have to take place in rural areas. The Ministry should, therefore, arrange for a competent study of the problem of village school buildings—in which teachers, builders and the school architect will all be associated—in order to prepare two or three types of plans suited to different climatic regions. The buildings can be economical without being ugly or cramped or deprived of proper lighting and ventilation, and should reflect local traditions and utilize local materials. It would be a

wise investment to spend some money on intelligent research and 346 experimentation in this field. The program of buildings should 872 also include, as suggested above, the construction of teachers' houses—particularly for women teachers—in places where they are not otherwise available.

More attention might well be paid to the equipment of new and existing schools. The libraries, for instance, are generally [217] poor: the number of books is small; they are not chosen with reference to the needs of the children for whom they are meant; their arrangement and display leave much to be desired; and the service provided is very unsatisfactory. No proper individual records of students' reading are maintained and no imaginative steps are taken to stimulate the desire to read and to make the library a dynamic and integral part of the school and of the life of the students. The library often consists simply of a few crowded, dust-laden bookshelves in one of the classrooms to which students have access at odd times and for short periods for borrowing books. School libraries not only should be stocked with a large number of well-displayed and suitable books but should be made the most pleasant and attractive place in the school.

The laboratory and workshop facilities provided, even in full- [816] fledged secondary schools, are also inadequate. There can be no proper teaching of science or crafts unless the equipment is greatly improved and practical work is given its due place. Apparently there is no examination in practical work at all at the end of the secondary school, and obviously there can be none so long as most schools have no laboratories or workshops, or very poor apologies for them. In fact, of the large number of secondary schools visited, only two, one government institution and one foreign school, had adequate laboratories. Under the circumstances, science is gen- [876] erally taught theoretically, as a lesson from the printed book or as a lecture by the teacher, with occasional demonstration of experiments by him in front of the class. This kind of vicarious experimentation, which never allows the students to handle any apparatus, does little to foster the scientific attitude. The provision of laboratory facilities will not by itself, however, make any great difference—what is needed is the introduction of activity methods in the teaching of science and the use of science as an instru-

346 ment to develop the students' powers of inquiry and independent
872 work. In the proposed transformation of "book schools" into
"work schools" this change coupled with craft work may well
form the starting point of the process.[1]

Financial Implications of the Introduction of Compulsion

872 It is difficult to work out the cost of the proposed scheme for primary education with any degree of accuracy because reliable figures and statistics are not easily available. However, on the basis of information supplied by the Ministry and obtained from other sources, it is possible to form an approximate idea of the order of expenditure that will have to be incurred. It should, however, be borne in mind that, generally speaking, the basis of calculation adopted is the per capita educational expenditure being incurred at present and, as the current provision for such items as books, furniture, apparatus and hostel accommodation is rather inadequate, the total cost worked out represents the minimum estimate of the requirements.

The three main items of expenditure in this program would be (1) the cost of operating primary schools for all children; (2) the cost of training additional teachers; and (3) the cost of constructing new buildings and improving or extending existing buildings.

Cost of Primary Schooling

According to available figures, the total number of additional children to be brought into school eventually, when compulsion has been introduced throughout the country, would be about 575,000. The present annual cost of primary education per child, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Education, works out at eight dinars. This estimate is also endorsed by Mr. Clark in his report. On this basis it can be assumed that the ultimate annual cost of schooling for all children of primary school age will be about ID 4,600,000. It should be remembered, however, that this estimate does not allow for higher salaries and prices which will almost certainly increase costs. As the Plan goes into operation, 872 the cost may also tend to rise for other reasons—because the number of children will increase with the growth in population during the next two decades, and because the provision of a better type of education, with a more practical orientation, and the strengthening of the inspection agency will mean a somewhat higher per capita cost. The organization of schools into community centers as recommended elsewhere will also affect the question of cost. On the other hand, it is likely that, during the stipulated period, perhaps 10 percent of all the children may escape schooling, which will lower its cost correspondingly. In this approximate estimate, it is not necessary to allow for these factors, because it is expected that the increase, if any, will be met by the normal expansion of the national budget. Table I in the appendix gives a breakdown, year by year, of the number of children to be admitted and the cost to be incurred on their schooling. This table envisages the extension of compulsory education to 562,500 children in 13 years, and the annual cost has been worked out on the assumption that 22,500 children, on the average, will be brought into school every year. If the scheme is put into operation in 1956, when the first group of trained teachers will become available, then during the one year that will fall within the next budget quinquennium, 1952-53 to 1956-57, the additional expenditure to be incurred will be ID 180,000. In the following 10 years, the total expenditure to be incurred for compulsory primary education will be about ID 21,600,000 or an average annual expenditure of ID 2,160,000.

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[1] In this connection, all science teachers might make a careful study of the fascinating pioneer work in the domain of science teaching done by the eminent British educator, Sanderson (Headmaster of the English Public School, Oundle). An account of his work will be found in two books—his biography by H. G. Wells entitled *The Story of a Great Schoolmaster* and a book written by his colleagues entitled *Sanderson of Oundle*.

Cost of Training Additional Teachers

The total number of additional teachers required for intro- 875 ducing universal, compulsory education has been estimated in Clark's Report at 15,000. The Ten Year Plan Committee, which aimed at bringing 50 percent of the children into school in 10 years, puts the figure at 8,000, allowing for the normal wastage due to superannuation, etc. Both these figures appear to be an underestimate. In calculating the cost of universal, compulsory education the Mission has aimed at putting 562,500 children in school in 1968. If the average number of children per teacher is put at 30, this means that 18,750 additional teachers will be required for the purpose, and provision will consequently have to

875 be made for their training.[2] The annual cost of training per teacher is estimated by the Ministry of Education to be about ID 70. If the average period of training is taken to be three years, as is likely to be the case in the future pattern of teacher training, the cost of training per teacher would be a little over ID 200. Table II in the appendix shows the number of teachers under training each year from 1953 to 1967 and the expenditure to be incurred every year over the project. From these figures it will be seen that the cost of the scheme during the next five budget years (1952-53 to 1956-57) will be about ID 737,500. Total cost until 1967, spread over 13 years, will be a little below ID 4,000,000 which means an average annual expenditure of about ID 300,000. It may be pointed out that, after this period, when the full quota of trained teachers is available, the annual expenditure on this item will be considerably reduced as provision will have to be made only for training the number of teachers required for normal replacement.

Cost of School Buildings

346 872 The problem of the construction of school buildings was surveyed recently by the Special Committee on School Buildings appointed under Ministerial Order No. 36314 of December 7, 1950. After consulting experts, the Committee drew up a program for the construction and improvement of schools and other educational buildings at a total estimated cost of approximately ID 8,110,000. The Mission was not able to ascertain definitely the premises on which this estimate was based. The Development Board has made a provision of ID 3,800,000 for school construction in its program for 1951-52 to 1955-56. The Mission suggests that the adequacy of this allocation as well as the total amount which would need to be spent over the next 10 years be carefully reviewed. In this review the Committee's estimate should be carefully checked, particularly to determine whether it took fully into account the needs arising out of the introduction of compulsory education as well as requirements for replacing old or

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[2] If the basis of calculation were 35 children per teacher, the total number of teachers required would be about 16,000. But as the Ministry of Education has itself wisely adopted the ratio of one teacher to 30 children, the Mission accepted that as the basis for calculations.

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rented school buildings. In any event it would seem desirable to 346
raise the budgetary provision for new buildings to approximately 872
ID 5,000,000 for the next five years. New needs may develop, lacunae may be discovered in the program and the cost of construction may rise. The total cost of the whole building program in the 10 year period may not be over ID 10,000,000, particularly if local help and cooperation is enlisted in the building.

The total financial implications of the whole scheme during the next five budget years (1952-53 to 1956-57) can be indicated in approximate figures as follows:

1. Operation of new primary schools	ID 180,000
2. Training of teachers	737,500
3. Buildings	5,000,000

Total expenditures for the program over the next five years will thus be about ID 5,900,000 which works out at less than three percent of the net revenues expected from oil during this period.

III. Provision of Fundamental Education for Adults 873

There is no phase of education in the country which has received less attention than the education of the adults. Not only are facilities for adult education almost wholly lacking, but there is a general misunderstanding of the purposes and methods of such education. A number of evening primary and secondary schools are run by the government or by private organizations, such as Teachers' Associations, for adults who work in the day and who want to complete the education they began as children. Their courses, however, are not designed to meet the special needs of such adults but are the same as those taught to children in the day schools. There are also a few "literacy centers" attended by illiterate adults and youths, but they are too few to make any appreciable impact and, as the name suggests, confine themselves to making adults literate.

The type of adult education which the Mission suggests should be widely extended in Iraq is not a matter of either the simple teaching of literacy or the instruction of adults in the same courses offered to children. To be sure, the initial objective would be the

873 eradication of illiteracy, but primarily as a means to an end—so that adults may benefit more fully from a continuous program of education which will show them what they can do individually and collectively to improve their own lot. As one authority has said, the task must be conceived "as a matter of going out into the field, of working in the communities, organizing their activities, improving their health and farming methods, establishing cooperatives and small cottage industries and tying all this up in the education and making the whole thing as closely knit an activity as possible."[8] The object must be to awaken in people an understanding of their problems and an urgent desire to solve them, not relying upon government to do everything but developing local initiative and resourcefulness to overcome some of the handicaps which they have suffered passively for centuries. Only this type of fundamental education, which, in recent years, has been advocated by UNESCO and many discerning educators in various countries, will be of practical value to the people of Iraq. In fact, unless the general receptiveness, understanding and cooperative spirit of the people are greatly quickened and stimulated by an educational campaign of this nature, the pace with which the country's development program can be carried out will seriously lag.

Magnitude of the Problem

[162] The proposed adult education campaign should be aimed primarily at those groups in the population which are beyond primary school age but are still receptive, namely those between the ages of 12 and 45 inclusive. On the basis of the census results available for the four provinces of Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul, it may be assumed that roughly 40 percent of the population are in this age group. In a total population of about 5,000,000 it may therefore be estimated that 2,000,000 should be reached by adult education. The number in this age group will gradually increase

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[8] Dr. Matta Akrawi, *Background Paper on Fundamental Education in the Arab World* presented to the Second United Nations' Seminar on Social Welfare in the Arab States, held at Cairo in 1950. Aside from this paper and the Report of the Committee on Rural Basic Education drawn up for this Seminar, a large amount of useful information on the aims and methods of fundamental education is available in UNESCO publications such as *Adult Education—Current Trends and Practices; Fundamental Education—Description and Program; The Use of Mobile Cinema and Radio Vans in Fundamental Education*, etc.

with the growth of the population. On the other hand, several 873 hundred thousand will be in areas too remote to be reached. Also, at least 10 percent are already literate. Thus an adult education program aimed initially at the eradication of illiteracy would have to reach about 1,500,000 people.

In these days when the methods and techniques of education and the various media of mass communication have become highly developed and efficient, it should be a manageable proposition to provide fundamental education for this number of adults within a reasonably short period. Unlike countries such as India and China, whose population is of an entirely different order of magnitude, the problem in Iraq can be tackled satisfactorily and expeditiously if the government and the Ministry of Education are really keen about it and they set about to win popular support in the right way. The ground will, of course, have to be carefully prepared. This will by no means be an easy task. Public apathy will have to be overcome, and the scattered and nomadic character of the population, the poverty of the people, the inadequacy of transport facilities and the insufficiency or inefficiency of the teaching personnel will have to be taken into account. It will, therefore, be desirable to formulate detailed plans carefully, to prepare the necessary material, to train the staff, to establish an adequate supervisory organization and to adopt an imaginative approach for mobilizing public opinion in favor of such a movement through all the resources of traditional as well as modern media of mass communication. For instance, in the case of the Bedouins, to whom the religious approach is likely to appeal, it would be advisable to secure the cooperation of their mullas. This would not be difficult because there is material in the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet which clearly enjoins upon all believers the acquisition of knowledge and education.

In most countries where campaigns of adult education have been undertaken without the proper education of public opinion, they have tended to fail. They started with great enthusiasm because of some temporary stimulus but, for lack of proper follow-up, they were not able to win public cooperation. It is, therefore, essential that the movement be organized as a national crusade against illiteracy and the other factors which hinder the develop-

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873 ment of the masses to their full stature as democratic citizens. This will only be possible if, on the one hand, there is close and cordial cooperation between official and nonofficial agencies and, on the other, close, well-organized interdepartmental cooperation. Such cooperation, though always assumed in theory, is very difficult to secure in practice. The government can, however, facilitate it by various measures, including the establishment of advisory councils consisting of representatives of various ministries and departments concerned as well as of nonofficial organizations. The village school will form, as suggested later, the focal point for the cooperation of all local departmental officers in the work of fundamental education.

An education program of this nature can be launched and carried out successfully only if a special department is established for this purpose. The Mission therefore strongly urges the establishment of a separate Division of Fundamental Education within the Ministry of Education and the appointment of a person with vision, ability and enthusiasm to head it. The Division would, of course, need to have the fullest cooperation of all other divisions and departments in its work. It has at times been suggested that there should be a Directorate of Mass Culture in the Ministry dealing with all the activities bearing on mass education—adult centers, libraries, radio, music, art, cinema, etc. The difficulty in implementing the suggestion would be to find persons of such many-sided ability and interests as would be able to shoulder that responsibility. There might also be a danger that the more urgent and specific issues of fundamental education would take a secondary place in such a program. In any case, there is no doubt whatever that there is need to insure that these various agencies pool their resources and pull together instead of pulling in different directions.

Stages in the Development of the Plan

The Pilot Project

The first step in the developing program of fundamental education should be the organization, in some suitable locality, of a Pilot Project which will draw upon the services of the best local educators and secure the help of such outside experts as may be required. It should give special attention to the following points:

1. Preparation of a group of selected teachers and trainers for work in the field of fundamental education. To develop the project on right lines and provide necessary training facilities, the project should "adopt" a suitable village or group of villages where, in cooperation with the local community and the government departments concerned, teachers under training and the local school teachers may actually carry on fundamental education among the villagers. The village would thus become a kind of practical laboratory where teachers would try out the lines and the techniques of work which they were learning in the center. Health officials and agricultural experts should be associated with the teachers in working out a broadly based program which will make the adults see and feel from the outset that the educational effort is really related to the practical problems of their life.

2. Preparation of suitable materials of all kinds—primers, books, folders and visual aids like pictures, charts, maps, wallpapers, films and film slides. Such material has been prepared in many other countries, for example, India, Mexico and China, and can be usefully studied and adapted, if necessary, to local needs. UNESCO has by now acquired a good deal of experience in this field and should be able to give valuable assistance in the organization of this project. In fact, useful work was initiated in this direction by the Second United Nations' Seminar on Social Welfare in the Arab States held at Cairo in November 1950. The UNESCO has also recently sent to Iraq a team of experts under Dr. Harold Allen with a similar program and objective. It carried on its preliminary work in the Dujaila area where a significant land development scheme is at present under operation. After this team (which worked in Egypt as well as Iraq) has completed its work, there is to be a seminar or a conference in which its results and projects are to be examined. It is hoped that the project will result in the establishment of a permanent Regional Center for Fundamental Education in the Middle East and that this Center will, among other things, organize and assist in the production of useful literature and other materials.

3. This period of experimental work on the Project, which may cover about two years, should also be utilized for:

   (a) carrying on an intensive campaign in favor of fundamental education in order to prepare the ground for its introduction on a national scale—students, teachers,

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influential local and national leaders, religious heads, all cooperating to prepare the public mind for the launching of this scheme;

(b) selecting suitable localities and deciding the order in which the scheme is to be introduced in those localities;

(c) conducting local surveys to assess the nature and magnitude of the work in each community or locality;

(d) preparing the material and translating it into different regional languages and adapting it to the needs of different regions;

(e) taking groups of teachers for short visits of observation and orientation to the project center; and

(f) introducing the principles and practice of fundamental education in the syllabus of training colleges and refresher courses for teachers.

Setting up of Model Centers

When the Pilot Project has been successfully worked out and the necessary materials,. resources and techniques are available, a beginning should be made with introducing fundamental education in selected localities in different natural and cultural regions so that they may become models—even centers of pilgrimage for teachers and general public—for the whole of that area. Each center can become a powerful agency of propaganda and its success will insure that every successive center will find its work smoother and easier.

Conversion of Existing Schools into Community Centers

After the twofold experimental stage has been satisfactorily completed, the next phase should consist of gradually converting all existing schools into community centers which may serve as schools for children in the daytime and as social centers for adults in the evening. This will not be an easy transformation by any means because it involves a radical change in the traditional conception of the school and in the teachers' approach to their work. To aid the process the following measures will be needed:

Careful reorientation of teachers' outlook and short refresher courses and group conferences to train them in the new type of work;

Preparation and distribution of brief, well-written leaflets, brochures and visual aids to teachers to add to their knowledge and keep their enthusiasm alive;

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Provision of the necessary minimum of additional equipment required by the schools for conducting the social centers; 873

Adequate supervision of the centers through the employment of additional inspection staff, if necessary; and

Arrangements to insure that the rural officers of relevant government departments use their appropriate publicity material and their visual education apparatus, if any (projector, radio, gramophone, charts and pictures), at these centers so that they become the natural focal point for the educational work done by all departments. This should apply specially to the departments dealing with health, agriculture, irrigation, cooperatives and local administration.

The work is not entirely new and has been attempted, in different forms, in many countries. Moreover, the technical help given by the UNESCO and the experience gained in the Pilot Project centers should provide the guidance necessary to orient the work in the right direction. It is, however, essential that each step should be a firm step which will not have to be retraced because it was taken without sufficient thought. In order to assure this, it would be wise at the outset to choose a few schools in each province with competent, enthusiastic and conscientious teachers, to organize them as community centers and use each as a model and observation center for teachers in the neighborhood. In this way, the movement will gradually spread outwards and, within about 10 years—the exact period depending on the success of the pioneering schools—it should be possible to use most of the existing schools as community centers.

An attempt should be made, wherever possible, to add a hall to the village school which would not only provide an evening center where adults could meet but would, in many cases, also prove a boon for the day school itself. In many cases, the hall might be constructed through cooperative local effort and local subscriptions. Villages and small towns may even, in the course of time, come to compete with one another in constructing commodious, simple and attractive halls, equipped with the necessary furniture for this purpose. Where this is not feasible, the government should include the construction of such halls as part of the building program. The new schools that are established for primary education should be designed from the outset as combination school-community centers and this idea should permeate their buildings. their equipment and their staffing. It will mean a modified and improved school plan, and the inclusion in the school equipment of material that may be useful for adults. The whole organization of the school and its timetable should be so formulated that this work with adults will not be regarded as an extra burden or an afterthought but will become an integral part of the educational function of the school. Even if this means giving the school an additional teacher, it will be both worthwhile and economical in the long run.

The time schedule of the program, which should be carried out irrespective of changes in administration, is difficult to establish because it will depend on a variety of factors which cannot be forecast. It is suggested that the target be to bring fundamental education, including literacy, to virtually all the adults in the proposed age groups within a period of 20 years, i.e., the same period set for the complete introduction of compulsory, universal education. It is therefore proposed to establish 1,500 adult education centers in accordance with a schedule which would make it possible to reach almost 1,500,000 adults during this period. Of this total period, approximately the first two years would be required, as suggested above, for the Pilot Project and the preliminary work; the next three years would be used to convert about 10 percent of the schools, i.e., 120 selected schools, into community centers; and in the following 10 years nearly all the rest of the existing schools would be brought into the scheme. The final period of five years should be utilized for extending the program to more remote and inaccessible regions and to less receptive groups and communities. Thus the suggested time schedule for the program would be as follows:

1952-1953: Pilot Project
1954-1956: Establishment of 120 centers in selected schools
1957-1966: Establishment of centers in all the other schools
1967-1971: Completion of the program.

The Organization of Centers

How are these centers to be worked and staffed? It would probably be best to use school teachers and senior school students for this purpose. Unfortunately there are no large, well-organized

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voluntary social agencies in the country today which could take up 873 this work. It is, therefore, suggested, as a practicable measure, that the school as a whole should be responsible for running these community centers for fundamental education—each primary or intermediate school being required to conduct at least one center in its neighborhood and each secondary school (with five classes) at least two such centers. This would mean, in effect, that different teachers of the school will take the responsibility of the work in turns so that no single teacher is burdened with it throughout the year. For instance, if one group of adults takes about four months to acquire training in literacy and useful knowledge, one particular teacher may see that group through its period of education and another teacher may take over from him when the next group comes in. While one teacher (or two in some cases) may be directly responsible for the day-to-day teaching, other teachers and senior students can, and should, be required to help in a variety of ways—giving occasional talks about health, social hygiene, civics and popular science; organizing discussion groups; reading newspapers, stories and poems; and showing charts, pictures and diagrams with suitable comment. This will not only lighten the work of the teachers in charge and broaden the scope of adult education into fundamental education, but also provide a welcome variety of approach and outlook for the adults and thus hold their interest better.

With the school used as a center of activity by both adults and children, it will be possible to make the school a really dynamic element in the development of the community. This objective was envisaged over 20 years ago in the *Report of the Educational Inquiry Commission,* headed by Dr. Paul Monroe, which visited Iraq in 1931:

> ". . . The modern school seeks to emphasize the total life of the entire community. It aims to teach all members of the community how to keep well and prevent diseases, how to make a better living in their own community, how to make interesting and wholesome use of their leisure time, how to increase and enrich their opportunities for participating in socially useful activities. These are some of the outcomes that may be reasonably expected from the proper and suc-

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813 cessful unity of the school and the community in this most important educational task of improving the quality of life among all the people."

Financial Implications of the Introduction of Adult Education

It is difficult to work out the financial implications of this scheme because there are hardly any tested data to go upon and the progress of the scheme itself depends on a variety of factors which have been indicated. The main items of expenditure would be:

> The establishment of a Division of Fundamental Education at the Ministry with adequate staff and resources for its functions as outlined.
>
> The cost of continuing the Dujaila Pilot Project (whether it is met from UNESCO funds or the national budget).
>
> The cost of conducting about 1,500 centers to be organized in the schools.
>
> The cost of a follow-up program.

The first two are comparatively small items for which provision should be easily possible through the normal expansion of the educational budget. The third item could involve considerable expenditure. However, the cost should not be too great if, as has been suggested, existing schools are used and the services of their teachers and senior pupils are made available on a voluntary basis. The teachers and senior students, who assist in the conduct of adult education centers, should be encouraged and expected to work primarily from a spirit of social service. The chief expenditure for staffing the center would thus be the payment of a small honorarium, perhaps five dinars per month, to the teacher (or two teachers in the case of larger centers) who will be directly responsible for supervision of each center. In addition, it will be necessary to provide for each center some necessary equipment as well as books, charts, pictures, and other materials, and to meet the cost of lighting in the evenings when it will usually be functioning.

The fourth item will cover the cost of a number of fully equipped mobile vans (which may be partly met out of the funds made available by one of the international technical assistance programs), the preparation of audio-visual aids, the publication of

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suitable literature for adults and guide books for teachers, the establishment and maintenance of village libraries and other agencies for stimulating and keeping alive the interest in reading, and other educational, social and useful practical activities, initiated through the community centers.

In working out the total cost of this program, it is necessary to indicate separately the expenditure that will be incurred in the first five years and the total expenditure to be incurred in the following period of 15 years.

During the first two years, the only expenditure will be on the Pilot Project and the establishment of a Division of Fundamental Education in the Ministry. For these, provision can be made, as suggested, in the normal budget of the Ministry without any difficulty. During the next three years, it is suggested that 120 model centers be opened at the rate of 40 centers each year. Each center will involve a recurring expenditure of about 60 dinars per year on the teachers' honoraria and about six dinars on lighting. The expenditure on equipment may be put down at about 30 dinars, on a nonrecurring basis—a modest figure, because it is proposed to make use of school equipment and furniture so far as possible. Moreover, it is expected that, as the community center wins the loyalty and goodwill of the local community, its members will provide funds, through voluntary contributions, for improvement and extension of facilities and for occasional replacement of materials. So far as the follow-up program is concerned, it will be necessary to make suitable provision for it from the very beginning in order to insure that adult education will be a continuous process and not primarily a three-months' literacy course followed by a relapse into illiteracy and cultural apathy. As each group of centers is started, a follow-up program will have to be organized, and provision at the rate of ID 2,000, 3,000 and 4,000 in the first three years, respectively, has been proposed accordingly. During the three years, 1954, 1955 and 1956, the cost will thus work out as follows:

Teachers' honoraria	ID 14,400
Lighting charges	1,440
Follow-up program	9,000
Equipment of 120 centers	3,600
	28,440

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873 Thus the total expediture on these centers within the next five years will be within ID 30,000. Table 1 shows the number of centers proposed to be opened during the following 15 years, the recurring and nonrecurring cost of these centers, the cost of the follow-up program and a rough idea of the number of persons who might be made literate by the program. The latter number is calculated on the assumption that a period of three to four months will probably be sufficient to achieve literacy and that each center might therefore be expected to make three groups of 30 to 40 adults literate in each year. If experience shows that this period is not sufficient, the number of adults expected to be educated will be reduced and the calculations made will be correspondingly affected. It should, however, be borne in mind that these calculations are based on the assumption that only 1,500 such centers will be functioning. Actually, it has been suggested—and it is to be expected—that many voluntary agencies will, in due course, cooperate to set up centers of their own, and most of the new schools to be opened will be combination schools and community centers from the outset. Thus, even if the centers cannot work with the full efficiency expected of them, it should not be difficult, with the help of these

TABLE 1

PROJECTED NUMBER AND RECURRING COST OF CENTERS OF FUNDAMENTAL EDUCATION

(in dinars)

Year	No. of centers	Teachers' honoraria and lighting	Follow-up program	Adults made literate
1957	220	14,520	8,000	22,000
1958	320	21,120	10,000	32,000
1959	420	27,720	12,000	42,000
1960	520	34,320	14,000	52,000
1961	620	40,920	16,000	62,000
1962	720	47,520	18,000	72,000
1963	820	54,120	20,000	82,000
1964	920	60,720	22,000	92,000
1965	1,020	67,320	24,000	102,000
1966	1,200	79,200	27,000	120,000
1967–71	1,500	495,000	165,000	750,000
	Total	942,480	336,000	1,428,000

additional centers, to bring about an almost complete eradication of illiteracy within the period specified. 873

Thus it may be tentatively estimated that the total recurrent cost of adult education as scheduled in the above table would amount over 15 years to ID 1,280,000, to which a nonrecurrent cost for equipment estimated at ID 45,000 would have to be added. If the expenditure for the initial five years is also taken into account, then the total cost of the 20-year adult education program will be approximately ID 1,355,000. Even if the total reaches ID 2,000,000, the cost cannot be regarded as a high price to pay for the virtual eradication of illiteracy among the adult population and the inauguration of a broad program of adult education.

IV. Agricultural and Technical Education

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The need for and urgency of a program for the improvement of agricultural and technical education has been stressed elsewhere in this report.[4] Such a program for technical education may, however, prove wasteful and disappointing unless it is planned intelligently at every stage with reference to the developmental needs of the country and steps are taken to insure that its qualitative standards are high. A competent specialist should therefore survey the whole field of agricultural and technical education in order to determine the adequacy of present facilities and the need for trained technical personnel during the next 10 years in the light of the total development program projected by the government. It is understood that UNESCO is providing specialists for this purpose. It is important that these specialists be enabled to obtain some idea of the total requirements in the field of technical personnel, the number of such persons available in different fields at present, the need for additional personnel, the policy to be followed in training Iraqi technicians in the country and abroad and the extent of the need for foreign technicians to meet immediate needs. In view of the limited size of the country and the fact that technically educated persons are almost all to be found in

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[4] See Annex C, *Agriculture and Animal Husbandry*, pp. 251 *et seq.*, and Annex D, *Industry*, pp. 297-8.

874 Baghdad or the larger cities in the province, either employed by the government or by a few well-known technical concerns, it should not be difficult to ascertain how much scientific manpower is actually available. Similarly, it would be comparatively simple to assess the needs of additional technical personnel in the various fields when the projects of development to be put through during the next 10 years have been finally selected.

While detailed recommendations for the reorganization of technical education will be made by these specialists, a few important points which should be taken into consideration in formulating a policy are noted here.

There can be no improvement in the standards of technical education or in the efficiency of trained students, unless general school education is made more practical from the earliest stages and is given an increasing vocational bias in the intermediate and [461] secondary schools. The Mission received evidence from all quarters that there was a general lack of enthusiasm, if not actual antipathy, for manual work on the part of the students, whether trained in general or technical schools. When students from these schools go to technical institutions and take their diplomas and degrees, they are anxious to get government jobs where they can act as "bosses" and "officers" and they fight shy of manual jobs whether on the farms or in the factories and machine shops. There is nothing either in the psychology or the religious and ethical traditions of the Arab race to justify such a mentality. As a tradition of the Prophet of Islam has it: "Al-Kasibo Habeebul-lah," which may be translated as "He who earns his living (by the sweat of his brow) is a friend of God." Eradication of this aversion to manual work should form an important objective of educational policy at all stages.

It is certain that, in view of the proposed technical development, a much larger number of technically trained young men will be required in the coming years and technical education will need to be strengthened both quantitatively and qualitatively. There is fairly general agreement on the part of those who are familiar with the existing technical schools that the training they provide is neither sufficiently practical nor closely enough related to the conditions that obtain in the factories and the market. The result is

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that most of their graduates are not equipped to set up a workshop 874 or business of their own or even to find useful employment in established private business. Instead, most of them hanker after government jobs or clerical positions in banking and commerce.

The total number of students in all technical institutions at present is a little more than 750. This is very small both in relation to the total population and the growing technical needs of the country. Moreover, so far as the Mission could discover, many technical graduates are not being fully utilized in types of work for which they are qualified. This represents a source of wastage which can be avoided partly by better coordination between technical schools and technical occupations, and partly by placing more stress on practical training in the schools. In expanding the existing facilities, provision must presumably be made for (1) the training of full-time students, and (2) supplementary training of promising workers selected from factories and workshops. In the latter case the course will need to cover not only the kind of technical knowledge best imparted through classroom instruction but also any deficiencies in formal education such as reading, writing and mathematics. In both cases the practical training with tools, machinery and other types of equipment should be given in well-equipped workshops like those of the railways and the Iraq Petroleum Company. Technical education should therefore be planned jointly with the management of such shops, and a system of apprenticeship should be instituted in all factories and on construction projects.

The State has sent about 780 candidates for study abroad during [658] the last 10 years. It will no doubt be necessary to continue this policy for some years but it should be carefully reviewed in the light of the developing needs of the country. The Mission would urge three points on the attention of the government in this connection. First, the availability of training facilities abroad should not delay establishment of such facilities in Iraq, particularly for the training of people at what may be called the intermediate level. Local technical institutions should give special attention to training foremen and supervisors who would act as intermediaries between the highly trained engineers at the top and the semiskilled or unskilled labor. There is a general com-

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plaint regarding the paucity of this type of trained foreman and it may well be regarded as the weakest link in the technical force available to the country. In this connection it would be advisable gradually to raise the standard of qualifications prescribed for direct entrance to technical schools. While arrangements should certainly be made, as already suggested, for part-time training—in evening classes—of selected factory workers who may have low academic qualifications, there is no reason why semiliterate candidates should be admitted to full-time training in the technical schools.

Second, the Mission suggests that, in selecting candidates for foreign training, an effort should be made to take an adequate proportion from among those who have actually worked in factories and workshops and have given evidence of practical skill and capacity, provided, of course, they possess the requisite qualifications for admission. The training of such candidates is likely to prove more useful to the country, in some ways, than that of graduates fresh from technical institutions who may seek foreign training chiefly in order to secure government jobs.

Third, programs for technical training of Iraqis both at home and abroad should be worked out in consultation with the Development Board. The latter will need to determine the technical manpower requirements and make sure that training schemes are focused in the first instance on satisfying these requirements.

Finally, the Mission would like to stress the great importance of giving agricultural education its proper place not only in the field of technical education but also in that of general education. Agriculture is, and will continue to be, the main industry of the country. It will not be possible to improve the conditions of the rural population unless productivity is increased, and, through education as well as agricultural extension work, the adults and the younger generation are made increasingly conscious of the importance and dignity of farming as a profession. It should be the function of schools, adult centers and agricultural extension work to bring accurate and fruitful knowledge about better methods of agriculture and allied subjects to the cultivators in the countryside and the children who are being educated in the schools.

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V. Administration

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It is an obvious truism that no educational policy or program can be implemented with any chance of success unless there is reasonable stability in the administration and approved schemes are carried on without being affected by ministerial changes and the varying fortunes of party politics. Such, however, has not been the case in the country during the last few decades. There have been quick changes not only of government but also, and in consequence, in the higher administrative personnel of the Ministry of Education. It has been calculated, for instance, that during the 18 years between 1927 and 1945, there were 14 different Directors General of Education, although the post is supposed to be permanent and the person in charge is expected to work as the head of the administration. The Departmental Committee which formulated the Ten Year Plan has itself rightly and courageously drawn attention to this distressing situation; its report points out that frequent changes of Ministers has led to instability in personnel and programs and that officials at the Ministry have often been too weak to defend programs and policies before successive Ministers who wished to make changes before they had been long enough in office to study the needs of the situation carefully. The Mission believes, therefore, that the government should take immediate steps to insure that there is reasonable stability of administration in the Ministry so that, once basic educational policies and programs are approved, they are not subject to change without mature consideration. In order to secure this objective, the following measures relating to the operation of the Ministry of Education are put forward:

1. A statutory Board or Council of Education, consisting of appropriate officials and nonofficials conversant with different types of educational problems, should be established to assist the Ministry of Education in the formulation of educational policies and programs and to guard against the possibility of hasty and ill-considered changes or the abandonment of approved programs. If the Board is created by statute, its constitution and personnel will not be easily upset as an incident of changes in the Ministry.

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2. There should be a permanent secretary in continuous charge of the Ministry and reporting directly to the Minister. He ought to be a qualified and experienced educator who would serve as a connecting link between successive Ministers and thus help to assure reasonable continuity of policy. The government might consider whether to merge the existing position of Director General of Education with that of permanent secretary or to have two separate positions. In any event, the present arrangement, under which separate and independent Directors General of primary, secondary and higher education work directly under the Minister, is administratively and educationally unsound and makes integration and coordination of educational effort extremely difficult.
3. An effort should be made to build up within the Ministry a body of competent educators, possessing vision and enthusiasm as well as experience, and enjoying reasonable security of tenure, who would specialize in different aspects of education. They should be able to speak with authority and confidence in their respective fields and guide and advise teachers in all types of schools. If they are to do so, it is essential that they be relieved of much of the petty administrative detail which at present hinders them from devoting themselves to larger issues. This would involve a certain amount of delegation of power to local educational officers, which would need to be carefully worked out but which is sound in principle.
4. It is certainly desirable to associate local administration and influential local persons with the working out of the program that the Mission has recommended. Such association will go a long way to stimulate public interest and cooperation in education. The Mission is, however, of the opinion that, at this stage, this assistance should be enlisted chiefly in an advisory capacity and that the over-all direction and supervision of the new and far-reaching educational reforms and measures should remain in the hands of the Ministry for the present. The Mission strongly questions the wisdom of the steps recently taken to entrust the provincial councils with the responsibility for primary education. Experience in other countries has shown that a sudden devolution of authority to local administration may lead to serious complications and difficulties and endanger the success of the entire program. This should not be taken to imply that many of the functions and powers which are at present exercised by the officials at the center need not be delegated, say, to the

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Directors of Education. It is meant rather as a warning 871
against transferring the supervision and control and the 647
general responsibility for compulsory or adult education to local bodies or officials who have had little or no experience in dealing with such problems.

The people in each locality should unquestionably be given a sense of participation in the educational effort. The Mission has already stressed the importance of enlisting local support for the introduction of compulsory primary education and the inauguration of adult education. Local participation can take the form of voluntary self-help through the provision of free midday meals, books and stationery, or shoes and clothing to needy children, improvements in school equipment and school gardens and the like. Local self-help in constructing or adding to school buildings should also be encouraged.

VI. Conclusion

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The Mission has considered already the financial implications of the educational program and has expressed the view that it is within the resources of the state—actual and potential—to undertake the suggested program of educational expansion and reconstruction. It trusts that the government will definitely adopt the view that increased expenditure on education is a long-range productive investment likely to give the country a generous return in the form of a more prosperous, cooperative, socially conscious and enlightened population. This return is no less real, though less tangible, than those that may be expected from investments in industry or even agriculture. Thus it requires courage and vision to make a large investment in education, for the purpose not only of multiplying schools, but also of raising the quality of education they provide.

The Mission's approach in the educational field is founded on the conviction that education is one of the most important means of raising production levels and living standards and thereby assuring the economic health of the country. It is for this reason that the Mission has given it a high priority in its recommended projects for development. If national development is to be balanced and har-

000 monious, measures for the improvement of health and the provision of better educational facilities—which have a more direct impact on production than in more developed countries—must be given their proper place. In underdeveloped countries, it would be most unwise to invest the bulk of the national resources in large industrial and agricultural projects while ignoring the need for developing social services essential to the mental and physical health of the people.

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TABLE I

PROJECTED STUDENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE COMPULSORY PRIMARY EDUCATION PROGRAM: 1956-1968

(in thousands)

Class	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
I	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	112.5
II	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0
III	....	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0
IV	....	....	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0	90.0
V	....	....	....	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0
VI	....	....	....	....	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0
Total	22.5	67.5	112.5	157.5	202.5	247.5	292.5	337.5	382.5	427.5	472.5	517.5	562.5
Cost in thousand dinars	180.0	540.0	900.0	1260.0	1620.0	1980.0	2340.0	2700.0	3060.0	3420.0	3780.0	4140.0	4500.0

Notes: 1. The duration of the primary course has been taken to be six years.
2. The average annual cost per student in a primary school has been assumed to be eight dinars.

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TABLE II

Projected Student Enrollment in Teachers' Training Colleges: 1953-1957

(in thousands)

Class	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
I	.75	1.50	1.50	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	....	....
II	....	.75	1.50	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	....
III	....	....	.75	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Total	.75	2.25	3.75	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	3.0	1.5
Cost in thousand dinars	52.50	157.50	262.50	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	210.0	105.0

Notes: 1. The period of training is taken as three years.
2. The average annual cost per student at a teachers' training college has been assumed to be ID 70.

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ANNEX H

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES

I. Introduction

In its main report the Mission has expressed in general terms 361 its view that more attention needs to be given to the problems of community planning and housing. Well-planned communities and a well-housed population are clearly desirable social assets; but it may not be so generally realized that they are also economic assets. The extra cost of good design and careful planning is small compared with the waste that ensues if they are ignored. In purely financial terms it is costly to maintain, and far more costly to improve, a city which has extensive slums and congested streets and whose growth does not follow lines that permit the provision of efficient public services.

The Mission has advocated the strengthening and improvement 647 of the Planning Office of the Directorate General of Municipalities 361 in the Ministry of Interior to take care of community planning, both rural and urban, and of the Housing Section attached to the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Social Affairs to take care of housing in all its phases. It believes that these related agencies should ultimately be developed into a genuine Community Planning Office and a central Housing Authority with separate and well-defined functions and with the power necessary to discharge those functions effectively and adequately. As a technical [816] supplement to the Housing Authority, the Mission has recommended the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station which would conduct research on improved methods of construction and on the new use of available building material and, as such, would most suitably be attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. The broad functions of these offices have been described in the main report.

647 361 [464] In this Annex it is intended to describe more fully their functions and the principles which should guide them and to illustrate this description by reference to particular conditions in Iraq. It may, however, be well to note at the outset that the men needed to discharge the functions of these offices adequately will have to be trained, as there are very few now in Iraq who have even part-time training in community planning and housing. The sooner a start is made, the quicker the offices can be built up. Promising men, who have had some experience, could be sent abroad for further training and experience. In Iraq, courses on the subjects might be introduced into the engineering and architecture curricula for those who intend to pursue a career in either of the two new government offices. Initially, it might be necessary to employ an experienced foreign technician to give these courses and to act in an advisory capacity to the government.

000 *The Functions of Community Planning and Housing*

Community planning is the process of effecting the orderly layout of a community and the continuous improvement of that community for the physical, economic and social welfare of its residents. It involves the task of thinking ahead so that proposals may be appropriate, timely, and based on factual analysis in the light of the objective sought. In an industrial community, for example, it would mean, after a survey of conditions, preparing a plan which would allocate various sections of the land to the category of use, industrial, business, residential, recreational, and so forth, for which they are best suited, considering the needs and existing facilities of the community. At all times, consideration has to be given to the future growth of the community, both in relation to the existing development and to the bigger metropolitan area or region of which it is a part.

Housing is not as broad a field as community planning, but the two are closely related, especially as housing affects the standards and development of residential areas. Housing has for its goal the most effective utilization of available resources for sheltering for the people and providing for them, or helping them to provide for themselves, the facilities and services for pleasant living. This involves the analysis of the composition and characteristics of the population, the determination of their ability to pay for hous-

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ing, the study of feasible methods of financing, the improvement of the quality of house designs and of methods of construction to fit the needs and pockets of the people, and the operation of rental housing projects. It may be mentioned that housing involves more than merely the design and construction of houses; it involves, too, the design and development of accessory facilities for community living. At this point the functions of housing and that of community planning meet.

There are several principles which are fundamental in both these spheres. The first is the need for coordination. The Mission has already touched on this in the main report in a more general discussion of government administration. The importance of coordination in dealing with communities where all aspects of economic and social life are united is clear, but, as will be seen subsequently, there is much room for improvement. The Community Planning Office recommended by the Mission should be the center for the coordination of the work of all Ministries insofar as their activities affect community life. As such, it should be empowered under an appropriate enabling act to issue regulations that would insure adequate coordination; and it would be greatly helped in its task if the Development Board were to insist that all schemes presented to it, which would affect community planning significantly, should be referred to the Community Planning Office.

A second principle is that planning should be integrated. A community must be treated as a whole. When problems such as excessive traffic congestion in certain streets or on river bridges arise, it is important that they be treated not as isolated difficulties, but as problems affecting the planning of the whole city. Solutions that might appear most expedient for the particular problem are apt to be expensive in the long run. In contrast to piecemeal planning of this kind, farsighted planning can deal with problems before they become acute.

A third principle is that planning should not be simply imposed from above. On the contrary, every effort should be made to encourage the people to improve their own lot and to provide intelligent advice to guide their efforts. Planning should be not only for the people but should enlist their participation. In this

170 connection, the method of "aided self-help" which has already been referred to in the main report can be a very useful tool.

Basically, this method is a very simple one. Whenever a group of people, a small village community, for example, wishes to carry out a project for the common good but lacks the means or the knowledge to do it, the government might agree to supply a few of the essential manufactured materials in return for an undertaking that the people will supply the labor by working on the project under the supervision of a government technician. This method has been successful in many parts of the world and can be applied to a variety of projects, such as housing, village dispensaries, and drinking places for cattle or dams across small streams.

Beginning with simple projects, the people will, as experience is gained, be able to undertake more complex projects of improvement. One of the objectives in stimulating the people to build for themselves and on their own initiative is to give them pride in their accomplishment and the will to maintain what they have built in good order. And this can be done at a minimum cost to the government in money and, what is perhaps more important in Iraq, at a maximum saving in the time of trained employees. The force of example often leads neighboring communities to embrace with enthusiasm similar methods of improving their conditions.

The function of community planning and the principles behind it apply equally to all types of communities, although their application may vary from case to case. In subsequent sections the rural and urban communities are described and their problems discussed separately for the sake of convenience. Although there is a wide gulf between the typical small village and the larger cities, the distinction is to some extent arbitrary, there being little difference between the larger villages with 1,000 to 2,000 inhabitants and the smaller towns with about the same population. Apart from this, it is important to remember that the principles of good planning, as distinct from the details of their application, are the same wherever they may be applied.

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II. Rural Communities

About one third of the people live in towns and cities; of the 162
remainder, a small proportion are nomads and the bulk live in 361
villages. In terms of population, therefore, the villages are the more predominant type of community. Although the distinction between a village and a small municipality is, as already noted, somewhat arbitrary, even the smallest municipalities are centers of local administration and have certain facilities of a higher standard than the villages. The distinction will, in any event, serve for present purposes.

Virtually all the rural population live in villages, isolated dwellings being very rare. Landowners, in fact, frequently count their fellahin by villages. Except for the extreme northwest, where there are seminomadic pastoral tribes who live in settled communities for only part of the year, the inhabitants of the villages are mainly cultivators. A few members of the community may have other occupations such as the tending of sheep and goats, the keeping of small shops and coffee houses or the building and repairing of huts. There are, also, villages where a considerable number of the people are engaged in handicrafts (e.g. weaving) but these are rare.

In the North, stone is generally available and is the common- 342
est material for buildings, while in the South and the Center, mud 333
is the usual material. The mud plaster of walls is reinforced with straw or cow dung to minimize the washing of clay in the mortar when it rains and to prevent temperature cracks. Where the climate is drier and palm leaves or reeds are available, especially in the marshes and palm belt of the South, these materials are more extensively used.

Another feature which distinguishes the North from the rest 361
of the country is the greater permanence of the villages. The main reason is probably that there is a much older tradition of settled cultivation than exists in the recently irrigated areas. Not only
are there more small-holders, who would naturally have a close [423]
association with their land, but the fellahin also appear to have
A GREATER SECURITY OF TENURE.

361 a greater security of tenure. Other factors, which have no doubt affected the permanence of villages in some parts of the irrigation zone in central and southern Iraq, are the salination of the land and the silting of canals. In such cases, the fellahin have no choice but to abandon their villages.

In spite of these differences, however, the villages have a number of characteristics in common. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled together without any orderly design. There are no communal facilities or open spaces for the recreation of the
342 children. The huts are so constructed as to keep out heat, cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently, they consist of a single room with thick walls and a doorway, which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for both cooking food and keeping draft animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight, windows are either very small or totally lacking; sashes are expensive. Furnishings are limited to such elementary necessities as a mat and a plain table or a bench. Sanitary facilities, including latrines, are generally lacking.

312 The villages are necessarily located near a source of water, by a canal in the irrigation zone, by a stream or a well in the North. The water is not piped, but must be carried from its source to wherever it is used. Nor is it purified, although the canals in the irrigation zone may be heavily polluted. The water which has been used by men for washing and in which animals have immersed themselves while drinking is often used for human consumption. The constant trampling of the canal banks for these purposes leads to leaks and, hence, to stagnant pools near the adjacent village. Where the source of water is a well, the earth nearby may be dug out for use in the construction of houses and so, similarly, a
[364] stagnant pool may be the result. Such pools, combined with the total absence of any sanitary disposal of waste and garbage, constitute a serious danger to health.

361 137 244 Trees are rarely seen in the villages, although they would give relief from the sun and from sandstorms. Trees would also provide firewood instead of the fuels currently used—animal dung, which could be used instead as fertilizer, and brushwood, which has to be gathered with considerable effort. Small gardens for vegetables are unknown. In fact, fruit and vegetables are almost

exclusively grown by farmers who specialize in these commodities 361
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and who market their produce in the towns. 244

Planning the Improvement of the Villages

Clearly it will not be possible to bring about any substantial 361
and lasting change in the state of some thousands of villages until the root causes of poverty, ignorance and insecurity have been tackled. Only then can thriving communities replace the present villages with their primitive and almost static mode of life.

Legislation for the improvement of villages is already in exist- 361
ence. In 1936, a law (No. 70) for the construction of new villages 185
was passed, empowering the Ministry of Interior to construct or renew villages, having regard particularly to health requirements, such as the construction of sanitary facilities and public baths, the hygienic disposal of waste and the provision of drinking water. A draft law on similar lines, but placing the responsibilty on the Ministry of Social Affairs, was put before Parliament during 1951. Parliament sent it back to the Council of Ministers for amalgamation with the earlier statute. Both are admirable in objective, but both are focussed primarily on the reconstitution of villages on more hygienic lines without regard for the urgent educational and economic aspects of the problem and without recognizing the need to enlist the cooperation of the people. Only a comprehensive and popular program can really reach the people and encourage them to help themselves. That little, in fact, has been done under the 1936 law is itself eloquent testimony to this.

The task of remaking the villages is typically one for the 361
new Community Planning Office. In cooperation with all the government departments concerned and with their advice, it should be able to formulate and issue the necessary regulations, of which those that affect health are only a part, under the power conferred on it by the projected planning enabling act.

The Mission has elsewhere made a number of recommendations designed to raise the standard of living of the rural population. On the agricultural side, these include the organization of an extension service, the creation of cooperatives, measures to improve livestock and the provision of better drainage. Medical recommendations include the opening of more village dispensaries, the

361 distribution of household remedies and measures to control endemic diseases. In addition, the recommended Housing Authority could design huts which could be built cheaply, would allow light and air to come in and would still afford protection against the elements.

The Community Planning Office should initiate and regulate a program to remake the villages according to simple, workable plans which conform to these requirements of economic and social progress and which do not merely consist of a more orderly layout of the village with improved huts. There is little point in improving a village if drainage fails and crop yields begin to fall. Education, too, is of fundamental importance. An adult education program as recommended in Annex G, *Education,* could help people to cope more effectively with their practical problems and prevent what might have been a well-planned community from deteriorating into its old way of life. Provision should, therefore, be made for the needs of education and cooperation by building a community center which could serve both as a school and as a meeting place. Shade trees, wood lots which would serve also as windbreaks and, possibly, small gardens could be laid out in accordance with the agricultural department's recommendations. Simple storage of grain could similarly be provided. Stabling and drinking troughs for animals should be provided in cooperation with the health and veterinary authorities. Water supply and sanitary facilities will also have to be included in accordance with health requirements. These are merely examples of the desirable attributes of a village designed to better the living standards of its people.

The Application of Self-help

In view of the magnitude and the continuing nature of the program, it is vital that the will to recreate the villages come from the people themselves. Unless it does, little of lasting benefit will be accomplished. In this connection, the method of aided self-help would be particularly valuable, since there are great potentialities in the force of example, one village following another. But, to be effective, the examples will have to be striking and of practical value. The Mission suggests as one possible approach that, initially, a few villages be selected in different parts of the country and plans prepared for their improvement. An important element in this will be the choice of villages. The villages chosen should have an

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intelligent and capable *Mukhtar* (headman), to whom the benefits of the replanned village and the methods by which it will be improved can be explained. He should be selected only if he shows enthusiasm for the plan and can carry his village with him. If such a man can be found, he should be consulted frequently, not only to give a sense of participation both to him and, through him, to the people of the village, but also because the *Mukhtar* may well be able to give valuable advice. In areas where the people are fellahin, the chosen village should be on the property of a landowner with a genuine interest in his people's welfare.

Once the plans have been agreed upon, they could be explained in general terms to the people of the village and the schedule of work outlined. Work should start at a time of the year when it will not interfere with the normal pursuits of the people. The first project should be one of interest to the village as a whole, perhaps the school. As the monograph on education notes, there have already been cases where villages have demonstrated their willingness to build their own schools. It would also be important to undertake at an early stage projects of obvious practical utility to the village, such as a piped water-supply with a simple purification plant and a drinking place for cattle. Ultimately, a start should be made on the rebuilding of the huts according to a design or a number of designs prepared by the Housing Authority. Preferably, this too should be a cooperative venture, each hut being built not by one family, but by a larger group which would build in turn for each member.

If work on the initial group of villages can be successfully completed, the country should have at its disposal several well-planned and executed demonstration units, where the people themselves will be able to point to the benefits they have received, largely through their own efforts. To the extent that they are convinced that, as a result, they enjoy a higher income, better health and a more pleasant environment, other villages will become keen to follow their example. Eventually, the program might extend to one village in each *qadha,* then one in each *nahiya* and so forth.

One warning must, however, be made about such a demonstration program. It should not be too elaborate. The initial demonstration units should not be show-places in the sense that

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361 they are elaborate and expensive to construct, require a great deal of funds and official attention to maintain, and the benefits are generally beyond the comprehension and appreciation of the average villager. They should, on the contrary, be simple enough so that the villager can both understand the improvement and be anxious to undertake most of the work himself, and will continue to do so for other future improvements. Otherwise, the people of other villages will merely admire the demonstration units and will feel that model villages are beyond their attainment.

New Settlements

Nowhere has the government a better opportunity for the planning of good rural communities than in new settlements such as Dujaila. Settlement in Dujaila began in 1946 and it is clear that a considerable effort was made to give the community an improved [166] layout. In May 1951, there were 1,058 cultivators settled in square lots of 100 donums each (500 by 500 meters). The portion of the Scheme which has been laid out has groups of four houses constructed at the adjoining corners of four lots.[1]

The cultivator is obliged by regulation to plant a garden of a specified area and to build his own house and those of his helpers within the unit under his possession. The Committee which administers the Scheme locates and determines the number of houses and decides on the period within which construction shall [342] be completed. The houses are made of mud or mud bricks, and each consists of a bedroom, a living room, a storeroom, a kitchen, a bath, a water closet and a stable covering a total area of about 80 square meters; a staircase leads to the flat roof. There is also an enclosed courtyard of about 220 square meters which is used by both the family and its livestock. Separate entrances are provided for the people and the animals.

Although the Dujaila settlement is a great improvement on the average village, it has a number of defects. The present layout makes it possible for each cultivator to have his house and those of his assistants on his own unit, but it has spread the population sparsely over a wide area resulting in long distances to community facilities, such as schools and stores, and a lack of the social life which compact communities provide. Although a club is maintained by a cooperative, only a few settlers patronize it because of its distance from their homes. Pure drinking water and sanitary facilities are not available and could only have been provided at great expense.

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[1] See diagram on pp. 348 and 349.

In future settlements these defects could be eliminated and the community pattern improved by a more social grouping of homes and a more accessible and convenient location of schools and other public facilities. The Mission has prepared an example of such a layout.[2] The land is divided into farms of 300 by 825 meters. A number of these farms combine to form a Rural Unit ("A") within which there is a Residential Group ("a") of 60 to 70 houses and gardens, each lot measuring 30 by 84 meters. Although not adjacent to their corresponding farms, they are within walking distance, yet far enough from the main irrigation canals to avoid pollution. The total area available to each farmer is thus about the same as in Dujaila. The houses are staggered in order that each may take advantage of its neighbor's gardens and avoid overcrowding of structures. Except for the front walls, the house lots and gardens are without solid fencing. Screens of trees or hedges may be used instead. Near the center of each Residential Group and easily and safely accessible to children are a small school and meeting hall and an open space which may be used for recreation; and adjacent to these are the local shops. A number of these Rural Units combine to form a Village Group. At its core is a Village Center with its larger open space, a school, a mosque, bigger shops and other facilities commonly associated with a Village Center.

This layout is, of course, intended only as a schematic illustration. Since it is designed for a particular size of individual farm, suitable modifications would have to be made for farms of different sizes. It might also be found desirable to alter other features, for example, the size of the village center in relation to the outlying residential groups or the distance between them. The most important consideration is that the design, as finally decided on, should be based on a thorough study of all the local conditions in the settlement and the needs of the people who are to live there.

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[2] See diagram on pp. 348 and 349.


500M
500M
House
Roads
House
Farm
Farm Boundaries
EXISTING LAYOUT
FARM AND HOUSE 500M x 500M = 250,000 SQ.M
100 FARMS IN THIS ARE, EACH PROVIDED WITH A HOUSE
HOUSES ARE IN GROUPS OF FOUR


Secondary Roads
300M
Tertiary Roads
Farm
Farm Boundaries
Residential Group"a"
Secondary Roads
School
Market
VILLAGE CENTER
825M
RURAL UNIT
SUGGESTED LAYOUT
FARM 300M x 825M = 247,500 SQ.M
LOT AND HOUSE 30M x 84M = 2,520 SQ.M
TOTAL OF FARM, LOT AND HOUSE 250,020 SQ.M
LOT AND HOUSE = 10% OF TOTAL
94 FARMS & HOUSES

361


Tertiary Road
Major Highway
A
A
A
A
a
a
a
a
Secondary Road
VILLAGE
CENTER
Secondary Roads
5KM
5KM
1650M
1650M
1650M

VILLAGE GROUP

EACH RURAL UNIT 'A' MEASURES ABOUT 5KM ON A SIDE. ITS CORE IS A RESIDENTIAL GROUP 'a' WHICH CONTAINS HOUSES, STORES AND SHOPS, SCHOOL AND PLAYGROUND.

FOUR OF THESE RURAL UNITS FORM A VILLAGE GROUP WITH A VILLAGE CENTER COMPOSED OF HOUSES, MARKET AND SHOPS, SCHOOL AND PLAYFIELD, HEALTH CENTER, AND OTHER VILLAGE FACILITIES.


Stores and Shops
Farms
Pedestrian Path
Playground
School and Meeting Hall
Lot
Pedestrian Path
300M
Stores and Shops
Tertiary Road
Farms

PART OF RESIDENTIAL GROUP

SEE 'a' IN VILLAGE GROUP SKETCHED ABOVE


Pedestrian Path
Plants or Hedges
Wall
House
Garden
84M
House
30M

DETAIL OF LOTS

NOTE THAT HOUSES ARE STAGGERED TO AVOID CROWDING.

DUJAILA LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEME

361 The Mission has noted elsewhere other defects in the Dujaila settlement: the large administrative staff, the tendency of the settlers to become minor landlords, the lack of participation by the Department of Agriculture, and the rapid deterioration of the soil owing to bad drainage. It has been made too elaborate and there has been insufficient coordination of effort. As a result, the settler relies too much on the benefits he has been given and too little on self-help, largely because self-help has not been aided in the way it should be by the concerted action of the appropriate government departments.

III. Urban Communities

The municipalities in Iraq range from Baghdad, the capital, with well over half a million inhabitants down to small towns with less than a thousand inhabitants. They cannot, therefore, be considered as a homogeneous group. The largest of them have certain distinctive functions.

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438 Baghdad is the seat of the government, the center of much of the wholesale trade and the hub of the rail and road systems. Since the war, a number of modern factories have been built so that industry is now becoming an important element. It is a rapidly growing city, a particularly large influx having occurred during the war. Growth has taken place along both banks of the Tigris, expansion away from the river being limited by the bunds, which protect the city from flood.

Mosul, the second largest city, has less than a quarter of the population of Baghdad. Lying on the rail line to Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, it is a center of trade to the west, especially in wool. Associated with this trade are industries such as the cleaning and packing of wool and the tanning of hides. In addition, there is a sizeable cotton and rayon textile industry, both factory and handicraft. It is an old city and formerly the capital of the Turkish Vilayet of Mosul; it does not appear to be growing.

Basra, the port on the Shatt al Arab, is really a complex of three towns situated a few miles apart: Magil, the modern sea and air port; Ashar, an older port; and Basra proper. Apart from its

port traffic and such associated activities as the packing of dates, 361
cleaning of barley and flour-milling (a new industry), Basra is 438
closely bound up with the development of the new oil field at Zubair, some 10 miles inland. Basra, like Baghdad, received a large influx of people during the war, especially from nearby Amara.

The population of Kirkuk, the fourth city, is believed to have tripled in the last 25 years as a consequence of the development of Iraq's major oil field. The two holy cities in Kerbela province, Kerbela and Nejf, have a large transient population due to pilgrim traffic from Iran and other Moslem countries. These two cities have many handicraft workers in such trades as jewelry, brasswork and embroidery.

These six cities, together with Amara, are the only ones with 361
a population of over 40,000. With a few exceptions, such as 162
Khanaqin with its small oil field and refinery, the other municipalities function primarily as centers of administration and trade for surrounding districts. Broadly speaking, their size varies with their administrative importance. Of the provincial capitals, other than those already mentioned, five have a population between 20,000 and 40,000 and three between 10,000 and 20,000. Of the remaining municipalities, none has a population exceeding 20,000; less than 30, most of them centers of *qadhas,* have a population of more than 6,000.

Despite differences in size and function, the cities and towns 361
have a number of characteristics in common. The older parts are 342
usually congested with narrow streets and alleys. Houses are 339
built around courtyards, the only opening to the street being the 366
main doorway. The houses usually have a flat roof or a partially open second story for sleeping outside in the summer. Brick is the commonest building material; most of the larger towns have brickworks nearby, many of which are small and primitive. There are also a few modern concrete and steel buildings, mainly in Baghdad. Schools and hospitals can be found in the heart of these congested areas. An important section in every city is the *Suq* or bazaar, a network of alleys, often covered by crude roofs forming a series of arcades. These alleys are lined with the small shops of retail merchants and handicraft workers in textiles and metals. The *Suq* is usually located near the principal mosque.

361 The development of the new parts of the cities is in striking
363 contrast to the old. Broad tree-lined boulevards have been laid out in the form of dual carriage-ways, the dividing strip being ornamented with flowers and shrubs. Along these boulevards there has been intermittent residential building activity, so that vacant lots alternate with the houses and gardens of the well-to-do. In Baghdad, particularly, many of these vacant lots have been occupied by squatters. In the largest cities, the new boulevards and the main streets are paved, but the paving is apparently of poor construction, as it has deteriorated rapidly. In the other cities and towns, however, the streets have merely been graded.

365 Most towns with a population of over 6,000, and a few smaller one, have both a piped water supply and an electricity system, which are, with three major exceptions, managed by municipal boards under the direction of the Ministry of Interior. The water is, however, not always purified and the electricity is invariably expensive. No city, not even Baghdad, has a sewage system. Waste water is disposed of into cesspools or allowed to run into the streets where it is apt to collect in stagnant pools.

The Lack of Coordination in Urban Planning

361 In spite of their superficially impressive appearance, the new sections of the cities have not been properly planned. Streets and traffic circles have been laid out according to prescribed geometrical patterns without paying much attention to their functions or to the need for creating integrated residential areas with appropriate housing for the different income groups and provision for schools, shops and hospitals or clinics. In the largest cities, the importance of allocating zones for different purposes and of establishing a proper interrelation between the zones has been largely neglected. Growth has been, in fact, piecemeal and spasmodic rather than coordinated and regular, and emphasis has been placed more on the ornamental than on the useful. Some traffic circles, for example, are unnecessary; others are even safety hazards. The practical value of new streets is vitiated by the common and dangerous practices of using both carriage-ways in both directions and of taking short cuts in the wrong direction around traffic circles. Sometimes streets have been ruthlessly cut or widened through built-up areas

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with little regard for the consequences; the remnants of buildings 361 which have been sliced through at odd angles can still be seen.

By law, the Ministry of Interior, through its Directorate 361 General of Municipalities, is already responsible for the planning 647 of municipalities. The Directorate General of Municipalities in turn has under it the Technical Section for Planning and Organization (or Planning Office) which has among its duties the submission of "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles" and the carrying out of "any of the said schemes which are required to be performed . . .".[8] This office with a staff of 17 does topographic surveys of towns and prepares development plans from such surveys. It also plans for and supervises construction of some municipal structures, including housing, and attends to legal matters concerning land sub-division and assessment.

Also by law, the Ministry of Interior has jurisdiction over the administration of municipalities. Law No. 84 of 1931, as amended, provides that municipalities should attend to "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specification of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places, and buildings in such areas." This particular duty concerning planning is assigned to the Office of the Municipal Engineer.

Although both the Planning Office and the Office of the Municipal Engineer are under the Ministry of Interior, the two entities involved with planning are quite distinct from each other. Duplication of work and conflict in jurisdiction both occur. Municipalities prepare their own plans and then forward them to the Ministry of Interior but apparently they do so only for information, and not for approval. Some plans are merely sketches. Others have been made without surveys. Where surveys have been undertaken, they are mainly topographic surveys showing the existing layout of streets and buildings, and not the diagnostic surveys required by scientific planning. In several cases plans have been altered without submission to the Ministry. Some streets which

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[8] Regulation of the Ministry of Interior, No. 39 of 1947.

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have been newly constructed do not appear at all on the records of the Planning Office. The Mission, in fact, found that many major details of developments such as civic centers, markets and the like, either were not shown in the plans or were contrary to the plans as prepared and filed. There were also instances where planned projects under construction were suddenly changed or stopped by a new mayor on his assuming office.

Cooperation of the central government with the local authorities has also been noticeably lacking. The Ministry of Education, without consultation with local officials, prepares school plans, showing not only the details of structures but also their location and distribution. Likewise, the Ministry of Social Affairs, without reference to local administration, prepares plans for hospitals, clinics, social centers, and housing schemes which form definite parts of the community. And, in similar fashion, the Ministry of Communications and Public Works prepares many plans for public works such as bridges, national highways and streets, and government structures designating details not only of construction but also of alignment, orientation and location. All these specialized planning activities are carried on with little or no coordination with the Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Even in Baghdad, where better cooperation between the municipality and the various government departments might be expected, a large school building was recently completed, abutting on a busy major thoroughfare, the proximity of which was dangerous for school children. The location was approved despite objections by the Planning Office.

Financial Difficulties

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Financial difficulties have contributed to the failure of the municipalities to plan more effectively. A large part of their revenues, which are in any case small, is derived from a share in the petrol and property taxes, the proceeds of which are handed over to the central government and, in theory at least, reallotted to the provincial and municipal governments. In years of financial stringency, however, the government has withheld a large part of these taxes for itself.

For capital funds, the municipalities have to rely on occasional loans—or, in rare cases, grants—from the central govern-

ment, which are usually forthcoming only at irregular intervals. 361
The loans usually have to be amortized over a period of 10 years 631
or less, which places an onerous burden on municipal finances. The municipal authorities in a number of northern cities, which were allocated funds in the fall of 1950 and had spent a large part of them at the time of the Mission's visit, were still in doubt as to whether they had received a grant or a loan. Uncertainty as to income or capital funds inhibits advance planning. Moreover, when the authorities do receive funds, they are apt to spend them as fast as possible for fear that, if they have not actually been spent, they may otherwise be withheld. The usual way of overcoming this situation, and possibly the only way in the circumstances, has been to build new streets, which are relatively easy to plan and execute. In addition, the municipality is by law entitled to recoup part of its expenses from the owners of land that has increased in value.

The provincial authorities, who are responsible for carrying out the projects of the central government and who might be expected to cooperate more closely with the municipalities, have been faced with similar difficulties. They, too, have had hand-to-mouth experience with capital expenditures. Nearly completed buildings have sometimes been left standing for months, because funds ran out before the construction could be finished. Furthermore, the projects to be undertaken are normally prescribed by the central government. Apparently, some advance on this procedure has been made recently and the *Mutasarrif* and the Provincial Administrative Councils have been given more latitude in planning their own development.

Planning in the Future

The opportunity now exists to substitute an entirely new 361
approach to urban development for the old haphazard methods. An 185
example of how well the development of a town can proceed, given the right spirit of cooperation, is provided by the small town of Bedrah, which lies near the Iranian border in Kut province and which has a population of about 4,000. This project involves the reconstruction of the old town on a new site.

Several streets had been constructed and 24 dwelling units were ready for occupancy when the Mission was in Iraq. Thirty more units were scheduled to be finished during the year. Besides

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361 185 these residential structures, there were a number of community facilities: a dispensary staffed by the Ministry of Social Affairs; a primary school building for 200 students and a secondary school building for an initial enrollment of 30 students constructed by the Ministry of Education; and a clubhouse which had been paid for by the people themselves. The municipality intended to erect a market and to install an electric generator. Residences for the *Qaimmaqam* (the administrator of the *qadha*) and the physician were also scheduled to be constructed.

Plans for the development of the new site for Bedrah were prepared by the Planning Office and followed by the local officials in the construction of the project. Work has been proceeding for several years and has been financed largely out of past savings. The whole project has, in fact, been carefully thought out and planned ahead. The initiative was due largely to the *Mutasarrif* of Kut and the success of the project to his close personal relation with the Planning Office.

361 647 This example is, unfortunately, an isolated one. In fact, the present status of the Technical Section for Planning and Organization in the Ministry of Interior does not permit comprehensive planning. It has neither the authority nor the staff to guide the planning of public works or buildings that are currently the concern of other ministries. The need for coordinated planning undoubtedly exists, but the function can only be discharged adequately if the Authority is given sufficient staff, trained not only in architecture and civil engineering, but in all the economic and sociological aspects of town planning.

General plans for the development of each municipality could then be based on facts and drawn up with a schedule of priorities, and future work should only be sanctioned if it is in conformity with these plans. Such plans should be practical and preferably designed so that they could be carried out in stages and changed and improved as conditions may demand. The new Community Planning Office should be made clearly responsible for approval of these plans or any changes in them. As a safeguard, funds for municipal development should be disbursed only for purposes which are in accordance with approved plans. This will require amendment of the present Roads and Buildings Regulations, which

are at present an amalgam of a building code and zoning regulations. These two distinct parts need to be separated and each properly administered. 361 647

While the Community Planning Office will have to take the lead in organizing the program, it is essential that it should not attempt to do all the detailed work itself. Although, in some cases, technically good plans may be prepared in this way, the result will be neither popular nor lasting and the planning authority may become a bottleneck. On the other hand, if plans are prepared independently by local authorities or by other government departments, the results will probably be uncorrelated and, therefore, unsatisfactory. The most desirable kind of planning is likely to be achieved by a combination of the two. Although plans should be initiated and later executed by the agencies immediately concerned, the central planning body should guide and coordinate them throughout the various stages. In the larger cities it could probably confine its activity to stimulating interest in the benefits of planning, advising on the preparation of plans and reviewing them at intervals in the course of preparation. In the smaller municipalities, it may have to do more of the actual work, but it should certainly endeavor to enlist as much local advice and cooperation as possible. As was noted earlier, imposition from above is undesirable.

Once plans have been drawn up, the financing of development should be placed on a more satisfactory footing. The principal source of funds for capital expenditure should be the Development Board. Whether they are in the form of loans or grants, they should be committed (although not actually credited) sufficiently far ahead for the municipalities to arrange a schedule of work with some degree of confidence. Loans should be made for a longer period and on less burdensome terms, especially as regards amortization. A careful study of a municipality's finances should be made to assess its probable ability to repay.

Slum Clearance

One of the major problems confronting the municipal authorities is the eradication of the worst slum areas of the cities. In Baghdad and Basra, this is a formidable undertaking, since the influx of people from Amara has been very large. Estimates vary 362 166

342 166 widely but probably at least 60,000 have migrated to Baghdad and 20,000 to Basra. Amara province is the heart of the rice-growing marshland, where the water buffalo is the prevailing livestock. The immigrants have naturally tended to recreate the conditions of life to which they are accustomed and which will enable them to raise buffalo. An area just outside the eastern bund of Baghdad has been settled by these people and converted to their normal mode of life. A series of stagnant pools for the cattle is interlaced with narrow paths just above the water-level and surrounded by a disorderly array of makeshift huts, called *sarifas.* Being outside the bund, the area is subject to spring floods in years of high water. In Basra the immigrants have settled along the banks of the existing canals. Conditions there are nearly as bad as in Baghdad.

It is clear that the process of migration and the creation of such slums can only be halted by eradicating the cause, namely, the harsh conditions of life in Amara and other places from which the migrants come. Meanwhile efforts will have to be made to resettle those who have already come, since, apart from the plight of the people themselves, these slums are a menace to the health of the entire population of the cities.

342 The few measures so far taken to resettle the sarifa dwellers have not been successful. In Baghdad the Ministry of Social Affairs made a plan for 8,000 mud huts at Shamiya which is about 12 kilometers from Baghdad. Several sample huts of defective construction were erected at the site at a cost of ID 35 each. This plan contemplated the housing of approximately 30,000 people from the sarifa district by giving each family 120 square meters of land apiece on which they were to build their own houses according to the samples already constructed. [342] Each hut would have had a covered floor area of 43 square meters consisting of two rooms, a hall and a water closet. The main pipelines for a fresh water supply had been provided and a clinic set up for the use of future residents. The plan, however, was later abandoned on the grounds that the site was too far from Baghdad where most of the prospective residents are employed.

Experience in Basra has been little better. There, the initiative came from the Municipality, which now has under construc-

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tion 750 dwelling units on a site five kilometers from the city. 362 This and three other city development projects were financed by a 10-year bank loan, guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. The original resettlement plans were, however, hastily and incompetently prepared; they were submitted to the Ministry of Interior only a few days before the foundations were laid. Subsequently they were found by the contractor to be so defective that an advisory committee of experienced engineers had to be appointed to review them. The committee recommended many changes in the layout and site engineering of the project, in the design of the houses and in the specifications of materials. Some of the changes, including the installation of an adequate sewage and drainage system, had to be made after construction was well under way.

Ultimately the cost of two-room houses is expected to be about ID 250 and of three-room houses, about ID 300. It is unlikely that the sarifa dwellers can afford to purchase these houses by installment as originally intended. The Municipality now has in mind to build 1,000 mud-and-mat huts at a cost of ID 40 each for sale to the sarifa dwellers.

Other cities besides Baghdad and Basra have their slum problems, though not necessarily of the same kind. For example, all but the most modern part of Erbil is situated on a high mound, rising almost sheer from the surrounding plain. On this mound, which is probably on the site of a city continuously occupied for several thousand years, the houses are packed together with only narrow alleys between them. Waste water runs down the middle of the alleys. The incidence of tuberculosis is said to be high. Less extensive examples of these so-called ancient "citadels" can be found elsewhere, for example, in Kirkuk and at Nabi Yunus near Mosul.

The problem of resettling large numbers of slum dwellers [166] varies, in kind and in degree, from city to city, but it should in essence be treated as a national problem. It is too important to be subjected to the kind of expediency and faulty technical planning with which it has so far been approached. The job is one for the new Housing Authority, although the municipalities will clearly have to play their part.

362 With more realistic planning, the mistakes previously made could be avoided. Preliminary investigation of the incomes and occupations of prospective occupiers of a resettlement project should be made in order to suit the site development and the cost of the buildings to the needs and incomes of the people. Sites should be well drained and within easy access to places of work. Depressed areas where water is liable to collect into stagnant pools should be avoided. If the only available site is still deficient from the point of view of drainage, then the ground should be improved by grading and filling before any hut is constructed. Too often in the past, the availability of government-owned land has been the governing factor in the choice of site without regard to the availability of places of employment, community facilities and public services.

Plans should be worked out for the construction of integrated neighborhoods with facilities such as safe water, sanitation, school, playground, market and health center. Their construction should be programmed over a number of years. The dwellings would have to be very simple, if the state is not to make large subsidies, which the Mission does not recommend. Instead, the same principles of aided self-help might be employed as in the villages. For example, simple but liveable mud-and-mat huts could be designed in such a way and with sufficient lot area so that their occupants could improve and extend them as they earn more income or as their families grow bigger. To improve the durability and strength of the walls, the mud of which they are made should be stabilized with materials like cement or reinforced with reeds or grass. To insure proper siting of structures, the government might stake out the foundations and help furnish some of the needed materials such as cement for stabilizing the earth floor. As an incentive toward completion, the government might also furnish one of the final elements of the self-built house, such as the roof. If representatives of the prospective occupants could be interested and consulted at an early stage and if places of employment were taken into consideration at the same time, the projects would stand a much better chance of success, for they would be not only better places in which to live but also better places in which to make a living.

IV. Housing

Although the resettlement of slum dwellers and the improvement of living conditions in the villages constitute by far the largest housing needs of the country, the provision of adequate housing on reasonable terms to workers on a somewhat higher income level is also important. Efforts in this direction have been started by the central and municipal governments, by the two quasi-public transport organizations and by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Private entrepreneurs have found it profitable to concentrate largely on construction for the well-to-do. Some of the projects have good features, particularly that carried out by the IPC. Generally, however, defects are such that there is clearly much that a Housing Authority could accomplish. 362

The Need for a Housing Authority

The need for a Housing Authority is twofold. First, it is required to take the initiative in providing suitable housing for the lowest economic strata of the population, such as the Baghdad sarifa dwellers. This is a special kind of problem, which cannot be expected to be undertaken by other agencies. Secondly, it is required as a general, policy-making, coordinating and advisory agency. In this there is no suggestion that it should try to undertake housing for the whole country. On the contrary, initiative from municipalities, quasi-government agencies and private concerns should be welcomed. The function of the Authority should be to give technical, legal and financial assistance where it is required; to prescribe certain minimum standards; and to act on its own initiative only in cases where there seems to be both an urgent need and no alternative. 362 647

It will be necessary for the Authority to initiate a systematic survey in order to assemble all the necessary data for the formulation of a national housing program. Census data will be helpful, but probably additional assistance will be required from the statistics department of the Ministry of Economics in devising sampling techniques in order to determine the requirements. These would be especially useful in resettlement projects for sarifa dwellers.

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Due to the nature and magnitude of the work involved, the Housing Authority should be firmly established in the Ministry of Social Affairs and provided with powers commensurate with its responsibilities so that it may perform its functions effectively. It should ultimately have a staff composed of technical men trained in housing design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, law and project management. As in the Community Planning Office, they should also have some knowledge of the sociological and economic aspects.

On the financial side, the Housing Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid so that maintenance and repairs could be financed without constant resort to the Treasury. Pending a housing survey the amounts set aside for housing in the five-year program of the Development Board, namely ID 300,000 annually, might be increased to ID 400,000 as a provisional target for housing expenditures.

[816] On the technical side, the Housing Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station should test, develop and demonstrate improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing; collect and disseminate technical housing and building information; experiment with and develop new uses of local building materials, construction methods and house designs; and carry on other useful research in the housing field. The Station should be staffed as far as possible with local technicians, but for the first year or so one or two building research experts from abroad should be engaged to start and run the Station and train the local technicians in order to enable them to operate the Station themselves after a time. A new building should be constructed for the Station and equipped with the basic instruments and machines necessary for starting tests and experiments. It will clearly be necessary for the Authority to work closely with the Station and to insure that the broad outlines of its work conform with the need of the country.

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Labor and Materials

The Housing Authority could also take the lead in improving 362
the quality of labor and materials in order to bring the costs of 647
building down. In this task, it should cooperate with the Ministry of Education in reorganizing training methods. It could also advise the Industrial Bank on desirable types of specifications of building materials and should estimate probable requirements so that the Bank could initiate investment to this end in partnership with private enterprise.

The materials produced locally for housing construction are 339
on the whole inferior and expensive. For example, a casual inspection of house construction in the cities will reveal that unevenly burnt bricks with cracks and chipped-off edges and corners have been and are being used. To remedy the shortage of good building materials, foreign goods have been imported at high cost. In the case of the IPC housing project, it was estimated that the cost of imported steel window and door sashes alone amounted to as much as 20 percent of the cost of the structures.

The inferiority of building materials is matched by the poor 331
quality of building labor, which again adds to the cost of construc- 464
tion. There is urgent need for good carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians and painters. Unfortunately, attempts to improve skills through vocational schools have not been altogether successful. The schools lack competent instructors, a number of those teaching in Baghdad, for example, being illiterate. Workshop accommodations are restricted and the equipment is out-of-date or in bad condition. These deficiencies might be overcome by importing instructors from neighboring countries, by obtaining new equipment and by running evening classes until more laboratory space is available.
This is not, however, the full answer. Graduates from vocational [461]
schools tend to prefer desk jobs to field work. It would be preferable to concentrate more on training schemes on the job under good supervision.

Government Housing

The Ministry of Social Affairs is empowered by Law No. 38 362
of 1941 and Law No. 22 of 1945 to "construct dwellings for

362 laborers at government expense" which may be sold or leased to them in accordance with special regulations.

[152] Housing projects have been financed by allocation from the capital works budget prepared every year. The unspent balance from this allocation reverts to the general treasury. Likewise the rents paid by tenants and the fees collected for maintenance, sanitary services, water and electricity find they way back to the general treasury. The 1950-51 budget provides ID 75,000 for housing. The five-year program of the Development Board envisages an increase to ID 150,000 in 1951-52 and to ID 300,000 in each of the four succeeding years.

The Ministry's principal project is at Tel Mohamed, about seven kilometers from Baghdad, where 204 brick dwelling units had been constructed by the Ministry of Public Works in 1946 and a further 185 are now under construction. Twenty shops are also being built. Most of the houses have a bedroom, a living room, a kitchen, a water closet and one or two verandas, but 50 of the newer ones will have two bedrooms. Floor area ranges from 49 to 71 square meters and the cost from ID 268 to ID 323, excluding the cost of development and of land which is government-owned. Lots were 150 square meters for the older houses, but the newer ones are smaller.

Rentals for the first dwelling units in the Tel Mohamed Project used to be ID 2.0 a month, but this was reduced later to ID 1.5. The government supplied water and electricity at an additional charge of 500 fils a month. Based on the actual cost of construction of each unit (ID 305) a generous estimate of 20 years for the life of the structures, interest on capital investment at the rate of six percent per annum and a nominal sum of ID 10 annually for maintenance of grounds plus repairs and land rental, the economic rent for each such unit would be ID 3.0 a month—that is, if no vacancy and unforeseen circumstances occurred to reduce the income from the project. In other words, the government has to make a subsidy equal to the present rental of ID 1.5 per month, if it hopes to replace these houses at the end of their estimated life.

In addition to these units in Baghdad, the Ministry requested bids for 40 one- and two-bedroom units in Basra which it rejected because the prices were too high, mainly because bricks made in

the vicinity of Basra were not up to specifications and the additional cost of haulage from Baghdad had to be borne.

Municipalities, which come under the Ministry of Interior, carry out projects such as those at Bedra and Basra. For various reasons, principally lack of finance, there have been few such projects. Other ministries occasionally provide houses for their officials who are stationed in the provinces, but, on the whole, the standard of housing for these officials is deplorably low. The incentive to obtain jobs in Baghdad is already considerable. The government needs able officials who will work willingly in the field and who will have a standing in their community. A decent house is certainly one of the prerequisites to attract such men.

Housing by Transport and Industrial Enterprises

The Port of Basra, which has over 5,000 employees, is at present completing the construction of 50 dwelling units for junior employees and is contemplating further building. Although there are plans for smaller houses of 45 square meters to cost about ID 300, most of these houses, which are of brick, concrete and steel, are much larger and have such additional facilities as a bath, storeroom and veranda leading to the roof. Their cost is, accordingly, high, ranging from ID 1,500 to ID 2,000, but they are let at a nominal rent.

Although the buildings were well designed and the materials used were of good quality, the site planning was not thoroughly studied. Too many structures were crowded in a limited area in spite of the fact that the Port has plenty of available land at its disposal. The yard spaces between the buildings and the high brick fences separating the units are hardly six feet wide. Buildings having different orientations have identical plans.

In 1926 the Iraqi State Railways started a program for the replacement of temporary buildings built after World War I. It is estimated that about 60 percent of the needed permanent quarters for artisans and laborers in stations other than those in Baghdad and Magil (Basra) have already been provided. Suitable quarters at Baghdad and Magil have been provided only for those members of the staff who are required, for operational reasons, to live in close proximity to the work.

362 The quarters which have so far been provided for laborers and artisans of the Iraqi State Railways are: 283 units consisting of two-room quarters, 2,090 units of one room and 60 units of sarifas.

Shortly after World War II, the Iraq Petroleum Company embarked on a large housing project in order to provide accommodation for its entire staff of artisans and their families. This was done because the increase in its activities and employees had caused a strong pressure on the available housing in Kirkuk. When rents became exorbitant, the company give its employees a rental allowance, but this failed in its purpose as rents rose by a corresponding amount almost immediately. The project has already succeeded in lowering rents in the town, the artisans' families who have moved in having released space in the town for laborers' housing. It is not proposed to extend the project to laborers' housing, first because of the shortage of materials and secondly because of the generally transient nature of the unskilled labor force.

The present housing project under construction in the Arrapha Ridge Area near Kirkuk will be finished in five to six years and will eventually consist of 1,028 houses. Of this number, 284 have been completed and accommodate about 1,485 people. At present [342] there are 58 more under construction. There are three basic types of houses: the one-bedroom, the two-bedroom and the three-bedroom semi-detached and attached units. Except for relative sizes and the number of bedrooms, the various types of houses have the same number of rooms: a living room, a kitchen, a storeroom, a bath, a water closet, a veranda and an enclosed courtyard. Stairs lead up to the flat roofs. The houses are surrounded by gardens.

The houses have walls made of bricks and stones with portland cement mortar, floors and ceilings of concrete, and window and door sashes of steel and glass. They are provided with both cold and hot water and with electricity. Each one-bedroom unit costs about ID 1,400 to build including utilities, and rents for ID 3.6 per month plus a service charge for water, power, etc., of ID 1.2. The biggest or three-bedroom unit costs about ID 3,000 and rents for ID 7.5 per month plus a service charge of ID 2.1.

The housing project has been planned on the neighborhood unit scheme—there being two units with schools, open spaces, stores and clinics. In addition the entire project will ultimately

have a mosque, a church, a post office, a cinema, a restaurant, a 362
police station and an institute equipped with reading rooms and a debating chamber. Streets and alleys are laid out to conform to the ground contours and paved with asphalt macadam. The streets are lighted and have recently been planted with trees. The project is much in advance of anything else that has so far been undertaken in Iraq, but its cost and the large element of subsidy involved make it impossible of general emulation.

The Iraq Petroleum Company is the only large private indus- [466]
trial concern which has provided substantial housing facilities for its employees, although in 1943 a law was approved compelling industrial project owners to construct houses for their laborers. This law has apparently been ineffective. Although there is much to be said for placing responsibility on industry for housing in out-of-the-way places, the Mission is of the opinion that, in general, provision of housing is an inappropriate burden on industry.

Private Housing; Mortgage Credit

The most spectacular ventures in private housing in recent years were two grandiose developments in Baghdad for the well-to-do. Both of there were financial failures.

Private housing of a more modest character for the middle [452]
classes, who cannot afford large outlays, requires assistance in the form of mortgage credit. In the main report, the Mission has recommended that the facilities offered by the Government Mortgage Bank be augmented. Instead of the original capital of ID 100,000, capital resources of ID 1,500,000 are suggested. The duration of loans, which is now limited to four years, should be increased to 15 years where it is considered desirable.

V. Public Utilities

As indicated earlier, considerable progress has been made in 365
providing the larger towns with water and electricity, but sewage systems have been wholly neglected. The Ministry of Interior is, with a few major exceptions, responsible for the planning, installation and general supervision of these public utilities. The actual

365 operating is under the control of Municipal Water and Electricity Boards. The Boards appear to be inexperienced in the management of such concerns, financial control being especially inadequate.

Water

312 One of the prime requisites of a community is a safe water supply. The principal source of water is the rivers. The Tigris, the Euphrates and their tributaries offer continuous and generous supplies of fresh water during the entire year. Communities have naturally stayed close to these sources of water and close to the many irrigation canals which now extend from the river systems.

While water from the rivers and irrigation canals is fresh (low in salt content), it nevertheless is high in colloidal and organic material, and usually high in bacteria. It is necessary, therefore, to treat such supplies of water for human consumption if general health is to be maintained (see Annex D, *Health*).

There are also a number of communities, mainly in the North, which are not situated near surface sources of water. These have to rely on subsoil water which, although it may be free from pollution, is apt to be brackish.

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312 The first modern water works was constructed shortly after the first World War. Development in this field has reached the point where approximately 40 municipalities have modern water systems, the outstanding ones being in the larger cities of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. All water works follow a similar pattern and consist of a raw water pumping station, sedimentation tanks, sand filters, chlorine treating equipment and an elevated surge tank. The capacity of the various water works is usually premised on the basis of 25 gallons per person per day with an allowance for a population growth in 25 years of 1.5 percent per annum.

Administration by the Water Boards has thus far been good. The Boards have established water rates for large consumers on a metered basis, while small consumers receive a flat rate. In either case, the rates are very reasonable and vary from 10 to 30 fils per cubic meter or from 100 to 250 fils per month, where a flat rate is established.

The development of municipal water systems has not taken place as rapidly as it should, primarily because of the lack of suffi-

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cient funds. The Department of Municipalities, however, antici- 312
pating assistance from the Development Board in its financing, has 365
prepared a plan of construction during the next five years which will include the expansion or construction of new facilities in 114 municipalities having an aggregate population of approximately 950,000. The plan is practical and technically follows present methods. Many of the treatment plants are of the same size. This, fortunately, permits standardization which considerably reduces capital costs. The total estimated cost of the program is ID 5,651,600 of which approximately 50 percent would be in foreign exchange, mostly in sterling.

There are numerous villages in addition to municipalities where the problem of obtaining water is very critical. In many cases, this could be relieved by either a single well or by pumping small quantities of water at some distance from streams or irrigation ditches. Such sources of water would in many cases be impure and would require the use of clay filters. Nevertheless, it would relieve the people of the burden of carrying water for human consumption a great distance. These facilities should not cost more than ID 1,500 per installation.

With the need for pure water so critical, it is recommended that the Development Board assist the Department of Municipalities in financing the five-year program for the municipalities. In the meantime, the Department should study the problem of supplying water to the numerous villages and formulate plans for consideration by the Development Board.

Sanitation

Adequate disposal of waste water is an acute problem through- 365
out Iraq and a long-term program needs to be drawn up. Pending 364
this, a start should be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rise in the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. In 1947, an English firm prepared a report on the installation of a sewage and drainage system for the city—complete with pumping stations, sewage purification works, etc., and estimated to cost ID 4,600,000 on the east bank of the Tigris and ID 4,300,000 on the west bank. The proposed scheme could be undertaken in stages.

365 364 The initial step might be to carry out the plan for the east bank according to a schedule based on the relative importance of its various elements. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless connections with the system are made compulsory for all property owners. No new constructions or major building alterations or enlargements should be permitted without adequate provision for such connections. Existing structures which are connected to the water supply system should be required to connect gradually to the sewer, according to a scheme to be worked out by the government and based on sanitary, engineering and financial considerations. The administration of the sewage system would logically come under the jurisdiction of the Water Board. The system might be made to help pay for itself by setting a certain surcharge over the cost of water actually used and then discharged into the system.

For the other larger cities, surveys should be conducted now to gather the data necessary for the actual design of each system. For example, the preliminary studies for the sewage problem of the City of Mosul should be preceded by a topographic survey. It is believed that the entire flow of the sewage and rain water could be designed so that no pumping will be needed. Chemical treatment of the sewage is to be preferred to discharge into the Tigris, because people living in downstream villages get their drinking water directly from the river.

For the smaller towns and villages, efficient and inexpensive individual sewage disposal units should be installed privately according to models prepared and tested by the government. Community bath and toilet facilities should be provided in the poorer sections of towns to supplement private individual units. Public lavatories should also be provided in the cities wherever there are concentrations of people, such as in business areas, parks and other public places.

Electric Power

365 377 Municipal power plants serve primarily public and domestic lighting needs. Most industrial plants supply their own power. Cheap fuel also makes it possible for small direct-connected diesels to compete favorably with electric motors as prime movers, pri-

marily because the capital cost of all the electrical equipment is 365
eliminated. It is chiefly for this reason that there are over 3,000 377
large diesel-driven irrigation pump installations along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, many of them very close to electric generating stations. In a similar manner, most of the older industrial [375]
enterprises and even many of the new ones have followed the same practice of using diesel engines as a source of power. In the field of public transportation, diesel or gasoline engines are universally used as a means of motive power, while kerosene and other fuels meet the country's needs for domestic heating and cooking. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the development of electric power to be on a very small scale and the per capita consumption among the lowest in the world; the total generating capacity in utility plants operating for public use is not more than 65,000 kw. Of this 42,000 kw. serves the city of Baghdad and 9,000 kw. is at Basra

Production and distribution of electricity in Baghdad are carried on by the Baghdad Light and Power Company and in Basra by the Port Authority. In Kirkuk the municipality receives its power from the Iraq Petroleum Company's large plant but is responsible for distribution. In all other municipalities, the electricity system is run by the local Electricity Board. 365

Recent expansions by the Baghdad Light and Power Company 365
and by the electric plant in Basra appear to be adequate for the 371
immediate future, unless new industries or other heavy loads create power demands beyond those now anticipated. Apart from Kirkuk, however, the remaining municipalities are badly in need of power. To meet this need, the Department of Municipalities has established a plan of development which is very practical. This plan calls for the construction of new plants in approximately 56 municipalities having an aggregate population of 175,000 and the expansion of existing plants in 47 municipalities having an aggregate population of approximately 750,000. All plants would be based on the use of relatively small, slow-speed, heavy-duty, diesel-engine generators having a combined capacity of not over 10,000 kw. Fortunately, many of the generating units would be identical, permitting standardization and allowing maintenance to be carried out by central repair facilities. It is estimated that the total cost including

365 371 distribution systems would be approximately ID 1,550,000, of which ID 1,000,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly sterling. The financing of this development will need to be undertaken by the Development Board.

365 It is important, however, that expansion of supply be accompanied by thoroughgoing measures to assure more efficient management. The only utilities that can be said to be operated efficiently are those at Baghdad and Basra. In spite of a considerable burden on its revenue (see Annex D, *Industry*), the Baghdad Light and Power Company charges the lowest rates in the country, pays regular dividends to its stockholders and finances plant expansions from reserves set aside for such purposes.

Rates charged by the municipally-owned plants vary widely, and, generally speaking, are twice those in either Baghdad or Basra. In some localities, the demand for power is so much greater than supply that rates are made exceptionally high for the purpose of discouraging the normal use of electricity by large consumers. Distribution losses are frequently as much as 36 percent and because of poor maintenance an engine generator is seldom capable of operating at more than 50 percent of its designed rating. Records are also very poor and in some cases nonexistent. It is obvious, therefore, that the present form of administration is unsatisfactory and must be changed if the consumer of electricity is [471] to be adequately served. It is recommended, therefore, that all publicly-owned electric utilities be placed under the management of a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company by means of a mutually satisfactory operating contract. The contract should require all operations to be conducted in accordance with sound utility practices and it should include some incentive to reduce rates to the level now enjoyed in Baghdad and Basra.

371 375 It has sometimes been argued that hydroelectric power should be developed as part of the projected water-storage schemes. While the possibility of such development undoubtedly exists, the Mission believes that thermal plants are at present the most economic source of power in Iraq. Hydroelectric plants require a much higher capital investment than thermal plants. They tend to be economical only where fuel costs are relatively high and there is

a comparatively high and steady demand for power. In Iraq, however, fuel is very cheap and electricity is principally used for lighting so that the load factor is low. Moreover, hydroelectric power would have to be transmitted at considerable expense over long distances to the principal centers of consumption, since the potential hydroelectric power sites are all in the North. The possibility of developing hydroelectric power in connection with the Wadi Tharthar project nearer Baghdad appears problematic.

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[For a detailed outline of the Development Program for Iraq recommended by the Mission which went to Iraq in 1951, see category 116, pp. 72-119.]

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TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

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TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

A Collection of the Stories told by the Arab Tribes of the Lower Euphrates Translated and Set Down by C. G. CAMPBELL and illustrated by John Buckland-Wright

LINDSAY DRUMMOND LONDON

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PREFACE

000 IN Victorian days it was customary to preface a translated work with an apology for imperfections in the translation. I would say that I am not an interpreter such as those of the United Nations, who can listen to a long speech in one language and who afterwards can render it accurately and with perfect memory in another language. I am also conscious that these stories when told with a wealth of gesture and expression of face and voice were things of vivid beauty like rare butterflies, and in reducing them to paper it is as if they have been killed and pinned in a collector's cabinet.

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233 These stories belong to the great Shia tribes of Southern Iraq. I first came into contact with these tribes when, coming over from the Western Desert in the winter of 1942, I halted on the road near Ur, and engaged a couple of likely-looking tribesmen to show me what local shooting there was, and to act as guides. The next day we drove far into the desert after bustard, and coming over a rise in the ground we saw before us a group of long, low, black tents; in my ignorance I turned to my two guides and asked them what the tribe of these bedouin was. Their faces registered horror and surprise, and they said: 'Those are not bedouin; they are Arabs.' Not having been previously aware of this distinction, I asked them how they told the difference between bedouin and Arab. They replied: 'We thought because you speak Arabic you

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would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a con- 262
stant current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat compli- 173
cated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

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173 The Muntafiq was a confederation of the Shia tribes living around the Gharraf River and around what is now the town of Nasiriya, drawn together for the purpose of opposing the Turks by Saadun of the Sunni family of Es Shabib, who became the founder of the house of Saadun. The tribes of the Muntafiq used to raid the Turks in the Basra area and harry their convoys on the road to Baghdad. However, in 1775 a new threat developed in South Iraq in the form of a Persian advance on Basra, and the Saadun leaders of the Muntafiq apparently decided that the Turks were the lesser evil, for they sent a force of their cavalry to assist them and stationed it at the ancient village of Zobeir.

Throughout the siege of the city the Muntafiq cavalry remained at Zobeir, which is about ten miles from Basra and separated from it by a salt plain liable to flood. The tribal horse, under Sheikh Abdulla es Saadun and Sheikh Thamir es Saadun, could not have been of much assistance to the garrison of the city, for the fighting was taking place in the belt of palm trees interspersed by numerous creeks which surrounds the town on all but one side; and the Persian infantry were assisted by that redoubtable tribe of watermen, the Kaab, who were particularly valuable in the area of marsh which used to extend from what in the last war was the military camp area of Makina to what is now the modern port of Maqil. It appears to have been a major error that the Muntafiq did not bring their footmen and boats down to assist in the defence of Basra, for the country was quite unsuited to cavalry; but it must be remembered that the Muntafiq could only have been lukewarm allies of the Turks, whom they had been fighting so recently.

Basra surrendered to the Persians in the spring of 1776,

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after a defence in which the Turkish garrison did not distinguish themselves. The Muntafiq force, however, remained at Zobeir, from where they controlled all exits from Basra to the desert, and the Euphrates route to Baghdad. It soon became apparent to Ali Muhammed, the Persian commander, that a port without a hinterland is a doubtful acquisition, but he took no measures against the Muntafiq tribesmen until 1778, when sheer boredom and the necessity of tending to their crops had reduced the Muntafiq force at Zobeir to practically nothing. Then, after a surprise attack, the village fell easily to the Persians, and Ali Muhammed ordered the Muntafiq garrison to be put to the sword.

The fury of the great tribes of the Muntafiq knew no bounds when they heard the news of the loss of Zobeir, involving as it did the rape and death of some Muntafiq women. Hawasing, or the singing of war songs accomanied by war dances, inaugurated a general rising of the whole Muntafiq confederation, the much dreaded 'Hamrat el Muntafiq'. Sheikh Thamir es Saadun took command of the Muntafiq forces, and a large horsed contingent marched down on Basra over the desert, while the tribal boats came down over the Hammar lake, and the footmen marched down the banks of the Euphrates River and the lake itself. Some ten thousand Persians marched out of Basra under Ali Muhammed to do battle, and the Persians also put on the river a flotilla of some twenty Basra jalbuts on which they had mounted guns and which had crews impressed from Basra itself. The redoubtable Kaab were absent from their order of battle.

The Persians seem to have learnt many false lessons in their campaign against Basra, and the most fatal of these was their belief that the Muntafiq tribes were desert

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173 fighters unable to manoeuvre in the palm belts and marshes. Thus, when their advanced guard cavalry gained contact with the Muntafiq horse in the desert Ali Muhammed successfully manoeuvred his force to drive them into the marshes and into what appeared to be a trap, an area surrounded on all but the entrance side by marsh or by bends of the river. The main Persian force entered this area to complete the destruction of the trapped tribesmen, but soon realised that the marshes were swarming with Muntafiq footmen. While the river held only tribal boats, there was no sign of the Persian flotilla, which, some say, had already been destroyed. When they attempted to retreat from this death-trap, the Persians found their escape blocked by more mounted tribesmen from the desert. Thamir es Saadun is said to have raised his sword and ordered a general massacre of the Persian force, a departure from the tribes' usual custom of taking prisoners, in revenge for the atrocities at Zobeir. Ali Muhammed was amongst the slain, and it is said that only three men escaped alive.

As a direct result of this disaster, in which they lost a major part of their force, the Persians evacuated Basra in the following year. This victory over the Persians was the Muntafiq's greatest success, but it also contained the seeds of the final dissolution of the Confederation, since the Shia tribes had been drawn together under Sunni leadership for the common purpose of opposing the Turks. After this battle the policy of the paramount sheikhs, the Saaduns, became more and more pro-Turkish, and by the middle of the nineteenth century we find that the paramount sheikh had almost invariably the title of Pasha, and was supported by the Turks in his rule of the Muntafiq. The tribal army now underwent a change: the great

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Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the 173
Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true, occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks, as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia 619
tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended pictures of King Feisal and of His Royal Highness the Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days when the country was under foreign domination, when they were the rallying-points of the resistance which prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example, numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the 463
capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, 166
lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this growing State a boy 555
may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city. When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirhem [651]
from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants are the first to send in their money: though they may be wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send in the exact dirhem along with the labourers and artisans. To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

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178 Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping
406 engines owned by every tribe send thousands of tons of the brown waters of the Euphrates down the irrigation
871 channels to make the land fertile and green. Education is spreading to the tribes, and an increasing number of tribesmen hold jobs of every sort in the railways, the port, and the oil companies. Many tribesmen from the Euphrates drove trucks on the great Aid to Russia route through Persia during the war. Others could be found serving the Allied war effort as far apart as Masira at the end of the Persian Gulf and Haifa.

With this development going on all around him, it is not surprising that the amusements of the tribesman are changing. Whereas before he had to amuse himself by listening to stories told by amateur but skilled storytellers, he can now pass the evening listening to a wireless set driven off the battery of his sheikh's or his sirkal's saloon car, or better still, he can jump a bus or lorry into the nearest village and watch an Egyptian, Indian, or American film. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the stories are dying out, and now only a few of the older men know them. These stories fulfilled a need in the days in which the tribes were in constant conflict with the Turkish Government, and in which facilities for written Arabic literature did not exist. Now, in more prosperous times, they must die out. I would stress that the stories were never considered as belonging to any great school of Arabic literature—they were simple little things, either originated by the tribesmen themselves or adapted from some more ancient story, and their intention was merely to evoke a smile on an arduous march, or to help pass a cold desert night; and so they must be judged.

000 To those who want the real beauty of a precise language, I say that this can be found in written classical Arabic,

but I warn them that Arabic is an Everest of languages, 000 not to be stormed by some carefree explorer bent on a year or so of study. Seven years of steady plodding may bring the explorer to the snowline, but the icy peaks still tower above him in all their clear beauty, as they have stood for over two thousand years, nor are their slopes safe for any but Arab feet to tread. In the words of Ibn ed Dahhan they may well say:

'Do not think that you will be a poet such as we, for 538 though the hen is feathered, it does not fly.'

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539 THE STORY OF HAJJI ALI, THE



GREAT SULTAN, AND HIS SON, THE AMIR KHEYYUN

And this story was written on a night of rain and flood, and the storyteller was Hamud.

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*539 NOW there was a Sultan from amongst the Sultans who ruled Iraq before the days of the Ottomans, and his name was Hajji Ali. And this Sultan had only one son, the Amir Kheyyun, who was a youth of twenty years, so handsome of the face that when he passed through the city the people would come out and throng the streets, and so dense were the crowds that not even a flea could pass through the town. And the Amir Kheyyun was famous in battle, for he commanded the armies of the Sultan, and he challenged the enemies of the Sultan his father to single combat, and used to kill them
[593] in front of their armies. And he obeyed the commands of the Sultan his father in everything, for this is the custom of the Arabs.

So one day the Sultan, Hajji Ali, sent for his son, Kheyyun, and he said: In this world only one thing is certain and only one thing is known, and that is that death comes to every man, nor can a single man escape from it. And the time is not long nor shall many years pass before you are Sultan of this land in my place, but (may it be far from you) when you are dead who shall replace you? Therefore it is now suitable that you take a wife. But Kheyyun, the obedient son, refused the command of his father, nor did he heed his words. And he said: I have studied the matter, and I have read every book concerning women, which has been written by every wise man and philosopher of Iraq, of Persia, of India, of China, and of Rome, and I have come to the conclusion that women are evil, and they are witches, nor is there truth and goodness in them. Therefore, how can a man take one of them for a wife?

*539 And the Sultan thought: This is only the foolishness of
626 youth. I will command my son to marry in the presence

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*539 626 of my ministers, my advisers, and my troops, then, through shame, he cannot disobey me. And he summoned his court, his ministers, and his troops, and he sent for the sheikhs and leading men of the country, and the palace was thronged with a great crowd, and he sent for his son, the Amir Kheyyun.

*539 527 And the Sultan spoke and said: It is long since we have had celebrations and rejoicing as is fitting in a great city on the occasion of a royal marriage or the birth of an heir to the throne. I therefore command and order the Minister of Finance to produce a sum of one hundred thousand dirhems, and that each of the sheikhs of the tribes shall bring one thousand Syrian sheep, and each of the great merchants shall bring one thousand bags of the finest rice of Amara and of El Huweiza, and the Governor of Basra shall bring one thousand boatloads of the sweetest dates in Basra, and the Maadan shall bring milk, and the people of Mosul shall bring honey, and of Baquba, fruit, and from each town and village shall come the fruits and crops and vegetables of that village. And for every day of the first month of the new year one thousand sheep shall be killed and roasted and stuffed with walnuts and almonds, nor shall any man in the city go hungry, and the travellers and the people of the desert shall also be satisfied, for in that auspicious month will be celebrated the wedding of my son, the Amir Kheyyun, the beloved.

*539 593 And the Amir Kheyyun stood up in front of his father, and he said: No. Then the faces of the great sheikhs and the great merchants and the captains of ships and the commanders of troops and the learned men became red with shame, for amongst the Arabs it is not fitting that a son speak in front of his father and into his father's face.

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And the Sultan became white with rage, and he ordered: Imprison him. 539

Then the guards and the officers of the Sultan seized the Amir and they took him away to the jail. And let it be known to you that the jail to which they took the Amir is unlike the jail with which you are acquainted, namely, that jail which lies at the Zobeir Gate of Basra City. It was also unlike the camps surrounded by wire in which the English keep the Germans at Shuaiba. For this prison was one especially for princes and the highest in the land. It was like a palace, and the walls were of marble and rare stones, and anything that a man could desire was available. Only the guards at the gate forbade the Amir Kheyyun to go out from it.

Now it happened one day that a fisherman went to the river in the morning, and at the rising of the sun he threw his net into the water and drew it back. In that net was a fish of gold, the like of which had never been seen before throughout the whole land of Iraq. And the fisherman talked with his comrades and said: I will take this fish to the Amir who is in the prison, for it may make him happy and it may bring him fortune. And he took the fish and put it in a bowl of water and took it to the prison and gave it to the Amir. And the Amir was happy for he had never before seen such a fish.

So the Amir made a pool for that fish, of which the sides were of gold and silver, and he sat by the pool and watched the beauty of the fish. And he remained for three hours appreciating its beauty. For the whole three hours the fish did not stand or stop, but it went at speed from one end of the pool to the other. And the Amir thought: Why does the fish not stop? Why does it dash about? It is a tragedy for it. Like me it is a prisoner. It needs the river.

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

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*539 And the Amir took that fish and threw it in the river.
828 Now that fish was of the tribe of Adam, and it was really a girl, for you know that the fish of gold are really of the tribe of men, though they have taken the disguise of fish, and are skilled in magic and unusual things. And as the Amir threw the fish into the river he said: May God leave you with your lover and may he leave me with a lover.

*539 Now when the fish girl landed in the water she swam off to her lover, to a cave beneath the waters of the Tigris, and he asked her: Where have you been and why have you delayed your coming? And she replied: I was taken in a net, and given to the Amir, but he returned me to the water and he said, Go to your lover.

But when the Amir had told his father the Sultan that all girls were witches and evil creatures he was lying, nor did he fully state the truth, for one girl, a princess in a neighbouring country, he thought not evil but good, and his blood was hot with love for her, but he concealed this from his father, knowing that the Sultan wished to marry him to his cousin, that her wealth might not go from Iraq.

And the lover of the fish girl was aware of these affairs, for of such are the magicians. And he thought: I must reward the Amir who gave me back my beloved. And he took on the shape of a derwish, and went to the prison, and saluted the Amir. And he said: You desire to take Aliya bint Rejab. When the Amir saw that his desire was known to the derwish he became as white as milk, and he was astonished, and he implored help from the derwish, saying: O master of miracles, help me get my beloved. And the Amir and the derwish mounted on horses and left the prison, nor did the guards become aware of their departure. They rode to the palace of the girl Aliya. And

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*539 they entered the palace like cats, in the second half of the night, and the alarm was not raised. And the Amir went into the room of the girl Aliya. The night was hot and she had cast off her clothes. And when the Amir saw the beauty of her body he was amazed, and he was near to fainting with wonder. But he covered the girl Aliya and took her to the horses, and they rode into the desert. And in the morning they halted and she cooked for them food. [262] When they had eaten of meat and rice and dates and lebn the derwish spoke to the Amir and said: It is written that we must divide this girl between us and each have his share of her, for if two are partners in labour they must share the achievement. And the Amir said: This suggestion is unsuitable, nor can it happen thus. And the girl heard and was amazed at the words of the derwish. But the derwish insisted and said: A division is written as the fate of this girl, and I have no power to alter it. The Amir thought: This derwish is one of the princes of magicians, and he has befriended me. So he said: If it is thus, then it shall be done according to your wishes, but how shall we divide her, up and down, or across? And the derwish replied: Up and down, for then each of us shall have a beautiful eye and a breast and an arm and a leg and it will be even between us, and neither shall have an advantage. The girl Aliya heard these words and became afraid. She cast herself at the derwish's feet and cried: O my masters, cast lots between yourselves as to which is to have me, but do not divide me. But the derwish said: It is necessary. And he drew his sword and waved it over the girl and *539 was about to strike, and the Amir Kheyyun covered his 825 eyes from the spectacle. But at that very moment the girl's mouth opened and the head of a snake appeared from it. And the derwish cried: Come out, Zeboshun,

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Come out, Zeboshun. And the snake came out and it was 539^{K}
twenty feet long and green of skin, and it went over the 825
desert with the speed of a horse. The derwish turned to the Amir and said: I have frightened the snake from her, for it was in her and she knew it not. For this snake was of a breed which enters girls without their knowledge, and its pleasure lies in the torment of men, for it waits for the girl to marry, then it causes her to be angry and nag her man, and her words become as the very venom of the snake, and there is no means of extracting the snake, unless you see its face and know its name and gain power over it.

The Amir was grateful and thanked the derwish, and 539^{K}
the derwish said: The girl is yours and I wish you enjoyment in her, and peace be on you and in God's hands. So the Amir took the girl and married her and went to his father's palace. The servants and slaves cried: Your father is stricken with grief for you. And the Amir went to his father the Sultan Hajji Ali and said: Peace on you, O my father, I have taken a wife in accordance with your wishes. And the Sultan became glad and rejoiced and he made his son reign in his place, and he was a wise and just ruler, and had many sons, beautiful as moons.

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A STORY CONCERNING THE IGNORANCE OF SLAVES

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

One day we were halted on the road to Fao. A Negro passed, a slave, a sailor on a dhow from Zanzibar. He called and asked us the time. We replied: Ten-ten. He then became angry and said: What do you mean ten-ten? I ask you the hour of the day. Can't you say twenty? Why this silly ten-ten? And Hamud said: It is known that Negro slaves are among the most ignorant people in the world. In the Muntafiq it is related as follows:

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x539 ONCE there were three slaves, and in the night their thoughts were turned to stealing, and they planned to steal sheep from the bedouin who were camped outside the town. In the first hour of the night they went to the camp of the bedouin and they went up to the animals. In the darkness they saw three animals, and each slave took one animal and led it away but they were goats and not sheep, and the slaves knew it not. And the slaves took the goats and went away. But when the goats of the bedouin, which numbered many hundreds, became aware that three goats had gone from them they started to follow them, for it is a custom of the goats that where one goat goes, there must go all the goats.

And the three slaves and the three goats went through the desert, and behind them they heard the sound of many feet. Then the slave Ali said to the slave Rashid: We are pursued. And the three slaves and the three goats ran, and the goats of the bedouin saw the three goats were running, so they, too, ran after them.

And the slave Rashid said to the slave Ali: Truly the bedouin are pursuing us. Then the slaves released the three goats and ran faster, but the goats, after the manner of goats, followed the men. So when the slaves slowed down the goats butted the slave Ali, who was last. And the slave Ali said to the slave Rashid: There are many sharp things prodding me in the posterior. What can they be? And the slave Rashid replied: They are the lances and swords of the Arabs. Run! Run! Though in fact they were not the lances and swords of the Arabs, but only the horns of the goats. But the slaves understood nothing of this affair, so they ran faster and faster until they came to the river. Now, when the goats smelt the river they turned about, 539 for goats have sense, but the leading slave, whose name was Hassan, fell into the river.

And it so happened that in that river was a crocodile, and when the slave Hassan fell in he bit off and ate the head of Hassan the slave. And the slave Ali and the slave Rashid came to the river and they saw that Hassan was in the river and they pulled him out and set him on the bank, but he had no head.

And the slave Ali noticed that Hassan had no head, so he turned and said to Rashid: See, our comrade is without a head. And the slaves are ignorant in these matters, so Rashid replied: Had he then a head before, or has he always been headless? And Ali answered: Truly, I never noticed and I do not remember. And Ali and Rashid discussed the matter between themselves and said: Verily, we must discover the truth of this matter, for if our comrade had a head and has lost it, then he is dead and we must bury him, for it is said amongst the learned that the separation of the head causes the departure of the soul from the body. But if he has always been headless, then he is now no better nor no worse than formerly, and by burying him we may do wrong. So the slave Ali said: Let us ask his mother, for she must have information about the matter.

The slave Ali and the slave Rashid went to the town and they went to the hut of the mother of Hassan and they called: Ya Umm Hassan! And Umm Hassan came and said: What do you want and why trouble me? And Ali asked: O Mother of Hassan, on the day your son was born can you remember, had he a head? And Umm Hassan thought and answered: On that day I was sick and in pain, and it is over twenty years ago and I cannot remember. Then the slave Rashid and the slave Ali went to the father

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of Hassan and said to him: Ya Aba Hassan! Ya Aba 539* Hassan! When your son Hassan was born, had he a head or was he then headless? And he replied: I have no information concerning this matter, for when my son was born, on that very day, I had gone to Basra to buy coffee, nor did I return till nightfall.

Then the two slaves went to an old woman called Tawa, for Tawa was the midwife. She was a Negro and a slave, but she was the one amongst them who had sense, and she was ignorant of nothing. It is said of her that she could remember even the building of the mosque of Kadhimain. And the slaves Ali and Rashid went to Tawa the midwife and asked of her: O Tawa! When you brought Hassan forth from his mother, had he then a head? And Tawa replied: He had a head, and there was hair on it, and there were eyes in it, and there were ears on it. And they said: O Tawa, now he has no head. What shall we do? And Tawa replied: He is dead. And when Ali and Rashid heard this, they wept and beat their chests, and said: Verily our comrade is dead. And Abu Hassan and Umm Hassan heard, and they came, and wept, and beat their chests.

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A STORY CONCERNING THE FOLLY OF JEALOUSY



This story was related at a halt in the desert to prepare tea, near an encampment of the Dhufair, and one of them killed five bustard, and we had none, and it was said, envy and jealousy are attributes of women.

p. 22

*539 ONCE in Iraq there were two small boys, one of them was the Amir Abdulla, son of the Sultan, and the other was Mohammed, son of the Wazir. And their fathers sent them to school and they stayed in the school for ten years. But in this school the Amir Abdulla learnt nothing. It was his custom only to hit and bully the younger boys, and to play at archery and horsemanship, and the drinking of wine and the pursuit of beauty. And in all these things his companion was Mohammed, son of the Wazir. When they were finished with the school and came out from it the Amir Abdulla had learnt not one single thing. But his friend, Mohammed, had learnt every language which was then spoken in the world, for he was both clever and industrious.

Now, when the son of the Sultan and the son of the Wazir left the school, they could find no work or occupation, for the government of the country was done by their fathers. So it became their custom to ride out at dawn to the high desert, and in the evening to return to the town. And with them as escort rode six Circassian slaves, youths of great beauty, armed with spears and swords. But when they had ridden many miles into the desert the Amir would dismiss the escort, saying: Go back to the town, but return to us here before the setting of the sun.

Then he and the son of the Wazir would spend the day in the pleasures of friendship and companionship. And what the Wazir's son said to the Amir, that suggestion would be adopted by the Amir and done by him, for they were of one heart. The Circassian slaves were jealous of this. They said amongst themselves: What the son of the Wazir tells our master, that he does, but as for us we are neglected. They give us no orders, telling us only to go

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*539 in the morning and come in the evening, and this state of affairs is not good. What is this constant desert, desert? Therefore we should kill the son of the Wazir that we may put an end to this state. But the Commander of the Circassians said: Why should we do this? It would be a shame to kill him. Rather let us do another thing. Let us go to the witch in the town and explain the affair to her, and let her do magic, that hate may come between these two boys.

So the Circassians went to the witch and said to her: O mistress of wonders, our state is thus and thus; please do magic that these two boys may hate each other. And the witch replied: In this there is no obstacle or difficulty, nor is it necessary to use the knowledge of forbidden books. Give me each of you one dirhem. And the witch took the six dirhems from the Circassians and went to the market. And she bought new clothes and paints and powder for
*539 her face and returned to her house. Now this witch was
302 an old hag of more than seventy summers, but such is the artifice of women that when she had applied kohl and put on new clothes, and washed her face with curdled milk, and applied to it paints and powders, she appeared as a young girl of seventeen. But only to one who saw her from many paces away.

*539 And in the morning the witch stood near a mound which lay one hundred paces from the road to the desert. So the two boys rode out of the palace with their Circassian slaves and they saw a young girl, beautiful as a moon, standing on the mound. The young Amir said: I shall have this girl. The son of the Wazir said: No, I shall have her. And the son of the Wazir jumped from his horse and ran towards the mound, and the young girl when she saw him come leapt behind the mound and was hidden from

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view. Before the Wazir's son arrived on the mound the witch wiped the paint from her face, threw on a dirty cloak, and bared her toothless gums. And she was hideous to behold. The son of the Wazir ran behind the mound and sought the girl, but he could see only the witch. And all around was desert and there was not enough cover for a flea to hide in. And the son of the Wazir was astonished, so slowly he returned to the prince. 539*

Now, the Amir Abdulla called out to Mohammed, son of the Wazir, and asked: Han, Han, and how did it go? Did you kiss her? And the son of Wazir replied: There never was a girl; it was a dream. And the Amir Abdulla, son of the Sultan, did not believe the words of Mohammed, son of the Wazir, and there was anger in his heart. He thought: Is he my friend that he lies to me? Does he imagine me a fool that I should believe this occurrence? And he said to the son of the Wazir: You saw her and you took her in your arms, and these lies are without benefit.

The Amir Abdulla, son of the Sultan, returned to the palace and did not ride out to the desert. And when he was alone he sent for the Commander of his Circassian slaves. And he commanded the officer to go straight to the room of the son of the Wazir and slay him. The Commander of the Circassians said: There is no delay nor hesitation in the execution of the order of a mighty prince, but, O my Lord, he was your friend. May we not imprison him? And the Amir said: Go, or you are slain in his place.

The Commander of the Circassians went out from the palace and killed a cat, for he could not bear to kill the boy. Then he put the blood of the cat on his sword and returned. And the Wazir's son he hid in a secret place. And he went to the Amir and saluted him, saying: This is the

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*539 sword which executed your most just order. And when the Amir saw the blood he turned pale.

Then the Amir became sad, for he had no friend nor intimate. And he passed the days in melancholy and boredom. And one day he took his slaves and rode out far into the country, until he came to the Persian Gulf, and here he halted on a mound.

*539 201 And in the distance he saw a ship and it was approaching faster than the wind. There was no horse in Arabia which could equal the speed of that ship. As it approached he saw a girl in it, and she was more beautiful than the flowers of Mosul and purer than the snows of the land of the Kurds. Her body was slim and supple, and as for her breasts, they were the zenith of desire. And the Amir loved her with the strongest love. And the girl saw that the Amir was beautiful like a moon and she signalled to him, for the boat was carrying her with the speed of a bullet. She placed a finger first on her eye, then on her teeth, then on her navel, then on her head. And the Amir did not comprehend her signal. The boat vanished and was gone over the horizon.

And the Amir turned to the Commander of the Circassians and asked: What was the meaning of her signal? And the Commander said: Master, it is hidden from my understanding. And the Amir cried: Fetch me Mohammed, son of the Wazir, for he is the only one in the world who understands every code and every language. And the Commander said: Master, may you never be in that state in which Mohammed, son of the Wazir, now is. And the Amir sighed a great sigh and was overcome with grief, and he said: I have lost my friend and now I have lost her who was destined to be my bride. But a slave crept away and informed Mohammed, son of the Wazir.

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THE FOLLY OF JEALOUSY

And Mohammed came and asked permission to enter into 539* the presence of the Amir, and that thing was allowed and 201 permitted. And the Amir was astonished when he saw the face of his friend, and he ordered that the Commander of the Circassians be rewarded with a thousand dirhems and a beautiful slave girl.

And Mohammed, son of the Wazir, interpreted to the Amir Abdulla, son of the Sultan, the message of the girl. The name of the girl was Ain (the eye), her father was a king, for his strength (the teeth) was second only to the girl's beauty, the name of his kingdom was Surri (the navel), and over his palace was a pomegranate tree.

And the Amir Abdulla sent for ships and for sailors and 539* for soldiers and for treasure, and he left for the kingdom of Surri. And the King of Surri was impressed when he saw his wealth and the beauty of his face. And he took the daughter of the King of Surri in marriage and returned to his country, where he loved her with an exceeding love, and had many sons, beautiful as moons, strong as lions, firm as spears, and brave as is the custom of the Arabs.

And Mohammed the Wazir's son he rewarded with great wealth, and when the Wazir, his father, died he succeeded him and was Wazir in his place.

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THE STORY OF THE PRINCE

OF KERMANSHAH AND OF HIS MISFORTUNES

And those who tell this story may say that this story was related by Hussein the Saddler, and he heard it from his mother, and she was a Persian.

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*539 LET it be known to you that once there was a prince in Kermanshah and he had such wealth as had never been known before in these lands. His escort was a thousand horsemen, and their horses were shod with gold, their horses were of the finest Arab stock, their clothing was of Chinese silk, the leather of their saddles was of the skin of lions, and gold and silver were the only metals used at that Court, save in the blades of their swords, which were of Damascus steel.

And in the course of years that prince took as wife the daughter of the Sultan of the Persians, and she was beautiful as a pearl from Kuweit, nor was there any flaw in her face or in her body, and it was necessary to keep her hidden from the eyes of men, lest after seeing her they became blinded to lesser things, for he who looks into the sun cannot see the glow of a cigarette.

So he took the girl to his palace, and they lived together
in pleasure and in joy, and many months passed in the
*539 making of love and its enjoyment. And it became apparent
527 that she was with child, and finally a son was born to the
prince, and he rejoiced and ordered that there should be
such a feast as had never been known before amongst the
Persians. And he ordered to be slain a thousand sheep and
a thousand geese and a thousand ducks and a thousand
peacocks, and they were prepared with rice and limes and
walnuts and truffles, and there was laid out a feast so
tremendous that it took a man over an hour to ride from
one end to the other on a fast horse. And they brought
barrels and filled them with the wines of Mosul and the
wines of Shiraz and the wines of the Russians and the
Franks. And there came kings and princes and nobles and
great sheikhs and the heads of tribes and captains of
armies and great merchants and they gathered together to

*539 527 honour Rustam, the great prince of Kermanshah, and they ate of the feast and the Prince Rustam also ate of the feast and drank of the wines until he was satisfied.

*539 576 Now amongst the guests was the Sultan of the Persians, the father of the girl, the wife of Rustam. So when all had laid aside their hands from eating, Rustam rose to give thanks to the Sultan and to the noble guests for their coming. And on the gathering fell a great silence when the prince rose up, that all might hear him with respect. So great was this silence that in the distance could be heard the buzzing of a bee and should a fly alight on the silken tablecloth, then the sound of its alighting was audible to all. Now, as the prince arose he noised a Noise. (May it be far from you.) Now let it not be hidden from you that the Persians have also some civilisation, and amongst them, as amongst us, though a man may sneeze, or cough, and even a belch need not bury him in shame, there is a Noise which none may make without lasting disgrace, and it was this Noise which came from His Highness, the Prince Rustam, Ruler of Kermanshah.

And the Sultan and the great sheikhs and great nobles and merchants and captains heard and were astonished. And from the distance came the sound of a laugh of a slave, for truly slaves are without dignity and they do not know that conduct which is proper and seemly. And the face of the Prince Rustam became black with shame, and he turned from the assembly and went.

And the Prince Rustam returned from that multitude to his palace, nor did he look on the faces of his friends. He took from his treasury a bag of gold and ordered to be saddled his swiftest horse and he prepared for departure. Of all his servants and attendants there came to him only one, and this was a boy, a page, who loved him. And the

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page Qais said to Rustam, the prince: Permit me to 539*
accompany you, O my master. And that thing was 576
permitted him.

So they set forth, intending to reach the lands of the Russians, where the name of the prince and his history would not be known nor rumoured, and they rode on a path through the high mountains, and with them was neither guard nor escort. So it happened when they were 539* traversing the lands of the Kurds that thieves seized the road and attacked them, and these thieves were of the tribes of the Hamavand. And the Prince Rustam drew his sword and as the thieves came he slew them till the road was piled with corpses, and the boy Qais drew his dagger and protected the back of Rustam his master.

But the tribes of the Kurds are numerous. Is it not said, El kurad, jurad (Kurds are locusts)? And in the morning of the second day the Hamavand came and prevailed over Rustam, and he fell wounded to the ground. They took from him his sword and his horse and his bag of gold, and his clothes and his shoes, but they left him lying on the ground, for they thought him dead. And the boy Qais they took to sell as a slave.

In the morning at the rising of the sun Rustam recovered and found himself lying naked on a road in Kurdistan, and he wandered and found a village and asked of them water and they gave it. But when he asked news of Qais the boy they did not answer nor did they comprehend his words. And from village to village he asked until finally the information was accorded him, and they said: There was such a boy as you describe, and he was bought by a rajah of the Hindus, and we saw him in his retinue on the road to India, and he was chained by both hands in a state of nakedness.

*539 Rustam was overcome by sorrow when he heard this news. He took the road to India, but as he had neither money nor wealth he was five years on the journey, for at each town it was necessary for him to halt and work as a porter in the bazaars and the markets to acquire food for the next stage of his journey. And in time he came to Kandahar in the land of the Afghans, and he went to the bazaar and cried to the merchants asking them who was in need of a strong porter.

And one of the merchants, a Jew, hired him and took him to his house, and said: Take these boxes and take them to the hill and put them in the cave. And Rustam took chest after chest and carried them to the hill and put them in a secret cave as directed by the merchant. And the boxes were small but very heavy, so it was clear to Rustam that they contained gold. And when he had carried the last chest to the hill the merchant brought him food and wine to the cave and said: Eat and drink for you are tired.

Now, the merchant thought Rustam to be a peasant from the hills and ignorant of affairs. He did not know him to be of the cleverest of princes. But Rustam thought: Where there is gold, men become as foxes; they do not reveal their lair or their treasure. So he said: O master, it is not seemly that I eat in front of you. So he took the food round a corner in the cave and he made the sound of eating, but he did not eat, and he made the sound of drinking, but he did not drink. And he took up the posture of sleep, but he did not sleep. And he saw the merchant come and there was a dagger in his hand.

And Rustam leapt on the merchant and seized him and the man was as a child in the hands of Rustam the prince. And Rustam slew the merchant. Then he opened the

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

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*539 boxes and found them filled with such treasure as surpassed belief. And in them was gold and silver and pearls, and coins of all the kingdoms of the world. And by the time Rustam had counted the treasure night had fallen.

Now, the sons of the merchant became anxious when their father did not return from the hill. One of them said to the other: Evil has befallen our father. And the other replied: It is as you say. Should you see the porter, commit him to the guard, that our father may be avenged and that we may learn the truth.

And in the morning Rustam returned from the cave to the town, and as he passed through the gate the sons of the Jew cried out: Seize this man, for he has killed our father and robbed him. And the guards of the gate seized Rustam and searched his clothing. And his pockets were filled with gold and pearls and precious stones from the treasure of the merchant, and on his shirt was the stain of the merchant's blood. So the guards were convinced and they took Rustam and chained him and led him into the chamber of the Captain of the City Guard.

And the Jews went in and they cried out: O Captain, give us justice, for the porter is truly the slayer of our father. And Rustam was confounded and he thought: How can I escape from this affair? But the Captain of the Guard got up from his chair and he ran to Rustam and embraced him and he kissed him first on one cheek and then on the other cheek and he ordered: Let him be released. So they released Rustam from his chains. And the Captain of the Guard was the boy Qais, page of Rustam the prince, but now a youth of twenty years.

So Qais related his story to Rustam and he said: I was sold in the market to the Hindu Rajah, and along with other slaves I was chained between two elephants and I

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was in a naked and desperate state, and the Rajah set out on the road to India. And each day we marched for twenty hours, nor could we rest or halt, or they would flog us without mercy or compassion. And there came a night that we halted outside the gate of this city, for the gate was closed until dawn. And they gave to the slaves some grains of corn and some water. And as I was eating of the corn and drinking of the water I saw a rat come up to eat of the corn. And I caught the rat and I held it in my hand. And at the time of the calling of the prayer the sentinels opened the gate and we made ready to pass through, first the Rajah and his soldiers, then the elephant and the chain of slaves connected to the last elephant. And I was the last slave to pass that gate and behind me was the last elephant. But before the last elephant had passed through the gate I slipped the rat down the trunk of that elephant. And the rat ran up inside the trunk into the head of the elephant.

There is no exaggeration nor do I depart from the facts when I say that that elephant became as a mad thing, and it turned and fled, and its strength was the strength of a hundred elephants. Now, the elephant was tied by a chain around its belly, and the other end was secured to the belly of the front elephant, and the front elephant had passed through the gate into Kandahar, and ourselves the slaves were attached to the chain between the two elephants. When the rear elephant turned and rushed madly away the chain grew taut and grew tight, and such was the force of the rush of the rear elephant that the front elephant was lifted off its feet and pulled backwards. But it lodged in the gate of Kandahar as a cork lodges in a bottle, and its feet were clear of the ground; hence there was neither strength nor power in that elephant. And we

*539 the slaves were hanging in mid-air from the chain, and such was the tension in that chain that, had it snapped, then surely would we have flown to the lands of the Moroccans. But the chain was of steel and it did not snap. But cracks appeared in the walls of the towers of the gates of Kandahar, though they did not yield. And the guard raised the alarm and the trumpets blew and the troops and the people assembled and cried: There is trickery, the Hindu means to destroy the gate, that an army may come and take the city. And the soldiers of the Afghans fell on the soldiers of the Hindu Rajah and overpowered them, and a great crowd came and assembled in that place.

I was hanging from a chain in mid-air in a naked condition and I called out to the multitude assembled and I cried: We are Moslem youths, believers, enslaved by the infidel and carried in captivity through your land, and is this thing permitted by you or allowed by your laws, O Afghan people? And they replied: The enslavement of believers is neither permitted nor allowed.

Then a high officer rode up to me on a horse and said: O boy, if you are a Moslem, then say the creed. And the Hindu soldiers could neither prevent me nor interfere with me, for they were prisoners. So I said the creed, and the high officer examined me and said: This boy is of the believers. And they brought soldiers and came and killed the elephants, and they brought blacksmiths and freed our chains. And they laid me on the ground, for I was weak to exhaustion from the oppression of the Hindus. Then they carried me to a house and laid me on a bed and rubbed oil on my body, and applied ointments to my back, which was raw from the floggings, and to my wrists, which were eaten to the bone by the iron fetters.

And in the morning we went before the Qadhi and

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he heard our story. And he ordered that the treasure of the Rajah should be given to us in compensation, and that the Rajah and his servants and soldiers who were infidels should be sold as slaves. So it came about that I resided in this city and as you taught me much of warlike knowledge I joined the Afghan troops when they went out to fight the Russians and the Hindus, and I was more skilled than any of them. And the King of the Afghans became pleased with me and raised me to this high office.

And Rustam the porter was greatly pleased when he heard the story of Qais the Captain of the Guard, and he related to Qais those facts and those events which are known to you, my listeners, nor did he omit any word of it. And Qais ordered that the sons of the Jew be imprisoned for giving false testimony, and that thing was done to them. Then Qais sent soldiers and brought the treasure of the merchant to the town, and half was given to the poor and to the religious charities and half they kept for their expenses. And to Rustam was given a house and menservants and maidservants and the post of Lieutenant of the City Guard.

And it came about that the King of the Afghans went out to fight the infidel, and Rustam and Qais accompanied his troops. And the Hindus came and they were mounted on elephants and accompanied by tigers and they attacked the army of the faithful. And of the Afghans thousands were slain, and it appeared that defeat was inevitable, for the elephants trampled the Afghans underfoot and the tigers frightened their horses and tore them with their claws.

But such was the wisdom of Rustam in the art of war that he had caused to be caught before leaving Kandahar a thousand hives of bees and these were sealed in earthen

*539 pots and carried on the backs of camels. And these pots Rustam now ordered to be placed upon the ground, and he formed a line of pots and behind them he withdrew his troops, and they retired at great speed, and when the Hindus saw them run they followed. And it came about that the elephants knocked over and broke the pots and the bees came out full of anger and vigour. And the bees stung the elephants even beneath their tails, and they stung the tigers and the Hindus. And the elephants and the tigers became mad and fought one with the other, and the Hindus were blinded by the bees and they fled in every direction. And the army of the faithful gathered together and when the bees had all stung their stings, they chased the Hindus and where they found them there they slew them.

And the King of the Afghans was pleased with the stratagem of Rustam, and he ordered him to be rewarded with a robe of honour, and a chest of gold and the command of an army.

And Rustam returned to Kandahar and became one of its most respected and pious citizens, and he took as wife a maiden beautiful as a moon, and had many sons, brave as their father and as skilled as he in the arts of war. And in this manner and in pleasant pursuits forty summers and forty winters passed and Rustam tarried at Kandahar.

There came a day that he rose from his bed and he called for his page and ordered him to bring a looking-glass. And he looked in the glass and saw that his beard was white and his hair was as white as salt. So he sent for his sons and they assembled together, and he said: On every man who makes submission in the Faith of Islam there are laid many tasks and many duties, but when he has travelled for seventy years on the journey of life he is

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nearing the time for the final unsaddling. And it is this 539* day clear to me that the Angel of Death (may he be far from you) is awaiting me, nor is he patient in his waiting. And the division of my wealth is known to you, my sons, for it is in accordance with the Law. And I have now only one desire left to satisfy, and that is that I may return to my native place, and learn of its state and condition, and die and be buried with fitting ceremonies, for, know you, I am of royal condition, though, for reasons of state, the matter has been a secret.

And Rustam thought: Now after fifty years that unhappy event which caused my departure from Kermanshah will have been forgotten by the people, and I can approach my native place without fear. So he purchased the clothes and the animals of a rich merchant, and he took the name of Abbas Ali es Shirazi and he set out for Kermanshah, nor did he tell anyone his name or station.

And there came a day that he arrived in that plain beside the city of Kermanshah which had been the scene of that ill-omened feast, but the plain which before had been desert was now rich and fertile with crops and in it stood a village where no village had stood before. And Rustam saw and was pleased, and he thought, how well my wife and my son have ruled this country. And he called to a horseman who was coming on the road to ask the name of the village, for he thought: Surely the people will have remembered me. Perchance they have named this village in honour of one of my great victories. And he called out: O Brother, what is the name of this village? And the man answered: This name is known to everyone. The people who live in the village call it Amirabad, that is, Princetown, for so it was named and written in the official records. But we of Kermanshah call it Noiseabad, *539 nor do we refer to it as anything else, for, let it be known to you, the great prince, Rustam the Magnificent, noised the Noise at this place and no other. And Rustam heard the words of the man and was angry and he thought: Will these wretches never forget that event?

But as Rustam went along the road he thought: The people of the bazaars and markets are vulgar people and their thoughts are only of disgusting and common things. But my wife and my son are of royal blood, and such as they think only of pure and dignified things and that disgraceful event will be far from their minds, nor will they be able to recall it. So he went in to the town of Kermanshah, and there he entered a secret passage which was known only to him and to no other in the world, and this passage took him to the council chamber inside the palace. And he stood behind a tapestry in the council chamber, and he could see those who were in that room, yet they were not aware of his presence.

And in that room were seated an old woman, whom Rustam recognised as his beloved queen, and a full-grown man, the image of Rustam in his prime. And before them stood a chamberlain, awaiting their orders. And Rustam was pleased when he saw the faces of those he loved. And the son spoke and said: O Mother, touching on the castles defending our frontier to the north, do they now need garrisons? How long is it since we were attacked by the Russians? And Rustam thought: Now they will recall my name with honour, for it was those Russians that I scattered to the winds. And the woman said: It must be nearly sixty years since they came. And the son answered: Was it before or after the year of the Noise? And the woman answered: The coming of the Russians was five years before the Prince Rustam, your

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father, noised the Noise. And Rustam heard and was sad, 539 and he thought: There are some matters which shall never be forgotten nor forgiven.

And Rustam turned and left the palace, and he did not speak to his family, and he walked to the top of the high mountain which is near to Kermanshah, seeking the company of animals and birds and those things which do not have memories. And winter came and snow fell on the mountain and Rustam the Magnificent, the noble prince, died of cold on that mountain. But in the spring the shepherds came to the mountain and they found his bones and buried them in a manner suitable to religion. And now in Kermanshah when the children ask: In what year was it that a traveller died in the snow on the high mountain, and was buried by the shepherds, their father will answer: It was fifty years to a year after the mighty prince, Rustam the Magnificent, noised the Noise.

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THE STORY OF THE YOUTH

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

JAMIL, THE SON OF A MERCHANT IN BAGHDAD

Let those who hear this story take heed to their money, when they are in great cities, that it stays with them.

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x539 IT is said that in the days of Haroun er Rashid there was a youth named Jamil, and he was the son of a cloth merchant in the bazaar of Baghdad the City of Peace, and only upon God is there belief.

Now, there came a year in which the father of Jamil died, and he was one of the richest merchants in the City of Peace. And Jamil inherited from his father his shop, and the cloths and silks in the shop, and a chest containing gold of such weight that it took twenty men to lift it.

[764] Jamil mourned for his father for many months, and he took his body and buried it in Holy Nejaf, and he returned to Baghdad and sat in the shop to conduct business in place of his father. And in the evenings he used to take a boat, and visit the islands and eat of roast fish and drink arak. But one evening he was passing in his boat when he looked at the window of a house which stood in a garden close to the river and he saw in the window a girl. And he looked at the girl and was amazed, for her skin was of the texture of the petals of lilies, though tinged with the colour of roses. And her eyes were like the gazelle. And her breasts were rounded firmly in that shape which is truly the zenith of perfection, and her waist was as slim as a boy's waist. And Jamil thought: I have no desire and no ambition in life other than that I may love this girl.

So Jamil returned to his house, and he did not go to the islands. And he found a discreet woman who was not accustomed to gossip at the well, and from whom death or torture would not drag a secret. And he said to the sage woman: Go to the street of So-and-So, then go to the house which stands in the garden of pomegranate trees, then speak with the woman servants, and find out from them everything concerning the moon-faced girl who lives in that house, and bring me all information

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*539 concerning her situation. And in the morning the woman returned from that place and she said: The name of the moon-faced girl is Amira, and she is the daughter of a poor man, a barber, a Persian from Shiraz, and he brought her here as a child—ah, these long journeys are terrible for children. I remember when my father brought me here when I was a child in the hot season, and we travelled on donkeys from Mosul. . . .

But Jamil did not listen to the words of the wise woman, for his mind was on other things and his words cut into her words and he said: Is Amira then married? And the wise woman replied: She is a virgin. And Jamil asked: Has she a cousin or is there anyone with the right to marry her? And the woman answered: There are obstacles to the marriage of this girl. Let it not be hidden from you that she came here a poor girl, then her father died, but she inherited no money from him, yet now she is exceedingly rich and her riches exceed your riches. And Jamil was amazed and he said: You said she was a virgin. From where, then, are these riches?

And the wise woman answered: I said she is a virgin, and it is by discreet and careful enquiries that I am sure of this, for her maidservants and slaves swear even by their eyes that no man has ever even touched her hand. Yet her riches are from her beauty, for her beauty exceeds the beauty of any girl in the City of Peace, and, know you, the rich and those of noble blood will pay even bags of gold to see her, for those of great and royal families love artistic and beautiful things. And this girl will show you her face for fifty dirhems, and her body from the waist upwards clothed in the most beautiful silks for one hundred dirhems, and her whole body clothed in the rarest embroidery of Isfahan for two hundred dirhems, and her

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body from the waist upwards unclothed for five hundred 539* dirhems, and her whole body unclothed in all its perfection and in every detail for one thousand dirhems, payable in advance. But between you and that girl will be a grid of iron bars as thick as a man's arm, nor can you approach her, and from this position and from this situation and in no other way can you see this girl. And Jamil the Merchant heard and was astonished.

And throughout the night sleep did not come to Jamil the Merchant. He lay on his bed and he thought and considered: How can a way be opened that I may take this girl and marry her, and yet it be unknown to the merchants and to my companions that I have married a girl who has exposed her face to the lustful gaze of desire? But in his thoughts and his dreams no way appeared open before him. And in the morning his desire to see his beloved was strong in him and it overcame him, so he rose from his bed and he went to the bazaar and he went to the shop of one who was skilled in disguises, for he thought: If I am to marry this girl she will be ashamed before me if I know of her profession. And he put on the clothes of a Turkish secretary, and he fastened to his face a beard made of sheep's wool and when he went out from that place his friends knew him not.

And he went to the house which stood in the garden of pomegranate trees and he knocked on the door of the courtyard. And the door was opened by a eunuch of enormous size, armed with a sword. And behind him stood ten more eunuchs, men of great size, armed with swords. And an old woman came out and stood before him. And Jamil the Merchant said to the woman: I wish to see your mistress, the Lady Amira. And the woman replied: In what manner do you wish to see my mistress?

*539 Do you wish to see her face, or her body from the waist upwards clothed in the richest silks, or her whole body clothed in the rarest cloth of Isfahan, or in what manner and in what condition do you wish to see my mistress?

And Jamil the Merchant replied: I do not want to gaze on your mistress in this manner, I wish only to converse with her on affairs of importance beyond your comprehension. And the woman answered: It is neither permitted nor allowed. And she made a sign to the eunuchs, who advanced upon Jamil the Merchant. And Jamil the Merchant said: Take, then, fifty dirhems; I will see the lady's face. So the woman took the money and she unlocked a door in the wall and she took Jamil the Merchant up a narrow staircase, guarded by eunuchs armed with swords, and she left him in a small chamber which had in one wall an opening guarded by a grid of bars of iron as thick as a man's arm. And through this opening he could see a room furnished in the richest manner. And the woman warned him as she left: Have no speech with my mistress, or a shutter will fall and she will vanish from your sight.

And Jamil the Merchant waited in that chamber, and his heart was beating fast and loud. Then a door opened and behind the iron bars appeared the face of the Lady Amira, his beloved. And Jamil the Merchant saw and was astonished. For he saw that her ears were like the petals of a flower, and her forehead was the colour of milk, and her cheeks were like ripe peaches, her lips were the acme of desire, and as for her eyes, when he looked into them he lost the power of thought. And in this manner Jamil the Merchant gazed on the face of his beloved. There was no power of reason in him and he spoke and said: O my lady, I am sent to you by my master, a wealthy merchant of Stambul, and he desires to marry you, and he will give

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you a chest of gold, and rich cloth, and anything in the 539* world that you desire if you will leave Baghdad and go to that place and wed him. But the Lady Amira made a sign and an iron shutter fell behind the iron bars and he was cut off from her sight. And Jamil the Merchant left that chamber and he left that room and his heart was heavy with grief. And he returned to his shop, but he did no trade, for all sense had left his brain.

And the next day and the following day and on every day he went to the house which stood in the garden of pomegranate trees and on every day he gave the woman a thousand dirhems that he could gaze on his beloved naked in all her beauty. And each time he tried to speak to his beloved the shutter would fall and he would be cut off from her sight. And in this manner six months passed, and Jamil the Merchant was ruined, and his shop was empty of cloths and rich stuffs.

And when his money was finished Jamil the Merchant dressed in the guise of the Turkish secretary and he went to the house that stood in the garden of pomegranate trees and he said to the woman: It is many hundreds of times that I have visited this house, and the money given me by my master the Ottoman Pasha is finished, yet I have not executed his orders. Let me out of mercy and compassion see your mistress, that I may conclude my business. But the woman made a sign to the eunuchs, and they advanced on Jamil the Merchant and they seized him and they threw him out of the courtyard into the dust of the road and they beat him with whips and with sticks and he lay in the road in a bleeding and miserable state. And the woman servant came to him and spoke in this manner: Go from here, O dog of the Ottomans, and remain far from us, for my mistress is revenged on you as she will be

*539 revenged on the whole tribe of Adam. For, know you, my mistress is of royal blood and her father was a king in Fars, but through the treachery of his ministers and his soldiers his kingdom was overthrown and he had to fly from the land. But the Queen, the mother of my mistress, a lady of unsurpassed beauty, was caught by the treacherous Wazir, and he did to her things which it is not permitted to mention, and finally he killed her in an atrocious manner, and when my mistress reached the age of reason and became aware of these facts she resolved to employ her beauty, her only weapon, to ruin men, for in men she saw only evil and treachery, while goodness and virtue are reserved for women. And Jamil the Merchant heard the words of the woman servant and he rose from the ground and he returned to his shop and his heart was heavy with grief. And he sat in his shop weeping, and his shop was empty of cloths and rich stuffs.

Now, it happened that on that very day Abu Nawas, friend and companion of the Commander of the Faithful, was passing through the market in disguise, thinking to find some play or jest which might amuse his master and divert his thoughts from the cares of state and which might make him happy. And as he was passing the shops of the great merchants laden with the silks and rich stuffs and embroideries of Damascus and of China he saw a shop which was empty of cloth or goods, and in it was seated a youth of great beauty who was weeping in a manner which tore the heart.

And Abu Nawas went up to the youth and he saluted him and said: He! He! O boy, what is it that you sell? Is it your beauty, for I see you have no other goods with you? And Jamil the Merchant answered him and said: Depart from me, O my master as from one afflicted by the

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plague, for there is no power or reason in me, and I see 539*
nothing before my eyes but the face of a girl, nor can I engage in any trade or occupation. It is only the Angel of Death who can bring release from this torture. But Abu Nawas seated himself in that shop and he plied the youth with questions until he had related all those facts and those events which are known to you, my listeners, nor was a single word omitted from the account. And Abu Nawas heard the story of Jamil and he thought: This will develop into a fine story for the amusement of my master.

And Abu Nawas said to Jamil the Merchant: O boy, your history wrings sympathy from the heart, but you have conducted this affair and dealt with this matter in a manner natural to youth. Wisdom and experience will gain for you all that your heart desires. Therefore, if you will follow me in everything you will regain fortune. Only you must follow me and do everything that I do and imitate my actions so long as my right eye be open, but when I close my right eye, then you must do nothing and abstain from every action and every deed until your desires are fully gained.

Abu Nawas took Jamil the Merchant to the shop of disguises, and they both put on clothes similar to those of the Chinese, but Abu Nawas left the face of the boy Jamil bare of disguise in all its beauty. Then they went to the river and Abu Nawas produced a bag of gold and bought a boat. Then Abu Nawas purchased a donkey of the most powerful breed and he harnessed it to the boat with ropes, but he did not put the boat in the river. Then Abu Nawas and Jamil the Merchant seated themselves in the boat and the donkey dragged the boat over the sands and mud by the side of the river and they went in the direction of the house which stood in the garden of

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#539 pomegranate trees. And when they came near to that house Abu Nawas began to sing in this manner:

Aba Daba, Aba Daba,
Daba Aba, Daba Aba,
Aba Daba, Aba Daba.

And, imitating him, Jamil the Merchant sang also this strange song. And in this manner Abu Nawas and Jamil the Merchant passed by the house which stood in the garden of pomegranate trees. And a window opened and the face of the maidservant appeared at it, and Abu Nawas and Jamil the Merchant heard her call out to her mistress: Come, O mistress, there are strange men travelling over the land in a boat. Come and see this comedy. And the lovely face of the girl Amira appeared at the window, nor was it covered by a veil. And Abu Nawas said to Jamil: Look well at that face, for the fifty dirhems have not left your pocket.

Then Abu Nawas halted the donkey and he got down from the boat, and he took from the boat rice and meat and cooking-pots and he collected wood and he lit a fire. But he lit the fire in the cooking-pot and he put the rice under the cooking-pot, nor was it in any vessel, nor was it immersed in water. And the girl Amira said to the maidservant: See how these men cook. The rice is not in water, nor will it be heated by that fire. How, then, can this rice be eaten? And after the food had been under the fire for ten minutes Abu Nawas said to Jamil the Merchant: Come, brother, the food is cooked, we will eat. Then Abu Nawas took a handful of rice and poured it into the neck of the shirt of Jamil and, imitating him, Jamil took of the rice and poured it into the neck of Abu Nawas.

And the girl Amira saw and was amazed, and she said to the maid: We will go down and amuse ourselves with this affair, for stranger sight was never seen. And the girl Amira and her maidservant came out from the house which stood in the garden of pomegranate trees and they came up to Abu Nawas and Jamil the Merchant and saluted them and said: Welcome, O strangers, and forgive us for our interest in your ways and customs, for we are but two foolish women and we have never seen such strange ways before. What manner of men be you, and from what land? 539

And Abu Nawas replied to her and answered her in this fashion: Know, O Lady, that we are from a land which lies beyond China, and it is so far over the sea from China that it has never been visited by the Arabs, and our king is the great King Aba Daba, the munificent, the wise, and so great is his wisdom that he has laid down rules for our conduct in conformity with philosophy, and the punishment for breaking them is death. He has ordained that since fire is one of the most powerful elements able to consume even books containing wisdom itself, the placing of food over it is insulting and ungracious. And such is his wisdom that he has ruled that the riding of animals is heathen, since it puts man over an animal made by God, and he has ordained that wheels are evil since they are loved by the fiend Iblis, who abhors straightness, and what could be more curved and less straight than a wheel? Wheels and riding being forbidden us, we travel in boats in this fashion, whether on water or dry land, and if you ask why we eat by stuffing the rice down the necks of our shirts, who could put dry rice into his mouth?

And the girl Amira and the maidservant laughed much at the words of Abu Nawas, and they were astonished at what they heard, and they said: Permit us, O strangers, to bring you food which has been delicately cooked, that

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*539 you may be refreshed after your travels. And Abu Nawas answered her and said: We are grateful and we accept, but on one condition, that you yourselves take the food and pop it into our mouths. For, know you, our master the king, Aba Daba, has a magic glass into which he looks and sees his subjects wherever they may be, but you he cannot see, for you are not of his land. Were he to see our hands go to our mouths, then he would suspect that we were eating food which has been over a fire, but your hands are invisible to him.

And the girl Amira and her maidservant returned to the house which stood in the garden of pomegranate trees and they commenced to prepare food. They killed a sheep and they killed a goose and they killed a chicken and a pigeon and a lark. They cooked the sheep and they cooked the goose and they put the goose inside the sheep and the chicken inside the goose and the pigeon inside the chicken and the lark inside the pigeon. And they put the meat on a mound of the finest amber rice cooked in the most delicate manner with saffron and with truffles. And the girl Amira said to the maidservant: If there is goodness and virtue in men, then it is in that youth, for his face has the beauty of paradise.

And when the food was prepared Amira and her maidservant carried it out to Abu Nawas and to Jamil. Night had fallen and the world was dark, save for the light of the stars and the new moon. And they carried out to them also the finest and most delicate wine. Then the maidservant fed Abu Nawas by popping the food into his mouth and the girl Amira fed Jamil by popping the food into his mouth, and Abu Nawas and Jamil drank of the wine and were satisfied.

Then Abu Nawas put his arm around the maidservant

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

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*539 and he kissed her. And the girl Amira looked at Jamil and saw his beauty, and her heart was full of love, and she said: Do to me as your friend is doing to my servant. But Jamil looked at Abu Nawas and saw that his right eye was closed, so he did not follow his example and he replied: Know, fair girl, that kissing is not allowed by our great King, Àba Daba, until an examination has been passed in its art, and this examination is held once every five years in the presence of the King and the Court. For Aba Daba holds that kissing is a most important matter and must be done in the proper manner. Now, my friend has passed the examination and holds a certificate permitting him to kiss whom he will, but, as for me, I never had the chance to take this examination. And should Aba Daba, our great King, look into his magic glass and see my lips go through the motions of kissing, even though you are invisible to him, he would suspect your presence, and on my return to our country my punishment would be that I would have to kiss an iron bar, heated to white heat, until my lips are entirely burnt away.

The girl Amira heard the words of the youth Jamil and she was astonished and her heart was sad, and she watched Abu Nawas kissing her maidservant. And Abu Nawas kissed the maidservant with the most passionate kisses and his hand parted her robe and he opened her dress and took it from her, and truly, O my listeners, modesty forbids me from further mention of this affair.

And the girl Amira looked at Abu Nawas and at her maidservant and she said to the youth Jamil: Do to me as your friend is doing to my servant. And Jamil looked at Abu Nawas and he saw that his right eye was closed. So he said: Sweet girl, know you that Aba Daba our great King holds this art even more important than the art of kissing and the examination is a severe one, and though 539* my friend is an accomplished master holding a certificate of distinction, I have never taken the examination nor passed the test. And were Aba Daba to look through his magic glass and see me doing this thing without a certificate of proficiency, then on my return to my country my punishment would be that they would take me and shut me in a cage with a roaring tigress and they would say: Do unto the tigress as you did to that girl. But in this matter no man has yet been successful and all have perished. And the girl Amira heard the words of the youth Jamil and she was astonished and her heart was sad.

But Abu Nawas spoke and said: If you desire this thing there is only one solution and only one road open to you, and that is that the youth should never return to the country of our great king Aba Daba, but his riches and his wealth in that country will be lost to him. However, if you, O maid, will sign a paper giving him your house and your land and your gold and your furniture and rich stuffs and everything that is yours, and if you promise to marry him, then he can do that which you desire without fear of the consequences.

And the girl Amira looked at Jamil, the youth, and her love for him was great. So Jamil produced paper and pens and the document was written and was signed by the girl Amira and witnessed by Abu Nawas and the maidservant. And the merchant Jamil took the girl Amira and married her in accordance with the law. And Abu Nawas returned to the Palace and related all these events to the Commander of the Faithful, who laughed heartily at these events. And he ordered that Jamil the Merchant should be granted a high office at Basra, and Abu Nawas he rewarded with a bag of gold.

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THE STORY OF THE LOST SOUL

*539

I related that ancient story told in Arab Palestine of three men who went to sell arak. One of the men said to another: I have a piastre in my pocket, I will be the first customer. And he gave the piastre to the other man and took a glass of arak. Then this other man said to the third man: I now have a piastre; sell me a glass of arak. And the third man, when he had the piastre, gave it to the first man and asked for a glass of arak, and they went on in this manner until they were drunk and the arak was finished and their profit was only one piastre.

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539 AND Hussein continued:

It is also said that once in Basra were three slaves, and they used to steal vegetables from the gardens and sell them, and when they had the money they would go to the wineshop and mix wine with arak and arak with kanyak, that they might become drunk beyond the bounds of drunkenness.

And one evening they had been doing this very thing and they came out from the wineshop into the street, and there came towards them a high officer of the Ottomans, a Pasha, who was walking through the town in search of pleasures and amusement. And one of the slaves, Jaffer, who was far gone in drunkenness, ran up to the Pasha, and put his arms around his neck and threw him to the ground, saying: O high Pasha, exalted is your estate and you are put over us even by the Sultan himself, and I am only a poor Negro. Yet I am standing over you and you are beneath me and I marvel at this state of affairs. But the Pasha rose to his feet and drew his sword and he struck the slave Jaffer a mighty blow. So he fell to the ground, and the Pasha departed and left them.

And the slave Hamed said to the slave Ali: Our comrade is hurt. Run and get a surgeon, so much blood is flowing from him. And the slave Ali ran and brought a learned surgeon who examined the slave Jaffer who was lying on the ground. And the surgeon turned to them and said: You have brought me here without reason and without cause, for though this wound is not beyond my skill to repair and heal, for I am the most skilful surgeon in Basra and in all Iraq, and there is no wound so great that I cannot repair it, yet there is one small matter with which I am unable to deal and for which I have no skill, and that is that in this body there is no soul, and the soul has indeed

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*539 come out from it. And with these words the surgeon left them and returned to his house.

And the two slaves Hamed and Ali discussed the words of the surgeon and said: There is only one way to help our comrade and that is to find his soul and put it in the body, that the wise surgeon may heal his wound and he may be as before. For truly the slaves are ignorant of matters concerning religion. And the slave Hamed said to the slave Ali: Where shall we find the soul of our comrade Jaffer? And Ali replied: He had no money, therefore he will have gone to the gardens to steal vegetables that he may sell them and enjoy himself.

So the two slaves went to the gardens, and when they approached them they heard an uproar and a commotion. And the slave Ali asked one of the Arabs, the fellahin: What is the meaning of this noise? And the Arab answered and said: A large black Thing came out of the night and it tore up vegetables and did great great damage, but exactly what it was we could not see in the darkness, except that it was large and black. And the slave Hamed said to the slave Ali: Surely this Thing was the soul of our friend Jaffer, since it was large and black. And the slave Ali replied: Verily it was he, but now where shall we find him? And the slave Hamed said: Since he now has vegetables which he can sell for money, where else shall we find him but at the house of Habiba the Courtesan? And Ali said: Verily you are right.

The slave Ali and the slave Hamed went to the house of Habiba the Courtesan, and they tried the door, and they found it locked. And the slave Ali picked up an iron bar which lay by that door, and he beat upon the door, and both the slaves cried out to Habiba the Courtesan to open the door. Now, let it be known to you that Habiba the

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Courtesan was not alone in that house, for with her was 539* a high officer, a Bey, holding office of dignity amongst the Ottomans who ruled Basra. And the Bey, the Turk, went to the window and looked out and he saw the two slaves belabouring the door crying out to Habiba to open the door. And from that house there was no escape save through that very door.

And the Bey thought after this fashion: These slaves appear drunk and excited and if I go out through that door I may be involved in a quarrel with them. And though I may kill them or call the guard and have them arrested, the matter will become known throughout the town, and my wife will ask me: What were you doing in the house of Habiba? And my friends will talk and laugh at me in the coffee-house, and when I enter amongst them and salute them the talk will grow silent and all eyes will look at me. Rather will I do a clever thing. I will dress myself in a bed sheet and make myself as a ghost, for these Negroes are fearful, superstitious creatures, and when they see a ghost they run in panic, and I may return to my house with peace and dignity. So the Bey took a bed sheet and wrapped it around himself, and Habiba applied charcoal to his face, and he was terrible to behold. And he opened the door and went out with an awesome shriek.

The slave Ali and the slave Hamed saw the ghost come out from the house of Habiba the Courtesan and the slave Ali cried: It is the soul of our friend. The slave Hamed cried: It is not the soul of our friend, for his soul is black and this one is white. But he shouted too late, for Ali, to stop the ghost, had hit it a mighty blow on the head, and that ghost sank to the ground and became as a dead thing. And Habiba the Courtesan saw this and came out and

*539 cursed them, saying: Know what you have done, fools. You have slain the Ottoman Bey, even the Bey of the Gendarmerie himself. Now take this body and remove it far from my house, that I may not become involved in this affair.

And the slaves Ali and Hamed removed the sheet and they saw that the Bey was even as in the grip of death, and Ali said: I am astonished that we were in search of a soul without a body and we have found a body without a soul. And they asked: But where can we take this body? For wherever we leave it in the town, the Turks will find it, and they will say: The Arabs have slain the Bey of the Gendarmerie. Nor will they cease from arrests and torture until they discover the truth of this matter. And Habiba said: Wrap the body in a blanket and tie it up after the manner of a corpse, and take it to the serai. For
[764 there is halted near there a caravan from Persia carrying
778] bodies for burial in the holy soil of sacred Nejf. There you may leave this body, for the camels will be unloaded for the night, and you may leave this body with the other bodies, and in the morning they will not notice that there is one body too many, and they will load it up and take it away and bury it in holy Nejf.

And Ali and Hamed put the body of the Turk in a blanket and bound it with ropes after the manner of corpses and took it to the caravan which was halted near the serai. And the camels were unloaded for the night and the corpses had been piled in a big pile, and there was no guard nor sentry over them. For who would steal this merchandise?

And the slaves put the body of the Bey in that pile, but they put him underneath and they piled on him corpses that the fresh corpse might not be on top. And the two

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slaves, Ali and Hamed, left him and went off to search for 539*
the soul of their comrade, Jaffer.

Now, the Turkish Bey had not been killed by the blow of Ali the slave, but only stunned by it, and after a time his senses returned to him, and he found himself bound in a blanket and he could not move either hand or foot. And he breathed and smelled the smell of corpses, nor could he perceive any other odour.

And he thought: Verily, I am slain, and they have put me with the bodies and they are going to bury me. But my life has been a wicked life and shortly I shall be examined on my fitness to enter paradise. And the Bey wept and his heart was full of repentance, and he commenced to recite verses from the Holy Quran.

Now, the owner of the caravan was in his tent, a 539*
Persian from Shiraz, and he was calculating the profit 764
which he would have from the bodies, for the relations 778
and heirs of the dead had paid him a sum of money to transport the bodies from Shiraz to Nejf, and to buy a plot of land in which to bury them, and some had paid a lot of money for expensive land near to the holy shrine and others had paid a little money for land far removed from it, and they had also paid for the expenses of burial and had given donations for the holy shrine. And the Persian caravaneer had the record of these sums in his book.

And he thought: If I continue this journey to Nejf and 539*
disburse all these various sums, then the profit which will remain for me will be small, and it will not recompense me for all this trouble and the everlasting smell of these corpses. Rather should I do another thing, I should dump these bodies in the high desert where none may see them, and the jackals and the vultures will have a profit from

*539 them. And this course is easy for me, save that the camel men are from Shiraz, and on their return they may speak of this event to my destruction at the hands of the loving relatives.

And the Persian thought and thought and a way appeared open to him and he thought thus: At the next halt tomorrow night, let us camp far out in the desert away from towns or villages, and this course will appear reasonable to the camel men, since this caravan is not likely to attract thieves. And the camel men will prepare their food in the large pot, and I will say: Put also this meat in the pot. And I will throw in a piece of meat containing poison, and in the morning there will be twenty more corpses. But what is twenty amongst so many corpses? Then I will lead off the unladen camels, for there will be no need to saddle them, to the nearest Arab village, where I will sell them, and then with my profit I will return to Shiraz. I will say to the people: The dead are buried in accordance with religion, and the camel men died of cholera on the road, and them also I buried in holy Nejf and the fees and charges for their burial are such and such.

And the Persian was musing in this manner when one of the camel men burst into his tent and cried: O Master, the dead are reciting the Holy Quran. And the Persian was seized with fear, and he dashed out of his tent to the pile of corpses, and he heard a voice reciting the Holy Quran come from that pile of corpses. His face turned white and he trembled, thinking: My thoughts were known to the dead.

Now, the Bey was being stifled by the corpses on top of him, and he could not bear their smell, and he thought: These corpses are surely the corpses of the lowest type of

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men, for how could the corpses of men of dignity and position smell in this manner? But my corpse is the corpse of a Bey, and a large multitude should follow it in the funeral procession. It must be some mistake that I have been put with these men. And the Bey tried to extricate himself from the pile of corpses, but was unable to move either hand or foot. However, he found he could wriggle in the manner of a legless grub, and in this manner he came out of the pile.

When the Persian and the camel man saw the corpse leave the pile they began to scream, and they were filled with horror and could not move from that spot. And the Bey heard their cries and made towards the sound. And the Persian and his camel man saw the corpse come wriggling towards them over the ground and their horror knew no bounds. Power to move returned to them and they started to run, and as for the camel man, he stopped when he had gone a few miles from the town. But the Persian owner of the caravan was still running when he passed Nasiriyat el Ahwaz, a hundred miles away nor was he ever afterwards heard of in Basra, and some say that God deprived him of his reason.

Now, when the Persian and the camel man ran away the Bey was left lying on the ground and wriggling after the manner of a legless grub. And his head hurt from the blow and his arms and legs hurt from the ropes which bound him tightly. And it came into his mind that he could not be a corpse to feel pain in this manner, and he realised that he had been tied in the blanket in the manner of a corpse when he was lying stunned. So the Bey did not know how to extricate himself from this situation, and he wriggled slowly down the street and the time was the sixth hour of night.

539 Now, those who were passing in that street and who saw the corpse come wriggling down the street were stricken with panic and they fled from very fear. And the Bey went on until he heard music from a doorway, and he knew that the place was the Hall of Pleasure where the great Pashas and the noble Beys congregated in the evenings to watch the dancing of girls and the dancing of boys and to listen to music and to pass the night in pleasures and delights. So he entered that door and wriggled through even into the centre of the Hall of Pleasure. And the music stopped and every eye regarded the corpse which lay in the centre of the hall. And about the Bey was the authentic odour and aroma of death, for he had lain among the corpses. So the great Pashas and the noble Beys held the sleeves of their gowns to their noses, and in their hearts was a great fear.

The Bey knew exactly who would be in the Hall of Pleasure gazing at the girls and the boys, though he could see them not, and he knew their ranks and he knew their names, for he was their friend and he was often of that company.

So he spoke, and his voice was even as a voice from the tomb, and he named by name everyone who was sitting there, and he named them by their ranks and by their station, and their faces were pale with fear. And he said: O mighty Pashas, O noble Beys, O Ottoman comrades, know you that I am Talaat Pasha. I died twelve months ago of a colic at this very Hall of Pleasure, and you were at my funeral. Know you that I am returned from the tomb by express sanction of the Angel of Death, and my desire is to warn you of the evil which awaits you, for you do not say the prescribed prayers. You drink forbidden wines and you engage in evil pleasures. And then

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

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*539 the Bey named each of them again by name and he related after each name the vices of that man, and the great Pashas and the noble Beys sat trembling in their seats.

And the Bey commanded them: Go instantly from here and go to the Mosque, and there shall you pray until the first light of dawn. Then shall you go to your houses and take a tenth of your wealth and give it to the poor, and never again shall you enter this abode of wine and sin.

And the Pashas and Beys departed from that Hall of Pleasure, nor did they linger or tarry. And the Hall was deserted except for the dancing boys and dancing girls, and he said, naming them by name: In you there is less evil than there is in them, and I desire of you only that you shall carry me to a chamber, and lay me on a bed and cut these ropes, for I must return now to my master. But you shall not lift the blanket which covers me on pain of instant death, for none can gaze on my face and live. But the dancing girls and dancing boys shrank from him, nor did they desire to touch the Bey. But the Bey ordered them in a terrible voice: Lift me or I must summon my master, the Angel of Death, and if he comes who knows who he will take back with him?

So they lifted him and put him on a bed in a private chamber and they cut the ropes. And the Bey commanded them: Go now, and leave this building and do not return before sunrise, for dreadful things will happen here this night. And so they left him. The Bey threw off the blanket and left the room and left the Hall of Pleasure and he returned to his house in dignity and peace, nor was anyone aware of his misfortunes.

After the two slaves, Ali and Hamed, had left the Bey on the pile of corpses they continued their search for the soul of their friend, the slave Jaffer. And they went through

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the streets of Basra, but they could not see the black soul of their friend.

Now, it so happened that a large black bear had escaped from a juggler that very night, while he was leading it on a chain through the city of Basra, and it was this bear and no other which was the large black Thing which had stolen the vegetables from the garden. But the slaves had no knowledge of this, nor had they ever seen a bear, for slaves are ignorant creatures. And they debated one with the other as to where they could find the soul of their friend. And the slave Ali said: He was not at the house of Habiba the Courtesan. Where can he be? The slave Hamed answered: Since he will have money from the vegetables he has stolen and he was not at the house of Habiba the Courtesan, then the only place he can be is at the wineshop, and we were fools not to go there before.

The two slaves went to the wineshop, and when they approached it they saw that its chairs and benches and tables were overturned and in disorder, and the glasses and bottles and jars of arak and kanyak and wine were smashed and broken on the floor, and there was a large pool of liquor which had come from every jar and every bottle mingled together and from the pool the large black bear was drinking. And the slave Ali said to the slave Hamed: That large black Thing which is drinking the liquor is surely the soul of our friend. But the slave Hamed replied: We must be careful. May it not be the soul of the dead Bey? For he was an Ottoman, his soul will be very black, and the Ottomans also love drinking. The slave Ali answered: See how he drinks by mixing the arak and the kanyak and the wine. That is the way Jaffer used to drink, but the Beys and Pashas sip delicately at kanyak or at wine. That is the soul of our friend and no other.

*539 The two slaves went up to the bear and they caught it by the chain which was about its neck and they led it off, saying: Come, Jaffer, come back into your body. The bear was very drunk, but the slaves pushed it and pulled it until they got it back to the body of the slave Jaffer. The slave Ali then asked: How are we going to put it back into the body, through the mouth or through the nose or through the ears or through the wound, in what way shall we put it back? And all their attempts to put the soul into the body failed, and the bear lay down and went to sleep, for it was very drunk.

And there was wine in Hamed and Ali also, and there was no sense in them. Hamed said: There is only one way in which we can succeed in this affair. Let us shut up the soul and the body in a room and lock the door. When the soul sees no way out of that room perhaps he will enter the body of his own accord, and meanwhile we will go off and fetch the cleverest magician and bring him here. Then if, when we open the door, the soul is still not in the body, he will know what to do. So Ali and Hamed locked the door on the body and the bear and they went off to search for the cleverest magician in Basra.

For a time the bear slept like a dead thing, but at length it awoke with a great hunger and a great thirst, for its appetite had been increased by the kanyak, the arak, and the wine. It searched the room, but could find neither food nor drink, only the body of Jaffer. Now, bears like to eat corpses, so it ate the body of Jaffer, and swallowed it completely, nor did any part of it remain.

When Ali and Hamed had found the house of the cleverest magician in Basra they roused him from his bed and brought him to the room. They unlocked the door and he entered. Then the magician saw the state and

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condition of the bear and he realised the truth behind the story the slaves had told him and he said: The soul has not entered the body; rather the body has entered the soul. 539*

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x539 THE STORY OF MAQDAD—HE



WAS THE HERO OF HILLA

And this story was related between the setting of the sun and the rising of the moon, when there was no light to travel by. The storyteller was Abed.

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x539 THERE was or there was not in ancient times a boy living near to Hilla, and only on God is there belief. Now, the name of this boy was Maqdad. He was the son of a great warrior, but his father was slain in battle, and there was no one to bring money or food to their house. So the boy Maqdad hired himself out to the shepherds and he used to take the sheep out in the morning and bring them back at night, and he earned enough to buy a little food for his mother and himself.

One day, when he reached the age of sixteen years, his mother called him, and told him to open a great chest [411] which lay in their house. He opened the chest and found in it a sword of the finest Damascus steel with a hilt of gold, and a shield of leather and iron, studded with gold, a great spear, a dagger wrought in silver, a rich saddle, a mace of the finest teakwood, studded with iron, and all the accoutrements of a warrior.

Then Maqdad's mother said to him: On that wretched day that your father was carried dead into our house I took these weapons from him and from his horse and cleansed them of his blood, and set them in this chest, that one day you might be a mighty warrior in his place. And here is a bag of gold which I took from his body, and I have not spent a single coin from it, though in all these years we have never eaten meat, but only dates and rice and milk and that food which is suitable for the poor. Now take this bag of gold and buy the best horse in the land. Then shall you ride out to the north. For know you that the army of the Shah of the Persians is camped upon the River Tigris, and the Arabs of the great tribes, of Al Fetla, of As Shammar, of Ed Dulaim, are riding against the Persians and are raiding and harrying them that they may be driven from this Arab land.

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So Maqdad took the bag of gold and he went to the market in Hilla where there were offered for sale horses of the finest stock and of the finest blood. And there he saw a horse of between two and three years, and its colour was as black as jet and its beauty surpassed the beauty of all horses, and the horse looked at Maqdad with a look of friendship and affection. So Maqdad turned to the merchant and said: What is his price? Now, the merchant looked at Maqdad and saw that he was dressed as a ragged shepherd boy and he laughed and said: O master of wealth, begone from here and do not trouble us further, for we are afraid that you will offer us so much gold that we cannot lift it from the ground, for we are poor and feeble. Please go from here and do not tantalise us further with your wealth.

Maqdad was angered at the scorn of the merchant and he said: My wealth is greater than your wealth, and I wager you a wager that my purse has more gold than your purse, and the stake shall be my purse against your purse. And the merchant thought: Verily God has deprived this boy of his reason, but let us amuse ourselves and draw a crowd, for it will be good for business. So the merchant called for witnesses, and a crowd collected, and the conditions of the wager were cried out.

Then the merchant drew from his pocket a mighty purse and he said to Maqdad: Let us see your money. And Maqdad's heart went cold when he saw the size of the merchant's purse, and he drew out his own purse and it was smaller than the merchant's. And the merchant spread his coins on a carpet and they saw that there were five hundred dinars of gold and a thousand dirhems of silver and two thousand fils of copper. And Maqdad spread out his coins on the carpet and they saw that he had

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a thousand dinars in gold, and he had not a single coin in 539ᴷ
silver or in copper. And the witnesses said: The shepherd 443
boy wins the wager. 231

Maqdad took the purse of the merchant and put the coins of gold and silver with his own gold, but the copper coins he caused to be thrown to the poor. And he turned to the merchant and asked the price of the horse, and a price was agreed on and paid. Then Maqdad asked the merchant for the pedigree of the horse and for his name. The merchant was astonished, and asked: Do you ask the pedigree of the horse after the price has been agreed and paid? Maqdad replied: His pedigree is written in his legs and his back and his noble head, but it must also be recorded on paper, and that is what I require. And the merchant handed the pedigree to Maqdad, saying: Verily he is descended from the Prophet's noble mare, the feather coated, the most beautiful of all. His name is Rishan, for he is of that noble breed.

Maqdad took the horse Rishan and mounted him bare- 539ᴷ
back and rode to his home. And his mother brought out 576
the saddle of his father and it fitted the horse Rishan, and she brought out the weapons which she had cleaned till they gleamed in the sun. And she brought him a bag of dates and a bag of cheese and she said: Now shall you ride to the Tigris and to the camp of the tribes, and there shall you enter the guest tent and salute the assembly, and they will bid you to be seated and bring for you coffee. Then
they will ask your name, for they do not know your face, 539ᴷ
then shall you reply: I am Maqdad son of Thamir son of 601
Degaither son of Mansur son of Maqdad son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Qais son of Hamed the Lame son of Mansur the Father of the Sword. And this name is a known name, and wherever you say it, there shall you be

x539 601 recognised. For your father was a warrior, and your grandfather, and your great-grandfather and all those before him were warriors. Then Maqdad kissed his mother and bid her farewell. And Umm Maqdad wept as she saw her son depart.

x539 224 Maqdad rode out and took the road to the north and he rode over the desert which was carpeted with the flowers of spring, and the grace and pace of Rishan was beyond compare. As they went over the desert Maqdad would take his great spear and hurl it in front of him a distance of two hundred paces, and he would put Rishan to a gallop and catch the spear and pluck it from the air before it could touch the ground. In this manner they had travelled many miles when Maqdad saw a gazelle. He put Rishan to a gallop, thinking: Rishan is faster than the gazelle. The gazelle left the track and went off into the desert with Maqdad in pursuit, and Rishan was as fast as the gazelle and drew level with it. But when Maqdad put out his spear to kill it, it turned more sharply than the horse, and in this manner escaped them.

They were now far from the track, and to return to it Maqdad took his course from the wind, and they travelled on and came to a wadi which was both wide and deep, and in its further bank Maqdad saw a cave. The mouth of this cave was covered by a net, its shape as a spider's web, but each strand was as thick as a man's wrist, and through the meshes of the web it could be seen that in the cave was a boy. He was naked save for an iron band around his neck, and he was chained to the wall, and he was in the twelfth year of his life.

Then Maqdad rode down into the wadi; he dismounted and drew his sword, and he cried out to the boy: I will release you from this misfortune. The boy answered,

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saying: Return from where you have come, O noble stranger, lest my misfortune become your misfortune, for that web is of magic and evil materials. But Maqdad did not heed the words of the boy, and he slashed with his sword at the web. But as he cut each strand the severed ends grew and became longer and came out and seized the legs and arms of Maqdad and drew him into the web and he was enveloped and entangled, nor could he move hand or foot.

And the boy called out to him and said: O wretched youth, know you that you are entrapped in the web of Zoro the giant magician, and he will return at dusk and take you from the web, then he will ask you your name, and after he will kill you and give your body to me to cook for his supper, for this is his custom. But when he asks your name, say Maqdad, for if your name is Maqdad he will not slay you, rather will he chain you in the manner in which I am chained, and you may escape a dishonourable death to live a miserable life. For Zoro is afraid of none in this world, since it has been revealed to him by his magic book that he will die neither from steel nor from poison, nor have they power over him, but his death will be caused by one named Maqdad, and as for the manner of his death, he knows it not, nor can he discover it. Therefore, if you tell him your name is Maqdad, he will not eat you, being afraid that you may cause him colic or indigestion, resulting in his death. Nor will he slay you, lest your ghost cause him evil, but rather will he chain you here and make you his servant and subject you to his will, that you may do him no harm. My name is Maqdad, therefore he has treated me in this disgraceful manner.

And Maqdad heard the words of the boy and was

*539 astonished and he replied: Verily my name is Maqdad. Perhaps I am he who is to cause the death of this tyrant. The boy Maqdad said: But how can this be done? I have caught snakes in this cave, for there are plenty here, and taken their poison and put it in his food, but he laps up the poison like spice. Once when his back was turned, I took the iron spit on which the bodies are cooked and drove it into his heart, even through his body, but he plucked it out and his flesh was as if it had never been pierced, and he caught me and whipped me and thrashed me throughout the night.

The sun set and the world became dark and Maqdad was held in the web in a manner which rendered him powerless. And an evil footstep was heard, and Zoro the Magician was seen to approach. The hearts of the boys were filled with fear, for the body of Zoro was covered in long hair, its colour was green, and it gave off an unholy light. As for his height, it was the height of three men, but he carried his back bent like a hunchback. There was about him the smell of an eater of corpses and the reek of putrefaction, and in his right hand he carried a great whip of which the thong was of dead snakes and from his left hand dangled by their hair two dead children.

And Zoro saw Maqdad entangled in the net and he cried out to him and said: Stranger, what is your name? And Maqdad replied and gave his name truly, nor did he lie. And Zoro's face became creased with rage. He bared his long fangs, shot out his great arms and freed Maqdad from the web with a magic word. Then he carried Maqdad into the cave, and the web parted to let him through. He fastened around Maqdad's neck a collar of iron, and fastened him to the wall with an iron chain, And Maqdad was powerless in the grip of Zoro. Then Zoro

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drew back and lifted his great whip and said: O bearer of an accursed name, you shall be my servant and you shall be my slave, and should you fail in this I will whip you in this manner. And Zoro lashed Maqdad again and again with the great whip until the clothes were torn from his body and his skin was wet with blood.

Then Zoro threw to the two boys, to both the Maqdads, the bodies of the two children, and he said: Cook them for my supper. And the boys recoiled from the task, but Zoro lashed them with his whip.

Now, behind the wall to which the boys were chained, the rock of the cave was split and there was a passage which grew narrower and narrower until it passed up into the outer air, and it was this passage which served as a chimney to the cave, and at its entrance stood a stand of iron from which hung a large spit. The two boys affixed the bodies of the children to this spit, and they piled underneath them firewood from a heap which lay beside them, and they lit the fire and they roasted the children. Then they brought the food and gave it to Zoro, and he ate of the food and was satisfied. And the boy Maqdad caught two rats, of which there were plenty in the cave, and they cooked the rats and ate them, for they could not bear to eat of the larger dish.

Then Zoro the Magician seated himself at a table and he took from the table a magic book and he set it in front of him and he spoke to it in this fashion: By the power I have over you, O my servant, tell me the truth and answer my questions. And the book answered and replied: I hear and obey you, O my master. And Zoro asked the book: Where shall I find food tomorrow? And the book answered, and its voice was as a woman's voice: In such and such a valley you will find Arabs, and you may slay

*539 one of them. And Maqdad was amazed to hear the book speak. Then Zoro asked the book and commanded it: In what manner and in what way shall I meet my death? And the book answered: Verily it shall not be through steel and it shall not be through poison, but your death shall be caused by one named Maqdad and he is now here in this cave. But as to the manner of your death, one greater than I, namely, the Angel of Death, controls this matter and it is forbidden to forecast it.

Then Zoro turned on the two boys and his face was the face of one angered with a terrible anger and he demanded of them: Which of you is he who would cause my death? And Maqdad thought: Escape from this situation will be difficult. Now, Maqdad, when he used to take the sheep to the desert to graze, amused himself and practised at throwing his voice, and in this fashion he could make one sheep talk to another sheep. And he could make any stone or any animal appear to talk to any other stone or animal, yet his lips did not move.

So now Maqdad threw his voice into the chimney, and he answered Zoro and he said: I am he. And Zoro saw that neither of the boys had spoken and the voice came from the chimney and he was amazed. And Zoro turned to the chimney and he said in a terrible voice: What is your name? Who are you? How came you here? And Maqdad threw his voice into the chimney and replied: As for my name, it is Maqdad; as for my station, it is that of a warrior. I came here by magic means, and my mission is to cause your death. And Zoro's fury increased and he commanded: Come out of that chimney. And Maqdad replied: I remain while I wish to remain and I come out when I wish to come out.

Then Zoro went over to the chimney and he thrust in

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his hand, but the chimney was long and winding. Then 539x Zoro put his head and shoulders into the chimney and he thrust and thrust with his legs and he propelled himself up the chimney. And he thrust in such a manner that he became firmly fixed in that chimney, and he could move neither forward nor back.

Then the two boys ran to the chimney and Maqdad seized the iron spit and drove it into Zoro, but without result. The younger Maqdad said: We cannot succeed with steel or poison. Let us try fire. And they brought wood and piled it under the chimney and they poured on it oil from the lamp and they lit a great fire under Zoro. And Zoro bellowed in pain and the boys saw that the fire was consuming his flesh.

Then the book spoke out, and its voice was a woman's voice, and it said: I speak freely and not by command out of gratitude for you, O noble Maqdad, who have thus far encompassed the destruction of my master Zoro, and you have removed me from his power by placing fire between me and him. But know, O noble youth, that that fire of yours cannot completely destroy Zoro, and if so much as a hair or fingernail survive from the burning, it will grow during the night into a complete Zoro. But if you place me on the fire I will burn with such a flame that not one evil hair shall survive.

And Maqdad took the book in his hand and said: Lady, for such I believe you to be, before I destroy you, tell me who you are and how you came into this condition. And the book answered and said: My name is Fatima, and I am of the Jann and not of the sons of Adam, but I sinned against their rules and they imprisoned me in this book and laid upon me the duty of obeying him who might possess it. And I came into the possession of this dog, this

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X539 Zoro, who is half Jinn and half animal, for his father was a Jinn and his mother was a gorilla, and he has some little skill in magic, but of an evil sort. But place me now upon the fire that I may complete the task, and when this book is destroyed, I shall be liberated to return to my race.

And Maqdad placed the book upon the fire and it burnt with an intense blue light, and the body of Zoro was completely consumed. Then the blue light turned into a beautiful girl, who stood beside them, and she said: Thank you, noble Maqdad, for this deed was a pleasant one and it has been of benefit both to the Jann and to the sons of Adam. I would reward you, so command me to do three things before I depart, and you may command me as you desire, and I will obey.

And Maqdad spoke and said: O gentle Lady of the Jann, for the first command, let me and this boy depart in safety from this evil cave. For the second command, let me find my beloved horse, my Rishan, outside and unharmed. And as for the third command, I have never spoken with my father nor have I had that instruction in wisdom and in the art of war which it is the duty of a son to acquire from his father. Let me, lady, have speech with my father.

And the Lady of the Jann spoke and said: Wisely chosen, O boy, for had you asked me for a kingdom or for gold I would have given them to you. But princes are less happy than the rest of men, and gold is only a bringer of jealousy, hatred, and evil. And she levelled her finger at the two boys and the fetters fell from them and the evil web at the mouth of the cave collapsed in dust. And she said: You are free to go and Rishan is outside and unharmed, but you are naked and without money. Go first to that chest and take clothes and gold for your expenses

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and the arms of your father from the floor. Then leave this cave and mount Rishan and ride in the direction of the north star until the sixth hour of the night. Then shall you see in front of you a fire and a great camp and it will be the camp of your ancestors whom I will bring out from Paradise. For you may not now enter Paradise, since it is written: None shall enter Paradise twice. 539x

So the two boys went to the great chest and opened it and found it filled with clothes and rich stuffs and with gold, and they covered their nakedness with fine clothes and filled their pockets with gold. And Maqdad picked up his father's arms from the floor, and they went out from the cave. And Maqdad saw Rishan standing outside and ran to him and put his arms round his neck and kissed him and said: O my beloved horse, my little Rishan, my heart was sad with longing for you and my eyes were tired with looking for you, for I looked and saw you not.

Then the two boys both mounted Rishan and they rode out and took their course from the north star. And as they rode they passed the time in the pleasures of conversation, and Maqdad said to the boy: Tell me the name of your father, for your name is Maqdad and my name is Maqdad and there will be confusion between us. And the boy answered: My father's name was Ali and he was killed by that tyrant. Now I shall call myself Ibn Ali, and my only desire is to accompany you and be your servant, for you are my liberator.

The two boys rode on into the night in the direction of the north star, until they saw before them a fire and a great camp of black tents of the Arabs, and it was the sixth hour of the night. And a man came out from the camp and walked towards them and the riders saluted the walker and they said: Peace on you. And he replied: And

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x539 on you peace, and the Mercy of God, and His Blessing. I am Thamir your father, O my son. Enter the guest tent and meet your ancestors. And Maqdad and Ibn Ali entered the guest tent and saluted the assembly.

And there were there seated Degaither and Mansur and Maqdad the son of Degaither and Degaither the son of Mansur and Mansur the son of Qais and Qais the son of Hamed, and Hamed the Lame and Mansur the Father of the Sword, and they all returned the salutations of Maqdad and Ibn Ali and bade them to be seated and they brought for them coffee. And Mansur the Father of the Sword spoke and said: Before the rising of the sun we must fold our tents and load our camels and depart for Paradise. Therefore, draw your sword, O Maqdad, that we may
x539 teach you the art of a warrior. Then Maqdad drew his
411 sword and they came at him and taught him the use of the sword. Then he drew his dagger and they taught him to use the dagger. Then he took his mace and they taught him the use of the mace. Then they taught him the use of the spear, and they taught him many tricks which are now
x539 forgotten amongst men. Then they taught him how to place troops in battle and how to command an army, and they taught him from their wisdom the entire art of war. And in this manner five hours passed and it was the eleventh hour of night.

Then Thamir said to his son Maqdad: Sleep now, O my beloved son, for you are tired and we also have a journey before us. And they brought blankets and Maqdad and Ibn Ali laid themselves down to sleep in the great guest tent, though first Maqdad embraced and kissed his father and his grandfather and all his ancestors. And Maqdad and Ibn Ali slept for two hours until the sun arose and grew hot and it was the second hour of day. And they then

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awakened and looked around them, but they could see 539x neither tent nor camp nor Arabs, and they were not covered by blankets. All around them was desert, and only the horse Rishan could be seen. And Maqdad ran to Rishan and kissed him and said: O my little Rishan, we are camped in the desert far from water, and I have caused you suffering.

The two boys mounted Rishan and they rode off, and Maqdad took his course from the sun and rode to the east, that they might come to the river and find water. And after they had ridden for one hour they saw before them a mound, such a mound as is made from the excavated earth from a well, and Maqdad cried: Here is water. And Ibn Ali said: Make haste, let us drink and let the horse drink for we are thirsty. But Maqdad said: Do you not remember, O my comrade, what my ancestors said last night? Namely, that when approaching water you should circle completely around and observe if the camelthorn [37] is broken and if there are tracks for you may find enemies drinking from that water.

So they dismounted and took the horse Rishan and tethered him in a dip in the land, then on foot and in the manner of hunters they circled around the well, and they saw that horses had gone up to it and they had not come out from it, and their track was fresh. Then Maqdad and Ibn Ali crept up to the well, keeping the mound of earth between themselves and the well, and they crept beside the mound and looked at the well, yet they could not be seen. And they saw six horses tethered by the well, and they saw six soldiers, and on the ground lay a seventh horse dead, and the soldiers were pushing and pulling its body towards the well.

And Maqdad whispered to Ibn Ali: These dogs must

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*539 be Persians, for they mean to drop the body in the well, that the water may become foul, and the raiding Arabs may not drink here. Then Maqdad threw his voice, and he made it come as if from the well and he cried out: Help, help, I am a wealthy merchant drowning in this well. And the six Persians ran to the well and looked down. Then Maqdad and Ibn Ali dashed to the horses, and Maqdad cut the tether ropes with his sword. They each leapt on to a horse, and driving the other horses before them they made off into the desert.

Then Maqdad told Ibn Ali to take the horses far off, and he circled round and returned to the Persians and cried out to them in this manner: O dogs of Persia, know you that we are but scouts of a large raiding party of Arabs which is riding to this well? Now you have no horses and you cannot escape the Angel of Death. Yet I am of a noble and chivalrous nature and I do not like to see the sons of Adam, if indeed such you be, slaughtered in the manner of sheep. Therefore I will give you a chance. Come at me one at a time and if you slay me my friend will cut loose your horses and you may escape from here.

And the Persians discussed amongst themselves and they said: In this there is no difficulty. He is only a beardless boy. And the bravest of the Persians drew his sword and came towards Maqdad. And Maqdad drew his sword and dismounted and awaited the coming of the Persian. Then the Persian came and struck at Maqdad cunning blows but Maqdad was swift in avoiding the blows of the Persian. And Maqdad fell back before the Persian, and behind him was camelthorn, but he knew it was there for he had first looked to see before the fight started, in the manner taught by his ancestors. As the Persian came forward Maqdad struck at him many blows,

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and his attention was taken in parrying them and he saw not the camelthorn. His foot caught in its roots and he fell forward, and Maqdad cut off his head.

And the five Persians were shocked to see the death of their comrade at the hands of the beardless boy, but they said: It was but an accident; his foot caught in the root and he fell. Then another Persian drew his sword and came at Maqdad. And Maqdad met him with his sword in his right hand, and in his left hand his headcloth. So they fenced and Maqdad fell back before the Persian. And Maqdad waited until the sun was shining on the face of the Persian, then he struck many blows at the Persian, but he turned them with his sword. And Maqdad waved his headcloth in the air with his left hand, at the same time making with his lips the sound of a sword hissing through the air. For a moment the Persian was deceived and he raised his sword on high to receive the blow, and in that moment Maqdad sliced off his head.

And the four Persians were amazed to see the death of their comrade at the hands of a beardless boy. But they said: Our comrade was a fool. Why did he raise his sword when the boy waved his headcloth? And another Persian came out to fight with Maqdad, but he took his spear and not his sword, for he said: The boy may have some skill with the sword, but what can a youth know of the spear? And Maqdad took up his spear and met the Persian. And the Persian struck many blows at Maqdad, but each time Maqdad slipped aside, and each time he took a pace to the left. And after fighting for some time in this manner, Maqdad dropped his spear on the ground and bent as if to pick it up. And the Persian thought: While the boy is picking up his spear he cannot dodge. So he struck a mighty blow at Maqdad and he put his whole

539 weight behind his spear. But Maqdad did not really pick up his spear from the ground, he only bent and put out his hand. So when the blow came, he leapt aside and seized the spear of the Persian and pulled hard towards himself. And the weight of the Persian was behind that spear, so he fell forward on his face, and Maqdad picked up his spear from the ground and transfixed the Persian before he could rise.

And the three Persians were astonished when they saw the death of their comrade at the hands of the beardless boy, and they whispered amongst themselves and said: Verily, this boy is the Devil himself. And one of them said to the others: Take you the bow, I will go and lure the boy to within bowshot of you, then slay him with an arrow, and in this manner we shall be rid of him and we may go our way. Now, Maqdad was watching the three Persians at the well, for his ancestors had taught him: Watch well your enemies that they may not deceive you. And he saw them whisper and he saw one of them take the bow and he understood their stratagem. So he measured with his eye the distance of a skilful bowshot from the well and he remembered the shape of the camelthorn at that place.

Then the Persian came out and drew his sword and challenged him and they fought together. And the Persian withdrew before Maqdad and he fell back before him in the direction of his friends. But when they reached the camelthorn which Maqdad had marked, though the Persian fell back Maqdad went no further, nor could he be lured beyond that point. Then when the Persian saw that Maqdad would not follow him he feigned illness and rolled on the ground and made himself appear as a man in agony that Maqdad might come within bowshot. But

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

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x539 Maqdad came not. Rather he took another course, he turned and mounted Rishan, that noble horse, and he took up his great spear and he rode down on the Persian with the speed of the wind, nor could an arrow hit him, and in this manner he speared that Persian and killed him. Then he rode on to the two Persians who stood near the well and he came with such dash and speed that they had no time to draw the bow. And one of them he killed with his spear and the other fell down on the ground before him and begged mercy from him in the most abject manner. And Maqdad commanded the Persian to take off his clothes and the man did so and stood naked before Maqdad.

And Maqdad commanded and said to him: Go to your King, the Shah of the Persians, and enter his presence and salute him, and you shall be in your present naked state. And then shall you say to him: O mighty Shah, look to my condition and see my nakedness, for this shall be the condition of the land of Persia should you desist not from war with the Arabs. For when the men are slain who shall sow the fields? And the land of Persia shall become as barren and naked as I am now. And this is the message of Maqdad son of Thamir, the Arab warrior, and he is from the Fetla tribes. And Maqdad gave the Persian a horse from the six horses, and he mounted and rode off according to the order of Maqdad, nor was he wearing a single stitch of clothing.

Then Maqdad and Ibn Ali watered the horse Rishan, and they continued their journey, taking with them the five horses of the Persians, and their intention was to reach
x539 the camp of the tribes. And they rode until the sun was in
361 the west, then they saw the black tents. And they rode up
576 to the greatest tent of all, and it was the guest tent of the

Fetla, and they tethered the horses and entered and saluted 539^{x}
the assembly. And seated there were the sheikhs and the 361
warriors of the tribe. They bade them be seated and they 576
brought for them coffee. And the Sheikh spoke to them and said: O strangers who have honoured us, may we know your names, and from whence you come, and from what tribe? And Maqdad replied and answered thus: My tribe is your tribe, for it was the tribe of my father Thamir son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Maqdad son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Qais son of Hamed the Lame son of Mansur the Father of the Sword. But know you I have not before entered amongst you as was fitting, nor have I fought in battle with you, as before I was of tender years, but now I am a man, and I am skilled in the art of war.

And the Sheikhs and the great men of the tribes who 539^{x}
were there assembled said: Your name is a known name, for well we remember your father and your grandfather. And out of his great courtesy the Sheikh asked of them concerning their journey, and Maqdad related those events which are known to you, my listeners, nor did he omit any word from the account. And the Sheikh spoke and said: Concerning the magician Zoro, we had information that such a one existed, and we had searched for him, but we did not find him. You have done well to encompass his destruction, for God was with you. But as for these five Persians you say you have killed, know you that boasting is unseemly, and how could a beardless boy do this deed.

And Maqdad looked and he saw disbelief written in the faces of those there present, nor did they believe his words. So he said: Look not at my face, for it is smooth, and neither my moustache nor my beard is grown, but

*539 when the farmer sows the seed in the field, perhaps the crop will come early in the year or perhaps it will come late, as is the will of God, and in His time. But know you that I am a man and not a boy, as a sown field is different from the desert, and the crop will come in season. And the Sheikh said: Is your face, then, a field? It is as smooth as the skin of a peach. How, then, can you ride with the warriors in the front of the battle? And Maqdad replied and said: I have slain the Persians and I have taken their horses, and I will challenge the bravest of the Persians to single combat and I will kill him even in front of his Shah, that you may believe my words. And the Sheikh agreed and consented to the words of Maqdad, and a challenge was written and sealed, and a boy took it and delivered it to the camp of the Persians, and it was given and read out to the Shah himself.

And the Shah had heard the words of the naked Persian soldier, as to how the beardless boy had slain five skilled men, and he feared Maqdad, and he ordered the bravest and most skilful Persian soldier to prepare for the combat, and his name was Pahlewan. He had slain more than five hundred men in single combat, and truly his name was feared throughout the land. And a day and an hour was fixed and appointed, and a place was arranged on an island in the River Tigris and the day approached. As for the weapons, the combatants were to use any weapon or method of fighting which they preferred.

[411] And Maqdad ordered Ibn Ali to bring him a shield of Damascus steel, and Ibn Ali executed his command and brought him a shield of the finest steel of Damascus, which was convex in shape like a basin. Then Maqdad ordered Ibn Ali to take out the leather lining of the shield and to burnish the inside until it shone like a mirror, and

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then he ordered that a leather handle be fixed to the outside of the shield, and Ibn Ali executed the commands of his master. And the shield was prepared and made ready though it presented its inside to an enemy. 539x

The day of the fight dawned, and the army of the Persians gathered on the east bank of the Tigris, and the Arabs of the great tribes came together on the west bank of the Tigris, and a great stand had been erected for the Shah of the Persians and his ladies and his court amongst the Persian troops. In the centre of the river was an island, to this island Maqdad came in a boat from the west bank, and Pahlewan came in a boat from the east bank, and they met on the island. And Maqdad saw that Pahlewan was armed with a great sword the length of which was the height of a man, and Pahlewan came towards Maqdad and his approach was that of a skilful fighter. And Maqdad retreated before Pahlewan, warding off his blows with his sword, and he kept his face to the sun, a position of disadvantage, and Pahlewan was pleased that Maqdad kept his face to the sun and he thought: They were fools who told me that this boy is a skilful fighter. He does not even try to manœuvre to get the sun behind him, and he wears his shield inside out. But at that very moment Maqdad turned his shield towards the face of Pahlewan, and the sun was shining full on the shield, and it was burnished like a mirror and it was concave in shape, for it was reversed, so it concentrated the rays of the sun and flung them fully into the eyes of Pahlewan, and he was forced to close his eyes. And Maqdad ran towards Pahlewan and attacked him, keeping the blinding rays on Pahlewan's eyes. Then Pahlewan struck out with his great sword, but he did not hit Maqdad, and Maqdad cut off Pahlewan's head with a single blow. √89x 726

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x539 726 And the onlookers were amazed, for they were far off and they did not see how the beardless boy had overcome Pahlewan, and the heart of the Shah of the Persians was full of anger and fear. Then Maqdad turned and shouted across the river to the Persian host, he raised his sword on high and cried: O mighty Shah of Persia, you I will not challenge, for your beard is grey, but you have a son, famous in battle. Send him to me that I may fight him. And the Shah made no reply to Maqdad, but he made a sign signifying that a reply would be sent later, so Maqdad returned to his boat and he crossed the river to the gathering of the tribes.

x J39 That night the Shah of Persia held council with his generals and commanders, and the prince his son was present, and a great general spoke and said: Master, it is fitting that the prince your son should fight with the Arab boy, lest the soldiers of our army say he is afraid of a beardless boy, and henceforward they will not follow him in battle, nor will they respect him. And the prince listened and there was fear in his heart. And the Shah ordered the commanders and generals to leave them, and he spoke to his son in this fashion: My son, this Arab boy may not be a great fighter. Perhaps it was luck or some trick of fate which delivered Pahlewan into his hands. It is fitting that you should go and fight him, that your name may be famous as a warrior, and that the soldiers shall fear you. For one day you will be Shah in my place, and if the soldiers and the people of the towns and the peasants do not fear the Shah, then they rise in rebellion and the kingdom is overthrown.

But the prince replied: Father, do not send me out to be slaughtered in the manner of a sheep. This boy is no fighter, he is a magician, and I am unskilled in magic and cannot oppose him. Did you not hear now he slew the five soldiers at the well? Send for a skilled magician that he may destroy the boy, and let me lead my troops into battle as befits a prince. But do not let me be destroyed by some evil power unknown to honest men. But the Shah saw that the face of his son was pale, and he said: I order you to fight this boy, and if you do not then I will kill you with my own hand, and I will beget a son as brave as me to rule Persia when I die. Do you think I am in my tomb? These grey hairs are but a tribute to my learning. I am as vigorous as a man of twenty. I will beget a hundred sons that one of them may come forth a brave man. A coward shall not wrap me in my shroud nor shall a craven inherit my throne. 539

The prince, the son of the Shah of Persia, returned to his tent and his heart was filled with a great sadness. He took up his mirror and looked at his face and it was beautiful to behold, so he said: O noble eyes, dignified as the eyes of a hawk, O lofty brow, O brave moustache, O sweet red lips to which the girls of Isfahan have written verses, shall you then rot and decay, hidden forever in the tomb from the eyes of men? Or shall I flee and hide this noble face forever from the gaze of men of honour? I cannot fight this boy, for my heart is filled with fear and my hand is shaking. And the prince commenced weeping and his sobs would have wrung the heart of a listener.

And his sister, for the prince had a sister of his own age whom he loved, heard his sobs and came to him in the tent. And he related to his sister, the beloved Princess Jamila, the words of his father the Shah. And the princess grieved much at the words of her brother and said: Should you fight this boy, then without doubt you will be killed, for they say in the camp that he has greater skill than

X539 anyone in our army or in the whole of Persia. And should you defy our father, then he will surely slay you, and should you flee, then how will you live in a strange land, since you know no trade and no occupation? There is only one way and one course open which promises success, and that is that I should fight this boy in your place.

And the prince looked at his sister sadly, for he thought that God had deprived her of her reason, but she continued, saying: We are of one face and we are as alike as two matches in a box, save that you have a moustache and my face is smooth. But I will make myself a moustache of sheep's wool and glue it to my lip, and when I go out to do battle with the boy our father will not know me from you. But whereas, if you fight the boy you will be slain, yet I have a woman's wit and a woman's weapons, and know you that my body is so beautiful that no man can gaze on it and retain his reason. And I will wear such a cloak that I can open it from the front, and beneath it I will wear no shirt or other garment, so that when we are fighting I can slip back the cloak. When he is stunned by what he sees, I shall slay him before he can recover. Yet the armies on the banks of the river will not be able to see what has happened. However, you must shave off your moustache and take your place with the women on that day. For, were our father to see me absent, he would ask where I was, and our ruse might be discovered.

And the prince replied: It is as you say. We have one face since we are begotten by the same father from the same mother, and your idea may save the land of Persia from being deprived of an heir to the throne. So the prince went to his father and he said: Send a messenger to the camp of the Arabs and tell them that the prince will fight. And the heart of the Shah was filled with joy at the courage of his son.

The day of combat dawned, and the army of the Persians gathered on the east bank of the Tigris and the Arabs of the great tribes collected on the west bank. And the Princess Jamila was wearing a man's cloak and a shield and a sword, and to her face was affixed a moustache of sheep's wool, and all who saw her thought she was the prince. And as for the prince, he had shaved off his moustache and was wearing the dress of a girl, and he was seated with the royal ladies, and all who saw him thought that he was the Princess Jamila.

The Princess Jamila got into a boat and was taken out to the island in the middle of the Tigris, and Maqdad came in a boat from the west bank. And the Princess met Maqdad on the island, and she told him to send back his boat to the bank, and she returned her own boat to the bank, speaking in the voice of a man. And Maqdad, when he saw that the Persian boat was returning to the shore, ordered his own boat back. So Maqdad and the Princess were left alone on the island and those on the banks of the river could only see them from afar. But Maqdad thought the Princess was a man, heir to the throne of Persia.

The Princess made a sign to Maqdad that the fight was to begin. She drew her sword and Maqdad drew his sword and they came together. As their swords met Maqdad saw that the wrist of his enemy was weak, and he thought: This prince is no fighter. I can slay him when I desire to slay him. But rather should I disarm him and take him back captive, that we may collect his ransom and force his father to accept our terms.

So he played and fenced with his adversary, nor did he strike a fatal blow. And as they were fencing thus the

539 Princess put her left hand to her cloak and undid the knot and she pulled back her cloak. Then Maqdad saw that the prince had the body of a most beautiful woman and he was struck with astonishment. He dropped his sword to the ground and stepped back and said: O lady, for such you appear to me to be, had I known that you were to fight me then had I prepared another weapon, for the sword must not spoil such beauty. And the Princess advanced on Maqdad with her sword upraised to strike the blow of death. But her heart was a woman's heart and she saw that Maqdad was handsome of the face and she did not strike the blow. And tears came to her eyes and Maqdad took her sword from her hand and he called for his boat, crying: The Persian prince is my prisoner. And Maqdad put her in the boat and they returned to the Arab shore. And the Shah and the Persians and the Arabs on the banks of the river were stricken with astonishment, for they had not seen what Maqdad had seen, and the Shah said: This was magic, for the Arab boy was disarmed and without a sword. Yet my son surrendered to him.

And Maqdad took the Princess Jamila to his tent and she related to him what had passed between her and her brother, and Maqdad was filled with an exceeding love for the Princess and he meditated to find a way of marrying her without disgracing her or her brother. And as for the Persian prince, he sat amongst the ladies and his heart was filled with fear, and he thought: How long am I to remain a woman? This disgrace is greater than if I had fled through cowardice. What will happen when my father marries me to some prince?

And Maqdad told nobody that the Persian prince was a woman, and he kept her captive in his tent, and he wrote a letter to the Shah and he wrote:

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

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x539 O Majesty the Shah, after the most respectful salutations I write to inform you that I am engaged in praying for Your Majesty's health, and as for your son the Prince, let it be known to you that he is in good health and he is my guest, and he occupies his time in praying for Your Majesty's health. And it would be fitting if the request which I am now about to lay at Your Majesty's feet were made by one of my friends or relations but in the present condition of war courtesy must fall by the way. And my request is this, that you give me your daughter the Princess Jamila in marriage, and if you name a price, that price will be paid, and as for her dowry, let her bring a pomegranate seed. My name is a known name and my pedigree is a known pedigree, and it is desirable that you send the Princess in a boat, as, due to the state of war, I cannot come to you. And let the Prince your son be present at the celebration of the marriage, and after it is concluded, even the duty of hospitality shall not cause us to detain him further. So he will return to your camp in safety and in peace.

And Maqdad signed and sealed the letter and sent it to the Persian camp.

The Shah of the Persians opened the letter of Maqdad and read it, and his face became black with anger and rage and he bellowed a bellow and roared a roar and he sent for his generals and his ministers and he shouted: This son of a camel has captured my son and now he wants to
x539 marry my daughter. And he ordered his generals to
726 prepare a plan for attacking the camp of the tribes and rescuing his son and killing Maqdad. But the generals looked grave and they said: Master, how can this be? It is true that our army is ten times the size of the force of these Arab tribesmen, but when we march against them

√38x 726 they fade away as do the bats at the first rays of the morning sun. But they return when we least expect them and kill our men and drive off our animals and they are gone before our army is in battle array.

√39x And one of the generals spoke and said: Master, might it not be political and diplomatic to give your daughter to this boy? For he is truly a great warrior and it were better that he be our friend than our enemy, and as for his pedigree, it is as he says, for in no royal house can you find a pedigree which equals that of the simplest Arab tribesman. But the Shah said: This cannot and shall not be. Either you, my commanders, evolve a plan to secure the release of my son or I will have you roped between horses and torn apart. And meanwhile I will marry my daughter to a prince of Turkey, that no man who calls a host his father, no product of love in a ditch, shall come to me and insult me by asking for her in marriage. Send now for my daughter that I inform her of my decision.

A page went from the tent of the Shah to the women's quarter, and he spoke to the eunuch on guard and said: Tell the Princess Jamila that the Shah her father commands her presence, for he is arranging her marriage to a prince of Turkey. And the eunuch delivered the message to the Prince, who was dressed as the Princess Jamila, and he said: Mistress, your father commands your presence, for he is arranging your marriage to a prince of Turkey. And the face of the Prince went pale with fear, for he thought: Now what will happen when the Turkish prince comes in to me on the night of the wedding? And he could see no escape from his misfortune.

So the Prince, wearing the veil and dress of a lady, went into the presence of his father the Shah. And the Shah spoke and said: Beloved daughter, your interest touches

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x539 my heart, and let it be known to you that some months ago the noble Prince Jalal of Turkey sent to us an ambassador and requested that I give you him in marriage. But seeking your advantage, and to advance affairs of state, I delayed answer, and I sought a better match. But you are now too old to remain long unmarried, for you are in the seventeenth year of your life. I am therefore sending an embassy of great dignity and magnificence to the noble Prince, and my ambassador will carry my acceptance of the Prince's offer. He will start on the morrow, with an escort of a thousand horsemen and a thousand footmen, and he will take with him one hundred slave girls of great beauty from Kafkaz as a present to the Sultan. But the Prince, speaking with the voice of a girl, said: O my father, do not marry me to this prince, this horrible Turk; marry me rather to the Arab boy, Maqdad, for him I love for his courage and the mercy he showed my brother, when he had overcome him by magic.

The Shah said: The decision is made and the execution awaits accomplishment, but your voice is strange today, O my little darling daughter. And the Prince replied: When my heart is broken shall not my voice break?

Then the Shah ordered the Commander of the Eunuchs to come into his presence, and he commanded him, saying: Take the Lady Jamila back to her tent, and search that tent for any knife or anything sharp enough to cut a vein and search it for poison, and search all who come into her presence. For she is full of the foolishness of youth and she desires not her marriage, and she may take her life. Put upon her tent a guard of ten eunuchs, and watch her that she escapes not, for if she dies or escapes us, then torture awaits you, and you will lose your eyes and your tongue even as you have been deprived in other ways.

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And the Commander of the Eunuchs answered: Master, 539x
she shall not escape, either in death or in life.

The Commander of the Eunuchs took the Prince back to the tent of the Princess his sister, and he searched the tent and he found the razor which the Prince used to keep his face as smooth as a girl's, and the Commander of the Eunuchs said: O my mistress, so you had already sent for a razor to cut your vein. And the heart of the Prince was cold with fear, for he thought: Without that razor my moustache will grow and my fate will be sealed. The Commander of the Eunuchs placed a guard of ten eunuchs of great stature, armed with swords, upon that tent.

Then the Prince, using the voice of the Princess, called for a slave girl whom he knew to be devoted to his sister and she came to the tent, and she was searched by the eunuchs for weapons and for poison, but they found that she had none with her, and they permitted her to enter. And the Prince, using the voice of a girl, said to the slave girl: O my eyes, know you that I love the boy Maqdad and I will not marry this Turk. Listen well and take this message to the Commander of the Cavalry, for he is in fear of his life should he not rescue my brother, and he will help me in this to save himself. Tell him that the Lady Jamila sends him this message:

Know you that through a trick, and by applying a moustache of sheep's wool to my face, I will at dawn tomorrow appear in the guise of my brother the Prince, now a captive in the Arab camp. Seize tonight the Court Magician and threaten him with death if he does not tell my father the Shah that through magic the boy Maqdad has taken me, the Lady Jamila, from my tent in the night without the guards being aware of it, and he has left in my place my brother the Prince. And let him keep this a

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x539 secret from everyone else in the camp and in the world. Then when my father knows that his daughter is in Maqdad's hands he will consent to the match from very shame, for should this become known in the world, then the Turkish prince would never marry me and our family will be disgraced. Advise my father that though I am a man and the Prince his son, I should dress as a girl, as the lady my sister, and he should send me over to the Arab camp to marry Maqdad, and when I am there I shall stay only to return as myself the Prince. Though in very fact and unknown to my father I will marry Maqdad and the Prince my brother will be released.

And the slave girl said: O my beloved mistress, this is indeed a clever scheme, but how can you pass as a man? And the Prince, in the voice of the Princess, replied: I shall pass as my brother and my father will not know the difference, for we are of one face and we are as alike as two matches in a box, save for the moustache which I shall affix to my face tomorrow. But go you now and deliver the message. Then bring to me under your clothes a man's clothes, but wear them, so that when the eunuchs search and feel your body for knives and bottles of poison they may not detect them. And the slave girl went and she gave the message to the Commander of the Cavalry and she brought back the clothes to the tent.

The Commander of the Cavalry heard the message given him by the slave girl and he was astonished at what he heard. He thought: My master the Shah will become as mad as a camel at the time of mating when he hears that the Princess Jamila has been taken in the night by magic and the Prince her brother left in her place. But he cannot in justice blame the affair on me, and should he believe that this has really taken place, then he cannot kill us, his

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commanders, for failing to rescue the Prince, for the Prince will be safe in our camp. And as for the Princess, what will be the point of rescuing the Princess after she has been taken to this Arab's tent? But the danger is great. Can the Lady Jamila pass as her brother? But he decided: A danger and a risk is better than certain death, for how can I rescue the Prince from the Arab camp? 539x

The Commander of the Cavalry sent for the Court Magician, and he came and entered his tent and saluted him. And the Commander spoke in this fashion: You know how quickly my sword comes from its scabbard and how truly it strikes. From now until dawn you will remain in my tent, closely guarded, and at dawn you and I will go to the tent of our Master the Shah, and we will wake him and then you will say to him: O master, I was looking in my magic glass in the night, and I saw a cat come into our camp and go into the tent of our mistress, the Lady Jamila. And in the mouth of the cat was a rat, and the cat laid the rat upon the bed of our mistress and I knew from my magic power that the cat was Maqdad, the Arab magician, and the rat was our master the Prince. I tried to say a spell, but I was held by some terrible power, for verily this Maqdad is a prince of magicians.

Then the cat spat into the face of our lady Mistress, and she also turned into a rat, and the cat took her in his mouth and went out from the tent and from the camp.

And when the cat had crossed the river and there was water between me and him, I was released from the spell which held me, and I turned to my magic books, and after working for two hours I worked a spell which turned our master, His Highness the Prince, back into his former state, and he is now lying sleeping in the tent of the lady his sister, and I have told nobody of this affair save His

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x539 Excellency the Commander of your Cavalry, for he is verily the most discreet and ablest of your officers. And when you say this to the Shah I shall be standing behind you and my hand will be on my sword, and should you vary one word of it I will strike you dead, crying: A plot to kill Your Majesty.

The Court Magician was filled with fear, and he said: But how can the Shah believe these words? For will he not go straight to the tent of our lady the Princess, and there he will find her sleeping. It is said she is closely guarded, while the Prince is indeed a prisoner in the Arab camp? But the Commander of the Cavalry said: Our lady the Princess will disguise herself as the Prince her brother, for they are of one face. Only she will fasten a moustache of sheep's wool to her face. And I will then advise the Shah to agree to the marriage with the boy Maqdad, and I will advise him to disguise his son the Prince as the lady Princess, that he may send her over in state and dignity for the marriage. And that the Prince is really the Princess the Shah will know not. And the boy Maqdad will agree to this trick to save his wife from shame. The Court Magician liked not the words of the Commander of the Cavalry, but he saw his sword and he consented.

At the first light of dawn the Commander of the Cavalry and the Court Magician went to the tent of the Shah, and they passed the guards and they wakened the Shah and the Commander of the Cavalry said: Master, your son the Prince is returned and sleeping safely in the tent of the Lady Jamila, but the Lady Jamila has been taken to the Arab camp. And the Court Magician said the words which had been told him by the Commander of the Cavalry, nor did he alter a single word of it, for the hand of the Commander of the Cavalry was on his sword

Then truly the Shah became as mad as a camel at the time of mating, and he rose from his bed in his tent and ran to the tent of his daughter, and the Commander of the Cavalry and the Court Magician followed him, and they passed the eunuchs and entered the tent. And they saw lying on the bed a figure wearing man's clothes and with a moustache. And as for the Commander of the Cavalry and the Court Magician, they thought the figure to be that of the Princess Jamila disguised as her brother, and as for the Shah, the figure appeared to be that of the Prince his son, brought in the night from the Arab camp. And as for you, my listeners, you know that the figure was indeed the figure of His Highness the Prince, though he had laid aside the clothes of a woman, and had put on the clothes of a man, and he had put on a moustache of sheep's wool, for his own moustache was only one day grown. And though the Shah was frothing at the mouth like a mad dog and pacing the tent like a courting bustard, his brain still worked and he thought: Perchance this is some trick of the Princess Jamila to escape to her lover, perhaps she has bribed the Court Magician and put on a false moustache that she may escape from this tent. So the Shah commanded: Wake him.

The Commander of the Cavalry wakened the sleeping Prince, and the Prince opened his eyes and said: I marvel at this state of affairs. I went to sleep a guarded prisoner in the Arab camp and I awake in the tent of my sister in our own camp, and you my father are present to greet me. But the Shah commanded: Pull that moustache and pull it hard. And the Commander of the Cavalry advanced to execute the Shah's order. And the hearts of the Commander of the Cavalry and the Court Magician were full of fear. And the Commander thought: How can I pull

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x539 this moustache hard without it coming off, and the smooth face of our Lady the Princess be shown? And the Prince was also fearful, for the moustache was indeed false. So he said: Father, do not let my moustache be pulled, for does not the proverb say: A man's honour is in the hair of his moustache. If you want to know if I am man or woman, for such appears to be your object, let me prove my sex in another way. Go you from this tent and send into it a slave girl, one whom you trust, and you may choose any girl you like in this camp, and let her come into me. Then let her come out and testify that I am a man.

And the Shah agreed, and he sent for a personal slave girl whom he trusted, and he and the Commander of the Cavalry and the Court Magician stood outside the tent. And the Shah ordered the slave girl: Enter the tent, and when you come out you shall testify whether the person within it is a man or a woman. And the slave girl entered the tent and the legs of the Commander of the Cavalry and the Court Magician were trembling through very fear, for they thought that their plot was discovered.

The slave girl came out from the tent and she said: I testify by the most solemn oath that the Prince within the tent is a man and not a woman. And the Shah believed her words. And as for the Commander of the Cavalry and the Court Magician, both of them were astonished. And they thought: How did the Princess, our mistress, work this trick?

Then the Shah and the Commander of the Cavalry and the Court Magician entered the tent, and the Shah was convinced that his daughter had indeed been taken in the night by magic. And the Commander of the Cavalry spoke and said: Master, this event is only known to us in this tent and to the Arab boy, and to no other in the

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world, and the secret can be preserved. Let the Prince here dress as his sister and send him over in all state and dignity to marry the Arab. The Arab boy will be satisfied, for he will in fact marry the Princess, whether we like it or not, and it will not be known in the world that the sanctity of your harem was violated. 539x

And the Shah agreed and commanded the Prince: I will send you a razor and a woman's dress. Make your face as smooth as a girl's face and dress in your sister's clothes. Then nobody can tell you from her. Then shall I send you over to the Arab camp in state and you will go to the tent in which your sister now is, though the world thinks you are yourself a captive in it. Then shall you change to a man's dress, and Maqdad may marry your sister in accordance with custom and religion.

But the Prince said: Father, I cannot dress as a girl. This will be a great shame for me. But the Shah commanded him and said: The order is given.

Then the Shah and the Commander of Cavalry and the Court Magician returned to the Shah's own tent. And as they went the Commander of the Cavalry whispered to the Shah: Master, the Court Magician knows that your daughter was abducted in the night, and a secret is less secret the more it is shared. And the Shah whispered back: You are right. Kill him. Then the Commander of the Cavalry whipped out his sword and killed the Court Magician with a single blow, before he could utter a single word. And the Commander of the Cavalry went to the Shah's tent with the Shah, and the Shah commanded him: Leave your sword outside my tent, for it smells of blood. And the Commander of the Cavalry obeyed the order of his master the Shah. And when they had entered the tent and the door was closed, the Shah took up his own sword

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*539 and said: You spoke truly when you said that a secret shared is no secret, and you also know this secret. And the Shah killed the Commander of his Cavalry with a single blow, and he was without a weapon with which to defend himself.

Then the Shah took a woman's clothes and a razor and he returned to the Prince, and he said: Make yourself as a girl. Then the Shah went out of the tent and he called for pages and ordered them to awaken the camp and to assemble the court, and the trumpets sounded and the wazirs and great men and commanders and generals came into the presence of the Shah.

And the Shah spoke and said: Know you that I have decided to give my beloved daughter, the Princess Jamila, to the noble and brave Arab boy, Maqdad the son of Thamir, of the Fetla tribes. And her dowry shall be one hundred thousand liras in gold and a thousand horses and a thousand riding camels, and as for the price which I shall ask of the boy, it shall be a water melon. And owing to the state of war I shall send her and her dowry in boats across the river, starting in one hour from now. Send messengers to the boy Maqdad that he may be apprised of these facts. But the wazirs and commanders looked grave and they spoke and said: Master, to you is the ordering and to us is obedience, but we had hoped for a better match for your daughter. And the Shah spoke and said: The pedigree of the simplest Arab tribesman is better than that of the noblest prince, and courage in battle is better than wide domains. So messengers went out and the orders of the Shah were carried out.

And when Maqdad heard the news his heart was full of joy, for though the Princess was in his tent, he did not know how to marry her without destroying her honour

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and the honour of her brother. And the Prince came 539ˣ across the river dressed as the Princess, and they took him to the tent in which was the Princess dressed as the Prince, and there, alone and unseen, they changed their clothes and became their proper selves.

Then Maqdad married the Princess and loved her with an exceeding love and had many sons as brave as their ancestors, and the Prince returned across the river to his father the Shah, and when his father died he ruled Persia in his place, and all who saw him thought that he was a lion in courage, nor was there any revolt among his subjects, and in the whole world only he and Maqdad and the Lady Jamila knew that he had been afraid to fight a beardless boy and that he had dressed as his sister to avoid the fight.

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A MAN'S HONOUR IS IN THE HAIR OF HIS MOUSTACHE

x539
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538

On the morning after the night in which we had heard the story of Maqdad, we halted for breakfast near Mussayib. Hamed said: You heard the story of Maqdad and you heard how the Persian Prince said that a man's honour is in the hair of his moustache. Now this is a true proverb of the Fetla tribes and I will relate how this saying originated, though truly the Prince was a man without honour, for he shaved off his moustache. And Abed said: If you know the true facts of the origin of this proverb, then tell us the story.

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x539 AND Hamed related:
443 Once in Hilla there was a cloth merchant of
moderate wealth, and his name was Abdul Rashid
Mejid. This merchant used to buy cloth from the great
merchants of Baghdad and he used to sell it in small
quantities to the tribesmen and the people of Hilla. He
made no great profit from his shop, but he had enough
x539 money for the rent of his house and for his food. He kept
462 no servants in his house, for the work of the house was
356 done by his wife and by his only daughter, a girl of great
beauty, in the sixteenth year of her life. The name of the
girl was Salma.

And one day it happened that at the hour of noon the hub in their house was empty of water, and the mother of Salma said to her: Go to the river and bring water for the hub. And Salma put a jar on her shoulder and she went to the river. But it was her habit not to go to that part of the river which ran through the town and was near to her house, for she was ashamed that she, a daughter of a merchant, should be seen drawing water, for the women who drew water were the wives and daughters of the porters, and the fellahin, and the leather workers and the coppersmiths, but the daughters of the cloth merchants used to have servants to draw water. Yet her father would have no servant, for his trade was not great. So she went out of the back of her house through the palm trees to a secluded part of the river.

x539 When Salma reached the river she was hot and tired, for the time was noon and the season was summer. She looked around her, but she could see not a single living soul, nor was there a sound from the bazaar or from the town, for the whole world was sleeping. So she thought: I will cool and refresh myself before I return to the house.

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x539 She took off her clothes and put them on the bank, and
she stepped into the river. Now, be it known to you that,
556 though she could see him not, there was concealed on the
437 bank a youth of the Fetla tribes, and his name was Kadhim.
x539 He did not own a single horse or mare, nor did he even
own the leg of a mare. He owned no sheep and he owned
no land, and he lived by eating at the guest tent of his
sheikh. And as for clothes, he used to go to the river and
set snares for the sandgrouse and partridges when they
came to drink, and sell them in the market to buy cloth.

x539 And Kadhim was concealed on the bank of the river
watching his snares when he saw a girl beautiful as a moon
come to the river and divest herself of her clothes. He saw
that she was perfect in figure, for her neck was slender and
her shoulders smooth and soft and her breasts rose firmly
and clearly as do the desert dunes in moonlight. As for her
[304] waist it was slender and her thighs were round and smooth
and around her navel was tattooed a butterfly. And he
watched her and forgot the sandgrouse and he forgot the
partridges. And after she had bathed in the river she dried
herself by lying in the sun. Then she put on her clothes
and filled the jar with water and returned to the town.

And the next day at the rising of the sun Kadhim concealed himself in the same place and awaited the coming of the girl. And about half an hour after dawn she came down and drew water from that very same place. And Kadhim, who was concealed in the tamarisk bushes, watched her, but she did not take off her clothes. She merely filled the pot with water and put it on her shoulder, and she turned and returned to the town. But Kadhim, who was a youth in the seventeenth year of his life and swift of foot, ran ahead behind the fruit groves and date trees and came out on the path ahead of her, and when

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X539



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x539 she drew near he greeted her and wished her the peace of God and His blessing. And Salma drew her veil across her face and she averted her eyes and she did not reply to the greeting of the strange youth. Then Kadhim drew level with her and he bent his head towards her and whispered: Did it hurt much when they tattooed the butterfly? When Salma heard these words her face grew red with shame. But she looked at Kadhim's face and saw that he was laughing, so she, too, laughed, and she dropped her veil and said: Since you have seen the butterfly you may as well see my face.

x539 304 Then Kadhim and Salma sat down by a tamarisk bush, and he told her his name and situation and she told him her name and details of her life, and they laughed much about the butterfly and she said: It did not hurt, for it was done when I was in the fifth year of my life, and it was only a little one, but it has grown larger with me. And they discovered that they were of one heart.

x539 Each day and every day that Salma went to draw water from the river Kadhim waited for her, and he helped her fill the jar with water, and they would sit down by a tamarisk bush and pass a few minutes in laughter and happiness. And when Salma returned to her house her eyes were like stars and her cheeks were like the blossoms of the rose. And the mother of Salma said to her husband, the merchant Abdul Rashid: See how happy our daughter is? What can cause this happiness? And Abdul Rashid said: She needs a husband. Perhaps she is falling in love. I will see the marriage broker today.

x539 584 So that very day, when he had closed his shop, Abdul Rashid went to the house of that discreet man, the marriage broker, and he said: My daughter is of an age to marry. And the broker said: There is one who seeks a

bride of fifteen or sixteen years, and he is Abbas Ali el 539x
Qassab, that wealthy merchant. His shop is said to be 584
worth three thousand gold liras. And the matter was discussed and the broker passed much between the two merchants, and all was ready for a formal proposal. And Abdul Rashid Mejid said: First I will ask the mother of the girl and the girl, for this matter affects them. Then let matters take a formal course.

Abdul Rashid Mejid went back to his house, and his daughter and his wife brought him food. And when he had eaten of the food he said: There is good news for our little Salma. I will arrange for her to marry Abbas Ali el Qassab, so that she can live in a fine house and have servants of her own, nor shall she have to draw water or soil her hands with cooking, and she will be too grand to come and see her poor parents.

But Salma started crying and sobbing and she said: 539x
Abbas Ali has no front teeth and he dyes his beard and 581
water runs always from his nose in the manner that it drips from the fronds of the palm trees when it rains. And she flung herself on the ground and her body was racked with sobs. And her mother said to her father: Don't worry, I will talk her round. I was like this when they told me I had to marry you.

Next morning at dawn Salma ran to the river and 539x
Kadhim took her in his arms, for she was sobbing and trembling like a tent in the wind. And she related to
Kadhim what had passed between her and her father. And [583]
he asked: What price does your father want for you? And
she replied: Eighty gold liras.

Then Kadhim said to the girl Salma: Do not weep and do not fear, for on the day that Abbas Ali el Qassab puts on his sword and mounts his horse to ride in procession to

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x539 your father's house, on that day shall I introduce him to
361 the Angel of Death. And Salma said: Only take me away with you to your tribe, that I may be safe from evil. Kadhim replied: You have seen our camps and our villages, and you have seen how the walls of the houses are of mud bricks, and the roofs are of the cloth of our tents or of straw matting. But do you know the reason for this? We of the tribes do not close both our eyes when we sleep. Perhaps the Turks will impose an unjust tax on us, or perhaps a Turkish soldier will speak to one of our women and he will die, or perhaps someone will seek refuge with us and the Turks will command us to surrender him. Then will our Sheikh cry: Sheil, and in less time than it takes to snuff a candle we are gone into the desert with our camels and horses and sheep, and all our property, even to the roofs of our houses, is loaded on our camels and is gone away. And when the Turkish troops arrive they find only the empty mud walls of our houses, which they cannot burn. And they find our crops sown in the field and they find our palm trees, and they may destroy some of them, and they try to seek us in the desert, but they cannot find us. And then we will ride against the Turks and we will destroy their caravans on the road to Basra and we will destroy their boats on the river, until the Turkish Governor cries: Do not pay the tax, or, Do
x539 not surrender the fugitive. But you are used to an easier life, for you should have a house and servants of your own, and you should not have to drink the water from a camel's stomach. I will marry you, but first I mean to become a great merchant, that I may give you a house and brass cooking-pots and a servant and two anklets of silver and a bangle of gold.

Salma left Kadhim and returned to the town, and there

was no fear in her heart, for she knew that Abbas Ali el 539x
Qassab would die before he could marry her. And Kadhim sat watching his snares and thinking: How can I become a great merchant? Kadhim was so poor that he had not even a single copper coin in his pocket; he owned [291]
no shoes, he had no headcloth, he was not even wearing any vest or underclothes, and his only garment was his thob. And Kadhim decided: I will borrow money, and trade with my capital and become a great merchant.

Then Kadhim went to the town and he was walking in 539
his bare feet, and he went to the shop of Abdul Rashid and 437
saluted the merchant and said: Give me a roll of cloth and 577
a loan of five gold liras and I will give you my pledge. And Abdul Rashid looked and he saw that the youth was dressed in a dirty and torn thob and that he was bareheaded and barefooted, but he saw that he carried his head like a hawk, so he said: You are, then, from the tribes? And Kadhim nodded and said: Yes.

Now, let it be known to you that the tribes were much poorer in the days of the Ottomans than they are today, for they were then unable to cultivate their land in peace and prosperity, and it often happened that it was necessary to celebrate a marriage or observe the rites of death when there was no money in the purse of the head of the house. Then would he go to the town and to a merchant and say: Give me cloth and money and take my pledge. And as for the pledge, if he had a gold or silver ring, he would give it, and if he had none then he would give his headcloth to the merchant, or even his riding switch, saying: This contains my honour. And when the pledge was given payment was always made, for this is the custom of the tribes.

Abdul Rashid Mejid looked at the youth Kadhim and

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x539 he saw that he was truly from the tribes, for his bearing
437 was proud and his gaze the gaze of the peregrine falcon.
577 So he said: Take the money and the cloth and give me
your pledge. Then Kadhim's cheeks flushed red, for he had forgotten to bring a pledge with him, nor did he own a ring, and he had no headcloth and he owned no riding switch, for he had no horse. But his brain was quick and he thought and answered: Verily a man's honour is contained in the hair of his moustache, for it is his moustache that distinguishes his face from that of a woman or a boy. Therefore I shall give you one hair of my moustache as a pledge. And Abdul Rashid Mejid was astonished at the words of the youth.

Then Kadhim called for scissors and for a mirror, and he studied his face in the mirror and searched for a hair in his moustache which was less beautiful than the rest. And he found such a hair and snipped it off and gave it to Abdul Rashid Mejid. And Abdul Rashid Mejid took the hair and put it with the pledges, and he put it in a box with the rings and the headcloths and riding switches, and he gave Kadhim five gold liras and a roll of cloth.

Kadhim took the money and the cloth and he went to the shop of a tailor whom he knew and trusted, for the man's father was from the Fetla tribes. He said to the tailor: Take this cloth and this money and make me the clothes of a very rich merchant, and bring me a beard of sheep's wool which I will fasten to my face, and keep this a secret, for it is more important to me than life itself. And
x539 the tailor said: Cut my head to keep the secret. Then the
556 tailor made for Kadhim the clothes of a wealthy merchant
and he brought for him a beard of sheep's wool, and when Kadhim had put on the beard and put on the clothes he looked so important and distinguished that anyone who

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saw him would say: This is a merchant whose shop is worth ten thousand gold liras. 539x 556

Kadhim, dressed as a wealthy merchant, went out from the shop of the tailor and he returned to the shop of Abdul Rashid Mejid. He entered the shop and greeted Abdul Rashid Mejid and wished him the peace of God. And Abdul Rashid Mejid rose when he saw the wealthy merchant enter his shop, and he returned his greeting, and he ordered the shop boy to bring a glass of tea from the coffee house for the distinguished visitor. And Kadhim sat in the chair which Abdul Rashid Mejid placed for him. [576]

Now, Kadhim, though a simple tribal boy, had travelled as far as Basra with the Sheikh, for in ancient times when the Sheikh travelled to Baghdad or to Basra he took fifty men in his retinue, that all who saw him might recognise his dignity and position and, as Kadhim had no land and no sheep, he used to accompany the Sheikh and eat at his expense in the hotels of Basra. So he had some knowledge of affairs.

Kadhim drank the glass of tea in the shop of Abdul Rashid Mejid and he asked after the health of his host. He said: Know you that I am a merchant of Basra and my trade is a general trade, and I deal in every article and every commodity, for my firm is a great firm with branches in India and in Persia and in Nejd. And let it be known to you that I have come to Hilla to seek a merchant of honesty and repute to act as my agent that I may transact various kinds of business at this place. So I asked from the great merchants and bankers of Baghdad that they give me the names of those merchants at Hilla who are reliable in their dealings, and they told me the name of your honour and of his honour our brother Abbas Ali el Qassab. But they said of the last named that water drips from his 539x

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x539 nose as it does from the fronds of the palm trees when it rains and that he dyes his beard, but grey hairs honour a man, and a man who would falsify his beard might well falsify the accounts. Therefore I have come to your honour with my request.

Abdul Rashid Mejid was overjoyed at the words of the wealthy merchant, and he thought: I did not know that the great merchants of Baghdad even knew my name, yet they know of me and know that I am honest. This is indeed a reward for my many years of honest if simple trade. And how great is the knowledge and command of affairs of these mighty merchants, that they even know that Abbas Ali el Qassab dyes his beard and that his nose drips as do the palm fronds in rain. And the heart of Abdul Rashid was full of gladness that he at last had the chance to engage in great commerce. So he said: I am willing to do anything you wish and your commands will be dearer to me than my eyes. But please may I know your name?

Kadhim, in the guise of the wealthy merchant, replied: Forgive me, I had thought you had recognised my face, for it is a known face in the bazaars of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and India. My name is Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi and my address is in the city of Basra in the bazaar of Umm el Brum at the Khan of the Indian, and there I may be found. For Kadhim knew it would take a fortnight for a letter to travel to Basra and a fortnight for an answer to return. Abdul Rashid Mejid did not recognise the name of Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi, but he thought: I must not show myself a yokel in front of this distinguished man. So he said: Your name is a known name and I am honoured that you should visit me. But what, sir, is your business?

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Kadhim replied: Please keep my presence here the 539x closest secret, for were the traders to hear my name and to know that I am here to buy, prices would rise a hundredfold. But know you that I am here to buy a thousand horses and a thousand mares of the finest Arab stock and I am going to take them to Basra, where the prices are very high, for they can be from there shipped to India, where the British officers are fighting the Hindus and the Sikhs and conquering the country, and they will pay huge prices for a good horse or mare. And what I require of you is that you do the buying, for I cannot show my face in the horse market without raising the prices. Then when I have the horses I will take them to Basra and send you a draft on Baghdad and I will share the profits with you half and half.

Abdul Rashid thought and spoke: I know that the price of horses is much higher at Basra than at Hilla, but how many of the horses will reach Basra, for you have to traverse the territory of the great tribes, and indeed the tribesmen love horses, and if they do not come on you in the day and take them by force, they will come on you at night at your camp and take what they will by stealth.

Kadhim answered, and his answer was firm and dignified: I will take the risk, for though you shall be my partner in the profit, I alone shall bear the loss, for what will these two thousand horses cost us? Not much more than twenty thousand gold liras, I think. Why, I have lost or won a larger amount in a single night at gambling.

Abdul Rashid Mejid was much impressed by the words of the wealthy merchant and he thought: If the horses get through to Basra then the profit will truly be enormous, but if they are lost or stolen on the road, and this is highly probable, then Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi will send me x539 the money with which to pay the horse traders, and I shall have to bear nothing of the loss. And he thought: I am now truly a great merchant, for whereas before I used to buy cloth from the Baghdad merchants for fifty gold liras and I paid them cash, it took me a month to sell it and my profit was only seven gold liras. Now I am going to buy horses worth twenty thousand liras on credit, and if I make a profit it will be an enormous profit, yet if there is a loss it will be borne by the worthy Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi. So Abdul Rashid Mejid consented to the words of Kadhim.

Then Abdul Rashid Mejid sent his shop boy to the bazaar to tell the dealers that he wanted to buy horses. And the great horse dealers started to bring horses and mares to the shop of Abdul Rashid Mejid, and Kadhim hid himself in the shop, and when he gave a signal Abdul Rashid purchased the horse, and when no signal was given the horse was led away unpurchased. Kadhim knew most of the horses by sight, for the dealers were from the Fetla tribes, though some also were from Es Shammar and Ed Dulaim. And on Kadhim's instructions Abdul Rashid sent a message asking for three hundred men of the Fetla to look after the horses and act as grooms at a salary of one gold lira for every man for a month.

And all that day Abdul Rashid bought horses and the merchants of the bazaar thought him mad. And the horse dealers talked amongst themselves and said: Has Abdul Rashid enough money to pay for all these horses? And they said: He has been a merchant here for twenty-five years and he has never cheated anyone out of as much as a centimetre of cloth. He has always given credit to the men of the tribes and he has always conducted himself as an honourable man. But the more cautious amongst them

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said: Let us put two men to watch Abdul Rashid night 539ˣ and day, and should he try to leave Hilla before he settles for the horses, on that day let him meet the Angel of Death. And the others agreed and said: Let us adopt this course.

When two thousand horses and mares had been purchased Abdul Rashid Mejid ceased from the buying of horses. And Kadhim told him to order the grooms to bring food for their journey to Basra and grain for the horses. And these charges were written on the credit of Abdul Rashid Mejid. Then, in accordance with the instructions of Kadhim, Abdul Rashid told them to take the horses and start on the road for Basra at dawn on the next day and he told them that he who was in charge of the caravan would meet them on the road.

When the purchasing of the horses and the arrangements for the food and supplies were concluded Kadhim and Abdul Rashid Mejid sat in the shop and drank tea. And the heart of Abdul Rashid Mejid was full of wonder and he thought: At the rising of the sun this morning I did not owe a single copper coin to any man and now I owe twenty-two thousand four hundred and twelve gold liras and I am engaged in the great affairs of commerce. And as for Kadhim, he was thinking of Salma as he had seen her bathing in the river and he was thinking of the butterfly, and he said: O brother, how greatly am I enjoying our partnership and our co-operation. How I wish that I had a daughter that I might give her to you in marriage that we might be tied by a closer tie than that of trade, and how I wish that you had a daughter that I might marry her, for I am in need of a wife.

Abdul Rashid Mejid said: I have indeed a daughter of an age for marriage, and I was in fact about to give her to

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X539 one of our minor local merchants, in fact to this Abbas Ali el Qassab whom you mentioned, the fellow who dyes his beard and whose nose drips like the palm fronds during rain. But if you desire her, let her be given to you in marriage, that our partnership may be sealed.

And Kadhim replied: Let it be as you say, but first let me go to Basra and sell the horses and conclude our business, for I depart tomorrow at dawn and the marriage will take a long time. Every day we delay lessens our profit, for we have to feed the horses and pay the grooms. But Abdul Rashid desired the marriage greatly, for he thought: Perhaps when this great merchant gets back to Basra he will change his mind, and it would be wise to tie him to me by a closer tie than that of business, since, should he forget or fail to send me the twenty-two thousand four hundred and twelve gold liras, these horse dealers will tear me limb from limb. But if I marry my little darling Salma to him, then she can go with him and remind him and see he sends the money.

So he said: A formal wedding indeed takes time, but the ulema are my friends, and formalities break down between friends and must be discarded when the needs of business press and I think that I could arrange for you to marry her this very night. The only difficulty that I can foresee is that the girl may become hysterical, for she is full of the foolishness of youth, but I will tell her that at least your nose does not drip as do the palm fronds in rain. And Kadhim agreed to the words of Abdul Rashid, and he said: Let then the marriage be tonight and as for feasts and formalities, let there be none, and as for the girl, tell her that my nose does not drip and that I am a lover of art and of beautiful things, such as butterflies. For Kadhim knew that the mother of Salma had never told Abdul

Rashid about the butterfly, for he would have called it a useless expense. 539*

Then Abdul Rashid Mejid hurried home to tell his wife and his daughter the great news, and he sent his shop boy to make the arrangements for the wedding. And he said to his daughter Salma: O little darling, how good is your luck. I am marrying you tonight to a great merchant of Basra. His name is Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi and he is so rich that twenty thousand gold liras is to him a mere nothing. But Salma cast herself on the ground and she sobbed great sobs, for she thought: Kadhim will kill Abbas Ali el Qassab, but he does not know of this new threat and I cannot see him before tonight.

Abdul Rashid Mejid said: Do not weep, my little daughter, for he is a handsome man and his nose is as dry as the desert at the end of summer and he tells me that he is a lover of beautiful things such as butterflies. And Salma's eyes dried when she heard her father's words, for she thought: Only my mother and Kadhim and no other person in the whole world knows about that butterfly. This is a signal from him. And her father thought: How my little daughter does hate dripping noses. Why, her face has become full of joy and her eyes are like the desert flowers in spring. And the heart of Abdul Rashid was glad that his daughter was happy, for he loved his daughter greatly.

So that night Kadhim went to the house of Abdul Rashid Mejid and he took the girl Salma in marriage, and when he took her from her father's house he took her to a black tent of the Arabs, for he had no other residence. And in the morning Kadhim and Salma rode out upon the Basra road, and they each rode one of the horses which had been purchased, though Salma had never even ridden

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x539 a horse before, for she was a town girl, and it is said of the Arab girls of the towns that they cannot tell the difference between a horse and a water buffalo.

And on the road they met the men of the Fetla who were acting as grooms and they met the two thousand horses. And Kadhim was still wearing his rich clothes, but he had removed his beard, and he rode up to them and said: Do you know my face? And they replied: Are you not Kadhim the son of Qais? From whence are these clothes? And Kadhim replied: Know you that I am now rich and these horses are my horses, and I have married a girl. They said: Kadhim, are you then married and we did not eat as much as the leg of a sparrow at the feast? And Kadhim replied: You shall be my guests when we reach Basra, and when we get these horses safely there, then I shall reward you. But some of them said: How many of these horses will reach Basra? We shall be surprised if one hair from a mare's ear reaches there in safety. For how many tribes lie in our road and do not they all love horses? And Kadhim said: Put these thoughts from you, for every horse and every mare shall arrive safely. And they said: But how can this thing be?

Then Kadhim called out by name twenty men whom he knew and who were clever, and he ordered them and said: You shall ride ahead and go to every sheikh of every tribe on our road and you shall greet them and say: Know you that a sickness has come upon our horses and of them fifty are dying every day, but we are sending two thousand of them to the sea, in the hope that bathing them in the salt water may improve their condition and cure the sickness, though we have little hope that half of them will reach the sea alive. And we warn you, noble sheikhs, to keep your animals far from the Basra road,

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that they may not catch the sickness, and we for our part 539x will keep our horses away from your animals, nor will we approach any well at which you are watering. And the men rode out to execute Kadhim's order.

The messengers rode out and they rode to the guest tents and guest houses of all the sheikhs on the road to Basra and they delivered Kadhim's message, and many of the sheikhs were angry and said: We will not let you enter our territory, for you may give us the sickness. But the messengers said: If you oppose us then you must fight us on horses, since we are mounted, and perhaps your horses will catch the sickness from our horses. So the sheikhs ordered their tribes to keep far from the horses of the Fetla, and this order was obeyed.

Then Kadhim made the journey to Basra by forced marches and he camped only on seven nights and he camped away from people and from wells, and he spent the nights in a black tent with Salma and he taught her the customs of the tribes.

On the morning of the eighth day they saw Basra in front of them, and they had not lost a single horse, and Kadhim brought his caravan of horses up to the walls of the city, and made ready to enter. But a Turkish officer came out and commanded them: Go far from here, for we hear there is a sickness amongst your horses. But Kadhim took the officer and showed the horses to him, and the officer saw that they were all fit and well. Then Kadhim made the officer a present of ten horses and he permitted them to enter the city.

In Basra the price of horses was three times the price in Hilla, and though Kadhim gave each man of the Fetla one horse to sell for his personal profit, he finished the sale of the horses with the sum of twenty-two thousand four x539 hundred and twelve gold liras in one hand and a profit of twenty-eight thousand gold liras on the other hand. And he split the profit of twenty-eight thousand gold liras and took fourteen thousand gold liras for himself and he added the other fourteen thousand gold liras to the sum he owed Abdul Rashid Mejid. Then from his own share he bought a house at Basra for Salma, and he bought her copper cooking-pots and a gold bangle and two anklets of silver, and he engaged for her servants that she might not have to draw water from the river. And Kadhim tarried awhile at Basra, spending the time in the making of love and its enjoyment.

And in Hilla Abdul Rashid Mejid sat in his shop and there was fear in his heart, for he thought: When will my partner come or send the money. For he saw that the tribesmen sent by the horse dealers were watching him, and where he went there they followed. And one day there came to Hilla a wealthy merchant from Basra and Abdul Rashid went to him and asked: Is there news of the Basra merchant, Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi? Is he in good health? And the merchant replied: His name is not known to me. Then Abdul Rashid's heart stopped through fear, and he said: Is he not the wealthy merchant at the Khan of the Indian? And the merchant replied: My shop is in the Khan of the Indian, and I do not recognise his name. Then Abdul Rashid became as one mad, and he sat in his shop and would do no business and he wrung his hands as the washerman wrings clothes, and the horse dealers waited for their money.

One day Kadhim said to his wife Salma: I must go now to Hilla, and pay the money that I owe to your father. And Kadhim went to a banker of Basra and he gave him the forty thousand four hundred and twelve gold liras

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539ˣ

belonging to Abdul Rashid Mejid; and he took from him a draft on Baghdad for that amount. Then he mounted his horse and rode to Hilla. And before he entered the town he put on the beard of sheep's wool and became as Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi, the wealthy merchant, and he rode up to the shop of Abdul Rashid Mejid.

Now, when Abdul Rashid Mejid saw him his fury knew no bounds, and he ran out of the shop cursing Abdul Hamed and using to him names which politeness forbids me to mention. And Abdul Rashid tried to catch and lay hold of Abdul Hamed the merchant, but he was an old man and he could not catch him, and Kadhim rode out of the town thinking: This was a fine reception from my father-in-law. I will teach him a lesson.

Then Kadhim took off his beard and his headcloth and his shoes and his coat and rich clothes and he entered the town on foot wearing only a ragged thob, and he went up to the shop of Abdul Rashid and said: Take your gold liras and give me back my pledge. Abdul Rashid remembered the youth who had taken the gold liras and the cloth against the pledge of a hair of his moustache, so he took the money and he opened the box of pledges and he searched amongst the riding canes and headcloths and rings but he could not find the hair of Kadhim's moustache. It was but a small one, and it had got caught in some headcloth and whisked out of the box. And so he said to Kadhim: The pledge is lost, but it was of no value. Then Kadhim said: Is then a hair of my moustache a thing of no value? You give me that hair or I want your life, for that hair contains my honour. And Kadhim cursed Abdul Rashid, and the curses which he used (may they be far from you) were the curses with which Abdul Rashid had cursed Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi.

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539 And after Kadhim was satisfied with cursing Abdul Rashid he drew out the draft for forty thousand four hundred and twelve gold liras and he gave it to Abdul Rashid and said: Know you that I am your son-in-law and Abdul Hamed el Atraqchi was but a dream. And Abdul Rashid looked at the draft and he saw that it was good and his heart was full of joy.

Then Kadhim returned to Basra and on the road it rained, and the rains were the first cold rains of winter, and Kadhim's clothes became wet and he caught cold, so that when he entered his house in Basra and greeted his wife Salma his nose was dripping even as the palm fronds drip in the rain, and Salma saw and she laughed much, nor did she weep at the dripping of Kadhim's nose.

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THE STORY OF KHALID, THE



COPPERSMITH OF NASIRIYA

Let the name of Mohammed Hassan be written, that he is the teller of this story.

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x539 ONCE, in the days when the Turks ruled Iraq, there was a coppersmith of Basra, and Khalid was his name. He was born in Nasiriya, and lived there until the sixteenth year of his life. Then, when his father died, he took his mother and went to Basra and he worked as a coppersmith in the bazaar of Umm el Brum, that he might earn enough with which to live. Now, the amount he earned each month from the owner of the coppershop was only enough for food and rent and clothes for his mother and himself, nor could he save money enough to buy a shop of his own or to marry a wife. And Khalid and his mother lived in a poor house, and she did the cooking and all the work of the house was in her hands.

x539 581 There came a day that the mother of Khalid fell sick and died and he was left alone in the house, nor was there anyone to do the cooking and the work of the house. As for Khalid, he had to go to work from the rising of the sun until its setting, so he could not go to the bazaar to buy vegetables and meat, nor could he cook his food. He therefore thought: Since I do not earn enough to keep a servant it is necessary that I marry a wife, and this course I would surely take if I had the money, since it is incumbent on a man to take to himself a wife. But since I have little money, let me seek out one who is less desired by men for some reason, that she may be cheap, and though she may not be perfect in all the requirements of a wife, she will at least buy the supplies from the market and cook them and clean the house.

x539 584 581 Then Khalid sent for a wise woman who acted as a go-between for those about to marry, and he said to her: Know you that my income is small and my capital is none and I desire to marry a wife. Therefore seek out one whose

father will not require of me more than one gold lira, 539x
and if she is lame or has only one eye, it matters not, but 584
let her be able to cook. And the wise woman replied and 581
said: I already know of such a one. Her father requires only a date stone. She is perfect in figure and in her face she has the beauty of the moon, she can recite poetry, and as for her cooking, verily it is said that there is a commotion in the heavens, for it is necessary to restrain the angels that they come not down to partake of it whenever she cooks a dish.

Khalid then said to the wise woman: If she be indeed as you say, then why the date stone? Perchance her name is dishonoured and such a one I do not want. But the woman said: If she be not a virgin, then return her to her father. Verily she is honourable, and as for the reason for the date stone, let it be known to you that this girl has the temper of a fiery steed, and her father has recently taken a wife of the same age as this girl, and she beats and torments the new wife of her father without mercy, nor is there peace in his house. Therefore he will give her to you in marriage and her name is Khalila. But she needs a firm hand on the reins. Khalid was happy that he should get a wife beautiful in face and figure, so he said to the wise woman: It shall be as you say. I shall marry this girl, and I shall control her, nor can her temper matter to me, for I am a man, and she is but a woman.

And so the arrangements were made and a day came on 539x
which Khalid sat in his house and his friends went and brought the girl Khalila to him and he took her in marriage. And Khalid's heart was filled with joy, for he found that the girl was beautiful of face and beautiful of figure and he spent the night in the delights and joy of matrimony, and he was happy and thought: I am only a poor

x539 coppersmith, yet I have a bride fit for the Sultan himself. And after a few days spent in married bliss Khalila woke Khalid at the rising of the sun and she said to him: Rise and go to your work, for the house is dirty and it needs cleaning and attention. And Khalid rose and he went to his work.

At the setting of the sun the coppersmiths in the bazaar of Umm el Brum closed their shops and Khalid's master permitted him to go and return to his home. And Khalid entered his house and he stood and rubbed his eyes, for he thought he was in a dream and that what he saw could not be true. For his house was carpeted with the most beautiful carpet made of silk, and it was truly worth not less than one hundred gold liras, and on it stood chairs and tables made of the finest woods, and on the tables were dishes and vases of silver. And Khalid saw that his house looked richer than that of the wealthiest merchant in Basra, and he was amazed at what he saw.

And he said to his wife Khalila: From whence is this wealth? She replied and said: Did you think that I was going to live in a mud hut with no carpet, and with chairs and tables of white deal, and with dishes of earthenware? I am of gentle birth and I need delicate and beautiful things. Therefore have I pledged your credit and brought
[437] these few poor things we need, and even this was difficult, for the merchants did not seem to think much of your ability to pay. And Khalid became angry and he said: Woman, what have you done? Know you it will take me fifty years to pay for this merchandise? She replied: Am I then to live in squalor? Are you not a man that you cannot pay for the needs of the house?

Then Khalid's fury grew, and it was in his thoughts that he should beat his wife, and he picked up a stick and

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539x

got in a few blows on her, but when he put out his hand to hold her in one place that he might beat her the better, she bit his wrist to the bone, and it became apparent to Khalid that his wife had indeed the temper of a fiery steed.

The night passed in fighting and quarrelling and in the morning Khalid's face was covered with scratches from the finger-nails of his wife, and as for Khalila, her back was bleeding and her eyes were yellow from blows. And at the rising of the sun Khalila stayed in her bed, and she refused to make the breakfast for Khalid, and he went to his work hungry and empty, without even a sip of tea.

Khalid sat in the shop of the coppersmith and he fashioned vessels of copper and brass according to the orders of his master, but his heart was full of sadness and grief, and he thought: It was better that I had not married this girl, for now I am indebted to the extent of several hundred gold liras, whereas before I did not owe a single copper coin. And as for my food, she will not prepare it, for she is a fine lady. And at the setting of the sun Khalid sought out a wise woman who lived in the market and he said to her: My state is thus and thus. How can I tame my wife and make her obedient to me?

The woman thought much and she questioned Khalid concerning the nights of bliss, for she was an expert in these matters, and she said: When you go to your house you shall refrain from your wife and remain far from her, and this shall be for many days. Then shall you arrange to marry another wife, but I promise you that she will come to her senses and be obedient to you before this happens.

Khalid returned to his house and he entered, but he did not greet his wife. Instead he went to the carpet and stroked it with his hand and he said: O lovely carpet, how beautiful is your silken pile, how gay your colours. Verily,

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x539 beauty is reserved to carpets only, nor do women have any share of it, for women are all alike. They have hair as black as a spider's legs, a pair of eyes similar to the eyes of a dog, mouths like monkeys' mouths, breasts like the udders of a water buffalo, and their skin is the colour of mud. How, then, can a man love a woman? But you, dear carpet, are of many gay colours, you have the colour of red roses, the blue of the morning sky, the green of young grass, and the yellow sheen of gold. What is more, you have the precious gift of silence, nor do you speak in shrill tones as do the cats when they fight in the moonlight. And that night and on the next night and on every night Khalid rolled up the carpet and took it with him to bed, nor did he speak to his wife. And as for Khalila, she thought: Unhappy is my lot, for I am married to a madman.

x539 651 Now, let it be known to you that in those days the Turkish Governor of Basra kept a spy at Baghdad, that he might receive information and warning that he be not surprised by his superiors, for truly the revenue of Basra was great, and the Governor took more than three-quarters of it for himself and for the expenses of his house, and the remainder he sent to Baghdad, saying: Basra is but a poor city.

x539 One day the Governor received a letter from his spy at Baghdad, and the letter read as follows:

O honoured and respected Governor, Let it be known to you that through the exercise of my secret trade I have discovered that a spy has been sent to Basra, and he has been ordered to report on your administration, and on the several revenues of the City. And as for his name, I know it not, and even if I knew it, then it would be of no value, for he would change it. But he is said to be such a man as

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would work as a smith or artisan, and I enjoin Your 539ˣ Honour to be on your guard against this dangerous man.

The Governor read the letter and his face turned as pale as milk, and he sent for his agents and spies, of whom he had many in the City of Basra, that they might inform him which of the merchants hid and concealed their wealth from him. And he said: Go to the bazaars and to the markets and make full enquiries concerning the smiths and artisans in this City, and inform me of one who is not a native of this place, and who is different from what he appears to be.

The spies and agents went off to execute the orders of their master the Governor, and for a whole week they made discreet enquiries in the bazaars and coffee-houses and they came back and reported to their master and they said: We have enquired diligently concerning every smith and every artisan of this City, and we have found one who says he comes from Nasiriya, and his name is Khalid. But these facts may be false, and he is certainly other than what he appears to be. For though he is only a poor coppersmith earning less than one gold lira a month, yet his house is furnished in a richer fashion than is your palace, and his wife goes to the market and she buys silken carpets and silver vessels worth hundreds of gold liras without a thought to the price.

The Governor dismissed them from his presence, and he thought: Verily this is he, for no doubt he was given a bag of gold for his expenses, and he has misappropriated the money for his own ends. And the Governor sent for his secretary, and this man enjoyed the fullest confidence of his master, and he said to his faithful secretary: The situation is thus and thus. Let us kill this dangerous man.

But the secretary thought for a long time, and then he x539 spoke after this fashion: To kill him would be folly, for another might come in his place. The Government has many hands and many eyes. Let us rather do another thing, let us incline this man to our side, for it is said that the heart of a man may be turned either by women or by gold. And the Governor agreed with his secretary and approved his words.

So the next day the secretary of the Governor went to the market of the coppersmiths and he went to the shop in which Khalid worked. And the master of the shop was pleased at his distinguished visitor, and he ordered a glass of tea from the coffee-house. But the secretary did not speak to the master of the shop. He turned to Khalid, and he examined the copper bowl he was making, and he said: This is indeed the best workman in Basra. And the master of the shop thought: Has the Governor's secretary been attracted by the eyes of our Khalid, for that bowl is no better and no worse than hundreds of others in this bazaar?

Then the secretary spoke and said: Know you that my master, the Governor, is always careful of the welfare of the people of Basra, and he is a lover of artistic and beautiful things, and he has heard that some of the copper vessels in the houses of the people of Basra are lacking in beauty and in skilful workmanship. Therefore has he commanded me that I find the most skilful coppersmith in Basra, that he may be appointed Inspector of Coppersmiths, and after due enquiry I find that you are indeed the best. I therefore appoint you Inspector of Coppersmiths at a salary of one hundred gold liras per month, and your duty shall be to inspect and license the coppersmiths of Basra, and you may charge them such fees as you deem suitable.

Khalid heard the words of the secretary, and his heart

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was filled with a great joy, and as for the master of the 539K shop, he thought: I knew that Khalid was a handsome young man, but I never thought that he would come to this, for it must be his beauty that the secretary admires, for as for his skill, it is not great.

Khalid thanked the secretary and he got up and left the coppersmith's shop, nor did he continue to work. And he went to his house to tell his wife to pack the furniture that they might move from the mud house to a house of marble and fine stones. And Khalid entered his house and he said to his wife: Pack the carpet and furniture that we may move to a palace fit for our high estate.

Khalila heard the words of her husband and her heart was filled with grief, and she thought: Truly I have driven this poor man mad, for he is only a poor coppersmith unable to find the money for even this house. Yet he talks of moving to a palace. How unlucky is my lot, for even [587] if he divorces me, who will marry a divorced woman? And it appears I shall spend my life married to a madman, and never again shall I taste of the joys of marriage.

So Khalila cast herself at her husband's feet, and her body vibrated with sobs, and she said: O my husband, only be as you were on the night of our wedding, and you may take a stick and beat me as much as your heart desires, for I merit a beating. And Khalid thought: She indeed merits a beating, and if I do this to her she will be obedient in future. So he took a stick and beat his wife until the blood came, nor did she fight or resist him.

Then Khalid took his wife and he moved to a fine house and he spent many years in the enjoyment of love and in drawing the emoluments of his high office. And Khalila returned his love exceedingly and she obeyed him in everything, and as for the Governor of Basra, he was

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1539 happy for he thought that he had inclined the heart of the Government spy towards him. And as for the real spy, he was never heard of, for he was set on and killed by the Maadan on his way to Basra, and they took from his body his bag of gold, nor did the Government send another spy in his place.

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r539 THE STORY OF THE SON OF



THE PILGRIM

Verily man cannot die before his appointed time, nor can he live after it for even as long as it takes a stone to drop from the hand to the ground.

P.141

539 ONCE in ancient times there was or there was not a great landowner, master of vast estates, to whom the sheikhs of the Arabs and of the bedouin paid tribute and in God only is there belief.

The name of the landowner was Hassan, and he had a young wife beautiful as a moon, and a faithful slave who had been with him since boyhood and whose name was Ahmed, and Ahmed was devoted to his master and obeyed him in everything.

There came a year in which the Sultan sent a command to the landowner Hassan, and he appointed him Prince of the caravan which was setting out on the Pilgrimage. The wife of Hassan was at that very time with child, and Hassan loved her greatly, nor did he like to leave her. So he ordered that a seat and canopy should be prepared for her on a camel, and he said: It is fitting that my son be born on the Pilgrimage.

The Pilgrimage set out and its destination was Mecca, and it marched according to the orders of the Prince of the Caravan, and with him went his wife and Ahmed his faithful slave. And the caravan reached the Valley of Tos and halted there for the night. Now, with the caravan
164 were many Indian pilgrims, and amongst them was the sickness of cholera, and in the Valley of Tos the sickness spread to many men and many women in the caravan, and they rolled on the ground in the agony of death.

And on that very night the child in the wife of Hassan reached his appointed hour for entering the world, and Hassan said to his faithful slave: Summon the midwife and the wet nurses. For he had arranged for them to be with the caravan. But the slave Ahmed answered and said: Master, they are dead of the sickness. Then Hassan and the slave Ahmed attended themselves to the wife of Hassan

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and they brought forth from her a fine boy and he lived, 539x but as for Hassan's wife, she died in the pangs and labour of childbirth. Then Hassan asked the slave Ahmed to enquire if there was any woman in the caravan who could nurse the boy, but Ahmed returned and said: Master, we of this caravan are now only of one sex, for those women who were amongst us are dead, and even the camels are not in milk.

Hassan's heart was full of grief and he thought: My √39x beloved wife is dead and now my son will die, and he 766 ordered Ahmed: Dig a tomb and place in it my wife and my son. Ahmed said: Master, will you, then, bury a living boy? Hassan answered: Is there, then, milk in your breast that you will nurse him? Rather should we leave him to the will of God. So the slave Ahmed dug a tomb and he placed in it the woman and the boy, and the boy still lived.

In the morning after they had buried those who had √39x died of the sickness the caravan marched on, and they came to the valley of Faratos, where they camped for the night. The sickness had not departed from them, and the night was filled with the screams of the dying. And the Prince of the Caravan fell sick and he died on that very night.

And in the morning the slave Ahmed looked around him and he saw that he was the only one of that company to rise from the ground to say the morning prayer, and as for the rest of them they were all in the stillness of death. The slave Ahmed collected the camels and the bags of money and supplies, and he tied the body of his master to a camel, for he thought: It is fitting that the Prince of the Caravan should complete the Pilgrimage.

The slave Ahmed loaded the camels and set out on the road to Mecca, and he arrived there after a journey free x539 from further misfortunes. At Mecca he remained for many months, and he sold the camels and the property of his master, for there were too many camels for one man to look after and he collected the sums of money and put them with the gold he had taken from the caravan, and he kept careful account of all these sums.

Then he thought and pondered after this fashion: What shall I do with all this money, for my master is dead, his wife is dead, and his son is dead, and his only heir is his brother? And although it is true that his brother will take my master's great estates and land, and this I cannot prevent, for I am only a poor slave, yet he should not have this gold as well, for verily there was hatred between these two brothers. And he decided thus: I will take this gold and return to our land, and if, please God, I arrive in safety, I will give the money to the mosques and to religious charities, that the name of my master may be remembered with honour.

The slave Ahmed waited for the rains, that the wells might be full and his journey easy, then he set out alone with a few camels, and his destination was Iraq. And in the course of his journey he came to the valley of Tos, and it was in his thoughts to attend the tomb of his mistress, and to repair it from the ravages of time. So when he had unloaded the camels and prepared his camp he walked over to the tomb of his mistress.

Ahmed looked at the tomb of his mistress and he saw that there was a hole in the roof, and he looked down through the hole and he was filled with amazement and surprise, for he saw in the tomb a living boy. Then Ahmed dragged aside the stones and opened the tomb, and he saw that the boy was about one year of age, and that the body of his mistress was decayed and withered away, except for one breast, which was alive and full. Ahmed took the child in his arms and in that very instant the remaining breast withered and decayed and faded away.

Ahmed took the child and walked over to his camels, and amongst the camels was a she camel in milk, and he took a vessel and filled it with milk and he gave it to the child and he drank.

The next day Ahmed continued his journey and he thought: I will go to Hail and there halt for some years, until my young master is grown. If we go now to Iraq the boy's uncle may do some evil thing, for he will by now have occupied the estates, and I am but a poor slave, and I will not be able to get my young master his rights. Fortunately we have plenty of gold and I can educate him in a manner fitting to his estate. Then, when he is a grown man, he can claim his land.

So Ahmed took the boy and he journeyed to Hail, and when he arrived there he bought a house and hired a nurse for the child, and when some years had passed he hired for him a teacher, and he educated him also in the use of the sword and the spear in horsemanship and in the arts of war.

There came a day that the boy was grown to sixteen years of age, and he was the handsomest of all the boys in Hail, and his beauty was unsurpassed, and as for his skill with the sword, there was none in Hail to equal him. And Ahmed came to him and said: Master, know you that I am but your slave and not your guardian as you had thought. And Ahmed related to his young master Rejab those facts and those events with which you, my listeners, are acquainted, and Rejab was amazed at what he heard.

Then Rejab ordered his slave Ahmed to prepare camels for their journey to Iraq, and Ahmed sold the house and prepared for the journey, and there was with him a large

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x539 bag of gold, for he had been careful of his master's wealth.

After many days on the road Rejab and his slave Ahmed came to Iraq, and to the estates of his father, which were near to Samawa. And they inquired in the villages and from the people concerning the situation and they replied: Hamed the brother of Hassan has inherited the estates and he has been in occupation of them for the last sixteen years. And verily he is a tyrant, for he takes from the poor even their bread. And Rejab and his slave Ahmed kept their identity a secret, and to those who asked of Ahmed concerning his master he replied: He is a young prince of the Shammar from Hail, and since he has no work or occupation he travels for his amusement. Rejab and Ahmed camped in a black tent of the Arabs near to Samawa, and they had only their animals for company.

One dark night before the rising of the moon Rejab and Ahmed were asleep in the tent and Ahmed awoke and heard a noise. So he took his sword and dashed out, thinking: Thieves are at the camels. He ran to the animals and found near them an old bent man with a long white beard, and the old man asked of him food and water. So Ahmed took the old man to the tent and he woke his young master, and Rejab ordered that the old man be given food and water, and he ate until he was satisfied. Then the old man thanked Rejab, and he said: I will sell you two sayings for a coin of Damascus. Ahmed searched in the bag of money until he found a coin of Damascus and he gave it to the old man. Then the old man spoke after this fashion: As for the first saying, Thou shalt beware of the one-eyed man, and as for the second saying, Thou shalt not sleep on the nights of the new moon. And the old man took his staff and rose and hobbled away.

In the morning Rejab said to Ahmed his slave: We are

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camped here without benefit, for no plan presents itself by which I may regain my estates, and verily if I say to the people, I am the son of Hassan and I lived for a year in my mother's tomb, no man will believe me. Rather should I go to my uncle's guest-house and see what manner of man he be, and if he be not evil, I should say, I am your nephew. But the slave Ahmed said: Verily he is evil. And Rejab replied: How can this be, for he is of my own blood? 539x

So Rejab and his slave rode to the guest-house of Hamed and Rejab entered and saluted the assembly. He saw that there was a great coming and going of people. So when the slave brought him coffee he asked: What is this great throng? And the slave replied: Know you that tonight the daughter of our master will be given in marriage, and people have come in from the whole district to be at the feast. And Rejab asked the slave: Is she beautiful? And the slave answered: Verily when my mistress comes out at night, then the moon hides its face, for it is jealous of her beauty. Rejab thought: It is my right as her cousin to marry this girl. I should see my uncle and declare myself. [582]

Rejab sat for half an hour in the guest-house. Then there was a commotion and the people rose, for the land-owner Hamed entered to partake of his morning coffee, and Rejab saw the face of his uncle. And he was amazed, for Hamed had only one eye. And Rejab turned to his neighbour in the assembly and he said: I never knew our host was one-eyed. The man replied: It was only a month ago that it happened. Our master was stroking and petting his hawks, and the falconer had put a new bird with them and he knew it not, and this hawk took out his eye as cleanly as it would take out the eye of a hare. And Rejab thought: The saying of the old man was surely a warning

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*539 against my uncle. I must not reveal my identity to him.

So Rejab sat in the guest-house, and he was thinking:
It is my right to marry this girl. How can I prevent the
marriage? And Hamed looked around his guest-house and
he saw a strange youth of great beauty seated there, and he
asked: Who is he? They answered: He is one of the
Shammar princes from Hail, and we do not know his
name. Then Rejab rose and thanked his host and left the
assembly, and he took his horse and rode off. But when
he was in the cover of the palm trees he halted and turned
[525 to look at the house of Hamed, for he thought: I must
839] carry off the girl this very day. He saw that the women's
quarter was heavily guarded by slaves and eunuchs armed
with swords, and all the doors to the courtyard were
guarded, nor was it possible to gain entrance. But he saw
[514] also that the House of the Dawn was situated at a distance
from the house, that its odours (may they be far from you)
should not disturb the people of the house, and he cursed
himself and thought: Had I come one day earlier I could
have carried off the girl when she comes at dawn to visit
the House of the Dawn, but now there is no time to wait
another day. Then an idea came to him, and he took his
horse and rode at a canter to Samawa.

*539 In the bazaar of Samawa, Rejab bought first a woman's
757 dress, and he wrapped it up and concealed it in his cloak.
Then he went to the pharmacist and he bought three Roman pills. Now, let it be known to you that in these days we have many and complicated medicines, but then we had only simple remedies, and the Roman pill served both for a man and for his animals, for verily it was said, One for a man, two for a horse, three for a camel. And he took the three Roman pills and he went to the shop of the sweet maker and he bought from him a tray of the

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finest sweets, and he cut open the largest and the best 539x
sweet and placed inside it the three Roman pills, saying to 757
the sweetmaker: My she-camel will not take pills, therefore I have to conceal them in sweets.

Rejab mounted his horse and rode back to his tent, and 539x
there he ordered his slave Ahmed to load the animals, and to take them to a mound which was eight hours' march out into the desert on a little used route. Then he mounted a fresh horse, and taking the woman's clothes and the sweets under his cloak, he rode out to the house of Hamed. But when he was near to the house he took his horse and tethered it in the concealment of the palm trees near to the House of the Dawn. Then he put on the woman's clothes and hid his own clothes near his horse, and he put the tray of sweets on his shoulder and walked towards the house, crying in a girl's voice: Buy my sweets and buy luck. And his veil he let fall after the manner of gypsies, for his moustache was not grown, and he was beautiful to behold, and the slaves and sentries who saw him thought: What a pretty gypsy girl is this. Perchance we can have some fun with her this night. And they let Rejab enter the courtyard of the harem.

Then the women servants came crowding around Rejab and they wanted to buy sweets, but he gave them not, saying: First I must sell the largest sweet for a piece of silver to her who is about to marry, for it will bring her luck and a fine boy child. And the women cried: Take the gypsy girl to our mistress, that she may be cheered up, for verily she is weeping now, for she likes not this marriage.

They took Rejab and led him into the chamber in which was seated the Lady Aliya, the daughter of Hamed, and she was weeping in a manner to tear the heart. And the maids and servants said to her: Mistress, buy a sweet

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x539 from the gypsy girl, that it may bring you luck and a fine boy child. And Rejab looked at the Lady Aliya and his heart was full of joy, for verily her eyes were like pearls, her mouth was like a rosebud, her breasts were revealed by the silken cloth of her dress, and lovely was their shape, and her body was as slim as that of a boy.

The Lady Aliya looked through her tears at the gypsy girl and she said: Give me, then, a sweet, though it cannot bring me happiness, for my grief is beyond help. And Rejab gave the Lady Aliya the largest sweet, and she ate it and said: On the outside it was sweet and delicious, but its centre was bitter. Why was this? And Rejab replied: Lady, this was a sweet of love, for know you that love is sweet, but it is not without bitterness, for love must end and all lovers will be parted if only finally by death. Therefore first a girl tastes the sweets of love, but afterwards she must taste its bitterness and grief.

And the Lady Aliya thought: How wise are the words of the gypsy girl. And she ordered that the girl be rewarded with a gold lira. And Rejab took the coin and he gave the remaining sweets to the servants, saying: Take these free, for your mistress has paid me handsomely, and I must go now and hurry to my tent and make many more sweets, for there will be a great demand for them this night. And Rejab left the chamber and left the courtyard, and the sentries and guards called out to him: O my pretty one, wilt thou return tonight? And Rejab winked at them and answered: Verily I shall be at your disposal this night. And he hurried away to the palm trees and to his horse.

The Lady Aliya sat in her chamber thinking: How pretty was that gypsy girl and how brazenly she looked at me with her eyes. It was almost as if she desired my body.

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x539



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x539 And how bitter was the centre of her sweet. For the Lady
757 Aliya knew not that the sweet contained three Roman
514 pills, the dose for a camel.

When Rejab reached his horse he stripped off the clothes of a girl and he put on his own clothes, and he strapped on his sword, and he stood by his horse, watching the House of the Dawn and thinking: It will not be long now. And after ten minutes he saw the Lady Aliya come out of the gate of the courtyard and her step was the step of one in haste, and she made towards the House of the Dawn. And when the Lady Aliya was near the House of the Dawn, but before she could enter it, Rejab rode down on her and seized her in his arms and pulled her across his horse, and he covered her mouth with his hand, nor could she utter a scream, and he turned his horse and galloped off in the direction of the desert. And with such dash and speed did he do this that the sentries saw nothing, for they were looking into the courtyard thinking: It is not fitting that we stare at the Lady Aliya while she walks towards the House of the Dawn.

x539 When they had galloped some distance from the house of Hamed, Rejab released his hand from Aliya's mouth, and she looked at his face and she saw that he had the face of the pretty gypsy girl. And she thought: If my captor is indeed a man, and so it appears, then I am indeed in luck, for he is handsomer by far than that horrible old landowner to whom my father was going to marry me. But there was agony and pain in the stomach of Aliya, and she said: O noble stranger, let me down for a moment that I may ease myself. And Rejab replied: Wait until we are in the desert when we may see if we are pursued.

After they had entered the desert, and when there was a clear mile behind them to watch for pursuit, Rejab per-

mitted the girl Aliya to get down and ease herself. And 539K
when she had done this she returned to his horse, nor did he have to catch her, and Rejab saw that she came with him freely. And she mounted the horse, and she said: Pardon the delay, but now let us ride on, that we may put many miles between my father and me. Then Rejab replied: As for the delay, it was necessary, for I gave you three Roman pills, the dose for a camel, that I might make sure. And Aliya answered: Verily you made sure that I would leave the house, for one of those Roman pills would have been enough. And Aliya laughed much at the stratagem of Rejab and she said: So this was the bitterness in the sweet of love. Then Rejab said: My darling, you who have tasted the bitterness at the beginning of our love will never have to taste it again, for there will be no end to our loving. And Aliya and Rejab discovered that they were of one heart.

Rejab took Aliya and he rode for eight hours into the desert until he came to the mound on the unfrequented track, and there they awaited the coming of the slave Ahmed with the animals. And after an hour's wait the slave arrived with the camels. They put up a black tent of the Arabs, and Aliya cooked food for them. And when they had eaten of the food, Rejab took Aliya into the black tent, and the slave Ahmed he ordered to stand on
guard. And the girl Aliya trembled as Rejab took her into 539K
the tent, and Rejab said to her: Do not fear, for I am close 582
to you, nor am I far, and I am he who has the right to marry you and the right to kill you. Then Aliya was astonished, and she said: But he who would have the right to marry me and the right to kill me would be my
cousin, yet cousin have I none. And Rejab replied: I am 539K
indeed he. And he related the full story of his birth and

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X539 his life in the tomb, and Aliya was astonished at what she heard.

Now, in the house of Hamed, after a period of time had passed, people began to ask: Where is the Lady Aliya? For the mother of the girl was calling, Aliya, Aliya, and yet there was no response. And Hamed the one-eyed became worried when he saw that his daughter was not in the house, and he questioned the sentries and said: Has the Lady Aliya gone out? And the sentries replied: Verily she passed out through this gate an hour ago, and she went towards the House of the Dawn. Yet we have not seen her return. And Hamed became anxious when he heard these words, for he thought: Perchance she has cut a vein or run away, for she wanted not this marriage. So he sent a slave girl to the House of the Dawn, saying: Report to me concerning your mistress.

The slave girl ran out to the House of the Dawn, and she found it empty, nor was there anyone there. Then Hamed ordered his slaves and guards to search the palm trees, and they went out and came back and reported: There is no one there, but we found these clothes belonging to a woman and this brass tray. Hamed examined the clothes, and the maids and the slave girls also came and examined them, and they said: These are not the clothes of our mistress. Rather, they are the clothes of the gypsy girl who sold the sweets. Then Hamed enquired of the guards at the gate, and one of them said: Truly I did not think of it at the time, for she was a girl and he was a boy, but the gypsy girl had verily the same face as the young Shammar prince who was here this morning, and they were as alike in the face as two hairs of a mare's tail.

Hamed was convinced by the words of the guard, and he said: My daughter has been taken by the Shammar prince. Does anyone know where his camp is? And one of 539 the Arabs in the assembly said: I have heard that he is camped near the village of so and so. And Hamed ordered his steward: Ride to the camp of the Shammar prince, and take twenty men, and bring him here by force. And the steward took the men and rode off, but after two hours he returned and reported: His camp is struck and he is away into the desert with his animals. And the fury of Hamed knew no bounds and he said: What are these Shammar princes? Do they hang around the harem as do rats around the grain store? Then Hamed ordered his steward: Prepare every man we have got, that we may pursue him on the road to Hail.

And those that were there assembled said: Are you, then, a great sheikh, or are you only a landowner, that you go to war with the Shammar? For never will they give up this boy who is one of their princes. And are they not said to have ten thousand warriors? Hamed realised the truth of their words and he said: I will pursue them with every man I have, that I may catch them before the territory of the Shammar. But should they enter, then I need assistance. And Hamed wrote a letter to those sheikhs who were his neighbours and whose tribes rented his land, and he said: Give me help to avenge my honour, for my daughter is stolen. But the sheikhs replied and said: We sympathise and regret your situation, and touching on your honour, you will know how to defend it, and as for us, we will not meddle in the affair. For the sheikhs liked not Hamed, since he was a miser.

Then Hamed collected every slave and every man he had, but they numbered only three hundred, and he rode out along the road to Hail. And the people said: Is it thus that one goes to war with the Shammar?

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X539 From his camp in the desert Rejab sent his slave Ahmed daily to the towns and villages, that he might bring information, and so he heard of the reply of the sheikhs and of the departure of Hamed. And he thought: Now is my chance to regain my estates. So Rejab left the girl Aliya with the slave Ahmed and he rode to the encampment of the greatest sheikh whose tribe rented land from Hamed, and he entered the guest-house and saluted the assembly, and he told his name to the sheikh, saying: I am Rejab the son of Hassan who died on the Pilgrimage, and I have come to regain my estates. But the sheikh said: How can this thing be? For Hassan had no son, though his wife was pregnant when he left here, and they all died of cholera on the road, nor did a single one of that caravan survive. And Rejab told the story of his birth and of his life in the tomb to the sheikh, and that sheikh was amazed at what he heard.

Then the sheikh said: You will honour us by taking a meal? And Rejab accepted the hospitality of the sheikh. Then the sheikh went out of the guest-house, and he ordered the slaves to bring food, and Rejab sat in the guest-house and he waited the coming of the meal. And after a time the slaves brought in the meal, and Rejab was amazed at what he saw, for instead of a mound of rice on the great dish there was a mound of steaming hot earth, and on the mound of earth there was the skeleton of a sheep, nor was there any meat on its bones. And Rejab turned to the sheikh and he said: Is this not a strange meal that you set before me? The sheikh replied: You as a child drank milk from the breast of a dead woman. It should be to you as nothing to get nourishment from the skeleton of a sheep and from a mound of steaming hot earth. But I am curious to see you do it, and after the meal

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is finished I will order the slave to bring you coffee made of hot ink. 539x

Rejab saw that the sheikh did not believe his story, and he thought: How can I convince him, for this story is indeed difficult to believe? And Rejab spoke and said: As for nourishment, there is nourishment in the skeleton. For do not the flies settle on it, and they go nowhere to amuse themselves? They only seek nourishment, and as for me, I cannot now die, even without nourishment, for would God have kept me alive for a year in my mother's tomb to have me die now in the sixteenth year of my life? Shoot at me an arrow if you so desire, for it cannot kill me, since my death is not yet ordained.

The sheikh ordered a slave to bring him his bow, and he took an arrow, and he stood at a distance of ten paces from Rejab in the great guest-room, and he drew the bow taut and aimed it at Rejab, and he said: I ask your pardon if I kill you, my guest, and if I do not kill you, I ask your pardon that I doubted your word. And Rejab said: Shoot the arrow and as for my pardon, it is granted. And the sheikh saw that Rejab did not flinch, and he released the bow, and the arrow went wide.

Then the sheikh bid Rejab be seated and he brought for him coffee, and he said: Verily you are your father's son, and I will assist you to get your rights, for this dog Hamed pleases me not. And the sheikh called his sirkals and he said: This boy is the rightful heir of Hassan. Call four hundred men and instal him in his father's house. And the sirkals assembled the tribesmen and they rode to the house of Hamed, nor did the guards left by Hamed oppose their entrance. And Rejab called the tenants and told them that Hamed was evicted and that he was the rightful heir.

Then Rejab wrote a letter to Hamed his uncle:

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x539 To His Honour the Brother, the Respected and Dear Uncle,—After the customary greetings it behoves me to inquire about your health, and I, dear uncle, am praying for your health and safety. And know you that I am the son of your brother Hassan, and in your absence I have occupied my father's house and lands, which you have cared for so well, and on your return I will greet you as my guest if you come in peace, and if you come in anger then I am ready. And know you that your daughter Aliya is my wife, and she spends her days in praying for Your Honour's health.

And Hamed received the letter when he was within seven marches of Hail, and when he read it his face turned black with fury, and he said: Who is this foundling upstart? And the messenger said: Verily he is your brother's son.

Then Hamed turned his men and returned to Iraq. And his slaves said: Thank God we are not to fight the Shammar with this army. And after several marches Hamed came to his former house, and he saw that it was surrounded by the black tents of the tribesmen. Hamed was outnumbered, but such was his fury that he led his men in a charge. Rejab stood in front of the tribesmen, and verily the force of Hamed went down before the tribesmen as does wheat in hail. Rejab disarmed his uncle, but allowed him his life, for he said: The brother of my father I cannot kill, and the father of my wife I cannot kill.

Then Rejab took his wife Aliya and he lived in the house of his father in prosperity and peace, and when the nights passed and dawn came in the East, then Rejab and Aliya would walk together to the House of the Dawn which stood at a distance from their house, nor would he let her go there alone.

X539

THE STORY OF THE CLOAK



WHICH WAS THE FATHER OF A CHILD

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x539 ONCE, in the days of Haroun er Rashid, Abu Nawas the friend and companion of the Commander of the Faithful was walking amongst the tents and reed huts of the poor people who lived on the outskirts of Baghdad, in search of amusement for his master. And as he was passing a tent he heard in it voices and they were raised in anger, and they were speaking in the slow tones of the people of the high desert, and Abu Nawas stopped to listen to their words.

x539 577 And a man's voice was speaking and its tones were the tones of fury and it said: O daughter, you shall tell me the name of the man who is the father of this child, that I may kill him and I may kill you and our name may be again among the honourable. And a girl's voice answered and said: O my father, verily there was no man. Know you that one night last winter I had gone to fetch water, and the ground was frosty and the night had the coldness of death, and I was trembling with cold and the fear of the night air, when I saw on the ground a man's cloak, and I picked it up and wrapped it around me and I became warm. But, alas, from the smell of that cloak there came in my stomach a child.

Abu Nawas thought: Verily this is an affair in which my master will be interested, for does he not take an interest in everything touching the welfare of his subjects? So Abu Nawas entered the tent, and he found there an old man whose face was creased in fury, and a young girl beautiful of the face who was weeping in a manner to turn the heart, and in the hand of her father was a dagger.

x 539 Abu Nawas commanded the man to lay his dagger aside and he said: Know you that I am a high officer of the State, and to disobey my orders will lose you your head. There is much in this affair of interest to justice. Therefore

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tomorrow shall you go to the Qadhi, and you shall take with you your daughter, and you shall take the cloak, and also the man who is the owner of the cloak, that the Qadhi may discover how there came into your daughter's stomach a child, that justice may be done. 539X

Then Abu Nawas returned to the Palace and he related to the Commander of the Faithful that which had taken place, and Haroun er Rashid was pleased and he ordered: Bring me a disguise, for tomorrow I myself will sit in the Qadhi's court. So the next day Haroun er Rashid and Abu Nawas went to the court of the Qadhi, and the girl and her father and the cloak and the owner of the cloak were also present there

And the father of the girl was abashed and silent in the presence of the Qadhi and the people of the court, for he was from the high desert. And the Qadhi asked him: Whom do you accuse? But the bedawi remained silent. Then Abu Nawas stepped forward and said: O Qadhi, let me speak for him, for he is without a tongue. And permission was allowed for him to speak.

Abu Nawas pointed a finger at the cloak, and he said: O Cloak, verily I accuse you of the rape of this innocent young girl. For did you not wrap your woollen folds even around her naked thighs and did not your lecherous male smell enter into her and cause to become in her stomach a child? And the Qadhi was amazed at the words of Abu Nawas, and he asked: Have you evidence to prove your accusation? And Abu Nawas said: Let the girl give evidence.

The girl walked forward and she said: O learned Qadhi, verily I am innocent of all evil and of all offence, nor have I ever been near to a man. But it happened that last winter I went in the night to draw water from the River Tigris, and there was frost on the ground, and I was trembling from cold and fear of the night. And as I walked along I saw in front of me on the path the cloak of a man, so I picked it up and wrapped it around me and I became warm. But, alas, though I knew it not at the time, from the smell of that cloak there came in my stomach a child. And the Qadhi thought: This is a most strange case and I like it not. For who is that huge merchant with the beard sitting in the crowd? He is almost big enough to be our lord and master Haroun er Rashid himself. And so the Qadhi questioned the girl, thinking: I must conduct this case according to the best and most learned rules of law, that the Commander of the Faithful be pleased with me.

The learned Qadhi asked the girl: What is your name? The girl replied: I am named Khadija, nor have I any other name. And the Qadhi wrote the reply of the girl in his great book. Then the Qadhi said to her and he asked of her: The accuser has stated that this cloak wrapped itself around your naked thighs. Did this indeed happen? And
[291] the girl Khadija replied: Verily it was so, for I was wearing a dress and my own black abba, and over it I put on this cloak of a man. And first it tickled me around my neck, so I pulled my dress up over my head so that my neck might be protected from its tickling. And when I did this that devil of a cloak wrapped its folds even around my naked thighs and it commenced tickling me a hundredfold in that region, so that I started to laugh and power departed from my legs and I fell to the ground. And such was its insistent tickling that I parted my legs and it may well have been that at this time its smell entered me and caused in my stomach a child.

The Qadhi turned to the assembly, and he asked: Does anyone speak for the accused, for being but a cloak it has

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no tongue? Yet none can be condemned unheard, for such is the wise order of our mighty master Haroun er Rashid, the noble, the blessed. And the bearded merchant who was indeed none other than the Commander of the Faithful in person, came forward and said: I will defend the cloak. 539ˣ

The bearded merchant raised his hand and he said in a noble and loud voice: Verily the cloak is innocent, for does not the girl say that it was the smell which caused in her stomach to come a child? And the smell is different from the cloak and it merely rides on it in the manner that a man rides on a horse. It frequently happens that a rider returns from the desert to his house and he enters unto his wife and he causes in her stomach to come a child. Yet never have I heard it said that the horse was the father of the child. And on one cloak may ride many smells, such as the smell of tobacco, the smell of scent, the smell of coffee and other smells, in the manner that one horse may have many riders. It is the smell which you must accuse and try, and the cloak you must acquit.

The learned Qadhi gave judgement and said: O Cloak, you are free from blame. You may continue to be a cloak and be such a cloak as you have always been before. And I hereby order to be brought before me the smell which despoiled this innocent girl.

And Abu Nawas said: O Qadhi, the smell is on the cloak and it must surely be before you, and if you doubt it come and sniff. And Abu Nawas turned to the cloak and he pointed his finger at it and he said: O evil smell, riding upon an innocent cloak, verily you entered this maiden and you caused in her stomach to come a child.

The Qadhi turned to the people there assembled and he asked: Does anyone speak for the smell? And again the x539 large merchant with a beard came forward and said: I will defend it.

Haroun er Rashid, for indeed it was he, raised his right hand and said: Verily the smell was innocent, for how can a smell know guilt? Do you accuse the arrow or do you accuse the man who shot it. O Qadhi, you must acquit the smell and accuse the owner of the smell. Then the Qadhi spoke and he gave judgement and said: O smell, you are found to be without guilt. Continue then to be a smell and smell as you have always smelled before.

Then the Qadhi ordered to be brought before him the owner of the smell, and they led a youth in the sixteenth year of his life in front of the Qadhi, and they said: This boy owns the cloak, therefore he must own the smell which goes with that cloak. And the Qadhi asked the boy: What is your name? The boy replied: Verily it is Karaim. Then the Qadhi said to the boy: Know you that you are accused of owning an active and dangerous smell, and, as you have failed to keep this smell under control you have caused in the stomach of this girl to exist a child. And the boy answered and said: Verily I am innocent of all wrong.

Then the Qadhi said to the boy: On the night that this girl found your cloak on the ground and she put it on to keep herself warm, where were you and why were you not controlling your smell? And the boy replied: On that bitterly cold night on which the girl put on my cloak to keep herself warm, verily I was inside the cloak and nowhere else, for where else should a man be on a cold night but inside his cloak?

So the Qadhi called the girl and he said: Verily your evidence was incomplete and lacking accuracy, for why did you not say that when you found the cloak on the ground that bitterly cold night and you put it on to keep

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yourself warm, that there was a boy in the cloak?

And the girl Khadija replied and said: Verily I had forgotten, for many months have passed since that night, and it is easy to forget what things contain. How often, O learned Qadhi, do you have to feel in your pockets to see if you have with you your key and your rosary and your money, when you took them from your house only a few minutes earlier? How much easier then, is it for me to have forgotten what that cloak contained after so many months.

The Qadhi then demanded of the boy Karaim: What is your reply to the accusation? Karaim raised his hand and answered: I am innocent, for I did but allow the girl to come and shelter in my cloak on that bitterly cold night. And do you, O Qadhi, blame the sheep when they huddle together in the frosty wind? For do not even the sheep know that two bodies are warmer than one, and are we, the sons of Adam, to be inferior to the sheep in this respect?

Then the Qadhi gave judgement and said: The boy is innocent and the girl is innocent of all wrong, nor shall the father of the girl have the right to kill them. But I do command and order that this boy and this girl be married this very day, that when the cold winds of winter blow he may cover her with his cloak and that they may huddle together to gain warmth.

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THE STORY OF THE TWO DANCERS



Let it be written that the story was related by Hamed, while we were awaiting the coming of the wild duck.

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ONCE in Basra there was a dancing boy and a dancing girl and they were brother and sister. They were Circassians of great beauty, and they were slaves of a Turk who kept a dancing hall. So beautiful was their dancing that the great and noble Pashas and even the Wali of Basra himself would pay bags of gold to watch their dancing. And the boy, whose name was Nasirulla, and the girl, whose name was Salma, were displeased at their situation, for whatever gold they earned, the Turk took it, and it appeared to them that they would remain forever slaves.

One day the boy Nasirulla said to his sister: Know you that a time will come when our beauty will fade, and then these mighty Pashas will no longer want to gaze at our dancing. Then will our Turkish master sell us to do manual work on the roads and fields, and they will work us so hard that we shall die in a few years in agony and misery. But as for our master, he will be rich from all this gold which he takes from us, and he will buy a house and live in it with his mistresses while we are starving, and this state of affairs is neither right nor is it just. The girl Salma replied: Indeed, you speak the truth, but how are we to escape from this Turk? For in the daytime he is watchful, and at night does he not chain us by the neck with an iron chain? And Nasirulla replied: We must kill this man. Salma turned pale and she said: Do you not know the penalties for slaves who kill their masters? And how will this benefit us, since they will find him dead and then they will commence to flog us? Anyway, how can you kill him, since you are only a weak boy?

Then Nasirulla said to her: Know you that I shall kill him, and when he is dead who will know of it? For the boys who serve the wines do not sleep in this house, and

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X539 to them we can say, Our master is sick, and they will suspect nothing. And as for the visitors who come for entertainment, they never see our master. For do not we have to go to them and sit on their knees and kiss them and coax them until they give us gold. And indeed they little know that our master takes the gold off us when we get behind the screen. Salma agreed with the words of her brother and she said: Verily we should risk all and slay him.

The next day, when the dancing hall was closed for the night, Nasirulla took a mouse he had caught and he threw it in the great jar of wine, which had a neck as large as a wheel, and the mouse swam around in the wine, nor did it want to drown. Then Nasirulla called out to his master: Come and help me, for there is a mouse in the wine. And the Turk grew angry, for he thought: This is some trick of the boy to dip a bowl in the wine and steal some of it. So the Turk came over and he peered into the jar of wine. And as he was looking for the mouse in the jar, Nasirulla caught him a blow on the back of the head with an iron bar, and he fell forward stunned, with his head in the jar. Then Nasirulla called his sister and together they lifted the legs of the Turk and they thrust him completely into the jar of wine. And upside down in the jar of wine the Turk met the Angel of Death. And Nasirulla and Salma took what gold they could find in the house and put it in their pockets. Yet it was not sufficient for them, for they did not know where the Turk kept his main hoard of gold.

The next night the boys who served the wine came to the dancing hall, and Nasirulla said to them: Know you that our master is sick, but you are to take the wine from the tap at the bottom of the jar as is your custom, and you will bring the money to me, for I am acting for our

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master, until, please God it may be soon, he is recovered 539ᵡ
and in health.

The boys drew the wine from the tap at the bottom of the jar, and they took it and gave it to the guests who were coming into the dancing hall. Then Nasirulla and Salma went out and they danced in a manner in which they had never danced before. And the Pashas and the Beys were amazed, for never had they seen such dancing, and they said one to the other: Never has the entertainment been so good as it is tonight, and even the wine tastes better and has more body to it.

And after their dance was finished Nasirulla and Salma went out and they sat on the knees of the Pashas and on the knees of the Beys and they kissed them and tickled their ears until they pulled out their bags of gold and they gave them money such as they had never given before. And that night when they closed the dancing hall Nasirulla and his sister counted their money and they said: If we can keep this up for one more week, then we shall have enough money to return to the Caucasus.

The next night the hall was even more crowded than it had been on the first night, for the Pashas and the Beys had told their friends of the excellence of the dancing and the quality of the wine. And again Nasirulla and Salma danced in the most exquisite manner and again they kissed and tickled the ears of the Ottomans and they received even more gold than before. And the noble Pashas and Beys said to each other: The wine at this hall gets better every night, and as for the dancing, there is none like it in the world.

And again on the third night and on the fourth night the dancing was perfect and the wine was getting richer and richer and Nasirulla and Salma collected much gold.

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X539 But on the fifth night so many Turkish officers came to the hall that they could not all enter, and they quarrelled one with the other and fought to get in and a noble Bey was killed. And the Wali of Basra was informed of the affair.

On the morning of the sixth day soldiers came to the cabaret and they asked Nasirulla: Where is Jamal Effendi, the owner of this hall? Nasirulla's heart was full of fear and he replied: Verily he has gone out to the market, nor do I know when he will return. Then the Shawish in charge of the soldiers said: We have been commanded by the Wali to confiscate the wine of this hall, because it is said to be of such quality that the officers of the garrison are fighting with each other to get at it. And we have also been ordered to take the dancing boy and the dancing girl who perform here, for they have been inflaming the passions of the garrison. But in future they will only perform before the Wali himself.

Nasirulla's face went as pale as death, and he thought: Now our secret is no longer a secret. But he said to the Shawish: Know you that this wine is the finest wine in the world, but it will spoil unless you have a large number of men to move the jar. The jar must be kept vertical and not shaken, for it is most delicate wine, and you must keep the mouth of the jar tightly sealed, lest the cold air strike the wine and spoil it. Then the Shawish went off to fetch porters to take the jar of wine, and Nasirulla said to his sister: Come, for we cannot delay further. Then Nasirulla and Salma left the hall and they went out into the street, and they took with them their gold.

When Nasirulla and Salma came out into the street the time was day, and they thought: Wherever we go now we will be seen by the people. It is better that we hide until nightfall. So they slipped into a large warehouse which

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was full of chests of Kuweit of enormous size. And Nasirulla opened one of the largest chests and he found it full of silk, so he emptied out the silk and hid it behind another chest. Then he and Salma got in the chest and he closed the lid, and with his knife he made a small hole that they might breathe the air within that chest.

And when they had been some time hidden in the chest, Nasirulla and Salma heard footsteps approaching, and men walked into the vault. And one man said to the other: Have you packed the silks? The other man replied: Master, I have packed them with my own hand in this chest. And he tapped with his hand on the chest in which Nasirulla and Salma were hiding. Then the master of the vault ordered: Rope the chest, and I will return in one hour with the camels. But the servant said: Master, I must fetch the porters to lift this chest before the rope can be passed around it, for alone I cannot lift it. And both the master and the servant left the store.

Salma was trembling with fear, and she said to Nasirulla: Let us escape before they return. But Nasirulla replied: Do not fear, for wherever this chest is going, we will go inside it. For it must be going a long way or they would not rope it, and any place is better for us than Basra. When the Wali finds the body of our master in his wine his brain will boil over even as the milk boils when it is left too long on the fire. But wait you here, and in two minutes I will return with bread and water for this may be a long journey. And Nasirulla opened the box and he ran out into the street and he ran to a shop and he said: Give me bread and dates and cheese and take this gold. And Nasirulla bought a large bag and filled it with bread and dates and cheese, and he bought the largest bottle he could see and he filled it with water and he ran back to his

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539x sister, and on the way back he bought two water melons also. And Nasirulla got into the chest and he closed the lid, saying to his sister: Know you that these supplies may have to last us even for weeks, for perchance they are loading this chest on to a ship and sending it to India.

After a time the servant returned with porters, and they lifted the chest and roped it securely. Then they brought a camel and loaded the chest and they set out. And Nasirulla and Salma heard the bells of many more camels and they said: This is no ship. Rather it is a caravan on the road to Baghdad. And for days and days the caravan marched, and at night it halted, and each day Nasirulla and Salma took only a sip of water, and a slice of water melon and a few dates.

And when the days had joined to become a week the water melons were finished, and when the weeks had joined to become a month, the water was finished, and only a few dates and a little cheese remained. And Nasirulla said to his sister: Know you that we were not on the road to Baghdad. Perchance we are on the road to Mecca through Busaiyir, or on the road to Syria by way of the desert. And Salma said: If we do not arrive within three days then I must call out to the camel men that they release us, if only to kill us, for I am dying of thirst.

But the next day they heard around them the sounds of a large city and Nasirulla listened to the swearing and shouting of the people of the streets and he said: The tongue is Turkish. How have we arrived in Turkey without passing through a great city? This must be a special caravan carrying goods for the Sultan himself, that it has been able to halt away from the cities, and supplies of water and food have been sent out to be ready for it in the desert that it be not delayed.

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THE STORY OF THE TWO DANCERS

The camels came to a halt and porters came and the great chest in which were Nasirulla and Salma was unloaded and carried by the porters for a long way, and finally it was set down on a stone floor. And Nasirulla and Salma knew not where they were. They heard a man come, and he cut the rope around the box, and he said in Turkish: I will go to summon the ladies that they may see the silks. And his voice was the voice of a eunuch. When the footsteps of the eunuch died away, Nasirulla opened the box and peered out, but there was nobody in sight.

So he and his sister staggered out of the chest, for they could scarcely walk from weakness, and they found themselves in a great hall, the walls of which were covered with marble and rare stones and with mirrors set in silver, and in the centre of the hall a fountain was playing. Nasirulla and Salma went to the fountain and they drank until their stomachs were filled. Then Nasirulla took his sister and said: Let us hide until we can find out what this place is, and how we can get out of it, for I do not suppose that it is closely guarded. And Nasirulla and Salma entered a small chamber which led off the main hall, and they found it crowded with the most beautiful dresses, made of rare cloths, and they were all for women, and there was not a single coat or cloak for a man in that room. Amongst the gowns and the dresses Nasirulla and Salma hid.

Then the eunuch returned to the large hall, and Nasirulla was amazed for behind the eunuch followed hundreds and hundreds of the most beautiful girls, and the eunuch went up to the great chest and threw it open, and he cried: Ladies, see the latest chest of silks and fine cloths. But in the chest was only the skin of two water melons, hundreds of date stones, an empty bottle and a smell of dirt for verily Nasirulla and his sister had not left that box

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x539 for over a month. And the ladies and the eunuch looked into the box and they were amazed what they saw. And the eunuch said: I will go to order the guards of the Palace to seize the camel men that they may feel the bastinado until they die, for verily they have stolen the cloth which our Lord the Sultan had ordered for the ladies of his imperial harem.

Nasirulla heard the words of the eunuch and his heart stopped through very fear, and he said to his sister: Do you know where we are? We are in the Harem of the Sultan himself, the most closely guarded place in the whole empire of the Ottomans, of which it is said that no man can enter it and no man can depart from it alive, and in this place there are only girls and eunuchs.

Nasirulla turned to the dresses in which they were hiding, and he took a dress which fitted him and he put it on, and his own clothes he hid. Salma also selected a new √35 dress and put it on, for her dress was dirty, and after they had put on the dresses Nasirulla and Salma looked like sisters, nor could anyone who saw him tell that Nasirulla was a boy, for he wore his hair long after the fashion of the dancing boys, and his moustache was not grown.

Then they heard the eunuchs call out: Ladies, come to your food. Nasirulla turned to his sister and he said: Let us go and eat, for we are hungry. And Salma replied: What, shall we go amongst them? Nasirulla said: We will go and eat. There are many hundreds of girls here and two new faces will never be noticed amongst them.

So Nasirulla and Salma went out into the hall, and they went into another hall, which was even larger than the first, and in it was laid out a great feast. And they saw before them a hundred roast sheep, and a hundred roast peacocks, and many hundreds of chickens and ducks and

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

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x539 pigeon and doves and partridge and quail, and from every direction hundreds of the most beautiful girls in the world were coming and sitting down to the meal and wine was brought for them by Negro slave girls.

Nasirulla and Salma sat down and ate of the feast until their stomachs were bursting, nor did anyone question who they were. And when all hands were withdrawn from eating, the Chief of the Eunuchs came round and he talked to some of the girls, and he came to Nasirulla and Salma and he said to them: Your faces are new. Were you part of the last present to our Lord? And Salma replied: Verily we are new here, and our desire is to be of service to our Lord and Master. But the eunuch sighed and he said: How can this be? It was different in the days when our master was a young man, though even then he rarely needed more than three hundred girls a year. But now he is old and his beard is white and his eyes are dim and even [838 one girl would be too much for him. Yet we have three 595] thousand in this place, and every month another hundred arrive as presents from the great rulers and governers, and these poor girls are condemned to live unloved and unseen in this vast harem, until they kiss and make love to each other from very sadness of heart.

And Nasirulla was amazed at the words of the eunuch, and he thought: While I am here and until I find a way out of this closely guarded place I will at least comfort some of these poor girls.

On the next day and on the following days Nasirulla examined all the doors and windows of the harem, but they were all guarded by eunuchs armed with swords, nor could anyone pass in or out. And the days lengthened into months, but Nasirulla could find no place unguarded save one, and this was a window which was covered by

a grid of iron bars as thick as a man's wrist, and beneath 539x the window was a lake, nor could anyone leave the window without swimming through the lake. And Nasirulla commenced to cut away at the bars, using diamonds and precious stones for the work, of which there was an abundance in the harem. But the cutting of each bar in such a manner that it could not be detected took weeks, and it was long before the work was nearing completion.

One day, just before Nasirulla had finished the cutting of the bars, Salma came to Nasirulla and her face was as pale as death, and she said to him: There is a rumour among the girls, and I believe this rumour to be true, that some eighty of them are become pregnant, and indeed they have children in their stomachs, and it is known that these cannot be the children of our Lord the Sultan. And after a short time these children will become known and they will become apparent even to the Chief Eunuch himself, and when that happens there will be such investigations and such floggings and tortures and executions that the fountain in this harem will spray only blood. And when Nasirulla heard the words of his sister he turned faint with fear, and he thought: Can such great consequences come from such little cause?

Then Nasirulla took his sister and they went to the window and they finished the cutting of the remaining bar. And in the lake beneath the window Nasirulla saw two naked boys, who were in the sixteenth year of their life, and they were swimming and amusing themselves in the water. Nasirulla said to his sister: We must get these boys out of the way and we must steal their clothes, for if we dive now into the water they may raise the alarm, and if we land from the lake in wet clothes, then we shall x539 attract attention. And verily we cannot walk through the city in the silken dresses of the harem.

Salma realised the truth of her brother's words, and she saw the clothes of the boys, which were lying safe and dry on the far bank of the lake. So Salma called out to the boys, and they saw the faces of two beautiful girls at the window for they knew not that Nasirulla was a boy, and they swam over to beneath the window, and Salma said to them: We are two and you are two, come up here and play.

And the boys replied: How can we do this when that window is covered by bars as thick as a man's arm? And is not that the Imperial Harem, the penalty for entering which is death by torture? Salma said: Do not fear. Just swarm up the wall and we will loosen the bars, nor will anyone see you, for the eunuchs never come to this window, as it is considered secure. And when you are inside we will hide you in a small chamber where none can see you, then let us amuse ourselves for an hour, and then you can return to the lake and to your clothes. And the boys thought: Verily, there is no danger, and what a jest it will be to go into the Sultan's harem itself.

So they clambered out of the water and up the wall, and they were in a naked condition. Nasirulla and Salma loosened the bars and let the boys in and led them to a small chamber which had only one door and no windows, and they said: Here we can amuse ourselves unseen. And Nasirulla and Salma said to the boys: Wait here while we look around the corners and see that the eunuchs are sleeping peacefully. But when Nasirulla and Salma were outside the door, they shut it and drove home a great bolt which secured that door from the outside, and the two boys were left prisoners in that room.

Then Nasirulla and Salma stripped off their clothes and 539x they dived into the water and swam over the lake to the clothes of the boys, and Nasirulla had tied around his waist a rope to which was tied much gold and rare jewels. And Nasirulla and Salma reached the clothes of the boys and they put them on and they became as two boys, for their long hair they wrapped in the turbans of the boys.

And as for the boys they sat in the small chamber and they said: How sportive are these girls, for they have locked the door on us. This is indeed a fine joke. But the minutes passed and passed and the boys became cold, for they were wet and naked, and they began to fear, for they thought: This place is the Sultan's harem, and it is no place to be caught in through some foolish girlish trick. But the girls did not return and the boys sat naked and shivering with fear and an hour passed.

And out in the main courtyard of the harem the Chief Eunuch sat with his assistants who were not guarding the doors and he was watching some of the girls washing at a fountain. And he said to his comrades: Are not some of the figures of the girls changing, or do my eyes play me tricks? And the eunuchs answered: Verily your thoughts are our thoughts, and we have also seen many girls lately who are red-eyed from weeping. There is truly some matter here which requires investigation.

Then the Chief Eunuch sent for a wise woman and she came and examined the girls, and she said to the Eunuch: Verily these girls are blessed with children. The Chief Eunuch was horrified at the words of the wise woman, and he thought: Who can be the father of these children? It cannot be the Sultan our master, nor can he be from us the eunuchs, and apart from us there are only girls here, nor can a man enter this place. So he ordered two of the

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x539 eunuchs to take one of the girls and they tied her up by her thumbs to the beam of the ceiling, and the Chief Eunuch said: There shall you remain until your thumbs pull out from your hands or until you tell us the truth of this matter. And the girl stayed for twenty minutes until she screamed out in agony, and she said: Know you that by magic, in the night, one of the girls in this harem becomes a boy, and she is one of the two Circassian sisters who are so much alike, and though in the daytime she is as a girl, yet at night she is a boy, and there is no doubt about this whatever.

The Chief Eunuch ordered the eunuchs: Go and fetch me the two Circassian sisters who are so alike. And they went off and they searched, but they returned and said: We cannot find them. The Chief Eunuch ordered them to go again and to search every room and every chamber in the great building of the harem. And they went and they searched and searched and they came to the chamber in which were the two naked boys, and they opened the door of that chamber and they found them within it, and they took them and chained them and brought them in front of the Chief Eunuch.

And the two boys wept and implored mercy from the Chief Eunuch, but he showed them no mercy. He commanded that they be tied by their thumbs to the beam of the ceiling, and that thing was done to them. He then ordered the eunuchs to flog them with whips until their lives were ended, for he thought: How can I show mercy when my own life is now in the most terrible danger?

And when the two boys were dead, the wise woman came to the Chief Eunuch and said: Verily eighty of the girls in this harem are in a condition of pregnancy. The heart of the Chief Eunuch stopped beating from very

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horror, and he thought: Now my royal master will end my life. And he thought and thought and a way appeared open to him, and he said to himself: I will announce this to the Sultan in open court, then through very shame he cannot confess that he is not able to have fathered these children.

So the next morning the Chief Eunuch went to the Royal Diwan, and there in the presence of the great ministers and generals and the distinguished people of the country he announced in a high voice: Majesty, eighty of the ladies of your harem are blessed with children. And those sitting in the court were amazed, for the beard of the Sultan was white and his eyes were dim and he dribbled down his beard. And the Sultan said nothing to the Chief Eunuch. However, when the court was over the Sultan retired to a private chamber and he sent for his secretary, whom he trusted, and he said: Kill the Chief of my Eunuchs and take his body and bury it and let it be known in the court that he has died of sickness. And the secretary obeyed the orders of his master the Sultan.

And as for Nasirulla and Salma, when they had put on the clothes of the boys, they went into the city, and Nasirulla purchased weapons and two horses of the finest stock and six baggage ponies and they loaded them with supplies and they set out that very night for their own country, nor did they desire to linger in the lands of the Turks, and after many weeks of travel they arrived in safety. And Nasirulla married a wife and he gave his sister Salma in marriage, and when in the winter evenings he used to go to the wineshop and drink with his friends, he would say to them: Know you that I have eighty children. But they did not believe his words.

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THE STORY OF SHEIKH MIZEIL



EL QURNACHI, A MAN OF A NOBLE FAMILY, THOUGH HIS LANDS WERE POOR

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*539 ONCE in the days of the Ottomans there lived in Baghdad a man of an ancient and noble family named Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, and he lived [651 in a great house by the banks of the Tigris. Yet his estates 731] had been reduced by the taxation and oppression of the Ottomans, and his crops spoiled by locust and by flood until he was reduced to poverty.

So he lived in his house with his only daughter without a single servant or a single slave, nor was there any furniture or silver left in his house, for he had sold all to buy [432] food. Yet the house he could not sell, for it would be shameful for him to do so, since it was the house of his ancestors.

The name of his daughter was Nura. She was in the [203] seventeenth year of her life, yet none had asked for her in marriage, for since there were no servant girls to gossip about her beauty, the boys of great and noble families had not even heard of her. Else surely their sleep would have been troubled by her description, for her hair was as black as the Shatt el Arab on a clear winter's night, and her eyes were as the stars which glisten in its waters, her skin was as golden as the desert sand when tinged by the first rosy red rays of dawn, her back was as supple as the reeds before the wind, and her thighs and breasts had the softness of the feather quilt which allures the tired traveller.

So one day Nura went to her father and she said to him: O my beloved father, my state is thus and thus. Shall I be forever a cook in your household or shall I be the mother of noble sons? And Sheikh Mizeil grieved much at the words of his daughter, and his heart was sad. And on the nights of the full moon Nura would go out on the roof of their great house, and speak to the moon and ask the question:

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x539 O Moon, you shine on youths and maidens,
Where is my lover, where is he,
He who will love me with the strongest love?

And the moon, ashamed at the waste of such beauty, would hide behind the nearest cloud.

x539 461 762 And one day Sheikh Mizeil came on his daughter and found her weeping, so he took her hand and said to her: O my little one, know you that we are more unfortunate than the poorest beggar of the City of Peace. For were I of the general run of men, I could work as a clerk, or as a washerman, or even as a porter or sweeper, and so gain a little money. But our name is a known name and it is shameful for me to work, or that any should know of our poverty. Therefore starvation faces us, and it is in my mind that we should cut the veins in our wrists, and so depart, but first take you this the last of my gold and make yourself a dress fit for a woman of our family, that when the neighbours come in and lay out our bodies for burial they may find you dressed as befits our dignity.

x539 So Nura put on her veil and she took the gold coins from her father, though the tears flowed from her eyes. And Nura went to the market and she went to the sellers of fine stuffs. And she bought the finest silk. Yet there was still some of the money unspent, so she went into a great shop, thinking: I will buy sequins with the last of the money and cover the dress with sequins, that in death they who find me will remember me. So she went to the merchant, who was named Jassim, and she asked of him for sequins, and he showed her jar after jar filled with the finest sequins of every known colour, and also of colours that are no longer remembered. And she gazed at the sequins and she gazed at her silk that she might exactly match its delicate colour. And while comparing the

colours she let her veil slip from her face. Yet such was her 539K concentration that she did not know that her beauty was exposed.

And the merchant Jassim gazed at her, and his gaze was the gaze of a jackal which looks at a dying gazelle, for Jassim was among those who desire the despoiling of girls, and his thoughts were evil thoughts. And he looked at Nura's face and he looked at the cloth of her cloak and her veil and he thought: She is not rich, yet her face is beyond compare, but who can dispense with caution? First I must discover her station and know if she has any brother or father to avenge her honour. And since he did not know her, or from whence she came, he thought of a cunning ruse. When she bought the sequins and ordered fifty mithkals of them, he weighed them out and packed them in a paper bag, but with his little finger he pierced the paper of the bag and left in it a small hole. So when Nura paid for the sequins and took the bag, it left a trail of sequins. Yet such was Nura's distraction and grief that she noticed it not.

Nura left the shop and returned to her father's house, and at a safe distance behind her followed Jassim. Nor was he in any doubt about the path she had taken, for on the ground lay a clear trail of glittering sequins. And through and about narrow passages and side turnings of Baghdad he followed her, though he could not see her, until he came to a great teakwood door studded with brass. And though the door was closed, he knew that she had entered, for the doorstep was sprinkled with sequins and there the trail ended. So Jassim asked and questioned the poor people of the street concerning the house with the teakwood door, and they replied: That is Qasr Qurnachi, and formerly it was a great and wealthy house, for they used x539 to slaughter ten sheep every day to feed the poor, but now the old sheikh lives there with his only daughter, without any servant or slave, nor does anybody else go in, nor does anybody else come out.

And Jassim thought and pondered, and he said to himself: Qurnachi is a great name. I would be unwise to meddle with that girl, for her father would surely kill me. Rather should I take a better course. Why should I not marry her? Then not only could I enjoy her beauty without fear, but I could also remark to my friends in the coffee-house: My latest wife is a model housekeeper. Of course, you know she is a Qurnachi. And then they will eye me with the eye of respect and my sons will mingle with those of noble blood, and since the sheikh is so poor I will offer him a handsome price and he will accept.

So on the next day Jassim the merchant called at the house of Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, and he knocked on the great door, for he was not acquainted with that conduct which is seemly. And Sheikh Mizeil opened the door himself and bade him welcome and entrance, for the Sheikh was a true Arab. And he said to him: I am honoured by your visit, respected merchant, but pardon me for the poorness of your reception, for I gave all my servants and staff permission to go to their homes and take a day's rest. Nor have I anyone here to prepare for you food or coffee, so pardon my rudeness, and pray tell me your name and your business with speed, that you may not linger in discomfort.

x539 And Jassim replied, and his reply was an abrupt reply,
584 lacking in dignity and form, and he said: Noble sheikh, as for my name, it is Jassim Kuweity, and I own the great cloth shop. And as for my business, it is marriage, for I hear you have a daughter, and as for the sum, I will pay

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one hundred thousand gold liras. Sheikh Mizeil was 539x amazed at the words of the merchant and his face went 584 black, and he said: You have lost your way. Are you looking for a brothel? I know your name and I have heard of you. Is it not said that your grandfather sold milk? Does then the vulture mate with the peacock? Were you other than a donkey's droppings you would not live after making this suggestion. As it is, I will give you a lesson in respect even as it is taught to slaves.

And Sheikh Mizeil seized Jassim in a grip of iron and he commenced beating the merchant about the head and ears with his riding-switch until the blood flowed. And when Sheikh Mizeil was satisfied with beating Jassim he 539x took him and cast him out into the dust. And Nura saw these events from a window of the inner courtyard, and she was amazed, thinking: Was not that the merchant from whom I bought the sequins? How then did he know our house? Then Nura, for she was a clever girl, remembered that the bag of sequins had been half empty on her arrival, and she looked out of the door and saw that the threshold was still sprinkled with sequins, and she thought: This was the stratagem of the lustful merchant.

And as for Jassim, he picked himself up from the dusty street and walked back to his shop, and his heart was full of anger and the desire for revenge. And he pondered: How can I bring this old maniac to ruin, he who has dared to treat me in this manner, he who has not even enough copper coins to put together to make a pair? And he returned to his shop and he went to his treasure chest and he opened it and he counted out ten thousand gold liras. He put the coins in a handkerchief of the finest silk, and he left his shop and he went to the house of the Turkish pasha, Commandant of Police, and he entered

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x539 and saluted the officer and he spoke to him after this fashion: O Your Honour, how much have I heard of your wise administration and your great munificence and your benevolent hospitality? I have come in your service to offer you a humble present, which I request you to honour me by expending in your great charitable and hospitable fashion. And Jassim placed the handkerchief of coins on the table, and the Turk eyed the present and saw that it was heavy, and he bade Jassim be seated and he ordered coffee.

And after suitable and polite conversation, Jassim said: O your Excellency the Pasha, I desire to warn you of a most dangerous plot and a devilish intrigue directed against even the Caliph himself, and the prime mover who has given birth to this foul conspiracy is none other than an Arab landowner named Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, cursed be his brood and sour be his food.

And the Commandant listened to the words of Jassim, and he summoned an officer and ordered: Take soldiers and go to Qasr Qurnachi and seize the Sheikh and fetter him. Then take him and chain him to the wall in the jail, for he is a danger to the State and an investigation must be made and an enquiry directed into the sedition which he has plotted.

Nura and her father were sitting in their house when they heard the tramp of horses and a thunderous knocking on the great door, and Sheikh Mizeil opened the door to the soldiers to enquire their business. But as for Nura, she turned and hid herself in the great house, thinking: Should these Turks see me, then should I not remain a maiden. And she saw the Turks seize her father and fetter him and lead him away, and she thought: This is the work of the merchant Jassim. And when the soldiers had taken her

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father and gone away Nura wept and sobbed until her heart was nearly broken. 539x

But she was a true Arab girl, so after a time she dried her tears and she ran to a cupboard which contained old clothes, and she took the clothes of a page boy, which had remained there from the days when Sheikh Mizeil had many servants and pages, and she cast off her clothes and she put on the clothes of a boy, and she took a riding-switch and put on a headcloth and aqal. And she left the house, thinking: Should I remain, then Jassim will seek me and find me. Yet her feet were bare, for she could find no boy's shoes to fit her feet. And she walked out into the street and away, not knowing where to go or where to find refuge. And she thought: I will go from Baghdad and go to the great tribes, for the people of the city lack generosity. But he who goes to the tribes, him they feed and shelter, and there I will devise a plan to save my father. So she walked and walked and went out from Baghdad and took the road to Basra, and she walked for many hours on the dusty road, and all who saw her thought that she was a boy.

And those that passed Nura on the road saluted her and she returned their salutation. And Nura walked and walked until the sun was in the west and her feet were torn and bleeding from the roughness of the road, when she saw before her a great cavalcade of horsemen. At their head rode a young Sheikh, whose face was as the full moon and whose bearing was as noble as a sword blade, and as they came up to Nura and passed her the riders saluted the walker and their greeting was returned, and the young Sheikh glanced at Nura, whom he thought to be a beautiful boy. And the Sheikh, who was none other than Aqab er Rejab, rode on, returning his glance to the

X539 ground after the manner of sheikhs who are pondering on affairs of state and high matters.

And after he had ridden on for ten minutes after passing the boy, the Sheikh urged his horse and cantered out away from his followers, calling one of his men, who was the chief of his trackers, to accompany him. And Sheikh Aqab er Rejab turned to that wise tracker Abood el Matrood, he who could tell from her tracks how many weeks a she camel had been in foal, and he spoke to him and said: Ya Abood, cast your eyes on the ground and tell me what you see there written concerning the moon-faced boy we passed not ten minutes ago. And Abood el Matrood replied and said: O son of Rejab, I am astonished, for my eyes saw the form of a boy, yet these footprints are the footprints of a girl. For that is not the shape of a boy's foot, nor is this stride a boy's stride, and also this girl is sore tired, nor is she used to walking barefoot. Aqab spoke and said: Your thoughts are my thoughts, but let this remain a secret. Ride back to the girl, and offer her my hospitality for the night, for the sun is in the west and we must camp, and we are travellers and she is a traveller. Yet disclose not to her that we know her to be a girl.

Then while Abood el Matrood rode back to carry out the orders of the Sheikh, Aqab er Rejab halted his men and ordered them to pitch the black tents, and to prepare the evening meal. And Abood returned with Nura, and the Sheikh asked her: O comrade of the road, who are you and where are you going? Nura replied and said: As for my name, it is Nuri, and I know not where I am going, for I am only a poor servant boy, and my master is imprisoned, and I seek refuge from oppression. And when the great hair tent was pitched the Sheikh questioned Nura until she had related the whole story to him, only

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she pretended to be Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi's page boy 539x rather than his daughter. And she said: As for Sheikh Mizeil's beautiful daughter, I know not what became of her. Perhaps she has thrown herself in the river to escape from shame. And the Sheikh spoke and said: This affair 539x shall be my affair, for I know Sheikh Mizeil's name, and 6[illegible]2 I think there is some blood connection between us and that we are distant cousins, and does not the poet say:

A man has cousins,
They are like his wings.
Can then the hawk,
Fly without wings?

And when the food was eaten Sheikh Aqab ordered 539x that the page boy be given a hair tent of his own to sleep in, and he whispered to Abood el Matrood: Guard her well in the night. Then the Sheikh sat in his own tent, passing his rosary through his fingers, thinking: How can I overcome the sequin seller and release Mizeil from the Turks, that I may earn the love of this girl? And by the time that the Star of Dawn was clear he had formed a plan. And when the first glow of dawn was in the East the Sheikh ordered the striking of the camp, and they took to the road, and as for their destination, it was Baghdad.

And on the morning of the second day the merchant Jassim rose from his bed and left his house and went to his shop as was his custom, and he called his assistants and slaves and shop boys and asked them and said: Have you yet found this runaway girl, daughter of the traitor Mizeil, and did you search for her throughout the night? And they replied: Master, we have searched every quarter in Baghdad, yet we cannot find her. Yet there is a matter of which we desire to acquaint you, for it fills us with fear, and that is that last night after you had left the shop there

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x539 came a man, and his face was hidden in his headcloth, and his tongue the tongue of the tribes, and he questioned us, asking: Is this the shop of the merchant Jassim? At what time does he come and at what time does he go? Where does he live and where does he eat? Where does he sit and where does he sleep? And the merchant Jassim liked not the words of his servants.

After an hour or so spent in trade and profit Jassim left his shop and went to the coffee-house as was his custom, that he might meet his friends and pass half an hour in the pleasures of conversation. And when he rose from the coffee-shop to return to his shop he saw that the road was sprinkled with sequins, and the trail of sequins led back to his own shop. And he was amazed at what he saw, and he felt in his pockets, thinking: Perhaps I put a bag of sequins in my pocket, and they have leaked out and made this trail. But he felt in his pockets and there were no sequins there.

And at the time of noon he left his shop and went to his house, and while he was seated at his food his slave boy ran in and said: Master, your bag of sequins is leaking. And Jassim went to the door of his house and he saw that a trail of sequins covered the path he had taken from his shop. So after he had fed and was satisfied, Jassim left his house, thinking: I will go to the river bank that I may see who is following me and sprinkling sequins behind me, for there there is an open space, and I can look behind me.

So Jassim walked out by the river bank, and he kept glancing behind him, yet nobody was in sight. And he walked in a great circle through the palm trees, yet he saw no son of Adam. And while returning to the town he recrossed the path he had taken and saw that it was sprinkled with sequins. And when he saw this, he ran and ran back to the town and to his house, though he was a portly merchant. 539K

And he went into his house and ordered his servants to bring him the dress of a woman, and they brought it, and he disguised himself, thinking: I will disguise myself as a woman and go to my brother's house and hide there, that I may escape from evil. And he came out of his house cloaked in a woman's cloak and veil, so that nobody could recognise him, and he walked to his brother's house at the other end of Baghdad, and knocked on the door and asked to see his brother. He was admitted and when he was in his brother's chamber he disclosed himself to him.

And while he was relating his situation to his brother there came a knock at the door and a servant cried out: Master, tell the old lady who is with you that her bag of sequins is leaking, for there is a trail of sequins leading right up to our threshold. And Jassim was amazed at what he heard, for he knew not that he was being followed by Abood el Matrood, whom no disguise could fool, since he recognised people by their footprints on the ground. Then Jassim and his brother ran out of the room and they saw that the words of the servant were true, for the threshold was sprinkled with sequins and a trail of sequins led away on the path taken by Jassim dressed as a woman. Then the brother turned to Jassim and said: Fear nothing and dread not death, for you will sleep here tonight and I will stand to guard you as you sleep with a drawn sword in my hand.

So when night came the brother of Jassim ordered all his servants to arm themselves and he posted them at the doors and windows of the house, so that not even a mouse could come in or go out. Then Jassim lay down to sleep on

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x539 his brother's bed, and his brother stood on guard beside him with a drawn sword. And Jassim slept and his heart was free from fear. But in the morning when he awoke his heart stopped and he turned faint from very fear, for the sheets of the bed were sprinkled with sequins, and his brother lay dead on the floor in a great pool of blood, and the blood of his brother was spangled with sequins.

So Jassim leapt from his bed and he ran from the room and from the house dressed as he was in his dress of the night, and as he went out he saw that all the slaves and all sentries who had guarded the doors in the night lay dead in pools of blood, spangled with sequins. So Jassim ran from his brother's house through the streets of the City of Peace, nor was he aware that those in the streets and the common people glanced in surprise at the portly merchant running in his nightshift. So Jassim ran and ran, and his destination was his shop.

But as Jassim drew near his shop he saw a great crowd there collected and he heard much shouting and commotion, and as he came up to his shop puffing and panting and out of breath his shop assistants and boys and apprentices caught hold of him and cried: O you in whose footsteps fall sequins, give us our pay and release us and let us depart in peace, for we cannot serve one accursed. And they led him into the shop, and he saw that the whole shop was sprinkled with sequins, and the watchman of the night lay dead in pools of blood, spangled with sequins, and on his great desk was a message in verse, written in blood sparkling with sequins, and it was written in Arabic and it read:

When Mizeil dies you die
When Mizeil is saved, you are saved.

So Jassim dressed himself in suitable attire and he left

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

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x539 his shop and he went to the house of the Commandant of the Ottoman Police, and he entered and saluted the officer and said: O Your Honour the Commandant, I have come to right a wrong and to replace injustice with justice. For I have discovered that I made a most foolish and careless mistake concerning Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi. He was not plotting sedition. Rather, he was praising the noble Ottoman Government and praying for the long life and prosperity of our lord, His Majesty the Caliph. Yet I mistook his words. So please show your famous clemency and mercy and release this gentle old sheikh.

But the Commandant of Police frowned and he spoke and his voice was lacking in mercy and he said: How can this be? For the date of execution of the treacherous sheikh is already fixed and ordained and reports have been made and submitted to high officers and ministers and even to the Caliph our Lord and Sultan concerning the plot which our watchful and vigilant police have detected and brought to light.

And Jassim replied and said: As for the noble old sheikh, he is indeed innocent. But there is a cloth merchant named Mizeil who was verily involved in the plot which Your Honour has detected, and his shop is near to my shop. Therefore let him be arrested and justice done, and this information is the true information. And as for me, pardon my carelessness and my error, for the names are similar, and though Your Honour has mentioned no punishment for me, yet I see that my mistake has caused trouble to Your Excellency, and I desire to punish myself. Therefore I go now to fetch one hundred thousand gold liras which I desire to pay you as a fine, for can carelessness go unpunished, should it inconvenience a high officer of state? So the Commandant agreed to the words of Jassim

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and he summoned an officer and ordered that Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi be released, and the traitor Mizeil the Merchant arrested and brought to justice. 539x

So Sheikh Mizeil came out of the prison a free man, and he went to his house, and his daughter Nura joined him there. Yet her heart was sad, for she was filled with great love for the noble Sheikh Aqab er Rejab, and she thought: He thinks me a boy, therefore will he not desire me, and I cannot discover myself to him, for I am an honourable girl. Therefore she was amazed and astonished when she saw a venerable sayyid of great dignity come in state to her father, and her father, after conversation with the sayyid, came to her and asked: Do you consent, O my eyes, to be taken in marriage by the noble Sheikh Aqab er Rejab, the father of a thousand swords? And Nura said to her father: I consent. And Nura thought: How did Aqab know my sex? And that night she went on to the roof of her house and she spoke to the moon and she said:

O Moon, you shine on youths and maidens
I have a lover, there is One
One who will love me with the strongest love.

And the moon smiled and did not hide behind a cloud.

As for the happiness and bliss of Nura and Aqab er Rejab, that I cannot describe to you, for since you did not see them together you would not comprehend my words. But if you ask me concerning the merchant Jassim, and if you question me concerning his affairs, then I will tell you that he was much reduced in wealth, for the Turks took from him much gold. Yet his lust and desire for young girls was not diminished, and he arranged to marry the daughter of a poor Persian milk-seller, a girl as beautiful as a gazelle, and since the price he paid for her was a large price, and since the girl was weeping and sobbing x539 and crying out: Can then my slender body be touched by that fat old merchant?—for these reasons and to comfort her, her father gave her some of the gold, and he said to her: Go to the bazaar and to the Mistress of Dressmakers, and let her make a marriage dress such as has never been known before.

And the girl dried her tears and she took her sisters and aunts and her friends and she went to the Mistress of Dressmakers, and she said: I desire such a dress as has never been known before on any marriage bed. And there was much whispering and conference and discussion, and finally the Mistress of Dressmakers whispered her idea to one of the girls, and the girl whispered to another girl, and in this manner they all heard the idea, and as they heard it they clapped their hands and cried: O pretty idea, O happy thought, O lovely device.

And on the night of the marriage when the feast was ended Jassim took his bride into the bedroom and he removed her cloak, and she was dressed in a lovely dress of shimmering silk, lovely against her golden skin, and Jassim was pleased to see that the dress was pure and untouched by any decoration or frill, nor was there on it a
[291] single sequin. And he laid his bride on the bed and he removed her dress and she was clad in an ataq and bag trousers of the finest silk, and he removed her ataq and exposed her lovely breasts, but when he came to remove her bag trousers he found that the knot was a tight knot, nor could he untie it.

But his hands were eager hands, nor would they brook delay. So he took hold of her bag trousers and gave a great pull, and the waist band broke, but as it broke there was a shower of sequins, and the lovely skin of his bride was sparkling with sequins, the sheets of the bed were

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spangled with sequins, and there were even sequins in his hair. For the clever dressmaker had tied paper bags of sequins all around the waist band, and had sown them to a cord around the girl's waist. Yet the girl did not understand why Jassim ran from the room dressed only in his vest, and with words coming from his mouth which were not words of reason. And in the morning they found him wandering naked in the street, making noises such as a dog makes, so they chained him and took him to the House of the Mad. 539*

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THE STORY OF DAOUD THE



CAMEL AND OF HIS MISFORTUNES

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x539 ONCE in Mosul there was an Arab, a Christian, named Daoud es Suleiman, and he worked as a goldsmith in the market, and all the ladies of Mosul would visit his shop and order from him bangles of gold, studded with pearls, and earrings and necklaces of gold and rare jewels. So his trade was great and he lived in wealth and comfort with his wife, a girl of perfect form and beauty, and his life was a life of happiness and ease.

And one day he was sitting in his shop at the time of the evening prayer, and he was putting away his gold and rare jewels in his iron chest, and his shop boy was closing the shutters, and he was preparing for the coming of [29] night, when there came to his shop a girl, and she was veiled as are the girls of the towns, and she was sobbing and weeping, and she spoke to Daoud, and as for her voice, it was the voice of a nightingale. She gave to Daoud a necklace of gold and pearls and rings and earrings of gold and rare stones, and she said: O Nazarene, take these my jewels and give me money, for I am in need and urgent haste. So Daoud took the jewels and he examined the stones, and he rubbed the gold with acid and weighed it until he was satisfied.

Then he turned to her and said: Know you, O lady, that these jewels are worth five thousand liras and not less, yet I have not so much money in my shop, for I only keep here jewellery. Therefore come you here tomorrow at the rising of the sun, and I will take your jewels and give you money. But the girl burst out sobbing and weeping in a manner to tear the heart, and she said: O merchant, give me the money now, else my life be ended and my lover destroyed.

And Daoud questioned her and asked her concerning her affairs, and she replied, saying: Kind merchant, know

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x539 you that I am the daughter of a great family, and their name is a respected and feared name, and I was a model of virtue. Yet it so happened and came about that I was walking in the street and I saw a youth, and his face had the beauty of a gazelle, and at that very instant a puff of wind, a wicked, naughty puff of wind, blew aside my veil, and our eyes met, and their meeting was as the union of two streams. And when I walked on I saw that he was following me, and my erring feet led me to the date gardens outside the town, nor could I control the course they took. And there we met and had speech and conversation, I and my lover, and there we used to meet every day. Yet now through some foul slander my father and my brothers are aware of the affair. They have not killed me; they seek to discover the name of my lover that he may share my fate. Therefore have they kept silent and they let me go my way, but they follow me everywhere, that when I meet my lover they may recognise him and kill him. But through a trick I have escaped from them since half an hour ago. Therefore give me the money that I may find my lover and flee the town.

Then Daoud spoke and said: If you desire the money now, there is only one way. Come with me to a money-changer. He will give me the money, since I am known to him. Then I will give it to you.

And the girl agreed to the words of Daoud. So he closed his shop, and they walked together through the streets in the direction of the bankers' market. And as they were turning a corner in the narrow street they met two men, and as she saw them the girl screamed and turned and she ran away with the speed of the gazelle, and the men cried: That is our sister with her lover. And they came up and seized Daoud and looked at his face, saying: This is

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the Christian goldsmith. We know his house and we 539x know his shop and we know his name. And as for Daoud, he shook with fear and he said: Verily I am innocent, and as for your sister I have never seen her or known her or heard her name. But one of the brothers struck Daoud with his riding-switch, saying: It is seemly that those about [776] to die should meet that angel who is appointed to take their souls with dignity, with patience, and with gladness, for he is God's messenger. Therefore, O smith, cease from unmanly pleading and go you to your house, and there prepare your affairs and settle your business and make your peace with the One God. And, if it be the will of God, tomorrow at the time of the dawn prayer, you will meet him whose coming all await and all expect, for he comes to every man at his appointed time, nor can a coward avoid him, nor can a brave man escape him. And as for us, we know your house and we know your shop, and we will be beside you at that time.

Daoud returned to his house, and his hands were shaking and tears flowed from his eyes, and he entered and embraced his wife and acquainted her with his state. And her tears mingled with his tears and her sobs echoed his sobs and they spent an hour in lamentation and in grief. And after they were exhausted with sobbing and weeping, the girl, the wife of Daoud, spoke and she said: O my lover, go from here and go to another city, for only in this way can your life be spared. Does not a caravan march from here at the sixth hour of night, for the time is summer? Wrap you all our store of gold and jewels in a handkerchief and depart.

So Daoud wrapped his wealth in a handkerchief and he covered his face with his headcloth and donned his cloak and left his house and he went to the serai and he x539 joined the caravan. It marched at the sixth hour, and its destination was Baghdad.

x539 721 And when they had been two days on the road, and the caravan was traversing the territories of the Shammar of the Jezira, they came on Bedawin, raiders, mounted on horses and on fine camels, and the riders rode up to the caravan and cried: Who be you, where do you go, from whence do you come, and by whose permission? And the Turkish officers and soldiers who were guarding the caravan cried out: We march by order of the Government. Make way! Make way! And the raiders shouted: Are the Ottomans, then, a Government? Know you that we are the Government here, and this is our customs post, and here we levy excise. And as for the caravan, we permit it to proceed when we have levied the tax, and as for the soldiers, we disarm them and permit them to return from whence they have come, but they shall go on foot.

And the Turkish officers saw that the tribesmen were many, well mounted and well armed, so they ordered their soldiers to lay down their arms, crying: Moslems! Spare our lives! And the tribesmen said; Our pledge is given. And the Turks dismounted from their horses and turned back on foot towards Mosul, and their arms they left on the ground.

Then the tribesmen cried out: Merchants, unload your camels and open your loads, that we may inspect the merchandise and levy the tax. And the merchants and camel men made the camels kneel and commenced unloading them. And Daoud was standing by a load of copper vessels and he saw that they were copper water pots of that shape which has a narrow neck through which the hand cannot pass and which has a long straight

x539 514 721

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spout, and which has only one use, and that is known to 539x
you. For is it not used for cleansing in the closet? And 514
Daoud thought after this manner: Why should I not slip 721
my jewels into one of these pots, for do the Bedawin use these water pots? They will never levy a tax on these goods.

So Daoud took his bag of gold and jewels and made it 539x
long and thin and he slipped it down the neck of a water 721
pot, nor did any see him do it. And the tribesmen came and inspected the loads, crying: Merchants, the tax is half to us and half to you, for you failed to notify us of your coming, that we might come to some other agreement. And they inspected the loads and from each load they took half and left half. And verily those Bedawin took those things that their hearts desired, of silks and linens and Mosul cloth, of rugs and carpets, of sugar and tobacco, of watches and clocks, of saddles and blankets and almonds and honey, of threads and needles and cheeses and charcoal, and they even took an umbrella. But when they came to the load of water pots they laughed and said: We permit these goods to pass exempt and tax free.

And men from amongst the men, the raiders, searched each of the merchants and took from them their purses and opened them, saying: These gold coins bear the cipher of the Ottomans and are confiscated, for we do not permit their circulation in our land. And they came on Daoud and searched him, but they found with him neither goods not gold, so they questioned him, saying: Merchant, where are your goods and where is your wealth? And Daoud replied, saying: I am not a wealthy merchant. I am only a poor coppersmith making enough for my needs, and I go to Baghdad where my mother is sick, and not for purposes of trade. And they took him and led him away,

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x539 saying: O coppersmith in the fine linen thob, come with
721 us and we will give you food enough for your needs, and may God heal your mother.

And when the Bedawin were finished with the caravan they permitted it to depart, but as for Daoud, they kept him, and he watched the load of copper water pots march away, and in one of the pots was his treasure. And Daoud remained with the Bedawin, even with the Shammar, for many weeks. They fed him with food, but they made him load the camels and unload the camels, and lift and carry the hair tents and heavy loads, and they made him clean the dishes and cooking pots, and on the march they made him walk with the sheep, nor did they permit him to ride. And each evening at sunset they said to him: Were you only a wealthy merchant and not a poor coppersmith you could proceed to Baghdad, after payment of the tax.
x539 What a pity that you have to stay here and labour, and may God heal your sick mother. And one evening when he was exhausted from labour in the heat of the day, Daoud cast himself at the feet of the Sheikh, crying: Merciful Sheikh, punish me if you must, for I deceived you. I was indeed wealthy and had with me much gold and precious stones, but I hid my wealth from your tax-gatherers in a water pot. But it marched away with the caravan, and now since many weeks are past, I may never find my treasure again. And the Sheikh laughed much at the words of Daoud, and he said: O Nazarene, your luck is faint and weak, for you have indeed fallen into misfortune. You have less chance of finding that water pot in the City of Peace than of recovering a dirhem dropped in a sandstorm. I permit you to depart and I postpone the payment of the tax. But should you find your water pot, I command you to pay a tax of one copper fils to my agent in

Baghdad, and his name is such and such, for I desire to be acquainted with the outcome of this affair. Then the Sheikh gave Daoud five gold liras and a fine horse and he permitted him to depart.

And Daoud rode away from the Shammar of the Jezira and they wished him God's safety. And after many days on the road he came to Baghdad, and he entered the city and he found a lodging at the house of a friend, like him a Christian from Mosul. And he sold the horse for a good price, and in the morning of the second day he went to the market of copper vessels, thinking: I must be careful not to reveal my object, else many will search for that which is lost, and amongst so many seekers I may not be the finder.

So Daoud wandered through the bazaars and markets, yet did not see the merchant who was the owner of the load of water pots. And the day passed, and another day passed, and a week passed and a month passed, and on each day Daoud wandered through the markets. Yet he did not see that face which amongst all faces he most desired to see. When he had despaired of success and he was sitting in a coffee-house considering his fate a man came up and saluted him, saying: Were you not of that caravan robbed by the Shammar, may their mothers be despoiled, and were you not led away a prisoner? And Daoud looked up and he saw the owner of the load of water pots. So Daoud bade him be seated and he ordered tea.

And after conversation and enquiries of health, Daoud asked the merchant: Have you still that load of water pots? For I am in mind to buy it, since my business is poor, and I will peddle that load from house to house that I may make a little profit. But the merchant replied, saying: As x539 for the water pots, I opened a stall and sold them all, and I sold at a loss, since I had no money left for food or for the expenses of my house. And Daoud said: Tell me, then, who were the buyers? for I feel my fate to be entwined with those water pots. But the merchant replied, saying: Who knows or remembers or cares who buys a water pot, for are these goods sold on credit? Do not the women come and haggle and argue and who wishes to remember these transactions?

So Daoud departed from the coffee-house and his heart was heavy with grief, and he wandered through the streets of Baghdad, thinking: Where is my wealth that I may recover it? And he thought after this fashion: These water pots do not allow the hand to enter, nor do they require cleaning, for they are only used in the closet. Nor can they be used elsewhere, since they have not the graceful curved spout of the ones used for washing hands after food. Therefore she who buys it will not cleanse it. She will merely set it in the closet and fill it with water, and the handkerchief will prevent the gold from chinking or making a noise. Therefore, whoever its owner, the gold is undiscovered. Why should I not go from house to house and gain entry to their closets by a trick, and then in the privacy of the closet I will empty the pots of water and poke in a stick and so discover my gold.

So Daoud returned to the market and he bought a tray of needles and he took them in his hands and he went to a street and he knocked on the door of a house, crying: Needles for sale. And when the door was opened, he said to the slave, the opener: Permit me to use your closet, for I have the gripes. And then in the privacy of the closet he emptied the water pot and poked in his stick, but he did not find his treasure. And then he went to the next house

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and another house and another house in this manner, and so to the next street, and in the day he visited forty houses. 539x

And the children and small boys who were playing in the houses and streets discussed him, saying: The needle-seller entered our house and entered our closet. And on the next day and for many days and for months Daoud went on visiting houses and entering closets, and the children were aware of this, saying: The Christian needle seller goes to every house and he enters the closet and uses it and empties the water jar. Then he goes to another house and another house and he behaves in this fashion at every house? And the boys asked in the streets: Will the stomach of Daoud never empty? And others would reply: He is even as the camel, for does a camel like its droppings to fall in one place? Will it not scatter them with its tail even as they fall? And the children said: Verily Daoud is as a camel, for he likes not his droppings to fall in one place.

So it came about that as Daoud walked through the streets the boys would run behind him, crying:

Daoud the Camel, Daoud the Camel,
Where will you drop your droppings today?

And the face of Daoud grew black with shame, and he ceased from visiting houses and from visiting closets. And Daoud sat mourning in the house of his friend, his lodging, nor could he go out from it during the hours of daylight, lest the children follow him, chanting rhymes. And he thought after this fashion: I have visited every house and every closet in Battaween and in Karkh, and I have visited half the closets in Bab es Sharji and Karrada. Do so many closets, then, remain in Baghdad? Rather, my chance of finding my gold increases with every house I visit, for should I visit all houses but one, then I know I shall find my wealth in that last house. For how can it be elsewhere?

x539 And how can I lift my hand from a task half done? For perhaps I shall find my treasure in the very next closet and in no other. Therefore, I must continue this work, but since the vulgarity of the children does not permit me to do it in the hours of day, then I must go as a thief in the night to inspect these water pots.

So that night when the moon was high in the sky, and the world and the city were asleep, Daoud went out from his lodging and he went to the next house from those houses which yet remained unvisited, and he scaled the high wall and entered the courtyard and he sought the closet. And when he was in the closet he found the lamp and lit it and he poured the water from the water jar. And it so happened that the lady of the house was troubled by a movement of her stomach, even in the middle of the night. So she rose from her bed and went to the closet and she opened the door, and she saw inside a man, and in his hand was the water pot. Then that lady let out a scream and yell which was heard far from Baghdad. It even woke the farmers and the fishermen beyond the town.

And the master of the house and his sons and servants seized their arms and ran out into the courtyard and they found Daoud in the closet and they surrounded him, crying: A thief, a thief. But one of the servants looked at Daoud and inspected his clothes and his shoes and said: Master, this is no thief. Does a thief wear these shoes? Does a thief dress as a merchant? And the master looked and he saw that Daoud was no thief and his anger rose beyond all control, and he said: O pimp, so you know I have beautiful daughters and you come with lustful intent and you hide in the closet. May I ruin your dear ones if you ever do this again. And the master of the house drew his sword and he struck Daoud a blow in the stomach so that

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the food came forth from within him and the summons 539K of death was ringing in his ears.

Then the youngest of the sons of the house, a boy of fourteen years, looked at Daoud and he said: Father, you have wronged him. This is no lewd fellow, this is only Daoud the Camel, the closet visitor. Perhaps he was seized with a desire for our closet only and not for our sisters. And the master of the house said: I have heard of the fellow. It is said that God has deprived him of his reason, and his madness takes the form of closet visiting, and to harm the mad is evil. But I think that that blow now struck cannot be unstruck.

The master of the house commanded his servants to bring a litter and they lifted Daoud and took him through the streets to the house of the Moslawi Christian, to the lodging of Daoud, and there they left him, and his friend called a surgeon and they brought water and bathed his wound. But the surgeon said: Verily the Angel of Death is expected here. So they brought the Book of the Christians, even the Bible, and commenced reciting verses. Yet the Angel tarried on the road. And Daoud lay on the bed tossing and moaning in fever and in pain. And he kept saying: The water pot, the water pot. I must find the water pot. And his friends did not understand his words, and they discussed the affair after this fashion, saying: A man on his deathbed should call for his wife and his sons and his loved ones. Why does he babble of water pots? And some of them answered, saying: He is mad. Know you he spent the days of his life in closets. But the wife of his friend said to her son: The words of the dying are words of meaning and wisdom and should be respected. Go to our closet and take the water pot which is within it, and which I bought but a few days before the arrival of

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x539 our friend, and empty it of water and bring it to us.

And the son went to the closet and he emptied the pot of water and he brought it to them, saying: This is the water pot which Daoud used at the dawning of every day, however many other pots he used later in the day. And they took the pot and shook it over Daoud, after the manner in which a toy is shaken over a baby or a madman, saying: Look at the water pot. What a nice water pot. And as they shook it they heard inside it a dull thud, thud, and they brought a stick and poked it in and found something within it, and they brought wire and fish hooks and drew it forth and it was a bundle tied in a handkerchief, wet with water and heavy with gold, but when they turned to acquaint Daoud of the affair they found that his eyes were filmed by death.

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x539

BETWEEN TRUTH AND FALSE-



HOOD LIE FOUR FINGERS

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x539 IN the days of the Ottomans there was a wealthy merchant in Basra, and in God only is there belief. The name of the merchant was Mahmud, and his wealth exceeded that of all the merchants of Basra. He was rich with exceeding riches, and he had a wife like unto a star, for she was as graceful as the gazelle, her eyes were like spring pools in the desert, her skin was as delicate as rose petals, her breasts were as two ripe peaches towards which the hand desires to stretch, her waist was slender as a young sapling and her thighs were smooth and lovely. And in virtue she was beyond compare, for she was as the golden shelduck, who pairs only with her mate, and dies if she is deprived of him. The name of this girl was Leila, for she was born in the night, and she was in the seventeenth year of her life.

So Mahmud the Merchant had abundance of those things which make for pleasure in this world. Yet he was not happy nor were the great merchants and bankers his friends, for he was a miser greatly given to suspicion and
x/539 doubt. His trade was a great trade and it was his custom
577 to go to the shroffs and bankers and he would give them bags of Turkish gold, saying: Here are two thousand Hamidiya liras. Give me their equivalent in Indian rupees or in Persian tomans. The great bankers would take the bag and put it with their gold without opening it or counting it, for this was the custom of men of honour. But when they gave a bag to Mahmud, saying: Take these twenty-five thousand rupees, Mahmud would open the bag and count out the rupees one by one, biting each coin to see that it was good. A crowd would collect to watch him, and the people would say: See how Mahmud counts the money. The banker must be a cheat or the merchant would not behave like this.

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And the bankers became angry with Mahmud, and 539x they said to him: Since how many years are we in this bazaar? Are our names not known names that you treat us as thieves? And Mahmud would reply to them: Verily the proverb says that between true and false lie four fingers, for if you place your right hand on your head, then the distance between your ear and your eye is measured by four fingers, and that which you hear with your ear may be false, but that which you see with your eye is the truth, nor is there any doubt about it. Therefore must I see these silver rupees.

And one of the bankers, named Daoud, a Nazarene, was angered by the manners and customs of Mahmud, and he said to his friends in the market: Verily Mahmud is a heathen. He is not from you the Moslems nor is he from us the Christians that he behaves in this fashion. For in nothing in this world is there belief, save only in One the Creator, and in all else seen or heard there is doubt. Yet we, to transact our business, must believe each other's words and take a risk, for it takes hours to count twenty-five thousand rupees. And if all of us were to behave in this manner, then our day's work would take us a year to complete. Therefore we should teach Mahmud a lesson and give him a warning, if he will profit from a warning, and caution him, if he will listen to a caution, that he is but a son of Adam to whom nothing is certain and nothing is known, save that he is a mortal created by the One God. And the bankers and money changers agreed with the words of Daoud and they said: Verily he shall be taught a teaching.

The next day Mahmud came to the market and he came to the shop of the Nazarene, and he said: Here are ten thousand gold Hamidiya liras. Give me Arabian dol-

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x539 lars. And Daoud put the bag with his gold without counting it, and he took four great bags of silver and he ~~gave them~~ to Mahmud, saying: Here are four bags, each containing ten thousand silver dollars of Arabia, and this is your exchange.

Mahmud took the four bags and he opened one of them and he began biting the silver dollars and ringing them on a stone and stacking them in piles of ten that they might be counted the easier, and Daoud the Nazarene sat watching him. And after the first hour the counting of the first bag was still incomplete. Then Daoud spoke and said: Verily your proverb is a true proverb that between truth and falsehood lie four fingers, and unless a man witnesses with his eyes he cannot believe. Yet I think there is one matter in which Your Honour believes for which you lack the evidence of your eyes.

Mahmud replied and said: I believe nothing unless I see it. I count every coin of the money I take. I measure every yard of the cloth I buy. I weigh every bag of corn, of sugar, of rice, and of barley, that enters my warehouse. And I even watch over my warehouse at night, for I do not trust the words of the watchman that he will remain wakeful. Then Daoud asked: But how do you know that your wife Leila is virtuous? Mahmud was angered and he answered: Do you doubt the honour of my house? I want your life, for you reflect also on my honour. Why, Leila's very name is a synonym for virtue in Basra. But Daoud continued, and he asked: Since she is not now before your eyes, how do you know that she is not even at this very moment lying with some lewd fellow?

Mahmud thought and replied: She is virtuous, and was there a way to test her I would surely test her, for this is my custom. But how can one test the honour of a woman?

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For she is not like a bag of coins that one can count, nor is 539x she like a roll of cloth that one can measure. Then how can the honour of a woman be weighed? Daoud the Nazarene replied and said: There is a way.

Mahmud was interested and he said: Tell me, then, this way, for it is in my mind that I should test the honour of my wife.

Then said Daoud the Nazarene: Write a letter to your wife that you are called away on business to Kuweit, and that you will pass there a fortnight. Send the letter by my shop boy to your wife. Then go to the shop that sells disguises, and return here as a bearded stranger. Then shall I tell you how you can test your wife. And Mahmud wrote the letter, and he left the shop of Daoud the Nazarene to go to the shop of disguises.

And when Mahmud was gone Daoud gave the letter to the shop boy and he said: Deliver this letter to the Mistress Leila, and when you return from her house pluck for me a sweet lime from the tree that grows beneath her window. But let nobody see you take it, and give it to me secretly and in private. And the shop boy left to execute the orders of his master. Then Daoud the Nazarene went to the cloth merchant at the end of the market and he said: Did not the Mistress Leila, wife of his honour the Brother, Mahmud the Merchant, come to your shop and buy red silk, spangled with silver stars, not ten days ago? For though she was veiled, who can mistake the grace of her walk? And I saw her walking back with it, and it is from such cloth that the ladies make petticoat trousers. The cloth merchant replied and said: She came here, and I sold her twenty metres of it, for she liked it much. And Daoud the Christian said: Give me then a snippet of that cloth that I may show it to my wife, for

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X539 she is pestering me for a present and I am minded to give her some of this cloth. But first I must show it to her and gain her approval, for the man who buys cloth for a woman without her approval is like one who takes a grape and offers it to a hungry tigress. So the merchant cut a snippet from the roll of cloth and gave it to the Christian.

And as Daoud returned to his shop from the cloth merchant, his shop boy returned from the house of Mahmud. Daoud took from him a sweet lime, and he went into his house which stood at the back of his shop, and he caught his she-cat and pulled out one of her whiskers. Then he took a seed pearl and he wrapped it in the snippet of the cloth, and he put it with the cat's whisker and the sweet lime in a handkerchief and he left the parcel in his house.

After a time Mahmud returned from the shop of disguises, and Daoud was amazed, for Mahmud was dressed as a bearded Persian, nor could he be recognised. And Mahmud sat in Daoud's shop, and he said: Now what do I have to do to test my wife? Daoud answered and said:
X539 Now send her a message in the code of love. Mahmud
202 asked: What is this code and how do I send a message in it? Daoud asked: Are you, then, such an ignorant lover? Then Daoud called his shop boy and ordered him: Go and bring me a rose, and a phial of crystal glass containing pure clear water, and a moth, and a flask of wine, and a silk handkerchief.

And after half an hour the shop boy returned with all these articles and he laid them in front of his master. Then Daoud took from his treasury a silver Persian toman and he laid the coin on the table with the other articles. Then Daoud the Christian turned to Mahmud the Moslem and he said: Know you that this is the message written in these

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articles in the universal language of love, as it is spoken in the lands of the Arabs and of the Turks and of the Hindus and of the Franks and of the Chinese, for this language is one understood by lovers and by ladies in every country of the world. Your message reads as follows: You are as delicate and lovely as the petals of a rose. I thirst after you as the gazelle thirsts for pure water. I am drawn to you as the moth is drawn to a candle. You quicken my heart even as wine quickens it and I am a Persian and a stranger.

Then Daoud wrapped up the articles in the silken handkerchief and he said: I will give the packet now to one of my maidservants who is discreet, that she will deliver it to your wife. Then shall we await a reply and then we shall know if she be virtuous or not. And Mahmud said: Do this, that I may know the truth. So Daoud took the packet and he went into his house, but he did not give it to the maidservant, instead he locked it in a cabinet. And he returned and sat in the shop with Mahmud and they discussed business and affairs and passed the time in conversation.

And after two hours Daoud said: I will go and see if the maidservant has returned. And he entered his house and went into his room and he took from it that other packet containing the cat's whisker, the sweet lime, the snippet of cloth and the pearl, and he returned to the shop and gave the packet to Mahmud, saying: This is the reply.

Mahmud opened the packet and he was amazed. He said: What mean these things? This sweet lime is like those on the trees outside my window. This cloth is from my wife's petticoat trousers. But what is this whisker? Daoud looked at the articles and he said: Let me interpret this message, for you are unskilled in this language. This

X539 whisker is the whisker of a cat, and its meaning is: Come 202 secretly like a cat in the night. The sweet lime from your tree means: Climb up the tree to my window. And as for this piece of cloth, it is wrapped up and there is something inside it. And Daoud opened the snippet of cloth and he said: Its meaning is this: When you remove my petticoat trousers you shall find a pearl.

X539 Mahmud was seized with fury and his face went black with rage. He put his hand on his dagger and shouted: I shall go now to kill this prostitute and cleanse my honour. But Daoud said: Stay, you must see your wife's dishonour with your own eyes. Else you cannot believe in it. You are now dressed as a Persian and you cannot be recognised. Go unto your wife in the night, and climb the tree and enter her window, then if you are able to take off her petticoat trousers and she screams not to rouse the servants, then shall you know that she is dishonourable. And Mahmud said: Have I not seen enough in this message? But Daoud answered: Perhaps she means to trick a lewd fellow to teach him a lesson. You must be sure before you kill your wife.

So Mahmud controlled himself and he sat to await the coming of night. But as for Daoud the Nazarene, he slipped away and told the other bankers the story of those events known to you, my listeners, and they laughed until the breath was gone from their lungs, and they asked Daoud: But what will happen at Mahmud's house tonight? And Daoud replied: He will climb up the sweet lime tree and enter her window, but before he can take off her petticoat trousers she will scream for the servants. They will come and give him a beating for they will think him a stranger, and this will be his lesson. And it will be one difficult to forget, for he is too much of a yokel to invent

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

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x539 a story for his wife. So he will tell her the truth, she will be greatly angered, and in after years, whenever they quarrel, she will recall these events to him, nor will he ever be allowed to forget them. And the bankers said: O Daoud, you have indeed prepared a fine lesson for our brother in commerce.

Mahmud the Merchant sat in the shop biting his fingernails from very impatience until the sun set and the moon rose, and the people of the town barred their doors and went to their beds and the town fell asleep.

Then when the town was quiet he gripped the hilt of his dagger and strode towards his house, thinking: Now my eyes shall witness the truth. And he came to his house and all was quiet. So he climbed up the sweet lime tree towards the balcony of his wife's room. And he was a great and heavy merchant, nor had he climbed a tree since his boyhood. So he puffed and panted as he pulled himself up with difficulty, and he put out his right hand and grasped the balcony above him. Yet he had not the strength to pull himself up. So he shoved with his legs upon the branch beneath him that he might be thrust upwards, and such was the strength of his shove that the branch splintered and fell away, and he was left hanging by his right arm with the fingers of his right hand grasping the balcony and his thumb beneath it.

And his wife Leila heard the crack of the branch and she came out. Yet she was not of the screaming, fainting women. She was a true Arab and she came out with a scimitar in her hand, and when she saw the fingers of a man grasping the balcony she cut at them and she severed those four fingers from his hand with one blow, and he fell to the ground. Then Leila called to the servants and they came out with sticks and started beating the man on

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the ground, but Mahmud pulled off his beard and discovered himself to them. Then Leila questioned Mahmud as to the reason for the masquerade as she bandaged the stumps of his fingers, and since he was unskilled in the art of love, he told her the truth, and she spoke to him, and her words were words of bitter scorn. 539*

And in the morning Mahmud went to the market-place to change money, and the merchants saw that his right hand was bandaged and that it had no fingers. And when Mahmud took the bags of money from the bankers, he did not open them nor did he count the money. He accepted their word. And when they questioned him concerning the loss of his fingers he did not reply to them. And when he was gone the bankers gathered together and said: It was our intention to teach a lesson, and verily a lesson has been taught. Yet it went beyond our teaching. And in after years whenever Mahmud argued or questioned the words of a man of Basra, those present would remark: Between true and false lie four fingers. And Mahmud would become silent and walk away.

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THE STORY OF ABDUL REHMAN ABU SULTAN AND THE TONGUE OF THE DEAD



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539 776 WHAT do you know of El Iraq, you who are boys? I was an old man before the First German War, and I know the country and its history, yet you say there is no monster in the Hor el Hammar. I have seen it, thirty years ago, for this monster takes on the shape of a woman, and it beckons to a man that he may enter the lake, and every twelve years it must eat a man. I have seen it beckoning on the edge of the lake on the nights when there was no moon, but I did not follow it, for I knew its history, and I know that a man must carry a needle when away from his house at night, yet you know nothing of these things, and you are like Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan, who was so ignorant that he desired nothing but money, and who was so foolish that he tried to rob the dead without listening to warnings or heeding cautions that the sons of Adam shall not meddle with magic and strange matters, nor shall they interfere with those that live beyond the end of the world, nor shall they disturb those that await the Last Day.

X539 Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan was a carpenter of Basra, and he lived in his house with a young and lovely wife and with a fine son, yet he was not happy, for his earnings [342 262] were few and his house was a poor house of bowari matting and his food was but dates and bread. And winter came and the rains fell and everything in Abdul Rehman's house was wet, even to the blankets of his bed, for the matting did not keep out the rain, and the cold wind whistled through the walls of his house, and he was in a miserable and desperate state, so he went to the coffee-house to get warm and he met there his friends, and he discussed his condition, saying: How can I get money to buy a dry house, and a sheep for the feast and clothes for my wife? And they replied, and said: Did we but know a

*539 way would we be sitting here? A man must work and earn a little money for the needs of his house, and this is man's fate in this world that he must work and yet be poor. Ours is a life of striving and endeavour, and wealth will come to us when God wills and at no other time. But one of the men who was sitting in the coffee-house said: There is a way to get rich that will give you so much gold that you cannot carry it and so many rare jewels that you cannot count them and so much knowledge that you will be master of the world, and this in the course of a single day. And Abdul Rehman asked: If you know this way, then why do you labour? And the man said: I know the way to get rich, but I like it not, for it is to rob the dead. And those that were there present lifted their hands and said: We take refuge in God from this conduct. But Abdul Rehman said: If you know of gold that belongs to the dead, tell me where it is, that I may acquire it, for what need have the dead of gold?

And the man replied and said: I was wandering around the ruined city of Tell el Ummgaya, and when I had reached the edge of the city which is towards the desert to the west, it so happened that I was tired and I sat down by a mound and I pulled from my pocket the box in which I carry cigarette paper and tobacco, for I wanted to smoke. And I tried to open the box, but it was tight, and when from the force of my fingers the lid flew open the contents were also thrown out, and in that box I had placed a silver dirhem, and the coin fell to the ground and rolled down the slope and entered a hole in the ground. And since I had no other money with me I was forced to pursue that dirhem, and I found that the hole into which it had fallen was large enough for me to enter, yet I was unwilling to do so, for it was dim and black within. Bu

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I do not lack courage, and there was no money with 539K me for my supper, so I entered the hole and descended. I struck a match to find the dirhem. And by the light of that match I saw the dirhem and I also saw that a great passage led away from the hole under the ground. And I picked up my dirhem from the ground and I was in mind to see where the passage went, so I lit other matches and went down the passage, and in this manner I travelled for a great distance under the very surface of the earth, until I came to a great door, studded with iron and with brass, and on it I saw by the light of a match writing in Arabic which read: Let the seeker who seeks kiss this door, then shall he enter. And though it was in my thoughts that lawful and honest matters do not hide from the light of the sun beneath the ground in dark caverns, yet I could not turn back without opening that door, so I tried it with my hand, but it did not yield, nor could I find any keyhole or bolt. So I placed my lips to that door and kissed it, and even as I kissed it I felt it move backwards and swing open and I found before me a chamber and along each wall hung skeletons of men, and on the ground were the bones of the dead, and in the middle of the chamber was a great pile of gold and jewels and rare stones, and on the pile was seated a great and full woman, yet on her body there was not cloth nor was there covering, her flesh was alive and ample, and her lips were the colour of blood. And I asked of her and demanded: Who be you and what do you in this evil place? And she answered and said: I am she who will make you richer than Solomon the King, and I shall give you so much gold that you cannot carry it, and so many rare jewels that you cannot count them, and so much knowledge that you will be master of the world, and all I ask of you is that you take me in your

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x 539 arms and kiss my lips, then shall you say these words: I accept your lips and I accept your body and I accept your tongue. Then shall you pass your tongue through my lips into my mouth and I shall press my tongue through your lips into your mouth, and I shall reveal to you miracles of knowledge and of wealth. And I said to her: This thing will I do, but first shall you say the creed, that I may know if you be good or evil. And she replied and said: Those words my tongue shall not utter. Then verily I knew her to be evil and I turned from her and fled, nor did I stop running until I came to the outer world and the heat of the sun, in which evil and horrible things cannot linger.

And Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan heard the words of his friend, and he said: You were lacking in courage and enterprise, for if a man be truly brave he fears nothing in the World or in Land of Doom, and if you show me the cavern in which this woman sits then I shall unseat her from her pile of gold, and I will make her think of other things than tongues before I leave her, and when I go I will take with me her treasure, for I have no fear. And those that were present in the coffee-house drew up their cloaks from the ground and said: There is no strength nor power save in God, and we take refuge in God from one so evil that he would meddle in these affairs. But the friend of Abdu' Rehman said: If you will not listen to wisdom and if you mock those who heed warnings and who abstain from evil things, then I will show you the entrance to this cavern, but I will not accompany you nor will I help you, nor shall you again enter my house nor will I sit with you again in a coffee-house, for verily your companions shall be the jackals and hyenas who dig at the graves at night.

But Abdul Rehman was wet and cold and his stomach

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

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X539 was empty of meat and good food, so he said: You shall show me the place.

So on the morning of the next day Abdul Rehman and his friend took camels and they left Basra, and their destination was Tell el Ummgaya. And after three days spent on the road they saw before them the hill and the time was evening and the sun was in the west. And Abdul Rehman said to his friend: Guide me to the hole in the ground and to the passage and to the door. And his friend replied: Would you then enter when it is night over the world? And Abdul Rehman said: I have no fear. So Abdul Rehman was guided by his friend to that part of the ruins and former dwellings of ancient men which lies towards the desert to the west, and his friend pointed with his finger to a hole in the ground saying: Here shall you enter, and strange and extraordinary matters lie ahead of you, but as for me, I shall march for Basra this very night, nor shall I again speak to you or hear your voice or see your face. And his friend and companion of the road turned and mounted his camel and departed from him, and Abdul Rehman was left without any of the sons of Adam near him, for around him were only the dwellings of the dead and of the wild and savage beasts of the desert.

And Abdul Rehman entered the hole and he entered the dark passage which lay under the surface of the earth, and it was cold and damp within and there was a smell of slimy and evil things and there was the smell of the dead. And Abdul Rehman sat down on the ground and there was fear in his heart and he thought: Why must I desire wealth and money and power, for if a man has all the wealth in the world, his stomach can only hold the food of one man, nor can he eat more, nor are the girls that he can love unlimited. When I go to my home after a day of

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labour the food tastes good to me, though it be cheap. 539K Does, then, the richest merchant in the city enjoy his quails and duck and partridges more than I enjoy my bread and dates? And can man be happier than I with my wife, for if there be not love what pleasure has a man in a woman? Truly the rich men with their great and fat bellies are no happier than I, for we are the same as they are, and what wealth or power does a man have when his eyes grow dim and his legs grow weak and his hand quivers and his voice grows faint, and the worms and the insects of the earth will eat their bodies even as they will eat my body? And it was in Abdul Rehman's thoughts that he should return back and abandon his purpose, but he thought: Those words which I spoke in the coffee-house will be remembered against me, and men will say to me: You mocked us and boasted of your courage, yet you are less than we, who know that we are but created beings and withdraw our hands from evil and forbidden matters.

So Abdul Rehman continued on under the surface of the earth until he came to the great door, and though his hand was shaking and his stomach sick with fear he pressed his lips to the door and said: Open. And the door swung open and he saw within a chamber lit with a green light, and along each wall hung skeletons of men and on the ground were the bones of the dead and in the middle of the chamber was a great pile of gold and jewels and rare stones and on the pile was seated a great and full woman, yet on her body there was not cloth nor was there covering: her flesh was alive and ample and her lips were the colour of blood. And Abdul Rehman demanded of her: Who be you and what do you here? And she replied saying: I am she who will make you richer than Solomon

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x539 the King, and I shall give you so much gold that you cannot carry it and so many rare jewels that you cannot count them and so much knowledge that you will be master of the world, and all I ask of you is that you take me in your arms and kiss my lips, then shall you say these words: I accept your lips and I accept your body and I accept your tongue. Then shall you pass your tongue through my lips into my mouth and I shall press my tongue through your lips into your mouth and I shall reveal to you miracles of knowledge and of wealth. And it was in Abdul Rehman's thought that he turn back for he was faint with fear, but he thought: My friends will mock me. So he took the woman in his arms and kissed her on the lips and he said the words: I accept your lips and I accept your body and I accept your tongue. Then Abdul Rehman put his lips to her lips and he pressed with his tongue against her lips and her lips parted and the tip of his tongue entered her mouth. Then Abdul Rehman shook with very fear and he tried to escape and leave the woman, for he found that his tongue was drawn and sucked into her mouth by a great force, nor could he stop it or control it, nor could he tear himself away from the woman, for the strength was gone from his limbs. And it happened that the tongue of Abdul Rehman was pulled away from its roots and it vanished completely into the mouth of the woman and there was a gush of blood in his mouth. Then again the woman pressed her lips to his lips and the tip of her tongue entered his mouth and he shuddered and trembled, for the feel of her tongue was as is the skin of a dead snake. Then her tongue entered his mouth, nor could he stop it, nor could his lips prevent it, and only when her tongue had fully entered his mouth was he able to move and escape, for then the flesh fell from her bones and her eyes fell out and she fell

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to the ground, a withered skeleton. But her tongue lay in his mouth and it was cold and horrible, and his fingers could not pluck it out. And he tried to say the holy words which avert evil things and banish them, but the words did not come, for the tongue was not his tongue. Then the tongue spoke and though the words came from his mouth he did not know the words until he heard them with his ears, for they were not his words. And the tongue said: Know you that I am the Tongue of the Dead, and though I shall keep my promise to you, and give you so much gold that you cannot carry it and so many rare jewels that you cannot count them, and so much knowledge that you shall be master of the world, yet in all else you must obey me, and when I say turn to the left you shall turn to the left and when I say turn to the right you shall turn to the right, for though you master the world I am your master. And the tears streamed from Abdul Rehman's eyes, though no sob or sound came from his mouth. 539x

And the Tongue commanded him that he march for Basra, so he left that chamber and came out from under the earth and the world was night. And he found his camel and mounted and set out on the road. And he was three days on the road and he ate of dates and cheese, yet he could not taste the food and it was without flavour. And on the evening of the third day he came to Basra and he went towards his house. And as he passed the coffee-house men came out, saying: Abdul Rehman has returned. And one of the men cried out to him, mocking: Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan, where is your bag of gold? But the Tongue replied, saying: Do you mock me, you whom all should mock. He who is at your side lay with your wife last night, and if you want proof of it, does not the great bed in your house lie against the wall and is not the wall

covered with red plaster, and who else has this plaster in their house? Look, then, at your friend's left arm and shoulder, for has it not been rubbing against that plaster. And the man looked and saw that it was true, so he drew his knife and leapt at the man, crying: A death to cleanse an injury. But the other man also drew his knife and before they could be restrained both were lying on the ground, one with his stomach ripped open and the other with his throat dashed open and the blood of their lives was flowing away. And the Tongue said to Abdul Rehman: Can any mock the Master of the World? But Abdul Rehman thought: They were my friends. And Abdul Rehman came to his house, and his loved wife, his girl Aina, came out to welcome him and she cried: Thanks be to God for your safe return; your presence is a present
X √39 of happiness. But the Tongue cried out: Come, neigh-
√86 bours. Come, witnesses. And all who heard were astonished. Then in a great voice the Tongue commenced saying the Oath of Divorce, and the girl Aina burst out sobbing and weeping, but those present said: She is better gone from him, for see, he is like a madman; though the words come clearly from his mouth, it is as if his hands were trying to stop them and his face is a face of horror and disgust. And when the divorce was completed and the girl Aina had gone weeping away Abdul Rehman entered his house and he saw there his boy Sultan, a fine boy in the tenth year of his age, and the boy was weeping,
X for he had heard the words of Divorce. And Abdul
√39 Rehman tried to speak to his son and excuse himself, but no words came; instead the Tongue spoke, saying: O my son, I test your obedience. Climb on to the wooden shaft above the well. And the boy was obedient, and he climbed up and stood on the shaft. But Abdul Rehman thought:

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The Tongue means evil. So he ran towards the boy to 539x protect him from evil and to take him in his arms. But as he ran the Tongue let out a dreadful cry, full of evil and fear, and when the boy Sultan saw his father running towards him crying a dreadful cry, he became afraid, so he turned away, but the shaft was narrow and he slipped and fell to the bottom of the well, and since the well was dry his backbone snapped, and Abdul Rehman was overcome with grief at the death of his son nor did he desire wealth nor did he desire to become master of the world, his one thought was to be free of the Tongue. So he left his house and went to the city and he tried to enter a mosque, but whenever he came near the door of a holy place the Tongue curled in his throat so that he choked, nor could he breathe the air. And it happened that he was walking on the bank of the river when he came on a derwish, an old man frail and white of beard. And he cast himself at the feet of the derwish and he wrote in the dust the letters: Say over me La hol. And though the Tongue choked him nearly to death, he wrote the words and the derwish read them and was astonished, and he said the verse. And when it heard the holy words the Tongue shook and such was the force of its shaking that Abdul Rehman was forced back into the river, but the Tongue came out of his mouth and it swam away like a great leech. Then up came four great fish, each six paces long and black of skin, and each fish seized a limb of Abdul Rehman and tore it off, and he was left without arms or legs. And slowly the derwish, who was frail and old, pulled Abdul Rehman from the river, and he had no limbs. And the fish vanished, nor did they touch the derwish. And men came and they carried Abdul Rehman to a surgeon, and he bound his stumps, but when they questioned him he did not reply and they saw

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x539 that he had no tongue. And they looked in his eyes and they saw that his reason was gone from him, for his eyes had the dim look of a mad dog. So when his stumps were healed they set him in a doorway, that those that passed ~~and the~~ charitable and the merciful might lift a little water and food to his lips. And the wealthy and generous threw at him coins, sometimes gold and sometimes jewels and they lay on the ledge beside him, nor could he pick them up, nor did any steal them, for who would rob a man with no hands and no legs.

And it happened that a wise man of the Arabs was passing through Basra in the company of the learned, and he was astonished at his condition, and he ordered that there be written above Abdul Rehman the words: Here is he who has so much gold that he cannot carry it and so many rare jewels that he cannot count them and so much knowledge that he is master of the world. And to those who questioned him he said: How much gold can a man carry with no legs and no arms, and how many jewels can a man count with no fingers, and the mad are masters of the world, for they are not bound by that which binds us, nor are they worried by cravings and desires, and the fountain of knowledge is the fear of God.

APPENDIX

TRIBAL MARRIAGE CUSTOMS 121

The attached translation is of a description of a marriage as it actually happens in the tribes. It is given because in some of the stories there are departures from normal marriage customs, and these variations from normal custom in the stories are intended to emphasise the situations into which the characters have got themselves.

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[291] √84 THE youth sees a girl on the road or in the fields, for the women of the tribes are not veiled, and he falls in love with her. He speaks to his mother, or if he has no mother, to his sister or his aunt, and she goes to the house of the girl and she sees any of the women of the house, but preferably she sees the mother of the girl. And she asks: Does your daughter agree to marry So-and-so? And the mother asks the girl and a reply is given.

If the reply is favourable the youth goes to his sheikh, or if his sheikh is away to one of the sons of his sheikh, and if there are no sons available he goes to a sayyid and he says: O Your Honour the Sheikh, I want to marry the daughter of So-and-so, for I love her and I want her and I cannot live without her. And will you be an intermediary in the affair? The sheikh usually agrees, for the man is of his tribe. Then the sheikh will send one of his servants to the father of the girl, and the servant will say: The sheikh wishes to visit you at such and such a time.

At that time the father of the girl remains ready in his house, and he has prepared a meal for the sheikh and for his retainers. The sheikh arrives in his car, and he is accompanied by three or four men to support his dignity. And the sheikh sits down in the house and he converses with the father of the girl for half an hour, but he does not mention the marriage. Then they have food, and after the meal the sheikh sits for a while and then he says: We must take our leave and go. And the father of the girl says: You have honoured me with a visit, and there must be some reason for it. Command me as to what service I can do. And the sheikh says: Let it be known to you that the business of our visit is marriage. And the sheikh continues and asks: Do you consent to the marriage of your daughter to So-and-so, and surely you must give your consent?

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The father of the girl says: Let me ask the women of the 584
house for I cannot compel them if they do not agree. And if the reply comes back that the women of the house agree, the sheikh says: How much do you ask of us? And the man replies: Give according to your pleasure. The sheikh says: No, you must name the sum. And the man says: One hundred dinars.

The next day the father of the youth, or if he has no 585
father, one of his male relatives, takes the hundred dinars 801
and he goes to the father of the girl and he gives him the hundred dinars. And when the father of the youth has gone, the father of the girl gives the money to the mother of the girl, and the mother goes out and buys a gold necklace, gold earrings, gold bangles and silver anklets for the girl, also clothes and shoes.

Then between three and ten days after the payment of 585
the money, at the time of sunset, the bridegroom sits in his house to await his bride, and he sends all his female relatives to bring her to him. His mother and his grandmother and his sisters and his aunts march in procession with a band to the house of the bride, and they are escorted by all the friends of the bridegroom belonging to the tribe, armed with their revolvers and rifles, and there should be fifty armed men in the procession for a fashionable wedding.

When the procession reaches the house of the bride the men fire their rifles, and the bride, who is ready, comes out, accompanied by her female relations, and her male relations sit quietly in their house and they do not come out. Then the bride goes back in procession to the house of the groom, surrounded by the female relations of the groom.

When the procession reaches the bridegroom's house

his relations take the bride into a special room which has been made ready with the best chairs and carpets the family possesses. There the mother of the groom gives tea and cakes to the bride and to the relations who have accompanied her, and one hour is spent on this entertainment. There are, of course, no men present in this room. The men are all sitting in the garden, as there are too many to entertain in the house, and they are being given tea by the father of the groom, and they are watching dancers who have been engaged to entertain them.

The bridegroom is sitting in the highest place in this party on a special throne, and he has his two 'wazirs', one on each side of him, and they should be dressed exactly as he is dressed, for when the groom bought cloth for his wedding suit he bought cloth also for the 'wazirs' and [593] gave it to them. In this gathering the father of the groom sits in a lower place and the groom does not get up when his father rises, and he may smoke and address the gathering in front of his father, which he would normally be prevented from doing by Arab custom.

The moumin is sitting with them, and after they have been sitting for an hour or so the father of the groom says to the moumin: Let us go and bring the words of the girl. Then the moumin and the father of the groom go to the room of the women, and they knock on the door and cry: Clear the way, clear the way. And when the women of the house hear this they leave the room, and the bride is left sitting amongst her own relatives. And the moumin enters the room and he says to the girl: Good evening, and how are you? And after she has replied the moumin says: Do you consent, O my girl, to the happy marriage, and to the sum of one hundred dinars paid by So-and-so the son of So-and-so, to you, So-and-so the daughter of

So-and-so, and do you consent to the consummation? The bride replies: I consent.

Then the moumin returns to the groom, and he says: O husband, congratulations on your marriage. Then he asks: O my boy, do you consent to this bride and her age is eighteen years? And the groom says: I consent. Then the moumin asks: Do you consent to the consummation? And the groom says: I consent. When the moumin has finished with the groom, the groom rises, and accompanied by his two 'wazirs', his father, brother, and close friends he enters the house. Those that rise with the groom say: Blessed be the Prophet of God.

The groom thus escorted walks to the door of the women's room and he enters. The men who have escorted him turn back at the door and return to the guests. The groom sits down with the bride and her relatives. Then, one by one, the relatives get up and bid the bride good night, and they go out to another room, leaving only the bride and the groom sitting there. Then the groom goes over to the bride and very slowly he raises her veil and takes it off her face; he then looks at her face for a minute or so, and gives her one kiss on the brow.

Then the mother and sisters of the groom come in and serve the wedding feast to the bride and groom, who eat it alone in their room. After they have eaten they drink coffee. Then the groom takes the hand of the bride and he leads her into the bedroom. Then he takes off the cloak of the bride and he lays it on the floor and he prays on it.

The guests are served with dinner at the same time as the bride and groom, and when they have finished eating they amuse themselves with music, watching the dancing, and firing their rifles until about 3 a.m.

In the morning the groom sits in his guest room, and

585 he receives congratulations from all his friends. For three days he stays in his house. Then after three days he goes and calls on the father of the bride. The bride may not go near her house until the thirtieth day after the marriage, when she goes to call on her father.

The male relatives of the bride are, of course, not present at the wedding feast, nor do they go to congratulate the groom on the morning after. They may, however, go and call on the groom ten days after the marriage, but they do not congratulate him. They are supposed to be sad at losing their daughter or sister as the case may be.

In the above account I have tried to give the details of what actually happens in a tribal marriage, rather than the theory of what should happen. The above refers to a tribesman who owns a small piece of land and who works in addition as a farm labourer. He owns a small house. A wedding for a sheikh or sirkal would be much more elaborate than this, and would include a reading from the Holy Quran. The customs of townspeople are also quite different. There appears to be only one point of resemblance and that is that the money expended is out of proportion to the means of the bridegroom, but he may only get married once in his life and the feast and entertainment will be talked about for a long time, and there is no doubt that the guests enjoy themselves far more than the guests, say, at an English wedding.

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NOTES

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TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

1. The Story of Hajji Ali, the Great Sultan and his Son, the Amir Kheyyun

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
556 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
438 rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often
acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they
have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
578 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A Story Concerning the Ignorance of Slaves

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

originates from Africa, possibly as one told by Negroes themselves./136 There are sharks in the Shatt el Arab and in the Karun River in Arabistan which occasionally take off the leg of a bather as far as eighty miles from the sea and the shark is far better known to the Iraqi than is the crocodile.

4. The Story of the Prince of Kermanshah and of His Misfortunes

Peacock. Page 29, Line 25. 'A thousand peacocks.'

I think this bird is only included to give an exotic flavour to the 000 feast. I remember once mentioning that I had shot and eaten peafowl in the Punjab, a statement which was received with much surprise and, I am afraid, some lack of belief, and on a subsequent occasion when someone was describing a feast one of those present shouted, 'Put in a peacock for the Sahib'. In India the peacock is not normally killed by Moslems on the grounds that it is a bird of Paradise. In Iraq, however, I do not doubt that the learned doctors of religion could give the answer straight away if asked. Pigeons which roost on mosques are exempt /137 from molestation, even when destroying crops outside villages. There 825 is incidentally a pretty Iraqi story which explains the large feet of a pigeon. It describes how the pride and arrogance of peacocks offended King Solomon, so to punish them he took away their feet and gave them the feet of the pigeons, that they might always be shamed by their smallness, while the peacocks' large and beautiful feet he gave of course to the pigeons.

5. The Story of the Youth Jamil, the Son of a Merchant in Baghdad

Page 43, Line 3. 'The City of Peace.'

Medinat es Salaam or 'City of Peace' is one of the names used in 103 poetry for Baghdad. The city, when first built, was originally named Medinat es Salaam, but it appears that people persisted in referring to it as Baghdad, or Dad's Garden, from some older name for the site of the present city. Arabs love these poetical names, differing from those in normal use. Iraq is sometimes known as Bilad er Rafidain, or Country of the Two Rivers, Jerusalem (Al Quds or the Holy in

103 Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

582 The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still main-
178 tained in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to
[619] force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

6. THE STORY OF THE LOST SOUL

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

764 The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy
788 families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for burial in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

NOTES

Arab time. Page 63, Line 32. 'And the time was the sixth hour of night.'

Arab time has long since been abandoned in Iraq though it continues 805 in modified forms in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. The Arab day of the week or date starts at sunset (e.g. the Arab Monday would start at sunset on our Sunday). The first twelve hours of each day of the week, that is, from sunset to twelve hours later, were known as the Hours of Night. They were followed by twelve further hours known as the Hours of Day, to complete the 24 hour cycle and to make one complete day. The sixth hour of night would thus be six hours after sunset, probably somewhere near our midnight. The Arab time system had many disadvantages, but probably for people living in the desert without watches, and therefore forced to use the sun or stars to tell them the time, it was as good a system as any. Sunset was the same for everybody and started the day, sunrise would in practice in the desert be considered to be twelve hours later and therefore the start of the first hour of day. Noon was, under the same casual reckoning, the sixth hour of day. In practice Arabs are extremely good at judging the time from noting the passage of the moon or stars, though I suppose that they will in time lose this gift through the present almost universal possession of watches.

7. The Story of Maqdad—He Was the Hero of Hilla

Hilla.

Hilla is an old Arab town situated at a crossing of the Euphrates 361 River near to the ancient site of Babylon. Al Fetla have of course no special claim to the town and I was surprised that Maqdad should be hero of Hilla rather than of one of the smaller places to which Al Fetla could lay a closer claim. I think one tends to forget that many of the smaller towns and villages were insignificant or did not exist at all until recent times. Nasiriya, for example, which the Muntafiq tribes now regard as their capital, and which is the seat of the Mutassarif of the Muntafiq Liwa, was only founded in the last century by Nasir Pasha es Saadun. Hilla must in the past have been the centre of a very much larger area than it is today. It is still one of the most important towns of South Iraq. It is well known beyond the borders of Iraq as

361 [539] being mentioned in a nursery rhyme which runs:

Cukukhti, wein ukhti?	Dove, where's my sister?
B'il Hilla.	In Hilla.
Sha takal?	What does she eat?
Bajilla.	Beans.
Wein tenam?	Where does she sleep?
Bab Illah	At God's door.

and which continues for several verses.

The mace. Page 71, Line 16. 'A mace of the finest teakwood.'

411 The mace may almost be said to be a traditional weapon in South Iraq. If you meet an Arab tribesman about his normal daily routine in the countryside, he will probably be armed with a mace and dagger. Rifles are weapons of luxury, to be kept away from dust and damp. [535] Many tribal dances are done with the mace, which is sometimes of solid wood carefully carved, and sometimes, a less beautiful weapon but more dangerous, it is made of a wooden shaft with a ball of lead or pitch at the end.

Page 74, Line 22. 'Maqdad took his course from the wind.'

821 Skilled desert guides can often recognise a wind as being from a certain quarter by its force, humidity, and temperature. The phrase here implies that the sun was clouded over and Maqdad was finding his way by the wind, which indicates that he had considerable skill. The only people who can use the wind are those who can detect quickly any change in its direction. I remember once asking some Arabs the way to a well, and they told me, Keep the wind on your left cheek. I had to use methods with which I was more familiar.

Page 81, Line 25. 'Now I shall call myself Ibn Ali.'

601 The kunya, or name defining a person by his relationship to someone else, is recorded both in classical and modern Arabic usage. Ibn Batuta, for example, a famous fourteenth century traveller, is known only by his kunya. The modern tribal practice appears to be to promote a man to a kunya when he becomes the father of a boy. A man who has become father of a boy named Qais will, for example, be hailed by his friends with exceptional heartiness for some weeks afterwards, 'Ahlan wa sahlan ya Ab Qais', and the name may or may not stick

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to him permanently. Women are almost invariably known by the name of their eldest son, preceded of course by Umm. The other extremely common practice is that of giving a man a laqab, or nickname, from some habit or personal peculiarity. The laqab is rarely complimentary. 601 551

8. A MAN'S HONOUR IS IN THE HAIR OF HIS MOUSTACHE

Page 111, Line 14. 'The hub in their house was empty of water.'

The hub is a large porous earthenware jar, which keeps water cool by evaporation. 415

Page 112, Line 6. 'Nor did he even own the leg of a mare.'

The phrase 'leg of a mare' implies that a man has ownership in a quarter share of the sale price of all foals from the mare. It is quite common for deals to be done in one, two, or three legs of a mare, and for one mare to have four owners. 422

Page 116, Line 13. 'Then will our sheikh cry, Sheil.'

Sheil, or Take away, is a word commonly used as an order to strike camp. 192

Page 116, Line 28. 'You should not have to drink the water from a camel's stomach.' 312 271

When threatened by death from thirst in the desert, Arabs may be forced to slaughter their camels in order to drink the stomach fluids. I have also been told that travellers have made their camels sick by forcing a stick down their throats to get a little fluid. I do not know if this is true. It would appear to me to be a most difficult operation.

Page 118, Line 29. 'Cut my head to keep the secret.'

This should probably have been more properly translated 'Cut my head off to keep the secret,' for I have since been told one man's version of this saying. According to his account there were three brothers of a famous Nejaf family, living in poverty, and they were forced to become thieves. One day they went to raid a Turkish Army camp near to Hindya. In the daytime they watched the camp and saw which was the guard tent in which the treasure chest was hidden. They then waited till night, and, when the camp was asleep, they 192 539

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192 crept up to the guard tent. One of the brothers slit the tent wall with
539 his knife and crept inside. Inside the tent he found a box of silver dollars, and he was passing it out through the slit in the tent to his two brothers when he trod on one of the Turks, who woke up and grabbed him by the legs. The Turk was shouting to raise the alarm, and the Nejafi, seeing that he could not get away, and fearing that if he was identified, his whole family would be punished, put his head out through the slit in the tent and implored his brothers to cut it off and take it away. This, according to the story, they did, getting away both with the chest of silver and their brother's head, the identity of the family remaining undiscovered. The word for 'cut' in Arabic does imply cutting off and removing when applied to heads.

10. The Story of the Son of the Pilgrim

Page 148, Line 7. 'He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail.'

619 The Shammar are mentioned in other stories and a reader may be confused by the different areas from which they appear to come. To write a note on this extensive tribe would require considerable knowledge both of Syria and of Saoudi Arabia, and I myself cannot do it. The Shammar best known to the Muntafiq tribes are the Shammar of Nejd, who send caravans legally to Zobeir, and with less authority to other areas. Some of the Nejdi Shammar do graze in Iraqi territory and in the Neutral Zones. However, the most famous Shammar of Iraq are those of Mosul Liwa. There are also Shammar, some of whom have adopted the Shia religion, living in Baghdad Liwa. Many of them have entered Iraq as refugees after defeat by Ibn Saoud. When a prince of the Shammar from Hail is mentioned, I should think that a member of the Rashid family is indicated. This family were once rulers in Nejd, and their capital was for a time at Hail. They were finally defeated by the Wahabis under Ibn Saoud. The word Amir
which I have here translated as prince, is a somewhat deceptive one.
[601] The sons of an Arab king carry, it is true, the title of Amir, but the
192 word has a larger usage. The tribes of Northern Arabia and Syria use it in their sheikhly houses, and in the Persian Gulf the word implies little more than a minor local official. The root of Amir is from the Arabic word for 'command' and is most literally translated in such

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phrases as 'Amir ul Mouminin', that is, "The Commander of the Faithful". 192

12. The Story of the Two Dancers

Page 171, Line 1. 'Which was full of chests of Kuweit of enormous size.' 489 439

The Kuweit chest is sometimes to be seen in English houses, its owners ignorant of its history. It is normally of polished or carved teakwood studded with brass, and with massive brass hinges and locks which are engraved by hand. In size it may be from four to six feet long, two and a half or three feet high, and of course broad in proportion. It sometimes has a false bottom or secret drawer. I have often hoped that some resident of Kuweit would write a book on these interesting chests. I have seen many of them, beautifully worked, in the bazaars of Baghdad and Basra. I also used to see them when going on board Kuweiti jalbuts from India when they called at Bahrein. There were usually a number of these chests carried as deck cargo, though not as large nor of such good wood as the old ones found in the bazaars. The nakhodas of the craft whom I questioned about these chests informed me that their sailors, in addition to receiving pay, had the right to bring one chest each from India, full of goods to be sold on their own account. I did in fact look through some of these chests and found them in the main stocked with Indian sandals, mirrors, scent, rolls of cloth, saris and similar articles. I was told that in the past Kuweiti sailors would buy the chest in India, stock it with goods, and carve it and put in the heavy brass studs on the voyage back to Kuweit, which might take several months, as the dhows call at a number of small Indian and Persian ports. On arrival at Kuweit or Basra the chests and their contents would be sold, and the price of a well worked chest was an important part of a sailor's earnings. I asked them why the chests on the deck of most of the dhows were without ornament, and was told that at present there was less profit in the sale of the chest than in the goods it contained, and that chests now available in Southern Indian ports were of such poor quality that they did not repay work. They still buy these chests as the sailor's own property is carried as

489 deck cargo, and the goods would be liable to damage by rain or spray
439 if otherwise packed.

13. The Story of Sheikh Mizhil el Qurnachi, a Man of a Noble Family, though His Land Was Poor

804 Page 185, Line 15. 'and ordered fifty mithkals of them.'
The mithkal is a small weight used by goldsmiths.

192 Page 188, Line 20. 'Take soldiers and go to Qasr Qurnachi.'
Qasr—castle. 'Qurnachi Castle.'

Page 191, Line 11. 'Can then the hawk fly without wings.'
539 I was told that this quotation was from a famous Arab poet, but
192 regret that I was unable to place it, and nobody could remember the name of the poet. The quotation as put into the mouth of Sheikh Aqab is particularly apt, as Aqab, though its literal translation is 'eagle,' is a name often given to hawks.

Page 198, Line 24. 'She was clad in an ataq and bag trousers.'
The ataq is a kind of blouse.

14. The Story of Daoud the Camel and of his Misfortunes

Page 204, Line 4. 'The Shammar of the Jezira.'
103 The area in Mosul Liwa which lies to the west of the Tigris, that is,
101 between the Tigris and the Euphrates, is known as the Jezira, or Island. The Shammar in this area are the famous tribe of the late Sheikh Ajil el Yawar.

15. Between Truth and Falsehood Lie Four Fingers

551 Page 214, Line 14. 'The name of this girl was Leila for she was born in the night.'

Leila, 'Night,' is a popular girl's name in South Iraq. I do not think it is restricted only to those girls born at night.

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/For the metaphors and similes employed in some Iraqi tribal tales that convey the concept of ideal beauty and proportions, see complete text. /

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/For the text of the tribal tales of the Muntafiq, the Al Fetla and the Beni Huchaim tribes, see category 116, complete text./

BOWYERS FIELD,
WROTHAM,
KENT.
December, 1931.

HIS EXCELLENCY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,
BAGHDAD.

EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to submit herewith my definite report on land tenure and related questions in el 'Iraq, in accordance with the invitation extended to me by Government and embodied in resolutions of the Council of Ministers, dated July 4th and December 22nd, 1929, and previous correspondence.

This report should entirely replace the series of provisional reports containing recommendations for the commencement of settlement of rights to land, which were forwarded at the special request of Government at the beginning of this year. Unfortunately the early action then hoped for, was not realised. But since the recommendations in the present report on the subject follow the same lines, this advance series may have served a useful purpose if they facilitate fuller consideration of these measures now.

The preparation of these provisional reports and a certain number of other current demands have helped to delay the presentation of this report: but the decisive reasons why it has taken much longer than I originally anticipated have been the time needed to study adequately the great mass of material ultimately collected and to formulate measures that would both achieve their object and be within the country's resources.

The necessity to put land tenure and land revenue on to a more stable basis has long been recognised. The ways and means of doing so have been continuously discussed throughout the last decade; but without any effective or sustained action having so far resulted. As mentioned in due course, el 'Iraq is not unusual in this respect; but, none the less, until effective measures are taken to remedy these long-standing evils, they must continue to impede the development of the country and the well-being of the people.

It appears from past discussions that the hesitation of successive governments to attack these evils resolutely is largely to be ascribed to lack of conviction both as to the real character of the problems and as to the practical remedies to be applied. It has therefore appeared to me essential to fulfil two governing requirements if I was to provide Government with assistance of a useful nature and in a useful form. I must probe the problem thoroughly and present it comprehensively, whatever time and effort was involved. And in formulating my recommendations, I must pay the closest attention to the practicability of the measures proposed, having regard to the country's capacity and resources. While it would be too much to hope that I have satisfied these conditions

121 fully, I believe that I have been able to furnish Government with a fundamentally reliable foundation for attainable measures of reform.

If I have been able to do so it is due in the first place to the unstinted co-operation that I received from everyone to whom I applied for information or help during my stay in the country, and in the second to having been able to treat the question as a continuous comprehensive study throughout.

In conclusion I wish to express my gratitude to Your Excellency and to all those to whom I am indebted for the unfailing courtesy and generous assistance that I everywhere received.

I have the honour to be,
Excellency,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) ERNEST M. DOWSON.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI.

An Inquiry

INTO

LAND TENURE AND RELATED QUESTIONS

PART I.—SCOPE AND PROCEDURE OF INQUIRY

185 1. The considerations which led Government to ask me to visit el 'Iraq in the winter-spring season 1929-30 were briefly summarised at the time. The necessity of setting up a sound system of settlement and registration of rights to land as an essential preliminary to agricultural development was urged. It was represented that until effective measures to achieve these ends had been devised and put into operation, agricultural development must either be delayed or based on unstable foundations. It was emphasised that while the country was full of agricultural possibilities and only required development on sound lines, it lacked the necessary basis of a sound system of land registration. And it was explained that the Departments of Revenue, of Land Registration and of State Domains were pursuing reform without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan.

The main objective was the promotion of agricultural development. The particular needs were adjudged to be (i) the execution of a settlement of rights to land throughout the country, (ii) the establishment of an efficient system of book-keeping of those rights, and (iii) the unification of divergent and disconnected Departmental efforts. I was asked to study the problem as a whole and to advise how it should be attacked. As outlined that problem appeared to be essentially one of organisation and procedure for attaining two accepted objectives: a just settlement, and an efficient register, of rights to land. I anticipated that the requisite information regarding existing conditions would be readily available: and I expected that the discussions of previous years would have produced clearly defined issues. But I had not allowed for the peculiar fluidity and diversity of methods of land tenure practised.

423
427 It proved to be common knowledge that the tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all. It was also common knowledge that the land law was defective and uncertain in its application to the other fifth. And it soon appeared that there was an almost complete lack of precise, authoritative and systematic information in the Headquarter Offices of Government in regard to land conditions generally and to the methods of holding, transferring and transmitting land actually practised from day to day by the great mass of landholders and agricultural peasantry throughout all parts of the country.

121 It therefore became necessary to extend the scope of my inquiry to include an investigation of the conditions of land tenure actually operating throughout the country, as distinct (for the most part) from those

121 enshrined in the Statute Books of Government. And since the taxation imposed on agricultural production is one of the most important practical conditions attaching to the utilisation of land, a study of such taxation had to enter into the inquiry. Nor could any investigation of conditions of landholding in el 'Iraq be intelligible or real which did not pay careful regard to the methods of irrigation, public and private, the prevalent forms and standards of cultivation, the distribution and remuneration of agricultural labour. It was not of course possible within the period of a few months to cover this vast field of investigation as thoroughly and completely as the occasion demanded: but owing to the widespread and generous collaboration aroused, the results provide an adequate basis for immediately useful measures.

121 185 This general study of existing conditions had to precede consideration of the three objectives originally indicated, if Government was to be sure of its ground and to be provided with a trustworthy foundation for progressively constructive reform. For settlement of rights to land pre-supposes and requires some stable bases of land law, or at least of legalised custom, on which such rights can be founded. And so far, by common admission, such bases rarely exist, nor do the discussions of previous years appear to have advanced agreement as to the remedy. Again although an efficient Land Register is indispensable in due course, both for the operation of the statutorily registered tenures, and for any orderly regulation of the enormous residue of (so-called) State Domain, yet the execution of a settlement of rights to land must precede the establishment of such a Register. For an effective Land Register is nothing but an intelligible and dependable record. Its function is simply to mirror clearly and faithfully rights to land existing at any and every moment. It is useless to devote money and effort to rectifying and burnishing the mirror, so long as it will only have an unintelligible tangle to reflect. Attention must first be directed to unravelling the tangle.

185 Further, while it is certainly true that no united effort had been made, and no connected plan pursued, by the three public services mentioned, yet it will be recognised that, as subordinate Departments of three separate Ministries, they were not in a position themselves to adopt any general scheme of reform. This is clearly the responsibility of Government as a whole. And, as will appear later, if any well-concerted and effective measures are to be undertaken, the better co-operation and coordination of the efforts of these services will not be enough.

423 2. The lack of a well-documented collection of information about existing conditions of land tenure throughout the country was not on consideration surprising, having regard to the vicissitudes of modern el 'Iraq's short history. There must have been an enormous amount of spade work to be done in establishing orderly government throughout the country during the last ten years: and the current needs of administration no doubt completely absorbed the time and energies of those who might otherwise have undertaken a systematic collection of trustworthy information. The collection of such information, particularly in statistical form, is apt to be a slow development in any country. It requires time, a scientific appreciation of the value of exact data, and the resources of a well-established and experienced public service. And in connection with land it requires a more comprehensive and far-sighted outlook than a number of disunited Departments can reasonably be expected to produce.

423 184 The collection of a representative volume of trustworthy information was also attended by peculiar difficulty, owing to the extreme diversity of conditions prevailing throughout the country. This diversity

is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated 423 by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman administration 184 present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts.

The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. 423 For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon.

3. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers 122 dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were unobtainable, 114 while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape.

A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of 114 reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" 185 written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform.

4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the 121 Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country.

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry 124 of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the

124 compilation of a map indicating the existing distribution of various categories of land in the liwa, (ii) for the preparation of numerical returns relating to population, to the various categories of land, etc., and (iii) a hundred important questions covering the main field of the investigation.

114 Thirdly, I studied at Headquarters the working of the Central Government services primarily concerned, as thoroughly as my immediate purpose required and the time at my disposal permitted.

124 Fourthly, I visited each of the fourteen liwas in turn and (i) discussed the main problems thoroughly with the Governor (Mutasarrif), 114 (ii) was taken to typical or specially instructive places, and (iii) met and questioned a number of other provincial officers, local notables, land holders and peasants. Owing to the previous circulation of the questionnaire, all provincial officers were well prepared for these discussions, while I also received very full written replies in all but every case.

124 Fifthly, I had the honour to be accorded several audiences by H.M. King Feisal as well as numerous interviews with Ministers, Deputies and others. And I also interviewed in Baghdad a number of experienced persons both European and 'Iraqi, with special knowledge and experience of land questions. Unfortunately owing to prolonged bad weather, which interfered with my touring programme and severely curtailed the time available for supplementing my information after its initial collection, it was not found possible to arrange meetings with some of those whom I was particularly anxious to see. I regret this very much, but greatly as they would have assisted me, I venture to believe that nothing they might have said would have seriously modified the main conclusions drawn from the mass of evidence collected.

000 5. Owing to the wideness of the field to be covered the five months that I spent in el 'Iraq were entirely occupied in collecting material which could not be digested until I got back to England. The records of the investigations fill more than forty dossiers. Naturally many gaps and uncertainties were discovered during the examination of this large body of material. This necessitated correspondence with Baghdad extending almost continuously over another six months. The attempt to obtain intelligible and consistent statistics was particularly troublesome.

It must not be thought that even this considerable volume of data covers the field wholly or unimpeachably, or that I can have escaped misinterpretations and errors. No such improvised body of information can be a satisfactory substitute for systematic public records and the accumulated experience of a competent and well organised public service able to concentrate on land problems. But the information and opinions collected, read in the light of experience elsewhere, do none the less enable the main evils to be diagnosed with confidence and the essential elements of constructive reform to be trustworthily indicated.

121 I have thought it advisable to explain the widening of the scope of my investigation and to outline the procedure adopted, so that the character and origin of my information is on record. But I have not attempted to reproduce the mass of conclusions which the material collected has yielded. This would fill volumes. And I have expressly excluded from consideration in this report many questions of the highest importance, which I have had to inquire about owing to their reaction on land tenure (e.g. methods of cultivation, of remuneration of labour, etc.), but which did not themselves directly constitute the subject of the inquiry. Again although it was necessary to study the special problems of each province (liwa) as far as time permitted, so as to get a

proper picture of the whole, I have confined myself in these pages to what may be described as the general aspects of the question as distinct from those of particular localities. Nor has anything like the attention the subject deserves been given to pastoral rights. For while settlement of rights to grazing and pasture is also required, they do not call for such rigid definition, nor is settlement of such rights so urgently needed as of rights to cultivable land, unless the two conflict. Consideration of the Land Revenue system in force when I visited the country has also been omitted, as this system has since been superseded (see ii, 4). 121 [233]

In pursuance of the attempt to restrict attention at this stage to those phases of the problem which call for action first, I have also avoided consideration here of many features or incidentals of existing land tenure, which may be intrinsically of as great importance as others that are examined. Among matters which are not examined in this report for this reason may be mentioned: the various forms of dedication in *waqf*, the conditions of *mulk* tenure, the escheat of tapu tenure for failure to cultivate or failure of heirs, known as *mahlul*, the charge known as *uqr*, the position of newly formed land in a river termed *shati*, the old and new forms of hypothec or mortgage. These almost exclusively affect the registered tenures, and are best considered in the general study and amendment of the land law which is advocated (see vii, 1). Similarly the much-debated question of the conditions under which acquisitive prescription of tapu tenure should come into effect, can have little practical value, until the Government is in a position to implement its statutory tenures. Important established customs affecting State Domain, which are not entered into for the same reason are the *mugharisa* and *ta'aba* systems of planting and tending gardens and groves. 121 423

Finally, I have thought it best, on these grounds also, to restrict detailed discussion of proposed measures to those required for the initial execution of reform. While the character of measures that would be required subsequently to conserve the benefits attained by reform have had to be indicated, no attempt is made to formulate them in detail.

Even generalised and truncated in these ways the main problem remains a difficult one either to present or to master; but it has not appeared to me possible to simplify it further without distortion. The study of the land tenure of any country, with a view to practical and realisable reform, is no light undertaking; and that undertaking is attended with peculiar difficulties in el 'Iraq for reasons which are explained. 000

To facilitate reading and reference I have divided this report into nine parts, which I have endeavoured to make as self-contained as possible. This necessitates some repetition and discontinuity on consecutive reading; but it is impossible to present this intricate question in any readily digestible form. The subject matter of each of these parts is given on the contents page and need not be repeated. The last alone calls for explanation. It has been written in response to numerous inquiries, official and otherwise, when I was in el 'Iraq, regarding the wider setting of the problems of land tenure in relation to the general development of the country as a whole and to the other great ameliorative movements needed. It concludes with a summary of the main recommendations made. It is hoped that this part of the report may be of assistance to those who, while impressed with the critical importance of a constructive reform of land tenure, may be unable to study the whole of this report textually.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

PREFACE

121 The present study on the Problem of *Compulsory Education in Iraq* is one of a series issued by Unesco in preparation for the 14th Conference on Public Education, organized jointly by Unesco and the International Bureau of Education in Geneva, in July 1951.

A major part of that conference is being devoted to the discussion of the problems of compulsory education, and it was thought that apart from the study conducted by the International Bureau of Education, based on a questionnaire sent to governments, Unesco would undertake six type-studies. Of these, three have been devoted to countries that have already achieved compulsory education, but whose method of execution differ one from the other: England as a country whose educational administration is decentralized; France as a country whose administration of education is centralized; and Australia as a country whose educational administration is decentralized on the federal, but centralized on the State level.

Another three type-studies have to do with countries that have reached different stages, leading to the achievement of compulsory education. For this purpose, one country in Latin America—Ecuador; in South East Asia—Thailand, and in the Middle East—Iraq, have been chosen.

In addition, two other studies have been undertaken; one a comparative study on the *Prolongation of Compulsory School Age* by Professor I. L. Kandel, and another on *Child Labour and Compulsory Education*, kindly being undertaken by the International Labour Office.

The present study on Iraq derives its main significance from the fact that it brings out very clearly the relation of compulsory education to other economic political and social factors, whether operating as agents, facilitating its realization, or putting obstacles in its way. The author has succeeded in sizing up the actual situation, of setting out the problem of land tenure, the poverty of the average farmer, tribal organization and various others factors which now impede the expansion of the primary school system. On the other hand, the great Arabic tradition and respect for learning and the impulse of the national movement

121 are among the factors acting for the continuous expansion of primary education.

It is hoped that this study, along with the others, will help to bring out the most important points necessary for a realistic discussion of compulsory education problems.

122 both of educational progress already made and the great obstacles which still have to be overcome.

121 While these visits were being made, a decision had to be taken as to the best means of using the limited time available. It seemed that the report on the study should take one of two forms. It could be a strictly limited account of the administrative action which would need to be taken to apply some measure of compulsory education in the fairly immediate future, together with detailed statistical data concerning towns and villages in each province in which the completion of primary school provision would enable compulsory education to be declared. This form of report was not, however, considered desirable for two reasons. First, it would have meant that, instead of visiting schools, seeing the general conditions of the country and meeting people representative of the different aspects of Iraqi life, most of the time would have had to be spent sitting at a desk in the provincial education offices and at the Ministry of Education itself. This is not the best means of attempting to feel the educational pulse of a country. Secondly, such a report was made a few years ago by the 'Ten-Year Plan Committee' referred to in the following pages. But little achievement in the direction of compulsory education arose from that most valuable report, mainly because certain major administrative reforms essential to its application were never carried out.

Consequently, it was decided that the study would probably be more valid, although more general, if it were based on the continuance of personal visits to schools and the other places indicated. It was felt that it would then be possible to consider prospects of compulsory education in the wider setting of the changes and developments that are taking place or need to take place. Administrative and other recommendations for practical action would have to be made, but these would arise from actual evidence and not from notions derived from the academic study of not entirely reliable statistics.

After many such visits up and down the country, during which impressions both of a general and particular nature were accumulated, it became clear that the report on the investigation could conveniently follow the sequence of a brief survey of the conditions of the country, an analysis of the educational needs of Iraq, an impression of the extent to which these needs are being met in the existing system, and an appreciation of the economic, political and social factors assisting or impeding educational advance. It soon became evident, however, that although there are many serious obstacles to the development of compulsory education, the study would be incomplete without reference to the significant

ways in which some of these are being overcome. This suggested /21 that there would be some value in then attempting to outline a policy of advance in the direction of compulsory education which would go hand in hand with the economic, political and social changes that are taking place. But although it proved possible to outline suggestions for such a policy of development, it also became abundantly clear that, until the major obstacle of the land tenure system can be overcome, ambitious progress towards compulsory education must continue to be frustrated.

So the study took the shape which appears in the following chapters. It would have been an impertinence to try to cover so much ground had it not been that the generous facilities given by the Minister of Education and the others already mentioned enabled me to use information, figures and opinion which have accumulated over a long period as a result of the efforts of people in the educational and other public services of Iraq. Nevertheless, although much of what is written in this study is a result of the thought and labours of others, any opinions expressed and conclusions drawn are, unless otherwise stated, my own responsibility. The same applies to the inevitable inaccuracies which are bound to be discovered by others who have long been associated with the educational affairs of Iraq. This acceptance of personal responsibility for opinions, conclusions and inaccuracies does, of course, draw attention to what may be regarded as a fundamental weakness in the whole study. Although every effort was made to undertake an objective enquiry, this cannot disguise the fact that the study is the work of an educational administrator whose knowledge of the Near and Middle East is limited and whose experience is based mainly on western systems.

At least two other defects or omissions are obvious. Firstly, in 114 relation to a country where most of the adult population remains /21 illiterate, suggestions for advance towards compulsory education cannot be dissociated from measures for combating general illiteracy. It will be seen that some reference is made both to the problem of adult illiteracy and to the need for associating day schools with realistic projects of fundamental education. Reference to this problem is only sketchy, partly because time pressed hard but mainly because, at the time of writing, a Unesco team is about to investigate materials and techniques for fundamental education in Iraq. Secondly, an account of the educational system beyond the primary stage is not given. This omission is deliberate—it is not necessary to duplicate the excellent information given by Dr. Matta Akrawi and Professor Roderic Matthews in their current book *Education in Arab Countries of the Near East.*

An attempt has been made to be reasonably frank. The 000

PREFACE

121 On October 10, 1950, the Government of Iraq officially requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a mission to Iraq to undertake a general review of the country's economic potentialities and make recommendations for a development program. After an exchange of views it was agreed that a mission would be sent with the following terms of reference:

> "The Mission will be expected to undertake a general review of Iraq's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the Government of Iraq to formulate a long-term program for the further development of the country's productive resources. Specifically, the report of the Mission is to include recommendations concerning:
>
> (1) investment priorities as among different sectors of the Iraqi economy and as among types of undertakings within each important sector;
>
> (2) the approximate rate of investment which can appropriately be undertaken without inflationary or other disruptive effects;
>
> (3) measures apart from capital investment which appear necessary or desirable for improving and increasing production;
>
> (4) economic and fiscal policies which may be important to accelerate the pace of Iraq's development; and
>
> (5) governmental organization and practices having an important effect on development."

114 A number of United Nations agencies cooperated in the selection of the personnel of the Mission. The agricultural economist, the agronomist and the expert on animal husbandry were nominated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which also undertook to pay a portion of their salaries

[p. viii is blank]

The Mission's[1] report consists of two parts. The first part contains the major findings and recommendations of the Mission to which are attached appendices: one, listing the Mission's recommendations, one, sumarizing the Mission's suggestions for technical assistance; and a third on statistical organization. The second part consists of a series of monographs dealing with particular subjects. The first monograph is concerned with the basic factors and conditions in the economy of Iraq which the Mission has considered in framing its recommendations. The others set forth in greater detail the Mission's views on flood control, irrigation and drainage; agriculture and animal husbandry; industry; transport and communications; public health; education; and community planning and housing. 128 121

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[1] - [International Bank Mission to Iraq, 1951-- Analyst]

APPENDIX

TRIBAL MARRIAGE CUSTOMS 1211

The attached translation is of a description of a marriage as it actually happens in the tribes. It is given because in some of the stories there are departures from normal marriage customs, and these variations from normal custom in the stories are intended to emphasise the situations into which the characters have got themselves.

p. 237

PREFACE

I-1
121

During 1934 as leader of the Field Museum Anthropological Expedition to the Near East, in addition to about 10,000 herbarium specimens from Trans-Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, I collected a number of useful plants and drugs in Iran and Iraq.

The late Dr. Berthold Laufer, then Curator of Anthropology, had requested me to make this collection and to obtain such information as could be had regarding their use in the treatment of diseases and in prescriptions for various ailments.

In Iran specimens were purchased in the native markets of Tehran and Isfahan. In each case the Persian name with its English transliteration and the use of the drug or herb was recorded. While guests of Dr. Erich Schmidt at Rayy during September, 1934, we obtained specimens in Tehran. Dr. Walter P. Kennedy of the Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad and Mr. George Miles, member of the archaeological expedition staff at Rayy, assisted in this work.

115 At Isfahan Mirza Muhammad Ali Khan, ninety-five-year-old doctor, very kindly consented to dictate his prescriptions (pp. 200–216) for various ailments. He began to practice medicine at the age of twenty after spending about five years in a local school. His father, several uncles, and his grandfather were medical practitioners using the oral tradition and two large handwritten volumes of prescriptions, which I examined at his home in the depths of the labyrinthine Ghetto. At Isfahan the dictation in Persian was recorded by Juda Rabbi Hedvat of the Alliance Israélite.

000 The translation was prepared in part by Dr. A. H. Mookree and by Dr. A. H. K. Sassani, Iran Government scholar at the University of Chicago. Dr. H. W. Bailey of the School of Oriental Studies, University of London, revised the Persian characters and the transliterations.

The assistance of Mr. Paul C. Standley, Associate Curator of Botany in Field Museum, who checked the botanical names in the text, and of Miss Elizabeth Reniff in the preparation of the report is gratefully acknowledged.

Mr. A. R. Horwood of Kew Herbarium very kindly identified some of the specimens.

The spelling of place names conforms to the system adopted by the British Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, published in London by the Royal Geographical Society.

[illegible] Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MH1

I-I To conform to current practice Iran has been substituted for Persia and Irani for Persian except in historical references.

114 In Iraq Dr. Hydari, Director of the Rustam Agricultural Experimental Farm at Hinaidi near Baghdad, presented to Field Museum a number of varieties of *Gossypium*, *Hordeum*, and *Triticum*. Dr. Calvin K. Staudt, Director of the American School for Boys in Baghdad, contributed information regarding local drugs.

As a result of Dr. Laufer's death, arrangements had to be made for the study and publication of the material desired by him without the benefit of his collaboration. Other collections of drugs from southwestern Asia had been studied by Dr. David Hooper of the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum in London. I therefore visited him to discuss the question of the identification of the collections from Iran and Iraq. Dr. Hooper, who a few years previously had published an account of the drugs of Iran, consented to prepare a report on the Field Museum material and this publication is the result. To his account, I have in certain cases added some notes (H.F.) and, from sources indicated in each instance, mostly from Evan Guest, a mention of some of the more important useful plants not a part of the collection studied by Dr. Hooper. Dr. Casey A. Wood has published a translation of the "Tadhkirat" of Ali ibn Isa of Baghdad (circa A.D. 940–1010) under the title "Memorandum Book of a Tenth-Century Oculist," Chicago, 1936. This publication contains (pp. 47–78) a list of drugs and other remedial agents which can be compared with the data in this report.

126 Because of the difficulties involved in recording the colloquial names for the various plants and drugs and their transliterations, there are inevitably certain discrepancies, but I believe that the list of native names in alphabetical order with their Latin equivalents should be of value to other collectors. If the native name is not in the list, the reader should refer to tukhm (seeds), gul-i (flowers), gil-i (earth), or rishah (root), as the name may appear in these forms.

121 The useful plants and materia medica of southwestern Asia may be considered to be fairly well known and no new drug plants are included in the list, but it is hoped that this report will be of value in making existing information even more accessible and in encouraging medical officers to publish additional information.

The rapid advance of westernization in Iran under Reza Shah Pahlevi and in Iraq under King Ghazi necessitates the accurate recording of rapidly disappearing primitive medical folklore.

HENRY FIELD

is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman administration present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts. 423 184

The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon. 423

3. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were unobtainable, while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape. 122 114

A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform. 114 185

4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country. 121

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the 124

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

At the invitation of Unesco I visited Iraq during the autumn of 1950 to undertake a study of the problem of compulsory education. It was soon discovered, however, that although the terms of reference were relatively simple, the problem is enormous. Rapid educational progress in certain directions has been made since Iraq became an independent State, but there exist major economic, political and social problems which constitute serious obstacles to the promotion of compulsory education. 114

The study of the problems and the difficulties which need to be surmounted before realistic progress in the direction of compulsory education can be made was greatly assisted by the facilities which were provided in Iraq. Immediately on my arrival the Minister of Education stated that every assistance would be afforded by himself and his colleagues at the Ministry, that free access would be given to relevant reports and records, and that he had made arrangements for the Provincial Governors and Provincial Directors of Education to provide unrestricted means of visiting schools and seeing the conditions of the country. 122

With such generous facilities it proved possible to visit some 150 primary schools and a number of secondary schools and training institutions, in nine out of the fourteen provinces of Iraq. Visits were also paid to towns, villages, private homes, teachers' clubs, farms, irrigation projects, land settlement schemes and industrial and commercial concerns. A significant feature of these visits, and of the many discussions with teachers, Government officials, sheikhs, farmers, agricultural workers and others was the great courtesy, frankness and generous hospitality that was shown. Thanks to the assistance of so many friendly people it was possible to venture as far north as the provinces of Mosul, Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk, to see much of the educational and social arrangements in Baghdad, and to travel through the southern provinces of Kut, Hilla, Amara and Basra. To see schools and meet people of all ranks in the mountains of Kurdistan, the northern desert and uplands, the great southern plain and the marshes of Amara was in itself an education, and provided realistic evidence

122 both of educational progress already made and the great obstacles which still have to be overcome.

121 While these visits were being made, a decision had to be taken as to the best means of using the limited time available. It seemed that the report on the study should take one of two forms. It could be a strictly limited account of the administrative action which would need to be taken to apply some measure of compulsory education in the fairly immediate future, together with detailed statistical data concerning towns and villages in each province in which the completion of primary school provision would enable compulsory education to be declared. This form of report was not, however, considered desirable for two reasons. First, it would have meant that, instead of visiting schools, seeing the general conditions of the country and meeting people representative of the different aspects of Iraqi life, most of the time would have had to be spent sitting at a desk in the provincial education offices and at the Ministry of Education itself. This is not the best means of attempting to feel the educational pulse of a country. Secondly, such a report was made a few years ago by the 'Ten-Year Plan Committee' referred to in the following pages. But little achievement in the direction of compulsory education arose from that most valuable report, mainly because certain major administrative reforms essential to its application were never carried out.

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After many such visits up and down the country, during which impressions both of a general and particular nature were accumulated, it became clear that the report on the investigation could conveniently follow the sequence of a brief survey of the conditions of the country, an analysis of the educational needs of Iraq, an impression of the extent to which these needs are being met in the existing system, and an appreciation of the economic, political and social factors assisting or impeding educational advance. It soon became evident, however, that although there are many serious obstacles to the development of compulsory education, the study would be incomplete without reference to the significant

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The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry 124
of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the

124 compilation of a map indicating the existing distribution of various categories of land in the liwa, (ii) for the preparation of numerical returns relating to population, to the various categories of land, etc., and (iii) a hundred important questions covering the main field of the investigation.

114 Thirdly, I studied at Headquarters the working of the Central Government services primarily concerned, as thoroughly as my immediate purpose required and the time at my disposal permitted.

124 114 Fourthly, I visited each of the fourteen liwas in turn and (i) discussed the main problems thoroughly with the Governor (Mutasarrif), (ii) was taken to typical or specially instructive places, and (iii) met and questioned a number of other provincial officers, local notables, land holders and peasants. Owing to the previous circulation of the questionnaire, all provincial officers were well prepared for these discussions, while I also received very full written replies in all but every case.

124 Fifthly, I had the honour to be accorded several audiences by H.M. King Feisal as well as numerous interviews with Ministers, Deputies and others. And I also interviewed in Baghdad a number of experienced persons both European and 'Iraqi, with special knowledge and experience of land questions. Unfortunately owing to prolonged bad weather, which interfered with my touring programme and severely curtailed the time available for supplementing my information after its initial collection, it was not found possible to arrange meetings with some of those whom I was particularly anxious to see. I regret this very much, but greatly as they would have assisted me, I venture to believe that nothing they might have said would have seriously modified the main conclusions drawn from the mass of evidence collected.

000 5. Owing to the wideness of the field to be covered the five months that I spent in el 'Iraq were entirely occupied in collecting material which could not be digested until I got back to England. The records of the investigations fill more than forty dossiers. Naturally many gaps and uncertainties were discovered during the examination of this large body of material. This necessitated correspondence with Baghdad extending almost continuously over another six months. The attempt to obtain intelligible and consistent statistics was particularly troublesome.

It must not be thought that even this considerable volume of data covers the field wholly or unimpeachably, or that I can have escaped misinterpretations and errors. No such improvised body of information can be a satisfactory substitute for systematic public records and the accumulated experience of a competent and well organised public service able to concentrate on land problems. But the information and opinions collected, read in the light of experience elsewhere, do none the less enable the main evils to be diagnosed with confidence and the essential elements of constructive reform to be trustworthily indicated.

121 I have thought it advisable to explain the widening of the scope of my investigation and to outline the procedure adopted, so that the character and origin of my information is on record. But I have not attempted to reproduce the mass of conclusions which the material collected has yielded. This would fill volumes. And I have expressly excluded from consideration in this report many questions of the highest importance, which I have had to inquire about owing to their reaction on land tenure (e.g. methods of cultivation, of remuneration of labour, etc.), but which did not themselves directly constitute the subject of the inquiry. Again although it was necessary to study the special problems of each province (liwa) as far as time permitted, so as to get a

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HENRY FIELD

PART II.—EXISTING CONDITIONS. THE LAND AND THE LAND SURVEY

423 1. The conditions of land tenure throughout el 'Iraq may be described generally as in various stages of divorce from innumerable primitive practices, but still rarely wedded to law. These conditions vary so much not only from province to province, but from locality to locality and from community to community, that no picture of them can be presented which combines fidelity of detail with a comprehensive view. Those who are familiar with the variations, even within one province, will appreciate the extreme difficulty of focussing the whole kaleidoscopic panorama into one generally intelligible picture. And yet it is impossible to plan or proceed with any sober and reasoned national attack on the unhealthy situation prevailing, without some dependable general diagnosis of that situation.

Neither effort nor time has been spared to secure this indispensable foundation for land reform and it is believed that the general analysis of existing conditions is fundamentally reliable; but it must always be remembered that no generalised statement can faithfully reflect the multitudinous local variations which exist everywhere. This does not matter provided the broad outlines of the analysis are sound, its limitations are understood and the need for some latitude in the application of reform later is recognised.

2. Area and Distribution of Cultivated Land

● 128 2. The data needed to compile a general map of the country showing the distribution of the land by its physical situation and agricultural potentialities not being available in the Headquarter Offices of Government, an attempt was made to remedy this deficiency. In response to a request already mentioned the Provincial authorities compiled a diagrammatic map on a scale of 1:250,000 showing the distribution of the land in each Province (Liwa) in certain broad classes. The Irrigation Department gave invaluable assistance in collecting the information on which the classification was based in the southern liwas, and the Survey Department in the preparation of the maps and the extraction of areas. The Land Registry (*Dairet el Tapu*) spared no effort to contribute, so far as their records allowed, the location of registered holdings. The original map sheets were left for consultation in Baghdad. The broad results are illustrated in Plates I and II, so far as the smaller scale used therein permits. The areas of the different varieties of land shown are given in Table I.

The compilation was a much more difficult and laborious task than the final simplified results suggest. The greatest trouble was taken by all those who collaborated to ensure that the maps represented the facts as faithfully as the conditions permitted. But it will be appreciated that the details given must not be regarded as reliable. This is due to the impossibility of analysing and classifying the land surface of the whole country with any approach to accuracy either in the time, or on the basis of the unavoidably defective general map series, which was alone available for the purpose. But poor as the component detail must be expected to be, the broad conclusions represented on the maps and in the table should constitute a sufficiently reliable analysis of the character of the land surface of the country as a whole, for immediate purposes.

The Mission's[1] report consists of two parts. The first part contains the major findings and recommendations of the Mission to which are attached appendices: one, listing the Mission's recommendations, one, sumarizing the Mission's suggestions for technical assistance; and a third on statistical organization. The second part consists of a series of monographs dealing with particular subjects. The first monograph is concerned with the basic factors and conditions in the economy of Iraq which the Mission has considered in framing its recommendations. The others set forth in greater detail the Mission's views on flood control, irrigation and drainage; agriculture and animal husbandry; industry; transport and communications; public health; education; and community planning and housing.

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[1] - [International Bank Mission to Iraq, 1951-- Analyst]

USEFUL PLANTS AND DRUGS OF IRAN AND IRAQ

DAVID HOOPER

INTRODUCTION

I-I
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The material embodied in the present catalogue is the result of three collections made in Iran and Iraq during the past eight years. The first was made by Henry Field, leader of the Field Museum Anthropological Expedition to the Near East, 1934. These specimens were obtained mostly from the bazaars of Tehran, Isfahan, and Baghdad, while some were gathered in fields and gardens where medicinal plants were cultivated. Lists accompanied these plants, stating their vernacular names and local properties and uses. The second collection was made in 1933 by Captain P. Johnston-Saint, of the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum in London; this consisted of 200 vegetable, animal, and mineral medicines from the markets of Putrus and Tehran.

The third collection was made by Dr. J. M. Cowan and Dr. C. D. Darlington in the spring of 1929 (*Kew Bulletin*, 1930, pp. 49–68). The drugs were all of vegetable origin and were found in the bazaars of Tehran, Hamadan, and Kermanshah.

The specimens of the first-named collection are specified in the catalogue under the name of "Field" followed by the number of the drug in the list. The numbers in the Field collection not followed by place names are from Tehran. Those followed by the letter A were obtained in Baghdad, Iraq. The specimens in the second collection are marked by "W.H.M.M." (Wellcome Historical Medical Museum) followed by the registered number. Those collected by Cowan and Darlington are distinguished by the letters "K.B." followed by a number referring to the page in the *Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information*, No. 6, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 1931, pp. 299–344, where the drug is described.

An opportunity is thus given of studying crude drugs and comparing them with the names of those found in the ancient literature of Iran where materia medica has long been a special science. One of the first and most important of the Persian works on pharmacology is the "Kitabulabnyat an haqa 'iq-uladviyat," or "Book of the Foundations of the True Properties of the Remedies," written about A.D. 970 by the physician Abu Mansur, who during one of his journeys 114

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

I

THE 'IRAQ OF 1900

I. THE THREE WILAYAS

'To the lover, Baghdad is not far off', 'A (false) account will come back even from Baghdad'; by these and suchlike proverbs the Turk of Istanbul, half a century ago, confessed the remoteness of the sunbaked lands of Tigris and Euphrates. The three wilayas (vilayets) one day to become the 'Iraq Kingdom lay indeed upon the very borderland of Turkish possessions. At no time inhabited by Turks, they belonged rather to the northern extension of the Arabian peninsula, and formed the eastern half of its Fertile Crescent. The country had in older days formed the 'Abbasid province of 'Iraq 'Arabi and part of Jazira. In the first three centuries of Turkish rule it had been united as the single eyalet of Baghdad, one of the great provinces of the Empire ruled by a three-tailed Pasha. Thanks to its ancient fame, its strategic position and present scale, Baghdad had always held easy primacy over the two other renowned cities of 'Iraq, Mosul and Baṣra; and even in 1900, after Mosul had emerged finally as a wilaya in 1879 and Baṣra in 1884, the Wali of Baghdad was by every standard the senior of the three governors. 175*

The tripartite territory was bounded on the north, amid wild mountains, by the Ḥakkari sanjaq of Van wilaya: on the north-west, by a short face of the Jazira-ibn-'Umar qadhā of Diyarbakr wilaya: on the west, by the newly created 'independent' sanjaq of Dayr el-Zur. Farther south the boundary lay at the mid-desert frontier of the wilaya of Damascus and, south again, crossed the deserts of north Arabia, beyond which lay the Arab oasis principalities. To the south also lay the waters of the Persian Gulf and, along its western shores, a stretch of maritime Arabia which was claimed as Turkish and grouped officially under the Baṣra wilaya. To the east, bordering all three provinces, lay Persia.

These boundaries were those of modern 'Iraq save in three particulars. The Persian frontier was still undemarcated; the line observed or flouted in 1900 was in places to be amended by the Commission of 1914. The boundary with the Turkish provinces of Van and Diyarbakr was to be fixed in 1926, that with later Syria in 1920 and 1933, that with the Arabian rulers in 1922. The territories of al-Aḥsā, Qaṭar, and Kuwayt ceased to be Turkish before or during the First World War, and do not concern the historian of 'Iraq. 131

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education
is not possible without some reference to the history and present 126
circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization
flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country
remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the
sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the
port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the
people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an
uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932
as an independent nation with membership of the League of
Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an
administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Ad- 185
ministrative reforms and some social advance were attempted 735
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became
an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority
of the population. Attempts have been made by successive
Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain
directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But
economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain,
all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 612
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible 212
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent
years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective
participation in the government of the country must inevitably
be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to 361
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and
Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of
Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

notables went there on pilgrimage. Later, at a tribal gathering 175
at Shumali, the leading shaikhs between Shināfīya and Hilla 186
unanimously determined to follow the lead of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī and Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. As a result of incitement from Baghdad, the Holy Cities and Syria, the tribes and towns became increasingly restless. A train was derailed above Baghdad in late May, and others below Hilla in early June. Petty crimes increased at an alarming rate. Arabs in government service began to resign. The collection of revenue on winter crops became more and more difficult. In Shatra, in the Muntafiq, it had already been intimated to Captain Mead, the Assistant Political Officer, on May 17th, that should he persist in carrying out chain or rope measurement of crops, he would be forcibly resisted.[1] The arrest of six agitators at Hilla[2] relaxed the tension there, but the arrest and deportation to Henjam[3] of Mirza Muhammad Ridhā and nine others at Karbalā on June 22nd added to the perilousness of the situation on the middle Euphrates. The arrest of Hajjī Muklūf, the principal agitator in Dīwānīya, did nothing to check the rising there. Signs of incipient unrest were manifest everywhere and a lapse into former lawlessness and anarchy seemed imminent. It was clear that only a spark would be needed to send off the train of insurrection.

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[1] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 2-3. This method of crop assessment, 651
introduced by the Turks, is described in detail in *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18. As late as 1929, rope measurement was employed in the Muntafiq and elsewhere in 'Iraq as a normal method of crop assessment: *Report of Revenue Department*, 1928-1929, pp. 11-13; also App. O. But cf. Wilson, op. cit., p. 282.

[2] Telegram No. 7289, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to P.O. Hilla, June 16th, 1920.

[3] According to the official *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf*, p. 629 ff., Henjam 131
is a small, rocky and dismal island in the Persian Gulf not far from the Clarence Straits. Its climate in summer is 'barely tolerable', the heat being terrific and aggravated by moisture, sandflies and other insects.

I. Introduction

311 161 131 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development. With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements, [135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap source of power and raw materials essential to the development of industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part 433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low 311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is [464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of [731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas; and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water, but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated [241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient 433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX A

BASIC FACTORS AND CONDITIONS

I. The Regions

131 Iraq, a country with a population of approximately 5,000,000 and an area of 168,040 square miles, forms roughly a triangular area with the base running southwest to northeast and the apex
133 terminating at the Persian Gulf. It is dominated by two great river systems—the Tigris and the Euphrates. The Euphrates rises in the mountains of Turkey, flows across the Northern Syrian plateau and then meanders through Iraq, receiving little additional water from tributaries. The Tigris also rises in Turkey, but further to the east and north. It enters Iraq in Mosul province and receives important accessions from the Greater and Lesser Zab Rivers which are fed from the snows and the rains of the mountains along the Turkish and Iranian borders and, to a lesser degree, from the Diyala River. Downstream from Ramadi on the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris the two rivers form a single low-lying alluvial valley built up as a delta into the Persian Gulf. As they flow south, the rivers are virtually lost in the marshes and lakes of southern Iraq, their remaining waters uniting at Qurna to flow as the Shatt al Arab into the Persian Gulf.

311 Only a relatively narrow belt, lying north-northeast of a line roughly running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin near the Iranian border, has sufficient rainfall to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation. In the rest of the country, agriculture depends upon the water of the two rivers for irrigation, whether by pump, by flow or by natural inundation. With the exception of the large and remote southern and northern deserts and the greater part of the rolling uplands between the Tigris and the Euphrates known as the northern Jezireh, most of this region can be cultivated once water is made available. With storage and regulation of the river waters, a great extension of the area under cultivation is possible. Without regulation, on the other hand, the

2: United Nations U-4 (no date) 1950 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

000 This study is concerned with the condition of transport and communications and is part of a series of studies undertaken in this special field. It deals with a group of countries in the Middle East, namely, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. These countries possess many and varied resources which, in many cases, have not been adequately utilized or even prospected.

I. IRAQ

A. *General description of the country*

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Iraq is situated in the western part of the group of countries which form the Middle Eastern group. The country lies between 29° 9′ and 37° 24′ latitude north and 38° and 48° 22′ longitude east. It is bounded on the west, along a diagonal line running north-east to south-west, by Syria; on the south-west by the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan; on the south by Saudi Arabia and by a small, lozenge-shaped territory, of which two sides border on Saudi Arabia and the eastern apex borders upon Kuwait, thus constituting a neutral zone, a kind of no-man's land; on the south-east, Iraq is bounded by Kuwait; its short coastline on the Persian Gulf is 50 kilometres long; the frontier with Iran, its eastern neighbour, runs south-east—north-west; Turkey is its northern neighbour.

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1950

●/31 /61 The territory of Iraq, which is shaped like an irregular triangle (see Map No. 1), covers an area of 435,223 square kilometres. At the time of the 1947 census, its population was 4,800,000 inhabitants, or 11 inhabitants per square kilometre.

/62 Over 75 per cent of the population of Iraq are Arabs. They live mainly in the centre and south of the country. The next most numerous inhabitants are the Kurds (over 15 per cent of the population), who live mainly in the north and especially in the region of Mosul. There are also some Persians, Armenians, Turks, Jews and others.

/33 The country, which is mountainous in the north and north-east, spreads out into the vast Mesopotamian plateau, which inclines gradually as it nears the Persian Gulf. This plateau, which was famous in ancient times for its network of irrigation channels, is now merely an arid steppe, and in some places even a desert.

Iraq is watered by the historic twin rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, which are the country's vital arteries. The Euphrates (Shatt el-Furat in Arabic) is approximately 3,000 kilometres long; its basin covers 673,000 square kilometres. The Tigris (Shatt el-Dijla), which is approximately 2,150 kilometres long, is joined by several tributaries, including the Shatt el-Gharraf, the Diyala, the Great Zab and the Little Zab. Its basin covers an area of 375,000 square kilometres. The Tigris and the Eu-

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

Chapter Five

IRAQ

THE LAND

131 THE area of Iraq within its present frontiers is approximately 175,000 square miles. It is most conveniently divided into three distinct geographical sections: the Mesopotamian plain, the Uplands, and the Folded Mountain Belt. The first of these is historically the most important for it was the plain which nursed the great civilizations of the past, and its two great rivers which nourished them.

133 *The Plain.* To the north-east the southern alluvial plain follows the foothills of the Persian mountains up from the sea, turns south-east across the old river estuaries at Samarra and Hit, and returns parallel to and west of the Euphrates. Within these limits the soil is stoneless alluvium. The two rivers flow in channels somewhat above the rest of the plain, which is consequently liable to be flooded during the high-water period in the spring when the snows melt in Kurdistan; local rain has comparatively little effect on the rivers. The Tigris rises in late March or early April, the rise at Baghdad being sometimes as much as 23 feet; the Euphrates rises two or three weeks later than the Tigris, a maximum of about 14 feet (at Faluja); both rivers are at their lowest in September–October. At no point is the plain higher than 150 feet above sea-level.

132 The annual rainfall in the plain averages about 6 inches only; this rain occurs usually between mid-November and mid-March, the wettest month being February; but it is impossible to generalize, as a complete season's rainfall may occur in a [241] space of three weeks, the remainder of the winter being dry. Cultivation in the plain depends almost entirely on irrigation, the rainfall often being insufficient to mature a winter crop.

133 The rivers, which have frequently changed their courses throughout history, unite about sixty miles above the city of Basra in a single great channel, the Shatt al-Arab. Also above Basra is the marshland of the Muntafiq and Amara *liwas*, where a distinctive group of Arabs—the 'marsh Arabs'—live on fish and the produce of their mud-banks and swampy islands, or tend their buffaloes from shallow-draft canoes.

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

The Uplands. This region, which approximately corresponds 133 to ancient Assyria, is undulating gravel steppe and rich ploughland, with some stone. Here, in an average year, the rainfall of 13 inches is sufficient to yield a winter crop without irrigation. In the districts of Kirkuk and Irbil, however, the rainfall is supplemented by the *kahriz* (underground water channels) system of water production, which is practised even more widely in Persia. Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk are respectively 703, 1,250, and 1,087 feet above sea-level.

Between the two rivers in this area and the south of lat. 36° N. is a wedge of uncultivable gypsum desert called al-Jezira (the Island).

The Mountain Belt. The crescent of mountain country included in the north-east frontier comprises the basins of the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, Greater Zab, and Khabur. It is peopled by Kurds, a hardy mountain race, living an entirely different life from the Arabs of the plain and uplands. Villages are stone-built and shelved into the sides of the hills, with tall silver poplars and terraced cultivation, including vineyards and tobacco. Large areas of mountainside are covered with scrub oak; the summits provide summer pastures.

Between the Euphrates valley and the western frontiers is a large section of al-Badia, the Syrian Desert, populated only by nomad tribes of bedouin with their flocks and camels.

Climate. The climate of Iraq is extreme. In the plains the 132 January mean temperature is 44–52°F.; in July, 86–96°F. In the mountains altitude decreases temperature in both seasons and increases the rainfall to as much as 40 inches.

The importance of Iraq's geographical situation has been 131 obvious since Alexander's armies linked Europe with India twenty-two centuries ago. Through it ran not only the shortest but the easiest routes from southern Europe to the Persian Gulf and to India until the discovery of the Cape route. From the time of the Babylonian empire the trade of the Far East tended to pass through Iraq to the Levant ports on the Mediterranean. In the nineteenth century the desire to control or to prevent others controlling this route involved Great Britain, Russia, and Germany in attempts to dominate Iraq. The discovery of oil and the growth of air communications in the twentieth century have given the country a positive place in the political framework of the world and the former has provided the resources to transform it into a progressive modern nation.

The People

Population Statistics. The single official census that has been 161

CHAPTER VI

THE ARABS OF MESOPOTAMIA

131 MESOPOTAMIA does not belong to Arabia
101 geographically. It lies to the north of the
peninsula and includes the territory between
the mountains of Asia Minor on the north, the mountains
of Persia on the east, the Syrian desert on the west and
the Persian Gulf on the south. The area enclosed between
these limits is enormous. These are its natural
boundaries, but politically the territory included takes
in certain districts that belong to Persia and Turkey as
144 well as the kingdom of Mesopotamia. It is of interest
101 to include Mesopotamia in any discussion of Arab life,
for although the Mesopotamians are not in Arabia geographically,
nor even politically, racially they are Arabs
as truly as the inhabitants of Nejd or the dwellers in the
197 valleys of Oman. Practically all of the inhabitants of
162 Mesopotamia are Arabic speaking and Arabic in origin,
101 the chief exceptions being the numerous Jews who have
come into the country from the north and the small community
of Sabaeans, or fire-worshippers, who are a remnant
of the people that the Arabs found inhabiting the
country. The Arab is the dominant element, and the
others together would probably not amount to five per
cent of the whole.

133 The character of the country is most easily understood
if we start by saying that Mesopotamia is the enormous

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185 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the direct beneficiaries It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenues resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

000 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the clos of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of th departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralized and made available more directl and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

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423 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income per capita does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate th distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary o tribal chiefs.

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185 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

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185 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing th standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East

IRAQ MH1

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Iraq

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Iraq is a constitutional monarchy which 642
has been an independent sovereign state 648
since the termination, in 1932, of the mandate awarded Great Britain by the League
of Nations. Historically, it is identified 131
with Mesopotamia, the "land between the rivers" and the home of one of the oldest
civilizations known to man. Modern Iraq 131
has an area of about 170,000 square miles, 133
encompassing the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, a fringe of highlands in the north and an expanse of desert in the southwest. It extends from the Persian Gulf and Arabia in the south to Turkey in the north, and from Iran in the east to Syria and Jordan in the west. The country is conveniently divided into four geographic regions—the alluvial plains of the rivers, the mountain ranges backing the northern and the northeastern frontiers, the intervening uplands and the desert.

Rising in the mountains of eastern Ana- 133
tolia, the Tigris River flows for 770 miles through Iraq, and in its northern course receives several tributaries, the most important in Iraqi territory being the Great Zab, the Little Zab and the Diyala. The Euphrates River also takes its source in Anatolia but meanders across central Syria and, subsequently, for 750 miles in Iraq before converging with the Tigris at Al Qurnah. The Shatt al Arab, formed by the union of the two rivers, flows for about 100 miles to the Persian Gulf, and for part of its length marks the boundary with Iran. The lower Euphrates and Tigris valleys form a great deltaic plain which reaches back from the Gulf to a zone north of Baghdad. It is

p. 21(A)

132 year in the plains of the delta region and 12 to 16 inches in the upland districts, while in some sections of the mountains it increases to around 50 inches. The summer temperatures are uniformly high and may reach 110° to 125° F. in the central and the southern provinces. The daily fluctuations are slight in the Gulf region, but they become more pronounced toward the interior. During the winter months snows are rare outside the highland districts, but frosts are occasionally encountered as far south as Basra. In January, the coldest month, the mean maximum temperature averages 60° to 65° F. at Basra, 58° to 61° F. at Baghdad and 50° to 55° F. at Mosul; the mean minimum temperature, 38° to 42° F., 44° to 47° F. and 34° to 36° F., respectively. The mean maximum temperatures approximate 104° to 110° F. in all 3 localities in July, while the mean minimum temperatures range from 76° to 82° F. in Basra to 72° to 75° F. in Mosul. In midsummer the mean daily relative humidity rarely rises above 25 to 35 per cent on the plains, although it is often excessive in the Gulf area. Northwest winds, known locally as the *shamal*, blow irregularly throughout the year. They are especially strong and desiccating during the summer months, and, in the south, are usually laden with dust and sand.

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

161 The population, according to the official census for 1947, was estimated at 4,799,500, including an unknown number of Bedouin, roughly calculated at about 250,000. The majority of the inhabitants are of mixed Arabic stock, representing a relatively homogeneous blend of ancient Semitic and Indo-European strains which has evolved over
162 centuries of successive conquests. About 95
795 per cent of the people are Moslems; slightly over one half are Shiites; and most of the
[131] remainder are Sunnites. The Kurds, who

p. 22(A)

[181] inhabit the mountainous districts near the
162 northeastern frontiers, constitute the largest
795 Moslem minority group. Racially and lin-
guistically distinct, they make up about 15
to 20 per cent of the population. Other non-
Arabic Moslem communities include about
50,000 each of Turkomans and Iranians,
the majority of whom are also found in the
northern provinces. Most of the Kurds and
the Turkomans are Sunnites, but some ad-
here to minor heterodox sects; the Iranians
are Shiites.

From 150,000 to 200,000 native Christians
reside in Iraq. The Chaldeans, a sect which
observes early Nestorian rites but owes al-
legiance to the Vatican, comprise the most
numerous group. Other communities in-
clude some 30,000 Assyrians (Nestorians),
refugees from Asia Minor in 1918, and
smaller contingents belonging to the Ar-
menian Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox, the
Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) and the Syrian
563 Catholic churches. Most of the Christian
peoples live together in more or less sepa-
rate ethnic and religious groups: about 70
per cent are settled in the northern prov-
inces of Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil, and a
large proportion of the remainder in the
cities of Baghdad and Basra. Prominent
among other indigenous sects are the Ye-
zidis, or so-called "devil-worshipers," about
30,000 of whom dwell in the districts near
the Syrian border. A few thousand Sabians,
famous as silver craftsmen, also live in
Baghdad, Amarah and Basra.

191 Arabic is spoken by over three quarters
of the population. Kurdish, Syriac and
Turki, however, are recognized as official
languages in limited areas in the north,
while English is extensively used in the
593 larger cities. Although the Iraqi are pre-
162 dominantly Arabs, marked gradations in
social structure are represented by the
nomadic Bedouin tribes of the deserts, the
"marsh Arabs" or primitive tribesmen of
the Amarah and Hammar lakes region of the
southern delta, the rural peasants and the
townspeople. Up to 1950, the population
included about 200,000 Jews, primarily of

p. 22(B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

SUMMARY

Iraq encompasses the valleys of the 131
Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and is as- 161
sociated historically with Mesopotamia, the 433
home of one of the oldest civilizations on
record. It has been an independent sover-
eign state since 1932. The population, which
was estimated at 4,799,500 in 1947, is 95
per cent Moslem and predominantly Arab.
Extensive petroleum resources and date cul-
tivation contribute to the wealth of the
country, which is still relatively underde-
veloped in other respects. The public health 744
activities of the Iraqi government are cen-
tralized in the Ministry of Health, with
headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry is
responsible for the maintenance of preven-
tive and curative services, which are carried
out in the provinces through subordinate
provincial organizations. Municipal depart-
ments exist in Baghdad and the principal
cities, but in other areas the enforcement
of sanitary regulations devolves upon the
government officers. In 1950, there were 82 743
civilian hospitals in the country, with an
aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly
more than 1 bed per 1,000 population.
Almost one half of the total beds were lo-
cated in the Baghdad area. Approximately
82 per cent of the hospitals are supported
by the government. Also in 1950, 433 dis-
pensaries were functioning in various parts
of the provinces, 403 under the jurisdiction
of the government health authorities.

The water supplies in the towns and the 312
villages of the alluvial plain are derived
from rivers, canals, lakes and wells; in the
northern highlands, from streams, springs
and wells. All the urban supplies are ob-
tained from rivers, except in Erbil and
Sulaimaniya, where spring sources are util-
ized. The water supplies of the larger cities
are treated, but those in the rural areas are
unprotected and often polluted. There are 314
no sewerage systems. In the cities, cesspits
and septic tanks are employed for the dis-
posal of sewage; in the rural villages, the
means are more primitive. The dietary 880

p. 47(B)

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

Chapter X

OIL AND DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ

IRAQ MAY SERVE as an excellent study of the relation 000 between oil production and the social and economic patterns of an underdeveloped country. Production of oil began almost simultaneously with the emergence of the independent state. Though Iraq's social and economic traditions were set when it was part of the Ottoman Empire and seriously bedeviled the growth and development of the new kingdom, the special Iraqi national patterns were being molded during the very period the oil was flowing in ever increasing quantity through pipelines hundreds of miles long to world markets. Moreover, Iraq had the benefit of Western guidance, the British administration, at first, and advice afterwards; yet during the first twenty-five years of oil production it would seem that the country did not progress as spectacularly as the oil figures (from 45,000 tons in 1927, to some 28,000,000 tons in 1953). The basic obstacles to the rapid social and economic development of the people and the transformation of the country could apparently not be overcome by the mere availability of oil, some technical knowledge, and royalties from the oil industry.

Before drawing any conclusions, we should examine some fundamental facts about the country, the people, and the factors which operated in Iraq to create the conditions prevailing there.

Land and People

The area of Iraq is about 175,000 square miles, and it has [13] [16] a population of approximately 5,000,000 people.[1] Because of the lack of sufficiently reliable data, as well as the cultivation 311

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[1] Tabulations of the returns of the first census, taken on Oct. 19, 1947, showed a population of 4,799,500. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, *International Reference Service*, Dec. 1948, 2.

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see M1 Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

About four-fifths of the country consists of unproductive or slightly productive desert, steppe, marsh and hill masses. The productive core is divided broadly into two regions within which cultivation is practised regularly. The northern region is fed by rainfall supplemented by perennial streams rising in the mountains and, to a limited extent, by lift from the rivers. The southern region largely depends upon irrigation, supplied by canals drawn from the river system, following winter rainfall. The former may be appropriately called the Rainfall Zone, and the latter the Irrigation Zone. Actually the southward extension of the northern rainfall varies annually, while the date gardens of the Basra Liwa constitute a distinct (and of course economically a very important) study. But this does not affect the correctness of the broad picture presented. 311 132 312

Reference to Table I will show that the region of cultivated and cultivable land within the Rainfall Zone covers about 41,000 square kilometres, and that within the Irrigation Zone about 51,000 square kilometres. These figures represent 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total land surface of the country respectively. The cultivation is preponderantly of an extensive character. Only a fraction of these zones, possibly from a fifth to a tenth, appears to be actually cultivated in any given year. So that land is available for a very great development of agriculture, when other factors are favourable.

TABLE I. APPROXIMATE CLASSIFICATION OF LAND SURFACE, 1930

Expressed in square kilometres

[423]

Liwa	Total area all land	Hill mass	Cultivated Region				Additional potentially cultivable territory	Total cultivated and cultivable region	Territory containing tapu holdings	Size of holdings in misharas*			
			Rainfall Zone		Irrigation Zone								
			? 3% hill mass	Plains	Canal fed territory†	Machine fed territory†				1-100	101 to 500	501 to 1,000	Over 1,000
Mosul	45,800	9,340	190	14,580	—	—	270	15,040	7,870	—	—	—	—
Arbil	16,600	7,630	150	7,010	—	—	—	7,160	2,420	7,418	728	500	—
Sulimani	9,500	6,400	130	2,420	—	—	—	2,550	2,280	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	20,800	—	—	12,020	—	—	3,240	15,260	6,280	—	—	—	—
Diyala	16,200	—	—	710	2,760	90	260	3,820	3,410	4,092	—	546	—
Baghdad	22,100	—	—	—	1,710	2,270	890	4,870	1,500	162	220	120	360
Dulaim	124,500	—	—	—	920	630	20	1,570	920	2,344	109	121	3
Karbala	21,200	—	—	—	660	—	20	680	620	—	—	—	—
Hilla	8,100	—	—	—	4,570	330	1,630	6,530	2,380	452	304	96	82
Kut	16,400	—	—	—	4,680	3,860	2,170	10,710	2,580	—	—	—	—
Diwaniya	83,000	—	—	—	3,770	2,180	5,520	11,470	2,270	8,378	—	155	69
Muntafiq	38,700	—	—	—	4,440	270	370	5,080	6,280	—	—	—	—
Amara	19,700	—	—	—	5,670	1,010	—	6,680	110	—	10	5	30
Basra	10,900	—	—	—	610‡	60	110	780	1,190	—	—	—	—
Totals	453,500	23,370	470	36,740	29,790	10,700	14,500	92,200	40,090	—	—	—	—

*Where information was available. Such information must not be presumed to be exhaustive. A mishara = 2,300 sq. metres or thereabouts.

†Territories so classified are at present very incompletely irrigated.

‡Tidally watered date gardens.

The information given in the table regarding the size of holdings is derived from fiscal returns. Although the classification of these holdings by area cannot be expected to be accurate, the figures possibly give some indication of the frequency of larger and smaller holdings in the districts actually concerned. The latter must not be taken to coincide with the cultivated areas of the liwas themselves.

3. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION

8. In any general study of the land tenure of a country it is desirable to know the numbers and distribution of the agricultural population. Thus it would greatly assist in planning development in el 'Iraq if trust- 161 162

2: United Nations U-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

133 phrates join together in their lower courses to form the Shatt al-Arab, which is 185 kilometres long, navigable throughout its length, passes by the port of Basra, and flows into the Persian Gulf. In some places, this river is one kilometre wide. Baghdad is on the Tigris.

There are also several lakes in Iraq; the largest is Al-Hammar, with an area of 5,200 square kilometres.

● 132 The climate in the west of the country is Mediterranean and sub-tropical, with a long dry summer (lasting over seven months), frequent changes of temperature, with an average of 33.8° C.; in winter the average temperature is 9° to 10° C. In the east of the country, the average is the same in the summer, but the winter in the north-east is colder, with an average of 7° to 7.7° C. The rainfall varies from a yearly average of 38 to 40 centimetres in the highlands (probably twice as much in the mountains) to a maximum annual precipitation of 10 centimetres in the south-western desert region.

631 The country is divided administratively into the following fourteen provinces or "liwas": Baghdad, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, Karbala, Hilla, Diwaniya, Kut, Amara, Basra, Diyala (chief town: Baquba), Dulaim (chief town: Ramadi), Muntafiq (chief town: Nasi-
RIYA), AND SULAIMANIYA.

2:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
IRAQ MHI

Chapter Five

IRAQ

THE LAND

131 THE area of Iraq within its present frontiers is approximately 175,000 square miles. It is most conveniently divided into three distinct geographical sections: the Mesopotamian plain, the Uplands, and the Folded Mountain Belt. The first of these is historically the most important for it was the plain which nursed the great civilizations of the past, and its two great rivers which nourished them.

133 *The Plain*. To the north-east the southern alluvial plain follows the foothills of the Persian mountains up from the sea, turns south-east across the old river estuaries at Samarra and Hit, and returns parallel to and west of the Euphrates. Within these limits the soil is stoneless alluvium. The two rivers flow in channels somewhat above the rest of the plain, which is consequently liable to be flooded during the high-water period in the spring when the snows melt in Kurdistan; local rain has comparatively little effect on the rivers. The Tigris rises in late March or early April, the rise at Baghdad being sometimes as much as 23 feet; the Euphrates rises two or three weeks later than the Tigris, a maximum of about 14 feet (at Faluja); both rivers are at their lowest in September–October. At no point is the plain higher than 150 feet above sea-level.

• 132 The annual rainfall in the plain averages about 6 inches only; this rain occurs usually between mid-November and mid-March, the wettest month being February; but it is impossible to generalize, as a complete season's rainfall may occur in a [241] space of three weeks, the remainder of the winter being dry. Cultivation in the plain depends almost entirely on irrigation, the rainfall often being insufficient to mature a winter crop.

133 The rivers, which have frequently changed their courses throughout history, unite about sixty miles above the city of Basra in a single great channel, the Shatt al-Arab. Also above Basra is the marshland of the Muntafiq and Amara *liwas*, where a distinctive group of Arabs—the 'marsh Arabs'—live on fish and the produce of their mud-banks and swampy islands, or tend their buffaloes from shallow-draft canoes.

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MHI

The Uplands. This region, which approximately corresponds 133 to ancient Assyria, is undulating gravel steppe and rich ploughland, with some stone. Here, in an average year, the rainfall of 13 inches is sufficient to yield a winter crop without irrigation. In the districts of Kirkuk and Irbil, however, the rainfall is supplemented by the *kahriz* (underground water channels) system of water production, which is practised even more widely in Persia. Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk are respectively 703, 1,250, and 1,087 feet above sea-level.

Between the two rivers in this area and the south of lat. 36° N. is a wedge of uncultivable gypsum desert called al-Jezira (the Island).

The Mountain Belt. The crescent of mountain country included in the north-east frontier comprises the basins of the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, Greater Zab, and Khabur. It is peopled by Kurds, a hardy mountain race, living an entirely different life from the Arabs of the plain and uplands. Villages are stone-built and shelved into the sides of the hills, with tall silver poplars and terraced cultivation, including vineyards and tobacco. Large areas of mountainside are covered with scrub oak; the summits provide summer pastures.

Between the Euphrates valley and the western frontiers is a large section of al-Badia, the Syrian Desert, populated only by nomad tribes of bedouin with their flocks and camels.

Climate. The climate of Iraq is extreme. In the plains the 132 January mean temperature is 44–52°F.; in July, 86–96°F. In the mountains altitude decreases temperature in both seasons and increases the rainfall to as much as 40 inches.

The importance of Iraq's geographical situation has been 131 obvious since Alexander's armies linked Europe with India twenty-two centuries ago. Through it ran not only the shortest but the easiest routes from southern Europe to the Persian Gulf and to India until the discovery of the Cape route. From the time of the Babylonian empire the trade of the Far East tended to pass through Iraq to the Levant ports on the Mediterranean. In the nineteenth century the desire to control or to prevent others controlling this route involved Great Britain, Russia, and Germany in attempts to dominate Iraq. The discovery of oil and the growth of air communications in the twentieth century have given the country a positive place in the political framework of the world and the former has provided the resources to transform it into a progressive modern nation.

THE PEOPLE

Population Statistics. The single official census that has been 161

873 usually hold the priority over primary schools. If a good building is vacant
346 it is usually the secondary school that gets the preference. Thus, in all parts of Iraq most intermediate and preparatory schools are housed in comparatively new buildings, with fairly large classrooms (16½ × 23½ feet), and with laboratories of larger size. An intermediate school usually has one common laboratory or science room. The better preparatory schools, such as the Central Preparatory School in Baghdad, have separate laboratories for physics, chemistry, and biology, with storerooms attached and with a machine for producing gas. Secondary schools are also more favored with a larger amount of space for playgrounds than primary schools have.

EQUIPMENT

873 The same is also true with regard to furniture and equipment. There are three types of classroom seats: desks, with seats attached, for one or for two students, and a tablet armchair for a single student much like the ones in American advanced classrooms, though not as good in quality. Blackboards are made of wood and are usually small and inadequate, often definitely bad. However, a new kind of plaster built-in blackboard large enough to fill the entire front wall, and sometimes the side walls too, was first used at the Higher Teachers College, and its use is spreading in the secondary schools. Laboratory equipment is supplied to intermediate schools from the central store of the Ministry of Education according to a standard list drawn up by the Ministry. A much larger collection of laboratory equipment is usually sent to the preparatory schools. The older schools are better equipped than the others, while some of the schools that were started during World War II or shortly before are meagerly supplied. Arabic maps are imported from England or from Egypt. Most of the laboratory equipment was imported from France and England and some from Germany. As there is no central workshop for repairing laboratory equipment and as most teachers have no experience in repair work, laboratory instruments tend to get out of order rather quickly, which results in a great
[132] deal of waste. For this reason and because of the great amount of dust in the Iraqi air, equipment acquires a dilapidated look which requires an extraordinary amount of care on the part of the teacher to avoid. The fact that teachers change frequently is an additional factor in the lack of care that is apparent in laboratory equipment.

TEACHING AND METHOD

x873 Methods of teaching in secondary schools do not differ in their essentials
x876 from those of the primary schools. In the main they are based on the

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East

/IRAQ MH1

Iraq

/33 interspersed by several large lakes and in the south by extensive stretches of marshland. In many areas the plain is lower than the rivers, and the riverain lands are flooded each spring when the waters are swollen by the rains and the melting snows from the mountains. The Tigris normally reaches flood level in March or April; the Euphrates, a few weeks later. Both rivers are [312] tapped by networks of irrigation canals, while dams constructed at Hindiyah on the Euphrates and at Kut on the Tigris serve to divert the rivers into forked channels and increase the area under irrigation.

North of this alluvial plain, the country gives way to undulating uplands with an average elevation of about 1,000 feet. The river valleys are more sharply defined and sometimes confined within narrow gorges. The land between the rivers in this region is mainly steppe or gypsum desert and is known, as in Syria, as the Al Jazira. Toward the north and the northeast, the valleys of the Tigris and its tributaries are encircled by lofty mountain ranges, with peaks rising to from 10,000 to 15,000 feet, which form part of the Kurdish highlands, straddling the boundaries between Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The entire southwestern half of the country, from the Euphrates to the southern and the western frontiers, is gravel or sandy desert, a portion of the Great Syrian Desert.

/32 The climate of Iraq varies with the topography, but in general it is characterized by hot, dry summers and cold, damp winters. Most of the rainfall is concentrated in the months from November to April, with the maximum precipitation during January and February. It averages 4 to 6 inches a

p. 21 (B)

IRAQ MH1

132 year in the plains of the delta region and 12 to 16 inches in the upland districts, while in some sections of the mountains it increases to around 50 inches. The summer temperatures are uniformly high and may reach 110° to 125° F. in the central and the southern provinces. The daily fluctuations are slight in the Gulf region, but they become more pronounced toward the interior. During the winter months snows are rare outside the highland districts, but frosts are occasionally encountered as far south as Basra. In January, the coldest month, the mean maximum temperature averages 60° to 65° F. at Basra, 58° to 61° F. at Baghdad and 50° to 55° F. at Mosul; the mean minimum temperature, 38° to 42° F., 44° to 47° F. and 34° to 36° F., respectively. The mean maximum temperatures approximate 104° to 110° F. in all 3 localities in July, while the mean minimum temperatures range from 76° to 82° F. in Basra to 72° to 75° F. in Mosul. In midsummer the mean daily relative humidity rarely rises above 25 to 35 per cent on the plains, although it is often excessive in the Gulf area. Northwest winds, known locally as the *shamal*, blow irregularly throughout the year. They are especially strong and desiccating during the summer months, and, in the south, are usually laden with dust and sand.

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

161 The population, according to the official census for 1947, was estimated at 4,799,500, including an unknown number of Bedouin, roughly calculated at about 250,000. The majority of the inhabitants are of mixed Arabic stock, representing a relatively homogeneous blend of ancient Semitic and Indo-European strains which has evolved over
162 centuries of successive conquests. About 95
795 per cent of the people are Moslems; slightly over one half are Shiites; and most of the
[131] remainder are Sunnites. The Kurds, who

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see Ml Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see Ml Mi[illegible]e East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

2. COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

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The zones of land surface into which the territory divides itself, though they belong less to history than to geography, may be briefly mentioned since they deeply affect the life of the inhabitants and reflect their ethnology.

First comes the mountain belt in the north and north-east. A part of the main Armenian and Zagros system, it formed in 1900 the sanjaq of Sulaymaniya and a large part of those of Mosul and Shahrizur. This terrain is wholly un-Arabian, the population solidly Kurdish. Its mountains, mainly barren but carrying also areas of forest, are divided by deep valleys sometimes widening into plains. The hardy inhabitants of its hundreds of villages produce crops of grain, rice, vegetables, fruit, and tobacco, grown on the water of springs and rivulets and the relatively abundant rain. The climate is equable in summer, harsh in winter, the landscape commonly of striking beauty.

In the flattish submontane area of Mosul and Shahrizur sanjaqs lie treeless uplands and the lower courses of the Greater and Lesser Zabs. Here, in ancient Assyria, village-dwelling cultivators grow spring grain crops on rain and, in places, by water-lift from the rivers. The country is intermediate in environment and race between the mountain zone and the hot flatlands of central 'Iraq. The latter, the most extensive and most characteristic region of the country, covered the sanjaqs of Baghdad and Karbalā and most of Ḥilla. Everywhere dead flat and stoneless, it is unblessed, save in rare seasons, by rainfall sufficient for crop-growing, and must needs be cultivated by lift or flow from controlled canals or flood-channels. The crops are winter and summer grain and vegetables, locally some rice, and vast gardens of dates. The population, entirely Arab, lives in mud-built villages or in clusters of hair tents or reed huts.

The equally flat silt-country of the lower Tigris–Euphrates delta, astride and below the prehistoric coast-line, covered the southern part of the Ḥilla sanjaq and almost the whole of the three sanjaqs of 'Amara, Muntafiq, and Baṣra. It was characterized by a higher proportion of reed dwellings, fewer mud villages: by lesser crops of wheat and barley, but extensive rice-growing in the flooded areas: by miles of date gardens, and by a special way of life developed by the buffalo breeders, mat weavers, and fishermen in the great marshes.

Ignoring the Arabian dependencies of Baṣra, two other zones remain to be mentioned. One is that of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab in the Baṣra sanjaq, with its miles of ordered date gardens in a lean strip between river and desert: the other is that of the arid steppe

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads; their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-
dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking "Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

NORTHERN 'IRAQ AND ITS PEOPLES

By MAJOR W. C. F. WILSON, O.B.E.

114 A lecture given before the Society on March 10, 1937, Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have much pleasure in introducing Major Wilson, who is going to speak to us on the subject of Northern 'Iraq and its peoples. He first served in 'Iraq under that very great officer, Sir Percy Cox, who recently passed away. Major Wilson rebuilt Kut after our victory over the Turks, and of recent years he has been administrative officer at Mosul; and can give us very up-to-date accounts of the Assyrian problem in Northern 'Iraq, and can also speak from first-hand knowledge of the Kurds and the other minorities of the country.

101 TO many who have never been to 'Iraq, the name, or its old alternative, Mesopotamia, possibly conjures up visions of flat, featureless plains, strips of cultivation along the banks of the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, sandstorms and a torrid climate. Such visions are in a fair measure true of central and southern 'Iraq, but are very far from applying to the two northern provinces of Arbil and Mosul.

Geography

133 From the Lesser Zab river northwards the country is undulating and intersected with watercourses or wādis, which after rain flow down to the Tigris and its half-dozen tributaries. This type of country extends right up to the foothills which fringe the mighty mountain mass of Kurdistan. Over this area, irrigation, except on the rivers for summer crops, is unnecessary, and the rainfall which comes between November and May is in most years sufficient for the cultivation of large crops of wheat and barley. In the spring, grazing for animals is plentiful and a wonderful assortment of wild flowers appear.

In the mountains, during the same period, heavy rain and snow fill the underground sources and provide water for the summer growing of rice, tobacco and other crops, and for good summer grazing for animals. These mountains contain several ranges 6,000 to 8,000 feet high and one peak near the Iranian frontier over 10,000 feet.

Population

144 The inhabitants of the two provinces consist of an extraordinarily heterogeneous collection of creeds and races with all the problems produced by such a collection.

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MAP I


40°
42°
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
PROVINCIAL (LIWA) BOUNDARY
QADHA BOUNDARY
RAILWAYS
RIVERS
PROVINCIAL (LIWA) CENTER
QADHA CENTER
NOTE: THE PROVINCES HAVE THE SAME NAME AS THEIR CENTERS EXCEPT WHERE MARKED
SINJAR
TEL AFAR
MOSUL
SYRIA
DULAIM LIWA
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
NORTHERN DESERT
TRANS JORDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
POLITICAL DIVISIONS
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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
TURKEY
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46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
I R A N
ERBIL
KIRKUK
SULEIMANIYA
HALEBJA
TAUQ
TIGRIS RIVER
BAQUBA
MENDALI
DIYALA LIWA
BAGHDAD
BEDRA
KERBELA
HILLA
KUT
ALI AL GHARBI
DIWANIYA
AFAK
NAJAF
ABU SUKHAIR
AMARA
RIFAI
QALAT SALEH
SHATRA
MUNTAFIQ LIWA
NASIRIYA
HAMMAR LAKE
QURNA
BASRA
SOUTHERN DESERT
K U W A I T
IRANIAN GULF

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
40°
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RAILWAYS
ROADS
METALLED
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WATERWAYS
NAVIGABLE
SEASONAL NAVIGABLE
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OIL PIPELINE
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SINJAR
MOSUL
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K3
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EUPHRATES RIVER
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TRANSPORT SYSTEM
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MAP III


TURKEY
44°
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SALAHUDIN
RAYAT
HAJ OMRAN
ROWANDUZ
SHAQLAWA
RANIA
MIRZA RUSTAM
ERBIL
KOI SANJAK
MAKHMUR
TAQTAQ
SHARGAT
SULEIMANIYA
PENJWIN
KIRKUK
TAL ALI
TUZ
HALEBJA
IRAN
JOULOULA JUNCTION
KHANAQIN
SAMARRA
HIT
EUPHRATES RIVER
TIGRIS RIVER
BAQUBA
MENDALI
RAMADI
FALUJA
BAGHDAD
AZIZIYA
HINDIYA JUNCTION
KERBELA
HILLA
KUT
NAMANIYA
HAI
KUFA
NAJAF
ABU SUKHAIR
DIWANIYA
SHAMIYA
AMARA
QADISIYA
SHATTRA
NASIRIYA
UR JUNCTION
HAMMAR LAKE
SHATT AL ARAB
MAQIL
ABADAN
BASRA
ZUBAIR
FAO
SOUTHERN DESERT
KUWAIT
IRANIAN GULF

FACING P. 44 (B)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX A

BASIC FACTORS AND CONDITIONS

I. The Regions

131 Iraq, a country with a population of approximately 5,000,000 and an area of 168,040 square miles, forms roughly a triangular area with the base running southwest to northeast and the apex
133 terminating at the Persian Gulf. It is dominated by two great river systems—the Tigris and the Euphrates. The Euphrates rises in the mountains of Turkey, flows across the Northern Syrian plateau and then meanders through Iraq, receiving little additional water from tributaries. The Tigris also rises in Turkey, but further to the east and north. It enters Iraq in Mosul province and receives important accessions from the Greater and Lesser Zab Rivers which are fed from the snows and the rains of the mountains along the Turkish and Iranian borders and, to a lesser degree, from the Diyala River. Downstream from Ramadi on the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris the two rivers form a single low-lying alluvial valley built up as a delta into the Persian Gulf. As they flow south, the rivers are virtually lost in the marshes and lakes of southern Iraq, their remaining waters uniting at Qurna to flow as the Shatt al Arab into the Persian Gulf.

311 Only a relatively narrow belt, lying north-northeast of a line roughly running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin near the Iranian border, has sufficient rainfall to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation. In the rest of the country, agriculture depends upon the water of the two rivers for irrigation, whether by pump, by flow or by natural inundation. With the exception of the large and remote southern and northern deserts and the greater part of the rolling uplands between the Tigris and the Euphrates known as the northern Jezireh, most of this region can be cultivated once water is made available. With storage and regulation of the river waters, a great extension of the area under cultivation is possible. Without regulation, on the other hand, the

311 waters of the twin rivers are largely wasted and periodically unloosen disastrous floods upon Baghdad and the alluvial plain to the south.

The Rain-fed Zone

241 In the upland plains of the rain-fed zone stretching from
438 Northern Mosul to Suleimaniya, wheat and barley are the principal crops. Rainfall is generally inadequate for summer crops, although water from streams and springs permit cultivation of rice and cotton. In part of this area, especially Northern Mosul, there has been a rapid extension of cultivation with the help of modern agricultural machinery.

233 To the north and northeast lie the mountain massifs of Iraq.
438 Here the raising of cattle, sheep and goats by Kurdish nomads is
241 one of the principal occupations. The mountains are largely barren of trees but offer natural pasture for animals. In the valleys and on hillsides grain, tobacco, timber and fruit are grown. Tobacco, although small in area, is an important cash crop.

438 Except for some handicrafts, there is little native industry in
433 this region. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, is principally a commercial center and an outlet for exports to Syria and
[315] Lebanon. Kirkuk, however, is the center of most of Iraq's petroleum production and one of the largest and richest oil fields in the world. Oil fields of subsidiary importance also exist at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin in Diyala province. The mountains of the North may ultimately yield other minerals such as copper, chrome and iron.

The Irrigation Zone

933 South of the rain-fed zone the river valleys may be divided
311 into three major regions: the upper river valleys; the lower river valley down to Amara and Nasiriya; and the triangular area from Nasiriya and Amara to the mouth of the Shatt al Arab.

The first of these regions includes most of the northern Jezireh and the area north of Baghdad and east of the Tigris. The latter area still awaits irrigation for the most part, and the Jezireh is hardly susceptible to irrigation because of the elevation and configuration of the land. The Jezireh is an upland plateau

relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major /33 one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311 nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438 the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241 River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312 carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162] lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438 generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342 dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262 the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439 stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504 marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

438 country's foreign trade. Near it is the country's second largest oil field.

●133 311 233 To the south and southwest of the irrigation zone lie the vast arid tracts known as the southern and northern deserts which comprise about 40 percent of the land area of Iraq. These are sparsely inhabited by roaming nomads who raise camels, goats and sheep and annually take their flocks into the river valleys in search of summer pasture.

II. The People

161 The first official census of the settled population in Iraq was taken in 1947 and preliminary statistics on the male and female population of each province have already been published.[1] The preliminary estimate of the enumerated population was approximately 4.6 million. This figure has been brought up to 4.8 million in the published statistics by adding a rough estimate of 200,000 for the nomads in Mosul province and in the provinces along the Euphrates. Like all other countries at a similar stage of development, Iraq has a very young population, about half being under the age of 20. Although no reliable vital statistics are available, all indications point on the one hand to a very high rate of mortality among infants and young children, and on the other, to a correspondingly high birth rate. Even under the present poor health conditions the population seems to have been increasing at a rate conjectured to be in the region of one to one and a half percent per annum. Whatever the present rate, however, it is clear that, if full advantage is taken of the ample opportunity to improve health

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[1] Considering the attendant difficulties, this census may be judged a success. The information about the people of Iraq which it has already yielded and, more especially, which it can yield when tabulation is completed, is without doubt far more reliable than any estimates previously made. However, as with most first attempts at census-taking, the results have to be interpreted with great caution. Besides the figures already published, the Mission had access to certain unpublished data on four provinces—Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra. Much of the description of the population which follows is based on this data, but it must be noted that, although allowance was made for the fact that these four provinces are a most imperfect cross-section of the country, this fact is an additional limitation to the validity of any but the broadest conclusions.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX B

FLOOD CONTROL, IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE

Effective and economical utilization of available water resources is the central problem of Iraq.[1] In its study of this problem the Mission has addressed itself to (1) the storage of water for the purpose of controlling floods and increasing the regular supply of water for irrigation, (2) the expansion of irrigation, (3) the provision of drainage to prevent deterioration of irrigated lands by salt, and (4) questions of operation and maintenance of irrigation systems. The Mission has relied heavily on published materials ranging from the *Report on the Irrigation of Mesopotamia* by Sir William Willcocks, published in 1911, to more recent studies, particularly the monumental *Report on the Control of the Rivers of Iraq and the Utilization of their Waters* made in 1949 by the Irrigation Development Commission under the presidency of Mr. F. F. Haigh. In addition, however, the Mission conducted a field survey, in the course of which one or more of its members visited the sites of proposed dams and reservoirs, and examined the problems of irrigation at first hand. Its conclusions are therefore based on observation as well as the study of relevant documents. 3/2

I. Water Storage

Today the storage of the flood waters of the Euphrates and Tigris and their tributaries is the foremost problem. The twin rivers carry, on the average, almost 70 billion cubic meters of water per year—a quantity theoretically adequate to irrigate vast areas. Much of this comes, however, in the spring at a time too 3/2 133

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[1] See the Mission's main report, p. 7 *et seq.*; also Annex A, *Basic Factors and Conditions.*

312 late to benefit winter crops and too early for summer crops.
133 Destructive spring floods are apt to occur just before the harvest-
[731] ing of the winter crops begins and as the planting of summer crops is in process. In the dry season—July to December—which is critical for both summer and winter crops, the mean discharge of the Euphrates at Hit and the Tigris at Baghdad is only 421 cumecs (cubic meters per second) and 559 cumecs, respectively, as compared with 1,765 cumecs and 2,572 cumecs during the three peak months of the spring.[2] The Haigh Commission has calculated that the mean discharge which can be relied upon for irrigation is only 280 cumecs for the Euphrates and 350 cumecs for the Tigris and its tributaries. This supply would appear to be barely equal to the water needed for existing irrigation systems when figured on the basis of the standards usually applied in Iraq. In fact, at present there is an acute shortage of water in the irrigated areas of the Diyala Valley and the Hilla canal system while in other areas water is wasted. Short of radical economies in the use of water, which can only be realized over the long term, no significant extension of the irrigated area can be undertaken without controlling and regulating the flow of the rivers. Nor can disastrous floods be controlled without schemes for the storage of the excess waters.

The Euphrates

653 A project for the regulated diversion of the flood waters of
312 the Euphrates into Lake Habbaniya is already under way. This project involves the construction of an inlet channel from the Euphrates near Ramadi to the lake as well as an outlet channel for the later release of the stored waters. A barrage will be built across the Euphrates at Warrar to raise the water level and thus permit an increase in the capacity of the lake reservoir. The outlet channel and regulator are already finished and work is w advanced on the inlet channel and its regulator. The project whe completed will reduce the flood discharge from a possible maximum of 5,200 cumecs to 2,000 cumecs and will increase the minimum supply of water available for irrigation from 280 cumecs to perhaps 440 cumecs. The total cost is estimated at ID 4,300,000.

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[2] See chart and also Tables I and II in the appendix.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq-MH1

HYDROGRAPHS OF THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES RIVERS

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——— Average Mean Monthly Discharge
– – – Minimum Mean Monthly Discharge
——— Maximum Mean Monthly Discharge



7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1

Mean Monthly Discharges of the Euphrates and the Tigris

(in cubic meters per second)

Month	The Euphrates at Hit[1]			The Tigris at Baghdad[2]		
	Mean monthly discharge	Maximum monthly discharge	Minimum monthly discharge	Mean monthly discharge	Maximum monthly discharge	Minimum monthly discharge
January	592	1,130	258	947	1,926	432
February	665	1,217	278	1,388	3,020	323
March	968	2,651	344	1,992	3,496	797
April	1,853	2,917	462	2,951	4,541	935
May	2,235	3,358	533	2,775	5,241	997
June	1,208	1,792	249	1,684	3,562	548
July	577	809	268	897	2,069	292
August	358	533	202	504	1,278	192
September	293	383	183	373	827	163
October	311	557	225	359	872	175
November	432	881	247	516	1,105	212
December	558	1,248	264	709	1,413	300

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[1] Based on observations over the years 1924-1946.

[2] Based on observations over the years 1906-1946.

7: International Bank N S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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TABLE III

SALINITY OF THE EUPHRATES AND THE TIGRIS[1]

(proportion of dissolved salts in parts per 100,000)

	Tigris At		Euphrates At		
Month	**Baghdad**	**Hindiya**	**Hilla**	**Samawah**	**Ur Junction**
January	26	9.5	16.7	19.7	20.0
February	26	7.2	16.9	22.6	23.5
March	22	10.7	20.5	21.1	20.7
April	19	7.4	18.0	13.9	20.0
May	19	5.8	18.5	10.3	10.0
June	19	8.3	10.8	10.9	8.0
July	23	9.1	10.2	16.5	14.0
August	28	22.1	22.5	69.0	70.9
September	30	20.7	26.6	90.7	97.6
October	32	26.8	27.0	69.8	82.2
November	33	17.5	19.1	53.3	57.2
December	27	17.1	21.4	57.2	74.4

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[1] Data for the Tigris are based on observations over the period 1924 to 1932, but those for the Euphrates on observations over only one year which was particularly dry.

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1950

/31 /61 The territory of Iraq, which is shaped like an irregular triangle (see Map No. 1), covers an area of 435,223 square kilometres. At the time of the 1947 census, its population was 4,800,000 inhabitants, or 11 inhabitants per square kilometre.

/62 Over 75 per cent of the population of Iraq are Arabs. They live mainly in the centre and south of the country. The next most numerous inhabitants are the Kurds (over 15 per cent of the population), who live mainly in the north and especially in the region of Mosul. There are also some Persians, Armenians, Turks, Jews and others.

/33 The country, which is mountainous in the north and north-east, spreads out into the vast Mesopotamian plateau, which inclines gradually as it nears the Persian Gulf. This plateau, which was famous in ancient times for its network of irrigation channels, is now merely an arid steppe, and in some places even a desert.

Iraq is watered by the historic twin rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, which are the country's vital arteries. The Euphrates (Shatt el-Furat in Arabic) is approximately 3,000 kilometres long; its basin covers 673,000 square kilometres. The Tigris (Shatt el-Dijla), which is approximately 2,150 kilometres long, is joined by several tributaries, including the Shatt el-Gharraf, the Diyala, the Great Zab and the Little Zab. Its basin covers an area of 375,000 square kilometres. The Tigris and the Eu-

● /133 phrates join together in their lower courses to form the Shatt al-Arab, which is 185 kilometres long, navigable throughout its length, passes by the port of Basra, and flows into the Persian Gulf. In some places, this river is one kilometre wide. Baghdad is on the Tigris.

There are also several lakes in Iraq; the largest is Al-Hammar, with an area of 5,200 square kilometres.

132 The climate in the west of the country is Mediterranean and sub-tropical, with a long dry summer (lasting over seven months), frequent changes of temperature, with an average of 33.8° C.; in winter the average temperature is 9° to 10° C. In the east of the country, the average is the same in the summer, but the winter in the north-east is colder, with an average of 7° to 7.7° C. The rainfall varies from a yearly average of 38 to 40 centimetres in the highlands (probably twice as much in the mountains) to a maximum annual precipitation of 10 centimetres in the south-western desert region.

631 The country is divided administratively into the following fourteen provinces or "liwas": Baghdad, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, Karbala, Hilla, Diwaniya, Kut, Amara, Basra, Diyala (chief town: Baquba), Dulaim (chief town: Ramadi), Muntafiq (chief town: Nasi- RIYA), AND SULAIMANIYA.

3cRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
IRAQ MHI

Chapter Five

IRAQ

THE LAND

131 THE area of Iraq within its present frontiers is approximately 175,000 square miles. It is most conveniently divided into three distinct geographical sections: the Mesopotamian plain, the Uplands, and the Folded Mountain Belt. The first of these is historically the most important for it was the plain which nursed the great civilizations of the past, and its two great rivers which nourished them.

133 *The Plain.* To the north-east the southern alluvial plain follows the foothills of the Persian mountains up from the sea, turns south-east across the old river estuaries at Samarra and Hit, and returns parallel to and west of the Euphrates. Within these limits the soil is stoneless alluvium. The two rivers flow in channels somewhat above the rest of the plain, which is consequently liable to be flooded during the high-water period in the spring when the snows melt in Kurdistan; local rain has comparatively little effect on the rivers. The Tigris rises in late March or early April, the rise at Baghdad being sometimes as much as 23 feet; the Euphrates rises two or three weeks later than the Tigris, a maximum of about 14 feet (at Faluja); both rivers are at their lowest in September–October. At no point is the plain higher than 150 feet above sea-level.

132 The annual rainfall in the plain averages about 6 inches only; this rain occurs usually between mid-November and mid-March, the wettest month being February; but it is impossible to generalize, as a complete season's rainfall may occur in a space of three weeks, the remainder of the winter being dry. [241] Cultivation in the plain depends almost entirely on irrigation, the rainfall often being insufficient to mature a winter crop.

133 The rivers, which have frequently changed their courses throughout history, unite about sixty miles above the city of Basra in a single great channel, the Shatt al-Arab. Also above Basra is the marshland of the Muntafiq and Amara *liwas*, where a distinctive group of Arabs—the 'marsh Arabs'—live on fish and the produce of their mud-banks and swampy islands, or tend their buffaloes from shallow-draft canoes.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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The Uplands. This region, which approximately corresponds 133 to ancient Assyria, is undulating gravel steppe and rich ploughland, with some stone. Here, in an average year, the rainfall of 13 inches is sufficient to yield a winter crop without irrigation. In the districts of Kirkuk and Irbil, however, the rainfall is supplemented by the *kahriz* (underground water channels) system of water production, which is practised even more widely in Persia. Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk are respectively 703, 1,250, and 1,087 feet above sea-level.

Between the two rivers in this area and the south of lat. 36° N. is a wedge of uncultivable gypsum desert called al-Jezira (the Island).

The Mountain Belt. The crescent of mountain country included in the north-east frontier comprises the basins of the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, Greater Zab, and Khabur. It is peopled by Kurds, a hardy mountain race, living an entirely different life from the Arabs of the plain and uplands. Villages are stone-built and shelved into the sides of the hills, with tall silver poplars and terraced cultivation, including vineyards and tobacco. Large areas of mountainside are covered with scrub oak; the summits provide summer pastures.

Between the Euphrates valley and the western frontiers is a large section of al-Badia, the Syrian Desert, populated only by nomad tribes of bedouin with their flocks and camels.

Climate. The climate of Iraq is extreme. In the plains the 132 January mean temperature is 44–52°F.; in July, 86–96°F. In the mountains altitude decreases temperature in both seasons and increases the rainfall to as much as 40 inches.

The importance of Iraq's geographical situation has been 131 obvious since Alexander's armies linked Europe with India twenty-two centuries ago. Through it ran not only the shortest but the easiest routes from southern Europe to the Persian Gulf and to India until the discovery of the Cape route. From the time of the Babylonian empire the trade of the Far East tended to pass through Iraq to the Levant ports on the Mediterranean. In the nineteenth century the desire to control or to prevent others controlling this route involved Great Britain, Russia, and Germany in attempts to dominate Iraq. The discovery of oil and the growth of air communications in the twentieth century have given the country a positive place in the political framework of the world and the former has provided the resources to transform it into a progressive modern nation.

THE PEOPLE

Population Statistics. The single official census that has been 161

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

CHAPTER VI

THE ARABS OF MESOPOTAMIA

131 MESOPOTAMIA does not belong to Arabia 101 geographically. It lies to the north of the peninsula and includes the territory between the mountains of Asia Minor on the north, the mountains of Persia on the east, the Syrian desert on the west and the Persian Gulf on the south. The area enclosed between these limits is enormous. These are its natural boundaries, but politically the territory included takes in certain districts that belong to Persia and Turkey as 144 well as the kingdom of Mesopotamia. It is of interest 101 to include Mesopotamia in any discussion of Arab life, for although the Mesopotamians are not in Arabia geographically, nor even politically, racially they are Arabs as truly as the inhabitants of Nejd or the dwellers in the 197 valleys of Oman. Practically all of the inhabitants of 162 Mesopotamia are Arabic speaking and Arabic in origin, 101 the chief exceptions being the numerous Jews who have come into the country from the north and the small community of Sabaeans, or fire-worshippers, who are a remnant of the people that the Arabs found inhabiting the country. The Arab is the dominant element, and the others together would probably not amount to five per cent of the whole.

133 The character of the country is most easily understood if we start by saying that Mesopotamia is the enormous

133 delta of two rivers—the Euphrates and the Tigris. With
insignificant exceptions, it is one vast level expanse made
up of the rich silt that these rivers have brought down.
It contains no physical features whatever that call for
comment except the plains and the rivers, unless we mention
that combination of plain and river which covers a
considerable area, namely the marsh. In the past this
district was the seat of some of the great empires of
antiquity—Assyria and Babylonia and Persia. When
Xenophon marched over it about 400 B. C., it was and
had been for centuries one of the world's centers of power
and productiveness. It supported a vast population in
those days, how vast no one knows, but the ruins of ancient
cities suggest that it must have been very great indeed.
312 deed. The basis of its[1] greatness was the use of the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers for irrigation. By this
means the whole country had been transformed into one
vast garden. The area was not so large then as it is
now, for year by year the delta encroaches on the sea.
It is supposed that in ancient times the sea reached up
as far as Gurna at least, and that is a hundred miles from
the present mouth of the river.

Under the Mohammedan caliphs of Baghdad the irrigation
dams, waterways and smaller canals that had existed
for centuries were allowed to fall into greater and
greater decay. The Mongol invasion of Mesopotamia,
which culminated in the capture of Baghdad in 1258 A. D.,
resulted in the complete destruction of this ancient system
of irrigation. Ever since it has been in ruins, but
the courses of the larger waterways are still distinguishable,
and engineers tell us that they can decipher the entire
162 tire system. The country has been a desert since that
311 day, populated by nomad tribes who roam over the vast

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[1] [The Tigris-Euphrates Delta Area -- Analyst]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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CHAPTER III

COTTON IN IRAQ

Iraq today is on the verge of a great transformation—from a land of want to a land of plenty. Probably the greatest rehabilitation program that has ever been undertaken in any country is in progress to make the Garden of Eden bloom again.

For generations the lack of capital had been the greatest limitation to the country's progress. Now tremendous new sums created by oil royalties are being spent in building large-scale irrigation works, constructing roads, financing industries, and improving the health and education of the people.

Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the first World War, the people have manifested a strong and continuing interest in improving their country. A great deal was done by the British during the period of their mandate, especially in the field of transportation. Probably even more was done by King Faisal when the country became a sovereign constitutional monarchy after the end of the mandate in 1932. For instance, in the last two decades the number of schools increased about seven times. More important, the people, for the first time in recent history, showed real interest in general economic improvements. More capital probably was invested in industry in the past 25 years than for several preceding centuries.

The need and the opportunity are both apparent. On the one 133
hand, the resources are abundant. Iraq is a fairly large country of some 175,000 square miles, the size of Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, about two-thirds of which are deserts and mountains unfit for intensive cultivation. Another 35,000 square miles, about 20 per cent of the land area, are in the Tigris-Euphrates lowlands, the largest alluvial area in the world, almost twice the size of the deltas of Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana combined. Extensive highlands between the lowlands and the mountains are excellent for cultivation.

BACKGROUND

This great Mesopotamia, or "land between the rivers," was once one of 600
the wealthiest regions of the world—the home of Adam and Eve, the Sumerian princes, Nebuchadnezzar, and the Arabian Nights, and the site of Babylon and Nineveh. This land has fostered at least three distinct civilizations through 5,000 years of history, and it cradled our present Western society.

These fertile soils are said by historians to have supported 15 to 20 161
million people in Biblical days. Now 5 million struggle to keep alive amidst 311

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East

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
TURKEY
SYRIA
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Mosul
Great Zab
Erbil
Kirkuk
Sulaimaniya
Little Zab
Tigris
Euphrates
TO TRIPOLI
OIL PIPELINE
JABAL HAMRIN
Diyala
Diyala Weir
I R A Q
IRAN
DULAIM
Baghdad
TO HAIFA
SYRIAN DESERT
Hindiyah Dam
Kerbela
Hilla
Kut Barrage
Diwaniya
Amarah
MUNTAFIQ
Euphrates
Al Qurnah
Basra
Shatt al Arab
KUWAIT
Persian Gulf
SAUDI ARABIA
NEUTRAL TERRITORY

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East

IRAQ MH1

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Iraq

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Iraq is a constitutional monarchy which 642
has been an independent sovereign state 648
since the termination, in 1932, of the mandate awarded Great Britain by the League
of Nations. Historically, it is identified 131
with Mesopotamia, the "land between the rivers" and the home of one of the oldest
civilizations known to man. Modern Iraq 131
has an area of about 170,000 square miles, 133
encompassing the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, a fringe of highlands in the north and an expanse of desert in the southwest. It extends from the Persian Gulf and Arabia in the south to Turkey in the north, and from Iran in the east to Syria and Jordan in the west. The country is conveniently divided into four geographic regions—the alluvial plains of the rivers, the mountain ranges backing the northern and the northeastern frontiers, the intervening uplands and the desert.

Rising in the mountains of eastern Anatolia, the Tigris River flows for 770 miles 133
through Iraq, and in its northern course receives several tributaries, the most important in Iraqi territory being the Great Zab, the Little Zab and the Diyala. The Euphrates River also takes its source in Anatolia but meanders across central Syria and, subsequently, for 750 miles in Iraq before converging with the Tigris at Al Qurnah. The Shatt al Arab, formed by the union of the two rivers, flows for about 100 miles to the Persian Gulf, and for part of its length marks the boundary with Iran. The lower Euphrates and Tigris valleys form a great deltaic plain which reaches back from the Gulf to a zone north of Baghdad. It is

Iraq

133 interspersed by several large lakes and in the south by extensive stretches of marshland. In many areas the plain is lower than the rivers, and the riverain lands are flooded each spring when the waters are swollen by the rains and the melting snows from the mountains. The Tigris normally reaches flood level in March or April; the Euphrates, a few weeks later. [312] Both rivers are tapped by networks of irrigation canals, while dams constructed at Hindiyah on the Euphrates and at Kut on the Tigris serve to divert the rivers into forked channels and increase the area under irrigation.

North of this alluvial plain, the country gives way to undulating uplands with an average elevation of about 1,000 feet. The river valleys are more sharply defined and sometimes confined within narrow gorges. The land between the rivers in this region is mainly steppe or gypsum desert and is known, as in Syria, as the Al Jazira. Toward the north and the northeast, the valleys of the Tigris and its tributaries are encircled by lofty mountain ranges, with peaks rising to from 10,000 to 15,000 feet, which form part of the Kurdish highlands, straddling the boundaries between Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The entire southwestern half of the country, from the Euphrates to the southern and the western frontiers, is gravel or sandy desert, a portion of the Great Syrian Desert.

132 The climate of Iraq varies with the topography, but in general it is characterized by hot, dry summers and cold, damp winters. Most of the rainfall is concentrated in the months from November to April, with the maximum precipitation during January and February. It averages 4 to 6 inches a

000 years. The infection is believed to be en-
164 zootic among the field rodents in sections
133 of the eastern and the southern provinces,
505 since outbreaks have sometimes coincided with floods which caused the rats to seek shelter in the villages. It has also been introduced on occasion by way of steamer traffic through Basra and the river towns.
164 With the exception of 34 cases, associated with a localized outbreak in the vicinity of Amarah in 1945, no instance of human plague was reported from 1937 through 1952. The 1945 outbreak started in a small village on the edge of the marshes near Amarah, in which 16 cases and 4 deaths were recorded within a period of 20 days.
164 Quarantine measures were enforced by the
744 government health organization and the Allied military authorities. DDT spraying was resisted by the inhabitants, who fled to the marshes, and the most seriously infected village was finally evacuated and burned to the ground.

In Baghdad and Basra, captured rats are often examined for the presence of plague, but rodent control is not attempted in the various cities and towns unless an epidemic is threatened. Plague-infected rats were found in Baghdad up to 1938.

164 Relapsing Fever. Both louse-borne and tick-borne relapsing fever are sporadic: from 25 to 100 cases are usually reported each year. Small localized outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever occur from time to time, primarily in the northern provinces. More extensive outbreaks were recorded in 1945-47, undoubtedly part of the epidemic wave which swept through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46. According to official statistics, 243 cases were treated in government institutions in 1945, 334 in 1946 and 379 in 1947, in contrast with 52 cases in 1944 and 26 to 33 in 1948-49.

Occasional cases of tick-borne relapsing fever are encountered in northern Iraq.
[136] *Ornithodorus tholozani* is regarded as the probable vector.

164
349 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis

sumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the 241
North. 245

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an 231
integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive
despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as [262]
camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed.

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently 241
inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained
unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer [372]
is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop
rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for
soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has [134]
materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter.

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq 423
and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central 427
Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. 241
The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

new settlements the government will have a unique opportunity to 241
remedy the shortcomings of the Dujaila project. 425

Improvement in Productivity

While expansion of land under cultivation, particularly through 000 large irrigation schemes, is essential in the long run to provide for a growing population and to establish a socially desirable class of smallholders, it should not be undertaken without a simultaneous vigorous campaign to increase the productivity of agriculture and livestock. The temptation to neglect such an effort in favor of striking new irrigation schemes should be resisted. Among the measures upon which this campaign should concentrate are drainage, the provision of better tools, seeds and draft animals, the introduction of soil-building and forage crops, the use of fertilizers, the improvement of livestock, the planting of trees and the establishment of an effective extension or advisory service to farmers.

1. Drainage

The drainage of existing irrigated lands would make the most 312 important single contribution to increasing the productivity of agriculture. Moreover, it will also have the most immediate effect since it can be carried out by the government while the success of virtually all other measures to raise productivity depends on the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation.

The Haigh Irrigation Commission, which made an extensive 311
study of irrigation and flood control for the government, estimated 134
a few years ago that about 60 percent of the land irrigated by flow had been seriously affected by salt. The Mission's own inquiries and observations indicate that as much as 20 to 30 percent of cultivated land has been abandoned over the last few decades because of salt accumulation, while on a large part of the remaining land yields have declined by 20 to 50 percent and even more. In a number of new irrigation projects such as Hawija and Dujaila salting forced abandonment of part of the land within two years after the schemes were initiated. Drainage, almost totally neglected in the past, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor in the future.

The main drainage canals for the whole irrigation zone have 312
been projected, but it is now necessary to proceed with detailed

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

IV. Natural Resources

Land and Water

312 Aside from oil, water and land may be said to be the principal natural resources of Iraq. Of the two, water is the more critical factor in the country's development. Underground water is generally plentiful, but in parts of the North it is frequently found only at considerable depth and in the central and southern portions, where the water table is high, it tends to be brackish and unfit for consumption. In the two major rivers, however, Iraq possesses a source of abundant water of a quality excellent for irrigation and, with purification, for human consumption. Here the chief problem lies in the marked variation of the flow of the rivers. On the Euphrates the mean monthly discharge of water varies from a low of 293 cubic meters per second in September to a high of 2,235 in May. On the Tigris the variation is even more marked, ranging from a low of 359 in October to a maximum of 2,951 in April. Thus periods of floods alternate with periods of acute scarcity. In the absence of storage facilities and a regulated flow, the limit on the cultivation of crops is set by the current low point in the water supply in the critical growing period for both winter and •[134] summer crops. The water problem is further complicated by the fact that continuous use of water for irrigation, coupled with the effect of evaporation in a dry, hot climate, has saturated the subsoil waters with salt and raised the water table, thus precipitating salt which, in the absence of drainage, quickly makes the land infertile. More effective use of the water supply is thus the central problem of Iraq.

311 In relation both to the population and the land actually under cultivation, the amount of cultivable land available in the country is very large. Accurate statistics on the total cultivable area are lacking, but the following estimates based largely on data supplied by the Department of Agriculture give some conception of the magnitude:

to keep the river bed deep enough to prevent the formation of additional outlets at flood times. These measures should then be complemented by a series of small works to provide proper control of the canals themselves. The Mission suggests that no regulator barrages be built across the Tigris itself until the results of these control measures are known. Meanwhile, the program should improve the navigability of the river and assist in draining the marshes. 3/2

As in the case of the Shamiya district on the Euphrates, the program for controlling the lower reaches of the Tigris will make adjustments necessary in the rice-growing areas of Amara. Here, too, it is therefore important that the Department of Agriculture provide timely assistance and advice to cultivators in adapting to the new water regime.

III. Drainage

While new irrigation schemes always appeal to the popular 3/2
imagination, it would be exceedingly unfortunate if they should 134
continue to be carried out, as in the past, to the neglect of essential drainage. Lack of drainage facilities has resulted in progressive salination and deterioration of the soil. In such areas as Hawija and Dujaila salt has become a serious problem within only a few years from the time irrigation was begun. Almost all land irrigated by flow has become salty to some degree, resulting in declining crop yields. The only conspicuous exception is the land in the Diyala River Valley for which the river, which has cut a deep bed from the Jebel Hamrin range to its confluence with the Tigris, acts as a natural drain during the dry season. Pump-irrigated lands generally suffer less from salting, partly because they are higher and thus tend to have better natural drainage and partly because, owing to the cost of pumping, there is an incentive to avoid the lavish use of water which tends to waterlog the soil.

The Haigh Commission estimated that about 60 percent of the irrigated areas have been affected by salt. The Mission's own observations indicated that perhaps 20 to 30 percent of the cultivated land in the irrigated areas has been abandoned during recent decades owing to the accumulation of salt and that yields on the

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134

land still being tilled may have declined by 20 to 50 percent. The situation appears to be worst in the regions fed by canals controlled by the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates. Thus about half of the lands irrigated by the Beni Hassan canal and 40 percent of those served by the Kifl canal have become too salty for winter cultivation.

The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates do not themselves contain excessive quantities of salt. Water is generally regarded as perfectly suitable for irrigation as long as the proportion of dissolved salts by weight does not exceed 70 parts in 100,000. Available analyses of the Tigris at Baghdad indicate that the proportion does not exceed 30 to 33 per 100,000 at most. For the upper reaches of the Euphrates the proportion is the same or even less, but in the lower Euphrates, which receives the drainage waters from the irrigated areas, the proportion may go as high as 90 parts per 100,000 in the fall of the year. (See Table III in the appendix.)

Salt has, however, become concentrated in the subsoil waters. The presence of some of the salt may be due to the fact that much of the land was originally under the sea. In the long run, however, it has been the continuous irrigation or flooding of the soil, combined with the effect of evaporation under the hot summer sun, which has led to a progressively greater concentration. Irrigation and flooding keep the water table high with the result that capillary action brings the water up into a zone where it evaporates under the heat of the sun and precipitates salt. Frequently cultivators resort to lavish use of irrigation water in order to wash the salt away from the roots of the crops. In the end, however, this practice has only worsened the situation by tending to raise the water table still further.

Salt accumulation can be prevented and existing salt evacuated only by digging drainage canals which will lower the water table to a level of 1.5 to 2 meters below the surface where capillary action can no longer be dangerous. Under such conditions water used in irrigation will wash away the salt deposited in the root zone and return it to the subsoil water which will be tapped by the drainage canals. Fortunately the salt found in the soil is not the sodium carbonate or "black alkali" type which cannot readily be washed away by water. Owing to the low level of the land the

salty water accumulating in the drainage canals will in most cases have to be evacuated by pumps. 312 134

Up to the present, drainage has been the subject of little planning or experimentation in Iraq. Mr. J. S. Turcan, the drainage expert of the Haigh Commission, carried out a drainage study for the Aggar Qub region, which is irrigated by the Saglawiyah and Abu Ghuraib canals. It was found that of the total area of 320,000 masharas, 197,000 needed drainage. Experiments indicated that a flow of 1.0 cumec per 1,200 marsharas over a period of two and a half months rid the soil of salt to a depth of two meters provided drains were installed with a maximum spacing of two kilometers and sufficient depth to keep the water table from rising to a level higher than 1.75 meters from the surface of the soil. The cost of a drainage project for this region, inclusive of the cost of a pumping station to evacuate the drainage waters to the Tigris, was estimated at ID 279,000 per 150,000 masharas or ID 1.86 per mashara. Preliminary plans have also been made for the drainage of other areas. One of these was for the area served by the Beni Hassan canal where the drainage of 330,000 masharas was estimated to cost ID 750,000 or ID 2.26 per mashara. The Haigh Commission came to the conclusion that the cost of drainage would average ID 2.0 per mashara or a total of ID 8,160,000 for 60 percent of the area now under flow irrigation.

Drainage might be usefully complemented by steps to line canals at points where there appear to be excessive losses of water through seepage. Such losses may lead to waterlogging of the soil and a resulting rise in the water table. Since Iraq is rich in asphalt, a lining of bituminous concrete might be best.

Deterioriation of land through salting has become such a serious problem that immediate steps should be taken to initiate drainage on a large scale. The Mission urges that work on the main drains be begun as soon as plans can be completed. At the same time complete drainage systems should be laid out and constructed for areas where the salt problem is most acute, notably those irrigated by the canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage. A start might be made with a drainage system for the Aggar Qub region since it has already been carefully studied. Early steps should also be taken to drain the Hawija and Dujaila areas. The

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

3/2 134 experience gained with the drainage systems first completed, particularly with respect to the depth and spacing of secondary drains, will be useful in planning subsequent schemes.

It is important also that drainage facilities be incorporated in any new irrigation schemes. It is always more costly to provide a drainage network for an already existing irrigation system, since it generally involves cutting across irrigation works and splitting up parcels of land. The installation of drainage facilities will be of vital importance for the rice-growing region of Kufa-Shamiya which the Mission recommends converting to a controlled flow-irrigated area. The same is true of the marshy region along the lower Tigris for which the Mission has suggested a number of control works.

The Development Board has allocated ID 2,000,000 to drainage in its five-year program. The Mission recommends, however, that at least ID 7,000,000 be devoted to this purpose over the next five years. Drainage works for the new irrigation projects alone would cost ID 5,600,000 on the assumption that about 60 percent of the area involved would require drainage. The Mission suggests that part of the cost of installing drainage facilities in existing irrigated areas be paid by the landholders who are benefited. This would be an equitable arrangement and need not be unduly burdensome if payments are spread over a number of years. Landowners, however, should not be given the option of participating in a drainage scheme, for the construction of an integrated drainage network requires the inclusion of all the land within a given area.

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IV. Operation and Maintenance

With attention focussed on the construction of reservoirs and new irrigation systems, there is a great danger that maintenance of existing irrigation works will continue to be neglected as in the past. There are many signs of such neglect today. Regulators have fallen into disrepair; canals have become silted and have developed bad leaks. False economies in the original construction and the use of poor materials have often made the task of maintenance more difficult. Thus frequently there has been no provision for roads

state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is prescribed. 654
Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and 423
barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums 241
are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the 166
older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted.

[511] On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines.

[34] The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

162 level plains and raise, by means of the scanty rainfall,
311 a meager amount of wheat and barley in favorable seasons.

312 Along the rivers in their upper courses are a few gardens, irrigated by means of various draught animals and water-wheels, which elevate water from the stream to the level of the land above. At Gurna the Tigris and Euphrates join to form one river and at Mohammerah the Karun empties into this united stream. The three rivers thus flow into the ocean as one enormous waterway, known locally as the "Arab River." For the last hundred miles before the sea is reached, the fresh water of the river ebbs and flows with the tides, and by cutting outlets along the river banks gardens may be automatically irrigated twice a day if so much water is desired.
245 Along these lower stretches each bank of the river is lined with beautiful gardens, which reach a depth of some miles in places and extend in practically an unbroken expanse all the way up to Basra and in less prolific culture even as far as Gurna. These date gardens are beautiful things, beautiful for what they are now, and more beautiful still as a suggestion of what all Mesopotamia might be. They are also one of the most melancholy things in the world as reminders of what the past developed and the present has wasted.

311 The land has enormous resources for agricultural de-
134 velopment. That whole vast district may be made into the garden spot of the earth. The soil is the best in the world, river silt hundreds of feet deep. It is as level as a parlor floor, with just enough pitch between the big rivers, and between the north and south, to make irriga-
312 tion easy. All that is necessary is a perfected system of
185 irrigation, and although the necessary investment would

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

Iraq MHT

COTTON IN IRAQ

Tigris, and a large reservoir at Bekhme in the mountains on the Great Zab. 312
The Mission endorsed these projects and recommended others to compensate for diversion and to balance the systems.

The Iraq Irrigation Development Commission believes that the area under irrigation can be increased to 12 million acres by the installation of additional storage facilities, by drainage, rehabilitation, and by new supplies of water.[44]

It is agreed generally that the rain-fed zones in the north must continue to depend primarily on rainfall. Although no accurate estimates are available, the total area which might be available for cultivation in this area is thought to be substantial.

Along with irrigation, an important means of improving productivity is 241
drainage. This would have an immediate effect; other proposals depend on
the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old 311
methods of cultivation.

As much as 20 to 30 per cent of the cultivated land is said to be abandoned because of salt accumulation. On a large part of the remaining land, yields have declined as much as 50 per cent. Drainage—almost totally neglected—the report concluded, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor.[45]

MECHANIZATION

Because of the cost, the Mission predicted that mechanization would pro- 241
ceed slowly. This conclusion was reached in the face of experience which 407
shows that tractor ploughing may increase yields 20 to 50 per cent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and better preparation of the soil.[46] No doubt mechanization will become increasingly important as additional land is placed under cultivation and labor becomes scarce.

About 750 tractors and 320 combines are in the country at the present time. A government agency owns 75 of the combines and 81 tractors and plans to import an additional 2,500 tractors and 550 combines with auxiliary equipment.[47] About 50 per cent of the machinery will be retained at government-owned tractor stations and rented or let out under contract.[48] The rest will be sold on easy terms to the farmers.

The International Bank approved a modified version of this machinery program but suggested that rental charges be increased to make the project self-sustaining, and adequate repair shops and demonstration and training programs were recommended.

SOIL BUILDING

It is obvious that the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished. [134]

Cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is said to be virtually un- 242
known. Attention needs to be given to the production of legumes. Commercial fertilization must be studied and, if possible, plants should be built to produce inorganic and organic materials. Soil analyses also are generally needed.

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[44] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, p. 16.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[48] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey, op. cit.*, p. 23.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN IRAQ

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

—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

Modern tractors with gang ploughs are now in general use in Iraq for ploughing cotton. Because the land is so heavy, tractors are usually of the heavy-duty track type. Most of the tractors are owned by the government and rented with drivers to farmers on an hourly basis. The Iraq Government is conducting experiments with all types of mechanical equipment in the hope that new lands in the rainfed areas to the north, too sparsely populated to farm with hand labor, may be brought into production with complete mechanization. [427]

These plants have been found to set 75 per cent of their bolls before the end of August. 242

Dr. Shelby Cain, cotton agronomist from Texas A. & M. College supplied by the Point Four Program, is concentrating on this problem in the cotton breeding program. He will be assisted by two Iraqi specialists now being trained at Texas A. & M. To some observers it appears that more work is needed on cultural practices before a full program on cotton breeding is started. For instance, the influence of planting dates, irrigation, fertilization, and cultivation on plant growths in this environment needs to be investigated before the more fundamental research in genetics and breeding can be used effectively.

Fertilization

Research on the problem of maintaining soil fertility is needed also and is included in the broad program for the future. There is an obvious deficiency of nitrogen and humus in the soil, and probably other plant foods. Much of the land in both of the main valleys has been under continuous cultivation 242 134

Iraq MHI

242 134 for centuries, and farmers have depended on the silt deposited from the overflows to maintain the fertility. Increased use of canals and dams for irrigation has made the overflows less frequent. Experiments conducted for the past three or four years with commercial fertilisers have shown no significant benefit, but the United States experts feel the tests are not conclusive and should be continued with various soil conditioners.

While depending on basic research to stimulate long-range production, the Director General is trying to force an immediate improvement through regulations requiring the application of techniques known to be beneficial.

248 656 *Controls*

In an effort to concentrate cotton production on the better suited lands and to facilitate insect control, seed control, and other beneficial measures, regulations have been promulgated requiring government permits for all cotton acreage planted. These permits, based primarily on suitability of the soil and availability of water and labor, are issued on the recommendation of local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the enforcement system is inadequate, and it is generally admitted that the regulation is not closely followed, especially in areas where the local sheiks are extremely powerful and are practically a law unto themselves.

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

At the government cotton experimental farm near Baghdad a double-handled board is used to level the high spots in a newly ploughed field. Outside the government farms little leveling is done. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Iraq Government in experiments and demonstrations to improve cotton cultural practices.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been 619
formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable as Qa'immaqam. 579 The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it 511
has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. 135
Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya 315
Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Nafṭchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Nafṭkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, [471] significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. 433
There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver ''Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Airways.
In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air communications—the
'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was completed
in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for packages;
communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold concession
granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

185 654 135 433 Rutba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial development proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its favour. 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

382 471 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in 1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

Much progress had been made, under the care of a Hides Associa- 433 tion, in the better treatment of local hides and skins, and well-tanned leather was produced. Boot and shoe manufacture, largely by electrically-operated machinery, had increased in scale and quality. The cement factory outside Bahgdad, using lime brought from near Ṭuz Khurmatu, came into important production in 1949 and was soon selling 250 tons a day. The three cotton ginneries erected before the war—one of them an Agricultural Bank enterprise at 'Aziziya—remained in being, with capacity to deal with much more than the available cotton crop. Printing presses, all small except one European-owned and that of the Government, remained substantially as before the war, save in their modernized equipment. The spinning and weaving industry, which in some cases also dyed and finished its fabrics, had by 1950 greatly increased its pre-war development and used in part local cotton; a factory in Mosul made also rayon cloth.

Other industrial projects more or less near to realization in 1950 were for rayon production from straw, for local production of fertilizers, and for sugar-refining. The treatment of tobacco leaf had been intensively studied, but remained defective. The industries likely, it was thought, to develop further, using 'Iraqi raw materials and diminishing the need for import, were those producing cement, soap, alcohol, vegetable oil, leather and shoes, cigarettes, beer, and textiles. The other industries would in all probability keep a lesser though perhaps a useful place; none was likely to produce a considerable surplus for export, unless, as some hoped, an industry could be founded to use, for fertilizers or otherwise, the abundant by-products of petroleum. The Development 185 Board intended considerable expenditure on 'industrial and mining 316 schemes' in the period 1951 to 1956, upon lines to be later revealed.

'Iraq's poverty in minerals other than petroleum seemed in part 135 to have been corrected by the discovery, in the later forties, of 317 interesting copper and copper pyrites deposits in the mountainous Qal'a Diza area, and by reports from the Government geologist of an outcrop of excellent marble near Rayat and supplies elsewhere of chromite, iron ore, magnesite. These, or some of them, were thought capable of commercial development. A hard limestone suitable for barrage building was sought and found. Local salt, gypsum, brick clay, Mosul building-stone, and cement-making materials were in use as before, and it was planned to renew the activity which during the war had produced up to 15,000 tons a year of Kifri 'coal'.

In spite of the imposed delays and frustrations of the war period, 382 the position achieved in the petroleum industry by 1950 was such as to place 'Iraq in the forefront of oil-producing countries, with

135 (2) The Supply of Raw Materials and Power: Iraqis is potentially
233 rich in many kinds of raw materials. In the first place it has abun-
241 dant supplies of oil and gas which provide a cheap source of both
433 raw material and fuel. Secondly, it has pastoral and agricultural products such as wool, camel hair, hides and skins, meat, fish, milk, animal fat. Thirdly, it has fertile land which, with the extension of irrigation, can be ~~a rich~~ source of such raw materials as sugar beets, sugar cane, soybeans and jute, in addition to products already available such as tobacco, cotton, sesame, linseed, and practically all types of grain, fruits and vegetables. Finally, recent geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. There are deposits of sulphurs, apparently of commercial value, in many parts of Iraq, and of salt, especially near Basrah. Yet each of these resources presents a different problem; none is easily exploitable (except oil); quantities available for industry are limited and the quality frequently poor. Agriculture has been kept at a low level of output because of the lack of irrigation schemes in most parts of the country; the difficulties caused by the present land tenure system and the agricultural techniques connected with the tribal system, which covers over 80 per cent of the cultivated area; the absence of an effective agricultural extension service and lack of modern storing facilities; these and other factors have held back both quantity and quality of agricultural and animal products. There was a noticeable extension in the cultivation of cotton in recent years, but the severe failure of the crop in 1951, owing to a pest attack, has been a great set-back. Difficulties in the supply of raw materials have held up many an industrial enterprise. The scheme for a sugar factory which has been under discussion since 1947 has had to be postponed from one year to another owing to the uncertainties connected with the
[28] cultivation of both sugar beet and sugar cane. The progress of the leather tanning industry, one of the oldest industries in Iraq, has been retarded due to the existing conditions in which hides and skins have been prepared and preserved, and great losses to this particularly native industry have resulted. The woollen textile
[289] mills have had to import certain qualities of Australian wool to mix with Iraqi wool which is of a coarse variety.

135 So far as mineral resources are concerned the surveys that have been made are insufficient.[1] Further exploration work is

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[1] As of writing, in July 1953.

needed to prove the extent and quality of the ores located. This 135 work has gone till now rather tardily, owing to the inadequate funds at the disposal of the Directorate General on Minerals. There also seems to be no clear policy as to how this wealth should be exploited: whether by the State directly or by concession to national or foreign enterprise.

Another factor delaying work in this field is the difficulty of [489] transport to and from the sites of the ore deposits which are remotely situated in desert and mountain.

Oil and gas are indeed plentiful in Iraq, and the exploitation 382 of oil resources has indirectly helped to finance the industrial development so far achieved. But the cost of oil fuel and other oil products for local consumption is not much lower than in other countries because of the high rate of taxes on consumption. This and the limited range of oil products so far made in Iraq by the Alwand refinery, owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., have led to the import of a number of oil products from abroad. But the situation should change when the State-owned refinery, now under construction, goes into production.

Another problem connected with the supply of fuel is the lack 371 of electric power. Power generation in Iraq is inefficiently organised and power rates, except in Basrah and Baghdad in recent years, are among the highest in the world. This has compelled most industries to generate their own power which has added a great deal to production cost. The recent reduction of power rates and the availability of electricity in Baghdad has been one of the major reasons for the concentration of industry in that city.

(3) ***Concentration of Industry*:** Industry in Iraq is heavily con- 438 centrated in the city of Baghdad which has a population of 550,000 inhabitants, in other words a little more than ten percent of the country's population. Excluding oil and one or two small textile, tanning, and grain-milling industries, all modern industry has been established in or near Baghdad, thus adding to the population and housing problems of the capital. There are many reasons for this concentration of industry. All routes converge on Baghdad; it has the largest population and, as the seat of Government, it offers easy access to the central authority. As an old trading centre Baghdad [366] has a well-organised market, large financial resources, and managerial and office staffs. Some of the factors that have made Baghdad

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development.
161 With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its
resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north
and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the
country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide
large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is
inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
● [135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq
possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap
source of power and raw materials essential to the development of
industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other
mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is
little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger
population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast
to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the
people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most
ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and
many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm
and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment
exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await
reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the
available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
[731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas;
and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is
hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water,
but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and
quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

III. Industry

Industry is as yet little developed in Iraq. As already indicated, apart from the oil industry which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 are working in modern industrial plants. These plants represent a total capital investment of approximately ID 4,000,000 and an annual gross income of about ID 3,000,000. Industry is largely confined to the processing of agricultural products, the production of building materials such as cement and bricks, and the manufacture of consumers' goods like textiles, soap, matches, cigarettes, shoes and beverages. 433

Conditions, however, are generally favorable to further industrial development. An expanding agriculture should provide more materials, such as fibres and oil seeds, for processing and when the standard of living among the rural population is raised there should be a growing domestic market for industrial products. In oil and natural gas the country possesses a cheap source of [135] power and fuel as well as an important source of raw materials. There are surface indications of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores, as well as of the existence of sulphur and salt deposits. The extent of such deposits should, however, be confirmed by core drilling before steps are taken to undertake their commercial exploitation. In the cities there is adequate manpower for industry, and the [464] Iraqi workman with proper training is generally adept at learning industrial processes. Skilled manpower, however, is very limited, and, naturally enough, there is little of the technical "know-how" which comes through experience and training. Other limiting factors in industrial development are the lack of sufficient private capital and initiative. Much capital, particularly that accumulated [454] from agriculture, is hoarded and the balance is generally invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce, where investors anticipate a higher rate of return. While there is a trend toward increased private investment in industry, particularly since the war, industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the initiative or financial assistance of the government.

000 The Mission has carefully considered what industries might be expanded and what new industries might be established. It has sought to confine its recommendations for industrial development to those industries where there is reasonable prospect of efficient production, competitive with imports, and where production is within the technical capacity available in Iraq, supplemented, where necessary, by outside technical and managerial assistance.

Petroleum and Refining

● 135 No recommendations need be made on the oil industry. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons and those of the less well
382 explored fields near Basra offering perhaps equal promise. The development of these resources by the oil companies is proceeding
[446] along sound lines. The oil companies have also been well in advance of other enterprises in providing housing, health services, and other amenities for their employees, in instituting labor training schemes and providing better pay for workers. The Mission realizes that there has been some criticism in Iraq of the rate of development, particularly in the Basra field. The expenditure of close to £90,000,000 by the oil companies on oil development in Iraq is now, however, beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Production in recent years might have been much greater if the outbreak of the war with Israel had not resulted in closing the pipeline to Haifa and in preventing the completion of another pipeline
[315] to that city. The existing line has a capacity of 2,000,000 tons and the projected line would have added another 4,000,000 tons. As already indicated, the government has recently obtained a commitment by the oil companies to increase output, which was a little less than 6,000,000 tons in 1950, to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955. It would not be advantageous to Iraq, however, to have production increased to such levels that the ensuing rise in oil revenues cannot in fact be effectively spent. Oil in the ground is a reserve for the future, and too rapid tapping of this reserve may entail a partial waste of resources.

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471 The government has decided to build a modern oil refinery near Baghdad which it anticipates will cost about £7,000,000. This refinery will use crude oil supplied from the Kirkuk fields at cost. With an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons, it will be able to supply

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

427 241 average; and in date and fruit groves his allotment is likely to be equally small. In each of these cases, however, the output per donum is considerably more valuable. In the rain-fed plains of the North where land is more plentiful and yields more uncertain, he may on the average plant as much as 40 donums in winter crops. In most areas the fellah and his family can probably get as large a winter crop area as they can till, but their capacity is limited by lack of draft animals, primitive agricultural techniques and the debilitating effects of disease and a hot climate. In some areas of the irrigation ~~zone,~~ however, particularly in parts of Hilla, Kerbela and Diwaniya, the fellah appears to get less land than he can till owing to the limited availability of good, irrigated land. The same applies to some rice-growing areas, particularly in Amara.

Lack of sufficient draft animals and implements, low yields and the necessity of turning over a share of the crop to the landlord or pump owner all combine to depress the economic status of the sharecropper. His position can only be improved by enabling him to raise his output or by increasing his bargaining power through the creation of alternative opportunities for employment and the opening up of new lands to settlement.

Minerals: Oil

135 315 Iraq possesses considerable mineral resources. Of these by far the most important is petroleum. There are at present two major oil fields—one near Kirkuk in the North, the other near Basra in the South. The Kirkuk field is generally reputed to have reserves of over 1,000 million tons, while that near Basra, which is less well explored, seems to be almost equally promising. There are also minor oil fields at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin on the Iranian border.

135 Although surface indications of the existence of copper, iron, chromite and other ores have been found in the mountainous belt adjoining Turkey and Iran, the existence of deposits of sufficient size to warrant commercial exploitation must first be confirmed by core drilling.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

● 135 Several geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. The extent and quality of these ores, however, will not be known until further exploration work has been accomplished. There are surface indications of 30 percent elemental sulphur mixed with limestone but, as in the case of the ores, these deposits have never been adequately proven. Previous to the large-scale production of oil, some coal was mined, but actual reserves have never been fully ascertained. A large and potentially valuable salt dome was located near Basra when geophysical surveys were being conducted in connection with oil exploration. It would appear, therefore, that Iraq has a fairly broad range of minerals which might be worthy of exploitation.

Some Factors Affecting Industrial Growth

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454 Some of the basic causes of industry's retarded development are lack of private investment, technical inexperience and inadequate markets. In the past capital has often been hoarded or invested in rural or urban property or in commerce, where the security or rate of return was believed to be higher than in industry. To some extent this tendency has been overcome through tax exemptions, tariff protection and the financial assistance of the Industrial Bank.

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433 On the other hand, little is being done to increase the number of skilled workers and technicians through education and training. One of the biggest handicaps in apprentice training is the lack of elementary education. Employees who are unable to read and write obviously can neither receive written instructions, maintain material and inventory control, select proper repair parts nor attend advanced in-plant training classes. Until this is corrected, Iraq must continue to rely on skilled foreign technicians and, in some of the larger and more complicated industries, on foreign management.

The supply of common labor is now ample and will probably remain so for many years to come. A shortage of labor, should it occur, could be corrected by the employment of women in greater numbers and by further mechanization. Industry has not, however, reached the stage of development where this should be attempted, for a highly mechanized plant means high capital costs, greater

in Basra, close to both shipping and the agricultural area which 288
may prove suitable for the growing of jute. It would employ
about 300 workers.

Automobile Tires

The importation of automobile and truck tires is increasing 383
at a rate of approximately 15 percent per annum, the value of all [439]
tires imported in 1950 being ID 468,000.

A plant of economic size to manufacture tires could be justified with a market of approximately twice that which now exists. Such a market will probably be reached in 1955. Since it would require approximately two years to construct a tire plant, it is recommended that plans be formulated to start such a plant in 1953.

The plant would be so designed as to utilize the maximum amount of labor and, accordingly, should cost no more than ID 750,000, including foreign exchange of ID 600,000, mainly pounds sterling. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required during the first years of its operation.

Salt

Geophysical work gives conclusive evidence of a very large 135
salt dome near Basra. Unfortunately, the analysis is not known.
This dome could be the source of very cheap salt for both export
and domestic consumption. It might make feasible the establish- [385]
ment of an alkali plant, particularly since the nearby oil field
would be able to furnish gas as a source of cheap power. It is
recommended, therefore, that core drilling of this dome be started
as soon as possible to permit a proper evaluation of the possi-
bilities of its use.

Sugar Mill

Considerable thought has been given to the recommendation 257
of a sugar refinery. Such an enterprise would, of course, have to
depend on agriculture to supply the raw material, either in the
form of sugar beets or sugar cane. Since this cannot be assured
at this time, it is recommended that the development of this indus-
try be held in abeyance for the present.

refinery on the river Alwand, near the town of Khanaqin.

The production of crude petroleum in Iraq amounted to 4,680,000 tons in 1946, 4,702,000 tons in 1947 and 3,427,000 tons in 1948, and is estimated at 4,326,000 tons for 1949.[2] The figures showing the crude petroleum production of the Middle-Eastern group, including Iraq, are given in an annex (see annex I, table 2).

● 135 Apart from petroleum, the subsoil of Iraq is rich in other minerals, such as coal, salt, sulphur, marble, limestone and various metals, including iron and copper. But the utilization of these resources has been delayed by the high cost of transport.

382 Although Iraq is so rich in petroleum, it has no refineries apart from the stabilization plant at Kirkuk, with an annual capacity of only 480,000 tons, and the Khanaqin Oil Company's small refinery on the Alwand, the daily capacity of which is 1,500 barrels, or 72,000 tons per year.

C. *Transport and communications*

Port

504 Basra is Iraq's only port. The designation "Port of Basra" generally refers to the whole length of the Shatt al-Arab, between the mouth of this river and the Naft-Umar lighthouse situated approximately 163 kilometres up-river from the Persian Gulf. The strip of land on the left bank of the river, between the Gulf and the Khaiyin Canal, is Iranian territory.

Iraq MH1

874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 217 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration, research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 439 433 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the world's supply. Her general economic organization is nevertheless agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the 339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com- 342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 652 [511] In 1950 a Development Board was established with the function of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing a general economic and financial plan for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

[Marsh Arabs]

243 Bombay was. "No," he said, "here we make our bread
262 from rice flour. When the wheat crop is a failure, as in
the past year, we have almost nothing else."

312 These overflow districts,* which are marshes in the
spring when the rivers overflow, dry down to hard soil
later in the year. To keep the water high for a few
weeks longer than it would naturally remain so, temporary
dams are constructed across some of the smaller
streams, leaving an opening to allow boats to pass and
water to run through. These dams persist in the face
[342] of a strong current in a way that is surprising. Mud,
tree branches, mats, soil and the like seem to be the only
building material, for there is no stone within hundreds of
[476] miles. The dams require a large amount of labor, and
of course are coöperative enterprises. Possibly because
of this necessity for coöperative effort, the Marsh Arab
communities appear to have developed a good degree of
community spirit.

361 Like their race everywhere, these Marsh Arabs do not
live in isolated individual houses in the midst of their
fields but collect in larger or smaller towns, some of them
of considerable size. These towns are located usually
in the fork of a river, or where several streams
come together. In Lower Mesopotamia there are many
small channels that carry water either ~~out~~ of the main
501 river or into it. The Marsh Arabs get about in picturesque,
high-prowed, black river boats, black because they
are covered with a thick coat of native bitumen which
wells from the ground in one or two places in Mesopotamia
[135] and is an indication, so the engineers tell us, that
petroleum is to be found in that country. These river
boats, which are the one means of transportation, are
built somewhat on the lines of a canoe and take consid-

*[along the last 100 miles of the Arab river from Gurna to the Gulf -- Analyst]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

IRAQ MA1

COTTON IN IRAQ

initiative and financial assistance of the government.[36] 433

The government has been advised to encourage development of light industries: Cotton textiles, cottonseed oil crushing mills, jute mills, bone fertilizer plants, automobile tire factories, small steel mills, central machine shops, concrete block plants, possibly a paper mill, a chemical factory for making inorganic fertilizer, and possibly salt refineries.

The Mission strongly urged the government not to attempt to own or operate these new factories itself, but to encourage private capital to do so.[37] [650 This recommendation has been followed in the main. The Industrial Bank, created with funds derived from the oil royalties, has been financing private industry in a number of fields, particularly cotton textiles and cottonseed oil crushing and refining. The outstanding exception is the new petroleum refinery being built by the government. 135

OIL

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Oil reserves in Iraq are thought to be tremendous—at least a third of the total Middle Eastern reserves, which are reckoned at 50 billion barrels, or



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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

Capacity of the Kut Barrage on the Tigris River in Iraq is almost a quarter of a million cubic feet of water per second, which makes it the largest diversion dam of its kind in the world. The dam was built by British contractors for the Iraq Government in 1939. With oil revenues now pouring into the treasury Iraq plans to build several more large-scale irrigation facilities for storage and diversion. New projects are already in progress in the upper reaches of the Tigris River system.

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[36] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

[135] 382 about half of the world's total. However, Iraq's past output has been paltry compared to its potential. A year ago Iraq's oil was flowing at the rate of 160,000 barrels a day. The figure is now 185,000, and estimates are that it will jump to 440,000 before long. The handicaps have been transportation and political difficulty. Iraq's wells are hundreds of miles from the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean Sea, which means pipelines have to be constructed. Before this year two pipelines were in operation from the Iraqi fields to Tripoli, Lebanon. A 12-inch pipeline to Haifa, Israel, has been put out of use since Iraq joined the Arab embargo of Israel. A new 16-inch line built almost to the Israeli border has never been completed for the same reason. Early this year one small new line was completed to the head of the Persian Gulf, which will have a capacity of about 40,000 barrels a day. The main addition is the 30-inch line to the Mediterranean just being finished. It runs to Banyas, Syria, and has a capacity of 280,000 barrels a day.

[471] Mining is carried out by the Iraq Petroleum Company, owned by United States, Dutch, British, and French interests. Despite this diversified interest, there has been continuous trouble with reactionary groups in Iraq along the same lines, but less serious than those in Iran. Recently the Parliament approved a new oil contract which promises the Iraqi Government 50 per cent of profits before foreign taxes, and (from the western point of view) the political situation seems to have improved.[28]

COTTON TEXTILES

288 Until the erection of the Iraqi Spinning and Weaving Company mill in 1948, cotton was used primarily for filling mattresses, for upholstery work, and for the home industries. Around 2,600 bales of cheap raw cotton and cotton waste normally have been imported from India for this purpose. A small crop of unirrigated indigenous cotton raised in the north around Zakho goes into this market, too.

The Iraqi Spinning and Weaving Company in Baghdad doubled its capacity in 1951 and now has about 27,200 spindles and 580 looms, producing about 18 million yards and finishing 5 million yards annually. The company already has purchased more equipment to give a total of 39,000 spindles and 900 looms, capable of producing about 27 million yards of cloth annually. Several small mills weaving cotton and rayon and three small knitting mills are reported also.

The mill consumed 10,482 bales of cotton in 1951 and expects to use 15,000 bales in 1952. The cotton has been secured almost entirely from the domestic crop. A poor crop forced the mill to buy 1,500 bales from the United States in the early part of 1952, but this unusual situation is not expected to be repeated.

471 288 Funds authorized in the government budget for other cotton textile mills have not been expended, presumably because of the general opposition to government intervention in the field of private enterprise and because of the recent expansion in the Iraqi mill. This expansion was financed by the Industrial Bank, which owns about a third of the company's stock.

288 With this expansion the factory should be able to produce about 40 million yards of cloth annually, or about 60 per cent of the country's requirements of 70 million yards.

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[28] Carmichael, J. H., "Oil from the Middle East Hits a New High Mark," *New York Times*, March 23, 1952.

241 commercial crops in the rain-fed zones of
the north; dates, cereals and cotton, in the
south. The date-palm groves in the irrigated
lands along the Shatt al Arab and the Eu-
phrates rivers, and in scattered areas along
the Tigris, furnish almost one third of the
233 world's supply of dates. Sheep, goats, cattle
and other livestock are raised in large num-
bers by the nomadic and the seminomadic
439 peoples. The chief agricultural exports are
dates, barley and other grains, cotton, wool,
hides and licorice: this last-named item
grows wild in many localities in the south.
242 The government is promoting the adoption
of modern methods of farming and animal
husbandry and the expansion of irrigation
facilities. It operates special agricultural
schools and experimental farms in different
parts of the country, as well as a date re-
search station near Basra. Within the last
few years it has initiated settlement and
demonstration projects on state lands at
Dujayla, near Kut; at Shahrizor, near
Sulaimaniya; at Huwaija, near Kirkuk;
and at Sinjar, near Mosul.

135 With the exception of the oil reserves,
the mineral resources of Iraq are negligible.
Small deposits of lignite, gypsum, sulfur and
other minerals are known to exist in the
north, while salt beds are found in widely
472 distributed areas. Industrial development is
438 slight, in spite of the impetus supplied by
the shortage of materials during the recent
war years. Small craft industries flourish in
the urban centers, and a few modern fac-
tories have been established in Baghdad and
Mosul for the processing of local products.
These consist primarily of plants for the
manufacture of textiles, cement, bricks, dis-
tilled liquors, soaps and cigarettes.

135 The petroleum industry has expanded
rapidly since the discovery of oil, in 1927,
at Baba Gurgur, in the Kirkuk region. The
reserves, which are reputed to be among the
richest in the Middle East, provide a pri-
471 mary source of wealth for the country. The
Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions,
originally granted in 1925, covering the
lands east of the Tigris River and north

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in 1935, the Agricultural and Industrial Bank was founded. Little progress was achieved before the outbreak of the Second World War, and during the war the difficulty of importing equipment prevented expansion. However, after 1942, industrial investment began to increase, the total amount from 1943 to 1948 being ID 3,089,000. 1/ Between 1948/49 and 1951/52, the capital invested in the principal industries, other than petroleum, increased from about ID 312 million to ID 4.4 million, the value of production from 1.4 million to ID 3.6 million, and the number employed from 1,649 to 3,837. 2/ Since then, there has been substantial development. In 1954 it was estimated that there were some 70,000 to 80,000 persons engaged in manufacturing. Of these, somewhat less than half were handicraftsmen; some 13,000 were employed in the petroleum industry; 10,000 to 15,000 in the textile and leather industries; about 6,000 in the building materials industry; about 4,500 in the food and beverages industries; and some 3,000 to 4,000 in the tobacco industry. 3/ 433 [463]

Manufacturing is concentrated around Baghdad, which accounts for about 70 per cent of total factory employment. In 1954, a check on firms in Baghdad showed that, of a total of 31,600 workers, 6,700 were in firms with over 1,000 employees; 3,800 were in firms with 500 to 999 employees; 2,000 were in the 250-499 group; 4,300 were in the 100-249 group; 3,000 were in the 20-99 group; 1,500 were in the 10-19 group; and 10,200 worked in firms employing 9 persons or less. 4/ 433 464

Recent surveys have indicated that Iraq may contain appreciable quantities of iron ore, copper, sulphur and sulphur compounds, gypsum, bitumen, dolomite, calcite and different varieties of marble. 5/ However, up to the present, little use has been made of these minerals, and the most important industries are those based on agricultural materials, namely: spinning and weaving of cotton and woollen textiles; rayon weaving; jute spinning and weaving; soap-making (about 7,500 tons); vegetable oils; tanning; tobacco products; beer (1,840,000 litres); alcohol (318,000 litres) and alcoholic drinks (1,560,000 litres). The recently founded cement industry produces about 200,000 tons a year. Consumption of electricity increased from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to 82 million in 1949 and 272 million in 1953. The amount used in manufacturing increased from 20 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to 35 million in 1949 and 159 million in 1953. 6/ 433 135

1/ Industrial Bank, *First Annual Report* (Baghdad, 1948) (in Arabic).

2/ Hassan Ahmad Salman, "Development of Industry in Modern Iraq", *Amrad*, March 1954 (Baghdad).

3/ Carl Iverson, *Monetary Policy in Iraq* (Baghdad, 1954), page 71.

4/ *The Iraq Times Annual*, 1954 (Baghdad), page 54.

5/ Salman, *loc. cit.*

6/ These figures include electricity consumed at the oilfields, which increased from about 11 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to about 21 million in 1949 and about 116 million in 1953; they exclude electricity consumed at pipeline stations, which amounted to 71 million kilowatt-hours in 1953 (*Statistical Abstract*).

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1. The Story of Hajji Ali, the Great Sultan and his Son, the Amir Kheyyun

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
√56 rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often
438 acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they
have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
482 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
√78 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful
by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A Story Concerning the Ignorance of Slaves

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the
end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

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originates from Africa, possibly as one told by Negroes themselves. 136
There are sharks in the Shatt el Arab and in the Karun River in Arabistan which occasionally take off the leg of a bather as far as eighty miles from the sea and the shark is far better known to the Iraqi than is the crocodile.

4. THE STORY OF THE PRINCE OF KERMANSHAH AND OF HIS MISFORTUNES

Peacock. Page 29, Line 25. 'A thousand peacocks.'

I think this bird is only included to give an exotic flavour to the 000
feast. I remember once mentioning that I had shot and eaten peafowl in the Punjab, a statement which was received with much surprise and, I am afraid, some lack of belief, and on a subsequent occasion when someone was describing a feast one of those present shouted, 'Put in a peacock for the Sahib'. In India the peacock is not normally killed by Moslems on the grounds that it is a bird of Paradise. In Iraq, however, I do not doubt that the learned doctors of religion could give the answer straight away if asked. Pigeons which roost on mosques are exempt 137
from molestation, even when destroying crops outside villages. There 825
is incidentally a pretty Iraqi story which explains the large feet of a pigeon. It describes how the pride and arrogance of peacocks offended King Solomon, so to punish them he took away their feet and gave them the feet of the pigeons, that they might always be shamed by their smallness, while the peacocks' large and beautiful feet he gave of course to the pigeons.

5. THE STORY OF THE YOUTH JAMIL, THE SON OF A MERCHANT IN BAGHDAD

Page 43, Line 3. 'The City of Peace.'

Medinat es Salaam or 'City of Peace' is one of the names used in 103
poetry for Baghdad. The city, when first built, was originally named Medinat es Salaam, but it appears that people persisted in referring to it as Baghdad, or Dad's Garden, from some older name for the site of the present city. Arabs love these poetical names, differing from those in normal use. Iraq is sometimes known as Bilad er Rafidain, or Country of the Two Rivers, Jerusalem (Al Quds or the Holy in

364 serve as latrines, while the use of the banks of streams or canals facilitates the ablutions required by Moslem rites. Frequent pollution of the water supplies promotes the spread of intestinal infections, which are prevalent among all groups of the population.

Fauna and Flora

136 164 **Arthropods.** Mosquitoes. Twelve species of anopheline mosquitoes have been recorded from different parts of the country, but the majority are regarded as of minor significance. Four species are of major interest in the transmission of malaria. 136 *Anopheles stephensi* is the primary vector throughout southern Iraq. *A. sacharovi* (= *A. elutus*) and *A. superpictus* are the principal vectors in the north, while *A. maculipennis maculipennis* is implicated in localized areas in the higher mountain valleys. *A. pulcherrimus* is widespread, particularly in the southern provinces, but is of doubtful importance in transmission. Other species, which are present to a varying extent in diverse localities, are *A. claviger*, *A. hyrcanus*, *A. multicolor*, *A. d'thali*, *A. fluviatilis*, *A. algeriensis* and *A. marteri*.

A. stephensi, the chief vector species in the south, is abundant in the irrigated date-growing areas along the Shatt al Arab and in the alluvial plains region, particularly in the Euphrates basin. It also occurs in various foci in the Tigris valley along the middle course of the river and in the Diyala basin to the edge of the foothills, as well as in the spring-fed oasis of Shifathah, in the desert west of Kerbela. It breeds in vegetated irrigation canals, seepage pools, borrow pits, shallows wells, hoofprints and other temporary collections of water. The larvae are found in greatest numbers from May to October, although breeding takes place throughout the year in the Gulf area. The prevalence of this species has increased appreciably within the last few decades, paralleling the expansion of irrigation facilities. At present it is the only proven vector in the Shatt al Arab and the lower delta areas.

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A. sacharovi was common in the tidal creek 136 zone of the Shatt al Arab until 1947, but it has not been found since that date, possibly in part as the result of control operations which have been carried on in the vicinity of Basra.

A. sacharovi is probably the most dangerous vector of malaria in the steppe and the foothill regions. It exists in association with *A. stephensi* in the Diyala basin: occasionally it invades areas as far south as Baghdad, but it does not normally encroach on the alluvial plain. Throughout most of its northern range it shares the role of vector with *A. superpictus*. It breeds in irrigation seepages, along the grassy margins of sluggish canals, in the rice fields and sometimes in small streams overgrown with vegetation. It is plentiful from March to May and appears again in some numbers in October.

A. superpictus is widely distributed in the northern provinces and is the dominant vector in the mountain and the escarpment districts. It breeds not only in the numerous small, sunlit watercourses and gravelly stream beds, but also in the rice fields and other habitats. It is active from May to October, with a peak of prevalence in August and September.

A. maculipennis maculipennis is reported from the mountain districts along the Iranian frontier, where it replaces *A. sacharovi* as a vector. *A. pulcherrimus* is widespread from the Persian Gulf to the beginning of the foothills. It is found primarily in the south, decreasing in prevalence from the alluvial plain northward. This species probably has little or no direct part in malaria [164] transmission, but the predominance of its larvae over those of other anophelines in the marshes and the rice fields of the alluvial plain suggests that it may exert a restraining influence on the establishment of *A. stephensi* and other species in such habitats.

Several species of *Aedes* are encountered, 136 among which *A. caspius* is most abundant. 164 *A. aegypti* occurs in some sections of the

southern provinces and has been held re- 136
sponsible for sporadic outbreaks of dengue 164
fever. It is also a potential vector of urban
yellow fever, although that disease is not
reported from this region. Many varieties
of Culex mosquitoes have been recorded,
but none has been specifically implicated in
the transmission of disease. *Culex quinque-*
fasciatus (= *C. fatigans*) or *C. pipiens*
(each a potential vector of *Wuchereria*
bancrofti) is present in most areas.

Within recent years extensive mosquito 744
control work has been undertaken by mu- 136
nicipal and government authorities, by the 312
oil companies and, during World War II,
by the British Expeditionary Forces. The
problem is stupendous, involving the im-
provement and the regulation of the irriga-
tion facilities on which the agricultural
economy of the country depends. In 1947, 744
malaria control was first attempted on a 164
nation-wide basis with the creation of an
antimalaria service within the Iraqi health
organization. Since that date, control opera-
tions have been carried on in various highly
endemic areas. Depending upon local condi-
tions, they have included antilarval meas-
ures, drainage works and residual spraying
of the rural villages with DDT prepara-
tions. In 1952, a demonstration DDT house-
spraying program was initiated in the
hyperendemic Tanjero Valley of Sulaima-
niya *liwa* (province), in conjunction with
the World Health Organization.

FLIES. Flies are prevalent in all parts of 136
the country. Numerous species of MUSCIDAE 164
are encountered, many of which are impli-
cated in the mechanical transmission of
intestinal and eye diseases. *Musca sorbens*
and *M. domestica vicina* are most fre-
quently incriminated, but *M. tempestiva*,
M. vitripennis and *M. mesopotamiensis* are
also abundant. The larvae of *Fannia canicu-* 136
laris sometimes cause myiasis in the live- 232
stock. The stable fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, 164
is almost ubiquitous. At least 22 species of
Tabanus are recorded, and many local au-
thorities believe that they are involved in
the mechanical transmission of anthrax.

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136 164 Several species of *Chrysops*, including *C. punctifera*, are known to be present.

232 Among the myiasis-producing flies which attack animals, and incidentally man, the most numerous are *Chrysomyia albiceps*; the blow fly, *Calliphora erythrocephala*; the green-bottle fly, *Lucilia sericata*; the horse bot fly, *Gasterophilus nasalis*; the sheep bot fly, *Oestrus ovis*; and the flesh fly, *Sarcophaga hirtipes*.

136 164 At least 12 species of sandflies are found. They are serious pests and may produce a form of dermatitis in susceptible individuals. The most widespread species is *Phlebotomus papatasii*, the vector of sandfly fever throughout this area. *P. sergenti* is abundant in the central and the southern provinces and in sections of the northern. It transmits cutaneous leishmaniasis and is apparently the only vector in Iraq, although *P. papatasii* is also implicated in adjacent territories. Potential vectors of kala-azar may be present in the northwest, but the disease is almost never reported.

Several species of SIMULIDAE occur in the hilly districts. The biting midge, *Leptoconops mesopotamiensis*, is an annoying pest.

LICE. All 3 species of human lice, *Pediculus humanus corporis*, *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis*, are common, especially among the poorer sections of the population. *P. humanus corporis* is important as the vector of louse-borne typhus and louse-borne relapsing fever, both of which are endemic.

136 164 232 FLEAS. The only flea of primary medical importance is the Oriental rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*. It parasitizes the rats and other rodents and is the vector in sporadic outbreaks of murine typhus and plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are plentiful in most areas.

136 BEDBUGS. The bedbug, *Cimex lectularius*, is indigenous. The tropical species, *C. hemipterus*, is frequently encountered in Baghdad, Basra and other cities, but is seldom seen in the rural villages.

600 TICKS AND MITES. Numerous species of

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164 136 232 TICKS AND MITES. NUMEROUS SPECIES OF ticks infest the livestock, including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus*, *Hyalomma dromedarii* and *Haemaphysalis cinnabarina punctata*. *Ornithodorus tholozani* occurs in many localities, and is the vector in sporadic cases of tick-borne relapsing fever. *O. savignyi* is present in the desert areas. The fowl or blue Persian tick, *Argas persicus*, and the castor bean tick, *Ixodes ricinus*, are widespread.

136 369 The itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is prevalent, especially in the congested urban communities and rural villages. The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventricosus*, is a frequent pest in the grain-growing districts.

136 **SCORPIONS AND SPIDERS.** Scorpions are common, particularly in the northern provinces. The most dangerous species are *Buthus australis* and *B. crassicauda*. [165] *B. europaeus* is also present. A few deaths from scorpion stings are reported each year, usually among young children or old people. *Scorpio maurus kruglovi* is sometimes encountered in the plains and *S. maurus townsendi* in the Persian Gulf region. The principal poisonous spider in Iraq is *Lycosa tarantula*.

136 752 **OTHER ARTHROPODS.** *Reduvius tabidus* and *R. annulipes* are found in many areas. The "date beetle," a large aquatic species of the family BELASTOMIDAE, is capable of causing serious bites.

136 752 165 **Reptiles.** Twenty-six species of snakes have been recorded from Iraq, but only 5 land varieties are venomous. Casualties from snake bites are reported occasionally. A large proportion of the fatalities is probably caused by the Levantine or blunt-nosed viper, *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, which inhabits the northeastern highlands from north of Baghdad to the Turkish and the Iranian frontiers. *V. lebetina euphratica* is also seen in some localities. The horned viper, *Aspis cerastes* (= *Cerastes cornutus*), is native to the alluvial plains, while the carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, is found in limited areas in Diwaniya province. The hoodless cobra, *Naja morgani*, is widely distributed but apparently is rare. The poison-

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ous sea snake, *Enhydrina shistosa*, roams 136
the Persian Gulf and the Shatt al Arab. 752
Although it may be dangerous to fishermen, 165
no fatalities are known to have occurred.

Rodents. *Rattus rattus frugivorus* is the 136
rat most frequently encountered in Iraqi 164
dwellings. *R. rattus alexandrinus* is also indigenous, while *R. norvegicus* is present in Basra, Baghdad and the river towns. *Nesokia buxtoni*, *Dipodillus dasyurus* and *Meriones charion* are reported from different localities. Rats are often captured in Baghdad and Basra and examined for evidences of plague, but otherwise little rodent control work is undertaken, except at the time of plague outbreaks.

Mollusks.* *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), the intermediate snail host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, is found in numerous foci in central and southern Iraq, where pump or gravity flow irrigation is employed. It inhabits the many small and sluggish irrigation canals and the rice fields, borrow pits, marshes and other suitable collections of water, but is strictly seasonal in appearance, being abundant only in the summer and the fall months, from May or June to November. The snails are widespread in Basra, Muntafiq, Diwaniya and Amarah provinces in the south, but are absent from the Shatt al Arab region south of Basra, where breeding is restricted by the salinity of the water. They are more scattered in distribution in the central provinces and practically nonexistent in the north, aside from localized foci around the
marshlands of the Mosul area. *Radix lagotis* 136
canaliculata, a vector of *S. turkestanicum* 232
which causes serious infections among the livestock, is found in the rice fields and the marshes of the southern delta.

The threat of the spread of *Bulinus trun-* 136
catus, and subsequently of schistosomiasis, 164
with the expansion of irrigation creates a 744
problem which is of major public health and economic importance to the country. Small-scale snail-control campaigns have been undertaken in the past in Baghdad, Basra and

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* See footnote, page 10.

Diwaniya provinces. In 1949, a co-ordinated 136
control program was introduced by the 164
Iraqi government, and a Bilharzia Section 744
was established within the national health organization. The section initiated a snail survey in the various endemic foci and research on the most effective methods of snail control. It carries on continuous snail destruction work through special units assigned to each of the infected provinces.

Plants. Little precise information is 137
available regarding the prevalence of 752
allergy-producing plants, but numerous weeds, grasses and trees, which have been incriminated in other countries, are present in districts with rainfall adequate to support such vegetation.

Occasional deaths, primarily among 137
young children, have been traced to the 165
consumption of the raw beans of *Vicia faba*, 232
a prominent food crop throughout this region. The beans are toxic to susceptible individuals in the raw state. Plants of the *Senecio* group grow in sections of the northern highlands. The young green shoots are poisonous and sometimes cause fatalities among the livestock.

FOOD SANITATION

The government and municipal health au- 744
thorities are responsible for the enforcement of regulations governing the sanitary quality of foods, meats and milk products, but the degree of enforcement varies in different localities. Health inspectors are charged with the supervision of establishments where foods are prepared or sold, such as foodshops, markets, restaurants and cafés, mineral-water bottling works and date-packing houses. Examinations for the presence of venereal diseases are theoretically required at regular intervals in the case of cooks and barbers, but no tests to detect other infections are carried out.

Meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter in the city abattoirs by officers of the government veterinary and health services. All carcasses offered for sale are supposed to bear an official stamp of

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164 parently of primary importance in all parts of the country, particularly in the lower delta region. Local authorities estimate that 25 to 35 per cent of the inhabitants in Baghdad harbor cysts of *Endamoeba histolytica*, while in Basra the carrier rate probably approximates 60 to 70 per cent. Liver abscesses are frequently encountered.

The actual distribution of bacillary infections is unknown, since the proportion of cases treated by medical officers is unduly small, and few facilities for confirmatory diagnosis are available. According to the official statistics for 1944 through 1949, from 17,000 to 30,000 cases of amebic dysentery and from 180 to 1,100 cases of bacillary dysentery were reported each year. Correspondingly, an analysis of the cases treated annually in the hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field and pipeline areas, in the 4 years 1946-50, shows that from 478 to 1,603 were amebic infections and from 58 to 175 bacillary. The Flexner group predominates among the *Shigella* strains isolated in dysentery cases at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad, but Sonne, Schmitz and Shiga types are also numerous.

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The abundance of flies and the insanitary habits of the people favor the spread of intestinal infections. Diarrhea and enteritis are major causes of illness and death, especially in early childhood. Giardiasis is common. Outbreaks of food poisoning, undoubtedly caused by various strains of *Salmonella*, are frequent.

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Cholera. Epidemics of cholera were formerly recurrent in the border districts and along the trade routes from India and the East. Although some authorities believe that an endemic focus may have existed in the Shatt al Arab region in the past, most epidemics have resulted from the introduction of the disease by way of traffic through the Persian Gulf ports or by overland travel through Iran, often in connection with pilgrimages to Mecca or local Shia shrines. 164 Within recent decades extensive outbreaks, each totaling from 1,500 to 2,500 cases,

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were reported in 1923, 1927 and 1931. Since 164
1931, cholera has been almost completely
absent from the country, although one imported
case was recorded in 1939, when the
disease was epidemic in Afghanistan and
Iran.

Strict quarantine regulations are enforced, 744
and travelers from India, Pakistan 484
and Ceylon, as well as pilgrims from Mecca, 164
without valid certificates of immunization
against cholera are retained in quarantine
centers for a period of 7 days. Mass immunization 751
with cholera vaccine is carried 164
on among the populations in the border
provinces whenever epidemics are reported
from the adjacent territories. At the time
of the recent epidemic in Egypt, in 1947,
immunization was compulsory for all travelers
entering the country and for the inhabitants
of towns and villages along the
Syrian frontier.

Helminthiases. SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schistosomiasis, 164
caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, 136
has probably been present in the
lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins
since ancient times. It is highly endemic in
the southern and the central provinces,
where the intermediate snail host, *Bulinus
truncatus*, is found in widespread but often
localized foci. The disease is prevalent 164
among the children and among the agricultural 462
and other laborers who work in infested
waters, particularly the men and the
boys, who are exposed to infection to a
greater extent than the women. It reaches
maximum proportions between 10 and 20
years of age, but is usually negligible in
early childhood. Transmission is seasonal: 164
it takes place from May to the end of November, 515
but primarily between June and
October, when infected snails are most
abundant. The insanitary customs of the
inhabitants, associated with the frequent
use of the canals for religious ablutions and
the severe summer heat which is conducive
to bathing in any convenient body of water,
are contributory factors. The infection rates 164
average 18 to 25 per cent in the irrigated 361
districts of the delta, but vary from zero

164 provinces, and conducts research and field
462 investigations on the distribution and the
312 control of the disease and the intermediate
744 snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from
15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually
in government hospitals and dis-
164 pensaries. The disease is considered commonplace
758 in most areas, however, and
probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the
infected individuals seek treatment under
743 ordinary conditions. Since 1949, special dis-
164 pensaries have been established in Baghdad,
Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour
the most seriously infected districts. In
1950, there were 11 mobile units for the
treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and
hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Ancylostomiasis is
361 widespread in the irrigated areas, but the
exact distribution and severity of the infection
in the different provinces are not accu-
● [186] rately known. *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the
only species found in the foci studied. The
infection rates are generally estimated at
10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces
and at 40 per cent in the southern. They
are especially high in the Amarah and the
Al Qurnah regions, but decrease toward the
south, and are relatively low in the districts
164 along the Shatt al Arab. In a study reported
742 in 1939,[47] fecal specimens from apparently
healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from
various parts of the country were examined
for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was
detected in 25 per cent of the specimens
from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per
cent from 135 men from the rural districts
of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations
revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per
cent of the individuals examined from Diyala
liwa and from 25 per cent of the individuals
from Dulaim. The degree of infection
is usually mild, but serious cases with
hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent
are not infrequent.

164 Treatment facilities are provided by the
758 schistosomiasis control units, as well as by
742 the government hospitals and dispensaries.

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63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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An ancylostomiasis section is incorporated 164
in the Department of Endemic Diseases, 744
and a program for the improvement of rural sanitation is being developed by the health authorities.

Other Helminth Infections. A large 164
proportion of the inhabitants harbor one or 136
more types of intestinal worms. Ascariasis 742
predominates in the northern and the central provinces. Heavy infections, often with intestinal obstruction, are common. In the studies made on groups of men of 18 to 20 years of age, as indicated above, ova of *Ascaris lumbricoides* were found in the fecal specimens from 10 per cent of the 125 individuals examined in Baghdad city. In the provinces, ova were detected in fecal samples from 9 per cent of 135 persons from Baghdad, from 15 per cent of 145 persons from Dulaim and from 13 per cent of 309 persons from Diyala.

Enterobiasis, trichuriasis and, to a lesser 164
extent, strongyloidiasis are prevalent. *Tri-* 136
chostrongylus, a parasite of sheep and goats 232
which sometimes infects man, is widely distributed in the Shatt al Arab region. Infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are numerous. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is often encountered, but not as widely as in Syria and other Arab countries where more raw meat is customarily consumed. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is occasionally observed in the Christian communities.

Hydatid disease is endemic, especially in 164
the central provinces. Stray dogs are nu- 136
merous and serve as primary reservoirs of 232
infection. In a survey published in 1940,[46] 742
adults of *Echinococcus granulosus* were found in 18 per cent of 123 street dogs examined in Baghdad. Hydatid cysts were seen in the carcasses of 12 per cent of 2,347 sheep and goats slaughtered in the municipal abattoir and in 25 per cent of 223 cattle.

Other Infections. Brucellosis is enzootic 164
among goats, sheep and cattle, and sporadic 232
human infections result from the consump- 758
tion of cheese, *leban* and other unboiled

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164 prevalent. In most areas the prominence of
eye lesions is aggravated by the frequency
of dust-laden winds and by the glare of the
sun. Conjunctivitis is the leading cause of
morbidity among the employees of the Iraq
Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field
and pipeline stations. It comprises almost
one half of the cases of infectious disease
treated each year. Gonococcal ophthalmia is
responsible for considerable blindness, particularly
743 in the urban communities. The
164 Ministry of Health operates 3 ophthalmic
hospitals and 5 dispensaries in Baghdad
and other cities, and provides special facilities
for the treatment of eye diseases
in the provincial hospitals and dispensaries.

164 **Diseases of the Skin.** The low standards
515 of hygiene prevailing among both urban and
rural populations are conducive to the
164 spread of skin infections. Mycotic infections
of various types are seen in large
numbers. Favus predominates: from 10 to
15 cases constitute the usual daily quota at
the clinic of the Royal Hospital in Baghdad.
Cases of actinomycosis and Madura foot are
often observed. Impetigo and erysipelas are
common. Scabies is widespread. Phagedenic
ulcers and cases of human myiasis are encountered
136 from time to time. A form of
164 dermatitis, caused by contact with cercariae
of nonhuman strains of *Schistosoma,* is frequent
in the southern provinces. The bites
of sandflies produce skin lesions in susceptible
individuals, and are apt to become
infected.

164 **Leprosy.** Leprosy is endemic, especially
in the marsh and the lake districts of the
south. The actual prevalence of the disease
is uncertain, but local observers estimate
that it probably does not exceed 400 to 500
cases. From 179 to 279 cases were reported
annually in 1944-49, with from 46 to 86 new
infections. A focus formerly existed around
Baghdad, but within recent years relatively
few indigenous cases have been found in the
743 central and the northern provinces. A leper
colony is maintained by the government on
an island near Amarah: it usually has 250
TO 300 PATIENTS IN RESIDENCE.

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tendances in the hospitals and the dispensaries 164
in 1950, ranged from 26 to 266 per
1,000 population. They approached, or exceeded,
the mean rate of 111 per 1,000 in
6 *liwas*, being 106 in Diyala, 111 in Diwaniya,
155 in Erbil, 158 in Sulaimaniya,
205 in Hilla and 266 in Kerbela. While
such statistics provide rough indices of the
present prevalence of the disease, they contribute
little to our knowledge of the extent
of the problem.

The northeastern mountain districts and 164
the irrigated zones along the Shatt al Arab 361
and the lower Euphrates are the most
highly malarious sections of the country.
Differences in the average rate of endemicity,
as shown by spleen surveys among
children 2 to 10 years of age, are indicated
on the following map,[41] in which the
principal malarious regions are arbitrarily
grouped according to the factors governing
the transmission of the disease. Malaria is
hyperendemic in the date-growing areas
along the Shatt al Arab (I), which are
watered by a complex system of tidal irrigation.
In Basra, Fao, Al Gurnah and the
chief towns, the spleen rates approximated
75 per cent in 1941, but were reduced to
about 12 per cent by 1949 as the result of
control operations. The rate of infection is
relatively low in the marshlands of the
southern delta (II), where *Anopheles pulcherrimus* [136]
predominates, but foci of greater
prevalence exist as far north as Qalat Saleh.
In Amarah and other towns, the spleen rates
are estimated at about 8 per cent. In the
lower Euphrates basin (III), the annual
flooding of the river and the extensive system
of gravity-flow irrigation from high-level
canals create conditions favorable to
the breeding of the vector species, *A. stephensi*.
The spleen rates usually average 30
to 60 per cent, but in controlled localities,
as Hilla, Kerbela, Nasiriyeh and Suq ash
Shuyukh, they had declined to around 20
per cent in 1950. In the upper Euphrates [312]
valley, north of Ramadi (IV), however,
irrigation is limited to small-scale projects
employing pumps or more primitive meth-

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seasonal distribution of the different species of malarial parasites. *Plasmodium falciparum* appears to predominate in most localities with a moderate to high rate of endemicity, as well as during epidemics in all parts of the country. *P. vivax* is also widespread. It is often observed in the blood of infected individuals, even in hyperendemic areas, during the nontransmission season, and the local authorities state that it is unusually difficult to eradicate certain strains in the course of treatment. *P. malariae* is reported more or less sporadically. In certain areas in northern Iraq, it is being encountered with increasing frequency, and some evidence exists that it may be found to take the place of *P. vivax* as the principal species concerned with clinical relapses. Among the 2,865 to 4,281 cases of malaria treated annually in the hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1946 through 1950, from 8 to 53 per cent were identified as *P. vivax* infections, from 0.7 to 7 per cent as *P. falciparum* and up to 8 per cent as *P. malariae*. The remainder were diagnosed on a clinical basis. *P. ovale* was reported recently, but the origin of the infection was obscure. Blackwater fever is rare, although cases are sometimes seen in Basra and in the northern highlands. 361 164 758 164 186

Malaria control measures have been carried on in limited areas under the auspices of governmental or other agencies. The Department of Endemic Diseases of the Ministry of Health conducts anopheline control and treatment programs in highly endemic areas throughout the country through subordinate units in central, southern and northern Iraq. A rural health and malaria control project was initiated in the hyperendemic Tanjero valley in Sulaimaniya *liwa* in 1952, in co-operation with the World Health Organization. 744 164

Rickettsial Infections. Outbreaks of louse-borne typhus recur almost annually, but are seldom extensive, except under abnormal conditions, as during war periods. The infection is frequently introduced by 136 164 680

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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THE INFECTION IS FREQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY
means of the pilgrimage traffic or tribal 164
migrations from the neighboring territories, 484
and is believed to smolder continuously in 167
the northeastern mountain districts. Cases 164
are usually observed during the winter and
the spring months, with the maximum incidence
in March and April. Serious outbreaks,
with a total of over 1,300 known
cases, were reported in 1942-43 in conjunction
with epidemics prevailing throughout
the entire Middle East. The actual prevalence
was probably several times the official
estimates. The greatest numbers of cases
were noted in Baghdad, and in Basra,
Mosul, Diyala and Sulaimaniya *liwas*, along
the main routes from Iran. The congestion 164
and the shortage of food, clothing, 722
soaps and other supplies existing in that
area as the result of military operations
during World War II favored the spread
of the infection among the louse-infested
populations. About 800 cases of typhus were 164
reported in 1944, but the annual incidence
subsequently declined to a low of 72 cases
in 1949. No differentiation is made as to
type, and the recorded cases include both
louse-borne and flea-borne infections. On
the basis of laboratory investigations, authorities
at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad
suggest that many outbreaks in the north,
where louse-borne typhus is supposedly endemic,
are caused by strains which are serologically
intermediate between *Rickettsia* [136]
prowazeki and *R. mooseri*.

Murine typhus is endemic, and probably
predominates in the rural areas in the absence
of a large-scale epidemic. Tick-borne
infections are not specifically reported, and
are undoubtedly rare. In the event of a 164
typhus outbreak, control measures, including 744
the use of DDT preparations and mass
immunization of the inhabitants with antityphus
vaccines, are carried on in the affected
communities by the government
health authorities.

Plague. Epidemics of plague were frequent 164
in the past, particularly in the region
around Baghdad, but the disease has been
almost completely absent within recent
YEARS.

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000 years. The infection is believed to be en-
164 zootic among the field rodents in sections
133 of the eastern and the southern provinces,
505 since outbreaks have sometimes coincided with floods which caused the rats to seek shelter in the villages. It has also been introduced on occasion by way of steamer traffic through Basra and the river towns.
164 With the exception of 34 cases, associated with a localized outbreak in the vicinity of Amarah in 1945, no instance of human plague was reported from 1937 through 1952. The 1945 outbreak started in a small village on the edge of the marshes near Amarah, in which 16 cases and 4 deaths were recorded within a period of 20 days.
164 Quarantine measures were enforced by the
744 government health organization and the Allied military authorities. DDT spraying was resisted by the inhabitants, who fled to the marshes, and the most seriously infected village was finally evacuated and burned to the ground.

In Baghdad and Basra, captured rats are often examined for the presence of plague, but rodent control is not attempted in the various cities and towns unless an epidemic is threatened. Plague-infected rats were found in Baghdad up to 1938.

164 **Relapsing Fever.** Both louse-borne and tick-borne relapsing fever are sporadic: from 25 to 100 cases are usually reported each year. Small localized outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever occur from time to time, primarily in the northern provinces. More extensive outbreaks were recorded in 1945-47, undoubtedly part of the epidemic wave which swept through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46. According to official statistics, 243 cases were treated in government institutions in 1945, 334 in 1946 and 379 in 1947, in contrast with 52 cases in 1944 and 26 to 33 in 1948-49.

Occasional cases of tick-borne relapsing fever are encountered in northern Iraq.
[136] *Ornithodorus tholozani* is regarded as the probable vector.

164 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis
349

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164 is endemic in the alluvial plain region,
369 within a radius of about 100 miles around Baghdad, which is one of the major foci in the Middle East. There the infection rates average 20 to 60 per cent, and probably approach 95 per cent in many localities, especially in the older parts of the city. Outside of this traditional focus, the infection is distributed irregularly. Some of the agricultural districts to the south are relatively free from the disease, but in the more compact towns and villages the infection rates are as high as 40 per cent. In Basra and Muntafiq *liwas*, the extent of infection is slight, and even in the towns the prevalence probably does not exceed 3 to 4 per cent. North of Baghdad the disease appears to be confined to isolated foci. It is widespread in the city of Mosul and in the towns of Beled, Samarrah and ‘Aqra, but is almost completely absent from the steppe country and from the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan.

164 In the 6-year period 1944-49, the cases
158 of Oriental sore treated annually in government institutions ranged between a minimum of 2,910 in 1948 and a maximum of 10,502 in 1945. All ages are affected, but most of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the greatest susceptibility between 1 and 4 years of age. Multiple lesions
[511] are frequent, particularly among individuals living in congested and unhygienic surroundings. Ulcerative sores predominate, but the nodular type is seen in a large percentage of the cases. Secondary tuberculoid lesions, arising in healing ulcers, are also common in children. The largest number of cases is usually observed in August, September and October. *Phlebotomus sergenti* is apparently the only important vector in
[136] Iraq, as in Pakistan. Cutaneous infections occur among the dogs and the cats found in the cities, but they are thought to play a minor role in the spread of the human disease.

164 Visceral leishmaniasis, or kala-azar, is
369 suspected of being sporadic in the northern part of the country, although up to 1950

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For a list of the economically useful plants of Iran and Iraq see MA1 Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 116, pp. 79-188.

For a list of native terms for useful plants see MA1 Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 116, pp. 217-241.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most 433
consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high 439
percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered 137
a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one- 313
fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and
productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of 185
improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and 241
the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Forestry

137 313 In a country where the plains are almost entirely devoid of trees and only the mountain valleys contain a few scattered forests, the importance of forests as a means of controlling erosion and floods and overcoming the acute shortage of timber needs no emphasis. The Mission did not give special attention to this problem because the government has already received an excellent detailed report and recommendations from a British expert. It wishes only ~~to stress~~ that it is important not only to protect and extend the forests in the mountain areas, but also to undertake the planting of trees in the plains to serve as windbreaks and as sources of fuel and building timber. In the Dujaila project an encouraging beginning has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundaries. In future settlement schemes it might be well to require farmers to plant and maintain small wood lots. To carry out a proper program the Forestry Department, which is now only a division within the Department of Agriculture, should be given an independent status and headed, as at present, by a well-trained foreigner. The training of an adequate number of foresters should also be undertaken.

Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture

647 Agriculture, livestock-raising and forestry are of such critical importance to Iraq that they merit a separate ministry in the government. The Mission recommends therefore the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use. Within this Ministry and directly under a permanent secretary, it is suggested that directorates-general be organized for each of the following subjects: agriculture and horticulture; animal husbandry; forestry and soil conservation; land settlement; and research. Special sections for administrative and personnel questions, legal affairs, economic research and statistics, and extension and education might form part of the immediate staff of a permanent secretary. Within the Ministry there should also be grouped the more or less autonomous organizations such as the Tobacco Monopoly, the Grain Board, the Agricultural Machinery Administration, the Date Association and the Chambers of Agriculture. The Mission believes that such a ministry would greatly facilitate more effective direction of the government's efforts to improve agriculture and related pursuits.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

XII. Forestry

311 Anyone who contemplates the treeless plains and the barren
131 mountains of Iraq is quickly persuaded of the need of afforestation. The forest area comprises only 25,500 square kilometers in the four northern provinces, and of this area only 17,000 square kilometers is covered by what may really be classified as forest.
33 The remainder is in forest pasture and sub-Alpine shrub. Yet forestry has received little attention. The only trained forester in Iraq is the foreign director of the Forestry Division which is subordinated to the Department of Agriculture. His staff is inadequate to provide proper protection of existing forests, let alone to undertake forest development. Only a small amount of afforestation, soil reclamation and propagation work is in progress. There is no modern forest law. Forests suffer severely from indiscriminate cutting for fuel and charcoal, overgrazing by livestock, shifting cultivation and fire. In the clearing of land for cultivation in the mountainous areas of the North, forest and pasture have been destroyed and land laid waste by erosion.

Afforestation is of vital importance not only to check erosion and help prevent floods but also ultimately to meet the acute shortage of timber for building and fuel. In the plains belts of trees are needed to serve as windbreaks. A detailed forestry program has already been set forth in a lengthy report by a British expert. The Mission can only urge that his recommendations be carried out.

The first step should be to build up an adequate forestry staff and to enact a satisfactory forest law. The Department of Forestry should be given a status equal to that of the present Department of Agriculture. Trained foresters will be required not only at headquarters and in the field but also at the forestry research stations at Abu Ghuraib, Bakrajo and Erbil. Initially some of the foresters, including the director, will have to be recruited abroad. A course in forestry might be given in the agricultural schools at Abu Ghuraib.

In the northern mountains the existing forest areas should be preserved primarily as a means of protecting the catchment of the Tigris and its principal tributaries. Controlled, rotational grazing will be necessary to protect these forests. To furnish a supply of

361 a greater security of tenure. Other factors, which have no doubt affected the permanence of villages in some parts of the irrigation zone in central and southern Iraq, are the salination of the land and the silting of canals. In such cases, the fellahin have no choice but to abandon their villages.

In spite of these differences, however, the villages have a number of characteristics in common. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled together without any orderly design. There are no communal facilities or open spaces for the recreation of the
342 children. The huts are so constructed as to keep out heat, cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently, they consist of a single room with thick walls and a doorway, which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for both cooking food and keeping draft animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight, windows are either very small or totally lacking; sashes are expensive. Furnishings are limited to such elementary necessities as a mat and a plain table or a bench. Sanitary facilities, including latrines, are generally lacking.

312 The villages are necessarily located near a source of water, by a canal in the irrigation zone, by a stream or a well in the North. The water is not piped, but must be carried from its source to wherever it is used. Nor is it purified, although the canals in the irrigation zone may be heavily polluted. The water which has been used by men for washing and in which animals have immersed themselves while drinking is often used for human consumption. The constant trampling of the canal banks for these purposes leads to leaks and, hence, to stagnant pools near the adjacent village. Where the source of water is a well, the earth nearby may be dug out for use in the construction of houses and so, similarly, a
[364] stagnant pool may be the result. Such pools, combined with the total absence of any sanitary disposal of waste and garbage, constitute a serious danger to health.

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Trees are rarely seen in the villages, although they would give relief from the sun and from sandstorms. Trees would also provide firewood instead of the fuels currently used—animal dung, which could be used instead as fertilizer, and brushwood, which has to be gathered with considerable effort. Small gardens for vegetables are unknown. In fact, fruit and vegetables are almost

exclusively grown by farmers who specialize in these commodities 361 137
and who market their produce in the towns. 244

Planning the Improvement of the Villages 361

Clearly it will not be possible to bring about any substantial and lasting change in the state of some thousands of villages until the root causes of poverty, ignorance and insecurity have been tackled. Only then can thriving communities replace the present villages with their primitive and almost static mode of life.

Legislation for the improvement of villages is already in existence. 361 185 In 1936, a law (No. 70) for the construction of new villages was passed, empowering the Ministry of Interior to construct or renew villages, having regard particularly to health requirements, such as the construction of sanitary facilities and public baths, the hygienic disposal of waste and the provision of drinking water. A draft law on similar lines, but placing the responsibilty on the Ministry of Social Affairs, was put before Parliament during 1951. Parliament sent it back to the Council of Ministers for amalgamation with the earlier statute. Both are admirable in objective, but both are focussed primarily on the reconstitution of villages on more hygienic lines without regard for the urgent educational and economic aspects of the problem and without recognizing the need to enlist the cooperation of the people. Only a comprehensive and popular program can really reach the people and encourage them to help themselves. That little, in fact, has been done under the 1936 law is itself eloquent testimony to this.

The task of remaking the villages is typically one for the 361 new Community Planning Office. In cooperation with all the government departments concerned and with their advice, it should be able to formulate and issue the necessary regulations, of which those that affect health are only a part, under the power conferred on it by the projected planning enabling act.

The Mission has elsewhere made a number of recommendations designed to raise the standard of living of the rural population. On the agricultural side, these include the organization of an extension service, the creation of cooperatives, measures to improve livestock and the provision of better drainage. Medical recommendations include the opening of more village dispensaries, the

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

awakened and looked around them, but they could see 539ˣ neither tent nor camp nor Arabs, and they were not covered by blankets. All around them was desert, and only the horse Rishan could be seen. And Maqdad ran to Rishan and kissed him and said: O my little Rishan, we are camped in the desert far from water, and I have caused you suffering.

The two boys mounted Rishan and they rode off, and Maqdad took his course from the sun and rode to the east, that they might come to the river and find water. And after they had ridden for one hour they saw before them a mound, such a mound as is made from the excavated earth from a well, and Maqdad cried: Here is water. And Ibn Ali said: Make haste, let us drink and let the horse drink for we are thirsty. But Maqdad said: Do you not remember, O my comrade, what my ancestors said last night? Namely, that when approaching water you should circle completely around and observe if the camelthorn [37] is broken and if there are tracks for you may find enemies drinking from that water.

So they dismounted and took the horse Rishan and tethered him in a dip in the land, then on foot and in the manner of hunters they circled around the well, and they saw that horses had gone up to it and they had not come out from it, and their track was fresh. Then Maqdad and Ibn Ali crept up to the well, keeping the mound of earth between themselves and the well, and they crept beside the mound and looked at the well, yet they could not be seen. And they saw six horses tethered by the well, and they saw six soldiers, and on the ground lay a seventh horse dead, and the soldiers were pushing and pulling its body towards the well.

And Maqdad whispered to Ibn Ali: These dogs must originates from Africa, possibly as one told by Negroes themselves. /136 There are sharks in the Shatt el Arab and in the Karun River in Arabistan which occasionally take off the leg of a bather as far as eighty miles from the sea and the shark is far better known to the Iraqi than is the crocodile.

4. The Story of the Prince of Kermanshah and of His Misfortunes

Peacock. Page 29, Line 25. 'A thousand peacocks.'

I think this bird is only included to give an exotic flavour to the 000 feast. I remember once mentioning that I had shot and eaten peafowl in the Punjab, a statement which was received with much surprise and, I am afraid, some lack of belief, and on a subsequent occasion when someone was describing a feast one of those present shouted, 'Put in a peacock for the Sahib'. In India the peacock is not normally killed by Moslems on the grounds that it is a bird of Paradise. In Iraq, however, I do not doubt that the learned doctors of religion could give the answer straight away if asked. Pigeons which roost on mosques are exempt /137 from molestation, even when destroying crops outside villages. There 825 is incidentally a pretty Iraqi story which explains the large feet of a pigeon. It describes how the pride and arrogance of peacocks offended King Solomon, so to punish them he took away their feet and gave them the feet of the pigeons, that they might always be shamed by their smallness, while the peacocks' large and beautiful feet he gave of course to the pigeons.

5. The Story of the Youth Jamil, the Son of a Merchant in Baghdad

Page 43, Line 3. 'The City of Peace.'

Medinat es Salaam or 'City of Peace' is one of the names used in 103 poetry for Baghdad. The city, when first built, was originally named Medinat es Salaam, but it appears that people persisted in referring to it as Baghdad, or Dad's Garden, from some older name for the site of the present city. Arabs love these poetical names, differing from those in normal use. Iraq is sometimes known as Bilad er Rafidain, or Country of the Two Rivers, Jerusalem (Al Quds or the Holy in

3Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's produc- 245
tion; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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185 charcoal production with consequent encouragement of
• 137 secondary industries, and improve climatic conditions.
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Problems of Agriculture

185 654 Among the natural difficulties which attend agriculture in Iraq are those imposed by drought, floods, dust storms, diseases, pests, and soil erosion, of which the first two are being attacked by a large-scale programme of irrigation and flood-control. The major diseases are the inflorescence rot of dates, wilt diseases of tomato and watermelon, gummosis of citrus, rusts of cereals, and various mildews. The major insect pests are the Moroccan locust, whose ravages have from time to time caused immense damage to cereal crops, the grasshopper, the Mediterranean fruit fly, the date-fruit mite and Dubas bug, and the Sunn pest and bug *Aolia acuminata* which attack wheat and barley. The Ministry of Agriculture is combating these diseases and pests by modern methods; in locust-fighting Iraq is among the most advanced countries in the world. The problem of soil erosion can to some extent be met by the activities of the Forestry Department.

Irrigation

312 The aim of water-control in Iraq is to even out the seasonal flow in the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, so as to prevent both drought and flooding in the irrigated areas and to increase the area under cultivation. Irrigation itself imposes the necessity of drainage, to prevent the salting up of irrigated land and the further spread of malaria.

Three methods of irrigation are employed: direct inundation at flood-time, which is used for rice cultivation and is of comparatively limited importance; distribution of water from rivers and canals by direct flow on to the land through a network of small channels and cuts; the lifting of water into the channels and cuts by various methods which include the use of mechanical pumps. The date-palm groves of the Shatt al-Arab benefit by natural irrigation; twice a day as the tide rises and falls fresh water is forced into the creeks and channels and then drains out again.

Irrigation—often highly organized—has been a feature of Iraqi agriculture since the Sumerian civilization, in decline since the seventh century, and especially since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Serious reconstruction began in this century, with the Hindiya barrage, completed in 1913, for which the Euphrates was diverted, and the Kut barrage on the

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Diwaniya provinces. In 1949, a co-ordinated control program was introduced by the Iraqi government, and a Bilharzia Section was established within the national health organization. The section initiated a snail survey in the various endemic foci and research on the most effective methods of snail control. It carries on continuous snail destruction work through special units assigned to each of the infected provinces. 136 164 744

Plants. Little precise information is available regarding the prevalence of allergy-producing plants, but numerous weeds, grasses and trees, which have been incriminated in other countries, are present in districts with rainfall adequate to support such vegetation. 137 752

Occasional deaths, primarily among young children, have been traced to the consumption of the raw beans of *Vicia fava*, a prominent food crop throughout this region. The beans are toxic to susceptible individuals in the raw state. Plants of the *Senecio* group grow in sections of the northern highlands. The young green shoots are poisonous and sometimes cause fatalities among the livestock. 137 165 232

FOOD SANITATION

The government and municipal health authorities are responsible for the enforcement of regulations governing the sanitary quality of foods, meats and milk products, but the degree of enforcement varies in different localities. Health inspectors are charged with the supervision of establishments where foods are prepared or sold, such as foodshops, markets, restaurants and cafés, mineral-water bottling works and date-packing houses. Examinations for the presence of venereal diseases are theoretically required at regular intervals in the case of cooks and barbers, but no tests to detect other infections are carried out. 744

Meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter in the city abattoirs by officers of the government veterinary and health services. All carcasses offered for sale are supposed to bear an official stamp of

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

Fig. 13. Jewish types of the 9th century B.C., Jewish men bearing tribute from King Jehu to Shalmaneser II (taken from Salaman).

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Whereas the Sephardim migrated away from Hittite centres, the Aschkenasim, on their Northern migration through Anatolia and the Balkans, have mixed with Armenoid blood, which explains the fact first emphasized by *von Luschan* that so many Aschkenasim have Armenoid features[1]).

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I now come to a totally different sample of the Near East, the Kurds, the Caucasians and Persians.—

Here again the frequency curves bring light in many obscurities caused by the old system of using averages, which instead of emphasizing the differences between various components of a people obscures their analyses.

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EGYPT MR1
IRAQ MH1

E
174 144 Menes united the two and began the dynastic period. In Upper Egypt the best skeletal series of the predynastic period is from Naqada. These resemble somewhat the earlier Badarians. The Naqada men were fairly tall, 168 c.m., but their heads and faces were larger than those of the Badarians and their noses were smaller.

In Lower Egypt, the predynastic inhabitants were Mediterraneans. They had broader heads, higher cephalic indices, mean 75 %, than the people of Upper Egypt, mean 73%. During the next 3000 years, the Mediterraneans spread up the river and have largely replaced the older groups of Hamites from Upper Egypt. E

[141] 174 Modern Copts, who most nearly represent the ancient type, have diverged for the skull length has been reduced from 185 to 177 mm., and the head breadth has increased from 131 to 136 mm; the faces have increased in length from 124 to 129 mm., and there has been a narrowing of the nose. It can be stated, however, that these represent but minor changes. As Professor Morant points out, "Changes in physical type in any part of Europe within the last five hundred years have been much greater than in Egypt during five thousand."

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● 141 Modern Iraqians are taller than the Arabs of Arabia, for their statures range from 168 cm. in the Kish area to 171 cm. in the region of Kirkuk. The cephalic index is around 76. The Iraqi heads are long and narrow. The total facial height is moderate except in the north where it is much higher. Particularly is that true of the upper facial height. The facial widths are also moderate, except in Kirkuk and the North where the faces are very broad. The Iraqi noses are both longer and broader than those in Arabia.

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142 The hair form of Iraqis is usually low waves, is dark brown or black. Five per cent or less have a reddish hue. The beards are much heavier than in Arabia. As in Arabia the hair color is predominantly dark brown but Iraqis have 25% of mixed light hues, such as was previously noted for some of the Syrian Bedouin.

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39:Sharklin D-4 (no date) no date MI Middle East

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IRAQ MH1

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads;
their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-
dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking ''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

41 Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

NORTHERN 'IRAQ AND ITS PEOPLES

By MAJOR W. C. F. WILSON, O.B.E.

114 A lecture given before the Society on March 10, 1937, Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have much pleasure in introducing Major Wilson, who is going to speak to us on the subject of Northern 'Iraq and its peoples. He first served in 'Iraq under that very great officer, Sir Percy Cox, who recently passed away. Major Wilson rebuilt Kut after our victory over the Turks, and of recent years he has been administrative officer at Mosul; and can give us very up-to-date accounts of the Assyrian problem in Northern 'Iraq, and can also speak from first-hand knowledge of the Kurds and the other minorities of the country.

101 TO many who have never been to 'Iraq, the name, or its old alternative, Mesopotamia, possibly conjures up visions of flat, featureless plains, strips of cultivation along the banks of the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, sandstorms and a torrid climate. Such visions are in a fair measure true of central and southern 'Iraq, but are very far from applying to the two northern provinces of Arbil and Mosul.

Geography

133 From the Lesser Zab river northwards the country is undulating and intersected with watercourses or wādis, which after rain flow down to the Tigris and its half-dozen tributaries. This type of country extends right up to the foothills which fringe the mighty mountain mass of Kurdistan. Over this area, irrigation, except on the rivers for summer crops, is unnecessary, and the rainfall which comes between November and May is in most years sufficient for the cultivation of large crops of wheat and barley. In the spring, grazing for animals is plentiful and a wonderful assortment of wild flowers appear.

In the mountains, during the same period, heavy rain and snow fill the underground sources and provide water for the summer growing of rice, tobacco and other crops, and for good summer grazing for animals. These mountains contain several ranges 6,000 to 8,000 feet high and one peak near the Iranian frontier over 10,000 feet.

Population

144 The inhabitants of the two provinces consist of an extraordinarily heterogeneous collection of creeds and races with all the problems produced by such a collection.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

CHAPTER VI

THE ARABS OF MESOPOTAMIA

131 MESOPOTAMIA does not belong to Arabia 101 geographically. It lies to the north of the peninsula and includes the territory between the mountains of Asia Minor on the north, the mountains of Persia on the east, the Syrian desert on the west and the Persian Gulf on the south. The area enclosed between these limits is enormous. These are its natural boundaries, but politically the territory included takes in certain districts that belong to Persia and Turkey as 104 well as the kingdom of Mesopotamia. It is of interest 101 to include Mesopotamia in any discussion of Arab life, for although the Mesopotamians are not in Arabia geographically, nor even politically, racially they are Arabs as truly as the inhabitants of Nejd or the dwellers in the 197 valleys of Oman. Practically all of the inhabitants of 162 Mesopotamia are Arabic speaking and Arabic in origin, 101 the chief exceptions being the numerous Jews who have come into the country from the north and the small community of Sabaeans, or fire-worshippers, who are a remnant of the people that the Arabs found inhabiting the country. The Arab is the dominant element, and the others together would probably not amount to five per cent of the whole.

133 The character of the country is most easily understood if we start by saying that Mesopotamia is the enormous

LEVANTINE JEWS MF4
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CHERKESS AH5
KURD MA11

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ed in the empire of Saul, David and Solomon) is strongly mixed with Hebrew elements. Although their facial expression nowadays is different from the Jewish, the more hereditary—and in this case (brachycephaly)—even dominant head index has remained. That this people has also influenced the population of Mesopotamia appears from the Irakian curve in which the 80—80.9 peak characteristic of this desert border group is still outstanding (fig. 5).—



Fig. 13. Jewish types of the 9th century B.C., Jewish men bearing tribute from King Jehû to Shalmaneser II (taken from Salaman).

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[illegible] D-4 (no date) no date 141 Middle East

EGYPT MR 1
IRAQ MH 1

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29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

Iraq MHI

161 311 poverty probably unequalled anywhere in the world. Throughout the centuries, production has declined as neglect and misuse have drained the fertility from the soils and permitted salt to seep in and ruin for cultivation thousands of acres in this Garden of Eden.

● [146] 511 The people, undernourished and ravaged by disease, have degenerated as the land has deteriorated. One would never guess that the present inhabitants, oppressed by poverty and ignorance, were in any way related to those men who shaped the history of the world for so many centuries.[1] Many

[1] [Text continues on p. 88--Analyst]

Table 27

439

IRAQ: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports

1937, 1949, 1950, and 1951

Value

Item	1937	1949	1950	1951
	Per Cent			
Crude Petroleum	65	53	51	51
Barley	7	20	19	21
Dates	6	11	10	19
Others	22	16	20	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79	92	126	166

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund

Table 28

IRAQ: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports

1937, 1949, and 1950

Value

Country	1937	1949	1950
	Per Cent		
France	51	25	38
United Kingdom	18	14	12
United States	7	2	6
India	2	9	3
Netherlands		8	7
Others	22	42	34
Total	100	100	100

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

IRAQ MH 1

pal population centers and radiate from 489
Baghdad and Mosul to cities in Syria, Iran 491
and Turkey. The Tigris is navigable to 505
barges from Basra to Baghdad throughout
the year, and to smaller craft as far as
Mosul during the high-water season. The
Shatt al Arab is open to ocean-going vessels, and Basra, about 85 miles from the
Persian Gulf, is one of the major ports of
the Middle East. A government-operated 496
railroad, part of the famous "Berlin to
Baghdad" railway, runs from Basra to
Baghdad and Mosul, with connections
through Aleppo to Istanbul. A branch line
extends from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and
Khanaquin. A government-owned airline 509
serves Iraq and the neighboring countries,
while international lines from Europe to
Africa and the Far East stop at Baghdad
and Basra.

FOOD AND NUTRITION

The nutrition of the people is governed 146
by the cultural habits of the different racial
and social communities, the economic status
of the individual families and the food supplies available under diverse climatic conditions. Undernutrition is prevalent among
the poorer inhabitants—tenant cultivators,
urban laborers and nomadic tribes—who
make up over three quarters of the population. Wheat, barley, rice and dates are the 241
staple food crops of the country, while vegetables and fruits, other than dates, are frequently scarce. Wheat is widely grown, primarily in the rainfall areas of the north,
but also in the irrigated riverain zones of
the south. Barley is cultivated extensively,
and, like wheat, is used in the preparation [262]
of breads and of *burghul*, a coarse-grained
cereal product typical of this region. Millet
and maize are common crops in the south.
Rice is produced in certain lowland districts
in the Kurdish highlands and on the fringes
of the southern marshes, and is a popular
food among all sections of the population.
Peas, beans and lentils are usually consumed throughout the year, and tomatoes,
eggplant and different root and green vege-

p. 25(a)

244 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
334 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
853 particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

Mb 657 of a nutrition institute with facilities for research has been proposed.

Housing

342 The dwellings of the rural cultivators, the nomads and the townspeople show considerable variation, conforming to the social customs of the people and the building materials at hand. The villages in the rural areas are typically compact. In the central plains, the houses are usually constructed of sun-dried mud bricks, with flat roofs of palm trunks covered with mud or palm leaves. They may contain one or several rooms opening into a central courtyard, and in the more prosperous families they sometimes have two stories. The livestock are sheltered in sheds in the compounds, in close proximity to the household. Stone replaces mud bricks in many sections of the northern highlands, where the roofs are built of mud or timber. In the mountain districts the villages often nestle on the hillsides surrounded by series of cultivated terraces.

In the south, the houses are traditionally made of woven reeds or palm fronds, although the compounds may be enclosed within mud walls. Woven reed, or *serifa*, huts are used by the seasonal laborers in the date groves, and are being introduced to an increasing extent by impoverished migratory workers in the cities of central and southern Iraq. In 1950, it was estimated that there were at least 60,000 *serifa* dwellers in Baghdad and 20,000 in Basra. Huts are put up on any convenient vacant plot of land and are frequently interspersed among the modern homes in the residential sections. Such *serifa* settlements, in which the living conditions are primitive, create serious public health hazards. More elaborate reed houses, built on islands or on brushwood or reed rafts, are characteristic of the villages of the "marsh Arabs" in the rice-growing areas and swamplands of the southern delta. In contrast, the nomadic peoples live in black tents of hair cloth or skins, of a type which has persisted for centuries.

milk products, or from contact with in- 164
fected animals. From 5 to 97 cases were 232
treated annually in government institutions 758
in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination 742
of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to 164
the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 232
1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella
antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br.*
melitensis was isolated from 5 of the 13
samples from which bacteriologic cultures
were made.

DISEASES SPREAD CHIEFLY THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the 164
most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49,
from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and
from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuber-
culosis were recorded annually. Such figures
are of little value in assessing the problem,
however, due to inadequate reporting and
the shortage of diagnostic and treatment
facilities. Local authorities estimate that
the prevalence of latent or active infections
approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in
many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and
Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas.
Widespread undernutrition and low stand- 164
ards of living, associated with overcrowd- 146
ing and ignorance of the basic principles of 511
hygiene, are factors contributing to the 165
spread of the disease. The death rates are
known to be high, but little precise infor-
mation is available. It is believed that a
considerable number of tuberculosis deaths
are erroneously attributed to pneumonia
and other respiratory infections. Moreover, [183]
the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit
the presence of tuberculosis in the family
due to the stigma customarily attached to
the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an aver- 164
age of 760 cases were treated in government 758
hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of
about 25 per cent. The maximum number
of cases occurred in the group from 16 to
30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. 164
Involvement of the bones or the glands ac-
counts for a large proportion of the non-

p. 39(6)

only 1 case, in which the diagnosis was 164
confirmed by laboratory examination, had 369
been recorded. Potential sandfly vectors of kala-azar are apparently absent in the southern and the central provinces, but they may exist in the northern highlands.

Other Infections. Sandfly fever is endemic, 164
and, in the delta region, reaches epidemic proportions every few years. From 842 to 4,688 cases were recorded annually in 1944-49. The sandfly vector, ***Phlebotomus papatasii***, is widely distributed. The season of transmission usually extends from May to November, with a peak in June or July. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the south.

Cases of elephantiasis of undetermined origin are occasionally encountered, but *Wuchereria bancrofti* is not known to be
present. Guinea worm infections are sometimes [484]
seen in pilgrims from southern Iran, but no indigenous cases have been recorded.

NUTRITIONAL DISEASES

Undernutrition, anemia and avitaminosis 146
are prevalent, especially among the wage- 511
earning classes in the cities and the impoverished 361
peasants of the south. Clinical manifestations of vitamin A and vitamin C deficiencies are widespread. In general, serious nutritional diseases tend to be more or less localized in distribution, depending upon the dietary habits and the standards of living of the people. Rickets is common, and from 100 to 2,387 cases were treated annually in the government institutions in 1944-49. Cases of scurvy and of osteomalacia are numerous. Beriberi and pellagra are sporadic, but minor symptoms of riboflavin deficiency are frequently observed. Protein edema is rare. A form of cirrhosis of the liver is encountered in which malnutrition is believed by some authorities to be a contributory factor.

MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS

Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and large-scale 164
epidemics are reported occasionally. Encephalitis lethargica is sporadic.

p. 41 (A)

IRAQ MH1

THE DIETARY

146 standards of the different urban and rural peoples vary, but undernutrition and avitaminosis are widespread.

164 Malaria, schistosomiasis hematobia, trachoma and tuberculosis are of major public health importance. Enteric fevers, amebic and bacillary dysenteries, hookworm infection, helminthiasis, venereal diseases, rheumatic fever, pneumonia, cutaneous leishmaniasis and various skin and eye diseases are prevalent. Bejel is widely distributed among the nomadic and the seminomadic populations. Epidemics of smallpox and louseborne typhus occur almost annually. Localized outbreaks of diphtheria and meningococcus meningitis are sporadic. Measles,

p. 48(A)

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readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects 795
belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their 167
Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the 648
Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace 563
terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it 162
was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of
the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous
unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large
number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands
as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some
of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred
which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in
'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil,
British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however,
proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council
of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have
been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the
remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria
include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may [I
be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers 463]
of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks,
etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All
these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed
as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are
shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, I
hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are 147
liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught
up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

The Yezidis

Y
The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This 101
is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. 776
They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock 779
Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the 871
lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is 771
incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that
he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult
to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education,
save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is
311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only
312 twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians. The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims, three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians,
871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some
153 important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

through institutions of higher education, seems to develop into an extraordinary mental agility. Those who are politically articulate share a high concern for the future of Iraq as a nation. 181 153

A visitor to the country is also struck by a number of contradictions. Iraq has a brilliant cultural inheritance, yet the bulk of the population is illiterate. It is a country of great economic possibilities, yet the majority of the people exist at a meagre standard of life. The soil is of high fertility, yet it continues to be farmed by primitive methods. Above all, although the future prosperity of the country depends upon the application of science and power to the land, agricultural development is inhibited by a most unsatisfactory system of land tenure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Primary education on any large scale in Iraq is of recent growth. 872
It began with the traditional Arabic mullah school, in which small groups of boys under the direction of a religious teacher memorized religious lore in a monotonous and repetitive manner. Traces of this verbal technique are still obvious in many of the primary schools.

Under the Ottoman régime the nucleus of a schools system was introduced, and it is said that by 1913 there were some 6,000 children attending primary schools of a sort. Soon after the next military conquest the British promoted some further educational development and, in particular, substituted Arabic instead of the alien Turkish language as the medium of instruction. By 1921 there were reputed to be more than 15,000 children attending public primary schools.

It is significant, however, that no real approach to a system of public primary schooling was made until the nation took its educational affairs into its own hands. Since the meeting of the first Iraqi Parliament in 1925 a real impetus appears to have been given to the development of primary education. By 1931 there existed 316 public primary schools with an enrolment of some 35,000 pupils. By 1950 extraordinary quantitative progress had been made, for by that year 175,000 children were enrolled in over 1,000 public primary schools.

THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

By 1940 the development of primary education, and of higher education, had gone on at such a pace that it was necessary to 872 645

Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for 563
a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions. 166

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. 657 The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Ḥarir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian 563 —continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in 701 Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Maḥmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition for self-protection in their new homes. [57] The Levies, besides the contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads;
their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-
settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-
dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe,
and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least
numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory
is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded
the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no
other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription
purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban
community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or
benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas,
may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps
a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A
total of midway between two and two and a half million people
may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest
Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for
'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern
world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking
''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every
population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as
invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi
community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh
century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into
'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth
century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other
cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these,
too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

206 existed in Baṣra and Baghdad and their suburbs; and the telephone and telegraph had become familiar or indispensable to all classes save the most backward. The new wireless transmitting station completed in 1951 at Abu Ghurayb, with the most modern design and range, secured communication with Europe and America and was used for the national broadcasting. The Development Board planned an expenditure of ID 2 million on telecommunications between 1951 and 1956.

499 Progress in road improvement was delayed during 1946–50 by the financial narrowness of the post-war years. This and bridge-building formed an important part of the projects[1] intended for realization in 1951–6 through the Development Board. The completion of this programme would fundamentally transform the conditions of transport and travel in 'Iraq, with far-reaching economic consequences. The 'Nairn route' to Damascus was still
491 in regular use; its traffic was highly organized, with air-conditioned vehicles, by the original company and its imitators. The Rawanduz road was little used; the tracks leading into Najd and Persia carried no important traffic; and the trunk route to Jordan or Palestine (p. 321) lost its value when the State of Israel blocked the sea-outlet it had offered.

5. TOWN AND COUNTRY, MID-CENTURY

161 The population of 'Iraq, declared by the census of 1947 to be
162 4,800,000, had by then doubled since the century opened. Its distribution[2] was in general unchanged as between towns, inlying villages, tribal country districts, and nomads; about a quarter were town-dwellers, a fifteenth nomads, the remainder settled cultiva-
311 tors. Wide areas of steppe desert and of barren mountain remained, as for the foreseeable future they must, almost uninhabited; the widest of such regions, those of the administratively separated northern and southern provinces of the Shamiya desert, amounted to some two-fifths of 'Iraq's whole surface. The average density
161 of population for the whole territory was of the order of eleven persons to the square kilometre, or, omitting the desert provinces, eighteen. The liwā with the greatest population was that of Baghdad with 800,000 people; next came Diwaniya, Muntafiq, and 'Amara. The greatest density was of 49 persons to the square

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[1] The projects considered as 'main roads', with their bridges, were estimated to cost: Baṣra–'Amara–Kut–Baghdad, ID 2,800,000: Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil, 2,500,000: Baghdad–Sharqaṭ, 3,450,oo. Elsewhere, ID 4,450,000 was allotted for 'mountain roads', 6,176,000 for miscellaneous bridges, 1,550,000 for a Ḥilla–Najf road, 1,300,000 for Ḥilla–Diwaniya–Shamiya, and 5,250,000 for numerous other routes.

[2] For distribution of the population by administrative units, see Appendix B.

kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by 161 Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanage- 182 able public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some 795 progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt— [771] gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities.

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial— 563 within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

About four-fifths of the country consists of unproductive or slightly 311
productive desert, steppe, marsh and hill masses. The productive core 132
is divided broadly into two regions within which cultivation is practised
regularly. The northern region is fed by rainfall supplemented by peren- 312
nial streams rising in the mountains and, to a limited extent, by lift from the rivers. The southern region largely depends upon irrigation, supplied by canals drawn from the river system, following winter rainfall. The former may be appropriately called the Rainfall Zone, and the latter the Irrigation Zone. Actually the southward extension of the northern rainfall varies annually, while the date gardens of the Basra Liwa constitute a distinct (and of course economically a very important) study. But this does not affect the correctness of the broad picture presented.

Reference to Table I will show that the region of cultivated and cultivable land within the Rainfall Zone covers about 41,000 square kilometres, and that within the Irrigation Zone about 51,000 square kilometres. These figures represent 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total land surface of the country respectively. The cultivation is preponderantly of an extensive character. Only a fraction of these zones, possibly from a fifth to a tenth, appears to be actually cultivated in any given year. So that land is available for a very great development of agriculture, when other factors are favourable.

TABLE I. APPROXIMATE CLASSIFICATION OF LAND SURFACE, 1930

Expressed in square kilometres

[423]

Liwa	Total area all land	Hill mass	Cultivated Region				Additional potentially cultivable territory	Total cultivated and cultivable region	Territory containing tapu holdings	Size of holdings in misharas*			
			Rainfall Zone		Irrigation Zone								
			? 8% hill mass	Plains	Canal fed territory†	Machine fed territory†				1-100	101 to 500	501 to 1,000	Over 1,001
Mosul	45,800	9,350	190	14,580	—	—	270	15,040	7,870	—	—	—	—
Arbil	16,600	7,620	150	7,010	—	—	—	7,160	2,420	7,418	728	300	—
Sulimani	9,300	6,400	130	2,420	—	—	—	2,550	2,280	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	20,800	—	—	12,020	—	—	3,240	15,260	6,280	—	—	—	—
Diyala	16,200	—	—	710	2,760	90	260	3,820	3,410	4,092	—	546	—
Baghdad	22,100	—	—	—	1,710	2,370	790	4,870	1,500	162	220	120	360
Dulaim	124,500	—	—	—	920	630	20	1,570	920	2,344	109	121	3
Karbala	21,200	—	—	—	660	—	20	680	620	—	—	—	—
Hilla	8,100	—	—	—	4,570	330	1,630	6,530	2,380	452	364	98	82
Kut	16,400	—	—	—	4,680	3,860	2,170	10,710	2,560	—	—	—	—
Diwaniya	83,000	—	—	—	3,770	2,180	5,520	11,470	2,270	8,378	—	155	60
Muntafiq	38,700	—	—	—	4,440	270	370	5,080	6,200	—	—	—	—
Amara	19,700	—	—	—	5,670	1,010	—	6,680	110	—	10	5	30
Basra	10,900	—	—	—	610‡	60	110	780	1,190	—	—	—	—
Totals	453,500	23,370	470	36,740	29,790	10,700	14,500	92,200	40,090	—	—	—	—

*Where information was available. Such information must not be presumed to be exhaustive. A mishara = 2,500 sq. metres or thereabouts.

†Territories so classified are at present very incompletely irrigated. ‡Tidally watered date gardens.

The information given in the table regarding the size of holdings is derived from fiscal returns. Although the classification of these holdings by area cannot be expected to be accurate, the figures possibly give some indication of the frequency of larger and smaller holdings in the districts actually concerned. The latter must not be taken to coincide with the cultivated areas of the liwas themselves.

3. Agricultural Population

8. In any general study of the land tenure of a country it is desirable 161
to know the numbers and distribution of the agricultural population. 162
Thus it would greatly assist in planning development in el 'Iraq if trust-

161 worthy information was available as to the rural population, their main occupations (e.g. cultivation with type of crops, stock-keeping, fishing,
162 reed cutting, the numbers of the sedentary, semi-nomadic and truly nomadic population, etc.). The figures need not be closely accurate, but they should necessarily be sufficiently reliable relative approximations to allow dependable deductions to be drawn from them. But although continuous and painstaking efforts were made to satisfy this need by the liwa authorities, it has to be admitted that no basis exists for arriving at figures that can be utilised with any confidence. Table II contains the best estimates that the liwa authorities were able to furnish; and the Census Department was not in a position to give me any better material. I include the table, because it at least represents the best local opinion of the position under the various heads cited. It should perhaps be noted more particularly that it was found impossible to separate in any systematic way those engaged in urban, from those engaged in rural, pursuits. Finally, only the populations of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were excluded from the latter. This explains the misleading density figure for the Karbala Liwa. It should also be noted that the figures given for the agricultural population include all those engaged in rural occupations, other than genuine nomads.

TABLE II. APPROXIMATE POPULATION, 1930

Expressed in thousands

Liwa	Total estimated population	Three principal towns	Nomadic tribal sections	Rural Population			Mean Density per sq. kilom. cultivated region
				Settled	Tribal	Total	
Mosul ..	320	79	45	176	20	196	22
Arbil ..	106	—	3	47	56	103	15
Sulimani ..	94	—	15	51	28	79	37
Kirkuk ..	160	—	19	63	78	141	13
Diyala ..	240	—	1	79	160	239	67
Baghdad ..	388	219	3	93	74	167	98
Dulaim ..	147	—	39	39	49	88	95
Karbala ..	90	—	2	83	5	88	136
Hilla ..	103	—	—	30	73	103	21
Kut ..	170	—	—	60	110	170	20
Diwaniya ..	238	—	58	79	101	180	40
Muntafiq ..	340	—	20	25	295	320	72
Amara ..	238	—	—	36	202	238	36
Basra ..	190	46	10	34	100	134	264
Totals ..	2,824	344	234	895	1,351	2,246	36*

* Mean density total 76,000 sq. km. cultivated region.

So far as the figures can be accepted the mean density of the rural population per square kilometre of the cultivated region works out at about 19 in the four liwas of the Rainfall Zone, and at about 35 in the five most typical liwas of the Irrigation Zone. These figures are very low, especially for the potentially fertile irrigable lands of the latter; but there is no reason to think that they err on this side. However, it will be appreciated that dependable statistics of the agricultural population are needed to enable development of the country to be pursued to the greatest advantage and with the greatest economy.

166 The extreme mobility of the majority of the population, especially throughout the Irrigation Zone, is an important factor in the considera-
185 tion of development schemes of all sorts, having regard to the general sparsity of the population and the limited resources of the country. If work can be concentrated on such schemes in a few of the most suitable areas, and facilities can be given to the population to colonise them as opportunity and occasion justify, much more rapid and satisfactory results will be obtained for the same effort and expenditure in a given

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

Egypt MRI

any solid economic advance in el 'Iraq. The third is the introduction and maintenance of a simple, secure and equitable land tenure, which term should be understood to include an even and readily met revenue demand. This report is only directly concerned with the last need: but in studying it, its inter-relation to the other two must be continuously kept in mind. No development of the country's agricultural resources can expect to be successful which does not take all these three needs into consideration together.

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3. COMPARISON WITH EGYPT

8. During the progress of my inquiry comparisons were frequently instituted with Egypt, a country with many parallels to el 'Iraq both in its history and its natural conditions. Owing to the courtesy of the Egyptian Government I am able to compare in Table X the respective positions on certain salient points of el 'Iraq in 1929 and of Egypt in successive decades from 1882 onwards. It will be noted that during the last fifty years Egypt has more than doubled her population, added 30 per cent. to her cropped area, quadrupled her trade, and her budget, built up a substantial budgetary reserve, and largely absorbed her original external debt.

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TABLE X. COMPARATIVE FIGURES, EL 'IRAQ AND EGYPT

		EL 'IRAQ	EGYPT					
		1929	1882	1890	1900	1910	1920	1929
Population in millions		2·8*	6·8	8·2	10·1	11·8	13·2	14·4
Gross cultivable area, sq. km.		90,000	32.000					
Area cropped yearly, sq. km.		10.000	24.000*	27.000*	30.000*	32.000*	34.000*	36.000*
Imports	in lakhs of rupees	980	1.100	1.100	1.900	3.200	14.000	7.200
Exports		360	1.800	1.700	2.400	4.000	11.800	7.800
Re-exports		510†	14	40	80	60	350	190
Land Revenue		168	680‡	700‡	600‡	700‡	700‡	720‡
Customs Revenue		274	80	190	330	480	1.370	1.620
Total Budgetary Revenue		570	1.300	1.650	1.630	2.260	4.700	5.790
Total Budgetary Expenditure		560	1.230	1.560	1.500	2.340	4.000	5.690
Budgetary Reserve Fund				200	1,150	790	2.370	5.540
Debt §			10.900	13.100	13.000	13.100	12.900	12.400

*From ½ to ⅓ cropped twice. Net area cultivated in 1929 was 23,000 sq. km.
†Goods in transit, not included in imports.
‡Yield maintained constant on re-assessment following revenue settlement. Fluctuations due to remissions to unwatered land followed by extensions of irrigation.
§Mostly held in Egypt now.

Egypt is more favourably situated geographically than el 'Iraq; while Mahommed Ali Pasha did much to initiate early in the last century the reform of her land tenure which has proceeded since. And it will be seen that even fifty years ago Egypt was considerably more populous and wealthier than el 'Iraq is to-day. But el 'Iraq is by no means devoid of advantages also. She has Egypt's established success before her. Her cultivable area is larger and more diverse, so that she is in a better position to develop a varied export trade. She is free of unproductive debt and can devote all funds not absorbed by current needs, to productive purposes. And her petroliferous deposits provide her with special financial aid at the most useful moment. So that a comparable advance to that made by Egypt may be hoped for, if a comparable effort can be made.

The unavoidably lengthy duration of a general settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq has been emphasised several times in this report: although no precise estimate of the period required is practicable in the 000

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development.
161 With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its
resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north
and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the
country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide
large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is
inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
[135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq
possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap
source of power and raw materials essential to the development of
industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other
mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is
little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger
population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast
to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the
people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most
ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and
many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm
and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment
exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await
reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the
available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
[731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas;
and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is
hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water,
but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and
quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

438 country's foreign trade. Near it is the country's second largest oil field.

133 211 233 To the south and southwest of the irrigation zone lie the vast arid tracts known as the southern and northern deserts which comprise about 40 percent of the land area of Iraq. These are sparsely inhabited by roaming nomads who raise camels, goats and sheep and annually take their flocks into the river valleys in search of summer pasture.

II. The People

● 161 The first official census of the settled population in Iraq was taken in 1947 and preliminary statistics on the male and female population of each province have already been published.[1] The preliminary estimate of the enumerated population was approximately 4.6 million. This figure has been brought up to 4.8 million in the published statistics by adding a rough estimate of 200,000 for the nomads in Mosul province and in the provinces along the Euphrates. Like all other countries at a similar stage of development, Iraq has a very young population, about half being under the age of 20. Although no reliable vital statistics are available, all indications point on the one hand to a very high rate of mortality among infants and young children, and on the other, to a correspondingly high birth rate. Even under the present poor health conditions the population seems to have been increasing at a rate conjectured to be in the region of one to one and a half percent per annum. Whatever the present rate, however, it is clear that, if full advantage is taken of the ample opportunity to improve health

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[1] Considering the attendant difficulties, this census may be judged a success. The information about the people of Iraq which it has already yielded and, more especially, which it can yield when tabulation is completed, is without doubt far more reliable than any estimates previously made. However, as with most first attempts at census-taking, the results have to be interpreted with great caution. Besides the figures already published, the Mission had access to certain unpublished data on four provinces—Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra. Much of the description of the population which follows is based on this data, but it must be noted that, although allowance was made for the fact that these four provinces are a most imperfect cross-section of the country, this fact is an additional limitation to the validity of any but the broadest conclusions.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

conditions in the future, the rate could rise to two percent per 161
annum or even higher within a comparatively short period.
Obviously this possibility will have to be borne in mind in planning
the development of social services such as education and housing.
It also has important implications in agriculture. As the limited
supply of water is more fully utilized, most of the increase in population
may ultimately have to be absorbed in nonagricultural pursuits,
unless water is used much more efficiently than it is now.

As the standard of social services such as health and education 162
is higher in the cities and the opportunities for employment are [369]
more varied, the distinction between urban and rural population is
an important one in considering the age and sex distribution of
the people, their occupations and their standard of living. About
550,000 people live in the municipality of Baghdad, another 300,000
in the next three largest cities of Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk and
some 350,000 in other towns having a population of over 15,000.
Thus about 1.2 million people or a quarter of the population live
in sizeable urban communities. In addition, there are about a
hundred smaller municipalities having an aggregate population of
under half a million. These towns are usually the administrative 632
and market centers of the minor political subdivisions such as
qadhas and *nahiyas* and many of them are little more than large
villages; in many respects they form a semirural category intermediate
between the larger towns and the villages.

There has been a strong migration from the country to the 166
cities in recent years, particularly during the last war. The most 369
striking examples of this can be seen in Baghdad and Basra where
many thousands of "squatters" from Amara province are crowded
together in makeshift huts under extremely unhygienic conditions.
The peculiarly adverse conditions of life in Amara have made that
province the principal source of migrants to the large cities and,
indeed, to most parts of the country, but there has evidently been
a substantial movement from the rural areas in general. As it is 162
prima facie likely that these migrants would consist principally of
young adults or adolescents, especially men, it is not surprising
to find that the census shows a much higher proportion of the
very young (under 10) and the old (over 50) in the rural areas,
the disparity being even more marked among men than among

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1950

/31 ● /61 The territory of Iraq, which is shaped like an irregular triangle (see Map No. 1), covers an area of 435,223 square kilometres. At the time of the 1947 census, its population was 4,800,000 inhabitants, or 11 inhabitants per square kilometre.

/62 Over 75 per cent of the population of Iraq are Arabs. They live mainly in the centre and south of the country. The next most numerous inhabitants are the Kurds (over 15 per cent of the population), who live mainly in the north and especially in the region of Mosul. There are also some Persians, Armenians, Turks, Jews and others.

/33 The country, which is mountainous in the north and north-east, spreads out into the vast Mesopotamian plateau, which inclines gradually as it nears the Persian Gulf. This plateau, which was famous in ancient times for its network of irrigation channels, is now merely an arid steppe, and in some places even a desert.

Iraq is watered by the historic twin rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, which are the country's vital arteries. The Euphrates (Shatt el-Furat in Arabic) is approximately 3,000 kilometres long; its basin covers 673,000 square kilometres. The Tigris (Shatt el-Dijla), which is approximately 2,150 kilometres long, is joined by several tributaries, including the Shatt el-Gharraf, the Diyala, the Great Zab and the Little Zab. Its basin covers an area of 375,000 square kilometres. The Tigris and the Eu-

3.Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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The Uplands. This region, which approximately corresponds 133
to ancient Assyria, is undulating gravel steppe and rich ploughland, with some stone. Here, in an average year, the rainfall of 13 inches is sufficient to yield a winter crop without irrigation. In the districts of Kirkuk and Irbil, however, the rainfall is supplemented by the *kahriz* (underground water channels) system of water production, which is practised even more widely in Persia. Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk are respectively 703, 1,250, and 1,087 feet above sea-level.

Between the two rivers in this area and the south of lat. 36° N. is a wedge of uncultivable gypsum desert called al-Jezira (the Island).

The Mountain Belt. The crescent of mountain country included in the north-east frontier comprises the basins of the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, Greater Zab, and Khabur. It is peopled by Kurds, a hardy mountain race, living an entirely different life from the Arabs of the plain and uplands. Villages are stone-built and shelved into the sides of the hills, with tall silver poplars and terraced cultivation, including vineyards and tobacco. Large areas of mountainside are covered with scrub oak; the summits provide summer pastures.

Between the Euphrates valley and the western frontiers is a large section of al-Badia, the Syrian Desert, populated only by nomad tribes of bedouin with their flocks and camels.

Climate. The climate of Iraq is extreme. In the plains the 132
January mean temperature is 44–52°F.; in July, 86–96°F. In the mountains altitude decreases temperature in both seasons and increases the rainfall to as much as 40 inches.

The importance of Iraq's geographical situation has been 131
obvious since Alexander's armies linked Europe with India twenty-two centuries ago. Through it ran not only the shortest but the easiest routes from southern Europe to the Persian Gulf and to India until the discovery of the Cape route. From the time of the Babylonian empire the trade of the Far East tended to pass through Iraq to the Levant ports on the Mediterranean. In the nineteenth century the desire to control or to prevent others controlling this route involved Great Britain, Russia, and Germany in attempts to dominate Iraq. The discovery of oil and the growth of air communications in the twentieth century have given the country a positive place in the political framework of the world and the former has provided the resources to transform it into a progressive modern nation.

The People

Population Statistics. The single official census that has been 161

161 taken, in 1947, gave the total population as 4,799,500; before that there were periodical official estimates as follows:

1930	2,824,000
1935	3,560,000
1943	3,995,000

The present population is probably about 5 million. According to the census, Baghdad has a population of 364,000, Mosul 302,000, Basra 94,000, and Kirkuk 69,000, Hilla being the only other town of over 50,000 inhabitants. Significant figures for density of population could be determined only after defining habitable land and distinguishing rural populations; the accepted density figure for the country as a whole (27·4 per square mile) means little. In the total cultivable area as calculated by an English authority the average density is 102 per square mile, but in many areas the density is much more than this for the rural population alone, and in the Baghdad and Basra districts exceeds 300 and 800 respectively per square mile.

163 165 164 *Vital Statistics*. For a number of reasons, which include the inaccessibility of large areas of Iraq and the lack of doctors in the rural districts, vital statistics are not available for the country as a whole. Statistics of possibly fair accuracy are, however, published for the population of some 1,160,000 served by the health centres in the main cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul; the latest, compiled for 1950, show a birth-rate of 27 and a death-rate of 12 per 1,000, with an infant mortality figure of 97 per 1,000 live births. The main causes of death were stated as old age, respiratory diseases other than tuberculosis, malaria, heart diseases, and tuberculosis.

197 *Language*. Arabic is the official and most widely spoken language. The 800,000 odd Kurds speak an Iranian language in various forms. Turkish dialects are spoken in Irbil, Kirkuk, to some extent in Khanaqin and in smaller intervening towns, and Syriac by Christian communities in northern Iraq. Other minority languages, such as Armenian, also occur, while in the Holy Cities of the south (Kerbela and Najaf) Persian is widely spoken.

Religions[1]

642 The constitution declares Islam to be the official religion of the state, but guarantees complete freedom of conscience and worship in conformity with accepted customs subject only to the maintenance of public order and morality, declares the absolute equality of all Iraqis before the law, gives communities

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[1] See above, p. 51ff.

Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312
water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423
are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427
There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24
per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [201]
on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators.
This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423
disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433
perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185
which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464
reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large 166
farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery
is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the [161]
cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 MJ Middle East
/ Iraq MHI

161 As far as population is concerned, the great cities are only a small fraction of Mesopotamia, for the last census gives the population of the entire country as 2,849,282, and that of the three cities of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul combined is probably not much over 350,000.

177 Much of the material advance in these Mesopotamian cities is, of course, an indirect outcome of the Great War. Few countries anywhere were more affected by the changes that the war brought in its wake. It is impossible to hazard a guess as to the ultimate effect of the last ten years' catastrophic happenings in Mesopotamia. Western civilization in its strong and unfortunately too often in its bad aspects has poured in on that country like a flood. Whether the various campaigns of the war and the whole influence of the English occupation, benevolent and efficient as it is, have resulted in genuine progress is difficult to say. Under the Turks, who had governed the three *vilayets,* or districts, of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul for hundreds of years as a part of the Turkish empire, the original Arab system of government had been changed very considerably. Since the war that change has been carried much farther by the British Government. In general terms, Mesopotamia was administered by Great Britian under a mandate at first, and later in 1921 a constitutional monarchy was created with an Arab ruler, Feisul, son of King Husein of Hejaz, on the throne. Religious liberty was guaranteed by the Constitution adopted at that time. A modern parliamentary government was set up, with more or less the same organization, codified law and court procedure that we are used to at home. It is open to question whether this is in accordance with the genius of the Arab race or whether it is not imposing an alien system on the coun-

25c Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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811 which now amounts to one million acres. More might be added
by water storage schemes. At present several large new schemes
812 are under consideration. These involve flood control by the
construction of the Bekhme dam on the Great Zab, and an extension
of the Habbaniya reservoir. In addition to the Bekhme
dam a scheme for flood irrigation in the Wadi Tharthar is being
considered. A survey commission is now preparing a report on
these developments, but so far no estimates have been made of
the area of land likely to be brought into cultivation.

464 At present there is no shortage of labour. The population is
small in relation to the area cropped, but it is growing rapidly.
161 In 1931, according to Dowson, the total population was
162 2,824,000, of which 2,246,000 were estimated to be rural, including
895,000 settled population and 1,351,000 still living in
tribal conditions.[1] Estimates for 1943 put the total population at
4,500,000, of which the rural population was 3,500,000. Some
regions, Basra, Karbala, Dulaim, and Muntafiq are densely
settled, while others, chiefly in the north, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk,
811 are settled very sparsely. The area of cropped land per head is 2
acres, and the area of cultivated land perhaps as much as 4 acres.

LAND TENURE

432 It is clear that Iraq has greater prospects of agricultural expansion
than any other Middle East country. But to the deve-
423 lopment of these potentialities the greatest obstacle is land
tenure. Sir Ernest Dowson, in his classical report on the subject,
says: 'The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty
and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country
and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly
or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know
many individual cases in which the development and use of the
land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity
and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would
be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of
holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free
000 from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort
of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy
conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the

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[1] Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth Garden City Press for the Iraqi Government, 1932), p. 12.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Iraq MHI

CHAPTER III

COTTON IN IRAQ

Iraq today is on the verge of a great transformation—from a land of want to a land of plenty. Probably the greatest rehabilitation program that has ever been undertaken in any country is in progress to make the Garden of Eden bloom again. 000

For generations the lack of capital had been the greatest limitation to the country's progress. Now tremendous new sums created by oil royalties are being spent in building large-scale irrigation works, constructing roads, financing industries, and improving the health and education of the people.

Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the first World War, the people have manifested a strong and continuing interest in improving their country. A great deal was done by the British during the period of their mandate, especially in the field of transportation. Probably even more was done by King Faisal when the country became a sovereign constitutional monarchy after the end of the mandate in 1932. For instance, in the last two decades the number of schools increased about seven times. More important, the people, for the first time in recent history, showed real interest in general economic improvements. More capital probably was invested in industry in the past 25 years than for several preceding centuries.

The need and the opportunity are both apparent. On the one hand, the resources are abundant. Iraq is a fairly large country of some 175,000 square miles, the size of Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, about two-thirds of which are deserts and mountains unfit for intensive cultivation. Another 35,000 square miles, about 20 per cent of the land area, are in the Tigris-Euphrates lowlands, the largest alluvial area in the world, almost twice the size of the deltas of Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana combined. Extensive highlands between the lowlands and the mountains are excellent for cultivation. 133

BACKGROUND

This great Mesopotamia, or "land between the rivers," was once one of the wealthiest regions of the world—the home of Adam and Eve, the Sumerian princes, Nebuchadnezzar, and the Arabian Nights, and the site of Babylon and Nineveh. This land has fostered at least three distinct civilizations through 5,000 years of history, and it cradled our present Western society. 100

These fertile soils are said by historians to have supported 15 to 20 million people in Biblical days. Now 5 million struggle to keep alive amidst 161 311

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

161 311 poverty probably unequalled anywhere in the world. Throughout the centuries, production has declined as neglect and misuse have drained the fertility from the soils and permitted salt to seep in and ruin for cultivation thousands of acres in this Garden of Eden.

[146] 511 The people, undernourished and ravaged by disease, have degenerated as the land has deteriorated. One would never guess that the present inhabitants, oppressed by poverty and ignorance, were in any way related to those men who shaped the history of the world for so many centuries.[1] Many

[1] [Text continues on p. 88--Analyst]

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Table 27

IRAQ: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports

1937, 1949, 1950, and 1951

Value

Item	1937	1949	1950	1951
	Per Cent			
Crude Petroleum	65	53	51	51
Barley	7	20	19	21
Dates	6	11	10	19
Others	22	16	20	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79	92	126	166

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

Table 28

IRAQ: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports

1937, 1949, and 1950

Value

Country	1937	1949	1950
	Per Cent		
France	51	25	38
United Kingdom	18	14	12
United States	7	2	6
India	2	9	3
Netherlands		8	7
Others	22	42	34
Total	100	100	100

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

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647 652 185 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the direct beneficiaries. It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenues resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

000 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the close of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of the departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralized and made available more directly and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

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642 131 ● 161 431 423 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income per capita does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate the distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary of tribal chiefs.

433 185 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

657 185 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing the standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

Chapter X

OIL AND DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ

IRAQ MAY SERVE as an excellent study of the relation 000 between oil production and the social and economic patterns of an underdeveloped country. Production of oil began almost simultaneously with the emergence of the independent state. Though Iraq's social and economic traditions were set when it was part of the Ottoman Empire and seriously bedeviled the growth and development of the new kingdom, the special Iraqi national patterns were being molded during the very period the oil was flowing in ever increasing quantity through pipelines hundreds of miles long to world markets. Moreover, Iraq had the benefit of Western guidance, the British administration, at first, and advice afterwards; yet during the first twenty-five years of oil production it would seem that the country did not progress as spectacularly as the oil figures (from 45,000 tons in 1927, to some 28,000,000 tons in 1953). The basic obstacles to the rapid social and economic development of the people and the transformation of the country could apparently not be overcome by the mere availability of oil, some technical knowledge, and royalties from the oil industry.

Before drawing any conclusions, we should examine some fundamental facts about the country, the people, and the factors which operated in Iraq to create the conditions prevailing there.

Land and People

The area of Iraq is about 175,000 square miles, and it has [131 161] a population of approximately 5,000,000 people.[1] Because of the lack of sufficiently reliable data, as well as the cultivation 311

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[1] Tabulations of the returns of the first census, taken on Oct. 19, 1947, showed a population of 4,799,500. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, *International Reference Service*, Dec. 1948, 2.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

creased. Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Iraq has all the 311
necessary requisites for a sound and rapid economic development, especially in the agricultural sector. It has a very considerable quantity of land ready for immediate cultivation, so defined by the most conservative standards, and with modern methods very great stretches now defined as uncultivable could
be improved and brought into the cultivable class; it has an 3N–
abundance of water for irrigation as well as for power, and it has at its disposal enormous quantities of cheap fuel both in petroleum and natural gas.

What, then, have been the economic, educational, health and 161
social conditions of the country? As regards the size and growth of the population, even today, more than thirty years since the creation of the Kingdom of Iraq, it would be very difficult to state categorically the percentage increase of the population. The accuracy of the figure advanced by the October 1947 census has been questioned by the International Bank Mission.[7]

Despite substantial strides in public health—an increased 165
number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors—during the first 164
thirty years of the existence of the Kingdom, the Bank Mission reported in 1951 that the infant mortality rate was very high, "perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births," and that there was a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and dysentery. Malaria was reported to cause 50,000 deaths every year. In 1948 no less than 6,657,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated.
Of these, 603,698 were malaria and 524,740 trachoma.[8] In 1944 759
the total number of doctors in the country was 528; in 1951 it was reported that there was one doctor to every 7,000 in the population, which would make a total of about 915 doctors, but a large percentage of them were concentrated in Bagdad.[9]

There can be no doubt that educationally the country pro- 871
gressed considerably from the stage in which it was in 1921, but all in all the sum total was not very impressive; the rate of

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[7] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 126.

[8] *Ibid.*, 49.

[9] *Ibid.*, 53; Hashim Al Witry, *Health Services in Iraq* (1944), 8. In 1945 there were, according to a British report, 569 doctors registered in Iraq. Since 308 were in Bagdad, this made approximately one doctor for every 15,400 in the population in the provinces, and one doctor to every 2,700 in Bagdad. Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, *Iraq* (1949), 30-31.

132 year in the plains of the delta region and 12 to 16 inches in the upland districts, while in some sections of the mountains it increases to around 50 inches. The summer temperatures are uniformly high and may reach 110° to 125° F. in the central and the southern provinces. The daily fluctuations are slight in the Gulf region, but they become more pronounced toward the interior. During the winter months snows are rare outside the highland districts, but frosts are occasionally encountered as far south as Basra. In January, the coldest month, the mean maximum temperature averages 60° to 65° F. at Basra, 58° to 61° F. at Baghdad and 50° to 55° F. at Mosul; the mean minimum temperature, 38° to 42° F., 44° to 47° F. and 34° to 36° F., respectively. The mean maximum temperatures approximate 104° to 110° F. in all 3 localities in July, while the mean minimum temperatures range from 76° to 82° F. in Basra to 72° to 75° F. in Mosul. In midsummer the mean daily relative humidity rarely rises above 25 to 35 per cent on the plains, although it is often excessive in the Gulf area. Northwest winds, known locally as the *shamal*, blow irregularly throughout the year. They are especially strong and desiccating during the summer months, and, in the south, are usually laden with dust and sand.

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

161 The population, according to the official census for 1947, was estimated at 4,799,500, including an unknown number of Bedouin, roughly calculated at about 250,000. The majority of the inhabitants are of mixed Arabic stock, representing a relatively homogeneous blend of ancient Semitic and Indo-European strains which has evolved over
162 centuries of successive conquests. About 95
795 per cent of the people are Moslems; slightly over one half are Shiites; and most of the
[131] remainder are Sunnites. The Kurds, who

p. 22(A)

IRAQ MH1

Sephardic origin. The majority have since 593
migrated to Israel, while probably less than 162
10,000 remain, subject to certain restrictions.
Over 130,000 were transported to
Israel by the Iraqi government in 1950-51.
About 5,000 Palestinian refugees have settled
in the country since the Arab-Israeli
conflict in 1948. Small numbers of British,
American and other nationalities also reside
in the larger cities.

As a whole, Iraq is sparsely settled, with 361
the population concentrated in the river 161
valleys and in the rain-irrigated highland
districts of the north. The most densely
populated areas are found in the river
valleys of the northern delta. In 1947, the
density of population in the provinces of
the upper delta region was calculated at 131
per square mile in Hilla and 104 in Baghdad.
In the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk
and Erbil it averaged 31 to 39 per square
mile, and in Sulaimaniya, on the eastern
frontier, 62 per square mile. In the south,
it ranged from 75 per square mile in Basra
province to 42 in Amarah, while in Dulaim,
on the upper reaches of the Euphrates, it
did not exceed 10 per square mile. The population 369
is essentially rural: over three quarters 161
of the inhabitants live in some 8,000
small villages or in semipermanent settlements.
The Bedouin, representing about 5 [464]
to 8 per cent of the total population, roam
the deserts with their flocks, but many migrate
seasonally to the towns in search of
work. There are only 7 cities with over 369
40,000 inhabitants. The population of 162
Baghdad, the capital, was estimated at
between 900,000 and 1 million in 1952,
including over 500,000 in the metropolitan
area and several hundred thousand in the
surrounding suburbs. The population of
Mosul, a commercial center on the upper
Tigris, totaled about 150,000, and of Kirkuk,
the metropolis of the oil region, almost
75,000. Basra, the chief port, located on the
Shatt al Arab, had a population of 90,000
to 100,000.

In spite of considerable progress in edu- 212
cation within the last 30 years, the majority 872

p. 23(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

SUMMARY

Iraq encompasses the valleys of the 131
Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and is as- 161 ●
sociated historically with Mesopotamia, the 433
home of one of the oldest civilizations on
record. It has been an independent sover-
eign state since 1932. The population, which
was estimated at 4,799,500 in 1947, is 95
per cent Moslem and predominantly Arab.
Extensive petroleum resources and date cul-
tivation contribute to the wealth of the
country, which is still relatively underde-
veloped in other respects. The public health 744
activities of the Iraqi government are cen-
tralized in the Ministry of Health, with
headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry is
responsible for the maintenance of preven-
tive and curative services, which are carried
out in the provinces through subordinate
provincial organizations. Municipal depart-
ments exist in Baghdad and the principal
cities, but in other areas the enforcement
of sanitary regulations devolves upon the
government officers. In 1950, there were 82 743
civilian hospitals in the country, with an
aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly
more than 1 bed per 1,000 population.
Almost one half of the total beds were lo-
cated in the Baghdad area. Approximately
82 per cent of the hospitals are supported
by the government. Also in 1950, 433 dis-
pensaries were functioning in various parts
of the provinces, 403 under the jurisdiction
of the government health authorities.

The water supplies in the towns and the 312
villages of the alluvial plain are derived
from rivers, canals, lakes and wells; in the
northern highlands, from streams, springs
and wells. All the urban supplies are ob-
tained from rivers, except in Erbil and
Sulaimaniya, where spring sources are util-
ized. The water supplies of the larger cities
are treated, but those in the rural areas are
unprotected and often polluted. There are 314
no sewerage systems. In the cities, cesspits
and septic tanks are employed for the dis-
posal of sewage; in the rural villages, the
means are more primitive. The dietary 880

p. 47(B)

433, 162, 464, 439
●

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
● Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2
Israel	MF1

/For an account of the economic effects of industrialization after World War II and information on industrial output in countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonne, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 293-298, p. 309, Turkey - pp. 298-300, 307-308, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 300-302, 309-310, Palestine - pp. 302-304, Israel - pp. 310-311./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads;
their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled
shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-dwellers,
then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe,
and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least
numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory
is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded
the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no
other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription
purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban
community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or
benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas,
may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps
a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A
total of midway between two and two and a half million people
may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest
Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for
'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern
world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking
''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every
population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as
invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi
community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh
century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into
'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth
century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other
cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these,
too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

184 the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged
795 generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i,
[578] while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated.
Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and
their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little
social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own
will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided
by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government
itself.

563 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of
162 the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—
perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which
occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the
Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid
Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of
563 which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear
621 racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement
and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority
to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in
character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled
them in a social organization which represented an identical
response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with
sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes;
but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or
district interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to
detribalization. About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided
into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the
whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur.
563 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds
795 of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their
197 homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of
the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan
Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran
between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan
(Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other
two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and
speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary
status.

563 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long
621 been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual
encroachment by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil,
and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for
563 the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley
dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish
Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

established at every qadhā and naḥiya; and the Kurds, in turn, 563
supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in 563
type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, 181
fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay
in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been 795
reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal 563
organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, 621
Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Ṭuz 181
Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shi'ism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined 563
almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with 162
184

563 the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of
162 the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few
184 households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, Kadhimiya,
Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to
which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian
and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar,
from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively
town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more unmanageable
[795] because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to
'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni
empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and
[463] Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These
hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk, with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boatbuilders in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever running water was available for their rites. Their origins and beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants 563
had been largely driven from the field. Western education was 162
widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish
progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The 184
community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was
treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities
and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying
avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position
and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little 563
from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to 795
official Millets headed locally by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch.
Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous 162
in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nes- 184
torians, few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Amadiya qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nestorians, had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians, whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq. The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but not in lower 'Iraq, specialized in retail commerce, hotel-keeping, artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number
of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had [463]
long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually schools, served for long years past by the missions of European churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls' schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, 563
were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by 162
families whose property or politics constrained them to live there, by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

563 ●162 perhaps a fifth part of the military forces and a tenth of the gendarmerie. But this minority was disproportionately powerful by dint of the authority of Government, and by the contact of its leaders with the ante-rooms of Istanbul and with Turkish culture. [177] It followed that some 'Iraqis, but not many, were thus attracted to the prestige of Turkish circles and all they signified, and, before the day of an Arab nationalism—or even after it—identified themselves with that element. Turkish was everywhere the language of Government, the courts, and the State schools.

3. PERSIAN AND ARABIAN NEIGHBOURS

648 With their Persian neighbour, Turkey and 'Iraq had a long tradition of discord. If, by the nineteenth century, the days of major aggressive war were over, there remained material for ill will between two unsympathetic peoples who differed in language, culture, and character. This was not diminished by the Persian Consular representatives—some of dubious status—at a dozen of the 'Iraq cities. The two Empires, devoted respectively to the Sunni and Shi'i faiths, were passing also through different stages of their evolution: Turkey struggling with modernism and western aspirations, Persia still medieval and uneasy with half-independent vassals in her midst. Reaction in its crudest forms was in the ascendant at Teheran since the accession in 1896 of the amiable spendthrift Mud͟haffar al-Din Shah.

The frontier itself had proved a major irritant. Its line had been settled by nothing more stable than the fortunes of many wars and the fickle adherences of tribes. It cut through the featureless flatlands east of the lower Tigris and across the tumbled mountains of Kurdistan; it divided homogeneous peoples, often migratory and always incapable of loyalty to a distant throne. The 1847 Treaty of Erzerum had been followed by thirty years of conventions, commissions, and map-making, and by as many, in the last quarter of the century, of minor forays, counter-interventions, and angry protests. The close of the century found the Turks still claiming Persian-occupied towns and valleys—Urmiya, Wazna, Bana, Sardasht, Zuhab—and the Persians demanding the Gul'ambar Plain, the Hawraman Mountain, and lands near Khaniqin. These squabbles, which forbade all border tranquillity, were echoed in the extreme south by the pretensions of both to possess the shoals and islands of the Shaṭṭ. Turkish claims to Muḥammara had indeed by now been abandoned; but jealousies and reprisals on the Shaṭṭ offered a fertile field for piracy, which led in turn to British intervention, the threat of a British Consul at Fao, and the stationing of a gunboat on the river in 1898.

The great pilgrimages by Persians to Najf, Karbalā, Kad͟himiya

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 439
'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry, and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the 452
exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies, and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on
the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the 436
National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and 241
was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. [162]
Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi
farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to 185
solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting. New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

206 existed in Baṣra and Baghdad and their suburbs; and the telephone and telegraph had become familiar or indispensable to all classes save the most backward. The new wireless transmitting station completed in 1951 at Abu Ghurayb, with the most modern design and range, secured communication with Europe and America and was used for the national broadcasting. The Development Board planned an expenditure of ID 2 million on telecommunications between 1951 and 1956.

499 Progress in road improvement was delayed during 1946–50 by
the financial narrowness of the post-war years. This and bridge-
building formed an important part of the projects[1] intended for
realization in 1951–6 through the Development Board. The
completion of this programme would fundamentally transform the
conditions of transport and travel in 'Iraq, with far-reaching
economic consequences. The 'Nairn route' to Damascus was still
491 in regular use; its traffic was highly organized, with air-conditioned
vehicles, by the original company and its imitators. The Rawanduz
road was little used; the tracks leading into Najd and Persia carried
no important traffic; and the trunk route to Jordan or Palestine
(p. 321) lost its value when the State of Israel blocked the sea-outlet
it had offered.

5. TOWN AND COUNTRY MID-CENTURY

161 The population of 'Iraq, declared by the census of 1947 to be
162 4,800,000, had by then doubled since the century opened. Its dis-
tribution[2] was in general unchanged as between towns, inlying
villages, tribal country districts, and nomads; about a quarter were
town-dwellers, a fifteenth nomads, the remainder settled cultiva-
311 tors. Wide areas of steppe desert and of barren mountain remained,
as for the foreseeable future they must, almost uninhabited; the
widest of such regions, those of the administratively separated
northern and southern provinces of the Shamiya desert, amounted
161 to some two-fifths of 'Iraq's whole surface. The average density
of population for the whole territory was of the order of eleven
persons to the square kilometre, or, omitting the desert provinces,
eighteen. The liwā with the greatest population was that of
Baghdad with 800,000 people; next came Diwaniya, Muntafiq,
and 'Amara. The greatest density was of 49 persons to the square

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[1] The projects considered as 'main roads', with their bridges, were estimated to cost: Baṣra–'Amara–Kut–Baghdad, ID 2,800,000: Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil, 2,500,000: Baghdad–Sharqaṭ, 3,450,00. Elsewhere, ID 4,450,000 was allotted for 'mountain roads', 6,176,000 for miscellaneous bridges, 1,550,000 for a Ḥilla–Najf road, 1,300,000 for Ḥilla–Diwaniya–Shamiya, and 5,250,000 for numerous other routes.

[2] For distribution of the population by administrative units, see Appendix B.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX B

Table showing (1) *area and population of each liwā;* (2) *qadhās of each liwā, including H.Q. area;* (3) *area* (*sq. km.*) *of each qadhā;* (4) *population of each qadhā.*

631
162
361

Liwā	*Area in sq. km.*	*Population*	*Qadhās with* (1) *area,* (2) *population*
Baghdad	20,000	805,000	Baghdad (1,900: 552,000); Kadhimiya (1,100: 114,000); Samarrā (15,600: 91,000); Maḥmudiya (1,450: 48,500).
Mosul	48,000	602,000	Mosul (12,900: 340,000); 'Amadiya (2,700: 50,000); Zakho (2,250: 37,000); Dohuk (2,250: 40,000); 'Aqra (1,950: 32,000); Sinjar (16,900: 32,000); Shaykhan (1,400: 24,700); Tall 'Afar (8,250: 45,500).
Baṣra	12,300	352,000	Baṣra (4,700: 206,000); Abu al-Khaṣib (4,000: 81,000); Qurna (3,650: 65,000).
Kirkuk	19,900	286,000	Kirkuk (7,000: 148,000); Kifri (5,300: 48,000); Chamchamal (2,400: 30,000); Ta'uq (5,200: 59,000).
Arbil	18,400	240,000	Arbil (3,500: 86,000); Makhmur (3,500: 44,000); Keui Sānjaq (1,900: 31,000); Rawanduz (5,500: 46,000); Raniya (2,100: 27,000); Zibar (1,950: 6,600).
Sulaymaniya	9,400	223,000	Sulaymaniya (3,000: 77,600); Ḥalabja (3,100: 71,000); Shahribazar (2,000: 38,000); Pishdar (1,250: 35,600).
Dulaym (H.Q., Ramadi)	45,400	193,000	Ramadi (15,600: 111,000); Faluja (4,750: 49,000); 'Ana (25,000: 33,600).
Ḥilla	5,300	262,000	Ḥilla (960: 81,000); Hashimiya (1,900: 52,000); Hindiya (1,200: 82,000); Musayib (1,200: 46,000).
Kut	16,000	225,000	Kut (4,000: 82,000); Ḥai (3,000: 67,500); Badra (3,800: 16,200); Ṣuwayra (5,250: 59,250).
Karbalā	6,000	277,000	Karbalā (5,600: 150,000); Najf (400: 127,000).
Diwaniya	14,900	384,000	Diwaniya (1,800: 63,000); Samawa (4,700: 82,000); Shamiya (2,900: 114,000); Abu Ṣukhayr (1,300: 79,000); 'Afaq (4,200: 46,000).
Muntafiq (H.Q., Naṣiriya)	14,150	370,000	Naṣiriya (5,500: 111,000); Rifa'i (3,200: 82,000); Suq al-Shuyukh (3,800: 109,000); Shaṭra (1,600: 68,000).
Diyalā (H.Q., Ba'quba)	16,000	273,500	Ba'quba (2,050: 94,500); Khaliṣ (3,600: 69,000); Khaniqin (3,750: 57,000); Mandali (6,500: 53,000).
'Amara	18,750	308,000	'Amara (8,650: 184,000); 'Ali al-Gharbi (5,750: 36,000); Qal'at Ṣaliḥ (4,350: 88,500).
Northern desert province	94,700		Population nomadic, and included in adjacent liwās.
Southern desert province	75,700		

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About four-fifths of the country consists of unproductive or slightly 311
productive desert, steppe, marsh and hill masses. The productive core 132
is divided broadly into two regions within which cultivation is practised
regularly. The northern region is fed by rainfall supplemented by peren- 312
nial streams rising in the mountains and, to a limited extent, by lift from
the rivers. The southern region largely depends upon irrigation, supplied
by canals drawn from the river system, following winter rainfall. The
former may be appropriately called the Rainfall Zone, and the latter
the Irrigation Zone. Actually the southward extension of the northern
rainfall varies annually, while the date gardens of the Basra Liwa constitute a distinct (and of course economically a very important) study.
But this does not affect the correctness of the broad picture presented.

Reference to Table I will show that the region of cultivated and cultivable land within the Rainfall Zone covers about 41,000 square kilometres, and that within the Irrigation Zone about 51,000 square kilometres. These figures represent 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total land surface of the country respectively. The cultivation is preponderantly of an extensive character. Only a fraction of these zones, possibly from a fifth to a tenth, appears to be actually cultivated in any given year. So that land is available for a very great development of agriculture, when other factors are favourable.

TABLE I. APPROXIMATE CLASSIFICATION OF LAND SURFACE, 1930 [423]

Expressed in square kilometres

Liwa	Total area all land	Hill mass	Cultivated Regions				Additional potentially cultivable territory	Total cultivated and cultivable region	Territory containing tapu holdings	Size of holdings in mishara*			
			Rainfall Zone		Irrigation Zone								
			? 2% hill mass	Plains	Canal fed territory†	Machine fed territory†				1-100	101 to 500	501 to 1,000	Over 1,001
Mosul	45,900	9,300	190	14,560	—	—	370	15,040	7,670	—	—	—	—
Arbil	16,600	7,620	150	7,010	—	—	—	7,160	2,420	7,418	728	300	—
Sulaimani	9,500	6,400	130	2,430	—	—	—	2,550	2,280	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	20,800	—	—	12,030	—	—	3,240	15,280	6,280	—	—	—	—
Diyala	16,900	—	—	710	2,760	90	360	3,820	3,410	4,092	—	546	—
Baghdad	22,100	—	—	—	1,710	2,270	880	4,870	1,500	162	220	120	380
Dulaim	124,500	—	—	—	930	630	20	1,570	920	2,344	109	121	3
Karbala	21,300	—	—	—	660	—	20	680	620	—	—	—	—
Hilla	5,100	—	—	—	4,570	330	1,630	6,530	2,380	452	364	98	82
Kut	16,800	—	—	—	4,680	3,860	2,170	10,710	2,580	—	—	—	—
Diwaniya	83,000	—	—	—	3,770	2,180	5,520	11,470	2,270	8,378	—	156	69
Muntafiq	26,700	—	—	—	4,440	270	370	5,080	6,280	—	—	—	—
Amara	19,700	—	—	—	5,670	1,010	—	6,680	110	—	19	5	50
Basra	10,900	—	—	—	610‡	60	110	780	1,190	—	—	—	—
Totals	453,500	23,370	470	36,740	29,790	10,700	14,500	92,300	40,090	—	—	—	—

*Where information was available. Such information must not be presumed to be exhaustive. A mishara = 2,500 sq. metres or thereabouts.

†Territories so classified are at present very incompletely irrigated.

‡Tidally watered date gardens.

The information given in the table regarding the size of holdings is derived from fiscal returns. Although the classification of these holdings by area cannot be expected to be accurate, the figures possibly give some indication of the frequency of larger and smaller holdings in the districts actually concerned. The latter must not be taken to coincide with the cultivated areas of the liwas themselves.

8. Agricultural Population

8. In any general study of the land tenure of a country it is desirable 161
to know the numbers and distribution of the agricultural population. 162
Thus it would greatly assist in planning development in el 'Iraq if trust-

161 162 worthy information was available as to the rural population, their main occupations (e.g. cultivation with type of crops, stock-keeping, fishing, reed cutting, the numbers of the sedentary, semi-nomadic and truly nomadic population, etc.). The figures need not be closely accurate, but they should necessarily be sufficiently reliable relative approximations to allow dependable deductions to be drawn from them. But although continuous and painstaking efforts were made to satisfy this need by the liwa authorities, it has to be admitted that no basis exists for arriving at figures that can be utilised with any confidence. Table II contains the best estimates that the liwa authorities were able to furnish; and the Census Department was not in a position to give me any better material. I include the table, because it at least represents the best local opinion of the position under the various heads cited. It should perhaps be noted more particularly that it was found impossible to separate in any systematic way those engaged in urban, from those engaged in rural, pursuits. Finally, only the populations of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were excluded from the latter. This explains the misleading density figure for the Karbala Liwa. It should also be noted that the figures given for the agricultural population include all those engaged in rural occupations, other than genuine nomads.

TABLE II. APPROXIMATE POPULATION, 1930

Expressed in thousands

Liwa	Total estimated population	Three principal towns	Nomadic tribal sections	Rural Population			Mean Density per sq. kilom. cultivated region
				Settled	Tribal	Total	
Mosul ..	320	79	45	176	20	196	22
Arbil ..	106	—	3	47	86	103	15
Sulimani ..	94	—	18	51	28	79	37
Kirkuk ..	160	—	19	63	78	141	13
Diyala ..	240	—	1	79	160	229	67
Baghdad ..	388	219	2	93	74	167	98
Dulaim ..	147	—	59	39	49	88	96
Karbala ..	90	—	2	63	5	68	136
Hilla ..	108	—	—	30	73	103	21
Kut ..	170	—	—	60	110	170	20
Diwaniya ..	238	—	58	79	101	180	40
Muntafiq ..	340	—	20	25	295	320	72
Amara ..	238	—	—	36	202	238	36
Basra ..	190	46	10	34	100	134	234
Totals ..	2,834	344	234	[illegible]	1,281	2,346	30*

* Mean density total 78,000 sq. km. cultivated region.

So far as the figures can be accepted the mean density of the rural population per square kilometre of the cultivated region works out at about 19 in the four liwas of the Rainfall Zone, and at about 35 in the five most typical liwas of the Irrigation Zone. These figures are very low, especially for the potentially fertile irrigable lands of the latter; but there is no reason to think that they err on this side. However, it will be appreciated that dependable statistics of the agricultural population are needed to enable development of the country to be pursued to the greatest advantage and with the greatest economy.

166 185 The extreme mobility of the majority of the population, especially throughout the Irrigation Zone, is an important factor in the consideration of development schemes of all sorts, having regard to the general sparsity of the population and the limited resources of the country. If work can be concentrated on such schemes in a few of the most suitable areas, and facilities can be given to the population to colonise them as opportunity and occasion justify, much more rapid and satisfactory results will be obtained for the same effort and expenditure in a given

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is
311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it
is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only
312 twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country
is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is
amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and
subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are
under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much
more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable
and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

● 162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-
seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent
Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians.
The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration
into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into
distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims,
three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians,
871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked
religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of
Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed
into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some
153 important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and
significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with
the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality
invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition
to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people
exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

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But this obstacle can be exaggerated. As a glance at the figures showing the growth of primary education in Iraq indicates, the proportion of girls to boys attending primary schools is not high, but their enrolment is steadily increasing. Although most of the large urban schools are single sex schools, Iraq has the distinction of having many co-educational village schools. The growing number of kindergartens are co-educational. In all the institutions of higher education young men and women work together.

The emancipation of women in Iraq still has a long way to go, but convincing signs of it are evident. It would, nevertheless, be a considerable advance if the Ministry of Education were to encourage the recruitment of a number of women to the staffs of the boys' primary schools. From visits to many Iraqi primary schools it is evident that the standards of the women teachers in matters of personal cleanliness of the children, care and decoration of the school premises, general decorum and pleasant social conduct are higher than those of their men colleagues. Their influence in boys' schools would be most salutary.

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The position of children is, of course, difficult when parents, especially in the rural areas, are dependent upon the labour of even very young children. Yet an increasing number of poor parents appear to be sending their children to school. It would be a great inducement to more and regular school attendance if means could be devised of providing free midday meals for some of the children, especially in the village schools. At one of the more modern primary schools in Baghdad attractively cooked and served midday meals are provided, but this is a school attended mainly by children from comfortable homes where the parents can afford to pay for this service. In the rural areas, however, simple food is not expensive, cooking devices and service are cheap, and it should be possible to provide free meals for the needy children at relatively low cost.

It should be noted that effective child labour legislation does not exist in Iraq. Until the time comes when such legislation can be enacted and enforced, compulsory education will be most difficult to apply.

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Tribal Organization and Mobility of Population. But the most formidable obstacles of all are those related to tribal organization and mobility of population. There are two particular sets of problems, those of the tribes who are still in a nomadic state, and those of the people who are in the transitional stage of semi-settlement. Between them, it is estimated that these nomadic and semi-settled peoples number nearly 2,000,000 persons, roughly 300,000 of whom are children of primary school age.

Some eight per cent of these tribal dwellers are still nomadic, 162
and educational arrangements for them will obviously be most
difficult to apply. People who are on the move, even if this be in 166
regular seasonal cycles or over more or less fixed areas, are never 871
susceptible to organized education. Even in countries where compulsory education laws have been in effect for several years and where school accommodation for the entire child population exists, it is not easy to make arrangements for the schooling of the children of mobile persons such as caravan and boat dwellers. Clearly, in a country like Iraq where the problem of mobility of population is of much greater magnitude, the conventional type of fixed village school is useless for these peoples. Some of them are not averse to education, and, especially in places where a sheikh is anxious that his own children shall be educated, there is an opportunity for providing educational facilities which would be shared by the other children of the tribal group. It is suggested, therefore, that the time is opportune for giving serious consideration to the training of peripatetic teachers of the kind recommended by the Monroe Commission in 1932.

The more urgent problem of tribal education relates to that 166
majority of the tribal peoples who are in the stage of transition 871
from nomadism to a more settled agricultural life. People who
are passing through this transitional stage present great problems 619
but also great opportunities to the educator. They are alleged to lose some of the simpler virtues of people who are forced to submit to the strict tribal laws and codes while they are still wandering in the desert. Be that as it may, they undoubtedly need practical education in the amenities of the more settled life, particularly in matters of health, child care under primitive housing conditions and agricultural practice. Their children also need schooling. These educational needs are becoming more acute because, as has been indicated in a previous chapter when discussing the problem of land tenure, the tribal peoples are losing their former wholesome relationship with the sheikh, who is becoming more of a landlord interested in the produce of his tenants and less of a leader with a responsibility for their welfare.

These needs of the tribal dwellers, therefore, and especially 876
those who are in the semi-settled stage, present a formidable 166
challenge to the Iraqi educator. What is probably needed to meet their peculiar requirements is a team of peripatetic teachers who could travel with the tribes while they are on the move, and who could establish simple schools-cum-community-centres in the places where the tribesmen and their families are gradually settling. So far as is known, devices of this kind are as yet untried; it would be well if a few young men and women of ingenuity and a practical

4a Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Iraq Bedouin MHS

I 162 The population of Mosul and Arbil provinces exceeds 630,000, of which 530,000 are Muslims. Of these Muslims, all but 10,000 are Sunnis. There are 60,000 Christians, 32,000 Yezidis and 10,000 Jews. The minorities therefore total only one-fifth of the whole. The Muslims consist of Arabs and Kurds in approximately equal parts, together with some 16,000 Turkomans.

I [162] 438 439 436 Mosul itself is mainly an Arab town with a population of 100,000. It is a great entrepôt for trade in sheep, cattle, wool, grain, hides, intestines, galls and eggs with the thickly populated districts round and also with Syria and Turkey. Its importance in this respect will certainly increase when at long last it is linked by rail with the Syrian frontier at Tel Kuchik and with Baghdad via Baa'iji. Work on this linking is now proceeding, and it is interesting to remember that when it is completed in a couple of years it will form the last stage in the famous Baghdad-Berlin Railway which was the Kaiser's fondest dream. The circumstances under which it will be completed are likely, however, to be very different to those which he visualized.

Arabs

I B 101 Apart from forming the majority of the inhabitants of Mosul itself, Arabs are found as cultivators on the Tigris both north and south of the town and to the south of the Jebal Sinjar (Sinjar mountain) and as bedouin who range the uncultivated areas to the south-west, west and north-west.

B 619 221 721 233 The bedouin consist of more than one tribe, but by far the most important is the Shammar. This great tribe is of Arabian origin and has in the past been pushed steadily northwards by economic forces and the search for new grazing grounds. With the great improvement in public security during recent years, cultivation has extended further and further from the towns and villages and encroached on the haunts of the Shammar. Formerly the means of livelihood of these bedouin were varied if not all respectable. They included the raiding of the flocks and herds of their weaker neighbours and the extortion of "khuwa" or safe-conduct money from merchants, travellers and others. At the same time they made a perfectly legitimate living from acting as shepherds for the flocks of townsmen and by breeding and selling camels. Nowadays raiding and safe-conduct money have been abolished and motor transport has to a great extent ousted the camel as a carrier in 'Iraq and the neighbouring countries and caused a severe slump in the camel market.

4 Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Iraq Bedouin MHS
Kurd MAH

B 619 a severe slump in the camel market. Slowly and very reluctantly the
558 bedouin are turning to cultivation and feel themselves immeasurably
178 lowered in the process. Strangely enough, they are also to be found in
461 greasy overalls, working on the rigs of the Mosul Oil Companies. In
this work they do not lose caste as they do if they become cultivators.

B Shaikh Ajil al Yawar is the paramount Shaikh of the 'Iraqi
622 Shammar. He is an outstanding personality possessing a fine presence
and a wonderful charm of manner. With singular astuteness he has
managed to control his tribesmen, keep on the right side of successive
governments and at the same time amass a considerable fortune for
himself. During recent years his figure has perhaps suffered somewhat from the use of motor-cars instead of riding a fiery Arab steed
or liver-shaking "dhillool" (trotting camel).

Turkomans

I Leaving the Arabs, we come to the Turkomans. They are the
173 remnants of ancient immigration and are to be found in Tel Affar
162 town between Mosul and Sinjar and in a string of villages across to
Altun Keupri and Kirkuk. Arbil is also largely a Turkoman town.
The village of Nainawa, the ancient Nineveh, just across the Tigris
from Mosul, is Turkoman. In a mosque built on unexcavated
Assyrian remains it contains the reputed tomb of the prophet Jonah.
The mosque is also said to contain a portion of the vertebræ of the
whale!

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Kurds

K Next we come to the Kurds, who form by far the majority of the
101 population of the mountain areas and who are also to be found in a
144 large number of villages well south of the mountains. The Kurds are
619 Aryan in origin and Sunni Muslims by religion. The mountain Kurds
and in fact all the mountaineers of Kurdistan bear a close resemblance
K to the Scottish clans of two hundred years ago. They are still organ-
622 ized on a tribal or clan basis, though the increase in government control
657 and influence is naturally tending to destroy this organization and
644 undermine the power of the chiefs, or Aghas as they are called.
276 Aghas may, however, still be seen proceeding to town or market with
619 a "tail" of armed henchmen and even a pipebearer. The Kurdish
pipebearer is, however, concerned with the Agha's tobacco pipe and
000 not with music. Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe

000 of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

K 137 Kurdistan is a beautiful country. It is in the main well wooded, with scrub or stunted oak on the hillsides and poplars, walnuts and mulberries near the villages. Pines grow in two areas only and chinārs (planes) along the streams. Unfortunately, deforestation is proceeding apace, and unless immediate and drastic steps are taken by the 'Iraq Government, heavy soil erosion and a tremendous decrease in grazing facilities will take place. Few new walnut trees are to be found owing to a prevalent superstition that the planter of a walnut tree will die with the appearance of the first nuts. It might be supposed that the oldest inhabitants could be employed in planting, but apparently the grandfathers look askance at this suggestion!

K 181 The Kurds are a virile and cheerful people. They have been called treacherous, and undoubtedly stories can be quoted in support of this accusation. Yet it must be remembered that the annals of our own Scottish highlands are by no means clean in this respect.

K 164 221 342 In the summer the valleys of Kurdistan are, unfortunately, very malarial, and this is fostered by the cultivation of rice with its invariable accompaniment of mosquitoes. During this season most of the flock-owners move to their "zōzāns" or summer sheilings on the mountain tops, where, in shelters of oak branches, they pass the time pleasantly enough.

Christians

I 795 The Christians of the northern provinces are divided into numerous sects, several of which are relics of the old schismatic divisions of the Eastern Communion. They include Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics, who are under the control of Rome, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians and Seventh Day Adventists.

I 795 167 563 648 162 Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics and Jacobites are found in Mosul and many villages on the left bank of the Tigris. Chaldeans are also found in the Supna valley near Amadia and in one large village near Arbil. Seventh Day Adventists only flourish in Mosul. Many people in England know something of the Assyrians and their recent history. The Assyrians themselves claim to be descendants of the famous kingdom of Nineveh and are certainly semitic. The term "Assyrian" now includes ex-Ottoman members of the Nestorian Church who were domiciled either within what is now the 'Iraq state or who were ejected from Hakkari by the Turks during the Great War and refused

Yazidis MH 10

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readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects 795
belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their 167
Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the
Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace 648
terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it 563
was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of 162
the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous
unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large
number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands
as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some
of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred
which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in
'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil,
British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however,
proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council
of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have
been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the
remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria
include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may [I
be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers 463]
of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks,
etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All
these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed
as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are
shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, I
hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are 147
liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught
up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

The Yezidis

The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This Y
is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. 101
They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock 776
Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the 779
lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is 871
incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that 771
he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult
to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education,
save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Yazidis MH 10

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The Yezidis in 'Iraq practically all dwell either in the Sinjār or 162
Shaikhān districts. Each of these districts has a brass peacock and that Y
belonging to Shaikhān must never cross the Tigris. If it did so the 101
world would come to an end! Non-Yezidis cannot view the peacocks 778
or the other sacred emblems, which include the "shema'dan" or
candlestick and the "bairaqs" or banners. When not touring, all Y
emblems are kept at the residence of the *Mir* at Baa'dhra in Shaikhān, [793
though a few years ago the Sinjār Yezidis, who were at variance with 795
the *Mir*, seized their peacock and collected subscriptions on their I
account until compelled by Government to return it to its lawful 659]
keeper. Yezidis object strongly to the use of the word "Shaitān" Y
(Satan) or any word resembling it. Terms meaning "curse" are also 776
never used less Satan construes them as a tactless reminder of his fall. 784

Owing to these difficulties and restrictions, Yezidis are not "good Y
mixers" and rarely enter Government service. A few were formerly 186
employed by the British Government in the transport company of the 463
'Iraq Levies, but did not prove very satisfactory. Occasionally they 669
have enlisted in the 'Iraq army, but an attempt to apply a light measure I 563
of conscription to the Sinjār Yezidis resulted in an armed revolt by 721 702
five villages. This necessitated punitive action with, unfortunately, 669
heavy casualties on both sides. The Yezidis speak a form of Kurdish, Y [197]
but many also know Arabic. Ain Sifni or Ain-i-Safina (Spring of the 174
Boat) is the chief market town of the Shaikhān Yezidis. It derives its 438
name from a tradition that the Ark touched ground there.

Yezidis are to be found outside 'Iraq in the Caucasus and also a Y
few thousand north of Aleppo. 101

It is difficult to believe that this curious religion can long survive Y
in 'Iraq under present-day conditions. The *Mir* is unpopular and 793
there is no better successor amongst his in-bred and degenerate relatives. 794
The Yezidis have recently refused to yield him many of his 578
former rights and have severely criticised his squandering of the religious
revenues. Most of the members of the hierarchy have concentrated
their energies on trying to divert funds to their own pockets and
have quarrelled furiously. A certain number of stalwarts have defied Y
the priests and attended schools. In the Sinjār prior to the Great War 771
religious pressure induced a considerable number of Yezidis to adopt [877]
Islam, and it is within the bounds of possibility that ere long there 797
may be a regular landslide to either the Christian or Islamic faith or
both.

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Levantine
Jews MF-1

Jews

J The Jews in 'Iraq are said to be the descendants of those taken
174 captive by Nebuchadnezzar and brought to Babylon, where they were
employed on the rebuilding of that city and on the upkeep of the
canals on which its wealth depended.

J In Mosul till recently the Jewish standard of education was lament-
871 ably low and their religious observances entirely out of keeping with
176 those of modern Jewry. Even there, however, an astute Jewish brain
784 invented an instrument controlled by clockwork to turn on and off
403 electric switches at fixed hours and so avoid the sin of making fire on
the Sabbath.

J The very generous Jewish philanthropist Sir Elly Khaduri, has in
871 recent years provided funds to build excellent schools for the com-
munity, and it is hoped that a great improvement in the education of
the Jewish children will result.

I 162 In Kurdistan, Jews of whom many are weavers are found in all the
563 J small towns and also in many otherwise purely Kurdish villages,
286 101 where they live in perfect amity with their Muslim neighbours. In
142 463 dress they are practically indistinguishable from the Kurds but easily
J recognizable by their facial features. In the most remote mountain
101 areas Jewish villages exist the inhabitants of which are cultivators and
463 possess vineyards and orchards. The reason for the survival of these
631 villages in the lawless past is that they and their inhabitants were the
property of powerful Kurdish Aghas who were strong to protect their
serfs as they would have protected their sheep, cattle or mules.
Throughout Kurdistan the ubiquitous itinerant Jewish pedlar may be
met who, quite unarmed, is surprisingly immune from molestation.
J 181 The Jews of northern 'Iraq are not at all interested in Zionism and
186 form a very useful, law-abiding, hard-working section of the population.

I 162 It is difficult, if not impossible, within the compass of a short
I lecture, to give an adequate description of the curious elements who
563 657 make up the attractive mosaic of northern 'Iraq. In the not very
distant past the 'Iraq Government has incurred, and rightly incurred,
strong criticism of its treatment of some of the peoples who go to
make up this mosaic. It should be realized, however, that the administration of the Mosul and Arbil provinces and the solution of the diverse and difficult problems they present is a matter which might well test the skill and patience of any government, even if far more experienced than that of the new state of 'Iraq.

680 cal resources of other countries. It will be noted throughout this report that the Mission has made numerous recommendations for the procurement of foreign technical assistance. These recommendations are in no sense a disparagement of the talent and skills now available in Iraq. They represent rather a recognition that a country whose development has been severely handicapped by limited financial resources in the past cannot now suddenly expect to launch a development program involving rapid expansion in virtually every field without availing itself of the many opportunities to obtain technical help from abroad.

II. Agriculture

241 [162] Any development program for Iraq must obviously put primary emphasis on agriculture. Over 60 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, and both industry and commerce depend in turn largely upon farming and animal husbandry. Moreover, large increases in output can be realized both by raising the productivity of livestock and farm land already in use and by bringing under cultivation large areas presently idle.

Existing Conditions

Agriculture in Iraq is devoted largely to the cultivation of winter crops. Because of the lack of rain in the summer, during that season crops can be grown only under irrigation. In the rainfed zone of the North, summer crops can be grown only on a moderate scale in small irrigated areas. In the irrigated zone of central and southern Iraq the limited water supply restricts the area devoted to summer crops to only about one quarter of that grown to winter crops. Barley and wheat are the only significant winter crops, while rice and, more recently, cotton are the principal summer crops. The area sown to sesame, corn, millet and grain sorghum is comparatively insignificant. Tobacco assumes some importance in the mountainous areas of the North. Fruit and 241 245 vegetables are quite important. Iraq is the world's principal producer and exporter of dates; excellent citrus fruit is grown, particularly in the Diyala Valley in east-central Iraq, for domestic consumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the North. 241 245

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. 231 Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as [262] ● camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed.

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently 241 inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer [372] is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has [134] materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter.

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq 423 and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central 427 Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. 241 The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

654* obviously based on a fixed rate of seed per donum (e.g. 15 kg. for wheat, 20 kg. for rice and barley) which has been applied regularly in almost every year. Yet the rate of seeding undoubtedly varies from one part of the country to another. An explanation of the methods of computation, of the reasons therefor and the degree of reliance that can be placed on them are certainly called for.

[659 162] Again, population statistics have been published for each province, based on a hand-count of the census results. The fact that these published figures contain an estimate for nomads might well be stated. A more important omission is an explanation of the very marked discrepancy between men and women. It is well-known that there is strong tendency in many parts of the country to record male children as female and the returns for the lower age groups confirm this in a striking manner. At least some preliminary note on how this affects the validity of the results would be advisable. A good example of an appropriate warning is the qualifying note introducing the vital statistics which have been published.

Closely allied to reliability is clarity of definition. It is not possible to use statistics properly, if it is not clear what they mean. As an example of this, the figures for cultivable land made available to the Mission and shown in Table 2 of Annex A may be cited. If definitions are not clear, a series of statistics may lack continuity. An example of this is the published figures for electricity consumption in the various provinces, which are divided into three groups—lighting, manufacturing and other purposes. It is not clear what "other purposes" means. Moreover, although the definition evidently changed in Mosul between 1945 and 1946, no explanation is given and no adjustment has been made. In general, too, a number of units of weight or capacity, such as the *mann* and the *hukka,* are used in the Abstract without stating their equivalent in more standard units. The fact that these units vary from one commodity to another and, it is said, from one city to another makes it all the more necessary to state the precise equivalent in the context used.

Statistics should also be properly selected. If statistical publications are not to become a mass of unwieldy detail, a proper balance has to be struck between what is to be included and what is to be excluded. The Abstract, at present, contains much detailed medical and legal data of a somewhat specialized nature. On agri-

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relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major /33
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162] ●
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

conditions in the future, the rate could rise to two percent per 161 annum or even higher within a comparatively short period. Obviously this possibility will have to be borne in mind in planning the development of social services such as education and housing. It also has important implications in agriculture. As the limited supply of water is more fully utilized, most of the increase in population may ultimately have to be absorbed in nonagricultural pursuits, unless water is used much more efficiently than it is now.

As the standard of social services such as health and education 162 is higher in the cities and the opportunities for employment are [369] more varied, the distinction between urban and rural population is an important one in considering the age and sex distribution of the people, their occupations and their standard of living. About 550,000 people live in the municipality of Baghdad, another 300,000 in the next three largest cities of Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk and some 350.000 in other towns having a population of over 15,000. Thus about 1.2 million people or a quarter of the population live in sizeable urban communities. In addition, there are about a hundred smaller municipalities having an aggregate population of under half a million. These towns are usually the administrative 632 and market centers of the minor political subdivisions such as *qadhas* and *nahiyas* and many of them are little more than large villages; in many respects they form a semirural category intermediate between the larger towns and the villages.

There has been a strong migration from the country to the 166 cities in recent years, particularly during the last war. The most 369 striking examples of this can be seen in Baghdad and Basra where many thousands of "squatters" from Amara province are crowded together in makeshift huts under extremely unhygienic conditions. The peculiarly adverse conditions of life in Amara have made that province the principal source of migrants to the large cities and, indeed, to most parts of the country, but there has evidently been a substantial movement from the rural areas in general. As it is 162 prima facie likely that these migrants would consist principally of young adults or adolescents, especially men, it is not surprising to find that the census shows a much higher proportion of the very young (under 10) and the old (over 50) in the rural areas, the disparity being even more marked among men than among

● 162 women. The census returns, in fact, record an extraordinarily large excess of women over men in some parts of the country—e.g., 57 percent in the three rural *qadhas* of Muntafiq province—but there is good reason to believe that such figures, while indicative of the true position, are generally exaggerated.

Occupation

162 The major occupation is agriculture and animal husbandry.
463 Nearly two thirds of the people live in the rural villages. As handicrafts are rarely found in the villages and only a few people are absorbed by such secondary occupations as trade and transport, it is likely that 85 to 90 percent of the rural population lives directly off the land.

Many of the inhabitants of the smaller and even some of the larger towns are also engaged in agriculture. In Tel Afar, a town of 20,000 in the principal grain-growing region of Mosul province, over three quarters of the male population whose occupation was recorded gave it as agriculture. This, however, is probably exceptional and the proportion would, no doubt, be considerably less than half in many smaller towns. Even in the largest cities, there is a smaller but far from negligible proportion of the population employed in agriculture, principally in the production of vegetables, dates and other fruits or in raising livestock for the city market.

In all, the number of people in families whose income is derived directly from work on the land is probably in the neighborhood of 60 percent of the total population. This method of expressing the percentage is used advisedly. A much higher figure could certainly be given for the number of people occupied since most
[464] of the rural population is employed to some extent. Unemployment, as opposed to underemployment, is largely an urban problem. In the rural areas the number of men whose occupation was recorded by the census is often nearly as large as the number over
[857 10 years of age. This, no doubt, corresponds closely to the facts,
887] since even young children tend flocks and perform other light work on the land while old men help with such tasks as threshing.
[462] Women, too, are an important source of agricultural labor, particularly at harvest time, although this is inadequately reflected in the census.

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In the towns, on the other hand, the occupations of a much 162
smaller proportion of the males were recorded. And, moreover, 463
many of those that were recorded fell into various ill-defined categories, which very probably include a large number of the unemployed or the unproductive (e.g., school children). There is, also, [462]
far less opportunity for work by women in the towns.

The estimate of 60 percent for the agricultural population would leave rather less than two million people in the families of those employed in other occupations. In this sector the labor force may be estimated at about 400,000 to 450,000 men and some 30,000 women or about 450,000 in all, with a considerable margin of error on either side. Some idea of the distribution of these workers is given in the following table.

TABLE 1

NONAGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE
(in thousands)

Commerce	110
Personal and public service	70
Manufacturing and handicraft	75
Transport	45
Government (including police)	55
	355
Other categories; errors and omissions	95
	450

This table, which is necessarily a compound of industrial and occupational classifications and consequently contains a few duplications, must be interpreted as only a rough estimate giving broad orders of magnitude.

After agriculture, commerce is certainly the most important occupational group; the census records nearly 50,000 (including a few women) in the four largest cities alone. There is probably at least an equal number in the rest of the country, since one of the main functions of the smaller towns is to serve as centers of retail

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●162 trade for the surrounding countryside and as collection centers for
463 its produce. Even in the smallest towns rows of small shopkeepers' booths can be seen and the larger towns usually have extensive bazaars.

Private and public service is another important group of occupations. Besides domestic service it includes such occupations as laundering and catering, the latter a not unimportant category in a country where the coffee-house is a center of social activity. In the four provinces for which data is available, there were 45,000 (of which 6,000 were women) in this group. The estimate given above does not seem excessive for the country as a whole.

A more detailed classification of workers employed in manufacturing will be found in Table 7. This table is based largely on statistics of workers employed in factories which have been compiled by the Labor Directorate from returns by factory inspectors. These figures are, however, acknowledged to be incomplete, particularly as regards the large numbers of handicraft workers who are self-employed with one or two assistants. From the census data it is evident that there are a large number of additional workers occupied in woodworking and allied occupations (e.g., working with palm leaves or reeds) and in tailoring or dressmaking; some addition would also have to be made for jewelry and textile workers. The figure of 75,000 given here includes an estimate for these additions.

The estimate for transportation, which includes all employees of the railways and the Port of Basra, is a particularly rough one. It is believed, however, to be of the right order of magnitude. The figure for government workers is reasonably accurate, although it may duplicate to some extent workers in other categories already specified. The residual figure, of course, is subject to an extremely wide margin of error. It includes all categories not mentioned elsewhere such as construction workers and the professions insofar as they are not employed by the government.

Literacy

212 The acquisition of skill is severely limited by lack of education. Education is, as the monograph on that subject shows, broader than the mere ability to read and write, but the degree of

consequence not only of the increase in population, but also of 433
the shift from the rural areas, where barley is often a staple ele- 439
ment in the diet. 262

Large quantities of rice are produced, but the surplus for export has always been very small. The only other cereal exported in any quantity is millet.

Animal Produce. The principal animal products exported 433
by Iraq are wool, live animals, hides and skins and casings (intes- 439
tines), usually in that order of importance. The sheep is the main source of these products, providing all the wool and usually the bulk of the other products. As with dates and cereals, the quantities exported vary greatly from year to year, sheep being vulnerable not only to disease, but also to extremes of winter cold and summer drought. In contrast with the other main exports, however, there has been no tendency for exports of animal products to increase. Exports of wool, hides and skins have, on the whole, been below prewar levels, while those of casings have fallen off badly. As animals are often taken across the frontier on the hoof, customs returns of live animals exported are not reliable. The recorded decrease since before the war, is, however, too large to be discounted.

Information on the animal population and on the domestic consumption of meat and other products is sketchy and unreliable. A rise in the consumption of meat could well explain the loss of exports of live animals, but this in turn would tend to make available a larger, not smaller, supply of most by-products. Part of the [233
explanation of the fall in export products may lie in a declining 162]
sheep population owing to the gradual shift from the pastoral life to settled agriculture and from agriculture to the towns. The monograph on agriculture and animal husbandry discusses the shortcomings of the livestock industry and recommends measures to improve livestock raising and the quality of livestock products. The value of exports of animal products is likely to continue its downward trend unless these measures are undertaken speedily and vigorously.

Sheep are especially important as a potential source of dollars. 439
Wool is the most important export to the United States, which 457
also takes all the casings exported and considerable quantities of

873 eradication of illiteracy, but primarily as a means to an end—so that adults may benefit more fully from a continuous program of education which will show them what they can do individually and collectively to improve their own lot. As one authority has said, the task must be conceived "as a matter of going out into the field, of working in the communities, organizing their activities, improving their health and farming methods, establishing cooperatives and small cottage industries and tying all this up in the education and making the whole thing as closely knit an activity as possible."[3] The object must be to awaken in people an understanding of their problems and an urgent desire to solve them, not relying upon government to do everything but developing local initiative and resourcefulness to overcome some of the handicaps which they have suffered passively for centuries. Only this type of fundamental education, which, in recent years, has been advocated by UNESCO and many discerning educators in various countries, will be of practical value to the people of Iraq. In fact, unless the general receptiveness, understanding and cooperative spirit of the people are greatly quickened and stimulated by an educational campaign of this nature, the pace with which the country's development program can be carried out will seriously lag.

Magnitude of the Problem

[162] The proposed adult education campaign should be aimed primarily at those groups in the population which are beyond primary school age but are still receptive, namely those between the ages of 12 and 45 inclusive. On the basis of the census results available for the four provinces of Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul, it may be assumed that roughly 40 percent of the population are in this age group. In a total population of about 5,000,000 it may therefore be estimated that 2,000,000 should be reached by adult education. The number in this age group will gradually increase

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[3] Dr. Matta Akrawi, *Background Paper on Fundamental Education in the Arab World* presented to the Second United Nations' Seminar on Social Welfare in the Arab States, held at Cairo in 1950. Aside from this paper and the Report of the Committee on Rural Basic Education drawn up for this Seminar, a large amount of useful information on the aims and methods of fundamental education is available in UNESCO publications such as *Adult Education—Current Trends and Practices; Fundamental Education—Description and Program; The Use of Mobile Cinema and Radio Vans in Fundamental Education*, etc.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

II. Rural Communities

About one third of the people live in towns and cities; of the 162 remainder, a small proportion are nomads and the bulk live in 361 villages. In terms of population, therefore, the villages are the more predominant type of community. Although the distinction between a village and a small municipality is, as already noted, somewhat arbitrary, even the smallest municipalities are centers of local administration and have certain facilities of a higher standard than the villages. The distinction will, in any event, serve for present purposes.

Virtually all the rural population live in villages, isolated dwellings being very rare. Landowners, in fact, frequently count their fellahin by villages. Except for the extreme northwest, where there are seminomadic pastoral tribes who live in settled communities for only part of the year, the inhabitants of the villages are mainly cultivators. A few members of the community may have other occupations such as the tending of sheep and goats, the keeping of small shops and coffee houses or the building and repairing of huts. There are, also, villages where a considerable number of the people are engaged in handicrafts (e.g. weaving) but these are rare.

In the North, stone is generally available and is the commonest material for buildings, while in the South and the Center, mud 342 333 is the usual material. The mud plaster of walls is reinforced with straw or cow dung to minimize the washing of clay in the mortar when it rains and to prevent temperature cracks. Where the climate is drier and palm leaves or reeds are available, especially in the marshes and palm belt of the South, these materials are more extensively used.

Another feature which distinguishes the North from the rest 361 of the country is the greater permanence of the villages. The main reason is probably that there is a much older tradition of settled cultivation than exists in the recently irrigated areas. Not only are there more small-holders, who would naturally have a close [423] association with their land, but the fellahin also appear to have A GREATER SECURITY OF TENURE.

port traffic and such associated activities as the packing of dates, 361
cleaning of barley and flour-milling (a new industry), Basra is 438
closely bound up with the development of the new oil field at Zubair, some 10 miles inland. Basra, like Baghdad, received a large influx of people during the war, especially from nearby Amara.

The population of Kirkuk, the fourth city, is believed to have tripled in the last 25 years as a consequence of the development of Iraq's major oil field. The two holy cities in Kerbela province, Kerbela and Nejf, have a large transient population due to pilgrim traffic from Iran and other Moslem countries. These two cities have many handicraft workers in such trades as jewelry, brasswork and embroidery.

These six cities, together with Amara, are the only ones with 361
a population of over 40,000. With a few exceptions, such as 162
Khanaqin with its small oil field and refinery, the other municipalities function primarily as centers of administration and trade for surrounding districts. Broadly speaking, their size varies with their administrative importance. Of the provincial capitals, other than those already mentioned, five have a population between 20,000 and 40,000 and three between 10,000 and 20,000. Of the remaining municipalities, none has a population exceeding 20,000; less than 30, most of them centers of *qadhas*, have a population of more than 6,000.

Despite differences in size and function, the cities and towns 361
have a number of characteristics in common. The older parts are 342
usually congested with narrow streets and alleys. Houses are 339
built around courtyards, the only opening to the street being the 366
main doorway. The houses usually have a flat roof or a partially open second story for sleeping outside in the summer. Brick is the commonest building material; most of the larger towns have brickworks nearby, many of which are small and primitive. There are also a few modern concrete and steel buildings, mainly in Baghdad. Schools and hospitals can be found in the heart of these congested areas. An important section in every city is the *Suq* or bazaar, a network of alleys, often covered by crude roofs forming a series of arcades. These alleys are lined with the small shops of retail merchants and handicraft workers in textiles and metals. The *Suq* is usually located near the principal mosque.

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/31 /61 The territory of Iraq, which is shaped like an irregular triangle (see Map No. 1), covers an area of 435,223 square kilometres. At the time of the 1947 census, its population was 4,800,000 inhabitants, or 11 inhabitants per square kilometre.

● /62 Over 75 per cent of the population of Iraq are Arabs. They live mainly in the centre and south of the country. The next most numerous inhabitants are the Kurds (over 15 per cent of the population), who live mainly in the north and especially in the region of Mosul. There are also some Persians, Armenians, Turks, Jews and others.

/33 The country, which is mountainous in the north and north-east, spreads out into the vast Mesopotamian plateau, which inclines gradually as it nears the Persian Gulf. This plateau, which was famous in ancient times for its network of irrigation channels, is now merely an arid steppe, and in some places even a desert.

Iraq is watered by the historic twin rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, which are the country's vital arteries. The Euphrates (Shatt el-Furat in Arabic) is approximately 3,000 kilometres long; its basin covers 673,000 square kilometres. The Tigris (Shatt el-Dijla), which is approximately 2,150 kilometres long, is joined by several tributaries, including the Shatt el-Gharraf, the Diyala, the Great Zab and the Little Zab. Its basin covers an area of 375,000 square kilometres. The Tigris and the Eu-

riya), and Sulaimaniya. The capital of Iraq is Bagh- 361
dad, with a population of 552,047 inhabitants, ac- 162●
cording to the census of 19 November 1947. Baghdad, which is situated on the Tigris and is the terminus and junction of all the Iraqi railways, is an active centre of trade and traffic. Other large towns are Mosul (340,541 inhabitants), Basra (206,302), Amara (183,870), Karbala (149,710), Kirkuk (148,349), Nasiriya (110,934), Ramadi (110,684), and Baquba (94,482).

B. *General features of the economy*

Agriculture

Agriculture is the main resource of Iraq's economy. 241
According to estimates, approximately 80 per cent 654
of the population are engaged in it. The fertile land [062]
of Iraq, which was regarded as one of the granaries of the world in the time of Herodotus and which was carefully watered by a well-planned system of irrigation until the thirteenth century of our era, has since then fallen into a state of neglect. Agriculture began to receive attention again in 1921. As droughts, dust storms and plagues of insects (especially in the Mosul region) cause serious depredations, the government supervises the condition of the country's agriculture and stock-raising and takes the necessary measures for their rational development: it has set up experimental farms, which also produce good quality seeds for the use of farmers, and is encouraging the mechanization of agriculture.

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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the right to establish and maintain schools for the instruction 642
of their members in their own languages, and provides that government appointments shall be made without discrimination in accordance with capacity. Parliament must, by law, contain six Christian deputies; the provision for a similar number of Jewish deputies was cancelled after the emigration of 1951–2 had left the Jewish community insufficient members to qualify for representation.

It is absolutely impossible to reckon with any accuracy the 162
strength of the various religious communities. At a very rough approximation the Muslims might be estimated at 4½ million, Christians at 150,000, Jews (since the emigration of some 130,000) at something less than 10,000, and other groups at 50,000.

(*a*) *Islam*

The Sunni and Shii sects are suspicious and intolerant of 778
each other, as are also the Arab and Kurdish members of the 162
Sunni group. Statistics are lacking, but it would appear that the Shiis slightly outnumber the Sunni Arabs and are less than Sunni Arabs and Kurds combined.

The Sunnis live mainly in the north of Iraq and in the *liwas* 778
of Baghdad, Diala, and Dulaim. There is one notable Sunni shrine in the country, that of Shaikh Abdul-Qadir al-Gailani, whose mosque and tomb in Baghdad are a centre of pilgrimage from regions as remote as India.

The Shiis form a majority in the central *liwas* of Kut, 795
Diwaniya, Kerbela, and Hilla and in the southern *liwas* of 162
Basra, Amara, and Muntafiq. Their religious life has as its 778
background the four Holy Cities of Kerbela, Najaf, Kadhimain, and Samarra and their shrines. Najaf is the burial place of Ali, the first Imam; Kerbela of Hussain, the third Imam. Thousands of Shiis from Persia, Afghanistan, and India take part in the traditional pilgrimages to the Holy Cities, where, during the first ten days of the religious month of Muharram, is enacted the famous Passion Play commemorating the death of Hussain ibn Ali at the battle of Kerbela in A.D. 680. The Shii Mujtahids exercise not only religious but at times also political influence, as was demonstrated in the tribal insurrection of 1920 and on numerous subsequent occasions. The Shiis are rectifying their exclusion under Ottoman rule from political and administrative power and their non-participation in advanced education; some recent Cabinets have contained more than four Shiis, and in 1953–4 there was a Shii Prime Minister.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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(*b*) *Christian Churches*

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Christianity was already gaining a hold in northern Mesopotamia by the middle of the second century A.D., when that region was part of the Roman Empire, while southern Iraq was governed as part of the Persian Empire of the successive Parthian and Sasanian dynasties. The so-called Church of Persia declared itself autocephalous in A.D. 424, and at the Council of Ephesus (431) adopted the doctrine of Nestorius, thus separating itself from orthodox Christendom. Subsequently two groups professing the Monophysite doctrine in opposition to the Council of Chalcedon (451) settled in the area and organized their own communities and hierarchies—the Syrian 'Orthodox' or Jacobite Church and the Armenian 'Orthodox' or Gregorian Church. From the seventeenth century onwards minority sections of these three churches have acknowledged Papal supremacy while retaining their own rites and customs and enjoying autonomy under their own elected Patriarchs: these sections are known respectively as the Chaldaean, Syrian Catholic, and Armenian Catholic Churches. Prior to the First World War the Nestorian Church, which had been largely destroyed by Timur Leng and had lost many of its remaining Iraqi members to the Chaldaean (Uniate) Church, survived mainly in the mountains of Persia and Turkey. At the end of the war some 25,000 of its members, now known as Assyrians, were introduced by the British authorities into Iraq and were settled extensively in the north, where they suffered severely in the events of 1933.[1] In addition to the above sects, there are smaller numbers of Orthodox and Catholics of Byzantine rite (the so-called Greek Catholics). Of them all the Patriarch of only one—the Chaldaean Church—resides in Iraq. Today the ancient theological differences which distinguished them are almost forgotten by their ordinary members, among whom the difference is rather one of liturgy, ecclesiastical discipline, and hierarchy; this is, however, sufficient to constitute minute nations rather than congregations, recognized by the Government as possessing competence in matters of personal status and other internal affairs. The Christians are more fully an urban community than the Muslims, and show a peculiar aptitude for commerce, crafts, and the professions; but there is also a large peasant community, Chaldaean, Syrian Orthodox, and Syrian Catholic, in the plains around Mosul, and Assyrians in the vicinity of Amadiya and Rowanduz.

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[1] See above, pp. 57–8.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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(c) *Jews*

Until recently Iraq contained a large community of Jews 162
whose families had been settled in the country for hundreds or 563
even thousands of years. They lived mostly in the large towns, 463
especially Baghdad, in whose economic life they played an 197
important part as merchants, financiers, manufacturers, and members of the professions. There were also Kurdish-speaking Jews in the north, mostly urban traders and craftsmen but also rural cultivators. A law of 1931 gave Jewish communities self-government in their own affairs, and there was a highly organized communal life, with schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In consequence of events in Palestine the majority of Jews left Iraq in 1950–1, mostly for Israel.

(d) *Yazidis*

These are vulgarly known as 'devil-worshippers' but, al- 162
though their religion includes the propitiation of Satan, it might 771
more justly be described as an amalgam of Christian, Muslim, 795
and Magian elements. They are divided between Jebel Sinjar 197
and the Shaikhan district north of Mosul, speak a Kurdish dialect, except in their rites, where Arabic is used, and are probably of Kurdish origin.

(e) *Sabians*

('Baptists'), also called the Mandaeans and the 'Christians 162
of St John'; their religion combines elements of various origins 463
and periods. Most of them are craftsmen—especially silver- 795
smiths—in the large towns.

(f) *Shabak*

Of Kurdish origin, who live in the area of the Yazidis and 162
are not clearly distinguished from them; their religion contains 795
Yazidi and extreme Shii elements.

(g) *Other Sects*

Include Bahais, Sarlis, Kakais, Qizilbashis, none of them of any political significance.

POLITICAL HISTORY

Written history began in Iraq at the end of the fourth mil- 175
lennium B.C., but archaeological remains from much earlier periods, first in the north and later also in the south, give evidence of palaeolithic man, of agricultural neolithic man and, from the sixth and fifth millennia, of increasing human progress expressed successively in extensive agriculture, copper

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of 185
the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 652
and is estimated at ID155,374,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken [654
account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank 648]
for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of an annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated 311
that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living [162]
directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported 241
products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 36 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

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[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1952).

CHAPTER VI

THE ARABS OF MESOPOTAMIA

131/101 MESOPOTAMIA does not belong to Arabia
geographically. It lies to the north of the
peninsula and includes the territory between
the mountains of Asia Minor on the north, the mountains
of Persia on the east, the Syrian desert on the west and
the Persian Gulf on the south. The area enclosed be-
tween these limits is enormous. These are its natural
boundaries, but politically the territory included takes
in certain districts that belong to Persia and Turkey as
144 well as the kingdom of Mesopotamia. It is of interest
101 to include Mesopotamia in any discussion of Arab life,
for although the Mesopotamians are not in Arabia geo-
graphically, nor even politically, racially they are Arabs
as truly as the inhabitants of Nejd or the dwellers in the
197 valleys of Oman. Practically all of the inhabitants of
● 162 Mesopotamia are Arabic speaking and Arabic in origin,
101 the chief exceptions being the numerous Jews who have
come into the country from the north and the small com-
munity of Sabaeans, or fire-worshippers, who are a rem-
nant of the people that the Arabs found inhabiting the
country. The Arab is the dominant element, and the
others together would probably not amount to five per
cent of the whole.

133 The character of the country is most easily understood if we start by saying that Mesopotamia is the enormous

133 delta of two rivers—the Euphrates and the Tigris. With insignificant exceptions, it is one vast level expanse made up of the rich silt that these rivers have brought down. It contains no physical features whatever that call for comment except the plains and the rivers, unless we mention that combination of plain and river which covers a considerable area, namely the marsh. In the past this district was the seat of some of the great empires of antiquity—Assyria and Babylonia and Persia. When Xenophon marched over it about 400 B. C., it was and had been for centuries one of the world's centers of power and productiveness. It supported a vast population in those days, how vast no one knows, but the ruins of ancient cities suggest that it must have been very great indeed. 312 The basis of its[1] greatness was the use of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for irrigation. By this means the whole country had been transformed into one vast garden. The area was not so large then as it is now, for year by year the delta encroaches on the sea. It is supposed that in ancient times the sea reached up as far as Gurna at least, and that is a hundred miles from the present mouth of the river.

Under the Mohammedan caliphs of Baghdad the irrigation dams, waterways and smaller canals that had existed for centuries were allowed to fall into greater and greater decay. The Mongol invasion of Mesopotamia, which culminated in the capture of Baghdad in 1258 A. D., resulted in the complete destruction of this ancient system of irrigation. Ever since it has been in ruins, but the courses of the larger waterways are still distinguishable, and engineers tell us that they can decipher the entire system. 162 311 The country has been a desert since that day, populated by nomad tribes who roam over the vast

[1] [The Tigris-Euphrates Delta Area -- Analyst]

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

162 level plains and raise, by means of the scanty rainfall, 311 a meager amount of wheat and barley in favorable seasons.

312 Along the rivers in their upper courses are a few gardens, irrigated by means of various draught animals and water-wheels, which elevate water from the stream to the level of the land above. At Gurna the Tigris and Euphrates join to form one river and at Mohammerah the Karun empties into this united stream. The three rivers thus flow into the ocean as one enormous waterway, known locally as the "Arab River." For the last hundred miles before the sea is reached, the fresh water of the river ebbs and flows with the tides, and by cutting outlets along the river banks gardens may be automatically irrigated twice a day if so much water is desired. 245 Along these lower stretches each bank of the river is lined with beautiful gardens, which reach a depth of some miles in places and extend in practically an unbroken expanse all the way up to Basra and in less prolific culture even as far as Gurna. These date gardens are beautiful things, beautiful for what they are now, and more beautiful still as a suggestion of what all Mesopotamia might be. They are also one of the most melancholy things in the world as reminders of what the past developed and the present has wasted.

311 The land has enormous resources for agricultural de-134 velopment. That whole vast district may be made into the garden spot of the earth. The soil is the best in the world, river silt hundreds of feet deep. It is as level as a parlor floor, with just enough pitch between the big rivers, and between the north and south, to make irriga-312 tion easy. All that is necessary is a perfected system of 185 irrigation, and although the necessary investment would

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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312 be large, running up to hundreds of millions of dollars,
185 it should bring excellent returns. The trouble hitherto
has been the unstable character of the government and
the consequent risk to which any such investment would
be exposed. During the time of the spring high waters,
a disaffected tribe might obtain control of some important
dam and with one stick of dynamite destroy nearly the
whole system. But with a stable government the pro-
ject should be one of great promise. The water is at
311 hand, three riverfuls of it, and as if to prove the prac-
312 ticability of the dream, we know that in the ages of an-
185 tiquity these resources were utilized for this purpose and
with the most splendid success. Whether there is actually
water enough to transform every square mile of the coun-
try into a garden or whether the supply of available land
will prove to be more than the water can care for, espe-
cially now since the area has so greatly increased, can
only be told after the project is tried. Certainly there
is water enough for hundreds of square miles, enough
indeed to make Mesopotamia one of the richest countries
of its size in the world. Already one new irrigated area
has been developed by the Hindiya Barrage built by a
British concern between 1911 and 1913 as the first step
in the reconstruction of the ancient irrigation system.
The erection of this great barrage on the Euphrates River
was due to the Young Turks, the dam being the first unit
in a comprehensive irrigation project for the entire coun-
try which had been drawn up for them by the noted
engineer, Sir William Willcocks. It is only a beginning,
but it has made the desert rejoice and blossom as the
rose over many square miles of territory.

311 With the exception of the rich petroleum deposits
•162 which are said to exist throughout the Mosul district and

311 which may play a prominent part in the economic devel-
162 opment of the country, Mesopotamia may be regarded as a purely agricultural land. From this standpoint it is best considered in two sections. There is the river-irrigated date-growing district to the south, with Basra as its center, and there is the district to the north inhabited by nomads, semi-nomads and river agriculturists, with its principal center in Baghdad and a second capital further north in Mosul.

312 The date gardeners along the river in the Basra terri-
245 tory resemble in many ways the cultivators that can be seen in any oasis town in Arabia. Their work is very similar. Irrigation systems must be constructed. Channels must be provided to carry the water to the roots of the date palms and to the squares of alfalfa and other crops. There is this difference, however, that the water flows of itself. Twice a day the tide of the ocean backs up the water of the great Arab River as far as Gurna, about a hundred miles from the sea. The extensive cultivation of dates stops at that point. The water can be shut out of a field if so desired, or the gates can be opened and as much allowed to enter as is needed. The supply is unlimited and can be had twice a day the year around. The soil is ideal. It is rich and hundreds of feet deep. In natural endowment Mesopotamia is a paradise for date gardeners.

511 As a matter of fact, however, that country is far from a paradise for date gardeners. The favorable conditions ought to make their work easier and their remuneration greater, but the facts are otherwise. Their condition is worse than that of the cultivators in Hasa. It is the story of the Bahrein pearl banks over again. The increased wealth of the Bahrein pearl banks has not bene-

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 ~~Middle East~~
Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

It is customary to abuse the Turkish Government as 000
responsible for these conditions. That government has
much to answer for, but it is doubtful whether even the
efficient and benevolent rule of the British will improve
the lot of the date gardener a great deal so long as the
present system remains unchanged. The trouble is that 466
the owner has no contact with his gardener except 427
through his agent, and is coerced by no intelligent and
effective public sentiment. Whether in Turkish or British
territory, he lives under a government built on the
theory that contracts made in good faith must be executed
at all costs and that knows no redress for the gardener
except that he seek employment elsewhere, a thing that
is very difficult to do. The adjustments possible in the
oases of Arabia, where it is the function of the sheikh to
modify oppressive contracts and where it is understood
that an unfavorable reputation will speedily endanger
the life of the land-owner, are out of the question in
Mesopotamia.

In addition to the date gardeners who cultivate the irrigated 243
land along the last hundred miles of the Arab [162] ●
River from Gurna to the Gulf, there are also a number of 262
so-called Marsh Arabs along the rivers in Lower Mesopotamia,
who raise rice, wheat and barley on land that is
overflowed in the spring when water is high. Rice is
their favorite crop and the one that is most reliable. In
that country the visitor is surprised at being served with
loaves of bread of the usual flat pancake-shape but snowy
white instead of the light brown color of the whole wheat
flour which is universal over all Arabia. I asked my
host with much surprise whether he imported his flour
from Bombay and he laughed. He hardly knew where

Iraq MH1
Iraq Bedouin MH8

I 438 248 As compared with the southern district the northern part of Mesopotamia grows only a small amount of dates. There are a few gardens around each city, which furnish fresh dates for local consumption during the season, but in this region water has to be raised from the river to the ground level by animals, by the method in use in Arabia. The gardens are small and confined to the river-side and I 243 are of no real significance in the economic support of the country. These northern regions are not devoid of rainfall, and a meager return is secured by sowing wheat and barley on unirrigated land. Such cultivation, however, is uncertain, and in about one year out of every three the crop is a dead failure.

• I 162 B 461 233 511 The great mass of the people are nomadic or semi-nomadic. Everywhere there can be found pasturage for the nomad's flocks and herds and wells for the watering of stock. Many of the Bedouin nomads engage in agriculture occasionally in good seasons. Even among those who refuse to degrade themselves by becoming agriculturists of any degree, the standards of life are considerably higher than among the Bedouins of Central Arabia. The supply of forage is more abundant, and their flocks of camels and sheep and goats are very large. These nomads have better clothes, very much more abundant food, and in every way live a more tolerable life than that of their brothers in the Central Arabian desert. B 231 [556] 492 Horses are common in Mesopotamia. They are a luxury but not such a tax on the resources of the owner as farther south, for there are always forage and water for them. Every Arab of position expects to own and ride one; otherwise he loses caste. Arab horses are beautiful animals and are trained as household pets, much as a fine dog is trained with us. They are ridden without saddle

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHL
Turklish PeriodM2

with, but even the admittedly great difficulties of her 000 task do not excuse her utter failure. Although she has had hundreds of years of opportunity to exert her abilities in harmonizing the different races which make up her population, they are now more discordant than ever, and we had during the war the hideous spectacle of the dominant race deliberately attempting to exterminate one of the insubordinate subject races in cold blood, certainly a sufficient confession of failure.

The Sabaeans or fire-worshippers of Mesopotamia furnish a notable example of Turkish ineptitude in facing this difficult problem of assimilating alien races. The Sabaeans are the remnants of the pre-Islamic pop- I
ulation of Mesopotamia who refused to become Moslems 101
in the days of the Moslem conquest. They have been, 795
and so far as their diminished numbers permit they 162
still are, a most valuable asset to the country. They are 463
by far the best artisans in the Arab world. Some of their silver work surpasses the best that India can offer. This community, which is absolutely peaceable and knows nothing of the arts of war, has been harried and persecuted until now there remains only the smallest fraction of their original numbers. They now number less than ten thousand, if their own estimates can be trusted, and their complete disappearance is apparently a matter of only a short time.

T
Another indictment that must be brought against the 185
Turk in the Arab world is the fact that he failed utterly as a civilizing force. This was his fault and not simply his misfortune, as might be argued of an Arab ruler who has never seen the vision of the government as a force working to uplift society. In Hasa sanitation was not improved even in the most elementary way. No

Iraq MH1

Chapter Eleven

IRAQ

Distribution of Minorities

THERE are no complete and up-to-date statistics of the population of Iraq, and estimates of the size of the minorities must therefore be treated with caution. The following figures have been arrived at by a comparison of several estimates, but are no more than rough approximations : 162

Kurds	800,000
Turcomans	75,000
Persians	80,000
Assyrians	30,000
Other Christians	60,000
Jews	100,000
Yazidis	30,000
Mandaeans	3,000
Shabak	12,000
Total	about 1,200,000
Total population	about 4,500,000

These figures show that the minorities between them form about a quarter of the population of Iraq. Of the minority-population itself three-quarters consist of groups which differ from the majority not in religion but in race and language. The minority-problem is much more one of relations between Arabs and non-Arabs than in the other countries.

The greater part of the minorities inhabit the north of the country. Almost all the Kurds dwell in the mountainous north and north-east, in which they constitute a majority. The Yazidis are a compact community in Jebel Sinjar in the north-west ; the Assyrians dwell largely in the Kurdish mountains and the plains around Mosul, although they are also scattered in other parts of the country. The majority of the other Christians live in and around Mosul, the remainder mostly in Baghdad and Basra. The Turcomans are to be found in a line of towns and villages running roughly south-east from Mosul in the border-districts between the predominantly Kurdish and predominantly Arab parts of the country ; their main centre is Kirkuk. The Shabak live on the banks of the Tigris, south of Mosul. 563

Most of the Persians live in the Shi'i Holy Cities of Nejf,

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

Only three cities, Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, have a total population [162] exceeding 100,000. *Baghdad* (population 1943, 300,000) lies on the 361 Tigris at the head of navigation of the river, and in the 'waist' of the lowlands, where the Tigris and Euphrates approach closely to each other, and hence give the best possibility of constructing irrigation canals. This narrow inter-riverine zone also provides a convenient crossing-place, since the marshland is reduced in extent and the firmer platform of steppeland provides a useful east-west route between the Mediterranean and Iran. The region of Baghdad thus has an important nodal position at the junction of routes from east and west across the desert, and from north, north-east, and south along the river valleys. It should be noted that all the factors mentioned above apply to a region and not to an actual site.

It is easy to see why a town should have grown up within the district of Baghdad, but the extra smaller scale features that usually fix the site of a town in one particular spot are less in evidence. Local changes in topography due to the shifting of drainage channels have led to the growth of three separate cities at various periods, and so within the Baghdad region there has arisen first Babylon, the ancient capital that lay closer to the Euphrates, some 60 miles to the south of modern Baghdad. Babylon was in turn succeeded by Ctesiphon, only a few miles from Baghdad, and this city remained the nodal centre until superseded by Baghdad in the early Muhammadan era. Baghdad itself dates only from the 8th century A.D., and a 'golden age' occurred when its Abbasid rulers supplanted the Omeyyads of Damascus and made it the capital of the Moslem world. Baghdad suffered greatly from Mongol invasion, and most of the older buildings have disappeared. The modern city is sprawling and undistinguished—in fact, an extreme disappointment to visitors who may wish to evoke the 'Arabian Nights'. Many of the poorer [342 houses are of mud, and flooding is a frequent feature (Fig. 65). 731]

Baghdad is the commercial centre of the region, with numerous, 361 but small workshops and distributing houses. Industry is, as we 438 have seen, mainly confined to bazaar crafts—textiles, metals, foodstuffs—and to the production of pottery and building materials. 565 Trade is for the most part in the hands of Europeans, Jews, and 463 Armenians, with Iraqi Christians as clerks and supervisors. An upper class—mainly Sunni Moslems—carries on the administration of the country; and a third element in the life of the city is a large group of absentee landlords.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date 1948 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

811 which now amounts to one million acres. More might be added
by water storage schemes. At present several large new schemes
812 are under consideration. These involve flood control by the
construction of the Bekhme dam on the Great Zab, and an extension of the Habbaniya reservoir. In addition to the Bekhme dam a scheme for flood irrigation in the Wadi Tharthar is being considered. A survey commission is now preparing a report on these developments, but so far no estimates have been made of the area of land likely to be brought into cultivation.

464 At present there is no shortage of labour. The population is
small in relation to the area cropped, but it is growing rapidly.
161 In 1931, according to Dowson, the total population was
162 2,824,000, of which 2,246,000 were estimated to be rural, including 895,000 settled population and 1,351,000 still living in tribal conditions.[1] Estimates for 1943 put the total population at 4,500,000, of which the rural population was 3,500,000. Some regions, Basra, Karbala, Dulaim, and Muntafiq are densely settled, while others, chiefly in the north, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk,
811 are settled very sparsely. The area of cropped land per head is 2
acres, and the area of cultivated land perhaps as much as 4 acres.

LAND TENURE

432 It is clear that Iraq has greater prospects of agricultural expansion than any other Middle East country. But to the deve-
422 lopment of these potentialities the greatest obstacle is land
tenure. Sir Ernest Dowson, in his classical report on the subject, says: 'The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free
000 from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort
of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the

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[1] Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth Garden City Press for the Iraqi Government, 1932), p. 12.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

COTTON IN IRAQ

The program is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a profound economic and social transformation, with far-reaching repercussions. 652 654

The International Bank concludes that the country will need no further foreign loans except possibly to meet part of the hard currency needs.[34] The oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling. However, under a new agreement, the United Kingdom has undertaken to furnish sufficient dollars against sterling to cover Iraq's essential needs.

The International Bank in 1950 already had loaned $12.8 million to Iraq, primarily for flood control, irrigation, and road construction. Apparently the Bank is willing to consider further loans, but the Iraqi are not interested as long as the oil revenues continue and they are able to get sterling converted into dollars.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A number of organizations are providing technical assistance to Iraq in its development program, notably the United States Point Four Program and the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization. 648 654

Point Four began its program early in 1952 in such fields as cotton agronomy, farm machinery, agricultural extension and vocational education, irrigation, entomology, rural health, sanitation, and industrial development. About 25 Americans have been employed, and the number may be doubled by the end of the year. Most of the Point Four funds go for salaries; the costs of tools and materials are assumed by the local government. The specialists in Iraq obviously were chosen for their competence, practical experience, and their interest in the assignment. They are anxious to develop the most desirable means of approaching the problem.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has about 11 specialists regularly employed in the country in such fields as soils, cooperatives, bacteriology, veterinary science, nutrition, agricultural statistics, farm mechanization, and home economics. The program may be extended to cover agricultural research, extension, underground water and drainage, forestry, and fisheries.

The FAO operates almost entirely at the government level; Point Four seeks to go beyond government planning to the grass roots.

INDUSTRY

The people of Iraq, in common with their neighbors of the Middle East, live almost entirely by agriculture. About 80 per cent of the population earns its living directly from the soil, and most of the others indirectly.[35] Industry is still relatively undeveloped. Apart from the oil industry, which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 people are employed in what are called modern industrial plants. 162 433

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 62.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Iraq M41

II. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

A. PRESENT CONDITIONS

369 The some 4,000,000 more people of Iraq who live the rural areas have been
511 long characterized by many people both within and outside Iraq as suffering from
162 poverty, ill health and illiteracy. These conditions become readily apparent to one visiting the villages of the country today. The characterization of the people can be extended to their being ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed.

369 The survey was immediately impressed with the crude and inefficient methods
511 of making a living and the unnecessarily poor and unhealthy home and village life. These conditions can be remedied by instruction and assistance. People farm with primitive equipment and are wasteful of land and water. In village after village there are mud huts without light or fresh air. Families live, sleep and eat in single rooms packed together with animals, food, stores, farming equipment and refuse. Children play in courtyards filled with animal dung and filth, many people suffer from infected eyes, skin sores and diseases caused by unsanitary conditions which could be greatly reduced by better sanitary conditions. In the homes food is prepared on the floors where it comes in contact with the accumulated filth, flies, chickens, dogs and other animals. Pots and pans and mixing spoons lie on the ground. They are crudely cleaned with dirty water or old rags. There are no such things as kitchens, screened lockers for food or clean and covered places for drinking water in the homes of the rural villagers. Instruction in home care could overcome much of this.

369 The lack of pure drinking water is one of the most acute problems in these
364 villages. Some pumps and water tanks and some water piped from springs to
511 collection pools have been installed. However, these facilities frequently lack sanitary protection and show lack of proper maintenance by the communities. Often wells have around them accumulation of stagnant water, mud and animal dung. Another acute problem is the lack of any facilities in many villages, and homes for taking care of human waste. Where toilets exist they are more uncovered holes open to flies and a source of spreading disease.

369 Many villages have not yet received the benefit of schools where children can
871 learn some of the concepts and techniques which would enable them to understand the need for improving their conditions and help their families in doing so. In some villages young girls are not allowed by their elders to attend school or not provided with primary schools, buildings and teachers. Much of a new generation is growing up illiterate and ignorant of how they might help themselves when they grow up.

369 Inquiry among villagers and local officials revealed that although there might
423 be a headman or mukhtar of the village, nearly all direction and management of their
471 affairs comes from outside leadership. Communities lack the local leadership and
511 organization by which they might progress through their own efforts. Sheikhs, landlords, their agents (sirkal) who are frequently local government representatives as well, direct the farming operations, decide the lands on which the villagers will farm and live, provide much of the seed and equipment, direct the cleaning of ditches, collect the shares of crops and other payments and decide whether or not the farmers may live and work on the land during the next year. Even the farmer who owns his own land is not without obligations to money lenders, tax collectors and government supervision. The farmers and tenants of Iraq are dependent upon

132 year in the plains of the delta region and 12 to 16 inches in the upland districts, while in some sections of the mountains it increases to around 50 inches. The summer temperatures are uniformly high and may reach 110° to 125° F. in the central and the southern provinces. The daily fluctuations are slight in the Gulf region, but they become more pronounced toward the interior. During the winter months snows are rare outside the highland districts, but frosts are occasionally encountered as far south as Basra. In January, the coldest month, the mean maximum temperature averages 60° to 65° F. at Basra, 58° to 61° F. at Baghdad and 50° to 55° F. at Mosul; the mean minimum temperature, 38° to 42° F., 44° to 47° F. and 34° to 36° F., respectively. The mean maximum temperatures approximate 104° to 110° F. in all 3 localities in July, while the mean minimum temperatures range from 76° to 82° F. in Basra to 72° to 75° F. in Mosul. In midsummer the mean daily relative humidity rarely rises above 25 to 35 per cent on the plains, although it is often excessive in the Gulf area. Northwest winds, known locally as the *shamal*, blow irregularly throughout the year. They are especially strong and desiccating during the summer months, and, in the south, are usually laden with dust and sand.

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

POPULATION

161 The population, according to the official census for 1947, was estimated at 4,799,500, including an unknown number of Bedouin, roughly calculated at about 250,000. The majority of the inhabitants are of mixed Arabic stock, representing a relatively homogeneous blend of ancient Semitic and Indo-European strains which has evolved over
162 centuries of successive conquests. About 95
795 per cent of the people are Moslems; slightly over one half are Shiites; and most of the
[131] remainder are Sunnites. The Kurds, who

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[181] inhabit the mountainous districts near the
162 northeastern frontiers, constitute the largest
795 Moslem minority group. Racially and linguistically
distinct, they make up about 15
to 20 per cent of the population. Other non-Arabic
Moslem communities include about
50,000 each of Turkomans and Iranians,
the majority of whom are also found in the
northern provinces. Most of the Kurds and
the Turkomans are Sunnites, but some adhere
to minor heterodox sects; the Iranians
are Shiites.

From 150,000 to 200,000 native Christians
reside in Iraq. The Chaldeans, a sect which
observes early Nestorian rites but owes allegiance
to the Vatican, comprise the most
numerous group. Other communities include
some 30,000 Assyrians (Nestorians),
refugees from Asia Minor in 1918, and
smaller contingents belonging to the Armenian
Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox, the
Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) and the Syrian
563 Catholic churches. Most of the Christian
peoples live together in more or less separate
ethnic and religious groups: about 70
per cent are settled in the northern provinces
of Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil, and a
large proportion of the remainder in the
cities of Baghdad and Basra. Prominent
among other indigenous sects are the Yezidis,
or so-called "devil-worshipers," about
30,000 of whom dwell in the districts near
the Syrian border. A few thousand Sabians,
famous as silver craftsmen, also live in
Baghdad, Amarah and Basra.

191 Arabic is spoken by over three quarters
of the population. Kurdish, Syriac and
Turki, however, are recognized as official
languages in limited areas in the north,
while English is extensively used in the
593 larger cities. Although the Iraqi are predominantly
162 Arabs, marked gradations in
social structure are represented by the
nomadic Bedouin tribes of the deserts, the
"marsh Arabs" or primitive tribesmen of
the Amarah and Hammar lakes region of the
southern delta, the rural peasants and the
townspeople. Up to 1950, the population
included about 200,000 Jews, primarily of

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

Sephardic origin. The majority have since 593
migrated to Israel, while probably less than 162
10,000 remain, subject to certain restrictions. Over 130,000 were transported to
Israel by the Iraqi government in 1950-51.
About 5,000 Palestinian refugees have settled in the country since the Arab-Israeli
conflict in 1948. Small numbers of British,
American and other nationalities also reside
in the larger cities.

As a whole, Iraq is sparsely settled, with 361
the population concentrated in the river 161
valleys and in the rain-irrigated highland
districts of the north. The most densely
populated areas are found in the river
valleys of the northern delta. In 1947, the
density of population in the provinces of
the upper delta region was calculated at 131
per square mile in Hilla and 104 in Baghdad.
In the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk
and Erbil it averaged 31 to 39 per square
mile, and in Sulaimaniya, on the eastern
frontier, 62 per square mile. In the south,
it ranged from 75 per square mile in Basra
province to 42 in Amarah, while in Dulaim,
on the upper reaches of the Euphrates, it
did not exceed 10 per square mile. The pop- 369
ulation is essentially rural: over three quar- 161
ters of the inhabitants live in some 8,000
small villages or in semipermanent settlements. The Bedouin, representing about 5 [464]
to 8 per cent of the total population, roam
the deserts with their flocks, but many migrate seasonally to the towns in search of
work. There are only 7 cities with over 369
40,000 inhabitants. The population of 162
Baghdad, the capital, was estimated at
between 900,000 and 1 million in 1952,
including over 500,000 in the metropolitan
area and several hundred thousand in the
surrounding suburbs. The population of
Mosul, a commercial center on the upper
Tigris, totaled about 150,000, and of Kirkuk,
the metropolis of the oil region, almost
75,000. Basra, the chief port, located on the
Shatt al Arab, had a population of 90,000
to 100,000.

In spite of considerable progress in edu- 212
cation within the last 30 years, the majority 872

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bk:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

CHAPTER III

IRAQ

563 An examination of the development of Muslim-Jewish relations in Iraq reveals two noteworthy features, apparently at variance with each other. On the one hand, probably in no other Muslim country has the Jewish minority been so closely associated with the whole fabric of social and political life as in Iraq. On the other hand, in none has anti-Jewish feeling in recent years been so general and nowhere have anti-Jewish measures been applied so systematically.

The Jews in Iraq constitute, as far as we know, the oldest Jewish settlement outside Palestine. Indeed, even if the origin of the House of Abraham in Ur of the Chaldees is disregarded, Jewish settlements in Iraq can be said to have first taken place about 600 years before Jews from Palestine emigrated to Egypt. The majority of the Jews now living in Iraq are the direct descendants of those Jews who, after the destruction of the First Temple 2,500 years ago, were led into exile in Babylonia and remained there after the return of some of their number to Jerusalem with Ezra.

But the great antiquity of the Jewish community is not, of course, the sole reason for the exceptionally close bonds which unite Iraqi Jews to their country and their non-Jewish neighbours. "They have made themselves an integral part of the nation. Both in business and in politics they have always played a big part." (E. Main: *Iraq*, 1935.)

Their close association with all aspects of the life around them is in part due to the fact that the proportion of the Jewish minority in Iraq to the rest of the population is far higher than in other Muslim ● [162] countries. Whereas the Jews in Egypt represent only 0.4 per cent of the total population, in Iraq they amount to about 2.5 per cent, and as much as 25 per cent in the capital, Baghdad.

It should be noted that it is more difficult to determine the total number of Jews in Iraq than in Egypt. For while in Egypt the Jewish population is almost exclusively concentrated in the big towns, in Iraq it is dispersed up and down the country, including some scattered among the Kurdish tribes in the North.

563 [197] 162 [463] The Kurdish Jews live somewhat apart from the rest of the Jewish community, just as the Kurdish minority lives apart from the Arab population. Both are different from the Arabs in general character and daily habits. The language of some of the Kurdish Jews is Syriac (a form of Aramaic), while those in Mosul speak Kurdish. They are mainly traders and craftsmen and live scattered among the various Kurdish villages and towns. In the Amadia district, however, there can be found a number of Jews engaged in tilling the land. It is

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East

Iraq MHI

difficult to make even an approximate estimate of how many Jews live 563
in these villages—perhaps 5,000-6,000 at most. They have remained 162
relatively untouched by the events of the past few years, which have had such a revolutionary effect on the rest of the Jewish community.

The total Jewish population of Iraq is estimated at 120,000. Although this figure may be out of date, it is probably not far wrong, if allowance is made for emigration, on the one hand, and increase in the birthrate, on the other. Of these, between 90,000 and 100,000 live in Baghdad. But neither is it the larger number of Jews in the country as a whole nor their concentration in the capital which accounts for the difference of their position, at least in the past, from that of their coreligionists in Egypt.

Most important is the fact that Western influence on Iraqi Jews, 563
being no stronger than it was on the town-bred Muslims, was much 177
weaker in Iraq than in Egypt. Middle-class Jews in Iraq took to
European dress at about the same time as the Muslims. Likewise, in [197]
their daily habits, their houses, and, last but not least, in their language,
there was no marked difference between the two communities. Arabic has always been, and still is to-day, the mother-tongue of both Jew and Muslim.

True, as a result of the higher educational facilities provided by the activities of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and the Anglo-Jewish Association, knowledge of French or English is more common among the Jews than the Muslims. But this difference has never been sufficient to detract from the central fact that Western influence on the Jews has not been much stronger than on other Iraqi communities. All this is in strong contrast to the situation in Egypt and—again unlike Egypt—there has been no noticeable immigration of Jews from European countries.

During the nineteenth century the Jewish community in Iraq was 563
fairly prosperous; and freedom to develop was assisted to no small degree by the two proclamations issued by the Sultan of Turkey in 1839 and 1856. At that time there was already a considerable number of well-to-do families. The schools of the *Alliance* helped to raise the community's educational standard. When the first Chamber of Deputies was opened in Istanbul in 1876, it included a representative of the Iraqi Jews (Menahem Danyiel) and, later, after the Constitution of 1900, the community was represented by Hezkiel Sassoon, a retired senior Ottoman Government official.

During the First World War, however, the Jewish community suffered great hardships at the hands of Turkish governors. Just prior to the fall of Baghdad in 1917, some of its leading members suffered death, torture, and imprisonment.

When, therefore, the Arabs rose against the Turks and made common cause with the Allies, the Jews regarded the fight for liberation as their own. They welcomed the establishment of the new Iraq under British Mandate, and many immediately offered their

161 taken, in 1947, gave the total population as 4,799,500; before that there were periodical official estimates as follows:

1930	2,824,000
1935	3,560,000
1943	3,995,000

The present population is probably about 5 million. According to the census, Baghdad has a population of 364,000, Mosul 302,000, Basra 94,000, and Kirkuk 69,000, Hilla being the only other town of over 50,000 inhabitants. Significant figures for density of population could be determined only after defining habitable land and distinguishing rural populations; the accepted density figure for the country as a whole (27·4 per square mile) means little. In the total cultivable area as calculated by an English authority the average density is 102 per square mile, but in many areas the density is much more than this for the rural population alone, and in the Baghdad and Basra districts exceeds 300 and 800 respectively per square mile.

163 *Vital Statistics*. For a number of reasons, which include the
165 inaccessibility of large areas of Iraq and the lack of doctors
164 in the rural districts, vital statistics are not available for the country as a whole. Statistics of possibly fair accuracy are, however, published for the population of some 1,160,000 served by the health centres in the main cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul; the latest, compiled for 1950, show a birth-rate of 27 and a death-rate of 12 per 1,000, with an infant mortality figure of 97 per 1,000 live births. The main causes of death were stated as old age, respiratory diseases other than tuberculosis, malaria, heart diseases, and tuberculosis.

197 *Language*. Arabic is the official and most widely spoken language. The 800,000 odd Kurds speak an Iranian language in various forms. Turkish dialects are spoken in Irbil, Kirkuk, to some extent in Khanaqin and in smaller intervening towns, and Syriac by Christian communities in northern Iraq. Other minority languages, such as Armenian, also occur, while in the Holy Cities of the south (Kerbela and Najaf) Persian is widely spoken.

RELIGIONS[1]

642 The constitution declares Islam to be the official religion of the state, but guarantees complete freedom of conscience and worship in conformity with accepted customs subject only to the maintenance of public order and morality, declares the absolute equality of all Iraqis before the law, gives communities

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[1] See above, p. 51ff.

IRAQ MH 1

of peasants and tribesmen are illiterate. 212
Theoretically, primary education is compulsory for both sexes, but the facilities are inadequate, particularly in the rural areas. 872
Recent estimates indicate that the literacy rate in the country as a whole approximates 10 per cent, in contrast with about 40 per cent in Baghdad and the larger cities.
Education is controlled by the government, 871
and public instruction is available at all 658
levels from the primary schools through the professional colleges. There is no university in Iraq, but the incorporation of the present colleges into a national institution, with university status, has been proposed. Separate colleges of medicine, pharmacy, law, science, arts, fine arts, engineering, commerce and teachers' training, as well as various types of vocational schools, are supported by the government. Secondary schools are also maintained by private and mission groups. Government scholarships are provided annually to qualified students for study abroad, usually in Egypt, Great Britain or the United States.

VITAL STATISTICS

Valid vital statistics are almost nonexist- 163
ent, since the registration of births and 165
deaths is admittedly incomplete, even in the principal cities, as Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The general reluctance of the inhabitants to report births, deaths and other statistical data and the large size of the nomadic and the semimigratory populations are factors contributing to the inaccuracy of the figures available. Within recent years statistics have been compiled by the government health organization in 75 centers under the jurisdiction of medical officers, but they do not reflect conditions throughout the country. In 1950, these health districts covered a population of 1,160,000, distributed in all 14 of the provinces into which Iraq is divided. The birth rate was estimated at 27 per 1,000 population, and the death rate at 12 per 1,000. Competent authorities, however, believe that the over-all birth rate is nearer 40 to 50 per 1,000 popu-

p. 23(B)

163 lation, and the death rate, 25 to 35. The 165 discrepancies in reporting are probably less in the case of deaths than of births.

On the basis of the health district populations for 1950, the infant mortality rate was calculated at 98 per 1,000 live births. The death rate of infants under 1 year was 14 per cent of the total deaths, and of children under 5 years, about 23 per cent. Local observers estimate that the mortality in infants under 1 year approximates 300 to 350 per 1,000 live births among most rural and impoverished urban communities, and that it reaches almost 500 per 1,000 live births in children under 5 years of age. Intestinal diseases, undernutrition, respiratory infections and malaria are prominent among the causes of death in infancy and early childhood.

SOCIAL ECONOMY

241 Agriculture and the petroleum industry together form the basis of Iraq's economy. Although this region was one of the chief granaries of the world centuries before the Christian Era, the present agricultural resources of the potentially fertile Tigris and Euphrates river basins are only partially developed. About 75 to 80 per cent of the inhabitants are engaged in farming or pastoral pursuits, but progress is retarded by the prevailing forms of land tenure, shortage of labor supply and inefficient methods 311 of cultivation. In 1950, less than one fifth 241 of the arable land, normally estimated at 25 to 30 million acres, was under production. Extensive areas of the alluvial plain are cultivated by means of irrigation, but improper drainage often results in consider- 427 able annual loss of soil fertility. A system 423 of tenancy farming predominates in most sections of the country. The proportion of land-owning peasants is small and largely restricted to the northern provinces. In cen- [444] tral and southern Iraq many families are migratory cultivators who work on a sharecropping basis for wealthy and, usually, absentee landlords.

244 Cereals, tobacco and cotton are important

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The social development which these processes entailed repre- 177
sented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue.

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the 181
merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by 511
serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and [164]
combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied.

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 361
changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building 363
materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Baṣra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Baṣra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen-contractors whose

the American School of Oriental Research founded in 1923 and the 172
British School founded in 1929 maintained headquarters in Baghdad,
and both published the results of their researches.

In the field of Public Health the Government services had 744
achieved much, but not the impossible. They had faced an im- 164
mense field to cover and to conquer, had started from nothing, and
had been always restricted by lack of funds and trained officials;
and meanwhile, inevitably, the disease- or weakness-producing
factors in the territory, and the apathy and conservatism of its
people, continued. The problem of general malnutrition and
resulting lack of physical vigour was, in fact, the problem of
poverty: the cure, still distant, lay as much or more in increased
wealth as in increased enlightenment; and the same was true, in
spite of active and multiplying maternity and child-welfare clinics,
of an infant death-rate still tragically high. Little, save increasingly
comprehensive and practical study, had yet been done to combat
the curse of hookworm, malaria, or bilharzia; a comprehensive
effort against these diseases and against tuberculosis, eye-disease,
and the typhoid group must call insistently for more time, more
funds, and more specialized staff. Steps taken against epidemic
disease had been successful; plague and cholera had scarcely
appeared for a quarter-century, and smallpox was well handled with
full modern resources. Urban sanitation had been improved, [364]
sewage schemes adopted, and sanitary inspector training developed;
but conditions in this respect over most of the territory remained
wholly primitive, and the majority of 'Iraqi doctors were little
interested in public health administration. The country at large 743
was served by some eighty hospitals, of which three-quarters were
general and a quarter specialized for fevers, mental and venereal
diseases, leprosy (at 'Amara), children's and chest and eye diseases;
a quarter of the whole were in Baghdad. Non-governmental
hospitals were those of the oil companies, foreign missions, and the
minority communities. The Jewish Mir Elias Hospital was still
open, for patients of all creeds; all other Jewish hospitals and dispensaries
had been closed. The Railways, the Port, the Police, and
the Army maintained their separate Medical services. The supply 759
of doctors, thanks to the Royal Medical College, had much
improved since the thirties, but some reliance on foreigners was
still necessary; some thirty of these were so employed in 1951 and
recruitment of more was in progress. Registered practitioners in
all numbered some 300 in 1945, 420 in 1949. The reluctance of
'Iraqi doctors to serve in the remoter regions—or, indeed, elsewhere
than in Baghdad—was still an embarrassment. Neverthe- 743
less, the busy and valued hospitals and dispensaries maintained in
all parts of 'Iraq were playing a major stabilizing as well as a

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education
is not possible without some reference to the history and present 186
circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization
flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country
remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the
sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the
port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the
people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an
uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932
as an independent nation with membership of the League of
Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an
administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Ad- 185
ministrative reforms and some social advance were attempted
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became 735
an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority
of the population. Attempts have been made by successive
Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain
directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But
economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain,
all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 642
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent 212
years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective
participation in the government of the country must inevitably
be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to 361
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and
Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of
Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

SOCIAL FACTORS

Alongside these economic and administrative problems are a 000
number of social factors which inhibit educational development.

Illiteracy and Health Problems. For many years it is likely that 212
illiteracy among the adult population, and the state of the public 164
health, will constitute obstacles to the extension of primary
education, especially in the rural areas. The reasons for this are 871
obvious. Parents who are themselves illiterate and living at a low standard of life are not easily persuaded that schooling is a worthwhile substitute for the work of their children. Neither are they able to provide in their homes those standards and values which, if the training of the schoolroom is not be negatived, are such necessary reinforcements to public education. Similarly, the prevalence of epidemic and endemic disease, together with inadequate sanitation, also contributes to a major health problem which must be taken into account in attempting to ensure regular school attendance.

Yet while obstacles of this kind exist, they are diminishing. 657
The Public Health Service is developing slowly but surely, and 212
one has only to see a doctor at work in a remote rural area to appreciate the devoted service which is beginning to contribute to a solution of some of the health problems. Again, although illiteracy and poverty are not the best friends of education, one has only to visit remote little village schools to realize that some of the poorest parents are making sacrifices to send their children to school.

Before compulsory education can be achieved, however, even 871
assuming that the money for it will be forthcoming, a vigorous attack on adult illiteracy will be essential. To this end, what is needed in the rural areas is a type of school which, in addition to meeting the needs of the children, provides in a practical and non-academic fashion realistic fundamental education for the parents. The teacher training institutions would make a most valuable contribution if, quite apart from training the future teachers to attend to the needs of children, they also initiated them into the more practical techniques of teaching illiterates the fundamentals of better living.

The Position of Women and Children. Another obstacle to educational 562
and social development which is often quoted is the position of women in a society which is predominantly Muslim. Traditionally women are discouraged from taking part in public life, and this attitude is bound to be reflected in education.

658 238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase
871 in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or
[875] quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still
inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of 'Iraqi
students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu
of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought
fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education
to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful
efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to
adapt Western methods to 'Iraq instead of blindly adopting
them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in
present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

871 Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern
has been expressed both by 'Iraqis and by others lest various
tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the
work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension
of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the
standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry
to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and controversies;
and the acquisition by students of the view that
education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that
government positions should be the reward of their school
certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free
itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of
educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the
growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves,
will depend much of the continued progress of 'Iraq.

744 In other fields, a health service has been in existence since
759 the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at
Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations
for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other
hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient
highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in out-
[158] lying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small
164 portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241 has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahin* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 437 features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648 may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433 existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466 have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647 of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175 economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185 of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

procurement of equipment and the erection of structures to house 206 this equipment. In the past these functions have been carried out by two different sections of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works with little or no coordination.

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.

[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

V. Public Health

Considerable progress in public health has undoubtedly been 164 made over recent decades. The number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors has greatly increased, and there have been no epidemics of pestilential diseases in recent years. Yet infant mortality is still [165] extremely high—perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births; and there is still a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and the dysenteries. Many of the prevailing diseases are the by-product of polluted water, and unsanitary, congested living conditions which in turn are traceable largely to poverty and ignorance. Thus an increase in production and standards of living brought about through the general development program will be an important complement to a direct attack upon the health problem through expansion and more effective organization of governmental health services.

The main attack will have to focus on those diseases which sap the vitality and undermine the productivity of the people. In some rural areas, for example, virtually the entire population is at certain times stricken with malaria. Malaria is said to cause 50,000 deaths every year, as well as much sickness and disability which results in great loss for the country. In the provinces of Amara, Muntafiq and Kut the incidence of bilharzia or schistosomiasis, another debilitating disease, is particularly high. The dysenteries and other intestinal ailments are also a prominent cause of low vitality. In 1948 no less than 5,656,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria, and 524,740 trachoma. These statistics are of twofold significance. On the one hand, they illustrate the great expansion which has taken place in facilities for treatment of disease. On the other hand, they indicate clearly the relative inadequacy of efforts to prevent disease. It is

164 therefore vitally important that more attention be devoted in the future to the preventive aspects of public health work.

Prevention of Disease

744 751 Many measures could be taken to strengthen the preventive aspect of public health work. Doctors and nurses must, above all, be imbued with its importance, for they have countless opportunities to impress on their patients the need for proper hygiene and sanitation. Thus social medicine, involving the study of the environmental factors bearing on health and of appropriate measures for the prevention of disease, should be taught as part of the qualifying course in the medical school at Baghdad. Far more emphasis also needs to be placed on the teaching of hygiene in elementary and secondary schools. Children should be taught not only good personal habits, but also the importance of sanitation in and around the home. Special classes might be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases, by the school medical officer whenever possible. Health education must likewise be given an important place in the curriculum of teachers' training colleges and special courses in the prevention of diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be provided in the School of Agriculture and the School of Engineering. Hospitals should be an object lesson in hygiene and every effort made to impress on patients the importance of personal and domestic hygiene. The interest of adults in public health can be stimulated by visual education and by organizing "health weeks", the first of which was held in Diwaniya with conspicuous success during the Mission's stay. The army and police have an excellent opportunity to teach habits conducive to good health. Prospective farmers for new settlement projects should be medically examined to restrict, as far as possible, the introduction of endemic diseases into these settlements. To prevent water pollution it would be desirable to locate villages in such settlements away from irrigation canals wherever possible.

743 759 The Mission strongly recommends that the number of village dispensaries, which is now over 400, be gradually increased and that they be equipped to serve as public health centers. Such centers would be simple in function, aimed primarily at providing elementary medical and health assistance to as many people as possi-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ble. As conditions permit, the scope of their services could be 743
expanded. At the present stage it will usually be sufficient to have 759
a specially trained medical assistant rather than a doctor in charge. At present there is no separate cadre of medical assistants. It is therefore suggested that the existing School for Health Officials be converted into a training school for such assistants or aides. The 744
medical assistant in charge of a dispensary will need to consider himself as the village sanitation officer and enlist the help of the village elder in organizing a cooperative effort to keep the village clean. He will also need the assistance of a village midwife and, at a later stage, of a public health nurse. The traditional midwife, if properly trained, could have great influence in improving the standards of personal and domestic hygiene, in combatting infant mortality and giving simple advice on the care of infants. Such midwives, when drawn from the ranks of the people whom they will serve, will have a ready entry into homes and will be able to speak in terms which will be readily understood. It is therefore recommended that a school for training such midwives, recruited from the villages, be established. A similar school should be set up for town midwives. It would be desirable to have three foreign midwives appointed to direct this training program.

In the cities a considerable improvement in sanitation could be effected through the creation of a sanitary corps. Such a corps should be charged with house-to-house inspection to detect health nuisances and prevent fly and mosquito breeding, with the inspection of eating-houses, foodstuffs and food handlers, and with the improvement of environmental hygiene in general. A foreign public health or sanitary engineer would be required to organize this service and establish the facilities and courses for training appropriate numbers of sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors who, in turn, would impart the necessary instruction to the house-to-house inspectors.

The prevention of hookworm, malaria and bilharzia warrants 164
special attention. These diseases are widely prevalent and through 744
their general debilitating effects materially lower productivity. The incidence of hookworm would be reduced by improvements in sewage disposal, the closing of open drains, provision of suitable latrines and the wearing of shoes. Bilharzia, which is transmitted

164 744 by a snail living in irrigation canals, can be combatted by elimination of stagnant, polluted water in which the snail thrives and by treating canals twice yearly with copper sulphate. DDT spraying and the elimination of stagnant water assist in the reduction of malaria. [312] In order to combat both malaria and bilharzia, major irrigation canals should be designed so as to maintain a rate of water flow no less than three miles per hour, and minor distributory canals so as to insure rapid drying-out after use. It is important that one complete "dry-out" per week be enforced in every section under irrigated cultivation.

Knowledge of such methods of combatting disease is already available in Iraq. What is needed is wider dissemination of the [742] knowledge and a vigorous campaign to give it effect. The Endemic Diseases Institute in Iraq has done much useful work in this field but it has been handicapped by insufficient transport, supplies and technical personnel. In the future there will be no justification for denying the Institute adequate funds for its work. It would be well to organize special campaigns in those provinces or districts where the incidence of a particular endemic disease has been especially high. Such a campaign would involve a simultaneous effort to treat the people already afflicted in the locality and to teach local officials and the local inhabitants in general the appropriate preventive measures. Mobile dispensaries and mobile vans equipped to show educational films would be especially useful for this purpose.

Curative Services

743 On the curative side, principal emphasis must first be placed on the improvement of existing hospitals and an expansion in the nursing service. In its five-year program the Development Board has allotted ID 3,800,000 for medical service buildings. The Mission believes that a large part of this sum should be used to modernize, extend or replace existing hospitals and improve their facilities for diagnosis and treatment rather than to construct additional hospitals. In the monograph on public health the Mission has listed the most urgent projects of this kind which it suggests should be undertaken in adition to those for which provision was made in the first annual budget of the Development Board. While the number

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX F

PUBLIC HEALTH

I. Introduction

Extent of Progress Made in Public Health

744
In the past 30 years health services in Iraq have improved 743
considerably. In 1918 the country had only one hospital, con- 164
trasted with the present 89 hospitals (4,812 in-patient beds or one bed per 1,000 people) and 448 dispensaries. Control measures including the use of vaccines, particularly for smallpox, have cut down the incidence of epidemics during the last few years. Cholera has not occurred since 1931 and the plague not since 1935. Smallpox and louse-borne typhus also seem to be under control. An Institute of Endemic Diseases has been set up with headquarters in Baghdad. Steps have already been taken to control malaria and a good deal of information is being assembled on schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and ankylostomiasis. Nevertheless, the main endemic diseases—malaria, schistosomiasis, trachoma, and ankylostomiasis—are still very common.

In 1949 there were 797 doctors practicing in Iraq, of whom 759
419 or 53 percent were in Baghdad. There were about 387 government pharmacies and 252 pharmacists working in private pharmacies in the larger towns.

The doctors are supplemented by 265 health officials, originally trained primarily to staff village dispensaries, and 400 nurses and 659 dressers (male hospital attendants), about one to every four or five hospital beds. There are also private nurses, midwives and dressers, and 130 public vaccinators who are employed on a perma-
nent basis. In 1948 and 1949, 3,061,955 and 2,080,777 smallpox [751]
vaccinations were made (the 1947 census showing a total population of 4,799,500).

Malaria, trachoma and bronchitis were the main hospital 164
cases; the dysenteries, anemias, wounds, syphilis and phthisis were 757

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767 also frequent causes for hospitalization. In 1949 there were 5,876,336 visits ~~to health institutions~~ for treatment.

Public Health Budget

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164 In 1951-52, ID 2,089,180 (7.6 percent of the total budget) were allocated to health services, as compared to ID 187,672 in 1931. Because of the prevalence of endemic diseases and the constant danger of epidemics, it would not be unreasonable to spend 10 percent of the total budget on health services.

759 Salaries ~~for~~ personnel in the medical service appear to be low in relation to the cost of living, although they are not low compared to other civil service salaries. The basic salaries, exclusive of cost-of-living allowances, range from ID 5.15 a month for a dresser, to ID 25 for a doctor and ID 80 for a director-general.

Current Health Conditions

165 In spite of the undeniable progress in health conditions, there is need for further improvement. Definitive data are lacking on total birth and death rates, but some figures are available on the infant mortality rate, which is probably the best index of the social circumstances of an area. For Baghdad, the recorded rate in 1949 was 128 deaths per thousand births. Iraqi doctors who have worked in different parts of the country consider the rate to be about 250 per thousand, on the average, compared with about 34 deaths per thousand live births in highly developed countries.

164 Among the people as a whole, malaria seems to be the chief killer, especially in country districts. In the main cities the leading causes of deaths were intestinal diseases, tuberculosis and respiratory diseases. These diseases and trachoma seriously affect the ability of men and women to work efficiently and are among the major causes of low productivity of labor in Iraq. For example, candidates for the police service are frequently rejected because of defective eyesight and what is characterized as "poor physique" associated with chronic malaria, schistosomiasis, etc. About 20 percent of the young men liable for military service are found to be unfit.

Heart trouble, cancer and other organic disturbances are far outnumbered by diseases which are essentially social in origin. Most of them can be traced to lack of hygiene, poor sanitation and

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monotonous diet. 164

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364 to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166 some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369] of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484 health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744 and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788 continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795] Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751 Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164 anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

164 *Ascaris,* caused by round worms living in the intestinal tract, is found particularly in the North. Sewage disposal is the worst offender in this case; the custom of using the contents of cesspools as manure for vegetables is probably among the chief factors in spreading the disease.

In the case of the *dysenteries,* the incidence has been correlated with fly-breeding seasons, and is thus generally lower in winter and in August and September. Many Iraqi doctors maintain there are now fewer cases of dysentery in those cities in which pure water supply systems have been installed.

Unlike dysentery and typhoid fever, *enteritis*—common throughout the land and particularly among infants—is, in the opinion of Iraqi doctors, as common as it ever was in spite of some sanitary improvements in the cities.

Malaria

The desert climate prevailing over the greater part of the country is not in itself conducive to the breeding of mosquitoes. Man-made conditions, specifically irrigation projects, are largely responsible for the breeding of the disease-carrying mosquitoes, especially in the central plains where they thrive in seepage water, open pools and the small irrigation channels of the date palm gardens. There can be no doubt that every year malaria causes many deaths (estimated by Iraqi doctors at 50,000 a year), much sickness and permanent disability and, consequently, immense loss to the country. It must also be remembered that malaria is commonly associated with schistosomiasis (carried by the snail thriving in polluted water) and ankylostomiasis, causing widespread anemia and debility. Malaria is therefore of profound significance to the economy of Iraq.

Tuberculosis

Although the total population is not large, many parts of the country are, even in the villages, densely populated. In a poor district of Baghdad and in many villages an average of 4.5 persons live in one room. Iraqi doctors are generally of the opinion that tuberculosis is increasing in the country although there are no

reliable figures on its true incidence. One real problem is that 164
the public has come to regard tuberculosis as a shameful disease [753]
so that few people report to hospitals in the early stage of the illness. The government has applied to the World Health Organization for assistance in dealing with tuberculosis. It is understood that WHO will send a team consisting of a consultant, an epidemiologist, a bacteriologist and two nurses to begin a BCG campaign; and that, by arrangement with UNICEF, they will be assisted by two medical officers, two nurses, and one administrator. The government will build a suitable "chest center" in Baghdad where the WHO team will work and where local staff can be trained.

Eye Diseases

Eye diseases are common in Iraq, as in the rest of the Middle East. It has been estimated that there are 40,000 totally blind persons, most of whom cannot work and must be cared for, thereby becoming a burden to the community. About one in five of the total population have been treated annually for conjunctivitis or trachoma in the past six years. To a large extent these also are social diseases, although some doctors in Iraq think certain eye diseases may have a nutritional basis in the consumption of large quantities of polished rice.

II. The Curative Services

Hospitals and Dispensaries 743

In general, the curative services have received more attention than preventive medicine. Iraq's 89 hospitals are unevenly distributed, however, since one third of them are in the Baghdad area and the remaining 59 are divided among the other 13 provinces. It is true, of course, that there is higher concentration of people in Baghdad.

Of the 89 hospitals, 58 are general and six are for infectious diseases, three for eye diseases, two for venereal diseases and one for lepers. There are also two hospitals for children, one for

IV. Endemic Disease Prevention

One of the most important sectors of the entire public health 744 program should be a well-planned attack on the leading endemic diseases, e.g. schistosomiasis, malaria and ankylostomiasis.

The need for better housing, sewage disposal systems and safe water supplies has already been mentioned. Measures to accomplish these improvements are discussed in detail in Annex H, on *Community Planning and Facilities.*

Schistosomiasis

It is clear from available records that at present relatively 164 few persons suffering from schistosomiasis receive treatment. The Schistosomiasis Section of the Endemic Diseases Institute has carried out a survey which shows that the disease does not occur south of Basra and that, north of Basra, after reaching a peak in the Lakes Area, its incidence declines steadily up to the Kurdish mountains, where the disease does not occur at all. In Basra province the incidence reaches 23 percent, in Amara province 67 percent and in Baghdad province 35 percent.

Apart from its debilitating effects, the disease is complicated in a number of cases by bladder stones and calcification of the bladder. Associated as it commonly is with attacks of malaria and infestation with hookworms, schistosomiasis is of profound economic significance since it lowers the individual's capacity for work and his ability to overcome intercurrent infections.

The intermediate host is a snail which lives in stagnant water. Irrigation therefore provides conditions which may cause an increase in the prevalence of the disease, as has been shown in Egypt where schistosomiasis is a major public health problem. Investigations made up to the present indicate that the only fresh water snail which carries the disease in Iraq is the *Bulinus truncatus.* It does not appear to occur in either the Euphrates or the Tigris, or in streams in which water flows at a rate of three or more miles an hour. The cold winter weather inhibits the snail's activity and it is able to multiply freely only during the months of June and July.

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Spread of the disease[1] may be limited by:

1. Destruction of the snail through the use of copper sulphate (or other compounds) and the elimination of stagnant water. The rapid lowering of water levels will also destroy the snail by desiccation, and in irrigation canals a free flow of water makes conditions unsuitable for the snail.
2. Prevention of infection of the snail by the human host. This can be effected by treating the human carriers and by preventing the pollution of water.

In new irrigation projects it is strongly recommended that steps be taken:

1. To design major canals so that they maintain a flow of three miles an hour or more and minor distributory canals so that they dry out rapidly.
2. To site villages and canals, wherever possible, at a distance not less than a mile apart.
3. To provide villages with a separate, protected water supply so that water is not drawn by the inhabitants direct from canals. Where the underground water is unfit for use, water could be drawn from the closest canal by pipe and be passed through a simple filter. The filtered water (it could in some cases by chlorinated) could then be raised by "hydrohoist" or by semi-rotary pump into a gravity tank—if so required. Another important measure would be the installation of village baths.
4. To provide suitable village latrines, some of which should be on the side of the village towards the canal. Experiments should be made to test the feasibility of using pit or bore hole latrines. Public water supplies, baths, and latrines require, of course, attendants to keep them in order. Householders should install their own latrines.
5. To examine, as far as possible, the people who will live and work in the project. If necessary, they should be treated for schistosomiasis before irrigation begins.
6. To treat the canals and all collections of water that harbor the snail with copper sulphate twice a year.
7. To examine annually representative groups such as school children to determine whether the measures taken are effective.
8. To educate the people not to foul water and to promulgate regulations to provide for the protection of water from pollution.

[1] [SCHISTOSOMIASIS -- ANALYST.]

Shitwi (winter) cultivation is, on account of the low temperature, far less likely to spread schistosomiasis than *saifi* (summer) cultivation. In considering any expansion of summer cultivation, therefore, the attendant health hazards should be carefully considered. 164● 744

To carry out mass treatment of the people an expansion of the dispensary system is necessary together with the provision of mobile dispensaries. Initially four of these mobile dispensaries might be put into operation in the provinces having the highest incidence of schistosomiasis. The cost of each, including three motor vehicles, tents, 20 beds and supplies, would probably not exceed ID 5,000. In addition, an increase is required in the number of vehicles available to the Endemic Diseases Institute and provision must be made for an adequate and constant supply of copper salts.

Malaria

There can be no doubt that irrigation has been associated with a considerable increase in the malaria of the plains. Gravity or flow irrigation may lead to flooding of land or to seepage due to the faulty construction of canal banks. Water is precious where irrigation is carried out by lift and is not commonly wasted; consequently, flooding of land is rare. A third form of irrigation employed—namely that by natural inundation—is only seasonal. 164

Much work has been done in the Endemic Diseases Institute on studies of malaria in Iraq and also on the bionomics of the chief vectors of the disease. It has been discovered that in the North the mosquito *A. sacharovi* is associated with high endemicity. It breeds mostly in seepage water, open pools and in rice cultivation, and appears to be associated with sharp outbreaks of malaria when it descends occasionally into the plains. [742]

In the South and spreading as far north as 34°N., *A. stephensi* breeds in similar conditions to those in which *A. sacharovi* develops in the North; it favors particularly water in small borrow pits, seepage water and the small irrigation channels of the date palm gardens. The *A. stephensi* mosquito is generally found in those areas where the level of the subsoil water is high. It is a highly efficient carrier of malaria and used to be found in the houses of Baghdad during the summer.

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Control measures[1] include larvicidal treatment and the residual spraying of dwelling houses for the destruction of adult mosquitoes. In Basra, weeding of the small irrigation channels in the date gardens to promote the free flow of water is followed by the application of one percent DDT in oil and also by the spraying of the scattered huts at the fringe of the town. After the British Army left Iraq, there was a gradual but progressive relaxation of control measures which, coupled with the high river flood, culminated in a sharp outbreak in 1946. Spleen rates rose to 90 percent in some parts of the town but have since fallen rapidly with the reinstitution of control measures.

Measures designed to reduce the incidence of malaria include the following:

1. Expansion and extension of present control measures to insure:
   (a) An ample and constant supply of the various forms of DDT required.
   (b) An increase in the number of motor vehicles available to the Endemic Diseases Institute for its work.
   (c) An increase in special technical staff as rapidly as personnel can be trained.
2. Drainage in those areas where the level of the subsoil water is high in order to lower the level. Every proposed drainage scheme must, however, be carefully examined and judged on its merits. The drainage of established swamps is not likely to reduce the incidence of malaria; indeed, it may even increase it by providing suitable breeding places for dangerous mosquitos in drains. Amara province, for example, has extensive swamps but the mosquito breeding in them is predominantly the harmless *A. pulcherrimus* and the incidence of malaria is not high.
3. Expansion and extension of the village dispensary system, including mobile and movable dispensaries, to make treatment more freely available to the sick. The sale of antimalarial drugs in village shops would also help those living in hamlets remote from hospital and dispensary.
4. The approval of every new proposed irrigation scheme however large or small and whether government or private, by both the local and central medical authorities.
5. Comprehensive legislation, with effective means to enforce it, to insure the absence from irrigation schemes of conditions prejudicial to health.

[1] [AGAINST MALARIA -- ANALYST.]

6. Well-trained sanitary staff in sufficient numbers to keep up a continuous inspection of irrigation schemes.
7. Recognition by officials of the Irrigation and Agriculture Departments of those conditions falling within the sphere of their own work that are prejudicial to health. They should also know how to remedy such conditions.
8. Cooperation of various departments. It is of primary importance that irrigation schemes be submitted for approval by the provincial administrative council, on which sits the chief medical officer.
9. The introduction of different crops or new methods of cultivation of existing crops which might have profound effects on the incidence of malaria. Possible examples are the substitution of potatoes for rice or the cultivation of "dry land" rice in the northern mountainous area.

It is understood that the government has sought advice from the World Health Organization on malaria control and that provision has been made under the technical assistance budget for one malariologist, one entomologist and one sanitation expert. The work is timed to begin in the second half of 1951 and to continue throughout 1952.

Ankylostomiasis

A good deal of work has been done in recent years to ascertain the prevalence and effects of hookworm disease. Improvements in sewage disposal, the closing of open drains, the provision of suitable latrines and the wearing of shoes are all measures that will assist in reducing the incidence of hookworm disease. Until such permanent improvements can be effected, much can be done by making treatment more freely available through extension of the village dispensary system and special treatment teams in mobile or movable dispensaries. These treatment teams should also undertake simple treatment for other conditions, especially schistosomiasis.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 4

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THE CHIEF INFECTIOUS DISEASES TREATED AT ALL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS

Diseases	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Malaria	540,333	556,613	742,921	717,831	603,698	492,602
Trachoma	533,089	501,280	558,323	532,310	524,940	510,668
Venereal Diseases:						
Syphilis	19,372	27,550	33,104	25,625	23,168	25,255
Soft Chancre	3,802	3,510	3,025	3,753	1,428	3,283
Gonorrhoea	7,690	9,492	11,415	9,859	11,090	11,310
Dysentery	19,360	24,456	34,046	33,384	27,394	28,570
Schistosomiasis	15,852	18,744	21,029	24,923	24,272	27,388
Tuberculosis:						
Pulmonary ..	3,804	3,436	6,521	4,183	6,752	6,807
Other Forms	1,386	2,622	2,139	1,837	1,719	3,127
Influenza	13,906	18,070	26,291	24,882	29,572	29,993
Small Pox......	178	59	1,468	62	2,025	736
Whooping Cough	1,957	2,329	2,968	5,344	4,452	4,175
Ankylostomiasis	6,332	7,319	13,992	12,041	8,927	10,754
Mumps	6,110	5,030	6,360	8,621	10,041	11,570
Sandfly Fever	2,070	842	4,688	3,711	1,248	1,521
Measles	809	657	1,468	2,147	1,812	1,936
Cancer	658	483	611	783	649	913
Typhoid Fever (group)	1,257	1,245	1,347	1,712	987	1,288
Erysipelas	314	284	288	304	337	306
Leprosy	217	279	240	223	270	179
Puerperal Fever	169	41	50	34	169	453
Plague	—	16	—	—	—	—
Diphtheria	210	237	283	406	903	612
Tetanus	160	171	136	141	239	236
Anthrax	133	178	170	213	206	186
Typhus Fever	791	491	170	379	154	72
Cerebro Spinal Fever	396	325	196	151	135	191
Scarlet Fever..	1	11	31	6	185	6
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—
All Other Infectious Diseases	707	4,031	7,682	5,631	4,352	4,533
Total....	1,181,053	1,189,801	1,480,962	1,420,496	1,291,225	1,178,670

TABLE 5

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CASES OF EYE DISEASES

Diseases	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Trachoma	533,089	501,280	558,323	532,310	524,940	452,084
Conjunctivitis	410,522	422,572	481,877	447,425	445,376	510,668
Tumors of the Eye	5,806	7,699	7,371	9,460	10,258	6,575
Other Eye Diseases	65,615	71,626	60,428	58,256	51,985	70,392
Total	1,015.032	1.003.177	1,107,999	1,047,451	1,032,559	1,039,719

TABLE 6

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TREATMENTS FOR MALARIA AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TREATMENTS AT HEALTH INSTITUTIONS

(By provinces: 1943-48)

Province	Total Treatments	Treatments for Malaria	Percentage
Baghdad	7,751,167	306,139	4
Basra	2,041,579	394,039	19
Mosul	2,909,256	475,065	16
Amara	1,769,157	102,172	6
Erbil	903,520	140,748	16
Diwaniya	2,000,261	300,043	15
Diyala	1,850,371	301,318	16
Dulaim	1,283,546	124,965	10
Hilla	2,131,928	487,170	23
Kerbela	2,180.664	487,886	22
Kirkuk	1,032,349	123,341	12
Kut	1,254,617	89,506	7
Muntafiq	1,624,345	240,525	15
Suleimaniya	1,005,355	97,714	10

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

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TABLE 7

Treatments for Malaria as Percentage of Total Treatments at Health Institutions

(By years)

Year	Total Treatments	Treatments for Malaria	Percentage
1923	317,615	57,552	18.1
1924	396,466	63,939	16.1
1925	501,925	86,688	17.3
*1926	645,392	175,923	27.3
1927	597,367	103,477	17.3
1928	636,861	87,467	13.7
*1929	1,035,524	158,902	15.3
1930	1,232,020	151,063	12.3
*1931	1,461,627	189,218	13.0
1932	1,600,933	178,871	11.2
*1933	2,113,273	239,629	11.3
1934	2,462,181	272,770	11.1
1935	3,882,079	338,804	8.7
*1936	3,780,982	640,967	17.0
1937	3,986,437	582,973	14.6
1938	4,093,753	524,292	12.8
1939	3,496,946	490,310	14.0
*1940	3,292,618	663,432	20.1
*1941	3,733,303	726,339	19.5
1942	3,875,657	575,780	14.9
1943	4,024,421	509,545	12.7
1944	4,368,327	540,333	12.4
1945	4,780,483	556,613	11.6
*1946	5,401,687	742,921	13.8
1947	5,586,725	717,831	12.8
1948	5,656,424	603,698	10.7
1949	5,876,336	492,602	8.4

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* Flood year

TABLE 8

Incidence of Schistosomiasis
(By provinces)

Province	Percentage of Incidence of Schistosomiasis
Baghdad	35
Basra	23
Mosul	0
Amara	67
Erbil	0
Diwaniya	26
Diyala	28
*Dulaim	36
Hilla	15
Kerbela	28
Kirkuk	0
Kut	48
Muntafiq	47
Suleimaniya	0

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* Survey for all the districts of the province not yet completed.

TABLE 9

Cases of Schistosomiasis Treated
(By provinces)

Province	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Baghdad	4,544	4,920	6,986	6,175	5,358	6,733
Basra	1,527	1,922	1,836	1,934	2,384	4,508
Mosul	83	92	110	85	90	59
Amara	865	973	1,300	1,518	1,680	843
Erbil	15	27	10	45	16	25
Diwaniya	1,546	2,142	2,035	2,024	2,756	3,166
Diyala	611	288	259	243	238	357
Dulaim	74	375	283	704	622	838
Hilla	594	2,158	802	2,381	1,514	1,113
Kerbela	1,077	930	1,471	1,567	1,544	1,458
Kirkuk	14	26	5	12	27	5
Kut	1,868	1,976	1,616	2,346	3,099	2,482
Muntafiq	2,969	2,909	4,310	5,890	4,942	5,801
Suleimaniya	5	6	6	2	2	—
Total	15,792	18,744	21,029	24,926	24,272	27,388

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 10

FORMS OF TUBERCULOSIS TREATED AT ALL INSTITUTIONS

Form	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
1. Respiratory (Lungs & Larynx)	3,844	3,438	6,521	4,183	6,752	6,807
2. Meninges	2	922	44	52	19	56
3. Intestine, etc.	83	101	148	79	92	141
4. Spinal Cord	83	71	189	133	158	184
5. Bones and Joints	396	324	331	304	353	592
6. Skin	317	187	1,005	887	639	911
7. Glands	303	318	302	294	324	923
8. Genito-urinary System	7	19	21	10	15	12
9. Other Organs	138	659	61	71	107	212
10. Disseminated	17	21	38	7	12	96
Total	5,190	6,060	8,660	6,020	8,471	9,934

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8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

1539 ONCE in ancient times there was or there was not a great landowner, master of vast estates, to whom the sheikhs of the Arabs and of the bedouin paid tribute and in God only is there belief.

The name of the landowner was Hassan, and he had a young wife beautiful as a moon, and a faithful slave who had been with him since boyhood and whose name was Ahmed, and Ahmed was devoted to his master and obeyed him in everything.

There came a year in which the Sultan sent a command to the landowner Hassan, and he appointed him Prince of the caravan which was setting out on the Pilgrimage. The wife of Hassan was at that very time with child, and Hassan loved her greatly, nor did he like to leave her. So he ordered that a seat and canopy should be prepared for her on a camel, and he said: It is fitting that my son be born on the Pilgrimage.

The Pilgrimage set out and its destination was Mecca, and it marched according to the orders of the Prince of the Caravan, and with him went his wife and Ahmed his faithful slave. And the caravan reached the Valley of Tos and halted there for the night. Now, with the caravan
● 164 were many Indian pilgrims, and amongst them was the sickness of cholera, and in the Valley of Tos the sickness spread to many men and many women in the caravan, and they rolled on the ground in the agony of death.

And on that very night the child in the wife of Hassan reached his appointed hour for entering the world, and Hassan said to his faithful slave: Summon the midwife and the wet nurses. For he had arranged for them to be with the caravan. But the slave Ahmed answered and said: Master, they are dead of the sickness. Then Hassan and the slave Ahmed attended themselves to the wife of Hassan

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MHI

161 taken, in 1947, gave the total population as 4,799,500; before that there were periodical official estimates as follows:

1930	2,824,000
1935	3,560,000
1943	3,995,000

The present population is probably about 5 million. According to the census, Baghdad has a population of 364,000, Mosul 302,000, Basra 94,000, and Kirkuk 69,000, Hilla being the only other town of over 50,000 inhabitants. Significant figures for density of population could be determined only after defining habitable land and distinguishing rural populations; the accepted density figure for the country as a whole (27·4 per square mile) means little. In the total cultivable area as calculated by an English authority the average density is 102 per square mile, but in many areas the density is much more than this for the rural population alone, and in the Baghdad and Basra districts exceeds 300 and 800 respectively per square mile.

163 165 ● 164 *Vital Statistics*. For a number of reasons, which include the inaccessibility of large areas of Iraq and the lack of doctors in the rural districts, vital statistics are not available for the country as a whole. Statistics of possibly fair accuracy are, however, published for the population of some 1,160,000 served by the health centres in the main cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul; the latest, compiled for 1950, show a birth-rate of 27 and a death-rate of 12 per 1,000, with an infant mortality figure of 97 per 1,000 live births. The main causes of death were stated as old age, respiratory diseases other than tuberculosis, malaria, heart diseases, and tuberculosis.

197 *Language*. Arabic is the official and most widely spoken language. The 800,000 odd Kurds speak an Iranian language in various forms. Turkish dialects are spoken in Irbil, Kirkuk, to some extent in Khanaqin and in smaller intervening towns, and Syriac by Christian communities in northern Iraq. Other minority languages, such as Armenian, also occur, while in the Holy Cities of the south (Kerbela and Najaf) Persian is widely spoken.

Religions[1]

642 The constitution declares Islam to be the official religion of the state, but guarantees complete freedom of conscience and worship in conformity with accepted customs subject only to the maintenance of public order and morality, declares the absolute equality of all Iraqis before the law, gives communities

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[1] See above, p. 51ff.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

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164 helminthosis are endemic. There are occasional outbreaks of
657 smallpox, typhus, and more rarely plague and cholera. With
the greater provision in the budget for schemes of public health,
the increased employment of international specialists and the
considerable assistance tendered by the World Health Organi-
zation, there is every prospect that the incidence of endemic
874 diseases will be greatly reduced. Fundamental results may be
expected from modern medical training, with emphasis on the
742 environmental aspects of disease and the need for prevention
657 as much as or even more than cure, and, above all, from the
743 efforts of the administration to improve the environment itself,
[312] with especial reference to drainage and water-supply. In addition, attention is to be paid to the public health aspects of the pilgrimages. The curative services have in general received more attention than the preventive and have improved considerably in the past thirty years. Simple conditions are treated in some 400 state dispensaries, distributed fairly evenly throughout the country but varying in their equipment and staff; it has hitherto proved difficult to attract doctors to the provinces and particularly to the rural districts. Each *liwa* centre has a general hospital, the larger towns more than one. There are also specialized hospitals for maternity and child welfare, for infectious, chest, eye, venereal, and mental diseases, and for lepers. The army, police, railways, Port of Basra, Ministry of Education, and oil companies maintain their own medical services and hospitals, and there are in addition an American Mission Hospital and a number of private nursing homes. A five-year programme, financed by the Development Board, will provide for the repair, extension, and replacement of medical buildings which have become old or inadequate. There is an acute shortage of well-trained nurses; attempts to expand the service are hampered by the reluctance of Muslim girls of good family to enter it.

Education

658 The state provides elementary, intermediate, secondary, and
871 higher education, all, since December 1952, completely free.
There are also private and foreign schools on a kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, and secondary level.

State Education. Primary education, by law universal and compulsory where facilities exist, begins at the age of six and continues for six years. It has been limited by a shortage of schools and trained teachers, especially in the villages. Plans are in hand to meet the need. The rapid expansion of state primary education is demonstrated in the following table:

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564 serve as latrines, while the use of the banks of streams or canals facilitates the ablutions required by Moslem rites. Frequent pollution of the water supplies promotes the spread of intestinal infections, which are prevalent among all groups of the population.

Fauna and Flora

136 164 Arthropods. Mosquitoes. Twelve species of anopheline mosquitoes have been recorded from different parts of the country, but the majority are regarded as of minor significance. Four species are of major interest in the transmission of malaria. 136 *Anopheles stephensi* is the primary vector throughout southern Iraq. *A. sacharovi* (= *A. elutus*) and *A. superpictus* are the principal vectors in the north, while *A. maculipennis maculipennis* is implicated in localized areas in the higher mountain valleys. *A. pulcherrimus* is widespread, particularly in the southern provinces, but is of doubtful importance in transmission. Other species, which are present to a varying extent in diverse localities, are *A. claviger*, *A. hyrcanus*, *A. multicolor*, *A. d'thali*, *A. fluviatilis*, *A. algeriensis* and *A. marteri*.

A. stephensi, the chief vector species in the south, is abundant in the irrigated date-growing areas along the Shatt al Arab and in the alluvial plains region, particularly in the Euphrates basin. It also occurs in various foci in the Tigris valley along the middle course of the river and in the Diyala basin to the edge of the foothills, as well as in the spring-fed oasis of Shifathah, in the desert west of Kerbela. It breeds in vegetated irrigation canals, seepage pools, borrow pits, shallows wells, hoofprints and other temporary collections of water. The larvae are found in greatest numbers from May to October, although breeding takes place throughout the year in the Gulf area. The prevalence of this species has increased appreciably within the last few decades, paralleling the expansion of irrigation facilities. At present it is the only proven vector in the Shatt al Arab and the lower delta areas.

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A. sacharovi was common in the tidal creek 136 zone of the Shatt al Arab until 1947, but it has not been found since that date, possibly in part as the result of control operations which have been carried on in the vicinity of Basra.

A. sacharovi is probably the most dangerous vector of malaria in the steppe and the foothill regions. It exists in association with *A. stephensi* in the Diyala basin: occasionally it invades areas as far south as Baghdad, but it does not normally encroach on the alluvial plain. Throughout most of its northern range it shares the role of vector with *A. superpictus*. It breeds in irrigation seepages, along the grassy margins of sluggish canals, in the rice fields and sometimes in small streams overgrown with vegetation. It is plentiful from March to May and appears again in some numbers in October.

A. superpictus is widely distributed in the northern provinces and is the dominant vector in the mountain and the escarpment districts. It breeds not only in the numerous small, sunlit watercourses and gravelly stream beds, but also in the rice fields and other habitats. It is active from May to October, with a peak of prevalence in August and September.

A. maculipennis maculipennis is reported from the mountain districts along the Iranian frontier, where it replaces *A. sacharovi* as a vector. *A. pulcherrimus* is widespread from the Persian Gulf to the beginning of the foothills. It is found primarily in the south, decreasing in prevalence from the alluvial plain northward. This species probably has little or no direct part in malaria [164] transmission, but the predominance of its larvae over those of other anophelines in the marshes and the rice fields of the alluvial plain suggests that it may exert a restraining influence on the establishment of *A. stephensi* and other species in such habitats.

Several species of *Aedes* are encountered, 136 among which *A. caspius* is most abundant. 164 *A. aegypti* occurs in some sections of the

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southern provinces and has been held re- 136
sponsible for sporadic outbreaks of dengue 164
fever. It is also a potential vector of urban
yellow fever, although that disease is not
reported from this region. Many varieties
of Culex mosquitoes have been recorded,
but none has been specifically implicated in
the transmission of disease. *Culex quinque-
fasciatus* (= *C. fatigans*) or *C. pipiens*
(each a potential vector of *Wuchereria
bancrofti*) is present in most areas.

Within recent years extensive mosquito 744
control work has been undertaken by mu- 136
nicipal and government authorities, by the 312
oil companies and, during World War II,
by the British Expeditionary Forces. The
problem is stupendous, involving the im-
provement and the regulation of the irriga-
tion facilities on which the agricultural
economy of the country depends. In 1947, 744
malaria control was first attempted on a 164
nation-wide basis with the creation of an
antimalaria service within the Iraqi health
organization. Since that date, control opera-
tions have been carried on in various highly
endemic areas. Depending upon local condi-
tions, they have included antilarval meas-
ures, drainage works and residual spraying
of the rural villages with DDT prepara-
tions. In 1952, a demonstration DDT house-
spraying program was initiated in the
hyperendemic Tanjero Valley of Sulaima-
niya *liwa* (province), in conjunction with
the World Health Organization.

FLIES. Flies are prevalent in all parts of 136
the country. Numerous species of MUSCIDAE 164
are encountered, many of which are impli-
cated in the mechanical transmission of
intestinal and eye diseases. *Musca sorbens*
and *M. domestica vicina* are most fre-
quently incriminated, but *M. tempestiva*,
M. vitripennis and *M. mesopotamiensis* are
also abundant. The larvae of *Fannia canicu-* 136
laris sometimes cause myiasis in the live- 232
stock. The stable fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, 164
is almost ubiquitous. At least 22 species of
Tabanus are recorded, and many local au-
thorities believe that they are involved in
the mechanical transmission of anthrax.

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136 Several species of *Chrysops*, including
164 *C. punctifera*, are known to be present.

232 Among the myiasis-producing flies which attack animals, and incidentally man, the most numerous are *Chrysomyia albiceps*; the blow fly, *Calliphora erythrocephala*; the green-bottle fly, *Lucilia sericata*; the horse bot fly, *Gasterophilus nasalis*; the sheep bot fly, *Oestrus ovis*; and the flesh fly, *Sarcophaga hirtipes*.

136 At least 12 species of sandflies are found.
164 They are serious pests and may produce a form of dermatitis in susceptible individuals. The most widespread species is *Phlebotomus papatasii*, the vector of sandfly fever throughout this area. *P. sergenti* is abundant in the central and the southern provinces and in sections of the northern. It transmits cutaneous leishmaniasis and is apparently the only vector in Iraq, although *P. papatasii* is also implicated in adjacent territories. Potential vectors of kala-azar may be present in the northwest, but the disease is almost never reported.

Several species of SIMULIDAE occur in the hilly districts. The biting midge, *Leptoconops mesopotamiensis*, is an annoying pest.

LICE. All 3 species of human lice, *Pediculus humanus corporis*, *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis*, are common, especially among the poorer sections of the population. *P. humanus corporis* is important as the vector of louse-borne typhus and louse-borne relapsing fever, both of which are endemic.

136 FLEAS. The only flea of primary medical
164 importance is the Oriental rat flea, *Xenop-*
232 *sylla cheopis*. It parasitizes the rats and other rodents and is the vector in sporadic outbreaks of murine typhus and plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are plentiful in most areas.

136 BEDBUGS. The bedbug, *Cimex lectularius*, is indigenous. The tropical species, *C. hemipterus*, is frequently encountered in Baghdad, Basra and other cities, but is seldom seen in the rural villages.

000 TICKS AND MITES. Numerous species of

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TICKS AND MITES. NUMEROUS SPECIES OF
164 ticks infest the livestock, including *Rhipi-
136 cephalus sanguineus*, *Hyalomma dromedarii*
232 and *Haemaphysalis cinnabarina punctata.*
Ornithodorus tholozani occurs in many localities, and is the vector in sporadic cases of tick-borne relapsing fever. *O. savignyi* is present in the desert areas. The fowl or blue Persian tick, *Argas persicus*, and the castor bean tick, *Ixodes ricinus*, are widespread.

136 The itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is preva-
369 lent, especially in the congested urban communities and rural villages. The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventricosus*, is a frequent pest in the grain-growing districts.

136 SCORPIONS AND SPIDERS. Scorpions are common, particularly in the northern provinces. The most dangerous species are *Buthus australis* and *B. crassicauda.*
[165] *B. europaeus* is also present. A few deaths from scorpion stings are reported each year, usually among young children or old people. *Scorpio maurus kruglovi* is sometimes encountered in the plains and *S. maurus townsendi* in the Persian Gulf region. The principal poisonous spider in Iraq is *Lycosa tarantula.*

136 OTHER ARTHROPODS. *Reduvius tabidus*
752 and *R. annulipes* are found in many areas. The "date beetle," a large aquatic species of the family BELASTOMIDAE, is capable of causing serious bites.

136 **Reptiles.** Twenty-six species of snakes
752 have been recorded from Iraq, but only 5
165 land varieties are venomous. Casualties from snake bites are reported occasionally. A large proportion of the fatalities is probably caused by the Levantine or blunt-nosed viper, *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, which inhabits the northeastern highlands from north of Baghdad to the Turkish and the Iranian frontiers. *V. lebetina euphratica* is also seen in some localities. The horned viper, *Aspis cerastes* (= *Cerastes cornutus*), is native to the alluvial plains, while the carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, is found in limited areas in Diwaniya province. The hoodless cobra, *Naja morgani*, is widely distributed but apparently is rare. The poison-

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ous sea snake, *Enhydrina shistosa*, roams 136
the Persian Gulf and the Shatt al Arab. 752
Although it may be dangerous to fishermen, 165
no fatalities are known to have occurred.

Rodents. *Rattus rattus frugivorus* is the 136
rat most frequently encountered in Iraqi 164
dwellings. *R. rattus alexandrinus* is also indigenous, while *R. norvegicus* is present in Basra, Baghdad and the river towns. *Nesokia buxtoni*, *Dipodillus dasyurus* and *Meriones charion* are reported from different localities. Rats are often captured in Baghdad and Basra and examined for evidences of plague, but otherwise little rodent control work is undertaken, except at the time of plague outbreaks.

Mollusks.* *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), the intermediate snail host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, is found in numerous foci in central and southern Iraq, where pump or gravity flow irrigation is employed. It inhabits the many small and sluggish irrigation canals and the rice fields, borrow pits, marshes and other suitable collections of water, but is strictly seasonal in appearance, being abundant only in the summer and the fall months, from May or June to November. The snails are widespread in Basra, Muntafiq, Diwaniya and Amarah provinces in the south, but are absent from the Shatt al Arab region south of Basra, where breeding is restricted by the salinity of the water. They are more scattered in distribution in the central provinces and practically nonexistent in the north, aside from localized foci around the
marshlands of the Mosul area. *Radix lagotis* 136
canaliculata, a vector of *S. turkestanicum* 232
which causes serious infections among the livestock, is found in the rice fields and the marshes of the southern delta.

The threat of the spread of *Bulinus trun-* 136
catus, and subsequently of schistosomiasis, 164
with the expansion of irrigation creates a 744
problem which is of major public health and economic importance to the country. Small-scale snail-control campaigns have been undertaken in the past in Baghdad, Basra and

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* See footnote, page 10.

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Diwaniya provinces. In 1949, a co-ordinated 136
control program was introduced by the 164
Iraqi government, and a Bilharzia Section 744
was established within the national health organization. The section initiated a snail survey in the various endemic foci and research on the most effective methods of snail control. It carries on continuous snail destruction work through special units assigned to each of the infected provinces.

Plants. Little precise information is 137
available regarding the prevalence of 752
allergy-producing plants, but numerous weeds, grasses and trees, which have been incriminated in other countries, are present in districts with rainfall adequate to support such vegetation.

Occasional deaths, primarily among 137
young children, have been traced to the 165
consumption of the raw beans of *Vicia fava*, 232
a prominent food crop throughout this region. The beans are toxic to susceptible individuals in the raw state. Plants of the *Senecio* group grow in sections of the northern highlands. The young green shoots are poisonous and sometimes cause fatalities among the livestock.

FOOD SANITATION

The government and municipal health au- 744
thorities are responsible for the enforcement of regulations governing the sanitary quality of foods, meats and milk products, but the degree of enforcement varies in different localities. Health inspectors are charged with the supervision of establishments where foods are prepared or sold, such as foodshops, markets, restaurants and cafés, mineral-water bottling works and date-packing houses. Examinations for the presence of venereal diseases are theoretically required at regular intervals in the case of cooks and barbers, but no tests to detect other infections are carried out.

Meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter in the city abattoirs by officers of the government veterinary and health services. All carcasses offered for sale are supposed to bear an official stamp of

744 approval, but illegal slaughtering takes place in many areas. No effective control is carried out in the rural villages, where the animals are slaughtered locally.

234 Milk from cows and goats is marketed by
744 large numbers of small producers. Govern-
ment regulations exist for the sanitary in-
spection of dairies and the periodic tuber-
culin testing of cattle. In practice, however,
few controls are exercised over the methods
of production or the quality of the product.
There is only one pasteurization plant in
the country. This is located in Baghdad,
and is operated by the government's Agri-
culture Department. It was established pri-
marily for the purpose of supplying pas-
teurized milk to the child welfare centers,
but a small percentage of its output is sold
234 to private customers. Milk is customarily
164 boiled before use, but butter and cheese
232 are often vehicles for the spread of brucel-
losis and other diseases. Brucellosis is
enzootic among the cattle and the goats, and
bovine tuberculosis among the dairy herds.

HEALTH SERVICES AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health Organizations

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657 Responsibility for the protection of the public health and for the provision of medical care facilities is centralized in the Ministry of Health of the Iraqi government, with headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry was established in 1952, replacing the former Directorate General of Health in the Ministry of Social Affairs. Under the present organization, the Minister of Health is assisted by a Director General of Health, in charge of health and medical services, and by an Inspector General of Health. The Minister also has jurisdiction over the Royal Faculty of Medicine which administers the Royal Hospital and the Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad.

The functional activities of the Ministry are concentrated in two major divisions—curative medicine and preventive and social medicine—as well as in a number of administrative branches.

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offers 5-year courses for the training of fully qualified pharmacists. 874

PERSONNEL

Physicians. The physicians registered in Iraq in 1950 totaled 811. Of this number, 543 were employed full or part time with governmental agencies. One hundred and ninety-two doctors were in private practice, and 6 were retired. Seventy were non-Iraqi, most of whom were working with the government, with the oil industry or with philanthropic organizations. The distribution of medical practitioners is extremely uneven; 444, or almost one half of the total in the country, were located in Baghdad province. The proportion of doctors in the Baghdad area averaged 55 to 70 per 100,000 population, as against 4 to 6 in the rural provinces. 759

Dentists. The registration for 1950 included 72 dentists, 29 in government service and 43 in private practice. Over 86 per cent of the latter group were established in Baghdad.

Nurses. There were 601 nurses in 1950, 497 of whom were employed in government institutions. The majority are probably graduates of the School of Nursing and Midwifery. Five British nurses were affiliated with the Ministry in 1951.

Other. Also in 1950, 803 midwives were licensed as "qualified" midwives, while an additional 9 were fully trained. Other medical personnel in the country included 69 pharmacists, 236 health officials or medical assistants, 341 vaccinators and 1,002 dressers.

DISEASES

The information available regarding the distribution and the prevalence of infectious diseases is sketchy. The official statistics compiled from the records of the government hospitals and dispensaries are derived only from institutions under the jurisdiction of medical officers, and are therefore limited in scope. The reporting of cases of 164

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illness and death in the rural areas is incomplete and unreliable. An unduly large proportion of the medical personnel is concentrated in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and other cities, while the inhabitants in many of the more remote districts receive little or no medical attention. Local authorities estimate that, in the case of most diseases, the official reports represent about one tenth of the probable prevalence. The mortality statistics are of questionable value, since the deaths in rural communities are often certified by nonmedical officials, and a considerable percentage are listed as due to unknown causes. Investigations undertaken by the staff of the Royal Hospital and the Royal College of Medicine, the Department of Endemic Diseases and other organizations contribute supplementary information on the nature and the prevalence of specific infections, as malaria and schistosomiasis. 164 165 164

DISEASES SPREAD OR CONTRACTED CHIEFLY THROUGH INTESTINAL OR URINARY TRACT

Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers. Enteric fevers are endemic: from 559 to 842 cases of typhoid fever and from 97 to 230 cases of paratyphoid fever were reported annually in the 6 years 1944-49. About 70 to 80 per cent of the known cases are classified as typhoid fever. The relative prevalence of paratyphoid A and B infections is uncertain, however, as differential diagnostic tests are seldom attempted, except in the central bacteriologic laboratory in Baghdad. Few large-scale epidemics have been reported since the improvement of the water supplies in the larger cities, but localized outbreaks, caused by contaminated food or water supplies, are numerous. Cases occur throughout the year, with the peak of incidence in the summer months, from July to October. Sporadic cases of paratyphoid C fever have been recorded, some of which have been associated with primary meningeal symptoms. [364]

Dysenteries. Both bacillary and amebic dysentery are widespread. Amebiasis is ap-

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164 parently of primary importance in all parts of the country, particularly in the lower delta region. Local authorities estimate that 25 to 35 per cent of the inhabitants in Baghdad harbor cysts of *Endamoeba histolytica*, while in Basra the carrier rate probably approximates 60 to 70 per cent. Liver abscesses are frequently encountered.

The actual distribution of bacillary infections is unknown, since the proportion of cases treated by medical officers is unduly small, and few facilities for confirmatory diagnosis are available. According to the official statistics for 1944 through 1949, from 17,000 to 30,000 cases of amebic dysentery and from 180 to 1,100 cases of bacillary dysentery were reported each year. Correspondingly, an analysis of the cases treated annually in the hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field and pipeline areas, in the 4 years 1946-50, shows that from 478 to 1,603 were amebic infections and from 58 to 175 bacillary. The Flexner group predominates among the *Shigella* strains isolated in dysentery cases at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad, but Sonne, Schmitz and Shiga types are also numerous.

136 The abundance of flies and the insanitary
515 habits of the people favor the spread of
164 intestinal infections. Diarrhea and enteritis
165 are major causes of illness and death, especially in early childhood. Giardiasis is common. Outbreaks of food poisoning, undoubtedly caused by various strains of *Salmonella*, are frequent.

164 Cholera. Epidemics of cholera were for-
484 merly recurrent in the border districts and along the trade routes from India and the East. Although some authorities believe that an endemic focus may have existed in the Shatt al Arab region in the past, most epidemics have resulted from the introduction of the disease by way of traffic through the Persian Gulf ports or by overland travel through Iran, often in connection with pilgrimages to Mecca or local Shia shrines.
164 Within recent decades extensive outbreaks, each totaling from 1,500 to 2,500 cases,

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were reported in 1923, 1927 and 1931. Since 164
1931, cholera has been almost completely absent from the country, although one imported case was recorded in 1939, when the disease was epidemic in Afghanistan and Iran.

Strict quarantine regulations are enforced, 744
and travelers from India, Pakistan 484
and Ceylon, as well as pilgrims from Mecca, 164
without valid certificates of immunization against cholera are retained in quarantine
centers for a period of 7 days. Mass immunization 751
with cholera vaccine is carried 164
on among the populations in the border provinces whenever epidemics are reported from the adjacent territories. At the time of the recent epidemic in Egypt, in 1947, immunization was compulsory for all travelers entering the country and for the inhabitants of towns and villages along the Syrian frontier.

Helminthiases. SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schistosomiasis, 164
caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, 136
has probably been present in the lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins since ancient times. It is highly endemic in the southern and the central provinces, where the intermediate snail host, *Bulinus truncatus*, is found in widespread but often
localized foci. The disease is prevalent 164
among the children and among the agricultural 462
and other laborers who work in infested waters, particularly the men and the boys, who are exposed to infection to a greater extent than the women. It reaches maximum proportions between 10 and 20 years of age, but is usually negligible in
early childhood. Transmission is seasonal: 164
it takes place from May to the end of November, 515
but primarily between June and October, when infected snails are most abundant. The insanitary customs of the inhabitants, associated with the frequent use of the canals for religious ablutions and the severe summer heat which is conducive to bathing in any convenient body of water,
are contributory factors. The infection rates 164
average 18 to 25 per cent in the irrigated 361
districts of the delta, but vary from zero

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

Distribution of Schistosomiasis in Iraq

to 80 per cent in different localities. The disease is most extensive in the southern provinces and particularly in the vicinity of the Hammar lakes and the Amarah marshes. It is absent south of Basra, however, since the salinity of the waters along the Shatt al Arab interferes with the breeding of the intermediate snail host. Foci of infection decrease in prevalence toward the north, but spread along the Euphrates to the Syrian border and, in the east, as far as the upper reaches of the Tigris and its main tributary, the Diyala. As yet the districts bordering the Great Zab and the Little Zab rivers are uninfected. The northern *liwas,* or provinces, of Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya are apparently free from the disease, but a few isolated foci exist south of the foothills in Mosul.

Surveys based upon the examination of urine specimens collected from men and boys in representative villages in 1949-50[84] suggest a mean infection rate of 67 per cent in Amarah *liwa* which, because of the predominance of marshlands, is one of the most seriously infected areas in the country. In Basra *liwa* the rate averaged 23 per cent, but ranged from 26 per cent in the city of

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164 361 369 Basra to 75 per cent at Al Qurnah, in the fork between the rivers. In Muntafiq, the mean rate was 47 per cent, and in Diwaniya, 26 per cent, although some districts were heavily infected and others practically free. In central Iraq the disease was more irregular in distribution. In Baghdad *liwa* the infection rates averaged 35 per cent, but approached 80 per cent in some localities. In Kut, the mean was 48 per cent, with a decrease in prevalence toward the Iranian frontier. In Hilla, it was 15 per cent, with variations from 5 to 50 per cent, and in Kerbela, 28 per cent, with variations from 18 to 48 per cent. In the areas studied in Diyala *liwa* it ranged from 28 to 60 per cent, and in Dulaim it approximated 36 per cent. Subsequent surveys have revealed 11 to 18 per cent infection in limited foci near the marshes in Mosul *liwa*.

164 361 369 742 In a survey conducted in Baghdad in 1950-51,[87] ova of *S. haematobium* were found in 25 per cent of the urine samples collected from 285 schoolchildren and in 46 per cent of the samples from 242 inhabitants in hut settlements on the outskirts of the city. The prevalence was around 20 to 25 per cent in the suburbs, but reached 83 per cent in foci along the main road to Teheran.

164 462 Indigenous cases of *S. mansoni* infection have not been reported, but numerous cases of rectal involvement with *S. haematobium* have been observed. A dermatitis produced by nonhuman schistosome cercariae is common in the south and is often responsible for considerable disability among the agricultural workers.

164 462 312 744 Schistosomiasis constitutes one of the most important disease problems in Iraq. It is of major public health and economic significance, and the possibility of its spread with the expansion of irrigation is a matter of considerable concern to the government authorities. An active schistosomiasis control program is carried on by the Bilharzia Section of the Department of Endemic Diseases. This section maintains snail destruction and treatment units in the affected

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164 provinces, and conducts research and field
462 investigations on the distribution and the
312 control of the disease and the intermediate
744 snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from
15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually in government hospitals and dis-
164 pensaries. The disease is considered com-
758 monplace in most areas, however, and
probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the
infected individuals seek treatment under
743 ordinary conditions. Since 1949, special dis-
164 pensaries have been established in Baghdad,
Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour
the most seriously infected districts. In
1950, there were 11 mobile units for the
treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and
hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 Ancylostomiasis. Ancylostomiasis is
361 widespread in the irrigated areas, but the
exact distribution and severity of the infec-
tion in the different provinces are not accu-
[139] rately known. *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the
only species found in the foci studied. The
infection rates are generally estimated at
10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces
and at 40 per cent in the southern. They
are especially high in the Amarah and the
Al Qurnah regions, but decrease toward the
south, and are relatively low in the districts
164 along the Shatt al Arab. In a study reported
742 in 1939,[47] fecal specimens from apparently
healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from various parts of the country were examined for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was detected in 25 per cent of the specimens from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per cent from 135 men from the rural districts of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per cent of the individuals examined from Diyala *liwa* and from 25 per cent of the individuals from Dulaim. The degree of infection is usually mild, but serious cases with hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent are not infrequent.

164 Treatment facilities are provided by the
758 schistosomiasis control units, as well as by
742 the government hospitals and dispensaries.

p. 88 (B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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An ancylostomiasis section is incorporated 164
in the Department of Endemic Diseases, 744
and a program for the improvement of rural sanitation is being developed by the health authorities.

OTHER HELMINTH INFECTIONS. A large 164
proportion of the inhabitants harbor one or 136
more types of intestinal worms. Ascariasis 742
predominates in the northern and the central provinces. Heavy infections, often with intestinal obstruction, are common. In the studies made on groups of men of 18 to 20 years of age, as indicated above, ova of *Ascaris lumbricoides* were found in the fecal specimens from 10 per cent of the 125 individuals examined in Baghdad city. In the provinces, ova were detected in fecal samples from 9 per cent of 135 persons from Baghdad, from 15 per cent of 145 persons from Dulaim and from 13 per cent of 309 persons from Diyala.

Enterobiasis, trichuriasis and, to a lesser 164
extent, strongyloidiasis are prevalent. *Tri-* 136
chostrongylus, a parasite of sheep and goats 232
which sometimes infects man, is widely distributed in the Shatt al Arab region. Infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are numerous. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is often encountered, but not as widely as in Syria and other Arab countries where more raw meat is customarily consumed. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is occasionally observed in the Christian communities.

Hydatid disease is endemic, especially in 164
the central provinces. Stray dogs are nu- 136
merous and serve as primary reservoirs of 232
infection. In a survey published in 1940,[40] 742
adults of *Echinococcus granulosus* were found in 18 per cent of 123 street dogs examined in Baghdad. Hydatid cysts were seen in the carcasses of 12 per cent of 2,347 sheep and goats slaughtered in the municipal abattoir and in 25 per cent of 223 cattle.

Other Infections. Brucellosis is enzootic 164
among goats, sheep and cattle, and sporadic 232
human infections result from the consump- 758
tion of cheese, *leban* and other unboiled

p. 39 (A)

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milk products, or from contact with in- 164
fected animals. From 5 to 97 cases were 232
treated annually in government institutions 758
in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination 742
of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to 164
the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 232
1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella
antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br.
melitensis* was isolated from 5 of the 13
samples from which bacteriologic cultures
were made.

DISEASES SPREAD CHIEFLY THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the 164
most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49,
from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and
from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuber-
culosis were recorded annually. Such figures
are of little value in assessing the problem,
however, due to inadequate reporting and
the shortage of diagnostic and treatment
facilities. Local authorities estimate that
the prevalence of latent or active infections
approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in
many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and
Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas.
Widespread undernutrition and low stand- 164
ards of living, associated with overcrowd- 146
ing and ignorance of the basic principles of 511
hygiene, are factors contributing to the 165
spread of the disease. The death rates are
known to be high, but little precise infor-
mation is available. It is believed that a
considerable number of tuberculosis deaths
are erroneously attributed to pneumonia
and other respiratory infections. Moreover, [183]
the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit
the presence of tuberculosis in the family
due to the stigma customarily attached to
the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an aver- 164
age of 760 cases were treated in government 758
hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of
about 25 per cent. The maximum number
of cases occurred in the group from 16 to
30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. 164
Involvement of the bones or the glands ac-
counts for a large proportion of the non-

p. 39(B)

164 pulmonary infections, but tuberculous meningitis is common in young children. Among 838 cases of nonpulmonary tuberculosis admitted to the surgical wards of the Royal Hospital in the 4 years 1947-50,[24] over 26 per cent were diagnosed as lymphadenitis and over 21 per cent as infections of the spine.

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743 The new 400-bed sanatorium opened near Baghdad under the joint auspices of the Anti-Tuberculosis Society and the government health authorities in 1951 was the first tuberculosis hospital in the country. Previously, facilities for the treatment of tuberculous cases were provided only in the provincial hospitals, or in sanatoria in Syria and Lebanon, where the Ministry of Health subsidizes about 200 beds for the use of Iraqi patients. Plans have been projected
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743
164 by the Ministry for the construction of tuberculosis hospitals in each of the provinces: a 120-bed hospital was completed in Basra in 1952, and it was anticipated that hospitals would soon be ready for use in Kirkuk and Mosul. As of 1950, the dispensaries available for the treatment of chest diseases totaled 6, of which 2 were located in Baghdad and one each in Mosul, Kirkuk Diwaniya and Sulaimaniya. X-ray laboratories were maintained in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul.

751 A BCG inoculation and tuberculin testing program was initiated by the Ministry in 1952, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. It is proposed to concentrate at first on the children and the adolescents in the larger cities. In 1952 also, the World Health Organization sponsored the establishment of a tuberculosis demonstration and training center at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad.

164 Smallpox. Epidemics of smallpox break out almost annually, and reach major proportions at intervals of 3 to 8 years. Since 1930, large-scale epidemics were reported in 1932-33, 1940-42, 1946 and 1948-49. In the 1932-33 outbreaks, the peak of incidence came in 1932, when 2,318 cases were re-

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164 corded; in 1940-42, a peak of 2,098 cases was noted in 1941. Over 1,460 cases were treated by the medical officers in 1946 and 2,026 in 1948, with a decrease to 736 cases in 1949. In the intervening years the recorded prevalence ranged from 18 to 700 cases. The fatality rates have varied in different outbreaks from 5 to 40 per cent. [165]

751 361 Vaccination against smallpox is required theoretically, but enforcement is difficult in the more remote villages, and particularly among the transitory laborers and nomadic tribes. In some sections, as in the date-growing areas, mass vaccination campaigns are carried on during the date harvest season, when people flock to the groves and the packing sheds in search of work. At the time of an epidemic, vaccination is compulsory among all the affected populations.

164 **Diphtheria.** Diphtheria is endemic, and localized outbreaks are observed from time to time. In the absence of Schick test surveys, however, little is known regarding the extent of infection in the general population. In the 6 years 1944-49, the recorded incidence rose from 210 cases in 1944 to 903 in 1948 and 612 in 1949—an apparent increase which is attributed by the local authorities to improved facilities for diagnosis. 751 164 Immunization against diphtheria is provided in many of the schools in the larger cities and in certain of the child health centers.

164 165 **Meningitis.** Outbreaks of meningococcus meningitis are sporadic, usually occurring during the winter months. In the 12-year period 1939-50, from 112 to 489 cases were recorded each year, while the fatality rates ranged from 8 to 35 per cent.

164 **Other Infections.** The pneumonias are prevalent, and are major causes of death in all age groups. Outbreaks of influenza are recurrent. Measles, whooping cough, chickenpox and mumps are endemic, and often epidemic. The cases of whooping cough are typically severe, and the mortality among the undernourished children is normally high.

Occasional cases of scarlet fever are en-

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countered. The prevalence rarely exceeds 5 to 20 cases a year, but, in 1948, outbreaks totaling 185 cases were recorded. Rheumatic fever is one of the most important diseases of childhood, particularly in Baghdad. From 10,000 to 23,000 cases were treated annually in the government hospitals and dispensaries throughout the country in 1944-49. Poliomyelitis was formerly regarded as sporadic, but cases are being recognized with increasing frequency. With improved diagnostic facilities, 70 to 100 cases have been reported annually since 1949 from the children's hospital in Baghdad. 164 [758]

DISEASES SPREAD OR CONTRACTED CHIEFLY THROUGH CONTACT

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal disease are encountered, especially in the urban communities. Syphilis predominates among the recognized cases; congenital syphilis is common. The prevalence of the disease in Baghdad and other cities is estimated locally at between 2 and 10 per cent. Chancroid and gonorrhea are widespread, but the extent of infection in the general population is not accurately known. Lymphogranuloma venereum and granuloma inguinale are relatively rare. The cases of venereal disease treated in government institutions averaged about 38,600 annually in the 6 years 1944-49. Roughly 65 per cent were diagnosed as syphilis, 26 per cent as gonorrhea and 9 per cent as chancroid. Treatment is provided by the health authorities in the various general hospitals and dispensaries, as well as in 2 special venereal disease hospitals. 164 [758]

Bejel is widely distributed among the nomadic and the seminomadic peoples in the Tigris and the Euphrates valleys and around the marshes and the lakes in the lower delta region. Apparently a form of syphilis transmitted by nonvenereal contact, the disease is characterized by a predominance of mucocutaneous lesions, usually with a high degree of oral and pharyngeal involvement. It is associated with primitive conditions of living, and is most extensive 164 361 511

p. 41(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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

Bejel in Iraq. Areas of Greatest Prevalence

in the settlements bordering the larger rivers and the marshes, where it is known locally by different names, chiefly *bejel*, *lawath* and *abou khisian*. It is believed that at least two thirds of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the maximum transmission between 2 and 5 years of age. Serious foci, in which the disease sometimes reaches epidemic proportions, exist in the southeastern provinces and along the Tigris and its tributaries in Mosul *liwa*. The districts around the Amarah marshes are probably the most severely affected, but infection rates of over 50 per cent are found in many villages in Amarah, Muntafiq, Basra and Mosul *liwas*. An important focus also persists in Dulaim *liwa*, in the vicinity of Hit and Ramadi. Surveys have shown moderately high infection rates in some villages, while in others the existence of 20 to 25 per cent of seropositive latent cases is suggestive of epidemic conditions in the recent past. The disease is present among the Bedouin tribes of the desert, but is absent among the Kurdish populations of the northeastern mountain districts. Indigenous cases are seldom seen in the towns, although a focus has been established in Baghdad,

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p. 41 (B)

164 where the infection was introduced by
369 refugees from Amarah and has spread in the
serifa settlements and the slum sections of
the city.

744 A syphilis and bejel control program was
164 initiated in 1950 by the government health
authorities, in conjunction with the World
Health Organization and the United Nations
International Children's Emergency
Fund. A dispensary and training center and
research laboratories are maintained at the
headquarters in Baghdad, while field units
conduct surveys and mass treatment campaigns
in the provinces. Investigations on
the distribution and the relative prevalence
of the infection, the significance of possible
[758] insect vectors, the most effective methods of
treatment and the radiologic and the serologic
aspects of the disease are being carried
forward by the headquarters and field personnel.

164 **Diseases of the Eyes.** Trachoma is
758 widespread, and is regarded by many as one
of the most important endemic diseases in
the country. The cases treated in government
institutions usually average over
164 500,000 a year. The infection rates are uniformly
high in the central provinces, and,
in 1950, were calculated at over 233 per 1,000 population in Baghdad, 195 in Kerbela, 140 in Diyala and 102 in Hilla *liwas*. In the remaining provinces they ranged from 24 to 70 per 1,000. The density of population and the concentration of medical facilities in central Iraq cast some doubt, however, that such figures are representative of the degree of infection in the different regions. Cases of advanced trachoma are common, while local authorities estimate that 25 to 40 per cent of the children in many districts suffer from some form of the disease. Statistics from the government hospitals and dispensaries for the 15 years from 1929 through 1943 show that 53 per cent of all the eye diseases treated and 26 to 36 per cent of the total infections were trachomatous in origin.

Conjunctivitis, including both infectious and noninfectious types, is almost equally

164 prevalent. In most areas the prominence of eye lesions is aggravated by the frequency of dust-laden winds and by the glare of the sun. Conjunctivitis is the leading cause of morbidity among the employees of the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field and pipeline stations. It comprises almost one half of the cases of infectious disease treated each year. Gonococcal ophthalmia is responsible for considerable blindness, particularly in the urban communities. 743 164 The Ministry of Health operates 3 ophthalmic hospitals and 5 dispensaries in Baghdad and other cities, and provides special facilities for the treatment of eye diseases in the provincial hospitals and dispensaries.

164 515 **Diseases of the Skin.** The low standards of hygiene prevailing among both urban and rural populations are conducive to the 164 spread of skin infections. Mycotic infections of various types are seen in large numbers. Favus predominates: from 10 to 15 cases constitute the usual daily quota at the clinic of the Royal Hospital in Baghdad. Cases of actinomycosis and Madura foot are often observed. Impetigo and erysipelas are common. Scabies is widespread. Phagedenic ulcers and cases of human myiasis are encountered from time to time. 136 164 A form of dermatitis, caused by contact with cercariae of nonhuman strains of *Schistosoma*, is frequent in the southern provinces. The bites of sandflies produce skin lesions in susceptible individuals, and are apt to become infected.

164 **Leprosy.** Leprosy is endemic, especially in the marsh and the lake districts of the south. The actual prevalence of the disease is uncertain, but local observers estimate that it probably does not exceed 400 to 500 cases. From 179 to 279 cases were reported annually in 1944-49, with from 46 to 86 new infections. A focus formerly existed around Baghdad, but within recent years relatively few indigenous cases have been found in the 743 central and the northern provinces. A leper colony is maintained by the government on an island near Amarah: it usually has 250 TO 300 PATIENTS IN RESIDENCE.

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to 300 patients in residence. A comprehensive leprosy control program is planned for the near future by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization. 000 744

Other Infections. Rabies is enzootic among dogs, jackals and other animals. The jackals, the principal reservoir, often invade the villages and the outlying sections of the towns. Human infections occur sporadically: in 1944-49, the recorded cases averaged from 4 to 32 a year. In the same period, from 739 to 1,365 persons were treated annually at the Antirabic Institute in Baghdad. The majority gave a history of having been bitten by rabid dogs. The Institute also prepares rabies vaccine for distribution throughout the country. 232 164 [745]

Anthrax is prevalent among the sheep. From 130 to 225 human cases are reported annually among persons in contact with infected animals, or among individuals working with hides or wool. Tetanus is sporadic: the known incidence totals 130 to 250 cases each year. Tetanus neonatorum is common, especially in the rural areas. Cases of human glanders are seen from time to time. Leptospirosis, or Weil's disease, is occasionally encountered in the southern provinces. However, no evidence of infection with *Leptospira icterohaemorrhagiae* has yet been found among the rats captured in Baghdad.

DISEASES SPREAD BY ARTHROPODS

Malaria. Malaria is endemic or hyperendemic throughout most of Iraq. The distribution and the severity of the disease vary with the physiographic features of the different regions and the amount and the type of irrigation. It has always been regarded as a disease of primary importance in the country, but within the last few decades it has become increasingly prominent in the southern provinces due to the expansion of irrigation facilities. The cases of malaria treated in government institutions in the 7 years 1944-50 averaged about 598,800 annually. The case rates in the various provinces, based upon the at- 164 361 164

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tendances in the hospitals and the dispensaries in 1950, ranged from 26 to 266 per 1,000 population. They approached, or exceeded, the mean rate of 111 per 1,000 in 6 *liwas*, being 106 in Diyala, 111 in Diwaniya, 155 in Erbil, 158 in Sulaimaniya, 205 in Hilla and 266 in Kerbela. While such statistics provide rough indices of the present prevalence of the disease, they contribute little to our knowledge of the extent of the problem. 164

The northeastern mountain districts and the irrigated zones along the Shatt al Arab and the lower Euphrates are the most highly malarious sections of the country. Differences in the average rate of endemicity, as shown by spleen surveys among children 2 to 10 years of age, are indicated on the following map,[41] in which the principal malarious regions are arbitrarily grouped according to the factors governing the transmission of the disease. Malaria is hyperendemic in the date-growing areas along the Shatt al Arab (I), which are watered by a complex system of tidal irrigation. In Basra, Fao, Al Gurnah and the chief towns, the spleen rates approximated 75 per cent in 1941, but were reduced to about 12 per cent by 1949 as the result of control operations. The rate of infection is relatively low in the marshlands of the southern delta (II), where *Anopheles pulcherrimus* predominates, but foci of greater prevalence exist as far north as Qalat Saleh. In Amarah and other towns, the spleen rates are estimated at about 8 per cent. In the lower Euphrates basin (III), the annual flooding of the river and the extensive system of gravity-flow irrigation from high-level canals create conditions favorable to the breeding of the vector species, *A. stephensi*. The spleen rates usually average 30 to 60 per cent, but in controlled localities, as Hilla, Kerbela, Nasiriyeh and Suq ash Shuyukh, they had declined to around 20 per cent in 1950. In the upper Euphrates valley, north of Ramadi (IV), however, irrigation is limited to small-scale projects employing pumps or more primitive meth-

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p. 43 (B)

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

Malaria in Iraq. Regional Endemicity[41]

[3/2] ods for lifting the water from the deep river channel, and malaria is only mildly endemic. The spleen rates in Hit, Anah, Haditha and such typical towns approximate about 4 per cent. Lift irrigation is also employed in the middle Tigris region (V). The spleen rates are generally low, although scattered foci of endemicity exist where conditions are suitable for the breeding of *A. stephensi.* In Baghdad and other towns the spleen rates are normally about 3 per cent, but epidemics sometimes result when other species invade the agricultural areas from neighboring foci to the north. An outbreak in which *A. sacharovi* was implicated was reported in 1946-47 in the vicinity of Baghdad. A sharp outbreak also occurred in 1947 in a district north of the city, when the infection was transmitted by *A. superpictus.* Malaria is endemic, as well as epidemic, in the gravity-irrigated zones of the lower Diyala basin (VI), but a low level of infection prevails in the districts near the junction of this river with the Tigris. Spleen rates of 20 to 50 per cent are found throughout much of the area, approaching nearer 90 per cent in uncontrolled villages around Baqubeh.

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p. 44(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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The disease is endemic along the Tigris, the Khazir, the Great Zab and the Little Zab rivers in northern Iraq, but the surrounding steppelands (VII) are relatively free. The infection was formerly widespread along the eastern edges of this zone. However, a marked reduction in prevalence has been noted within recent years around Erbil and Kirkuk, due probably to the fuller utilization of the mountain streams for irrigation purposes. In 1946, spleen rates of about 38 per cent were recorded in typical riverside communities, as Eski Mosul, Mosul, Kellek and Quwair, but in Kirkuk and other towns distant from the main rivers they averaged only 9 per cent. Since that date, control measures have been carried on in Mosul, and in 1950 the spleen rate was estimated at 5 per cent. The foothill regions along the Iranian border in Kut *liwa* (VIII) and in the northeastern provinces (IX) are highly malarious, or subject to occasional sharp epidemics. *A. superpictus* is the only vector in the southern foci, but *A. superpictus*, *A. sacharovi* and, possibly, *A. claviger* are responsible for the transmission of the infection in the north. The spleen rates in uncontrolled communities in Sulaimaniya *liwa* and in the eastern portions of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk and Diyala range from 20 to 100 per cent. In the valleys of the Kurdish mountains along the Iranian and the Turkish frontiers (X), *A. sacharovi* is replaced by *A. maculipennis maculipennis* at the higher elevations. Spleen rates of 25 to 90 per cent are found in different localities.

On the alluvial plains, malaria transmission takes place from March to November, with two peak periods, the more important from May to August and the second in October and November. In the extreme south some transmission continues throughout the year. The season is shorter and more continuous in the northern provinces, and normally extends from May to October, with the maximum infection rates in July and August. Further study is required for an appraisal of the relative prevalence and

p. 44(B)

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seasonal distribution of the different species of malarial parasites. *Plasmodium falciparum* appears to predominate in most localities with a moderate to high rate of endemicity, as well as during epidemics in all parts of the country. *P. vivax* is also widespread. It is often observed in the blood of infected individuals, even in hyperendemic areas, during the nontransmission season, and the local authorities state that it is unusually difficult to eradicate certain strains in the course of treatment. *P. malariae* is reported more or less sporadically. In certain areas in northern Iraq, it is being encountered with increasing frequency, and some evidence exists that it may be found to take the place of *P. vivax* as the principal species concerned with clinical relapses. Among the 2,865 to 4,281 cases of malaria treated annually in the hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1946 through 1950, from 8 to 53 per cent were identified as *P. vivax* infections, from 0.7 to 7 per cent as *P. falciparum* and up to 8 per cent as *P. malariae*. The remainder were diagnosed on a clinical basis. *P. ovale* was reported recently, but the origin of the infection was obscure. Blackwater fever is rare, although cases are sometimes seen in Basra and in the northern highlands. 361 164 758 164 186

Malaria control measures have been carried on in limited areas under the auspices of governmental or other agencies. The Department of Endemic Diseases of the Ministry of Health conducts anopheline control and treatment programs in highly endemic areas throughout the country through subordinate units in central, southern and northern Iraq. A rural health and malaria control project was initiated in the hyperendemic Tanjero valley in Sulaimaniya *liwa* in 1952, in co-operation with the World Health Organization. 744 164

Rickettsial Infections. Outbreaks of louse-borne typhus recur almost annually, but are seldom extensive, except under abnormal conditions, as during war periods. The infection is frequently introduced by 136 164 080

p. 45(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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THE INFECTION IS FREQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY
means of the pilgrimage traffic or tribal 164
migrations from the neighboring territories, 484
and is believed to smolder continuously in 167
the northeastern mountain districts. Cases 164
are usually observed during the winter and
the spring months, with the maximum inci-
dence in March and April. Serious out-
breaks, with a total of over 1,300 known
cases, were reported in 1942-43 in conjunc-
tion with epidemics prevailing throughout
the entire Middle East. The actual preva-
lence was probably several times the official
estimates. The greatest numbers of cases
were noted in Baghdad, and in Basra,
Mosul, Diyala and Sulaimaniya *liwas*, along
the main routes from Iran. The conges- 164
tion and the shortage of food, clothing, 722
soaps and other supplies existing in that
area as the result of military operations
during World War II favored the spread
of the infection among the louse-infested
populations. About 800 cases of typhus were 164
reported in 1944, but the annual incidence
subsequently declined to a low of 72 cases
in 1949. No differentiation is made as to
type, and the recorded cases include both
louse-borne and flea-borne infections. On
the basis of laboratory investigations, au-
thorities at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad
suggest that many outbreaks in the north,
where louse-borne typhus is supposedly en-
demic, are caused by strains which are sero-
logically intermediate between *Rickettsia* [136]
prowazeki and *R. mooseri*.

Murine typhus is endemic, and probably
predominates in the rural areas in the ab-
sence of a large-scale epidemic. Tick-borne
infections are not specifically reported, and
are undoubtedly rare. In the event of a 164
typhus outbreak, control measures, includ- 744
ing the use of DDT preparations and mass
immunization of the inhabitants with anti-
typhus vaccines, are carried on in the af-
fected communities by the government
health authorities.

Plague. Epidemics of plague were fre- 164
quent in the past, particularly in the region
around Baghdad, but the disease has been
almost completely absent within recent
YEARS.

p. 45 (B)

63;Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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000 years. The infection is believed to be en-
164 zootic among the field rodents in sections
133 of the eastern and the southern provinces,
505 since outbreaks have sometimes coincided with floods which caused the rats to seek shelter in the villages. It has also been introduced on occasion by way of steamer traffic through Basra and the river towns.
164 With the exception of 34 cases, associated with a localized outbreak in the vicinity of Amarah in 1945, no instance of human plague was reported from 1937 through 1952. The 1945 outbreak started in a small village on the edge of the marshes near Amarah, in which 16 cases and 4 deaths were recorded within a period of 20 days.
164 Quarantine measures were enforced by the
744 government health organization and the Allied military authorities. DDT spraying was resisted by the inhabitants, who fled to the marshes, and the most seriously infected village was finally evacuated and burned to the ground.

In Baghdad and Basra, captured rats are often examined for the presence of plague, but rodent control is not attempted in the various cities and towns unless an epidemic is threatened. Plague-infected rats were found in Baghdad up to 1938.

164 **Relapsing Fever.** Both louse-borne and tick-borne relapsing fever are sporadic: from 25 to 100 cases are usually reported each year. Small localized outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever occur from time to time, primarily in the northern provinces. More extensive outbreaks were recorded in 1945-47, undoubtedly part of the epidemic wave which swept through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46. According to official statistics, 243 cases were treated in government institutions in 1945, 334 in 1946 and 379 in 1947, in contrast with 52 cases in 1944 and 26 to 33 in 1948-49.

Occasional cases of tick-borne relapsing fever are encountered in northern Iraq.
[136] *Ornithodorus tholozani* is regarded as the probable vector.

164
329 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis

p. 46 (A)

164 369 is endemic in the alluvial plain region, within a radius of about 100 miles around Baghdad, which is one of the major foci in the Middle East. There the infection rates average 20 to 60 per cent, and probably approach 95 per cent in many localities, especially in the older parts of the city. Outside of this traditional focus, the infection is distributed irregularly. Some of the agricultural districts to the south are relatively free from the disease, but in the more compact towns and villages the infection rates are as high as 40 per cent. In Basra and Muntafiq *liwas*, the extent of infection is slight, and even in the towns the prevalence probably does not exceed 3 to 4 per cent. North of Baghdad the disease appears to be confined to isolated foci. It is widespread in the city of Mosul and in the towns of Beled, Samarrah and 'Aqra, but is almost completely absent from the steppe country and from the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan.

164 758 In the 6-year period 1944-49, the cases of Oriental sore treated annually in government institutions ranged between a minimum of 2,910 in 1948 and a maximum of 10,502 in 1945. All ages are affected, but most of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the greatest susceptibility between 1 and 4 years of age. Multiple lesions [511] are frequent, particularly among individuals living in congested and unhygienic surroundings. Ulcerative sores predominate, but the nodular type is seen in a large percentage of the cases. Secondary tuberculoid lesions, arising in healing ulcers, are also common in children. The largest number of cases is usually observed in August, September and October. *Phlebotomus sergenti* is apparently the only important vector in [136] Iraq, as in Pakistan. Cutaneous infections occur among the dogs and the cats found in the cities, but they are thought to play a minor role in the spread of the human disease.

164 369 Visceral leishmaniasis, or kala-azar, is suspected of being sporadic in the northern part of the country, although up to 1950

p. 46(B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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only 1 case, in which the diagnosis was confirmed by laboratory examination, had been recorded. Potential sandfly vectors of kala-azar are apparently absent in the southern and the central provinces, but they may exist in the northern highlands. 164 369

Other Infections. Sandfly fever is endemic, and, in the delta region, reaches epidemic proportions every few years. From 842 to 4,688 cases were recorded annually in 1944-49. The sandfly vector, *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is widely distributed. The season of transmission usually extends from May to November, with a peak in June or July. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the south. 164

Cases of elephantiasis of undetermined origin are occasionally encountered, but *Wuchereria bancrofti* is not known to be present. Guinea worm infections are sometimes seen in pilgrims from southern Iran, but no indigenous cases have been recorded. [484]

NUTRITIONAL DISEASES

Undernutrition, anemia and avitaminosis are prevalent, especially among the wage-earning classes in the cities and the impoverished peasants of the south. Clinical manifestations of vitamin A and vitamin C deficiencies are widespread. In general, serious nutritional diseases tend to be more or less localized in distribution, depending upon the dietary habits and the standards of living of the people. Rickets is common, and from 100 to 2,387 cases were treated annually in the government institutions in 1944-49. Cases of scurvy and of osteomalacia are numerous. Beriberi and pellagra are sporadic, but minor symptoms of riboflavin deficiency are frequently observed. Protein edema is rare. A form of cirrhosis of the liver is encountered in which malnutrition is believed by some authorities to be a contributory factor. 146 511 361

MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS

Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and large-scale epidemics are reported occasionally. Encephalitis lethargica is sporadic. 164

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63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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THE DIETARY

146 standards of the different urban and rural peoples vary, but undernutrition and avitaminosis are widespread.

164 Malaria, schistosomiasis hematobia, trachoma and tuberculosis are of major public health importance. Enteric fevers, amebic and bacillary dysenteries, hookworm infection, helminthiasis, venereal diseases, rheumatic fever, pneumonia, cutaneous leishmaniasis and various skin and eye diseases are prevalent. Bejel is widely distributed among the nomadic and the seminomadic populations. Epidemics of smallpox and louse-borne typhus occur almost annually. Localized outbreaks of diphtheria and meningococcus meningitis are sporadic. Measles,

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164 whooping cough, sandfly fever, dengue fever and infectious hepatitis are endemic and frequently epidemic. Leprosy, louse-borne and tick-borne relapsing fever and murine typhus are endemic in various parts of the country. Brucellosis, rabies and anthrax are epizootic, and occasional human cases are reported. Scarlet fever, poliomyelitis and leptospirosis are encountered irregularly. Epidemics of cholera were common in the past; the last outbreak was in 1931. A localized outbreak of plague was recorded in 1945, the only cases since 1936 and the first epidemic within recent decades. The presence of kala-azar is questionable, while filariasis is unknown.

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64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
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creased. Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Iraq has all the 311
necessary requisites for a sound and rapid economic development, especially in the agricultural sector. It has a very considerable quantity of land ready for immediate cultivation, so defined by the most conservative standards, and with modern methods very great stretches now defined as uncultivable could be improved and brought into the cultivable class; it has an 3N—
abundance of water for irrigation as well as for power, and it has at its disposal enormous quantities of cheap fuel both in petroleum and natural gas.

What, then, have been the economic, educational, health and 161
social conditions of the country? As regards the size and growth of the population, even today, more than thirty years since the creation of the Kingdom of Iraq, it would be very difficult to state categorically the percentage increase of the population. The accuracy of the figure advanced by the October 1947 census has been questioned by the International Bank Mission.[7]

Despite substantial strides in public health—an increased 165
number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors—during the first 164
thirty years of the existence of the Kingdom, the Bank Mission reported in 1951 that the infant mortality rate was very high, "perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births," and that there was a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and dysentery. Malaria was reported to cause 50,000 deaths every year. In 1948 no less than 6,657,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria and 524,740 trachoma.[8] In 1944 [759]
the total number of doctors in the country was 528; in 1951 it was reported that there was one doctor to every 7,000 in the population, which would make a total of about 915 doctors, but a large percentage of them were concentrated in Bagdad.[9]

There can be no doubt that educationally the country pro- 871
gressed considerably from the stage in which it was in 1921, but all in all the sum total was not very impressive; the rate of

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[7] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 126.

[8] *Ibid.*, 49.

[9] *Ibid.*, 53; Hashim Al Witry, *Health Services in Iraq* (1944), 8. In 1945 there were, according to a British report, 569 doctors registered in Iraq. Since 308 were in Bagdad, this made approximately one doctor for every 15,400 in the population in the provinces, and one doctor to every 2,700 in Bagdad. Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, *Iraq* (1949), 80-81.

procurement of equipment and the erection of structures to house 206 this equipment. In the past these functions have been carried out by two different sections of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works with little or no coordination.

V. Public Health

Considerable progress in public health has undoubtedly been 164 made over recent decades. The number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors has greatly increased, and there have been no epidemics of pestilential diseases in recent years. Yet infant mortality is still [165] ● extremely high—perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births; and there is still a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and the dysenteries. Many of the prevailing diseases are the by-product of polluted water, and unsanitary, congested living conditions which in turn are traceable largely to poverty and ignorance. Thus an increase in production and standards of living brought about through the general development program will be an important complement to a direct attack upon the health problem through expansion and more effective organization of governmental health services.

The main attack will have to focus on those diseases which sap the vitality and undermine the productivity of the people. In some rural areas, for example, virtually the entire population is at certain times stricken with malaria. Malaria is said to cause 50,000 deaths every year, as well as much sickness and disability which results in great loss for the country. In the provinces of Amara, Muntafiq and Kut the incidence of bilharzia or schistosomiasis, another debilitating disease, is particularly high. The dysenteries and other intestinal ailments are also a prominent cause of low vitality. In 1948 no less than 5,656,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria, and 524,740 trachoma. These statistics are of twofold significance. On the one hand, they illustrate the great expansion which has taken place in facilities for treatment of disease. On the other hand, they indicate clearly the relative inadequacy of efforts to prevent disease. It is

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757 also frequent causes for hospitalization. In 1949 there were 5,876,336 visits ~~to health institutions~~ for treatment.

Public Health Budget

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164 In 1951-52, ID 2,089,180 (7.6 percent of the total budget) were allocated to health services, as compared to ID 187,672 in 1931. Because of the prevalence of endemic diseases and the constant danger of epidemics, it would not be unreasonable to spend 10 percent of the total budget on health services.

759 Salaries ~~for~~ personnel in the medical service appear to be low in relation to the cost of living, although they are not low compared to other civil service salaries. The basic salaries, exclusive of cost-of-living allowances, range from ID 5.15 a month for a dresser, to ID 25 for a doctor and ID 80 for a director-general.

Current Health Conditions

165 In spite of the undeniable progress in health conditions, there is need for further improvement. Definitive data are lacking on total birth and death rates, but some figures are available on the infant mortality rate, which is probably the best index of the social circumstances of an area. For Baghdad, the recorded rate in 1949 was 128 deaths per thousand births. Iraqi doctors who have worked in different parts of the country consider the rate to be about 250 per thousand, on the average, compared with about 34 deaths per thousand live births in highly developed countries.

164 Among the people as a whole, malaria seems to be the chief killer, especially in country districts. In the main cities the leading causes of deaths were intestinal diseases, tuberculosis and respiratory diseases. These diseases and trachoma seriously affect the ability of men and women to work efficiently and are among the major causes of low productivity of labor in Iraq. For example, candidates for the police service are frequently rejected because of defective eyesight and what is characterized as "poor physique" associated with chronic malaria, schistosomiasis, etc. About 20 percent of the young men liable for military service are found to be unfit.

Heart trouble, cancer and other organic disturbances are far outnumbered by diseases which are essentially social in origin. Most of them can be traced to lack of hygiene, poor sanitation and

161 taken, in 1947, gave the total population as 4,799,500; before that there were periodical official estimates as follows:

1930	2,824,000
1935	3,560,000
1943	3,995,000

The present population is probably about 5 million. According to the census, Baghdad has a population of 364,000, Mosul 302,000, Basra 94,000, and Kirkuk 69,000, Hilla being the only other town of over 50,000 inhabitants. Significant figures for density of population could be determined only after defining habitable land and distinguishing rural populations; the accepted density figure for the country as a whole (27·4 per square mile) means little. In the total cultivable area as calculated by an English authority the average density is 102 per square mile, but in many areas the density is much more than this for the rural population alone, and in the Baghdad and Basra districts exceeds 300 and 800 respectively per square mile.

163 *Vital Statistics.* For a number of reasons, which include the
•165 inaccessibility of large areas of Iraq and the lack of doctors
164 in the rural districts, vital statistics are not available for the country as a whole. Statistics of possibly fair accuracy are, however, published for the population of some 1,160,000 served by the health centres in the main cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul; the latest, compiled for 1950, show a birth-rate of 27 and a death-rate of 12 per 1,000, with an infant mortality figure of 97 per 1,000 live births. The main causes of death were stated as old age, respiratory diseases other than tuberculosis, malaria, heart diseases, and tuberculosis.

197 *Language.* Arabic is the official and most widely spoken language. The 800,000 odd Kurds speak an Iranian language in various forms. Turkish dialects are spoken in Irbil, Kirkuk, to some extent in Khanaqin and in smaller intervening towns, and Syriac by Christian communities in northern Iraq. Other minority languages, such as Armenian, also occur, while in the Holy Cities of the south (Kerbela and Najaf) Persian is widely spoken.

RELIGIONS[1]

642 The constitution declares Islam to be the official religion of the state, but guarantees complete freedom of conscience and worship in conformity with accepted customs subject only to the maintenance of public order and morality, declares the absolute equality of all Iraqis before the law, gives communities

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[1] See above, p. 51ff.

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of peasants and tribesmen are illiterate. 212
Theoretically, primary education is com- 872
pulsory for both sexes, but the facilities are inadequate, particularly in the rural areas. Recent estimates indicate that the literacy rate in the country as a whole approximates 10 per cent, in contrast with about 40 per cent in Baghdad and the larger cities.
Education is controlled by the government, 871
and public instruction is available at all 658
levels from the primary schools through the professional colleges. There is no university in Iraq, but the incorporation of the present colleges into a national institution, with university status, has been proposed. Separate colleges of medicine, pharmacy, law, science, arts, fine arts, engineering, commerce and teachers' training, as well as various types of vocational schools, are supported by the government. Secondary schools are also maintained by private and mission groups. Government scholarships are provided annually to qualified students for study abroad, usually in Egypt, Great Britain or the United States.

VITAL STATISTICS

Valid vital statistics are almost nonexist- 143
ent, since the registration of births and 165
deaths is admittedly incomplete, even in the principal cities, as Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The general reluctance of the inhabitants to report births, deaths and other statistical data and the large size of the nomadic and the semimigratory populations are factors contributing to the inaccuracy of the figures available. Within recent years statistics have been compiled by the government health organization in 75 centers under the jurisdiction of medical officers, but they do not reflect conditions throughout the country. In 1950, these health districts covered a population of 1,160,000, distributed in all 14 of the provinces into which Iraq is divided. The birth rate was estimated at 27 per 1,000 population, and the death rate at 12 per 1,000. Competent authorities, however, believe that the over-all birth rate is nearer 40 to 50 per 1,000 popu-

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163 lation, and the death rate, 25 to 35. The
165 discrepancies in reporting are probably less
in the case of deaths than of births.

On the basis of the health district populations for 1950, the infant mortality rate was calculated at 98 per 1,000 live births. The death rate of infants under 1 year was 14 per cent of the total deaths, and of children under 5 years, about 23 per cent. Local observers estimate that the mortality in infants under 1 year approximates 300 to 350 per 1,000 live births among most rural and impoverished urban communities, and that it reaches almost 500 per 1,000 live births in children under 5 years of age. Intestinal diseases, undernutrition, respiratory infections and malaria are prominent among the causes of death in infancy and early childhood.

SOCIAL ECONOMY

241 Agriculture and the petroleum industry
together form the basis of Iraq's economy.
Although this region was one of the chief
granaries of the world centuries before the
Christian Era, the present agricultural resources
of the potentially fertile Tigris and
Euphrates river basins are only partially
developed. About 75 to 80 per cent of the
inhabitants are engaged in farming or pastoral
pursuits, but progress is retarded by
the prevailing forms of land tenure, shortage
of labor supply and inefficient methods
311 of cultivation. In 1950, less than one fifth
241 of the arable land, normally estimated at
25 to 30 million acres, was under production.
Extensive areas of the alluvial plain
are cultivated by means of irrigation, but
improper drainage often results in considerable
427 annual loss of soil fertility. A system
423 of tenancy farming predominates in most
sections of the country. The proportion of
land-owning peasants is small and largely
restricted to the northern provinces. In central
244 and southern Iraq many families are
migratory cultivators who work on a sharecropping
basis for wealthy and, usually, absentee
landlords.

241 Cereals, tobacco and cotton are important

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244 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
334 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.

146 *Measures to raise the standards of nutrition*
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
853 particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

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TICKS AND MITES. NUMEROUS SPECIES OF
164 ticks infest the livestock, including *Rhipi-*
136 *cephalus sanguineus, Hyalomma dromedarii*
232 and *Haemaphysalis cinnabarina punctata.* *Ornithodorus tholozani* occurs in many localities, and is the vector in sporadic cases of tick-borne relapsing fever. *O. savignyi* is present in the desert areas. The fowl or blue Persian tick, *Argas persicus*, and the castor bean tick, *Ixodes ricinus*, are widespread.

136 The itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is preva-
369 lent, especially in the congested urban communities and rural villages. The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventricosus*, is a frequent pest in the grain-growing districts.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Scorpions are common, particularly in the northern provinces. The most dangerous species are *Buthus australis* and *B. crassicauda.*
[165] *B. europaeus* is also present. A few deaths from scorpion stings are reported each year, usually among young children or old people. *Scorpio maurus kruglovi* is sometimes encountered in the plains and *S. maurus townsendi* in the Persian Gulf region. The principal poisonous spider in Iraq is *Lycosa tarantula.*

136 Other Arthropods. *Reduvius tabidus*
752 and *R. annulipes* are found in many areas. The "date beetle," a large aquatic species of the family BELASTOMIDAE, is capable of causing serious bites.

136 Reptiles. Twenty-six species of snakes
752 have been recorded from Iraq, but only 5
165 land varieties are venomous. Casualties from snake bites are reported occasionally. A large proportion of the fatalities is probably caused by the Levantine or blunt-nosed viper, *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, which inhabits the northeastern highlands from north of Baghdad to the Turkish and the Iranian frontiers. *V. lebetina euphratica* is also seen in some localities. The horned viper, *Aspis cerastes* (= *Cerastes cornutus*), is native to the alluvial plains, while the carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, is found in limited areas in Diwaniya province. The hoodless cobra, *Naja morgani*, is widely distributed but apparently is rare. The poison-

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ous sea snake, *Enhydrina shistosa*, roams 136
the Persian Gulf and the Shatt al Arab. 752
Although it may be dangerous to fishermen, 165
no fatalities are known to have occurred.

Rodents. *Rattus rattus frugivorus* is the 136
rat most frequently encountered in Iraqi 164
dwellings. *R. rattus alexandrinus* is also indigenous, while *R. norvegicus* is present in Basra, Baghdad and the river towns. *Nesokia buxtoni*, *Dipodillus dasyurus* and *Meriones charion* are reported from different localities. Rats are often captured in Baghdad and Basra and examined for evidences of plague, but otherwise little rodent control work is undertaken, except at the time of plague outbreaks.

Mollusks.* *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), the intermediate snail host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, is found in numerous foci in central and southern Iraq, where pump or gravity flow irrigation is employed. It inhabits the many small and sluggish irrigation canals and the rice fields, borrow pits, marshes and other suitable collections of water, but is strictly seasonal in appearance, being abundant only in the summer and the fall months, from May or June to November. The snails are widespread in Basra, Muntafiq, Diwaniya and Amarah provinces in the south, but are absent from the Shatt al Arab region south of Basra, where breeding is restricted by the salinity of the water. They are more scattered in distribution in the central provinces and practically nonexistent in the
north, aside from localized foci around the
marshlands of the Mosul area. *Radix lagotis* 136
canaliculata, a vector of *S. turkestanicum* 232
which causes serious infections among the livestock, is found in the rice fields and the marshes of the southern delta.

The threat of the spread of *Bulinus truncatus*, 136
and subsequently of schistosomiasis, 164
with the expansion of irrigation creates a 744
problem which is of major public health and economic importance to the country. Small-scale snail-control campaigns have been undertaken in the past in Baghdad, Basra and

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* See footnote, page 10.

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Diwaniya provinces. In 1949, a co-ordinated control program was introduced by the Iraqi government, and a Bilharzia Section was established within the national health organization. The section initiated a snail survey in the various endemic foci and research on the most effective methods of snail control. It carries on continuous snail destruction work through special units assigned to each of the infected provinces. 136 164 744

Plants. Little precise information is available regarding the prevalence of allergy-producing plants, but numerous weeds, grasses and trees, which have been incriminated in other countries, are present in districts with rainfall adequate to support such vegetation. 137 752

Occasional deaths, primarily among young children, have been traced to the consumption of the raw beans of *Vicia fava*, a prominent food crop throughout this region. The beans are toxic to susceptible individuals in the raw state. Plants of the *Senecio* group grow in sections of the northern highlands. The young green shoots are poisonous and sometimes cause fatalities among the livestock. 137 165 232

Food Sanitation

The government and municipal health authorities are responsible for the enforcement of regulations governing the sanitary quality of foods, meats and milk products, but the degree of enforcement varies in different localities. Health inspectors are charged with the supervision of establishments where foods are prepared or sold, such as foodshops, markets, restaurants and cafés, mineral-water bottling works and date-packing houses. Examinations for the presence of venereal diseases are theoretically required at regular intervals in the case of cooks and barbers, but no tests to detect other infections are carried out. 744

Meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter in the city abattoirs by officers of the government veterinary and health services. All carcasses offered for sale are supposed to bear an official stamp of

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illness and death in the rural areas is in- 164
complete and unreliable. An unduly large
proportion of the medical personnel is con-
centrated in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and
other cities, while the inhabitants in many
of the more remote districts receive little or
no medical attention. Local authorities esti-
mate that, in the case of most diseases, the
official reports represent about one tenth of
the probable prevalence. The mortality sta- 165
tistics are of questionable value, since the
deaths in rural communities are often certi-
fied by nonmedical officials, and a consider-
able percentage are listed as due to unknown
causes. Investigations undertaken by the 164
staff of the Royal Hospital and the Royal
College of Medicine, the Department of
Endemic Diseases and other organizations
contribute supplementary information on
the nature and the prevalence of specific
infections, as malaria and schistosomiasis.

DISEASES SPREAD OR CONTRACTED CHIEFLY THROUGH INTESTINAL OR URINARY TRACT

Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers. En-
teric fevers are endemic: from 559 to 842
cases of typhoid fever and from 97 to 230
cases of paratyphoid fever were reported
annually in the 6 years 1944-49. About 70
to 80 per cent of the known cases are
classified as typhoid fever. The relative
prevalence of paratyphoid A and B infec-
tions is uncertain, however, as differential
diagnostic tests are seldom attempted, ex-
cept in the central bacteriologic laboratory
in Baghdad. Few large-scale epidemics have [364]
been reported since the improvement of the
water supplies in the larger cities, but lo-
calized outbreaks, caused by contaminated
food or water supplies, are numerous. Cases
occur throughout the year, with the peak of
incidence in the summer months, from July
to October. Sporadic cases of paratyphoid C
fever have been recorded, some of which
have been associated with primary menin-
geal symptoms.

Dysenteries. Both bacillary and amebic dysentery are widespread. Amebiasis is ap-

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164 parently of primary importance in all parts of the country, particularly in the lower delta region. Local authorities estimate that 25 to 35 per cent of the inhabitants in Baghdad harbor cysts of *Endamoeba histolytica,* while in Basra the carrier rate probably approximates 60 to 70 per cent. Liver abscesses are frequently encountered.

The actual distribution of bacillary infections is unknown, since the proportion of cases treated by medical officers is unduly small, and few facilities for confirmatory diagnosis are available. According to the official statistics for 1944 through 1949, from 17,000 to 30,000 cases of amebic dysentery and from 180 to 1,100 cases of bacillary dysentery were reported each year. Correspondingly, an analysis of the cases treated annually in the hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field and pipeline areas, in the 4 years 1946-50, shows that from 478 to 1,603 were amebic infections and from 58 to 175 bacillary. The Flexner group predominates among the *Shigella* strains isolated in dysentery cases at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad, but Sonne, Schmitz and Shiga types are also numerous.

136 The abundance of flies and the insanitary
515 habits of the people favor the spread of
164 intestinal infections. Diarrhea and enteritis
165 are major causes of illness and death, especially in early childhood. Giardiasis is common. Outbreaks of food poisoning, undoubtedly caused by various strains of *Salmonella,* are frequent.

164 Cholera. Epidemics of cholera were for-
484 merly recurrent in the border districts and along the trade routes from India and the East. Although some authorities believe that an endemic focus may have existed in the Shatt al Arab region in the past, most epidemics have resulted from the introduction of the disease by way of traffic through the Persian Gulf ports or by overland travel through Iran, often in connection with pilgrimages to Mecca or local Shia shrines.
164 Within recent decades extensive outbreaks, each totaling from 1,500 to 2,500 cases,

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milk products, or from contact with in- 164
fected animals. From 5 to 97 cases were 232
treated annually in government institutions 758
in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination 742
of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to 164
the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 232
1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella
antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br.
melitensis* was isolated from 5 of the 13
samples from which bacteriologic cultures
were made.

DISEASES SPREAD CHIEFLY THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the 164
most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49,
from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and
from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuber-
culosis were recorded annually. Such figures
are of little value in assessing the problem,
however, due to inadequate reporting and
the shortage of diagnostic and treatment
facilities. Local authorities estimate that
the prevalence of latent or active infections
approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in
many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and
Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas.
Widespread undernutrition and low stand- 164
ards of living, associated with overcrowd- 146
ing and ignorance of the basic principles of 511
hygiene, are factors contributing to the 165
spread of the disease. The death rates are
known to be high, but little precise infor-
mation is available. It is believed that a
considerable number of tuberculosis deaths
are erroneously attributed to pneumonia
and other respiratory infections. Moreover, [183]
the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit
the presence of tuberculosis in the family
due to the stigma customarily attached to
the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an aver- 164
age of 760 cases were treated in government 758
hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of
about 25 per cent. The maximum number
of cases occurred in the group from 16 to
30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. 164
Involvement of the bones or the glands ac-
counts for a large proportion of the non-

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164 corded; in 1940-42, a peak of 2,098 cases was noted in 1941. Over 1,460 cases were treated by the medical officers in 1946 and 2,026 in 1948, with a decrease to 736 cases in 1949. In the intervening years the recorded prevalence ranged from 18 to 700
[165] cases. The fatality rates have varied in different outbreaks from 5 to 40 per cent.

751
361 Vaccination against smallpox is required theoretically, but enforcement is difficult in the more remote villages, and particularly among the transitory laborers and nomadic tribes. In some sections, as in the date-growing areas, mass vaccination campaigns are carried on during the date harvest season, when people flock to the groves and the packing sheds in search of work. At the time of an epidemic, vaccination is compulsory among all the affected populations.

164 Diphtheria. Diphtheria is endemic, and localized outbreaks are observed from time to time. In the absence of Schick test surveys, however, little is known regarding the extent of infection in the general population. In the 6 years 1944-49, the recorded incidence rose from 210 cases in 1944 to 903 in 1948 and 612 in 1949—an apparent increase which is attributed by the local authorities to improved facilities for diagnosis.
751 Immunization against diphtheria is pro-
164 vided in many of the schools in the larger cities and in certain of the child health centers.

164
165 Meningitis. Outbreaks of meningococcus meningitis are sporadic, usually occurring during the winter months. In the 12-year period 1939-50, from 112 to 489 cases were recorded each year, while the fatality rates ranged from 8 to 35 per cent.

164 Other Infections. The pneumonias are prevalent, and are major causes of death in all age groups. Outbreaks of influenza are recurrent. Measles, whooping cough, chickenpox and mumps are endemic, and often epidemic. The cases of whooping cough are typically severe, and the mortality among the undernourished children is normally high.

Occasional cases of scarlet fever are en-

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64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East
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creased. Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Iraq has all the 311 necessary requisites for a sound and rapid economic development, especially in the agricultural sector. It has a very considerable quantity of land ready for immediate cultivation, so defined by the most conservative standards, and with modern methods very great stretches now defined as uncultivable could be improved and brought into the cultivable class; it has an 31N- abundance of water for irrigation as well as for power, and it has at its disposal enormous quantities of cheap fuel both in petroleum and natural gas.

What, then, have been the economic, educational, health and 161 social conditions of the country? As regards the size and growth of the population, even today, more than thirty years since the creation of the Kingdom of Iraq, it would be very difficult to state categorically the percentage increase of the population. The accuracy of the figure advanced by the October 1947 census has been questioned by the International Bank Mission.[7]

Despite substantial strides in public health—an increased 165 number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors—during the first 164 thirty years of the existence of the Kingdom, the Bank Mission reported in 1951 that the infant mortality rate was very high, "perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births," and that there was a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and dysentery. Malaria was reported to cause 50,000 deaths every year. In 1948 no less than 6,657,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria and 524,740 trachoma.[8] In 1944 [759] the total number of doctors in the country was 528; in 1951 it was reported that there was one doctor to every 7,000 in the population, which would make a total of about 915 doctors, but a large percentage of them were concentrated in Bagdad.[9]

There can be no doubt that educationally the country pro- 871 gressed considerably from the stage in which it was in 1921, but all in all the sum total was not very impressive; the rate of

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[7] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 126.

[8] *Ibid.*, 49.

[9] *Ibid.*, 53; Hashim Al Witry, *Health Services in Iraq* (1944), 8. In 1945 there were, according to a British report, 569 doctors registered in Iraq. Since 308 were in Bagdad, this made approximately one doctor for every 15,400 in the population in the provinces, and one doctor to every 2,700 in Bagdad. Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, *Iraq* (1949), 30-31.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic 747
Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary 814
clubs.

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil 619
period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land 166
communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyala tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi Dhafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the Dhafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions 648x
in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdi- 721
stan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 inhabitants, could Curzon agree to the value or feasibility of a plebiscite. The Conference broke up on 2 February 1923, with every difficulty unsolved and with the Turks resolutely rejecting Curzon's offer or threat to refer the matter to the arbitration of the League.

The Turkish National Assembly proceeded, early in April, to award to the veteran American concession-seeker, Admiral Chester, a railway and mineral concession stretching far into 'Iraq; but at the second Lausanne Conference, which was convened on 23 April, wiser councils were manifest. British pressure for reference of the Mosul issue to League decision, a step wholly consonant with world opinion at the time, could no longer be resisted. Ismet maintained all his claims but agreed that, failing direct Anglo-Turkish agreement within twelve months (later reduced to nine), the Council of the League should be asked to arbitrate the dispute. The search for such agreement, pursued in conferences which Sir Percy Cox attended in Istanbul in May and June 1924, remained fruitless. Neither side yielded, and the problem was referred by Great Britain, in face of great Turkish reluctance, back to the League Council. This was to meet on 20 September.

721 These moves of diplomacy in Europe did nothing, meanwhile,
to allay movement and violence in Kurdistan. Shaykh Maḥmud,
648 supporting his band of cut-throat followers by looting the helpless, welcomed Turkish officers at Sulaymaniya, sent delegates to Kirkuk to consult the local Turkophiles, and dispatched envoys even to Karbalā and Najf to enlist support. Refusing the order of the High Commissioner to report himself in Baghdad, he was finally evicted from Sulaymaniya by the bombs of the Royal Air Force and made for temporary refuge at Sardasht with whatever funds and followers he could collect. The vigilance of the Air Force prevented a reoccupation of Sulaymaniya by his bands, and touch was kept with his more reasonable brother Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir. The Jaf and other tribes showed every eagerness to be detached effectively from the orbit of the Sulaymaniya 'Government'.

On the northern frontier the Turks' treatment of their own Kurds was confirming, within the 'Iraq border, Kurdish resistance to their return. Their troop concentrations at Nisibin and Jazira-ibn-'Umar remained alarming, and their occupation of Rawanduz left, while it lasted, a centre for aggressive intrigue within 'Iraq.
563 In the debated land, astride the frontier, Assyrian resettlement had
[166] proceeded. Hundreds of their houses had been established in the
areas of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, and Zakho. Others had attained their original homes in Tiyari and neighbouring country, and more, seeking to do the same early in 1923, had met the resistance of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

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In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army, Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

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The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 657 166 Turkey. The frontier was now established, and the impossibility of settlement in their old homes was cruelly manifest. Schemes for the establishment of the Assyrians in Canada or elsewhere overseas had been considered in London, and abandoned. In spite of 'Iraqi frowns at the self-conscious, ever discontented, and hardly manageable community, it seemed that they must settle in 'Iraq or nowhere. The surviving community of some 20,000 souls could never be concentrated in a single enclave, since 'Iraq afforded none which was sufficient, cultivable, and unoccupied. Hundreds of households of the Baz and Jelu clans had dispersed over the Mosul plain, the upper Tiyari and Takhuma in Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, the lower Tiyari around Barwari Bala. It was hoped next to find room for a thousand households in the Baradost area of Rawanduz qadhā, and for more again in Barwari Zayr. Money was collected in England to assist them, seed and cattle were supplied. Pay earned in the Levies kept many families together; but the preservation of their communal identity, their pride of religion and tradition must devolve upon themselves, as it had devolved for so long on others of the Christian minorities in 'Iraq.

6. THE OTHER NEIGHBOURS

648x The relations of 'Iraq with its eastern neighbour were unsatisfactory; with persistent Persian denial of recognition of the new Kingdom, and with habitual bickering across a thousand-mile open frontier, they could not be otherwise. They grew worse with the controversy arising from the self-exile from 'Iraq of the Persian Mujtahids in 1923 (p. 149), and so persisted after their return next year and after the reopening in 1925 of the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Cities, in its new railway-borne fashion. They were not improved by the frontier tergiversations of Simko and the Persian Kurds, nor by quarrels, reminiscent of the days before 1914, between Persian and Baṣrawi Customs authorities on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab: nor by the relations of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh with the Bani Lam, though these improved in 1924: nor by the perennial squabble over the Mandali water.

The supersession of the effete Qajar dynasty of Persia in the last days of 1924 by the virile but savage and uneducated adventurer and autocrat Ridhā Shah Pahlavi at once revolutionized Persian public life in every region, and closely affected its neighbours. The lord of Pusht-i-Kuh, after a panic flight to 'Iraq, returned home to make the best terms he could with the rigidly centralizing dictator. The Shaykh of Muḥammara, Khaz'al Khan, so long the close friend of the British and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, unwisely failed to adapt himself to the new exigencies, and quarrelled with the Persian Government in conditions which gave the British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

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In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

563 657 182 Government had in fact, not without lapses, maintained the principle of employing Kurdish officials, other than technical, in Kurdish areas. It now proceeded to reaffirm this and to enact a Language Law in the interests of Kurdish-speakers, to set up a translation bureau, to appoint a Kurdish Inspector of Education for north-eastern 'Iraq, and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior. Local committees were next formed to determine the language of instruction to be used in each school, to specify the dialect of Kurdish required, and to replace non-Kurdish-speaking staff. Repeated visits were paid to north and north-east 'Iraq by the King, the Amir Ghazi, the High Commissioner, and 'Iraqi ministers with the purpose of allaying suspicion, increasing personal contact, and collecting such information as would satisfy the still uneasy Mandates Commission. It was possible, at this stage, to hope for increasing coalescence of the Kurdish areas of 'Iraq, and that their nationalism, wisely handled, would weaken: hopes not impossible but unduly optimistic, since the high statesmanship which could have achieved these ends was not in sight. Yet, in adopting a hesitant attitude to Kurdish claims, the 'Iraq Government was not always unreasonable. These claims were at times frankly separatist, incompatible with an 'Iraq State as constituted, exacerbated by the abiding antipathy felt mutually between the two races, and not lessened by the signs of a more sympathetic or more generous attitude towards the Kurds by the British advisers than by 'Iraqi statesmen. The fear existed, in addition, that privileges granted to the Kurds would be demanded immediately by the Shi'is of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question. It resulted that the entry of 'Iraq into the League was unmarked by any true solution of the problem of its unassimilated Kurdish minority. The Government, the British sponsors, and the League itself had to be content with palliatives and hopes.

563 166 657 The same is true of that far smaller, more alien, and still less assimilable community, the Assyrians. Substantial numbers of these had by 1926 been settled in scattered Kurd-surrounded villages in Mosul liwā (p. 158). The completion of this process, further resettlement of the less satisfied, and improvement of the settlements were the tasks of the years 1927 to 1930. The High Commissioner's interest was shown by visits to the areas, by many conferences, and by invitations to Government to show all reasonable favour to the Assyrians, even though these, by their attitude of grumbling non-cooperation, in part frustrated the efforts of their well-wishers. A well-qualified Settlement Officer was employed, more villages cleared and reoccupied in the Ḥarir area of Rawanduz qadhā, advances of seed and money given to the reluctant settlers.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for 563
a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions. 166•

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. 657 The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Ḥarir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian 563 —continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in 701 Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Maḥmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition for self-protection in their new homes. The Levies, besides the [157] contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as 425
too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land- 135
developers, and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization,
capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding [423]
was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallaḥ, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original
law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes [166
to construct model villages, good in conception but at present 654]
trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increas- 241
ing official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241
was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce
and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease
supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās
and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors,
mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation,
with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities.
Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the
educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had
been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the
establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of [166
these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in 414]
their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time
employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423
committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 85
since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout
the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq,
and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās;
but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of
Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was
made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries,
and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now
approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for
model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government
land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant
insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized.
On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425
a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166
sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be
gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions
and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and
a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The
Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen
families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused
keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312
continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their 653
studies and planning, though the intended major projects could
not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on
the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the
intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the
return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken.
Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing 4/23
personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el 617
'Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country.

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still 423
remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although 233
they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised.

All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or 423
pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use.

8. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of 166
the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the 178
installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the

161 162 worthy information was available as to the rural population, their main occupations (e.g. cultivation with type of crops, stock-keeping, fishing, reed cutting, the numbers of the sedentary, semi-nomadic and truly nomadic population, etc.). The figures need not be closely accurate, but they should necessarily be sufficiently reliable relative approximations to allow dependable deductions to be drawn from them. But although continuous and painstaking efforts were made to satisfy this need by the liwa authorities, it has to be admitted that no basis exists for arriving at figures that can be utilised with any confidence. Table II contains the best estimates that the liwa authorities were able to furnish; and the Census Department was not in a position to give me any better material. I include the table, because it at least represents the best local opinion of the position under the various heads cited. It should perhaps be noted more particularly that it was found impossible to separate in any systematic way those engaged in urban, from those engaged in rural, pursuits. Finally, only the populations of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were excluded from the latter. This explains the misleading density figure for the Karbala Liwa. It should also be noted that the figures given for the agricultural population include all those engaged in rural occupations, other than genuine nomads.

TABLE II. APPROXIMATE POPULATION, 1930

Expressed in thousands

Liwa	Total estimated population	Three principal towns	Nomadic tribal sections	Rural Population			Mean Density per sq. kilom. cultivated region
				Settled	Tribal	Total	
Mosul ..	320	79	45	176	20	196	22
Arbil ..	106	—	3	47	56	103	15
Sulimani ..	94	—	15	51	28	79	37
Kirkuk ..	160	—	19	63	78	141	13
Diyala ..	240	—	1	79	160	239	67
Baghdad ..	388	219	2	93	74	167	96
Dulaim ..	147	—	59	39	49	88	95
Karbala ..	90	—	2	83	5	88	136
Hilla ..	103	—	—	30	73	103	21
Kut ..	170	—	—	60	110	170	20
Diwaniya ..	238	—	58	79	101	180	40
Muntafiq ..	340	—	20	25	295	320	72
Amara ..	238	—	—	36	202	238	36
Basra ..	190	46	10	34	100	134	284
Totals ..	2,824	344	234	895	1,351	2,246	36*

*Mean density total 78,000 sq. km. cultivated region.

So far as the figures can be accepted the mean density of the rural population per square kilometre of the cultivated region works out at about 19 in the four liwas of the Rainfall Zone, and at about 35 in the five most typical liwas of the Irrigation Zone. These figures are very low, especially for the potentially fertile irrigable lands of the latter; but there is no reason to think that they err on this side. However, it will be appreciated that dependable statistics of the agricultural population are needed to enable development of the country to be pursued to the greatest advantage and with the greatest economy.

166 185 The extreme mobility of the majority of the population, especially throughout the Irrigation Zone, is an important factor in the consideration of development schemes of all sorts, having regard to the general sparsity of the population and the limited resources of the country. If work can be concentrated on such schemes in a few of the most suitable areas, and facilities can be given to the population to colonise them as opportunity and occasion justify, much more rapid and satisfactory results will be obtained for the same effort and expenditure in a given

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time, than if attempts have to be made to carry out development in a scattered and incomplete manner throughout the whole country at once.

4. Land Revenue Returns

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4. It was my original intention to devote one part of this report entirely to a study of land revenue questions. For although in some respects a matter for independent consideration, the effect upon all tenures of land of the burden of any land revenue demand (whether in cash or kind) and the methods by which it is imposed, is profound. But since I left el 'Iraq a drastic change in the land revenue system has been enacted.* It will clearly not be helpful to comment on land revenue methods that have been superseded. And I understand that the new laws are of a specifically provisional nature and that their imperfections are realised, so that it seems of equally little use to comment on them. But although no useful purpose seems likely to be served by the discussion of the displaced land revenue system now, the three accompany-

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* Law for the collection of Istihlak (Consumption) Tax. No. 82 of 1931. Law for the collection of Land Rent. No. 83 of 1931.

TABLE III. ANNUAL COLLECTIONS OF LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

In lakhs of rupees

Year	Summer Crops	Winter Crops	Dates	Vegetables	Other fruits	Tobacco	Miscellaneous	Totals
1923	34·20	44·75	16·73	9·62		1·30	2·24	108·84
1924	34·15	47·24	19·34	6·09	2·33	3·70	0·02	112·87
1925	46·13	69·20	22·79	6·03	2·44	1·96	0·04	148·59
1926	42·16	59·94	18·25	5·28	2·47	2·67	0·02	130·89
1927	39·32	59·07	21·60	4·70	3·46	2·98	0·01	131·14
1928	40·94	59·92	23·30	4·63	3·76	2·91	0·04	135·50
1929	87·77		18·92	3·68	3·11	1·67	0·07	115·42
Totals	273·23	391·57	140·93	36·63	21·07	17·39	2·44	883·25
Averages	39·04	55·94	20·13	5·23	3·01	2·48	0·35	126·18

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

Under forms of assessment prescribed by Law 40 of 1920

Crops	Average receipts 1923-9		Percentage distribution under various forms of assessment prescribed									
	In lakhs of rupees	Per cent. of total	By unit of area Art. 6	Estimation Art. 9	Rope measurement Art. 10	Tree counting Art. 11	By plough units Art. 12	At market centres Art. 14	At Customs and Excise Offices Art. 15	By unit of lift Art. 17	Lease by auction Art. 20	Three, four, or five-year agreements Art. 21
Summer crops	39·04	30·6	6·1*	8·5	7·7§	—	—	—	—	4·6	0·6	3·1
Winter crops	55·94	45·9	6·4	12·4	2·3	—	9·2	—	—	6·9	0·5	8·2
Dates ..	20·13	15·3	9·2†	0·3	—	5·8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vegetables	5·23	3·8	1·2‡	—	—	—	—	2·3	—	0·3	—	—
Other fruits	3·01	2·3	0·1	0·1	—	1·6	—	0·1	—	—	—	0·4
Tobacco ..	2·48	1·9	—	—	—	—	—	—	1·9	—	—	—
Miscellaneous	0·35	0·2	—	—	—	—	—	—	0·2	—	—	—
Totals ..	126·18	100·0	23·0	21·3	10·0	7·4	9·2	2·4	2·1	11·8	1·1	11·7

This table is intended to illustrate the operation of Law 40, applied during an average year under conditions existing in 1929. Actually estimation was principally resorted to before 1926, the various new methods of assessment having been increasingly used subsequently.

* Largely Amara rice, Baghdad and Kut summer crops and rice included in Basra jarib tax.
† Basra jarib tax.
‡ 1930 figures, previously under Art. 14.
§ Mostly Diwaniya rice.

166 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick
178 building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer
423 (mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended,
651 wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many
619 liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective: but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent
619 years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants
427 at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private [439] pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 18, 157, 157, 288, 288, 468 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errrors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort ● [166] made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was 464 hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among 465 these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer 439 crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour, (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

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* A mishara is reckoned =2,500 sq. metres.

562 872 But this obstacle can be exaggerated. As a glance at the figures showing the growth of primary education in Iraq indicates, the proportion of girls to boys attending primary schools is not high, but their enrolment is steadily increasing. Although most of the large urban schools are single sex schools, Iraq has the distinction of having many co-educational village schools. The growing number of kindergartens are co-educational. In all the institutions of higher education young men and women work together.

The emancipation of women in Iraq still has a long way to go, but convincing signs of it are evident. It would, nevertheless, be a considerable advance if the Ministry of Education were to encourage the recruitment of a number of women to the staffs of the boys' primary schools. From visits to many Iraqi primary schools it is evident that the standards of the women teachers in matters of personal cleanliness of the children, care and decoration of the school premises, general decorum and pleasant social conduct are higher than those of their men colleagues. Their influence in boys' schools would be most salutary.

464 872 The position of children is, of course, difficult when parents, especially in the rural areas, are dependent upon the labour of even very young children. Yet an increasing number of poor parents appear to be sending their children to school. It would be a great inducement to more and regular school attendance if means could be devised of providing free midday meals for some of the children, especially in the village schools. At one of the more modern primary schools in Baghdad attractively cooked and served midday meals are provided, but this is a school attended mainly by children from comfortable homes where the parents can afford to pay for this service. In the rural areas, however, simple food is not expensive, cooking devices and service are cheap, and it should be possible to provide free meals for the needy children at relatively low cost.

It should be noted that effective child labour legislation does not exist in Iraq. Until the time comes when such legislation can be enacted and enforced, compulsory education will be most difficult to apply.

162 166 871 *Tribal Organization and Mobility of Population.* But the most formidable obstacles of all are those related to tribal organization and mobility of population. There are two particular sets of problems, those of the tribes who are still in a nomadic state, and those of the people who are in the transitional stage of semi-settlement. Between them, it is estimated that these nomadic and semi-settled peoples number nearly 2,000,000 persons, roughly 300,000 of whom are children of primary school age.

162 166 871 Some eight per cent of these tribal dwellers are still nomadic, and educational arrangements for them will obviously be most difficult to apply. People who are on the move, even if this be in regular seasonal cycles or over more or less fixed areas, are never susceptible to organized education. Even in countries where compulsory education laws have been in effect for several years and where school accommodation for the entire child population exists, it is not easy to make arrangements for the schooling of the children of mobile persons such as caravan and boat dwellers. Clearly, in a country like Iraq where the problem of mobility of population is of much greater magnitude, the conventional type of fixed village school is useless for these peoples. Some of them are not averse to education, and, especially in places where a sheikh is anxious that his own children shall be educated, there is an opportunity for providing educational facilities which would be shared by the other children of the tribal group. It is suggested, therefore, that the time is opportune for giving serious consideration to the training of peripatetic teachers of the kind recommended by the Monroe Commission in 1932.

166 871 619 The more urgent problem of tribal education relates to that majority of the tribal peoples who are in the stage of transition from nomadism to a more settled agricultural life. People who are passing through this transitional stage present great problems but also great opportunities to the educator. They are alleged to lose some of the simpler virtues of people who are forced to submit to the strict tribal laws and codes while they are still wandering in the desert. Be that as it may, they undoubtedly need practical education in the amenities of the more settled life, particularly in matters of health, child care under primitive housing conditions and agricultural practice. Their children also need schooling. These educational needs are becoming more acute because, as has been indicated in a previous chapter when discussing the problem of land tenure, the tribal peoples are losing their former wholesome relationship with the sheikh, who is becoming more of a landlord interested in the produce of his tenants and less of a leader with a responsibility for their welfare.

876 166 These needs of the tribal dwellers, therefore, and especially those who are in the semi-settled stage, present a formidable challenge to the Iraqi educator. What is probably needed to meet their peculiar requirements is a team of peripatetic teachers who could travel with the tribes while they are on the move, and who could establish simple schools-cum-community-centres in the places where the tribesmen and their families are gradually settling. So far as is known, devices of this kind are as yet untried; it would be well if a few young men and women of ingenuity and a practical

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876 166 turn of mind, and preferably from the tribal areas themselves, could be specially trained as intensely practical teachers and then appointed to establish pilot projects of tribal education.

871 619 Some people with whom these possibilities have been discussed are not optimistic about such attempts to meet the educational needs of the tribes. They maintain that the tribal dweller has a strong suspicion of anything that smacks of Government interference and that he would have nothing to do with publicly-provided education. There is, however, another point of view. The writer and an Iraqi inspector of schools were sitting in a Bedouin guest tent one evening recently, together with two sheikhs, one of whom is reputed to be amassing land for his own purposes and the other who is the more liberal minded son of a sheikh who once established two schools. The following conversation was heard and, for what it is worth, is quoted verbatim:

First sheikh: 'I hear that you have offered to provide a school building if the Government will provide teachers.'

Second sheikh: 'Yes, I would like a school for my son Silah and for the other boys of his age.'

First sheikh: 'If your people become educated they will be demanding more rights. You will be laying up trouble for the future.'

Second sheikh: 'I want my people to be educated so that they may become better human beings. The future is with those who are educated.'

There is, of course, always more than one point of view about educational matters. The point of view of the second sheikh is expressed in another way by an Iraqi educator who writes, 'The problem which the Iraq Government faces as regards the tribes, the solution of which should form one of the main civic aims of education in Iraq, is the broadening of the outlook and allegiance of the tribesmen from their narrow tribal limits to a national horizon'.

000 These then, are some of the economic, political and social problems which must be taken into consideration before any ambitious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. It is only against this background that the realism of possible solutions to present educational difficulties can be judged. But these problems are not new and, despite the obstacles which they constitute, definite quantitative progress in the field of primary education has undoubtedly been achieved in recent years.

The next step must be to consider the practicability of making

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which 166
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement.

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent 185
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, 425
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intellig- 185
ently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

● 166 must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land
185 must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting.
He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

425 (4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and
provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

427 (5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders.
So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila
area, and the total population of adults and children is between
871 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with
a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing
185 for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good
design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of
Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for
a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to
avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish
intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village
which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of
the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the
intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural
streams'.

427 It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which
has been in operation for only four years and is still in process
425 of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it
241 appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless
185 cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average
465 income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of
the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced
from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood
is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the
Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation
the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more
robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators.
Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which,
by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The
men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed,
it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in
the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

427 The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants,
apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging
185 and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they
make a certain contribution to the public purse through the
sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage
an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly
needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that
they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their
contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 423
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system
remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient
national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary
for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory
education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the
present time would not be possible, because those who profit
from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land
throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in
a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to
similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 511
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 565
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of 166
living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek
educational opportunities for their children. Equally important,
it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence
who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs
and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic
local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social
life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the
official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle
class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of
the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing
the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of
self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the
effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge
the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor
but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote
a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for
his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial
Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

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K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I 168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
64x] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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613 new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of 666 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory before candidates received government support.

643 In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the [653] interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,[1] whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.[2] ● [166] To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes on the land, and the development of residential amenities about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early inclination to find employment for those who had served him in western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion to its contribution to the welfare of 'Iraq enabled him to take a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although 'Iraqis universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly asserted their competence to run them, conditions in 'Iraq were [565] far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

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[1] By the Prime Minister, Nūri Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

[2] Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, 'Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years* 1930 *and* 1931 *and Capital Development Works Budget for* 5 *Years* 1931-35.

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more brought into use. The government should take steps to 312 survey the possibilities for small projects and to provide assistance in carrying them out, thus giving aid and security to the farm population of the North which now feels that its needs have been neglected and overlooked.

In general, however, the North will have to remain dependent 311 on rain-fall to sustain its agriculture. There are apparently still considerable rain-fed areas which can be settled and put to the plow. Particular care should be exercised, however, to insure that the areas are not sub-marginal from the standpoint of either rainfall or fertility and that settlers are really available in the North, which is generally more sparsely settled than the central and southern portions of Iraq. For example, the Mission believes that the prospect of scanty and uncertain rainfall will probably make it undesirable to proceed, except on a very restricted, experimental basis, with the settlement scheme near Balad Sinjar in Mosul province which has been projected by the Agriculture Department.

Settlement of New Land

In the past much of the vacant land available for an expansion 425 of crop production which ostensibly belonged to the state has fallen 421 into the hands of big landowners. The so-called Land Settlement Law of 1932, which inaugurated a cadastral survey for the purpose of settling the past confusion regarding land titles and systems of tenure, facilitated this process. It permitted the land settlement committees appointed to administer the law to grant titles (so-called *lazmah* grants) to people who could demonstrate that they had made productive use of land within the previous fifteen years. In practice, it has been possible to obtain title on the presentation of proof that a crop was produced on the land in one year, and the land settlement committees have occasionally accepted even more tenuous proof of cultivation. In this way many sheikhs and other influential persons have managed to obtain title to large tracts of land without any payment whatsoever. Since the cadastral survey is only about half completed, more land may be preempted in this way unless a limit is set on such acquisitions.

Land definitely adjudged to be state (*miri sirf*) property by 425 the land settlement committees has, however, been set aside for 166 421

425 421 166 distribution to selected settlers under the terms of a law passed by Parliament in the spring of 1951. This law reflects a growing realization that a class of independent small-holders needs to be created. Settlement areas ranging in size from 2,000 donums in the mountains to 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated land and 80,000 donums in the dry-farming zone are to be established. Units up to 20 donums in mountainous land, 100 donums in flow-irrigated lands, 200 donums in lands irrigated by low-lift pumps and 400 donums in dry-farming lands are to be distributed among farmers, with preference to be accorded to those living in or near the settlement areas. Up to 20 percent of each area may also be allotted to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 percent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates, provided that the committee responsible for the administration of the whole scheme is convinced of their agricultural capabilities. Settlers will be given the opportunity to participate in the work of preparing each area for settlement. The committee will plan the whole settlement, including the sites of houses and public buildings which are to be constructed in accordance with its specifications. The committee will also issue instructions regarding the type and method of cultivation. After ten years farmers who have made good will be granted title to their land without charge, and for a further period of ten years they will not be permitted to alienate their land in any way or to mortgage it except to the state Agricultural Bank. The only exception to this kind of distribution and settlement will be made in the case of state lands which can be irrigated only by high-lift pumps. Such lands may still be leased in tracts up to a maximum of 5,000 donums to a single individual.

425 421 This law, properly administered, will undoubtedly result in great benefit to Iraq. The Mission urges, however, that the government insist on the principle that settlers farm their land themselves without resort to sharecroppers. Otherwise there is a danger that a considerable number of minor landlords will be created, thus defeating the fundamental purpose of the scheme. This principle may be jeopardized both by the selection of non-farmers as beneficiaries and by the contemplated allotment of excessively large

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425 421 The Mission believes that the settlers should, as a matter of general principle, be required to make some payment for the extensive benefits received. This is all the more necessary in order not to widen unduly the disparity between the economic status of the favored settlers and that of the great majority of cultivators who will continue to work under much less favorable conditions. Such payments need not be excessively burdensome, since they could be spread over a number of years.

244 425 [166] The new law will apply on a broad scale the basic principles of the Dujaila land settlement scheme in south-central Iraq. In the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled there on 100-donum plots allotted from state-owned irrigated land. The Mission was impressed by the results achieved through this scheme. The farmers, who used to be sharecroppers, are conscious of their new-won independence and dignity. By comparison with the fellahin in neighboring areas they appear prosperous and content. [474] Many of them are members of a cooperative—the only one of its kind in Iraq—which owns 10 tractors, two lorries, a flour mill and a club-house. Although the accounts of this cooperative leave much to be desired, its operations are generally along sound lines and indicative of what can be accomplished through state-assisted self-help. The Dujaila scheme is, however, not without defects. Its success as an agricultural venture is jeopardized by the progressive salination of the land because of failure to provide drainage facilities—an omission which should be promptly remedied. The administrative staff appears to be excessively large. Small-scale "landlordism" has crept in, since some farmers have brought in others to do a large part of their work on a sharecropping basis. The farmers were settled in a scattered fashion without regard to the need for community life. Most important, aside from insisting on small fruit gardens, the committee in charge of the project has effected no improvement in farming methods. The Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee, and there are no agricultural experts in the project capable of assisting farmers in raising their standards of cultivation. The improved economic position of the cultivators in the Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to a landlord. In the

that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also 744
be important to provide both the provincial and district medical 647
officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge
their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather 361
haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great 166
congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally
unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in
buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been
greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to
escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find
opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have [362]
simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they
live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually
difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities. [364]

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. 362
They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly con- 342
structed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

conditions in the future, the rate could rise to two percent per 161
annum or even higher within a comparatively short period. Obviously this possibility will have to be borne in mind in planning the development of social services such as education and housing. It also has important implications in agriculture. As the limited supply of water is more fully utilized, most of the increase in population may ultimately have to be absorbed in nonagricultural pursuits, unless water is used much more efficiently than it is now.

As the standard of social services such as health and education 162
is higher in the cities and the opportunities for employment are [369]
more varied, the distinction between urban and rural population is an important one in considering the age and sex distribution of the people, their occupations and their standard of living. About 550,000 people live in the municipality of Baghdad, another 300,000 in the next three largest cities of Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk and some 350.000 in other towns having a population of over 15,000. Thus about 1.2 million people or a quarter of the population live in sizeable urban communities. In addition, there are about a hundred smaller municipalities having an aggregate population of under half a million. These towns are usually the administrative 632
and market centers of the minor political subdivisions such as *qadhas* and *nahiyas* and many of them are little more than large villages; in many respects they form a semirural category intermediate between the larger towns and the villages.

There has been a strong migration from the country to the 166
cities in recent years, particularly during the last war. The most 369
striking examples of this can be seen in Baghdad and Basra where many thousands of "squatters" from Amara province are crowded together in makeshift huts under extremely unhygienic conditions. The peculiarly adverse conditions of life in Amara have made that province the principal source of migrants to the large cities and, indeed, to most parts of the country, but there has evidently been a substantial movement from the rural areas in general. As it is 162
prima facie likely that these migrants would consist principally of young adults or adolescents, especially men, it is not surprising to find that the census shows a much higher proportion of the very young (under 10) and the old (over 50) in the rural areas, the disparity being even more marked among men than among

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sive benefits, particularly in relationship to those who are not fortunate enough to be selected as beneficiaries. Moreover, the value of the benefits conferred may be all the more appreciated if some charge, which need not be burdensome, is made for them.

Fourthly, it may be desirable to reconsider the provision exempting the areas irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution in accordance with the law. Apparently this provision was also dictated by the belief that the requisite pumping facilities would need to be provided by private investment and that such investment was unlikely ~~to be~~ forthcoming unless a comparatively large grant of land was made for development by high-lift pumping. In the future, however, public capital should be made available for the installation of such pumping facilities.

Finally, the safeguards against alienation of the land may need further strengthening. After the two consecutive periods of 10 years each, during which these safeguards would apply, it may still be desirable for the government to retain an option to purchase any of such land offered for sale. In this way it would be possible to prevent, if necessary, the gradual acquisition of excessively large landholdings in these newly developed areas.

A brief comment might be made regarding the settlement possibilities in the rain-fed zone. Much of the land available for such settlement may be submarginal from the standpoint of rainfall. Care must be taken, therefore, not to invest too much in the development of the lands the yield of which will be highly speculative. It is noted that the Department of Agriculture has drawn up an ambitious scheme involving the settlement of 1,000,000 donums and the establishment of 50 villages in northwestern Mosul near Balad Sinjar. There are indications, however, that the rainfall in this region may be insufficient to permit settlers to earn a good livelihood. If attempts are made to carry out this scheme, it is suggested that small-scale tests first be undertaken over a number of years.

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The law for the development of *miri sirf* lands which has been discussed at length above is basically modelled on the 1945 act under which the Dujaila settlement was established in south-central Iraq near Kut. During the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled in this area on 100 donum plots allotted from

state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is prescribed. Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted. 654 423 244 166

On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines. [511]

The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers. [34]

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congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monoton- 164
ous diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the
highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

361 they are elaborate and expensive to construct, require a great deal of funds and official attention to maintain, and the benefits are generally beyond the comprehension and appreciation of the average villager. They should, on the contrary, be simple enough so that the villager can both understand the improvement and be anxious to undertake most of the work himself, and will continue to do so for other future improvements. Otherwise, the people of other villages will merely admire the demonstration units and will feel that model villages are beyond their attainment.

New Settlements

Nowhere has the government a better opportunity for the planning of good rural communities than in new settlements such as Dujaila. Settlement in Dujaila began in 1946 and it is clear that a considerable effort was made to give the community an improved [166] layout. In May 1951, there were 1,058 cultivators settled in square lots of 100 donums each (500 by 500 meters). The portion of the Scheme which has been laid out has groups of four houses constructed at the adjoining corners of four lots.[1]

The cultivator is obliged by regulation to plant a garden of a specified area and to build his own house and those of his helpers within the unit under his possession. The Committee which administers the Scheme locates and determines the number of houses and decides on the period within which construction shall [342] be completed. The houses are made of mud or mud bricks, and each consists of a bedroom, a living room, a storeroom, a kitchen, a bath, a water closet and a stable covering a total area of about 80 square meters; a staircase leads to the flat roof. There is also an enclosed courtyard of about 220 square meters which is used by both the family and its livestock. Separate entrances are provided for the people and the animals.

Although the Dujaila settlement is a great improvement on the average village, it has a number of defects. The present layout makes it possible for each cultivator to have his house and those of his assistants on his own unit, but it has spread the population sparsely over a wide area resulting in long distances to community facilities, such as schools and stores, and a lack of the

are at present an amalgam of a building code and zoning regulations. These two distinct parts need to be separated and each properly administered. 361 647

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[1] See diagram on pp. 348 and 349.

While the Community Planning Office will have to take the lead in organizing the program, it is essential that it should not attempt to do all the detailed work itself. Although, in some cases, technically good plans may be prepared in this way, the result will be neither popular nor lasting and the planning authority may become a bottleneck. On the other hand, if plans are prepared independently by local authorities or by other government departments, the results will probably be uncorrelated and, therefore, unsatisfactory. The most desirable kind of planning is likely to be achieved by a combination of the two. Although plans should be initiated and later executed by the agencies immediately concerned, the central planning body should guide and coordinate them throughout the various stages. In the larger cities it could probably confine its activity to stimulating interest in the benefits of planning, advising on the preparation of plans and reviewing them at intervals in the course of preparation. In the smaller municipalities, it may have to do more of the actual work, but it should certainly endeavor to enlist as much local advice and cooperation as possible. As was noted earlier, imposition from above is undesirable.

Once plans have been drawn up, the financing of development should be placed on a more satisfactory footing. The principal source of funds for capital expenditure should be the Development Board. Whether they are in the form of loans or grants, they should be committed (although not actually credited) sufficiently far ahead for the municipalities to arrange a schedule of work with some degree of confidence. Loans should be made for a longer period and on less burdensome terms, especially as regards amortization. A careful study of a municipality's finances should be made to assess its probable ability to repay.

Slum Clearance

One of the major problems confronting the municipal authorities is the eradication of the worst slum areas of the cities. In Baghdad and Basra, this is a formidable undertaking, since the influx of people from Amara has been very large. Estimates vary 362 166

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362 widely but probably at least 60,000 have migrated to Baghdad
166 and 20,000 to Basra. Amara province is the heart of the rice-growing marshland, where the water buffalo is the prevailing livestock. The immigrants have naturally tended to recreate the conditions of life to which they are accustomed and which will enable them to raise buffalo. An area just outside the eastern bund of Baghdad has been settled by these people and converted to their normal mode of life. A series of stagnant pools for the cattle is interlaced with narrow paths just above the water-level and surrounded by a disorderly array of makeshift huts, called *sarifas*. Being outside the bund, the area is subject to spring floods in years of high water. In Basra the immigrants have settled along the banks of the existing canals. Conditions there are nearly as bad as in Baghdad.

It is clear that the process of migration and the creation of such slums can only be halted by eradicating the cause, namely, the harsh conditions of life in Amara and other places from which the migrants come. Meanwhile efforts will have to be made to resettle those who have already come, since, apart from the plight of the people themselves, these slums are a menace to the health of the entire population of the cities.

362 The few measures so far taken to resettle the sarifa dwellers have not been successful. In Baghdad the Ministry of Social Affairs made a plan for 8,000 mud huts at Shamiya which is about 12 kilometers from Baghdad. Several sample huts of defective construction were erected at the site at a cost of ID 35 each. This plan contemplated the housing of approximately 30,000 people from the sarifa district by giving each family 120 square meters of land apiece on which they were to build their own houses according to the samples already constructed. [342] Each hut would have had a covered floor area of 43 square meters consisting of two rooms, a hall and a water closet. The main pipelines for a fresh water supply had been provided and a clinic set up for the use of future residents. The plan, however, was later abandoned on the grounds that the site was too far from Baghdad where most of the prospective residents are employed.

Experience in Basra has been little better. There, the initiative came from the Municipality, which now has under construc-

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tion 750 dwelling units on a site five kilometers from the city. 362
This and three other city development projects were financed by a 10-year bank loan, guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. The original resettlement plans were, however, hastily and incompetently prepared; they were submitted to the Ministry of Interior only a few days before the foundations were laid. Subsequently they were found by the contractor to be so defective that an advisory committee of experienced engineers had to be appointed to review them. The committee recommended many changes in the layout and site engineering of the project, in the design of the houses and in the specifications of materials. Some of the changes, including the installation of an adequate sewage and drainage system, had to be made after construction was well under way.

Ultimately the cost of two-room houses is expected to be about ID 250 and of three-room houses, about ID 300. It is unlikely that the sarifa dwellers can afford to purchase these houses by installment as originally intended. The Municipality now has in mind to build 1,000 mud-and-mat huts at a cost of ID 40 each for sale to the sarifa dwellers.

Other cities besides Baghdad and Basra have their slum problems, though not necessarily of the same kind. For example, all but the most modern part of Erbil is situated on a high mound, rising almost sheer from the surrounding plain. On this mound, which is probably on the site of a city continuously occupied for several thousand years, the houses are packed together with only narrow alleys between them. Waste water runs down the middle of the alleys. The incidence of tuberculosis is said to be high. Less extensive examples of these so-called ancient "citadels" can be found elsewhere, for example, in Kirkuk and at Nabi Yunus near Mosul.

The problem of resettling large numbers of slum dwellers [166]
varies, in kind and in degree, from city to city, but it should in essence be treated as a national problem. It is too important to be subjected to the kind of expediency and faulty technical planning with which it has so far been approached. The job is one for the new Housing Authority, although the municipalities will clearly have to play their part.

Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the 173
Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid
retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true,
occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks,
as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads
with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia 619
tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal
sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is
touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended
pictures of King Feisal and of His Royal Highness the
Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days
when the country was under foreign domination, when
they were the rallying-points of the resistance which
prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or
Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is
less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth
preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not
necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example,
numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the 463
capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, 166
lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this growing State a boy 555
may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish
up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the
tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by
way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city.
When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirhem [651]
from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants
are the first to send in their money: though they may be
wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send
in the exact dirhem along with the labourers and artisans.
To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

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Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312 water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423
are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427
There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24
per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [211]
on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators.
This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423
disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433
perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185
which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464
reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large
farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery 166 •
is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of
farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the [161]
cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

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423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-
464 supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
166 shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agri-
[452] cultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
654 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
185 have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

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distributed reclaimed state domain among the peasants. During the past few years the Ministry of Social Affairs, under energetic and progressive leadership, has been increasingly and effectively sponsoring the cause of the peasant. Among other things, it has proposed draft laws aimed at land reform and at improved tenancy terms. In July 1950, the Egyptian Parliament passed one of these bills, stipulating that estate owners should provide tenants with certain housing and health facilities, and with other services. During the last two years certain deputies have proposed two definite draft laws for land reform in Parliament. Similar proposals have been made by other responsible leaders. All of them aim straight at the heart of the problem — stipulating the distribution of state domain among peasants, the restriction of the size of holdings within minimum and maximum limits, the extension of credit to the new small owner, the protection of peasant property, the improvement of tenancy terms, etc.

I 423
M 423

A similar consciousness of the magnitude of the problem and the grave consequences it might entail has arisen in Iraq. As far back as 1932 a comprehensive program of land survey and registration was initiated and has been in operation since. At the end of 1947 about 20 million acres (close to 20 percent of the total area of the country) were surveyed and classified. This program constitutes a basic move in the right direction, as it results in clearing the great confusion over title claims.

I 423 312 • 166 425
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In 1945 the Iraqi Parliament passed a bill (Law No. 23) authorizing the Government to distribute state domain among landless peasants or tribesmen on the basis of small private ownership. It was a small beginning as the application of the law was restricted to one specific area, the Dujaylah lands, in the Kut Liwa south of Baghdad. Some 180,000 acres were put under irrigation and divided into plots of about 60 acres each for distribution to farming families. After a probationary period of 10 years under government supervision, the farmer can acquire complete ownership of the land. At the beginning of 1947 about 400 cultivators were settled on the project land. Possibly an equal number has been settled since that time. In 1946 another project, the Hawijah Settlement Scheme, was finished. It involved the distribution of some 200,000 acres of irrigated state land among members of the 'Ubayd tribe.

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
IRAQ MH1

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On February 16, 1950, the Prime Minister issued a statement of governmental policy in which he gave emphasis to land reform. He stated that small family farm ownership will be made the basis for agricultural expansion as undertaken by the Government in the future. In June and July 1950 the Government issued decrees by means of which the application of Law No. 23 of 1945 was extended to additional areas of state domain: in the provinces of Hilla and Kerbala in the south, in Diyala in central Iraq, in Suleimaniya and at the Hawijah irrigation project in the north. 471 166 185 M 471 166 185

It might be argued that all of these measures do not amount to much as yet. This is true; but the important fact remains that the present governments of the region are doing something about the matter. This is an indication of at least some concern on the part of national leadership. Through the extension of moral, technical, and material support by the United States and other cooperating countries, these beginnings could be transformed into great national realities for the whole Middle East. M 185

2. *Progressive elements and groups are working at land reform.* In Egypt and Syria, in Lebanon and Iraq, there are leading individuals and organized groups who have been giving serious thought to the problem. Some have begun to do something about it; others stand ready to lend their support once a national project is launched. Some have worked out sound plans and proposed draft laws for reform; others have established improved tenancy terms on their estates; and many others have written pointedly on the subject, depicting the problem and urging a solution. These enlightened elements have been increasing in numbers and in influence; they constitute the real hope of the Middle East. The encouraging reality is that we find these elements not only among the intellectuals and professional groups, but also among the tribal chiefs and large landowners. M 185

In November 1950 a large group of professional and governmental leaders, representing most of the Arab countries, met in Cairo in a Social Welfare Seminar under the auspices of the United Nations. Reports already received indicate that the subject of land tenure and land reform received serious consideration, the gravity of the problem and possible solutions being discussed in detail.

to extend and improve the cultivation of the land and raise the 563
standard of living. This had serious consequences when the 668
war came and brought with it urgent economic problems. The 511
mountain districts did not produce enough cereals to feed the population, and importation on an adequate scale was rendered difficult by the poverty of the Kurdish peasants, the lack of a food-supply organization and the insufficiency of transport. The sense of grievance was further stimulated by the example of the Kurds in Persia, who had thrown off the authority of the Persian Government since the Allied occupation of 1941. In 1943 Mulla Mustafa, the brother of Shaikh Ahmad, rose in revolt in the Barzan district. His rising lasted for several months. Attempts to suppress it failed and it was finally called off after negotiations, and an undertaking by the Government to look into Kurdish grievances. Majid Mustafa himself a Kurd and a distinguished administrator, was appointed Minister without Portfolio with the special duty of devoting himself to Kurdish affairs. His report outlined a scheme of economic and administrative reforms. In the course of 1944 little was done to carry out these or any reforms, and Mulla Mustafa's movement still smouldered; the condition of the Kurds was somewhat improved, however, by the increased cultivation of tobacco, their most important cash-crop.

The Assyrians

The Assyrians form a distinct community, not only by reason 563
of their Nestorian faith, but also through their language, a Syriac 621
dialect, and their traditions. They are probably the descendants of tribes which moved from the plains of Iraq into the mountains to the north during the period of the Mongol invasion, and remained there until the present generation. In their mountain-home they lived as shepherds, feudally organized under their *maliks* with their Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, as their temporal as well as spiritual ruler. They paid a yearly tribute to the Ottoman Sultan, but were in practice autonomous, although their autonomy was always subject to interference by their neighbours the Kurds.

At the beginning of the First World War they were divided into 563
three main groups: first, the mountaineers in the Hakkiari dis- 166
trict of what is now Turkey; secondly, those in the plains to the west of Lake Urmiyah, in Persia; and, thirdly those in the

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

563 lowlands to the south of Hakkiari, in what is now Iraq. When
166 the war broke out, the Hakkiari group revolted against the Turks, largely in the hope of Russian help. Driven from their homes, they joined up with their fellow-countrymen and with the Russians around Urmiyah; but the collapse of Russia destroyed their position, and after resisting the Turks for a time, they were forced to flee southwards to Hamadan, where the British military authorities disarmed them and sent them on to the refugee camp at Baqubah near Baghdad.

When the war ended, the problem arose of what to do with the refugees on Baqubah. In 1919 there were some 25,000 of them; most of them were from the Hakkiari group and wanted nothing except to be allowed to return to their native mountains. This, which would have been possible immediately after the war, became impossible when in 1925 the Council of the League of Nations settled the question of the Turco-Iraqi frontier in a way which left the Hakkiari region inside Turkey. Thus, the land which the Assyrian refugees regarded as theirs was placed on one side of the frontier while they themselves were on the other; and since the Turkish Government refused to allow them to return, and deported such of them as had returned, the mandatory and Iraqi authorities were left with the problem of finding new homes for them.

By 1930 a great deal had been done to solve the problem. Some thousands had been settled in villages in the northern district of the country (this in addition to those who had returned to their homes to the south of the Hakkiari mountains, and whose position was unaffected by subsequent disturbances). In addition, several thousands had found work in Mosul, Baghdad and other towns. Only a few hundreds still remained unsettled. All this work had been helped by the privileges granted to the refugees by the Iraqi Government and the interest taken in them by the mandatory Power, which had special obligations towards them because of what they had suffered for the Allied cause during the war.

563 Nevertheless, the Assyrians were not contented with their
641 position. Their discontent was partly due to the general unrest and demoralization which their experiences in the war and as refugees living on charity had implanted in them. But it was also due to more particular causes. First, there was their continuing desire to return to their own country, and their refusal

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

Iraq MH1

COTTON IN IRAQ

The problems of land tenure are generally cited as being a restriction to agricultural development. One United Nations' study states the absence of settlement title is undoubtedly a major obstacle to expansion of cultivation of dry land and intensification of agriculture in irrigated or irrigable zones.[40] The same report also points out that the lack of adequate legislation on water rights is another serious defect.[41] 423

RESETTLEMENT

Sizable areas are being settled by the state under the provisions of a law passed in 1951 which distributes about 67 acres per family to landless people, agricultural school graduates, former civil service employees, pensioners, and the unemployed. The farming program on these projects is supervised rigorously. On the 75,000-acre Dujaila Project on the Tigris River the prescribed planting program is as follows: 20 per cent in wheat, 15 per cent in barley, 5 per cent in fruit, 4 per cent in cotton and flax, 3 per cent in sesame, and 3 per cent in vegetables. Another 5 per cent will be devoted to housing, and the remaining 45 per cent must lie in fallow because of a water shortage.[42] 1166 425 241

The Mission report criticized these land settlement schemes on several bases. The land is given to the farmers, the title being transferred after 10 years of successful operation. The Mission believes the land should be sold. The Mission also criticizes the allocation of land to people who have had no farming experience and who have not necessarily shown themselves to be suited by temperament for farming, and it expresses doubt that the program actually has improved the land or the farmer. The economic report stated: "The improved economic position of the cultivators in the new Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to his landlord."[43]

There are half a dozen other projects, involving 250,000 acres, in various stages of promotion which the Point Four Mission is being urged to assist in planning and supervising.

IRRIGATION

At present irrigation water is provided by the Kut and Hilla Barrages on the upper Tigris River, several smaller ones on the lower reaches, and the Hindiya Barrage on the Euphrates River. The water is carried by pumps and canals. About 2 million acres are irrigated by pumps and another 4 to 5 million acres by gravity flow. 312

Estimates indicated cultivatable land can be expanded almost three times if water is available. Yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not permit even the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers during the spring flood season are clearly essential. The government already has initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage system for the Euphrates River and has let the contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The Development Board is undertaking also construction of three dams on the upper tributaries of the 1

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[40] *Land Reform*, United Nations, 1951, p. 27.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[42] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, United Nations, December, 1949, p. 31.

[43] Boardman, Frances, "Iraq Moves Toward Land Reform," *Foreign Agriculture*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1951.

1 - [Text continues on p. 97--Analyst]

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered 648x
districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to
secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in
robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to
maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no
direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended
by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern 563
frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's
visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from 167
Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which 657
the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in
February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or
fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by
a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother
of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq
territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further
large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul
wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in
February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the
Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by
a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by
nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya
area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and
evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these
unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to
re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 563
'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising 631
and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an 185
elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in
a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance
was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities
in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment
of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State
in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own
countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army,
Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or
improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the
tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government
was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber
of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete
integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 563
still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least 657
passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to 166

4a Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Kurd IIA II

000 of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

K Kurdistan is a beautiful country. It is in the main well wooded,
137 with scrub or stunted oak on the hillsides and poplars, walnuts and mulberries near the villages. Pines grow in two areas only and chinārs (planes) along the streams. Unfortunately, deforestation is proceeding apace, and unless immediate and drastic steps are taken by the 'Iraq Government, heavy soil erosion and a tremendous decrease in grazing facilities will take place. Few new walnut trees are to be found owing to a prevalent superstition that the planter of a walnut tree will die with the appearance of the first nuts. It might be supposed that the oldest inhabitants could be employed in planting, but apparently the grandfathers look askance at this suggestion!

K The Kurds are a virile and cheerful people. They have been called
181 treacherous, and undoubtedly stories can be quoted in support of this accusation. Yet it must be remembered that the annals of our own Scottish highlands are by no means clean in this respect.

K In the summer the valleys of Kurdistan are, unfortunately, very
164 malarial, and this is fostered by the cultivation of rice with its invariable
221 accompaniment of mosquitoes. During this season most of the flock-
342 owners move to their "zōzāns" or summer sheilings on the mountain tops, where, in shelters of oak branches, they pass the time pleasantly enough.

Christians

I The Christians of the northern provinces are divided into numerous
795 sects, several of which are relics of the old schismatic divisions of the Eastern Communion. They include Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics, who are under the control of Rome, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians and Seventh Day Adventists.

I Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics and Jacobites are found in Mosul and
795 many villages on the left bank of the Tigris. Chaldeans are also
167 found in the Supna valley near Amadia and in one large village near
563 Arbil. Seventh Day Adventists only flourish in Mosul. Many people
648 in England know something of the Assyrians and their recent history.
162 The Assyrians themselves claim to be descendants of the famous kingdom of Nineveh and are certainly semitic. The term "Assyrian" now includes ex-Ottoman members of the Nestorian Church who were domiciled either within what is now the 'Iraq state or who were ejected from Hakkari by the Turks during the Great War and refused

4z Wilson G-8 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Yazidis MH 10

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readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects 795
belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their 167 ●
Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the 648
Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace 563
terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it 162
was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in 'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil, British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however, proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may [I
be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers 463]
of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks, etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, I
hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are 147
liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

The Yezidis

The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This Y
is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. 101
They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock 776
Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the 779
lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is 871
incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that 771
he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education, save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

THE INFECTION IS FREQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY
means of the pilgrimage traffic or tribal 164
migrations from the neighboring territories, 484
and is believed to smolder continuously in 167
the northeastern mountain districts. Cases
are usually observed during the winter and 164
the spring months, with the maximum incidence in March and April. Serious outbreaks, with a total of over 1,300 known cases, were reported in 1942-43 in conjunction with epidemics prevailing throughout the entire Middle East. The actual prevalence was probably several times the official estimates. The greatest numbers of cases were noted in Baghdad, and in Basra, Mosul, Diyala and Sulaimaniya *liwas*, along
the main routes from Iran. The conges- 164
tion and the shortage of food, clothing, 722
soaps and other supplies existing in that area as the result of military operations during World War II favored the spread of the infection among the louse-infested
populations. About 800 cases of typhus were 164
reported in 1944, but the annual incidence subsequently declined to a low of 72 cases in 1949. No differentiation is made as to type, and the recorded cases include both louse-borne and flea-borne infections. On the basis of laboratory investigations, authorities at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad suggest that many outbreaks in the north, where louse-borne typhus is supposedly endemic, are caused by strains which are sero-
logically intermediate between *Rickettsia* [136]
prowazeki and *R. mooseri*.

Murine typhus is endemic, and probably predominates in the rural areas in the absence of a large-scale epidemic. Tick-borne infections are not specifically reported, and
are undoubtedly rare. In the event of a 164
typhus outbreak, control measures, includ- 744
ing the use of DDT preparations and mass immunization of the inhabitants with antityphus vaccines, are carried on in the affected communities by the government health authorities.

Plague. Epidemics of plague were fre- 164
quent in the past, particularly in the region around Baghdad, but the disease has been almost completely absent within recent YEARS.

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4§ Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Kurd MHI

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K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I
168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
64x] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administration was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise. 361 185 632 [1423]

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Basra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeological wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum, 871 658 172

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

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In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater 656 freedom of Turkish times.

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that 172 archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Hilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Lu', and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and coordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell.

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily de- 494 veloped during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern 499 Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Fayṣal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders.

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

same was true of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs. 647
Tainsh after fifteen years as Director left the Railways, handing
over to Ward who combined the post for three years with the Port
Directorate. Wheatley left the Advisership to Communications
and Works early in 1937.

The relation of Yasin Pasha to the British Embassy, where Sir
Archibald Clark Kerr had succeeded Humphrys in March 1935,
were close and cordial. The Census Department was strengthened,
that of Publicity represented a development of the old Press
Bureau. The Courts, with their complement of British judges 192
under the Agreement of 1930, were well maintained. The general
desire for a more comprehensive educational system could be met 871
only in part. Primary and secondary schools showed a limited
development, with increased use of borrowed Egyptian teachers,
and the beginning of book publication by the Ministry. Technical
education, studied by visiting foreign experts, advanced little. The
university project stood still. The Higher Teachers' Training- 875
College was reopened in 1935. A Directorate of Female Education
was formed in 1934, but abolished next year. A Rural Teachers'
College—a recommendation of the Monroe Report—was established
in 1934 at Shaṭra on the Gharraf, and later moved to Rustumiya
outside Baghdad. An Elementary Teachers' College for
Women was opened at Diwaniya in 1934, but did not survive.
The College of Pharmacy was founded in 1936. The schools of 871
the minority communities and of the missions, Protestant, Catholic,
and Jewish, flourished. The proposal for a public school on the
British pattern was not yet realized, and a British adviser to the
Minister of Education ceased to be employed. German teaching
increased. School books in use became increasingly nationalist and
xenophobe in tone. Military instruction was first given in the
schools in 1935, and grew thereafter to be a popular feature of
school life, with a developed Youth Movement in uniform.

Ancient sites of 'Iraq continued each winter to attract foreign 172
archaeological missions. Valuable excavations were carried out by
the representatives of university, museum, or other learned bodies,
American, German, British, French, and Italian, from 1933 to 1939
at sites in northern 'Iraq—Gawra, Nineveh, Saydawa, and Khorsabad:
in the Baghdad area, at Khafaja on the Diyalā, and at
Seleucia: and in the centre and south at the Sumerian cities of
Warqa and Larsa. A setback to this activity was caused, indeed, by
the intervention in 1933 of the Shi'i Minister of Education, who
produced a draft Antiquities Law calculated by its one-sided
severities to discourage all future excavation; but under the
Hashimi Ministry an improved draft was accepted, and work
could proceed in reasonable conditions.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

185 657 The Ministry of Social Affairs, inspired by Dr. Sami Shawkat on the orthodox lines of Axis philosophy, pressed for a higher birth-rate and legislated for the encouragement of lower dowries and earlier marriages. It urged the fuller development of trade unionism, and for the first time enforced the law which restricted certain trades (p. 246) to 'Iraqis. A bill was introduced to compel landowners in successive zones to build cottages for their cultivators. 172 The Department of Antiquities, with Seton Lloyd as its Adviser from 1939, conducted excavations at Samarrā and at Jabal Sinjar in 1939, and at the site of Wasiṭ in 1939–41; a German expedition dug at Warqa also in 1939.

648✓ In politics the movement, from the early summer of 1940 onwards, was from doubt towards decision, from a pretended unity towards evident faction. As the war of inaction in Europe gave place to a series of German successes, with the collapse of France and the entry of Italy, many 'Iraqis could see in adhesion to Great Britain little but self-condemnation to the losing side. The Army leaders, pro-Axis by temperament and by absorbed propaganda, saw no case for hesitation; in every Anglophobe old rancours found anew the support of logic and of national interest; and the prudent or uneasy of most political colourings admitted the value of at least a tacit reinsurance with the probable victors. The failure of final efforts in the summer of 1940 to wring from the British some reassurance over Palestine, or some hopeful countenance to the 'liberation' of Syria, was exploited by the Mufti and his many friends. Syrian ministers visiting Baghdad late in the year—Jamil Mardam Bey, Sa'dullah Jabri, and Luṭfi Ḥaffar—were fêted with enthusiasm as partners in the struggle against imperialism. Diplomatic relations with Denmark had been dutifully broken off when it was overrun by Hitler; but with Italy, whose Legation in Baghdad was now the centre of Axis activity, no breach was enforced when Mussolini entered the war on 10 June, and the British Ambassador's remonstrances went unheeded; the few Italians interned were soon liberated and returned to Italy. Nuri's influence failed on this and similar issues to carry the Cabinet with him, and one minister, Amin Zaki, resigned. The tone of the press passed from dubious neutrality to overt favour of the Axis, rather encouraged than restrained by the Prime Minister. Later in the year the difficulty or indeed impossibility found by Great Britain in supplying military equipment to 'Iraq, and her reluctance to provide dollars to buy arms for an ally so half-hearted, led to angry resentment in 'Iraq officialdom and the Army, and to the dispatch of an 'Iraqi purchasing mission to the United States.

The joint visit to Ankara of Nuri Sa'id and Naji Shawkat late in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

secondary boarding school on European lines was founded in 871
Baghdad in 1941, the King Fayṣal College. Mosul Technical School was reopened in 1942, and another in Kirkuk in 1945. The Queen 'Aliya Institute for the higher training of women teachers was founded in 1945, and a higher Engineering College in 1942; but a College for Physical Education, opened in the latter year, survived only four years. The Institute of Fine Arts, with separate faculties of Music, Painting, Sculpture, and Dramatic Art, was founded in 1941. Professor H. R. Hamley served as Adviser to the Ministry of Education—the first after a lapse of ten years—in 1942–3, K. J. Ritchie in 1944–5, and C. H. Scaife of Cairo University thereafter for two years. The Department of Antiquities 172
was fully active; it carried out excavation at Tall 'Uqayr, fifty miles south of Baghdad, in 1940–1: at Dayr on the Yusifiya Canal in 1941; at the 'Aqar Quf in 1942–4; at Tall Ḥasuna near Mosul in 1943–4: at Ḥira near Kufa and Tall Harmal near Baghdad in 1945. The greatest part of these works was carried out by 'Iraqi scholars, who had acquired high qualifications.

The Administration itself, gravely shaken by the events of 1941 645+
and the strains which followed, and confronted with new tasks and new temptations, lapsed perceptibly both in efficiency and integrity. Neither ministerial unity nor the administrative grasp required to correct this weakness was forthcoming, and resulting conditions led to renewed complaints against 'the old gang' by critics who pressed for the infusion of new blood into the Cabinet, preferably their own. The middle and later periods of the war gave, indeed, no scope for military coups, the incitement of tribesmen, or inspired strikes; but they permitted all too much of the personal intrigues, the intemperate mutual criticism, and the irritated frustrations of normal times.

The inspiring war news from Libya and Tunis in the winter of 721
1942–3 was greeted by public holidays and the renaming of streets, and extinguished the lingering hopes of Nazi sympathizers: hopes which the capture in July of three German officers, dropped near Mosul by parachute with a Kurdish guide, did nothing to restore. The improved atmosphere led to a turn of ministerial policy towards increased indulgence to the internees of the 'Amara camp and Rhodesia; the resulting releases, considered sadly premature by the British Embassy, were followed by the reinstatement in public functions of men known for violent anti-British and anti-Hashimite sympathies.

Useful non-political work had been done meanwhile by a Com- 642
mittee of Senators and Jurists, with Drower and Edmonds as advisers, on an amendment to the Constitution designed to correct some evident present inadequacies. The Committee met early in

871 General in policy and co-ordination. Female education had secured equal rights with male; of 6,000 primary teachers in the Government schools, nearly a third were women, and a similar proportion among the secondary and higher teachers. Between government and private (including foreign) schools of all grades not less than 200,000 children were being educated, a figure annually and rapidly increasing. A small remnant only of the Jewish schools remained in existence; that of the Alliance Israélite had been closed. The Tafayyudh Society, founded in 1919 as a popular non-political educational body, continued its work to combat illiteracy and maintained its printing-press. Students still enjoyed important exemptions and privileges in their military service obligation. 874 Vocational schools covered technical instruction, domestic science, agriculture, public health, and police duties. The teachers' training facilities had been increased in 1949 by additional training classes instituted at a number of existing secondary schools, and standards had been raised. The university, in spite of repeated 873 expert recommendations, was still an unrealized project; but higher education was available at the Law School, the Engineering College founded in 1942 and broadened in 1951, the Royal College of Medicine with its associated schools of Pharmacy and Nursing, the College of Agriculture, the College of Arts and Sciences founded in 1949, the Institute of Fine Arts, the College of Commerce and Economics founded in 1951, the Royal Military Academy and Royal Staff College, and the Higher Police Training School. Considerable numbers of pupils attended European or American universities; these would increase with the greater funds which were soon to become available and with the development of oil company programmes of technical and scientific training. Public libraries existed at every liwā headquarters.

172 The department of Antiquities had continued to develop its admirably enriched Museum (which it was soon to exchange for more adequate premises), to deal with the learned world, and to conduct or supervise the excavation of ancient sites. In the period from 1946–50 expeditions from the department were active at Tall Abu Shahrayn, near Ur: on the lower Diyalā: in the Arbil plain: in the neighbourhood of Chamchamal and of Sulaymaniya: and at Ḥadhr near Sharqaṭ. Expeditions from American seats of learning—Chicago, Pennsylvania, Harvard—dug at sites in the district of Kirkuk, in those of Chamchamal and Baradost in Kurdistan, and near 'Afak on the middle Euphrates, and a mission of the British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq excavated for three seasons at Nimrud. The work of these scholars of whatever nationality drew, with great goodwill, the attention of the academic world to 'Iraq's archaeological wealth and present fortunes. Both

the American School of Oriental Research founded in 1923 and the 172
British School founded in 1929 maintained headquarters in Baghdad, and both published the results of their researches.

In the field of Public Health the Government services had 744
achieved much, but not the impossible. They had faced an im- 164
mense field to cover and to conquer, had started from nothing, and had been always restricted by lack of funds and trained officials; and meanwhile, inevitably, the disease- or weakness-producing factors in the territory, and the apathy and conservatism of its people, continued. The problem of general malnutrition and resulting lack of physical vigour was, in fact, the problem of poverty: the cure, still distant, lay as much or more in increased wealth as in increased enlightenment; and the same was true, in spite of active and multiplying maternity and child-welfare clinics, of an infant death-rate still tragically high. Little, save increasingly comprehensive and practical study, had yet been done to combat the curse of hookworm, malaria, or bilharzia; a comprehensive effort against these diseases and against tuberculosis, eye-disease, and the typhoid group must call insistently for more time, more funds, and more specialized staff. Steps taken against epidemic disease had been successful; plague and cholera had scarcely appeared for a quarter-century, and smallpox was well handled with
full modern resources. Urban sanitation had been improved, [364]
sewage schemes adopted, and sanitary inspector training developed; but conditions in this respect over most of the territory remained wholly primitive, and the majority of 'Iraqi doctors were little
interested in public health administration. The country at large 743
was served by some eighty hospitals, of which three-quarters were general and a quarter specialized for fevers, mental and venereal diseases, leprosy (at 'Amara), children's and chest and eye diseases; a quarter of the whole were in Baghdad. Non-governmental hospitals were those of the oil companies, foreign missions, and the minority communities. The Jewish Mir Elias Hospital was still open, for patients of all creeds; all other Jewish hospitals and dispensaries had been closed. The Railways, the Port, the Police, and
the Army maintained their separate Medical services. The supply 759
of doctors, thanks to the Royal Medical College, had much improved since the thirties, but some reliance on foreigners was still necessary, some thirty of these were so employed in 1951 and recruitment of more was in progress. Registered practitioners in all numbered some 300 in 1945, 420 in 1949. The reluctance of 'Iraqi doctors to serve in the remoter regions—or, indeed, else-
where than in Baghdad—was still an embarrassment. Neverthe- 743
less, the busy and valued hospitals and dispensaries maintained in all parts of 'Iraq were playing a major stabilizing as well as a

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official who acts as secretary to the Minister. The Director General of Antiquities has charge of all the museums and the archeological activities conducted by his department and also supervises the work of foreign archeological expeditions and the preservation of monuments and remains of historical value. Although an agency for informal education, the Antiquities Department is not an integral part of the educational system.

In the days of the mandate a British adviser was attached to the Ministry of Education, but the office was abolished after 1930, prior to the termination of the mandate. It was re-established in 1943. The function of the adviser was to render an opinion on questions referred to him by the Minister and to make recommendations for the improvement of the work of the Ministry. The post of adviser was abolished in 1946.

The deans of the Law College and of the Higher Teachers College are directly responsible to the Minister for the proper functioning of their respective institutions. Both colleges are run under the supervision of their own faculty councils, whose decisions are subject to the approval of the Minister. They develop their own curriculums and conduct their own examinations. The faculty council of the Law College recommends candidates for its teaching posts, but in the Higher Teachers College this function is performed by the dean.

The Minister serves also as president of the Advisory Council on Education, a body created by the regulations of 1943 and consisting of the Minister, the Director General of Education, the Technical Adviser, the Director General of Antiquities, the deans of the Law College and of the Higher Teachers College, and four permanent members appointed—one each—by the Ministers of Finance, Communications and Works, Social Affairs, and Economics. All these persons meeting together elect four private citizens known for their experience and interest in education to supplement their number. The council meets at least twice a year, in October and April, and makes recommendations to the Minister of Education.

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF EDUCATION

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The Director General of Education is the real administrative head of the public-school system. He is expected to be a man of experience in educational administration and in matters of teaching in the schools. He is responsible to the Minister for the proper operation and inspection of all the schools in order to insure that all Iraqi youth shall receive the right moral, intellectual, and physical education regardless of their race, lan-

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the crop. This is one of the reasons for the growing popularity of the newly-introduced 'Ajībah, a variety highly resistant to rust. A certain amount of bread wheat is also grown on rain in the 'daim' areas of the north, where it is known as Hintah Qandahārī (*N.*).

"Macaroni Wheat, *T. durum* Desf. Hintah Khushnah. Much the greater portion of the 'daim' wheat in the north is of this type. It gives a higher yield, has greater resistance to drought and is more immune to rust than the local bread wheats. The grain of this type of wheat is harder and larger than the grain of bread wheat; but the bread made from it is of a poor quality. It is largely eaten in the form of Burghul (Kurd.), a kind of local porridge.

"Khorasan Wheat, *T. orientale*, and Polish Wheat, *T. polonicum*. Both these spp. have long hard grains known as Sinn-aj-jamal or Sinn-al-fil. Sometimes cultivated in the north.

"Dwarf Wheat, *T. compactum* L. Hintah walwal. One or two wild spp. of *Triticum* and of the grass, *Aegilops* (now generally included as a subsp. of this genus), are known to occur in Iraq. Of these the following may be mentioned:

"*T. dicoccoides* Koern. A specimen has been received from Jebel Sinjar, where it is said to grow on the hillside."

In the collections of the Rustam Agricultural Experimental Farm at Hinaidi near Baghdad, Iraq, the following varieties of wheat are represented:

(*a*) *T. vulgare durum libicum.* Black wheat. Rustam No. 41. Field 15A. Origin Euphrates, Iraq.

(*b*) *T. vulgare erytholenca.* Punjab B8. Rustam No. 48. Field 18A. Origin Punjab, India.

(*c*) *T. vulgare albidum.* Linga No. 3. Rustam No. 141. Field 17A. Origin Australia.

(*d*) *T. vulgare leucospermum.* U.S.A. Rustam No. 207. Field 16A. Origin Pusa, India.

(*e*) *T. vulgare turcicum.* Ajibak. Punjab No. 8A. Rustam No. 210. Field 19A. Origin Punjab, India.

(*f*) *T. vulgare albidum.* Clarendon wheat K. Rustam No. 602. Field 14A. Origin Australia.

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During excavations at Kish and Jemdet Nasr in Iraq by the Field Museum–Oxford University Joint Expedition, samples of wheat and barley were found in pottery vessels belonging to the period approximately three thousand years before the Christian era. These grains,

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preserved through being burnt, are difficult to identify with regard to their species. A summary of this discussion has been published by Henry Field, "Ancient Wheat and Barley from Kish, Mesopotamia," *Amer. Anthr.*, 34, No. 2, pp. 308–309. For further information on this subject the reader is referred to various publications by Nikolai Vavilov, Institute of Plant Industry, Leningrad, U.S.S.R.

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Tulipa montana Lindl. (Liliaceae)

فريونه

Fraiyōnah (Iraq); Lāla (Afg.); Govarikh, Wodak (Bal.); bulbs.

Field 54.

The bulbs of this tulip of Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan have brown, coppery skins. They are sold in the Mosul market as food (G.). The bulbs are eaten also in Baluchistan, where the leaves are a fodder for goats.

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Uncaria Gambier Roxb. (Rubiaceae)

كات كلابى

Kāt-i-gulābī (Teh.); Chinai-katha (Bom.); extract, pale catechu.

Field 208.

This is a specimen of the pale catechu of commerce obtained from Singapore. In the form of cubes, 1 inch across, it is prepared from the leaves and stalks of the plant grown in the Malay States. It is very astringent, as it contains both catechin and tannin. In Tehran it is prescribed for coughs.

Veratrum album L. (Liliaceae)

كندش

Kundush (Ham., Teh.); Kondochi (Schl.); hellebore root.

Boiss. 5: 171.

Field 221; K.B. 343.

White hellebore is a plant of Europe, Central Asia, and Japan. The root is mentioned as a drug in the herbals of Hippocrates and Galen. The rhizome is dark brown, cylindrical or slightly tapering, 2.5 cm. in diameter, with numerous scars of broken rootlets, whitish within. It contains a poisonous alkaloid, jervine. The root is one of the Irani poisons, and is used only externally, as a paste for headache and facial neuralgia.—It is also applied as a relief from nasal catarrh (H.F.).

4a Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Iraq Bedouin MH8
Kurd MA

B a severe slump in the camel market. Slowly and very reluctantly the
619 bedouin are turning to cultivation and feel themselves immeasurably
558 lowered in the process. Strangely enough, they are also to be found in
178 461 greasy overalls, working on the rigs of the Mosul Oil Companies. In
this work they do not lose caste as they do if they become cultivators.

B Shaikh Ajil al Yawar is the paramount Shaikh of the 'Iraqi
622 Shammar. He is an outstanding personality possessing a fine presence
and a wonderful charm of manner. With singular astuteness he has
managed to control his tribesmen, keep on the right side of successive
governments and at the same time amass a considerable fortune for
himself. During recent years his figure has perhaps suffered somewhat from the use of motor-cars instead of riding a fiery Arab steed
or liver-shaking "dhillool" (trotting camel).

Turkomans

I Leaving the Arabs, we come to the Turkomans. They are the
173 remnants of ancient immigration and are to be found in Tel Affar
162 town between Mosul and Sinjar and in a string of villages across to
Altun Keupri and Kirkuk. Arbil is also largely a Turkoman town.
The village of Nainawa, the ancient Nineveh, just across the Tigris
from Mosul, is Turkoman. In a mosque built on unexcavated
Assyrian remains it contains the reputed tomb of the prophet Jonah.
The mosque is also said to contain a portion of the vertebræ of the
whale!

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Kurds

K Next we come to the Kurds, who form by far the majority of the
101 population of the mountain areas and who are also to be found in a
144 large number of villages well south of the mountains. The Kurds are
619 Aryan in origin and Sunni Muslims by religion. The mountain Kurds
and in fact all the mountaineers of Kurdistan bear a close resemblance
K to the Scottish clans of two hundred years ago. They are still organ-
622 ized on a tribal or clan basis, though the increase in government control
657 and influence is naturally tending to destroy this organization and
644 undermine the power of the chiefs, or Aghas as they are called.
276 Aghas may, however, still be seen proceeding to town or market with
619 a "tail" of armed henchmen and even a pipebearer. The Kurdish
pipebearer is, however, concerned with the Agha's tobacco pipe and
000 not with music. Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Kurd MA11

I K 438 439 173 782 539

now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradition at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

I K 653 185

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

I K 721 361

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

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8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a con- 262
stant current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat compli- 173
cated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

173 The Muntafiq was a confederation of the Shia tribes living around the Gharraf River and around what is now the town of Nasiriya, drawn together for the purpose of opposing the Turks by Saadun of the Sunni family of Es Shabib, who became the founder of the house of Saadun. The tribes of the Muntafiq used to raid the Turks in the Basra area and harry their convoys on the road to Baghdad. However, in 1775 a new threat developed in South Iraq in the form of a Persian advance on Basra, and the Saadun leaders of the Muntafiq apparently decided that the Turks were the lesser evil, for they sent a force of their cavalry to assist them and stationed it at the ancient village of Zobeir.

Throughout the siege of the city the Muntafiq cavalry remained at Zobeir, which is about ten miles from Basra and separated from it by a salt plain liable to flood. The tribal horse, under Sheikh Abdulla es Saadun and Sheikh Thamir es Saadun, could not have been of much assistance to the garrison of the city, for the fighting was taking place in the belt of palm trees interspersed by numerous creeks which surrounds the town on all but one side; and the Persian infantry were assisted by that redoubtable tribe of watermen, the Kaab, who were particularly valuable in the area of marsh which used to extend from what in the last war was the military camp area of Makina to what is now the modern port of Maqil. It appears to have been a major error that the Muntafiq did not bring their footmen and boats down to assist in the defence of Basra, for the country was quite unsuited to cavalry; but it must be remembered that the Muntafiq could only have been lukewarm allies of the Turks, whom they had been fighting so recently.

Basra surrendered to the Persians in the spring of 1776,

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after a defence in which the Turkish garrison did not distinguish themselves. The Muntafiq force, however, remained at Zobeir, from where they controlled all exits from Basra to the desert, and the Euphrates route to Baghdad. It soon became apparent to Ali Muhammed, the Persian commander, that a port without a hinterland is a doubtful acquisition, but he took no measures against the Muntafiq tribesmen until 1778, when sheer boredom and the necessity of tending to their crops had reduced the Muntafiq force at Zobeir to practically nothing. Then, after a surprise attack, the village fell easily to the Persians, and Ali Muhammed ordered the Muntafiq garrison to be put to the sword.

The fury of the great tribes of the Muntafiq knew no bounds when they heard the news of the loss of Zobeir, involving as it did the rape and death of some Muntafiq women. Hawasing, or the singing of war songs accompanied by war dances, inaugurated a general rising of the whole Muntafiq confederation, the much dreaded 'Hamrat el Muntafiq'. Sheikh Thamir es Saadun took command of the Muntafiq forces, and a large horsed contingent marched down on Basra over the desert, while the tribal boats came down over the Hammar lake, and the footmen marched down the banks of the Euphrates River and the lake itself. Some ten thousand Persians marched out of Basra under Ali Muhammed to do battle, and the Persians also put on the river a flotilla of some twenty Basra jalbuts on which they had mounted guns and which had crews impressed from Basra itself. The redoubtable Kaab were absent from their order of battle.

The Persians seem to have learnt many false lessons in their campaign against Basra, and the most fatal of these was their belief that the Muntafiq tribes were desert

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● 173 fighters unable to manoeuvre in the palm belts and marshes. Thus, when their advanced guard cavalry gained contact with the Muntafiq horse in the desert Ali Muhammed successfully manoeuvred his force to drive them into the marshes and into what appeared to be a trap, an area surrounded on all but the entrance side by marsh or by bends of the river. The main Persian force entered this area to complete the destruction of the trapped tribesmen, but soon realised that the marshes were swarming with Muntafiq footmen. While the river held only tribal boats, there was no sign of the Persian flotilla, which, some say, had already been destroyed. When they attempted to retreat from this death-trap, the Persians found their escape blocked by more mounted tribesmen from the desert. Thamir es Saadun is said to have raised his sword and ordered a general massacre of the Persian force, a departure from the tribes' usual custom of taking prisoners, in revenge for the atrocities at Zobeir. Ali Muhammed was amongst the slain, and it is said that only three men escaped alive.

As a direct result of this disaster, in which they lost a major part of their force, the Persians evacuated Basra in the following year. This victory over the Persians was the Muntafiq's greatest success, but it also contained the seeds of the final dissolution of the Confederation, since the Shia tribes had been drawn together under Sunni leadership for the common purpose of opposing the Turks. After this battle the policy of the paramount sheikhs, the Saaduns, became more and more pro-Turkish, and by the middle of the nineteenth century we find that the paramount sheikh had almost invariably the title of Pasha, and was supported by the Turks in his rule of the Muntafiq. The tribal army now underwent a change: the great

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the 173
Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid
retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true,
occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks,
as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads
with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia 619
tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal
sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is
touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended
pictures of King Feisal and of His Royal Highness the
Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days
when the country was under foreign domination, when
they were the rallying-points of the resistance which
prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or
Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is
less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth
preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not
necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example,
numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the 463
capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, 166
lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this growing State a boy 555
may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish
up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the
tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by
way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city.
When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirhem [651]
from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants
are the first to send in their money: though they may be
wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send
in the exact dirhem along with the labourers and artisans.
To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

LEVANTINE JEWS MF4
IRAQ MH1
CHERKESS AH5
KURD MA11

LJ
141
144
174

ed in the empire of Saul, David and Solomon) is strongly mixed with Hebrew elements. Although their facial expression nowadays is different from the Jewish, the more hereditary—and in this case (brachycephaly)—even dominant head index has remained. That this people has also influenced the population of Mesopotamia appears from the Irakian curve in which the 80—80.9 peak characteristic of this desert border group is still outstanding (fig. 5).—

LJ
I
141
144
174



Fig. 13. Jewish types of the 9th century B.C., Jewish men bearing tribute from King Jehu to Shalmaneser II (taken from Salaman).

With the Irakians also the fleshy, curved nose seems to be more frequent (*Dr. H. Frankfort* called my attention to this). This might be due to Hittite influence, that may have affected also the aspect of the Jewish type. Hittite marriages especially in preexilic times were quite frequent (c.f. *Zedekia*). That this influence has become more pronounced with the Aschkenasim than with the Sephardim is not strange.

Whereas the Sephardim migrated away from Hittite centres, the Aschkenasim, on their Northern migration through Anatolia and the Balkans, have mixed with Armenoid blood, which explains the fact first emphasized by *von Luschan* that so many Aschkenasim have Armenoid features[1]).

C
K
144

I now come to a totally different sample of the Near East, the Kurds, the Caucasians and Persians.—

Here again the frequency curves bring light in many obscurities caused by the old system of using averages, which instead of emphasizing the differences between various components of a people obscures their analyses.

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[1] A striking example of Armenoid influence on the Northern Jews is the fact that near lake Urmiah the Jewish head index is the same as the Armenian, as first stated by *Chantre* and confirmed by *Weissenberg*. This is not strange since we know that brachycephaly with post auricular shortness is predominent in heredity, as was proved by *Frets*.

EGYPT MR1
IRAQ MH1

E
174 144 Menes united the two and began the dynastic period. In Upper Egypt the best skeletal series of the predynastic period is from Naqada. These resemble somewhat the earlier Badarians. The Naqada men were fairly tall, 166 c.m., but their heads and faces were larger than those of the Badarians and their noses were smaller.

In Lower Egypt, the predynastic inhabitants were Mediterraneans. They had broader heads, higher cephalic indices, mean 75 %, than the people of Upper Egypt, mean 73%. During the next 3000 years, the Mediterraneans spread up the river and have largely replaced the older groups of Hamites from Upper Egypt.

E
[141]
174 Modern Copts, who most nearly represent the ancient type, have diverged for the skull length has been reduced from 185 to 177 mm., and the head breadth has increased from 131 to 139 mm; the faces have increased in length from 124 to 130 mm., and there has been a narrowing of the nose. It can be stated, however, that these represent but minor changes. As Professor Morant points out, "Changes in physical type in any part of Europe within the last five hundred years have been much greater than in Egypt during five thousand."

I
174 144 IRAQ Central and southern Iraq, like the Syrian desert is occupied by members of the Mediterranean races. Buxton and Rice, who studied the skeletal remains at Kish dating about 3000 B.C., also studied the living inhabitants of the same area. They state "The measurements seem to indicate that the inhabitants of the Kish region, south of Baghdad, have not altered to any great degree within the last 5000 years. The Sumerians also belonged to this early long headed Mediterranean racial strain."

I
141 Modern Iraqians are taller than the Arabs of Arabia, for their statures range from 168 cm. in the Kish area to 171 cm. in the region of Kirkuk. The cephalic index is around 76. The Iraqi heads are long and narrow. The total facial height is moderate except in the north where it is much higher. Particularly is that true of the upper facial height. The facial widths are also moderate, except in Kirkuk and the North where the faces are very broad. The Iraqi noses are both longer and broader than those in Arabia.

I
142 The hair form of Iraqis is usually low waves, is dark brown or black. Five per cent or less have a reddish hue. The beards are much heavier than in Arabia. As in Arabia the hair color is predominantly dark brown but Iraqis have 20% of mixed light hues, such as was previously noted for some of the Syrian Bedouin.

I
141 144 The nasal profile is usually straight. The Iraqis are not the purest Mediterraneans for there is a fairly strong Irano-Afghan element as well as of the tall Atlanto-Mediterranean. There are, however, unabsorbed Bedouin tribes in Iraq, such as the Ba'ij, Shammar and Khazaal, that are typically Mediterranean, as are those described in the Syrian and Transjordan deserts.

1: Longrigg
645, 175 ●

MHl Iraq MHl

[For the rise and fall of various ministries, their policies and internal politics from 1900 to 1950 in Iraq, see category 116, entire source.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

175 'Iraq's place in the Empire was determined by various factors Its remoteness, its non-Turkish inhabitants, its fierce climate were all considerations which made service in it the dread of most Turkish officials; and little was in practice contributed to correct this ill repute by the prestige and past glories of Baghdad, its history of struggles with Persian armies, its almost successful attempts to secede. The progress which Turkish culture had made in some 'Iraqi circles detracted little from the Arab character which it shared equally with the backward provinces of the Ḥijaz, the Yaman, and North Africa, and with those, more sophisticated, of the Levant. The whole block of Arab territory exceeded in area the rest of Turkey, possessed great cultural solidarity, and differed from the Turkish dominions in race and history, in language, social atmosphere, and manners. And as the Arab provinces in general, so 'Iraq in particular brought the Sultan's Government into touch with foreign issues of particular delicacy. The Caliph could not disinterest himself in the loyalty of a race which controlled the Holy Cities of the Ḥijaz, the Shi'i shrines of the Euphrates, the tomb of the Sunni saint 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani (Jilani): who spoke the unique language of Islam and, inhabiting its lands of origin, must control much of its living sentiment in Islamic countries. To this realization, as well as to mere vainglory, were due the ceaseless efforts of the Turks to complete what in the end they never achieved, the conquest of Arabia: a conquest which on the Red Sea coasts, in al-Aḥsā and 'Uman and later in Najd, finally eluded them after weary and weakening aggressive efforts, of which 'Iraqis had been and were to be the spectators. The sight did nothing to diminish the abiding mutual antipathy which in general marked the attitudes of Turk and Arab.

The 'Iraq wilayas, viewed with however scanty favour, were yet held as vital to the Caliph's position. Beyond their fame in Islamic history and religion, they had another claim. From these most neglected and remote of provinces came stories of vast potential riches and the expectation of important future development. In the later years of the century not only foreign travellers and diplomats but Turks at the Sublime Porte itself, and incoming Walis hot for progress, spoke of railways, canal schemes, minerals, extended river navigation, bridges, and town-planning. Such designs had not advanced in 1900 beyond the stage of idle speculation or vaguest project; the impediments of sheer poverty, governmental ignorance, and pervading insecurity had prevented realization of any part of the schemes. But they existed still, in diwan and coffee-shop, and gained for 'Iraq a measure of interest and respect.

To Europeans the country had for a century past become

6: Ireland
175

MHl Iraq MHl

/For a history of Iraq under British occupation and administration from 1914 to 1920, a review of events leading to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and of the evolution of political institutions and social conditions in Iraq from 1925 to 1932, see category 116, entire source./

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

(c) *Jews*

Until recently Iraq contained a large community of Jews 162
whose families had been settled in the country for hundreds or 563
even thousands of years. They lived mostly in the large towns, 463
especially Baghdad, in whose economic life they played an
important part as merchants, financiers, manufacturers, and 197
members of the professions. There were also Kurdish-speaking Jews in the north, mostly urban traders and craftsmen but also rural cultivators. A law of 1931 gave Jewish communities self-government in their own affairs, and there was a highly organized communal life, with schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In consequence of events in Palestine the majority of Jews left Iraq in 1950–1, mostly for Israel.

(d) *Yazidis*

These are vulgarly known as 'devil-worshippers' but, al- 162
though their religion includes the propitiation of Satan, it might 771
more justly be described as an amalgam of Christian, Muslim, 795
and Magian elements. They are divided between Jebel Sinjar 197
and the Shaikhan district north of Mosul, speak a Kurdish dialect, except in their rites, where Arabic is used, and are probably of Kurdish origin.

(e) *Sabians*

('Baptists'), also called the Mandaeans and the 'Christians 162
of St John'; their religion combines elements of various origins 463
and periods. Most of them are craftsmen—especially silver- 795
smiths—in the large towns.

(f) *Shabak*

Of Kurdish origin, who live in the area of the Yazidis and 162
are not clearly distinguished from them; their religion contains 795
Yazidi and extreme Shii elements.

(g) *Other Sects*

Include Bahais, Sarlis, Kakais, Qizilbashis, none of them of any political significance.

POLITICAL HISTORY

Written history began in Iraq at the end of the fourth mil- 175
lennium B.C., but archaeological remains from much earlier periods, first in the north and later also in the south, give evidence of palaeolithic man, of agricultural neolithic man and, from the sixth and fifth millennia, of increasing human progress expressed successively in extensive agriculture, copper

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

175 and bronze work, wheeled vehicles, the potter's wheel, the sailing ship, bricks, temples, writing, seals, and sculpture of considerable maturity. Fully evolved urban life and written records appear before 3000 B.C., with the emergence in southern Iraqi city-states of the magnificent Sumerian civilization, the first highly developed culture in the world. It was absorbed and transformed by the first historical Semitic immigration, that of the Akkadians (c. 2400), who united the country into a single kingdom and extended it by foreign conquest. The unity, destroyed by tribal incursions from the East, was re-established for two centuries under the hegemony of Ur of the Chaldees, to be disrupted again, at the beginning of the second millennium, by a further invasion, of Elamites and Semitic Amorites, from which, in the eighteenth century, arose the Babylon of Hammurabi. Babylon, under various dynasties, absorbed and was itself modified by incursions of Hittites and Hurrians from the north and west and Kassites from the east, and in 745 B.C. fell to the Semitic Power of Assyria, which, expanding during the ninth and eighth centuries from a local city-state in the north, came to dominate the whole riverland and for a time controlled most of the Middle East. Assyria itself fell in 612 B.C. to the combination of a revived Babylon and the new Power of Media; and the neo-Babylonian empire—that of Nebuchadnezzar and 'Balthazar'—was overcome in 539 B.C. by Cyrus, the founder of the first of the three great Persian dynasties, which, during the next thousand years, extended westward over Iraq. The first, the Achaemenian, was overthrown by Alexander the Great, whose Seleucid successors continued to dispute Iraq with the second great dynasty, the Parthian, after it had evicted them; these fell in turn to the Sasanians, who, like their predecessors, warred with Imperial Rome from their capital at Ctesiphon.

In the seventh century A.D. the preaching of Mohammed provided an inspiration which temporarily united the tribes of Arabia; their campaigns immediately after the Prophet's death overthrew the Sasanian Empire and reduced the Syrian and Egyptian provinces of the East Roman (Byzantine) Empire. The Umayyad family, who soon afterwards constituted themselves the Prophet's successors—Caliphs—in leadership of the Muslim community, made Damascus the centre of a fast-expanding Arab, though only nominally Muslim, empire which, by the centenary of the Prophet's death, extended from Central Asia to beyond the Pyrenees. In A.D. 750 the Syrian-based Umayyads were supplanted by the related Abbasid family, which drew its support from Iraq and farther east and in 762 founded a

3 Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date) 1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

new capital at Baghdad. During the 500 years of their Caliphate the area of Arab conquest became a religious and cultural unity in which Baghdad held an eminent, at times pre-eminent position; the material authority of the Abbasids, however, despite increased centralization and standardization of government, rapidly dwindled, as province after province fell to invaders, adventurers, or local princes and the central power was sapped in dynastic quarrels and the disputes of the powerful palace guard. From the tenth century A.D. the Caliph was little more than a religious figurehead under the temporal protection of successive Turkish dynasties, holding insecurely only part of an economically declining Iraq. In 1258 Baghdad was destroyed in a Mongol invasion and the Abbasid dynasty, long shorn of imperial power, was overthrown. The Mongol ravages intensified the ruinous aftermath of centuries of invasion and internal strife, and the country was subsequently despoiled and fought over by Turkomans and Tatars, then disputed by the Persian and Ottoman Empires, each exploiting the internal religious division between Sunni and Shii Muslims and the opportunism of frontier Kurds. In 1638 Iraq, although still open to Persian invasion, fell finally to the Turks and remained a province, or provinces, of the Ottoman Empire until the First World War.

Modern Iraq

In November 1914 the Allied Powers, provoked by a Turkish attack on Russian sea ports, declared war on Turkey and an Indian Army brigade landed in Iraq. The purpose of this force, rapidly strengthened, was to implement the long-established Anglo-Indian policy of maintaining the Persian Gulf and the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad as outposts of India, to combat the possibility of a German-encouraged Turco-Arab *jihad*, with its likely effect on India, and to protect the already important oilfields of south-western Persia.

In 1916 the Allies had provided for the post-war status of the Mesopotamian provinces of the Ottoman Empire in two incompatible agreements: first, that of Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif Hussain, which (though with vague reservations as to French and British interests) accorded independence to the Arab portions of them; this was confirmed by Allied propaganda, General Maude's Baghdad proclamation of 19 March 1917, the Anglo-French Declaration of 8 November 1918, and President Wilson's Fourteen Points; second, the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916, by which Britain was to obtain southern Mesopotamia with Baghdad and, as a sphere of in-

3;Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

175 fluence under Arab rule, the zone between this area and the province of Mosul; the latter was to fall in the French sphere of interest but was included by the Clemenceau–Lloyd George Agreement of December 1918 in the British sphere in exchange for French participation in the north Mesopotamian oil deposits.

British official opinion was divided in its policy towards Iraq. The civil administration in Iraq was for long uncertain whether Iraq, including even the Mosul area, might not be annexed and come under direct rule of the Indian pattern. In the interest of imperial security and administrative efficiency they distrusted the Arab nationalism which had inspired the Arab Revolt in the west. The Arab Bureau in Cairo, on the other hand, favoured Hashimi rule of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The British Government, beset by conflicting advice and embarrassed by its war-time agreements, attempted, through the agency of the administration in the country, to sound Iraqi opinion on the most acceptable form of control.

With the consequent delay in making a definite pronouncement of policy and with practical indications that the administration on the spot was preparing for British rule rather than for Iraqi independence, there was considerable discontent among Iraqi nationalists and pan-Arabists, who consisted chiefly of educated townsmen. Resentment was fanned by Turkish propaganda and by the fiercely enthusiastic Iraqi officers serving with Amir Faisal ibn Hussain in Syria and aggravated by the war-time measures of a foreign, non-Muslim administration. These weighed particularly heavily on the tribal and landowning rural population, especially the Shii tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, who, self-interested rather than strongly nationalist, were assailed by the propaganda of the urban nationalists and the Shii divines of the Holy Cities. The assignment of the Mandate for Iraq to Great Britain at San Remo in 1920 and an attempt at tribal disarmament were followed by disturbances which, in July of that year, developed into an insurrection which, while it left large areas of the country unaffected, required considerable forces to suppress it. It was not completely suppressed till early 1921; but by October 1920 Sir Percy Cox, the first High Commissioner under the mandatory system, had terminated military rule and established an Arab Council of State advised by British officials.

642
648 By March 1921 the Amir Faisal ibn Hussain, expelled from Damascus by the French the previous year, agreed at the instance of the British Government to accept the throne of Iraq;

642, 728, 177, 565

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the political regime, social stratification, and Westernizing of administration under the British and French Mandates following the First World War, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 88-101./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

communities: an influence in which observers found an element of Gallic nationalism accompanied by rancour against non-Catholics and the Powers who might support these. The French missions were ancient and active. Their long-established Carmelites maintained two boys' schools at Baghdad, a press, an orphanage, and a dispensary. At Mosul the Dominican fathers, formerly Italian but French since 1859, maintained their urban and village schools, their dispensaries, their priests' training college, their church, and their prolific and polyglot printing-press; while, from the same Order, the Sisters of the Presentation had maintained their elementary and needle-work schools for girls at Mosul since the eighteen-seventies, and extended their work to Baghdad in 1881. These efforts had gone far to popularize the French language, enrich the culture of the Uniates, and contribute an element of real education to the local world. 'Iraq, in fact, and particularly the Mosul wilaya, formed part of the French sphere of cultural predominance. The missionary work of French Jewry will be mentioned later.

A Consul of the United States had been replaced in 1894 by a Vice-Consul, who resided intermittently in Baghdad; for American interest in 'Iraq was slight. An ambitious archaeological survey was carried out in the 'eighties, followed by a season of excavation; and a branch of the Arabian mission of the Dutch Reformed Church of America was started in the 'nineties with a school, dispensary, and hospital at Baṣra, with later work also at 'Amara and Naṣiriya. The effort met with strong Turkish opposition, which it survived. A number of converts to Protestantism were made from local Christians.

Other nations of Europe pretended at this period to little or no concern in the 'Iraq wilayas. Greek subjects had had recourse until 1897 to the British Resident, Austrian until 1900 to the French Consul. The German Empire had entrusted its slight interests in 'Iraq to Great Britain until 1894, when a German resident in Baghdad was appointed Consul. Late in the century their archaeologists had appeared—Sachau in 1879 and the great Koldewey first in 1889, then from 1898 onwards; but they showed no other concern with the territory until the eastward march of German policy was to raise, at the end of the century, the burning question of the Baghdad Railway. Meanwhile the penetration of Turkey by a mission of German military officers, their railway enterprises in Anatolia, the Kaiser's State visits, the abstention of his Government alone among the Powers from condemnation of the Armenian atrocities, were confirming Germany in the empty place of Great Britain as the leading Western nation in the Ottoman Empire.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 perhaps a fifth part of the military forces and a tenth of the gen-
162 darmerie. But this minority was disproportionately powerful by dint of the authority of Government, and by the contact of its leaders with the ante-rooms of Istanbul and with Turkish culture.
[177] It followed that some 'Iraqis, but not many, were thus attracted to the prestige of Turkish circles and all they signified, and, before the day of an Arab nationalism—or even after it—identified themselves with that element. Turkish was everywhere the language of Government, the courts, and the State schools.

3. PERSIAN AND ARABIAN NEIGHBOURS

648 With their Persian neighbour, Turkey and 'Iraq had a long tradition of discord. If, by the nineteenth century, the days of major aggressive war were over, there remained material for ill will between two unsympathetic peoples who differed in language, culture, and character. This was not diminished by the Persian Consular representatives—some of dubious status—at a dozen of the 'Iraq cities. The two Empires, devoted respectively to the Sunni and Shi'i faiths, were passing also through different stages of their evolution: Turkey struggling with modernism and western aspirations, Persia still medieval and uneasy with half-independent vassals in her midst. Reaction in its crudest forms was in the ascendant at Teheran since the accession in 1896 of the amiable spendthrift Mudhaffar al-Din Shah.

The frontier itself had proved a major irritant. Its line had been settled by nothing more stable than the fortunes of many wars and the fickle adherences of tribes. It cut through the featureless flatlands east of the lower Tigris and across the tumbled mountains of Kurdistan; it divided homogeneous peoples, often migratory and always incapable of loyalty to a distant throne. The 1847 Treaty of Erzerum had been followed by thirty years of conventions, commissions, and map-making, and by as many, in the last quarter of the century, of minor forays, counter-interventions, and angry protests. The close of the century found the Turks still claiming Persian-occupied towns and valleys—Urmiya, Wazna, Bana, Sardasht, Zuhab—and the Persians demanding the Gul'ambar Plain, the Hawraman Mountain, and lands near Khaniqin. These squabbles, which forbade all border tranquillity, were echoed in the extreme south by the pretensions of both to possess the shoals and islands of the Shaṭṭ. Turkish claims to Muḥammara had indeed by now been abandoned; but jealousies and reprisals on the Shaṭṭ offered a fertile field for piracy, which led in turn to British intervention, the threat of a British Consul at Fao, and the stationing of a gunboat on the river in 1898.

The great pilgrimages by Persians to Najf, Karbalā, Kadhimiya

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

4. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TOWNS

During the span of a single lifetime, from 1830 to 1900, profound 178
changes had come to pass in the urban society of 'Iraq. Most 369
marked in the upper classes, but perceptible in the lower, they
radiated from both outwards into a countryside still socially
primeval.

Early in the nineteenth century 'Iraq town society had remained 181
almost wholly isolated from Western influences. There was no 177
acquaintance with the outside world. The tempo of life was that of
earlier ages, traditional manners held the field, and life in every relationship was based on Islam. No restless progressiveness had appeared: the evils of the times were accepted by all with submissive fatalism. The impact of Western conceptions and activities upon this society was in the Levant gradual, in 'Iraq relatively sudden. Such ideas and phenomena came first to 'Iraq by way of the New Army which had, in a day, superseded Janissaries and Hayta bands: an army with Europeanized officers, soon followed by doctors, engineers, and the whole body of Westernized effendis. The senior officials, Turkish in speech and half-European in education, were accompanied by wives of Istanbul and children fresh from modern-fashioned schools. Posts and telegraphs, foreign trade and enterprise began to operate. The Christian and Jewish minorities, with their European leanings, continued to set a higher standard of education, aided by the missions which served them.

The cumulative effect of these influences had produced by 1900 178
an 'Iraqi urban society far removed from that of a lifetime earlier.
Fed by the telegraph, an incipient press, and the resident foreigners, 181
the talk amongst officials in the Saray, merchants and agents in the coffee-shop, notables in their diwans, could for the first time embrace wider interests. Literacy had become commoner, changes had appeared in domestic and social habit, European clothes were worn by an increasing minority, the tempo of life accelerated. The wealthy class increased in numbers as in possessions, and found fresh ways of spending. Social leadership was still on patriarchal or plutocratic lines; an intelligentsia scarcely existed; but among a widening circle the old acquiescence had begun to yield to dissatisfaction and questioning. An excessive confidence was felt in 'science' and modern knowledge, conceived always as a set of formulae with miraculous efficacy. Except where devotion to orthodox Islam and its endowments was a vested interest, there had been signs of diminished respect for that doctrine and for its professors; but this was still very far from a landslide to atheism, nor had the old standards of behaviour been yet abandoned even by the *évolués*.

The social development which these processes entailed represented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue. 177

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied. 181 511 [164]

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Baṣra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Baṣra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen–contractors whose 361 363

619 from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be
178 seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships
631 had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in
the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as
river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme
posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads
[423] had become a Government function; more and more the local
Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the
Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands
as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and
jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain
and loyal follower.

619 Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old
77 tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came
389 with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steam-
ship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself
radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats.
European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and
the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom
a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their
kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the
world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travel-
lers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the
last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government
of the outlying regions.

619 The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into
579 Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr
and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern
Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief,
ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and
now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the
Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by
1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police
posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

619 unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their
511 tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting
backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the
sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnutrition,
disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty
619 years since Independence, there had been change in directions
178 which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first
511 was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and
private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there
had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards
177 security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it
was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include
some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within
reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's
social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased
use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census,
police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away
from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in
the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as
never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications
inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and
disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in
fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally,
detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress
which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing
the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative
of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal
public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with
those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from
raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for
leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture
had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new
allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by
the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries,
lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had
departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures,
while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and
Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The
picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early
but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition
from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself
transitional and unformed—of the country at large and
of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well
begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in
1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company,
that of Baṣra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with
current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the
Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office
literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British
expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the
Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective
interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to
trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges,
housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose
realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited
welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—
were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the
Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They
were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive
organization, by the oil companies.

511 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the modernization
tion and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle
362 classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes
than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise
above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private
life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their
domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of
interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two
177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance
and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more
generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much
ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now
562 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women
learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law,
followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work,
and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the
franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded
were still considerable, and included the households of many
leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families,
by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western
type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop
[265] kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within
the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and
business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include
575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class professional
526 sional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various
branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

872 876 promotion, is indicated by the following extract from a teacher's introduction to the first issue of a primary school magazine:

> 'Our Magazine.
> Dear Pupils,
>
> This is the first number of our school magazine. I want every pupil to read it very carefully because it is for you, not for the teacher.
>
> Please read this paper carefully and ask me any question about it. If you do as I say, you will succeed in the examination.
>
> Your Teacher,
> Signed ....'

974 654 *The Agricultural Primary Schools.* The need for realistic village schools in Iraq has been advocated in the Report of the Monroe Commission and elsewhere. They have taken a long time to materialize, but there are now signs of progress.

In 1948 the Ministry of Education requested the Provincial Directors of Education to establish an experimental primary school in each province. One such school has since been provided in most of the provinces, not as an entirely new project but as an extension of an existing primary school. Several acres of land have been attached to these schools and some of them keep a limited amount of livestock. Some have modest dairy equipment, a stock of hand tools for the pupils and an agricultural machine such as a power-driven cultivator. One or two have a tractor. In the irrigation districts some possess their own water pump.

Unfortunately these schools were established during a period of retrenchment, and although the Ministry of Education launched this important experiment it was apparently unable to provide the money for other essential buildings and equipment such as handicraft shops, simple laboratories and materials for experiment. It was also unable to provide every such school with a teacher acquainted with the basic practice and principles of farming. Despite these initial handicaps, some of the agricultural primary schools have started courageously and have attempted to free [177] themselves from a purely academic curriculum. In certain of the schools, apart from teaching methods of normal cultivation, experiments are being made in the growth of crops hitherto unfamiliar to the local economy. Indeed one teacher claims that, through his introduction of American cotton on to the school farm, the local landowner has since grown this crop on a large scale and has made a substantial profit from it. If this is so, it certainly illustrates the extra-mural influence of a village school which adjusts its curriculum to real life situations.

175 727 671 of criminal justice in British India shall have effect as if the Occupied Territories were a district in the Presidency of Bombay'. This section, taken with the Code as a whole, tends to confirm the impression that valid as were some of the reasons advanced at the time for the introduction of the new legal system, the most cogent reason was the underlying desire to pave the way for the painless absorption of lower Mesopotamia to India.

The belief, apparently held at this time, that the Indian system introduced by the Code was no more foreign to Turkish Arabia than the Turkish system which it replaced,[1] and that therefore the change was acceptable, seems scarcely in accordance with the facts. As Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, head of the Judicial system in Mesopotamia, 1917-21, has pointed out:

> The present organization of these Courts and the Codes (of the Turks) have been in force for more than a generation, and indeed some of the Codes date back to a much earlier date. The people are accustomed to them, and are accustomed to regulate their transactions by them. This is especially true of the Baghdad mercantile community . . . Lawyers and Government officials have been trained in the procedure of the Courts and use of the Codes.[2]

The same statement could hardly be made concerning the Indian Laws, none of which were available either in Arabic or in Turkish when introduced. Even the Code was not translated into Arabic for some time following its introduction. Only four of the several score of Indian Laws had been translated into Arabic at the end of 1917, a fact which called forth a protest from the retiring Senior Judicial Officer, Lieut.-Colonel
671 S. G. Knox.[3] With the introduction of the Code, Arabic became
177 the official language in the Courts, a measure popular to the
115 727 people. Its use, however, was not entirely new. A circular from

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[1] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 68.

[2] *Report on the Admin. of Justice, Baghdad*, 1917, in *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 184.

[3] *Review of the Reports of the Administration of Basrah Wilayet from April to December*, 1917 (Calcutta, 1918), (hereafter *Admin. Rep., Basrah*, 1917): *Report on the Admin. of Justice*, 1917, p. 108.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

department, no administrative order in the Ministry being 871
given by a British official after 1923.[1] The responsibility for the
educational system thus has been largely 'Iraqī, in spite of the
inclination both of 'Iraqī officials and of American educationalists
to lay the blame for its deficiencies at the feet of the British
officials. Indeed, more influence of foreign origin has been [117
exerted on the educational system by 'Iraqī students returning 871]
from American and English schools and Universities than by
the British officials of the Ministry.

No government department has been a greater source of 658
optimism for the continued development of 'Iraq, both to 871
'Iraqī and to foreign observers, than has Education. No other
department can point to budget appropriations which have
steadily increased from 1921, the amount assigned in 1932 to
Education being more than double the sum in 1921.[2] No other
Ministry can show such concrete and progressively achieved
results. The number of primary schools for boys has increased [872]
from 124 in 1921 to 247 in 1930, the enrolment increasing from
12,226 to 24,885. In the same period, girls' schools have
increased from 27 to 44, with an increase in enrolment from
3849 to 6008. During this period, secondary and intermediate
schools have grown from four, with an estimated attendance of

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 224.

[2] A summary of the expenditures of the Ministry of Education, 1921-32) in lacs of rupees) is as follows:

Year	*Expenditure*	*Percentage of Budget to total expenditure*
1921–22	19·36	3·3
1922–23	19·94	4·1
1923–24	18·15	4·0
1924–25	22·13	4·59
1925–26	23·48	4·43
1926–27	26·93*	5·2
1927–28	27·42	4·74
1928–29	32·01	5·33
1929–30	37·18	6·42
1930–31	38·41	7·5
1931–32	39·98	7·9

* The budget of the Antiquities Department and of the Engineering School was added to the Budget in this year and in subsequent years.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

463 each kind of goods has its special section of the bazaar.
565 The brass- and copper-smiths' quarter rings like a small
441 boiler factory all day long. The artisans who are engaged in producing these commodities form a considerable section of the Mesopotamian city population and are fairly prosperous and contented, much more so than the date gardeners of the outside districts. Supreme over them all stands the Mesopotamian silver worker, whose antimony silver work can scarcely be duplicated anywhere in the world.

463 The professional classes in these Mesopotamian cities
871 are fairly well developed. There are teachers of every
794 sort. Some of them have been trained abroad, but many
177 are indigenous and [illegible] very great credit to the schools that
have turned them out. There are a number of government schools, and in addition the different religious sects maintain schools of their own. In these days when western education is in great demand, the schools of the Jews and the Christians are patronized by an increasing number of Mohammedans. No local medical profession has
463 been developed as yet, but the wealth and the culture of
759 Mosul, Baghdad and Basra have attracted a considerable number of trained physicians from outside. We have therefore the beginnings of a medical profession, and although it is not yet indigenous, it will soon become so. Its ethics are not of a very high order; the campaign of the American College of Surgeons to abolish fee-splitting would not make much headway among Mesopotamian doctors, but time will develop ethical standards, and at the worst the profession is a long way in advance
463 of the quacks that infest Arabia proper. There is also a
693 well-established group of lawyers. One of the results of the governing of the country for hundreds of years by

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 MJ Middle East / Iraq MHI

161 As far as population is concerned, the great cities are only a small fraction of Mesopotamia, for the last census gives the population of the entire country as 2,849,282, and that of the three cities of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul combined is probably not much over 350,000.

177 Much of the material advance in these Mesopotamian cities is, of course, an indirect outcome of the Great War. Few countries anywhere were more affected by the changes that the war brought in its wake. It is impossible to hazard a guess as to the ultimate effect of the last ten years' catastrophic happenings in Mesopotamia. Western civilization in its strong and unfortunately too often in its bad aspects has poured in on that country like a flood. Whether the various campaigns of the war and the whole influence of the English occupation, benevolent and efficient as it is, have resulted in genuine progress is difficult to say. Under the Turks, who had governed the three *vilayets,* or districts, of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul for hundreds of years as a part of the Turkish empire, the original Arab system of government had been changed very considerably. Since the war that change has been carried much farther by the British Government. In general terms, Mesopotamia was administered by Great Britian under a mandate at first, and later in 1921 a constitutional monarchy was created with an Arab ruler, Feisul, son of King Husein of Hejaz, on the throne. Religious liberty was guaranteed by the Constitution adopted at that time. A modern parliamentary government was set up, with more or less the same organization, codified law and court procedure that we are used to at home. It is open to question whether this is in accordance with the genius of the Arab race or whether it is not imposing an alien system on the coun-

177 try rather than fostering the development of something
indigenous and natural. Under such a system the en-
forcement of law may become of necessity very mechani-
cal, as when an Indian Sepoy nearly knocks down an in-
offensive Arab pedestrian by a blow with his fist for no
greater crime than walking on the wrong side of the
road to avoid a mud puddle. In the courts, too, a crowd
of lawyers and an abundance of red tape, with venal
underlings, may serve to make the paths of justice tor-
tuous and uncertain in spite of the best intentions on the
part of the presiding judge.

185 Nevertheless, even under such handicaps as those we
177 have indicated, there is no questioning the very great
material progress that is to be seen in Mesopotamia.
[363] Even before the war one of Baghdad's streets was paved,
and since the British have taken over the administration
of the kingdom, all sorts of improvements have been in-
[496] troduced. The railroad system of the country now ex-
tends 360 miles from Basra to Baghdad and from there
on nearly to Mosul. There are several subsidiary lines,
the total amounting to over 1000 miles. By far the
greater part of this mileage was constructed by the Brit-
[312] ish for war purposes. Under British rule, also, the Hin-
diya Barrage and other less important irrigation works
have been kept in order and improved and extensive har-
bor improvements at Basra undertaken.

364 British sanitary and health officers have been ap-
744 pointed for Mesopotamia and no praise is too high for
their largely unappreciated but nevertheless unselfish and
extremely efficient labors in that country. The hospital
work that has been undertaken in Basra, Baghdad and
Amara, the inspection of eating houses, and the maintain-
ing of sanitary conditions have been excellently done.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

364 Unfortunately the fact that this work is practical benevo-
764 lence of the finest sort and carried on in the finest spirit
has not served to commend sanitary regulations to the Arab, who regards them as a nuisance, a hindrance to business and an infringement of his personal liberty.

371 Mesopotamia has also grappled with the whole prob-
185 lem of education most courageously. An educational
177 system has been organized which includes normal schools
for teachers and a large number of primary and secondary schools for both boys and girls. There are a smaller number of high schools, and a central university is planned. Fifteen years ago the dominant European influence in this community was French, and no one could claim to be educated who could not talk that language fluently. There was a marked change a little later, and before the Great War German was the commanding influence. Now, of course, the predominant western influence is English, and it seems likely to remain so, for commerce will probably talk the English language for many years, whatever political upheavals the country may be destined to experience. It is true that the educational system has not as yet taken very deep root and that much of the work done is very superficial, but it is none the less exceedingly creditable and encouraging. Moreover, this western system of education will probably be more or less permanent, for it will always be the gateway to remunerative positions.

185 In general, the people of Mesopotamia have been
177 brought into contact with conditions of modern life and
are anxious for further progress. New wants have been created, and a certain increase in the commerce of the country is the inevitable result. All manner of western dress goods and shoes are to be found in the bazaars, as

185 well as many western food products, such as candies and
177 fancy crackers. The country is lighted by kerosene oil, much of which comes from America. Numbers of automobiles are to be seen, and in some places even electric lights. All these things represent the gratification of wants that did not exist previous to the entrance of western influence.

439 There has also been a development of the export trade
311 of the country. However, the articles for export are not many nor of great amount. Dates are the principal product, together with a certain amount of wheat and rice and some hides and wool. In the long run, of course, no more can be brought into the country than is sent out of it, and the trade of Mesopotamia cannot increase to any great figure until her own natural resources are developed.

000 Just how far these various modern improvements will go remains to be seen. If the British continue in power, there is no doubt that material development will be steady and sound. If they evacuate the country and leave it to an independent local government, progress will be much
435 slower, to say the least. During the war wages went up
511 to fabulous heights, and although prices of food and rent
177 advanced even more, there is no doubt that the sum total of the war's influence was to raise the standard of
185 living in the cities and to stimulate enormously the desire for many western products and for western education. Just now there has been a very sharp reaction; times are hard, work is scarce, wages are poor. Everything western is discounted, and the cry is for an independent national development with the elimination of every foreign
000 influence. The common people long for the golden days of the Turks, forgetting with a completeness quite as-

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

tonishing the nature of those golden days, now only ten 000
years and less in the past.

The fundamental difficulty is that the new régime, with 177
all its virtues, is essentially an alien system imposed upon 609
the country from without by virtue of superior military 186
power. Thus it shares the unpopularity of alien systems the world over. The opposition to the present ruler and his British advisers is not simply the frothing of irresponsible and ambitious nationalist agitators. It is all that, but there is something far more significant underneath. I was once entertained for an afternoon by a rabid nationalist of Mesopotamia who attempted to show that the system of education introduced by the British was inferior in curriculum and in number of students to the pre-war system of the Turks, which proposition was about as reasonable as that two and two make twenty. But it would have been a great mistake to conclude that the man was primarily concerned to vindicate the Turks. He was not even primarily concerned over the educational system of Mesopotamia. Nor was he simply a fool. The thing that troubled him was the fact that his country was ruled by aliens. The tremendous following that such men have is not due to any outstanding ability they possess and still less to any profound insight into the various problems of the day, but rather to the fact that the average Arab, the man in the street in Mesopotamia, also resents that alien domination very intensely. It is hard for the unimaginative Westerner to realize that what the Arab wants is not efficient government or even good government. What he wants is self-government.

On the whole, in spite of many encouraging signs of 185
progress, a more intimate acquaintance with affairs in 177

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 ~~Middle East~~ Iraq MH 1

185 177 Mesopotamia distinctly dampens enthusiasm. It appears gravely doubtful whether we are on the road of progress at all—whether, in fact, we are not on a road with a very different ending. The sanitary and educational systems are both of them expensive, and it is doubtful if either can be continued now that Great Britain is no longer willing to spend large sums of money on the country. The railroads have hardly been brought to the point of self-support, and the harbor facilities of Basra, which were constructed to meet war needs, are ludicrously excessive. The local administrators now are at their wits' end to find funds sufficient to maintain them. All work on the irrigation system is at a standstill for the same reason. The whole government structure is a showy shell, vastly more expensive than can be properly shouldered by such a country. Its alien character makes this expense inevitable. The rulers who come from Great Britain demand salaries which are enormous judged by local standards, and much the same exaggerated scale of remuneration prevails throughout their staff of indigenous assistants. Creating a government that shall be modern enough to foster progress and at the same time cheap enough to sit lightly upon the community and be at least tolerable if not popular, constitutes a problem which is by no means solved.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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<874 irrigation, railways, roads, and economics; the fourth, strength of materials, theory of structures, hydraulics, surveying, municipal engineering (water supply and sewage disposal), estimating (specifications and contracts), engineering law, and design (structures, irrigation works, and buildings). Lectures and practical work total from twenty-eight to thirty-two hours per week. This curriculum will be expanded when specialization in mechanical and electrical engineering is added.

No tuition or boarding fees are charged, but students sign a contract to work for a period of five years after graduation in the Department of Public Works. During this period of employment they are paid on the same scale as other government officials with similar preparation and experience.

Educational Missions

658 It was in 1921, just after the foundation of the national government
• 177 and the accession of King Faysal I to the throne of Iraq, that the Ministry of Education proposed sending qualified students abroad to study. That year nine of the brighter boys were picked from the secondary schools, six of whom were sent to the American University of Beirut in Lebanon and three to England. Of these, two were to study medicine in England, one was later to study agriculture in the United States, and six were to prepare for high-school teaching. From the first, the idea of educational missions was to train specialists to meet Iraq's needs in the fields of health, education, and agriculture.

Needs multiplied until foreign educational missions were projected in no less than forty-six of the most diverse subjects. These included various sciences and subjects necessary to teaching, such as physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, history, geography, Arabic, and English. Students were sent to study education, psychology, and kindergarten methods, chiefly in America. Agriculture was studied almost entirely in America. Students went abroad to study all types of engineering, surveying, architecture, the social sciences, modern business practice, astronomy, geology, meteorology, and law. The establishment of the Royal College of Medicine at Baghdad in 1927 almost stopped the movement of medical students to foreign universities, except for graduate study, but they continued to go abroad to study dentistry and veterinary science. They went on missions to study technical trades, archeology, Islamic art, physical education, printing, library science, and home economics. For the study of painting, sculpture, and music they were sent principally to France and Italy.

As the fields to be studied on mission became more numerous, so did the

number of students sent. The number of students supported wholly or 658
almost wholly by the government rose from 9 in 1921 to 93 in 1928–29 1770
and reached the peak figure of 238 in 1939–40. It declined because of World War II to 114 in 1943–44, but began to increase in 1945. Altogether more than 700 students have been sent abroad for study in the last quarter-century. The number of students who studied abroad at their own expense is at least as large.

Missions have been sent to eleven different countries, Lebanon receiving the most because of the popularity of the American University of Beirut. This University has not only prepared a large number of teachers for the Iraqi secondary schools; it has also served as a station for students going to America, to improve their English and prepare them for advanced study in the United States. After Lebanon, England receives the most, then Egypt, and in order, the United States, Switzerland, France, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Italy, and India. World War II limited the missions for the most part to Lebanon and Egypt.

The first mission students returned to Iraq in 1926 and were absorbed by the secondary schools and the Primary Teachers College. Since then hundreds of students have returned. Most of them and most of the students who studied abroad at their own expense have gone into government posts where they are helping to fill a great need. At least 4 have attained cabinet rank, while many have become directors general of various departments and members of Parliament. The largest number have gone into teaching or administrative posts in the Ministry of Education. The next largest group are in technical posts in engineering or agriculture. Others are scattered throughout the ministries, having begun their careers as teachers and transferred from the Ministry of Education.

The budget for educational missions began in a modest way in 1921 and reached its highest peak of 62,000 dinars ($248,000) in 1938–39. It declined to 45,000 dinars ($180,000) in the war years, but is now expected to be increased. For a full-scholarship student the government pays nearly all his necessary expenses, including tuition fees, travel expenses to and from his place of study, an adequate monthly allowance for living expenses—varying from country to country—and an allowance for books and medical care. Any major medical treatment or surgery is also paid for by the government. A former government official sent on a mission receives, in addition to these benefits, one-third of his former salary to help support his family. In return for all this, the student signs a contract which commits him to serve the government one year for each year of study. In case of default or of failure to complete his studies, he must

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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reimburse the government for all expenditure in his behalf. This system allows many a bright but impoverished student to achieve a kind of education and career that unaided he could never have had.

Regulations govern the selection of students and other aspects of this program. The latest revision of the regulations was in 1942, and, according to these, a student to be eligible must be at least a secondary-school graduate with an average of no less than 66 in the public examination and of no less than 75 percent in the subject of his specialization; he must pass a medical examination and be interviewed by the selection committee, which looks into his credentials and into a confidential report from his former school principal. To qualify for postgraduate study abroad, a student must have attained first- or second-class honors in his undergraduate course.

The Council of Ministers determines the number of students to be sent every year and the fields to be studied, basing the decisions on statements of the various ministries and departments concerning their needs. With the growth of the various colleges in Iraq, more emphasis is being placed upon postgraduate study to prepare advanced specialists. In undergraduate work there is a good deal of concentration on the various branches of engineering and technology.

65: Landshut S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

difficult to make even an approximate estimate of how many Jews live 563
in these villages—perhaps 5,000-6,000 at most. They have remained 162
relatively untouched by the events of the past few years, which have had such a revolutionary effect on the rest of the Jewish community.

The total Jewish population of Iraq is estimated at 120,000. Although this figure may be out of date, it is probably not far wrong, if allowance is made for emigration, on the one hand, and increase in the birthrate, on the other. Of these, between 90,000 and 100,000 live in Baghdad. But neither is it the larger number of Jews in the country as a whole nor their concentration in the capital which accounts for the difference of their position, at least in the past, from that of their coreligionists in Egypt.

Most important is the fact that Western influence on Iraqi Jews, 563
being no stronger than it was on the town-bred Muslims, was much 177
weaker in Iraq than in Egypt. Middle-class Jews in Iraq took to European dress at about the same time as the Muslims. Likewise, in their daily habits, their houses, and, last but not least, in their language, [197] there was no marked difference between the two communities. Arabic has always been, and still is to-day, the mother-tongue of both Jew and Muslim.

True, as a result of the higher educational facilities provided by the activities of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and the Anglo-Jewish Association, knowledge of French or English is more common among the Jews than the Muslims. But this difference has never been sufficient to detract from the central fact that Western influence on the Jews has not been much stronger than on other Iraqi communities. All this is in strong contrast to the situation in Egypt and—again unlike Egypt—there has been no noticeable immigration of Jews from European countries.

During the nineteenth century the Jewish community in Iraq was 563
fairly prosperous; and freedom to develop was assisted to no small degree by the two proclamations issued by the Sultan of Turkey in 1839 and 1856. At that time there was already a considerable number of well-to-do families. The schools of the *Alliance* helped to raise the community's educational standard. When the first Chamber of Deputies was opened in Istanbul in 1876, it included a representative of the Iraqi Jews (Menahem Danyiel) and, later, after the Constitution of 1900, the community was represented by Hezkiel Sassoon, a retired senior Ottoman Government official.

During the First World War, however, the Jewish community suffered great hardships at the hands of Turkish governors. Just prior to the fall of Baghdad in 1917, some of its leading members suffered death, torture, and imprisonment.

When, therefore, the Arabs rose against the Turks and made common cause with the Allies, the Jews regarded the fight for liberation as their own. They welcomed the establishment of the new Iraq under British Mandate, and many immediately offered their

4. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TOWNS

During the span of a single lifetime, from 1830 to 1900, profound 178
changes had come to pass in the urban society of 'Iraq. Most 369
marked in the upper classes, but perceptible in the lower, they radiated from both outwards into a countryside still socially primeval.

Early in the nineteenth century 'Iraq town society had remained 181
almost wholly isolated from Western influences. There was no 177
acquaintance with the outside world. The tempo of life was that of earlier ages, traditional manners held the field, and life in every relationship was based on Islam. No restless progressiveness had appeared: the evils of the times were accepted by all with submissive fatalism. The impact of Western conceptions and activities upon this society was in the Levant gradual, in 'Iraq relatively sudden. Such ideas and phenomena came first to 'Iraq by way of the New Army which had, in a day, superseded Janissaries and Hayta bands: an army with Europeanized officers, soon followed by doctors, engineers, and the whole body of Westernized effendis. The senior officials, Turkish in speech and half-European in education, were accompanied by wives of Istanbul and children fresh from modern-fashioned schools. Posts and telegraphs, foreign trade and enterprise began to operate. The Christian and Jewish minorities, with their European leanings, continued to set a higher standard of education, aided by the missions which served them.

The cumulative effect of these influences had produced by 1900 178
an 'Iraqi urban society far removed from that of a lifetime earlier.
Fed by the telegraph, an incipient press, and the resident foreigners, 181
the talk amongst officials in the Saray, merchants and agents in the coffee-shop, notables in their diwans, could for the first time embrace wider interests. Literacy had become commoner, changes had appeared in domestic and social habit, European clothes were worn by an increasing minority, the tempo of life accelerated. The wealthy class increased in numbers as in possessions, and found fresh ways of spending. Social leadership was still on patriarchal or plutocratic lines; an intelligentsia scarcely existed; but among a widening circle the old acquiescence had begun to yield to dissatisfaction and questioning. An excessive confidence was felt in 'science' and modern knowledge, conceived always as a set of formulae with miraculous efficacy. Except where devotion to orthodox Islam and its endowments was a vested interest, there had been signs of diminished respect for that doctrine and for its professors; but this was still very far from a landslide to atheism, nor had the old standards of behaviour been yet abandoned even by the *évolués*.

and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal 619
memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of
time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups
of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or
Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis,
well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a
secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original 619
kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread 602
wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in
sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over
centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and
is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great con- 619
federacies embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen
tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal
life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the
tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One
authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities,
birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable.
The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal
authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the
tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in 619
the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, 869
their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk;
and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable
range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed
to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might
feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—
whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess
the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found
equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord
of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the
Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' 619
material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer 178
fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had 631
been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the
town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The
Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal
areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern
military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be
ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal
jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal
refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*ḍhabṭiya*) could appear

619 from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be
178 seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships
631 had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in
the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as
river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme
posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads
[423] had become a Government function; more and more the local
Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the
Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands
as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and
jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain
and loyal follower.

619 Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old
177 tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came
369 with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

619 The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into
573 Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found [453] a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of
• 178 tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the
579 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud
721 with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

1. MIDSUMMER 1914

To few countries in the world were greater changes brought by 178
the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Govern- 511
ment by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was 178
clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or
modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, con- 186
fined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile 642
to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater 619
efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648k Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and
721 although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1921–6

642 These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality
186 a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a naḥiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-
642 twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroit-
178 ness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

644 There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Ḥaydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners simi-
648' larly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic

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[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their
511 tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting
backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the
sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnu-
trition, disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty
619 years since Independence, there had been change in directions
● 179 which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first
511 was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and
private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there
had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards
[177] security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it
was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census, police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally, detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries, lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures, while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself transitional and unformed—of the country at large and of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in 1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both 619 178
economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 511

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361
the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change, if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been
forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363
labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible.
Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362
or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for
outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365
service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been, imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the
ancient '*arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363
Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and
Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366
shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown
in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368
services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified
themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365
power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

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[1] The mausoleum of King Fayṣal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered [575]
by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526
survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in
'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling,
was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place
in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America.
Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542
well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the 434
poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying 369
the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in
austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529
summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in 212
the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world 173
upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts, easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development, an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted, was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of 1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those
affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology 814
apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

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[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

1f Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

642 character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the
186 chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence
and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign
well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters
of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses.
642 The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its
182 widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its
648x strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or
'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of
recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen
untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature:
the loss of Faysal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi
empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages
of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young
State, and had gravely unsettled it.

178 Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties
and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as
182 between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and
innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing,
and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international
menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer
how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise,
frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in
which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement,
000 tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce
to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to
describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and
organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment
and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-standards
of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the
conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with
reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people
might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as
human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of
which they were inescapably members, might allow.

123 But occupying cultivators in the South, while recognising tribal allegiance and the State's legal ownership (raqaba) of the land, commonly 579 regarded their tribal group as possessors of the soil by immemorial right, whatever the period of its occupancy of the land might in fact be. They frequently resented any demand for mallakiya, and indeed any claims to overlordship other than those of the State. It should not be assumed that in such disputes one side was invariably unjustly acquisitive or the other side obstinately recalcitrant. Each party doubtless thought that substantial justice lay on its side. Circumstances alter cases and it is neither possible nor useful to generalise on the point. It is the removal of the injury caused by these longstanding differences, alike to agricultural prosperity and to public peace, that is the objective, not the justification or satisfaction of particular disputants. As is well known this need was so strongly impressed on Government by recurring violence along the Hai and in the Muntafiq, occasioned by the perennial disputes arising out of the differences mentioned, that a law regulating the investigation and settlement of the conflicting claims in these areas was enacted two years ago and is now in course of application.*

621 In the northern rainfall zone the people generally lived in regular 622 villages, under the shadow of a local *agha* or other notable, and cultivated the soil and pastured their flocks round about. As there was ordinarily 423 more land than men to till it, land was brought under cultivation as 178 required and successive generations commonly tilled the same groups of parcels, alternating fallow with sown. When necessary, the local leader became the intermediary between the people and any central Government that could make itself felt. Thus he compounded for the village tithe ('ushr) and collected appropriate contributions from the cultivators. He settled land disputes in village conclave or otherwise, and his jurisdiction to do so was of no material importance so long as these mediæval conditions prevailed. As civilisation developed, towns became more attractive and communications improved, such local leadership sometimes tended to become absentee landlordship; while with the introduction of tapu tenure many village areas appear to have been wholly or partially registered as the personal possessions of local notables, without any consideration of the immemorial rights of those who had regularly occupied and tilled the land or pastured their flocks thereon. The pinch in these cases seems to have been mainly felt when the lands were pledged, and forfeited, to town-dwelling merchants for debt. The personal touch and interdependence that existed between even the most arbitrary local chieftain and the village cultivators appears not infrequently then to have been replaced by more mechanical efforts to exploit the land from outside and by obstruction to such efforts from within.

423 These generalised instances are only intended to serve as illustrations of the evil effects of granting tapu tenure in the past without a thorough study and due safeguard of previously existing rights. No comprehensive or detailed study of these cases is possible here.

5. When the maps from which Plates I and II were prepared were in process of compilation the Tapu Department did its best to show the location and extent of all land held under tapu tenure. Partly owing to the destruction of records by the retreating Turks, but much more owing to the inherent defects of their Land Registry methods, it was not found possible generally to do more than indicate approximately the outside limits of patches of territory thought to be affected. The maximum limits of these groups of territory will be seen, on reference to Table I, to cover about 40,000 square kilometres. It is impossible to say what proportion of the areas included would prove upon due investigation to be reasonably entitled to be held in tapu tenure.

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*Law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq Lands, No. 23 of April 4, 1929.

The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el 'Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country. 423 619

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised. 423 233

All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use. 423

8. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the 166 178

166 178 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 423 651 619 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer (mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended, wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective; but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 619 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 427 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

178 Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping
406 engines owned by every tribe send thousands of tons of the brown waters of the Euphrates down the irrigation
871 channels to make the land fertile and green. Education is spreading to the tribes, and an increasing number of tribesmen hold jobs of every sort in the railways, the port, and the oil companies. Many tribesmen from the Euphrates drove trucks on the great Aid to Russia route through Persia during the war. Others could be found serving the Allied war effort as far apart as Masira at the end of the Persian Gulf and Haifa.

With this development going on all around him, it is not surprising that the amusements of the tribesman are changing. Whereas before he had to amuse himself by listening to stories told by amateur but skilled storytellers, he can now pass the evening listening to a wireless set driven off the battery of his sheikh's or his sirkal's saloon car, or better still, he can jump a bus or lorry into the nearest village and watch an Egyptian, Indian, or American film. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the stories are dying out, and now only a few of the older men know them. These stories fulfilled a need in the days in which the tribes were in constant conflict with the Turkish Government, and in which facilities for written Arabic literature did not exist. Now, in more prosperous times, they must die out. I would stress that the stories were never considered as belonging to any great school of Arabic literature—they were simple little things, either originated by the tribesmen themselves or adapted from some more ancient story, and their intention was merely to evoke a smile on an arduous march, or to help pass a cold desert night; and so they must be judged.

000 To those who want the real beauty of a precise language, I say that this can be found in written classical Arabic,

103 Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

582 178 [619] The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still maintained in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

6. The Story of the Lost Soul

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

764 788 The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for burial in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

15: Tannous N, G-5 (no date) 1951 MI Middle East MI
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equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

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There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

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Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

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On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without distinction as equal citizens of the State. 641 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at least some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling. 668

The Kurds: Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are concentrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous, and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals, moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being semi-sedentary. 563 221 [241]

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized. Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly 563 619 178

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

563 acknowledge no law except their own customs, and no leadership
619 except that of their chief families, some of which, like the Baban
178 family, were virtually independent princes in Ottoman days.

Tribal feeling is still, as it has always been, stronger than Kurdish national feeling; and the Kurds have never formed a nation, still less a nation-state. In the last generation or so, however, new factors of unity have been arising. One is the growth of a Kurdish town-population. In the past the Kurds tended to leave commercial crafts to Jews and Christians, but now a Kurdish burgeoisie has appeared, in whom tribal loyalties are weaker and national ideals stronger. Another factor is the emergence of a Kurdish intelligentsia. Its education has been mainly non-Kurdish: Turkish in the days of the Ottoman Empire, Arabic and Western in the present generation; in consequence many of the educated Kurds have been assimilated to the Turks or Arabs. The majority, however, have remained Kurds, and have begun to develop a modern Kurdish press and literature, with its centres in Baghdad and Sulaimania. They are in contact with the centres of Kurdish life in Syria, Persia, Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Republic, and are forming and spreading the ideas of Kurdish independence and unity.

The Kurds under the Mandate

648 Before the war of 1914–18, the majority of the Kurds were
563 subject to Ottoman rule. It was natural, therefore, that the Allies should favour the idea of Kurdish autonomy: an ideal embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which provided for local autonomy for the Kurds still to be left in Turkey, or, if they themselves desired it, an independent state to include the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, of which the disposal was still undecided. The Treaty was never carried out, and was replaced in 1923 by that of Lausanne, which said nothing about a Kurdish State or about autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan. In the meantime, an Iraqi Government under British Mandate had been established, and, as it had been found impossible for economic and other reasons to establish a separate government for the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, it had been decided to incorporate them in the unitary State of Iraq. On the whole, the Kurds of the Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk regions accepted this, but those of Sulaimania did not. In 1922 they revolted under the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud. The revolt was only with difficulty suppressed; and it was not

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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Chapter 9

PUBLIC PRIMARY EDUCATION

*872 Free public primary education extends over six grades and is offered to any Iraqi child who has reached the age of six years. In theory, primary education is compulsory in areas where adequate facilities exist; in practice, in the few instances in which the Ministry of Education has declared attendance to be compulsory in given areas, social and economic conditions, together with inadequate planning, have made the ruling ineffective.

Except for certain modifications in schools in Kurdish or Turkish districts, or in the few so-called "model rural primary schools," the primary course is uniform throughout Iraq. Thus, a child moving from one district to another, from urban to rural or tribal district, is not handicapped by basic variation in the curriculum.

To a large extent, primary education segregates boys from girls, with [562 178] boys schools taught by men and girls schools by women. The Ministry of Education, however, has made considerable progress in recent years, especially in the cities, in overcoming the traditional prejudice against coeducation. In 1933–34 the Ministry opened kindergartens, later called "junior schools," which admitted both boys and girls and employed women teachers. In the larger cities, particularly in Baghdad, the kindergartens soon were enlarged to include first- and second-grade classes. Rather hesitant about adding classes at first, the Ministry was encouraged by the popularity of this experiment to enlarge the program. By 1938–39 junior schools had sprung up in the capitals of almost all the provinces, and in spite of the war these schools continued to flourish, increasing in number and attendance until in 1944–45 there were 56 schools attended by 8,512 children, 4,322 boys and 4,190 girls. At the present time the typical junior school consists of the first four grades and parallels the work of those grades in the public primary school. A few junior schools offer a five- or six-year course. Apart from these planned coeducational schools, coeducation at the primary level is tolerated in many rural villages where no girls schools or only incomplete ones exist.

000 and write to obtain more information. Most rural people have not yet learned such
369 fundamental principles as crop rotation to enrich the land, the concept of germs, or the principles of infection and contagion. Under their circumstances they
311 have not been able to acquire a growing store of knowledge or of experience to pass down for the advancement of each successive generation. In other words, the people of rural Iraq have had little cultural heritage or growth.

5. Attitudes and Social Organization

369 Also fundamental to their poverty are attitudes derived from their social position and relationships with their sheikhs and landowners. Virtually imprisoned
366 by their condition of total dependence and debt, rural people have developed deep feelings of powerlessness and futility. Many of these attitudes stem from a
181 weakening of historical tribal relationship in which there were greater reciprocal
●198 obligations between leaders and the people. Now they become unbalanced when the traditional tribal social system degenerates as sheikhs abandon their tribal responsibilities and take tribal lands as their personal possessions. The tribesman becomes detached from his social group. His dependence becomes greater upon the whims of his sheikh. This leader feels less and less obligation as the state and local governments assume those responsibilities for the [illegible] of the people which the sheikh formerly performed.

III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL PEOPLE

000 A. A PROBLEM REQUIRING TOTAL GOVERNMENT ACTION

The causes of the rural problems as briefly described obviously indicate that nothing less than a full scale attack upon them by all ministries and agencies of the government will bring about the desirable changes and improvements. Economic and social development of the rural people is not only necessary for their own welfare but for the welfare and progress of Iraq as a whole. A national economic and social development programme for rural peoples under the co-operative planning and direction of government leaders is needed. This programme should integrate into single, national, social plan of action the present and planned government activities of land and water development. The provisions should include as well as new plans for making ownership of farms available to tenants and landless people, credit, accessible to these small farmers at reasonable rates, instruction in new agricultural practices, establishment of public health and professional medical services available for all people, provision of education for every child, advice and demonstration in the improvement of housing, instruction in home and child care, establishment of social services for the needy, ill, blind and orphaned, construction of access roads to allow marketing of farm products from every village, development of village industries and the organization of communities for participation in an ultimate direction of their local affairs. This will take time, effort, money, careful study and planning, and increased inter-ministry and agency co-operation before it can be put into effect. The information and skills now exist to undertake this national campaign. It is a programme on which national leaders and with technical assistance from abroad can unite in their thinking and their efforts to build a solid agricultural economy as the foundation of Iraq.

established at every qadhā and naḥiya; and the Kurds, in turn, 563
supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in 563
type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, 181
fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay 795
in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal 563
organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, 621
Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Ṭuz 181
Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shi'ism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined 563
almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with 162
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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

4. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TOWNS

During the span of a single lifetime, from 1830 to 1900, profound 178
changes had come to pass in the urban society of 'Iraq. Most 369
marked in the upper classes, but perceptible in the lower, they
radiated from both outwards into a countryside still socially
primeval.

Early in the nineteenth century 'Iraq town society had remained 181 ●
almost wholly isolated from Western influences. There was no 177
acquaintance with the outside world. The tempo of life was that of earlier ages, traditional manners held the field, and life in every relationship was based on Islam. No restless progressiveness had appeared: the evils of the times were accepted by all with submissive fatalism. The impact of Western conceptions and activities upon this society was in the Levant gradual, in 'Iraq relatively sudden. Such ideas and phenomena came first to 'Iraq by way of the New Army which had, in a day, superseded Janissaries and Hayta bands: an army with Europeanized officers, soon followed by doctors, engineers, and the whole body of Westernized effendis. The senior officials, Turkish in speech and half-European in education, were accompanied by wives of Istanbul and children fresh from modern-fashioned schools. Posts and telegraphs, foreign trade and enterprise began to operate. The Christian and Jewish minorities, with their European leanings, continued to set a higher standard of education, aided by the missions which served them.

The cumulative effect of these influences had produced by 1900 178
an 'Iraqi urban society far removed from that of a lifetime earlier.
Fed by the telegraph, an incipient press, and the resident foreigners, 181
the talk amongst officials in the Saray, merchants and agents in the coffee-shop, notables in their diwans, could for the first time embrace wider interests. Literacy had become commoner, changes had appeared in domestic and social habit, European clothes were worn by an increasing minority, the tempo of life accelerated. The wealthy class increased in numbers as in possessions, and found fresh ways of spending. Social leadership was still on patriarchal or plutocratic lines; an intelligentsia scarcely existed; but among a widening circle the old acquiescence had begun to yield to dissatisfaction and questioning. An excessive confidence was felt in 'science' and modern knowledge, conceived always as a set of formulae with miraculous efficacy. Except where devotion to orthodox Islam and its endowments was a vested interest, there had been signs of diminished respect for that doctrine and for its professors; but this was still very far from a landslide to atheism, nor had the old standards of behaviour been yet abandoned even by the *évolués*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The social development which these processes entailed represented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue. 177

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied. 181 ● 511 [164]

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Baṣra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Baṣra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen-contractors whose 361 363

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The power
wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formid- 793
able not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was 565
always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of
State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their
considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse
of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were
exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable
element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish,
anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could
be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local
politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no
means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd
and Shumurd of Najf were notorious.

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without 517
its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social 181
observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations
of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of
information regarding the world, past or present, and that of
æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the
towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were
represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remembered
Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected
poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of
handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars
of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmelite),
and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans,
Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries
and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing,
book production, or generally readable literary output there was
nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excavation,
'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to
'Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery. The professional classes—
lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish
sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard
admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—
agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost
nothing to show. Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a 812
class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body
of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and 779
the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy 793
Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since
no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime
of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale
disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion,
this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631
foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of
the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the
greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The
'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, [181]
unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal
warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between
town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; [579
to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i com- 182]
munities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the
Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western
opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642
these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631
generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which
was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood
at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and
was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule
was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the
Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the
local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including
those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642
dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, 185
which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And
while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the
conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law
and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing
agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational
foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and
a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the
attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe
to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached
from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern,
pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government
of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had
enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its
Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every
new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya
system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565
a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the
effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647
were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by
race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part
of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

VII

AL-ISTIQLĀL AL-TAMM

I. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had 000 travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. 648x It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous 311 territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average 181 of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience 642 or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: 182 the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too 563 favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in 795 which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

182 563 795 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development, and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shiʿi which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shiʿi leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shiʿism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions. 181 665 204 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradition of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations' in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe. The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in 646 666 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions, that of the Deputies.

642 662 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively 665 responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it 642 appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism 181 as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local 642 nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over- 186 sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is 311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it 312 is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians. The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims, three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians, 871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed 153 into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

through institutions of higher education, seems to develop into an extraordinary mental agility. Those who are politically articulate share a high concern for the future of Iraq as a nation. 181 153

A visitor to the country is also struck by a number of contradictions. Iraq has a brilliant cultural inheritance, yet the bulk of the population is illiterate. It is a country of great economic possibilities, yet the majority of the people exist at a meagre standard of life. The soil is of high fertility, yet it continues to be farmed by primitive methods. Above all, although the future prosperity of the country depends upon the application of science and power to the land, agricultural development is inhibited by a most unsatisfactory system of land tenure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Primary education on any large scale in Iraq is of recent growth. 872 It began with the traditional Arabic mullah school, in which small groups of boys under the direction of a religious teacher memorized religious lore in a monotonous and repetitive manner. Traces of this verbal technique are still obvious in many of the primary schools.

Under the Ottoman régime the nucleus of a schools system was introduced, and it is said that by 1913 there were some 6,000 children attending primary schools of a sort. Soon after the next military conquest the British promoted some further educational development and, in particular, substituted Arabic instead of the alien Turkish language as the medium of instruction. By 1921 there were reputed to be more than 15,000 children attending public primary schools.

It is significant, however, that no real approach to a system of public primary schooling was made until the nation took its educational affairs into its own hands. Since the meeting of the first Iraqi Parliament in 1925 a real impetus appears to have been given to the development of primary education. By 1931 there existed 316 public primary schools with an enrolment of some 35,000 pupils. By 1950 extraordinary quantitative progress had been made, for by that year 175,000 children were enrolled in over 1,000 public primary schools.

THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

By 1940 the development of primary education, and of higher education, had gone on at such a pace that it was necessary to 645

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

In spite of arrests in the middle of October of leaders of the 175*
Arab Movement, including Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Shaikh Sa'id 668*
Effendi, Hamdī Beg Pāchahjī, Mahmūd Beg, head of *Nadī'* 186*
Watanī, or Native Land Club, and Bahjat Beg, fresh demands for decentralization were formulated. A general conference to meet at Kuwait in early 1914 to consider Arab questions was proposed in November. Representatives of Amīr Ibn Sa'ūd and of the Sharīf of Mecca, with whom Saiyid Talib had long been in correspondence, and Amīr Ibn Rashīd of the Shammar, Shaikh 'Ajaimī of the Muntafiq, the Shaikh of Kuwait and Saiyid Talib were to be among the delegates. Ibn Sa'ūd, in response to the invitation, replied that when the time came to rise he would be ready, but that the moment had not come.[1] Neither he nor the other Arab potentates were as yet able to sink their personal ambitions and enmities in the common cause. The conference was never convened.

In this same inability to make common cause seems to lie the [181] ●
failure of Arab Nationalism to make even greater progress before 1914 than it had actually made. In no way did the essential individualism of the Arab character reveal itself more than in these early days of the Arab Movement. In spite of the correspondence and interchange of views between the various sections of the Arab world, in spite of the manifestos and literature issued in the name of the Arab peoples, in spite of the essential unity of the aims and purposes of Arab Nationalism, the Movement tended to break into sectionalism, limited by the horizons of immediate locality. The rank and file of the Movement, no less than the sectional leaders, regarded with mistrust any leaders whose ascendancy seemed to overshadow their own interests and to detract from their own importance. Personal rivalries, religious differences and sectional animosities thus hampered the progress of the Movement, stultifying its efforts and nullifying its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the Movement

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[1] The statement in *The Times*, December 27th, 1913, that the Arab chiefs had composed their differences proved to be unsubstantiated by facts.

871 found to be entirely preoccupied with the classical and literary
876 tradition. It is true that the Arab mind has a flair for language and
[517 literature and delights in oral self-expression, and young children
181] learn to read and write quickly and speak with a fluency and feeling for words which children of other lands would find difficult to emulate. But with the increased importance of science and technology and the need of improving productive efficiency in industry, agriculture and other occupations, the people of Iraq cannot afford to remain content with a system of education which does not equip the younger generation to play its part in the projected plans of development.

Once educational authorities clearly recognize that the introduction of activity-centered methods and curricula and of craft work is basic to the whole idea of educational reconstruction, it should not be difficult to work out the necessary measures. In many other countries, such a reorientation of education has been actually achieved, and not only detailed theoretical discussion but records of concrete, practically worked-out schemes are available for consultation and guidance. It will, of course, not be possible—and even if it were possible, it would not be desirable—to copy these methods and schemes mechanically, because education is a creative field in which ideas have to be applied to the particular situation in which one is working. It will be necessary for Iraqi educators to work out their own pattern of "activity schools" and their appropriate forms of craft work. In fact, some gifted educators have already envisaged this problem in its true perspective. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis on *Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of Iraq* (published in 1942) is an effective presentation of the case for reorganized methods and curricula breaking with the narrow academic tradition. What is more, it gives concrete instances of how units in social studies and health education can be worked out in such a way as to break down the barriers between schooling and life.

What kind of crafts can be introduced in the village and city schools which will appeal to the children and will also be related to their environment so that they can leave school with trained skill and aptitudes and participate effectively in the work of their communities? The answer to this question can be given only after

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000 and write to obtain more information. Most rural people have not yet learned such
369 fundamental principles as crop rotation to enrich the land, the concept of germs, or the principles of infection and contagion. Under their circumstances they
311 have not been able to acquire a growing store of knowledge or of experience to pass down for the advancement of each successive generation. In other words, the people of rural Iraq have had little cultural heritage or growth.

5. Attitudes and Social Organization

369 Also fundamental to their poverty are attitudes derived from their social position and relationships with their sheikhs and landowners. Virtually imprisoned
566 by their condition of total dependence and debt, rural people have developed deep feelings of powerlessness and futility. Many of these attitudes stem from a
181 weakening of historical tribal relationship in which there were greater reciprocal
198 obligations between leaders and the people. Now they become unbalanced when the traditional tribal social system degenerates as sheikhs abandon their tribal responsibilities and take tribal lands as their personal possessions. The tribesman becomes detached from his social group. His dependence becomes greater upon the whims of his sheikh. This leader feels less and less obligation as the state and local governments assume those responsibilities for the care of the people which the sheikh formerly performed.

III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL PEOPLE

000 A. A PROBLEM REQUIRING TOTAL GOVERNMENT ACTION

The causes of the rural problems as briefly described obviously indicate that nothing less than a full scale attack upon them by all ministries and agencies of the government will bring about the desirable changes and improvements. Economic and social development of the rural people is not only necessary for their own welfare but for the welfare and progress of Iraq as a whole. A national economic and social development programme for rural peoples under the co-operative planning and direction of government leaders is needed. This programme should integrate into single, national, social plan of action the present and planned government activities of land and water development. The provisions should include as well as new plans for making ownership of farms available to tenants and landless people, credit, accessible to these small farmers at reasonable rates, instruction in new agricultural practices, establishment of public health and professional medical services available for all people, provision of education for every child, advice and demonstration in the improvement of housing, instruction in home and child care, establishment of social services for the needy, ill, blind and orphaned, construction of access roads to allow marketing of farm products from every village, development of village industries and the organization of communities for participation in an ultimate direction of their local affairs. This will take time, effort, money, careful study and planning, and increased inter-ministry and agency co-operation before it can be put into effect. The information and skills now exist to undertake this national campaign. It is a programme on which national leaders and with technical assistance from abroad can unite in their thinking and their efforts to build a solid agricultural economy as the foundation of Iraq.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631
foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of
the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the
greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The
'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, [181]
unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal
warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between [579
town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administra-
tion; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i com- 182]
munities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the
Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western
opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642
these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631
generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which
was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood
at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and
was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule
was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the
Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the
local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, includ-
ing those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642
dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, 185
which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And
while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the
conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law
and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing
agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational
foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and
a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the
attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe
to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached
from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-
modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government
of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had
enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its
Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every
new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya
system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565
a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the
effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647
were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by
race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part
of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated 635
secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming 661
C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim 636
Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of 663
ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the 185
town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless 369
showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew 182 ●
rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their 668
reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be 369
different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

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192 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the
668 Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in
563 the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unim-
369 portant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Ḥilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

579 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained,
674 and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the
sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation
[731] of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913)
the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

665 ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals
565 in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical
superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927, the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni schoolmaster, began a sequence of events which involved ministerial intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the
665 Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day,
565 by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for
182 Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened
668 by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the
Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned, and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i 'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between 'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January 1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

702 The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the
668 time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its
claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect 'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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Government had in fact, not without lapses, maintained the principle of employing Kurdish officials, other than technical, in Kurdish areas. It now proceeded to reaffirm this and to enact a Language Law in the interests of Kurdish-speakers, to set up a translation bureau, to appoint a Kurdish Inspector of Education for north-eastern 'Iraq, and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior. Local committees were next formed to determine the language of instruction to be used in each school, to specify the dialect of Kurdish required, and to replace non-Kurdish-speaking staff. Repeated visits were paid to north and north-east 'Iraq by the King, the Amir Ghazi, the High Commissioner, and 'Iraqi ministers with the purpose of allaying suspicion, increasing personal contact, and collecting such information as would satisfy the still uneasy Mandates Commission. It was possible, at this stage, to hope for increasing coalescence of the Kurdish areas of 'Iraq, and that their nationalism, wisely handled, would weaken: hopes not impossible but unduly optimistic, since the high statesmanship which could have achieved these ends was not in sight. Yet, in adopting a hesitant attitude to Kurdish claims, the 'Iraq Government was not always unreasonable. These claims were at times frankly separatist, incompatible with an 'Iraq State as constituted, exacerbated by the abiding antipathy felt mutually between the two races, and not lessened by the signs of a more sympathetic or more generous attitude towards the Kurds by the British advisers than by 'Iraqi statesmen. The fear existed, in addition, that privileges granted to the Kurds would be demanded immediately by the Shi'is of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question. It resulted that the entry of 'Iraq into the League was unmarked by any true solution of the problem of its unassimilated Kurdish minority. The Government, the British sponsors, and the League itself had to be content with palliatives and hopes.

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The same is true of that far smaller, more alien, and still less assimilable community, the Assyrians. Substantial numbers of these had by 1926 been settled in scattered Kurd-surrounded villages in Mosul liwā (p. 158). The completion of this process, further resettlement of the less satisfied, and improvement of the settlements were the tasks of the years 1927 to 1930. The High Commissioner's interest was shown by visits to the areas, by many conferences, and by invitations to Government to show all reasonable favour to the Assyrians, even though these, by their attitude of grumbling non-cooperation, in part frustrated the efforts of their well-wishers. A well-qualified Settlement Officer was employed, more villages cleared and reoccupied in the Ḥarir area of Rawanduz qadhā, advances of seed and money given to the reluctant settlers.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

VII.

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

I. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had 000
travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. 648x
It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous 311
territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average 181
of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience 642
or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: 182
the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too 563
favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in 795
which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

182 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development, 563 and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and out- 795 standing differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

565 184 as speakers and writers, this element which aspired increasingly to the leadership of the nation contained a number of able, sincere, and progressive men; but too large a proportion showed also the defects of the 'Iraqi political character—emotional hastiness, irresponsibility, egoism—and in spite of their claim to be the 'enlightened' they seemed at present not greatly to excel the 'old school' in disinterestedness or in wisdom. The 'old school', meanwhile, the ruling and minister-providing order which held most of the power in 1932, derived from the wealthier Sunni families of the greater cities, landowning or otherwise: from the ranks of senior ex-officials, who often belonged also to these families, and from the higher ex-officers, who rarely did so: and from a small class of rich Shi'i notables. These in all formed a body of established and experienced men of the world. Devoted often to sectional interests, they were not incapable of transcending them, and while willing to accept democratic forms they were reluctant to welcome disturbing elements from outside or from below.

182 ● Such elements composed the 'Iraqi political public of 1932, or claimed to lead it. Future years must reveal how far they could be reconciled, absorbed, or proved capable of self-subordination. Meanwhile, with material enough for divided councils, intrigue and faction, and for personal interests and ambitions, there were important unifying factors also, in addition to the general bonds of common religion, culture, and citizenship. All the public alike had been subject to the mandatory régime, with its control and its well-intentioned counsels—and almost all had, to some degree, reacted against it. In the future, with the passing of the direct control which Great Britain had exercised, the services of a few British servants of the 'Iraq Government would remain to be used in whatever manner and degree 'Iraqis might approve. The help of the British Ambassador,[1] successor to the High Commissioner, was equally to be available to future 'Iraqi Prime Ministers. These were and had long been factors of stability and continuity. Another had been the monarchy itself; and there was in 1932 no expectation

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[1] British Ambassadors to 'Iraq in the period 1932–51 (all of whom are mentioned in the text) were: Sir Francis Humphrys, 1932–5, having been High Commissioner since 1929: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 1935–8: Sir Maurice Peterson, 1938–9: Sir Basil Newton, 1939–41: Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (ex-Adviser to Interior, 1921–35), 1941–5: Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird, 1945–7: Sir Henry Mack, 1947–50: Sir John Troutbeck, 1951.

The services rendered to 'Iraq by senior members of their staffs were in some cases very appreciable, though entirely unknown to the public. Those who held the position of Counsellor—and usually acted for considerable periods as chargé d'affaires—were: G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, 1932–5: C. H. Bateman, 1935–8: W. E. Houstoun-Boswall, 1938–40: A. Holman, 1940–2: G. H. Thompson, 1942–5: D. L. Busk, 1946–8: H. Trevelyan, 1948–50: H. Beeley, 1950. Oriental Secretaries of the period were V. Holt, 1932–44, S. H. Perowne, 1945–7, J. C. B. Richmond, 1948–51.

that the incomparable services of King Fayṣal would not be available for another twenty years, capable as they were of neutralizing many of the conflicts and unstable features of 'Iraqi public life. That this was not to be was mercifully concealed at the hour of Independence; equally, it could not be foreseen that one of the agencies of security and national unity—the promising and hitherto correctly subordinate Army—was to take the lead in revolution and embitterment. 182

The most effective of unifying features—though in fact one of division also, since it was espoused by different factions with very different degrees of passion—was that of nationalism, the strongest single force in contemporary 'Iraqi politics. It had taken the form usual in 'new' nations, who adopt with enthusiasm the attitudes of which older, disillusioned countries have already wearied. Pride of country and desire for its political freedom have been generally hailed as laudable emotions, and by 1932 many 'Iraqis had shown ardours of patriotism as respectable as any in any country. But, in common with that of other countries, 'Iraqi nationalism had been in some measure vitiated by elements less respectable. Their friends would have wished to purge it of features morally and materially damaging to it, and to diffuse conscious pride of country throughout the public rather than see it concentrated in a small political class. They would have preferred political aspiration, which used nationalism as its war-cry, directed towards securing a better life for the masses rather than towards political goals as ends in themselves. If strident xenophobic nationalism had been less crudely in evidence, and a broader-based, more tolerant patriotism had taken its place, hopes for sound progress could have been the brighter. It was a defect of this nationalism, reacting against the country's social backwardness and resenting the material and international superiority of Europeans (and, often enough, their airs of social superiority also) to indulge in uncritical self-flattery and distorted history; and it added, as a unifying element, the encouragement of common hatreds directed sometimes against internal minorities, sometimes against 'the foreigner'. The local nationalism showed, save in a few individuals, little appreciation of what Western European civilization had at its best to offer—in tolerance, generosity, true freedom, and equality of opportunity—and little sense of the practical self-preserving wisdom, for small nations, of accepting a friendly place beside stronger Powers. An excessive or morbid sensitiveness reacted instead against imagined insults, fears of interference or suspected moves of 'imperialism'. Wrongly identified with patriotism, nationalism in fact was a field for political competition: the more anti-foreign the politician, the greater patriot. This persistent feature of 'Iraqi 186

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by 161
Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanageable public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt—gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities. 182 795 [771]

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial— 563
within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

1i Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

642 character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the
186 chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence
and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign
well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters
of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses.
642 The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its
● 182 widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its
648x strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or
'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of
recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen
untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature:
the loss of Fayṣal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi
empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages
of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young
State, and had gravely unsettled it.

172 Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties
and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as
182 between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and
innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing,
and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international
menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer
how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise,
frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in
which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement,
000 tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce
to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to
describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and
organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment
and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-
standards of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the
conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with
reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people
might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as
human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of
which they were inescapably members, might allow.

mitted in office. A Higher Disciplinary Board handles appeals and disputes 875K
regarding the rights of officials. 466

The Educational Ladder

The educational ladder in Iraq is based on a primary school, which 871K children enter at the age of six and attend for six years, a secondary school of five years, and a number of colleges of three to six years; there are also numerous professional and vocational schools. (See Chart IV.) The secondary school is of two levels: an intermediate school of three years' duration is an approximation of the American junior-high school; a two-year preparatory school is a shorter version of the American senior-high school. Thus, Iraqi primary and secondary schools operate on the 6-3-2 plan as compared with the American 8-4 or 6-3-3 year plans. Below the primary-school level, a few kindergartens are maintained by the Ministry of Education or by some private agencies.

Public primary schools

The public primary school is free to all children who have reached the 872K age of six years and offers a uniform curriculum extending over six grades. It is the common school which most Iraqi children, whatever their class, [182] religion, or race, attend, and it is the medium through which the educational authorities of Iraq hope to develop a sense of citizenship and national unity. Attendance is compulsory wherever adequate facilities exist. Article 36 of the Public Education Law prohibits Iraqi children from attending foreign primary schools; and as native private schools follow rather closely the curriculum of the government schools, it is safe to conclude that all Iraqi children of primary school age who attend school at all receive a standard type of primary education.

The primary-school course ends in a special public primary examination, set by the Ministry for all the schools of Iraq. No pupil can be promoted to a postprimary school, whether public, private, or foreign, without first passing the public primary examination or presenting a certificate showing that he has pursued similar studies abroad.

Postprimary education

Of 5,416 graduates of primary schools in 1942–43, 4,214 pupils, or 873K 77.6 percent, continued their education the following year. The great majority of these, 3,921 pupils, entered the intermediate schools, while the remainder, 293, entered some vocational or professional school. The boys

milk products, or from contact with in- 164
fected animals. From 5 to 97 cases were 232
treated annually in government institutions 758
in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination 742
of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to 164
the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 232
1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br. melitensis* was isolated from 5 of the 13 samples from which bacteriologic cultures were made.

DISEASES SPREAD CHIEFLY THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the 164
most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49, from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuberculosis were recorded annually. Such figures are of little value in assessing the problem, however, due to inadequate reporting and the shortage of diagnostic and treatment facilities. Local authorities estimate that the prevalence of latent or active infections approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas.
Widespread undernutrition and low stand- 164
ards of living, associated with overcrowd- 146
ing and ignorance of the basic principles of 511
hygiene, are factors contributing to the 165
spread of the disease. The death rates are known to be high, but little precise information is available. It is believed that a considerable number of tuberculosis deaths are erroneously attributed to pneumonia
and other respiratory infections. Moreover, [183]
the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit the presence of tuberculosis in the family due to the stigma customarily attached to
the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an aver- 164
age of 760 cases were treated in government 758
hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of about 25 per cent. The maximum number of cases occurred in the group from 16 to 30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. 164
Involvement of the bones or the glands accounts for a large proportion of the non-

p. 39(8)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads; their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-
dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking "Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

184 the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged
795 generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i,
[578] while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated.
Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and
their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little
social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own
will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided
by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government
itself.

563 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of
162 the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—
perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which
occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the
Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid
Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of
563 which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear
621 racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement
and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority
to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in
character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled
them in a social organization which represented an identical
response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with
sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes;
but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district
interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization.
About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided
into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the
whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur.
563 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds
795 of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their
197 homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of
the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan
Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran
between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan
(Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other
two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and
speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary
status.

563 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long
621 been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment
by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil,
and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for
563 the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley
dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish
Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

established at every qadhā and naḥiya; and the Kurds, in turn, 563
supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in 563
type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, 181
fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay
in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been 795
reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal 563
organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, 621
Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Ṭuz 181
Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shi'ism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined 563
almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with 162
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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of
162 the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few
184 households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, Kadhimiya,
Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to
which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian
and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar,
from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively
town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more
[795] unmanageable because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to
'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni
empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and
Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These
[463] hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk, with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boatbuilders in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever running water was available for their rites. Their origins and beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants 563
had been largely driven from the field. Western education was 162
widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish
progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The 184 ●
community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little 563
from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to 795
official Millets headed locally by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch. 162
Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous
in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nes- 184
torians, few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Amadiya qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nestorians, had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians, whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq. The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but not in lower 'Iraq, specialized in retail commerce, hotel-keeping, artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number
of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had [463]
long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All
the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually schools, served for long years past by the missions of European churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls' schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, 563
were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by 162
families whose property or politics constrained them to live there, by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded
civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of
French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession
and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated
State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the
shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties
of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired
mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments.
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on 647
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the
Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

bility, for some other power to intervene with decision; a part 642
which, in the event, was to be that of the Army. 662

It may be asked, would a frankly authoritarian government— 000
dictatorship, acknowledged oligarchy or mere Arab patriarchy—have been preferable? It would in all likelihood have been still less acceptable to its public than the pseudo-democracy actually imposed; the procedures of democracy, however ill conducted, were at least educative and might later show a narrowing gulf between form and spirit. Even a semi-nominated Chamber contained enough of intelligence, experience, and public spirit to be a valuable deliberative and critical body; politics and press at least provided an arena of action for the intelligentsia, whose suppression would be dangerous as well as improper. The only alternative to 'democracy' might well prove to be a tyranny oppressive within and, by its probable international adhesions, dangerous without. ʿIraqi political history for the ten years following its achievement of independence was to be one of the alternation in short cycles of the imposition and the relaxation of authority: the former accompanied by protests and violent intrigues against 'slavery', the latter always abused by licence turning to anarchy.

There was reference above to a ruling class. In fact, claimants 665
to leadership were more than one, and their claims if permitted 134
could be scarcely consistent with a democratic régime. In tribal society the position of the shaykhs, with all their intestine rivalries and schisms, was still unchallenged though no longer State-sponsored. Among the Shiʿi population, and especially among the tribes of the Euphrates, the influence of the ʿUlamā was still considerable and rarely exercised in the direction favoured by Government. Officialdom, an alternative source of leadership and itself a main social element, was now broadened by full admission of the Shiʿis, and its standard of education, conduct, and efficiency had risen markedly since Turkish times; but nothing in its position or allegiances could lead it to a sense of solidarity with the masses. The same is true of the non-official part of that important middle class whose upper edges touched the ministerial, the lower the proletariat class, and which included the lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shop-keepers, commercial employees, higher technicians, middlemen, and ex-officers. Extending from bare literacy to some learned pretensions, the class was self-conscious as the evolved and progressive element in their country; but it was frustrated by lack of active outlets in public life and especially by failure to break into the ruling circle. From it were arising, already before 1932, the new politicians and publicists. Not without quick intelligence and shrewdness, and often effective

565 as speakers and writers, this element which aspired increasingly to
184 the leadership of the nation contained a number of able, sincere, and progressive men; but too large a proportion showed also the defects of the 'Iraqi political character—emotional hastiness, irresponsibility, egoism—and in spite of their claim to be the 'enlightened' they seemed at present not greatly to excel the 'old school' in disinterestedness or in wisdom. The 'old school', meanwhile, the ruling and minister-providing order which held most of the power in 1932, derived from the wealthier Sunni families of the greater cities, landowning or otherwise: from the ranks of senior ex-officials, who often belonged also to these families, and from the higher ex-officers, who rarely did so: and from a small class of rich Shi'i notables. These in all formed a body of established and experienced men of the world. Devoted often to sectional interests, they were not incapable of transcending them, and while willing to accept democratic forms they were reluctant to welcome disturbing elements from outside or from below.

182 Such elements composed the 'Iraqi political public of 1932, or claimed to lead it. Future years must reveal how far they could be reconciled, absorbed, or proved capable of self-subordination. Meanwhile, with material enough for divided councils, intrigue and faction, and for personal interests and ambitions, there were important unifying factors also, in addition to the general bonds of common religion, culture, and citizenship. All the public alike had been subject to the mandatory régime, with its control and its well-intentioned counsels—and almost all had, to some degree, reacted against it. In the future, with the passing of the direct control which Great Britain had exercised, the services of a few British servants of the 'Iraq Government would remain to be used in whatever manner and degree 'Iraqis might approve. The help of the British Ambassador,[1] successor to the High Commissioner, was equally to be available to future 'Iraqi Prime Ministers. These were and had long been factors of stability and continuity. Another had been the monarchy itself; and there was in 1932 no expectation

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[1] British Ambassadors to 'Iraq in the period 1932–51 (all of whom are mentioned in the text) were: Sir Francis Humphrys, 1932–5, having been High Commissioner since 1929: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 1935–8: Sir Maurice Peterson, 1938–9: Sir Basil Newton, 1939–41: Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (ex-Adviser to Interior, 1921–35), 1941–5: Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird, 1945–7: Sir Henry Mack, 1947–50: Sir John Troutbeck, 1951.

The services rendered to 'Iraq by senior members of their staffs were in some cases very appreciable, though entirely unknown to the public. Those who held the position of Counsellor—and usually acted for considerable periods as chargé d'affaires—were: G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, 1932–5: C. H. Bateman, 1935–8: W. E. Houstoun-Boswall, 1938–40: A. Holman, 1940–2: G. H. Thompson, 1942–5: D. L. Busk, 1946–8: H. Trevelyan, 1948–50: H. Beeley, 1950. Oriental Secretaries of the period were V. Holt, 1932–44, S. H. Perowne, 1945–7, J. C. B. Richmond, 1948–51.

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply,
improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imperfect.
184 Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was
not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission
constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq
Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong,
was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies.

121 enshrined in the Statute Books of Government. And since the taxation imposed on agricultural production is one of the most important practical conditions attaching to the utilisation of land, a study of such taxation had to enter into the inquiry. Nor could any investigation of conditions of landholding in el 'Iraq be intelligible or real which did not pay careful regard to the methods of irrigation, public and private, the prevalent forms and standards of cultivation, the distribution and remuneration of agricultural labour. It was not of course possible within the period of a few months to cover this vast field of investigation as thoroughly and completely as the occasion demanded: but owing to the widespread and generous collaboration aroused, the results provide an adequate basis for immediately useful measures.

121 185 This general study of existing conditions had to precede consideration of the three objectives originally indicated, if Government was to be sure of its ground and to be provided with a trustworthy foundation for progressively constructive reform. For settlement of rights to land pre-supposes and requires some stable bases of land law, or at least of legalised custom, on which such rights can be founded. And so far, by common admission, such bases rarely exist, nor do the discussions of previous years appear to have advanced agreement as to the remedy. Again although an efficient Land Register is indispensable in due course, both for the operation of the statutorily registered tenures, and for any orderly regulation of the enormous residue of (so-called) State Domain, yet the execution of a settlement of rights to land must precede the establishment of such a Register. For an effective Land Register is nothing but an intelligible and dependable record. Its function is simply to mirror clearly and faithfully rights to land existing at any and every moment. It is useless to devote money and effort to rectifying and burnishing the mirror, so long as it will only have an unintelligible tangle to reflect. Attention must first be directed to unravelling the tangle.

185 Further, while it is certainly true that no united effort had been made, and no connected plan pursued, by the three public services mentioned, yet it will be recognised that, as subordinate Departments of three separate Ministries, they were not in a position themselves to adopt any general scheme of reform. This is clearly the responsibility of Government as a whole. And, as will appear later, if any well-concerted and effective measures are to be undertaken, the better co-operation and coordination of the efforts of these services will not be enough.

423 2. The lack of a well-documented collection of information about existing conditions of land tenure throughout the country was not on consideration surprising, having regard to the vicissitudes of modern el 'Iraq's short history. There must have been an enormous amount of spade work to be done in establishing orderly government throughout the country during the last ten years: and the current needs of administration no doubt completely absorbed the time and energies of those who might otherwise have undertaken a systematic collection of trustworthy information. The collection of such information, particularly in statistical form, is apt to be a slow development in any country. It requires time, a scientific appreciation of the value of exact data, and the resources of a well-established and experienced public service. And in connection with land it requires a more comprehensive and far-sighted outlook than a number of disunited Departments can reasonably be expected to produce.

423 184 The collection of a representative volume of trustworthy information was also attended by peculiar difficulty, owing to the extreme diversity of conditions prevailing throughout the country. This diversity

is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated 423
by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman ad- 184
ministration present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts.

The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. 423
For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon.

3. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers 122
dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were 114
unobtainable, while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape.

A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of 114
reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" 185
written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform.

4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the 121
Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country.

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry 124
of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the

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Iraq MH1

[For information on the customs of the Muntafiq tribes in Iraq, see MI1 Kuwait, 1: Dickson, Category 116, scattered references on pp. 110, 111, 124, 147, 164-171, 179, 191, 375, 421, 443-444, 518, 543, 545-560, 607-608, and 615.]

185, 433, 654

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Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
●Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the program of industrialization in countries of the Middle East after World War I up to 1945, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Turkey - pp. 274-284, Egypt - pp. 285-286, Iraq - pp. 287-289, Palestine - 289-290, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 290-291./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most 433 consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high 439 percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered 137 a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one- 313 fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of 185 improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and 241 the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the 511 423
resources to initiate new methods or improve the old.

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and dis- 511
couraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the 241
lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both 241
of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal 312
functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains
and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are 312
evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage 185
of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312 185 Although by 1900 these conditions were not unrealized either in Baghdad or Istanbul, they had not been formulated as connected problems for solution. Governmental activity in this sphere had consisted, at the caprice of Pashas, in no more than some measure of organization of petty local works. The Administration had in fact neither the knowledge nor control nor finance necessary to formulate or organize a comprehensive irrigation system. Heedless alike of present evils and of rich possibilities, the governors of 'Iraq were doing and planning nothing while irrigation in Egypt and India was making great and fruitful progress. Nor was the contribution of the public more promising; the shiftless tribal cultivators carried out with low efficiency such minimum of silt-clearance and flood-dyke repairs as was forced upon them, erected temporary canal-heads of reed-bundles or brushwood, multiplied their primeval devices of water-lift, wastefully prolonged or resited their canals, and ruined area after area with neglected salting.

An outstanding case of deterioration in irrigation conditions was occurring in these years on the middle Euphrates. Up to 1880 the Ḥilla branch had been maintained as the principal waterway, the Hindiya branch being a canal deriving from it. But the closing of the Ṣaqlawiya head up-stream, and the operation of natural forces of silting and scouring, allowed the Hindiya branch to gain in width and discharge. The problem of maintaining the flow of the Ḥilla branch had become first critically difficult and finally impossible. French engineers in 1891 completed a masonry dam which still held precariously in 1900, but failed to arrest the increasing ruin of Ḥilla branch irrigation.

487 The ancient land routes of the territory had remained constant since many centuries. Camel caravans used the desert ways of Damascus and Aleppo, mule-trains the time-worn hill tracks into Luristan, Kirmanshah, Persian Kurdistan, and the Van wilaya.
491 Within 'Iraq the routes were fixed by custom based on convenience; but here there were signs of recent progress in the provision of wayside Khans, new toll-bridges of stone or brick or resting on fragile pontoons. The roads, varying by districts in surface and security, were everywhere unsurfaced and neglected, deep in summer dust or flooded to seas of mud by rain or the overflow of canals.

499 Railways had, for many years, been hailed from a distance by 'Iraqis of every class as the bringers of ease and progress, and schemes in plenty had been propounded—those of Chesney in the eighteen-thirties, of Andrew in the 'fifties, and later of the Austrian von Pressel, the Italian Tonetti, the Frenchman Cottard, the Russian Kapnist. A local company had been formed in the 'eighties to construct a Khaniqin–Baghdad line, which lack of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631
foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of
the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the
greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The
'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, [181]
unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal
warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between
town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; [579
to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. 182]
Such was the territory which for four centuries the
Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western
opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642
these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631
generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which
was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood
at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and
was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule
was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the
Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the
local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including
those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642
dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats,
which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And 185
while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the
conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law
and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing
agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational
foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and
a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the
attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe
to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached
from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern,
pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government
of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had
enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its
Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every
new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya
system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565
a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the
effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647
were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by
race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part
of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the 642
example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self- 661
interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all,
'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards:
'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in
1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant
alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by
adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with
corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz
alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by
playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with
false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of
which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking.
From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its
ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and
to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 643
'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the 185
important town families—and notably those of religious pretension
—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and
charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as
planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic
preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal
bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which 631
any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the 619
impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom,
and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power
permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of
direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by
nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own
favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless
struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the
shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and
the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was
it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch suc-
cessful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to over-
look flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to
name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and
sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his
requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and
the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could 668
not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature
of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the
Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, 186
to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn 668
Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khuḍhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some 030
well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the 185
efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee 661
647

185 for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the
661 civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced
by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intru-
647 sion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in ʿIraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Bequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattuʿ) was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Ḥilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; ʿAna qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of ʿAbd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

701 The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad ʿAbakhana (military clothing

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated 635
secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming 661
C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim 635
Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of 663
ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the 185
town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless 369
showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew 192
rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their 668
reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be 369
different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the 579
period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of
Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It 674
was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest
eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq
of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg,
General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in
June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant
of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings 368
of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in
the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra.
The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast.
Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja
under its Jāf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals 743
and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The
Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building
for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their
Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrangements 744
in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely
a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to
combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels 368
appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enterprise, 185
a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple 439
exports of the territory still varied annually according to the harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates, grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin, partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are elsewhere mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

and progressively deteriorated. The river now adopted its Hindiya 312 channel to an extent of nine-tenths, leaving desolation at Ḥilla, Diwaniya, and Daghara. Government organized repair works, but without adequate funds or energy, and the greater efforts made under M. Cugnin in early 1909 proved unavailing. The Euphrates irrigation position remained menacing or disastrous.

But help was, after all, at hand. The veteran irrigation engineer 312 of Egypt, Sir William Willcocks, had studied the problems of 'Iraq 185 water-control from 1902 onwards, and had submitted proposals to Istanbul through the British Ambassador. 653 Late in 1908 he was appointed Consultant for 'Iraq irrigation, reached Baghdad in December and toured and studied with boundless energy, resolution, and intolerance, while the Mesopotamia Irrigation Survey pursued its work. By 1910 he had solved his problems. From the proposals in his report, most of which still held the field almost intact forty years later, there emerged the necessity for immediate large-scale works. To prevent flooding he demanded regulated flood escapes at key points, with strong embankments and the closing of existing breaches. The Euphrates escape would be at or near Ramadi, into Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Abu Dibis depression. The Tigris escape would be from the Samarrā area through miles of high ground into the Tharthar depression, unless the cost of so vast a scheme proved prohibitive. To raise low-season water-levels and provide reliable supplies to the off-taking canals, a barrage would be erected near Balad above Baghdad, and another at Kut al-Amara to restore the irrigable Gharraf (Ḥai) lands. The ancient Nahrwan canal was, by one of alternative methods, to be restored, and the waters of the Diyalā—and some of the Tigris—to be poured into it. The lower Euphrates swamps would be reclaimed by re-forming the main channels and by providing for flood escape. A barrage at Qarmat 'Ali would give controlled irrigation in Baṣra area. Large-scale drainage would be provided throughout the country by utilizing existing depressions, Tigris navigation would be safeguarded by controlling the great flood channels of the 'Amara district, the Buṭayra, Chahla, Majr Kabir, and Musharra.

Of this programme, grandiose and costly by any standards, criticism was not lacking on the grounds of deficient finances, tribal insecurity, lack of man-power, and chronic Turkish maladministration. But it was boldly adopted by the Turkish Government, with preference for the Hindiya Barrage as the first step. Willcocks witnessed from 1909 to 1911 the failure of further stop-gap attempts to repair the existing barrage, and was soon to experience his first taste of the greatest of all his problems—that of obtaining funds from the Turkish Government. Nevertheless

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312 work on the new Barrage began. Tenders for the complete con-
185 struction were called for in September 1910, and the contract
653 awarded to the British firm of Sir John Jackson & Co.

The construction of the Barrage, then and now one of the greatest works in 'Iraq, was carried out with extraordinary speed by a staff which included Turks, Indians, Armenians, and some 3,500 'Iraqis. The suspicion of certain elements in Turkish officialdom usually turned to gratified encouragement after a personal visit to Hindiya. Labour troubles were few. Transport, especially that on the Euphrates routes from Baṣra, presented extreme difficulties, with tribal blackmail and navigational obstacles: and the continual struggles needed to obtain funds from an empty Treasury in Istanbul and a harassed Daftardar in Baghdad were successful only after actual stoppage of the work seemed inevitable. The iron gates arrived in the late summer of 1913, and a crowded and triumphant ceremonial opening of the whole work was held in November of that year. Although the Barrage, which had cost less than £500,000, still lacked the canalization which it was designed to support downstream, it conferred immediately enormous benefits on the countryside which it served. These would have been a hundredfold greater if they could have included public security, an equitable land system, and some hope of new agricultural methods.

Elsewhere in 'Iraq, much of the earth-work of the Ḥabbaniya Escape in its first phase was completed, and digging of the Ṣaqlawiya Canal was begun but abandoned. Further surveys produced information of great future value, though no other major enterprise belongs to this period. A scheme for watering the Hawija, north-west of Kirkuk, from the Lesser Zab was begun without study and ended in fiasco and scandal. More important, and prophetic of a major development of the future, was the growing riverside use of oil engines for irrigation purposes. These increased from a mere dozen in 1900 to some scores in 1914. Meanwhile, flood-bank protection annually renewed followed its unsure and expensive course, rarely effective and always burdensome. The 'bunds' built by Nadhim Pasha for the safeguarding of Baghdad, though they failed partially in their first year, were an important work.

433 These last years of Turkish rule were marked by little industrial development. Some increase in local shipbuilding and the use of irrigation pumps, ice machines, wool and liquorice-presses called for the first time for mechanical repair facilities. The first motor-
494 car appeared in 'Iraq in 1908 from Aleppo; by 1914 less than a dozen were in use. These included a motor-bus service on the Ba'quba road, and the private cars of a few notables. Efforts to mechanize the Kufa tramway had failed.

642 distant, hated, interfering bugbear and, to the shaykhs, the enemy
619 whose every advance must be at the cost of their power and
livelihood. This was no less true among the Kurds, who, hating
the Turks, were unlikely to welcome the substitution of Arabs as
rulers; indeed, a national consciousness of their own had already
come, feebly, to birth. And on the Euphrates the theocratic Shi'i
priesthood were likely under any régime to maintain their own pre-
tensions, incompatible as these were with any secular Govern-
ment. Nevertheless, the tendency of the period prior to 1914
642 had been on the whole towards extension of the authority of
185 Government, a process likely or certain to continue under the
newer-fashioned post-1909 Administration: for this, tactless and
over-centralizing, was nevertheless more vital and more modern-
minded than any previous Ottoman Government. Its administra-
tive record even in the excessively embarrassed period of 1908 to
1914 contained creditable features: better attention was being paid
to education, health services, town planning; the gendarmerie had
been improved, town police perfected, the Army reorganized, the
judicial system in part revised. And the international agreements
of 1913 and 1914 between Turkey, Great Britain, and Germany
seemed to clear away many obstacles to development.

In the latter field, indeed, there was room for fair hopes. Though many problems were untackled—those of improved agriculture, use of water resources, land tenure—yet a notable beginning had been made with irrigation works, and the Baghdad Railway was at last, it seemed, to be completed. River navigation was likely to be improved under the 1913 arrangements. The eventual opening up of productive areas and markets would encourage trade and agriculture, and perhaps create industry. A concession for the oil of Baghdad and Mosul wilayas had been promised, and that to parties well able to develop that wealth, if it existed.

000 Thus a prudent observer of 'Iraq in the midsummer of 1914 might have prophesied a future of increasing development of resources and communications. These, directed by a vigorous Government free at last from international strife, might have produced by degrees the wealth necessary to maintain stronger forces, to impose security, to pay an improving civil service, to remedy, in fact, the more glaring evils of the Administration. Society would almost inevitably progress towards higher standards. The movement of local nationalism was likely to gain further ground in the direction of a privileged, even an autonomous, status in the Empire; but a complete secession of the Arab provinces was unlikely because it was backed neither by any military force, nor by any especial sympathy of Europe such as the Balkan Christians had enjoyed, nor by any unity of aim among the Arabs.

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered 648x
districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to
secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in
robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to
maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no
direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended
by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern 563
frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's 167
visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from
Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which 657
the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in
February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or
fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by
a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother
of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq
territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further
large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul
wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in
February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the
Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by
a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by
nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya
area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and
evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these
unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to
re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 563
'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising 631
and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an
elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in 185
a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance
was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities
in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment
of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State
in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own
countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army,
Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or
improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the
tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government
was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber
of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete
integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 563
still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least 657
passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to 166

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation,
of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great progress
697 was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi
management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development
by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities
and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
291 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional
circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed,
185 with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings,
366 and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-'Aṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries,
a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared
with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects
for which local pride was clamoring.

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administration 361
was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and 185
a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old 632
abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans
were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on [423]
specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise.

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and 871
showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way 658
haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Basra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeological 172
wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum,

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

1. TREATY DEADLOCK

648 THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary
Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to
observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the
years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify
optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to
complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds;
it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations.
Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished.
Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function,
and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused
of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased,
with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international
repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome
of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva
which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League.
With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved
normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts.
Its communications by land and air to foreign lands
543 developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the
minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially
unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an
optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of
peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of
619 Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal
resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not
extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous
of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were
less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Mean-
18 while, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further
developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a
closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved,
though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was
unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation
questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially
liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines
were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion
of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These
459 progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi
661
665

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors. Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation, in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equip- 331
ment, the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930 Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930 and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Airways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F., and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain, a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the (French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air communications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr. Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was completed in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were used as they came into being for letters, the former also for packages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized. In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185 ●
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold concession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

185 Rutba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of 654 bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial develop- 135 ment proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its 433 favour. 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

382 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil 471 export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in 1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

182 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development,
563 and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and out-
795 standing differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses
511 were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

tures; and the introduction of these, with the gradual rescue of 185 agriculture from primitive method and low yield, was a certain feature of the future. 'Iraq's irrigation problems—flood-protection, conservation of dry-season water, distribution, drainage—had been partly solved at least on paper, and more than one important scheme was formulated in readiness for execution; smaller works had been carried out, others were imminent. The complex problem of stultifying and perverse forms of land tenure had been unravelled, the way was open for clearance and rebuilding, and Settlement Committees were already in the field. Mineral wealth had been sought—but found wanting, save in the vastly important presence of a single asset, petroleum. The development of this had begun well, its potentialities were unlimited, and its contribution to 'Iraq's finances could already be foreseen as essential to all its hopes. Industry, willingly fostered, had indeed lagged behind for lack of raw materials, markets, and aptitudes, but could be expected to find a modestly increasing place in 'Iraqi economy. Trade was at the level, and on the lines, indicated by tradition and by present needs, and had well survived a world-wide depression. The means of communication of every type had immensely developed in the last half-generation, and would certainly be improved to meet the needs of an expanding economy and social and international needs. At least the elements of well-conceived public services already existed, and if funds permitted would gradually increase the social area of their activity.

This security and these beneficent developments and social 642 services had called and would call firstly for a reasonably efficient and comprehensive Administration, and secondly, for a sound and benevolent authority in the State itself, with a political life based on stable foundations. As to the first, the Administration which existed in 1932, while imperfect and in places rudimentary, not only was far superior to its Turkish predecessor, but seemed likely with time to shed the features which at present depressed it below the level of which the best 'Iraqi officials—keen, intelligent, honourable—were certainly capable. As to the second, the main bases of public life and legislation, there is more to be said.

'Iraq had adopted, as its form of government, representative parliamentary democracy. The choice could be criticized; but there had been no alternative. 'Iraq was no Najd, with full consent to a patriarchal tyranny: and no Persia or Turkey, which could throw up an efficient military dictator. It had as its only guide a political class which claimed to be liberal, wished to go on where the revolution of 1908 had left off, and was scornful of earlier forms; nor did it contain a personality capable of single rule, or a group capable of acceptable oligarchy. Neither to the British,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and his entourage, further corrupted by greater power, lost the b45K
respect of the better elements by their drunkenness and arrogance.
His marriage to a Viennese dancing girl was frowned upon. His
part in the murder of Dhiyā' Yunis, ex-Secretary of the Council of
Ministers and friend of the exiled Yasin Pasha, was everywhere
believed, and not less his directing hand in an assault made on
a veteran Arab patriot and fighter (but critic of Bakr) Mawlud
Pasha Mukhliṣ. The death in Damascus of Yasin himself in June
1937 rallied popular feeling to the side of this strong and sincere
half-sinister, half-charming personality, whose services his country
had so ill requited. The suicide of Ja'far Pasha's brother, the
death of other friends simultaneously with that of Yasin, and the
murder of a Baghdad notable, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Sinawi by a Kurd
whom Bakr protected, led to grim jests at the General's expense.

The impatient demands for Army expansion were financially b45+
embarrassing to the Government, and much unwise spending, b52
accompanied by the raising of funds 'for the forces' by public subscription,
did not make them more popular with the political
public. All officers concerned in the coup d'état of October 1936
were indemnified under a law of April 1937; but the sycophantic
suggestion to erect a statue to Bakr Ṣidqi, as Hero of the Revolution,
was not adopted. The conscription machinery still worked
largely amiss, though against less resistance; and most units were
below strength. Relations with the British Military Mission were b48K
for a time uncordial. The provision by Great Britain of armaments
and equipment raised questions of particular difficulty; the time
coincided with large-scale rearmament in the United Kingdom,
and many 'Iraqi demands for guns, aircraft, and equipment
remained, to their angry impatience, unsatisfied. This failure,
exploited by the adroit propaganda of Herr Grobba, the German
Minister, and on a passing visit by Dr. Schacht himself, was in
pointed contrast to the flattering offers of German and Czech arms
manufacturers, and led to the placing of 'Iraqi orders for armaments
with the Krupp and Skoda Companies and elsewhere, and for aircraft—of
types wholly unsuitable—with Italian suppliers. Some
of the material so ordered was delivered; the rest, to a value of some
£500,000, was countermanded when the Ministry fell.

It was not for the Army alone that funds were needed; Ḥikmat's b45K
ambition was to signalize his 'revolution' by the initiation of the 185
important works so long projected—roads, buildings, the railway
extension, and completion of the Kut Barrage. Messrs. Baring
Bros., again approached, could offer £3 million on favourable b52
terms, and Parliament in the spring of 1937 authorized this
borrowing. The 'Iraq Petroleum Company, however, whose
royalties were the proffered security, declined on principle to pay

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439
Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453
varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656
shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436
in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. 652
The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern 185
multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291
served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi *sidara* in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had 433
little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382
significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

49½ British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership,
as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In
the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern
became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment
of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the
responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with
British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on
these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without
some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest.
499 The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for
the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development
northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late
in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–
Nisibin line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier
at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek,
all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Basra–Baghdad–Istanbul
system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to
construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken
by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed
forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq
Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began,
the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest
of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qadhās.

509 Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch
trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing
frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself
to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment
came into being at Baghdad and Baṣra, and British flying-boats
after 1937 used also Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A
French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and
Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested
Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation
was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry
206 of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land
line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public
services from Baghdad and Baṣra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and
Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and
kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broad-
207 casting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to
1937 still experimental and occasional.

425 Good progress was made during these five years in the all-
important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up
185 under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked
excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and
others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as 425 135 too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land-developers, and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding [423] was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallaḥ, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes [166 654] to construct model villages, good in conception but at present trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increas- 241 ing official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

241 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The
473 Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. A Com-
[656] mittee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the
312 prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new
[45[illegible]] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural
[185] affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first
312 stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates
653 left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

185 The Ministry of Social Affairs, inspired by Dr. Sami Shawkat
657 on the orthodox lines of Axis philosophy, pressed for a higher birth-rate and legislated for the encouragement of lower dowries and earlier marriages. It urged the fuller development of trade unionism, and for the first time enforced the law which restricted certain trades (p. 246) to 'Iraqis. A bill was introduced to compel landowners in successive zones to build cottages for their cultivators.
172 The Department of Antiquities, with Seton Lloyd as its Adviser from 1939, conducted excavations at Samarrā and at Jabal Sinjar in 1939, and at the site of Wasiṭ in 1939–41; a German expedition dug at Warqa also in 1939.

648✓ In politics the movement, from the early summer of 1940 onwards, was from doubt towards decision, from a pretended unity towards evident faction. As the war of inaction in Europe gave place to a series of German successes, with the collapse of France and the entry of Italy, many 'Iraqis could see in adhesion to Great Britain little but self-condemnation to the losing side. The Army leaders, pro-Axis by temperament and by absorbed propaganda, saw no case for hesitation; in every Anglophobe old rancours found anew the support of logic and of national interest; and the prudent or uneasy of most political colourings admitted the value of at least a tacit reinsurance with the probable victors. The failure of final efforts in the summer of 1940 to wring from the British some reassurance over Palestine, or some hopeful countenance to the 'liberation' of Syria, was exploited by the Mufti and his many friends. Syrian ministers visiting Baghdad late in the year—Jamil Mardam Bey, Sa'dullah Jabri, and Luṭfi Ḥaffar—were fêted with enthusiasm as partners in the struggle against imperialism. Diplomatic relations with Denmark had been dutifully broken off when it was overrun by Hitler; but with Italy, whose Legation in Baghdad was now the centre of Axis activity, no breach was enforced when Mussolini entered the war on 10 June, and the British Ambassador's remonstrances went unheeded; the few Italians interned were soon liberated and returned to Italy. Nuri's influence failed on this and similar issues to carry the Cabinet with him, and one minister, Amin Zaki, resigned. The tone of the press passed from dubious neutrality to overt favour of the Axis, rather encouraged than restrained by the Prime Minister. Later in the year the difficulty or indeed impossibility found by Great Britain in supplying military equipment to 'Iraq, and her reluctance to provide dollars to buy arms for an ally so half-hearted, led to angry resentment in 'Iraq officialdom and the Army, and to the dispatch of an 'Iraqi purchasing mission to the United States.

The joint visit to Ankara of Nuri Sa'id and Naji Shawkat late in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

721 exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no impor-
tant practical results could be expected from this move, which at
*645 best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the
Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the
Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor
dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of
obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent
of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of
foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the
Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi
officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under
Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Water-
house, did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship.
Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the
722 Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were
offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition
without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British
advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or
surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system
accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements,
the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and
grain supplies provided.

361 Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which
was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such
185 major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban develop-
ment could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be
planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with
working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud
and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great
changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions them-
selves were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the
resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled
during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of
London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of
744 office to the Amin al-'Asima. The Health services continued to
develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private
practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the
Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had
served the country and their science now for twenty years, still
played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far
871 from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was
passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls,
and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools
were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few
during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382 of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241 was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the 166 establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in 464 their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423 committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185 since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425 a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166 sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312 continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their studies and planning, though the intended major projects could 653 not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 439
'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry, and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the 453
exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies, and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the 436
National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and 241
was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. [162]
Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi
farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to 185
solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting. New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

241 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in
● 185 operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize
and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those
473 of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of
export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices,
throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension
granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the
last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year
would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist.
Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the
Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers
and exporters.

654 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-
242 year course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for
agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya
185 (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at
Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry
station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected,
tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield,
quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust campaigns
in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world:
caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another
and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many
centres. The department was in touch with local industry which
could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley,
beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments
in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would
diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intolerably
[474] wasteful. It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative
societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspectorate,
and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself
in rural education and established agricultural schools in every
[361] liwā. It was promoting village settlement, in which field the interesting
and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323)
was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the
Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board
allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six
years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechanization
of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of
depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly
under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all
the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties
of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of
a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under
controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power as its chief limiting factor. Attention was being given to 654
the increase and improvement of livestock, a major asset of the 242
country; Ayrshire and Friesian bulls were imported and distributed, rams from a selected herd were sold to reliable farmers, 185
laboratory work on wool was carried out. Yet other lines of progress were dairying, with experiments in cheese production, the breeding of improved mules and donkeys, the increase of egg production by improving poultry breeds. The allotment by the Development Board for the period 1951–6 was nearly 2 million dinars for agricultural research, 3½ million for small-scale reclamation schemes, 1¼ million for animal husbandry, and a million for swamp reclamation. The need for a measure of integration between animal husbandry and crop production, hitherto divorced, was realized, as well as the broad essential singleness of the effort which must be made in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, land settlement, rural education, and the provision of capital. It seemed certain as the nineteen-fifties opened that if this effort were made and sustained by public and Government, and in the absence of any general calamity, the prospects for agricultural development in this wide and favoured territory, within the ultimately fixed limits of its river-water and rainfall resources, exceeded those not only of any Middle Eastern country, but of any territory of comparable size elsewhere in the world; the growing of food for less fortunate nations could prove, indeed, to be the main part of 'Iraq's material contribution to humanity.

In the care of its forests not much had yet been accomplished 313
beyond the limits of study, experiment, and the establishment of 185
tree-nurseries; the wide but neglected forest areas (p. 29) of the north still lay untended and unimproved, lacking notably a modern forest code, a staff of trained foresters, and even detailed exploration. Some steps had indeed been taken to provide fire protection and to carry out by helicopter and air photography the first forest surveys, but few to prevent uncontrolled cutting, grazing, and trespass by the villagers. One million dinars were allotted by the Development Board for forestry development in 1951–6. The significance of these areas to soil erosion, silt deposit, and river flooding was understood, and plans were being prepared on these and allied matters; but only a beginning had been made to solve these problems or to move towards the large-scale action which must be involved, or to provide the 'Iraqi public with sources of fuel and timber at present lacking.

Although sea fishing, based on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, was but a 226
limited resource, the rivers and swamps of the territory were the source of a fish catch estimated at many thousands of tons a year, and export of fish to the Levant—and in particular to the Jews in

226 Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

312 The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of
rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long
desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable.
[731] The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous
floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory
of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the
[647] resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were
supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

312 The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the
652 Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis
185 project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in
two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Dukan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Isḥaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Board[1] at its early meetings in 1951 and they were, with possible 312
modifications, to form the basis of 'Iraq's future irrigation activity, 653
whose full realization, however, must, for all the impatience of the 185
public and the press, occupy not less than fifty years.

Works actually completed before the end of 1951 were the re-aligned Ḥabbaniya inlet (Warrar channel) and the return outlet to the river (Sinn al-Ḍhibban channel), ensuring flood protection and making possible the use of stored flood water. The Wadi Tharthar inlet channel—a work of very great magnitude—was put to tender by the Development Board in 1951; the Samarrā barrage and headworks, and the greater Ḥabbaniya scheme, were to follow later. Much detailed planning and designing remained to be done, even for the immediately following five years, before a programme, especially in lower 'Iraq—'Amara, Baṣra, and the Gharraf—could be established. The extent, however, to which the Willcocks plans of forty years earlier had stood all tests was indeed remarkable. Only the Faluja and Balad barrages (p. 63) had been abandoned, and development in the Baṣra–Ḥammar area might or might not in the end follow Willcocks's plans. The abiding problem of silt deposit appeared partly soluble, by improved headwork design and by mechanical clearance. Pump irrigation seemed by now to have reached its economic limit in much of the territory, but there was ample room for more intensive cultivation of the pump-lands.

The connexion of reasonable and stable forms of land tenure 423
had long been recognized by Government in its land-settlement 565
activity, and the latter had a creditable volume of achievement to show after eighteen years of sustained effort. Early criticism of the procedures adopted (p. 261) and the progress of the work itself throughout 'Iraq (p. 323) have been elsewhere described. Five more years' work since the end of the war had defined, delimited, and recorded the personal rights in other wide areas. The abiding problem of Muntafiq land rights had not yet been solved; in 'Amara an answer not very different from the *status quo*, but with longer-term security for the shaykhs and greater fragmentation was likely to be found. Elsewhere the hard case of the landless fallaḥ was little changed wherever he had been unable to establish a basis of title and, at the opposite extreme, the good fortune of

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[1] The Board's six-year plan, legalized early in 1952, provided for year-by-year expenditure, from 1951–6 inclusive, on the Tharthar project, to a total of (in thousands of ID) 10,300: on the Ḥabbaniya, 2,200: on the Diyālā dams and canalization, 6,750: on the Dukan dam, Ḥawija barrage, 'Udhaym barrage and canalization, 6,750: on the Bakhma dam, 8,700: on irrigation works in Mosul and Arbil liwās, 1,900: Tigris barrage and canalization, south of 'Udhaym mouth, 1,800: and main drainage, 4,100. New and re-formed canalization on the middle and lower Euphrates, lower Tigris and Gharraf, and Baṣra area were allotted 10,425.

Much progress had been made, under the care of a Hides Associa- 433 tion, in the better treatment of local hides and skins, and well-tanned leather was produced. Boot and shoe manufacture, largely by electrically-operated machinery, had increased in scale and quality. The cement factory outside Bahgdad, using lime brought from near Ṭuz Khurmatu, came into important production in 1949 and was soon selling 250 tons a day. The three cotton ginneries erected before the war—one of them an Agricultural Bank enterprise at 'Aziziya—remained in being, with capacity to deal with much more than the available cotton crop. Printing presses, all small except one European-owned and that of the Government, remained substantially as before the war, save in their modernized equipment. The spinning and weaving industry, which in some cases also dyed and finished its fabrics, had by 1950 greatly increased its pre-war development and used in part local cotton; a factory in Mosul made also rayon cloth.

Other industrial projects more or less near to realization in 1950 were for rayon production from straw, for local production of fertilizers, and for sugar-refining. The treatment of tobacco leaf had been intensively studied, but remained defective. The industries likely, it was thought, to develop further, using 'Iraqi raw materials and diminishing the need for import, were those producing cement, soap, alcohol, vegetable oil, leather and shoes, cigarettes, beer, and textiles. The other industries would in all probability keep a lesser though perhaps a useful place; none was likely to produce a considerable surplus for export, unless, as some hoped, an industry could be founded to use, for fertilizers or otherwise, the abundant by-products of petroleum. The Development 185
Board intended considerable expenditure on 'industrial and mining 3167
schemes' in the period 1951 to 1956, upon lines to be later revealed.

'Iraq's poverty in minerals other than petroleum seemed in part 135
to have been corrected by the discovery, in the later forties, of 317
interesting copper and copper pyrites deposits in the mountainous Qal'a Diza area, and by reports from the Government geologist of an outcrop of excellent marble near Rayat and supplies elsewhere of chromite, iron ore, magnesite. These, or some of them, were thought capable of commercial development. A hard limestone suitable for barrage building was sought and found. Local salt, gypsum, brick clay, Mosul building-stone, and cement-making materials were in use as before, and it was planned to renew the activity which during the war had produced up to 15,000 tons a year of Kifri 'coal'.

In spite of the imposed delays and frustrations of the war period, 382
the position achieved in the petroleum industry by 1950 was such as to place 'Iraq in the forefront of oil-producing countries, with

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl.

An Inquiry
INTO
LAND TENURE AND RELATED QUESTIONS

PART I.—SCOPE AND PROCEDURE OF INQUIRY

185 1. The considerations which led Government to ask me to visit el 'Iraq in the winter-spring season 1929-30 were briefly summarised at the time. The necessity of setting up a sound system of settlement and registration of rights to land as an essential preliminary to agricultural development was urged. It was represented that until effective measures to achieve these ends had been devised and put into operation, agricultural development must either be delayed or based on unstable foundations. It was emphasised that while the country was full of agricultural possibilities and only required development on sound lines, it lacked the necessary basis of a sound system of land registration. And it was explained that the Departments of Revenue, of Land Registration and of State Domains were pursuing reform without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan.

The main objective was the promotion of agricultural development. The particular needs were adjudged to be (i) the execution of a settlement of rights to land throughout the country, (ii) the establishment of an efficient system of book-keeping of those rights, and (iii) the unification of divergent and disconnected Departmental efforts. I was asked to study the problem as a whole and to advise how it should be attacked. As outlined that problem appeared to be essentially one of organisation and procedure for attaining two accepted objectives: a just settlement, and an efficient register, of rights to land. I anticipated that the requisite information regarding existing conditions would be readily available: and I expected that the discussions of previous years would have produced clearly defined issues. But I had not allowed for the peculiar fluidity and diversity of methods of land tenure practised.

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427 It proved to be common knowledge that the tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all. It was also common knowledge that the land law was defective and uncertain in its application to the other fifth. And it soon appeared that there was an almost complete lack of precise, authoritative and systematic information in the Headquarter Offices of Government in regard to land conditions generally and to the methods of holding, transferring and transmitting land actually practised from day to day by the great mass of landholders and agricultural peasantry throughout all parts of the country.

121 It therefore became necessary to extend the scope of my inquiry to include an investigation of the conditions of land tenure actually operating throughout the country, as distinct (for the most part) from those

121 enshrined in the Statute Books of Government. And since the taxation imposed on agricultural production is one of the most important practical conditions attaching to the utilisation of land, a study of such taxation had to enter into the inquiry. Nor could any investigation of conditions of landholding in el 'Iraq be intelligible or real which did not pay careful regard to the methods of irrigation, public and private, the prevalent forms and standards of cultivation, the distribution and remuneration of agricultural labour. It was not of course possible within the period of a few months to cover this vast field of investigation as thoroughly and completely as the occasion demanded: but owing to the widespread and generous collaboration aroused, the results provide an adequate basis for immediately useful measures.

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185 This general study of existing conditions had to precede consideration of the three objectives originally indicated, if Government was to be sure of its ground and to be provided with a trustworthy foundation for progressively constructive reform. For settlement of rights to land pre-supposes and requires some stable bases of land law, or at least of legalised custom, on which such rights can be founded. And so far, by common admission, such bases rarely exist, nor do the discussions of previous years appear to have advanced agreement as to the remedy. Again although an efficient Land Register is indispensable in due course, both for the operation of the statutorily registered tenures, and for any orderly regulation of the enormous residue of (so-called) State Domain, yet the execution of a settlement of rights to land must precede the establishment of such a Register. For an effective Land Register is nothing but an intelligible and dependable record. Its function is simply to mirror clearly and faithfully rights to land existing at any and every moment. It is useless to devote money and effort to rectifying and burnishing the mirror, so long as it will only have an unintelligible tangle to reflect. Attention must first be directed to unravelling the tangle.

185 Further, while it is certainly true that no united effort had been made, and no connected plan pursued, by the three public services mentioned, yet it will be recognised that, as subordinate Departments of three separate Ministries, they were not in a position themselves to adopt any general scheme of reform. This is clearly the responsibility of Government as a whole. And, as will appear later, if any well-concerted and effective measures are to be undertaken, the better co-operation and coordination of the efforts of these services will not be enough.

423 2. The lack of a well-documented collection of information about existing conditions of land tenure throughout the country was not on consideration surprising, having regard to the vicissitudes of modern el 'Iraq's short history. There must have been an enormous amount of spade work to be done in establishing orderly government throughout the country during the last ten years: and the current needs of administration no doubt completely absorbed the time and energies of those who might otherwise have undertaken a systematic collection of trustworthy information. The collection of such information, particularly in statistical form, is apt to be a slow development in any country. It requires time, a scientific appreciation of the value of exact data, and the resources of a well-established and experienced public service. And in connection with land it requires a more comprehensive and far-sighted outlook than a number of disunited Departments can reasonably be expected to produce.

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184 The collection of a representative volume of trustworthy information was also attended by peculiar difficulty, owing to the extreme diversity of conditions prevailing throughout the country. This diversity

is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman administration present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts. 423 184

The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon. 423

3. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were unobtainable, while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape. 122 114

A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform. 114 185

4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country. 121

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the 124

161 162 worthy information was available as to the rural population, their main occupations (e.g. cultivation with type of crops, stock-keeping, fishing, reed cutting, the numbers of the sedentary, semi-nomadic and truly nomadic population, etc.). The figures need not be closely accurate, but they should necessarily be sufficiently reliable relative approximations to allow dependable deductions to be drawn from them. But although continuous and painstaking efforts were made to satisfy this need by the liwa authorities, it has to be admitted that no basis exists for arriving at figures that can be utilised with any confidence. Table II contains the best estimates that the liwa authorities were able to furnish; and the Census Department was not in a position to give me any better material. I include the table, because it at least represents the best local opinion of the position under the various heads cited. It should perhaps be noted more particularly that it was found impossible to separate in any systematic way those engaged in urban, from those engaged in rural, pursuits. Finally, only the populations of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were excluded from the latter. This explains the misleading density figure for the Karbala Liwa. It should also be noted that the figures given for the agricultural population include all those engaged in rural occupations, other than genuine nomads.

TABLE II. APPROXIMATE POPULATION, 1930

Expressed in thousands

Liwa	Total estimated population	Three principal towns	Nomadic tribal sections	Rural Population			Mean Density per sq. kilom. cultivated region
				Settled	Tribal	Total	
Mosul ..	320	79	45	176	20	196	22
Arbil ..	106	—	3	47	56	103	15
Sulimani ..	94	—	15	51	28	79	37
Kirkuk ..	160	—	19	63	78	141	13
Diyala ..	240	—	1	79	160	239	67
Baghdad ..	388	219	2	93	74	167	86
Dulaim ..	147	—	59	39	49	88	95
Karbala ..	90	—	2	83	5	88	136
Hilla ..	103	—	—	30	73	103	21
Kut ..	170	—	—	60	110	170	30
Diwaniya ..	238	—	58	79	101	180	40
Muntafiq ..	340	—	20	25	295	320	72
Amara ..	238	—	—	36	202	238	36
Basra ..	190	46	10	34	100	134	264
Totals ..	2,824	344	234	895	1,351	2,246	36*

*Mean density total 78,000 sq. km. cultivated region.

So far as the figures can be accepted the mean density of the rural population per square kilometre of the cultivated region works out at about 19 in the four liwas of the Rainfall Zone, and at about 35 in the five most typical liwas of the Irrigation Zone. These figures are very low, especially for the potentially fertile irrigable lands of the latter; but there is no reason to think that they err on this side. However, it will be appreciated that dependable statistics of the agricultural population are needed to enable development of the country to be pursued to the greatest advantage and with the greatest economy.

166 185 The extreme mobility of the majority of the population, especially throughout the Irrigation Zone, is an important factor in the consideration of development schemes of all sorts, having regard to the general sparsity of the population and the limited resources of the country. If work can be concentrated on such schemes in a few of the most suitable areas, and facilities can be given to the population to colonise them as opportunity and occasion justify, much more rapid and satisfactory results will be obtained for the same effort and expenditure in a given

166 185 time, than if attempts have to be made to carry out development in a scattered and incomplete manner throughout the whole country at once.

4. Land Revenue Returns

651 4. It was my original intention to devote one part of this report entirely to a study of land revenue questions. For although in some respects a matter for independent consideration, the effect upon all tenures of land of the burden of any land revenue demand (whether in cash or kind) and the methods by which it is imposed, is profound. But since I left el 'Iraq a drastic change in the land revenue system has been enacted.* It will clearly not be helpful to comment on land revenue methods that have been superseded. And I understand that the new laws are of a specifically provisional nature and that their imperfections are realised, so that it seems of equally little use to comment on them. But although no useful purpose seems likely to be served by the discussion of the displaced land revenue system now, the three accompany-

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* Law for the collection of Istihlak (Consumption) Tax. No. 83 of 1931. Law for the collection of Land Rent. No. 85 of 1931.

TABLE III. ANNUAL COLLECTIONS OF LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

In lakhs of rupees

Year	Summer Crops	Winter Crops	Dates	Vegetables	Other fruits	Tobacco	Miscellaneous	Totals
1923	34·20	44·75	16·73	9·62		1·30	2·24	106·84
1924	34·15	47·24	19·34	6·09	2·33	3·70	0·02	112·87
1925	46·13	69·20	22·79	6·03	2·44	1·96	0·04	148·59
1926	42·16	59·94	18·25	5·38	2·47	2·67	0·02	130·89
1927	39·32	59·07	21·60	4·70	3·46	2·98	0·01	131·14
1928	40·94	59·92	23·30	4·63	3·76	2·91	0·04	135·50
1929	87·77		18·22	3·66	3·11	1·67	0·07	115·42
Totals	273·22	391·57	140·93	36·63	21·07	17·39	2·44	883·25
Averages	39·04	55·94	20·13	5·23	3·01	2·48	0·35	126·18

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

Under forms of assessment prescribed by Law 40 of 1920

Crops	Average receipts 1923-9		Percentage distribution under various forms of assessment prescribed									
	In lakhs of rupees	Per cent. of total	By unit of area Art. 6	Estimation Art. 9	Rope measurement Art. 10	Tree counting Art. 11	By plough units Art. 12	At market centres Art. 14	At Customs and Excise Offices Art. 15	By unit of lift Art. 17	Lease by auction Art. 20	Three, four, or five-year agreements Art. 21
Summer crops	39·04	30·6	6·1*	8·5	7·7§	—	—	—	—	4·6	0·6	3·1
Winter crops	55·94	45·9	6·4	12·4	2·3	—	9·2	—	—	6·9	0·5	8·2
Dates ..	20·13	15·3	9·2†	0·3	—	5·8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vegetables	5·23	3·8	1·2‡	—	—	—	—	2·3	—	0·3	—	—
Other fruits	3·01	2·3	0·1	0·1	—	1·6	—	0·1	—	—	—	0·4
Tobacco ..	2·48	1·9	—	—	—	—	—	—	1·9	—	—	—
Miscellaneous	0·35	0·2	—	—	—	—	—	—	0·2	—	—	—
Totals ..	126·18	100·0	23·0	21·3	10·0	7·4	9·2	2·4	2·1	11·8	1·1	11·7

This table is intended to illustrate the operation of Law 40, applied during an average year under conditions existing in 1929. Actually estimation was principally resorted to before 1926, the various new methods of assessment having been increasingly used subsequently.

* Largely Amara rice, Baghdad and Kut summer crops and rice included in Basra jarib tax.

† Basra jarib tax.

‡ 1930 figures, previously under Art. 14.

§ Mostly Diwaniya rice.

2. The introduction of the Ottoman Land Code, and more particularly of tapu tenure, by Midhat Pasha about 1870, was a serious attempt at land reform in el 'Iraq which failed through no want of perseverance or sincerity of purpose. It failed for two reasons, either of which would have been decisive. It was foredoomed to fail, as it failed generally throughout the Ottoman dominions, because the administrative experience and machinery, the technical knowledge and the qualified staff needed to accomplish so formidable a task, were lacking. It was also foredoomed to fail because it attempted prematurely to cast in a rigid (and an alien) mould the fluid practices of a still preponderantly primitive society. Land reform cannot be imposed on a country as an exotic by any outside agency. To be successful it must be suited to local needs, conform to local ideas and conditions and be established gradually by Government and people together. Essential preliminaries to success were a sympathetic adaptation of the Code to meet these requirements and a sympathetic initial investigation and stabilisation of existing occupancy and other customary rights. Moreover the construction and maintenance of a reliable Land register would have been indispensable. These were not the only essentials of success, but they are those that chiefly concern us here. Probably none of them were sufficiently understood at the time. Certainly none of them were satisfied. While the causes of the failure must be analysed if a repetition of these old errors is to be avoided in a modern and better managed effort now, they must be recognised to have been not unusual ones at the time. And although the Ottoman Land Code has never been properly assimilated or generally applied in el 'Iraq, yet it has gradually affected both local concepts and local practice deeply. It would therefore in my opinion be an error resembling that originally made, to abandon this Code now for an entirely strange one as Turkey herself has done. The old Ottoman Land Code is no longer an entirely foreign code and it can be more readily and more closely adapted to local needs than any new importation. It unquestionably requires to be drastically mended, but it certainly should not be ended.

3-5. REGISTERED TENURE

3. Outside of the towns and certain garden reaches the private ownership of land (mulk) is rare in the country. As already noted true waqf land can only be constituted from mulk and is correspondingly limited, while untrue waqf is restricted to a dedication of some financial interest in the land affected. There is little differentiation in the Sacred law between movables and immovables held as private property (mulk). But an Ottoman law of 28 Rajab 1291 (September, 1874) required that the latter (including trees and buildings on miri land) should all be registered and forbade the unregistered ownership of such property subsequently. A certain amount of mulk immovable property is registered in el 'Iraq, but the compulsory registration of such property has never been practicable or systematically attempted.

Land reserved for public or communal use (matruka) is not registered as such. It constitutes a small fraction of the whole and, as noted earlier, the distinction between such land and ordinary State Domain is rarely recognised.

With the relatively minor exceptions mentioned the whole land surface of the country—cultivated land, pasture, waste, forest, mountain, desert, steppe, marsh—is in law State Domain of one or other of the two categories (miri or mewat) laid down in the Ottoman Land Code. The legal ownership (raqaba) of all this land is vested in the State; but, as noted, subject to certain important conditions its usufructuary possession (tesaruf) may be granted out on a permanent, heritable,

Government Department, certainly beyond the power of the organisa- 423
tion and resources so far devoted to the purpose. 427

This is not to say that no systematic efforts have been made to put 427
the tenure of miri land on to a more secure and orderly basis. Many such 185
efforts have been made throughout the country by Provincial Officers, the Irrigation Department, the Survey and others. Foremost among them must be mentioned the periodic revenue settlements in Amara, which not only defined the limits of the various tribal interests there, but have also tended to stabilise many lesser holdings. A valuable fiscal survey of a large part of the Basra Date Gardens has been done. A business-like survey, allotment and record of land accompanied the construction of the Yusefiya, and other canals: and pains have been taken to keep these records up to date. In the Dulaim liwa a careful list of all the holders of recognised parcels of land has been compiled and subsequent changes noted. Other instances could be given. Naturally, all the resulting compilations have serious imperfections regarded as permanent records of the rights admitted to miri land: but this was not usually their primary purpose and such imperfections were inevitable in the conditions under which the investigations had to be made. And whatever the imperfections of such undertakings may be, they deserve grateful recognition and they should materially facilitate further stabilisation of tenure.

But it must none the less be admitted that these were all detached uncorrelated efforts owing no inspiration to any concerted attempt of the Central Government to improve the position of the mass of holders of miri land. Broadly speaking, those who occupy and cultivate miri land are allowed to do so in the absence of more influential opposition. Possession is ordinarily nine points of the law: but neither long possession nor any other mode of acquisition confers security. Personal influence with the most effective arbiter is commonly the decisive factor at any moment in any particular land dispute: and anyone may find the most convincing claims set aside. Moreover, any dispute may be reopened at any time if circumstances promise a more favourable consideration of a disappointed party's case.

Having regard to the history of the land, the widespread acceptance of tribal rather than individual rights, and the extensive and ill-defined areas affected, this state of affairs is not really remarkable; but it none the less calls for recognition and progressive remedy.

5-7. Pump Development of the Riverain Tracts

5. As is well known there has been a rapid and extensive develop- 312
ment of irrigation by privately owned pumps during the last ten years throughout the high level tracts bordering the main waterways (see Plates I and II). As is also well known, the confident expectations of an early and profitable return on the considerable sums sunk in this development have been largely disappointed.

Persevering efforts have been made to obtain consistent and comprehensive statistics of the numbers of pumps erected, of the horse power of those pumps and of the areas irrigable by them: but owing to the records having been differently dealt with at different times and in the various liwas and departments concerned, it has not been found possible to do so. Although this is disappointing, in view of the interest and importance of this development, it is not surprising. And I have none the less been enabled to illustrate the rapidity and extent of the

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private [439] pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 18, 157, 157, 288, 288, 403 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errrors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort [166] made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 464 465 439 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour, (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

●185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

* A *mishara* is reckoned =2,500 sq. metres.

423 ephemerally the unceasing stream of disputes concerning or arising out
427 of the possession and use of land.

The confusion of land tenure throughout the country generally is not confined to one category of land. While it may be more general in the case of miri land, it is also common in the case of tapu land. The long-standing and bitter disputes in the Muntafiq area regarding land claimed to be held by tapu sanad are the most notorious, but far from the only, illustration of this. Similar uncertainties are common throughout the country, in regard to land claimed in tapu tenure, to land and trees claimed to be mulk possessions, and to land dedicated, or claimed to have been dedicated, under the various forms of waqf.

185 The execution of an effective reform of land tenure throughout el 'Iraq is a formidable undertaking and one which under the most favourable conditions is bound to take a great many years to complete. It is easy enough to draft bills designed to bring about academic reforms and to get these passed into law: but it is a very difficult matter to ensure that such enactments are beneficial and workable in sober practice and, even more difficult to ensure their steady, intelligent and impartial application over the long term of years that must intervene between the introduction and the accomplishment throughout the whole country of the thorough-going reforms that are needed. But serious as the difficulties to be encountered are, they will yield, as they have done elsewhere, to intelligent, sincere and persevering attack.

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423 2. The late State Domains Department warmly espoused and steadfastly advocated the implementation of the original attempt of the Ottoman administration to grant out all cultivated miri land on tapu tenure. This policy was loosely and, I venture to think, misleadingly termed the alienation of miri land. For alienation denotes an estrangement of legal ownership whereas such ownership (el raqaba) is specifically reserved to the State under tapu tenure. The correction has more than legal significance; because the expression "alienation of State land" connoted, both to the Department itself and to the public, the adoption of a new, a beneficial, and a feasible policy of distributing land hitherto held by the State to private, and for the most part to peasant, proprietors. Tapu tenure, as already noted, was expressly intended in the country of its origin to promote a body of industrious peasant proprietors and taxpayers.

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427 In sober fact the overwhelming majority of the cultivated holdings, classified as miri in el 'Iraq, has for generations been in the hands of the people. Its possession is sufficiently subject to local or central interference to cause great individual insecurity of tenure, and all the evils resulting therefrom, as we have noticed. But while the legal ownership of the State is indisputable, its exercise of such ownership is, for the most part ineffective, uncertain and spasmodic. This is inevitable under existing conditions and is bound to remain so until they have been remedied.

The reform attempted by the Turks, and advocated again by the State Domains Department, was not, therefore, in any real sense, a substitution of private for public ownership of land. It was essentially no more than the legal regularisation in a prescribed form of the already widely existing private or communal holding of miri land. Some such reconciliation of actual with lawful tenure of miri land is indispensable if general security of tenure is to be established at all: and the greatest sympathy must be felt with the desire to effect this reconciliation through the medium of an established statutory tenure.

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427 for public purposes (e.g. as public waterways, railways, roads) which should be formally reserved forthwith as public utility areas.

It thus appears, on a most cursory examination, that there is a large, a pressing, and a complicated programme of practical reform waiting to be done in the existing legal categories of mulk, tapu and matruka (or manafa' umumiya) land alone. The complementary task of establishing the overwhelming balance of miri land on a securer and economically sounder basis is even more formidable. This balance, it will be remembered, includes the riverain tracts, the settlement of whose complex problems is probably the most imperative agrarian question of all.

● 185 The conclusion is inevitable that if any effective reform of existing land tenure is to be established at all throughout the country as a whole within the life-time of the present generation, it must be initiated and maintained on the simplest lines that will satisfy the bare essentials of equitable settlement of existing claims, of substantial security of subsequent tenure, and of even and economical taxation. Simplification of the land law and of the practical working of all tenures; simplification of the procedure of cadastral survey, of settlement and record of rights; simplification of fiscal assessment and collection, must be given the utmost possible consideration throughout.

4. It will be easier to see what simplifications of tapu tenure are desirable and justly possible when the existing provisions of that tenure have been analysed as applied or applicable in el 'Iraq to-day (see vii, 1). But from the point of view of the national interest the necessity of securing a fair and proper valuation of tapu acquisition payments (e.g. tapu mithl or bedl mithl) on all initial grants in this tenure is probably the most important. The enormous territories of miri land now existing constitute the principal capital of the nation and any transfer of rights over such land to individuals should be accompanied by equivalent advantages to the public purse. Timely provision against excessive shareholding, and for the nomination of authorised representatives when there are more than two or three shareholders, should also not be overlooked.

But since the vast majority of the cultivated land in el 'Iraq is miri, the necessity for the general simplification just emphasised applies with greatest force to this category of land. In general the simplest, the quickest and probably the only feasible method of placing the tenure of miri land on to a more satisfactory basis, is to accept to the utmost possible extent the present simple concepts and practices and to concentrate upon making their application more systematic, more equitable and more sure. It is evident that for many years to come at least, the tenure of the great mass of miri land throughout the country must be regulated locally, if it is to be governed by law at all. It is always possible for the central Government to intervene in particular cases here and there: but in the overwhelming majority of cases the questions that arise from day to day must continue to be decided on the spot by the people among themselves, or by the authority of a local public officer (e.g. mudir el nahiya) who is familiar with both the people and the land concerned. Consequently any tenure that is to be operative in practice must be understood by, and commend itself to, the judgment of the mass of actual landholders, social leaders and provincial authorities. Simple principles and simple procedure thus understood and accepted can be made to provide the foundation for an attainable reform which, modest though it may be, is preferable to the pursuit of more theoretically perfect tenures, which will inevitably sleep in the statute books because neither people, nor effective authority, nor conditions are ripe for their application. But desirable as it is to put the land tenure as rapidly as

possible on to a firm and complete basis of law and of fuller economic 185
freedom everywhere, it has to be recognised that the process must be gradual, particularly in the remoter and more backward parts of the country.

Some measure of discretionary control will require to be exercised 423
in regard to the persons accepted as lawful holders of miri land, for two 185
reasons. In the first place, so long as there are tribal areas (dira) which
must continue to be recognised, it may be necessary to restrict the hold- 428
ing of miri land within those areas to members of the tribal group concerned. In the second place holdings of miri land are not transmissible on death, and this would be inconsistent with that tenure as outlined. So that on the death of a miri holder a suitable successor has to be agreed upon. As we have seen the claims of the deceased holder's family to such succession are commonly admitted by prevailing custom. This is unquestionably in the public interest, provided the recognised representatives of the family are willing and able to discharge their obligations as miri holders to the community and the State. But it is necessary for the secure and economical working of miri, as of tapu tenure, that the number of representatives of a group of holders of a parcel of miri land shall be limited. In my provisional report I suggested that the number should not exceed three. In the case of holdings below a certain size (e.g. 10 misharas) limitation to a single recognised representative or holder might be advisable.

Such recognised representatives or holders should be in actual con- 423
trol of the land on the spot and thus effectively responsible for its
cultivation and management. He or they should preferably be chosen 185
by the deceased holder's family (or the group concerned) with the assistance, if necessary, of the local authority. Commonly he or they would have taken a leading part in the cultivation and management of the holding previously. The responsibility of a recognised holder of miri land to his family must primarily be a matter between himself and that family, as it is now. Complaints of abuse could always, also as now, be brought before the local authority, and possibly in future in certain cases before the *qadi*. Again, when the size and productivity of a miri holding permits it could, if desired, be divided on the death of a previous holder. No mortgage direct or indirect of miri land is reconcilable with the tenure as outlined, nor (for reasons given above) does this appear to me desirable (v, 2). Possibly some restriction should also be exercised over the pledging of produce and of agricultural animals and implements.

In the interests of the nation and the agricultural community as a whole, it is essential to recognise in a practical way, from the first, the economic limitation set on both the fragmentation of holdings and the multiplication of shareholding. The capacity of a parcel of land to provide a livelihood is necessarily restricted, and those who actually develop and work on it, with their immediate households, must evidently have the first call on its production. Moreover, unless there is a surplus of profit to put back into the land the general advance in the standard of agriculture, which is so greatly needed, will be retarded, if not prevented. Security of tenure is one of the primary conditions of such an advance. But security of tenure must be coupled with a wide-spread and general opportunity to make agriculture provide more than a bare and narrow livelihood for the greater mass of the population engaged in it, if any sustained national advance is to be realised. Owing to the sparsity and mobility of the country's existing population and to the backward state of its agricultural development there should be no difficulty for very many years in preventing any uneconomical congestion of the agricultural community on the land. But excessive shareholding

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already occurs in more intensive holdings (e.g. gardens) and in house property.

5. When considering the position in the riverain tracts, in my provisional report I suggested (iii, 24) that the simplest and the most appropriate means of regularising the holding of miri land was by standard leasehold agreements in accordance with prevailing theory and partially prevailing practice. It never appears to be contested, even by the most firmly entrenched holders of miri land, that the ownership of such land belongs to the State. Nor is it contended that this ownership is titular. But while the effective ownership of the State is recognised, it is claimed that this ownership does not carry the right to evict at will well-established holders from their holdings of miri land. Subject to good behaviour, to maintaining cultivation, to payment to Government of its revenue contribution, and to the satisfactory discharge of certain public duties, such holders of miri land claim a right of undisturbed possession, which in principle is universally admitted.

There will probably be no difficulty in formulating the main rights and obligations of miri holders in standard terms, if and when Government decide to maintain and systematise miri tenure. But within the main framework of this tenure considerable elasticity would have to be allowed for supplementary or even exceptional provisions required to meet varieties of local circumstances, of local customs and of agricultural needs. The rain-watered plains of the north, the valley cultivation of the hills, the pump-fed riverain tracts, the rice-growing fringes of the marshes, the areas supplied with regular free flow irrigation, are instances of such variations which will occur to all.

[651] At first sight the contingent obligations now customarily imposed on miri holders in the form of public duties appear to be impracticably onerous. But the obligation that needs definition most of all is the nature, the method of assessment and the method of payment of the revenue contribution, which represents the miri holder's amalgamated rent and tax to the nation, for the land he holds. General public duties should not fall on miri holders as such. They would more reasonably be discharged by some unpaid local dignitary, who could be accorded appropriate privileges.

In pursuance of the need to establish greater security of tenure and in conformity with customary doctrine, miri leaseholds held by long-established miri holders or their descendants, should normally be renewable in practice, although terminable in form. The duration of miri leaseholds might as a matter of regular routine be fixed at ten years. While such leaseholds should ordinarily be renewable to previous holders, if they had previously discharged their obligations satisfactorily, yet renewal should require a formal act on both sides. This would keep the nature of the tenure in the public mind, and the existing records up to date and reliable. Standard fees should be charged for all issues and renewals of miri leaseholds. These fees should in principle be limited to covering the aggregate cost of the simple administrative and technical procedure needed to maintain the necessary records satisfactorily.

6. The Land Register

423 6. As already noted the Land Code only recognises the private holding of land in two ways. Such a holding must either be private
[425] property (mulk) or it must be State property* held in tapu tenure. And the acquisition of all private holdings in either of these categories must be registered to be valid.

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* Miri in law including all cultivated land not owned in mulk.

be registered to be valid. Thus the Ottoman legislators intended and 423
provided that all holdings of cultivated land should be recorded in the Land Register. The inability of the Ottoman administration to put the land law into force, has left the greater part of the cultivated land of the country in parcels occupied on loose and irregular tenures unrecognised by the Statute law and unrecorded in the present limited Land Register. Instead of comprising, as intended, a record of all cultivated holdings that Register probably excludes from its purview between three-quarters and four-fifths of the cultivated zones. To permit the Land 185
Registry to perform its intended national function and constitute the general and dependable custodian of land tenure that is needed, not 647
only must its administration and procedure be drastically reformed, but the scope of its operations must be steadily extended until they include at least all privately held land of every recognised category. It should in fact become a General Land Registry (Daftarkhana umumiya el arazi) instead of being, as at present, a Department of tapu and mulk registration only. (Dairet el tapu.)

There are three points to which reform must more particularly be directed before the Land Registry can perform its functions. The Land Register is at present a register of transactions or deeds. Registration of deeds is an unreliable and incomplete method of recording rights to land. It should be converted into registration of title. There are also at present two decisive external obstacles to the construction and maintenance of an effective register of title. The first of these is the absence of a dependable cadastral survey. The existing service recognises this need and carries out scattered property surveys itself to the best of its ability: but this is no substitute for a properly controlled survey conducted by the technically competent Department. The second obstacle is the absence of practical provision to make the extreme multiplication and sub-division of shares upon inheritance of mulk property and tapu holdings economically workable. Such extreme shareholding may possibly still be rare, but it occurs*; and it would be fostered by the introduction of an efficient record until the position became unmanageable.

Since the major defects of the existing Land Registry are due for the most part to circumstances outside of the control of the Department itself, no useful purpose will be served by examining its internal procedure in detail now. Nor does space permit here of any explanation of the necessary conversion of the Register into a Register of Title. When the immediate questions of constructive reform have been decided the requisite modifications in the methods and machinery of record that should supplement them can be considered in detail if desired.

7. Land Survey

7. Reference to Part II will recall to mind the position and prospects 423
of the national land survey, which it will be remembered is of a purely 647
topographical nature. So far as can be foreseen it will take about another 185
ten years to complete and map this survey on a scale of 1:10,000 throughout the cultivated area of the country, if the staff and efficiency of the Survey Department are sufficiently strengthened to enable them to push ahead with their general framework and to make good certain other weaknesses while continuing detail survey on the present lines. It may be hoped that Government will be able to afford the Department the necessary financial and administrative support to enable at least this modest forecast to be fulfilled.

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* E.g. see "A Report on al 'Iraq," page 22(b), by Ahmed Fehmi Beg, Director-General of Revenue, Government Press, Baghdad, 1926.

423 647 185 This forecast could be halved at relatively slight additional expense if a minor expansion of staff of all grades and of resources could be authorised, if land marks could be regularly safeguarded, and if an uninterrupted programme of work could be maintained. This would make a regular and equitable valuation of the Land for purposes of land revenue practicable within a reasonable period (see vi, 9).

But I see no prospect of any general programme of more detailed or larger scale survey being realisable, nor could it be recommended at present.

423 185 It has already been stressed that the execution of a methodical and trustworthy land survey of the country is a requisite condition of all effective land reform. It is a requisite condition not only of the establishment of a stable and secure land tenure and of an equitable assessment of land revenue, but also of any efficient system of irrigation and indeed of any reliable and systematic knowledge, development and use of the territorial resources of the country. It was, for example, to provide essential information for the Irrigation Department that the Survey has concentrated on work in the Irrigation Zone hitherto. It is, therefore, imperative that while devoting closer and more considered attention to the needs of land tenure in future, the Survey should call no halt in meeting these other primary needs.

Unquestionably a detailed cadastral survey, which reliably locates the limits of all individual holdings, is required to place land tenure and land revenue on to a thoroughly satisfactory basis. Only on the basis of such a survey can the unqualified stability and security of tenure be attained which is required to stimulate the development and productive capacity of the country fully. But the change from pronounced confusion now characteristic of land tenure to detailed order, is too great to be effected at a single step. The requisite detailed cadastral survey would be a lengthy and onerous undertaking for a much richer, better prepared and better equipped country. It should not be attempted in el 'Iraq at present.

[651] Doubtless in the vicinity of the larger towns and in other places, in which the higher value of land brings in commensurate receipts in higher fees or in increased rentals or other revenues to Government, true large scale cadastral surveys may be justified exceptionally. And the ultimate extension of a proper cadastral survey elsewhere, as development proceeds and land values increase, should always be kept in view.

But the hopes of establishing orderly record, secure tenure, and fair and dependable taxation of land throughout the overwhelming mass of the cultivated territories of the country within the next ten or fifteen years, must be based on a foundation of simpler and less detailed survey. To be precise, the measures of attainable land reform within any period worth envisaging at present should be such as are applicable, and can be maintained, in conjunction with a 1:10,000 topographical survey of the cultivated terrain of broadly the same character and accuracy as is now being produced. The work should be converted into (what has been aptly termed elsewhere) a topo-cadastral survey, without markedly increasing the complexity and closeness of the detail. The parcels or sub-divisions of the land adopted as cadastral units for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment, must be of considerable size and bounded (at least ordinarily and preponderantly) by easily recognisable physical features. The placing, and still more the subsequent maintenance and control by Government, of a host of artificial boundary beacons outlining individual holdings must be dismissed as entirely impracticable. It will be as much as the country can do to establish and

protect the framework of survey reference points, which constitutes the one and only indispensable collection of ground marks.

The landed subdivision, cultivation unit, or estate, commonly known as *muqata'a*, which exists in one form or another throughout the greater part of the country, affords an admirable general instance of the type of topo-cadastral unit needed. Plate V shows the actual grouping of land in muqata'as in a village selected at random as well as their considerable variations in size. The term muqata'a itself is usually, if not invariably, applied to large existing agricultural holdings regardless of the method of tenure or the legal category or categories of land included therein. Existing muqata'as should not, of course, be surveyed and accepted as cadastral units without proper scrutiny of their history and tenure, while in some cases they may require subdivision and in others grouping. But subject to necessary investigation and adaptation to the practical requirements of survey and record, they constitute a series of major territorial units of the greatest economical importance agriculturally and the greatest practical importance administratively for the handling and maintenance of land reform. Where muqata'as do not exist, a similar artificial grouping of agricultural land for purposes of survey and record can be substituted. All the more important rights to land can be recorded with respect to some one or other of a series of such major territorial units, not as precisely as if a detailed cadastral survey could be carried out, but with a sufficiently substantial degree of exactness and reliability to provide a solid foundation for the most necessary reforms.

It can, therefore, be concluded that the main objective of survey during the next ten or fifteen years should be the execution of a topo-cadastral survey of the cultivated surface of the country on a scale of 1:10,000 of the existing muqata'as, or of similar artificial territorial groupings of land on the same general lines as at present. In principle this survey should be conducted in association with a preliminary settlement and subsequent record of rights, which will be next considered. And it must be embodied in accurately reproduced published maps, if it is to be of general value and use.

But an extent of territory that would occupy settlement for a number of years has already been mapped on 1:10,000 or some larger scale. So that the survey would be working in advance of settlement for a long time. None the less the co-operation of the Survey staff would be needed on the ground to embody in the maps revisions and additions required during the progress of settlement. The necessary association between the two branches of the work could be secured in this way, although probably not as conveniently or as economically as if the original survey had been done in conjunction with settlement. However, as experience is gained the character of the original survey could be increasingly suited to the later requirements of settlement.

Some reference to surveying from air photographs should be made in view of the discouraging outcome of the work done recently. The difficulties met with appear to have been occasioned by some failure by Government to ensure effective co-operation between the Survey Department and the air work. This should not prevent careful study of the advisability of again utilising air photography under more carefully considered arrangements at least in less accessible areas. The exclusion of all but bold topo-cadastral boundaries should facilitate the use of air photographs in the original survey: but the simplicity of detail, the quality of contouring needed for irrigation purposes and the scale adopted may be expected to continue to make the use of the plane table economical, and of the level necessary, throughout the cultivated terrain. But

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recent advances in the use of air photographs have been great, and further advances should be carefully followed by the Survey Department because of the great acceleration in the rate of survey which the utilisation of air photography secures. But while air work can unquestionably be carried out best by a specialist organisation, such work should be done as part and parcel of the national survey and not as an independent operation.

Finally, emphasis should perhaps again be laid on the necessity of basing all methods of detail survey on a mathematically sound and physically adequate framework of reference points. The provision and the maintenance of such a framework is the first and most important requirement of a dependable survey. It is just as dangerous and short-sighted to build up a survey on an unreliable foundation as a house, or to fail to maintain that foundation subsequently.

PART VI.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. SETTLEMENT OF RIGHTS TO LAND AND LAND VALUATION

1-5. Settlement of Rights to Land

1. The injurious uncertainty and insecurity of tenure now so widely prevailing throughout el 'Iraq can only be terminated by a progressive settlement of rights to all individual holdings throughout the length and breadth of the country. This process may be left to the chances of a gradual consolidation over an indefinite future of the results brought about by the interplay of the innumerable social and economic forces operating among the population; or it may be brought about by the conscious statesmanship of Government aiming at the establishment of a sound basis for the development of national prosperity within as short a period as possible. It is such a deliberately planned settlement of rights to land alone that is considered here. Henceforward for brevity the process will frequently be called settlement of rights or simply settlement. 423 185

There are two radically different methods by which a settlement of rights may be undertaken throughout a territory. These may be termed respectively Sporadic settlement and Systematic settlement.

Sporadic settlement aims at allowing the work to be carried out piecemeal here and there as the circumstances of the particular settlement require, until it has been completed throughout the territory concerned. Thus any optional settlement must be sporadic, or any settlement which is compulsory on a specified occasion (e.g. when land changes hands).

Systematic settlement is effected methodically parcel by parcel until the work has been completed throughout the territory dealt with. A systematic settlement must be compulsory.

Sporadic settlement is the more attractive at first sight, because it appears to offer the same opportunity of settlement to all landholders in the country or even the possibility of an entirely voluntary operation. It has indeed been warmly advocated in el 'Iraq on the ground that it would be inequitable not to accord the same facilities to all those claiming rights to land. Actually, it is a delusion to suppose that by any method or expedient the same opportunities for settlement can be provided for all landholders everywhere at the same time. This is unquestionably desirable: but it is unfortunately impossible. Under the most favourable conditions any settlement of rights to land is bound to take many years to complete throughout the country. Consequently somehow or another a drastic selection or restriction must be exercised as to the holdings to be settled in any given period. A voluntary settlement would be unworkable. Applications might be made at the outset which would occupy the Settlement staff for years, or they might be so uncertain and irregular as to dislocate the work completely. Moreover, a voluntary settlement might drag on indefinitely everywhere. Again, a settlement effected when any land changed hands, or upon some such specific occasion, would demand staff and resources greatly beyond the country's means.

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A sporadic settlement is sometimes possible in countries in which a great part of the necessary work of defining holdings, tenures and holders has been previously done, or in new countries in which the number of properties to be defined and recorded annually is relatively small. But a sporadic settlement is inevitably more difficult, more protracted and more costly—ordinarily very much more so—simply because it is essentially a settlement conducted in a haphazard and unmethodical manner.

But there are also more concrete obstacles which render any general sporadic settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq impracticable. It would require a numerous and competent staff capable of visiting at short notice over a long period of years an unknown number of holdings indiscriminately scattered throughout the country, and of authoritatively deciding their rightful limits, tenures, holders and many important ancillary details. It would require a Survey Department sufficiently well staffed and equipped, and with its work sufficiently well advanced everywhere, to enable all these scattered holdings to be concurrently mapped and incorporated piecemeal in a national cadastral survey. And it would also require in operation throughout the whole country a General Land Registry capable of recording efficiently the results of each separate settlement as it occurred and of all subsequent changes affecting the land concerned. For unless such changes were regularly recorded the work would rapidly get out of date again and the settlement would never be finished.

Even if it is thought that the first of these three requirements might be satisfied, the second and third unquestionably could not. It is a technically difficult and a prohibitively costly proceeding to build up the cadastral survey of a mosaic of holdings throughout any large territory in a piecemeal way. In el 'Iraq it is impossible to do so, for the basic framework of triangulation on which such a survey must depend is for the most part lacking and will take many years to provide. Moreover, it has been shown already that the execution of a genuine cadastral survey is beyond the capacity of the country, even if it was carried out in an effective and economical manner. A sporadic settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq is also impracticable because no General Land Register exists in which the results could be effectively recorded and subsequently kept up-to-date. Nor could such a General Land Register be readily established, even if the necessary financial provision could be made, as the history of the Tapu Land Register amply demonstrates.

There are further difficulties which need not be entered into. For it should be evident that it is impossible to attack the formidable task of effecting a settlement of rights to land in every part of the country at once. It is very much to be regretted that the long-standing disabilities of landholders cannot be remedied everywhere without delay. But since this is so, it is best to face the fact and at least to make a start at remedying them somewhere. The sporadic settlement of a limited number of parcels selected for some special reason is, of course, feasible, and may even be necessary. Thus the Government appears to be committed to the sporadic settlement of the miri groves and gardens, while the Tapu Department can hardly avoid continuing to seek to reconcile its records with fact whenever occasion demands. And there may be other cases in which public policy may require sporadic operations occasionally and exceptionally. But the main contention that a general sporadic settlement is impracticable holds true none the less, and however unavoidable and even justifiable a limited amount of privileged sporadic settlement may be, it is bound to be costly and to delay the progress of any general settlement out of all proportion to the extent of the territories specially dealt with in this way.

2. A systematic settlement offers the only realisable prospect of establishing any general certainty and security of land tenure throughout the country. Even a systematic settlement would take many years to accomplish. It is evidently more urgently needed in some parts of the country and under some conditions than others. But, gradually and systematically, settlement of rights to hold or use land under any form of legal tenure should be extended over the whole land surface of the country. And concurrently, as such extension proceeds, measures should be taken to prevent the territory that has been dealt with from reverting again to the confusion of rights and uncertainty of tenure now commonly prevailing. For although a complete survey and settlement would be most beneficial irrespective of subsequent measures, since an immense obstacle to progress would be removed by merely clearing up existing uncertainties and providing a sure starting point for title even for the next few generations alone; yet the full benefits of a settlement will evidently be thrown away if the stability and security of tenure gained thereby are not subsequently maintained. 423 185

The record (or General Land Register) of all holdings and their lawful holders that is needed for this purpose has been mentioned earlier (v, 6). It can be progressively compiled as survey and settlement are carried through the country. This is a very different thing to endeavouring to introduce it everywhere at once. As the compilation extends it can be kept up-to-date in conjunction with the survey by quite simple routine measures, provided the land law and current practice have been reconciled. Settlement should be undertaken, and the General Land Register arranged, geographically and follow the administrative divisions of the country—nahiya, qadha, liwa. When the boundaries of these divisions are doubtful they should be decided before or during settlement and survey. The necessity of adopting large territorial units of the muqata'a type as the main unit of survey and record has already been explained. It will be among the earliest, and not the least important, functions of settlement to subdivide each nahiya into these requisite units. Although existing muqata'as would naturally be adopted as such units when of suitable size and satisfactorily defined physically, yet these units need not in principle be units of property. Indeed, if they are to facilitate simplified operations as intended, they must frequently include a number of smaller parcels of property on the one hand, or they may represent portions of larger properties on the other. They should in short, primarily be chosen as convenient permanent subdivisions of the nahiya for the purposes mentioned, and be carefully distinguished as such from the units of property with whose boundaries they may coincide. To differentiate clearly between the two these units of survey, record and assessment, should be given a distinctive name. For convenience in this report they are provisionally termed Sections of the Nahiya (aqsam el nahiya), or more briefly referred to simply as sections. 185

3. When a settlement of rights has to be conducted under conditions similar to those in el 'Iraq—particularly in the general absence of a previous survey and reliable records—it must be conducted parcel by parcel in the field in the presence of the rival claimants, landholders and tenants, of their neighbours, and of the members of the local community generally. Only in the local setting can the Settlement Authority (whoever he be) get to understand the many-sided local problems on which he will be called upon to adjudicate. And only in that setting will he be able to obtain and weigh properly all the available evidence. A peasant who becomes befogged or lies in a Court-house or Government office will do so less readily when in local surroundings and in the presence of his neighbours who live on the land affected. His errors will also be more evident and be more easily rectified. Indeed,

185 deficiencies in the information presented and mistakes of all sorts, which might escape detection elsewhere, are often obvious on the spot. Moreover, it is impossible to transport to a distance (or even to discover in advance) all the local inhabitants who have knowledge of the past history of the land, any one of whom may supply important information at any stage of an inquiry conducted in the locality. Only in this manner can a settlement of rights be secured which will be understood and considered equitable by the general body of the agricultural community and thereby give them the confidence and the stimulus needed to get the best out of the land.

Provision must, of course, be made to ensure the attendance of all witnesses and the submission of all documents, whose evidence may prove useful in investigating the rights to any parcel of land. But special knowledge and care should be exercised before admitting the validity of documents, particularly if torn, dirty and hoary, or if uncorroborated by independent records, or if in conflict with the consistent evidence of accredited local witnesses. The fabrication of specious documentary evidence presents no great difficulty and is the obvious expedient of an unscrupulous claimant. But a little practical knowledge of the composition of inks and papers and of the forger's customary tricks will enable spurious documents to be fairly readily detected, while in more difficult cases recourse should be had to suitable chemical and physical tests in a scientific laboratory.

Whatever justification there may be elsewhere for composite bodies and elaborate procedure in the conduct of an initial settlement of rights, it has already been shown that the possibilities of any effective reform in el 'Iraq entirely depend upon the use of the simplest methods and procedure possible. Anything of the character of Settlement Commissions, consisting of three or more members, would be far too costly and slow to be practicable. Nor are there available in the judiciary anything like the number of judges with the necessary standing and knowledge of the Land Law and the land, who could be spared from the bench to sit on such Commissions. Nor even if such judges were available would it be either economical or advantageous to employ them in this manner. It can be said with confidence that if settlement is conducted in the field on the general lines recommended there should be no serious dispute or uncertainty in regard to the rightful holders of 80 to 90 per cent. of the holdings. And only a proportion of the remainder are likely to present problems of a nature to call for high judicial consideration. Such consideration will be needed in a small proportion of cases and it should be devoted to them alone, after all possible preliminary elucidation of facts has been carried out in the field by the routine processes of settlement. The cases that require high judicial consideration are unlikely to exceed 5 per cent. of the total at the outside, if the previous work has been properly done. Indeed, they should fall considerably below this figure. But even consideration of 1 or 2 per cent. of the total cases presented to the Settlement Authorities in the field might constitute a heavy additional demand upon the regular judiciary if settlement proceeded at all vigorously.

The best course would be to establish a special Land Court to operate in conjunction with settlement and to hear appeals from, or cases referred to it by, the settlement authorities. Careful provision would have to be made to limit these cases to the minimum strictly justified and necessary. Such a special Land Court would soon acquire unrivalled experience of the operation of the land law and accumulate a mass of valuable precedents. It would be able to deal with the cases submitted to it more rapidly and consistently and with much greater insight than the ordinary courts. The jurisdiction of this Land Court

might embrace all land cases, whether arising from the settlement or not: but if any considered programme of settlement is undertaken, probably more than one Land Court would be required. 185

4. The conduct of settlement operations in the field will be carried out more rapidly, more economically and more effectively by suitable individual executive officers than by Commissions of any sort or by officers with preponderantly judicial experience and training. Executive officers entrusted with the conduct of settlement operations (henceforward called Settlement Officers) should be very carefully selected for qualities of independence, integrity, judgment and experience of the people and the land, as well as for administrative capacity. And they must be capable of conducting simple cases in a judicial manner and exercising simple judicial powers with competence and dignity. For there are bound to be a number of marginal cases on which a minor dispute arises which requires investigation in a judicial manner, but which can most appropriately and economically be dealt with by the Settlement Officer acting in a judicial capacity on the spot.

The regular reference of such minor disputes to the suggested Land Court (or other competent Court) would make settlement impracticable by imposing innumerable delays on its progress and greatly increasing its cost. Such reference would also greatly augment the volume of formal court work. Nor is any gain in justice or efficiency to be expected thereby. A competent officer on the spot is in a much better position to decide the majority of such disputes equitably than a distant court. He will certainly do so more speedily and economically. The majority of more difficult and more doubtful cases alone should be referred to the regular court designated, whose proceedings will gain in value from being able to devote attention exclusively to them.

It is well known that experienced and capable Iraqi officials are at present far too few for the multifarious needs of the country. This is sufficiently evidenced by the enactment of the recent Discipline Law and the proceedings taken under it. Every first class Iraqi will be needed for some time ahead in the regular grades and for the regular work of Government. Settlement of rights is a temporary need apart from the current administration, and Government could not do better than entrust its conduct to some of the present Administrative Inspectors, who are being released from their current duties. It would be impossible to find anywhere a body of officers better fitted to discharge these onerous and responsible functions. They have served the Government of el 'Iraq devotedly for a number of years. They are familiar with the working of the various public services and have long been accustomed to collaborate with them. They have, for the most part, long since shown their knowledge of, and their interest in, the land problems with which they would be required to deal. They are familiar with the fundamental provisions of the current Ottoman Land Code, with post-war legislation affecting land and with the customary practices of the country. They have already had considerable judicial experience as magistrates. They know the country and the language of the people. They know, and are known by, all leading Iraqis. They understand and sympathise with the difficulties of landholders and cultivators, and they would spare no pains to help them. 647 185

5. It would occupy too much space to outline the procedure of settlement in any detail here. Nor will it serve any useful purpose to do so, until the Government have reached a decision on their general policy. But certain broad features of the work may perhaps be usefully indicated. 185

Each Settlement Officer should be entirely responsible for the conduct of settlement operations within a specified Settlement Area and be given the necessary judicial powers for the purpose, subject to such

185 provisions for reference and appeal to the suggested Land Court or other Court of Law as may be judged proper.

Work should be taken up nahiya by nahiya in collaboration with the local authorities and with the Survey. Every effort should be made to arrange proceedings so that the survey and settlement staff work independently, and thus are not delayed by each other. This should present exceptionally little difficulty in view of the large units to which it is suggested survey operations should be principally confined. Collaboration will be needed in the selection and definition of these units (Sections of Nahiyas) in the first place: but the survey staff will probably be able to undertake this part of the work with the assistance of the local officer (Mudir) in most cases, as soon as they have gained a little experience.

While the work is new to the people and while the procedure is being initially tested, it would be advisable for Settlement Officers to investigate all cases throughout themselves; but as soon as possible all preliminary investigations should be entrusted to Assistant Settlement Officers drawn from the junior ranks of the provincial administration. The speed, and consequently the economy, of the settlement could be greatly increased by this means. The permanent value of the work, as well as its future prospects, would depend very much on the quality of these Assistant Settlement Officers. As time passes and local difficulties are surmounted the operations of settlement could be increasingly undertaken by them. They should consequently be carefully chosen and the importance of their work be publicly recognised. Officers with the requisite qualities and experience should be specially selected in consultation with the Settlement Officer concerned. It would be a valuable recognition of their status if they could be given the rank of Qaimmaqam.

While I am clear that the formation of Commissions to conduct settlement operations would be inadvisable, Settlement Officers should be enabled to utilise the services of men of standing and experience in the country as Assessors in difficult cases when this is desired by all parties concerned. Care would have to be taken to ensure (i) that no one was nominated Assessor in a case in which he himself was in any way interested, and (ii) that no undue demands should be made on the time of any particular person. Perhaps a panel of suitable persons to act as Assessors in each Settlement Area might be drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior in consultation with the Settlement Officer concerned, from which the actual choice might in each case be made.

Due and sufficient notice should be given to the public before settlement of rights is begun in a nahiya. When begun it should be undertaken section by section in an orderly manner. All claimants to rights to hold or use or benefit from the use of land in a section should present themselves in person or by suitable deputy to the Settlement Officer on the day notified, irrespective of tenure or form of occupation. The settlement should embrace all forms of tenure and in all cases define the tenure recognised. Lawful charges on the land (e.g. mortgages of tapu land) should also be investigated. If different forms of tenure exist within the same section the limits between them should be surveyed. Otherwise, scientific survey should be strictly confined at the outset to the definition of the boundaries of sections. When the area of a section is sub-divided internally into a number of separate holdings, the record of the limits of these holdings within the section and of their superficial areas must be of a rough and ready nature based on local knowledge and local practice. Since a valuable control will be furnished by the survey limits and surveyed area of each section, the weaknesses of the interior survey and record will not affect other sections. And I am confident that with a little care and patience local men and local means will be found sufficiently adaptable to meet this need with the advice and general collaboration of the Survey.

In the process of settlement all claims to hold land on tapu tenure or in mulk, and the limits of land so held, will require to be thoroughly investigated and authoritatively decided in conjunction with other claims; but although such cases will be important when they arise, they will be a small proportion of the whole and they should present fewer difficulties. But it must be appreciated at the outset that here again a wide discrepancy will commonly be found between law and fact. In law mulk is only valid if registered, while the root of title of all lands granted on tapu tenure exists, and exists solely, in the Land Registers of the Government and in the certificates of registration (tapu sanads) issued by the Land Registry Department (Dairet el Tapu) in conformity with those registers. Now the general imperfection of the Land Registers is well known, and it can be anticipated with confidence that titles to hold land in mulk or tapu would suffer very severely if the legal basis for those titles was solely considered and demanded. Ordinarily under the operation of the Land Code hardships arising from such investigations of legal title to tapu tenure would be mitigated by the recognition of haq el qarar (acquisitive prescription of tapu tenure); but since haq el qarar has long been inoperative this safeguard will be unavailable. Similar difficulties will occur in establishing waqf.

Here, as generally, the solution is to reorganise[1] fact and discount fiction. Suitable provisions should be included in any enactment providing for settlement of rights to land, to allow any claims to mulk or tapu or waqf rights to be adjudged on all the evidence of the facts available, and not merely, or necessarily at all, on the basis of the admittedly unreliable, and often unintelligible, existing Land Registers.

As settlement proceeds a schedule embodying the results should be prepared by the Settlement Officer for each section of each nahiya. In this should be set forth all the more important details. Among these may be mentioned:

(i) The total area of the section.
(ii) The uncultivated area included.
(iii) A list of the separate holdings recognised.
(iv) The location and area (cultivable and uncultivable) of such holdings given with such precision as is possible.
(v) The names of the accepted holders, tenants or holders of other rights with a statement of the nature of all such rights.

Separate holdings should be numbered consecutively throughout the section for convenience of reference.

After suitable periods for publicity and amendment resulting therefrom, and also for appeal as previously suggested, this Schedule would become the record of the settlement of rights to land in the section concerned, and would constitute with the Survey map and documents the authority and basis of the new General Land Register required.

6–8. SELECTION OF SETTLEMENT AREAS

6. Although settlement of rights is gravely needed throughout the whole country it can evidently only be undertaken in a limited number of places at a time, and it must be expected to take a number of years to complete. If work is to proceed it is therefore a matter of some moment to decide the places in which it shall be commenced. The area of practicable and useful choice is restricted to the districts in which detail survey has been carried out or in which the triangulation framework can be completed in time to allow the suggested topo-cadastral survey to be

1 "reorganize" should be "recognize"

185 pushed forward in conjunction with settlement operations without delaying the latter. Broadly speaking this means that settlement can be carried out as extensively as men and resources permit in the Irrigation Zone, but must be limited in the Rainfall Zone to the immediate vicinity of Mosul town (see Plates III and IV).

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185 In this neighbourhood the land is widely held, or claimed, in tapu tenure (see Plate II) and special efforts have been made by the Tapu Department during recent years to clear up uncertainties and define the parcels justly affected. It was primarily on this account that a considerable block of isolated detailed survey has been completed here. Settlement of this block of territory therefore appears preponderantly to involve an investigation and definition of the parcels held in tapu tenure and, so far as such parcels are concerned, to have been in progress for some time. But rights to tapu tenure should be systematically reviewed and if possible rights to miri land concurrently settled, throughout this area by an independent Settlement Officer in collaboration with the Survey at an early date.

In the Irrigation Zone a considerable amount of detailed survey has been completed in every liwa and there is a wide range of territory in various stages of readiness for systematic settlement.

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651 In el Amara, as is well known, the political and administrative conditions have been retained on an almost exclusively tribal basis, the miri lands (of which the liwa is almost exclusively composed) being farmed out to various tribal sheikhs for triennially assessed payments. It is impossible to discuss the details of these methods here; nor is there any need, since the agrarian conditions of no liwa have been investigated and reported on so regularly or so fully, owing to these periodic assessments. Each successive assessment has built on that which preceded it, but has been carried out in greater detail with increasing attention to the smaller men who hold from the leading sheikhs and really manage and work the land. If public security and genuine national consciousness continue to grow these periodic assessments should crystallise steadily into an effective settlement of rights to land. But the conditions under which the work had to be done in the past were extremely difficult, and if this end is to be obtained (and even if the revenue assessments are to be as equitable and reliable as is now reasonable and practicable) the work must be more closely based upon trustworthy detailed survey and rights be investigated more thoroughly than has so far been possible. A reassessment of the Amara estates (muqata'as) was due, and has doubtless been undertaken, this year. And under the agreements in force with the leading sheikhs the prevailing system terminates and is open to review in 1934. The consideration of fuller and more permanent settlement of rights in this district can therefore properly be left over until this termination approaches, or a further reassessment is arranged.

In the Basra liwa, as already observed, an excellent fiscal survey of the date gardens was carried out several years ago. And the principle of a regular Land Tax has long been familiar through the operation of Midhat Pasha's enlightened *jarib* tax.* The tenure of these gardens (mulk or miri) appears to be rarely, if at all, disputed. For the most part the mulk owners are well known, or could readily be determined.
185 Consequently a relatively minor effort would enable titles to be authoritatively reviewed and, when necessary, settled throughout the Basra reach on the basis of the existing survey. The respective responsibilities of garden owners and the State for the maintenance of the tidal
[312] creeks off the Shatt el Arab, from which the gardens are largely watered,

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* A commutation of the Government crop share on date gardens into a tax assessed by quality and area, carried out in 1871. A jarib=2667 square metres, or 0·66 of an acre.

should also be decided on grounds of common interest and common sense, not by expositions of the law. 185

The management of the miri, or State Domain, date gardens must be mentioned as it has been the subject of controversy for some time and calls for some consistent policy. But interesting and important intrinsically as the points of principle and practice involved are, space does not allow of their consideration here. In its relation to the major problems of the land tenure of the country as a whole, this is a domestic question for the separate consideration of Government in its capacity as one landholder among many. 423

In the Muntafiq liwa, as we have noted, an authoritative settlement of disputes arising out of important and long-standing claims to hold land in tapu tenure was initiated recently under a special law (see iii, 4). But the work appears to be limited to investigations into claims to this tenure alone and thus to fall considerably short of the general settlement of rights to land that is needed throughout the country. If land is declared free of tapu rights it is, I believe, simply recorded as miri without any settlement of the rights of those in occupation of it. Even a successful settlement of tapu rights alone in this, or in any, area is no doubt a valuable contribution to the general introduction of secure land tenure needed: but when all the cost of carrying out investigation of tapu claims is being incurred in a district so honeycombed with them, it would be a great pity to miss the opportunity to effect a thorough and complete settlement. 1123 185

And although it was natural, and very possibly desirable, to entrust this particular piece of settlement originally to a Commission, it is permissible to doubt whether the diversion of three important members of the judiciary and two important members of the administration from their normal duties will continue to be justified by any persistent delicacy or difficulty in the investigation of tapu rights in this particular district. The general widespread need of settlement in all parts of the country is commonly admitted. I have represented earlier that the only hope of satisfying this need within the lifetime of the present generation is to adopt the simplest and cheapest procedure and machinery possible everywhere. No doubt the size and composition of the Muntafiq Commission helped to inspire confidence among the disputants with whom it had to deal, but with all its qualities and advantages a Commission of this nature is bound to be costly and deliberate, and unduly to absorb for the benefit of one locality, public service and public funds which can be ill spared from the much wider general national effort that is needed. At a suitable opportunity (of which the Commission itself would be the appropriate judge) the work which they have initiated might be transferred to an organisation of the simpler character that I have recommended for adoption elsewhere, without breach of continuity, authority or efficiency. 1123 185 647

In the remaining liwas of the Irrigation Zone there are several canal areas already mentioned (e.g. the Yusefiya canal area) which were settled by the Irrigation Department, when the canals irrigating them were remodelled or constructed. The work that I saw appeared to have been well done and was certainly well recorded. It should not be allowed to fall into confusion. Owing to various chances I did not succeed in visiting the Latifiya estate, which I very much regret, as the lessons to be derived from its methods and experience in the field of agricultural development should be extremely valuable; but in respect of land tenure it can no doubt be regarded as a specially granted and administered canal area.

The Dulaim reach is ripe for settlement because of much good investigatory work already done and recorded; but largely for this very reason, settlement (except possibly in its lower portion) can, I think, 1123 185

be delayed with less disadvantage here than in areas in which the unsolved pump problems cluster more thickly.

7. Throughout the Irrigation Zone as a whole it is the riverain tracts watered by pump installations which appear to me to call most insistently for early and authoritative settlement of rights. Economically it is these mechanically watered territories (whose approximate extent is indicated on Plate II and embraces about 10,000 square kilometres) that present the most urgent as well as the most intricate problems. And it is these territories that the most progressive elements in the nation are particularly endeavouring to develop.

It can be recognised now without reproach or fault-finding that the interests alike of the nation as a whole, of the claimants to prescriptive rights, and of members of the public willing to invest money and energy in the development of these riverain tracts, would have been immeasurably better served if all pre-existing rights had been properly investigated and settled, and if the parcels of land affected had been satisfactorily defined and recorded, before pump permits were granted in increased numbers and before agreements with reputed holders of prescriptive rights had been recognised.

The systematic settlement of rights to land throughout these tracts, that I have already recommended, affords a second opportunity of putting matters on to a stable footing; but it need hardly be repeated that the position of prescriptive holders has been appreciably strengthened and the extent of their claims appreciably increased in the interval. When such holders (corporate or individual) have in effect themselves invested money and effort in pump works, etc., this may be accepted without regret, provided their holdings promise to be effectively developed. Where, what may perhaps be briefly called, dual enterprises are in operation, it is impossible to formulate any general conclusions having regard to the great varieties of conditions in the terms of the agreements made and in the personalities concerned. But it can be said with assurance that a definition of existing rights still remains the first step to a clarification of the relative positions of those associated in these dual enterprises and that such clarification is, in its turn, the doorway towards improvement. Whatever mistakes have been made in the past, whether by the Government itself or by the parties concerned, there will be no hesitation in agreeing that it is in the common interest now, wherever and however reasonably possible, either to reconcile or to separate the interests of those unsuccessfully associated in these joint enterprises.

The complication of conflicting claims and rights in these riverain tracts is very great, but the conditions differ so much from one pump area to the next that there is no general decision that can clear up the existing tangle. This can only be done by a patient investigation and settlement parcel by parcel conducted by a competent and impartial officer equipped with the necessary powers. While I do not pretend that such a settlement of rights in these areas would be easy, I am quite confident that it is practicable. And there can be no doubt that it is most necessary both in the interests of the country as a whole and of the particular parties concerned in each case.

The normally convenient section of survey and record throughout these riverain tracts will tend to conform to the limits worked by a pump, or battery of pumps, as a unified agricultural holding. Sections so indicated will probably be fairly stable; but they may frequently require subdivision for fiscal assessment. High ground not commanded by the pump, or not worth cultivating, would be included or constituted part of an adjoining section, as best suited the general requirements of the work.

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The first objective of any settlement of rights in the pump areas should therefore be a systematic investigation and detailed settlement of the prescriptive claims admitted as the basis of existing agreements. This is undeniably difficult because the indications of earlier cultivation, in the light of which this settlement might have been previously carried out, have now been submerged by the great extension of cultivation. It has consequently been suggested that the only practicable course is to allow a specific area per adult male cultivator whose right to participate is recognised. This area would naturally vary according to the locality and the general conditions prevailing. Under certain conditions this expedient may be the best, or indeed the only practicable, course; but it savours of a new allotment of land rather than of a recognition of a claim based upon previous use. As a general rule, and wherever possible, it is preferable that the physical recognition of the limits affected by a prescriptive claim, as well as the equitable recognition of the claim itself, should be based upon reasonably attested previous exploitation of the soil. I believe that a painstaking, experienced and impartial officer studying local features and hearing local evidence on the spot, will even now generally be able to arrive at very dependable conclusions regarding both (i) the limits of old effective occupation and use and (ii) the present-day representatives of the previous occupants and users.

It has been mentioned earlier that the prior rights recognised by the provincial authorities as the basis of so many pump agreements were largely of tribal origin and character. During settlement the exact nature of all holdings should be carefully investigated and recorded in a manner that is compatible with their origin and character. This should present no undue difficulty in the cases referred to, if the leasehold form of miri tenure is systematically applied in future. It would probably be sufficient if the lease was made with the accepted head of the tribal section (reis-el-firqa) as such. Or legislative provision might be made to recognise tribal sections as juristic persons represented in each case by a duly appointed head or a small council (lujna), when preferred. In the event of the death of the accepted head, or other representative, of a tribal section a substitute would need to be forthwith nominated. When there was no disagreement, such nomination would no doubt be a matter for the tribal section concerned, but the local authorities should be empowered to make the nomination, after consultation with the members of such a section, when the latter were unable to agree.

8. On a general review it is evident that the prospective field of settlement is very large. But it is unfortunately no less evident that, under existing conditions, any immediate commencement can only be on a very small scale. I suggest for consideration the appointment of three small settlement parties under the charge of three of the present Administrative Inspectors as Settlement Officers. One of these Settlement Officers might take over the work in the Muntafiq if and as circumstances and occasion permit. The development of this work into a general settlement of miri holdings as well should be considered. Such a development is very desirable if it can be reconciled with the primary need to terminate promptly the long-standing disputes regarding tapu tenure in this district. Alternatively the miri areas could be revisited and settled in detail subsequently; but this would necessarily be slower, more costly and probably less satisfactory in the long run.

The selection of the other two areas in which settlement could most advantageously be initiated is inevitably difficult, when there is so much work waiting to be done everywhere. In my opinion it is at least clear that the settlement of the difficulties that have occurred in the development of the riverain tracts by pump is the most pressing of

185 many pressing problems. I therefore suggest that two settlement areas should be constituted in these tracts, preferably one situated on the Tigris and the other on the Euphrates. From these as starting points, settlement of these tracts could progressively be extended up and down the two rivers until they had been completed.

The above is no doubt an extremely modest programme; but it is better to begin modestly than to continue to postpone these greatly needed land reforms indefinitely. After six months practical experience in the field, and of the cost and speed of the work in three different settlement areas, there would be solid grounds on which to base plans for an extension of operations.

185 423 It will not have escaped attention that the completion of the work already partly done in the Mosul and Basra liwas is not included in this initial programme. This is not because such exclusion can be contentedly acquiesced in, even temporarily, but because it appears to me that a cessation of the appeasement that has been started in the Muntafiq, or still further delay in placing pump cultivation along the river reaches on to a healthy basis, would be even more deplorable.

9. LAND VALUATION

651 185 9. For reasons given earlier (ii, 4) it has not appeared useful to comment either on the recently superseded land revenue methods or on the two new laws But the old and the new appear mutually to envisage the eventual establishment of a regular land tax or Government rental, if this term is preferable. By this I mean the valuation of the land by appropriate means and the assessment and imposition of an annual payment based thereon. Thus, in the explanation issued with the displaced land tax assessment law,* the Land Revenue policy of Government was described as "the imposition of a fixed assessment in cash per unit of area of land," while the universal application of this method ultimately was foreshadowed. And Article 6 of the law required that the process of assessment should include survey, the classification of the land into grades according to the quantity and value of the produce, and the resulting assessment per unit of area of each grade.

And I understand Article 6 of the second of the new laws to provide for the early completion of the survey and valuation of all cultivated miri land and all irrigated tapu land with a view to the assessment and imposition of an annual rental thereon.

The ultimate objective in this important sphere of reform therefore appears essentially to be unchanged, and it is an objective which, in my opinion, alone offers any prospect of escape from the inequalities, irregularities, uncertainties and hardships inseparable from the wisest and most carefully considered combinations of stop-gap methods lacking a uniform and systematic basis. For pending a methodical valuation of the land there are bound to be seriously unsatisfactory features in any land revenue expedients adopted.

185 The section of the nahiya (qism el nahiya) suggested earlier as the land unit of immediate topo-cadastral survey and record (v, 7, and vi, 2) should also constitute a suitable land unit for revenue purposes, if carefully selected with this further object also in view. No doubt the quality of the land within the limits of such sections will not be strictly uniform, and may frequently include salty or other uncultivable patches on the one hand, and possibly gardens or other exceptionally fertile pieces on the other. When the conditions really justify it, areas differing markedly from the general quality of the land within the section can be excluded or specially treated; but so far as practicable an average valuation of the section should be aimed at, taking the good with the

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* "Law prescribing the methods of assessment of land tax and rent due to Government." No. 40 of [illegible].

bad, especially when the section coincides with an estate (muqata'a) owned or managed as a cultivation unit. Such general averaging of the land value throughout each section may add a little to the difficulty of initial valuation, but it will enormously facilitate subsequent collection and administration of the tax and the prevention of abuse. When series of small holdings occur in a section of markedly irregular quality, subdivision of the section and more careful detailed valuation will no doubt be necessary; but such cases should be a small proportion of the whole, although in certain districts they may predominate. But having regard to the supreme importance, both to Government and to landholders and peasantry, of getting the taxation of the agricultural industry on to a better basis throughout the whole country with the utmost dispatch, a bold policy of general averaging of value throughout each section of a nahiya should, I suggest, be adopted in the first place. Some, even considerable, unevennesses there would unquestionably be; but only by accepting such imperfections can a generally tolerable and workable system of land tax be introduced without excessive delay. And the results should be compared, not with the ideally assessed taxation of selected parcels of land that could be obtained by slow and careful work; but with the degree of solid improvement on existing conditions attainable for the nation at large and the great mass of land revenue payers within the shortest possible period. Once such a basis of general valuation existed throughout the country a progressive improvement could be undertaken.

Selection, definition and valuation of sections of nahiyas need not wait upon settlement. Wherever the detail survey has been completed, the former work could be put in hand and pressed forward independently. Lack or uncertainty of ownership does not prevent taxation now, and should be no bar to putting assessment on to an orderly and carefully considered basis in advance of a settlement of legal rights. And such a definition and valuation of sections ahead of settlement, accompanied as it should be by a roll of land taxpayers compiled section by section throughout nahiyas, would immensely facilitate and accelerate the subsequent slower march of settlement.

The detail survey is sufficiently advanced throughout the Irrigation Zone to enable this work to be taken up promptly and pressed forward as vigorously as staff and funds permit for a few years; but a gradual expansion of the Survey staff would be needed throughout those same years to allow survey and land valuation to proceed with the speed desirable afterwards. For it will be remembered that in accordance with the present programme another ten years may be expected to be required to complete the detailed survey of the cultivated area of the country. A delay of another ten years, in putting the Land Revenue system of the country on to a better basis, could hardly be accepted with equanimity.

In this connection I should again emphasise the extreme importance of carefully considering, and then steadfastly maintaining, the authorised programme of survey. Nothing has dissipated the efforts and the value of public expenditure provided for the Survey Department more than the continually varying demands made upon it during the last ten years. Small occasional special demands there must be; but if important national objectives, such as those under consideration, are to be secured in reasonable time and at reasonable cost, continuity of the main programme of survey work must be maintained.

No attempt is made here to consider the qualifications of the staff or the nature of the methods that would be necessary to carry out the systematic valuation of land for fiscal purposes suggested. These could be decided more usefully later should Government adopt some such procedure as outlined.

PART VII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. LEGISLATION, INITIAL FEES, GENERAL CO-OPERATION

1 AND 2. LEGISLATION

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1. I have neither thought it possible nor useful to endeavour to catalogue the many ambiguities, omissions, contradictions and redundancies of the Statute Law as it stands. The existence of serious defects in all these respects is not likely to be contested; nor that the law must be made consistent, intelligible and adequate, if the tenure of land is to be put on a clear and stable legal basis. But two conditions must be satisfied before any constructive amendment of the law can be advantageously undertaken.

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In the first place we should know where we stand. In the second we should know where we are going. The first demands a careful study and authoritative statement of the existing law with a view to as complete an elucidation as possible of the points on which it is ambiguous or defective, in preparation for comprehensive clarification and amendment, as well as as a guide to those dealing with land questions in the meantime. A similar need arose in Palestine and was met by a most valuable "Statement of the Land Law of Palestine" prepared by Messrs. Goadby and Dukhan in 1927. Copies of this work were supplied to the 'Iraqi Government at the time. For although recent legislation in the two countries is different the foundation of their land law is, of course, the same. The preparation of a similar statement of the existing Land Law of el 'Iraq should be greatly facilitated by this previous work. But in el 'Iraq custom and administrative practice exercise so much wider and more powerful an influence on land dealings than the statute law, that special provision should be made to include them in an appropriate manner in such a statement.

I recommend that two competent officers shall be nominated by Government to undertake this important preparatory work. I suggest that one of these shall be an officer with legal training and knowledge of the existing land law and of its administration in the Courts, and that the other shall be an officer with personal knowledge and experience of the actual practices prevailing in the holding, use and transfer of land throughout the country These officers should be instructed to make specific recommendations in due course for the progressive amendment and codification of the Land Law.

The second requisite preliminary is a decision by Government on the critical questions of principle or policy, which occasioned the present inquiry, and on points of law which are presented in the suggested statement.

2. The direct object of a general settlement of rights is the establishment of land tenure progressively throughout the country on a firm foundation of legal right determined in a judicial manner on the spot with reference to actual and physically defined parcels of land. Moreover, to perpetuate the definition and security of tenure thereby obtained, the results should be suitably incorporated in an effective record (or Land Register) which thereafter is continuously kept up-to-date. The whole

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process calls for a body of carefully considered and carefully co-ordinated legislation.

By whatever methods the initial settlement is conducted there must be a lengthy period during which land holdings are in one of three distinct conditions: (*a*) their initial unsettled condition, (*b*) a transitory condition while undergoing settlement, (*c*) an ultimately settled condition. A similar distinction should be preserved in the legislation applying to the three. The first stage is intended to disappear finally, if gradually, so that legislative provisions applying to it alone should disappear with it. The second is also a transitory stage, which should be governed by a special law for the settlement of rights to land. This law should provide the necessary authority for, and prescribe the general conduct of, the settlement. The character of the process and the nature of the procedure have already been discussed. The third stage requires legislation designed to place the land law and land tenure of the country permanently on a sound footing. The detailed elucidation of the existing land law and operative practice recommended above should furnish the necessary foundation for the progressive amendment and re-enactment of the whole land law that is needed. This should include a new law providing for the regular registration of rights to land subsequent to settlement, which would replace the various Ottoman laws and regulations on the subject now in force.

The preparation of the full body of legislation needed will demand a good deal of study, effort and time. It is useless to enact it unless the Government have carefully weighed the need and have given the requisite measures their considered approval. They are unlikely to do this unreservedly or finally on the strength of even the most careful and thorough preliminary study alone. And even if they did so the legislation would be sterile until some simple organisation for the general conduct and co-ordination of the work had been established, suitable settlement officers appointed, effective investigationary and technical procedure adopted.

It therefore appears on all grounds advisable to pass legislation of a provisional nature in the first place, providing for the abrogation of the existing law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq lands, if and when deemed advisable, and for the execution of settlement on the general lines recommended and in such areas as Government may decide. This would have the advantage of combining a practical test of these recommendations with an immediate and realistic attempt to settle the problems of the pump areas in a methodical way. Concurrently the preparation of the legislation needed to continue the work on a more fully considered and permanent basis could be prepared thoroughly and carefully.

In preparing legislation it must never be forgotten that settlement of rights to land and the establishment of a stable land tenure in el 'Iraq are practical operations of an intricate nature dependent upon the conscientious execution of a steady programme of investigation and survey carried out day by day in the field for a great many years in co-operation with landholders and people. The quality of the officers entrusted with the work, the suitability of the procedure employed and the degree of co-operation obtained will be the critical determinants of failure or success. Bad laws may readily retard, multiply the cost of, jeopardise, or even prevent the attainment of reform: although a considerable degree of success can sometimes be obtained by good officers operating good investigatory and technical methods in spite of defective laws. But failing these essential agents and methods the best laws would remain idle instruments or be viciously misapplied. Suitable legislation is, of course, required to empower and consolidate success: but it cannot do more. And it will only be suitable if it is designed to give statutory endorsement to very carefully considered and thoroughly well-tested detailed procedure.

But while general knowledge of the practicable requirements of land reform, applied in the light of local conditions and local experience, can alone supply the material for the planning and execution of the necessary measures, this material can only be transmuted into successful legislation by a skilled legal draftsman, himself thoroughly conversant with the existing land law, working in consultation with accredited representatives of the public services responsible for the execution of reform.

I emphasise these points because the history of land reform in el 'Iraq is punctuated by abortive measures which appear to have been drawn by various executive officers without adequate legal assistance and without proper previous discussion. In a matter of such far-reaching importance and complexity, as the measures of land reform now projected, personal ability and the individual view point of even the most important Departments of State, are insufficient. Successful legislation will demand the careful preparatory team work of all the public services primarily concerned and the skilled expression of a trained legal draftsman, or at least of a professional lawyer.

There seems to be an inclination to feel that something of positive value has been achieved if a law purporting to give effect to some benevolent or public-spirited intention has been placed on the Statute Book, however unworkable such a law may be. But this feeling will not stand intelligent examination or satisfy any patriotic legislator who seeks more than documentary results and facile applause. In sober fact, academic aspirations and indifferent legislation appear to me to have been the worst enemies of practically realisable reform in the country hitherto.

3. Considerations of Initial Cost and Fees

3. The principal difficulty in carrying out a settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq will no doubt be the initial cost. It is impossible to make any useful estimate of this cost on the basis of the numerous hypotheses that would be inevitable at present. But it will be evident that work on the modest lines proposed above could be initiated at a very small cost, particularly having regard to the importance, both to the nation at large and to the parties immediately concerned, of making an early effort to secure a more satisfactory return from the capital and effort sunk in the pump development of the riverain tracts during the last ten years. The financial provision needed for the first year's work would amount to little more than the cost (i) of equipping and maintaining the three suggested Settlement parties possibly for eight months in the field and for the remaining four at Headquarters, or elsewhere, and (ii) of establishing a Land Court a few months later. As against this the cost of the present Muntafiq Commission might be saved. The requirements of the Survey would not be materially affected. The introduction of the General Land Register could advisedly await the conclusion of the initial year's work. Although the speed and cost of the work in such an initiatory stage would be gravely misleading as an index of future progress, since both would rapidly improve from year to year, yet a considerably better forecast could be made in the light of the experience gained by actual trial than by the most elaborate estimates that could be furnished now.

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Although public funds will benefit directly by methodical and equitable assessment and imposition of land revenue, and indirectly by the steady increase in prosperity which should follow if settlement is accompanied by complementary developments in irrigation and agricultural conditions, yet these financial returns will not be immediate. The immediate problem of finding the funds needed to initiate settlement would be lightened or removed, if the cost could be promptly recovered from the individuals whose rights to land are thereby recognised and secured. Now settlement is essentially the clearing up of disputes and uncertainties inherited from an indefinite past. It has been necessitated in el 'Iraq by the failure of past governments to keep their records of mulk, tapu and miri land properly. It is now required in the interests of the nation as a whole, and the national budget will benefit generously by it in the future if it is accompanied by appropriate complementary measures. While therefore it is proper that individuals and corporate bodies should pay fees for the recognition of their rights in mulk, in tapu and in waqf (just as they would legally have been required to do if the existing Land Registers had been functioning properly hitherto and registration of all changes had been required, as they occurred): it is not equitable that they should repeat any payments they themselves have already made to the existing Land Registry or pay on a higher scale than may be needed to maintain the General Land Register in the future. It will, of course, be understood that the fees referred to here are genuine registration fees only, not acquisition payments on obtaining land in tapu tenure initially. 185 651

The settlement and record of rights to hold and use miri land stands on a different footing. It would not intrinsically be in any way inequitable to charge a suitable fee upon recognition and record of these rights also: but it would, I think, be inexpedient and inadvisable to do so upon initial settlement. If settlement is to be carried out with the utmost practicable speed and economy it is essential that everything possible should be done to encourage and ensure the presentation of all claims promptly at the appropriate moment. The degree of smooth and punctual co-operation secured between the great mass of claimants and the Settlement parties will primarily determine the speed and success of the work, while these in turn will primarily govern its cost. The bulk of mulk and tapu claimants and of custodians of waqf interests may reasonably be relied upon to appreciate the advantage of assisting the settlement and of consolidating their recognised rights by due and proper record: but the bulk of holders and users of miri land may be expected to be illiterate and very possibly suspicious of ulterior designs on the part of Government. Nothing will facilitate, accelerate and therefore cheapen, settlement so much as waiving all fees on the initial settlement of miri land. The poverty of the majority of such land is too great to admit of any really adequate scale of fees being imposed. And it may be predicted with some confidence that the saving in the cost of the work occasioned by foregoing such fees will more than compensate for any effective revenue lost thereby. 185

4. GENERAL CO-OPERATION

4. In previous sections attention has been primarily devoted to the objectives, methods and procedure of the various agents directly concerned in one way or another with the conduct of reform. But a really national effort will be required if success is to be achieved. The necessity of winning the confidence and securing the prompt and willing co-operation of the great mass of landholders and cultivators has probably been sufficiently stressed already. The necessity of ensuring the continuous and effective co-operation of all branches of the public service,

and more particularly of the provincial administration, is as great. Provincial officers can assist the settlement in more ways than can possibly be mentioned without in the least interfering with the independence either of its judgments or of its progress. They above all others could prepare and educate public opinion by explaining beforehand the objects of the work and the character of the procedure to those with whom they are brought in daily contact. This would go far towards preparing men's minds and making them ready to participate promptly and effectively when their turn came. And it is only provincial officers who, by patient influence and persistent firmness, will be able gradually to enlist the assistance of landholders and cultivators in the protection of survey reference marks and in the regular notification of those that are displaced. The possibility of survey and provincial officers working in conjunction in advance of settlement to subdivide nahiyas into sections suitable for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment has been previously mentioned. It would also facilitate, and consequently accelerate, the work very materially if each local officer (mudir el nahiya) could provisionally collect and tabulate all claims to each of such sections of his nahiya in preparation for the settlement officer. I saw in Kut liwa schedules of information concerning pump areas and other estates which would be most helpful. Analogous records exist in other liwas.

The co-operation of the provincial authorities, as well as of other interested services, would also be needed to define provisionally in advance of settlement the areas that should be reserved (*a*) for public utility waterways, roads, railways, historic sites, (*b*) for particular tribes or communities, (*c*) for projected national forests, pastures, etc. etc. But such examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

The importance of general and sustained co-operation from all national elements who are in a position to do so cannot be exaggerated. The degree to which it was secured might readily decide success or failure. It would certainly affect decisively the quality and cost of the proposed settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq and the period taken to complete it.

PART VIII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

1-8. Unified Planning and Direction of Reform

1. It will be remembered that among the defects which Government expressly sought to cure was the pursuit of reform by three independent Departments of State without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan. I have ventured earlier to express the view that these Departments were not in a position to adopt a suitable common plan or to pursue it unitedly. But it is also important to realise that their Departmental duties are not properly reconcilable with the conduct of the requisite reforms. 185 641

In considering the administrative organisation of reform it is desirable to distinguish clearly between the men, measures and machinery needed: (i) to produce order initially out of the chaos inherited from past centuries, and (ii) to consolidate and perpetuate this order as it is secured. These two processes may be conveniently called the execution, and the conservation, of reform. 185

The executive programme of reform should co-ordinate in one carefully balanced and united effort:

(i) The study and revision of the land law.
(ii) The completion of the topo-cadastral survey.
(iii) The systematic valuation of the land for revenue purposes.
(iv) The general settlement of rights to land.

The economy, speed and quality of the results will depend upon the efficiency of the combination secured. But although the importance of the initial execution of reform is supreme, and although it will necessarily occupy many years, yet administratively, legally and financially it should be recognised to be a special, terminable, capital effort.

The conservation subsequently of the benefits secured by this initial capital effort would necessitate administratively

(i) The progressive establishment, and maintenance up-to-date thereafter, of a General Land Register or Land Book.
(ii) The corresponding maintenance up-to-date of the complementary topo-cadastral survey.
(iii) The establishment of suitable ancillary land revenue records based on the above.

Throughout this Report I have avoided any detailed discussion of these conservancy measures: because the execution of initial reform is a sufficiently complex matter and is independently justified. And it seems more reasonable to defer consideration of methods of conserving reform, until it has been decided whether such reform will be undertaken. It may, however, be observed that if the requisite reforms are carried out successfully, there should be no intrinsic difficulty about subsequent conservation of the results; although it will demand a thoroughly efficient

185 organisation. Moreover, the current cost of such conservation should be balanced by current fees.

But if it is reasonable and proper to defer consideration of conservancy measures which may or may not be needed, consideration of the administrative organisation best suited to give effect to these measures can also be deferred.

2. If the activities to be co-ordinated in the execution of the initial programme of reform are again referred to, it will be seen how slight is any functional aptitude of any of the three specified Departments to undertake this work, and how strong are the reasons of public policy that should preclude them from participation in its conduct. The necessary study and revision of the land law must in any case be taken up by specially selected individuals. The completion of the land survey is the express business of quite another department. Land valuation could no doubt be undertaken by the Revenue Department and the Survey Departments in co-operation, if this was a solitary measure; but it will be more easily, cheaply and satisfactorily effected as part of the general programme of reform. Moreover, it is really preferable that this valuation should be carried out by an organisation occupying a midway position between the fisc and the taxpayer, and not functionally concerned with raising revenue. Again a general settlement of rights is a process that none of the three departments mentioned are in any way organised or equipped to undertake. Such a settlement will necessitate a special staff and special arrangements in any event; while it is imperative that the judicial character and independence of the proceedings shall be unchallengeable. This dominant consideration should preclude all idea of settlement being conducted by either the State Domains or the Tapu Departments. For the State Domains should be responsible for presenting the State's rights as a landholder throughout the whole course of settlement and will thus occupy a partisan position, although most rightly and properly. And during the course of the work the settlement authorities will be continuously required to scrutinise, interpret and adjudicate on Tapu documents and records. It will be the duty of the officials of the Tapu Department to do their best to expound and explain such material to the settlement officers; but the latter must be open to no charge of departmental bias influencing their decisions.

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647 But although the Departments of Revenue, of State Domains and of Tapu should be dissociated from any participation in the execution of reform, and although they cannot be justly held responsible for failure to unite to produce and promote a programme of such reform in the past, yet the serious character of the defect in organisation indicated by Government, is only emphasised thereby. It is to the lack of a competent executive authority charged with the unified study and conduct of the necessary reforms, that the persistent failure of successive governments throughout the last decade to proceed from discussion to action must be primarily attributed. For the volume of memoranda and correspondence on the subject from the early days of the administration onwards, shows a constant and clearly understood appreciation of the need to put the systems of land tenure and land revenue on to a healthier basis. In the early days settlement of rights indeed appears to have been actually started in one or more districts. But during the latter half of the period the discussions have been characterised by uncertainty and disagreement as to the methods and means whereby the necessary objectives might be attained.

185 If a single central authority, possessing vigour and initiative, had been responsible to Government for the planning and general direction of the requisite reforms, a mass of sterile interdepartmental discussions

would have been avoided and some practical effort to discharge this responsibility must have been made. And no sincere, sensible and united effort could have failed to benefit by the lessons of experience and to have achieved a considerable degree of success by now. If my assistance had still been necessary I should hardly have had to devote time and energy to unearthing and collating details of elementary information needed to arrive at trustworthy primary deductions. This was work which an established organ of Government would have done gradually and methodically year by year, with fuller and more reliable results. But neither organised preparation for, nor organised execution of, these vitally important national reforms was to be expected as the bye-product of the unrelated activities of three public services charged with other primary responsibilities.

3. Organically therefore the imperative need is to establish as soon as possible in the central administration of Government, a service expressly and exclusively charged with the continued study, preparation and general direction of the measures of executive reform named a little earlier. All that is needed at this stage, and all that is desirable under present conditions, is quite a small office to act as the thinking and directing organ of executive reform. For here again reform must be initiated on the simplest lines that will satisfy bare essentials. But, although the Central Lands Office can be small, its influence and authority within the wide field of its responsibility must be effective. And although every effort has to be made to initiate reform cheaply, this Office must be made efficient if it is to fulfil its purpose and replace in the counsels of Government all unco-ordinated sectional advice.

The main functions of the Central Lands Office may be summarised as follows. It should be the central clearing house, depository and advisory office of Government on all matters of public policy regarding the tenure and use of land. It should have general administrative direction and control of the procedure and operations of settlement and land valuation, which should be treated as a conjoint enterprise. This direction and control should include that of any unavoidable sporadic operations. In the case of such sporadic investigations into existing registered tenures, any necessary measures should be concerted by the Tapu Department and the Central Lands Office in consultation. The Central Lands Office should also have the necessary authority to secure the complete and fully co-ordinated co-operation of the Survey Department in the execution of the programme of settlement and land valuation adopted. The necessary legal assistance should be placed at its disposal, to enable the requisite legislation (and orders thereunder) to be properly drafted, and the progressive amendment of the Land Law to proceed steadily. It should also, with the least possible delay, make a start to ensure the regular collection, tabulation and mathematical scrutiny of all important statistics relating to the land. Such statistics could be collected by the most appropriate or most convenient branch of the public service in each case, but their tabulation and mathematical scrutiny will be carried out most economically and efficiently by the Mathematical Office of the Survey with the assistance of calculating machines.

It should perhaps be emphasised again that the general administrative direction and control of settlement and land valuation exercised by the Central Lands Office must not confer or permit any power to review, criticise or alter any actual decisions of settlement or valuation. The independence of such decisions of all administrative modification must be absolute and indisputable. On due and proper occasion the former will be subject to appeal to the proposed Land Court, while some independent expert body qualified to review and revise land valuations when required would also be necessary.

4 and 5. Land Survey

185 4. The general direction and control of all survey work should be left to the technical head of that service. Any administrative subordination of the Survey Department to the small Central Lands Office would only be an inconvenience to both sides and nothing is to be gained by it, if it is clearly recognised that the Survey Department's primary duty is to co-operate as closely and effectively as possible with the Lands Office in carrying out the Government's general plan of land reform. For purposes of the programme of land survey, that plan must provide for the progressive requirements of concurrent development in other branches of work, notably of irrigation; but no departures from the approved national programme of survey should be permitted without the concurrence of the Central Lands Office, as the plan of general land reform, its cost and its speed, will be dependent upon a steady and punctual performance of that programme.

185 647. The Survey Department is rightly recognised to be a specialist scientific service; and good work has been done in organising and equipping it for its duties. But its importance as an agent of economic progress appears to me to be insufficiently appreciated, while circumstances have interfered with its vigorous use in the steady execution of a national programme of land survey drawn up in consultation with the public services primarily concerned. It also possesses serious weaknesses which must be cured if it is to play its essential part in the well-co-ordinated effort without which the successful development of the country will remain a dream.

The land survey of a large, varied and previously unmapped country, like el 'Iraq, is a formidable scientific operation. It would be wasteful and short-sighted to an extreme degree to grudge the few additional specialist officers and the gradual addition to its accommodation and resources that are needed to enable this indispensable service to carry out its work punctually, reliably and to proper general advantage. A first-class Observer to push on with the primary triangulation is long overdue. Effective measures must be taken to protect survey reference marks. Additional specialist assistance is greatly needed in the Mathematical Office and in the performance of the chain of scientific processes whereby the surveyors' field work is reproduced and published as series of national maps. Map drawing, map reproduction by modern photo-metal processes and map printing, under the difficult climatic conditions existing in Baghdad, call for great skill, knowledge and experience, if they are to be successfully and economically performed. The publication of the Department's maps is very much in arrear, as has been already noted. And yet the value of national expenditure on survey operations is seriously minimised if the work remains locked away in the Department's cupboards in the form of original drawings, instead of being published in printed maps available to all. More systematic provision for the training of Iraqi staff in the technical operations of survey is also very necessary.

And timely consideration should be given to the whole question of the situation of the Survey Department and the arrangements for its present and future accommodation. The present site of the Department is, or is likely to become, valuable; and it is by no means the most suitable for the delicate processes of map reproduction. Again a fire-proof map store is badly needed. The original field sheets and records of the Survey (and to a lesser extent its eventually published map series) represent the capitalised value of all the expenditure of past years on this branch of work. The set back to the country if all these records were destroyed as development of all sorts was at length getting well under way, would take many years and a large expenditure of money to retrieve. And such wholesale destructions of valuable public documents have quite frequently occurred elsewhere. Perhaps an opportunity might be found to transfer the whole Department to less valuable, less busy and less dusty, but more commodious precincts, where its map reproduction offices, its map stores, etc., might be planned for gradual expansion as the Land Survey of the country extends. Scientific organisations, such as this, depending upon the punctual co-operation of numerous specialist branches are wasteful to administer if badly arranged and they are costly to move after they have been long established. A central urban situation is neither necessary nor desirable, for the Headquarter Offices of a national land survey. 185 647

5. Another matter calling for early consideration is the amalgamation of the two existing organisations charged with the conduct of land survey—the Survey Department proper and the Survey branch of the Tapu Department. The Survey Department has had a somewhat chequered career; but two important steps in the direction of constituting it the single unified national service that is required for the economical and effective conduct of land surveys, appear to have been previously taken. In 1922 about half of the survey staff of the Tapu Department were absorbed by the Survey Department proper; while in 1925 the Irrigation Department, which had previously carried out its own surveys, transferred its Survey Division to the Survey Department. The process should now be completed.

When I was in el 'Iraq the comparable field staff of these two existing land survey services were returned to me as follows:

Survey Department	*Tapu Survey Branch*
8 Survey Officers	1 Director (Mudir)
14 Inspectors	4 Inspectors
100 Surveyors	58 Surveyors

I wish to make it clear that the development of its own little Survey Department by the Tapu Department is a matter for commendation; not for reproach. That Department realised acutely the need to define with some approach to accuracy the parcels of land which were purported to be held on tapu tenure. The National Survey were either non-existent or too weak at the time to assist, so that two parallel survey organisations were established.

The arrangement is none the less indefensible and absurd from the national standpoint. If the land surveys carried out by the smaller organisation are necessary in the public interest they should be carried out under the technical direction and control of the competent public service. In the course of this report various weaknesses in the Survey Department proper have been indicated. Of the lesser service it may be briefly said that, in spite of much keenness and appreciation of technical needs it is not, and cannot be, either properly organised and equipped or adequately directed technically to execute land surveys of the quality and permanence which expenditure of public funds should secure. No country, and particularly no country which requires the utmost economy and efficiency of effort to promote its primary development, should attempt to maintain two organisations to carry out the indivisible task of a national land survey. It is otherwise with what may be called engineering surveying or lay-outs for railways, roads, etc. These are sectional operations which can be best performed by the Engineering services concerned; but even these services should, and no 185

185 doubt would, make the fullest use of the National Land Survey and leave all genuine land survey operations to it.

I do not advocate any hasty change. That would probably do more harm than good. But I venture to urge that it should be accepted in principle that this duality must be terminated as rapidly as the mutual convenience of the Survey Department proper and the Tapu Department permit. And among the duties of the proposed Central Lands Office should be the examination at an early date, in consultation with the Tapu Department and the Survey Department, of the comparative public advantages (i) of continuing to carry out the Tapu Department's special programme unabated, or (ii) of employing a portion of the resulting addition to the Survey Department's resources on the greatly needed acceleration of the national programme. I am not questioning the intrinsic value of the former, and so far as it meets specific Land Registry needs which are covered by fees received, it should doubtless be continued; but it may well be that on mature and comprehensive consideration the acceleration of the national programme of survey may justify some sacrifice of the more purely departmental work.

6. ADMINISTRATION OF AREAS AWAITING SETTLEMENT

6. However intensively, and by whatsoever methods, a general settlement of rights to land is conducted, there will for many years be a large balance of unsettled holdings, which balance can only be very gradually redressed. The satisfactory administration of these unsettled holdings pending their turn for settlement, is one of the most serious problems of the transition period; but it is clearly one that will be more manageable and better understood, if homogeneous settled and unsettled areas are maintained so far as possible. Any attempts to effect a general settlement sporadically would not only dissipate energy and resources (as previously pointed out), but also further complicate the administration of unsettled land by causing settled and unsettled holdings to occur increasingly intermixed side by side. It has already been recognised that sporadic settlement of some special holdings will be necessary; but this should not occasion undue difficulty if it is restricted to really necessary cases.

185 It is the current mangement of the enormous extent of miri land
647 during the years preceding settlement that is however the main problem. This must in practice be conducted for the most part, as at present, by the local officers of the provincial administration, except in areas under some form of tribal or sectional occupation. Some measure of central supervision and control must be maintained. This can continue to be exercised most suitably by the State Domains Section, which, I believe, is now administered in association with Land Revenue, under the Ministry of Finance. In advance of settlement this association of functions appears to me to be both an economical and a convenient
185 arrangement. If land valuation is undertaken methodically in the manner suggested, there will gradually be formed in advance of settlement a national roll of land revenue payers who will also for the most part be claimants to prescriptive rights to hold and use miri land. So that the connection between the supervision of miri land and of land revenue will throughout the pre-settlement stage be close. After settlement the work of both services should be greatly simplified and new arrangements would probably be required; but these can be more usefully discussed after the measures of executive reform to be undertaken have been decided.

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In advance of settlement, and pending the establishment subsequently of a General Land Register, map records should be constituted showing the position of all land authoritatively reserved for public purposes, or forming the subject of special concessions. These should be kept in duplicate through the agency of the Survey Department at the Headquarters of each liwa and in the capital. All Departments should be instructed to collaborate in the preparation and maintenance of these records, whereby the waste of public funds and the injury to public interests occasioned by conflicting arrangements and authorisations to utilise land might be quickly eliminated, without waiting for the gradual advance of settlement.

All proposed reservations of miri land, all proposed concessions and all proposed expropriations of mulk or tapu land should be examined by a small committee representing the bodies principally concerned in the administration of land or of its use for public purposes. These proposals might then be submitted with the committee's recommendations to the proper Minister, who I take it would normally be the Minister of Finance as custodian both of the public purse and of miri land. In this way all important public interests would receive consideration before land was reserved, conceded or expropriated for any special purpose. To make the record as complete as possible the location of all existing reservations, concessions, etc., should be examined and defined, so far as available information permits. In the case of urban areas the local record would most conveniently be kept in the town concerned.

Since the proposed record is in the form of maps indicating specific locations of land, the work of constructing and maintaining it should be entrusted to the Survey Department. The Headquarter Offices of the Survey would also be the best place to keep the authorised duplicates of the local maps, so that all changes could be regularly and easily incorporated. A Survey Officer might also conveniently act as the Secretary of the suggested Examining Committee.

7 AND 8. MINISTERIAL GROUPING OF SERVICES

7. If settlement of rights and land valuation are undertaken on the lines recommended, four Departments of State will be required to perform important functions; but there is a sharp division in the nature of those functions, as already noted.

Two Departments will be charged with the execution of these reforms, viz. the Central Lands Office (with its settlement and valuation field parties) and the Survey Department. Two other Departments, viz. the combined Land Revenue and State Domains Department, and the Tapu Department will be charged respectively with the presentation and support during settlement and valuation (*a*) of the interests of the State as the largest landowner and the collector of land revenue and (*b*) of the registered rights to mulk, tapu and waqf interests.

The two former will be called upon to discharge the functions of impartial and disinterested investigators and recorders of duly established rights. The two latter will be called upon to expound and support as strongly and ably as possible the particular public interests or private rights for which they are responsible.

The first of these services has still to be created and attached to some Ministry. The other three are already in existence, attached respectively to the Ministries of Economics, Communications and Works, of Finance and of Justice. In pursuance of the general inadvisability of

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making avoidable changes at this stage these existing arrangements should not be disturbed. The Central Lands Office would in my opinion be most advantageously attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The supreme importance, for speedy and economical working, of the general and widespread co-operation of the provincial staff of the Ministry of the Interior, both during and in advance of settlement, has previously been emphasised. Indeed, the conduct of settlement, which so closely affects the security, contentment and peacefulness of the whole mass of landholders and peasantry throughout the country, must in any case be a dominant interest and responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. It is better that this interest should be directly safeguarded and this responsibility directly discharged, by the Ministry most intimately concerned. The arrangements in the field for securing the attendance of claimants and witnesses, as well as for orderly conduct of operations would in any case have to be made by the provincial staff of this Ministry. Settlement Officers and their principal assistants must also for the most part be drawn from the same staff, for that staff constitutes the only body of public servants who combine the necessary qualifications with the necessary experience. Moreover if the Ministry of the Interior undertakes administrative charge of the work, it will be a simpler matter to make changes in the personnel, than it would be if such changes involved transfers to and from another Ministry each time. For while it can be said with confidence that Settlement Officers and Assistant Settlement Officers should normally be recruited from the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, it is not to be expected that all those selected will find the work congenial or will prove successful.

8. I understand that the Ministry of Finance incline to the view that the general administration of settlement and land valuation operations might more appropriately be undertaken by that Ministry. This course would, in my opinion, be inadvisable both in the financial interests of the State and in those of the proposed reforms.

It must, I think, be recognised that the Ministry of Finance occupies an essentially different position and performs essentially different functions to, all other Ministries of State. It is the primary duty of all other Ministries to administer efficiently the specific branches of the public service, executive or judicial, allotted to their control. On the other hand, the distinctive and all-important duties of the Ministry of Finance are (i) to inspire, supervise and control all the operations of Government in so far as they affect the financial position of the State, and (ii) to nurse the economic resources of the country, to study all potential sources of revenue and to make these contribute fairly and without injurious reaction to the income of the State.

The Ministry of Finance must necessarily administer its own financial services; but I venture to think that, otherwise it should aim at as complete a detachment as possible from those administrative and executive functions of Government, which it is its duty to criticise impartially and control closely from a financial standpoint. Not only do the Ministry of Finance's wide and supremely important range of financial and economic functions demand its exclusive and fullest attention, if they are to be performed with any approach to the high standard needed; but the Ministry's duty as the financial watchdog of the State cannot be discharged with the same detachment, and is unlikely to be credited with the same disinterestedness, when applied to its own proceedings.

On these grounds alone it appears to me highly undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should itself assume administrative conduct and control of a new and formidable undertaking which is no part of its financial duties.

I also believe that the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the public purse, regards itself as the natural trustee and manager of State land and I imagine that it was on this account that the duties of the late State Domains Department were resumed by the Ministry of Finance. Subject to the considerations just urged, no exception to this view is called for, and the transfer was logical. But it should be recognised that (*a*) the current management of, what may be termed, the national estate (miri) and (*b*) the proposed systematic settlement of rights and valuation of land, are not only different but mutually incompatible, undertakings.

During the process of settlement innumerable cases are bound to arise in which the immediate and direct interests of the State, as landowner, will conflict with those of private individuals. It is essential that the former shall be presented as wholeheartedly and singlemindedly as the latter, at every stage of settlement operations. This is a duty which very properly pertains to the Ministry of Finance as custodian of the public purse. For the vast territories of the national estate (miri) represent by far the most important capital asset which el 'Iraq possesses, not excepting her petroliferous deposits. As custodian and advocate of the landed interests of the State in its capacity as landowner, the Ministry of Finance occupies the position, and should be free to act without distraction, as a profoundly interested party. Subject to the general conditions of the settlement law, it should, as a general matter of principle during settlement, offer a healthy opposition through its appropriate Department to all claims to rights over land statutorily in the ownership of the State.

And similar considerations apply to the general methodical valuation of land for fiscal purposes. Here again the organisation charged with execution of the task should occupy a position of cold scientific detachment. Here again there should be provision for appeal from the decisions of the settlement authorities under proper safeguards against obstruction or frivolous abuse. Here again the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the financial interests of the State, should act as the vigilant and unhampered exponent of those interests. And here again landholders and other parties directly concerned may be relied on to exercise no less vigilance in their endeavours to ensure that the approved results do not unduly favour at their expense, either their neighbours or the State.

In short, the successful and satisfactory execution of settlement of rights and valuation of land for fiscal purposes, requires complete freedom on the part of the Ministry of Finance to defend the financial interests of the State, whether represented by its capital assets in land or its prospective revenue. And such a successful and satisfactory execution also requires a position of recognised and unchallengeable impartiality on the part of the Ministry responsible for the administrative conduct of these operations. On these further grounds also it appears to me most undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should undertake this part of the general task.

PART IX.—GENERAL REVIEW OF PROBLEM

1. Old Conditions and New

000 In conclusion it may be useful to review the problem in the wider setting of the general agricultural development which it is the main purpose to stimulate and serve. The land traversed by the historic rivers of el 'Iraq was one of the cradles of civilisation. It has been the seat of a succession of famous kingdoms. It was one of the birthplaces of artificial irrigation. If not the earliest, it was the best known, source of mineral fuel. And from time immemorial it has been recognised as one of the most fertile areas in the world. The country thus played a part second to none in earlier days and still possesses exceptional natural resources. Unfortunately these initial advantages have been nullified by centuries of unprogressive administration and by the unprecedented progress in human organisation and scientific advance made in the meanwhile elsewhere.

439 In ancient days bursting granaries represented prosperity and constituted wealth. The old world was small and its good grain lands scarce; while those of el 'Iraq were productive and accessible by the leisurely transport of the time. To-day the grain lands of civilised man circle the globe; while science and organisation have enabled him everywhere to enhance quality and yield many fold, as well as to obliterate distance. Moreover, with increasing individual well-being and vastly increased control of the earth's resources, mankind is eating a smaller proportion of bread and demanding a greater proportion of other commodities. And since he has the whole world competing to meet his requirements, everywhere he is selecting higher quality, cleaner, better graded, better packed produce and rejecting inferior supplies. There is a belief prevalent in el 'Iraq, as in other countries, that combines, rings and other marketing associations have power to affect the nation's trade critically. Temporary and restricted effects they may have: but the modern world is too closely knit together and the volume of its trade far too large and too complex to allow such manœuvres to prevent any reliable supply of satisfactory goods from finding its proper market before long. And since solid and efficient trading associations are partners in the nation's prosperity, it is to the interest of all such associations to promote the expansion of the country's trade and the reputation of its goods in the world's markets.

185 But el 'Iraq to-day must be recognised as being in the position of an old estate, previously rich, still very valuable potentially, but now derelict through long bad management, accentuated by changing needs and progress elsewhere. And its difficulties have been enhanced by its unfavourable transport connections with the outside world, as judged by modern requirements. Subject to the over-riding necessity of preserving public order and contentment and to the steady improvement of communications, the country's primary need is the reclamation of its derelict national estate and the regeneration of its agriculture. No intelligent and progressive person inheriting such an estate would fail to recognise the wisdom of spending on it the capital sums needed to bring it to a high pitch of prosperity again. Such expenditure planned on well-considered lines, carefully managed financially, and devoted

solely to the productive regeneration of the estate, should soon prove a profitable investment. If the accompanying returns of Budgetary Revenue and Expenditure during the nine years 1921-29 are referred to, it will be seen how small a sum, both absolutely and relatively, the Government has been able so far to allot to land development services. And 185 652 651

TABLE VII. TOTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE, 1921-1929

Nature of Service	Expenditure in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total expenditure
General National Charges*	325·5	6·9
Finance	619·4	13·1
Interior	1,066·3	22·7
Health	221·9	4·7
Defence	980·1	20·9
Justice	125·2	2·6
Education	223·2	5·0
Communications and works ..	680·6	14·5
Lands Services†	454·0	9·6
Total ..	4,696·2	100·0

*Civil List of H.M. the King, Parliament, Council of Ministers, Comptroller and Auditor-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Debt and Pensions, Antiquities and Census Departments.

†Departments of Irrigation, Agriculture, Veterinary Service, Land Survey, Tapu, State Domains and Ministerial Services of the Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture during its existence.

necessarily only a modicum of that sum could be utilised for capital improvements. If expenditure on capital development continues to be limited to what can be spared from current resources, it is to be feared that the economic revival of the country must be indefinitely retarded.

TABLE VIII. TOTAL BUDGETARY REVENUE, 1921-1929

Nature of Revenue	Revenue in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total revenue
Direct Revenues from land*	1,619·3	32·7
Customs and Excise	2,248·4	45·4
Post and Telegraph Receipts ..	287·1	5·8
Other revenues	795·7	16·1
Total ..	4,950·5	100·0

*Land revenue, animal tax, receipts of land services, mines, rents of Government property, etc.

2. Three Spheres of Reform

2. In the northern Rainfall Zone the effects of past neglect are less obvious and the problem of agricultural development less intricate owing to this area being predominantly independent of irrigation: but otherwise there is just as great a need for a steady programme of agrarian reform here as in the South. 185

The three great obstacles to the agricultural development, and, therefore, to the economic advance of el 'Iraq may be summarised as:

in the south (*a*) the absence of an adequate irrigation system,
and throughout the country
(*b*) the rude methods of cultivation and stock-keeping practised, and
(*c*) the chaotic state of land tenure.

312 The inadequacy of the existing irrigation system is generally recognised in so far as it relates to the great incompleteness of the network of engineering works needed, such as storage reservoirs, flood embankments, regulator constructions, delivery and drainage channels: but it appears at present to be insufficiently appreciated in the country that the proper utilisation and maintenance of these expensive works is even more important than their construction and probably calls for greater technical skill at the outset. It is a serious mistake to suppose that the management of a great engineering undertaking, such as a national irrigation system, is a simpler problem than its design and construction, or that such management can be economically and wisely left to inexpert hands or to officials primarily occupied with other duties.

242 The primitive methods of cultivation, stock-keeping and disposal of produce prevalently practised, as well as their marked effect on the quantity and quality of the country's output and on its reputation in the world's markets, have been repeatedly emphasised and need only be mentioned here.

439 To build up her prosperity el 'Iraq must evidently develop her export trade both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is therefore of great importance to follow the statistics of external trade continuously and to endeavour to adjust the country's agricultural output unceasingly to world demand. Unlike the various land statistics, which have proved so difficult to collect and so unreliable when collected, the Trade statistics kept by the Customs and Excise Department appear not only to be in excellent order but to be used. No attempt will be made to discuss these valuable figures here: but the nature, quantity and value of the principal exports of agricultural products during the five years 1925-6 to 1929-30 in the accompanying table should be noted.

TABLE IX. MAIN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS DURING FIVE YEARS 1925-6 TO 1929-30

Product	Quantity in thousands of tons	Value in lakhs of rupees
Living animals (horses, camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc.)	835·6*	87·7
Raw cotton	3·2	32·7
Dates	624·3	902·1
Grain, etc. (barley, pulse, rice, wheat, etc.)	366·2	449·1
Hides (cow, sheep, goats, wild animal, etc.)	9·3	171·9
Intestines (casings)	0·6	70·1
Raw silk	0·005	0·7
Tobacco	0·8	9·2
Raw wool	32·4	368·2

*Thousands of animals.

242 It is in experimenting in the culture of new or improved products required by the world, in adapting them to local environment, in multiplying them for local growth, and in demonstrating their successful cultivation and disposal on a commercial scale, that scientific agricultural research stations, progressive landed estates and well-managed marketing bodies, have such an indispensable part to play in the general development of the country's agriculture.

185 The establishment of an efficient national irrigation system and the application of the lessons of progressive scientific research and experience elsewhere must be recognised as two of the fundamental conditions of

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any solid economic advance in el 'Iraq. The third is the introduction and maintenance of a simple, secure and equitable land tenure, which term should be understood to include an even and readily met revenue demand. This report is only directly concerned with the last need: but in studying it, its inter-relation to the other two must be continuously kept in mind. No development of the country's agricultural resources can expect to be successful which does not take all these three needs into consideration together.

8. COMPARISON WITH EGYPT

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8. During the progress of my inquiry comparisons were frequently instituted with Egypt, a country with many parallels to el 'Iraq both in its history and its natural conditions. Owing to the courtesy of the Egyptian Government I am able to compare in Table X the respective positions on certain salient points of el 'Iraq in 1929 and of Egypt in successive decades from 1882 onwards. It will be noted that during the last fifty years Egypt has more than doubled her population, added 50 per cent. to her cropped area, quadrupled her trade, and her budget, built up a substantial budgetary reserve, and largely absorbed her original external debt.

TABLE X. COMPARATIVE FIGURES, EL 'IRAQ AND EGYPT

		EL 'IRAQ	EGYPT					
		1929	1882	1890	1900	1910	1920	1929
Population in millions		2·8	6·8	8·2	10·1	11·8	13·2	14·4
Gross cultivable area, sq. km.		90,000	32,000					
Area cropped yearly, sq. km.		?10,000	?24,000*	27,000*	30,000*	32,000*	34,000*	36,000*
Imports	In lakhs of rupees	980	1,100	1,100	1,900	3,200	14,000	7,200
Exports		360	1,800	1,700	2,400	4,000	11,800	7,800
Re-exports		510†	14	40	80	60	380	190
Land Revenue		168	680‡	700‡	600‡	700‡	700‡	720‡
Customs Revenue		274	80	190	330	480	1,370	1,020
Total Budgetary Revenue		570	1,300	1,650	1,630	2,260	4,700	5,790
Total Budgetary Expenditure		560	1,230	1,560	1,500	2,340	4,000	5,090
Budgetary Reserve Fund				200	1,150	790	2,370	8,540
Debt §			10,900	13,100	13,000	13,100	12,900	12,400

*From ⅓ to ½ cropped twice. Net area cultivated in 1929 was 23,000 sq. km.

†Goods in transit, not included in imports.

‡Yield maintained constant on re-assessment following revenue settlement. Fluctuations due to remissions to unwatered land followed by extensions of irrigation.

§Mostly held in Egypt now.

Egypt is more favourably situated geographically than el 'Iraq; while Mahommed Ali Pasha did much to initiate early in the last century the reform of her land tenure which has proceeded since. And it will be seen that even fifty years ago Egypt was considerably more populous and wealthier than el 'Iraq is to-day. But el 'Iraq is by no means devoid of advantages also. She has Egypt's established success before her. Her cultivable area is larger and more diverse, so that she is in a better position to develop a varied export trade. She is free of unproductive debt and can devote all funds not absorbed by current needs, to productive purposes. And her petroliferous deposits provide her with special financial aid at the most useful moment. So that a comparable advance to that made by Egypt may be hoped for, if a comparable effort can be made.

The unavoidably lengthy duration of a general settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq has been emphasised several times in this report: although no precise estimate of the period required is practicable in the 000

which the Administration were unable to provide. And even if this radical defect had been remedied the application of this advanced tenure would have been premature throughout the majority of the country. So that to-day—more than half a century after the introduction of the Ottoman Land Code in the country—only a fraction of the cultivated region is somewhat uncertainly held on tapu tenure, while throughout the overwhelming balance, land is for the most part occupied and cultivated on no legal tenure at all. 1123 471

The injurious effects of the prevailing welter of insecurity and confusion both on agricultural productivity and on public order have been emphasised in the body of this report and are too well known to need repetition. The main problem of land tenure may therefore be summarised as the need to establish security and clarity of tenure everywhere by a general definition and settlement on a clear legal basis of both statutory and equitable rights to land. The broad objective should be to confirm and maintain beneficial occupation and use, whenever this is reconcilable with the equitable treatment of third parties and the just interests of the public. 185

It is very understandably urged that the proper course is to extend tapu tenure generally throughout the cultivated territory, subject of course to the requisite clarification of that tenure and its adaptation to national requirements. Excellent as the chief characteristics of tapu tenure are, and advantageous as the suggested course may prove ultimately to be, this is too ambitious a plan to be practicable at present. It is what the Ottoman Government attempted and failed to do, and the causes for their failure must be remedied before that attempt can be successfully repeated. This was implicitly recognised by the Turks themselves some years before the war in a provisional law already cited. No useful purpose will be served by examining here the prospects of practical success of this now defunct measure. But it is certain that it is beyond the present capacity of el 'Iraq to establish the detailed cadastral survey and land register of the requisite accuracy and authority. And without these accompaniments any ostensible general introduction of tapu tenure would be to grasp an attractive shadow in preference to the substance of a solid and attainable reform. To place even the admitted rights to tapu tenure on an intelligible and proper basis will be a most difficult and lengthy undertaking.

Occasional and sporadic grants of miri land in tapu tenure can, of course, be made and implemented in due course if special justification arises and special efforts are taken. But no general grant of tapu tenure can be made effective for many years to come. And while islands of secure tenure and good culture are most valuable, it is the establishment of a general reform giving security of tenure to the mass of existing landholders and cultivating tenants, which is needed to stimulate enterprise and development throughout the length and breadth of the country and thereby promote economic revival on a national scale.

A hardly less important accompanying reform is the establishment of a uniform and equitable basis for land revenue collection. Here again the Turkish administrator perseveringly sought to establish in his land tax (werko) a measure admirable in principle and conception. But here again he was unable to translate his measure effectively and generally from the Statute book to the land. And here again no far-reaching or solid success is practicable in the absence of a reliable land survey, or without a general settlement of rights and a methodical valuation of the land, as was also ultimately recognised by the Ottoman Government.

5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

185 5. The dominant facts to be taken into consideration in planning these reforms are the magnitude of the task and the poverty of el 'Iraq's resources at present in experienced public servants, in money and in equipment. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the simplest measures that will secure the main essentials shall be adopted. Anything less will be waste of money and effort. Anything more, at this stage, will divert money, effort and equipment from complementary productive reforms.

The simplest form of tenure that can be adopted at present for miri land is the effective application of the leasehold, under which it is already in theory commonly supposed to be held. This will be immeasurably easier to operate than tapu tenure. And leaseholds which work successfully can give the great body of landholders a clarity and security of tenure in practice, which will not be realisable under tapu tenure until a proper cadastral survey of the country has been executed and an efficient system of registration of title to land is in general operation.

It would also seem wiser for the State to retain the residuary freedom it would still possess under the leasehold system to occupy and use miri land for national purposes, until the land surface of a district has been mapped and contoured, and the irrigation and communications systems projected therein have been planned in detail. For many years to come el 'Iraq will possess a superabundance of potentially valuable agricultural land, so that in planning new works it should always be possible to re-arrange holdings to the common advantage of the holders and the State. But if a general policy of granting land in tapu tenure is adopted in advance of the planning of the national estate, expropriation would have to be resorted to, to resume land so granted. And expropriation would be more troublesome, slower and more costly, all of which would ultimately re-act on the general taxpayers and on the progress of development as a whole.

000 The principal measures recommended in the main body of this report may now be summarised very briefly :

- (i) The establishment of a small Central Lands Office attached to the Ministry of the Interior. This office would be responsible for the continued study of land tenure and allied questions and for the general direction of the executive programme of reform recommended (viii, 3 and 7).
- (ii) The Survey Department, the State Domains service, and the Tapu Department to remain attached to their present Ministries (viii, 7).
- (iii) The remedy of a number of important weaknesses in the organisation and equipment of the Survey Department and the unification of all land survey required by the State under this service (ii, 5 and viii, 4 and 5).
- (iv) A combined programme of a skeleton form of cadastral survey, of settlement of rights to land, and of land valuation, on the simplest lines to be carried methodically through the country (v, 7, vi, 1-5 and 9).
- (v) Land survey operations to be conducted under the unfettered technical direction of the Survey Department, but in accordance with the general programme adopted, after due consultation, by the Central Lands Office (viii, 3 and 4).

(vi) The parallel operations of settlement of rights to land and of land valuation in the field to be undertaken by selected Administrative Officers working under the general administration of the Central Lands Office, and helped by suitable assistant officers (vi, 4 and 5, viii, 8). 000

(vii) The comprehensive study and progressive amendment of the Land Code and supplementary legislation, so as to make the statutory land law clear, consistent, and workable and better adapted to local needs and conditions (vii, 1).

(viii) The establishment of a special Land Court to hear due and proper appeals from the decisions of Settlement Officers in regard to rights to land (vi, 8).

(ix) The establishment of a suitable independent body to hear similar due and proper appeals in regard to the valuation of land (viii, 8).

(x) The general policy animating settlement of rights to land to be the confirmation and maintenance of beneficial occupation and use whenever reconcilable with the equitable treatment of third parties and the just interests of the public. Existing legal tenures to be duly recognised: but the possession of miri land to be granted out on leasehold, which it is suggested might normally be for ten-year periods.

The above are all measures for the initial execution of the reforms. Owing to the complexity and many-sidedness of the problem, it is better to defer detailed consideration of the measures of conservation that would be subsequently needed, until Government has decided whether to proceed with the programme of initial reforms or not. The nature of these subsequent measures of conservation, have been indicated in previous parts of this report (e.g., viii, 1).

The greatest pains have been taken throughout to suggest the simplest and cheapest measures which are capable, if steadily and effectively applied, of establishing the land tenure and land revenue of the country on a generally acceptable and económically sound foundation. It is earnestly hoped that the interdependence of these measures will be recognised and that the scheme put forward will be considered as a united whole. And I venture more particularly here to emphasise the desirability of entrusting the conduct of settlement and land valuation operations in the field to selected Administrative Inspectors, at least during the earlier years of the work. As has been represented earlier (vi, 4) the qualifications that these officers possess make them exceptionally fitted for the execution of this most onerous, greatly needed, but essentially transitory, task.

6 and 7. CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

6. But the central question for Government to decide is whether to undertake a comprehensive programme of practical reform or to leave things as they are. As has been noted more fully earlier in this report, the importance of putting the land tenure of the country on to a clear, equitable and stable basis was appreciated at the very outset of the establishment of modern el 'Iraq. It has received most earnest consideration ever since. And yet it has to be recognised that more than a decade has passed without any effective steps in the desired direction having been taken. The times have been troubled, the pre-occupations of Government great, while a decade is a brief space in the lifetime of a 185

people. So there is nothing unusual in the failure so far to attack this evil effectively. Richer and more experienced countries have done no better. Indeed it is remarkable that the importance of the question was realised so quickly and appears to be understood so generally throughout the country.

But attention has to be directed to the past as a guide to the future. For this reason it should be realised that ten years, during which a great deal of thought and labour have been devoted to the subject, have elapsed without any constructive measure for the general improvement of the tenure of land by the mass of landowners and cultivators having been carried out. And although ten years is a short span in a country's history it is a considerable portion of a man's life. Resolute and well-directed effort during the next ten years could put the tenure of land throughout the bulk of the country on to an essentially sound and satisfactory footing; whereas the next ten, twenty, or a hundred years will find the prevailing evils still uncured if they are not attacked on more practical lines than hitherto. And it should perhaps again be stressed that few countries exhibit such deplorably unstable and confused conditions of land tenure, or are so dependent for the creation of the wealth they need, upon stimulating the energy of the whole agricultural population and safeguarding their attachment to the land. For while no proper development of the country's resources is possible without a well planned and well regulated system of irrigation or without assimilating and applying the lessons of scientific and economic advance elsewhere, yet the fruitfulness of these measures will ultimately depend upon the individual efforts of the great mass of landholders and cultivators throughout the country.

7. And the past history of the land should also help the public to realise that the present long established and deep-seated evils cannot be cured by edict or in a year or two. The establishment in practice throughout the country of a secure legal land tenure will not be brought about by a vote in the Legislative Chamber nor by any official actions alone. A considerable amount of preparatory work must precede any useful legislation: and such preparatory work must be well conceived and thorough if it is to yield satisfactory, economical and assured results. For even the most appropriate legislation is only the national authority to proceed. Before such legislation can be implemented attention must be directed to providing the necessary working organisation, to securing suitable officers, and to formulating investigatory and technical procedure which will both satisfy the practical requirements of the work and ensure the co-operation of the agricultural population. For success must be gauged by its ultimate effects, and it will be decisively determined in the open fields by the confidence felt by the general body of landholders and cultivators in the integrity and competence of the settlement staff, by the reasonableness and dispatch of the procedure adopted, and by the equity and stability of the findings.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education
is not possible without some reference to the history and present 186
circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an
administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Ad- 185
ministrative reforms and some social advance were attempted 735
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became
an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 642
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent 212
years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to 361
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

powerful local landowners operated as effective obstacles to compulsory schooling. 872 658

Despite this initial failure of a modest attempt to apply compulsory education in certain parts of the country, enlightened opinion in Iraq is strongly in favour of educational development. Because of the economic, political and social obstacles which will have to be overcome before a real approach to universal compulsory education can be made, few if any of the country's educators feel that this desirable objective is likely to be achieved in a short time. As educators, however, and for educational reasons, they are anxious that the practicability of achieving a realistic approach towards compulsory education should be soberly investigated. This enlightened minority are likely to be assisted in their demands by pressure of nationalist opinion, which sees in the development of education a means of spreading national culture and national sentiments among the people. 871 185

There are other important reasons why the time is ripe for assessing the ways and means by which compulsory education can be approached. Although Iraq, like many other countries is, economically, passing through a difficult stage, rapid development in thought and ways of life is taking place. The country is at present at the cross-roads between traditional and modern or western civilization. Change and development, in one direction or another, seem to be the order of the day. It is for this reason that a contemporary Iraqi educator urges that the present time 'affords a unique opportunity for making a good start in education'. 000

Before, however, considering the practicability of making a 'good start' or at any rate a new start in the direction of compulsory education, consideration must be given to the educational needs of the country at its present stage of development and the extent to which these needs are being met by the existing system. It will then be possible to consider, in the light of prevailing economic, political and social conditions, ways and means of achieving further advance.

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent 185
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and,
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, 425
allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intelligently
conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract 185
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

166 must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land
185 must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting.
He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

425 (4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and
provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

427 (5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders.
So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila
area, and the total population of adults and children is between
871 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with
a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing
185 for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good
design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of
Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for
a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to
avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish
intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village
which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of
the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the
intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural
streams'.

427 It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which
has been in operation for only four years and is still in process
425 of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it
241 appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless
185 cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average
465 income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of
the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced
from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the
Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation
the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more
robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators.
Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which,
by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The
men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed,
it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in
the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

427 The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants,
apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging
185 and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they
make a certain contribution to the public purse through the
sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage
an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly
needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that
they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their
contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 423
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant 511
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 565
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 166
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

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CHAPTER SIX

A POLICY OF ADVANCE TOWARDS COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

So far in this study an attempt has been made to ascertain the main educational needs of Iraq, to evaluate recent developments in primary education both quantitatively and qualitatively, to demonstrate the enormous obstacles to further advance and to illustrate, from examples, the ways in which some of these obstacles are being overcome. It is clear, however, that while some circumstances and conditions exist which suggest that the time for further advance is propitious, such advance will only be possible by the adoption and persistent implementation of a policy which takes into account both the desired objective and the obstacles which still have to be surmounted. The obstacles are clear enough. The desired objective is also clear, always provided it is appreciated that quantitative advance is not in itself sufficient. What is needed is not only a policy of advance which will get more children into school, but one which will ensure that children enjoy forms of primary education which are related to their individual needs and to the special needs of Iraq. 000

Before considering possible lines of advance towards compulsory education for all children in schools of the right type, it is necessary to call to mind the magnitude of the task quantitatively. With a potential primary school population of 750,000 children which is rising daily, with not more than twenty-four per cent of this number now attending school for periods of varying duration, with a national budget which is barely balanced, with a country which is badly in need of other public services, it would appear to be unrealistically idealistic to assume that any effective advance towards universal compulsory education could be achieved over any short period of years. The present total education budget would have to be more than doubled to provide primary education for all children at existing standards, some 15,000 additional teachers would have to be trained, and a sum of money which it is not possible to estimate would be required for capital expenditure on school buildings. 871

The magnitude of the problem, however, is not new to the Ministry of Education. In 1946 a special committee of the Ministry drew up a 'Ten-Year Plan' in which it was suggested that, provided 871
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871 certain administrative reforms were introduced into the Ministry
itself, and provided a vigorous educational drive was made, it
645 should prove possible within ten years to achieve a total school
185 attendance of fifty per cent of all children of primary school age.
Under this plan it was hoped that it would be possible to train 400 additional teachers in the first year and provide for an increased school attendance of some 12,000 children. At this rate of progress some 42,000 additional children should have been attending primary schools by the end of 1949. Actually the total increased primary school attendance between 1946 and 1949 amounted to some 34,000 children. This increase took place despite the fact that, apart from some not too satisfactory measures for the short-term training of teachers, the reforms advocated by the special committee of the Ministry of Education were never put into operation. In other words, the recent quantitative advance appears to have resulted not so much through any 'Ten-Year Plan' as because of continued public pressure.

871 There is no doubt that this public pressure for more schools will
continue and that, unless a more vigorous policy of coping with
185 the demand is initiated, quantitative demand will continue for
some years to outstrip primary school provision. Indeed, when one looks back over a period of years and realizes that, whereas in 1931 there were not more than 35,000 children attending primary schools, there are now 175,000 children, there is little cause for any immediate pessimism so far as numerical advance is concerned. It is for this reason that some Iraqi educational reformers maintain that, on the assumption that quantitative development goes on at the same total pace, i.e., another five-fold increase over the next twenty years, compulsory education of a type could be achieved by 1970. It is not possible, however, to predict the future rate of progress even in general terms because, although quantitative growth has been rapid since 1930, it cannot go on beyond a certain point until some of the economic, political and social obstacles already outlined have been solved. Although numerical development has increased five-fold since 1930, that rate of increase will undoubtedly drop when the children of the relatively higher income groups are in school and when the Ministry of Education is confronted with the task of meeting the needs of the children of very poor parents and those who are living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions.

If these suppositions are valid, the broad lines of a policy of genuine advance towards compulsory education become clearer. First, steps must be taken to cope with the present unsatisfied demand for primary education. Secondly, consideration will sooner or later have to be given to the measures which will need to be

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taken to provide both for the children whose parents cannot yet afford to send them to school and those who are living under partly or entirely nomadic conditions. Equally important, preparations will need to be made for ensuring that qualitative accompanies quantitative progress. If real advance towards compulsory education is desired, some of these measures will have to be taken immediately; others will have to be developed more gradually. Consideration must, therefore, now be given to a policy of advance towards compulsory education which includes both immediate and long-term measures.

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A SHORT-TERM POLICY

COPING WITH EXISTING DEMANDS

The most immediate necessity is that measures should be taken to meet the demands of parents who wish to send their children to primary schools. Some advocates of educational advance do not recommend this immediate action, urging that the more important task is to improve the quality of the existing schools. It is doubtful whether this view could be sustained: it would provoke further parental disillusionment and deprive many children of a fair start in life.

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An attempt should, therefore, be made to ascertain the extent of this immediate problem by asking every Provincial Director of Education to give, from his local knowledge, details of the number of children in the province who would attend school under existing conditions if accommodation were available for them, the number of new schools needed and the extra teachers required. The results would probably be surprising in that they would demonstrate a public desire for education in the provinces of which the Ministry of Education may not be entirely aware.

These needs should be met forthwith and financed by a special allocation from the central budget in the next financial year. The extra teachers could be found partly by abandoning uneconomic rented premises which are wasteful of teaching staff, but mainly by 'stepping-up' existing teacher training provision as an emergency measure. Some new buildings would be necessary but many of these, at any rate in the smaller towns and villages, would be provided voluntarily from local resources. In the larger towns, consideration should be given to a suggestion made by an Iraqi economist that new school buildings could be provided through

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000 the floating of local public loans which could be partly redeemed by the gradual release of the large sums of 'dead money' which are at present being spent on rented premises which cannot be used economically.

In other words, what is needed at the present time is a vigorous administrative gesture which would assure the public that the Ministry of Education is controlling the existing pressure for primary schools rather than being jockeyed along by it.

REFORM OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

871 But perhaps before the Ministry of Education can itself promote
185 immediate measures of this kind with the vigour required,
consideration will have to be given once more to two major
645 administrative reforms which were advocated by the special
committee appointed to draw up the 'Ten-Year Plan' in 1946.

The Minister as a Trustee of the Public Educational Interest. Until very recently the advent of a new Minister of Education has tended to be accompanied by abrupt changes and reverses of educational policy, and sometimes by changes in official personnel. This is certainly not calculated to assist that continuity and persistence in educational policy which is so essential at the present time.

Some maintain that this unfortunate tendency has been due to the intrusion of party politics and sectarian interests into the Ministry. If this is true, it should be emphasized that a Ministry of Education, while being responsive to sound educational opinion, should always endeavour independently to attach itself to national educational policy which is free from these non-educational considerations.

It is probably nearer the truth to suggest that these fluctuations in educational policy are due as much to the influence of the individual opinions and plans of the Ministers themselves. It is perhaps natural in a young and rapidly developing country that Ministers should wish to leave their own impress on the country's educational affairs. It is not desirable, however, that they should have the unrestricted power to do this, and in any event they should be required to justify proposed changes before men who have had long experience of education and educational administration. It is refreshing, therefore, to gather from conversations with some of the recent holders of this important office that the time may be approaching when the Minister tends more and more to regard himself, not as one who is entitled to control

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educational policy in the light of opinions and schemes based on his own inevitably limited educational experience, or by considerations of his own political group or sect, but as a trustee of the educational interest of the whole country.

The Formation of a National Council of Education. It was also suggested by the special committee referred to that a means of assisting successive Ministers to pursue a consistent policy of educational advance would be the creation of a National Council of Education which would be composed of Directors-General of Education, the Deans of Institutions of Higher Education, representatives from other Ministries whose co-operation is essential in educational progress, representatives appointed by Parliament, and other leading personalities in the country. It was suggested that 'the principle function of this National Council of Education should be to ensure that educational policy is well-founded and that there is stability in its application'. In other words, the National Council of Education would be a continuing body pledged to an agreed national policy of educational development from which successive Ministers of Education would find it difficult to depart.

It appears that a properly constituted National Council of Education has never been formed. Some such bodies have been established and abolished from time to time at the discretion of successive Ministers. One reason given for failure to maintain a National Council of Education is that the Minister should justify himself, not to a Committee of 'experts' but to public opinion. Theoretically there is much to be said for such an explanation but, in a country where the bulk of the population have not had educational opportunity and cannot therefore be articulate in public affairs, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a sound public opinion in matters educational.

A new Education Law giving the Ministry of Education the necessary powers and duties to cope with present pressing demands and needs is overdue. Such a law should include categorical provision for the establishment of a well-balanced National Council of Education with a dignified status. It should have definite powers and duties and meet at regular and legally stipulated intervals. The Minister should be required to consult the Council on major changes of policy, and should not make changes without a majority decision by it. The Council should approve all major plans and developments and regulations of the Ministry before they become effective. Most important, the National Council should have the power of initiating discussion and enquiry as it thinks fit, and should not necessarily await the invitation of the Minister before so doing.

871 185 645 There are signs that the present time is opportune for the formation of this body. The writer had the privilege of being present at a recent *ad hoc* gathering of men prominent in the educational affairs of Iraq, presided over by the Minister of Education. The level of discussion was exceptionally high, and one advantage of the meeting was that the Minister was both able to be made aware of trends of opinion and in turn to bring to the notice of the 'experts' practical administrative considerations which might prevent him from applying all their advice. If such a body could be transformed into a regularly meeting National Council of Education and given the powers indicated, it is likely that that consistent policy without which advance in the direction of compulsory education cannot be achieved would be considerably assisted.

871 645 *Concentration of the Ministry of Education on Major Issues of National Educational Policy.* If the Minister were guided in the formation of policy by a properly constituted National Council of Education, the way to consideration of an agreed national policy of educational advance would be facilitated. However, before these reforms could achieve their object, they would need to be accompanied by a reformed conception of the Ministry of Education itself. At the present time, the Ministry is more in the nature of a national administrative office than a policy-making body. In addition to controlling all forms of education and exercising most minute financial control in small matters, the senior officials of the Ministry appear to be occupied with a mass of detailed administration, much of which could very well be left to the Provincial Directors of Education.

It is suggested that, at any rate in the sphere of primary education, many of the existing administrative tasks performed by officers of the Ministry of Education should be transferred to the offices of the Provincial Directors of Education. If this were done it would enable the senior officials of the Ministry to concentrate their talents on major issues of national policy which, at the present time, need considerable thought and investigation. If compulsory education of quality is ever to become a reality, matters of major policy which at present receive insufficient consideration must be investigated by officers of the Ministry before the facts concerning them can be adequately considered by the Minister and the National Council of Education which it is hoped he may soon have to assist him. Plans for improved training and distribution of teachers badly need mature consideration, as do investigations into the most suitable types of school building for a country with the climatic conditions of Iraq.

It is understood that there is a
871 possibility that one of the most enlightened sheikhs of one of the
185 largest tribal groups in Iraq would be prepared to co-operate by
providing premises, together with accommodation for the team
consisting possibly of teachers, an agriculturalist and health officer.

A LONG-TERM POLICY

000 These then are some of the short-term measures which it is suggested should be considered as the basis of a practical policy leading towards the establishment of compulsory education. They are, of course, only 'short-term' in the sense that they constitute lines of fairly immediate action, most of which will need to be carried forward and embodied within a more long-term policy. It is now necessary to discuss other measures, more of a qualitative nature, which will take longer to materialize but which must be put into operation over a much longer period if quantitative advance is to result in the provision of the right type or types of school.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE TEACHER

The Training of Teachers. The establishment of more schools must be accompanied by the training of more and better qualified teachers. If the Ministry of Education could be freed from its serious overload of administrative detail on the lines indicated, one of its most important tasks would be the development and gradual transformation of existing arrangements for the training of teachers.

As was indicated in Chapter Three, the output of teachers from training institutions during the current year is likely to be 754. Some of the training institutions are doing excellent and lively work. They are handicapped by the fact, however, that many of the students did not complete a full secondary education before they entered the training institution. This means that the period of training for these teachers has to be devoted too much to the task of repairing deficiencies in educational background, and is not sufficiently a professional college course. Many of those who had the advantage of a full secondary education before they took up training do not enter a training college proper but attend a one-year course attached to a secondary school with limited facilities.

Training devices of this kind were essential if the output of teachers was to keep pace with the rapidly growing demand for more schools. The effects of inadequate training are, however,

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now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade 438
with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge 439
of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though 173
unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradition 782
at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the
bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, 539
who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with I
all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the K
construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while 653
sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When 185
echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on I
a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn K
Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled 721
by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the 361
Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body
of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a
jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

645 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment
669 than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment
of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2]
Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions
of many 'Iraqīs held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government
●185 by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time
[207] in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of
land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been
648 won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of
loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other 'Iraqī Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

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[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 5th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *At-Tariq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936.

1-[1936 .. Analysis]

eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241 has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahīn* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 439 features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648 may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433 existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466 have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647 of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175 economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185 of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937. [2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.
[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

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175* 185 so recent in origin and a people so recently brought into contact with larger ideas than have motivated them for centuries past, that a relative standard of judgment should be applied. On such a standard the League of Nations itself was obliged to assess the readiness of 'Iraq for independence, in response to the firm insistence on the part of the Mandatary, which declared in its special report presented to the League in 1931:

> His Majesty's Government have never regarded the attainment of an ideal standard of administrative efficiency and stability as a necessary condition either of the termination of the Mandatory Regime or of the admission of 'Iraq to membership of the League of Nations. Nor has it been their conception that 'Iraq should from the first be able to challenge comparison with the most highly developed and civilised nations in the modern world.[1]

On the basis of a similar standard it can be confidently stated that 'Iraq not only achieved unprecedented development in the period from 1914 to 1932, and particularly since 1921, but much of the development has been maintained since 1932. The development at the time of 'Iraq's entrance into the League may not have been so great as put forward in the Official Reports or in the statements made by British representatives to the League of Nations, nevertheless it has been very real. Less than a score of years previous to 1932, 'Iraq was an isolated lethargic maladministered portion of the Ottoman Empire. In 1932, as since that time, 'Iraq has occupied a strategic position on the highway of air-communications. It possesses the machinery of a modern democratic state although the control is now centred in a Government backed by military force. It belongs by general acceptance to the international community, having assumed the obligations of a sovereign nation for international agreements.

175† 227 185 In reaching this state of development, 'Iraq has undergone a period of direct British control, first under military and then

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 11.

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under civil administration, followed by a period of tutelage. Under the first of these regimes, the administrative and economic development took place according to the dictates of an Anglo-Indian administration, apparently determined to make of 'Iraq an Indian province. Under the mandatory regime, extending from 1920 to 1932, 'Iraq was forced to accept the restricting hand of the mandatory Power but, at the same time, was able to count upon its support and assistance.

The British Government, as Mandatary, had assumed definite responsibilities from the League: the granting of assistance for the development of 'Iraq's political and social institutions, for its economic regeneration and for its protection from external enemies. These obligations it was not unprepared to honour but only on its own conditions, imposed in a manner which, as has been indicated, guaranteed its position in the country. These conditions do not seem to have been laid down because of any inherent lack of sympathy with 'Iraq's national aspirations. On the one hand, the British Government felt unable to relinquish the Mandate, for fear of losing prestige, until it had satisfied world opinion that as Mandatary its obligations had been fulfilled. On the other hand, the British Government was unwilling to give up its favoured position in 'Iraq until it had achieved the aims for which, in accordance with British policy in the Middle East for the past century and a half, it had occupied 'Iraq. These aims included the control of the land route to India, now vital to the British Empire as the result of the development of air-transport; the assurance of peace and order in the strategic centre of the Middle East; the extension and protection of British commerce; and the control of the existing and potential oil-producing districts of 'Iraq and Persia. Until these objectives were achieved, through the establishment of a stable government, 'friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligations to H.B.M. Government',[1] the 'Iraqī Nationalists seem to

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[1] Instructions of H.M. Government to the High Commissioner of 'Iraq, cited *Admin. Report*, 1927, p. 11.

175* have had little effect on British policy. Although agreeing to the
●185 progressive restatement of its relations with 'Iraq, the British
727 Government diminished no whit of its insistence that its advice, through the High Commissioner and the British officials, be taken; that its assistance, as outlined in the Treaty and the Agreements, be employed; and that its will as the mandatory Power be the ultimate authority.

175* If the formal relinquishment, October, 1932, by Great
185 Britain of her right to control the affairs of 'Iraq except in accordance with the Treaty and Agreements still in force, marked another stage in 'Iraq's political existence, the work of development has not been completed. In the continued reorganization of finances, in the perfection of the Judicial system, in the raising of education standards, and in the extension of agriculture, irrigation and means of communication still lie much to be done. Hopeful signs of governmental action would seem to appear in the current version of the frequently altered Five Year Capital Works Plan with its provision for irrigation projects, roads, bridges, 130 schools and numerous health centres,[1] in the proposed Health Campaign,[2] and in the recently created Agricultural Bank,[3] and in the many new proposals laid before the Chamber by the new Government.

[648] 'Iraq's recent treaty of friendship with Sa'ūdī Arabia, April 2nd, 1936,[4] and her amiable relations with Turkey seem to point to the removal of these two external dangers. Within the country still lie the problems of the creation of a social class of citizens, now beginning to appear, capable and willing to assume political duties from a sense of public duty and not of personal aggrandizement, the evolution of a free Press motivated by public spirit rather than by individual or party grievances, the assurance of free elections, and the elimination of sectarian and sectional animosities which will eradicate the antipathies between tribesmen and townsmen, will bring the Shī'īs into

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, April 9th, 23rd, 1936.

[2] *N.E. and I.*, August 8th, 22nd, 1935.

[3] *G.B. and E.*, March 26th, 1936.

[4] Text: ibid., April 23rd, 1936.

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the body politic, will create a real bond between Kurds and 175*
Arabs, and provide adequate protection to all minorities within 185●
the State.

If the past progress of 'Iraq has been a matter of concern to OOO
a wider group than merely the people of 'Iraq, so also is the problem of its future. The first of the mandated territories to achieve the right 'to stand alone' as contemplated by the drafter of the League of Nations Covenant, 'Iraq, the model Mandate, has been the object of special interest to believers in the mandate system, to whom its future will bring additional proof of the success or failure of the Mandate idea. 'Iraq's progress, followed in the past as providing confirmation or refutation of Great Britain's assurances that she had fulfilled the obligations laid on her as Mandatary, will furnish new evidence concerning Great Britain's trusteeship. To the Arab Nationalists in Syria and Lebanon, whose demands for independence have been both stimulated and assisted by 'Iraq's achievements, 'Iraq's future will either provide new arguments for treaty revision or supply France with reasons for resisting Nationalist demands. Of even greater importance will be the effect of the future on the welfare of the 'Iraqis themselves: Kurds and Arabs; townsmen and tribesmen; *fallahīn* and landowners; and Muslims, Jews and Christians.

The future is not without its dark aspects, but if the new regime can provide stability with a much needed discipline, if it will be motivated by foresighted and courageous statesmanship, and if the people of 'Iraq can and will devote themselves to the tasks which lie before them with the same energy which they expended in achieving independence, the position of 'Iraq among the progressive states may yet be assured.

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however, had to be kept small. In the field of industry the government sought to stimulate private enterprise by according special tax benefits and protection and by establishing the Industrial Bank. 654

The Development Board

With the prospect of a rapid rise in oil production and therefore in government oil revenues, the promise of a much wider field of activity developed. Accordingly a law was enacted in 1950 establishing a Development Board and assigning to it all the oil revenues as well as the proceeds of any loans contracted by it or by the government on its behalf. The Board consists of two ex officio members—the Prime Minister, who functions as its president, and the Minister of Finance—and six executive members appointed for five years. The Board was directed to draw up a general program for the development of Iraq and, upon its approval by Parliament, to proceed with the detailed plans and specifications of the projects included in the program and with their execution in accordance with an approved order of priorities. Each year any revisions in the program, an annual budget and an annual report are to be presented to the Parliament. The Board is also to consider and coordinate development schemes which may originate in the various ministries of the government. 654 185 647

The establishment of this Board is evidence of the government's determination to see the extraordinary oil revenues used for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living and to insure some continuity in development which frequent changes in governments have made virtually impossible in the past.

The Board was constituted and began operations toward the end of 1950. The British and American governments each nominated one of the executive members in accordance with a request by Iraq. In the spring of 1951 the Board submitted its preliminary over-all program involving a total outlay of ID 65,674,000 over a five-year period beginning with the fiscal year 1951-52. About ID 29,401,000 of the Board's projected revenues, consisting of the income from oil anticipated at that time and nearly all of the proceeds of the $12.8 million loan obtained from the International Bank for the Wadi Tharthar flood control project, were reserved

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654 for subsequent programming. Expenditures for the five-year period
• 185 were allocated by broad fields as follows (in dinars):[5]
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Water storage and irrigation schemes	30,044,000
Roads	15,826,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	12,618,000
Miscellaneous projects	6,216,000
Administrative expenditures	970,000
Unprogrammed reserve	29,401,000

Because of the brief time devoted to its preparation, this program will necessarily undergo modification as more detailed study is given to requirements and the cost of individual projects and as some of the over-all allocations are programmed in detail.

652 The magnitude of this projected outlay is in startling contrast to the financial stringency which has characterized public expenditures in the past. The government has had great difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays were pared; government salaries were not increased despite the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds.

Government Budgets

The trend of government finances is indicated in Table 16.

It will be noted that, despite economies and tax increases, the government's total budget showed substantial deficit in 1948-49 and 1949-50, primarily because of the bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 and the effects of the war with Israel. Of the government's principal autonomous enterprises, the railways also ran considerable deficits on capital account which were defrayed only by using reserve funds, by borrowing ID 1,000,000 from the government and contracting a loan of ID 3,000,000 through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The Iraqi government borrowed at home to meet its own needs, its domestic debt rising from ID 4,500,000 on March 31, 1948, to ID 10,800,000 on March 31, 1951. Borrowing had to be limited, however, because the market for government securities was virtually restricted to the banking system. As of March 31, 1951, the National Bank and the commercial banks held ID 9,200,000 of the domestic debt.

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[5] For a more detailed breakdown, see Table V in Appendix.

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TABLE IV

EXPENDITURES PROJECTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD

(in millions of dinars)

	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56	Total
Irrigation projects:						
Wadi Tharthar	1.3	3.6	3.1	1.5	0.2	9.6
Habbaniya	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	—	2.1
Diyala Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.1	2.2	1.9	6.1
Dokan Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.0	1.8	2.0	5.7
General drainage	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Other irrigation projects:						
New projects	0.4	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.9	4.2
Completion of projects begun previously	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.3
Total	3.0	6.6	7.4	7.5	5.5	30.0
Roads and bridges:						
Main roads across Iraq from south to north (Basra-Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc.)	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.6
Other roads	1.3	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	9.4
Total	2.1	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.5	15.9
Buildings:						
Hospitals	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Schools	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Other buildings	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.0
Total	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	12.6
Other projects:						
Small settlement projects	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Artesian wells and water for drinking purposes	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Special projects in northern Iraq	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.3
Reforestation and filling of swamps and marshes	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5
Telegraphs & telephones	0.5	—	—	—	—	0.5
Other projects	0.2	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.4
Expropriations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	—	1.1
Total	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	6.2
Administrative expenses	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0
Grand Total	9.4	13.7	14.8	15.0	12.8	65.7

Note—Totals do not necessarily add up because of rounding.

exclusively grown by farmers who specialize in these commodities 361 137
and who market their produce in the towns. 244

Planning the Improvement of the Villages

Clearly it will not be possible to bring about any substantial 361 and lasting change in the state of some thousands of villages until the root causes of poverty, ignorance and insecurity have been tackled. Only then can thriving communities replace the present villages with their primitive and almost static mode of life.

Legislation for the improvement of villages is already in existence. 361 In 1936, a law (No. 70) for the construction of new villages 185 was passed, empowering the Ministry of Interior to construct or renew villages, having regard particularly to health requirements, such as the construction of sanitary facilities and public baths, the hygienic disposal of waste and the provision of drinking water. A draft law on similar lines, but placing the responsibilty on the Ministry of Social Affairs, was put before Parliament during 1951. Parliament sent it back to the Council of Ministers for amalgamation with the earlier statute. Both are admirable in objective, but both are focussed primarily on the reconstitution of villages on more hygienic lines without regard for the urgent educational and economic aspects of the problem and without recognizing the need to enlist the cooperation of the people. Only a comprehensive and popular program can really reach the people and encourage them to help themselves. That little, in fact, has been done under the 1936 law is itself eloquent testimony to this.

The task of remaking the villages is typically one for the 361 new Community Planning Office. In cooperation with all the government departments concerned and with their advice, it should be able to formulate and issue the necessary regulations, of which those that affect health are only a part, under the power conferred on it by the projected planning enabling act.

The Mission has elsewhere made a number of recommendations designed to raise the standard of living of the rural population. On the agricultural side, these include the organization of an extension service, the creation of cooperatives, measures to improve livestock and the provision of better drainage. Medical recommendations include the opening of more village dispensaries, the

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ment, which are usually forthcoming only at irregular intervals. 361 The loans usually have to be amortized over a period of 10 years 631 or less, which places an onerous burden on municipal finances. The municipal authorities in a number of northern cities, which were allocated funds in the fall of 1950 and had spent a large part of them at the time of the Mission's visit, were still in doubt as to whether they had received a grant or a loan. Uncertainty as to income or capital funds inhibits advance planning. Moreover, when the authorities do receive funds, they are apt to spend them as fast as possible for fear that, if they have not actually been spent, they may otherwise be withheld. The usual way of overcoming this situation, and possibly the only way in the circumstances, has been to build new streets, which are relatively easy to plan and execute. In addition, the municipality is by law entitled to recoup part of its expenses from the owners of land that has increased in value.

The provincial authorities, who are responsible for carrying out the projects of the central government and who might be expected to cooperate more closely with the municipalities, have been faced with similar difficulties. They, too, have had hand-to-mouth experience with capital expenditures. Nearly completed buildings have sometimes been left standing for months, because funds ran out before the construction could be finished. Furthermore, the projects to be undertaken are normally prescribed by the central government. Apparently, some advance on this procedure has been made recently and the *Mutasarrif* and the Provincial Administrative Councils have been given more latitude in planning their own development.

Planning in the Future

The opportunity now exists to substitute an entirely new 361 approach to urban development for the old haphazard methods. An 185 example of how well the development of a town can proceed, given the right spirit of cooperation, is provided by the small town of Bedrah, which lies near the Iranian border in Kut province and which has a population of about 4,000. This project involves the reconstruction of the old town on a new site.

Several streets had been constructed and 24 dwelling units were ready for occupancy when the Mission was in Iraq. Thirty more units were scheduled to be finished during the year. Besides

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361 185 these residential structures, there were a number of community facilities: a dispensary staffed by the Ministry of Social Affairs; a primary school building for 200 students and a secondary school building for an initial enrollment of 30 students constructed by the Ministry of Education; and a clubhouse which had been paid for by the people themselves. The municipality intended to erect a market and to install an electric generator. Residences for the *Qaimmaqam* (the administrator of the *qadha*) and the physician were also scheduled to be constructed.

Plans for the development of the new site for Bedrah were prepared by the Planning Office and followed by the local officials in the construction of the project. Work has been proceeding for several years and has been financed largely out of past savings. The whole project has, in fact, been carefully thought out and planned ahead. The initiative was due largely to the *Mutasarrif* of Kut and the success of the project to his close personal relation with the Planning Office.

361 647 This example is, unfortunately, an isolated one. In fact, the present status of the Technical Section for Planning and Organization in the Ministry of Interior does not permit comprehensive planning. It has neither the authority nor the staff to guide the planning of public works or buildings that are currently the concern of other ministries. The need for coordinated planning undoubtedly exists, but the function can only be discharged adequately if the Authority is given sufficient staff, trained not only in architecture and civil engineering, but in all the economic and sociological aspects of town planning.

General plans for the development of each municipality could then be based on facts and drawn up with a schedule of priorities, and future work should only be sanctioned if it is in conformity with these plans. Such plans should be practical and preferably designed so that they could be carried out in stages and changed and improved as conditions may demand. The new Community Planning Office should be made clearly responsible for approval of these plans or any changes in them. As a safeguard, funds for municipal development should be disbursed only for purposes which are in accordance with approved plans. This will require amendment of the present Roads and Buildings Regulations, which

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648 forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction
[186] and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the
643 ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was
645 inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets
668 which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the
669 factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in
• [185] assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

648 In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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648 Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

668 Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the econo-
665 mic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified
the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and
[185] continued action against Communism and incipient plans for
national development have not so far availed to counteract.
[565] The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely
[870] lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but
the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties including
666 the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in
January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former
opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge
of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally
showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither
the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have
affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect
of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in
spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred.
The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently
abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for
little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the
time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election
of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals
of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September
by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the
Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree
on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume
their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the
646 Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed
by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained
the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an
honourable past in the service of the Government and the
country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities
maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration,
217 research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be
439 drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the
world's supply. Her general economic organization is neverthe-
433 less agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the
339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com-
342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 In 1950 a Development Board was established with the func-
652 tion of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing
a general economic and financial plan for developing the
[511] country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

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cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of 185
the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 652
and is estimated at ID155,374,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken [654
account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank 648]
for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of an annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated 311
that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living [162]
directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported 2.41
products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 36 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

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[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1952).

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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's production; 245
the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

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185 charcoal production with consequent encouragement of
137 secondary industries, and improve climatic conditions.
313

Problems of Agriculture

185 Among the natural difficulties which attend agriculture in
654 Iraq are those imposed by drought, floods, dust storms, diseases, pests, and soil erosion, of which the first two are being attacked by a large-scale programme of irrigation and flood-control. The major diseases are the inflorescence rot of dates, wilt diseases of tomato and watermelon, gummosis of citrus, rusts of cereals, and various mildews. The major insect pests are the Moroccan locust, whose ravages have from time to time caused immense damage to cereal crops, the grasshopper, the Mediterranean fruit fly, the date-fruit mite and Dubas bug, and the Sunn pest and bug *Aolia acuminata* which attack wheat and barley. The Ministry of Agriculture is combating these diseases and pests by modern methods; in locust-fighting Iraq is among the most advanced countries in the world. The problem of soil erosion can to some extent be met by the activities of the Forestry Department.

Irrigation

312 The aim of water-control in Iraq is to even out the seasonal flow in the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, so as to prevent both drought and flooding in the irrigated areas and to increase the area under cultivation. Irrigation itself imposes the necessity of drainage, to prevent the salting up of irrigated land and the further spread of malaria.

Three methods of irrigation are employed: direct inundation at flood-time, which is used for rice cultivation and is of comparatively limited importance; distribution of water from rivers and canals by direct flow on to the land through a network of small channels and cuts; the lifting of water into the channels and cuts by various methods which include the use of mechanical pumps. The date-palm groves of the Shatt al-Arab benefit by natural irrigation; twice a day as the tide rises and falls fresh water is forced into the creeks and channels and then drains out again.

Irrigation—often highly organized—has been a feature of Iraqi agriculture since the Sumerian civilization, in decline since the seventh century, and especially since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Serious reconstruction began in this century, with the Hindiya barrage, completed in 1913, for which the Euphrates was diverted, and the Kut barrage on the

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Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312
water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423
are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427
There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24
per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [2011]
on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators.
This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423
disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433
perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185 ●
which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464
reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large
farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery 166
is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of
farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the [161]
cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the
sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

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423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-
464 supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
166 shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently
go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agri-
[452] cultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in
1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and
traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
654 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
185 have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being
semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

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162 311 level plains and raise, by means of the scanty rainfall, a meager amount of wheat and barley in favorable seasons.

312 Along the rivers in their upper courses are a few gardens, irrigated by means of various draught animals and water-wheels, which elevate water from the stream to the level of the land above. At Gurna the Tigris and Euphrates join to form one river and at Mohammerah the Karun empties into this united stream. The three rivers thus flow into the ocean as one enormous waterway, known locally as the "Arab River." For the last hundred miles before the sea is reached, the fresh water of the river ebbs and flows with the tides, and by cutting outlets along the river banks gardens may be automatically irrigated twice a day if so much water is desired. 245 Along these lower stretches each bank of the river is lined with beautiful gardens, which reach a depth of some miles in places and extend in practically an unbroken expanse all the way up to Basra and in less prolific culture even as far as Gurna. These date gardens are beautiful things, beautiful for what they are now, and more beautiful still as a suggestion of what all Mesopotamia might be. They are also one of the most melancholy things in the world as reminders of what the past developed and the present has wasted.

311 134 The land has enormous resources for agricultural development. That whole vast district may be made into the garden spot of the earth. The soil is the best in the world, river silt hundreds of feet deep. It is as level as a parlor floor, with just enough pitch between the big rivers, and between the north and south, to make irrigation easy. 312 185 All that is necessary is a perfected system of irrigation, and although the necessary investment would

312 be large, running up to hundreds of millions of dollars,
185 it should bring excellent returns. The trouble hitherto
● has been the unstable character of the government and
the consequent risk to which any such investment would
be exposed. During the time of the spring high waters,
a disaffected tribe might obtain control of some important
dam and with one stick of dynamite destroy nearly the
whole system. But with a stable government the pro-
ject should be one of great promise. The water is at
311 hand, three riverfuls of it, and as if to prove the prac-
312 ticability of the dream, we know that in the ages of an-
185 tiquity these resources were utilized for this purpose and
with the most splendid success. Whether there is actually
water enough to transform every square mile of the coun-
try into a garden or whether the supply of available land
will prove to be more than the water can care for, espe-
cially now since the area has so greatly increased, can
only be told after the project is tried. Certainly there
is water enough for hundreds of square miles, enough
indeed to make Mesopotamia one of the richest countries
of its size in the world. Already one new irrigated area
has been developed by the Hindiya Barrage built by a
British concern between 1911 and 1913 as the first step
in the reconstruction of the ancient irrigation system.
The erection of this great barrage on the Euphrates River
was due to the Young Turks, the dam being the first unit
in a comprehensive irrigation project for the entire coun-
try which had been drawn up for them by the noted
engineer, Sir William Willcocks. It is only a beginning,
but it has made the desert rejoice and blossom as the
rose over many square miles of territory.

311 With the exception of the rich petroleum deposits
162 which are said to exist throughout the Mosul district and

177 try rather than fostering the development of something indigenous and natural. Under such a system the enforcement of law may become of necessity very mechanical, as when an Indian Sepoy nearly knocks down an inoffensive Arab pedestrian by a blow with his fist for no greater crime than walking on the wrong side of the road to avoid a mud puddle. In the courts, too, a crowd of lawyers and an abundance of red tape, with venal underlings, may serve to make the paths of justice tortuous and uncertain in spite of the best intentions on the part of the presiding judge.

185 177 Nevertheless, even under such handicaps as those we have indicated, there is no questioning the very great material progress that is to be seen in Mesopotamia. [363] Even before the war one of Baghdad's streets was paved, and since the British have taken over the administration of the kingdom, all sorts of improvements have been introduced. [496] The railroad system of the country now extends 360 miles from Basra to Baghdad and from there on nearly to Mosul. There are several subsidiary lines, the total amounting to over 1000 miles. By far the greater part of this mileage was constructed by the British for war purposes. [312] Under British rule, also, the Hindiya Barrage and other less important irrigation works have been kept in order and improved and extensive harbor improvements at Basra undertaken.

364 744 British sanitary and health officers have been appointed for Mesopotamia and no praise is too high for their largely unappreciated but nevertheless unselfish and extremely efficient labors in that country. The hospital work that has been undertaken in Basra, Baghdad and Amara, the inspection of eating houses, and the maintaining of sanitary conditions have been excellently done.

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364 Unfortunately the fact that this work is practical benevo-
764 lence of the finest sort and carried on in the finest spirit has not served to commend sanitary regulations to the Arab, who regards them as a nuisance, a hindrance to business and an infringement of his personal liberty.

871 Mesopotamia has also grappled with the whole prob-
● 185 lem of education most courageously. An educational
177 system has been organized which includes normal schools for teachers and a large number of primary and secondary schools for both boys and girls. There are a smaller number of high schools, and a central university is planned. Fifteen years ago the dominant European influence in this community was French, and no one could claim to be educated who could not talk that language fluently. There was a marked change a little later, and before the Great War German was the commanding influence. Now, of course, the predominant western influence is English, and it seems likely to remain so, for commerce will probably talk the English language for many years, whatever political upheavals the country may be destined to experience. It is true that the educational system has not as yet taken very deep root and that much of the work done is very superficial, but it is none the less exceedingly creditable and encouraging. Moreover, this western system of education will probably be more or less permanent, for it will always be the gateway to remunerative positions.

185 In general, the people of Mesopotamia have been
177 brought into contact with conditions of modern life and are anxious for further progress. New wants have been created, and a certain increase in the commerce of the country is the inevitable result. All manner of western dress goods and shoes are to be found in the bazaars, as

185 well as many western food products, such as candies and
177 fancy crackers. The country is lighted by kerosene oil,
much of which comes from America. Numbers of automobiles
are to be seen, and in some places even electric
lights. All these things represent the gratification of
wants that did not exist previous to the entrance of western
influence.

439 There has also been a development of the export trade
311 of the country. However, the articles for export are not
many nor of great amount. Dates are the principal product,
together with a certain amount of wheat and rice
and some hides and wool. In the long run, of course, no
more can be brought into the country than is sent out of
it, and the trade of Mesopotamia cannot increase to any
great figure until her own natural resources are developed.

000 Just how far these various modern improvements will
go remains to be seen. If the British continue in power,
there is no doubt that material development will be steady
and sound. If they evacuate the country and leave it to
an independent local government, progress will be much
435 slower, to say the least. During the war wages went up
511 to fabulous heights, and although prices of food and rent
177 advanced even more, there is no doubt that the sum
185 total of the war's influence was to raise the standard of
living in the cities and to stimulate enormously the desire
for many western products and for western education.
Just now there has been a very sharp reaction; times are
hard, work is scarce, wages are poor. Everything western
is discounted, and the cry is for an independent national
development with the elimination of every foreign
000 influence. The common people long for the golden days
of the Turks, forgetting with a completeness quite as-

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tonishing the nature of those golden days, now only ten 000
years and less in the past.

The fundamental difficulty is that the new régime, with 177
all its virtues, is essentially an alien system imposed upon 609
the country from without by virtue of superior military 186
power. Thus it shares the unpopularity of alien systems the world over. The opposition to the present ruler and his British advisers is not simply the frothing of irresponsible and ambitious nationalist agitators. It is all that, but there is something far more significant underneath. I was once entertained for an afternoon by a rabid nationalist of Mesopotamia who attempted to show that the system of education introduced by the British was inferior in curriculum and in number of students to the pre-war system of the Turks, which proposition was about as reasonable as that two and two make twenty. But it would have been a great mistake to conclude that the man was primarily concerned to vindicate the Turks. He was not even primarily concerned over the educational system of Mesopotamia. Nor was he simply a fool. The thing that troubled him was the fact that his country was ruled by aliens. The tremendous following that such men have is not due to any outstanding ability they possess and still less to any profound insight into the various problems of the day, but rather to the fact that the average Arab, the man in the street in Mesopotamia, also resents that alien domination very intensely. It is hard for the unimaginative Westerner to realize that what the Arab wants is not efficient government or even good government. What he wants is self-government.

On the whole, in spite of many encouraging signs of 185
progress, a more intimate acquaintance with affairs in 177

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185 Mesopotamia distinctly dampens enthusiasm. It appears
177 gravely doubtful whether we are on the road of progress at all—whether, in fact, we are not on a road with a very different ending. The sanitary and educational systems are both of them expensive, and it is doubtful if either can be continued now that Great Britain is no longer willing to spend large sums of money on the country. The railroads have hardly been brought to the point of self-support, and the harbor facilities of Basra, which were constructed to meet war needs, are ludicrously excessive. The local administrators now are at their wits' end to find funds sufficient to maintain them. All work on the irrigation system is at a standstill for the same reason. The whole government structure is a showy shell, vastly more expensive than can be properly shouldered by such a country. Its alien character makes this expense inevitable. The rulers who come from Great Britain demand salaries which are enormous judged by local standards, and much the same exaggerated scale of remuneration prevails throughout their staff of indigenous assistants. Creating a government that shall be modern enough to foster progress and at the same time cheap enough to sit lightly upon the community and be at least tolerable if not popular, constitutes a problem which is by no means solved.

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On February 16, 1950, the Prime Minister issued a statement of governmental policy in which he gave emphasis to land reform. He stated that small family farm ownership will be made the basis for agricultural expansion as undertaken by the Government in the future. In June and July 1950 the Government issued decrees by means of which the application of Law No. 23 of 1945 was extended to additional areas of state domain: in the provinces of Hilla and Kerbala in the south, in Diyala in central Iraq, in Suleimaniya and at the Hawijah irrigation project in the north.

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It might be argued that all of these measures do not amount to much as yet. This is true; but the important fact remains that the present governments of the region are doing something about the matter. This is an indication of at least some concern on the part of national leadership. Through the extension of moral, technical, and material support by the United States and other cooperating countries, these beginnings could be transformed into great national realities for the whole Middle East.

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2. *Progressive elements and groups are working at land reform.* In Egypt and Syria, in Lebanon and Iraq, there are leading individuals and organized groups who have been giving serious thought to the problem. Some have begun to do something about it; others stand ready to lend their support once a national project is launched. Some have worked out sound plans and proposed draft laws for reform; others have established improved tenancy terms on their estates; and many others have written pointedly on the subject, depicting the problem and urging a solution. These enlightened elements have been increasing in numbers and in influence; they constitute the real hope of the Middle East. The encouraging reality is that we find these elements not only among the intellectuals and professional groups, but also among the tribal chiefs and large landowners.

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In November 1950 a large group of professional and governmental leaders, representing most of the Arab countries, met in Cairo in a Social Welfare Seminar under the auspices of the United Nations. Reports already received indicate that the subject of land tenure and land reform received serious consideration, the gravity of the problem and possible solutions being discussed in detail.

427 Out of this 40 per cent the fellah must also pay a rent for the upkeep of the canals which irrigate the holding; this may amount to 20–45 per cent of his share.

426 At the beginning of the season the fellah receives in advance from the employer:

	Dinars
300 kg wheat	1.800
150 kg barley	.325
Cash in 3 instalments	3.750
	6.075
Seasonal interest 30 per cent	1.800
TOTAL	7.875

1 Dinar = £1 sterling

He is not as a rule able to repay the loans from the sale of the produce, and so gets deeper and deeper into debt to the landowner. Thus there has evolved a particular kind of debt-serfdom: a landowner who needs labour from one estate can pay an advance to a whole village or several villages, and so obtain 'the right to demand the transference of the land workers thus "freed" from their debts to his lands.'[1]

651 Changes in taxation have also benefited the big landowners. To promote the expansion of pump irrigation, land irrigated with pumps was partially exempted from taxation. The reform of taxation under the Istihlak law of 1931 has also operated mainly to the advantage of the large landowners.[2]

427 Thus the former tribesman in Iraq has been reduced to the position of a serf-tenant, who is entangled in crushing indebtedness, and so is tied to the holding which he cultivates.

423 In spite of the wise recommendations of Sir Ernest Dowson's
report, and the advisory efforts of British officials to improve
427 the security of the small cultivator, it cannot be said that land
● 185 settlement has succeeded in removing the oppressive character
of the land system. Nor has any reform been made to permit
the development of State land.

423 As regards water-rights, there is the same situation as in
Palestine and Transjordan; attempts at legislation have been
185 frustrated by local interests, and here the need for legislation is

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[1] ibid., p. 55.

[2] See P. W. Ireland, *Iraq, A Study in Political Development* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1937), pp. 440–1.

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423 still greater. Rights are recognized *ab antiquo*, which means
● 185 by custom established beyond the memory of man, but since all the pumps have been installed in the last thirty years, no rights in connection with them can be recognized. The main problem has been that sheikhs or town notables put in pumps on a holding and then claim the whole of the land. Where there has been a settlement of title, claims have usually been settled on a share basis, but in other cases the pump owner has succeeded in getting the whole of the land. This is not a satisfactory position; in 1938 a draft irrigation law was prepared by the British expert on land tenure, but it has not been enacted.

The Government which came to power in Iraq after the *coup d'état* of 1936 severely criticized the policy of granting enormous blocks of land to individual owners. The fact is of course that previous governments were unable to resist the power of the sheikhs, or of the pump owners, and allowed them to jump claims to land before settlement. As a result of these criticisms, a new act was passed in 1938, which somewhat modified the powers of the pump owners, and gave the existing cultivators stronger rights.

423 But little progress has been made since that time. The Govern-
185 ment's conception of reform was revealed in 1943 when the Ministry of Finance began the sale of the State leasehold (*miri*
458 *sirf*) lands by auction, as an anti-inflationary measure. This was an illusory remedy for inflation, and threw away some of the State's power to reform land tenure and develop agricultural resources. In view of the fact that cultivation is likely to extend in the future as a result of new irrigation schemes, it is clearly important that the Government should decide on the principles which ought to determine future policy. If Iraq is to receive large loans for development, a settlement of the rights of the cultivators will become even more important.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

185 In Iraq, unlike the other countries of the Middle East, the reform of land tenure is the subject of genuine political discussion. Although in its economic life Iraq is far more backward than Egypt, it is politically more alive, and it is realized by the official class at least that reforms are needed, and that a new
000 system of tenure must be evolved. Discontent with the land

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Discontent with the land

579 system often takes a very active form: clashes between officials and peasants in regard to the collection of revenue, for instance, are quite common, and there are long-drawn-out conflicts about land occupancy, as for instance in the Muntafiq district.

● 185 But although there is discontent, there is not much hope that the land-tenure system will be reformed with reference to standards of social equality or economic efficiency. Land tenure is mainly a controversial subject because it has been linked with British administration, and its abuses attributed to British mistakes. The difficulty has been that the British influence was only advisory, and that the Government did not control an administration efficient enough to carry out the recommendations of the expert advisers, nor could it take measures against the landowners.

Hence there is no agreement as to the object of reform. Some consider that the small cultivator ought to be given freehold tenure; others consider that settlement in larger units, with the sirkals as owners, is desirable.

The real problem is to propose a reform of tenure on lines which would reconcile the need for national planning with security for the small cultivators. From this standpoint the only proposals which have been made are those drawn up by an official of the Land Department, who has had long experience in this field.

These are:

1. Reform of the present system of *tapu* tenure (i.e., the freehold type by making non-cultivation a cause for loss of title, as is at present the case for land held on *lazma* tenure.

2. Reform of the *miri sirf* category of land by dividing it into two categories:

(*a*) Those which Government intends to develop by canalization, for example, land covered by the Greater Iskandariya scheme, or by the scheme for development at Abu Ghuraib and on the Greater Musaiyib. Grants of title should not be made in these regions without decision of a special committee, and should be approved by the Council of Ministers. These regions should be reserved for grants of *tapu* land in plots of not more than 100 dunums, and no person should be allowed more than one

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185 plot; they should, in fact, be reserved for peasant proprietorship.

(*b*) Those which the Government does not intend to develop by canalization. In this category development will of necessity be by utilization of private enterprise and capital. It is recommended that this land should be granted in *tapu* ownership by auction in plots of not more than 10,000 dunums.

This last proposal seems difficult to approve in the districts where tribal system still holds sway, since in these districts the granting of large areas of land would serve simply to bolster up the powers of the sheikhs and would not necessarily lead to
622 development. Some of the sheikhs are modern business men (as,
185 for instance, the sheikh of the Beni Shammar who, although illiterate, has converted his enormous properties into a limited company registered in New York). Others are still tribal chiefs whose authority rests on the traditions of religion and war, and who are not likely to plan for the development of their land.
185 Other proposals which have been made are:

1. The development of colonization schemes on new land, with favourable leasehold conditions for the small cultivator, which would attract labour from the sheikh's estates by offering better conditions. By causing a shortage of labour, this would induce the large proprietors to offer better conditions.

This proposal has been advocated by Salih Jaber, the present Prime Minister, and is probably the most practicable under present conditions.

2. Settlement of title on the basis of sirkal ownership. The sirkals are, as has been explained, minor sheikhs or agents of the large sheikhs. They perform an indispensable service in organizing production, because they organize the digging of canals and the planting of the cultivated area in relation to it. They are in fact a sort of irrigation service, and a type of farm manager which does not occur elsewhere. Whether they should really become the basis of the property system seems doubtful, but the proposal is mentioned because it does take into account an essential feature of the Iraqi land system which might be difficult to replace.

25a Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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185 √165 The difficulty in the way of these proposals is that they all presuppose some limitation on the power of the large proprietors which the Government must carry though. Yet the Government itself is composed of the large proprietors. In many parts of the country the sheikhs are still an essential part of the administrative system, and are local authorities who can, if need be, oppose the central Government. In the programme of the present Iraqi Government it is stated that one of the aims of economic policy should be 'to encourage small ownership and make it a basis for agricultural development in all parts of Iraq, and to set maximum and minimum limits for ownership on all future agricultural projects to be undertaken by the Government in *miri sirf* lands.' But it seems improbable that this proposal, which would necessitate revision of the titles granted under land settlement in recent years, will actually be put into effect. Indeed it is as useless to expect that the existing regime will take steps to reverse or check the extension of large ownership as it would have been to expect the oligarchic governments of nineteenth-century England to stop the advance of enclosures. There is as yet no political force to counterbalance the large landowners, and until one develops there is not likely to be any limitation on their power.

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[For the recommendations of the United State Mission of 1952 to study community organization and development in Iraq, see Middle East file, Category 116, pp. 38-54.]

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647 852 185 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the direct beneficiaries. It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenues resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

000 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the close of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of the departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralized and made available more directly and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

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642 131 161 434 423 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income per capita does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate the distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary of tribal chiefs.

483 185 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

657 185 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing the standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

59: Allen et al S-3 (1952-53) 1953 M1 Middle East

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services. "The disease has been recognized", he said, "what was required was that medicine for the prescription should be supplied and the patient taught how to take that medicine". The same Minister informed us that he himself, as a young man called upon to draft a new educational programme, had included in it the provision of community centres, but that unfortunately this feature of the scheme had not materialized. 657 185

45. Community welfare organization on a self-help basis in Iraq is, indeed, as yet in its infancy. Some observers consider that an indispensable preliminary to its development is to create in the minds of a people long under the influence and domination of a feudal tribal system an effective desire for self-government.

46. As is generally known, Iraq is rich in oil resources and it is the policy of the Government to transfer mineral wealth into productive capital for the general welfare. A statutory Development Board was established in 1950 to ensure continuity of economic policy, regardless of political changes. Seventy per cent of the income from oil revenues is allocated to the Board as revenue for projects of water conservation, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, etc. The Board is also responsible for co-ordinating the development schemes in these fields initiated by the various ministerial Departments. Over 200 foreign technicians are listed as working in Iraq in formulating a variety of development schemes, mostly relating to economic improvements. Some of the experts are in the direct employ of the Iraq Government; others have been assigned to the Government for short periods for specific purposes by agencies and organizations furnishing technical assistance on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Relatively few technicians have so far been concerned with social developments, but the country's needs in this respect have, we understand, been partially surveyed. 651 382 185 471

47. In the absence of detailed documentation, we left it to the Government agencies most directly concerned with the subject of our mission to determine whom we should see and to suggest which projects or institutions we should visit. 000

48. During our short stay in Baghdad we were able to visit at Tal Mohamed a well-constructed modern building designed to serve as a centre for community activities for the residents of a model housing estate constructed by the Ministry of Social Affairs for low-income government employees. Cheap transport facilities were available between Baghdad and the new estate, in which some 500 houses were already in occupation and more would be constructed as funds became available. The imposing building in which it is intended that community activities shall be carried out has been ready for use for more than a year but only some of the equipment and furniture (including seven beds for maternity cases) have been installed. A difficulty in finding suitable qualified staff has delayed the opening of the centre. When it is in full working order it is planned to offer nursing, educational and indoor and outdoor recreational facilities on modern lines. The general appearance of the centre and model village was marred by the state of the roads after heavy rains. 657 185 362

49. It is understood that centres similar to that at Tal Mohamed are planned for other urban areas. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which until recently formed part of the Ministry of Health, has also other plans under consideration for creating, with external technical assistance, pilot projects of community organization or demonstration centres, in urban as well as in rural areas.

50. A survey of Iraq villages jointly conducted by Mr. Gordon MacGregor (TCA adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs) and Dr. Yusuf Khaddoury, M.D. (Officer in charge of international relations of that Ministry) reveals: 185 657

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"an almost universal need among the people for training in the fundamentals of farm practices and farm management for greater food production and income; training in the building of better homes; training of women in better home and child care; and for improvement of sanitation and general health conditions. Underlying these conditions are two basic problems: the lack of land owned by farmers on which they can build houses and raise sufficient food for themselves, and the lack of credit facilities by which they can advance themselves.

"The survey finds in general little development of strong local leadership and group organization among the villagers, through which self-help, management and development of their own affairs can take place. There appear as general characteristics dependence upon others, great expectations of help from the Government and few patterns of co-operative effort and confidence among the village people, beyond the confines of the family or local groups of relatives.

"The survey finds a framework of a governmental organization to serve the rural people and a land development programme on irrigated public lands. As yet, and for many very practical reasons, only a limited extension of government services in education, health and agriculture with assistance from several technical cooperation agencies is reaching the villages..."

The Survey accordingly recommends a national rural improvement programme to be undertaken eventually as a co-operative activity by the Ministers of Agriculture, Education, Health and Social Affairs, with assistance from her Ministries, the Development Board and Technical Assistance Agencies. With this recommendation we would have concurred but for the suggestion that in its early stages co-ordination should be effected by a new Department to be created in the Ministry of Social Affairs.

51. As will be gathered from an earlier chapter of our report, we had misgivings on this aspect of the proposal, the ultimate effect of which might be to alienate the sympathies of the other Ministries concerned and to lead to duplication of effort, instead of the desired co-ordination, at the village level of departmental activities intended to serve the community as a whole. Time did not permit of our discussing our point of view in detail with Dr. Khaddoury or his colleague, Mr. MacGregor, who was absent from Baghdad. We were informed that it was hoped to make provision for this scheme of rural reform in the 1953/1954 Budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The scheme has not been adopted or approved by the Council of Ministers at the time of our visit, and informal discussions which we had in other Departments left in our minds the impression that under closer examination modifications might be suggested from the outset.

The joint report of Mr. MacGregor and Dr. Khaddoury is included as Appendix (III), although the plan does not appear to have reached the stage at which it can be described as representing Government policy.

52. In some, if not all respects, the MacGregor-Khaddoury plan appears to have much in common with what we are able to learn of UNESCO's experiment in Fundamental Education now being carried out as part of the land reclamation and resettlement project at Dujailah, near Kut, some 110 miles south of Baghdad. Adverse weather conditions and the state of the roads prevented us from visiting the project but, by a fortunate chance we were able to meet Mr. Trowbridge, the present Director, during our stay in Beirut. Bad weather also made impossible a visit to another land scheme at Kirkuk to the north of the capital, which had only been started and where, we were told, some of the mistakes of the pioneering project had been avoided.

53. In the course of our interview with the Ministers of Health and Social Affairs 657
and their officials, we were offered facilities, of which we were unable, however, 185
to avail ourselves, for visiting single-purpose centres, e.g., homes for the aged
and for the blind, a rehabilitation centre for crippled boys, hospitals, and
maternity clinics — all under official patronage and in some, if not every instance,
receiving a State subsidy. In a working class district of Baghdad we did, however, 657
visit a maternity clinic that had been started by the Red Crescent Society. It had
recently come under the direction of an English woman doctor, assisted by, possibly, 743
the only certified Iraqi Public Health nurse in the country. Both spoke of the
improvement in health which was to be observed amongst the out-patients, and of the 185
evident appreciation by the latter of the assistance afforded, but the shortage of
milk for the infants was a matter of concern. Some benefit may come in this respect
from the discussions then in progress between the Iraq Government and UNICEF for the
provision of a pasteurising plant. The Ministry of Social Affairs have recently
taken over from the Red Crescent Society the responsibility for the staff employed
at the clinic and for providing certain necessary supplies and medicaments.

54. It is perhaps worth adding that the remarks made during our visit by the staff 657
of the clinic on the subject of attempts to teach sewing to the out-patients while
waiting for attention and the difficulty of keeping amused the numerous children who 185
came with their mothers, suggests that there is scope at the clinic (and no doubt other similar institutions) for better educated women of leisure, many of whom contribute generously from their purses to such works, to undertake another simpler form of voluntary social service for which little or no preliminary training is required. Indeed, it is not impossible that with such assistance and under favourable conditions a rudimentary club or community centre might be developed for the women in the district whose standard of life is very low but who have shown a desire to improve it. A development on these lines would have the merit of encouraging educated women of leisure in Baghdad to take part in voluntary social services. It will be long before trained, professional social workers will be available in sufficient numbers for such duties. We had however, no opportunity of discussing these suggestions with anyone in a position to transform them into actuality.

55. We heard from Miss Govan (UNTAA expert) of a scheme with which she had been associated for training 25 young women as social workers. The scheme had made some progress but was momentarily hindered, partly by difficulties in providing local facilities for completing practical in-service training and in persuading the girls' parents to permit them to take up duty away from home.

56. Although we were met with every possible courtesy during our visit to Iraq, the fact that a caretaker Government was in office and a general election was about to take place created a situation in which it was pointless to discuss in detail with the departments concerned, future plans and policies for social development.

57. Recommendation. Until the MacGregor-Khaddoury scheme has been more closely studied by the departments concerned and the necessary financial provision has been approved, we are unable to make any recommendations.

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651 The methods of collection reveal the attitude of the general public to personal taxes. In 1945 the total number of individuals who paid income taxes were 18,482; one-third of these were Government employees, ten per cent were from other salaried groups.[18]

185 These random facts about Iraq and its population indicate,
651 on the one hand, a low standard of living and general underdevelopment; and on the other hand, excellent potentialities for expansion and improvement in agriculture and industry. The importance of the income from oil and its utilization for capital improvement were realized from the very beginning. In 1931 the Five Year Capital Works Program was enacted in order to hypothecate the revenues from advance oil royalties and dead rent. The monies earmarked for the Capital Development Works Scheme Account were never, however, completely used for capital works projects, and from time to time the Government used the funds to cover the accumulated deficit.[19] The Iraqi Parliament subsequently adopted two yearly budgets, ordinary and extraordinary.[20] The latter, for development schemes, was derived mainly from oil revenues and income from the Iraq Currency Board, but its revenues were frequently diverted to other than the intended purposes.[21]

The various Iraqi governments—as a rule they had a high frequency of change and a low rate of duration—not only realized the importance of the oil revenue to the general development of the country, but also the need for expert surveys and development plans. From time to time specialists were invited to prepare reports for the Government. The most im-

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[18] United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Public Finance Information Papers, Iraq* (New York, 1951), 21. Henceforth cited U.N., *Public Finance Iraq*. For a further breakdown of the composition of income tax payers between 1944 and 1947, see *ibid.* The British report stated that in 1949 there were 24,000 income tax payers. Great Britain *Iraq Review*, 22.

[19] This was done, for instance, in 1931 and 1932. Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development*, 437; *Report to the Council of the League of Nations*, 32, 30.

[20] For a table of both ordinary and extraordinary budgets for the years 1938-1949, as well as a brief discussion of Iraqi finances, see United Nations, Conciliation Commission for Palestine, *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, I (New York, 1949), 43-44; for the years 1949-1951, International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 170-176. See also Alfred Michaelis, "Economic Recovery and Development of Iraq," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, III, 101-106, Apr., 1952.

[21] In the prewar years when the ordinary budget showed a surplus, oil royalties provided "nearly 30% of the total revenue." Great Britain, *Iraq Review*, 5.

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portant of these, prior to the International Bank Mission, was perhaps the Haigh Irrigation Commission, which worked from 1946 to 1949 and recommended a £100 million development plan which would have increased the irrigated area from 8 to 17 million acres.[22] Yet in 1949 the United Nations Survey Mission reported that the financial resources available to the Iraq Government, not only from oil royalties but also from the accumulated wartime sterling surplus, had been largely diverted to financing consumption imports and the operating expenses of the State.[23] 185 651

In this statement the Mission touched on the basic problem of the area, even of those sections which have available financial resources for development projects. The realization of the importance of investment in development projects which will bear returns in the future necessitates self-denial of immediate consumption goods. Such long-range visualization, especially when resources for gratification of immediate needs are readily available, is, however, a quality with which neither the masses nor many of the political leaders are endowed. It is perhaps in the lack of this quality that the explanation for the failure of all the numerous development plans of the Middle Eastern oil producing countries may be found. The ability to curtail current spending for the sake of investments which will increase not merely the individual's returns but the wealth-producing potential of the nation as a whole would be a *sine qua non* for any growing and even highly developed economy, and certainly for underdeveloped areas. But the temptation to utilize the "external" income—from oil—for current needs which could never before be afforded, for alleviating the tax burden, for improving political standing with the electorate, proved too strong, and sooner or later all succumbed. 000

The Development Board

To return to Iraq. In May 1950 the Government promulgated a law (1950 No. 23) creating a Development Board to which was to be assigned the revenue derived from the oil com- 647 651 185

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[22] U. N., *Review 1949-50,* 29; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry,* Sept., 1953, 93.

[23] United Nations, *Final Report of the Survey Mission,* I, 36.

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panies; in 1952 the law was amended assigning only seventy per cent of the revenue to the Board. The Board with the Premier as chairman, the Minister of Finance as member *ex officio*, and six non-political full time executive members, was charged with preparing an overall development plan and given the authority to execute major capital development projects. On October 10 of that year Iraq officially requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a survey mission to review the economic potentialities of the country and make recommendations for a development program.[24] The Mission arrived in Iraq on February 25, 1951 and a year later, on February 11, 1952, the report was submitted to Premier Nuri es Said. It proposed a development plan for the years 1952-1956 involving a total expenditure of some $470,000,000, to be derived from the oil revenue for the same period. Basing itself on the Mission's report, the Development Board worked out the following five-year plan:

Table V. *Iraq Development Board Program*

Projects	*Cost* (in I.D.)
Irrigation schemes	53,400,000
Roads	26,700,000
Other communications	4,100,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	18,000,000
Public utilities	4,100,000
Agriculture	7,500,000
Industry (including erection of a chemical factory)	31,000,000
Miscellaneous	10,600,000
Total	155,400,000[25]

As far as the financing was concerned, the Development Board had no difficulty. As mentioned in the previous chapter, oil production in 1952 and 1953 ran ahead of schedule, and the Board's share of revenue in those two years alone was about ID30,000,000.

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[24] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, ix. The terms of reference agreed to were: "The Mission will be expected to undertake a general review of Iraq's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the Government of Iraq to formulate a long-term program for the further development of the country's productive resources." *Ibid.*

[25] This differs in some respects from the recommendations of the Survey Mission both in total expenditure as well as in the allotments for the various items. See International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 73.

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The general progress of the Development Board under the 647
existing conditions was tolerably satisfactory, but the long- 651
range objectives and the conditions necessary for their realiza- 185
tion were not appreciated either by the people or by the politicians. In 1953 the Development Board Law was amended and a new Ministry of Development was created. Though the Development Board was retained, the execution of the development plan was placed under both the Board and the Ministry. The Minister of Development became an additional *ex officio* member of the Board, responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his Ministry and of the Board. The original intent of the law to remove the Board from the vagaries of political change was thus negated. Moreover, because of the general educational and technological level of the population, the Development Board found itself in the unusual, if not unique, position of not being able to spend the constantly increasing revenue.[26] The Board consequently resorted to lending its funds to other Government agencies not concerned with long-range development, and a goodly portion of its income was diverted to other regular expenses.[27]

Despite inherent limitations and basic difficulties, the aware- 433
ness of the people and the Government that the oil revenue 185
could be used as a means of advancing the development of the country has had some positive and some negative effects on Iraq's growth. One might note a general tendency to depend exclusively on oil income, to the exclusion of all other resources of governmental and economic operations. For obvious [651]
reasons the Government adopted a policy of reducing taxes[28] in view of the gigantic income from oil.[29] Such a policy, combined

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[26] In 1952-53, ID11 million of the Board's allotment remained unspent. *The Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 6, 1953.

[27] For a description of the various projects, see U.N., *Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission*, I, 71-74; International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 183-457; Norman Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, IV, Summer, 1951, 362-370; Fuad Jameel, "Development Projects and Economic Progress in Iraq," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954; Mohammed Zaki Abdul Kareem, "Beehive of Construction," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, June 12, 19, 26, July 3, 1954; *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Dec. 13, 1954, 3.

[28] In 1953 the Government lifted the consumption tax on fresh fruits and vegetables, increased the reductions in the real estate tax and announced substantial cuts in customs and excise taxes. Jameel, "Development Projects," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954.

[29] The 1952-53 total Government budget amounted to $134,000,000, of which about 42 per cent came from direct oil revenue (only 30 per cent of total income, the other 70 per cent being assigned to the Development Board). U.N., *Summary 1952-53*, 60.

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433 with enormous spending, brings in its wake a host of problems
185 and dangers: inflation, a great strain on a primitive economy, shortages of human resources (civil servants, teachers, doctors, engineers), and the overburdening and eventual breakdown of transportation and communications. Nevertheless, progress was registered. Many irrigation and drainage projects were undertaken, and some were completed; a beginning of agrarian reform and rehabilitation through such projects as Diyala was made.[30] In 1952 the United Nations reported that a slight expansion in industry had been achieved and a basis for more
454 rapid development laid. Capital investments in major indus-
464 tries rose from a cumulative total of ID3.18 million in 1948-1949 to 5.84 million in 1951-1952; the value of output rose from ID 1.4 million to 4.4 million, and the number of workers increased from 1,650 to 4,550.[31]

In its report for the fiscal years 1952-1953 the Development Board stated that considerable progress had been made on some of the construction and irrigation projects although it had not used up its revenues and had granted ID6.3 million to municipalities and Government departments to carry out new programs.[32]

185 The impact of the oil industry on Iraq was not as great as it could have been. In spite of Government effort, and in spite of the belief held by some governmental leaders that it was an unconditional, integral part of the overall development program, industry made very little progress. There have been some advances in agriculture, but not as much as hoped for. There exists a serious danger that after the irrigation projects are completed and the land available for cultivation increased, unless the Iraqi peasant is educated—psychologically as well as technically—to utilize the additional acreage effectively and constructively and to keep the irrigation machinery in working order, the enormous expenditures may well have been wasted. Neither will the new hospitals and new school buildings be able to fulfil their proper functions unless there are enough trained doctors, nurses and teachers with a social consciousness and a deep-seated and genuine desire to help the impoverished,

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[30] Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal,* V, Summer, 1951, 362-366.

[31] U. N., *Summary 1952-53,* 22.

[32] *Al Zaman,* July 24, 1953.

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uneducated masses. The investment in education may be a complete waste if children continue to drop out of schools in great numbers as they progress to the higher grades in the primary schools.

The consumption of petroleum and petroleum products, which cost less in Iraq than anywhere in the world, according to the International Bank Mission, does not indicate that the Iraqis are taking advantage of the opportunities presented by cheap fuel for the general development of their country. The difficulties which the Development Board experienced in getting ahead with its work, the political interference with its efforts, and the inability to spend its income on long-range approved projects are indications of the inherent obstacles to the achievement of transforming a "backward, semi-feudal state into a prosperous, progressive modern nation."[33]

It might therefore be concluded that with the basic conditions of backwardness, illiteracy, inadequate health conditions, lack of educational (vocational and professional) facilities, a country—even though it is endowed with a plentiful supply of land, abundant water resources, cheap fuel and tremendous financial resources—cannot by its own efforts utilize these advantages to rehabilitate itself at a pace which would seem warranted by the favorable conditions. The will to achieve realization of the development plans is no doubt there, at least on the part of the leadership; the intentions are no doubt good; the various plans and projects prepared by foreign experts would no doubt be operative under normal conditions. But for any of these plans to succeed two basic conditions are prerequisite. The masses for whom the projects are intended must cooperate fully with the authorities; they must understand the objective, they must be prepared to work diligently for its achievement, and they must be prepared to wait for its maturity. Above all else, they must identify themselves and their effort as part of the plan and its realization. Those in charge of the execution must have not only good intentions and willingness to work with foreign experts both on the preparation and execution levels, but must possess deep understanding and have faith in the social and national objective.

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[33] "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.

433 311 241 There has been little change in the crop pattern in recent years. In 1950, under the stimulus of rising world prices, the area planted to cotton increased, but the damage caused by pests, together with the fall in prices, caused heavy losses and led to a shift to other crops. There has also been an extension of the area planted to fruits and vegetables.

242 The Government has taken several important measures to aid agriculture. In 1952, in order to improve the quality of dates, the government-owned Iraqi Dates Association contributed 49 per cent of the capital of a company which will market the crop. In 1953, the Government appropriated funds for the building of grain silos with a capacity of 150,000 tons, in order to improve quality, since low grading depresses export prices. The Agricultural Machinery Administration rents "machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts". 1/ The activities of the Agricultural Bank are discussed below.

423 241 Among the major obstacles to agricultural development has been the land tenure system. The uncertainty of land titles has by now been largely eliminated by the work carried out since passage of the land settlement law of 1932. By the end of 1953, titles to 16,126,000 hectares had been settled; this represented 68.4 per cent of the area of the country, excluding the desert regions. Another obstacle is the unequal distribution of land. The agricultural census showed that there were only 125,000 holdings, with an average area of 51 hectares per holding. Of these, 24,000 holdings were under 1 hectare, 26,000 between 1 and 5 hectares, 16,000 between 5 and 10 hectares and 19,000 between 10 and 20 hectares. Thus, 85,000 holders, or 68 per cent of the total, owned about 8 per cent of the total area. At the other extreme, some 33,000 holders, with over 100 hectares each, owned some 85 per cent of the total area. The majority of the agricultural population is landless.

311 241 185 The Government has attempted to remedy this situation by settlement schemes on government-owned land, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of the settled area. Following a successful experiment at Dujaila, 4,284 farmers were settled, in five projects with a total area of 198,000 hectares, and by the end of 1954, 10,200 farmers had been settled on 510,000 hectares. 2/ Farmers are organized in supply and marketing co-operatives. They are given the land free of rent for ten years, after which those who have made good are granted title without charge. 3/ Further projects are under way, including the distribution of 1,125,000 hectares in Mosul province, the distribution of 100,000 hectares near Baghdad, the expansion of the Hawijah settlement and the distribution of land near Basra and along the southern Euphrates. 4/

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, page 20.

2/ The Iraq Times (Baghdad), 25 October 1954.

3/ For further details see United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, Progress in Land Reform (1954), page 105.

4/ The Iraq Times, 14 December 1954, 4 January 1955, 8 January 1955 and 7 February 1955.

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obtained in 1950. It was not fully drawn upon, and has been repaid. The other major foreign debt was a loan of $12.8 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 1950, to meet the foreign exchange requirements of the Wadi Tharthar irrigation scheme. In addition, the Government obtained several advances free of interest from the oil companies, totalling ID 4.5 million, which have now been repaid.

Five domestic loans, totalling ID 7 million, were used to finance the railways and irrigation schemes. Two of these, of ID 1 million each, at 3 per cent interest, issued in 1944 and 1947 with maturities of 3 and 5 years respectively, were redeemed. Other outstanding bond issues comprised a one ID 1 million loan with 3 1/2 per cent interest, issued in 1948, and two twenty year loans, issued in 1944 and 1948, for ID 1 million and ID 3 million respectively. The above mentioned total does not include outstanding Treasury bills and the loans and advances made by the National Bank, commercial banks or other institutions. However, the public debt of Iraq is comparatively small and does not constitute a real burden on the economy of the country. In fact, the Government now has almost no difficulty as far as revenues are concerned, in redeeming not only foreign debts but also domestic ones as well. It is believed that the floating of domestic loans is intended to absorb "idle money" and is an anti-inflationary measure, while the foreign loans were to provide foreign exchange required for various development schemes. The repayment of the United Kingdom loan and the announcement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that the Government of Iraq had cancelled the unused balance of $6.5 million on its loan are evidence of Iraq's ability to meet its needs from its own resources.

Development programme

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The rapid increase in revenue anticipated from the expansion of petroleum production and the revision of the terms of payment by the oil companies led the Government to initiate an over-all plan to develop the resources of the country. In 1950, a Development Board was established and a comprehensive five-year (1951 to 1956) development plan, involving an estimated expenditure of ID 65.8 million, was drawn up.

In 1951, at the request of the Iraqi Government, a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development visited Iraq and submitted a report, which included a five-year plan with an estimated expenditure of ID 168.5 million. 1/ The Iraqi Government accordingly, in the light of the Bank's recommendation, replaced its earlier plan by a six-year plan (1 April 1951 to 31 March 1957) calling for expenditure of ID 155.4 million (table 30).

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq (Baltimore, 1952).

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Table 30. Iraq: Proposed Expenditure and Revenue of the Development Board, 1951/52 to 1956/57

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1954/55	1955/56	1956/57	Total
Revenue:							
Oil revenue	10,150	18,690	32,900	34,300	34,300	34,300	164,640
Proceeds of Tharthar project loan ...	320	1,850	970	640	185	-	3,965
Miscellaneous receipts	2	8	50	35	20	20	135
Total	10,472	20,548	33,928	34,975	34,505	34,320	168,740
Expenditure:							
Administrative and research expenses.	170	460	600	650	650	650	3,180
Irrigation projects:							
Tharthar	1,250	3,600	3,140	1,450	185	675	10,300
Habbaniya	450	300	500	500	200	250	2,200
Diyala reservoir	200	450	1,800	2,100	1,700	1,000	7,250
Dokan reservoir	200	600	1,400	1,700	1,550	1,250	6,700
Bekhme reservoir	200	1,000	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	8,700
Udhaim barrage and construction of canals	-	550	250	500	500	500	1,800
Other irrigation projects	724	1,500	2,000	2,450	2,700	2,950	12,324
Major drainage projects	200	400	750	750	1,000	1,000	4,100
Total, irrigation projects	3,024	7,100	10,840	11,950	10,335	10,125	53,374
Roads and bridges	2,066	3,800	4,700	5,300	5,450	5,450	26,766
Buildings	2,368	2,650	3,100	3,300	3,300	3,300	18,018
Reclamation of land, etc.	1,686	3,450	4,150	4,400	4,600	4,700	22,986
Industries	050	3,000	5,000	6,000	8,000	9,000	31,050
Total	9,364	20,460	28,390	31,600	32,335	33,225	155,374

Source: Compilation of Laws concerning the Development Board (revised). Schedule A (Baghdad, 1952), pages 8 and 9. Figures represent planned expenditure and revenue for fiscal years ending 31 March.

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 MI Middle East
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185 647 Previously the Government had carried out several schemes in various fields but development projects had had to be kept small and had been aimed at the more immediate needs. Financing was carried out by means of yearly capital works appropriations, totalling about ID35 million from 1931 to 1950. It is not, however, clear whether these appropriations were fully spent.

647 433 The execution of the Six-Year Plan was entrusted to the Development Board, established in the spring of 1950 under Law No. 23 of 1950 as amended by Law No. 6 of 1952. It was constituted under the presidency of the Prime Minister; the members were the Minister of Finance and six executive members, nominated by the Council of Ministers for a term of five years, including three experts, one each in finance and economics; in irrigations; and in an unspecified field to be prescribed by the Council of Ministers. The Board was entrusted with the duty of preparing "a general economic and financial plan for the development of the resources of Iraq and the raising of the standard of living of the people"; with undertaking "a general survey of the exploited and unexploited resources of Iraq"; with the execution of the plans "in accordance with their determined priority"; and with co-ordinating the various ministries' development schemes in relation to the general development of the country. The Board has its own budget, and its revenue consisted, at the outset, of the total revenue received from the oil companies, but in 1952 this was amended to 70 per cent plus such other sums as may be allotted to it by Parliament and the proceeds of any loans, domestic or foreign.

647 645 433 In July 1953 the Ministry of Development was set up, headed by a new cabinet minister who became the ninth voting member, the Board's representative on the Council of Ministers and the link between Parliament and the Board. The new law did not change the Six-Year Plan or the financial structure of the Board, although it changed the latter's organizational framework and required the new minister to prepare a new development plan to be executed after the completion of the present one. Furthermore, with a view to administrative decentralization, a distinction has been made between "capital development projects" to be carried out entirely by the Board and "small development projects" which, though financed by the Board, are to be entrusted to the appropriate government departments for execution. The Board held its first meeting on 30 November 1950 and in May 1951 prepared its general programme, which was approved by Parliament in June 1951. The Six-Year Plan (1951 to 1957) calls for a total expenditure of ID 155.4 million and an estimated revenue of ID 168.7 million.

433 647 Actual expenditures on development plans for the financial years 1951/52 to 1953/54 totalled ID 26 million. They fell short of planned expenditure, which amounted to ID 58.2 million, thus leaving an unspent balance of ID 31.9 million. The building programme and reclamation of lands and other projects ran nearest to schedule while irrigation and industry lagged behind (see table 31). In addition, the Board has granted a number of loans to municipalities and semi-governmental institutions up to the end of March 1954 as follows (in thousands of Iraqi dinars):

Omnibus service, Baghdad	1,000
Agricultural machinery and tools	500
Oil refinery service	6.000
Baghdad Water Board	660
Directorate General of Iraqi Railways	2.500
Industrial Bank	500
Eight municipalities	3,553
Total	14.113

647 433 The increase in oil production and other earnings of the Board resulted in a higher revenue during the years 1951/52 to 1953/54 than that originally estimated, in spite of a smaller withdrawal from the $12.8 million Wadi Tharthar project loan granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the meantime, the Board's over-all expenditure during the same period amounted to about ID 40 million, including loans and advances: accounts deposited with the National Bank of Iraq for the disbursement of the Tharthar project; and the sum of ID 10.5 million paid to the Ministry of Finance for the schemes undertaken by the various ministries on behalf of the Board (see table 32). Furthermore the Board has authorized government departments to finance various plans on its behalf, and has awarded several contracts for its major plans to various foreign and national companies. Some of these plans have already been completed and the rest are to be completed in the next few years. Thus the actual expenditure plus the obligated expenditure of the Board have been estimated to be about ID 45 to ID 55 million.

The most important reasons for deferring the expenditure of the allocated amounts provided for in the Board's budgets since its operation have been the delay in the approval of the programme by Parliament; the inability of the different departments, particularly in the first two years, to execute the projects entrusted to them by the Board; and the necessity for providing adequate time to study, survey and prepare the estimated cost and specifications for inviting tenders for the various projects. Most of the projects outlined in the original programme needed further studies and surveys, several of which have since been completed. Many have been submitted by various engineering consultants of international repute, and are under consideration by the Board. The Board hopes to accelerate the execution of such projects as were planned since it has almost reached the end of the planning stage.

Major projects.

312 ●185 433 One of the main purposes of the Six-Year Plan is to control floods in the Tigris and Euphrates by storing surplus water which can be used for irrigation. An over-all programme has been prepared, at an estimated cost of ID 335 million, providing for the construction of ten dams; 1/ it is expected to increase the cropped area by 75 per cent and raise net annual agricultural income from its present level of ID 62 million to ID 222 million; part of this programme is being implemented under the Six-Year Plan. The plan also provides for industrial expansion, the building of 3,500 kilometres of metalled roads and improvement of a further 3,000 kilometres.

1/ See Knappen, Tippets, Abbott and McCarthy, Report on the Development of the Tigris and Euphrates River Systems (Baghdad, 1954).

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Table 32. Iraq: Revenue and Expenditure of the Development Board, 1951/52 to June 1954

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1954 April to June
Revenue:				
Oil receipts	6,702	22,876	34,824	9,471
Proceeds of loan for Tharthar project	764	1,118	227	49
Miscellaneous receipts ..	1	5	226	95
Total	7,467	23,999	35,277	9,615
Expenditure:				
Development expenditure .	3,131	12,838	7,282	2,116
Net balance of loans and advances	769	6,227	9,799	2,245
Net balance of deposit accounts	- 267	- 2,591	2,676	- 5
Total	3,633	16,474	19,757	4,356
Surplus	3,834	7,525 a/	15,520	5,259

Source: National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin, No. 11, July-September 1954 (Baghdad). Figures are provisional returns for fiscal years ending 31 March.

a/ Including ID 5 million transferred to the ordinary budget according to ordinance No. 7 of 1952.

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 M1 Middle East.
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There are several other projected dams and barrages on the Tigris and its tributaries (see map). The dam on the Tigris near Eski Mosul is estimated to have a capacity of 8 billion cubic metres and to cost ID 16 million. The Bekhme dam, on the Greater Zab, will have an initial capacity of 3 billion cubic metres and an ultimate capacity of 8.3 billion; its costs are estimated at ID 21.8 million and ID 39.6 million, respectively. The dam would provide irrigation for 625,000 hectares and a capacity of 600,000 kilowatts of electric power.

Two projects are planned on the Diyala, another tributary of the Tigris. A dam at Derbendi-Khan would have a storage capacity of 3.7 billion cubic metres and would increase the water supply for 309,000 hectares at present receiving light irrigation; its costs are put at ID 21 million. Preliminary work has begun. A barrage at Bani Saad, costing ID 1.75 million would, when complemented by the Nahrawan irrigation works, provide water for 223,000 hectares. In addition to the Dokan dam, a barrage is to be built on the Lesser Zab, at Hawija; it could irrigate 50,000 hectares. The Gharraf scheme will channel water from the projected Eski Mosul or Bekhme dams to 429,000 hectares in the Amara region. Another project, falling outside the Six-Year Plan, is a dam at Damir Kapu, on the Adhaim river, providing irrigation for 175,000 hectares, as well as electric power.

The total area which will be irrigated by the various projected schemes on the Tigris and its tributaries was estimated at 1.24 million hectares, and that by the Euphrates schemes at 560,000 hectares, a total of 1.8 million hectares. Work is also proceeding on the drainage of 233,000 hectares, and the Six-Year Plan provides for an expenditure of ID 23 million for land reclamation, agricultural research, afforestation, improvement of animal husbandry, filling swamps and marshes and various other schemes.

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Industrial development plans aim at both increasing the output of consumer goods and utilizing Iraq's petroleum resources to produce certain basic products. A cotton spinning and weaving factory is under construction near Mosul; it will have 20,000 spindles, thus doubling the present capacity 1/ and is expected to produce 20 million square metres of cloth per annum; a sum of ID 3,115,000 has been allocated for the project. 2/ Some expansion and improvement is also taking place in the privately owned woollen and rayon industries. 3/ Cement plants are being built, or planned, by both the Government and private enterprise. The Government is setting up factories at Mosul and Sarchinar, with a daily capacity of 350 tons each; completion is scheduled for 1956 and costs are estimated at ID 2,205,000 and ID 3,115,000, respectively. 4/ In addition, a privately owned plant at Mosul with a capacity of 350 tons a day is scheduled for completion by July 1955, another privately owned plant, near Baghdad, is doubling its present capacity of 600 tons a day, and a third private plant, with a daily capacity of 700 tons, is to be established near Hindiya barrage. 5/ The completion of all

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1/ Salman, loc. cit.; existing capacity is privately owned.

2/ The Iraq Times, 5 February 1955 (Baghdad).

3/ Al Shaab, 28 February 1954 (Baghdad).

4/ The Iraq Times, 5 February 1955 (Baghdad).

5/ Ibid., 26 January 1955.

these schemes would raise annual capacity to over a million tons. Other projects include a sugar factory using locally grown beets to produce 10,000 tons of sugar per annum and refine 25,000 tons of imported sugar, at an estimated cost of ID 1.78 million; a pilot paper plant; a glass factory; a rayon factory; and a tobacco factory. 1/ 433 185

The most important project connected with petroleum is a refinery with an annual capacity of one million tons, at Dora, near Baghdad. Completion was scheduled for 1955 and total costs have been estimated at ID 10.5 million. A pipeline supplying the refinery with crude petroleum, from Baiji, on the Euphrates west of Kirkuk, has been completed and five pipelines are under construction to carry the refined products to Baghdad and Um Al Adham. 2/ An asphalt refinery being built at Qayara, near Mosul, at a cost of ID 1.15 million, is expected to produce 60,000 tons of asphalt per annum, as well as 24,000 tons of gas oil. A smaller plant at Muftiya, near Basra, with an annual capacity of 6,000 tons, was scheduled to start operations at the beginning of 1955. 3/ A lubricating oil refinery has also been approved near Baghdad; it will produce 25,000 tons and cost 3.4 million. 433 382 315 185

The major project under consideration is that for utilizing natural gases from the Kirkuk oil wells to produce chemical fertilizers, cement, sulphur and electric power. Two alternative projects have been submitted, one of which would cost ID 33 million and produce 500,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizers, 200,000 tons of cement and 100,000 tons of sulphur, while the other would cost ID 20 million and produce half these quantities. 185 433

A survey of mineral resources is being carried out by a group of foreign consulting engineers. Negotiations are proceeding with a United States sulphur company regarding the exploitation of Iraq's sulphur deposits, which are believed to be large.

Other development projects include a highway and bridge building programme, the expansion of Baghdad airport and improvement of telecommunications. In addition, a large-scale building programme is under way, including hospitals, schools, low-cost housing and public buildings.

The new Five-Year Plan

The Ministry of Development and the Development Board have approved the new Five-Year Plan for the financial years 1955/56 to 1959/60. Subject to approval by Parliament, the plan calls for an estimated total expenditure of ID 303,306,100. Revenue estimates total ID 252,658,000. These are calculated on an estimated annual revenue of ID 43 million derived from a 70 per cent share of the oil receipts making a total of ID 215 million, plus a sum of about ID 38 million from previous years. The deficit of about ID 50 million is to be balanced by an anticipated increase in oil revenue during this period. 185

1/ The Iraq Times, 20 October 1954.

2/ Ibid., 6 December 1954.

3/ Ibid., 19 November 1954.

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186 ETHNOCENTRISM--exaltation of the ingroup (e.g., consciousness of kind, local pride, patriotism, class consciousness, old school tie); unfavorable judgments of other groups (e.g., race prejudice, religious intolerance, national antipathies); overt manifestations (e.g., snobbishness, discrimination, ethical dualism, nationalism); symbolic representation (e.g., flags, anthems, emblems, national heroes); channeling of hostilities (e.g., sports rivalry, ethnic scapegoats); etc. See also:

Sports and games	52
Prejudice and discrimination toward ethnic and other stratified groups	56
Ingroup antagonisms	578
Behavior toward nonrelatives, strangers, and aliens	609
Moiety rivalries	616
Development of nationalism	619
Citizenship	641
International relations	648
Political parties	665
Nationalistic and nativistic movements	668
Military morale	703
Religious persecution	798
Ideas about race	829

186, 728, 648, 668
●

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
● Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

668 but fatalistic acceptance, which was mixed in Shi'i quarters with theocratic as well as emotional repugnance, and in Sunni often with genuine if paradoxical respect for the Caliph. To none at this time was an alternative conceivable. [18b] At the best, reform of some present abuses could be hoped, and the persistence of Arab race-consciousness and the slow growth of a critical spirit were already bringing such hopes to birth. But there was heard in 'Iraq no echo yet of the literary and political movements in the Lebanon and Egypt, where even now an Arab Movement was coming to birth.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of 668 the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P.[1] committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, [646] followed four months later by another for the accession of Muḥammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sultan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 665 1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable 186 as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and 668 frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

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[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Bey (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Bey: Fu'ad Bey al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1 [Turkish Committee of Union & Progress -- analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

186 Egypt, hints of a claim to nationhood itself put forward by Arab
668 *émigrés* in Paris—all these, with developing intercommunication and greater awareness of world thought, had prepared the ground for nationalism in 'Iraq even before the final impetus of the Turkish revolution.

The 1908 revolution, while it created an active Turkish-political life in 'Iraq, soon indicated also the gulf between Turkish and Arab aspirations. An 'Arab Brotherhood' group, formed in the first Turkish Chamber, was summarily suppressed by the Young Turks; the proportion of Arab to Turkish deputies and senators in Parliament was unjustly low. Incoming Walis of the 'Iraq wilayas showed less sympathy than ever with decentralization or the suggested use of Arabic; more 'Iraqis than ever groaned at the hateful prospect of conscription in Turkish armies—perhaps to fight brother Arabs in the endless warfare of the Yaman. It followed that the politicians of 'Iraq soon after 1908 began to mix various strains of Arab separatism with their pro- or anti-C.U.P. polemics: and to treat seriously tentative ideas of greater local privilege, a higher proportion of appointments, wider local powers and, finally, local autonomy itself.

For such claims there was basis in Arab character and culture, in 'Iraq's geographical separateness, and perhaps still more in the personal aspirations of ambitious 'Iraqis, who could imagine a great career in an Arab or 'Iraqi State more easily than in a Turkish. Meanwhile there were the beginnings of contact with coteries formed abroad to foster Arab ambitions and to frame demands. Such were the secret but short-lived Qaḥṭaniya in Istanbul, whose members favoured an Arab Kingdom within the Turkish Empire, and such the Young Arab Society which, moved from Paris to Beirut in 1913, was to play a heroic part in 1915. More important in 'Iraq were the local circles in contact with the Ottoman Decentralization Party of Cairo: a society which, founded in 1912 with its conception of local autonomy within the Empire, came nearest to expressing the political ambitions of the 'Iraqis of the day, and took root in Baghdad and Baṣra. The relations of Arab officers in Turkish regiments with their brother officers became strained, and 'Iraqi Qa'immaqams found odious
204 the task of applying Turkish repressive measures. From 1910 to
186 1914 a surprising development of the press in 'Iraq marked the
668 new political age. In place of the half-dozen colourless official newspapers of the wilaya capitals and Najf in Ḥamidiyan times, sheets of every colouring appeared in Arabic or Turkish month by month, to a final total of some fifty; they advocated various programmes—brilliant or foolish and always irresponsible—of pan-Islam, local or pan-Arab nationalism, Turkish patriotism or anti-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', 204 who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Govern- 186 ment, were active in these politics before 1914. 668

Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least 665 enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families 668 of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of 186 Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to indepen- 668 dent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It 186 was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Aḥsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'dham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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In May some results appeared, induced perhaps more by the Beirut than the Baṣra pressure. A new Wilaya Law ordained the increased use of Arabic in Arab wilayas, and the formation of a not ineffective General Council in each. Sayid Ṭalib telegraphed vainly to Istanbul in protest against so hollow a concession and informed Mr. Crow, the British Consul, that a trial of strength was now inevitable. The Consul thought it prudent to summon a British warship, H.M.S. *Alert*, which anchored for a time off 'Ashar; but Sayid Ṭalib decided after all on a policy of moderate pressure, until the resounding murder of the local general, Farid Bey—a crime inevitably ascribed to Sayid Ṭalib—diverted attention from less vivid politics. In the same month, June 1913, the Wali of Baghdad arrested four leading nationalist spokesmen, including Yusif al-Suwaydi, for the excessive freedom of their anti-Turkish expressions; but all save one were promptly released. In July and August hopeful-seeming Turko-Arab negotiations took place in Istanbul after the Arabs had organized a meeting in June in Paris which, attended by two 'Iraqis, pressed for decentralization; and in August a decree promulgated in all wilayas seemed to grant a substantial part of Arab demands. Military service was to be performed only within the Inspectorate; the schools would teach in Arabic, with higher education in Turkish; officials in Arab territory would be Arab-speaking, and all but the highest appointments would be made locally; progressive foreign experts would be employed, grants of funds could be expected, the resolutions of the General Wilaya Councils would be executed, three ministers of the Central Government, five Walis, ten Mutaṣarrifs were to be Arabs. But these provisions, felt with excellent reason to be a mere placation of Arab demands, evoked more of 'Iraqi scepticism than confidence.

The gulf between Arab and Turkish views was by now profound and explicit. Most foreigners, not unsympathetic to Arab demands, still felt their nationalism to be a premature and unreliable candidate for support; they distrusted Arab administrative powers even as compared with Turkish, and noted the mutually hostile groups into which the Arab nationalist world was already divided, and in which no one spoke for 'Iraq, since such a unit was not yet imagined. But, on whatever level, agitation in every form continued, and interchanges with the movements in the Levant increased. A secret society, al-'Ahd—the Covenant—was from early in 1914 to embrace scores of 'Iraqi officers in the Turkish Army. The Baṣra 'Reform Committee' with Sayid Ṭalib as President, published an inflammatory pamphlet. Telegrams still poured from 'Iraq to Istanbul, demanding Arab autonomy. Writers in the newspapers abandoned restraint, nationalist clubs were formed

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, 186 668 to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khuḏhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some 000 well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the 185 661 647 efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 interested in Arab affairs—G. E. Leachman, Hubert Young, Trenchard Fowle, A. G. A. Hore-Ruthven, and others—and writers of distinction who included the gifted and scholarly traveller Gertrude Bell. Among private British residents were interesting or outstanding personalities: Dr. W. A. Wigram of the Archbishop's mission, Arthur Tod of Lynch's, Captain C. H. Cowley [186] of the river steamers. But even while personal relations with the Pashas remained cordial, a policy of pinpricks which reflected a jealous and suspicious xenophobia was at times directed against British interests. Expropriations without compensation, capricious refusal of the right to use commercial codes, baseless demands for registration fees, permission to practise withheld from British doctors, mean treatment of British employees recruited for technical functions: these were episodes of an intermittent campaign of petty malice. The refusal of British Consuls to listen to shaykhs or notables who begged for British 'protection', and their manifest sympathy with distracted Governors, availed little to overcome the suspicion that the British had, somehow, sinister designs on the 'Iraq wilayas. Nevertheless, life in 'Iraq was found pleasant enough by resident Englishmen, and many warm friendships were formed between them and 'Iraqis.

British Residents and their Consuls during the period maintained a high level of loyal and disinterested service. At Baṣra A. C. Wratislaw was Consul from 1898 to 1903, E. F. Crow from 1903 to 1914; both were loyal friends of successive Walis. At Baghdad Colonel L. S. Newmarch was Resident and Consul-General from 1902 to 1906, Colonel J. Ramsey and J. G. Lorimer from 1906 to 1909 and 1909 to 1913. These, and not these alone, were outstanding public servants and good friends of the 'Iraq peoples. The tragic death in 1914 of Lorimer, author of the encyclopædic *Persian Gulf Gazetteer*, was a grievous loss.

British-Indian interests did not diminish. The extraterritorial Post Offices continued to be resented by Turkish officialdom, the Indian pilgrim-agents at Samarrā and Kadhimiya served their visiting fellow countrymen in spite of official interference, trading firms developed their businesses. Visits to the Holy Cities by the rich and great of Indian Islam were events notable to the Indian communities which existed in most of the larger towns of central and southern 'Iraq; but these, with partial assimilation into the local population, had little community organization and few eminent members.

000 To turn now to 'Iraq's Arabian and Persian neighbours, Shaykh Mubarak at Kuwayt maintained his delicate triple position of nominal Qa'immaqam, treaty-bound British protégé, and effectively independent ruler. He survived the embarrassing visit of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

I. MIDSUMMER 1914

To few countries in the world were greater changes brought by 178
the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Govern- 511
ment by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for
some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was 178
clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or
modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, con- 186
fined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile 642
to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater 619
efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

habitual, and much admirable work was done by the departments. 000 Few indeed could deny the improvement in the honesty and justice of the Administration, its prevailing security, its achieved and expected progress in material matters, over the familiar Turkish standards. Nevertheless, the charge that the type or tone of this Administration were among the causes of the lawless outbreaks so soon and so disappointingly to follow cannot completely be denied.

It[1] was, first, that of a Christian Power. To some indifferent, [186 this fact was objectionable to many, and not least to the Shi'i 795] hierarchy whose status and powers would be lost for ever if a foreign secular Power were to be installed. In Sunni minds a nostalgic feeling for the Califate as the true and sole legitimate source of power, even in its temporary defeat, was nearly allied to their religion; and the indulgence of such feelings was the easier, and the new régime must remain the more rootless and untrusted, while peace with Turkey was delayed. Religion and Ottoman loyalties apart, the British régime was foreign and unfamiliar. Its spokesmen, often weak in Arabic, differed from their predecessors, to the point of strangeness, in dress, manner, and social customs. The use of Indians as clerks and departmental subordinates was universal, and was resented. The efficiency at which the Administration aimed was no desideratum of the governed, and its ranking as a paramount objective has been alleged as a chief defect of the régime. The charge is doubtfully true; but in fact little was done to render the machinery of Government easy or acceptable to its public. It tended to rigidity of standard, mixed little tolerance with its uncomfortable and not always desired justice, and was pitiless to long-familiar laxities.

The disappearance of many restrictions with the Armistice still left the military occupation of notables' houses, military roads or camps which blocked canals, and other galling inconveniences. These grievances increased with time. With them came the disappointment and disillusion of post-war retrenchment; projects were abandoned, departments restricted, military expenditure greatly reduced. After all, it seemed, no golden age had arrived! The Railway, Indian-staffed, was slow and expensive. The outcry for schools and English lessons was unmet. The agricultural experts had not transformed agriculture, those of irrigation had cured neither drought nor floods. The Land Registry settled few disputes. And the insistence on full revenue collection on every crop and garden was galling alike to rich and poor, who, in spite of lowered demand-rates, found themselves paying more taxation than ever before, with little or no improvement in the old and evil assessment methods.

In the towns the Administration, desperately short of subordinate

[1 - British civil administration following World War I -- Analyst]

000 staff, insisted nevertheless on standards of education and knowledge of English necessarily lacking in the hundreds of unemployed 'Iraqi ex-officials. These, idle and aggrieved, crowded the coffee shops; and the return of many more from Turkey increased the body of malcontents. Wilson's Administration in fact made little effective effort to use in senior or even junior posts the considerable experience and goodwill possessed by the available 'Iraqis.

186 668 Such are among the considerations which can explain the willingness of large elements of the fickle and disillusioned 'Iraqi public, by the end of 1919, to support any anti-British movement which might appear. The leadership which such movement was in fact to follow was that of nationalism: that Arab nationalism which the Wilson Administration, and notably its head, largely through too local and too limited an experience of Arabs and ignorance of the political conceptions now new-born or coming to birth in Europe, belittled and distrusted. The development of this movement, and the successive uneasy stages by which 'Iraq was to advance to a new constitutional status, are next to be recorded.

3. OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH

000 The Ḥijaz correspondence of 1915–16 between the Sharif Ḥusayn and Sir Henry McMahon had accepted the idea of a post-war Arab State to embrace, with named exceptions, all Arab territories in Asia. It could indeed be argued that 'Iraq stood apart from other Arab lands, with differing needs and conditions; it could be shown that the McMahon letters called for 'special administrative arrangements in Baṣra and Baghdad'. But such exclusion from the Arab State could, the Sharif had replied, be only temporary 'for a period to be settled by negotiation': 'Iraq was a historic and sacred Arab land. A British policy of mere selfish acquisition of 'Iraq was after this, to any serious statesman, unthinkable; and in fact War Office instructions of March 1917 had already visualized specifically an Arab Amirate of Baṣra and Baghdad. The formation of an Arab State or States was an objective of idealists and realists alike, in Syria and in London; it was visibly realized under the Amir Fayṣal in Damascus before the end of 1918; and a policy of self-determination for the ex-Ottoman Arab countries had by that time been clearly expressed by the British Prime Minister in January 1918, again by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, yet again in the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November 1918. The last quoted declared 'the goal envisaged by France and Great Britain' to be 'the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of National Governments and administrations

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.' 000

186 668 The 'Iraq public, among whom this hopeful declaration raised high and immediate hopes, had throughout the War shown no visible signs of nationalist feeling. The political leaders of the period 1911–14 were scattered, Sayid Ṭalib abroad, the Clubs dead or inactive, the press non-existent, communications with other countries severed. But the movement was not dead; the end of the War, it might have been anticipated, must inevitably revive it with greater vitality than ever. Meanwhile no British act or speech in 'Iraq, save only the vague flamboyance of the Maude speech of March 1917, had given any indication of future self-government. Surprisingly, no use had been made in 'Iraq of Arab forces against the Turks, in spite of the success of these in the Ḥijaz and Syria, and the tentative prompting of the War Office itself. The British Military Command was deterred, it seemed, by the impossibility of guaranteeing the finality of Turkish disappearance, by the difficulty of equipping and training Arab recruits for serious warfare, by its lack of contact with the best 'Iraqi material such as the officers then fighting with the Amir Fayṣal: and perhaps not least by the attitude of the Government of India, which frankly disapproved of Arab national ambitions and of any movement which would encourage them.

7:7 x The provisions of the administratively absurd and morally lamentable Sykes–Picot Agreement, signed by France and Great Britain in May 1916 and revealed to the world by the Russians in October 1917, seemed indeed if taken literally to weigh heavily against a self-determined régime for 'Iraq. It had provided that Mosul and part of its wilaya should be reserved for French exploitation, under Arab suzerainty, and that most of western 'Iraq should be of similar status but under British domination, with the body of central and southern districts placed under direct British rule. These provisions, which the French did not lightly abandon, were patently incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Sharifian commitments; and indeed the need to conciliate French feeling, especially in Syria, was a main and inescapable British post-war embarrassment.

186 668 Meanwhile the Anglo-French Declaration, the relaxing of many war-time restrictions, the return of 'Iraqis from abroad, the prospect of security and development in the territory, all raised its future as an immediate issue, and brought 'Iraqi nationalism back to life in a day.

Nourished from various sources, it was to grow rapidly during the first half of 1919, and thereafter. The central core of the movement was, no doubt, the claim of a part of the 'Iraqi educated

186 classes to 'complete independence', and resentment that this was
668 withheld. Contributory to it as anti-Government—that is, anti-British—forces were at this stage the strains of propaganda entering the country from Turkey, from Bolshevik Russia, and from the eagerly nationalistic 'Iraqis with Fayṣal in Syria. Contributory also were the fears of the Mujtahids for their own position, since nothing could be more damaging to the Shi'i theocracy than a British Administration, and the specifically anti-British and anti-Christian exhortations which radiated from Karbalā and Najf from 1918 onwards. The real or fancied shortcomings of the Administration itself, elsewhere described, could add to a growing dissatisfaction: every frustration, every delay or disappointment was the fault of the British, and created new nationalists. Among the tribes, the shaykhs' rivals in every group were ready always to join an insurgent movement and to dethrone a British-supported leader; and the hunger for loot and inveterate pleasure in raiding, the dislike of revenue payment, and the conviction that British forces were withdrawing, combined to prepare the way for wholesale non-obedience or worse. The history of 1919 and early 1920 is, therefore, one of the increase and coalescence of malcontent elements until the climax of July 1920.

727× Colonel Wilson, horrified by the Anglo-French Declaration, pronounced it wholly unsuitable as a basis for government in 'Iraq. He urged that nothing but firm British administration of whatever State might be created could keep the country from anarchy; and he reacted no less strongly against suggestions by his *bête noire*, T. E. Lawrence, for the facile establishment of a group of States, 'Iraqi and Syrian, under Sharifian princes. His own earliest proposal to Whitehall was for the cautious formation of an Arab State of 'Iraq to include Mosul and, placed under an Arab Amir, to be fortified by a British High Commission and a full complement of advisers. But the difficulty of choosing an Amir was at once obvious, and the Acting Civil Commissioner reviewed in vain the claims of a Mosul notable, of the Naqib of Baghdad, of an unspecified Egyptian prince, and of a son of King Ḥusayn. Finding serious objection to all or any of these he ended by preferring that the State should for five years be ruled by Sir Percy Cox, with no Amir at all; this if anything, he felt, should both ensure efficiency and keep nationalism within bounds.

In London, Middle Eastern affairs were at this time handled by an Interdepartmental Committee presided over by Lord Curzon. In this body the Western school of British doctrine on Arab affairs prevailed over the rival Eastern or Indian school: and in it the clashing temperaments and views of Lord Curzon and Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary for India, had ample play. The Committee

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

727× Treaty of Sèvres was to provide. Arab governors and Arab district councils would be appointed, British military and financial help would be made available. Curzon, resolute to postpone any British Government commitment over Mosul, preferred that that wilaya should form a separate Amirate ringed by 'independent' Kurdish principalities. The debate continued. The clash of French and Arab ambitions in Syria: the long failure to make peace with Turkey: American pressure in Paris for a free right of choice by the Arab populations, as exemplified by their King–Crane fact-finding commission which visited Syria in 1919: the attitude of the Council of Ten in Paris, who in January 1919 had decided on the detachment of 'Iraq from Turkey, and in March were near to agreeing on the distribution of Mandates: the wide differences of view among the British Government's own advisers on Arab affairs: the increasing call for post-war economy—or even for bag-and-baggage evacuation, or retreat to Baṣra—in the British press and Parliament: all these were scarcely reconcilable elements in reaching a clear solution of 'Iraq's future. The Baghdad Administration had as yet no clear guidance from the peace-makers in Europe on the new Mandatory idea which, propounded at Versailles by General Smuts, was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations coming to birth early in 1919, and was held especially applicable—as Article 22 of the Covenant provided—to the ex-Ottoman territories. Acceptance of this conception by Powers concerned was implicit in the Versailles Treaty, which was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified on 10 January 1920.

728× In 'Iraq, meanwhile, the Army visibly diminished. Garrisoned
647× posts were abandoned, camps shrunk, effective mobile forces were fewer and ever smaller. The Civil Administration retained, indeed, always a very considerable body of popular acceptance in town and country among moderate unpolitical elements and the general
186 public. But, as 1919 advanced, signs were not lacking that opposi-
668 tion to Government in its present form, so unsatisfying to nationalist aspirations, was on the increase. The local disorders in Kurdistan were reported and exaggerated. Messengers and considerable funds reached Baghdad and the Euphrates from the 'Iraqi officers now in Damascus and Aleppo, and these addressed a memorandum to the British Command in Syria, and another to the Foreign Secretary, on the need for an early national régime in 'Iraq. A distinguished Baghdadi lawyer and administrator, Naji Bey al-Suwaydi, invited from Damascus by Wilson to accept an advisory post in Baghdad, found the atmosphere uncongenial and returned unhappy to Syria. Other 'Iraqi visitors from the West reported a 'colonial' attitude in Wilson's Administration, which seemed to belittle or ignore 'Iraqi abilities. Rumours grew in

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Baghdad of the proposed Mandate over 'Iraq, soon to be allotted by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. British women and children were reported as pouring into the country as into a British colony, and in fact over 500 so entered late in 1919. The work and plans of the British civil departments seemed to suggest permanence of occupation. There had been arrests and deportations of trouble-makers—that is, said the nationalists, of patriots. Month by month the ranks of the politically-conscious were swollen. The national secondary school was established as a centre of propaganda. With the autumn the results of political preaching emanating from Syria, from Baghdad, and with increasing violence from Najf and Karbalā, became more obvious among the Euphrates tribes; and in Baghdad, where secret meetings and societies began to be reported, new and significant contacts were observed between the Sunni and Shi'i communities, with joint politico-religious conclaves and exchanges of courtesies without precedent. So passed the winter of 1919.

In spite of the wide extent by this time of a potentially violent political movement, a precarious outward peace was kept throughout these months save in one district, the upper Euphrates. Threats and rumours re-echoed here from the Turks at Mardin as well as from agents of the Arab Government at Aleppo; and in mid-December 1919 Dayr al-Zur was occupied by excited Syrian tribesmen escorting a Sharifian 'Governor of the Euphrates'. A critical and humiliating situation in the town, where the Assistant Political Officer was held prisoner, ended only on Christmas Day by an arrangement between representatives of the Civil Commissioner and those of Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, Governor of Aleppo, whereby Dayr was abandoned by the British. It became a centre for propaganda, for raids, and for loud threats to annex Mosul itself. Tribesmen entered and looted Albu Kamal, Syrian tax-collectors operated far into 'Iraq. The next Governor at Dayr, himself a Mosulawi, maintained a violent and well-subsidized campaign of Sharifian propaganda, and refused all suggestions for a diplomatic settlement of the frontier. The British authorities, physically powerless in the whole area, could do no more than protest and threaten reprisals by air. The return of the Amir Fayṣal to Syria from Europe in March 1920 led to the withdrawal of the invaders, and early in May a frontier conference, convened at 'Ashara, agreed on a boundary line immediately west of al-Qa'im. But this settlement wholly failed to improve conditions. The Syrian-inspired looting parties and demonstrations spread over all Dulaym and Shammar territory. The belief in British apathy and impending withdrawal was universal, the Mosul–Baghdad road and railway became unsafe, and violent propaganda posters of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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'Ahd al-'Iraqi appeared in Mosul city. The efforts of Turkish agents based on Jazira-ibn-'Umar aided those of the Sharifian officers and envoys—whose funds, as the Civil Commissioner complained, were from those supplied by the British Government itself to the Sharifian ruler of Syria. How far the Amir was aware of his too zealous supporters' activities in 'Iraq can never be known; his own attitude was correct. In the first week of June a tribal force under an 'Iraqi officer, Jamil al-Madfa'i, entered Tall 'Afar, murdered two British officers, Captain J. E. Barlow and Captain B. Stuart, and two sergeants, and moved on to threaten Mosul; but a small British column from that garrison dispersed the tribesmen and re-occupied Tall 'Afar. A precarious calm settled thereafter on the upper Euphrates and the Jazira, the Damascus Government prudently disassociating itself from this and other acts of its agents.

The situation in Baghdad and central 'Iraq had by the late spring of 1920 further deteriorated. The significant Sunni-Shi'i meetings continued, with rivalry only in inflammatory speeches. Turkish and Bolshevik agents were reputed to be at work in addition to those of Arab nationalism, of Mujtahid reaction, of tribal lawlessness, of anti-British venom. Security in Baghdad itself was affected, the bazaars closed intermittently, ugly episodes occurred. Warnings to political leaders—two Shi'i nationalists, Sayid Muhammad al-Ṣadr and Ja'far abu al-Timman, and two Sunnis, Yusif al-Suwaydi (p. 46) and 'Ali al-Bazirgan—were unavailing, and the arrest of a petty agitator provoked angry crowds and rifle shots. Fuel was added to these flames by the Resolution of a group of 'Iraqis in Damascus which elected Fayṣal King of Syria; it resolved that the 'Iraq throne be forthwith offered to Fayṣal's elder brother, the Amir 'Abdullah. The tone and substance of House of Commons debates on Middle Eastern matters was keenly studied by 'Iraq politicians. The unpopular features of the local Administration, and its exclusion of 'Iraqi elements, continued unimproved. Finally came the news, confirming persistent rumours, that at San Remo on 28 April a Mandate for 'Iraq had been offered to Great Britain by the victorious Powers in conclave. This seeming death-blow to 'Iraqi hopes of immediate 'complete independence' was announced in Baghdad early in May with vague reassurances by the Civil Commissioner. The effect of these was not increased by the known, though unannounced, recommendations of the Bonham-Carter Committee, which Wilson had set up in March to draft a future 'Iraq Constitution: recommendations which, while well in advance of Wilson's own original views, were, with their insistence on continued British control over a structure of 'Iraqi deputies and officials, cautious and grudging to

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

the point of complete unacceptability in the eyes of 'Iraqi nationalists. 186 668

An interview on 2 June, two days before the Tall 'Afar murders, between Wilson and a body of fifteen self-appointed nationalist delegates—to whom he added twenty-five more notables, selected by himself—served only to make clearer the gap between Wilsonian and nationalist views. The latter were unsatisfied by his explanations and assurances, while he continued to treat their demands for immediate independent 'Iraq nationhood as those of a malcontent clique, and to affirm that the main public of 'Iraq would be tolerant of, and safest under, what amounted to direct British rule.

The Curzon Committee, less cautious or more liberal than Wilson, had meanwhile considered the Bonham-Carter proposals and criticisms of them, and had decided that the time was ripe for an announcement on 'Iraqi constitutional advance. Under instructions from London, accordingly, the Civil Commissioner proclaimed on 17 June that a general Elective Assembly would be convened, and early progress sought towards the Constitution of an Arab State whose self-government would, while incomplete, be real and effective. But the announcement came too late. Nationalist emotion and expectation had gone too far, and forces in town and tribe were in motion that no suave phrases of a proclamation could now arrest. A few days spent in Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, now leaving the post of British Minister in Teheran, made little impression, for all his personal prestige. A Mandate, hated word, had been awarded; British rule effectively continued; of true independence there was neither sign nor early hope; and a committee of ex-Turkish deputies, headed by Sayid Ṭalib, who had returned to 'Iraq in February 1920, pursued without effect on public opinion its labours on the machinery for holding the promised elections. 727x 186 668

Meanwhile the drift of British armies out of 'Iraq had proceeded far. Effective troops were few and scattered. Lines of communication in 'Iraq and in Persia were long and barely defensible; and the static duties of guarding stores, Turkish prisoners, and Christian ex-Turkish refugees were calculated to employ nearly the whole surviving force. The British soldiers' families, recently arrived, were now concentrated at Karind in Persia. The military command had been held since March 1920 by an elderly General new to 'Iraq, Sir Aylmer Haldane, who showed from the first little confidence in the warnings of the Civil Commissioner and his officers: warnings which by now were those of an imminent outbreak.

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

work in Baghdad. The Ḥakkari clans were settled, as far as great 563 efforts and British expenditure could effect it, in the Government- 657 owned villages of Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, while hundreds of their more optimistic households passed over—ill-led, distraught by faction, and weakened by malaria—into their native hills across the border. Aghā Petros, their evil genius, was thankfully dispatched to Europe where he died in Paris soon afterwards. The Patriarchal household settled at Baybad, near 'Amadiya, sustained by the vigour and loyalty of Surma Khanim, the boy Patriarch's aunt. But the troubles of the hapless Assyrians, due so largely to their own fierce indiscipline, folly, and disunion, were not at or near their end.

For the Armenian refugees, who numbered some 15,000 at the time of their dispatch late in 1920 from Ba'quba to camp at Nahr 'Umar near Baṣra, other means of dispersal were sought. But their passive non-co-operation and sullen refusal to accept work in 'Iraq long defeated all the efforts made for them. Some measure of absorption in the cities or into Persia or among the Assyrians reduced their numbers, and most of the surviving main body of some 8,000 could at last be transported by ship to Batum—at the cost, as ever, of the British Government—by agreement with the new Armenian Government in Transcaucasia. The residue, still resisting all suggested forms of self-help, were induced by March 1922 to leave Nahr 'Umar, and the camp was closed.

2. THE FIRST TREATY

The proposal of the British Government to express the Anglo- 648x 'Iraq relationship by treaty, rather than by undisguised mandatory 186 Government, was approved by the Amir before his arrival in 'Iraq, and seemed not to be opposed, initially, by nationalist spokesmen there. To both sides it appeared likely to minimize the odium of a humiliating guardian-ward relationship, and to invest 'Iraq from the outset with the dignity of an independent treaty-making State. It was, in fact, unquestionably the most prudent and most imaginative way to handle a situation which lacked all precedent; but, to the resentment of 'Iraqi patriots and the poisoning of Anglo-'Iraq relations for the next ten years, the Mandate itself remained. Unmentioned in the draft Treaty, it had nevertheless notoriously been awarded to and accepted by Great Britain, and was even now in draft and awaiting League ratification in the last days of 1921. The remoteness of such a situation from the 'Complete Independence' claimed by the nationalists was all too obvious, however the Mandate be interpreted, excused, or kept out of sight.

A view hostile to the Mandate, and suspicious of a Treaty however otherwise generous which merely veiled it, was inevitably

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x adopted by the King and his entourage from the first. He had
186 been led by Mr. Churchill in London, he complained, to envisage
a very different form of Treaty: the Mandate must go, disappear,
be repudiated! And if it be urged that a debatable nicety of constitutional
or international law was an unrealistic or scarcely
sufficient basis—and one important only to a tiny minority of
'Iraqis—on which to found, as did the political 'Iraqis of 1921 to
1930, a ten-year campaign of political struggle, marked by civil
resistance, murder, and intended insurrection, it remains true that
the Mandate did in fact involve an imperfect independence and
an affront to national pride, damaging, it was claimed, to 'Iraq in
Islamic eyes everywhere.

648x As Treaty discussions in the Cabinet proceeded early in 1922,
186 the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme
nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the
Shi'i 'Ulamā and leading supporters and even intimates of the
King, cried out against mandated 'slavery' and demanded complete
British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by
reaction an 'English' party of notables and shaykhs favourable,
they said, to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists,
whose views the King personally shared, stood for abrogation of
the Mandate, a friendly and equal Treaty, and continued British
support. The cleavage in opinion grew more specific after a conference
called at Karbalā in April 1922, nominally to protest against
Ikhwan raiding, by Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi, a Shi'i 'Alim devoted
to politics. The conference, attended by some 200 Shi'i notables,
'Ulamā, and tribesmen, was watched with uneasiness by the
moderate parties, and, in spite of the colourless resolution finally
passed, was effective in rallying anti-Treaty opinion; it was productive
also of indiscipline and near-anarchy in the sensitive
631 Muntafiq and Shamiya districts. A further evil now clearly visible
186 and likely to increase was the 'political' administration in some of
the Euphrates areas, by strongly nationalistic Mutaṣarrifs and
668 Qa'immaqams. These, ignoring their advisory British colleagues,
openly favoured the 'patriot' shaykhs in their land disputes and
revenue assessments, and frowned upon the 'English' faction.
Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street
demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad, deputations waited
x645 upon the King. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922, by
the resignation of five ministers, who included Naji al-Suwaydi,
'Izzat Pasha of Kirkuk, and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil of Baṣra. The
ministers who replaced these included Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi, a
senior official of superior type who had been a Turkish deputy and
lately Mayor of Baghdad: Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, a Turko-Kurd of outstanding
energy and rich humour: 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey al-Sa'dun,

a Baṣra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a 645*
Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajj
Ja'far abu al-Timman. This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al- 648x
Timman, accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the
proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the
Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent
Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet 666
approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of 668
electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited,
to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, 186
by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by
a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was
especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating
nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaṣarrif. Conditions
elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were
uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made
by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British)
politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble
was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i 665
political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani 668
(Nationalist) and the Nahdha (Awakening); these were matched by
the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, 648x
Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot'
meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties
and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible
rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded
that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate
in elections. al-Khaliṣi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish
views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence.
The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least
tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their
more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The 668
King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification 648x
with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a
Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government
but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost
infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening.
Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23
August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly
to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime
Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée
itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648x 721 Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1921–6

642 180 These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still-minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a naḥiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-642 178 twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroitness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

644 There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Ḥaydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners simi-648x larly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic

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[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645 a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The
648A former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called
[665] for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

665 The Sunni–Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the
668 efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahdha Party lost
186 support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

*645 'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

that the incomparable services of King Fayṣal would not be available for another twenty years, capable as they were of neutralizing many of the conflicts and unstable features of 'Iraqi public life. That this was not to be was mercifully concealed at the hour of Independence; equally, it could not be foreseen that one of the agencies of security and national unity—the promising and hitherto correctly subordinate Army—was to take the lead in revolution and embitterment. 182

The most effective of unifying features—though in fact one of division also, since it was espoused by different factions with very different degrees of passion—was that of nationalism, the strongest single force in contemporary 'Iraqi politics. It had taken the form usual in 'new' nations, who adopt with enthusiasm the attitudes of which older, disillusioned countries have already wearied. Pride of country and desire for its political freedom have been generally hailed as laudable emotions, and by 1932 many 'Iraqis had shown ardours of patriotism as respectable as any in any country. But, in common with that of other countries, 'Iraqi nationalism had been in some measure vitiated by elements less respectable. Their friends would have wished to purge it of features morally and materially damaging to it, and to diffuse conscious pride of country throughout the public rather than see it concentrated in a small political class. They would have preferred political aspiration, which used nationalism as its war-cry, directed towards securing a better life for the masses rather than towards political goals as ends in themselves. If strident xenophobic nationalism had been less crudely in evidence, and a broader-based, more tolerant patriotism had taken its place, hopes for sound progress could have been the brighter. It was a defect of this nationalism, reacting against the country's social backwardness and resenting the material and international superiority of Europeans (and, often enough, their airs of social superiority also) to indulge in uncritical self-flattery and distorted history; and it added, as a unifying element, the encouragement of common hatreds directed sometimes against internal minorities, sometimes against 'the foreigner'. The local nationalism showed, save in a few individuals, little appreciation of what Western European civilization had at its best to offer—in tolerance, generosity, true freedom, and equality of opportunity—and little sense of the practical self-preserving wisdom, for small nations, of accepting a friendly place beside stronger Powers. An excessive or morbid sensitiveness reacted instead against imagined insults, fears of interference or suspected moves of 'imperialism'. Wrongly identified with patriotism, nationalism in fact was a field for political competition: the more anti-foreign the politician, the greater patriot. This persistent feature of 'Iraqi 186

186 politics cost the careers and sometimes the lives of some of its best sons, and deprived its people of real advantages.

648* In the international field, three main tasks would devolve after 1932 on the 'Iraqi nation: the first, to profit to the full from the support and help which its ally was prepared, without interference or self-seeking, to offer it: the second, so to align itself in world politics as to secure its own safety in whatever power-struggles might lie ahead: and thirdly, to take such steps as popular feeling might indicate in the direction of closer relations with the rest of the Arab world. The first of these tasks, which called for nothing more than the maintenance of mutually friendly relations with the British, was no arduous one; there was indeed no field of clashing interest between the two allies, and the anti-foreign extravagances of the press could no doubt be rightly assessed by both parties. In world affairs outside 'Iraq, its Government had no choice to make until the rise of Nazi power in Germany, and the attractiveness to many 'Iraqis of its forms and methods, created the temptation of a move of 'Iraqi policy away from Great Britain and towards her probable enemies: a temptation which an 'Iraq Government, a decade later, failed to resist. In the Arab world, forward movement was inevitable and was likely to be viewed with general sympathy. 'Arab Unity' had made its appearance in ministerial programmes before the end of the Mandate and, though not all statesmen gave it identical interpretations or priority, to none did it fail to appeal. Unity of a sort, indeed, was implicit in the shared linguistic and cultural environment of Arabs, their common traditions, religion, and pride, from 'Iraq to Morocco; and politically it both reflected the inspiring memory of the medieval Islamic (though in fact mainly non-Arab) empires and was the heir of the generalized Arab nationalism of the early years of the twentieth century. 'Iraqis were mindful, more particularly, of the war-time promises to King Ḥusayn, when a single Arab State seemed to be envisaged, and of the urge to weld a greater Arab nation as a heavier counterpoise to the dominance of Europe, to correct the resented post-war parcellation of the Arab lands, and to enjoy a wider economic and social life. But there were factors, not easily to be dissipated, which must be expected to render political unity difficult to achieve. Such were the effects not only of sheer geographical separation but of the distinct local loyalties which, with the fullest encouragement of their respective Governments, had developed since 1918. Such were the differences in orientation, commercial interests, personal leaderships of dynasty or statesmen, and stages of evolution reached in the various Arab lands: and such the difference, in general, between inherited but untested fraternal sympathy, and the uneasy and exacting demands of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed 645x
in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was 665
notorious that the strike in the Port of Baṣra during the summer
had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but 661
vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist
League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 186●
1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine
Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i
circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in
Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed
Zionism, backed by American money and competing political
interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all
others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other
foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment
as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and
cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of
anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn 000
of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no
agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan'
which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American
Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally
rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain
to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured
Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and
pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General
Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from
Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision
in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab
areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab
and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be
established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, 668
a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some 665
sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious
Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent
and potential violence which were actually present and
were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December [731]
the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were
approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks.
Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present
discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous
political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western,
narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less
powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively 665 responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it 642 appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism 181 as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local 642 nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over- 186 sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the
186 chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence
and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign
well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters
of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses.
642 The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its
182 widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its
648x strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or
'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of
recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen
untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature:
the loss of Faysal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi
empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages
of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young
State, and had gravely unsettled it.

172 Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties
and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as
182 between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and
innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing,
and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international
menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer
how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise,
frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in
which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement,
000 tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce
to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to
describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and
organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment
and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-standards
of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the
conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with
reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people
might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as
human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of
which they were inescapably members, might allow.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education 186
is not possible without some reference to the history and present circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Administrative 185
reforms and some social advance were attempted 735
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 642
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible 212
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to 361
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

DISCUSSION

Mrs. Soane-Ellis: Might I ask if the lecturer has any information as to the whereabouts of Sheikh Mahmud? The last time I saw him he was a prisoner at Ramadi. 000

Major Wilson: I cannot say whether he is exactly a prisoner now, but he certainly would not be allowed to go back to Sulaimaniyyeh.

Brigadier J. G. Browne: May I ask what is the position of the Pizhder Kurds under the present Government? 657 563

Major Wilson: There has been a slight extension of police control, but, as far as I know, real administration has not yet been established over the Pizhder.

The Chairman: It remains, I think, only for me to sum up what we have learnt. We see here again the extraordinary importance of the question of roads in establishing the authority of the Government among mountain peoples. We are building roads on the North-West Frontier of India. And here we have seen the roads that are being built through Kurdistan, like Mr. Hamilton's very fine achievement, the making of the road through the Rowanduz Gorge. I believe the account of the building of that road is going to be published shortly, and it should make a book well worth reading. 653 657

We have seen some extraordinarily interesting slides. And we have learnt some valuable information about the present position of the Assyrians. From what the lecturer says, the best plan now would appear to be rather to leave them alone where they are. The other plan was to have been to move them to an extremely suitable site on the Orontes River. But unfortunately the lands chosen had been sequestrated from their original owner, who had been in trouble. When M. Blum came into office, he decided he could deal with this case, reinstated the man in question, and restored his lands. So that scheme necessarily came to nothing, and it is quite impossible on other grounds now for the Assyrians to go there. But one gathers that it is wisest not to agitate on their behalf, nor to stir them up, for that only makes them very unpopular in the country. They are finding employment to some extent in the oil-fields, and as guards and station masters on the railways and in similar employment, and one can hope things may settle down and that they will stay in their own country. 186 463

We must thank our lecturer, not only for the good work he has obviously done in 'Iraq, but also for the excellent and informative lecture he has given us this evening. 000

6: Ireland MHl Iraq MHl
186, 668

/For an account of Arab Nationalism prior to 1914, and of Nationalism in Iraq between 1914 and 1920, see category 116, pp. 222-265./

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

175+ Arabs of Mesopotamia, notwithstanding the efforts of Sir Percy 727* Cox and his associates to win Arab support in other directions[1] had far-reaching effects, not only during the period of hostilities but also long after the end of the war.

The British authorities in Mesopotamia lost thereby the war-time services of capable Arab leaders. Arabs of 'Iraq by the score, once in Turkish service, were gathered from the internment camps in India and Egypt, to serve as leaders and officers, •[180 not in the land of their birth, but in the Hijāz. In contact there 665] with the sources of the Arab Movement, they were to imbibe and to pass on to 'Iraq, in the days after the Armistice, an intensity of Arab Nationalism hitherto unknown in 'Iraq. On the western side of Arabia, they had come into contact with English officers who, no less sincere in their allegiance to British interests than those on the eastern side of Arabia, were nevertheless sympathetic to this awakening Arab Nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that these 'Iraqīs felt the difference between the official mind in Mesopotamia and that on the Mediterranean side of the desert, nor that, appreciating the difference, they were all the more impatient with the attitude of the Civil Administration which prevailed at Baghdad after Sir Percy Cox had been sent to Teheran in early 1918. Such impatience was none the less because they had little or no experience or knowledge of the difficulties of the military or administrative problems of Turkish Arabia, of which the British had gained an intimate, first-hand knowledge.

The military authorities in Mesopotamia also lost the opportunity to learn what British officers in western Arabia had already learned: that the Arabs might be more than treacherous, self-seeking, half-civilized peoples. The end of the war,

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[1] To the untimely death of Capt. W. H. I. Shakespear near Artawī, in January, 1915, has been ascribed the failure of Ibn Sa'ūd to take an active part in the war and the failure to develop in Mesopotamia an Arab Movement comparable to that in the Hijāz. See Philby, *The Heart of Arabia*, Vol. 1, p. 21; Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1914-1917, p. 161; also, Coke, Richard, *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 221.

175* Sāmarrā, the fourth of the Holy Cities. No declarations were 727* taken in the Dulaim Division, either from the tribes or from 648* Fallūja, Ramādī or other towns. One declaration signed by 666 twenty Muslims represented 160,000 Arab Muslims of Mōsul Wilayet. Official pressure had to be brought to bear in Najaf[1] before its notables produced satisfactory declarations.

666 The plebiscite as 'an authoritative statement of the views held 186 by the local population',[2] also failed to indicate the elements of 175* opposition in the country and to reveal their relative strength. 1 727* It gave no hint, for instance, of the large section of opinion, 647* particularly strong in Basra,[3] which, while recognizing the benefits and the increased prosperity of British rule, found the constant growth of the military machine, including ports, camps and depots; the continuation of military regulations; the maintenance of demands for forced labour and the very efficiency of the administration with its insistence on promptness, probity and justice, too disturbing to their life-long habits of mind and of action and too much of a strain on their patience to be endured.[4]

The plebiscite gave no hint that the tribesmen, uncivilized, even barbarous, were already restive under the British tribal policy which gave the shaikhs relying on British support almost unlimited power over the details of tribal life, a power too often abused for the advancement of the shaikhs' own personal interests. It gave no inkling of such tribal feeling, which was to grow in intensity during the next eighteen months and which was to pave the way for the rebellion against both shaikhs and the British rule which maintained them in control.

The *Mujtahids* of the Shī'īs and the other religious dignitaries who, firm in their opposition to any but a theocratic Muslim State, would allow no idols other than of their own making,

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[1] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

[2] See Telegram, cited *supra*, p. 161.

[3] See statement by the Rev. J. Van Ess, cited Wilson, op. cit., p. 112, confirmed to writer, in April, 1934.

[4] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 1.

1 [Then 1918-19 - Analysi]

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were dismissed, although their power over the masses was 186.
enormous, as too ignorant of modern state-craft, too self- 175.
centred and too alien to be allowed to influence the creation of 727.
a new state. 648.

[565] The Nationalist elements, composed of those who had worked for Arab autonomy before the war, those who prided themselves on being the intelligentsia of 'Iraq, and the religious leaders, were brushed aside, although they were destined to grow in power and influence during the coming months, especially under the stimulus of Nationalism in Syria, as being too negligible, too irresponsible and too full of sound and fury to merit consideration. No inferences seem to have been drawn from the fact that the anti-British declarations, almost identical in tenor and phraseology, pointed to a carefully organized opposition, just as the close resemblance of many of the pro-British declarations indicated the care and attention which the Civil Administration had devoted to the conduct of the plebiscite.

The failure of the plebiscite to represent all these elements of current opinion in their relative importance and to reflect local opinion in its true proportions, was destined to mislead H.M. Government in its attempts to set up a new State satisfactory to the inhabitants of 'Iraq, and, by making it complacently unaware of the need for quick and decisive action in settling the future of the country, to prepare the ground for the disastrous events of 1920.

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Lord Curzon, on the receipt of the telegram, which did not 175*
officially reach the Foreign Office until June 24th,[1] took the 727*
position that the creation of the sanctioned provinces, councils 618*
and advisory positions were steps in devolution and in decentralization from the temporary military administration. He could not understand, moreover, why the application of such steps should be dependent on the inclusion of Mōsul in 'Iraq or on any particular combination of provinces. The original sanction for the Acting Civil Commissioner's proposals had not implied that any combination of provinces or that even the guardianship of H.M. Government would be permanent. A telegram to this effect was dispatched to Baghdad, July 5th, which stated in conclusion: 'Any action which would give rise in Mosul Wilayet or elsewhere to the impression that the future political status of 'Iraq has already been decided upon should therefore be most scrupulously avoided.'[2]

Still unsatisfied, the Acting Civil Commissioner, instead of devoting his energies whole-heartedly to the execution of the proposals which he had himself drawn up, entered into further correspondence with H.M. Government, endeavouring to obtain their approval to the inclusion of Mōsul in the new regime.

Growth of 'Iraqī opposition

In the meantime, opposition to British control had continued 175*
to grow both in 'Iraq and in Syria. A letter in January, 1919, 727*
from the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, welcoming the Anglo-French 186
Declaration as an indication that no part of 'Iraq was to be 618
under foreign rule, had been followed in early June by another letter, supposed to have been written by Amīr Faisal himself, and addressed to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The letter suggested that the severity of the British officials in 'Iraq had begun to turn

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[1] Young, op. cit., pp. 287-8.

[2] Telegram S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 5th, 1919.

175 away the regard of the people, and that if the Anglo-French
721 Declaration signified anything, the time had come for a change.
● 186 His own officers felt strongly the need for the acceleration of a
668 National Government and fully understood that the longer the present system existed the greater would be the difficulty in changing the system later.

Lord Curzon, however, believed that no further action was necessary. He had already, two months before, sanctioned what he believed was the limit of Arab self-government compatible with a military occupation. No reply was sent.

The incident of Nājī Beg as-Sūwaidī, in addition, confirmed both the Arabs and the British officials of the hostility and bad faith of those on the opposite side. The Acting Civil Commissioner, on his journey from London to Baghdad, had interviewed two of the 'Iraqī officers in Damascus. He had admitted that affairs in 'Iraq were not perfect, and that he was ready to do what he could to meet their views. He had pointed out his difficulty in obtaining good men for positions in 'Iraq. He had at once agreed when the two officers had asked whether he would consent to a representative being chosen from among their number to go to Baghdad and to make suggestions.

Accordingly, Nājī Beg, a capable and ardent Nationalist, of an old Baghdad family,[1] arrived in Baghdad, early in June. He soon found, contrary to the expectations which the interview with the Acting Civil Commissioner had aroused in himself and in his fellow 'Iraqīs, that he was to be merely a cog in the British machine and that his advice would not be heeded and was not even wanted.[2]

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[1] Nājī Beg, now known as Nājī Pasha, was a son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī who, as a prominent Arab Nationalist in Baghdad before the war, had suffered imprisonment at the hands of the Turks (*Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913), and who took a large part in the post-war Nationalist movement in 'Iraq. Nājī Pasha had been a popular *Qaimmaqām* of Najaf under the Turks (ibid., April, 1913). He was Acting Civil Governor of Aleppo under the Damascus Government, and has been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, etc., of 'Iraq.

[2] In an interview with the writer, Nājī Pasha stated that he believed that he had been asked to come to Baghdad to assist and to advise in setting up a National Government. On discovering his mistake, he resigned.

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His subsequent resignation and return to Syria confirmed the opinion of the 'Iraqīs in Syria that the British authorities in 'Iraq regarded them as active enemies who were trying to undermine British influence in the country, and that no real opportunities would ever be given to the 'Iraqīs to manage their own affairs. The Acting Civil Commissioner, in his turn, was convinced that his view of the Arab Nationalists was the correct one: that they were incapable and inconstant and that nothing constructive might be expected from them. When, therefore, the Acting Civil Commissioner's opinion was asked on a draft reply[1] to a Memorandum which the 'Iraqī officers had sent to the Foreign Office demanding the immediate establishment of a National Government, he gave way to a characteristic outburst, deprecating in no uncertain language that an important announcement should be drawn from H.M. Government by 'such small fry'. He suggested, however, that if a reply were believed to be necessary it 'should be restricted to an intimation that the writers appear to have been misinformed as to the progress of events in Mesopotamia, and that it is open to them to go to Mesopotamia to see things for themselves'.[2]

Some form of reassurance to the 'Iraqī officers was held to be necessary by both Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu. A new reply was drafted. After stating that 'pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to Mandatory power and nature of Mandate it would be premature to attempt constitutional experiments', it followed the Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion for a reply and pointed out that if the officers would visit the country they would find that Provincial and Divisional Councils were already being formed 'to ensure measure of Arab participation compatible with military occupation and mutual interest in political future'. The appointment of Nājī

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 15th, 1919.

[2] Telegram No. 8107, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, July 19th, 1919.

175* Pasha was mentioned as evidence of the goodwill of 727* H.M. Government.[1]

● 186 668* Whatever the effect of the reply at the time on the Acting Civil Commissioner to whom it had been repeated for his information, he was later to claim that it came as 'a serious blow, not less serious because it was addressed to Cairo, for communication to a group of prominent 'Iraqī Officers in the Sharifian service, and was the outcome of telegraphic correspondence extending over four months'.[2] The evidence available makes it difficult to understand how he could have regarded the reply, drafted by H.M. Government on the lines he had himself put forward on July 19th, as the unexpected and disastrous result of his own efforts extending over four months of telegraphic correspondence.[3] His correspondence during that period had been concerned principally with persuading H.M. Government to limit Arab participation in the administration and not to extend it, and with urging the inclusion of Mōsul in a British-administered 'Iraq. Nor is it easy to understand just how the reply which he had assisted in drafting was a blow or check to the carrying out of the proposals with the execution of which he had been entrusted in May. The excerpt which he later extracted from the telegram and presented in a setting of his own fashioning in his *Clash of Loyalties*[4] might well give such an impression if it were not known that he had already been informed in the telegram of July 5th that constitutional experiments, other than those already sanctioned, could not be approved. The telegram of August 9th, taken as a whole and in its proper setting, can be considered only as a blow to the demand of the 'Iraqī officers for immediate National Government. Far from being a rebuff to him, the telegram

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[1] Telegram, No. 249, Foreign Office to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Cairo, August 9th, 1919, repeated to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.

[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 124.

[3] Ibid.: 'I eventually elicited the following pronouncement from the Foreign Office (9th August) . . .'

[4] Ibid.

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indicated that the British Government stood behind him in his 175*
attempts to realize the measures he had proposed in April and 727*
should have been extremely welcome to him in his attempts to 186
combat any scheme of Arab Government as implied in the 668
Anglo-French Declaration. Indeed, so far was the Acting Civil Commissioner from being actually affected by the 'serious blow', as he has endeavoured to indicate, he was assuring H.M. Government within the following week that, while the constitutional proposals sanctioned in May would require a year to put into operation, they would meet the needs of the country for many years to come.[1]

In Syria, the agitation for a National Government at Baghdad continued, eventually overflowing into 'Iraq itself and swelling the local movement there until it broke into a flood of rebellion. The telegram of August 9th from the Foreign Office had not satisfied the 'Iraqī members of Faisal's staff. Nājī Pasha's appointment had been no answer to their aspirations; his resignation had been the confirmation of their fears. What they wanted, they declared, was assurance that the existing military administration was not to continue. They found

> the attitude of the British officials was more than that of administrators of a foreign population who were incapable, and would always remain incapable, of governing themselves than that to which the Baghdadi officers had become accustomed on the other side, of friendly advisers who started on the assumption that the Arabs were managing their own affairs, and that it was not for them to do more than make friendly suggestions for the improvement of their plans.[2]

The delay in setting up the various measures which had been sanctioned seemed to the inhabitants of 'Iraq no less than to the 'Iraqī officers in Syria to point to a lack of goodwill on the part of the Acting Civil Commissioner and to give substance

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[1] Young, op. cit., p. 294.

[2] Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd to Major Sir H. W. Young, cited ibid., p. 297. Confirmed by Nūrī Pasha to the writer, December 18th, 1934.

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175+ to the belief that no real aid to the achievement of their
127 aspirations could be expected from that quarter.[1] Rumours
186 were about that the mandate system was but annexation in a
668 new form, and that colonization by the British and by the Government of India had not been abandoned. The coming of 550 English women, wives and relatives of officials, pointed to the establishment of the British for a long stay. The establishment of farms for experimental work in cotton-growing was interpreted as further evidence of India's intentions towards 'Iraq. Confidence was difficult to maintain in the face of so many facts and rumours. The 'Iraqīs, like their fellow Arabs, lacked patience to await developments. They desired results, and these immediately and in a tangible form. Cool and far-sighted heads were not lacking, but they were not always in control. The majority believed, as Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī was to remark later to Miss Gertrude Bell: 'My lady, complete independence is never given, it is always taken.'[2]

The establishment of the Syrian State, immediately following the Armistice, encouraged the 'Iraqīs to look to their own country where direct British administration continued.[3] The growing insistence of the Syrians that posts in the Damascus Government be given to Syrians only made it necessary for the 'Iraqī officers there to seek new outlets and opportunities for their energies. 'Iraqī officers, disguised as Beduins, had already toured Mesopotamia during July. They had reported that the temper of the country was rising, and that active agitation and continuous propaganda, backed with funds, might win independence from Great Britain if it were not freely given.

Other propagandists began to slip over the desert. Societies

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[1] The attitude of the 'Iraqī Officers in Syria was ably reviewed by Gertrude Bell in her confidential note, *Syria in October*, 1919, pp. 3-4 *passim.*

[2] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 569. Lawrence had continually drilled the same principle into the leaders of the Movement in Western Arabia: 'I had preached to Faisal, from our first meeting, that freedom was taken not given.' Lawrence, op. cit., p. 274.

[3] *Syria in October*, 1919, p. 11.

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already existing throughout ‘Iraq became the channels of 175*
Nationalist agitation. Anti-Government and anti-British 727*
sentiment and discontent in the towns, in the religious centres, 186 ●
among the tribes and among the unemployed ex-officials, were 668
stimulated and then skilfully assimilated to the nucleus of Nationalist feeling already existing among those who believed in Arab and in ‘Iraqī independence as desirable in themselves. Appeals to religious fervour and fanaticism, to pride of race, to Nationalist feeling, to cupidity, and to all the elemental instincts in each of the component groups which had been drawn into the movement, were working their spell during the days when politicians of the West, like Joshua of old, bade the East stand still until the battle at Paris over the spoils should be ended.

H.M. Government was not entirely unaware that public opinion in ‘Iraq during the last months of 1919 was not the same as had prevailed in the final months of 1918. As early as August 23rd, when a police report of July 7th stated that

> every Moslem Arab of education in Baghdad was a member of a society, with branches in all the important towns in Mesopotamia, which was described as simply a pan-Arab and anti-foreign organization formed with a view to the expulsion of the British and the establishment of Arab rule.[1]

Mr. Montagu’s suggestion that an announcement should be made that Great Britain would remain in the country, in some form or other, was negatived by the British delegation at Paris which deprecated such action as injudicious in view of the state of affairs at the Peace Conference.

In October and November, when even more disturbing news was received of the temper of the country, of the attitude of the ‘Iraqī officers in Syria[2] and of the slowness with which the constitutional proposals were being executed,[3] Lord Curzon,

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[1] Cited Young, op. cit., p. 294.

[2] *Syria in October*, 1919.

[3] After six months, only four of the nine Divisional Councils and none of the Provincial Councils had been formed. On further inquiry, it was discovered that the Acting Civil Commissioner did not contemplate moving in the matter that year. Young, op. cit., p. 298.

175* in alarm, called a meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee,
127* November 10th. The Committee agreed that the first condi-
186 tion for recovery of confidence and for the future settlement of
668 the country was the return of Sir Percy Cox. This would be difficult, however, until the Mandate was announced and he could act with complete authority.[1] The Mandate would probably not be given before the New Year, but an early announcement of his impending return was desirable. It was hardly possible that he could take up his new duties until the autumn.

In his turn, the Acting Civil Commissioner also realized that the temper of the country was altering. He assigned, correctly, much of the change to trans-desert sources but, considering the authors to be unimportant, he was inclined to underrate the necessity to take their views — a mistake which was to have serious consequences. Resentful of the Western Arabia policy, he was ready to believe that Sharif Husain's inordinate ambition, that England's golden sovereigns and the Arabs' love of plunder were the sole motives behind the movement in the West. He shut his eyes to the other factors. His contacts with the Middle East had hitherto been primarily in India, Persia and the Persian Gulf.[2] His first-hand acquaintance with Arabs and his knowledge of their character had been limited to the lower Tigris. He had no personal knowledge of the deep hold which Independence and Nationalism, as abstract ideas, had upon the 'Iraqī participants in the Arab Movement. He could not realize, therefore, that the motives which had helped to sustain them during months of desert warfare would continue to do so, even if their enemies were France or Britain.

He did not seem to realize that, however much the dignitaries of Baghdad might repudiate the officers as men of

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[1] Reference to Sir Percy Cox in Tehrān, found him unprepared to return without complete authority.

[2] He had spent about ten days in Baghdad, July, 1911: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1911.

importance and position,[1] many of the latter had been the life 175*
of the pre-war Arab Movement and had been instigators of 727*
several disturbances in the Turkish army.[2] Moreover, they had 186
created positions for themselves by their ability, first in the 668
Turkish Army and then in the Arab Movement and, in consequence, had acquired a reputation in popular opinion equalling their actual importance. In addition, the 'Iraqīs had in Mōsul, Basra, Baghdad and outlying districts, families, relatives and friends who cast up, at their instigation, waves of increasing size in the sea of 'Iraqī Nationalism.

Outwardly paying lip-service to Arab participation, his 175x
real opinion, not only of Arabs but also of those who advocated 727x
their wide participation in the government and administration of 'Iraq, came out in his memorandum on Miss Bell's note on Syria.[3] He disagreed with her fundamental assumption that 'an Arab State in Mesopotamia . . . within a short period of years is a possibility, and that the recognition or creation of a logical scheme of government on these lines, in supersession of those on which we are now working in Mesopotamia, would be practical and popular'. He declared:

> My observations in this country and elsewhere have forced me to the conviction that this assumption is erroneous, and although I am aware that in holding this view I differ from authorities and observers both at home and abroad . . . I venture, probably for the last time in my present capacity, to lay before H.M.'s Government the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. . . .
>
> I therefore regard the creation of an Arab Government

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[1] Practically every 'Iraqī who served under Faisal has occupied, upon his return to 'Iraq, positions of responsibility in the 'Iraq Government. Their enemies declare that this monopolization of high office has been due to British influence, and to the fact that they have constituted themselves a ruling clique. Their friends maintain their position has been due to their ability and experience.

[2] As in Baghdad, from March to July, 1913: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March, April and July, 1913.

[3] Letter No. 34436, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, November 15th, 1919.

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Meanwhile, no further action should be taken on announce- 175*
ment made. I hope to be able to send you fuller instructions 727*
shortly.[1]

The reply of the Interdepartmental Committee filled the Acting Civil Commissioner with apprehension. The reference to 'framing the mandate' seemed to presage new and disheartening delays at a time when action was imperative. The failure to approve of the Bonham-Carter Report left him little with which to combat the growing unrest in 'Iraq. His telegrams to H.M. Government were, however, not without results. At the second of the two meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee to re-examine the draft Mandate in the light of recent developments, Mr. Montagu's suggestion of the establishment of a provisional Government with Sir Percy Cox in charge, on the lines proposed by the Bonham-Carter Committee but with increased Arab participation, was approved. The Interdepartmental Committee agreed that Mr. Montagu should draft the telegram along these lines.

Events had now begun to move more swiftly towards an announcement of intentions of the British Government towards 'Iraq. They were not swift enough, however, to prevent open conflict between the inhabitants of 'Iraq and the forces of Great Britain.

Excitement had been running high in Baghdad following the 175*
announcement of the Mandate. Meetings organized by the 727
Nationalists had been held in the mosques where orators in the 186 ●
name of independence, race and religion had urged their 666
listeners to rise against the British. Clashes between Nationalists and the authorities had already taken place, and it had been necessary to patrol the streets with armoured cars. The group of fifteen Baghdad Nationalists, known locally as the *Mandubīn* or Delegates, had approached the Acting Civil Commissioner asking for an opportunity to lay their proposals before

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[1] Telegram No. P. 3839, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad May 20th, 1920.

175* him for transmission to H.M. Government. He had tried to
727* avoid giving the interview. He did not wish to give any
186 opportunity for a demonstration and he felt that he had
668 nothing definite with which to counter their demands. He held, moreover, that the *Mandubīn* were unrepresentative, referring to them in his dispatches as self-elected Delegates, although they had received the approval of a public meeting held in one of the principal mosques. Realizing, however, that they had a large popular following and that they could sway great masses of public opinion, he finally gave them an appointment for the morning of June 2nd, at the Turkish *Sarai* or Government headquarters. He took the precaution, however, of inviting by name about forty other dignitaries of all religions, supposed to be favourably disposed to the British regime. To cope with possible demonstrations or disorder among the expected crowds, special police arrangements were made, troops were held in readiness at the barracks and R.I.M.S. *Comet* with steam up and trained guns was stationed on the Tigris opposite the *Sarai*.

At the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner explained the desire of H.M. Government to give a National Government and the difficulties which had been encountered. He declared that they were then about to make an announcement along the lines proposed in the Bonham-Carter Report of which he gave an outline. He reminded his hearers that nothing was to be gained by hasty action, and that with the best will in the world an indigenous National Government could not be set up at once. He warned them that any attempts at disorder or violence would be met with force and that the military authorities would be called in if necessary.[1]

The Delegates professed themselves unsatisfied with the proposals and presented their own petition asking for the immediate formation of a National Arab Convention for 'Iraq,

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[1] Text: Telegram No. 6583, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

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elected according to Turkish Electoral Law. The Convention 175*
would be empowered to draw up proposals for a National 727*
Government as promised in the Anglo-French Declaration. 186
They also asked for freedom of the Press. With these demands a 668
number of the invited notables, contrary to the Acting Civil Commissioner's expectations, associated themselves and declared that 'Iraqi independence was the concern of the entire Arab people.

The meeting itself, although feeling ran high, had been conducted with dignity. As those attending began to disperse, the immense crowd which filled the Court of the *Sarai* hissed and shouted abuse at the British officials. The *Mandubīn* were cheered and several of the leaders were carried out on the shoulders of the crowd. No clashes occurred, however, between the crowds and the police.

In forwarding the petition and an account of the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner threw the entire blame for the 'movement reaching its present uncompromising form, backed as it is by skilfully fomented public excitement' on the failure of H.M. Government to allow him to make the announcement of the Bonham-Carter proposals before the beginning of Ramadhan as he had requested on May 8th.

He then declared:

> It is probable that in the present temper a proposal that the country should submit even for a limited period to a provisional Constitution as to which they had not been consulted would be met on the part of the Nationalists by a Declaration of Independence. Such proposals would be represented as contrary to the Anglo-French Declaration, the real meaning of which is little understood and widely misrepresented, and would harden public opinion against us, while if the present temper continues the proposed Legislative Assembly would on being summoned convert itself into a Constituent Assembly though not so authorized.[1]

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[1] Telegram No. 6584, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

175 arise which will lead to the High Commissioner seeking his
727 authority to bring to the notice of His Majesty the King of
648 'Iraq any action on your part which he may regard as
detrimental thereto.

The terms of service upon which you are engaged have been set forth in a contract which has been given to you by His Majesty the King of 'Iraq.[1]

Ratification of the Treaty by the Council of Ministers

By the time of Major Young's departure for England, in early 1922, the main lines of the Treaty had been settled. The King and his Prime Minister had been consulted, but the task had remained throughout in British hands. Not until after the Council meeting of February 19th, 1922, when the Naqīb announced that neither H.M. King Faisal nor he felt able to continue the negotiations alone, was the Treaty, which had already received the approval of the Colonial Office, placed before the Council of Ministers. During the eight months the Treaty was before it, the Council suggested numerous amendments, but their main objection was that made by the King and the Nationalists: the Treaty did not specifically abrogate the Mandate relationship.

The Naqīb, in particular, agreed with the King that the interests of 'Iraq and of Great Britain required a treaty but he joined him in pointing out that the attempt of Great Britain to pose as an ally to 'Iraq and as the mandatory Power to the League of Nations was irreconcilable, as well as unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq. He hesitated to put his name to a treaty which did not satisfy national ambitions and which would displease the Muslims of India with whom he was intimately in touch and whose good opinion he valued greatly.

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176 The evident reluctance of the King and his Ministers to
175 ratify the Treaty as it stood was not uninfluenced by the increas-
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648 ing intensity of anti-Mandate sentiment, skilfully fostered by the

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[1] Cited *Progress of 'Iraq*, pp. 289-90.

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Nationalists, to whom the King was inclined to turn for support. 175*
The great gathering of Sunnī and Shī'a Nationalists from all 727*
parts of 'Iraq, at Karbalā, April 12th and 13th, 1922, summoned 648*
by Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, ostensibly to consider measures of 668
defence against the Wahhābīs, whose raids in early March had 186 ●
thrown 'Iraq into a furore of nervous excitement,[1] had been hailed as a body greater than the prospective National Assembly since it had met at the wish of the nation without the influence of the Government.[2]

Although the formal sessions actually came to little, moderate petitions replacing the original extreme demands,[3] the private meetings were more productive. From them developed the organization of much of the later agitation. The vernacular newspapers, which had steadily maintained during the spring that 'Iraq would not accept the Treaty so long as it contained a shadow of the Mandate,[4] were also to increase their virulence after the meetings.

The Residency attempted to counter this propaganda by inserting articles in the local English papers. These articles, placing the mandatory system in its most favourable light,[5] insisting that the misunderstandings of the Nationalists arose from the use of the wrong Arabic word for Mandate[6] and urging as a diversion, that 'Iraqīs should support their new army as a quick means of achieving independence,[7] merely stirred the Arabic press to fresh denunciations. The papers retorted, in unison, that the word Mandate, however translated, meant the same thing: subjection and colonization.[8] *Al-'Iraq*

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

[2] *Al-Mufīd*, April 17th, 1922. The King was believed to be giving his support to the Conference. See his telegram of thanks to the Conference, April 13th, 1922; *Al-Dijla*, April 16th, 1922; also *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, April 7th, 1922; but cf. *Al-Mufīd*, same date.

[4] *Lisān al-'Arab*, February 24th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 1st and 9th, 1922; *Al-'Iraq*, March 3rd, 1922; *Al-Jazīra* (Mōsul), April 4th, 1922.

[5] *Baghdad Times*, May 26th; July 5th, 6th, 1922.

[6] Ibid., May 27th, 29th; June 10th, 20th, 1922.

[7] Ibid., July 12th, 1922.

[8] *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-Rāfidan*, June 5th, 1922; also *supra*, pp. 261-3.

175 pointed to Syria as a typical example of what the Mandate de-
727 noted.[1] *Al-Mufīd* declared that the Mandate, 'even if veiled
648 under financial control, assistance to the army and 'Iraq repre-
668 sentatives abroad' must be abrogated.[2] 'Iraq must be created
186 independent before treaties could be made, since treaties were
only possible between independent nations.[3] In answer to the statement that Great Britain could not, even if she wished, divest herself of her obligations to the League, *Al-Istiqlāl* replied:

> We cannot imagine that the League has power to force Great Britain to accept the yoke of the mandate. Everyone has the right to return any responsibility prejudicial to him and his friend. Suppose the League asked Great Britain to put her fleet at its disposal. Would Great Britain agree as she has agreed to the yoke of the mandate?[4]

Al-Mufīd declared:

> If weak nations are by terrorism and enticement to sign a document that means slavery and oppression, weak nations will find means to release themselves from responsibility.[5]

British officials themselves were not immune from newspaper criticisms; Major Yetts, Adviser for the Muntafiq *Liwā*, in particular being singled out for attack on account of his alleged pro-Mandate activities.[6]

Mr. Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons, May 23rd, 1921, to the effect that H.M. King Faisal and the 'Iraq Government had not refused to accept the Mandate,[7] added fresh fuel to the flames. At a gathering in Kādhimain, a programme of further meetings in the mosques, of monster petitions and of telegrams to the British Government and to all foreign governments was drawn up. A great gathering was planned for the evening of May 28th, in the Haidar Khāna

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 7th, 1922.

[2] *Al-Mufīd*, May 20th, 1922.

[3] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 24th, 1922.

[4] Ibid., June 23rd, 1922.

[5] *Al-Mufīd*, June 28th, 1922.

[6] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 18th; *Al-Mufīd*, June 19th; *Al-Rafidān*, June 21st, 1922.

[7] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLIII (1922), p. 995.

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mosque, a special edition of *Al-Istiqlāl* being published to urge 175*
the population to attend.[1] Prompt action by King Faisal 727
prevented disturbances at the mosque, but a committee was 648*
appointed to approach the King with protests against Mr. 668
Churchill's statement.[2] Telegrams of protest to foreign governments, 186
to the value of Rs. 1,500 (£115), were prepared but were held up at the instance of the High Commissioner, whose action was later confirmed by King Faisal.[3]

In the provinces, anti-Mandate and pro-Mandate petitions were producing a heated atmosphere, while revenue payment in the Euphrates area ceased, on the assurance of the Nationalists that the British would soon leave 'Iraq. In 'Amāra and Kūt, the great landowners viewed these assurances with great dissatisfaction. Many shaikhs, resenting the scant consideration already shown them by the Arab Government, feared the time when British control should be completely removed. On the other hand, a large body of shaikhs, including Shaikh 'Abdul Wahīd of the Fatla,[4] and tribesmen, mainly Shi'is and therefore under the influence of the *'Ulamā*, sought the overthrow of the British-controlled regime.

Tension was not lessened by the fact that in administrative circles, as early as the end of 1921, a distinction had been made, as by the *Qaimmaqām* of Abū Sukhair, between those who had taken part in the Insurrection of 1920 and those who had been and still were pro-British. The former, particularly in Hilla *Liwā*, by the special orders of the *Mutasarrif*,[5] were given light revenue assessments, facilities for payment and prompt attention to their complaints. The latter were faced with

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 28th, 1922. *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed July 7th, when the license of *Al-Tauhid* (founded Baghdad, June 24th, 1922) was withdrawn.

[2] Ibid., May 31st, 1922; *Al-Mufid*, June 1st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 4th, 1922. When the telegrams were held up in Baghdad, the Nationalists chartered a motor to take them to Persia, but the King was persuaded to bring pressure to bear on those concerned, to abandon the scheme.

[4] Chief instigator of the tribal revolt against the 'Iraq Government in 1935.

[5] The Mutasarrif's campaign, which he carried even into Karbalā *Liwā*, was based on (*a*) Rejection of the Treaty; (*b*) Resignation of the Cabinet; (*c*) Removal of the British provincial Advisers.

175" unprecedented estimates and with demands for immediate
127 payment, while their petitions received scant consideration.

648" In Baghdad, the division extended to the Council where
668 heated discussions occurred, as at its meetings of June 12th and
186 22nd. Ja'far abū Timman, Minister of Commerce, led the attack on the Treaty, declaring that all the Holy Saiyids and the pillars of Islam were opposed to it. His resignation, on June 26th, was taken as evidence of his sacrificial patriotism,[1] but in British official circles it was maintained that, realizing his post was about to be abolished, he resigned in order to win popularity among the Nationalists.[2]

Although the Council of Ministers resolved, on June 25th, to ratify the Treaty with a proviso which the High Commissioner had repeatedly urged them to drop, that the Treaty must be approved by the Constituent Assembly,[3] it was clear even before the critical days of August, that political antagonisms had received sharp definition. It was apparent that they were likely to increase in bitterness with the prospect of settlement by force only. Both sides had burned their bridges behind them. The '*Ulamā*, opposed to the Mandate, had spent heavily on propaganda and were in debt for their taxes. If they were unsuccessful in removing British control, they would be financially ruined. The moral forces on the side of the Government were stronger than in 1920 but the actual forces for repressing disorders were far smaller than two years before. Moreover, the forces included the 'Iraq army, which under the circumstances was an extremely doubtful element.

An early publication of the Treaty, together with a clear statement of the alternatives between which 'Iraqis would be forced to choose, would have cleared the air.[4] In the absence

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 27th, 1922; *Al-Tauhīd*, July 2nd, 1922.

[2] *Report on 'Iraq Administration, April*, 1922—*March*, 1923, Colonial No. 4 (1924), p. 14.

[3] Ja'far abū Timman signed the resolution, dissenting, however, with most of the articles.

[4] Mr. Churchill's threat in the House of Commons, July 11th (*Parl. Debates*, Vol. CLVI (1922), p. 1121), 'to wash our hands of the whole business', only aggravated public feeling in 'Iraq. *Al-Mufīd*, July 23rd, 1922.

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of a clear pronouncement of policy from H.M. Government, 175*
the demand for withdrawal from ʻIraq made by the British 927*
Press and by Parliament,[1] duly reported in ʻIraq, encouraged 648*
the Nationalists to believe that continued agitation would force 668
the British to withdraw. 186

The difficulties facing the High Commissioner and the ʻIraqīs favouring the Treaty were not decreased by the attitude of H.M. King Faisal. He recognized the necessity for a treaty in accordance with the conditions of his enthronement, yet he continued to rely on the Nationalists for support in opposition to the terms of the Treaty as placed before him. Prominent Nationalists, such as Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī,[2] Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, and others had access to him. Within the palace, Fahmī al-Mudārris and Saiyid Mahdī al-Bāsīr had his private ear. Jaʻfar abū Timman had been his agent in reporting the Karbalā meetings.[3] Although differences of opinion had grown up between the King and the Naqīb, both of them had ʻproclaimed to the listening Universe that they will never, so help them God, accept the Mandateʼ.[4] The undoubted opposition of the King, together with his telegram to the Karbalā Conference, his favourable reception to the Nationalists, on May 30th, and his relations with the leaders to whom presents of money were known to have been given, confirmed popular opinion that to oppose the Treaty was not to oppose the King.

As a result of his association with the Nationalists, it has since been maintained that the King had been won over to their side.[5] Such an assertion implies that he embraced Arab Nationalism

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CLI (1922), pp. 1554 ff.; Vol. CLVI (1922), pp. 1085, 1092, 1098-102, 1107 ff.

[2] By early August, however, a breach between Shaikh Mahdī and the King seems to have been complete. The latter regarded the former as pro-Turk.

[3] This did not prevent him from holding a meeting at his house, August 2nd, when the dethronement of King Faisal was put forward.

[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 643; also *Al-Mufid*, June 26th, 1922.

[5] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IX. (1922), pp. 235-7; Hooper, C. A.: *L'Iraq et la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1928), p. 33.

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175x only at the instigation of the 'Iraqī Nationalists, overlooking the
727 fact that he had, in effect, early dedicated his life to the Arab
648x cause. It disregards his previous work for Arab independence
at every conceivable opportunity; at Constantinople; in Syria
486 after the outbreak of the war at the risk of his life; in the Arab
668 revolt; in Damascus in the attempt to set up an Arab State; and
at the Peace Conference in Paris. The rejection of Arab claims at Paris and his ejection from Syria had neither curbed nor broken his ardour, as his unpublished *Memoirs* amply confirm. He remained the Arab patriot with dreams of an Arab Federation stretching from the Taurus to the Indian Ocean.[1]

In 'Iraq he found himself the point of balance between his British mentors and his own subjects. To the former, he owed his throne, as well as support for it. To them, he owed the prospect of future development for the country, but on their own terms. To his fellow Arabs, from whom only could come the moral support and the sympathetic public opinion on which he hoped to build the 'Iraq nation, he owed loyalty to the Arab cause. Only by joining forces with the Nationalists, whose ideas rather than those of the British, more closely approximated his own, could he win from H.M. Government the concessions which would give 'Iraq real independence and would place more power in his hands to meet the responsibilities which had been thrust upon him by the Treaty.

If he turned to the extreme Nationalists and to the '*Ulamā*, therefore, it was because he sought to adjust the balance in favour of Arab Nationalism. If he descended to indirect methods of obtaining his ends, it was because he held that the end merited the means, and because his better judgment was at times swayed and warped by influences within his palace.

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[1] In spite of official denials of his anti-French sentiment, Faisal never renounced his ambition of recapturing Syria for the Arab Federation, making 'Iraq his base of attack.

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So definitely had the King's alliance with the extreme 175x
Nationalists affected the situation, that a prediction was made 727x
in British official circles in the middle of August that, unless he 648x
turned to the moderates, it would be impossible to foresee the 186
outcome of the next six weeks. 668

The Council of Ministers itself felt that the King, in allying himself with the Nationalists outside the Cabinet, and in apparently approving of their actions, which had included denunciations of the Council, had failed to give it his confidence. These misgivings the Council expressed in a resolution on August 9th, when it requested 'His Majesty to co-operate with this persevering Government in conducting affairs, in order to convince the people that the Government of His Majesty can rely on the confidence of His Majesty'. By stating in his reply that he saw no reason to alter his policy, the King indicated, contrary to the advice of the High Commissioner, that he personally wished the Cabinet to fall. The Ministers, therefore, resigned on August 14th.[1] Their fall was hailed as a blow to the pro-Treaty party, the extreme Nationalists openly declaring that Ja'far abū Timman, Hamdī Pāchahjī and Maulūd Pasha would replace the fallen Ministers, that Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr would be Prime Minister and that the Mandate would be abrogated. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr immediately issued a manifesto to the people, advising them, among other things, to persevere towards complete independence and to reject the British Mandate by all legal means.[2]

King Faisal himself added to the critical state of affairs by writing to the High Commissioner, on August 20th, and stating that, in view of the existing uncertainties of policy and lack of definition of responsibilities between himself and the High Commissioner on matters of internal administration, he felt compelled to inform the High Commissioner and through him the

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[1] The Naqīb remained in office for a few days longer.

[2] Full text of Manifesto: *Al-Mufīd*, August 19th, 1922; summary: *Baghdad Times*, August 23rd, 1922.

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175x 729' 648 /16 668 Colonial Office that, in the event of a rising, which was confidentially to be expected, His Majesty disclaimed all responsibility. He begged the High Commissioner either to assume the conduct of administration or to give himself a free hand to direct affairs on such lines as he saw fit.

The High Commissioner immediately drafted a strong reply, pointing out the responsibility of the King in the situation. The letter was withheld, however, in order that it might not mar the approaching anniversary of King Faisal's accession.

[665] The two Nationalist political parties, *Hizb al-Watanī*,[1] (National Party), and *Hizb an-Nahdha*[2] (Renaissance Party), which, with the *Hizb al-Hurr*[3] (Independent Party), had been formed in early August to take part in the prospective elections,[4] thought the moment opportune to add their weight to the protests against the Mandate. At a joint meeting, on November 20th and 21st, under the presidency of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. the parties drew up an address which they presented to the King.[5] The address culminated in three demands:

1. Immediate termination of the present policy and of British influence.
2. Selection of a Cabinet, members of which were to be sincere patriots, possessing the confidence of the people.
3. Suspension of treaty negotiations until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, its members having been freely elected.[6]

Arrangements were also made by the parties for a joint public protest on August 23rd at the anniversary celebration.[7]

On the morning of the 23rd, when the High Commissioner

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[1] Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 8th, 1922.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, August 10th, 1922; Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 21st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, August 11th, 1922.

[4] The Law of Associations, under which the parties were strictly regulated had been approved, after much delay, by the Council on June 29th, and promulgated on July 2nd, 1922. *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 56-8.

[5] *Al-Mufid*, August 22nd, 1922.

[6] *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufid*, June 23rd, 1922.

[7] *Al-'Iraq* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922.

and his staff arrived at the Palace, they found the courtyard 175x
packed and an address being delivered from a balcony. As the 727x
High Commissioner passed up the stairs, shouts from the 648x
crowd were heard, followed by loud applause. After the 186
audience at which the King appeared to be somewhat nervous,[1] 668
the High Commissioner, on inquiry, learned that the demonstration as arranged by the *Hizb al-Watanī* and *Hizb an-Nahdha* had been directed against the Mandate. The next day, he sent a strong protest, demanding an apology and the arrest of those responsible for the affair. The apology was immediate and ample.[2] Unfortunately the King, about noon on the same day, was stricken with appendicitis, an operation being performed early the following day. The necessary papers, however, had not been signed by him. The High Commissioner approached His Majesty shortly before the operation, but the King refused to sign, protesting that he would not put his signature to the condemnation of any of his subjects as an act which might well be his last.

The High Commissioner at once issued a proclamation, taking over the reins of government into his own hands and stating that the absence of a Cabinet, the King's illness and the seditious disturbances in the country left him no other alternative.[3] Hamdī Pāchahjī, Saiyid Mahdī al-Basīr, Amīn al-Chārchafī and 'Abdul Rasūl al-Kubba were deported to Henjam. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr and Shaikh Muhammad Māhdī al-Khālisī were advised by the High Commissioner that 'if they did not go, he would be forced to take measures which, out of respect to the '*Ulamā*, he did not want to take'. They crossed the Persian frontier, August 29th. Notice was served that any further attempts at sedition would be promptly and severely dealt with.[4]

From the provinces disquieting news had been reported. In

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[1] Cf. Bell, op. cit., p. 649.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, August 26th, 1922. No Arabic papers printed these letters.

[3] Ibid., Special Edition, August 26th, 1922.

[4] Ibid.

175 Shamīya, the chiefs were defiant; in Dīwānīya, tribal lawless-
727 ness had broken out, while in Nāsirīya and Sūq ash-Shuyūkh,
648 public order trembled in the balance. In Diyālā, unrest had
186 increased to such an extent that had any rising taken place
668 elsewhere, the tribes of Dīltāwa, Shahrābān and Delli 'Abbās would unquestionably have risen. Prompt and strong measures restored administrative authority on non-party lines, however, the Nationalist officials being summoned to Baghdad where the outstanding offender, the *Mutassarif* of Hilla, was tried and adjudged to be unworthy of future employment. Revenue was collected, land cases settled and incipient revolt checked, aerial action being necessary in four cases to re-establish the authority of the Government.

175 Whether or not the actual incident on August 23rd required
727 the stern and, in the case of the deportations, even harsh
648 measures employed, there can be no question that the High Commissioner, as responsible for peace and order, considered his measures, vigorously and promptly taken, to be essential for the well-being of the country as well as for the eventual success of British policy. His actions restored prestige to the Government, the country as a whole settling down to 'an era of reconstruction'.[1]

In order that the measures taken by the High Commissioner should appear to be constitutional, it was essential that they should be ratified by the King. Both British and 'Iraqī officials were aware of the grave situation which might result if the King should refuse to give the required ratification. On September 10th, the High Commissioner approached King Faisal. His Majesty was told plainly that the British Government would not tolerate his connection with future Nationalist agitation nor any further delay in ratifying the Treaty. The King agreed to invite the Naqīb to form a new Cabinet, after the receipt of a declaration from the Secretary of State for the Colonies which would form the basis of an announcement of his

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, p. 21.

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embracing the State. Not yet had a sense of loyalty and duty 643
to the nation arisen to surmount the differences between tribes- [578
men and townsmen, between Sunnī and Shī'ī, and between 186]
Muslims and minority communities or to replace personal opportunism. Patriotism still denoted independence without obligations to the State.

In his impatience with these materials at hand for the 643
creation of the new State, King Faisal may have gone farther than he was justified in attempting to mould the political institutions to his own will. On the other hand, it seems possible that had he not assumed the role of a benevolent despot, the political system of 'Iraq might have faltered and even collapsed entirely and the stable government insisted upon by the League of Nations as one of its criteria of 'Iraq's readiness for independence[1] would have been absent in 1932. It is equally probable that without King Faisal's guiding influence, supported by Great Britain, the 'Iraqī people in their impatience would have refused to agree to the obligations imposed by Great Britain as the price of her assistance. In the latter circumstance, Great Britain would have been forced to resume direct control or to withdraw from 'Iraq. Either course would undoubtedly have retarded for many years the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations and her acceptance as a member of the international community.

Upon the accession of King Ghāzī I, September 9th, 1933, the young King, barely turned twenty-one and not less of a Nationalist nor less mindful of his position than his father, attempted to use the immense popularity he had acquired as the result of his openly displayed approval of the campaign against the Assyrians,[2] to exert the power of the crown and to take the reins of control into his own hands, after the example of his late father. The Prime Minister, Rashīd 'Alī al Gailānī, although

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[1] *Official Journal*, November, 1931, pp. 2057 ff.

[2] *The Times*, September 1st, 11th, 1933. 'Iraqī-Assyrian relations are held to be outside the scope of this study. See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (1935), pp. 135 ff.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a con- 262
stant current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a background of sound varying from that of the cooking of a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump, thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat compli- 173
cated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

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his nomination, accepted at the Cairo Conference of 1921, was approved, in spite of some opposition, by the Iraqi Council of State and confirmed in a referendum, and he was enthroned on 23 August 1921. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, through which the mandatory Power had decided to embody its obligations towards the League of Nations, was signed by the Iraq Government on 10 October 1922 against the determined opposition of nationalist elements, who insisted that the Treaty should terminate the Mandate and British influence, whereas it in fact incorporated the provisions of the Mandate, gave guarantees on judicial matters to make up for the abolition of the Capitulations, and guaranteed Great Britain's special interests in Iraq. Its period of validity, twenty years, was reduced the following year to four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey, which followed in July 1923; this, and the subsequent evolution of the British Government's attitude towards Iraq, were due largely to the increasing demand in Great Britain to terminate British commitments there. In March 1924, in spite of nationalist and Shii threats to boycott the elections, a Constituent Assembly was elected and was induced, in the face of considerable political and popular resentment, to accept the Treaty (June 1924); and later ratified it and the Organic Law, which had been drawn up on the basis of an Iraqi draft, after considerable disagreement between the King and the British Government on one side and Iraqi political opinion on the other over the royal powers. b42 b48 [186] •

In November the Council of the League of Nations awarded the major part of the Mosul vilayet to Iraq. In the same year a treaty between Turkey, Great Britain, and Iraq accepted the new frontiers as definitive and inviolable, while Iraq agreed to pay to Turkey 10 per cent on Mosul oil royalties on condition that the mandatory régime, as expressed in the Treaty, should continue for twenty-five years unless Iraq were previously admitted as a member of the League; this provision was embodied in a new Treaty in 1926. In September 1929 the British Government undertook to support Iraq's candidature for membership in 1932 and in 1930 a further new Treaty was signed, which provided for a close Anglo-Iraqi alliance, to last for twenty-five years from the admission of Iraq to the League. There was to be full and frank consultation between the parties in matters of foreign policy which might affect their common interest; mutual assistance in the event of war, including Iraq's provision of communications and all other facilities and assistance and the right of passage to British troops; and lease of sites for air bases near Basra and west of the Euphrates at which b48

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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648 forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction
[186] and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the
643 ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was
645 inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets
668 which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the
669 factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in
[185] assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

648 In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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Afghanistan, which provided for consultation in all disputes 648 that might affect the common interests of the four states.

Relations with Great Britain

During the period of independence the hostility of Iraqi 648 nationalists towards Great Britain in no way diminished. The 186 mandate had been replaced by a treaty that they had from the first opposed as denying full independence and their sentiments were strengthened by Syrian and Palestinian nationalists, deeply critical of British policy in Palestine, who took refuge in Iraq. A further stimulus was provided by Axis propaganda, which produced among nationalist groups not only hostility to Great Britain but a positive admiration for the totalitarian states. When King Ghazi killed himself in a motor accident in [643] April 1939, to be succeeded by his infant son Faisal II, with the Amir Abdul-Ilah, Ghazi's cousin and brother-in-law, as Regent, there was a violent outburst of anti-British feeling in the belief that the accident was British-inspired.

Consequently, although the Iraqi Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany in September 1939, political opinion was divided on the measure of assistance to be granted to Great Britain under the Treaty; nationalists, especially in the all-important army, demanded non-belligerency and even the resumption of relations with Germany; and diplomatic relations with Italy were maintained. In 1941 the routine of political intrigue combined with nationalist and anti-British feeling and the effect of allied reverses, five years of Axis propaganda, and the presence of the Mufti of Jerusalem in Baghdad, to produce a chain of events which culminated in April 1941 in the last of the coups d'état. Rashid Ali al-Gailani seized 669 power with the support of an army group more violently 645 nationalist and anti-British than himself and formed a Government which was pledged to maintain Iraq's non-belligerency and displayed considerable sympathy towards the Axis. The Regent and several senior statesmen quitted the country. Relations were strained between the new Cabinet and the British Government, which was reluctant to recognize it, and on 2 May a disagreement over the passage of British troops through Iraq, on the basis of the Treaty, led to Anglo-Iraqi hostilities. These were terminated, after the introduction of further British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion, on 29 May; by this time the Regent had returned to Iraq, the Rashid Ali Government had fled, and armistice negotiations were in progress. Shortly after the outbreak of Anglo-Iraqi hostilities the Iraqi Government had been in touch with

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tonishing the nature of those golden days, now only ten 000
years and less in the past.

The fundamental difficulty is that the new régime, with 177
all its virtues, is essentially an alien system imposed upon 609
the country from without by virtue of superior military 186
power. Thus it shares the unpopularity of alien systems the world over. The opposition to the present ruler and his British advisers is not simply the frothing of irresponsible and ambitious nationalist agitators. It is all that, but there is something far more significant underneath. I was once entertained for an afternoon by a rabid nationalist of Mesopotamia who attempted to show that the system of education introduced by the British was inferior in curriculum and in number of students to the pre-war system of the Turks, which proposition was about as reasonable as that two and two make twenty. But it would have been a great mistake to conclude that the man was primarily concerned to vindicate the Turks. He was not even primarily concerned over the educational system of Mesopotamia. Nor was he simply a fool. The thing that troubled him was the fact that his country was ruled by aliens. The tremendous following that such men have is not due to any outstanding ability they possess and still less to any profound insight into the various problems of the day, but rather to the fact that the average Arab, the man in the street in Mesopotamia, also resents that alien domination very intensely. It is hard for the unimaginative Westerner to realize that what the Arab wants is not efficient government or even good government. What he wants is self-government.

On the whole, in spite of many encouraging signs of 185
progress, a more intimate acquaintance with affairs in 177

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East

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if that were true, how would it be possible to explain the excellence of 661
the relations between the communities but a few years ago and the 563
obvious recognition in former years of the Jewish population as an integral part of the nation?

The answer must be sought in the workings of the Eastern mind. There would be no room in a survey of this kind to attempt a description of the subtle blend of human passions, age-old habits, and deep-seated prejudices which have gone into the forging of the Oriental tradition of thought or to estimate how that tradition of thought has reacted to the impact of Western civilisation, with its conception of law and human rights. It is, however, necessary to draw attention to certain points.

To begin with, the Arab States which emerged from the First 186
World War represented an attempt to create the whole fabric of the Western nation-state out of a galaxy of various semi-independent tribes, self-conscious and self-centred city populations, rival clans, powerful landowners, interspersed with minorities of different races and religions. This complex had no common tradition beyond the allegiance of the majority to Islam.

The consequence was that from the beginning the Arab States rested on social foundations of the most insecure kind. Symptoms of this have been a very characteristic shrill aggressiveness of national outlook and an almost comic attachment to national dignity, coupled with an exaggerated anxiety lest the State's new-found independence should be threatened in any way or its sovereignty infringed.

In the case of Iraq, no sooner had the new State come into existence than this excessive national sensitiveness resulted in a wave of feeling against its very creator and helper—Britain. And when King Faisal, whose great ability and authority had succeeded in surmounting many initial difficulties, died just at the end of the mandatory period (1933), the struggle for key positions in the Government was intensified, thereby adding a new element of insecurity.

Rival tribal chieftains, with their dependants and hangers-on, began competing with each other for the favours of extremist parties, and contributed to making every change of Government an event of greater or lesser violence. Rashid Ali's *coup d'état* in April, 1941, was merely one of a series of such changes; it was only the most striking because of its dangerous political and strategic implications in the middle of a world war.

This ever-present latent tension was aggravated by the inability of succeeding Governments to cope with urgent problems of social reform, agricultural development, finance, and administration. As early as 1942, the budget showed a deficit of £1,334,733, despite the big royalties paid to the Government by the oil companies for the exploitation of the oilfields. During the first six months of 1948, imports exceeded exports by £17,000,000, while the country's whole foreign trade amounted to only £27,000,000. Hence the prevailing nervousness

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East

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186 in official circles of Communist propaganda, a fear which frequently reached hysterical proportions.

563 186 To cap everything, there has been the problem of minorities. The absence of ethnical homogeneity has always been the weak spot of newly created States; the more so when religious and racial differences alienate the minorities from the majority, making the latter—rightly or wrongly—always suspicious of the minorities.

Ever since the formation of the State of Iraq, the Kurds, a close-knit minority numbering more than 700,000 in the mountains of the North, have repeatedly revolted against the Government in Baghdad—and not without grounds.

The unsatisfactory nature of the State's relations with the minorities was made worse by a shocking event in 1933. In that year, a large group of Christian (Nestorian) Assyrians, who had crossed into Syria and wanted to re-enter Iraq, was brutally massacred by a detachment of the Iraqi Army.

The event sent a wave of horror among all the Christian minorities dwelling in the country. (Under considerable official pressure, the Christians—coreligionists of the victims—and, of course, the Jews, were forced to contribute large sums towards a fund in aid of the survivors, whereas the amount of money subscribed by the Muslim majority was, in the absence of any such pressure, small.)

In any case, the position of any minority dwelling amongst a Muslim population must always be delicate. Constitutional guarantees and protection by law will never induce the Muslim masses, with their innate conservatism and lack of education, to abandon their inborn distrust of the non-believer.

In the case of Iraq, whose rise as a nation-state was threatened at the outset by minority troubles, this factor was particularly important, especially as the predominance of British influence for many years had made the populace hyper-sensitive about the country's national independence.

As for the Jews, so long as general attention was not focused on them specifically, their position was no worse than was normal for any non-Muslim minority in an Islamic country. If anything, their age-old connection with the country, their important economic and social position, and the obvious absence of any separatist tendency among them made their position rather better than that of most of the other minorities.

But the steadily growing atmosphere of political insecurity and distrust was bound in the long run to bring about a deterioration. That deterioration became serious as soon as it became possible for the Muslims to suspect any sense of solidarity between Iraqi Jews and those in Palestine.

On balance this much can be said: the nature and extent of recent persecution does not mean that, in altered circumstances, there can

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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be no ultimate return of the peaceful relationship which existed between Muslims and Jews in Iraq formerly.

Indeed, once the fever of the anti-Jewish campaign had passed its peak—that is, by the end of 1948—there is plenty of evidence to show that many educated Muslims had begun to have second thoughts. Here and there Jewish officials who had been dismissed were asked to resume their posts. The return to the premiership of Nuri Pasha al-Said (the most experienced and esteemed of all Iraqi politicians) raised hopes of better relations, especially as the fanatically nationalist Minister of Defence, Sadiq al-Bassam—the man largely responsible for the sinister activities of the courts martial—was forced to resign.

It was then that the Jewish representative in the Senate, the universally respected Ezra Danyiel, was able to appeal to the Government for justice and to remind the Senate of the long-standing loyalty of the Jewish community. On the whole, this speech had a favourable effect, and resulted in official assurances that in future the rights of the Jews to treatment as citizens enjoying equal rights with other citizens would be respected. Since then, Jews have been able to reopen their businesses.

Yet the future must remain uncertain. As this Survey goes to press, reports are being published to the effect that the Iraqi Government has now decided to allow Iraqi Jews to emigrate—on condition that they give up their Iraqi citizenship. It is not clear, at the time of writing, whether there are any other conditions attached. In view of what has happened in recent years, however, there can be little doubt that a large-scale exodus from Iraq to Israel is to be expected in the near future.

As for those who remain, it would be idle to pretend that their future prospects are bright. In so far as they can expect a measure of stability and security, this must—to a large extent—depend on the Governments of Israel and Iraq reaching, if not agreement, at any rate a satisfactory *modus vivendi*. At the present time there is not even an armistice agreement between the two countries; and Iraq, which does not border upon Israel territory, has shown no anxiety to improve relations.

[181] inhabit the mountainous districts near the
162 northeastern frontiers, constitute the largest
745 Moslem minority group. Racially and linguistically distinct, they make up about 15 to 20 per cent of the population. Other non-Arabic Moslem communities include about 50,000 each of Turkomans and Iranians, the majority of whom are also found in the northern provinces. Most of the Kurds and the Turkomans are Sunnites, but some adhere to minor heterodox sects; the Iranians are Shiites.

From 150,000 to 200,000 native Christians reside in Iraq. The Chaldeans, a sect which observes early Nestorian rites but owes allegiance to the Vatican, comprise the most numerous group. Other communities include some 30,000 Assyrians (Nestorians), refugees from Asia Minor in 1918, and smaller contingents belonging to the Armenian Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox, the Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) and the Syrian
563 Catholic churches. Most of the Christian peoples live together in more or less separate ethnic and religious groups: about 70 per cent are settled in the northern provinces of Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil, and a large proportion of the remainder in the cities of Baghdad and Basra. Prominent among other indigenous sects are the Yezidis, or so-called "devil-worshipers," about 30,000 of whom dwell in the districts near the Syrian border. A few thousand Sabians, famous as silver craftsmen, also live in Baghdad, Amarah and Basra.

191 Arabic is spoken by over three quarters of the population. Kurdish, Syriac and Turki, however, are recognized as official languages in limited areas in the north, while English is extensively used in the
593 larger cities. Although the Iraqi are pre-
162 dominantly Arabs, marked gradations in social structure are represented by the nomadic Bedouin tribes of the deserts, the "marsh Arabs" or primitive tribesmen of the Amarah and Hammar lakes region of the southern delta, the rural peasants and the townspeople. Up to 1950, the population included about 200,000 Jews, primarily of

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same was true of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs. 647 'Fainah after fifteen years as Director left the Railways, handing over to Ward who combined the post for three years with the Port Directorate. Wheatley left the Advisership to Communications and Works early in 1937.

The relation of Yasin Pasha to the British Embassy, where Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had succeeded Humphrys in March 1935, were close and cordial. The Census Department was strengthened, that of Publicity represented a development of the old Press Bureau. The Courts, with their complement of British judges 1192 under the Agreement of 1930, were well maintained. The general 871 desire for a more comprehensive educational system could be met only in part. Primary and secondary schools showed a limited development, with increased use of borrowed Egyptian teachers, and the beginning of book publication by the Ministry. Technical education, studied by visiting foreign experts, advanced little. The university project stood still. The Higher Teachers' Training- 875 College was reopened in 1935. A Directorate of Female Education was formed in 1934, but abolished next year. A Rural Teachers' College—a recommendation of the Monroe Report—was established in 1934 at Shaṭra on the Gharraf, and later moved to Rustumiya outside Baghdad. An Elementary Teachers' College for Women was opened at Diwaniya in 1934, but did not survive. The College of Pharmacy was founded in 1936. The schools of 871 the minority communities and of the missions, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, flourished. The proposal for a public school on the British pattern was not yet realized, and a British adviser to the Minister of Education ceased to be employed. German teaching increased. School books in use became increasingly nationalist and xenophobe in tone. Military instruction was first given in the schools in 1935, and grew thereafter to be a popular feature of school life, with a developed Youth Movement in uniform.

Ancient sites of 'Iraq continued each winter to attract foreign 1172 archaeological missions. Valuable excavations were carried out by the representatives of university, museum, or other learned bodies, American, German, British, French, and Italian, from 1933 to 1939 at sites in northern 'Iraq—Gawra, Nineveh, Saydawa, and Khorsabad: in the Baghdad area, at Khafaja on the Diyalā, and at Seleucia: and in the centre and south at the Sumerian cities of Warqa and Larsa. A setback to this activity was caused, indeed, by the intervention in 1933 of the Shi'i Minister of Education, who produced a draft Antiquities Law calculated by its one-sided severities to discourage all future excavation; but under the Hashimi Ministry an improved draft was accepted, and work could proceed in reasonable conditions.

TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

1. THE STORY OF HAJJI ALI, THE GREAT SULTAN AND HIS SON, THE AMIR KHEYYUN

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
√56 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
438 rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often
acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they
have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
√78 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful
by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A STORY CONCERNING THE IGNORANCE OF SLAVES

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the
end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

[192] *Crocodile*. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'
The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

to him permanently. Women are almost invariably known by the 601
name of their eldest son, preceded of course by Umm. The other
extremely common practice is that of giving a man a laqab, or nick- 551
name, from some habit or personal peculiarity. The laqab is rarely
complimentary.

8. A Man's Honour is in the Hair of His Moustache

Page 111, Line 14. 'The hub in their house was empty of water.'

The hub is a large porous earthenware jar, which keeps water cool 415
by evaporation.

Page 112, Line 6. 'Nor did he even own the leg of a mare.'

The phrase 'leg of a mare' implies that a man has ownership in a 422
quarter share of the sale price of all foals from the mare. It is quite common for deals to be done in one, two, or three legs of a mare, and for one mare to have four owners.

Page 116, Line 13. 'Then will our sheikh cry, Sheil.'

Sheil, or Take away, is a word commonly used as an order to strike 192
camp.

Page 116, Line 28. 'You should not have to drink the water from a 312
camel's stomach.' 271

When threatened by death from thirst in the desert, Arabs may be forced to slaughter their camels in order to drink the stomach fluids. I have also been told that travellers have made their camels sick by forcing a stick down their throats to get a little fluid. I do not know if this is true. It would appear to me to be a most difficult operation.

Page 118, Line 29. 'Cut my head to keep the secret.'

This should probably have been more properly translated 'Cut my 192
head off to keep the secret,' for I have since been told one man's 539
version of this saying. According to his account there were three brothers of a famous Nejaf family, living in poverty, and they were forced to become thieves. One day they went to raid a Turkish Army camp near to Hindya. In the daytime they watched the camp and saw which was the guard tent in which the treasure chest was hidden. They then waited till night, and, when the camp was asleep, they

192 crept up to the guard tent. One of the brothers slit the tent wall with
539 his knife and crept inside. Inside the tent he found a box of silver dollars, and he was passing it out through the slit in the tent to his two brothers when he trod on one of the Turks, who woke up and grabbed him by the legs. The Turk was shouting to raise the alarm, and the Nejafi, seeing that he could not get away, and fearing that if he was identified, his whole family would be punished, put his head out through the slit in the tent and implored his brothers to cut it off and take it away. This, according to the story, they did, getting away both with the chest of silver and their brother's head, the identity of the family remaining undiscovered. The word for 'cut' in Arabic does imply cutting off and removing when applied to heads.

10. The Story of the Son of the Pilgrim

Page 148, Line 7. 'He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail.'

619 The Shammar are mentioned in other stories and a reader may be confused by the different areas from which they appear to come. To write a note on this extensive tribe would require considerable knowledge both of Syria and of Saoudi Arabia, and I myself cannot do it. The Shammar best known to the Muntafiq tribes are the Shammar of Nejd, who send caravans legally to Zobeir, and with less authority to other areas. Some of the Nejdi Shammar do graze in Iraqi territory and in the Neutral Zones. However, the most famous Shammar of Iraq are those of Mosul Liwa. There are also Shammar, some of whom have adopted the Shia religion, living in Baghdad Liwa. Many of them have entered Iraq as refugees after defeat by Ibn Saoud. When a prince of the Shammar from Hail is mentioned, I should think that a member of the Rashid family is indicated. This family were once rulers in Nejd, and their capital was for a time at Hail. They were finally defeated by the Wahabis under Ibn Saoud. The word Amir which I have here translated as prince, is a somewhat deceptive one.
[601] The sons of an Arab king carry, it is true, the title of Amir, but the
192 word has a larger usage. The tribes of Northern Arabia and Syria use it in their sheikhly houses, and in the Persian Gulf the word implies little more than a minor local official. The root of Amir is from the Arabic word for 'command' and is most literally translated in such

phrases as 'Amir ul Mouminin', that is, 'The Commander of the Faithful". 192

12. The Story of the Two Dancers

Page 171, Line 1. 'Which was full of chests of Kuweit of enormous size.' 489 439

The Kuweit chest is sometimes to be seen in English houses, its owners ignorant of its history. It is normally of polished or carved teakwood studded with brass, and with massive brass hinges and locks which are engraved by hand. In size it may be from four to six feet long, two and a half or three feet high, and of course broad in proportion. It sometimes has a false bottom or secret drawer. I have often hoped that some resident of Kuweit would write a book on these interesting chests. I have seen many of them, beautifully worked, in the bazaars of Baghdad and Basra. I also used to see them when going on board Kuweiti jalbuts from India when they called at Bahrein. There were usually a number of these chests carried as deck cargo, though not as large nor of such good wood as the old ones found in the bazaars. The nakhodas of the craft whom I questioned about these chests informed me that their sailors, in addition to receiving pay, had the right to bring one chest each from India, full of goods to be sold on their own account. I did in fact look through some of these chests and found them in the main stocked with Indian sandals, mirrors, scent, rolls of cloth, saris and similar articles. I was told that in the past Kuweiti sailors would buy the chest in India, stock it with goods, and carve it and put in the heavy brass studs on the voyage back to Kuweit, which might take several months, as the dhows call at a number of small Indian and Persian ports. On arrival at Kuweit or Basra the chests and their contents would be sold, and the price of a well worked chest was an important part of a sailor's earnings. I asked them why the chests on the deck of most of the dhows were without ornament, and was told that at present there was less profit in the sale of the chest than in the goods it contained, and that chests now available in Southern Indian ports were of such poor quality that they did not repay work. They still buy these chests as the sailor's own property is carried as

489 deck cargo, and the goods would be liable to damage by rain or spray
439 if otherwise packed.

13. THE STORY OF SHEIKH MIZHIL EL QURNACHI, A MAN OF A NOBLE FAMILY, THOUGH HIS LAND WAS POOR

804 Page 185, Line 15. 'and ordered fifty mithkals of them.'
The mithkal is a small weight used by goldsmiths.

● 192 Page 188, Line 20. 'Take soldiers and go to Qasr Qurnachi.'
Qasr—castle. 'Qurnachi Castle.'

Page 191, Line 11. 'Can then the hawk fly without wings.'
539 I was told that this quotation was from a famous Arab poet, but
192 regret that I was unable to place it, and nobody could remember the name of the poet. The quotation as put into the mouth of Sheikh Aqab is particularly apt, as Aqab, though its literal translation is 'eagle,' is a name often given to hawks.

Page 198, Line 24. 'She was clad in an ataq and bag trousers.'
The ataq is a kind of blouse.

14. THE STORY OF DAOUD THE CAMEL AND OF HIS MISFORTUNES

Page 204, Line 4. 'The Shammar of the Jezira.'
103 The area in Mosul Liwa which lies to the west of the Tigris, that is,
101 between the Tigris and the Euphrates, is known as the Jezira, or Island. The Shammar in this area are the famous tribe of the late Sheikh Ajil el Yawar.

15. BETWEEN TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD LIE FOUR FINGERS

551 Page 214, Line 14. 'The name of this girl was Leila for she was born in the night.'
Leila, 'Night,' is a popular girl's name in South Iraq. I do not think it is restricted only to those girls born at night.

184 the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged
795 generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i,
[578] while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated.
Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and
their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little
social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own
will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided
by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government
itself.

563 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of
162 the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—
perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which
occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the
Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid
Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of
563 which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear
621 racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement
and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority
to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in
character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled
them in a social organization which represented an identical
response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with
sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes;
but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district
interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization.
About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided
into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the
whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur.
563 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds
795 of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their
homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of
197 the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan
Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran
between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan
(Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other
two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and
speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary
status.

563 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long
621 been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment
by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil,
and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for
563 the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley
dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish
Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

CHAPTER VI

THE ARABS OF MESOPOTAMIA

131 MESOPOTAMIA does not belong to Arabia
101 geographically. It lies to the north of the
peninsula and includes the territory between
the mountains of Asia Minor on the north, the mountains
of Persia on the east, the Syrian desert on the west and
the Persian Gulf on the south. The area enclosed between
these limits is enormous. These are its natural
boundaries, but politically the territory included takes
in certain districts that belong to Persia and Turkey as
144 well as the kingdom of Mesopotamia. It is of interest
101 to include Mesopotamia in any discussion of Arab life,
for although the Mesopotamians are not in Arabia geographically,
nor even politically, racially they are Arabs
as truly as the inhabitants of Nejd or the dwellers in the
197 valleys of Oman. Practically all of the inhabitants of
162 Mesopotamia are Arabic speaking and Arabic in origin,
101 the chief exceptions being the numerous Jews who have
come into the country from the north and the small community
of Sabaeans, or fire-worshippers, who are a remnant
of the people that the Arabs found inhabiting the
country. The Arab is the dominant element, and the
others together would probably not amount to five per
cent of the whole.

133 The character of the country is most easily understood
if we start by saying that Mesopotamia is the enormous

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

the Turkish Ministry of Interior in April, 1913, had directed 175*
that the use of Arabic should be allowed in the Courts of 671
Justice and in public offices. In spite of the failure to carry out 197
this concession literally, the use of Turkish was more of an 727*
affront to Arab sentiment than a handicap to litigation. Turkish was, and in many centres still is, the polite language, much as French was at the Courts of Prussia and Russia in the eighteenth century.

Although criminal cases could be tried in these newly 692
established civil courts,[1] the bulk of such cases was not sent to 175*
them. Serious cases, mainly robbery under arms, continued to 727*
be tried by military courts, under a highly summary procedure.[1] In Basra, ʻAshar, ʻAmāra and Nāsiriya, the Military or Deputy Military Governors decided disputes of all kinds, while in the districts the same powers were exercised by Political Officers. Until after the fall of Baghdad no civil courts existed outside of Basra town.

Justice in Tribal Areas

It was soon evident that the ʻIraq Code could not be applied in its entirety to the tribal areas, comprising practically all of the Occupied Territories outside the towns. It was also clear that special powers were needed by the Political Officers to dispose of civil and criminal cases in their districts. To meet the situation, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation was drawn up by Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs,[2] on the lines of the Indian

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[1] *Admin. Rep., Basrah*, 1917: *Rep. Military Governor of Basrah*, 1917, p. 199.

[2] Henry Robert Conway Dobbs, G.B.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E. (1871-1934), may be rightfully called one of the makers of modern ʻIraq. He saw wide and distinguished service in India, Persia and Afghanistan. As Revenue and Judicial Commissioner to Baluchistan, 1909, 1911 and 1917, he came into direct contact with the ʻSandeman System'. He was under orders as Resident to Turkish Arabia when war broke out in 1914, but it was as Revenue Commissioner that he supervised the organization of administration, 1915-16, while Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, enlarged political relations with the Arabs. Versatile in talents, but essentially an administrator, he brought to the difficult period, 1923-9, when he served as High Commissioner to ʻIraq, a great capacity for realistic thinking, a highly developed sense of duty, and a deep loyalty to the Empire which dominated all his relations with the Arabs.

1 [Under British military administration ca 1917]

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

161 taken, in 1947, gave the total population as 4,799,500; before that there were periodical official estimates as follows:

1930	2,824,000
1935	3,560,000
1943	3,995,000

The present population is probably about 5 million. According to the census, Baghdad has a population of 364,000, Mosul 302,000, Basra 94,000, and Kirkuk 69,000, Hilla being the only other town of over 50,000 inhabitants. Significant figures for density of population could be determined only after defining habitable land and distinguishing rural populations; the accepted density figure for the country as a whole (27·4 per square mile) means little. In the total cultivable area as calculated by an English authority the average density is 102 per square mile, but in many areas the density is much more than this for the rural population alone, and in the Baghdad and Basra districts exceeds 300 and 800 respectively per square mile.

163 165 164 *Vital Statistics*. For a number of reasons, which include the inaccessibility of large areas of Iraq and the lack of doctors in the rural districts, vital statistics are not available for the country as a whole. Statistics of possibly fair accuracy are, however, published for the population of some 1,160,000 served by the health centres in the main cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul; the latest, compiled for 1950, show a birth-rate of 27 and a death-rate of 12 per 1,000, with an infant mortality figure of 97 per 1,000 live births. The main causes of death were stated as old age, respiratory diseases other than tuberculosis, malaria, heart diseases, and tuberculosis.

197 *Language*. Arabic is the official and most widely spoken language. The 800,000 odd Kurds speak an Iranian language in various forms. Turkish dialects are spoken in Irbil, Kirkuk, to some extent in Khanaqin and in smaller intervening towns, and Syriac by Christian communities in northern Iraq. Other minority languages, such as Armenian, also occur, while in the Holy Cities of the south (Kerbela and Najaf) Persian is widely spoken.

RELIGIONS[1]

642 The constitution declares Islam to be the official religion of the state, but guarantees complete freedom of conscience and worship in conformity with accepted customs subject only to the maintenance of public order and morality, declares the absolute equality of all Iraqis before the law, gives communities

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[1] See above, p. 51ff.

(c) *Jews*

Until recently Iraq contained a large community of Jews 162
whose families had been settled in the country for hundreds or 563
even thousands of years. They lived mostly in the large towns, 463
especially Baghdad, in whose economic life they played an
important part as merchants, financiers, manufacturers, and 197
members of the professions. There were also Kurdish-speaking Jews in the north, mostly urban traders and craftsmen but also rural cultivators. A law of 1931 gave Jewish communities self-government in their own affairs, and there was a highly organized communal life, with schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In consequence of events in Palestine the majority of Jews left Iraq in 1950–1, mostly for Israel.

(d) *Yazidis*

These are vulgarly known as 'devil-worshippers' but, al- 162
though their religion includes the propitiation of Satan, it might 771
more justly be described as an amalgam of Christian, Muslim, 795
and Magian elements. They are divided between Jebel Sinjar
and the Shaikhan district north of Mosul, speak a Kurdish 197
dialect, except in their rites, where Arabic is used, and are probably of Kurdish origin.

(e) *Sabians*

('Baptists'), also called the Mandaeans and the 'Christians 162
of St John'; their religion combines elements of various origins 463
and periods. Most of them are craftsmen—especially silver- 795
smiths—in the large towns.

(f) *Shabak*

Of Kurdish origin, who live in the area of the Yazidis and 162
are not clearly distinguished from them; their religion contains 795
Yazidi and extreme Shii elements.

(g) *Other Sects*

Include Bahais, Sarlis, Kakais, Qizilbashis, none of them of any political significance.

POLITICAL HISTORY

Written history began in Iraq at the end of the fourth mil- 175
lennium B.C., but archaeological remains from much earlier periods, first in the north and later also in the south, give evidence of palaeolithic man, of agricultural neolithic man and, from the sixth and fifth millennia, of increasing human progress expressed successively in extensive agriculture, copper

66:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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CHAPTER III

IRAQ

563 An examination of the development of Muslim-Jewish relations in Iraq reveals two noteworthy features, apparently at variance with each other. On the one hand, probably in no other Muslim country has the Jewish minority been so closely associated with the whole fabric of social and political life as in Iraq. On the other hand, in none has anti-Jewish feeling in recent years been so general and nowhere have anti-Jewish measures been applied so systematically.

The Jews in Iraq constitute, as far as we know, the oldest Jewish settlement outside Palestine. Indeed, even if the origin of the House of Abraham in Ur of the Chaldees is disregarded, Jewish settlements in Iraq can be said to have first taken place about 600 years before Jews from Palestine emigrated to Egypt. The majority of the Jews now living in Iraq are the direct descendants of those Jews who, after the destruction of the First Temple 2,500 years ago, were led into exile in Babylonia and remained there after the return of some of their number to Jerusalem with Ezra.

But the great antiquity of the Jewish community is not, of course, the sole reason for the exceptionally close bonds which unite Iraqi Jews to their country and their non-Jewish neighbours. "They have made themselves an integral part of the nation. Both in business and in politics they have always played a big part." (E. Main: *Iraq*, 1935.)

Their close association with all aspects of the life around them is in part due to the fact that the proportion of the Jewish minority in Iraq to the rest of the population is far higher than in other Muslim [162] countries. Whereas the Jews in Egypt represent only 0.4 per cent of the total population, in Iraq they amount to about 2.5 per cent, and as much as 25 per cent in the capital, Baghdad.

It should be noted that it is more difficult to determine the total number of Jews in Iraq than in Egypt. For while in Egypt the Jewish population is almost exclusively concentrated in the big towns, in Iraq it is dispersed up and down the country, including some scattered among the Kurdish tribes in the North.

563 The Kurdish Jews live somewhat apart from the rest of the Jewish
● [197] community, just as the Kurdish minority lives apart from the Arab population. Both are different from the Arabs in general character and
162 daily habits. The language of some of the Kurdish Jews is Syriac (a form of Aramaic), while those in Mosul speak Kurdish. They are
[463] mainly traders and craftsmen and live scattered among the various Kurdish villages and towns. In the Amadia district, however, there can be found a number of Jews engaged in tilling the land. It is

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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difficult to make even an approximate estimate of how many Jews live 563
in these villages—perhaps 5,000-6,000 at most. They have remained 162
relatively untouched by the events of the past few years, which have had such a revolutionary effect on the rest of the Jewish community.

The total Jewish population of Iraq is estimated at 120,000. Although this figure may be out of date, it is probably not far wrong, if allowance is made for emigration, on the one hand, and increase in the birthrate, on the other. Of these, between 90,000 and 100,000 live in Baghdad. But neither is it the larger number of Jews in the country as a whole nor their concentration in the capital which accounts for the difference of their position, at least in the past, from that of their coreligionists in Egypt.

Most important is the fact that Western influence on Iraqi Jews, 563
being no stronger than it was on the town-bred Muslims, was much 177
weaker in Iraq than in Egypt. Middle-class Jews in Iraq took to European dress at about the same time as the Muslims. Likewise, in their daily habits, their houses, and, last but not least, in their language, [197]
there was no marked difference between the two communities. Arabic has always been, and still is to-day, the mother-tongue of both Jew and Muslim.

True, as a result of the higher educational facilities provided by the activities of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and the Anglo-Jewish Association, knowledge of French or English is more common among the Jews than the Muslims. But this difference has never been sufficient to detract from the central fact that Western influence on the Jews has not been much stronger than on other Iraqi communities. All this is in strong contrast to the situation in Egypt and—again unlike Egypt—there has been no noticeable immigration of Jews from European countries.

During the nineteenth century the Jewish community in Iraq was 563
fairly prosperous; and freedom to develop was assisted to no small degree by the two proclamations issued by the Sultan of Turkey in 1839 and 1856. At that time there was already a considerable number of well-to-do families. The schools of the *Alliance* helped to raise the community's educational standard. When the first Chamber of Deputies was opened in Istanbul in 1876, it included a representative of the Iraqi Jews (Menahem Danyiel) and, later, after the Constitution of 1900, the community was represented by Hezkiel Sassoon, a retired senior Ottoman Government official.

During the First World War, however, the Jewish community suffered great hardships at the hands of Turkish governors. Just prior to the fall of Baghdad in 1917, some of its leading members suffered death, torture, and imprisonment.

When, therefore, the Arabs rose against the Turks and made common cause with the Allies, the Jews regarded the fight for liberation as their own. They welcomed the establishment of the new Iraq under British Mandate, and many immediately offered their

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 sword which executed your most just order. And when the Amir saw the blood he turned pale.

Then the Amir became sad, for he had no friend nor intimate. And he passed the days in melancholy and boredom. And one day he took his slaves and rode out far into the country, until he came to the Persian Gulf, and here he halted on a mound.

*539 201 And in the distance he saw a ship and it was approaching faster than the wind. There was no horse in Arabia which could equal the speed of that ship. As it approached he saw a girl in it, and she was more beautiful than the flowers of Mosul and purer than the snows of the land of the Kurds. Her body was slim and supple, and as for her breasts, they were the zenith of desire. And the Amir loved her with the strongest love. And the girl saw that the Amir was beautiful like a moon and she signalled to him, for the boat was carrying her with the speed of a bullet. She placed a finger first on her eye, then on her teeth, then on her navel, then on her head. And the Amir did not comprehend her signal. The boat vanished and was gone over the horizon.

And the Amir turned to the Commander of the Circassians and asked: What was the meaning of her signal? And the Commander said: Master, it is hidden from my understanding. And the Amir cried: Fetch me Mohammed, son of the Wazir, for he is the only one in the world who understands every code and every language. And the Commander said: Master, may you never be in that state in which Mohammed, son of the Wazir, now is. And the Amir sighed a great sigh and was overcome with grief, and he said: I have lost my friend and now I have lost her who was destined to be my bride. But a slave crept away and informed Mohammed, son of the Wazir.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

And Mohammed came and asked permission to enter into 539* the presence of the Amir, and that thing was allowed and 201 permitted. And the Amir was astonished when he saw the face of his friend, and he ordered that the Commander of the Circassians be rewarded with a thousand dirhems and a beautiful slave girl.

And Mohammed, son of the Wazir, interpreted to the Amir Abdulla, son of the Sultan, the message of the girl. The name of the girl was Ain (the eye), her father was a king, for his strength (the teeth) was second only to the girl's beauty, the name of his kingdom was Surri (the navel), and over his palace was a pomegranate tree.

And the Amir Abdulla sent for ships and for sailors and 539* for soldiers and for treasure, and he left for the kingdom of Surri. And the King of Surri was impressed when he saw his wealth and the beauty of his face. And he took the daughter of the King of Surri in marriage and returned to his country, where he loved her with an exceeding love, and had many sons, beautiful as moons, strong as lions, firm as spears, and brave as is the custom of the Arabs.

And Mohammed the Wazir's son he rewarded with great wealth, and when the Wazir, his father, died he succeeded him and was Wazir in his place.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 she is pestering me for a present and I am minded to give her some of this cloth. But first I must show it to her and gain her approval, for the man who buys cloth for a woman without her approval is like one who takes a grape and offers it to a hungry tigress. So the merchant cut a snippet from the roll of cloth and gave it to the Christian.

And as Daoud returned to his shop from the cloth merchant, his shop boy returned from the house of Mahmud. Daoud took from him a sweet lime, and he went into his house which stood at the back of his shop, and he caught his she-cat and pulled out one of her whiskers. Then he took a seed pearl and he wrapped it in the snippet of the cloth, and he put it with the cat's whisker and the sweet lime in a handkerchief and he left the parcel in his house.

After a time Mahmud returned from the shop of disguises, and Daoud was amazed, for Mahmud was dressed as a bearded Persian, nor could he be recognised. And Mahmud sat in Daoud's shop, and he said: Now what do I have to do to test my wife? Daoud answered and said:
x539 Now send her a message in the code of love. Mahmud
202 asked: What is this code and how do I send a message in
● it? Daoud asked: Are you, then, such an ignorant lover? Then Daoud called his shop boy and ordered him: Go and bring me a rose, and a phial of crystal glass containing pure clear water, and a moth, and a flask of wine, and a silk handkerchief.

And after half an hour the shop boy returned with all these articles and he laid them in front of his master. Then Daoud took from his treasury a silver Persian toman and he laid the coin on the table with the other articles. Then Daoud the Christian turned to Mahmud the Moslem and he said: Know you that this is the message written in these

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

articles in the universal language of love, as it is spoken 539x
in the lands of the Arabs and of the Turks and of the 202
Hindus and of the Franks and of the Chinese, for this language is one understood by lovers and by ladies in every country of the world. Your message reads as follows: You are as delicate and lovely as the petals of a rose. I thirst after you as the gazelle thirsts for pure water. I am drawn to you as the moth is drawn to a candle. You quicken my heart even as wine quickens it and I am a Persian and a stranger.

Then Daoud wrapped up the articles in the silken handkerchief and he said: I will give the packet now to one of my maidservants who is discreet, that she will deliver it to your wife. Then shall we await a reply and then we shall know if she be virtuous or not. And Mahmud said: Do this, that I may know the truth. So Daoud took the packet and he went into his house, but he did not give it to the maidservant, instead he locked it in a cabinet. And he returned and sat in the shop with Mahmud and they discussed business and affairs and passed the time in conversation.

And after two hours Daoud said: I will go and see if the maidservant has returned. And he entered his house and went into his room and he took from it that other packet containing the cat's whisker, the sweet lime, the snippet of cloth and the pearl, and he returned to the shop and gave the packet to Mahmud, saying: This is the reply.

Mahmud opened the packet and he was amazed. He said: What mean these things? This sweet lime is like those on the trees outside my window. This cloth is from my wife's petticoat trousers. But what is this whisker? Daoud looked at the articles and he said: Let me interpret this message, for you are unskilled in this language. This

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

X539 whisker is the whisker of a cat, and its meaning is: Come
202 secretly like a cat in the night. The sweet lime from your tree means: Climb up the tree to my window. And as for this piece of cloth, it is wrapped up and there is something inside it. And Daoud opened the snippet of cloth and he said: Its meaning is this: When you remove my petticoat trousers you shall find a pearl.

X539 Mahmud was seized with fury and his face went black with rage. He put his hand on his dagger and shouted: I shall go now to kill this prostitute and cleanse my honour. But Daoud said: Stay, you must see your wife's dishonour with your own eyes. Else you cannot believe in it. You are now dressed as a Persian and you cannot be recognised. Go unto your wife in the night, and climb the tree and enter her window, then if you are able to take off her petticoat trousers and she screams not to rouse the servants, then shall you know that she is dishonourable. And Mahmud said: Have I not seen enough in this message? But Daoud answered: Perhaps she means to trick a lewd fellow to teach him a lesson. You must be sure before you kill your wife.

So Mahmud controlled himself and he sat to await the coming of night. But as for Daoud the Nazarene, he slipped away and told the other bankers the story of those events known to you, my listeners, and they laughed until the breath was gone from their lungs, and they asked Daoud: But what will happen at Mahmud's house tonight? And Daoud replied: He will climb up the sweet lime tree and enter her window, but before he can take off her petticoat trousers she will scream for the servants. They will come and give him a beating for they will think him a stranger, and this will be his lesson. And it will be one difficult to forget, for he is too much of a yokel to invent

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 ONCE in the days of the Ottomans there lived in Baghdad a man of an ancient and noble family named Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, and he lived [651 in a great house by the banks of the Tigris. Yet his estates 731] had been reduced by the taxation and oppression of the Ottomans, and his crops spoiled by locust and by flood until he was reduced to poverty.

So he lived in his house with his only daughter without a single servant or a single slave, nor was there any furniture or silver left in his house, for he had sold all to buy [432] food. Yet the house he could not sell, for it would be shameful for him to do so, since it was the house of his ancestors.

The name of his daughter was Nura. She was in the [203] seventeenth year of her life, yet none had asked for her in marriage, for since there were no servant girls to gossip about her beauty, the boys of great and noble families had not even heard of her. Else surely their sleep would have been troubled by her description, for her hair was as black as the Shatt el Arab on a clear winter's night, and her eyes were as the stars which glisten in its waters, her skin was as golden as the desert sand when tinged by the first rosy red rays of dawn, her back was as supple as the reeds before the wind, and her thighs and breasts had the softness of the feather quilt which allures the tired traveller.

So one day Nura went to her father and she said to him: O my beloved father, my state is thus and thus. Shall I be forever a cook in your household or shall I be the mother of noble sons? And Sheikh Mizeil grieved much at the words of his daughter, and his heart was sad. And on the nights of the full moon Nura would go out on the roof of their great house, and speak to the moon and ask the question:

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

186 Egypt, hints of a claim to nationhood itself put forward by Arab
662 *émigrés* in Paris—all these, with developing intercommunication and greater awareness of world thought, had prepared the ground for nationalism in 'Iraq even before the final impetus of the Turkish revolution.

The 1908 revolution, while it created an active Turkish-political life in 'Iraq, soon indicated also the gulf between Turkish and Arab aspirations. An 'Arab Brotherhood' group, formed in the first Turkish Chamber, was summarily suppressed by the Young Turks; the proportion of Arab to Turkish deputies and senators in Parliament was unjustly low. Incoming Walis of the 'Iraq wilayas showed less sympathy than ever with decentralization or the suggested use of Arabic; more 'Iraqis than ever groaned at the hateful prospect of conscription in Turkish armies—perhaps to fight brother Arabs in the endless warfare of the Yaman. It followed that the politicians of 'Iraq soon after 1908 began to mix various strains of Arab separatism with their pro- or anti-C.U.P. polemics: and to treat seriously tentative ideas of greater local privilege, a higher proportion of appointments, wider local powers and, finally, local autonomy itself.

For such claims there was basis in Arab character and culture, in 'Iraq's geographical separateness, and perhaps still more in the personal aspirations of ambitious 'Iraqis, who could imagine a great career in an Arab or 'Iraqi State more easily than in a Turkish. Meanwhile there were the beginnings of contact with coteries formed abroad to foster Arab ambitions and to frame demands. Such were the secret but short-lived Qaḥṭaniya in Istanbul, whose members favoured an Arab Kingdom within the Turkish Empire, and such the Young Arab Society which, moved from Paris to Beirut in 1913, was to play a heroic part in 1915. More important in 'Iraq were the local circles in contact with the Ottoman Decentralization Party of Cairo: a society which, founded in 1912 with its conception of local autonomy within the Empire, came nearest to expressing the political ambitions of the 'Iraqis of the day, and took root in Baghdad and Baṣra. The relations of Arab officers in Turkish regiments with their brother officers became strained, and 'Iraqi Qa'immaqams found odious
204 the task of applying Turkish repressive measures. From 1910 to
186 1914 a surprising development of the press in 'Iraq marked the
662 new political age. In place of the half-dozen colourless official newspapers of the wilaya capitals and Najf in Ḥamidiyan times, sheets of every colouring appeared in Arabic or Turkish month by month, to a final total of some fifty; they advocated various programmes—brilliant or foolish and always irresponsible—of pan-Islam, local or pan-Arab nationalism, Turkish patriotism or anti-

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', 204
who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Govern- 186
ment, were active in these politics before 1914. 668

Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least 665
enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families 668
of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of 186
Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to indepen- 668
dent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It 186
was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Aḥsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'dham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

563 battalion, and to the men's return to the sluggish pauperization of Ba'quba.

871 The Education branch, founded and first inspired by Major H. E. Bowman, was faced with the problem of providing schooling for the youth of 'Iraq in the absence of funds, buildings, books, equipment or teachers in a tithe of sufficient quantities. At a pace always disappointing, but the fastest financially or functionally practicable, primary schools aiming at fair standards were opened to a total of seventy-five by the end of 1919. Fifty-six of these taught in Arabic, eleven in Turkish, seven in Kurdish, one in Persian. The new-founded Teachers' Training College could supply but a part of their urgent needs, and the scale of secondary classes, confined to the three principal cities, was regrettably humble; nor was the country-wide penetration of 'politics' into the schools, thus early, less to be deplored. Means were found to reopen the Law School, and a commercial and a technical school. The many privately-conducted Mullās' schools, archaic in method, scope, and equipment, continued to produce a bare literacy in their thousands of pupils; but the temptation to multiply inferior Government schools was resisted, and the teaching of English almost wholly withheld in spite of a general clamour for it. Upon the desirability of girls' schools, Muslim opinion was at first divided; five, all primary, had been opened by the first weeks of 1920. The schools of the local Christian and Jewish minorities and those of the foreign missions were fostered by support and subsidy; some of these were of high standard. Some archaeological work was carried out by R. Campbell Thompson at Abu Shahrayn (Eridu) in the spring of 1918, and more under H. R. Hall at Ur and elsewhere in 1919.

204 Printing-presses were operating at Najf in 1918, at Sulaymaniya in 1919, and in Baṣra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the occupation of these places. Newspapers in English were published at Baghdad and Baṣra, in Arabic at those cities and Mosul, in Turkish at Kirkuk, in Kurdish at Sulaymaniya.

439 The great increase of goods entering 'Iraq in 1918–19 taxed the young Customs administration of C. R. Watkins and Major A. G. H. Sievwright to the utmost. It was due to cessation of imports into north Persia from Russia, to the increase of 'Iraq's own spending power, and to the general depletion of stocks by war [436] interruption. The Indian rupee, now the universal currency of 'Iraq, supplied an adequate medium; and the rising volume of [504] civilian traffic could be handled easily by the now fully developed Port of Baṣra, which as such came into existence under Colonel J. C. Ward in the autumn of 1919 and was soon afterwards transferred 000 to the Civil Administration. The Railways, when at their greatest

652 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager development. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained: schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

631 In the liwās,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwā early in 1922. Arbil, a sub-liwā of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Ḥilla. No more was heard of Baṣra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwā and qadhā. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

632 In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1922 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative —cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three
204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq
747 *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable
814 institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

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[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwās or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* S. G. C. Murray, H. M. Flaxman, E. C. H. Alban,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. S. Berry,* L. Kettlewell, S. E. Hedgcock, H. C. Pulley, R. E. Alderman,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. D. Jeffreys, L. W. Reed, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Grice, A. J. B. Chapman, J. B. Glubb (p. 291). Gillan, Murray, Flaxman, Kettlewell, Reed, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Pulley had died, and Longrigg and Hedgcock had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928–33), from the Sudan.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to
install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly
demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional
forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq
with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that
the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better
alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in
fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions.
181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradition
665 of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free
204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations'
in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic
features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill
informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe.
The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any
politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of
personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any
consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of
speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence
or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or
sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed
doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived
society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have
wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and
insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in
646 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the
666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed
electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the
Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of
Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions,
that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of
662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the
stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the
actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on
the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial
posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint
to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes.
The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived
Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of
Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies
capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind
their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative
hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—
that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the 625
Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards 657
such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and 665
at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Āli, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplica- 204
tion of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when out- 668
lawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid 'Āli in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of 'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

814 antiquities, Kurdish lore and tribal traditions, some of whom had
produced monographs of interest and value. Returning graduates
from foreign universities had reached, at the least, the standard
indicated by their doctorates, but few had been attracted by the
deeper or more humane culture of the West. The study of Islamic
dogma and history was still practised in both Sunni and Shi'i
circles of the professional divines, and still attracted pupils; but its
seeming divorce from the living world repelled the more active and
vital of the rising generation; it offered a career less interesting
than the professions or politics; and its appeal was without force to
a society in which Islam seemed to have lost much (and in politics
874 nearly all) of its hold. Professional standards, on the other hand, in
medicine, archaeology, police and military studies, engineering,
economics, and the applied sciences had risen beyond comparison
above those of a generation earlier, and gave scope for the best
qualities of the 'Iraqi mind.

538 The output of original literary work was small. The modern
[213] (linotype) presses installed since the Second World War produced
mainly governmental or institutional works or pamphlets, largely
educational. Western publishing methods were not in use; books
[214] were printed at the author's expense and sold with difficulty
through a bookseller; workmanship in book production, especially
in binding and illustration, was notably poor. The lack of demand
(especially after the Jewish exodus), the unwillingness of the rich
to patronize letters, and at times a capricious censorship, had discouraged writers; there were but humble traces of creative effort,
and these confined to the fields of poetry (in which 'Iraq had always
held its own in the Arab world) and to a lesser extent of fiction
writing; women writers had earned a place in both. Interest in
contemporary Arabic literature other than newspapers was slight,
and the study of earlier Arabic works, though regarded as something of a national asset, did not greatly attract a younger generation,
204 who preferred the writings of modern Europe. The dozen of
monthly or quarterly magazines, which appeared at Ḥilla, Mosul,
Baṣra, Najf, Arbil, and Kirkuk as well as at Baghdad, were in most
cases the organs of various societies or government departments,
and though competently written they had few subscribers and no
great literary pretension. Kurdish literary activity, though on a
diminutive scale, was of vitality and promise. 'Iraqi artists, on the
532 other hand, were producing work of some interest, if almost wholly
Western in inspiration; musical and dramatic studies were pursued
533 at the Institute of Fine Arts, and more than one 'Iraqi musician—
and at least one 'Iraqi cinema actress—had attained a creditable
place.

204 The circumstances of its public life and the lively intelligence of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

its educated class should have made the 'Iraqi press both high in 204 quality and great in influence. It was, in fact, superabundant in quantity, with dozens of ephemeral sheets appearing and vanishing, and it was written not infrequently with point and humour; but [461] journalism had on the whole, it seemed, failed to attract the best minds and brains of the country, and as a profession was ill regarded by the public. With rare exceptions[1] inconsistency was habitual, and the selection and presentation of news capricious and unskilful and lacking in Western—or even Egyptian or Lebanese—technique. A news-service was scarcely attempted, and mere political rhetoric and the wearisome use of outworn phrases took the place of fact, analysis, or sober comment. Broadcasting from 207 Radio Baghdad, which after 1951 used the new and fully modern transmitting station of Abu Ghurayb, offered daily a ten-hour Arabic, a three-hour Kurdish, and a one-hour or half-hour English programme. The service, though still uneven, had improved materially in recent years in editing and in reliable audibility. It was aided by some of the best among 'Iraqi writers, and was rich in its Arabic musical programme; but frequent administrative changes had affected its quality and continuity, and many listeners preferred to hear foreign stations, notably London, Paris, and the *Sharq al-adnā* station of Cyprus.

The educational system operating in 1950 represented, with 871 whatever shortcomings, the considerable outcome of a sustained and meritorious effort. An immense work lay ahead: but the period of slow and difficult beginnings lay behind, and ground was being yearly gained. The faults of 'Iraqi education were those of superficiality, impatience, indifferent standards, and the persistent infusion—unchecked by legal prohibitions—of 'politics' in the schools. Its virtues were those of genuine enthusiasm, the use of modern techniques, and much improved teaching and supervisory staffs. Many and better school buildings were, it was hoped, soon to follow. Instruction was free at all levels, the governing Regulations modernized, and primary education in theory compulsory. The High Council of Instruction, representative of all the higher institutions of learning, assisted the Minister and his Directors-

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[1] The best of the papers were two or three independents, notably *al-Zaman* and *al-Sha'b* and those associated with the political parties. The latter were the moderate *al-Ittihad al-Dasturi*, *al-Akhbar*, and the evening *al-Ḥawadith* of the Constitutional Union Party: *al-Umma* and *al-Nabā*, of the Socialist Party of the Nation; *Liwā al-Istiqlal*, of the Independence Party: the near-Communist *Ṣadā al-Ahali*, of the National Democratic Party: and the *Jabha al-Sha'biya*, of the Popular Front. These papers appeared in 1951 to be fairly stable and self-supporting and, being party organs, relatively immune from Government suppression. Provincial daily papers included three (and often more) each at Başra and Mosul, and others at Sulaymaniya and Kirkuk, in the languages there spoken; they attained a fair standard.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

and 286 in the period 1904 to 1914.[1] In Egypt and in the 000
United States, the Arabic press,[2] with a wide circulation even in the Ottoman Empire,[3] was a powerful agent, by its constant and bitter denunciation of the Turks, in arousing Nationalist sentiment among Arab peoples.[4]

In 'Iraq, no less than in Syria and Arabia, the 'Ottoman- 175*
izing' policy of the Young Turks stimulated the Nationalist 668*
Movement. It continued, however, to lag behind the Move- 186*
ment across the desert, even as it had been slower to develop. Cut off by its geographical position and by its lack of communication from the West, 'Iraq lay torpid, a potentially rich Turkish Siberia but lacking educational facilities and the stimulus of new ideas and of political thought such as prevailed along the Mediterranean coast. Conservative in thought, the Sunnī Muslims were slow to withdraw their political allegiance from the Sultan whom both religion and tradition had established as their religious head.[5] The Shī'a priesthood, Persian for the most part, hated the Osmanlis both as Sunnīs and as oppressors, but possessed little community of interest with the Arabs, although Arabs of the Shī'a sect formed a majority of the population of 'Iraq.

The social structure, based fundamentally on the soil, and 175*
not far removed from feudalism, was stony ground for National- 186*
ism. Landlords sought only relief from taxation. Shaikhs 668*
desired individual freedom for themselves and their tribes. 565
Merchants, principally Jews, perhaps the most progressive single element in the land, had little deep feeling for either

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[1] The life of a journal during the Turkish regime was often not long, particu- 204
larly if in opposition to the Government. Suppressed journals frequently 656
reappeared under new names.

[2] From 1904 to 1914, 385 Arabic newspapers and magazines were founded in Egypt, North and South America: Tarazi, op. cit.

[3] Although banned from Turkey, they were distributed through the foreign post offices.

[4] Djemal Pasha, in particular, resented the part played by the Arabic Press abroad: Turkish Red Book, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne*, pp. 12-13.

[5] *Infra*, p. 235, for typical view on the sanctity of the Ottoman regime.

Talib might nullify the decision reached at Cairo: the final /175 effort of H.M. Government to settle the future status of 'Iraq. 727

The action of the High Commissioner convinced the great /643 mass of the 'Iraqis that the British authorities would not hesitate to use strong measures if the occasion demanded it. This widespread conviction probably did more to ensure the acquiescence of the masses of the population in Faisal's candidature, once it was announced, than the absence of Talib Pasha's opposition or the existence of any definite desire among them for a son of the Sharīf of Mecca. In any case Faisal's prospects of success immediately improved. The Naqīb withdrew his opposition to a Hāshimī, declaring that it would be best to follow the wishes of H.M. Government. A moderate Sharifian party having a definite programme was formed, with the approval of the High Commissioner who, while aware of the immense influence which the Sharifians could exert in creating and enlarging public opinion for Faisal, also realized the necessity of controlling them and of preventing the extremists from using Faisal for their own ends in opposition to the Mandate. Encouragement to the Sharifians was also extended [204] by the vernacular press, particularly by *Ash-Sharq*, under the editorship of the Secretary to the Council of State;[1] by *Al-'Iraq* which took the most prominent part;[2] by *Lisān al-'Arab* which, under its editor, Ibrāhīm Hilmī al-'Umarī, was pro-Faisal and, for the moment, pro-British;[3] and by *Al-Auqāt al-'Irāqīya* of Basra and *Al-Mūsil* of Mōsul.[4] The *Baghdad Times*, the English newspaper owned by the Government, also published a few pro-Faisal articles.

In the creation of sentiment on behalf of Amīr Faisal and in

[1] Established August 30th, 1920, by Saiyid Husain al-Afnan.

[2] See particularly its issues of April 25th, 26th, 28th, 29th; May 4th, 7th, 9th to 13th, 21st, 23rd; June 4th, 13th, 14th.

[3] Originally published in Damascus, its editor had transferred it to Baghdad, its first number, 401, appearing on June 23rd, 1921. It had not always given its support to Faisal as King of 'Iraq. Cf. issue of November 13th, 1920.

[4] Founded in 1921 and on November 14th, 1918, respectively. Both were owned by the Government.

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most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert 205
postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of 647
this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq 661
today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group,
651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an
ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving
the construction of the Ḥabbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and
a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable
success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton
Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards
called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist
nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale
which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method,
came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated
in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable
harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness,
654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small
Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with
231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it
could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi
flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual
losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility
of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship
494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay
in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in
mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The
mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased
threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars
plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying
repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much
491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by
Ramadi and Ruṭba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated
in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters
was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's
foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian)
competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the
victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The
Ruṭba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in
the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year
thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through
205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails
by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services
superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi
administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive
and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 498
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Air-
ways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air com-
munications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was com-
pleted in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for pack-
ages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold con-
cession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Future Developments

It must be expected that Iraqi Airways will continue to operate at a loss for some years to come. This should be accepted because the air services serve a real traffic need and there are reasonable prospects of reducing and perhaps ultimately eliminating operating deficits. The Airways Accounts are separate from the Railway Accounts and the steps recommended in the Palmer Report for complete separation of the finances of the Railways and the Airways should be adopted. There is no reason why the Railways should be expected to defray the deficits of the Airways. 509

There appears to be room for expansion of services in the area where Europe, Asia and Africa meet; and the government should encourage Iraqi Airways to play an increasingly important part in air traffic in this area. Internal demands appear to be negligible at present but may be expected to develop in conjunction with extended international services. These services appear to present an opportunity for far-reaching economies through closer cooperation between Middle Eastern airlines in their services, their administration and agencies outside the home countries.

VIII. Post, Telegraph, Telephone, Radio Communications

Organization

Responsibility for communications is concentrated in the Directorate General of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services in the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. Iraq is a full member of the International Postal Union and the communications services of the country, including their tariffs, comply with the standards of the Union. 647 205 206

The number of post, telepragh and telephone offices has developed as follows: 205 206

TYPE OF OFFICE	1940	1951
24 hrs. service	14	46
16 hrs. service	12	37
12 hrs. service	18	4
7 hrs. service	42	54
Local and rural agencies	155	171

205
206

Mail is carried:

on regular railway routes	1,604 kilometers
on contractors' routes (road)	3,010 "
on occasional routes (roads, tracks)	1,214 "
by air	a maximum of 14 daily routes

The only recommendation to be made regarding these services is to speed up air conveyance by moving the sorting center at Basra from Basra town to Magil.

Communications with other countries are as follows:

Postal services to all Union countries.

Telegraph and telephone with:
- Iran by land lines,
- Turkey by land lines,
- Syria by wireless telegraph and land line telephone,
- Transjordan by land lines,
- Lebanon via Syria,
- Saudi-Arabia by wireless telegraph,
- Yemen by wireless telegraph,
- Egypt by wireless telegraph (two services, government and Marconi),
- Tangiers, relay point for wireless telegraph overseas,
- United Kingdom by direct wireless communication (projected).

A British submarine cable from Fao to Karachi-Bombay has been out of operation since 1950. Repairs are not contemplated, and wireless telegraph has been substituted.

206 *Internal Communications*

Trunk lines and carrier lines connect the towns and villages of any importance, and outlying villages and police posts are connected by wire from nearest exchanges. The telephone network is being continuously expanded, generally keeping up with demands. A new transmitter and a new broadcasting station have recently been installed near Baghdad.

The Mission suggests that an independent or at least auxiliary power plant be provided for the newly-built transmitter. A breakdown in the power supply, now assured by a long, open air transmission line, would have serious consequences.

The PTT service is a revenue earning department, but the revenues accrue to the government treasury so that all expenditures must be authorized by the government's annual budget. Operating revenue and capital expenditures are shown in the following table.

Power

376 In spite of the existence of several large dams, Iraq apparently has no hydroelectric power installations. It is reported, however, that the proposed dam at Bekhme, at the junction of the river Ruwandiz and the Great Zab, which will produce a mountain lake 65 kilometres long, will be used to produce electric power, on the model of the Boulder Dam in the United States.

Postal Service

205 By the end of the financial year 1947-48, Iraq had 171 post and telegraph offices.

The regular postal service of Iraq covers a network of 8,664 kilometres and mail is transported by: railways, over 1,600 kilometres; automobiles, 5,630 kilometres; river boats and barges, 390 kilometres; couriers and beasts of burden, 1,044 kilometres.

An air mail service to Egypt, Greece, Italy, France, Switzerland, Canada and the United States is operated twice a week via Egypt. An air mail service is operated between Iraq and the countries of the Near East and the other countries of the Middle East. By the end of July 1948, the Iraqi air mail network covered 18,910 kilometres.

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most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās.
The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the
beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a
Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert 205
postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo
terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended
in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Iṣtanbul was maintained
until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried
post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in
1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either
proposal would have involved major road improvement and called
for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of 647
this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq 661
today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish
administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Telegraphs wire 206

reconstructed, offices multiplied, and a mid-desert wireless-station was installed at Ruṭba.

Tigris river navigation did not, and was unlikely to, exceed 505 substantially its pre-1914 scale. The pace was slow, navigation difficult and the Railway in powerful rivalry. The 'Euphrates and Tigris' fleet, managed by 'Mespers', still handled the bulk of the traffic, with its three ancient and two modern paddle-steamers (p. 111). These were increased in 1924 by the acquisition of two stern-wheelers, the *Kadri* and the *Ihsan* both built in 1918, and of the 1908-built *Baghdad*, originally owned by the Idara Nahriya. These three had belonged to the long-established Khudhayri company which was absorbed by 'Euphrates and Tigris' in 1924. A few other Khudhayri boats remained in commission, and the Royal Air Force maintained both the Inland Water Transport dockyard at Baṣra and a few vessels for their own supplies. The 504 Port of Baṣra, administered by J. C. Ward as Port Director under the Finance Ministry of the 'Iraq Government since 1920, was still in 1926 owned by the British Government pending completion of capital repayment by instalments and the creation of a Port Trust. From 1922 onwards the Port was organized on a permanent and self-supporting peace-time basis and supplied all normal facilities both for 'Iraqi trade and for the oil-tanker fleet of Abadan. In 1923 it undertook, by a loan from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the dredging of a deep channel through the Fao bar which before 1920 was impassable at high water by any ship drawing more than 20 feet. The agreement provided for a channel of 28-foot depth at high water and 300-foot width, and 12 miles long. Work began in 1924, and the Rooka Channel of these dimensions was opened for traffic in 1926.

The status of 'Iraq Railways, directed by J. R. Tainsh since 1921, 496 was similar to that of the Port: they were British-owned and after 1923 'Iraqi-administered with the aid of British executives and technicians, in anticipation of future purchase and adjustment. The Baṣra–Baghdad line was reopened in April 1921, and thereafter a Musaiyib–Karbalā extension, a line from Mafraq to the Hindiya Barrage and spurs giving access to Khaniqin and to Baṣra city were completed between 1921 and 1924. The Kut–Baghdad line, the Jabal Sanam quarry line south of Zubayr, and that from near Khaniqin to the Persian frontier at Tiaruq (Qurait) were closed in the same period. Permanent bridges were built in 1924 and 1925 at the Euphrates crossings and an extension from the Khaniqin line across the Diyalā to Kifri and Kirkuk was finished in 1925. The main workshops were brought from Shu'ayba to Shalchiya, in the western outskirts of Baghdad, in the same year. The Tigris wagon-ferry link at Baghdad between the

1-[1920-25-- Analyst

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1910-1940) MHI Iraq MRI

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Airways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air communications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was completed in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for packages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold concession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

49½ British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership, as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest. 49? The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–Nisibin line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek, all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Baṣra–Baghdad–Istanbul system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began, the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qaḍhās.

509 Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment came into being at Baghdad and Baṣra, and British flying-boats after 1937 used also Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry 206 of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public services from Baghdad and Baṣra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broad- 207 casting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to 1937 still experimental and occasional.

425 Good progress was made during these five years in the all-important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up 185 under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656 throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped. A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp, in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality, shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramaḍhan fast was enforced by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653 Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382 since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the Tripoli branch into Vichy–French territory, in July 1940. The 241 sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced. 655 The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474 even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial 453 Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company, and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded on the Bagḥdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206 1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652 room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656 control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439 a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country. The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt; trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

pletion of the Kirkuk–Arbil extension and its Lesser Zab bridge: 496
of the railway and road bridge[1] at Baghdad, opened late in 1950: 499
of the Musayib bridge leading to Karbalā: and of new stations at Ba'quba, Diwaniya, Naṣiriya and elsewhere. New rolling stock was ordered and by 1950 delivered. Progress was made in erecting a grandiose combined station and administrative headquarters at Baghdad West, and in redesigning the yards and depots there; but the high cost of these projects, the diminution of receipts by road and air competition (in spite of good traffic in grain and oilfield materials), and losses due to repeated river flooding rapidly exhausted the war-time surplus and led to the need to borrow first from Government in 1946, then from London—a loan of £3 million —in 1950, before supplies and contractors could be paid and work
could proceed. Working conditions in the railway system were [468]
disturbed by the strikes elsewhere mentioned in 1945, 1946, and
1949. The Jewish employees of the traffic branch were replaced in [464]
1949 by imported Pakistani staff, and the training of 'Iraqis to replace these and the few remaining British executives was accelerated. The status and composition of the Railway Board was unchanged, though criticized by the press as outdated and insufficiently 'national'. The post of Director-General was passed by H. C. Smith to W. J. Moffat in 1950, and an 'Iraqi, General Isma'il Ṣafwat, assumed the post in 1952.

'Iraq Airways was initiated by the Railway as a subordinate 509
enterprise in 1945, and started service in 1946 with five light aircraft hired from Great Britain. In the following year the hired aircraft were replaced by its own machines, and it extended its range from Baghdad–Baṣra outwards to Mosul, Cairo, and Damascus, and by 1948 could, thanks to reciprocal agreements, offer transport weekly or monthly to Teheran, Karachi, and Ankara. The service, to which British Overseas Airways Corporation acted as technical advisers and agents, was efficiently maintained but, thanks to competition and high costs, financially unprofitable. British, American, Dutch, French and other foreign airlines continued to use 'Iraqi airports. An expenditure of over ID 2 million on aerodromes formed part of the six-year development plan. The meteorological service, begun in 1936 in a single room, now maintained under the Ministry of Defence a dozen stations and many rainfall-observation posts, used its own wireless links, and broadcast weather reports for Baghdad area half-hourly.

Telecommunications had, by the close of the period, reached a 206
high standard. Trunk land-lines had been overhauled, often duplicated and widely extended; automatic telephone exchanges

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[1] The bridges were built by Messrs. Holloway Bros.; earthwork on the Kirkuk–Arbil line was handled by Messrs. Balfour Beatty.

206 existed in Baṣra and Baghdad and their suburbs; and the telephone and telegraph had become familiar or indispensable to all classes save the most backward. The new wireless transmitting station completed in 1951 at Abu Ghurayb, with the most modern design and range, secured communication with Europe and America and was used for the national broadcasting. The Development Board planned an expenditure of ID 2 million on telecommunications between 1951 and 1956.

499 Progress in road improvement was delayed during 1946–50 by the financial narrowness of the post-war years. This and bridge-building formed an important part of the projects[1] intended for realization in 1951–6 through the Development Board. The completion of this programme would fundamentally transform the conditions of transport and travel in 'Iraq, with far-reaching economic consequences. The 'Nairn route' to Damascus was still 491 in regular use; its traffic was highly organized, with air-conditioned vehicles, by the original company and its imitators. The Rawanduz road was little used; the tracks leading into Najd and Persia carried no important traffic; and the trunk route to Jordan or Palestine (p. 321) lost its value when the State of Israel blocked the sea-outlet it had offered.

5. TOWN AND COUNTRY, MID-CENTURY

161 The population of 'Iraq, declared by the census of 1947 to be 162 4,800,000, had by then doubled since the century opened. Its distribution[2] was in general unchanged as between towns, inlying villages, tribal country districts, and nomads; about a quarter were town-dwellers, a fifteenth nomads, the remainder settled cultivators. 311 Wide areas of steppe desert and of barren mountain remained, as for the foreseeable future they must, almost uninhabited; the widest of such regions, those of the administratively separated northern and southern provinces of the Shamiya desert, amounted to some two-fifths of 'Iraq's whole surface. 161 The average density of population for the whole territory was of the order of eleven persons to the square kilometre, or, omitting the desert provinces, eighteen. The liwā with the greatest population was that of Baghdad with 800,000 people; next came Diwaniya, Muntafiq, and 'Amara. The greatest density was of 49 persons to the square

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[1] The projects considered as 'main roads', with their bridges, were estimated to cost: Baṣra–'Amara–Kut–Baghdad, ID 2,800,000: Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil, 2,500,000: Baghdad–Sharqaṭ, 3,450,00. Elsewhere, ID 4,450,000 was allotted for 'mountain roads', 6,176,000 for miscellaneous bridges, 1,550,000 for a Ḥilla–Najf road, 1,300,000 for Ḥilla–Diwaniya–Shamiya, and 5,250,000 for numerous other routes.

[2] For distribution of the population by administrative units, see Appendix B.

491 499 be necessary. Such a program will need to be coordinated particularly with the development of new agricultural areas. Earth excavated in the construction of new irrigation and drainage canals can be used in the building of such roads. The surfaced roads should be constructed by contractors of repute capable of furnishing their own road-making plant. It is generally recognized that the Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra and the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul roads should have first priority. The first of these is at present only a dirt road but the latter has sections which are already surfaced.

494 As road transport develops, it will be vital to institute some controls, particularly since most of the operators now provide only irregular and unreliable service. Limitations on loads and regular inspection of vehicles should be instituted and enforced. Operators of transport services should be licensed to make sure that they are equipped to provide adequate and reliable service at reasonable rates and that they carry insurance.

The Mission has also given some attention to the municipal bus service in Baghdad. Operations at present are seriously handicapped by the diversity and age of its transport equipment and high maintenance costs. A sound decision has been made to standardize equipment. The central workshop should also be modernized and re-equipped and a central garage and four auxiliary garages provided. To carry out this program financial assistance from the Development Board will be necessary. It is also suggested that more efficient management of municipal transport might be achieved through the appointment of a single Director General in place of the present Board, and that a stricter control over the collection of passenger fares be instituted to improve revenues.

Communications

206 For communications, capital outlays will be required primarily in connection with the extension of the telephone system. The needs are well-known in Iraq and do not require elaboration here. Although the communications services are operated at a profit which is credited to the government budget, it is suggested that future capital expenditures be financed by the Development Board. This will not only make it easier to balance the government budget, but will enable the Board to insist on better synchronization of the

procurement of equipment and the erection of structures to house 206 this equipment. In the past these functions have been carried out by two different sections of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works with little or no coordination.

V. Public Health

Considerable progress in public health has undoubtedly been 164 made over recent decades. The number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors has greatly increased, and there have been no epidemics of pestilential diseases in recent years. Yet infant mortality is still [165] extremely high—perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births; and there is still a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and the dysenteries. Many of the prevailing diseases are the by-product of polluted water, and unsanitary, congested living conditions which in turn are traceable largely to poverty and ignorance. Thus an increase in production and standards of living brought about through the general development program will be an important complement to a direct attack upon the health problem through expansion and more effective organization of governmental health services.

The main attack will have to focus on those diseases which sap the vitality and undermine the productivity of the people. In some rural areas, for example, virtually the entire population is at certain times stricken with malaria. Malaria is said to cause 50,000 deaths every year, as well as much sickness and disability which results in great loss for the country. In the provinces of Amara, Muntafiq and Kut the incidence of bilharzia or schistosomiasis, another debilitating disease, is particularly high. The dysenteries and other intestinal ailments are also a prominent cause of low vitality. In 1948 no less than 5,656,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria, and 524,740 trachoma. These statistics are of twofold significance. On the one hand, they illustrate the great expansion which has taken place in facilities for treatment of disease. On the other hand, they indicate clearly the relative inadequacy of efforts to prevent disease. It is

Future Developments

It must be expected that Iraqi Airways will continue to operate at a loss for some years to come. This should be accepted because the air services serve a real traffic need and there are reasonable prospects of reducing and perhaps ultimately eliminating operating deficits. The Airways Accounts are separate from the Railway Accounts and the steps recommended in the Palmer Report for complete separation of the finances of the Railways and the Airways should be adopted. There is no reason why the Railways should be expected to defray the deficits of the Airways. 509

There appears to be room for expansion of services in the area where Europe, Asia and Africa meet; and the government should encourage Iraqi Airways to play an increasingly important part in air traffic in this area. Internal demands appear to be negligible at present but may be expected to develop in conjunction with extended international services. These services appear to present an opportunity for far-reaching economies through closer cooperation between Middle Eastern airlines in their services, their administration and agencies outside the home countries.

VIII. Post, Telegraph, Telephone, Radio Communications

Organization

Responsibility for communications is concentrated in the Directorate General of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services in the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. Iraq is a full member of the International Postal Union and the communications services of the country, including their tariffs, comply with the standards of the Union. 647 205 206

The number of post, telepragh and telephone offices has developed as follows: 205 206

TYPE OF OFFICE	1940	1951
24 hrs. service	14	46
16 hrs. service	12	37
12 hrs. service	18	4
7 hrs. service	42	54
Local and rural agencies	155	171

205 Mail is carried:

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on regular railway routes	1,604 kilometers
on contractors' routes (road)	3,010 "
on occasional routes (roads, tracks)	1,214 "
by air	a maximum of 14 daily routes

The only recommendation to be made regarding these services is to speed up air conveyance by moving the sorting center at Basra from Basra town to Magil.

Communications with other countries are as follows:

Postal services to all Union countries.

Telegraph and telephone with:
- Iran by land lines,
- Turkey by land lines,
- Syria by wireless telegraph and land line telephone,
- Transjordan by land lines,
- Lebanon via Syria,
- Saudi-Arabia by wireless telegraph,
- Yemen by wireless telegraph,
- Egypt by wireless telegraph (two services, government and Marconi),
- Tangiers, relay point for wireless telegraph overseas,
- United Kingdom by direct wireless communication (projected).

A British submarine cable from Fao to Karachi-Bombay has been out of operation since 1950. Repairs are not contemplated, and wireless telegraph has been substituted.

206 *Internal Communications*

Trunk lines and carrier lines connect the towns and villages of any importance, and outlying villages and police posts are connected by wire from nearest exchanges. The telephone network is being continuously expanded, generally keeping up with demands. A new transmitter and a new broadcasting station have recently been installed near Baghdad.

The Mission suggests that an independent or at least auxiliary power plant be provided for the newly-built transmitter. A breakdown in the power supply, now assured by a long, open air transmission line, would have serious consequences.

The PTT service is a revenue earning department, but the revenues accrue to the government treasury so that all expenditures must be authorized by the government's annual budget. Operating revenue and capital expenditures are shown in the following table.

TABLE 10

Financial Accounts of PTT
(in dinars)

Year	Operating Revenue	Operating Expenditures	Capital Expenditures
1940-41	434,979	243,684	84,590
1941-42	481,809	298,688	25,931
1942-43	626,356	250,161	10,171
1943-44	669,057	447,110	23,688
1944-45	712,865	392,764	3,445
1945-46	748,110	449,238	18,554
1946-47	857,200	522,078	42,810
1947-48	991,741	587,913	303,355
1948-49	992,049	596,720	349,046
1949-50	1,119,478	747,193	298,510
1950-51	1,154,000	799,675	600,000*

* sanctioned

Developments

Major development projects are chiefly directed toward extensions of telephone communications, increased trunklines and carrier lines between the large centers, telephone lines to rural areas, and telephone exchanges to cope with the increased number of subscribers. The telephone equipment is ordered abroad, and the buildings are provided by local action. However, coordination between the two is almost completely lacking. Equipment more often than not arrives in Iraq before buildings are ready to receive it. Equipment is stored and maintained, in some cases for more than a year, waiting for the buildings to be completed and even, on occasion, to be started.

This fact gives rise to the Mission's single important recommendation in the communications field. Basically the PTT service should be given responsibility for the proper coordination of capital expenditures on communications no matter how financed. It has sometimes been suggested that the best means to this end would be to make the PTT financially autonomous so that it can spend its operating surpluses on capital development at its discretion. The Mission does not believe, however, that this would be the appropriate solution. In the last analysis the amount and rate of investment in communications facilities should be determined by the

206 Development Board which is responsible for coordinating the development program of the country as a whole. The Board should also provide the financial means but leave to the PTT responsibility for execution of communications projects.

IX. Pipelines

315 Inconspicuous, but most important, in Iraq's transport and communications systems are the oil pipelines. The existing lines are: a dual line, 12 inches and 16 inches, from the Kirkuk oilfields to Tripoli, the Lebanese Mediterranean port; a 12-inch line to Haifa in Israel, closed in 1948; and a new 30-inch line under construction between Kirkuk and the Syrian Mediterranean port of Banias. A short line runs from the Basra oilfields at Zubair to the shipping stage at Fao. The pipelines carry a tonnage of oil which far outstrips the total carried by the country's railways. They are operated, maintained and expanded by the oil companies, and need only be mentioned to complete the picture of Iraq's transport system.

X. Surveys

654 No development in any branch is possible without maps and surveys. The Directorate General of Surveys, which is under the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, has surveyed and mapped the southern part of the country aside from the desert to scales varying from 1:5,000 to 1:50,000. Few topographical surveys have been carried out in the rest of the country, and the existing maps are not very reliable. The education and training of competent surveyors is difficult. Terms of service are not attractive to young engineers and surveyors who find better prospects in engineering, planning and construction work. Air surveys can, to all practical purposes, solve the problem and progress with them is now being made in the North. The skilled surveyors who are available are at present employed in cadastral work, land settlement surveys and mapping to fix the demarcation of land ownership.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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XII. Projected Cost of Proposed Programs

504 The projects recommended for consideration are summarized
508 below as to cost and time of realization. The total cost which the
●206 Development Board might have to defray over the next five years
654 would be approximately ID 31,000,000.

TABLE 11

COST OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS
SUGGESTED FOR DEVELOPMENT BOARD FINANCING

Project	Costs (in dinars)	Period (years)
PORT		
New channel	2,000,000	4
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT		
Study of river training by experts	Token	2
RAILWAYS		
Baghdad Station commitment	143,000	1
Baghdad new layout, provisional	100,000	1
22 continuation and completion projects		
under way	213,770	1
labor quarters	341,000	4
Rehabilitation and modernization projects	500,000	5
Renewals including diesel traction	6,300,000[a]	5
Extra for gauge conversion (tentative)	6,000,000	6
ROADS		
Trunk road system	14,500,000	10
Secondary road system	4,000,000	5
Road transport control	Token	1
URBAN TRANSPORT		
Baghdad transport services, workshops, garages and vehicles	500,000	3
AIRPORTS		
Baghdad development	300,000	2
Basra development	[b]	2
AIRLINES		
Iraqi Airways	600,000	4
POST, TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, RADIO		
Telephone extensions and buildings (if not financed from Communications budget)	300,000	Annually
Auxiliary power plant for transmitter	30,000	1
SURVEYS AND MAPPING		
Air surveys	40,000	Annually

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[a] On assumption of gauge conversion.
[b] To be financed by Port of Basra.

Telecommunications

206 Iraq's quite elaborate system of telecommunications is entirely State-owned and is steadily expanding. The telegraph and telephone network covered 9,876 kilometres on 31 March 1948, and involved a total of 86,172 kilometres of wires.

The big cities of Iraq have automatic telephone exchanges: Baghdad and Basra have three each, and Mosul and Kirkuk have one each. In addition, Baghdad, like other towns in Iraq, has an automatic dial exchange: 159 of the 184 administrative centres of Iraq are interconnected by telephone. By the end of 1947, there were 13,043 telephone subscribers in the country. Iraq has telephone service to Iran, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. There is a telegraphic intercommunication system between the principal towns and between these and foreign countries. The system works as follows: Mosul communicates, via Zakho, with Diyarbekir (Turkey), and beyond; the same town communicates with Aleppo (Syria), and thence with Lebanon; Baghdad is in direct communication with Teheran (Iran); Basra communicates with the principalities of Kuwait and Bahrein, with Bushire and with Karachi (Pakistan).

The radio-telegraphic station at Baghdad communicates with Teheran, Cairo, Damascus, Amman (Jordan), Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) and Sana (Yemen).

Iq 206 It is proposed to set up a 25-kilocycle short-wave station at Abu Ghuraib, 21 kilometres from Baghdad. This station would provide radio-telephonic and radio-telegraphic services with the neighbouring countries, the United Kingdom and the United States.

207 Considerable development is also reported in the field of broadcasting: the station at Baghdad has just been improved and it is proposed to build another station at Abu Ghuraib.

II. IRAN

A. *General description of the country*

Ir. 131 Iran is the central country of the so-called Middle-Eastern group. The territory of Iran lies between 25° 3′ and 39° 40′ latitude north and 44° and 63° 20′ longitude east. The country is bounded on the west by Iraq, on the north-west by Turkey, on the north by the USSR, on the east by Afghanistan and on the south-east by Pakistan. In the south, it has a coastline on the Persian Gulf and the sea of Oman and, in the north, a coastline on the Caspian Sea. Its land frontiers are 4,600 kilometres long and its coastline is 2,650 kilometres long.

The territory of Iran is shaped like an irregular right-angled triangle (see Map No. 2), with the base running north-west to south-east in a straight line for 2,200 kilometres, and with a median over 1,200 kilometres long. The total area is estimated at 1,644,000 square kilometres. The population at the time of the 1944 census was 16,549,837 inhabitants.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

315 Iraq Petroleum Company, for its part, is planning to build new pipe-lines which would enable the Kirkuk basin to supply 27 to 28 million tons of crude petroleum annually by 1953, that is, a volume greater than the 1948 production of Iran, which was and still is the fourth largest producing country in the world.

206 It seems that in spite of constant development the telecommunication systems, particularly the telegraph system, do not yet adequately cover the whole country.

000 Iran has many ports of varying importance on the Shatt al-Arab, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman and the Caspian Sea. Generally speaking, all these ports are in need of repairs, improved installations, materials, etc. Overseas Consultants, Inc., of the United States states that the ports of Khurramshahr and Bandar-Shahpur are constantly blocked and, as a first step in the Seven-Year Plan for the development of the country, it recommends the allocation of the necessary funds for urgent improvements at these two ports, and at the ports of Bushire and Bandar-Abbas, and the establishment of an administration of ports and inland waterways. This latter recommendation seems to be a significant finding as well as a proposal for action.

496 British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership,
as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In
the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern
became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment
of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the
responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with
British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on
these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without
some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest.
499 The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for
the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development
northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late
in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–Nisibin
line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier
at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek,
all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Basra–Baghdad–Istanbul
system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to
construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken
by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed
forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq
Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began,
the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest
of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qadhās.

509 Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch
trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing
frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself
to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment
came into being at Baghdad and Basra, and British flying-boats
after 1937 used also Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A
French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and
Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested
Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation
was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry
206 of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land
line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public
services from Baghdad and Basra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and
Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and
kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broadcasting
207 from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to
1937 still experimental and occasional.

425 Good progress was made during these five years in the all-important
sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up
185 under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked
excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and
others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

its educated class should have made the 'Iraqi press both high in 204 quality and great in influence. It was, in fact, superabundant in quantity, with dozens of ephemeral sheets appearing and vanishing, and it was written not infrequently with point and humour; but [461] journalism had on the whole, it seemed, failed to attract the best minds and brains of the country, and as a profession was ill regarded by the public. With rare exceptions[1] inconsistency was habitual, and the selection and presentation of news capricious and unskilful and lacking in Western—or even Egyptian or Lebanese—technique. A news-service was scarcely attempted, and mere political rhetoric and the wearisome use of outworn phrases took the place of fact, analysis, or sober comment. Broadcasting from 207 Radio Baghdad, which after 1951 used the new and fully modern transmitting station of Abu Ghurayb, offered daily a ten-hour Arabic, a three-hour Kurdish, and a one-hour or half-hour English programme. The service, though still uneven, had improved materially in recent years in editing and in reliable audibility. It was aided by some of the best among 'Iraqi writers, and was rich in its Arabic musical programme; but frequent administrative changes had affected its quality and continuity, and many listeners preferred to hear foreign stations, notably London, Paris, and the *Sharq al-adnā* station of Cyprus.

The educational system operating in 1950 represented, with 871 whatever shortcomings, the considerable outcome of a sustained and meritorious effort. An immense work lay ahead: but the period of slow and difficult beginnings lay behind, and ground was being yearly gained. The faults of 'Iraqi education were those of superficiality, impatience, indifferent standards, and the persistent infusion—unchecked by legal prohibitions—of 'politics' in the schools. Its virtues were those of genuine enthusiasm, the use of modern techniques, and much improved teaching and supervisory staffs. Many and better school buildings were, it was hoped, soon to follow. Instruction was free at all levels, the governing Regulations modernized, and primary education in theory compulsory. The High Council of Instruction, representative of all the higher institutions of learning, assisted the Minister and his Directors-

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[1] The best of the papers were two or three independents, notably *al-Zaman* and *al-Sha'b* and those associated with the political parties. The latter were the moderate *al-Ittihad al-Dasturi*, *al-Akhbar*, and the evening *al-Ḥawadith* of the Constitutional Union Party: *al-Umma* and *al-Nabā*, of the Socialist Party of the Nation; *Liwā al-Istiqlal*, of the Independence Party: the near-Communist *Ṣadā al-Ahali*, of the National Democratic Party: and the *Jabha al-Sha'biya*, of the Popular Front. These papers appeared in 1951 to be fairly stable and self-supporting and, being party organs, relatively immune from Government suppression. Provincial daily papers included three (and often more) each at Baṣra and Mosul, and others at Sulaymaniya and Kirkuk, in the languages there spoken; they attained a fair standard.

645 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment
669 than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2] Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many 'Iraqīs held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government
185 by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time
[307] in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been
648 won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other 'Iraqi Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

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[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsīn Pasha al-Hāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 5th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *At-Tariq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936.

1- [1936 .. Analysi]

Iq 206 It is proposed to set up a 25-kilocycle short-wave station at Abu Ghuraib, 21 kilometres from Baghdad. This station would provide radio-telephonic and radio-telegraphic services with the neighbouring countries, the United Kingdom and the United States.

207 Considerable development is also reported in the field of broadcasting: the station at Baghdad has just been improved and it is proposed to build another station at Abu Ghuraib.

II. IRAN

A. *General description of the country*

In 131 Iran is the central country of the so-called Middle-Eastern group. The territory of Iran lies between 25° 3′ and 39° 40′ latitude north and 44° and 63° 20′ longitude east. The country is bounded on the west by Iraq, on the north-west by Turkey, on the north by the USSR, on the east by Afghanistan and on the south-east by Pakistan. In the south, it has a coastline on the Persian Gulf and the sea of Oman and, in the north, a coastline on the Caspian Sea. Its land frontiers are 4,600 kilometres long and its coastline is 2,650 kilometres long.

The territory of Iran is shaped like an irregular right-angled triangle (see Map No. 2), with the base running north-west to south-east in a straight line for 2,200 kilometres, and with a median over 1,200 kilometres long. The total area is estimated at 1,644,000 square kilometres. The population at the time of the 1944 census was 16,549,837 inhabitants.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered [575]
by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526
survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in
'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling,
was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place
in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America.
Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542
well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator
arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by
two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs
and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course
in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now
under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of
a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's
patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the 434
poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying 369
the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is
true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to
Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape
from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2]
in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in
austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529
summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year
plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in 212
the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world 173
upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts,
easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development,
an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and
local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation
of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably,
among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world
and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted,
was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of
1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those
affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology 814
apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

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[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education
is not possible without some reference to the history and present 125
circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an
administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Ad- 185
ministrative reforms and some social advance were attempted
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became 735
an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 612
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent 212
years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [illegible]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and 361
Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

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The Need for Realistic Tribal Education. Apart from this great need for the right type of village school for the forty per cent of the population who are living in settled rural communities, there should be educational provision related to the special needs of the thirty-eight per cent of the population living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions and participating in a partial or fully tribal life.

Here again attention was drawn to this important educational need by the Monroe Commission which stated that 'practically [212] all tribal members are illiterate with the exception of some sheikhs who were sent early in their lives to towns or had a special mullah or sayyid, who lived with the tribe, to teach them reading the Koran and writing'. Again with certain modifications, due to the efforts of a minority of tribal heads who have provided their own school buildings, the comments of the Monroe Commission apply equally to conditions in 1950.

The Monroe Commission, mainly on the advice of an Iraqi educator who had made a special study of the educational needs of tribal adults and children, stressed the great importance of both preventive and constructive education for tribal dwellers during the difficult period of transition from the nomadic to the more settled agricultural life. They advocated novel educational devices to meet these special educational needs, including the provision of peripatetic teachers-cum-social advisers who would ultimately promote realistic rural schools which would provide primary education for the children and simple community centres for the adults.

These then, are the general and the outstanding educational needs of Iraq. It is now necessary, in so far as these relate to children of primary school age, to enquire to what extent they are being met in the existing primary schools system, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

SOCIAL FACTORS

000 Alongside these economic and administrative problems are a number of social factors which inhibit educational development.

212 164 871 *Illiteracy and Health Problems.* For many years it is likely that illiteracy among the adult population, and the state of the public health, will constitute obstacles to the extension of primary education, especially in the rural areas. The reasons for this are obvious. Parents who are themselves illiterate and living at a low standard of life are not easily persuaded that schooling is a worthwhile substitute for the work of their children. Neither are they able to provide in their homes those standards and values which, if the training of the schoolroom is not be negatived, are such necessary reinforcements to public education. Similarly, the prevalence of epidemic and endemic disease, together with inadequate sanitation, also contributes to a major health problem which must be taken into account in attempting to ensure regular school attendance.

657 212 Yet while obstacles of this kind exist, they are diminishing. The Public Health Service is developing slowly but surely, and one has only to see a doctor at work in a remote rural area to appreciate the devoted service which is beginning to contribute to a solution of some of the health problems. Again, although illiteracy and poverty are not the best friends of education, one has only to visit remote little village schools to realize that some of the poorest parents are making sacrifices to send their children to school.

871 Before compulsory education can be achieved, however, even assuming that the money for it will be forthcoming, a vigorous attack on adult illiteracy will be essential. To this end, what is needed in the rural areas is a type of school which, in addition to meeting the needs of the children, provides in a practical and non-academic fashion realistic fundamental education for the parents. The teacher training institutions would make a most valuable contribution if, quite apart from training the future teachers to attend to the needs of children, they also initiated them into the more practical techniques of teaching illiterates the fundamentals of better living.

562 *The Position of Women and Children.* Another obstacle to educational and social development which is often quoted is the position of women in a society which is predominantly Muslim. Traditionally women are discouraged from taking part in public life, and this attitude is bound to be reflected in education.

for some time. Women have been employed so far only in exceptional 464 cases. A new problem has been recently experienced in the high turnover of ordinary labour. Owing to the development of the oil industry in Kuweit and other Persian Gulf areas, and the high wages being paid there, many workers in Baghdad, and more still in the depressed farming areas, have been emigrating there. The turnover in the cotton textile industry of Iraq is estimated at 20 per cent of employed labour.

The main difficulty however lies in the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour. The vast amount of illiteracy among the [212 population, and the failure to make elementary education compulsory 871] has made it difficult to apply any system of apprenticeship successfully. Technical education provided by the State has [874] so far been on a very limited scale - indeed, there are only three technical secondary schools in the whole of Iraq. Therefore a new industry has often first to train its own labourers and technicians, and this of course adds to costs. In the meanwhile, most industries are dependent on foreign technicians, experts, constructors, heads of sections, and foremen. The employment of foreign technicians no doubt is inevitable in the early stages of development, but it has its own drawbacks and burdens. Foreign skill demands higher rewards abroad than it would accept at home, the standard of skill obtained is often not the highest, service is often interrupted either by ordinary leaves, or illness or inability to fit in with local conditions.

The lack of qualified labour also applies to the fields of administration, [658 accounts, and management. Efficient clerks, typists, 874] store-keepers, accountants and secretaries are in great demand and very few are available in Iraq. The inadequacy of State commercial education is no less than that of technical education. The scarcity of able management is a serious obstacle to the progress of industry. Those few who have entered the field of industry are 464 mostly of the type of proprietor-manager (even in joint-stock 472 companies managers are usually fairly large share-holders); while 473 the members of boards of directors of industrial companies, (about twenty to twenty-five men) mostly have their own business or profession to attend to. No wonder they show reluctance to go into new enterprises. For one reason or another salaried managers have not made their way into industry, except in very rare cases. On the other hand foreign management, especially on the

466 467 greater benefits through collective bargaining. At present, labor laws set up certain requirements with respect to hours of work, periods of rest, vacations, employment of minors and compensation for disability. The Labor Department, however, is inadequately staffed to enforce the law and the many reported violations are generally allowed to go uncorrected. In 1949-50, of 1,228 enterprises inspected, only 136 were found to comply with the law. Of the remainder, 974 were simply warned and 118 cases were referred to courts. It would be desirable to enforce existing legislation before enacting other labor laws. Efforts are apparently being made to survey the possibility of introducing a social insurance system into Iraq. Under existing conditions, however, any social insurance law might tend to remain a dead letter.

874 464 [212] Training of labor is impeded by the prevailing illiteracy which makes instruction in writing largely impossible. Elementary schooling and adult education are therefore essential to the improvement of labor efficiency. There is in existence a secondary technical school which attempts to train intermediate school graduates in industry. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training; and the graduates of the school show a disinclination to work with their hands. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for the basic practical training, and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workers and foremen. Those who are trained in the shop or on the site through such apprenticeship systems can then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work. Large private companies and public enterprises like the Iraq Petroleum Company, the railways and the Basra port administration all possess large machine shops where varied training can be imparted to many more than at present. It is suggested, therefore, that the government enlist their cooperation in the training of skilled workers for Iraq's requirements generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Government, banking and commercial firms, and industrial concerns are all handicapped by a shortage of competent typists, stenographers, clerks, bookkeepers and accountants which has been aggravated by

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

primary school education and much of the investment in their education accordingly bears little fruit. 871 The facilities and quality of technical or vocational education are seriously deficient and adult education has been almost wholly neglected. Probably about 80 [212] percent of the men and over 95 percent of the women remain illiterate. Moreover, educational concepts are far too narrow and too little related to the everyday problems of living.

As the result of its study of educational needs the Mission has come to the conclusion that the government should launch a three-part program involving (1) the improvement and extension of technical education, (2) the gradual introduction of compulsory primary school education, and (3) fundamental education for adults.

Technical Schooling

The question of technical or vocational education is not treated 874 in detail here, partly because it has already been discussed in connection with agriculture and industry, partly because the government has requested UNESCO to send a special mission on vocational education. Although the number of students in technical [461] schools—about 750—seems very inadequate, Iraq apparently has had difficulty in absorbing the graduates of these institutions largely because they lack sufficient practical training and they show a distaste for manual work. Obviously one of the first steps toward improved technical training will be to give the curriculum of the intermediate and secondary schools a greater vocational bias, with emphasis upon the dignity and value of manual labor. It is also worth emphasizing again that skilled labor and foremen can best be recruited from the ranks of active young workmen through on-the-job training programs, supplemented in some cases by technical schooling. Only the higher supervisory grades of personnel need to be trained in technical schools, and even for these there should be considerable emphasis on practical training in business, industry and agriculture as an integral part of the curriculum.

Introduction of Compulsory Primary Education 871

There is a general consensus both among Iraqi educators and foreign experts who have examined the problem that the time has come for a broad advance in the direction of compulsory education.

162 trade for the surrounding countryside and as collection centers for 163 its produce. Even in the smallest towns rows of small shopkeepers' booths can be seen and the larger towns usually have extensive bazaars.

Private and public service is another important group of occupations. Besides domestic service it includes such occupations as laundering and catering, the latter a not unimportant category in a country where the coffee-house is a center of social activity. In the four provinces for which data is available, there were 45,000 (of which 6,000 were women) in this group. The estimate given above does not seem excessive for the country as a whole.

A more detailed classification of workers employed in manufacturing will be found in Table 7. This table is based largely on statistics of workers employed in factories which have been compiled by the Labor Directorate from returns by factory inspectors. These figures are, however, acknowledged to be incomplete, particularly as regards the large numbers of handicraft workers who are self-employed with one or two assistants. From the census data it is evident that there are a large number of additional workers occupied in woodworking and allied occupations (e.g., working with palm leaves or reeds) and in tailoring or dressmaking; some addition would also have to be made for jewelry and textile workers. The figure of 75,000 given here includes an estimate for these additions.

The estimate for transportation, which includes all employees of the railways and the Port of Basra, is a particularly rough one. It is believed, however, to be of the right order of magnitude. The figure for government workers is reasonably accurate, although it may duplicate to some extent workers in other categories already specified. The residual figure, of course, is subject to an extremely wide margin of error. It includes all categories not mentioned elsewhere such as construction workers and the professions insofar as they are not employed by the government.

Literacy

● 212 The acquisition of skill is severely limited by lack of education. Education is, as the monograph on that subject shows, broader than the mere ability to read and write, but the degree of literacy in the country is a fair guide to the extent to which the 212 Iraqi can be considered educated. According to the census, which recorded the literacy of all those of five years of age or over, literacy in Baghdad among males over five was over 40 percent; in the smaller towns of the province it was about 30 percent and in the villages only 10 percent. These figures are probably well above the average. Cities like Basra and Kirkuk have a male literacy nearer 30 percent, but in many rural *nahiyas* it is five percent or less and in the remoter *nahiyas* of the North as low as two percent.

Literacy is much lower among women than among men. In the cities of Baghdad and Mosul, the proportion of literate females over five was about 20 percent (about half that of the males). Outside of the larger cities, however, female education hardly exists. The proportion of female literates in the rural areas and the smaller towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Basra and Baghdad provinces barely exceeds one percent.

It is not known how literacy was defined in the census, but even if these figures represent a real ability to read and understand rather than a smattering of education, it is clear that illiteracy is a great handicap to even the simplest form of written instruction. In industry this is apt to put a heavy burden of detailed work on the management of a factory. In agriculture it gives little possibility of supplementing the limited amount of oral instruction or visual demonstration which the present agricultural service can render.

III. The Standard of Living

No systematic estimate of the national income has yet been 434 made. A rough estimate by the Statistical Office of the United 511 Nations put the income per head in 1949 at $85. The equivalent in dinars would depend on the exchange rate chosen for conversion, which is necessarily an arbitrary choice; at the old rate, it would be about ID 20, at the new ID 30. The Mission attempted to make an estimate of the national product, but the information

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

871 212 Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

651 382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

647 654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

652 654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

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[33] *Economic Development of Iraq*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 63.

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
511 utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.

Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
369 of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
433 to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
511 for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
566 land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
423 house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
471 better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
566 more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
and write to obtain more information.

Sephardic origin. The majority have since 593
migrated to Israel, while probably less than 162
10,000 remain, subject to certain restric-
tions. Over 130,000 were transported to
Israel by the Iraqi government in 1950-51.
About 5,000 Palestinian refugees have set-
tled in the country since the Arab-Israeli
conflict in 1948. Small numbers of British,
American and other nationalities also reside
in the larger cities.

As a whole, Iraq is sparsely settled, with 361
the population concentrated in the river 161
valleys and in the rain-irrigated highland
districts of the north. The most densely
populated areas are found in the river
valleys of the northern delta. In 1947, the
density of population in the provinces of
the upper delta region was calculated at 131
per square mile in Hilla and 104 in Baghdad.
In the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk
and Erbil it averaged 31 to 39 per square
mile, and in Sulaimaniya, on the eastern
frontier, 62 per square mile. In the south,
it ranged from 75 per square mile in Basra
province to 42 in Amarah, while in Dulaim,
on the upper reaches of the Euphrates, it
did not exceed 10 per square mile. The pop- 369
ulation is essentially rural: over three quar- 161
ters of the inhabitants live in some 8,000
small villages or in semipermanent settle-
ments. The Bedouin, representing about 5 [4:A]
to 8 per cent of the total population, roam
the deserts with their flocks, but many mi-
grate seasonally to the towns in search of
work. There are only 7 cities with over 369
40,000 inhabitants. The population of 162
Baghdad, the capital, was estimated at
between 900,000 and 1 million in 1952,
including over 500,000 in the metropolitan
area and several hundred thousand in the
surrounding suburbs. The population of
Mosul, a commercial center on the upper
Tigris, totaled about 150,000, and of Kirkuk,
the metropolis of the oil region, almost
75,000. Basra, the chief port, located on the
Shatt al Arab, had a population of 90,000
to 100,000.

In spite of considerable progress in edu- 212
cation within the last 30 years, the majority 872

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of peasants and tribesmen are illiterate. 212
Theoretically, primary education is com- 872
pulsory for both sexes, but the facilities are inadequate, particularly in the rural areas. Recent estimates indicate that the literacy rate in the country as a whole approximates 10 per cent, in contrast with about 40 per cent in Baghdad and the larger cities.
Education is controlled by the government, 871
and public instruction is available at all 658
levels from the primary schools through the professional colleges. There is no university in Iraq, but the incorporation of the present colleges into a national institution, with university status, has been proposed. Separate colleges of medicine, pharmacy, law, science, arts, fine arts, engineering, commerce and teachers' training, as well as various types of vocational schools, are supported by the government. Secondary schools are also maintained by private and mission groups. Government scholarships are provided annually to qualified students for study abroad, usually in Egypt, Great Britain or the United States.

VITAL STATISTICS

Valid vital statistics are almost nonexist- 163
ent, since the registration of births and 165
deaths is admittedly incomplete, even in the principal cities, as Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The general reluctance of the inhabitants to report births, deaths and other statistical data and the large size of the nomadic and the semimigratory populations are factors contributing to the inaccuracy of the figures available. Within recent years statistics have been compiled by the government health organization in 75 centers under the jurisdiction of medical officers, but they do not reflect conditions throughout the country. In 1950, these health districts covered a population of 1,160,000, distributed in all 14 of the provinces into which Iraq is divided. The birth rate was estimated at 27 per 1,000 population, and the death rate at 12 per 1,000. Competent authorities, however, believe that the over-all birth rate is nearer 40 to 50 per 1,000 popu-

814 antiquities, Kurdish lore and tribal traditions, some of whom had produced monographs of interest and value. Returning graduates from foreign universities had reached, at the least, the standard indicated by their doctorates, but few had been attracted by the deeper or more humane culture of the West. The study of Islamic dogma and history was still practised in both Sunni and Shi'i circles of the professional divines, and still attracted pupils; but its seeming divorce from the living world repelled the more active and vital of the rising generation; it offered a career less interesting than the professions or politics; and its appeal was without force to a society in which Islam seemed to have lost much (and in politics 874 nearly all) of its hold. Professional standards, on the other hand, in medicine, archaeology, police and military studies, engineering, economics, and the applied sciences had risen beyond comparison above those of a generation earlier, and gave scope for the best qualities of the 'Iraqi mind.

538 The output of original literary work was small. The modern (linotype) presses installed since the Second World War produced ● [213] mainly governmental or institutional works or pamphlets, largely educational. Western publishing methods were not in use; books [214] were printed at the author's expense and sold with difficulty through a bookseller; workmanship in book production, especially in binding and illustration, was notably poor. The lack of demand (especially after the Jewish exodus), the unwillingness of the rich to patronize letters, and at times a capricious censorship, had discouraged writers; there were but humble traces of creative effort, and these confined to the fields of poetry (in which 'Iraq had always held its own in the Arab world) and to a lesser extent of fiction writing; women writers had earned a place in both. Interest in contemporary Arabic literature other than newspapers was slight, and the study of earlier Arabic works, though regarded as something of a national asset, did not greatly attract a younger generation, who preferred the writings of modern Europe. The dozen of 204 monthly or quarterly magazines, which appeared at Ḥilla, Mosul, Baṣra, Najf, Arbil, and Kirkuk as well as at Baghdad, were in most cases the organs of various societies or government departments, and though competently written they had few subscribers and no great literary pretension. Kurdish literary activity, though on a diminutive scale, was of vitality and promise. 'Iraqi artists, on the 532 other hand, were producing work of some interest, if almost wholly Western in inspiration; musical and dramatic studies were pursued 533 at the Institute of Fine Arts, and more than one 'Iraqi musician—and at least one 'Iraqi cinema actress—had attained a creditable place.

204 The circumstances of its public life and the lively intelligence of

214

214 PUBLISHING--organized production and distribution of records; products (e.g., books, sheet music, phonograph records); personnel and organization; selection of material to be published; business arrangements with authors; (e.g., advances, royalties); sales promotion; finance (e.g., profits, subsidies); etc. See also:

Music, art, and literature	53	Book dealers	549
Newspaper and magazine publishing	204	Humanistic studies	814
Copyrights	424		

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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wise investment to spend some money on intelligent research and 346
experimentation in this field. The program of buildings should 872
also include, as suggested above, the construction of teachers' houses—particularly for women teachers—in places where they are not otherwise available.

More attention might well be paid to the equipment of new and existing schools. The libraries, for instance, are generally [217] poor: the number of books is small; they are not chosen with reference to the needs of the children for whom they are meant; their arrangement and display leave much to be desired; and the service provided is very unsatisfactory. No proper individual records of students' reading are maintained and no imaginative steps are taken to stimulate the desire to read and to make the library a dynamic and integral part of the school and of the life of the students. The library often consists simply of a few crowded, dust-laden bookshelves in one of the classrooms to which students have access at odd times and for short periods for borrowing books. School libraries not only should be stocked with a large number of well-displayed and suitable books but should be made the most pleasant and attractive place in the school.

The laboratory and workshop facilities provided, even in full- [816] fledged secondary schools, are also inadequate. There can be no proper teaching of science or crafts unless the equipment is greatly improved and practical work is given its due place. Apparently there is no examination in practical work at all at the end of the secondary school, and obviously there can be none so long as most schools have no laboratories or workshops, or very poor apologies for them. In fact, of the large number of secondary schools visited, only two, one government institution and one foreign school, had adequate laboratories. Under the circumstances, science is gen- [876] erally taught theoretically, as a lesson from the printed book or as a lecture by the teacher, with occasional demonstration of experiments by him in front of the class. This kind of vicarious experimentation, which never allows the students to handle any apparatus, does little to foster the scientific attitude. The provision of laboratory facilities will not by itself, however, make any great difference—what is needed is the introduction of activity methods in the teaching of science and the use of science as an instru-

8:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 217 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration, research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 439 433 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the world's supply. Her general economic organization is nevertheless agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the 339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com- 342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 652 [511] In 1950 a Development Board was established with the function of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing a general economic and financial plan for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

x873 y876 initiative and activity of the teacher in class. Great stress is laid on the teacher's explanation in class by inductive, deductive, lecture, and demonstration methods according to the subject. Not enough emphasis is laid on student activity which should develop understanding and knowledge of what the students are studying. They, therefore, come to rely on the teacher for clarifying the subject. Theirs is to learn what has been explained and be ready to recite it back when required. In this way the "spoon-feeding" of the primary school is carried over to the secondary school, and the students do not as a rule acquire a habit of self-reliance and self-instruction.

It is largely a textbook method of teaching. The textbooks are chosen by the Ministry of Education and are uniform for all public schools and most of the private schools, which usually choose to follow the government program. The textbook is followed closely lesson by lesson and chapter by chapter, the students relying on it and on the teacher's explanation in preparing their lessons. Little, if any, reading is done outside the textbook, since most of the teachers do not assign reference work. It is the rare teacher who tries to stimulate students' interest in reading outside magazines and books, fiction or otherwise.

●[217] Intermediate-school libraries are small and on the whole little used, except where an enterprising principal or teacher tries to take charge of it and encourage students to read. Preparatory-school libraries are usually larger and in the case of the older schools may exceed 1,000 books.

In the field of science, demonstration by the teacher predominates in the intermediate schools. This is limited sometimes by the equipment as well as by lack of ingenuity of the teacher. The latter is particularly true in the field of biology where, if charts and models are not existent, the enterprising teacher can find a great deal of material in nature. Some good teachers, however, have made their own biology charts, and in one instance a teacher of biology with artistic talent produced a large number of excellent charts. In the preparatory schools more individual work is carried by the students where equipment is adequate. A great deal of room for improvement exists in the care of the laboratory equipment, in a much greater use of it, in working out laboratory manuals for secondary schools, and in general in greater effort to make the laboratory the center of science teaching. At the same time more excursions for nature study and for visits to establishments of scientific interest are needed.

x873

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES AND SPORTS

Extracurricular activities are becoming more popular in the secondary schools, though not to the same extent as in some more advanced countries.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

*874 the atom. Mathematics courses begin with elementary calculus, analytical
*875 geometry, and higher algebra, continue with advanced courses in these subjects, and end up with differential equations and interpolation in the fourth year.

Before graduation a student from any section must write two theses—one in the field of education or psychology, the other on a subject within the field of his specialization—and pass a comprehensive oral examination in both fields.

Equipment.—The fact that the Higher Teachers College was just getting re-established at the outbreak of World War II subjected it to delays and shortages in equipment. However, the government was rather generous in its budgetary allotment, and every attempt was made to equip it as well as possible.

Laboratories were started from nothing in the summer of 1937, only two years before the war. Large orders for equipment placed in England and various European countries gradually materialized, so that by 1941 the laboratories were supplied with essential, if not adequate, apparatus, chemicals, glassware, microscopes and slides, charts, and specimens. During the last year of the war the shortage of chemicals was felt, and the increase in number of students made the number of available microscopes inadequate. In 1945 the College was in great need of a workshop for repairing scientific apparatus and trained technicians to do the work.

For geography a good collection of Arabic, English, and German maps and globes has been brought together. Maps of Iraq of various scales have been supplied by the Iraqi Survey Department. There is a small geological collection, and a biological museum is contemplated.

● [217 The library grew from about 500 volues in 1937 to 9,252 in October 1945. About two-thirds of the books are in English; the rest, except for a few hundred in French and Turkish, are in Arabic. In spite of the difficulties of importing books in wartime, the library managed to add from 1,200 to 1,500 volumes to its collection yearly. The library has a fairly representative list of periodicals, but it was impossible during the war to get American magazines regularly, and there are many gaps in the files. Almost all the important Arabic periodicals are received and about 35 English and American periodicals. The Dewey Decimal system of classification is used. Work was proceeding in 1945 on a card catalog of authors, subjects, and titles.

Students make heavy use of library books for reference and assigned reading, but borrow few books for their own enjoyment.

Staff and administration.—In 1945–46 the staff of the Higher Teachers

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East
Iraq M11

and the boys take the public certificate examinations. Instruction in mathe- 872ᵏ
matics and science and some other subjects is in English, but care is 873ᵏ
taken to cover the appropriate vocabularies in Arabic. An extensively equipped laboratory makes individual experiment possible in physics, chemistry, and biology. A large library circulates many books for collateral reading. Informal organizations include religious groups, the International Relations Club, various sports associations, a debating society, and a staff which publishes a school paper.

Another foreign agency which is making an important contribution to education in Iraq is the British Council. Institutes have been established in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk in which young men and young women are given an opportunity to prepare for proficiency examinations in English as well as for the London matriculation and intermediate examinations. Classes are held in the mornings for women and in the late afternoons and evenings for men. Fees are nominal and the classes are popular. A model kindergarten has also been established in Baghdad which is
attended largely by children of English-speaking parents. Clubs which [575
have both social and educational aims have been established in the larger 544]
cities. Lecture series, musical evenings, and discussion programs are regularly scheduled for these clubs. Educational films are distributed to schools
and organizations in Baghdad. Although not a responsibility of the British [217]
Council, the reading rooms established in the smaller towns and larger villages by the Public Relations Department of the British Embassy are much used. Current magazines in English and Arabic are regularly supplied to these reading rooms and a small library of selected titles is available. A radio is usually supplied also.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x locust-control had grown, though the discrepancy of the two policies towards their wards was manifest. Desert life was characterized by the usual hostilities between the Ṭai, the Yazidis of Jabal Sinjar and the Shammar, which were composed in 1927, and those of the warring Shammar factions themselves—'Ajil against Daḥam—and their tax-avoiding migrations. A successful large-scale assembly of tribal and Government representatives met at 'Aqra in the spring of 1927 and agreed to the cancellation of a score of outstanding claims. Such meetings were repeated in and after 1931. [221] The mass movements of the great 'Aniza sections ignored, as ever, the frontiers assumed by their nominal Governments; in 1929 the bulk of the Ruwalla and Saba'a poured into 'Iraq for grazing and passed across the desert motor route, but tribal fighting, for which the 'Iraqi 'Amarat were all too ready, was avoided by their withdrawal. In 1931 progress in Paris conversations on the still undetermined frontier had so far advanced that application could be made to the League Council to appoint a Commission to trace a boundary based on that of 1920. A Swiss president, with a Spanish and a Swedish member, were appointed for the task. The first of these, Colonel de Reynier, lost his life in an aircraft accident on his way eastward, and was replaced by a fellow countryman, Colonel Iselin. The Commission finished their task in May 1932 and offered their recommendations, which were not unanimous, in September. These were adopted by the League. They involved the inclusion of the whole Jabal Sinjar within 'Iraq, with compensating transfer of territory to Syria elsewhere. The subsequent Delimitation Committee, with the same Chairman, finished its work in 1933. It was notable that in frontier dealings thereafter, as well as before, 'Iraqi tribal and other interests were defended by 'Iraqis, Syrian by Frenchmen.

The grievous events of the 'Iraqi–Najd border in 1927–9 illustrated, all too typically, the effects of confronting the proud but primitive and fanatical bedouin of north-eastern Arabia with a territorial frontier, which they could neither locate nor comprehend, as opposed to one tribally indicated; with an attempt at national discipline in their own country, which they resisted with savage individualism: and with modern weapons, which they resented as evil and unjust. With the penetration of Western conceptions into Arabia, the erection there of a relatively formidable central Government, and habituation to guns and aircraft, the same conditions are unlikely to recur; indeed, they may have passed for ever from the world.

648+ 721 The good effect of the Baḥra agreement lasted for two years, and although the establishment of the frontier tribunal envisaged in it was for many months delayed, the peace was kept in the wastes

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

241 feeding will make livestock far more productive and resistant to
231 disease and produce better and stronger draft animals. By making
the keeping and systematic feeding of livestock an integral part
of settled agriculture, the people on the land will be assured fuller
employment and higher incomes. Livestock should play a more
prominent part in the farm economy for still another reason. The
great bulk of the sheep and goats, which constitute over 80 percent
of the livestock, are the property of nomads and semi-nomads.
● [221] Nomads from the northern and southern deserts regularly move
into the riverine areas in search of summer pasture; and semi-nomadic shepherds move within the irrigated areas feeding their flocks on green barley, grain stubble and the grass and weeds of fallow land. Both are meeting with increased resistance from the settled farmers; and in any event the expansion of the area under irrigation will increasingly curtail the pasture available to the nomads. Thus the remaining nomadic tribes will need to be gradually settled, but they will adapt themselves readily to settled agriculture only if it will enable them also to maintain considerable livestock.

246 Among the forage crops berseem or Egyptian clover, a winter annual, is well-adapted to most of the irrigated area of Iraq and could be grown on a much larger scale. Sown in the grain stubble in late summer, it will provide a good pasture, soiling and hay crop. Alfalfa, a perennial, also makes a good forage crop capable of yielding 1.5 to 5 tons per donum for two to five years. However, in view of its deep roots, it cannot be recommended unless good cultivating equipment is available to kill it when necessary. For summer pasture, quick-growing crops such as millet or binder crops such as maize and sorghum should be grown. Summer legumes—cowpeas and mungo beans, and particularly the black mungo of India—can be recommended. The lack of water during the summer makes the problem of forage crops in the rain-fed zone more difficult. Large areas can, however, be planted to winter oats and vetch which, when cut, cured and cocked, will provide a good reserve feed.

248 The increased production of cotton which has taken place recently should be an excellent source of livestock feed once farmers learn to appreciate the value of oil cake feeding. For this

development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without 641
distinction as equal citizens of the State. 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one 668
another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at least some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling.

The Kurds: Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority 563
in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are con- 221
centrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous, and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals, moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains [241]
and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being semi-sedentary.

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority 563
belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve 619
their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts 178
they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized. Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly

25c Warriner S-5 (update) 1948 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

423 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of
427 the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-cropping basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths, or a third of the produce.

428 But even on these individual holdings communual ownership
621 is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-tribal chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal
622 chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and
428 especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

428 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area,
241 it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years. Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants
● 221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and
241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing re-
233 mains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it pre-
423 vailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the
619 State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organization, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

*539 601 recognised. For your father was a warrior, and your grandfather, and your great-grandfather and all those before him were warriors. Then Maqdad kissed his mother and bid her farewell. And Umm Maqdad wept as she saw her son depart.

*539 224 ● Maqdad rode out and took the road to the north and he rode over the desert which was carpeted with the flowers of spring, and the grace and pace of Rishan was beyond compare. As they went over the desert Maqdad would take his great spear and hurl it in front of him a distance of two hundred paces, and he would put Rishan to a gallop and catch the spear and pluck it from the air before it could touch the ground. In this manner they had travelled many miles when Maqdad saw a gazelle. He put Rishan to a gallop, thinking: Rishan is faster than the gazelle. The gazelle left the track and went off into the desert with Maqdad in pursuit, and Rishan was as fast as the gazelle and drew level with it. But when Maqdad put out his spear to kill it, it turned more sharply than the horse, and in this manner escaped them.

They were now far from the track, and to return to it Maqdad took his course from the wind, and they travelled on and came to a wadi which was both wide and deep, and in its further bank Maqdad saw a cave. The mouth of this cave was covered by a net, its shape as a spider's web, but each strand was as thick as a man's wrist, and through the meshes of the web it could be seen that in the cave was a boy. He was naked save for an iron band around his neck, and he was chained to the wall, and he was in the twelfth year of his life.

Then Maqdad rode down into the wadi; he dismounted and drew his sword, and he cried out to the boy: I will release you from this misfortune. The boy answered,

35; Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
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Ait.; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 459; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 90. 824*
W.H.M.M. 150816; K.B. 339. 278*

Nux vomica or Kuchula seeds are frequently referred to in ancient Persian works. In the "Makhzan el Adwiya" they are said to have been used from very early times for paralysis. Called Azaraki by Indian Mohammedans, they are given for debility. The seeds are imported from India, and are known throughout Iran as a poison. Aitchison says, "The seed of the nux vomica is imported freely into these parts (northeast of Iran) as a valuable tonic, but it is chiefly employed by the nomad tribes for poisoning wolves and dogs, these animals frequently proving destructive to their flocks." [224]

Tagetes erecta L. (Compositae)

گل جعفری

Gul-i-ja'fari (Teh.); Ja'fari (Iraq); Gul gaindo (Bal.); Guljaferi (Hind.); Rojia (Port.); African marigold.

Field 86.

Both the African marigold and the French marigold (*T. patula* L.) are cultivated in flower gardens for their orange-yellow blossoms and scented foliage. They were probably introduced into India by the Portuguese. The flowers are often worn as garlands during religious festivals. Sold in the bazaars in India and Iran, the dried flower heads are said to purify the blood. [247]

Tamarindus indica L. (Leguminosae)

تخم تمر

Tukhm-i-tamr (Teh.); Baz-i-tamar-hindi (Ar.); seeds of the tamarind.

Field 262.

The seeds of the Indian tamarind tree are dark brown, shining, flattened, of an irregular outline, containing ivory-white cotyledons. Size is made from the seeds, and it appears that this preparation is used in Tehran as a plaster for boils (see "Tamarind Seed" by D. Hooper, *Agricultural Ledger*, No. 2, 1907).

Tamarix gallica L. var. mannifera Ehrenb. (Tamaricaceae) 824*

گز خونسار 263

Gaz-i-khūnsār, Gaz-alafi, Gaz-anjabin, "tamarisk honey" (Teh.); Gaz-i-shakar, "tamarisk sugar"; tamarisk manna.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power as its chief limiting factor. Attention was being given to 154
the increase and improvement of livestock, a major asset of the 242
country; Ayrshire and Friesian bulls were imported and distributed, rams from a selected herd were sold to reliable farmers, 185
laboratory work on wool was carried out. Yet other lines of progress were dairying, with experiments in cheese production, the breeding of improved mules and donkeys, the increase of egg production by improving poultry breeds. The allotment by the Development Board for the period 1951–6 was nearly 2 million dinars for agricultural research, 3½ million for small-scale reclamation schemes, 1¼ million for animal husbandry, and a million for swamp reclamation. The need for a measure of integration between animal husbandry and crop production, hitherto divorced, was realized, as well as the broad essential singleness of the effort which must be made in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, land settlement, rural education, and the provision of capital. It seemed certain as the nineteen-fifties opened that if this effort were made and sustained by public and Government, and in the absence of any general calamity, the prospects for agricultural development in this wide and favoured territory, within the ultimately fixed limits of its river-water and rainfall resources, exceeded those not only of any Middle Eastern country, but of any territory of comparable size elsewhere in the world; the growing of food for less fortunate nations could prove, indeed, to be the main part of 'Iraq's material contribution to humanity.

In the care of its forests not much had yet been accomplished 313
beyond the limits of study, experiment, and the establishment of 185
tree-nurseries; the wide but neglected forest areas (p. 29) of the north still lay untended and unimproved, lacking notably a modern forest code, a staff of trained foresters, and even detailed exploration. Some steps had indeed been taken to provide fire protection and to carry out by helicopter and air photography the first forest surveys, but few to prevent uncontrolled cutting, grazing, and trespass by the villagers. One million dinars were allotted by the Development Board for forestry development in 1951–6. The significance of these areas to soil erosion, silt deposit, and river flooding was understood, and plans were being prepared on these and allied matters; but only a beginning had been made to solve these problems or to move towards the large-scale action which must be involved, or to provide the 'Iraqi public with sources of fuel and timber at present lacking.

Although sea fishing, based on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, was but a 226
limited resource, the rivers and swamps of the territory were the source of a fish catch estimated at many thousands of tons a year, and export of fish to the Levant—and in particular to the Jews in

226 Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

312 The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable.
[731] The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the
[647] resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

312 The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the
653 Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis
185 project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Dukan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Isḥaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqī swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

I-I
824*
278*

Anacyclus Pyrethrum DC. (Compositae)

عاقر قرحا

Agirgarhā (Teh., Isf.); Akalkara (Hind.); pellitory of Spain; the root.

Field 410; W.H.M.M. 150791.

Pellitory root, obtained in northern Africa, is nearly cylindrical in shape, tapering near the tip, with a tuft of hairs or the remains of leaves toward the crown. When chewed the drug has a pungent taste, exciting a flow of saliva.—It is prescribed for toothache (H.F.).

Anamirta paniculata Coleb. (Menispermaceae)

مرک ماهی

Marg-i-māhī, "fish poison" (Teh.); Zahar (Iraq); the berries.

Field 138, 101 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150746.

Cocculus indicus or Levant berries are yielded by a shrub indigenous to eastern India and the Malay Archipelago. The fruits are round or kidney-shaped, dark brown without, each containing a white seed with oily, bitter endosperm. The power possessed by the fruits, when thrown into water, of stupefying fish has long been known, and is due to the poisonous crystalline principle, picrotoxin, in the seed. The berries are used in the East for poisoning dogs and fish and for making ointments to destroy pediculi on the skin.

[226] •

Anthemis Wiedemanniana Fisch. & Mey. (Compositae)

گل بابونه

Gul-i-bābūna (Ham.); flower heads.

Achundow; Ait.; Post; Schl.; Boiss. 2: 286; Pharmacog. 346; Ph. Ind. 2: 275; I.H.B.

K.B. 303.

Banoi is probably a contraction of Bābūna or Babunaj, a name for camomile and other medicinal composites, including the above.

Irani camomile flowers are generally obtained from *Matricaria Chamomilla* L. (q.v.).

Apium graveolens L. (Umbelliferae)

تخم کرفس

Tukhm-i-karafs (Teh.); Buzz-ul-karaphs (Ar.); Asil-a-krasb (Afg.); Karafs (Iraq); Ajmud (Hind.); Udasaliyun (Gr.); wild celery fruits.

35_2 Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MH1

824* **Verbascum Thapsus L.** (Scrophulariaceae)

278* مازریونا

Māzaryūn (Teh.); Mahi zahraj, Bon tamaku (Ar.); Gidar tamaku (Hind.); great mullein.

W.H.M.M. 150758.

This mullein grows from the temperate Himalayas westward to Britain. The drug consists of broken stalks and thick, hairy leaves. The narcotic action of mullein on fish appears to be well known to the Arabs and Iranis, the meaning of Mahi zahraj being "fish poison." • [226] Mohammedan physicians prescribe it in gout and rheumatism in combination with aperients. Throughout Europe mullein has long had a reputation in the pulmonary diseases of cattle, on which account it bears the name of cow's lungwort.

824* **Vetiveria zizanioides** Stapf (*Andropogon muricatus* Retz) (Gramineae)

278* برمکیا

302 Barmakiyā, Bikh-i-wala (Pers.); Khas Khas (Hind.); Izkhir-i-jami (Ar.); Vetiver (Tam.); root of cuscus grass.

Field 5 (Isf.).

The use of these fragrant, wiry roots for medicinal purposes and [355] in perfumery has been common in India for a long time. The roots emit a pleasant odor when moist, and for this reason they are woven into screens and mats (tatties) which hang over doors and windows to cool and perfume the atmosphere during the hot season. A paste of the root is applied to the skin to relieve oppressive heat of the body, and a cooling aromatic bath is prepared by adding some broken root to the water. The root yields a fragrant essential oil which commands a high price as a perfume (Otto Stapf, *Kew Bulletin*, 1906, 347–349).

824* **Vicia Faba L.** (Leguminosae)

278* باقله

262 Bāghalā (Iraq); Banklent (Bal.); Bakla (Hind.); Baqilla, Baqlah (Turk.); Paglah (Kurd.); broad or horse bean.

246 Field 4, 56, 69 (Iraq).

This legume is a native of Iran and is now universally cultivated. The beans are a well-known vegetable and an excellent horse food. The shoots are said to be efficacious in rousing a drunkard from

244 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
853 particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

Iraq MHl

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see Ml Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see Ml Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group, 651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving the construction of the Habbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method, came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness, 654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with 231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship 494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much 491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by Ramadi and Rutba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian) competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The Rutba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through 205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

sumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the 241
North. 245

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an 231
integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive
despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as [262]
camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed.

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently 241
inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained
unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer [372]
is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop
rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for
soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has [134]
materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter.

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq 423
and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central 427
Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. 241
The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

241 [387] yields. As will be indicated later, inorganic fertilizers could probably be produced cheaply in Iraq and organic fertilizers could be produced as by-products of the slaughtering industry.

231 4. Livestock Improvement

The productivity of livestock is extremely low, primarily because of inadequate feed supply. In addition to the production of fodder crops, measures should be taken to improve natural pasture lands, particularly in the northern mountains, which have generally suffered from over-grazing. Reseeding and rotational grazing are necessary. Productivity could be further raised by the establishment of shelters, better breeding methods, especially the introduction of new and improved sires and maintenance of stud stations, and by more effective control of parasitic diseases through an increase in the number of veterinarians and the provision of more extensive diagnostic facilities in the provinces.

The quality of livestock products could be raised considerably by a number of measures. One of these is an improvement in the practices and more stringent sanitary supervision of abattoirs. Others would be the establishment of a number of wool shearing and grading units under the guidance of an appropriate expert; appointment of a hides and skins expert to serve as general manager of the newly established Hides and Skins Association; and recruitment of an abattoir specialist to train local abattoir supervisors in improved methods of flaying and preserving hides and skins.

234 At present, even the major cities are without a clean, safe milk supply. The supply of milk could be substantially improved by better feeding of livestock, concentration of milking cattle in well-equipped settlements on the outskirts of cities, and central collection, transportation and processing of milk under strict sanitary controls. The possibility of cooperative collection and processing of milk should be explored.

231 [233] Since the nomads and semi-nomads, who may number from 200,000 to 500,000, account for a large proportion of the livestock in the country, particularly sheep and goats, their needs must receive special attention. Measures should be taken, for instance, to provide them with better watering facilities, sheep-dipping stations,

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

and trained medical and veterinary assistants to control disease. In 231
the North, livestock shelters would reduce the high mortality in the winter. In the long run, however, livestock raising is likely to become increasingly the preoccupation of settled farmers, particularly as the area under cultivation is gradually extended and natural pastures correspondingly restricted. Mixed farming, in which livestock raising based on the production of fodder crops would have its appropriate place, would greatly enhance incomes, especially because it would give more year-around employment to farmers who now, with the concentration on winter crop production, are underemployed for the greater part of the year.

5. Research and Education: Incentives 080

While is it relatively easy to point out what should be done to improve agriculture and livestock, devising the means to accomplish the improvement is incomparably more difficult. The means available to the state for a direct attack on low productivity are necessarily limited. The government can, of course, lay out drainage schemes, make more water available, provide facilities for combatting plant and animal diseases and pests, establish livestock shelters, assist in organizing cooperatives, and furnish more ample credit facilities. However, except perhaps in the new settlement areas, the state cannot prescribe better crop rotation, the use of improved seeds, better methods of cultivation and the like. These depend on private initiative which can at best only be stimulated and encouraged by the government. In some circumstances farmers can be relied upon to seize the initiative, as in the case of cotton where high prices have stimulated a rapid expansion of production. In the main, however, greater productivity depends on the success of efforts to persuade large numbers of landowners and cultivators to change their time-hallowed methods and techniques. For this reason principal reliance will have to be placed on education, supported by practical research and supplemented where feasible by financial incentives provided by the government.

First of all, steps should be initiated immediately to organize 242
an effective extension or advisory service to farmers. At present 647
the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and much of their

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

value of the country's total exports, other than oil, in the years 245
1948-1950. Citrus fruit, grown for domestic consumption, is of 439
considerable importance in the Diyala River valley and substantial quantities of other fruits and nuts, although of rather poor quality and marketability, are grown in the North, especially in Suleimaniya and Erbil. Vegetable culture is of particular importance in the neighborhood of large cities.

Agricultural yields are generally low, although most of the 241
soil is inherently quite fertile. Barley yields, for instance, are about 30 to 35 percent less than those in Canada and the United States and probably slightly less than those of Turkey and Iran. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Salinity attributable to poor drainage has materially lowered productivity of land in the irrigation zone. The soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Chief reliance is placed on the fallow system to restore soil fertility, but, since fallow land is often allowed to go up in weeds on which animals graze, its efficacy is limited.

The raising of livestock is an important industry. Sheep and 233
goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding.

TABLE 6

Estimate of Livestock Population, 1949-50

Sheep	7,489,700
Goats	1,754,300
Cattle	1,034,600
Buffaloes	200,700
Camels	279,200
Horses	183,800
Mules	66,850
Donkeys	326,400

Sheep and goats, as well as camels, are kept primarily by 231
pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural

231 population. Livestock, however, are an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Many fellahin have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only the livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed. Livestock yields are generally very low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because [439] of poor breeding and disease. Yet livestock and livestock products —wool, hides and skins, and casings—accounted for about 13 percent of the total value of Iraq's exports, exclusive of oil, in the period 1948-1950.

Industrial Output

433 Industrial production is still very small. Reliable figures on industrial output and employment are unavailable. According to the Department of Labor, there are roughly 2,400 enterprises in industry, exclusive of service industries, employing over four persons. From Department of Labor data as well as certain supplementary sources, it is possible to give a breakdown for approximately 45,000 people engaged in industrial production. As already indicated, the actual number of people so employed is apparently considerably greater if account is taken of small handicraft enterprises. About 11,500 are employed in petroleum production and refining. The textile, apparel and footwear industries probably employ about 11,000 people. The processing of food, beverages, tobacco, other agricultural products and livestock products accounts for an employment of perhaps 9,000; the production of building materials, including bricks, tile and cement, for about 6,000; and wood processing, for approximately 2,000. Metal-working and machinery repair and maintenance account for most of the balance.

These employment figures tend to convey a rather exaggerated impression of possible industrial output. With the exception of those in the petroleum industry, virtually all are employed in small undertakings where the work is predominantly done by hand and productivity is accordingly very low. It is estimated that only about 2,000 people are engaged in what might be characterized as modern plants. Among these are one woolen and one cotton mill, one brewery, several distilleries, a cement plant, a vegetable oil and soap factory, and a number of flour mills.

: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX C

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

I. Introduction

The main features of agriculture and animal husbandry in Iraq 241 have already been set forth elsewhere and are only briefly recapitu- 231 lated here.[1] Barley, wheat, rice, dates, other fruits and vegetables, and, more recently, cotton are the principal crops. Animal husbandry is of great importance but at present is really not integrated with agriculture. There is virtually no mixed farming. Crop and livestock yields are very low. Poor feeding is the principal cause of the low productivity of livestock. Low crop yields are attributable to poor drainage in the irrigation zone, to the failure to maintain soil fertility through the use of manure and fertilizer and the cultivation of soil-building crops, and to inadequate tools of production. Advances in agricultural techniques are seriously hampered by the poverty and ignorance of the fellahin who cultivate the soil and by the lack of interest displayed by most of the large landowners in improving agriculture. While there are exten- 311 sive lands that can be put to the plow, particularly if more water is 433 made available, a substantial portion of the land now in exploitation may be said to be overpopulated considering the present level of agricultural technique.

An increase in production is urgent. The standard of living 433 which now prevails on the land is deplorably low. At the same time the population is increasing at a rate that can be expected to grow more rapid as public health improves. Output can be greatly increased both by extending the area under cultivation and by raising the productivity of land already being exploited. Primary emphasis has hitherto been placed on the first of these, and large new water storage and irrigation schemes are being planned.[2]

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[1] See Annex A, *Basic Factors and Conditions.*

[2] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage.*

7: International Bank N. $-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

II. Diversification of Production

Fodder and Pasture

Existing crop rotation is far too limited and does not make 241 effective use of the land. Wheat and barley are virtually the only winter crops. There are a considerable number of summer crops, but cotton and rice clearly predominate. Rice is really outside any crop rotation, since, for the most part, it is grown year after year on naturally inundated land. Fallow generally takes the place of good crop rotation. No doubt the large amount of water required for summer crops in relation to the available supply has hindered the introduction of new crops, but the water storage schemes that will be carried out over the next decade should bring a change in this respect. Moreover, economies in the use of water which may be effected may in the long run make more water available for summer cultivation.[3]

Basically the aim in the future must be to make fuller use of the land and the people who work it. The cultivator who grows wheat or barley in the winter does not have enough to occupy him except at sowing and harvest time and has still less to do in the summer. Conversely, the rice farmer has virtually nothing to do in the winter. On the average, cultivators keep little or no live- 231 stock outside of a draft animal or two and they grow no fodder and plant no pasture for their livestock. Hay-making is unknown. While in and around the towns grain, oil cake and cut legumes are used for feeding, in general the most important source of feed for sheep, goats, buffaloes and cattle alike are grain stubble and the uncultivated grasses and herbage. Thus the animals are left to forage for themselves. Under these conditions their food is adequate for only five to six months, barely sufficient for maintenance during three to four months and at starvation level for the remainder of the year.

Introduction of a mixed type of farming which will include 241 leguminous fodder crops in the rotation with cash crops would 231 mark a most important advance in Iraqi agriculture. Such crops will enrich the soil as well as provide feed for livestock. Better

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[3] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage*, pp. 208-09.

241 feeding will make livestock far more productive and resistant to
● 231 disease and produce better and stronger draft animals. By making
the keeping and systematic feeding of livestock an integral part
of settled agriculture, the people on the land will be assured fuller
employment and higher incomes. Livestock should play a more
prominent part in the farm economy for still another reason. The
great bulk of the sheep and goats, which constitute over 80 percent
of the livestock, are the property of nomads and semi-nomads.
[221] Nomads from the northern and southern deserts regularly move
into the riverine areas in search of summer pasture; and semi-nomadic shepherds move within the irrigated areas feeding their flocks on green barley, grain stubble and the grass and weeds of fallow land. Both are meeting with increased resistance from the settled farmers; and in any event the expansion of the area under irrigation will increasingly curtail the pasture available to the nomads. Thus the remaining nomadic tribes will need to be gradually settled, but they will adapt themselves readily to settled agriculture only if it will enable them also to maintain considerable livestock.

246 Among the forage crops berseem or Egyptian clover, a winter annual, is well-adapted to most of the irrigated area of Iraq and could be grown on a much larger scale. Sown in the grain stubble in late summer, it will provide a good pasture, soiling and hay crop. Alfalfa, a perennial, also makes a good forage crop capable of yielding 1.5 to 5 tons per donum for two to five years. However, in view of its deep roots, it cannot be recommended unless good cultivating equipment is available to kill it when necessary. For summer pasture, quick-growing crops such as millet or binder crops such as maize and sorghum should be grown. Summer legumes—cowpeas and mungo beans, and particularly the black mungo of India—can be recommended. The lack of water during the summer makes the problem of forage crops in the rain-fed zone more difficult. Large areas can, however, be planted to winter oats and vetch which, when cut, cured and cocked, will provide a good reserve feed.

248 The increased production of cotton which has taken place recently should be an excellent source of livestock feed once farmers learn to appreciate the value of oil cake feeding. For this

In any discussion of pests the damage caused by weeds is worth emphasizing again. Poor tillage and the tendency to use idle land as pasture has caused a rapid spread of Bermuda and Johnson grass in the irrigation zone. These pests have actually forced a considerable amount of crop land out of production and have lowered the yield of such summer crops as cotton, maize and sesame. 242

VI. Improvement in Livestock and Livestock Products

Improvement in both the quality and quantity of livestock production is likely to be of growing importance in the future, particularly since the anticipated rapid increase in public expenditures on development as a whole will create an expanding and more discriminating market for animal products. 231

In general the types of livestock found in Iraq represent rather hardy animals which, through a process of natural selection, have become fairly resistant to the rigors imposed by a severe climate and inadequate feed supplies. This does not mean that improvements in breeding cannot be effected. At present breeding 232 is largely haphazard and uncontrolled, particularly as to timing and the selection of sires. It is a well-known scientific fact, however, that the evaluation of genetic factors influencing production in any direction—meat, milk, wool, work, and the like—cannot be properly assessed unless the nutritional level is first improved, thus permitting the full genetic development of the livestock to take place. Iraq is a particularly striking illustration of the truth of the old saying that "half the breed goes into the mouth."

One of the best methods of exploring the possibility of improved breeding and the results of better feeding and other livestock practices would be to establish a number of herds and flocks of indigenous breeds of livestock as well as poultry on government farms throughout Iraq. There careful records would be kept to discover for the first time what these animals can really produce with improved feeding, breeding and management. These livestock stations could also provide progeny-tested sires to farmers for

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So Maqdad took the bag of gold and he went to the market in Hilla where there were offered for sale horses of the finest stock and of the finest blood. And there he saw a horse of between two and three years, and its colour was as black as jet and its beauty surpassed the beauty of all horses, and the horse looked at Maqdad with a look of friendship and affection. So Maqdad turned to the merchant and said: What is his price? Now, the merchant looked at Maqdad and saw that he was dressed as a ragged shepherd boy and he laughed and said: O master of wealth, begone from here and do not trouble us further, for we are afraid that you will offer us so much gold that we cannot lift it from the ground, for we are poor and feeble. Please go from here and do not tantalise us further with your wealth.

Maqdad was angered at the scorn of the merchant and he said: My wealth is greater than your wealth, and I wager you a wager that my purse has more gold than your purse, and the stake shall be my purse against your purse. And the merchant thought: Verily God has deprived this boy of his reason, but let us amuse ourselves and draw a crowd, for it will be good for business. So the merchant called for witnesses, and a crowd collected, and the conditions of the wager were cried out.

Then the merchant drew from his pocket a mighty purse and he said to Maqdad: Let us see your money. And Maqdad's heart went cold when he saw the size of the merchant's purse, and he drew out his own purse and it was smaller than the merchant's. And the merchant spread his coins on a carpet and they saw that there were five hundred dinars of gold and a thousand dirhems of silver and two thousand fils of copper. And Maqdad spread out his coins on the carpet and they saw that he had

a thousand dinars in gold, and he had not a single coin in 539^{K}
silver or in copper. And the witnesses said: The shepherd 443
boy wins the wager. 231 ●

Maqdad took the purse of the merchant and put the coins of gold and silver with his own gold, but the copper coins he caused to be thrown to the poor. And he turned to the merchant and asked the price of the horse, and a price was agreed on and paid. Then Maqdad asked the merchant for the pedigree of the horse and for his name. The merchant was astonished, and asked: Do you ask the pedigree of the horse after the price has been agreed and paid? Maqdad replied: His pedigree is written in his legs and his back and his noble head, but it must also be recorded on paper, and that is what I require. And the merchant handed the pedigree to Maqdad, saying: Verily he is descended from the Prophet's noble mare, the feather coated, the most beautiful of all. His name is Rishan, for he is of that noble breed.

Maqdad took the horse Rishan and mounted him bare- 539^{K}
back and rode to his home. And his mother brought out 576
the saddle of his father and it fitted the horse Rishan, and she brought out the weapons which she had cleaned till they gleamed in the sun. And she brought him a bag of dates and a bag of cheese and she said: Now shall you ride to the Tigris and to the camp of the tribes, and there shall you enter the guest tent and salute the assembly, and they will bid you to be seated and bring for you coffee. Then they will ask your name, for they do not know your face, 539^{K}
then shall you reply: I am Maqdad son of Thamir son of 601
Degaither son of Mansur son of Maqdad son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Qais son of Hamed the Lame son of Mansur the Father of the Sword. And this name is a known name, and wherever you say it, there shall you be

1. THE STORY OF HAJJI ALI, THE GREAT SULTAN AND HIS SON, THE AMIR KHEYYUN

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
556 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often
438 acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they
have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
● [231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
578 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful
by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A STORY CONCERNING THE IGNORANCE OF SLAVES

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the
end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-
464 supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
166 shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agri-
[452] cultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

•231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
654 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
185 have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq m H1

245 Iraq produces about 80 per cent. of the total
[439] world supply of dates—that is, of the proportion of dates that form an article of commerce, because most dates are eaten directly by the growers, or else bartered. The general conditions under which date palms thrive have already been touched upon, and it is sufficient to recall that the palms can flourish in dry, saline, sandy, loamy, or even water-logged soils, although the maximum yield of fruit is obtained when abundant water is available.

The region of the Shatt el Arab is pre-eminently suited to date-production, and both banks are lined with date groves extending inland for about a mile and a half. Some 25 to 30 million palms are cultivated throughout the region, and of these, one-half are found close to the Shatt el Arab, the rest occurring along the river banks as far north as Latitude 33° N. A curious feature is the rise of the river under the influence of the incoming tide. Fresh water is ponded back in the Shatt el Arab, and floods the banks to a depth of as much as 3 feet to provide natural and regular irrigation of the groves—a phenomenon that from the point of view of the native farmer is wholly estimable.

In order to ensure a good crop, the land is dug over once every four years; and because of the frequent presence of creeks and water-courses, this must be done by hand. Artificial pollination is, as we have already seen, highly necessary; and though most groves include 3 per cent. of male palms, the district of Fao has developed a special trade in male pollen dust, from which other date-growing regions are supplied.

About 130 varieties of date are known, but three are most widely grown. The *Halawi* palm produces the finest fruit, but gives only a moderate yield (44 lb. per tree) (Dowson), whilst the *Sayir* produces slightly less, but is more tolerant of inferior growing conditions, and is probably the most widely grown. The *Zahidi* does not give a fruit of high quality, but the yield is over 120 lb. per tree, and this compensates for the low price obtained. Fertilisation of the female palm takes place in April, and picking begins in August, when large numbers of nomadic tribesmen move into the date-growing areas to work as seasonal harvesters.

273 Besides forming an extremely important part of local diet, dates
231 are used in the distilling of *arak*—the chief fermented beverage
313 outside the vine-growing areas, and one thought to have value as a
289 prophylactic against malaria. The crushed stones are fed to cattle, and both leaves and trunk of the palm are used in light constructional work (houses, boats, even bridges), and also in the manufacture of paper.

244 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
853 particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

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824* Ait.; Post; Boiss. 1: 542; Ph. Ind. 1:155.

296 K.B. 319.

515 This is a shrubby plant of northern Iran, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, 3 to 4 feet high, with numerous stems springing from the perennial rootstock. The underground rootstocks are collected and used as soap for washing the hair and clothes. The Irani drug is no doubt a substitute for the older Roman and Egyptian Struthium, the root of *G. Struthium* L. of southern Europe. The roots contain from 6 to 16 per cent saponin.

824* **Halimodendron argenteum Fisch. (Leguminosae)**

278* Field 14, 31 (Iraq).

Halimodendron is a thorny shrub found in Iran, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Fruits of this plant were collected without a local name, from Yezd-i-Khast between Isfahan and Shiraz. The thorns are used in native surgical operations. Inflated pods, 2 cm. long and oblique, are brown, and contain two or three seeds like chick peas.

824* **Helianthus annuus L. (Compositae)**

262 افتاب گردن

Aftāb gardan (Teh.); Ward-ash-shams, Shams-wa-qamar (Iraq); Qunah baqan (Turk.); sunflower seeds.

Field 122 (Teh.), 72, 73 (Iraq).

Two kinds of sunflower seeds are represented in these collections: black, ovate-elongate, 12 by 6 mm.; and white, smooth, broader achenes, 12 by 7 mm. There is a good market for these seeds, which
[262] are used for human consumption and for bird food, and yield by
• [231] expression an oil for cooking purposes. Many tons of the seeds are produced annually in the U.S.S.R.

824* **Helicteres Isora L. (Sterculiaceae)**

278* بهمن پیچ.

Bahman-i-pich, Pachman-i-puh (Teh.); Kisht bar Kisht (Pers.); Pechak, Marorphali (Hind.); Avartin (Sans.); the Persian and Sanskrit names signify the furrows on a ploughed field; the spiral fruits.

Ibn Baitar; Achundow; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 365; Ph. Ind. 1: 231.

Field 137; K.B. 320.

The East Indian screw tree occurs in dry forests throughout central and western India and in Ceylon, Java, and northern Australia. The spirally curved fruits are sold in all Indian bazaars and

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in more northern countries. The fruit is composed of fine, slender, angular carpels twisted like corkscrews, which together form a cone 3.5 to 5 cm. long. The carpels are pubescent and greenish brown, and each one contains a single row of dark brown, angular seeds.

The drug has demulcent and slightly astringent properties, and is employed as a medicine for dysentery and for griping of bowels and flatulence in children.

Heracleum persicum Desf. (Umbelliferae)

گل سپر

Gul-i-sipar (Teh.); Gul-i-parr (Isf.); Goleper (Kerm.); Giafari (Schl.); the fruits.

Schl.; Post; Boiss. 2: 1044.

Field 434; W.H.M.M. 150779; K.B. 320.

This species of cow parsnip is indigenous to the moist valleys of the Elburz Mountains, and is related to *H. pubescens* M.B., of a wider range. Boissier refers the plant Goulpere to *H. lasiopetalum.* The fruits, which are sold as a spice and used in pickles, are ovate-oblong, villous on the back, the margin aculeate, the dorsal vittae thick and clavate, reaching to two-thirds the length of the mericarp. While some of these plants are used medicinally and for food, other species in America and Europe are poisonous and produce erysipelatous inflammation (Cormerin, "Des Plantes Vénéneuses," 1887). [263]

Hibiscus cannabinus L. (Malvaceae)

جل جل

Jiljil (Iraq); Hab-el-zalim (Ar.); Palsan (Hind.); Ambari (Duk.); the seeds.

Field 61 (Iraq).

The Deccan hemp plant is grown in western India and the tropics. The seeds are dull grayish brown, triangular or kidney-shaped, 5 by 3 mm. They contain an oil useful for culinary and lubricating purposes. The seeds are used in medicine and as cattle food. [252] [231] •

—*H. Trionum* L., Qunnab, called Jiljil near Basra, yields a bast fiber resembling that of the Deccan (H.F.).

Holarrhena antidysenterica Wall. (Apocynaceae)

میوه زبان کنجشک

Mīvah-i-zabān-i-gunjishk, Tukhm-zabān-i-gunjishk-i-talkh, "the seeds of the bitter sparrow's tongue" (Pers.); Lizan ul asafir (Achundow); Indrajaou (Hind.); Estrefanthus; the seeds.

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Bizre Kattane (Schl.); the names for linseed in India are Alsi, Atasi, and Alashi; linseed. 278* 824*

Ph. Ind. 1: 239.

Field 21; 63, 67 (Moroccan and River Plate seeds from Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150809, 150920; K.B. 326.

Aitchison informs us that in Afghanistan the flax plant and seed are known as Zagher; the oil of the seed as Roghan-i-zagher; the fiber and linen cloth as Katan or Katun. The plant is cultivated in Turkestan for the oil of its seeds, but, as in India, the fiber is not collected. In Iraq Moroccan linseed has been distributed in considerable quantities as Indian varieties have been severely attacked by rust disease (G.). The oil is valued for various industrial purposes and the seeds are eaten as sweetmeats.—Boiled with *Althaea* sp., the seeds are used as a poultice for boils (H.F.). [385]

Lolium rigidum Gaud. (Gramineae) 824*

کل چمن [231] •

Gul-i-chaman (Teh.); Ziwan (Iraq); rigid rye grass; seeds.

W.H.M.M. 150705.

This is a tufted annual grass grazed by sheep and other animals. It is related to the darnel grass (*L. temutenlum*), "Jamdar," which is regarded as an obnoxious weed, since its seeds are sometimes infected by an ergot fungus generating a narcotic poison. The use of the seeds sold in Tehran is not known.

Loranthus Grewinkii Boiss. and Bunge (Loranthaceae) 824*

کشمش کولی 278*

Kishmish-i-kūlī (Teh.); Kishmish-kawali (Ind. bazaars); Dibk (Ar.); mistletoe berries.

Field 139; W.H.M.M. 150756.

These fruits are called raisins of Kawali, Kawali being the name for gypsies in Iraq and Iran. Le Bode in his "Travels in Lauristan and Arabistan" mentions his being shown in the forests of the Zagros Mountains, on the road from Kermanshah to Baghdad, a fruit called by the natives Angur-i-kauli (Kawali) or grapes of Kauli, a parasite on the oak. The dried berries are rounded, 8 mm. in diameter, soft, dark brown, and shriveled, and have one seed. They are mawkish in taste, containing a form of caoutchouc which can be drawn out in threads. The author of the "Makhzan-el-Adwiya"

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This plant, allied to *Colchicum*, occurs in North Iran, Afghanistan, the juniper tracts of Baluchistan, and in the Punjab. Aitchison found this plant common all over the Badghis and Khorasan. The corms are collected as a medicine and exported from Meshed through Iran via the Persian Gulf to India. The drug is one of the forms of the ancient Hermodactyl. It is probably the Surinjan-i-shirin or sweet Surinjan, a medicine used by Mohammedans in India. The root from Hamadan is broken into pieces showing a white, starchy fracture with no perceptible taste or smell. The drug is said to have the same action as the bitter Surinjan (*Colchicum* spp.) as a remedy for rheumatism.

Mirabilis Jalapa L. (Nyctaginaceae)

تخم لال عباس

Tukhm-i-lāl'abbās (Teh.); Gul-i-abbasa (Pers.); fruits of the marvel of Peru.

W.H.M.M. 150895.

The marvel of Peru or four-o'clock is a plant of tropical America. It is named *Mirabilis*, or wonderful, on account of the variegated colors of the flowers, and *Jalapa*, as it was formerly supposed to be the true jalap plant. The fruits are oval or vase-shaped, 8 by 5 mm., dark reddish brown, five-ribbed, and papillate, containing a white, starchy seed. Little is known about its medicinal action, but the fruits have been said to be used in adulterating black pepper. [263]

Morus nigra L. (Moraceae)

شاه توت

The fruits: Tūt-i-kushk (Teh.).

The root: Rishah-shāh-tūt (Teh.).

The tree: Shāh-tūt, "royal mulberry" (Pers.).

Field 46A, 269, 402; K.B. 327.

The black or grafted mulberry is cultivated in Iran and Baluchistan, principally for its fruit; the white mulberry (*M. alba*), for sericulture. They both yield fruit which in season is sold in the bazaar and met with in nearly every household (Ait.). When carefully dried, the fruits are called Tut-i-dham, and supply a wholesome and nutritious article of diet during winter. [262] [231] [245]

The other drug of the mulberry tree from Tehran consists of the bark of the root, reddish colored externally, with strong, silky white liber cells. It is used for dysmenorrhea.

35: Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MHI

824* Field 194; W.H.M.M. 150774; K.B. 328.

278* Schlimmer remarks that Shiraz supplies Iran with these seeds and adds that they are an indispensable ingredient in iced sherbet [263] (sorbets à la glace). The seeds, or nutlets, are black, punctulate, oblong or ellipsoid, 2 by 1 mm., arched on one side, with a bifurcate line on the other. They are smaller than those of the sweet basil, with a less prominent, white umbilicus, but, like them, they become coated with opalescent mucilage when placed in water. The seeds are given locally for lung and chest complaints and as a heart tonic.

Olea europea L. (Oleaceae)

زیتون

Zaitūn; olive.

[262] Cultivated for its fruits and for the extraction of oil, the olive tree provides an important article of diet and medicinal remedy.—Leaves are sometimes prepared as a decoction for coughs (H.F.).

Onosma echioides L. (Boraginaceae)

ریشه هوه چوبه

Rīshah havah-i-chūbah (Ham.); Havah-i-chūbah (Teh.); Ratanjot (Hind.); Indian alkanet root.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 4: 181; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 178; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 2: 54.

Field 165; W.H.M.M. 150718; K.B. 329.

This plant, growing in Afghanistan and Siberia, affords a root which is substituted for European alkanet (*Anchusa tinctoria*), from Al-kanna of the Arabs, employed as a dye and medicine in early times. The root of the allied species, *O. Hookeri* Clarke, is called Ranj-i-badshah, "King's dye." The tapering root has a [386] purplish red color, and the cortical portion easily separates in flakes. It imparts its color to oils and spirits, and is used in coloring medicinal • [231] preparations. In Iran the root is powdered and given to horses for coughs and as a condition powder.

Orchis latifolia L. (Orchidaceae)

سعلب

Sa'lab (Teh.); Salab-misri (Ar.); Punjah-i-salaba; Oriental salep.

Field 229; W.H.M.M. 150908.

Palmate or hand-shaped tubers of orchids are considered the best for medicinal purposes. They are deprived of their epidermis by

This agaric occurs on the oak and larch, and in sizes as large as a 824*
fist or a child's head; it is light, spongy, and friable, and is not easily 278*
powdered. The use of this fungus in medicine is of very ancient date.
Avicenna insists upon the great efficacy of agaric as an alexipharmic.
Mohammedan physicians closely follow the Greeks in considering
that it removes all kinds of visceral obstructions and expels diseased
humors. It is also a Chinese drug. The light, white, spongy interior [372]
is made into touchwood, spunk, or tinder, and was formerly used to
absorb blood and secretions from wounds, etc.; hence the old name
Fungus or Boletus Chirurgorum given to the plant.

Prosopis Stephaniana Kunth (Leguminosae)

خرنوبان

Kharnūbān, Kornub (Isf.); Shok (Ar.); Kumbut (Syr.); Chughak: "humphacked, bent," applied to the contorted pods, Tukhm-i-jinjak (Ait.); the pods.

Field 403.

This is a loose, straggling, thorny shrub of the Caucasus, Syria,
Iran, and northern India. The pods are brown or copper-colored,
4 by 1.5 cm., galled, swollen, and contorted, containing several oval,
brown seeds separated by soft, spongy dissepiments. The pods are [231]
eaten by sheep, but the seeds pass through undamaged and germinate
readily at the coming of the winter rains (G.). The pods and roots
of the plant are regarded as astringent and are given for dysentery.

Prunus Amygdalus Stokes var. amara Baill. (Rosaceae) [245]

بادام تلخ

Bādām-i-talkh (Teh.); bitter almonds.

Field 52A, 171.

The bitter almond tree, like the sweet, is a native probably
of Iran and Asia Minor, and is indistinguishable in botanical characters.
In form and appearance bitter almonds closely resemble
Valencia almonds, but are usually smaller. They are employed in
confectionery and for flavoring, but as the hydrocyanic acid yielded [263]
by them varies in quantity, they should be used with caution.—An
ointment made of bitter almonds is applied to furuncles (H.F.).

Prunus Armeniaca L. (Rosaceae) 824*

زرد آلو 262

The fruit: Zard ālū (Pers.); Mishmish (Iraq); Khūbani, with 245
stones removed (Hind.); dried apricot.

machinery. At the same time the cost of new machinery and equip- 655
ment will need to be financed—possibly out of Development Board 407
funds if earlier plans to borrow for this purpose from the Inter- 427
national Bank do not materialize.

Government rental of machinery should at best be considered a temporary expedient. It is wasteful, primarily because overhead expenses are high. The transportation of machinery from central shops to the renters tends to be expensive and to expose the machinery to excessive wear and tear. Private and cooperative ownership of machinery should therefore be encouraged. One step in this direction would be to enable the Agricultural Bank to lend money for this purpose on the security of the machinery. In the past the absence of any provision for registering title to such machinery has prevented such loans. Another important measure would be to encourage the establishment of cooperatives for the collective ownership of machinery, especially in the new agricultural areas which are to be opened. At present the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project owns a number of tractors. [474] Because overhead costs are relatively low it is able to rent them out at lower rate than the AMA while still apparently covering the cost of operation and depreciation.

V. Control of Pests and Diseases

Livestock Pests and Mortality 232 ●

More effective control of pests and diseases would also materially help to improve yields. This is particularly true of livestock. Because of lack of funds, equipment and trained personnel, no systematic campaigns for eradicating specific groups of diseases have been undertaken. Many livestock diseases, particularly of the parasitic type, are rife. Among the principal livestock diseases are foot and mouth disease; haemorrhagic septicaemia; anthrax; sheep pox; blackleg; parasitic gastritis; tick-borne diseases (anaplasmosis and piroplasmosis); fowl cholera; Newcastle disease; various manges; and dourine. The available staff is wholly insufficient to control, let alone eradicate, any epidemic which might break out. A serious outbreak of disease would endanger the livestock industry of neighboring countries as well as that of Iraq.

232

The first requisite for an effective campaign against livestock diseases is a larger trained staff. The number of field veterinarians should be increased from 17 to 28 as rapidly as possible. A number of Iraqis should be sent to foreign veterinary schools, preferably in countries where comparable livestock conditions exist, such as India, Pakistan, Egypt or Turkey. Pending the training of Iraqis, it would be advisable to engage a number of veterinarians abroad. The field service should be augmented by trained assistants and dispensers. Graduates of the Abu Ghuraib agricultural school might be recruited for these positions and given a short concentrated course in the practical aspects of veterinary science at the veterinary school at Baghdad, with further instruction at the neighboring clinic, the Veterinary Service Institute and the abattoir. It would be highly advisable to take some of the candidates for such training from the nomadic tribes so that they can later help their own tribes in combatting the hundred and one ailments which beset their livestock. Organization of a competent veterinary field service is likely to prove impossible, however, unless the prevailing pay and other conditions of service are greatly improved.

Secondly, facilities for diagnosis and treatment should be improved. It is suggested that simple regional diagnostic laboratories be set up in all provinces. At present all laboratory work in connection with diagnosis is centered in the Veterinary Service Institute at Baghdad, thus causing much waste of time and effort. Decentralization might begin with the establishment of laboratories in Mosul and Kirkuk to serve the North and in Basra to serve the South. Such regional laboratories should not be established, however, at the expense of the quality of the staff and service of the Institute in Baghdad. Complicated diagnosis would continue to be handled by the Institute which also manufactures sera and vaccines. It would be advisable to reorganize and strengthen the Institute so that it can give adequate support to the veterinarians in the field and make an appropriate contribution to veterinary education. The quality of equipment must be improved and production methods modernized. A qualified foreign expert might be appointed to assist in making the necessary changes.

232

There is a great need for systematic remedial and prophylactic treatment to reduce widely prevalent parasitic infections by such means as flock treatment against internal worms, and cattle and sheep dipping against external parasites. A small campaign to control sheep pox and other external ailments was begun at one time, but abandoned because of lack of funds. In the future adequate funds should be set aside to carry out a well-planned campaign of dipping, particularly in the North. This will involve the establishment of dip-tanks at strategic points in relation to the grazing grounds of the herds and flocks, the location to be worked out by a ground survey undertaken by field officers. Another important prophylactic measure would be the establishment of quarantine stations at points used for international trade in livestock.

At present many livestock belonging to the nomadic tribes die from lack of water or exposure to severe weather, either directly or indirectly as the result of lowered resistance to disease. In the severe winter of 1949 about 1,500,000 sheep are said to have died in the mountains of Kurdistan. In the South the waterholes used by the tribes tend to dry up in dry years, thus necessitating great treks to reach water during which many animals are lost. Such losses would be greatly reduced by livestock shelters in the North and more wells in the South. The shelters, which should be built at strategic points on the migration routes, would be primarily for the protection of lambing ewes and would provide emergency feed supplies for migratory flocks. A three-walled mud structure, with a roof and accommodations for shepherds and some feedstuffs, will be sufficient. Although the government has dug some wells for the use of the southern tribes, much more could be done.

Plant Diseases and Pests

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The pests and diseases affecting crops have not been as great a problem as those attacking livestock. The locust plague is a periodic menace, but has been kept rather successfully under control in recent years. The systematic distribution of poison bait in hatching areas during the spring has been the most effective method of combating the locust.[9] Since the bait will be scorned when succulent green food is available, it is important also that farmers

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[9] The best bait consists of mill-run bran, sawdust, sodium fluorsilicate and water and should be applied at the rate of 14 pounds of wet bait per donum.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

In any discussion of pests the damage caused by weeds is worth emphasizing again. Poor tillage and the tendency to use idle land as pasture has caused a rapid spread of Bermuda and Johnson grass in the irrigation zone. These pests have actually forced a considerable amount of crop land out of production and have lowered the yield of such summer crops as cotton, maize and sesame. 242

VI. Improvement in Livestock and Livestock Products

Improvement in both the quality and quantity of livestock production is likely to be of growing importance in the future, particularly since the anticipated rapid increase in public expenditures on development as a whole will create an expanding and more discriminating market for animal products. 231

In general the types of livestock found in Iraq represent rather hardy animals which, through a process of natural selection, have become fairly resistant to the rigors imposed by a severe climate and inadequate feed supplies. This does not mean that improvements in breeding cannot be effected. At present breeding 232 is largely haphazard and uncontrolled, particularly as to timing and the selection of sires. It is a well-known scientific fact, however, that the evaluation of genetic factors influencing production in any direction—meat, milk, wool, work, and the like—cannot be properly assessed unless the nutritional level is first improved, thus permitting the full genetic development of the livestock to take place. Iraq is a particularly striking illustration of the truth of the old saying that "half the breed goes into the mouth."

One of the best methods of exploring the possibility of improved breeding and the results of better feeding and other livestock practices would be to establish a number of herds and flocks of indigenous breeds of livestock as well as poultry on government farms throughout Iraq. There careful records would be kept to discover for the first time what these animals can really produce with improved feeding, breeding and management. These livestock stations could also provide progeny-tested sires to farmers for

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

breeding. Above all, farmers could be brought there to see with their own eyes the benefits of better livestock practices and the value of mixed farming. A start toward establishing such herds and flocks has already been made.

The following expanded program might be carried out over the next few years in different parts of Iraq:

Southern Area:

1. A flock of purebred Arabi sheep should be kept at the government farm at Basra, together with a herd of selected buffalo.
2. A herd of selected buffalo should be established at Amara either on government property or on private property where the owner will cooperate with the government in obtaining the necessary information on breeding, performance, feeding, etc.

Central Area:

1. At Abu Ghuraib Farm the selected flock of Awasi sheep should be more usefully adapted than at present to give information on breed performance, milk production, wool yield, etc. The herd of Jenubi dairy cows should follow a carefully planned program with respect to breeding, feeding and types of management to determine performance, influence of improved feeding, likely foundation dairy strains for country stations, and the like. At present the farm has no clearly defined livestock policy and lacks continuity of policy. This station might also usefully continue its work on Friesians as a town (Baghdad) cow, purely for urban milk supplies. It would be undesirable to continue with more than one imported breed of cows for this purpose, and the use of this breed should be strictly limited to urban requirements.
2. Work should also be done on buffalo in this central area but this can be readily carried out by controlling breeding and management on one or more of the buffalo settlements (e.g. Dora) in the neighborhood of Baghdad.
3. In the central area also, the work on Arab horse breeding should be maintained and expanded on a more realistic basis. The local racing organizations and the Turf Club would probably cooperate readily in a comprehensive breeding scheme to improve the quality of the local horses.
4. Finally, a small farm (300-500 donums) should be purchased in the Diyala province and organized on a mixed

farming basis, including crops, horticulture and livestock 232 in its program. From the livestock point of view it should be a demonstration of the production of milk, eggs and poultry under irrigation conditions to meet urban requirements in the Baquba and Baghdad areas; a lesson in improved feeding, breeding and management, and, above all, in mixed farming.

Northern Area:

1. Flocks of Karadi sheep should be established at Nineveh and Bakrajo, a herd of northern black cattle at Bakrajo, and a herd of Sharabi cattle at Nineveh. Improved foundation stock or even purebred sires of the black mountain breed of cattle might be brought in from Turkey.
2. For mule breeding, selected foundation stock (jacks) might be introduced from Cyprus to meet the mountain and hill requirements of this northern area.

Special measures will need to be taken to assist the nomads in improving their livestock. Aside from the veterinary assistants which might be attached to the tribes, it would be desirable to train a few members of each tribe in such a way that they can give advice and assistance on other livestock matters, including the development of better breeds with the help of selected sires procured from the government. Better pasturage is, however, the critical question. In view of the difficulty of increasing the feed supply for the livestock of the nomads in the South, their problem may be best met in the end by converting an increasing number to mixed farming as new areas are irrigated. Some help may be given by investigating the possibility of conserving existing desert forage plants and introducing new drought-resistant grasses and herbs. For the northern nomads better watered natural grazing lands are available. Unfortunately these lands have been badly [233] abused, and, in the Northeast in particular, a considerable portion has been overgrazed so severely that scarcely any palatable forage remains. Regulations to enforce rotational grazing are urgently needed. Reseeding of the worst areas would not be impossible and would certainly reap large dividends. Controlled grazing is particularly necessary to safeguard the scanty forest areas. For this purpose it is suggested that the migration routes for livestock in the North be fixed in consultation with the Forestry Department.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-
464 supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
166 shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently
go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agri-
[452] cultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
654 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
185 have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being
semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

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southern provinces and has been held responsible for sporadic outbreaks of dengue fever. It is also a potential vector of urban yellow fever, although that disease is not reported from this region. Many varieties of Culex mosquitoes have been recorded, but none has been specifically implicated in the transmission of disease. *Culex quinquefasciatus* (= *C. fatigans*) or *C. pipiens* (each a potential vector of *Wuchereria bancrofti*) is present in most areas. 136 164

Within recent years extensive mosquito control work has been undertaken by municipal and government authorities, by the oil companies and, during World War II, by the British Expeditionary Forces. The problem is stupendous, involving the improvement and the regulation of the irrigation facilities on which the agricultural economy of the country depends. In 1947, malaria control was first attempted on a nation-wide basis with the creation of an antimalaria service within the Iraqi health organization. Since that date, control operations have been carried on in various highly endemic areas. Depending upon local conditions, they have included antilarval measures, drainage works and residual spraying of the rural villages with DDT preparations. In 1952, a demonstration DDT house-spraying program was initiated in the hyperendemic Tanjero Valley of Sulaimaniya *liwa* (province), in conjunction with the World Health Organization. 744 136 312 744 164

FLIES. Flies are prevalent in all parts of the country. Numerous species of MUSCIDAE are encountered, many of which are implicated in the mechanical transmission of intestinal and eye diseases. *Musca sorbens* and *M. domestica vicina* are most frequently incriminated, but *M. tempestiva*, *M. vitripennis* and *M. mesopotamiensis* are also abundant. The larvae of *Fannia canicularis* sometimes cause myiasis in the livestock. The stable fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, is almost ubiquitous. At least 22 species of *Tabanus* are recorded, and many local authorities believe that they are involved in the mechanical transmission of anthrax. 136 164 136 232 164

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136 164 Several species of *Chrysops*, including *C. punctifera*, are known to be present.

232 Among the myiasis-producing flies which attack animals, and incidentally man, the most numerous are *Chrysomyia albiceps*; the blow fly, *Calliphora erythrocephala*; the green-bottle fly, *Lucilia sericata*; the horse bot fly, *Gasterophilus nasalis*; the sheep bot fly, *Oestrus ovis*; and the flesh fly, *Sarcophaga hirtipes*.

136 164 At least 12 species of sandflies are found. They are serious pests and may produce a form of dermatitis in susceptible individuals. The most widespread species is *Phlebotomus papatasii*, the vector of sandfly fever throughout this area. *P. sergenti* is abundant in the central and the southern provinces and in sections of the northern. It transmits cutaneous leishmaniasis and is apparently the only vector in Iraq, although *P. papatasii* is also implicated in adjacent territories. Potential vectors of kala-azar may be present in the northwest, but the disease is almost never reported.

Several species of SIMULIDAE occur in the hilly districts. The biting midge, *Leptoconops mesopotamiensis*, is an annoying pest.

LICE. All 3 species of human lice, *Pediculus humanus corporis*, *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis*, are common, especially among the poorer sections of the population. *P. humanus corporis* is important as the vector of louse-borne typhus and louse-borne relapsing fever, both of which are endemic.

136 164 232 FLEAS. The only flea of primary medical importance is the Oriental rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*. It parasitizes the rats and other rodents and is the vector in sporadic outbreaks of murine typhus and plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are plentiful in most areas.

136 BEDBUGS. The bedbug, *Cimex lectularius*, is indigenous. The tropical species, *C. hemipterus*, is frequently encountered in Baghdad, Basra and other cities, but is seldom seen in the rural villages.

000 TICKS AND MITES. Numerous species of

TICKS AND MITES. NUMEROUS SPECIES OF
164 ticks infest the livestock, including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus*, *Hyalomma dromedarii*
136 and *Haemaphysalis cinnabarina punctata*.
232 *Ornithodorus tholozani* occurs in many localities, and is the vector in sporadic cases of tick-borne relapsing fever. *O. savignyi* is present in the desert areas. The fowl or blue Persian tick, *Argas persicus*, and the castor bean tick, *Ixodes ricinus*, are widespread.

136 The itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is prevalent,
369 especially in the congested urban communities and rural villages. The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventricosus*, is a frequent pest in the grain-growing districts.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Scorpions are common, particularly in the northern provinces. The most dangerous species are *Buthus australis* and *B. crassicauda*.
[165] *B. europaeus* is also present. A few deaths from scorpion stings are reported each year, usually among young children or old people. *Scorpio maurus kruglovi* is sometimes encountered in the plains and *S. maurus townsendi* in the Persian Gulf region. The principal poisonous spider in Iraq is *Lycosa tarantula*.

136 Other Arthropods. *Reduvius tabidus*
752 and *R. annulipes* are found in many areas. The "date beetle," a large aquatic species of the family BELASTOMIDAE, is capable of causing serious bites.

136 Reptiles. Twenty-six species of snakes
752 have been recorded from Iraq, but only 5
165 land varieties are venomous. Casualties from snake bites are reported occasionally. A large proportion of the fatalities is probably caused by the Levantine or blunt-nosed viper, *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, which inhabits the northeastern highlands from north of Baghdad to the Turkish and the Iranian frontiers. *V. lebetina euphratica* is also seen in some localities. The horned viper, *Aspis cerastes* (= *Cerastes cornutus*), is native to the alluvial plains, while the carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, is found in limited areas in Diwaniya province. The hoodless cobra, *Naja morgani*, is widely distributed but apparently is rare. The poison-

ous sea snake, *Enhydrina shistosa*, roams 136
the Persian Gulf and the Shatt al Arab. 752
Although it may be dangerous to fishermen, 165
no fatalities are known to have occurred.

Rodents. *Rattus rattus frugivorus* is the 136
rat most frequently encountered in Iraqi 164
dwellings. *R. rattus alexandrinus* is also indigenous, while *R. norvegicus* is present in Basra, Baghdad and the river towns. *Nesokia buxtoni, Dipodillus dasyurus* and *Meriones charion* are reported from different localities. Rats are often captured in Baghdad and Basra and examined for evidences of plague, but otherwise little rodent control work is undertaken, except at the time of plague outbreaks.

Mollusks.* *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), the intermediate snail host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, is found in numerous foci in central and southern Iraq, where pump or gravity flow irrigation is employed. It inhabits the many small and sluggish irrigation canals and the rice fields, borrow pits, marshes and other suitable collections of water, but is strictly seasonal in appearance, being abundant only in the summer and the fall months, from May or June to November. The snails are widespread in Basra, Muntafiq, Diwaniya and Amarah provinces in the south, but are absent from the Shatt al Arab region south of Basra, where breeding is restricted by the salinity of the water. They are more scattered in distribution in the central provinces and practically nonexistent in the north, aside from localized foci around the
marshlands of the Mosul area. *Radix lagotis* 136
canaliculata, a vector of *S. turkestanicum* 232
which causes serious infections among the livestock, is found in the rice fields and the marshes of the southern delta.

The threat of the spread of *Bulinus trun-* 136
catus, and subsequently of schistosomiasis, 164
with the expansion of irrigation creates a 744
problem which is of major public health and economic importance to the country. Small-scale snail-control campaigns have been undertaken in the past in Baghdad, Basra and

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* See footnote, page 10.

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Diwaniya provinces. In 1949, a co-ordinated control program was introduced by the Iraqi government, and a Bilharzia Section was established within the national health organization. The section initiated a snail survey in the various endemic foci and research on the most effective methods of snail control. It carries on continuous snail destruction work through special units assigned to each of the infected provinces. 136 164 744

Plants. Little precise information is available regarding the prevalence of allergy-producing plants, but numerous weeds, grasses and trees, which have been incriminated in other countries, are present in districts with rainfall adequate to support such vegetation. 137 752

Occasional deaths, primarily among young children, have been traced to the consumption of the raw beans of *Vicia fava*, a prominent food crop throughout this region. The beans are toxic to susceptible individuals in the raw state. Plants of the *Senecio* group grow in sections of the northern highlands. The young green shoots are poisonous and sometimes cause fatalities among the livestock. 137 165 232

Food Sanitation

The government and municipal health authorities are responsible for the enforcement of regulations governing the sanitary quality of foods, meats and milk products, but the degree of enforcement varies in different localities. Health inspectors are charged with the supervision of establishments where foods are prepared or sold, such as foodshops, markets, restaurants and cafés, mineral-water bottling works and date-packing houses. Examinations for the presence of venereal diseases are theoretically required at regular intervals in the case of cooks and barbers, but no tests to detect other infections are carried out. 744

Meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter in the city abattoirs by officers of the government veterinary and health services. All carcasses offered for sale are supposed to bear an official stamp of

744 approval, but illegal slaughtering takes place in many areas. No effective control is carried out in the rural villages, where the animals are slaughtered locally.

234 744 Milk from cows and goats is marketed by large numbers of small producers. Government regulations exist for the sanitary inspection of dairies and the periodic tuberculin testing of cattle. In practice, however, few controls are exercised over the methods of production or the quality of the product. There is only one pasteurization plant in the country. This is located in Baghdad, and is operated by the government's Agriculture Department. It was established primarily for the purpose of supplying pasteurized milk to the child welfare centers, but a small percentage of its output is sold
234 to private customers. Milk is customarily
164 boiled before use, but butter and cheese
232 are often vehicles for the spread of brucellosis and other diseases. Brucellosis is enzootic among the cattle and the goats, and bovine tuberculosis among the dairy herds.

HEALTH SERVICES AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health Organizations

744 657 Responsibility for the protection of the public health and for the provision of medical care facilities is centralized in the Ministry of Health of the Iraqi government, with headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry was established in 1952, replacing the former Directorate General of Health in the Ministry of Social Affairs. Under the present organization, the Minister of Health is assisted by a Director General of Health, in charge of health and medical services, and by an Inspector General of Health. The Minister also has jurisdiction over the Royal Faculty of Medicine which administers the Royal Hospital and the Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad.

The functional activities of the Ministry are concentrated in two major divisions—curative medicine and preventive and social medicine—as well as in a number of admin-
ISTRATIVE BRANCHES.

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An ancylostomiasis section is incorporated in the Department of Endemic Diseases, and a program for the improvement of rural sanitation is being developed by the health authorities.

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OTHER HELMINTH INFECTIONS. A large proportion of the inhabitants harbor one or more types of intestinal worms. Ascariasis predominates in the northern and the central provinces. Heavy infections, often with intestinal obstruction, are common. In the studies made on groups of men of 18 to 20 years of age, as indicated above, ova of *Ascaris lumbricoides* were found in the fecal specimens from 10 per cent of the 125 individuals examined in Baghdad city. In the provinces, ova were detected in fecal samples from 9 per cent of 135 persons from Baghdad, from 15 per cent of 145 persons from Dulaim and from 13 per cent of 309 persons from Diyala.

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Enterobiasis, trichuriasis and, to a lesser extent, strongyloidiasis are prevalent. *Trichostrongylus*, a parasite of sheep and goats which sometimes infects man, is widely distributed in the Shatt al Arab region. Infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are numerous. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is often encountered, but not as widely as in Syria and other Arab countries where more raw meat is customarily consumed. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is occasionally observed in the Christian communities.

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Hydatid disease is endemic, especially in the central provinces. Stray dogs are numerous and serve as primary reservoirs of infection. In a survey published in 1940,[46] adults of *Echinococcus granulosus* were found in 18 per cent of 123 street dogs examined in Baghdad. Hydatid cysts were seen in the carcasses of 12 per cent of 2,347 sheep and goats slaughtered in the municipal abattoir and in 25 per cent of 223 cattle.

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Other Infections. Brucellosis is enzootic among goats, sheep and cattle, and sporadic human infections result from the consumption of cheese, *leban* and other unboiled

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milk products, or from contact with in- 164
fected animals. From 5 to 97 cases were 232
treated annually in government institutions 758
in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination 742
of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to 164
the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 232
1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br. melitensis* was isolated from 5 of the 13 samples from which bacteriologic cultures were made.

DISEASES SPREAD CHIEFLY THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the 164
most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49, from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuberculosis were recorded annually. Such figures are of little value in assessing the problem, however, due to inadequate reporting and the shortage of diagnostic and treatment facilities. Local authorities estimate that the prevalence of latent or active infections approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas.
Widespread undernutrition and low stand- 164
ards of living, associated with overcrowd- 146
ing and ignorance of the basic principles of 511
hygiene, are factors contributing to the 165
spread of the disease. The death rates are known to be high, but little precise information is available. It is believed that a considerable number of tuberculosis deaths are erroneously attributed to pneumonia
and other respiratory infections. Moreover, [183]
the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit the presence of tuberculosis in the family due to the stigma customarily attached to
the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an aver- 164
age of 760 cases were treated in government 758
hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of about 25 per cent. The maximum number of cases occurred in the group from 16 to 30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. 164
Involvement of the bones or the glands accounts for a large proportion of the non-

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000 744 to 300 patients in residence. A comprehensive leprosy control program is planned for the near future by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization.

232 164 **Other Infections.** Rabies is enzootic among dogs, jackals and other animals. The jackals, the principal reservoir, often invade the villages and the outlying sections of the towns. Human infections occur sporadically: in 1944-49, the recorded cases averaged from 4 to 32 a year. In the same period, from 739 to 1,365 persons were treated annually at the Antirabic Institute in Baghdad. The majority gave a history of having been bitten by rabid dogs. The Institute also prepares rabies vaccine for distribution throughout the country. [743]

Anthrax is prevalent among the sheep. From 130 to 225 human cases are reported annually among persons in contact with infected animals, or among individuals working with hides or wool. Tetanus is sporadic: the known incidence totals 130 to 250 cases each year. Tetanus neonatorum is common, especially in the rural areas. Cases of human glanders are seen from time to time. Leptospirosis, or Weil's disease, is occasionally encountered in the southern provinces. However, no evidence of infection with *Leptospira icterohaemorrhagiae* has yet been found among the rats captured in Baghdad.

DISEASES SPREAD BY ARTHROPODS

164 361 **Malaria.** Malaria is endemic or hyperendemic throughout most of Iraq. The distribution and the severity of the disease vary with the physiographic features of the different regions and the amount and the type of irrigation. It has always been regarded as a disease of primary importance in the country, but within the last few decades it has become increasingly prominent in the southern provinces due to the expansion of irrigation facilities. 164 The cases of malaria treated in government institutions in the 7 years 1944-50 averaged about 598,800 annually. The case rates in the various provinces, based upon the at-

p. 43(A)

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scarlet foliage. The fruit and root-stock of wild rhubarb are collected and employed in medicine; the fruits were official in the "Pharmacopoeia Persica." A decoction of the reddish, triangular-winged fruits is considered a more powerful purgative than that of the rootstock (Aitchison). The fruits are used in Tehran as a vermifuge for horses, and in Hamadan the drug is applied as a poultice for headache. The rhubarb leaves from Isfahan are made into an infusion and used for gonorrhea (C.).

Rhodymenia sp. (Florideae, Rhodymeniaceae)

ليقا

Lyka, Leeka (Iraq); Chinai-ghasa or seaweed.

Field 31A.

This alga, obtained in northern Iran, is light brown and gelatinous. A decoction is given for coughs. As a substitute for agar-agar, it is emulcent, emollient, and alterative, and may be used as a cultivating medium for bacteria.

Rhus coriaria L. (Anacardiaceae)

سماق

Summāq, Summāq-i-shakki bī hastah (Teh.); Tirsh (Kurd.); Tartak (Hind.); leaves, bark, and fruits.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 2: 4; Post; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 1: 373.

[245] [281] [386]

Field 164, 272; 107 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150800; K.B. 335.

The sumac is a tree cultivated in Khurasan, western Afghanistan, and throughout Central Asia. The leaves have long been used by the Arabs, Turks, Iranis, and in Europe, for dyeing silk and tanning leather. They contain from 15 to 35 per cent of tannin.

The fruit is exported from Iran and used by Mohammedans in India. It is a small, sticky drupe, the size of a lentil, 5 mm. in diameter, red or green, acid, and astringent to the taste, containing one lenticular, polished, brown seed.

—Mixed with *Punica Granatum* L., sumac is applied to relieve painful gums. The seeds in an infusion are used to acidulate foods (H.F.).

Ricinus communis L. (Euphorbiaceae)

گرچک فرنگی

Garchak farangī (Teh.); Warchak (Ham.); Tochme Kertchec (Schl.); Kurwa (Ar., Iraq); Bedanjir, "willow fig"; castor oil seeds.

proper picture of the whole, I have confined myself in these pages t 121
what may be described as the general aspects of the question as distinc
from those of particular localities. Nor has anything like the attention
the subject deserves been given to pastoral rights. For while settlement [233]
of rights to grazing and pasture is also required, they do not call for such
rigid definition, nor is settlement of such rights so urgently needed as
of rights to cultivable land, unless the two conflict. Consideration of the
Land Revenue system in force when I visited the country has also been
omitted, as this system has since been superseded (see ii, 4).

In pursuance of the attempt to restrict attention at this stage to 121
those phases of the problem which call for action first, I have also avoided 423
consideration here of many features or incidentals of existing land tenure,
which may be intrinsically of as great importance as others that are
examined. Among matters which are not examined in this report for
this reason may be mentioned: the various forms of dedication in *waqf*,
the conditions of *mulk* tenure, the escheat of tapu tenure for failure to
cultivate or failure of heirs, known as *mahlul*, the charge known as *uqr*,
the position of newly formed land in a river termed *shati*, the old and
new forms of hypothec or mortgage. These almost exclusively affect
the registered tenures, and are best considered in the general study and
amendment of the land law which is advocated (see vii, 1). Similarly
the much-debated question of the conditions under which acquisitive
prescription of tapu tenure should come into effect, can have little
practical value, until the Government is in a position to implement its
statutory tenures. Important established customs affecting State
Domain, which are not entered into for the same reason are the *mugharisa*
and *ta'aba* systems of planting and tending gardens and groves.

Finally, I have thought it best, on these grounds also, to restrict detailed discussion of proposed measures to those required for the initial execution of reform. While the character of measures that would be required subsequently to conserve the benefits attained by reform have had to be indicated, no attempt is made to formulate them in detail.

Even generalised and truncated in these ways the main problem 000
remains a difficult one either to present or to master; but it has not appeared to me possible to simplify it further without distortion. The study of the land tenure of any country, with a view to practical and realisable reform, is no light undertaking; and that undertaking is attended with peculiar difficulties in el 'Iraq for reasons which are explained.

To facilitate reading and reference I have divided this report into nine parts, which I have endeavoured to make as self-contained as possible. This necessitates some repetition and discontinuity on consecutive reading; but it is impossible to present this intricate question in any readily digestible form. The subject matter of each of these parts is given on the contents page and need not be repeated. The last alone calls for explanation. It has been written in response to numerous inquiries, official and otherwise, when I was in el 'Iraq, regarding the wider setting of the problems of land tenure in relation to the general development of the country as a whole and to the other great ameliorative movements needed. It concludes with a summary of the main recommendations made. It is hoped that this part of the report may be of assistance to those who, while impressed with the critical importance of a constructive reform of land tenure, may be unable to study the whole of this report textually.

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The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el 'Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country.

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

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Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised.

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All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use.

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8. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the

135 (2) The Supply of Raw Materials and Power: Iraqis is potentially
233 rich in many kinds of raw materials. In the first place it has abundant
241 supplies of oil and gas which provide a cheap source of both
433 raw material and fuel. Secondly, it has pastoral and agricultural products such as wool, camel hair, hides and skins, meat, fish, milk, animal fat. Thirdly, it has fertile land which, with the extension of irrigation, can be a rich source of such raw materials as sugar beets, sugar cane, soybeans and jute, in addition to products already available such as tobacco, cotton, sesame, linseed, and practically all types of grain, fruits and vegetables. Finally, recent geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. There are deposits of sulphurs, apparently of commercial value, in many parts of Iraq, and of salt, especially near Basrah. Yet each of these resources presents a different problem; none is easily exploitable (except oil); quantities available for industry are limited and the quality frequently poor. Agriculture has been kept at a low level of output because of the lack of irrigation schemes in most parts of the country; the difficulties caused by the present land tenure system and the agricultural techniques connected with the tribal system, which covers over 80 per cent of the cultivated area; the absence of an effective agricultural extension service and lack of modern storing facilities; these and other factors have held back both quantity and quality of agricultural and animal products. There was a noticeable extension in the cultivation of cotton in recent years, but the severe failure of the crop in 1951, owing to a pest attack, has been a great set-back. Difficulties in the supply of raw materials have held up many an industrial enterprise. The scheme for a sugar factory which has been under discussion since 1947 has had to be postponed from one year to another owing to the uncertainties connected with the
[28] cultivation of both sugar beet and sugar cane. The progress of the leather tanning industry, one of the oldest industries in Iraq, has been retarded due to the existing conditions in which hides and skins have been prepared and preserved, and great losses to this particularly native industry have resulted. The woollen textile
[289] mills have had to import certain qualities of Australian wool to mix with Iraqi wool which is of a coarse variety.

135 So far as mineral resources are concerned the surveys that have been made are insufficient.[1] Further exploration work is

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[1] As of writing, in July 1953.

241 [387] yields. As will be indicated later, inorganic fertilizers could probably be produced cheaply in Iraq and organic fertilizers could be produced as by-products of the slaughtering industry.

231 4. Livestock Improvement

The productivity of livestock is extremely low, primarily because of inadequate feed supply. In addition to the production of fodder crops, measures should be taken to improve natural pasture lands, particularly in the northern mountains, which have generally suffered from over-grazing. Reseeding and rotational grazing are necessary. Productivity could be further raised by the establishment of shelters, better breeding methods, especially the introduction of new and improved sires and maintenance of stud stations, and by more effective control of parasitic diseases through an increase in the number of veterinarians and the provision of more extensive diagnostic facilities in the provinces.

The quality of livestock products could be raised considerably by a number of measures. One of these is an improvement in the practices and more stringent sanitary supervision of abattoirs. Others would be the establishment of a number of wool shearing and grading units under the guidance of an appropriate expert; appointment of a hides and skins expert to serve as general manager of the newly established Hides and Skins Association; and recruitment of an abattoir specialist to train local abattoir supervisors in improved methods of flaying and preserving hides and skins.

234 At present, even the major cities are without a clean, safe milk supply. The supply of milk could be substantially improved by better feeding of livestock, concentration of milking cattle in well-equipped settlements on the outskirts of cities, and central collection, transportation and processing of milk under strict sanitary controls. The possibility of cooperative collection and processing of milk should be explored.

231 [233] Since the nomads and semi-nomads, who may number from 200,000 to 500,000, account for a large proportion of the livestock in the country, particularly sheep and goats, their needs must receive special attention. Measures should be taken, for instance, to provide them with better watering facilities, sheep-dipping stations,

311 waters of the twin rivers are largely wasted and periodically unloosen disastrous floods upon Baghdad and the alluvial plain to the south.

The Rain-fed Zone

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438 In the upland plains of the rain-fed zone stretching from Northern Mosul to Suleimaniya, wheat and barley are the principal crops. Rainfall is generally inadequate for summer crops, although water from streams and springs permit cultivation of rice and cotton. In part of this area, especially Northern Mosul, there has been a rapid extension of cultivation with the help of modern agricultural machinery.

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241 To the north and northeast lie the mountain massifs of Iraq. Here the raising of cattle, sheep and goats by Kurdish nomads is one of the principal occupations. The mountains are largely barren of trees but offer natural pasture for animals. In the valleys and on hillsides grain, tobacco, timber and fruit are grown. Tobacco, although small in area, is an important cash crop.

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433 Except for some handicrafts, there is little native industry in this region. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, is principally a commercial center and an outlet for exports to Syria and [315] Lebanon. Kirkuk, however, is the center of most of Iraq's petroleum production and one of the largest and richest oil fields in the world. Oil fields of subsidiary importance also exist at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin in Diyala province. The mountains of the North may ultimately yield other minerals such as copper, chrome and iron.

The Irrigation Zone

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311 South of the rain-fed zone the river valleys may be divided into three major regions: the upper river valleys; the lower river valley down to Amara and Nasiriya; and the triangular area from Nasiriya and Amara to the mouth of the Shatt al Arab.

The first of these regions includes most of the northern Jezireh and the area north of Baghdad and east of the Tigris. The latter area still awaits irrigation for the most part, and the Jezireh is hardly susceptible to irrigation because of the elevation and configuration of the land. The Jezireh is an upland plateau

438 country's foreign trade. Near it is the country's second largest oil field.

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233 To the south and southwest of the irrigation zone lie the vast arid tracts known as the southern and northern deserts which comprise about 40 percent of the land area of Iraq. These are sparsely inhabited by roaming nomads who raise camels, goats and sheep and annually take their flocks into the river valleys in search of summer pasture.

II. The People

161 The first official census of the settled population in Iraq was taken in 1947 and preliminary statistics on the male and female population of each province have already been published.[1] The preliminary estimate of the enumerated population was approximately 4.6 million. This figure has been brought up to 4.8 million in the published statistics by adding a rough estimate of 200,000 for the nomads in Mosul province and in the provinces along the Euphrates. Like all other countries at a similar stage of development, Iraq has a very young population, about half being under the age of 20. Although no reliable vital statistics are available, all indications point on the one hand to a very high rate of mortality among infants and young children, and on the other, to a correspondingly high birth rate. Even under the present poor health conditions the population seems to have been increasing at a rate conjectured to be in the region of one to one and a half percent per annum. Whatever the present rate, however, it is clear that, if full advantage is taken of the ample opportunity to improve health

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[1] Considering the attendant difficulties, this census may be judged a success. The information about the people of Iraq which it has already yielded and, more especially, which it can yield when tabulation is completed, is without doubt far more reliable than any estimates previously made. However, as with most first attempts at census-taking, the results have to be interpreted with great caution. Besides the figures already published, the Mission had access to certain unpublished data on four provinces—Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra. Much of the description of the population which follows is based on this data, but it must be noted that, although allowance was made for the fact that these four provinces are a most imperfect cross-section of the country, this fact is an additional limitation to the validity of any but the broadest conclusions.

value of the country's total exports, other than oil, in the years 245 1948-1950. Citrus fruit, grown for domestic consumption, is of 439 considerable importance in the Diyala River valley and substantial quantities of other fruits and nuts, although of rather poor quality and marketability, are grown in the North, especially in Suleimaniya and Erbil. Vegetable culture is of particular importance in the neighborhood of large cities.

Agricultural yields are generally low, although most of the 241 soil is inherently quite fertile. Barley yields, for instance, are about 30 to 35 percent less than those in Canada and the United States and probably slightly less than those of Turkey and Iran. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Salinity attributable to poor drainage has materially lowered productivity of land in the irrigation zone. The soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Chief reliance is placed on the fallow system to restore soil fertility, but, since fallow land is often allowed to go up in weeds on which animals graze, its efficacy is limited.

The raising of livestock is an important industry. Sheep and 233 goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding.

TABLE 6

Estimate of Livestock Population, 1949-50

Sheep	7,489,700
Goats	1,754,300
Cattle	1,034,600
Buffaloes	200,700
Camels	279,200
Horses	183,800
Mules	66,850
Donkeys	326,400

Sheep and goats, as well as camels, are kept primarily by 231 pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural

consequence not only of the increase in population, but also of 438
the shift from the rural areas, where barley is often a staple ele- 439
ment in the diet. 262

Large quantities of rice are produced, but the surplus for export has always been very small. The only other cereal exported in any quantity is millet.

Animal Produce. The principal animal products exported 433
by Iraq are wool, live animals, hides and skins and casings (intes- 437
tines), usually in that order of importance. The sheep is the main source of these products, providing all the wool and usually the bulk of the other products. As with dates and cereals, the quantities exported vary greatly from year to year, sheep being vulnerable not only to disease, but also to extremes of winter cold and summer drought. In contrast with the other main exports, however, there has been no tendency for exports of animal products to increase. Exports of wool, hides and skins have, on the whole, been below prewar levels, while those of casings have fallen off badly. As animals are often taken across the frontier on the hoof, customs returns of live animals exported are not reliable. The recorded decrease since before the war, is, however, too large to be discounted.

Information on the animal population and on the domestic consumption of meat and other products is sketchy and unreliable. A rise in the consumption of meat could well explain the loss of exports of live animals, but this in turn would tend to make available a larger, not smaller, supply of most by-products. Part of the [233
explanation of the fall in export products may lie in a declining 162]
sheep population owing to the gradual shift from the pastoral life to settled agriculture and from agriculture to the towns. The monograph on agriculture and animal husbandry discusses the shortcomings of the livestock industry and recommends measures to improve livestock raising and the quality of livestock products. The value of exports of animal products is likely to continue its downward trend unless these measures are undertaken speedily and vigorously.

Sheep are especially important as a potential source of dollars. 437
Wool is the most important export to the United States, which 457
also takes all the casings exported and considerable quantities of

farming basis, including crops, horticulture and livestock in its program. From the livestock point of view it should be a demonstration of the production of milk, eggs and poultry under irrigation conditions to meet urban requirements in the Baquba and Baghdad areas; a lesson in improved feeding, breeding and management, and, above all, in mixed farming. 232

Northern Area:

1. Flocks of Karadi sheep should be established at Nineveh and Bakrajo, a herd of northern black cattle at Bakrajo, and a herd of Sharabi cattle at Nineveh. Improved foundation stock or even purebred sires of the black mountain breed of cattle might be brought in from Turkey.
2. For mule breeding, selected foundation stock (jacks) might be introduced from Cyprus to meet the mountain and hill requirements of this northern area.

Special measures will need to be taken to assist the nomads in improving their livestock. Aside from the veterinary assistants which might be attached to the tribes, it would be desirable to train a few members of each tribe in such a way that they can give advice and assistance on other livestock matters, including the development of better breeds with the help of selected sires procured from the government. Better pasturage is, however, the critical question. In view of the difficulty of increasing the feed supply for the livestock of the nomads in the South, their problem may be best met in the end by converting an increasing number to mixed farming as new areas are irrigated. Some help may be given by investigating the possibility of conserving existing desert forage plants and introducing new drought-resistant grasses and herbs. For the northern nomads better watered natural grazing lands are available. Unfortunately these lands have been badly [233] abused, and, in the Northeast in particular, a considerable portion has been overgrazed so severely that scarcely any palatable forage remains. Regulations to enforce rotational grazing are urgently needed. Reseeding of the worst areas would not be impossible and would certainly reap large dividends. Controlled grazing is particularly necessary to safeguard the scanty forest areas. For this purpose it is suggested that the migration routes for livestock in the North be fixed in consultation with the Forestry Department.

PREFACE

000 IN Victorian days it was customary to preface a translated work with an apology for imperfections in the translation. I would say that I am not an interpreter such as those of the United Nations, who can listen to a long speech in one language and who afterwards can render it accurately and with perfect memory in another language. I am also conscious that these stories when told with a wealth of gesture and expression of face and voice were things of vivid beauty like rare butterflies, and in reducing them to paper it is as if they have been killed and pinned in a collector's cabinet.

101 These stories belong to the great Shia tribes of Southern
361 Iraq. I first came into contact with these tribes when,
233 coming over from the Western Desert in the winter of 1942, I halted on the road near Ur, and engaged a couple of likely-looking tribesmen to show me what local shooting there was, and to act as guides. The next day we drove far into the desert after bustard, and coming over a rise in the ground we saw before us a group of long, low, black tents; in my ignorance I turned to my two guides and asked them what the tribe of these bedouin was. Their faces registered horror and surprise, and they said: 'Those are not bedouin; they are Arabs.' Not having been previously aware of this distinction, I asked them how they told the difference between bedouin and Arab. They replied: We thought because you speak Arabic you

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a constant 262
current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a background of sound varying from that of the cooking of a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump, thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat complicated, 173
and to give in full the history of a single tribe as told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

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241 2. Fruit, especially dates: it is estimated that Iraq's date crop accounted for 80 per cent of world production in some years; the largest harvests came from the regions south of Baghdad, including the Euphrates Valley (between the northern district of Hilla and Nasiriya), south-east of Ana, and especially in the valley of the Shatt al-Arab, notably in the Basra region; large quantities are exported. Other crops are oranges in the Mosul region and north of Baghdad (Baquba and Mandali), grapes (north of Mosul), cotton in the Baghdad region, cane from Hilla and Diyala; tobacco is also grown, especially between Baquba and Mandali.

Stock-raising

● 239 Stock-raising represents an important factor of Iraqi economy. The principal areas are as follows: for sheep, the region of the upper Diyala (a tributary of the Tigris), and the southern part of Sulaimaniya (wool is exported for carpet manufacture); for goats, the Tigris Valley, especially the right bank, near Samarra; camels are raised mainly in the south-west of the country, south of Rutba; horses, mules and asses are reared more or less everywhere.

423 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of
427 the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-cropping basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths, or a third of the produce.

423 But even on these individual holdings communal ownership
621 is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-tribal chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal
622 chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and
428 especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

423 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area,
241 it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years. Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants
221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and
241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing
● 233 remains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it
423 prevailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political
619 organization, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

Iraq MHI

241 substantial surplus of barley for export. Sugar and tea are about the only agricultural commodities always imported.[39]

PRODUCTION

Agriculture in Iraq is devoted largely to the cultivation of winter crops. Because of the lack of rain in the south, summer crops can be grown only under irrigation. In the rain-fed zone of the north, summer crops can be grown on a moderate scale. In the irrigated zone of central and southern Iraq the limited water supply restricts the area devoted to summer crops to only about one-quarter of that grown to winter crops.

Barley and wheat are the only significant winter crops, while rice and, more recently, cotton are the principal summer crops. The area sown to sesame, corn, millet, and grain sorghum is comparatively insignificant. Tobacco assumes some importance in the mountainous areas of the north. Fruit and vegetables are quite important. Iraq is the world's principal producer and exporter of dates. Excellent citrus fruit is grown, particularly in the Diyala Valley in east central Iraq for domestic consumption, and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the north.

233 Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats as well as camels are kept primarily by pastoral nomads.

YIELDS

241 Crop yields are generally low for a number of reasons. The water supply is frequently inadequate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for soil building crops. Salinity, attributed to poor drainage, has materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigated zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared and weeds detract from yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left in fallow as the means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to grow up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited.

LAND TENURE

423 427 Ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheiks and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare existence. The land assigned to the *Fellah*, or peasant, often changes from year to year so that the cultivator has virtually no incentive to improve it.

About 67 per cent of the privately-owned land is said to be in units exceeding 618 acres.

Most of the landowners are said to show little interest in improving agriculture. In the irrigated zone the *Fellah* generally gets only half of the crop, even though the state provides the irrigation works. His share is even smaller when the land is irrigated by privately-owned pumps or when the landlords supply seed, draft animals, or machinery.

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[39] "Iraq." *International Reference Service*, March, 1950.

241 commercial crops in the rain-fed zones of
the north; dates, cereals and cotton, in the
south. The date-palm groves in the irrigated
lands along the Shatt al Arab and the Euphrates
rivers, and in scattered areas along
the Tigris, furnish almost one third of the
233 world's supply of dates. Sheep, goats, cattle
and other livestock are raised in large numbers
by the nomadic and the seminomadic
439 peoples. The chief agricultural exports are
dates, barley and other grains, cotton, wool,
hides and licorice: this last-named item
grows wild in many localities in the south.
242 The government is promoting the adoption
of modern methods of farming and animal
husbandry and the expansion of irrigation
facilities. It operates special agricultural
schools and experimental farms in different
parts of the country, as well as a date research
station near Basra. Within the last
few years it has initiated settlement and
demonstration projects on state lands at
Dujayla, near Kut; at Shahrizor, near
Sulaimaniya; at Huwaija, near Kirkuk;
and at Sinjar, near Mosul.

135 With the exception of the oil reserves,
the mineral resources of Iraq are negligible.
Small deposits of lignite, gypsum, sulfur and
other minerals are known to exist in the
north, while salt beds are found in widely
472 distributed areas. Industrial development is
438 slight, in spite of the impetus supplied by
the shortage of materials during the recent
war years. Small craft industries flourish in
the urban centers, and a few modern factories
have been established in Baghdad and
Mosul for the processing of local products.
These consist primarily of plants for the
manufacture of textiles, cement, bricks, distilled
liquors, soaps and cigarettes.

135 The petroleum industry has expanded
rapidly since the discovery of oil, in 1927,
at Baba Gurgur, in the Kirkuk region. The
reserves, which are reputed to be among the
richest in the Middle East, provide a primary
471 source of wealth for the country. The
Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions,
originally granted in 1925, covering the
lands east of the Tigris River and north

241 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
853 particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

241 [387] yields. As will be indicated later, inorganic fertilizers could probably be produced cheaply in Iraq and organic fertilizers could be produced as by-products of the slaughtering industry.

231 4. Livestock Improvement

The productivity of livestock is extremely low, primarily because of inadequate feed supply. In addition to the production of fodder crops, measures should be taken to improve natural pasture lands, particularly in the northern mountains, which have generally suffered from over-grazing. Reseeding and rotational grazing are necessary. Productivity could be further raised by the establishment of shelters, better breeding methods, especially the introduction of new and improved sires and maintenance of stud stations, and by more effective control of parasitic diseases through an increase in the number of veterinarians and the provision of more extensive diagnostic facilities in the provinces.

The quality of livestock products could be raised considerably by a number of measures. One of these is an improvement in the practices and more stringent sanitary supervision of abattoirs. Others would be the establishment of a number of wool shearing and grading units under the guidance of an appropriate expert; appointment of a hides and skins expert to serve as general manager of the newly established Hides and Skins Association; and recruitment of an abattoir specialist to train local abattoir supervisors in improved methods of flaying and preserving hides and skins.

● 234 At present, even the major cities are without a clean, safe milk supply. The supply of milk could be substantially improved by better feeding of livestock, concentration of milking cattle in well-equipped settlements on the outskirts of cities, and central collection, transportation and processing of milk under strict sanitary controls. The possibility of cooperative collection and processing of milk should be explored.

231 [233] Since the nomads and semi-nomads, who may number from 200,000 to 500,000, account for a large proportion of the livestock in the country, particularly sheep and goats, their needs must receive special attention. Measures should be taken, for instance, to provide them with better watering facilities, sheep-dipping stations,

Dairy Products

The larger towns receive their milk and milk products from cows, buffalo, sheep and goats which are kept in backyards in town or on nearby farms and settlements. The dairy cattle among them are usually of mixed or nondescript breed. While they are surprisingly well fed, their housing and the methods of milking and processing the milk are extremely primitive. The majority of municipalities appear to have sufficient legislation to ensure clean milk production, but enforcement is poor and the livestock owner is not educated to the necessity for taking more care with the production of his commodity. Baghdad, for example, has regulations to remove livestock out of the city and locate them outside of the city boundaries. It has provided livestock settlements for the milking buffalo complete with walled paddocks, running water and feeding stalls, but unfortunately with no accommodation or living quarters for the workers. Despite these facilities many livestock owners continue to keep their animals in the poorer quarter of the city, and no attempt is made by the government to demonstrate clean milk production in these settlements.

The government has taken a step in the right direction in installing a small milk pasteurizing plant in Baghdad (100-gallon flash pasteurizer), but the only milk passing through the plant is some 200-300 liters a day from the Abu Ghuraib agricultural station. Unfortunately many Baghdad residents do not even know of its existence. Some government officials have urged a larger pasteurizing plant even though the present plant is daily running considerably below capacity. The cleanliness of existing milk supplies must first be improved and producers persuaded to use the existing plant.

Another unfortunate feature of the present "backyard" herds is the fact that many dry cows and calves are sent to slaughter and only the milk producing animal is retained. Each year the dairy industry loses a great number of potentially good milk-producing animals in this way.

The following recommendations for the amelioration of the situation in Baghdad are put forward with the expectation that, if they are successfully applied there, they can be extended also to the other major cities:

(a) A survey of all the milk-producing animals in Baghdad and environs should be undertaken through the Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Department. This should include the number of animals, names of owners and approximate production of milk; disposal of milk, either as fluid milk or processed; estimates of seasonal variations in production; some general information on sources of feeding stuffs; list of retail dairies and details of the disposal of their products.

(b) On the basis of the information thus obtained the government should take the lead in forming a cowkeepers association or milk producers association, which will represent the trade and deal with the government in all matters affecting milk supplies. The association should have a voice in advising the government on any regulation of the retail prices of dairy products.

(c) Through the Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Department the milk producer should be shown and persuaded to adopt better feeding, breeding and management methods.

(d) Existing legislation to move the livestock out of the heart of the city to settlements and nearby farms outside the city boundaries should be enforced. Regulations forbidding adulteration of milk must also be made effective, which will presumably necessitate more adequate remuneration of medical department inspectors to prevent bribery. Adequate laboratory facilities, together with the necessary trained staff, ought to be made available for testing inspection samples.

(e) On existing or newly established livestock settlements, adequate provision must be made for housing the workers, storing feeding stuffs, and purchasing day-to-day requirements. From visits to these settlements and discussions held with the producers, it appears that they would lend themselves admirably to the formation of producers' cooperative societies. The milk could be individually produced, taken to a central collecting station on the settlement and communally transported to town for either pasteurizing or direct processing and retail to the public. The cooperative could also provide the producers with cheaper feeds bought in bulk, dairy utensils and other provisions.

(f) The existing government pasteurizing plant might also be turned into a producers' cooperative. As a first step, a government board, including selected members of the private trade, might be appointed to supervise the plant. In

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

the second stage it might then become a complete cooperative, with the government retaining representation on the board only to the extent that its agricultural station contributed milk for pasteurization. The cooperative would of course be subject to government inspection from time to time to ensure efficient and hygienic operation. 234

(g) The government should explore the possibility of purchasing selected young calves and dry cows from the producers, keeping them on a selected irrigated farm outside of town, and rearing and breeding from these stock for resale to the milk producers.

(h) Measures to eliminate disease among dairy cattle, including testing for tuberculosis and brucellosis, should be inaugurated.

(i) The government should send two of its trained staff from the Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Department to see and examine the Bombay Milk Scheme, Bombay, India, in order to assist in solving the similar problems which confront the Baghdad milk industry.

If the government is prepared to carry out such an over-all campaign to organize adequate and safe milk supplies for Baghdad and later for other major cities, there is little doubt that UNICEF and FAO will be prepared to assist with machinery and technical assistance, providing a fair proportion of the resulting supplies of pasteurized milk were reserved for those groups in the population who particularly need them (children, nursing and pregnant mothers).

VII. Education and Research

It will be readily apparent that a program for the improvement of agricultural and livestock production does not necessarily involve large government investments. Most of all, it requires a well-directed, adequately staffed government service that can effectively assist the cultivator and the livestock keeper. Within this service the primary emphasis in the future must be on a field organization equipped to work directly with the producer in improving his methods and management and supported by a properly focussed, practical research program. 242

Such a service is unfortunately conspicuously lacking in Iraq. Within the Department of Agriculture there are less than 25

244 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
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in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
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165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
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to function in an advisory capacity to
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744 approval, but illegal slaughtering takes
place in many areas. No effective control
is carried out in the rural villages, where
the animals are slaughtered locally.

234 Milk from cows and goats is marketed by
744 large numbers of small producers. Government regulations exist for the sanitary inspection of dairies and the periodic tuberculin testing of cattle. In practice, however, few controls are exercised over the methods of production or the quality of the product. There is only one pasteurization plant in the country. This is located in Baghdad, and is operated by the government's Agriculture Department. It was established primarily for the purpose of supplying pasteurized milk to the child welfare centers, but a small percentage of its output is sold
234 to private customers. Milk is customarily
164 boiled before use, but butter and cheese
232 are often vehicles for the spread of brucellosis and other diseases. Brucellosis is enzootic among the cattle and the goats, and bovine tuberculosis among the dairy herds.

HEALTH SERVICES AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health Organizations

744 Responsibility for the protection of the
657 public health and for the provision of medical care facilities is centralized in the Ministry of Health of the Iraqi government, with headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry was established in 1952, replacing the former Directorate General of Health in the Ministry of Social Affairs. Under the present organization, the Minister of Health is assisted by a Director General of Health, in charge of health and medical services, and by an Inspector General of Health. The Minister also has jurisdiction over the Royal Faculty of Medicine which administers the Royal Hospital and the Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad.

The functional activities of the Ministry are concentrated in two major divisions—curative medicine and preventive and social medicine—as well as in a number of administrative branches.

p. 32(A)

35: Hooper and Field 9-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

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it fully, and extols its good qualities as an alexipharmic. Linschoten devotes a chapter to the description of "Bezar stones and other stones good against poyson" and quotes da Orta's account of the origin of this biliary concretion which came from Iran. Similar stones are obtained from the cow, goat, wild boar, antelope, porcupine, and camel. That obtained from the camel is the cheapest, but that from the Persian wild goat is considered the most efficacious. The specimen cited came from Shiraz.

Goats' droppings

ماميز کری

Māmiz, Māmiz-i-kiri (Teh.).

Field 224; W.H.M.M. 150735.

The specimens consist of lumps of fecal matter, from 1 to 1.5 cm. across. Broken and examined with a lens, they were seen to be composed principally of vegetable débris. This is unusual as a drug, and not recorded in ordinary medical works of the East, but in Tehran is said to be rubbed on the chest for bronchitis.

Sheep's stomach, dried

مايه بره

Māyah-i-barrah (Isf.); sheep's stomach.

Field 8 (Isf.).

• [234]

This specimen is a dried portion of a sheep's stomach, containing the active principle of the gastric juice. The name Māyah refers to ferment, leaven or rennet, and Panir māyeh, "cheese producer." Rennet for preparing cheese is also obtained in the East from the stomach of hare, dog, or pig, as well as from that of the sheep and calf.

Mummy

ميائي

Mūmiyāī, Mūmiyā (Pers.); Silajit (Hind.); Silajatu, "rock sweat" (Sans.); Khatmolt, Mashana churro (Bal.); Asphaltum Persicum; Asphaltum Punjabinum; Osteocolla (Lat.).

This is one of the most ancient medicines of Iran and northern India, and there has been considerable confusion regarding its origin and nature. There is no doubt that it was early associated with dead or embalmed bodies from Egyptian tombs, which were used

236 the tail, and in many cases not even all the "clippable" wool is taken from the body and legs. It is suggested, therefore, that one or more Australian wool clippers be recruited to teach several Iraqis, preferably shepherds, the proper way to secure a maximum clip. These trained clippers, who would be in government service, would then be assigned to clipping sheds which, with proper shearing equipment, should be established in one or two of the main sheep areas, starting, perhaps, with Samawa and Aqra. The tribes would be encouraged to bring their sheep to these sheds where they would be clipped for a small fee in cash or in kind. The sheds could at the same time be used as wool grading stations so that livestock owners could easily see which type of animals pays them best. They might also serve as centers for the collection of goat hair for export. In addition to the stationary clipping sheds, one mobile unit might be tried. The cost of these shearing units, which might be either hand or power driven, would be very small.

● 235 Poultry and Eggs

Poultry, which take a very secondary place in the livestock picture of the average village, are generally of nondescript breeds and feed themselves primarily through uncontrolled scavenging supplemented by an occasional handful of grain. No thought is given to breeding a better type bird or a bird which will produce larger eggs over a longer laying season. Yet the possibility of developing better and more productive poultry through proper feeding and management has already been demonstrated by work carried on by the government. In the future, poultry units should be established for demonstration and breeding purposes on all government agricultural stations. Experimental work on the control of parasites and on the construction of cheap poultry houses out of locally available materials should be carried on at Abu Ghuraib, Bakrajo and possibly Basra. Farmers should be asked to come and observe the results of good management and to draw better breeding stock from these agricultural stations. One or two of the larger farmers might be encouraged to undertake the raising of poultry on a large scale as an experiment. There will certainly be a growing domestic market for poultry and eggs, and it may ultimately be possible to cater to the markets of Gulf ports and the oil company settlements in the Middle East.

influence. He would need to work in close cooperation with the 281 proposed abattoir specialist. The Association should also investigate the possibility of using more local materials in the hides and skins industry. Thus local valonia or oak bark might be employed for tanning and locally refined and sulphurated fish oils used in the leather industry. Efforts might also be made to procure better salt at reasonable prices from the government salt works at Fao and to organize more adequate local supplies of date syrup which small tanneries use as a glucose.

Casings

253

Most if not all the casings are obtained from the abattoirs in barrels. Initial cleaning and grading is usually done on the floor which is occasionally washed down with water. The casings examined appeared to be remarkably free of parasitic infection, particularly in the North. More hygienic casings could be produced under more efficient and comfortable working conditions if the work were raised from the floor to zinc-lined tables and improved drainage and piped water supplies were provided in the sections dealing with casings.

Other Improvements in Abattoirs

Many abattoir buildings are in need of repair, enlargement 253 and alteration. Improvements such as an impervious floor, better 348 drainage and water supplies can often be effected at small cost. At present abattoir offal is largely wasted even though the amount involved would warrant the installation of modern methods of converting it into glue, bone meal, blood meal, etc. In order to encourage more slaughtering at the government-supervised abattoirs, it might also be desirable to review the taxes assessed at the abattoir which encourage livestock owners to resort to illicit slaughter.

Wool

The wool collected from the various fat-tailed varieties of 236 sheep makes a good carpet wool and a valuable export product. Little attention is given, however, to good shearing, perhaps because milk rather than wool is considered the main product of the flocks. Shearing is done with crude hand shears. Wool is frequently left on the head and neck region and around the root of

236 the tail, and in many cases not even all the "clippable" wool is taken from the body and legs. It is suggested, therefore, that one or more Australian wool clippers be recruited to teach several Iraqis, preferably shepherds, the proper way to secure a maximum clip. These trained clippers, who would be in government service, would then be assigned to clipping sheds which, with proper shearing equipment, should be established in one or two of the main sheep areas, starting, perhaps, with Samawa and Aqra. The tribes would be encouraged to bring their sheep to these sheds where they would be clipped for a small fee in cash or in kind. The sheds could at the same time be used as wool grading stations so that livestock owners could easily see which type of animals pays them best. They might also serve as centers for the collection of goat hair for export. In addition to the stationary clipping sheds, one mobile unit might be tried. The cost of these shearing units, which might be either hand or power driven, would be very small.

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Quality of Livestock Products

● 237 Livestock products already play an important role in the economy. Demand for such products may well rise with the anticipated increase in the purchasing power of the population. With it will come an insistence on the improvement of quality which is now often very low. Better quality would also substantially raise the prices of export products.

Hides and Skins

281 Although there are a few modern plants, many tanneries are still extremely primitive and produce a poorly finished product. Their chief handicap, however, is the low quality of the hides they receive. Methods of flaying and preserving are generally poor. Even in the abattoirs which are supervised by the Veterinary Department the quality of the product leaves much to be desired. The prevailing methods of flaying—with the knife in the case of sheep and cattle, and with the axe in the case of buffalo—leave the hide lacerated, with hair, meat and blood adhering to the inside. Methods of preservation are also inadequate. Hides and skins collected outside of the abattoirs and many of those taken from the abattoirs are frequently improperly prepared to ensure keeping quality during storage and transportation until the time of their arrival at the tannery. The low-paid and poorly trained supervisors which the Veterinary Department assigns to the abattoirs are incapable of effecting any improvement.

In view of these conditions it would be advisable to appoint an experienced abattoir specialist to teach and direct the abattoir supervisors. The teaching could be done in the Veterinary School at Baghdad, with practical demonstrations at the Baghdad abattoir. Once an adequate number of supervisors are trained, the School might conduct simple courses for the abattoir workers themselves. This scheme of training could later be extended to village slaughterers.

The Hides and Skins Association established by a law enacted in 1951 affords another opportunity to raise the standards of the trade and industry. It is suggested that an experienced foreign expert be appointed to manage the Association in the initial period and establish its reputation as a constructive and modernizing

382 387 reliable foreign chemical firm can be secured to design and construct it and, at least at the outset, operate it under a management contract.

The plant would give permanent employment to about 1,000 workers.

387 *Bone Meal Plants*

237 Another promising field for new industry is the conversion of the waste products from abattoirs to fertilizers for domestic use. Bone meal, for example, is a very valuable fertilizer. Yet at present Iraq, with no domestic plant to utilize them, is exporting approximately 15,000 tons of bones per year to Europe.

There would probably be sufficient demand for fertilizer to support three plants, located at Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Their combined cost would probably amount to roughly ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, principally pounds sterling. With help from the Industrial Bank, this could probably be financed by the abattoir owners. When completed the plants would give employment to about 60 workers.

Steel

327 Iraq is now producing about 5,000 tons of steel scrap per year. It is recommended that a small hand-operated mill and electric melting furnace be set up to convert this scrap into reinforcing bars, window shapes and small angles, all of which are in great demand. This mill ought to be located in Baghdad and arrangements made to obtain off-peak power from the Baghdad power plant or from the railroad shops. As an alternative to electric melting, crucibles might be considered. In either case, the cost of the plant would be approximately ID 300,000, including ID 200,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in hard currency. This mill could not satisfy the whole of Iraq's steel needs; nevertheless, it would furnish about 5,000 tons per year of certain types at probably half the cost of the imported steel it would replace.

The mill could be financed by private capital with help from the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required dur-

423, 241

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the organization of agriculture and forms of land tenure and an historical summary of changes in agricultural systems and methods in the countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 127-129, 192-196, Turkey - pp. 129-130, Iraq - pp. 130-133, 189-192, 202-203, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine - pp. 133-135, 188-189, 203-204./

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Iraq MHl

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see Ml Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see Ml Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

2. COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

133 The zones of land surface into which the territory divides itself,
311 though they belong less to history than to geography, may be
• 241 briefly mentioned since they deeply affect the life of the inhabitants
361 and reflect their ethnology.

First comes the mountain belt in the north and north-east. A part of the main Armenian and Zagros system, it formed in 1900 the sanjaq of Sulaymaniya and a large part of those of Mosul and Shahrizur. This terrain is wholly un-Arabian, the population solidly Kurdish. Its mountains, mainly barren but carrying also areas of forest, are divided by deep valleys sometimes widening into plains. The hardy inhabitants of its hundreds of villages produce crops of grain, rice, vegetables, fruit, and tobacco, grown on the water of springs and rivulets and the relatively abundant rain. The climate is equable in summer, harsh in winter, the landscape commonly of striking beauty.

In the flattish submontane area of Mosul and Shahrizur sanjaqs lie treeless uplands and the lower courses of the Greater and Lesser Zabs. Here, in ancient Assyria, village-dwelling cultivators grow spring grain crops on rain and, in places, by water-lift from the rivers. The country is intermediate in environment and race between the mountain zone and the hot flatlands of central 'Iraq. The latter, the most extensive and most characteristic region of the country, covered the sanjaqs of Baghdad and Karbalā and most of Ḥilla. Everywhere dead flat and stoneless, it is unblessed, save in rare seasons, by rainfall sufficient for crop-growing, and must needs be cultivated by lift or flow from controlled canals or flood-channels. The crops are winter and summer grain and vegetables, locally some rice, and vast gardens of dates. The population, entirely Arab, lives in mud-built villages or in clusters of hair tents or reed huts.

The equally flat silt-country of the lower Tigris–Euphrates delta, astride and below the prehistoric coast-line, covered the southern part of the Ḥilla sanjaq and almost the whole of the three sanjaqs of 'Amara, Muntafiq, and Baṣra. It was characterized by a higher proportion of reed dwellings, fewer mud villages: by lesser crops of wheat and barley, but extensive rice-growing in the flooded areas: by miles of date gardens, and by a special way of life developed by the buffalo breeders, mat weavers, and fishermen in the great marshes.

Ignoring the Arabian dependencies of Baṣra, two other zones remain to be mentioned. One is that of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab in the Baṣra sanjaq, with its miles of ordered date gardens in a lean strip between river and desert: the other is that of the arid steppe

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads;
their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled
shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-dwellers,
then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe,
and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least
numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory
is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded
the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no
other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription
purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban
community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or
benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas,
may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps
a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A
total of midway between two and two and a half million people
may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest
Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for
'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern
world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking
''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every
population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as
invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi
community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh
century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into
'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth
century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other
cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these,
too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most 433 consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high 439 percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered 137 a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one- 313 fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and 185 productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and 241 the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 [312] advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallaḥ*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

511 In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of 511 the *badu* and their hungry camels. Even where tenure was reasonably 423 secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving productivity; [476] wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

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[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[311] [2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north.

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the 511
resources to initiate new methods or improve the old. 423

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and dis- 511
couraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the 241
lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both 241
of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal 312
functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are 312
evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage 185
of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

312 The daily lives of many 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in
653 agriculture than by even the greatest industry, and such progress in this period was not negligible. The grandiose irrigation schemes for which the press and public called were not, indeed, at once attainable; maintenance, minor improvement, and research were rather the order of the day. Nevertheless, some works of fair magnitude were carried out. New headworks and canalization on the Diwaniya and Daghara branches of the Euphrates were undertaken, and improvements in the water-supply to the Suq rice-lands. Swamp-drainage at Karbalā was primarily a public health measure. A permanent weir across the Diyalā replaced annually renewed antiquated works and secured supplies for the Ruz, Khurasan, and Maḥrut canals. The Laṭifiya Canal, the new Iskandariya, the Shayshubar were dug or re-aligned. A clearance of the Baṣra creeks and a major regulator, opened by the King in 1930, on the Bad'a in Muntafiq country were works of great local value. With them went continuous researches, surveys, experiments in desalination and drainage, and efforts to maintain and improve the 'bunds', breaches of which could ruin a countryside as they did in the disastrous floods of 1926 and 1929, and the necessity for which only the completion of the long-standing flood-diversion schemes could remove. Such was the Ḥabbaniya project, conceived by Willcocks twenty years earlier and closely restudied from 1927 to 1932; in the last of these years tenders were called for and the work seemed imminent. Other major plans, postponed by lack of funds and incomplete data, were the Tigris barrage at Kut al-Amara to restore the Gharraf and to control the 'Amara rice-lands: the smaller Abu Ghurayb canal from the Euphrates left bank, begun in 1932: an 'Aqar Quf drainage project near Baghdad: a proposed reservoir at or near Qizil Rubaṭ to conserve Diyalā water for summer use: a new head for the Ḥilla branch: the Isḥaqi Canal, to take Tigris water from opposite Samarrā: and work on the main Euphrates channel near Shinafiya. The Irrigation Department was administered from 1925 to 1928 by L. E. Bury, who acted also as Adviser to the Ministry of Works and after 1927 to that also of Irrigation and Agriculture. W. Allard succeeded as Director of Irrigation from 1928 to 1933, and as Chief Engineer under an 'Iraqi director in 1933–4. Wheatley resumed the advisership of Communications and Works in 1929, and held it for the next eight years.

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654 Of the need to improve agricultural methods, if these canal works were to yield all their value, the public was little aware. In spite of continued research and experiment, the main agricultural problems of the territory were yet unsolved—those of soil deterioration, antiquated techniques, inferior crop varieties, low and impure yields, and harvests endangered by flood or drought.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MHI

Their solution must depend on the simultaneous and widespread 241 working of forces of rural education, reliable security, sound land 654 tenure and properly financed enterprise. Meanwhile, the annual locust campaigns in northern 'Iraq were developed jointly with neighbouring countries. Progress was made in hill-country tobacco-growing and treatment of the leaf on modern lines. Silk experiments continued, though with scant success. Cotton-growing was still restricted by unskilled cultivation and by pests. The produce of the great date-groves of southern 'Iraq was bringing difficult problems not only of improved culture but of organization and disposal, and civil war raged between growers and packers. Of the attempts at modern estate development (p. 17) none had yet succeeded. The projected Agricultural Bank could not, it was found, be inaugurated until clearer land-titles gave security for loans. The Aṣfar Concession was limited and revised to provide for the acquisition and development by the Company of the Laṭifiya estate, south of Baghdad; the Irrigation Department constructed the main canal at the Company's expense, and promising operations on the 65,000-acre area began under European management.

The main agricultural development of the time was that of riverside 312 pump irrigation. This had been initiated before 1914 and moderately extended between 1920 and 1925. Aided by important fiscal privileges, it began thereafter to show remarkable increase, to the point of becoming a main feature of 'Iraq's economy. Installations in the liwās of Baghdad, Diwaniya, Kut, 'Amara, and Diyalā had by the end of 1930 brought the number of pumps to over 2,000, representing a million-acre increase of cultivable area. There was evident value in thus attracting capital to agriculture, utilizing the cheap oil available, exploiting the high-lying virgin lands, and avoiding the precarious chances of flood irrigation. But the development 311 was not free from trouble. The attraction of cultivators to 472 new lands rather diverted them from old than increased their numbers; improvement in yields, due to fresh lands and secure irrigation, was not matched by superior type or purity of crops. Estate management attempted by townsmen was sometimes shortsighted and uneconomic, and the hard times and low prices of 1930–1 brought ruin to many hopeful enterprises. These, more- 423 over, jointly undertaken by an urban capitalist—often a Deputy or city notable—and a tribal shaykh or *sirkal*, were productive of puzzling difficulties of land tenure and rights. Neither the traditional occupancy of the tribe, nor the share claimed by the incoming capitalist, had any basis in law. Agreements between the parties often proved unworkable, and in practice did not always bring blessings to the cultivators. These conditions indicated, yet by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as 425 too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land- 135 developers, and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding [1423] was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallaḥ, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes [166 to construct model villages, good in conception but at present 654] trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increas- 241 ing official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The 473 Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. A Com- [656] mittee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the 312 prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new [454] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural [185] affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first 312 stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates 652 left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped.
A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous
régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp,
in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib
was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles
the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality,
shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously
improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal
Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramaḍhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, per-
mitted at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling
stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both
pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy–French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it
curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to
full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods
were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce
fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to
a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Com-
pany, and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu
Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya
river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit
allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted accord-
ing to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea
or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the
hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country.
The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt;
trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241
was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce
and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease
supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās
and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors,
mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation,
with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities.
Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the
educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had
been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the
establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of [166
these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in 414]
their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time
employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423
committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185
since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout
the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq,
and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās;
but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of
Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was
made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries,
and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now
approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for
model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government
land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant
insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized.
On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425
a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166
sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be
gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions
and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and
a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The
Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen
families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused
keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312
continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their
studies and planning, though the intended major projects could 653
not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on
the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the
intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the
return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken.
Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 439 'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry, and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the 453 exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies, and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the 436 National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and 241 was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. [162] Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to 185 solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting. New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in
185 operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize
and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those
473 of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of
export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices,
throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension
granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the
last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year
would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist.
Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the
Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers
and exporters.

654 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-
242 year course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for
agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya
185 (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at
Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry
station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected,
tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield,
quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust cam-
paigns in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world:
caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another
and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many
centres. The department was in touch with local industry which
could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley,
beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments
in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would
diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intoler-
[474] ably wasteful. It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative
societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspec-
torate, and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself
in rural education and established agricultural schools in every
[361] liwā. It was promoting village settlement, in which field the in-
teresting and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323)
was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the
Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board
allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six
years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechan-
ization of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of
depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly
under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all
the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties
of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of
a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under
controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. [439] It is also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 18, 157, 157, 288, 288, 468 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort [166] made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

● 241 464 465 439 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour, (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

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* A mishara is reckoned = 2,500 sq. metres.

471 423 of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators
were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the
425 small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of
[565] cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

511 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally
642 a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

CHAPTER FIVE

SIGNIFICANT RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY ADVANCE IN IRAQ

000 Although the various obstacles outlined in the previous chapter are serious ones, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that certain of them are being at any rate partly overcome; some of them in ways which are significant pointers to the directions along which positive advance towards compulsory education may be possible.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCE FAVOURABLE TO EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Certain economic and social advances are taking place which are likely to be favourable to the development of education, both as regards producing more revenue and in improving the standard of life of parents so that they can afford to allow their children to attend school.

241 407 *Evidence of Improved Agricultural Practice.* A few of the more enlightened landowners, especially those who are not absentee landlords and take an active interest in their farms, are engaged in the important business of applying power and science to the land. Large tracts of land in the rainfall region which have not previously been cultivated are being opened up by the mechanical plough. Indeed, it has been fascinating to see land which was hitherto regarded as desert being ploughed at night by modern tractors with headlights. Other landowners and farmers are experimenting, with considerable success, in the growing of relatively new crops such as American cotton of high quality. In some of the northern provinces there are cattle bred to considerably higher standards than formerly. The writer was present at a lively discussion between farmers who were suggesting ways of conserving by modern silage the nutritious spring vegetation most of which is at present only scantily cropped and then left to be burnt up by the summer sun.

654 It has also been gratifying to observe the growing interest which is being taken in certain of the experimental farms organized by the Directorate of Agriculture.

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue. 241 651

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most hopeful and significant economic and social development which is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 471 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity. 653 185 425

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intelligently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows: 166 185 425 427 [647]

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

166 must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land
185 must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting.
He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.
425 (4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and
provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.
427 (5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders.
So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila
area, and the total population of adults and children is between
871 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with
a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing
185 for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good
design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of
Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for
a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to
avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish
intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village
which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of
the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the
intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural
streams'.

427 It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which
has been in operation for only four years and is still in process
425 of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it
● 241 appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless
185 cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average
465 income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of
the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced
from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the
Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation
the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more
robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators.
Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which,
by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The
men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed,
it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in
the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

427 The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants,
apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging
185 and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they
make a certain contribution to the public purse through the
sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage
an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly
needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that
they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

135 (2) The Supply of Raw Materials and Power: Iraq is potentially
233 rich in many kinds of raw materials. In the first place it has abun-
241 dant supplies of oil and gas which provide a cheap source of both
433 raw material and fuel. Secondly, it has pastoral and agricultural products such as wool, camel hair, hides and skins, meat, fish, milk, animal fat. Thirdly, it has fertile land which, with the extension of irrigation, can be a rich source of such raw materials as sugar beets, sugar cane, soybeans and jute, in addition to products already available such as tobacco, cotton, sesame, linseed, and practically all types of grain, fruits and vegetables. Finally, recent geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. There are deposits of sulphurs, apparently of commercial value, in many parts of Iraq, and of salt, especially near Basrah. Yet each of these resources presents a different problem; none is easily exploitable (except oil); quantities available for industry are limited and the quality frequently poor. Agriculture has been kept at a low level of output because of the lack of irrigation schemes in most parts of the country; the difficulties caused by the present land tenure system and the agricultural techniques connected with the tribal system, which covers over 80 per cent of the cultivated area; the absence of an effective agricultural extension service and lack of modern storing facilities; these and other factors have held back both quantity and quality of agricultural and animal products. There was a noticeable extension in the cultivation of cotton in recent years, but the severe failure of the crop in 1951, owing to a pest attack, has been a great set-back. Difficulties in the supply of raw materials have held up many an industrial enterprise. The scheme for a sugar factory which has been under discussion since 1947 has had to be postponed from one year to another owing to the uncertainties connected with the
[281] cultivation of both sugar beet and sugar cane. The progress of the leather tanning industry, one of the oldest industries in Iraq, has been retarded due to the existing conditions in which hides and skins have been prepared and preserved, and great losses to this particularly native industry have resulted. The woollen textile
[289] mills have had to import certain qualities of Australian wool to mix with Iraqi wool which is of a coarse variety.

135 So far as mineral resources are concerned the surveys that have been made are insufficient.[1] Further exploration work is

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[1] As of writing, in July 1953.

‘IRAQ

Irrigation and Agriculture

175* 241 312 In a country so predominantly agricultural as ‘Iraq, where rainfall, generally speaking, is too slight for its needs, the provision of irrigation from the rivers, the traditional source of the country's prosperity, remains one of the major problems. The problem of irrigation, however, is more than one of mere extraction of water from the rivers. It is also the maintenance of the natural drainage of the country, its protection from floods and the preservation of navigable waterways.[1]

After the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the early irrigation systems, the remains of which can still be seen, collapsed. No government which assumed power was able to maintain canals or regulate the flow of water. Each man did what was good in his own eyes. Many canals silted up. Other canals, cut in the banks by the cultivators, without adequate knowledge or without regard for the future, came to carry more water than the parent river. In many cases, the abstracted water because of improper drainage ruined the land through salination or else filled vast marshes. The rivers, unable to scour their beds in the lower reaches, increased the dangers from floods and hampered navigation.[2]

Not until comparatively modern times were efforts made by the Turks to prevent flooding and to secure the services of engineers to study and to undertake irrigation works. The most prominent of the foreign engineers was Sir William Willcocks who, from his appointment in 1908, studied and proposed schemes for the irrigation and drainage of the country.[3]

[1] *Note on Irrigation in Mesopotamia, December*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 9.

[2] Ibid., p. 7; *Brief Note on Irrigation Work in Mesopotamia and the operations of the Irrigation Directorate, M. E. F., up to November*, 1918 (Baghdad, 1919), p. 1.

[3] His programme, in brief, was: the construction of two barrages on the Euphrates at Hindīya and at Fallūja, and two on the Tigris at Kūt and Balad; the construction of a proper canal system from these barrages; the utilization of the Habbānīya-‘Abū Dibbis depression as an escape for the flood waters of the Tigris; the regulation of the swamps above Basra; the rehabilitation of the Nahrwan Canal from the Diyālā; and the provision of drainage, escapes and afforestation in connection with the entire programme. Willcocks, Sir W., *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, 2nd ed.), pp. 15 ff.

The Turks, however, lacking both money and initiative for 175*
his whole programme,[1] undertook, with encouragement from 241
Great Britain and from Germany, the construction of the 312
Hindīya barrage and the Habbānīya escape of which only the former was completed in 1914.

At the beginning of the Occupation, the interest of the 175*
military authorities in irrigation and in agriculture had been 727*
confined to restricting the former where it hindered navigation, 241
and encouraging the latter to meet the needs of the troops, 312
although a certain amount of flood prevention work was undertaken from late 1915 onwards. Urgent repairs of the Hindīya barrage and the completion of its canal were also carried out by military engineers in June, 1917, but not until a shortage of local food supplies for the army and later for the civil population was threatened,[2] was the extension of agriculture by means of irrigation taken seriously in hand through the Agricultural Development Scheme, put forward by Mr. C. C. Garbett, First Revenue Officer, July, 1917.[3] 'The plan was to complete canals left half finished by the Turks, dig new ones, improve old ones, to import and advance to the cultivators plough-cattle and seeds'.[4]

The Scheme was only partially successful, the new acreage brought under cultivation, 319,152 acres, being only a little more than half of the original estimate of 606,000 acres.[5] It had been calculated that 280,000 tons of grain would be produced.[6] Actually between 50,000 and 60,000 tons for the

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[1] Sir William Willcock's estimate for his programme was £T29,105,020 or about £26,537,000. He anticipated the return would be about nine per cent. *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, 2nd. ed.), p. 52.

[2] *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 2; Hewitt, Sir J. P., *Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia* (1919), pp. 4, 6, 9.

[3] See minutes of Conference, August 10th, 1917, which formally proposed Scheme. Hewitt, op. cit. App. 5, p. 44. The War Office approved of the Scheme on September 16th, 1917; ibid., p. 5. See also *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 28.

[4] Ibid., p. 3.

[5] *Brief Note on Irrigation Works in Mesopotamia to November*, 1918, pp. 3-4, 7.

[6] *Final Report of the Agricultural Development Scheme* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3.

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175* army,[1] besides supplies for the civil population were obtained.
729* More valuable than the actual amount of the supplies and the
241 consequent reduction of prices and economy of shipping were
312 the political effects of averting a threatened famine, of the show of encouragement to agriculture and the hold acquired over the shaikhs and the tribes of the regions opened up by the Scheme.[2]

The Irrigation Department was taken over by the Civil Administration, April 1st, 1919.[3] The Acting High Commissioner, envisaging, no doubt, a long period of British control, advocated immediate caution and retrenchment. He recommended concentration of 'attention on securing and improving already existing systems where necessary' on the grounds that 'shortage of labour alike for construction and cultivation and financial stringency makes it impractical and inexpedient to open up considerable fresh areas for cultivation'.[4] The arguments of the Acting Civil Commissioner as well as the 'small and unambitious programme of minor works'[5] evolved under his direction and centring about the gradual establishment of the natural regime of the rivers,[6] were, no doubt, believed to be in accordance with the needs of the moment. Colonel R. G. Garrow, Officiating Director of Irrigation, had estimated that the existing population could cultivate approximately 1,500,000 acres of which approximately 1,320,000 acres were to be in cultivation by the end of 1919.[7]

Nevertheless, the policy as enunciated and the programme as

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[1] Hewitt, op. cit., p. 13, gives 56,472 tons. See also *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 80; *Revenue Report*, 1918, pp. 2-3.

[2] *Final Report*, p. 1; *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 2; Hewitt, op. cit., p. 9.

[3] *Irrigation Directorate, M. E. F., Admin. Report for period 1st April to 31st December*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 4.

[4] Memorandum, A.C.C. to D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, December 27th, 1918. Also *Draft Report Covering the Last Ten Years of the Work of the Irrigation Department, 'Iraq, dated Baghdad, 14 May*, 1931, para. 3 (hereafter, *Draft Report*, 1920-30).

[5] *Irrigation Directorate, Admin. Report*, 1919, p. 2.

[6] Memorandum, Col. R. G. Garrow to D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, in *Correspondence Regarding Post-War Irrigation Policy in Mesopotamia*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919), p. 9. Also, *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, p. 171.

[7] *Correspondence*, p. 2.

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evolved for one of the most essential departments of government 175*
for the country was unfortunate. They set up standards for 727*
works and expenditure which were to extend over into the 241
Anglo-Arab regime.[1] They gave little or no encouragement to the department as constituted under that regime and tended to create a *non-possumus* attitude which was to add to the inherent difficulties of development of the country along progressive lines.

Out of the military Agricultural Development Scheme and the Directorate of Agriculture established in connection with it,[2] also grew the Agricultural Department of the Civil Administration which took over from the Deputy Quarter-Master General on March 1st, 1919.[3] Until late 1920, the functions of the Department were threefold: the improvement of Agriculture by scientific research, demonstration and education; the supplying of seeds and advice to military units in connection with vegetables and fodder production; and the administration of the Military Farms Department[4] attached to the Expeditionary Force.[5]

The prospect of developing Mesopotamia as a cotton-growing country had from the first attracted the attention of India, which apparently had hopes that Mesopotamia might provide a possible outlet for her surplus population,[6] and of the British Cotton Growers Association, which anticipated that it would become an additional source of supply of Empire cotton. A cotton expert, Captain Roger Thomas, was engaged;[7] a cotton

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[1] The actual expenditure of the Department in 1919-20 was 8·4 per cent of the total, while in succeeding years the proportions to total expenditure were: 1921, 6·2 per cent; 1922, 7·1 per cent; 1923, 7·65 per cent; 1924, 6·26 per cent; 1925, 3·78 per cent; 1926, 5·35 per cent; 1927, 5·49 per cent; 1928, 5·27 per cent; 1929, 6·97 per cent; 1930, 4·07 per cent; 1931, 3·25 per cent.

[2] General Routine Order No. 820, July 30th, 1918.

[3] *Admin. Report Agricultural Directorate*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

[4] *Report Local Resources Depart.*, 1918, pp. 7, 9, 11.

[5] *Note on Organization of Civil Admin.*, 1 *September*, 1919, p. 2.

[6] Andrews, C. F., *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1930, p. 441; *infra*, p. 149.

[7] At the suggestion of the Trade Commissioners, Messrs. R. E. Holland and J. H. White, in their report, June 16th, 1917, *The Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf* (Delhi, 1917), (confidential). They pointed out that in view of the prospective importance of Mesopotamia as a cotton growing area, an expert should be appointed to conduct tests with Egyptian, American and Indian seed.

175* farm at Karrāda, near Baghdad, and other experimental plots
727* established in the country. Captain Thomas made comprehen-
241 sive experiments,[1] both in the growing of cotton and in the
● marketing of the product, which seemed to hold out bright
prospects for the future of Mesopotamia as a cotton-growing
country.[2]

The activities of the Department centred about this and other experimental work,[3] but attempts were also made to encourage better agricultural methods, both by the dissemination of information and by the demonstration of modern machinery.[4] The handicaps, however, of the long years of ignorance and of dependence on traditional methods, the consequent apathy of the actual cultivators, the lack of education, the weather vagaries, the uncertainty of water supplies and the uncontrolled pests as well as the scarcity of funds available hampered the Department on every side. Under such conditions, the pioneering activities of the Department, often discouraging in the lack of apparent results, laid the foundations of service which might have played a greater part in regenerating the country had its early efforts been maintained during the succeeding years.

Education

175* Under the Turkish Government, an excellent system of
871 education, according to its own reports, existed for 'Iraq, with a

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[1] Thomas, R., *Possibilities of Mesopotamia as a Cotton Growing Country, Note I, June* 15, 1918 (Baghdad, 1918); *Note II, January* 15, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919); *Note III, November* 5, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919); *Report on Cotton Experimentation Work in Mesopotamia*, 1918 (Baghdad, 1919); Ibid., 1918-19, (Baghdad, 1920); *Report of Deputation to England* (Baghdad, 1919). Also, Philby, H. St. J. B., *Cultivation of Cotton in Mesopotamia* (Baghdad, 1919).

[2] Thomas, R., *Note III*, 1919, p. 10. Also, *Baghdad Times*, April 14, 1923.

[3] Results of the early studies of dates were embodied in Dowson, H. V., *Dates and Date Cultivation* (Cambridge, 1924); experiments with wheat in Garbett, C. C., *Note on Wheat Experiments, Mesopotamia*, 1917-18 (Baghdad, 1918) and those of other experiments in leaflets published by the Department.

[4] Most of the technical staff, both gazetted and non-gazetted, of the Department came from India as did most of the experimental equipment. *Admin. Report of the Department of Agriculture in Mesopotamia*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), pp. 2-3.

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cases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241
has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been
curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved
machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the
British Occupation have not been introduced generally and
are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton,
once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the
Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil,
by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahin* to
cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for
themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices.
Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market
being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing
dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective
co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 437
features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648
may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between
'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free
zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The
favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently
announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433
existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466
have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647
of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the
League of Nations has had few important matters to come into
its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against
foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175
economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185
of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory
lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.

[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

I. Introduction

311 161 131 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development. With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements, [135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap source of power and raw materials essential to the development of industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part 433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low 311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is [464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of [731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas; and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water, but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated ●[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient 433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

680 cal resources of other countries. It will be noted throughout this report that the Mission has made numerous recommendations for the procurement of foreign technical assistance. These recommendations are in no sense a disparagement of the talent and skills now available in Iraq. They represent rather a recognition that a country whose development has been severely handicapped by limited financial resources in the past cannot now suddenly expect to launch a development program involving rapid expansion in virtually every field without availing itself of the many opportunities to obtain technical help from abroad.

II. Agriculture

● 241 [162] Any development program for Iraq must obviously put primary emphasis on agriculture. Over 60 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, and both industry and commerce depend in turn largely upon farming and animal husbandry. Moreover, large increases in output can be realized both by raising the productivity of livestock and farm land already in use and by bringing under cultivation large areas presently idle.

Existing Conditions

Agriculture in Iraq is devoted largely to the cultivation of
winter crops. Because of the lack of rain in the summer, during
that season crops can be grown only under irrigation. In the rain-
fed zone of the North, summer crops can be grown only on a
moderate scale in small irrigated areas. In the irrigated zone of
central and southern Iraq the limited water supply restricts the
area devoted to summer crops to only about one quarter of that
grown to winter crops. Barley and wheat are the only significant
winter crops, while rice and, more recently, cotton are the principal
summer crops. The area sown to sesame, corn, millet and grain
sorghum is comparatively insignificant. Tobacco assumes some
importance in the mountainous areas of the North. Fruit and
241 vegetables are quite important. Iraq is the world's principal pro-
245 ducer and exporter of dates; excellent citrus fruit is grown, partic-
ularly in the Diyala Valley in east-central Iraq, for domestic con-

sumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the North. 241 245

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an 231
integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as [262]
camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed.

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently 241
inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer [372]
is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has [134]
materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter.

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq 423
and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central 427
Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. 241
The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

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fellah or peasant generally changes from year to year so that the cultivator has virtually no incentive to improve it. Moreover, the sharecropping system discourages the cultivation of animal fodder crops since the customary apportionment of shares between landlord and tenant does not lend itself readily to such crops. Most of the landowners themselves show little interest in improving agriculture. Enjoying a large share of the crop with the expenditure of little or no effort on their part, they have little incentive to raise output. In recent years, however, an increasing number of landlords have been displaying a direct interest in improving crops and diversifying production. Some of them have been instrumental in raising production by installing pumps for irrigation, introducing new and more remunerative crops such as cotton, and investing in agricultural machinery.

The depressed economic condition of the fellah or sharecropper undoubtedly retards progress. It undermines the health and vigor of the rural population, limits the market for industrial products and may in the long run jeopardize the stability of the social order. The sharecropper's plight is attributable both to his poor economic bargaining position and to the low productivity of agriculture. In the irrigation zone the fellah generally gets only half of the crop even though the state has provided the irrigation works; and his share falls substantially below this percentage whenever the land is irrigated by privately-owned pumps or the landlord supplies seed, draft animals or machinery. In a country where capital is scarce in relation to manpower, the ability to provide the means of production—land, seed, animals and machinery—almost invariably also carries with it the ability to exact a high proportion of the return. In Iraq this is reinforced by a law which forbids the sharecropper to leave the land as long as he is indebted to his landlord, which is generally the case. In the long run the sharecropping system could be made quite tolerable if the productivity of the land were raised; and the economic bargaining power of the sharecropper could be increased by giving him access to the means of production—seeds, animals and implements—on more favorable terms through such institutions as cooperatives. In the shorter run, however, the sharecropper's position is likely to improve only as the landowner takes steps to improve his lot in order to keep him

on the land. There is apt to be increasing pressure on the land- 423
owner to take such steps as a result of the growing opportunities 427
for alternative employment created by a large increase in public 246
expenditures on development, the expansion of industry and the opening of state lands to settlement. In fact, unless the sharecropper's status is improved, there is a great danger that there will be a continued flight of labor from the land, impairing the country's agricultural production.

The government itself has made only a modest contribution 654
to the advancement of agriculture. The Directorate-General of 242
Agriculture is only a subordinate department in the Ministry of Economics and has been severely handicapped by lack of funds and a shortage of competent agricultural officers. While it has had some success in combatting pests and diseases and in the extension of such crops as cotton and citrus fruit, too little attention has been devoted to practical research, and almost no field work has been carried out to assist cultivators in improving their crops and methods of cultivation. The expenditures of the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments were actually cut from ID 1,160,000 in 1948-49 to ID 540,000 in 1950-51 and, at the latter figure, represented only 1.8 percent of the total budget outlay. Expenditures on both agriculture and irrigation 1950-51 amounted to only 6.7 percent of the total.

Plans for the future now envisage large water storage and 654
irrigation projects to provide more water for land already in use 311
and to increase the area under cultivation and provide for the settlement of new land. These plans are in general quite sound. They will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time more stress is placed on arresting the deterioration of land already in use by extensive drainage schemes and on raising the productivity of agriculture by other means. The establishment of an efficient extension service and the provision of incentives to improve methods of cultivation are particularly important in this connection.

Expansion of Area under Cultivation: Irrigation 311

Extension of the area of land under cultivation is vitally important not only to an increase in production, but, above all, as

170 number of factors including (1) the cost and the technical aspects of the irrigation works, (2) the agricultural potentialities of the land affected, (3) the location of the land in relation to the availability of potential settlers, and (4) the ownership of the land. The first three of these need no elaboration. The fourth is important primarily because, provided adequate consideration is given to the first three factors, it would presumably be desirable to give priority to the irrigation of those lands which are clearly part of the state domain and which therefore would be available for distribution to small-holders.

241 312 Before laying out new irrigation projects the basic premises on which such projects have been designed in the past should, we suggest, be re-examined. Hitherto such projects have been laid out on the assumption that half of the area devoted to the cultivation of winter crops would lie fallow annually. The area in summer crops has not been considered since, in the absence of water storage facilities, the amount of water available limited the area that could be devoted to summer cultivation to about 15 to 20 percent of that in winter crops. The fallow system was regarded as necessary to permit the soil to rest and recover its fertility and to enable the land to dry out and the water table to sink, thus minimizing to some extent the danger of salinity. In the future the government will have the opportunity, through organized settlement and development of the new land, to prescribe the use of better systems of crop rotation which will more effectively maintain soil fertility; and the simultaneous installation of drainage facilities, now universally acknowledged to be essential, will prevent salination. At the same time the completion of the large storage projects will presumably permit some control over the distribution of water for winter crops on the one hand and summer crops on the other. Thus it will be desirable to determine, within the limits of flexibility set by the available water supply, the proportion of winter to summer crops which promises the largest overall yield, having regard both to improved crop rotation and to better utilization of manpower on the land. Such a reexamination of the premises on which irrigation projects have been designed in the past may lead to the conclusion that the area to be covered by irrigation canals using a given quantity of water can in future planning be reduced.

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Greater attention should also be paid to measures which would 241
insure more economical use of available water, thereby making pos- 312
sible a further expansion of the area under cultivation in the irrigation zone. Among these are the installation of regulators on the Gharraf canal, for which provision has already been made in the Development Board's program, and more effective regulation of the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates to prevent the dissipation of water into the extensive marshes in the South. Leaks from canals, which are sometimes quite substantial, should be reduced to a minimum, if necessary by lining certain sections of the canals. Above all, the wasteful use of water in irrigation should be arrested. The amount of water used for each crop in Iraq is generally much greater than that in the irrigated areas of other countries. At present, water is used lavishly over wide areas in an effort to wash accumulating salt from the roots of crops. In the end this only accelerates the progressive salination by raising the water table which brings up and precipitates the salt. The installation of drainage facilities which will lower the water table will therefore be the most effective means of preventing wastage of water. There is also an urgent need, however, to ascertain through practical experimentation, carried out under the joint technical supervision of agricultural and irrigation experts, the optimum amount of water required for each crop and to disseminate these findings among the cultivators.

The completion of the water storage facilities and irrigation works mentioned above will undoubtedly create some problems of adjustment. In a few places pump-irrigated lands will have to be abandoned as the consequence of new flow-irrigation schemes, and the people affected will require resettlement. In an area of about 750,000 donums the natural flooding of rice lands practised in some districts will presumably no longer be possible, and new methods of rice culture will need to be introduced. Rice patches will have to be terraced to permit the progressive flow of water from one terrace to the next and fertilizers used in the place of silt to replenish the soil; alternatively, new crops may have to be introduced. In some cases, partial resettlement of the people affected may need to take place. Even under existing conditions, however, problems of readjustment arise. Natural inundation, for example,

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2/1 3/2 has led to the progressive silting and raising of rice lands, thereby pushing rice culture deeper into the marshes.

3/2 Finally, the Mission wishes to emphasize the importance of improved operation and maintenance of existing irrigation works. To insure proper functioning of the irrigation system the canals must be equipped with an adequate system of regulator intakes and [4/23] distributors. Rational distribution of water is often impeded by ancient water rights which insure some landowners a disproportionately large share. In times of scarcity the apportionment of water is often hotly disputed and subject to favoritism. The right of access to water across the lands of other farmers is inadequately insured. A sufficient number of adequately compensated irrigation officials of acknowledged probity is necessary to a fair distribution of water. They should be assisted by local councils of farmers who would gradually learn to approach the problem of equitable distribution in a cooperative spirit.

Lack of maintenance has been a serious problem in the past. To facilitate maintenance, irrigation systems should be equipped from the very beginning with such works as roads along canals, canal crossings for people and livestock, water-holes and washing places. To insure adequate operation and maintenance in the future, the Mission recommends that the annual budget of the Irrigation Department, which has averaged only ID 270,000 over the last ten years, should be increased progressively to about ID 1,000,000. The technical supervisory and planning staff also needs to be strengthened

The Rain-fed Zone

Except for some areas west-northwest of Kirkuk and the possibility of ultimately irrigating part of the Erbil plain with the water stored behind the Bekhme dam, large-scale irrigation schemes for the North do not appear feasible. Lack of suitable dam sites and topographical difficulties militate against such schemes. Smaller projects, utilizing the water of small streams, springs or wells are possible, however, and these should not be neglected in favor of the more striking, larger schemes. In many parts small streams and springs are already being used, but with direction and stimulus provided by the government these could be improved and many

425 421 The Mission believes that the settlers should, as a matter of general principle, be required to make some payment for the extensive benefits received. This is all the more necessary in order not to widen unduly the disparity between the economic status of the favored settlers and that of the great majority of cultivators who will continue to work under much less favorable conditions. Such payments need not be excessively burdensome, since they could be spread over a number of years.

•241 425 [166] The new law will apply on a broad scale the basic principles of the Dujaila land settlement scheme in south-central Iraq. In the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled there on 100-donum plots allotted from state-owned irrigated land. The Mission was impressed by the results achieved through this scheme. The farmers, who used to be sharecroppers, are conscious of their new-won independence and dignity. By comparison with the fellahin in neighboring areas they appear prosperous and content. [474] Many of them are members of a cooperative—the only one of its kind in Iraq—which owns 10 tractors, two lorries, a flour mill and a club-house. Although the accounts of this cooperative leave much to be desired, its operations are generally along sound lines and indicative of what can be accomplished through state-assisted self-help. The Dujaila scheme is, however, not without defects. Its success as an agricultural venture is jeopardized by the progressive salination of the land because of failure to provide drainage facilities—an omission which should be promptly remedied. The administrative staff appears to be excessively large. Small-scale "landlordism" has crept in, since some farmers have brought in others to do a large part of their work on a sharecropping basis. The farmers were settled in a scattered fashion without regard to the need for community life. Most important, aside from insisting on small fruit gardens, the committee in charge of the project has effected no improvement in farming methods. The Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee, and there are no agricultural experts in the project capable of assisting farmers in raising their standards of cultivation. The improved economic position of the cultivators in the Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to a landlord. In the new settlements the government will have a unique opportunity to remedy the shortcomings of the Dujaila project. 241 425

Improvement in Productivity

While expansion of land under cultivation, particularly through 000 large irrigation schemes, is essential in the long run to provide for a growing population and to establish a socially desirable class of smallholders, it should not be undertaken without a simultaneous vigorous campaign to increase the productivity of agriculture and livestock. The temptation to neglect such an effort in favor of striking new irrigation schemes should be resisted. Among the measures upon which this campaign should concentrate are drainage, the provision of better tools, seeds and draft animals, the introduction of soil-building and forage crops, the use of fertilizers, the improvement of livestock, the planting of trees and the establishment of an effective extension or advisory service to farmers.

1. Drainage

The drainage of existing irrigated lands would make the most 312 important single contribution to increasing the productivity of agriculture. Moreover, it will also have the most immediate effect since it can be carried out by the government while the success of virtually all other measures to raise productivity depends on the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation.

The Haigh Irrigation Commission, which made an extensive 311 study of irrigation and flood control for the government, estimated 134 a few years ago that about 60 percent of the land irrigated by flow had been seriously affected by salt. The Mission's own inquiries and observations indicate that as much as 20 to 30 percent of cultivated land has been abandoned over the last few decades because of salt accumulation, while on a large part of the remaining land yields have declined by 20 to 50 percent and even more. In a number of new irrigation projects such as Hawija and Dujaila salting forced abandonment of part of the land within two years after the schemes were initiated. Drainage, almost totally neglected in the past, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor in the future.

The main drainage canals for the whole irrigation zone have 312 been projected, but it is now necessary to proceed with detailed

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3/2 planning and execution. First priority should be given to the drainage of the areas irrigated by the canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates. A complete drainage network should be laid out as soon as possible for the Aggar Qub region, where drainage studies have already been carried out, in order to determine through practical experimentation the most appropriate design and spacing of the subsidiary drainage canals. Prompt attention should also be given to the drainage of the Dujaila area in order to halt the rapid deterioration of the land which may otherwise endanger the success of this important social experiment. Altogether the Mission believes that about ID 7,000,000 should be allotted to drainage over the next five years. This compares with a sum of ID 2,000,000 provided in the initial five-year program of the Development Board. So important is drainage that the Mission recommends that it be given priority over new irrigation schemes whenever a limitation of resources makes it impossible to carry out both simultaneously.

Since landowners will benefit greatly from drainage, they might reasonably be required to pay at least some part of the cost. Consideration might therefore be given to the imposition of a levy to pay the cost of subsidiary drainage canals. Construction of such subsidiary canals should not be optional with the landowners because failure to build them across one man's property might deny the benefits of drainage to adjoining properties.

2. Tools and Draft Animals

● 241 In the recent past much stress has been placed in Iraq on agricultural mechanization. In large parts of the country, particularly in the dry-farming zone, natural conditions are undoubtedly favorable to the use of tractors. The use of threshing machines or combines has also been shown to have the advantage of producing a far cleaner grain than that obtained through the customary method of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. For a long time to come, however, the great majority of Iraqi farmers will be unable to afford the purchase or rental of power machinery even on deferred payment; and many others will find mechanized farming unprofitable particularly as long as the cost of machinery remains so high in relation to the cost of labor. For most farmers the provision of simple tools as well as more and better draft ani-

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mals offers a more practical answer to their needs at this time. 241●
Experience in Iraq shows that tractor plowing may increase yields by 20 to 50 percent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and partly also through better preparation of the soil. Much the same effect could, however, be achieved through better animal-drawn plows replacing those which now, for the most part, barely scratch the surface and fail to uproot the weeds. Means for the acquisition of such tools and improved draft animals should be created through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of better credit facilities.

Mechanization will nevertheless play an increasingly important role in the future, especially as labor becomes more scarce and additional land becomes available for cultivation. Mechanization has already facilitated the expansion of cultivation in the dry-farming areas of Mosul and the new pump-irrigated lands in central Iraq. While certain areas in the irrigation zone are undoubtedly overpopulated in relation to land currently available, in other areas, particularly in the rain-fed zone, labor is scarce relative to the supply of land. As development schemes are launched and new land is opened up for settlement, the available manpower on lands already under cultivation may well be reduced. The government will need therefore to take steps to insure that mechanization will keep pace with developing requirements. In the period immediately ahead, however, the government should be mindful of the possibility that mechanization initiated by landowners may result in a substantial reduction of the portion of the crop going to sharecroppers or in the displacement of sharecroppers before alternative means of employment or settlement become available. Through its control over the importation and distribution of machinery and the extension of credit for the purchase of such machinery, the government will have the power to influence the direction of mechanization and thus minimize to some extent possibly adverse social consequences.

At present only a small portion of Iraqi agriculture is mechanized. 407
Combines and tractors in operation are reported to number 475
320 and 750 respectively, with about half of the number concen- 427
trated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. Of these, 75 com- 647
bines and 81 tractors are owned by the Agricultural Machinery

to machinery. In the future cooperative ownership and operation, especially in the new settlement areas, should be encouraged as one of the best means of extending the use of machinery on a practicable and economical basis. The experience of the Dujaila cooperative, which, owing to low overhead and transport costs, rents machinery to its members at rates lower than those of the AMA and yet is apparently able to cover the cost of depreciation, seems promising in this respect. 407 471 647

Lack of repair facilities and spare parts have greatly handicapped mechanization. The government is seeking to overcome this difficulty both by establishing its own repair shops and by requiring importers to provide repair facilities and maintain minimum stocks of spare parts. Such centrally located shops will be available, however, only for major repairs. Since local repair facilities are now almost wholly lacking, steps should also be taken to establish a considerable number of small shops equipped to undertake minor repairs. In addition, courses designed to train drivers in elementary maintenance are urgently needed. The cost of mechanization will remain discouragingly high unless the life of machinery is prolonged by more adequate maintenance and repair. 407 445

3. Soil-building and Forage Crops: Fertilizers

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The cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is virtually unknown even though the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished and an improvement in feed supply would make the greatest single contribution to an increase in the low productivity of livestock. In the irrigation zone berseem clover, sown in the grain stubble in late summer, would provide a particularly good pasture, soiling and hay crop. In the rain-fed region winter oats and vetch, when cut and cured, would provide a good reserve feed. In the irrigation zone quick-growing crops such as millet could be grown for summer pasture; and more corn, sorghum and legumes such as cowpeas and mungo beans should be cultivated.

Little fertilizer is used and animal manure is generally collected and dried for use as fuel. With the expanding cultivation of crops such as cotton, the use of fertilizer is becoming more urgent. There is need for soil analysis and extensive experimentation to ascertain the fertilizer requirement and the effect of fertilizer on 241

241 [387] yields. As will be indicated later, inorganic fertilizers could probably be produced cheaply in Iraq and organic fertilizers could be produced as by-products of the slaughtering industry.

231 4. Livestock Improvement

The productivity of livestock is extremely low, primarily because of inadequate feed supply. In addition to the production of fodder crops, measures should be taken to improve natural pasture lands, particularly in the northern mountains, which have generally suffered from over-grazing. Reseeding and rotational grazing are necessary. Productivity could be further raised by the establishment of shelters, better breeding methods, especially the introduction of new and improved sires and maintenance of stud stations, and by more effective control of parasitic diseases through an increase in the number of veterinarians and the provision of more extensive diagnostic facilities in the provinces.

The quality of livestock products could be raised considerably by a number of measures. One of these is an improvement in the practices and more stringent sanitary supervision of abattoirs. Others would be the establishment of a number of wool shearing and grading units under the guidance of an appropriate expert; appointment of a hides and skins expert to serve as general manager of the newly established Hides and Skins Association; and recruitment of an abattoir specialist to train local abattoir supervisors in improved methods of flaying and preserving hides and skins.

234 At present, even the major cities are without a clean, safe milk supply. The supply of milk could be substantially improved by better feeding of livestock, concentration of milking cattle in well-equipped settlements on the outskirts of cities, and central collection, transportation and processing of milk under strict sanitary controls. The possibility of cooperative collection and processing of milk should be explored.

231 [233] Since the nomads and semi-nomads, who may number from 200,000 to 500,000, account for a large proportion of the livestock in the country, particularly sheep and goats, their needs must receive special attention. Measures should be taken, for instance, to provide them with better watering facilities, sheep-dipping stations,

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the only remedy available were a more equitable division of income. 511
Fortunately, the future does afford the promise of a large increase in national income as a whole. The country has the natural resources—land, water and oil—which can bring a much higher standard of living to all. The revenues from oil will provide the means for a potentially rapid development of other productive resources. The central objective must be the attainment of a much higher output in a manner that will benefit the people as a whole.

In a country like Iraq principal emphasis will inevitably need 654*
to be placed on the development of agriculture. For this reason 241
schemes for the storage of the flood waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris will be of key importance. They will prevent disastrous floods and control the flow of the rivers so as to bring more water to deficient areas and open up large new areas for settlement by land-hungry peasants. An increase in production, however, will not come simply from an expansion of the area under cultivation. The time will come when further expansion will not be possible except at great cost. This makes it all the more necessary to raise the present low productivity of agriculture. The drainage of lands which have deteriorated owing to salting has accordingly been emphasized by the Mission as one of the first objectives. Great importance is also attached to the early development of an adequate agricultural extension service, supported by an effective practical experimental organization, which would work directly with farmers in improving their methods of production. Other measures recommended to this end include the provision of incentives to use fertilizers and to cultivate soil-building and fodder crops, and the organization of cooperatives and more ample credit facilities so that farmers can have easier access to improved means of production—better plows and draft animals, other agricultural machinery, seeds and fertilizers.

Industrial development can in many ways effectively complement 654*
agriculture. The proposed chemical plant at Kirkuk, supplemented 433
by bonemeal plants, could provide the cheap fertilizers needed to raise the productivity of Iraqi agriculture. Expansion of cotton textile and vegetable oil extraction capacity would capitalize on the growing output of cotton. The proposed modern machine shop would cater to agriculture by reducing the cost of irrigation

311 waters of the twin rivers are largely wasted and periodically unloosen disastrous floods upon Baghdad and the alluvial plain to the south.

The Rain-fed Zone

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438 In the upland plains of the rain-fed zone stretching from Northern Mosul to Suleimaniya, wheat and barley are the principal crops. Rainfall is generally inadequate for summer crops, although water from streams and springs permit cultivation of rice and cotton. In part of this area, especially Northern Mosul, there has been a rapid extension of cultivation with the help of modern agricultural machinery.

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241 To the north and northeast lie the mountain massifs of Iraq. Here the raising of cattle, sheep and goats by Kurdish nomads is one of the principal occupations. The mountains are largely barren of trees but offer natural pasture for animals. In the valleys and on hillsides grain, tobacco, timber and fruit are grown. Tobacco, although small in area, is an important cash crop.

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[315] Except for some handicrafts, there is little native industry in this region. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, is principally a commercial center and an outlet for exports to Syria and Lebanon. Kirkuk, however, is the center of most of Iraq's petroleum production and one of the largest and richest oil fields in the world. Oil fields of subsidiary importance also exist at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin in Diyala province. The mountains of the North may ultimately yield other minerals such as copper, chrome and iron.

The Irrigation Zone

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311 South of the rain-fed zone the river valleys may be divided into three major regions: the upper river valleys; the lower river valley down to Amara and Nasiriya; and the triangular area from Nasiriya and Amara to the mouth of the Shatt al Arab.

The first of these regions includes most of the northern Jezireh and the area north of Baghdad and east of the Tigris. The latter area still awaits irrigation for the most part, and the Jezireh is hardly susceptible to irrigation because of the elevation and configuration of the land. The Jezireh is an upland plateau

relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major 133
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative
by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther
down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162]
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

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TABLE 2

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CULTIVABLE LAND, CROPPED LAND AND LAND IN AGRICULTURE USE

(in millions of donums)

CULTIVABLE AREA		48.1
Irrigation zone	32.1	
Rain-fed zone	16.0	
AREA ACTUALLY IN CROPS		11.1
By area		
Irrigation zone	7.6	
Rain-fed zone	3.5	
By type of crop		
Winter	8.4	
Summer	1.9	
Orchards	0.8	
AREA UNDER CULTIVATION		17.5

These figures would indicate that the area under cultivation, taking into account the assumption that almost half of the area devoted to winter crops is normally left fallow, is only about 36 percent of the total cultivable area. In the rain-fed zone the area under cultivation could theoretically be more than doubled; and in the irrigation zone it could be almost tripled. Unquestionably these figures give a somewhat exaggerated impression for it is likely that the criteria employed in classifying land as cultivable have been rather liberal, but there is little doubt that the area under cultivation can be greatly extended. What would be required in detail to put this additional cultivable land in actual use is not known, but, in the irrigation zone, water and drainage are undoubtedly the prime prerequisites while, in the rain-fed zone, more manpower and machinery may be the principal requirements. 311

Forms of Land Tenure

Land is held under a complicated system of tenure which has given rise to much confusion and conflict. In accordance with traditional legal concepts the state has retained the ultimate legal title to nearly all the available land. Absolute private ownership, known as *mamloukah* or *mulk,* is confined to urban property and orchards. Rights to the permanent usufructuary possession of a large proportion of state or *miri* land have been acquired by private 423 471

that the land was cultivated and a crop produced in any one year, 425 and the land settlement officers, who have sometimes been inexperienced and subject to influence, have on occasion accepted even more tenuous evidence as proof of a prescriptive claim. In this way a large portion of state land has been alienated to sheikhs and other influential persons, and the number of large landowners has multiplied.

Distribution of Land

423 Complete data on the distribution of landholdings are not available. For the area covered by the cadastral survey, it is possible to classify private landholdings into various categories according to size. Such a classification, given in the accompanying table, shows that holdings of 1000 donums or less account for only 15.7 percent of the area. This is indicative of the small number of peasant proprietors. On the other hand, holdings of over 1,000 donums accounted for 67.1 percent of the total of privately owned land, while those of more than 10,000 donums comprised 24.3 percent of the area. Moreover, the importance of large holdings is undoubtedly underestimated by these figures. The cadastral survey has proceeded by areas known as *muqata'as*. In a number of cases landowners have holdings in several *muqata'as*, but these have been registered as separate holdings. Thus, according to the cadastral survey, there is only one holding in Kut in excess of 100,000 donums (namely 174,251 donums), although it is generally reported that there are actually several holdings well over 300,000 donums.

The accompanying table indicates that the highest proportion of small holdings is apparently in Basra, Dulaim, Kirkuk and Suleimaniya. The provinces of Kut, Amara, Mosul, Diyala and Kerbela have the highest percentage of large holdings.

The Sharecropping System

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Although the amount of land cultivated directly by the landowner has increased since the last war with the use of modern machinery, particularly in Mosul and Baghdad provinces, the great bulk of the land is tilled for the landholder by peasants or fellahin against a share in the crop. The sharecropper is not a tenant in the sense that this word is generally used in the western world. He has no discretion in the use of the land and does not lease a

specified piece of land for a definite period from the landholder 427 against a fixed rental. The landholder or his agent *(sirkal)* assigns 241 to the sharecropper each year the land to be cropped, determines the type and quantity of seed to be sown and prescribes the time and methods of plowing, watering, harvesting, etc. He generally makes an initial advance to the cultivator and often provides the fellah with seeds, draft animals and other means of production. Under the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators enacted in 1933, the landholder has the power to keep the fellah on the land as long as the latter is indebted to him. Thus the fellah is in reality a laborer who works with his family not for a fixed wage, but for a share of the crop.

The portion of the crop retained by the fellah varies rather widely. In the northern rain-fed zone it is higher than in the southern irrigation zone. In flow-irrigated areas it is half or two fifths but drops to about one third when the landholder provides the seed. Although, under the law, the landholder is not allowed to charge interest on his advances to cultivators, his share of the crop when he provides the seed increases out of proportion to the cost of the seed he furnishes. When the land is pump-irrigated, the fellah's share is generally only two sevenths or three sevenths of the crop. In date and fruit groves where the landowner must make a heavy investment and the value of the output is high, the fellah may only get a fifth to an eighth of the crop. In the rain-fed zone the fellah usually retains 90 percent of the winter crop and even more if the land is relatively remote from the town or city. His share of summer crops which can only be grown with water furnished by the landowner may range from two thirds to one half provided he supplies his own seeds and implements. In general the fellah's share is larger in the North because manpower is less plentiful in relation to available land, yields tend to be lower owing to uncertain rainfall and the fellah frequently has long-established rights to the cultivation of his land.

The amount of land cultivated by each fellah and his family varies widely. In the irrigation zone the fellah may on the average plant about 20 donums of winter crops, and, owing to the shortage of water, perhaps 15 percent of this area in summer crops. In rice areas, he generally has only about four to five donums on the

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average; and in date and fruit groves his allotment is likely to be equally small. In each of these cases, however, the output per donum is considerably more valuable. In the rain-fed plains of the North where land is more plentiful and yields more uncertain, he may on the average plant as much as 40 donums in winter crops. In most areas the fellah and his family can probably get as large a winter crop area as they can till, but their capacity is limited by lack of draft animals, primitive agricultural techniques and the debilitating effects of disease and a hot climate. In some areas of the irrigation ~~zone,~~ however, particularly in parts of Hilla, Kerbela and Diwaniya, the fellah appears to get less land than he can till owing to the limited availability of good, irrigated land. The same applies to some rice-growing areas, particularly in Amara.

Lack of sufficient draft animals and implements, low yields and the necessity of turning over a share of the crop to the landlord or pump owner all combine to depress the economic status of the sharecropper. His position can only be improved by enabling him to raise his output or by increasing his bargaining power through the creation of alternative opportunities for employment and the opening up of new lands to settlement.

Minerals: Oil

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Iraq possesses considerable mineral resources. Of these by far the most important is petroleum. There are at present two major oil fields—one near Kirkuk in the North, the other near Basra in the South. The Kirkuk field is generally reputed to have reserves of over 1,000 million tons, while that near Basra, which is less well explored, seems to be almost equally promising. There are also minor oil fields at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin on the Iranian border.

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Although surface indications of the existence of copper, iron, chromite and other ores have been found in the mountainous belt adjoining Turkey and Iran, the existence of deposits of sufficient size to warrant commercial exploitation must first be confirmed by core drilling.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

V. Production

A considerable part of Iraq's potentially large resources are as 311
yet unutilized or ineffectively utilized. Most of the manpower on 433
the land is underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of flow. Oil reserves have as yet been tapped only in relatively modest quantities. The output of the country is therefore still very low and the standard of living correspondingly depressed.

Agriculture and Livestock

Estimates of the area and output of the principal crops are 241
given in the table below. Although the statistics are not very reliable, they give some indication of the relative importance of the various crops. Barley and wheat are clearly the dominant crops. Barley is one of the leading exports, and cereals altogether accounted for 43 percent by value of the country's exports other than oil in the period 1948-50. Rice is another important cereal. Cotton is now vying with rice as the leading summer crop. Stimulated by high prices and government encouragement, the area planted to cotton has risen rapidly in recent years. In 1951, probably about 580,000 donums were put in cotton—almost five times the amount in the preceding year. Other summer crops are comparatively insignificant. Some sesame is grown for oil, and some corn, millet and grain sorghum. Tobacco assumes importance only in the mountainous area of the North. Virtually no crops are grown for animal fodder, and the production of hay is unknown. The area devoted to soil-building crops such as legumes is rather small.

Next to cereals, dates are the most important crop. There 245
are about 20.2 million date trees, of which about 9.7 million are 439
along the Shatt al Arab near Basra and the balance in the central valley districts of the Tigris and the Euphrates and the Diyala River Valley. Dates are a staple food over most of Iraq and date exports, particularly from the Basra area, contributed 31 percent by

TABLE 5

ESTIMATED AREA AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS

	Area (in 1000 donums)				Production (in 1000 metric tons)			
	1935-39 Average	1946-50 Average	1949	1950	1935-39 Average	1946-50 Average	1949	1950
Winter crops								
Barley	3200	4156	3814	4000	583	703	750	800
Wheat	2940	3686	3493	3800	541	375	450	520
Lentils	n.a.[1]	41	43	45	n.a.	5	5	6
Vetch	n.a.	28	34	35	n.a.	2	3	3
Linseed	n.a.	6	6	8	n.a.	0.2	0.3	0.2
Summer crops								
Rice	636	970	617	870	148	273	212	242
Cotton	84	55	43	130	2.5	7	6	25
Sesame	n.a.	153	176	75	n.a.	10	9	10
Vegetables	n.a.	n.a.	100	110	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Corn	n.a.	106	61	130	150	16	10	21
Millet	n.a.	160	165	140	n.a.	13	18	19
Green gram	n.a.	86	111	70	n.a.	9	11	12
Tobacco	16	19[2]	15[2]	16[2]	5	4[3]	5[3]	3[3]
Dates	n.a.	750	750	750	300	275	170	250
Other fruits					n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Vegetables	n.a.	n.a.	100	110	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

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[1] Not available
[2] Licensed area
[3] Purchases by the Tobacco Monopoly

value of the country's total exports, other than oil, in the years 245
1948-1950. Citrus fruit, grown for domestic consumption, is of 439
considerable importance in the Diyala River valley and substantial quantities of other fruits and nuts, although of rather poor quality and marketability, are grown in the North, especially in Suleimaniya and Erbil. Vegetable culture is of particular importance in the neighborhood of large cities.

Agricultural yields are generally low, although most of the 241
soil is inherently quite fertile. Barley yields, for instance, are about 30 to 35 percent less than those in Canada and the United States and probably slightly less than those of Turkey and Iran. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Salinity attributable to poor drainage has materially lowered productivity of land in the irrigation zone. The soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Chief reliance is placed on the fallow system to restore soil fertility, but, since fallow land is often allowed to go up in weeds on which animals graze, its efficacy is limited.

The raising of livestock is an important industry. Sheep and 233
goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding.

TABLE 6

ESTIMATE OF LIVESTOCK POPULATION, 1949-50

Sheep	7,489,700
Goats	1,754,300
Cattle	1,034,600
Buffaloes	200,700
Camels	279,200
Horses	183,800
Mules	66,850
Donkeys	326,400

Sheep and goats, as well as camels, are kept primarily by 231
pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural

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ANNEX C

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

I. Introduction

The main features of agriculture and animal husbandry in Iraq 241 have already been set forth elsewhere and are only briefly recapitulated here.[1] 231 Barley, wheat, rice, dates, other fruits and vegetables, and, more recently, cotton are the principal crops. Animal husbandry is of great importance but at present is really not integrated with agriculture. There is virtually no mixed farming. Crop and livestock yields are very low. Poor feeding is the principal cause of the low productivity of livestock. Low crop yields are attributable to poor drainage in the irrigation zone, to the failure to maintain soil fertility through the use of manure and fertilizer and the cultivation of soil-building crops, and to inadequate tools of production. Advances in agricultural techniques are seriously hampered by the poverty and ignorance of the fellahin who cultivate the soil and by the lack of interest displayed by most of the large landowners in improving agriculture. While there are exten- 311 sive lands that can be put to the plow, particularly if more water is 433 made available, a substantial portion of the land now in exploitation may be said to be overpopulated considering the present level of agricultural technique.

An increase in production is urgent. The standard of living 433 which now prevails on the land is deplorably low. At the same time the population is increasing at a rate that can be expected to grow more rapid as public health improves. Output can be greatly increased both by extending the area under cultivation and by raising the productivity of land already being exploited. Primary emphasis has hitherto been placed on the first of these, and large new water storage and irrigation schemes are being planned.[2]

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[1] See Annex A, *Basic Factors and Conditions.*

[2] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage.*

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

II. Diversification of Production

Fodder and Pasture

Existing crop rotation is far too limited and does not make 241 effective use of the land. Wheat and barley are virtually the only winter crops. There are a considerable number of summer crops, but cotton and rice clearly predominate. Rice is really outside any crop rotation, since, for the most part, it is grown year after year on naturally inundated land. Fallow generally takes the place of good crop rotation. No doubt the large amount of water required for summer crops in relation to the available supply has hindered the introduction of new crops, but the water storage schemes that will be carried out over the next decade should bring a change in this respect. Moreover, economies in the use of water which may be effected may in the long run make more water available for summer cultivation.[3]

Basically the aim in the future must be to make fuller use of the land and the people who work it. The cultivator who grows wheat or barley in the winter does not have enough to occupy him except at sowing and harvest time and has still less to do in the summer. Conversely, the rice farmer has virtually nothing to do in the winter. On the average, cultivators keep little or no live- 231 stock outside of a draft animal or two and they grow no fodder and plant no pasture for their livestock. Hay-making is unknown. While in and around the towns grain, oil cake and cut legumes are used for feeding, in general the most important source of feed for sheep, goats, buffaloes and cattle alike are grain stubble and the uncultivated grasses and herbage. Thus the animals are left to forage for themselves. Under these conditions their food is adequate for only five to six months, barely sufficient for maintenance during three to four months and at starvation level for the remainder of the year.

Introduction of a mixed type of farming which will include 241 leguminous fodder crops in the rotation with cash crops would 231 mark a most important advance in Iraqi agriculture. Such crops will enrich the soil as well as provide feed for livestock. Better

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[3] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage*, pp. 208-09.

241 feeding will make livestock far more productive and resistant to
231 disease and produce better and stronger draft animals. By making
the keeping and systematic feeding of livestock an integral part
of settled agriculture, the people on the land will be assured fuller
employment and higher incomes. Livestock should play a more
prominent part in the farm economy for still another reason. The
great bulk of the sheep and goats, which constitute over 80 percent
of the livestock, are the property of nomads and semi-nomads.
[221] Nomads from the northern and southern deserts regularly move
into the riverine areas in search of summer pasture; and semi-nomadic shepherds move within the irrigated areas feeding their flocks on green barley, grain stubble and the grass and weeds of fallow land. Both are meeting with increased resistance from the settled farmers; and in any event the expansion of the area under irrigation will increasingly curtail the pasture available to the nomads. Thus the remaining nomadic tribes will need to be gradually settled, but they will adapt themselves readily to settled agriculture only if it will enable them also to maintain considerable livestock.

246 Among the forage crops berseem or Egyptian clover, a winter annual, is well-adapted to most of the irrigated area of Iraq and could be grown on a much larger scale. Sown in the grain stubble in late summer, it will provide a good pasture, soiling and hay crop. Alfalfa, a perennial, also makes a good forage crop capable of yielding 1.5 to 5 tons per donum for two to five years. However, in view of its deep roots, it cannot be recommended unless good cultivating equipment is available to kill it when necessary. For summer pasture, quick-growing crops such as millet or binder crops such as maize and sorghum should be grown. Summer legumes—cowpeas and mungo beans, and particularly the black mungo of India—can be recommended. The lack of water during the summer makes the problem of forage crops in the rain-fed zone more difficult. Large areas can, however, be planted to winter oats and vetch which, when cut, cured and cocked, will provide a good reserve feed.

248 The increased production of cotton which has taken place recently should be an excellent source of livestock feed once farmers learn to appreciate the value of oil cake feeding. For this

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IV. Improved Methods of Cultivation

Dry-farming Techniques

Following this discussion of specific crops, it will be appropriate to give some attention to the various improvements in cultivation which might raise the yields of agriculture in general. Many of these improvements will be of special benefit to wheat and barley which will continue to be the principal crops.

One important method of increasing the productivity of the land—namely drainage—has already been discussed elsewhere.[5] It is worth emphasizing again, however, that the excessive use of water which aggravates salting should be discouraged as far as possible. Farmers in both the irrigation and the rain-fed zone must be taught how to make the most of the available water. For this reason the methods of dry-land farming which have proven successful elsewhere could usefully be applied in Iraq. These stress the need to prepare a proper seedbed that will insure seedlings a good start, to plant when moisture conditions are right and to sow during overcast weather if possible. Second, they include a number of practices to reduce evaporation—furrow irrigation instead of flood irrigation whenever practicable; subsoiling to break the soil pan and permit better percolation of water to a greater depth; and mulching as soon as possible after irrigation. Finally, they seek to increase the water-holding capacity of the soil through the addition of organic manure in the form of green crops; by thorough cultivation to improve tilth and by less frequent irrigation, but with greater amounts of water.

Fallow Practices

The existing fallow practices could also be considerably improved. Fallow as practiced in Iraq does tend to restore soil fertility to some extent and lowers the water table in the irrigation zone, thereby reducing the danger of salinity. Improved crop rotation (including especially the cultivation of soil-building crops), the use of fertilizer, drainage and more economical use of water will all in the long run reduce the need to keep land fallow.

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[5] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage*, pp. 203-06.

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For a considerable time to come, however, it will be an important factor in agriculture. Proper fallow will promote nitrification and store in the soil up to 30 percent of the precipitation during the fallow period. This is true, however, only where the fallow land is kept free of vegetation which depletes the soil moisture and uses up the accumulated plant food. In Iraq this is seldom done, either because fallow is used as pasture or because the available tools [407] are not adapted to destroy the deep-rooted perennial weeds. The typical wooden "nail" plow, drawn by ill-fed and ill-kept animals, reduces the annual weeds but only encourages the more persistent, deeper-rooted species which subsequently offer stiff competition for crops following the fallow period.

In the rain-fed zone considerable land is tilled where the rainfall is marginal. The yield on such land is usually very poor. During a 10-year period, for instance, there will generally be five fallow years, two crop failures, two fair crops and one good crop. Better results might on the average be obtained if grain were planted every year on rows two and a half to three feet apart. This would reduce the plant population per unit of area and permit intertillage to control weeds and conserve moisture. Tests of this sort might well be made.

Use of Fertilizers

Although soils are generally fertile and have sufficient potash, phosphorus and nitrogen for crop production under the existing fallow system, experiments have indicated that applications of nitrogen increase yields under certain conditions. This is true of vegetables, of green gram following wheat and barley in the rotation, of cotton following small grain, of dates and citrus fruits and of rice produced in areas where silt does not replenish the soil. On the other hand, in Iraq the application of fertilizer to wheat and barley in the fall has failed to increase yields materially, and its application to small grain frequently promotes excessive vegetative growth. Presumably this lack of response is due to the fact that grain is grown on fallow land which has had a chance to replenish its supply of nitrogen. It is possible, however, that even on such land nitrogen may be deficient in the spring, making a top dressing at that time beneficial. Experience elsewhere has demonstrated that proper crop rotation and use of fertilizers make

possible more intensive utilization of the land. Experiments conducted over a long period in the United States have shown the reaction of wheat yields to fallow, fertilizer and crop rotation. The results indicate that yields respond most favorably to fertilizers used in combination with a crop rotation scheme.[6] There is great need to do more experimental work in Iraq in order to determine the optimum rates of fertilizer applications for various crops, the best time of application and the effect of green manure on production. 241

The high cost of fertilizers may have deterred their use. This [387] handicap may be overcome if steps are taken to carry out the Mission's proposals to establish a large nitrogen plant at Kirkuk as well as a number of small bonemeal plants.

Tools and Draft Power

In discussing the need for weed control, reference has already been made to the lack of adequate equipment and good draft animals. In some parts of Iraq hand cultivation without the use of draft power may still be seen. In other parts, however, one can see the most modern tractors and combines at work in the fields.

Better tools and draft power will no doubt help to improve the productivity of the land both by destroying weeds and by better preparation of the soil. Similarly, better threshing equipment will raise the quality of the grain. This does not mean, however, that mechanization of agriculture will necessarily be the appropriate solution. Most farmers do not have sufficient land or money to warrant the purchase of a tractor or combine, and cooperative ownership will inevitably develop rather slowly. Moreover, under existing conditions the cost of amortization, operation and maintenance may be too high in relation to the cost of labor. Better plows drawn by sturdy animals may have largely the same effect as tractor-drawn plows in destroying weeds and improving prep-

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[6] Yields under various conditions were as follows in terms of bushels per acre:

1.	Continuous wheat, without fertilizer	12.33
2.	Continuous wheat, with fertilizer	23.58
3.	Wheat after one year of fallow	22.00
4.	Wheat in a 4-year rotation, without fertilizer	24.00
5.	Wheat in a 4-year rotation, with fertilizer	32.00

241 aration of the soil. Similarly, small stationary threshers may offer a better alternative than large harvesting combines to the present methods of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. The government should pay at least as much attention to the task of getting simple, inexpensive tools into the hands of the cultivators as to the much more ambitious program of agricultural mechanization. [412] Good hand tools, for example, are almost nonexistent. Improvement in draft animals is also necessary. While the supply of draft animals cannot be increased rapidly, it is possible to get animals of greater strength and endurance by better feeding and selection.

In the longer run, however, there is no doubt that mechanization of agriculture will assume growing importance. Physically, the country with its flat broad plains is ideally suited to mechanization although the canals and ditches in the irrigation zone offer [464] some impediments to the use of machinery. Moreover, even now there are labor shortages at sowing and harvest times in some parts of the country, particularly in the North. In the future such shortages may become really acute as manpower is drawn from the land to take advantage of the new employment opportunities created by the over-all development program and as some of the fellahin working on land now under cultivation leave to settle new land. Under such circumstances mechanization may become the principal means of maintaining and expanding agricultural output. In its policy respecting mechanization the government will need to steer a careful course. On the one hand, it will want to keep some check on mechanization as long and wherever there is danger of displacing fellahin before alternative means of employment become available; on the other hand, it will find it desirable to accelerate mechanization whenever labor shortages become serious. Through its control over imports and credit, the government possesses effective methods of influencing the rate of mechanization.

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427 The United States Lend-Lease Program gave mechanization its first impetus. At present there are probably about 170 combines and 550 tractors in operation in the country, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. In addition, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned and made

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

available for rental by the Agricultural Machinery Administration, 241 407
an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Economics.[7] 427

Further progress will be seriously impeded, however, unless means are found to prolong the life of machinery which is now less than half what it is in the United States. The shortage of spare parts and repair facilities has been very discouraging to machinery owners. The failure of private dealers to provide these largely [655] inspired the government's original decision to establish the Agricultural Machinery Administration as a monopoly for the importation and distribution of agricultural machinery. In accordance with suggestions made by an earlier International Bank Mission, the government has tried to meet the problem by different measures, namely by licensing dealers only on condition they agree to set up repair facilities and maintain an adequate stock of spare parts. The enforcement of these requirements, however, will not provide a complete solution, even if it is supplemented by completion of the AMA program for setting up its own repair facilities at Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Diwaniya and Kut. The AMA and private dealers should also cooperate in conducting courses in operation and elementary maintenance of machines for drivers. Moreover, simple local facilities to carry out all but major repairs are needed. An adequate number of mechanics both for the central and local repair shops must be trained, and for this purpose foreign shop supervisors and instructors will be necessary. The Industrial Bank may have to cooperate by providing small loans for equipping local shops.

The AMA now performs a number of useful functions. It 655
regulates, imports and the distribution of spare parts and tests 407
different types of machinery for their adaptability to conditions in 427
Iraq. Most important, it maintains a pool of machinery for rental. In some respects its operations could undoubtedly be improved.

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[7] An official estimate given to the Mission gives a total of 320 combines and 750 tractors. Customs statistics for the years 1945 to 1950 inclusive, however, show that only 632 tractors and 262 combines were imported. Part of these are already out of commission. An on-the-spot survey in each province by a member of the Mission indicated that only 170 combines and 549 tractors, exclusive of government-owned machines, were in operation. Of the combines, Mosul had 75; Baghdad, 75; seven provinces, one to five each; and five provinces, none. Of the tractors, Baghdad had 250; Mosul, 150; Kut, 40; Kirkuk, 23; Erbil, 15; six provinces, less than 10 each; and three provinces, none.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

VIII. Use of Incentives

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Through practical and realistic experimentation and demonstration much progress can undoubtedly be made in persuading farmers and livestock keepers of the value of more modern methods. Throughout the world, however, the farmer and shepherd tend to be conservative. Even though he sees other methods yield good results on experimental farms or even on his neighbor's land, he may still be reluctant to try them himself, particularly if it involves him in higher initial costs. The government cannot, after all, prescribe what he should do, except perhaps on land which it allots for settlement. If it cannot persuade him, the government may find it necessary to give him some financial incentive to induce him to experiment with new crops or fertilizer. Thus it might make seeds or stock of new and improved varieties available free of charge or at nominal prices or subsidize the cultivation of forage or soil-building crops or the use of fertilizer. The use of such incentives to bring about the adoption of new crops or better methods of cultivation has on occasion proved effective in other countries. Experience also indicates, however, that great care must be taken to prevent them from becoming permanent.

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427 The problem of incentives is particularly acute because the prevailing sharecropping system appears to offer a special obstacle to the introduction of forage and soil-building crops. Although the landlord can in theory direct his fellah to grow any crop, the fellah will in practice resist the cultivation of any crop which involves curtailing other crops he can consume himself or sell for cash. Generally able to eke out only a bare subsistence, the fellah is not likely to have any interest in growing fodder for which there is no cash market, especially when he has little or no livestock of his own. Similarly he is likely to oppose cultivation of a leguminous crop for green manure, especially since he himself may not get back the same parcel for farming the following year. He might ultimately be persuaded of the advantages of a given four-year crop rotation, but only if he were assured tenure of the same land over a sufficiently long period. The ways and means of overcoming these difficulties inherent in the existing tenancy system should be

carefully studied by the government. In this study the possibility 241
of offering financial incentives directly to the fellah and of mak- 427
ing certain changes in the conditions of tenancy would need to be explored.

IX. Agricultural Credit

If farmers are to purchase fertilizer, more livestock and better 452
draft animals, tools and machinery, they will need access to credit facilities. The Agricultural Bank with a nominal capital of 453
ID 1,000,000 does not at present adequately serve their needs. First of all, its resources have been insufficient. As of March 31, 1950, the latest date for which a balance sheet was made available to the Mission, the capital actually paid in amounted to only ID 500,000. Its lending resources were supplemented to some extent by time deposits totalling ID 136,996. Total loans outstanding aggregated only ID 556,609. Since that date a further capital contribution of ID 50,000 has been made to the Bank, its time deposits have increased somewhat and a loan of ID 150,000, repayable in three annual installments, was obtained from the National Bank in April 1951. A shortage of liquid resources compelled the Bank virtually to suspend lending in November 1949. Not until a year later was it possible to resume credit operations and then only on a modest scale. The Bank has never been able to meet the demand for credit. Although authorized to lend up to ID 3,000 to any individual for a maximum term of 10 years, in practice it has limited the size of its loans to ID 1,000 and the duration to five years.

It would be desirable to increase the capital of the Bank substantially—to a total of perhaps ID 2,000,000. The Development Board would seem to be the logical and probably the only available source of funds for this purpose. The Bank would then be able to repay its debt to the National Bank and still extend its loan operations substantially. At the same time, however, there should be a careful review of the Bank's lending policies to make sure they are sound. In the past there has been a tendency for its loans to become frozen. In the fiscal year 1949-50, for example, only ID 108,333 of the total amount of ID 279,975 in loans falling due was actually received. Maturities were postponed on loans totalling

654 423 sive benefits, particularly in relationship to those who are not fortunate enough to be selected as beneficiaries. Moreover, the value of the benefits conferred may be all the more appreciated if some charge, which need not be burdensome, is made for them.

Fourthly, it may be desirable to reconsider the provision exempting the areas irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution in accordance with the law. Apparently this provision was also dictated by the belief that the requisite pumping facilities would need to be provided by private investment and that such investment was unlikely ~~to be~~ forthcoming unless a comparatively large grant of land was made for development by high-lift pumping. In the future, however, public capital should be made available for the installation of such pumping facilities.

Finally, the safeguards against alienation of the land may need further strengthening. After the two consecutive periods of 10 years each, during which these safeguards would apply, it may still be desirable for the government to retain an option to purchase any of such land offered for sale. In this way it would be possible to prevent, if necessary, the gradual acquisition of excessively large landholdings in these newly developed areas.

A brief comment might be made regarding the settlement possibilities in the rain-fed zone. Much of the land available for such settlement may be submarginal from the standpoint of rainfall. Care must be taken, therefore, not to invest too much in the development of the lands the yield of which will be highly speculative. It is noted that the Department of Agriculture has drawn up an ambitious scheme involving the settlement of 1,000,000 donums and the establishment of 50 villages in northwestern Mosul near Balad Sinjar. There are indications, however, that the rainfall in this region may be insufficient to permit settlers to earn a good livelihood. If attempts are made to carry out this scheme, it is suggested that small-scale tests first be undertaken over a number of years.

654 423 •241 166 The law for the development of *miri sirf* lands which has been discussed at length above is basically modelled on the 1945 act under which the Dujaila settlement was established in south-central Iraq near Kut. During the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled in this area on 100 donum plots allotted from

state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is pre- 654
scribed. Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and 423
barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums 241
are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the 166
older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted.

On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously [511] successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines.

The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified [34] success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241] •
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a con- 262
stant current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat compli- 173
cated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

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[For information on the following cultigens, see MA1 Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 116, pp. 80-188; sweet flag root (Alcorus calamus) onion (Allium cepa), garlic (Allium sativum), celery (Apium graveolens), beet (Beta vulgaris), rape (Brassica campestris), chili pepper (Capsicum frutescens), safflower (Carathmus tinctorius), bishop's weed (Carum copticum), parsley (Carum petroselinum), watermelon (Citrullus vulgaris), jute (Corchorus olitorius), coriander (Coriandrum sativum), cucumber (Cucumis sativus), pumpkin (Cucurbita pepo), cumin (Cuminum cyminum), artichoke (Cynara scolymus), carrot (Daucus carota), kidney bean (Dolichos lablab), Malabar cardamom (Elettaria cardamomum), fennel (Foeniculum vulgare), lettuce (Latuca sativa), bottle gourd (Lagenaria vulgaris), chickling vetch (Lathyrus sativus), henna (Lawsonia alba), lentil (Lens esculenta), hoary cress (Lepidium draba), garden cress (Lepidium sativum), flax (Linum usitatissimum), mint (Mentha sylvestris), four-o'-clock (Mirabilis jalapa), black cumin (Nigella sativa), sweet basil (Ocimum basilicum), white basil (Ocimum canum), mountain rue (Peganum harmola), dill (Peucedanum graveolens), mash (Phaseolus radiatus), aniseed (Pimpinella anisum), French bean (Phaseolus vulgaris), radish (Raphanus sativus), madder (Rubia cordifolia), garden rue (Ruta graveolens), spinach (Spinacia oleracea), Merian golè (Salvia officinalis), fenugreek (Trigonella foenum-graecum),

241

horse bean (Vicia faba), cow pea (Vigna catjang), and jujube (Zizyphus vulgaris.)]

[The information on the cereal crops--barley (Hordeum vulgare), rice (Oryza sativa), common millet (Panicum miliaceum), sesame (Sesamum indicum), giant millet (Sorghum vulgare), and wheat (Triticum vulgare)-- has been filed under category 243, pp. 126-127, 147, 170-171 and 173. That on the forage crops--mash (Phaseolus radiatus), horse bean (Vicia faba), sesame (Sesamum indicum), common millet (Panicum miliaceum), alfalfa (Medicago sativa), giant millet (Sorghum vulgare), Egyptian clover (Trifolium alexandrinum), the sunflower (Helianthus anuus), and chickling vetch (Lathyrus sativus)--has been filed under category 246. That on cotton (Gossypium sp.) has been filed under category 248, and the information on tobacco and poppies will be found under category 249. Data on ornamental plants-- khatmi (Althaea lavateraefolia), the pot marigold (Calendula officinalis), the nettle tree (Celtis australis), the castor oil plant (Ricinus communis), various roses, and the African marigold (Tagetes erecta)-- have been filed under category 247, pp. 83, 93, 97, 162 - 165, 175 and 178. Information on tea

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(Thea sinensis), the date palm (Phoenix dactylifera), the fig (Ficus carica), the grape (Vitis vinifera), and the castor oil plant (Ricinus communis), the quince (Pyrus cydonia), sumac (Rhus coriaria), mulberry (Morus nigra), sesbania (Sesbania aculeata), the sebestan plum (Cordia myxa), Persian lilac (Melia azedarach), the walnut (Juglans regia), the bitter almond (Prunus amygdalus), the apricot (Prunus armenaica), the sour cherry (Prunus cerasus), the common plum (Prunnus domestica), and the Bokhara plum (Prunus institia), all of which are trees or shrubs of some economic importance, has been filed under category 245.]

riya), and Sulaimaniya. The capital of Iraq is Baghdad, 361
with a population of 552,047 inhabitants, according 162
to the census of 19 November 1947. Baghdad, which is situated on the Tigris and is the terminus and junction of all the Iraqi railways, is an active centre of trade and traffic. Other large towns are Mosul (340,541 inhabitants), Basra (206,302), Amara (183,870), Karbala (149,710), Kirkuk (148,349), Nasiriya (110,934), Ramadi (110,684), and Baquba (94,482).

B. *General features of the economy*

Agriculture

Agriculture is the main resource of Iraq's economy. 241
According to estimates, approximately 80 per cent 654
of the population are engaged in it. The fertile land [062]
of Iraq, which was regarded as one of the granaries of the world in the time of Herodotus and which was carefully watered by a well-planned system of irrigation until the thirteenth century of our era, has since then fallen into a state of neglect. Agriculture began to receive attention again in 1921. As droughts, dust storms and plagues of insects (especially in the Mosul region) cause serious depredations, the government supervises the condition of the country's agriculture and stock-raising and takes the necessary measures for their rational development: it has set up experimental farms, which also produce good quality seeds for the use of farmers, and is encouraging the mechanization of agriculture.

3/2 The area of arable land is now estimated at one-fifth of the total area. A new system of irrigation has been put into operation: many canals have been dug; dams have been built, the largest of which are the Kut dam, which is 500 metres long and irrigates 2,225 square kilometres, and the Diyala dam, which irrigates the whole province of the same name; reservoirs and pumps have been installed: in 1946-47, 3,168 pumps, with a total capacity of 111,687 h.p., were in operation in the Tigris basin, 973 in the basin of the Euphrates, and eighty-seven in the basin of the Shatt al-Arab and in the creek of Basra.

● 241 The main crops are as follows:

1. Cereals: barley, especially north-east of Kirkuk and in the regions of Kut and Muntafiq, south-east of Baghdad, in the irrigated area; wheat, north of Kirkuk (where the best quality is grown), in the regions of Baghdad, Kut and Diwaniya, and also east of Ramadi; rice, in the regions of the lower Euphrates, near Suq ash Shuyukh and east of Nasiriya and the Tigris, south of Amara, and in the districts of Diwaniya and Hilla. In the southern part of the country, maize and millet are also cultivated.

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● 241 2. Fruit, especially dates: it is estimated that Iraq's date crop accounted for 80 per cent of world production in some years; the largest harvests came from the regions south of Baghdad, including the Euphrates Valley (between the northern district of Hilla and Nasiriya), south-east of Ana, and especially in the valley of the Shatt al-Arab, notably in the Basra region; large quantities are exported. Other crops are oranges in the Mosul region and north of Baghdad (Baquba and Mandali), grapes (north of Mosul), cotton in the Baghdad region, cane from Hilla and Diyala; tobacco is also grown, especially between Baquba and Mandali.

Stock-raising

239 Stock-raising represents an important factor of Iraqi economy. The principal areas are as follows: for sheep, the region of the upper Diyala (a tributary of the Tigris), and the southern part of Sulaimaniya (wool is exported for carpet manufacture); for goats, the Tigris Valley, especially the right bank, near Samarra; camels are raised mainly in the south-west of the country, south of Rutba; horses, mules and asses are reared more or less everywhere.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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Chapter Five

IRAQ

THE LAND

131 THE area of Iraq within its present frontiers is approximately 175,000 square miles. It is most conveniently divided into three distinct geographical sections: the Mesopotamian plain, the Uplands, and the Folded Mountain Belt. The first of these is historically the most important for it was the plain which nursed the great civilizations of the past, and its two great rivers which nourished them.

133 *The Plain.* To the north-east the southern alluvial plain follows the foothills of the Persian mountains up from the sea, turns south-east across the old river estuaries at Samarra and Hit, and returns parallel to and west of the Euphrates. Within these limits the soil is stoneless alluvium. The two rivers flow in channels somewhat above the rest of the plain, which is consequently liable to be flooded during the high-water period in the spring when the snows melt in Kurdistan; local rain has comparatively little effect on the rivers. The Tigris rises in late March or early April, the rise at Baghdad being sometimes as much as 23 feet; the Euphrates rises two or three weeks later than the Tigris, a maximum of about 14 feet (at Faluja); both rivers are at their lowest in September–October. At no point is the plain higher than 150 feet above sea-level.

132 The annual rainfall in the plain averages about 6 inches only; this rain occurs usually between mid-November and mid-March, the wettest month being February; but it is impossible to generalize, as a complete season's rainfall may occur in a [241] space of three weeks, the remainder of the winter being dry. Cultivation in the plain depends almost entirely on irrigation, the rainfall often being insufficient to mature a winter crop.

133 The rivers, which have frequently changed their courses throughout history, unite about sixty miles above the city of Basra in a single great channel, the Shatt al-Arab. Also above Basra is the marshland of the Muntafiq and Amara *liwas*, where a distinctive group of Arabs—the 'marsh Arabs'—live on fish and the produce of their mud-banks and swampy islands, or tend their buffaloes from shallow-draft canoes.

cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of 185 the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 652 and is estimated at ID155,374,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken [254 account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank 648] for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of an annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated 311 that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living [162] directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported 241 products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 36 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

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[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1952).

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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311 241 alluvial plain of the centre and south, where agriculture depends on the water of the Tigris and Euphrates for irrigation by pump, flow, or natural inundation. In the first region rainfed winter cereals predominate, with millet, maize, sesame and other summer crops grown as subsidiaries where irrigation is possible. Kurdish mountain crops include tobacco and grapes. In the central canal zone (Faluja–Baghdad–Diala) wheat and barley are the principal winter crops; summer crops include millet, maize, sesame, and the produce of market gardens near Baghdad. From here southward barley and rice predominate, with a great concentration of palm groves in all the riverain land, especially around Basra on the Shatt al-Arab. The deserts of west Iraq afford extensive grazing after the winter rains.

241 Cultivation is based traditionally on the following system. In the south, either half the land is left fallow and half tilled each year, or half is sown with a summer crop, half with a winter. In the north the land may be continuously cropped for two or three years, and then left fallow for the same period. The use of artificial fertilizers is practically unknown, but the land is sometimes manured by allowing shepherd tribes to pasture their flocks on fallow ground.

Although the vast majority of agricultural implements employed are still traditional and primitive, modern machinery is being imported steadily. A high target has been set, especially since the war, and Government service stations have been [439] established. In 1950 imports were as follows: tractors 166, ploughs 146, cultivators 26, combines 98, threshers 1, grain drills 21, disc harrows 14. Oil pumps for irrigation are even more in demand than tractors; in 1949–50 there were 3,600 in use, with an average horse-power of 36.

U [645] The agricultural development of the country is organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, which contains departments for plant breeding and protection, horticulture, forestry, agricultural machinery, animal husbandry and veterinary services.

Crops

433 The principal crops, with their production in 1950 in thousands of metric tons, are *Winter*: barley, 851; wheat, 520; lentils, 6; vetch, 3·5; linseed, 0·2; *Summer*: rice, 242; cotton, 25; sesame, 10; maize, 21; millet 19; green gram, 12; tobacco, 3 (purchased by Government Tobacco Monopoly); dates, 250.[1] Of the two most important crops, barley and dates, the former is grown mainly in the northern plains and the *liwas* of Kut, Muntafiq, Hilla, and Diwaniya in the irrigated zone. With a

[1] ibid. p. 146.

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Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312
water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423
are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427
There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24
per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [2411]
on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators.
This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423
disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433
perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185
which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464
reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large
farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery 166
is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the
cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the [1617]
sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East

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development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without 641
distinction as equal citizens of the State. 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one 668
another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at least some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling.

The Kurds: Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority 563
in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are con- 221
centrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous, and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals, moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains [241] ●
and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being semi-sedentary.

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority 563
belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve 619
their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts 178
they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized. Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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Chapter VII

IRAQ

LAND AND POPULATION

241 3121 THE peculiar feature of agriculture in Iraq is that in the greater part of the country extensive farming is practised on irrigated land. Elsewhere in the Middle East irrigation is always accompanied by a great intensification of production, but in Iraq extensive and shifting cultivation is practised even on irrigated land, and both land and water are wasted.

311 The productive area of the country falls into two halves—the rainfall zone in the north, and the irrigation zone of the south, on the alluvial plain between the two rivers.

3121 In the irrigation zone, there is no controlled system of irrigation, as in Egypt. Each river has a modern barrage, the Tigris at Kut, and the Euphrates at Hindiya, but both are situated low down towards the delta, and command a comparatively small area of cultivation. Apart from the areas served by the barrages, the main system of irrigation is by flow, that is, by basin irrigation.

There are two flood periods, December to March, due to winter rains, and March till May, when the snow melts in the higher reaches of the rivers, and there are therefore two crop seasons. The danger of flood is always present, because the level of the rivers in many parts is a few feet higher than the level of the plain. Some progress has been made in recent years in flood control, as for instance the Habbaniya escape, but there is great need for a reservoir in one of the upper tributaries of the Tigris to prevent flooding in the spring and to release extra water in the dry season.

311 In recent years there has been a rapid extension of cultivation as population has increased. In 1918, the total cropped area in the irrigation zone was only 936,500 acres, and in 1943 it had increased to 4,241,718 acres.

The classification of land in Iraq presents difficulties, because not all the cultivable area is cultivated and not all the cultivated area is cropped.

The main divisions in 1943 were as follows:

423 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of
427 the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-cropping basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths, or a third of the produce.

423 But even on these individual holdings communal ownership
621 is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-tribal chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal
622 chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and
428 especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

423 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area,
● 241 it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years. Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants
221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and
241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing re-
233 mains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it pre-
423 vailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the
619 State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organization, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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471 over larger areas, much as the pump owners are doing on the Lower Tigris.

But in the north-eastern rain-fed zone, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, the position of the cultivator is better. There is a settled system of cultivation and a large part of the land is held by small proprietors. In the plain lands of Kirkuk and Erbil as much as 75 per cent of the land is held by small cultivators with
● 241 holdings up to 200 dunums. Here the method of cultivation is much the same as in Syria, a *daim* (i.e. dry) crop being taken every two years.

423 Here too the legal position is different. In this part of the country, the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code remained in
425 force, and most of the land was registered in Turkish times. Frequently the *agha* (or *mukhtar*), who was originally the patriarchal head of the village with the duty of maintaining order, has used his position to acquire land, and registered the land of the village under his own name. This has happened particularly often in the Kurd villages, where in spite of the Land Code's explicit prohibition of granting an entire village in the name of one person, the Turkish authorities, for the sake of peace, registered whole groups of villages in the names of the notables of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya.

427 But even though the landlords have obtained title to land, the share paid to them is much less than in the south, and amounts to only 10–20 per cent of the product.

426 Thus the problem of reforming tenure is here much less acute. As in Syria, peasant indebtedness is the major problem, but in the course of the recent war the high prices of grain have enabled the majority of the peasants to wipe off the burden of debt.

241 In the high mountain regions, however, particularly in the Zibar district, there is acute agricultural distress; a series of bad harvests due to plant disease, insect pests, and insecurity, has caused the agricultural economy to go steeply downhill in the past few years.

423 *Settlement of Title.* During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Government attempted to settle title to land under the Land Code, as it did in the rest of the Turkish Empire. The Code was extended to Iraq under Midhat Pasha with the object of registering occupiers of land and thereby granting them

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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423 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly com-
622 plete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his
secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor
estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short
of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any
terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or
sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and
the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this
district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of
the towns.'[1]

● 241 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions.
The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
452 rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The
government regulation that land must remain fallow in alter-
nate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area
is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the
report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward
selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears,
at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan
amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

427 In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually
receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical
apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53–E.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN IRAQ

Import duties on textiles are relatively modest—from 11 to 20 per cent ad valorem. However, at the insistence of the mills the government has completely embargoed importation of yarns up to count 40s and closely controls foreign exchange for imports of cloth. 651

Table 31

IRAQ: Textile Products Available for Home Use
1938, 1948, 1949, 1950, and 1951

288

Year and Item	Consumption	Net Imports Yarn	Net Imports Cloth	Available for Home Use	Population	Per Capita Availability
	1,000 Metric Tons				Millions	Pounds
1938						
Cotton		.6	6.0	6.6	4.0	3.7
Wool	3.0	.1	2.2	5.3	4.0	2.9
Rayon		.1	2.2	2.3	4.0	1.3
Total	3.0	.8	10.4	14.2	4.0	7.9
1948						
Cotton	.7	.5	7.5	8.7	4.9	4.0
Wool	5.0		.6	5.6	4.9	2.6
Rayon		.1	.2	.3	4.9	.1
Total	5.7	.6	8.3	14.6	4.9	6.7
1949						
Cotton	1.1	.1	6.9	8.1	5.0	3.5
Wool	5.0		.5	5.5	5.0	2.6
Rayon		.1	.6	.7	5.0	.3
Total	6.1	.2	8.0	14.3	5.0	6.4
1950						
Cotton	1.1		8.0	9.1	5.1	4.0
Wool	5.0		.5	5.5	5.1	2.6
Rayon		.2	.6	.8	5.1	.4
Total	6.1	.2	9.1	15.4	5.1	7.0
1951*						
Cotton	1.4		6.1	7.5	5.2	3.2

* Estimated from trade sources.

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

AGRICULTURE

From the statistics it would appear that agricultural production has been going down in relation to the population and that considerable pressure is developing on the land. The Food and Agriculture Organization's reports, which are based on the official figures for the country, show reduced acreage, sharply declining yields, and lower consumption of food in the postwar compared with the prewar period. But the United States Agricultural Attache, who has lived in this general area for many years and is intimately familiar with agriculture, expresses the same skepticism about the Iraqi figures as he does about agricultural statistics in the other Middle East countries. It is his view, and that of a number of other local agricultural leaders, that these figures simply are not correct and that both the output and consumption have been maintained fairly well. 241

Iraq is normally self-sufficient in food. Occasionally, in years of poor crops small quantities of cereals are imported, but the country usually has a

Iraq MHI

241 substantial surplus of barley for export. Sugar and tea are about the only agricultural commodities always imported.[39]

PRODUCTION

Agriculture in Iraq is devoted largely to the cultivation of winter crops. Because of the lack of rain in the south, summer crops can be grown only under irrigation. In the rain-fed zone of the north, summer crops can be grown on a moderate scale. In the irrigated zone of central and southern Iraq the limited water supply restricts the area devoted to summer crops to only about one-quarter of that grown to winter crops.

Barley and wheat are the only significant winter crops, while rice and, more recently, cotton are the principal summer crops. The area sown to sesame, corn, millet, and grain sorghum is comparatively insignificant. Tobacco assumes some importance in the mountainous areas of the north. Fruit and vegetables are quite important. Iraq is the world's principal producer and exporter of dates. Excellent citrus fruit is grown, particularly in the Diyala Valley in east central Iraq for domestic consumption, and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the north.

233 Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats as well as camels are kept primarily by pastoral nomads.

YIELDS

241 Crop yields are generally low for a number of reasons. The water supply is frequently inadequate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for soil building crops. Salinity, attributed to poor drainage, has materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigated zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared and weeds detract from yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left in fallow as the means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to grow up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited.

LAND TENURE

423
427 Ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheiks and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare existence. The land assigned to the *Fellah*, or peasant, often changes from year to year so that the cultivator has virtually no incentive to improve it.

About 67 per cent of the privately-owned land is said to be in units exceeding 618 acres.

Most of the landowners are said to show little interest in improving agriculture. In the irrigated zone the *Fellah* generally gets only half of the crop, even though the state provides the irrigation works. His share is even smaller when the land is irrigated by privately-owned pumps or when the landlords supply seed, draft animals, or machinery.

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[39] "Iraq," *International Reference Service*, March, 1950.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

The problems of land tenure are generally cited as being a restriction to 423 agricultural development. One United Nations' study states the absence of settlement title is undoubtedly a major obstacle to expansion of cultivation of dry land and intensification of agriculture in irrigated or irrigable zones.[40] The same report also points out that the lack of adequate legislation on water rights is another serious defect.[41]

RESETTLEMENT

Sizable areas are being settled by the state under the provisions of a law 1166 passed in 1951 which distributes about 67 acres per family to landless people, agricultural school graduates, former civil service employees, pensioners, and 425 the unemployed. The farming program on these projects is supervised 241 rigorously. On the 75,000-acre Dujaila Project on the Tigris River the prescribed planting program is as follows: 20 per cent in wheat, 15 per cent in barley, 5 per cent in fruit, 4 per cent in cotton and flax, 3 per cent in sesame, and 3 per cent in vegetables. Another 5 per cent will be devoted to housing, and the remaining 45 per cent must lie in fallow because of a water shortage.[42]

The Mission report criticized these land settlement schemes on several bases. The land is given to the farmers, the title being transferred after 10 years of successful operation. The Mission believes the land should be sold. The Mission also criticizes the allocation of land to people who have had no farming experience and who have not necessarily shown themselves to be suited by temperament for farming, and it expresses doubt that the program actually has improved the land or the farmer. The economic report stated: "The improved economic position of the cultivators in the new Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to his landlord." [43]

There are half a dozen other projects, involving 250,000 acres, in various stages of promotion which the Point Four Mission is being urged to assist in planning and supervising.

IRRIGATION

At present irrigation water is provided by the Kut and Hilla Barrages 312 on the upper Tigris River, several smaller ones on the lower reaches, and the Hindiya Barrage on the Euphrates River. The water is carried by pumps and canals. About 2 million acres are irrigated by pumps and another 4 to 5 million acres by gravity flow.

Estimates indicated cultivatable land can be expanded almost three times if water is available. Yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not permit even the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers during the spring flood season are clearly essential. The government already has initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage system for the Euphrates River and has let the contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The Development Board is undertaking also construction of three dams on the upper tributaries of the 1 ^

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[40] *Land Reform*, United Nations, 1951, p. 27.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[42] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, United Nations, December, 1949, p. 31.

[43] Boardman, Frances, "Iraq Moves Toward Land Reform," *Foreign Agriculture*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1951.

1 ^ - [Text continues on p. 97--Analyst]

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Table 32

IRAQ: Area Under Cultivation by Crops as Per Cent of Cultivated Area
1948

Crop	Per Cent of Total
	Per Cent
Rice	12.3
Sesame	2.5
Maize	1.4
Green Gram	1.0
Millet	.9
Wheat	40.2
Barley	40.6
Linseed	.1
Lentils	.4
Chickling	.3
Cotton	.3
Total	100.0
Total Acres under Cultivation	5,877,494

SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture.

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
40°
42°
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
TURKEY
SYRIA
Mosul
Greater Zab
Zab R.
Lesser
Tigris
Euphrates R.
Diyala R.
DIYALA WEIR
RAINFED ZONE
IRRIGATION ZONE
HABBANIYA LAKE
Baghdad
HINDIYA BARRAGE
Hilla
HAMMAR LAKE
Basra
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
EXISTING IRRIGATION
Flow
Pump
Marsh areas
High dam sites
Existing barrages
Proposed barrages
Proposed canal or extensions
Existing rivers or canals
STATUTE MILES
0
50
100
150

IRAQ
IRRIGATION SYSTEM

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COTTON IN IRAQ

Tigris, and a large reservoir at Bekhme in the mountains on the Great Zab. The Mission endorsed these projects and recommended others to compensate for diversion and to balance the systems. 312

The Iraq Irrigation Development Commission believes that the area under irrigation can be increased to 12 million acres by the installation of additional storage facilities, by drainage, rehabilitation, and by new supplies of water.[44]

It is agreed generally that the rain-fed zones in the north must continue to depend primarily on rainfall. Although no accurate estimates are available, the total area which might be available for cultivation in this area is thought to be substantial.

Along with irrigation, an important means of improving productivity is drainage. This would have an immediate effect; other proposals depend on the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation. 241 311

As much as 20 to 30 per cent of the cultivated land is said to be abandoned because of salt accumulation. On a large part of the remaining land, yields have declined as much as 50 per cent. Drainage—almost totally neglected—the report concluded, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor.[45]

MECHANIZATION

Because of the cost, the Mission predicted that mechanization would proceed slowly. This conclusion was reached in the face of experience which shows that tractor ploughing may increase yields 20 to 50 per cent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and better preparation of the soil.[46] No doubt mechanization will become increasingly important as additional land is placed under cultivation and labor becomes scarce. 241 407

About 750 tractors and 320 combines are in the country at the present time. A government agency owns 75 of the combines and 81 tractors and plans to import an additional 2,500 tractors and 550 combines with auxiliary equipment.[47] About 50 per cent of the machinery will be retained at government-owned tractor stations and rented or let out under contract.[48] The rest will be sold on easy terms to the farmers.

The International Bank approved a modified version of this machinery program but suggested that rental charges be increased to make the project self-sustaining, and adequate repair shops and demonstration and training programs were recommended.

SOIL BUILDING

It is obvious that the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished. [134] 242

Cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is said to be virtually unknown. Attention needs to be given to the production of legumes. Commercial fertilization must be studied and, if possible, plants should be built to produce inorganic and organic materials. Soil analyses also are generally needed.

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[44] *Economic Development of Iraq*, op. cit., p. 16.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[48] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey*, op. cit., p. 33.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

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

—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

Modern tractors with gang ploughs are now in general use in Iraq for ploughing cotton. Because the land is so heavy, tractors are usually of the heavy-duty track type. Most of the tractors are owned by the government and rented with drivers to farmers on an hourly basis. The Iraq Government is conducting experiments with all types of mechanical equipment in the hope that new lands in the rainfed areas to the north, too sparsely populated to farm with hand labor, may be brought into production with complete mechanization. [427]

These plants have been found to set 75 per cent of their bolls before the end of August. 242

Dr. Shelby Cain, cotton agronomist from Texas A. & M. College supplied by the Point Four Program, is concentrating on this problem in the cotton breeding program. He will be assisted by two Iraqi specialists now being trained at Texas A. & M. To some observers it appears that more work is needed on cultural practices before a full program on cotton breeding is started. For instance, the influence of planting dates, irrigation, fertilization, and cultivation on plant growths in this environment needs to be investigated before the more fundamental research in genetics and breeding can be used effectively.

Fertilization

Research on the problem of maintaining soil fertility is needed also and is included in the broad program for the future. There is an obvious deficiency of nitrogen and humus in the soil, and probably other plant foods. Much of the land in both of the main valleys has been under continuous cultivation 242
134

163 lation, and the death rate, 25 to 35. The
165 discrepancies in reporting are probably less
in the case of deaths than of births.

On the basis of the health district populations for 1950, the infant mortality rate was calculated at 98 per 1,000 live births. The death rate of infants under 1 year was 14 per cent of the total deaths, and of children under 5 years, about 23 per cent. Local observers estimate that the mortality in infants under 1 year approximates 300 to 350 per 1,000 live births among most rural and impoverished urban communities, and that it reaches almost 500 per 1,000 live births in children under 5 years of age. Intestinal diseases, undernutrition, respiratory infections and malaria are prominent among the causes of death in infancy and early childhood.

SOCIAL ECONOMY

241 Agriculture and the petroleum industry
together form the basis of Iraq's economy.
Although this region was one of the chief
granaries of the world centuries before the
Christian Era, the present agricultural resources of the potentially fertile Tigris and
Euphrates river basins are only partially
developed. About 75 to 80 per cent of the
inhabitants are engaged in farming or pastoral pursuits, but progress is retarded by
the prevailing forms of land tenure, shortage of labor supply and inefficient methods
311 of cultivation. In 1950, less than one fifth
241 of the arable land, normally estimated at
25 to 30 million acres, was under production. Extensive areas of the alluvial plain
are cultivated by means of irrigation, but
improper drainage often results in consider-
427 able annual loss of soil fertility. A system
423 of tenancy farming predominates in most
sections of the country. The proportion of
land-owning peasants is small and largely
restricted to the northern provinces. In cen-
[444] tral and southern Iraq many families are
migratory cultivators who work on a sharecropping basis for wealthy and, usually, absentee landlords.

241 Cereals, tobacco and cotton are important

p. 24(A)

241 commercial crops in the rain-fed zones of
the north; dates, cereals and cotton, in the
south. The date-palm groves in the irrigated
lands along the Shatt al Arab and the Euphrates
rivers, and in scattered areas along
the Tigris, furnish almost one third of the
233 world's supply of dates. Sheep, goats, cattle
and other livestock are raised in large numbers
by the nomadic and the seminomadic
439 peoples. The chief agricultural exports are
dates, barley and other grains, cotton, wool,
hides and licorice: this last-named item
grows wild in many localities in the south.
242 The government is promoting the adoption
of modern methods of farming and animal
husbandry and the expansion of irrigation
facilities. It operates special agricultural
schools and experimental farms in different
parts of the country, as well as a date research
station near Basra. Within the last
few years it has initiated settlement and
demonstration projects on state lands at
Dujayla, near Kut; at Shahrizor, near
Sulaimaniya; at Huwaija, near Kirkuk;
and at Sinjar, near Mosul.

135 With the exception of the oil reserves,
the mineral resources of Iraq are negligible.
Small deposits of lignite, gypsum, sulfur and
other minerals are known to exist in the
north, while salt beds are found in widely
472 distributed areas. Industrial development is
438 slight, in spite of the impetus supplied by
the shortage of materials during the recent
war years. Small craft industries flourish in
the urban centers, and a few modern factories
have been established in Baghdad and
Mosul for the processing of local products.
These consist primarily of plants for the
manufacture of textiles, cement, bricks, distilled
liquors, soaps and cigarettes.

135 The petroleum industry has expanded
rapidly since the discovery of oil, in 1927,
at Baba Gurgur, in the Kirkuk region. The
reserves, which are reputed to be among the
richest in the Middle East, provide a primary
471 source of wealth for the country. The
Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions
originally granted in 1925, covering the
lands east of the Tigris River and north

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pal population centers and radiate from Baghdad and Mosul to cities in Syria, Iran and Turkey. The Tigris is navigable to barges from Basra to Baghdad throughout the year, and to smaller craft as far as Mosul during the high-water season. The Shatt al Arab is open to ocean-going vessels, and Basra, about 85 miles from the Persian Gulf, is one of the major ports of the Middle East. A government-operated railroad, part of the famous "Berlin to Baghdad" railway, runs from Basra to Baghdad and Mosul, with connections through Aleppo to Istanbul. A branch line extends from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Khanaquin. A government-owned airline serves Iraq and the neighboring countries, while international lines from Europe to Africa and the Far East stop at Baghdad and Basra. 489 491 505 496 509

FOOD AND NUTRITION

The nutrition of the people is governed by the cultural habits of the different racial and social communities, the economic status of the individual families and the food supplies available under diverse climatic conditions. Undernutrition is prevalent among the poorer inhabitants—tenant cultivators, urban laborers and nomadic tribes—who make up over three quarters of the population. Wheat, barley, rice and dates are the staple food crops of the country, while vegetables and fruits, other than dates, are frequently scarce. Wheat is widely grown, primarily in the rainfall areas of the north, but also in the irrigated riverain zones of the south. Barley is cultivated extensively, and, like wheat, is used in the preparation of breads and of *burghul*, a coarse-grained cereal product typical of this region. Millet and maize are common crops in the south. Rice is produced in certain lowland districts in the Kurdish highlands and on the fringes of the southern marshes, and is a popular food among all sections of the population. Peas, beans and lentils are usually consumed throughout the year, and tomatoes, eggplant and different root and green vege- 146 241 [262]

p. 25(B)

241 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in in-
853 fancy, particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

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In the early post-war period there was little development. Petroleum production, and the revenue accruing to the Government therefrom, remained at the pre-war level or below and agricultural and industrial output showed little change. The deficit in the balance of payments was met by drawing on foreign exchange reserves. The Government budget showed deficits, and little was spent on capital works. By 1950, however, the situation began to change. Output of petroleum increased rapidly, and new agreements with the producing companies greatly raised government receipts. With the technical and financial assistance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a large-scale development plan was drawn up which is at present being carried out. The completion of the various projects under way should result in a considerable increase in the national income.

Production

Agriculture

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The increase in area and output achieved during the Second World War was generally maintained during the post-war period (see table 26). In recent years, there seems to have been a further extension in acreage, owing to increased irrigation and greater mechanization. 1/ Yields have continued to fluctuate in response to weather conditions, floods and attacks by locusts and other insect pests; total output has therefore varied considerably from year to year. The experience of recent years, notably that of 1952, has, however, shown that, thanks to the co-operation of other Middle Eastern and foreign governments, locust attacks cause much less damage than they did formerly. Similarly, completion of the irrigation works at present under way should greatly reduce the danger of floods like that of 1954, which destroyed many crops and damaged property.

The agricultural and livestock census 2/ of 1952/53, the first of its kind, puts the total agricultural holdings of Iraq at 6,384,000 hectares, of which

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1/ The number of pumps used in irrigation rose from 2,757, with a total horsepower of 91,332 in 1945, to 4,339, with a horsepower of 167,288 in 1953 (Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract 1953 (Baghdad)). In addition, the construction of canals made it possible to extend appreciably the area irrigated by existing dams. Early in 1951, there were 320 combines and 750 tractors (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, (Baltimore, 1952), page 19). In 1952 and 1953, 625 combines and 502 tractors were sold to farmers; of these over two-thirds were sold in 1953 (Statistical Abstract). There were 2,091 tractors in 1954 (Le Commerce du Levant, 11 August 1954 (Beirut)).

2/ Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract 1953 (Baghdad).

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Table 26. Iraq: Area and Production of Principal Crops, 1934-38, 1945, 1948 and 1950 to 1954

Crop	1934-38	1945	1948	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Area (thousands of hectares):								
Wheat	661	777	963	950	863	882	1,046	...
Barley	743	826	974	1,000	927	700	1,211	...
Rice	152	194	295	218	189	210	129	...
Cotton	16	...	...	32	44	40	24	...
Production (thousands of metric tons):								
Wheat	478	400	301	545	487	480	762	800
Barley	575	650	570	851	839	800	1,111	700
Rice	205	245	350	242	190	250	200	250
Cotton	2	1	2	8	6	3	4	...
Dates	260	...	301a/	305	350	370	350	...

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics (Rome), Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics; agricultural census of 1952/53; Le Commerce du Levant (Beirut), 25 December 1954.

a/ 1947.

2,752,000 hectares are rainfed, 2,912,000 irrigated 1/ and 644,000 hectares uncultivable. Of the total, 2,527,000 hectares, or 40 per cent, were cropped; 2,795,000 hectares, or 44 per cent, were left fallow; 128,000 hectares, or 2 per cent, was under fruit trees and vines; 231,000 hectares, or 4 per cent, consisted of pastures; and 42,000 hectares, or 1 per cent, consisted of woodland. Double cropping is practised in a few areas.

The census showed that the area planted to the major field crops was as follows: barley 1,211,000 hectares; wheat, 1,046,000; rice, 129,000; maize, 54,000; cotton, 24,000; millet, 22,000; sesame, 22,000; tobacco, 10,000; vegetables, 45,000; others, 38,000; total, 2,601,000 hectares. Barley is to be found in most parts of the country, while wheat is grown mainly in the north, the provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk accounting for half the total area; cotton and fruit trees are grown mainly around Baghdad and in other central provinces, and rice in the south; date cultivation is concentrated around the town of Basra. 2/

1/ Of this total, 1,685,000 hectares are irrigated by flow, 1,120,000 hectares by pumps and 107,000 by water wheels and other means.

2/ The census put livestock on agricultural holdings as follows: horses, 137,000; cattle, 712,000; buffaloes, 47,000; sheep, 4,484,000; goats, 1,618,000; donkeys, 399,000; camels, 38,000; and mules, 57,000.

433 311 241 There has been little change in the crop pattern in recent years. In 1950, under the stimulus of rising world prices, the area planted to cotton increased, but the damage caused by pests, together with the fall in prices, caused heavy losses and led to a shift to other crops. There has also been an extension of the area planted to fruits and vegetables.

242 The Government has taken several important measures to aid agriculture. In 1952, in order to improve the quality of dates, the government-owned Iraqi Dates Association contributed 49 per cent of the capital of a company which will market the crop. In 1953, the Government appropriated funds for the building of grain silos with a capacity of 150,000 tons, in order to improve quality, since low grading depresses export prices. The Agricultural Machinery Administration rents "machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts". 1/ The activities of the Agricultural Bank are discussed below.

423 241 Among the major obstacles to agricultural development has been the land tenure system. The uncertainty of land titles has by now been largely eliminated by the work carried out since passage of the land settlement law of 1932. By the end of 1953, titles to 16,126,000 hectares had been settled; this represented 68.4 per cent of the area of the country, excluding the desert regions. Another obstacle is the unequal distribution of land. The agricultural census showed that there were only 125,000 holdings, with an average area of 51 hectares per holding. Of these, 24,000 holdings were under 1 hectare, 26,000 between 1 and 5 hectares, 16,000 between 5 and 10 hectares and 19,000 between 10 and 20 hectares. Thus, 85,000 holders, or 68 per cent of the total, owned about 8 per cent of the total area. At the other extreme, some 33,000 holders, with over 100 hectares each, owned some 85 per cent of the total area. The majority of the agricultural population is landless.

311 241 185 The Government has attempted to remedy this situation by settlement schemes on government-owned land, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of the settled area. Following a successful experiment at Dujaila, 4,284 farmers were settled, in five projects with a total area of 198,000 hectares, and by the end of 1954, 10,200 farmers had been settled on 510,000 hectares. 2/ Farmers are organized in supply and marketing co-operatives. They are given the land free of rent for ten years, after which those who have made good are granted title without charge. 3/ Further projects are under way, including the distribution of 1,125,000 hectares in Mosul province, the distribution of 100,000 hectares near Baghdad, the expansion of the Hawijah settlement and the distribution of land near Basra and along the southern Euphrates. 4/

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, page 20.

2/ The Iraq Times (Baghdad), 25 October 1954.

3/ For further details see United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, Progress in Land Reform (1954), page 105.

4/ The Iraq Times, 14 December 1954, 4 January 1955, 8 January 1955 and 7 February 1955.

35₂ Hooper and Field 8-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MA1
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Field 264; 4, 12, 36, 53 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150739; K.B. 335. 824*

The castor oil plant[1] is a native of India, but is common now throughout tropical and subtropical countries. In Iraq and Iran it is cultivated as a windbreak for cotton and other summer crops and in gardens as an ornamental plant. It may attain a height of 10 meters and be a perennial tree, but in cooler climates it is either a shrub or an annual herb. With variations of the plant there are also varieties, large and small, of the seeds. The four samples from Iraq were classed as follows: "Abhangi seeds" 15 by 9 mm., "ordinary" 13 by 10 mm., "Indian red-stemmed" 11 by 8 mm., "Syrian Baladi" 13 by 11 mm. The most important constituent of castor seed is the fixed oil, which exists to the extent of about 50 per cent. The oil is used as a lubricant, as an illuminant, and in medicine as a safe purgative. The oil cake contains all the poisonous property originally present in the seed, hence can not be used as a cattle food; it is, however, an excellent manure and fuel.

278* 372 [247] [245] [241] •

Roccella Montagnei Bél. (Ascolichenes, Roccellaceae) 824*

دواله

278*

Davâlah (Ham.); a lichen.

Field 28A; W.H.M.M. 150824; K.B. 336.

Achundow refers this drug to *Muscus arboreus*, and gives the Persian names as Dawalak and Karbasu and the Arabic name as Aschna (*Usnea* sp.). The Persian name Davâlah is applied to more than one kind of lichen, since Dymock gives *Parmelia kamtschadalis* Esch. as the source of this drug in the Indian bazaars (Ph. Ind. 3: 627). In the Field collection from Baghdad, No. 28A, this drug occurs under the name of "Lihayat as-shâyib." Some of the Parmelias are used as a dye. They are gray lichens, in broken pieces, having emollient and astringent properties, used in a bath or as a poultice.

Rosa damascena Mill. (Rosaceae) 824*

گل سرخ

213
278*

Gul-i-surkh, "red flower" (Teh.); Ward (Ar.); flowers of red rose.

Field 42A; W.H.M.M. 150763.

The rose of Damascus is largely cultivated in western Asia. In Turkey, Bulgaria, and the south of France this species yields attar of rose and is the flower from which the official rose water is prepared.

The petals are slightly astringent, and are used chiefly as an agreeable astringent or as a coloring agent. "Gulanjabin," of rose [346]

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[1] [Ricinus communis --ANALYST]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group, 651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving the construction of the Ḥabbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method, came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness, 654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with 231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship 494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much 491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by Ramadi and Ruṭba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian) competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The Ruṭba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through 205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 185 473 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those of the Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab only—had wisely retained the system of export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices, throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist. Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers and exporters.

654 ● 242 185 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-year course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Zaʿfaraniya (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected, tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield, quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust campaigns in the technique of which ʿIraq claimed to lead the world: caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many centres. The department was in touch with local industry which could use as raw materials ʿIraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley, beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intolerably wasteful. [474] It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspectorate, and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself in rural education and established agricultural schools in every liwā. [381] It was promoting village settlement, in which field the interesting and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323) was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechanization of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of a future ʿIraqi agriculture which with great new areas under controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power as its chief limiting factor. Attention was being given to 654
the increase and improvement of livestock, a major asset of the 242
country; Ayrshire and Friesian bulls were imported and distributed, rams from a selected herd were sold to reliable farmers, 185
laboratory work on wool was carried out. Yet other lines of progress were dairying, with experiments in cheese production, the breeding of improved mules and donkeys, the increase of egg production by improving poultry breeds. The allotment by the Development Board for the period 1951–6 was nearly 2 million dinars for agricultural research, 3½ million for small-scale reclamation schemes, 1¼ million for animal husbandry, and a million for swamp reclamation. The need for a measure of integration between animal husbandry and crop production, hitherto divorced, was realized, as well as the broad essential singleness of the effort which must be made in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, land settlement, rural education, and the provision of capital. It seemed certain as the nineteen-fifties opened that if this effort were made and sustained by public and Government, and in the absence of any general calamity, the prospects for agricultural development in this wide and favoured territory, within the ultimately fixed limits of its river-water and rainfall resources, exceeded those not only of any Middle Eastern country, but of any territory of comparable size elsewhere in the world; the growing of food for less fortunate nations could prove, indeed, to be the main part of 'Iraq's material contribution to humanity.

In the care of its forests not much had yet been accomplished 313
beyond the limits of study, experiment, and the establishment of 185
tree-nurseries; the wide but neglected forest areas (p. 29) of the north still lay untended and unimproved, lacking notably a modern forest code, a staff of trained foresters, and even detailed exploration. Some steps had indeed been taken to provide fire protection and to carry out by helicopter and air photography the first forest surveys, but few to prevent uncontrolled cutting, grazing, and trespass by the villagers. One million dinars were allotted by the Development Board for forestry development in 1951–6. The significance of these areas to soil erosion, silt deposit, and river flooding was understood, and plans were being prepared on these and allied matters; but only a beginning had been made to solve these problems or to move towards the large-scale action which must be involved, or to provide the 'Iraqi public with sources of fuel and timber at present lacking.

Although sea fishing, based on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, was but a 226
limited resource, the rivers and swamps of the territory were the source of a fish catch estimated at many thousands of tons a year, and export of fish to the Levant—and in particular to the Jews in

312 The inadequacy of the existing irrigation system is generally recognised in so far as it relates to the great incompleteness of the network of engineering works needed, such as storage reservoirs, flood embankments, regulator constructions, delivery and drainage channels: but it appears at present to be insufficiently appreciated in the country that the proper utilisation and maintenance of these expensive works is even more important than their construction and probably calls for greater technical skill at the outset. It is a serious mistake to suppose that the management of a great engineering undertaking, such as a national irrigation system, is a simpler problem than its design and construction, or that such management can be economically and wisely left to inexpert hands or to officials primarily occupied with other duties.

242 The primitive methods of cultivation, stock-keeping and disposal of produce prevalently practised, as well as their marked effect on the quantity and quality of the country's output and on its reputation in the world's markets, have been repeatedly emphasised and need only be mentioned here.

439 To build up her prosperity el 'Iraq must evidently develop her export trade both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is therefore of great importance to follow the statistics of external trade continuously and to endeavour to adjust the country's agricultural output unceasingly to world demand. Unlike the various land statistics, which have proved so difficult to collect and so unreliable when collected, the Trade statistics kept by the Customs and Excise Department appear not only to be in excellent order but to be used. No attempt will be made to discuss these valuable figures here: but the nature, quantity and value of the principal exports of agricultural products during the five years 1925-6 to 1929-30 in the accompanying table should be noted.

TABLE IX. MAIN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS DURING FIVE YEARS 1925-6 TO 1929-30

Product	Quantity in thousands of tons	Value in lakhs of rupees
Living animals (horses, camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc.)	835·6*	87·7
Raw cotton	3·2	32·7
Dates	624·3	902·1
Grain, etc. (barley, pulse, rice, wheat, etc.)	306·2	449·1
Hides (cow, sheep, goats, wild animal, etc.)	9·5	171·9
Intestines (casings)	0·6	70·1
Raw silk	0·005	0·7
Tobacco	0·8	9·2
Raw wool	32·4	368·2

*Thousands of animals.

242 It is in experimenting in the culture of new or improved products required by the world, in adapting them to local environment, in multiplying them for local growth, and in demonstrating their successful cultivation and disposal on a commercial scale, that scientific agricultural research stations, progressive landed estates and well-managed marketing bodies, have such an indispensable part to play in the general development of the country's agriculture.

185 The establishment of an efficient national irrigation system and the application of the lessons of progressive scientific research and experience elsewhere must be recognised as two of the fundamental conditions of

higher levels of education but, in general, the basis for most of them is acquired in the primary school. Before considering, therefore, ways and means of advance towards compulsory primary education for all children, it will be desirable to ascertain to what extent these general educational needs are met in the existing primary schools system. If it should be found that the primary schools do not adequately meet these needs, it may be wise to advocate qualitative reform in primary schooling before ambitious quantitative advance. 000

SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

In addition to these general educational needs, and partly arising from them, there are two outstanding needs which are connected with the economy of the country and the transitional stage through which an important section of the population is passing.

The Need for Realistic Rural Education. The first outstanding need is that of realistic rural education. In a country whose future development and prosperity is so bound up with the necessity for agricultural improvement, it is important that the schools of the countryside should relate their activities to rural pursuits. As the following extract from the report of the Monroe Commission, issued in 1932, indicates, there is nothing novel in directing attention to this vital educational requirement in Iraq: 874 871

> Agriculture as a science is comparatively recent. As a science it has not yet entered Iraq to any great extent. Here it is still predominantly a rude craft; most of those who live by agriculture use primitive methods of farming and stock-keeping of generations or centuries ago. If these out-worn methods are to be replaced by better ones the change must be worked through education, and largely through the village school. . . . [242]
>
> If the work of the village schools is to be determined by the actual and present needs of the people they are set up to serve, then they should first of all become a means of teaching the people how to make a better living from the land. The village school should provide more vital instruction and training in improved agricultural methods; manual arts; the importance of native industries; the proper breeding and selection of seeds. . .

With certain modifications, due mainly to the efforts of the Directorate of Agriculture, these observations of the Monroe Commission are as valid in 1950 as they were in 1932. They will need to be taken into account at a later stage of this study when the type of advance towards compulsory education in the countryside is being considered. 874

on the land. There is apt to be increasing pressure on the land- 423
owner to take such steps as a result of the growing opportunities 427
for alternative employment created by a large increase in public 241
expenditures on development, the expansion of industry and the opening of state lands to settlement. In fact, unless the sharecropper's status is improved, there is a great danger that there will be a continued flight of labor from the land, impairing the country's agricultural production.

The government itself has made only a modest contribution 654
to the advancement of agriculture. The Directorate-General of 242
Agriculture is only a subordinate department in the Ministry of Economics and has been severely handicapped by lack of funds and a shortage of competent agricultural officers. While it has had some success in combatting pests and diseases and in the extension of such crops as cotton and citrus fruit, too little attention has been devoted to practical research, and almost no field work has been carried out to assist cultivators in improving their crops and methods of cultivation. The expenditures of the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments were actually cut from ID 1,160,000 in 1948-49 to ID 540,000 in 1950-51 and, at the latter figure, represented only 1.8 percent of the total budget outlay. Expenditures on both agriculture and irrigation 1950-51 amounted to only 6.7 percent of the total.

Plans for the future now envisage large water storage and 654
irrigation projects to provide more water for land already in use 311
and to increase the area under cultivation and provide for the settlement of new land. These plans are in general quite sound. They will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time more stress is placed on arresting the deterioration of land already in use by extensive drainage schemes and on raising the productivity of agriculture by other means. The establishment of an efficient extension service and the provision of incentives to improve methods of cultivation are particularly important in this connection.

Expansion of Area under Cultivation: Irrigation 311

Extension of the area of land under cultivation is vitally important not only to an increase in production, but, above all, as

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

and trained medical and veterinary assistants to control disease. In 231 the North, livestock shelters would reduce the high mortality in the winter. In the long run, however, livestock raising is likely to become increasingly the preoccupation of settled farmers, particularly as the area under cultivation is gradually extended and natural pastures correspondingly restricted. Mixed farming, in which livestock raising based on the production of fodder crops would have its appropriate place, would greatly enhance incomes, especially because it would give more year-around employment to farmers who now, with the concentration on winter crop production, are underemployed for the greater part of the year.

5. Research and Education: Incentives

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While is it relatively easy to point out what should be done to improve agriculture and livestock, devising the means to accomplish the improvement is incomparably more difficult. The means available to the state for a direct attack on low productivity are necessarily limited. The government can, of course, lay out drainage schemes, make more water available, provide facilities for combatting plant and animal diseases and pests, establish livestock shelters, assist in organizing cooperatives, and furnish more ample credit facilities. However, except perhaps in the new settlement areas, the state cannot prescribe better crop rotation, the use of improved seeds, better methods of cultivation and the like. These depend on private initiative which can at best only be stimulated and encouraged by the government. In some circumstances farmers can be relied upon to seize the initiative, as in the case of cotton where high prices have stimulated a rapid expansion of production. In the main, however, greater productivity depends on the success of efforts to persuade large numbers of landowners and cultivators to change their time-hallowed methods and techniques. For this reason principal reliance will have to be placed on education, supported by practical research and supplemented where feasible by financial incentives provided by the government.

First of all, steps should be initiated immediately to organize 242 an effective extension or advisory service to farmers. At present 647 the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and much of their

242 attention is devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks. The 647 relatively small number of agricultural officers in the provinces are engaged primarily in the distribution of seed, in the collection of rather inadequate statistics and in administrative tasks. They lack the time, the transport facilities, and, often, the ability to counsel farmers on methods of improving their output. While shortages of trained personnel will prevent the immediate establishment of a full-time extension service, the Mission recommends the early appointment of a director of extension and education whose first responsibility would be the recruitment and training of personnel for such a service. The need is for people well-grounded in practical, [874] general agriculture rather than specialists. The facilities of the secondary agricultural school and the higher agricultural institute at Abu Ghuraib might well be used to train the required people, provided the quality of the staff is improved and the curriculum revised, especially in the direction of giving more practical training in agriculture. It will be impossible, however, to attract properly qualified people to an extension service unless the status of agricultural officers in the provinces is considerably raised and their conditions of service, particularly housing and pay, are greatly improved.

The effectiveness of such an extension service would be greatly enhanced by the organization of demonstration units on strategically located government and private farms. There, farmers could be brought to see with their own eyes the practical advantages of improved methods of raising livestock, poultry and farm crops. At the same time the extension service might work closely with the public schools in the rural areas and small towns to insure that a knowledge of the rudimentary principles of agriculture is instilled in children at an early age. Rural primary and secondary schools should give agriculture an appropriate place in their curriculum.

816 An extension service must be backed up by sound, practical 242 research which will develop new crops and more productive varieties, improved livestock breeds, better methods of cultivation, and more effective control of pests and diseases. At present there are few people engaged in full-time research. Government farms are devoted primarily to the commercial production of seed, serving neither as demonstration farms nor as centers for extensive

242 816 research. The Mission recommends that in the future such farms should be used primarily as experimental stations. Seed for distribution to farmers could be produced on land surplus to the needs of the experimental stations or on a contract basis under appropriate government supervision on private farms. The Mission suggests that immediate steps be taken to secure a research director to coordinate all existing research and to recruit a gradually expanding staff of full-time research experts consisting partly of foreigners and partly of Iraqis.

242 These measures will bring about an improvement in agriculture only very gradually. In the short run they will need to be supplemented by positive financial incentives. Most farmers will probably prove unwilling or unable to invest money or time in the cultivation of fodder crops or the use of fertilizers unless they are convinced through practical experience that such an investment is really worthwhile. In order to induce farmers to experiment themselves, the government may wish to consider providing free seed for fodder crops and defraying part of the cost of fertilizer, or, alternatively, making a flat money payment per donum to those undertaking to use fertilizers or grow feed. Such incentives should, of course, be offered only as long as is necessary to demonstrate the value of improved methods. The provision of credit for the acquisition of machinery, fertilizers and other means of production will also be helpful in this respect.

242 427 It has already been pointed out that the existing sharecropping system, coupled with the shifting nature of cultivation, militates against the introduction of soil-building and forage crops. Under present conditions the landlord will find it difficult to compel the fellah to grow such crops unless the fellah is actually paid for doing so. The Mission therefore suggests that the difficulties inherent in the sharecropping system, as well as the advisability of changes in this system, be studied by an expert on land tenure.

Tobacco and the Tobacco Monopoly

249 655 The Mission has paid special attention to tobacco, not only because cultivation of this crop is of considerable importance to the Kurdish farmers of the North, but also because tobacco leaf is

TABLE 15

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MERCHANDISE TRADE
(in millions of dinars)

	1949		1950	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Customs returns	12.4	40.5	22.0	37.6
Less				
Oil Companies trade	− 0.7	−10.3	− 0.8	− 8.4
"Officially" financed	−14.9	−20.0	−20.6	−24.8
Discrepancy	− 3.2	10.2	0.6	4.4

457 Agents). But the principal explanation of the large amount of residual imports is the import of goods "without foreign exchange." Licenses issued (but not necessarily used) amounted to ID 10,800,000 and 7,400,000 in 1949 and 1950. These were paid for with foreign exchange acquired by the methods already described. Part of this foreign exchange was, no doubt, also used for travel abroad, particularly in the Lebanon. Insofar as receipts and expenditures in "unofficial" foreign exchange did not balance in any one year, there must have been a balancing item in these transactions, representing capital export or import. No data is available on this, but it is generally believed that there has been a considerable export of capital in recent years.

IX. Government and the Economy

654 Until recently the goverment, handicapped primarily by a shortage of funds, played a comparatively modest role in promoting economic life. In agriculture the main effort was confined to the • [242] production and distribution of seeds, the promotion of cotton and citrus culture and the combating of diseases and pests, particularly the locusts. Some help was given through the establishment of the Agricultural Bank and of a government organization for the rental of agricultural machinery. One project for the settlement of smallholders on newly irrigated government land in the Dujaila district near Kut was initiated. Outlays on irrigation and flood control,

There is a great need for systematic remedial and prophylactic treatment to reduce widely prevalent parasitic infections by such means as flock treatment against internal worms, and cattle and sheep dipping against external parasites. A small campaign to control sheep pox and other external ailments was begun at one time, but abandoned because of lack of funds. In the future adequate funds should be set aside to carry out a well-planned campaign of dipping, particularly in the North. This will involve the establishment of dip-tanks at strategic points in relation to the grazing grounds of the herds and flocks, the location to be worked out by a ground survey undertaken by field officers. Another important prophylactic measure would be the establishment of quarantine stations at points used for international trade in livestock. 232

At present many livestock belonging to the nomadic tribes die from lack of water or exposure to severe weather, either directly or indirectly as the result of lowered resistance to disease. In the severe winter of 1949 about 1,500,000 sheep are said to have died in the mountains of Kurdistan. In the South the waterholes used by the tribes tend to dry up in dry years, thus necessitating great treks to reach water during which many animals are lost. Such losses would be greatly reduced by livestock shelters in the North and more wells in the South. The shelters, which should be built at strategic points on the migration routes, would be primarily for the protection of lambing ewes and would provide emergency feed supplies for migratory flocks. A three-walled mud structure, with a roof and accommodations for shepherds and some feedstuffs, will be sufficient. Although the government has dug some wells for the use of the southern tribes, much more could be done.

Plant Diseases and Pests

The pests and diseases affecting crops have not been as great a problem as those attacking livestock. The locust plague is a periodic menace, but has been kept rather successfully under control in recent years. The systematic distribution of poison bait in hatching areas during the spring has been the most effective method of combating the locust.[9] Since the bait will be scorned when succulent green food is available, it is important also that farmers 242

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[9] The best bait consists of mill-run bran, sawdust, sodium fluorsilicate and water and should be applied at the rate of 14 pounds of wet bait per donum.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

be made to realize that the eggs can be destroyed before hatching by cultivating infested areas to a depth of about two inches either in late fall or early spring. Once the locusts or grasshoppers begin to spread, their ravages can be arrested by applying chlordane or toxaphene as spray or dust. Sprays have the advantage of causing higher initial kills and they continue to kill over longer periods than dust. To control future outbreaks the Department of Agriculture should at all times have access to sufficient funds and have on hand an adequate amount of supplies, vehicles, spraying and dusting equipment. This has not always been true in the past.

The most destructive of several sucking insects is the Sunn pest *(Burygaster integriceps)* which does great damage to wheat and barley crops in several Middle East countries. Iraq has reported losses of 30 to 50 percent and in some sections almost total crop losses. The most common procedure used in control of this insect has been to plant early-maturing varieties of grain, since the insect does not attack after the seed has begun to harden.

Grain losses from rust and smut are sometimes quite substantial and could undoubtedly be reduced. Although the Mission made only a superficial survey, loose smut of wheat and barley and close smut of barley were noted over a considerable area. In certain sections as much as 10 to 20 percent of the seeds appeared to be smutted. Leaf rust of wheat and leaf and stem rust of barley, as well as powdery mildew, were also observed.

Cotton pests and diseases are not at present a factor in production. The pink boll worm, however, has been recorded from Basra and the boll worm *(Earia insulana)* is found throughout the cotton-growing region. *Laphygma exigua* is most common and does some damage. There are also a number of other pests. While, in the aggregate, these have not inflicted serious losses, agricultural officers should be prepared to recognize any new infestations and should be briefed on the most effective methods of control. It might be noted in this connection that the State University of Arizona at Tucson, Arizona, U.S.A., has published in pamphlet form a schedule for cotton insect control that is outstandingly good.[10]

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[10] *Cotton Insect Control*, Circular 179, Agricultural Extension Service, University of Arizona, Tucson.

In any discussion of pests the damage caused by weeds is worth emphasizing again. Poor tillage and the tendency to use idle land as pasture has caused a rapid spread of Bermuda and Johnson grass in the irrigation zone. These pests have actually forced a considerable amount of crop land out of production and have lowered the yield of such summer crops as cotton, maize and sesame. 242

VI. Improvement in Livestock and Livestock Products

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Improvement in both the quality and quantity of livestock production is likely to be of growing importance in the future, particularly since the anticipated rapid increase in public expenditures on development as a whole will create an expanding and more discriminating market for animal products.

In general the types of livestock found in Iraq represent rather hardy animals which, through a process of natural selection, have become fairly resistant to the rigors imposed by a severe climate and inadequate feed supplies. This does not mean that improvements in breeding cannot be effected. At present breeding 232
is largely haphazard and uncontrolled, particularly as to timing and the selection of sires. It is a well-known scientific fact, however, that the evaluation of genetic factors influencing production in any direction—meat, milk, wool, work, and the like—cannot be properly assessed unless the nutritional level is first improved, thus permitting the full genetic development of the livestock to take place. Iraq is a particularly striking illustration of the truth of the old saying that "half the breed goes into the mouth."

One of the best methods of exploring the possibility of improved breeding and the results of better feeding and other livestock practices would be to establish a number of herds and flocks of indigenous breeds of livestock as well as poultry on government farms throughout Iraq. There careful records would be kept to discover for the first time what these animals can really produce with improved feeding, breeding and management. These livestock stations could also provide progeny-tested sires to farmers for

the second stage it might then become a complete cooperative, with the government retaining representation on the board only to the extent that its agricultural station contributed milk for pasteurization. The cooperative would of course be subject to government inspection from time to time to ensure efficient and hygienic operation. 234

(g) The government should explore the possibility of purchasing selected young calves and dry cows from the producers, keeping them on a selected irrigated farm outside of town, and rearing and breeding from these stock for resale to the milk producers.

(h) Measures to eliminate disease among dairy cattle, including testing for tuberculosis and brucellosis, should be inaugurated.

(i) The government should send two of its trained staff from the Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Department to see and examine the Bombay Milk Scheme, Bombay, India, in order to assist in solving the similar problems which confront the Baghdad milk industry.

If the government is prepared to carry out such an over-all campaign to organize adequate and safe milk supplies for Baghdad and later for other major cities, there is little doubt that UNICEF and FAO will be prepared to assist with machinery and technical assistance, providing a fair proportion of the resulting supplies of pasteurized milk were reserved for those groups in the population who particularly need them (children, nursing and pregnant mothers).

VII. Education and Research

It will be readily apparent that a program for the improvement of agricultural and livestock production does not necessarily involve large government investments. Most of all, it requires a well-directed, adequately staffed government service that can effectively assist the cultivator and the livestock keeper. Within this service the primary emphasis in the future must be on a field organization equipped to work directly with the producer in improving his methods and management and supported by a properly focussed, practical research program. 242

Such a service is unfortunately conspicuously lacking in Iraq. Within the Department of Agriculture there are less than 25

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242 trained agriculturists.[11] In each province there is an agricultural staff of five to 20 men, but the officers are not qualified to direct research or extension work. The trained staff of the Veterinary Department is correspondingly restricted. It has already been mentioned that there are only 17 trained veterinarians in its field [465] service. In 1950 the Agricultural and Veterinary Departments had only 108 and 40 officers respectively with a base pay of over ID 15 per month.[12]

The field services operate under great handicaps. The officers are underpaid and thus often supplement their income by engaging in other work or by extending special favors. Neither their pay nor their standing in the community is such as to attract promising talent. Transport or other equipment such as laboratory facilities is frequently lacking. Excessive centralization leaves little room for initiative. Even the taking of a field trip requires the consent of the central office. The staff is preoccupied with routine tasks, generally of a regulatory or control nature, to the virtual exclusion of real research or extension work. They grow and distribute seed and nursery stock, do some control work on pests and diseases, carry out inspections and collect rather inadequate information on production. Moreover, their work is rigidly compartmentalized. There is little or no contact between those dealing with livestock and those concerned with agronomy and no coordination between agriculture and irrigation.

Organization of an Extension Service

One of the principal tasks of the future should be to organize an extension or advisory service to farmers and livestock keepers. Such a service, adequately equipped with transport, would devote itself entirely to assisting the farmers and shepherds in the field. Its main emphasis would be on education through demonstration. For this purpose it would need to establish crop, livestock and poultry demonstration units in all parts of the country. Suggestions 242 for such livestock units have already been made. In many cases it will not be necessary to establish government-owned farms, for it should be possible to stimulate the more enlightened landowners to lead the way in adopting better methods and permitting those in the neighborhood to come and see for themselves the results achieved. The ultimate goal should be to make some practical demonstration of the value of such improved methods accessible to nearly all cultivators. In addition the officers of the extension service would need to work intimately with the rural primary and secondary schools in a program to bring children a knowledge of the principles of good agriculture and animal husbandry as early as possible. They should also play a prominent role in any adult education programs launched by the Ministry of Education. For this purpose they should be equipped with visual teaching aids.

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[11] These include in the Central Office at Baghdad, the director-general, two junior agricultural officers, one plant protection officer, one extension officer and one technical assistant; in the agricultural station at Abu Ghuraib, one senior livestock officer, two plant pathologists, one senior entomologist and four junior assistants; in the agricultural school at Abu Ghuraib, one director and two teachers; and in the horticultural station at Zafanaria, one director, two assistants and two junior officers.

[12] With living allowances, this ranges from ID 23.750 to ID 26.750.

Obviously, such an extension service cannot be created overnight. The first step should be to appoint an expert who has had considerable experience in extension work abroad to recruit and train the necessary staff and take other preparatory measures. His initial staff might consist of an assistant responsible for collecting materials for use in the service and two or three supervisors to direct the gradually increasing amount of advisory work in the field. A few people should be sent abroad each year to gain practical experience of extension work. The supervisory personnel would initially have to be obtained abroad. Those officers who would work directly with farmers and livestock keepers in the field should not be highly specialized. Rather they need a good general training in agriculture and animal husbandry. In the past too much stress has been placed on specialization.

Many of the candidates for the extension service could be 242
educated at the secondary agricultural school and the more 874
advanced institute at Abu Ghuraib. The first of these now gives a three-year course to students who have completed three years of secondary schooling while the latter provides a two-year advanced course to graduates of secondary schools. The institute's course has recently been extended to three years and will soon be increased to a full four years leading to a bachelor's degree in agriculture. Both these schools should be in the position to train

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242 874 forward-looking men for actual farming as well as for posts in the agricultural administration and the extension and educational service. Unfortunately their teaching staff and curricula have been deficient in many respects. The teaching staffs should be strengthened by recruiting additional qualified teachers abroad and by using specialists engaged in agricultural research to teach their specialties. More practical agricultural work should be incorporated into the curriculum. Students in the institute, for instance, might be required to remain on the government farm at least one or two summers and complete a course in practical agriculture. This course would include the actual operation of farm machinery, the establishment of simple plots to demonstrate yield, crop adaptation and other agricultural techniques, and the care of livestock. It is important that students actually work with their hands during such a course, for there is no room in a field extension service for officers who consider manual work degrading. In addition to their regular instruction, both schools should be equipped to give brief courses from time to time in special subjects such as the operation and maintenance of machinery, animal husbandry, soil analysis, forestry, and techniques of extension work.

242 It will be some years before sufficient people can be recruited and trained for an adequate extension service. In the intervening period a complete separation between the extension service and the regulatory and inspection service cannot be carried out. Those newly trained would join the existing service and carry out both types of work, with the expectation, however, that growing emphasis would be placed on extension work. Consideration might be given, however, to establishing a full-time extension service as soon as possible within one or two areas limited to a few selected *qadhas*, so that different methods of working with farmers could be tested.

Ultimately it will be desirable to separate the extension service from the inspection and regulatory service. The latter might then be organized into two sections: one dealing with control of injurious pests and diseases, maintenance of standards for agricultural and livestock products, fertilizers and insecticides, and surveys of production and land use; the other concerned with the production, processing and distribution of pure agricultural seed

and nursery stock. The first of these sections should have adequate laboratory facilities for identifying plants, insects and diseases and for analyzing chemicals, pesticides, fertilizers, feed and food products. The second section would need better equipment than is now available at Abu Ghuraib to test, clean and process seed. It would also require at least three nurseries—one each for the northern, central and southern parts of Iraq—to propagate needed fruit, nut and citrus stocks. Seed stocks of proven strains would have to be either imported or produced locally either on government farms or on private farms under contract. Experience indicates that soil and climatic conditions are favorable to the production of seed of the most important field crops, as well as alfalfa, berseem clover and many of the grasses. 242

The inspection and regulatory service in the field will presumably exist separately for agriculture and animal husbandry under the direction of the departments respectively responsible for these subjects at Baghdad. Ultimately, however, the extension service should be under the unified direction of a single director, particularly since it is so desirable in the future to integrate animal husbandry with agriculture.

Establishment of a Research Department

An extension service will need to be complemented by a staff engaged in practical research and experimental work and a small staff of agricultural statisticians and economists. The first will develop and test new and better strains of seeds and stock, experiment with different methods of soil cultivation and fertilization, explore means of improving livestock breeding and feeding, and the like in order to develop the most effective and best adapted agricultural and livestock practices for practical application through the extension service. The small staff of statisticians and economists will be concerned with developing a more accurate picture concerning farm and livestock production and land use. It will study marketing problems and provide advice on the pattern of agricultural and animal output that is likely to be most remunerative for the farmer in various sections of the country. 654 242

It is important that a Department of Research and Experimentation be established within the ministry charged with respon-

sibility for agriculture. Such a department should gradually be staffed over the next five years with trained personnel able to devote full time to research and experimentation. At present those engaged in research are generally charged with other duties as well. Until more staff can be trained, the available personnel will presumably have to discharge several functions. It is strongly recommended, however, that immediate steps be taken to recruit a man with wide experience in research as the director of the new service. It would be his responsibility to coordinate such research as is now being carried on both in agriculture and animal husbandry and to build up a full-time staff. The research department should have ample facilities and therefore have jurisdiction over all experiment stations. Government farms are now primarily devoted to commercial production of seed and nursery stock rather than to research. In the future their principal task should be to serve as experimental and demonstration stations. Only such land as is surplus to these needs should be turned over to commercial seed or stock production. Under those circumstances part of the seed production may have to be contracted out or grown on newly established government farms.

The research department would concentrate on the following fields:

1. *Soil management and conservation.* This would include the initiation of a complete soil survey to determine the properties of different soils by field and laboratory studies, classify the soils by their properties and possible uses and summarize the information available on each type with respect to its tilth, fertility, adaptability to particular crops and the like. Such a survey would be extremely useful in planning land use, especially in the selection of land for irrigation and drainage projects. The first step would be to carry out a preliminary reconnaissance survey. The advantages of the intensive cropping system, involving proper crop rotation and the use of fertilizer, should also be studied in comparison with those of the crop-fallow system. Finally, the various methods of conserving moisture through better cultivation, timely destruction of weeds and the prevention of soil erosion could be tested.
2. *Introduction of new and better varieties of crops.* Among the subjects to be examined in this field would be the suitability of different types of forage crops, including

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grasses and legumes; new grain sorghum varieties and hybrid maize strains; and the adaptability of sugar beets and sugar cane. 654 242

3. *Horticulture.* This work, which should be centered at the Zafarania station, would cover vegetables, dates, nuts, citrus and other fruits. Tests should be carried out in the northern and southern as well as the central part of Iraq.
4. *Tools and machinery.* This type of work would test the suitability of various kinds of hand, animal-drawn and power tools for different conditions and jobs and especially seek to develop cheap but effective animal-drawn equipment and hand tools.
5. *Forestry.* Research on forestry should be developed with particular attention to experiments with controlled grazing on range and forest land and the selection and culture of trees suitable for various uses and sections of the country. It would be desirable to carry on this research not only at the forest nursery in Erbil, but also at the Abu Ghuraib and Bakrajo stations.
6. *Animal husbandry.* This would focus on the development of the most suitable pasture and feed crops and the best methods of preserving fodder for winter feeding. As already indicated, it would determine to what extent existing types of livestock could be improved by systematic breeding and feeding. The cost and results of feeding with different oilseed by-products and date by-products should be studied and a laboratory established to work on the relative value and digestibility of various feedstuffs. A research program on range development should also be carried out, but jointly with the forestry service. The government has already taken a constructive step by inaugurating a scheme near Chemchemal in the province of Kirkuk for experimenting with afforestation and rotational grazing. The site appears to be unsuited, however, for the production of low-priced fodder to aid in overwintering cattle. Experiments should also be conducted with the reseeding of pastures, using both foreign and indigenous grasses and clovers and with the possible use of fodder trees such as mesquites.

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Tigris, and a large reservoir at Bekhme in the mountains on the Great Zab. 312
The Mission endorsed these projects and recommended others to compensate for diversion and to balance the systems.

The Iraq Irrigation Development Commission believes that the area under irrigation can be increased to 12 million acres by the installation of additional storage facilities, by drainage, rehabilitation, and by new supplies of water.[44]

It is agreed generally that the rain-fed zones in the north must continue to depend primarily on rainfall. Although no accurate estimates are available, the total area which might be available for cultivation in this area is thought to be substantial.

Along with irrigation, an important means of improving productivity is 241
drainage. This would have an immediate effect; other proposals depend on 311
the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation.

As much as 20 to 30 per cent of the cultivated land is said to be abandoned because of salt accumulation. On a large part of the remaining land, yields have declined as much as 50 per cent. Drainage—almost totally neglected—the report concluded, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor.[45]

MECHANIZATION

Because of the cost, the Mission predicted that mechanization would proceed slowly. This conclusion was reached in the face of experience which shows that tractor ploughing may increase yields 20 to 50 per cent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and better preparation of the soil.[46] No doubt mechanization will become increasingly important as additional land is placed under cultivation and labor becomes scarce. 241 407

About 750 tractors and 320 combines are in the country at the present time. A government agency owns 75 of the combines and 81 tractors and plans to import an additional 2,500 tractors and 550 combines with auxiliary equipment.[47] About 50 per cent of the machinery will be retained at government-owned tractor stations and rented or let out under contract.[48] The rest will be sold on easy terms to the farmers.

The International Bank approved a modified version of this machinery program but suggested that rental charges be increased to make the project self-sustaining, and adequate repair shops and demonstration and training programs were recommended.

SOIL BUILDING

It is obvious that the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished. [134]

Cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is said to be virtually unknown. Attention needs to be given to the production of legumes. Commercial fertilization must be studied and, if possible, plants should be built to produce inorganic and organic materials. Soil analyses also are generally needed. 242

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[44] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, p. 16.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[48] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey, op. cit.*, p. 33.

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RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

654 242 At present the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and most of their time is said to be devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks.[49] A complete program in research and extension is needed. Such a program is being developed gradually now with the help of the various technical assistance agencies.

CREDIT

452 652 Production credit facilities are almost non-existent. An effort is being made, however, to increase the resources of the state-owned agricultural bank to provide adequate production credit and to establish storage facilities for crops. According to the United Nations' special reports, moneylenders' interest rates to farmers for crop production were 30 to 40 per cent before the government recently established the agricultural bank.

COTTON

248 Cotton has never been particularly important in Iraq, from the standpoint of either the acreage involved or the total production. Its potential, however, is great.

Table 33

**IRAQ: Statistics on Cotton Production and Distribution
Specified Years, 1920-1951**

Year beginning August 1	Acreage	Yield per Acre	Production	Consumption	Exports	Imports
	Acres	Pounds	Bales			
Average 1920-24	NA	NA	808	NA	NA	NA
Average 1925-29	NA	NA	2,977	NA	NA	NA
Average 1930-34	3,751	159	1,240	NA	NA	NA
Average 1935-39	53,099	97	10,773	NA	NA	NA
Average 1940-44	73,000	62	9,409	NA	10,477	2,845
Average 1945-49	21,619	100	4,493	4,000	3,152	2,733
1950	100,000	183	38,121	7,000	31,000	0
1951	135,000	135	38,000	10,000	1,887[1]	

[1] Exports, August through November.

SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, and International Cotton Advisory Committee.

Before the war, production averaged only about 12,000 bales and slightly less in the postwar years through 1949. Higher prices throughout the world, together with the export controls imposed by the United States and the shortage of cotton, sent production to about 38,000 bales. It would have been three to four times as large on the basis of the planted acreage had it not been for heavy insect damage.

AREA

About two-thirds of the cotton is produced under irrigation in the vicinity of Baghdad and Kut on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. These two areas, together with three or four other smaller ones, account for about 88 per cent of production. Some 10 to 12 per cent is produced in Northern Iraq, mostly around Mosul, and about 2 per cent in Southern Iraq, from Basra north along the river.

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[49] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

Iraq hopes to expand the cotton area greatly, especially in the northern sections where the winters are cold enough to kill the insects. Here there are millions of acres, suitable from the standpoint of soil and temperature, which could be used for cotton if the available water is utilized for irrigation to supplement rainfall of 10 to 15 inches. The few protected valleys with rainfall high enough to permit cotton production without irrigation are small in total area. 248

The northern areas are now sparsely populated and expansion of cultivation is expected to be under complete mechanization. The government is planning to buy a cotton picker for experimental purposes, looking toward the possibility of using them in this area later, after the proposed irrigation facilities are constructed.

Expansion doubtless will depend on the rapidity and extent of the irrigation development.

YIELDS

Historical data on yields are sketchy and not too dependable. These records indicate a prewar range by years from 80 to over 300 pounds of lint per acre and postwar yields from 67 to 180 pounds per acre. The large variations are attributed to insect damage. This was the case in 1951 when the yield averaged about 135 pounds.

Yields at the cotton experiment stations also vary greatly from a little over 100 pounds to as much as a bale and a half. The average is about half a bale per acre. Experiment station specialists insist that their yields are from two to four times higher than those on private farms in the area.

VARIETIES

During the twenties a cotton called Mezo-White, developed in Iraq from 248
a strain of an American Upland called Weber 49, was generally planted, but 242
about 1930 it was supplanted by Rogers Acala. Some reports say the seed of the Acala cotton is badly mixed and both the yield and the staple have deteriorated. Pure seed is available out of the selections from the original Acala, and planting of the so-called "old" Acala is now prohibited by law. This law, however, is not completely effective.

Several new upland varieties now are being grown experimentally, and some look very promising, especially Coker Wilt from which pure seed is now being distributed. The new Acala strains and the Coker cottons are said to staple about $1\frac{1}{32}$ inches as a rule and run up to $1\frac{1}{8}$ inches under very favorable conditions. In 1951-52 about 90 per cent of the crop was Rogers Acala and 10 per cent Coker.

A small quantity of an indigenous Asiatic *herbaceum* called Levantine is still planted primarily for local use by the farmers for wadding and padding, and there is some interest in trying to improve the seed.

CULTURAL PRACTICES

Formerly the tenants prepared the land with primitive ploughs, but now practically all the cotton fields and most of the wheat fields are prepared with tractors which are either owned by the sheiks or rented from the govern- 248

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other commodities. As might be expected in such a situation, the system of classification is limited. The cotton is usually sold on types. Ginners indicate they will buy and sell cotton themselves in the future as in many other countries. 442

The one large cotton spinning mill is putting in its own gin to supply the mill with its requirements of around 15,000 bales annually. This will restrict merchandising to exports unless and until another mill is built.

OIL MILLS 388

There is one oil mill which crushes the largest part of the seed produced. The rest is exported. The capacity of this plant is to be increased and facilities for processing oil products are being added.

EXPORTS 439

Iraq has exported approximately 18,000 bales during each of the past two years, mostly to Germany and Japan, with smaller quantities to Holland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 248

The Director General of Agriculture has promulgated an ambitious 10-year program for increasing cotton production to about 500,000 bales. In time, he believes that on the basis of the available land and water Iraqi production can be boosted to more than a million bales. While admitting his program is ambitious, the Director General appears to be firmly convinced it can be accomplished, given adequate technical assistance. 654

United States agricultural experts with the Point Four Program are inclined to agree that the country's natural resources can support a potential cotton production of this magnitude. The rate of increase, they think, will depend on how effectively the technical resources of the country are organized and applied.

The Director General is highly regarded for his technical as well as his administrative ability and particularly for his driving force. He is especially well qualified to direct the cotton improvement program, having graduated in cotton agronomy from Texas A. & M. College.

Long-Range

For long-range improvements he is depending on the agricultural research agencies now being organized to develop better varieties, more effective irrigation and cultural practices, better insect control techniques, and improved methods of classification and marketing. Still in the planning stages, the research program has done some fairly effective work, especially on variety selection, propagation, and fertilization.

Insect Control

One of the main research problems is the control of insects. The government estimates that 75 per cent of the 1951 cotton crop was destroyed by insects, principally by the spiney bollworm, *Earis insulana* (Boisd.), a white fly that attacks the leaves, and by aphids. Fortunately, the Director said, the pink bollworm has not made its appearance in the country. Experiments are 242

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

242 being conducted this year with about nine different insecticides, but a more thorough program is needed.

The FAO is supplying a specialized cotton entomologist, and the Point Four Mission is supplying a general entomologist to help develop an effective program.

[656] The country has a law requiring that all cotton stalks must be destroyed, the debris burned, and the land ploughed by the first of January. In fact, the farmer is not given permission to plant cotton again unless he has complied with these regulations. Seed sterilization also is required. But the Director General himself admits the program has been ineffective. There are many host plants on which cotton insects can live, and the people do not understand the law or are not in a position to comply, especially where they are in the habit of saving the stalks for fuel.

One of the real difficulties is the growth habits of the present Acala varieties which are said to set 80 per cent of their bolls on what is called the second flush, after the end of August, when the insect population is highest. Efforts are being directed toward development of varieties that have a shorter maturing period, and early results with Coker Wilt have been encouraging.

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

—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

This irrigation system of a farm in southern Iraq dates back to Biblical times. Mules walk down an inclined track beside the well pulling the goatskin water scoops. The scoops, hauled to ground level by the mules, spill their contents into the irrigation ditch. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Government of Iraq in its extensive projects to modernize and improve irrigation and increase crop output.

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

—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

Modern tractors with gang ploughs are now in general use in Iraq for ploughing cotton. Because the land is so heavy, tractors are usually of the heavy-duty track type. Most of the tractors are owned by the government and rented with drivers to farmers on an hourly basis. The Iraq Government is conducting experiments with all types of mechanical equipment in the hope that new lands in the rainfed areas to the north, too sparsely populated to farm with hand labor, may be brought into production with complete mechanization. [427]

These plants have been found to set 75 per cent of their bolls before the end of August. 242

Dr. Shelby Cain, cotton agronomist from Texas A. & M. College supplied by the Point Four Program, is concentrating on this problem in the cotton breeding program. He will be assisted by two Iraqi specialists now being trained at Texas A. & M. To some observers it appears that more work is needed on cultural practices before a full program on cotton breeding is started. For instance, the influence of planting dates, irrigation, fertilization, and cultivation on plant growths in this environment needs to be investigated before the more fundamental research in genetics and breeding can be used effectively.

Fertilization

Research on the problem of maintaining soil fertility is needed also and is included in the broad program for the future. There is an obvious deficiency of nitrogen and humus in the soil, and probably other plant foods. Much of the land in both of the main valleys has been under continuous cultivation 242
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242 134 for centuries, and farmers have depended on the silt deposited from the overflows to maintain the fertility. Increased use of canals and dams for irrigation has made the overflows less frequent. Experiments conducted for the past three or four years with commercial fertilizers have shown no significant benefit, but the United States experts feel the tests are not conclusive and should be continued with various soil conditioners.

While depending on basic research to stimulate long-range production, the Director General is trying to force an immediate improvement through regulations requiring the application of techniques known to be beneficial.

248 *Controls*

656 In an effort to concentrate cotton production on the better suited lands and to facilitate insect control, seed control, and other beneficial measures, regulations have been promulgated requiring government permits for all cotton acreage planted. These permits, based primarily on suitability of the soil and availability of water and labor, are issued on the recommendation of local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the enforcement system is inadequate, and it is generally admitted that the regulation is not closely followed, especially in areas where the local sheiks are extremely powerful and are practically a law unto themselves.

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

At the government cotton experimental farm near Baghdad a double-handled board is used to level the high spots in a newly ploughed field. Outside the government farms little leveling is done. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Iraq Government in experiments and demonstrations to improve cotton cultural practices.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

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
TURKEY
SYRIA
KEY TO NAMES OF PROVINCES-
1. MOSUL
2. ERBIL
3. KIRKUK
4. SULAIMANIYA
5. DULAIM
6. BAGHDAD
7. DIYALA
8. AL BADIYA ASH SHIMALIYA
9. KARBALA
10. HILLA
11. KUT AL IMARA
12. DIWANIYA
13. AMARA
14. AL BADIYA AL JUNUBIYA
15. MUNTAFIQ
16. BASRA
Each dot represents 1000 bales
Mosul
Greater Zab
Little Zab
Tigris
Euphrates R.
Diyala R.
Baghdad
Kut
Basra
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
IRAQ
COTTON PRODUCTION
1951
STATUTE MILES
0 50 100 150
40° 42° 44° 46° 48°

The Ministry also has a program under which pure seed imported from the United States and those propagated on the state farms are distributed free of charge to farmers who have received planting permits and who agree to the variety control. Under this program the government proposes to distribute enough seed to plant most of the area annually for the next five years. Despite this incentive, widespread evasion also is reported. Apparently the farmers still rely on the mixed seed on the theory that if one does not produce another will. (Seed distribution in 1952 was considerably less than in 1951 because of the bad crop last season.) 248 656

The government also has established supervision over all the gins for control of seed distribution to prevent any except approved seed from going back to the farms for planting. Here again enforcement is said to be inadequate.

The mandatory insect control program is another illustration of the effort to force an improvement in cotton, and here again the results have been questionable. 242

The Director General is thinking also of establishing a price stabilization program to lend further encouragement to the promotional programs, but this has not been approved as yet.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East

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government employment where vacancies are fewer than applicants. In 1945, 30 out of 48 graduates of the School were employed by the Department of Agriculture, 17 by the Ministry of Education, and 1 was at home, occupation unknown. Many of those employed in the Ministry of Education are teaching in the model-farm schools, a new type of primary school.

The first- and second-year students in the School of Agriculture have a thirty-six-hour week. In the first year they study Arabic language, English, physics, chemistry, agronomy, botany, zoology, practical agriculture, surveying, and carpentry. In the second year they study Arabic, English, [242] organic chemistry, insects, bees, animal-breeding, irrigation, agricultural machinery, practical agriculture, vegetables, meteorology, carpentry, and veterinary medicine. In the third year the program is increased to thirty-eight hours a week and consists of English, soils, agricultural economics, cooperatives, agricultural accounting, plant products, dairying, plant diseases, agricultural machinery, practical agriculture, fruits, flowers, carpentry, and chicken-breeding. There is no organized physical education, but the students play basketball and volleyball in their leisure time. There is a supervised-study period of two hours each night. All students live at the college at government expense.

Plans are underway to introduce some of the vocational and special types of education into the secondary-school system. The central idea is to have vocational schools offer programs of secondary standard, combining academic and vocational subjects. These courses would lead, through public examination, to Intermediate-School and Secondary-School Certificates. As the combination of the two programs requires more time, the Higher Committee on Studies and Curricula has decided to have a six-year secondary vocational school, with four years of intermediate and two of preparatory work. The plan embraces the technical, agricultural, commercial, and home-arts schools and may eventually include the Fine Arts School.

Students who pass the public primary-school examination will be admitted at government expense and first given a two-year vocational and academic program. At the end of two years those who pass a selective examination conducted by the Ministry in both types of study and who show promise of benefiting from a full secondary course will be given another two years leading to the public intermediate-school examination. Those who pass the intermediate examination will continue with a higher vocational-preparatory course of two years ending with a vocational-secondary certificate entitling the student to admission to higher institutions of the same type. Students who fail the second-year examination will be

IRAQ MH1

241 commercial crops in the rain-fed zones of
the north; dates, cereals and cotton, in the
south. The date-palm groves in the irrigated
lands along the Shatt al Arab and the Euphrates
rivers, and in scattered areas along
the Tigris, furnish almost one third of the
233 world's supply of dates. Sheep, goats, cattle
and other livestock are raised in large numbers
by the nomadic and the seminomadic
489 peoples. The chief agricultural exports are
dates, barley and other grains, cotton, wool,
hides and licorice: this last-named item
grows wild in many localities in the south.
242 The government is promoting the adoption
of modern methods of farming and animal
husbandry and the expansion of irrigation
facilities. It operates special agricultural
schools and experimental farms in different
parts of the country, as well as a date research
station near Basra. Within the last
few years it has initiated settlement and
demonstration projects on state lands at
Dujayla, near Kut; at Shahrizor, near
Sulaimaniya; at Huwaija, near Kirkuk;
and at Sinjar, near Mosul.

135 With the exception of the oil reserves,
the mineral resources of Iraq are negligible.
Small deposits of lignite, gypsum, sulfur and
other minerals are known to exist in the
north, while salt beds are found in widely
472 distributed areas. Industrial development is
438 slight, in spite of the impetus supplied by
the shortage of materials during the recent
war years. Small craft industries flourish in
the urban centers, and a few modern factories
have been established in Baghdad and
Mosul for the processing of local products.
These consist primarily of plants for the
manufacture of textiles, cement, bricks, distilled
liquors, soaps and cigarettes.

135 The petroleum industry has expanded
rapidly since the discovery of oil, in 1927,
at Baba Gurgur, in the Kirkuk region. The
reserves, which are reputed to be among the
richest in the Middle East, provide a
471 primary source of wealth for the country. The
Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions,
originally granted in 1925, covering the
lands east of the Tigris River and north

p. 24(B)

IRAQ MHI

433 311 241 There has been little change in the crop pattern in recent years. In 1950, under the stimulus of rising world prices, the area planted to cotton increased, but the damage caused by pests, together with the fall in prices, caused heavy losses and led to a shift to other crops. There has also been an extension of the area planted to fruits and vegetables.

242 The Government has taken several important measures to aid agriculture. In 1952, in order to improve the quality of dates, the government-owned Iraqi Dates Association contributed 49 per cent of the capital of a company which will market the crop. In 1953, the Government appropriated funds for the building of grain silos with a capacity of 150,000 tons, in order to improve quality, since low grading depresses export prices. The Agricultural Machinery Administration rents "machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts". 1/ The activities of the Agricultural Bank are discussed below.

423 241 Among the major obstacles to agricultural development has been the land tenure system. The uncertainty of land titles has by now been largely eliminated by the work carried out since passage of the land settlement law of 1932. By the end of 1953, titles to 16,126,000 hectares had been settled; this represented 68.4 per cent of the area of the country, excluding the desert regions. Another obstacle is the unequal distribution of land. The agricultural census showed that there were only 125,000 holdings, with an average area of 51 hectares per holding. Of these, 24,000 holdings were under 1 hectare, 26,000 between 1 and 5 hectares, 16,000 between 5 and 10 hectares and 19,000 between 10 and 20 hectares. Thus, 85,000 holders, or 68 per cent of the total, owned about 8 per cent of the total area. At the other extreme, some 35,000 holders, with over 100 hectares each, owned some 85 per cent of the total area. The majority of the agricultural population is landless.

311 241 185 The Government has attempted to remedy this situation by settlement schemes on government-owned land, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of the settled area. Following a successful experiment at Dujaila, 4,284 farmers were settled, in five projects with a total area of 198,000 hectares, and by the end of 1954, 10,200 farmers had been settled on 510,000 hectares. 2/ Farmers are organized in supply and marketing co-operatives. They are given the land free of rent for ten years, after which those who have made good are granted title without charge. 3/ Further projects are under way, including the distribution of 1,125,000 hectares in Mosul province, the distribution of 100,000 hectares near Baghdad, the expansion of the Hawijah settlement and the distribution of land near Basra and along the southern Euphrates. 4/

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, page 20.

2/ The Iraq Times (Baghdad), 25 October 1954.

3/ For further details see United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, Progress in Land Reform (1954), page 105.

4/ The Iraq Times, 14 December 1954, 4 January 1955, 8 January 1955 and 7 February 1955.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's produc- 245
tion; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

[Marsh Arabs]

It is customary to abuse the Turkish Government as 000
responsible for these conditions. That government has much to answer for, but it is doubtful whether even the efficient and benevolent rule of the British will improve the lot of the date gardener a great deal so long as the
present system remains unchanged. The trouble is that 466
the owner has no contact with his gardener except 427
through his agent, and is coerced by no intelligent and effective public sentiment. Whether in Turkish or British territory, he lives under a government built on the theory that contracts made in good faith must be executed at all costs and that knows no redress for the gardener except that he seek employment elsewhere, a thing that is very difficult to do. The adjustments possible in the oases of Arabia, where it is the function of the sheikh to modify oppressive contracts and where it is understood that an unfavorable reputation will speedily endanger the life of the land-owner, are out of the question in Mesopotamia.

In addition to the date gardeners who cultivate the irri- 243
gated land along the last hundred miles of the Arab [162]
River from Gurna to the Gulf, there are also a number of 262
so-called Marsh Arabs along the rivers in Lower Mesopotamia, who raise rice, wheat and barley on land that is overflowed in the spring when water is high. Rice is their favorite crop and the one that is most reliable. In that country the visitor is surprised at being served with loaves of bread of the usual flat pancake-shape but snowy white instead of the light brown color of the whole wheat flour which is universal over all Arabia. I asked my host with much surprise whether he imported his flour from Bombay and he laughed. He hardly knew where

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

243 Bombay was. "No," he said, "here we make our bread
262 from rice flour. When the wheat crop is a failure, as in
the past year, we have almost nothing else."

312 These overflow districts,^ which are marshes in the
spring when the rivers overflow, dry down to hard soil
later in the year. To keep the water high for a few
weeks longer than it would naturally remain so, temporary
dams are constructed across some of the smaller
streams, leaving an opening to allow boats to pass and
water to run through. These dams persist in the face
[342] of a strong current in a way that is surprising. Mud,
tree branches, mats, soil and the like seem to be the only
building material, for there is no stone within hundreds of
[476] miles. The dams require a large amount of labor, and
of course are coöperative enterprises. Possibly because
of this necessity for coöperative effort, the Marsh Arab
communities appear to have developed a good degree of
community spirit.

361 Like their race everywhere, these Marsh Arabs do not
live in isolated individual houses in the midst of their
fields but collect in larger or smaller towns, some of them
of considerable size. These towns are located usually
in the fork of a river, or where several streams
come together. In Lower Mesopotamia there are many
small channels that carry water either ~~out~~ of the main
501 river or into it. The Marsh ~~Arabs~~ get about in picturesque,
high-prowed, black river boats, black because they
are covered with a thick coat of native bitumen which
wells from the ground in one or two places in Mesopotamia
135] and is an indication, so the engineers tell us, that
petroleum is to be found in that country. These river
boats, which are the one means of transportation, are
built somewhat on the lines of a canoe and take consid-

^[along the last 100 miles of the Arab river from Gurna
to the Gulf -- Analyst]

Iraq MH1

Iraq Bedouin MH8

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438 As compared with the southern district the northern
245 part of Mesopotamia grows only a small amount of dates.
There are a few gardens around each city, which furnish
fresh dates for local consumption during the season, but
in this region water has to be raised from the river to the
ground level by animals, by the method in use in Arabia.
The gardens are small and confined to the river-side and
I are of no real significance in the economic support of the
● 243 country. These northern regions are not devoid of rainfall, and a meager return is secured by sowing wheat and
barley on unirrigated land. Such cultivation, however,
is uncertain, and in about one year out of every three the
crop is a dead failure.

I The great mass of the people are nomadic or semi-
162 nomadic. Everywhere there can be found pasturage for
B the nomad's flocks and herds and wells for the watering
461 of stock. Many of the Bedouin nomads engage in agri-
233 culture occasionally in good seasons. Even among those
511 who refuse to degrade themselves by becoming agriculturists of any degree, the standards of life are considerably higher than among the Bedouins of Central Arabia.
The supply of forage is more abundant, and their flocks
of camels and sheep and goats are very large. These
nomads have better clothes, very much more abundant
food, and in every way live a more tolerable life than that
B of their brothers in the Central Arabian desert. Horses
231 are common in Mesopotamia. They are a luxury but
[556] not such a tax on the resources of the owner as farther
492 south, for there are always forage and water for them.
Every Arab of position expects to own and ride one;
otherwise he loses caste. Arab horses are beautiful animals and are trained as household pets, much as a fine
dog is trained with us. They are ridden without saddle

312 to the irrigation department, and the procedure to be followed
681 for their recovery though covered by Article 19 is now done
694 through the *Mutasarrifs* concerned in accordance with the Law for the Collection of Debts Due to the Government No. 43 of 23 April 1931 as amended by subsequent Laws.

5) Rice Cultivation

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The Law for Rice Cultivation No. 23 of 31 March 1932, as subsequently amended by Law 53 of 15 May 1940, prohibits or restricts in areas defined by Regulation issued from time to time, the cultivation of rice for health reasons, economy in the use of water or soil conservation (*Article 1*).

Rice cultivation could only be conducted under special license (*Article 4*), and areas in which rice cultivation is restricted shall be fixed by Regulation (*Article 2*).

Regulation No. 34 of 28 August 1944, defines the regions in which rice cultivation is prohibited and also fixes areas in masharas for regions where rice could be cultivated.

The Minister of Agriculture shall decide the manner in which areas for rice cultivation alloted to each *Liwa* are to be distributed,and the *mutassarrif* concerned shall issue a notice inviting those interested to apply for the necessary permits.

Requests must be submitted to the *quaimmaqam* of the *qadha* in which the lands are situated, and the *mutassarrif*, to whom the requests are transferred shall issue the permits, with the requirements of the Irrigation Department. The minimum distance between rice fields and inhabited localities shall be three kilometres. The permits are non-transferable and are strictly limited to the persons and to the plot of land and irrigation works stated on them. The permit holder agrees to the rotation of water supplies determined by the Irrigation Department, and he accepts responsibility for all shortage of irrigation supply with consequent damage to crops.

6) Offences and Penalties under the Law for Rice Cultivation

243 It is forbidden for any person to exceed the area for rice
681 cultivation fixed in the permits,or to cultivate without permit
in prohibited and restricted areas. Contraveners shall be fined

61: Caponera S-4 (no date) 1954 M1 Middle East

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IRAQ MH1

ID. 1/500 for every mashara of land cultivated with rice without a permit or in excess of the permitted areas (Article 5). I 243 681

7. Forcible Assistance Law

In addition to the provision of Article 13 of the Irrigation and Embankments Law for emergency requisition of labor, the Ministry of Interior may under the Forcible Assistance Law No. 27 of 31 March 1923, as subsequently amended by Law No. 24 of 30 March 1936, in sudden and unforeseen circumstances such as water floods, fire, locusts, etc. authorise the mutassarrifs with the power of collecting and employing labor at rates to be prescribed by the Government. 466

Every laborer who contravenes the order shall be forcibly taken to the place of the work and shall afterwards be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding Rs. 100.

Persons having jurisdiction to collect laborers who refuse to supply the necessary number of labor or to give the necessary assistance shall upon conviction be liable to imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding Rs. 1000 or to both imprisonment and fine.

JORDAN

J 671 312

Since the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire, the Mejelle Civil Code has remained in force there. Subsequently, another law supplementing water legislation, No. 38 dated 8 August 1946 (15 Muharram 1366) has been enacted. Jordan authorities are considering amending this latter law at the present time, but the draft is still under study by the interested departments. 1/ This law consists of five sections with 41 articles.

1/Schweng, L. D. Expanded Technical Assistance Program of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy. Private letter.

35$_1$ Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MH1

I-I 278* 824* Ph. Ind. 2: 392; Pyman, Journ. Chem. Soc. 1919; Fl. Br. Ind. 3: 645.

W.H.M.M. 150793; K.B. 320.

This small, deciduous tree is found in the tropical Himalayas from the Chenab westward, and throughout the drier forests of India to Travancore and Malacca. Samples of the seed came from Hamadan and Tehran, showing that the Indian drug is well established in Iran. The seeds are narrowly linear-oblong, glabrous, and brown, about 12 mm. long. They have a bitter taste due to the presence of the alkaloid wrightine (conessine), which acts like emetine. The seeds are reputed to have tonic and aphrodisiac properties.

• 243 **Hordeum vulgare L.** (Gramineae)

262 جو سفيد جو سياه

824* Jau, Jōyi safīd (white), Jōyi siyāh (black) (Iraq); Jao (Sind); Jū (Kurd.); Jav (Hind.); barley.

Field 59, 71, 275; 11, 32, 44, 46, 70 (Iraq).

Barley is the most widely cultivated grain and forage crop throughout Iraq. The variety *hexastichon*, or six-rowed barley, has been found in the earliest Egyptian monuments and is the variety most frequently grown in India and Iraq. Early sown barley provides the greater part of the winter grazing in the irrigated areas; horses and other animals are also fed on the grain. Local barleys yield well, but are generally unsuitable for malting. The collection includes specimens of white and black barley, the varieties *distichon*, *hexastichon*, and *erectum*, and the Alleidum barley of Iraq. Pearl barley is imported from Europe and is obtainable in most Eastern bazaars. Mason quotes a saying in Iran, "What has disease to do with men who live upon barley-bread and buttermilk?"

Iraq 243 824* Guest (p. 46) gives the following information concerning barley:

"*Hordeum* (Gramineae). Barley grass, Barley. Sha'ir, etc.

"*H. murinum* L., Wall Barley or Barley grass. Sha'irah, Shuwairib, Sha'ur, etc. Small tufted annual grass with a flattened inflorescence like a miniature barley. Widely distributed in fields, on channels and ditches, by waysides and in waste places. March–April. In maturity it is a fodder plant of rather low feeding value, though the young growth is nutritious. The seeds are barbed and the awns serrated; hence the mature plants are likely to injure the tender parts of stock.

35$_1$ Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
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243 •
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824*

"*H. bulbosum* L. Abu Suwaif, Gizar Gia (Kurd.), etc. A tall perennial barley grass with a bulbous root. A common weed in cereal fields on the upper plains and in the valleys of Kurdistan, often projecting conspicuously above the ears of the crop. March–May. It is a useful fodder plant sometimes preserved for winter feeding. Children often eat the bulbous roots.

"*H. spontaneum* K. Koch. Tall grass similar to the above. Common on the rocky slopes of Jebel Sinjar and other hills. April–May.

"*H. sativum* Pers. (*H. vulgare* L.). Sha'īr, Arpā (Turk.), Jū (Kurd.). The most widely cultivated grain and forage crop throughout Iraq; with wheat, rice, and dates it forms the staple food of the majority of the inhabitants. Early-sown barley provides the greater part of the winter grazing in the irrigated areas; horses and other animals are also fed on the grain. The climate is unfavorable for the slow ripening which is necessary to produce good malting barley, since the summer comes on very suddenly, almost before the spring is over. Two-rowed barley (var. *distichon*) is generally known as Sha'īr Abū Sūwaif or Sha'īr Abū Sikkatain; six-rowed barley (var. *hexastichon*) as Sha'īr Sparqalān."

—In the collections of the Rustam Agricultural Experimental Farm at Hinaidi near Baghdad, Iraq, the following varieties of barley are represented:

(*a*) *H. sativum* dest. erect., *nigrum*. Sha'īr Abū Sūwaif. Rustam No. 127. Field 23A. Origin Al Mahmudiya, Iraq.

(*b*) *H. sativum* Pers. (*H. vulgare* L.) *albidum*. Rustam No. 128. Field 24A. Origin Biskra.

(*c*) *H sativum distichon*. Chilian barley. Rustam No. 160. Field 25A. Origin Australia.

(*d*) *H. hexastichon albidum*. Circlan barley. Rustam No. 217. Field 22A. Origin Iraq.

(*e*) *H. sativum albidum*. California barley. Rustam No. 150. Field 20A.

(*f*) *H. sativum albidum*. Sha'īr. Rustam No. 218. Field 21A. Origin Iraq. (H.F.)

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278*

Hyoscyamus reticulatus L. (Solanaceae)

بزر بنج

Bazr-i-banj (Teh., Ham.); Kohi bang (Bal.); Banj barri (Iraq); Benj (Ar.); Bango (Port.); henbane seeds.

35_2 Hooper and Field 3-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MH1

I-I

scalding in water and then dried. They are hard, horny, whitish, 824*
opaque or translucent, branching tubers, mucilaginous when placed 278*
in water. A gruel made of these roots is esteemed as a nervine tonic, demulcent, and nutritive.—As an infusion it is given to relieve hoarseness (H.F.).

Oryza sativa L. (Gramineae) 824*

برنج صدری 243 ●

Birinj-i-sadri, Berij sadri Gilan (Teh.); Timan (Iraq); Ruzz 262
(Ar.); Shilib, Pirinj (Turk.); Chaltuk (Kurd.); rice grain.

Field 58, 72; 15, 18, 20, 34 (Iraq).

"Rice is cultivated as a summer crop over immense areas, especially in the southern marshes, also in the valleys of Kurdistan and on the flow canals of certain regions in lower Iraq" (G.). There are three main types of the crop represented in the above specimens from Iraq: (1) Harfi or early-sown, (2) Afli or late-sown, and (3) Shittāl or transplanted.

Timan is the hulled rice of Iraq. The two samples from Tehran
are of fine, white, table rice. 824*

Panicum miliaceum L. (Gramineae) 243

ارزن 262

Arzan (Pers.); Dukhn (Iraq); Chīna (Hind., Sans.); millet grain.

Field 57, 106A; 22, 80 (Iraq).

Common millet is cultivated as a summer crop in Iraq, especially along the Shatt-al-Hai. The grain can be cooked and eaten whole or
made into bread. It is commonly used in the form of porridge. The [246]
green plant is an excellent fodder for animals.—The seeds provide feed for chickens (H.F.).

Papaver somniferum L. (Papaveraceae) 824*

کوکنار 278*

Kavl-a-kūknār, Pōst-a-kūknār (Pers., Afg.); poppy heads. 276

تخم خشخاش

Tukhm-i-khash khāsh; Tukhm-i-shaga'ig (Ham.); Kishkash (Ar.); poppy seeds.

Ait.; Post; Ph. Ind. 1: 73.

Field 48, 64, 81A, 82A, 185; W.H.M.M. 150835, 150911; K.B. 329.

35: Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
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824*
278*

medicine for its stimulant (irritant) and antiseptic action in the genito-urinary tract.

Saussurea Lappa C. B. Clarke (Compositae)

قستلخ

Qust-i-talkh, Butinak (Teh.); Patchak (Beng.); Kutha Kushta patchuk (Hind.); Costum amarum (Ph. Pers.); Indian costus.

Ait.; Fl. Br. Ind. 3: 376; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 296.

W.H.M.M. 150813; K.B. 338.

The soft, fragrant, whitish root comes from plants grown as a Crown monopoly in Kashmir, and is exported to Iran, India, and China. This ancient and valuable drug was called Arabian costus as it was carried to Turkey and Europe by the Arabs. The root occurs in cylindrical or twisted pieces, light colored, with an agreeable odor and a bitter and biting aftertaste. A second sample of Kust from Hamadan was a smaller root, spirally twisted and lighter in color, Chob-i-kut is the name of a plant used to adulterate costus root in Afghanistan. Various chemical principles have been separated from the root, some of which account for the violet-like odor: Costulactone isomeric with alantolactone costus acid, dehydrocostus lactone, and costol. Costus root is prescribed externally and internally for various complaints, and is taken locally to ward off the effects of snake and animal bites.

Semecarpus Anacardium L. (Anacardiaceae)

بلادر

Balādur (Teh., Isf.); Bhela, Bhilava (Hind.); marking nut.

Field 439; W.H.M.M. 150873.

The marking nut tree inhabits the hotter part of India, Ceylon, and Burma. The black, obliquely cordate nuts contain within the pericarp a black, resinous, viscid, acrid juice which is used as marking ink. A local caustic and vesicant, the juice, when applied to the skin, causes intense pain and swelling. In small quantities, it is given for relief in rheumatic pains and leprous affections.—Prepared like tea, it is also taken to relieve flatulence following severe piles (H.F.).

824*
278*
263
246
• 243

Sesamum indicum L. (Pedaliaceae)

سمسم

Simsim (Iraq); Kunjad (Kurd.); Kundij (Turk.); Til, Jinjili, Gingelly (Hind.); til or sesame seed.

Field 128A, 52 (Iraq). I-I

Sesame is widely cultivated as a summer crop. The seeds, white, 824*
brown, or black, are used for garnishing cakes and sweetmeats and 278*
are eaten by the poor in times of scarcity. They contain about 50 263
per cent of a fixed oil which is an excellent substitute for olive oil
or other salad oil in cooking. The oil cake is a cattle food. The 246
oil is also the basis of most of the fragrant or scented oils—medicated
oils prepared with various vegetable drugs. 243 •

In Baghdad, Rashi is the name given to a preparation of ground sesame seed after it has been soaked and roasted, which is used as an emollient, Rahishi (Ar.), Arwah-i-kunjad (Pers.).

Sesbania aculeata Poir. (Leguminosae) 824*

Sesbaniyah (Iraq); Saisaban (Egy.); Rasin (Hind.); Akar, 278*
Majandri (Bal.); Jayanti (Beng.); Sesbania seeds.

Field 47 (Iraq).

The plant has been introduced into Iraq and planted for windbreaks. The seeds are sold in bazaars throughout India and Iran. They are dull grayish brown, oblong, 2 by 4 mm., smooth, hard, and bitter to the taste. The Hindus have a superstition that sight of the seeds will remove the pain of scorpion stings. They are used medicinally on account of their astringent properties. The seeds are beaten into a paste which is applied locally to cure eruptions.

Sisymbrium Sophia L. (Cruciferae)

خاکشیرین

Khākshīr, Khākshīr-i-shīrīn (Teh.); Towdri, Khub-kalan, Khaksi (Hind.); the seeds.

Ait.; Schl.; Boiss. 1: 216; Ph. Ind. 1: 118, 121.

Field 4 (Isf.), 50; W.H.M.M. 150712.

These seeds resemble in size, shape, and color the drug Tukhm-i-khākshīr talkh, the bitter Khākshīr (*Erysimum* sp.), except that they are dull and not shiny. There are several kinds of cruciferous seeds known as "Towdri": pale, light brown, red, and black. The seed of *Lepidium Iberis* L., the Kasis of Iran, is one of them, and the seeds of *Matthiola incana* R. Br., from the Punjab and Sind, is another. The seeds are small, yellowish brown, 1 mm. in length, and become coated with transparent mucilage when placed in water. The drug is considered aphrodisiac, "fattening the body and purifying the blood." [832]

I-I

Solanum xanthocarpum Schrad. & Wendl. and S. Melongena L. (Solanaceae) 824* 278*

تخم باد نجان

Tukhm-i-bādanjān (Teh.); seeds of the wild eggplant.

Field 261.

These plants occur throughout India. The stem and leaves are armed with strong prickles; the flowers are in racemes; and the berries are spherical, smooth, and marked with variegated, green and yellow stripes. The seeds are reniform, 2 mm. in diameter, compressed, and light brown in color. They are expectorant in asthma and catarrh.

Sorghum vulgare Pers. and Andropogon Sorghum Brot. (Gramineae) 824* 262 243 •

دهوره

Dhurah, Idhrah baidha (Ar.); Dari, Gowar (Hind.); Baryadh dari (Turk.); Zuratspi (Kurd.); great millet.

Field 111 (Iraq).

Giant millet is cultivated extensively as an irrigated summer cereal crop in the riverain areas between Basra and Mosul. During the past few years there has been an annual export of grain from Iraq amounting to between 30,000 and 50,000 tons. The grain is well liked by the people as a food (G.).

Spinacia oleracea L. (Chenopodiaceae) 824* 278* 262

تخم اسپناج

Tukhm-i-ispanāj (Teh.); Ispinākh (Iraq); Sag Palak (Hind.); spinach seeds.

Field 45; W.H.M.M. 150912.

Spinach is cultivated in kitchen gardens in Iraq and Iran for its large, fleshy leaves which are eaten as a vegetable. It is sometimes confused with spinach beet (*Beta vulgaris* var.), which is much used as a substitute for spinach. The fruits are in green clusters, triangular, each angle terminating in two or more spines, the surface rugose and wrinkled. The fruits contain mucilage and alkaline nitrates, and are demulcent and diuretic, employed for fever and inflammation of the bowels.

The seeds of *Chenopodium capitatum* Aschers. are also sold under the above vernacular names.

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are occasionally used for poultices and in curries. The seeds are mucilaginous and have been known since antiquity for their medicinal properties, which are stomachic and cordial.—As an infusion they are given for menorrhagia (H.F.).

Triticum vulgare Vill. (Gramineae)

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گندم سفید

Gandum-i-safīd, Gandum-ābī (Teh.); Kanim (Kurd.); Gehun (Hind.); Godumai (Tam.); wheat grains.

Nishāstah (Teh.); wheat starch.

Field 160, 273; 9, 26, 27, 35, 40, 42, 49, 56 (Iraq); 57A, 58A, 59A, 60A, 61A, 62A.

Wheat is one of the principal winter crops grown in cultivated areas throughout the country. Herodotus (III, 22) mentions only wheat as the staple food of the Persians at the time of Cambyses. Modern Irani primitive physicians use wheat starch as a dusting powder to allay the pain of burns and inflammation.

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Guest (p. 102) records the following information: "*Triticum* (Gramineae). Wheat. Hintah, Bughdāi (Turk.), Ganim (Kurd.). One of the two principal winter crops grown extensively in the cultivated areas throughout the country; the other is barley. There are several indigenous spp. and many hundreds of local varieties. Wheat is grown on irrigation in the riverain areas of Lower Iraq and, more extensively, on rain in the 'daim' areas of the upper plains; it is also grown in the valleys of Kurdistan (up to alt. about 2,000 m.). There is in normal years a considerable export of grain from Iraq, denoting a surplus above the requirements of the inhabitants. Formerly, the grain had a bad name in the trade owing to the dirt and other impurities which it contained; it was classed as 'Persian' and fetched a poor price in the world markets. Of recent years a great improvement has taken place in the cleanliness and quality of the grain exported from this country and it is confidently hoped to establish a name for Iraqi wheat. To this end legislation has recently been introduced to encourage the propagation of 'Ajībah wheat (one of the Punjab wheats), which was issued by the Department of Agriculture a few years ago after trials had proved it to be superior to any other local or imported variety.

"Bread Wheat, *T. vulgare* Vill. Almost the only kind of wheat grown on irrigation in the riverain areas of Lower Iraq. In certain years it suffers badly from rust disease which takes a heavy toll of

35; Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran
Iraq [illegible]

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the crop. This is one of the reasons for the growing popularity of the newly-introduced 'Ajibah, a variety highly resistant to rust. A certain amount of bread wheat is also grown on rain in the 'daim' areas of the north, where it is known as Hintah Qandahārī (*N.*).

"Macaroni Wheat, *T. durum* Desf. Hintah Khushnah. Much the greater portion of the 'daim' wheat in the north is of this type. It gives a higher yield, has greater resistance to drought and is more immune to rust than the local bread wheats. The grain of this type of wheat is harder and larger than the grain of bread wheat; but the bread made from it is of a poor quality. It is largely eaten in the form of Burghul (Kurd.), a kind of local porridge.

"Khorasan Wheat, *T. orientale*, and Polish Wheat, *T. polonicum*. Both these spp. have long hard grains known as Sinn-aj-jamal or Sinn-al-fīl. Sometimes cultivated in the north.

"Dwarf Wheat, *T. compactum* L. Hintah walwal. One or two wild spp. of *Triticum* and of the grass, *Aegilops* (now generally included as a subsp. of this genus), are known to occur in Iraq. Of these the following may be mentioned:

"*T. dicoccoides* Koern. A specimen has been received from Jebel Sinjar, where it is said to grow on the hillside."

In the collections of the Rustam Agricultural Experimental Farm at Hinaidi near Baghdad, Iraq, the following varieties of wheat are represented:

(*a*) *T. vulgare durum libicum.* Black wheat. Rustam No. 41. Field 15A. Origin Euphrates, Iraq.

(*b*) *T. vulgare erytholenca.* Punjab B8. Rustam No. 48. Field 18A. Origin Punjab, India.

(*c*) *T. vulgare albidum.* Linga No. 3. Rustam No. 141. Field 17A. Origin Australia.

(*d*) *T. vulgare leucospermum.* U.S.A. Rustam No. 207. Field 16A. Origin Pusa, India.

(*e*) *T. vulgare turcicum.* Ajibak. Punjab No. 8A. Rustam No. 210. Field 19A. Origin Punjab, India.

(*f*) *T. vulgare albidum.* Clarendon wheat K. Rustam No. 602. Field 14A. Origin Australia.

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During excavations at Kish and Jemdet Nasr in Iraq by the Field Museum–Oxford University Joint Expedition, samples of wheat and barley were found in pottery vessels belonging to the period approximately three thousand years before the Christian era. These grains,

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preserved through being burnt, are difficult to identify with regard to their species. A summary of this discussion has been published by Henry Field, "Ancient Wheat and Barley from Kish, Mesopotamia," *Amer. Anthr.*, 34, No. 2, pp. 303–309. For further information on this subject the reader is referred to various publications by Nikolai Vavilov, Institute of Plant Industry, Leningrad, U.S.S.R.

Tulipa montana Lindl. (Liliaceae) 824*
262

فریونه

Fraiyōnah (Iraq); Lāla (Afg.); Govarikh, Wodak (Bal.); bulbs.

Field 54.

The bulbs of this tulip of Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan have brown, coppery skins. They are sold in the Mosul market as food (G.). The bulbs are eaten also in Baluchistan, where the leaves are a fodder for goats.

Uncaria Gambier Roxb. (Rubiaceae) 824*
278*

کات گلابی

Kāt-i-gulābī (Teh.); Chinai-katha (Bom.); extract, pale catechu.

Field 208.

This is a specimen of the pale catechu of commerce obtained from Singapore. In the form of cubes, 1 inch across, it is prepared from the leaves and stalks of the plant grown in the Malay States. It is very astringent, as it contains both catechin and tannin. In Tehran it is prescribed for coughs.

Veratrum album L. (Liliaceae)

کندش

Kundush (Ham., Teh.); Kondochi (Schl.); hellebore root.

Boiss. 5: 171.

Field 221; K.B. 348.

White hellebore is a plant of Europe, Central Asia, and Japan. The root is mentioned as a drug in the herbals of Hippocrates and Galen. The rhizome is dark brown, cylindrical or slightly tapering, 2.5 cm. in diameter, with numerous scars of broken rootlets, whitish within. It contains a poisonous alkaloid, jervine. The root is one of the Irani poisons, and is used only externally, as a paste for headache and facial neuralgia.—It is also applied as a relief from nasal catarrh (H.F.).

varieties of pistachio scions on established native pistachio trees 245 should be given particular attention. Almond orchards could be increased to advantage.

Vegetables and Potatoes

Vegetable culture is concentrated in the neighborhood of the 244 large cities where such products as radishes, lettuce, cabbage, cucumbers, 369 squash, tomatoes and others are in good supply during the season. Unfortunately vegetables do not figure prominently in the [262] diet of most people. Outside of the big towns little or no vegetables are eaten. In part, this appears to be due to the fact that tribal tradition holds the cultivation of vegetables in low esteem. However, where the sharecropper is inclined to grow vegetables, he may be discouraged by the lack of available land or the shifting of the area assigned to him for cultivation. If a determined effort were made by the government to enlist the cooperation of the landowners, it might not be too difficult to overcome these obstacles.

It might be desirable to increase the production of potatoes 244 which are now imported to the value of about ID 100,000 per year. The lighter soils along the large streams in the provinces of Mosul, Erbil and Suleimaniya are particularly well adapted to the production of both Irish and sweet potatoes. With proper guidance in cultural practices and the use of fertilizers, planters in these areas could easily supply the country's needs. If it is demonstrated that potato yields compare favorably with other crops, the government might well encourage the planting of potatoes both by launching an educational campaign and by furnishing the necessary seed to planters. Special attention will need to be given to transport, however, and the growers will have to be shown how to build inexpensive potato bins or pits with sufficient ventilation, insulation and accessibility.

Tobacco

Tobacco has been grown to some extent in the North for centuries, 249 although it was not until the last few decades that its production 655 assumed importance. Even now, the value of the tobacco crop is probably no more than a tenth of that of wheat or barley. In the mountainous areas of Erbil and Suleimaniya, however, it is

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361 a greater security of tenure. Other factors, which have no doubt affected the permanence of villages in some parts of the irrigation zone in central and southern Iraq, are the salination of the land and the silting of canals. In such cases, the fellahin have no choice but to abandon their villages.

In spite of these differences, however, the villages have a number of characteristics in common. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled together without any orderly design. There are no communal facilities or open spaces for the recreation of the
342 children. The huts are so constructed as to keep out heat, cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently, they consist of a single room with thick walls and a doorway, which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for both cooking food and keeping draft animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight, windows are either very small or totally lacking; sashes are expensive. Furnishings are limited to such elementary necessities as a mat and a plain table or a bench. Sanitary facilities, including latrines, are generally lacking.

312 The villages are necessarily located near a source of water, by a canal in the irrigation zone, by a stream or a well in the North. The water is not piped, but must be carried from its source to wherever it is used. Nor is it purified, although the canals in the irrigation zone may be heavily polluted. The water which has been used by men for washing and in which animals have immersed themselves while drinking is often used for human consumption. The constant trampling of the canal banks for these purposes leads to leaks and, hence, to stagnant pools near the adjacent village. Where the source of water is a well, the earth nearby may be dug out for use in the construction of houses and so, similarly, a
[364] stagnant pool may be the result. Such pools, combined with the total absence of any sanitary disposal of waste and garbage, constitute a serious danger to health.

361
137
244 Trees are rarely seen in the villages, although they would give relief from the sun and from sandstorms. Trees would also provide firewood instead of the fuels currently used—animal dung, which could be used instead as fertilizer, and brushwood, which has to be gathered with considerable effort. Small gardens for vegetables are unknown. In fact, fruit and vegetables are almost

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exclusively grown by farmers who specialize in these commodities 361 137
and who market their produce in the towns. 244●

Planning the Improvement of the Villages

Clearly it will not be possible to bring about any substantial 361 and lasting change in the state of some thousands of villages until the root causes of poverty, ignorance and insecurity have been tackled. Only then can thriving communities replace the present villages with their primitive and almost static mode of life.

Legislation for the improvement of villages is already in existence. 361 In 1936, a law (No. 70) for the construction of new villages 185 was passed, empowering the Ministry of Interior to construct or renew villages, having regard particularly to health requirements, such as the construction of sanitary facilities and public baths, the hygienic disposal of waste and the provision of drinking water. A draft law on similar lines, but placing the responsibilty on the Ministry of Social Affairs, was put before Parliament during 1951. Parliament sent it back to the Council of Ministers for amalgamation with the earlier statute. Both are admirable in objective, but both are focussed primarily on the reconstitution of villages on more hygienic lines without regard for the urgent educational and economic aspects of the problem and without recognizing the need to enlist the cooperation of the people. Only a comprehensive and popular program can really reach the people and encourage them to help themselves. That little, in fact, has been done under the 1936 law is itself eloquent testimony to this.

The task of remaking the villages is typically one for the 361 new Community Planning Office. In cooperation with all the government departments concerned and with their advice, it should be able to formulate and issue the necessary regulations, of which those that affect health are only a part, under the power conferred on it by the projected planning enabling act.

The Mission has elsewhere made a number of recommendations designed to raise the standard of living of the rural population. On the agricultural side, these include the organization of an extension service, the creation of cooperatives, measures to improve livestock and the provision of better drainage. Medical recommendations include the opening of more village dispensaries, the

680 cal resources of other countries. It will be noted throughout this report that the Mission has made numerous recommendations for the procurement of foreign technical assistance. These recommendations are in no sense a disparagement of the talent and skills now available in Iraq. They represent rather a recognition that a country whose development has been severely handicapped by limited financial resources in the past cannot now suddenly expect to launch a development program involving rapid expansion in virtually every field without availing itself of the many opportunities to obtain technical help from abroad.

II. Agriculture

241 Any development program for Iraq must obviously put primary emphasis on agriculture. [162] Over 60 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, and both industry and commerce depend in turn largely upon farming and animal husbandry. Moreover, large increases in output can be realized both by raising the productivity of livestock and farm land already in use and by bringing under cultivation large areas presently idle.

Existing Conditions

Agriculture in Iraq is devoted largely to the cultivation of winter crops. Because of the lack of rain in the summer, during that season crops can be grown only under irrigation. In the rainfed zone of the North, summer crops can be grown only on a moderate scale in small irrigated areas. In the irrigated zone of central and southern Iraq the limited water supply restricts the area devoted to summer crops to only about one quarter of that grown to winter crops. Barley and wheat are the only significant winter crops, while rice and, more recently, cotton are the principal summer crops. The area sown to sesame, corn, millet and grain sorghum is comparatively insignificant. Tobacco assumes some importance in the mountainous areas of the North. Fruit and 241 vegetables are quite important. Iraq is the world's principal pro- 245 ducer and exporter of dates; excellent citrus fruit is grown, particularly in the Diyala Valley in east-central Iraq, for domestic con-

sumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the 241
North. 245

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an 231
integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive
despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as [262]
camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed.

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently 241
inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained
unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer [372]
is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop
rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for
soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has [134]
materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter.

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq 423
and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central 427
Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. 241
The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

V. Production

A considerable part of Iraq's potentially large resources are as 311
yet unutilized or ineffectively utilized. Most of the manpower on 433
the land is underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of flow. Oil reserves have as yet been tapped only in relatively modest quantities. The output of the country is therefore still very low and the standard of living correspondingly depressed.

Agriculture and Livestock

Estimates of the area and output of the principal crops are 241
given in the table below. Although the statistics are not very reliable, they give some indication of the relative importance of the various crops. Barley and wheat are clearly the dominant crops. Barley is one of the leading exports, and cereals altogether accounted for 43 percent by value of the country's exports other than oil in the period 1948-50. Rice is another important cereal. Cotton is now vying with rice as the leading summer crop. Stimulated by high prices and government encouragement, the area planted to cotton has risen rapidly in recent years. In 1951, probably about 580,000 donums were put in cotton—almost five times the amount in the preceding year. Other summer crops are comparatively insignificant. Some sesame is grown for oil, and some corn, millet and grain sorghum. Tobacco assumes importance only in the mountainous area of the North. Virtually no crops are grown for animal fodder, and the production of hay is unknown. The area devoted to soil-building crops such as legumes is rather small.

Next to cereals, dates are the most important crop. There 245
are about 20.2 million date trees, of which about 9.7 million are 439
along the Shatt al Arab near Basra and the balance in the central valley districts of the Tigris and the Euphrates and the Diyala River Valley. Dates are a staple food over most of Iraq and date exports, particularly from the Basra area, contributed 31 percent by

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value of the country's total exports, other than oil, in the years 245
1948-1950. Citrus fruit, grown for domestic consumption, is of 439
considerable importance in the Diyala River valley and substantial quantities of other fruits and nuts, although of rather poor quality and marketability, are grown in the North, especially in Suleimaniya and Erbil. Vegetable culture is of particular importance in the neighborhood of large cities.

Agricultural yields are generally low, although most of the 241
soil is inherently quite fertile. Barley yields, for instance, are about 30 to 35 percent less than those in Canada and the United States and probably slightly less than those of Turkey and Iran. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Salinity attributable to poor drainage has materially lowered productivity of land in the irrigation zone. The soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Chief reliance is placed on the fallow system to restore soil fertility, but, since fallow land is often allowed to go up in weeds on which animals graze, its efficacy is limited.

The raising of livestock is an important industry. Sheep and 233
goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding.

TABLE 6

ESTIMATE OF LIVESTOCK POPULATION, 1949-50

Sheep	7,489,700
Goats	1,754,300
Cattle	1,034,600
Buffaloes	200,700
Camels	279,200
Horses	183,800
Mules	66,850
Donkeys	326,400

Sheep and goats, as well as camels, are kept primarily by 231
pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural

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Dates

Dates, one of the principal foods of Iraq, are also a main export 245
crop. While Iraq's pre-eminence in the world date market will not easily be threatened, the quality of dates has apparently declined and replacement of old trees has been far from adequate. Not more than 15 percent of the old gardens have under way a tree-planting program sufficient to replace old and deteriorating stands. More than 60 percent of the gardens are in poor condition owing to inadequate cultivation. Halfa, Johnson and Bermuda grasses have been allowed to become serious pests, causing considerable damage. Yields could be improved by better cultivation, manuring, fertilization, reduction of other fruit trees planted in date gardens and improvement in irrigation through the cleaning of canals and the installation of more pumps. Processing of the crop could also be improved, for old packing sheds where primitive methods of handling are employed are still in use.

Responsibility for promotion and improvement of the date 654
industry is entrusted to the Date Association under a law approved 246
in 1935. Ever since 1939 the Association has had a contract with 473
the Andrew Weir Company whereby the latter undertakes to buy at fixed prices and export all the dates of the best varieties offered for sale from the Basra district. There is general agreement among the growers that this arrangement has helped to stabilize prices. On the expiration of the current contract with Andrew Weir after the 1952 season, the Association hopes to conclude a similar agreement with a newly-formed Iraqi company. The Association, the growers and the foreign companies engaged in the date trade are each expected to subscribe one third of this company's capital of ID 500,000. Consideration is also being given to extending its price-support operations to the dates grown in the Tigris-Euphrates valley. In addition, the Date Association is contemplating a distillery to convert into alcohol dates which are surplus to market needs.

There is considerable danger that in carrying out these ambi- 654
tious plans the Association will neglect the need for better cul- 245
tural practices stressed above. The Association has already been criticized for doing little to improve the production of dates. It would be unfortunate if it followed the precedent set by the Tobacco

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654 245 Monopoly which seems to have lost sight of one of its primary objectives, namely, to raise the quality of tobacco. Moreover, before the Association and its Iraqi "marketing" company undertake the contemplated stabilization program, there must be reasonable assurance that prices are not fixed at excessively high levels owing to political pressures and that the company has ample financial resources. An operation of this character is likely to be highly speculative. While large profits may be earned in some years, severe losses will be incurred in others. With respect to the projected alcohol plant, caution should also be exercised. There is already one distillery making alcohol as well as arak. For the time being the demands for alcohol may make another plant appear attractive, but it is doubtful that in the long run dates can compete with other raw materials such as molasses as an economical source of alcohol.

Other Fruits

245 Iraq can grow a wide variety of fruits and nuts. Citrus fruit has been conspicuously successful in the Diyala River Valley and the number of plantings has increased greatly with the help of the Department of Agriculture which distributes the trees. A higher output could be achieved through the use of fertilizers, particularly nitrogen, and by better cultivation to discourage weeds and pests. Better storage facilities are also needed.

In some parts of the country, particularly in the North, conditions are quite favorable to the growing of deciduous fruits. The fruit, however, is poor in quality and seldom gets beyond local markets. The better grades of fruit are all imported from other Middle Eastern countries. Yet better care in pruning, cultivation, thinning and in the control of insects and diseases might well double the output of apricots, peaches and apples and greatly improve their quality. A rising standard of living should provide an incentive to higher production provided facilities are made available to can, dry and store the fruit. The proposed small-business section of the Industrial Bank might investigate the possibility of financing such facilities. The organization of transport to the market also requires attention.

Nut culture could also be expanded in the northern provinces. The possibility of top-working, budding or grafting improved

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varieties of pistachio scions on established native pistachio trees 245 should be given particular attention. Almond orchards could be increased to advantage.

Vegetables and Potatoes

Vegetable culture is concentrated in the neighborhood of the 244 large cities where such products as radishes, lettuce, cabbage, cucumbers, 369 squash, tomatoes and others are in good supply during the season. Unfortunately vegetables do not figure prominently in the [262] diet of most people. Outside of the big towns little or no vegetables are eaten. In part, this appears to be due to the fact that tribal tradition holds the cultivation of vegetables in low esteem. However, where the sharecropper is inclined to grow vegetables, he may be discouraged by the lack of available land or the shifting of the area assigned to him for cultivation. If a determined effort were made by the government to enlist the cooperation of the landowners, it might not be too difficult to overcome these obstacles.

It might be desirable to increase the production of potatoes 244 which are now imported to the value of about ID 100,000 per year. The lighter soils along the large streams in the provinces of Mosul, Erbil and Suleimaniya are particularly well adapted to the production of both Irish and sweet potatoes. With proper guidance in cultural practices and the use of fertilizers, planters in these areas could easily supply the country's needs. If it is demonstrated that potato yields compare favorably with other crops, the government might well encourage the planting of potatoes both by launching an educational campaign and by furnishing the necessary seed to planters. Special attention will need to be given to transport, however, and the growers will have to be shown how to build inexpensive potato bins or pits with sufficient ventilation, insulation and accessibility.

Tobacco

Tobacco has been grown to some extent in the North for centuries, 249 although it was not until the last few decades that its production 655 assumed importance. Even now, the value of the tobacco crop is probably no more than a tenth of that of wheat or barley. In the mountainous areas of Erbil and Suleimaniya, however, it is

3;Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's produc- 245
tion; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313.
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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162 311 level plains and raise, by means of the scanty rainfall, a meager amount of wheat and barley in favorable seasons.

312 Along the rivers in their upper courses are a few gardens, irrigated by means of various draught animals and water-wheels, which elevate water from the stream to the level of the land above. At Gurna the Tigris and Euphrates join to form one river and at Mohammerah the Karun empties into this united stream. The three rivers thus flow into the ocean as one enormous waterway, known locally as the "Arab River." For the last hundred miles before the sea is reached, the fresh water of the river ebbs and flows with the tides, and by cutting outlets along the river banks gardens may be automatically irrigated twice a day if so much water is desired. 245 Along these lower stretches each bank of the river is lined with beautiful gardens, which reach a depth of some miles in places and extend in practically an unbroken expanse all the way up to Basra and in less prolific culture even as far as Gurna. These date gardens are beautiful things, beautiful for what they are now, and more beautiful still as a suggestion of what all Mesopotamia might be. They are also one of the most melancholy things in the world as reminders of what the past developed and the present has wasted.

311 134 The land has enormous resources for agricultural development. That whole vast district may be made into the garden spot of the earth. The soil is the best in the world, river silt hundreds of feet deep. It is as level as a parlor floor, with just enough pitch between the big rivers, and between the north and south, to make irrigation easy. 312 185 All that is necessary is a perfected system of irrigation, and although the necessary investment would

311 162 which may play a prominent part in the economic development of the country, Mesopotamia may be regarded as a purely agricultural land. From this standpoint it is best considered in two sections. There is the river-irrigated date-growing district to the south, with Basra as its center, and there is the district to the north inhabited by nomads, semi-nomads and river agriculturists, with its principal center in Baghdad and a second capital further north in Mosul.

312 245 The date gardeners along the river in the Basra territory resemble in many ways the cultivators that can be seen in any oasis town in Arabia. Their work is very similar. Irrigation systems must be constructed. Channels must be provided to carry the water to the roots of the date palms and to the squares of alfalfa and other crops. There is this difference, however, that the water flows of itself. Twice a day the tide of the ocean backs up the water of the great Arab River as far as Gurna, about a hundred miles from the sea. The extensive cultivation of dates stops at that point. The water can be shut out of a field if so desired, or the gates can be opened and as much allowed to enter as is needed. The supply is unlimited and can be had twice a day the year around. The soil is ideal. It is rich and hundreds of feet deep. In natural endowment Mesopotamia is a paradise for date gardeners.

511 As a matter of fact, however, that country is far from a paradise for date gardeners. The favorable conditions ought to make their work easier and their remuneration greater, but the facts are otherwise. Their condition is worse than that of the cultivators in Hasa. It is the story of the Bahrein pearl banks over again. The increased wealth of the Bahrein pearl banks has not bene-

Iraq MH1
Iraq Bedouin MH8

I 43[illegible] ●246 As compared with the southern district the northern part of Mesopotamia grows only a small amount of dates. There are a few gardens around each city, which furnish fresh dates for local consumption during the season, but in this region water has to be raised from the river to the ground level by animals, by the method in use in Arabia. The gardens are small and confined to the river-side and are of no real significance in the economic support of the country. I 243 These northern regions are not devoid of rainfall, and a meager return is secured by sowing wheat and barley on unirrigated land. Such cultivation, however, is uncertain, and in about one year out of every three the crop is a dead failure.

I 162 B 461 233 511 The great mass of the people are nomadic or semi-nomadic. Everywhere there can be found pasturage for the nomad's flocks and herds and wells for the watering of stock. Many of the Bedouin nomads engage in agriculture occasionally in good seasons. Even among those who refuse to degrade themselves by becoming agriculturists of any degree, the standards of life are considerably higher than among the Bedouins of Central Arabia. The supply of forage is more abundant, and their flocks of camels and sheep and goats are very large. These nomads have better clothes, very much more abundant food, and in every way live a more tolerable life than that of their brothers in the Central Arabian desert. B 231 [556] 492 Horses are common in Mesopotamia. They are a luxury but not such a tax on the resources of the owner as farther south, for there are always forage and water for them. Every Arab of position expects to own and ride one; otherwise he loses caste. Arab horses are beautiful animals and are trained as household pets, much as a fine dog is trained with us. They are ridden without saddle

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq-m H1

245 Iraq produces about 80 per cent. of the total
[439] world supply of dates—that is, of the proportion of dates that form an article of commerce, because most dates are eaten directly by the growers, or else bartered. The general conditions under which date palms thrive have already been touched upon, and it is sufficient to recall that the palms can flourish in dry, saline, sandy, loamy, or even water-logged soils, although the maximum yield of fruit is obtained when abundant water is available.

The region of the Shatt el Arab is pre-eminently suited to date-production, and both banks are lined with date groves extending inland for about a mile and a half. Some 25 to 30 million palms are cultivated throughout the region, and of these, one-half are found close to the Shatt el Arab, the rest occurring along the river banks as far north as Latitude 33° N. A curious feature is the rise of the river under the influence of the incoming tide. Fresh water is ponded back in the Shatt el Arab, and floods the banks to a depth of as much as 3 feet to provide natural and regular irrigation of the groves—a phenomenon that from the point of view of the native farmer is wholly estimable.

In order to ensure a good crop, the land is dug over once every four years; and because of the frequent presence of creeks and water-courses, this must be done by hand. Artificial pollination is, as we have already seen, highly necessary; and though most groves include 3 per cent. of male palms, the district of Fao has developed a special trade in male pollen dust, from which other date-growing regions are supplied.

About 130 varieties of date are known, but three are most widely grown. The *Halawi* palm produces the finest fruit, but gives only a moderate yield (44 lb. per tree) (Dowson), whilst the *Sayir* produces slightly less, but is more tolerant of inferior growing conditions, and is probably the most widely grown. The *Zahidi* does not give a fruit of high quality, but the yield is over 120 lb. per tree, and this compensates for the low price obtained. Fertilisation of the female palm takes place in April, and picking begins in August, when large numbers of nomadic tribesmen move into the date-growing areas to work as seasonal harvesters.

273 Besides forming an extremely important part of local diet, dates
231 are used in the distilling of *arak*—the chief fermented beverage
313 outside the vine-growing areas, and one thought to have value as a
289 prophylactic against malaria. The crushed stones are fed to cattle, and both leaves and trunk of the palm are used in light constructional work (houses, boats, even bridges), and also in the manufacture of paper.

25 Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

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
TURKEY
SYRIA
Amadiya
Mosul
Rawanduz
Erbil
Kirkuk
Sulaimaniya
Wadi Tharthar
IRAQ
SYRIAN DESERT
PERSIA
L. Habbaniya
Baghdad
Musaiyib
Karbala
Hindiya Barrage
Diwaniya
Amara
MUNTAFIQ
Basra
Rainfed
Flow Irrigation
Mechanical Pump Irrigation
Date Palm Plantations
3

IRAQ: TYPES OF CULTIVATION

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as a plaster to sores and wounds. The drug contains resin 65, gum 20, and essential oil 10 to 20 per cent.

Ferula persica Willd. (Umbelliferae)

سکبینج

Sakbinaj (Teh.); Saka-binaja (Ar.); Sek binedge (Schl.); Sagapenum gum.

Achundow; Ait.; Schl.; Laufer 366; Ph. Ind. 2: 161.

Field 163; K.B. 317; W.H.M.M. 150922.

Sagapenum is a fragrant gum-resin obtained from Laristan and Kerman. It is found in the market in tears or agglutinated into brownish yellow cakes with a persistent, alliaceous odor and acrid taste. It yields on distillation a volatile oil containing sulphur. [314]

The drug has a local reputation as a plaster for rheumatism and lumbago.—Mixed with linseed oil it forms a salve for the relief of piles and pains in the back (H.F.).

Ferula Sumbul Hook. f. (Umbelliferae)

ریشه کلفس

Rīshah-i-kalafs, Sumbul, also the name for celery root (Teh.); musk or violet root.

Field 134.

This is a large, perennial plant of Samarkand. The root is thick and fusiform, light and spongy, transversely wrinkled, with corky, brown bark, and fibrous, whitish interior with resinous cells. The odor is strong and musk-like, and the taste bitter and aromatic. It is employed as a stimulant, nervine tonic, and antispasmodic, given in hysteria and nervous disorders.

Ficus Carica L. (Moraceae)

تین

Tin; common fig.

The edible fig grows wild in the mountain valleys of Kurdistan and in the foothills, and is also cultivated throughout Iraq as a fruit tree (G.).—The figs are usually sold strung on cords hung from the ceiling (H.F.). [262] [245] •

Foeniculum vulgare Mill. (Umbelliferae)

ریشه رازیانه

Rīshah-i-rāziyānah (Teh.); the root of fennel.

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Violet root or orris root was recognized in ancient Greece and Rome and has long been known throughout the East, where the root is used for its perfume and as a medicine. The drug is obtained from more than one species, and the specimens differ in their properties and aroma. Aitchison says the rhizome called Orisa in Afghanistan is brought from Bijnort to the Meshed market. Bombay is supplied with orris root from Iran and Kashmir, and some of the Irani root comes from Kurdistan. A specimen of Banafshah from Iraq (Field 23, Iraq) was a well-trimmed sample of orris root from Europe (*I. florentina* L.).—It is given as an infusion to relieve headache, and is prescribed for excessive labor pains (H.F.).

Jateorhiza Columba Miers (Menispermaceae)

كلمبو

Kulambū (Teh.); Kalamb-ki-jar (Hind.); calumba root.

Field 209; W.H.M.M. 150780.

Calumba root, obtained from climbing plants growing in the forests of the Zambezi in Portuguese East Africa, has established itself as a drug in nearly every part of the world. The dry root is met with in circular or oval, transverse slices about 1 to 2 inches in diameter. The taste is very bitter, aromatic, and mucilaginous. Calumba is employed as a stomachic and bitter tonic. It contains no tannin, so can be combined with iron salts.

Juglans regia L. (Juglandaceae)

گردو

Girdū (Teh.); Charmaghy (Pers.); Jawz-i-rumi (Afg.); Joz, Goz (Turk.); Guzk (Kurd.); Akhrot (Hind.); the walnut tree.

Field 270.

The walnut is a handsome tree in Iran, Kashmir, and China. The leaves, bark, nuts, and oil are used in medicine. In Iraq cultivated walnut trees, giving nuts with a soft shell, are called Chagzī, those with a hard shell, Metahk. The nuts are somewhat smaller than those of Europe. [245] •

Juniperus excelsa Bieb. (Coniferae)

ابهل

Abhil, Aabb-el-harar (Teh.); Harhār-kohī (Afg.); Hab-el-a'ra'r (Ind. bazaars); juniper berries.

Field 248; W.H.M.M. 150876.

36: Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MNI

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This plant, allied to *Colchicum*, occurs in North Iran, Afghanistan, the juniper tracts of Baluchistan, and in the Punjab. Aitchison found this plant common all over the Badghis and Khorasan. The corms are collected as a medicine and exported from Meshed through Iran via the Persian Gulf to India. The drug is one of the forms of the ancient Hermodactyl. It is probably the Surinjan-i-shirin or sweet Surinjan, a medicine used by Mohammedans in India. The root from Hamadan is broken into pieces showing a white, starchy fracture with no perceptible taste or smell. The drug is said to have the same action as the bitter Surinjan (*Colchicum* spp.) as a remedy for rheumatism.

Mirabilis Jalapa L. (Nyctaginaceae)

تخم لال عباس

Tukhm-i-lāl'abbās (Teh.); Gul-i-abbasa (Pers.); fruits of the marvel of Peru.

W.H.M.M. 150895.

The marvel of Peru or four-o'clock is a plant of tropical America. It is named *Mirabilis*, or wonderful, on account of the variegated colors of the flowers, and *Jalapa*, as it was formerly supposed to be the true jalap plant. The fruits are oval or vase-shaped, 8 by 5 mm., dark reddish brown, five-ribbed, and papillate, containing a white, starchy seed. Little is known about its medicinal action, but the fruits have been said to be used in adulterating black pepper. [263]

Morus nigra L. (Moraceae)

شاه توت

The fruits: Tūt-i-kushk (Teh.).

The root: Rīshah-shāh-tūt (Teh.).

The tree: Shāh-tūt, "royal mulberry" (Pers.).

Field 46A, 269, 402; K.B. 327.

The black or grafted mulberry is cultivated in Iran and Baluchistan, principally for its fruit; the white mulberry (*M. alba*), for sericulture. They both yield fruit which in season is sold in the bazaars and met with in nearly every household (Ait.). When carefully dried, the fruits are called Tut-i-dham, and supply a wholesome and nutritious article of diet during winter.

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[245] •

The other drug of the mulberry tree from Tehran consists of the bark of the root, reddish colored externally, with strong, silky white liber cells. It is used for dysmenorrhea.

Field 69, 409; W.H.M.M. 150847; K.B. 303. I-I

The well-known dill is a tall, annual or biennial herb, with a strong, aromatic odor, finely dissected leaves, and umbels of yellow flowers. Dill fruits are sold in the bazaars and used as a condiment and carminative. On distillation they yield an oil used in medicine for the preparation of dill water. The plant is often confused with fennel and the fruit with caraway seed; hence the name Karawyah, sometimes used. In Iran dill serves as a potherb; the leaves are cooked with rice as a condiment to restore lost appetite. 824* 278* [263]

Phaseolus radiatus L. (Leguminosae) 824*

ماش 262

Māsh (Iraq, Pers.); Urd or Urid (Ind.); Masha (Sans.); the seeds.

Field 76A, 274; 5, 60 (Iraq).

Mash is cultivated as a summer pulse crop, sometimes mixed with maize or sorghum. The green pods are eaten as a vegetable, and the plant is used as fodder or green manure. The small, green, oblong beans are cooked and eaten, made into biscuits, cakes, and sweetmeats. In Afghanistan this pulse is so much esteemed that it is called Mash-i-maha, "the king of peas." [246]

Phaseolus vulgaris L. (Leguminosae)

فاصوليه

Fāsūliyah (Iraq); Lubia, Lubia-kermiz (red) (Teh.); Rāzmah (Kash.); French bean; the seeds.

Field 69, 70, 77A, 75 (Iraq).

The French or kidney bean is grown as a vegetable or a pulse in kitchen gardens. The pods can be eaten green and the ripe seeds dried as haricot beans, or white soup beans.

The beans are ovate, oblong, 12 to 14 by 6 to 8 mm., white, red, or brown, splashed with black streaks, the hilum on the inner side.

Phoenix dactylifera L. (Palmae) 824*

نخل تمر 245 •

Tamr (ripe fruit), Rutab (half ripe), Khalal (unripe), Nakhli (male tree), Khurmā; the date palm, date. 262

Date gardens are found on both sides of the Euphrates from An Nasiriya to Basra. From Nahr Umr down the Shatt-al-Arab to Fao is the largest date-growing district in the world. There are

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date gardens on both banks which vary in width from a few hundred yards to five miles. The date is the most important crop in Iraq (G.).

The best variety of Iraq dates is grown in the Suq district. The finest fruit is produced when the tree is between twelve and forty years old. Over a hundred varieties are known, but in Iraq they may be divided into two classes: (*a*) those used chiefly for trade; (*b*) those used for local consumption.

(*a*)	(*b*)
1. Halawi	1. Mishi
2. Khadrawi	2. Gentar
3. Sa'ir	3. Hasawi
4. Dairi	4. Khasib
5. Za'adi	5. Lihur
6. Digal	6. Barhi

Of these 60 per cent are of the Sa'ir variety. The Halawi are popular in America, the Khadrawi sell in Europe while India and Iran are content with the Sa'ir varieties. The numerous uses of the date palm are proverbial.—The fruit yields a syrup and is used in making the local spirit, 'araq (H.F.).

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Phyllanthus Emblica L. (Euphorbiaceae)

آمله سفته

Amulah-i-suftah (Teh.); Amulah-mugashshar (Isf.); Amlaj (Ar.); Aola amla (Hind.); Kurk amla = dried fruit, Amla morabba = preserved fruit, in Turkestan; emblic myrobalans.

Field 16 (Isf.); W.H.M.M. 150871.

This tree grows throughout tropical India, and is valued for its fruits which, when dried, constitute the emblic myrobalans of commerce. As met with in the shops, the drug occurs in broken sections of a fruit, smaller than a walnut, with dried pulp and hard, woody endocarp. The pulp is very acid and contains much tannin. The fruit is astringent, stomachic, and refrigerant; mixed with grape juice and honey it is a favorite drink for fever and diarrhea.

Physalis Alkekengi L. (Solanaceae)

کاکنج

Kākanj (Isf., Teh.); Gul-i-kākanj; Alkikenji (Ar.); clammy winter cherry.

Achundow; Boiss. 4: 287; Post; Ait.; Schl.; Ph. Pers.; Ph. Ind. 2: 560.

Field 12 (Isf.), 162; W.H.M.M. 150721; K.B. 330.

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This agaric occurs on the oak and larch, and in sizes as large as a fist or a child's head; it is light, spongy, and friable, and is not easily powdered. The use of this fungus in medicine is of very ancient date. Avicenna insists upon the great efficacy of agaric as an alexipharmic. Mohammedan physicians closely follow the Greeks in considering that it removes all kinds of visceral obstructions and expels diseased humors. It is also a Chinese drug. The light, white, spongy interior is made into touchwood, spunk, or tinder, and was formerly used to absorb blood and secretions from wounds, etc.; hence the old name Fungus or Boletus Chirurgorum given to the plant. [372]

Prosopis Stephaniana Kunth (Leguminosae)

خرنوبان

Kharnūbān, Kornub (Isf.); Shok (Ar.); Kunbut (Syr.); Chughak: "humpbacked, bent," applied to the contorted pods, Tukhm-i-jinjak (Ait.); the pods.

Field 403.

This is a loose, straggling, thorny shrub of the Caucasus, Syria, Iran, and northern India. The pods are brown or copper-colored, 4 by 1.5 cm., galled, swollen, and contorted, containing several oval, brown seeds separated by soft, spongy dissepiments. The pods are eaten by sheep, but the seeds pass through undamaged and germinate readily at the coming of the winter rains (G.). The pods and roots of the plant are regarded as astringent and are given for dysentery. [231]

Prosopis Amygdalus Stokes var. amara Baill. (Rosaceae) [245] •

بادام تلخ

Bādām-i-talkh (Teh.); bitter almonds.

Field 52A, 171.

The bitter almond tree, like the sweet, is a native probably of Iran and Asia Minor, and is indistinguishable in botanical characters. In form and appearance bitter almonds closely resemble Valencia almonds, but are usually smaller. They are employed in confectionery and for flavoring, but as the hydrocyanic acid yielded by them varies in quantity, they should be used with caution.—An ointment made of bitter almonds is applied to furuncles (H.F.). [263]

Prunus Armeniaca L. (Rosaceae) 824*

زرد آلو 262

The fruit: **Zard ālū (Pers.); Mishmish (Iraq); Khūbani, with stones removed (Hind.); dried apricot.** 245

824* *The seeds:* Hasta-i-zard ālū.

262 Field 80, 39 (Iraq); 108A.

• 245 The home of this tree is in the Caucasus region. Dried apricots are called Pating in Afghanistan, and Chuli by the Botes. Sheets of compressed apricot pulp are sometimes sold in the market as Qamr-ad-din. In this form the dried apricot preserves its flavor for an indefinite period; it can be used as required after soaking in water, when it swells into a nutritive paste like jam. This substance was one of the rations issued to Turkish soldiers during the War (G.). Apricot kernels, called Stigu in Afghanistan, are used as almonds.

824* **Prunus Cerasus L. (Rosaceae)**

278* هسته آلبالو.

262 Hastah-i-ālbālū (Teh.); Karaz (Ar.); Kerasza (Hind.); cherry

245 stones.

دم آلبالو

Dam-i-ālbālū(Teh.); cherry stalks or peduncles.

Field 144; W.H.M.M. 150810, 150860.

The sour or bitter cherry is a tree of western Asia and eastern Europe. The fruits are light brown, resembling those of the common cherry. The seeds contain kernels having the odor of bitter almonds, are nutritive and tonic and are used in confections. The cherry tree and other plum trees in Iran yield a useful gum called Sumgh alucha.—Cherry stones mixed with barley awns, and cherry stems, are given as an infusion for gonorrhea (H.F.).

824* **Prunus domestica L. var. Juliana** (Rosaceae)

262 آلوچه

245 Alūchah (Teh.); Anjar (Iraq); Halu zhgarh (Kurd.); Alucha (Hind.); prunes.

Field 268, 95A, 104A.

The dried plums are black, wrinkled, ovate, 20 mm. long, with a sweet, pleasantly acid pulp; the seed is 14 by 12 mm., the kernel has an odor of bitter almonds. On account of their acidity they are preferred for cooking, and are used for cleaning metal.

Prunus institia L. var. bokharensis (Rosaceae)

آلو

Alū, Alū-bokhara (Teh.); Bokhara plum.

Field 271.

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The fruit is globular, sweetish, and acidulous, surface compressed and wrinkled, color reddish or brown, with an odor like that of dates. Inside, the fruit is an almond-like nut in a hard shell, containing a kernel resembling sweet almonds. These plums may be used in place of prunes in the preparation of confection of senna.

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Prunus Mahaleb L. (Rosaceae)

حب المحلب

Habbu'l-ma'lab (Teh.); Hab-ul-mahaliba (Ar.); Paiwand-e-maryam (Pers.); perfumed cherry tree fruits.

Field 103 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150862.

This small tree occurs in Central Asia and Europe. The drug is found in the bazaars in two forms, the dried fruits and the kernels. The fruits are drupes, brown and oval, 9 by 6 mm., with a wrinkled skin, covering a fragile shell and the kernel. The kernels are light brown in color, ovate, 6 by 4 mm., with the taste of bitter almonds. They are used by Arabian physicians as a stomachic and for general debility.

Pterocarpus santalinus L. (Leguminosae)

صندل سرخ

Sandal-i-surkh, Rātiyanah (Teh.); Lal-chandan (Hind.); Ratanjali (Guz.); red sanders, red sandalwood.

Field 193, 232.

This wood is the Rakta chandana of Sanskrit writers. It comes from southern India, where the felling of the trees is under government control, and yields a considerable revenue. Hindus and Mohammedans use this wood combined with white sandalwood in bathing and religious services. The use of the red wood in powder for treating bloody fluxes must be based on the "Doctrine of Signatures." The drug called Rātiyanah in Tehran, a remedy for dysentery, appears to consist of chips of this wood. Red sandalwood is well known in Europe as an ingredient in French polish.

Punica Granatum L. (Lythraceae)

گلنار فارسی

Gulnār-i-farsi, Gul-i-anār (Teh.); Nar (Turk.); Gul nare-farsi (Schl.); Flores Punicae granati (Ph. Pers.); pomegranate flowers.

Achundow; Ait.; Post; I.H.B.; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 581; Ph. Ind. 2: 45; Boiss. 2: 736.

35: Hooper and Field 9-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran (MAI
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824* Field 77, 157; W.H.M.M. 150738; K.B. 338.

278* ریشه انار

Root bark: Rīshah-i-anār (Teh.); Granati Cortex (Ph. Pers.).

Field 184.

Seeds: Chab roman (Bagh.).

Field 98A.

The pomegranate is a small tree with showy, reddish flowers, growing in subtropical countries. The flowers, rind of fruit, and dried bark of the stem and root are medicinal. The flowers are astringent and stomachic; the rind of the fruit is also astringent and is used for dyeing and prescribed for dysentery; the root bark is vermifuge and used for expelling tapeworm; the alkaloid pelletierine is its active principle.—The flowers, powdered with *Nummulites* sp. and *Rhus coriaria* L., are applied to painful gums.

Imm-harmal is a variety with small, black fruits which are used medicinally only (H.F.).

Pyrethrum sp. (?) (Compositae)

Katek bah (?) (Teh.).

K.B. 333.

This drug consists of a tapering root with a few undeveloped leaves arising from the crown. The root has the characters of a composite and the leaves resemble those of a *Pyrethrum*.—The sample is marked "Poison, used as an eye medicine" (H.F.).

• [245] **Pyrus Cydonia L. (Rosaceae)**

تخم بهدانه

Tukhm-i-bihdānah (Teh.); Bibi (Bal.); quince seeds.

Field 5; 53A.

The quince is a native of Central Asia, and is grown for its fruit in most temperate countries. Seeds used in and exported from Iran are irregularly ovoid, angular, adherent to one another by mucilage, and covered with a membrane; the color of the testa is dark brown, and that of the kernel yellowish white; they have the odor and taste of bitter almonds. When roasted and salted they are called Hab-safarjal. The seeds contain a large quantity of mucilage, which favorably recommends them as nutritive, demulcent, and emollient for coughing and dysentery; they are taken in the form of an infusion.

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[232] scarlet foliage. The fruit and root-stock of wild rhubarb are collected and employed in medicine; the fruits were official in the "Pharmacopoeia Persica." A decoction of the reddish, triangular-winged fruits is considered a more powerful purgative than that of the rootstock (Aitchison). The fruits are used in Tehran as a vermifuge for horses, and in Hamadan the drug is applied as a poultice for headache. The rhubarb leaves from Isfahan are made into an infusion and used for gonorrhea (C.).

Rhodymenia sp. (Florideae, Rhodymeniaceae)

لیقا

Lyka, Leeka (Iraq); Chinai-ghasa or seaweed.

Field 31A.

This alga, obtained in northern Iran, is light brown and gelatinous. A decoction is given for coughs. As a substitute for agar-agar, it is emulcent, emollient, and alterative, and may be used as a cultivating medium for bacteria.

Rhus coriaria L. (Anacardiaceae)

سماق

Summāq, Summāq-i-shakki bī hastah (Teh.); Tirsh (Kurd.); Tartak (Hind.); leaves, bark, and fruits.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 2: 4; Post; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 1: 373.

• [245] Field 164, 272; 107 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150800; K.B. 335.

[281] [386] The sumac is a tree cultivated in Khurasan, western Afghanistan, and throughout Central Asia. The leaves have long been used by the Arabs, Turks, Iranis, and in Europe, for dyeing silk and tanning leather. They contain from 15 to 35 per cent of tannin.

The fruit is exported from Iran and used by Mohammedans in India. It is a small, sticky drupe, the size of a lentil, 5 mm. in diameter, red or green, acid, and astringent to the taste, containing one lenticular, polished, brown seed.

—Mixed with *Punica Granatum* L., sumac is applied to relieve painful gums. The seeds in an infusion are used to acidulate foods (H.F.).

Ricinus communis L. (Euphorbiaceae)

کرچک فرنگی

Garchak farangī (Teh.); Karchak (Ham.); Tochme Kertchec (Schl.); Kurwa (Ar., Iraq); Bedanjir, "willow fig"; castor oil seeds.

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278*
372
[247]
[245] •

Field 264; 4, 12, 36, 58 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150739; K.B. 335.

The castor oil plant[1] is a native of India, but is common now throughout tropical and subtropical countries. In Iraq and Iran it is cultivated as a windbreak for cotton and other summer crops and in gardens as an ornamental plant. It may attain a height of 10 meters and be a perennial tree, but in cooler climates it is either a shrub or an annual herb. With variations of the plant there are also varieties, large and small, of the seeds. The four samples from Iraq were classed as follows: "Abhangi seeds" 15 by 9 mm., "ordinary" 13 by 10 mm., "Indian red-stemmed" 11 by 8 mm., "Syrian Baladi" 13 by 11 mm. The most important constituent of castor seed is the fixed oil, which exists to the extent of about 50 per cent. The oil is used as a lubricant, as an illuminant, and in medicine as a safe purgative. The oil cake contains all the poisonous property originally present in the seed, hence can not be used as a cattle food; it is, however, an excellent manure and fuel. [241]

Roccella Montagnei Bél. (Ascolichenes, Roccellaceae)

824*
278*

دواله

Davālah (Ham.); a lichen.

Field 28A; W.H.M.M. 150824; K.B. 336.

Achundow refers this drug to *Muscus arboreus*, and gives the Persian names as Dawalak and Karbasu and the Arabic name as Aschna (*Usnea* sp.). The Persian name Davālah is applied to more than one kind of lichen, since Dymock gives *Parmelia kamtschadalis* Esch. as the source of this drug in the Indian bazaars (Ph. Ind. 3: 627). In the Field collection from Baghdad, No. 28A, this drug occurs under the name of "Lihayat as-shāyib." Some of the Parmelias are used as a dye. They are gray lichens, in broken pieces, having emollient and astringent properties, used in a bath or as a poultice.

824*
263
278*

Rosa damascena Mill. (Rosaceae)

گل سرخ

Gul-i-surkh, "red flower" (Teh.); Ward (Ar.); flowers of red rose.

Field 42A; W.H.M.M. 150763.

The rose of Damascus is largely cultivated in western Asia. In Turkey, Bulgaria, and the south of France this species yields attar of rose and is the flower from which the official rose water is prepared.

The petals are slightly astringent, and are used chiefly as an agreeable astringent or as a coloring agent. "Gulanjabin," of rose [386]

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[1] [Ricinus communis --ANALYST]

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I-I The Merian gole of the "Terminologie is referred to
824* *Salvia officinalis* L., but according to Gilliat-Smith, this plant,
278* although cultivated in gardens in Tabriz, has no local name and is
not used by the natives.

247 Boiss. 4: 821; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 3: 125.

Field 130; W.H.M.M. 150799; K.B. 341.

This plant is the poley germander or polion of the Greeks. The drug consists of the small, woolly flowers, mixed with some stalks and leaves. It has the fragrance of thyme, and is given as an infusion for internal disorders—to relieve pains during pregnancy (H.F.). In Baluchistan *T. Stocksianus* Boiss. is called Kalpora, and is a remedy for fever.

824* **Thea sinensis L. (Theaceae)**

272 چای سبز

• 245 Chā'ī sabz (Teh.); Chā (Hind.); green tea leaves.

W.H.M.M. 150820.

A sample of prepared green tea. Tea is imported in immense quantities, chiefly from southern Iran and India. Iranis are very fond of this beverage; prepared tea is sold in nearly every bazaar.

According to Laufer (pp. 553–554) "in Mongol, Turkish, Persian, Indian, Portuguese, neo-Greek, and Russian we equally find the word *čai*, based on North Chinese *c'a*. The Tibetans retain the Chinese word in the ancient form *ja* (*dža*)."

824* **Thymus Serpyllum L. var. Kotschyanus Boiss. (Labiatae)**

278* کوشان شیرازی

Jōshan Shīrāzī (Teh.); Zatār (Syr., Iraq); Seetere (Schl.); Djūshā (Pers.); the herb.

Ait.; Boiss. 4: 556; Post; Schl.; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 649; Ph. Ind. 3: 114.

Field 75A; K.B. 341.

This variety of thyme is a plant of Iran and Kurdistan. The leaves are rounded, cuneate, ovate to lanceolate, with prominent nerves below. The leaves are fragrant, and resemble those of *Zataria multiflora* Boiss., a plant which also has the name of Zatar. Post applies the name Zatar to all plants of the genus *Thymus*. Boissier, on the other hand, refers Zatar to *Origanum Maru* L., Zatar farisi to *T. capitatus* L., and Zaeteran to *T. decussatis* Boiss. It would thus appear that Zatar and Jōshan Shīrāzī are similar drugs, characterized by a thyme-like aroma. The leaves are carminative.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

to machinery. In the future cooperative ownership and operation, 407
especially in the new settlement areas, should be encouraged as one 471
of the best means of extending the use of machinery on a practicable 647
and economical basis. The experience of the Dujaila cooperative, which, owing to low overhead and transport costs, rents machinery to its members at rates lower than those of the AMA and yet is apparently able to cover the cost of depreciation, seems promising in this respect.

Lack of repair facilities and spare parts have greatly handicapped 407
mechanization. The government is seeking to overcome 445
this difficulty both by establishing its own repair shops and by requiring importers to provide repair facilities and maintain minimum stocks of spare parts. Such centrally located shops will be available, however, only for major repairs. Since local repair facilities are now almost wholly lacking, steps should also be taken to establish a considerable number of small shops equipped to undertake minor repairs. In addition, courses designed to train drivers in elementary maintenance are urgently needed. The cost of mechanization will remain discouragingly high unless the life of machinery is prolonged by more adequate maintenance and repair.

3. Soil-building and Forage Crops: Fertilizers

246
The cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is virtually unknown even though the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished and an improvement in feed supply would make the greatest single contribution to an increase in the low productivity of livestock. In the irrigation zone berseem clover, sown in the grain stubble in late summer, would provide a particularly good pasture, soiling and hay crop. In the rain-fed region winter oats and vetch, when cut and cured, would provide a good reserve feed. In the irrigation zone quick-growing crops such as millet could be grown for summer pasture; and more corn, sorghum and legumes such as cowpeas and mungo beans should be cultivated.

Little fertilizer is used and animal manure is generally collected 241
and dried for use as fuel. With the expanding cultivation of crops such as cotton, the use of fertilizer is becoming more urgent. There is need for soil analysis and extensive experimentation to ascertain the fertilizer requirement and the effect of fertilizer on

241 feeding will make livestock far more productive and resistant to
231 disease and produce better and stronger draft animals. By making the keeping and systematic feeding of livestock an integral part of settled agriculture, the people on the land will be assured fuller employment and higher incomes. Livestock should play a more prominent part in the farm economy for still another reason. The great bulk of the sheep and goats, which constitute over 80 percent of the livestock, are the property of nomads and semi-nomads.
[221] Nomads from the northern and southern deserts regularly move into the riverine areas in search of summer pasture; and semi-nomadic shepherds move within the irrigated areas feeding their flocks on green barley, grain stubble and the grass and weeds of fallow land. Both are meeting with increased resistance from the settled farmers; and in any event the expansion of the area under irrigation will increasingly curtail the pasture available to the nomads. Thus the remaining nomadic tribes will need to be gradually settled, but they will adapt themselves readily to settled agriculture only if it will enable them also to maintain considerable livestock.

● 246 Among the forage crops berseem or Egyptian clover, a winter annual, is well-adapted to most of the irrigated area of Iraq and could be grown on a much larger scale. Sown in the grain stubble in late summer, it will provide a good pasture, soiling and hay crop. Alfalfa, a perennial, also makes a good forage crop capable of yielding 1.5 to 5 tons per donum for two to five years. However, in view of its deep roots, it cannot be recommended unless good cultivating equipment is available to kill it when necessary. For summer pasture, quick-growing crops such as millet or binder crops such as maize and sorghum should be grown. Summer legumes—cowpeas and mungo beans, and particularly the black mungo of India—can be recommended. The lack of water during the summer makes the problem of forage crops in the rain-fed zone more difficult. Large areas can, however, be planted to winter oats and vetch which, when cut, cured and cocked, will provide a good reserve feed.

248 The increased production of cotton which has taken place recently should be an excellent source of livestock feed once farmers learn to appreciate the value of oil cake feeding. For this

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278* This annual herb is indigenous to the region that extends from the
824* Caucasus to northern India, and is frequently cultivated in India
and Iraq as a winter crop. The seeds are used for human consump-
[262] tion and for feeding animals; as a green manure or forage crop it
• [246] surpasses other vetches. It has for a long time been known that a
form of paralysis named Lathyrism is believed to result when this
pulse is eaten continuously for some length of time. Guest, however, states that there is no evidence that its harmful nature has ever been recorded in Iraq.

Lavandula dentata L. (Labiatae)

اسطوخودوس

Ustūkhūdūs (Teh.); Osthoukhodouce (Schl.); the Persian name is derived from the Greek; flower heads.

See paper on this drug by I. H. Burkill in the Journ. As. Soc. Bengal, N. S., V, No. 3, March, 1909, 67–71; Ph. Ind. 3: 93; Boiss. 4: 540.

Field 18; W.H.M.M. 150737; K.B. 824.

These are the flower heads of a species of lavender sold in Tehran and brought from Shiraz. They constitute an ancient drug used by the Greeks and referred to by Arabian and Persian physicians. The name has also been applied to *L. Stoechas* L., the Staechus of old works on materia medica. The flowering spikes have the odor of rosemary and camphor, and yield an essential oil containing dextro-camphor and dextro-fenchone. In the form of an infusion the drug is given for catarrh and malaria; it is also used for washing wounds and eruptions.

278* **Lawsonia alba Lam. (Lythraceae)**

824* حناٴ برک

302 Hinnāy-i-barg (Teh.); Hinna (Iraq); Rang-mehndi (Hind.); Camphire (Syr.); henna leaves.

386 Field 74, 188, 220; 19, 45 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150819, 150863.

The henna plant is cultivated throughout India on account of its leaves, which yield the henna dye, and as a garden hedge plant. They are sold in the shops in two forms: (1) the broken leaves, and (2) the leaves called "Rangh" reduced to fine powder and mixed with a small quantity of mustard oil. The principal value is as an article of the toilet, for staining the finger nails, hands, and feet a dull orange color, and for dyeing the hair bright red. The use of henna

‡[Chickling vetch (Lathyrus sativus) - - Analyst]

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Field 48, 66, 68 (Iraq); 105A.

The lentil is an excellent fodder or grazing plant, affording a most nutritious pulse. As an article of food it has been known from the most ancient times; specimens have been discovered in the tombs of Egypt dated 1500 B.C., and are shown in the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum. Lentils are used as food whole or split (when they are called in India "Dall"), and in the form of flour.—A specimen in the American School for Boys, Baghdad, is labeled "Adas mar, lentils ground and taken by women to facilitate parturition" (H.F.).

278* **Lepidium Draba L.** (Cruciferae)

824* مچه

Muchchah (Isf.); Bajindak (Afg., Hind.); Buski (Bal.); hoary cress.

K.B. 325.

The hoary cress is a weed of cultivation distributed westward to Europe. In Tabriz the young shoots are used as a salad or potherb under the name of "Khili-wili." The seeds, smaller than those of *L. sativum*, are oval and dark brown. Seven or eight seeds are given as a dose for flatulence. [262]

Lepidium sativum L. (Cruciferae)

تخم شاهی

Tukhm-i-shāhī (Teh.); Tukhm tartizak (Isf.); Halim (Hind.); Asalia (Bom.); Tara tezak (Afg.); cress seed.

Ait.; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 1: 120; Boiss. 1: 354.

Field 31, 448; W.H.M.M. 150717; K.B. 325.

Garden cress is a native of Iran, and is widely distributed as a cultivated plant eastward to Tibet. The seeds are exported as a drug from Iran to India, and westward to Europe. They are light brown or reddish brown, oblong, 3 by 1.2 mm., with a depression on the inner margin, and a white spot at one end, have a pungent, cress-like taste, and become coated with transparent mucilage when soaked in water. They are tonic, aphrodisiac, and diuretic.

Linum usitatissimum L. (Linaceae)

تخم بزرک

Tukhm-i-bazrak, Bazrak (Ham.); Basarak Katrin, "little seed of flax" (Pers.); Tukhm-i-katan (Ait.); Bazr ul Kattan (Achundow);

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the above species of mallow occur, although Panirak ("little cheeses") refers only to the rounded fruits. Khatmi or Khitmi is usually applied to the larger plants belonging to a species of *Althaea*. The mallows have mucilaginous and cooling properties, and are given for coughs.—Mixed with violet flowers, *Nymphaea alba* L., jujube, sebestan, and *Alhagi camelorum* Fisch., mallow is sometimes prescribed as a purgative (H.F.).

Matricaria Chamomilla L. (Compositae)

بابونه

Bābūnah, Tukhm-i-bābūnah (Teh.); Babunaj (Pers.); Baibun (Mosul); camomile flowers.

Field 142, 202; W.H.M.M. 150732, 150904.

Formerly the camomile flowers met with in the bazaars were all obtained from northern India and Iran, and were the flowers of the above plant, named after the village of Babunah in Arabia where it was particularly abundant. Other fragrant composites occasionally make their appearance. The camomiles sold in the bazaars of Iraq consist of flowers of *M. aurea* L. (G.). Post identifies those in Syria with *Achillea fragrantissima* Forsk. (see *Anthemis*). We have received from Tehran a drug under the name of "Mukhlisah" (Maglah), which is *Matricaria* (?*decipiens*). Camomiles are carminative, stimulant, and febrifuge.—Camomile tea prepared from the daisies is given to relieve intercostal neuralgia. An infusion of the drug is prescribed for dysentery (H.F.).

Medicago sativa L. (Leguminosae)

قت

Qatt, Jatt (Ar.); Winjah, Yunjah (Kurd.); Aspust (Bal.); Spistha (Afg.); lucern or alfalfa.

Field 29 (Jaffa Lucerna), 62 (Iraq).

Alfalfa is a native of western temperate Asia. It is extensively cultivated in Khotan, and is largely grown in many parts of India. There are at least two varieties; the Kandahar, and the Irani or Arabian. The latter, doubtless of Iraqi origin, is generally free from dodder and for this reason the seed was exported annually before the World War from Basra to South Africa (G.). The seeds are oval or rounded, 2 mm. long, brown, white, or greenish in color.—They are used as a cooling poultice for boils (H.F.). [246] •

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scalding in water and then dried. They are hard, horny, whitish, opaque or translucent, branching tubers, mucilaginous when placed in water. A gruel made of these roots is esteemed as a nervine tonic, demulcent, and nutritive.—As an infusion it is given to relieve hoarseness (H.F.). 824* 278*

Oryza sativa L. (Gramineae) 824*

برنج صدری 243

Birinj-i-sadri, Berij sadri Gilan (Teh.); Timan (Iraq); Ruzz (Ar.); Shilib, Pīrinj (Turk.); Chaltuk (Kurd.); rice grain. 262

Field 58, 72; 15, 18, 20, 34 (Iraq).

"Rice is cultivated as a summer crop over immense areas, especially in the southern marshes, also in the valleys of Kurdistan and on the flow canals of certain regions in lower Iraq" (G.). There are three main types of the crop represented in the above specimens from Iraq: (1) Harfi or early-sown, (2) Affi or late-sown, and (3) Shittāl or transplanted.

Timan is the hulled rice of Iraq. The two samples from Tehran are of fine, white, table rice.

Panicum miliaceum L. (Gramineae) 824* 243

ارزن 262

Arzan (Pers.); Dukhn (Iraq); Chīna (Hind., Sans.); millet grain.

Field 57, 106A; 22, 80 (Iraq).

Common millet is cultivated as a summer crop in Iraq, especially along the Shatt-al-Hai. The grain can be cooked and eaten whole or made into bread. It is commonly used in the form of porridge. The green plant is an excellent fodder for animals.—The seeds provide feed for chickens (H.F.). [246] •

Papaver somniferum L. (Papaveraceae) 824*

کوکنار 278*

Kavl-a-kūknār, Pōst-a-kūknār (Pers., Afg.); poppy heads. 276

تخم خشخاش

Tukhm-i-khash khāsh; Tukhm-i-shaga'ig (Ham.); Kishkash (Ar.); poppy seeds.

Ait.; Post; Ph. Ind. 1: 73.

Field 48, 64, 81A, 82A, 185; W.H.M.M. 150835, 150911; K.B. 329.

Field 69, 409; W.H.M.M. 150847; K.B. 303. I-I

The well-known dill is a tall, annual or biennial herb, with a strong, aromatic odor, finely dissected leaves, and umbels of yellow flowers. Dill fruits are sold in the bazaars and used as a condiment and carminative. On distillation they yield an oil used in medicine for the preparation of dill water. The plant is often confused with fennel and the fruit with caraway seed; hence the name Karawyah, sometimes used. In Iran dill serves as a potherb; the leaves are cooked with rice as a condiment to restore lost appetite. 824* 278* [263]

Phaseolus radiatus L. (Leguminosae) 824*

ماش 262

Māsh (Iraq, Pers.); Urd or Urid (Ind.); Masha (Sans.); the seeds.

Field 76A, 274; 5, 60 (Iraq).

Mash is cultivated as a summer pulse crop, sometimes mixed with maize or sorghum. The green pods are eaten as a vegetable, and the plant is used as fodder or green manure. The small, green, oblong beans are cooked and eaten, made into biscuits, cakes, and sweetmeats. In Afghanistan this pulse is so much esteemed that it is called Mash-i-maha, "the king of peas." [246] •

Phaseolus vulgaris L. (Leguminosae)

فاصوليه

Fāsūliyah (Iraq); Lubia, Lubia-kermiz (red) (Teh.); Rāzmah (Kash.); French bean; the seeds.

Field 69, 70, 77A, 75 (Iraq).

The French or kidney bean is grown as a vegetable or a pulse in kitchen gardens. The pods can be eaten green and the ripe seeds dried as haricot beans, or white soup beans.

The beans are ovate, oblong, 12 to 14 by 6 to 8 mm., white, red, or brown, splashed with black streaks, the hilum on the inner side.

Phoenix dactylifera L. (Palmae) 824*

نخل تمر 245

Tamr (ripe fruit), Rutab (half ripe), Khalal (unripe), Nakhli (male tree), Khurmā; the date palm, date. 262

Date gardens are found on both sides of the Euphrates from An Nasiriya to Basra. From Nahr Umr down the Shatt-al-Arab to Fao is the largest date-growing district in the world. There are

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medicine for its stimulant (irritant) and antiseptic action in the genito-urinary tract.

Saussurea Lappa C. B. Clarke (Compositae)

قسطلخ

Qust-i-talkh, Butinak (Teh.); Patchak (Beng.); Kutha Kushta patchuk (Hind.); Costum amarum (Ph. Pers.); Indian costus.

Ait.; Fl. Br. Ind. 3: 376; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 296.

W.H.M.M. 150813; K.B. 338.

The soft, fragrant, whitish root comes from plants grown as a Crown monopoly in Kashmir, and is exported to Iran, India, and China. This ancient and valuable drug was called Arabian costus as it was carried to Turkey and Europe by the Arabs. The root occurs in cylindrical or twisted pieces, light colored, with an agreeable odor and a bitter and biting aftertaste. A second sample of Kust from Hamadan was a smaller root, spirally twisted and lighter in color. Chob-i-kut is the name of a plant used to adulterate costus root in Afghanistan. Various chemical principles have been separated from the root, some of which account for the violet-like odor: Costulactone isomeric with alantolactone costus acid, dehydrocostus lactone, and costol. Costus root is prescribed externally and internally for various complaints, and is taken locally to ward off the effects of snake and animal bites.

Semecarpus Anacardium L. (Anacardiaceae)

بلادر

Balādur (Teh., Isf.); Bhela, Bhilava (Hind.); marking nut.

Field 439; W.H.M.M. 150873.

The marking nut tree inhabits the hotter part of India, Ceylon, and Burma. The black, obliquely cordate nuts contain within the pericarp a black, resinous, viscid, acrid juice which is used as marking ink. A local caustic and vesicant, the juice, when applied to the skin, causes intense pain and swelling. In small quantities, it is given for relief in rheumatic pains and leprous affections.—Prepared like tea, it is also taken to relieve flatulence following severe piles (H.F.).

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Sesamum indicum L. (Pedaliaceae)

سمسم

Simsim (Iraq); Kunjad (Kurd.); Kundij (Turk.); Til, Jinjili, Gingelly (Hind.); til or sesame seed.

Field 128A, 52 (Iraq). I-I

Sesame is widely cultivated as a summer crop. The seeds, white, 824*
brown, or black, are used for garnishing cakes and sweetmeats and 278*
are eaten by the poor in times of scarcity. They contain about 50 263
per cent of a fixed oil which is an excellent substitute for olive oil 246 •
or other salad oil in cooking. The oil cake is a cattle food. The
oil is also the basis of most of the fragrant or scented oils—medicated 243
oils prepared with various vegetable drugs.

In Baghdad, Rashi is the name given to a preparation of ground sesame seed after it has been soaked and roasted, which is used as an emollient, Rahishi (Ar.), Arwah-i-kunjad (Pers.).

Sesbania aculeata Poir. (Leguminosae) 824*

Sesbaniyah (Iraq); Saisaban (Egy.); Rasin (Hind.); Akar, Majandri (Bal.); Jayanti (Beng.); Sesbania seeds. 278*

Field 47 (Iraq).

The plant has been introduced into Iraq and planted for windbreaks. The seeds are sold in bazaars throughout India and Iran. They are dull grayish brown, oblong, 2 by 4 mm., smooth, hard, and bitter to the taste. The Hindus have a superstition that sight of the seeds will remove the pain of scorpion stings. They are used medicinally on account of their astringent properties. The seeds are beaten into a paste which is applied locally to cure eruptions.

Sisymbrium Sophia L. (Cruciferae)

خاکشیرین

Khākshīr, Khākshīr-i-shīrīn (Teh.); Towdri, Khub-kalan, Khaksi (Hind.); the seeds.

Ait.; Schl.; Boiss. 1: 216; Ph. Ind. 1: 118, 121.

Field 4 (Isf.), 50; W.H.M.M. 150712.

These seeds resemble in size, shape, and color the drug Tukhm-i-khākshīr talkh, the bitter Khākshīr (*Erysimum* sp.), except that they are dull and not shiny. There are several kinds of cruciferous seeds known as "Towdri": pale, light brown, red, and black. The seed of *Lepidium Iberis* L., the Kasis of Iran, is one of them, and the seeds of *Matthiola incana* R. Br., from the Punjab and Sind, is another. The seeds are small, yellowish brown, 1 mm. in length, and become coated with transparent mucilage when placed in water. The drug is considered aphrodisiac, "fattening the body and purifying the blood." [832]

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Achundow; I.H.B.; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 423; Ph. Ind. 1: 243.

Field 253; W.H.M.M. 150849; K.B. 342.

This plant is found in the sandy deserts of northwestern India, where the fruits are collected for the market. As a drug it is mentioned by Dioscorides and Pliny and in the Bower manuscript. The fruit, the size of a small bean, has five cells, each of which is wedge-shaped and armed with four strong prickles. The seeds are oily and enclosed in hard, stony cells. The fruits are diuretic and are said to act as a charm in bladder troubles. Dulm-ul-hasak and Rughan-i-char-i-chesak are names for an oil prepared from the fruits and applied to relieve rheumatism.—Small caltrops are given as an infusion for gonorrhea (H.F.).

[246] **Trifolium alexandrinum L. (Leguminosae)**

برسیم

Barsim (Iraq); seeds of berseem or Egyptian clover.

Field 31, 51 (Iraq).

This is a well-known fodder and green manure. Experiments have shown that it can be grown satisfactorily as a winter crop. The seeds are yellowish brown, smooth, oval, 2 mm. long.

Trifolium repens L. (Leguminosae)

تخم شبدر

Tukhm-i-shabdar (Teh.); Shaftal (Punj., Bal.); Nafal, Nifil (Iraq); white clover seed.

Field 29 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150902.

Clover or trefoil grows in northern India, at an elevation sometimes of 10,000 feet in the Himalayas. The seeds are oval, brown or green, and are used for making cooling poultices for boils.

Trigonella Foenum-graecum L. (Leguminosae)

تخم شنبليله

Tukhm-i-shambalīlah (Teh., Ham.); Hulbah (Iraq); the seeds.

Shambalīlah (Teh.); Methi (Hind., Bom.); the herb, fenugreek.

Ait.; I.H.B.; Boiss. 2: 70; Post; Ph. Ind. 1: 402.

Field 27, 71A, 213; 16 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150749, 150795; K.B. 343.

[263] Fenugreek is cultivated universally in gardens as a potherb, and in Egypt and Afghanistan as a food and fodder crop. The leaves are occasionally used for poultices and in curries.

I-I

824* **Verbascum Thapsus L.** (Scrophulariaceae)

278* ماذريون

Māzaryūn (Teh.); Mahi zahraj, Bon tamaku (Ar.); Gidar tamaku (Hind.); great mullein.

W.H.M.M. 150758.

This mullein grows from the temperate Himalayas westward to Britain. The drug consists of broken stalks and thick, hairy leaves. The narcotic action of mullein on fish appears to be well known to [226] the Arabs and Iranis, the meaning of Mahi zahraj being "fish poison." Mohammedan physicians prescribe it in gout and rheumatism in combination with aperients. Throughout Europe mullein has long had a reputation in the pulmonary diseases of cattle, on which account it bears the name of cow's lungwort.

824* **Vetiveria zizanioides** Stapf (*Andropogon muricatus* Retz) (Gramineae)

278* برمكيا

302 Barmakiyā, Bikh-i-wala (Pers.); Khas Khas (Hind.); Izkhir-i-jami (Ar.); Vetiver (Tam.); root of cuscus grass.

Field 5 (Iaf.).

The use of these fragrant, wiry roots for medicinal purposes and [855] in perfumery has been common in India for a long time. The roots emit a pleasant odor when moist, and for this reason they are woven into screens and mats (tatties) which hang over doors and windows to cool and perfume the atmosphere during the hot season. A paste of the root is applied to the skin to relieve oppressive heat of the body, and a cooling aromatic bath is prepared by adding some broken root to the water. The root yields a fragrant essential oil which commands a high price as a perfume (Otto Stapf, *Kew Bulletin*, 1906, 347–349).

824* **Vicia Faba L.** (Leguminosae)

278* باقله

262 Bāghalā (Iraq); Banklent (Bal.); Bakla (Hind.); Baqilla, Baqlah (Turk.); Paglah (Kurd.); broad or horse bean.

•246 Field 4, 56, 69 (Iraq).

This legume is a native of Iran and is now universally cultivated. The beans are a well-known vegetable and an excellent horse food. The shoots are said to be efficacious in rousing a drunkard from

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stupor. The seeds are oblong, 24 by 18 mm. Those of the small 824 *
variety are oblong, 8 by 5 mm., brown in color, with a white hilum. 278 *
These seeds are exported from Egypt in large quantities for feeding 262
horses. 246

Vigna Catjang Walp. (Leguminosae)

لوبيا 824*

Lubia (Iraq); Mak (Bal.); Chowli (Hind.); Barbati (Beng.); cow pea. 262

Field 58, 93A; 50, 64 (Iraq).

The cow pea is cultivated as an irrigated summer crop and much grown on mud flats along the receding rivers in summer and autumn. The green pods are cooked and eaten as a vegetable and the seeds are eaten as a pulse. The seeds are recognized by their oblong shape, 10 by 7 mm., and white color with a brown or black spot or hilum on one side. The black-eyed variety is known in Italy under the name of Faggiuola del occhio.

Viola sp. (Violaceae) 824*

كل بنفشه 278*

Gul-i-banafshah (Teh.); flowers of violet.

Abu Mansur; Ph. Pers.; Ait.; Boiss. 1: 450; Post 118; Ph. Ind. 1: 141.

Field 8, 76; W.H.M.M. 150710; K.B. 343.

Violet flowers are regarded in Iran and the Punjab as a valuable medicine. The sweet violet (*V. odorata*) is stated to be the origin of the commercial article, but as the flowers are frequently broken and mixed with leaves and stalks, it is not possible to determine the species. The drug is astringent, demulcent, and diaphoretic, and mixed with lime juice and sugar, is administered as an infusion for fever and headache.

—Mixed with *Echium amoenum* Fisch. & Mey., *Nymphaea alba* L., *Cordia myxa* L., *Zizyphus vulgaris* L., as well as lime juice and sugar, *Viola* sp. is given in an infusion for headache, fevers (not malarial), and to soften feces before purgation (H.F.).

Vitis vinifera L. (Vitaceae) 824*

كشمش عناب 278*

Grapes: 'Inab (Iraq); Angur, Drakh (Hind.). 262

Raisins: Kishmish, Munakha (Pers.); fruit of the vine.

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Aloe Perryi Baker (Liliaceae)

صبر زرد

Sabr-i-zard (Teh.); Sibar, Musabbar (Ar.); Bol shiah (Hind.); bitter aloes.

W.H.M.M. 150786.

This specimen is a piece of Socotrine aloes prepared from the leaves of the plant. It is a black or liverish colored extract with a brownish yellow dust. Aloes is a well-known purgative, introduced by Arab traders in early times.

Althaea lavateraefolia DC. (Malvaceae)

ریشه خطمی

Rishah-i-khatmī (Ham.); the root.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 1: 828; Post; Ait.; I.H.B.

K.B. 303.

This plant grows in Egypt, Iran, and Afghanistan. Aitchison says it is cultivated not only for the showiness of its flowers but for its petals, which are collected as they fall off the plant and are called Gul-i-khatmī, the seeds Tukhm-i-khatmī. The root from Hamadan agrees with that of the above-named species. In Baghdad the roots (Erok Chatma) are said to belong to the hollyhock (*Althaea rosea* L.), but Achundow refers the drug to *A. ficifolia* Cav. The root is fibrous, light-colored, and becomes mucilaginous when soaked in water. It is considered strengthening, and is probably an Irani substitute for the root of the marshmallow of Europe (*Althaea officinalis* L.). [247] •

Althaea sp. (Malvaceae)

گل خطمی

Gul-i-khatmī (Teh.); the flowers.

Field 20; W.H.M.M. 150828.

Tukhm-i-khatmī (Isf.); the carpels.

Field 401, 35 (Iraq).

These drugs are doubtless derived from more than one species of *Althaea*. The hollyhock (*A. rosea* L.), *A. ficifolia* Cav., and *A. lavateraefolia* DC., and various hybrids yield medicinal flowers and seeds. In Baluchistan the flowers of *A. pallida* Wald. & Kit. are collected. They are yellow and pink, with hairy calyces. The seeds, or properly carpels, are brown, reniform, and hairy; the margin is marked with fan-like ridges. All parts of these plants are mucilag-

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These seeds are flat, reddish brown, 5 by 3 cm., containing white cotyledons. The seeds are an Indian remedy for tapeworm. The powdered seeds are prescribed two days after a dose of wormseed. 824* 278*

Caesalpinia Bonducella Roxb. (Leguminosae)

تخم ابلیس

Tukhm-i-iblīs (Teh.); Khaza-i-iblīs, "Devil's testicles"; Bonduk-i-hindi (Ar.); Kat karanj (Hind.); bonduc nut, nicker tree.

W.H.M.M. 150709.

Bonduc seeds are globular, smooth, dull gray in color, and yield an oil by expression. They are worn as necklaces for charms, and the kernels are bitter, tonic, antiperiodic, and anthelmintic. [301]

Calamintha graveolens Benth. (Labiatae)

ترنگمسک

Terengamisk(?) (Teh.); Faranj mishk or Biranj mishk; Palang mishk has been referred to *Ocimum sanctum* L., and Palenguemeeke by Schlimmer to *Dracocephalum Kotschyi* Boiss.

Boiss. 4: 583; Post 624.

Field 32; K.B. 306.

This species of calamint frequents the Mediterranean region, Syria, Asia Minor, Iraq, and Trans-Caucasia. The seeds are known in India, where supplies come from Iran. They are dark brown, oblong in shape, 2 by 1 mm., three-angled, tapering toward the umbilicus, where there is a white, V-shaped mark; they are feebly pungent and become coated with transparent mucilage when soaked in water. The seeds are stimulating and aphrodisiac. [832]

Calendula officinalis L. (Compositae)

همیشه بهار

Hamishah bahār (Teh., Iraq); Gole himmicheh behar (Schl.); Qarah Koz (Turk.); marigold flowers.

Field 123.

The pot marigold, a plant of the Mediterranean coast, is a weed of cultivation in northern India, and is much grown in gardens for its ornamental flowers. The yellow flower heads are bitter and have long been used among domestic remedies. "A tincture made from the dried florets was formerly used in medicine for application to wounds" (Guest). [247] •

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intervals during the day. Bread must be omitted from the diet during the time of medication (H.F.).

Celosia argentea L. (Amarantaceae)

کل حلوا

Gul-i-halvā (Isf.); Sarwali (Hind.); cockscomb seeds.

Field 408.

The plant grows throughout India and tropical Asia. The pinkish and yellow flower heads, seeds, and roots are used in medicine. The seeds are lenticular, brown or black, smooth, shining, convex on both surfaces. The leaves are used for poultices; the flowering tops with seeds are given as a nervine tonic and in diarrhea. The author of the "Muffaridat-i-Nasiri" states that 180 grains of the seeds, with an equal quantity of sugar candy, taken daily in a cup of milk, is a powerful aphrodisiac. [832]

—Mixed with *Chrozophora verbascifolia* Juss., the seeds are given as an infusion for chest pains, especially during whooping cough (H.F.).

Celtis australis L. (Ulmaceae)

دغ دغان

Digh-dighane (Isf.); nettle tree.

Field 70.

This ornamental tree is cultivated in Khorasan and near Baghdad, frequently near shrines and holy places. The small, green, wrinkled fruits of *C. caucasica* Willd. are mixed with ordinary flour to be made into bread. [247] [262]

C. Tournefortii Lam., Tawak in Kurdistan, bears small edible fruits like cherries.

Chaerophyllum sp. (Umbelliferae)

قردمانا

Qurdumānā (Teh.); Keruwiah (Isf.); the fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150836.

These fruits are gray-green, elongated, 10 by 1 mm., with a faint caraway odor. Honigberger refers the Arabic Kurdamana to *Lagaecia cuminoides* having similar properties. Stapf informs us that Keruwiah brought from Chahār Mahal and sold for medicine in Isfahan is an allied umbelliferous plant, *Grammosciadium macrodon* Boiss. They are both carminative medicines.

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Pharmacog.; Connold's British Oak Galls; Houard 375; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 3: 360.

K.B. 334.

These galls are produced by the insect *Andricus lucidus* Hartig. var. *orientalis* Trotter (illustrated in Connold's "British Oak Galls"). This cynipid makes galls on various species of oak. The bazaar specimens are probably brought from Asia Minor; they have long spines which are usually broken off in the commercial samples. They are used by tanners and are sold also as an astringent medicine. This drug is given locally as a febrifuge (C.).

824* **Quercus Vallonea Kotschy (Fagaceae)**

262 گوزی علفی

257 Gueze elefi, Pune (Teh.); oak manna.

K.B. 334.

Under these names is supplied a confection or cake of sugary substance, green with the presence of broken leaves. It is a form of Tar-anjubin, "green honey," or Gaz-anjabin, "tamarisk honey." Layard referred to this substance in his "Early Adventures in Persia," I, p. 349: "The mountainous country beyond Fellaut is thickly wooded with the 'beloot' or oak. These trees are chiefly valuable for the white substance called by the Bakhtyaris 'gaz' or 'gazu,' a kind of manna. It is an article of export to all parts of Persia, and is sold everywhere in the bazaars, and employed in the manufacture of a sweetmeat called 'Gazenjubeen,' which is much relished and considered very wholesome. When boiled with the leaves and allowed to harden it forms a kind of greenish cake, not disagreeable to the taste, but, prepared for the use of the ladies of the enderun and to be offered to guests, it is carefully skimmed and separated, when it becomes a white paste of very delicate flavor."

Oak manna, manna quercina, Gueza-elefi of Schlimmer, has also been obtained from the leaves and fruits of *Q. mannifera* Lindl. of Kurdistan, *Q. persica* Jaub. & Spach, and *Q. tauricola* Klotzsch. Saccharose, glucose, fructose, and mucilage have been separated from these secretions, but no mannite.

278* **Quisqualis indica L. (Combretaceae)**

824* Rangan-ki-bel (Hind.); Liane vermifuge (Fr.); fruits of the Rangoon creeper.

• 247 Field 82 (Iraq).

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The Rangoon creeper is cultivated as an ornamental flowering shrub in most parts of India. The fruits are oval or oblong, pointed at either end, and sharply pentagonal. The pericarp is thin, woody, fragile, of a mahogany color, enclosing an oily seed. The medicinal use of the creeper originated in Mauritius and the Moluccas. The seeds are valued as an anthelmintic; four or five seeds bruised and mixed with honey are administered as a dose for expelling lumbrici. 824 * 278 * 247 •

Raphanus sativus L. (Cruciferae) 824 * 278 *

طربچه

Tukhm-i-turubchah (Teh.); Turb (Pers.); Bazr-el-fujl (Ar.); Tur (Kurd.); Mula, Muro (Hind.); radish seeds.

Field 37; W.H.M.M. 150921.

The well-known radish is cultivated as a vegetable throughout the country. Its seeds, sold in the bazaars, are oblong, 3 to 4 by 2 mm., light reddish brown, with the testa minutely reticulated. They have the pungent taste of mustard. The seeds are diuretic, laxative, and lithontriptic. [262]

Rheum palmatum L. (Polygonaceae)

ریوند چینی

Rīvand-i-chīnī (Isf., Teh.); rhubarb root.

Field 7 (Isf.); 1, 206.

The appearance of sticks of Chinese rhubarb in the bazaars of Iran indicates the favor in which this medicine is held. It is aperient, stomachic, tonic, and slightly astringent, and promotes the action of the liver without any catharsis.—In Tehran it is used as a paste for syphilitic ulcers (H.F.).

Rheum Ribes L. (Polygonaceae)

کل لیواس

Gul-i-livās, Tukhm-i-livās (Ham., Teh.); Livās, the Persian and Arabic name of the plant; Riwas (Punj.); rhubarb fruits.

Barg-i-livās (Isf.); rhubarb leaves.

Boiss. 4: 1003; Ph. Ind. 3: 153.

Field 22, 400; W.H.M.M. 150885; K.B. 335.

The edible rhubarb is indigenous throughout the moister localities at 3,000 feet and upward. It occurs in great expanses on a northern exposure on the higher hills of Khurasan, marking the country characteristically in the autumn with the brilliancy of its almost

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Field 264; 4, 12, 36, 53 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150739; K.B. 335. 824*

The castor oil plant[1] is a native of India, but is common now 278*
throughout tropical and subtropical countries. In Iraq and Iran 372
it is cultivated as a windbreak for cotton and other summer crops [247] •
and in gardens as an ornamental plant. It may attain a height of
10 meters and be a perennial tree, but in cooler climates it is either [245]
a shrub or an annual herb. With variations of the plant there are also varieties, large and small, of the seeds. The four samples from Iraq were classed as follows: "Abhangi seeds" 15 by 9 mm., "ordinary" 13 by 10 mm., "Indian red-stemmed" 11 by 8 mm., "Syrian Baladi" 13 by 11 mm. The most important constituent of castor seed is the fixed oil, which exists to the extent of about 50 per cent. The oil is used as a lubricant, as an illuminant, and in medicine as a safe purgative. The oil cake contains all the poisonous property
originally present in the seed, hence can not be used as a cattle food; [241]
it is, however, an excellent manure and fuel.

Roccella Montagnei Bél. (Ascolichenes, Roccellaceae) 824*

دواله 278*

Davālah (Ham.); a lichen.

Field 28A; W.H.M.M. 150824; K.B. 336.

Achundow refers this drug to *Muscus arboreus*, and gives the Persian names as Dawalak and Karbasu and the Arabic name as Aschna (*Usnea* sp.). The Persian name Davālah is applied to more than one kind of lichen, since Dymock gives *Parmelia kamtschadalis* Esch. as the source of this drug in the Indian bazaars (Ph. Ind. 3: 627). In the Field collection from Baghdad, No. 28A, this drug occurs under the name of "Lihayat as-shāyib." Some of the Parmelias are used as a dye. They are gray lichens, in broken pieces, having emollient and astringent properties, used in a bath or as a poultice.

Rosa damascena Mill. (Rosaceae) 824*

گل سرخ 263

Gul-i-surkh, "red flower" (Teh.); Ward (Ar.); flowers of red rose. 278*

Field 42A; W.H.M.M. 150763.

The rose of Damascus is largely cultivated in western Asia. In Turkey, Bulgaria, and the south of France this species yields attar of rose and is the flower from which the official rose water is prepared.

The petals are slightly astringent, and are used chiefly as an [386]
agreeable astringent or as a coloring agent. "Gulanjabin," of rose

[1] [*Ricinus communis* --ANALYST]

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[257]

"Gulanjabin," of rose

petals mixed with honey, is a confection sold in Eastern bazaars. "Gulkhand" is a conserve made from equal parts of rose petals and white sugar beaten together.—Rose petals are added to curry as a flavoring (H.F.).

Rosa foetida Herm. (Rosaceae)

گل زرد

Gul-i-zard, "yellow flower" (Teh.); Gole zarde (Schl.).

A. Olivier ("Voyage dans l'Empire Ottoman, l'Egypte et la Perse," Paris, 1807); Boiss. 2: 671.

Field 154; W.H.M.M. 150823; K.B. 336.

• [247]

The Persian yellow rose is a shrub cultivated in gardens. This is the yellow Austrian briar in a wild state, ranging from the Crimea and Asia Minor through Iran to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and the Punjab to eastern Tibet. Aitchison calls it Gul-i-raman-zeba, "lovely flower" of the Hari Rud Valley. Dried rose petals, obtained chiefly from Iran, are sold in the bazaars in India and are prescribed for colic and diarrhea.

Rosa hemisphaerica Herm. (Rosaceae)

دماوره

Damaverah (Ham.); Dalik, Ward (Ar.); the hips.

Ph. Ind. 1: 574; Boiss. 2: 672; Post.

K.B. 336.

This rose occurs in Iran and Afghanistan and, according to Post, is cultivated extensively in Syria.

The drug consists of the hips of the plant. They are nearly globular, broader than long, from 10 by 7 mm. to 13 by 8 mm., crowned with the remains of sepals, red, wrinkled, and covered with short protuberances. Within are several light brown, hard, smooth seeds, 4 mm. long, mixed with silky hairs. The fruits are hot, dry, and astringent, and are given locally for stomach complaints.

Rubia Cordifolia L. and R. tinctorium L. (Rubiaceae)

روناس

Rūnās, Rūniyās (Teh., Isf.); Rounace (Schl.); Fuwwah (Ar.); Manjit (Hind.); madder root.

Ait.; Boiss. 3: 17; Post 224; Schl.; Ph. Ind.

Field 6 (Isf.); 39; 109 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150726; K.B. 336.

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Ait.; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 459; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 90. 824*
W.H.M.M. 150816; K.B. 339. 278*

Nux vomica or Kuchula seeds are frequently referred to in ancient Persian works. In the "Makhzan el Adwiya" they are said to have been used from very early times for paralysis. Called Azaraki by Indian Mohammedans, they are given for debility. The seeds are imported from India, and are known throughout Iran as a poison. Aitchison says, "The seed of the nux vomica is imported freely into these parts (northeast of Iran) as a valuable tonic, but it is chiefly employed by the nomad tribes for poisoning wolves and dogs, these animals frequently proving destructive to their flocks." [224]

Tagetes erecta L. (Compositae)

گل جعفری

Gul-i-ja'fari (Teh.); Ja'fari (Iraq); Gul gaindo (Bal.); Guljaferi (Hind.); Rojia (Port.); African marigold.

Field 86.

Both the African marigold and the French marigold (*T. patula* L.) are cultivated in flower gardens for their orange-yellow blossoms and scented foliage. They were probably introduced into India by the Portuguese. The flowers are often worn as garlands during religious festivals. Sold in the bazaars in India and Iran, the dried flower heads are said to purify the blood. [247] •

Tamarindus indica L. (Leguminosae)

تخم تمر

Tukhm-i-tamr (Teh.); Baz-i-tamar-hindi (Ar.); seeds of the tamarind.

Field 262.

The seeds of the Indian tamarind tree are dark brown, shining, flattened, of an irregular outline, containing ivory-white cotyledons. Size is made from the seeds, and it appears that this preparation is used in Tehran as a plaster for boils (see "Tamarind Seed" by D. Hooper, *Agricultural Ledger*, No. 2, 1907).

Tamarix gallica L. var. mannifera Ehrenb. (Tamaricaceae) 824*

گز خونسار 263

Gaz-i-khūnsār, Gaz-alafi, Gaz-anjabin, "tamarisk honey" (Teh.); Gaz-i-shakar, "tamarisk sugar"; tamarisk manna.

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I-I The Merian gole of the "Terminologie is referred to
824* *Salvia officinalis* L., but according to Gilliat-Smith, this plant,
278* although cultivated in gardens in Tabriz, has no local name and is not used by the natives.

• 247 Boiss. 4: 821; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 3: 125.

Field 130; W.H.M.M. 150799; K.B. 341.

This plant is the poley germander or polion of the Greeks. The drug consists of the small, woolly flowers, mixed with some stalks and leaves. It has the fragrance of thyme, and is given as an infusion for internal disorders—to relieve pains during pregnancy (H.F.). In Baluchistan *T. Stocksianum* Boiss. is called Kalpora, and is a remedy for fever.

824* **Thea sinensis L. (Theaceae)**

272 چای سبز

246 Chā'ī sabz (Teh.); Chā (Hind.); green tea leaves.

W.H.M.M. 150820.

A sample of prepared green tea. Tea is imported in immense quantities, chiefly from southern Iran and India. Iranis are very fond of this beverage; prepared tea is sold in nearly every bazaar.

According to Laufer (pp. 553–554) "in Mongol, Turkish, Persian, Indian, Portuguese, neo-Greek, and Russian we equally find the word *čai*, based on North Chinese *č'a*. The Tibetans retain the Chinese word in the ancient form *ja* (*dža*)."

824* **Thymus Serpyllum L. var. Kotschyanus Boiss. (Labiatae)**

278* کوشان شیرازی

Jōshan Shīrāzī (Teh.); Zatār (Syr., Iraq); Seetere (Schl.); Djūshā (Pers.); the herb.

Ait.; Boiss. 4: 556; Post; Schl.; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 649; Ph. Ind. 3: 114.

Field 75A; K.B. 341.

This variety of thyme is a plant of Iran and Kurdistan. The leaves are rounded, cuneate, ovate to lanceolate, with prominent nerves below. The leaves are fragrant, and resemble those of *Zataria multiflora* Boiss., a plant which also has the name of Zatar. Post applies the name Zatar to all plants of the genus *Thymus*. Boissier, on the other hand, refers Zatar to *Origanum Maru* L., Zatar farisi to *T. capitatus* L., and Zaeteran to *T. decussatis* Boiss. It would thus appear that Zatar and Jōshan Shīrāzī are similar drugs, characterized by a thyme-like aroma. The leaves are carminative.

439 457 skins. Not all the dollar income accrues to Iraq, however, partly because invoices are regularly undervalued and also because some commodities are sold through intermediaries in the Lebanon.

439 **Other Products.** In the years 1947 to 1949 the remaining exports consisted of the following: bricks and sand exported for use by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the value of about ID 300,000 a year; a variety of agricultural products, whose total value did not exceed ID 500,000 in any one year; and cotton. Iraq has always exported a little cotton, but in the best years, just before the war and again in 1950, its value was only about five percent ●[241] of all export receipts. The position is now changing radically. Iraq, like several neighboring countries, is experiencing a cotton boom. Under the stimulus of high prices, the area under cultivation has increased rapidly in the last few years and predictions for the 1951 crop have ranged as high as 150,000 tons of seed-cotton, compared with 25,000 tons the year before. If the fellah's traditional aversion to a crop he cannot consume himself has been permanently overcome and if he can acquire the necessary knowledge for good cultivation, cotton could very soon become one of Iraq's most important exports, if not the most important. As a summer crop, however, its cultivation will be hazardous until the control of the rivers gives better assurance of a summer water supply.

Import Policy

439 656 457 All foreign transactions are, with certain exceptions, subject to exchange control. Imports from hard currency areas have been governed by licensing systems and have been limited to goods such as agricultural and industrial machinery, automobiles, trucks and drugs. Before 1948, imports from other areas were not subject to license, except for about 100 items, mainly luxuries. In that year, however, Iraq experienced a very large drain on her foreign exchange reserves and a more complex system was introduced.

Under the system now in force, all imported goods have been placed on one of several lists, the two longest consisting of "unlimited" and "limited" goods. Each merchant is given an annual quota in dinars, within which he can import unlimited goods without restriction, provided he obtains a license for each purchase. Alternatively, he can spend a small part of his quota on "limited" goods, but only up to a fixed amount.

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241 feeding will make livestock far more productive and resistant to
231 disease and produce better and stronger draft animals. By making the keeping and systematic feeding of livestock an integral part of settled agriculture, the people on the land will be assured fuller employment and higher incomes. Livestock should play a more prominent part in the farm economy for still another reason. The great bulk of the sheep and goats, which constitute over 80 percent of the livestock, are the property of nomads and semi-nomads.
[221] Nomads from the northern and southern deserts regularly move into the riverine areas in search of summer pasture; and semi-nomadic shepherds move within the irrigated areas feeding their flocks on green barley, grain stubble and the grass and weeds of fallow land. Both are meeting with increased resistance from the settled farmers; and in any event the expansion of the area under irrigation will increasingly curtail the pasture available to the nomads. Thus the remaining nomadic tribes will need to be gradually settled, but they will adapt themselves readily to settled agriculture only if it will enable them also to maintain considerable livestock.

246 Among the forage crops berseem or Egyptian clover, a winter annual, is well-adapted to most of the irrigated area of Iraq and could be grown on a much larger scale. Sown in the grain stubble in late summer, it will provide a good pasture, soiling and hay crop. Alfalfa, a perennial, also makes a good forage crop capable of yielding 1.5 to 5 tons per donum for two to five years. However, in view of its deep roots, it cannot be recommended unless good cultivating equipment is available to kill it when necessary. For summer pasture, quick-growing crops such as millet or binder crops such as maize and sorghum should be grown. Summer legumes—cowpeas and mungo beans, and particularly the black mungo of India—can be recommended. The lack of water during the summer makes the problem of forage crops in the rain-fed zone more ~~difficult~~. Large areas can, however, be planted to winter oats and vetch which, when cut, cured and cocked, will provide a good reserve feed.

248 The increased production of cotton which has taken place recently should be an excellent source of livestock feed once ~~farmers learn to appreciate~~ the value of oil cake feeding. For this

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reason the cultivation of more cotton as well as such crops as linseed and sunflower seed will be important to the livestock economy. 248

Sugar Beets and Cane

The value of beet tops and pulp for livestock feeding might 249 also be regarded as one of the principal reasons for introducing the cultivation of sugar beets. Similarly, one of the advantages of cane sugar might be the production of molasses which could also be used for livestock feed. These have been, of course, subordinate considerations in the minds of those who have advocated these crops for Iraq. The principal consideration has been to produce at [439] home the sugar now imported in a volume which averaged 75,000 tons per year in the three-year period 1948 to 1950.

Undoubtedly sugar beets could be cultivated in the northern provinces of Suleimaniya and Mosul and sugar cane in the South, particularly in Amara. The real question is, however, whether either or both of these crops could be grown economically and on a scale large enough to warrant the necessary investment in processing plant. It must be decided whether cane or beet is preferable and whether either of them can compete with cotton for the available land, water and labor. The data available at present do not make it possible to arrive at sound decisions on these questions.

Test plots grown over 10 years indicate that there are several varieties of beet well adapted to Iraq and capable of reasonably high yields in terms of sugar. Experiments on cane sugar production at Abu Ghuraib, Basra and Amara have yielded much less favorable results, although one variety under test held some promise of furnishing sugar at an economic cost. The experiments, however, have not been conducted in a way and on a scale that would permit a satisfactory conclusion. If further experiments prove the feasibility of growing cane, it is likely to be a more economic crop than sugar beet. Experience elsewhere demonstrates that cane yields are generally higher and that the production of cane is less difficult and less demanding of skilled and semi-skilled labor than that of sugar beets. It is suggested therefore that further experiments on a larger scale be undertaken under appropriate expert guidance. In each of the possible beet sugar areas five or more 10-donum plantings might be tried. Special attention

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

PRODUCTION

433 Industry at present is confined largely to processing agricultural products, producing building materials, and manufacturing consumer goods—matches, soap, cigarettes, shoes, beverages, and textiles.

Conditions are favorable for further industrial development. Opportunities are abundant for producing agricultural raw materials for processing, and indications are that iron, copper, zinc, chrome, sulphur, and salt exist in commercial quantities. With plenty of oil and natural gas, fuel is no problem. Manpower is adequate, and with proper training the Iraqi workman is said to be competent. A higher level of agricultural production would create also a wider market for manufactured products.

There are a number of limitations. The lack of technical "know-how" and the lack of sufficient private capital and initiative are the most important. Much capital, particularly that accumulated from agriculture, is said to be hoarded; and the balance generally is invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce where investors anticipate a 471 high rate of return. It is suggested for this reason that industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the

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—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

In most of the Middle East countries, cotton harvesting and, to a certain extent, weeding depend on migrant laborers who travel from one area to another. In Iraq, most of the members of the migrant farm worker's family walk, carrying their household goods on their heads. Only the tiniest youngsters and the oldest women ride the burros.

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

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At present the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and most of their time is said to be devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks.[49] A complete program in research and extension is needed. Such a program is being developed gradually now with the help of the various technical assistance agencies.

CREDIT

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Production credit facilities are almost non-existent. An effort is being made, however, to increase the resources of the state-owned agricultural bank to provide adequate production credit and to establish storage facilities for crops. According to the United Nations' special reports, moneylenders' interest rates to farmers for crop production were 30 to 40 per cent before the government recently established the agricultural bank.

COTTON

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Cotton has never been particularly important in Iraq, from the standpoint of either the acreage involved or the total production. Its potential, however, is great.

Table 33

IRAQ: Statistics on Cotton Production and Distribution
Specified Years, 1920-1951

Year beginning August 1	Acreage	Yield per Acre	Production	Consumption	Exports	Imports
	Acres	Pounds	Bales			
Average 1920-24	NA	NA	808	NA	NA	NA
Average 1925-29	NA	NA	2,977	NA	NA	NA
Average 1930-34	3,751	159	1,240	NA	NA	NA
Average 1935-39	53,399	97	10,772	NA	NA	NA
Average 1940-44	73,000	62	9,409	NA	10,477	2,845
Average 1945-49	21,619	100	4,492	4,000	3,152	2,733
1950	100,000	182	38,121	7,000	31,000	0
1951	135,000	135	38,000	10,000	1,887[1]	

[1] Exports, August through November.

SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, and International Cotton Advisory Committee.

Before the war, production averaged only about 12,000 bales and slightly less in the postwar years through 1949. Higher prices throughout the world, together with the export controls imposed by the United States and the shortage of cotton, sent production to about 38,000 bales. It would have been three to four times as large on the basis of the planted acreage had it not been for heavy insect damage.

AREA

About two-thirds of the cotton is produced under irrigation in the vicinity of Baghdad and Kut on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. These two areas, together with three or four other smaller ones, account for about 88 per cent of production. Some 10 to 12 per cent is produced in Northern Iraq, mostly around Mosul, and about 2 per cent in Southern Iraq, from Basra north along the river.

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[49] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

Iraq hopes to expand the cotton area greatly, especially in the northern sections where the winters are cold enough to kill the insects. Here there are millions of acres, suitable from the standpoint of soil and temperature, which could be used for cotton if the available water is utilized for irrigation to supplement rainfall of 10 to 15 inches. The few protected valleys with rainfall high enough to permit cotton production without irrigation are small in total area. 248

The northern areas are now sparsely populated and expansion of cultivation is expected to be under complete mechanization. The government is planning to buy a cotton picker for experimental purposes, looking toward the possibility of using them in this area later, after the proposed irrigation facilities are constructed.

Expansion doubtless will depend on the rapidity and extent of the irrigation development.

YIELDS

Historical data on yields are sketchy and not too dependable. These records indicate a prewar range by years from 80 to over 300 pounds of lint per acre and postwar yields from 67 to 180 pounds per acre. The large variations are attributed to insect damage. This was the case in 1951 when the yield averaged about 135 pounds.

Yields at the cotton experiment stations also vary greatly from a little over 100 pounds to as much as a bale and a half. The average is about half a bale per acre. Experiment station specialists insist that their yields are from two to four times higher than those on private farms in the area.

VARIETIES

During the twenties a cotton called Mezo-White, developed in Iraq from a strain of an American Upland called Weber 49, was generally planted, but about 1930 it was supplanted by Rogers Acala. Some reports say the seed of the Acala cotton is badly mixed and both the yield and the staple have deteriorated. Pure seed is available out of the selections from the original Acala, and planting of the so-called "old" Acala is now prohibited by law. This law, however, is not completely effective. 248 242

Several new upland varieties now are being grown experimentally, and some look very promising, especially Coker Wilt from which pure seed is,now being distributed. The new Acala strains and the Coker cottons are said to staple about $1\frac{1}{32}$ inches as a rule and run up to $1\frac{1}{8}$ inches under very favorable conditions. In 1951-52 about 90 per cent of the crop was Rogers Acala and 10 per cent Coker.

A small quantity of an indigenous Asiatic *herbaceum* called Levantine is still planted primarily for local use by the farmers for wadding and padding, and there is some interest in trying to improve the seed.

CULTURAL PRACTICES

Formerly the tenants prepared the land with primitive ploughs, but now practically all the cotton fields and most of the wheat fields are prepared with tractors which are either owned by the sheiks or rented from the govern- 248

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ment. The land is usually broken dry with large mould board ploughs, pulled with heavy-duty track tractors, which is an expensive operation. The heavy dry base and the lack of humus cause the soil to break up into very large clods which then have to be cut down with large disk harrows pulled back and forth a number of times across the fields, resulting in a substantial addition to preparation costs. It has been suggested that pre-irrigation before ploughing would greatly improve seed bed preparation and reduce power costs. This suggestion may be adopted after its practicability has been tested. This is another example of the need for research in cultural practices, especially in the use of new mechanical equipment.

In spite of the heavy machinery used almost entirely in pre-planting operations, hand labor is employed to ridge the land into rows 35 to 40 feet long, about a foot high, 9 inches wide, and about 3.5 feet apart. (The practice of broadcasting on flat beds is being discontinued.) A pre-planting irrigation is given by flooding the furrows between the ridges. Then seed, which has been soaked overnight to enhance germination, is planted by hand, about five seeds to the hill with the hills about seven to nine inches apart. The seed is planted on the south side of the ridge where it is thought it will be more protected and warmer during the germination period.

Immediately after planting, cotton is given a shallow irrigation; about fifteen days later a full irrigation; and is then watered every 10 days to 2 weeks until the bolls open. This method gives the cotton from 12 to 20 irrigations, an average of six acre-inches per irrigation or a total of from 5 to 10 acre-feet. The idea seems to be prevalent that heavy irrigations help to wash the salt from the roots of the plants. On the contrary, irrigation engineers have pointed out that just the opposite occurs, since a heavy input of water raises the water table and causes the salt to rise to the top. United States agronomists in Iraq are of the opinion that the excessive water causes

Photo Courtesy of E. R. Collier

In Iraq, as in the other arid countries where cotton is produced, seed cotton and cottonseed are often stored in bags in the gin yards.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

the plants to vegetate without setting squares and bolls and that it also 248 increases the period of maturity, making the plants more susceptible to damage by insects late in the season. This is simply another of many problems in cotton culture which need to be studied carefully if the crop is to be expanded as rapidly as the government hopes.

Cotton usually is thinned to two plants per hill and weeded only about twice. This, together with the heavy irrigations, leaves the patches weedy. Farmers as a rule do very little cultivation except around the plant itself at the time of weeding. Then they try to pull the soil from the top of the ridge to leave the plants in the center.

The equipment used by the tenants themselves is in sharp contrast to the tractors now employed in land preparation. The only tools used in ridging [412] are a pointed spade and a short-handled hoe. This is the same instrument used for planting, thinning, weeding, and the limited amount of cultivation.

Such practices are obviously laborious and time-consuming. One of the United States observers estimated that it takes three women all day to plant a quarter of an acre. Even at the low wage scale, equivalent to 25 cents a day, [465] this costs $3.00 per acre. It would be less expensive to use mechanical equipment, even though the tractor drivers are paid the equivalent of about $1.25 per day, five times as much as common labor.

Complete mechanization may come quickly in the thinly settled new areas of the north, but in the denser, old areas labor is tied to the land in long-

—*Photo Courtesy of E. R. Collier*

In Iraq, as in most of the Middle East, cotton is brought to the gin in large burlap bags, ginned, and pressed into bales weighing between 400 and 500 pounds, when new equipment is used. Gins in Iraq wrap the cotton on all sides and wind a continuous band around the bale.

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248 established tenure systems, and the primitive methods likely will disappear slowly.

Earlier British experiments in the area indicated March 15 to April 15 as the optimum sowing dates, but reports are that cotton usually is planted much later, either because of laxness or because of labor competition with other crops. Some farmers try to get wheat off and then plant cotton, which throws the cotton very late. Cotton planted in April will begin opening in August. The Rogers Acala undergoes a dormant period of several weeks after the first bolls open and then continues to set and mature bolls up to January. About 80 per cent of the cotton is made on what is called this second or late flush. Picking goes on during all this period.

GINNING

248 407 Until a few years ago there were only about four saw gins with 10 stands in the country and no roller gins. The large profits in recent years on the limited number of gins and the general interest in expanding the crop have prompted a rush to buy new equipment. A total of seven gins operated last season, of which three were newly constructed by the Murray Gin Company. This company has sold three more new gins with a total of 16 stands, which are in process of erection. All the new gins are fully equipped with overhead Mitchell cleaner-feeders and one has the new incline cleaner. Not only the equipment but also the buildings, offices, and storage houses are very modern.

All the gins, with one exception, are privately owned. However, the government will buy another small gin for experiment station use in ginning pure seed that is produced on the station's farm. All the gins except one near Mosul are in the Baghdad and Kut areas.

A great deal of hand labor is employed in the storage houses for picking out foreign matter and damaged and immature locks of cotton before ginning. There are reports that as much as 35 per cent of the weight of the seed cotton coming to the gins is taken out as extraneous foreign matter added to increase the weight of the bales. The government is making a strenuous effort to protect the reputation of cotton by encouraging better ginning.

To facilitate transportation, the ginners make a light 400-pound bale covered on six sides in light-weight burlap and bound with a continuous narrow steel band which is simply tucked under at the end instead of buckled. There are no other compresses and the cotton must be exported in the form in which it comes from the gin. This results in a heavy freight charge, since the gin bales have a density of only 16 to 18 pounds.

442 MARKETING

[489] The farmers themselves take the seed cotton in bags to a central market place, usually located at the gins, and sell to merchants. Transportation is scarce. Oftentimes the cotton is carried by the farmer in sacks on his back or his head for miles.

The merchants make little differentiation in price for fiber quality. They do make allowances for foreign matter and moisture which, merchants claim, are added by the farmers in an effort to increase the weight. The merchants gin the cotton for their own account and retain title to the seed and the lint.

The merchandising system can best be described as haphazard. The volume of cotton is small, and merchants handle the cotton along with many

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other commodities. As might be expected in such a situation, the system of classification is limited. The cotton is usually sold on types. Ginners indicate they will buy and sell cotton themselves in the future as in many other countries. 442

The one large cotton spinning mill is putting in its own gin to supply the mill with its requirements of around 15,000 bales annually. This will restrict merchandising to exports unless and until another mill is built.

OIL MILLS 388

There is one oil mill which crushes the largest part of the seed produced. The rest is exported. The capacity of this plant is to be increased and facilities for processing oil products are being added.

EXPORTS 439

Iraq has exported approximately 18,000 bales during each of the past two years, mostly to Germany and Japan, with smaller quantities to Holland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 248

The Director General of Agriculture has promulgated an ambitious 10-year program for increasing cotton production to about 500,000 bales. In time, he believes that on the basis of the available land and water Iraqi production can be boosted to more than a million bales. While admitting his program is ambitious, the Director General appears to be firmly convinced it can be accomplished, given adequate technical assistance. 654

United States agricultural experts with the Point Four Program are inclined to agree that the country's natural resources can support a potential cotton production of this magnitude. The rate of increase, they think, will depend on how effectively the technical resources of the country are organized and applied.

The Director General is highly regarded for his technical as well as his administrative ability and particularly for his driving force. He is especially well qualified to direct the cotton improvement program, having graduated in cotton agronomy from Texas A. & M. College.

Long-Range

For long-range improvements he is depending on the agricultural research agencies now being organized to develop better varieties, more effective irrigation and cultural practices, better insect control techniques, and improved methods of classification and marketing. Still in the planning stages, the research program has done some fairly effective work, especially on variety selection, propagation, and fertilization.

Insect Control

One of the main research problems is the control of insects. The government estimates that 75 per cent of the 1951 cotton crop was destroyed by insects, principally by the spiney bollworm, *Earis insulana* (Boisd.), a white fly that attacks the leaves, and by aphids. Fortunately, the Director said, the pink bollworm has not made its appearance in the country. Experiments are 242

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for centuries, and farmers have depended on the silt deposited from the overflows to maintain the fertility. Increased use of canals and dams for irrigation has made the overflows less frequent. Experiments conducted for the past three or four years with commercial fertilizers have shown no significant benefit, but the United States experts feel the tests are not conclusive and should be continued with various soil conditioners.

While depending on basic research to stimulate long-range production, the Director General is trying to force an immediate improvement through regulations requiring the application of techniques known to be beneficial.

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Controls

In an effort to concentrate cotton production on the better suited lands and to facilitate insect control, seed control, and other beneficial measures, regulations have been promulgated requiring government permits for all cotton acreage planted. These permits, based primarily on suitability of the soil and availability of water and labor, are issued on the recommendation of local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the enforcement system is inadequate, and it is generally admitted that the regulation is not closely followed, especially in areas where the local sheiks are extremely powerful and are practically a law unto themselves.

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

At the government cotton experimental farm near Baghdad a double-handled board is used to level the high spots in a newly ploughed field. Outside the government farms little leveling is done. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Iraq Government in experiments and demonstrations to improve cotton cultural practices.

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
TURKEY
SYRIA
KEY TO NAMES OF PROVINCES-
1. MOSUL
2. ERBIL
3. KIRKUK
4. SULAIMANIYA
5. DULAIM
6. BAGHDAD
7. DIYALA
8. AL BADIYA ASH SHIMALIYA
9. KARBALA
10. HILLA
11. KUT AL IMARA
12. DIWANIYA
13. AMARA
14. AL BADIYA AL JUNUBIYA
15. MUNTAFIQ
16. BASRA
Each dot represents 1000 bales
Mosul
Greater Zab
Little Zab
Tigris
Euphrates R.
Diyala R.
Baghdad
Kut
Basra
IRAQ
COTTON PRODUCTION
1951
STATUTE MILES
0
50
100
150
NEUTRAL ZONE
KUWAIT
40°
42°
44°
46°
48°
30°
32°
34°
36°

The Ministry also has a program under which pure seed imported from the United States and those propagated on the state farms are distributed free of charge to farmers who have received planting permits and who agree to the variety control. Under this program the government proposes to distribute enough seed to plant most of the area annually for the next five years. Despite this incentive, widespread evasion also is reported. Apparently the farmers still rely on the mixed seed on the theory that if one does not produce another will. (Seed distribution in 1952 was considerably less than in 1951 because of the bad crop last season.) 248 656

The government also has established supervision over all the gins for control of seed distribution to prevent any except approved seed from going back to the farms for planting. Here again enforcement is said to be inadequate.

The mandatory insect control program is another illustration of the effort to force an improvement in cotton, and here again the results have been questionable. 242

The Director General is thinking also of establishing a price stabilization program to lend further encouragement to the promotional programs, but this has not been approved as yet.

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Even the government recognizes the difficulty of enforcing these rather drastic measures in a short period of time against the tradition of complete freedom of action by the landowners. The most significant fact is not that they have not been completely successful in the first few years, but that the measures have been adopted by the government. The trend definitely is toward tighter and tighter control by the government. The outcome likely will depend on how readily the big landlords accept the regimentation and cooperate. If the landlords become convinced that the regulations are to their ultimate economic advantage, they may comply willingly. So in the end the controls may depend on the educational program.

I-I
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[832]

Egypt and Baghdad in a powdered form and employed by Coptic and Arabian women as a strengthening medicine. Before 1914 it was exported in considerable quantities, chiefly to Egypt, as an aphrodisiac. A decoction of the root is sometimes used at Baghdad as a cough cure (G.).

Glycyrrhiza glabra L. (Leguminosae)

ریشه اصل سوس

Rīshah-i-asl-i-sūs (Teh.); Bekh-sus; the root.

رب سوس

Rubb-i-sūs, Asal-alsus; the sweet extract; licorice.

Achundow; Ait.; Boiss. 2: 202; Post 277; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 1: 491.

Field 243, 259; K.B. 319.

The licorice plant is a characteristic and common shrub in the Badghis and Khorasan at an altitude of about 2,000 feet, and occurs also in Baluchistan. The annual shoots grow to 4 feet from enormous underground rootstalks, which are sometimes used as fuel. The nomads at Yezd prepare an extract from these roots. India obtains market supplies of the root and extract from Iran and Sind; it has been suggested that the plant might be cultivated in the North-Western Frontier Province. Throughout Asia, licorice root and its extract, from time immemorial, have been used for cough and chest complaints.

—Licorice root is also given to relieve acute indigestion from eating fruit (H.F.). The plant is said to yield an aphrodisiac (G.).

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Gossypium sp. (Malvaceae)

قطن

Cotton (Qutn, Ar.) is the hair-like cells clothing the seeds of the cotton plant. Specimens of cotton and seeds presented to Field Museum by the Rustam Agricultural Experimental Farm at Hinaidi, Iraq, are:

G. herbaceum L. Iraqi or Indian cotton (Qutn Iraqi); probably indigenous or at least cultivated for many centuries. (Field 6A.)

G. barbadense L. Sea Island cotton. (Field 2A.)

G. hirsutum L. "Mesowhite" (Qutn Amrikani). A derivative of the long-staple American upland cotton. (Field 38 [Iraq]; 8A, 10A, 13A.)

Iraq
824*
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G. mexicanum Tod. Mexican cotton introduced into India in 1804. The seeds yield a copious, woolly floss. (Field 13 [Iraq]; 1A.)

At Rustam Farm the following varieties of cotton are also grown:

(*a*) Rustam No. 65. Field 2A. Origin Iraq.

(*b*) Rustam No. 124. Field 5A, 9A. Origin Punjab, India.

(c) Mosul White. Field 4A. Origin Mosul, Iraq.

(*d*) *G. peruvianum.* Ish-hony. Field 11A, 12A. Origin Egypt.

(*e*) Rustam No. 128. Field 7A. Origin Acala.

Guest (p. 39) records the following information: "*Gossypium* (Malvaceae). Cotton. Qutn (Ar.), Pambuq (Turk.), Lukah (Kurd.), Pambu (Kurd.).

"Iraqi or Indian Cotton, *G. herbaceum* L. (Qutn Iraqi), a well-known, short-stapled type, is probably indigenous or has at least been cultivated in Iraq for many centuries. It is still grown to some extent as a summer crop, especially on the northern plains where springs or streams provide irrigation water. The lint is used chiefly for stuffing. It is the local practice to pick this type of cotton with the boll intact, the dry boll and other rubbish being removed later.

"After the War the Department of Agriculture tried many foreign varieties of cotton and eventually issued seed of 'Mesowhite,' a derivative of the long-stapled American Upland cotton, *G. hirsutum* L. (Qutn Amrikani). A ginnery was erected by the British Cotton Growing Association, who did much to encourage this crop. The cultivation of Mesowhite cotton as an irrigated summer crop rapidly became popular in lower Iraq and after ten years (in 1928) the annual export of cotton exceeded 5,000 bales of 400 pounds each. Since that year the size of the crop has fallen off very rapidly, chiefly owing to the slump in world prices which has discouraged the local farmers. In 1932 the export of bales of cotton from Iraq amounted to only about four hundred. One or two other varieties of American cotton, such as Acala, have done well in trials at Rustam Farm; this is a cotton inferior to Mesowhite but gives a higher yield and ginning percentage.

"Egyptian cottons (Qutn Misri) have also been tried but have not proved successful under local conditions."

I-I

Gypsophila paniculata L. (Caryophyllaceae) 824*

الصابونيه 296

El-sābūniyeh (Ar.); Zuleh (Ham.); Saosafid, Bekh (Ait.); Kundur, Kundusch (Achundow); soap-root. 515

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249 **SPECIAL CROPS**--specialized cultivation of plants not classifiable under the foregoing headings (e.g., cinchona, indigo, oil palm, opium poppy, rubber, sugarcane, tobacco); techniques of planting and harvesting; use of specialized tools and equipment; organization of labor and production; processing prior to shipment or industrial use (e.g., curing, refining, grading); etc. See also:

Manufacture and use of narcotics	27	Rubber industry	383
Confectionery industries	257	Dyes	386
Condiments	263		

research. The Mission recommends that in the future such farms 242
should be used primarily as experimental stations. Seed for distri- 816
bution to farmers could be produced on land surplus to the needs of the experimental stations or on a contract basis under appropriate government supervision on private farms. The Mission suggests that immediate steps be taken to secure a research director to coordinate all existing research and to recruit a gradually expanding staff of full-time research experts consisting partly of foreigners and partly of Iraqis.

These measures will bring about an improvement in agri- 242
culture only very gradually. In the short run they will need to be supplemented by positive financial incentives. Most farmers will probably prove unwilling or unable to invest money or time in the cultivation of fodder crops or the use of fertilizers unless they are convinced through practical experience that such an investment is really worthwhile. In order to induce farmers to experiment themselves, the government may wish to consider providing free seed for fodder crops and defraying part of the cost of fertilizer, or, alternatively, making a flat money payment per donum to those undertaking to use fertilizers or grow feed. Such incentives should, of course, be offered only as long as is necessary to demonstrate the value of improved methods. The provision of credit for the acquisition of machinery, fertilizers and other means of production will also be helpful in this respect.

It has already been pointed out that the existing sharecropping 242
system, coupled with the shifting nature of cultivation, militates 427
against the introduction of soil-building and forage crops. Under present conditions the landlord will find it difficult to compel the fellah to grow such crops unless the fellah is actually paid for doing so. The Mission therefore suggests that the difficulties inherent in the sharecropping system, as well as the advisability of changes in this system, be studied by an expert on land tenure.

Tobacco and the Tobacco Monopoly

The Mission has paid special attention to tobacco, not only 249
because cultivation of this crop is of considerable importance to the 655
Kurdish farmers of the North, but also because tobacco leaf is

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

249 handled by a government monopoly, the operations of which have
665 been highly controversial.

The Tobacco Monopoly was established in 1939 in order (1) to improve the quality of tobacco, (2) to assure farmers stable and remunerative prices, and (3) to raise revenue for the government, although this objective was not explicit and was certainly subordinate to the other two. The Monopoly licenses the area which may be planted to tobacco, buys the tobacco produced thereon at fixed prices set each year and resells it to manufacturers at prices more than twice as high as those it pays.

It is generally recognized that the first objective has not been realized, for the quality of tobacco, which was never high, has probably declined still further. Neither the Monopoly nor the Department of Agriculture has had the personnel to assist farmers in improving the varieties or strains of tobacco grown or the methods of cultivating, picking, curing and sorting, all of which leave much to be desired. The Monopoly's rather haphazard and often arbitrary system of grading and its limitation on the amount of tobacco it will buy per licensed donum have discouraged the production of better quality tobacco and the achievement of higher yields. Storage of tobacco in inadequate warehouses contributes further to its deterioration.

The second objective appears to have been at least partly realized, at least insofar as farmers have been given remunerative prices for their tobacco and have received a fairly stable income in the last five years. During the war years farmers enjoyed a bonanza since the Monopoly had no effective limitations on output, classified most of the tobacco in top grades and bought it at very high prices. After the war, changes in grading, stricter limitations on output and lower prices inevitably created discontent, although prices were still remunerative and, until recently, the Monopoly continued to buy more tobacco than the licensed output. The wide disparity between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices has continued, however, to put a premium on the illicit growing and marketing of tobacco. Moreover, the merchant has managed to interpose himself to an increasing extent between the grower and the Monopoly because of his ability to advance money on crops, to transport tobacco to distant collection centers and to obtain a

higher classification for the tobacco than the grower is often able to get.

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The third objective has undoubtedly been achieved. During the period September 1, 1943 to March 31, 1950 the Monopoly's cash income exceeded its cash expenditures by almost 6.5 million dinars. In fact, contrary to original intentions, revenue would seem to have become the primary objective of the Monopoly.

Improvement in the quality of tobacco should be the primary aim in the future. The Mission therefore suggests that one or two foreign experts, together with a number of Iraqis, be engaged to work in the field in order to help farmers to better their methods of growing, picking, curing and sorting tobacco. At least one expert should be recruited to instruct graders in proper methods of classifying tobacco, and another expert with an Iraqi deputy should be appointed to approve all tobacco for final purchase by the Monopoly. The existing inadequate warehouses should be replaced by four or five new warehouses provided with dust extracting facilities and proper humidifying equipment.

The Mission believes that under existing circumstances the Monopoly should be retained. As long as the tobacco is not of such quality that it can be marketed abroad, there will need to be some agency to limit production. Moreover, in the absence of the Monopoly the large number of small growers would have inadequate bargaining power in the fixing of prices vis-a-vis the merchants and manufacturers. The Mission advises strongly, however, against the proposed extension of the Monopoly to the manufacture of tobacco products. Such a step seems hardly necessary, since manufacturing is generally in competent hands, and it would only divert the Monopoly's attention from the primary task of improving the quality of the tobacco. The Mission suggests that the Monopoly be reorganized as a fiscally autonomous agency within the Ministry of Agriculture recommended elsewhere in the report. The Monopoly should be headed by an Iraqi director-general assisted by an expert adviser and an advisory board which would include representatives of the growers. In order to discourage illicit marketing of tobacco, the difference between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices should be narrowed to an amount sufficient to cover operating costs and depreciation as well as the accumulation

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655 249 of a small cash reserve. The resulting loss in revenue can be offset by an increase in the tobacco excises which are relatively easy to collect from the manufacturers. The reduction in illicit production and marketing thus achieved should make it possible to raise the existing limitation on output per donum. This would encourage the better farmers, yet probably would not necessitate a further restriction of the licensed area, which the Mission realizes would be politically impracticable.

The Introduction of Sugar

249 [439] In view of the government's desire to introduce the cultivation of sugar beets in northern Iraq, this subject has also been given special attention by the Mission. The possibility merits serious consideration because Iraq has imported over the last three years, on the average, 75,000 tons of sugar annually. There is, in addition, a serious need for new crops to diversify production and make more effective use of the manpower on the land. The Mission believes, however, that no decision on the production of sugar should be made until there is reasonable assurance that sugar can be produced at a cost competitive with the landed price of imported sugar (thus exclusive of import duty) and that the farmer will derive an income from sugar at least equal to that obtained from alternative crops, such as cotton, which can be grown on the same land. Moreover, before a decision is made in favor of sugar beets, the superiority of this crop over sugar cane, which could be grown in the South, must have been clearly established.

Sugar beets have been successfully grown in northern Iraq in test plantings carried out by the Department of Agriculture. Larger and more extensive test plantings are necessary, however, particularly to study the problems of insect control, yields and costs. The problems of labor supply and transport also need to be more thoroughly explored. The cultivation, transport and processing of sugar beets require close coordination and therefore careful organization. The production of beets is exacting, requiring considerable skill and labor. While preliminary evidence indicates that, on the basis of current price relationships, the yield per donum of sugar beets and cotton would not be significantly different, the balance of advantage may well prove to be on the side of cotton since, owing

to the greater amount of labor required for sugar beets, a single 249 family can probably cultivate a larger area in cotton. Up to the present, tests have not found a variety of sugar cane adapted to Iraq, but both the methods and the scale of the experiments have not been adequate enough to prove conclusive. If further experimentation does result in the discovery of a well- adapted variety, the production of cane may be preferable since cane yields are generally higher than beet sugar yields and cane production requires less skill. Moreover, the farmers in Amara in southern Iraq, where cane would be grown, are at least as much in need of a new crop as those in the North.

The Mission therefore believes that further investigation and experimentation over the next few years are required before a sound decision can be reached on the production of sugar. For this purpose it suggests that two experts be engaged to direct further research, one in beet and the other in sugar cane. During the period of experimentation it may also be desirable to invite a leading foreign sugar company, acquainted with the production and processing of both beet and cane, to make a study and recommendations on the best way of organizing the cultivation and processing of sugar.

Production Credit and Marketing

A considerable increase in farm income could ultimately be 452 achieved through the provision of more ample agricultural credit, the establishment of storage facilities for crops and the organization of cooperatives.

The resources of the state-owned Agricultural Bank, the only 452 agricultural credit institution, are insufficient to meet existing needs 453 for credit. In many cases farmers must either borrow money from private lenders at exorbitant rates of interest or sell their crops in advance of the harvest at substantial discounts. Although the Bank has an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000, the government has paid in only ID 550,000 and the Bank has been compelled to borrow ID 300,000 to supplement its slender resources. In November 1949 the Bank was forced to suspend lending except for small amounts and not until a year later was it able to resume credit operations on a modest scale. It is vital that farmers be

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reason the cultivation of more cotton as well as such crops as linseed and sunflower seed will be important to the livestock economy. 248

Sugar Beets and Cane

The value of beet tops and pulp for livestock feeding might 249 also be regarded as one of the principal reasons for introducing the cultivation of sugar beets. Similarly, one of the advantages of cane sugar might be the production of molasses which could also be used for livestock feed. These have been, of course, subordinate considerations in the minds of those who have advocated these crops for Iraq. The principal consideration has been to produce at [439] home the sugar now imported in a volume which averaged 75,000 tons per year in the three-year period 1948 to 1950.

Undoubtedly sugar beets could be cultivated in the northern provinces of Suleimaniya and Mosul and sugar cane in the South, particularly in Amara. The real question is, however, whether either or both of these crops could be grown economically and on a scale large enough to warrant the necessary investment in processing plant. It must be decided whether cane or beet is preferable and whether either of them can compete with cotton for the available land, water and labor. The data available at present do not make it possible to arrive at sound decisions on these questions.

Test plots grown over 10 years indicate that there are several varieties of beet well adapted to Iraq and capable of reasonably high yields in terms of sugar. Experiments on cane sugar production at Abu Ghuraib, Basra and Amara have yielded much less favorable results, although one variety under test held some promise of furnishing sugar at an economic cost. The experiments, however, have not been conducted in a way and on a scale that would permit a satisfactory conclusion. If further experiments prove the feasibility of growing cane, it is likely to be a more economic crop than sugar beet. Experience elsewhere demonstrates that cane yields are generally higher and that the production of cane is less difficult and less demanding of skilled and semi-skilled labor than that of sugar beets. It is suggested therefore that further experiments on a larger scale be undertaken under appropriate expert guidance. In each of the possible beet sugar areas five or more 10-donum plantings might be tried. Special attention

0249 should be paid to the effect of fertilizers on yields and to the possibility of insect and disease damage. A careful record should be kept of production costs. Similar large scale experiments with sugar cane would have to be initiated at Amara on a comparable basis. A sugar beet expert should be engaged to direct research at Abu Ghuraib, with assistants at the Bakrajo and Nineveh substations. Another expert would be needed to take charge of the experimental work on cane. Both men would have to be given a sufficient field force to carry out the manual labor involved.

These field experiments should be supplemented by an economic inquiry into requirements for labor, farm equipment and transport and into comparative costs of production. In this connection the cost of producing cotton on the same land would have to be investigated. The value of the yield per donum, taking into account the by-products, would need to be compared on the basis of existing price relationships as well as the factors which may affect that relationship in the future. For example, it might be concluded that in the longer run the demand for cotton, and therefore its price, would be better maintained, especially in the sterling area. In any comparison of yields it would be necessary not only to consider the output per unit of area but also the area which an average family could be expected to cultivate in the particular crop. Thus it is probable that one family could grow a larger area in cotton than in sugar beets because the latter demand more labor, particularly heavy labor that could be performed only by adults. Finally, there must be a reasonable assurance that sugar can be produced and sold at a price which will prove competitive with that of imported sugar less the import duty.

III. Observations on Existing Crops

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No attempt is made in this monograph to comment on every crop grown in Iraq. Many crops could be improved through the introduction of varieties which are more productive and resistant to insects and disease. Only an adequate research and extension service, to which reference will be made later, will be able to capitalize on the many potentialities for improvement. Here, only a few of the more important crops are singled out for special mention.

varieties of pistachio scions on established native pistachio trees 245
should be given particular attention. Almond orchards could be increased to advantage.

Vegetables and Potatoes

Vegetable culture is concentrated in the neighborhood of the 244
large cities where such products as radishes, lettuce, cabbage, cucumbers, 369
squash, tomatoes and others are in good supply during the season. Unfortunately vegetables do not figure prominently in the [262]
diet of most people. Outside of the big towns little or no vegetables are eaten. In part, this appears to be due to the fact that tribal tradition holds the cultivation of vegetables in low esteem. However, where the sharecropper is inclined to grow vegetables, he may be discouraged by the lack of available land or the shifting of the area assigned to him for cultivation. If a determined effort were made by the government to enlist the cooperation of the landowners, it might not be too difficult to overcome these obstacles.

It might be desirable to increase the production of potatoes 244
which are now imported to the value of about ID 100,000 per year. The lighter soils along the large streams in the provinces of Mosul, Erbil and Suleimaniya are particularly well adapted to the production of both Irish and sweet potatoes. With proper guidance in cultural practices and the use of fertilizers, planters in these areas could easily supply the country's needs. If it is demonstrated that potato yields compare favorably with other crops, the government might well encourage the planting of potatoes both by launching an educational campaign and by furnishing the necessary seed to planters. Special attention will need to be given to transport, however, and the growers will have to be shown how to build inexpensive potato bins or pits with sufficient ventilation, insulation and accessibility.

Tobacco

Tobacco has been grown to some extent in the North for centuries, 249
although it was not until the last few decades that its production 655
assumed importance. Even now, the value of the tobacco crop is probably no more than a tenth of that of wheat or barley. In the mountainous areas of Erbil and Suleimaniya, however, it is)

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249 the principal crop of the Kurdish farmers. Moreover, the way in
655 which tobacco has ~~been~~ bought, sold and handled by the government Monopoly has created much controversy. At the same time the Monopoly's operations have yielded considerable profits to the Treasury. Finally, the government is hopeful of expanding the production of tobacco, which is at present grown only for home consumption, so that it will make a significant contribution to exports. For all these reasons tobacco has become an important and controversial subject.

The purchase and sale of raw tobacco and tombak was vested in the government by law No. 35 of 1939. This legislation also instituted government licensing of the manufacturing, importation, wholesaling and retailing of cigarettes and controls over the importation of cigarette paper, boxes and other requisites for the manufacture of cigarettes. Operation of the Monopoly was at first entrusted to the Customs Department but in 1943 it was transferred to a separate Directorate-General within the Ministry of Economics. The original law did not detail the objectives of the Monopoly beyond specifying that "one of its main objectives shall be the improvement of tobacco." Apparently, however, other objectives were (1) to assure the cultivators fixed and remunerative prices for their tobacco, and (2) to raise revenue for the government.

Quality of Tobacco

The principal objective of the Monopoly has certainly not been achieved. In fact, it is generally recognized that the quality of tobacco has deteriorated rather than improved during its existence. The reasons for this are many. First of all, neither the Monopoly nor the Department of Agriculture has given farmers any assistance in improving their crop even though the cultivation, picking and curing of tobacco require considerable knowledge and skill which has been largely lacking in Iraq. The tobacco now grown is a mixture of several varieties not at all uniform in type, time of maturity or quality. Instead of picking the leaves individually starting at the bottom of the stem, the whole plant is frequently harvested at once. Curing is haphazard, with immediate exposure of the leaves to the sun instead of retaining them in a wilting shed

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for three or four days. In packing and grading, growers do not 249
separate the bottom, middle and top leaves or take care that pack- 655
ing takes place only when the moisture content and the pliability of
the leaves are just right.

The second reason for the poor quality is inadequate grading
and manipulation by the Monopoly. Tobacco is graded for the
Monopoly by committees whose members are generally untrained.
Classification is by color only and a bale given a single grade often
has tobacco ranging through all shades of green, yellow and brown.
Influential cultivators, or merchants acting on their behalf, can
often obtain grades for their tobacco unwarranted by its merits.
Thus the grading system offers little or no incentive to the grower
to produce the best possible tobacco. Finally, the Monopoly stores
tobacco under conditions which contribute to its rapid deteriora-
tion. Warehouses are often exposed to the elements and are with- [488]
out temperature and humidity control so that tobacco may alter-
nately ferment and dry out. Little re-grading or manipulation is
done in warehouses.

Farmer Income from Tobacco

Whether the Kurdish farmers have on the whole obtained an 249
adequate income from tobacco is less easy to determine. Their 435
income from tobacco has depended on (1) the amount of tobacco 655
purchased from each year's crop by the Monopoly and the prices
(less *istihlak* and land tax) paid, and (2) the amount of tobacco
sold illicitly and the prices realized thereon. Unfortunately, not
enough data are available to permit an estimate of the income of
tobacco farmers. Data on prices paid by the Monopoly for the first
three years of its operation are lacking; figures on total tobacco
production, from which the amount marketed illicitly might be
deduced, do not exist; and little or nothing is known about the
prices realized on tobacco marketed illegally.

During the war the Monopoly, which was supposed to equate the supply of tobacco with demand by licensing the area under cultivation, apparently made no real effort to use licensing as an instrument for the restriction of production. The area licensed rose steadily from 28,014 donums in 1940 to a peak of 71,730 in 1944. In the period 1943-45 the income of farmers was also considerably

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increased by classifying a much larger proportion of their output as "extra" or "first" grades which, of course, fetched higher prices. At the same time the Monopoly boosted the prices paid for the 1944 crop to a level more than twice as high as those which had prevailed for the 1943 crop. For the 1945 crop it lowered its prices somewhat but still maintained them at a level approximately twice as high as in 1943. As a result the Kurdish farmers reaped a bonanza. Whereas the Monopoly paid only ID 634,005 for the 1943 crop, it disbursed ID 3,208,032 for the 1944 crop and ID 3,608,997 for the 1945 crop (see table).

TABLE 1

LICENSING AND PURCHASING OPERATIONS OF THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY

Year	Donums Licensed	Prices Paid for Each Grade (1943 = 100)				Total Purchases	
		Extra	First	Second	Third	Quantity (kg)	Value (dinars)
1943	57,747	100	100	100	100	4,080,787	634,005
1944	71,730	247	233	229	250	8,863,022	3,208,032
1945	34,797	210	198	194	211	12,582,734	3,608,997
1946	26,818	140	151	183	214	4,395,166	746,499
1947	19,225	154	167	202	236	4,231,320	757,152
1948	15,500	140	151	183	214	4,347,639	772,729
1949	15,500	140	151	183	214	6,621,905	1,326,291
1950	16,000	140	151	183	214	n.a.	n.a.

Beginning in 1946 the Monopoly began to retrench sharply. The area licensed was reduced successively to 19,225 donums in 1947 and 15,500 in 1948, and it has since been held to approximately this level. Prices were also lowered to some extent. Most important of all, a stricter grading policy was adopted, resulting since 1946 in the virtual elimination of purchases of the "extra" grade and substantial reduction in the proportion of "first" grade tobacco purchased. As a result the Monopoly's disbursements for purchases from the 1946 crop fell to only ID 746,499. They have since been maintained at approximately this annual level except for the amount paid for the 1949 crop which amounted to ID 1,326,291. The quantity purchased of each year's crop fell from a peak of 12,600,000 kilograms in 1945 to about 4,400,000 in 1946,

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4,200,000 in 1947, 4,300,000 in 1948, and rose again to 6,600,000 249
in 1949. Actually, the Monopoly by no means fully enforced its 435
announced policy of buying no more than the maximum amount 655
that the licensed area could ostensibly produce.[4] Its purchases exceeded the ostensible maximum by about 400,000 kilos for the 1947 crop, 1,200,000 for the 1948 crop and as much as 3,500,000 for the 1949 crop. Much of the 1946, 1947 and 1948 crops evidently found their way into the black market.

Because of the danger of growing stocks, the Director-General, supported by the Prime Minister, issued a warning in advance of the 1950 crop that in the future no more tobacco would be bought than could be produced on the licensed area. Evidently the Monopoly carried out this policy for, up to April 12, 1951, it had bought only 2,250,000 kilos from the 1950 crop out of a theoretical total of 3,200,000 kilos. Since the cultivators apparently did not take the government's declared intention seriously, the actual crop substantially exceeded the permissible total. However, farmers were apparently compelled to sell their surplus illicitly at very low prices, thus giving rise to an expectation that in the next years the limitation on production will be more generally observed. If so, it seems likely that farmers' receipts from tobacco will amount to between ID 600,000 and ID 700,000 per year at prevailing Monopoly prices.

In general, it can probably be said that farmers received more for their tobacco than they would have obtained in the absence of the Monopoly. Since the tobacco produced is generally poor and therefore is unable to find foreign outlets, it is likely that, in the absence of the Monopoly's price support and production control program, prices would have been substantially lower. At the same time, the farmers suffered from the rather erratic policies of the Monopoly which permitted them to realize very high incomes during some of the war years and let them down suddenly immediately after the war.

Tobacco Monopoly Revenues

The government has undoubtedly enjoyed considerable income 651
from the Monopoly. In any discussion of this subject a distinction 655

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[4] The Monopoly has operated on the assumption that each licensed donum would produce up to a maximum of 200 kg. of tobacco.

accrued despite rather inefficient operation because the Monopoly 651
has consistently charged tobacco manufacturers prices two to two 655
and a half times higher than those it paid for tobacco and it has been able to compel them to accept tobacco at the grade which it has specified, despite the marked deterioration of such tobacco in the Monopoly's warehouses.

Recommendations

In the future the first concern should be improvement in the 249
quality of tobacco. To accomplish this it would be desirable first of all to recruit abroad at least two or three experts on the growing of tobacco. These, assisted by a selected number of Iraqis, would work directly with the growers in a campaign to raise the standards of cultivation, picking and curing. In addition, a minimum of two leaf experts should be engaged to give instruction in the proper methods of grading or classifying tobacco. In order to provide a check on the work of the grading committees, the appointment of an expert buyer to approve all tobacco for final purchase by the Monopoly is recommended. He would presumably need to be a foreigner initially, but would have an Iraqi deputy who would be trained to take his place. In the warehouses, several experienced foremen-manipulators are needed to supervise and teach the staff correct methods of handling and storing the tobacco. The inadequate existing warehouses should be replaced with four to five new ones constructed of brick and concrete, equipped with dust extracting and humidifying plant and portable storage racks. Each of these new warehouses would have four floors, the first three devoted to storage and the fourth to manipulation.

The Monopoly itself might be retained, principally because 249
there will need to be some agency to limit production as long as 655
the tobacco is not of such quality that it can readily be sold abroad. Moreover, the large number of small tobacco growers might otherwise be at the mercy of the merchants and manufacturers who would have incomparably more bargaining power in the fixing of prices. It is suggested, however, that the Monopoly be reorganized into a financially autonomous agency with its own budget, its own accounts and its own funds. As an autonomous government enterprise it would be required to turn over annually to the Treasury

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its profits, less a suitable reserve, determined in accordance with approved accounting practice. An expert accountant should be engaged to draw up a proper system of accounting for the agency. In this connection it would be desirable to revalue the stocks of the Monopoly realistically after destroying inferior and excessively deteriorated tobaccos. The Monopoly would be headed, as at present, by a Director-General who might usefully be assisted by an adviser of recognized competence in the production and handling of tobacco. It would be desirable also to have an advisory board on which both manufacturers and growers could be represented.

The existing wide disparity between the buying and selling prices of the Monopoly provides a powerful incentive to illicit production and marketing of tobacco. The Mission strongly urges that this differential be greatly narrowed to a point where it is sufficient only to cover the expenditures of the Monopoly, plus a reasonable reserve. The revenue lost in this way could be collected in the form of additional excises on the manufacturers whose output and sales can be controlled relatively easily.

The present limitation on the amount of tobacco which the Monopoly will purchase from each licensed donum discourages productivity and should accordingly be lifted. This would not necessarily mean a further contraction of the licensed area, for the curtailment of black marketing resulting from the reduction of the difference between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices should enable the Monopoly to buy and sell more tobacco.

The Mission believes it would be very unwise to adopt current proposals to extend the Monopoly's operations to the manufacture of tobacco products. The remedy for the poor quality of tobacco does not lie in government assumption of manufacturing operations. The present manufacturers turn out a reasonably good product considering the quality of their materials. Their production costs are also likely to compare favorably with those that could be achieved with government operation.

Field 3 (Inf.), 423; W.H.M.M. 150745. I-I

The above plant, growing in the alpine Himalayas, yields the Nardus root or spikenard of the ancients. The rhizome is short, thick, and dark gray, crowned by a bundle of strong fibers called by the natives "Devil's hair." The odor resembles valerian, and yields about 1 per cent of volatile oil containing valerianic acid. The physiological action is similar to that of valerian root, and the drug is administered for nervous disorders.—Prepared like tea it is given for heart diseases (H.F.). 278* 824*

Nepeta micrantha Bunge and N. ispahanica Boiss. (Labiatae)

زوفا

Zūfā, Zūnā (Teh.); Zufah-i-yabis (Ar.); the flowering herb.

Boiss. 4: 166; Achundow; Ph. Ind. 3: 116.

Field 23; W.H.M.M. 150733; K.B. 327.

Zufah is a fragrant plant used since primitive times as a carminative in the East. It has often been referred to as hyssop, but recent examinations have shown it to be *Nepeta*. Dymock found the Zufah of Sind to be *N. ciliaris* Benth., while the plant of that name in Baluchistan is *N. bracteata* Benth. Two specimens from Tehran consist of the fruiting calyx, flowers, and seeds. The calyx is erect, green, with purplish, acute teeth. The seeds are oblong, brown, 1 mm. in length, with a white, V-shaped scar at the end. They are mucilaginous when placed in water and are given for influenza and catarrh.—As an aromatic mint a cold infusion is prescribed for pain in the chest (H.F.).

Nicotiana Tabacum L. and N. rustica L. (Solanaceae) 824*

توتون 276

Tūtūn (Iraq); Tambaku, Tumaku; N. rustica=Turkomani tambaku (Afg.); tobacco leaves.

Field 89 (Iraq); 18, 23.

Tobacco is cultivated in northeastern Iran for local consumption as well as for local trade. It is an expensive crop there, as the fields must be heavily manured and require careful irrigation. The leaf is frequently treated with gur or crude sugar to moisten and add weight to the leaf. Beside being smoked, it is extensively used as an errhine or snuff (Nashwar). This is sometimes mixed with powdered ashes of *Ephedra pachyclada* Boiss., Huma (Gnetaceae) to render it more pungent. Two samples of snuff are noticed in the collection: [249]

1-I

324* بهار نارنج

278* *Flowers:* Bahār-i-nāranj, "spice of orange" (Teh.); Naphae flores (Schl.); neroli.

Ph. Ind. 1: 270.

Field 219; W.H.M.M. 150778; K.B. 309.

The dried flowers of the cultivated orange are sold in bazaars and recommended as a stimulant and to prevent dysentery. Schlimmer refers to Aqua fiorum aurantii or Aqua naphae as a favorite flavoring agent. The oil contains a nitrogenous substance of exceeding fragrance, anthanilic acid methyl-ester.

برک نارنج

Leaves: Barg-i-nāranj (Isf.).

Field 429.

Among other uses, the leaves of the orange tree are applied to reduce swollen legs.—For this purpose they are sometimes mixed with *Taxus baccata* L., orange seeds, bitter cane, and hemlock fruits (H.F.).

خلال نارنج

Orange peel: Khalal-i-nāranj, Pust-i-utruj (Teh.); the peel or pericarp in thin shreds.

Field 153; W.H.M.M. 150804, 150896.

[263] Orange peel is an ingredient in the preparation of tincture of cinchona and tincture of gentian. In domestic cookery in Iran it gives a flavor to boiled rice and other vegetables.

• [251] Post-i-nāranj is the fruit which, cut in two and dried in the sun, is sold in the bazaars.

هسته نارنج

Seeds: Hastah-i-nāranj (Teh.).

Field 431.

Orange seeds or pips are bitter. They are first torrefied to remove the husks, and are taken as a stimulating remedy.

Colchicum luteum Baker and C. speciosum Stev. (Liliaceae)

سورنجان کرمانی

Surinjān-i-kirmānī (Teh.); Surinjān-i-talkh (Pers.); Hermodactyl, "the finger of Hermes" (Gr.); the corms.

Achundow; Ph. Pers.; Boiss. 5: 155; Schl.; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 3: 496.

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[For information pertaining to Iraqi recipes and food preparation see 70: Rowland, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 135-174.]

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Iraq MH1

I-I

824 * (4) Mangel-wurzel should succeed in Kurdistan.

278 * (5) Wild beets, known as Silaijah or Silaigah.

Boswellia Carterii Bird. (Burseraceae)

کندر

Kundur (Teh.); Seta Kundura (Hind.); frankincense or olibanum.

Field 199.

[314] There are several kinds of this fragrant oleo-gum-resin found in commerce. Kundura zakara, "male frankincense," is in reddish or deep yellow, circular tears; Kundura unsa, "female frankincense," is in yellowish white translucent or pale tears; Kisher Kundur or Dhupa of the bazaars occurs in scaly pieces of the bark coated with the exudation.—Olibanum is used chiefly as incense; it is an ingredient in plasters; a dose of half a misqal (35 grains) is said to improve the memory (H.F.).

Brassica campestris L. var. Napus Bab. (Cruciferae)

تخم شلغم

Tukhm-i-shalgham (Teh.); Sarsun (Hind.); rape or colza seed.

Field 54 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150856.

• [252] [373] This is an important crop in India and elsewhere, cultivated chiefly for its seed. Rape seeds are small, brownish or reddish brown, 2 mm. in diameter, smooth. They yield by expression a bland oil used as an emollient and in cooking and lighting.

Brassica (Sinapis) nigra (L.) Koch, and B. alba Rabenh. (Cruciferae)

خردل

Khardal.

[263] Mustard, now a widespread weed, is of Eurasian origin. The powdered seeds are an important condiment, used in curries, and medicinally in the preparation of poultices and plasters. Mustard is taken internally as an emetic in cases of narcotic poisoning (G.).

Butea frondosa Roxb. (Leguminosae)

برگ هند ایران

Barg-i-hind īrān, Parakeh-i-hindī (Teh.); Palaspapado (Duk.); Palas Keby (Hind.); seeds of bastard teak or Bengal kino tree.

Field 181; W.H.M.M. 150818.

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Iraq MN1

I-I
824*
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in more northern countries. The fruit is composed of fine, slender, angular carpels twisted like corkscrews, which together form a cone 3.5 to 5 cm. long. The carpels are pubescent and greenish brown, and each one contains a single row of dark brown, angular seeds.

The drug has demulcent and slightly astringent properties, and is employed as a medicine for dysentery and for griping of bowels and flatulence in children.

Heracleum persicum Desf. (Umbelliferae)

گل سپر

Gul-i-sipar (Teh.); Gul-i-parr (Isf.); Goleper (Kerm.); Giafari (Schl.); the fruits.

Schl.; Post; Boiss. 2: 1044.

Field 434; W.H.M.M. 150779; K.B. 320.

This species of cow parsnip is indigenous to the moist valleys of the Elburz Mountains, and is related to *H. pubescens* M.B., of a wider range. Boissier refers the plant Goulpere to *H. lasiopetalum*. The fruits, which are sold as a spice and used in pickles, are ovate-oblong, villous on the back, the margin aculeate, the dorsal vittae thick and clavate, reaching to two-thirds the length of the mericarp. While some of these plants are used medicinally and for food, other species in America and Europe are poisonous and produce erysipelatous inflammation (Cormerin, "Des Plantes Vénéneuses," 1887). [263]

Hibiscus cannabinus L. (Malvaceae)

حل جل

Jiljil (Iraq); Hab-el-zalim (Ar.); Palsan (Hind.); Ambari (Duk.); the seeds.

Field 61 (Iraq).

The Deccan hemp plant is grown in western India and the tropics. The seeds are dull grayish brown, triangular or kidney-shaped, 5 by 3 mm. They contain an oil useful for culinary and lubricating purposes. The seeds are used in medicine and as cattle food. [252] • [231]

—*H. Trionum* L., Qunnab, called Jiljil near Basra, yields a bast fiber resembling that of the Deccan (H.F.).

Holarrhena antidysenterica Wall. (Apocynaceae)

میوه زبان کنجشک

Mīvah-i-zabān-i-gunjishk, Tukhm-zabān-i-gunjishk-i-talkh, "the seeds of the bitter sparrow's tongue" (Pers.); Lizan ul asafir (Achundow); Indrajaou (Hind.); Estrefanthus; the seeds.

influence. He would need to work in close cooperation with the proposed abattoir specialist. The Association should also investigate the possibility of using more local materials in the hides and skins industry. Thus local valonia or oak bark might be employed for tanning and locally refined and sulphurated fish oils used in the leather industry. Efforts might also be made to procure better salt at reasonable prices from the government salt works at Fao and to organize more adequate local supplies of date syrup which small tanneries use as a glucose. 281

Casings

Most if not all the casings are obtained from the abattoirs in barrels. Initial cleaning and grading is usually done on the floor which is occasionally washed down with water. The casings examined appeared to be remarkably free of parasitic infection, particularly in the North. More hygienic casings could be produced under more efficient and comfortable working conditions if the work were raised from the floor to zinc-lined tables and improved drainage and piped water supplies were provided in the sections dealing with casings. 253

Other Improvements in Abattoirs

Many abattoir buildings are in need of repair, enlargement and alteration. Improvements such as an impervious floor, better drainage and water supplies can often be effected at small cost. At present abattoir offal is largely wasted even though the amount involved would warrant the installation of modern methods of converting it into glue, bone meal, blood meal, etc. In order to encourage more slaughtering at the government-supervised abattoirs, it might also be desirable to review the taxes assessed at the abattoir which encourage livestock owners to resort to illicit slaughter. 253 348

Wool

The wool collected from the various fat-tailed varieties of sheep makes a good carpet wool and a valuable export product. Little attention is given, however, to good shearing, perhaps because milk rather than wool is considered the main product of the flocks. Shearing is done with crude hand shears. Wool is frequently left on the head and neck region and around the root of 236

256

256 **CEREAL INDUSTRY**--industrialized processing of cereal products (e.g., flour, starch, breakfast foods); storage facilities (e.g., grain elevators); mills and bakeries; technology and special equipment; organization of labor and production; etc. See also:

Cereal agriculture	248	Manufacture of milling machinery.	392
Beverage industries	274	Manufacture of bakery equipment	394
Baking ovens	354	Milling machines	402

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

488 452 the farmer to get a fairer share of the price and bring about greater price stability. Even if the merchants primarily used these facilities, the farmer would still benefit indirectly because more merchants would be financially able to compete for his products.

488 256 Grain stores are especially needed. Cotton can at present be stored at ginneries, and the Agricultural Bank is lending money on such cotton. Aside, however, from a 5,000 ton silo at Baghdad, which went into use with the 1951 harvest, the country possesses no modern grain storage facilities. The Grain Board which is charged with responsibility for storage projects is contemplating the construction of a 40,000 ton silo costing about ID 2,145,000 at Basra. This silo would primarily serve the export trade. It would be desirable to supplement these two with a number of smaller stores, less elaborately equipped and located nearer the centers of production. Such stores would afford necessary protection against grain pests and also help to mitigate the fear of famine which is ever present in a country with sharply fluctuating harvests. If equipped with simple cleaning plant they would help greatly to improve the quality of the grain. Grain thrashed by hand according to the prevailing custom contains from 15 to 40 percent foreign matter and from 5 to 15 percent dirt. The number, location and size could only be determined after a thorough survey. It is not unlikely, however, that from 12 to 18 such stores with an individual capacity ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 tons and a total capacity of about 75,000 tons would be needed. For the most part they will not have to be mechanized and can consist basically of simple steel or concrete sheds. The total cost would probably not exceed ID 750,000.

[651] Two possible obstacles to the actual utilization of grain storage facilities should be considered. There may be a disinclination to use them for fear of giving the government knowledge of such stocks and thereby exposing them to taxation. Much grain now escapes taxation. To encourage people to take advantage of the stores it may therefore be necessary to reduce substantially or abolish the *istihlak* tax which is a type of sales or turnover tax. Other reasons for abolishing or reducing this tax have already been advanced elsewhere.[14] Another difficulty in the way of using such

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[14] See the Mission's main report, p. 95.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

storage facilities lies in the wide variation in the quality of the grain. Those with better quality grain may refuse to store it except under conditions which will ensure that it will be kept as a separate parcel. While this may be possible in the smaller, non-mechanized sheds, it will be impossible in the silos at Baghdad or Basra. There, however, it will be desirable at least to have means for weighing each parcel of grain after as well as before cleaning. At present there are no such facilities in the Baghdad silo and none are apparently contemplated for the Basra silo. Under such conditions there will be a premium on the storage of grain with a large percentage of foreign matter. Those with relatively clean grain harvested by combines will, on the other hand, refuse to use the silos.

If credit is to be extended on grain stored in silos, there must be adequate supervision to insure the issuance of proper warehouse receipts and to prevent the release of any stored grain except against the surrender of such receipts. Presumably any new facilities would be owned and supervised by the Grain Board. This Board, however, would hardly be in the position to finance all the proposed additional facilities. In 1950 the International Bank was approached with respect to the financing of the Basra silo, but now that Iraq is assured ample sterling revenue from oil and only a small part of the necessary expenditures is likely to be in dollars, the government may consider it undesirable to contract a loan for this purpose. Financing by the Development Board would then appear to be the only alternative. The Grain Board might even have difficulty in financing the smaller storage facilities. Although its assets as of March 31, 1951, amounted to ID 1,123,969, over 30 percent or ID 321,113 consisted of "fixed assets" and another item of ID 687,222 designated as "sundry debtors" represented almost entirely a claim on the Treasury. Over [651] a number of years the government has levied a one percent tax on grain for the benefit of the Board but it has retained the proceeds provisionally for its own needs. As long as the ordinary budget remains tight, as is likely over the next few years, the government may find it difficult to convert this claim into cash. Under such circumstances the Development Board may find it necessary to give financial assistance for the smaller projects.

sonable. However, the quality of the brick, because of the type of clay available, is rather poor. The demand for brick is easily met by the present highly competitive industry. When, however, the cement plant is enlarged, it will tend to replace brick by offering better and cheaper material in such forms as concrete blocks. In view of this, there does not appear to be any justification for enlarging the brick industry. 339

At present, some tile is made, but it, too, is being replaced by cement.

Milling

Iraq possesses three fairly large flour mills. The older ones are now being modernized with the latest machinery. A very modern mill was recently constructed at Basra, with a capacity of 50 tons per day, for the purpose of making possible the exportation of flour rather than just wheat. So far, a shortage of grain has prevented the mill from operating as planned. When a sufficient supply of grain becomes available, however, the mill will be capable of serving the export market in addition to local requirements. 256

Aluminumware

Aluminumware is very popular. It is now being manufactured in a small plant in Baghdad from imported sheet, which represents more than 70 percent of the production cost of the finished article. Production is limited to about 480 tons per year because of the difficulty in getting aluminum; however, even with an ample supply of material, the present capacity of the plant (600 tons) is only sufficient to meet about one third of the country's requirements. Production costs could be greatly reduced, first, by increasing the capacity of the plant, and second, by installing facilities permitting the utilization of both scrap aluminum and pig. To double the plant's capacity and install equipment to melt and roll scrap and pig would cost approximately ID 200,000, of which ID 175,000 would be foreign exchange, mainly in pounds sterling. These new facilities would require about two years to construct and, when finished, would employ approximately 40 additional workers. 328

in Basra, close to both shipping and the agricultural area which 288
may prove suitable for the growing of jute. It would employ about 300 workers.

Automobile Tires

The importation of automobile and truck tires is increasing 383
at a rate of approximately 15 percent per annum, the value of all [439]
tires imported in 1950 being ID 468,000.

A plant of economic size to manufacture tires could be justified with a market of approximately twice that which now exists. Such a market will probably be reached in 1955. Since it would require approximately two years to construct a tire plant, it is recommended that plans be formulated to start such a plant in 1953.

The plant would be so designed as to utilize the maximum amount of labor and, accordingly, should cost no more than ID 750,000, including foreign exchange of ID 600,000, mainly pounds sterling. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required during the first years of its operation.

Salt

Geophysical work gives conclusive evidence of a very large 135
salt dome near Basra. Unfortunately, the analysis is not known. This dome could be the source of very cheap salt for both export
and domestic consumption. It might make feasible the establish- [385]
ment of an alkali plant, particularly since the nearby oil field would be able to furnish gas as a source of cheap power. It is recommended, therefore, that core drilling of this dome be started as soon as possible to permit a proper evaluation of the possibilities of its use.

Sugar Mill

Considerable thought has been given to the recommendation 257 ●
of a sugar refinery. Such an enterprise would, of course, have to depend on agriculture to supply the raw material, either in the form of sugar beets or sugar cane. Since this cannot be assured at this time, it is recommended that the development of this industry be held in abeyance for the present.

35$_8$ Hooper and Field 8-5 (1834) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MAII

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said to be a tonic medicine and useful as an application for rheumatism and snake bites.

Elettaria Cardamomum Maton. (Zingiberaceae)

هل

Hil (Iraq); Arak or Erok Hail (Bagh.); Ilachi (Hind.): cardamom fruits.

Field 38A, 59 (Iraq).

There are two kinds of cardamoms sold in Iran and Iraq: the small or Malabar cardamom from the above plant, and the great or Nepal cardamom from *Amomum subulatum* Roxb. (q.v.). They are both imported, but the first kind is occasionally cultivated in Iraq in shaded gardens. As a masticatory and for flavoring food, as in curry, the Malabar or small cardamom is preferred by the natives, but the other kind, which is cheaper and of less delicate flavor, is used largely by sweetmeat makers. [263] • [257]

Embelia Ribes Burm. (Myrsinaceae)

برنج كابلى

Birinj-i-kābulī (Teh., Isf.); Berengue Kaboli (Schl.); Baberang (Hind.); the fruits, Embely currants.

Fl. Br. Ind. 3: 513; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 349.

Field 419; K.B. 316.

This shrub grows throughout India, where the berries have long been known as a medicine. Susruta described the anthelmintic properties of the fruits, which were given the Sanskrit name Vrishanasana, "destroyer of enemy (worm)." The drug is referred to in all Mohammedan works of medicine, and its value in removing tapeworm (*Taenia*) in children and adults has been abundantly confirmed. The fruits are globular, dull red, with a 5-parted calyx, and stalked. The outer shell is striated from base to apex, the seed is horny and embedded in reddish brown afflorescence. In 1888 Warden separated the crystalline active principle, embelic acid. Brissemoret in 1907 showed this substance to be an oxyquinone.

Entada gigas (L.) Fawc. & Rendle (Leguminosae)

قرس كمر

Qurs-i-kamar, "nuts for loins" (Teh.); Gila (Beng.); Garabi (Hind.); the seeds.

Field 47.

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The fruit is globular, sweetish, and acidulous, surface compressed and wrinkled, color reddish or brown, with an odor like that of dates. Inside, the fruit is an almond-like nut in a hard shell, containing a kernel resembling sweet almonds. These plums may be used in place of prunes in the preparation of confection of senna.

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245
[257] •

Prunus Mahaleb L. (Rosaceae)

حب المعلب

824*
278*

Habbu'l-ma'lab (Teh.); Hab-ul-mahaliba (Ar.); Paiwand-e-maryam (Pers.); perfumed cherry tree fruits.

Field 103 (Iraq); W.H.[illegible].M. 150862.

This small tree occurs in Central Asia and Europe. The drug is found in the bazaars in two forms, the dried fruits and the kernels. The fruits are drupes, brown and oval, 9 by 6 mm., with a wrinkled skin, covering a fragile shell and the kernel. The kernels are light brown in color, ovate, 6 by 4 mm., with the taste of bitter almonds. They are used by Arabian physicians as a stomachic and for general debility.

Pterocarpus santalinus L. (Leguminosae)

صندل سرخ

Sandal-i-surkh, Rātiyanah (Teh.); Lal-chandan (Hind.); Ratanjali (Guz.); red sanders, red sandalwood.

Field 193, 232.

This wood is the Rakta chandana of Sanskrit writers. It comes from southern India, where the felling of the trees is under government control, and yields a considerable revenue. Hindus and Mohammedans use this wood combined with white sandalwood in bathing and religious services. The use of the red wood in powder for treating bloody fluxes must be based on the "Doctrine of Signatures." The drug called Rātiyanah in Tehran, a remedy for dysentery, appears to consist of chips of this wood. Red sandalwood is well known in Europe as an ingredient in French polish.

Punica Granatum L. (Lythraceae)

گلنار فارسی

Gulnār-i-farsī, Gul-i-anār (Teh.); Nar (Turk.); Gul nare-farci (Schl.); Flores Punicae granati (Ph. Pers.); pomegranate flowers.

Achundow; Ait.; Post; I.H.B.; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 581; Ph. Ind. 2: 45; Boiss. 2: 736.

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Pharmacog.; Connold's British Oak Galls; Houard 375; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 3: 360.

K.B. 334.

These galls are produced by the insect *Andricus lucidus* Hartig. var. *orientalis* Trotter (illustrated in Connold's "British Oak Galls"). This cynipid makes galls on various species of oak. The bazaar specimens are probably brought from Asia Minor; they have long spines which are usually broken off in the commercial samples. They are used by tanners and are sold also as an astringent medicine. This drug is given locally as a febrifuge (C.).

824*
262
• 257

Quercus Vallonea Kotschy (Fagaceae)

کوزی علفی

Gueze elefi, Pune (Teh.); oak manna.

K.B. 334.

Under these names is supplied a confection or cake of sugary substance, green with the presence of broken leaves. It is a form of Tar-anjubin, "green honey," or Gaz-anjabin, "tamarisk honey." Layard referred to this substance in his "Early Adventures in Persia," I, p. 349: "The mountainous country beyond Fellaut is thickly wooded with the 'beloot' or oak. These trees are chiefly valuable for the white substance called by the Bakhtyaris 'gaz' or 'gazu,' a kind of manna. It is an article of export to all parts of Persia, and is sold everywhere in the bazaars, and employed in the manufacture of a sweetmeat called 'Gazenjubeen,' which is much relished and considered very wholesome. When boiled with the leaves and allowed to harden it forms a kind of greenish cake, not disagreeable to the taste, but, prepared for the use of the ladies of the enderun and to be offered to guests, it is carefully skimmed and separated, when it becomes a white paste of very delicate flavor."

Oak manna, manna quercina, Gueza-elefi of Schlimmer, has also been obtained from the leaves and fruits of *Q. mannifera* Lindl. of Kurdistan, *Q. persica* Jaub. & Spach, and *Q. tauricola* Klotszch. Saccharose, glucose, fructose, and mucilage have been separated from these secretions, but no mannite.

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824*
247

Quisqualis indica L. (Combretaceae)

Rangan-ki-bel (Hind.); Liane vermifuge (Fr.); fruits of the Rangoon creeper.

Field 82 (Iraq).

35: Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MA1

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278*
263
•[257]

"Gulanjabin," of rose petals mixed with honey, is a confection sold in Eastern bazaars. "Gulkhand" is a conserve made from equal parts of rose petals and white sugar beaten together.—Rose petals are added to curry as a flavoring (H.F.).

Rosa foetida Herm. (Rosaceae)

گل زرد

Gul-i-zard, "yellow flower" (Teh.); Gole zarde (Schl.).

A. Olivier ("Voyage dans l'Empire Ottoman, l'Egypte et la Perse," Paris, 1807); Boiss. 2: 671.

Field 154; W.H.M.M. 150823; K.B. 336.

[247]

The Persian yellow rose is a shrub cultivated in gardens. This is the yellow Austrian briar in a wild state, ranging from the Crimea and Asia Minor through Iran to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and the Punjab to eastern Tibet. Aitchison calls it Gul-i-raman-zeba, "lovely flower" of the Hari Rud Valley. Dried rose petals, obtained chiefly from Iran, are sold in the bazaars in India and are prescribed for colic and diarrhea.

Rosa hemisphaerica Herm. (Rosaceae)

دماوره

Damaverah (Ham.); Dalik, Ward (Ar.); the hips.

Ph. Ind. 1: 574; Boiss. 2: 672; Post.

K.B. 336.

This rose occurs in Iran and Afghanistan and, according to Post, is cultivated extensively in Syria.

The drug consists of the hips of the plant. They are nearly globular, broader than long, from 10 by 7 mm. to 13 by 8 mm., crowned with the remains of sepals, red, wrinkled, and covered with short protuberances. Within are several light brown, hard, smooth seeds, 4 mm. long, mixed with silky hairs. The fruits are hot, dry, and astringent, and are given locally for stomach complaints.

Rubia Cordifolia L. and R. tinctorium L. (Rubiaceae)

روناس

Rūnās, Rūniyās (Teh., Isf.); Rounace (Schl.); Fuwwah (Ar.); Manjit (Hind.); madder root.

Ait.; Boiss. 3: 17; Post 224; Schl.; Ph. Ind.

Field 6 (Isf.); 39; 109 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150726; K.B. 336.

Breweries

274 Iraq's only brewery, having a capacity of 50 barrels per day, is not adequate to meet market demands. The owners are therefore in the process of obtaining additional equipment to double the plant's output. The brewery, which has been in operation since 1945, is very modern in design and its product is of excellent quality.

Distillery

Iraq's only source of ethyl alcohol is a small, modern, well-designed distillery located in Baghdad. Surplus dates are used as raw material. Although they are not expensive, they are nevertheless more costly than the raw materials, such as molasses, which are used in the alcohol industry in other countries. Thus the distillery is operating at about one third capacity, since the market will not absorb its entire production at the prices it charges. Most of the current output is used in the making of the national alcoholic drink known as *arak*.

258 *Date Packing*

Date packing is probably one of the oldest industries in the country. Market requirements have kept the industry very modern and fully capable of meeting all demands on it.

Matches

372 There are two match manufacturing companies in Iraq, both producing matches of very good quality. One company utilizes paper, and the other wood. Their combined production is equivalent to about one half of Iraq's requirements.

Cigarettes

277 The bulk of Iraq's requirements of cigarettes are made in the country from home grown tobacco. The output of 12 factories in 1949 amounted to 2.25 billion cigarettes, but there were in addition many small producers of handmade cigarettes. Even in the factories much of the work is done by hand, but further mechanization cannot be expected until labor becomes more expensive.

Small Enterprises

433
445 There are many small enterprises in Iraq which could be expanded, such as tire retreading, reclaiming of lube oil, wood-

DRUGS OF MINERAL ORIGIN

I-I

Alum

278*

زاج سفید

823*

317*

Zāj-u-safid (Teh.); Sheb (Bagh., Iraq); Spati-kari (Sans.); Zamchi (Turk.); Phitkari, Phataki (Hind.).

Field 250; 126A.

Crystals of alum sulphate, with a styptic, sweetish taste. Alum is used to stop bleeding, to settle turbid water, and in the native tanning industry.—It is also a whitening agent and used as an astringent (H.F.). It is obtained in commercial quantities from Aksu and Kuchar in eastern Turkestan.

Antimonium sulphate

کل سرمه

Kuhl or Surmah (Pers.); Arjan, Surma-ka-pathar (Hind.); black sulphide of antimony, Kermes mineral, kohl.

Field 10 (Isf.), 40A.

Kohl or powdered black antimony is used throughout the East [302] for blackening the eyelids. Introduced originally by the native doctors, hakims, as a remedy for eye diseases, it is now used by women as a cosmetic to improve their appearance. Lampblack is sometimes sold to take the place of the mineral compound.—A detailed summary of the use of kohl in southwestern Asia will form part of a forthcoming publication (H.F.).

Armenian earth

کل ارمنی

Gil-i-armani (Pers., Hind.); Hajr-el-armeni (Ar.); Armenian bole or earth, ocher.

Field 196, 235; 139A.

Armenian clay consists of oxide of iron mixed with carbonate of lime. Clay of bright red contains a small amount of lime, but lighter-colored clays effervesce strongly with acids and contain less oxide of iron. Armenian bole, either by itself or mixed with red sandalwood and spices, is painted on the face and body to relieve skin affections, [261] boils, and sores. It is one of the earths eaten by pregnant women. In Afghanistan this habit is so frequent that the term "Gil-khwar" [843] is applied to clay or chalk eaters (see Laufer, Berthold, "Geophagy," Field Mus. Nat. Hist., Anthro. Series, 18, No. 2, 1930).

I-I

Gil-i-sarshūr (Teh., Afg.) is the name given by Aitchison to the edible clay of Afghanistan. The term is applied to a clay of general domestic utility. In Iran it is the name of an earth used by women for cleansing the hair.—The two samples from Tehran were stated to be used as "hair cosmetic" and "complexion cosmetic" (H.F.). 278 * 823 * 317 *

Lead carbonate

Safid āb-i-shaikh (Teh.); Isfedaj (Ar.); Sufeda (Hind.); carbonate of lead, white lead, painters' whitening.

Field 166.

A soft, white, heavy powder, this is used in making ointment of lead carbonate, which acts as a local sedative and astringent.

Lead oxide

مرداسنگ نقرئی

Murdā sang-i-nugra'i, Murdā sang-i-tilā'ī, Murda sang, "death stone" (Teh.); Sindur (Bom.); litharge.

W.H.M.M. 150704, 150772.

The specimens have a similar appearance; they consist of pieces of fused metal with a grayish brown or pinkish exterior. They are probably samples of the unfinished product of the action of heated air on melted lead, and not proper litharge.

Potassium nitrate

سورة قلم

Shūrah-i-qalam (Teh.); Shorah (Hind.); niter, saltpeter.

Field 231; W.H.M.M. 150854.

Obtained on a large scale from the saltpeter earth of the Punjab and Bihar, crude saltpeter occurs in small, dirty crystals, mixed with much common salt. Shūrah-i-qalam is pure saltpeter in white, crystalline, pen-shaped prisms (qalam=pen).—Niter or saltpeter is prescribed for difficult urination and for gonorrhea (H.F.).

Russian clay 823 *

گل داغستان 278 *

Gil-i-dāghistān (Isf., Teh.). 261 •

Field 9 (Isf.), 227. 843

This is a grayish white clay, a compound of silica and alumina, in heavy lumps, soapy to the touch and adhesive to the tongue. The clay is brought from Daghestan in the northeastern part of the

I-I

278* Caucasus, and is used with other medicaments and applied to
823* infected parts of the body. It is also taken internally as a tonic
• 261 in pregnancy, or, as Schlimmer remarks, to satisfy the "appétit
des femmes enceintes."
843

Shāf-i-mamitā (Teh.)

شاف ماميتا

W.H.M.M. 150725.

These are small rolls of a mineral preparation about 2.5 to 3.5 cm. in length, pointed at one end. They consist of chalk, which dissolves in acid, and a quantity of red clay left insoluble. From the name Shāf, meaning suppository or clyster, they are probably used for this purpose.

278* **Sigillated earth**

261 گل مخدوم

843 Gil-i-makhdūm (Teh.); Tukhm-makhtum (Punj.).

Field 246; 86 (Iraq).

These are two forms of sigillated earth, sealed clay or Lemnian earth. The sample from Tehran is a rounded cake of light reddish clay with white specks, 2 cm. in diameter and 1.5 cm. thick; on the upper portion there is a depression in the center made by a stamp. The clay is smooth to the touch and contains no carbonate of lime. For use in medicine it is moistened with water and applied to purulent wounds.

The samples from Iraq are circular lumps of white clay of a larger size, 3.2 cm. in diameter and 1.2 cm. thick. Each is marked above by three thumb impressions, with checkered lines below. The powdered clay is used as a desiccant for dusting abraded surfaces.

[118] The literature on the Sacred Sealed Earth of Lemnos is very extensive. The earth is described by Dioscorides (A.D. 40) and Galen (A.D. 131–201), and was used in Europe until the 17th century. An interesting account is given in Pomet's "Histoire des Druges" (1694), and perhaps the most recent review of the subject is "Terra Sigillata: a Famous Medicament of Ancient Times," by C. J. S. Thompson (1914). Laufer ("Geophagy," pp. 164–166) gives an account of terra sigillata from Lemnos (cf. Armenian earth).

Other medicinal clays represented in the Field collection are: Gil-i-berz (263), a cosmetic used to counteract excessive perspiration;

I-I

Gil-i-gazwin (247), a clay eaten by pregnant women; and Gil-i-batuni (258), a siliceous powder used by painters. 278* 261 •

The following is a list from other sources of edible and medicinal clays met with in Iran and India. 843 823*

Gil-i-gubrasi. Cyprus clay.

Gil-i-igritus. Cretan earth.

Gil-i-khurasani. Edible chalk.

Gil-i-misri or *Karkooti.* Egyptian earth or Nile mud taken from bed of river.

Gil-i-shamus. Samian earth (according to Dioscorides the Greeks used the earth of Samos as a means of stopping the vomiting of blood—Laufer, "Geophagy," p. 109).

Gil-i-zard. Yellow clay from Istanbul.

Chunniah (from China, lime). A soap-like, earthy substance obtained from lakes near Halla, eaten by women of Sind.

The subject of eating clays is of ethnological as well as medicinal interest. An attempt to deal with the subject from these points of view will be found in a paper on "Earth-eating and the Earth-eating Habit in India," by D. Hooper and H. H. Mann (*Mem. Asiatic Soc. Bengal*, Calcutta, 1906, pp. 240–270). [113]

Sodium carbonate (crude) 278*

نمک قلیاب 317

Namak, Qalyāb (Teh.); washing soda. 823*

W.H.M.M. 150843.

This is a white, alkaline salt, either thrown up as an efflorescent deposit on the soil (Sajji mati), or prepared from the ashes of marine plants. It consists of sodium carbonate, containing much chloride and sulphate of sodium, and insoluble matter.

Sulphur

گوگرد زرد

Gūgird-i-zard, Gūgird-i-akhmar (Teh.); Gogut (Yark.); Gandhak (Hind.).

Field 218, 241; W.H.M.M. 150731.

Yellow sulphur in powder and crystalline masses is said to come from the Mount Demavend district in Iran.—Sulphur ointment is used for skin complaints and for secondary syphilis (H.F.).

relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major 133
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative
by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 214
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks
of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily
accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided
by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the
Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River.
Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by
the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than
the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates.
In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by
wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them
cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving
sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit
culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic
consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular
produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between
Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther
down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162]
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the
provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It
includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000
and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo
is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest
date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab
and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only
port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the
country's foreign trade.

little more than one ton left to sell and he might even have to 511
keep part of this for his draft animals, if they are unable to find enough stubble and other natural fodder.

The price which a fellah gets for his grain is usually very much less than the wholesale market price in Basra or Baghdad. Although rail transport is very cheap for grains, the other costs such as local transport, bagging, weighing and storage are high; the merchants' profit and the *istihlak* tax also have to be deducted. Finally, the fellah's funds are usually exhausted before the harvest season and he frequently accepts a low forward price on his crop before it is gathered. For the 1950-51 crop, prices have been high (over ID 20 per ton), but many fellahin undoubtedly sold forward at prices little over ID 10. This would not be an unusual price in past seasons. Thus, ID 10 for the winter crop and perhaps another ID 10 for a small summer crop of sesame would constitute his total cash income for the year.

This income would usually be spent on food, clothing and
possibly some low-grade domestic tobacco. Two of the most [662]
important items in food expenditure are sugar and tea. Dates, particularly in the South, and a few vegetables such as onions are also purchased, but, on the whole, most fruit and vegetables are beyond the reach of the fellah and are sold in the towns. Meat is only eaten occasionally, although fish is available in the marsh areas of the South. Nor does the fellah who owns no animals other than his draft animals consume much milk or *leban* (sour milk). Clothing would consist of some cheap cotton sheeting sufficient for a few garments and occasionally a second-hand jacket; few fellahin wear shoes. Hardly anything is spent on housing or furniture, the living quarters being a small mud hut without windows and hardly any furnishing but a few mats and cooking utensils. Soap, for example, is undoubtedly a luxury. Life is not far above the subsistence level and must often be below it.

In the process of selling his surplus crop and making his small 511
purchases, the fellah is taxed. While with crops consumed in 651
Iraq the *istihlak* tax is largely borne by the buyer, in the case of an export crop such as barley, which is influenced by world prices, the tax falls most heavily on the producer. At the end of 1950, customs duties on sugar were about one fifth to one quarter of the

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

439 433 As Iraq has such a large share in the world's trade, variations in the size of the crop can cause large fluctuations in price and, in a prolific year, marketing difficulties. Since 1939 the burden of marketing the prime quality varieties (Khadrawi, Hallawi and Sayer), which are sold in the United Kingdom, Western Europe, North America and Australia, has been largely removed by a series of bulk contracts between the Date Association and a British company, under which the latter has agreed to purchase at a fixed price all dates of these varieties grown in Basra province.

No such scheme exists for the Zahdi and other lower quality dates. Their principal markets are in India, Egypt and other countries of the Far and Middle East to which much of the trade is carried in the traditional Persian Gulf sailing ships. Disposal of the extremely large 1950-51 crop through the normal channels proved impossible and the price of Zahdi dates fell during 1951 to a point where it was hardly remunerative to transport them to Basra. Faced with this situation, the government sent a trade mission to India and Pakistan and succeeded in making agreements with those countries which provided, among other things, for increased imports of dates.

Cereals. Barley is the only cereal now exported in large quantities, but the quantity is subject to extreme fluctuations owing to the great variability in the crop. On the average, exports have increased considerably over the years. In the latter half of the twenties, they averaged 100,000 tons and before the war 230,000 tons. From 1945 to 1947 they were around 250,000 tons annually, but successive bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 led to a temporary ban on exports in 1948, when less than 3,000 tons were exported. Two bumper crops followed, however, and in 1949 and 1950 exports, which had not before exceeded 300,000 tons, amounted to 326,000 and 462,000 tons respectively.

433 439 262 There was normally a surplus of wheat for export before the war; in 1937, the best year, over 100,000 tons were exported. Since the war, however, exports have been negligible except in 1950, while in 1948 and 1949 there were considerable imports as a consequence of the bad harvests. On balance, therefore, Iraq cannot at present be considered an exporter of wheat. This is, no doubt, due to the increasing consumption of wheat in the country, as a

consequence not only of the increase in population, but also of 438
the shift from the rural areas, where barley is often a staple ele- 439
ment in the diet. 262

Large quantities of rice are produced, but the surplus for export has always been very small. The only other cereal exported in any quantity is millet.

Animal Produce. The principal animal products exported 433
by Iraq are wool, live animals, hides and skins and casings (intes- 437
tines), usually in that order of importance. The sheep is the main source of these products, providing all the wool and usually the bulk of the other products. As with dates and cereals, the quantities exported vary greatly from year to year, sheep being vulnerable not only to disease, but also to extremes of winter cold and summer drought. In contrast with the other main exports, however, there has been no tendency for exports of animal products to increase. Exports of wool, hides and skins have, on the whole, been below prewar levels, while those of casings have fallen off badly. As animals are often taken across the frontier on the hoof, customs returns of live animals exported are not reliable. The recorded decrease since before the war, is, however, too large to be discounted.

Information on the animal population and on the domestic consumption of meat and other products is sketchy and unreliable. A rise in the consumption of meat could well explain the loss of exports of live animals, but this in turn would tend to make avail-
able a larger, not smaller, supply of most by-products. Part of the [233
explanation of the fall in export products may lie in a declining 162]
sheep population owing to the gradual shift from the pastoral life to settled agriculture and from agriculture to the towns. The monograph on agriculture and animal husbandry discusses the shortcomings of the livestock industry and recommends measures to improve livestock raising and the quality of livestock products. The value of exports of animal products is likely to continue its downward trend unless these measures are undertaken speedily and vigorously.

Sheep are especially important as a potential source of dollars. 437
Wool is the most important export to the United States, which 457
also takes all the casings exported and considerable quantities of

varieties of pistachio scions on established native pistachio trees 245 should be given particular attention. Almond orchards could be increased to advantage.

Vegetables and Potatoes

Vegetable culture is concentrated in the neighborhood of the 244 large cities where such products as radishes, lettuce, cabbage, cucumbers, 369 squash, tomatoes and others are in good supply during the season. Unfortunately vegetables do not figure prominently in the [262] ● diet of most people. Outside of the big towns little or no vegetables are eaten. In part, this appears to be due to the fact that tribal tradition holds the cultivation of vegetables in low esteem. However, where the sharecropper is inclined to grow vegetables, he may be discouraged by the lack of available land or the shifting of the area assigned to him for cultivation. If a determined effort were made by the government to enlist the cooperation of the landowners, it might not be too difficult to overcome these obstacles.

It might be desirable to increase the production of potatoes 244 which are now imported to the value of about ID 100,000 per year. The lighter soils along the large streams in the provinces of Mosul, Erbil and Suleimaniya are particularly well adapted to the production of both Irish and sweet potatoes. With proper guidance in cultural practices and the use of fertilizers, planters in these areas could easily supply the country's needs. If it is demonstrated that potato yields compare favorably with other crops, the government might well encourage the planting of potatoes both by launching an educational campaign and by furnishing the necessary seed to planters. Special attention will need to be given to transport, however, and the growers will have to be shown how to build inexpensive potato bins or pits with sufficient ventilation, insulation and accessibility.

Tobacco

Tobacco has been grown to some extent in the North for cen- 249 turies, although it was not until the last few decades that its pro- 655 duction assumed importance. Even now, the value of the tobacco crop is probably no more than a tenth of that of wheat or barley. In the mountainous areas of Erbil and Suleimaniya, however, it is

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a constant 262
current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat complicated, 173
and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

*539 they entered the palace like cats, in the second half of the
night, and the alarm was not raised. And the Amir went
into the room of the girl Aliya. The night was hot and
she had cast off her clothes. And when the Amir saw the
beauty of her body he was amazed, and he was near to
fainting with wonder. But he covered the girl Aliya and
took her to the horses, and they rode into the desert. And
in the morning they halted and she cooked for them food.
[262] When they had eaten of meat and rice and dates and
lebn the derwish spoke to the Amir and said: It is written
that we must divide this girl between us and each have his
share of her, for if two are partners in labour they must
share the achievement. And the Amir said: This suggestion
is unsuitable, nor can it happen thus. And the girl heard
and was amazed at the words of the derwish. But the
derwish insisted and said: A division is written as the fate
of this girl, and I have no power to alter it. The Amir
thought: This derwish is one of the princes of magicians,
and he has befriended me. So he said: If it is thus, then it
shall be done according to your wishes, but how shall we
divide her, up and down, or across? And the derwish
replied: Up and down, for then each of us shall have a
beautiful eye and a breast and an arm and a leg and it will
be even between us, and neither shall have an advantage.
The girl Aliya heard these words and became afraid. She
cast herself at the derwish's feet and cried: O my masters,
cast lots between yourselves as to which is to have me, but
do not divide me. But the derwish said: It is necessary.
And he drew his sword and waved it over the girl and
*539 was about to strike, and the Amir Kheyyun covered his
825 eyes from the spectacle. But at that very moment the
girl's mouth opened and the head of a snake appeared
from it. And the derwish cried: Come out, Zeboshun,

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

539 776 WHAT do you know of El Iraq, you who are boys? I was an old man before the First German War, and I know the country and its history, yet you say there is no monster in the Hor el Hammar. I have seen it, thirty years ago, for this monster takes on the shape of a woman, and it beckons to a man that he may enter the lake, and every twelve years it must eat a man. I have seen it beckoning on the edge of the lake on the nights when there was no moon, but I did not follow it, for I knew its history, and I know that a man must carry a needle when away from his house at night, yet you know nothing of these things, and you are like Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan, who was so ignorant that he desired nothing but money, and who was so foolish that he tried to rob the dead without listening to warnings or heeding cautions that the sons of Adam shall not meddle with magic and strange matters, nor shall they interfere with those that live beyond the end of the world, nor shall they disturb those that await the Last Day.

X539 Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan was a carpenter of Basra, and he lived in his house with a young and lovely wife and with a fine son, yet he was not happy, for his earnings [342 262] were few and his house was a poor house of bowari matting and his food was but dates and bread. And winter came and the rains fell and everything in Abdul Rehman's house was wet, even to the blankets of his bed, for the matting did not keep out the rain, and the cold wind whistled through the walls of his house, and he was in a miserable and desperate state, so he went to the coffeehouse to get warm and he met there his friends, and he discussed his condition, saying: How can I get money to buy a dry house, and a sheep for the feast and clothes for my wife? And they replied, and said: Did we but know a

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's produc- 245
tion; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 [redacted]
Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

It is customary to abuse the Turkish Government as 000
responsible for these conditions. That government has
much to answer for, but it is doubtful whether even the
efficient and benevolent rule of the British will improve
the lot of the date gardener a great deal so long as the
present system remains unchanged. The trouble is that 466
the owner has no contact with his gardener except 427
through his agent, and is coerced by no intelligent and
effective public sentiment. Whether in Turkish or British
territory, he lives under a government built on the
theory that contracts made in good faith must be executed
at all costs and that knows no redress for the gardener
except that he seek employment elsewhere, a thing that
is very difficult to do. The adjustments possible in the
oases of Arabia, where it is the function of the sheikh to
modify oppressive contracts and where it is understood
that an unfavorable reputation will speedily endanger
the life of the land-owner, are out of the question in
Mesopotamia.

In addition to the date gardeners who cultivate the irrigated 243
land along the last hundred miles of the Arab [162]
River from Gurna to the Gulf, there are also a number of 262
so-called Marsh Arabs along the rivers in Lower Mesopotamia,
who raise rice, wheat and barley on land that is
overflowed in the spring when water is high. Rice is
their favorite crop and the one that is most reliable. In
that country the visitor is surprised at being served with
loaves of bread of the usual flat pancake-shape but snowy
white instead of the light brown color of the whole wheat
flour which is universal over all Arabia. I asked my
host with much surprise whether he imported his flour
from Bombay and he laughed. He hardly knew where

[Marsh Arabs]

243 Bombay was. "No," he said, "here we make our bread
262 from rice flour. When the wheat crop is a failure, as in
the past year, we have almost nothing else."

312 These overflow districts,^ which are marshes in the
spring when the rivers overflow, dry down to hard soil
later in the year. To keep the water high for a few
weeks longer than it would naturally remain so, temporary
dams are constructed across some of the smaller
streams, leaving an opening to allow boats to pass and
water to run through. These dams persist in the face
[342] of a strong current in a way that is surprising. Mud,
tree branches, mats, soil and the like seem to be the only
building material, for there is no stone within hundreds of
[476] miles. The dams require a large amount of labor, and
of course are coöperative enterprises. Possibly because
of this necessity for coöperative effort, the Marsh Arab
communities appear to have developed a good degree of
community spirit.

361 Like their race everywhere, these Marsh Arabs do not
live in isolated individual houses in the midst of their
fields but collect in larger or smaller towns, some of them
of considerable size. These towns are located usually
in the fork of a river, or where several streams
come together. In Lower Mesopotamia there are many
small channels that carry water either ~~out~~ of the main
501 river or into it. The Marsh A~~rabs~~ get about in picturesque,
high-prowed, black river boats~~,~~ black because they
are covered with a thick coat of native bitumen which
wells from the ground in one or two places in Mesopo-
135] tamia and is an indication, so the engineers tell us, that
petroleum is to be found in that country. These river
boats, which are the one means of transportation, are
built somewhat on the lines of a canoe and take consid-

^[along the last 100 miles of the Arab river from Gurna
to the Gulf -- Analyst]

[illegible] et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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IRAQ MH 1

pal population centers and radiate from 489 Baghdad and Mosul to cities in Syria, Iran 491 and Turkey. The Tigris is navigable to 505 barges from Basra to Baghdad throughout the year, and to smaller craft as far as Mosul during the high-water season. The Shatt al Arab is open to ocean-going vessels, and Basra, about 85 miles from the Persian Gulf, is one of the major ports of the Middle East. A government-operated 496 railroad, part of the famous "Berlin to Baghdad" railway, runs from Basra to Baghdad and Mosul, with connections through Aleppo to Istanbul. A branch line extends from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Khanaquin. A government-owned airline 509 serves Iraq and the neighboring countries, while international lines from Europe to Africa and the Far East stop at Baghdad and Basra.

Food and Nutrition

The nutrition of the people is governed 146 by the cultural habits of the different racial and social communities, the economic status of the individual families and the food supplies available under diverse climatic conditions. Undernutrition is prevalent among the poorer inhabitants—tenant cultivators, urban laborers and nomadic tribes—who make up over three quarters of the population. Wheat, barley, rice and dates are the 241 staple food crops of the country, while vegetables and fruits, other than dates, are frequently scarce. Wheat is widely grown, primarily in the rainfall areas of the north, but also in the irrigated riverain zones of the south. Barley is cultivated extensively, and, like wheat, is used in the preparation [262] of breads and of *burghul*, a coarse-grained cereal product typical of this region. Millet and maize are common crops in the south. Rice is produced in certain lowland districts in the Kurdish highlands and on the fringes of the southern marshes, and is a popular food among all sections of the population. Peas, beans and lentils are usually consumed throughout the year, and tomatoes, eggplant and different root and green vege-

y

p. 25(B)

241 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in in-
853 fancy, particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

35r Hooper and Field 5-6 [illegible] 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

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824*
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Adiantum Capillus-Veneris L. (Polypodiaceae)

پر سیاوش

Parr-i-siyāvash, Kashburat (Teh.); Kashburat-el-bir, "coriander of the wall" (Pers.); Krafas-al-bir, Shar-al-anat (Iraq); Kansburaj, Moohar-khas (Ind. bazaars); the fronds.

Ait.; Post; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 3: 624.

Field 49; W.H.M.M. 150714; K.B. 302.

The maidenhair fern is found in Iran, Afghanistan, the northwestern Himalayas, and western China, but other species of ferns are used medicinally and are called by similar names. The fronds of the fern are usually supplied, but the rhizome is credited with expectorant properties and is given for relieving difficult respiration and for spasms in whooping cough.

—A maidenhair fern decoction is served as a cooling drink during the summer (H.F.). [272]

Agaric (Fungi) [262] •

قارچ

Qārch (Teh.); Kriwarik (Turk.); dried mushrooms.

Field 242; W.H.M.M. 150775.

This is a portion of a hard fungus, gray brown on the outside and whitish within, 4 to 5 inches across. A notation is made on one sample that it is a vermifuge. Schlimmer identifies "Ghartsche" as *Agaricus esculentus*, one of the edible mushrooms, of which there are numerous species. For agaricum of the Greeks, Ghariqun, see *Polyporus officinalis*.

Alhagi camelorum Fisch. (Leguminosae)

ترنجبین

Tar-anjubin (Teh.); "green honey"; manna.

Field 1; W.H.M.M. 150888.

The camel's thorn (Kār shūtur, Pers.) is a thorny shrub found in the deserts of Iran, Syria, and Egypt. A saccharine exudation forms on the plant. It is shaken off the branches, collected, and used as a sweetmeat and in medicine. It is supposed to be the "greenish cake" of Layard's "Travels," but this secretion was collected from oak trees (see *Quercus*). The white grains of manna separated from the pods, stalks, and leaves contain chiefly cane sugar; this is administered as a laxative and expectorant. [314] [263]

I-I
82†*
278*

Allium Akaka Gmel. (Liliaceae)

والک

Vālik (Teh.); the plant.

W.H.M.M. 150838.

This plant is found in Europe and northern Asia, and is the Welec or Weleque of Ehlicher. The specimen is represented by the entire plant: leaves, pinkish green flowers, and bulbs, having a strong alliaceous odor.

Allium Cepa L. (Liliaceae)

تخم پیاز

Tukhm-i-piyāz (Teh.); Basal (Ar.); Goondina (Pers.); Piaz (Kurd.); the seeds.

Field 41, 415; W.H.M.M. 150831.

• [262] The onion is probably the earliest kind of food plant and is widely cultivated in tropical, subtropical, and temperate countries. Its small, black, corrugated seeds are sold in all the bazaars of Iran and are regarded as a demulcent and stimulant.—Boiled with sugar and almond oil they are given as a purgative during typhoid fever (H.F.).

Allium sativum L. (Liliaceae)

تخم تره

Tukhm-i-tarrah (Teh.); (tarrah is the Persian name for potherb); the seeds.

Boiss. 5: 229.

Field 40; W.H.M.M. 150883; K.B. 302.

[262] Under this name the black, angular seeds of garlic are sold in the bazaars, having similar properties to those of the onion. They are eaten with cheese.

Sir (Teh., Iraq); Som (Ar.); Thum (Turk.); Lehsan (Hind.); garlic.

Field 47A, 77, 115 (Iraq).

[263] This is the bulb of the garlic, containing several daughter bulbs or cloves. They have a peculiarly pungent and disagreeable odor and an acrid and burning taste. The garlic is *par excellence* the potherb of the East, aids digestion, and is a gastric stimulant. Three kinds of the plant are grown in Iran: Bustani (garden), Bari (wild), and Kirathi (leek-like).

35; Hooper and Fi S-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

I-I

Field 244. 824*

Tabashir is a siliceous concretion found in the hollow stems of bamboo plants, and is a valuable Hindu medicine. It occurs as hard, white, opaque, mineral-like fragments of various shapes. The sample from Tehran, bearing the above vernacular name, consisted of burnt bones, and was not true tabashir.—It could not, however, be considered a fraudulent substitute for the authentic drug, as it was labeled "Calcined bones for toothpowder" (H.F.). 278*

Berberis vulgaris L. (Berberidaceae)

زرشک کلی

Zirishk-i-gulī (Ham., Teh.); Zarishk (Hind., Bom.); the fruits.

Achundow; Ait.; Schl.; Boiss. 1: 103; Ph. Ind. 1: 65.

W.H.M.M. 150841; K.B. 306.

The Indian barberry is a common shrub growing in the hilly districts of India and Iran, and the berries are largely collected and appreciated as a condiment or made into jam. In the Punjab the fruits and preserve are called Zirishk-tursh (sour currants) to distinguish them in the trade from the small, black, dried grapes known in Europe as currants or corinths. The consumption of these acid fruits in medicine is said to relieve itch and other skin complaints. —A specimen of dried *Berberis* fruits in the collections of the American School for Boys, Baghdad, bears the label Zirishk. Barberries are used as a decoction for general health and to sweeten the breath (H.F.). [263]

Beta vulgaris L. (Chenopodiaceae) [262] •

تخم چقندر

Tukhm-i-chuqundur (Teh.); Chuk-andar (Hind.); common beet.

Field 28 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150787.

These are small, cup-shaped fruits with light brown seeds, which taste saltish. In Iran they are cultivated largely as a vegetable. The seeds of the beet are sold in Indian bazaars for medicinal use under the name of Chukander (Ph. Ind. 3: 148).

There are several varieties grown in Iraq:

(1) Beetroot. Chukundar (Turk.). The root is eaten.

(2) Spinach beet. Siliq (Turk.); common. The leaves are cooked and eaten as a substitute for spinach.

(3) Sugar beet. Shuwandar sukari. Climate of the Baghdad area is unsuitable for cultivation.

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824* **Capparis spinosa L. (Capparidaceae)**

278* ریشه کبار

Rīshah-i-kabar (Teh.); Kabar (Pers., Iraq); the bark.

Ph. Ind. 1: 131; Boiss. 1: 420.

Field 200; W.H.M.M. 150803; K.B. 307.

The thorny caper is found in western Asia, Europe, North Africa, and Australia. It is a common shrub in the open country, forming great bushes fully 5 feet high.

● [262] Throughout Iran the flower buds are collected to be made into pickles. The light-colored root and the thick root bark are used in medicine, the bark being the Capparis Cortex Radicis of the old "Persian Pharmacopoeia." They are both pungent and bitter and are given for intermittent fever and rheumatism.

Capsicum frutescens L. (Solanaceae)

فلفل مویه

Filfil mūyeh, Filfil-i-surkh (Teh.); Filfil ahmer (Ar.); Lal mirch (Hind.); red pepper, bird pepper, chilies.

Field 96A, 111A; W.H.M.M. 150914.

[263] This species of peppers or chilies, *Capsicum* and *C. annuum*, are cultivated throughout India and Iran for their pungent fruits, and are used throughout the East for culinary purposes. Capsicums and their preparations act as a powerful local irritant. In medicinal doses chilies stimulate the alimentary canal, promoting the flow of gastric juice "to increase appetite and aid digestion."

Carthamus tinctorius L. (Compositae)

کافشه

Kāfshah, Tukhm-i-kāfshah (Teh., Ham.); the seed.

Gul-i-rang (Teh.); Gul-i-kajira, Qurtum (Ar.); Kusam (Hind.); Atractus (Gr.); safflower, the flowers.

Ait.; Post; Schl.; Laufer 324; Ph. Ind. 2: 308.

Field 33, 39A, 195; W.H.M.M. 150866; K.B. 307.

[303] [386] The safflower plant is cultivated in Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan as a field crop for its red florets, which are used as a dyestuff and cosmetic. The red flowers are often supplied as a cheap substitute for saffron, the stigmas of *Crocus sativus* L.

The fruits or achenes, called parrot seed, the size of barley grains, yield by expression an oil which is used as a salve for sprains and rheumatism.

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intervals during the day. Bread must be omitted from the diet during the time of medication (H.F.).

Celosia argentea L. (Amarantaceae)

كل حلوا

Gul-i-halvā (Isf.); Sarwali (Hind.); cockscomb seeds.

Field 408.

The plant grows throughout India and tropical Asia. The pinkish and yellow flower heads, seeds, and roots are used in medicine. The seeds are lenticular, brown or black, smooth, shining, convex on both surfaces. The leaves are used for poultices; the flowering tops with seeds are given as a nervine tonic and in diarrhea. The author of the "Muffaridat-i-Nāsiri" states that 180 grains of the seeds, with an equal quantity of sugar candy, taken daily in a cup of milk, is a powerful aphrodisiac. [832]

—Mixed with *Chrozophora verbascifolia* Juss., the seeds are given as an infusion for chest pains, especially during whooping cough (H.F.).

Celtis australis L. (Ulmaceae)

دغ دغان

Digh-dighane (Isf.); nettle tree.

Field 70.

This ornamental tree is cultivated in Khorasan and near Baghdad, frequently near shrines and holy places. The small, green, wrinkled fruits of *C. caucasica* Willd. are mixed with ordinary flour to be made into bread. [247] [262]

C. Tournefortii Lam., Tawak in Kurdistan, bears small edible fruits like cherries.

Chaerophyllum sp. (Umbelliferae)

قردمانا

Qurdumānā (Teh.); Keruwiah (Isf.); the fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150836.

These fruits are gray-green, elongated, 10 by 1 mm., with a faint caraway odor. Honigberger refers the Arabic Kurdamana to *Lagaecia cuminoides* having similar properties. Stapf informs us that Keruwiah brought from Chahār Mahal and sold for medicine in Isfahan is an allied umbelliferous plant, *Grammosciadium macrodon* Boiss. They are both carminative medicines.

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Field 106 (Iraq); 77A (Iran and Iraq). I-I

The colocynth is a trailing, perennial herb with mottled, green or yellow fruit about the size of a large orange, and is common in sandy desert regions in northern India, Iran, and Syria. The rind is brittle and the inner surface is covered with a soft, spongy, white substance with an intensely bitter taste. This pulp, made into an extract, is official in all the pharmacopoeias. 824 * 278 *

This is a drastic hydragogue cathartic, due to the presence of colocynthin, a crystallizable glucoside. The small, oval, brown seeds contain about 17 per cent of a fixed oil, and, with albuminous matter and salts, are edible and nutritious.

Citrullus vulgaris Schrad. (Cucurbitaceae)

تخم کرمک

Tukhm-i-garmak, Tarbuz (Teh.); Qarpuz (Turk.); Shami (Iraq); watermelon.

Field 73A, 94A; W.H.M.M. 150728.

This melon is cultivated throughout the country in the summer. [262] • The fruit is well known for its refreshing pulp, and is sometimes used as a source of water. For two months in the year the watermelon, with a little bread, may be looked upon as the food and drink of the people (Aitchison). The seeds are collected, sold, and eaten, with or without salt; they are chewed as a pastime and considered to have medicinal properties. The seeds also comprise one of the five cucurbitaceous seeds of Hindu medicine, the other four being: *Cucumis sativus* L. (cucumber); *C. Melo* L. (muskmelon, Kharbuz); *Lagenaria vulgaris* Ser. (bottle gourd or Dudhi); and *Benincasa cerifera* Savi (white tallow gourd, Kodu). They are cooling, diuretic, and nutritive.

Citrus aurantifolia (Christm.) Swingle (Rutaceae)

ليمون

Limon, Limon-amman or Limmon Basra (Iraq); Post-i-limon (Afg.); Basra lime.

Field 43A.

Hard, dry lemons or limes the size of a nutmeg, these fruits [272] (Numi Basra) are imported into Iraq from India, and used with sugar for making a beverage called Shai Hamidh (G.).

Citrus sinensis (L.) Osbeck (Rutaceae)

Four products of the orange tree are used in medicine in Iran:

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in medicine, and are forwarded in great quantities to Turkestan.—On account of their demulcent properties, they are useful for coughs and chest complaints; the dose in Tehran is said to be ten fruits (H.F.).

Coriandrum sativum L. (Umbelliferae)

تخم كشنيز

Tukhm-i-gishniz (Teh.); Kuzbara (Ar., Iraq); Gashnish (Turk.); Dhanya (Hind.); Koriyan (Gr.); coriander fruits.

Achundow; Schl.; Laufer; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 177; Ph. Ind. 2: 129.

Field 30, 33A; W.H.M.M. 150918; K.B. 311.

[263] The coriander plant is cultivated in gardens throughout Iran, Afghanistan, and India. The globular fruits are a well-known spice and flavoring agent. The plant is used in salads and curries, and an infusion of the leaves is said to relieve headache.—The fruits are smoked to relieve toothache (H.F.).

Corylus Colurna L. (Cupuliferae)

فندق

Funduk (Teh.); Findaq, Bundaq (Iraq); Findak (Hind.); Indian or Constantinople hazel.

Field 66 (Iraq), 48A.

• [262] A tree of the northwestern Himalayas, Kashmir, and Afghanistan, this is a relative of the European hazel (*C. Avellana*). Its nuts are generally plentiful in the larger markets of Iran and are said to come from the north. Filberts or cobnuts contain a large quantity of sweet oil and are eaten either raw or roasted.

Cotoneaster nummularia Fisch. & Mey. (Rosaceae)

شير خشت

Shir Khisht, Khushk=dried (Teh.); Shir-milk, (Pers.); a saccharine exudation.

Field 126.

This is a common shrub on the Sia-Koh and Safed-Koh ranges, at an elevation of 3,000 feet and upward. It yields in certain seasons, from its smaller branches, white, sugary lumps of manna which are considered aperient and stomachic.—Mixed with water, it is considered a remedy for typhoid (H.F.). This is one of the four varieties of manna met with in Iran; the others are Tar-anjubin (*Alhagi camelorum* Fisch.), Gaz-anjabin (*Tamarix gallica* L.), and Shakr-ul-

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This small tree, indigenous to China and northeastern India, is now under cultivation throughout the greater part of India and the East. Croton seeds were known to the Persians at an early date, and were doubtless introduced from China by the caravan route through Central Asia. Described by Acosta in 1578, they were called Piñones de Malaca. The seeds contain a violently purgative oil, and are classified by the Iranis among the poisons.

Cucumis sativus L. (Cucurbitaceae)

تخم خیار

Tukhm-i-khiyār (Teh.); Khira (Punj.); Lār (Kash.); Kira (Hind.); cucumber seeds.

Field 34; W.H.M.M. 150754.

Cucumber seeds are ovate, pointed at both ends, 12 by 5 mm., notched at the apex; the cotyledons are oily and sweet.

The seeds are a favorite nutritive and demulcent, resembling in action and uses the five cucurbitaceous seeds (see *Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.). The therapeutic action of cucumber seeds, from a local point of view, must be considered as somewhat negative, since they may be "mixed with any medicine the doctor prescribes."—They are given as an infusion for typhoid (H.F.).

Cucurbita Pepo DC. (Cucurbitaceae)

کل کدو

Gul-i-kadū (Teh., Ham.); Shijar (Iraq); Kadu (Hind.); flowers of the pumpkin.

Ait.; Schl.; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 622.

Field 214, 92A; W.H.M.M. 150891; K.B. 312.

• [262] The pumpkin is largely cultivated as a vegetable in Iran and Afghanistan. The flowers, chiefly yellow or orange corollas, are sold in the bazaars. Made into a decoction, they may be applied to the face "to improve the complexion"; they are also administered internally for chest complaints. [302]

تخم کدو

Tukhm-i-kadū (Teh.); the seeds of the pumpkin.

Field 65; W.H.M.M. 150766.

[262] The seeds are light colored, oval, 2 by 1 cm., smooth, with a marginal rim. Like the seeds of other members of the gourd family, they form a nutritive and palatable addition to ordinary diet.

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The sedge grows plentifully in moist or boggy ground. The small, dark, hairy tubers are ovate-oblong, pointed at both ends, about 2.5 cm. or less in length, brown, hard, and horny. They have a fragrance resembling lemon and cardamom. These tubers are known in Asia for their perfume and medicinal properties; they are used for [302] cleaning the teeth and are placed among clothes to keep away insects.

Datura Stramonium L. (Solanaceae)

تخم تاتورا

Tukhm-tātūrā (Pers.); Datura (Hind.); Jouj macel (Ar.); Shinah Azqhi (Bal.); stramonium thorn apple.

Ait.; Ph. Ind. 2: 586; Y.B. Pharm. 1927, 49; Synopsis of Genus Datura, W. E. Safford, Journ. Wash. Acad. Sci., 19 Apr. 1921.

K.B. 314.

The thorn apple grows in North, Central, and South America, and was introduced at a very early date into the warm regions of Europe, Asia, and Africa. This species is a weed in Iran, and the name has been borrowed from other countries. Specimens of the seeds came from Tehran and Hamadan and the leaves from Hamadan. Both seeds and leaves are used as poultices to allay pain. The natives recognize the poisonous properties of the seeds and sometimes call them Kachola, the name for the seeds of nux vomica, as both are used for killing dogs.

Daucus Carota L. (Umbelliferae)

تخم هويج

Tukhm-i-havīj, Tukhm zardak (Teh.); Jazr-ul-bostani (Ar.); Jazar, Gaizar (Iraq); Gajur (Hind.); Hawu[illegible] (Turk.); carrot fruits.

Field 120A, 203; W.H.M.M. 150887.

• [262] The carrot is greatly valued as a vegetable and much cultivated. The fruits are dull brown, oval, and compressed, the surface is rugose, marked with ridges which are distinctly winged, and the wings fringed with white teeth or bristles. The taste is balsamic, bitter, and oily. The fruit is stimulant, laxative, emollient, diuretic, and emmenagogue.

Delphinium Zalil Ait. & Hemsl. (Ranunculaceae)

اسپرک

Isparak (Teh.); Asbarg, Aswarg, Zalil (other parts of Iran); Hishwarg (Bal.); flowers of yellow larkspur.

Field 36.

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This plant is a gigantic shrub, remarkable for its legumes, which are several feet long. It has been called Burmese tamarind. The seeds are more or less heart-shaped, flattened, about 2 inches in diameter, with a shining, brown surface. They are used by some hill tribes for washing the hair, as they contain saponin. Aitchison remarks that Kors-i-kamar seeds are exported from India to Iran and employed in medicine. In Tehran they are powdered and, mixed with yolk of egg, made into a plaster for pain in the back.

Equisetum ramosissimum Desf. (Equisetaceae)

قنطریون

Qantaryūn (Teh.); the herb, horsetail.

W.H.M.M. 150859.

The light green stalks of the horsetail with their brittle structure and acute edges appear by some mistake to have been intended to represent the centaury plant (*Erythraea Centaurium* Pers., Gentianaceae). They could not replace the pleasantly bitter centaury herb. *Dianthus anatolicus* Boiss. is called Kanturiyan in Iran, where it is also used as a substitute for the centaury of the European flora. The centaury, like other plants of the gentian family, is a domestic remedy for a general tonic.

Eremurus Aucherianus Boiss. (Liliaceae)

سریش سفید

Sirish-i-safīd (Isf., Teh.); commercial names: chiresh, sarish, siris, shirias; roots of the giant asphodel.

Field 1, 2 (Isf.); 80A, 240.

The roots of one or more species of asphodel, including *Asphodelus ramosus* L., are found in commerce in Iran and Central Asia, and are trade products in Mosul and Leh, either dried entire or powdered (Sirish-i-narm). They are exported from the Balad Sinjar district in northwestern Iraq to Syria (G.). The roots, whitish, twisted, hard, light brown, swell and soften and partly dissolve in water, forming a thick mucilage. Water added to the powder forms a glue used for cementing leather, in binding books, and for other industrial purposes. The green part of the plant is eaten. [381] [262]

Erysimum repandum L. (Cruciferae)

تخم خاک شیر

Tukhm-i-khāk-i-shīr (Ham.); Khakshir-talkh (Isf.); Khakechi (Schl.); Khubah (Ar.); Kashir (Bal.); the seeds.

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as a plaster to sores and wounds. The drug contains resin 65, gum 20, and essential oil 10 to 20 per cent. 278* 824*

Ferula persica Willd. (Umbelliferae)

سکبینج

Sakbīnaj (Teh.); Saka-binaja (Ar.); Sek binedge (Schl.); Sagapenum gum.

Achundow; Ait.; Schl.; Laufer 366; Ph. Ind. 2: 161.

Field 163; K.B. 317; W.H.M.M. 150922.

Sagapenum is a fragrant gum-resin obtained from Laristan and Kerman. It is found in the market in tears or agglutinated into brownish yellow cakes with a persistent, alliaceous odor and acrid taste. It yields on distillation a volatile oil containing sulphur. [314]

The drug has a local reputation as a plaster for rheumatism and lumbago.—Mixed with linseed oil it forms a salve for the relief of piles and pains in the back (H.F.).

Ferula Sumbul Hook. f. (Umbelliferae)

ریشه کلفس

Rīshah-i-kalafs, Sumbul, also the name for celery root (Teh.); musk or violet root.

Field 134.

This is a large, perennial plant of Samarkand. The root is thick and fusiform, light and spongy, transversely wrinkled, with corky, brown bark, and fibrous, whitish interior with resinous cells. The odor is strong and musk-like, and the taste bitter and aromatic. It is employed as a stimulant, nervine tonic, and antispasmodic, given in hysteria and nervous disorders.

Ficus Carica L. (Moraceae)

تین

Tin; common fig.

The edible fig grows wild in the mountain valleys of Kurdistan and in the foothills, and is also cultivated throughout Iraq as a fruit tree (G.).—The figs are usually sold strung on cords hung from the ceiling (H.F.). [262] ● [245]

Foeniculum vulgare Mill. (Umbelliferae)

ریشه رازیانه

Rīshah-i-rāziyānah (Teh.); the root of fennel.

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824* Ait.; Post; Boiss. 1: 542; Ph. Ind. 1:155.

296 K.B. 319.

515 This is a shrubby plant of northern Iran, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, 3 to 4 feet high, with numerous stems springing from the perennial rootstock. The underground rootstocks are collected and used as soap for washing the hair and clothes. The Irani drug is no doubt a substitute for the older Roman and Egyptian Struthium, the root of *G. Struthium* L. of southern Europe. The roots contain from 6 to 16 per cent saponin.

824* **Halimodendron argenteum Fisch.** (Leguminosae)

278* Field 14, 31 (Iraq).

Halimodendron is a thorny shrub found in Iran, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Fruits of this plant were collected without a local name, from Yezd-i-Khast between Isfahan and Shiraz. The thorns are used in native surgical operations. Inflated pods, 2 cm. long and oblique, are brown, and contain two or three seeds like chick peas.

824* **Helianthus annuus L.** (Compositae)

● 262 افتاب کردن

Aftāb gardan (Teh.); Ward-ash-shams, Shams-wa-qamar (Iraq); Qunah baqan (Turk.); sunflower seeds.

Field 122 (Teh.), 72, 73 (Iraq).

Two kinds of sunflower seeds are represented in these collections: black, ovate-elongate, 12 by 6 mm.; and white, smooth, broader achenes, 12 by 7 mm. There is a good market for these seeds, which [262] are used for human consumption and for bird food, and yield by [231] expression an oil for cooking purposes. Many tons of the seeds are produced annually in the U.S.S.R.

824* **Helicteres Isora L.** (Sterculiaceae)

278* بهمن پيچ.

Bahman-i-pich, Pachman-i-puh (Teh.); Kisht bar Kisht (Pers.); Pechak, Marorphali (Hind.); Avartin (Sans.); the Persian and Sanskrit names signify the furrows on a ploughed field; the spiral fruits.

Ibn Baitar; Achundow; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 365; Ph. Ind. 1: 231.

Field 137; K.B. 320.

The East Indian screw tree occurs in dry forests throughout central and western India and in Ceylon, Java, and northern Australia. The spirally curved fruits are sold in all Indian bazaars and

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Ph. Ind. 2: 392; Pyman, Journ. Chem. Soc. 1919; Fl. Br. Ind. 3: 645.

W.H.M.M. 150793; K.B. 320.

This small, deciduous tree is found in the tropical Himalayas from the Chenab westward, and throughout the drier forests of India to Travancore and Malacca. Samples of the seed came from Hamadan and Tehran, showing that the Indian drug is well established in Iran. The seeds are narrowly linear-oblong, glabrous, and brown, about 12 mm. long. They have a bitter taste due to the presence of the alkaloid wrightine (conessine), which acts like emetine. The seeds are reputed to have tonic and aphrodisiac properties.

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Hordeum vulgare L. (Gramineae)

جو سفید جو سیاه

Jau, Jōyi safīd (white), Jōyi siyāh (black) (Iraq); Jao (Sind); Jū (Kurd.); Jav (Hind.); barley.

Field 59, 71, 275; 11, 32, 44, 46, 70 (Iraq).

Barley is the most widely cultivated grain and forage crop throughout Iraq. The variety *hexastichon*, or six-rowed barley, has been found in the earliest Egyptian monuments and is the variety most frequently grown in India and Iraq. Early sown barley provides the greater part of the winter grazing in the irrigated areas; horses and other animals are also fed on the grain. Local barleys yield well, but are generally unsuitable for malting. The collection includes specimens of white and black barley, the varieties *distichon*, *hexastichon*, and *erectum*, and the Alleidum barley of Iraq. Pearl barley is imported from Europe and is obtainable in most Eastern bazaars. Mason quotes a saying in Iran, "What has disease to do with men who live upon barley-bread and buttermilk?"

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Guest (p. 46) gives the following information concerning barley:

"*Hordeum* (Gramineae). Barley grass, Barley. Sha'ir, etc.

"*H. murinum* L., Wall Barley or Barley grass. Sha'irah, Shuwairib, Sha'ur, etc. Small tufted annual grass with a flattened inflorescence like a miniature barley. Widely distributed in fields, on channels and ditches, by waysides and in waste places. March–April. In maturity it is a fodder plant of rather low feeding value, though the young growth is nutritious. The seeds are barbed and the awns serrated; hence the mature plants are likely to injure the tender parts of stock.

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"*H. bulbosum* L. Abu Suwaif, Gizar Gia (Kurd.), etc. A tall perennial barley grass with a bulbous root. A common weed in cereal fields on the upper plains and in the valleys of Kurdistan, often projecting conspicuously above the ears of the crop. March–May. It is a useful fodder plant sometimes preserved for winter feeding. Children often eat the bulbous roots.

"*H. spontaneum* K. Koch. Tall grass similar to the above. Common on the rocky slopes of Jebel Sinjar and other hills. April–May.

"*H. sativum* Pers. (*H. vulgare* L.). Sha'ir, Arpā (Turk.), Jū (Kurd.). The most widely cultivated grain and forage crop throughout Iraq; with wheat, rice, and dates it forms the staple food of the majority of the inhabitants. Early-sown barley provides the greater part of the winter grazing in the irrigated areas; horses and other animals are also fed on the grain. The climate is unfavorable for the slow ripening which is necessary to produce good malting barley, since the summer comes on very suddenly, almost before the spring is over. Two-rowed barley (var. *distichon*) is generally known as Sha'ir Abū Sūwaif or Sha'ir Abū Sikkatain; six-rowed barley (var. *hexastichon*) as Sha'ir Sparqalān."

—In the collections of the Rustam Agricultural Experimental Farm at Hinaidi near Baghdad, Iraq, the following varieties of barley are represented:

(*a*) *H. sativum* dest. erect., *nigrum*. Sha'ir Abū Sūwaif. Rustam No. 127. Field 23A. Origin Al Mahmudiya, Iraq.

(*b*) *H. sativum* Pers. (*H. vulgare* L.) *albidum*. Rustam No. 128. Field 24A. Origin Biskra.

(*c*) *H sativum distichon*. Chilian barley. Rustam No. 160. Field 25A. Origin Australia.

(*d*) *H. hexastichon albidum*. Circlan barley. Rustam No. 217. Field 22A. Origin Iraq.

(*e*) *H. sativum albidum*. California barley. Rustam No. 150. Field 20A.

(*f*) *H. sativum albidum*. Sha'ir. Rustam No. 218. Field 21A. Origin Iraq. (H.F.)

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Hyoscyamus reticulatus L. (Solanaceae)

بزر بنج

Bazr-i-banj (Teh., Ham.); Kohi bang (Bal.); Banj barri (Iraq); Benj (Ar.); Bango (Port.); henbane seeds.

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This annual herb is indigenous to the region that extends from the Caucasus to northern India, and is frequently cultivated in India and Iraq as a winter crop. The seeds are used for human consumption and for feeding animals; as a green manure or forage crop it surpasses other vetches. It has for a long time been known that a form of paralysis named Lathyrism is believed to result when this pulse is eaten continuously for some length of time. Guest, however, states that there is no evidence that its harmful nature has ever been recorded in Iraq.

Lavandula dentata L. (Labiatae)

اسطوخودوس

Ustūkhūdūs (Teh.); Osthoukhodouce (Schl.); the Persian name is derived from the Greek; flower heads.

See paper on this drug by I. H. Burkill in the Journ. As. Soc. Bengal, N. S., V, No. 3, March, 1909, 67–71; Ph. Ind. 3: 93; Boiss. 4: 540.

Field 18; W.H.M.M. 150737; K.B. 324.

These are the flower heads of a species of lavender sold in Tehran and brought from Shiraz. They constitute an ancient drug used by the Greeks and referred to by Arabian and Persian physicians. The name has also been applied to *L. Stoechas* L., the Staechus of old works on materia medica. The flowering spikes have the odor of rosemary and camphor, and yield an essential oil containing dextro-camphor and dextro-fenchone. In the form of an infusion the drug is given for catarrh and malaria; it is also used for washing wounds and eruptions.

278* **Lawsonia alba Lam.** (Lythraceae)

824* حنا برگ

302 Hinnāy-i-barg (Teh.); Hinna (Iraq); Rang-mehndi (Hind.); Camphire (Syr.); henna leaves.

386 Field 74, 188, 220; 19, 45 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150819, 150863.

The henna plant is cultivated throughout India on account of its leaves, which yield the henna dye, and as a garden hedge plant. They are sold in the shops in two forms: (1) the broken leaves, and (2) the leaves called "Rangh" reduced to fine powder and mixed with a small quantity of mustard oil. The principal value is as an article of the toilet, for staining the finger nails, hands, and feet a dull orange color, and for dyeing the hair bright red. The use of henna

1/I [Chickling vetch (Lathyrus sativus) - - Analyst]

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278* Field 48, 66, 68 (Iraq); 105A.

824* The lentil is an excellent fodder or grazing plant, affording a most nutritious pulse. As an article of food it has been known from
• 262 the most ancient times; specimens have been discovered in the tombs
246 of Egypt dated 1500 B.C., and are shown in the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum. Lentils are used as food whole or split (when they are called in India "Dall"), and in the form of flour.—A specimen in the American School for Boys, Baghdad, is labeled "Adas mar, lentils ground and taken by women to facilitate parturition" (H.F.).

278* **Lepidium Draba** L. (Cruciferae)

824* مچه

Muchchah (Isf.); Bajindak (Afg., Hind.); Buski (Bal.); hoary cress.

K.B. 325.

The hoary cress is a weed of cultivation distributed westward to Europe. In Tabriz the young shoots are used as a salad or potherb
[262] under the name of "Khili-wili." The seeds, smaller than those of *L. sativum*, are oval and dark brown. Seven or eight seeds are given as a dose for flatulence.

Lepidium sativum L. (Cruciferae)

تخم شاهی

Tukhm-i-shāhī (Teh.); Tukhm tartizak (Isf.); Halim (Hind.); Asalia (Bom.); Tara tezak (Afg.); cress seed.

Ait.; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 1: 120; Boiss. 1: 354.

Field 31, 448; W.H.M.M. 150717; K.B. 325.

Garden cress is a native of Iran, and is widely distributed as a cultivated plant eastward to Tibet. The seeds are exported as a drug from Iran to India, and westward to Europe. They are light brown or reddish brown, oblong, 3 by 1.2 mm., with a depression on the inner margin, and a white spot at one end, have a pungent, cress-like taste, and become coated with transparent mucilage when soaked in water. They are tonic, aphrodisiac, and diuretic.

Linum usitatissimum L. (Linaceae)

تخم بزرک

Tukhm-i-bazrak, Bazrak (Ham.); Basarak Katrin, "little seed of flax" (Pers.); Tukhm-i-katan (Ait.); Bazr ul Kattan (Achundow);

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This plant, allied to *Colchicum*, occurs in North Iran, Afghanistan, the juniper tracts of Baluchistan, and in the Punjab. Aitchison found this plant common all over the Badghis and Khorasan. The corms are collected as a medicine and exported from Meshed through Iran via the Persian Gulf to India. The drug is one of the forms of the ancient Hermodactyl. It is probably the Surinjan-i-shirin or sweet Surinjan, a medicine used by Mohammedans in India. The root from Hamadan is broken into pieces showing a white, starchy fracture with no perceptible taste or smell. The drug is said to have the same action as the bitter Surinjan (*Colchicum* spp.) as a remedy for rheumatism.

Mirabilis Jalapa L. (Nyctaginaceae)

تخم لال عباس

Tukhm-i-lāl'abbās (Teh.); Gul-i-abbasa (Pers.); fruits of the marvel of Peru.

W.H.M.M. 150895.

The marvel of Peru or four-o'clock is a plant of tropical America. It is named *Mirabilis*, or wonderful, on account of the variegated colors of the flowers, and *Jalapa*, as it was formerly supposed to be the true jalap plant. The fruits are oval or vase-shaped, 8 by 5 mm., dark reddish brown, five-ribbed, and papillate, containing a white, starchy seed. Little is known about its medicinal action, but the fruits have been said to be used in adulterating black pepper. [263]

Morus nigra L. (Moraceae)

شاه توت

The fruits: Tūt-i-kushk (Teh.).

The root: Rīshah-shāh-tūt (Teh.).

The tree: Shāh-tūt, "royal mulberry" (Pers.).

Field 46A, 269, 402; K.B. 327.

[262] •
[231]
[245]

The black or grafted mulberry is cultivated in Iran and Baluchistan, principally for its fruit; the white mulberry (*M. alba*), for sericulture. They both yield fruit which in season is sold in the bazaars and met with in nearly every household (Ait.). When carefully dried, the fruits are called Tut-i-dham, and supply a wholesome and nutritious article of diet during winter.

The other drug of the mulberry tree from Tehran consists of the bark of the root, reddish colored externally, with strong, silky white liber cells. It is used for dysmenorrhea.

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children, for fevers and chest troubles (C.).—For this purpose the flowers are often mixed with *Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L., jujube, violet flowers, oxtongue, and sugar (H.F.).

Ochrocarpus longifolius Benth. & Hook. (Guttiferae)

نور موش

Nūr-mūs, Normush (Ham.); Tambrā (red) nagkeshur (Pers.); the flower buds.

Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 270; Ph. Ind. 1: 172.

K.B. 328.

This tree, called cobra saffron, grows in the western part of the peninsula of India from Canara to the Concan. The flower buds come principally from Rajapur and the Deccan. The reddish brown, globular buds, like cloves, are astringent, and are used for dyeing silk. In Iran, where they seem recently to have been introduced, they are used as an aromatic tonic. [386]

Ocimum Basilicum L. (Labiatae)

تخم ریحان

Tukhm-i-raihān (Ham., Teh.); Ruhan (Kurd.); Takmeria (Bom.); Semen Basilici (Old Herbals); Alfabaca (Port.); sweet basil.

Ait.; Boiss. 4: 534; Fl. Br. Ind. 4; Ph. Ind. 3: 83.

Field 84A; W.H.M.M. 150830; K.B. 728.

The sweet, Roman, or garden basil is a native of India and Iran, and is distributed in Africa and Malaya. Raihan is the Arabic name for "the herb," and the plant is a potherb much used for its mint-like aroma. The "seeds," long known in medicine, are said to be the Badranj of Avicenna. Large quantities are imported into India from Iran. The nutlets or "seeds" are blackish, oblong, 2 to 2.5 mm. long, broad, punctulate, slightly arched, with a white umbilicus at the narrow end. When placed in water, they immediately become coated with a semi-opaque mucilage. Schlimmer [262] remarks that the seeds are eaten with bread and cheese.—The seeds are prescribed as a cold infusion for influenza (H.F.).

Ocimum canum Sims (Labiatae)

تخم شربتی

Tukhm-i-sharbatī (Ham., Teh.); Tukhm-chirbati, Reyhane Kouhi, Badroudge ibieze (Schl.); white basil.

I-I

824* Field 194; W.H.M.M. 150774; K.B. 328.

278* [263] Schlimmer remarks that Shiraz supplies Iran with these seeds and adds that they are an indispensable ingredient in iced sherbet (sorbets à la glace). The seeds, or nutlets, are black, punctulate, oblong or ellipsoid, 2 by 1 mm., arched on one side, with a bifurcate line on the other. They are smaller than those of the sweet basil, with a less prominent, white umbilicus, but, like them, they become coated with opalescent mucilage when placed in water. The seeds are given locally for lung and chest complaints and as a heart tonic.

Olea europea L. (Oleaceae)

زیتون

Zaitūn; olive.

• [262] Cultivated for its fruits and for the extraction of oil, the olive tree provides an important article of diet and medicinal remedy.—Leaves are sometimes prepared as a decoction for coughs (H.F.).

Onosma echioides L. (Boraginaceae)

ریشه هوه چوبه

Rīshah havah-i-chūbah (Ham.); Havah-i-chūbah (Teh.); Ratanjot (Hind.); Indian alkanet root.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 4: 181; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 178; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 2: 54.

Field 165; W.H.M.M. 150718; K.B. 329.

[386] [231] This plant, growing in Afghanistan and Siberia, affords a root which is substituted for European alkanet (*Anchusa tinctoria*), from Al-kanna of the Arabs, employed as a dye and medicine in early times. The root of the allied species, *O. Hookeri* Clarke, is called Ranj-i-badshah, "King's dye." The tapering root has a purplish red color, and the cortical portion easily separates in flakes. It imparts its color to oils and spirits, and is used in coloring medicinal preparations. In Iran the root is powdered and given to horses for coughs and as a condition powder.

Orchis latifolia L. (Orchidaceae)

سعلب

Sa'lab (Teh.); Salab-misri (Ar.); Punjah-i-salaba; Oriental salep.

Field 229; W.H.M.M. 150908.

Palmate or hand-shaped tubers of orchids are considered the best for medicinal purposes. They are deprived of their epidermis by

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scalding in water and then dried. They are hard, horny, whitish, 824*
opaque or translucent, branching tubers, mucilaginous when placed 278*
in water. A gruel made of these roots is esteemed as a nervine tonic, demulcent, and nutritive.—As an infusion it is given to relieve hoarseness (H.F.).

Oryza sativa L. (Gramineae) 824*

برنج صدری 243

Birinj-i-sadri, Berij sadri Gilan (Teh.); Timan (Iraq); Ruzz (Ar.); Shilib, Pīrinj (Turk.); Chaltuk (Kurd.); rice grain. 262•

Field 58, 72; 15, 18, 20, 34 (Iraq).

"Rice is cultivated as a summer crop over immense areas, especially in the southern marshes, also in the valleys of Kurdistan and on the flow canals of certain regions in lower Iraq" (G.). There are three main types of the crop represented in the above specimens from Iraq: (1) Harfi or early-sown, (2) Affi or late-sown, and (3) Shittāl or transplanted.

Timan is the hulled rice of Iraq. The two samples from Tehran are of fine, white, table rice.

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Panicum miliaceum L. (Gramineae) 243

ارزن 262

Arzan (Pers.); Dukhn (Iraq); China (Hind., Sans.); millet grain.

Field 57, 106A; 22, 80 (Iraq).

Common millet is cultivated as a summer crop in Iraq, especially along the Shatt-al-Hai. The grain can be cooked and eaten whole or made into bread. It is commonly used in the form of porridge. The green plant is an excellent fodder for animals.—The seeds provide feed for chickens (H.F.). [246]

Papaver somniferum L. (Papaveraceae) 824*

کوکنار 278*

Kạvl-a-kūknār, Pōst-a-kūknār (Pers., Afg.); poppy heads. 276

تخم خشخاش

Tukhm-i-khash khāsh; Tukhm-i-shaga'ig (Ham.); Kishkash (Ar.); poppy seeds.

Ait.; Post; Ph. Ind. 1: 73.

Field 48, 64, 81A, 82A, 185; W.H.M.M. 150835, 150911; K.B. 329.

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824* Opium is known locally as Afyun, but the cultivation of the
278* opium poppy is prohibited in Iraq. The capsules, some of them
scarified, are sold in the bazaars, but their narcotic effects are less
276 powerful and more uncertain than those of opium. The seeds contain 50 per cent of drying oil, which is sometimes called Roghan-i-khash khāsh. The seeds, often erroneously supposed to be poisonous
• [262] because they are contained in the opium-yielding capsule, are wholesome and nutritious, and are eaten chiefly in sweetmeats.—The seeds are given to relieve epistaxis; an oil derived from them is employed in making soap. The fruits mixed with *Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss. and *Linum usitatissimum* L. form a paste for application to boils (H.F.).

Parmelia kamtschdalis Esch. A lichen. See *Roccella Montagnei* Bél.

824* **Peganum Harmala** L. (Rutaceae)

278* تخم اسفند

789 Tukhm-i-isfand, Sipand (Teh.); Harmal, Harmal rutbah (Ar., Iraq); Aspand (Kurd.); Uzarih (Turk.); the Syrian rue.

Achundow; Schl.; Post; Boiss. 1: 917; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 486; Ph. Ind. 1: 75; Weisner 44.

Field 46; 4, 26, 27, 119 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150850; K.B. 329.

The mountain rue is a plant of Iran, Arabia, Syria, North Africa, and southern Europe. The plant and seeds were used medicinally by the Greeks and Romans, and were noted in European herbals in the 17th century. The seeds are exported from Iran into India, where the plant was originally introduced by Mohammedans. The seeds are dull gray, 2 mm. long, angular, having a bitter taste, and, when crushed, a heavy, narcotic odor. The active principle resides in the alkaloids, harmaline and harmine. The custom prevails in Iran and Iraq of sprinkling the seeds on burning coals at marriages to avert the malignant influence of the Evil Eye; the smoke from the
[832] burning seeds is said to drive away epidemics. The seeds are reputed to be an alterative and purifying medicine, and are supposed to stimulate the sexual system.

Peucedanum graveolens Benth. & Hook. (*Anethum graveolens* L.) (Umbelliferae)

تخم شويد

Tukhm-i-shivid (Teh.); Shivit (Isf.); Shabbit (Ar.); Sawa, Soyah (Hind.); Habbat Halwah (Iraq); Anitum (Yunani); dill.

Field 69, 409; W.H.M.M. 150847; K.B. 303. I-I

The well-known dill is a tall, annual or biennial herb, with a strong, aromatic odor, finely dissected leaves, and umbels of yellow flowers. Dill fruits are sold in the bazaars and used as a condiment and carminative. On distillation they yield an oil used in medicine for the preparation of dill water. The plant is often confused with fennel and the fruit with caraway seed; hence the name Karawyah, sometimes used. In Iran dill serves as a potherb; the leaves are cooked with rice as a condiment to restore lost appetite. 824* 278* [2[illegible]]

Phaseolus radiatus L. (Leguminosae) 824*

ماش 262•

Māsh (Iraq, Pers.); Urd or Urid (Ind.); Masha (Sans.); the seeds.

Field 76A, 274; 5, 60 (Iraq).

Mash is cultivated as a summer pulse crop, sometimes mixed with maize or sorghum. The green pods are eaten as a vegetable, and the plant is used as fodder or green manure. The small, green, oblong beans are cooked and eaten, made into biscuits, cakes, and sweetmeats. In Afghanistan this pulse is so much esteemed that it is called Mash-i-maha, "the king of peas." [246]

Phaseolus vulgaris L. (Leguminosae)

فاصوليه

Fāsūliyah (Iraq); Lubia, Lubia-kermiz (red) (Teh.); Rāzmah (Kash.); French bean; the seeds.

Field 69, 70, 77A, 75 (Iraq).

The French or kidney bean is grown as a vegetable or a pulse in kitchen gardens. The pods can be eaten green and the ripe seeds dried as haricot beans, or white soup beans.

The beans are ovate, oblong, 12 to 14 by 6 to 8 mm., white, red, or brown, splashed with black streaks, the hilum on the inner side.

Phoenix dactylifera L. (Palmae) 824*

نخل تمر 245

Tamr (ripe fruit), Rutab (half ripe), Khalal (unripe), Nakhli (male tree), Khurmā; the date palm, date. 262

Date gardens are found on both sides of the Euphrates from An Nasiriya to Basra. From Nahr Umr down the Shatt-al-Arab to Fao is the largest date-growing district in the world. There are

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date gardens on both banks which vary in width from a few hundred yards to five miles. The date is the most important crop in Iraq (G.).

The best variety of Iraq dates is grown in the Suq district. The finest fruit is produced when the tree is between twelve and forty years old. Over a hundred varieties are known, but in Iraq they may be divided into two classes: (*a*) those used chiefly for trade; (*b*) those used for local consumption.

(*a*)	(*b*)
1. **Halawi**	1. **Mishi**
2. **Khadrawi**	2. **Gentar**
3. **Sa'ir**	3. **Hasawi**
4. **Dairi**	4. **Khasib**
5. **Za'adi**	5. **Lihur**
6. **Digal**	6. **Barhi**

Of these 60 per cent are of the Sa'ir variety. The Halawi are popular in America, the Khadrawi sell in Europe while India and Iran are content with the Sa'ir varieties. The numerous uses of the date palm are proverbial.—The fruit yields a syrup and is used in making the local spirit, 'araq (H.F.).

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Phyllanthus Emblica L. (Euphorbiaceae)

آمله سفته

Amulah-i-suftah (Teh.); Amulah-mugashshar (Isf.); Amlaj (Ar.); Aola amla (Hind.); Kurk amla = dried fruit, Amla morabba = preserved fruit, in Turkestan; emblic myrobalans.

Field 16 (Isf.); W.H.M.M. 150871.

This tree grows throughout tropical India, and is valued for its fruits which, when dried, constitute the emblic myrobalans of commerce. As met with in the shops, the drug occurs in broken sections of a fruit, smaller than a walnut, with dried pulp and hard, woody endocarp. The pulp is very acid and contains much tannin. The fruit is astringent, stomachic, and refrigerant; mixed with grape juice and honey it is a favorite drink for fever and diarrhea.

Physalis Alkekengi L. (Solanaceae)

کاکنج

Kākanj (Isf., Teh.); Gul-i-kākanj; Alkikenji (Ar.); clammy winter cherry.

Achundow; Boiss. 4: 287; Post; Ait.; Schl.; Ph. Pers.; Ph. Ind. 2: 560.

Field 12 (Isf.), 162; W.H.M.M. 150721; K.B. 330.

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crushed, a spicy odor, and possess a strong, spicy, and bitter taste. They have a stimulant and antiseptic action on the mucous membrane of the genito-urinary organs, and are also a diuretic.

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Pistacia integerrima Stew. (Anacardiaceae)

چهار تخوش

Chahār tankhūsh (Teh.); **Chatlanguch** (Ham.); **Kharshnai** (Kash.); fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150839; K.B. 331.

This is the northwestern Himalayan form of the turpentine tree, called also the false or donkey mastich. The small drupes are broader than long, 5 by 6 mm., glabrous, rugose, gray with a bony stone. They have a marked terebinthinate odor, and are used locally to impart flavor to milk.

جفت

Field 201; W.H.M.M. 150706.

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Under the name of Jift or Juft, the broken shells of the galls of the turpentine tree are sold in Tehran. Being very astringent, they are used for tanning; mixed with lime, they remove hair from skins.

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Pistacia Khinjuk Stocks. (Anacardiaceae)

حب الغار

Habbu'l ghār (Isf.); **Habul-khazra** (Teh.); **Hebbul-beneh** (Ar.); the fruits.

Field 449; 116 (Iraq); K.B. 331.

سبز قلنج

Subz-i-gulanj (Teh.); **Buzghanj** (Ham., Isf.); **Gul-i-pisteh** (Bom.); **Afs-el-batum** (Tri.); the galls.

Ait.; Boiss. 2: 6; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 1: 377.

Field 422; W.H.M.M. 150878; K.B. 331.

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[281]

This tree is common in Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan, and has been described under different species names. The tree yields a resin-like material, and the nuts, which are eaten, afford a sweet oil; the leaves and galls are employed for tanning. The small, seed-like fruits are oval in shape, 6 mm. long, reddish brown in color, with an acid taste and terebinthinate odor. The fruits are eaten and are said to be good for debility.—Prepared like tea, they relieve stomach pains (H.F.).

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The galls are formed by *Pemphigus utricularius* Pass. (figured in "Les Zoöcécidies des Plantes d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Océanie," by C. Houard, 1923, figs. 1010–1012, p. 471, under *P. atlantica* No. 1731). They contain about 40 per cent of gallotannic acid, are ovoid, larger than peas, somewhat fig-shaped, pink in color, turning gray; the wall is thin, brittle, and rugose on the outside, smooth within and translucent. The taste is astringent and slightly terebinthinate. In Persian and Arabic works on medicine the galls are described as cold, dry, and astringent.—Mixed with Indian spikenard they are administered to relieve stomach pains (H.F.). 824* 278*

Pistacia Terebinthus L. (Anacardiaceae)

سقز سفید

Sagiz-i-safid (Teh.); Sages (Stapf); Zunghari, Sukhur; the oleo-resin and leaves.

Field 129; W.H.M.M. 150894.

The turpentine tree grows freely near Banni in the hills of Sherag. [314] Its oleo-resin is a thick, tenacious, white, opaque mass, gradually taking the shape of the bottle in which it is placed; it softens on warming and has a pleasant terebinthinate odor. It is used in Tehran as a chewing gum, and is similar to the Chian turpentine which was recommended about fifty years ago as a remedy for cancer. [386] The leaves are astringent and are used for dyeing.

Pistacia vera L. (Anacardiaceae) 824* 278* 262 •

پسته

Pistah (Teh.); pistachio nuts in shells.

Field 265; 49A, 50A, 51A; 124 (Iraq).

پوست پسته

Pust-i-pistah (Teh.); husks of the fruits.

Field 186.

The fruit of the pistachio nut is the size of an olive; its husk is reddish and astringent, its odor terebinthinate. Within the fruit is a woody shell or nut, brownish white in color, with hard, horny, and polished texture and ovoid shape. The kernel or almond is pale green, and covered with a thin, brittle, brown skin, easily removed by scratching. The taste is sweet, oily, and balsamic. The outer husk of the fruit (Pust-i-pistah) is used as an infusion for dysentery [386] and is imported into Bombay from Iran as a dyeing and tanning agent. [281]

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The fruits of various species of *Pistacia* have been used as food. Laufer in "Sino-Iranica" remarks that these indigenous trees from ancient times have occupied a prominent place in the life of the Persians. The youth of Persia were taught to subsist on terebinths, and "terebinth eaters" became a nickname. The seeds of the pistachio tree are probably the terebinths referred to, but other species and varieties also afford edible fruits. In Baluchistan the fruits of the Khinjuk tree, called "Shahna," are dried and made into flour and eaten by the poor.

824* **Plantago major L. (Plantaginaceae)**
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بارهنگ

Bārhang (Teh.); Tukhm-i-bārhang (Ham.); Bizr dinbil (Iraq); Bar-i-tang (Bal.); seeds of greater plantain.

Achundow; Ait.; Schl.; Boiss. 4: 878; Post 668; Ph. Ind. 3: 128; I.H.B.; Gilliat-Smith.

Field 6; W.H.M.M. 150918; K.B. 331.

Greater plantain is widely distributed in temperate countries, and the seeds of this and other species are largely employed in medicine in the East. In Tabriz this plant is called in Turki Bizousha dishi, the female kind; *P. lanceolata* L. is distinguished as Bizousha erkek, the male kind. The seeds are small, oval, 1 mm. long, smooth, and brown. They throw off a transparent, mucilaginous coating when placed in water, on account of which the seeds have a reputation in treatment for affections of the bowels and as a remedy for dysentery. The colloquial name for the seeds in Iraq means "for making poultices for boils." The seeds of *P. Loefflingii* L. are called in Tabriz Karni Yarikh, meaning "healing of the stomach" (Gilliat-Smith).

Plantago ovata Forsk. (Plantaginaceae)

اسفرزه

Isparzah (Teh.); Asbaghul, Ispaghul (Pers.); Lesan ul Lamal (Ar.); Psylli semina (Ph. Pers.); Khar-danick (Bal.); spogul seeds.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 4: 855; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 3: 126; B.P. 1914.

Field 7; W.H.M.M. 150707; K.B. 332.

This species of plantain is a native of Iran, Baluchistan, and northern India. Stocks observed that it was grown especially in Sind for its mucilaginous seeds, which from the time of Dioscorides

I-I

This agaric occurs on the oak and larch, and in sizes as large as a 824*
fist or a child's head; it is light, spongy, and friable, and is not easily 278*
powdered. The use of this fungus in medicine is of very ancient date. Avicenna insists upon the great efficacy of agaric as an alexipharmic. Mohammedan physicians closely follow the Greeks in considering that it removes all kinds of visceral obstructions and expels diseased humors. It is also a Chinese drug. The light, white, spongy interior [372]
is made into touchwood, spunk, or tinder, and was formerly used to absorb blood and secretions from wounds, etc.; hence the old name Fungus or Boletus Chirurgorum given to the plant.

Prosopis Stephaniana Kunth (Leguminosae)

خرنوبان

Kharnūbān, Kornub (Isf.); Shok (Ar.); Kunbut (Syr.); Chughak: "humpbacked, bent," applied to the contorted pods, Tukhm-i-jinjak (Ait.); the pods.

Field 403.

This is a loose, straggling, thorny shrub of the Caucasus, Syria, Iran, and northern India. The pods are brown or copper-colored, 4 by 1.5 cm., galled, swollen, and contorted, containing several oval, brown seeds separated by soft, spongy dissepiments. The pods are [231]
eaten by sheep, but the seeds pass through undamaged and germinate readily at the coming of the winter rains (G.). The pods and roots of the plant are regarded as astringent and are given for dysentery.

Prunus Amygdalus Stokes var. amara Baill. (Rosaceae) [245]

بادام تلخ

Bādām-i-talkh (Teh.); bitter almonds.

Field 52A, 171.

The bitter almond tree, like the sweet, is a native probably of Iran and Asia Minor, and is indistinguishable in botanical characters. In form and appearance bitter almonds closely resemble Valencia almonds, but are usually smaller. They are employed in confectionery and for flavoring, but as the hydrocyanic acid yielded [263]
by them varies in quantity, they should be used with caution.—An ointment made of bitter almonds is applied to furuncles (H.F.).

Prunus Armeniaca L. (Rosaceae) 824*

زرد آلو 262•

The fruit: Zard ālū (Pers.); Mishmish (Iraq); Khūbani, with 245
stones removed (Hind.); dried apricot.

I-I

824* *The seeds:* Hasta-i-zard ālū.

• 262 Field 30, 39 (Iraq); 108A.

245 The home of this tree is in the Caucasus region. Dried apricots are called Pating in Afghanistan, and Chuli by the Botes. Sheets of compressed apricot pulp are sometimes sold in the market as Qamr-ad-din. In this form the dried apricot preserves its flavor for an indefinite period; it can be used as required after soaking in water, when it swells into a nutritive paste like jam. This substance was one of the rations issued to Turkish soldiers during the War (G.). Apricot kernels, called Stigu in Afghanistan, are used as almonds.

824* **Prunus Cerasus L. (Rosaceae)**

278* هسته آلبالو

262 Hastah-i-ālbālū (Teh.); Karaz (Ar.); Kerasza (Hind.); cherry stones.

245 دم آلبالو

Dam-i-ālbālū(Teh.); cherry stalks or peduncles.

Field 144; W.H.M.M. 150810, 150860.

The sour or bitter cherry is a tree of western Asia and eastern Europe. The fruits are light brown, resembling those of the common cherry. The seeds contain kernels having the odor of bitter almonds, are nutritive and tonic and are used in confections. The cherry tree and other plum trees in Iran yield a useful gum called Sumgh alucha.—Cherry stones mixed with barley awns, and cherry stems, are given as an infusion for gonorrhea (H.F.).

824* **Prunus domestica L. var. Juliana (Rosaceae)**

262 آلوچه

245 Alūchah (Teh.); Anjar (Iraq); Halu zhgarh (Kurd.); Alucha (Hind.); prunes.

Field 268, 95A, 104A.

The dried plums are black, wrinkled, ovate, 20 mm. long, with a sweet, pleasantly acid pulp; the seed is 14 by 12 mm., the kernel has an odor of bitter almonds. On account of their acidity they are preferred for cooking, and are used for cleaning metal.

Prunus insititia L. var. bokharensis (Rosaceae)

آلو

Alū, Alū-bokhara (Teh.); Bokhara plum.

Field 271.

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The fruit is globular, sweetish, and acidulous, surface compressed and wrinkled, color reddish or brown, with an odor like that of dates. Inside, the fruit is an almond-like nut in a hard shell, containing a kernel resembling sweet almonds. These plums may be used in place of prunes in the preparation of confection of senna.

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Prunus Mahaleb L. (Rosaceae)

824*
278*

حب المعلب

Habbu'l-ma'lab (Teh.); Hab-ul-mahaliba (Ar.); Paiwand-e-maryam (Pers.); perfumed cherry tree fruits.

Field 103 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150862.

This small tree occurs in Central Asia and Europe. The drug is found in the bazaars in two forms, the dried fruits and the kernels. The fruits are drupes, brown and oval, 9 by 6 mm., with a wrinkled skin, covering a fragile shell and the kernel. The kernels are light brown in color, ovate, 6 by 4 mm., with the taste of bitter almonds. They are used by Arabian physicians as a stomachic and for general debility.

Pterocarpus santalinus L. (Leguminosae)

صندل سرخ

Sandal-i-surkh, Rātiyanah (Teh.); Lal-chandan (Hind.); Ratanjali (Guz.); red sanders, red sandalwood.

Field 193, 232.

This wood is the Rakta chandana of Sanskrit writers. It comes from southern India, where the felling of the trees is under government control, and yields a considerable revenue. Hindus and Mohammedans use this wood combined with white sandalwood in bathing and religious services. The use of the red wood in powder for treating bloody fluxes must be based on the "Doctrine of Signatures." The drug called Rātiyanah in Tehran, a remedy for dysentery, appears to consist of chips of this wood. Red sandalwood is well known in Europe as an ingredient in French polish.

Punica Granatum L. (Lythraceae)

گلنار فارسی

Gulnār-i-farsi, Gul-i-anār (Teh.); Nar (Turk.); Gul nare-farci (Schl.); Flores Punicae granati (Ph. Pers.); pomegranate flowers.

Achundow; Ait.; Post; I.H.B.; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 581; Ph. Ind. 2: 45; Boiss. 2: 736.

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824* Pharmacog.; Connold's British Oak Galls; Houard 375; Ait.;
278* Ph. Ind. 3: 360.

281 K.B. 334.

These galls are produced by the insect *Andricus lucidus* Hartig. var. *orientalis* Trotter (illustrated in Connold's "British Oak Galls"). This cynipid makes galls on various species of oak. The bazaar specimens are probably brought from Asia Minor; they have long spines which are usually broken off in the commercial samples. They are used by tanners and are sold also as an astringent medicine. This drug is given locally as a febrifuge (C.).

824* **Quercus Vallonea Kotschy (Fagaceae)**

• 262 کوزی علفی

257 Gueze elefi, Pune (Teh.); oak manna.

K.B. 334.

Under these names is supplied a confection or cake of sugary substance, green with the presence of broken leaves. It is a form of Tar-anjubin, "green honey," or Gaz-anjabin, "tamarisk honey." Layard referred to this substance in his "Early Adventures in Persia," I, p. 349: "The mountainous country beyond Fellaut is thickly wooded with the 'beloot' or oak. These trees are chiefly valuable for the white substance called by the Bakhtyaris 'gaz' or 'gazu,' a kind of manna. It is an article of export to all parts of Persia, and is sold everywhere in the bazaars, and employed in the manufacture of a sweetmeat called 'Gazenjubeen,' which is much relished and considered very wholesome. When boiled with the leaves and allowed to harden it forms a kind of greenish cake, not disagreeable to the taste, but, prepared for the use of the ladies of the enderun and to be offered to guests, it is carefully skimmed and separated, when it becomes a white paste of very delicate flavor."

Oak manna, manna quercina, Gueza-elefi of Schlimmer, has also been obtained from the leaves and fruits of *Q. mannifera* Lindl. of Kurdistan, *Q. persica* Jaub. & Spach, and *Q. tauricola* Klotszch. Saccharose, glucose, fructose, and mucilage have been separated from these secretions, but no mannite.

278* **Quisqualis indica L. (Combretaceae)**

824* Rangan-ki-bel (Hind.); Liane vermifuge (Fr.); fruits of the Rangoon creeper.

247 Field 82 (Iraq).

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The Rangoon creeper is cultivated as an ornamental flowering shrub in most parts of India. The fruits are oval or oblong, pointed at either end, and sharply pentagonal. The pericarp is thin, woody, fragile, of a mahogany color, enclosing an oily seed. The medicinal use of the creeper originated in Mauritius and the Moluccas. The seeds are valued as an anthelmintic; four or five seeds bruised and mixed with honey are administered as a dose for expelling lumbrici. 824* 278* 247

Raphanus sativus L. (Cruciferae) 824* 278*

طربچه

Tukhm-i-turubchah (Teh.); Turb (Pers.); Bazr-el-fujl (Ar.); Tur (Kurd.); Mula, Muro (Hind.); radish seeds.

Field 37; W.H.M.M. 150921.

The well-known radish is cultivated as a vegetable throughout the country. Its seeds, sold in the bazaars, are oblong, 3 to 4 by 2 mm., light reddish brown, with the testa minutely reticulated. They have the pungent taste of mustard. The seeds are diuretic, laxative, and lithontriptic. [262] •

Rheum palmatum L. (Polygonaceae)

ریوند چینی

Rīvand-i-chinī (Isf., Teh.); rhubarb root.

Field 7 (Isf.); 1, 206.

The appearance of sticks of Chinese rhubarb in the bazaars of Iran indicates the favor in which this medicine is held. It is aperient, stomachic, tonic, and slightly astringent, and promotes the action of the liver without any catharsis.—In Tehran it is used as a paste for syphilitic ulcers (H.F.).

Rheum Ribes L. (Polygonaceae)

کل لیواس

Gul-i-livās, Tukhm-i-livās (Ham., Teh.); Livās, the Persian and Arabic name of the plant; Riwas (Punj.); rhubarb fruits.

Barg-i-livās (Isf.); rhubarb leaves.

Boiss. 4: 1003; Ph. Ind. 3: 153.

Field 22, 400; W.H.M.M. 150885; K.B. 335.

The edible rhubarb is indigenous throughout the moister localities at 3,000 feet and upward. It occurs in great expanses on a northern exposure on the higher hills of Khurasan, marking the country characteristically in the autumn with the brilliancy of its almost

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—Taken with a little sugar and cold water it is a remedy for nausea, or is given in hot water for stomach pains; it is said to be harmless, even for children (H.F.).

Smilax China L., and S. glabra Roxb. (Liliaceae)

چوب چین

Chūb Chinī (Ind. bazaars); Tu fu ling (Chin.); Raiz de China (Port.); Tuber Chinae; China root, Chinese sarsaparilla.

Schl.; Laufer 556; Colloquios; Ph. Ind. 3: 500.

W.H.M.M. 150773; K.B. 338.

This root was once a famous remedy for the treatment of Morbus americanus (syphilis), and was first introduced into Europe by the returning sailors of Columbus, and into India by the sailors of Vasco da Gama. It is mentioned by Indian writers of the 16th century. Garcia da Orta traced the source of the drug to China and records a cure made in 1535. It was soon afterward introduced into Iran by the Portuguese. Saponin was found in the root by Kobert in 1911, but its therapeutical action is not considered very marked.

Solanum nigrum L. (Solanaceae)

تاچریزی

Tāj-i-rīzī (Teh.); Inab-ath-thalab, "fox's grapes"; Inab-ed-dib (Ar.); Karezgi (Bal.); black nightshade, wonderberry.

Achundow; Boiss. 4: 284; Ph. Ind. 2: 550; I.H.B.

Field 130A, 414; W.H.M.M. 150722; K.B. 339.

• [262] This species of *Solanum* is a common weed in Iran, where the leaves are eaten as spinach, and the small, black fruits with yellow seeds are medicinal. The berries are eaten by the country people (G.). [302] The Bote women employ the fruit as a cosmetic; they stick the fresh seeds on their cheeks to remove freckles and improve the complexion.

—Mixed with violet flowers, *Nymphaea alba* L., jujube, sebestan, and sugar, the fruits of *S. nigrum* are prepared like tea to soften the feces before giving a purgative, especially in typhoid fever (H.F.).

The fruits of bittersweet (*S. Dulcamara* L.), under the name of Sag-anjar, "dog's grapes," are among the drugs exported to India. They are considered laxative and are employed in chronic enlargement of the liver.

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Solanum xanthocarpum Schrad. & Wendl. and S. Melongena L. (Solanaceae) 824* 278*

تخم باد نجان

Tukhm-i-bādanjān (Teh.); seeds of the wild eggplant.

Field 261.

These plants occur throughout India. The stem and leaves are armed with strong prickles; the flowers are in racemes; and the berries are spherical, smooth, and marked with variegated, green and yellow stripes. The seeds are reniform, 2 mm. in diameter, compressed, and light brown in color. They are expectorant in asthma and catarrh.

Sorghum vulgare Pers. and Andropogon Sorghum Brot. (Gramineae) 824* 262 • 243

دهوره

Dhurah, Idhrah baidha (Ar.); Dari, Gowar (Hind.); Baryadh dari (Turk.); Zuratspi (Kurd.); great millet.

Field 111 (Iraq).

Giant millet is cultivated extensively as an irrigated summer cereal crop in the riverain areas between Basra and Mosul. During the past few years there has been an annual export of grain from Iraq amounting to between 30,000 and 50,000 tons. The grain is well liked by the people as a food (G.).

Spinacia oleracea L. (Chenopodiaceae) 824* 278*

تخم اسپناج

Tukhm-i-ispanāj (Teh.); Ispinākh (Iraq); Sag Palak (Hind.); spinach seeds. 262

Field 45; W.H.M.M. 150912.

Spinach is cultivated in kitchen gardens in Iraq and Iran for its large, fleshy leaves which are eaten as a vegetable. It is sometimes confused with spinach beet (*Beta vulgaris* var.), which is much used as a substitute for spinach. The fruits are in green clusters, triangular, each angle terminating in two or more spines, the surface rugose and wrinkled. The fruits contain mucilage and alkaline nitrates, and are demulcent and diuretic, employed for fever and inflammation of the bowels.

The seeds of *Chenopodium capitatum* Aschers. are also sold under the above vernacular names.

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are occasionally used for poultices and in curries. The seeds are mucilaginous and have been known since antiquity for their medicinal properties, which are stomachic and cordial.—As an infusion they are given for menorrhagia (H.F.). 824* 278*

Triticum vulgare Vill. (Gramineae) 824* 262 • 243 278*

کندم سفید

Gandum-i-safīd, Gandum-ābī (Teh.); Kanim (Kurd.); Gehun (Hind.); Godumai (Tam.); wheat grains.

Nishāstah (Teh.); wheat starch.

Field 160, 278; 9, 26, 27, 35, 40, 42, 49, 56 (Iraq); 57A, 58A, 59A, 60A, 61A, 62A.

Wheat is one of the principal winter crops grown in cultivated areas throughout the country. Herodotus (III, 22) mentions only wheat as the staple food of the Persians at the time of Cambyses. Modern Irani primitive physicians use wheat starch as a dusting powder to allay the pain of burns and inflammation.

Iraq 824* 243

Guest (p. 102) records the following information: "*Triticum* (Gramineae). Wheat. Hintah, Bughdāi (Turk.), Ganim (Kurd.). One of the two principal winter crops grown extensively in the cultivated areas throughout the country; the other is barley. There are several indigenous spp. and many hundreds of local varieties. Wheat is grown on irrigation in the riverain areas of Lower Iraq and, more extensively, on rain in the 'daim' areas of the upper plains; it is also grown in the valleys of Kurdistan (up to alt. about 2,000 m.). There is in normal years a considerable export of grain from Iraq, denoting a surplus above the requirements of the inhabitants. Formerly, the grain had a bad name in the trade owing to the dirt and other impurities which it contained; it was classed as 'Persian' and fetched a poor price in the world markets. Of recent years a great improvement has taken place in the cleanliness and quality of the grain exported from this country and it is confidently hoped to establish a name for Iraqi wheat. To this end legislation has recently been introduced to encourage the propagation of 'Ajībah wheat (one of the Punjab wheats), which was issued by the Department of Agriculture a few years ago after trials had proved it to be superior to any other local or imported variety.

"Bread Wheat, *T. vulgare* Vill. Almost the only kind of wheat grown on irrigation in the riverain areas of Lower Iraq. In certain years it suffers badly from rust disease which takes a heavy toll of

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824*
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preserved through being burnt, are difficult to identify with regard to their species. A summary of this discussion has been published by Henry Field, "Ancient Wheat and Barley from Kish, Mesopotamia," *Amer. Anthr.*, 34, No. 2, pp. 303–309. For further information on this subject the reader is referred to various publications by Nikolai Vavilov, Institute of Plant Industry, Leningrad, U.S.S.R.

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Tulipa montana Lindl. (Liliaceae)

فريونه

Fraiyōnah (Iraq); Lāla (Afg.); Govarikh, Wodak (Bal.); bulbs.

Field 54.

The bulbs of this tulip of Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan have brown, coppery skins. They are sold in the Mosul market as food (G.). The bulbs are eaten also in Baluchistan, where the leaves are a fodder for goats.

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Uncaria Gambier Roxb. (Rubiaceae)

كات كلابى

Kāt-i-gulābī (Teh.); Chinai-katha (Bom.); extract, pale catechu.

Field 208.

This is a specimen of the pale catechu of commerce obtained from Singapore. In the form of cubes, 1 inch across, it is prepared from the leaves and stalks of the plant grown in the Malay States. It is very astringent, as it contains both catechin and tannin. In Tehran it is prescribed for coughs.

Veratrum album L. (Liliaceae)

كندش

Kundush (Ham., Teh.); Kondochi (Schl.); hellebore root.

Boiss. 5: 171.

Field 221; K.B. 348.

White hellebore is a plant of Europe, Central Asia, and Japan. The root is mentioned as a drug in the herbals of Hippocrates and Galen. The rhizome is dark brown, cylindrical or slightly tapering, 2.5 cm. in diameter, with numerous scars of broken rootlets, whitish within. It contains a poisonous alkaloid, jervine. The root is one of the Irani poisons, and is used only externally, as a paste for headache and facial neuralgia.—It is also applied as a relief from nasal catarrh (H.F.).

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824* **Verbascum Thapsus L.** (Scrophulariaceae)

278* مازریون

Māzaryūn (Teh.); Mahi zahraj, Bon tamaku (Ar.); Gidar tamaku (Hind.); great mullein.

W.H.M.M. 150758.

This mullein grows from the temperate Himalayas westward to Britain. The drug consists of broken stalks and thick, hairy leaves. The narcotic action of mullein on fish appears to be well known to [226] the Arabs and Iranis, the meaning of Mahi zahraj being "fish poison." Mohammedan physicians prescribe it in gout and rheumatism in combination with aperients. Throughout Europe mullein has long had a reputation in the pulmonary diseases of cattle, on which account it bears the name of cow's lungwort.

824* **Vetiveria zizanioides Stapf** (*Andropogon muricatus* Retz) (Gramineae)

278* برمکیا

302

Barmakiyā, Bikh-i-wala (Pers.); Khas Khas (Hind.); Izkhir-i-jami (Ar.); Vetiver (Tam.); root of cuscus grass.

Field 5 (Isf.).

The use of these fragrant, wiry roots for medicinal purposes and [355] in perfumery has been common in India for a long time. The roots emit a pleasant odor when moist, and for this reason they are woven into screens and mats (tatties) which hang over doors and windows to cool and perfume the atmosphere during the hot season. A paste of the root is applied to the skin to relieve oppressive heat of the body, and a cooling aromatic bath is prepared by adding some broken root to the water. The root yields a fragrant essential oil which commands a high price as a perfume (Otto Stapf, *Kew Bulletin*, 1906, 347–349).

824* **Vicia Faba L.** (Leguminosae)

278* باقله

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Bāghalā (Iraq); Banklent (Bal.); Bakla (Hind.); Baqilla, Baqlah (Turk.); Paglah (Kurd.); broad or horse bean.

Field 4, 56, 69 (Iraq).

This legume is a native of Iran and is now universally cultivated. The beans are a well-known vegetable and an excellent horse food. The shoots are said to be efficacious in rousing a drunkard from

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stupor. The seeds are oblong, 24 by 18 mm. Those of the small variety are oblong, 8 by 5 mm., brown in color, with a white hilum. These seeds are exported from Egypt in large quantities for feeding horses.

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Vigna Catjang Walp. (Leguminosae)

لوبيا 824*

Lubia (Iraq); Mak (Bal.); Chowli (Hind.); Barbati (Beng.); cow pea. 262

Field 58, 93A; 50, 64 (Iraq).

The cow pea is cultivated as an irrigated summer crop and much grown on mud flats along the receding rivers in summer and autumn. The green pods are cooked and eaten as a vegetable and the seeds are eaten as a pulse. The seeds are recognized by their oblong shape, 10 by 7 mm., and white color with a brown or black spot or hilum on one side. The black-eyed variety is known in Italy under the name of Faggiuola del occhio.

Viola sp. (Violaceae) 824*

كل بنفشه 278*

Gul-i-banafshah (Teh.); flowers of violet.

Abu Mansur; Ph. Pers.; Ait.; Boiss. 1: 450; Post 118; Ph. Ind. 1: 141.

Field 8, 76; W.H.M.M. 150710; K.B. 343.

Violet flowers are regarded in Iran and the Punjab as a valuable medicine. The sweet violet (*V. odorata*) is stated to be the origin of the commercial article, but as the flowers are frequently broken and mixed with leaves and stalks, it is not possible to determine the species. The drug is astringent, demulcent, and diaphoretic, and mixed with lime juice and sugar, is administered as an infusion for fever and headache.

—Mixed with *Echium amoenum* Fisch. & Mey., *Nymphaea alba* L., *Cordia myxa* L., *Zizyphus vulgaris* L., as well as lime juice and sugar, *Viola* sp. is given in an infusion for headache, fevers (not malarial), and to soften feces before purgation (H.F.).

Vitis vinifera L. (Vitaceae) 824*

كشمش عناب 278*

Grapes: 'Inab (Iraq); Angur, Drakh (Hind.). 262

Raisins: Kishmish, Munakha (Pers.); fruit of the vine.

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Field 63, Kishmish-askari; 266, Kishmish-i-sabzah; 267, Kishmish-i-dūgh; 99A, 100A, 101A, 102A, 103A, Pasteek.

Grapes, in Sanskrit, Draksha, are noted by Susruta and Charaka; in the dried state they were used in medicine on account of their demulcent, laxative, and cooling properties. The raisins found in India are the sultanas from Kabul and Iran, some of which are very large and pale greenish yellow in color, called Angul Drakh; the black bloom raisins, Kala Drakh, from the same countries, are used for medicinal purposes; and an inferior kind called Munakha is like the pudding raisins sold in England. Pasteek of Baghdad is a confection of raisins and nuts made in Diarbekir and Kurdistan. Soo'juch is another confection of raisins and almonds made in Kurdistan and eaten in winter in place of fresh fruit.

Withania somnifera Dunal (Solanaceae)

بوزيدان

Būzīdān (Teh., Ham.); Asgandh (Hind., Guz.); Sekran (Syr.); Hajarat el dib, "wolf's tree" (Ar.); the root.

Boiss. 4: 287; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 239; I.H.B.; Post; Ph. Ind. 2: 566; Kew and Pharm. Soc. Museums.

W.H.M.M. 150806; K.B. 343–344.

This is an unarmed shrub with ovate, woolly leaves, inhabiting the south of Europe, Syria, Arabia, India, and Africa. The roots are long, tapering, light brown, with knotty crowns, plump, smooth, white internally, with a short, starchy fracture. The taste is mucilaginous and slightly bitter. From observations on the nature of this plant and the specific names *somnifera* and *hypnotica* given to it by botanists, it might be expected to be harmful to human beings. In Hamadan the root is considered a poison and in parts of Arabia animals refuse to graze on the plant. In Baluchistan, however, it is said to be a vegetable and fodder for goats. Duthie says the shrub is alterative and the root is given to horses. F. B. Power and A. H. Salway (*Proc. Chem. Soc.*, London, 1911) found evidence of an alkaloid and other crystalline principles in the root; but it contained no mydriatic alkaloid, and physiological tests failed to confirm the sedative and hypnotic properties attributed to it.

Zanthoxylum Rhetsa DC. (Rutaceae)

دهن باز دهن بسته

Dahan-bastah, Dahan bastah-bāz (Teh.); Fagara Avicennae.

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825

Burnt, the ashes are given internally in profuse menstruation and chronic diarrhea.

Under the name of Abrisham, white silk, cut into small pieces, is given in Ajmere as a remedy for impotence (Irvine).

Otoliths of fish (Percomorphi, Sciaenidae)

Sang-i-sar-i-māhī (from Sang, "a stone"; Sar, "a head"; Mahi, "fish"; an allusion to the belief among the natives that the stone is found in the head of a fish), "pos teeth" (Ind.).

W.H.M.M. 51699.

Otoliths are semi-crystalline bodies composed of carbonate of lime, found in the ear sacs of fish. These concretions are sold in Delhi and other cities in northern India. They resemble in color and form the human incisor teeth, being white and smooth, and having both surfaces convex. The concretions are powdered and given for urinary diseases, chiefly in the suppression and retention of urine (Khory).

Tortoise eggs (*Testudo horsfieldii* Grey and *T. graeca*. Chelonia)

تخم لاک پشت

Tukhm-i-lāk-pusht, "eggs of the hard-backed one" (Teh.); Sur-kūk (Afg.); Lek-poshte (Schl.); tortoise eggs.

W.H.M.M. 150899.

These are globular, orange-colored, waxy bodies, 2 cm. across, disintegrating in water, leaving a yellowish powder, insoluble, with oily globules on the surface. Eggs of the tortoise are used by the Bruhies (Afghanistan) whipped up with water and smeared over the pustules as a remedy to prevent pitting from smallpox (Bellew). In Assam the eggs are also eaten and used medicinally. The eggs and flesh are said to be aphrodisiac. People of the Makran coast (Baluchistan) have a custom of tying a piece of turtle shell to any animal having a stoppage of urine.

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Milk curds from *Bos indicus* (Ruminantia)

قرقروت

Qar-i-qurūt (Teh.); Karūt, Krūt (Afg.); dried oxygal, hardened cheese.

Field 238.

Qurūt or Karūt occurs in round balls or cakes of varying shapes made from the milk of cows, buffaloes, or goats. It is usually

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obtained by evaporating sour buttermilk, pressing out the whey in bags, by hand, and drying the solid curd in the sun. These cakes are used by Afghans and residents of the black tents of Helmand, who carry them on their tours as a favorite article of diet. When required, the cakes are mixed with water, brinjal fruits and bread added; the whole forms an admirable dish. The Qar-i-qurūt from Tehran is a blackish brown mass, acidulous and salty to the taste, largely soluble in water; it is very similar to meat extracts sold in America and Europe.—The preparation is used as a soup following vermifuge treatment (H.F.).

Kashk Kashk (Kurd.).

Field 61.

These are balls of casein, butter, and salt, prepared from milk. They probably represent the "Pleasant Food" (Khushk horāk) flavored with asafoetida, used in Afghanistan (Aitchison).

Camel's flesh, dried from *Camelus dromedarius* L.; single-humped or Arabian camel 278*
825

کوهان شتر

Kūhān-i-shutur (Teh.); camel's hump.

Field 140.

The specimen is a piece of yellowish white, dried, fibrous flesh from the hump of a camel. This peculiar drug is directed to be mixed with fat and made into an ointment for piles. The Tatars use the hump cut into slices, which, placed in tea, serve the purpose of butter. Camel's meat is eaten by Greeks and Iranis; the flesh of the young dromedary is considered by Arabs to be equal to veal. Ainslie states that the rennet of the camel, which the Iranis term Punir-mayeh-shutur, is placed among their aphrodisiacs; Honigberger calls the substance Camelinum coagulum and says it is highly esteemed by Arabian doctors. [262] [832]

Bezoar stones from *Capra aegagrus* Gmel.; Persian wild goat

پادزاهر

Pādzahr (Pers.); Fadzehre heyvani (Schl.); Gorochan (Hind.); bezoar stone.

W.H.M.M. 199302.

The bezoar stone appears to have been first used as a medicine by the Arabian physician Avicenna. Razis in his "Continens" describes

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Adiantum Capillus-Veneris L. (Polypodiaceae)

پر سیاوش

Parr-i-siyāvash, Kashburat (Teh.); Kashburat-el-bir, "coriander of the wall" (Pers.); Krafas-al-bir, Shar-al-anat (Iraq); Kansburaj, Moohar-khas (Ind. bazaars); the fronds.

Ait.; Post; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 3: 624.

Field 49; W.H.M.M. 150714; K.B. 302.

The maidenhair fern is found in Iran, Afghanistan, the northwestern Himalayas, and western China, but other species of ferns are used medicinally and are called by similar names. The fronds of the fern are usually supplied, but the rhizome is credited with expectorant properties and is given for relieving difficult respiration and for spasms in whooping cough.

—A maidenhair fern decoction is served as a cooling drink during the summer (H.F.). [272]

Agaric (Fungi) [262]

قارچ

Qārch (Teh.); Kriwarik (Turk.); dried mushrooms.

Field 242; W.H.M.M. 150775.

This is a portion of a hard fungus, gray brown on the outside and whitish within, 4 to 5 inches across. A notation is made on one sample that it is a vermifuge. Schlimmer identifies "Ghartsche" as *Agaricus esculentus*, one of the edible mushrooms, of which there are numerous species. For agaricum of the Greeks, Ghariqun, see *Polyporus officinalis*.

Alhagi camelorum Fisch. (Leguminosae)

ترنجبین

Tar-anjubin (Teh.); "green honey"; manna.

Field 1; W.H.M.M. 150888.

The camel's thorn (Kār shūtur, Pers.) is a thorny shrub found in the deserts of Iran, Syria, and Egypt. A saccharine exudation forms on the plant. It is shaken off the branches, collected, and used as a sweetmeat and in medicine. It is supposed to be the "greenish cake" of Layard's "Travels," but this secretion was collected from oak trees (see *Quercus*). The white grains of manna separated from the pods, stalks, and leaves contain chiefly cane sugar; this is administered as a laxative and expectorant. [314] [263]

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Allium Akaka Gmel. (Liliaceae)

والک

Vālik (Teh.); the plant.

W.H.M.M. 150838.

This plant is found in Europe and northern Asia, and is the Welec or Weleque of Ehlicher. The specimen is represented by the entire plant: leaves, pinkish green flowers, and bulbs, having a strong alliaceous odor.

Allium Cepa L. (Liliaceae)

تخم پیاز

Tukhm-i-piyāz (Teh.); Basal (Ar.); Goondina (Pers.); Piaz (Kurd.); the seeds.

Field 41, 415; W.H.M.M. 150831.

[262] The onion is probably the earliest kind of food plant and is widely cultivated in tropical, subtropical, and temperate countries. Its small, black, corrugated seeds are sold in all the bazaars of Iran and are regarded as a demulcent and stimulant.—Boiled with sugar and almond oil they are given as a purgative during typhoid fever (H.F.).

Allium sativum L. (Liliaceae)

تخم تره

Tukhm-i-tarrah (Teh.); (tarrah is the Persian name for potherb); the seeds.

Boiss. 5: 229.

Field 40; W.H.M.M. 150883; K.B. 302.

[262] Under this name the black, angular seeds of garlic are sold in the bazaars, having similar properties to those of the onion. They are eaten with cheese.

Sir (Teh., Iraq); Som (Ar.); Thum (Turk.); Lehsan (Hind.); garlic.

Field 47A, 77, 115 (Iraq).

• [263] This is the bulb of the garlic, containing several daughter bulbs or cloves. They have a peculiarly pungent and disagreeable odor and an acrid and burning taste. The garlic is *par excellence* the potherb of the East, aids digestion, and is a gastric stimulant. Three kinds of the plant are grown in Iran: Bustani (garden), Bari (wild), and Kirathi (leek-like).

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inous and demulcent.—The flowers, often mixed with linseed and boiled, are made into poultices for boils, and the seeds or carpels are given as a tea for coughs and inflammation of the chest (H.F.).

Alyssum campestre L. (Cruciferae)

قدامه شهری

Gudāmah, Gudāmah-i-shahri, Gudāmah-i-shērazi (Teh.); Qodumah (Ar.); Ghodaoumche chirazi (Schl.); hedge garlic, the seeds.

Field 3; W.H.M.M. 150727, 150868; K.B. 303.

The seeds of this small plant, common in Iran and Iraq, are light brown, lens-shaped, 2 by 1.5 mm., with a yellowish gray border. They become coated with semi-opaque mucilage when placed in water.—Mixed with *Lallemantia Royleana* Benth., *Pyrus Cydonia* L., and *Plantago major* L., the seeds are given in an infusion for coughs (H.F.).

Amaranthus paniculatus L. (Amarantaceae)

تاج خروس

Tāj-i-khurūs (Teh.); Tukhm-tāj-i-khurūs (Isf.); flower heads and seeds of cockscomb or star flower.

Field 92, 425; W.H.M.M. 150874.

The chaffy flower heads are white with shades of pink or light brown. The black, shining, lens-shaped seeds are eaten, and are medicinal. Cockscomb leaves form a wholesome potherb, and are taken as a tea to relieve the chest.

Amomum subulatum Roxb. (Zingiberaceae)

هل قراب

Hil-i-qurāb (Teh., Isf.); Hil (Ar.); Ela (Sans.); hill or Nepal cardamoms.

Field 421; W.H.M.M. 150729.

The capsules are ovate and bluntly triangular, containing numerous round or angular brown seeds, closely packed. The odor of the seeds is camphoraceous and agreeable. Hill cardamoms are used as a substitute for the smaller and more aromatic Malabar cardamoms of southern India (*Elettaria Cardamomum* Maton). They are both used as a spice and for their carminative and stimulating properties. [263]

—As a cure for general debility they are sometimes mixed with Belleric myrobalans (H.F.).

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Field 244.

Tabashir is a siliceous concretion found in the hollow stems of bamboo plants, and is a valuable Hindu medicine. It occurs as hard, white, opaque, mineral-like fragments of various shapes. The sample from Tehran, bearing the above vernacular name, consisted of burnt bones, and was not true tabashir.—It could not, however, be considered a fraudulent substitute for the authentic drug, as it was labeled "Calcined bones for toothpowder" (H.F.).

Berberis vulgaris L. (Berberidaceae)

زرشک گلی

Zirishk-i-gulī (Ham., Teh.); Zarishk (Hind., Bom.); the fruits.
Achundow; Ait.; Schl.; Boiss. 1: 103; Ph. Ind. 1: 65.
W.H.M.M. 150841; K.B. 306.

The Indian barberry is a common shrub growing in the hilly districts of India and Iran, and the berries are largely collected and appreciated as a condiment or made into jam. In the Punjab the fruits and preserve are called Zirishk-tursh (sour currants) to distinguish them in the trade from the small, black, dried grapes known in Europe as currants or corinths. The consumption of these acid fruits in medicine is said to relieve itch and other skin complaints. [263]

—A specimen of dried *Berberis* fruits in the collections of the American School for Boys, Baghdad, bears the label Zirishk. Barberries are used as a decoction for general health and to sweeten the breath (H.F.).

[262]

Beta vulgaris L. (Chenopodiaceae)

تخم چقندر

Tukhm-i-chuqundur (Teh.); Chuk-andar (Hind.); common beet.
Field 28 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150787.

These are small, cup-shaped fruits with light brown seeds, which taste saltish. In Iran they are cultivated largely as a vegetable. The seeds of the beet are sold in Indian bazaars for medicinal use under the name of Chukander (Ph. Ind. 3: 148).

There are several varieties grown in Iraq:

(1) Beetroot. Chukundar (Turk.). The root is eaten.
(2) Spinach beet. Siliq (Turk.); common. The leaves are cooked and eaten as a substitute for spinach.
(3) Sugar beet. Shuwandar sukari. Climate of the Baghdad area is unsuitable for cultivation.

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824* (4) Mangel-wurzel should succeed in Kurdistan.

278* (5) Wild beets, known as Silaijah or Silaigah.

Boswellia Carterii Bird. (Burseraceae)

کندر

Kundur (Teh.); Seta Kundura (Hind.); frankincense or olibanum. Field 199.

[314] There are several kinds of this fragrant oleo-gum-resin found in commerce. Kundura zakara, "male frankincense," is in reddish or deep yellow, circular tears; Kundura unsa, "female frankincense," is in yellowish white, translucent or pale tears; Kisher Kundur or Dhupa of the bazaars occurs in scaly pieces of the bark coated with the exudation.—Olibanum is used chiefly as incense; it is an ingredient in plasters; a dose of half a misqal (35 grains) is said to improve the memory (H.F.).

Brassica campestris L. var. Napus Bab. (Cruciferae)

تخم شلغم

Tukhm-i-shalgham (Teh.); Sarsun (Hind.); rape or colza seed. Field 54 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150856.

[252] [373] This is an important crop in India and elsewhere, cultivated chiefly for its seed. Rape seeds are small, brownish or reddish brown, 2 mm. in diameter, smooth. They yield by expression a bland oil used as an emollient and in cooking and lighting.

Brassica (Sinapis) nigra (L.) Koch, and B. alba Rabenh. (Cruciferae)

خردل

Khardal.

• [263] Mustard, now a widespread weed, is of Eurasian origin. The powdered seeds are an important condiment, used in curries, and medicinally in the preparation of poultices and plasters. Mustard is taken internally as an emetic in cases of narcotic poisoning (G.).

Butea frondosa Roxb. (Leguminosae)

برگ هند ایران

Barg-i-hind īrān, Parakeh-i-hindī (Teh.); Palaspapado (Duk.); Palas Keby (Hind.); seeds of bastard teak or Bengal kino tree. Field 181; W.H.M.M. 150818.

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824* **Capparis spinosa L.** (Capparidaceae)

278* ریشه کبار

Rishah-i-kabar (Teh.); Kabar (Pers., Iraq); the bark.

Ph. Ind. 1: 131; Boiss. 1: 420.

Field 200; W.H.M.M. 150803; K.B. 307.

The thorny caper is found in western Asia, Europe, North Africa, and Australia. It is a common shrub in the open country, forming great bushes fully 5 feet high.

[262] Throughout Iran the flower buds are collected to be made into pickles. The light-colored root and the thick root bark are used in medicine, the bark being the Capparis Cortex Radicis of the old "Persian Pharmacopoeia." They are both pungent and bitter and are given for intermittent fever and rheumatism.

Capsicum frutescens L. (Solanaceae)

فلفل مویه

Filfil mūyeh, Filfil-i-surkh (Teh.); Filfil ahmer (Ar.); Lal mirch (Hind.); red pepper, bird pepper, chilies.

Field 96A, 111A; W.H.M.M. 150914.

[263] This species of peppers or chilies, *Capsicum* and *C. annuum*, are cultivated throughout India and Iran for their pungent fruits, and are used throughout the East for culinary purposes. Capsicums and their preparations act as a powerful local irritant. In medicinal doses chilies stimulate the alimentary canal, promoting the flow of gastric juice "to increase appetite and aid digestion."

Carthamus tinctorius L. (Compositae)

کافشه

Kāfshah, Tukhm-i-kāfshah (Teh., Ham.); the seed.

Gul-i-rang (Teh.); Gul-i-kajira, Qurtum (Ar.); Kusam (Hind.); Atractus (Gr.); safflower, the flowers.

Ait.; Post; Schl.; Laufer 324; Ph. Ind. 2: 308.

Field 33, 39A, 195; W.H.M.M. 150866; K.B. 307.

[303] [386] The safflower plant is cultivated in Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan as a field crop for its red florets, which are used as a dyestuff and cosmetic. The red flowers are often supplied as a cheap substitute for saffron, the stigmas of *Crocus sativus* L.

The fruits or achenes, called parrot seed, the size of barley grains, yield by expression an oil which is used as a salve for sprains and rheumatism.

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Carum Bulbocastanum Koch (Umbelliferae) 824*

زیره سیاه کرمانی 278*

Tukhm zireh (Teh.); Zireh-siyah, Kirmani (Isf.); Kala-zirah (Afg.); Jira-shak (N.E. Pers.); black caraway.

Field 35, 441; W.H.M.M. 150909.

These fruits constitute the spice called black caraway of Iran and northern India. Royle described the plant yielding these fruits as *Carum nigrum*, but Aitchison was the first to observe that they were collected from a plant with tuberous roots. They are a substitute for the ordinary caraway of Europe (*C. Carui* L.), and are used in medicine as a carminative. [263] •

Carum copticum Benth. & Hook. (*Sison Ammi* L.; *Trachyspermum Ammi* Sprague ex Turrill; *Ptychotis Ajowan* DC.; *Ammi copticum* L.) (Umbelliferae)

زنیان

Ziniyān (Teh., Ham.); Ajowan, Ajwain (Hind.); Omum (Tam.); Ammeos (Ph. Pers.); Basilikon Kuminon (Gr.); bishop's weed, the fruits.

Boiss. 2: 898; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 682; Ph. Ind. 2: 116.

Field 17; W.H.M.M. 150750; K.B. 308.

This is an African plant, cultivated in Europe, Iran, Afghanistan, and throughout India. The aromatic fruits were a well-known medicine among the ancient Greeks and Arabs. The Irani drug is produced largely in the province of Shiraz. The fruits are brownish gray, smaller and more curved than caraway seeds. The fragrance and active principle reside in an essential oil holding a stearoptene, called thymol, which crystallizes out at ordinary temperatures. Thymol is known in India as Ajwain-ka-phul or "Flowers of Ajwain." The distillate obtained from the fruits when boiled with water is called "Omum water," and is used as a carminative for children and as a cholera remedy.

Carum Petroselinum Benth. & Hook. (Umbelliferae)

تخم کلم

Tukhm-i-kalam (Teh.); Maghdunes (Iraq); Pitar saleri (Hind.); parsley seed.

W.H.M.M. 150829.

Parsley is a plant of southern Europe, cultivated in kitchen gardens for its leaves, which are used as a condiment. The fruits [263]

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924* **Cinnamomum Cassia Blume (Lauraceae)**

278* دارچینی

Dār-chīnī (Isf., the Hindi name); Darasini (Ar.); Chinese cinnamon bark.

Field 14 (Isf.), 108.

• [263] The cinnamon bark from China is kept by druggists, and is a favorite spice. It is used in curry and as an ingredient in medicines. The bark is prepared as a tea for excessive salivation, frequent in Iran.

قرفه

Gurfah (Teh.); Kalphah (Bom.); the fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150867.

The small, black fruits of the cinnamon tree from China are sold in the bazaars. In South India the fruits of *C. iners* Reinw. are used in medicine, but are inferior to the above.

برگ ساذج

Barg-i-sādhaj (Teh.); Sādhaj-i-hindī (Isf.); the leaves.

Field 17 (Isf.); W.H.M.M. 150884.

The leaves of the cinnamon are taken internally for rheumatism. The vernacular name is applied by the Indian Mohammedans to the leaves of a wild cinnamon tree in Sylhet used as a carminative and stimulant (Ph. Ind. 3: 209). The leaves constitute the ancient Hindu drug known as Malabathrum, Talispatra, and Folia indica.

Cirsium lanceolatum L. (Compositae)

Foveh (?) (Ham.); thistledown.

Achundow; Boiss. 2: 538; Post

K.B. 309.

Under this name the white, feathery pappus or thistledown from the above plant is sold in the bazaars. A medicine called "Badawerde" (carried by the wind) consists of the pappus of the holy thistle (*Cnicus benedictus* L.). The downy heads of species of *Volutarella* and *Echinops* are also used as a drug, probably as an absorbent material for external application.

Citrullus Colocynthis Schrad. (Cucurbitaceae)

خربوزه روباه

Kharbūzah-rūbāh, Kabiste talkh (Pers.); Hanzal (Ar.); Handhal, Gozharik (Kurd.); Indrazana (Hind.); colocynth, bitter apple, Indian gourd.

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بهار نارنج

Flowers: Bahār-i-nāranj, "spice of orange" (Teh.); Naphae flores (Schl.); neroli.

Ph. Ind. 1: 270.

Field 219; W.H.M.M. 150778; K.B. 309.

The dried flowers of the cultivated orange are sold in bazaars and recommended as a stimulant and to prevent dysentery. Schlimmer refers to Aqua florum aurantii or Aqua naphae as a favorite flavoring agent. The oil contains a nitrogenous substance of exceeding fragrance, anthanilic acid methyl-ester.

برک نارنج

Leaves: Barg-i-nāranj (Isf.).

Field 429.

Among other uses, the leaves of the orange tree are applied to reduce swollen legs.—For this purpose they are sometimes mixed with *Taxus baccata* L., orange seeds, bitter cane, and hemlock fruits (H.F.).

خلال نارنج

Orange peel: Khalal-i-nāranj, Pust-i-utruj (Teh.); the peel or pericarp in thin shreds.

Field 153; W.H.M.M. 150804, 150896.

• [263] Orange peel is an ingredient in the preparation of tincture of cinchona and tincture of gentian. In domestic cookery in Iran it gives a flavor to boiled rice and other vegetables.

[251] Post-i-nāranj is the fruit which, cut in two and dried in the sun, is sold in the bazaars.

هسته نارنج

Seeds: Hastah-i-nāranj (Teh.).

Field 431.

Orange seeds or pips are bitter. They are first torrefied to remove the husks, and are taken as a stimulating remedy.

Colchicum luteum Baker and C. speciosum Stev. (Liliaceae)

سورنجان کرمانی

Surinjān-i-kirmānī (Teh.); Surinjān-i-talkh (Pers.); Hermodactyl, "the finger of Hermes" (Gr.); the corms.

Achundow; Ph. Pers.; Boiss. 5: 155; Schl.; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 3: 496.

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in medicine, and are forwarded in great quantities to Turkestan.—On account of their demulcent properties, they are useful for coughs and chest complaints; the dose in Tehran is said to be ten fruits (H.F.).

Coriandrum sativum L. (Umbelliferae)

تخم کشنیز

Tukhm-i-gishniz (Teh.); Kuzbara (Ar., Iraq); Gashnish (Turk.); Dhanya (Hind.); Koriyan (Gr.); coriander fruits.

Achundow; Schl.; Laufer; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 177; Ph. Ind. 2: 129.

Field 30, 33A; W.H.M.M. 150918; K.B. 311.

• [263] The coriander plant is cultivated in gardens throughout Iran, Afghanistan, and India. The globular fruits are a well-known spice and flavoring agent. The plant is used in salads and curries, and an infusion of the leaves is said to relieve headache.—The fruits are smoked to relieve toothache (H.F.).

Corylus Colurna L. (Cupuliferae)

فندق

Funduk (Teh.); Findaq, Bundaq (Iraq); Findak (Hind.); Indian or Constantinople hazel.

Field 66 (Iraq), 48A.

[262] A tree of the northwestern Himalayas, Kashmir, and Afghanistan, this is a relative of the European hazel (*C. Avellana*). Its nuts are generally plentiful in the larger markets of Iran and are said to come from the north. Filberts or cobnuts contain a large quantity of sweet oil and are eaten either raw or roasted.

Cotoneaster nummularia Fisch. & Mey. (Rosaceae)

شیر خشت

Shīr Khisht, Khushk=dried (Teh.); Shir-milk, (Pers.); a saccharine exudation.

Field 126.

This is a common shrub on the Sia-Koh and Safed-Koh ranges, at an elevation of 3,000 feet and upward. It yields in certain seasons, from its smaller branches, white, sugary lumps of manna which are considered aperient and stomachic.—Mixed with water, it is considered a remedy for typhoid (H.F.). This is one of the four varieties of manna met with in Iran; the others are Tar-anjubin (*Alhagi camelorum* Fisch.), Gaz-anjabin (*Tamarix gallica* L.), and Shakr-ul-

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ashar or Shakar tiqāl, the product of a beetle on *Echinops persicus* Stev.

Shīr Khisht is eaten as it comes from the shrub, with food, or converted into a sweetmeat; sometimes it is expcrted to India.

Crataegus orientalis Bieb. (Rosaceae)

کیک‌واش

Kaik-vāsh, Kawich (Isf.); Ghich (Ham.); Gaiwuzh (Turk.); Alafkhareg (Afg.); the fruits.

Schl.; Boiss. 2: 660; Post; Ait.; I.H.B.

K.B. 312.

The Oriental hawthorn is a shrub or small tree of Asia Minor or the Caucasus. The fruits of most species are used in medicine, and those grown in the gardens at Ba'quba, Iraq, fetch a good price in the local market. The berries from Hamadan are pome-like, rounded, 12 mm. across, with a reddish brown, wrinkled pericarp, surmounted by an umbilicate disk of the minute lobes of the calyx; within are three oval, light brown, hard pyrenes. The fruits contain sugar, and are supposed to act as an opiate, while the seeds are used as a medicine for spermatorrhea.

Crocus sativus L. (Iridaceae)

زعفران

Za'farān (Teh.); Zafran (Ar.); Karkum, Abir (Pers.); Kesar (Kash.); Kesara (Hind.); saffron, hay saffron.

Field 2; W.H.M.M. 150720.

The saffron plant is cultivated in the neighborhood of Pampur in Kashmir and was formerly cultivated in Isfahan. It was grown in the 10th century in Spain, where the bulk of the European saffron is now produced. The dried, red stigmas of the crocus are a favorite coloring matter in medicine and food. The drug has a stimulant and antispasmodic action. [263]

Croton Tiglium L. (Euphorbiaceae)

حب السلاطين

Habb-el-salatin, "Sultan's seeds" (Ham.); Habb-el-khatai, "Cathay (China) seeds"; Bidend jireh khatai, "castor oil seeds from China"; Habb-dilmaluk (Ait.); Jamalgota (Punj.); croton seeds.

Ait.; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 3: 281.

K.B. 312.

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Cuminum Cyminum L. (Umbelliferae)

زیره سبز

Zirah-i-sabz (Isf., Iraq); Zira (Hind.); Jira (Beng., Bom.); Goi-zira; "green weed" (Turk. in Tabriz); Cummun (Syr.); the fruits.

Post 373; Gilliat-Smith & Turrill, Kew Bull. 1930, 390; Ph. Ind. 2: 113.

Field 438, 34A; W.H.M.M. 150792; K.B. 313.

The fruits of cumin are called green or white caraway to distinguish them from darker or black caraway (*Carum Bulbocastanum* Koch). The cumin plant is grown in gardens as a potherb, and the seeds, or properly fruits, are sold in the bazaars as a condiment and carminative medicine.—They are also prescribed to relieve pains after childbirth (H.F.). From the dawn of civilization in Egypt, its use spread into Arabia, Iran, India, and China. [263] •

Cupressus sempervirens L. (Coniferae)

گل سرو

Gul-i-sarv (Teh.); cypress fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150903.

The fruits of the cypress tree are reddish brown, opening by a five-parted covering, fragrant, and bitter. They contain an essential oil which has been recommended for whooping cough and as an anthelmintic.

Curcuma aromatica Salisb. (Zingiberaceae)

قرنباد

Qurunbād—this name is a corruption of Zurunbād (*Curcuma Zedoaria* Roxb.—(Teh.); Jangali-haladi (Hind.); wild turmeric, round or yellow zedoary tubers.

Field 146.

This is a contorted, yellow root, dressed with yellow powder, hard and orange brown within, having a delicate camphoraceous odor.—The powdered root is used for flatulence (H.F.).

Curcuma domestica Val. and C. longa Trim. (Zingiberaceae)

کرکم

Karkum, the Persian name for saffron (Teh.); Haldi (Hind.); Zard chobah, yellow root (Pers.); turmeric.

Field 73, 94; 73A, 74A.

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These samples represent the rhizome and powdered root of turmeric. The root, called Indian saffron, is imported from India as a dye stuff, but is sometimes employed in Iran as a condiment. In medicine turmeric is a stimulant, tonic, and aromatic. Like other yellow roots, it is used in a decoction as a cooling lotion for conjunctivitis. Turmeric contains a yellow coloring matter, curcumin, and a thick, viscid oil.

Curcuma Zedoaria Roxb. and C. Zerumbet Roxb. (Zingiberaceae)

زرمباد

Zurunbād (Teh.); Kachura (Hind.); Uruk-el-kafur (Ar.); zedoary, long zedoary.

Field 148; W.H.M.M. 150910.

Zedoary is imported in quantity from India, most of it to be passed on to Turkestan. The root occurs in thin, transverse slices, 2 to 5 cm. in diameter, pale brown and wrinkled without, smooth and mealy within, odor camphoraceous, taste pungent and bitter.
[263] The drug, which is also employed as a condiment, is carminative and stimulant, and an ingredient in various alterative medicines.—It is recommended for relief of flatulence (H.F.).

Cuscuta planifolia Ten. and C. hyalina Roth (Convolvulaceae)

تخم کشوث

Tukhm-i-kushūth, Tukhm-i-kishvar, Resha-i-kishvar (Ham., Isf., Teh.); Gul-i-geshuz (Ham.); Kukil-i-pol, "moist silk" (Kash.); Aftīmūn, the herb; Kashūth is the Arabic name for dodder; Kassutha (Gr.); Cuscuta (Lat.), hence Keshus (Pers.); kill weed; seeds and flowers.

Boiss. 4: 117; Ph. Ind. 1: 548; Sci. Pa. 240.

Field 187, 226, 436, 437; W.H.M.M. 150734, 150782; K.B. 313.

Gul-i-keshus (the flowers) and Tukhm-i-keshus (the seeds) are exported from Iran to India mixed with the leaves and spines of the plants on which they grow. The seeds are light brown and have a bitter taste. The flowers are given for asthma—as an infusion, one cup, for catarrh (H.F.)—and for obesity the (thin, filamentous stems). The drug Aftīmūn, Epitymon (Gr.), is probably derived from *C. europaea*, a native of Europe and western Asia. It is given as a digestive and purifier of the blood, just as in Europe dodder is an ancient remedy for intestinal disorders such as constipation and flatulence.

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278* said to be a tonic medicine and useful as an application for rheumatism and snake bites.
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Elettaria Cardamomum Maton. (Zingiberaceae)

هل

Hil (Iraq); Arak or Erok Hail (Bagh.); Ilachi (Hind.): cardamom fruits.

Field 38A, 59 (Iraq).

There are two kinds of cardamoms sold in Iran and Iraq: the small or Malabar cardamom from the above plant, and the great or Nepal cardamom from *Amomum subulatum* Roxb. (q.v.). They are both imported, but the first kind is occasionally cultivated in Iraq in
• [263] shaded gardens. As a masticatory and for flavoring food, as in curry, the Malabar or small cardamom is preferred by the natives,
[257] but the other kind, which is cheaper and of less delicate flavor, is used largely by sweetmeat makers.

Embelia Ribes Burm. (Myrsinaceae)

برنج كابلى

Birinj-i-kābulī (Teh., Isf.); Berengue Kaboli (Schl.); Baberang (Hind.); the fruits, Embely currants.

Fl. Br. Ind. 3: 513; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 349.

Field 419; K.B. 316.

This shrub grows throughout India, where the berries have long been known as a medicine. Susruta described the anthelmintic properties of the fruits, which were given the Sanskrit name Vrishanasana, "destroyer of enemy (worm)." The drug is referred to in all Mohammedan works of medicine, and its value in removing tapeworm (*Taenia*) in children and adults has been abundantly confirmed. The fruits are globular, dull red, with a 5-parted calyx, and stalked. The outer shell is striated from base to apex, the seed is horny and embedded in reddish brown afflorescence. In 1888 Warden separated the crystalline active principle, embelic acid. Brissemoret in 1907 showed this substance to be an oxyquinone.

Entada gigas (L.) Fawc. & Rendle (Leguminosae)

قرص كمر

Qurs-i-kamar, "nuts for loins" (Teh.); Gila (Beng.); Garabi (Hind.); the seeds.

Field 47.

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Achundow; Ait.; Schl.; Boiss. 1: 189; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 153; I.H.B. Field 150; K.B. 317.

This small, annual herb, hoary with close, appressed hairs, is frequent in Kashmir and Iran, and westward to Europe and West Africa. The seeds, with those of *Sisymbrium Sophia* L. and *S. Irio*, are exported into India from Iran under the name of Khākshīr. They are small, oblong, 1 mm. long, reddish or yellowish brown, smooth, and shining (not dull like those of *S. Sophia*). When placed in water, they become coated with transparent mucilage. The kernel is yellowish and oily and has the flavor of mustard. The seeds are given in fever and, in the form of a poultice, are used to relieve stomach pains.—They are often smoked to relieve eye diseases (H.F.).

Eugenia aromatica Baill. (Myrtaceae)

قرنفل

Qaranful, Qaranful-asward (Iraq); Karanaphal (Ar.); Laung (Hind.); cloves, the flower buds.

Field 43 (Iraq), 69A, 70A, 102.

• [265] Cloves, the well-known spice, consisting of the flower buds of a tree originally belonging to the Moluccas, are sold in all bazaars in the East. In modern medicine, cloves are used as a carminative and stimulant to relieve irritation of the throat, and the oil to relieve the pain of toothache. The oil, which is the most important constituent of cloves, is obtainable to the extent of 16 to 20 per cent. It is a mixture of a terpene and an oxygenated oil called eugenol.

Ferula galbaniflua Boiss. (Umbelliferae)

باريجه

Bārījah, Bariz, Rish-shar, Gavshira (Teh.); jāv or gāv means a cow, and shīr, milk; in allusion to the milky nature of the juice; gum galbanum.

Boiss. 2: 988; Schl. 295; Laufer 363; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 2: 152.

Field 131, 135; W.H.M.M. 150797; K.B. 317.

The galbanum plant is found in moist localities, as in the Badghis near Gulvan, where it grows in sandy soil. The stem is thick at the base, tapering suddenly and reaching a height of 4 feet. The stem, on injury, yields an orange yellow juice, which slowly consolidates into tears, and has a strong odor of celery. The sample from Tehran is said to have come from Kurdistan or Māzanderān. Galbanum is taken internally as a stomachic. Externally it is applied

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باد یان سبز

Bādiyān-i-sabz, Tukhm-i-rāziyānah (Teh., Ham.); Badyan (Afg.); the fruits of fennel.

Post 356; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 124; On the Commercial Varieties of Fennel, J. C. Umney, Pharm. Journ. 58 (1897) 225; I.H.B.

Field 16, 55A, 233, 413; W.H.M.M. 150771; K.B. 318.

Fennel is a stately, umbelliferous plant cultivated for its fruits in several parts of Europe and Asia. The fruits are frequently, in the bazaars, confounded with aniseed (*Pimpinella Anisum* L.), the Persian name for which is Badian, and Bādiyān-i-sabz is usually applied to fennel fruits. The taste is sweet and aromatic, and the fruits contain from 3 to 5 per cent of essential oil with anethol as the principal ingredient. J. C. Umney found the odor of Irani fennel nearer to anise than any other variety of fruit examined, the percentage of anethol being higher and fenchone comparatively low. • [263] Fennel is valued as a condiment and enters into mixtures given for dysentery and colds.

The root of the fennel plant is a rather important medicine in native practices, being to the present day esteemed as one of the five "opening roots" of the ancients, the other four being parsley, celery, asparagus, and butcher's broom.—Fennel roots, with *Carum copticum* Benth. & Hook., are given as an infusion for flatus; and alone as an infusion for toothache and to relieve pains following childbirth (H.F.).

Fritillaria imperialis L. (Liliaceae)

گل سر نگون

Gul-i-sarnigūn (Teh.), "the bulbs of the topsy-turvy"; "the tubers of a plant, the flowers of which, according to the natives, hang upside down, considered rare in Afghanistan and highly valued as a medicine" (Aitchison). Another Persian name for this plant is Gul-i-shirper, "flowers of six feathers."

Boiss. 5: 189; Ph. Ind. 3: 498.

Field 178, 189; W.H.M.M. 150882; K.B. 318.

Crown imperial is common on the mountain slopes of Kurdistan. The drug consists of broken pieces of thick, whitish corms, without odor or taste. The starch is oval and regular. A toxic alkaloid has been separated from them by Fragner (1888). The corms of this plant are valued as a medicine in the Far East, chiefly for chest complaints and toothache. Regarding the Irani drug, it is said,

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in more northern countries. The fruit is composed of fine, slender, angular carpels twisted like corkscrews, which together form a cone 3.5 to 5 cm. long. The carpels are pubescent and greenish brown, and each one contains a single row of dark brown, angular seeds. 829* 278*

The drug has demulcent and slightly astringent properties, and is employed as a medicine for dysentery and for griping of bowels and flatulence in children.

Heracleum persicum Desf. (Umbelliferae)

گل سپر

Gul-i-sipar (Teh.); Gul-i-parr (Isf.); Goleper (Kerm.); Giafari (Schl.); the fruits.

Schl.; Post; Boiss. 2: 1044.

Field 434; W.H.M.M. 150779; K.B. 320.

This species of cow parsnip is indigenous to the moist valleys of the Elburz Mountains, and is related to *H. pubescens* M.B., of a wider range. Boissier refers the plant Goulpere to *H. lasiopetalum.* The fruits, which are sold as a spice and used in pickles, are ovate-oblong, villous on the back, the margin aculeate, the dorsal vittae thick and clavate, reaching to two-thirds the length of the mericarp. While some of these plants are used medicinally and for food, other species in America and Europe are poisonous and produce erysipelatous inflammation (Cornerin, "Des Plantes Vénéneuses," 1887). [263]•

Hibiscus cannabinus L. (Malvaceae)

حل جل

Jiljil (Iraq); Hab-el-zalim (Ar.); Palsan (Hind.); Ambari (Duk.); the seeds.

Field 61 (Iraq).

The Deccan hemp plant is grown in western India and the tropics. The seeds are dull grayish brown, triangular or kidney-shaped, 5 by 3 mm. They contain an oil useful for culinary and lubricating purposes. The seeds are used in medicine and as cattle food. [252] [231]

—*H. Trionum* L., Qunnab, called Jiljil near Basra, yields a bast fiber resembling that of the Deccan (H.F.).

Holarrhena antidysenterica Wall. (Apocynaceae)

میوه زبان کنجشک

Mīvah-i-zabān-i-gunjishk, Tukhm-zabān-i-gunjishk-i-talkh, "the seeds of the bitter sparrow's tongue" (Pers.); Lizan ul asafir (Achundow); Indrajaou (Hind.); Estrefanthus; the seeds.

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Ait.; Boiss. 4: 295; Schl.; Post; Ph. Ind. 2: 626.

Field 217; K.B. 321.

This species of *Hyoscyamus*, as well as *H. muticus* L. and *H. pusillus* L., is found wild in Iran and Syria. Aitchison observed that goats and sheep grazed on henbane plants without apparently bad effects, and the shepherds did not look upon these plants as poisonous. The seeds, however, are regarded by native physicians to be as poisonous as opium; they are exported from Iran to India. Henbane seeds are reniform, laterally compressed, grayish brown, with the testa finely reticulated. The taste is oily, bitter, and acrid; they contain the poisonous alkaloid, hyoscyamine.—The smoke of the seed is inhaled for toothache (H.F.).

Hyssopus officinalis L. var. angustifolia Boiss. (Labiatae)

گل پونه

Gul-i-pūnah (Teh.); Zupha-e-yabis (Ar.); Jupha (Hind.); hyssop, the herb.

W.H.M.M. 150723.

The true hyssop is a small, aromatic plant of Iran, Sind, and southern Europe. It is from 6 to 10 inches high, with a slender, square stem, hairy flowers in oblong spikes, of a brownish or bluish purple color and with the odor of hay. The seeds are oblong, three-angled, dark brown mottled with a red tint. The plant is given as a stimulant, carminative, and diaphoretic.

Illicium verum Hook. f. (Magnoliaceae)

بادنجان خطائی

Bādiyān-i-khatā'i, "anise of China" (Pers.); from Tehran.

Schl.; Ph. Ind. 1: 41.

Field 190; W.H.M.M. 150715; K.B. 321.

The star anise of commerce is obtained from trees growing in South China and Indo-China. Star anise was a new medicine and spice in Persia a hundred years ago, but the fruits and oil are now shipped regularly to India from China, and reach Iran via Bombay. The star-shaped fruits, composed of eight brown, radiating, boat-shaped carpels, vary from 3 to 3.5 cm. in diameter. They contain about 5 per cent of essential oil, consisting of solid and liquid anethol. The fruits and oil are stomachic, given to relieve cough and lung affections, and are used in confectionery and for seasoning food.

• [263]

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The seeds of this plant[1] are larger than those of *L. Royleana* Benth., being 5 by 1.5 mm., brownish in color, and with a V-shaped mark at the apex. They slowly become coated with mucilage when placed in water. The plant is one of the potherbs of Iran. [263] •

Lallemantia Royleana Benth. (Labiatae)

بالنكو شيرازى

Bālingū (Ham.); Bālingū-shīrāzī (Teh.); seeds.

Boiss. 4: 674; Ph. Ind. 3: 90.

Field 4; 15 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150901; K.B. 323.

This plant is found throughout Iran, Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Turkestan, and northern India.

The seeds are black, narrowly oblong, 3 by 1 mm., smooth, angled on the inner side, arched on the other, a white spot at the narrow end or umbilicus. When soaked in water they immediately become coated with an opaque, gray, tasteless mucilage. The seeds are used for coughs.

Languas officinarum Burkill (*Alpinia officinarum* Hance) (Zingiberaceae)

خولنجان

Khūlanjān (Teh.); lesser galangal.

Schl.; Ph. Ind. 3: 437; Sci. Papers 370.

W.H.M.M. 150877; K.B. 324.

This plant is indigenous to the Chinese island of Hainan, and is cultivated on the neighboring coast of Kwangtung and in Siam. The rhizome is an ancient spice and medicine of the East and is occasionally brought to Europe. The root is about 5 cm. long and less than 1.3 cm. in diameter, often branching, of a rusty brown color, longitudinally striated, and transversely marked with remains of leaf sheaths. The odor is aromatic and the taste hot and spicy. Galangal root is used as a condiment and is given as a stomachic and for rheumatism. [263]

Lathyrus sativus L. (Leguminosae)

حرتومان

Hurtāmūn (Iraq); Kesari (Hind.); Lakh (Bom.); Lang (Guz.); the chickling vetch and seeds.

Field 74 (Iraq), 65A.

[1] [Lallemantica iberica - for indigeneous names see p. 132, category 116, MAI Iran -- Analyst]

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This plant, allied to *Colchicum*, occurs in North Iran, Afghanistan, the juniper tracts of Baluchistan, and in the Punjab. Aitchison found this plant common all over the Badghis and Khorasan. The corms are collected as a medicine and exported from Meshed through Iran via the Persian Gulf to India. The drug is one of the forms of the ancient Hermodactyl. It is probably the Surinjan-i-shirin or sweet Surinjan, a medicine used by Mohammedans in India. The root from Hamadan is broken into pieces showing a white, starchy fracture with no perceptible taste or smell. The drug is said to have the same action as the bitter Surinjan (*Colchicum* spp.) as a remedy for rheumatism.

Mirabilis Jalapa L. (Nyctaginaceae)

تخم لال عباس

Tukhm-i-lāl'abbās (Teh.); Gul-i-abbasa (Pers.); fruits of the marvel of Peru.

W.H.M.M. 150895.

The marvel of Peru or four-o'clock is a plant of tropical America. It is named *Mirabilis*, or wonderful, on account of the variegated colors of the flowers, and *Jalapa*, as it was formerly supposed to be the true jalap plant. The fruits are oval or vase-shaped, 8 by 5 mm., dark reddish brown, five-ribbed, and papillate, containing a white, starchy seed. Little is known about its medicinal action, but the fruits have been said to be used in adulterating black pepper. [263] •

Morus nigra L. (Moraceae)

شاه توت

The fruits: Tūt-i-kushk (Teh.).

The root: Rishah-shāh-tūt (Teh.).

The tree: Shāh-tūt, "royal mulberry" (Pers.).

Field 46A, 269, 402; K.B. 327.

The black or grafted mulberry is cultivated in Iran and Baluchistan, principally for its fruit; the white mulberry (*M. alba*), for sericulture. They both yield fruit which in season is sold in the bazaar and met with in nearly every household (Ait.). When carefully dried, the fruits are called Tut-i-dham, and supply a wholesome and nutritious article of diet during winter. [262] [231] [245]

The other drug of the mulberry tree from Tehran consists of the bark of the root, reddish colored externally, with strong, silky white liber cells. It is used for dysmenorrhea.

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Myristica fragrans Houtt. (Myristicaceae)

جوز بویا

Jauz-i-būyā, "fragrant nut" (Teh., Ar.); Bazbaz (Pers.); Jaephal (Hind.); nutmeg and mace.

Field 147; W.H.M.M. 150851.

• [263] The well-known seeds of the nutmeg are used all over India and Iran as a spice and for medicinal purposes.

Mace, the aril or testa, called Gul-i-jauz or "flower of the nutmeg," is sold and employed for the same purpose as the kernel.

Myrtus communis L. (Myrtaceae)

تخم مورد

Tukhm-i-mūrd (Teh.); Hab-el-aas (Ar.); Uurd (Abu Mansur); myrtle fruits.

مورد سبز

Mūrd-i-sabz; Barg-i-mūrd (Teh.); leaves of the myrtle.

Field 24; W.H.M.M. 150814, 150827.

Myrtle berries are black, pea-shaped, aromatic, and slightly sweet; each fruit contains several white, hard, kidney-shaped seeds. The leaves are small, lanceolate, and dotted with glands, emitting an agreeable odor when bruised. All parts of the myrtle contain a volatile oil to which the virtues of the plant are due. The plant is stimulant and astringent, and the volatile oil is antiseptic, parasiticide, and rubefacient.—It is applied hot as a poultice for boils (H.F.).

Nannorrhops Ritchieana Wendl. (Palmae)

کاکل زرد

Kākil-i-zard (Teh.); Khove, Khū (Afg.); fiber of the dwarf palm.

W.H.M.M. 150798.

[372] The soft fiber or tomentum, very like camel's hair, from the petioles of this palm is used as tinder and for dressing wounds. Khū is the name in Afghanistan for tinder obtained from any source and used in lighting pipes and fires.

Nardostachys Jatamansi DC. (Valerianaceae)

سنبل لطیب

Sumbul-i-latif, Sumbulu'l-tib (Teh., Isf.); Sumbul-jibali (Ar.); Jaṭa-masi (Sans., Hind.); Balchar (Afg.); Bekh-i-sumbul (Pers.); musk root, Indian spikenard.

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824* Thebba (253 Iraq). Snuff, tobacco powder soaked in ʻAraq.

276 Bernooty (234 Iraq). Snuff, tobacco powder perfumed with jasmine.

824* **Nigella sativa Sibth. (Ranunculaceae)**

278* سیاه تخمه

• 263 Tukhm-i-siyāh, Siyāh-danan, Siyāh-tukhmah (Teh.); Hab-es-souda (Ar., Egy., Iraq); Kala jira, Mugrila (Hind.); false or black cumin, fitches.

Boiss. 1: 68; Ph. Ind. 1: 28.

Field 42; 56A; 7, 21 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150906; K.B. 327.

This is an annual herb, sometimes called nutmeg flower or fennel flower, cultivated in Egypt, Syria, and Iran. According to Birdwood, the seeds are the black cumin of the Bible, the melanthion of Dioscorides, and the gith of Pliny. They are black, triangular, 3 mm. long, the testa rough-wrinkled, with a white, oily kernel within. When crushed they have a pleasant odor of lemon. The seeds contain an essential oil, a fixed oil, and a saponin-like body, and are used extensively as a spice and medicine. The ancient Mohammedan custom of sprinkling the seeds, like those of cumin, over the surface of bread, still prevails in Tehran and Tabriz. There is an Arab proverb: "In the black seed is the medicine for every disease except death." Around Tabriz *N. arvensis* L. is cultivated as a potherb and for its seeds. It is called Gara tsochorek oti, "Black bread weed" (Gilliat-Smith).

824* **Nymphaea alba L. (Nymphaeaceae)**

278* گل نیلوفر

Gul-i-nīlūfar, Nīlūfar-i-kirmānashāhī (Teh.); Nenuphar (Ph. Pers.); white water lily flowers.

Ait.; Boiss. 1: 104; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 114; Ph. Ind. 1: 70.

Field 10, 207; W.H.M.M. 150781, 150858; K.B. 328.

These are the flowers, stalks, and leaves of the white water lily, found in ponds throughout Europe and Siberia. Nīlūfar is a name also applied to flowers of other water lilies, and sometimes to species of *Ipomoea*, which have blue flowers. Kamal, the flowers of a *Nymphaea*, is sold in drug shops in India, and occasionally the flowers of the sacred or Egyptian lotus (*Nelumbium speciosum* L.) are used medicinally throughout China. The flowers have cooling and astringent properties, and are administered locally, especially to

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Field 194; W.H.M.M. 150774; K.B. 328.

Schlimmer remarks that Shiraz supplies Iran with these seeds and adds that they are an indispensable ingredient in iced sherbet (sorbets à la glace). The seeds, or nutlets, are black, punctulate, oblong or ellipsoid, 2 by 1 mm., arched on one side, with a bifurcate line on the other. They are smaller than those of the sweet basil, with a less prominent, white umbilicus, but, like them, they become coated with opalescent mucilage when placed in water. The seeds are given locally for lung and chest complaints and as a heart tonic.

Olea europea L. (Oleaceae)

زيتون

Zaitūn; olive.

[262] Cultivated for its fruits and for the extraction of oil, the olive tree provides an important article of diet and medicinal remedy.—Leaves are sometimes prepared as a decoction for coughs (H.F.).

Onosma echioides L. (Boraginaceae)

ريشه هوه چوبه

Rīshah havah-i-chūbah (Ham.); Havah-i-chūbah (Teh.); Ratanjot (Hind.); Indian alkanet root.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 4: 181; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 178; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 2: 54.

Field 165; W.H.M.M. 150718; K.B. 329.

This plant, growing in Afghanistan and Siberia, affords a root which is substituted for European alkanet (*Anchusa tinctoria*), from Al-kanna of the Arabs, employed as a dye and medicine in early times. The root of the allied species, *O. Hookeri* Clarke, is called Ranj-i-badshah, "King's dye." The tapering root has a [386] purplish red color, and the cortical portion easily separates in flakes. It imparts its color to oils and spirits, and is used in coloring medicinal [231] preparations. In Iran the root is powdered and given to horses for coughs and as a condition powder.

Orchis latifolia L. (Orchidaceae)

سعلب

Sa'lab (Teh.); Salab-misri (Ar.); Punjah-i-salaba; Oriental salep.

Field 229; W.H.M.M. 150908.

Palmate or hand-shaped tubers of orchids are considered the best for medicinal purposes. They are deprived of their epidermis by

Field 69, 409; W.H.M.M. 150847; K.B. 308. I-I

The well-known dill is a tall, annual or biennial herb, with a strong, aromatic odor, finely dissected leaves, and umbels of yellow flowers. Dill fruits are sold in the bazaars and used as a condiment and carminative. On distillation they yield an oil used in medicine for the preparation of dill water. The plant is often confused with fennel and the fruit with caraway seed; hence the name Karawyah, sometimes used. In Iran dill serves as a potherb; the leaves are cooked with rice as a condiment to restore lost appetite. 824* 278* [263] •

Phaseolus radiatus L. (Leguminosae) 824*

ماش 262

Māsh (Iraq, Pers.); Urd or Urid (Ind.); Masha (Sans.); the seeds.

Field 76A, 274; 5, 60 (Iraq).

Mash is cultivated as a summer pulse crop, sometimes mixed with maize or sorghum. The green pods are eaten as a vegetable, and the plant is used as fodder or green manure. The small, green, oblong beans are cooked and eaten, made into biscuits, cakes, and sweetmeats. In Afghanistan this pulse is so much esteemed that it is called Mash-i-maha, "the king of peas." [246]

Phaseolus vulgaris L. (Leguminosae)

فاصوليه

Fāsūliyah (Iraq); Lubia, Lubia-kermiz (red) (Teh.); Rāzmah (Kash.); French bean; the seeds.

Field 69, 70, 77A, 75 (Iraq).

The French or kidney bean is grown as a vegetable or a pulse in kitchen gardens. The pods can be eaten green and the ripe seeds dried as haricot beans, or white soup beans.

The beans are ovate, oblong, 12 to 14 by 6 to 8 mm., white, red, or brown, splashed with black streaks, the hilum on the inner side.

Phoenix dactylifera L. (Palmae) 824*

نخل . تمر 245

Tamr (ripe fruit), Rutab (half ripe), Khalal (unripe), Nakhli (male tree), Khurmā; the date palm, date. 262

Date gardens are found on both sides of the Euphrates from An Nasiriya to Basra. From Nahr Umr down the Shatt-al-Arab to Fao is the largest date-growing district in the world. There are

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This is a plant of Arabia, Syria, Iran, and Baluchistan, distributed also in Europe. The berries are like dried cherries, but full of pulp, in which are embedded many reniform, yellowish seeds. As sold in the bazaars, broken fragments of the red, accrescent calyces are mixed with the drug. The fruits are said by Schlimmer to be hydragogue and vermifuge. Achundow indicates their use in certain female complaints. Locally they are regarded as a remedy for syphilis, and are supposed to be intoxicating when taken in sufficient quantity.

Pimpinella Anisum L. (Umbelliferae)

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انيسون

Anisūn, Badian-i-rumi (Teh.); Antchibun, a corruption of Anisum (Tab.); Erva dos, from Portuguese Herba doce (Dymock); aniseed.

Ait.; Boiss. 2: 866; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 1: 131.

Field 25; 35A; 10 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150768; K.B. 330.

Aniseed is cultivated largely in the U.S.S.R., as well as in Iran, for its seed, which is employed as a condiment and medicine. The fruit is often confounded with fennel, as the Arabic name Badian in some districts is applied to aniseed and in others to fennel. Aniseed has been introduced into India from Iran, whence the supply for the Bombay market still comes. It is mainly a Mohammedan medicine and is given in cough mixtures, and as a flavoring agent. Arak-badiani or anise water, prepared by distillation, is mentioned by Schlimmer, and local spirit is still flavored with it. The active principle resides in an essential oil consisting of 80 to 90 per cent of solid anethol, which separates slightly below ordinary temperatures, and anisic methyl charvicol.

Piper Cubeba L. (Piperaceae)

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كبابه چينى

Kabābah-i-chīnī (Teh., Isf.); Kabab-chini (Hind.); cubeb pepper.

Field 25, 440; W.H.M.M. 150880.

Cubeb or tailed pepper is imported from Malaya and Java; it was formerly supposed to have come from China. The commercial drug consists of nearly globular fruits measuring about 4 mm. in diameter, of grayish brown or black, reticulately wrinkled on the surface, and abruptly prolonged at the base into a slender stalk or "tail." Within the pericarp is a single seed. Cubebs exhale, when

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crushed, a spicy odor, and possess a strong, spicy, and bitter taste. They have a stimulant and antiseptic action on the mucous membrane of the genito-urinary organs, and are also a diuretic.

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Pistacia integerrima Stew. (Anacardiaceae)

چهار تنخوش

Chahār tankh'ūsh (Teh.); **Chatlanguch** (Ham.); **Kharshnai** (Kash.); fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150839; K.B. 331.

This is the northwestern Himalayan form of the turpentine tree, called also the false or donkey mastich. The small drupes are broader than long, 5 by 6 mm., glabrous, rugose, gray with a bony stone. They have a marked terebinthinate odor, and are used locally to impart flavor to milk.

جفت

Field 201; W.H.M.M. 150706.

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Under the name of Jift or Juft, the broken shells of the galls of the turpentine tree are sold in Tehran. Being very astringent, they are used for tanning; mixed with lime, they remove hair from skins.

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Pistacia Khinjuk Stocks. (Anacardiaceae)

حب الغار

Habbu'l ghār (Isf.); **Habul-khazra** (Teh.); **Hebbul-beneh** (Ar.); the fruits.

Field 449; 116 (Iraq); K.B. 331.

سبز گلنج

Subz-i-gulanj (Teh.); **Buzghanj** (Ham., Isf.); **Gul-i-pisteh** (Bom.); **Afs-el-batum** (Tri.); the galls.

Ait.; Boiss. 2: 6; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 1: 377.

Field 422; W.H.M.M. 150878; K.B. 331.

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This tree is common in Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan, and has been described under different species names. The tree yields a resin-like material, and the nuts, which are eaten, afford a sweet oil; the leaves and galls are employed for tanning. The small, seed-like fruits are oval in shape, 6 mm. long, reddish brown in color, with an acid taste and terebinthinate odor. The fruits are eaten and are said to be good for debility.—Prepared like tea, they relieve stomach pains (H.F.).

I-I

This agaric occurs on the oak and larch, and in sizes as large as a 824*
fist or a child's head; it is light, spongy, and friable, and is not easily 278*
powdered. The use of this fungus in medicine is of very ancient date. Avicenna insists upon the great efficacy of agaric as an alexipharmic. Mohammedan physicians closely follow the Greeks in considering that it removes all kinds of visceral obstructions and expels diseased humors. It is also a Chinese drug. The light, white, spongy interior [372] is made into touchwood, spunk, or tinder, and was formerly used to absorb blood and secretions from wounds, etc.; hence the old name Fungus or Boletus Chirurgorum given to the plant.

Prosopis Stephaniana Kunth (Leguminosae)

خرنوبان

Kharnūbān, Kornub (Isf.); Shok (Ar.); Kunbut (Syr.); Chughak: "humpbacked, bent," applied to the contorted pods, Tukhm-i-jinjak (Ait.); the pods.

Field 403.

This is a loose, straggling, thorny shrub of the Caucasus, Syria, Iran, and northern India. The pods are brown or copper-colored, 4 by 1.5 cm., galled, swollen, and contorted, containing several oval, brown seeds separated by soft, spongy dissepiments. The pods are [231] eaten by sheep, but the seeds pass through undamaged and germinate readily at the coming of the winter rains (G.). The pods and roots of the plant are regarded as astringent and are given for dysentery.

Prunus Amygdalus Stokes var. amara Baill. (Rosaceae) [245]

بادام تلخ

Bādām-i-talkh (Teh.); bitter almonds.

Field 52A, 171.

The bitter almond tree, like the sweet, is a native probably of Iran and Asia Minor, and is indistinguishable in botanical characters. In form and appearance bitter almonds closely resemble Valencia almonds, but are usually smaller. They are employed in [263] •
confectionery and for flavoring, but as the hydrocyanic acid yielded by them varies in quantity, they should be used with caution.—An ointment made of bitter almonds is applied to furuncles (H.F.).

Prunus Armeniaca L. (Rosaceae) 824*

زرد آلو 262

245

The fruit: Zard ālū (Pers.); Mishmish (Iraq); Khūbani, with stones removed (Hind.); dried apricot.

I-I

Field 264; 4, 12, 36, 53 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150739; K.B. 335. 824*

The castor oil plant[1] is a native of India, but is common now 278* throughout tropical and subtropical countries. In Iraq and Iran 372 it is cultivated as a windbreak for cotton and other summer crops [247] and in gardens as an ornamental plant. It may attain a height of 10 meters and be a perennial tree, but in cooler climates it is either [245] a shrub or an annual herb. With variations of the plant there are also varieties, large and small, of the seeds. The four samples from Iraq were classed as follows: "Abhangi seeds" 15 by 9 mm., "ordinary" 13 by 10 mm., "Indian red-stemmed" 11 by 8 mm., "Syrian Baladi" 13 by 11 mm. The most important constituent of castor seed is the fixed oil, which exists to the extent of about 50 per cent. The oil is used as a lubricant, as an illuminant, and in medicine as a safe purgative. The oil cake contains all the poisonous property originally present in the seed, hence can not be used as a cattle food; [241] it is, however, an excellent manure and fuel.

Roccella Montagnei Bél. (Ascolichenes, Roccellaceae) 824*

دواله 278*

Davālah (Ham.); a lichen.

Field 28A; W.H.M.M. 150824; K.B. 336.

Achundow refers this drug to *Muscus arboreus*, and gives the Persian names as Dawalak and Karbasu and the Arabic name as Aschna (*Usnea* sp.). The Persian name Davālah is applied to more than one kind of lichen, since Dymock gives *Parmelia kamtschadalis* Esch. as the source of this drug in the Indian bazaars (Ph. Ind. 3: 627). In the Field collection from Baghdad, No. 28A, this drug occurs under the name of "Lihayat as-shāyib." Some of the Parmelias are used as a dye. They are gray lichens, in broken pieces, having emollient and astringent properties, used in a bath or as a poultice.

824*

Rosa damascena Mill. (Rosaceae) 213•

گل سرخ 278*

Gul-i-surkh, "red flower" (Teh.); Ward (Ar.); flowers of red rose.

Field 42A; W.H.M.M. 150763.

The rose of Damascus is largely cultivated in western Asia. In Turkey, Bulgaria, and the south of France this species yields attar of rose and is the flower from which the official rose water is prepared.

The petals are slightly astringent, and are used chiefly as an [386] agreeable astringent or as a coloring agent. "Gulanjabin," of rose

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[1] [Ricinus communis --ANALYST]

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[257]

"Gulanjabin," of rose petals mixed with honey, is a confection sold in Eastern bazaars. "Gulkhand" is a conserve made from equal parts of rose petals and white sugar beaten together.—Rose petals are added to curry as a flavoring (H.F.).

Rosa foetida Herm. (Rosaceae)

گل زرد

Gul-i-zard, "yellow flower" (Teh.); Gole zarde (Schl.).

A. Olivier ("Voyage dans l'Empire Ottoman, l'Egypte et la Perse," Paris, 1807); Boiss. 2: 671.

Field 154; W.H.M.M. 150823; K.B. 336.

[247] The Persian yellow rose is a shrub cultivated in gardens. This is the yellow Austrian briar in a wild state, ranging from the Crimea and Asia Minor through Iran to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and the Punjab to eastern Tibet. Aitchison calls it Gul-i-raman-zeba, "lovely flower" of the Hari Rud Valley. Dried rose petals, obtained chiefly from Iran, are sold in the bazaars in India and are prescribed for colic and diarrhea.

Rosa hemisphaerica Herm. (Rosaceae)

دماوره

Damaverah (Ham.); Dalik, Ward (Ar.); the hips.

Ph. Ind. 1: 574; Boiss. 2: 672; Post.

K.B. 336.

This rose occurs in Iran and Afghanistan and, according to Post, is cultivated extensively in Syria.

The drug consists of the hips of the plant. They are nearly globular, broader than long, from 10 by 7 mm. to 13 by 8 mm., crowned with the remains of sepals, red, wrinkled, and covered with short protuberances. Within are several light brown, hard, smooth seeds, 4 mm. long, mixed with silky hairs. The fruits are hot, dry, and astringent, and are given locally for stomach complaints.

Rubia Cordifolia L. and R. tinctorium L. (Rubiaceae)

رونأس

Rūnās, Rūniyās (Teh., Isf.); Rounace (Schl.); Fuwwah (Ar.); Manjit (Hind.); madder root.

Ait.; Boiss. 3: 17; Post 224; Schl.; Ph. Ind.

Field 6 (Isf.); 39; 109 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150726; K.B. 336.

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I-I
821✱ **Saccharum officinarum L.** (Gramineae)

• 263 شکر سرخ

Shakar-i-surkh (Teh.); sugar cane.

W.H.M.M. 150711.

This is a sample of crude sugar or Gur, a soft, saccharine mass, reddish in color, and very soluble in water. The unrefined, dark brown Guda of the Hindus was known to the ancient Persians, as well as Shakar from which the dry, crystalline sugar was made. At Leh there are five kinds of sugar imported: Tavi misri, flat cakes; Kusa misri, heavier cakes; Khand, soft brown crystals; Gur, coarse sugar; and Shahi or Kashi, sugar candy. The vernacular names Misri (Egyptian) for refined sugar, and Chini (Chin.) for sugar candy, indicate the comparatively recent introduction of these products into India and Iran.

824✱ **Salix fragilis L.** (Salicaceae)

278✱ بید خشت

Bid-khisht (Teh.); Bid-anjubin, "willow honey" (Afg.); Bide Knecht (Achundow); willow manna.

Field 127; W.H.M.M. 150748.

A saccharine secretion afforded by a species of willow has been referred to by old writers on Eastern medicine. The drug occurs in small, dirty white lumps, resembling in taste the European manna obtained from the ash (*Fraxinus Ornus* L.) of Sicily. It is recommended for *Herpes labialis*, or thrush.

Salvia Hydrangea DC. (Labiatae)

Gul-i-arbore(?) (Teh.); Issikuttuz (Turk.); Sarsand (Bal.); the flowers.

Boiss. 4: 606; Ph. Ind. 3: 94; Kew Bull. 1930, 459.

K.B. 337.

This is a handsome flowering plant of Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan. The drug consists of the mauve flowers with green-veined bracts and small, rounded, brown seeds. Dymock says it is allied to Jadeh, probably a *Teucrium*. The flowering tops of a *Moluccella*, having enlarged purple calyces and a balm-like odor, and the rose-colored, mucilaginous calyces of *Hymenocrater elegans* Br., are used in medicine in Iran under the name of Gul-i-serwaj. In Tabriz the inflorescence of *S. Hydrangea* is used for making a

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medicine for its stimulant (irritant) and antiseptic action in the genito-urinary tract.

Saussurea Lappa C. B. Clarke (Compositae)

قتلخ

Qust-i-talkh, Butinak (Teh.); Patchak (Beng.); Kutha Kushta patchuk (Hind.); Costum amarum (Ph. Pers.); Indian costus.

Ait.; Fl. Br. Ind. 3: 376; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 296.

W.H.M.M. 150813; K.B. 338.

The soft, fragrant, whitish root comes from plants grown as a Crown monopoly in Kashmir, and is exported to Iran, India, and China. This ancient and valuable drug was called Arabian costus as it was carried to Turkey and Europe by the Arabs. The root occurs in cylindrical or twisted pieces, light colored, with an agreeable odor and a bitter and biting aftertaste. A second sample of Kust from Hamadan was a smaller root, spirally twisted and lighter in color. Chob-i-kut is the name of a plant used to adulterate costus root in Afghanistan. Various chemical principles have been separated from the root, some of which account for the violet-like odor: Costulactone isomeric with alantolactone costus acid, dehydrocostus lactone, and costol. Costus root is prescribed externally and internally for various complaints, and is taken locally to ward off the effects of snake and animal bites.

Semecarpus Anacardium L. (Anacardiaceae)

بلادر

Balādur (Teh., Isf.); Bhela, Bhilava (Hind.); marking nut.

Field 439; W.H.M.M. 150873.

The marking nut tree inhabits the hotter part of India, Ceylon, and Burma. The black, obliquely cordate nuts contain within the pericarp a black, resinous, viscid, acrid juice which is used as marking ink. A local caustic and vesicant, the juice, when applied to the skin, causes intense pain and swelling. In small quantities, it is given for relief in rheumatic pains and leprous affections.—Prepared like tea, it is also taken to relieve flatulence following severe piles (H.F.).

824* **Sesamum indicum L. (Pedaliaceae)**

278*

سمسم

• 263 Simsim (Iraq); Kunjad (Kurd.); Kundij (Turk.); Til, Jinjili,

246 Gingelly (Hind.); til or sesame seed.

243

Field 128A, 52 (Iraq). I-I

Sesame is widely cultivated as a summer crop. The seeds, white, 824*
brown, or black, are used for garnishing cakes and sweetmeats and 278*
are eaten by the poor in times of scarcity. They contain about 50 263•
per cent of a fixed oil which is an excellent substitute for olive oil
or other salad oil in cooking. The oil cake is a cattle food. The 246
oil is also the basis of most of the fragrant or scented oils—medicated 243
oils prepared with various vegetable drugs.

In Baghdad, Rashi is the name given to a preparation of ground sesame seed after it has been soaked and roasted, which is used as an emollient, Rahishi (Ar.), Arwah-i-kunjad (Pers.).

Sesbania aculeata Poir. (Leguminosae) 824*

Sesbaniyah (Iraq); Saisaban (Egy.); Rasin (Hind.); Akar, 278*
Majandri (Bal.); Jayanti (Beng.); Sesbania seeds.

Field 47 (Iraq).

The plant has been introduced into Iraq and planted for windbreaks. The seeds are sold in bazaars throughout India and Iran. They are dull grayish brown, oblong, 2 by 4 mm., smooth, hard, and bitter to the taste. The Hindus have a superstition that sight of the seeds will remove the pain of scorpion stings. They are used medicinally on account of their astringent properties. The seeds are beaten into a paste which is applied locally to cure eruptions.

Sisymbrium Sophia L. (Cruciferae)

خاکشیرین

Khākshīr, Khākshīr-i-shīrīn (Teh.); Towdri, Khub-kalan, Khaksi (Hind.); the seeds.

Ait.; Schl.; Boiss. 1: 216; Ph. Ind. 1: 118, 121.

Field 4 (Isf.), 50; W.H.M.M. 150712.

These seeds resemble in size, shape, and color the drug Tukhm-i-khākshīr talkh, the bitter Khākshīr (*Erysimum* sp.), except that they are dull and not shiny. There are several kinds of cruciferous seeds known as "Towdri": pale, light brown, red, and black. The seed of *Lepidium Iberis* L., the Kasis of Iran, is one of them, and the seeds of *Matthiola incana* R. Br., from the Punjab and Sind, is another. The seeds are small, yellowish brown, 1 mm. in length, and become coated with transparent mucilage when placed in water. [832]
The drug is considered aphrodisiac, "fattening the body and purifying the blood."

I-I

Ait.; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 459; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 90. 824*

W.H.M.M. 150816; K.B. 339. 278*

Nux vomica or Kuchula seeds are frequently referred to in ancient Persian works. In the "Makhzan el Adwiya" they are said to have been used from very early times for paralysis. Called Azaraki by Indian Mohammedans, they are given for debility. The seeds are imported from India, and are known throughout Iran as a poison. Aitchison says, "The seed of the nux vomica is imported freely into these parts (northeast of Iran) as a valuable tonic, but it is chiefly employed by the nomad tribes for poisoning wolves and dogs, these animals frequently proving destructive to their flocks." [224]

Tagetes erecta L. (Compositae)

گل جعفری

Gul-i-ja'farī (Teh.); Ja'fari (Iraq); Gul gaindo (Bal.); Gul-jaferi (Hind.); Rojia (Port.); African marigold.

Field 86.

Both the African marigold and the French marigold (*T. patula* L.) are cultivated in flower gardens for their orange-yellow blossoms and scented foliage. They were probably introduced into India by the Portuguese. The flowers are often worn as garlands during religious festivals. Sold in the bazaars in India and Iran, the dried flower heads are said to purify the blood. [247]

Tamarindus indica L. (Leguminosae)

تخم تمر

Tukhm-i-tamr (Teh.); Baz-i-tamar-hindi (Ar.); seeds of the tamarind.

Field 262.

The seeds of the Indian tamarind tree are dark brown, shining, flattened, of an irregular outline, containing ivory-white cotyledons. Size is made from the seeds, and it appears that this preparation is used in Tehran as a plaster for boils (see "Tamarind Seed" by D. Hooper, *Agricultural Ledger*, No. 2, 1907).

Tamarix gallica L. var. mannifera Ehrenb. (Tamaricaceae) 824*

گز خونسار 263 •

Gaz-i-khūnsār, Gaz-alafi, Gaz-anjabin, "tamarisk honey" (Teh.); Gaz-i-shakar, "tamarisk sugar"; tamarisk manna.

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Ph. Pers.; Ait.; Boiss. 1: 778; Ph. Ind. 1: 161.

Field 13; W.H.M.M. 150881; K.B. 340.

Aitchison collected in the Badghis samples of manna from this variety of *Tamarix*, which the natives distinguished from the ordinary species, *T. gallica*. The saccharine exudation of these plants is said to be collected only in southeastern Iran, in the district of Kerman, where small galls also are formed on the leaves. In other parts of Iran Gaz-anjabin is obtained from other species of tamarisk (see *T. pentandra*). Ehrenberg believes the sugar to be formed as a result of the punctures of *Coccus manniparus*. The sample from Tehran is a dried cake of confection wrapped in silver paper, probably a mixture of the manna with ordinary sugar.

Tamarix pentandra Pall. (Tamaricaceae)

کز مازج

Guezmazedj (Teh.); Guize khouncar, Hebbel aale (Schl.); manna.

Tamarisk Manna, D. Hooper, Jour. As. Soc. Bengal, n.s. V, 1909, 31–36; Boiss. 1: 773.

K.B. 340.

The various species of tamarisk are the commonest shrubs or small trees found from Quetta to Balamtghab, and from Herat to Meshed, up to 3,000 feet. At least six species are widely distributed in Baluchistan, and two of them, *T. articulata* Vahl (Siah gaz) and *T. pentandra* (Shingir gaz), have been observed to yield a sweet gum. The latter is known to give large quantities of this saccharine secretion in the Helmand. The samples are [illegible]; they are sweet, sticky, transparent, quite soluble in water, and become hard and opaque when kept, owing to the crystallization of the saccharose.

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278*

Taxus baccata L. (Taxaceae)

زرنب

Zarnab (Isf.); Barambi, Talispatra (Hind.); Himalayan yew.

Field 430.

Zarnab is an Arabic name for an odoriferous drug and plant quoted by old writers on Eastern materia medica. The drug has been referred to various trees of the pine and fir group, particularly the yew and *Abies Webbiana* Lindl. (Ph. Ind. 3: 375). The present drug appears to consist of the staminate inflorescence of the yew, but other recorded specimens are mixtures of the leaves, branches, and

35q Hooper and Field 3-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MAI
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824* Achundow; I.H.B.; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 423; Ph. Ind. 1: 243.

278* Field 253; W.H.M.M. 150849; K.B. 342.

This plant is found in the sandy deserts of northwestern India, where the fruits are collected for the market. As a drug it is mentioned by Dioscorides and Pliny and in the Bower manuscript. The fruit, the size of a small bean, has five cells, each of which is wedge-shaped and armed with four strong prickles. The seeds are oily and enclosed in hard, stony cells. The fruits are diuretic and are said to act as a charm in bladder troubles. Dulm-ul-hasak and Rughan-i-char-i-chesak are names for an oil prepared from the fruits and applied to relieve rheumatism.—Small caltrops are given as an infusion for gonorrhea (H.F.).

[246] **Trifolium alexandrinum L. (Leguminosae)**

برسيم

Barsim (Iraq); seeds of berseem or Egyptian clover.

Field 31, 51 (Iraq).

This is a well-known fodder and green manure. Experiments have shown that it can be grown satisfactorily as a winter crop. The seeds are yellowish brown, smooth, oval, 2 mm. long.

Trifolium repens L. (Leguminosae)

تخم شبدر

Tukhm-i-shabdar (Teh.); Shaftal (Punj., Bal.); Nafal, Nifil (Iraq); white clover seed.

Field 29 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150902.

Clover or trefoil grows in northern India, at an elevation sometimes of 10,000 feet in the Himalayas. The seeds are oval, brown or green, and are used for making cooling poultices for boils.

Trigonella Foenum-graecum L. (Leguminosae)

تخم شنبليله

Tukhm-i-shambalilah (Teh., Ham.); Hulbah (Iraq); the seeds.

Shambalilah (Teh.); Methi (Hind., Bom.); the herb, fenugreek.

Ait.; I.H.B.; Boiss. 2: 70; Post; Ph. Ind. 1: 402.

Field 27, 71A, 213; 16 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150749, 150795; K.B. 343.

• [263] Fenugreek is cultivated universally in gardens as a potherb, and in Egypt and Afghanistan as a food and fodder crop. The leaves are occasionally used for poultices and in curries.

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Zizyphus vulgaris L. (Rhamnaceae)

عناب

'Unnāb, Barg-i-unnāb (Teh.); 'Unnāb' (Iraq); Ber (Hind.); jujube, fruits and leaves.

Achundow; Boiss. 2: 12; Ph. Ind. 1: 350; Post.

Field 12; 79A; W.H.M.M. 150801; K.B. 344.

The indigenous form of the jujube is a shrub, rarely a tree, in th hills from the Badghis eastward to Kashmir. It is cultivated in al orchards for its fruit, which is eaten by the natives, especially o journeys; this, Aitchison thinks, may account for the spread of th tree throughout Asia along caravan routes. The fruits, which ar sweet and wholesome, are the origin of the confection called jujube They are imported into India, and are used as a demulcent an medicinally from the Persian Gulf to China, where they exist in many varieties and constitute one of the important fruits of the country. The leaves of the jujube tree are eaten with catechu as an astringent, and are made into a poultice to promote the suppuration of boils.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Baṣra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

511
362 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the modernization and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two generations. 177 In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much ground. 562 Resistance to the emancipation of women was now narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law, followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work, and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded were still considerable, and included the households of many leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families, by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western type, by casinos and modernized cafés. ● [265] The traditional coffee shop kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include 575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class profes- 526 sional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

to him permanently. Women are almost invariably known by the 601
name of their eldest son, preceded of course by Umm. The other
extremely common practice is that of giving a man a laqab, or nick- 551
name, from some habit or personal peculiarity. The laqab is rarely
complimentary.

8. A Man's Honour is in the Hair of His Moustache

Page 111, Line 14. 'The hub in their house was empty of water.'

The hub is a large porous earthenware jar, which keeps water cool 415
by evaporation.

Page 112, Line 6. 'Nor did he even own the leg of a mare.'

The phrase 'leg of a mare' implies that a man has ownership in a 422
quarter share of the sale price of all foals from the mare. It is quite
common for deals to be done in one, two, or three legs of a mare, and
for one mare to have four owners.

Page 116, Line 13. 'Then will our sheikh cry, Sheil.'

Sheil, or Take away, is a word commonly used as an order to strike 192
camp.

Page 116, Line 28. 'You should not have to drink the water from a 312
camel's stomach.' 271

When threatened by death from thirst in the desert, Arabs may be
forced to slaughter their camels in order to drink the stomach fluids.
I have also been told that travellers have made their camels sick by
forcing a stick down their throats to get a little fluid. I do not know if
this is true. It would appear to me to be a most difficult operation.

Page 118, Line 29. 'Cut my head to keep the secret.'

This should probably have been more properly translated 'Cut my 192
head off to keep the secret,' for I have since been told one man's 539
version of this saying. According to his account there were three
brothers of a famous Nejaf family, living in poverty, and they were
forced to become thieves. One day they went to raid a Turkish Army
camp near to Hindya. In the daytime they watched the camp and
saw which was the guard tent in which the treasure chest was hidden.
They then waited till night, and, when the camp was asleep, they

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Adiantum Capillus-Veneris L. (Polypodiaceae)

پر سیاوش

Parr-i-siyāvash, Kashburat (Teh.); Kashburat-el-bir, "coriander of the wall" (Pers.); Krafas-al-bir, Shar-al-anat (Iraq); Kansburaj, Moohar-khas (Ind. bazaars); the fronds.

Ait.; Post; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 3: 624.

Field 49; W.H.M.M. 150714; K.B. 302.

The maidenhair fern is found in Iran, Afghanistan, the northwestern Himalayas, and western China, but other species of ferns are used medicinally and are called by similar names. The fronds of the fern are usually supplied, but the rhizome is credited with expectorant properties and is given for relieving difficult respiration and for spasms in whooping cough.

—A maidenhair fern decoction is served as a cooling drink during the summer (H.F.). [272] •

Agaric (Fungi) [262]

قارچ

Qārch (Teh.); Kriwarik (Turk.); dried mushrooms.

Field 242; W.H.M.M. 150775.

This is a portion of a hard fungus, gray brown on the outside and whitish within, 4 to 5 inches across. A notation is made on one sample that it is a vermifuge. Schlimmer identifies "Ghartsche" as *Agaricus esculentus*, one of the edible mushrooms, of which there are numerous species. For agaricum of the Greeks, Ghariqun, see *Polyporus officinalis*.

Alhagi camelorum Fisch. (Leguminosae)

ترنجبین

Tar-anjubin (Teh.); "green honey"; manna.

Field 1; W.H.M.M. 150888.

The camel's thorn (Kār shūtur, Pers.) is a thorny shrub found [314]
in the deserts of Iran, Syria, and Egypt. A saccharine exudation
forms on the plant. It is shaken off the branches, collected, and [263]
used as a sweetmeat and in medicine. It is supposed to be the "greenish cake" of Layard's "Travels," but this secretion was collected from oak trees (see *Quercus*). The white grains of manna separated from the pods, stalks, and leaves contain chiefly cane sugar; this is administered as a laxative and expectorant.

Field 106 (Iraq); 77A (Iran and Iraq). I-I

The colocynth is a trailing, perennial herb with mottled, green or yellow fruit about the size of a large orange, and is common in sandy desert regions in northern India, Iran, and Syria. The rind is brittle and the inner surface is covered with a soft, spongy, white substance with an intensely bitter taste. This pulp, made into an extract, is official in all the pharmacopoeias. 824* 278*

This is a drastic hydragogue cathartic, due to the presence of colocynthin, a crystallizable glucoside. The small, oval, brown seeds contain about 17 per cent of a fixed oil, and, with albuminous matter and salts, are edible and nutritious.

Citrullus vulgaris Schrad. (Cucurbitaceae)

تخم کرمک

Tukhm-i-garmak, Tarbuz (Teh.); Qarpuz (Turk.); Shami (Iraq); watermelon.

Field 73A, 94A; W.H.M.M. 150728.

This melon is cultivated throughout the country in the summer. The fruit is well known for its refreshing pulp, and is sometimes used as a source of water. For two months in the year the watermelon, with a little bread, may be looked upon as the food and drink of the people (Aitchison). The seeds are collected, sold, and eaten, with or without salt; they are chewed as a pastime and considered to have medicinal properties. The seeds also comprise one of the five cucurbitaceous seeds of Hindu medicine, the other four being: *Cucumis sativus* L. (cucumber); *C. Melo* L. (muskmelon, Kharbuz); *Lagenaria vulgaris* Ser. (bottle gourd or Dudhi); and *Benincasa cerifera* Savi (white tallow gourd, Kodu). They are cooling, diuretic, and nutritive. [262]

Citrus aurantifolia (Christm.) Swingle (Rutaceae)

ليمون

Limon, Limon-amman or Limmon Basra (Iraq); Post-i-limon (Afg.); Basra lime.

Field 43A.

Hard, dry lemons or limes the size of a nutmeg, these fruits (Numi Basra) are imported into Iraq from India, and used with sugar for making a beverage called Shai Hamidh (G.). [272] •

Citrus sinensis (L.) Osbeck (Rutaceae)

Four products of the orange tree are used in medicine in Iran:

35q Hooper and Field 5-6 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MRI

I-I The Merian gole of the "Terminologie is referred to
824 * *Salvia officinalis* L., but according to Gilliat-Smith, this plant,
276 * although cultivated in gardens in Tabriz, has no local name and is
not used by the natives.
247

Boiss. 4: 821; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 3: 125.

Field 130; W.H.M.M. 150799; K.B. 341.

This plant is the poley germander or polion of the Greeks. The drug consists of the small, woolly flowers, mixed with some stalks and leaves. It has the fragrance of thyme, and is given as an infusion for internal disorders—to relieve pains during pregnancy (H.F.). In Baluchistan *T. Stocksianum* Boiss. is called Kalpora, and is a remedy for fever.

824* **Thea sinensis L. (Theaceae)**

• 272 چای سبز

245 Chā'ī sabz (Teh.); Chā (Hind.); green tea leaves.

W.H.M.M. 150820.

A sample of prepared green tea. Tea is imported in immense quantities, chiefly from southern Iran and India. Iranis are very fond of this beverage; prepared tea is sold in nearly every bazaar.

According to Laufer (pp. 553–554) "in Mongol, Turkish, Persian, Indian, Portuguese, neo-Greek, and Russian we equally find the word *čai*, based on North Chinese *c'a*. The Tibetans retain the Chinese word in the ancient form *ja* (*dža*)."

824* **Thymus Serpyllum L. var. Kotschyanus Boiss. (Labiatae)**

278* کوشان شیرازی

Jōshan Shīrāzī (Teh.); Zatār (Syr., Iraq); Seetere (Schl.); Djūshā (Pers.); the herb.

Ait.; Boiss. 4: 556; Post; Schl.; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 649; Ph. Ind. 3: 114.

Field 75A; K.B. 341.

This variety of thyme is a plant of Iran and Kurdistan. The leaves are rounded, cuneate, ovate to lanceolate, with prominent nerves below. The leaves are fragrant, and resemble those of *Zataria multiflora* Boiss., a plant which also has the name of Zatar. Post applies the name Zatar to all plants of the genus *Thymus*. Boissier, on the other hand, refers Zatar to *Origanum Maru* L., Zatar farisi to *T. capitatus* L., and Zaeteran to *T. decussatis* Boiss. It would thus appear that Zatar and Jōshan Shīrāzī are similar drugs, characterized by a thyme-like aroma. The leaves are carminative.

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq m H1

245 Iraq produces about 80 per cent. of the total
[439] world supply of dates—that is, of the proportion of dates that form an article of commerce, because most dates are eaten directly by the growers, or else bartered. The general conditions under which date palms thrive have already been touched upon, and it is sufficient to recall that the palms can flourish in dry, saline, sandy, loamy, or even water-logged soils, although the maximum yield of fruit is obtained when abundant water is available.

The region of the Shatt el Arab is pre-eminently suited to date-production, and both banks are lined with date groves extending inland for about a mile and a half. Some 25 to 30 million palms are cultivated throughout the region, and of these, one-half are found close to the Shatt el Arab, the rest occurring along the river banks as far north as Latitude 33° N. A curious feature is the rise of the river under the influence of the incoming tide. Fresh water is ponded back in the Shatt el Arab, and floods the banks to a depth of as much as 3 feet to provide natural and regular irrigation of the groves—a phenomenon that from the point of view of the native farmer is wholly estimable.

In order to ensure a good crop, the land is dug over once every four years; and because of the frequent presence of creeks and water-courses, this must be done by hand. Artificial pollination is, as we have already seen, highly necessary; and though most groves include 3 per cent. of male palms, the district of Fao has developed a special trade in male pollen dust, from which other date-growing regions are supplied.

About 130 varieties of date are known, but three are most widely grown. The *Halawi* palm produces the finest fruit, but gives only a moderate yield (44 lb. per tree) (Dowson), whilst the *Sayir* produces slightly less, but is more tolerant of inferior growing conditions, and is probably the most widely grown. The *Zahidi* does not give a fruit of high quality, but the yield is over 120 lb. per tree, and this compensates for the low price obtained. Fertilisation of the female palm takes place in April, and picking begins in August, when large numbers of nomadic tribesmen move into the date-growing areas to work as seasonal harvesters.

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Besides forming an extremely important part of local diet, dates are used in the distilling of *arak*—the chief fermented beverage outside the vine-growing areas, and one thought to have value as a prophylactic against malaria. The crushed stones are fed to cattle, and both leaves and trunk of the palm are used in light constructional work (houses, boats, even bridges), and also in the manufacture of paper.

35a Hooper and Field 3-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
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This is a plant of Arabia, Syria, Iran, and Baluchistan, distributed also in Europe. The berries are like dried cherries, but full of pulp, in which are embedded many reniform, yellowish seeds. As sold in the bazaars, broken fragments of the red, accrescent calyces are mixed with the drug. The fruits are said by Schlimmer to be hydragogue and vermifuge. Achundow indicates their use in certain female complaints. Locally they are regarded as a remedy for syphilis, and are supposed to be intoxicating when taken in sufficient quantity.

Pimpinella Anisum L. (Umbelliferae) 278*

انیسون

Anisūn, Badian-i-rumi (Teh.); Antchibun, a corruption of Anisum (Tab.); Erva dos, from Portuguese Herba doce (Dymock); aniseed. 824* 273 •

Ait.; Boiss. 2: 866; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 1: 131. 263

Field 25; 35A; 10 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150768; K.B. 330.

Aniseed is cultivated largely in the U.S.S.R., as well as in Iran, for its seed, which is employed as a condiment and medicine. The fruit is often confounded with fennel, as the Arabic name Badian in some districts is applied to aniseed and in others to fennel. Aniseed has been introduced into India from Iran, whence the supply for the Bombay market still comes. It is mainly a Mohammedan medicine and is given in cough mixtures, and as a flavoring agent. Arak-badiani or anise water, prepared by distillation, is mentioned by Schlimmer, and local spirit is still flavored with it. The active principle resides in an essential oil consisting of 80 to 90 per cent of solid anethol, which separates slightly below ordinary temperatures, and anisic methyl charvicol.

278*

Piper Cubeba L. (Piperaceae) 824*

کبابه چینی

Kabābah-i-chīnī (Teh., Isf.); Kabab-chini (Hind.); cubeb pepper.

Field 25, 440; W.H.M.M. 150880.

Cubeb or tailed pepper is imported from Malaya and Java; it was formerly supposed to have come from China. The commercial drug consists of nearly globular fruits measuring about 4 mm. in diameter, of grayish brown or black, reticulately wrinkled on the surface, and abruptly prolonged at the base into a slender stalk or "tail." Within the pericarp is a single seed. Cubebs exhale, when

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Breweries

274 Iraq's only brewery, having a capacity of 50 barrels per day, is not adequate to meet market demands. The owners are therefore in the process of obtaining additional equipment to double the plant's output. The brewery, which has been in operation since 1945, is very modern in design and its product is of excellent quality.

Distillery

Iraq's only source of ethyl alcohol is a small, modern, well-designed distillery located in Baghdad. Surplus dates are used as raw material. Although they are not expensive, they are nevertheless more costly than the raw materials, such as molasses, which are used in the alcohol industry in other countries. Thus the distillery is operating at about one third capacity, since the market will not absorb its entire production at the prices it charges. Most of the current output is used in the making of the national alcoholic drink known as *arak*.

258 *Date Packing*

Date packing is probably one of the oldest industries in the country. Market requirements have kept the industry very modern and fully capable of meeting all demands on it.

Matches

372 There are two match manufacturing companies in Iraq, both producing matches of very good quality. One company utilizes paper, and the other wood. Their combined production is equivalent to about one half of Iraq's requirements.

Cigarettes

277 The bulk of Iraq's requirements of cigarettes are made in the country from home grown tobacco. The output of 12 factories in 1949 amounted to 2.25 billion cigarettes, but there were in addition many small producers of handmade cigarettes. Even in the factories much of the work is done by hand, but further mechanization cannot be expected until labor becomes more expensive.

Small Enterprises

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445 There are many small enterprises in Iraq which could be expanded, such as tire retreading, reclaiming of lube oil, wood-

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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the
Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting
between September and November. Its yield and price are
usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more
extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted
by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable
surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to
limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's produc- 245
tion; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date
Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other
main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from
Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its
quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties
of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are
usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in
normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone
for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are im-
proving greatly under the supervision of the Government
Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950,
India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and
Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting
and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of
Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and
afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

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Field 177; W.H.M.M. 150808.

Celery is a plant of the northwestern Himalayas and Iran, and is cultivated for its fruit, leaf stalks, and roots. The seeds, or properly fruits, are greenish yellow or brown, and have a mint-like aroma and a somewhat pungent and bitter taste. The fruit is carminative, aromatic, and tonic. In Tehran the drug is placed in boiling water and the steam inhaled for headache. The fruits contain apiin, a jelly-like glucoside.

Arctium Lappa L. (Compositae)

ریشه بابا آدم

Rishah-i-bābā-Adam (Teh.); the root. Bardane (Teh.); Semen Bardanae (English Herbal 1730); the fruits.

Field 234; K.B. 304.

The burdock plant is found in Syria, Iran, and Khorasan as well as in Europe. The root under the name of Risha Baba Adam or "Root of Father Adam" is quoted in Schlimmer's "Terminologie," and is regarded throughout India as depurative and antiphlogistic. In Tehran the root, with that of sarsaparilla, is used as a remedy for syphilis. The drug has had a considerable reputation in ancient times, but from a chemical examination by Zellner (1924) there is no indication of any substance in the root being physiologically active.

Areca Catechu L. (Palmae)

فوفل

Fūfal (Teh., Ar.); Papal (Pers.); Sopari (Hind.); Pinang (Mal.); betel nuts, nuts of the Areca palm.

Field 149.

• [276] Areca nuts are used everywhere in the East as a masticatory. They are a gentle stimulant, astringent, and taenifuge, increase the flow of saliva, lessen perspiration, sweeten the breath, and strengthen the gums. They contain tannin and two active alkaloids, arecoline and arecaine.—Mixed with sugar and coriander, they are given for induction of labor (H.F.). [844]

Aristolochia longa L. (Aristolochiaceae)

زراوند طويل

Zarāvand-i-tavīl (Ham., Teh.); the roots.

Achundow; Schl.; Ph. Pers.; Post; Ph. Ind. 3: 165.

W.H.M.M. 150855; K.B. 304.

36a Hooper and Field 8-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
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Field 3 (Isf.), 423; W.H.M.M. 150745. I-I

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The above plant, growing in the alpine Himalayas, yields the Nardus root or spikenard of the ancients. The rhizome is short, thick, and dark gray, crowned by a bundle of strong fibers called by the natives "Devil's hair." The odor resembles valerian, and yields about 1 per cent of volatile oil containing valerianic acid. The physiological action is similar to that of valerian root, and the drug is administered for nervous disorders.—Prepared like tea it is given for heart diseases (H.F.).

Nepeta micrantha Bunge and N. ispahanica Boiss. (Labiatae)

زوفا

Zūfā, Zūnā (Teh.); Zufah-i-yabis (Ar.); the flowering herb.

Boiss. 4: 166; Achundow; Ph. Ind. 3: 116.

Field 23; W.H.M.M. 150733; K.B. 327.

Zufah is a fragrant plant used since primitive times as a carminative in the East. It has often been referred to as hyssop, but recent examinations have shown it to be *Nepeta*. Dymock found the Zufah of Sind to be *N. ciliaris* Benth., while the plant of that name in Baluchistan is *N. bracteata* Benth. Two specimens from Tehran consist of the fruiting calyx, flowers, and seeds. The calyx is erect, green, with purplish, acute teeth. The seeds are oblong, brown, 1 mm. in length, with a white, V-shaped scar at the end. They are mucilaginous when placed in water and are given for influenza and catarrh.—As an aromatic mint a cold infusion is prescribed for pain in the chest (H.F.).

Nicotiana Tabacum L. and N. rustica L. (Solanaceae) 824*

276 •

توتون

Tūtūn (Iraq); Tambaku, Tumaku; N. rustica = Turkomani tambaku (Afg.); tobacco leaves.

Field 89 (Iraq); 18, 23.

[249]

Tobacco is cultivated in northeastern Iran for local consumption as well as for local trade. It is an expensive crop there, as the fields must be heavily manured and require careful irrigation. The leaf is frequently treated with gur or crude sugar to moisten and add weight to the leaf. Beside being smoked, it is extensively used as an errhine or snuff (Nashwar). This is sometimes mixed with powdered ashes of *Ephedra pachyclada* Boiss., Huma (Gnetaceae) to render it more pungent. Two samples of snuff are noticed in the collection:

I-I

824* Thebba (253 Iraq). Snuff, tobacco powder soaked in ‘Araq.

• 276 Bernooty (234 Iraq). Snuff, tobacco powder perfumed with jasmine.

824* **Nigella sativa Sibth.** (Ranunculaceae)

278* سیاه تخمه

263 Tukhm-i-siyāh, Siyāh-danan, Siyāh-tukhmah (Teh.); Hab-es-souda (Ar., Egy., Iraq); Kala jira, Mugrila (Hind.); false or black cumin, fitches.

Boiss. 1: 68; Ph. Ind. 1: 28.

Field 42; 56A; 7, 21 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150906; K.B. 327.

This is an annual herb, sometimes called nutmeg flower or fennel flower, cultivated in Egypt, Syria, and Iran. According to Birdwood, the seeds are the black cumin of the Bible, the melanthion of Dioscorides, and the gith of Pliny. They are black, triangular, 3 mm. long, the testa rough-wrinkled, with a white, oily kernel within. When crushed they have a pleasant odor of lemon. The seeds contain an essential oil, a fixed oil, and a saponin-like body, and are used extensively as a spice and medicine. The ancient Mohammedan custom of sprinkling the seeds, like those of cumin, over the surface of bread, still prevails in Tehran and Tabriz. There is an Arab proverb: "In the black seed is the medicine for every disease except death." Around Tabriz *N. arvensis* L. is cultivated as a potherb and for its seeds. It is called Gara tsochorek oti, "Black bread weed" (Gilliat-Smith).

824* **Nymphaea alba L.** (Nymphaeaceae)

278* گل نیلوفر

Gul-i-nīlūfar, Nīlūfar-i-kirmānashāhī (Teh.); Nenuphar (Ph. Pers.); white water lily flowers.

Ait.; Boiss. 1: 104; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 114; Ph. Ind. 1: 70.

Field 10, 207; W.H.M.M. 150781, 150858; K.B. 328.

These are the flowers, stalks, and leaves of the white water lily, found in ponds throughout Europe and Siberia. Nīlūfar is a name also applied to flowers of other water lilies, and sometimes to species of *Ipomoea*, which have blue flowers. Kamal, the flowers of a *Nymphaea*, is sold in drug shops in India, and occasionally the flowers of the sacred or Egyptian lotus (*Nelumbium speciosum* L.) are used medicinally throughout China. The flowers have cooling and astringent properties, and are administered locally, especially to

I-I

scalding in water and then dried. They are hard, horny, whitish, opaque or translucent, branching tubers, mucilaginous when placed in water. A gruel made of these roots is esteemed as a nervine tonic, demulcent, and nutritive.—As an infusion it is given to relieve hoarseness (H.F.). 824* 278*

Oryza sativa L. (Gramineae) 824* 243 262

برنج سدری

Birinj-i-sadri, Berij sadri Gilan (Teh.); Timan (Iraq); Ruzz (Ar.); Shilib, Pīrinj (Turk.); Chaltuk (Kurd.); rice grain.

Field 58, 72; 15, 18, 20, 34 (Iraq).

"Rice is cultivated as a summer crop over immense areas, especially in the southern marshes, also in the valleys of Kurdistan and on the flow canals of certain regions in lower Iraq" (G.). There are three main types of the crop represented in the above specimens from Iraq: (1) Harfi or early-sown, (2) Afli or late-sown, and (3) Shittāl or transplanted.

Timan is the hulled rice of Iraq. The two samples from Tehran are of fine, white, table rice.

Panicum miliaceum L. (Gramineae) 824* 243 262

ارزن

Arzan (Pers.); Dukhn (Iraq); China (Hind., Sans.); millet grain.

Field 57, 106A; 22, 80 (Iraq).

Common millet is cultivated as a summer crop in Iraq, especially along the Shatt-al-Hai. The grain can be cooked and eaten whole or made into bread. It is commonly used in the form of porridge. The green plant is an excellent fodder for animals.—The seeds provide feed for chickens (H.F.). [246]

Papaver somniferum L. (Papaveraceae) 824* 278* 276 •

کوکنار

Kavl-a-kūknār, Pōst-a-kūknār (Pers., Afg.); poppy heads.

تخم خشخاش

Tukhm-i-khash khāsh; Tukhm-i-shaga'ig (Ham.); Kishkash (Ar.); poppy seeds.

Ait.; Post; Ph. Ind. 1: 73.

Field 48, 64, 81A, 82A, 185; W.H.M.M. 150835, 150911; K.B. 329.

I-I
824* Opium is known locally as Afyun, but the cultivation of the
278* opium poppy is prohibited in Iraq. The capsules, some of them
scarified, are sold in the bazaars, but their narcotic effects are less
•276 powerful and more uncertain than those of opium. The seeds contain 50 per cent of drying oil, which is sometimes called Roghan-i-khash khash. The seeds, often erroneously supposed to be poisonous
[262] because they are contained in the opium-yielding capsule, are wholesome and nutritious, and are eaten chiefly in sweetmeats.—The seeds are given to relieve epistaxis; an oil derived from them is employed in making soap. The fruits mixed with *Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss. and *Linum usitatissimum* L. form a paste for application to boils (H.F.).

Parmelia kamtschdalis Esch. A lichen. See *Roccella Montagnei Bél.*

824* **Peganum Harmala** L. (Rutaceae)

278* تخم اسفند

789 Tukhm-i-isfand, Sipand (Teh.); Harmal, Harmal rutbah (Ar., Iraq); Aspand (Kurd.); Uzarih (Turk.); the Syrian rue.

Achundow; Schl.; Post; Boiss. 1: 917; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 486; Ph. Ind. 1: 75; Weisner 44.

Field 46; 4, 26, 27, 119 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150850; K.B. 329.

The mountain rue is a plant of Iran, Arabia, Syria, North Africa, and southern Europe. The plant and seeds were used medicinally by the Greeks and Romans, and were noted in European herbals in the 17th century. The seeds are exported from Iran into India, where the plant was originally introduced by Mohammedans. The seeds are dull gray, 2 mm. long, angular, having a bitter taste, and, when crushed, a heavy, narcotic odor. The active principle resides in the alkaloids, harmaline and harmine. The custom prevails in Iran and Iraq of sprinkling the seeds on burning coals at marriages to avert the malignant influence of the Evil Eye; the smoke from the
[832] burning seeds is said to drive away epidemics. The seeds are reputed to be an alterative and purifying medicine, and are supposed to stimulate the sexual system.

Peucedanum graveolens Benth. & Hook. (*Anethum graveolens* L.) (Umbelliferae)

تخم شوید

Tukhm-i-shivid (Teh.); Shivit (Isf.); Shabbit (Ar.); Sawa, Soyah (Hind.); Habbat Halwah (Iraq); Anitum (Yunani); dill.

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Breweries

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Distillery

Iraq's only source of ethyl alcohol is a small, modern, well-designed distillery located in Baghdad. Surplus dates are used as raw material. Although they are not expensive, they are nevertheless more costly than the raw materials, such as molasses, which are used in the alcohol industry in other countries. Thus the distillery is operating at about one third capacity, since the market will not absorb its entire production at the prices it charges. Most of the current output is used in the making of the national alcoholic drink known as *arak*.

258 *Date Packing*

Date packing is probably one of the oldest industries in the country. Market requirements have kept the industry very modern and fully capable of meeting all demands on it.

Matches

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Cigarettes

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Small Enterprises

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445 There are many small enterprises in Iraq which could be expanded, such as tire retreading, reclaiming of lube oil, wood-

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757

For botanically derived materia medica and their use see MA1 Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 116, pp. 80-122, 124-181 and 183-188.

For a list of native terms for various plants and drugs see MA1 Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 116, pp. 217-241.

759 ence has already been made to the importance of special training for medical assistants who will generally be in charge of village dispensaries.

278 Many people will continue to be far removed from hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies. For these it is important to make available such simple "household remedies" as anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, tincture of iodine, DDT powder and Epsom salts. It is suggested that the government make arrangements to supply through village shops such drugs in suitable packets carrying simple directions for use. The general availability of these remedies at a reasonable price will also help to reduce the large number of visits to dispensaries for comparatively trivial ailments.

Organization of Public Health Administration

744
647 The measures outlined above require a number of changes in the administration of the public health program. The present organization, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, does not lend itself to an effective attack on the problem of disease prevention. Like most of the other central administrations, it suffers from excessive centralization. There is too little contact with other ministries whose activities are of importance to public health. The Mission suggests that a public health administrator, together with an epidemiologist and a sanitary expert, be recruited abroad to advise the Minister on the organization and further development of the health services. The epidemiologist would concentrate on the principal endemic diseases and the sanitary expert would advise on measures to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene. While a detailed reorganization should await their advice, it would seem best to group health services according to two main divisions, one concerned with the curative, the other with the preventive services.

In the future the reorganized health services will need to work much more closely with the departments concerned with irrigation and agriculture and, on the problem of health education, with the Ministry of Education. In carrying out a much needed decentralization considerable responsibility must, above all, be placed on the chief medical officer in every province. This officer, who now also carries on a private practice, should be given more adequate pay so

759 An estimate of the cost of the full scheme follows:

(a)	CAPITAL	
	(1) Quarters for women nurses	ID 125,000
	(2) Demonstration rooms	28,000
	(3) Quarters for foreign sisters[1]	80,000
	(4) Equipment, etc.	7,000
		ID 240,000
(b)	RECURRENT	
	Salaries for foreign sisters (only)	ID 37,000

Training schools are also necessary for hospital storekeepers, laboratory assistants, radiographers and probably for physiotherapists and dispensers. Storekeepers should be appointed to every hospital to preserve equipment and to check the use of expendable items. Dressers, who are already familiar with the names of many articles used in hospital work, would probably be the most suitable candidates for training. The schools could be started with the existing staff and facilities of the Royal Hospital and of the Central Medical Stores, and as each trained group is ready to go to work an appropriate pay scale ought to be established for them.

Pharmacists and Medical Supplies

874 A School of Pharmacy and Chemistry was founded in 1936. The five-year pharmacy course is comprehensive and the facilities for teaching, including laboratories, are good.

● 278 So far 218 pharmacists have qualified from the school but many have gone into private work and only 64 remain in government service. Apparently the salary paid to a pharmacist working in a private shop is at least twice as high as that paid by the government. Further, a number of qualified pharmacists have recently left the country. With the existing accommodations the school can graduate about 20 pharmacists annually. Meanwhile there are only 64 pharmacists working in the 89 hospitals and in some hospitals the dispensing, including that of poisons, appears to be carried out entirely by health officials.

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[1] It is estimated that 37 foreign nursing sisters would be required: 27 for the 14 provinces (there is already one in Basra); five for the Royal Hospital at Baghdad; and five additional for replacements during sickness and leave.

Pharmacists are licensed by the Director General of Health. 278, An Inspector of Pharmacies inspects private pharmacies, although 744 it would appear reasonable to place the supervision of these pharmacies more directly under the local chief medical officer.

Certain drugs, such as the anti-biotics and sulphonamides, are 278 supplied in most countries only on a doctor's prescription. In Iraq, however, these drugs can be freely obtained at any pharmacy. Hospitals at times suffer from a shortage of drugs owing to the limited funds made available by the government. Thus patients admitted to hospitals sometimes have had to buy drugs for themselves from pharmacies in the towns. It is to be hoped that future budgetary provisions will be sufficient to supply hospitals with the drugs necessary for their work.

Under the present system, local hospitals send their requisitions to the Director General of Health, through the chief medical officer of the province. These requisitions are scrutinized by the Director of Supplies, who passes them on to the Director General of Health for authority to issue the supplies required. The issues are then made direct to the hospital concerned. It seems that most medical supplies—although by no means all—are purchased from the Crown Agents of the British Government. The central supplies are kept in Baghdad in what seems to be an orderly and well-run department. There is at present some congestion in the drugs and dressings section, and new buildings are required to provide adequate space for the many items stocked.

Because Iraq is a country of great distances with many 758 scattered villages and hamlets, during certain seasons of the year small communities may be cut off from medical aid by snow, rain and mud. It is not possible to place hospitals and dispensaries within easy and certain reach of all people throughout the year. There are, however, many simple household remedies such as the anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, DDT powder, iodine and Epsom salts that could be put up in suitable packages with full directions for use. It is suggested that the government package such remedies for sale in village shops at a price within reach of the local people.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

874 and bookkeeping, physics, and zoology in the first year; analytical chemistry, pharmacy, pharmacognosy and pharmaceutical botany, inorganic materia medica, and organic chemistry in the second; organic pharmaceutical chemistry, biochemistry, pharmacy, organic materia medica, and pharmaceutical physiology in the third; and microscopic pharmacognosy, toxicology, inorganic pharmaceutical chemistry, pharmacy, bacteriology and parasitology, and hygiene and first aid in the fourth. There are fourteen hours of lectures and sixteen of laboratory per week in the first year, twelve of lectures and sixteen of laboratory in the second and third years, and ten of lectures and twenty-four of laboratory in the fourth. A student must not fall below the mark of 50 percent in any subject in the yearly final examinations or below 65 as an average. First-year students are allowed to repeat in the event of failure, but a second failure results in dismissal from the College. The [278] nine-month practice period ends in oral and practical examinations which the student must pass, and he must also receive a favorable report from the supervisory pharmacist before he is granted his diploma and may work independently as a pharmacist.

THE SCHOOL OF NURSING

The School of Nursing is under the general administration of the dean of the College of Medicine, but has a principal as the immediate head. Instruction is in Arabic and English and is given by doctors associated with the College of Medicine or the Royal Hospital. It is a three-year course, and admission is limited to those who have an Intermediate-School Certificate or its equivalent. Applicants must be between eighteen and twenty-three years of age and are selected on the basis of their school records, public-examination results, and medical examinations. Students must sign a contract to work in a government hospital for four years upon graduation, but while they attend school all their expenses are paid and they receive an allowance of 1.5 dinars ($6.00) per month during the first year, 2 dinars ($8.00) during the second, and 2.5 dinars ($10) the third. A vacation of one month is granted during the period of July through September when no classes are held. Students are on duty in the Royal Hospital from seven to ten each morning and for two hours in the afternoon. Formal lectures are given daily from ten to twelve. A graduate may be released from the obligation to serve in a government hospital by paying 200 dinars ($800) to the government. In 1945–46 there were 33 girls enrolled in each the first and the third year classes and 20 in the second.

Subjects of instruction for the first year are anatomy and physiology, elementary science (including hygiene, sanitation, and bacteriology), food

281

281 **WORK IN SKINS**--preparation of hides and furs (e.g., drying, scraping, tanning, tawing); materials and products; special apparatus; cutting and sewing of skins; specialization and organization; etc. See also:

Animal by-products	237	General tools	412
Manufacture of garments	294		

135 (2) The Supply of Raw Materials and Power: Iraq is potentially
233 rich in many kinds of raw materials. In the first place it has abun-
241 dant supplies of oil and gas which provide a cheap source of both
433 raw material and fuel. Secondly, it has pastoral and agricultural products such as wool, camel hair, hides and skins, meat, fish, milk, animal fat. Thirdly, it has fertile land which, with the extension of irrigation, can be a rich source of such raw materials as sugar beets, sugar cane, soybeans and jute, in addition to products already available such as tobacco, cotton, sesame, linseed, and practically all types of grain, fruits and vegetables. Finally, recent geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. There are deposits of sulphurs, apparently of commercial value, in many parts of Iraq, and of salt, especially near Basrah. Yet each of these resources presents a different problem; none is easily exploitable (except oil); quantities available for industry are limited and the quality frequently poor. Agriculture has been kept at a low level of output because of the lack of irrigation schemes in most parts of the country; the difficulties caused by the present land tenure system and the agricultural techniques connected with the tribal system, which covers over 80 per cent of the cultivated area; the absence of an effective agricultural extension service and lack of modern storing facilities; these and other factors have held back both quantity and quality of agricultural and animal products. There was a noticeable extension in the cultivation of cotton in recent years, but the severe failure of the crop in 1951, owing to a pest attack, has been a great set-back. Difficulties in the supply of raw materials have held up many an industrial enterprise. The scheme for a sugar factory which has been under discussion since 1947 has had to be postponed from one year to another owing to the uncertainties connected with the
[281] cultivation of both sugar beet and sugar cane. The progress of the leather tanning industry, one of the oldest industries in Iraq, has been retarded due to the existing conditions in which hides and skins have been prepared and preserved, and great losses to this particularly native industry have resulted. The woollen textile
[289] mills have had to import certain qualities of Australian wool to mix with Iraqi wool which is of a coarse variety.

135 So far as mineral resources are concerned the surveys that have been made are insufficient.[1] Further exploration work is

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[1] **As of writing, in July 1953.**

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Quality of Livestock Products

237 Livestock products already play an important role in the economy. Demand for such products may well rise with the anticipated increase in the purchasing power of the population. With it will come an insistence on the improvement of quality which is now often very low. Better quality would also substantially raise the prices of export products.

Hides and Skins

● 281 Although there are a few modern plants, many tanneries are still extremely primitive and produce a poorly finished product. Their chief handicap, however, is the low quality of the hides they receive. Methods of flaying and preserving are generally poor. Even in the abattoirs which are supervised by the Veterinary Department the quality of the product leaves much to be desired. The prevailing methods of flaying—with the knife in the case of sheep and cattle, and with the axe in the case of buffalo—leave the hide lacerated, with hair, meat and blood adhering to the inside. Methods of preservation are also inadequate. Hides and skins collected outside of the abattoirs and many of those taken from the abattoirs are frequently improperly prepared to ensure keeping quality during storage and transportation until the time of their arrival at the tannery. The low-paid and poorly trained supervisors which the Veterinary Department assigns to the abattoirs are incapable of effecting any improvement.

In view of these conditions it would be advisable to appoint an experienced abattoir specialist to teach and direct the abattoir supervisors. The teaching could be done in the Veterinary School at Baghdad, with practical demonstrations at the Baghdad abattoir. Once an adequate number of supervisors are trained, the School might conduct simple courses for the abattoir workers themselves. This scheme of training could later be extended to village slaughterers.

The Hides and Skins Association established by a law enacted in 1951 affords another opportunity to raise the standards of the trade and industry. It is suggested that an experienced foreign expert be appointed to manage the Association in the initial period and establish its reputation as a constructive and modernizing

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

influence. He would need to work in close cooperation with the proposed abattoir specialist. The Association should also investigate the possibility of using more local materials in the hides and skins industry. Thus local valonia or oak bark might be employed for tanning and locally refined and sulphurated fish oils used in the leather industry. Efforts might also be made to procure better salt at reasonable prices from the government salt works at Fao and to organize more adequate local supplies of date syrup which small tanneries use as a glucose. 281

Casings

Most if not all the casings are obtained from the abattoirs in barrels. Initial cleaning and grading is usually done on the floor which is occasionally washed down with water. The casings examined appeared to be remarkably free of parasitic infection, particularly in the North. More hygienic casings could be produced under more efficient and comfortable working conditions if the work were raised from the floor to zinc-lined tables and improved drainage and piped water supplies were provided in the sections dealing with casings. 253

Other Improvements in Abattoirs

Many abattoir buildings are in need of repair, enlargement and alteration. Improvements such as an impervious floor, better drainage and water supplies can often be effected at small cost. At present abattoir offal is largely wasted even though the amount involved would warrant the installation of modern methods of converting it into glue, bone meal, blood meal, etc. In order to encourage more slaughtering at the government-supervised abattoirs, it might also be desirable to review the taxes assessed at the abattoir which encourage livestock owners to resort to illicit slaughter. 253 348

Wool

The wool collected from the various fat-tailed varieties of sheep makes a good carpet wool and a valuable export product. Little attention is given, however, to good shearing, perhaps because milk rather than wool is considered the main product of the flocks. Shearing is done with crude hand shears. Wool is frequently left on the head and neck region and around the root of 236

35₂ Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAl Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

I-I
924*
278*
crushed, a spicy odor, and possess a strong, spicy, and bitter taste. They have a stimulant and antiseptic action on the mucous membrane of the genito-urinary organs, and are also a diuretic.

924*
263
Pistacia integerrima Stew. (Anacardiaceae)

چهار تنخوش

Chahār tankhūsh (Teh.); Chatlanguch (Ham.); Kharshnai (Kash.); fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150839; K.B. 331.

This is the northwestern Himalayan form of the turpentine tree, called also the false or donkey mastich. The small drupes are broader than long, 5 by 6 mm., glabrous, rugose, gray with a bony stone. They have a marked terebinthinate odor, and are used locally to impart flavor to milk.

جفت

Field 201; W.H.M.M. 150706.

Iran
[281]
Under the name of Jift or Juft, the broken shells of the galls of the turpentine tree are sold in Tehran. Being very astringent, they are used for tanning; mixed with lime, they remove hair from skins.

I-I
924*
278*
Pistacia Khinjuk Stocks. (Anacardiaceae)

حب الغار

Habbu'l ghār (Isf.); Habul-khazra (Teh.); Hebbul-beneh (Ar.); the fruits.

Field 449; 116 (Iraq); K.B. 331.

سبز قلنج

Subz-i-gulanj (Teh.); Buzghanj (Ham., Isf.); Gul-i-pisteh (Bom.); Afs-el-batum (Tri.); the galls.

Ait.; Boiss. 2: 6; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 1: 377.

Field 422; W.H.M.M. 150878; K.B. 331.

[262]
[314]
• [281]
This tree is common in Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan, and has been described under different species names. The tree yields a resin-like material, and the nuts, which are eaten, afford a sweet oil; the leaves and galls are employed for tanning. The small, seed-like fruits are oval in shape, 6 mm. long, reddish brown in color, with an acid taste and terebinthinate odor. The fruits are eaten and are said to be good for debility.—Prepared like tea, they relieve stomach pains (H.F.).

I-I

The galls are formed by *Pemphigus utricularius* Pass. (figured in "Les Zoocécidies des Plantes d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Océanie," by C. Houard, 1923, figs. 1010–1012, p. 471, under *P. atlantica* No. 1731). They contain about 40 per cent of gallotannic acid, are ovoid, larger than peas, somewhat fig-shaped, pink in color, turning gray; the wall is thin, brittle, and rugose on the outside, smooth within and translucent. The taste is astringent and slightly terebinthinate. In Persian and Arabic works on medicine the galls are described as cold, dry, and astringent.—Mixed with Indian spikenard they are administered to relieve stomach pains (H.F.). 824* 278*

Pistacia Terebinthus L. (Anacardiaceae)

سقز سفید

Sagiz-i-safid (Teh.); Sages (Stapf); Zunghari, Sukhur; the oleo-resin and leaves.

Field 129; W.H.M.M. 150894.

The turpentine tree grows freely near Banni in the hills of Sherag. [314] Its oleo-resin is a thick, tenacious, white, opaque mass, gradually taking the shape of the bottle in which it is placed; it softens on warming and has a pleasant terebinthinate odor. It is used in Tehran as a chewing gum, and is similar to the Chian turpentine which was recommended about fifty years ago as a remedy for cancer. The [386] leaves are astringent and are used for dyeing.

Pistacia vera L. (Anacardiaceae) 824*

پسته 278*

Pistah (Teh.); pistachio nuts in shells. 262

Field 265; 49A, 50A, 51A; 124 (Iraq).

پوست پسته

Pust-i-pistah (Teh.); husks of the fruits.

Field 186.

The fruit of the pistachio nut is the size of an olive; its husk is reddish and astringent, its odor terebinthinate. Within the fruit is a woody shell or nut, brownish white in color, with hard, horny, and polished texture and ovoid shape. The kernel or almond is pale green, and covered with a thin, brittle, brown skin, easily removed by scratching. The taste is sweet, oily, and balsamic. The outer husk of the fruit (Pust-i-pistah) is used as an infusion for [386] dysentery and is imported into Bombay from Iran as a dyeing and [281] • tanning agent.

35: Hooper and Field 8-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI
Kurd MA-11

I-I

Quercus infectoria Olivier (Fagaceae) 824 *

مازو 278 *

Māzū (Isf.); Affaz (Teh.); Ajees-aafs (Ar.); Maiphala (Hind.); galls, mad, or Dead Sea apples. 386

Field 45A, 447; W.H.M.M. 150783. 281 •

These galls are excrescences on the twigs of oak trees, resulting from the deposition of eggs of *Cynips gallae-tinctoriae* Olivier. Oak galls are collected in Asiatic Turkey, as well as in the province of Aleppo, and are known commercially as "Aleppo," "Smyrna," or "Turkey" galls. They are nearly spherical in shape, and vary from 12 to 20 mm. in diameter, bluish green externally and yellowish within. They are hard and heavy, and bear short, bluntly pointed projections. The galls contain from 50 to 70 per cent of gallotannic acid, and consequently are used medicinally as a local astringent, to be dusted on wounds. They find an extensive application technically in dyeing and tanning.—In Kurdistan they are sometimes strung as beads and hung over the cradle to ward off the Evil Eye (H.F.). K [789]

Quercus lusitanica Lam. var. tauricola (Fagaceae)

Talkak (?) (Iraq); Basra galls.

Field 102, 120 (Iraq).

These galls are formed by *Cynips insana* Mayr. on the above oak, and also on *Quercus infectoria*. They are much larger than Aleppo galls, dark brown, oval or subspherical, 4 by 3.5 cm., yellowish brown within, a channel leading to the cavity in the center. They are very astringent and rich in tannic acid.

Quercus persica Jaub. & Spach (Fagaceae) 824*

بلوط 278*

Balūt (Teh.); Glans Quercus Ballotáe (Ph. Pers.); acorns.

Field 191; W.H.M.M. 150834.

This is one of the most common species of oak throughout the forests of Kurdistan and the Rowandiz area. The acorns are oblong, 3.5 by 1.7 cm., light brown in color, glabrous, shining, and contain a single seed. Acorns have a styptic action because of the tannin they contain; they are used for colic pains in children, and as a gargle. —In Kurdistan acorns are sometimes eaten raw, but they are usually roasted and the flour made into cakes (H.F.). [262]

Quercus sp. (Fagaceae)

Giash mashi (Ham.); Kisa, Kesa; spiny galls.

35₁ Hooper and Field 8-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MHI

I-I
824* Pharmacog.; Connold's British Oak Galls; Houard 375; Ait.;
278* Ph. Ind. 3: 360.

• 281 K.B. 334.

These galls are produced by the insect *Andricus lucidus* Hartig. var. *orientalis* Trotter (illustrated in Connold's "British Oak Galls"). This cynipid makes galls on various species of oak. The bazaar specimens are probably brought from Asia Minor; they have long spines which are usually broken off in the commercial samples. They are used by tanners and are sold also as an astringent medicine. This drug is given locally as a febrifuge (C.).

824* **Quercus Vallonea Kotschy (Fagaceae)**

262 گوزی علفی

Gueze elefi, Pune (Teh.); oak manna.

257 K.B. 334.

Under these names is supplied a confection or cake of sugary substance, green with the presence of broken leaves. It is a form of Tar-anjubin, "green honey," or Gaz-anjabin, "tamarisk honey." Layard referred to this substance in his "Early Adventures in Persia," I, p. 349: "The mountainous country beyond Fellaut is thickly wooded with the 'beloot' or oak. These trees are chiefly valuable for the white substance called by the Bakhtyaris 'gaz' or 'gazu,' a kind of manna. It is an article of export to all parts of Persia, and is sold everywhere in the bazaars, and employed in the manufacture of a sweetmeat called 'Gazenjubeen,' which is much relished and considered very wholesome. When boiled with the leaves and allowed to harden it forms a kind of greenish cake, not disagreeable to the taste, but, prepared for the use of the ladies of the enderun and to be offered to guests, it is carefully skimmed and separated, when it becomes a white paste of very delicate flavor."

Oak manna, manna quercina, Gueza-elefi of Schlimmer, has also been obtained from the leaves and fruits of *Q. mannifera* Lindl. of Kurdistan, *Q. persica* Jaub. & Spach, and *Q. tauricola* Klotszch. Saccharose, glucose, fructose, and mucilage have been separated from these secretions, but no mannite.

278* **Quisqualis indica L. (Combretaceae)**

824* Rangan-ki-bel (Hind.); Liane vermifuge (Fr.); fruits of the Rangoon creeper.

247 Field 82 (Iraq).

I-I

324* 278* scarlet foliage. The fruit and root-stock of wild rhubarb are collected and employed in medicine; the fruits were official in the "Pharmacopoeia Persica." A decoction of the reddish, triangular-winged fruits is considered a more powerful purgative than that of the rootstock [232] (Aitchison). The fruits are used in Tehran as a vermifuge for horses, and in Hamadan the drug is applied as a poultice for headache. The rhubarb leaves from Isfahan are made into an infusion and used for gonorrhea (C.).

Rhodymenia sp. (Florideae, Rhodymeniaceae)

لیقا

Lyka, Leeka (Iraq); Chinai-ghaza or seaweed.

Field 31A.

This alga, obtained in northern Iran, is light brown and gelatinous. A decoction is given for coughs. As a substitute for agar-agar, it is emulcent, emollient, and alterative, and may be used as a cultivating medium for bacteria.

Rhus coriaria L. (Anacardiaceae)

سماق

Summāq, Summāq-i-shakki bī hastah (Teh.); Tirsh (Kurd.); Tartak (Hind.); leaves, bark, and fruits.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 2: 4; Post; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 1: 373.

[245] Field 164, 272; 107 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150800; K.B. 335.

• [231] [386] The sumac is a tree cultivated in Khurasan, western Afghanistan, and throughout Central Asia. The leaves have long been used by the Arabs, Turks, Iranis, and in Europe, for dyeing silk and tanning leather. They contain from 15 to 35 per cent of tannin.

The fruit is exported from Iran and used by Mohammedans in India. It is a small, sticky drupe, the size of a lentil, 5 mm. in diameter, red or green, acid, and astringent to the taste, containing one lenticular, polished, brown seed.

—Mixed with *Punica Granatum* L., sumac is applied to relieve painful gums. The seeds in an infusion are used to acidulate foods (H.F.).

Ricinus communis L. (Euphorbiaceae)

گرچک فرنگی

Garchak farangī (Teh.); ^{u}archak (Ham.); Tochme Kertchec (Schl.); Kurwa (Ar., Iraq); Bedanjir, "willow fig"; castor oil seeds.

I-I
824*
278*

bark of a conifer. The drug is regarded as antispasmodic and is given in asthmatic affections.

Terminalia bellerica Roxb. (Combretaceae)

بليله

Balīlah (Teh., Isf.); Balera (Hind.); Belleric myrobalans.

Ph. Pers.; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 2: 5; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 446.

Field 424; K.B. 340.

This is an Indian tree, and because of its medicinal properties it bears the Sanskrit synonym Anīla-ghnaka or "wind killing." The belleric myrobalans of commerce are the fruits of this tree, and are imported into Iran from India. Mohammedan physicians regard them as astringent and digestive, and use them for making a lotion for sore eyes.—Myrobalans, mixed with cardamoms, are given in pills to cure general debility (H.F.).

Terminalia Chebula Retz. (Combretaceae)

هليله سياه

Halīlah-i-zard, Halīlah-i-kābulī, Halīlah-i-siyāh (Teh., Isf.); Har, Hara (Hind.); Hirda (Bom.); Haritaki (Beng.); Chebulic myrobalans.

Ph. Pers.; Schl.; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 447; Ph. Ind. 2: 1.

Field 19, 407, 417; W.H.M.M. 150777; K.B. 341.

Myrobalans were known to the early Arabian and Greek writers, and several kinds were described. At the present time two varieties are found in every Eastern bazaar: (1) the young, unripe nuts which turn black on drying, Halīlah-i-siyāh or black myrobalans; and (2) the mature nuts, which are larger and yellowish in color, called Halīlah-i-zard or Halīlah-i-kābulī. The first kind is used chiefly in medicine, and many fanciful properties are attributed to it.—Powdered and made into pills it is used as a strong purgative and to relieve stomach pains (H.F.).

The yellow myrobalans contain about 30 per cent of tannin and are employed as a tanning agent. [281] •

Teucrium Polium L. (Labiatae)

مريم نخودى

Maryam nukhūdī, "peas of Mary" (Teh.); Jaʻad (Iraq); Meriam Nekhodi, according to Schlimmer, is the Tehran name for *T. scordioides* Schreb. The Merian gole of the "Terminologie" is referred to

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

fully capable of meeting all of the requirements of domestic consumption with the possible exception of minor items of a special nature. The plant's present capacity is 500,000 meters of cloth and 50,000 kilos of yarn. Recent improvements and expansion have brought the woolen textile industry abreast of the needs of the country. 288

Leather

Until recent years, there was little modern tanning of hides, most of the hides being exported. Since the war, however, several tanneries have been constructed and are now producing leather of fair quality sufficient for most of Iraq's needs, with the exception of those grades required to make the higher quality shoes. 282

Tanneries are not showing the profits which were originally anticipated, largely because they have to use hides of very poor quality. In many cases, the hides have been cut during flaying, while in other cases they have not been well preserved. The tanneries also have not attempted to make use of waste products and in some cases do not split the hides, a practice which is essential to low cost production. However, once these various technical problems have been solved, the tanneries should be able to meet all of Iraq's needs.

Shoes

Nearly 90 percent of Iraq's shoes are made by hand in numerous small home industries. There is one fairly modern factory, however, which, using both local and imported leather, now makes over 30,000 pairs of high grade shoes per year. The company has also set up retail outlets in all of the provinces. An increase in the capacity of this plant would do much to reduce shoe prices to the ultimate consumer. Annual production could be raised to 100,000 pairs by the procurement of additional equipment costing approximately ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly in Swiss francs. These facilities could be put into operation within two years and would increase employment from approximately 40 to 120 workers. 295

Vegetable Oil and Soap 388

A vegetable oil extraction plant has been in successful operation for approximately three years. It is designed to extract oil

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's produc- 245
tion; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

135 (2) The Supply of Raw Materials and Power: Iraq is potentially
233 rich in many kinds of raw materials. In the first place it has abun-
241 dant supplies of oil and gas which provide a cheap source of both
433 raw material and fuel. Secondly, it has pastoral and agricultural
products such as wool, camel hair, hides and skins, meat, fish, milk, animal fat. Thirdly, it has fertile land which, with the extension of irrigation, can be a rich source of such raw materials as sugar beets, sugar cane, soybeans and jute, in addition to products already available such as tobacco, cotton, sesame, linseed, and practically all types of grain, fruits and vegetables. Finally, recent geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. There are deposits of sulphurs, apparently of commercial value, in many parts of Iraq, and of salt, especially near Basrah. Yet each of these resources presents a different problem; none is easily exploitable (except oil); quantities available for industry are limited and the quality frequently poor. Agriculture has been kept at a low level of output because of the lack of irrigation schemes in most parts of the country; the difficulties caused by the present land tenure system and the agricultural techniques connected with the tribal system, which covers over 80 per cent of the cultivated area; the absence of an effective agricultural extension service and lack of modern storing facilities; these and other factors have held back both quantity and quality of agricultural and animal products. There was a noticeable extension in the cultivation of cotton in recent years, but the severe failure of the crop in 1951, owing to a pest attack, has been a great set-back. Difficulties in the supply of raw materials have held up many an industrial enterprise. The scheme for a sugar factory which has been under discussion since 1947 has had to be postponed from one year to another owing to the uncertainties connected with the
[28] cultivation of both sugar beet and sugar cane. The progress of the leather tanning industry, one of the oldest industries in Iraq, has been retarded due to the existing conditions in which hides and skins have been prepared and preserved, and great losses to this particularly native industry have resulted. The woollen textile
[288] mills have had to import certain qualities of Australian wool to mix with Iraqi wool which is of a coarse variety.

135 So far as mineral resources are concerned the surveys that have been made are insufficient.[1] Further exploration work is

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[1] As of writing, in July 1953.

all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for some time. This decision 382 reflects an understandable desire on the part of Iraq to have a 471 modern refinery of its own, replacing the somewhat inadequate and rather old Alwand refinery at Khanaqin which is owned by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and is capable of supplying not quite 70 percent of Iraq's current requirements.[8] Foreign management of the new refinery will probably be necessary, at least for an initial period. The project will make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery and probably also the small oil field near the Iranian border from which it draws its crude. This field probably cannot be developed on a scale large enough to warrant investment in the pipelines necessary to export the oil.

Expansion of Old Industries

Some industries are now expanding without government finan- 433 cial assistance. The cement plant and the brewery are both doubling their capacity. Recent improvements and expansion have put the woolen industry abreast of the country's needs. Other industries do not for the present require expansion. Flour milling capacity, for instance, appears ample. The tanneries also appear to have sufficient capacity, but to raise the quality of their raw material supply, technical assistance is needed to improve methods of flaying and preserving hides.

Still other industries could usefully be expanded but do not have sufficient financial resources to do so without government assistance. The cotton and rayon textile factories in Baghdad and [288] Mosul might well double their designed capacity and extend their facilities to make a wider range of products. At present cotton textile capacity can meet only about a quarter of the country's requirements. Since ample raw material is available and costs of production can become competitive with those abroad, further expansion would appear to be warranted. In its regular budget for [471] 1951-52 the government has provided ID 1,000,000 for a government textile mill. The Mission believes, however, that government ownership and operation would not be desirable and that it would be vastly preferable to extend capacity with the participation of private capital and enterprise.

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[8] By an agreement reached in December, 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

By and large this new partnership between the oil companies and the government should prove mutually beneficial. 382

The Government for several years has been considering the building of a modern oil refinery near Baghdad. In recent months, final plans were formulated and arrangements for its construction have apparently been made. This refinery, estimated to cost at least ID 7,000,000, is designed for an annual capacity of approximately 1,000,000 tons and when completed should be able to supply all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for refined petroleum products except for certain specialties. 382 655

The project will probably make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery, owned until recently by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,[1] now producing something less than 70 percent of Iraq's requirements. Likewise, the use of Kirkuk crude, which can be obtained by the Government at cost, will probably make it necessary to close down the small oil field near Khanaqin which supplies the Alwand refinery, since it is unlikely that the oil resources in and near this field can be developed to such an extent that investment in a pipeline for export of the crude would be warranted.

Cotton and Rayon Textiles

In 1947, a cotton spinning and weaving mill was started near Baghdad, with a pilot plant consisting of 5,000 spindles and 84 automatic looms. The second stage, which is something over 70 percent complete, consists of 22,000 spindles and 500 automatic looms. The plant is modern in design and includes dyeing, printing and finishing equipment. About one half of the equipment has been in full operation for over a year, and shows good returns for an uncompleted plant which has not reached stabilized operation conditions. When completed and when operating on a full three-shift basis, it is expected that the spinning mill will produce 6,000,000 lbs. of yarn annually. Part of the spinning capacity is used in making yarn for sale to other small textile mills or even for home industries for weaving into cloth. In Mosul, for example, there are over 1,000 hand looms in various small home industries 288

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[1] By an agreement reached in December 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

281 which depend entirely upon yarn from the new spinning mill, now that importation of yarn from abroad is no longer permitted. The total consumption of cotton yarn by these smaller mills and home industries is in the neighborhood of 1,500,000 lbs. per year. They also make rayon cloth from imported yarn, imports in 1950 being about 500,000 lbs.

The weaving capacity of the plant, consisting of 584 automatic looms when completed, will produce approximately 15 million square yards of cotton and rayon cloth per year. This is, however, less than one quarter of Iraq's normal annual requirements for all classes of cotton and rayon piece goods.

The industry would be in a far better position to meet domestic requirements if the cotton mill at Baghdad as well as the cotton and rayon weaving plant in Mosul could double their designed capacity and extend their facilities to make a wider range of products such as shirting and poplin. The finishing, printing, and dyeing departments should also be expanded. To put these additional facilities into full operation would take approximately four years and even then it would still be necessary to import considerable quantities of various types of textiles.

The Mission recommends that such an expansion program be undertaken. The total cost would be about ID 1,300,000, of which approximately ID 900,000 would be in foreign exchange, mainly in pounds sterling. As before, the Industrial Bank, working in conjunction with private capital, should arrange to finance the additional facilities. Since private capital will be available for participation, there appears to be no need for a wholly-owned government plant for which ID 1,000,000 has been set aside in the ordinary budget for 1951-52. The new facilities will require the employment of approximately 1,500 additional workers in the textile industry.

Woolen Textiles

Woolen textiles have been made for many years. The first modern textile mill was started approximately 30 years ago. This mill, like the cotton textile mill, has a greater spinning than weaving capacity, so that yarn is available for local use both in knitting and in weaving by hand looms. The plant is equipped to make a broad range of fine fabrics and, along with other smaller mills, is

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

fully capable of meeting all of the requirements of domestic con- 288 sumption with the possible exception of minor items of a special nature. The plant's present capacity is 500,000 meters of cloth and 50,000 kilos of yarn. Recent improvements and expansion have brought the woolen textile industry abreast of the needs of the country.

Leather

Until recent years, there was little modern tanning of hides, 282 most of the hides being exported. Since the war, however, several tanneries have been constructed and are now producing leather of fair quality sufficient for most of Iraq's needs, with the exception of those grades required to make the higher quality shoes.

Tanneries are not showing the profits which were originally anticipated, largely because they have to use hides of very poor quality. In many cases, the hides have been cut during flaying, while in other cases they have not been well preserved. The tanneries also have not attempted to make use of waste products and in some cases do not split the hides, a practice which is essential to low cost production. However, once these various technical problems have been solved, the tanneries should be able to meet all of Iraq's needs.

Shoes

Nearly 90 percent of Iraq's shoes are made by hand in num- 295 erous small home industries. There is one fairly modern factory, however, which, using both local and imported leather, now makes over 30,000 pairs of high grade shoes per year. The company has also set up retail outlets in all of the provinces. An increase in the capacity of this plant would do much to reduce shoe prices to the ultimate consumer. Annual production could be raised to 100,000 pairs by the procurement of additional equipment costing approximately ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly in Swiss francs. These facilities could be put into operation within two years and would increase employment from approximately 40 to 120 workers.

Vegetable Oil and Soap 388

A vegetable oil extraction plant has been in successful operation for approximately three years. It is designed to extract oil

Machine Shop

312 There are about 150 very small machine shops in Baghdad. The total labor force in these shops is approximately 400. They do various types of metal work but by far the most important is the normal maintenance work on more than 3,000 diesel-driven irrigation pumps. While the workmanship is good, costs are very high because of the heavy overhead.

All of this work could be readily accomplished in one small, modern machine shop equipped with metal fabricating facilities, electric repair shops and including a modern foundry. With such facilities, not only could maintenance work on irrigation pumps and engines be carried out, but completely new diesel-driven pumps could be manufactured, replacing those now imported. It would, of course, be necessary to import special items such as fuel pumps, bearings and gears. Likewise, the design should be obtained through a license arrangement with some international firm. This plant would reduce the cost of present maintenance work by about one third and constitute the beginning of a modern equipment manufacturing concern. The shops thus replaced could be moved to rural areas to handle local automotive and agricultural machinery repairs.

The cost of such a machine shop would be about ID 600,000, including ID 500,000 of foreign exchange, mostly pounds sterling. It should be financed by private capital in conjunction with the Industrial Bank.

Jute Mill

● 288
[431] Jute products such as sacks, hessian cloth and twine are now being imported at the rate of about ID 384,000 per annum. The demand for such products is increasing and appears to be large enough to warrant establishment of a jute industry, even though the raw material will need to be imported. Ultimately it may even prove feasible to grow jute in Iraq.

The plant should be capable of making about 10,000 tons of jute products per year. The cost of such a mill would be about ID 500,000, including ID 400,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in pounds sterling. This mill could be financed by private capital and the Industrial Bank. It is recommended that it be located

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

in Basra, close to both shipping and the agricultural area which 288
may prove suitable for the growing of jute. It would employ about 300 workers.

Automobile Tires

The importation of automobile and truck tires is increasing 383
at a rate of approximately 15 percent per annum, the value of all [438]
tires imported in 1950 being ID 468,000.

A plant of economic size to manufacture tires could be justified with a market of approximately twice that which now exists. Such a market will probably be reached in 1955. Since it would require approximately two years to construct a tire plant, it is recommended that plans be formulated to start such a plant in 1953.

The plant would be so designed as to utilize the maximum amount of labor and, accordingly, should cost no more than ID 750,000, including foreign exchange of ID 600,000, mainly pounds sterling. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required during the first years of its operation.

Salt

Geophysical work gives conclusive evidence of a very large 135
salt dome near Basra. Unfortunately, the analysis is not known. This dome could be the source of very cheap salt for both export
and domestic consumption. It might make feasible the establish- [385]
ment of an alkali plant, particularly since the nearby oil field would be able to furnish gas as a source of cheap power. It is recommended, therefore, that core drilling of this dome be started as soon as possible to permit a proper evaluation of the possibilities of its use.

Sugar Mill

Considerable thought has been given to the recommendation 257
of a sugar refinery. Such an enterprise would, of course, have to depend on agriculture to supply the raw material, either in the form of sugar beets or sugar cane. Since this cannot be assured at this time, it is recommended that the development of this industry be held in abeyance for the present.

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East

Iraq M41

regions for which it acts as commercial outlet and exchange centre. 361
These regions are :

(*a*) The plains of northern Assyria, where there is a dense agricultural population.

(*b*) The hills of Kurdistan, occupied by shepherds practising transhumance.

(*c*) The steppes of the Jezireh, where there is a mixed population of true nomads rearing sheep, cattle and draught animals ; and sedentary farmers.

(*d*) The uplands of the Jebel Sinjar, where pastoralism and agriculture are carried on by the Yezidi.

As a result, there is extreme heterogeneity of peoples within the 563
city. Arabs are in the majority, with smaller groups of Kurds, 438
Christians, Jews, and Yezidi, most of whom speak their own languages. [288]
An important mediaeval textile industry (note the word *muslin*) has now disappeared, though coarser textiles using wool as a raw material are still produced in the bazaars, and a recent feature has been the introduction of artificial silk weaving. Mosul is also important for leather working—a reflexion of its position on the edge of the steppe. Manufacturing is, however, less important than trade: grain, timber, hides, and manufactured goods are exchanged, and there are long distance communications with Baghdad and south-east Turkey. Much of the produce from Turkey comes by kelek (page 364).

Basra is an agglomeration of small sites grouped along the western 361
bank of the Shatt el Arab some 70 miles upstream from the Persian Gulf. Basra proper is situated on a small creek 2 miles distant from the Shatt el Arab, and the principal port is at Ashar, on the main river. Modern docks have also been constructed at Maqil, 4 miles upstream from Ashar, and since 1939, further development has taken place at Tanuma on the eastern bank of the Shatt el Arab, opposite Ashar. Because of the recession of the head of the Persian Gulf, the growth of the port is relatively recent, and dredging on a considerable scale is necessary to prevent silting of the channel. Basra handles the greater 439
proportion of the foreign trade of Iraq, and is the centre of the date- 438
growing region, being itself surrounded by date-groves. Dates form 361
the chief item in its export trade. Second in importance amongst exports is grain, with wool, liquorice root, and hides as subsidiaries. Imports consist chiefly of manufactured goods (cement, cotton and woollen textiles, machinery), tea, and sugar. Basra can be reached by large ocean going ships, but about 10 per cent. of its commerce is still carried on in small native craft.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

[135] 382 about half of the world's total. However, Iraq's past output has been paltry compared to its potential. A year ago Iraq's oil was flowing at the rate of 160,000 barrels a day. The figure is now 185,000, and estimates are that it will jump to 440,000 before long. The handicaps have been transportation and political difficulty. Iraq's wells are hundreds of miles from the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean Sea, which means pipelines have to be constructed. Before this year two pipelines were in operation from the Iraqi fields to Tripoli, Lebanon. A 12-inch pipeline to Haifa, Israel, has been put out of use since Iraq joined the Arab embargo of Israel. A new 16-inch line built almost to the Israeli border has never been completed for the same reason. Early this year one small new line was completed to the head of the Persian Gulf, which will have a capacity of about 40,000 barrels a day. The main addition is the 30-inch line to the Mediterranean just being finished. It runs to Banyas, Syria, and has a capacity of 280,000 barrels a day.

[471] Mining is carried out by the Iraq Petroleum Company, owned by United States, Dutch, British, and French interests. Despite this diversified interest, there has been continuous trouble with reactionary groups in Iraq along the same lines, but less serious than those in Iran. Recently the Parliament approved a new oil contract which promises the Iraqi Government 50 per cent of profits before foreign taxes, and (from the western point of view) the political situation seems to have improved.[38]

COTTON TEXTILES

288 Until the erection of the Iraqi Spinning and Weaving Company mill in 1948, cotton was used primarily for filling mattresses, for upholstery work, and for the home industries. Around 2,600 bales of cheap raw cotton and cotton waste normally have been imported from India for this purpose. A small crop of unirrigated indigenous cotton raised in the north around Zakho goes into this market, too.

The Iraqi Spinning and Weaving Company in Baghdad doubled its capacity in 1951 and now has about 27,200 spindles and 580 looms, producing about 18 million yards and finishing 5 million yards annually. The company already has purchased more equipment to give a total of 39,000 spindles and 900 looms, capable of producing about 27 million yards of cloth annually. Several small mills weaving cotton and rayon and three small knitting mills are reported also.

The mill consumed 10,482 bales of cotton in 1951 and expects to use 15,000 bales in 1952. The cotton has been secured almost entirely from the domestic crop. A poor crop forced the mill to buy 1,500 bales from the United States in the early part of 1952, but this unusual situation is not expected to be repeated.

471 288 Funds authorized in the government budget for other cotton textile mills have not been expended, presumably because of the general opposition to government intervention in the field of private enterprise and because of the recent expansion in the Iraqi mill. This expansion was financed by the Industrial Bank, which owns about a third of the company's stock.

288 With this expansion the factory should be able to produce about 40 million yards of cloth annually, or about 60 per cent of the country's requirements of 70 million yards.

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[38] Carmichael, J. H., "Oil from the Middle East Hits a New High Mark," *New York Times*, March 23, 1952.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

Iraq MHI

Import duties on textiles are relatively modest—from 11 to 20 per cent ad valorem. However, at the insistence of the mills the government has com- 651

Table 31

IRAQ: Textile Products Available for Home Use 1938, 1948, 1949, 1950, and 1951

288

Year and Item	Consumption	Net Imports Yarn	Net Imports Cloth	Available for Home Use	Population	Per Capita Availability
	1,000 Metric Tons				Millions	Pounds
1938						
Cotton		.6	6.0	6.6	4.0	3.7
Wool	3.0	.1	2.2	5.3	4.0	2.9
Rayon		.1	2.2	2.3	4.0	1.3
Total	3.0	.8	10.4	14.2	4.0	7.9
1948						
Cotton	.7	.5	7.5	8.7	4.9	4.0
Wool	5.0		.6	5.6	4.9	2.6
Rayon		.1	.2	.3	4.9	.1
Total	5.7	.6	8.3	14.6	4.9	6.7
1949						
Cotton	1.1	.1	6.9	8.1	5.0	3.5
Wool	5.0		.5	5.5	5.0	2.6
Rayon		.1	.6	.7	5.0	.3
Total	6.1	.2	8.0	14.3	5.0	6.4
1950						
Cotton	1.1	·	8.0	9.1	5.1	4.0
Wool	5.0		.5	5.5	5.1	2.6
Rayon		.2	.6	.8	5.1	.4
Total	6.1	.2	9.1	15.4	5.1	7.0
1951*						
Cotton	1.4		6.1	7.5	5.2	3.2

* Estimated from trade sources.

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

pletely embargoed importation of yarns up to count 40s and closely controls foreign exchange for imports of cloth.

AGRICULTURE

From the statistics it would appear that agricultural production has been going down in relation to the population and that considerable pressure is developing on the land. The Food and Agriculture Organization's reports, which are based on the official figures for the country, show reduced acreage, sharply declining yields, and lower consumption of food in the postwar compared with the prewar period. But the United States Agricultural Attache, who has lived in this general area for many years and is intimately familiar with agriculture, expresses the same skepticism about the Iraqi figures as he does about agricultural statistics in the other Middle East countries. It is his view, and that of a number of other local agricultural leaders, that these figures simply are not correct and that both the output and consumption have been maintained fairly well. 241

Iraq is normally self-sufficient in food. Occasionally, in years of poor crops small quantities of cereals are imported, but the country usually has a

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

In addition to the above-mentioned enterprises, it may well be 433
desirable to establish a paper mill as soon as there is an assured [289]
supply of pulp from abroad. As the demand for paper bagging for domestically produced fertilizers and cement increases, it will probably be more economical to produce such paper in Iraq than to import it. A plant for the manufacture of glass bottles, other containers and tumblers might also be started, provided the availability of the right type of sand can be confirmed.

The largest and perhaps the most promising industrial possi- 339
bility lies in the utilization of the natural gas produced in conjunc- 387
tion with oil and now almost totally wasted. The Mission recommends therefore that early consideration be given to the erection, near Kirkuk, of a plant which, using natural gas and gypsum as raw materials, would be capable of producing annually 500,000 tons of ammonium sulphate fertilizer, 100,000 tons of elemental sulphur, 10,000 tons of carbon black and 300,000 tons of cement. Since the natural gas contains about 10.5 percent of hydrogen sulphide by volume, it would be worthwhile to establish a plant to recover sulphur from all of the gas produced. Part of the cleaned gas would then be cracked thermally, producing hydrogen after removal of the carbon black. In the most important part of the plant the hydrogen and nitrogen won by removing carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide from the flue gases would be synthesized under high pressure into ammonia. Ammonia and carbon dioxide would then be passed through a slurry of finely ground gypsum, yielding calcium carbonate and ammonium sulphate. The latter would be sold as fertilizer and the former used to make cement. Such a plant could produce fertilizer very cheaply, thereby stimulating its use in Iraq; and any fertilizer not consumed domestically would find a ready market abroad. Sulphur and carbon black could be used in the production of rubber tires in Iraq and would also be in great demand abroad; and there will undoubtedly be a growing demand for cement in Iraq. The plant would cost aproximately ID 25,000,000, of which the sulphur recovery plant would account for about ID 8,750,000 and the cement plant for ID 1,500,000. It should be attempted only if a reliable foreign chemical concern can be interested in designing and erecting it and undertaking its operation under a management contract.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Paper Mill

289 Iraq does not have a suitable source of material for a pulp plant at this time. The development of a paper making industry would therefore require the importation of pulp to meet its various requirements. This procedure would ordinarily be both practicable and economical; however, the world market for pulp is now very critical and may remain so for several years. It is recommended, therefore, that the paper mill be held in abeyance until an adequate supply of pulp is assured.

III. State Assistance to Industry

Financial Assistance

454 433 The widespread reluctance of private capital to venture into industry can be overcome only gradually as the profitability of industrial investment is demonstrated in various fields. In the meantime, it will be necessary for the government to furnish most of the capital for industrial development.

Plants which will require a large amount of capital and will need completely foreign management at least in their beginning may have to be financed completely by the government through the Development Board. The oil refinery and the fertilizer plant are projects which fall into this category. Other more modest undertakings will require relatively small amounts of capital and in most cases may be economically operated by Iraqi management even though some foreign technicians may be necessary. This combination lends itself to the use of private capital, which should be encouraged as much as possible by the government, by means of financial assistance where justified.

652 433 The Industrial Bank is now the principal agency for rendering financial assistance to the development of private industry. The Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951, it had outstanding loans totalling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicapped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq m H1

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[439] Iraq produces about 80 per cent. of the total world supply of dates—that is, of the proportion of dates that form an article of commerce, because most dates are eaten directly by the growers, or else bartered. The general conditions under which date palms thrive have already been touched upon, and it is sufficient to recall that the palms can flourish in dry, saline, sandy, loamy, or even water-logged soils, although the maximum yield of fruit is obtained when abundant water is available.

The region of the Shatt el Arab is pre-eminently suited to date-production, and both banks are lined with date groves extending inland for about a mile and a half. Some 25 to 30 million palms are cultivated throughout the region, and of these, one-half are found close to the Shatt el Arab, the rest occurring along the river banks as far north as Latitude 33° N. A curious feature is the rise of the river under the influence of the incoming tide. Fresh water is ponded back in the Shatt el Arab, and floods the banks to a depth of as much as 3 feet to provide natural and regular irrigation of the groves—a phenomenon that from the point of view of the native farmer is wholly estimable.

In order to ensure a good crop, the land is dug over once every four years; and because of the frequent presence of creeks and water-courses, this must be done by hand. Artificial pollination is, as we have already seen, highly necessary; and though most groves include 3 per cent. of male palms, the district of Fao has developed a special trade in male pollen dust, from which other date-growing regions are supplied.

About 130 varieties of date are known, but three are most widely grown. The *Halawi* palm produces the finest fruit, but gives only a moderate yield (44 lb. per tree) (Dowson), whilst the *Sayir* produces slightly less, but is more tolerant of inferior growing conditions, and is probably the most widely grown. The *Zahidi* does not give a fruit of high quality, but the yield is over 120 lb. per tree, and this compensates for the low price obtained. Fertilisation of the female palm takes place in April, and picking begins in August, when large numbers of nomadic tribesmen move into the date-growing areas to work as seasonal harvesters.

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Besides forming an extremely important part of local diet, dates are used in the distilling of *arak*—the chief fermented beverage outside the vine-growing areas, and one thought to have value as a prophylactic against malaria. The crushed stones are fed to cattle, and both leaves and trunk of the palm are used in light constructional work (houses, boats, even bridges), and also in the manufacture of paper.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investiga-
tion, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great pro-
697 gress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-
'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its develop-
ment by poverty. This limited the activities both of the munici-
palities and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
● 291 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and pro-
fessional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was trans-
185 formed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public build-
366 ings, and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-'Aṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dis-
pensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources com-
pared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor pro-
jects for which local pride was clamoring.

291 European dress was ever more generally adopted in the larger towns, and spread significantly to urbanized tribesmen. Among upper-class women, though the veil was still almost universal among Muslims, Western 556 clothing was worn increasingly. The desire for material progress was reflected in the eagerness of the rich to acquire motor-cars, gramophones, and the toys and amenities of Europe; but inability to pay for these gave rise to demands for limitless credit.

466 Interest at the International Labour Office in conditions among 'Iraq's industrial workers led to some answering efforts to produce suitable legislation; but the smallness of this class in an unindustrialized country made European criteria and standards largely inapplicable. The first seeds were sown, however, of a social interest in labour matters.

744 To the whole community and to urban society in particular with its still prevalent poverty and low purchasing power the Government's Health and Education services contributed valuably. The former improved its quarantine and pilgrim services, multiplied its countryside dispensaries, improved its specialist institutes, and dealt well with the cholera epidemics of 1927 and 1931. It was significant that out-patient attendances, less than 750,000 in 1921, had more than doubled by 1926 and quadrupled by 1930. In response to foreign purchasers' outcry, the Health Department imposed measures of cleanliness in the date industry. In 1927 it founded the Royal Medical College; this, a medical school of good standards, took at once a high place in 'Iraq's higher and professional education. A School of Pharmacy had existed since 1922. The Government adhered during these years to a number of international conventions on medical as on many other matters.

871 The 'Iraqi schools seemed to foreign observers at this period—and indeed at others—to lack something of the best spirit of education. There was criticism of lax discipline, uncritical self-flattery, a worship of modernity and materialism; politics pervaded too many of the schools, always in the form of a crude xenophobia eager for street demonstrations. Nevertheless, an educational system grew and multiplied its facilities, fought for budget allotments, developed an Inspectorate, codified its Regulations. A Hygiene Directorate was formed in the Education Ministry, later [562] greatly to develop. The year 1930 saw the first Government secondary schools for girls; the days of Muslim hesitation over female education were almost over. For boys the secondary period was prolonged from four to five years, three 'intermediate' and two 'senior'. The dispatch of students for higher education abroad grew commoner. Technical education remained unpopular: it did not lead quickly enough to the goal chiefly envisaged, a Govern-

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439
Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453
varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656
shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by
insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies,
by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly
in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking.
The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436
in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. 652
The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in
some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern 185
multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still
prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped
to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were
the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private
cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291
served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced
Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi
sidara in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with
ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises men- 433
tioned on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382
significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

was no fear in her heart, for she knew that Abbas Ali el 539x
Qassab would die before he could marry her. And Kadhim sat watching his snares and thinking: How can I become a great merchant? Kadhim was so poor that he had not even a single copper coin in his pocket; he owned [291]
no shoes, he had no headcloth, he was not even wearing any vest or underclothes, and his only garment was his thob. And Kadhim decided: I will borrow money, and trade with my capital and become a great merchant.

Then Kadhim went to the town and he was walking in 539
his bare feet, and he went to the shop of Abdul Rashid and 437
saluted the merchant and said: Give me a roll of cloth and 577
a loan of five gold liras and I will give you my pledge. And Abdul Rashid looked and he saw that the youth was dressed in a dirty and torn thob and that he was bareheaded and barefooted, but he saw that he carried his head like a hawk, so he said: You are, then, from the tribes? And Kadhim nodded and said: Yes.

Now, let it be known to you that the tribes were much poorer in the days of the Ottomans than they are today, for they were then unable to cultivate their land in peace and prosperity, and it often happened that it was necessary to celebrate a marriage or observe the rites of death when there was no money in the purse of the head of the house. Then would he go to the town and to a merchant and say: Give me cloth and money and take my pledge. And as for the pledge, if he had a gold or silver ring, he would give it, and if he had none then he would give his headcloth to the merchant, or even his riding switch, saying: This contains my honour. And when the pledge was given payment was always made, for this is the custom of the tribes.

Abdul Rashid Mejid looked at the youth Kadhim and

and there was frost on the ground, and I was trembling from cold and fear of the night. And as I walked along I saw in front of me on the path the cloak of a man, so I picked it up and wrapped it around me and I became warm. But, alas, though I knew it not at the time, from the smell of that cloak there came in my stomach a child. And the Qadhi thought: This is a most strange case and I like it not. For who is that huge merchant with the beard sitting in the crowd? He is almost big enough to be our lord and master Haroun er Rashid himself. And so the Qadhi questioned the girl, thinking: I must conduct this case according to the best and most learned rules of law, that the Commander of the Faithful be pleased with me.

The learned Qadhi asked the girl: What is your name? The girl replied: I am named Khadija, nor have I any other name. And the Qadhi wrote the reply of the girl in his great book. Then the Qadhi said to her and he asked of her: The accuser has stated that this cloak wrapped itself around your naked thighs. Did this indeed happen? And [291] the girl Khadija replied: Verily it was so, for I was wearing a dress and my own black abba, and over it I put on this cloak of a man. And first it tickled me around my neck, so I pulled my dress up over my head so that my neck might be protected from its tickling. And when I did this that devil of a cloak wrapped its folds even around my naked thighs and it commenced tickling me a hundredfold in that region, so that I started to laugh and power departed from my legs and I fell to the ground. And such was its insistent tickling that I parted my legs and it may well have been that at this time its smell entered me and caused in my stomach a child.

The Qadhi turned to the assembly, and he asked: Does anyone speak for the accused, for being but a cloak it has x539 and crying out: Can then my slender body be touched by that fat old merchant?—for these reasons and to comfort her, her father gave her some of the gold, and he said to her: Go to the bazaar and to the Mistress of Dressmakers, and let her make a marriage dress such as has never been known before.

And the girl dried her tears and she took her sisters and aunts and her friends and she went to the Mistress of Dressmakers, and she said: I desire such a dress as has never been known before on any marriage bed. And there was much whispering and conference and discussion, and finally the Mistress of Dressmakers whispered her idea to one of the girls, and the girl whispered to another girl, and in this manner they all heard the idea, and as they heard it they clapped their hands and cried: O pretty idea, O happy thought, O lovely device.

And on the night of the marriage when the feast was ended Jassim took his bride into the bedroom and he removed her cloak, and she was dressed in a lovely dress of shimmering silk, lovely against her golden skin, and Jassim was pleased to see that the dress was pure and untouched by any decoration or frill, nor was there on it a
[291] single sequin. And he laid his bride on the bed and he removed her dress and she was clad in an ataq and bag trousers of the finest silk, and he removed her ataq and exposed her lovely breasts, but when he came to remove her bag trousers he found that the knot was a tight knot, nor could he untie it.

But his hands were eager hands, nor would they brook delay. So he took hold of her bag trousers and gave a great pull, and the waist band broke, but as it broke there was a shower of sequins, and the lovely skin of his bride was sparkling with sequins, the sheets of the bed were x539 ONCE in Mosul there was an Arab, a Christian, named Daoud es Suleiman, and he worked as a goldsmith in the market, and all the ladies of Mosul would visit his shop and order from him bangles of gold, studded with pearls, and earrings and necklaces of gold and rare jewels. So his trade was great and he lived in wealth and comfort with his wife, a girl of perfect form and beauty, and his life was a life of happiness and ease.

And one day he was sitting in his shop at the time of the evening prayer, and he was putting away his gold and rare jewels in his iron chest, and his shop boy was closing the shutters, and he was preparing for the coming of [219] night, when there came to his shop a girl, and she was veiled as are the girls of the towns, and she was sobbing and weeping, and she spoke to Daoud, and as for her voice, it was the voice of a nightingale. She gave to Daoud a necklace of gold and pearls and rings and earrings of gold and rare stones, and she said: O Nazarene, take these my jewels and give me money, for I am in need and urgent haste. So Daoud took the jewels and he examined the stones, and he rubbed the gold with acid and weighed it until he was satisfied.

Then he turned to her and said: Know you, O lady, that these jewels are worth five thousand liras and not less, yet I have not so much money in my shop, for I only keep here jewellery. Therefore come you here tomorrow at the rising of the sun, and I will take your jewels and give you money. But the girl burst out sobbing and weeping in a manner to tear the heart, and she said: O merchant, give me the money now, else my life be ended and my lover destroyed.

And Daoud questioned her and asked her concerning her affairs, and she replied, saying: Kind merchant, know

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MHI Iraq MHI

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THE youth sees a girl on the road or in the fields, for the women of the tribes are not veiled, and he falls in love with her. He speaks to his mother, or if he has no mother, to his sister or his aunt, and she goes to the house of the girl and she sees any of the women of the house, but preferably she sees the mother of the girl. And she asks: Does your daughter agree to marry So-and-so? And the mother asks the girl and a reply is given.

If the reply is favourable the youth goes to his sheikh, or if his sheikh is away to one of the sons of his sheikh, and if there are no sons available he goes to a sayyid and he says: O Your Honour the Sheikh, I want to marry the daughter of So-and-so, for I love her and I want her and I cannot live without her. And will you be an intermediary in the affair? The sheikh usually agrees, for the man is of his tribe. Then the sheikh will send one of his servants to the father of the girl, and the servant will say: The sheikh wishes to visit you at such and such a time.

At that time the father of the girl remains ready in his house, and he has prepared a meal for the sheikh and for his retainers. The sheikh arrives in his car, and he is accompanied by three or four men to support his dignity. And the sheikh sits down in the house and he converses with the father of the girl for half an hour, but he does not mention the marriage. Then they have food, and after the meal the sheikh sits for a while and then he says: We must take our leave and go. And the father of the girl says: You have honoured me with a visit, and there must be some reason for it. Command me as to what service I can do. And the sheikh says: Let it be known to you that the business of our visit is marriage. And the sheikh continues and asks: Do you consent to the marriage of your daughter to So-and-so, and surely you must give your consent?

44:Matthews and Akrawi S,G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
Iraq MN1

EQUIPMENT

x872 First- and second-grade rooms are normally furnished with tables at each of which two children are seated. The chairs, though easily movable, are usually set in rows. In the middle grades the typical desk has a small, narrow, backless bench attached to it and accommodates two children—though in crowded classrooms there may be three children to a desk. In the upper grades individual desks with fixed seats are common.

Most schools are supplied with Arabic maps of the continents and with French—or sometimes English—charts for use in conversation lessons. The larger and older schools are equipped with French natural-history charts and closets of miscellaneous, simple laboratory materials. There is little if any equipment for manual arts, drawing, music, and singing.

The older schools have libraries of 300 to 350 books and pamphlets. The newer the school, the smaller the library. The book collection is a mixture of old textbooks, courses of study, books on teaching method, and some travel books. Children's books are few. The same books are found in most schools because schools are almost entirely dependent upon the Ministry for their library collections. This "library" is kept in a closet in the principal's office, and in most schools visited by the Commission it seemed to be used very little by either teachers or pupils. A couple of refreshing exceptions to the rule were found in Baghdad in schools connected with the teachers colleges, where a definite effort had been made by the staff to collect reference books and children's literature in both English and Arabic, the purchases having been made out of small contributions from the children.

THE CHILDREN

There are more over-age children in Iraqi primary schools than in European or American schools. This is due not only to retardation in learning, but also the lack of compulsory-attendance requirements results in many children entering school late. Usually there are more overage children in village schools than in city schools.

●[291] School children are encouraged to wear Western dress, and in the cities most of them do, but in rural districts and small communities native dress is common. Many rural children are too poor to buy either shoes or essential books and stationery. The Ministry has recently undertaken to provide needy children with free books, which are returned to the school at the end of the year. Children of more prosperous parents may either buy or rent their schoolbooks.

In 1943 an attempt was made in the province of 'Amarah to provide a fully capable of meeting all of the requirements of domestic consumption with the possible exception of minor items of a special nature. The plant's present capacity is 500,000 meters of cloth and 50,000 kilos of yarn. Recent improvements and expansion have brought the woolen textile industry abreast of the needs of the country. 288

Leather

Until recent years, there was little modern tanning of hides, most of the hides being exported. Since the war, however, several tanneries have been constructed and are now producing leather of fair quality sufficient for most of Iraq's needs, with the exception of those grades required to make the higher quality shoes. 282

Tanneries are not showing the profits which were originally anticipated, largely because they have to use hides of very poor quality. In many cases, the hides have been cut during flaying, while in other cases they have not been well preserved. The tanneries also have not attempted to make use of waste products and in some cases do not split the hides, a practice which is essential to low cost production. However, once these various technical problems have been solved, the tanneries should be able to meet all of Iraq's needs.

Shoes

Nearly 90 percent of Iraq's shoes are made by hand in numerous small home industries. There is one fairly modern factory, however, which, using both local and imported leather, now makes over 30,000 pairs of high grade shoes per year. The company has also set up retail outlets in all of the provinces. An increase in the capacity of this plant would do much to reduce shoe prices to the ultimate consumer. Annual production could be raised to 100,000 pairs by the procurement of additional equipment costing approximately ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly in Swiss francs. These facilities could be put into operation within two years and would increase employment from approximately 40 to 120 workers. 295

Vegetable Oil and Soap 388

A vegetable oil extraction plant has been in successful operation for approximately three years. It is designed to extract oil

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For the use of soaproots in bathing and laundering see MA1 Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 515, pp. 79 and 123-124.

25a Hooper and Field 9-3 [illegible] 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MNI

Iraq

G. mexicanum Tod. Mexican cotton introduced into India in 1804. The seeds yield a copious, woolly floss. (Field 13 [Iraq]; 1A.) 824* 248

At Rustam Farm the following varieties of cotton are also grown:

(*a*) Rustam No. 65. Field 3A. Origin Iraq.

(*b*) Rustam No. 124. Field 5A, 9A. Origin Punjab, India.

(*c*) Mosul White. Field 4A. Origin Mosul, Iraq.

(*d*) *G. peruvianum.* Ish-kury. Field 11A, 12A. Origin Egypt.

(*e*) Rustam No. 138. Field 7A. Origin Acala.

Guest (p. 39) records the following information: "*Gossypium* (Malvaceae). Cotton. Qutn (Ar.), Pambuq (Turk.), Lukah (Kurd.), Pambu (Kurd.).

"Iraqi or Indian Cotton, *G. herbaceum* L. (Qutn Iraqi), a well-known, short-stapled type, is probably indigenous or has at least been cultivated in Iraq for many centuries. It is still grown to some extent as a summer crop, especially on the northern plains where springs or streams provide irrigation water. The lint is used chiefly for stuffing. It is the local practice to pick this type of cotton with the boll intact, the dry boll and other rubbish being removed later.

"After the War the Department of Agriculture tried many foreign varieties of cotton and eventually issued seed of 'Mesowhite,' a derivative of the long-stapled American Upland cotton, *G. hirsutum* L. (Qutn Amrikani). A ginnery was erected by the British Cotton Growing Association, who did much to encourage this crop. The cultivation of Mesowhite cotton as an irrigated summer crop rapidly became popular in lower Iraq and after ten years (in 1928) the annual export of cotton exceeded 5,000 bales of 400 pounds each. Since that year the size of the crop has fallen off very rapidly, chiefly owing to the slump in world prices which has discouraged the local farmers. In 1932 the export of bales of cotton from Iraq amounted to only about four hundred. One or two other varieties of American cotton, such as Acala, have done well in trials at Rustam Farm; this is a cotton inferior to Mesowhite but gives a higher yield and ginning percentage.

"Egyptian cottons (Qutn Misri) have also been tried but have not proved successful under local conditions."

I-I

Gypsophila paniculata L. (Caryophyllaceae) 824*

الصابونيه 296 •

El-sâbûniyeh (Ar.); Zuleh (Ham.); Saosafid, Bekh (Ait.); Kundur, Kundusch (Achundow); soap-root. 515

35: Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAl Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

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824* Ait.; Post; Boiss. 1: 542; Ph. Ind. 1:155.
• 296 K.B. 319.
515 This is a shrubby plant of northern Iran, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, 3 to 4 feet high, with numerous stems springing from the perennial rootstock. The underground rootstocks are collected and used as soap for washing the hair and clothes. The Irani drug is no doubt a substitute for the older Roman and Egyptian Struthium, the root of *G. Struthium* L. of southern Europe. The roots contain from 6 to 16 per cent saponin.

824* **Halimodendron argenteum Fisch.** (Leguminosae)

278* Field 14, 31 (Iraq).

Halimodendron is a thorny shrub found in Iran, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Fruits of this plant were collected without a local name, from Yezd-i-Khast between Isfahan and Shiraz. The thorns are used in native surgical operations. Inflated pods, 2 cm. long and oblique, are brown, and contain two or three seeds like chick peas.

824* **Helianthus annuus L.** (Compositae)

262 افتاب گردن

Aftāb gardan (Teh.); Ward-ash-shams, Shams-wa-qamar (Iraq); Qunah baqan (Turk.); sunflower seeds.

Field 122 (Teh.), 72, 73 (Iraq).

Two kinds of sunflower seeds are represented in these collections: black, ovate-elongate, 12 by 6 mm.; and white, smooth, broader achenes, 12 by 7 mm. There is a good market for these seeds, which
[262] are used for human consumption and for bird food, and yield by
[231] expression an oil for cooking purposes. Many tons of the seeds are produced annually in the U.S.S.R.

824* **Helicteres Isora L.** (Sterculiaceae)

278* بهمن پیچ.

Bahman-i-pīch, Pachman-i-puh (Teh.); Kisht bar Kisht (Pers.); Pechak, Marorphali (Hind.); Avartin (Sans.); the Persian and Sanskrit names signify the furrows on a ploughed field; the spiral fruits.

Ibn Baitar; Achundow; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 365; Ph. Ind. 1: 231.

Field 137; K.B. 320.

The East Indian screw tree occurs in dry forests throughout central and western India and in Ceylon, Java, and northern Australia. The spirally curved fruits are sold in all Indian bazaars and

8;Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

The father of the girl says: Let me ask the women of the 584
house for I cannot compel them if they do not agree. And
if the reply comes back that the women of the house
agree, the sheikh says: How much do you ask of us? And
the man replies: Give according to your pleasure. The
sheikh says: No, you must name the sum. And the man
says: One hundred dinars.

The next day the father of the youth, or if he has no 585
father, one of his male relatives, takes the hundred dinars 201
and he goes to the father of the girl and he gives him the
hundred dinars. And when the father of the youth has
gone, the father of the girl gives the money to the mother
of the girl, and the mother goes out and buys a gold necklace,
gold earrings, gold bangles and silver anklets for the
girl, also clothes and shoes.

Then between three and ten days after the payment of 585
the money, at the time of sunset, the bridegroom sits in his house to await his bride, and he sends all his female relatives to bring her to him. His mother and his grandmother and his sisters and his aunts march in procession with a band to the house of the bride, and they are escorted by all the friends of the bridegroom belonging to the tribe, armed with their revolvers and rifles, and there should be fifty armed men in the procession for a fashionable wedding.

When the procession reaches the house of the bride the men fire their rifles, and the bride, who is ready, comes out, accompanied by her female relations, and her male relations sit quietly in their house and they do not come out. Then the bride goes back in procession to the house of the groom, surrounded by the female relations of the groom.

When the procession reaches the bridegroom's house

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These seeds are flat, reddish brown, 5 by 3 cm., containing white cotyledons. The seeds are an Indian remedy for tapeworm. The powdered seeds are prescribed two days after a dose of wormseed. 824* 278*

Caesalpinia Bonducella Roxb. (Leguminosae)

تخم ابلیس

Tukhm-i-iblīs (Teh.); Khaza-i-iblīs, "Devil's testicles"; Bonduk-i-hindi (Ar.); Kat karanj (Hind.); bonduc nut, nicker tree.

W.H.M.M. 150709.

Bonduc seeds are globular, smooth, dull gray in color, and yield an oil by expression. They are worn as necklaces for charms, and the kernels are bitter, tonic, antiperiodic, and anthelmintic. [301] •

Calamintha graveolens Benth. (Labiatae)

ترنکمسک

Terengamisk(?) (Teh.); Faranj mishk or Biranj mishk; Palang mishk has been referred to *Ocimum sanctum* L., and Palenguemeeke by Schlimmer to *Dracocephalum Kotschyi* Boiss.

Boiss. 4: 583; Post 624.

Field 32; K.B. 306.

This species of calamint frequents the Mediterranean region, Syria, Asia Minor, Iraq, and Trans-Caucasia. The seeds are known in India, where supplies come from Iran. They are dark brown, oblong in shape, 2 by 1 mm., three-angled, tapering toward the umbilicus, where there is a white, V-shaped mark; they are feebly pungent and become coated with transparent mucilage when soaked in water. The seeds are stimulating and aphrodisiac. [832]

Calendula officinalis L. (Compositae)

همیشه بهار

Hamīshah bahār (Teh., Iraq); Gole himmicheh behar (Schl.); Qarah Koz (Turk.); marigold flowers.

Field 123.

The pot marigold, a plant of the Mediterranean coast, is a weed of cultivation in northern India, and is much grown in gardens for its ornamental flowers. The yellow flower heads are bitter and have long been used among domestic remedies. "A tincture made from the dried florets was formerly used in medicine for application to wounds" (Guest). [247]

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to be petrified fruits; the name they bear in Delhi, Pathar-ka-ber, signifies the fruits or stones of the jujube tree. The stones are oval, pointed at both ends, 3.5 cm. long and 2 cm. in diameter. They contain 95 per cent of calcium carbonate. These stones are sold all over northern India, Iran, Syria, and Palestine. They are said to be useful for healing wounds, and, internally, for flatulence and diarrhea.

Cypraea moneta L. (Gastropoda)

صدف

Sadaf, Wuda (Ar.); Khar mahra (Pers.); Cowri, Sipi (Hind.); cowrie shells.

Field 269A.

[321]
[301] •
[436]

These well-known porcelaneous shells from the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf are used throughout the East for making ornaments, and at one time were a means of barter or medium of exchange. They consist chiefly of calcium carbonate, and in medicine are used as an antacid, alterative, and expectorant. The shells also serve as charms against the Evil Eye for babies, horses, and machines (H. F.).

Larinus maculatus Fald. (Coleoptera)

Yielding Tréhala manna; described under the name of the host-plant, *Echinops persicus*.

Bee's wax (Hymenoptera, Apoidea)

موم

Mūm (Teh.); Moma (Hind.); Cera alba; white wax.

Field 216, 260.

White wax is sold in the shops and used for plasters and ointments.

"Camphor candle" (Mūm-i-kāfūri) is a specimen of a crudely made wax candle in the composition of which camphor has been incorporated to diffuse a pleasant odor when burning.

Bombyx fortunatus Hutton (Lepidoptera)

پیله ابریشم

Abrisham, Pīlāh abrīsham (Teh.); Pileh, cocoon; Resham, silk; Pat (Beng.); Resham-ki-keri (Duk.); cocoons of the silk moth.

W.H.M.M. 150821.

The cocoons of the silk moth or silk worm are said to be styptic and tonic, and are generally administered with other astringents.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MHl Iraq MHl

*539 in the morning and come in the evening, and this state of affairs is not good. What is this constant desert, desert? Therefore we should kill the son of the Wazir that we may put an end to this state. But the Commander of the Circassians said: Why should we do this? It would be a shame to kill him. Rather let us do another thing. Let us go to the witch in the town and explain the affair to her, and let her do magic, that hate may come between these two boys.

So the Circassians went to the witch and said to her: O
mistress of wonders, our state is thus and thus; please do
magic that these two boys may hate each other. And the
witch replied: In this there is no obstacle or difficulty, nor
is it necessary to use the knowledge of forbidden books.
Give me each of you one dirhem. And the witch took the
six dirhems from the Circassians and went to the market.
And she bought new clothes and paints and powder for
*539 her face and returned to her house. Now this witch was
302 an old hag of more than seventy summers, but such is the
artifice of women that when she had applied kohl and
put on new clothes, and washed her face with curdled
milk, and applied to it paints and powders, she appeared
as a young girl of seventeen. But only to one who saw
her from many paces away.

*539 And in the morning the witch stood near a mound which lay one hundred paces from the road to the desert. So the two boys rode out of the palace with their Circassian slaves and they saw a young girl, beautiful as a moon, standing on the mound. The young Amir said: I shall have this girl. The son of the Wazir said: No, I shall have her. And the son of the Wazir jumped from his horse and ran towards the mound, and the young girl when she saw him come leapt behind the mound and was hidden from

I-I
824*

218* water and alcohol, odorless but with a sweetish taste. It contains a
[152] principle similar to glycyrrhizin. Sarcocolla[2] forms a plaster long used by Parsi bone-setters, and is applied locally to the ears and
• [302] face to allay neuralgic pains. Aitchison says the gum is used by ladies of the harem to improve their appearance and to give the skin a gloss (see "Sarcocolla" by D. Hooper, *Journ. As. Soc. Bengal*, Vol. 9, 1913, pp. 177–181).

Astragalus gummifer Labill. (Leguminosae)

کثیرا

Kathīrā (Teh.); Qatera, Katira gond (Hind.); gum Tragacanth. Field 128; W.H.M.M. 150861.

[314] The small, branching, thorny shrubs of *Astragalus* are especially to be found in Asiatic Turkey and Iran, where they form one of the most characteristic features of the vegetation. The above and other species yield, when incised, flat, ribbon-shaped pieces, or, when punctured, vermiform tears. The tragacanth gum from Tehran is in clean white ribbons, typical of the best commercial quality, largely used in medicine and confectionery.

Astragalus hamosus L. (Leguminosae)

اکلیل الملك

Iklīl (Teh.); Iklīl-ul-malik (Ar.); Adhafir-aj-jian, Adhafir-ash-shaitan (Iraq); Iklil-ul-mulk (Bom.); Aketi (Ham.); the curved pods. Field 145; W.H.M.M. 150889; K.B. 342.

The origin of this drug has been referred to various species of *Melilotus* and *Trigonella* which have curved pods. Those received from Tehran and Hamadan are horseshoe-shaped, 2.5 cm. in length, grayish brown, smooth, curved outward, grooved on both sides, and beaked; they are divided by a central partition and contain grayish yellow, rhomboidal seeds, notched at one end and with black spots. The pods are called in Iraq "Fairies' Nails" or "Devil's Claws," and are used for various disorders, but chiefly as a suppurative and astringent. Sometimes they are made into a plaster for reducing tumorous and painful swellings.—Mixed with *Viola* sp., they are taken before purgation (H.F.).

Bambusa arundinacea L. (Gramineae)

تباشیر قلمی

Tabāshīr-i-qalamī (Teh.); Tabashira (Ar.); Bans lochan (Hind.); mineral concretion in stems of bamboo.

[2] [i.e., the gum of Astragalus fasciculaefolius, Kohl Farsi -- Analyst]

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This small tree, indigenous to China and northeastern India, is now under cultivation throughout the greater part of India and the East. Croton seeds were known to the Persians at an early date, and were doubtless introduced from China by the caravan route through Central Asia. Described by Acosta in 1578, they were called Piñones de Malaca. The seeds contain a violently purgative oil, and are classified by the Iranis among the poisons.

Cucumis sativus L. (Cucurbitaceae)

تخم خیار

Tukhm-i-khiyār (Teh.); Khira (Punj.); Lār (Kash.); Kira (Hind.); cucumber seeds.

Field 34; W.H.M.M. 150754.

Cucumber seeds are ovate, pointed at both ends, 12 by 5 mm., notched at the apex; the cotyledons are oily and sweet.

The seeds are a favorite nutritive and demulcent, resembling in action and uses the five cucurbitaceous seeds (see *Citrullus vulgaris* Schrad.). The therapeutic action of cucumber seeds, from a local point of view, must be considered as somewhat negative, since they may be "mixed with any medicine the doctor prescribes."—They are given as an infusion for typhoid (H.F.).

Cucurbita Pepo DC. (Cucurbitaceae)

گل کدو

Gul-i-kadū (Teh., Ham.); Shijar (Iraq); Kadu (Hind.); flowers of the pumpkin.

Ait.; Schl.; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 622.

Field 214, 92A; W.H.M.M. 150891; K.B. 312.

[262] The pumpkin is largely cultivated as a vegetable in Iran and Afghanistan. The flowers, chiefly yellow or orange corollas, are sold in the bazaars. Made into a decoction, they may be applied to the face "to improve the complexion"; they are also administered internally for chest complaints. • [302]

تخم کدو

Tukhm-i-kadū (Teh.); the seeds of the pumpkin.

Field 65; W.H.M.M. 150766.

[262] The seeds are light colored, oval, 2 by 1 cm., smooth, with a marginal rim. Like the seeds of other members of the gourd family, they form a nutritive and palatable addition to ordinary diet.

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The sedge grows plentifully in moist or boggy ground. The small, dark, hairy tubers are ovate-oblong, pointed at both ends, about 2.5 cm. or less in length, brown, hard, and horny. They have a fragrance resembling lemon and cardamom. These tubers are known in Asia for their perfume and medicinal properties; they are used for cleaning the teeth and are placed among clothes to keep away insects.

[302]

Datura Stramonium L. (Solanaceae)

تخم تاتورا

Tukhm-tātūrā (Pers.); Datura (Hind.); Jouj macel (Ar.); Shinah Azqhi (Bal.); stramonium thorn apple.

Ait.; Ph. Ind. 2: 586; Y.B. Pharm. 1927, 49; Synopsis of Genus Datura, W. E. Safford, Journ. Wash. Acad. Sci., 19 Apr. 1921.

K.B. 314.

The thorn apple grows in North, Central, and South America, and was introduced at a very early date into the warm regions of Europe, Asia, and Africa. This species is a weed in Iran, and the name has been borrowed from other countries. Specimens of the seeds came from Tehran and Hamadan and the leaves from Hamadan. Both seeds and leaves are used as poultices to allay pain. The natives recognize the poisonous properties of the seeds and sometimes call them Kachola, the name for the seeds of nux vomica, as both are used for killing dogs.

Daucus Carota L. (Umbelliferae)

تخم هويج

Tukhm-i-havīj, Tukhm zardak (Teh.); Jazr-ul-bostani (Ar.); Jazar, Gaizar (Iraq); Gajur (Hind.); Hawu[illegible] (Turk.); carrot fruits.

Field 120A, 203; W.H.M.M. 150887.

[262]

The carrot is greatly valued as a vegetable and much cultivated. The fruits are dull brown, oval, and compressed, the surface is rugose, marked with ridges which are distinctly winged, and the wings fringed with white teeth or bristles. The taste is balsamic, bitter, and oily. The fruit is stimulant, laxative, emollient, diuretic, and emmenagogue.

Delphinium Zalil Ait. & Hemsl. (Ranunculaceae)

اسپرگ

Isparak (Teh.); Asbarg, Aswarg, Zalil (other parts of Iran); Hishwarg (Bal.); flowers of yellow larkspur.

Field 36.

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Indigofera Roxburghii Jaume (Leguminosae) 824*

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'Adas-i-talkh (Teh.); Bin-i-talkh (Isf.); the seeds.

Field 442; W.H.M.M. 150872.

These seeds are red in color, polished, flattened, oblong, 4 by 2 mm., very hard, and bitter.—They are given to relieve stomach pains (H.F.), and are similar to seeds of an allied plant, *I. trifoliata* L., prescribed in Guzrat as a restorative.

Indigofera tinctoria L. (Leguminosae) 386

رنگ کرمانی 824*

Rang-i-kirmānī, Nasābīdah-i-kirmani(?), Rang-i-sābīdah, Rang-i-vasmah (Teh.); Wasma (Punj.); Nil (Hind.); leaves of the indigo plant.

Field 112A, 152; W.H.M.M. 150762, 150790.

It is of historic interest to note that the old name for indigo leaves in the Punjab, Iran, and Turkey is Wasma, the name formerly used for woad, the dye obtained from *Isatis tinctoria*, and used by the early Britons. *Isatis* is indigenous to the Kuram Valley, where it is called Ranjowah or cat's filth. Indigo was known in Avicenna's time, and India has cultivated and produced the dye as a leading industry for several generations. The leaves, like henna, are sold in both coarse and fine powder, and used chiefly as a cosmetic for coloring the skin. [302] •

Inula Helenium L. (Compositae) 824*

رأس هندی 278*

Ra's-i-hindī, Ghaza gouzanah (Teh.); Anduz (Ham.); Pil gush, "elephant's ear"; Rasan, Rasna of the Hindus; Andiz otu (Turk., see Boiss. 2: 186); Zanjabil chami, "ginger of Damos"; Zanjabil-i-shami, "Syrian Costus"; Année (Fr.); Helenion (Gr.); Enula Campana (Med. Lat.); elecampane root.

Ph. Pers.; Schl.; Boiss.; Pharmacog. 340; Ph. Ind. 2: 259.

Field 222; K.B. 322.

Elecampane root was an ancient medicine among the Greeks, and its use spread to other parts of Europe and to Asia. The root is hard and horny, grayish brown in color, paler within. Crystals are seen in the interstices of the wood in old commercial samples. The root, which has an agreeable, aromatic odor, and a warm, bitter

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This annual herb is indigenous to the region that extends from the Caucasus to northern India, and is frequently cultivated in India and Iraq as a winter crop. The seeds are used for human consumption and for feeding animals; as a green manure or forage crop it surpasses other vetches. It has for a long time been known that a form of paralysis named Lathyrism is believed to result when this pulse is eaten continuously for some length of time. Guest, however, states that there is no evidence that its harmful nature has ever been recorded in Iraq.

Lavandula dentata L. (Labiatae)

اسطوخودوس

Ustūkhūdūs (Teh.); Osthoukhodouce (Schl.); the Persian name is derived from the Greek; flower heads.

See paper on this drug by I. H. Burkill in the Journ. As. Soc. Bengal, N. S., V, No. 3, March, 1909, 67–71; Ph. Ind. 3: 93; Boiss. 4: 540.

Field 18; W.H.M.M. 150737; K.B. 324.

These are the flower heads of a species of lavender sold in Tehran and brought from Shiraz. They constitute an ancient drug used by the Greeks and referred to by Arabian and Persian physicians. The name has also been applied to *L. Stoechas* L., the Staechus of old works on materia medica. The flowering spikes have the odor of rosemary and camphor, and yield an essential oil containing dextro-camphor and dextro-fenchone. In the form of an infusion the drug is given for catarrh and malaria; it is also used for washing wounds and eruptions.

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Lawsonia alba Lam. (Lythraceae)

حنا برک

Hinnāy-i-barg (Teh.); Hinna (Iraq); Rang-mehndi (Hind.); Camphire (Syr.); henna leaves.

Field 74, 188, 220; 19, 45 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150819, 150863.

The henna plant is cultivated throughout India on account of its leaves, which yield the henna dye, and as a garden hedge plant. They are sold in the shops in two forms: (1) the broken leaves, and (2) the leaves called "Rangh" reduced to fine powder and mixed with a small quantity of mustard oil. The principal value is as an article of the toilet, for staining the finger nails, hands, and feet a dull orange color, and for dyeing the hair bright red. The use of henna

1/[Chickling vetch (Lathyrus sativus)--Analyst]

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as a cosmetic dates from very ancient times; it is practiced by 278*
Mohammedan women, and has become a vogue in Europe. Staining 824*
the finger nails with henna to make them resemble hazelnuts is called
"funduq bastan." Henna is also used as an external application for 302 •
skin diseases, blind boils, and leprosy.—It is painted on the pubic 386
region for stoppage of bladder (H.F.). The seeds contain about
10 per cent of fixed oil.

Lecanora esculenta Eversm. (Parmeliaceae) 278*

شیر زاد 824*

Shīr-zād (Teh.); Chir zadi, Agalactie (Schl.); the lichen.

Holmes, Manna, Chem. & Drugg. 92: 25 (1920).

Field 418; W.H.M.M. 150752; K.B. 325.

This manna lichen is abundant in North Africa and western Asia, and locally in the desert of Seistan. It varies from the size of a pea to a small nut, clear brown or whitish; the interior is soft, white, with interlacing hyphae and crystals of calcium oxalate. There is a tendency for the thallus to develop excrescences of a nodular form which easily become free and drift about with the wind in the desert. Schlimmer gives references to the use of this lichen as food from the time of Alexander the Great. It contains lichenin. Its nutritive power is very low. The name of the drug means "milk begetting," and it is employed to increase the flow of human milk.

Other lichens referred to in the Field collection:

Usnea sp. (28A), a lichen of Iraq and Iran, called Lihayat-as-shāyib, or "old man's beard." This is mixed with flour in bread-making, and a decoction is sometimes taken to correct bad breath.

An Alpine lichen (87A) called Lachyat-as-sheikh. This is used as a perfume. Perfumed lichens have been observed in the genera *Evernia*, *Ramalina*, and *Zobaria*.

Bouceroscа Aucheri(?), a lichen called Mārmūt, used by Brahuis
in languor and oppression (Ait.). Pāla-mangy and Māhriz are the [302]
Kashmir names of two lichens employed to dye the nails and hands [386]
as substitutes for henna (Ait.). One of these is probably *Squamaria
chrysoleuca* Sm.

Lens esculenta Moench (Leguminosae)

نیسک

Nisik (Kurd. in Iraq); Adas (Turk.); Masūr (Hind.); the lentil.

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—Taken with a little sugar and cold water it is a remedy for nausea, or is given in hot water for stomach pains; it is said to be harmless, even for children (H.F.).

Smilax China L., and S. glabra Roxb. (Liliaceae)

چوب چین

Chūb Chīnī (Ind. bazaars); Tu fu ling (Chin.); Raiz de China (Port.); Tuber Chinae; China root, Chinese sarsaparilla.

Schl.; Laufer 556; Colloquios; Ph. Ind. 3: 500.

W.H.M.M. 150773; K.B. 338.

This root was once a famous remedy for the treatment of Morbus americanus (syphilis), and was first introduced into Europe by the returning sailors of Columbus, and into India by the sailors of Vasco da Gama. It is mentioned by Indian writers of the 16th century. Garcia da Orta traced the source of the drug to China and records a cure made in 1535. It was soon afterward introduced into Iran by the Portuguese. Saponin was found in the root by Kobert in 1911, but its therapeutical action is not considered very marked.

Solanum nigrum L. (Solanaceae)

تاجریزی

Tāj-i-rizī (Teh.); Inab-ath-thalab, "fox's grapes"; Inab-ed-dib (Ar.); Karezgi (Bal.); black nightshade, wonderberry.

Achundow; Boiss. 4: 284; Ph. Ind. 2: 550; I.H.B.

Field 130A, 414; W.H.M.M. 150722; K.B. 339.

[262] This species of *Solanum* is a common weed in Iran, where the leaves are eaten as spinach, and the small, black fruits with yellow seeds are medicinal. The berries are eaten by the country people (G.). The Bote women employ the fruit as a cosmetic; they stick
[302] the fresh seeds on their cheeks to remove freckles and improve the complexion.

—Mixed with violet flowers, *Nymphaea alba* L., jujube, sebestan, and sugar, the fruits of *S. nigrum* are prepared like tea to soften the feces before giving a purgative, especially in typhoid fever (H.F.).

The fruits of bittersweet (*S. Dulcamara* L.), under the name of Sag-anjar, "dog's grapes," are among the drugs exported to India. They are considered laxative and are employed in chronic enlargement of the liver.

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824* **Verbascum Thapsus L.** (Scrophulariaceae)

278* مازريون

Māzaryūn (Teh.); Mahi zahraj, Bon tamaku (Ar.); Gidar tamaku (Hind.); great mullein.

W.H.M.M. 150758.

This mullein grows from the temperate Himalayas westward to Britain. The drug consists of broken stalks and thick, hairy leaves. The narcotic action of mullein on fish appears to be well known to [226] the Arabs and Iranis, the meaning of Mahi zahraj being "fish poison." Mohammedan physicians prescribe it in gout and rheumatism in combination with aperients. Throughout Europe mullein has long had a reputation in the pulmonary diseases of cattle, on which account it bears the name of cow's lungwort.

824* **Vetiveria zizanioides Stapf** (*Andropogon muricatus* Retz) (Gramineae)

278* برمكيا

• 302 Barmakiyā, Bikh-i-wala (Pers.); Khas Khas (Hind.); Izkhir-i-jami (Ar.); Vetiver (Tam.); root of cuscus grass.

Field 5 (Isf.).

The use of these fragrant, wiry roots for medicinal purposes and [355] in perfumery has been common in India for a long time. The roots emit a pleasant odor when moist, and for this reason they are woven into screens and mats (tatties) which hang over doors and windows to cool and perfume the atmosphere during the hot season. A paste of the root is applied to the skin to relieve oppressive heat of the body, and a cooling aromatic bath is prepared by adding some broken root to the water. The root yields a fragrant essential oil which commands a high price as a perfume (Otto Stapf, *Kew Bulletin*, 1906, 347–349).

824* **Vicia Faba L.** (Leguminosae)

278* باقله

262 Bāghalā (Iraq); Banklent (Bal.); Bakla (Hind.); Baqilla, Baqlah (Turk.); Paglah (Kurd.); broad or horse bean.

246 Field 4, 56, 69 (Iraq).

This legume is a native of Iran and is now universally cultivated. The beans are a well-known vegetable and an excellent horse food. The shoots are said to be efficacious in rousing a drunkard from

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Alum 278*

زاج سفید 823*

Zāj-u-safīd (Teh.); Sheb (Bagh., Iraq); Spati-kari (Sans.); 317* Zamchi (Turk.); Phitkari, Phataki (Hind.).

Field 250; 126A.

Crystals of alum sulphate, with a styptic, sweetish taste. Alum is used to stop bleeding, to settle turbid water, and in the native tanning industry.—It is also a whitening agent and used as an astringent (H.F.). It is obtained in commercial quantities from Aksu and Kuchar in eastern Turkestan.

Antimonium sulphate

کل سرمه

Kuhl or Surmah (Pers.); Arjan, Surma-ka-pathar (Hind.); black sulphide of antimony, Kermes mineral, kohl.

Field 10 (Isf.), 40A.

Kohl or powdered black antimony is used throughout the East [302]● for blackening the eyelids. Introduced originally by the native doctors, hakims, as a remedy for eye diseases, it is now used by women as a cosmetic to improve their appearance. Lampblack is sometimes sold to take the place of the mineral compound.—A detailed summary of the use of kohl in southwestern Asia will form part of a forthcoming publication (H.F.).

Armenian earth

کل ارمنی

Gil-i-armanī (Pers., Hind.); Hajr-el-armeni (Ar.); Armenian bole or earth, ocher.

Field 196, 235; 139A

Armenian clay consists of oxide of iron mixed with carbonate of lime. Clay of bright red contains a small amount of lime, but lighter-colored clays effervesce strongly with acids and contain less oxide of iron. Armenian bole, either by itself or mixed with red sandalwood and spices, is painted on the face and body to relieve skin affections, boils, and sores. It is one of the earths eaten by pregnant women. [261] In Afghanistan this habit is so frequent that the term "Gil-khwar" [843] is applied to clay or chalk eaters (see Laufer, Berthold, "Geophagy," Field Mus. Nat. Hist., Anthro. Series, 18, No. 2, 1930).

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Arsenic trisulphide

زرنیخ

Zarnikh, Zārnickh-i-dandan (Teh.); Zārnikh-zard (Isf.); Hartal (Hind.); Haritala (Sans.); yellow sulphide of arsenic, orpiment.

Field 230; W.H.M.M. 150825.

Orpiment is obtained from the Hayana Mountains, Iran, and from China. It occurs in massive or lamellar, golden yellow crystalline pieces, sometimes mixed with gray or black metallic portions. It is used [illegible] an alterative and nervine tonic.—Mixed with lime it is employed as a depilatory (H.F.). ● [302]

Calcium sulphate

گچ کاشان

Gach-i-kāshān (Teh.); Guetcha (Schl.); Gil-i-dschar (Achundow, Ph. Pers.); Sanjirahut (Sans.); Sufid pathar (Hind.); gypsum.

Field 215; W.H.M.M. 150893.

Gypsum is a white crystalline mineral, transparent, and slightly soluble in water. Some bazaar specimens are mixed with mineral impurities.

Plaster of Paris is powdered gypsum deprived of its water of crystallization by heat.—To stop epistaxis it is dissolved in water and rubbed on the forehead (H.F.).

Copper oxide

لاسرخ

Lāsurkh (Teh., Isf.); copper oxide, oxidized copper.

Field 151, 427; W.H.M.M. 150822.

Copper oxide is heavy, gray or black metal with crystalline fracture. It is said to be prepared "by placing the metal in a mouse's stomach and burning," and the resulting compound is used directly for ophthalmia. "It is an adhesive application for the eyes to relieve swelling." Lāsurkh is also regarded as a form of kohl, or preparation [302] of antimony, which ladies apply to their eyelids and brows, not only to give them a beautiful black but to smooth away excrescences.

Edible clay

گلی. سرشور

Field 228, 251.

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824* **Capparis spinosa** L. (Capparidaceae)

278* ریشه کبار

Rishah-i-kabar (Teh.); Kabar (Pers., Iraq); the bark.

Ph. Ind. 1: 131; Boiss. 1: 420.

Field 200; W.H.M.M. 150803; K.B. 307.

The thorny caper is found in western Asia, Europe, North Africa, and Australia. It is a common shrub in the open country, forming great bushes fully 5 feet high.

[262] Throughout Iran the flower buds are collected to be made into pickles. The light-colored root and the thick root bark are used in medicine, the bark being the Capparis Cortex Radicis of the old "Persian Pharmacopoeia." They are both pungent and bitter and are given for intermittent fever and rheumatism.

Capsicum frutescens L. (Solanaceae)

فلفل مویه

Filfil mūyeh, Filfil-i-surkh (Teh.); Filfil ahmer (Ar.); Lal mirch (Hind.); red pepper, bird pepper, chilies.

Field 96A, 111A; W.H.M.M. 150914.

[263] This species of peppers or chilies, *Capsicum* and *C. annuum*, are cultivated throughout India and Iran for their pungent fruits, and are used throughout the East for culinary purposes. Capsicums and their preparations act as a powerful local irritant. In medicinal doses chilies stimulate the alimentary canal, promoting the flow of gastric juice "to increase appetite and aid digestion."

Carthamus tinctorius L. (Compositae)

کافشه

Kāfshah, Tukhm-i-kāfshah (Teh., Ham.); the seed.

Gul-i-rang (Teh.); Gul-i-kajira, Qurtum (Ar.); Kusam (Hind.); Atractus (Gr.); safflower, the flowers.

Ait.; Post; Schl.; Laufer 324; Ph. Ind. 2: 308.

Field 33, 39A, 195; W.H.M.M. 150866; K.B. 307.

• [303] [386] The safflower plant is cultivated in Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan as a field crop for its red florets, which are used as a dyestuff and cosmetic. The red flowers are often supplied as a cheap substitute for saffron, the stigmas of *Crocus sativus* L.

The fruits or achenes, called parrot seed, the size of barley grains, yield by expression an oil which is used as a salve for sprains and rheumatism.

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medicinal tea.—In Tehran the drug is said to stop excessive menstruation (H.F.)

Salvia macrosiphon Boiss. (Labiatae)

تخم مرو

Tukhm-i-marv, Tukhm-i-anjurah—Anjurah is a Persian name for the mucilaginous seeds of Blepharis (Teh.); Kanocha, Marv (Isf.); seeds.

Field 136, 197; W.H.M.M. 150853; K.B. 338.

Schlimmer, Aitchison, and Dymock refer to species of sage used in medicine under the name of Kanocha. Stapf has shown that they are identical with those called Marv, and belong to the above species of *Salvia*, a plant of Afghanistan and Iran. The seeds are light brown or greenish, oval, lens-shaped, 3 mm. in length, the polished surface having wavy or branching markings. The seeds are mucilaginous when placed in water; they are used for debility.—They are also given to alleviate heart disturbances in pregnancy and phlegmasia after childbirth (H.F.).

The seeds of *S. aegyptica* L., called Maur in Baluchistan, are said to be a remedy for eye diseases.

Salvia sp. (Labiatae)

خردل شهری

Khardal-i-shahri, Tukhm-i-khardal (Teh., Ham.); the seeds.

Field 252; K.B. 337.

Tukhm-i-khardal is the Persian name for mustard seed and the seed of *Salvadora persica*, but in the above two specimens seeds of a *Salvia* have been supplied. The seeds are rounded, 1 mm. in diameter, grayish brown, with a minute, round umbilicus; a transparent mucilaginous coating is formed when they are soaked in water. The seeds are prescribed with bitter medicines.

Santalum album L. (Santalaceae)

سندل سفید

Sandal-i-safid (Teh.); white sandalwood.

Field 232; W.H.M.M. 150789.

These are pieces of the fragrant, white sandalwood of India. The important constituent of the wood is the volatile oil, of which it yields from 2 to 5 per cent. This contains about 90 per cent of the alcohol santalol. Sandalwood oil is used in perfumery, and in [303]

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x539 She took off her clothes and put them on the bank, and
she stepped into the river. Now, be it known to you that,
556 though she could see him not, there was concealed on the
437 bank a youth of the Fetla tribes, and his name was Kadhim.
x539 He did not own a single horse or mare, nor did he even
own the leg of a mare. He owned no sheep and he owned
no land, and he lived by eating at the guest tent of his
sheikh. And as for clothes, he used to go to the river and
set snares for the sandgrouse and partridges when they
came to drink, and sell them in the market to buy cloth.

x539 And Kadhim was concealed on the bank of the river
watching his snares when he saw a girl beautiful as a moon
come to the river and divest herself of her clothes. He saw
that she was perfect in figure, for her neck was slender and
her shoulders smooth and soft and her breasts rose firmly
and clearly as do the desert dunes in moonlight. As for her
● [304] waist it was slender and her thighs were round and smooth
and around her navel was tattooed a butterfly. And he
watched her and forgot the sandgrouse and he forgot the
partridges. And after she had bathed in the river she dried
herself by lying in the sun. Then she put on her clothes
and filled the jar with water and returned to the town.

And the next day at the rising of the sun Kadhim concealed himself in the same place and awaited the coming of the girl. And about half an hour after dawn she came down and drew water from that very same place. And Kadhim, who was concealed in the tamarisk bushes, watched her, but she did not take off her clothes. She merely filled the pot with water and put it on her shoulder, and she turned and returned to the town. But Kadhim, who was a youth in the seventeenth year of his life and swift of foot, ran ahead behind the fruit groves and date trees and came out on the path ahead of her, and when

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 she drew near he greeted her and wished her the peace of God and His blessing. And Salma drew her veil across her face and she averted her eyes and she did not reply to the greeting of the strange youth. Then Kadhim drew level with her and he bent his head towards her and whispered: Did it hurt much when they tattooed the butterfly? When Salma heard these words her face grew red with shame. But she looked at Kadhim's face and saw that he was laughing, so she, too, laughed, and she dropped her veil and said: Since you have seen the butterfly you may as well see my face.

x539 Then Kadhim and Salma sat down by a tamarisk bush, •304 and he told her his name and situation and she told him her name and details of her life, and they laughed much about the butterfly and she said: It did not hurt, for it was done when I was in the fifth year of my life, and it was only a little one, but it has grown larger with me. And they discovered that they were of one heart.

x539 Each day and every day that Salma went to draw water from the river Kadhim waited for her, and he helped her fill the jar with water, and they would sit down by a tamarisk bush and pass a few minutes in laughter and happiness. And when Salma returned to her house her eyes were like stars and her cheeks were like the blossoms of the rose. And the mother of Salma said to her husband, the merchant Abdul Rashid: See how happy our daughter is? What can cause this happiness? And Abdul Rashid said: She needs a husband. Perhaps she is falling in love. I will see the marriage broker today.

x539 So that very day, when he had closed his shop, Abdul 584 Rashid went to the house of that discreet man, the marriage broker, and he said: My daughter is of an age to marry. And the broker said: There is one who seeks a

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Iraq MHl

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see Ml Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see Ml Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

2. COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

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The zones of land surface into which the territory divides itself, though they belong less to history than to geography, may be briefly mentioned since they deeply affect the life of the inhabitants and reflect their ethnology.

First comes the mountain belt in the north and north-east. A part of the main Armenian and Zagros system, it formed in 1900 the sanjaq of Sulaymaniya and a large part of those of Mosul and Shahrizur. This terrain is wholly un-Arabian, the population solidly Kurdish. Its mountains, mainly barren but carrying also areas of forest, are divided by deep valleys sometimes widening into plains. The hardy inhabitants of its hundreds of villages produce crops of grain, rice, vegetables, fruit, and tobacco, grown on the water of springs and rivulets and the relatively abundant rain. The climate is equable in summer, harsh in winter, the landscape commonly of striking beauty.

In the flattish submontane area of Mosul and Shahrizur sanjaqs lie treeless uplands and the lower courses of the Greater and Lesser Zabs. Here, in ancient Assyria, village-dwelling cultivators grow spring grain crops on rain and, in places, by water-lift from the rivers. The country is intermediate in environment and race between the mountain zone and the hot flatlands of central 'Iraq. The latter, the most extensive and most characteristic region of the country, covered the sanjaqs of Baghdad and Karbalā and most of Ḥilla. Everywhere dead flat and stoneless, it is unblessed, save in rare seasons, by rainfall sufficient for crop-growing, and must needs be cultivated by lift or flow from controlled canals or flood-channels. The crops are winter and summer grain and vegetables, locally some rice, and vast gardens of dates. The population, entirely Arab, lives in mud-built villages or in clusters of hair tents or reed huts.

The equally flat silt-country of the lower Tigris–Euphrates delta, astride and below the prehistoric coast-line, covered the southern part of the Ḥilla sanjaq and almost the whole of the three sanjaqs of 'Amara, Muntafiq, and Baṣra. It was characterized by a higher proportion of reed dwellings, fewer mud villages: by lesser crops of wheat and barley, but extensive rice-growing in the flooded areas: by miles of date gardens, and by a special way of life developed by the buffalo breeders, mat weavers, and fishermen in the great marshes.

Ignoring the Arabian dependencies of Baṣra, two other zones remain to be mentioned. One is that of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab in the Baṣra sanjaq, with its miles of ordered date gardens in a lean strip between river and desert: the other is that of the arid steppe

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads;
their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-
settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-
dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe,
and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least
numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory
is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded
the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no
other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription
purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban
community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or
benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas,
may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps
a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A
total of midway between two and two and a half million people
may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest
Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for
'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern
world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking
''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every
population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as
invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi
community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh
century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into
'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth
century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other
cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these,
too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

241 advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made [312] but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallah*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

511 In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of 511 the *badu* and their hungry camels. Even where tenure was reason-423 ably secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving productivity; [476] wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

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[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[311] [2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north.

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Their solution must depend on the simultaneous and widespread 241 working of forces of rural education, reliable security, sound land 654 tenure and properly financed enterprise. Meanwhile, the annual locust campaigns in northern 'Iraq were developed jointly with neighbouring countries. Progress was made in hill-country tobacco-growing and treatment of the leaf on modern lines. Silk experiments continued, though with scant success. Cotton-growing was still restricted by unskilled cultivation and by pests. The produce of the great date-groves of southern 'Iraq was bringing difficult problems not only of improved culture but of organization and disposal, and civil war raged between growers and packers. Of the attempts at modern estate development (p. 17) none had yet succeeded. The projected Agricultural Bank could not, it was found, be inaugurated until clearer land-titles gave security for loans. The Aṣfar Concession was limited and revised to provide for the acquisition and development by the Company of the Laṭifiya estate, south of Baghdad; the Irrigation Department constructed the main canal at the Company's expense, and promising operations on the 65,000-acre area began under European management.

The main agricultural development of the time was that of riverside pump irrigation. 312 This had been initiated before 1914 and moderately extended between 1920 and 1925. Aided by important fiscal privileges, it began thereafter to show remarkable increase, to the point of becoming a main feature of 'Iraq's economy. Installations in the liwās of Baghdad, Diwaniya, Kut, 'Amara, and Diyalā had by the end of 1930 brought the number of pumps to over 2,000, representing a million-acre increase of cultivable area. There was evident value in thus attracting capital to agriculture, utilizing the cheap oil available, exploiting the high-lying virgin lands, and avoiding the precarious chances of flood irrigation. But the develop- 311 ment was not free from trouble. 472 The attraction of cultivators to new lands rather diverted them from old than increased their numbers; improvement in yields, due to fresh lands and secure irrigation, was not matched by superior type or purity of crops. Estate management attempted by townsmen was sometimes shortsighted and uneconomic, and the hard times and low prices of 1930–1 brought ruin to many hopeful enterprises. These, more- 423 over, jointly undertaken by an urban capitalist—often a Deputy or city notable—and a tribal shaykh or *sirkal*, were productive of puzzling difficulties of land tenure and rights. Neither the traditional occupancy of the tribe, nor the share claimed by the incoming capitalist, had any basis in law. Agreements between the parties often proved unworkable, and in practice did not always bring blessings to the cultivators. These conditions indicated, yet

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

1. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had 000
travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. 648x
It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous 311
territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average 181
of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience 642
or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: 182
the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too 563
favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in 795
which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

206 existed in Baṣra and Baghdad and their suburbs; and the telephone and telegraph had become familiar or indispensable to all classes save the most backward. The new wireless transmitting station completed in 1951 at Abu Ghurayb, with the most modern design and range, secured communication with Europe and America and was used for the national broadcasting. The Development Board planned an expenditure of ID 2 million on telecommunications between 1951 and 1956.

499 Progress in road improvement was delayed during 1946–50 by the financial narrowness of the post-war years. This and bridge-building formed an important part of the projects[1] intended for realization in 1951–6 through the Development Board. The completion of this programme would fundamentally transform the conditions of transport and travel in 'Iraq, with far-reaching economic consequences. The 'Nairn route' to Damascus was still
491 in regular use; its traffic was highly organized, with air-conditioned vehicles, by the original company and its imitators. The Rawanduz road was little used; the tracks leading into Najd and Persia carried no important traffic; and the trunk route to Jordan or Palestine (p. 321) lost its value when the State of Israel blocked the sea-outlet it had offered.

5. TOWN AND COUNTRY, MID-CENTURY

161 The population of 'Iraq, declared by the census of 1947 to be
162 4,800,000, had by then doubled since the century opened. Its distribution[2] was in general unchanged as between towns, inlying villages, tribal country districts, and nomads; about a quarter were town-dwellers, a fifteenth nomads, the remainder settled cultiva-
● 311 tors. Wide areas of steppe desert and of barren mountain remained, as for the foreseeable future they must, almost uninhabited; the widest of such regions, those of the administratively separated northern and southern provinces of the Shamiya desert, amounted to some two-fifths of 'Iraq's whole surface. The average density
161 of population for the whole territory was of the order of eleven persons to the square kilometre, or, omitting the desert provinces, eighteen. The liwā with the greatest population was that of Baghdad with 800,000 people; next came Diwaniya, Muntafiq, and 'Amara. The greatest density was of 49 persons to the square

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[1] The projects considered as 'main roads', with their bridges, were estimated to cost: Baṣra–'Amara–Kut–Baghdad, ID 2,800,000: Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil, 2,500,000: Baghdad–Sharqaṭ, 3,450,00. Elsewhere, ID 4,450,000 was allotted for 'mountain roads', 6,176,000 for miscellaneous bridges, 1,550,000 for a Ḥilla–Najf road, 1,300,000 for Ḥilla–Diwaniya–Shamiya, and 5,250,000 for numerous other routes.

[2] For distribution of the population by administrative units, see Appendix B.

About four-fifths of the country consists of unproductive or slightly 311 productive desert, steppe, marsh and hill masses. The productive core 132 is divided broadly into two regions within which cultivation is practised regularly. The northern region is fed by rainfall supplemented by peren- 312 nial streams rising in the mountains and, to a limited extent, by lift from the rivers. The southern region largely depends upon irrigation, supplied by canals drawn from the river system, following winter rainfall. The former may be appropriately called the Rainfall Zone, and the latter the Irrigation Zone. Actually the southward extension of the northern rainfall varies annually, while the date gardens of the Basra Liwa constitute a distinct (and of course economically a very important) study. But this does not affect the correctness of the broad picture presented.

Reference to Table I will show that the region of cultivated and cultivable land within the Rainfall Zone covers about 41,000 square kilometres, and that within the Irrigation Zone about 51,000 square kilometres. These figures represent 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total land surface of the country respectively. The cultivation is preponderantly of an extensive character. Only a fraction of these zones, possibly from a fifth to a tenth, appears to be actually cultivated in any given year. So that land is available for a very great development of agriculture, when other factors are favourable.

TABLE I. APPROXIMATE CLASSIFICATION OF LAND SURFACE, 1930

Expressed in square kilometres

[423]

Liwa	Total area all land	Hill mass	Cultivated Region				Additional potentially cultivable territory	Total cultivated and cultivable region	Territory containing large holdings	Size of holdings in misharas*			
			Rainfall Zone		Irrigation Zone								
			†3% hill mass	Plains	Canal fed territory†	Machine fed territory†				1-100	101 to 500	501 to 1,000	Over 1,001
Mosul	45,800	9,330	190	14,580	—	—	270	15,040	7,870	—	—	—	—
Arbil	16,600	7,620	150	7,010	—	—	—	7,160	2,420	7,418	728	500	—
Sulimani	9,300	6,400	130	2,420	—	—	—	2,550	2,280	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	20,800	—	—	12,020	—	—	3,240	15,260	6,280	—	—	—	—
Diyala	16,200	—	—	710	2,760	90	260	3,820	3,410	4,092	—	546	—
Baghdad	22,100	—	—	—	1,710	2,270	890	4,870	1,500	162	220	120	360
Dulaim	124,500	—	—	—	920	630	20	1,570	920	2,344	109	121	3
Karbala	21,200	—	—	—	660	—	20	680	620	—	—	—	—
Hilla	8,100	—	—	—	4,570	330	1,630	6,530	2,380	452	364	98	82
Kut	16,400	—	—	—	4,680	3,860	2,170	10,710	2,580	—	—	—	—
Diwaniya	83,000	—	—	—	3,770	2,180	5,520	11,470	2,270	6,378	—	155	69
Muntafiq	38,700	—	—	—	4,440	270	370	5,080	6,260	—	—	—	—
Amara	19,700	—	—	—	5,670	1,010	—	6,680	110	—	10	5	50
Basra	10,900	—	—	—	610‡	60	110	780	1,190	—	—	—	—
Totals	453,500	23,370	470	36,740	29,790	10,700	14,500	92,200	40,090	—	—	—	—

*Where information was available. Such information must not be presumed to be exhaustive. A mishara = 2,500 sq. metres or thereabouts.

†Territories so classified are at present very incompletely irrigated.

‡Tidally watered date gardens.

The information given in the table regarding the size of holdings is derived from fiscal returns. Although the classification of these holdings by area cannot be expected to be accurate, the figures possibly give some indication of the frequency of larger and smaller holdings in the districts actually concerned. The latter must not be taken to coincide with the cultivated areas of the liwas themselves.

3. Agricultural Population

3. In any general study of the land tenure of a country it is desirable 161 to know the numbers and distribution of the agricultural population. 162 Thus it would greatly assist in planning development in el 'Iraq if trust-

312 seriously, many a decisively, injurious effect on the success of pump development as a whole. These difficulties all call for careful study and for steady and carefully considered ameliorative measures. They are, however, for the most part outside of the scope of this report. But underlying and aggravating all other difficulties there is a widely prevailing uncertainty of rights to hold and to exploit the land affected. This has in many cases poisoned the relations between the two classes mainly interested in the majority of these enterprises and reduced to a minimum the prospects of their successful co-operation. And it has nearly always left the rights and the obligations of those concerned injuriously indefinite towards both the Government and to those associated with them. Consequently the bulk of these pump-fed areas have never received the single-minded and unified agricultural management that was, and is, an essential condition of success. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the other adverse conditions recited would in any case have prevented the general and widespread success anticipated. But a number of instances have been given me of pump ventures that have proved profitable in spite of these handicaps, because unified management was, for one reason or another, possible and realised.

427 311 Be this as it may, it is indisputable that the prospects of general success would have been increased if in all cases the rights to the land affected had been authoritatively settled and the requisite unification of agricultural control had been secured, before capital and energy had been so lavishly expended on these ventures. It was most unfortunate that this remarkable agricultural development should have coincided with the singularly unstable economic period that has followed the war. But it can also be recognised now, in the light of experience, that the rush to develop these riverain tracts was carried out without sufficient preparation and foresight, and at a rate and to an extent which made too drastic demands upon the adaptability and the numbers of the primitive agricultural population upon whose efforts success ultimately depended.

311 312 The riverain tracts, which are primarily affected, are among the most valuable agricultural areas in the country, because (*a*) of their contiguity to the main waterways and roadways, (*b*) of the natural fertility of the alluvium deposited along the river ridges which contain them, and (*c*) of their relatively high levels, which facilitate drainage and minimise the dangers of high floods. But owing to the last quality any regular cultivation of these tracts necessitates the installation of some artificial means of lifting the water from the adjacent waterway on to the land.

312 Prior to the recent pump development such artificial means of water lifting were virtually confined to the local water wheel (kerid) or to other simple devices, operated by animal or man power. Where kerid cultivation exists to-day it seems not infrequently to be more efficient than pump cultivation, since the more laboriously acquired water tends to be more carefully used and the land to be more carefully tilled to receive it. So it may be accepted that where cultivation by kerid or other simple lifting devices existed previously, such cultivation was usually good of its kind.

311 It therefore appears that until recent years cultivation in these valuable tracts was restricted to certain fringes watered by the simple types of lift mentioned, supplemented by rain in good years, and by flood water, through flood channels, when and where conditions permitted. [464] And since land was comparatively plentiful and cultivators comparatively scarce, the parcels of land actually cultivated varied incessantly to meet soil impoverishment, flood devastations, river

changes, canal silting, tribal movements, Central Government action, or 311
other circumstances.

7. With relatively little exception the riverain tracts affected are 311
miri land. It has been noted how the cultivation previously shifted 423
therein in response to changing circumstances. The prescriptive claims
to pasture were naturally even more variable and indeterminate. It is 427
consequently not surprising that as the pump development movement
extended, these riverain tracts were found so closely interpenetrated by 312
prescriptive claims (lazma) of one sort or another, that few areas suitable for pump development were unaffected. These claims constituted a serious obstacle to the general development of the riverain tracts by pump installations. For at first the claimants as a whole had neither the desire, nor the enterprise, nor the ability to raise the capital needed to undertake this development themselves.

In discussing these prescriptive claims earlier their primarily tribal 427
origin was mentioned: and it appears that the prescriptive rights recog- 312
nised by the provincial authorities in pump agreements are preponder-
antly of such origin and character. These pump agreements may be 622
made in the name of a sheikh or sirkal, but he stands as the tribal or sub-tribal, representative. No doubt when the sheikh or sirkal is a forcible person, he may engulf in his own person the rights of his tribal associates. Alternatively when the sheikh or sirkal is a man of straw, unable to lead his section or keep it together, he may be displaced, and even lose his strictly tribal share in the common holding. In a number of cases, after the movement started and its potentialities had become more apparent, a sheikh or other leading member of a tribal section which claimed prescriptive rights over a promising area, himself erected a pump and cultivated the area with the labour of the other members of the section. Under these circumstances the difficulties of divided interests and divided control, so frequently attending these pump ventures, may not arise. And so far as my information goes it is pump ventures inaugurated and worked by a capable tribal leader under these conditions that promise to be the most successful.

But enterprising townsmen and others with tribal affiliations, who 427
wished to participate in the movement usually had to search for a suit-
able stretch of miri land and enter into an agreement with some group of 312
claimants to prescriptive rights over it. No very definite procedure was 311
required. The process may be loosely generalised somewhat as follows. An enterprising individual, having some miri land of uncertain limits and subject to uncertain prescriptive claims in mind, decided to buy a pump and engine, the capacity of which usually depended as much on his financial resources as the situation and extent of the land to be watered. He applied to the Governor of the Province for permission to erect the installation. This always necessitated a permit from the Irrigation Department (under the Irrigation and Embankments Law), and when the land was miri (as it usually was) the approval of the State Domains Department and the issue of a lease by them.

The Irrigation Department checked the suitability of the installation to the extent of land, according to the information given; and if they had the means tried to locate the land and check the area on a map. Otherwise the figures had to be accepted as notified. And even when the capacity of the installation and the area of the land (as quoted) were discrepant, it was often found that the pump had already been bought. The Department also tried to ensure that the site of the pumping plant was wisely chosen in regard to flood and low stage river conditions, as well as the distribution of the water for cultivation.

The State Domains Department acted through the provincial authorities, who necessarily had no better information as to the situation

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and extent of the land affected than could be furnished to, or provided by, the Irrigation Department.

But probably the two most unsatisfactory features of the proceedings were (i) the failure to settle the rights of prescriptive claimants definitely before allowing agreements to be made with them as *de facto* landholders, and (ii) the loose and unsatisfactory agreements, commonly entered into, between these claimants and the pump owners.

It is apparent now that it would have saved time, money and a great deal of trouble in the long run to have investigated and settled all prescriptive claims at the outset. It was reasonable and equitable that prescriptive claims based on effective exploitation of the soil should be recognised. But such recognition should have been coupled with an equally definite limitation of the claimants' rights to these specifically recognised areas. It was clearly unreasonable and contrary to the public interest that, in addition to such properly recognisable rights, a vague mass of indefinite and shifting claims should be allowed to persist and to interfere with the economic development of these tracts as a whole. It was desirable when the opportunity occurred to define alike the rights of prescriptive holders and the balance of unincumbered miri land free for exploitation by other parties under lease or grant from the State. And since the object of pump development was a much greater extension of cultivation it was evident that the necessarily restricted limits of previously existing cultivation would tend to be obliterated thereby. Consequently, if prescriptive claims were to be recognised on the only clear and equitable basis possible—that of effective exploitation of the land—it was important to investigate and record the existing limits of such exploitation before these limits were effaced.

If this had been more evident at the time, such claimants could no doubt have been justly accorded considerably smaller areas than are now claimed, while the Government would have secured a balance of free miri land irrigable by pump which might have been leased directly to those desirous of erecting pumps. No doubt in these circumstances the areas available for lease to pump owners would often have been awkwardly interspersed with the recognised prescriptive holdings; but this was unavoidable unless such claims had been repudiated. And if both parties had known exactly where they were at the outset, agreements between them could have been entered into on a much more satisfactory basis than was as a rule actually possible.

As it is the peculiar difficulties that have arisen in the tenure of these riverain holdings have been primarily occasioned by the uncertainty of the respective rights of pump owner and prescriptive holder, when these are different parties. When they are united in one person, or in a tribal or other group that displays effective cohesion, current difficulties for the most part resolve into those commonly attaching to the holding of miri land elsewhere. It is true that certain obligations are due to the situation of these holdings in proximity to the main waterways (e.g. the maintenance of flood protection) but these can be separately considered and were neither new nor unexpected.

So the problem of the riverain holdings in which pump development has taken place may be regarded essentially as a particular case of the general problem of the tenure of miri land. But this merely makes at least a provisional solution of this larger question the more imperative. And any such solution, when applied to the pump areas, must also provide for the definition and reconciliation of the respective rights of pump owners and prescriptive holders, when separate parties in a joint undertaking.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

Egypt MR1

any solid economic advance in el 'Iraq. The third is the introduction and maintenance of a simple, secure and equitable land tenure, which term should be understood to include an even and readily met revenue demand. This report is only directly concerned with the last need: but in studying it, its inter-relation to the other two must be continuously kept in mind. No development of the country's agricultural resources can expect to be successful which does not take all these three needs into consideration together. I 185

8. Comparison with Egypt

8. During the progress of my inquiry comparisons were frequently instituted with Egypt, a country with many parallels to el 'Iraq both in its history and its natural conditions. Owing to the courtesy of the Egyptian Government I am able to compare in Table X the respective positions on certain salient points of el 'Iraq in 1929 and of Egypt in successive decades from 1882 onwards. It will be noted that during the last fifty years Egypt has more than doubled her population, added 50 per cent. to her cropped area, quadrupled her trade, and her budget, built up a substantial budgetary reserve, and largely absorbed her original external debt.

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TABLE X. COMPARATIVE FIGURES, EL 'IRAQ AND EGYPT

		EL 'IRAQ	EGYPT					
		1929	1882	1890	1900	1910	1920	1929
Population in millions		2·8	6·8	8·2	10·1	11·8	13·2	14·4
Gross cultivable area, sq. km. ..		90,000	32.000					
Area cropped yearly, sq. km. ..		?10.000	24.000*	27.000*	30.000*	32.000*	34,000*	36.000*
Imports	In lakhs of rupees	980	1.100	1.100	1.900	3.200	14.000	7.200
Exports		560	1.800	1.700	2.400	4.000	11.800	7.800
Re-exports		510†	14	40	80	60	350	190
Land Revenue		168	680‡	700‡	690‡	700‡	700‡	720‡
Customs Revenue		274	80	190	330	480	1.370	1.620
Total Budgetary Revenue ..		570	1.300	1.650	1.630	2.260	4.700	3.790
Total Budgetary Expenditure		560	1.230	1.560	1.600	2.340	4,000	5.090
Budgetary Reserve Fund ..				209	1,150	790	2.370	5.540
Debt §			10.900	13.100	13.000	13.100	12,900	12.400

*From ⅓ to ½ cropped twice. Net area cultivated in 1929 was 22,000 sq. km.

†Goods in transit, not included in imports.

‡Yield maintained constant on re-assessment following revenue settlement. Fluctuations due to remissions to unwatered land followed by extensions of irrigation.

§Mostly held in Egypt now.

Egypt is more favourably situated geographically than el 'Iraq; while Mahommed Ali Pasha did much to initiate early in the last century the reform of her land tenure which has proceeded since. And it will be seen that even fifty years ago Egypt was considerably more populous and wealthier than el 'Iraq is to-day. But el 'Iraq is by no means devoid of advantages also. She has Egypt's established success before her. Her cultivable area is larger and more diverse, so that she is in a better position to develop a varied export trade. She is free of unproductive debt and can devote all funds not absorbed by current needs, to productive purposes. And her petroliferous deposits provide her with special financial aid at the most useful moment. So that a comparable advance to that made by Egypt may be hoped for, if a comparable effort can be made.

The unavoidably lengthy duration of a general settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq has been emphasised several times in this report: although no precise estimate of the period required is practicable in the 000

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is
311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it
312 is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only
twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country
is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is
amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and
subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are
under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much
more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable
and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-
seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent
Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians.
The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration
into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into
distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims,
three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians,
871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked
religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of
Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed
into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some
153 important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and
significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with
the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality
invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition
to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people
exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

651 Government officials whose incomes are known and to a minority of the merchants, should be extended to other forms of income, and that provision should also be made for an inheritance tax. There can be no doubt that, if income tax were extended to other forms of income, a wealthy section of the community who at present derive large incomes from land ownership and other sources would contribute much more than they do at present to the national revenue. Another suggestion put forward is that customs and excise duties should be adjusted to *ad valorem* rates to bring them more into accord with post-war prices. They also recommend that the consumption or sales tax, which is at present a fixed rate of 12.5 per cent on produce sold, should be replaced by a form of sliding scale tax related both to land values and to the use made of land. In advocating this important change the reformers maintain that this would produce more revenue, would prevent existing evasions and would also serve as an incentive to increased agricultural production.

It is not within the competence of the writer to comment on the validity or practicability of revenue reforms of this kind. It is clear, however, that there is a fertile field for intelligent enquiry into methods for producing that additional budget revenue without which educational and other advance will be slower than is desirable.

311 *The Problem of Land Tenure.* While it is possible that measures such as those indicated would produce valuable additions to the national revenue, the fact remains that the main source of Iraq's future wealth must be the proper exploitation of the land. Upon this depends that higher standard of life for the bulk of the population, and the concomitant increase of wealth for both private and public use, without which the country will never be able to enjoy that abundant life which the rich natural agricultural resources of Iraq make possible. Unfortunately the country's enormous agricultural potential is greatly hindered by the system of land tenure.

423 The land tenure system of Iraq is far too complicated a subject fully to be examined in this study, but the following extract from Sir Ernest Dowson's classic report on this problem gives some idea of its effects and ramifications:

> The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development.
161 With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its
resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north
and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the
country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide
large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is
inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
[135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq
possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap
source of power and raw materials essential to the development of
industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other
mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is
little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger
population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast
to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the
people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most
ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and
many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm
and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment
exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await
reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the
available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
[731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas;
and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is
hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water,
but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and
quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

on the land. There is apt to be increasing pressure on the landowner 423
to take such steps as a result of the growing opportunities 427
for alternative employment created by a large increase in public 241
expenditures on development, the expansion of industry and the opening of state lands to settlement. In fact, unless the sharecropper's status is improved, there is a great danger that there will be a continued flight of labor from the land, impairing the country's agricultural production.

The government itself has made only a modest contribution 654
to the advancement of agriculture. The Directorate-General of 242
Agriculture is only a subordinate department in the Ministry of Economics and has been severely handicapped by lack of funds and a shortage of competent agricultural officers. While it has had some success in combatting pests and diseases and in the extension of such crops as cotton and citrus fruit, too little attention has been devoted to practical research, and almost no field work has been carried out to assist cultivators in improving their crops and methods of cultivation. The expenditures of the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments were actually cut from ID 1,160,000 in 1948-49 to ID 540,000 in 1950-51 and, at the latter figure, represented only 1.8 percent of the total budget outlay. Expenditures on both agriculture and irrigation 1950-51 amounted to only 6.7 percent of the total.

Plans for the future now envisage large water storage and 654
irrigation projects to provide more water for land already in use 316
and to increase the area under cultivation and provide for the settlement of new land. These plans are in general quite sound. They will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time more stress is placed on arresting the deterioration of land already in use by extensive drainage schemes and on raising the productivity of agriculture by other means. The establishment of an efficient extension service and the provision of incentives to improve methods of cultivation are particularly important in this connection.

Expansion of Area under Cultivation: Irrigation 311

Extension of the area of land under cultivation is vitally important not only to an increase in production, but, above all, as

311 a means of establishing a class of independent peasant landowners capable of earning a decent livelihood. Official estimates indicate that the amount of "cultivable" land is almost three times that under cultivation. The criteria used in determining the cultivability of land have, however, probably varied widely. Thus part of the cultivable land in the so-called rain-fed zone in the north may well be in areas sub-marginal from the standpoint of rainfall. As soon as possible the government should classify the cultivable land which is not presently cultivated by types of soil and determine what measures are required in each instance to put the land under cultivation, e.g. whether the land must be reclaimed by drainage and whether, if the land needs to be irrigated, the irrigation should be by pump or by flow.

Most of the area which can be put under cultivation will require water, yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not even permit the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of the excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates rivers during the spring flood season and 653 frequently unloosens destructive floods are clearly essential. The 312 government has already initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage scheme for the Euphrates River and has let a contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The program of the Development Board also makes provision for storage dams on two tributaries of the Tigris, the Lesser Zab and the Diyala River. While the Derbend-i-Khan dam on the Diyala River will provide primarily for the more effective irrigation of land already under cultivation, completion of the Dokan dam on the Lesser Zab and of the Habbaniya Lake project should provide enough water to extend the cultivable area under irrigation from about 11 million donums at present to approximately 15 million.

The Mission fully endorses these projects (see map), with the proviso that borings prove the soundness of the Dokan dam site. At the same time it recommends that they be complemented by the construction at an early date of the Bekhme dam on the Greater Zab River for which no provision has yet been made. This dam would compensate for the diversion of the Lesser Zab water from the Tigris by the Dokan dam. Without the Bekhme dam the

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more brought into use. The government should take steps to 312
survey the possibilities for small projects and to provide assistance in carrying them out, thus giving aid and security to the farm population of the North which now feels that its needs have been neglected and overlooked.

In general, however, the North will have to remain dependent 311 ●
on rain-fall to sustain its agriculture. There are apparently still considerable rain-fed areas which can be settled and put to the plow. Particular care should be exercised, however, to insure that the areas are not sub-marginal from the standpoint of either rainfall or fertility and that settlers are really available in the North, which is generally more sparsely settled than the central and southern portions of Iraq. For example, the Mission believes that the prospect of scanty and uncertain rainfall will probably make it undesirable to proceed, except on a very restricted, experimental basis, with the settlement scheme near Balad Sinjar in Mosul province which has been projected by the Agriculture Department.

Settlement of New Land

In the past much of the vacant land available for an expansion 425
of crop production which ostensibly belonged to the state has fallen 421
into the hands of big landowners. The so-called Land Settlement Law of 1932, which inaugurated a cadastral survey for the purpose of settling the past confusion regarding land titles and systems of tenure, facilitated this process. It permitted the land settlement committees appointed to administer the law to grant titles (so-called *lazmah* grants) to people who could demonstrate that they had made productive use of land within the previous fifteen years. In practice, it has been possible to obtain title on the presentation of proof that a crop was produced on the land in one year, and the land settlement committees have occasionally accepted even more tenuous proof of cultivation. In this way many sheikhs and other influential persons have managed to obtain title to large tracts of land without any payment whatsoever. Since the cadastral survey is only about half completed, more land may be preempted in this way unless a limit is set on such acquisitions.

Land definitely adjudged to be state (*miri sirf*) property by 425
the land settlement committees has, however, been set aside for 166
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new settlements the government will have a unique opportunity to 241
remedy the shortcomings of the Dujaila project. 425

Improvement in Productivity

While expansion of land under cultivation, particularly through 000
large irrigation schemes, is essential in the long run to provide for a growing population and to establish a socially desirable class of smallholders, it should not be undertaken without a simultaneous vigorous campaign to increase the productivity of agriculture and livestock. The temptation to neglect such an effort in favor of striking new irrigation schemes should be resisted. Among the measures upon which this campaign should concentrate are drainage, the provision of better tools, seeds and draft animals, the introduction of soil-building and forage crops, the use of fertilizers, the improvement of livestock, the planting of trees and the establishment of an effective extension or advisory service to farmers.

1. Drainage

The drainage of existing irrigated lands would make the most 312
important single contribution to increasing the productivity of agriculture. Moreover, it will also have the most immediate effect since it can be carried out by the government while the success of virtually all other measures to raise productivity depends on the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation.

The Haigh Irrigation Commission, which made an extensive 311
study of irrigation and flood control for the government, estimated 134
a few years ago that about 60 percent of the land irrigated by flow had been seriously affected by salt. The Mission's own inquiries and observations indicate that as much as 20 to 30 percent of cultivated land has been abandoned over the last few decades because of salt accumulation, while on a large part of the remaining land yields have declined by 20 to 50 percent and even more. In a number of new irrigation projects such as Hawija and Dujaila salting forced abandonment of part of the land within two years after the schemes were initiated. Drainage, almost totally neglected in the past, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor in the future.

The main drainage canals for the whole irrigation zone have 312
been projected, but it is now necessary to proceed with detailed

ANNEX A

BASIC FACTORS AND CONDITIONS

I. The Regions

131 Iraq, a country with a population of approximately 5,000,000 and an area of 168,040 square miles, forms roughly a triangular area with the base running southwest to northeast and the apex 133 terminating at the Persian Gulf. It is dominated by two great river systems—the Tigris and the Euphrates. The Euphrates rises in the mountains of Turkey, flows across the Northern Syrian plateau and then meanders through Iraq, receiving little additional water from tributaries. The Tigris also rises in Turkey, but further to the east and north. It enters Iraq in Mosul province and receives important accessions from the Greater and Lesser Zab Rivers which are fed from the snows and the rains of the mountains along the Turkish and Iranian borders and, to a lesser degree, from the Diyala River. Downstream from Ramadi on the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris the two rivers form a single low-lying alluvial valley built up as a delta into the Persian Gulf. As they flow south, the rivers are virtually lost in the marshes and lakes of southern Iraq, their remaining waters uniting at Qurna to flow as the Shatt al Arab into the Persian Gulf.

311 Only a relatively narrow belt, lying north-northeast of a line roughly running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin near the Iranian border, has sufficient rainfall to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation. In the rest of the country, agriculture depends upon the water of the two rivers for irrigation, whether by pump, by flow or by natural inundation. With the exception of the large and remote southern and northern deserts and the greater part of the rolling uplands between the Tigris and the Euphrates known as the northern Jezireh, most of this region can be cultivated once water is made available. With storage and regulation of the river waters, a great extension of the area under cultivation is possible. Without regulation, on the other hand, the

●311 waters of the twin rivers are largely wasted and periodically unloosen disastrous floods upon Baghdad and the alluvial plain to the south.

The Rain-fed Zone

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438 In the upland plains of the rain-fed zone stretching from Northern Mosul to Suleimaniya, wheat and barley are the principal crops. Rainfall is generally inadequate for summer crops, although water from streams and springs permit cultivation of rice and cotton. In part of this area, especially Northern Mosul, there has been a rapid extension of cultivation with the help of modern agricultural machinery.

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241 To the north and northeast lie the mountain massifs of Iraq. Here the raising of cattle, sheep and goats by Kurdish nomads is one of the principal occupations. The mountains are largely barren of trees but offer natural pasture for animals. In the valleys and on hillsides grain, tobacco, timber and fruit are grown. Tobacco, although small in area, is an important cash crop.

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433 Except for some handicrafts, there is little native industry in this region. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, is principally a commercial center and an outlet for exports to Syria and [315] Lebanon. Kirkuk, however, is the center of most of Iraq's petroleum production and one of the largest and richest oil fields in the world. Oil fields of subsidiary importance also exist at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin in Diyala province. The mountains of the North may ultimately yield other minerals such as copper, chrome and iron.

The Irrigation Zone

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311 South of the rain-fed zone the river valleys may be divided into three major regions: the upper river valleys; the lower river valley down to Amara and Nasiriya; and the triangular area from Nasiriya and Amara to the mouth of the Shatt al Arab.

The first of these regions includes most of the northern Jezireh and the area north of Baghdad and east of the Tigris. The latter area still awaits irrigation for the most part, and the Jezireh is hardly susceptible to irrigation because of the elevation and configuration of the land. The Jezireh is an upland plateau

relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major 133
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther
down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162]
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

438 country's foreign trade. Near it is the country's second largest oil field.

133 ●311 233 To the south and southwest of the irrigation zone lie the vast arid tracts known as the southern and northern deserts which comprise about 40 percent of the land area of Iraq. These are sparsely inhabited by roaming nomads who raise camels, goats and sheep and annually take their flocks into the river valleys in search of summer pasture.

II. The People

161 The first official census of the settled population in Iraq was taken in 1947 and preliminary statistics on the male and female population of each province have already been published.[1] The preliminary estimate of the enumerated population was approximately 4.6 million. This figure has been brought up to 4.8 million in the published statistics by adding a rough estimate of 200,000 for the nomads in Mosul province and in the provinces along the Euphrates. Like all other countries at a similar stage of development, Iraq has a very young population, about half being under the age of 20. Although no reliable vital statistics are available, all indications point on the one hand to a very high rate of mortality among infants and young children, and on the other, to a correspondingly high birth rate. Even under the present poor health conditions the population seems to have been increasing at a rate conjectured to be in the region of one to one and a half percent per annum. Whatever the present rate, however, it is clear that, if full advantage is taken of the ample opportunity to improve health

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[1] Considering the attendant difficulties, this census may be judged a success. The information about the people of Iraq which it has already yielded and, more especially, which it can yield when tabulation is completed, is without doubt far more reliable than any estimates previously made. However, as with most first attempts at census-taking, the results have to be interpreted with great caution. Besides the figures already published, the Mission had access to certain unpublished data on four provinces—Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra. Much of the description of the population which follows is based on this data, but it must be noted that, although allowance was made for the fact that these four provinces are a most imperfect cross-section of the country, this fact is an additional limitation to the validity of any but the broadest conclusions.

IV. Natural Resources

Land and Water

312 Aside from oil, water and land may be said to be the principal natural resources of Iraq. Of the two, water is the more critical factor in the country's development. Underground water is generally plentiful, but in parts of the North it is frequently found only at considerable depth and in the central and southern portions, where the water table is high, it tends to be brackish and unfit for consumption. In the two major rivers, however, Iraq possesses a source of abundant water of a quality excellent for irrigation and, with purification, for human consumption. Here the chief problem lies in the marked variation of the flow of the rivers. On the Euphrates the mean monthly discharge of water varies from a low of 293 cubic meters per second in September to a high of 2,235 in May. On the Tigris the variation is even more marked, ranging from a low of 359 in October to a maximum of 2,951 in April. Thus periods of floods alternate with periods of acute scarcity. In the absence of storage facilities and a regulated flow, the limit on the cultivation of crops is set by the current low point in the water supply in the critical growing period for both winter and [134] summer crops. The water problem is further complicated by the fact that continuous use of water for irrigation, coupled with the effect of evaporation in a dry, hot climate, has saturated the subsoil waters with salt and raised the water table, thus precipitating salt which, in the absence of drainage, quickly makes the land infertile. More effective use of the water supply is thus the central problem of Iraq.

● 311 In relation both to the population and the land actually under cultivation, the amount of cultivable land available in the country is very large. Accurate statistics on the total cultivable area are lacking, but the following estimates based largely on data supplied by the Department of Agriculture give some conception of the magnitude:

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TABLE 2

CULTIVABLE LAND, CROPPED LAND AND LAND IN AGRICULTURE USE
(in millions of donums)

CULTIVABLE AREA		48.1
Irrigation zone	32.1	
Rain-fed zone	16.0	
AREA ACTUALLY IN CROPS		11.1
By area		
Irrigation zone	7.6	
Rain-fed zone	3.5	
By type of crop		
Winter	8.4	
Summer	1.9	
Orchards	0.8	
AREA UNDER CULTIVATION		17.5

These figures would indicate that the area under cultivation, taking into account the assumption that almost half of the area devoted to winter crops is normally left fallow, is only about 36 percent of the total cultivable area. In the rain-fed zone the area under cultivation could theoretically be more than doubled; and in the irrigation zone it could be almost tripled. Unquestionably these figures give a somewhat exaggerated impression for it is likely that the criteria employed in classifying land as cultivable have been rather liberal, but there is little doubt that the area under cultivation can be greatly extended. What would be required in detail to put this additional cultivable land in actual use is not known, but, in the irrigation zone, water and drainage are undoubtedly the prime prerequisites while, in the rain-fed zone, more manpower and machinery may be the principal requirements. 311

Forms of Land Tenure

Land is held under a complicated system of tenure which has given rise to much confusion and conflict. In accordance with traditional legal concepts the state has retained the ultimate legal title to nearly all the available land. Absolute private ownership, known as *mamloukah* or *mulk*, is confined to urban property and orchards. Rights to the permanent usufructuary possession of a large proportion of state or *miri* land have been acquired by private 423 471

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

V. Production

A considerable part of Iraq's potentially large resources are as 311
yet unutilized or ineffectively utilized. Most of the manpower on 433
the land is underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of flow. Oil reserves have as yet been tapped only in relatively modest quantities. The output of the country is therefore still very low and the standard of living correspondingly depressed.

Agriculture and Livestock

Estimates of the area and output of the principal crops are 241
given in the table below. Although the statistics are not very reliable, they give some indication of the relative importance of the various crops. Barley and wheat are clearly the dominant crops. Barley is one of the leading exports, and cereals altogether accounted for 43 percent by value of the country's exports other than oil in the period 1948-50. Rice is another important cereal. Cotton is now vying with rice as the leading summer crop. Stimulated by high prices and government encouragement, the area planted to cotton has risen rapidly in recent years. In 1951, probably about 580,000 donums were put in cotton—almost five times the amount in the preceding year. Other summer crops are comparatively insignificant. Some sesame is grown for oil, and some corn, millet and grain sorghum. Tobacco assumes importance only in the mountainous area of the North. Virtually no crops are grown for animal fodder, and the production of hay is unknown. The area devoted to soil-building crops such as legumes is rather small.

Next to cereals, dates are the most important crop. There 245
are about 20.2 million date trees, of which about 9.7 million are 439
along the Shatt al Arab near Basra and the balance in the central valley districts of the Tigris and the Euphrates and the Diyala River Valley. Dates are a staple food over most of Iraq and date exports, particularly from the Basra area, contributed 31 percent by

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TABLE I-A

Land Classified According to Types of Tenure by Cadastral Survey up to February 8, 1951

CULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	Total
Baghdad	7,906,800	69,620	6,588	81,360	319,171	1,037,157	3,324,500	4,838,398
Kut	6,208,325	66	—	203	618,974	1,595,466	2,535,439	4,750,149
Kerbela	2,447,600	11	—	2,319	84,652	19,488	23,958	130,429
Basra	4,908,400	63,067	—	15,181	84,576	3,041	61,608	227,473
Amara	7,496,800	—	—	22	7,991	47,043	1,914,865	1,969,921
Diwaniya	5,981,600	28	92	—	187,791	840,588	307,405	1,335,905
Dulaim	18,428,400	6,669	—	13,840	123,181	432,201	3,579,990	4,155,882
Erbil	7,217,200	10	—	645	786,739	817,853	302,540	1,907,787
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	16	—	190	355,373	2,705	51,793	411,076
Mosul	20,129,200	56	913	170,914	2,979,610	1,099,525	7,775,652	12,026,669
Kirkuk	8,132,400	200	1,615	109,878	1,372,423	310,935	991,127	2,786,179
Hilla	2,100,000	3,489	37	27,976	573,148	758,091	262,092	1,624,834
Diyala	6,438,000	7,369	50	126,670	876,964	407,637	605,193	2,023,874
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	150,601	9,296	549,198	8,370,595	7,371,720	21,737,165	38,178,575

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

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TABLE 1-B

LAND CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TYPES OF TENURE BY CADASTRAL SURVEY UP TO FEBRUARY 8, 1951

UNCULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	Total
Baghdad	7,906,800	14,951	108,756	9,010	41,592	71,131	349,126	594,567
Kut	6,208,325	20	54,148	192	127,504	152,311	1,124,000	1,458,176
Kerbela	2,447,600	96	3,872	160	26,391	1,637	868,073	900,229
Basra	4,908,400	4,447	21,372	441	6,613	113	748,587	781,575
Amara	7,496,800	258	9,271	57	202	7,595	836,648	854,032
Diwaniya	5,981,600	8	23,924	2	31,578	98,093	75,474	229,081
Dulaim	18,428,400	435	81,074	550	7,490	26,693	4,320,580	4,436,823
Erbil	7,217,200	517	202,888	813	9,326	5,970	162,132	381,646
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	15	117,982	2	1,250	—	12,873	132,113
Mosul	20,129,200	116	354,692	4,442	213,207	4,274	324,210	900,942
Kirkuk	8,132,400	135	621,893	2,503	42,381	632	160,035	827,570
Hilla	2,100,000	182	37,821	3,158	65,532	65,442	192,575	364,711
Diyala	6,438,000	1,186	49,218	15,206	125,927	51,408	164,050	406,996
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	22,366	1,686,912	36,538	698,897	485,291	9,338,365	12,268,459

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

TABLE I-C

Land Classified According to Types of Tenure by Cadastral Survey up to February 8, 1951

TOTAL, CULTIVABLE AND UNCULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	Grand Total
Baghdad	7,906,800	84,571	115,344	90,370	360,763	1,108,288	3,673,626	5,432,965
Kut	6,208,325	86	54,148	395	746,478	1,747,771	3,659,439	6,208,325
Kerbela	2,447,600	107	3,872	2,479	111,043	21,125	891,931	1,030,658
Basra	4,908,400	67,514	21,372	15,622	91,289	3,154	810,195	1,009,048
Amara	7,496,800	258	9,271	79	8,193	54,638	2,751,513	2,823,953
Diwaniya	5,981,600	36	24,016	2	219,369	938,681	382,879	1,564,986
Dulaim	18,428,400	7,104	81,074	14,390	130,671	458,894	7,900,570	8,592,705
Erbil	7,217,200	527	202,888	1,458	796,065	823,823	464,672	2,289,433
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	31	117,982	192	356,623	2,705	64,666	543,189
Mosul	20,129,200	172	355,605	175,356	3,192,817	1,103,799	8,099,862	12,927,611
Kirkuk	8,132,400	335	623,508	112,381	1,414,804	311,567	1,115,162	3,613,749
Hilla	2,100,000	3,671	37,858	31,134	638,680	823,532	454,667	1,989,545
Diyala	6,438,000	8,555	49,268	141,876	2,136,892	459,045	769,243	2,430,870
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	172,967	1,696,208	585,736	9,069,582	7,857,011	31,075,530	50,447,034

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TABLE 1

AREA WITHIN IRRIGATION SYSTEMS
(in 1000 masharas)

	Gross	Cultivated	Winter crop area irrigated	Mean discharge used for irrigation (in cumecs)
EUPHRATES				
Flow irrigation	3,109	2,666	1,160	161
Pump irrigation from				
canals	607	515	263	32
river	955	812	474	43
Total	4,671	3,993	1,897	236
TIGRIS*				
Flow irrigation	2,380	2,033	760	105
Pump irrigation from				
canals	1,060	901	400	49
river	3,020	2,567	1,280	115
Total	6,460	5,491	2,440	269
DIYALA				
Flow irrigation	1,350	1,148	572	74
Pump irrigation	215	183	92	8
Total	1,565	1,331	665	82
Grand Total	12,696	10,815	5,002	587

* Including tributaries other than the Diyala.

311
312

In considering the areas which might be provided with new irrigation systems, the Mission has adopted certain standards and practices which have been generally accepted in the past. Among these are:

1. The amount of cultivated land (in winter crops) which can be irrigated effectively by a constant flow of one cumec measured at the intake of an irrigation system (i.e. the so-called irrigation duty) is 7,200 masharas or donums;
2. Half of the cultivable area within an irrigation system is left fallow during the winter crop season; and, since a given amount of water can generally irrigate an area in winter crops about four times as large as in summer crops, the area of an irrigation system is conceived in terms of the winter crop;

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

3. The cultivable area within an irrigation system is about 85 percent of the gross area which includes the surface occupied by roads, villages, canals, etc. 3/12 3/11

The Mission does not regard the first two criteria as immutable. The indicated irrigation duty is certainly very low; and the Mission will make some suggestions regarding it in the subsequent discussion of problems of operation. The present fallow system practiced in agriculture should also not be regarded as sacrosanct. Through the use of fertilizers and the introduction of soil-building crops the proportion of fallow might well be considerably reduced. Since almost all of the land which will be newly irrigated will be opened to settlement by small-holders under prescribed conditions, the state will be in a good position to insist on better agricultural practices in such areas. With water stored in reservoirs, it will also be possible to regulate the distribution of water as between winter and summer crops. In the past the amount of water which has flown down the rivers at critical parts of the growing seasons has set an automatic limit on the area both in winter and summer crops. In the future, however, this flow will be subject to control through the release of stored water. The Mission therefore suggests that the government make a special study to determine what combination of winter and summer crops using a given quantity of water would yield the highest output for the manpower employed on the land. The outcome of this study as well as a re-examination of the fallow system may in the end affect the calculations of the gross area which needs to be covered by irrigation works in order to use a given supply of water.

The sequence in which new areas are to be supplied with irrigation is governed partly by purely technical factors. Within the limits set by these technical factors, however, the selection of the areas to be irrigated should take into account the agricultural value of the land, its proximity to potential settlers and its ownership. In making its recommendations regarding new irrigation systems, the Mission has sought to give appropriate weight to all these factors. It was not always possible to arrive at a considered judgment of the agricultural potentialities of various areas, so that on this ground alone its suggestions may be subject to revision. Regarding the ownership of lands which could be irrigated, the Mission had no information. Presumably most of this land is in

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

3/1 3/2 state ownership. In any event, as long as it is technically feasible and not more costly, it will be desirable to give preference to the irrigation of good agricultural land remaining in state ownership because such land can be used for distribution among small-holders.

Expansion of Irrigation—the Euphrates

3/2 Except for a narrow band on both banks of the Euphrates between Hit and Hindiya and some smaller areas along the lower Euphrates, which are irrigated directly from the river by pumps, the irrigation systems of the Euphrates are served by a series of canals whose off-takes are above the Hindiya barrage. Nine of these canals serve the left bank of the Euphrates[4]; and only two[5], the right bank. The Hindiya barrage was built primarily to increase the intake into the most important of these canals—the Hilla. This canal, together with its three terminal branches—the Diwaniya, Dagharrah and Hurriyah canals, is supposed to irrigate a gross area of 2,333,000 masharas. The supply of water, however, is sufficient to irrigate only about 35 percent of the cultivable area commanded by the Hilla canal system. It has already been recognized, therefore, that the additional water made available from the Habbaniya should, in the first instance, be used to increase the irrigation intensity in the Hilla canal system to the standard 50 percent. The Development Board has already reserved ID 900,000 to remodel the Hilla canal in order to bring about the necessary increase in its capacity from 114 to 175 cumecs at its head and from 57 to 87 cumecs at its tail. As will be noted below, an additional enlargement of the canal's capacity will be necessitated by further expansion of irrigation. While the Haigh Commission contemplated carrying out the required increase in capacity in two phases and proposed to rely partly on erosion as a means of attaining the needed capacity, the Mission believes it desirable to give the Hilla canal its final outline from the very beginning and to avoid reliance upon the rather erratic effects of erosion. At the same time, the course of the canal should be straightened and precautions taken to reduce losses by infiltration at the resulting low points.

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[4] Saglawiyah, Abu Ghuraib, Yusufiyah, Latifiyah, Iskandiriyah, Musayib, Nasiriyah, Kifl and Hilla.

[5] Husseiniyah and Beni Hassan.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX C

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

I. Introduction

The main features of agriculture and animal husbandry in Iraq 241
have already been set forth elsewhere and are only briefly recapitulated 231
here.[1] Barley, wheat, rice, dates, other fruits and vegetables, and, more recently, cotton are the principal crops. Animal husbandry is of great importance but at present is really not integrated with agriculture. There is virtually no mixed farming. Crop and livestock yields are very low. Poor feeding is the principal cause of the low productivity of livestock. Low crop yields are attributable to poor drainage in the irrigation zone, to the failure to maintain soil fertility through the use of manure and fertilizer and the cultivation of soil-building crops, and to inadequate tools of production. Advances in agricultural techniques are seriously hampered by the poverty and ignorance of the fellahin who cultivate the soil and by the lack of interest displayed by most of the large landowners in improving agriculture. While there are extensive 311
lands that can be put to the plow, particularly if more water is 433
made available, a substantial portion of the land now in exploitation may be said to be overpopulated considering the present level of agricultural technique.

An increase in production is urgent. The standard of living 433
which now prevails on the land is deplorably low. At the same time the population is increasing at a rate that can be expected to grow more rapid as public health improves. Output can be greatly increased both by extending the area under cultivation and by raising the productivity of land already being exploited. Primary emphasis has hitherto been placed on the first of these, and large new water storage and irrigation schemes are being planned.[2]

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[1] See Annex A, *Basic Factors and Conditions.*

[2] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage.*

XII. Forestry

311 Anyone who contemplates the treeless plains and the barren 137 mountains of Iraq is quickly persuaded of the need of afforestation. The forest area comprises only 25,500 square kilometers in the four northern provinces, and of this area only 17,000 square kilometers is covered by what may really be classified as forest. 33 The remainder is in forest pasture and sub-Alpine shrub. Yet forestry has received little attention. The only trained forester in Iraq is the foreign director of the Forestry Division which is subordinated to the Department of Agriculture. His staff is inadequate to provide proper protection of existing forests, let alone to undertake forest development. Only a small amount of afforestation, soil reclamation and propagation work is in progress. There is no modern forest law. Forests suffer severely from indiscriminate cutting for fuel and charcoal, overgrazing by livestock, shifting cultivation and fire. In the clearing of land for cultivation in the mountainous areas of the North, forest and pasture have been destroyed and land laid waste by erosion.

Afforestation is of vital importance not only to check erosion and help prevent floods but also ultimately to meet the acute shortage of timber for building and fuel. In the plains belts of trees are needed to serve as windbreaks. A detailed forestry program has already been set forth in a lengthy report by a British expert. The Mission can only urge that his recommendations be carried out.

The first step should be to build up an adequate forestry staff and to enact a satisfactory forest law. The Department of Forestry should be given a status equal to that of the present Department of Agriculture. Trained foresters will be required not only at headquarters and in the field but also at the forestry research stations at Abu Ghuraib, Bakrajo and Erbil. Initially some of the foresters, including the director, will have to be recruited abroad. A course in forestry might be given in the agricultural schools at Abu Ghuraib.

In the northern mountains the existing forest areas should be preserved primarily as a means of protecting the catchment of the Tigris and its principal tributaries. Controlled, rotational grazing will be necessary to protect these forests. To furnish a supply of

timber, at least 5,000 square kilometers in the valleys of the main 313 rivers in the north ought to be afforested by means of irrigated plantations of quick-growing species such as poplar, eucalyptus, tamarisk, ash, plane and shisham. Such forests should be able to furnish timber in growing amounts in 15 to 20 years.

It will be at least equally important, however, to plant trees in irrigated plains of central and southern Iraq. The ultimate goal should be to devote at least 10 percent of the irrigated areas to forestry in the form of farmers' woodlots, plantings along roads and canals, windbreaks and shelter belts. In the new settlement areas farmers might well be required to plant a specified area in trees. Measures such as these will make timber available in the immediate vicinity where it is sorely needed.

The Development Board has recognized the need for some additional expenditure on forestry by tentatively setting aside ID 250,000 for this purpose in its five-year program. It is urged that this amount be raised to a total of ID 750,000 over the next five years. More could probably not be spent in this period because staffing and organization will take time and attention. In the ensuing five-year period, however, the amount might well be doubled.

XIII. Settlement of New Land

In the future much of the increase in agricultural production 311 will inevitably come from the settlement of new land. Iraq is one of the few Middle Eastern countries which have large reserves of cultivable land. While the official estimates, which indicate that the area under cultivation can be almost tripled, may be questioned, there is no doubt that there are vast areas both in the rain-fed zone and in the irrigation zone which can be put to the plow. When water from the Habbaniya and Dokan reservoirs becomes available, for example, it will be possible to extend the area under cultivation from about 11 to 15 million donums; and if the Bekhme dam is built, still additional areas can be irrigated.

The way in which these new lands are settled and developed 423 will in many respects be critical for the future of Iraq. If reserved

cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of 185
the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 652
and is estimated at ID155,374,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken [654
account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank 648]
for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of an annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated 311
that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living [162]
directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported 2.41
products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 36 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

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[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1952).

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241 alluvial plain of the centre and south, where agriculture depends on the water of the Tigris and Euphrates for irrigation by pump, flow, or natural inundation. In the first region rainfed winter cereals predominate, with millet, maize, sesame and other summer crops grown as subsidiaries where irrigation is possible. Kurdish mountain crops include tobacco and grapes. In the central canal zone (Faluja–Baghdad–Diala) wheat and barley are the principal winter crops; summer crops include millet, maize, sesame, and the produce of market gardens near Baghdad. From here southward barley and rice predominate, with a great concentration of palm groves in all the riverain land, especially around Basra on the Shatt al-Arab. The deserts of west Iraq afford extensive grazing after the winter rains.

241 Cultivation is based traditionally on the following system. In the south, either half the land is left fallow and half tilled each year, or half is sown with a summer crop, half with a winter. In the north the land may be continuously cropped for two or three years, and then left fallow for the same period. The use of artificial fertilizers is practically unknown, but the land is sometimes manured by allowing shepherd tribes to pasture their flocks on fallow ground.

Although the vast majority of agricultural implements employed are still traditional and primitive, modern machinery is being imported steadily. A high target has been set, especially since the war, and Government service stations have been [439] established. In 1950 imports were as follows: tractors 166, ploughs 146, cultivators 26, combines 98, threshers 1, grain drills 21, disc harrows 14. Oil pumps for irrigation are even more in demand than tractors; in 1949–50 there were 3,600 in use, with an average horse-power of 36.

[645] The agricultural development of the country is organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, which contains departments for plant breeding and protection, horticulture, forestry, agricultural machinery, animal husbandry and veterinary services.

Crops

433 The principal crops, with their production in 1950 in thousands of metric tons, are *Winter*: barley, 851; wheat, 520; lentils, 6; vetch, 3·5; linseed, 0·2; *Summer*: rice, 242; cotton, 25; sesame, 10; maize, 21; millet 19; green gram, 12; tobacco, 3 (purchased by Government Tobacco Monopoly); dates, 250.[1] Of the two most important crops, barley and dates, the former is grown mainly in the northern plains and the *liwas* of Kut, Muntafiq, Hilla, and Diwaniya in the irrigated zone. With a

[1] ibid. p. 146.

133 delta of two rivers—the Euphrates and the Tigris. With
insignificant exceptions, it is one vast level expanse made
up of the rich silt that these rivers have brought down.
It contains no physical features whatever that call for
comment except the plains and the rivers, unless we mention
that combination of plain and river which covers a
considerable area, namely the marsh. In the past this
district was the seat of some of the great empires of
antiquity—Assyria and Babylonia and Persia. When
Xenophon marched over it about 400 B. C., it was and
had been for centuries one of the world's centers of power
and productiveness. It supported a vast population in
those days, how vast no one knows, but the ruins of ancient
cities suggest that it must have been very great indeed.
312 The basis of its[1] greatness was the use of the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers for irrigation. By this
means the whole country had been transformed into one
vast garden. The area was not so large then as it is
now, for year by year the delta encroaches on the sea.
It is supposed that in ancient times the sea reached up
as far as Gurna at least, and that is a hundred miles from
the present mouth of the river.

Under the Mohammedan caliphs of Baghdad the irrigation
dams, waterways and smaller canals that had existed
for centuries were allowed to fall into greater and
greater decay. The Mongol invasion of Mesopotamia,
which culminated in the capture of Baghdad in 1258 A. D.,
resulted in the complete destruction of this ancient system
of irrigation. Ever since it has been in ruins, but
the courses of the larger waterways are still distinguishable,
and engineers tell us that they can decipher the entire
162 system. The country has been a desert since that
311 day, populated by nomad tribes who roam over the vast

[1] [The Tigris-Euphrates Delta area -- Analyst]

162 level plains and raise, by means of the scanty rainfall,
● 311 a meager amount of wheat and barley in favorable
seasons.

312 Along the rivers in their upper courses are a few gar-
dens, irrigated by means of various draught animals and
water-wheels, which elevate water from the stream to the
level of the land above. At Gurna the Tigris and
Euphrates join to form one river and at Mohammerah the
Karun empties into this united stream. The three rivers
thus flow into the ocean as one enormous waterway,
known locally as the "Arab River." For the last hun-
dred miles before the sea is reached, the fresh water of
the river ebbs and flows with the tides, and by cutting
outlets along the river banks gardens may be automati-
cally irrigated twice a day if so much water is desired.
245 Along these lower stretches each bank of the river is
lined with beautiful gardens, which reach a depth of some
miles in places and extend in practically an unbroken ex-
panse all the way up to Basra and in less prolific culture
even as far as Gurna. These date gardens are beautiful
things, beautiful for what they are now, and more beau-
tiful still as a suggestion of what all Mesopotamia might
be. They are also one of the most melancholy things in
the world as reminders of what the past developed and
the present has wasted.

311 The land has enormous resources for agricultural de-
134 velopment. That whole vast district may be made into
the garden spot of the earth. The soil is the best in the
world, river silt hundreds of feet deep. It is as level as
a parlor floor, with just enough pitch between the big
rivers, and between the north and south, to make irriga-
312 tion easy. All that is necessary is a perfected system of
185 irrigation, and although the necessary investment would

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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312 be large, running up to hundreds of millions of dollars,
185 it should bring excellent returns. The trouble hitherto
has been the unstable character of the government and
the consequent risk to which any such investment would
be exposed. During the time of the spring high waters,
a disaffected tribe might obtain control of some important
dam and with one stick of dynamite destroy nearly the
whole system. But with a stable government the project
should be one of great promise. The water is at
311 hand, three riverfuls of it, and as if to prove the practicability
312 of the dream, we know that in the ages of antiquity
185 these resources were utilized for this purpose and
with the most splendid success. Whether there is actually
water enough to transform every square mile of the country
into a garden or whether the supply of available land
will prove to be more than the water can care for, especially
now since the area has so greatly increased, can
only be told after the project is tried. Certainly there
is water enough for hundreds of square miles, enough
indeed to make Mesopotamia one of the richest countries
of its size in the world. Already one new irrigated area
has been developed by the Hindiya Barrage built by a
British concern between 1911 and 1913 as the first step
in the reconstruction of the ancient irrigation system.
The erection of this great barrage on the Euphrates River
was due to the Young Turks, the dam being the first unit
in a comprehensive irrigation project for the entire country
which had been drawn up for them by the noted
engineer, Sir William Willcocks. It is only a beginning,
but it has made the desert rejoice and blossom as the
rose over many square miles of territory.

311 With the exception of the rich petroleum deposits
162 which are said to exist throughout the Mosul district and

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311 162 which may play a prominent part in the economic development of the country, Mesopotamia may be regarded as a purely agricultural land. From this standpoint it is best considered in two sections. There is the river-irrigated date-growing district to the south, with Basra as its center, and there is the district to the north inhabited by nomads, semi-nomads and river agriculturists, with its principal center in Baghdad and a second capital further north in Mosul.

312 245 The date gardeners along the river in the Basra territory resemble in many ways the cultivators that can be seen in any oasis town in Arabia. Their work is very similar. Irrigation systems must be constructed. Channels must be provided to carry the water to the roots of the date palms and to the squares of alfalfa and other crops. There is this difference, however, that the water flows of itself. Twice a day the tide of the ocean backs up the water of the great Arab River as far as Gurna, about a hundred miles from the sea. The extensive cultivation of dates stops at that point. The water can be shut out of a field if so desired, or the gates can be opened and as much allowed to enter as is needed. The supply is unlimited and can be had twice a day the year around. The soil is ideal. It is rich and hundreds of feet deep. In natural endowment Mesopotamia is a paradise for date gardeners.

511 As a matter of fact, however, that country is far from a paradise for date gardeners. The favorable conditions ought to make their work easier and their remuneration greater, but the facts are otherwise. Their condition is worse than that of the cultivators in Hasa. It is the story of the Bahrein pearl banks over again. The increased wealth of the Bahrein pearl banks has not bene-

185 well as many western food products, such as candies and
177 fancy crackers. The country is lighted by kerosene oil, much of which comes from America. Numbers of automobiles are to be seen, and in some places even electric lights. All these things represent the gratification of wants that did not exist previous to the entrance of western influence.

439 There has also been a development of the export trade
311 of the country. However, the articles for export are not
● many nor of great amount. Dates are the principal product, together with a certain amount of wheat and rice and some hides and wool. In the long run, of course, no more can be brought into the country than is sent out of it, and the trade of Mesopotamia cannot increase to any great figure until her own natural resources are developed.

000 Just how far these various modern improvements will go remains to be seen. If the British continue in power, there is no doubt that material development will be steady and sound. If they evacuate the country and leave it to an independent local government, progress will be much
435 slower, to say the least. During the war wages went up
511 to fabulous heights, and although prices of food and rent
177 advanced even more, there is no doubt that the sum
185 total of the war's influence was to raise the standard of living in the cities and to stimulate enormously the desire for many western products and for western education. Just now there has been a very sharp reaction; times are hard, work is scarce, wages are poor. Everything western is discounted, and the cry is for an independent national development with the elimination of every foreign
000 influence. The common people long for the golden days of the Turks, forgetting with a completeness quite as-

15: Tannous N,G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1

Iraq MH1

I
433 Unlike Egypt, Iraq is a sparsely populated country relative
471 to its land resource. Yet we find there the same conditions of
● 311 landlessness, and low levels of living among the peasant folk.
M More serious still, we find in that country a great agricultural
potential which is threatened by the prevailing destructive sys-
471 tem of land tenure.

433 This fertile land of the ancient Tigris and Euphrates rivers
311 has a total potentially cultivable area (mostly by means of expanded irrigation) of some 25 million acres. The present area that is under cultivation each year, however, is less than 6 million acres. There is no doubt that capital and technical aid from the West will make it possible for Iraq to realize this tremendous potential. The serious question, however, is whether development will be attempted on the present shaky foundations of feudalism, absentee ownership, and sharecropping, or on the sounder and more stable foundations of a thriving rural community that is emancipated through its ownership or control of the land. The answer, one way or the other, will be of grave consequence to the future of Iraq.

I The following is a brief summary of the situation as it now
423 exists. Less than 0.5 percent of the land is owned privately in
427 fee simple. About 36 percent is state domain which has been
471 leased out more or less permanently to individuals. Over 58
M percent is held directly and fully by the state, and is leased out
423 on a yearly basis. These figures indicate clearly that the fate
427 of the land resource has not yet been fully decided as in the case
471 of Egypt. The major portion of it is still in the hands of the state, which could dispose of it either in favor of the landless cultivator and tribesmen, or in favor of the absentee owner and the tribal chief.

The land that is now under cultivation (whether privately owned or leased from the state) is predominantly in the hands or under the control of the semi-feudal tribal chief and the large owner from the city. In either case, absenteeism prevails. The peasants, consisting of village folk and semi-settled tribal people, are in the majority of cases landless sharecroppers. They raise crops and receive a share ranging from 20 to 50 percent of the produce, depending upon whether they supply the seed, the

Chapter VII

IRAQ

LAND AND POPULATION

241 312 The peculiar feature of agriculture in Iraq is that in the greater part of the country extensive farming is practised on irrigated land. Elsewhere in the Middle East irrigation is always accompanied by a great intensification of production, but in Iraq extensive and shifting cultivation is practised even on irrigated land, and both land and water are wasted.

311 The productive area of the country falls into two halves—the rainfall zone in the north, and the irrigation zone of the south, on the alluvial plain between the two rivers.

312 In the irrigation zone, there is no controlled system of irrigation, as in Egypt. Each river has a modern barrage, the Tigris at Kut, and the Euphrates at Hindiya, but both are situated low down towards the delta, and command a comparatively small area of cultivation. Apart from the areas served by the barrages, the main system of irrigation is by flow, that is, by basin irrigation.

There are two flood periods, December to March, due to winter rains, and March till May, when the snow melts in the higher reaches of the rivers, and there are therefore two crop seasons. The danger of flood is always present, because the level of the rivers in many parts is a few feet higher than the level of the plain. Some progress has been made in recent years in flood control, as for instance the Habbaniya escape, but there is great need for a reservoir in one of the upper tributaries of the Tigris to prevent flooding in the spring and to release extra water in the dry season.

311 In recent years there has been a rapid extension of cultivation as population has increased. In 1918, the total cropped area in the irrigation zone was only 936,500 acres, and in 1943 it had increased to 4,241,718 acres.

The classification of land in Iraq presents difficulties, because not all the cultivable area is cultivated and not all the cultivated area is cropped.

The main divisions in 1943 were as follows:

25 Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

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3121
2445


TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAQ
SYRIAN DESERT
PERSIA
Amadiya
Mosul
Rowanduz
Erbil
Kirkuk
Sulaimaniya
L. Habbaniya
Baghdad
Musaiyib
Karbala
Hindiya Barrage
Kut
Amara
MUNTAFIK
Basra
Rainfed
Flow Irrigation
Mechanical Pump-Irrigation
Date Palm Plantations
3

IRAQ: TYPES OF CULTIVATION

LAND AND POPULATION

LAND UTILIZATION IN IRAQ

	Square Kilometres	Acres
311 (a) *Total Area*	453,500	112,060,000
(b) *Rainfall Zone*		
312 1. Approximate gross area of cultivated and cultivable lands	41,000	10,131,000
2. Approximate *shitwi* (winter) and *saifi* (summer) areas at present cultivated annually	6,000	1,483,000
(c) *Irrigation Zone*		
1. Approximate gross area of cultivated and cultivable lands	80,000	19,770,000
2. (a) Area of *shitwi* (winter) cultivation capable of annual irrigation by river supplies	16,000	3,900,000
(b) Area of *saifi* (summer) cultivation capable of annual irrigation by river supplies	4,300	1,054,000
3. *Shitwi* (winter) areas at present irrigated annually	12,100	2,947,000[1]
4. *Saifi* (summer) areas at present irrigated annually	4,000	1,001,000[2]
5. *Shitwi* and *saifi* areas at present cultivated annually (total of 3 and 4)	16,100	3,948,000
6. Garden areas at present irrigated annually	1,200	309,000
7. Total area cultivated (5 and 6)	17,300	4,257,000

Source: Ahmed Sousa, *Iraq Irrigation Handbook*, Part I: The Euphrates (Baghdad, Directorate General of Irrigation, 1944), pp. 11–12.

Thus the total cultivated and cultivable and cropped areas are:

	Acres
Rainfall Zone	
Cultivated and Cultivable	10,131,000
Cropped	1,483,000
Irrigation Zone	
Cultivated and Cultivable	19,770,000
Cropped	4,257,000
Total Cultivable Land	29,901,000
Total Cropped Land	5,740,000

The cropped area in the irrigation zone is divided between:

Winter crops	2,947,000
Summer crops	1,001,000
Garden areas (i.e., dates, etc.)	309,000
TOTAL	4,257,000

311 The cropped area amounts to only one-fifth of the cultivable area, and this needs explanation since it suggests that great increases in cultivation are possible. Within the area cultivated

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[1] By lift from pump installations approximately 1,591,380 acres; by flow from perennial canals approximately 1,355,620 acres.

[2] By lift from pump installations approximately 560,560 acres; by flow (rice and other summer crops) approximately 440,440 acres.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

311 at any one time, a large proportion of the land is left fallow, as water supplies are insufficient to irrigate more. The cultivated land is approximately twice the cropped area, but under present conditions it would not be possible to crop the whole area owing to shortage of water. If water could be stored for the summer period, a crop could be sown during the summer in the irrigation zone. When the Bekhme dam is completed, the summer supplies of water will be so large that the area under summer crops could be greatly increased.

Not only is much land left fallow within the area which is being cultivated at any one time, but the area of cultivation shifts within the irrigation zone at intervals of several years, because after a period of cultivation the soil becomes saline. This results from the lack of drainage. Only in the areas where there is natural drainage from the Euphrates to the Tigris near Baghdad, or further south, where the Tigris drains into the Euphrates, is there no danger of salinity. When the soil gets saline, the landlord abandons it and transfers cultivation to new ground, and new canals are dug. This is of course a wasteful system, and can only continue as long as there are ample reserves of land. Thus an increase in the area cultivated depends on (1) a general irrigation system, (2) a general drainage system.

311 The question of how far it will be possible to extend the area under cultivation depends on how great an increase in total water
312 supply is practicable. It is water, not land, which is lacking in Iraq. Varying estimates are available; Sir William Willcocks considered that the amount of land which could be put under winter cultivation in the irrigation zone with the existing average supplies of Iraq's rivers would be 7,410,000 acres or two and a half times the present winter cropped area.[1] Ahmed Sousa, in the estimates given in *Iraq Irrigation Handbook*, puts the total area which could be put under winter crops with the existing water supplies at 3,900,000 acres,[2] an increase of one million acres on the present area cropped.

On this estimate the maximum addition to the area under winter cultivation may be about one million acres; and possibly half a million acres could be added to the summer cropped area

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[1] *Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, 2nd edition (London, Spon Ltd, 1917), p. 9.

[2] p. 3.

26: Warriner S-5 (no date 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

● 811 which now amounts to one million acres. More might be added
by water storage schemes. At present several large new schemes
812 are under consideration. These involve flood control by the
construction of the Bekhme dam on the Great Zab, and an ex-
tension of the Habbaniya reservoir. In addition to the Bekhme
dam a scheme for flood irrigation in the Wadi Tharthar is being
considered. A survey commission is now preparing a report on
these developments, but so far no estimates have been made of
the area of land likely to be brought into cultivation.

464 At present there is no shortage of labour. The population is
small in relation to the area cropped, but it is growing rapidly.
161 In 1931, according to Dowson, the total population was
162 2,824,000, of which 2,246,000 were estimated to be rural, in-
cluding 895,000 settled population and 1,351,000 still living in
tribal conditions.[1] Estimates for 1943 put the total population at
4,500,000, of which the rural population was 3,500,000. Some
regions, Basra, Karbala, Dulaim, and Muntafiq are densely
settled, while others, chiefly in the north, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk,
311 are settled very sparsely. The area of cropped land per head is 2
acres, and the area of cultivated land perhaps as much as 4 acres.

LAND TENURE

432 It is clear that Iraq has greater prospects of agricultural ex-
482 pansion than any other Middle East country. But to the deve-
422 lopment of these potentialities the greatest obstacle is land
tenure. Sir Ernest Dowson, in his classical report on the subject,
says: 'The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty
and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country
and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly
or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know
many individual cases in which the development and use of the
land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity
and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would
be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of
holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free
000 from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort
of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these un-
happy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the

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[1] Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth Garden City Press for the Iraqi Government, 1932), p. 12.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

CHAPTER III

COTTON IN IRAQ

000 Iraq today is on the verge of a great transformation—from a land of want to a land of plenty. Probably the greatest rehabilitation program that has ever been undertaken in any country is in progress to make the Garden of Eden bloom again.

For generations the lack of capital had been the greatest limitation to the country's progress. Now tremendous new sums created by oil royalties are being spent in building large-scale irrigation works, constructing roads, financing industries, and improving the health and education of the people.

Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the first World War, the people have manifested a strong and continuing interest in improving their country. A great deal was done by the British during the period of their mandate, especially in the field of transportation. Probably even more was done by King Faisal when the country became a sovereign constitutional monarchy after the end of the mandate in 1932. For instance, in the last two decades the number of schools increased about seven times. More important, the people, for the first time in recent history, showed real interest in general economic improvements. More capital probably was invested in industry in the past 25 years than for several preceding centuries.

133 The need and the opportunity are both apparent. On the one hand, the resources are abundant. Iraq is a fairly large country of some 175,000 square miles, the size of Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, about two-thirds of which are deserts and mountains unfit for intensive cultivation. Another 35,000 square miles, about 20 per cent of the land area, are in the Tigris-Euphrates lowlands, the largest alluvial area in the world, almost twice the size of the deltas of Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana combined. Extensive highlands between the lowlands and the mountains are excellent for cultivation.

BACKGROUND

100 This great Mesopotamia, or "land between the rivers," was once one of the wealthiest regions of the world—the home of Adam and Eve, the Sumerian princes, Nebuchadnezzar, and the Arabian Nights, and the site of Babylon and Nineveh. This land has fostered at least three distinct civilizations through 5,000 years of history, and it cradled our present Western society.

These fertile soils are said by historians to have supported 15 to 20 161
million people in Biblical days. Now 5 million struggle to keep alive amidst 311

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

161 311 poverty probably unequalled anywhere in the world. Throughout the centuries, production has declined as neglect and misuse have drained the fertility from the soils and permitted salt to seep in and ruin for cultivation thousands of acres in this Garden of Eden.

[146] 511 The people, undernourished and ravaged by disease, have degenerated as the land has deteriorated. One would never guess that the present inhabitants, oppressed by poverty and ignorance, were in any way related to those men who shaped the history of the world for so many centuries.[1] Many

[1] [Text continues on p. 88--Analyst]

Table 27

439

IRAQ: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports

1937, 1949, 1950, and 1951

Value

Item	1937	1949	1950	1951
	Per Cent			
Crude Petroleum	65	53	51	51
Barley	7	20	19	21
Dates	6	11	10	19
Others	22	16	20	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79	92	126	166

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

Table 28

IRAQ: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports

1937, 1949, and 1950

Value

Country	1937	1949	1950
	Per Cent		
France	51	25	38
United Kingdom	18	14	12
United States	7	2	6
India	2	9	3
Netherlands		8	7
Others	22	42	34
Total	100	100	100

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

Iraq MHI

Table 32

IRAQ: Area Under Cultivation by Crops as Per Cent of Cultivated Area
1948

241

Crop	Per Cent of Total
	Per Cent
Rice	12.3
Sesame	2.5
Maize	1.4
Green Gram	1.0
Millet	.9
Wheat	40.2
Barley	40.6
Linseed	.1
Lentils	.4
Chickling	.3
Cotton	.2
Total	100.0
Total Acres under Cultivation	5,877,494

SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture.

● 311
312


40°
42°
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
TURKEY
SYRIA
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
EXISTING IRRIGATION
Flow
Pump
Marsh areas
High dam sites
Existing barrages
Proposed barrages
Proposed canal or extensions
Existing rivers or canals
RAINFED ZONE
IRRIGATION ZONE
Mosul
Greater Zab
Zab R.
Lesser Zab
Tigris
Euphrates
DIYALA WEIR
Baghdad
HABBANIYA LAKE
HINDIYA BARRAGE
Hilla
Kut
HAMMAR LAKE
Basra
STATUTE MILES
0
50
100
150

IRAQ
IRRIGATION SYSTEM

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Iraq MH1

Tigris, and a large reservoir at Bekhme in the mountains on the Great Zab. 312 The Mission endorsed these projects and recommended others to compensate for diversion and to balance the systems.

The Iraq Irrigation Development Commission believes that the area under irrigation can be increased to 12 million acres by the installation of additional storage facilities, by drainage, rehabilitation, and by new supplies of water.[44]

It is agreed generally that the rain-fed zones in the north must continue to depend primarily on rainfall. Although no accurate estimates are available, the total area which might be available for cultivation in this area is thought to be substantial.

Along with irrigation, an important means of improving productivity is drainage. This would have an immediate effect; other proposals depend on the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation. 241 311

As much as 20 to 30 per cent of the cultivated land is said to be abandoned because of salt accumulation. On a large part of the remaining land, yields have declined as much as 50 per cent. Drainage—almost totally neglected—the report concluded, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor.[45]

MECHANIZATION

Because of the cost, the Mission predicted that mechanization would proceed slowly. This conclusion was reached in the face of experience which shows that tractor ploughing may increase yields 20 to 50 per cent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and better preparation of the soil.[46] No doubt mechanization will become increasingly important as additional land is placed under cultivation and labor becomes scarce. 241 407

About 750 tractors and 320 combines are in the country at the present time. A government agency owns 75 of the combines and 81 tractors and plans to import an additional 2,500 tractors and 550 combines with auxiliary equipment.[47] About 50 per cent of the machinery will be retained at government-owned tractor stations and rented or let out under contract.[48] The rest will be sold on easy terms to the farmers.

The International Bank approved a modified version of this machinery program but suggested that rental charges be increased to make the project self-sustaining, and adequate repair shops and demonstration and training programs were recommended.

SOIL BUILDING

It is obvious that the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished. [134] 242

Cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is said to be virtually unknown. Attention needs to be given to the production of legumes. Commercial fertilization must be studied and, if possible, plants should be built to produce inorganic and organic materials. Soil analyses also are generally needed.

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[44] *Economic Development of Iraq*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[48] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.
511

Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
369 of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
438 to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
511 conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
566 land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
423 house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
471 directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
566 with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
and write to obtain more information.

000 and write to obtain more information. Most rural people have not yet learned such
369 fundamental principles as crop rotation to enrich the land, the concept of germs, or the principles of infection and contagion. Under their circumstances they
311 have not been able to acquire a growing store of knowledge or of experience to pass down for the advancement of each successive generation. In other words, the people of rural Iraq have had little cultural heritage or growth.

5. Attitudes and Social Organization

369 Also fundamental to their poverty are attitudes derived from their social position and relationships with their sheikhs and landowners. Virtually imprisoned
366 by their condition of total dependence and debt, rural people have developed deep feelings of powerlessness and futility. Many of these attitudes stem from a
181 weakening of historical tribal relationship in which there were greater reciprocal
178 obligations between leaders and the people. Now they become unbalanced when the traditional tribal social system degenerates as sheikhs abandon their tribal responsibilities and take tribal lands as their personal possessions. The tribesman becomes detached from his social group. His dependence becomes greater upon the whims of his sheikh. This leader feels less and less obligation as the state and local governments assume those responsibilities for the care of the people which the sheikh formerly performed.

III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL PEOPLE

000 A. A PROBLEM REQUIRING TOTAL GOVERNMENT ACTION

The causes of the rural problems as briefly described obviously indicate that nothing less than a full scale attack upon them by all ministries and agencies of the government will bring about the desirable changes and improvements. Economic and social development of the rural people is not only necessary for their own welfare but for the welfare and progress of Iraq as a whole. A national economic and social development programme for rural peoples under the co-operative planning and direction of government leaders is needed. This programme should integrate into single, national, social plan of action the present and planned government activities of land and water development. The provisions should include as well as new plans for making ownership of farms available to tenants and landless people, credit, accessible to these small farmers at reasonable rates, instruction in new agricultural practices, establishment of public health and professional medical services available for all people, provision of education for every child, advice and demonstration in the improvement of housing, instruction in home and child care, establishment of social services for the needy, ill, blind and orphaned, construction of access roads to allow marketing of farm products from every village, development of village industries and the organization of communities for participation in an ultimate direction of their local affairs. This will take time, effort, money, careful study and planning, and increased inter-ministry and agency co-operation before it can be put into effect. The information and skills now exist to undertake this national campaign. It is a programme on which national leaders and with technical assistance from abroad can unite in their thinking and their efforts to build a solid agricultural economy as the foundation of Iraq.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East
IRAQ MHI

Chapter X

OIL AND DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ

IRAQ MAY SERVE as an excellent study of the relation 000 between oil production and the social and economic patterns of an underdeveloped country. Production of oil began almost simultaneously with the emergence of the independent state. Though Iraq's social and economic traditions were set when it was part of the Ottoman Empire and seriously bedeviled the growth and development of the new kingdom, the special Iraqi national patterns were being molded during the very period the oil was flowing in ever increasing quantity through pipelines hundreds of miles long to world markets. Moreover, Iraq had the benefit of Western guidance, the British administration, at first, and advice afterwards; yet during the first twenty-five years of oil production it would seem that the country did not progress as spectacularly as the oil figures (from 45,000 tons in 1927, to some 28,000,000 tons in 1953). The basic obstacles to the rapid social and economic development of the people and the transformation of the country could apparently not be overcome by the mere availability of oil, some technical knowledge, and royalties from the oil industry.

Before drawing any conclusions, we should examine some fundamental facts about the country, the people, and the factors which operated in Iraq to create the conditions prevailing there.

Land and People

The area of Iraq is about 175,000 square miles, and it has 13
a population of approximately 5,000,000 people.[1] Because of 16
the lack of sufficiently reliable data, as well as the cultivation 311

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[1] Tabulations of the returns of the first census, taken on Oct. 19, 1947, showed a population of 4,799,500. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, *International Reference Service*, Dec. 1948, 2.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

311 practices of the Iraqi peasants, no exact figures are available as to the cultivable and cultivated areas or the extent of the uncultivable part. The first comprehensive survey of land tenure, methods of cultivation and other related questions was made by Sir Ernest Dowson in 1930. He estimated the cultivable area as 92,000 square kilometers—41,000 in the rainfall zone, and 51,000 in the irrigation zone—and that only a fraction of the zones, possibly one-fifth to one-tenth, was cultivated in any one year.[2] In 1945 it was estimated that out of the total of some 112,000,000 acres, the potentially cultivable area was about 30,000,000, and that only about 6.5 million were irrigated.[3] The United Nations reported in 1949 that only 3,200,000 hectares—1,300,000 under irrigation—were cultivated, out of 6,000,000 cultivable.[4] In the same year the British estimated the cultivable area as 35,000 square miles and a small portion as utilized in any one year.[5]

The International Bank Mission to Iraq in 1951 could not state with any certainty the cultivated and cultivable areas. According to the Mission, the official estimates indicated that the amount of cultivable land was about three times that under cultivation, but the definition of cultivability was not established and no accurate figures were available.[6]

Regardless of the exact statistics, it is universally agreed that although about 80 per cent of the population derives its living directly or indirectly from the soil, a goodly portion of the cultivable land, perhaps more than half, was not and is not cultivated; that with a little effort and systematic organization, the area under cultivation could be quickly increased, and that with better and more intensive cultivation, the wealth and earning capacity of the country could be substantially in-

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[2] Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions. Proposals for the Initiative of Reform* (Letchworth, England, [1932]), 11.

[3] Great Britain, Dept. of Overseas Trade, *Iraq Review of Commercial Conditions* (London, 1945), 3. Henceforth cited Great Britain, *Iraq Review*.

[4] U. N., *Review 1949-50*, 45.

[5] Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, *Iraq* (London, 1949), 18.

[6] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 8. The Dept. of Agriculture supplied the Mission with the following statistics: cultivable area about 48.1 million donums—32.1 million in the irrigation zone and 16 million in the rainfall zone; under cultivation about 17.5 million donums, and actually under crops not more than 11.1 million; of these 7.6 in the irrigation zone, and 3.5 million in the rainfall zone. *Ibid.*, 137. For an analysis of the agrarian problem of Iraq, especially the most aggravating one—the tenure aspect—see Gabriel Baer, "The Agrarian Problem of Iraq," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, III, 381-391, Dec., 1952.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East
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creased. Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Iraq has all the 311
necessary requisites for a sound and rapid economic development, especially in the agricultural sector. It has a very considerable quantity of land ready for immediate cultivation, so defined by the most conservative standards, and with modern methods very great stretches now defined as uncultivable could be improved and brought into the cultivable class; it has an 3N–
abundance of water for irrigation as well as for power, and it has at its disposal enormous quantities of cheap fuel both in petroleum and natural gas.

What, then, have been the economic, educational, health and 161
social conditions of the country? As regards the size and growth of the population, even today, more than thirty years since the creation of the Kingdom of Iraq, it would be very difficult to state categorically the percentage increase of the population. The accuracy of the figure advanced by the October 1947 census has been questioned by the International Bank Mission.[7]

Despite substantial strides in public health—an increased 165
number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors—during the first 164
thirty years of the existence of the Kingdom, the Bank Mission reported in 1951 that the infant mortality rate was very high, "perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births," and that there was a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and dysentery. Malaria was reported to cause 50,000 deaths every year. In 1948 no less than 6,657,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria and 524,740 trachoma.[8] In 1944 [759]
the total number of doctors in the country was 528; in 1951 it was reported that there was one doctor to every 7,000 in the population, which would make a total of about 915 doctors, but a large percentage of them were concentrated in Bagdad.[9]

There can be no doubt that educationally the country pro- 871
gressed considerably from the stage in which it was in 1921, but all in all the sum total was not very impressive; the rate of

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[7] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 128.

[8] *Ibid.*, 49.

[9] *Ibid.*, 53; Hashim Al Witry, *Health Services in Iraq* (1944), 8. In 1945 there were, according to a British report, 569 doctors registered in Iraq. Since 308 were in Bagdad, this made approximately one doctor for every 15,400 in the population in the provinces, and one doctor to every 2,700 in Bagdad. Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, *Iraq* (1949), 80-81.

163 lation, and the death rate, 25 to 35. The
165 discrepancies in reporting are probably less in the case of deaths than of births.

On the basis of the health district populations for 1950, the infant mortality rate was calculated at 98 per 1,000 live births. The death rate of infants under 1 year was 14 per cent of the total deaths, and of children under 5 years, about 23 per cent. Local observers estimate that the mortality in infants under 1 year approximates 300 to 350 per 1,000 live births among most rural and impoverished urban communities, and that it reaches almost 500 per 1,000 live births in children under 5 years of age. Intestinal diseases, undernutrition, respiratory infections and malaria are prominent among the causes of death in infancy and early childhood.

SOCIAL ECONOMY

241 Agriculture and the petroleum industry together form the basis of Iraq's economy. Although this region was one of the chief granaries of the world centuries before the Christian Era, the present agricultural resources of the potentially fertile Tigris and Euphrates river basins are only partially developed. About 75 to 80 per cent of the inhabitants are engaged in farming or pastoral pursuits, but progress is retarded by the prevailing forms of land tenure, shortage of labor supply and inefficient methods
311 of cultivation. In 1950, less than one fifth
241 of the arable land, normally estimated at 25 to 30 million acres, was under production. Extensive areas of the alluvial plain are cultivated by means of irrigation, but improper drainage often results in consider-
427 able annual loss of soil fertility. A system
423 of tenancy farming predominates in most sections of the country. The proportion of land-owning peasants is small and largely restricted to the northern provinces. In cen-
[241] tral and southern Iraq many families are migratory cultivators who work on a sharecropping basis for wealthy and, usually, absentee landlords.

241 Cereals, tobacco and cotton are important

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Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

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In the early post-war period there was little development. Petroleum production, and the revenue accruing to the Government therefrom, remained at the pre-war level or below and agricultural and industrial output showed little change. The deficit in the balance of payments was met by drawing on foreign exchange reserves. The Government budget showed deficits, and little was spent on capital works. By 1950, however, the situation began to change. Output of petroleum increased rapidly, and new agreements with the producing companies greatly raised government receipts. With the technical and financial assistance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a large-scale development plan was drawn up which is at present being carried out. The completion of the various projects under way should result in a considerable increase in the national income.

Production

Agriculture

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The increase in area and output achieved during the Second World War was generally maintained during the post-war period (see table 26). In recent years, there seems to have been a further extension in acreage, owing to increased irrigation and greater mechanization. 1/ Yields have continued to fluctuate in response to weather conditions, floods and attacks by locusts and other insect pests; total output has therefore varied considerably from year to year. The experience of recent years, notably that of 1952, has, however, shown that, thanks to the co-operation of other Middle Eastern and foreign governments, locust attacks cause much less damage than they did formerly. Similarly, completion of the irrigation works at present under way should greatly reduce the danger of floods like that of 1954, which destroyed many crops and damaged property.

The agricultural and livestock census 2/ of 1952/53, the first of its kind, puts the total agricultural holdings of Iraq at 6,384,000 hectares, of which

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1/ The number of pumps used in irrigation rose from 2,757, with a total horsepower of 91,332 in 1945, to 4,339, with a horsepower of 167,288 in 1953 (Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract 1953 (Baghdad)). In addition, the construction of canals made it possible to extend appreciably the area irrigated by existing dams. Early in 1951, there were 320 combines and 750 tractors (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, (Baltimore, 1952), page 19). In 1952 and 1953, 625 combines and 502 tractors were sold to farmers; of these over two-thirds were sold in 1953 (Statistical Abstract). There were 2,091 tractors in 1954 (Le Commerce du Levant, 11 August 1954 (Beirut)).

2/ Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract 1953 (Baghdad).

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Table 26. Iraq: Area and Production of Principal Crops, 1934-38, 1945, 1948 and 1950 to 1954

Crop	1934-38	1945	1948	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Area (thousands of hectares):								
Wheat	661	777	963	950	863	882	1,046	...
Barley	743	826	974	1,000	927	700	1,211	...
Rice	152	194	295	218	189	210	129	...
Cotton	16	...	...	32	44	40	24	...
Production (thousands of metric tons):								
Wheat	478	400	301	545	487	480	762	800
Barley	575	650	570	851	839	800	1,111	700
Rice	205	245	350	242	190	250	200	250
Cotton	2	1	2	8	6	3	4	...
Dates	260	...	301[a]	305	350	370	350	...

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics (Rome), Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics; agricultural census of 1952/53; Le Commerce du Levant (Beirut), 25 December 1954.

[a] 1947.

2,752,000 hectares are rainfed, 2,912,000 irrigated [1] and 644,000 hectares uncultivable. Of the total, 2,527,000 hectares, or 40 per cent, were cropped; 2,795,000 hectares, or 44 per cent, were left fallow; 128,000 hectares, or 2 per cent, was under fruit trees and vines; 231,000 hectares, or 4 per cent, consisted of pastures; and 42,000 hectares, or 1 per cent, consisted of woodland. Double cropping is practised in a few areas.

The census showed that the area planted to the major field crops was as follows: barley 1,211,000 hectares; wheat, 1,046,000; rice, 129,000; maize, 54,000; cotton, 24,000; millet, 22,000; sesame, 22,000; tobacco, 10,000; vegetables, 45,000; others, 38,000; total, 2,601,000 hectares. Barley is to be found in most parts of the country, while wheat is grown mainly in the north, the provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk accounting for half the total area; cotton and fruit trees are grown mainly around Baghdad and in other central provinces, and rice in the south; date cultivation is concentrated around the town of Basra. [2]

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[1] Of this total, 1,685,000 hectares are irrigated by flow, 1,120,000 hectares by pumps and 107,000 by water wheels and other means.

[2] The census put livestock on agricultural holdings as follows: horses, 137,000; cattle, 712,000; buffaloes, 47,000; sheep, 4,484,000; goats, 1,618,000; donkeys, 399,000; camels, 38,000; and mules, 57,000.

433 There has been little change in the crop pattern in recent years. In 1950,
311 under the stimulus of rising world prices, the area planted to cotton increased,
but the damage caused by pests, together with the fall in prices, caused heavy
241 losses and led to a shift to other crops. There has also been an extension of the area planted to fruits and vegetables.

242 The Government has taken several important measures to aid agriculture. In 1952, in order to improve the quality of dates, the government-owned Iraqi Dates Association contributed 49 per cent of the capital of a company which will market the crop. In 1953, the Government appropriated funds for the building of grain silos with a capacity of 150,000 tons, in order to improve quality, since low grading depresses export prices. The Agricultural Machinery Administration rents "machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts". 1/ The activities of the Agricultural Bank are discussed below.

423 Among the major obstacles to agricultural development has been the land
tenure system. The uncertainty of land titles has by now been largely eliminated
241 by the work carried out since passage of the land settlement law of 1932. By the end of 1953, titles to 16,126,000 hectares had been settled; this represented 68.4 per cent of the area of the country, excluding the desert regions. Another obstacle is the unequal distribution of land. The agricultural census showed that there were only 125,000 holdings, with an average area of 51 hectares per holding. Of these, 24,000 holdings were under 1 hectare, 26,000 between 1 and 5 hectares, 16,000 between 5 and 10 hectares and 19,000 between 10 and 20 hectares. Thus, 85,000 holders, or 68 per cent of the total, owned about 8 per cent of the total area. At the other extreme, some 33,000 holders, with over 100 hectares each, owned some 85 per cent of the total area. The majority of the agricultural population is landless.

311 The Government has attempted to remedy this situation by settlement schemes
241 on government-owned land, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of the settled
area. Following a successful experiment at Dujaila, 4,284 farmers were settled,
in five projects with a total area of 198,000 hectares, and by the end of 1954,
185 10,200 farmers had been settled on 510,000 hectares. 2/ Farmers are organized in supply and marketing co-operatives. They are given the land free of rent for ten years, after which those who have made good are granted title without charge. 3/ Further projects are under way, including the distribution of 1,125,000 hectares in Mosul province, the distribution of 100,000 hectares near Baghdad, the expansion of the Hawijah settlement and the distribution of land near Basra and along the southern Euphrates. 4/

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, page 20.

2/ The Iraq Times (Baghdad), 25 October 1954.

3/ For further details see United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, Progress in Land Reform (1954), page 105.

4/ The Iraq Times, 14 December 1954, 4 January 1955, 8 January 1955 and 7 February 1955.

241 advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made [312] but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallah*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

511 In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of 511 423 the *badu* and their hungry camels. Even where tenure was reasonably secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving pro- [476] ductivity; wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

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[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[311] [2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north.

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the 511 423
resources to initiate new methods or improve the old.

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and dis- 511
couraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the 241
lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both 241
of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal 312
functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains
and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are 312
evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage 185
of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312 185 Although by 1900 these conditions were not unrealized either in Baghdad or Istanbul, they had not been formulated as connected problems for solution. Governmental activity in this sphere had consisted, at the caprice of Pashas, in no more than some measure of organization of petty local works. The Administration had in fact neither the knowledge nor control nor finance necessary to formulate or organize a comprehensive irrigation system. Heedless alike of present evils and of rich possibilities, the governors of 'Iraq were doing and planning nothing while irrigation in Egypt and India was making great and fruitful progress. Nor was the contribution of the public more promising; the shiftless tribal cultivators carried out with low efficiency such minimum of silt-clearance and flood-dyke repairs as was forced upon them, erected temporary canal-heads of reed-bundles or brushwood, multiplied their primeval devices of water-lift, wastefully prolonged or resited their canals, and ruined area after area with neglected salting.

An outstanding case of deterioration in irrigation conditions was occurring in these years on the middle Euphrates. Up to 1880 the Ḥilla branch had been maintained as the principal waterway, the Hindiya branch being a canal deriving from it. But the closing of the Ṣaqlawiya head up-stream, and the operation of natural forces of silting and scouring, allowed the Hindiya branch to gain in width and discharge. The problem of maintaining the flow of the Ḥilla branch had become first critically difficult and finally impossible. French engineers in 1891 completed a masonry dam which still held precariously in 1900, but failed to arrest the increasing ruin of Ḥilla branch irrigation.

487 The ancient land routes of the territory had remained constant since many centuries. Camel caravans used the desert ways of Damascus and Aleppo, mule-trains the time-worn hill tracks into Luristan, Kirmanshah, Persian Kurdistan, and the Van wilaya. 491 Within 'Iraq the routes were fixed by custom based on convenience; but here there were signs of recent progress in the provision of wayside Khans, new toll-bridges of stone or brick or resting on fragile pontoons. The roads, varying by districts in surface and security, were everywhere unsurfaced and neglected, deep in summer dust or flooded to seas of mud by rain or the overflow of canals.

499 Railways had, for many years, been hailed from a distance by 'Iraqis of every class as the bringers of ease and progress, and schemes in plenty had been propounded—those of Chesney in the eighteen-thirties, of Andrew in the 'fifties, and later of the Austrian von Pressel, the Italian Tonetti, the Frenchman Cottard, the Russian Kapnist. A local company had been formed in the 'eighties to construct a Khaniqin–Baghdad line, which lack of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

505 Privy Purse to an organization of the central Government, the Ottoman River (Nahriya) Administration; but the service deteriorated in spite of new and important units acquired in 1912, the *Basra* and the *Baghdad*. Negotiations for a merger between Lynch and the Nahriya were persistent after 1909, but were long delayed by strong hostile outcry, both locally and in Istanbul, against such an example of foreign dominance, and were incomplete on the outbreak of war.

505 648x The subject, indeed, was among those covered by the never-ratified Anglo-Turkish Agreement of May 1913. This provided that, in the interests of the steamers, no 'navigable streams' were to be diverted from their courses; navigation rights were to be awarded for sixty years to a new Ottoman River Navigation Company, to be formed upon a basis of equal participation by Turkish and British interests. A fourth steamer (but under the Turkish flag) was to be allowed to the Euphrates Company. But while this arrangement was acceptable to the Baghdad Railway Company, which guaranteed the new Company a high minimum of tonnage, the damage to Lynch interests was clear. This in turn was met by a further agreement of March 1914 which was to bring the Lynch interest itself into the Ottoman Navigation Company. The Railway's rights of port-construction at Baṣra were to be passed to an Ottoman Port Company with participation for each of Lynch, Lord Inchcape, and the British India interests, and the Baghdad Railway. World events, however, were to prevent any of these arrangements from coming into force; before the end of 1914 German and Turkish interest in Tigris steam navigation was for ever extinguished.

Meanwhile, the immediate task of moving the Baghdad Railway materials from Baṣra led to the formation in 1912 of an *ad hoc* company, the Société de Transports Fluviaux en Orient, with equal participation of the Lynch Company and the Deutsche Bank; it acquired suitable small craft for its purposes, and was controlled locally by the Euphrates and Tigris management.

312 In the all-important sphere of irrigation, the new century was to see great and promising developments. The year 1900 and succeeding years found, indeed, the same evils as ever flourishing unchecked: disastrous annual flooding, deficiency of irrigation water in the season of greatest need, lack of control, lack of drainage. The same helplessness of the unled and unrecognized cultivators, the same archaic methods, the same vague and abortive projects formed in high circles, continued to provide no practical cure. Conditions in the mid-Euphrates area turned from bad to worse, with lands abandoned, canals drying, and tribes fighting for existence. The Hindiya Barrage again partially collapsed in 1903

and progressively deteriorated. The river now adopted its Hindiya 312 channel to an extent of nine-tenths, leaving desolation at Ḥilla, Diwaniya, and Daghara. Government organized repair works, but without adequate funds or energy, and the greater efforts made under M. Cugnin in early 1909 proved unavailing. The Euphrates irrigation position remained menacing or disastrous.

But help was, after all, at hand. The veteran irrigation engineer 312 of Egypt, Sir William Willcocks, had studied the problems of 'Iraq 185 water-control from 1902 onwards, and had submitted proposals to Istanbul through the British Ambassador. Late in 1908 he was 653 appointed Consultant for 'Iraq irrigation, reached Baghdad in December and toured and studied with boundless energy, resolution, and intolerance, while the Mesopotamia Irrigation Survey pursued its work. By 1910 he had solved his problems. From the proposals in his report, most of which still held the field almost intact forty years later, there emerged the necessity for immediate large-scale works. To prevent flooding he demanded regulated flood escapes at key points, with strong embankments and the closing of existing breaches. The Euphrates escape would be at or near Ramadi, into Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Abu Dibis depression. The Tigris escape would be from the Samarrā area through miles of high ground into the Tharthar depression, unless the cost of so vast a scheme proved prohibitive. To raise low-season water-levels and provide reliable supplies to the off-taking canals, a barrage would be erected near Balad above Baghdad, and another at Kut al-Amara to restore the irrigable Gharraf (Ḥai) lands. The ancient Nahrwan canal was, by one of alternative methods, to be restored, and the waters of the Diyalā—and some of the Tigris—to be poured into it. The lower Euphrates swamps would be reclaimed by re-forming the main channels and by providing for flood escape. A barrage at Qarmat 'Ali would give controlled irrigation in Baṣra area. Large-scale drainage would be provided throughout the country by utilizing existing depressions, Tigris navigation would be safeguarded by controlling the great flood channels of the 'Amara district, the Buṭayra, Chahla, Majr Kabir, and Musharra.

Of this programme, grandiose and costly by any standards, criticism was not lacking on the grounds of deficient finances, tribal insecurity, lack of man-power, and chronic Turkish maladministration. But it was boldly adopted by the Turkish Government, with preference for the Hindiya Barrage as the first step. Willcocks witnessed from 1909 to 1911 the failure of further stop-gap attempts to repair the existing barrage, and was soon to experience his first taste of the greatest of all his problems—that of obtaining funds from the Turkish Government. Nevertheless

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312 work on the new Barrage began. Tenders for the complete con-
185 struction were called for in September 1910, and the contract
653 awarded to the British firm of Sir John Jackson & Co.

The construction of the Barrage, then and now one of the greatest works in 'Iraq, was carried out with extraordinary speed by a staff which included Turks, Indians, Armenians, and some 3,500 'Iraqis. The suspicion of certain elements in Turkish officialdom usually turned to gratified encouragement after a personal visit to Hindiya. Labour troubles were few. Transport, especially that on the Euphrates routes from Baṣra, presented extreme difficulties, with tribal blackmail and navigational obstacles: and the continual struggles needed to obtain funds from an empty Treasury in Istanbul and a harassed Daftardar in Baghdad were successful only after actual stoppage of the work seemed inevitable. The iron gates arrived in the late summer of 1913, and a crowded and triumphant ceremonial opening of the whole work was held in November of that year. Although the Barrage, which had cost less than £500,000, still lacked the canalization which it was designed to support downstream, it conferred immediately enormous benefits on the countryside which it served. These would have been a hundredfold greater if they could have included public security, an equitable land system, and some hope of new agricultural methods.

Elsewhere in 'Iraq, much of the earth-work of the Ḥabbaniya Escape in its first phase was completed, and digging of the Ṣaqlawiya Canal was begun but abandoned. Further surveys produced information of great future value, though no other major enterprise belongs to this period. A scheme for watering the Ḥawija, north-west of Kirkuk, from the Lesser Zab was begun without study and ended in fiasco and scandal. More important, and prophetic of a major development of the future, was the growing riverside use of oil engines for irrigation purposes. These increased from a mere dozen in 1900 to some scores in 1914. Meanwhile, flood-bank protection annually renewed followed its unsure and expensive course, rarely effective and always burdensome. The 'bunds' built by Nadhim Pasha for the safeguarding of Baghdad, though they failed partially in their first year, were an important work.

433 These last years of Turkish rule were marked by little industrial development. Some increase in local shipbuilding and the use of irrigation pumps, ice machines, wool and liquorice-presses called for the first time for mechanical repair facilities. The first motor-
494 car appeared in 'Iraq in 1908 from Aleppo; by 1914 less than a dozen were in use. These included a motor-bus service on the Ba'quba road, and the private cars of a few notables. Efforts to mechanize the Kufa tramway had failed.

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Ṣarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312 The daily lives of many 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in
653 agriculture than by even the greatest industry, and such progress in this period was not negligible. The grandiose irrigation schemes for which the press and public called were not, indeed, at once attainable; maintenance, minor improvement, and research were rather the order of the day. Nevertheless, some works of fair magnitude were carried out. New headworks and canalization on the Diwaniya and Daghara branches of the Euphrates were undertaken, and improvements in the water-supply to the Suq rice-lands. Swamp-drainage at Karbalā was primarily a public health measure. A permanent weir across the Diyalā replaced annually renewed antiquated works and secured supplies for the Ruz, Khurasan, and Maḥrut canals. The Laṭifiya Canal, the new Iskandariya, the Shayshubar were dug or re-aligned. A clearance of the Baṣra creeks and a major regulator, opened by the King in 1930, on the Bad'a in Muntafiq country were works of great local value. With them went continuous researches, surveys, experiments in desalination and drainage, and efforts to maintain and improve the 'bunds', breaches of which could ruin a countryside as they did in the disastrous floods of 1926 and 1929, and the necessity for which only the completion of the long-standing flood-diversion schemes could remove. Such was the Ḥabbaniya project, conceived by Willcocks twenty years earlier and closely restudied from 1927 to 1932; in the last of these years tenders were called for and the work seemed imminent. Other major plans, postponed by lack of funds and incomplete data, were the Tigris barrage at Kut al-Amara to restore the Gharraf and to control the 'Amara rice-lands: the smaller Abu Ghurayb canal from the Euphrates left bank, begun in 1932: an 'Aqar Quf drainage project near Baghdad: a proposed reservoir at or near Qizil Rubaṭ to conserve Diyalā water for summer use: a new head for the Ḥilla branch: the Isḥaqi Canal, to take Tigris water from opposite Samarrā: and work on the main Euphrates channel near Shinafiya. The Irrigation Department was administered from 1925 to 1928 by L. E. Bury, who acted also as Adviser to the Ministry of Works and after 1927 to that also of Irrigation and Agriculture. W. Allard succeeded as Director of Irrigation from 1928 to 1933, and as Chief Engineer under an 'Iraqi director in 1933–4. Wheatley resumed the advisership of Communications and Works in 1929, and held it for the next eight years.

241
654 Of the need to improve agricultural methods, if these canal works were to yield all their value, the public was little aware. In spite of continued research and experiment, the main agricultural problems of the territory were yet unsolved—those of soil deterioration, antiquated techniques, inferior crop varieties, low and impure yields, and harvests endangered by flood or drought.

1z Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Their solution must depend on the simultaneous and widespread 241 working of forces of rural education, reliable security, sound land 654 tenure and properly financed enterprise. Meanwhile, the annual locust campaigns in northern 'Iraq were developed jointly with neighbouring countries. Progress was made in hill-country tobacco-growing and treatment of the leaf on modern lines. Silk experiments continued, though with scant success. Cotton-growing was still restricted by unskilled cultivation and by pests. The produce of the great date-groves of southern 'Iraq was bringing difficult problems not only of improved culture but of organization and disposal, and civil war raged between growers and packers. Of the attempts at modern estate development (p. 17) none had yet succeeded. The projected Agricultural Bank could not, it was found, be inaugurated until clearer land-titles gave security for loans. The Aṣfar Concession was limited and revised to provide for the acquisition and development by the Company of the Laṭifiya estate, south of Baghdad; the Irrigation Department constructed the main canal at the Company's expense, and promising operations on the 65,000-acre area began under European management.

The main agricultural development of the time was that of riverside 312 pump irrigation. This had been initiated before 1914 and moderately extended between 1920 and 1925. Aided by important fiscal privileges, it began thereafter to show remarkable increase, to the point of becoming a main feature of 'Iraq's economy. Installations in the liwās of Baghdad, Diwaniya, Kut, 'Amara, and Diyalā had by the end of 1930 brought the number of pumps to over 2,000, representing a million-acre increase of cultivable area. There was evident value in thus attracting capital to agriculture, utilizing the cheap oil available, exploiting the high-lying virgin lands, and avoiding the precarious chances of flood irrigation. But the development 311 was not free from trouble. The attraction of cultivators to 472 new lands rather diverted them from old than increased their numbers; improvement in yields, due to fresh lands and secure irrigation, was not matched by superior type or purity of crops. Estate management attempted by townsmen was sometimes short-sighted and uneconomic, and the hard times and low prices of 1930–1 brought ruin to many hopeful enterprises. These, more- 423 over, jointly undertaken by an urban capitalist—often a Deputy or city notable—and a tribal shaykh or *sirkal*, were productive of puzzling difficulties of land tenure and rights. Neither the traditional occupancy of the tribe, nor the share claimed by the incoming capitalist, had any basis in law. Agreements between the parties often proved unworkable, and in practice did not always bring blessings to the cultivators. These conditions indicated, yet

241 473 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. [656] A Committee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Ḳurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 312 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new [45[illegible]] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural [185] affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first 312 653 stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

from the Lesser Zab west of Altun Kupri and irrigating land in the 312 Ḥawija was begun in the same year. Schemes for a Diyalā dam, 653 and for a restoration of the ancient Isḥaqi canal were studied, but the long-favoured Ḥabbaniya scheme seemed unable to come to life. It was re-formulated in 1932; tenders were invited next year but none accepted; and in 1934 the project seemed likely to be reduced to the scale of a mere flood reservoir, whereafter, for a time, no progress in the scheme was made. Its place as first favourite was taken by the Tigris barrage, to control the Gharraf river from its point of bifurcation opposite Kut. This project, which allowed by means of locks for continued Tigris navigation and for fish movement, was put to tender in 1934. Work was begun by the chosen contractors, Messrs. Balfour Beatty & Co., and by mid-1937 it approached completion—the second of the great Willcocks schemes to be realized; but the dependent canalization necessary to ensure its full value would require much further time and effort. The collapse in 1935 of the Diyalā weir, built in 1928, was a setback which called for large-scale restoration, and steps to this end were taken in 1936–7. The upkeep and improvement of existing canals continued with increasing use of 'Iraqi technical personnel, and with it further study of the abiding problems of flood protection, drainage, water economy, and silting. There was little money to spend.

6. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Both events within 'Iraq and the external contacts natural to a 648K modern State led during these years[1] to greatly widened relations between Baghdad and the world outside. The process of establishing these was continuous; prestige and strategy both played their part; and no sphere of Government activity was freer from party politics. The system continued whereunder 'Iraqi representation abroad was entrusted to the diplomats and consuls of Great Britain, save only at Geneva and at the small but increasing number of capitals to which 'Iraqi Ministers were appointed. The Soviet Union alone refused to accept this system, or to recognize 'Iraq.

Italy, to which a State visit of King Fayṣal had been planned before his death, courted 'Iraqi goodwill. In spite of Sanctions, in which 'Iraq conformed to the British attitude towards the aggression against Ethiopia in 1935, Italy secured 'Iraqi armament orders in 1936 and later fêted and decorated 'Iraqi visitors to Rome (where a Legation had been opened in 1934) and subsidized in Baghdad a newspaper Fascist in tone, the *Sha'ab*. On the whole, however, Italian activity was less evident in 'Iraq than in the Levant States, and foreshadowed the assignment of that territory, with Persia, to

[1] - [Mid nineteen-thirties -- Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x to ensure Arab rights in the Holy Land, or by that of the Foreign Minister 'Ali Jawdat to Sa'udi Arabia in June.

The child-King was taken to the Lebanon for the summer, and there hailed by village enthusiasts by the roadside as 'King of Syria'. In Baghdad a new British Ambassador, Sir Basil Newton, to whom the Middle East and its problems were unfamiliar, succeeded Peterson in March 1939.

652 The financial needs of the State, which thanks to over-spending were now serious, were met by a grant of credits by the British Government for the pressing needs of the Railway, and equipment for the Army. Nearly £4 million was thus made available on the security of 'Iraq's oil revenues and with conditions of moderate interest and repayment spaced over seventeen years. An interest-free loan was granted at the same time by the 'Iraq Petroleum Company in return for a seven-year postponement of its export obligation under the B.O.D. Company's concession; it was payable in six half-yearly instalments of £500,000 each, and repayable at leisure out of royalties.

653 [496] 312 The Railway section from Tall Kochek to Mosul was completed, at unexpectedly high cost, and trains could now run from that city to Istanbul. The Kut barrage and Gharraf headworks were completed in March 1939: the official opening had been King Ghazi's last public act. With its fifty-six mechanically-operated gates, overall width of 1,615 feet, lock, and fish-ladder, this important work had cost £1,200,000 and, given full dependent canalization (at present lacking), was capable of the controlled irrigation of a million acres. The seven-gate Yau regulator, at the end of that branch of the Kufa channel, was erected in 1939–40, also by Messrs. Balfour Beatty. A new and improved Diyalā weir (p. 263) was undertaken in 1939 and completed by the end of 1940. Execution of the Ḥabbaniya project, which had been revived urgently after the Euphrates floods of 1938, was entrusted in June 1939 by contract to Messrs. Balfour Beatty for £700,000 for the first phase, that of the intake canal to the lake at Ramadi and the controlled outlet from the lake to the vast Abu Dibis depression. Work on these was pressed forward. The first of the two steel bridges at Baghdad, built under contract by Messrs. Holloway Bros., was completed; it formed an imposing structure, 700 ft. long and 50 ft. wide, and, named al-Ma'mun Bridge, was opened with ceremony by the Regent. Bridge tolls were abolished through-
652 out the country. A long-standing project drew nearer to realization when a Government bank, to be known as the Rafidain Bank, was established by law though not yet opened; its initial capital was fixed at £500,000, subscribed in part by the State. A revised version of the capital works programme was evolved by Rustum

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241
was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce
and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease
supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās
and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors,
mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation,
with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities.
Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the
educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had
been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the
establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of [166
these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in 464]
their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time
employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423
committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185
since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout
the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq,
and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās;
but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of
Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was
made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries,
and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now
approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for
model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government
land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant
insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized.
On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425
a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166
sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be
gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions
and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and
a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The
Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen
families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused
keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312 ●
continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their
studies and planning, though the intended major projects could 653
not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on
the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the
intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the
return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken.
Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

226 Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

312 The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable. [731] The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the [647] resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

312 653 185 The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Dukan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Isḥaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Board[1] at its early meetings in 1951 and they were, with possible 312
modifications, to form the basis of 'Iraq's future irrigation activity, 653
whose full realization, however, must, for all the impatience of the 185
public and the press, occupy not less than fifty years.

Works actually completed before the end of 1951 were the re-aligned Ḥabbaniya inlet (Warrar channel) and the return outlet to the river (Sinn al-Ḏhibban channel), ensuring flood protection and making possible the use of stored flood water. The Wadi Tharthar inlet channel—a work of very great magnitude—was put to tender by the Development Board in 1951; the Samarrā barrage and headworks, and the greater Ḥabbaniya scheme, were to follow later. Much detailed planning and designing remained to be done, even for the immediately following five years, before a programme, especially in lower 'Iraq—'Amara, Baṣra, and the Gharraf—could be established. The extent, however, to which the Willcocks plans of forty years earlier had stood all tests was indeed remarkable. Only the Faluja and Balad barrages (p. 63) had been abandoned, and development in the Baṣra–Ḥammar area might or might not in the end follow Willcocks's plans. The abiding problem of silt deposit appeared partly soluble, by improved headwork design and by mechanical clearance. Pump irrigation seemed by now to have reached its economic limit in much of the territory, but there was ample room for more intensive cultivation of the pump-lands. 1

The connexion of reasonable and stable forms of land tenure 423
had long been recognized by Government in its land-settlement 565
activity, and the latter had a creditable volume of achievement to show after eighteen years of sustained effort. Early criticism of the procedures adopted (p. 261) and the progress of the work itself throughout 'Iraq (p. 323) have been elsewhere described. Five more years' work since the end of the war had defined, delimited, and recorded the personal rights in other wide areas. The abiding problem of Muntafiq land rights had not yet been solved; in 'Amara an answer not very different from the *status quo*, but with longer-term security for the shaykhs and greater fragmentation was likely to be found. Elsewhere the hard case of the landless fallaḥ was little changed wherever he had been unable to establish a basis of title and, at the opposite extreme, the good fortune of

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[1] The Board's six-year plan, legalized early in 1952, provided for year-by-year expenditure, from 1951–6 inclusive, on the Tharthar project, to a total of (in thousands of ID) 16,300: on the Ḥabbaniya, 2,200: on the Diyalā dams and canalization, 6,750: on the Dukan dam, Ḥawija barrage, 'Uḏhaym barrage and canalization, 6,750: on the Bakhma dam, 8,700: on irrigation works in Mosul and Arbil liwās, 1,900: Tigris barrage and canalization, south of 'Uḏhaym mouth, 1,800: and main drainage, 4,100. New and re-formed canalization on the middle and lower Euphrates, lower Tigris and Gharraf, and Baṣra area were allotted 10,425.

About four-fifths of the country consists of unproductive or slightly 311
productive desert, steppe, marsh and hill masses. The productive core 132
is divided broadly into two regions within which cultivation is practised
regularly. 312
The northern region is fed by rainfall supplemented by perennial streams rising in the mountains and, to a limited extent, by lift from the rivers. The southern region largely depends upon irrigation, supplied by canals drawn from the river system, following winter rainfall. The former may be appropriately called the Rainfall Zone, and the latter the Irrigation Zone. Actually the southward extension of the northern rainfall varies annually, while the date gardens of the Basra Liwa constitute a distinct (and of course economically a very important) study. But this does not affect the correctness of the broad picture presented.

Reference to Table I will show that the region of cultivated and cultivable land within the Rainfall Zone covers about 41,000 square kilometres, and that within the Irrigation Zone about 51,000 square kilometres. These figures represent 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total land surface of the country respectively. The cultivation is preponderantly of an extensive character. Only a fraction of these zones, possibly from a fifth to a tenth, appears to be actually cultivated in any given year. So that land is available for a very great development of agriculture, when other factors are favourable.

TABLE I. APPROXIMATE CLASSIFICATION OF LAND SURFACE, 1930

Expressed in square kilometres

[423]

Liwa	Total area all land	Hill mass	Cultivated Region				Additional potentially cultivable territory	Total cultivated and cultivable region	Territory containing tapu holdings	Size of holdings in misharas*			
			Rainfall Zone		Irrigation Zone								
			? 3% hill mass	Plains	Canal fed territory†	Machine fed territory†				1-100	101 to 500	501 to 1,000	Over 1,001
Mosul	45.800	9,300	190	14,580	—	—	270	15,040	7,870	—	—	—	—
Arbil	16,600	7,630	150	7,010	—	—	—	7,160	2,420	7,418	728	300	—
Sulimani	9,300	6,400	130	2,420	—	—	—	2,550	2,280	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	20.800	—	—	12,020	—	—	3,240	15,260	6,280	—	—	—	—
Diyala	16,200	—	—	710	2,760	90	260	3,820	3,410	4,092	—	546	—
Baghdad	22,100	—	—	—	1,710	2,270	890	4,870	1,500	162	220	120	360
Dulaim	124,500	—	—	—	920	630	20	1,570	920	2,344	109	121	3
Karbala	21,200	—	—	—	660	—	20	680	620	—	—	—	—
Hilla	8.100	—	—	—	4,570	330	1,630	6,530	2,380	452	364	98	82
Kut	16,400	—	—	—	4,680	3,860	2,170	10,710	2,580	—	—	—	—
Diwaniya	83,000	—	—	—	3,770	2,180	5,520	11,470	2,270	8,378	—	155	69
Muntafiq	38,700	—	—	—	4,440	270	370	5,080	6,260	—	—	—	—
Amara	19.700	—	—	—	5,670	1,010	—	6,680	110	—	10	5	50
Basra	10,900	—	—	—	610‡	60	110	780	1.190	—	—	—	—
Totals	453.500	23,370	470	36,740	29.790	10.700	14,500	92,200	40.090	—	—	—	—

*Where information was available. Such information must not be presumed to be exhaustive. A mishara = 2,500 sq. metres or thereabouts.

†Territories so classified are at present very incompletely irrigated. ‡Tidally watered date gardens.

The information given in the table regarding the size of holdings is derived from fiscal returns. Although the classification of these holdings by area cannot be expected to be accurate, the figures possibly give some indication of the frequency of larger and smaller holdings in the districts actually concerned. The latter must not be taken to coincide with the cultivated areas of the liwas themselves.

3. Agricultural Population

8. In any general study of the land tenure of a country it is desirable 161
to know the numbers and distribution of the agricultural population. 162
Thus it would greatly assist in planning development in el 'Iraq if trust-

Government Department, certainly beyond the power of the organisation and resources so far devoted to the purpose. 423 427

This is not to say that no systematic efforts have been made to put the tenure of miri land on to a more secure and orderly basis. Many such efforts have been made throughout the country by Provincial Officers, the Irrigation Department, the Survey and others. Foremost among them must be mentioned the periodic revenue settlements in Amara, which not only defined the limits of the various tribal interests there, but have also tended to stabilise many lesser holdings. A valuable fiscal survey of a large part of the Basra Date Gardens has been done. A business-like survey, allotment and record of land accompanied the construction of the Yusefiya, and other canals: and pains have been taken to keep these records up to date. In the Dulaim liwa a careful list of all the holders of recognised parcels of land has been compiled and subsequent changes noted. Other instances could be given. Naturally, all the resulting compilations have serious imperfections regarded as permanent records of the rights admitted to miri land: but this was not usually their primary purpose and such imperfections were inevitable in the conditions under which the investigations had to be made. And whatever the imperfections of such undertakings may be, they deserve grateful recognition and they should materially facilitate further stabilisation of tenure. 427 185

But it must none the less be admitted that these were all detached uncorrelated efforts owing no inspiration to any concerted attempt of the Central Government to improve the position of the mass of holders of miri land. Broadly speaking, those who occupy and cultivate miri land are allowed to do so in the absence of more influential opposition. Possession is ordinarily nine points of the law: but neither long possession nor any other mode of acquisition confers security. Personal influence with the most effective arbiter is commonly the decisive factor at any moment in any particular land dispute: and anyone may find the most convincing claims set aside. Moreover, any dispute may be reopened at any time if circumstances promise a more favourable consideration of a disappointed party's case.

Having regard to the history of the land, the widespread acceptance of tribal rather than individual rights, and the extensive and ill-defined areas affected, this state of affairs is not really remarkable: but it none the less calls for recognition and progressive remedy.

5-7. PUMP DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIVERAIN TRACTS

5. As is well known there has been a rapid and extensive development of irrigation by privately owned pumps during the last ten years throughout the high level tracts bordering the main waterways (see Plates I and II). As is also well known, the confident expectations of an early and profitable return on the considerable sums sunk in this development have been largely disappointed. 312

Persevering efforts have been made to obtain consistent and comprehensive statistics of the numbers of pumps erected, of the horse power of those pumps and of the areas irrigable by them: but owing to the records having been differently dealt with at different times and in the various liwas and departments concerned, it has not been found possible to do so. Although this is disappointing, in view of the interest and importance of this development, it is not surprising. And I have none the less been enabled to illustrate the rapidity and extent of the

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private
[431] pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is
also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 18, 157, 157, 238, 288, 468 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort
[166] made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the
powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was
464 hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among
465 these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer
439 crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour,
(*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

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* A mishara is reckoned = 2,500 sq. metres.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH Iraq MH

TABLE VI. PUMP DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIVERAIN TRACTS, 1921-9

NUMBERS AND AGGREGATE HORSE-POWER OF PUMPS EXISTING

Liwa.	1921		1922		1923		1924		1925		1926		1927		1928		1929	
	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.	No.	H.P.
Mosul	(1)		(1)		(1)		(1)		(2)		(4)		(6)		9*		13*	
Kirkuk									(1)		(2)		(3)		4*		5*	
Diyala			3	41	4	48	8	103	17	338	33	683	37	1,009	54	1,437	55	1,445
Baghdad	103		111		102		107		195		(360)		(490)		856*		1,098*	
Dulaim	1		2	25	2	25	4	69	6	119	9	200	16	371	41	1,060	90	2,833
Karbala	1		1		1		1		1		1		1		3		3	
Hilla	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(6)		(12)		(18)		24*		34*	
Kut			2	15	6	51	14	136	27	364	32	140	73	1,512	165	3,606	390	10,904
Diwaniya	6	53	12	160	16	239	34	669	97	2,206	143	3,434	177	4,606	216	6,044	243	7,165
Muntafiq									4	46	4	46	15	406	20	636	34	1,266
Amara	30	337	35	403	44	504	48	557	51	609	84	684	56	741	90	2,113	139	4,256
Total number of pumps	143		169		179		221		407		673		892		1,481		2,051	
Average horse-power returned‡		10·8		11·9		13·0		14·2		18·4		18·8		23·0		25·2		29·1
Approx. total area served in square kilometres†	190		250		270		390		940		1,560		2,560		4,670		7,380	

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* Figures supplied by the Irrigation Department. All other figures supplied by Liwas.
Figures in brackets are guesses founded on such information as was available.
When not given, the horse-power figures were not returned or are too doubtful to use.

† The approximate areas served are based on an allowance of 50 misharas (0·126 sq. km.) per horse-power.

‡ The Irrigation records indicate that the average horse-power of all the pumps installed is somewhat lower than that of those returned here, e.g. 24 in 1928 and 26·8 in 1929. This would reduce the areas served in these years to 4,400 and 6,450 sq. km., on the basis given. The Department's 1930 figures show an increase in average horse-power to 28·1, a reduction of about 100 pump installations in the Baghdad liwa and of about 20 in the whole country. The principal increases are in the Amara and Kut liwas.

312

312 seriously, many a decisively, injurious effect on the success of pump development as a whole. These difficulties all call for careful study and for steady and carefully considered ameliorative measures. They are, however, for the most part outside of the scope of this report. But underlying and aggravating all other difficulties there is a widely prevailing uncertainty of rights to hold and to exploit the land affected. This has in many cases poisoned the relations between the two classes mainly interested in the majority of these enterprises and reduced to a minimum the prospects of their successful co-operation. And it has nearly always left the rights and the obligations of those concerned injuriously indefinite towards both the Government and to those associated with them. Consequently the bulk of these pump-fed areas have never received the single-minded and unified agricultural management that was, and is, an essential condition of success. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the other adverse conditions recited would in any case have prevented the general and widespread success anticipated. But a number of instances have been given me of pump ventures that have proved profitable in spite of these handicaps, because unified management was, for one reason or another, possible and realised.

427 311 Be this as it may, it is indisputable that the prospects of general success would have been increased if in all cases the rights to the land affected had been authoritatively settled and the requisite unification of agricultural control had been secured, before capital and energy had been so lavishly expended on these ventures. It was most unfortunate that this remarkable agricultural development should have coincided with the singularly unstable economic period that has followed the war. But it can also be recognised now, in the light of experience, that the rush to develop these riverain tracts was carried out without sufficient preparation and foresight, and at a rate and to an extent which made too drastic demands upon the adaptability and the numbers of the primitive agricultural population upon whose efforts success ultimately depended.

311 312 The riverain tracts, which are primarily affected, are among the most valuable agricultural areas in the country, because (*a*) of their contiguity to the main waterways and roadways, (*b*) of the natural fertility of the alluvium deposited along the river ridges which contain them, and (*c*) of their relatively high levels, which facilitate drainage and minimise the dangers of high floods. But owing to the last quality any regular cultivation of these tracts necessitates the installation of some artificial means of lifting the water from the adjacent waterway on to the land.

312 Prior to the recent pump development such artificial means of water lifting were virtually confined to the local water wheel (kerid) or to other simple devices, operated by animal or man power. Where kerid cultivation exists to-day it seems not infrequently to be more efficient than pump cultivation, since the more laboriously acquired water tends to be more carefully used and the land to be more carefully tilled to receive it. So it may be accepted that where cultivation by kerid or other simple lifting devices existed previously, such cultivation was usually good of its kind.

311 It therefore appears that until recent years cultivation in these valuable tracts was restricted to certain fringes watered by the simple types of lift mentioned, supplemented by rain in good years, and by flood water, through flood channels, when and where conditions permitted. [464] And since land was comparatively plentiful and cultivators comparatively scarce, the parcels of land actually cultivated varied incessantly to meet soil impoverishment, flood devastations, river

changes, canal silting, tribal movements, Central Government action, or 311
other circumstances.

7. With relatively little exception the riverain tracts affected are 311
miri land. It has been noted how the cultivation previously shifted 423
therein in response to changing circumstances. The prescriptive claims
to pasture were naturally even more variable and indeterminate. It is 427
consequently not surprising that as the pump development movement
extended, these riverain tracts were found so closely interpenetrated by 312
prescriptive claims (lazma) of one sort or another, that few areas suitable for pump development were unaffected. These claims constituted a serious obstacle to the general development of the riverain tracts by pump installations. For at first the claimants as a whole had neither the desire, nor the enterprise, nor the ability to raise the capital needed to undertake this development themselves.

In discussing these prescriptive claims earlier their primarily tribal 427
origin was mentioned: and it appears that the prescriptive rights recog- 312
nised by the provincial authorities in pump agreements are preponder-
antly of such origin and character. These pump agreements may be 622
made in the name of a sheikh or sirkal, but he stands as the tribal or sub-tribal, representative. No doubt when the sheikh or sirkal is a forcible person, he may engulf in his own person the rights of his tribal associates. Alternatively when the sheikh or sirkal is a man of straw, unable to lead his section or keep it together, he may be displaced, and even lose his strictly tribal share in the common holding. In a number of cases, after the movement started and its potentialities had become more apparent, a sheikh or other leading member of a tribal section which claimed prescriptive rights over a promising area, himself erected a pump and cultivated the area with the labour of the other members of the section. Under these circumstances the difficulties of divided interests and divided control, so frequently attending these pump ventures, may not arise. And so far as my information goes it is pump ventures inaugurated and worked by a capable tribal leader under these conditions that promise to be the most successful.

But enterprising townsmen and others with tribal affiliations, who 427
wished to participate in the movement usually had to search for a suit-
able stretch of miri land and enter into an agreement with some group of 312
claimants to prescriptive rights over it. No very definite procedure was 311
required. The process may be loosely generalised somewhat as follows. An enterprising individual, having some miri land of uncertain limits and subject to uncertain prescriptive claims in mind, decided to buy a pump and engine, the capacity of which usually depended as much on his financial resources as the situation and extent of the land to be watered. He applied to the Governor of the Province for permission to erect the installation. This always necessitated a permit from the Irrigation Department (under the Irrigation and Embankments Law), and when the land was miri (as it usually was) the approval of the State Domains Department and the issue of a lease by them.

The Irrigation Department checked the suitability of the installation to the extent of land, according to the information given; and if they had the means tried to locate the land and check the area on a map. Otherwise the figures had to be accepted as notified. And even when the capacity of the installation and the area of the land (as quoted) were discrepant, it was often found that the pump had already been bought. The Department also tried to ensure that the site of the pumping plant was wisely chosen in regard to flood and low stage river conditions, as well as the distribution of the water for cultivation.

The State Domains Department acted through the provincial authorities, who necessarily had no better information as to the situation

427
311 and extent of the land affected than could be furnished to, or provided by, the Irrigation Department.

312 But probably the two most unsatisfactory features of the proceedings were (i) the failure to settle the rights of prescriptive claimants definitely before allowing agreements to be made with them as *de facto* landholders, and (ii) the loose and unsatisfactory agreements, commonly entered into, between these claimants and the pump owners.

It is apparent now that it would have saved time, money and a great deal of trouble in the long run to have investigated and settled all prescriptive claims at the outset. It was reasonable and equitable that prescriptive claims based on effective exploitation of the soil should be recognised. But such recognition should have been coupled with an equally definite limitation of the claimants' rights to these specifically recognised areas. It was clearly unreasonable and contrary to the public interest that, in addition to such properly recognisable rights, a vague mass of indefinite and shifting claims should be allowed to persist and to interfere with the economic development of these tracts as a whole. It was desirable when the opportunity occurred to define alike the rights of prescriptive holders and the balance of unincumbered miri land free for exploitation by other parties under lease or grant from the State. And since the object of pump development was a much greater extension of cultivation it was evident that the necessarily restricted limits of previously existing cultivation would tend to be obliterated thereby. Consequently, if prescriptive claims were to be recognised on the only clear and equitable basis possible—that of effective exploitation of the land—it was important to investigate and record the existing limits of such exploitation before these limits were effaced.

If this had been more evident at the time, such claimants could no doubt have been justly accorded considerably smaller areas than are now claimed, while the Government would have secured a balance of free miri land irrigable by pump which might have been leased directly to those desirous of erecting pumps. No doubt in these circumstances the areas available for lease to pump owners would often have been awkwardly interspersed with the recognised prescriptive holdings; but this was unavoidable unless such claims had been repudiated. And if both parties had known exactly where they were at the outset, agreements between them could have been entered into on a much more satisfactory basis than was as a rule actually possible.

As it is the peculiar difficulties that have arisen in the tenure of these riverain holdings have been primarily occasioned by the uncertainty of the respective rights of pump owner and prescriptive holder, when these are different parties. When they are united in one person, or in a tribal or other group that displays effective cohesion, current difficulties for the most part resolve into those commonly attaching to the holding of miri land elsewhere. It is true that certain obligations are due to the situation of these holdings in proximity to the main waterways (e.g. the maintenance of flood protection) but these can be separately considered and were neither new nor unexpected.

So the problem of the riverain holdings in which pump development has taken place may be regarded essentially as a particular case of the general problem of the tenure of miri land. But this merely makes at least a provisional solution of this larger question the more imperative. And any such solution, when applied to the pump areas, must also provide for the definition and reconciliation of the respective rights of pump owners and prescriptive holders, when separate parties in a joint undertaking.

185 pushed forward in conjunction with settlement operations without delaying the latter. Broadly speaking this means that settlement can be carried out as extensively as men and resources permit in the Irrigation Zone, but must be limited in the Rainfall Zone to the immediate vicinity of Mosul town (see Plates III and IV).

423 185 In this neighbourhood the land is widely held, or claimed, in tapu tenure (see Plate II) and special efforts have been made by the Tapu Department during recent years to clear up uncertainties and define the parcels justly affected. It was primarily on this account that a considerable block of isolated detailed survey has been completed here. Settlement of this block of territory therefore appears preponderantly to involve an investigation and definition of the parcels held in tapu tenure and, so far as such parcels are concerned, to have been in progress for some time. But rights to tapu tenure should be systematically reviewed and if possible rights to miri land concurrently settled, throughout this area by an independent Settlement Officer in collaboration with the Survey at an early date.

In the Irrigation Zone a considerable amount of detailed survey has been completed in every liwa and there is a wide range of territory in various stages of readiness for systematic settlement.

423 185 651 In el Amara, as is well known, the political and administrative conditions have been retained on an almost exclusively tribal basis, the miri lands (of which the liwa is almost exclusively composed) being farmed out to various tribal sheikhs for triennially assessed payments. It is impossible to discuss the details of these methods here; nor is there any need, since the agrarian conditions of no liwa have been investigated and reported on so regularly or so fully, owing to these periodic assessments. Each successive assessment has built on that which preceded it, but has been carried out in greater detail with increasing attention to the smaller men who hold from the leading sheikhs and really manage and work the land. If public security and genuine national consciousness continue to grow these periodic assessments should crystallise steadily into an effective settlement of rights to land. But the conditions under which the work had to be done in the past were extremely difficult, and if this end is to be obtained (and even if the revenue assessments are to be as equitable and reliable as is now reasonable and practicable) the work must be more closely based upon trustworthy detailed survey and rights be investigated more thoroughly than has so far been possible. A reassessment of the Amara estates (muqata'as) was due, and has doubtless been undertaken, this year. And under the agreements in force with the leading sheikhs the prevailing system terminates and is open to review in 1934. The consideration of fuller and more permanent settlement of rights in this district can therefore properly be left over until this termination approaches, or a further reassessment is arranged.

In the Basra liwa, as already observed, an excellent fiscal survey of the date gardens was carried out several years ago. And the principle of a regular Land Tax has long been familiar through the operation of Midhat Pasha's enlightened *jarib* tax.* The tenure of these gardens (mulk or miri) appears to be rarely, if at all, disputed. For the most part the mulk owners are well known, or could readily be determined.
185 Consequently a relatively minor effort would enable titles to be authoritatively reviewed and, when necessary, settled throughout the Basra reach on the basis of the existing survey. The respective responsibilities of garden owners and the State for the maintenance of the tidal
[312] creeks off the Shatt el Arab, from which the gardens are largely watered,

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* A commutation of the Government crop share on date gardens into a tax assessed by quality and area, carried out in 1871. A jarib=3967 square metres, or 0·98 of an acre.

312 The inadequacy of the existing irrigation system is generally recognised in so far as it relates to the great incompleteness of the network of engineering works needed, such as storage reservoirs, flood embankments, regulator constructions, delivery and drainage channels: but it appears at present to be insufficiently appreciated in the country that the proper utilisation and maintenance of these expensive works is even more important than their construction and probably calls for greater technical skill at the outset. It is a serious mistake to suppose that the management of a great engineering undertaking, such as a national irrigation system, is a simpler problem than its design and construction, or that such management can be economically and wisely left to inexpert hands or to officials primarily occupied with other duties.

242 The primitive methods of cultivation, stock-keeping and disposal of produce prevalently practised, as well as their marked effect on the quantity and quality of the country's output and on its reputation in the world's markets, have been repeatedly emphasised and need only be mentioned here.

439 To build up her prosperity el 'Iraq must evidently develop her export trade both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is therefore of great importance to follow the statistics of external trade continuously and to endeavour to adjust the country's agricultural output unceasingly to world demand. Unlike the various land statistics, which have proved so difficult to collect and so unreliable when collected, the Trade statistics kept by the Customs and Excise Department appear not only to be in excellent order but to be used. No attempt will be made to discuss these valuable figures here: but the nature, quantity and value of the principal exports of agricultural products during the five years 1925-6 to 1929-30 in the accompanying table should be noted.

TABLE IX. MAIN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS DURING FIVE YEARS 1925-6 TO 1929-30

Product	Quantity in thousands of tons	Value in lakhs of rupees
Living animals (horses, camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc.)	835·6*	87·7
Raw cotton	3·2	32·7
Dates	624·3	902·1
Grain, etc. (barley, pulse, rice, wheat, etc.)	366·2	449·1
Hides (cow, sheep, goats, wild animal, etc.)	9·5	171·9
Intestines (casings)	0·6	70·1
Raw silk	0·005	0·7
Tobacco	0·8	9·2
Raw wool	32·4	368·2

*Thousands of animals.

242 It is in experimenting in the culture of new or improved products required by the world, in adapting them to local environment, in multiplying them for local growth, and in demonstrating their successful cultivation and disposal on a commercial scale, that scientific agricultural research stations, progressive landed estates and well-managed marketing bodies, have such an indispensable part to play in the general development of the country's agriculture.

185 The establishment of an efficient national irrigation system and the application of the lessons of progressive scientific research and experience elsewhere must be recognised as two of the fundamental conditions of

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is
311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it
is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only
312 twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians. The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims, three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians,
871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some
153 important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

'IRAQ

Irrigation and Agriculture

175* In a country so predominantly agricultural as 'Iraq, where
241 rainfall, generally speaking, is too slight for its needs, the
312 provision of irrigation from the rivers, the traditional source of the country's prosperity, remains one of the major problems. The problem of irrigation, however, is more than one of mere extraction of water from the rivers. It is also the maintenance of the natural drainage of the country, its protection from floods and the preservation of navigable waterways.[1]

After the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the early irrigation systems, the remains of which can still be seen, collapsed. No government which assumed power was able to maintain canals or regulate the flow of water. Each man did what was good in his own eyes. Many canals silted up. Other canals, cut in the banks by the cultivators, without adequate knowledge or without regard for the future, came to carry more water than the parent river. In many cases, the abstracted water because of improper drainage ruined the land through salination or else filled vast marshes. The rivers, unable to scour their beds in the lower reaches, increased the dangers from floods and hampered navigation.[2]

Not until comparatively modern times were efforts made by the Turks to prevent flooding and to secure the services of engineers to study and to undertake irrigation works. The most prominent of the foreign engineers was Sir William Willcocks who, from his appointment in 1908, studied and proposed schemes for the irrigation and drainage of the country.[3]

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[1] *Note on Irrigation in Mesopotamia, December*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 9.

[2] Ibid., p. 7; *Brief Note on Irrigation Work in Mesopotamia and the operations of the Irrigation Directorate, M. E. F., up to November*, 1918 (Baghdad, 1919), p. 1.

[3] His programme, in brief, was: the construction of two barrages on the Euphrates at Hindīya and at Fallūja, and two on the Tigris at Kūt and Balad; the construction of a proper canal system from these barrages; the utilization of the Habbānīya-'Abū Dibbis depression as an escape for the flood waters of the Tigris; the regulation of the swamps above Basra; the rehabilitation of the Nahrwan Canal from the Diyālā; and the provision of drainage, escapes and afforestation in connection with the entire programme. Willcocks, Sir W., *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, 2nd ed.), pp. 15 ff.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

The Turks, however, lacking both money and initiative for 175*
his whole programme,[1] undertook, with encouragement from 241
Great Britain and from Germany, the construction of the 312
Hindīya barrage and the Habbānīya escape of which only the former was completed in 1914.

At the beginning of the Occupation, the interest of the 175*
military authorities in irrigation and in agriculture had been 727*
confined to restricting the former where it hindered navigation, 241
and encouraging the latter to meet the needs of the troops, 312
although a certain amount of flood prevention work was undertaken from late 1915 onwards. Urgent repairs of the Hindīya barrage and the completion of its canal were also carried out by military engineers in June, 1917, but not until a shortage of local food supplies for the army and later for the civil population was threatened,[2] was the extension of agriculture by means of irrigation taken seriously in hand through the Agricultural Development Scheme, put forward by Mr. C. C. Garbett, First Revenue Officer, July, 1917.[3] 'The plan was to complete canals left half finished by the Turks, dig new ones, improve old ones, to import and advance to the cultivators plough-cattle and seeds'.[4]

The Scheme was only partially successful, the new acreage brought under cultivation, 319,152 acres, being only a little more than half of the original estimate of 606,000 acres.[5] It had been calculated that 280,000 tons of grain would be produced.[6] Actually between 50,000 and 60,000 tons for the

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[1] Sir William Willcock's estimate for his programme was £T29,105,020 or about £26,537,000. He anticipated the return would be about nine per cent. *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, 2nd. ed.), p. 52.

[2] *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 2; Hewitt, Sir J. P., *Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia* (1919), pp. 4, 6, 9.

[3] See minutes of Conference, August 10th, 1917, which formally proposed Scheme. Hewitt, op. cit. App. 5, p. 44. The War Office approved of the Scheme on September 16th, 1917; ibid., p. 5. See also *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 28.

[4] Ibid., p. 3.

[5] *Brief Note on Irrigation Works in Mesopotamia to November*, 1918, pp. 3-4, 7.

[6] *Final Report of the Agricultural Development Scheme* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3.

175* army,[1] besides supplies for the civil population were obtained.
727* More valuable than the actual amount of the supplies and the
241 consequent reduction of prices and economy of shipping were
312 the political effects of averting a threatened famine, of the show
of encouragement to agriculture and the hold acquired over the
shaikhs and the tribes of the regions opened up by the Scheme.[2]

The Irrigation Department was taken over by the Civil Administration, April 1st, 1919.[3] The Acting High Commissioner, envisaging, no doubt, a long period of British control, advocated immediate caution and retrenchment. He recommended concentration of 'attention on securing and improving already existing systems where necessary' on the grounds that 'shortage of labour alike for construction and cultivation and financial stringency makes it impractical and inexpedient to open up considerable fresh areas for cultivation'.[4] The arguments of the Acting Civil Commissioner as well as the 'small and unambitious programme of minor works'[5] evolved under his direction and centring about the gradual establishment of the natural regime of the rivers,[6] were, no doubt, believed to be in accordance with the needs of the moment. Colonel R. G. Garrow, Officiating Director of Irrigation, had estimated that the existing population could cultivate approximately 1,500,000 acres of which approximately 1,320,000 acres were to be in cultivation by the end of 1919.[7]

Nevertheless, the policy as enunciated and the programme as

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[1] Hewitt, op. cit., p. 13, gives 56,472 tons. See also *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 80; *Revenue Report*, 1918, pp. 2-3.

[2] *Final Report*, p. 1; *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 2; Hewitt, op. cit., p. 9.

[3] *Irrigation Directorate, M. E. F., Admin. Report for period 1st April to 31st December*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 4.

[4] Memorandum, A.C.C. to D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, December 27th, 1918. Also *Draft Report Covering the Last Ten Years of the Work of the Irrigation Department, 'Iraq, dated Baghdad*, 14 *May*, 1931, para. 3 (hereafter, *Draft Report*, 1920-30).

[5] *Irrigation Directorate, Admin. Report*, 1919, p. 2.

[6] Memorandum, Col. R. G. Garrow to D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, in *Correspondence Regarding Post-War Irrigation Policy in Mesopotamia*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919), p. 9. Also, *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, p. 171.

[7] *Correspondence*, p. 2.

311 a means of establishing a class of independent peasant landowners capable of earning a decent livelihood. Official estimates indicate that the amount of "cultivable" land is almost three times that under cultivation. The criteria used in determining the cultivability of land have, however, probably varied widely. Thus part of the cultivable land in the so-called rain-fed zone in the north may well be in areas sub-marginal from the standpoint of rainfall. As soon as possible the government should classify the cultivable land which is not presently cultivated by types of soil and determine what measures are required in each instance to put the land under cultivation, e.g. whether the land must be reclaimed by drainage and whether, if the land needs to be irrigated, the irrigation should be by pump or by flow.

Most of the area which can be put under cultivation will require water, yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not even permit the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of the excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates rivers during the spring flood season and 653 312 frequently unloosens destructive floods are clearly essential. The government has already initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage scheme for the Euphrates River and has let a contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The program of the Development Board also makes provision for storage dams on two tributaries of the Tigris, the Lesser Zab and the Diyala River. While the Derbend-i-Khan dam on the Diyala River will provide primarily for the more effective irrigation of land already under cultivation, completion of the Dokan dam on the Lesser Zab and of the Habbaniya Lake project should provide enough water to extend the cultivable area under irrigation from about 11 million donums at present to approximately 15 million.

The Mission fully endorses these projects (see map), with the proviso that borings prove the soundness of the Dokan dam site. At the same time it recommends that they be complemented by the construction at an early date of the Bekhme dam on the Greater Zab River for which no provision has yet been made. This dam would compensate for the diversion of the Lesser Zab water from the Tigris by the Dokan dam. Without the Bekhme dam the

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
40°
42°
EXISTING IRRIGATION
FLOW
PUMP
MARSH AREAS
HIGH DAM SITES
EXISTING BARRAGES
PROPOSED BARRAGES
PROPOSED CANALS OR EXTENSIONS
EXISTING RIVERS OR CANALS
EUPHRATES
TIGRIS
HABBANIYA LAKE
ABU DIBIS RESERVOIR
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

IRRIGATION SYSTEM

FACING P. 8(A)

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3/12

MAP II


44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
MOSUL
ERBIL
DOKAN
ZAB
LESSER ZAB
KIRKUK
SULEIMANIYA
DERBENDI-I-KHAN
FATHA
ADHAIM FEEDER
ADHAIM
SAMARRA
DIYALA WEIR
DIYALA
BAQUBA
RESERVOIR
RAINFED ZONE
IRRIGATION ZONE
RAMADI
BANIYA LAKE
BAGHDAD
BENI SAAD BARRAGE
KERBELA
U DIBIS RESERVOIR
HINDIYA BARRAGE
HILLA
KIFL BARRAGE
DIWANIYA
KUT BARRAGE
NASIRIYA
HAMMAR LAKE
SHATT AL ARAB
BASRA

FACING P. 8 (B)

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already existing water shortage in the Kut and Amara regions in southern Iraq would become more acute. Its construction is all the more urgent because the Wadi Tharthar reservoir will not supply supplementary water for the Tigris for another decade at best. In fact, some geologists believe that loss of water in the reservoir may be such that little or no water for irrigation will ever be furnished by the Wadi Tharthar. Should the Wadi Tharthar ultimately prove able to supply water for irrigation, the water impounded by the Bekhme dam could be utilized for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in northern Iraq.

Completion of the final stage of the Habbaniya project calls for the storage in the Abu Dibis and related depressions of water in excess of the expanded capacity of Habbaniya Lake and, in theory, would also permit a substantial extension of irrigation in the Euphrates Valley. Further study is required before beginning this stage of that project, however, because there is great danger that the salt in the depression may make the water unfit for irrigation, or at least dangerous to use, until after the completion of drainage facilities for all the areas irrigated from the Euphrates. At the same time the technical possibility of providing alternative storage capacity through the erection of a dam on the upper Euphrates near Ana should be explored.

[648] The irrigation projects outlined above necessitate agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the conservation and utilization of the water of the Euphrates and the Tigris and their tributaries. An agreement with Syria is particularly urgent, since the extensive irrigation development possible in that country might adversely affect Iraq. With Turkey and Iran it is important to conclude understandings for joint afforestation and other water conservation measures in the watershed of the Tigris and its tributaries. Afforestation and other anti-erosion measures in the international watersheds of the two rivers will effectively complement the flood-control features of the water storage schemes.

680 In the monograph on irrigation the Mission has given a tentative selection of the irrigation projects which it believes should be initiated to utilize the waters of the new reservoirs. In view of the inadequacy of the information at its disposal, the Mission suggests, however, that its recommendations be reviewed in the light of a

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180 number of factors including (1) the cost and the technical aspects of the irrigation works, (2) the agricultural potentialities of the land affected, (3) the location of the land in relation to the availability of potential settlers, and (4) the ownership of the land. The first three of these need no elaboration. The fourth is important primarily because, provided adequate consideration is given to the first three factors, it would presumably be desirable to give priority to the irrigation of those lands which are clearly part of the state domain and which therefore would be available for distribution to small-holders.

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312 Before laying out new irrigation projects the basic premises on which such projects have been designed in the past should, we suggest, be re-examined. Hitherto such projects have been laid out on the assumption that half of the area devoted to the cultivation of winter crops would lie fallow annually. The area in summer crops has not been considered since, in the absence of water storage facilities, the amount of water available limited the area that could be devoted to summer cultivation to about 15 to 20 percent of that in winter crops. The fallow system was regarded as necessary to permit the soil to rest and recover its fertility and to enable the land to dry out and the water table to sink, thus minimizing to some extent the danger of salinity. In the future the government will have the opportunity, through organized settlement and development of the new land, to prescribe the use of better systems of crop rotation which will more effectively maintain soil fertility; and the simultaneous installation of drainage facilities, now universally acknowledged to be essential, will prevent salination. At the same time the completion of the large storage projects will presumably permit some control over the distribution of water for winter crops on the one hand and summer crops on the other. Thus it will be desirable to determine, within the limits of flexibility set by the available water supply, the proportion of winter to summer crops which promises the largest overall yield, having regard both to improved crop rotation and to better utilization of manpower on the land. Such a reexamination of the premises on which irrigation projects have been designed in the past may lead to the conclusion that the area to be covered by irrigation canals using a given quantity of water can in future planning be reduced.

Greater attention should also be paid to measures which would insure more economical use of available water, thereby making possible a further expansion of the area under cultivation in the irrigation zone. Among these are the installation of regulators on the Gharraf canal, for which provision has already been made in the Development Board's program, and more effective regulation of the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates to prevent the dissipation of water into the extensive marshes in the South. Leaks from canals, which are sometimes quite substantial, should be reduced to a minimum, if necessary by lining certain sections of the canals. Above all, the wasteful use of water in irrigation should be arrested. The amount of water used for each crop in Iraq is generally much greater than that in the irrigated areas of other countries. At present, water is used lavishly over wide areas in an effort to wash accumulating salt from the roots of crops. In the end this only accelerates the progressive salination by raising the water table which brings up and precipitates the salt. The installation of drainage facilities which will lower the water table will therefore be the most effective means of preventing wastage of water. There is also an urgent need, however, to ascertain through practical experimentation, carried out under the joint technical supervision of agricultural and irrigation experts, the optimum amount of water required for each crop and to disseminate these findings among the cultivators.

The completion of the water storage facilities and irrigation works mentioned above will undoubtedly create some problems of adjustment. In a few places pump-irrigated lands will have to be abandoned as the consequence of new flow-irrigation schemes, and the people affected will require resettlement. In an area of about 750,000 donums the natural flooding of rice lands practised in some districts will presumably no longer be possible, and new methods of rice culture will need to be introduced. Rice patches will have to be terraced to permit the progressive flow of water from one terrace to the next and fertilizers used in the place of silt to replenish the soil; alternatively, new crops may have to be introduced. In some cases, partial resettlement of the people affected may need to take place. Even under existing conditions, however, problems of readjustment arise. Natural inundation, for example,

241 312 has led to the progressive silting and raising of rice lands, thereby pushing rice culture deeper into the marshes.

312 Finally, the Mission wishes to emphasize the importance of improved operation and maintenance of existing irrigation works. To insure proper functioning of the irrigation system the canals must be equipped with an adequate system of regulator intakes and [423] distributors. Rational distribution of water is often impeded by ancient water rights which insure some landowners a disproportionately large share. In times of scarcity the apportionment of water is often hotly disputed and subject to favoritism. The right of access to water across the lands of other farmers is inadequately insured. A sufficient number of adequately compensated irrigation officials of acknowledged probity is necessary to a fair distribution of water. They should be assisted by local councils of farmers who would gradually learn to approach the problem of equitable distribution in a cooperative spirit.

Lack of maintenance has been a serious problem in the past. To facilitate maintenance, irrigation systems should be equipped from the very beginning with such works as roads along canals, canal crossings for people and livestock, water-holes and washing places. To insure adequate operation and maintenance in the future, the Mission recommends that the annual budget of the Irrigation Department, which has averaged only ID 270,000 over the last ten years, should be increased progressively to about ID 1,000,000. The technical supervisory and planning staff also needs to be strengthened

The Rain-fed Zone

Except for some areas west-northwest of Kirkuk and the possibility of ultimately irrigating part of the Erbil plain with the water stored behind the Bekhme dam, large-scale irrigation schemes for the North do not appear feasible. Lack of suitable dam sites and topographical difficulties militate against such schemes. Smaller projects, utilizing the water of small streams, springs or wells are possible, however, and these should not be neglected in favor of the more striking, larger schemes. In many parts small streams and springs are already being used, but with direction and stimulus provided by the government these could be improved and many

more brought into use. The government should take steps to 312
survey the possibilities for small projects and to provide assistance in carrying them out, thus giving aid and security to the farm population of the North which now feels that its needs have been neglected and overlooked.

In general, however, the North will have to remain dependent 311
on rain-fall to sustain its agriculture. There are apparently still considerable rain-fed areas which can be settled and put to the plow. Particular care should be exercised, however, to insure that the areas are not sub-marginal from the standpoint of either rainfall or fertility and that settlers are really available in the North, which is generally more sparsely settled than the central and southern portions of Iraq. For example, the Mission believes that the prospect of scanty and uncertain rainfall will probably make it undesirable to proceed, except on a very restricted, experimental basis, with the settlement scheme near Balad Sinjar in Mosul province which has been projected by the Agriculture Department.

Settlement of New Land

In the past much of the vacant land available for an expansion 425
of crop production which ostensibly belonged to the state has fallen 421
into the hands of big landowners. The so-called Land Settlement Law of 1932, which inaugurated a cadastral survey for the purpose of settling the past confusion regarding land titles and systems of tenure, facilitated this process. It permitted the land settlement committees appointed to administer the law to grant titles (so-called *lazmah* grants) to people who could demonstrate that they had made productive use of land within the previous fifteen years. In practice, it has been possible to obtain title on the presentation of proof that a crop was produced on the land in one year, and the land settlement committees have occasionally accepted even more tenuous proof of cultivation. In this way many sheikhs and other influential persons have managed to obtain title to large tracts of land without any payment whatsoever. Since the cadastral survey is only about half completed, more land may be preempted in this way unless a limit is set on such acquisitions.

Land definitely adjudged to be state (*miri sirf*) property by 425
the land settlement committees has, however, been set aside for 166
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new settlements the government will have a unique opportunity to remedy the shortcomings of the Dujaila project. 241 425

Improvement in Productivity

While expansion of land under cultivation, particularly through large irrigation schemes, is essential in the long run to provide for a growing population and to establish a socially desirable class of smallholders, it should not be undertaken without a simultaneous vigorous campaign to increase the productivity of agriculture and livestock. The temptation to neglect such an effort in favor of striking new irrigation schemes should be resisted. Among the measures upon which this campaign should concentrate are drainage, the provision of better tools, seeds and draft animals, the introduction of soil-building and forage crops, the use of fertilizers, the improvement of livestock, the planting of trees and the establishment of an effective extension or advisory service to farmers. 000

1. Drainage

The drainage of existing irrigated lands would make the most important single contribution to increasing the productivity of agriculture. Moreover, it will also have the most immediate effect since it can be carried out by the government while the success of virtually all other measures to raise productivity depends on the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation. 312

The Haigh Irrigation Commission, which made an extensive study of irrigation and flood control for the government, estimated a few years ago that about 60 percent of the land irrigated by flow had been seriously affected by salt. The Mission's own inquiries and observations indicate that as much as 20 to 30 percent of cultivated land has been abandoned over the last few decades because of salt accumulation, while on a large part of the remaining land yields have declined by 20 to 50 percent and even more. In a number of new irrigation projects such as Hawija and Dujaila salting forced abandonment of part of the land within two years after the schemes were initiated. Drainage, almost totally neglected in the past, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor in the future. 311 134

The main drainage canals for the whole irrigation zone have been projected, but it is now necessary to proceed with detailed 312

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●3/2 planning and execution. First priority should be given to the drainage of the areas irrigated by the canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates. A complete drainage network should be laid out as soon as possible for the Aggar Qub region, where drainage studies have already been carried out, in order to determine through practical experimentation the most appropriate design and spacing of the subsidiary drainage canals. Prompt attention should also be given to the drainage of the Dujaila area in order to halt the rapid deterioration of the land which may otherwise endanger the success of this important social experiment. Altogether the Mission believes that about ID 7,000,000 should be allotted to drainage over the next five years. This compares with a sum of ID 2,000,000 provided in the initial five-year program of the Development Board. So important is drainage that the Mission recommends that it be given priority over new irrigation schemes whenever a limitation of resources makes it impossible to carry out both simultaneously.

Since landowners will benefit greatly from drainage, they might reasonably be required to pay at least some part of the cost. Consideration might therefore be given to the imposition of a levy to pay the cost of subsidiary drainage canals. Construction of such subsidiary canals should not be optional with the landowners because failure to build them across one man's property might deny the benefits of drainage to adjoining properties.

2. Tools and Draft Animals

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In the recent past much stress has been placed in Iraq on agricultural mechanization. In large parts of the country, particularly in the dry-farming zone, natural conditions are undoubtedly favorable to the use of tractors. The use of threshing machines or combines has also been shown to have the advantage of producing a far cleaner grain than that obtained through the customary method of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. For a long time to come, however, the great majority of Iraqi farmers will be unable to afford the purchase or rental of power machinery even on deferred payment; and many others will find mechanized farming unprofitable particularly as long as the cost of machinery remains so high in relation to the cost of labor. For most farmers the provision of simple tools as well as more and better draft ani-

164 by a snail living in irrigation canals, can be combatted by elimination
744 of stagnant, polluted water in which the snail thrives and by treating canals twice yearly with copper sulphate. DDT spraying and
the elimination of stagnant water assist in the reduction of malaria.
[312] In order to combat both malaria and bilharzia, major irrigation
canals should be designed so as to maintain a rate of water flow no less than three miles per hour, and minor distributory canals so as to insure rapid drying-out after use. It is important that one complete "dry-out" per week be enforced in every section under irrigated cultivation.

Knowledge of such methods of combatting disease is already
available in Iraq. What is needed is wider dissemination of the
[742] knowledge and a vigorous campaign to give it effect. The Endemic
Diseases Institute in Iraq has done much useful work in this field but it has been handicapped by insufficient transport, supplies and technical personnel. In the future there will be no justification for denying the Institute adequate funds for its work. It would be well to organize special campaigns in those provinces or districts where the incidence of a particular endemic disease has been especially high. Such a campaign would involve a simultaneous effort to treat the people already afflicted in the locality and to teach local officials and the local inhabitants in general the appropriate preventive measures. Mobile dispensaries and mobile vans equipped to show educational films would be especially useful for this purpose.

Curative Services

743 On the curative side, principal emphasis must first be placed on the improvement of existing hospitals and an expansion in the nursing service. In its five-year program the Development Board has allotted ID 3,800,000 for medical service buildings. The Mission believes that a large part of this sum should be used to modernize, extend or replace existing hospitals and improve their facilities for diagnosis and treatment rather than to construct additional hospitals. In the monograph on public health the Mission has listed the most urgent projects of this kind which it suggests should be undertaken in adition to those for which provision was made in the first annual budget of the Development Board. While the number

relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major 133
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162]
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

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IV. Natural Resources

Land and Water

•312 Aside from oil, water and land may be said to be the principal natural resources of Iraq. Of the two, water is the more critical factor in the country's development. Underground water is generally plentiful, but in parts of the North it is frequently found only at considerable depth and in the central and southern portions, where the water table is high, it tends to be brackish and unfit for consumption. In the two major rivers, however, Iraq possesses a source of abundant water of a quality excellent for irrigation and, with purification, for human consumption. Here the chief problem lies in the marked variation of the flow of the rivers. On the Euphrates the mean monthly discharge of water varies from a low of 293 cubic meters per second in September to a high of 2,235 in May. On the Tigris the variation is even more marked, ranging from a low of 359 in October to a maximum of 2,951 in April. Thus periods of floods alternate with periods of acute scarcity. In the absence of storage facilities and a regulated flow, the limit on the cultivation of crops is set by the current low point in the water supply in the critical growing period for both winter and [134] summer crops. The water problem is further complicated by the fact that continuous use of water for irrigation, coupled with the effect of evaporation in a dry, hot climate, has saturated the subsoil waters with salt and raised the water table, thus precipitating salt which, in the absence of drainage, quickly makes the land infertile. More effective use of the water supply is thus the central problem of Iraq.

311 In relation both to the population and the land actually under cultivation, the amount of cultivable land available in the country is very large. Accurate statistics on the total cultivable area are lacking, but the following estimates based largely on data supplied by the Department of Agriculture give some conception of the magnitude:

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ANNEX B

FLOOD CONTROL, IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE

Effective and economical utilization of available water resources is the central problem of Iraq.[1] In its study of this problem the Mission has addressed itself to (1) the storage of water for the purpose of controlling floods and increasing the regular supply of water for irrigation, (2) the expansion of irrigation, (3) the provision of drainage to prevent deterioration of irrigated lands by salt, and (4) questions of operation and maintenance of irrigation systems. The Mission has relied heavily on published materials ranging from the *Report on the Irrigation of Mesopotamia* by Sir William Willcocks, published in 1911, to more recent studies, particularly the monumental *Report on the Control of the Rivers of Iraq and the Utilization of their Waters* made in 1949 by the Irrigation Development Commission under the presidency of Mr. F. F. Haigh. In addition, however, the Mission conducted a field survey, in the course of which one or more of its members visited the sites of proposed dams and reservoirs, and examined the problems of irrigation at first hand. Its conclusions are therefore based on observation as well as the study of relevant documents. 3/2 ●

I. Water Storage

Today the storage of the flood waters of the Euphrates and Tigris and their tributaries is the foremost problem. The twin rivers carry, on the average, almost 70 billion cubic meters of water per year—a quantity theoretically adequate to irrigate vast areas. Much of this comes, however, in the spring at a time too 3/2 /133

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[1] See the Mission's main report, p. 7 *et seq.*; also Annex A, *Basic Factors and Conditions.*

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312 133 [731] late to benefit winter crops and too early for summer crops. Destructive spring floods are apt to occur just before the harvesting of the winter crops begins and as the planting of summer crops is in process. In the dry season—July to December—which is critical for both summer and winter crops, the mean discharge of the Euphrates at Hit and the Tigris at Baghdad is only 421 cumecs (cubic meters per second) and 559 cumecs, respectively, as compared with 1,765 cumecs and 2,572 cumecs during the three peak months of the spring.[2] The Haigh Commission has calculated that the mean discharge which can be relied upon for irrigation is only 280 cumecs for the Euphrates and 350 cumecs for the Tigris and its tributaries. This supply would appear to be barely equal to the water needed for existing irrigation systems when figured on the basis of the standards usually applied in Iraq. In fact, at present there is an acute shortage of water in the irrigated areas of the Diyala Valley and the Hilla canal system while in other areas water is wasted. Short of radical economies in the use of water, which can only be realized over the long term, no significant extension of the irrigated area can be undertaken without controlling and regulating the flow of the rivers. Nor can disastrous floods be controlled without schemes for the storage of the excess waters.

The Euphrates

653 312 A project for the regulated diversion of the flood waters of the Euphrates into Lake Habbaniya is already under way. This project involves the construction of an inlet channel from the Euphrates near Ramadi to the lake as well as an outlet channel for the later release of the stored waters. A barrage will be built across the Euphrates at Warrar to raise the water level and thus permit an increase in the capacity of the lake reservoir. The outlet channel and regulator are already finished and work is w advanced on the inlet channel and its regulator. The project whe completed will reduce the flood discharge from a possible maximum of 5,200 cumecs to 2,000 cumecs and will increase the minimum supply of water available for irrigation from 280 cumecs to perhaps 440 cumecs. The total cost is estimated at ID 4,300,000.

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[2] See chart and also Tables I and II in the appendix.

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HYDROGRAPHS OF THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES RIVERS

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——— Average Mean Monthly Discharge
- - - - Minimum Mean Monthly Discharge
——— Maximum Mean Monthly Discharge



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While the soundness of the scheme is beyond question, the Mission has serious reservations about extending the storage capacity of the project by evacuating part of the water in Lake Habbaniya to the nearby depressions of Bahr el Milh and Abu Dibis through the discharge channel of Mujarrah. The Haigh Commission contemplated that with the reservoir formed by these depressions the maximum flood discharge could be further reduced to 1,500 cumecs and the water available for irrigation could be raised to 510 cumecs. In the opinion of the Mission, however, the salt in these depressions would be a serious obstacle to their use as a reservoir for irrigation water. The use of the stored water of Lake Habbaniya would in itself tend to raise the salt content of the Euphrates to the maximum concentration considered usable for irrigation. Since the lake is said to contain about two million tons of salt, and the waters of the Euphrates entering the lake themselves contain some salt, the waters of the lake at the capacity set by the 49.5 meters contour may reach a salt content of 100 parts per 100,000. These waters when mixed half and half with those of the Euphrates, which have a maximum salinity of 40 parts per 100,000, will tend to have a salt concentration of 70 per 100,000 or approximately the maximum tolerance. The Bahr el Milh and Abu Dibis depressions, however, now contain about 44 million tons of salt. The 20.5 billion cubic meters of water which might be stored in these depressions would therefore have a salinity of 215 parts per 100,000. It would be necessary to remove 27 million tons of salt in order to reduce salinity to 80 parts per 100,000. The Haigh Commission thought it possible to achieve this lower salt content in approximately four years by progressively evacuating the stored water into the Euphrates, but at a rate which would not raise the salt in the Euphrates itself over 80 parts in 100,000. Even granting this possibility, the Mission believes, however, that the resulting salt content would still be too high for irrigation water.

As a minimum, the Mission strongly suggests that any project for storing water in these two depressions be deferred until the problem of salting, already acute, has been brought under control by the installation of drainage facilities in the irrigated areas of the Euphrates Valley. At the same time it would be advisable to explore the possibility of alternative storage capacity somewhere

along the Euphrates. Of several possible sites, the best appears to be at Rawa, a few kilometers upstream from Ana. There a dam 35 to 40 meters in height could be erected to create a reservoir with a capacity of seven billion cubic meters and an area of 480 square kilometers. The water would be backed up over a distance of 200 kilometers of which 60 kilometers would be in Syria. No geologic study of this possible dam emplacement has been made. An examination of outcroppings shows a series of horizontal layers in which soft but fairly compact limestone alternates with layers of highly decomposed rock and layers of soluble gypsum. While these surface indications raise serious doubt concerning the watertightness of the possible reservoir, the Mission urges that a geologic study of the site, supported by soundings, be carried out in order to obtain a geologic cross-section in the neighborhood of the projected dam emplacement.

The Tigris

Flood control on the Tigris is to be assured by the Wadi Tharthar project. A contract for the work on part of this scheme was awarded in the fall of 1951. The project involves the erection of a barrage across the Tigris, north of Samarra, to limit the flood discharge of the river to about 3,500 cumecs and divert the excess waters via an inlet channel into the Wadi Tharthar depression. At a contour of 60 meters the depression is expected to hold about 68 billion cubic meters of water in a reservoir extending over 2,050 square kilometers. The total cost of this project, for which the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development provided a loan of $12,800,000 in June 1950, has been budgeted by the Development Board at a figure of ID 9,625,000.

The efficacy of the Wadi Tharthar as a flood control scheme is clear. That the depression is sufficiently watertight to store enough water for irrigation is less certain. The Haigh Commission and its geologist had no doubt on this score, but other experts, including the one who served as government geologist until recently, have raised serious questions regarding the tightness of the reservoir. Two firms of consulting engineers—Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther, and Sir William Halcrows and Partners—have advised that the Wadi Tharthar project be considered exclusively for flood control. In any event, it would take about ten years

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for the reservoir to fill to the level at which water might be supplied for irrigation, and this water would then be available only for use in the Tigris Valley from Baghdad south. Thus other schemes for the storage of water for irrigation have to be considered.

From time to time storage dams for the Upper Tigris have been suggested, some with the obvious hope that they would cater to the needs of the North where rainfall is unreliable and does not permit the cultivation of summer crops. Among the sites proposed are two north of Mosul. One is near the village of Zumar about 115 kilometers from Mosul. The topographic features there would permit the creation of a storage basin, but geologic conditions appear to be very unfavorable. The soil consists of badly decomposed and fissured Lower Fars limestone and of marl which is also more or less decomposed. While no geologic investigation of the site has been made, borings made by the Mosul Petroleum Company about 10 kilometers away indicate the presence of numerous permeable layers in this area through which large amounts of water would probably be lost. Despite these prima facie doubts about the water tightness of the reservoir, the Mission believes that a complete geologic study, including borings, should be made of the site because of the understandable interest in this project in the North.

Conditions at the second site—Badosh, 25 kilometers above Mosul—are even less favorable. It has been suggested that with a dam 45 to 50 meters high a reservoir with a capacity of five billion cubic meters could be constituted. Outcroppings, however, disclose decomposed limestone with many caverns on this site. The dam would have to be built across a slight fold, cutting through various formations. Even with resort to costly and laborious injections of concrete, it is extremely doubtful that the proposed reservoir could be waterproofed.

Farther down the Tigris there is another possible dam site at Fatha where the river crosses a mountainous fold running northwest-southeast and known as Jebel Hamrin on the left bank and Jebel Mahul on the right bank. This site was studied in some detail by consulting engineers in 1940, and the investigation was resumed by the Haigh Commission in 1948. The Commission's geologist held that it would be impossible to build a gravity dam

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in the gorge itself but that an earthen dam farther upstream might be feasible. The dam would have to be about 3,500 meters long and, with a height of 75 meters and a fall board of six meters, could be used to store 24 billion cubic meters of water up to a contour of 182 meters. It could therefore be considered as an alternative to Wadi Tharthar and even as preferable since it would be likely to make more water available for irrigation. However, the anticipated cost of construction—about ID 20,000,000—and the vulnerability of an earthen dam to enemy attacks in time of war caused it to be rejected. Now that there no longer is any question of its consideration as an alternative to Wadi Tharthar, the possibility of a more modest project at Fatha might well be examined. A dam only 40 meters high could create a reservoir of five billion cubic meters which might some time in the future become of critical importance to irrigation. At the same time it would be so much smaller than the original project that the same objections concerning its safety could hardly be entertained. The Mission would therefore recommend further geologic studies and, particularly, a series of borings to determine definitely a geologic cross-section along the axis of the site.

The Tigris Tributaries

The Development Board has already provided in its five-year program for the construction of the Derbend-i-Khan dam on the Diyala river and the Dokan dam on the Lesser Zab river. The Mission agrees that these dam sites are the best available but suggests, as will be indicated in greater detail later, that these two projects be supplemented by the construction of the Bekhme dam on the Greater Zab river.

The Derbend-i-Khan Dam on the Diyala

Originally the Haigh Commission recommended that a dam be built at a point called Gibraltar where the Jebel Hamrin crosses the river. In 1950, however, Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther and Sir William Halcrows and Partners expressed their preference for a dam at the Derbend-i-Khan defile farther upstream; and in 1951 the Development Board included this project at a total cost of ID 4,800,000 in its five-year program. The Mission considers this decision sound. The foundation soil at the

3/2 653 Gibraltar site is soft sandstone sandwiched with layers of impermeable marl. The dam would have to be built of locally available sand and gravel, with an impervious facing in reinforced concrete or an impervious core; and it would be difficult to establish a watertight joint between the impervious facing and the impervious soil through the sandstone. The hills edging the reservoir show many low points where lines of seepage are so short as to create the risk of breaches. The presence of a lot of gypsum adds to the doubt about the watertightness of the reservoir. Moreover, its size and location are such that 128,000 masharas[3] of arable land would be submerged and 35 kilometers of railway detoured.

Borings have been made at the Derbend-i-Khan site and expert geologic opinion holds that the site provides a good foundation for a dam and has possibilities for a watertight reservoir. The rock-fill dam to be built will only close the breach, opened by centuries of erosion, in a solid rock sheath which, over long geologic periods, must have constituted the resistant part of a natural dam. The capacity of the dam will be only 0.87 billion cubic meters as compared with 1.56 billion for the Gibraltar dam. However, after allowing for losses, engineers believe that Derbend-i-Khan will provide a discharge of 80 cumecs at the Diyala weir, which governs the Diyala irrigation canals, as agaist 85 cumecs for Gibraltar. At present the usable mean discharge at the weir is only 38 cumecs.

The Dokan Dam on the Lesser Zab

A short distance from the Iranian border the Lesser Zab River passes through four gorges. According to competent geologic opinion, only the fourth of these, namely the Dokan Gorge, appears to offer a suitable dam site. The Dokan Gorge cuts through about 60 meters of Judean limestone covered by 40 meters of Shiranish limestone. Surface examination indicates that the former apparently consists of horizontal, generally sound beds, interspersed here and there, however, by caverns, while the Shiranish appears to be much more fissured. Up to the present only a brief geologic reconnaissance of the site has been carried out. Borings should be undertaken to confirm the surface indications and determine what special precautions should be taken in building the dam. The geologic investigation should extend to the Shiranish limestone, for if this is found to be of adequate quality a higher dam and larger reservoir would be possible. 312 653

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[3] A mashara is equal to a donum (0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres).

The construction of an arch dam at this site would be more economical than a gravity dam, but the proper planning and execution of such a dam requires much more skill. The Mission suggests that, after a thorough program of borings have shown the geologic conditions that will be encountered, the design and engineering of the dam should be entrusted to several consulting engineering firms so that the Development Board will be enabled to judge the best of different conceptions. So far as possible, all risks should be eliminated before construction commences. Soundness of conception and safety should not be sacrificed in a desire to get things done rapidly.

An arch dam 60 meters in height would provide storage capacity for 1.99 million cubic meters at a level of 501 meters and for 2.21 million at a level of 508 meters. The usable mean discharge of the Lesser Zab would then be raised from about 63 cumecs to 108.5 and 149 cumecs at these respective levels.

The Bekhme Dam on the Greater Zab

The Haigh Commission made a complete geologic reconnaissance, including borings, of the possibilities of building a dam at two different sites in the Bekhme Gorge. It concluded that the Shiranish limestone at the upstream entrance to the gorge would provide a sound foundation for the construction of a high dam. The Commission was primarily interested in this dam as a flood control project, and, after deciding in favor of the Wadi Tharthar scheme, did not therefore include the dam in its program. The Development Board's five-year program also makes no provision for Bekhme.

The Mission urges, however, that construction of the Bekhme dam be undertaken as soon as possible. With the completion of the Dokan dam and related works it is planned to divert the waters of the Lesser Zab into the Adhaim River and use them for irrigating areas on the left bank of the Tigris and in the Diyala River Valley. Thus the Lesser Zab which has a usable flow of about 60 cumecs at present will no longer be supplying water to the Tigris.

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As a result irrigation in the Lower Tigris basin, particularly in the area served by the Shatt al Gharraf where water is already acutely short, would inevitably suffer in consequence unless water were made available from some alternative source. Although the deficit may be made good from the Wadi Tharthar in the end, it is by no means certain, as has already been pointed out, that the Wadi Tharthar depression will be able to supply water for irrigation. If the Wadi Tharthar reservoir can ultimately supply the Lower Tigris, it will still be possible to use the water stored behind the Bekhme dam for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in the North.

Nor should the cost be regarded as out of proportion to the results that will be achieved. In 1948 Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther estimated the cost of a gravity dam in concrete at ID 9,000,000, but in 1950 they came to the conclusion that a buttress dam could be built at considerably lower cost, namely about ID 6,500,000. The dam would provide a net storage capacity of 1.66 billion cubic meters and would increase the usable discharge of the river from 128 cumecs to about 240 cumecs. This would furnish additional water sufficient to irrigate an area of two million masharas gross. On this area it would be possible to grow winter cereals on 828,000 masharas which might have a total value of ID 3,700,000, assuming conservatively a yield of one quarter of a ton per donum and a price of ID 18 per ton. If, in addition, summer crops were grown on one third of the area devoted to winter crops and yielded about the same value per mashara, the total value of the crops grown on the area of two million masharas gross could be put at about ID 5,000,000 per year. The resulting increase in national income would far outweigh the cost of the scheme. Even the tax yield would exceed the cost of amortization.

International Agreements

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The construction of these reservoirs makes it necessary to reach agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the control of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris. For the Euphrates this is particularly urgent because half of the course of the river is in Turkish and Syrian territory and nearly all of its basin is in a foreign country. There are irrigation possibilities in Syria which could seriously reduce the flow of water into Iraq. Works which would raise the water level 10 to 20 meters upstream would com-

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

mand an area for irrigation of 1,000,000 to 1,360,000 masharas in Syria. Irrigation of 1,000,000 masharas would require a flow of almost 60 cumecs. In Turkey and Iran the mountainous nature of the watershed of the rivers makes it much less likely that significant quantities of water will be diverted for irrigation. With these countries, however, it will be important to reach agreements regarding joint anti-erosion measures. Such measures will effectively complement water-storage schemes as means of flood control, the more so since silting will otherwise substantially reduce the effective life of reservoirs. Cooperation in afforestation of the watershed areas of these rivers is therefore highly desirable. 312 648

At present no such agreements exist. With Syria, there is no accord whatever. With Iran, there is only an old protocol of 1914 governing the use of the waters of a small stream, the Gangir. A protocol annexed to the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness, concluded with Turkey on March 29, 1946, set up a flood-warning service, permitted Iraq to investigate possible sites for flood-control dams in Turkey and gave agreement in principle, subject to confirmation in each case, for construction of works recognized to be necessary. Turkey also undertook to inform Iraq of any contemplated works on any of the two rivers. The scope of the agreement is thus rather limited.

II. Irrigation Works

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It is now necessary to consider what irrigation works will be needed to utilize the additional water that will ultimately be made available by the water reservoirs discussed above and what further works should be undertaken to ensure better utilization of water.

Aside from flood control, the most important consequence of the new reservoirs will be the expansion of the area under irrigation. As Table 1 indicates, the area now under irrigation has been estimated by the Haigh Commission at 12,696,000 masharas gross, of which 4,671,000 are irrigated by the waters of the Euphrates and 8,025,000 by those of the Tigris and its tributaries.

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TABLE 1

AREA WITHIN IRRIGATION SYSTEMS

(in 1000 masharas)

	Gross	Cultivated	Winter crop area irrigated	Mean discharge used for irrigation (in cumecs)
EUPHRATES				
Flow irrigation	3,109	2,666	1,160	161
Pump irrigation from				
canals	607	515	263	32
river	955	812	474	43
Total	4,671	3,993	1,897	236
TIGRIS*				
Flow irrigation	2,380	2,033	760	105
Pump irrigation from				
canals	1,060	901	400	49
river	3,020	2,567	1,280	115
Total	6,460	5,491	2,440	269
DIYALA				
Flow irrigation	1,350	1,148	572	74
Pump irrigation	215	183	92	8
Total	1,565	1,331	665	82
Grand Total	12,696	10,815	5,002	587

* Including tributaries other than the Diyala.

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In considering the areas which might be provided with new irrigation systems, the Mission has adopted certain standards and practices which have been generally accepted in the past. Among these are:

1. The amount of cultivated land (in winter crops) which can be irrigated effectively by a constant flow of one cumec measured at the intake of an irrigation system (i.e. the so-called irrigation duty) is 7,200 masharas or donums;
2. Half of the cultivable area within an irrigation system is left fallow during the winter crop season; and, since a given amount of water can generally irrigate an area in winter crops about four times as large as in summer crops, the area of an irrigation system is conceived in terms of the winter crop;

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3. The cultivable area within an irrigation system is about 85 percent of the gross area which includes the surface occupied by roads, villages, canals, etc. 312 311

The Mission does not regard the first two criteria as immutable. The indicated irrigation duty is certainly very low; and the Mission will make some suggestions regarding it in the subsequent discussion of problems of operation. The present fallow system practiced in agriculture should also not be regarded as sacrosanct. Through the use of fertilizers and the introduction of soil-building crops the proportion of fallow might well be considerably reduced. Since almost all of the land which will be newly irrigated will be opened to settlement by small-holders under prescribed conditions, the state will be in a good position to insist on better agricultural practices in such areas. With water stored in reservoirs, it will also be possible to regulate the distribution of water as between winter and summer crops. In the past the amount of water which has flown down the rivers at critical parts of the growing seasons has set an automatic limit on the area both in winter and summer crops. In the future, however, this flow will be subject to control through the release of stored water. The Mission therefore suggests that the government make a special study to determine what combination of winter and summer crops using a given quantity of water would yield the highest output for the manpower employed on the land. The outcome of this study as well as a re-examination of the fallow system may in the end affect the calculations of the gross area which needs to be covered by irrigation works in order to use a given supply of water.

The sequence in which new areas are to be supplied with irrigation is governed partly by purely technical factors. Within the limits set by these technical factors, however, the selection of the areas to be irrigated should take into account the agricultural value of the land, its proximity to potential settlers and its ownership. In making its recommendations regarding new irrigation systems, the Mission has sought to give appropriate weight to all these factors. It was not always possible to arrive at a considered judgment of the agricultural potentialities of various areas, so that on this ground alone its suggestions may be subject to revision. Regarding the ownership of lands which could be irrigated, the Mission had no information. Presumably most of this land is in

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3/1 state ownership. In any event, as long as it is technically feasible
3/2 and not more costly, it will be desirable to give preference to the irrigation of good agricultural land remaining in state ownership because such land can be used for distribution among small-holders.

Expansion of Irrigation—the Euphrates

3/2 Except for a narrow band on both banks of the Euphrates between Hit and Hindiya and some smaller areas along the lower Euphrates, which are irrigated directly from the river by pumps, the irrigation systems of the Euphrates are served by a series of canals whose off-takes are above the Hindiya barrage. Nine of these canals serve the left bank of the Euphrates[4]; and only two[5], the right bank. The Hindiya barrage was built primarily to increase the intake into the most important of these canals—the Hilla. This canal, together with its three terminal branches—the Diwaniya, Dagharrah and Hurriyah canals, is supposed to irrigate a gross area of 2,333,000 masharas. The supply of water, however, is sufficient to irrigate only about 35 percent of the cultivable area commanded by the Hilla canal system. It has already been recognized, therefore, that the additional water made available from the Habbaniya should, in the first instance, be used to increase the irrigation intensity in the Hilla canal system to the standard 50 percent. The Development Board has already reserved ID 900,000 to remodel the Hilla canal in order to bring about the necessary increase in its capacity from 114 to 175 cumecs at its head and from 57 to 87 cumecs at its tail. As will be noted below, an additional enlargement of the canal's capacity will be necessitated by further expansion of irrigation. While the Haigh Commission contemplated carrying out the required increase in capacity in two phases and proposed to rely partly on erosion as a means of attaining the needed capacity, the Mission believes it desirable to give the Hilla canal its final outline from the very beginning and to avoid reliance upon the rather erratic effects of erosion. At the same time, the course of the canal should be straightened and precautions taken to reduce losses by infiltration at the resulting low points.

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[4] Saglawiyah, Abu Ghuraib, Yusufiyah, Latifiyah, Iskandiriyah, Musayib, Nasiriyah, Kifl and Hilla.

[5] Husseiniyah and Beni Hassan.

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It has already been mentioned that upon the completion of the Habbaniya project the usable flow of the Euphrates will be raised from 280 to 440 cumecs. Since the Hilla canal area will absorb 30 cumecs, the balance of the increase, or 130 cumecs, will be available for the extension of irrigation to a gross area of 2,200,000 masharas. To use this quantity of water the following irrigation projects are recommended: 3/12

1. Extension and enlargement of the Musayib and Iskandiriyah canals to irrigate an additional gross area of 228,000 masharas. The Development Board has already earmarked ID 400,000 for these works.
2. Prolongation of the Babil canal, which is at present only a secondary canal branching off from the Hilla, and increasing its capacity from eight to 65 cumecs so as to provide water for 670,000 masharas gross. For this purpose the capacity of the Hilla canal at its head will have to be raised to 229 cumecs.
3. Construction of a barrage below Kifl on a deviation of the Kufa branch of the Euphrates which would govern, on the right bank, a new canal intended to serve the Bahr el Najaf and, on the left bank, the Shamiya, a branch of the Euphrates which would thereby become a controlled canal with an enlarged capacity of 272 cumecs at its head. This would extend irrigation to a gross area of 590,000 masharas.
4. Construction of a feeder canal connecting the Shamiya with the Diwaniya, one of the branches of the Hilla canal, in order to irrigate a gross area of 385,000 masharas between Shamiya and Diwaniya and deliver a flow of water which would release about 38 cumecs at the tail of the Hilla canal for use elsewhere. This feeder, which would have a capacity of 237 cumecs at its head and of 184 cumecs at its junction with the Diwaniya, would be extended to serve the new Khar canal.
5. Irrigation of a gross area of 108,000 masharas in and immediately south of the Dagharrah canal area by remodelling the Dagharrah Canal and constructing the head of the Khar canal. The additional water for the Gagharrah would come from that released at the tail of the Hilla Canal as a result of the building of the Shamiya-Diwaniya feeder; and that for the Khar canal would come from the expanded supply of the Diwaniya.
6. Additional construction of the Khar canal to irrigate about 220,000 masharas gross.

3/2 The Mission suggests that detailed plans of these irrigation works be made as soon as possible in order to make sure that this program is completed by the time the Habbaniya project is finished. Execution of this program will require some agricultural adjustments in the Shamiya area where rice is now grown under conditions of natural inundation. By controlling the Shamiya and installing a flow-irrigation system the area available for winter cultivation will be greatly increased, but at the same time rice cultivation may have to be curtailed. In any event, the fellahin will have to grow rice not on naturally flooded land, but on terraced plots watered successively from canals. At the same time fertilizer rather than silt brought by the floods will have to be used to maintain the productivity of the rice lands. As the Haigh Commission has already noted, these adjustments would in the end have to be made anyway, owing to the progressive silting of the rice lands which is gradually raising them to levels where they can no longer be flooded. The Department of Agriculture should take timely steps to assist the fellahin to adapt themselves to the new conditions.

Other Irrigation Works on the Euphrates

Aside from the works required to expand the area under irrigation, certain other irrigation works on the Euphrates appear to be necessary. The Development Board has already set aside ID 250,000 for improving the Shamiya, one of the branches into which the Euphrates divides below Kifl, and controlling the erosion phenomenon known as the *nagarah* which threatens to dry up the whole rice-growing district of Shamiya. In the Shamiya-Kufa district the flooding and silting caused by the diversion of the Euphrates waters into several branches and numerous canals has raised the river and canal beds above those of the downstream region of Shinafiyah where the waters are once more united in a single channel. During the dry season the remaining water, confined to a narrow channel, rapidly erodes the accumulated alluvium causing a series of falls which move up the canals and tend to lower them to a level where they can no longer be used for irrigation. Regulators to stop this erosive action have been installed on two of the principal canals, but more are needed.

A somewhat similar problem is encountered farther down the river in the rice-growing region above Lake Hammar. Here erosion keeps the river bed so low in relation to the silted rice lands that the distribution of water in the dry season has become very difficult. The Development Board has provided ID 1,000,000 in its program for necessary control structures on this part of the Euphrates. There has been no agreement as yet, however, on a plan for these works. 3/2

Expansion of Irrigation—the Tigris and its Tributaries

Along the Tigris and the Diyala, pump irrigation is much more prominent than along the Euphrates. A large part of the country's irrigation pumps are concentrated on the stretch of the Tigris between Baghdad and Kut.[6] The principal flow-irrigation areas are in the Diyala River and, farther south, along the Shatt al Gharraf. Both these areas suffer from an acute shortage of water. In the North there is a small flow-irrigated area known as Hawija and near Kut an area of similar size fed by the Dujaila canal.

The Derbend-i-Khan dam will not make possible any expansion of the area under irrigation. However, by assuring a usable flow of 80 cumecs, as compared with a present mean flow of only 38 cumecs, it will provide a really adequate water supply over the entire area covered by existing irrigation systems in the Diyala Valley.

The Dokan dam will supply enough water to irrigate about 2.5 million masharas gross. In general accordance with the Haigh Commission's recommendations and the contemplated program of the Development Board, the Mission believes that this water should be used to irrigate new areas on the left bank of the Tigris, both above and below Baghdad, as well as additional areas in the Diyala River Valley. For this purpose, that part of the water supply not used for the irrigation of areas along the Lesser Zab River should be diverted through a new feeder into the Adhaim River; this in turn would be linked by a new feeder to the Diyala River. The latter would then supply the new Nahrwan canal which would be constructed to serve a large area on the left bank of the Tigris below the confluence of the Diyala. The Adhaim feeder should allow for a flow of about 76 cumecs and the Diyala feeder for about 41 cumecs.

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[6] For a tabulation of the irrigation pumps in Iraq, see Table II in the appendix.

•312 Irrigation projects for the following areas would then be necessary:

1. Along the Lesser Zab the Makhmur area on the right bank (400,000 masharas gross) and the Hawija area on the left bank (300,000 masharas gross). About 180,000 masharas in the Hawija project are already being irrigated, and work is proceeding on the extension of irrigation to the balance. Both areas would be served by canals governed by a new barrage (Hawija barrage) on the Lesser Zab River which would also control the intake into the Adhaim feeder.
2. On the left bank of the Adhaim River a gross area of 600,000 masharas. To raise the water level for the necessary new canals, as well as for the Diyala feeder, construction of a barrage across the Adhaim will be necessary.
3. Extension of the irrigation system of the Diyala by 540,000 masharas gross.
4. Irrigation of a gross area of 660,000 masharas on the left bank of the Tigris below the Diyala River through construction of the Nahrwan canal and of a regulating barrage just above Beni Saad to govern the take-off of the canal from the Diyala.

This program differs from that recommended by the Haigh Commission in that it does not provide for the irrigation (1) of a gross area of 560,000 masharas on the left bank of the Tigris below Fatha, and (2) of a gross area of 300,000 on the right bank of the Adhaim. The agricultural potentialities of these areas have not been surveyed. A decision to provide irrigation for them should accordingly not be made until it is established that their agricultural value is at least equal to that of the other areas.

[653] In its five-year program the Development Board has already included part of the works for the above projects. This program budgets ID 500,000 for the Hawija barrage on the Lesser Zab, ID 300,000 for the barrage on the Adhaim, ID 500,000 for the Beni Saad dam, ID 750,000 for the construction of part of the new Nahrwan canal and ID 2,600,000 for canal systems in the areas commanded by the Hawija and Adhaim barrages. On the other hand, no provision has yet been made for the Adhaim and Diyala feeders.

The Mission has not attempted to determine which new areas might be irrigated with the additional flow made available upon

completion of the Bekhme dam. As already indicated, the ultimate 3/2 choice will depend on whether or not the Wadi Tharthar reservoir will store sufficient water for use in irrigation.

Other Irrigation Works on the Tigris

Other works are required, particularly to insure more effective utilization of the available water supply. One of the more important problems along the lower Tigris is how to prevent the wastage of water which is sent through Shatt al Gharraf from the Tigris. The Shatt al Gharraf, a former branch of the Tigris, has been converted into a canal through construction of an intake works which in turn is governed by the barrage across the Tigris at Kut. For a distance of 150 kilometers, however, it has no regulators of any kind. This makes it necessary to send through the intake a flow about double what would otherwise be needed and causes a great loss of water at the tail end of the canal. The gross area irrigated from the Shatt al Gharraf is theoretically 2,350,000 masharas of which 1,950,000 are irrigated by flow and 400,000 by pumping. Actually, however, the area in winter crops is apparently only about 700,000 masharas which indicates an intensity of irrigation of only 35 percent as compared with the customary 50 percent. Chronic difficulties are therefore experienced in supplying the requisite volume of water. In order to insure the required supply even for the 700,000 masharas in winter crops it is often necessary in the dry season to close the gates of the Kut barrage for some time, thereby depriving the lower reaches of the Tigris of water and interrupting navigation. The installation of regulators at suitable intervals will make it possible to irrigate the same area with a much smaller volume of water.

The Haigh Commission contemplated the construction of one regulator on the Gharraf, but only for the purpose of governing a new canal which would extend the area under irrigation. The Development Board has set aside ID 450,000 for "construction of regulators on the Gharraf and reclamation of new regions". The Mission urges that the regulators be constructed as rapidly as possible, but suggests caution in undertaking any new reclamation until there is ample assurance that the existing area can be adequately irrigated. Ultimately, of course, expansion of the area

312 under irrigation may become possible when additional water becomes available either from the Bekhme dam or the Wadi Tharthar reservoir.

Another important project which should be undertaken is the better control of the lower Tigris in the vicinity of Amara. For a considerable distance above Amara and in the immediate neighborhood of that city, the Tigris is progressively impoverished by a series of outlets which can hardly be called canals but which, owing to inadequate control, divert a large portion of the river waters into the marshes. One of the largest of these outlets is the Musandaq on the right bank of the river. This outlet takes off the flood waters of the Tigris up to a maximum capacity of 2,000 cumecs and is normally sealed off in the dry season by a dike. After breaching by a flood, however, the dike cannot be rebuilt except at a time of low water long after the flood peak has subsided. In the intervening period much valuable water is lost. Near Amara the Buteira, Mushara and Kahala canals, with capacities of 1,000, 100 and 450 cumecs, respectively, further deplete the water supply in the Tigris. Farther downstream still more canals, of which the principal ones are the Tabar, the Majar el Kebir and the Michiriyah, deprive the Tigris of water. While all these outlets or canals benefit rice cultivation, they also submerge much land suitable for cultivation of other crops and result in immense losses of water. It is therefore necessary to devise a control program which will prevent the flooding of cultivable land, drain and make available for cultivation the extensive marshes on both banks of the Tigris below Amara, and keep enough water in the Tigris to maintain navigation. The Haigh Commission gave a brief study to such a program, the cost of which is estimated at about ID 3,000,000; and the Development Board has set aside ID 1,2000, 000 for the "construction of regulators on the Tigris at Amara".

The Mission urges that, as a first step, all the canals branching off the Tigris be equipped with effective intake regulators which would make it possible to control water diversion. First of all, the Musandaq should be provided with such a regulator and the temporary wooden regulator of the Buteira should be replaced. An intake regulator should also be constructed for the Mushara. In addition, dredging of the Tigris might be undertaken in an effort to keep the river bed deep enough to prevent the formation of 3/12 additional outlets at flood times. These measures should then be complemented by a series of small works to provide proper control of the canals themselves. The Mission suggests that no regulator barrages be built across the Tigris itself until the results of these control measures are known. Meanwhile, the program should improve the navigability of the river and assist in draining the marshes.

As in the case of the Shamiya district on the Euphrates, the program for controlling the lower reaches of the Tigris will make adjustments necessary in the rice-growing areas of Amara. Here, too, it is therefore important that the Department of Agriculture provide timely assistance and advice to cultivators in adapting to the new water regime.

III. Drainage

While new irrigation schemes always appeal to the popular 3/12 imagination, it would be exceedingly unfortunate if they should 134 continue to be carried out, as in the past, to the neglect of essential drainage. Lack of drainage facilities has resulted in progressive salination and deterioration of the soil. In such areas as Hawija and Dujaila salt has become a serious problem within only a few years from the time irrigation was begun. Almost all land irrigated by flow has become salty to some degree, resulting in declining crop yields. The only conspicuous exception is the land in the Diyala River Valley for which the river, which has cut a deep bed from the Jebel Hamrin range to its confluence with the Tigris, acts as a natural drain during the dry season. Pump-irrigated lands generally suffer less from salting, partly because they are higher and thus tend to have better natural drainage and partly because, owing to the cost of pumping, there is an incentive to avoid the lavish use of water which tends to waterlog the soil.

The Haigh Commission estimated that about 60 percent of the irrigated areas have been affected by salt. The Mission's own observations indicated that perhaps 20 to 30 percent of the cultivated land in the irrigated areas has been abandoned during recent decades owing to the accumulation of salt and that yields on the

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land still being tilled may have declined by 20 to 50 percent. The situation appears to be worst in the regions fed by canals controlled by the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates. Thus about half of the lands irrigated by the Beni Hassan canal and 40 percent of those served by the Kifl canal have become too salty for winter cultivation.

The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates do not themselves contain excessive quantities of salt. Water is generally regarded as perfectly suitable for irrigation as long as the proportion of dissolved salts by weight does not exceed 70 parts in 100,000. Available analyses of the Tigris at Baghdad indicate that the proportion does not exceed 30 to 33 per 100,000 at most. For the upper reaches of the Euphrates the proportion is the same or even less, but in the lower Euphrates, which receives the drainage waters from the irrigated areas, the proportion may go as high as 90 parts per 100,000 in the fall of the year. (See Table III in the appendix.)

Salt has, however, become concentrated in the subsoil waters. The presence of some of the salt may be due to the fact that much of the land was originally under the sea. In the long run, however, it has been the continuous irrigation or flooding of the soil, combined with the effect of evaporation under the hot summer sun, which has led to a progressively greater concentration. Irrigation and flooding keep the water table high with the result that capillary action brings the water up into a zone where it evaporates under the heat of the sun and precipitates salt. Frequently cultivators resort to lavish use of irrigation water in order to wash the salt away from the roots of the crops. In the end, however, this practice has only worsened the situation by tending to raise the water table still further.

Salt accumulation can be prevented and existing salt evacuated only by digging drainage canals which will lower the water table to a level of 1.5 to 2 meters below the surface where capillary action can no longer be dangerous. Under such conditions water used in irrigation will wash away the salt deposited in the root zone and return it to the subsoil water which will be tapped by the drainage canals. Fortunately the salt found in the soil is not the sodium carbonate or "black alkali" type which cannot readily be washed away by water. Owing to the low level of the land the

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salty water accumulating in the drainage canals will in most cases have to be evacuated by pumps.

Up to the present, drainage has been the subject of little planning or experimentation in Iraq. Mr. J. S. Turcan, the drainage expert of the Haigh Commission, carried out a drainage study for the Aggar Qub region, which is irrigated by the Saglawiyah and Abu Ghuraib canals. It was found that of the total area of 320,000 masharas, 197,000 needed drainage. Experiments indicated that a flow of 1.0 cumec per 1,200 marsharas over a period of two and a half months rid the soil of salt to a depth of two meters provided drains were installed with a maximum spacing of two kilometers and sufficient depth to keep the water table from rising to a level higher than 1.75 meters from the surface of the soil. The cost of a drainage project for this region, inclusive of the cost of a pumping station to evacuate the drainage waters to the Tigris, was estimated at ID 279,000 per 150,000 masharas or ID 1.86 per mashara. Preliminary plans have also been made for the drainage of other areas. One of these was for the area served by the Beni Hassan canal where the drainage of 330,000 masharas was estimated to cost ID 750,000 or ID 2.26 per mashara. The Haigh Commission came to the conclusion that the cost of drainage would average ID 2.0 per mashara or a total of ID 8,160,000 for 60 percent of the area now under flow irrigation.

Drainage might be usefully complemented by steps to line canals at points where there appear to be excessive losses of water through seepage. Such losses may lead to waterlogging of the soil and a resulting rise in the water table. Since Iraq is rich in asphalt, a lining of bituminous concrete might be best.

Deterioriation of land through salting has become such a serious problem that immediate steps should be taken to initiate drainage on a large scale. The Mission urges that work on the main drains be begun as soon as plans can be completed. At the same time complete drainage systems should be laid out and constructed for areas where the salt problem is most acute, notably those irrigated by the canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage. A start might be made with a drainage system for the Aggar Qub region since it has already been carefully studied. Early steps should also be taken to drain the Hawija and Dujaila areas. The

3/2 134 experience gained with the drainage systems first completed, particularly with respect to the depth and spacing of secondary drains, will be useful in planning subsequent schemes.

It is important also that drainage facilities be incorporated in any new irrigation schemes. It is always more costly to provide a drainage network for an already existing irrigation system, since it generally involves cutting across irrigation works and splitting up parcels of land. The installation of drainage facilities will be of vital importance for the rice-growing region of Kufa-Shamiya which the Mission recommends converting to a controlled flow-irrigated area. The same is true of the marshy region along the lower Tigris for which the Mission has suggested a number of control works.

The Development Board has allocated ID 2,000,000 to drainage in its five-year program. The Mission recommends, however, that at least ID 7,000,000 be devoted to this purpose over the next five years. Drainage works for the new irrigation projects alone would cost ID 5,600,000 on the assumption that about 60 percent of the area involved would require drainage. The Mission suggests that part of the cost of installing drainage facilities in existing irrigated areas be paid by the landholders who are benefited. This would be an equitable arrangement and need not be unduly burdensome if payments are spread over a number of years. Landowners, however, should not be given the option of participating in a drainage scheme, for the construction of an integrated drainage network requires the inclusion of all the land within a given area.

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IV. Operation and Maintenance

With attention focussed on the construction of reservoirs and new irrigation systems, there is a great danger that maintenance of existing irrigation works will continue to be neglected as in the past. There are many signs of such neglect today. Regulators have fallen into disrepair; canals have become silted and have developed bad leaks. False economies in the original construction and the use of poor materials have often made the task of maintenance more difficult. Thus frequently there has been no provision for roads

along the banks of main and secondary canals although roads 3/2 greatly facilitate inspection and maintenance. The facing of the canals adjoining the control structures is often too short for effective protection of both the canals and the control works. The turbulent water coming up against the earthen embankments may then undermine the embankments or even the control structures themselves. Brick, which lacks adequate resistance to shock and erosion, has sometimes been used as a construction material where concrete or precast concrete blocks would have been definitely preferable. In the future, it might also be desirable to try gabions of iron-wire net, weighted with stones and coarse gravel, in facing canals. These have given excellent and cheap protection against erosion in some countries.

Maintenance is also made more costly by failure to provide originally enough canal crossings for livestock and people, as well as places for washing and drinking. Under such conditions canal banks inevitably deteriorate with resulting leaks and the creation of pools of stagnant water. Crossings, which for the most part can be very simple in construction, should be installed near the villages and at points frequented by cattle. Paved fords will generally be best for cattle since they will provide facilities for drinking at the same time. There is also a need to regulate road crossings of small canals and ditches. Such crossings, which are built by the landowners, are often too short and constructed so poorly that considerable water escapes and the approaches to the crossings are reduced to quagmires.

The operation of the irrigation systems, involving the delivery of water to the actual users, could be considerably improved. Fair distribution is undoubtedly made difficult by chronic shortages of water. Whenever water is short, its distribution tends to be hotly disputed. Under such circumstances the influential landowner is [661] often successful in bringing pressure to bear on the poorly-paid irrigation official who is in charge of distribution. Sometimes landowners resort to more direct action by building temporary dams across canals in order to divert more water to their land. Equitable 3/2 distribution is also impeded by old water rights which are attached 4/2 3 to individual land parcels, particularly in the Diyala River Valley, and are transferred with such property. They often confer a right

312 to use a quantity of water out of proportion to the amount of land 423 to be irrigated; and in times of water scarcity they must be taken into account in rationing the available supply even though an objective appraisal of relative requirements might produce quite a different distribution.

312 A larger supply of water would, of course, minimize the difficulties of distribution set forth above, but in the long run it is also vitally important that economies be effected in the amount of water used. The provision of drainage facilities and the installation of an adequate amount of regulators on canals will certainly bring about substantial economies of this character. The cultivators in Iraq, however, have for many years been accustomed to use water rather lavishly; only demonstration will convince them that they 312 can safely manage with a smaller supply. It has already been 651 pointed out that the irrigation duty is very low compared to that in many other countries. For flow-irrigated lands it is about 16,950 masharas gross (equivalent to 7,200 masharas in crops); for land irrigated by pumps from canals, 19,500; and for that irrigated by pumps from rivers, 26,200. Pump-irrigated lands have a somewhat higher duty because they are generally better drained and therefore less salted and because the cost of pumping encourages economy in the use of water. As far as the Mission is aware, the problem of 312 raising the irrigation duty has not been systematically studied. The Mission recommends strongly that fields be set aside in each irrigation system for the purpose of determining through practical experimentation over a number of years the optimum quantity of water to be supplied to each crop. Such experiments should be carried out under the joint direction of the Agriculture and Irrigation Departments.

In the future it would be desirable to associate the landholders in each irrigation area as far as possible with the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. Irrigation should be a truly [476] cooperative venture. The Mission understands that councils of landowners already exist in some districts, notably along the Diyala, to assist irrigation officials in the distribution of water at times of shortage. Such councils might well be organized in all districts and with the broader function of advising on all problems of maintenance and distribution. They could sponsor the experiments in the best use of water mentioned earlier and could assist in disseminating the findings. They would be an important means of developing the concept of common responsibility for the efficient operation and upkeep of irrigation systems and might ultimately serve also to disseminate information on agriculture. 312

The legal situation with respect to water rights and the construction, maintenance and operation of irrigation and flood-control works is defined by Articles 1234 to 1238 of the Mejelle, or Ottoman Civil Code, and Law No. 23 of 1923 and its successive amendments. Repeated changes in this legislation have made it difficult to determine the validity of certain provisions. It would be desirable to codify and clarify the legislation and, in the course of such a review, to eliminate some of its defects. It would be advisable, for instance, to ensure a right of passage for canals across the property of third parties with compensation fixed by the Irrigation Department in accordance with defined criteria. At present such a right of passage is recognized but with the proviso that the interested party must buy or lease the necessary land, which, in practice, may lead to extortionate terms. There is also a need for a review of old water rights. While presumably such rights cannot be abolished, the right to use water might well be brought into closer accord with the amount of land to be irrigated. 312 671 423

The law makes the Directorate General for Irrigation in the Ministry of Communications and Public Works responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation and flood-control schemes. In 1949 the irrigation services had a staff of 1,330 persons, classified approximately as follows: 312 647

Engineers	26
Assistant engineers	20
Overseers	94
Office personnel	250
Bund personnel	820
Specialists	120

On the whole, there is an insufficient number of competent, experienced engineers; and pay scales are inadequate to retain able men in a service which often entails considerable hardship. The staff in the provinces is generally not large enough to cope with technical problems along with the many administrative questions

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centering particularly about the distribution of water. Young engineers are often sent as beginners to outlying posts where they work without adequate technical supervision. The service has lacked an experienced Chief Engineer who could, through frequent visits in the field, provide advice and guidance and support the staff with the weight of his authority. The Mission understands that such a Chief Engineer has now been appointed. It would be desirable to provide him with several experienced assistants specialized in drainage and irrigation questions.

In the past the planning of new works has been characterized by two defects: inadequate coordination with other government departments, particularly those dealing with agriculture and health, and failure to make full use of the knowledge and experience of the divisional irrigation engineers.

Although irrigation obviously serves agriculture, the Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Economics has been virtually ignored in the planning of new irrigation schemes. The same has been true of the health service which is vitally interested in the layout of irrigation projects in connection with its fight against malaria and bilharzia. In its capacity as an over-all planning and coordinating agency the Development Board will be able to insist that all interested government departments be consulted in the planning of projects. A committee consisting of representatives of the Irrigation, Agriculture and Health Departments might be established to pass on irrigation and drainage projects and advise on their priority.

This committee might be complemented by a technical committee which would direct the experiments to ascertain the optimum use of water, to which reference has already been made, and perhaps to study other technical operating problems.

In the future planning of irrigation works it would be desirable to make greater use of the divisional irrigation engineers in the provinces. These officials have often acquired an experience and knowledge of local conditions which could greatly aid realistic planning.

The cost of new flood-control and irrigation works will in the future be defrayed out of the budget of the Development Board.

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The cost of operation, however, will have to be met out of the ordinary budget. In the past the ordinary budget of the Irrigation Department has been wholly inadequate to insure efficient operation and maintenance of the existing irrigation systems. In the last ten years an average of only ID 270,000 has been spent annually under the ordinary budget.[7] Expenses for operation and maintenance should actually be about 150 fils per gross mashara under flow irrigation. With a gross area of approximately 6,800,000 masharas under flow irrigation, the appropriate total would therefore be about ID 1,000,000 per year, inclusive of the salaries of the requisite personnel. The Mission therefore suggests that the budget of the Irrigation Department be progressively increased to reach that sum within the next five years, with the additional cost to be borne by the Development Board.

V. Costs of the Program

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The Mission estimates that the total cost of the over-all program it has recommended would amount over the next five years (1952-53 to 1956-57) to about ID 55,000,000. Of this ID 27,600,000 would be for water reservoirs, ID 7,000,000 for drainage, ID 2,000,000 for improved maintenance and the balance for new irrigation works. A more detailed breakdown is given in Table V of the appendix. These estimates are exclusive of the provision made in the first year's budget of the Development Board. They are based upon cost estimates made in Iraq by the Haigh Commission and others, but make allowances of 10 to 20 percent for intervening price increases. A further rise in prices in the future would, of course, raise the aggregate cost.

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[7] See Table IV in the appendix.

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APPENDIX

TABLE I

MEAN MONTHLY DISCHARGES OF THE EUPHRATES AND THE TIGRIS

(in cubic meters per second)

Month	The Euphrates at Hit[1]			The Tigris at Baghdad[2]		
	Mean monthly discharge	Maximum monthly discharge	Minimum monthly discharge	Mean monthly discharge	Maximum monthly discharge	Minimum monthly discharge
January	592	1,130	258	947	1,926	432
February	665	1,217	278	1,388	3,020	323
March	968	2,651	344	1,992	3,496	797
April	1,853	2,917	462	2,951	4,541	935
May	2,235	3,358	533	2,775	5,241	997
June	1,208	1,792	249	1,684	3,562	548
July	577	809	268	897	2,069	292
August	358	533	202	504	1,278	192
September	293	383	183	373	827	163
October	311	557	225	359	872	175
November	432	881	247	516	1,105	212
December	558	1,248	264	709	1,413	300

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[1] Based on observations over the years 1924-1946.

[2] Based on observations over the years 1906-1946.

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TABLE II

NUMBER AND HORSEPOWER OF IRRIGATION PUMPS AS OF MARCH 1, 1950

Average capacity of pumps: 1948-49 = 36.22 H.P.
1949-50 = 36.40 H.P.

Liwas	Euphrates and canals		Tigris and tributaries		Diyala and tributaries		Shatt al Gharraf		Shatt al Arab		Total 1949-50		Total 1948-49	
	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.
Mosul	—	—	74	2,394	—	—	—	—	—	—	74	2,394	71	2,209
Erbil	—	—	2	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	68	2	68
Suleimaniya	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	—	—	3	44	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	44	2	28
Diyala	—	—	54	2,518	68	3,277	—	—	—	—	122	5,795	115	5,386
Baghdad	139	4,453	1,084	33,475	92	3,852	—	—	—	—	1,315	41,780	1,313	41,849
Dulaim	265	7,904	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	265	7,904	268	7,974
Hilla	86	2,032	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	86	2,032	75	1,738
Kerbela	30	651	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	651	29	624
Diwaniya	570	22,610	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	570	22,610	477	18,705
Muntafiq	82	3,364	—	—	—	—	24	1,310	—	—	106	4,674	82	3,362
Kut	—	—	451	21,568	—	—	97	4,508	—	—	548	26,076	552	26,115
Amara	—	—	354	13,656	—	—	—	—	—	—	354	13,656	333	13,002
Basra	5	167	12	448	—	—	—	—	101	2,840	118	3,455	106	2,982
Total	1,177	41,181	2,034	74,171	160	7,129	121	5,818	101	2,840	3,593	131,139	3,425	124,042

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TABLE III

Salinity of the Euphrates and the Tigris[1]

(proportion of dissolved salts in parts per 100,000)

Month	Tigris At		Euphrates At		
	Baghdad	Hindiya	Hilla	Samawah	Ur Junction
January	26	9.5	16.7	19.7	20.0
February	26	7.2	16.9	22.6	23.5
March	22	10.7	20.5	21.1	20.7
April	19	7.4	18.0	13.9	20.0
May	19	5.8	18.5	10.3	10.0
June	19	8.3	10.8	10.9	8.0
July	23	9.1	10.2	16.5	14.0
August	28	22.1	22.5	69.0	70.9
September	30	20.7	26.6	90.7	97.6
October	32	26.8	27.0	69.8	82.2
November	33	17.5	19.1	53.3	57.2
December	27	17.1	21.4	57.2	74.4

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[1] Data for the Tigris are based on observations over the period 1924 to 1932, but those for the Euphrates on observations over only one year which was particularly dry.

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TABLE IV

Expenditures of the Directorate General of Irrigation
(in dinars)

Fiscal Year	CAPITAL WORKS BUDGET Capital Works Other than Bunds	Bunds	Total	ORDINARY BUDGET Irrigation and Drainage	Flood Control	Salaries Allowances Services	Total	TOTAL BUDGET
1941-42	247,396	53,295	300,691	63,986	32,566	75,332	171,884	472,575
1942-43	200,328	119,047	319,375	67,971	36,512	95,128	199,611	518,986
1943-44	355,461	152,830	508,291	82,606	22,842	118,598	224,046	732,337
1944-45	448,309	157,986	606,295	74,963	23,266	154,693	252,922	859,217
1945-46	326,975	124,756	451,731	68,077	28,093	157,981	254,151	705,882
1946-47	667,057	337,897	1,004,954	89,965	125,208	201,527	416,700	1,421,654
1947-48	783,139	363,020	1,146,159	86,628	13,318	187,781	287,727	1,433,886
1948-49	1,088,591	230,671	1,319,262	70,765	54,213	206,146	331,124	1,650,386
1949-50	726,224	159,084	885,308	69,924	32,608	189,418	291,950	1,177,258
1950-51	607,481	173,080	780,561	56,926	19,877	193,868	270,671	1,051,232
Total	5,450,961	1,871,666	7,322,627	731,811	388,503	1,580,472	2,700,786	10,023,413

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TABLE V

Estimated Cost of the Program
(in million dinars)

Project	Development Board Program 1951-52 to 1955-56	Mission Program 1952-53 to 1956-57
I. Dams and reservoirs		
Wadi Tharthar	9.62	10.30
Dokan	2.32	2.80
Bekhme	—	7.80
Derbend-i-Khan	4.80	5.10
Habbaniya	2.12	1.56
II. Irrigation works		
On the Tigris and its tributaries		
Hawija barrage	.50	.60
Adhaim barrage	.30	.36
Adhaim and Diyala feeders	—	1.50
Beni Saad barrage	.50	.60
Irrigation systems using Dokan reservoir supply	2.60	5.41
Regulators on the Gharraf	.45	.45
Control of the lower Tigris	1.20	1.20
On the Euphrates		
Remodelling of Hilla canal	.90	.90
Kifl barrage, regulation of the Shamiya, and Shamiya-Diwaniya feeder	.25	1.40
Irrigation systems using Habbaniya water supply	.40	5.18
Regulation of tails of the Euphrates	1.00	1.00
Other irrigation works	.32	—
III. Drainage	2.00	7.00
IV. Improved maintenance and operation	—	2.00
Total	29.28	55.16

361 a greater security of tenure. Other factors, which have no doubt affected the permanence of villages in some parts of the irrigation zone in central and southern Iraq, are the salination of the land and the silting of canals. In such cases, the fellahin have no choice but to abandon their villages.

In spite of these differences, however, the villages have a number of characteristics in common. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled together without any orderly design. There are no communal facilities or open spaces for the recreation of the
342 children. The huts are so constructed as to keep out heat, cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently, they consist of a single room with thick walls and a doorway, which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for both cooking food and keeping draft animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight, windows are either very small or totally lacking; sashes are expensive. Furnishings are limited to such elementary necessities as a mat and a plain table or a bench. Sanitary facilities, including latrines, are generally lacking.

312 The villages are necessarily located near a source of water, by a canal in the irrigation zone, by a stream or a well in the North. The water is not piped, but must be carried from its source to wherever it is used. Nor is it purified, although the canals in the irrigation zone may be heavily polluted. The water which has been used by men for washing and in which animals have immersed themselves while drinking is often used for human consumption. The constant trampling of the canal banks for these purposes leads to leaks and, hence, to stagnant pools near the adjacent village. Where the source of water is a well, the earth nearby may be dug out for use in the construction of houses and so, similarly, a
[364] stagnant pool may be the result. Such pools, combined with the total absence of any sanitary disposal of waste and garbage, constitute a serious danger to health.

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244 Trees are rarely seen in the villages, although they would give relief from the sun and from sandstorms. Trees would also provide firewood instead of the fuels currently used—animal dung, which could be used instead as fertilizer, and brushwood, which has to be gathered with considerable effort. Small gardens for vegetables are unknown. In fact, fruit and vegetables are almost

365 operating is under the control of Municipal Water and Electricity Boards. The Boards appear to be inexperienced in the management of such concerns, financial control being especially inadequate.

Water

• 312 One of the prime requisites of a community is a safe water supply. The principal source of water is the rivers. The Tigris, the Euphrates and their tributaries offer continuous and generous supplies of fresh water during the entire year. Communities have naturally stayed close to these sources of water and close to the many irrigation canals which now extend from the river systems.

While water from the rivers and irrigation canals is fresh (low in salt content), it nevertheless is high in colloidal and organic material, and usually high in bacteria. It is necessary, therefore, to treat such supplies of water for human consumption if general health is to be maintained (see Annex D, *Health*).

There are also a number of communities, mainly in the North, which are not situated near surface sources of water. These have to rely on subsoil water which, although it may be free from pollution, is apt to be brackish.

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312 The first modern water works was constructed shortly after the first World War. Development in this field has reached the point where approximately 40 municipalities have modern water systems, the outstanding ones being in the larger cities of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. All water works follow a similar pattern and consist of a raw water pumping station, sedimentation tanks, sand filters, chlorine treating equipment and an elevated surge tank. The capacity of the various water works is usually premised on the basis of 25 gallons per person per day with an allowance for a population growth in 25 years of 1.5 percent per annum.

Administration by the Water Boards has thus far been good. The Boards have established water rates for large consumers on a metered basis, while small consumers receive a flat rate. In either case, the rates are very reasonable and vary from 10 to 30 fils per cubic meter or from 100 to 250 fils per month, where a flat rate is established.

The development of municipal water systems has not taken place as rapidly as it should, primarily because of the lack of suffi-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

cient funds. The Department of Municipalities, however, antici- 312 pating assistance from the Development Board in its financing, has 365 prepared a plan of construction during the next five years which will include the expansion or construction of new facilities in 114 municipalities having an aggregate population of approximately 950,000. The plan is practical and technically follows present methods. Many of the treatment plants are of the same size. This, fortunately, permits standardization which considerably reduces capital costs. The total estimated cost of the program is ID 5,651,600 of which approximately 50 percent would be in foreign exchange, mostly in sterling.

There are numerous villages in addition to municipalities where the problem of obtaining water is very critical. In many cases, this could be relieved by either a single well or by pumping small quantities of water at some distance from streams or irrigation ditches. Such sources of water would in many cases be impure and would require the use of clay filters. Nevertheless, it would relieve the people of the burden of carrying water for human consumption a great distance. These facilities should not cost more than ID 1,500 per installation.

With the need for pure water so critical, it is recommended that the Development Board assist the Department of Municipalities in financing the five-year program for the municipalities. In the meantime, the Department should study the problem of supplying water to the numerous villages and formulate plans for consideration by the Development Board.

Sanitation

Adequate disposal of waste water is an acute problem through- 365 out Iraq and a long-term program needs to be drawn up. Pending 364 this, a start should be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rise in the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. In 1947, an English firm prepared a report on the installation of a sewage and drainage system for the city—complete with pumping stations, sewage purification works, etc., and estimated to cost ID 4,600,000 on the east bank of the Tigris and ID 4,300,000 on the west bank. The proposed scheme could be undertaken in stages.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

to him permanently. Women are almost invariably known by the 601
name of their eldest son, preceded of course by Umm. The other
extremely common practice is that of giving a man a laqab, or nick- 551
name, from some habit or personal peculiarity. The laqab is rarely
complimentary.

8. A MAN'S HONOUR IS IN THE HAIR OF HIS MOUSTACHE

Page 111, Line 14. 'The hub in their house was empty of water.'

The hub is a large porous earthenware jar, which keeps water cool 415
by evaporation.

Page 112, Line 6. 'Nor did he even own the leg of a mare.'

The phrase 'leg of a mare' implies that a man has ownership in a 422
quarter share of the sale price of all foals from the mare. It is quite
common for deals to be done in one, two, or three legs of a mare, and
for one mare to have four owners.

Page 116, Line 13. 'Then will our sheikh cry, Sheil.'

Sheil, or Take away, is a word commonly used as an order to strike 192
camp.

Page 116, Line 28. 'You should not have to drink the water from a 312
camel's stomach.' 271

When threatened by death from thirst in the desert, Arabs may be forced to slaughter their camels in order to drink the stomach fluids. I have also been told that travellers have made their camels sick by forcing a stick down their throats to get a little fluid. I do not know if this is true. It would appear to me to be a most difficult operation.

Page 118, Line 29. 'Cut my head to keep the secret.'

This should probably have been more properly translated 'Cut my 192
head off to keep the secret,' for I have since been told one man's 539
version of this saying. According to his account there were three
brothers of a famous Nejaf family, living in poverty, and they were
forced to become thieves. One day they went to raid a Turkish Army
camp near to Hindya. In the daytime they watched the camp and
saw which was the guard tent in which the treasure chest was hidden.
They then waited till night, and, when the camp was asleep, they

● 312 The area of arable land is now estimated at one-fifth of the total area. A new system of irrigation has been put into operation: many canals have been dug; dams have been built, the largest of which are the Kut dam, which is 500 metres long and irrigates 2,225 square kilometres, and the Diyala dam, which irrigates the whole province of the same name; reservoirs and pumps have been installed: in 1946-47, 3,168 pumps, with a total capacity of 111,687 h.p., were in operation in the Tigris basin, 973 in the basin of the Euphrates, and eighty-seven in the basin of the Shatt al-Arab and in the creek of Basra.

241 The main crops are as follows:

1. Cereals: barley, especially north-east of Kirkuk and in the regions of Kut and Muntafiq, south-east of Baghdad, in the irrigated area; wheat, north of Kirkuk (where the best quality is grown), in the regions of Baghdad, Kut and Diwaniya, and also east of Ramadi; rice, in the regions of the lower Euphrates, near Suq ash Shuyukh and east of Nasiriya and the Tigris, south of Amara, and in the districts of Diwaniya and Hilla. In the southern part of the country, maize and millet are also cultivated.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
IraqMH1

164 helminthosis are endemic. There are occasional outbreaks of
657 smallpox, typhus, and more rarely plague and cholera. With
the greater provision in the budget for schemes of public health,
the increased employment of international specialists and the
considerable assistance tendered by the World Health Organi-
zation, there is every prospect that the incidence of endemic
874 diseases will be greatly reduced. Fundamental results may be
expected from modern medical training, with emphasis on the
742 environmental aspects of disease and the need for prevention
657 as much as or even more than cure, and, above all, from the
743 efforts of the administration to improve the environment itself,
[312] with especial reference to drainage and water-supply. In addi-
tion, attention is to be paid to the public health aspects of the
pilgrimages. The curative services have in general received more attention than the preventive and have improved considerably in the past thirty years. Simple conditions are treated in some 400 state dispensaries, distributed fairly evenly throughout the country but varying in their equipment and staff; it has hitherto proved difficult to attract doctors to the provinces and particularly to the rural districts. Each *liwa* centre has a general hospital, the larger towns more than one. There are also specialized hospitals for maternity and child welfare, for infectious, chest, eye, venereal, and mental diseases, and for lepers. The army, police, railways, Port of Basra, Ministry of Education, and oil companies maintain their own medical services and hospitals, and there are in addition an American Mission Hospital and a number of private nursing homes. A five-year programme, financed by the Development Board, will provide for the repair, extension, and replacement of medical buildings which have become old or inadequate. There is an acute shortage of well-trained nurses; attempts to expand the service are hampered by the reluctance of Muslim girls of good family to enter it.

Education

658 The state provides elementary, intermediate, secondary, and
871 higher education, all, since December 1952, completely free.
There are also private and foreign schools on a kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, and secondary level.

State Education. Primary education, by law universal and compulsory where facilities exist, begins at the age of six and continues for six years. It has been limited by a shortage of schools and trained teachers, especially in the villages. Plans are in hand to meet the need. The rapid expansion of state primary education is demonstrated in the following table:

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185 charcoal production with consequent encouragement of
137 secondary industries, and improve climatic conditions.
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Problems of Agriculture

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Among the natural difficulties which attend agriculture in Iraq are those imposed by drought, floods, dust storms, diseases, pests, and soil erosion, of which the first two are being attacked by a large-scale programme of irrigation and flood-control. The major diseases are the inflorescence rot of dates, wilt diseases of tomato and watermelon, gummosis of citrus, rusts of cereals, and various mildews. The major insect pests are the Moroccan locust, whose ravages have from time to time caused immense damage to cereal crops, the grasshopper, the Mediterranean fruit fly, the date-fruit mite and Dubas bug, and the Sunn pest and bug *Aolia acuminata* which attack wheat and barley. The Ministry of Agriculture is combating these diseases and pests by modern methods; in locust-fighting Iraq is among the most advanced countries in the world. The problem of soil erosion can to some extent be met by the activities of the Forestry Department.

Irrigation

● 312 The aim of water-control in Iraq is to even out the seasonal flow in the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, so as to prevent both drought and flooding in the irrigated areas and to increase the area under cultivation. Irrigation itself imposes the necessity of drainage, to prevent the salting up of irrigated land and the further spread of malaria.

Three methods of irrigation are employed: direct inundation at flood-time, which is used for rice cultivation and is of comparatively limited importance; distribution of water from rivers and canals by direct flow on to the land through a network of small channels and cuts; the lifting of water into the channels and cuts by various methods which include the use of mechanical pumps. The date-palm groves of the Shatt al-Arab benefit by natural irrigation; twice a day as the tide rises and falls fresh water is forced into the creeks and channels and then drains out again.

Irrigation—often highly organized—has been a feature of Iraqi agriculture since the Sumerian civilization, in decline since the seventh century, and especially since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Serious reconstruction began in this century, with the Hindiya barrage, completed in 1913, for which the Euphrates was diverted, and the Kut barrage on the

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312
water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423
are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427
There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24
per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [241]
on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators.
This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423
disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433
perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185
which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464
reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large
farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery 166
is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of
farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the [161]
cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

133 delta of two rivers—the Euphrates and the Tigris. With insignificant exceptions, it is one vast level expanse made up of the rich silt that these rivers have brought down. It contains no physical features whatever that call for comment except the plains and the rivers, unless we mention that combination of plain and river which covers a considerable area, namely the marsh. In the past this district was the seat of some of the great empires of antiquity—Assyria and Babylonia and Persia. When Xenophon marched over it about 400 B. C., it was and had been for centuries one of the world's centers of power and productiveness. It supported a vast population in those days, how vast no one knows, but the ruins of ancient cities suggest that it must have been very great in-
312 deed. The basis of its[1] greatness was the use of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for irrigation. By this means the whole country had been transformed into one vast garden. The area was not so large then as it is now, for year by year the delta encroaches on the sea. It is supposed that in ancient times the sea reached up as far as Gurna at least, and that is a hundred miles from the present mouth of the river.

Under the Mohammedan caliphs of Baghdad the irrigation dams, waterways and smaller canals that had existed for centuries were allowed to fall into greater and greater decay. The Mongol invasion of Mesopotamia, which culminated in the capture of Baghdad in 1258 A. D., resulted in the complete destruction of this ancient system of irrigation. Ever since it has been in ruins, but the courses of the larger waterways are still distinguishable, and engineers tell us that they can decipher the en-
162 tire system. The country has been a desert since that
311 day, populated by nomad tribes who roam over the vast

[1] [The Tigris-Euphrates Delta Area -- Analyst]

Iraq MH1

162 level plains and raise, by means of the scanty rainfall, 311 a meager amount of wheat and barley in favorable seasons.

312 Along the rivers in their upper courses are a few gardens, irrigated by means of various draught animals and water-wheels, which elevate water from the stream to the level of the land above. At Gurna the Tigris and Euphrates join to form one river and at Mohammerah the Karun empties into this united stream. The three rivers thus flow into the ocean as one enormous waterway, known locally as the "Arab River." For the last hundred miles before the sea is reached, the fresh water of the river ebbs and flows with the tides, and by cutting outlets along the river banks gardens may be automatically irrigated twice a day if so much water is desired.
245 Along these lower stretches each bank of the river is lined with beautiful gardens, which reach a depth of some miles in places and extend in practically an unbroken expanse all the way up to Basra and in less prolific culture even as far as Gurna. These date gardens are beautiful things, beautiful for what they are now, and more beautiful still as a suggestion of what all Mesopotamia might be. They are also one of the most melancholy things in the world as reminders of what the past developed and the present has wasted.

311 The land has enormous resources for agricultural de-
134 velopment. That whole vast district may be made into the garden spot of the earth. The soil is the best in the world, river silt hundreds of feet deep. It is as level as a parlor floor, with just enough pitch between the big rivers, and between the north and south, to make irriga-
312 tion easy. All that is necessary is a perfected system of
185 irrigation, and although the necessary investment would

● 312 be large, running up to hundreds of millions of dollars,
185 it should bring excellent returns. The trouble hitherto
has been the unstable character of the government and
the consequent risk to which any such investment would
be exposed. During the time of the spring high waters,
a disaffected tribe might obtain control of some important
dam and with one stick of dynamite destroy nearly the
whole system. But with a stable government the project
should be one of great promise. The water is at
311 hand, three riverfuls of it, and as if to prove the prac-
312 ticability of the dream, we know that in the ages of an-
185 tiquity these resources were utilized for this purpose and
with the most splendid success. Whether there is actually
water enough to transform every square mile of the country
into a garden or whether the supply of available land
will prove to be more than the water can care for, especially
now since the area has so greatly increased, can
only be told after the project is tried. Certainly there
is water enough for hundreds of square miles, enough
indeed to make Mesopotamia one of the richest countries
of its size in the world. Already one new irrigated area
has been developed by the Hindiya Barrage built by a
British concern between 1911 and 1913 as the first step
in the reconstruction of the ancient irrigation system.
The erection of this great barrage on the Euphrates River
was due to the Young Turks, the dam being the first unit
in a comprehensive irrigation project for the entire country
which had been drawn up for them by the noted
engineer, Sir William Willcocks. It is only a beginning,
but it has made the desert rejoice and blossom as the
rose over many square miles of territory.

311 With the exception of the rich petroleum deposits
162 which are said to exist throughout the Mosul district and

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

311 162 which may play a prominent part in the economic development of the country, Mesopotamia may be regarded as a purely agricultural land. From this standpoint it is best considered in two sections. There is the river-irrigated date-growing district to the south, with Basra as its center, and there is the district to the north inhabited by nomads, semi-nomads and river agriculturists, with its principal center in Baghdad and a second capital further north in Mosul.

● 312 245 The date gardeners along the river in the Basra territory resemble in many ways the cultivators that can be seen in any oasis town in Arabia. Their work is very similar. Irrigation systems must be constructed. Channels must be provided to carry the water to the roots of the date palms and to the squares of alfalfa and other crops. There is this difference, however, that the water flows of itself. Twice a day the tide of the ocean backs up the water of the great Arab River as far as Gurna, about a hundred miles from the sea. The extensive cultivation of dates stops at that point. The water can be shut out of a field if so desired, or the gates can be opened and as much allowed to enter as is needed. The supply is unlimited and can be had twice a day the year around. The soil is ideal. It is rich and hundreds of feet deep. In natural endowment Mesopotamia is a paradise for date gardeners.

511 As a matter of fact, however, that country is far from a paradise for date gardeners. The favorable conditions ought to make their work easier and their remuneration greater, but the facts are otherwise. Their condition is worse than that of the cultivators in Hasa. It is the story of the Bahrein pearl banks over again. The increased wealth of the Bahrein pearl banks has not bene-

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East

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[Marsh Arabs]

243 Bombay was. "No," he said, "here we make our bread
262 from rice flour. When the wheat crop is a failure, as in
the past year, we have almost nothing else."

312 These overflow districts,^ which are marshes in the
spring when the rivers overflow, dry down to hard soil
later in the year. To keep the water high for a few
weeks longer than it would naturally remain so, temporary
dams are constructed across some of the smaller
streams, leaving an opening to allow boats to pass and
water to run through. These dams persist in the face
[342] of a strong current in a way that is surprising. Mud,
tree branches, mats, soil and the like seem to be the only
building material, for there is no stone within hundreds of
[476] miles. The dams require a large amount of labor, and
of course are coöperative enterprises. Possibly because
of this necessity for coöperative effort, the Marsh Arab
communities appear to have developed a good degree of
community spirit.

361 Like their race everywhere, these Marsh Arabs do not
live in isolated individual houses in the midst of their
fields but collect in larger or smaller towns, some of them
of considerable size. These towns are located usually
in the fork of a river, or where several streams
come together. In Lower Mesopotamia there are many
small channels that carry water either out of the main
501 river or into it. The Marsh Arabs get about in picturesque,
high-prowed, black river boats, black because they
are covered with a thick coat of native bitumen which
wells from the ground in one or two places in Mesopo-
[135] tamia and is an indication, so the engineers tell us, that
petroleum is to be found in that country. These river
boats, which are the one means of transportation, are
built somewhat on the lines of a canoe and take consid-

^[along the last 100 miles of the Arab river from Gurna to the Gulf -- Analyst]

177 try rather than fostering the development of something
indigenous and natural. Under such a system the enforcement
of law may become of necessity very mechanical,
as when an Indian Sepoy nearly knocks down an inoffensive
Arab pedestrian by a blow with his fist for no
greater crime than walking on the wrong side of the
road to avoid a mud puddle. In the courts, too, a crowd
of lawyers and an abundance of red tape, with venal
underlings, may serve to make the paths of justice tortuous
and uncertain in spite of the best intentions on the
part of the presiding judge.

185 Nevertheless, even under such handicaps as those we
177 have indicated, there is no questioning the very great
material progress that is to be seen in Mesopotamia.
[363] Even before the war one of Baghdad's streets was paved,
and since the British have taken over the administration
of the kingdom, all sorts of improvements have been introduced.
[496] The railroad system of the country now extends
360 miles from Basra to Baghdad and from there
on nearly to Mosul. There are several subsidiary lines,
the total amounting to over 1000 miles. By far the
greater part of this mileage was constructed by the British
[312] for war purposes. Under British rule, also, the Hindiya
Barrage and other less important irrigation works
have been kept in order and improved and extensive harbor
improvements at Basra undertaken.

364 British sanitary and health officers have been appointed
744 for Mesopotamia and no praise is too high for
their largely unappreciated but nevertheless unselfish and
extremely efficient labors in that country. The hospital
work that has been undertaken in Basra, Baghdad and
Amara, the inspection of eating houses, and the maintaining
of sanitary conditions have been excellently done.

15: Tannous N,G-5 (no date) 1951 MI Middle East MI
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Syria MD1

equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

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There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

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Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

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On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1

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distributed reclaimed state domain among the peasants. During the past few years the Ministry of Social Affairs, under energetic and progressive leadership, has been increasingly and effectively sponsoring the cause of the peasant. Among other things, it has proposed draft laws aimed at land reform and at improved tenancy terms. In July 1950, the Egyptian Parliament passed one of these bills, stipulating that estate owners should provide tenants with certain housing and health facilities, and with other services. During the last two years certain deputies have proposed two definite draft laws for land reform in Parliament. Similar proposals have been made by other responsible leaders. All of them aim straight at the heart of the problem — stipulating the distribution of state domain among peasants, the restriction of the size of holdings within minimum and maximum limits, the extension of credit to the new small owner, the protection of peasant property, the improvement of tenancy terms, etc.

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A similar consciousness of the magnitude of the problem and the grave consequences it might entail has arisen in Iraq. As far back as 1932 a comprehensive program of land survey and registration was initiated and has been in operation since. At the end of 1947 about 20 million acres (close to 20 percent of the total area of the country) were surveyed and classified. This program constitutes a basic move in the right direction, as it results in clearing the great confusion over title claims.

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In 1945 the Iraqi Parliament passed a bill (Law No. 23) authorizing the Government to distribute state domain among landless peasants or tribesmen on the basis of small private ownership. It was a small beginning as the application of the law was restricted to one specific area, the Dujaylah lands, in the Kut Liwa south of Baghdad. Some 180,000 acres were put under irrigation and divided into plots of about 60 acres each for distribution to farming families. After a probationary period of 10 years under government supervision, the farmer can acquire complete ownership of the land. At the beginning of 1947 about 400 cultivators were settled on the project land. Possibly an equal number has been settled since that time. In 1946 another project, the Hawijah Settlement Scheme, was finished. It involved the distribution of some 200,000 acres of irrigated state land among members of the 'Ubayd tribe.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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Chapter VII

IRAQ

LAND AND POPULATION

2441 3124 THE peculiar feature of agriculture in Iraq is that in the greater part of the country extensive farming is practised on irrigated land. Elsewhere in the Middle East irrigation is always accompanied by a great intensification of production, but in Iraq extensive and shifting cultivation is practised even on irrigated land, and both land and water are wasted.

311 The productive area of the country falls into two halves—the rainfall zone in the north, and the irrigation zone of the south, on the alluvial plain between the two rivers.

3124 In the irrigation zone, there is no controlled system of irrigation, as in Egypt. Each river has a modern barrage, the Tigris at Kut, and the Euphrates at Hindiya, but both are situated low down towards the delta, and command a comparatively small area of cultivation. Apart from the areas served by the barrages, the main system of irrigation is by flow, that is, by basin irrigation.

There are two flood periods, December to March, due to winter rains, and March till May, when the snow melts in the higher reaches of the rivers, and there are therefore two crop seasons. The danger of flood is always present, because the level of the rivers in many parts is a few feet higher than the level of the plain. Some progress has been made in recent years in flood control, as for instance the Habbaniya escape, but there is great need for a reservoir in one of the upper tributaries of the Tigris to prevent flooding in the spring and to release extra water in the dry season.

311 In recent years there has been a rapid extension of cultivation as population has increased. In 1918, the total cropped area in the irrigation zone was only 936,500 acres, and in 1943 it had increased to 4,241,718 acres.

The classification of land in Iraq presents difficulties, because not all the cultivable area is cultivated and not all the cultivated area is cropped.

The main divisions in 1943 were as follows:

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
TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAQ
SYRIAN DESERT
PERSIA
Urmia Lake
Amadiya
Mosul
Bakhme Gorge
Rowanduz
Erbil
Kirkuk
Sulaimaniya
Wadi Tharthar
Euphrates
L. Habbaniya
Diyala
Baghdad
Musaiyib
Karbala
Hindiya Barrage
Kut
Diwaniya
MUNTAFIQ
Amara
Basra
S
Rainfed
Flow Irrigation
Mechanical Pump Irrigation
Date Palm Plantations

IRAQ: TYPES OF CULTIVATION

LAND AND POPULATION

LAND UTILIZATION IN IRAQ

	Square Kilometres	*Acres*
311 (*a*) *Total Area*	453,500	112,060,000
(*b*) *Rainfall Zone*		
312 1. Approximate gross area of cultivated and cultivable lands	41,000	10,131,000
2. Approximate *shitwi* (winter) and *saifi* (summer) areas at present cultivated annually	6,000	1,483,000
(*c*) *Irrigation Zone*		
1. Approximate gross area of cultivated and cultivable lands	80,000	19,770,000
2. (*a*) Area of *shitwi* (winter) cultivation capable of annual irrigation by river supplies	16,000	3,900,000
(*b*) Area of *saifi* (summer) cultivation capable of annual irrigation by river supplies	4,300	1,054,000
3. *Shitwi* (winter) areas at present irrigated annually	12,100	2,947,000[1]
4. *Saifi* (summer) areas at present irrigated annually	4,000	1,001,000[2]
5. *Shitwi* and *saifi* areas at present cultivated annually (total of 3 and 4)	16,100	3,948,000
6. Garden areas at present irrigated annually	1,200	309,000
7. Total area cultivated (5 and 6)	17,300	4,257,000

Source: Ahmed Sousa, *Iraq Irrigation Handbook*, Part I: The Euphrates (Baghdad, Directorate General of Irrigation, 1944), pp. 11–12.

Thus the total cultivated and cultivable and cropped areas are:

	Acres
Rainfall Zone	
Cultivated and Cultivable	10,131,000
Cropped	1,483,000
Irrigation Zone	
Cultivated and Cultivable	19,770,000
Cropped	4,257,000
Total Cultivable Land	29,901,000
Total Cropped Land	5,740,000

The cropped area in the irrigation zone is divided between:

Winter crops	2,947,000
Summer crops	1,001,000
Garden areas (i.e., dates, etc.)	309,000
TOTAL	4,257,000

311 The cropped area amounts to only one-fifth of the cultivable area, and this needs explanation since it suggests that great increases in cultivation are possible. Within the area cultivated

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[1] By lift from pump installations approximately 1,591,380 acres; by flow from perennial canals approximately 1,355,620 acres.

[2] By lift from pump installations approximately 560,560 acres; by flow (rice and other summer crops) approximately 440,440 acres.

311 at any one time, a large proportion of the land is left fallow, as water supplies are insufficient to irrigate more. The cultivated land is approximately twice the cropped area, but under present conditions it would not be possible to crop the whole area owing to shortage of water. If water could be stored for the summer period, a crop could be sown during the summer in the irrigation zone. When the Bekhme dam is completed, the summer supplies of water will be so large that the area under summer crops could be greatly increased.

Not only is much land left fallow within the area which is being cultivated at any one time, but the area of cultivation shifts within the irrigation zone at intervals of several years, because after a period of cultivation the soil becomes saline. This results from the lack of drainage. Only in the areas where there is natural drainage from the Euphrates to the Tigris near Baghdad, or further south, where the Tigris drains into the Euphrates, is there no danger of salinity. When the soil gets saline, the landlord abandons it and transfers cultivation to new ground, and new canals are dug. This is of course a wasteful system, and can only continue as long as there are ample reserves of land. Thus an increase in the area cultivated depends on (1) a general irrigation system, (2) a general drainage system.

311 The question of how far it will be possible to extend the area under cultivation depends on how great an increase in total water
● 312 supply is practicable. It is water, not land, which is lacking in Iraq. Varying estimates are available; Sir William Willcocks considered that the amount of land which could be put under winter cultivation in the irrigation zone with the existing average supplies of Iraq's rivers would be 7,410,000 acres or two and a half times the present winter cropped area.[1] Ahmed Sousa, in the estimates given in *Iraq Irrigation Handbook*, puts the total area which could be put under winter crops with the existing water supplies at 3,900,000 acres,[2] an increase of one million acres on the present area cropped.

On this estimate the maximum addition to the area under winter cultivation may be about one million acres; and possibly half a million acres could be added to the summer cropped area

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[1] *Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, 2nd edition (London, Spon Ltd, 1917), p. 9.
[2] p. 3.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

811 which now amounts to one million acres. More might be added by water storage schemes. At present several large new schemes 812 are under consideration. These involve flood control by the construction of the Bekhme dam on the Great Zab, and an extension of the Habbaniya reservoir. In addition to the Bekhme dam a scheme for flood irrigation in the Wadi Tharthar is being considered. A survey commission is now preparing a report on these developments, but so far no estimates have been made of the area of land likely to be brought into cultivation.

464 At present there is no shortage of labour. The population is 161 small in relation to the area cropped, but it is growing rapidly. In 1931, according to Dowson, the total population was 162 2,824,000, of which 2,246,000 were estimated to be rural, including 895,000 settled population and 1,351,000 still living in tribal conditions.[1] Estimates for 1943 put the total population at 4,500,000, of which the rural population was 3,500,000. Some regions, Basra, Karbala, Dulaim, and Muntafiq are densely settled, while others, chiefly in the north, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, 811 are settled very sparsely. The area of cropped land per head is 2 acres, and the area of cultivated land perhaps as much as 4 acres.

LAND TENURE

432 It is clear that Iraq has greater prospects of agricultural expansion than any other Middle East country. But to the deve- 423 lopment of these potentialities the greatest obstacle is land tenure. Sir Ernest Dowson, in his classical report on the subject, says: 'The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free 000 from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the

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[1] Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth Garden City Press for the Iraqi Government, 1932), p. 12.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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423 tribal organization there was no clear definition of individual rights of ownership to the collectively-owned land. It was a 619 system which could exist as long as no one thought about it; as long, that is, as the tribe was accepted as the unit of political life, and as long as no individual claims were likely to be made. It is for this reason that it is impossible, once the tribal system has ceased to be the political unit, to settle land on a tribal basis; and yet to settle land on the basis of the supposed individual claims creates grave injustice, because in practice it means that too much land is allotted to the sheikhs and that the cultivators are reduced to the position of tenants or labourers.

439 Since the early years of the twentieth century the tribal system has been breaking up, and the economic development of the country in the twenty years between the wars has hastened its disintegration. When water transport came to the Persian Gulf towards the end of the nineteenth century, export markets opened for Iraq grain; the subsistence economy broke down and production for export began. Exports of grain increased from 65,000 tons in the early eighteen-nineties to 120,000 tons in 1909–13, and to 380,000 tons in 1934–9. The profitability of 556 export has given the tribal chiefs a motive for acquiring land as their personal property.

The tendency to acquire land for the sake of money income was much strengthened, in the twenty years between the two wars, by the rapid extension of pump irrigation and the accompanying increase in the cultivated area. Pump installations ● 312 have increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,000 in 1944, and provide 426 water for some 2½ million acres of land, or over half the cultivated land in the irrigated zone. The installation of a pumping system is comparatively cheap, costing some £2,000 before the recent war, but it is far beyond the means of the peasants, so that pumps have been installed by sheikhs, or more frequently by city notables, who make contracts to supply them to peasants at extortionate rates of interest, and so gradually acquire the land in payment of debt. In many cases the sub-chiefs, or sirkals, have become pump owners.

423 Thus in the regions of pump irrigation the tribal system has entirely ceased to function. The land is mainly the property of 427 the pump owners, with the cultivators taking a meagre share of the crop, varying from one-seventh to one-fourteenth or one-

423 twenty-first part of the total. The position of the share-tenant
427 in Iraq is much worse than that of his counterpart in Syria.

In the districts of flood irrigation the tribal system has dis-
621 integrated, but its superstructure, the sheikhs and sirkals, re-
622 mains. Most of the political functions of the tribe have now
been transferred to the State, and the only economic function
● 312 now performed by the tribal authorities is the control of irri-
427 gation, digging of canals, and repairing of breaches, which is
done by the cultivators under the direction of the sirkal who
has become a kind of farm bailiff acting for the sheikh. Under
this system the sheikh and sirkal take together up to 80 per cent
of the crop, leaving the cultivator some 20–30 per cent.

423 This exploitation is possible because the sheikhs have succeed-
ed in establishing, mainly during the last fifteen years, their title
425 to absolute ownership of the tribal land by means of land settlement. Because in Ottoman times the cultivators had no legal title to the land which they occupied, the landlords were able, during the period of the mandate, to use their political power to secure legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the property of the tribe. In much the same way the English landlords of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enclosed land as their property which was traditionally common property, and ousted small holders whose title was based only on custom. As in nineteenth century England, the process is being hastened by mechanization, which gives the big landowners an advantage as against the small cultivator, and by inflation, which gives them
565 the impetus to invest. The big landowners of Iraq are a comparatively recent creation, and it is the economic and legal changes of the past twenty years which have established their position.

423 *Northern Iraq*. In northern Iraq there is a different type of land
tenure and fewer large landowners. South of Mosul, in the fertile
471 Tigris Valley, where pumps have been installed, there is a tribal
system resembling that of the south, and the land is owned
mainly by tribal sheikhs and notables. West of Mosul, on the
rolling uplands with poor rainfall, the land is also held on
471 a tribal system. In this region in recent years there has been
a rapid introduction of machinery; and the sheikhs are extending
their power to acquire land. In future bigger imports of
machinery will probably cause them to extend their influence

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initiative and financial assistance of the government.[36] 433

The government has been advised to encourage development of light industries: Cotton textiles, cottonseed oil crushing mills, jute mills, bone fertilizer plants, automobile tire factories, small steel mills, central machine shops, concrete block plants, possibly a paper mill, a chemical factory for making inorganic fertilizer, and possibly salt refineries.

The Mission strongly urged the government not to attempt to own or operate these new factories itself, but to encourage private capital to do so.[37] This recommendation has been followed in the main. The Industrial Bank, created with funds derived from the oil royalties, has been financing private industry in a number of fields, particularly cotton textiles and cottonseed oil crushing and refining. The outstanding exception is the new petroleum refinery being built by the government. 652 135

OIL 382

Oil reserves in Iraq are thought to be tremendous—at least a third of the total Middle Eastern reserves, which are reckoned at 50 billion barrels, or

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administrat*

Capacity of the Kut Barrage on the Tigris River in Iraq is almost a quarter of a million cubic feet of water per second, which makes it the largest diversion dam of its kind in the world. The dam was built by British contractors for the Iraq Government in 1939. With oil revenues now pouring into the treasury Iraq plans to build several more large-scale irrigation facilities for storage and diversion. New projects are already in progress in the upper reaches of the Tigris River system.

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[36] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

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The problems of land tenure are generally cited as being a restriction to agricultural development. One United Nations' study states the absence of settlement title is undoubtedly a major obstacle to expansion of cultivation of dry land and intensification of agriculture in irrigated or irrigable zones.[40] The same report also points out that the lack of adequate legislation on water rights is another serious defect.[41] 423

RESETTLEMENT

Sizable areas are being settled by the state under the provisions of a law passed in 1951 which distributes about 67 acres per family to landless people, agricultural school graduates, former civil service employees, pensioners, and the unemployed. The farming program on these projects is supervised rigorously. On the 75,000-acre Dujaila Project on the Tigris River the prescribed planting program is as follows: 20 per cent in wheat, 15 per cent in barley, 5 per cent in fruit, 4 per cent in cotton and flax, 3 per cent in sesame, and 3 per cent in vegetables. Another 5 per cent will be devoted to housing, and the remaining 45 per cent must lie in fallow because of a water shortage.[42] 166 425 241

The Mission report criticized these land settlement schemes on several bases. The land is given to the farmers, the title being transferred after 10 years of successful operation. The Mission believes the land should be sold. The Mission also criticizes the allocation of land to people who have had no farming experience and who have not necessarily shown themselves to be suited by temperament for farming, and it expresses doubt that the program actually has improved the land or the farmer. The economic report stated: "The improved economic position of the cultivators in the new Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to his landlord."[43]

There are half a dozen other projects, involving 250,000 acres, in various stages of promotion which the Point Four Mission is being urged to assist in planning and supervising.

IRRIGATION

At present irrigation water is provided by the Kut and Hilla Barrages on the upper Tigris River, several smaller ones on the lower reaches, and the Hindiya Barrage on the Euphrates River. The water is carried by pumps and canals. About 2 million acres are irrigated by pumps and another 4 to 5 million acres by gravity flow. 312

Estimates indicated cultivatable land can be expanded almost three times if water is available. Yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not permit even the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers during the spring flood season are clearly essential. The government already has initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage system for the Euphrates River and has let the contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The Development Board is undertaking also construction of three dams on the upper tributaries of the $\overset{1}{\wedge}$

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[40] *Land Reform*, United Nations, 1951, p. 27.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[42] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, United Nations, December, 1949, p. 31.

[43] Boardman, Frances, "Iraq Moves Toward Land Reform," *Foreign Agriculture*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1951.

$\underset{\wedge}{1}$- [Text continues on p. 97--Analyst]

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Table 32

IRAQ: Area Under Cultivation by Crops as Per Cent of Cultivated Area
1948

Crop	Per Cent of Total
	Per Cent
Rice	12.3
Sesame	2.5
Maize	1.4
Green Gram	1.0
Millet	.9
Wheat	40.2
Barley	40.6
Linseed	.1
Lentils	.4
Chickling	.3
Cotton	.3
Total	100.0
Total Acres under Cultivation	5,877,494

SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture.

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
TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAQ
IRRIGATION SYSTEM
EXISTING IRRIGATION
Flow
Pump
Marsh areas
High dam sites
Existing barrages
Proposed barrages
Proposed canal or extensions
Existing rivers or canals
RAINFED ZONE
IRRIGATION ZONE
Mosul
Greater Zab
Zab R.
Lesser Zab
Tigris
Euphrates R.
Diyala R.
DIYALA WEIR
HABBANIYA LAKE
Baghdad
HINDIYA BARRAGE
Hilla
Kut
HAMMAR LAKE
Basra
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
STATUTE MILES
0
50
100
150
40°
42°
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°

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Tigris, and a large reservoir at Bekhme in the mountains on the Great Zab. 312
The Mission endorsed these projects and recommended others to compensate for diversion and to balance the systems.

The Iraq Irrigation Development Commission believes that the area under irrigation can be increased to 12 million acres by the installation of additional storage facilities, by drainage, rehabilitation, and by new supplies of water.[44]

It is agreed generally that the rain-fed zones in the north must continue to depend primarily on rainfall. Although no accurate estimates are available, the total area which might be available for cultivation in this area is thought to be substantial.

Along with irrigation, an important means of improving productivity is 241
drainage. This would have an immediate effect; other proposals depend on 311
the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation.

As much as 20 to 30 per cent of the cultivated land is said to be abandoned because of salt accumulation. On a large part of the remaining land, yields have declined as much as 50 per cent. Drainage—almost totally neglected—the report concluded, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor.[45]

MECHANIZATION

Because of the cost, the Mission predicted that mechanization would pro- 241
ceed slowly. This conclusion was reached in the face of experience which 407
shows that tractor ploughing may increase yields 20 to 50 per cent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and better preparation of the soil.[46] No doubt mechanization will become increasingly important as additional land is placed under cultivation and labor becomes scarce.

About 750 tractors and 320 combines are in the country at the present time. A government agency owns 75 of the combines and 81 tractors and plans to import an additional 2,500 tractors and 550 combines with auxiliary equipment.[47] About 50 per cent of the machinery will be retained at government-owned tractor stations and rented or let out under contract.[48] The rest will be sold on easy terms to the farmers.

The International Bank approved a modified version of this machinery program but suggested that rental charges be increased to make the project self-sustaining, and adequate repair shops and demonstration and training programs were recommended.

SOIL BUILDING

It is obvious that the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished. [134]

Cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is said to be virtually un- 242
known. Attention needs to be given to the production of legumes. Commercial fertilization must be studied and, if possible, plants should be built to produce inorganic and organic materials. Soil analyses also are generally needed.

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[44] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, p. 16.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[48] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey, op. cit.*, p. 33.

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242 being conducted this year with about nine different insecticides, but a more thorough program is needed.

The FAO is supplying a specialized cotton entomologist, and the Point Four Mission is supplying a general entomologist to help develop an effective program.

[656] The country has a law requiring that all cotton stalks must be destroyed, the debris burned, and the land ploughed by the first of January. In fact, the farmer is not given permission to plant cotton again unless he has complied with these regulations. Seed sterilization also is required. But the Director General himself admits the program has been ineffective. There are many host plants on which cotton insects can live, and the people do not understand the law or are not in a position to comply, especially where they are in the habit of saving the stalks for fuel.

One of the real difficulties is the growth habits of the present Acala varieties which are said to set 80 per cent of their bolls on what is called the second flush, after the end of August, when the insect population is highest. Efforts are being directed toward development of varieties that have a shorter maturing period, and early results with Coker Wilt have been encouraging.

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

—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

This irrigation system of a farm in southern Iraq dates back to Biblical times. Mules walk down an inclined track beside the well pulling the goatskin water scoops. The scoops, hauled to ground level by the mules, spill their contents into the irrigation ditch. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Government of Iraq in its extensive projects to modernize and improve irrigation and increase crop output.

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lators fostered irrigation practices and the construction and repair of conduits and established, under the law of 9/VI/1309 as amended by those of 21/III/1312, 13/VI/1313 and 15/XII/1316, the Agricultural Bank which is empowered to open credit for the implementation of such works.

On the other hand, the government intervened and obtained, under the laws of 6/VII/1309, 15/XII/1310 and 25/VIII/1316, credit for the irrigation of abandoned, formerly fertile areas and for the subsequent sale of these improved lands to private individuals on condition that they be rationally cultivated.

The Independent Irrigation Institute

N 647 312

The above institute, established under the law of 20 May 1943, was set up with a view toward developing and improving irrigation practices in Iran. It has been placed under the Ministry of Agriculture for a period of ten years (Article 4), and annual credit has been allocated to it by the government (Article 2).

This independent Institute shall supervise and carry out all irrigation and drainage projects (Article 11). It shall provide technical assistance to private individuals who wish to carry out irrigation works at their own expense and shall design plans for these works (Article 5).

N [651]

It shall have the right to collect dues for the allocation of water (Article 6). It shall form societies for the implementation of irrigation works in which private owners may participate.

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The institute is authorised to set up the necessary administrative offices to ensure the distribution of water and to guarantee the maintenance of dams, reservoirs, public canals, kanâts, etc. It may also compel the owners of kanâts to repair, clean or destroy them and eventually to carry out these operations at their own expense, regaining the amount involved either directly or on crops.

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Since the gradual occupation of Iraq by the British Forces

(1914-1919) 1/ and its separation from the Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Lausanne, 1923) the Mejelle or Ottoman Civil Code has remained the basis for Iraq's water laws.

Aside from this Code, other laws relating to water use have been promulgated and these legislative measures were supplemented from time to time by Regulations and Instructions. The laws, Regulations and Instructions now in force on water use in Iraq are enumerated below:

1. The Mejelle Civil Code, compiled from 1869 to 1876.

2. Law No. 52 of 4 October 1923 which has been amended by various other laws and amplified by Regulations and Instructions.

    a. Circular No. 508 dated 26 January 1924 giving instructions for the better execution of the law.

    b. Royal Iradah (Decree) No. 118 dated 31 July 1926 which makes this law applicable in ten out of fourteen _liwas_ (administrative districts).

    c. Royal Iradah (Decree) No. 171 dated 20 June 1931 which makes the law valid throughout Iraq.

    d. Amendment Law of 22 January 1925.

    e. Amendment Law No. 39 of 24 April 1927 defining "irrigation works of public importance" to be so declared by special Regulation (see next sub-para. "f") and (ii) substituting with amplification Article 6 of the Law in connection with responsibilities for the repairs and maintenance of irrigation works.

    f. Regulation No. 56 of 9 October 1941, detailing the various terms of "irrigation works of public importance."

1/ Proclamations issued from time to time by the General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Army of Occupation had legal effect on those areas gradually occupied. The validity of these Proclamations were subsequently recognised by the Constitution

g. Amendment Law No. 1 of 26 February 1945 amending again Article 14 of the 1923 Law, and adding a provision for silt clearance by mechanical means under some conditions.

3. The Forcible Assistance Law No. 27 of 31 March 1923, as subsequently amended by Law 24 of 30 March 1936.

4. Law for Rice Cultivation No. 23 of 31 March 1932, amended by the Law Amending Rice Cultivation Law No. 53 of 15 May 1940 prescribing that Regulation shall determine the areas in which rice cultivation is to be prohibited or restricted for health reasons, economy in the use of water or for the conservation of the soil.

5. Liwa Administrative Law No.16 of 15 February 1946 which, in Article 24, paragraph 9, prescribes among the various functions of the mutassarrif (prefect or governor) in his Liwa (one of the 14 administrative districts of Iraq) that he shall "give assistance and facilities to cultivators and ensure distribution of water to their cultivations." Paragraph 1 (b) of Article 63, places within the duties of the Liwa administration "the improvement and drying of pools and swamps." Paragraph 8 of Article 65 includes among the expenditures of the Liwa administration the "cost of construction and maintenance of irrigation works belonging to it (the Liwa), except those undertaken by the State."

6. Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators No. 28 of 1 July 1933, makes the "farm owner" responsible for aligning watercourses (Art. 3 d); fixing time for watering and manner of distributing the waters among the various sections of the land (Art. 3.g).

7. Land Settlement Law No. 29 of 11 April 1938, as subsequently amended prescribes vide Article 3, paragraph 2, that settlement shall include the "confirmation of rights appurtenant to land such as........of waterway, of drainage and of drinking and also....." and that such "rights shall be registered (Article 13, paragraph "a") in the names of such interested persons."

8. Law for the Development and Usufruct of State Lands No. 43 in force as from 17.9.1951 prescribes that the Committee set up for the Management of State Lands dis-

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tributed into small plots for purpose of development shall be entrusted with the distribution of water within the project's areas (Article 11, para. 3) and water distribution shall be confined to the lands of the project (Article 11, para. 1).

1) The Use of Water for Irrigation Purposes

Notification No. 226 of the Minister of Communications and Works dated 9 June 1927, issued under the Irrigation Law of 1923, declares all rivers (anhar) and waterways (majari) in Iraq to be "Irrigation Works." This term covers irrigation and flood protection works as well as areas, occupied by or required for the construction or maintenance of such works. The right of undertaking irrigation works on privately owned lands is granted (Art. 3) to the Government, provided the land so required for the works is expropriated according to Law, once the proposed works have been declared to be of public utility. A private owner wishing to carry out works on or through another person's property shall obtain a certificate from the Executive Irrigation Engineer, stating the necessity of such works together with their extent and probable effect on neighboring lands. The applicant remains responsible for the acquisition, lease or arrangement with the interposed owners (Art. 4).

Requests from particulars for constructing any irrigation works are submitted to the mutassarrif of the Liwa concerned. If such requests are not rejected for administrative reasons, they are transmitted to the Executive Irrigation Engineer who may reject them on technical ground or otherwise issue the necessary permit on Irrigation Form No. 44, embodying instructions constituting the specifications of the work for which approval has been granted. The Law does not confer "water rights," but when a permit is issued and implies use of water, it is henceforth recognized that the land to be brought under cultivation shall enjoy the use of water under conditions similar to others within the same district.

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All irrigation works of public importance shall be constructed, repaired and maintained by and remain under the control and supervision of the Irrigation Department, even when such works have been declared to have ceased to be of public importance (Art. 6). The Executive Irrigation Engineer may require the person responsible with the maintenance of watercourses (channels not maintained by the Government, Art. 2, para. 4),

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to carry out the necessary repair work and in the event of failure, the said Engineer may execute such work at the expense of the defaulter. If damage has been caused to structures and the offender is not found then the owners of the lands depending on the watercourse shall be held jointly responsible (Article 7). A "Notice of Repair or Removal" on Irrigation Form No. 45, is used for the repair, removal or reconstruction of works as defined under Articles 4, 7, and 11 of the Law.

The Irrigation Engineers shall determine the dimensions of canals and watercourses, the lands and areas which may be irrigated from such canals and watercourses (Article 5). The distribution of water is carried out by the Irrigation Department up to a point below the heads of the watercourses (Article 8). Interference with another person's water supply, or the opening of any outlet which has been closed by competent authority or the taking of water from a source other than that prescribed by the Executive Irrigation Engineer, are not permitted (Article 10).

Article 9 prescribes that the Executive Irrigation Engineer shall have the power to stop the water supply to any watercourse in the following cases:

a) for the purpose of executing irrigation works;

b) whenever the watercourse is not maintained in such repair as to prevent the wasteful escape of water;

c) to supply water in rotation;

d) whenever wastage or misuse of water takes place;

e) whenever notices issued or demands made have not been complied with regarding (i) maintenance and repair of works (Article 7); (ii) supply of able-bodied persons for undertaking either work or repairs to works for preventing loss of life or serious damage to property and land (Article 13) or repairs and maintenance of irrigation works (Article 14). This notice shall be called "Notice of Stoppage of Water."

Article 11 states that no person shall construct any building, canal or watercourse, erect any pump, water lift or water wheel, plant any crops within the boundaries of any irrigation area without the written approval of the Executive Engineer, who

312 may order the offender to remove the unauthorised structure with-
647 in 15 days of the date of notice served on Irrigation Form No.
654 45. Should he fail to comply with the instructions contained in the Notice, the work of removal may then be carried out by the Executive Engineer and cost recovered from the offender.

If the water supplied is used in an unauthorised manner or causes damage to the lands, and if the persons responsible cannot be discovered, the person or persons on whose land such water flowed shall be held responsible. Such person shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 20 rupees per mashara 1/ of inundated land.

2) Requisition of Labour

Article 13 provides for the recruiting at rates of pay to be fixed by the Executive Engineer in consultation with the Mutassarrif, of able-bodied persons whenever workers for the immediate execution of emergency or repair works for preventing loss of life or serious damage to land and property cannot be obtained in the ordinary manner. For the purpose of the repair and maintenance of irrigation works, the person who will benefit from their being in good condition and will lose if otherwise, may be called on to furnish the necessary labor (Article 14).

The Executive Engineer may call on the mutassarrif or qaimaqam (sub-prefect or sub-governor) to raise the necessary labor contingent. To this end, the mutassarrifs shall furnish the Director of Irrigation with two statements every year, before the tenth of August: the first statement (Irrigation Form No. 47) shall show the total number of able-bodied men of laboring class residing in the Liwa, for purpose of Article 13. The second statement (Irrigation Forms 48 and 48A) shall show the total labor residing in the Liwa available for work under Article 14, during three different periods, i.e.: September to December - January to April - May to August. The requisition of labor, urgent (Art. 13) or otherwise (Art. 14) is made on Irrigation Forms 49 and 50 respectively.

Any person who refuses or neglects to supply labor as provided for in the two above-mentioned articles of the Law, shall upon conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding Rs. 500 or to

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1/ 20 rupees = ID. 1/500 = $6.00; mashara = 1/4 hectares = 0.618 acres

imprisonment not exceeding two months or to both, fine and imprisonment. 312 466

The Directorate-General of Irrigation may undertake the clearance of irrigation canals by machinery, and the persons benefiting from such work shall refund the costs so incurred. (Last para. of Art. 14, added by Amending Law of 1945).

3) Offences and Penalties under the Irrigation and Embankments Law 312 681

__Articles 15 to 18__ deal with offences and penalties, in addition to those already mentioned.

__Article 15__ prescribes the death penalty for whomsoever wilfully and maliciously damages or alters any irrigation work thereby causing injury to life or to property and with penal servitude for life, or a term not exceeding 15 years, if it does not.

__Article 16__ lists a series of offences punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two months or a fine not exceeding 500 rupees of to both imprisonment and fine. Among the offences stipulated herein are:

Damage, alteration and obstruction to any irrigation work, interference with the supply of water; fouling of water; destruction, tampering with, or alteration of land, level marks or water gauges; damages caused to canal or flood enbankments by grazing cattle; refusal or neglect to supply labor; neglect to prevent waste of water; obstruction to Government official from executing their duties; etc. Addition to or cancellation or alteration to the above list may be made by Regulation (__Article 20__).

__Article 17__ prescribes a fine not exceeding 30 rupees for persons failing to comply with a notice to execute repairs, within the time specified in such notice.

4) **Miscellaneous Provisions**

In any proceedings on offences mentioned in Articles 12 and 16 thereof, before a Magistrate, a report signed by an assistant engineer or by any senior official in the Irrigation Department may be accepted as evidence in court. The recovery of sums due 312 681 694

312 to the irrigation department, and the procedure to be followed
681 for their recovery though covered by Article 19 is now done
694 through the Mutassarrifs concerned in accordance with the Law for
the Collection of Debts Due to the Government No. 43 of 23 April
1931 as amended by subsequent Laws.

5) Rice Cultivation

243 The Law for Rice Cultivation No. 23 of 31 March 1932, as
656 subsequently amended by Law 53 of 15 May 1940, prohibits or restricts in areas defined by Regulation issued from time to time, the cultivation of rice for health reasons, economy in the use of water or soil conservation (Article 1).

Rice cultivation could only be conducted under special license (Article 4), and areas in which rice cultivation is restricted shall be fixed by Regulation (Article 2).

Regulation No. 34 of 28 August 1944, defines the regions in which rice cultivation is prohibited and also fixes areas in masharas for regions where rice could be cultivated.

The Minister of Agriculture shall decide the manner in which areas for rice cultivation alloted to each Liwa are to be distributed, and the mutassarrif concerned shall issue a notice inviting those interested to apply for the necessary permits.

Requests must be submitted to the quaimmaqam of the qadha in which the lands are situated, and the mutassarrif, to whom the requests are transferred shall issue the permits, with the requirements of the Irrigation Department. The minimum distance between rice fields and inhabited localities shall be three kilometres. The permits are non-transferable and are strictly limited to the persons and to the plot of land and irrigation works stated on them. The permit holder agrees to the rotation of water supplies determined by the Irrigation Department, and he accepts responsibility for all shortage of irigation supply with consequent damage to crops.

6) Offences and Penalties under the Law for Rice Cultivation

243 It is forbidden for any person to exceed the area for rice
681 cultivation fixed in the permits, or to cultivate without permit
in prohibited and restricted areas. Contraveners shall be fined

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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Iraq

133 interspersed by several large lakes and in the south by extensive stretches of marshland. In many areas the plain is lower than the rivers, and the riverain lands are flooded each spring when the waters are swollen by the rains and the melting snows from the mountains. The Tigris normally reaches flood level in March or April; the Euphrates, a few weeks later. Both rivers are [312] tapped by networks of irrigation canals, while dams constructed at Hindiyah on the Euphrates and at Kut on the Tigris serve to divert the rivers into forked channels and increase the area under irrigation.

North of this alluvial plain, the country gives way to undulating uplands with an average elevation of about 1,000 feet. The river valleys are more sharply defined and sometimes confined within narrow gorges. The land between the rivers in this region is mainly steppe or gypsum desert and is known, as in Syria, as the Al Jazira. Toward the north and the northeast, the valleys of the Tigris and its tributaries are encircled by lofty mountain ranges, with peaks rising to from 10,000 to 15,000 feet, which form part of the Kurdish highlands, straddling the boundaries between Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The entire southwestern half of the country, from the Euphrates to the southern and the western frontiers, is gravel or sandy desert, a portion of the Great Syrian Desert.

132 The climate of Iraq varies with the topography, but in general it is characterized by hot, dry summers and cold, damp winters. Most of the rainfall is concentrated in the months from November to April, with the maximum precipitation during January and February. It averages 4 to 6 inches a

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As in other countries, all gradations in 342
housing, between the palatial homes of the
wealthy and the congested hovels of the
poor, are found in the cities. Brick and
cement are the usual building materials,
although stone is widely used in Mosul and
other towns in the north. In Baghdad, 341
Arabic and Turkish styles of architecture 342
predominate in the older sections of the
city; modern villas, in the newer residential
developments. Basra is a composite of 3
townships: Basra City, a typical Arab
town; Ashar, the business community; and
Margil, the new town and port center. In
the oil field areas, housing estates are maintained
by the operating companies for the
benefit of their workers.

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

WATER SUPPLIES

Water supplies are reasonably plentiful 312
in the inhabited portions of the country. In the highland areas of the north and the northeast, water is obtained from streams, springs or wells, but in the alluvial plains, where the rainfall rarely exceeds 2 to 6 inches, it is taken entirely from rivers, canals, lakes or wells. Water is scarce in the desert regions but is available in some localities from waterholes, dug in dried stream beds, or from occasional permanent deep wells. The well waters in the mountain districts are sometimes highly mineralized, while shallow well supplies in the lower delta are generally brackish.

The domestic water supplies are treated 312
before distribution in the larger cities and 364
towns, but throughout rural Iraq they are unprotected and frequently polluted. The municipal water supply for the city of Baghdad is pumped from the Tigris River at 4 stations—3 on the left bank and 1 on the right. The entire supply is treated by sedimentation and chlorination, while filtration plants are also operated in connection with the pumping stations at Karrada and Sarrifiya, on the left bank. It is piped to individual service connections in all sections

of the city, except in some of the poorer districts, where community taps are installed. 312 364
The construction of additional plants for the treatment of the water supplies in the surrounding towns was planned in 1952.

At Basra, the water supply for the 3 townships and some of the adjacent villages is taken from the Shatt al Arab. It is treated by filtration and chlorination at Jubailah before distribution to suitably located storage tanks, from which it is piped to individual houses and community taps. The municipal supply of Mosul is derived from the Tigris River and treated by filtration and chlorination. River supplies are utilized by the capital cities of all the provinces, except Erbil and Sulaimaniya, on the northeastern border, where adequate spring sources are available. Treated water is furnished by the Iraq Petroleum Company to its installations in the vicinity of Kirkuk, and a portion of the supply is delivered by the company to the municipality. In the various cities the drinking water supplies are supervised by the municipal authorities. Bacteriologic examinations are [744] made periodically in the laboratories of the government health services. No control is exercised over the smaller supplies, however, except when gross pollution is suspected.

The waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers have been utilized for irrigation for centuries, and the existing ruins appear to indicate that the ancient systems were more extensive than those in use today. 312
Pumps and more primitive types of lift irrigation predominate, but other methods are employed along the course of the rivers, including tidal flow irrigation on the Shatt al Arab and free flow irrigation in the lower delta. In the northern provinces, local irrigation systems, fed from underground conduits which tap springs in the foothills and are connected by series of wells, are found in many areas. These *karez* are comparable with the *qanats* of northern Iran.

Several large-scale projects have been undertaken for the purpose of regulating

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312 and controlling the flow of the rivers. By the construction of the Hindiyah dam on the lower Euphrates in 1913, part of its flow was diverted through the Hilla canal and secondary channels, thus opening up over 650,000 acres for irrigation in the western delta. A parallel barrage at Kut, on the Tigris, which was completed in 1939, permitted the forking of the river through abandoned channels and ultimately will bring almost 1 million acres under irrigation. A dam on the Diyala River provides water for the irrigation of about 260,000 acres in that valley. Other projects, designed for flood control, irrigation and sometimes hydroelectric power purposes, are under construction, or planned, for the Great Zab, the Little Zab and other rivers. The enlargement of Habbaniya Lake, west of Baghdad, into a reservoir to control the flooding of the Euphrates and to furnish water for expanded irrigation facilities has been completed recently, while the conversion of the Wadi Tharthar depression, in the Al Jazira region, into a reservoir for the storage of the flood waters of the Tigris was
653 in process of construction in 1952. A Gen-
312 eral Development Board was created by the Iraqi government in 1950 to review its various development programs, including irrigation, communications, medical institutions and other public services. Since its inception, the Board has underwritten extensive projects for the development of domestic water supplies and irrigation.

WASTE DISPOSAL

344 There are no municipal sewerage systems in Iraq. In the cities, cesspits are commonly employed for the disposal of sewage, although water-borne systems, connected with septic tanks, are installed in some of the modern homes, hotels and public buildings. The contents of the cesspits are usually carted to dumping grounds on the outskirts of the towns. In the smaller towns and villages, sewage disposal is by means of pit privies or cesspits. However housetops, courtyards and other convenient sites often

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southern provinces and has been held responsible 136
for sporadic outbreaks of dengue 164
fever. It is also a potential vector of urban
yellow fever, although that disease is not
reported from this region. Many varieties
of Culex mosquitoes have been recorded,
but none has been specifically implicated in
the transmission of disease. *Culex quinquefasciatus*
(— *C. fatigans*) or *C. pipiens*
(each a potential vector of *Wuchereria
bancrofti*) is present in most areas.

Within recent years extensive mosquito 744
control work has been undertaken by municipal 136
and government authorities, by the 312
oil companies and, during World War II,
by the British Expeditionary Forces. The
problem is stupendous, involving the improvement
and the regulation of the irrigation
facilities on which the agricultural
economy of the country depends. In 1947, 744
malaria control was first attempted on a 164
nation-wide basis with the creation of an
antimalaria service within the Iraqi health
organization. Since that date, control operations
have been carried on in various highly
endemic areas. Depending upon local conditions,
they have included antilarval measures,
drainage works and residual spraying
of the rural villages with DDT preparations.
In 1952, a demonstration DDT housespraying
program was initiated in the
hyperendemic Tanjero Valley of Sulaimaniya
liwa (province), in conjunction with
the World Health Organization.

FLIES. Flies are prevalent in all parts of 136
the country. Numerous species of MUSCIDAE 164
are encountered, many of which are implicated
in the mechanical transmission of
intestinal and eye diseases. *Musca sorbens*
and *M. domestica vicina* are most frequently
incriminated, but *M. tempestiva*,
M. vitripennis and *M. mesopotamiensis* are
also abundant. The larvae of *Fannia canicularis* 136
sometimes cause myiasis in the live- 232
stock. The stable fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, 164
is almost ubiquitous. At least 22 species of
Tabanus are recorded, and many local authorities
believe that they are involved in
the mechanical transmission of anthrax.

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164 361 369 Basra to 75 per cent at Al Qurnah, in the fork between the rivers. In Muntafiq, the mean rate was 47 per cent, and in Diwaniya, 26 per cent, although some districts were heavily infected and others practically free. In central Iraq the disease was more irregular in distribution. In Baghdad *liwa* the infection rates averaged 35 per cent, but approached 80 per cent in some localities. In Kut, the mean was 48 per cent, with a decrease in prevalence toward the Iranian frontier. In Hilla, it was 15 per cent, with variations from 5 to 50 per cent, and in Kerbela, 28 per cent, with variations from 18 to 48 per cent. In the areas studied in Diyala *liwa* it ranged from 28 to 60 per cent, and in Dulaim it approximated 36 per cent. Subsequent surveys have revealed 11 to 18 per cent infection in limited foci near the marshes in Mosul *liwa*.

164 361 369 742 In a survey conducted in Baghdad in 1950-51,[67] ova of *S. haematobium* were found in 25 per cent of the urine samples collected from 285 schoolchildren and in 46 per cent of the samples from 242 inhabitants in hut settlements on the outskirts of the city. The prevalence was around 20 to 25 per cent in the suburbs, but reached 83 per cent in foci along the main road to Teheran.

164 462 Indigenous cases of *S. mansoni* infection have not been reported, but numerous cases of rectal involvement with *S. haematobium* have been observed. A dermatitis produced by nonhuman schistosome cercariae is common in the south and is often responsible for considerable disability among the agricultural workers.

164 462 312 744 Schistosomiasis constitutes one of the most important disease problems in Iraq. It is of major public health and economic significance, and the possibility of its spread with the expansion of irrigation is a matter of considerable concern to the government authorities. An active schistosomiasis control program is carried on by the Bilharzia Section of the Department of Endemic Diseases. This section maintains snail destruction and treatment units in the affected

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164 provinces, and conducts research and field
462 investigations on the distribution and the
312 control of the disease and the intermediate
744 snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from
15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually in government hospitals and dis-
164 pensaries. The disease is considered com-
758 monplace in most areas, however, and
probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the infected individuals seek treatment under
743 ordinary conditions. Since 1949, special dis-
164 pensaries have been established in Baghdad, Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour the most seriously infected districts. In 1950, there were 11 mobile units for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 Ancylostomiasis. Ancylostomiasis is
361 widespread in the irrigated areas, but the exact distribution and severity of the infection in the different provinces are not accu-
[136] rately known. *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the only species found in the foci studied. The infection rates are generally estimated at 10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces and at 40 per cent in the southern. They are especially high in the Amarah and the Al Q[illegible] regions, but decrease toward the south, and are relatively low in the districts
164 along the Shatt al Arab. In a study reported
742 in 1939,[47] fecal specimens from apparently healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from various parts of the country were examined for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was detected in 25 per cent of the specimens from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per cent from 135 men from the rural districts of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per cent of the individuals examined from Diyala *liwa* and from 25 per cent of the individuals from Dulaim. The degree of infection is usually mild, but serious cases with hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent are not infrequent.

164 Treatment facilities are provided by the
758 schistosomiasis control units, as well as by
742 the government hospitals and dispensaries.

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tendances in the hospitals and the dispensaries in 1950, ranged from 26 to 266 per 1,000 population. They approached, or exceeded, the mean rate of 111 per 1,000 in 6 *liwas*, being 106 in Diyala, 111 in Diwaniya, 155 in Erbil, 158 in Sulaimaniya, 205 in Hilla and 266 in Kerbela. While such statistics provide rough indices of the present prevalence of the disease, they contribute little to our knowledge of the extent of the problem. 164

The northeastern mountain districts and the irrigated zones along the Shatt al Arab and the lower Euphrates are the most highly malarious sections of the country. Differences in the average rate of endemicity, as shown by spleen surveys among children 2 to 10 years of age, are indicated on the following map,[41] in which the principal malarious regions are arbitrarily grouped according to the factors governing the transmission of the disease. Malaria is hyperendemic in the date-growing areas along the Shatt al Arab (I), which are watered by a complex system of tidal irrigation. In Basra, Fao, Al Gurnah and the chief towns, the spleen rates approximated 75 per cent in 1941, but were reduced to about 12 per cent by 1949 as the result of control operations. The rate of infection is relatively low in the marshlands of the southern delta (II), where *Anopheles pulcherrimus* predominates, but foci of greater prevalence exist as far north as Qalat Saleh. In Amarah and other towns, the spleen rates are estimated at about 8 per cent. In the lower Euphrates basin (III), the annual flooding of the river and the extensive system of gravity-flow irrigation from high-level canals create conditions favorable to the breeding of the vector species, *A. stephensi*. The spleen rates usually average 30 to 60 per cent, but in controlled localities, as Hilla, Kerbela, Nasiriyeh and Suq ash Shuyukh, they had declined to around 20 per cent in 1950. In the upper Euphrates valley, north of Ramadi (IV), however, irrigation is limited to small-scale projects employing pumps or more primitive meth- 164 561 [136] [312]

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

Malaria in Iraq. Regional Endemicity[41]

[312] ods for lifting the water from the deep river channel, and malaria is only mildly endemic. The spleen rates in Hit, Anah, Ḥadītha and such typical towns approximate about 4 per cent. [312] Lift irrigation is also employed in the middle Tigris region (V). The spleen rates are generally low, although scattered foci of endemicity exist where conditions are suitable for the breeding of *A. stephensi.* In Baghdad and other towns the spleen rates are normally about 3 per cent, but epidemics sometimes result when other species invade the agricultural areas from neighboring foci to the north. An outbreak in which *A. sacharovi* was implicated was reported in 1946-47 in the vicinity of Baghdad. A sharp outbreak also occurred in 1947 in a district north of the city, when the infection was transmitted by *A. superpictus.* Malaria is endemic, as well as epidemic, in the gravity-irrigated zones of the lower Diyala basin (VI), but a low level of infection prevails in the districts near the junction of this river with the Tigris. Spleen rates of 20 to 50 per cent are found throughout much of the area, approaching nearer 90 per cent in uncontrolled villages around Baqubeh.

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63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954

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SUMMARY

Iraq encompasses the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and is associated historically with Mesopotamia, the home of ope of the oldest civilizations on record. It has been an independent sovereign state since 1932. The population, which was estimated at 4,799,500 in 1947, is 95 per cent Moslem and predominantly Arab. Extensive petroleum resources and date cultivation contribute to the wealth of the country, which is still relatively underdeveloped in other respects. The public health activities of the Iraqi government are centralized in the Ministry of Health, with headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry is responsible for the maintenance of preventive and curative services, which are carried out in the provinces through subordinate provincial organizations. Municipal departments exist in Baghdad and the principal cities, but in other areas the enforcement of sanitary regulations devolves upon the government officers. In 1950, there were 82 civilian hospitals in the country, with an aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly more than 1 bed per 1,000 population. Almost one half of the total beds were located in the Baghdad area. Approximately 82 per cent of the hospitals are supported by the government. Also in 1950, 433 dispensaries were functioning in various parts of the provinces, 403 under the jurisdiction of the government health authorities.

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The water supplies in the towns and the villages of the alluvial plain are derived from rivers, canals, lakes and wells; in the northern highlands, from streams, springs and wells. All the urban supplies are obtained from rivers, except in Erbil and Sulaimaniya, where spring sources are utilized. The water supplies of the larger cities are treated, but those in the rural areas are unprotected and often polluted. There are no sewerage systems. In the cities, cesspits and septic tanks are employed for the disposal of sewage; in the rural villages, the means are more primitive. The dietary

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Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
315 Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
[496] works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-
owned Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

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433 The increase in oil production and other earnings of the Board resulted in a higher revenue during the years 1951/52 to 1953/54 than that originally estimated, in spite of a smaller withdrawal from the 312.8 million Wadi Tharthar project loan granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the meantime, the Board's over-all expenditure during the same period amounted to about ID 40 million, including loans and advances: accounts deposited with the National Bank of Iraq for the disbursement of the Tharthar project; and the sum of ID 10.5 million paid to the Ministry of Finance for the schemes undertaken by the various ministries on behalf of the Board (see table 32). Furthermore the Board has authorized government departments to finance various plans on its behalf, and has awarded several contracts for its major plans to various foreign and national companies. Some of these plans have already been completed and the rest are to be completed in the next few years. Thus the actual expenditure plus the obligated expenditure of the Board have been estimated to be about ID 45 to ID 55 million.

The most important reasons for deferring the expenditure of the allocated amounts provided for in the Board's budgets since its operation have been the delay in the approval of the programme by Parliament; the inability of the different departments, particularly in the first two years, to execute the projects entrusted to them by the Board; and the necessity for providing adequate time to study, survey and prepare the estimated cost and specifications for inviting tenders for the various projects. Most of the projects outlined in the original programme needed further studies and surveys, several of which have since been completed. Many have been submitted by various engineering consultants of international repute, and are under consideration by the Board. The Board hopes to accelerate the execution of such projects as were planned since it has almost reached the end of the planning stage.

Major projects

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433 One of the main purposes of the Six-Year Plan is to control floods in the Tigris and Euphrates by storing surplus water which can be used for irrigation. An over-all programme has been prepared, at an estimated cost of ID 335 million, providing for the construction of ten dams;[1] it is expected to increase the cropped area by 75 per cent and raise net annual agricultural income from its present level of ID 62 million to ID 222 million; part of this programme is being implemented under the Six-Year Plan. The plan also provides for industrial expansion, the building of 3,500 kilometres of metalled roads and improvement of a further 3,000 kilometres.

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[1] See Knappen, Tippets, Abbott and McCarthy, Report on the Development of the Tigris and Euphrates River Systems (Baghdad, 1954).

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 Ml Middle East

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
SYRIA
Eski Mosul
Mosul
Bekhme
Greater Zab
Dokan
Lower Zab
Hawija
Kirkuk
Derbendi-Khan
Ana
Wadi Tharthar
Samarra
IRAN
Ramadi
Habbaniya
BAGHDAD
Abu Dibis
Musayyib
Hindiya
Tigris
Kut
Diwaniya
Amara
Gharraf
Basra
NEUTRAL ZONE
KUWAIT
SAUDI ARABIA
IRAQ
FLOOD CONTROL AND IRRIGATION
International boundary
Proposed dam site
Dam and barrage under construction
Existing barrage
Existing canal
Proposed canal
NEW IRRIGATION PROJECTS
1 Musayyib
2 Hilla
3 Babil
4 Shamiya
5 Tikrit
6 Ishaqi
7 Makhmur
8 Hawija
9 Adhaim
10 Lower Nahrawan
11 Dujaila
12 Gharraf
0 30 60 90 120 150
MILES
0 30 60 90 120 150
KILOMETRES

MAP NO. 707 UNITED NATIONS
JUNE 1955

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312 185 433 There are several other projected dams and barrages on the Tigris and its tributaries (see map). The dam on the Tigris near Eski Mosul is estimated to have a capacity of 8 billion cubic metres and to cost ID 16 million. The Bekhme dam, on the Greater Zab, will have an initial capacity of 3 billion cubic metres and an ultimate capacity of 8.3 billion; its costs are estimated at ID 21.8 million and ID 39.6 million, respectively. The dam would provide irrigation for 625,000 hectares and a capacity of 600,000 kilowatts of electric power.

Two projects are planned on the Diyala, another tributary of the Tigris. A dam at Derbendi-Khan would have a storage capacity of 3.7 billion cubic metres and would increase the water supply for 309,000 hectares at present receiving light irrigation; its costs are put at ID 21 million. Preliminary work has begun. A barrage at Bani Saad, costing ID 1.75 million would, when complemented by the Nahrawan irrigation works, provide water for 223,000 hectares. In addition to the Dokan dam, a barrage is to be built on the Lesser Zab, at Hawija; it could irrigate 50,000 hectares. The Gharraf scheme will channel water from the projected Eski Mosul or Bekhme dams to 429,000 hectares in the Amara region. Another project, falling outside the Six-Year Plan, is a dam at Damir Kapu, on the Adhaim river, providing irrigation for 175,000 hectares, as well as electric power.

The total area which will be irrigated by the various projected schemes on the Tigris and its tributaries was estimated at 1.24 million hectares, and that by the Euphrates schemes at 560,000 hectares, a total of 1.8 million hectares. Work is also proceeding on the drainage of 233,000 hectares, and the Six-Year Plan provides for an expenditure of ID 23 million for land reclamation, agricultural research, afforestation, improvement of animal husbandry, filling swamps and marshes and various other schemes.

433 185 Industrial development plans aim at both increasing the output of consumer goods and utilizing Iraq's petroleum resources to produce certain basic products. A cotton spinning and weaving factory is under construction near Mosul; it will have 20,000 spindles, thus doubling the present capacity 1/ and is expected to produce 20 million square metres of cloth per annum; a sum of ID 3,115,000 has been allocated for the project. 2/ Some expansion and improvement is also taking place in the privately owned woollen and rayon industries. 3/ Cement plants are being built, or planned, by both the Government and private enterprise. The Government is setting up factories at Mosul and Sarchinar, with a daily capacity of 350 tons each; completion is scheduled for 1956 and costs are estimated at ID 2,20[illegible],000 and ID 3,115,000, respectively. 4/ In addition, a privately owned plant at Mosul with a capacity of 350 tons a day is scheduled for completion by July 1955; another privately owned plant, near Baghdad, is doubling its present capacity of 800 tons a day, and a third private plant, with a daily capacity of 700 tons, is to be established near Hindiya barrage. 5/ The completion of all

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1/ Salman, loc. cit.; existing capacity is privately owned.

2/ The Iraq Times, 5 February 1955 (Baghdad).

3/ Al Shaab, 28 February 1954 (Baghdad).

4/ The Iraq Times, 5 February 1955 (Baghdad).

5/ Ibid., 26 January 1955.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most 433
consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high 439
percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered 137
a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one- 313
fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and
productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of 185
improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and 241
the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power as its chief limiting factor. Attention was being given to 154 the increase and improvement of livestock, a major asset of the 242 country; Ayrshire and Friesian bulls were imported and distributed, rams from a selected herd were sold to reliable farmers, 185 laboratory work on wool was carried out. Yet other lines of progress were dairying, with experiments in cheese production, the breeding of improved mules and donkeys, the increase of egg production by improving poultry breeds. The allotment by the Development Board for the period 1951–6 was nearly 2 million dinars for agricultural research, 3½ million for small-scale reclamation schemes, 1¼ million for animal husbandry, and a million for swamp reclamation. The need for a measure of integration between animal husbandry and crop production, hitherto divorced, was realized, as well as the broad essential singleness of the effort which must be made in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, land settlement, rural education, and the provision of capital. It seemed certain as the nineteen-fifties opened that if this effort were made and sustained by public and Government, and in the absence of any general calamity, the prospects for agricultural development in this wide and favoured territory, within the ultimately fixed limits of its river-water and rainfall resources, exceeded those not only of any Middle Eastern country, but of any territory of comparable size elsewhere in the world; the growing of food for less fortunate nations could prove, indeed, to be the main part of 'Iraq's material contribution to humanity.

In the care of its forests not much had yet been accomplished 313 beyond the limits of study, experiment, and the establishment of 185 tree-nurseries; the wide but neglected forest areas (p. 29) of the north still lay untended and unimproved, lacking notably a modern forest code, a staff of trained foresters, and even detailed exploration. Some steps had indeed been taken to provide fire protection and to carry out by helicopter and air photography the first forest surveys, but few to prevent uncontrolled cutting, grazing, and trespass by the villagers. One million dinars were allotted by the Development Board for forestry development in 1951–6. The significance of these areas to soil erosion, silt deposit, and river flooding was understood, and plans were being prepared on these and allied matters; but only a beginning had been made to solve these problems or to move towards the large-scale action which must be involved, or to provide the 'Iraqi public with sources of fuel and timber at present lacking.

Although sea fishing, based on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, was but a 226 limited resource, the rivers and swamps of the territory were the source of a fish catch estimated at many thousands of tons a year, and export of fish to the Levant—and in particular to the Jews in

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Forestry

137 313 In a country where the plains are almost entirely devoid of trees and only the mountain valleys contain a few scattered forests, the importance of forests as a means of controlling erosion and floods and overcoming the acute shortage of timber needs no emphasis. The Mission did not give special attention to this problem because the government has already received an excellent detailed report and recommendations from a British expert. It wishes only ~~to stress~~ that it is important not only to protect and extend the forests in the mountain areas, but also to undertake the planting of trees in the plains to serve as windbreaks and as sources of fuel and building timber. In the Dujaila project an encouraging beginning has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundaries. In future settlement schemes it might be well to require farmers to plant and maintain small wood lots. To carry out a proper program the Forestry Department, which is now only a division within the Department of Agriculture, should be given an independent status and headed, as at present, by a well-trained foreigner. The training of an adequate number of foresters should also be undertaken.

Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture

647 Agriculture, livestock-raising and forestry are of such critical importance to Iraq that they merit a separate ministry in the government. The Mission recommends therefore the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use. Within this Ministry and directly under a permanent secretary, it is suggested that directorates-general be organized for each of the following subjects: agriculture and horticulture; animal husbandry; forestry and soil conservation; land settlement; and research. Special sections for administrative and personnel questions, legal affairs, economic research and statistics, and extension and education might form part of the immediate staff of a permanent secretary. Within the Ministry there should also be grouped the more or less autonomous organizations such as the Tobacco Monopoly, the Grain Board, the Agricultural Machinery Administration, the Date Association and the Chambers of Agriculture. The Mission believes that such a ministry would greatly facilitate more effective direction of the government's efforts to improve agriculture and related pursuits.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

XII. Forestry

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Anyone who contemplates the treeless plains and the barren mountains of Iraq is quickly persuaded of the need of afforestation. The forest area comprises only 25,500 square kilometers in the four northern provinces, and of this area only 17,000 square kilometers is covered by what may really be classified as forest. The remainder is in forest pasture and sub-Alpine shrub. Yet forestry has received little attention. The only trained forester in Iraq is the foreign director of the Forestry Division which is subordinated to the Department of Agriculture. His staff is inadequate to provide proper protection of existing forests, let alone to undertake forest development. Only a small amount of afforestation, soil reclamation and propagation work is in progress. There is no modern forest law. Forests suffer severely from indiscriminate cutting for fuel and charcoal, overgrazing by livestock, shifting cultivation and fire. In the clearing of land for cultivation in the mountainous areas of the North, forest and pasture have been destroyed and land laid waste by erosion. 313

Afforestation is of vital importance not only to check erosion and help prevent floods but also ultimately to meet the acute shortage of timber for building and fuel. In the plains belts of trees are needed to serve as windbreaks. A detailed forestry program has already been set forth in a lengthy report by a British expert. The Mission can only urge that his recommendations be carried out.

The first step should be to build up an adequate forestry staff and to enact a satisfactory forest law. The Department of Forestry should be given a status equal to that of the present Department of Agriculture. Trained foresters will be required not only at headquarters and in the field but also at the forestry research stations at Abu Ghuraib, Bakrajo and Erbil. Initially some of the foresters, including the director, will have to be recruited abroad. A course in forestry might be given in the agricultural schools at Abu Ghuraib.

In the northern mountains the existing forest areas should be preserved primarily as a means of protecting the catchment of the Tigris and its principal tributaries. Controlled, rotational grazing will be necessary to protect these forests. To furnish a supply of

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

timber, at least 5,000 square kilometers in the valleys of the main 313 ● rivers in the north ought to be afforested by means of irrigated plantations of quick-growing species such as poplar, eucalyptus, tamarisk, ash, plane and shisham. Such forests should be able to furnish timber in growing amounts in 15 to 20 years.

It will be at least equally important, however, to plant trees in irrigated plains of central and southern Iraq. The ultimate goal should be to devote at least 10 percent of the irrigated areas to forestry in the form of farmers' woodlots, plantings along roads and canals, windbreaks and shelter belts. In the new settlement areas farmers might well be required to plant a specified area in trees. Measures such as these will make timber available in the immediate vicinity where it is sorely needed.

The Development Board has recognized the need for some additional expenditure on forestry by tentatively setting aside ID 250,000 for this purpose in its five-year program. It is urged that this amount be raised to a total of ID 750,000 over the next five years. More could probably not be spent in this period because staffing and organization will take time and attention. In the ensuing five-year period, however, the amount might well be doubled.

XIII. Settlement of New Land

In the future much of the increase in agricultural production 311 will inevitably come from the settlement of new land. Iraq is one of the few Middle Eastern countries which have large reserves of cultivable land. While the official estimates, which indicate that the area under cultivation can be almost tripled, may be questioned, there is no doubt that there are vast areas both in the rain-fed zone and in the irrigation zone which can be put to the plow. When water from the Habbaniya and Dokan reservoirs becomes available, for example, it will be possible to extend the area under cultivation from about 11 to 15 million donums; and if the Bekhme dam is built, still additional areas can be irrigated.

The way in which these new lands are settled and developed 423 will in many respects be critical for the future of Iraq. If reserved

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's production; 245
the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilometres, 185
are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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185 charcoal production with consequent encouragement of
137 secondary industries, and improve climatic conditions.
•313

Problems of Agriculture

185 Among the natural difficulties which attend agriculture in
Iraq are those imposed by drought, floods, dust storms, diseases,
654 pests, and soil erosion, of which the first two are being attacked by a large-scale programme of irrigation and flood-control. The major diseases are the inflorescence rot of dates, wilt diseases of tomato and watermelon, gummosis of citrus, rusts of cereals, and various mildews. The major insect pests are the Moroccan locust, whose ravages have from time to time caused immense damage to cereal crops, the grasshopper, the Mediterranean fruit fly, the date-fruit mite and Dubas bug, and the Sunn pest and bug *Aolia acuminata* which attack wheat and barley. The Ministry of Agriculture is combating these diseases and pests by modern methods; in locust-fighting Iraq is among the most advanced countries in the world. The problem of soil erosion can to some extent be met by the activities of the Forestry Department.

Irrigation

312 The aim of water-control in Iraq is to even out the seasonal flow in the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, so as to prevent both drought and flooding in the irrigated areas and to increase the area under cultivation. Irrigation itself imposes the necessity of drainage, to prevent the salting up of irrigated land and the further spread of malaria.

Three methods of irrigation are employed: direct inundation at flood-time, which is used for rice cultivation and is of comparatively limited importance; distribution of water from rivers and canals by direct flow on to the land through a network of small channels and cuts; the lifting of water into the channels and cuts by various methods which include the use of mechanical pumps. The date-palm groves of the Shatt al-Arab benefit by natural irrigation; twice a day as the tide rises and falls fresh water is forced into the creeks and channels and then drains out again.

Irrigation—often highly organized—has been a feature of Iraqi agriculture since the Sumerian civilization, in decline since the seventh century, and especially since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Serious reconstruction began in this century, with the Hindiya barrage, completed in 1913, for which the Euphrates was diverted, and the Kut barrage on the

245 Iraq produces about 80 per cent. of the total
[439] world supply of dates—that is, of the proportion of dates that form an article of commerce, because most dates are eaten directly by the growers, or else bartered. The general conditions under which date palms thrive have already been touched upon, and it is sufficient to recall that the palms can flourish in dry, saline, sandy, loamy, or even water-logged soils, although the maximum yield of fruit is obtained when abundant water is available.

The region of the Shatt el Arab is pre-eminently suited to date-production, and both banks are lined with date groves extending inland for about a mile and a half. Some 25 to 30 million palms are cultivated throughout the region, and of these, one-half are found close to the Shatt el Arab, the rest occurring along the river banks as far north as Latitude 33° N. A curious feature is the rise of the river under the influence of the incoming tide. Fresh water is ponded back in the Shatt el Arab, and floods the banks to a depth of as much as 3 feet to provide natural and regular irrigation of the groves—a phenomenon that from the point of view of the native farmer is wholly estimable.

In order to ensure a good crop, the land is dug over once every four years; and because of the frequent presence of creeks and water-courses, this must be done by hand. Artificial pollination is, as we have already seen, highly necessary; and though most groves include 3 per cent. of male palms, the district of Fao has developed a special trade in male pollen dust, from which other date-growing regions are supplied.

About 130 varieties of date are known, but three are most widely grown. The *Halawi* palm produces the finest fruit, but gives only a moderate yield (44 lb. per tree) (Dowson), whilst the *Sayir* produces slightly less, but is more tolerant of inferior growing conditions, and is probably the most widely grown. The *Zahidi* does not give a fruit of high quality, but the yield is over 120 lb. per tree, and this compensates for the low price obtained. Fertilisation of the female palm takes place in April, and picking begins in August, when large numbers of nomadic tribesmen move into the date-growing areas to work as seasonal harvesters.

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Besides forming an extremely important part of local diet, dates are used in the distilling of *arak*—the chief fermented beverage outside the vine-growing areas, and one thought to have value as a prophylactic against malaria. The crushed stones are fed to cattle, and both leaves and trunk of the palm are used in light constructional work (houses, boats, even bridges), and also in the manufacture of paper.

35$_1$ Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
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Abrus precatorius L. (Leguminosae)

چشم خروس

Chashm-i-khurūs (Pers.); Rati (Hind.); Jequirity (Tupi, Brazil); Paternoster seed, Indian licorice.

Schl.; Fl. Br. Ind. 2: 175; Ph. Ind. 1: 430.

W.H.M.M. 150736; K.B. 301.

This plant is cosmopolitan in the tropics and grows in India. The well-known scarlet seeds, with a black spot at one end, are exported from India to Iran and other countries in the West, and are made into necklaces and rosaries. They were formerly used in India as a standard weight by goldsmiths, the average weight of a seed being 1.7 grams.

In medicine the seeds are said to have hilarant properties, and in Iran they are classified among the poisons. The seeds contain toxalbumin, a protein body. The leaves and root contain sugars (D. Hooper, *Pharm. Journ.* 1894, 937).

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Acacia Senegal Willd. (Leguminosae)

صمغ ارژن

Samgh-i-arzhan, Angūm (Teh.); Samgh Arabi (Ar., Pers., Iraq); gum arabic.

Field 78A, 257; 30, 70 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150716.

Acacia Senegal is the chief source of gum arabic of commerce, but in the Eastern bazaars many gums are sold which are procured from various other trees. Schlimmer in his "Terminologie" speaks of Gummi nostras or indigenous gum obtained from cherry and prune trees.

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Acanthophyllum squarrosum Boiss. (Caryophyllaceae)

شیر کلن

Shir Kalan (Teh.); the root.

W.H.M.M. 150848.

[515]

This is one of the Irani soap-roots. It is smaller than the usual roots supplied by species of Gypsophylla, as it occurs in pieces 8 to 18 mm. in diameter, has an exterior of light brown, twisted spirally, with a white, starchy interior showing yellowish, woody rays. The root has a slightly bitter taste and contains small quantities of saponin.

[illegible] Hooper and Field [illegible] [illegible] 1937 MAI Iran MAI
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Adiantum Capillus-Veneris L. (Polypodiaceae)

پر سیاوش

Parr-i-siyāvash, Kashburat (Teh.); Kashburat-el-bír, "coriander of the wall" (Pers.); Krafas-al-bir, Shar-al-anat (Iraq); Kansburaj, Moohar-khas (Ind. bazaars); the fronds.

Ait.; Post; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 3: 624.

Field 49; W.H.M.M. 150714; K.B. 302.

The maidenhair fern is found in Iran, Afghanistan, the northwestern Himalayas, and western China, but other species of ferns are used medicinally and are called by similar names. The fronds of the fern are usually supplied, but the rhizome is credited with expectorant properties and is given for relieving difficult respiration and for spasms in whooping cough.

—A maidenhair fern decoction is served as a cooling drink during the summer (H.F.). [272]

Agaric (Fungi) [262]

قارچ

Qārch (Teh.); Kriwarik (Turk.); dried mushrooms.

Field 242; W.H.M.M. 150775.

This is a portion of a hard fungus, gray brown on the outside and whitish within, 4 to 5 inches across. A notation is made on one sample that it is a vermifuge. Schlimmer identifies "Ghartsche" as *Agaricus esculentus*, one of the edible mushrooms, of which there are numerous species. For agaricum of the Greeks, Ghariqun, see *Polyporus officinalis*.

Alhagi camelorum Fisch. (Leguminosae)

ترنجبين

Tar-anjubin (Teh.); "green honey"; manna.

Field 1; W.H.M.M. 150888.

The camel's thorn (Kār shūtur, Pers.) is a thorny shrub found in the deserts of Iran, Syria, and Egypt. A saccharine exudation forms on the plant. It is shaken off the branches, collected, and used as a sweetmeat and in medicine. It is supposed to be the "greenish cake" of Layard's "Travels," but this secretion was collected from oak trees (see *Quercus*). The white grains of manna separated from the pods, stalks, and leaves contain chiefly cane sugar; this is administered as a laxative and expectorant. [314] • [263]

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[752] water and alcohol, odorless but with a sweetish taste. It contains a principle similar to glycyrrhizin. Sarcocolla[1] forms a plaster long used by Parsi bone-setters, and is applied locally to the ears and
[302] face to allay neuralgic pains. Aitchison says the gum is used by ladies of the harem to improve their appearance and to give the skin a gloss (see "Sarcocolla" by D. Hooper, *Journ. As. Soc. Bengal*, Vol. 9, 1913, pp. 177–181).

Astragalus gummifer Labill. (Leguminosae)

كتيرا

Kathīrā (Teh.); Qatera, Katira gond (Hind.); gum Tragacanth.
Field 128; W.H.M.M. 150861.

• [314] The small, branching, thorny shrubs of *Astragalus* are especially to be found in Asiatic Turkey and Iran, where they form one of the most characteristic features of the vegetation. The above and other species yield, when incised, flat, ribbon-shaped pieces, or, when punctured, vermiform tears. The tragacanth gum from Tehran is in clean white ribbons, typical of the best commercial quality, largely used in medicine and confectionery.

Astragalus hamosus L. (Leguminosae)

اكليل الملك

Iklīl (Teh.); Iklīl-ul-malik (Ar.); Adhafir-aj-jian, Adhafir-ash-shaitan (Iraq); Iklil-ul-mulk (Bom.); Aketi (Ham.); the curved pods.
Field 145; W.H.M.M. 150889; K.B. 342.

The origin of this drug has been referred to various species of *Melilotus* and *Trigonella* which have curved pods. Those received from Tehran and Hamadan are horseshoe-shaped, 2.5 cm. in length, grayish brown, smooth, curved outward, grooved on both sides, and beaked; they are divided by a central partition and contain grayish yellow, rhomboidal seeds, notched at one end and with black spots. The pods are called in Iraq "Fairies' Nails" or "Devil's Claws," and are used for various disorders, but chiefly as a suppurative and astringent. Sometimes they are made into a plaster for reducing tumorous and painful swellings.—Mixed with *Viola* sp., they are taken before purgation (H.F.).

Bambusa arundinacea L. (Gramineae)

تبا شير قلمى

Tabāshīr-i-qalamī (Teh.); Tabashira (Ar.); Bans lochan (Hind.); mineral concretion in stems of bamboo.

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[1] [i.e., the gum of Astragalus fasciulaefolius, Kohl Farsi -- Analyst]

35₂ Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAl Iran MAl
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824 * (4) Mangel-wurzel should succeed in Kurdistan.

278 * (5) Wild beets, known as Silaijah or Silaigah.

Boswellia Carterii Bird. (Burseraceae)

کندر

Kundur (Teh.); Seta Kundura (Hind.); frankincense or olibanum.

Field 199.

• [314] There are several kinds of this fragrant oleo-gum-resin found in commerce. Kundura zakara, "male frankincense," is in reddish or deep yellow, circular tears; Kundura unsa, "female frankincense," is in yellowish white, translucent or pale tears; Kisher Kundur or Dhupa of the bazaars occurs in scaly pieces of the bark coated with the exudation.—Olibanum is used chiefly as incense; it is an ingredient in plasters; a dose of half a misqal (35 grains) is said to improve the memory (H.F.).

Brassica campestris L. var. **Napus** Bab. (Cruciferae)

تخم شلغم

Tukhm-i-shalgham (Teh.); Sarsun (Hind.); rape or colza seed.

Field 54 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150856.

[252] [373] This is an important crop in India and elsewhere, cultivated chiefly for its seed. Rape seeds are small, brownish or reddish brown, 2 mm. in diameter, smooth. They yield by expression a bland oil used as an emollient and in cooking and lighting.

Brassica (Sinapis) **nigra** (L.) Koch, and **B. alba** Rabenh. (Cruciferae)

خردل

Khardal.

[263] Mustard, now a widespread weed, is of Eurasian origin. The powdered seeds are an important condiment, used in curries, and medicinally in the preparation of poultices and plasters. Mustard is taken internally as an emetic in cases of narcotic poisoning (G.).

Butea frondosa Roxb. (Leguminosae)

برگ هند ایران

Barg-i-hind īrān, Parakeh-i-hindī (Teh.); Palaspapado (Duk.); Palas Keby (Hind.); seeds of bastard teak or Bengal kino tree.

Field 181; W.H.M.M. 150818.

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[386]

The yellow larkspur is a perennial herb in desert regions of Iran and Iraq, with shoots 2 feet high, each bearing a terminal spike of yellow flowers. The dried petals are of commercial importance, yielding a valuable yellow dye for silk, and are exported for this purpose in large quantities to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and even to India, where the flowers, to a small extent, are employed in medicine.

Dolichos Lablab L. (Leguminosae)

لوبياگل

Lūbiyā-gul (Teh.); Sim (Hind.); Simbi (Sans.); kidney bean.

Field 99.

This is a climbing perennial, or, under cultivation, an annual, common in India, where the seeds, which vary much in form and color, are employed as food. The beans from Tehran are black and brown, 15 by 10 mm., with a white hilum.

Dorema Ammoniacum Don (Umbelliferae)

وشا

Vashā (Teh.); Ushna ushek (Pers.); Kandal (Afg.); Samagh Hamama (Hind.); gum ammoniacum.

W.H.M.M. 150769.

The plant yielding this exudation is found in the desert regions of Afghanistan and Iran. The light colored gum-resin occurs in rounded tears, agglutinated masses, or cakes; it breaks with an opaque, shining or yellow conchoidal fracture, forming a milky emulsion with water. The drug has a faint, peculiar odor, and a bitter, nauseous taste. The gum is stimulating, expectorant, and laxative. Externally it acts as a resolvent, and is used as a plaster in asthmatic cases, and for indolent tumors and glandular swellings. [314] •

Doronicum Pardalianches L. (Compositae)

درونج اقربی

Darūnaj-i-akrabī (Teh., Ham.); Darvunedge eghrebi (Schl.); Doronic (Gr.); Doronicum Graeci (Ph. Pers.); doronicum root.

Achundow; Boiss. 3: 379; Makhjan-el-Adwiya; Ph. Ind. 2: 292; Kew Museum.

Field 168; K.B. 315.

This ancient drug is said to have come originally from Greece and Syria. *D. scorpioides* Lam. affords some supplies of the drug,

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as a plaster to sores and wounds. The drug contains resin 65, gum 20, and essential oil 10 to 20 per cent.

Ferula persica Willd. (Umbelliferae)

سکبینج

Sakbīnaj (Teh.); Saka-binaja (Ar.); Sek binedge (Schl.); Sagapenum gum.

Achundow; Ait.; Schl.; Laufer 366; Ph. Ind. 2: 161.

Field 163; K.B. 317; W.H.M.M. 150922.

Sagapenum is a fragrant gum-resin obtained from Laristan and Kerman. It is found in the market in tears or agglutinated into brownish yellow cakes with a persistent, alliaceous odor and acrid taste. It yields on distillation a volatile oil containing sulphur. [314]

The drug has a local reputation as a plaster for rheumatism and lumbago.—Mixed with linseed oil it forms a salve for the relief of piles and pains in the back (H.F.).

Ferula Sumbul Hook. f. (Umbelliferae)

ریشه کلفس

Rīshah-i-kalafs, Sumbul, also the name for celery root (Teh.); musk or violet root.

Field 134.

This is a large, perennial plant of Samarkand. The root is thick and fusiform, light and spongy, transversely wrinkled, with corky, brown bark, and fibrous, whitish interior with resinous cells. The odor is strong and musk-like, and the taste bitter and aromatic. It is employed as a stimulant, nervine tonic, and antispasmodic, given in hysteria and nervous disorders.

Ficus Carica L. (Moraceae)

تین

Tin; common fig.

The edible fig grows wild in the mountain valleys of Kurdistan and in the foothills, and is also cultivated throughout Iraq as a fruit tree (G.).—The figs are usually sold strung on cords hung from the ceiling (H.F.). [262] [245]

Foeniculum vulgare Mill. (Umbelliferae)

ریشه رازیانه

Rishah-i-rāziyānah (Teh.); the root of fennel.

I-I

924* 278* crushed, a spicy odor, and possess a strong, spicy, and bitter taste. They have a stimulant and antiseptic action on the mucous membrane of the genito-urinary organs, and are also a diuretic.

924* 263 **Pistacia integerrima Stew.** (Anacardiaceae)

چهار تنخوش

Chahār tankhūsh (Teh.); **Chatlanguch** (Ham.); **Kharshnai** (Kash.); fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150839; K.B. 331.

This is the northwestern Himalayan form of the turpentine tree, called also the false or donkey mastich. The small drupes are broader than long, 5 by 6 mm., glabrous, rugose, gray with a bony stone. They have a marked terebinthinate odor, and are used locally to impart flavor to milk.

جفت

Field 201; W.H.M.M. 150706.

Iran [281] Under the name of Jift or Juft, the broken shells of the galls of the turpentine tree are sold in Tehran. Being very astringent, they are used for tanning; mixed with lime, they remove hair from skins.

I-I 924* 278* **Pistacia Khinjuk Stocks.** (Anacardiaceae)

حب الغار

Habbu'l ghār (Isf.); **Habul-khazra** (Teh.); **Hebbul-beneh** (Ar.); the fruits.

Field 449; 116 (Iraq); K.B. 331.

سبز قلنج

Subz-i-gulanj (Teh.); **Buzghanj** (Ham., Isf.); **Gul-i-pisteh** (Bom.); **Afs-el-batum** (Tri.); the galls.

Ait.; Boiss. 2: 6; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 1: 377.

Field 422; W.H.M.M. 150878; K.B. 331.

[262] [314] [281] This tree is common in Iran, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan, and has been described under different species names. The tree yields a resin-like material, and the nuts, which are eaten, afford a sweet oil; the leaves and galls are employed for tanning. The small, seed-like fruits are oval in shape, 6 mm. long, reddish brown in color, with an acid taste and terebinthinate odor. The fruits are eaten and are said to be good for debility.—Prepared like tea, they relieve stomach pains (H.F.).

1: Longrigg
496, 315, 631

MHl Iraq MHl

The map following page 436 has been reproduced according to the following schedule:

d	e	f
a	b	c

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been 619 formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable 579 as Qa'immaqam. The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it 511 has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. 135 Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya 315 Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Naftchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Naftkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, 471 significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. 433 There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver ''Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The infant oil industry in neighbouring Persia will be mentioned 315
later (p. 71). In 'Iraq, in spite of some enlargement of the primi- 471
tive extraction and refining plants at Qaiyara and elsewhere, no modern oilfield enterprise appeared. Nevertheless, the presence of important oil deposits in the Mosul and Baghdad wilayas was universally believed, and was affirmed by German visitors in 1907. The first move was the allotment of a twenty-metre strip of territory, athwart the railway alignment, to the Anatolian Railway in its 1902 and 1903 Conventions; the Sultan reaffirmed in December 1903 his previous Iradas declaring the Privy Purse to be sole owner of 'Iraq oil; and in July 1904 an option for exploration was given by that administration to the Baghdad Railway who passed it to the Deutsche Bank. It was not pursued, and after two renewals the option was treated by the Turks (though never by the Bank) as having lapsed.

Meanwhile W. K. D'Arcy, after gaining his Persian Concession 315
(p. 71), had sent a representative to Istanbul in 1901 and after 471
three years of negotiation and a ministerial promise that a con-
cession would later be forthcoming, firm application was made 648*
by his new-formed Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate. Success was almost achieved in 1908; but the revolution interfered, Royal Iradas retransferred Turkish oil rights to the Treasury, and all negotiators perforce started again. The latter by now included another British group associated with Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian, an able and progressive Armenian, and representatives of Admiral Chester, an American ex-officer with long-standing Turkish connexions and now a candidate for railway and mineral privileges.

The aspirants for 'Iraq oil development—for this was chiefly though not exclusively in question—regrouped and returned to the attack in 1910. In January 1911 Mr. Gulbenkian's group formed African and Eastern Concessions Ltd., with substantial holdings by the newly founded (British) National Bank of Turkey, the Shell interests, the Deutsche Bank, and Mr. Gulbenkian himself. The Company was late in 1912 renamed the Turkish Petroleum Company, with doubled capital, and the Deutsche Bank agreed to transfer to it the options which it claimed for railway-strip exploration. The D'Arcy interests, merged in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company since 1909, continued to press its candidature, which in 1913 again narrowly failed of success. Meanwhile, late in 1909, a Turkish Parliamentary Committee had voted for the grant of mineral rights on a 900 mile railway strip to Admiral Chester; and strong German opposition was needed to thwart his efforts to achieve ratification.

By 1913 the desirability of reconciling the rival applicants and enabling field work to commence was clear to all. Anglo-German

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

315 agreement on the diplomatic level was added to that of the Com-
471 panies. The Turkish Petroleum Company was again reorganized.
A quarter of its capital was allotted to the Deutsche Bank, a quarter
648x to the Shell group, and a half to Anglo-Persian, with an interest
of 5 per cent. to Gulbenkian. Confident application could now be made to the Grand Vizier, with the backing of both British and German Ambassadors. The result was a letter to these from Sa'id Ḥalim Pasha on 28 June 1914. It stated that the Minister of Finance agreed to lease to the T.P.C. all oil deposits discovered or to be discovered in the Mosul and Baghdad wilayas, and 'reserved the right later on to fix its own share, as well as the general terms of the Agreement'. Upon this letter, precisely, was based the application of the T.P.C. to the 'Iraq Government in 1923 for an oil concession to cover northern and central 'Iraq.

5. NEIGHBOURS AND FOREIGNERS

648x The increase in foreign interest and interests in 'Iraq during this period was rapid beyond precedent. It is explained by 'Iraq's more active participation in the nationalist movement, in Istanbul politics, and in educational foundations such as the Tribal College and the American University of Beirut; and it was aided by the railway and irrigation works projected and under execution, and the considerations of strategy and development suggested by them.

The Germans had, from 1900, included 'Iraq in their area of eastern expansion. They had taken the lead in archaeological work by nearly two decades of excavation by Koldewey at Babylon, and initiated excavation elsewhere in 'Iraq, for which their Consuls alleged the personal interest of the Kaiser. They founded a German school in Baghdad, and invited the French Carmelite fathers to teach German. They appointed a regular Consul in Baghdad in 1905 with his Vice-Consul at Baṣra, and planned a German-dominated quarter of the town with the Consulate, railway station, wharves, and Customs house. Since the earliest arrivals of German steamers at Baṣra in 1899, the subsidized traffic of these had steadily increased. The Hamburg–Amerika Line started regular sailings in 1906, to be followed by an influx of German commercial travellers and resident agents—notably the firm of Wonckhaus at Baṣra—and by the appearance of their goods in the Baghdad shops. 'Iraq, in fact, seemed destined to afford a stage for full German penetration.

Russian enterprise still kept to limited and uncommercial lines. Having failed at Kuwayt, they felt their way towards acquiring rights in a Persian port, and projected a trans-Persian railway; but the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 1907 helped to remove from these projects the element of menace to British interests in the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MH1

496 two-metre-gauge systems (Baghdad–Baṣra and Baghdad–Kirkuk) remained a source of delay and trouble, and the floods of 1926 destroyed much railway property. But the reopening of Persian [464] pilgrim traffic after 1924 brought welcome revenue to the railway. The Indian labour disappeared in thousands year by year, replaced by 'Iraqis.

433 Industry in modern guise was slow to appear. Cotton-ginning and mechanical transport maintenance, ancillary to other forms of enterprise, have been mentioned. Of modern manufacture there was none, though various possibilities were often discussed. The future source, however, of the country's greatest single enterprise 315 and wealth advanced during these years from the conference-room 471 into the open: mineral oil.

648 The Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913–14 had allotted to Turkey, and therefore ultimately to 'Iraq, the western half of the Naftkhana border area south of Khaniqin; and the Turkish, and thus by inheritance the 'Iraqi, Government had accepted that this Transferred Territory should be treated as still included in the grant made to D'Arcy in 1901. Negotiations on this basis between the Anglo-Persian Company and the 'Iraqi Ministry of Works were concluded in 1925, and later reopened to produce a revised and modernized agreement in May 1926. Drilling had early located a producing well, followed by others, and it was decided to convey the crude oil by pipeline the twenty-mile distance to Khaniqin. The refinery which, with Government encouragement, the Company decided to erect at Alwand outside the town, but still within the Transferred Territory, was begun in June 1926. 'Iraq seemed thus assured of its own petroleum supply, with all the importance of this to mechanical transport, pump-irrigation, and perhaps future industries.

The Vizirial promise given to the Turkish Petroleum Company on 28 June 1914 had in the seven years following been first doubted but later affirmed by the Foreign Office. It was questioned but later accepted by the French who in 1920, under the Cadman–Berthelot agreement at San Remo, inherited the Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent. shareholding in the Company; and it was viewed askance by the Americans who demanded an Open Door to 'Iraqi development with no complication of old unratified promises. This diplomatic obstacle was removed by the allotment of half the Anglo-Persian share to a group of American companies by an agreement reached in principle in 1923, but not implemented formally until 1928. Thus the shares of the Company in its final form were held as to 5 per cent. as ever by Mr. Gulbenkian, and as to 95 per cent. equally between the Shell Group (as the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company), the Anglo-Persian (as the

D'Arcy Exploration Company), the French Government-sponsored 315 Compagnie Française des Pétroles, and the American companies 471 grouped *ad hoc* into the Near East Development Corporation. This 648 shareholding was unchanged thirty years later, except in the internal holdings within the American group, where the six early participants narrowed finally to two, the Standard Oil (New Jersey) and the Socony. The Turkish Petroleum Company approached the successor Government first in 1924 for a suitable implementation of Sa'id Ḥalim Pasha's promise. Discussions were prolonged, Government a hard bargainer, and the Company's ideal of an all-'Iraq 'blanket' concession impossible of realization. The agreement signed in March 1925 covered the whole of Mosul and Baghdad wilayas and, since Parliament did not yet exist, was ratified by the Council of Ministers and the King. It provided for exploration by the T.P.C. within a time limit, for the selection of limited plots for the Company's own exploitation, with the obligation to let the remaining territory pass for development into the hands of the highest bidders. The royalty payable on petroleum obtained was to be four shillings (gold) per ton. Upon these bases, later to be revised, geological work in the field could begin, with great energy and expense, before the end of 1925. Concentrating first upon the known seepages and visible surface structures of the southern districts of Mosul wilaya, the Company devoted 1926 to extensive exploration. It was accompanied by the making of roads, the laying of water and fuel pipelines, and the erection of buildings. Fifty British and 2,500 'Iraqis took part. Drilling sites were selected in the Jabal Ḥamrin, near Ṭuz Khurmatu, in the neighbourhood of Kirkuk, and near Qaiyara and south of Sharqaṭ on the right bank of the Tigris. Drilling was to begin early in 1927. The claims put forward by the heirs of the late Sultan Abd al-Ḥamid, a formidable body of Turkish princes and princesses, to the ownership of all the oil of the old Ottoman Empire, and much besides, were not then or later taken seriously in 'Iraq.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

102
496
315
631



Oil pipe line
N O R
D E
52
JORDAN
BULGARIA
U. S. S. R.
Tbilisi
Istanbul
Batum
Ankara
TURKEY
Aleppo
SYRIA
O.P.L.
CRETE
CYPRUS
Beirut
LEBANON
Damascus
IRAQ
Bag
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv
JORDAN
Amman
Jerusalem
Alexandria
Cairo
Suez
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA

End Map (A)

In Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

102
496
315
631


D
Khan Baghdadi
Hit
EUPHRATES
Kubaysa
'AQARQUF
Samarra
Baghdad
DIYALA
Ramadi
Habbaniya
Falluja
Ctesiphon
Mahmudiya
KUT
THERN
Kutba
I R A
Raheliya
BAHR AL MILH
Karbala
Musaiyib
Hindiya Barrage
Babylon
Shithatha
Hilla
Hashimi
Khan Hammad
HILLA
Kifl
Kufa
Najf
Shamiya
Abu Sukhair
Faysaliya
Kharm
Shinafiya
DIW
SERT
KARBALA
Baku
Tabriz
Teheran
Hamadan
PERSIA
Baghdad
Basra
0 200 M.
Railways
Oil pipe lines
SOUTHERN
Salman
DESERT
Oil pipe line
44

End Map (B)

Iz Longrigg G-4, 3 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

102
496
315
631


Balad Ruz
dad
KUT AL AMARA
Badra
Jassan
'Aziziya
Baghayla (Na'umiya)
Kut al Amara
Shaykh Sa'ad
'Ali al-Gharbi
Hashimiya
Daghara
'Afak
Shamiya
Sukhayr
Rifa'i
Qal'at Sikr
Karradi
Kumayt
'Amara
Qal'at Salih
Rumaytha
Shatra
Suwayj
'Uzayr
MUNTAFIQ
Samawa
Khidhr
Nasiriya
Ur
Hammar
Chubayish
Qurna
Madina
Suq ash Shuyukh
HAMMAR LAKE
Qusayr
Salman
abu Ghar
Busaiya
BASRA
Shu'ayba
Zubayr
Basra
JABAL SANAM
Umm Qasr
Abadan
Khurramshahr
Dizful
Shushtar
Masjid Sulaiman
Ahwaz
KARUN
KHUZISTAN
Bandar Shapur
Fao
Bubiyan Is.
KUWAYT
Kuwayt
PERSIAN GULF
NEUTRAL ZONE
NEUTRAL ZONE
32
30
46
48
R. W. FORD

End map (c)

102
496
315
631


36
38
40
38
36
34
TURKE
Diyarbakr
KHA
Alexandretta
Banyas
SYRIA
Dayr al-Zur
Oil pipe line
Ab

End Map (d)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

102
496
315
631


42
44
LAKE VAN
Tall Kochek
'Ayn Zalah
Dohuk
Tall 'Uwaynat
KHABUR
JABAL SINJAR
Balad Sinjar
Tall 'Afar
Tall Kayf
Mosul
Barzan
Zibar
'Aqra
Rawanduz
Arbil
Raniya
GREATER ZAB
Quwayr
Makhmur
Qaiyara
Koi Sanjaq
Altun Kupri
Chamchamal
Kirkuk
Shargat
LESSER ZAB
HAWIJA
Taza Khurmatu
Daquq (Tauq)
Tuz Khurmatu
M O S U L
A R B I L
K I R K U K
B A G H D A D
Baiji
WADI THARTHAR
JABAL HAMRIN
TIGRIS
Kifri
Kingarban
Qara Tepe
Takrit
Abu Kamal
al-Qa'im
'Ana
Rawa
Haditha
Samarra
Deli 'Abbas
Khalis
DIYALA
Sumayka
Daltawa
Ba'quba
D U L A I M

End Map (E)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

102
496
315
631


46
48
50
38
36
34
CASPIAN SEA
Tabriz
PERSIA
0
100
MILES
International frontiers
Provincial boundaries
Land above 1500 ft.
" " 6000 ft.
Railways
Saqqiz
Sulaymaniya
Marivan
Penjwin
Sina
Hamadan
Qasr-i-Shirin
Kermanshah
Karind
Khaniqin
Qizil Rubat
Naft Khana
Naft-i-Shah
Mandali
Baladruz
Shahraban
DIYALA
SIRWAN R.
SULAYMANIYA

End Map (F)

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

487
496
617
315


TURK
ALEXANDRETTA
ALEPPO
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LATAKIA
SYRIA
Dara
HAMA
HOMS
TRIPOLI
PALMYRA
BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
HAIFA
Burqa
JAFFA
AMMAN
Qasr Azraq
JERUSALEM
TRANSJORDANIA
PALESTINE
TRANS-DESER
RAILWAYS
BOUNDARIES
TRIBAL NAMES
OIL PIPE LINES
100
0

[following p. 96(a)]

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

487
496
619
315


URKEY
RIA
'IRAQ
A
LEPPO
Nisibin
Tell Ziouan
Zakho
Dohuk
Amadia
Aqra
Tigris
Tell Afar
Balad Sinjar
MOSUL
Erbil
Koi Sanjak
Altun Kopri
Zab R.
Qala Shergat
KIRKUK
Dar ez Zur
Euphrates
PALMYRA
Baiji
Tikrit
Samarra
Abu Kamal
Ana
Al Qaim
HADITHA
Khan Baghdadi
Hit
Ramadi
Al Kadhimain
Al Falluja
Al Mahmudiya
Al Musaiyib
KARBALA'
Tuwairij
Al Kifl
AN NAJAF
Abu Sukhair
T.1
Rutba
Burqa
Shabicha
TRANS-DESERT ROUTES
RAILWAYS
BOUNDARIES
TRIBAL NAMES
OIL PIPE LINES
Scale of Miles
100
0
100
200

[following p. 96(b)]

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

487
496
619
315


IRAN
Ruwandiz
Ranja
Koi Sanjak
Sulaimaniya
Chemchemal
Tauq
Tuz Khurmatli
Kifri
Khanaqin
Karind
KERMANSHAH
Qizil Ribat
Deli Abbas
Naft Khanah
Shahraban
BA'QUBA
Mandali
Marut
BAGHDAD
Salman Pak
Al Aziziya
Hindiya
HILLA
Bughaila
Kut al Amara
Ali Gharbi
Ali Sharqi
Kifl
Al Kufa
Al Diwaniya
Afaq
Kut al Hai
Qala Sikar
Amara
Qala Salih
Rumaitha
Shatra
Euphrates
Tigris
Samawa
Al Khidhr
An Nasiriya
Al Qurna
SUK ASH SHUYUKH
Al Khamisiya
BASRA
Abul Khasib
MOHAMMERAH
Shuaiba
Az Zubair
As Sulman
Safwan
Umm Qasr
FAO
Busaiya
Al Amghar
Jahra
AL KUWAIT
Ansab
KUWAIT
35°
32°

[following p. 96(c)]

000 The Mission has carefully considered what industries might be expanded and what new industries might be established. It has sought to confine its recommendations for industrial development to those industries where there is reasonable prospect of efficient production, competitive with imports, and where production is within the technical capacity available in Iraq, supplemented, where necessary, by outside technical and managerial assistance.

Petroleum and Refining

135 No recommendations need be made on the oil industry. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons and those of the less well
382 explored fields near Basra offering perhaps equal promise. The development of these resources by the oil companies is proceeding
[466] along sound lines. The oil companies have also been well in advance of other enterprises in providing housing, health services, and other amenities for their employees, in instituting labor training schemes and providing better pay for workers. The Mission realizes that there has been some criticism in Iraq of the rate of development, particularly in the Basra field. The expenditure of close to £90,000,000 by the oil companies on oil development in Iraq is now, however, beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Production in recent years might have been much greater if the outbreak of the war with Israel had not resulted in closing the pipeline to Haifa and in preventing the completion of another pipeline
●[315] to that city. The existing line has a capacity of 2,000,000 tons and the projected line would have added another 4,000,000 tons. As already indicated, the government has recently obtained a commitment by the oil companies to increase output, which was a little less than 6,000,000 tons in 1950, to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955. It would not be advantageous to Iraq, however, to have production increased to such levels that the ensuing rise in oil revenues cannot in fact be effectively spent. Oil in the ground is a reserve for the future, and too rapid tapping of this reserve may entail a partial waste of resources.

382 The government has decided to build a modern oil refinery
471 near Baghdad which it anticipates will cost about £7,000,000. This refinery will use crude oil supplied from the Kirkuk fields at cost. With an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons, it will be able to supply

7; International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

496
491
● 315
508
133


40°
42°
RAILWAYS
ROADS
METALLED
UNMETALLED
WATERWAYS
NAVIGABLE
SEASONAL NAVIGABLE
OTHER
OIL PIPELINE
AIRPORT
S Y R I A
ZAKHO
TEL KOTCHEK
SINJAR
MOSUL
T1
K3
H1
H2
H3
HIT
RAMADI
TRANS JORDAN
NORTHERN DESERT
S A U D I A R A B I A
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

TRANSPORT SYSTEM

FACING P. 44(A)

7; International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

496
491
●316
508
133

MAP III


TURKEY
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
ZAKHO
AMADIA
DOHUK
ATRUSH
AKRA
TEL KAIF
MOSUL
SALAHUDIN
HAJ OMRAN
RAWANDUZ
SHAQLAWA
RANIA
ERBIL
KOI SANJAK
MAKHMUR
TAQTAQ
SHARGAT
KIRKUK
SULEIMANIYA
PENJWIN
TEL ALI
TUZ
HALEBJA
JOULOULA JUNCTION
SAMARRA
TIGRIS RIVER
HIT
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
FALUJA
BAQUBA
MENDALI
BAGHDAD
AZIZIYA
KERBELA
HINDIYA JUNCTION
HILLA
KUT
NUMANIYA
HAI
KUFA
NAJAF
ABU SUKHAIR
DIWANIYA
SHAMIYA
AMARA
SHATTRA
NASIRIYA
UR JUNCTION
BASRA
ZUBAIR
FAO
SOUTHERN DESERT
KUWAIT
IRANIAN GULF

FACING P. 44 (B)

311 waters of the twin rivers are largely wasted and periodically unloosen disastrous floods upon Baghdad and the alluvial plain to the south.

The Rain-fed Zone

244
438 In the upland plains of the rain-fed zone stretching from Northern Mosul to Suleimaniya, wheat and barley are the principal crops. Rainfall is generally inadequate for summer crops, although water from streams and springs permit cultivation of rice and cotton. In part of this area, especially Northern Mosul, there has been a rapid extension of cultivation with the help of modern agricultural machinery.

233
438
241 To the north and northeast lie the mountain massifs of Iraq. Here the raising of cattle, sheep and goats by Kurdish nomads is one of the principal occupations. The mountains are largely barren of trees but offer natural pasture for animals. In the valleys and on hillsides grain, tobacco, timber and fruit are grown. Tobacco, although small in area, is an important cash crop.

438
433 Except for some handicrafts, there is little native industry in this region. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, is principally a commercial center and an outlet for exports to Syria and
● [315] Lebanon. Kirkuk, however, is the center of most of Iraq's petroleum production and one of the largest and richest oil fields in the world. Oil fields of subsidiary importance also exist at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin in Diyala province. The mountains of the North may ultimately yield other minerals such as copper, chrome and iron.

The Irrigation Zone

133
311 South of the rain-fed zone the river valleys may be divided into three major regions: the upper river valleys; the lower river valley down to Amara and Nasiriya; and the triangular area from Nasiriya and Amara to the mouth of the Shatt al Arab.

The first of these regions includes most of the northern Jezireh and the area north of Baghdad and east of the Tigris. The latter area still awaits irrigation for the most part, and the Jezireh is hardly susceptible to irrigation because of the elevation and configuration of the land. The Jezireh is an upland plateau

?: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

427 average; and in date and fruit groves his allotment is likely to be
241 equally small. In each of these cases, however, the output per donum is considerably more valuable. In the rain-fed plains of the North where land is more plentiful and yields more uncertain, he may on the average plant as much as 40 donums in winter crops. In most areas the fellah and his family can probably get as large a winter crop area as they can till, but their capacity is limited by lack of draft animals, primitive agricultural techniques and the debilitating effects of disease and a hot climate. In some areas of the irrigation ~~zone,~~ however, particularly in parts of Hilla, Kerbela and Diwaniya, the fellah appears to get less land than he can till owing to the limited availability of good, irrigated land. The same applies to some rice-growing areas, particularly in Amara.

Lack of sufficient draft animals and implements, low yields and the necessity of turning over a share of the crop to the landlord or pump owner all combine to depress the economic status of the sharecropper. His position can only be improved by enabling him to raise his output or by increasing his bargaining power through the creation of alternative opportunities for employment and the opening up of new lands to settlement.

Minerals: Oil

135 Iraq possesses considerable mineral resources. Of these by far
315 the most important is petroleum. There are at present two major oil fields—one near Kirkuk in the North, the other near Basra in the South. The Kirkuk field is generally reputed to have reserves of over 1,000 million tons, while that near Basra, which is less well explored, seems to be almost equally promising. There are also minor oil fields at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin on the Iranian border.

135 Although surface indications of the existence of copper, iron, chromite and other ores have been found in the mountainous belt adjoining Turkey and Iran, the existence of deposits of sufficient size to warrant commercial exploitation must first be confirmed by core drilling.

7-International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

TABLE 7

ESTIMATED INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT

433
464

Petroleum production and refining	11,500
Food and beverage	4,500
Tobacco	3,500
Wool and cotton processing, textiles, wearing apparel and footwear	11,000
Wood processing and wood products	2,000
Leather (other than footwear)	450
Chemicals (vegetable oils, soap, etc.)	550
Building materials	6,000
Metal-working, including jewelry	1,500
Machinery and machinery repair	2,700
Electricity and water supply	1,100
Miscellaneous	1,000
Total	45,800

Indications of output in the more primitive industries are very 433 scanty, but data on output in some of the more modern industries can be found in the monograph on Industry. Production is, in general, on a modest scale, although some industries such as cement fill most of the country's needs.

Petroleum Production and Refining

Although production of petroleum is now rising rapidly, it 315 has been relatively modest in the past. The exploitation of oil is 471 predominantly in the hands of three companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—all owned in equal shares, except for five percent controlled by Mr. Gulbenkian, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Royal Dutch-Shell, the *Compagnie Française des Petroles* and the Near East Development Corporation (owned jointly by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum). Of these three, the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is exploiting the large field near Kirkuk, is the only one in production. In addition, the Khanaqin Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, has a small concession adjoining the Iranian border.

Efforts to develop production have been concentrated mainly 315 on the Kirkuk field where oil is found at the depth of only between

315 2,500 and 2,800 feet and production costs are accordingly low. Production capacity has been increasing more rapidly than transport capacity. Until 1949 there were only two 12" pipelines with an annual capacity of over 2,000,000 tons each—one to Tripoli in the Lebanon, the other to Haifa in Palestine. With the outbreak of war with Israel the Haifa pipeline was shut down and work on the completion of an additional 16" pipeline to Haifa, which was to have an annual capacity of 4,000,000 tons, was halted. Output therefore had to be reduced from 4,354,000 tons in 1947 to 3,017,000 tons in 1948. With the completion of another 16" line to Tripoli in 1949, it rose again to about 6,000,000 tons in 1950. Work has proceeded steadily on the construction of a new 30" line, with an annual capacity of 13,000,000 tons, from Banias, Syria, and it is expected that this line will be linked in the spring of 1952 with the disused portions of the two lines to Haifa lying inside Iraq, thus permitting a partial use of the new capacity while the remainder of the line is finished in Iraq. Meanwhile the productive capacity of the Kirkuk field is being increased rapidly to an annual volume of over 20,000,000 tons.

In Mosul, where prospects are much less promising, production is not expected to begin until 1953 and then only at a rate of about 1,000,000 tons per year. Work on the fields near Basra, which are potentially very rich, was begun much later but is now rapidly proceeding. Production costs will be considerably higher than at Kirkuk because oil is found only at a depth of 10,000 feet or more. A pipeline with an annual capacity of about 2,500,000 tons has been completed to the port of Fao on the Persian Gulf, and oil is expected to start flowing early in 1952. The company has undertaken to increase production to 8,000,000 tons by 1955.

382 The output of the Khanaqin Oil Company is confined to two wells in the Naft Khaneh field and is used entirely in the company's Alwand refinery, a simple distillation plant which is the only refinery in Iraq. Although drilling is proceeding in the Chia Surkh field north of Khanaqin, it is unlikely that the company's total output will rise substantially. The company's Alwand refinery, which employs approximately 525 people, produces about 70 percent of the petroleum products consumed in Iraq, the remainder being supplied, until recently, from the Abadan refinery in Iran.

Petroleum products are distributed by the Rafidain Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and at prices, exclusive of taxes, which are among the lowest in the world. 382

TABLE 8

PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM AND REFINED PRODUCTS
(in thousand metric tons)

315
382

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951 (est'd.)
Crude oil					
Iraq Petroleum Company	4,354	3,017	3,671	5,986	7,500
Khanaqin Oil Company	339	367	365	384	350
Total	4,639	3,384	4,036	6,370	7,850
Refined products	n.a.	373	369	393	—

VI. Transport

The state-owned railway system is the principal means of transport, carrying about 2,000,000 tons of cargo and over 3,000,000 passengers annually. Part of it is standard and part meter gauge. The standard-gauge section is part of the original Berlin-Baghdad railway and runs from Baghdad northward via Mosul into Syria and Turkey. The meter-gauge line extends from the Port of Basra in the South to Baghdad and then beyond to Kirkuk and Erbil in the North, with a branch line to Khanaqin. Over recent years the railways have managed to carry out a considerable capital development program despite serious financial obstacles, but they now face the need of replacing, on a considerable scale, old track, rolling stock and locomotives. 496

Road transport has as yet primarily supplemented rather than replaced railway traffic. There are only about 11,000 passenger cars and a little over 9,000 trucks and buses in the country. Roads are generally inadequate. There are only about 2,500 kilometers of metalled and surfaced roads in all of Iraq. The remaining dirt roads quickly become impassable in bad weather. Some important 494 491

433 expanded will, however, require financial assistance from the Industrial Bank. This should be arranged just as soon as plans can be formulated.

Petroleum Development

382 315 [471] The further development of the oil industry can safely be left to the internationally-owned companies now operating in Iraq. Under an agreement finalized early in October 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three major oil companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—undertook to increase their oil output to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraq Government 50 percent of the profit on their production before the deduction of taxes. Although output in 1950 amounted to only about 6,000,000 tons, there should be no difficulty about attaining the agreed target. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons, with the new fields near Basra offering equal promise. In the development of these fields and means of transport, the oil companies have already made an investment of close to ID 90,000,000, which is now beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Development in the Kirkuk and Mosul field has already proceeded on the assumption that a production capacity of at least 22,000,000 tons would be achieved in a few years, and with the completion of the pipeline to Banias, Syria, there should also be ample transport capacity. The balance of the projected output, namely 8,000,000 tons, will have to come from the newer fields near Basra. This may require some increase in drilling and will necessitate additional pipeline capacity to Fao, but neither of these will be difficult to accomplish.

382 466 The oil companies have been among the leaders in Iraq in providing better conditions and amenities for their employees and in instituting schemes for training skilled labor and technicians. They have been criticized, however, for their failure to appoint more Iraqis to leading positions. Under the agreement already cited they have undertaken to send 50 Iraqi students per year to British Universities to study various subjects relating to the oil industry, and also to establish a school in Kirkuk to train 60 Iraqis yearly in technical oil subjects.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

working shops, battery and electrical repair work, shops for repair 433
of automotive and agricultural equipment, bakeries, confectioneries 445
and food processing establishments of various kinds. The amount of capital required in individual cases is quite small but, in the aggregate, it adds up to a considerable sum. The Industrial Bank should arrange for a small-enterprise section to make surveys of small industries in each community, advise them concerning ways of improving their methods of production and assist in getting proper financial help where it is justified. It is estimated that ID 400,000 would be sufficient to meet the needs of these industries over the next five years.

The assistance of small industries by the Industrial Bank is to be preferred to assistance or stimulation of so-called cottage industries. Cottage industries may be of benefit in the overpopulated areas of Asia, but for Iraq they do not appear to be an appropriate solution to industrial growth. Iraq's population is small in relation to the resources available. Over the long term its problem is not primarily one of creating a maximum number of jobs with a minimum of capital but rather one of utilizing capital resources in ways which will make a permanent addition to the productive capacity of the country and to the building of modern industrial enterprises.

Establishment of New Industries

The entrance of industry into new fields would help to balance the over-all development of the country and to utilize its resources more fully. At the same time it would increase employment and thereby aid in raising the general standard of living.

Nitrate Fertilizer, Sulphur and Cement Plant

The largest and perhaps most promising possibility for new 382 387
industrial development lies in the utilization of the natural gas [316 ●
produced in conjunction with oil. Upon completion of the 30-inch 339]
pipeline, oil production at the Kirkuk field will be at a rate which will make more than 25 billion cu. ft. of gas available per year. For the most part, this gas will be wasted until some means is found for its economic utilization. This gas contains, according

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

491 are unsurfaced and impassable for long periods in wet weather. All-weather roads are at present found only in the Baghdad area and in the mountains in the North. The only passable trunk roads are those from Baghdad to Khanaqin, Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul, and Baghdad to Rutba and Syria. Even these have shorter or longer sections in very poor condition. There is no all-season road between Baghdad and Basra.

508 509 Two civilian airports, Baghdad and Basra, serve the principal air routes between Europe, Asia and beyond. Internal air services are limited to one line between Baghdad and Basra. Military airfields and landing grounds and a few private air strips are available in certain places, but demand for internal air transport has so far been negligible.

509 475 One state air line, Iraqi Airways, operates services with neighbor countries and Egypt through Baghdad and Basra with a small fleet of four aircraft. Administration and management of the airline are combined with those of the state railways.

315 Oil from the oil fields at Kirkuk is carried by pipelines across the country to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa, but the line to Haifa is now out of operation. A shorter pipeline connects the southern Iraq oilfield with the Shatt al Arab oil port at Fao.

489 Transport connections with the outside world are well served by the Port of Basra for ocean-going traffic, by the airports of Baghdad and Basra in international air traffic and by the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean. At present only one railway line, beginning at Baghdad, connects Iraq with Syria, and via Syria with Turkey and Europe. A desert road exists for through road traffic between Iraq and Syria and Lebanon. A private company, Nairn Transport, operates an international bus service on this route. There are two main roads for exchange of traffic with Iran, one from Baghdad via Khanaqin, and one from Erbil via the Rowanduz Valley and Rayat. Future economic developments may perhaps demand new traffic outlets to the Mediterranean, shorter and better equipped than the existing railway and road routes, but at present there are few signs of such a demand.

206 Development Board which is responsible for coordinating the development program of the country as a whole. The Board should also provide the financial means but leave to the PTT responsibility for execution of communications projects.

IX. Pipelines

315 Inconspicuous, but most important, in Iraq's transport and communications systems are the oil pipelines. The existing lines are: a dual line, 12 inches and 16 inches, from the Kirkuk oilfields to Tripoli, the Lebanese Mediterranean port; a 12-inch line to Haifa in Israel, closed in 1948; and a new 30-inch line under construction between Kirkuk and the Syrian Mediterranean port of Banias. A short line runs from the Basra oilfields at Zubair to the shipping stage at Fao. The pipelines carry a tonnage of oil which far outstrips the total carried by the country's railways. They are operated, maintained and expanded by the oil companies, and need only be mentioned to complete the picture of Iraq's transport system.

X. Surveys

654 No development in any branch is possible without maps and surveys. The Directorate General of Surveys, which is under the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, has surveyed and mapped the southern part of the country aside from the desert to scales varying from 1:5,000 to 1:50,000. Few topographical surveys have been carried out in the rest of the country, and the existing maps are not very reliable. The education and training of competent surveyors is difficult. Terms of service are not attractive to young engineers and surveyors who find better prospects in engineering, planning and construction work. Air surveys can, to all practical purposes, solve the problem and progress with them is now being made in the North. The skilled surveyors who are available are at present employed in cadastral work, land settlement surveys and mapping to fix the demarcation of land ownership.

2ᴚ United Nations U-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
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Map No. 1


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TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAN
JORDAN
Zakho
Tell Kochek
Aqra
Rayat
Rowanduz
Mahabad
Mosul
Erbil
Al Hadr
Koi Sanjaq
Penjwin
Qal'a Sharqat
Kirkuk
Sulaimaniya
Halabja
Baiji
Abu Kemal
Ana
Haditha
Samarra
Khanaqin
Tell Douke
Al Falluja
BAGHDAD
Rutba
Ramadi
Lake Habbaniya
Badra
Kut al Imara
Al Musaiyib
Hilla
Shithatha
Hashimiya
Karbala
Nukhaib
Al Kufa
Afaq
Amara

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

IRAQ
PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT ROUTES

Railway
Paved road
Unpaved road
Selected trail
Main oil pipelines
Airfield
0 50 100 200
MILES
0 50 100 200
KILOMETRES
SAUDI ARABIA
Nukhaib
Judaidat al 'Ar'ar
Al Kufa
Najaf
'Afaq
Ad Diwaniya
Samawa
Euphrates
An Nasiriya
Ur
Suq ash Shuyukh
Amara
Tigris
Basra
Az Zubair
Al Faw
Al 'Athamin
NEUTRAL TERRITORY
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF
40
42
44
46
48
32
30
28
26
AIR ROUTES AND AIRFIELDS
0 500 MILES
0 500 KILOMETRES
USSR
IRAN
IRAQ
JORDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
Mosul
Erbil
Kirkuk
Beirut
Damascus
Rutba
Baghdad
Basra
Kuwait
to Cairo
to Teheran
to Karachi
to Dhahran

MAP NO. 312

50-29085

20a

Minerals

● 3/5 The extraction of petroleum, which began early in the twentieth century, expanded considerably after the First World War. The possibilities of the country's petroleum extraction, which were ranked seventh among the principal producers in 1947 (see annex I, table 1), are estimated to be far in excess (perhaps several times greater) of the existing effective production. The oil fields are situated: (1) east of the Tigris, in the Kirkuk region (at present, thirty-one wells are worked and forty-eight are under observation; the largest is the Baba-Gurgur well), covering an area of over 80,000 square kilometres; this oil field is worked by the Iraq Petroleum Company; production is limited by the existing transport conditions; the reserves of the Kirkuk oil field are estimated at 1,200 million tons; (2) west of the Tigris, north of the 33rd parallel; the concession was granted on 25 May 1932 to the British Oil Development Company Ltd. for seventy-five years and was transferred in 1935 to the Mosul Petroleum Company for the production and transport of not less than one million tons annually; but the working of this field is still in the experimental stage; (3) south of Baghdad, the concession granted on 30 November 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company for the working and transport of one million tons annually is also in the experimental stage; and (4) along the Iranian frontier, where the entire production from the oil field of Naft-Khaneh, worked by the Khanaqin Oil Company since 1925, is supplied, for local consumption only, to the company's

509 Since August 1949, the Dutch KLM line has been flying four weekly services. The Swiss company SWISS/AIR has a weekly Zurich—Geneva—Cairo—Basra service. The Air India International company operates two services a week on the Bombay—Basra—Cairo—Geneva—London route. Iraqi Airways offers two connexions to Baghdad.

Iraq's international civil aviation traffic was as follows, in thousands:

	1947	*1948*	*1949*
Kilometres flown	423.3	877.7	1,107.2
Passenger-kilometres	3,996.	7,673.	[illegible]
Freight ton-kilometres	105.6	220.6	174.6
Mail ton-kilometres	8.70	12.58	12.48

Pipe-lines

●315 As a country whose principal asset is its petroleum and whose reserves offer the prospect of a great development in the near future, Iraq is chiefly interested in the satisfactory transmission of its crude petroleum. The country's vast petroleum deposits now being worked are some 900 kilometres from the port of Basra. Hence nearly all the petroleum exported, which means in effect the production of the Kirkuk basin, is carried by pipe-lines leading to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa whence it is transported by boat to the various countries of destination.

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1950

● 315 The double pipe-line belonging to the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is the largest pipe-line in the Middle East, was completed in 1935. It consists, in fact, of two pipe-lines with a maximum diameter of 32.4 centimetres (12¾ inches). The lines run parallel from Kirkuk, and separate at Haditha, forming an enormous letter Y: one pipe-line, commonly known as Branch T, runs across the Syrian desert to Tripoli (Lebanon); the other, known as Branch H, runs through Jordan and ends at Haifa (Israel). The first of these pipe-lines (Kirkuk—Tripoli) is 853 kilometres long, and the other (Kirkuk—Haifa) is 1,000 kilometres long. The whole system of pipe-lines has twelve pumping stations and depots; partially macadamized or good unmade roads run along the lines, and the system is equipped with a telephone line, radio, electricity and water supply stations, repair shops and dwelling houses. It is under constant supervision by land and air patrols. Its present annual capacity is approximately 4.3 million tons, equally divided between Tripoli and Haifa. The transport of crude petroleum in 1948 was very small, amounting to less than 3.5 million tons.

The same company is building two new pipe-lines, 40.6 centimetres (16 inches) in diameter, alongside the two pipe-lines already mentioned, with an estimated capacity of 8.5 million tons per year. In 1948, only the last section (56 km.) of a new pipe-line

3/5 between Kirkuk and Haifa, running from the Jordan frontier to Haifa, remained to be built. When these two new pipe-lines are put into commission, the annual capacity of the four pipe-lines will reach 13 million tons. In view of the heavy demands of consumer countries and the vast resources of the petroleum region of Kirkuk, the Iraq Petroleum Company is planning the construction of a giant pipe-line, 71.1 to 81.3 centimetres (28 to 32 inches) in diameter, from Kirkuk to Banias (Lebanon). With the exception of the stretch between Homs and Baniyas (80 kilometres), this pipe-line will run parallel (in the north) to the 16-inch pipe-line now under construction. The time estimated for the construction and the cost would appear to be sufficiently favourable to make the scheme feasible, and it is hoped that this pipe-line, with its annual capacity of 14,600,000 tons, can be put into use in 1953. The annual production of the Kirkuk basin would thus amount to 27-28 million tons.

[382] Apart from the large pipe-lines described above, Iraq has a small pipe-line, 39 kilometres long and 10.2 to 15.2 centimetres (4 to 6 inches) in diameter, from the petroleum fields of Naftkhaneh to the Alwand refinery near Khanaqin, which has a refining capacity of 8,600 barrels (1,146 tons) per day, or 420,000 tons per year.

A
206 communications with Pakistan, India, the USSR, various European countries and the United States of America. Kabul has a radio station broadcasting
207 in the Pushtu language.

IV. GENERAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS

ME
101 Geographers point out that formidable mountain barriers, which can only be crossed by difficult passes, separate Asia Minor from Asia proper and that the latter really begins only at the Mesopotamia plateau. As a matter of fact, although forming part of the same geographical group, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, generally speaking, have no natural connexions with each other. Furthermore, there is often no cohesion between the various regions in each of these countries.

241 From ancient times, the three countries have been essentially agricultural and they still remain so. The main occupation of the population, largely nomad, is agriculture and stock-raising.

I
489
[504]
[316] In different ways and to varying degrees, the economy of these countries is seriously handicapped by the lack of means of communication. Iraq, as we have seen, has for its foreign trade the excellent deep port of Basra, with its modern installations, and a long river channel, the Shatt al-Arab, linking it to the Persian Gulf. However, there are permanent obstructions at the river mouth which are a constant preoccupation to the Basra port authorities. In the case of crude petroleum, Iraq's chief export, the transport problem has been solved by the construction of the remarkable pipe-lines which vastly facilitate operations, save time and reduce cost. Lastly,

489 needs of the southern districts are particularly acute:
653 as yet they possess only roads which are not practicable for any traffic, still less for heavy motor
[491] traffic, during the rainy season and for a long time afterwards, and boat-bridges of a very old—almost antediluvian—type across the Euphrates and other rivers.

[508] The government is taking steps to modernize the Baghdad and Basra-Ma'agil airports (the latter, in addition to its modern technical installations, has had since 1937 an air-conditioned hotel, swimming pool, tennis courts, etc.). The aim is to make them into first-class international airports. In addition, a training school for civilian air pilots was established in Iraq in 1937.

377 As the country lacks hydroelectric power stations, in spite of the existence of various large dams, there is now a plan to utilize the Bekhme dam for the generation of electric power.

● 315 In the expectation of the return of normal political conditions in the Near and Middle East, the

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[8] It is interesting to note that for the Basra—Baghdad section (568 km), these coaches are placed on special 1-metre bogies.

2: United Nations U-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

● 315 Iraq Petroleum Company, for its part, is planning to build new pipe-lines which would enable the Kirkūk basin to supply 27 to 28 million tons of crude petroleum annually by 1953, that is, a volume greater than the 1948 production of Iran, which was and still is the fourth largest producing country in the world.

206 It seems that in spite of constant development the telecommunication systems, particularly the telegraph system, do not yet adequately cover the whole country.

600 Iran has many ports of varying importance on the Shatt al-Arab, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman and the Caspian Sea. Generally speaking, all these ports are in need of repairs, improved installations, materials, etc. Overseas Consultants, Inc., of the United States states that the ports of Khurramshahr and Bandar-Shahpur are constantly blocked and, as a first step in the Seven-Year Plan for the development of the country, it recommends the allocation of the necessary funds for urgent improvements at these two ports, and at the ports of Bushire and Bandar-Abbas, and the establishment of an administration of ports and inland waterways. This latter recommendation seems to be a significant finding as well as a proposal for action.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Oil Industry

Petroleum concessions covering most of Iraq are held by 471 IPC and the associated Mosul and Basra Petroleum Companies (MPC and BPC).[1] The three concessions are all for seventy-five years, from 1925, 1932, and 1938 respectively. They initially provided for the payment of dead rent until oil was produced and thereafter for royalties at the rate of 4*s.* gold per ton of crude oil exported. A new agreement, of 3 February 1952, made retroactive to 1 January 1951, provides that the Iraq Government shall receive 50 per cent of the companies' profits from their operations in Iraq before deduction for foreign taxes, part of the half share consisting of oil in kind (12½ per cent of the net production of each of the companies). In all circumstances except those of *force majeure* the Government's total income from the companies' operations is not to be less than 25 per cent of the seaboard value of all crude oil exported by IPC and MPC, plus 33⅓ per cent of the seaboard value of crude oil exported by BPC; the Government's income is further guaranteed at not less than £20 million sterling per annum during 1953 and 1954 and not less that £25 million during 1955 and subsequent years. Should circumstances of *force majeure* impose a suspension of oil production in the country, the Government will receive from the companies unconditionally a minimum annual revenue of 25 million for two years. In addition, the companies guarantee to produce and dispose of minimum quantities of crude oil annually as follows: IPC 20½ million tons, MPC 1½ million tons as from 1 January 1954, and BPC 8 million tons as from 1 January 1956. This replaces the previous undertaking that IPC should dispose of a minimum of 3 million tons per annum and MPC and BPC a minimum each of 1 million tons per annum. The approximate oil revenues forecast by the Iraq Government on the new basis for the years 1953–5 inclusive are respectively 45 and 59 million dinars.

Oil was struck for the first time in Iraq in 1927, near Kirkuk, 315 433 and by the end of 1934 IPC exported crude oil through two 12-inch pipelines, each of 7 million tons' annual capacity, to Tripoli (530 miles) and Haifa (617 miles) on the Mediterranean coast. In 1949 a 16-inch pipeline of 4 million tons' capacity was opened to Tripoli. In consequence of the Palestine conflict work on a similar pipeline to Haifa stopped short at the Palestinian frontier; for the same reason the Iraq Government closed the 12-inch Haifa line, which has since remained disconnected at the

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[1] For the location of concession areas, the length of period of the concessions, and the respective share holdings of the parent companies, see Appendix IV, pp. 568–9 below.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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● 315 frontier. A 30–32-inch pipeline of 14 million tons' capacity was
433 opened to Banias in Syria (560 miles) in 1952.

In the MPC concessionary area exploration and drilling were carried out before 1931, but it was not until after the Second World War that oil of certain commercial value was discovered and produced, at Ain Zala, north-west of Mosul. In 1952 the field was linked by a 12-inch pipeline to the IPC pipeline system, to permit the export of its crude oil to the Mediterranean coast.

In the BPC concessionary area exploration began in 1939 and, when resumed at the end of the war, was made more effective by the application of new geophysical methods. A field producing oil of good quality was developed in the area of Zubair, the average depth of the wells—some 11,000 feet—being greater than in any neighbouring Persian Gulf oilfield and four times greater than at Kirkuk. Oil is carried the seventy-four miles from the field to a new oil port at Fao, where oil was first shipped in December 1951, through a 12-inch pipeline; a second pipeline, of 24 inches, was completed in 1953 to cope with the company's increased production programme under the terms of the 1952 agreement.

433 Production of crude oil for 1952 (the first year of MPC and BPC production) was as follows: Kirkuk (IPC) 15,553,000 tons, Ain Zala (MPC) 270,000 tons, Zubair (BPC) 2,238,000 tons.

471 The area of eastern Iraq excluded from the concessions of
433 these three companies has been developed by the Khanaqin Oil Company, a subsidiary of AIOC, on the basis of agreements
382 made in 1925 and 1926. The output of the company's refinery near Khanaqin, together with imports from Abadan, provided Iraq's internal requirements of petroleum products. In accordance with an agreement ratified in 1952, the Iraq Government has bought the refinery, the company undertaking to operate it for ten years and, if requested, to operate also the new government refinery near Baghdad which is to replace it; after the Khanaqin refinery is closed the company will retain its production area on the same terms as those of the IPC 1952 agreement, conditional on exporting an annual minimum of 2 million tons of crude oil.

The government refinery at Daura near Baghdad, on which work started in 1952, is designed to produce a million tons of refined petroleum products per annum, a figure well in excess of the present requirements of the country. Meanwhile a small refinery of some 175,000 tons annual capacity has been erected
[439] at Basra to help make good the deficiency caused by the cessation of petroleum imports from Abadan.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954

M1 Middle East

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
TURKEY
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Erbil
Little Zab
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Tigris
JEBEL HAMRIN
Diyala
I R A Q
IRAN
BULAIM
Baghdad
SYRIAN
DESERT
Hindiyah Dam
Kerbela
Hilla
Kut Barrage
Tigris
Amarah
Diwaniya
MUNTAFIQ
Euphrates
Al Qurnah
Basra
Shatt al Arab
SAUDI
ARABIA
KUWAIT
Persian Gulf
NEUTRAL
TERRITORY

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63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954

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of the 33rd parallel. Affiliated companies have concessions over the remaining territory—the Mosul Petroleum Company in the region west of the Tigris and the Basra Petroleum Company south of the 33rd parallel. Oil is extracted from the Kirkuk fields by the Iraq Petroleum Company and conveyed by pipelines to Mediterranean ports. It was formerly pumped to terminals in Tripoli and Haifa, but the latter pipeline has been closed since the Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1948. A new pipeline, constructed from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias, was opened early in 1952. 471 315 471

In 1938, the Basra Petroleum Company began drilling operations in the Persian Gulf area, where the existence of an extensive oil field has since been established. In 1950, a pipeline was completed to its shipping terminal at Fao, at the head of the Gulf. The activities of the Mosul company are still in the exploratory stage, but the production of oil has recently been started at Ain Zala. It is piped to the Mediterranean by a line which joins that from the Kirkuk fields at Baiji, on the Tigris.

A smaller oil field at Naft Khanah, near the Iranian border, is worked by the Khanaquin Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This company operates a refinery on the Alwand River, near Khanaquin, which supplies petroleum products for local consumption. Since 1952, it has also constructed a small refinery at Basra to process products for use in southern Iraq. It obtains the crude oil from Naft Khanah or from the Basra Petroleum Company. 382 471

Iraq derives a considerable revenue from the pilgrimage traffic. The principal shrines of the Shia sect are located at An Najef, Kerbela, Kadhimain and Samarra, and, in addition to local pilgrims, they are visited annually by thousands of Shiites from Iran, Pakistan and other Moslem countries. The privilege of burial near the shrines is also coveted by devout Shiite Moslems. 788 346

Transportation is mainly by roads or waterways. Motor highways link the princi- 459 491

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64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East

Iraq MHI

Chapter VII

EARLY ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS

The Turkish Petroleum Company

x471 THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE existence of petroleum in what is now Iraq goes back perhaps to ancient times, but it was not until the latter part of the last century that it became known that the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul contained oil fields which might have commercial potentialities, and the Ottoman authorities became aware of the possibilities of exploiting these fields. In 1888 and 1898 Sultan Abdul Hamid conferred, by special firmans,[1] the concessions of the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, respectively, on his Civil List, thus making the concessions his private business.[2]

●[315] In 1904 the Civil List signed a contract with the Anatolian Railway Company—nominally Turkish but actually German—acting for the Deutsche Bank, to carry out a preliminary survey of the fields in the two vilayets, with an option, within two years after completing the survey, to enter into a contract with the Civil List for joint operation of the fields. Two years later the Civil List considered the agreement with the Anatolian Railway terminated and began negotiations with William Knox D'Arcy, who had the active support of the British Ambassador at Constantinople. While these negotiations were going on, the Young Turk Revolution took place and the Mesopotamian oil fields were transferred from the Civil List to the Ministry of Finance. D'Arcy continued to negotiate with the Ministry, but with no tangible results.

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[1] For the Turkish text of these firmans and their English translation, see "The Mesopotamian Oil Fields," *Oil Engineering and Finance*, Feb. 17, 1923, 198-201.

[2] *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washintgon, 1936), II, 81, (henceforth cited as *Foreign Relations* and year); Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the United States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in Mandated Territories*, Cmd. 1226, 1921, 11.

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The Basrah Petroleum Company Concession

x471 x648 On December 4, 1938, the Basrah Petroleum Company, also a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, obtained a 75-year concession covering all lands not included under previous concessions (about 93,000 square miles). Except that Basrah was to pay dead rent of £200,000 (gold) annually until commercial quantities were exported, all the other provisions were the same as those of the Mosul Petroleum Company agreement.[19] Basrah began producing and exporting oil in 1951.[20]

As discussed in Chapter II above, after the Persian Government granted the concession to D'Arcy, Great Britain succeeded in obtaining recognition by the Turkish Government that the concession covered the strip of territory on the Turco-Persian border which had been transferred from Persia to Turkey in 1913. This strip, known as the "transferred territories," was recognized as part of the Anglo-Persian concession by all the parties involved in the discussions, negotiations and prolonged deals over Iraqi oil. On August 30, 1925, an agreement was concluded between the Government of Iraq and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, granting the concession in the "transferred territories" for thirty-five years and establishing the royalty payments on a percentage of profits basis. The agreement also called for the formation of a subsidiary company to operate within Iraq. The subsidiary company was to erect a refinery for oil products to be consumed in Iraq; all the oil produced was to be for local consumption. The following year, on May 24, 1926, the agreement was revised. Royalties were to be paid on a per metric ton basis, the same as I.P.C.; the subsidiary company was also to become a marketing agency throughout the country; and the concession was extended for an additional thirty-five years.[21]

x471 •315 382 The subsidiary organized was the Khanaqin Company. It produced oil from the Naft Khaneh field, and its refinery at Alwand, near Khanaqin, terminus of a twenty-five mile pipeline, was completed in May 1927. Early in 1932 a marketing

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[19] The full text of the concession is reproduced in *Iraq Government Gazette*, Dec. 4, 1938, 686-706; the law ratifying the agreement, 672.

[20] Iraq Petroleum Co., *Iraq Oil in 1951* (London, 1952), 21.

[21] *Special Report*, Col. No. 58, 1931, 222. Six hundred eighty-four square miles were covered by this concession.

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company, the Rafidain Oil Company, was organized for the 471K
purpose of supplying Iraq's petroleum requirements. In May of 315●
the same year Khanaqin made over to Rafidain that portion of 382
its business which was concerned with the marketing of oil and oil products in Iraq.[22]

Production

Oil in commercial quantities was discovered as early as 1927.[23] It was not until 1934, however, with the completion of the Company's pipeline, that large quantities of oil were produced.[24] Since the major fields were inland, at Kirkuk, the output was inevitably limited by the capacity of the pipelines. Table III, on the following page, gives total production from 1927 up to and including 1951.

Pipelines and Refineries

The production of oil in Iraq was conditioned, at least in large measure, as was noted above, by transportation, hence the provisions in the original concessions for the transport of the oil.

The first major pipeline built by the Iraq Petroleum Company was a parallel 12-inch line from Kirkuk to Haditha, a distance of 150 miles, where it branched off in two directions, one line going to Haifa (Palestine) for a distance of 470 miles,

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[22] *Report 1932,* 40. A short summary of the various concessions is given in *The Middle East. A Political and Economic Survey* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1954), 281-282, and in *An Introduction to the Past and Present of the Kingdom of Iraq* (by a Committee of Officials, Baltimore, 1946), 43-45. A generalized outline of the terms of the concessions, almost on a schematic basis, appears in Raymond F. Mikesell and Hollis B. Chenery, *Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1949), 44-48; a sketchy outline is also given in *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1949-1950.* United Nations. E1910/Add.2/Rev.1, ST/ECA/9Add. 2, New York, 1951), 58. Henceforth cited U.N., *Review 1949-50;* Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East,* 66-76.

[23] Drilling began in April and in October Baba Gurgur No. 1 well came into production with 60,000 barrels a day. Mohammed al Naqib, "How Iraq's Oil Production Began and Grew," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya,* Feb. 6, 1954; see also *P.D.C.,* 207, col. 658, June 13, 1927.

[24] The Company spent about $62,000,000 from the time of the signing of the concession in 1925 until the oil began to flow through the pipeline for commercial marketing. U.S. Senate, *American Petroleum Interests,* 228.

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Table III. *Iraq Oil Production 1927-1951*

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In Metric Tons[25]

1927	45,000	1940	2,514,000
1928	95,000	1941	1,566,000
1929	116,000	1942	2,595,000
1930	121,000	1943	3,572,000
1931	120,000	1944	4,146,000
1932	115,000	1945	4,607,000
1933	123,000	1946	4,680,000
1934	1,031,000	1947	4,702,000
1935	3,729,000	1948	3,427,000
1936	4,011,000	1949	4,067,000
1937	4,255,000	1950	6,479,000
1938	4,298,000	1951	8,351,000
1939	3,963,000		

In Barrels[26]

1927	338,000	1940	24,225,000
1928	713,000	1941	12,650,000
1929	798,000	1942	19,726,000
1930	913,000	1943	24,848,000
1931	830,000	1944	30,943,000
1932	836,000	1945	35,112,000
1933	917,000	1946	35,665,000
1934	7,689,000	1947	35,834,000
1935	27,408,000	1948	26,115,000
1936	30,406,000	1949	30,957,000
1937	31,836,000	1950	46,760,000
1938	32,643,000	1951	61,534,000
1939	30,791,000		

and one to Tripoli (Lebanon) for a distance of 380 miles.[27] The line, which had an annual capacity of 4,000,000 metric tons,

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[25] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1949-1950*, 147, and *1951*, 141. Production in metric tons covering the years 1928, 1933 and 1938-1950 is given in U.N., *Review, 1949-50*, 60; figures in metric tons for I.P.C. in Walter E. Skinner's *Oil and Petroleum Year Book* (London), for the years 1934-1951 in the volumes for 1936, 1940, 1946, 1949, 1951 and 1952. I.P.C. production for 1934, 1938 and 1946-1951 appears diagrammatically in *Iraq Oil in 1951*, 8; the cumulative production from the beginning of operations to the end of 1951 is given as 68 million tons, 9.

[26] *World Oil*, July 15, 1952, 66; see also the graph in *Iraq Oil in 1951*, 8, covering two pre-war years and 1946-1951—limited, however to I.P.C.

[27] A detailed description of this pipeline is given in *American Petroleum Interests*, 212; U.N., *Review 1949-50*, 61. The building of this parallel pipeline

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was completed in 1934. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and 471X
the Dutch-Shell Company received their shares of oil at Haifa 315●
where, after the Consolidated Refineries were completed, it 382
was refined. The American and French groups received their crude at Tripoli.

Immediately after World War II (October 1946) a second parallel pipeline to terminate at Haifa and Tripoli was started, but because of the Arab-Israel war the branch to Haifa stopped at the boundary, about 42 miles from the terminus; the branch to Tripoli was completed in July 1949. A 30-inch pipeline from Kirkuk to Banias (Syria) covering a distance of 556 miles and with an annual capacity of 12,000,000 tons, was completed in April 1952 and officially inaugurated on November 18. This large new pipeline made possible a 95 per cent increase in the oil production from Kirkuk as compared with that of 1951.[28]

For the Basrah area a 75-mile 12-inch pipeline, begun in 1948, was completed in October 1951 from the Zubair field to Fao on the Shatt-al-Arab, on the Persian Gulf; a parallel 24-inch line was commissioned on January 1, 1954. The new oil field of Rumaila, 20 miles west of Zubair was connected with the last-named field by a 20-mile 20-inch pipeline.[29]

In July 1952 a 135-mile 12-inch pipeline from Ain Zalah, in the Mosul area, to Station K2 on the main Kirkuk-Mediterranean pipeline, was completed.[30]

The question of refineries was one of the major issues between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company. The former was anxious to have refineries on its territory; they would not only supply refined petroleum products necessary for home consumption, but would also increase the country's income, employ a greater number of workers, and enable the Iraqis to learn the necessary technique in the advanced stages of the oil industry.

A small refinery to meet local needs—but perhaps more because the A.I.O.C. would not build a long pipeline to carry the limited quantity of oil produced at Naft Khaneh in the "trans-

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was provided for in the agreement signed on Mar. 24, 1931 and the British Government had previously obtained agreements from the Governments of Palestine and Transjordan, *P.D.C.*, 248, col. 212, Feb. 10, 1931; *P.D.C.*, 250, col. 1080, Apr. 1, 1931.

[28] U.N., *Review 1949-50*, 61; *Iraq Oil in 1952*, 2. It took seventeen months to complete and cost £41 million.

[29] *Iraq Oil in 1953*, 27; *Iraq Oil in 1954*, 14.

[30] *Iraq Oil in 1952*, 27-30.

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x471 ferred territories"—was erected at Alwand in 1927 by the Khana-
● 315 qin Oil Company, as mentioned above.[31] It produced about 70
382 per cent of the petroleum products consumed in Iraq; the remainder was supplied by the Abadan refinery in Iran.[32]

In spite of persistent agitation by the Government, until 1951 the Iraq Petroleum Company refused to build more refineries in Iraq; it had two very small refineries at Kirkuk and Haditha, and a processing plant at Kirkuk. The great refineries were in Haifa and in Europe.

Closely connected with the question of refining was that of marketing of oil and oil products for internal consumption. As mentioned above, this was concentrated in the Rafidain Company. On December 25, 1951, the Iraq Government and the Khanaqin and Rafidain Companies signed an agreement providing for the purchase by the Government, at an agreed amount, of the Alwand refinery and the Rafidain facilities. Rafidain, acting on behalf of the Government, was to operate the refinery and, until 1961, was also to act as sole distributing agent for certain oil products for local consumption.[33]

To satisfy all local consumption demands, the Government decided to build a large refinery in the vicinity of Bagdad. Early in July 1951, it announced that it had accepted a bid from W. W. Kellog[34] of New York to erect a refinery south of Bagdad, with an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons. Work on the refinery at Doura started in 1952 and was expected to be finished in 1955, at a cost of £10,000,000. A 135-mile 12-inch pipeline was to bring crude from pumping station K2. In the meantime, as a temporary measure to meet the emergency created by the shutdown of Abadan, a small refinery with a 175,000-ton annual capacity was erected at Muftiya, outside of Basrah. In addition, the stabilizing and topping plants at Kirkuk helped to meet immediate local needs.[35]

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[31] *P.D.C.*, 207, col. 1467, June 20, 1927.

[32] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Iraq. Report of a Mission* (Baltimore, 1952), 150-151. Henceforth cited, International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report.*

[33] Iranian Oil Co. Ltd., *Annual Report and Accounts as at 31st December, 1951,* 21.

[34] *The Christian Science Monitor,* July 6, 1951.

[35] *Iraq Oil in 1952,* 16-17; *The Middle East. A Political and Economic Survey,* 282; United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East 1952-53* (New York, 1954), 49-50. Henceforth cited U.N., *Summary 1952-53.*

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
IRAQ
▲ Oil fields
— Oil pipe lines
★ Refineries
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Miles
Ain Zalah
Mosul
Quwair
Kirkuk
Suleimaniah
Al Fatha
Baiji
Khanaqin
Alwand
Naft Khaneh
Haditha
Bagdad
Rutba
Tigris
Euphrates
Nahr Umr
Basra
Zubair
Fao

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creased. Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Iraq has all the 311
necessary requisites for a sound and rapid economic development, especially in the agricultural sector. It has a very considerable quantity of land ready for immediate cultivation, so defined by the most conservative standards, and with modern methods very great stretches now defined as uncultivable could be improved and brought into the cultivable class; it has an 3N-
abundance of water for irrigation as well as for power, and it has at its disposal enormous quantities of cheap fuel both in petroleum and natural gas.

What, then, have been the economic, educational, health and 161
social conditions of the country? As regards the size and growth of the population, even today, more than thirty years since the creation of the Kingdom of Iraq, it would be very difficult to state categorically the percentage increase of the population. The accuracy of the figure advanced by the October 1947 census has been questioned by the International Bank Mission.[7]

Despite substantial strides in public health—an increased 165
number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors—during the first 164
thirty years of the existence of the Kingdom, the Bank Mission reported in 1951 that the infant mortality rate was very high, "perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births," and that there was a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and dysentery. Malaria was reported to cause 50,000 deaths every year. In 1948 no less than 6,657,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria and 524,740 trachoma.[8] In 1944 [759]
the total number of doctors in the country was 528; in 1951 it was reported that there was one doctor to every 7,000 in the population, which would make a total of about 915 doctors, but a large percentage of them were concentrated in Bagdad.[9]

There can be no doubt that educationally the country pro- 871
gressed considerably from the stage in which it was in 1921, but all in all the sum total was not very impressive; the rate of

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[7] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report,* 126.

[8] *Ibid.,* 49.

[9] *Ibid.,* 53; Hashim Al Witry, *Health Services in Iraq* (1944), 8. In 1945 there were, according to a British report, 569 doctors registered in Iraq. Since 308 were in Bagdad, this made approximately one doctor for every 15,400 in the population in the provinces, and one doctor to every 2,700 in Bagdad. Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, *Iraq* (1949), 80-81.

Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
315 Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
[496] works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-owned Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

Petroleum

433 382 315 439 [464] The petroleum industry in Iraq has made striking progress during the post-war period. Production and exports, which had been low mainly owing to the lack of transport facilities, increased sharply following construction of new pipelines to the seacoasts. Exploration activities led to the discovery of new oilfields, which are being developed. As a result of increasing output of petroleum and the revision of the terms of payment, Iraq's oil revenues have multiplied. These revenues have provided the financial means for development of the country's resources. Revenue from the oil industry, which is in the form of sterling, together with the substantial and rising foreign exchange disbursements of the oil companies for local expenditures, increased considerably the foreign exchange supplies of the country and made larger imports possible. Availability of petroleum products, at relatively low cost, has facilitated economic development, and the consumption of oil products has increased severalfold. In addition, the petroleum industry has given employment to an increasing number of employees (see table 27) and is providing them with training. After a setback during the war years, when production declined to 1.6 million metric tons in 1941, output of crude petroleum in 1944 recovered to its pre-war level of 4.3 million metric tons. Construction of two additional pipelines, parallel to the previous lines and with a yearly capacity of about 4.5 million tons each, started immediately after the end of the war. The pipeline to Tripoli was completed in 1949, but construction of the other, destined for Haifa, was interrupted by the Palestine conflict and it remains incomplete. Another large-diameter pipeline with an annual throughput capacity of 13.5 million tons, linking the Kirkuk field to Baniyas in Syria, was completed in 1952 at a cost of ID 41 million. In the meantime, the activities of the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company, Ltd., both affiliated with the Iraq Petroleum Company, led to the discovery of Ain Zalah and Butmah oilfields in the Mosul area, and Zubair and Rumaila oilfields near Basra. The development of these fields, especially Zubair, and the installation of pipelines and oil handling facilities during the past four years, has increased substantially the crude petroleum export capacity of Iraq. In addition, another smaller oilfield had been discovered by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company before the war at Naftkhaneh, near the Iranian border, and its output, which was refined locally, served the domestic market exclusively.

As a result of the foregoing developments during the last decade, as well as increasing world demand for petroleum, production of crude oil, which had declined from 4.7 million tons in 1946 and 1947 to 3.4 million tons in 1948, because of the Palestine conflict and the shutdown of the pipeline to Haifa, started to rise sharply, to 6.5 million tons in 1950, 18.9 million in 1952, and 29.6 million in 1954, representing in the latter year 4.3 per cent of the world's crude petroleum output as against 1.5 per cent in 1938. This production may be compared with proved oil reserves, which were estimated at 700 million tons in early 1949, and nearly 2,300 million tons at the end of 1954. Total investment in the petroleum industry of Iraq was estimated in 1952 at approximately ID 90 million, of which the main portion had been for construction of pipelines.

439 382 471 Iraq is exclusively an exporter of crude petroleum; the value of petroleum exports was estimated at ID 137 million in 1954 as compared with ID 10 million in 1938. Exports are handled by the parent companies of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its affiliates, but under the terms of the February 1952 agreement,

these schemes would raise annual capacity to over a million tons. Other projects 433
include a sugar factory using locally grown beets to produce 10,000 tons of sugar
per annum and refine 25,000 tons of imported sugar, at an estimated cost of 185
ID 1.78 million; a pilot paper plant; a glass factory; a rayon factory; and a
tobacco factory. 1/

The most important project connected with petroleum is a refinery with an 433
annual capacity of one million tons, at Dora, near Baghdad. Completion was
scheduled for 1955 and total costs have been estimated at ID 10.5 million. A 382
pipeline supplying the refinery with crude petroleum, from Baiji, on the
Euphrates west of Kirkuk, has been completed and five pipelines are under 315
construction to carry the refined products to Baghdad and Um Al Adham. 2/ An 185
asphalt refinery being built at Qayara, near Mosul, at a cost of ID 1.15 million,
is expected to produce 60,000 tons of asphalt per annum, as well as 24,000 tons
of gas oil. A smaller plant at Muftiya, near Basra, with an annual capacity of
6,000 tons, was scheduled to start operations at the beginning of 1955. 3/ A
lubricating oil refinery has also been approved near Baghdad; it will produce
25,000 tons and cost 3.4 million.

The major project under consideration is that for utilizing natural gases 185
from the Kirkuk oil wells to produce chemical fertilizers, cement, sulphur and
electric power. Two alternative projects have been submitted, one of which would 433
cost ID 33 million and produce 500,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizers, 200,000 tons
of cement and 100,000 tons of sulphur, while the other would cost ID 20 million
and produce half these quantities.

A survey of mineral resources is being carried out by a group of foreign consulting engineers. Negotiations are proceeding with a United States sulphur company regarding the exploitation of Iraq's sulphur deposits, which are believed to be large.

Other development projects include a highway and bridge building programme, the expansion of Baghdad airport and improvement of telecommunications. In addition, a large-scale building programme is under way, including hospitals, schools, low-cost housing and public buildings.

The new Five-Year Plan

The Ministry of Development and the Development Board have approved the new 185
Five-Year Plan for the financial years 1955/56 to 1959/60. Subject to approval by
Parliament, the plan calls for an estimated total expenditure of ID 303,306,100.
Revenue estimates total ID 252,658,000. These are calculated on an estimated
annual revenue of ID 43 million derived from a 70 per cent share of the oil
receipts making a total of ID 215 million, plus a sum of about ID 38 million from
previous years. The deficit of about ID 50 million is to be balanced by an
anticipated increase in oil revenue during this period.

1/ The Iraq Times, 20 October 1954.

2/ Ibid., 6 December 1954.

3/ Ibid., 19 November 1954.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

433 Much progress had been made, under the care of a Hides Association, in the better treatment of local hides and skins, and well-tanned leather was produced. Boot and shoe manufacture, largely by electrically-operated machinery, had increased in scale and quality. The cement factory outside Bahgdad, using lime brought from near Ṭuz Khurmatu, came into important production in 1949 and was soon selling 250 tons a day. The three cotton ginneries erected before the war—one of them an Agricultural Bank enterprise at 'Aziziya—remained in being, with capacity to deal with much more than the available cotton crop. Printing presses, all small except one European-owned and that of the Government, remained substantially as before the war, save in their modernized equipment. The spinning and weaving industry, which in some cases also dyed and finished its fabrics, had by 1950 greatly increased its pre-war development and used in part local cotton; a factory in Mosul made also rayon cloth.

Other industrial projects more or less near to realization in 1950 were for rayon production from straw, for local production of fertilizers, and for sugar-refining. The treatment of tobacco leaf had been intensively studied, but remained defective. The industries likely, it was thought, to develop further, using 'Iraqi raw materials and diminishing the need for import, were those producing cement, soap, alcohol, vegetable oil, leather and shoes, cigarettes, beer, and textiles. The other industries would in all probability keep a lesser though perhaps a useful place; none was likely to produce a considerable surplus for export, unless, as some hoped, an industry could be founded to use, for fertilizers or otherwise, the abundant by-products of petroleum. The Development 185
Board intended considerable expenditure on 'industrial and mining 316]
schemes' in the period 1951 to 1956, upon lines to be later revealed.

'Iraq's poverty in minerals other than petroleum seemed in part 135
to have been corrected by the discovery, in the later forties, of 317
interesting copper and copper pyrites deposits in the mountainous Qal'a Diza area, and by reports from the Government geologist of an outcrop of excellent marble near Rayat and supplies elsewhere of chromite, iron ore, magnesite. These, or some of them, were thought capable of commercial development. A hard limestone suitable for barrage building was sought and found. Local salt, gypsum, brick clay, Mosul building-stone, and cement-making materials were in use as before, and it was planned to renew the activity which during the war had produced up to 15,000 tons a year of Kifri 'coal'.

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7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

● 317 The exploitation of salt deposits may ultimately prove to be another industrial possibility. A salt dome known to exist near Basra might provide large quantities of salt for both export and domestic consumption and might make possible the establishment of an alkali plant, for which the gas from the nearby oil field could furnish cheap power. The Mission therefore suggests that core drilling of this dome be undertaken in order to appraise its commercial possibilities.

433 In the process of industrial development the host of small enterprises which account in the aggregate for a considerable output should not be neglected. Among these are shops engaged in tire retreading, reclamation of lube oil, battery and electrical repair work, automotive and machinery repair, wood-working, etc. Many of them could be assisted to improve their production through installation of power-operated tools and other equipment.

In starting new plants and expanding old ones it is important that capital charges be kept at a minimum by arranging for maximum possible utilization of the installed equipment. This involves the employment of as many shifts as possible, the use of machines at maximum working speed and, above all, the use of purchased power. In the past, industrial plants have added unnecessarily to their capital overhead by installing their own power plants. Such plants usually prove costly since they operate only part of the time. Single plants catering to both industrial and lighting needs are
365 more economical because of a high and steady load factor. In order to induce industries to purchase power, however, the price of electricity for industrial use will need to be reduced. Such a reduction could be achieved in Baghdad, the principal industrial center, particularly if steps were taken to relieve the Baghdad Light and Power Company from the heavy burden of sharing its profits with the Iraq government and also having its profits taxed by the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, such as in Mosul, a reduction in power prices depends on more efficient management.

Financing of Industrial Development

433
471 The Mission believes that complete government ownership of industry should be adopted only where absolutely necessary. In general it will prove necessary only where private capital is not available either because the contemplated investment is too large,

35e Hooper and Field 9-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

I-I

Gil-i-gazwin (247), a clay eaten by pregnant women; and Gil-i-batuni (258), a siliceous powder used by painters. 278* 261

The following is a list from other sources of edible and medicinal clays met with in Iran and India. 843 823*

Gil-i-qubrasi. Cyprus clay.

Gil-i-igritus. Cretan earth.

Gil-i-khurasani. Edible chalk.

Gil-i-misri or *Karkooti.* Egyptian earth or Nile mud taken from bed of river.

Gil-i-shamus. Samian earth (according to Dioscorides the Greeks used the earth of Samos as a means of stopping the vomiting of blood—Laufer, "Geophagy," p. 109).

Gil-i-zard. Yellow clay from Istanbul.

Chunniah (from China, lime). A soap-like, earthy substance obtained from lakes near Halla, eaten by women of Sind.

The subject of eating clays is of ethnological as well as medicinal interest. An attempt to deal with the subject from these points of view will be found in a paper on "Earth-eating and the Earth-eating Habit in India," by D. Hooper and H. H. Mann (*Mem. Asiatic Soc. Bengal*, Calcutta, 1906, pp. 240–270). [113]

Sodium carbonate (crude) 278*

نمک قلیاب 317 •

Namak, Qalyāb (Teh.); washing soda. 823*

W.H.M.M. 150843.

This is a white, alkaline salt, either thrown up as an efflorescent deposit on the soil (Sajji mati), or prepared from the ashes of marine plants. It consists of sodium carbonate, containing much chloride and sulphate of sodium, and insoluble matter.

Sulphur

گوگرد زرد

Gūgird-i-zard, Gūgird-i-akhmar (Teh.); Gogut (Yark.); Gandhak (Hind.).

Field 218, 241; W.H.M.M. 150731.

Yellow sulphur in powder and crystalline masses is said to come from the Mount Demavend district in Iran.—Sulphur ointment is used for skin complaints and for secondary syphilis (H.F.).

I-I
278*
825

to be petrified fruits; the name they bear in Delhi, Pathar-ka-ber, signifies the fruits or stones of the jujube tree. The stones are oval, pointed at both ends, 3.5 cm. long and 2 cm. in diameter. They contain 95 per cent of calcium carbonate. These stones are sold all over northern India, Iran, Syria, and Palestine. They are said to be useful for healing wounds, and, internally, for flatulence and diarrhea.

Cypraea moneta L. (Gastropoda)

صدف

Sadaf, Wuda (Ar.); Khar mahra (Pers.); Cowri, Sipi (Hind.); cowrie shells.

Field 269A.

These well-known porcelaneous shells from the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf are used throughout the East for making ornaments, and at one time were a means of barter or medium of exchange. They consist chiefly of calcium carbonate, and in medicine are used as an antacid, alterative, and expectorant. The shells also serve as charms against the Evil Eye for babies, horses, and machines (H. F.). [321] • [301] [436]

Larinus maculatus Fald. (Coleoptera)

Yielding Tréhala manna; described under the name of the host-plant, *Echinops persicus*.

Bee's wax (Hymenoptera, Apoidea)

موم

Mūm (Teh.); Moma (Hind.); Cera alba; white wax.

Field 216, 260.

White wax is sold in the shops and used for plasters and ointments.

"Camphor candle" (Mūm-i-kāfūri) is a specimen of a crudely made wax candle in the composition of which camphor has been incorporated to diffuse a pleasant odor when burning.

Bombyx fortunatus Hutton (Lepidoptera)

پیله ابریشم

Abrīsham, Pīlāh abrīsham (Teh.); Pileh, cocoon; Resham, silk; Pat (Beng.); Resham-ki-keri (Duk.); cocoons of the silk moth.

W.H.M.M. 150821.

The cocoons of the silk moth or silk worm are said to be styptic and tonic, and are generally administered with other astringents.

ing the first years of operation. Such a mill would give permanent employment to approximately 50 workers. 327

Concrete Batching Plant

339 Iraq will probably undertake in the near future a considerable number of construction projects for which poured concrete would appear to be the best material. It would therefore be desirable to locate in Baghdad a batching plant with ready-mix trucks to furnish the concrete. Standard steel forms would also be needed. A batching plant capable of producing cement for approximately 5,000 houses per year would cost about ID 125,000 in foreign exchange, mostly U. S. dollars. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank.

Glass Works

323 During the war, two plants at Mosul remelted broken glass to make glass tumblers, etc. These plants are now closed as they are no longer competitive with imported glass.

It has been stated that suitable sand for glass manufacture has been located near Mosul. If the Department of Industries verifies the adequacy and suitability of this sand, then a new glass factory might well be constructed to make bottles, white containers and tumblers for domestic consumption. No attempt, however, should be made to manufacture flat glass. No recommendation is made in regard to the construction of such a plant, however, until adequate sources of material are proven.

Date Packing Crates

322 The cost of wooden boxes for the shipping of dates has steadily increased and represents a considerable cost to the date industry. At present, the practice is to import the boxes in pieces for assembly in Iraq. It is recommended that a small box plant be constructed at Basra to make these boxes from imported timber. This factory would require only a few power-driven wood-working tools estimated to cost ID 10,000, primarily in pounds sterling, and should reduce the cost of date boxes by at least 50 percent. The plant could be financed by private capital and sponsored by the ~~Date Association~~. It would employ about 30 full-time workers.

327 ing the first years of operation. Such a mill would give permanent employment to approximately 50 workers.

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382 387 reliable foreign chemical firm can be secured to design and construct it and, at least at the outset, operate it under a management contract.

The plant would give permanent employment to about 1,000 workers.

387 237 *Bone Meal Plants*

Another promising field for new industry is the conversion of the waste products from abattoirs to fertilizers for domestic use. Bone meal, for example, is a very valuable fertilizer. Yet at present Iraq, with no domestic plant to utilize them, is exporting approximately 15,000 tons of bones per year to Europe.

There would probably be sufficient demand for fertilizer to support three plants, located at Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Their combined cost would probably amount to roughly ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, principally pounds sterling. With help from the Industrial Bank, this could probably be financed by the abattoir owners. When completed the plants would give employment to about 60 workers.

Steel

327 Iraq is now producing about 5,000 tons of steel scrap per year. It is recommended that a small hand-operated mill and electric melting furnace be set up to convert this scrap into reinforcing bars, window shapes and small angles, all of which are in great demand. This mill ought to be located in Baghdad and arrangements made to obtain off-peak power from the Baghdad power plant or from the railroad shops. As an alternative to electric melting, crucibles might be considered. In either case, the cost of the plant would be approximately ID 300,000, including ID 200,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in hard currency. This mill could not satisfy the whole of Iraq's steel needs; nevertheless, it would furnish about 5,000 tons per year of certain types at probably half the cost of the imported steel it would replace.

The mill could be financed by private capital with help from the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required dur-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ing the first years of operation. Such a mill would give permanent employment to approximately 50 workers. 327

Concrete Batching Plant

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7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

339 sonable. However, the quality of the brick, because of the type of clay available, is rather poor. The demand for brick is easily met by the present highly competitive industry. When, however, the cement plant is enlarged, it will tend to replace brick by offering better and cheaper material in such forms as concrete blocks. In view of this, there does not appear to be any justification for enlarging the brick industry.

At present, some tile is made, but it, too, is being replaced by cement.

Milling

256 Iraq possesses three fairly large flour mills. The older ones are now being modernized with the latest machinery. A very modern mill was recently constructed at Basra, with a capacity of 50 tons per day, for the purpose of making possible the exportation of flour rather than just wheat. So far, a shortage of grain has prevented the mill from operating as planned. When a sufficient supply of grain becomes available, however, the mill will be capable of serving the export market in addition to local requirements.

Aluminumware

328 Aluminumware is very popular. It is now being manufactured in a small plant in Baghdad from imported sheet, which represents more than 70 percent of the production cost of the finished article. Production is limited to about 480 tons per year because of the difficulty in getting aluminum; however, even with an ample supply of material, the present capacity of the plant (600 tons) is only sufficient to meet about one third of the country's requirements. Production costs could be greatly reduced, first, by increasing the capacity of the plant, and second, by installing facilities permitting the utilization of both scrap aluminum and pig. To double the plant's capacity and install equipment to melt and roll scrap and pig would cost approximately ID 200,000, of which ID 175,000 would be foreign exchange, mainly in pounds sterling. These new facilities would require about two years to construct and, when finished, would employ approximately 40 additional workers.

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors. Imported goods found favour less by quality than by cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation, in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equip- 331
ment, the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

Labor and Materials

The Housing Authority could also take the lead in improving 362 the quality of labor and materials in order to bring the costs of 647 building down. In this task, it should cooperate with the Ministry of Education in reorganizing training methods. It could also advise the Industrial Bank on desirable types of specifications of building materials and should estimate probable requirements so that the Bank could initiate investment to this end in partnership with private enterprise.

The materials produced locally for housing construction are 339 on the whole inferior and expensive. For example, a casual inspection of house construction in the cities will reveal that unevenly burnt bricks with cracks and chipped-off edges and corners have been and are being used. To remedy the shortage of good building materials, foreign goods have been imported at high cost. In the case of the IPC housing project, it was estimated that the cost of imported steel window and door sashes alone amounted to as much as 20 percent of the cost of the structures.

The inferiority of building materials is matched by the poor 331 quality of building labor, which again adds to the cost of construc- 464 tion. There is urgent need for good carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians and painters. Unfortunately, attempts to improve skills through vocational schools have not been altogether successful. The schools lack competent instructors, a number of those teaching in Baghdad, for example, being illiterate. Workshop accommodations are restricted and the equipment is out-of-date or in bad condition. These deficiencies might be overcome by importing instructors from neighboring countries, by obtaining new equipment and by running evening classes until more laboratory space is available. This is not, however, the full answer. Graduates from vocational [461] schools tend to prefer desk jobs to field work. It would be preferable to concentrate more on training schemes on the job under good supervision.

Government Housing

The Ministry of Social Affairs is empowered by Law No. 38 362 of 1941 and Law No. 22 of 1945 to "construct dwellings for

II. Rural Communities

About one third of the people live in towns and cities; of the 162
remainder, a small proportion are nomads and the bulk live in 361
villages. In terms of population, therefore, the villages are the more predominant type of community. Although the distinction between a village and a small municipality is, as already noted, somewhat arbitrary, even the smallest municipalities are centers of local administration and have certain facilities of a higher standard than the villages. The distinction will, in any event, serve for present purposes.

Virtually all the rural population live in villages, isolated dwellings being very rare. Landowners, in fact, frequently count their fellahin by villages. Except for the extreme northwest, where there are seminomadic pastoral tribes who live in settled communities for only part of the year, the inhabitants of the villages are mainly cultivators. A few members of the community may have other occupations such as the tending of sheep and goats, the keeping of small shops and coffee houses or the building and repairing of huts. There are, also, villages where a considerable number of the people are engaged in handicrafts (e.g. weaving) but these are rare.

In the North, stone is generally available and is the common- 342
est material for buildings, while in the South and the Center, mud 333
is the usual material. The mud plaster of walls is reinforced with straw or cow dung to minimize the washing of clay in the mortar when it rains and to prevent temperature cracks. Where the climate is drier and palm leaves or reeds are available, especially in the marshes and palm belt of the South, these materials are more extensively used.

Another feature which distinguishes the North from the rest 361
of the country is the greater permanence of the villages. The main reason is probably that there is a much older tradition of settled cultivation than exists in the recently irrigated areas. Not only are there more small-holders, who would naturally have a close [423]
association with their land, but the fellahin also appear to have
A GREATER SECURITY OF TENURE.

In addition to the above-mentioned enterprises, it may well be 433
desirable to establish a paper mill as soon as there is an assured [289]
supply of pulp from abroad. As the demand for paper bagging for domestically produced fertilizers and cement increases, it will probably be more economical to produce such paper in Iraq than to import it. A plant for the manufacture of glass bottles, other containers and tumblers might also be started, provided the availability of the right type of sand can be confirmed.

The largest and perhaps the most promising industrial possi- 339
bility lies in the utilization of the natural gas produced in conjunc- 387
tion with oil and now almost totally wasted. The Mission recommends therefore that early consideration be given to the erection, near Kirkuk, of a plant which, using natural gas and gypsum as raw materials, would be capable of producing annually 500,000 tons of ammonium sulphate fertilizer, 100,000 tons of elemental sulphur, 10,000 tons of carbon black and 300,000 tons of cement. Since the natural gas contains about 10.5 percent of hydrogen sulphide by volume, it would be worthwhile to establish a plant to recover sulphur from all of the gas produced. Part of the cleaned gas would then be cracked thermally, producing hydrogen after removal of the carbon black. In the most important part of the plant the hydrogen and nitrogen won by removing carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide from the flue gases would be synthesized under high pressure into ammonia. Ammonia and carbon dioxide would then be passed through a slurry of finely ground gypsum, yielding calcium carbonate and ammonium sulphate. The latter would be sold as fertilizer and the former used to make cement. Such a plant could produce fertilizer very cheaply, thereby stimulating its use in Iraq; and any fertilizer not consumed domestically would find a ready market abroad. Sulphur and carbon black could be used in the production of rubber tires in Iraq and would also be in great demand abroad; and there will undoubtedly be a growing demand for cement in Iraq. The plant would cost aproximately ID 25,000,000, of which the sulphur recovery plant would account for about ID 8,750,000 and the cement plant for ID 1,500,000. It should be attempted only if a reliable foreign chemical concern can be interested in designing and erecting it and undertaking its operation under a management contract.

338 from the seeds of agricultural crops such as cotton, sesame and linseed. The linseed oil is blended and used in the making of paint, while the sesame and cotton seed oils are purified and distilled into light and heavy fractions, the light fractions being used as an edible oil, while the heavier are retained for soap-making. Although the expellers have a combined capacity of 20 tons of seed per day, the plant fails to satisfy present needs. Capacity should be increased by the installation of two additional mechanical expellers and a single solvent extraction unit to serve the entire plant. A washing plant should be installed for the purpose of reducing maintenance on the expellers. In addition to extending the capacity of the present facilities, new equipment is needed for the hydrogenation of oil for cooking fats.

Operating in conjunction with the oil plant is a soap plant with a capacity of 7.5 tons of laundry soap and 2.5 tons of toilet soap per day. This is estimated to be less than one third of present requirements. These facilities should be increased to take care of at least one half of the country's needs.

In all, the expansion program would cost an estimated ID 600,000, including ID 500,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in pounds sterling. It would probably require approximately two years before all of the facilities could be put into operation. Employment would be increased by approximately 60 workers.

Cement

339 Iraq's new cement plant is one of the more important projects sponsored by the Industrial Bank. The market for cement is expanding at a rapid rate and is well beyond the present plant's capacity of 220 tons per day. Additional equipment now scheduled for operation in 1952 will double the plant's output. Even so, production will fall short of domestic requirements. The larger plant should, however, reduce production costs and the cheaper cement should in turn open up many new markets in the construction and transport fields.

Brick and Tile

Brick is the prime building material. Over 30 private factories are engaged in the manufacture of bricks, and even though most of the plants are very antiquated, production costs are very rea-

sonable. However, the quality of the brick, because of the type of 339 clay available, is rather poor. The demand for brick is easily met by the present highly competitive industry. When, however, the cement plant is enlarged, it will tend to replace brick by offering better and cheaper material in such forms as concrete blocks. In view of this, there does not appear to be any justification for enlarging the brick industry.

At present, some tile is made, but it, too, is being replaced by cement.

Milling

Iraq possesses three fairly large flour mills. The older ones 256 are now being modernized with the latest machinery. A very modern mill was recently constructed at Basra, with a capacity of 50 tons per day, for the purpose of making possible the exportation of flour rather than just wheat. So far, a shortage of grain has prevented the mill from operating as planned. When a sufficient supply of grain becomes available, however, the mill will be capable of serving the export market in addition to local requirements.

Aluminumware

Aluminumware is very popular. It is now being manufac- 328 tured in a small plant in Baghdad from imported sheet, which represents more than 70 percent of the production cost of the finished article. Production is limited to about 480 tons per year because of the difficulty in getting aluminum; however, even with an ample supply of material, the present capacity of the plant (600 tons) is only sufficient to meet about one third of the country's requirements. Production costs could be greatly reduced, first, by increasing the capacity of the plant, and second, by installing facilities permitting the utilization of both scrap aluminum and pig. To double the plant's capacity and install equipment to melt and roll scrap and pig would cost approximately ID 200,000, of which ID 175,000 would be foreign exchange, mainly in pounds sterling. These new facilities would require about two years to construct and, when finished, would employ approximately 40 additional workers.

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working shops, battery and electrical repair work, shops for repair 433
of automotive and agricultural equipment, bakeries, confectioneries 445
and food processing establishments of various kinds. The amount of capital required in individual cases is quite small but, in the aggregate, it adds up to a considerable sum. The Industrial Bank should arrange for a small-enterprise section to make surveys of small industries in each community, advise them concerning ways of improving their methods of production and assist in getting proper financial help where it is justified. It is estimated that ID 400,000 would be sufficient to meet the needs of these industries over the next five years.

The assistance of small industries by the Industrial Bank is to be preferred to assistance or stimulation of so-called cottage industries. Cottage industries may be of benefit in the over-populated areas of Asia, but for Iraq they do not appear to be an appropriate solution to industrial growth. Iraq's population is small in relation to the resources available. Over the long term its problem is not primarily one of creating a maximum number of jobs with a minimum of capital but rather one of utilizing capital resources in ways which will make a permanent addition to the productive capacity of the country and to the building of modern industrial enterprises.

Establishment of New Industries

The entrance of industry into new fields would help to balance the over-all development of the country and to utilize its resources more fully. At the same time it would increase employment and thereby aid in raising the general standard of living.

Nitrate Fertilizer, Sulphur and Cement Plant

The largest and perhaps most promising possibility for new 382 387
industrial development lies in the utilization of the natural gas [316
produced in conjunction with oil. Upon completion of the 30-inch 339]
pipeline, oil production at the Kirkuk field will be at a rate which will make more than 25 billion cu. ft. of gas available per year. For the most part, this gas will be wasted until some means is found for its economic utilization. This gas contains, according

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ing the first years of operation. Such a mill would give permanent employment to approximately 50 workers. 327

Concrete Batching Plant

Iraq will probably undertake in the near future a considerable number of construction projects for which poured concrete would appear to be the best material. It would therefore be desirable to locate in Baghdad a batching plant with ready-mix trucks to furnish the concrete. Standard steel forms would also be needed. A batching plant capable of producing cement for approximately 5,000 houses per year would cost about ID 125,000 in foreign exchange, mostly U. S. dollars. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank. 339

Glass Works

During the war, two plants at Mosul remelted broken glass to make glass tumblers, etc. These plants are now closed as they are no longer competitive with imported glass. 323

It has been stated that suitable sand for glass manufacture has been located near Mosul. If the Department of Industries verifies the adequacy and suitability of this sand, then a new glass factory might well be constructed to make bottles, white containers and tumblers for domestic consumption. No attempt, however, should be made to manufacture flat glass. No recommendation is made in regard to the construction of such a plant, however, until adequate sources of material are proven.

Date Packing Crates

The cost of wooden boxes for the shipping of dates has steadily increased and represents a considerable cost to the date industry. At present, the practice is to import the boxes in pieces for assembly in Iraq. It is recommended that a small box plant be constructed at Basra to make these boxes from imported timber. This factory would require only a few power-driven wood-working tools estimated to cost ID 10,000, primarily in pounds sterling, and should reduce the cost of date boxes by at least 50 percent. The plant could be financed by private capital and sponsored by the Date Association. It would employ about 30 full-time workers. 322

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closely bound up with the development of the new oil field at Zubair, some 10 miles inland. Basra, like Baghdad, received a large influx of people during the war, especially from nearby Amara.

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These six cities, together with Amara, are the only ones with 361
a population of over 40,000. With a few exceptions, such as 162
Khanaqin with its small oil field and refinery, the other municipalities function primarily as centers of administration and trade for surrounding districts. Broadly speaking, their size varies with their administrative importance. Of the provincial capitals, other than those already mentioned, five have a population between 20,000 and 40,000 and three between 10,000 and 20,000. Of the remaining municipalities, none has a population exceeding 20,000; less than 30, most of them centers of *qadhas*, have a population of more than 6,000.

Despite differences in size and function, the cities and towns 361
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built around courtyards, the only opening to the street being the 366
main doorway. The houses usually have a flat roof or a partially open second story for sleeping outside in the summer. Brick is the commonest building material; most of the larger towns have brickworks nearby, many of which are small and primitive. There are also a few modern concrete and steel buildings, mainly in Baghdad. Schools and hospitals can be found in the heart of these congested areas. An important section in every city is the *Suq* or bazaar, a network of alleys, often covered by crude roofs forming a series of arcades. These alleys are lined with the small shops of retail merchants and handicraft workers in textiles and metals. The *Suq* is usually located near the principal mosque.

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Labor and Materials

362 647 The Housing Authority could also take the lead in improving the quality of labor and materials in order to bring the costs of building down. In this task, it should cooperate with the Ministry of Education in reorganizing training methods. It could also advise the Industrial Bank on desirable types of specifications of building materials and should estimate probable requirements so that the Bank could initiate investment to this end in partnership with private enterprise.

339 The materials produced locally for housing construction are on the whole inferior and expensive. For example, a casual inspection of house construction in the cities will reveal that unevenly burnt bricks with cracks and chipped-off edges and corners have been and are being used. To remedy the shortage of good building materials, foreign goods have been imported at high cost. In the case of the IPC housing project, it was estimated that the cost of imported steel window and door sashes alone amounted to as much as 20 percent of the cost of the structures.

331 464 The inferiority of building materials is matched by the poor quality of building labor, which again adds to the cost of construction. There is urgent need for good carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians and painters. Unfortunately, attempts to improve skills through vocational schools have not been altogether successful. The schools lack competent instructors, a number of those teaching in Baghdad, for example, being illiterate. Workshop accommodations are restricted and the equipment is out-of-date or in bad condition. These deficiencies might be overcome by importing instructors from neighboring countries, by obtaining new equipment and by running evening classes until more laboratory space is available. This is not, however, the full answer. Graduates from vocational [461] schools tend to prefer desk jobs to field work. It would be preferable to concentrate more on training schemes on the job under good supervision.

Government Housing

362 The Ministry of Social Affairs is empowered by Law No. 38 of 1941 and Law No. 22 of 1945 to "construct dwellings for

874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 217 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration, research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

Economic Survey

651 439 433 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the world's supply. Her general economic organization is nevertheless agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the 339 342 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the common building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 652 [511] In 1950 a Development Board was established with the function of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing a general economic and financial plan for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

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As in other countries, all gradations in 342
housing, between the palatial homes of the
wealthy and the congested hovels of the
poor, are found in the cities. Brick and
cement are the usual building materials,
although stone is widely used in Mosul and
other towns in the north. In Baghdad, 341
Arabic and Turkish styles of architecture 342
predominate in the older sections of the
city; modern villas, in the newer residential
developments. Basra is a composite of 3
townships: Basra City, a typical Arab
town; Ashar, the business community; and
Margil, the new town and port center. In
the oil field areas, housing estates are maintained
by the operating companies for the
benefit of their workers.

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

WATER SUPPLIES

Water supplies are reasonably plentiful 312
in the inhabited portions of the country. In the highland areas of the north and the northeast, water is obtained from streams, springs or wells, but in the alluvial plains, where the rainfall rarely exceeds 2 to 6 inches, it is taken entirely from rivers, canals, lakes or wells. Water is scarce in the desert regions but is available in some localities from waterholes, dug in dried stream beds, or from occasional permanent deep wells. The well waters in the mountain districts are sometimes highly mineralized, while shallow well supplies in the lower delta are generally brackish.

The domestic water supplies are treated 312
before distribution in the larger cities and 364
towns, but throughout rural Iraq they are unprotected and frequently polluted. The municipal water supply for the city of Baghdad is pumped from the Tigris River at 4 stations—3 on the left bank and 1 on the right. The entire supply is treated by sedimentation and chlorination, while filtration plants are also operated in connection with the pumping stations at Karrada and Sarrifiya, on the left bank. It is piped to individual service connections in all sections

that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also 744
be important to provide both the provincial and district medical 647
officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather 361
haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great 166
congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have [362]
simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities. [364]

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. 362
They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly con- 342
structed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

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362 however, they are poorly built and too small; and they are crowded
342 together on sites and under conditions which breed disease.

Need for Community Planning

361 In recent decades there has been a growing awareness of the need for community planning, better housing and community facilities. With respect to villages, little has as yet been done except for the planned development of the Dujaila project. Here some effort was made to have houses erected according to standard specifications and to depart from the village-type of settlement by requiring that houses be erected in groups of four on the adjoining corners of four land allotments. As an aid to town and city planning there has been created within the Department of Municipalities of the Ministry of Interior a small planning section to provide "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles". The municipalities themselves have been charged with "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specifications of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places and buildings in such areas". The final responsibility for planning has, however, remained unclear. The surveys, plans and partial plans have generally been hastily drawn and with little regard for the actual conditions prevailing in the community. In any event, municipalities have for the most part continued to develop without reference to any plans. In many towns new streets have been arbitrarily cut through residential and commercial districts with little concern for real needs or for the people affected. The various ministries concerned with the erection of schools, hospitals, public buildings and bridges generally locate their projects without reference to an overall plan and without consultation with each other.

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647 There is today a real need for integrated community planning. The Mission believes that it would be desirable to work towards the establishment of a genuine Community Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Such an office should ultimately be staffed with an adequate number of experts versed in architecture, engineering and other aspects of town planning. The first step might be to strengthen the existing planning section in the Department of

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relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major 133
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162]
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

II. Rural Communities

About one third of the people live in towns and cities; of the 162 remainder, a small proportion are nomads and the bulk live in 361 villages. In terms of population, therefore, the villages are the more predominant type of community. Although the distinction between a village and a small municipality is, as already noted, somewhat arbitrary, even the smallest municipalities are centers of local administration and have certain facilities of a higher standard than the villages. The distinction will, in any event, serve for present purposes.

Virtually all the rural population live in villages, isolated dwellings being very rare. Landowners, in fact, frequently count their fellahin by villages. Except for the extreme northwest, where there are seminomadic pastoral tribes who live in settled communities for only part of the year, the inhabitants of the villages are mainly cultivators. A few members of the community may have other occupations such as the tending of sheep and goats, the keeping of small shops and coffee houses or the building and repairing of huts. There are, also, villages where a considerable number of the people are engaged in handicrafts (e.g. weaving) but these are rare.

In the North, stone is generally available and is the commonest 342 material for buildings, while in the South and the Center, mud 333 is the usual material. The mud plaster of walls is reinforced with straw or cow dung to minimize the washing of clay in the mortar when it rains and to prevent temperature cracks. Where the climate is drier and palm leaves or reeds are available, especially in the marshes and palm belt of the South, these materials are more extensively used.

Another feature which distinguishes the North from the rest 361 of the country is the greater permanence of the villages. The main reason is probably that there is a much older tradition of settled cultivation than exists in the recently irrigated areas. Not only are there more small-holders, who would naturally have a close [423] association with their land, but the fellahin also appear to have A GREATER SECURITY OF TENURE.

361 a greater security of tenure. Other factors, which have no doubt affected the permanence of villages in some parts of the irrigation zone in central and southern Iraq, are the salination of the land and the silting of canals. In such cases, the fellahin have no choice but to abandon their villages.

In spite of these differences, however, the villages have a number of characteristics in common. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled together without any orderly design. There are no communal facilities or open spaces for the recreation of the
342 children. The huts are so constructed as to keep out heat, cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently, they consist of a single room with thick walls and a doorway, which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for both cooking food and keeping draft animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight, windows are either very small or totally lacking; sashes are expensive. Furnishings are limited to such elementary necessities as a mat and a plain table or a bench. Sanitary facilities, including latrines, are generally lacking.

312 The villages are necessarily located near a source of water, by a canal in the irrigation zone, by a stream or a well in the North. The water is not piped, but must be carried from its source to wherever it is used. Nor is it purified, although the canals in the irrigation zone may be heavily polluted. The water which has been used by men for washing and in which animals have immersed themselves while drinking is often used for human consumption. The constant trampling of the canal banks for these purposes leads to leaks and, hence, to stagnant pools near the adjacent village. Where the source of water is a well, the earth nearby may be dug out for use in the construction of houses and so, similarly, a
[364] stagnant pool may be the result. Such pools, combined with the total absence of any sanitary disposal of waste and garbage, constitute a serious danger to health.

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244 Trees are rarely seen in the villages, although they would give relief from the sun and from sandstorms. Trees would also provide firewood instead of the fuels currently used—animal dung, which could be used instead as fertilizer, and brushwood, which has to be gathered with considerable effort. Small gardens for vegetables are unknown. In fact, fruit and vegetables are almost

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361 they are elaborate and expensive to construct, require a great deal of funds and official attention to maintain, and the benefits are generally beyond the comprehension and appreciation of the average villager. They should, on the contrary, be simple enough so that the villager can both understand the improvement and be anxious to undertake most of the work himself, and will continue to do so for other future improvements. Otherwise, the people of other villages will merely admire the demonstration units and will feel that model villages are beyond their attainment.

New Settlements

Nowhere has the government a better opportunity for the planning of good rural communities than in new settlements such as Dujaila. Settlement in Dujaila began in 1946 and it is clear that a considerable effort was made to give the community an improved [166] layout. In May 1951, there were 1,058 cultivators settled in square lots of 100 donums each (500 by 500 meters). The portion of the Scheme which has been laid out has groups of four houses constructed at the adjoining corners of four lots.[1]

The cultivator is obliged by regulation to plant a garden of a specified area and to build his own house and those of his helpers within the unit under his possession. The Committee which administers the Scheme locates and determines the number of houses and decides on the period within which construction shall [342] be completed. The houses are made of mud or mud bricks, and each consists of a bedroom, a living room, a storeroom, a kitchen, a bath, a water closet and a stable covering a total area of about 80 square meters; a staircase leads to the flat roof. There is also an enclosed courtyard of about 220 square meters which is used by both the family and its livestock. Separate entrances are provided for the people and the animals.

Although the Dujaila settlement is a great improvement on the average village, it has a number of defects. The present layout makes it possible for each cultivator to have his house and those of his assistants on his own unit, but it has spread the population sparsely over a wide area resulting in long distances to community facilities, such as schools and stores, and a lack of the

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[1] See diagram on pp. 348 and 349.

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362
166 widely but probably at least 60,000 have migrated to Baghdad and 20,000 to Basra. Amara province is the heart of the rice-growing marshland, where the water buffalo is the prevailing livestock. The immigrants have naturally tended to recreate the conditions of life to which they are accustomed and which will enable them to raise buffalo. An area just outside the eastern bund of Baghdad has been settled by these people and converted to their normal mode of life. A series of stagnant pools for the cattle is interlaced with narrow paths just above the water-level and surrounded by a disorderly array of makeshift huts, called *sarifas.* Being outside the bund, the area is subject to spring floods in years of high water. In Basra the immigrants have settled along the banks of the existing canals. Conditions there are nearly as bad as in Baghdad.

It is clear that the process of migration and the creation of such slums can only be halted by eradicating the cause, namely, the harsh conditions of life in Amara and other places from which the migrants come. Meanwhile efforts will have to be made to resettle those who have already come, since, apart from the plight of the people themselves, these slums are a menace to the health of the entire population of the cities.

362 The few measures so far taken to resettle the sarifa dwellers have not been successful. In Baghdad the Ministry of Social Affairs made a plan for 8,000 mud huts at Shamiya which is about 12 kilometers from Baghdad. Several sample huts of defective construction were erected at the site at a cost of ID 35 each. This plan contemplated the housing of approximately 30,000 people from the sarifa district by giving each family 120 square meters of land apiece on which they were to build their own houses according to the samples already constructed. [342] Each hut would have had a covered floor area of 43 square meters consisting of two rooms, a hall and a water closet. The main pipelines for a fresh water supply had been provided and a clinic set up for the use of future residents. The plan, however, was later abandoned on the grounds that the site was too far from Baghdad where most of the prospective residents are employed.

Experience in Basra has been little better. There, the initiative came from the Municipality, which now has under construc-

362 The quarters which have so far been provided for laborers and artisans of the Iraqi State Railways are: 283 units consisting of two-room quarters, 2,090 units of one room and 60 units of sarifas.

Shortly after World War II, the Iraq Petroleum Company embarked on a large housing project in order to provide accommodation for its entire staff of artisans and their families. This was done because the increase in its activities and employees had caused a strong pressure on the available housing in Kirkuk. When rents became exorbitant, the company give its employees a rental allowance, but this failed in its purpose as rents rose by a corresponding amount almost immediately. The project has already succeeded in lowering rents in the town, the artisans' families who have moved in having released space in the town for laborers' housing. It is not proposed to extend the project to laborers' housing, first because of the shortage of materials and secondly because of the generally transient nature of the unskilled labor force.

The present housing project under construction in the Arrapha Ridge Area near Kirkuk will be finished in five to six years and will eventually consist of 1,028 houses. Of this number, 284 have been completed and accommodate about 1,485 people. At present
● [342] there are 58 more under construction. There are three basic types of houses: the one-bedroom, the two-bedroom and the three-bedroom semi-detached and attached units. Except for relative sizes and the number of bedrooms, the various types of houses have the same number of rooms: a living room, a kitchen, a storeroom, a bath, a water closet, a veranda and an enclosed courtyard. Stairs lead up to the flat roofs. The houses are surrounded by gardens.

The houses have walls made of bricks and stones with portland cement mortar, floors and ceilings of concrete, and window and door sashes of steel and glass. They are provided with both cold and hot water and with electricity. Each one-bedroom unit costs about ID 1,400 to build including utilities, and rents for ID 3.6 per month plus a service charge for water, power, etc., of ID 1.2. The biggest or three-bedroom unit costs about ID 3,000 and rents for ID 7.5 per month plus a service charge of ID 2.1.

The housing project has been planned on the neighborhood unit scheme—there being two units with schools, open spaces, stores and clinics. In addition the entire project will ultimately

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a con- 262
stant current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat compli- 173
cated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

539 776 WHAT do you know of El Iraq, you who are boys? I was an old man before the First German War, and I know the country and its history, yet you say there is no monster in the Hor el Hammar. I have seen it, thirty years ago, for this monster takes on the shape of a woman, and it beckons to a man that he may enter the lake, and every twelve years it must eat a man. I have seen it beckoning on the edge of the lake on the nights when there was no moon, but I did not follow it, for I knew its history, and I know that a man must carry a needle when away from his house at night, yet you know nothing of these things, and you are like Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan, who was so ignorant that he desired nothing but money, and who was so foolish that he tried to rob the dead without listening to warnings or heeding cautions that the sons of Adam shall not meddle with magic and strange matters, nor shall they interfere with those that live beyond the end of the world, nor shall they disturb those that await the Last Day.

x539 Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan was a carpenter of Basra, and he lived in his house with a young and lovely wife and with a fine son, yet he was not happy, for his earnings
• [342 were few and his house was a poor house of bowari
262] matting and his food was but dates and bread. And winter came and the rains fell and everything in Abdul Rehman's house was wet, even to the blankets of his bed, for the matting did not keep out the rain, and the cold wind whistled through the walls of his house, and he was in a miserable and desperate state, so he went to the coffee-house to get warm and he met there his friends, and he discussed his condition, saying: How can I get money to buy a dry house, and a sheep for the feast and clothes for my wife? And they replied, and said: Did we but know a

8:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MHI

874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 *Department of Antiquities*. The Department of Antiquities
maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration,
217 research and publication and has gained recognition for its
work in international academic circles. It controls five museums
in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently
opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be
439 drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the
world's supply. Her general economic organization is neverthe-
433 less agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically
suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide,
after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits
of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and,
in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz,
sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the
339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com-
342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made
burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 In 1950 a Development Board was established with the func-
652 tion of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing
a general economic and financial plan for developing the
[511] country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to
include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy,
flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and
improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the
execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

5t Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

361

342



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AN ARAB VILLAGE ON THE LOWER EUPHRATES

facing page 112

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

243 Bombay was. "No," he said, "here we make our bread 262 from rice flour. When the wheat crop is a failure, as in the past year, we have almost nothing else."

312 These overflow districts,^ which are marshes in the spring when the rivers overflow, dry down to hard soil later in the year. To keep the water high for a few weeks longer than it would naturally remain so, temporary dams are constructed across some of the smaller streams, leaving an opening to allow boats to pass and water to run through. These dams persist in the face [342] of a strong current in a way that is surprising. Mud, tree branches, mats, soil and the like seem to be the only building material, for there is no stone within hundreds of [476] miles. The dams require a large amount of labor, and of course are coöperative enterprises. Possibly because of this necessity for coöperative effort, the Marsh Arab communities appear to have developed a good degree of community spirit.

361 Like their race everywhere, these Marsh Arabs do not live in isolated individual houses in the midst of their fields but collect in larger or smaller towns, some of them of considerable size. These towns are located usually in the fork of a river, or where several streams come together. In Lower Mesopotamia there are many small channels that carry water either out of the main 501 river or into it. The Marsh Arabs get about in picturesque, high-prowed, black river boats, black because they are covered with a thick coat of native bitumen which wells from the ground in one or two places in Mesopo- [135] tamia and is an indication, so the engineers tell us, that petroleum is to be found in that country. These river boats, which are the one means of transportation, are built somewhat on the lines of a canoe and take consid-

^[along the last 100 miles of the Arab river from Gurna to the Gulf -- Analyst]

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

501 erable skill to navigate. They are capable of great speed and are driven either by a sail or by oars as the occasion requires. To a stranger they seem very unstable, but the Marsh Arab, who has practically lived in them ever since he was a baby, finds them abundantly stable and perfectly safe.

342 From a distance the houses occupied by these people are very picturesque. The reeds that grow in great abundance in the marshes of Lower Mesopotamia are gathered and when dry are tied in great bundles perhaps two feet in diameter. They are ten to fifteen feet tall or even more, and two bundles tied together at the tops are bent over to form an arch. Each of these arches forms one of the ribs of the house. They are placed every four to six feet, giving an air of solidity and dignity to the structure that is most unusual for this sort of simple architecture. Over these ribs a mat roof is constructed which is surprisingly tight even in the heaviest rains. The houses vary in size, and the largest ones, which serve as guest halls for the sheikhs and the rich, may be seventy-five feet long and twenty feet broad.

423 This agricultural district is peculiar in that while it
621 has a settled community engaged in agricultural pursuits, there is no private ownership of land. The Marsh Arabs form a group almost untouched by Europeans. In the one district we visited all land is owned by the government, in this case a sheikh far removed from the district.
427 The only tax that he levies is a moderate rental for the
651 land. Apparently there is little difficulty in getting land;
425 at least no one complained of any trouble of that sort, nor does there seem to be any difficulty in keeping the same plot of land indefinitely if the cultivator wishes to do so.
000 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq mH1

Only three cities, Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, have a total population [162] exceeding 100,000. 361 *Baghdad* (population 1943, 300,000) lies on the Tigris at the head of navigation of the river, and in the 'waist' of the lowlands, where the Tigris and Euphrates approach closely to each other, and hence give the best possibility of constructing irrigation canals. This narrow inter-riverine zone also provides a convenient crossing-place, since the marshland is reduced in extent and the firmer platform of steppeland provides a useful east-west route between the Mediterranean and Iran. The region of Baghdad thus has an important nodal position at the junction of routes from east and west across the desert, and from north, north-east, and south along the river valleys. It should be noted that all the factors mentioned above apply to a region and not to an actual site.

It is easy to see why a town should have grown up within the district of Baghdad, but the extra smaller scale features that usually fix the site of a town in one particular spot are less in evidence. Local changes in topography due to the shifting of drainage channels have led to the growth of three separate cities at various periods, and so within the Baghdad region there has arisen first Babylon, the ancient capital that lay closer to the Euphrates, some 60 miles to the south of modern Baghdad. Babylon was in turn succeeded by Ctesiphon, only a few miles from Baghdad, and this city remained the nodal centre until superseded by Baghdad in the early Muhammadan era. Baghdad itself dates only from the 8th century A.D., and a 'golden age' occurred when its Abbasid rulers supplanted the Omeyyads of Damascus and made it the capital of the Moslem world. Baghdad suffered greatly from Mongol invasion, and most of the older buildings have disappeared. The modern city is sprawling and undistinguished—in fact, an extreme disappointment to visitors who may wish to evoke the 'Arabian Nights'. Many of the poorer [342 houses are of mud, and flooding is a frequent feature (Fig. 65). 731]

Baghdad is the commercial centre of the region, with numerous, 361 but small workshops and distributing houses. Industry is, as we 438 have seen, mainly confined to bazaar crafts—textiles, metals, food- 565 stuffs—and to the production of pottery and building materials. 463 Trade is for the most part in the hands of Europeans, Jews, and Armenians, with Iraqi Christians as clerks and supervisors. An upper class—mainly Sunni Moslems—carries on the administration of the country; and a third element in the life of the city is a large group of absentee landlords.

146 657 of a nutrition institute with facilities for research has been proposed.

Housing

342 The dwellings of the rural cultivators, the nomads and the townspeople show considerable variation, conforming to the social customs of the people and the building materials at hand. The villages in the rural areas are typically compact. In the central plains, the houses are usually constructed of sun-dried mud bricks, with flat roofs of palm trunks covered with mud or palm leaves. They may contain one or several rooms opening into a central courtyard, and in the more prosperous families they sometimes have two stories. The livestock are sheltered in sheds in the compounds, in close proximity to the household. Stone replaces mud bricks in many sections of the northern highlands, where the roofs are built of mud or timber. In the mountain districts the villages often nestle on the hillsides surrounded by series of cultivated terraces.

In the south, the houses are traditionally made of woven reeds or palm fronds, although the compounds may be enclosed within mud walls. Woven reed, or *serifa,* huts are used by the seasonal laborers in the date groves, and are being introduced to an increasing extent by impoverished migratory workers in the cities of central and southern Iraq. In 1950, it was estimated that there were at least 60,000 *serifa* dwellers in Baghdad and 20,000 in Basra. Huts are put up on any convenient vacant plot of land and are frequently interspersed among the modern homes in the residential sections. Such *serifa* settlements, in which the living conditions are primitive, create serious public health hazards. More elaborate reed houses, built on islands or on brushwood or reed rafts, are characteristic of the villages of the "marsh Arabs" in the rice-growing areas and swamplands of the southern delta. In contrast, the nomadic peoples live in black tents of hair cloth or skins, of a type which has persisted for centuries.

p. 26(B)

IRAQ MH 1

As in other countries, all gradations in housing, between the palatial homes of the wealthy and the congested hovels of the poor, are found in the cities. Brick and cement are the usual building materials, although stone is widely used in Mosul and other towns in the north. In Baghdad, Arabic and Turkish styles of architecture predominate in the older sections of the city; modern villas, in the newer residential developments. Basra is a composite of 3 townships: Basra City, a typical Arab town; Ashar, the business community; and Margil, the new town and port center. In the oil field areas, housing estates are maintained by the operating companies for the benefit of their workers. 342 341 342

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

Water Supplies

Water supplies are reasonably plentiful in the inhabited portions of the country. In the highland areas of the north and the northeast, water is obtained from streams, springs or wells, but in the alluvial plains, where the rainfall rarely exceeds 2 to 6 inches, it is taken entirely from rivers, canals, lakes or wells. Water is scarce in the desert regions but is available in some localities from waterholes, dug in dried stream beds, or from occasional permanent deep wells. The well waters in the mountain districts are sometimes highly mineralized, while shallow well supplies in the lower delta are generally brackish. 312

The domestic water supplies are treated before distribution in the larger cities and towns, but throughout rural Iraq they are unprotected and frequently polluted. The municipal water supply for the city of Baghdad is pumped from the Tigris River at 4 stations—3 on the left bank and 1 on the right. The entire supply is treated by sedimentation and chlorination, while filtration plants are also operated in connection with the pumping stations at Karrada and Sarrifiya, on the left bank. It is piped to individual service connections in all sections 312 364

p. 27(A)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

452 enabled to obtain sufficient credit to buy seeds, fertilizer, livestock,
453 machinery and other means of production and to make it unnecessary for them to sell their crops immediately after harvest at extremely low prices. The Mission therefore suggests that the Development Board provide sufficient funds to raise the paid-in capital of the Bank to about ID 2,000,000. This should permit the Bank to expand its credit operations and refund its borrowed resources. Action to enable the Bank to increase its lending will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time greater care is exercised to insure that loans are promptly repaid and that farmers, who are often improvident, borrow only for purposes which will increase their output. In the past a considerable portion of the Bank's capital has become frozen as the result of repeated extensions of the maturity dates on its loans.

•343
488 Good storage facilities for grain and perhaps other crops would reduce losses due to infestation, improve the quality of grain, assist in the stabilization of prices and provide some assurance against famine. At present grain is often stored in the open or in inadequate buildings and sheds. A modern 5,000-ton grain elevator has recently been erected in Baghdad, and another of 40,000 tons is projected for Basra to serve the export trade. There is, however, an urgent need for less elaborate and smaller storage facilities throughout the grain-growing areas. These could be of simple concrete or corrugated steel construction and range in capacity from 1,000 to 3,000 tons. Simple cleaning machinery would be desirable in order to remove impurities from the grain. Such storage facilities, which might have a total capacity of about 75,000 tons, would presumably be owned and operated by the Grain Board, an autonomous government agency, and would need to be closely controlled so that the Agricultural Bank could with safety make loans against grain stored in them by farmers and merchants. Under such conditions, more merchants would probably enter the market to bid for grain at harvest time and farmers themselves would not be under the necessity of marketing their grain immediately after the harvest irrespective of the level of prices.

474 Although an impressive law on cooperatives has been put on the statute books, almost nothing has been done to organize effec-

452 probably amounted to only ID 2,300,000 of which about 70 percent represented urban mortgages. Of the latter the greater part probably consisted of mortgages on buildings other than houses. [652] At the beginning of 1950 a government Mortgage Bank began operations. Only ID 100,000 of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000 has, however, been paid in; and the Bank has had to supplement its resources by borrowing. Moreover, it can make loans only for a maximum of four years and up to ID 2,000. To facilitate an expansion of its operations, the Mission suggests that the Development Board provide funds sufficient to increase its actual capital to about ID 1,500,000 and that the Bank be authorized to extend the duration of its mortgages to at least 15 years where warranted.

● 344 The Mission has given no special attention to the need for public buildings for which the Development Board has budgeted ID 3,350,000 in its five-year program. Undoubtedly the construction of new buildings for the accommodation of government offices is in certain cases desirable, for existing government buildings are for the most part scattered, overcrowded, poorly lighted and equipped and therefore not conducive to working efficiency. As already indicated, the new railway building in Baghdad should provide some space for government offices.

Water and Electricity Supply

364
365 With respect to community facilities, the most urgent tasks appear to be the installation of sewage systems for the major cities, and the provision of safe water supplies and electricity.

It is suggested that a start be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rising level of the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. A plan for such a system has already been prepared by consultants to the government. The initial step might be to carry it out for that portion of the city on the east bank of the Tigris. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless there is a determination to make connections with the system compulsory for all property owners who are supplied with municipal water.

A safe water supply is, as was pointed out earlier, one of the keys to the health problem. While a number of cities and towns now have a reasonably safe water supply, the situation in the great

CHAPTER THREE

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE BEING MET

TYPICAL PRIMARY SCHOOLS

Before attempting to draw general conclusions as to the extent to which the educational needs indicated in the previous chapter are being met, it may be useful to give a general picture of typical primary schools in Iraq. To speak of a 'typical' school is, of course, misleading, for every school has or should have its individual character. In general, however, most of the Iraqi primary schools have certain common characteristics which make it possible to venture a description of types. 872

A Typical Town Primary School. In each of the provincial capitals and most of the smaller towns are to be found large schools which may provide for between 300 and 500 pupils. The great majority of the urban primary schools are single sex schools. Such a school may have from ten to twelve rooms of varying sizes. The numbers in each class may vary from sixty to thirty, the smaller usually being the sixth or top class. The class-rooms are frequently overcrowded, with sometimes three children sitting on a desk built for two. Lighting and sanitary arrangements are generally not of a high standard. In some schools where available accommodation has not kept pace with the local demand for primary education, there may be as many as seventy children in one of the lower classes. Desks are not well constructed and generally show lack of maintenance. [345]

In such a school, as in every other full-range primary school, there are six grades of class, the children being promoted from class to class each year provided they pass an examination indicating that they have satisfied the requirements of the centrally prescribed programme of studies. Those who do not pass the promotion examination are required to repeat the previous year's work.

The teachers seem to work very hard, they occupy the centre of the stage and either lecture to their pupils or follow the common technique of verbal question and answer. There is little activity on the part of the children apart from incredibly quick oral [876]

87a response, and there is not much evidence of handicraft or art. [876] Outdoor physical education follows the prescribed syllabus which, however, seems to be more modern in technique than some of the other subjects.

● [346] Generally speaking, the older buildings look as depressing as their counterparts in some of the western countries. Unfortunately there are not many very recent buildings.

While these conditions apply to many of the schools, however, in the larger towns there are some noteworthy exceptions to which reference will be made later.

[346] *A Typical Village School.* A village school may consist of two or three rooms housing from twenty to seventy pupils of both sexes, but it is rarely a complete six-class school. Lighting and sanitation are usually inferior to that of the town schools. In the northern provinces some of the schools are built of stone, but mostly they are made of dried mud bricks. In parts of the south, especially in the marsh districts, the buildings are reed huts.

The curriculum and teaching techniques in the village school are identical with those of the town school. The children rarely enjoy activity methods, and sit in their desks most of the time.

In many of the village schools children cannot complete their full period of primary schooling because the numbers are too small to permit the organization of the full six classes. In a minority of these schools, however, an increasing number of teachers are learning the technique of simultaneously teaching more than one attainment group and are thus able to provide a complete primary school course in an incomplete school.

Most of the village schools have no garden, handicraft or livestock. But the newly established agricultural primary schools, to which detailed reference will be made later, provide exceptions to this rule.

Because of the absence of compulsory school attendance and the consequent late admission to school of a number of pupils, there is a great variety of age-range in both urban and village schools. Within the limits of the curriculum, however, the teachers meet these difficulties with commendable patience, and both the older and the younger children in any one class are usually a [565] happy family. Another happy feature of the Iraqi primary school is the absence of social distinctions within the class-room. A wealthy sheikh's son may rub shoulders with a poorly clad lad from a very humble home.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE MET QUANTITATIVELY

The Rapid Growth of the Primary Schools System. As will have been

875 this meets the needs of the situation fully and would strongly recommend a careful and sympathetic examination of the whole problem in the light of existing conditions. Such an examination should include also the question of providing housing accommodation for teachers, particularly women teachers, in villages.

The question is not, however, merely one of salaries but rather of raising the whole dignity and status of the profession. [554] In Iraq teachers do not, as a whole, apparently suffer from a sense of social inferiority as is the case in some other countries. This is good but not good enough. It is necessary to insure for them a position of honor and prestige and to accord conspicuous recognition to any meritorious work done by them. The government should endeavor to have the public realize the basic value of their work as nation builders.

School Construction and Equipment

346
872 Whether or not there is an immediate extension of primary education, school construction has to be tackled urgently. The number of schools is inadequate even for existing needs and they are ill-planned and overcrowded. About 40 percent of the schools are said to be housed in rented buildings, which are generally poorly constructed and lighted. Many of the government buildings and those built out of public subscriptions are only a little better. Almost all of the schools, whether government or rented, have now become too small for the number of students enrolled, and the introduction of the compulsory principle will bring a large further increase in enrollment. It will, therefore, be necessary to undertake without delay a carefully planned and large-scale program involving the construction of new school buildings and the improvement and extension of existing buildings.

Much of the new building will have to take place in rural areas. The Ministry should, therefore, arrange for a competent study of the problem of village school buildings—in which teachers, builders and the school architect will all be associated—in order to prepare two or three types of plans suited to different climatic regions. The buildings can be economical without being ugly or cramped or deprived of proper lighting and ventilation, and should reflect local traditions and utilize local materials. It would be a

wise investment to spend some money on intelligent research and 346 experimentation in this field. The program of buildings should 872 also include, as suggested above, the construction of teachers' houses—particularly for women teachers—in places where they are not otherwise available.

More attention might well be paid to the equipment of new and existing schools. The libraries, for instance, are generally [217] poor: the number of books is small; they are not chosen with reference to the needs of the children for whom they are meant; their arrangement and display leave much to be desired; and the service provided is very unsatisfactory. No proper individual records of students' reading are maintained and no imaginative steps are taken to stimulate the desire to read and to make the library a dynamic and integral part of the school and of the life of the students. The library often consists simply of a few crowded, dust-laden bookshelves in one of the classrooms to which students have access at odd times and for short periods for borrowing books. School libraries not only should be stocked with a large number of well-displayed and suitable books but should be made the most pleasant and attractive place in the school.

The laboratory and workshop facilities provided, even in full- [816] fledged secondary schools, are also inadequate. There can be no proper teaching of science or crafts unless the equipment is greatly improved and practical work is given its due place. Apparently there is no examination in practical work at all at the end of the secondary school, and obviously there can be none so long as most schools have no laboratories or workshops, or very poor apologies for them. In fact, of the large number of secondary schools visited, only two, one government institution and one foreign school, had adequate laboratories. Under the circumstances, science is gen- [876] erally taught theoretically, as a lesson from the printed book or as a lecture by the teacher, with occasional demonstration of experiments by him in front of the class. This kind of vicarious experimentation, which never allows the students to handle any apparatus, does little to foster the scientific attitude. The provision of laboratory facilities will not by itself, however, make any great difference—what is needed is the introduction of activity methods in the teaching of science and the use of science as an instru-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

346 ment to develop the students' powers of inquiry and independent
872 work. In the proposed transformation of "book schools" into "work schools" this change coupled with craft work may well form the starting point of the process.[1]

Financial Implications of the Introduction of Compulsion

872 It is difficult to work out the cost of the proposed scheme for primary education with any degree of accuracy because reliable figures and statistics are not easily available. However, on the basis of information supplied by the Ministry and obtained from other sources, it is possible to form an approximate idea of the order of expenditure that will have to be incurred. It should, however, be borne in mind that, generally speaking, the basis of calculation adopted is the per capita educational expenditure being incurred at present and, as the current provision for such items as books, furniture, apparatus and hostel accommodation is rather inadequate, the total cost worked out represents the minimum estimate of the requirements.

The three main items of expenditure in this program would be (1) the cost of operating primary schools for all children; (2) the cost of training additional teachers; and (3) the cost of constructing new buildings and improving or extending existing buildings.

Cost of Primary Schooling

According to available figures, the total number of additional children to be brought into school eventually, when compulsion has been introduced throughout the country, would be about 575,000. The present annual cost of primary education per child, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Education, works out at eight dinars. This estimate is also endorsed by Mr. Clark in his report. On this basis it can be assumed that the ultimate annual cost of schooling for all children of primary school age will be about ID 4,600,000. It should be remembered, however, that this estimate does not allow for higher salaries and prices which will

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[1] In this connection, all science teachers might make a careful study of the fascinating pioneer work in the domain of science teaching done by the eminent British educator, Sanderson (Headmaster of the English Public School, Oundle). An account of his work will be found in two books—his biography by H. G. Wells entitled *The Story of a Great Schoolmaster* and a book written by his colleagues entitled *Sanderson of Oundle.*

875 be made for their training.[2] The annual cost of training per teacher is estimated by the Ministry of Education to be about ID 70. If the average period of training is taken to be three years, as is likely to be the case in the future pattern of teacher training, the cost of training per teacher would be a little over ID 200. Table II in the appendix shows the number of teachers under training each year from 1953 to 1967 and the expenditure to be incurred every year over the project. From these figures it will be seen that the cost of the scheme during the next five budget years (1952-53 to 1956-57) will be about ID 737,500. Total cost until 1967, spread over 13 years, will be a little below ID 4,000,000 which means an average annual expenditure of about ID 300,000. It may be pointed out that, after this period, when the full quota of trained teachers is available, the annual expenditure on this item will be considerably reduced as provision will have to be made only for training the number of teachers required for normal replacement.

Cost of School Buildings

346

872 The problem of the construction of school buildings was surveyed recently by the Special Committee on School Buildings appointed under Ministerial Order No. 36314 of December 7, 1950. After consulting experts, the Committee drew up a program for the construction and improvement of schools and other educational buildings at a total estimated cost of approximately ID 8,110,000. The Mission was not able to ascertain definitely the premises on which this estimate was based. The Development Board has made a provision of ID 3,800,000 for school construction in its program for 1951-52 to 1955-56. The Mission suggests that the adequacy of this allocation as well as the total amount which would need to be spent over the next 10 years be carefully reviewed. In this review the Committee's estimate should be carefully checked, particularly to determine whether it took fully into account the needs arising out of the introduction of compulsory education as well as requirements for replacing old or

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[2] If the basis of calculation were 35 children per teacher, the total number of teachers required would be about 16,000. But as the Ministry of Education has itself wisely adopted the ratio of one teacher to 30 children, the Mission accepted that as the basis for calculations.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

rented school buildings. In any event it would seem desirable to 346
raise the budgetary provision for new buildings to approximately 872
ID 5,000,000 for the next five years. New needs may develop, lacunae may be discovered in the program and the cost of construction may rise. The total cost of the whole building program in the 10 year period may not be over ID 10,000,000, particularly if local help and cooperation is enlisted in the building.

The total financial implications of the whole scheme during the next five budget years (1952-53 to 1956-57) can be indicated in approximate figures as follows:

1. Operation of new primary schools	ID 180,000
2. Training of teachers	737,500
3. Buildings	5,000,000

Total expenditures for the program over the next five years will thus be about ID 5,900,000 which works out at less than three percent of the net revenues expected from oil during this period.

III. Provision of Fundamental Education for Adults 873

There is no phase of education in the country which has received less attention than the education of the adults. Not only are facilities for adult education almost wholly lacking, but there is a general misunderstanding of the purposes and methods of such education. A number of evening primary and secondary schools are run by the government or by private organizations, such as Teachers' Associations, for adults who work in the day and who want to complete the education they began as children. Their courses, however, are not designed to meet the special needs of such adults but are the same as those taught to children in the day schools. There are also a few "literacy centers" attended by illiterate adults and youths, but they are too few to make any appreciable impact and, as the name suggests, confine themselves to making adults literate.

The type of adult education which the Mission suggests should be widely extended in Iraq is not a matter of either the simple teaching of literacy or the instruction of adults in the same courses offered to children. To be sure, the initial objective would be the

facing p. 238



MOSQUES IN MESOPOTAMIA

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5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 MI Middle East MI
Iraq MH1

Iraq MHI

x872 x876 *Drawing* starts in the first two grades with the drawing of simple objects and ornamentation, continues in the next two grades with drawing from nature and some composition, and in the last two grades special attention is given to Arab ornamental designs. The work is mainly conventional, and lacks vitality and originality.

In *manual arts* the boys work with colored paper, cardboard, plasticine, straw and palm leaves, and wood, making toylike things, leading to more useful objects later. The girls concentrate on needlework and embroidery, knitting, and making such things as doilies, aprons, and baby clothes. They also learn how to wash and clean clothes, polish windows and furniture, and prepare the tea table. They study other home economics subjects.

Physical education programs differ for boys and girls. Boys engage in athletic exercises, classroom games, rhythmic movements and games, and later organized games such as basketball, volleyball, and soccer. Competitive sports meets between schools are held in the larger cities. For the girls, appropriate exercises and games are provided. Singing is confined almost exclusively to national songs.

Description of the Iraqi Public Primary School

x872 It may be worth while to close this part of the report with a description of the primary school, both segregated and coeducational, as the American Council Commission saw it function in the eight provinces (*liwas*) included in its itinerary. It is impossible to give an account that would apply in all its details to all public primary schools, but traits common to all are numerous enough to warrant the conclusion that there is a general type of Iraqi primary school which can be described.

BUILDINGS

● 346 x872 About 60 percent of the schools are housed in public buildings built either by the government or by local subscription. A number of public schools for Christian children are housed in buildings owned by various sects. These schools were previously parochial schools administered by religious communities and were willingly given over to the government in accordance with an agreement in 1921 between the Department of Education and the communities. By the terms of this agreement the communities were to supply the buildings, and the government would pay the salaries of the teachers, supply and equip the schools, and assume administrative responsibility. The remaining 40 percent of the primary schools are housed in rented buildings, usually former residences. Rented buildings converted

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
Iraq MHI

to use as schools are found principally in the cities of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basrah and most of the capitals of the provinces. 346
872ˣ

A government primary school built within the last twelve to fifteen years in the cities usually has ten to twelve rooms about 5 × 7 meters (16.4 × 22.96 feet) or 5.5 × 8 meters (18.04 × 26.24 feet). In addition, there may be two to four smaller rooms used as offices or storerooms. Toilet facilities are outside the building. Drinking water is in large earthenware containers provided with taps from which the children can drink. School buildings need improved plumbing and sanitary facilities, but the [464] country as a whole suffers from a lack of skilled plumbers.

School buildings dating from the twenties are not as good as the more recently constructed ones, being less substantial and having smaller rooms. There are a few exceptions to this rule in the provinces of Basrah and ʻAmarah where the erection of some schools was financed by the Maud[1] Memorial Fund and subscriptions collected by a particularly energetic governor of ʻAmarah. Some buildings show signs of the rapid growth of the system, having started as two- or three-room constructions and then having a room or two added as needed.

The typical village school building has four to eight small, narrow, inadequately lighted and ventilated rooms. Some schoolrooms visited by the Commission were absolutely dark. Some first-grade rooms were badly overcrowded; in one instance the children had overflowed to the floor and filled the windows. Poor construction materials are often used for village schools, especially when hurriedly built by local authorities. Dripping ceilings were a commonplace. Some rural schools in the south, particularly in the province of ʻAmarah, were housed in reed huts. After 1934, however, the government built a number of village schools of from two to six rooms of standard size with adequate lighting and ventilation.

The large number of rented houses serving as school buildings in urban Iraq is explained in terms of the growth of the school system which has been so rapid that the building program fell far short. Most of the rented buildings are not suitable for school purposes, the rooms being too small for classroom use. Play space is limited to the central courtyard, which is usually small. Repairs and readjustments are neglected because owners are reluctant to spend money on the property since prewar rental ceilings have been maintained by law. Government-owned schools, too, have deteriorated in the war years.

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[1] The name of the British general who conquered Baghdad from the Turks in 1917.

x874
346

346
x873



Above: Recess at the rural school used as a demonstration and practice school by the students of the Rural Teachers College, Rustumiyah, Iraq
Below: Secondary school for girls, Baghdad, Iraq

following p. 167 (a)

873 soap, matches, and brick. Laboratory-work topics are specified for performance by the students in addition to the demonstrations by the teacher.

The course in *physics* in the third year is more comprehensive than in the other Arab countries studied, and in the scientific section, fifth year, an expanded treatment is given in seven periods a week. A more extended treatment of chemistry and biology is also given in the fourth year of the scientific section, biology now being divided into botany and zoology. Toward the end of the biology course a study is made of animal cells and fission, body and reproductive cells, Mendelian and non-Mendelian heredity, variation and mutation, and finally the theory of organic evolution. In all the science courses laboratory experiments are performed by the students in the fourth and fifth preparatory years.

The course in economics in the fifth year of the literary section goes over the usual ground but in an abbreviated form, and attention is given to economic conditions in Iraq—its monetary system, baking, trade, business and industry, and natural resources.

The course in *child care* for girls of the fourth-year science program comprises the care of the mother, the child's room, his cleanliness and feeding, the child's exercise, his development and weight, children's diseases and bodily defects; also home-nursing and first aid. The latter includes study of the patient's room and his bed, observation of his temperature, pulse, respiration, urine and excretion, prevention of some of the infectious diseases, first aid for burns, wounds, sprains, fractures, bites, gas poisoning, bleeding, sunstroke, electric shock, and of entry of foreign matter into the body.

In addition, the fifth-year literary section for girls includes a course in child psychology and development in mind and body, learning and habit formation, motivation, the child's toys and games, imagination, stories and story-telling, the child's questions, social behavior of children, mental hygiene, children's problems, child study, and child guidance.

The course in *manual arts* and *home economics* for girls comprises sewing, embroidery, knitting, cooking, and home cleaning in a more developed form than in the primary years.

The courses in *drawing* and *physical education* are of the same nature as in earlier years but in a more advanced form.

873

Description of the Public Secondary Schools

346

BUILDINGS

Secondary schools on the whole have better buildings than the primary schools. Whenever there is a building program, the secondary schools

873 usually hold the priority over primary schools. If a good building is vacant
346 it is usually the secondary school that gets the preference. Thus, in all
parts of Iraq most intermediate and preparatory schools are housed in comparatively new buildings, with fairly large classrooms (16½ × 23½ feet), and with laboratories of larger size. An intermediate school usually has one common laboratory or science room. The better preparatory schools, such as the Central Preparatory School in Baghdad, have separate laboratories for physics, chemistry, and biology, with storerooms attached and with a machine for producing gas. Secondary schools are also more favored with a larger amount of space for playgrounds than primary schools have.

EQUIPMENT

873 The same is also true with regard to furniture and equipment. There are three types of classroom seats: desks, with seats attached, for one or for two students, and a tablet armchair for a single student much like the ones in American advanced classrooms, though not as good in quality. Blackboards are made of wood and are usually small and inadequate, often definitely bad. However, a new kind of plaster built-in blackboard large enough to fill the entire front wall, and sometimes the side walls too, was first used at the Higher Teachers College, and its use is spreading in the secondary schools. Laboratory equipment is supplied to intermediate schools from the central store of the Ministry of Education according to a standard list drawn up by the Ministry. A much larger collection of laboratory equipment is usually sent to the preparatory schools. The older schools are better equipped than the others, while some of the schools that were started during World War II or shortly before are meagerly supplied. Arabic maps are imported from England or from Egypt. Most of the laboratory equipment was imported from France and England and some from Germany. As there is no central workshop for repairing laboratory equipment and as most teachers have no experience in repair work, laboratory instruments tend to get out of order rather quickly, which results in a great
[132] deal of waste. For this reason and because of the great amount of dust in the Iraqi air, equipment acquires a dilapidated look which requires an extraordinary amount of care on the part of the teacher to avoid. The fact that teachers change frequently is an additional factor in the lack of care that is apparent in laboratory equipment.

TEACHING AND METHOD

873 Methods of teaching in secondary schools do not differ in their essentials
876 from those of the primary schools. In the main they are based on the

}874 year works in each of the different trades to acquire a basis for choosing the one he will follow. In the third year theory occupies fourteen hours and shopwork twenty-eight hours weekly, while in the fourth year the distribution is fifteen hours for theory and twenty-seven for practical work.

All shops seemed to be well equipped except the electrical shop, which in 1945 was a recent establishment and suffered because of the difficulty of obtaining suitable materials and equipment under war conditions. The machine-shop was congested and poorly lighted, but, in general, though classrooms and shops were small, the small enrollment prevented serious crowding. Instructional materials were available in mechanical drawing, and there were excellent models for the study of internal-combustion engines.

The director's tabulation of present occupations of graduates from 1928–40 inclusive showed that of 84 graduates, 68 were engaged in the occupations for which the school had prepared them, while 16 had taken up other types of work.

346] The Technical School in Baghdad is housed in modern buildings with ample classrooms for theoretical instruction and large, relatively light, extensively equipped workshops. Physical facilities would accommodate five or six times the number of students enrolled in 1945–46.

The present program at Baghdad provides for twenty-eight hours per week of theoretical work for the first two years—mathematics, five; English, five; Arabic, four; history, two; geography, two; science, four; mechanical drawing, four; and physical education, 1—and fourteen hours of practical work. In the first year the shopwork consists of carpentry with hand tools and sheet metal work. In the second year the students work in the machine-shop, and in shops providing experience in sheet metal, blacksmithing, foundry, electricity, carpentry, and building. Theoretical work in the third and fourth years is reduced to fourteen hours and shopwork is increased to twenty-eight hours a week. The student specializes in his last two years in the building trades (carpentry, furniture construction and repair, plumbing and electric wiring), heavy engineering (blacksmithing, sheet metal work, and foundry) or light engineering (fitting, turning, electric welding, automobile repair, tractors, and internal-combustion engines). It is considered necessary for a graduate to work with an experienced workman for two or three years before setting out independently.

The major needs of the school as expressed or implied are a teaching staff that is adequate in training and number, means of attracting boys of aptitude and interest to the school, reclassification of the school to give it

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East

Iraq MHI

x874 x875 At the time of the American Council Commission's visit (1945) the College had 212 students, almost all of them boarders at government expense. The attempt to admit only village girls is less successful than the similar policy in the rural-teachers colleges for men because there are fewer village schools for girls to supply candidates and because of the prejudice of parents against sending girls away from home. There is a staff of thirteen, including the principal and assistant principal. Of this number, five have had some professional training. The College is housed in a large quadrangle, one part of which is occupied by a practice school and a kindergarten.

The Education of Secondary-School Teachers

Teachers for intermediate and secondary schools are now educated at the Higher Teachers College, the three-year course at the Queen 'Aliyah Institute for women teachers, and at the Physical Education Institute.

THE HIGHER TEACHERS COLLEGE

The Higher Teachers College originated in evening classes which were opened for primary-school teachers in 1923 in order to prepare them to teach in secondary schools. This was later turned into a full-time boarding college giving a course of two years above the secondary school, divided into a literary and a scientific section. The College was abolished in 1931 as being of a low standard and having an inadequate staff. The need for secondary-school teachers made the Ministry of Education reopen the College in 1935, with a course of two years which was lengthened to three in 1937 and to four in 1939. In 1943 it was decided to add a preparatory year taught exclusively in English.[3] Women students were first admitted in 1937 and now constitute about one-third of the enrollment.

x874 ●346 x875 *Buildings and grounds.*—The Higher Teachers College is housed in two large, modern buildings on the northern outskirts of Baghdad with ample space for additional buildings, playgrounds, and gardens.

One building houses administrative offices, classrooms, and an assembly hall. The other houses the dormitory, the dining-room, reception rooms, the College library, and, until a special science building is erected, the physics and chemistry laboratories. Women students live in a rented house

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[3] Word has recently been received that the preparatory year has been dropped and the program again reduced to four years. As no details of the new program were available, the description of the program as it was being executed and planned at the time of the visit of the American Council Commission has been maintained.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1845-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
Iraq MHI

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about a mile from the College. It is planned to build a special women's dormitory closer to the College.

Students.—In October 1945 when the American Council Commission visited the Higher Teachers College, there were four classes: preparatory, first, second, and fourth years. The fourth-year class was the last following the old four-year program. The remaining three classes were following the five-year program. Of the total registration of about 357 students it was expected that about 120 would be women, an increase of about 20 women students over the previous year. Students registered in the College were distributed as shown in Table 31.

TABLE 31

ENROLLMENT IN HIGHER TEACHERS COLLEGE, BAGHDAD, 1945–46

Year*	Literary	Social Studies	English	Chemistry —Biology	Physics—Mathematics	Total
Preparatory year....	...	...	...	...	...	130
1st year...........	17	19	12	20	14	82
2nd year...........	12	10	8	18	8	56
4th year...........	20	17	9	25	18	8[illegible]
Total..........	...	...	...	...	...	3[illegible]

* There was no third-year class in 1945–46 because of the change of length of course from four to five years.

Students are admitted on the basis of standing in the public secondary-school examination, distribution by provinces, health, and personal interview by the admission committee. Tuition, board and lodging, books, and medical care are free. Boarding students sign a contract with the Ministry, agreeing to serve the Ministry two years for every year spent at the College or pay 50 dinars ($200) for each year of study. Day students agree to teach one year for each year of study or forfeit 25 dinars ($100) per year of study.

Curriculum.—The distribution of subjects and periods is shown in Tables 32 and 33. The preparatory year has two parallel courses, the literary and the scientific. Both sections study the same courses in Arabic and English. However, in the English course students are grouped into A, B, and C sections, according to ability, each taking a course corresponding to its ability. Students wishing to become teachers of English must be members of section A or else stand very high in section B.

Preparatory students of the literary section take, in addition to English and Arabic, a three-period course in general mathematics and four-period courses in ancient history, modern history, and geography, whereas the scientific section concentrates on mathematics, physics, and chemistry. All

46:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1948) 1949 MI Middle East

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Above: The circulation desk of the library of Baghdad College at the end of the day, Baghdad, Iraq

Below: Snack-time at the kindergarten of the demonstration school of the Elementary Teachers College for Women, Baghdad, Iraq

following p. 200 (b)

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East

Iraq MHI

X374

professors of the medical college who are nominated by the board of studies and approved by the Minister of Social Affairs. Members of the faculty have received their medical training at universities and hospitals in England, Egypt, Turkey, Paris, and Beirut.

[346] The College is housed in a modern building specially built for it with fairly extensive laboratories, dissection rooms, and lecture halls, large enough to accommodate 60 to 70 students in each of the six years. In addition, the College enjoys the extensive facilities of the teaching hospital on
743] the grounds of which it is situated. This largest of Iraq's hospitals has 600 beds in large wards and semiprivate and private rooms, thus accommodating patients of all classes. As the hospital receives patients not only from the Baghdad area, but also from all parts of Iraq, students have a chance of seeing a very large and representative variety of cases and diseases. The hospital has a very large outpatient clinic occupying a two-story building and some annexes where more than 700,000 new cases are treated each
744] year. Next to the College building is the large building housing the pathological and bacteriological institutes and the antirabic and vaccine-production institutes. On the same grounds is also the extensive X-ray building with facilities for both X-ray diagnosis and therapy, including fluoroscopy and radium therapy. All these facilities form part of the teaching facilities of the College.

THE COLLEGE OF PHARMACY

The College of Pharmacy, included for administrative purposes in the Royal College of Medicine, was established in 1936 and provides graduates of the secondary school with a four-year course leading to a Diploma of Pharmaceutical Chemist. In 1945–46 the enrollment was 98, with the four classes about equal in size. Upon graduation the student spends six months in practical work with a registered pharmacist and three months in a government dispensary. Students are admitted on the basis of a medical examination, public secondary-school examinations, personal interview, and geographical and minority distribution. Those who sign a contract to serve the Department of Health for four years after graduation are exempt from all fees except an instruction fee of 3 dinars ($12) yearly. Tuition fees for others are 33 dinars ($132) per year.

The College is administered by the dean assisted by a college board composed of permanent professors and lecturers. Members of the teaching staff are nominated by the dean, subject to the approval of the college board and confirmation by the Director General of Health.

The curriculum includes botany, general chemistry, business methods

of the 33rd parallel. Affiliated companies 471
have concessions over the remaining territory—
the Mosul Petroleum Company in the
region west of the Tigris and the Basra
Petroleum Company south of the 33rd
parallel. Oil is extracted from the Kirkuk 315
fields by the Iraq Petroleum Company and 471
conveyed by pipelines to Mediterranean
ports. It was formerly pumped to terminals
in Tripoli and Haifa, but the latter pipeline
has been closed since the Arab-Israeli hostilities
in 1948. A new pipeline, constructed
from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias,
was opened early in 1952.

In 1938, the Basra Petroleum Company began drilling operations in the Persian Gulf area, where the existence of an extensive oil field has since been established. In 1950, a pipeline was completed to its shipping terminal at Fao, at the head of the Gulf. The activities of the Mosul company are still in the exploratory stage, but the production of oil has recently been started at Ain Zala. It is piped to the Mediterranean by a line which joins that from the Kirkuk fields at Baiji, on the Tigris.

A smaller oil field at Naft Khanah, near
the Iranian border, is worked by the
Khanaquin Oil Company, a subsidiary
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This
company operates a refinery on the Alwand
River, near Khanaquin, which supplies petroleum
products for local consumption.
Since 1952, it has also constructed a small 382
refinery at Basra to process products for use 471
in southern Iraq. It obtains the crude oil
from Naft Khanah or from the Basra Petroleum
Company.

Iraq derives a considerable revenue from 788
the pilgrimage traffic. The principal shrines 346
of the Shia sect are located at An Najef,
Kerbela, Kadhimain and Samarra, and, in
addition to local pilgrims, they are visited
annually by thousands of Shiites from Iran,
Pakistan and other Moslem countries. The
privilege of burial near the shrines is also
coveted by devout Shiite Moslems.

Transportation is mainly by roads or 459
waterways. Motor highways link the princi- 491

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

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

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COFFEE SHOPS IN MOSUL

facing p. 118

influence. He would need to work in close cooperation with the proposed abattoir specialist. The Association should also investigate the possibility of using more local materials in the hides and skins industry. Thus local valonia or oak bark might be employed for tanning and locally refined and sulphurated fish oils used in the leather industry. Efforts might also be made to procure better salt at reasonable prices from the government salt works at Fao and to organize more adequate local supplies of date syrup which small tanneries use as a glucose. 281

Casings

Most if not all the casings are obtained from the abattoirs in barrels. Initial cleaning and grading is usually done on the floor which is occasionally washed down with water. The casings examined appeared to be remarkably free of parasitic infection, particularly in the North. More hygienic casings could be produced under more efficient and comfortable working conditions if the work were raised from the floor to zinc-lined tables and improved drainage and piped water supplies were provided in the sections dealing with casings. 253

Other Improvements in Abattoirs

Many abattoir buildings are in need of repair, enlargement and alteration. Improvements such as an impervious floor, better drainage and water supplies can often be effected at small cost. At present abattoir offal is largely wasted even though the amount involved would warrant the installation of modern methods of converting it into glue, bone meal, blood meal, etc. In order to encourage more slaughtering at the government-supervised abattoirs, it might also be desirable to review the taxes assessed at the abattoir which encourage livestock owners to resort to illicit slaughter. 253 348

Wool

The wool collected from the various fat-tailed varieties of sheep makes a good carpet wool and a valuable export product. Little attention is given, however, to good shearing, perhaps because milk rather than wool is considered the main product of the flocks. Shearing is done with crude hand shears. Wool is frequently left on the head and neck region and around the root of 236

Measures to Improve Productivity and Quality of Output

1. Improved Lighting, Noise Abatement and Temperature Control

Good lighting is important in reducing fatigue, improving the quality of work and increasing production. Light that glares has the same effect as too little illumination; in either circumstance workers tire easily and their efficiency is quickly lowered. In designing new industrial buildings care should be taken to avoid the direct rays of the sun and to arrange wherever possible for the light to come from the north through the roof. In many existing plants, especially in the two-story buildings, the amount of artificial lighting needs to be increased. 354

Tests have also shown conclusively that a continuous high level of noise quickly brings fatigue and boredom. The resulting loss in productivity fully justifies taking whatever steps are feasible, such as the installation of sound-absorbing ceilings, to reduce the noise level to generally acceptable limits.

While the average temperature in Iraq is high, the humidity is quite low. This greatly simplifies the conditioning of air for comfort, it being necessary only to increase the humidity to decrease the temperature. This practice, known as "desert cooling," is now being adopted with considerable success and should be extended in those industries (especially textile mills) where it is of distinct advantage.

2. Improvements in Flow of Material

With the exception of the new textile mill, industrial plants 348 are poorly arranged from the standpoint of material flow. Most buildings have two stories, requiring either stairs, conveyors or elevators to move material through the plant. Columns to support the upper floor interfere with operations on the lower floor. Such an arrangement requires duplicate handling of material and interferes with the use of modern equipment such as fork trucks. Similarly, the buildings which comprise a plant are frequently laid out without regard to the flow of materials from one to the other. There are, moreover, many cases of duplicate operations (for example, separate power plants). While it is difficult to correct existing conditions, the layout of any new plants should be

348 arranged so that the material flows through the plant with a minimum of handling.

000 3. Use of Time Studies and Cost Accounting

Time studies are indispensable in some industries. In textile and machine shops, for example, these studies are essential to break down production costs for proper evaluation. To illustrate, a large costly lathe might show a greater return by speeding up its operation through the use of a different design of cutting tool, or a planer might show such a low return that its replacement by a milling machine would be fully justified. In textiles, time studies might show that it is actually more costly to have one operator tending five looms than to have him tend only four looms; or the reverse could be true, depending on all of the related factors. There are numerous other examples which could be cited to show the need of time studies in certain sectors of industry.

Cost accounting is very important to good operations and must be practiced before an industry can expect to reach maximum operating efficiency. Without it, many losses, which could easily be avoided, go unnoticed by management.

433 464 4. Improved Administration

At present there is very little delegation of responsibility by management to foremen and supervisors. This limits the economic size of plants and tends to complicate the work of management. There are good reasons for this situation, chiefly the widespread lack of education, experience and training, which has already been described. While the basic problem can be overcome only in time, industry can take steps to alleviate the immediate situation through such measures as on-the-job training programs suggested earlier, special courses for supervisory personnel, and better organization of inventories and distribution of stores of spare parts. The result should be an increase in production and, at the same time, a reduction in per-unit cost.

110 5. Greater Emphasis on Workers' Welfare

To hire and train a worker requires time and money, and the investment is lost if, because of sickness, the worker is unable to hold his job or to turn out a full day's work. A physical examination prior to hire would insure that a worker is physically

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35_1 Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

I-I

824* **Verbascum Thapsus L.** (Scrophulariaceae)

278* ماذریون

Māzaryūn (Teh.); Mahi zahraj, Bon tamaku (Ar.); Gidar tamaku (Hind.); great mullein.

W.H.M.M. 150758.

[226] This mullein grows from the temperate Himalayas westward to Britain. The drug consists of broken stalks and thick, hairy leaves. The narcotic action of mullein on fish appears to be well known to the Arabs and Iranis, the meaning of Mahi zahraj being "fish poison." Mohammedan physicians prescribe it in gout and rheumatism in combination with aperients. Throughout Europe mullein has long had a reputation in the pulmonary diseases of cattle, on which account it bears the name of cow's lungwort.

824* **Vetiveria zizanioides Stapf** (*Andropogon muricatus* Retz) (Gramineae)

278* برمکیا

302 Barmakiyā, Bikh-i-wala (Pers.); Khas Khas (Hind.); Izkhir-i-jami (Ar.); Vetiver (Tam.); root of cuscus grass.

Field 5 (Isf.).

• [355] The use of these fragrant, wiry roots for medicinal purposes and in perfumery has been common in India for a long time. The roots emit a pleasant odor when moist, and for this reason they are woven into screens and mats (tatties) which hang over doors and windows to cool and perfume the atmosphere during the hot season. A paste of the root is applied to the skin to relieve oppressive heat of the body, and a cooling aromatic bath is prepared by adding some broken root to the water. The root yields a fragrant essential oil which commands a high price as a perfume (Otto Stapf, *Kew Bulletin*, 1906, 347–349).

824* **Vicia Faba L.** (Leguminosae)

278* باقله

262 Bāghalā (Iraq); Banklent (Bal.); Bakla (Hind.); Baqilla, Baqlah (Turk.); Paglah (Kurd.); broad or horse bean.

246 Field 4, 56, 69 (Iraq).

This legume is a native of Iran and is now universally cultivated. The beans are a well-known vegetable and an excellent horse food. The shoots are said to be efficacious in rousing a drunkard from

x539 AND Hamed related:
443 Once in Hilla there was a cloth merchant of
moderate wealth, and his name was Abdul Rashid
Mejid. This merchant used to buy cloth from the great
merchants of Baghdad and he used to sell it in small
quantities to the tribesmen and the people of Hilla. He
made no great profit from his shop, but he had enough
x539 money for the rent of his house and for his food. He kept
462 no servants in his house, for the work of the house was
356 done by his wife and by his only daughter, a girl of great
beauty, in the sixteenth year of her life. The name of the
girl was Salma.

And one day it happened that at the hour of noon the hub in their house was empty of water, and the mother of Salma said to her: Go to the river and bring water for the hub. And Salma put a jar on her shoulder and she went to the river. But it was her habit not to go to that part of the river which ran through the town and was near to her house, for she was ashamed that she, a daughter of a merchant, should be seen drawing water, for the women who drew water were the wives and daughters of the porters, and the fellahin, and the leather workers and the coppersmiths, but the daughters of the cloth merchants used to have servants to draw water. Yet her father would have no servant, for his trade was not great. So she went out of the back of her house through the palm trees to a secluded part of the river.

x539 When Salma reached the river she was hot and tired, for the time was noon and the season was summer. She looked around her, but she could see not a single living soul, nor was there a sound from the bazaar or from the town, for the whole world was sleeping. So she thought: I will cool and refresh myself before I return to the house.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

2. COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

133 The zones of land surface into which the territory divides itself,
311 though they belong less to history than to geography, may be
241 briefly mentioned since they deeply affect the life of the inhabitants
and reflect their ethnology.

361 First comes the mountain belt in the north and north-east. A part of the main Armenian and Zagros system, it formed in 1900 the sanjaq of Sulaymaniya and a large part of those of Mosul and Shahrizur. This terrain is wholly un-Arabian, the population solidly Kurdish. Its mountains, mainly barren but carrying also areas of forest, are divided by deep valleys sometimes widening into plains. The hardy inhabitants of its hundreds of villages produce crops of grain, rice, vegetables, fruit, and tobacco, grown on the water of springs and rivulets and the relatively abundant rain. The climate is equable in summer, harsh in winter, the landscape commonly of striking beauty.

In the flattish submontane area of Mosul and Shahrizur sanjaqs lie treeless uplands and the lower courses of the Greater and Lesser Zabs. Here, in ancient Assyria, village-dwelling cultivators grow spring grain crops on rain and, in places, by water-lift from the rivers. The country is intermediate in environment and race between the mountain zone and the hot flatlands of central 'Iraq. The latter, the most extensive and most characteristic region of the country, covered the sanjaqs of Baghdad and Karbalā and most of Ḥilla. Everywhere dead flat and stoneless, it is unblessed, save in rare seasons, by rainfall sufficient for crop-growing, and must needs be cultivated by lift or flow from controlled canals or flood-channels. The crops are winter and summer grain and vegetables, locally some rice, and vast gardens of dates. The population, entirely Arab, lives in mud-built villages or in clusters of hair tents or reed huts.

The equally flat silt-country of the lower Tigris–Euphrates delta, astride and below the prehistoric coast-line, covered the southern part of the Ḥilla sanjaq and almost the whole of the three sanjaqs of 'Amara, Muntafiq, and Baṣra. It was characterized by a higher proportion of reed dwellings, fewer mud villages: by lesser crops of wheat and barley, but extensive rice-growing in the flooded areas: by miles of date gardens, and by a special way of life developed by the buffalo breeders, mat weavers, and fishermen in the great marshes.

Ignoring the Arabian dependencies of Baṣra, two other zones remain to be mentioned. One is that of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab in the Baṣra sanjaq, with its miles of ordered date gardens in a lean strip between river and desert: the other is that of the arid steppe

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads; their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-
dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking ''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

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The social development which these processes entailed represented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue. 177

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied. 181 511 [164]

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Baṣra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Baṣra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen–contractors whose 361 363

technique included blackmail. Rickety boat-bridges served a 361
dozen of the riverain towns. Street lighting consisted, at the best, 363
of a few battered oil-lamps. Water was supplied by donkey-borne [365]
waterskins from the river, or from polluted wells in private courtyards; only in Baghdad was a single quarter of the town furnished by pipes with silt-laden untreated water. Municipal street-sweepers maintained some appearance of decency in the main lanes and bazaars, while filth and stenches abounded in the rest. Every town and larger village had cemeteries in its midst or on its fringes. Khans for caravans or wayfarers were found everywhere; hotels approaching the lowest European standard existed only in Baghdad.

Municipal administration was entrusted, save in unorganized 632
villages, to a Mayor and his council. These functionaries, elected by procedures which could amount to Government nomination, enjoyed some local prestige; but their powers in practice were limited so rigidly that the local Governor in fact controlled all projects and all expenditure. Baghdad in the 'nineties was divided into three *baladiyas*, two for the left bank and one for the right. The Mayor was a member or nominee of one of its leading families or, rarely, a Government official. Municipal law was not inadequate, the code of taxation and procedure meticulous, its sphere of nominal activity reasonable. But in practice these administrations were corrupt and futile, and effective chiefly in providing a salary for a city notable and free servants for the local Governor. Nevertheless, pride of city was not lacking and schemes of town improvement were popular topics throughout decades of inactivity.

The picture of urban society of the period must embrace varying 361
scenes. Baṣra with its miles of date gardens and network of tidal
creeks, the activity of its riverain suburb—the sole seaport of 621
'Iraq—its daily contacts with Najd and Muḥammara, its rich garden-owning notables, its cosmopolitan merchants and agents, had a character unique in 'Iraq. Of the other towns of Baṣra sanjaq, Qurna was tribe-dominated, the growing village of Abu al-Khaṣib non-tribal, and Zubayr a desert-fringe town ruled by a hereditary Shaykh. Among Baṣra's leading families were those of the Naqib, and the houses of Basha'yan, Mandil, and Ṣani'.

Baghdad city with a mainly Sunni right bank and an all-Shi'i and largely Persian left, and its important suburbs of Kadhimiya, Mu'adhdham, and Qarara formed by far the greatest commercial centre in the wilayas. It was industrially important, administratively and militarily dominant. The city was mean, without modern improvements, without protection against river floods; it was adorned only by two or three monuments and mosques of interest and by the great shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani. With

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361 621 its greater society of high officials, its circle of famous Sunni Muslim families, its half-Europeanized wealthy Jews—the houses of Daniel and Sasun (Sassoon)—its doctors and lawyers, its men of affairs and their busy agents, Baghdad could claim at least equality with Baṣra in the vanguard of 'Iraqi progress. In both cities a small European society, led by the Consulates and predominantly British, maintained its comfortable homes, its clubs and sports, and found life pleasant.

Mosul fell far behind; lesser in status and remoter from Westernizing influences save those of French Catholicism, the city acted as entrepôt for the Jazira and the Kurdish highlands, and maintained a restless yet unprogressive atmosphere among its mixed population. Despite the dignity of the leading families—Pashas of the province in bygone days, the houses of the Jalilis and 'Umaris—and some Christian families of repute, it was ill famed for its criminal brawling, its fanaticism, and its dirt. Its dusty and treeless glare, subdued only by the smoke of lime-kilns, attracted few visitors.

In the lesser cities of 'Iraq, Arab or Kurdish, the atmosphere and condition of society varied widely with the environment. Many towns had no interest but that of staging-post for caravans, produce market for an agricultural area, fuelling point for river steamers, or cantonment for troops. Others had more individual character. Such were Hit with its industry of bitumen: Kirkuk and Arbil as main entrepôts for Kurdistan and nurseries of Turkish-speaking effendis: Khaniqin as the frontier post for Persia. Mandali and Badra looked east to Pusht-i-Kuh in much of their sentiment and interests. Sulaymaniya was the capital of the southern Kurds, and dominated by its oppressive 'holy' family of the Barzinji Sayids. Ḥalabja was the urban centre of the great Jaf tribe, as was 'Amara of the Tigris marshmen and Naṣiriya of the Muntafiq. Kadhimiya and Samarrā were eminent as Shi'i shrines and pilgrim-places, Ba'quba, Shahroban, and Daltawa as centres for the estates of the landed gentry. The mid-Euphrates Shi'i towns were suffering at the time from a tragic disturbance of Euphrates irrigation. On the upper Euphrates, settlements of the Dulaym were turning into villages or miniature townships. In the qadhā headquarter towns of Mosul province—'Aqra, Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, Raniya, Rawanduz, Keui Sanjaq—urban life was developing and a class of town notables, sometimes religious, was holding its own against the tribal Aghās.

Yet more particular was the function of the Euphrates Holy Cities, Karbalā and Najf. These were at once the twin hearts of 'Iraqi Shi'ism (the greatest non-Turkish influence in the territory) and centres of the pilgrim and corpse-burial industries. The power

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625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and ‘special’ investiga-
tion, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into ‘Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
to twelve, ‘Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great pro-
697 gress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-
‘Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of ‘Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its develop-
ment by poverty. This limited the activities both of the munici-
palities and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
291 The wearing of the characteristic ‘Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in ‘Iraqi upper-class and pro-
fessional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was trans-
185 formed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public build-
366 ings, and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of ‘Ashar, Ma‘qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, ‘Iraq’s finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-‘Aṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and ‘Iraqi, municipal dis-
pensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources com-
pared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor pro-
jects for which local pride was clamoring.

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jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administra- 361
tion was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and 185
a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old 632
abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans [1423]
were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on
specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise.

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and 871
showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way 658
haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Baṣra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic
theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeo- 172
logical wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum,

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744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply, improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934, devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
184 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab Companies.

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721 exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important practical results could be expected from this move, which at
"645 best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse, did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship. Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the
722 Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements, the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and grain supplies provided.

361 Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which
185 was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of
744 office to the Amin al-'Aṣima. The Health services continued to develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had served the country and their science now for twenty years, still played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far
871 from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls, and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

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241 185 473 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices, throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist. Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers and exporters.

654 242 185 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-year course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected, tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield, quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust campaigns in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world: caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many centres. The department was in touch with local industry which could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley, beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intolerably wasteful. [474] It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspectorate, and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself in rural education and established agricultural schools in every liwā. [381] It was promoting village settlement, in which field the interesting and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323) was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechanization of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

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old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both 619 178
economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 511

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361
the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change,
if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it
was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless,
and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same
goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet
in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and
unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public
State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the
sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved
approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole
areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and
modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman
Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been
forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363
labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well
maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible.
Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362
or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor
and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building
was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers,
the development of town amenities, and the need for
outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365
service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—
supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been,
imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere
abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the
ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363
Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and
Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366
shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide
buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered
a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well
established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown
in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368
services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified
themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365
power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

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[1] The mausoleum of King Fayṣal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

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APPENDIX B

Table showing (1) *area and population of each liwā;* (2) *qadhās of each liwā, including H.Q. area;* (3) *area* (*sq. km.*) *of each qadhā;* (4) *population of each qadhā.*

Liwā	*Area in sq. km.*	*Population*	*Qadhās with* (1) *area,* (2) *population*
Baghdad	20,000	805,000	Baghdad (1,900: 552,000); Kadhimiya (1,100: 114,000); Samarrā (15,600: 91,000); Maḥmudiya (1,450: 48,500).
Mosul	48,000	602,000	Mosul (12,900: 340,000); 'Amadiya (2,700: 50,000); Zakho (2,250: 37,000); Dohuk (2,250: 40,000); 'Aqra (1,950: 32,000); Sinjar (16,900: 32,000); Shaykhan (1,400: 24,700); Tall 'Afar (8,250: 45,500).
Baṣra	12,300	352,000	Baṣra (4,700: 206,000); Abu al-Khaṣib (4,000: 81,000); Qurna (3,650: 65,000).
Kirkuk	19,900	286,000	Kirkuk (7,000: 148,000); Kifri (5,300: 48,000); Chamchamal (2,400: 30,000); Ta'uq (5,200: 59,000).
Arbil	18,400	240,000	Arbil (3,500: 86,000); Makhmur (3,500: 44,000); Keui Sanjaq (1,900: 31,000); Rawanduz (5,500: 46,000); Raniya (2,100: 27,000); Zibar (1,950: 6,600).
Sulaymaniya	9,400	223,000	Sulaymaniya (3,000: 77,600); Ḥalabja (3,100: 71,000); Shahribazar (2,000: 38,000); Pishdar (1,250: 35,600).
Dulaym (H.Q., Ramadi)	45,400	193,000	Ramadi (15,600: 111,000); Faluja (4,750: 49,000); 'Ana (25,000: 33,600).
Ḥilla	5,300	262,000	Ḥilla (960: 81,000); Hashimiya (1,900: 52,000); Hindiya (1,200: 82,000); Musayib (1,200: 46,000).
Kut	16,000	225,000	Kut (4,000: 82,000); Ḥai (3,000: 67,500); Badra (3,800: 16,200); Ṣuwayra (5,250: 59,250).
Karbalā	6,000	277,000	Karbalā (5,600: 150,000); Najf (400: 127,000).
Diwaniya	14,900	384,000	Diwaniya (1,800: 63,000); Samawa (4,700: 82,000); Shamiya (2,900: 114,000); Abu Ṣukhayr (1,300: 79,000); 'Afaq (4,200: 46,000).
Muntafiq (H.Q., Naṣiriya)	14,150	370,000	Naṣiriya (5,500: 111,000); Rifa'i (3,200: 82,000); Suq al-Shuyukh (3,800: 109,000); Shaṭra (1,600: 68,000).
Diyalā (H.Q., Ba'quba)	16,000	273,500	Ba'quba (2,050: 94,500); Khaliṣ (3,600: 69,000); Khaniqin (3,750: 57,000); Mandali (6,500: 53,000).
'Amara	18,750	308,000	'Amara (8,650: 184,000); 'Ali al-Gharbi (5,750: 36,000); Qal'at Ṣaliḥ (4,350: 88,500).
Northern desert province	94,700		Population nomadic, and included in adjacent liwās.
Southern desert province	75,700		

P. 400

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHl Iraq MHl

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education
is not possible without some reference to the history and present 186
circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an
administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Ad- 185
ministrative reforms and some social advance were attempted
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became 735
an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 642
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent 212
years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and 361
Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is
311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only
312 twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians. The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims, three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians,
871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some
153 important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
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now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade 438
with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge 439
of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though 173
unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradition 782
at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the
bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, 539
who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with I
all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the K
construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while 653
sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When 185
echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on I
a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn K
Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled 721
by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the 361
Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also 744
be important to provide both the provincial and district medical 647
officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather 361 ●
haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great 166
congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have [362]
simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities. [364]

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. 362
They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly con- 342
structed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

362 however, they are poorly built and too small; and they are crowded
342 together on sites and under conditions which breed disease.

Need for Community Planning

361 ● In recent decades there has been a growing awareness of the need for community planning, better housing and community facilities. With respect to villages, little has as yet been done except for the planned development of the Dujaila project. Here some effort was made to have houses erected according to standard specifications and to depart from the village-type of settlement by requiring that houses be erected in groups of four on the adjoining corners of four land allotments. As an aid to town and city planning there has been created within the Department of Municipalities of the Ministry of Interior a small planning section to provide "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles". The municipalities themselves have been charged with "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specifications of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places and buildings in such areas". The final responsibility for planning has, however, remained unclear. The surveys, plans and partial plans have generally been hastily drawn and with little regard for the actual conditions prevailing in the community. In any event, municipalities have for the most part continued to develop without reference to any plans. In many towns new streets have been arbitrarily cut through residential and commercial districts with little concern for real needs or for the people affected. The various ministries concerned with the erection of schools, hospitals, public buildings and bridges generally locate their projects without reference to an overall plan and without consultation with each other.

361 There is today a real need for integrated community planning.
647 The Mission believes that it would be desirable to work towards
the establishment of a genuine Community Planning Office in the
Ministry of Interior. Such an office should ultimately be staffed
with an adequate number of experts versed in architecture, engineering and other aspects of town planning. The first step might
be to strengthen the existing planning section in the Department of

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Municipalities by appointing a capable, experienced town planner 361
as director and giving him authority to build up a trained staff 647
gradually. It could serve both the Development Board and local authorities in coordinating development projects on the community level and in ascertaining whether the projects for schools, hospitals, and similar facilities in any given community are properly related to the needs and facilties of neighboring communities.

Housing Developments

Public and quasi-public housing has received increased attention in recent years. 362 The Ministry of Social Affairs, which is authorized to construct houses for workers, has built 204 units and has 185 units under construction. The low rentals on completed units constitute a definite subsidy to the occupants. The city of Basra is now building 750 low-cost houses in accordance with a plan that unfortunately was hastily and inexpertly prepared. Probably the best municipal housing project is near the old city of Bedra in Kut province where a new town site is being developed. The Railway Administration has provided housing for more than 2,400 of its employees, and the Port of Basra is also building accommodations, primarily for its junior officials.

Laws which require the construction of houses by industrial firms and large landowners have remained unenforced. Industrial housing is still little developed. The outstanding project of this kind is at Kirkuk where the Iraq Petroleum Company has been building a large housing development, consisting of 1,028 units, for its skilled artisans and officials. The cost of this project is such, however, that it is unlikely to be widely copied.

Most of the public and quasi-public housing is open to criticism on several counts. Use of poor materials, improper spacing and orientation, poor planning and site engineering have characterized some of these projects. The few public housing projects undertaken have been launched without adequate attention to the problem of how much rent the potential occupants could pay.

Establishment of a Housing Authority

In the light of these considerations, the Mission suggests that 362 647
the responsibility for planning and supervising housing be entrusted ultimately to a Housing Authority located in the Ministry of Social

modations be built for government officials in the provinces in 362
order to make living conditions attractive enough for capable men.

Self-help in Housing

Any housing program under present conditions should lay primary stress on the encouragement of self-help measures. The great majority of the *sarifa* dwellers, for example, could probably not afford to live in houses built by the state unless really large subsidies were provided, which the Mission does not recommend. These people can best be assisted by setting aside suitable tracts of land for their resettlement and encouraging them to build their own houses of mud and other readily available materials in accordance with models provided by the government. To insure proper siting of structures the government might assist in staking out the foundations and in providing some of the needed materials such as cement for stabilizing the mud floor. As an incentive toward completion, it might also furnish one of the final elements of the self-built house such as the roof or roof timbers or window frames. A project of this kind is particularly needed for the *sarifa* dwellers of Baghdad. The site of such a project should be well-drained, provided with safe water, sanitary facilities, a school, market and health center and located not too far from places of employment. The government actually started a project of this type but it was unfortunately abandoned.

Similar self-help measures are contemplated in connection with 361 ●
the new land settlement schemes. Here the government has a unique opportunity for new forms of community planning. The Mission has for this purpose developed a suggested pattern which seeks to combine most effectively the features to be desired in such a community. Details of this are set forth in the monograph on community planning. Self-help measures can, of course, also be stimulated in existing villages and small towns, particularly in the direction of constructing public latrines and baths, erecting needed community centers and planting shade trees.

Another means of assisting self-help would be the provision 452
of an adequate system of mortgage credit. Private building has always been handicapped by the lack of credit available on reasonable terms. At the end of 1950 the total mortgages outstanding

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
RAILROADS
ROADS
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TO BAGHDAD NORTH GATE
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P. 343 (a)

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
KIRKUK
TIGRIS RIVER
PRESENT RAILWAY STATIONS AND YARDS TO BE ABANDONED
ACCESS TO
NEW MAIN LINE
MARSHALLING YARD

p. 343 (b)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX A

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IRAQI STATE RAILWAYS REVISED LAYOUT BAGHDAD RAILWAYS & ROADS IN NEW TOWN PLAN


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p. 343 (c)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX H

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES

I. Introduction

In its main report the Mission has expressed in general terms 361 its view that more attention needs to be given to the problems of community planning and housing. Well-planned communities and a well-housed population are clearly desirable social assets; but it may not be so generally realized that they are also economic assets. The extra cost of good design and careful planning is small compared with the waste that ensues if they are ignored. In purely financial terms it is costly to maintain, and far more costly to improve, a city which has extensive slums and congested streets and whose growth does not follow lines that permit the provision of efficient public services.

The Mission has advocated the strengthening and improve- 647 ment of the Planning Office of the Directorate General of Munici- 361 palities in the Ministry of Interior to take care of community planning, both rural and urban, and of the Housing Section attached to the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Social Affairs to take care of housing in all its phases. It believes that these related agencies should ultimately be developed into a genuine Community Planning Office and a central Housing Authority with separate and well-defined functions and with the power necessary to discharge those functions effectively and adequately. As a tech- [816] nical supplement to the Housing Authority, the Mission has recommended the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station which would conduct research on improved methods of construction and on the new use of available building material and, as such, would most suitably be attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. The broad functions of these offices have been described in the main report.

647 ●361 In this Annex it is intended to describe more fully their functions and the principles which should guide them and to illustrate this description by reference to particular conditions in Iraq. It may, however, be well to note at the outset that the men [424] needed to discharge the functions of these offices adequately will have to be trained, as there are very few now in Iraq who have even part-time training in community planning and housing. The sooner a start is made, the quicker the offices can be built up. Promising men, who have had some experience, could be sent abroad for further training and experience. In Iraq, courses on the subjects might be introduced into the engineering and architecture curricula for those who intend to pursue a career in either of the two new government offices. Initially, it might be necessary to employ an experienced foreign technician to give these courses and to act in an advisory capacity to the government.

000 *The Functions of Community Planning and Housing*

Community planning is the process of effecting the orderly layout of a community and the continuous improvement of that community for the physical, economic and social welfare of its residents. It involves the task of thinking ahead so that proposals may be appropriate, timely, and based on factual analysis in the light of the objective sought. In an industrial community, for example, it would mean, after a survey of conditions, preparing a plan which would allocate various sections of the land to the category of use, industrial, business, residential, recreational, and so forth, for which they are best suited, considering the needs and existing facilities of the community. At all times, consideration has to be given to the future growth of the community, both in relation to the existing development and to the bigger metropolitan area or region of which it is a part.

Housing is not as broad a field as community planning, but the two are closely related, especially as housing affects the standards and development of residential areas. Housing has for its goal the most effective utilization of available resources for sheltering for the people and providing for them, or helping them to provide for themselves, the facilities and services for pleasant living. This involves the analysis of the composition and characteristics of the population, the determination of their ability to pay for hous-

II. Rural Communities

About one third of the people live in towns and cities; of the 162
remainder, a small proportion are nomads and the bulk live in 361
villages. In terms of population, therefore, the villages are the more predominant type of community. Although the distinction between a village and a small municipality is, as already noted, somewhat arbitrary, even the smallest municipalities are centers of local administration and have certain facilities of a higher standard than the villages. The distinction will, in any event, serve for present purposes.

Virtually all the rural population live in villages, isolated dwellings being very rare. Landowners, in fact, frequently count their fellahin by villages. Except for the extreme northwest, where there are seminomadic pastoral tribes who live in settled communities for only part of the year, the inhabitants of the villages are mainly cultivators. A few members of the community may have other occupations such as the tending of sheep and goats, the keeping of small shops and coffee houses or the building and repairing of huts. There are, also, villages where a considerable number of the people are engaged in handicrafts (e.g. weaving) but these are rare.

In the North, stone is generally available and is the common- 342
est material for buildings, while in the South and the Center, mud 333
is the usual material. The mud plaster of walls is reinforced with straw or cow dung to minimize the washing of clay in the mortar when it rains and to prevent temperature cracks. Where the climate is drier and palm leaves or reeds are available, especially in the marshes and palm belt of the South, these materials are more extensively used.

Another feature which distinguishes the North from the rest 361
of the country is the greater permanence of the villages. The main reason is probably that there is a much older tradition of settled cultivation than exists in the recently irrigated areas. Not only
are there more small-holders, who would naturally have a close [423]
association with their land, but the fellahin also appear to have
A GREATER SECURITY OF TENURE.

361 a greater security of tenure. Other factors, which have no doubt affected the permanence of villages in some parts of the irrigation zone in central and southern Iraq, are the salination of the land and the silting of canals. In such cases, the fellahin have no choice but to abandon their villages.

In spite of these differences, however, the villages have a number of characteristics in common. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled together without any orderly design. There are no communal facilities or open spaces for the recreation of the
342 children. The huts are so constructed as to keep out heat, cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently, they consist of a single room with thick walls and a doorway, which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for both cooking food and keeping draft animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight, windows are either very small or totally lacking; sashes are expensive. Furnishings are limited to such elementary necessities as a mat and a plain table or a bench. Sanitary facilities, including latrines, are generally lacking.

312 The villages are necessarily located near a source of water, by a canal in the irrigation zone, by a stream or a well in the North. The water is not piped, but must be carried from its source to wherever it is used. Nor is it purified, although the canals in the irrigation zone may be heavily polluted. The water which has been used by men for washing and in which animals have immersed themselves while drinking is often used for human consumption. The constant trampling of the canal banks for these purposes leads to leaks and, hence, to stagnant pools near the adjacent village. Where the source of water is a well, the earth nearby may be dug out for use in the construction of houses and so, similarly, a
[364] stagnant pool may be the result. Such pools, combined with the total absence of any sanitary disposal of waste and garbage, constitute a serious danger to health.

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244 Trees are rarely seen in the villages, although they would give relief from the sun and from sandstorms. Trees would also provide firewood instead of the fuels currently used—animal dung, which could be used instead as fertilizer, and brushwood, which has to be gathered with considerable effort. Small gardens for vegetables are unknown. In fact, fruit and vegetables are almost

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

exclusively grown by farmers who specialize in these commodities 361 137
and who market their produce in the towns. 244

Planning the Improvement of the Villages

Clearly it will not be possible to bring about any substantial 361
and lasting change in the state of some thousands of villages until the root causes of poverty, ignorance and insecurity have been tackled. Only then can thriving communities replace the present villages with their primitive and almost static mode of life.

Legislation for the improvement of villages is already in existence. 361 In 1936, a law (No. 70) for the construction of new villages 185
was passed, empowering the Ministry of Interior to construct or renew villages, having regard particularly to health requirements, such as the construction of sanitary facilities and public baths, the hygienic disposal of waste and the provision of drinking water. A draft law on similar lines, but placing the responsibilty on the Ministry of Social Affairs, was put before Parliament during 1951. Parliament sent it back to the Council of Ministers for amalgamation with the earlier statute. Both are admirable in objective, but both are focussed primarily on the reconstitution of villages on more hygienic lines without regard for the urgent educational and economic aspects of the problem and without recognizing the need to enlist the cooperation of the people. Only a comprehensive and popular program can really reach the people and encourage them to help themselves. That little, in fact, has been done under the 1936 law is itself eloquent testimony to this.

The task of remaking the villages is typically one for the 361
new Community Planning Office. In cooperation with all the government departments concerned and with their advice, it should be able to formulate and issue the necessary regulations, of which those that affect health are only a part, under the power conferred on it by the projected planning enabling act.

The Mission has elsewhere made a number of recommendations designed to raise the standard of living of the rural population. On the agricultural side, these include the organization of an extension service, the creation of cooperatives, measures to improve livestock and the provision of better drainage. Medical recommendations include the opening of more village dispensaries, the

●361 distribution of household remedies and measures to control endemic diseases. In addition, the recommended Housing Authority could design huts which could be built cheaply, would allow light and air to come in and would still afford protection against the elements.

The Community Planning Office should initiate and regulate a program to remake the villages according to simple, workable plans which conform to these requirements of economic and social progress and which do not merely consist of a more orderly layout of the village with improved huts. There is little point in improving a village if drainage fails and crop yields begin to fall. Education, too, is of fundamental importance. An adult education program as recommended in Annex G, *Education,* could help people to cope more effectively with their practical problems and prevent what might have been a well-planned community from deteriorating into its old way of life. Provision should, therefore, be made for the needs of education and cooperation by building a community center which could serve both as a school and as a meeting place. Shade trees, wood lots which would serve also as windbreaks and, possibly, small gardens could be laid out in accordance with the agricultural department's recommendations. Simple storage of grain could similarly be provided. Stabling and drinking troughs for animals should be provided in cooperation with the health and veterinary authorities. Water supply and sanitary facilities will also have to be included in accordance with health requirements. These are merely examples of the desirable attributes of a village designed to better the living standards of its people.

The Application of Self-help

In view of the magnitude and the continuing nature of the program, it is vital that the will to recreate the villages come from the people themselves. Unless it does, little of lasting benefit will be accomplished. In this connection, the method of aided self-help would be particularly valuable, since there are great potentialities in the force of example, one village following another. But, to be effective, the examples will have to be striking and of practical value. The Mission suggests as one possible approach that, initially, a few villages be selected in different parts of the country and plans prepared for their improvement. An important element in this will be the choice of villages. The villages chosen should have an intelligent and capable *Mukhtar* (headman), to whom the benefits of the replanned village and the methods by which it will be improved can be explained. He should be selected only if he shows enthusiasm for the plan and can carry his village with him. If such a man can be found, he should be consulted frequently, not only to give a sense of participation both to him and, through him, to the people of the village, but also because the *Mukhtar* may well be able to give valuable advice. In areas where the people are fellahin, the chosen village should be on the property of a landowner with a genuine interest in his people's welfare.

Once the plans have been agreed upon, they could be explained in general terms to the people of the village and the schedule of work outlined. Work should start at a time of the year when it will not interfere with the normal pursuits of the people. The first project should be one of interest to the village as a whole, perhaps the school. As the monograph on education notes, there have already been cases where villages have demonstrated their willingness to build their own schools. It would also be important to undertake at an early stage projects of obvious practical utility to the village, such as a piped water-supply with a simple purification plant and a drinking place for cattle. Ultimately, a start should be made on the rebuilding of the huts according to a design or a number of designs prepared by the Housing Authority. Preferably, this too should be a cooperative venture, each hut being built not by one family, but by a larger group which would build in turn for each member.

If work on the initial group of villages can be successfully completed, the country should have at its disposal several well-planned and executed demonstration units, where the people themselves will be able to point to the benefits they have received, largely through their own efforts. To the extent that they are convinced that, as a result, they enjoy a higher income, better health and a more pleasant environment, other villages will become keen to follow their example. Eventually, the program might extend to one village in each *qadha*, then one in each *nahiya* and so forth.

One warning must, however, be made about such a demonstration program. It should not be too elaborate. The initial demonstration units should not be show-places in the sense that

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341 they are elaborate and expensive to construct, require a great deal of funds and official attention to maintain, and the benefits are generally beyond the comprehension and appreciation of the average villager. They should, on the contrary, be simple enough so that the villager can both understand the improvement and be anxious to undertake most of the work himself, and will continue to do so for other future improvements. Otherwise, the people of other villages will merely admire the demonstration units and will feel that model villages are beyond their attainment.

New Settlements

Nowhere has the government a better opportunity for the planning of good rural communities than in new settlements such as Dujaila. Settlement in Dujaila began in 1946 and it is clear that a considerable effort was made to give the community an improved [166] layout. In May 1951, there were 1,058 cultivators settled in square lots of 100 donums each (500 by 500 meters). The portion of the Scheme which has been laid out has groups of four houses constructed at the adjoining corners of four lots.[1]

The cultivator is obliged by regulation to plant a garden of a specified area and to build his own house and those of his helpers within the unit under his possession. The Committee which administers the Scheme locates and determines the number of houses and decides on the period within which construction shall [342] be completed. The houses are made of mud or mud bricks, and each consists of a bedroom, a living room, a storeroom, a kitchen, a bath, a water closet and a stable covering a total area of about 80 square meters; a staircase leads to the flat roof. There is also an enclosed courtyard of about 220 square meters which is used by both the family and its livestock. Separate entrances are provided for the people and the animals.

Although the Dujaila settlement is a great improvement on the average village, it has a number of defects. The present layout makes it possible for each cultivator to have his house and those of his assistants on his own unit, but it has spread the population sparsely over a wide area resulting in long distances to community facilities, such as schools and stores, and a lack of the

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[1] See diagram on pp. 348 and 349.

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social life which compact communities provide. Although a club is maintained by a cooperative, only a few settlers patronize it because of its distance from their homes. Pure drinking water and sanitary facilities are not available and could only have been provided at great expense.

In future settlements these defects could be eliminated and the community pattern improved by a more social grouping of homes and a more accessible and convenient location of schools and other public facilities. The Mission has prepared an example of such a layout.[2] The land is divided into farms of 300 by 825 meters. A number of these farms combine to form a Rural Unit ("A") within which there is a Residential Group ("a") of 60 to 70 houses and gardens, each lot measuring 30 by 84 meters. Although not adjacent to their corresponding farms, they are within walking distance, yet far enough from the main irrigation canals to avoid pollution. The total area available to each farmer is thus about the same as in Dujaila. The houses are staggered in order that each may take advantage of its neighbor's gardens and avoid overcrowding of structures. Except for the front walls, the house lots and gardens are without solid fencing. Screens of trees or hedges may be used instead. Near the center of each Residential Group and easily and safely accessible to children are a small school and meeting hall and an open space which may be used for recreation; and adjacent to these are the local shops. A number of these Rural Units combine to form a Village Group. At its core is a Village Center with its larger open space, a school, a mosque, bigger shops and other facilities commonly associated with a Village Center.

This layout is, of course, intended only as a schematic illustration. Since it is designed for a particular size of individual farm, suitable modifications would have to be made for farms of different sizes. It might also be found desirable to alter other features, for example, the size of the village center in relation to the outlying residential groups or the distance between them. The most important consideration is that the design, as finally decided on, should be based on a thorough study of all the local conditions in the settlement and the needs of the people who are to live there.

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[2] See diagram on pp. 348 and 349.

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
500M
500M
House
Roads
House
Farm
Farm Boundaries
EXISTING LAYOUT
FARM AND HOUSE 500M x 500M = 250,000 SQ.M
100 FARMS IN THIS ARE, EACH PROVIDED WITH A HOUSE
HOUSES ARE IN GROUPS OF FOUR


Secondary Roads
300M
Tertiary Roads
Farm
Farm Boundaries
Residential Group "a"
Secondary Roads
School
Market
VILLAGE CENTER
RURAL UNIT SUGGESTED LAYOUT
FARM 300M x 825M = 247,500 SQ.M
LOT AND HOUSE 30M x 84M = 2,520 SQ.M
TOTAL OF FARM, LOT AND HOUSE 250,020 SQ.M
LOT AND HOUSE = 10% OF TOTAL
94 FARMS & HOUSES

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
Tertiary Road
Major Highway
A
a
Secondary Road
VILLAGE CENTER
5KM
5KM
Secondary Roads
1650M
1650M
1650M

VILLAGE GROUP

EACH RURAL UNIT 'A' MEASURES ABOUT 5KM ON A SIDE. ITS CORE IS A RESIDENTIAL GROUP 'a' WHICH CONTAINS HOUSES, STORES AND SHOPS, SCHOOL AND PLAYGROUND.

FOUR OF THESE RURAL UNITS FORM A VILLAGE GROUP WITH A VILLAGE CENTER COMPOSED OF HOUSES, MARKET AND SHOPS, SCHOOL AND PLAYFIELD, HEALTH CENTER, AND OTHER VILLAGE FACILITIES.


Stores and Shops
Farms
Pedestrian Path
Playground
School and Meeting Hall
Lot
300M
Pedestrian Path
Stores and Shops
Tertiary Road
Farms

PART OF RESIDENTIAL GROUP

SEE 'a' IN VILLAGE GROUP SKETCHED ABOVE


Pedestrian Path
Plants or Hedges
Wall
House
Garden
64M
House
30M

DETAIL OF LOTS

NOTE THAT HOUSES ARE STAGGERED TO AVOID CROWDING.

DUJAILA LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEME

361 The Mission has noted elsewhere other defects in the Dujaila settlement: the large administrative staff, the tendency of the settlers to become minor landlords, the lack of participation by the Department of Agriculture, and the rapid deterioration of the soil owing to bad drainage. It has been made too elaborate and there has been insufficient coordination of effort. As a result, the settler relies too much on the benefits he has been given and too little on self-help, largely because self-help has not been aided in the way it should be by the concerted action of the appropriate government departments.

III. Urban Communities

The municipalities in Iraq range from Baghdad, the capital, with well over half a million inhabitants down to small towns with less than a thousand inhabitants. They cannot, therefore, be considered as a homogeneous group. The largest of them have certain distinctive functions.

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438 Baghdad is the seat of the government, the center of much of the wholesale trade and the hub of the rail and road systems. Since the war, a number of modern factories have been built so that industry is now becoming an important element. It is a rapidly growing city, a particularly large influx having occurred during the war. Growth has taken place along both banks of the Tigris, expansion away from the river being limited by the bunds, which protect the city from flood.

Mosul, the second largest city, has less than a quarter of the population of Baghdad. Lying on the rail line to Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, it is a center of trade to the west, especially in wool. Associated with this trade are industries such as the cleaning and packing of wool and the tanning of hides. In addition, there is a sizeable cotton and rayon textile industry, both factory and handicraft. It is an old city and formerly the capital of the Turkish Vilayet of Mosul; it does not appear to be growing.

Basra, the port on the Shatt al Arab, is really a complex of three towns situated a few miles apart: Magil, the modern sea and air port; Ashar, an older port; and Basra proper. Apart from its

port traffic and such associated activities as the packing of dates, 361
cleaning of barley and flour-milling (a new industry), Basra is 438
closely bound up with the development of the new oil field at Zubair, some 10 miles inland. Basra, like Baghdad, received a large influx of people during the war, especially from nearby Amara.

The population of Kirkuk, the fourth city, is believed to have tripled in the last 25 years as a consequence of the development of Iraq's major oil field. The two holy cities in Kerbela province, Kerbela and Nejf, have a large transient population due to pilgrim traffic from Iran and other Moslem countries. These two cities have many handicraft workers in such trades as jewelry, brasswork and embroidery.

These six cities, together with Amara, are the only ones with 361
a population of over 40,000. With a few exceptions, such as 162
Khanaqin with its small oil field and refinery, the other municipalities function primarily as centers of administration and trade for surrounding districts. Broadly speaking, their size varies with their administrative importance. Of the provincial capitals, other than those already mentioned, five have a population between 20,000 and 40,000 and three between 10,000 and 20,000. Of the remaining municipalities, none has a population exceeding 20,000; less than 30, most of them centers of *qadhas,* have a population of more than 6,000.

Despite differences in size and function, the cities and towns 361
have a number of characteristics in common. The older parts are 342
usually congested with narrow streets and alleys. Houses are 339
built around courtyards, the only opening to the street being the 366
main doorway. The houses usually have a flat roof or a partially open second story for sleeping outside in the summer. Brick is the commonest building material; most of the larger towns have brickworks nearby, many of which are small and primitive. There are also a few modern concrete and steel buildings, mainly in Baghdad. Schools and hospitals can be found in the heart of these congested areas. An important section in every city is the *Suq* or bazaar, a network of alleys, often covered by crude roofs forming a series of arcades. These alleys are lined with the small shops of retail merchants and handicraft workers in textiles and metals. The *Suq* is usually located near the principal mosque.

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361 363 The development of the new parts of the cities is in striking contrast to the old. Broad tree-lined boulevards have been laid out in the form of dual carriage-ways, the dividing strip being ornamented with flowers and shrubs. Along these boulevards there has been intermittent residential building activity, so that vacant lots alternate with the houses and gardens of the well-to-do. In Baghdad, particularly, many of these vacant lots have been occupied by squatters. In the largest cities, the new boulevards and the main streets are paved, but the paving is apparently of poor construction, as it has deteriorated rapidly. In the other cities and towns, however, the streets have merely been graded.

365 Most towns with a population of over 6,000, and a few smaller one, have both a piped water supply and an electricity system, which are, with three major exceptions, managed by municipal boards under the direction of the Ministry of Interior. The water is, however, not always purified and the electricity is invariably expensive. No city, not even Baghdad, has a sewage system. Waste water is disposed of into cesspools or allowed to run into the streets where it is apt to collect in stagnant pools.

The Lack of Coordination in Urban Planning

361 In spite of their superficially impressive appearance, the new sections of the cities have not been properly planned. Streets and traffic circles have been laid out according to prescribed geometrical patterns without paying much attention to their functions or to the need for creating integrated residential areas with appropriate housing for the different income groups and provision for schools, shops and hospitals or clinics. In the largest cities, the importance of allocating zones for different purposes and of establishing a proper interrelation between the zones has been largely neglected. Growth has been, in fact, piecemeal and spasmodic rather than coordinated and regular, and emphasis has been placed more on the ornamental than on the useful. Some traffic circles, for example, are unnecessary; others are even safety hazards. The practical value of new streets is vitiated by the common and dangerous practices of using both carriage-ways in both directions and of taking short cuts in the wrong direction around traffic circles. Sometimes streets have been ruthlessly cut or widened through built-up areas

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vith little regard for the consequences; the remnants of buildings 361
vhich have been sliced through at odd angles can still be seen.

By law, the Ministry of Interior, through its Directorate 361
General of Municipalities, is already responsible for the planning 647
f municipalities. The Directorate General of Municipalities in urn has under it the Technical Section for Planning and Organiation (or Planning Office) which has among its duties the subnission of "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the rganization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with nodern principles" and the carrying out of "any of the said chemes which are required to be performed . . .".[3] This office vith a staff of 17 does topographic surveys of towns and prepares levelopment plans from such surveys. It also plans for and upervises construction of some municipal structures, including ousing, and attends to legal matters concerning land sub-division nd assessment.

Also by law, the Ministry of Interior has jurisdiction over the dministration of municipalities. Law No. 84 of 1931, as amended, rovides that municipalities should attend to "the division of the own into areas having regard to its development capacity and the pecification of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, ublic places, and buildings in such areas." This particular duty oncerning planning is assigned to the Office of the Municipal Engineer.

Although both the Planning Office and the Office of the Municipal Engineer are under the Ministry of Interior, the two ntities involved with planning are quite distinct from each other. Duplication of work and conflict in jurisdiction both occur. Municipalities prepare their own plans and then forward them to the Ministry of Interior but apparently they do so only for information, nd not for approval. Some plans are merely sketches. Others ave been made without surveys. Where surveys have been underaken, they are mainly topographic surveys showing the existing ayout of streets and buildings, and not the diagnostic surveys equired by scientific planning. In several cases plans have been ltered without submission to the Ministry. Some streets which

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[3] Regulation of the Ministry of Interior, No. 39 of 1947.

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have been newly constructed do not appear at all on the records of the Planning Office. The Mission, in fact, found that many major details of developments such as civic centers, markets and the like, either were not shown in the plans or were contrary to the plans as prepared and filed. There were also instances where planned projects under construction were suddenly changed or stopped by a new mayor on his assuming office.

Cooperation of the central government with the local authorities has also been noticeably lacking. The Ministry of Education, without consultation with local officials, prepares school plans, showing not only the details of structures but also their location and distribution. Likewise, the Ministry of Social Affairs, without reference to local administration, prepares plans for hospitals, clinics, social centers, and housing schemes which form definite parts of the community. And, in similar fashion, the Ministry of Communications and Public Works prepares many plans for public works such as bridges, national highways and streets, and government structures designating details not only of construction but also of alignment, orientation and location. All these specialized planning activities are carried on with little or no coordination with the Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Even in Baghdad, where better cooperation between the municipality and the various government departments might be expected, a large school building was recently completed, abutting on a busy major thoroughfare, the proximity of which was dangerous for school children. The location was approved despite objections by the Planning Office.

Financial Difficulties

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631
[LS1]
Financial difficulties have contributed to the failure of the municipalities to plan more effectively. A large part of their revenues, which are in any case small, is derived from a share in the petrol and property taxes, the proceeds of which are handed over to the central government and, in theory at least, reallotted to the provincial and municipal governments. In years of financial stringency, however, the government has withheld a large part of these taxes for itself.

For capital funds, the municipalities have to rely on occasional loans—or, in rare cases, grants—from the central govern-

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ment, which are usually forthcoming only at irregular intervals. 361 ●
The loans usually have to be amortized over a period of 10 years 631
or less, which places an onerous burden on municipal finances. The municipal authorities in a number of northern cities, which were allocated funds in the fall of 1950 and had spent a large part of them at the time of the Mission's visit, were still in doubt as to whether they had received a grant or a loan. Uncertainty as to income or capital funds inhibits advance planning. Moreover, when the authorities do receive funds, they are apt to spend them as fast as possible for fear that, if they have not actually been spent, they may otherwise be withheld. The usual way of overcoming this situation, and possibly the only way in the circumstances, has been to build new streets, which are relatively easy to plan and execute. In addition, the municipality is by law entitled to recoup part of its expenses from the owners of land that has increased in value.

The provincial authorities, who are responsible for carrying out the projects of the central government and who might be expected to cooperate more closely with the municipalities, have been faced with similar difficulties. They, too, have had hand-to-mouth experience with capital expenditures. Nearly completed buildings have sometimes been left standing for months, because funds ran out before the construction could be finished. Furthermore, the projects to be undertaken are normally prescribed by the central government. Apparently, some advance on this procedure has been made recently and the *Mutasarrif* and the Provincial Administrative Councils have been given more latitude in planning their own development.

Planning in the Future

The opportunity now exists to substitute an entirely new 361
approach to urban development for the old haphazard methods. An 185
example of how well the development of a town can proceed, given the right spirit of cooperation, is provided by the small town of Bedrah, which lies near the Iranian border in Kut province and which has a population of about 4,000. This project involves the reconstruction of the old town on a new site.

Several streets had been constructed and 24 dwelling units were ready for occupancy when the Mission was in Iraq. Thirty more units were scheduled to be finished during the year. Besides

361 185 these residential structures, there were a number of community facilities: a dispensary staffed by the Ministry of Social Affairs; a primary school building for 200 students and a secondary school building for an initial enrollment of 30 students constructed by the Ministry of Education; and a clubhouse which had been paid for by the people themselves. The municipality intended to erect a market and to install an electric generator. Residences for the *Qaimmaqam* (the administrator of the *qadha*) and the physician were also scheduled to be constructed.

Plans for the development of the new site for Bedrah were prepared by the Planning Office and followed by the local officials in the construction of the project. Work has been proceeding for several years and has been financed largely out of past savings. The whole project has, in fact, been carefully thought out and planned ahead. The initiative was due largely to the *Mutasarrif* of Kut and the success of the project to his close personal relation with the Planning Office.

361 647 This example is, unfortunately, an isolated one. In fact, the present status of the Technical Section for Planning and Organization in the Ministry of Interior does not permit comprehensive planning. It has neither the authority nor the staff to guide the planning of public works or buildings that are currently the concern of other ministries. The need for coordinated planning undoubtedly exists, but the function can only be discharged adequately if the Authority is given sufficient staff, trained not only in architecture and civil engineering, but in all the economic and sociological aspects of town planning.

General plans for the development of each municipality could then be based on facts and drawn up with a schedule of priorities, and future work should only be sanctioned if it is in conformity with these plans. Such plans should be practical and preferably designed so that they could be carried out in stages and changed and improved as conditions may demand. The new Community Planning Office should be made clearly responsible for approval of these plans or any changes in them. As a safeguard, funds for municipal development should be disbursed only for purposes which are in accordance with approved plans. This will require amendment of the present Roads and Buildings Regulations, which

are at present an amalgam of a building code and zoning regulations. These two distinct parts need to be separated and each properly administered. 361 647

While the Community Planning Office will have to take the lead in organizing the program, it is essential that it should not attempt to do all the detailed work itself. Although, in some cases, technically good plans may be prepared in this way, the result will be neither popular nor lasting and the planning authority may become a bottleneck. On the other hand, if plans are prepared independently by local authorities or by other government departments, the results will probably be uncorrelated and, therefore, unsatisfactory. The most desirable kind of planning is likely to be achieved by a combination of the two. Although plans should be initiated and later executed by the agencies immediately concerned, the central planning body should guide and coordinate them throughout the various stages. In the larger cities it could probably confine its activity to stimulating interest in the benefits of planning, advising on the preparation of plans and reviewing them at intervals in the course of preparation. In the smaller municipalities, it may have to do more of the actual work, but it should certainly endeavor to enlist as much local advice and cooperation as possible. As was noted earlier, imposition from above is undesirable.

Once plans have been drawn up, the financing of development should be placed on a more satisfactory footing. The principal source of funds for capital expenditure should be the Development Board. Whether they are in the form of loans or grants, they should be committed (although not actually credited) sufficiently far ahead for the municipalities to arrange a schedule of work with some degree of confidence. Loans should be made for a longer period and on less burdensome terms, especially as regards amortization. A careful study of a municipality's finances should be made to assess its probable ability to repay.

Slum Clearance

One of the major problems confronting the municipal authorities is the eradication of the worst slum areas of the cities. In Baghdad and Basra, this is a formidable undertaking, since the influx of people from Amara has been very large. Estimates vary 362 166

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PREFACE

000 IN Victorian days it was customary to preface a translated work with an apology for imperfections in the translation. I would say that I am not an interpreter such as those of the United Nations, who can listen to a long speech in one language and who afterwards can render it accurately and with perfect memory in another language. I am also conscious that these stories when told with a wealth of gesture and expression of face and voice were things of vivid beauty like rare butterflies, and in reducing them to paper it is as if they have been killed and pinned in a collector's cabinet.

101 These stories belong to the great Shia tribes of Southern
• 361 Iraq. I first came into contact with these tribes when,
233 coming over from the Western Desert in the winter of 1942, I halted on the road near Ur, and engaged a couple of likely-looking tribesmen to show me what local shooting there was, and to act as guides. The next day we drove far into the desert after bustard, and coming over a rise in the ground we saw before us a group of long, low, black tents; in my ignorance I turned to my two guides and asked them what the tribe of these bedouin was. Their faces registered horror and surprise, and they said: 'Those are not bedouin; they are Arabs.' Not having been previously aware of this distinction, I asked them how they told the difference between bedouin and Arab. They replied: 'We thought because you speak Arabic you

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would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361 ●
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a constant 262
current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat complicated, 173
and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

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x539 Maqdad came not. Rather he took another course, he turned and mounted Rishan, that noble horse, and he took up his great spear and he rode down on the Persian with the speed of the wind, nor could an arrow hit him, and in this manner he speared that Persian and killed him. Then he rode on to the two Persians who stood near the well and he came with such dash and speed that they had no time to draw the bow. And one of them he killed with his spear and the other fell down on the ground before him and begged mercy from him in the most abject manner. And Maqdad commanded the Persian to take off his clothes and the man did so and stood naked before Maqdad.

And Maqdad commanded and said to him: Go to your King, the Shah of the Persians, and enter his presence and salute him, and you shall be in your present naked state. And then shall you say to him: O mighty Shah, look to my condition and see my nakedness, for this shall be the condition of the land of Persia should you desist not from war with the Arabs. For when the men are slain who shall sow the fields? And the land of Persia shall become as barren and naked as I am now. And this is the message of Maqdad son of Thamir, the Arab warrior, and he is from the Fetla tribes. And Maqdad gave the Persian a horse from the six horses, and he mounted and rode off according to the order of Maqdad, nor was he wearing a single stitch of clothing.

Then Maqdad and Ibn Ali watered the horse Rishan, and they continued their journey, taking with them the five horses of the Persians, and their intention was to reach
x539 the camp of the tribes. And they rode until the sun was in
● 361 the west, then they saw the black tents. And they rode up
576 to the greatest tent of all, and it was the guest tent of the

Fetla, and they tethered the horses and entered and saluted 539x
the assembly. And seated there were the sheikhs and the 361
warriors of the tribe. They bade them be seated and they 576
brought for them coffee. And the Sheikh spoke to them and said: O strangers who have honoured us, may we know your names, and from whence you come, and from what tribe? And Maqdad replied and answered thus: My tribe is your tribe, for it was the tribe of my father Thamir son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Maqdad son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Qais son of Hamed the Lame son of Mansur the Father of the Sword. But know you I have not before entered amongst you as was fitting, nor have I fought in battle with you, as before I was of tender years, but now I am a man, and I am skilled in the art of war.

And the Sheikhs and the great men of the tribes who 539x
were there assembled said: Your name is a known name, for well we remember your father and your grandfather. And out of his great courtesy the Sheikh asked of them concerning their journey, and Maqdad related those events which are known to you, my listeners, nor did he omit any word from the account. And the Sheikh spoke and said: Concerning the magician Zoro, we had information that such a one existed, and we had searched for him, but we did not find him. You have done well to encompass his destruction, for God was with you. But as for these five Persians you say you have killed, know you that boasting is unseemly, and how could a beardless boy do this deed.

And Maqdad looked and he saw disbelief written in the faces of those there present, nor did they believe his words. So he said: Look not at my face, for it is smooth, and neither my moustache nor my beard is grown, but

x539 361 your father's house, on that day shall I introduce him to the Angel of Death. And Salma said: Only take me away with you to your tribe, that I may be safe from evil. Kadhim replied: You have seen our camps and our villages, and you have seen how the walls of the houses are of mud bricks, and the roofs are of the cloth of our tents or of straw matting. But do you know the reason for this? We of the tribes do not close both our eyes when we sleep. Perhaps the Turks will impose an unjust tax on us, or perhaps a Turkish soldier will speak to one of our women and he will die, or perhaps someone will seek refuge with us and the Turks will command us to surrender him. Then will our Sheikh cry: Sheil, and in less time than it takes to snuff a candle we are gone into the desert with our camels and horses and sheep, and all our property, even to the roofs of our houses, is loaded on our camels and is gone away. And when the Turkish troops arrive they find only the empty mud walls of our houses, which they cannot burn. And they find our crops sown in the field and they find our palm trees, and they may destroy some of them, and they try to seek us in the desert, but they cannot find us. And then we will ride against the Turks and we will destroy their caravans on the road to Basra and we will destroy their boats on the river, until the Turkish Governor cries: Do not pay the tax, or, Do x539 not surrender the fugitive. But you are used to an easier life, for you should have a house and servants of your own, and you should not have to drink the water from a camel's stomach. I will marry you, but first I mean to become a great merchant, that I may give you a house and brass cooking-pots and a servant and two anklets of silver and a bangle of gold.

Salma left Kadhim and returned to the town, and there

TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

1. The Story of Hajji Ali, the Great Sultan and his Son, the Amir Kheyyun

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
√56 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
438 rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often
acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they
have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
√78 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful
by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A Story Concerning the Ignorance of Slaves

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the
end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

NOTES

Arab time. Page 63, Line 32. 'And the time was the sixth hour of night.'

Arab time has long since been abandoned in Iraq though it continues 805 in modified forms in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. The Arab day of the week or date starts at sunset (e.g. the Arab Monday would start at sunset on our Sunday). The first twelve hours of each day of the week, that is, from sunset to twelve hours later, were known as the Hours of Night. They were followed by twelve further hours known as the Hours of Day, to complete the 24 hour cycle and to make one complete day. The sixth hour of night would thus be six hours after sunset, probably somewhere near our midnight. The Arab time system had many disadvantages, but probably for people living in the desert without watches, and therefore forced to use the sun or stars to tell them the time, it was as good a system as any. Sunset was the same for everybody and started the day, sunrise would in practice in the desert be considered to be twelve hours later and therefore the start of the first hour of day. Noon was, under the same casual reckoning, the sixth hour of day. In practice Arabs are extremely good at judging the time from noting the passage of the moon or stars, though I suppose that they will in time lose this gift through the present almost universal possession of watches.

7. The Story of Maqdad—He Was the Hero of Hilla

Hilla.

Hilla is an old Arab town situated at a crossing of the Euphrates 361 River near to the ancient site of Babylon. Al Fetla have of course no special claim to the town and I was surprised that Maqdad should be hero of Hilla rather than of one of the smaller places to which Al Fetla could lay a closer claim. I think one tends to forget that many of the smaller towns and villages were insignificant or did not exist at all until recent times. Nasiriya, for example, which the Muntafiq tribes now regard as their capital, and which is the seat of the Mutassarif of the Muntafiq Liwa, was only founded in the last century by Nasir Pasha es Saadun. Hilla must in the past have been the centre of a very much larger area than it is today. It is still one of the most important towns of South Iraq. It is well known beyond the borders of Iraq as

361 [539] being mentioned in a nursery rhyme which runs:

Cukukhti, wein ukhti?	Dove, where's my sister?
B'il Hilla.	In Hilla.
Sha takal?	What does she eat?
Bajilla.	Beans.
Wein tenam?	Where does she sleep?
Bab Illah	At God's door.

and which continues for several verses.

The mace. Page 71, Line 16. 'A mace of the finest teakwood.'

411 The mace may almost be said to be a traditional weapon in South Iraq. If you meet an Arab tribesman about his normal daily routine in the countryside, he will probably be armed with a mace and dagger. Rifles are weapons of luxury, to be kept away from dust and damp. [535] Many tribal dances are done with the mace, which is sometimes of solid wood carefully carved, and sometimes, a less beautiful weapon but more dangerous, it is made of a wooden shaft with a ball of lead or pitch at the end.

Page 74, Line 22. 'Maqdad took his course from the wind.'

821 Skilled desert guides can often recognise a wind as being from a certain quarter by its force, humidity, and temperature. The phrase here implies that the sun was clouded over and Maqdad was finding his way by the wind, which indicates that he had considerable skill. The only people who can use the wind are those who can detect quickly any change in its direction. I remember once asking some Arabs the way to a well, and they told me, Keep the wind on your left cheek. I had to use methods with which I was more familiar.

Page 81, Line 25. 'Now I shall call myself Ibn Ali.'

601 The kunya, or name defining a person by his relationship to someone else, is recorded both in classical and modern Arabic usage. Ibn Batuta, for example, a famous fourteenth century traveller, is known only by his kunya. The modern tribal practice appears to be to promote a man to a kunya when he becomes the father of a boy. A man who has become father of a boy named Qais will, for example, be hailed by his friends with exceptional heartiness for some weeks afterwards, 'Ahlan wa sahlan ya Ab Qais', and the name may or may not stick

riya), and Sulaimaniya. The capital of Iraq is Baghdad, with a population of 552,047 inhabitants, according to the census of 19 November 1947. Baghdad, which is situated on the Tigris and is the terminus and junction of all the Iraqi railways, is an active centre of trade and traffic. Other large towns are Mosul (340,541 inhabitants), Basra (206,302), Amara (183,870), Karbala (149,710), Kirkuk (148,349), Nasiriya (110,934), Ramadi (110,684), and Baquba (94,482). 361 162

B. *General features of the economy*

Agriculture

Agriculture is the main resource of Iraq's economy. According to estimates, approximately 80 per cent of the population are engaged in it. The fertile land of Iraq, which was regarded as one of the granaries of the world in the time of Herodotus and which was carefully watered by a well-planned system of irrigation until the thirteenth century of our era, has since then fallen into a state of neglect. Agriculture began to receive attention again in 1921. As droughts, dust storms and plagues of insects (especially in the Mosul region) cause serious depredations, the government supervises the condition of the country's agriculture and stock-raising and takes the necessary measures for their rational development: it has set up experimental farms, which also produce good quality seeds for the use of farmers, and is encouraging the mechanization of agriculture. 241 654 [162]

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Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

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

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AN ARAB VILLAGE ON THE LOWER EUPHRATES

facing page 112

Iraq M+1

[Marsh Arabs]

243 Bombay was. "No," he said, "here we make our bread
262 from rice flour. When the wheat crop is a failure, as in the past year, we have almost nothing else."

312 These overflow districts,^ which are marshes in the spring when the rivers overflow, dry down to hard soil later in the year. To keep the water high for a few weeks longer than it would naturally remain so, temporary dams are constructed across some of the smaller streams, leaving an opening to allow boats to pass and water to run through. These dams persist in the face
[342] of a strong current in a way that is surprising. Mud, tree branches, mats, soil and the like seem to be the only building material, for there is no stone within hundreds of
[476] miles. The dams require a large amount of labor, and of course are coöperative enterprises. Possibly because of this necessity for coöperative effort, the Marsh Arab communities appear to have developed a good degree of community spirit.

● 361 Like their race everywhere, these Marsh Arabs do not live in isolated individual houses in the midst of their fields but collect in larger or smaller towns, some of them of considerable size. These towns are located usually in the fork of a river, or where several streams come together. In Lower Mesopotamia there are many small channels that carry water either out of the main
501 river or into it. The Marsh Arabs get about in picturesque, high-prowed, black river boats, black because they are covered with a thick coat of native bitumen which wells from the ground in one or two places in Mesopo-
[135] tamia and is an indication, so the engineers tell us, that petroleum is to be found in that country. These river boats, which are the one means of transportation, are built somewhat on the lines of a canoe and take consid-

^[along the last 100 miles of the Arab river from Gurna to the Gulf -- Analyst]

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Only three cities, Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, have a total population [162]
exceeding 100,000. *Baghdad* (population 1943, 300,000) lies on the 361
Tigris at the head of navigation of the river, and in the 'waist' of the lowlands, where the Tigris and Euphrates approach closely to each other, and hence give the best possibility of constructing irrigation canals. This narrow inter-riverine zone also provides a convenient crossing-place, since the marshland is reduced in extent and the firmer platform of steppeland provides a useful east-west route between the Mediterranean and Iran. The region of Baghdad thus has an important nodal position at the junction of routes from east and west across the desert, and from north, north-east, and south along the river valleys. It should be noted that all the factors mentioned above apply to a region and not to an actual site.

It is easy to see why a town should have grown up within the district of Baghdad, but the extra smaller scale features that usually fix the site of a town in one particular spot are less in evidence. Local changes in topography due to the shifting of drainage channels have led to the growth of three separate cities at various periods, and so within the Baghdad region there has arisen first Babylon, the ancient capital that lay closer to the Euphrates, some 60 miles to the south of modern Baghdad. Babylon was in turn succeeded by Ctesiphon, only a few miles from Baghdad, and this city remained the nodal centre until superseded by Baghdad in the early Muhammadan era. Baghdad itself dates only from the 8th century A.D., and a 'golden age' occurred when its Abbasid rulers supplanted the Omeyyads of Damascus and made it the capital of the Moslem world. Baghdad suffered greatly from Mongol invasion, and most of the older buildings have disappeared. The modern city is sprawling and undistinguished—in fact, an extreme disappointment to visitors
who may wish to evoke the 'Arabian Nights'. Many of the poorer [342
houses are of mud, and flooding is a frequent feature (Fig. 65). 731]

Baghdad is the commercial centre of the region, with numerous,
but small workshops and distributing houses. Industry is, as we 361
have seen, mainly confined to bazaar crafts—textiles, metals, food- 438
stuffs—and to the production of pottery and building materials. 565
Trade is for the most part in the hands of Europeans, Jews, and 463
Armenians, with Iraqi Christians as clerks and supervisors. An upper class—mainly Sunni Moslems—carries on the administration of the country; and a third element in the life of the city is a large group of absentee landlords.

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East

Iraq m41

361 *Mosul*, like Baghdad, dates only from the early Muhammadan era, though on the opposite bank of the river Tigris the ruins of Nineveh go back to the second millennium B.C. Like many other sites in the Middle East, the fallen clay walls of the ancient city form an enormous *tell* or mound. Here, again, is an example of regional factors outweighing local influences in determining the growth of a city. The importance of the city arises from its position in the centre of the upper basin of the Tigris, at the junction of four contrasting geographical


R. Tigris
R. Diyala
Canal
BAGHDAD
Lake Habbaniya
Canal
Ctesiphon
Rail
Road
R. Euphrates
0 10 20
To Ahwaz
SHATT
MAQIL
TANUMA
ASHAR
Air Field
To Baghdad
BASRA
0 1 2 3
Miles
To Shaiba

FIG. 65. The sites of Baghdad and Basra.

regions for which it acts as commercial outlet and exchange centre. 361
These regions are :

(*a*) The plains of northern Assyria, where there is a dense agricultural population.

(*b*) The hills of Kurdistan, occupied by shepherds practising transhumance.

(*c*) The steppes of the Jezireh, where there is a mixed population of true nomads rearing sheep, cattle and draught animals ; and sedentary farmers.

(*d*) The uplands of the Jebel Sinjar, where pastoralism and agriculture are carried on by the Yezidi.

As a result, there is extreme heterogeneity of peoples within the 563
city. Arabs are in the majority, with smaller groups of Kurds, 438
Christians, Jews, and Yezidi, most of whom speak their own languages. [288]
An important mediaeval textile industry (note the word *muslin*) has now disappeared, though coarser textiles using wool as a raw material are still produced in the bazaars, and a recent feature has been the introduction of artificial silk weaving. Mosul is also important for leather working—a reflexion of its position on the edge of the steppe. Manufacturing is, however, less important than trade: grain, timber, hides, and manufactured goods are exchanged, and there are long distance communications with Baghdad and south-east Turkey. Much of the produce from Turkey comes by kelek (page 364).

Basra is an agglomeration of small sites grouped along the western 361
bank of the Shatt el Arab some 70 miles upstream from the Persian Gulf. Basra proper is situated on a small creek 2 miles distant from the Shatt el Arab, and the principal port is at Ashar, on the main river. Modern docks have also been constructed at Maqil, 4 miles upstream from Ashar, and since 1939, further development has taken place at Tanuma on the eastern bank of the Shatt el Arab, opposite Ashar. Because of the recession of the head of the Persian Gulf, the growth of the port is relatively recent, and dredging on a considerable scale is
necessary to prevent silting of the channel. Basra handles the greater 439
proportion of the foreign trade of Iraq, and is the centre of the date- 438
growing region, being itself surrounded by date-groves. Dates form 361
the chief item in its export trade. Second in importance amongst exports is grain, with wool, liquorice root, and hides as subsidiaries. Imports consist chiefly of manufactured goods (cement, cotton and woollen textiles, machinery), tea, and sugar. Basra can be reached by large ocean going ships, but about 10 per cent. of its commerce is still carried on in small native craft.

IRAQ MN1

Sephardic origin. The majority have since migrated to Israel, while probably less than 10,000 remain, subject to certain restrictions. Over 130,000 were transported to Israel by the Iraqi government in 1950-51. About 5,000 Palestinian refugees have settled in the country since the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. Small numbers of British, American and other nationalities also reside in the larger cities. 593 162

As a whole, Iraq is sparsely settled, with the population concentrated in the river valleys and in the rain-irrigated highland districts of the north. The most densely populated areas are found in the river valleys of the northern delta. In 1947, the density of population in the provinces of the upper delta region was calculated at 131 per square mile in Hilla and 104 in Baghdad. In the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk and Erbil it averaged 31 to 39 per square mile, and in Sulaimaniya, on the eastern frontier, 62 per square mile. In the south, it ranged from 75 per square mile in Basra province to 42 in Amarah, while in Dulaim, on the upper reaches of the Euphrates, it did not exceed 10 per square mile. The population is essentially rural: over three quarters of the inhabitants live in some 8,000 small villages or in semipermanent settlements. The Bedouin, representing about 5 to 8 per cent of the total population, roam the deserts with their flocks, but many migrate seasonally to the towns in search of work. There are only 7 cities with over 40,000 inhabitants. The population of Baghdad, the capital, was estimated at between 900,000 and 1 million in 1952, including over 500,000 in the metropolitan area and several hundred thousand in the surrounding suburbs. The population of Mosul, a commercial center on the upper Tigris, totaled about 150,000, and of Kirkuk, the metropolis of the oil region, almost 75,000. Basra, the chief port, located on the Shatt al Arab, had a population of 90,000 to 100,000. 361 161 369 161 [464] 369 162

In spite of considerable progress in education within the last 30 years, the majority 212 872

p. 23(A)

Simmons et al G-6 ([illegible]) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ M11

were reported in 1923, 1927 and 1931. Since 164
1931, cholera has been almost completely
absent from the country, although one im-
ported case was recorded in 1939, when the
disease was epidemic in Afghanistan and
Iran.

Strict quarantine regulations are en- 744
forced, and travelers from India, Pakistan 484
and Ceylon, as well as pilgrims from Mecca, 164
without valid certificates of immunization
against cholera are retained in quarantine
centers for a period of 7 days. Mass im- 751
munization with cholera vaccine is carried 164
on among the populations in the border
provinces whenever epidemics are reported
from the adjacent territories. At the time
of the recent epidemic in Egypt, in 1947,
immunization was compulsory for all travel-
ers entering the country and for the in-
habitants of towns and villages along the
Syrian frontier.

Helminthiases. SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schis- 164
tosomiasis, caused by *Schistosoma haema-* 136
tobium, has probably been present in the
lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins
since ancient times. It is highly endemic in
the southern and the central provinces,
where the intermediate snail host, *Bulinus*
truncatus, is found in widespread but often
localized foci. The disease is prevalent 164
among the children and among the agricul- 462
tural and other laborers who work in in-
fested waters, particularly the men and the
boys, who are exposed to infection to a
greater extent than the women. It reaches
maximum proportions between 10 and 20
years of age, but is usually negligible in
early childhood. Transmission is seasonal: 164
it takes place from May to the end of No- 515
vember, but primarily between June and
October, when infected snails are most
abundant. The insanitary customs of the
inhabitants, associated with the frequent
use of the canals for religious ablutions and
the severe summer heat which is conducive
to bathing in any convenient body of water,
are contributory factors. The infection rates 164
average 18 to 25 per cent in the irrigated 361
districts of the delta, but vary from zero

p. 37(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East

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

Distribution of Schistosomiasis in Iraq

to 80 per cent in different localities. The disease is most extensive in the southern provinces and particularly in the vicinity of the Hammar lakes and the Amarah marshes. It is absent south of Basra, however, since the salinity of the waters along the Shatt al Arab interferes with the breeding of the intermediate snail host. Foci of infection decrease in prevalence toward the north, but spread along the Euphrates to the Syrian border and, in the east, as far as the upper reaches of the Tigris and its main tributary, the Diyala. As yet the districts bordering the Great Zab and the Little Zab rivers are uninfected. The northern *liwas*, or provinces, of Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya are apparently free from the disease, but a few isolated foci exist south of the foothills in Mosul.

Surveys based upon the examination of urine specimens collected from men and boys in representative villages in 1949-50[84] suggest a mean infection rate of 67 per cent in Amarah *liwa* which, because of the predominance of marshlands, is one of the most seriously infected areas in the country. In Basra *liwa* the rate averaged 23 per cent, but ranged from 26 per cent in the city of

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361
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p. 37(B)

164 361 369 Basra to 75 per cent at Al Qurnah, in the fork between the rivers. In Muntafiq, the mean rate was 47 per cent, and in Diwaniya, 26 per cent, although some districts were heavily infected and others practically free. In central Iraq the disease was more irregular in distribution. In Baghdad *liwa* the infection rates averaged 35 per cent, but approached 80 per cent in some localities. In Kut, the mean was 48 per cent, with a decrease in prevalence toward the Iranian frontier. In Hilla, it was 15 per cent, with variations from 5 to 50 per cent, and in Kerbela, 28 per cent, with variations from 18 to 48 per cent. In the areas studied in Diyala *liwa* it ranged from 28 to 60 per cent, and in Dulaim it approximated 36 per cent. Subsequent surveys have revealed 11 to 18 per cent infection in limited foci near the marshes in Mosul *liwa*.

164 361 369 742 In a survey conducted in Baghdad in 1950-51,[57] ova of *S. haematobium* were found in 25 per cent of the urine samples collected from 285 schoolchildren and in 46 per cent of the samples from 242 inhabitants in hut settlements on the outskirts of the city. The prevalence was around 20 to 25 per cent in the suburbs, but reached 83 per cent in foci along the main road to Teheran.

164 462 Indigenous cases of *S. mansoni* infection have not been reported, but numerous cases of rectal involvement with *S. haematobium* have been observed. A dermatitis produced by nonhuman schistosome cercariae is common in the south and is often responsible for considerable disability among the agricultural workers.

164 462 312 744 Schistosomiasis constitutes one of the most important disease problems in Iraq. It is of major public health and economic significance, and the possibility of its spread with the expansion of irrigation is a matter of considerable concern to the government authorities. An active schistosomiasis control program is carried on by the Bilharzia Section of the Department of Endemic Diseases. This section maintains snail destruction and treatment units in the affected

IRAQ MN1

164 provinces, and conducts research and field
462 investigations on the distribution and the
312 control of the disease and the intermediate
744 snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from 15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually in government hospitals and dis-
164 pensaries. The disease is considered com-
758 monplace in most areas, however, and probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the infected individuals seek treatment under
743 ordinary conditions. Since 1949, special dis-
164 pensaries have been established in Baghdad, Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour the most seriously infected districts. In 1950, there were 11 mobile units for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Ancylostomiasis is
361 widespread in the irrigated areas, but the exact distribution and severity of the infection in the different provinces are not accu-
[136] rately known. *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the only species found in the foci studied. The infection rates are generally estimated at 10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces and at 40 per cent in the southern. They are especially high in the Amarah and the Al Qurnah regions, but decrease toward the south, and are relatively low in the districts
164 along the Shatt al Arab. In a study reported
742 in 1939,[48] fecal specimens from apparently healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from various parts of the country were examined for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was detected in 25 per cent of the specimens from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per cent from 135 men from the rural districts of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per cent of the individuals examined from Diyala *liwa* and from 25 per cent of the individuals from Dulaim. The degree of infection is usually mild, but serious cases with hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent are not infrequent.

164 Treatment facilities are provided by the
758 schistosomiasis control units, as well as by
742 the government hospitals and dispensaries.

p. 88(B)

[illegible] et al G-S([illegible]-1951) 1954
641 Middle East
IRAQ MN1

164 corded; in 1940-42, a peak of 2,098 cases was noted in 1941. Over 1,460 cases were treated by the medical officers in 1946 and 2,026 in 1948, with a decrease to 736 cases in 1949. In the intervening years the recorded prevalence ranged from 18 to 700 [165] cases. The fatality rates have varied in different outbreaks from 5 to 40 per cent.

751 Vaccination against smallpox is required
● 361 theoretically, but enforcement is difficult in the more remote villages, and particularly among the transitory laborers and nomadic tribes. In some sections, as in the date-growing areas, mass vaccination campaigns are carried on during the date harvest season, when people flock to the groves and the packing sheds in search of work. At the time of an epidemic, vaccination is compulsory among all the affected populations.

164 Diphtheria. Diphtheria is endemic, and localized outbreaks are observed from time to time. In the absence of Schick test surveys, however, little is known regarding the extent of infection in the general population. In the 6 years 1944-49, the recorded incidence rose from 210 cases in 1944 to 903 in 1948 and 612 in 1949—an apparent increase which is attributed by the local authorities to improved facilities for diagnosis.
751 Immunization against diphtheria is pro-
164 vided in many of the schools in the larger cities and in certain of the child health centers.

164 Meningitis. Outbreaks of meningococcus
165 meningitis are sporadic, usually occurring during the winter months. In the 12-year period 1939-50, from 112 to 489 cases were recorded each year, while the fatality rates ranged from 8 to 35 per cent.

164 Other Infections. The pneumonias are prevalent, and are major causes of death in all age groups. Outbreaks of influenza are recurrent. Measles, whooping cough, chickenpox and mumps are endemic, and often epidemic. The cases of whooping cough are typically severe, and the mortality among the undernourished children is normally high.

Occasional cases of scarlet fever are en-

p. 40(0)

IRAQ MHI

countered. The prevalence rarely exceeds 5 164 to 20 cases a year, but, in 1948, outbreaks totaling 185 cases were recorded. Rheumatic fever is one of the most important diseases of childhood, particularly in Baghdad. From 10,000 to 23,000 cases were treated annually [758] in the government hospitals and dispensaries throughout the country in 1944-49. Poliomyelitis was formerly regarded as sporadic, but cases are being recognized with increasing frequency. With improved diagnostic facilities, 70 to 100 cases have been reported annually since 1949 from the children's hospital in Baghdad.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Contact

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal 164 disease are encountered, especially in the urban communities. Syphilis predominates among the recognized cases; congenital syphilis is common. The prevalence of the disease in Baghdad and other cities is estimated locally at between 2 and 10 per cent. Chancroid and gonorrhea are widespread, but the extent of infection in the general population is not accurately known. Lymphogranuloma venereum and granuloma inguinale are relatively rare. The cases of venereal disease treated in government institutions averaged about 38,600 annually in the 6 years 1944-49. Roughly 65 per cent were diagnosed as syphilis, 26 per cent as gonorrhea and 9 per cent as chancroid. Treatment is provided by the health authorities in the various general hospitals [758] and dispensaries, as well as in 2 special venereal disease hospitals.

Bejel is widely distributed among the 164 nomadic and the seminomadic peoples in 361 the Tigris and the Euphrates valleys and 511 around the marshes and the lakes in the lower delta region. Apparently a form of syphilis transmitted by nonvenereal contact, the disease is characterized by a predominance of mucocutaneous lesions, usually with a high degree of oral and pharyngeal involvement. It is associated with primitive conditions of living, and is most extensive

p. 41(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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

Bejel in Iraq. Areas of Greatest Prevalence

in the settlements bordering the larger rivers and the marshes, where it is known locally by different names, chiefly *bejel*, *lawath* and *abou khisian*. It is believed that at least two thirds of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the maximum transmission between 2 and 5 years of age. Serious foci, in which the disease sometimes reaches epidemic proportions, exist in the southeastern provinces and along the Tigris and its tributaries in Mosul *liwa*. The districts around the Amarah marshes are probably the most severely affected, but infection rates of over 50 per cent are found in many villages in Amarah, Muntafiq, Basra and Mosul *liwas*. An important focus also persists in Dulaim *liwa*, in the vicinity of Hit and Ramadi. Surveys have shown moderately high infection rates in some villages, while in others the existence of 20 to 25 per cent of seropositive latent cases is suggestive of epidemic conditions in the recent past. The disease is present among the Bedouin tribes of the desert, but is absent among the Kurdish populations of the northeastern mountain districts. Indigenous cases are seldom seen in the towns, although a focus has been established in Baghdad,

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p. 41 (B)

IRAQ MH1

to 300 patients in residence. A comprehensive leprosy control program is planned for the near future by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization. 000 744

Other Infections. Rabies is enzootic among dogs, jackals and other animals. The jackals, the principal reservoir, often invade the villages and the outlying sections of the towns. Human infections occur sporadically: in 1944-49, the recorded cases averaged from 4 to 32 a year. In the same period, from 739 to 1,365 persons were treated annually at the Antirabic Institute in Baghdad. The majority gave a history of having been bitten by rabid dogs. The Institute also prepares rabies vaccine for distribution throughout the country. 232 164 [745]

Anthrax is prevalent among the sheep. From 130 to 225 human cases are reported annually among persons in contact with infected animals, or among individuals working with hides or wool. Tetanus is sporadic: the known incidence totals 130 to 250 cases each year. Tetanus neonatorum is common, especially in the rural areas. Cases of human glanders are seen from time to time. Leptospirosis, or Weil's disease, is occasionally encountered in the southern provinces. However, no evidence of infection with *Leptospira icterohaemorrhagiae* has yet been found among the rats captured in Baghdad.

DISEASES SPREAD BY ARTHROPODS

Malaria. Malaria is endemic or hyperendemic throughout most of Iraq. The distribution and the severity of the disease vary with the physiographic features of the different regions and the amount and the type of irrigation. It has always been regarded as a disease of primary importance in the country, but within the last few decades it has become increasingly prominent in the southern provinces due to the expansion of irrigation facilities. The cases of malaria treated in government institutions in the 7 years 1944-50 averaged about 598,800 annually. The case rates in the various provinces, based upon the at- 164 361 164

tendances in the hospitals and the dispen- 164
saries in 1950, ranged from 26 to 266 per 1,000 population. They approached, or exceeded, the mean rate of 111 per 1,000 in 6 *liwas*, being 106 in Diyala, 111 in Diwaniya, 155 in Erbil, 158 in Sulaimaniya, 205 in Hilla and 266 in Kerbela. While such statistics provide rough indices of the present prevalence of the disease, they contribute little to our knowledge of the extent of the problem.

The northeastern mountain districts and 164
the irrigated zones along the Shatt al Arab 361
and the lower Euphrates are the most highly malarious sections of the country. Differences in the average rate of endemicity, as shown by spleen surveys among children 2 to 10 years of age, are indicated on the following map,[41] in which the principal malarious regions are arbitrarily grouped according to the factors governing the transmission of the disease. Malaria is hyperendemic in the date-growing areas along the Shatt al Arab (I), which are watered by a complex system of tidal irrigation. In Basra, Fao, Al Gurnah and the chief towns, the spleen rates approximated 75 per cent in 1941, but were reduced to about 12 per cent by 1949 as the result of control operations. The rate of infection is relatively low in the marshlands of the
southern delta (II), where *Anopheles pul-* [136]
cherrimus predominates, but foci of greater prevalence exist as far north as Qalat Saleh. In Amarah and other towns, the spleen rates are estimated at about 8 per cent. In the lower Euphrates basin (III), the annual flooding of the river and the extensive system of gravity-flow irrigation from high-level canals create conditions favorable to the breeding of the vector species, *A. stephensi*. The spleen rates usually average 30 to 60 per cent, but in controlled localities, as Hilla, Kerbela, Nasiriyeh and Suq ash Shuyukh, they had declined to around 20
per cent in 1950. In the upper Euphrates [312]
valley, north of Ramadi (IV), however, irrigation is limited to small-scale projects employing pumps or more primitive meth-

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

Malaria in Iraq. Regional Endemicity[41]

[3/2] ods for lifting the water from the deep river channel, and malaria is only mildly endemic. The spleen rates in Hit, Anah, Haditha and such typical towns approximate about 4 per cent. Lift irrigation is also [3/2] employed in the middle Tigris region (V). The spleen rates are generally low, although scattered foci of endemicity exist where conditions are suitable for the breeding of *A. stephensi.* In Baghdad and other towns the spleen rates are normally about 3 per cent, but epidemics sometimes result when other species invade the agricultural areas from neighboring foci to the north. An outbreak in which *A. sacharovi* was implicated was reported in 1946-47 in the vicinity of Baghdad. A sharp outbreak also occurred in 1947 in a district north of the city, when the infection was transmitted by *A. superpictus.* Malaria is endemic, as well as epidemic, in the gravity-irrigated zones of the lower Diyala basin (VI), but a low level of infection prevails in the districts near the junction of this river with the Tigris. Spleen rates of 20 to 50 per cent are found throughout much of the area, approaching nearer 90 per cent in uncontrolled villages around Baqubeh.

p. 44(A)

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The disease is endemic along the Tigris, the Khazir, the Great Zab and the Little Zab rivers in northern Iraq, but the surrounding steppelands (VII) are relatively free. The infection was formerly widespread along the eastern edges of this zone. However, a marked reduction in prevalence has been noted within recent years around Erbil and Kirkuk, due probably to the fuller utilization of the mountain streams for irrigation purposes. In 1946, spleen rates of about 38 per cent were recorded in typical riverside communities, as Eski Mosul, Mosul, Kellek and Quwair, but in Kirkuk and other towns distant from the main rivers they averaged only 9 per cent. Since that date, control measures have been carried on in Mosul, and in 1950 the spleen rate was estimated at 5 per cent. The foothill regions along the Iranian border in Kut *liwa* (VIII) and in the northeastern provinces (IX) are highly malarious, or subject to occasional sharp epidemics. *A. superpictus* is the only vector in the southern foci, but *A. superpictus*, *A. sacharovi* and, possibly, *A. claviger* are responsible for the transmission of the infection in the north. The spleen rates in uncontrolled communities in Sulaimaniya *liwa* and in the eastern portions of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk and Diyala range from 20 to 100 per cent. In the valleys of the Kurdish mountains along the Iranian and the Turkish frontiers (X), *A. sacharovi* is replaced by *A. maculipennis maculipennis* at the higher elevations. Spleen rates of 25 to 90 per cent are found in different localities.

On the alluvial plains, malaria transmission takes place from March to November, with two peak periods, the more important from May to August and the second in October and November. In the extreme south some transmission continues throughout the year. The season is shorter and more continuous in the northern provinces, and normally extends from May to October, with the maximum infection rates in July and August. Further study is required for an appraisal of the relative prevalence and

p. 44(B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

seasonal distribution of the different species 361
of malarial parasites. *Plasmodium falciparum* 164
appears to predominate in most localities with a moderate to high rate of endemicity, as well as during epidemics in all parts of the country. *P. vivax* is also widespread. It is often observed in the blood of infected individuals, even in hyperendemic areas, during the nontransmission season, and the local authorities state that it is unusually difficult to eradicate certain strains in the course of treatment. *P. malariae* is reported more or less sporadically. In certain areas in northern Iraq, it is being encountered with increasing frequency, and some evidence exists that it may be found to take the place of *P. vivax* as the principal species concerned with
clinical relapses. Among the 2,865 to 4,281 758
cases of malaria treated annually in the 164
hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq 186
Petroleum Company in 1946 through 1950, from 8 to 53 per cent were identified as *P. vivax* infections, from 0.7 to 7 per cent as *P. falciparum* and up to 8 per cent as *P. malariae*. The remainder were diagnosed on a clinical basis. *P. ovale* was reported recently, but the origin of the infection was obscure. Blackwater fever is rare, although cases are sometimes seen in Basra and in the northern highlands.

Malaria control measures have been car- 744
ried on in limited areas under the auspices 164
of governmental or other agencies. The Department of Endemic Diseases of the Ministry of Health conducts anopheline control and treatment programs in highly endemic areas throughout the country through subordinate units in central, southern and northern Iraq. A rural health and malaria control project was initiated in the hyperendemic Tanjero valley in Sulaimaniya *liwa* in 1952, in co-operation with the World Health Organization.

Rickettsial Infections. Outbreaks of 136
louse-borne typhus recur almost annually, 164
but are seldom extensive, except under abnormal conditions, as during war periods.
The infection is frequently introduced by 800

p. 45(A)

IRAQ MH1

only 1 case, in which the diagnosis was confirmed by laboratory examination, had been recorded. Potential sandfly vectors of kala-azar are apparently absent in the southern and the central provinces, but they may exist in the northern highlands. 164 369

Other Infections. Sandfly fever is endemic, and, in the delta region, reaches epidemic proportions every few years. From 842 to 4,688 cases were recorded annually in 1944-49. The sandfly vector, *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is widely distributed. The season of transmission usually extends from May to November, with a peak in June or July. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the south. 164

Cases of elephantiasis of undetermined origin are occasionally encountered, but *Wuchereria bancrofti* is not known to be present. Guinea worm infections are sometimes seen in pilgrims from southern Iran, but no indigenous cases have been recorded. [484]

NUTRITIONAL DISEASES

Undernutrition, anemia and avitaminosis are prevalent, especially among the wage-earning classes in the cities and the impoverished peasants of the south. Clinical manifestations of vitamin A and vitamin C deficiencies are widespread. In general, serious nutritional diseases tend to be more or less localized in distribution, depending upon the dietary habits and the standards of living of the people. Rickets is common, and from 100 to 2,387 cases were treated annually in the government institutions in 1944-49. Cases of scurvy and of osteomalacia are numerous. Beriberi and pellagra are sporadic, but minor symptoms of riboflavin deficiency are frequently observed. Protein edema is rare. A form of cirrhosis of the liver is encountered in which malnutrition is believed by some authorities to be a contributory factor. 146 511 361

MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS

Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and large-scale epidemics are reported occasionally. Encephalitis lethargica is sporadic. 164

p. 41 (A)

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial
operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors.
Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation,
in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equipment, 331
the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both 619 178
economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 511

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361
the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change,
if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it
was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless,
and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same
goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet
in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and
unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public
State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the
sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved
approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole
areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and
modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman
Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been
forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363
labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well
maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible.
Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362 ●
or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor
and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building
was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers,
the development of town amenities, and the need for
outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365
service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—
supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been,
imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere
abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the
ancient '*arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363
Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and
Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366
shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide
buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered
a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well
established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown
in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368
services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified
themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365
power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

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[1] The mausoleum of King Fayṣal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Basra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

511 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the modernization
and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle
362 classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes
than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise
above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private
life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their
domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of
interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two
177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance
and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more
generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much
ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now
582 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women
learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law,
followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work,
and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the
franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded
were still considerable, and included the households of many
leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families,
by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western
type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop
[265] kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within
the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and
business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include
575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class professional
526 clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various
branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

372 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General
645 Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The
Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound
in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education
was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age
of admission to the primary school should not be less than six
and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that
'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out
in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when
[581] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this
Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

371 By this time the administration of education had been highly
systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of
645 Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration
is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of
Education controlling and supervising the most minute details
both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education
himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in
other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed
by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the
fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education
who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is
in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

372 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was
made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does
658 not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out
of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age,
not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940
an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education
provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the
declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed
in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty
[464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with
the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of
the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the
●[362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where
housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is
also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other
[696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the
legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

000 875 362 will be necessary to consider improved arrangements for the housing of teachers, especially in the rural areas. Because of the limited housing facilities in many of the villages, the majority of the teachers in the rural areas live under most unsatisfactory domestic conditions. Some live in the staff-rooms or school store. Others dwell in improvized buildings which are inadequate both for their personal needs and the status they should occupy in local society. It is because of circumstances of this kind that some of the teachers who work in the villages feel that they are undertaking penance, from which they will only escape when they can secure transfer to a town.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF PRIMARY SCHOOLING

871 875 *The Corporate Life of the Primary School.* Apart from some of the more established town schools where staffs have served in the same school for a number of years, many of the schools seem to lack that corporate life which is essential to the success of any school community. This is partly due to the fact that, because of unsatisfactory living conditions outside the larger centres of population, many teachers stay in the rural schools for only very short periods. They hardly get to know their pupils as individuals and do not stay long enough to assimilate the life of the surrounding community or to influence it. These conditions, when remedied by the provision of teachers' houses, possibly accompanied by 'rural teachers' allowances', will do much to improve the quality of the school as a community.

871 *Greater Freedom for Teachers.* As the teaching profession becomes better trained and housed, it is to be expected that they will be allowed greater freedom in the preparation of their own programmes of study and activity. Complaints are frequently made that, because the existing programmes of study are centrally prepared and prescribed, they restrict the freedom of the teachers. This is only partly true because, although the primary school programme is overloaded and does not provide for sufficient differentiation either as between urban and rural schools or as between the sexes, it is not perhaps so illiberal in conception as some of those who interpret it.

Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the time will come when, with a better qualified primary school teaching cadre, it will be possible for the Ministry of Education to abandon centrally prescribed syllabuses in favour of something in the way of 'A
000 Programme of Suggestions for Teachers'. If such a programme

that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also 744
be important to provide both the provincial and district medical 647
officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather 361
haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great 166
congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find
opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have [362]
simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually
difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities. [364]

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. 362
They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly con- 342
structed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

362 however, they are poorly built and too small; and they are crowded
342 together on sites and under conditions which breed disease.

Need for Community Planning

361 In recent decades there has been a growing awareness of the need for community planning, better housing and community facilities. With respect to villages, little has as yet been done except for the planned development of the Dujaila project. Here some effort was made to have houses erected according to standard specifications and to depart from the village-type of settlement by requiring that houses be erected in groups of four on the adjoining corners of four land allotments. As an aid to town and city planning there has been created within the Department of Municipalities of the Ministry of Interior a small planning section to provide "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles". The municipalities themselves have been charged with "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specifications of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places and buildings in such areas". The final responsibility for planning has, however, remained unclear. The surveys, plans and partial plans have generally been hastily drawn and with little regard for the actual conditions prevailing in the community. In any event, municipalities have for the most part continued to develop without reference to any plans. In many towns new streets have been arbitrarily cut through residential and commercial districts with little concern for real needs or for the people affected. The various ministries concerned with the erection of schools, hospitals, public buildings and bridges generally locate their projects without reference to an overall plan and without consultation with each other.

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647 There is today a real need for integrated community planning. The Mission believes that it would be desirable to work towards the establishment of a genuine Community Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Such an office should ultimately be staffed with an adequate number of experts versed in architecture, engineering and other aspects of town planning. The first step might be to strengthen the existing planning section in the Department of

Municipalities by appointing a capable, experienced town planner 361 as director and giving him authority to build up a trained staff 647 gradually. It could serve both the Development Board and local authorities in coordinating development projects on the community level and in ascertaining whether the projects for schools, hospitals, and similar facilities in any given community are properly related to the needs and facilties of neighboring communities.

Housing Developments

Public and quasi-public housing has received increased attention in recent years. 362 The Ministry of Social Affairs, which is authorized to construct houses for workers, has built 204 units and has 185 units under construction. The low rentals on completed units constitute a definite subsidy to the occupants. The city of Basra is now building 750 low-cost houses in accordance with a plan that unfortunately was hastily and inexpertly prepared. Probably the best municipal housing project is near the old city of Bedra in Kut province where a new town site is being developed. The Railway Administration has provided housing for more than 2,400 of its employees, and the Port of Basra is also building accommodations, primarily for its junior officials.

Laws which require the construction of houses by industrial firms and large landowners have remained unenforced. Industrial housing is still little developed. The outstanding project of this kind is at Kirkuk where the Iraq Petroleum Company has been building a large housing development, consisting of 1,028 units, for its skilled artisans and officials. The cost of this project is such, however, that it is unlikely to be widely copied.

Most of the public and quasi-public housing is open to criticism on several counts. Use of poor materials, improper spacing and orientation, poor planning and site engineering have characterized some of these projects. The few public housing projects undertaken have been launched without adequate attention to the problem of how much rent the potential occupants could pay.

Establishment of a Housing Authority

In the light of these considerations, the Mission suggests that 362 647 the responsibility for planning and supervising housing be entrusted ultimately to a Housing Authority located in the Ministry of Social

2: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

362 647 Affairs and staffed by men trained in house design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, public health, housing and land economics, and project management. Initially a nucleus for such an Authority might be created by strengthening the existing housing section of the Department of Labor. At present the section is staffed only by one part-time architect with one part-time assistant, a superintendent, and a few clerks and accountants. The Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid. Maintenance and repairs could thus be financed without constant resort to the Treasury.

[816] The Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Industrial Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station would conduct research designed to develop improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing. In particular, it would experiment with the most economical and effective combination of locally available materials and try them in actual housing units. It would test, for example, such possibilities as the utilization of date-palm fronds for the manufacture of pressed boards, of rice husk and asphalt mixed and pressed into blocks or bricks for interior partitions, and of reed mats and bitumen to form waterproof sheets for roofing materials.

362 How much public housing should be undertaken is difficult to determine in the absence of sample surveys to ascertain the needs of different parts of the population, particularly in the light of what they can afford to pay for housing. Housing will, of course, automatically improve as the productivity and the incomes of the people rise, but this does not mean that some portion of the revenue from increased production of oil should not be used to provide housing for those in urgent need. Pending a more thorough study, an amount of about ID 400,000 annually might be taken as a provisional target for expenditures. Presumably public housing should cater primarily to the needs of low-paid employees and industrial workers. While a large public housing program is not a matter of high priority at present, it is vitally important that adequate accom-

modations be built for government officials in the provinces in 362 order to make living conditions attractive enough for capable men.

Self-help in Housing

Any housing program under present conditions should lay primary stress on the encouragement of self-help measures. The great majority of the *sarifa* dwellers, for example, could probably not afford to live in houses built by the state unless really large subsidies were provided, which the Mission does not recommend. These people can best be assisted by setting aside suitable tracts of land for their resettlement and encouraging them to build their own houses of mud and other readily available materials in accordance with models provided by the government. To insure proper siting of structures the government might assist in staking out the foundations and in providing some of the needed materials such as cement for stabilizing the mud floor. As an incentive toward completion, it might also furnish one of the final elements of the self-built house such as the roof or roof timbers or window frames. A project of this kind is particularly needed for the *sarifa* dwellers of Baghdad. The site of such a project should be well-drained, provided with safe water, sanitary facilities, a school, market and health center and located not too far from places of employment. The government actually started a project of this type but it was unfortunately abandoned.

Similar self-help measures are contemplated in connection with 361 the new land settlement schemes. Here the government has a unique opportunity for new forms of community planning. The Mission has for this purpose developed a suggested pattern which seeks to combine most effectively the features to be desired in such a community. Details of this are set forth in the monograph on community planning. Self-help measures can, of course, also be stimulated in existing villages and small towns, particularly in the direction of constructing public latrines and baths, erecting needed community centers and planting shade trees.

Another means of assisting self-help would be the provision 452 of an adequate system of mortgage credit. Private building has always been handicapped by the lack of credit available on reasonable terms. At the end of 1950 the total mortgages outstanding

are at present an amalgam of a building code and zoning regulations. These two distinct parts need to be separated and each properly administered. 361 647

While the Community Planning Office will have to take the lead in organizing the program, it is essential that it should not attempt to do all the detailed work itself. Although, in some cases, technically good plans may be prepared in this way, the result will be neither popular nor lasting and the planning authority may become a bottleneck. On the other hand, if plans are prepared independently by local authorities or by other government departments, the results will probably be uncorrelated and, therefore, unsatisfactory. The most desirable kind of planning is likely to be achieved by a combination of the two. Although plans should be initiated and later executed by the agencies immediately concerned, the central planning body should guide and coordinate them throughout the various stages. In the larger cities it could probably confine its activity to stimulating interest in the benefits of planning, advising on the preparation of plans and reviewing them at intervals in the course of preparation. In the smaller municipalities, it may have to do more of the actual work, but it should certainly endeavor to enlist as much local advice and cooperation as possible. As was noted earlier, imposition from above is undesirable.

Once plans have been drawn up, the financing of development should be placed on a more satisfactory footing. The principal source of funds for capital expenditure should be the Development Board. Whether they are in the form of loans or grants, they should be committed (although not actually credited) sufficiently far ahead for the municipalities to arrange a schedule of work with some degree of confidence. Loans should be made for a longer period and on less burdensome terms, especially as regards amortization. A careful study of a municipality's finances should be made to assess its probable ability to repay.

Slum Clearance

One of the major problems confronting the municipal authorities is the eradication of the worst slum areas of the cities. In Baghdad and Basra, this is a formidable undertaking, since the influx of people from Amara has been very large. Estimates vary 362 166

362 166 widely but probably at least 60,000 have migrated to Baghdad and 20,000 to Basra. Amara province is the heart of the rice-growing marshland, where the water buffalo is the prevailing livestock. The immigrants have naturally tended to recreate the conditions of life to which they are accustomed and which will enable them to raise buffalo. An area just outside the eastern bund of Baghdad has been settled by these people and converted to their normal mode of life. A series of stagnant pools for the cattle is interlaced with narrow paths just above the water-level and surrounded by a disorderly array of makeshift huts, called *sarifas*. Being outside the bund, the area is subject to spring floods in years of high water. In Basra the immigrants have settled along the banks of the existing canals. Conditions there are nearly as bad as in Baghdad.

It is clear that the process of migration and the creation of such slums can only be halted by eradicating the cause, namely, the harsh conditions of life in Amara and other places from which the migrants come. Meanwhile efforts will have to be made to resettle those who have already come, since, apart from the plight of the people themselves, these slums are a menace to the health of the entire population of the cities.

362 The few measures so far taken to resettle the sarifa dwellers have not been successful. In Baghdad the Ministry of Social Affairs made a plan for 8,000 mud huts at Shamiya which is about 12 kilometers from Baghdad. Several sample huts of defective construction were erected at the site at a cost of ID 35 each. This plan contemplated the housing of approximately 30,000 people from the sarifa district by giving each family 120 square meters of land apiece on which they were to build their own houses according to the samples already constructed. [342] Each hut would have had a covered floor area of 43 square meters consisting of two rooms, a hall and a water closet. The main pipelines for a fresh water supply had been provided and a clinic set up for the use of future residents. The plan, however, was later abandoned on the grounds that the site was too far from Baghdad where most of the prospective residents are employed.

Experience in Basra has been little better. There, the initiative came from the Municipality, which now has under construc-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

tion 750 dwelling units on a site five kilometers from the city. 362 This and three other city development projects were financed by a 10-year bank loan, guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. The original resettlement plans were, however, hastily and incompetently prepared; they were submitted to the Ministry of Interior only a few days before the foundations were laid. Subsequently they were found by the contractor to be so defective that an advisory committee of experienced engineers had to be appointed to review them. The committee recommended many changes in the layout and site engineering of the project, in the design of the houses and in the specifications of materials. Some of the changes, including the installation of an adequate sewage and drainage system, had to be made after construction was well under way.

Ultimately the cost of two-room houses is expected to be about ID 250 and of three-room houses, about ID 300. It is unlikely that the sarifa dwellers can afford to purchase these houses by installment as originally intended. The Municipality now has in mind to build 1,000 mud-and-mat huts at a cost of ID 40 each for sale to the sarifa dwellers.

Other cities besides Baghdad and Basra have their slum problems, though not necessarily of the same kind. For example, all but the most modern part of Erbil is situated on a high mound, rising almost sheer from the surrounding plain. On this mound, which is probably on the site of a city continuously occupied for several thousand years, the houses are packed together with only narrow alleys between them. Waste water runs down the middle of the alleys. The incidence of tuberculosis is said to be high. Less extensive examples of these so-called ancient "citadels" can be found elsewhere, for example, in Kirkuk and at Nabi Yunus near Mosul.

The problem of resettling large numbers of slum dwellers [166] varies, in kind and in degree, from city to city, but it should in essence be treated as a national problem. It is too important to be subjected to the kind of expediency and faulty technical planning with which it has so far been approached. The job is one for the new Housing Authority, although the municipalities will clearly have to play their part.

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362 With more realistic planning, the mistakes previously made could be avoided. Preliminary investigation of the incomes and occupations of prospective occupiers of a resettlement project should be made in order to suit the site development and the cost of the buildings to the needs and incomes of the people. Sites should be well drained and within easy access to places of work. Depressed areas where water is liable to collect into stagnant pools should be avoided. If the only available site is still deficient from the point of view of drainage, then the ground should be improved by grading and filling before any hut is constructed. Too often in the past, the availability of government-owned land has been the governing factor in the choice of site without regard to the availability of places of employment, community facilities and public services.

Plans should be worked out for the construction of integrated neighborhoods with facilities such as safe water, sanitation, school, playground, market and health center. Their construction should be programmed over a number of years. The dwellings would have to be very simple, if the state is not to make large subsidies, which the Mission does not recommend. Instead, the same principles of aided self-help might be employed as in the villages. For example, simple but liveable mud-and-mat huts could be designed in such a way and with sufficient lot area so that their occupants could improve and extend them as they earn more income or as their families grow bigger. To improve the durability and strength of the walls, the mud of which they are made should be stabilized with materials like cement or reinforced with reeds or grass. To insure proper siting of structures, the government might stake out the foundations and help furnish some of the needed materials such as cement for stabilizing the earth floor. As an incentive toward completion, the government might also furnish one of the final elements of the self-built house, such as the roof. If representatives of the prospective occupants could be interested and consulted at an early stage and if places of employment were taken into consideration at the same time, the projects would stand a much better chance of success, for they would be not only better places in which to live but also better places in which to make a living.

IV. Housing

Although the resettlement of slum dwellers and the improvement of living conditions in the villages constitute by far the largest housing needs of the country, the provision of adequate housing on reasonable terms to workers on a somewhat higher income level is also important. Efforts in this direction have been started by the central and municipal governments, by the two quasi-public transport organizations and by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Private entrepreneurs have found it profitable to concentrate largely on construction for the well-to-do. Some of the projects have good features, particularly that carried out by the IPC. Generally, however, defects are such that there is clearly much that a Housing Authority could accomplish. 362

The Need for a Housing Authority

The need for a Housing Authority is twofold. First, it is required to take the initiative in providing suitable housing for the lowest economic strata of the population, such as the Baghdad sarifa dwellers. This is a special kind of problem, which cannot be expected to be undertaken by other agencies. Secondly, it is required as a general, policy-making, coordinating and advisory agency. In this there is no suggestion that it should try to undertake housing for the whole country. On the contrary, initiative from municipalities, quasi-government agencies and private concerns should be welcomed. The function of the Authority should be to give technical, legal and financial assistance where it is required; to prescribe certain minimum standards; and to act on its own initiative only in cases where there seems to be both an urgent need and no alternative. 362 647

It will be necessary for the Authority to initiate a systematic survey in order to assemble all the necessary data for the formulation of a national housing program. Census data will be helpful, but probably additional assistance will be required from the statistics department of the Ministry of Economics in devising sampling techniques in order to determine the requirements. These would be especially useful in resettlement projects for sarifa dwellers.

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647 Due to the nature and magnitude of the work involved, the Housing Authority should be firmly established in the Ministry of Social Affairs and provided with powers commensurate with its responsibilities so that it may perform its functions effectively. It should ultimately have a staff composed of technical men trained in housing design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, law and project management. As in the Community Planning Office, they should also have some knowledge of the sociological and economic aspects.

On the financial side, the Housing Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid so that maintenance and repairs could be financed without constant resort to the Treasury. Pending a housing survey the amounts set aside for housing in the five-year program of the Development Board, namely ID 300,000 annually, might be increased to ID 400,000 as a provisional target for housing expenditures.

[816] On the technical side, the Housing Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station should test, develop and demonstrate improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing; collect and disseminate technical housing and building information; experiment with and develop new uses of local building materials, construction methods and house designs; and carry on other useful research in the housing field. The Station should be staffed as far as possible with local technicians, but for the first year or so one or two building research experts from abroad should be engaged to start and run the Station and train the local technicians in order to enable them to operate the Station themselves after a time. A new building should be constructed for the Station and equipped with the basic instruments and machines necessary for starting tests and experiments. It will clearly be necessary for the Authority to work closely with the Station and to insure that the broad outlines of its work conform with the need of the country.

Labor and Materials

The Housing Authority could also take the lead in improving 362 the quality of labor and materials in order to bring the costs of 647 building down. In this task, it should cooperate with the Ministry of Education in reorganizing training methods. It could also advise the Industrial Bank on desirable types of specifications of building materials and should estimate probable requirements so that the Bank could initiate investment to this end in partnership with private enterprise.

The materials produced locally for housing construction are 339 on the whole inferior and expensive. For example, a casual inspection of house construction in the cities will reveal that unevenly burnt bricks with cracks and chipped-off edges and corners have been and are being used. To remedy the shortage of good building materials, foreign goods have been imported at high cost. In the case of the IPC housing project, it was estimated that the cost of imported steel window and door sashes alone amounted to as much as 20 percent of the cost of the structures.

The inferiority of building materials is matched by the poor 331 quality of building labor, which again adds to the cost of construction. 464 There is urgent need for good carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians and painters. Unfortunately, attempts to improve skills through vocational schools have not been altogether successful. The schools lack competent instructors, a number of those teaching in Baghdad, for example, being illiterate. Workshop accommodations are restricted and the equipment is out-of-date or in bad condition. These deficiencies might be overcome by importing instructors from neighboring countries, by obtaining new equipment and by running evening classes until more laboratory space is available. This is not, however, the full answer. Graduates from vocational [461] schools tend to prefer desk jobs to field work. It would be preferable to concentrate more on training schemes on the job under good supervision.

Government Housing

The Ministry of Social Affairs is empowered by Law No. 38 362 of 1941 and Law No. 22 of 1945 to "construct dwellings for

362 laborers at government expense" which may be sold or leased to them in accordance with special regulations.

[152] Housing projects have been financed by allocation from the capital works budget prepared every year. The unspent balance from this allocation reverts to the general treasury. Likewise the rents paid by tenants and the fees collected for maintenance, sanitary services, water and electricity find they way back to the general treasury. The 1950-51 budget provides ID 75,000 for housing. The five-year program of the Development Board envisages an increase to ID 150,000 in 1951-52 and to ID 300,000 in each of the four succeeding years.

The Ministry's principal project is at Tel Mohamed, about seven kilometers from Baghdad, where 204 brick dwelling units had been constructed by the Ministry of Public Works in 1946 and a further 185 are now under construction. Twenty shops are also being built. Most of the houses have a bedroom, a living room, a kitchen, a water closet and one or two verandas, but 50 of the newer ones will have two bedrooms. Floor area ranges from 49 to 71 square meters and the cost from ID 268 to ID 323, excluding the cost of development and of land which is government-owned. Lots were 150 square meters for the older houses, but the newer ones are smaller.

Rentals for the first dwelling units in the Tel Mohamed Project used to be ID 2.0 a month, but this was reduced later to ID 1.5. The government supplied water and electricity at an additional charge of 500 fils a month. Based on the actual cost of construction of each unit (ID 305) a generous estimate of 20 years for the life of the structures, interest on capital investment at the rate of six percent per annum and a nominal sum of ID 10 annually for maintenance of grounds plus repairs and land rental, the economic rent for each such unit would be ID 3.0 a month—that is, if no vacancy and unforeseen circumstances occurred to reduce the income from the project. In other words, the government has to make a subsidy equal to the present rental of ID 1.5 per month, if it hopes to replace these houses at the end of their estimated life.

In addition to these units in Baghdad, the Ministry requested bids for 40 one- and two-bedroom units in Basra which it rejected because the prices were too high, mainly because bricks made in

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

the vicinity of Basra were not up to specifications and the additional cost of haulage from Baghdad had to be borne.

Municipalities, which come under the Ministry of Interior, carry out projects such as those at Bedra and Basra. For various reasons, principally lack of finance, there have been few such projects. Other ministries occasionally provide houses for their officials who are stationed in the provinces, but, on the whole, the standard of housing for these officials is deplorably low. The incentive to obtain jobs in Baghdad is already considerable. The government needs able officials who will work willingly in the field and who will have a standing in their community. A decent house is certainly one of the prerequisites to attract such men.

Housing by Transport and Industrial Enterprises

The Port of Basra, which has over 5,000 employees, is at present completing the construction of 50 dwelling units for junior employees and is contemplating further building. Although there are plans for smaller houses of 45 square meters to cost about ID 300, most of these houses, which are of brick, concrete and steel, are much larger and have such additional facilities as a bath, storeroom and veranda leading to the roof. Their cost is, accordingly, high, ranging from ID 1,500 to ID 2,000, but they are let at a nominal rent.

Although the buildings were well designed and the materials used were of good quality, the site planning was not thoroughly studied. Too many structures were crowded in a limited area in spite of the fact that the Port has plenty of available land at its disposal. The yard spaces between the buildings and the high brick fences separating the units are hardly six feet wide. Buildings having different orientations have identical plans.

In 1926 the Iraqi State Railways started a program for the replacement of temporary buildings built after World War I. It is estimated that about 60 percent of the needed permanent quarters for artisans and laborers in stations other than those in Baghdad and Magil (Basra) have already been provided. Suitable quarters at Baghdad and Magil have been provided only for those members of the staff who are required, for operational reasons, to live in close proximity to the work.

362 The quarters which have so far been provided for laborers and artisans of the Iraqi State Railways are: 283 units consisting of two-room quarters, 2,090 units of one room and 60 units of sarifas.

Shortly after World War II, the Iraq Petroleum Company embarked on a large housing project in order to provide accommodation for its entire staff of artisans and their families. This was done because the increase in its activities and employees had caused a strong pressure on the available housing in Kirkuk. When rents became exorbitant, the company give its employees a rental allowance, but this failed in its purpose as rents rose by a corresponding amount almost immediately. The project has already succeeded in lowering rents in the town, the artisans' families who have moved in having released space in the town for laborers' housing. It is not proposed to extend the project to laborers' housing, first because of the shortage of materials and secondly because of the generally transient nature of the unskilled labor force.

The present housing project under construction in the Arrapha Ridge Area near Kirkuk will be finished in five to six years and will eventually consist of 1,028 houses. Of this number, 284 have been completed and accommodate about 1,485 people. At present [342] there are 58 more under construction. There are three basic types of houses: the one-bedroom, the two-bedroom and the three-bedroom semi-detached and attached units. Except for relative sizes and the number of bedrooms, the various types of houses have the same number of rooms: a living room, a kitchen, a storeroom, a bath, a water closet, a veranda and an enclosed courtyard. Stairs lead up to the flat roofs. The houses are surrounded by gardens.

The houses have walls made of bricks and stones with portland cement mortar, floors and ceilings of concrete, and window and door sashes of steel and glass. They are provided with both cold and hot water and with electricity. Each one-bedroom unit costs about ID 1,400 to build including utilities, and rents for ID 3.6 per month plus a service charge for water, power, etc., of ID 1.2. The biggest or three-bedroom unit costs about ID 3,000 and rents for ID 7.5 per month plus a service charge of ID 2.1.

The housing project has been planned on the neighborhood unit scheme—there being two units with schools, open spaces, stores and clinics. In addition the entire project will ultimately

have a mosque, a church, a post office, a cinema, a restaurant, a 362 police station and an institute equipped with reading rooms and a debating chamber. Streets and alleys are laid out to conform to the ground contours and paved with asphalt macadam. The streets are lighted and have recently been planted with trees. The project is much in advance of anything else that has so far been undertaken in Iraq, but its cost and the large element of subsidy involved make it impossible of general emulation.

The Iraq Petroleum Company is the only large private industrial concern which has provided substantial housing facilities for its employees, although in 1943 a law was approved compelling industrial project owners to construct houses for their laborers. This law has apparently been ineffective. Although there is much to be said for placing responsibility on industry for housing in out-of-the-way places, the Mission is of the opinion that, in general, provision of housing is an inappropriate burden on industry. [466]

Private Housing; Mortgage Credit

The most spectacular ventures in private housing in recent years were two grandiose developments in Baghdad for the well-to-do. Both of there were financial failures.

Private housing of a more modest character for the middle classes, who cannot afford large outlays, requires assistance in the form of mortgage credit. In the main report, the Mission has recommended that the facilities offered by the Government Mortgage Bank be augmented. Instead of the original capital of ID 100,000, capital resources of ID 1,500,000 are suggested. The duration of loans, which is now limited to four years, should be increased to 15 years where it is considered desirable. [452]

V. Public Utilities

As indicated earlier, considerable progress has been made in 365 providing the larger towns with water and electricity, but sewage systems have been wholly neglected. The Ministry of Interior is, with a few major exceptions, responsible for the planning, installation and general supervision of these public utilities. The actual

services. "The disease has been recognized", he said, "what was required was that 657
medicine for the prescription should be supplied and the patient taught how to take
that medicine". The same Minister informed us that he himself, as a young man called 185
upon to draft a new educational programme, had included in it the provision of
community centres, but that unfortunately this feature of the scheme had not
materialized.

45. Community welfare organization on a self-help basis in Iraq is, indeed, as yet in its infancy. Some observers consider that an indispensable preliminary to its development is to create in the minds of a people long under the influence and domination of a feudal tribal system an effective desire for self-government.

46. As is generally known, Iraq is rich in oil resources and it is the policy of the 651
Government to transfer mineral wealth into productive capital for the general
welfare. A statutory Development Board was established in 1950 to ensure continuity 382
of economic policy, regardless of political changes. Seventy per cent of the income 185
from oil revenues is allocated to the Board as revenue for projects of water
conservation, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, etc. The Board 471
is also responsible for co-ordinating the development schemes in these fields
initiated by the various ministerial Departments. Over 200 foreign technicians are
listed as working in Iraq in formulating a variety of development schemes, mostly
relating to economic improvements. Some of the experts are in the direct employ of
the Iraq Government: others have been assigned to the Government for short periods
for specific purposes by agencies and organizations furnishing technical assistance
on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Relatively few technicians have so far been
concerned with social developments, but the country's needs in this respect have, we
understand, been partially surveyed.

47. In the absence of detailed documentation, we left it to the Government agencies 800
most directly concerned with the subject of our mission to determine whom we should
see and to suggest which projects or institutions we should visit.

48. During our short stay in Baghdad we were able to visit at Tal Mohamed a well- 657
constructed modern building designed to serve as a centre for community activities 185
for the residents of a model housing estate constructed by the Ministry of Social
Affairs for low-income government employees. Cheap transport facilities were 362
available between Baghdad and the new estate, in which some 500 houses were already
in occupation and more would be constructed as funds became available. The imposing
building in which it is intended that community activities shall be carried out has
been ready for use for more than a year but only some of the equipment and furniture
(including seven beds for maternity cases) have been installed. A difficulty in
finding suitable qualified staff has delayed the opening of the centre. When it is
in full working order it is planned to offer nursing, educational and indoor and
outdoor recreational facilities on modern lines. The general appearance of the
centre and model village was marred by the state of the roads after heavy rains.

49. It is understood that centres similar to that at Tal Mohamed are planned for other urban areas. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which until recently formed part of the Ministry of Health, has also other plans under consideration for creating, with external technical assistance, pilot projects of community organization or demonstration centres, in urban as well as in rural areas.

50. A survey of Iraq villages jointly conducted by Mr. Gordon MacGregor (TCA adviser 185
to the Ministry of Social Affairs) and Dr. Yusuf Khaddoury, M.D. (Officer in charge 657
of international relations of that Ministry) reveals:

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The social development which these processes entailed repre- 177
sented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue.

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the 181
merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by 511
serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and [164]
combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied.

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 361
changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building 363
materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Başra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Başra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen-contractors whose

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

technique included blackmail. Rickety boat-bridges served a 361
dozen of the riverain towns. Street lighting consisted, at the best, 363
of a few battered oil-lamps. Water was supplied by donkey-borne [365]
waterskins from the river, or from polluted wells in private courtyards; only in Baghdad was a single quarter of the town furnished by pipes with silt-laden untreated water. Municipal street-sweepers maintained some appearance of decency in the main lanes and bazaars, while filth and stenches abounded in the rest. Every town and larger village had cemeteries in its midst or on its fringes. Khans for caravans or wayfarers were found everywhere; hotels approaching the lowest European standard existed only in Baghdad.

Municipal administration was entrusted, save in unorganized 632
villages, to a Mayor and his council. These functionaries, elected by procedures which could amount to Government nomination, enjoyed some local prestige; but their powers in practice were limited so rigidly that the local Governor in fact controlled all projects and all expenditure. Baghdad in the ’nineties was divided into three *baladiyas*, two for the left bank and one for the right. The Mayor was a member or nominee of one of its leading families or, rarely, a Government official. Municipal law was not inadequate, the code of taxation and procedure meticulous, its sphere of nominal activity reasonable. But in practice these administrations were corrupt and futile, and effective chiefly in providing a salary for a city notable and free servants for the local Governor. Nevertheless, pride of city was not lacking and schemes of town improvement were popular topics throughout decades of inactivity.

The picture of urban society of the period must embrace varying 361
scenes. Baṣra with its miles of date gardens and network of tidal
creeks, the activity of its riverain suburb—the sole seaport of 621
‘Iraq—its daily contacts with Najd and Muḥammara, its rich garden-owning notables, its cosmopolitan merchants and agents, had a character unique in ‘Iraq. Of the other towns of Baṣra sanjaq, Qurna was tribe-dominated, the growing village of Abu al-Khaṣib non-tribal, and Zubayr a desert-fringe town ruled by a hereditary Shaykh. Among Baṣra’s leading families were those of the Naqib, and the houses of Basha‘yan, Mandil, and Ṣani‘.

Baghdad city with a mainly Sunni right bank and an all-Shi‘i and largely Persian left, and its important suburbs of Kadhimiya, Mu‘adhdham, and Qarara formed by far the greatest commercial centre in the wilayas. It was industrially important, administratively and militarily dominant. The city was mean, without modern improvements, without protection against river floods; it was adorned only by two or three monuments and mosques of interest and by the great shrine of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani. With

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than 3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great pro-
697 gress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities and of those central Government departments whose work
● [363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
241 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the *sidara*, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was trans-
185 formed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public build-
366 ings, and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under the Amin al-'Aṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion, the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service, hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European, an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting, street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects for which local pride was clamoring.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both 619 178
economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 511

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361
the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change,
if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it
was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, air-
less, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same
goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet
in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and
unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public
State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the
sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved
approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole
areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and
modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman
Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been
forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363
labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well
maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible.
Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362
or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor
and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building
was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-
registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for
outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365
service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—
supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been,
imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere
abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the
ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363
Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and
Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366
shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide
buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered
a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well
established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown
in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368
services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified
themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365
power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

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[1] The mausoleum of King Fayṣal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

V. Roads

Organization

Iraq's road system is controlled and maintained by the Public 491 Works Department under the Minister of Communications and 647 Public Works. It is headed by the Director General of Public Works and under his direction five divisional engineers assure the maintenance and works service in divisions centered in Baghdad (four provinces), Hilla (three provinces), Basra (three provinces), Kirkuk (two provinces) and Mosul (two provinces). A sixth divisional engineer is in charge of central operations in the capital. District engineers, usually stationed at the provincial capitals, are in charge of day-to-day maintenance. Planning is carried out at the headquarters of the Director General. There is a lack of technical staff to carry out surveys in the field. Except for this fact, the organization is efficient and effective. It may have to be expanded as the road construction program progresses. Provincial governments and municipalities control secondary and urban roads and streets.

At present the road system controlled and maintained by the 491 Public Works Department consists of approximately

2,500 kilometers metalled and surfaced,
500 kilometers metalled only,
5,000 kilometers earth roads.

Many of the metalled roads were built in the two war periods, and most of them are concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the capital, between Baghdad and the East and North, and in the North. All the roads in the southern plains are earth roads, and their maintenance and use suffers from the effects of rains on the salt-impregnated soil. Roads within municipal boundaries are generally [363] in a very poor state of repair, not excluding the streets in the capital. Roads in the Basra Port area are controlled and maintained by the Port Directorate and are in good repair.

Maintenance was, until a few years ago, extremely poor, but today every effort is being made, and with conspicuous success, at least to prevent further deterioration. Maintenance costs are allocated on the Ministry's budget and calculated at ID 40 per

of all road users as well as their passengers and cargoes. The expectation of increased road traffic makes it imperative that appropriate measures of control be devised without delay. 494

The following measures are suggested for adoption:

1. Construction of road weighbridges at suitable check points.
2. Compulsory inspection of all vehicles carrying passengers for payment and of all trucks before a periodic license is issued.
3. Appointment of qualified inspectors with sufficient authority and responsibility to ensure adequate enforcement of vehicle regulations.

With the development of traffic on the new highways it will be necessary to introduce and enforce proper traffic rules and regulations. The Mission, therefore, recommends that a highway code be drawn up and that traffic police be instructed and trained in the application and enforcement of the code.

Traffic conditions in the capital are at certain times of the day chaotic, even though city traffic is by no means dense. It would appear that, with training, the formidable force of traffic police now regulating the city's traffic could without expansion serve for traffic control on the country's highway system as well. It would pay the government to engage the services of a traffic expert, preferably from a metropolitan police such as London's, for a limited period, to design the highway code and to instruct the traffic police. [363] [625]

Public Road Transport

It will become increasingly necessary to regulate public road transport of passengers and goods by a licensing system. If this transport is left entirely free and uncontrolled, chaos will be the result; too many operators are likely to engage in public transport, run their services on borrowed money, find their vehicles run down before the loans are repaid and end in bankruptcy. The country's economy will suffer both from the waste of resources involved in such uneconomic ventures and from the probable need of protecting the railways by subsidies from the consequences of such wasteful operations. A reasonable number of capable private operators should provide healthy competition among themselves and with the railway.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

XII. Projected Cost of Proposed Programs

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The projects recommended for consideration are summarized below as to cost and time of realization. The total cost which the Development Board might have to defray over the next five years would be approximately ID 31,000,000.

TABLE 11

COST OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS SUGGESTED FOR DEVELOPMENT BOARD FINANCING

Project	Costs (in dinars)	Period (years)
PORT		
New channel	2,000,000	4
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT		
Study of river training by experts	Token	2
RAILWAYS		
Baghdad Station commitment	143,000	1
Baghdad new layout, provisional	100,000	1
22 continuation and completion projects		
under way	213,770	1
labor quarters	341,000	4
Rehabilitation and modernization projects	500,000	5
Renewals including diesel traction	6,300,000[a]	5
Extra for gauge conversion (tentative)	6,000,000	6
ROADS		
Trunk road system	14,500,000	10
Secondary road system	4,000,000	5
Road transport control	Token	1
URBAN TRANSPORT		
Baghdad transport services, workshops, garages and vehicles	500,000	3
AIRPORTS		
Baghdad development	300,000	2
Basra development	[b]	2
AIRLINES		
Iraqi Airways	600,000	4
POST, TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, RADIO		
Telephone extensions and buildings (if not financed from Communications budget)	300,000	Annually
Auxiliary power plant for transmitter	30,000	1
SURVEYS AND MAPPING		
Air surveys	40,000	Annually

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[a] On assumption of gauge conversion.
[b] To be financed by Port of Basra.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

361 363 The development of the new parts of the cities is in striking contrast to the old. Broad tree-lined boulevards have been laid out in the form of dual carriage-ways, the dividing strip being ornamented with flowers and shrubs. Along these boulevards there has been intermittent residential building activity, so that vacant lots alternate with the houses and gardens of the well-to-do. In Baghdad, particularly, many of these vacant lots have been occupied by squatters. In the largest cities, the new boulevards and the main streets are paved, but the paving is apparently of poor construction, as it has deteriorated rapidly. In the other cities and towns, however, the streets have merely been graded.

365 Most towns with a population of over 6,000, and a few smaller one, have both a piped water supply and an electricity system, which are, with three major exceptions, managed by municipal boards under the direction of the Ministry of Interior. The water is, however, not always purified and the electricity is invariably expensive. No city, not even Baghdad, has a sewage system. Waste water is disposed of into cesspools or allowed to run into the streets where it is apt to collect in stagnant pools.

The Lack of Coordination in Urban Planning

361 In spite of their superficially impressive appearance, the new sections of the cities have not been properly planned. Streets and traffic circles have been laid out according to prescribed geometrical patterns without paying much attention to their functions or to the need for creating integrated residential areas with appropriate housing for the different income groups and provision for schools, shops and hospitals or clinics. In the largest cities, the importance of allocating zones for different purposes and of establishing a proper interrelation between the zones has been largely neglected. Growth has been, in fact, piecemeal and spasmodic rather than coordinated and regular, and emphasis has been placed more on the ornamental than on the useful. Some traffic circles, for example, are unnecessary; others are even safety hazards. The practical value of new streets is vitiated by the common and dangerous practices of using both carriage-ways in both directions and of taking short cuts in the wrong direction around traffic circles. Sometimes streets have been ruthlessly cut or widened through built-up areas

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

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A SCENE IN BAGHDAD

facing page 116

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

177 try rather than fostering the development of something
indigenous and natural. Under such a system the enforcement of law may become of necessity very mechanical, as when an Indian Sepoy nearly knocks down an inoffensive Arab pedestrian by a blow with his fist for no greater crime than walking on the wrong side of the road to avoid a mud puddle. In the courts, too, a crowd of lawyers and an abundance of red tape, with venal underlings, may serve to make the paths of justice tortuous and uncertain in spite of the best intentions on the part of the presiding judge.

185 Nevertheless, even under such handicaps as those we
177 have indicated, there is no questioning the very great
material progress that is to be seen in Mesopotamia.
● [363] Even before the war one of Baghdad's streets was paved,
and since the British have taken over the administration
of the kingdom, all sorts of improvements have been in-
[496] troduced. The railroad system of the country now extends 360 miles from Basra to Baghdad and from there
on nearly to Mosul. There are several subsidiary lines,
the total amounting to over 1000 miles. By far the
greater part of this mileage was constructed by the Brit-
[312] ish for war purposes. Under British rule, also, the Hindiya Barrage and other less important irrigation works have been kept in order and improved and extensive harbor improvements at Basra undertaken.

364 British sanitary and health officers have been ap-
744 pointed for Mesopotamia and no praise is too high for
their largely unappreciated but nevertheless unselfish and extremely efficient labors in that country. The hospital work that has been undertaken in Basra, Baghdad and Amara, the inspection of eating houses, and the maintaining of sanitary conditions have been excellently done.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the American School of Oriental Research founded in 1923 and the 172 British School founded in 1929 maintained headquarters in Baghdad, and both published the results of their researches.

In the field of Public Health the Government services had 744 achieved much, but not the impossible. They had faced an im- 164 mense field to cover and to conquer, had started from nothing, and had been always restricted by lack of funds and trained officials; and meanwhile, inevitably, the disease- or weakness-producing factors in the territory, and the apathy and conservatism of its people, continued. The problem of general malnutrition and resulting lack of physical vigour was, in fact, the problem of poverty: the cure, still distant, lay as much or more in increased wealth as in increased enlightenment; and the same was true, in spite of active and multiplying maternity and child-welfare clinics, of an infant death-rate still tragically high. Little, save increasingly comprehensive and practical study, had yet been done to combat the curse of hookworm, malaria, or bilharzia; a comprehensive effort against these diseases and against tuberculosis, eye-disease, and the typhoid group must call insistently for more time, more funds, and more specialized staff. Steps taken against epidemic disease had been successful; plague and cholera had scarcely appeared for a quarter-century, and smallpox was well handled with full modern resources. Urban sanitation had been improved, [364] sewage schemes adopted, and sanitary inspector training developed; but conditions in this respect over most of the territory remained wholly primitive, and the majority of 'Iraqi doctors were little interested in public health administration. The country at large 743 was served by some eighty hospitals, of which three-quarters were general and a quarter specialized for fevers, mental and venereal diseases, leprosy (at 'Amara), children's and chest and eye diseases; a quarter of the whole were in Baghdad. Non-governmental hospitals were those of the oil companies, foreign missions, and the minority communities. The Jewish Mir Elias Hospital was still open, for patients of all creeds; all other Jewish hospitals and dispensaries had been closed. The Railways, the Port, the Police, and the Army maintained their separate Medical services. The supply 759 of doctors, thanks to the Royal Medical College, had much improved since the thirties, but some reliance on foreigners was still necessary; some thirty of these were so employed in 1951 and recruitment of more was in progress. Registered practitioners in all numbered some 300 in 1945, 420 in 1949. The reluctance of 'Iraqi doctors to serve in the remoter regions—or, indeed, elsewhere than in Baghdad—was still an embarrassment. Neverthe- 743 less, the busy and valued hospitals and dispensaries maintained in all parts of 'Iraq were playing a major stabilizing as well as a

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also 744
be important to provide both the provincial and district medical 647
officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather 361
haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great 166
congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have [362]
simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities. [364]

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. 362
They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly con- 342
structed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

452 probably amounted to only ID 2,300,000 of which about 70 percent represented urban mortgages. Of the latter the greater part probably consisted of mortgages on buildings other than houses. [652] At the beginning of 1950 a government Mortgage Bank began operations. Only ID 100,000 of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000 has, however, been paid in; and the Bank has had to supplement its resources by borrowing. Moreover, it can make loans only for a maximum of four years and up to ID 2,000. To facilitate an expansion of its operations, the Mission suggests that the Development Board provide funds sufficient to increase its actual capital to about ID 1,500,000 and that the Bank be authorized to extend the duration of its mortgages to at least 15 years where warranted.

344 The Mission has given no special attention to the need for public buildings for which the Development Board has budgeted ID 3,350,000 in its five-year program. Undoubtedly the construction of new buildings for the accommodation of government offices is in certain cases desirable, for existing government buildings are for the most part scattered, overcrowded, poorly lighted and equipped and therefore not conducive to working efficiency. As already indicated, the new railway building in Baghdad should provide some space for government offices.

Water and Electricity Supply

364 365 With respect to community facilities, the most urgent tasks appear to be the installation of sewage systems for the major cities, and the provision of safe water supplies and electricity.

It is suggested that a start be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rising level of the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. A plan for such a system has already been prepared by consultants to the government. The initial step might be to carry it out for that portion of the city on the east bank of the Tigris. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless there is a determination to make connections with the system compulsory for all property owners who are supplied with municipal water.

A safe water supply is, as was pointed out earlier, one of the keys to the health problem. While a number of cities and towns now have a reasonably safe water supply, the situation in the great

majority needs substantial improvement. The Department of 364
Municipalities has drawn up a five-year program to provide or 365
extend water supply systems for 114 municipalities with a total population of 943,000 people. Since such water systems are technically simple and the need is great, the Mission suggests that the Department be authorized to proceed with this program. Water supply systems for villages must, of course, be simple and inexpensive. In some cases, wells may prove to be the solution, although frequently brackish water is encountered; in other cases, water piped from a stream or canal with the help of a small pump and run through simple filters may be possible.

Outside of Baghdad and Basra municipal power plants are 365
generally inadequate, and a considerable number of municipalities 377
with a total population of 175,000 have no electricity at all. Baghdad and Basra, which together account for a generating capacity of 51,000 kilowatts, have a sufficient supply; and Kirkuk is adequately supplied from the large power plant of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Total generating capacity available in the remaining municipalities, however, is only 14,000 kw. A program for the expansion of this capacity and the provision of electricity for all municipalities would involve the installation of generators with an aggregate capacity of 10,000 kw. It would be desirable to proceed with such a program, provided simultaneous steps were taken to improve the management of municipally-owned power plants outside Baghdad and Basra. In these two cities the power plants are owned and man- [471]
aged efficiently by a private company and the Port respectively. At present the machinery in the plants of other municipalities is poorly maintained and little or no attention is paid to depreciation. Power "losses" are as high as 36 percent compared to not more than eight percent in Baghdad and Basra; and the rates charged range from 30 to 55 fils[4] per kw-hr as contrasted with 18 fils and less in Baghdad and Basra. To remedy these evident deficiencies it is recommended that serious consideration be given to entrusting the management of such plants to a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company.

The Mission does not believe that it would be economic to 371
develop hydroelectric power at present. The capital cost of hydro-

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[4] One dinar equals one thousand fils.

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monotonous diet. 164

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the
highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

361 a greater security of tenure. Other factors, which have no doubt affected the permanence of villages in some parts of the irrigation zone in central and southern Iraq, are the salination of the land and the silting of canals. In such cases, the fellahin have no choice but to abandon their villages.

In spite of these differences, however, the villages have a number of characteristics in common. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled together without any orderly design. There are no communal facilities or open spaces for the recreation of the
342 children. The huts are so constructed as to keep out heat, cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently, they consist of a single room with thick walls and a doorway, which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for both cooking food and keeping draft animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight, windows are either very small or totally lacking; sashes are expensive. Furnishings are limited to such elementary necessities as a mat and a plain table or a bench. Sanitary facilities, including latrines, are generally lacking.

312 The villages are necessarily located near a source of water, by a canal in the irrigation zone, by a stream or a well in the North. The water is not piped, but must be carried from its source to wherever it is used. Nor is it purified, although the canals in the irrigation zone may be heavily polluted. The water which has been used by men for washing and in which animals have immersed themselves while drinking is often used for human consumption. The constant trampling of the canal banks for these purposes leads to leaks and, hence, to stagnant pools near the adjacent village. Where the source of water is a well, the earth nearby may be dug out for use in the construction of houses and so, similarly, a
[364] stagnant pool may be the result. Such pools, combined with the total absence of any sanitary disposal of waste and garbage, constitute a serious danger to health.

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244 Trees are rarely seen in the villages, although they would give relief from the sun and from sandstorms. Trees would also provide firewood instead of the fuels currently used—animal dung, which could be used instead as fertilizer, and brushwood, which has to be gathered with considerable effort. Small gardens for vegetables are unknown. In fact, fruit and vegetables are almost

cient funds. The Department of Municipalities, however, antici- 312
pating assistance from the Development Board in its financing, has 365
prepared a plan of construction during the next five years which will include the expansion or construction of new facilities in 114 municipalities having an aggregate population of approximately 950,000. The plan is practical and technically follows present methods. Many of the treatment plants are of the same size. This, fortunately, permits standardization which considerably reduces capital costs. The total estimated cost of the program is ID 5,651,600 of which approximately 50 percent would be in foreign exchange, mostly in sterling.

There are numerous villages in addition to municipalities where the problem of obtaining water is very critical. In many cases, this could be relieved by either a single well or by pumping small quantities of water at some distance from streams or irrigation ditches. Such sources of water would in many cases be impure and would require the use of clay filters. Nevertheless, it would relieve the people of the burden of carrying water for human consumption a great distance. These facilities should not cost more than ID 1,500 per installation.

With the need for pure water so critical, it is recommended that the Development Board assist the Department of Municipalities in financing the five-year program for the municipalities. In the meantime, the Department should study the problem of supplying water to the numerous villages and formulate plans for consideration by the Development Board.

Sanitation

Adequate disposal of waste water is an acute problem through- 365
out Iraq and a long-term program needs to be drawn up. Pending 364
this, a start should be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rise in the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. In 1947, an English firm prepared a report on the installation of a sewage and drainage system for the city—complete with pumping stations, sewage purification works, etc., and estimated to cost ID 4,600,000 on the east bank of the Tigris and ID 4,300,000 on the west bank. The proposed scheme could be undertaken in stages.

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364 The initial step might be to carry out the plan for the east bank according to a schedule based on the relative importance of its various elements. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless connections with the system are made compulsory for all property owners. No new constructions or major building alterations or enlargements should be permitted without adequate provision for such connections. Existing structures which are connected to the water supply system should be required to connect gradually to the sewer, according to a scheme to be worked out by the government and based on sanitary, engineering and financial considerations. The administration of the sewage system would logically come under the jurisdiction of the Water Board. The system might be made to help pay for itself by setting a certain surcharge over the cost of water actually used and then discharged into the system.

For the other larger cities, surveys should be conducted now to gather the data necessary for the actual design of each system. For example, the preliminary studies for the sewage problem of the City of Mosul should be preceded by a topographic survey. It is believed that the entire flow of the sewage and rain water could be designed so that no pumping will be needed. Chemical treatment of the sewage is to be preferred to discharge into the Tigris, because people living in downstream villages get their drinking water directly from the river.

For the smaller towns and villages, efficient and inexpensive individual sewage disposal units should be installed privately according to models prepared and tested by the government. Community bath and toilet facilities should be provided in the poorer sections of towns to supplement private individual units. Public lavatories should also be provided in the cities wherever there are concentrations of people, such as in business areas, parks and other public places.

Electric Power

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377 Municipal power plants serve primarily public and domestic lighting needs. Most industrial plants supply their own power. Cheap fuel also makes it possible for small direct-connected diesels to compete favorably with electric motors as prime movers, pri-

177 try rather than fostering the development of something indigenous and natural. Under such a system the enforcement of law may become of necessity very mechanical, as when an Indian Sepoy nearly knocks down an inoffensive Arab pedestrian by a blow with his fist for no greater crime than walking on the wrong side of the road to avoid a mud puddle. In the courts, too, a crowd of lawyers and an abundance of red tape, with venal underlings, may serve to make the paths of justice tortuous and uncertain in spite of the best intentions on the part of the presiding judge.

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177 have indicated, there is no questioning the very great
material progress that is to be seen in Mesopotamia.
[363] Even before the war one of Baghdad's streets was paved,
and since the British have taken over the administration
of the kingdom, all sorts of improvements have been introduced.
[496] The railroad system of the country now extends
360 miles from Basra to Baghdad and from there
on nearly to Mosul. There are several subsidiary lines,
the total amounting to over 1000 miles. By far the
greater part of this mileage was constructed by the British
[312] for war purposes. Under British rule, also, the Hindiya
Barrage and other less important irrigation works
have been kept in order and improved and extensive harbor
improvements at Basra undertaken.

● 364 British sanitary and health officers have been appointed
744 for Mesopotamia and no praise is too high for their largely unappreciated but nevertheless unselfish and extremely efficient labors in that country. The hospital work that has been undertaken in Basra, Baghdad and Amara, the inspection of eating houses, and the maintaining of sanitary conditions have been excellently done.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

364 764 Unfortunately the fact that this work is practical benevolence of the finest sort and carried on in the finest spirit has not served to commend sanitary regulations to the Arab, who regards them as a nuisance, a hindrance to business and an infringement of his personal liberty.

871 185 177 Mesopotamia has also grappled with the whole problem of education most courageously. An educational system has been organized which includes normal schools for teachers and a large number of primary and secondary schools for both boys and girls. There are a smaller number of high schools, and a central university is planned. Fifteen years ago the dominant European influence in this community was French, and no one could claim to be educated who could not talk that language fluently. There was a marked change a little later, and before the Great War German was the commanding influence. Now, of course, the predominant western influence is English, and it seems likely to remain so, for commerce will probably talk the English language for many years, whatever political upheavals the country may be destined to experience. It is true that the educational system has not as yet taken very deep root and that much of the work done is very superficial, but it is none the less exceedingly creditable and encouraging. Moreover, this western system of education will probably be more or less permanent, for it will always be the gateway to remunerative positions.

185 177 In general, the people of Mesopotamia have been brought into contact with conditions of modern life and are anxious for further progress. New wants have been created, and a certain increase in the commerce of the country is the inevitable result. All manner of western dress goods and shoes are to be found in the bazaars, as

II. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

A. PRESENT CONDITIONS

369 511 162 The some 4,000,000 more people of Iraq who live the rural areas have been long characterised by many people both within and outside Iraq as suffering from poverty, ill health and illiteracy. These conditions become readily apparent to one visiting the villages of the country today. The characterisation of the people can be extended to their being ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed.

369 511 The survey was immediately impressed with the crude and inefficient methods of making a living and the unnecessarily poor and unhealthy home and village life. These conditions can be remedied by instruction and assistance. People farm with primitive equipment and are wasteful of land and water. In village after village there are mud huts without light or fresh air. Families live, sleep and eat in single rooms packed together with animals, food, stores, farming equipment and refuse. Children play in courtyards filled with animal dung and filth, many people suffer from infected eyes, skin sores and diseases caused by unsanitary conditions which could be greatly reduced by better sanitary conditions. In the homes food is prepared on the floors where it comes in contact with the accumulated filth, flies, chickens, dogs and other animals. Pots and pans and mixing spoons lie on the ground. They are crudely cleaned with dirty water or old rags. There are no such things as kitchens, screened lockers for food or clean and covered places for drinking water in the homes of the rural villagers. Instruction in home care could overcome much of this.

369 364 511 The lack of pure drinking water is one of the most acute problems in these villages. Some pumps and water tanks and some water piped from springs to collection pools have been installed. However, these facilities frequently lack sanitary protection and show lack of proper maintenance by the communities. Often wells have around them accumulation of stagnant water, mud and animal dung. Another acute problem is the lack of any facilities in many villages, and homes for taking care of human waste. Where toilets exist they are mere uncovered holes open to flies and a source of spreading disease.

369 871 Many villages have not yet received the benefit of schools where children can learn some of the concepts and techniques which would enable them to understand the need for improving their conditions and help their families in doing so. In some villages young girls are not allowed by their elders to attend school or not provided with primary schools, buildings and teachers. Much of a new generation is growing up illiterate and ignorant of how they might help themselves when they grow up.

369 423 471 [illegible] Inquiry among villagers and local officials revealed that although there might be a headman or mukhtar of the village, nearly all direction and management of their affairs comes from outside leadership. Communities lack the local leadership and organization by which they might progress through their own efforts. Sheikhs, landlords, their agents (sirkal) who are frequently local government representatives as well, direct the farming operations, decide the lands on which the villagers will farm and live, provide much of the seed and equipment, direct the cleaning of ditches, collect the shares of crops and other payments and decide whether or not the farmers may live and work on the land during the next year. Even the farmer who owns his own land is not without obligations to money lenders, tax collectors and government supervision. The farmers and tenants of Iraq are dependent upon

IRAQ MH1

As in other countries, all gradations in housing, between the palatial homes of the wealthy and the congested hovels of the poor, are found in the cities. Brick and cement are the usual building materials, although stone is widely used in Mosul and other towns in the north. In Baghdad, Arabic and Turkish styles of architecture predominate in the older sections of the city; modern villas, in the newer residential developments. Basra is a composite of 3 townships: Basra City, a typical Arab town; Ashar, the business community; and Margil, the new town and port center. In the oil field areas, housing estates are maintained by the operating companies for the benefit of their workers. 342 341 342

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

Water Supplies

Water supplies are reasonably plentiful in the inhabited portions of the country. In the highland areas of the north and the northeast, water is obtained from streams, springs or wells, but in the alluvial plains, where the rainfall rarely exceeds 2 to 6 inches, it is taken entirely from rivers, canals, lakes or wells. Water is scarce in the desert regions but is available in some localities from waterholes, dug in dried stream beds, or from occasional permanent deep wells. The well waters in the mountain districts are sometimes highly mineralized, while shallow well supplies in the lower delta are generally brackish. 312

The domestic water supplies are treated before distribution in the larger cities and towns, but throughout rural Iraq they are unprotected and frequently polluted. The municipal water supply for the city of Baghdad is pumped from the Tigris River at 4 stations—3 on the left bank and 1 on the right. The entire supply is treated by sedimentation and chlorination, while filtration plants are also operated in connection with the pumping stations at Karrada and Sarrifiya, on the left bank. It is piped to individual service connections in all sections 312 364

p. 27(A)

312 364

of the city, except in some of the poorer districts, where community taps are installed. The construction of additional plants for the treatment of the water supplies in the surrounding towns was planned in 1952.

At Basra, the water supply for the 3 townships and some of the adjacent villages is taken from the Shatt al Arab. It is treated by filtration and chlorination at Jubailah before distribution to suitably located storage tanks, from which it is piped to individual houses and community taps. The municipal supply of Mosul is derived from the Tigris River and treated by filtration and chlorination. River supplies are utilized by the capital cities of all the provinces, except Erbil and Sulaimaniya, on the northeastern border, where adequate spring sources are available. Treated water is furnished by the Iraq Petroleum Company to its installations in the vicinity of Kirkuk, and a portion of the supply is delivered by the company to the municipality. In the various cities the drinking water supplies are supervised by the municipal authorities. [744] Bacteriologic examinations are made periodically in the laboratories of the government health services. No control is exercised over the smaller supplies, however, except when gross pollution is suspected.

312 The waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers have been utilized for irrigation for centuries, and the existing ruins appear to indicate that the ancient systems were more extensive than those in use today. Pumps and more primitive types of lift irrigation predominate, but other methods are employed along the course of the rivers, including tidal flow irrigation on the Shatt al Arab and free flow irrigation in the lower delta. In the northern provinces, local irrigation systems, fed from underground conduits which tap springs in the foothills and are connected by series of wells, are found in many areas. These *karez* are comparable with the *qanats* of northern Iran.

Several large-scale projects have been undertaken for the purpose of regulating

312 and controlling the flow of the rivers. By the construction of the Hindiyah dam on the lower Euphrates in 1913, part of its flow was diverted through the Hilla canal and secondary channels, thus opening up over 650,000 acres for irrigation in the western delta. A parallel barrage at Kut, on the Tigris, which was completed in 1939, permitted the forking of the river through abandoned channels and ultimately will bring almost 1 million acres under irrigation. A dam on the Diyala River provides water for the irrigation of about 260,000 acres in that valley. Other projects, designed for flood control, irrigation and sometimes hydroelectric power purposes, are under construction, or planned, for the Great Zab, the Little Zab and other rivers. The enlargement of Habbaniya Lake, west of Baghdad, into a reservoir to control the flooding of the Euphrates and to furnish water for expanded irrigation facilities has been completed recently, while the conversion of the Wadi Tharthar depression, in the Al Jazira region, into a reservoir for the storage of the flood waters of the Tigris was
653 in process of construction in 1952. A Gen-
312 eral Development Board was created by the Iraqi government in 1950 to review its various development programs, including irrigation, communications, medical institutions and other public services. Since its inception, the Board has underwritten extensive projects for the development of domestic water supplies and irrigation.

WASTE DISPOSAL

364 There are no municipal sewerage systems in Iraq. In the cities, cesspits are commonly employed for the disposal of sewage, although water-borne systems, connected with septic tanks, are installed in some of the modern homes, hotels and public buildings. The contents of the cesspits are usually carted to dumping grounds on the outskirts of the towns. In the smaller towns and villages, sewage disposal is by means of pit privies or cesspits. However housetops, courtyards and other convenient sites often

564 serve as latrines, while the use of the banks of streams or canals facilitates the ablutions required by Moslem rites. Frequent pollution of the water supplies promotes the spread of intestinal infections, which are prevalent among all groups of the population.

FAUNA AND FLORA

136 164 **Arthropods.** MOSQUITOES. Twelve species of anopheline mosquitoes have been recorded from different parts of the country, but the majority are regarded as of minor significance. Four species are of major interest in the transmission of malaria. 136 *Anopheles stephensi* is the primary vector throughout southern Iraq. *A. sacharovi* (= *A. elutus*) and *A. superpictus* are the principal vectors in the north, while *A. maculipennis maculipennis* is implicated in localized areas in the higher mountain valleys. *A. pulcherrimus* is widespread, particularly in the southern provinces, but is of doubtful importance in transmission. Other species, which are present to a varying extent in diverse localities, are *A. claviger, A. hyrcanus, A. multicolor, A. d'thali, A. fluviatilis, A. algeriensis* and *A. marteri.*

A. stephensi, the chief vector species in the south, is abundant in the irrigated date-growing areas along the Shatt al Arab and in the alluvial plains region, particularly in the Euphrates basin. It also occurs in various foci in the Tigris valley along the middle course of the river and in the Diyala basin to the edge of the foothills, as well as in the spring-fed oasis of Shifathah, in the desert west of Kerbela. It breeds in vegetated irrigation canals, seepage pools, borrow pits, shallows wells, hoofprints and other temporary collections of water. The larvae are found in greatest numbers from May to October, although breeding takes place throughout the year in the Gulf area. The prevalence of this species has increased appreciably within the last few decades, paralleling the expansion of irrigation facilities. At present it is the only proven vector in the Shatt al Arab and the lower delta areas.

p. 28(B)

IRAQ MH1

illness and death in the rural areas is incomplete and unreliable. An unduly large proportion of the medical personnel is concentrated in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and other cities, while the inhabitants in many of the more remote districts receive little or no medical attention. Local authorities estimate that, in the case of most diseases, the official reports represent about one tenth of the probable prevalence. The mortality statistics are of questionable value, since the deaths in rural communities are often certified by nonmedical officials, and a considerable percentage are listed as due to unknown causes. Investigations undertaken by the staff of the Royal Hospital and the Royal College of Medicine, the Department of Endemic Diseases and other organizations contribute supplementary information on the nature and the prevalence of specific infections, as malaria and schistosomiasis. 164 165 164

DISEASES SPREAD OR CONTRACTED CHIEFLY THROUGH INTESTINAL OR URINARY TRACT

Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers. Enteric fevers are endemic: from 559 to 842 cases of typhoid fever and from 97 to 230 cases of paratyphoid fever were reported annually in the 6 years 1944-49. About 70 to 80 per cent of the known cases are classified as typhoid fever. The relative prevalence of paratyphoid A and B infections is uncertain, however, as differential diagnostic tests are seldom attempted, except in the central bacteriologic laboratory in Baghdad. Few large-scale epidemics have been reported since the improvement of the water supplies in the larger cities, but localized outbreaks, caused by contaminated food or water supplies, are numerous. Cases occur throughout the year, with the peak of incidence in the summer months, from July to October. Sporadic cases of paratyphoid C fever have been recorded, some of which have been associated with primary meningeal symptoms. [364]

Dysenteries. Both bacillary and amebic dysentery are widespread. Amebiasis is ap-

p. 36(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

SUMMARY

Iraq encompasses the valleys of the 131
Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and is as- 161
sociated historically with Mesopotamia, the 433
home of one of the oldest civilizations on record. It has been an independent sovereign state since 1932. The population, which was estimated at 4,799,500 in 1947, is 95 per cent Moslem and predominantly Arab. Extensive petroleum resources and date cultivation contribute to the wealth of the country, which is still relatively underde-
veloped in other respects. The public health 744
activities of the Iraqi government are centralized in the Ministry of Health, with headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry is responsible for the maintenance of preventive and curative services, which are carried out in the provinces through subordinate provincial organizations. Municipal departments exist in Baghdad and the principal cities, but in other areas the enforcement of sanitary regulations devolves upon the
government officers. In 1950, there were 82 743
civilian hospitals in the country, with an aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly more than 1 bed per 1,000 population. Almost one half of the total beds were located in the Baghdad area. Approximately 82 per cent of the hospitals are supported by the government. Also in 1950, 433 dispensaries were functioning in various parts of the provinces, 403 under the jurisdiction of the government health authorities.

The water supplies in the towns and the 312
villages of the alluvial plain are derived from rivers, canals, lakes and wells; in the northern highlands, from streams, springs and wells. All the urban supplies are obtained from rivers, except in Erbil and Sulaimaniya, where spring sources are utilized. The water supplies of the larger cities are treated, but those in the rural areas are
unprotected and often polluted. There are 314 ●
no sewerage systems. In the cities, cesspits and septic tanks are employed for the disposal of sewage; in the rural villages, the
means are more primitive. The dietary 800

p. 47(B)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

technique included blackmail. Rickety boat-bridges served a 361
dozen of the riverain towns. Street lighting consisted, at the best, 363
of a few battered oil-lamps. Water was supplied by donkey-borne [365]
waterskins from the river, or from polluted wells in private court-
yards; only in Baghdad was a single quarter of the town furnished
by pipes with silt-laden untreated water. Municipal street-sweepers
maintained some appearance of decency in the main lanes and
bazaars, while filth and stenches abounded in the rest. Every
town and larger village had cemeteries in its midst or on its
fringes. Khans for caravans or wayfarers were found everywhere;
hotels approaching the lowest European standard existed only in
Baghdad.

Municipal administration was entrusted, save in unorganized 632
villages, to a Mayor and his council. These functionaries, elected
by procedures which could amount to Government nomination,
enjoyed some local prestige; but their powers in practice were
limited so rigidly that the local Governor in fact controlled all pro-
jects and all expenditure. Baghdad in the 'nineties was divided into
three *baladiyas*, two for the left bank and one for the right. The
Mayor was a member or nominee of one of its leading families or,
rarely, a Government official. Municipal law was not inadequate,
the code of taxation and procedure meticulous, its sphere of
nominal activity reasonable. But in practice these administrations
were corrupt and futile, and effective chiefly in providing a salary
for a city notable and free servants for the local Governor. Never-
theless, pride of city was not lacking and schemes of town improve-
ment were popular topics throughout decades of inactivity.

The picture of urban society of the period must embrace varying 361
scenes. Baṣra with its miles of date gardens and network of tidal
creeks, the activity of its riverain suburb—the sole seaport of 621
'Iraq—its daily contacts with Najd and Muḥammara, its rich
garden-owning notables, its cosmopolitan merchants and agents,
had a character unique in 'Iraq. Of the other towns of Baṣra
sanjaq, Qurna was tribe-dominated, the growing village of Abu
al-Khaṣib non-tribal, and Zubayr a desert-fringe town ruled by
a hereditary Shaykh. Among Baṣra's leading families were those of
the Naqib, and the houses of Basha'yan, Mandil, and Ṣani'.

Baghdad city with a mainly Sunni right bank and an all-Shi'i and largely Persian left, and its important suburbs of Kadhimiya, Mu'adhdham, and Qarara formed by far the greatest commercial centre in the wilayas. It was industrially important, administratively and militarily dominant. The city was mean, without modern improvements, without protection against river floods; it was adorned only by two or three monuments and mosques of interest and by the great shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani. With

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial
operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors.
Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation,
in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building 331
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equipment,
the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 619 178 511

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361
the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change, if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363
labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible. Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362
or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365
service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been, imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the ancient '*arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363
Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366
shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368
services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365
power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

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[1] The mausoleum of King Fayṣal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Basra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

511 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the moderniza-
362 tion and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two
177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now
562 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law, followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work, and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded were still considerable, and included the households of many leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families, by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop
[265] kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include
575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class profes-
526 sional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

438 more attractive for industry than other areas can be corrected by
[365] proper action. First and foremost is the relative cheapness of power
and fuel in Baghdad. The cost of the electric power unit in most cities is double that of Baghdad and rarely is a municipality-owned plant able to supply sufficient power to industry. The cost of oil fuel is at least ten percent higher outside Baghdad. The correction of these factors, together with a more equal distribution of educational, housing, transport and social welfare facilities, could greatly relieve the situation. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry could also be amended so as to give additional concessions for industries established in other parts of the country. The cost of labour and land is already becoming burdensome for industry in Baghdad. This, in addition to the social evil of overcrowdedness, calls for immediate consideration.

434 (4) **Limitation of Markets**: A newly industrialised country can hardly hope to find foreign markets for its finished products. It has to depend on its home market. The market in Iraq, with its small population (about 5 million inhabitants), of low purchasing power (annual income per head is estimated at between £ 20 and £ 30 or $85), affords very limited scope for large-scale industry. Many of the industries studied at one time by the Industrial Bank, such as the making of artificial silk fibres, the manufacture of paper and cardboard from straw, and the printing of cotton piece-goods, had to be abandoned because the smallest economic unit of these plants is much beyond the capacity of the Iraqi market to support. This situation will no doubt improve as the whole economy of the coun-
439 try expands. But it should be possible to deal with this situation
648 more effectively by joint action on the part of the Arab States,
along lines already discussed at high political level. These discussions have had the object of reducing or abolishing inter-state tariff barriers so as to make the whole area one market. Such an action is indeed vital to the progress and prosperity of these countries and their peoples. It should be remembered that before World War I, these countries formed one economic and political unit under the Ottoman Empire.

464 (5) **Labour, Technical Staff and Management Problems**: The supply of ordinary labour, owing to the high rate of population increase (estimated to be one and a half per cent per annum) and emigration from country to town, is quite sufficient and will remain so

317 The exploitation of salt deposits may ultimately prove to be another industrial possibility. A salt dome known to exist near Basra might provide large quantities of salt for both export and domestic consumption and might make possible the establishment of an alkali plant, for which the gas from the nearby oil field could furnish cheap power. The Mission therefore suggests that core drilling of this dome be undertaken in order to appraise its commercial possibilities.

433 In the process of industrial development the host of small enterprises which account in the aggregate for a considerable output should not be neglected. Among these are shops engaged in tire retreading, reclamation of lube oil, battery and electrical repair work, automotive and machinery repair, wood-working, etc. Many of them could be assisted to improve their production through installation of power-operated tools and other equipment.

In starting new plants and expanding old ones it is important that capital charges be kept at a minimum by arranging for maximum possible utilization of the installed equipment. This involves the employment of as many shifts as possible, the use of machines at maximum working speed and, above all, the use of purchased power. In the past, industrial plants have added unnecessarily to their capital overhead by installing their own power plants. Such plants usually prove costly since they operate only part of the time. Single plants catering to both industrial and lighting needs are
365 more economical because of a high and steady load factor. In order to induce industries to purchase power, however, the price of electricity for industrial use will need to be reduced. Such a reduction could be achieved in Baghdad, the principal industrial center, particularly if steps were taken to relieve the Baghdad Light and Power Company from the heavy burden of sharing its profits with the Iraq government and also having its profits taxed by the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, such as in Mosul, a reduction in power prices depends on more efficient management.

Financing of Industrial Development

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471 The Mission believes that complete government ownership of industry should be adopted only where absolutely necessary. In general it will prove necessary only where private capital is not available either because the contemplated investment is too large,

452 probably amounted to only ID 2,300,000 of which about 70 percent represented urban mortgages. Of the latter the greater part probably consisted of mortgages on buildings other than houses. [652] At the beginning of 1950 a government Mortgage Bank began operations. Only ID 100,000 of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000 has, however, been paid in; and the Bank has had to supplement its resources by borrowing. Moreover, it can make loans only for a maximum of four years and up to ID 2,000. To facilitate an expansion of its operations, the Mission suggests that the Development Board provide funds sufficient to increase its actual capital to about ID 1,500,000 and that the Bank be authorized to extend the duration of its mortgages to at least 15 years where warranted.

344 The Mission has given no special attention to the need for public buildings for which the Development Board has budgeted ID 3,350,000 in its five-year program. Undoubtedly the construction of new buildings for the accommodation of government offices is in certain cases desirable, for existing government buildings are for the most part scattered, overcrowded, poorly lighted and equipped and therefore not conducive to working efficiency. As already indicated, the new railway building in Baghdad should provide some space for government offices.

Water and Electricity Supply

364
365 With respect to community facilities, the most urgent tasks appear to be the installation of sewage systems for the major cities, and the provision of safe water supplies and electricity.

It is suggested that a start be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rising level of the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. A plan for such a system has already been prepared by consultants to the government. The initial step might be to carry it out for that portion of the city on the east bank of the Tigris. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless there is a determination to make connections with the system compulsory for all property owners who are supplied with municipal water.

A safe water supply is, as was pointed out earlier, one of the keys to the health problem. While a number of cities and towns now have a reasonably safe water supply, the situation in the great

majority needs substantial improvement. The Department of 364
Municipalities has drawn up a five-year program to provide or 365
extend water supply systems for 114 municipalities with a total population of 943,000 people. Since such water systems are technically simple and the need is great, the Mission suggests that the Department be authorized to proceed with this program. Water supply systems for villages must, of course, be simple and inexpensive. In some cases, wells may prove to be the solution, although frequently brackish water is encountered; in other cases, water piped from a stream or canal with the help of a small pump and run through simple filters may be possible.

Outside of Baghdad and Basra municipal power plants are 365
generally inadequate, and a considerable number of municipalities 377
with a total population of 175,000 have no electricity at all. Baghdad and Basra, which together account for a generating capacity of 51,000 kilowatts, have a sufficient supply; and Kirkuk is adequately supplied from the large power plant of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Total generating capacity available in the remaining municipalities, however, is only 14,000 kw. A program for the expansion of this capacity and the provision of electricity for all municipalities would involve the installation of generators with an aggregate capacity of 10,000 kw. It would be desirable to proceed with such a program, provided simultaneous steps were taken to improve the management of municipally-owned power plants outside Baghdad and Basra. In these two cities the power plants are owned and man- [471]
aged efficiently by a private company and the Port respectively. At present the machinery in the plants of other municipalities is poorly maintained and little or no attention is paid to depreciation. Power "losses" are as high as 36 percent compared to not more than eight percent in Baghdad and Basra; and the rates charged range from 30 to 55 fils[4] per kw-hr as contrasted with 18 fils and less in Baghdad and Basra. To remedy these evident deficiencies it is recommended that serious consideration be given to entrusting the management of such plants to a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company.

The Mission does not believe that it would be economic to 371
develop hydroelectric power at present. The capital cost of hydro-

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[4] One dinar equals one thousand fils.

371 electric plants is considerably greater than that of equivalent thermal capacity; and Iraq possesses very cheap fuel for the generation of power. At present municipal power is used primarily [365] for lighting, and even if industrial plants should turn increasingly to municipal stations for their power supply they would be able to obtain considerable amounts of "off-peak" power in such cities as Baghdad and Basra without any increase in generating capacity. In the judgment of the Mission hydroelectric power should be considered only if it does not need to be transmitted over long distances and then only if the demand is such as to insure a steady and high load factor. It is not yet clear that the Wadi Tharthar depression will actually store enough water to permit the generation of power, and the power which might be generated at the dams projected elsewhere is likely to be too far removed from major consuming centers.

VII. Education

871 Education is a basic condition for the agricultural, industrial and technological progress of the country as well as for the development of a fuller cultural life and the sound growth of democratic institutions. Its importance has received growing recognition and considerable progress has been made. In years of financial stringency the budget for education has usually continued to expand while other government expenditures were curtailed. In the last two decades, the number of schools rose from 262 to 1,100, the number of pupils from 32,750 to 175,000 and the number of primary school teachers increased from 1,325 to 6,588. During the same period, expenditures on education rose from about ID 300,000 per year to well over ID 4,000,000—a not inconsiderable advance even after taking into account the rise in prices.

Nevertheless, there are still only 175,000 children in schools out of about 750,000 of school age. Despite the increased emphasis on primary education, expenditures for this purpose still take only 51 percent of the education budget. The number of children in school declines sharply with each succeeding grade, so that only about half the children starting in primary school actually finish their

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

sures of production and assistance which tend to shield industry 647
against competition. There is much to be done to help industry 654
to achieve better control of the quality of its products, in reducing waste through material salvage, in analyzing production costs, in making market surveys and in raising labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

IV. Other Suggestions for the Improvement of Industry

Possibilities for Economies in the Use of Capital

Whenever the capital cost of a plant is an important determi- 433
nant of production costs, it becomes essential to utilize the plant to the fullest extent. This may be accomplished, for example, by increasing the number of shifts, by extending the work week and by stepping up machines to their maximum economic speed. Completely integrated plants seldom if ever offer the opportunity for this type of operation, because certain machines are never called upon for continuous use. This is, of course, very noticeable where the plant does all its own maintenance work, even to all of its foundry items. The solution is obviously one of resorting to contracting or sub-contracting with concerns specializing in particular operations. For example, a single finishing and dyeing concern might advantageously serve two or more textile mills, where the capacity of these mills is insufficient to load separate finishing departments to their economic limit.

In Iraq there is a tendency in industry to generate its own 433
power rather than to purchase it. This leads to the installation of 377
expensive facilities which are utilized only part of the day. While 365
industry is operating, many municipal power plants stand virtually idle because they serve primarily lighting needs and their peak load accordingly comes at night. In some cases, where large quantities of process steam are needed, industrial enterprises may be justified in generating their own power, but for the most part,
the purchase of power is preferable. Unfortunately, power rates, 433
except in Basra and Baghdad, are so high that the purchase of 365

433
365 power by industry is out of the question. It is hoped, however, that in time this may be corrected.

Even in Baghdad the purchase of power by industry would be greatly stimulated by a reduction in the industrial rates of the Baghdad Light and Power Company. Profits, after depreciation [471] but before taxes, are now over half of gross receipts. Under the terms of its concession, the company pays a substantial part of these profits to the Iraq Government, the remainder being allocated to United Kingdom taxes, reserves for capital expenditure and dividends. The Iraq Government's share in the profits effectively constitutes a tax on electricity consumption, which it might be well advised to forego if it could thereby secure an equivalent reduction in power rates to Iraqi industry. The government might, therefore, explore with the Company and with the tax authorities in the United Kingdom the possibility of an equitable arrangement, whereby power rates would be reduced as far as possible, while still providing adequate funds for capital improvement and continuing a fair return to stockholders. A possible arrangement that has to be considered is the exercise by the government at the end of 1954 of its option to purchase the undertaking as a going concern. If such a course should be decided on, it would be desirable to enter into a management contract with the Company in order to ensure the continuance of efficient operation.

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452 The amount of working capital required in Iraq per unit of production is exceedingly high, partly because enterprises want to be as self-sufficient as possible with respect to needed supplies and materials, partly because Iraq is relatively distant from international markets. Probably the best means of reducing the need for working capital would be through the erection and operation of a bonded warehouse which would provide all industries with facilities to store, until needed, supplies, material and chemicals of all types under conditions that would enable banks to extend credits on the stocks in bond. In this way the banks would have assurance that the stored material would not be released prior to full payment plus interest, storage and service charges. In effect, this would permit operations along lines very similar to those in highly developed countries where supplies and materials are obtained in accordance with production schedules.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

494 Transport licenses should be granted only if the proposed operator appears responsible and sufficiently well equipped to perform the transport services and if there is evidence of present or prospective need. Operators should be required to take out insurance, to adhere to published rates, routes and schedules, and to conform to loading regulations.

Maintenance

491 The maintenance of the new road system when once completed is even more important than its initial construction. Service and funds must be assured to keep the roads in the condition in which they have been built. The Minister of Finance should budget for annual expenditures, to be estimated by the Public Works Department, for maintenance of the road systems and all accessories including sign posting, for improvements necessitated by increased traffic, for inspection and control of road traffic and for the traffic police required. The expenditures should, in general, be covered by revenue from those who actually use the roads.

Subsidiary Roads and Urban Streets

489 It is recommended that at the earliest opportunity a system of cooperation between the Public Works Department and provincial and municipal road departments be established to bring maintenance, traffic control and municipal licensing in line with the government's policy in these matters and that appropriate provision for this cooperation be made in the budget.

City Transport

365 An essential part of the country's transport system is passenger transport service in the capital. Baghdad and its suburbs form a city of a population of over half a million spread over an area with a radius of four to eight miles. In 1938 it was decided to establish a municipal passenger service to be operated with buses. The war intervened and limited services were brought into operation in 1942 with converted army trucks equipped with locally built bodies. A loan of ID 500,000 was raised, more vehicles purchased and workshops and garages of sorts installed. The services deteriorated with the poor equipment, which was all that was available in wartime, and the municipality was unable to carry the financial burden. Early in 1950 the service was taken over by

the central government. Since then it has been operated by an 365 Administrative Board under the Ministry of the Interior, consisting of a Director General, who is president, and four other members.

The Board operates bus lines in and to all parts of the city and suburbs with a fleet of 236 buses of sundry makes and types. They are in poor condition owing to excessive service and the poor equipment of workshops and garages. At the time of the transfer to the central government, 70 percent of the vehicles were under, awaiting or beyond repaid. With effort the proportion has been brought down to just over 50 percent at present. A wise decision has been taken to standardize the type of bus to be operated in the future, and 100 new vehicles have been purchased at a cost of ID 500,000 to be paid over a period of three years. This sum includes a generous supply of spare parts. The services of one traffic and one workshop expert have been obtained on loan from the London Transport Executive to take up duties in Baghdad in September 1951.

TABLE 7

BUDGET SUMMARY FOR 1951-52

REVENUES	
Passenger traffic	ID 590,000
Miscellaneous (chiefly sales)	5,000
	595,000
EXPENDITURES	
Salaries and allowances	ID 47,150
Wages and allowances	227,600
Board, etc.	3,300
Administrative expenses	33,500
Maintenance and new buildings	16,000
Maintenance of vehicles	90,000
Fuel and oil	65,000
Loan service	61,662
	544,212
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	
New buses	ID 205,000
Machinery and tools	7,000
	ID 212,000

365 The operating position may be judged from a summary of the sanctioned budget for the current financial year, ending March 31, 1952.

Administrative expenses include a contribution of ID 2,000 to the Baghdad Municipality for maintenance of roads. The ID 90,000 for maintenance of vehicles is alarming. This high figure is caused chiefly by the large number of different types, the difficulties of procuring parts, the high cost of manufacturing substitutes and the large number of breakages of vehicle springs, axles and other parts due in great measure to Baghdad's bad roads.

A program to put the service on a sound operating, administrative and financial basis would include the following features:

1. Modernization of the central workshop and equipment, preferably moved to a site in the industrial section of the town.
2. Establishment of one central garage and four auxiliary terminal garages, all largely open air compounds, the latter to accommodate early and late services.
3. A fleet of 180 to 200 standard buses, to allow for reasonable running shifts and sufficient time for maintenance and servicing.

The Mission suggests that the cost of this program, estimated at ID 500,000, be financed by the Development Board. At the same time, however, it might be considered whether economies in administration could not be achieved by entrusting management entirely to a Director General rather than a Board, and whether revenues could not be increased by a stricter check on the collection of passenger fares.

VI. Airports

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Both Iraq's international airports are very favorably situated within the town limits of Baghdad and Basra Port (Magil). This great advantage should be preserved and any developments should be on the present sites. Climatic conditions are favorable, and only a runway in one direction is required to accommodate traffic at all seasons. Town developments need suffer no inconveniences from

361 The development of the new parts of the cities is in striking
363 contrast to the old. Broad tree-lined boulevards have been laid out in the form of dual carriage-ways, the dividing strip being ornamented with flowers and shrubs. Along these boulevards there has been intermittent residential building activity, so that vacant lots alternate with the houses and gardens of the well-to-do. In Baghdad, particularly, many of these vacant lots have been occupied by squatters. In the largest cities, the new boulevards and the main streets are paved, but the paving is apparently of poor construction, as it has deteriorated rapidly. In the other cities and towns, however, the streets have merely been graded.

365 Most towns with a population of over 6,000, and a few smaller one, have both a piped water supply and an electricity system, which are, with three major exceptions, managed by municipal boards under the direction of the Ministry of Interior. The water is, however, not always purified and the electricity is invariably expensive. No city, not even Baghdad, has a sewage system. Waste water is disposed of into cesspools or allowed to run into the streets where it is apt to collect in stagnant pools.

The Lack of Coordination in Urban Planning

361 In spite of their superficially impressive appearance, the new sections of the cities have not been properly planned. Streets and traffic circles have been laid out according to prescribed geometrical patterns without paying much attention to their functions or to the need for creating integrated residential areas with appropriate housing for the different income groups and provision for schools, shops and hospitals or clinics. In the largest cities, the importance of allocating zones for different purposes and of establishing a proper interrelation between the zones has been largely neglected. Growth has been, in fact, piecemeal and spasmodic rather than coordinated and regular, and emphasis has been placed more on the ornamental than on the useful. Some traffic circles, for example, are unnecessary; others are even safety hazards. The practical value of new streets is vitiated by the common and dangerous practices of using both carriage-ways in both directions and of taking short cuts in the wrong direction around traffic circles. Sometimes streets have been ruthlessly cut or widened through built-up areas

have a mosque, a church, a post office, a cinema, a restaurant, a police station and an institute equipped with reading rooms and a debating chamber. Streets and alleys are laid out to conform to the ground contours and paved with asphalt macadam. The streets are lighted and have recently been planted with trees. The project is much in advance of anything else that has so far been undertaken in Iraq, but its cost and the large element of subsidy involved make it impossible of general emulation. 362

The Iraq Petroleum Company is the only large private industrial concern which has provided substantial housing facilities for its employees, although in 1943 a law was approved compelling industrial project owners to construct houses for their laborers. This law has apparently been ineffective. Although there is much to be said for placing responsibility on industry for housing in out-of-the-way places, the Mission is of the opinion that, in general, provision of housing is an inappropriate burden on industry. [466]

Private Housing; Mortgage Credit

The most spectacular ventures in private housing in recent years were two grandiose developments in Baghdad for the well-to-do. Both of there were financial failures.

Private housing of a more modest character for the middle classes, who cannot afford large outlays, requires assistance in the form of mortgage credit. In the main report, the Mission has recommended that the facilities offered by the Government Mortgage Bank be augmented. Instead of the original capital of ID 100,000, capital resources of ID 1,500,000 are suggested. The duration of loans, which is now limited to four years, should be increased to 15 years where it is considered desirable. [452]

V. Public Utilities

As indicated earlier, considerable progress has been made in providing the larger towns with water and electricity, but sewage systems have been wholly neglected. The Ministry of Interior is, with a few major exceptions, responsible for the planning, installation and general supervision of these public utilities. The actual 365

365 operating is under the control of Municipal Water and Electricity Boards. The Boards appear to be inexperienced in the management of such concerns, financial control being especially inadequate.

Water

312 One of the prime requisites of a community is a safe water supply. The principal source of water is the rivers. The Tigris, the Euphrates and their tributaries offer continuous and generous supplies of fresh water during the entire year. Communities have naturally stayed close to these sources of water and close to the many irrigation canals which now extend from the river systems.

While water from the rivers and irrigation canals is fresh (low in salt content), it nevertheless is high in colloidal and organic material, and usually high in bacteria. It is necessary, therefore, to treat such supplies of water for human consumption if general health is to be maintained (see Annex D, *Health*).

There are also a number of communities, mainly in the North, which are not situated near surface sources of water. These have to rely on subsoil water which, although it may be free from pollution, is apt to be brackish.

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312 The first modern water works was constructed shortly after the first World War. Development in this field has reached the point where approximately 40 municipalities have modern water systems, the outstanding ones being in the larger cities of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. All water works follow a similar pattern and consist of a raw water pumping station, sedimentation tanks, sand filters, chlorine treating equipment and an elevated surge tank. The capacity of the various water works is usually premised on the basis of 25 gallons per person per day with an allowance for a population growth in 25 years of 1.5 percent per annum.

Administration by the Water Boards has thus far been good. The Boards have established water rates for large consumers on a metered basis, while small consumers receive a flat rate. In either case, the rates are very reasonable and vary from 10 to 30 fils per cubic meter or from 100 to 250 fils per month, where a flat rate is established.

The development of municipal water systems has not taken place as rapidly as it should, primarily because of the lack of suffi-

cient funds. The Department of Municipalities, however, antici- 312
pating assistance from the Development Board in its financing, has 365
prepared a plan of construction during the next five years which will include the expansion or construction of new facilities in 114 municipalities having an aggregate population of approximately 950,000. The plan is practical and technically follows present methods. Many of the treatment plants are of the same size. This, fortunately, permits standardization which considerably reduces capital costs. The total estimated cost of the program is ID 5,651,600 of which approximately 50 percent would be in foreign exchange, mostly in sterling.

There are numerous villages in addition to municipalities where the problem of obtaining water is very critical. In many cases, this could be relieved by either a single well or by pumping small quantities of water at some distance from streams or irrigation ditches. Such sources of water would in many cases be impure and would require the use of clay filters. Nevertheless, it would relieve the people of the burden of carrying water for human consumption a great distance. These facilities should not cost more than ID 1,500 per installation.

With the need for pure water so critical, it is recommended that the Development Board assist the Department of Municipalities in financing the five-year program for the municipalities. In the meantime, the Department should study the problem of supplying water to the numerous villages and formulate plans for consideration by the Development Board.

Sanitation

Adequate disposal of waste water is an acute problem through- 365
out Iraq and a long-term program needs to be drawn up. Pending 364
this, a start should be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rise in the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. In 1947, an English firm prepared a report on the installation of a sewage and drainage system for the city—complete with pumping stations, sewage purification works, etc., and estimated to cost ID 4,600,000 on the east bank of the Tigris and ID 4,300,000 on the west bank. The proposed scheme could be undertaken in stages.

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364 The initial step might be to carry out the plan for the east bank according to a schedule based on the relative importance of its various elements. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless connections with the system are made compulsory for all property owners. No new constructions or major building alterations or enlargements should be permitted without adequate provision for such connections. Existing structures which are connected to the water supply system should be required to connect gradually to the sewer, according to a scheme to be worked out by the government and based on sanitary, engineering and financial considerations. The administration of the sewage system would logically come under the jurisdiction of the Water Board. The system might be made to help pay for itself by setting a certain surcharge over the cost of water actually used and then discharged into the system.

For the other larger cities, surveys should be conducted now to gather the data necessary for the actual design of each system. For example, the preliminary studies for the sewage problem of the City of Mosul should be preceded by a topographic survey. It is believed that the entire flow of the sewage and rain water could be designed so that no pumping will be needed. Chemical treatment of the sewage is to be preferred to discharge into the Tigris, because people living in downstream villages get their drinking water directly from the river.

For the smaller towns and villages, efficient and inexpensive individual sewage disposal units should be installed privately according to models prepared and tested by the government. Community bath and toilet facilities should be provided in the poorer sections of towns to supplement private individual units. Public lavatories should also be provided in the cities wherever there are concentrations of people, such as in business areas, parks and other public places.

Electric Power

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377 Municipal power plants serve primarily public and domestic lighting needs. Most industrial plants supply their own power. Cheap fuel also makes it possible for small direct-connected diesels to compete favorably with electric motors as prime movers, pri-

marily because the capital cost of all the electrical equipment is 365
eliminated. It is chiefly for this reason that there are over 3,000 377
large diesel-driven irrigation pump installations along the Tigris
and Euphrates Rivers, many of them very close to electric generat-
ing stations. In a similar manner, most of the older industrial [375]
enterprises and even many of the new ones have followed the same
practice of using diesel engines as a source of power. In the field
of public transportation, diesel or gasoline engines are universally
used as a means of motive power, while kerosene and other fuels
meet the country's needs for domestic heating and cooking. It is
not surprising, therefore, to find the development of electric power
to be on a very small scale and the per capita consumption among
the lowest in the world; the total generating capacity in utility
plants operating for public use is not more than 65,000 kw. Of
this 42,000 kw. serves the city of Baghdad and 9,000 kw. is
at Basra

Production and distribution of electricity in Baghdad are car- 365
ried on by the Baghdad Light and Power Company and in Basra
by the Port Authority. In Kirkuk the municipality receives its
power from the Iraq Petroleum Company's large plant but is
responsible for distribution. In all other municipalities, the electri-
city system is run by the local Electricity Board.

Recent expansions by the Baghdad Light and Power Company 365
and by the electric plant in Basra appear to be adequate for the 371
immediate future, unless new industries or other heavy loads create
power demands beyond those now anticipated. Apart from Kirkuk,
however, the remaining municipalities are badly in need of power.
To meet this need, the Department of Municipalities has estab-
lished a plan of development which is very practical. This plan calls
for the construction of new plants in approximately 56 municipal-
ities having an aggregate population of 175,000 and the expansion
of existing plants in 47 municipalities having an aggregate popula-
tion of approximately 750,000. All plants would be based on the
use of relatively small, slow-speed, heavy-duty, diesel-engine gen-
erators having a combined capacity of not over 10,000 kw. Fortu-
nately, many of the generating units would be identical, permitting
standardization and allowing maintenance to be carried out by
central repair facilities. It is estimated that the total cost including

365 371 distribution systems would be approximately ID 1,550,000, of which ID 1,000,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly sterling. The financing of this development will need to be undertaken by the Development Board.

365 It is important, however, that expansion of supply be accompanied by thoroughgoing measures to assure more efficient management. The only utilities that can be said to be operated efficiently are those at Baghdad and Basra. In spite of a considerable burden on its revenue (see Annex D, *Industry*), the Baghdad Light and Power Company charges the lowest rates in the country, pays regular dividends to its stockholders and finances plant expansions from reserves set aside for such purposes.

Rates charged by the municipally-owned plants vary widely, and, generally speaking, are twice those in either Baghdad or Basra. In some localities, the demand for power is so much greater than supply that rates are made exceptionally high for the purpose of discouraging the normal use of electricity by large consumers. Distribution losses are frequently as much as 36 percent and because of poor maintenance an engine generator is seldom capable of operating at more than 50 percent of its designed rating. Records are also very poor and in some cases nonexistent. It is obvious, therefore, that the present form of administration is unsatisfactory and must be changed if the consumer of electricity is
[471] to be adequately served. It is recommended, therefore, that all publicly-owned electric utilities be placed under the management of a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company by means of a mutually satisfactory operating contract. The contract should require all operations to be conducted in accordance with sound utility practices and it should include some incentive to reduce rates to the level now enjoyed in Baghdad and Basra.

371 375 It has sometimes been argued that hydroelectric power should be developed as part of the projected water-storage schemes. While the possibility of such development undoubtedly exists, the Mission believes that thermal plants are at present the most economic source of power in Iraq. Hydroelectric plants require a much higher capital investment than thermal plants. They tend to be economical only where fuel costs are relatively high and there is

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than 3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great
697 progress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
291 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the *sidara*, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was trans-
185 formed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public build-
● 366 ings, and gardens. Basra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under the Amin al-'Asima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion, the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service, hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European, an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting, street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects for which local pride was clamoring.

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial
operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors.
Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation,
in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building 331
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equipment,
the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both 619 178 economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 511

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361 the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change, if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363 labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible. Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362 or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365 service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been, imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the ancient '*arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363 Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366● shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368 services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365 power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the needed to prove the extent and quality of the ores located. This work has gone till now rather tardily, owing to the inadequate funds at the disposal of the Directorate General on Minerals. There also seems to be no clear policy as to how this wealth should be exploited : whether by the State directly or by concession to national or foreign enterprise. 135

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[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

Another factor delaying work in this field is the difficulty of transport to and from the sites of the ore deposits which are remotely situated in desert and mountain. [489]

Oil and gas are indeed plentiful in Iraq, and the exploitation of oil resources has indirectly helped to finance the industrial development so far achieved. But the cost of oil fuel and other oil products for local consumption is not much lower than in other countries because of the high rate of taxes on consumption. This and the limited range of oil products so far made in Iraq by the Alwand refinery, owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., have led to the import of a number of oil products from abroad. But the situation should change when the State-owned refinery, now under construction, goes into production. 382

Another problem connected with the supply of fuel is the lack of electric power. Power generation in Iraq is inefficiently organised and power rates, except in Basrah and Baghdad in recent years, are among the highest in the world. This has compelled most industries to generate their own power which has added a great deal to production cost. The recent reduction of power rates and the availability of electricity in Baghdad has been one of the major reasons for the concentration of industry in that city. 371

(3) **Concentration of Industry** : Industry in Iraq is heavily concentrated in the city of Baghdad which has a population of 550,000 inhabitants, in other words a little more than ten percent of the country's population. Excluding oil and one or two small textile, tanning, and grain-milling industries, all modern industry has been established in or near Baghdad, thus adding to the population and housing problems of the capital. There are many reasons for this concentration of industry. All routes converge on Baghdad ; it has the largest population and, as the seat of Government, it offers easy access to the central authority. As an old trading centre Baghdad has a well-organised market, large financial resources, and managerial and office staffs. Some of the factors that have made Baghdad 438 [366]

port traffic and such associated activities as the packing of dates, 361
cleaning of barley and flour-milling (a new industry), Basra is 438
closely bound up with the development of the new oil field at Zubair, some 10 miles inland. Basra, like Baghdad, received a large influx of people during the war, especially from nearby Amara.

The population of Kirkuk, the fourth city, is believed to have tripled in the last 25 years as a consequence of the development of Iraq's major oil field. The two holy cities in Kerbela province, Kerbela and Nejf, have a large transient population due to pilgrim traffic from Iran and other Moslem countries. These two cities have many handicraft workers in such trades as jewelry, brasswork and embroidery.

These six cities, together with Amara, are the only ones with 361
a population of over 40,000. With a few exceptions, such as 162
Khanaqin with its small oil field and refinery, the other municipalities function primarily as centers of administration and trade for surrounding districts. Broadly speaking, their size varies with their administrative importance. Of the provincial capitals, other than those already mentioned, five have a population between 20,000 and 40,000 and three between 10,000 and 20,000. Of the remaining municipalities, none has a population exceeding 20,000; less than 30, most of them centers of *qadhas*, have a population of more than 6,000.

Despite differences in size and function, the cities and towns 361
have a number of characteristics in common. The older parts are 342
usually congested with narrow streets and alleys. Houses are 339
built around courtyards, the only opening to the street being the 366
main doorway. The houses usually have a flat roof or a partially open second story for sleeping outside in the summer. Brick is the commonest building material; most of the larger towns have brickworks nearby, many of which are small and primitive. There are also a few modern concrete and steel buildings, mainly in Baghdad. Schools and hospitals can be found in the heart of these congested areas. An important section in every city is the *Suq* or bazaar, a network of alleys, often covered by crude roofs forming a series of arcades. These alleys are lined with the small shops of retail merchants and handicraft workers in textiles and metals. The *Suq* is usually located near the principal mosque.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the 579
period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of
Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It 674
was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest
eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq
of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg,
General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in
June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant
of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings 368
of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in
the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra.
The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast.
Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja
under its Jāf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals 743
and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The
Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building
for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their
Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrange- 744
ments in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely
a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to
combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels 368
appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enter- 185
prise, a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple 439
exports of the territory still varied annually according to the
harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates,
grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and
the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage
and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The
increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly
the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin,
partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater
demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate
inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are else-
where mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation,
of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great
697 progress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi
management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development
by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities
and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
291 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional
circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed,
185 with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings,
366 and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-ʿAṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries,
a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared
with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects
for which local pride was clamoring.

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1z Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads; their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 3690
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-
dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking "Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

4. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TOWNS

During the span of a single lifetime, from 1830 to 1900, profound 178
changes had come to pass in the urban society of 'Iraq. Most 369
marked in the upper classes, but perceptible in the lower, they radiated from both outwards into a countryside still socially primeval.

Early in the nineteenth century 'Iraq town society had remained 181
almost wholly isolated from Western influences. There was no 177
acquaintance with the outside world. The tempo of life was that of earlier ages, traditional manners held the field, and life in every relationship was based on Islam. No restless progressiveness had appeared: the evils of the times were accepted by all with submissive fatalism. The impact of Western conceptions and activities upon this society was in the Levant gradual, in 'Iraq relatively sudden. Such ideas and phenomena came first to 'Iraq by way of the New Army which had, in a day, superseded Janissaries and Hayta bands: an army with Europeanized officers, soon followed by doctors, engineers, and the whole body of Westernized effendis. The senior officials, Turkish in speech and half-European in education, were accompanied by wives of Istanbul and children fresh from modern-fashioned schools. Posts and telegraphs, foreign trade and enterprise began to operate. The Christian and Jewish minorities, with their European leanings, continued to set a higher standard of education, aided by the missions which served them.

The cumulative effect of these influences had produced by 1900 178
an 'Iraqi urban society far removed from that of a lifetime earlier.
Fed by the telegraph, an incipient press, and the resident foreigners, 181
the talk amongst officials in the Saray, merchants and agents in the coffee-shop, notables in their diwans, could for the first time embrace wider interests. Literacy had become commoner, changes had appeared in domestic and social habit, European clothes were worn by an increasing minority, the tempo of life accelerated. The wealthy class increased in numbers as in possessions, and found fresh ways of spending. Social leadership was still on patriarchal or plutocratic lines; an intelligentsia scarcely existed; but among a widening circle the old acquiescence had begun to yield to dissatisfaction and questioning. An excessive confidence was felt in 'science' and modern knowledge, conceived always as a set of formulae with miraculous efficacy. Except where devotion to orthodox Islam and its endowments was a vested interest, there had been signs of diminished respect for that doctrine and for its professors; but this was still very far from a landslide to atheism, nor had the old standards of behaviour been yet abandoned even by the *évolués*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

812 stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who
779 claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

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5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

369 If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded, on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The
619 tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of
795 intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects. Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some, notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy. Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence and embarrassment.

619 The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but
621 its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muḥammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the
619 vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal 619
memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of
time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups
of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or
Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis,
well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a
secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original 619
kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread 602
wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in
sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over
centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and
is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great con- 619
federacies embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen
tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal
life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the
tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One
authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities,
birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable.
The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal
authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the
tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in 619
the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, 369
their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk;
and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable
range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed
to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might
feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—
whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess
the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found
equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord
of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the
Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' 619
material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer 178
fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had 631
been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the
town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The
Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal
areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern
military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be
ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal
refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*dhabṭiya*) could appear

619 from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be
178 seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships
631 had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in
the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as
river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme
posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads
[423] had become a Government function; more and more the local
Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the
Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands
as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and
jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain
and loyal follower.

619 Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old
177 tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came
369 with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steam-
ship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself
radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats.
European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and
the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom
a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their
kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the
world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the
last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government
of the outlying regions.

619 The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into
579 Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr
and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated 635
secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming 661
C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim 635
Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of 663
ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the 185
town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless 369
showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew 182
rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their 668
reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be 369
different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

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182 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the
668 Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in
563 the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unim-
369 portant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Ḥilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

579 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained,
and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the
674 sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless.
Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation
[731] of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913)
the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found [453] a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 178 579 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 721 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation,
of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great progress
697 was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi
management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development
by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities
and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
241 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional
circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed,
185 with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings,
366 and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-'Aṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries,
a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared
with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects
for which local pride was clamoring.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered [575]
by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526
survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in
'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling,
was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place
in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America.
Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542
well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the 434
poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying 369
the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is
true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to
Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape
from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-
stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in
austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529
summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in 212
the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world 178
upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts,
easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development,
an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and
local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world
and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted,
was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of
1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those
affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology 814
apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

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[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

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The Need for Realistic Tribal Education. Apart from this great need for the right type of village school for the forty per cent of the population who are living in settled rural communities, there should be educational provision related to the special needs of the thirty-eight per cent of the population living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions and participating in a partial or fully tribal life.

Here again attention was drawn to this important educational need by the Monroe Commission which stated that 'practically [212] all tribal members are illiterate with the exception of some sheikhs who were sent early in their lives to towns or had a special mullah or sayyid, who lived with the tribe, to teach them reading the Koran and writing'. Again with certain modifications, due to the efforts of a minority of tribal heads who have provided their own school buildings, the comments of the Monroe Commission apply equally to conditions in 1950.

The Monroe Commission, mainly on the advice of an Iraqi educator who had made a special study of the educational needs of tribal adults and children, stressed the great importance of both preventive and constructive education for tribal dwellers during the difficult period of transition from the nomadic to the more settled agricultural life. They advocated novel educational devices to meet these special educational needs, including the provision of peripatetic teachers-cum-social advisers who would ultimately promote realistic rural schools which would provide primary education for the children and simple community centres for the adults.

These then, are the general and the outstanding educational needs of Iraq. It is now necessary, in so far as these relate to children of primary school age, to enquire to what extent they are being met in the existing primary schools system, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

conditions in the future, the rate could rise to two percent per 161
annum or even higher within a comparatively short period.
Obviously this possibility will have to be borne in mind in planning
the development of social services such as education and housing.
It also has important implications in agriculture. As the limited
supply of water is more fully utilized, most of the increase in population
may ultimately have to be absorbed in nonagricultural pursuits,
unless water is used much more efficiently than it is now.

As the standard of social services such as health and education 162
is higher in the cities and the opportunities for employment are [369]
more varied, the distinction between urban and rural population is
an important one in considering the age and sex distribution of
the people, their occupations and their standard of living. About
550,000 people live in the municipality of Baghdad, another 300,000
in the next three largest cities of Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk and
some 350,000 in other towns having a population of over 15,000.
Thus about 1.2 million people or a quarter of the population live
in sizeable urban communities. In addition, there are about a
hundred smaller municipalities having an aggregate population of
under half a million. These towns are usually the administrative 632
and market centers of the minor political subdivisions such as
qadhas and *nahiyas* and many of them are little more than large
villages; in many respects they form a semirural category intermediate
between the larger towns and the villages.

There has been a strong migration from the country to the 166
cities in recent years, particularly during the last war. The most 369
striking examples of this can be seen in Baghdad and Basra where
many thousands of "squatters" from Amara province are crowded
together in makeshift huts under extremely unhygienic conditions.
The peculiarly adverse conditions of life in Amara have made that
province the principal source of migrants to the large cities and,
indeed, to most parts of the country, but there has evidently been
a substantial movement from the rural areas in general. As it is 162
prima facie likely that these migrants would consist principally of
young adults or adolescents, especially men, it is not surprising
to find that the census shows a much higher proportion of the
very young (under 10) and the old (over 50) in the rural areas,
the disparity being even more marked among men than among

As a consequence they have a far healthier diet and are obviously 511
better dressed. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a farmer who
himself employs a fellah. Although this is partly a consequence of
the large size of his plot (100 donums including fallow), it is
indicative of his much higher standard of living.

In the towns, workers with regular employment would be 571
much better off than the poor fellah, but in cities such as Basra 465
and Baghdad where there has been a great influx of people from
the country, there is considerable underemployment in addition
to unemployment. Although, at the current rate of wages for
casual labor (about 200 to 250 fils a day) a man might theoretically
earn an annual income of ID 75 or more, there must be many
who work irregularly and earn less than ID 50. Bread and rice
are comparatively costly and, together with the rent of a room for
a man's family, might take nearly half his income.

Wages are probably not much higher in many of the smaller
and more primitive industries, but artisans such as plumbers and
electricians are scarce and can command much higher wages. In
the more modern industries, such as the oil industry, the Port of
Basra and the new factories in Baghdad, a skilled machinist can
earn a dinar a day or more. On the clerical side, in the lowest
grade of the regular civil service a married official with more than
one child receives ID 13 per month.

The higher income of the city-dweller with regular employment 511
enables him to purchase a reasonable diet, better clothing 369
and better housing. He also has access to educational and health
services. Nevertheless, congestion and sanitary conditions are often
very bad in certain parts of the cities and disease is common.

Above these various classes is the small rich group of landowners 565
and merchants. No estimate of the proportion of the 511
national income accruing to this group is possible, but some indication
can be gleaned from the fact that a landowner in the South
normally gets at least half the net value of the output from the land,
while, in industry, profits may exceed the total payroll.

varieties of pistachio scions on established native pistachio trees 245
should be given particular attention. Almond orchards could be increased to advantage.

Vegetables and Potatoes

Vegetable culture is concentrated in the neighborhood of the 244
large cities where such products as radishes, lettuce, cabbage, cucum- 369 ●
bers, squash, tomatoes and others are in good supply during the
season. Unfortunately vegetables do not figure prominently in the [262]
diet of most people. Outside of the big towns little or no vegetables are eaten. In part, this appears to be due to the fact that tribal tradition holds the cultivation of vegetables in low esteem. However, where the sharecropper is inclined to grow vegetables, he may be discouraged by the lack of available land or the shifting of the area assigned to him for cultivation. If a determined effort were made by the government to enlist the cooperation of the landowners, it might not be too difficult to overcome these obstacles.

It might be desirable to increase the production of potatoes 244
which are now imported to the value of about ID 100,000 per year. The lighter soils along the large streams in the provinces of Mosul, Erbil and Suleimaniya are particularly well adapted to the production of both Irish and sweet potatoes. With proper guidance in cultural practices and the use of fertilizers, planters in these areas could easily supply the country's needs. If it is demonstrated that potato yields compare favorably with other crops, the government might well encourage the planting of potatoes both by launching an educational campaign and by furnishing the necessary seed to planters. Special attention will need to be given to transport, however, and the growers will have to be shown how to build inexpensive potato bins or pits with sufficient ventilation, insulation and accessibility.

Tobacco

Tobacco has been grown to some extent in the North for cen- 249
turies, although it was not until the last few decades that its pro- 655
duction assumed importance. Even now, the value of the tobacco crop is probably no more than a tenth of that of wheat or barley. In the mountainous areas of Erbil and Suleimaniya, however, it is

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monotonous 164
diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the
highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

759 legislation, water supplies, removal and treatment of waste matter, industrial health, and maternity and child welfare. In the qualifying course it would best be taught as social medicine which might be defined as "the study of those environmental factors which affect health, and the application of that study to the benefit of man with a view to the prevention of disease and promotion of health."

There appears to be an excessive trend towards specialization. In some hospitals specialists have been appointed where there is clearly not enough specialized work for them. Though specialization should by no means be overlooked, a specialist service must depend first upon an adequate supply of general practitioners. Probably the four most needed types of doctors, in addition to physicians, are surgeons, eye specialists, gynecologists and obstetricians.

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369 One of the more urgent requirements is to attract doctors to the provinces. Iraqi doctors have shown little inclination so far to work in villages, partly for financial reasons but not a little because of the great lack of amenities in rural areas. There are no suitable houses for the doctors and their families, few schools, and in many places neither lighting nor a pure water supply. Young doctors who have been trained to require and depend upon all the latest technical aids in diagnosis and to insist upon the use of the most modern forms of treatment generally find that in most villages they cannot practice the medicine they were taught. If the best use is to be made of the doctors available, as much emphasis must be put on improving village facilities as on training doctors for the provinces.

Medical Aides

759 The acute shortage of trained aides is almost more serious than the shortage of doctors. In one hospital there were 21 doctors but only 12 trained nurses. There is a general lack of specially trained laboratory assistants, operating room attendants, radiographers, hospital storekeepers or hospital dispensers, and the like. Health officials, trained primarily for service in village dispensaries, are frequently diverted to hospitals to act as special "medical auxiliaries".

In all, there are about 1,000 nurses and dressers for some 5,000 hospital beds. Trained nurses are few in number so that

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economically dependent on the British. Quite apart from the 563
economic dangers of this, there were signs that they once more hoped for autonomy under British protection. The danger of such hopes is too obvious to need explanation.

The Other Christians

Apart from the Assyrians, the Christians in Iraq are mainly 563
Chaldaeans, Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, and Armenian 795
Orthodox and Catholics, with smaller numbers of Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and other Uniates, and Protestants. The communities are recognized by the Government as possessing competence in matters of personal status and other internal affairs.

Here, as in the other countries, the Christians are more fully 563
an urban community than the Moslems, and show a peculiar 369
aptitude for commerce, crafts and the professions; but there is 871
also a large peasant community, Chaldaean, Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic, in the plains around Mosul. In Iraq, as elsewhere, the proportion of educated Christians is higher than that of educated Moslems, and they are further advanced on the road to Westernization, thanks to the work of foreign missions and schools.

The Armenians are a trading community in the towns. They 563
preserve their language and traditions carefully, but they are too few to be able to avoid some measure of external assimilation. The other Christians are partly Syriac-speaking, partly Arabic. This cannot, however, be regarded as a sharp distinction, since the language used depends upon the environment in which they are living, and many of them are bi-lingual. In general, it is true that those whose native language is now Arabic spoke Syriac until recent generations, and that with few exceptions they are not conscious of belonging to the Arab nation.

In spite of efforts to spread the conception of a 'Syriac' 563
people, the general tendency among the Christians is towards at 668
least a superficial Arabization. This raises the question of their relation towards the Arab nationalist movement. So far, they have regarded it with fear and hostility, apart from some individuals who have supported it with enthusiasm. The nationalists too have tended to suspect them, although the existence of the much greater Kurdish and Shi'i problems has diverted attention from them. What the future relationship will be depends very

875 American Council Commission visited some schools in which the majority
872 of teachers had been recently transferred, and in one province about a third of the principals had been shifted before the start of the school year. This practice makes for instability and lack of continuity of policy in the school and at the same time destroys personal interest on the part of teachers and principals in their own schools. As it is, teachers and principals tend to lay the blame for the shortcomings of the school on the shoulders of their predecessors. Responsibility for good or bad school management is lost, and it is difficult for the Ministry to appraise the work of the teachers. Appraisal is made by inspectors on the basis of short visits and reports of the conduct of the teachers rather than on long-term achievement.

No one cause explains the frequency of transfers, but a variety of reasons may be found. Among these are lack of cooperation or personal quarrels among teachers or between teachers and their principals and differences between teachers and the local populations or the administrative authorities, the fact that transfers drag other transfers in their trail, and the fact that dissatisfaction with their posts leads teachers to exert continuous pressure on the educational authorities for transfers to more favorable situations. Some of this is a natural and legitimate desire for advancement, but much of it arises from nostalgia for the home province or from
[369] the extreme discomfort of living in an outlying village. It is impossible to deny that most of the outlying villages lack the simplest and most necessary amenities of life: satisfactory living quarters are unavailable; there are frequently no facilities for buying fresh meat and vegetables or for medical care. Under such conditions conscientious work and professional enthusiasm do not flourish, however capable and well-intentioned the teacher may be.

A housing program for village teachers and their families would go a long way toward solving this problem and toward raising the morale of the teaching profession. The dividend secured in increase in teaching efficiency would be worth the cost. Moreover, at least some of the expense could be recovered in the form of rent.

SALARIES AND PROMOTIONS

895 Graduates of rural- and elementary-teachers colleges have a beginning
465 salary of eight dinars ($32) per month; graduates of the three-year course in the primary-teachers colleges begin at ten dinars ($40) per month; and graduates of the four-year course—two years beyond secondary—receive 12 dinars ($48) per month. Salaries are paid for all twelve months, and teachers have a three-month summer vacation.

II. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

A. PRESENT CONDITIONS

369 511 162 The some 4,000,000 more people of Iraq who live the rural areas have been long characterized by many people both within and outside Iraq as suffering from poverty, ill health and illiteracy. These conditions become readily apparent to one visiting the villages of the country today. The characterization of the people can be extended to their being ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed.

369 511 The survey was immediately impressed with the crude and inefficient methods of making a living and the unnecessarily poor and unhealthy home and village life. These conditions can be remedied by instruction and assistance. People farm with primitive equipment and are wasteful of land and water. In village after village there are mud huts without light or fresh air. Families live, sleep and eat in single rooms packed together with animals, food, stores, farming equipment and refuse. Children play in courtyards filled with animal dung and filth, many people suffer from infected eyes, skin sores and diseases caused by unsanitary conditions which could be greatly reduced by better sanitary conditions. In the homes food is prepared on the floors where it comes in contact with the accumulated filth, flies, chickens, dogs and other animals. Pots and pans and mixing spoons lie on the ground. They are crudely cleaned with dirty water or old rags. There are no such things as kitchens, screened lockers for food or clean and covered places for drinking water in the homes of the rural villagers. Instruction in home care could overcome much of this.

369 364 511 The lack of pure drinking water is one of the most acute problems in these villages. Some pumps and water tanks and some water piped from springs to collection pools have been installed. However, these facilities frequently lack sanitary protection and show lack of proper maintenance by the communities. Often wells have around them accumulation of stagnant water, mud and animal dung. Another acute problem is the lack of any facilities in many villages, and homes for taking care of human waste. Where toilets exist they are mere uncovered holes open to flies and a source of spreading disease.

369 871 Many villages have not yet received the benefit of schools where children can learn some of the concepts and techniques which would enable them to understand the need for improving their conditions and help their families in doing so. In some villages young girls are not allowed by their elders to attend school or not provided with primary schools, buildings and teachers. Much of a new generation is growing up illiterate and ignorant of how they might help themselves when they grow up.

369 423 471 511 Inquiry among villagers and local officials revealed that although there might be a headman or mukhtar of the village, nearly all direction and management of their affairs comes from outside leadership. Communities lack the local leadership and organization by which they might progress through their own efforts. Sheikhs, landlords, their agents (sirkal) who are frequently local government representatives as well, direct the farming operations, decide the lands on which the villagers will farm and live, provide much of the seed and equipment, direct the cleaning of ditches, collect the shares of crops and other payments and decide whether or not the farmers may live and work on the land during the next year. Even the farmer who owns his own land is not without obligations to money lenders, tax collectors and government supervision. The farmers and tenants of Iraq are dependent upon

369 423 471 511 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.

369 433 511 Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 566 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 423 471 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 452 566 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 566 311 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which he puts his lands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 871 212 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read and write to obtain more information.

000 and write to obtain more information. Most rural people have not yet learned such
369 fundamental principles as crop rotation to enrich the land, the concept of germs, or the principles of infection and contagion. Under their circumstances they
311 have not been able to acquire a growing store of knowledge or of experience to pass down for the advancement of each successive generation. In other words, the people of rural Iraq have had little cultural heritage or growth.

5. Attitudes and Social Organization

369 Also fundamental to their poverty are attitudes derived from their social position and relationships with their sheikhs and landowners. Virtually imprisoned
366 by their condition of total dependence and debt, rural people have developed deep feelings of powerlessness and futility. Many of these attitudes stem from a
181 weakening of historical tribal relationship in which there were greater reciprocal
178 obligations between leaders and the people. Now they become unbalanced when the traditional tribal social system degenerates as sheikhs abandon their tribal responsibilities and take tribal lands as their personal possessions. The tribesman becomes detached from his social group. His dependence becomes greater upon the whims of his sheikh. This leader feels less and less obligation as the state and local governments assume those responsibilities for the [illegible] of the people which the sheikh formerly performed.

III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL PEOPLE

000 A. A PROBLEM REQUIRING TOTAL GOVERNMENT ACTION

The causes of the rural problems as briefly described obviously indicate that nothing less than a full scale attack upon them by all ministries and agencies of the government will bring about the desirable changes and improvements. Economic and social development of the rural people is not only necessary for their own welfare but for the welfare and progress of Iraq as a whole. A national economic and social development programme for rural peoples under the co-operative planning and direction of government leaders is needed. This programme should integrate into single, national, social plan of action the present and planned government activities of land and water development. The provisions should include as well as new plans for making ownership of farms available to tenants and landless people, credit, accessible to these small farmers at reasonable rates, instruction in new agricultural practices, establishment of public health and professional medical services available for all people, provision of education for every child, advice and demonstration in the improvement of housing, instruction in home and child care, establishment of social services for the needy, ill, blind and orphaned, construction of access roads to allow marketing of farm products from every village, development of village industries and the organization of communities for participation in an ultimate direction of their local affairs. This will take time, effort, money, careful study and planning, and increased inter-ministry and agency co-operation before it can be put into effect. The information and skills now exist to undertake this national campaign. It is a programme on which national leaders and with technical assistance from abroad can unite in their thinking and their efforts to build a solid agricultural economy as the foundation of Iraq.

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Sephardic origin. The majority have since 593
migrated to Israel, while probably less than 162
10,000 remain, subject to certain restrictions. Over 130,000 were transported to Israel by the Iraqi government in 1950-51. About 5,000 Palestinian refugees have settled in the country since the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. Small numbers of British, American and other nationalities also reside in the larger cities.

As a whole, Iraq is sparsely settled, with 361
the population concentrated in the river 161
valleys and in the rain-irrigated highland districts of the north. The most densely populated areas are found in the river valleys of the northern delta. In 1947, the density of population in the provinces of the upper delta region was calculated at 131 per square mile in Hilla and 104 in Baghdad. In the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk and Erbil it averaged 31 to 39 per square mile, and in Sulaimaniya, on the eastern frontier, 62 per square mile. In the south, it ranged from 75 per square mile in Basra province to 42 in Amarah, while in Dulaim, on the upper reaches of the Euphrates, it
did not exceed 10 per square mile. The pop- 369
ulation is essentially rural: over three quar- 161
ters of the inhabitants live in some 8,000 small villages or in semipermanent settle-
ments. The Bedouin, representing about 5 [464]
to 8 per cent of the total population, roam the deserts with their flocks, but many migrate seasonally to the towns in search of
work. There are only 7 cities with over 369
40,000 inhabitants. The population of 162
Baghdad, the capital, was estimated at between 900,000 and 1 million in 1952, including over 500,000 in the metropolitan area and several hundred thousand in the surrounding suburbs. The population of Mosul, a commercial center on the upper Tigris, totaled about 150,000, and of Kirkuk, the metropolis of the oil region, almost 75,000. Basra, the chief port, located on the Shatt al Arab, had a population of 90,000 to 100,000.

In spite of considerable progress in edu- 212
cation within the last 30 years, the majority 872

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TICKS AND MITES. NUMEROUS SPECIES OF
164 ticks infest the livestock, including *Rhipi-*
136 *cephalus sanguineus*, *Hyalomma dromedarii*
232 and *Haemaphysalis cinnabarina punctata.*
Ornithodorus tholozani occurs in many localities, and is the vector in sporadic cases of tick-borne relapsing fever. *O. savignyi* is present in the desert areas. The fowl or blue Persian tick, *Argas persicus*, and the castor bean tick, *Ixodes ricinus*, are widespread.

136 The itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is preva-
369 lent, especially in the congested urban communities and rural villages. The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventricosus*, is a frequent pest in the grain-growing districts.

136 SCORPIONS AND SPIDERS. Scorpions are common, particularly in the northern provinces. The most dangerous species are *Buthus australis* and *B. crassicauda.*
[165] *B. europaeus* is also present. A few deaths from scorpion stings are reported each year, usually among young children or old people. *Scorpio maurus kruglovi* is sometimes encountered in the plains and *S. maurus townsendi* in the Persian Gulf region. The principal poisonous spider in Iraq is *Lycosa tarantula.*

136 OTHER ARTHROPODS. *Reduvius tabidus*
752 and *R. annulipes* are found in many areas. The "date beetle," a large aquatic species of the family BELASTOMIDAE, is capable of causing serious bites.

136 **Reptiles.** Twenty-six species of snakes
752 have been recorded from Iraq, but only 5
165 land varieties are venomous. Casualties from snake bites are reported occasionally. A large proportion of the fatalities is probably caused by the Levantine or blunt-nosed viper, *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, which inhabits the northeastern highlands from north of Baghdad to the Turkish and the Iranian frontiers. *V. lebetina euphratica* is also seen in some localities. The horned viper, *Aspis cerastes* (= *Cerastes cornutus*), is native to the alluvial plains, while the carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, is found in limited areas in Diwaniya province. The hoodless cobra, *Naja morgani*, is widely distributed but apparently is rare. The poison-

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

Distribution of Schistosomiasis in Iraq

to 80 per cent in different localities. The disease is most extensive in the southern provinces and particularly in the vicinity of the Hammar lakes and the Amarah marshes. It is absent south of Basra, however, since the salinity of the waters along the Shatt al Arab interferes with the breeding of the intermediate snail host. Foci of infection decrease in prevalence toward the north, but spread along the Euphrates to the Syrian border and, in the east, as far as the upper reaches of the Tigris and its main tributary, the Diyala. As yet the districts bordering the Great Zab and the Little Zab rivers are uninfected. The northern *liwas*, or provinces, of Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya are apparently free from the disease, but a few isolated foci exist south of the foothills in Mosul.

Surveys based upon the examination of urine specimens collected from men and boys in representative villages in 1949-50[84] suggest a mean infection rate of 67 per cent in Amarah *liwa* which, because of the predominance of marshlands, is one of the most seriously infected areas in the country. In Basra *liwa* the rate averaged 23 per cent, but ranged from 26 per cent in the city of

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p. 37(B)

164 361 369 Basra to 75 per cent at Al Qurnah, in the fork between the rivers. In Muntafiq, the mean rate was 47 per cent, and in Diwaniya, 26 per cent, although some districts were heavily infected and others practically free. In central Iraq the disease was more irregular in distribution. In Baghdad *liwa* the infection rates averaged 35 per cent, but approached 80 per cent in some localities. In Kut, the mean was 48 per cent, with a decrease in prevalence toward the Iranian frontier. In Hilla, it was 15 per cent, with variations from 5 to 50 per cent, and in Kerbela, 28 per cent, with variations from 18 to 48 per cent. In the areas studied in Diyala *liwa* it ranged from 28 to 60 per cent, and in Dulaim it approximated 36 per cent. Subsequent surveys have revealed 11 to 18 per cent infection in limited foci near the marshes in Mosul *liwa*.

164 361 369 742 In a survey conducted in Baghdad in 1950-51,[87] ova of *S. haematobium* were found in 25 per cent of the urine samples collected from 285 schoolchildren and in 46 per cent of the samples from 242 inhabitants in hut settlements on the outskirts of the city. The prevalence was around 20 to 25 per cent in the suburbs, but reached 83 per cent in foci along the main road to Teheran.

164 462 Indigenous cases of *S. mansoni* infection have not been reported, but numerous cases of rectal involvement with *S. haematobium* have been observed. A dermatitis produced by nonhuman schistosome cercariae is common in the south and is often responsible for considerable disability among the agricultural workers.

164 462 312 744 Schistosomiasis constitutes one of the most important disease problems in Iraq. It is of major public health and economic significance, and the possibility of its spread with the expansion of irrigation is a matter of considerable concern to the government authorities. An active schistosomiasis control program is carried on by the Bilharzia Section of the Department of Endemic Diseases. This section maintains snail destruction and treatment units in the affected

63;Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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

Bejel in Iraq. Areas of Greatest Prevalence

in the settlements bordering the larger rivers and the marshes, where it is known locally by different names, chiefly *bejel, lawath* and *abou khisian*. It is believed that 164
at least two thirds of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the maximum transmission between 2 and 5 years of age. 369
Serious foci, in which the disease sometimes reaches epidemic proportions, exist in the southeastern provinces and along the Tigris and its tributaries in Mosul *liwa*. The districts around the Amarah marshes are probably the most severely affected, but infection rates of over 50 per cent are found in many villages in Amarah, Muntafiq, Basra and Mosul *liwas*. An important focus also persists in Dulaim *liwa*, in the vicinity of Hit and Ramadi. Surveys have shown moderately high infection rates in some villages, while in others the existence of 20 to 25 per cent of seropositive latent cases is suggestive of epidemic conditions in the recent past. The disease is present among the Bedouin tribes of the desert, but is absent among the Kurdish populations of the northeastern mountain districts. Indigenous cases are seldom seen in the towns, although a focus has been established in Baghdad,

p. 41 (B)

164 where the infection was introduced by 369 refugees from Amarah and has spread in the *serifa* settlements and the slum sections of the city.

744 A syphilis and bejel control program was 164 initiated in 1950 by the government health authorities, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. A dispensary and training center and research laboratories are maintained at the headquarters in Baghdad, while field units conduct surveys and mass treatment campaigns in the provinces. Investigations on the distribution and the relative prevalence of the infection, the significance of possible [758] insect vectors, the most effective methods of treatment and the radiologic and the serologic aspects of the disease are being carried forward by the headquarters and field personnel.

164 **Diseases of the Eyes.** Trachoma is 758 widespread, and is regarded by many as one of the most important endemic diseases in the country. The cases treated in government institutions usually average over 164 500,000 a year. The infection rates are uniformly high in the central provinces, and, in 1950, were calculated at over 233 per 1,000 population in Baghdad, 195 in Kerbela, 140 in Diyala and 102 in Hilla *liwas*. In the remaining provinces they ranged from 24 to 70 per 1,000. The density of population and the concentration of medical facilities in central Iraq cast some doubt, however, that such figures are representative of the degree of infection in the different regions. Cases of advanced trachoma are common, while local authorities estimate that 25 to 40 per cent of the children in many districts suffer from some form of the disease. Statistics from the government hospitals and dispensaries for the 15 years from 1929 through 1943 show that 53 per cent of all the eye diseases treated and 26 to 36 per cent of the total infections were trachomatous in origin.

Conjunctivitis, including both infectious and noninfectious types, is almost equally

p. 42(A)

000 years. The infection is believed to be en-
164 zootic among the field rodents in sections
133 of the eastern and the southern provinces,
505 since outbreaks have sometimes coincided
with floods which caused the rats to seek
shelter in the villages. It has also been
introduced on occasion by way of steamer
traffic through Basra and the river towns.
164 With the exception of 34 cases, associated
with a localized outbreak in the vicinity of
Amarah in 1945, no instance of human
plague was reported from 1937 through
1952. The 1945 outbreak started in a small
village on the edge of the marshes near
Amarah, in which 16 cases and 4 deaths
were recorded within a period of 20 days.
164 Quarantine measures were enforced by the
744 government health organization and the
Allied military authorities. DDT spraying
was resisted by the inhabitants, who fled
to the marshes, and the most seriously in-
infected village was finally evacuated and
burned to the ground.

In Baghdad and Basra, captured rats are often examined for the presence of plague, but rodent control is not attempted in the various cities and towns unless an epidemic is threatened. Plague-infected rats were found in Baghdad up to 1938.

164 **Relapsing Fever.** Both louse-borne and tick-borne relapsing fever are sporadic: from 25 to 100 cases are usually reported each year. Small localized outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever occur from time to time, primarily in the northern provinces. More extensive outbreaks were recorded in 1945-47, undoubtedly part of the epidemic wave which swept through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46. According to official statistics, 243 cases were treated in government institutions in 1945, 334 in 1946 and 379 in 1947, in contrast with 52 cases in 1944 and 26 to 33 in 1948-49.

Occasional cases of tick-borne relapsing fever are encountered in northern Iraq.
[136] *Ornithodorus tholozani* is regarded as the probable vector.

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349 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis

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369 is endemic in the alluvial plain region, within a radius of about 100 miles around Baghdad, which is one of the major foci in the Middle East. There the infection rates average 20 to 60 per cent, and probably approach 95 per cent in many localities, especially in the older parts of the city. Outside of this traditional focus, the infection is distributed irregularly. Some of the agricultural districts to the south are relatively free from the disease, but in the more compact towns and villages the infection rates are as high as 40 per cent. In Basra and Muntafiq *liwas*, the extent of infection is slight, and even in the towns the prevalence probably does not exceed 3 to 4 per cent. North of Baghdad the disease appears to be confined to isolated foci. It is widespread in the city of Mosul and in the towns of Beled, Samarrah and ʻAqra, but is almost completely absent from the steppe country and from the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan.

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758 In the 6-year period 1944-49, the cases of Oriental sore treated annually in government institutions ranged between a minimum of 2,910 in 1948 and a maximum of 10,502 in 1945. All ages are affected, but most of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the greatest susceptibility between 1 and 4 years of age. Multiple lesions [F11] are frequent, particularly among individuals living in congested and unhygienic surroundings. Ulcerative sores predominate, but the nodular type is seen in a large percentage of the cases. Secondary tuberculoid lesions, arising in healing ulcers, are also common in children. The largest number of cases is usually observed in August, September and October. *Phlebotomus sergenti* is apparently the only important vector in [136] Iraq, as in Pakistan. Cutaneous infections occur among the dogs and the cats found in the cities, but they are thought to play a minor role in the spread of the human disease.

164
369 Visceral leishmaniasis, or kala-azar, is suspected of being sporadic in the northern part of the country, although up to 1950

p. 46(B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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only 1 case, in which the diagnosis was confirmed by laboratory examination, had been recorded. Potential sandfly vectors of kala-azar are apparently absent in the southern and the central provinces, but they may exist in the northern highlands. 164 369 ●

Other Infections. Sandfly fever is endemic, and, in the delta region, reaches epidemic proportions every few years. From 842 to 4,688 cases were recorded annually in 1944-49. The sandfly vector, *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is widely distributed. The season of transmission usually extends from May to November, with a peak in June or July. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the south. 164

Cases of elephantiasis of undetermined origin are occasionally encountered, but *Wuchereria bancrofti* is not known to be present. Guinea worm infections are sometimes seen in pilgrims from southern Iran, but no indigenous cases have been recorded. [484]

NUTRITIONAL DISEASES

Undernutrition, anemia and avitaminosis are prevalent, especially among the wage-earning classes in the cities and the impoverished peasants of the south. Clinical manifestations of vitamin A and vitamin C deficiencies are widespread. In general, serious nutritional diseases tend to be more or less localized in distribution, depending upon the dietary habits and the standards of living of the people. Rickets is common, and from 100 to 2,387 cases were treated annually in the government institutions in 1944-49. Cases of scurvy and of osteomalacia are numerous. Beriberi and pellagra are sporadic, but minor symptoms of riboflavin deficiency are frequently observed. Protein edema is rare. A form of cirrhosis of the liver is encountered in which malnutrition is believed by some authorities to be a contributory factor. 146 511 361

MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS

Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and large-scale epidemics are reported occasionally. Encephalitis lethargica is sporadic. 164

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majority needs substantial improvement. The Department of 364 Municipalities has drawn up a five-year program to provide or 365 extend water supply systems for 114 municipalities with a total population of 943,000 people. Since such water systems are technically simple and the need is great, the Mission suggests that the Department be authorized to proceed with this program. Water supply systems for villages must, of course, be simple and inexpensive. In some cases, wells may prove to be the solution, although frequently brackish water is encountered; in other cases, water piped from a stream or canal with the help of a small pump and run through simple filters may be possible.

Outside of Baghdad and Basra municipal power plants are 365 generally inadequate, and a considerable number of municipalities 377 with a total population of 175,000 have no electricity at all. Baghdad and Basra, which together account for a generating capacity of 51,000 kilowatts, have a sufficient supply; and Kirkuk is adequately supplied from the large power plant of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Total generating capacity available in the remaining municipalities, however, is only 14,000 kw. A program for the expansion of this capacity and the provision of electricity for all municipalities would involve the installation of generators with an aggregate capacity of 10,000 kw. It would be desirable to proceed with such a program, provided simultaneous steps were taken to improve the management of municipally-owned power plants outside Baghdad and Basra. In these two cities the power plants are owned and managed [471] efficiently by a private company and the Port respectively. At present the machinery in the plants of other municipalities is poorly maintained and little or no attention is paid to depreciation. Power "losses" are as high as 36 percent compared to not more than eight percent in Baghdad and Basra; and the rates charged range from 30 to 55 fils[4] per kw-hr as contrasted with 18 fils and less in Baghdad and Basra. To remedy these evident deficiencies it is recommended that serious consideration be given to entrusting the management of such plants to a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company.

The Mission does not believe that it would be economic to 371 develop hydroelectric power at present. The capital cost of hydro-

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[4] One dinar equals one thousand fils.

371 [365] electric plants is considerably greater than that of equivalent thermal capacity; and Iraq possesses very cheap fuel for the generation of power. At present municipal power is used primarily for lighting, and even if industrial plants should turn increasingly to municipal stations for their power supply they would be able to obtain considerable amounts of "off-peak" power in such cities as Baghdad and Basra without any increase in generating capacity. In the judgment of the Mission hydroelectric power should be considered only if it does not need to be transmitted over long distances and then only if the demand is such as to insure a steady and high load factor. It is not yet clear that the Wadi Tharthar depression will actually store enough water to permit the generation of power, and the power which might be generated at the dams projected elsewhere is likely to be too far removed from major consuming centers.

VII. Education

871 Education is a basic condition for the agricultural, industrial and technological progress of the country as well as for the development of a fuller cultural life and the sound growth of democratic institutions. Its importance has received growing recognition and considerable progress has been made. In years of financial stringency the budget for education has usually continued to expand while other government expenditures were curtailed. In the last two decades, the number of schools rose from 262 to 1,100, the number of pupils from 32,750 to 175,000 and the number of primary school teachers increased from 1,325 to 6,588. During the same period, expenditures on education rose from about ID 300,000 per year to well over ID 4,000,000—a not inconsiderable advance even after taking into account the rise in prices.

Nevertheless, there are still only 175,000 children in schools out of about 750,000 of school age. Despite the increased emphasis on primary education, expenditures for this purpose still take only 51 percent of the education budget. The number of children in school declines sharply with each succeeding grade, so that only about half the children starting in primary school actually finish their

marily because the capital cost of all the electrical equipment is 365
eliminated. It is chiefly for this reason that there are over 3,000 377
large diesel-driven irrigation pump installations along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, many of them very close to electric generating stations. In a similar manner, most of the older industrial [375]
enterprises and even many of the new ones have followed the same practice of using diesel engines as a source of power. In the field of public transportation, diesel or gasoline engines are universally used as a means of motive power, while kerosene and other fuels meet the country's needs for domestic heating and cooking. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the development of electric power to be on a very small scale and the per capita consumption among the lowest in the world; the total generating capacity in utility plants operating for public use is not more than 65,000 kw. Of this 42,000 kw. serves the city of Baghdad and 9,000 kw. is at Basra

Production and distribution of electricity in Baghdad are carried on by the Baghdad Light and Power Company and in Basra by the Port Authority. In Kirkuk the municipality receives its power from the Iraq Petroleum Company's large plant but is responsible for distribution. In all other municipalities, the electricity system is run by the local Electricity Board. 365

Recent expansions by the Baghdad Light and Power Company 365
and by the electric plant in Basra appear to be adequate for the 371
immediate future, unless new industries or other heavy loads create power demands beyond those now anticipated. Apart from Kirkuk, however, the remaining municipalities are badly in need of power. To meet this need, the Department of Municipalities has established a plan of development which is very practical. This plan calls for the construction of new plants in approximately 56 municipalities having an aggregate population of 175,000 and the expansion of existing plants in 47 municipalities having an aggregate population of approximately 750,000. All plants would be based on the use of relatively small, slow-speed, heavy-duty, diesel-engine generators having a combined capacity of not over 10,000 kw. Fortunately, many of the generating units would be identical, permitting standardization and allowing maintenance to be carried out by central repair facilities. It is estimated that the total cost including

365 distribution systems would be approximately ID 1,550,000, of
371 which ID 1,000,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly sterling. The financing of this development will need to be undertaken by the Development Board.

365 It is important, however, that expansion of supply be accompanied by thoroughgoing measures to assure more efficient management. The only utilities that can be said to be operated efficiently are those at Baghdad and Basra. In spite of a considerable burden on its revenue (see Annex D, *Industry*), the Baghdad Light and Power Company charges the lowest rates in the country, pays regular dividends to its stockholders and finances plant expansions from reserves set aside for such purposes.

Rates charged by the municipally-owned plants vary widely, and, generally speaking, are twice those in either Baghdad or Basra. In some localities, the demand for power is so much greater than supply that rates are made exceptionally high for the purpose of discouraging the normal use of electricity by large consumers. Distribution losses are frequently as much as 36 percent and because of poor maintenance an engine generator is seldom capable of operating at more than 50 percent of its designed rating. Records are also very poor and in some cases nonexistent. It is obvious, therefore, that the present form of administration is unsatisfactory and must be changed if the consumer of electricity is
[471] to be adequately served. It is recommended, therefore, that all publicly-owned electric utilities be placed under the management of a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company by means of a mutually satisfactory operating contract. The contract should require all operations to be conducted in accordance with sound utility practices and it should include some incentive to reduce rates to the level now enjoyed in Baghdad and Basra.

371 It has sometimes been argued that hydroelectric power should
375 be developed as part of the projected water-storage schemes. While the possibility of such development undoubtedly exists, the Mission believes that thermal plants are at present the most economic source of power in Iraq. Hydroelectric plants require a much higher capital investment than thermal plants. They tend to be economical only where fuel costs are relatively high and there is

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

a comparatively high and steady demand for power. In Iraq, how- 371
ever, fuel is very cheap and electricity is principally used for light- 375
ing so that the load factor is low. Moreover, hydroelectric power would have to be transmitted at considerable expense over long distances to the principal centers of consumption, since the potential hydroelectric power sites are all in the North. The possibility of developing hydroelectric power in connection with the Wadi Tharthar project nearer Baghdad appears problematic.

sumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the 241 245 North.

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an 231 integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as [262] camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed.

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently 241 inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer [372] is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has [134] materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter.

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq 423 and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central 427 Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. 241 The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Breweries

274 Iraq's only brewery, having a capacity of 50 barrels per day, is not adequate to meet market demands. The owners are therefore in the process of obtaining additional equipment to double the plant's output. The brewery, which has been in operation since 1945, is very modern in design and its product is of excellent quality.

Distillery

Iraq's only source of ethyl alcohol is a small, modern, well-designed distillery located in Baghdad. Surplus dates are used as raw material. Although they are not expensive, they are nevertheless more costly than the raw materials, such as molasses, which are used in the alcohol industry in other countries. Thus the distillery is operating at about one third capacity, since the market will not absorb its entire production at the prices it charges. Most of the current output is used in the making of the national alcoholic drink known as *arak*.

258 *Date Packing*

Date packing is probably one of the oldest industries in the country. Market requirements have kept the industry very modern and fully capable of meeting all demands on it.

Matches

● 372 There are two match manufacturing companies in Iraq, both producing matches of very good quality. One company utilizes paper, and the other wood. Their combined production is equivalent to about one half of Iraq's requirements.

Cigarettes

277 The bulk of Iraq's requirements of cigarettes are made in the country from home grown tobacco. The output of 12 factories in 1949 amounted to 2.25 billion cigarettes, but there were in addition many small producers of handmade cigarettes. Even in the factories much of the work is done by hand, but further mechanization cannot be expected until labor becomes more expensive.

Small Enterprises

433 There are many small enterprises in Iraq which could be
445 expanded, such as tire retreading, reclaiming of lube oil, wood-

I-I
824✱
278✱

The roots of this and other species of birthwort are highly valued medicines in the East. The drug from Iran is a cylindrical and contorted root, 12 mm. in diameter, showing in section the peculiar wedge-shaped bundles of the wood. It has a somewhat bitter and pungent taste. The Aristolochias are stimulating tonics and are often given for snake bites. Locally the root is used for amenorrhea and as a pectoral and stomachic.

Aristolochia rotunda L. (Aristolochiaceae)

نخود الوند

Nukhūd-i-alvand (Teh., Isf.); Nukhund-i-alavandi (Ar.); Zaravand-i-gird (Pers.); the roots.

W.H.M.M. 150761.

The roots are tuberous, brownish or gray, round in shape like a small cottage loaf, with a broad base, a top narrow and marked with pit-like scars and the remains of fallen stems. They are hard, horny, and starchy, and have an acrid odor and taste. The drug is given as a tonic, diuretic, emmenagogue, and vermifuge. In Iraq *A. Maurorum* L. is used by the tribes to provide an antiseptic for healing wounds, and also for curing scab in sheep (G.).

Artemisia maritima L. (Compositae)

درمنه

Darmanah (Teh.); Afsant-el-bahara (Ar.); santonica, wormseed.

Ph. Ind. 2: 288; Greenish and Maplethorpe, Y.B.Pharm. 1923, 646.

Field 179; K.B. 304.

The dried, unexpanded flower heads of various species of *Artemisia*—often mixed with *A. vulgaris* L. and water (H.F.)—are used [751] as a vermifuge. The provinces of Turkestan and Kurdistan supply large quantities. Aitchison says that *A. maritima* L. and *A. campestris* are to be found everywhere in northeastern Iran. The rootstocks [372] and dry stems are used for fuel, and the flower heads collected from the villages around Tehran are sold in the bazaars. Santonin, the active, anthelmintic principle of wormseed, is now manufactured near the town of Chimkent in Turkestan (Ph. Ind. 2: 288).

Artemisia vulgaris L. (Compositae)

افسنطين

Afsantīn (Teh.); Afsantīn-i-hindi (Ar.); wormwood.

Ph. Ind. 2: 284.

35_1 Hooper and Field 5-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MH1

I-I
278* **Myristica fragrans Houtt. (Myristicaceae)**

824* جوز بويا

Jauz-i-būyā, "fragrant nut" (Teh., Ar.); Bazbaz (Pers.); Jaephal (Hind.); nutmeg and mace.

Field 147; W.H.M.M. 150851.

[263] The well-known seeds of the nutmeg are used all over India and Iran as a spice and for medicinal purposes.

Mace, the aril or testa, called Gul-i-jauz or "flower of the nutmeg," is sold and employed for the same purpose as the kernel.

Myrtus communis L. (Myrtaceae)

تخم مورد

Tukhm-i-mūrd (Teh.); Hab-el-aas (Ar.); Uurd (Abu Mansur); myrtle fruits.

مورد سبز

Mūrd-i-sabz; Barg-i-mūrd (Teh.); leaves of the myrtle.

Field 24; W.H.M.M. 150814, 150827.

Myrtle berries are black, pea-shaped, aromatic, and slightly sweet; each fruit contains several white, hard, kidney-shaped seeds. The leaves are small, lanceolate, and dotted with glands, emitting an agreeable odor when bruised. All parts of the myrtle contain a volatile oil to which the virtues of the plant are due. The plant is stimulant and astringent, and the volatile oil is antiseptic, parasiticide, and rubefacient.—It is applied hot as a poultice for boils (H.F.).

Nannorrhops Ritchieana Wendl. (Palmae)

كاكل زرد

Kākil-i-zard (Teh.); Khove, Khū (Afg.); fiber of the dwarf palm.

W.H.M.M. 150798.

The soft fiber or tomentum, very like camel's hair, from the petioles of this palm is used as tinder and for dressing wounds. • [372] Khū is the name in Afghanistan for tinder obtained from any source and used in lighting pipes and fires.

Nardostachys Jatamansi DC. (Valerianaceae)

سنبل لطيب

Sumbul-i-latif, Sumbulu'l-tib (Teh., Isf.); Sumbul-jibali (Ar.); Jata-masi (Sans., Hind.); Balchar (Afg.); Bekh-i-sumbul (Pers.); musk root, Indian spikenard.

I-I
824*
278*

This agaric occurs on the oak and larch, and in sizes as large as a fist or a child's head; it is light, spongy, and friable, and is not easily powdered. The use of this fungus in medicine is of very ancient date. Avicenna insists upon the great efficacy of agaric as an alexipharmic. Mohammedan physicians closely follow the Greeks in considering that it removes all kinds of visceral obstructions and expels diseased humors. It is also a Chinese drug. The light, white, spongy interior is made into touchwood, spunk, or tinder, and was formerly used to absorb blood and secretions from wounds, etc.; hence the old name Fungus or Boletus Chirurgorum given to the plant. [372] •

Prosopis Stephaniana Kunth (Leguminosae)

خرنوبان

Kharnūbān, Kornub (Isf.); Shok (Ar.); Kunbut (Syr.); Chughak: "humpbacked, bent," applied to the contorted pods, Tukhm-i-jinjak (Ait.); the pods.

Field 403.

This is a loose, straggling, thorny shrub of the Caucasus, Syria, Iran, and northern India. The pods are brown or copper-colored, 4 by 1.5 cm., galled, swollen, and contorted, containing several oval, brown seeds separated by soft, spongy dissepiments. The pods are [231] eaten by sheep, but the seeds pass through undamaged and germinate readily at the coming of the winter rains (G.). The pods and roots of the plant are regarded as astringent and are given for dysentery.

Prunus Amygdalus Stokes var. amara Baill. (Rosaceae) [245]

بادام تلخ

Bādām-i-talkh (Teh.); bitter almonds.

Field 52A, 171.

The bitter almond tree, like the sweet, is a native probably of Iran and Asia Minor, and is indistinguishable in botanical characters. In form and appearance bitter almonds closely resemble Valencia almonds, but are usually smaller. They are employed in confectionery and for flavoring, but as the hydrocyanic acid yielded [263] by them varies in quantity, they should be used with caution.—An ointment made of bitter almonds is applied to furuncles (H.F.).

Prunus Armeniaca L. (Rosaceae) 824*

زرد آلو 262

The fruit: Zard ālū (Pers.); Mishmish (Iraq); Khūbani, with 245 stones removed (Hind.); dried apricot.

I-I

Field 264; 4, 12, 36, 53 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150739; K.B. 335. 824*

The castor oil plant[1] is a native of India, but is common now 278*
throughout tropical and subtropical countries. In Iraq and Iran
it is cultivated as a windbreak for cotton and other summer crops 372•
and in gardens as an ornamental plant. It may attain a height of [247]
10 meters and be a perennial tree, but in cooler climates it is either [245]
a shrub or an annual herb. With variations of the plant there are also varieties, large and small, of the seeds. The four samples from Iraq were classed as follows: "Abhangi seeds" 15 by 9 mm., "ordinary" 13 by 10 mm., "Indian red-stemmed" 11 by 8 mm., "Syrian Baladi" 13 by 11 mm. The most important constituent of castor seed is the fixed oil, which exists to the extent of about 50 per cent. The oil is used as a lubricant, as an illuminant, and in medicine as a safe purgative. The oil cake contains all the poisonous property
originally present in the seed, hence can not be used as a cattle food; [241]
it is, however, an excellent manure and fuel.

Roccella Montagnei Bél. (Ascolichenes, Roccellaceae) 824*

دواله

Davālah (Ham.); a lichen. 278*

Field 28A; W.H.M.M. 150824; K.B. 336.

Achundow refers this drug to *Muscus arboreus*, and gives the Persian names as Dawalak and Karbasu and the Arabic name as Aschna (*Usnea* sp.). The Persian name Davālah is applied to more than one kind of lichen, since Dymock gives *Parmelia kamtschadalis* Esch. as the source of this drug in the Indian bazaars (Ph. Ind. 3: 627). In the Field collection from Baghdad, No. 28A, this drug occurs under the name of "Lihayat as-shāyib." Some of the Parmelias are used as a dye. They are gray lichens, in broken pieces, having emollient and astringent properties, used in a bath or as a poultice.

Rosa damascena Mill. (Rosaceae) 824*

گل سرخ 263

Gul-i-surkh, "red flower" (Teh.); Ward (Ar.); flowers of red rose. 278*

Field 42A; W.H.M.M. 150763.

The rose of Damascus is largely cultivated in western Asia. In Turkey, Bulgaria, and the south of France this species yields attar of rose and is the flower from which the official rose water is prepared.

The petals are slightly astringent, and are used chiefly as an [386]
agreeable astringent or as a coloring agent. "Gulanjabin," of rose

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[1] [Ricinus communis --ANALYST]

35₈ Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

I-I

824 * (4) Mangel-wurzel should succeed in Kurdistan.

278 * (5) Wild beets, known as Silaijah or Silaigah.

Boswellia Carterii Bird. (Burseraceae)

کندر

Kundur (Teh.); Seta Kundura (Hind.); frankincense or olibanum.

Field 199.

[314] There are several kinds of this fragrant oleo-gum-resin found in commerce. Kundura zakara, "male frankincense," is in reddish or deep yellow, circular tears; Kundura unsa, "female frankincense," is in yellowish white, translucent or pale tears; Kisher Kundur or Dhupa of the bazaars occurs in scaly pieces of the bark coated with the exudation.—Olibanum is used chiefly as incense; it is an ingredient in plasters; a dose of half a misqal (35 grains) is said to improve the memory (H.F.).

Brassica campestris L. var. Napus Bab. (Cruciferae)

تخم شلغم

Tukhm-i-shalgham (Teh.); Sarsun (Hind.); rape or colza seed.

Field 54 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150856.

[252] • [373] This is an important crop in India and elsewhere, cultivated chiefly for its seed. Rape seeds are small, brownish or reddish brown, 2 mm. in diameter, smooth. They yield by expression a bland oil used as an emollient and in cooking and lighting.

Brassica (Sinapis) nigra (L.) Koch, and B. alba Rabenh. (Cruciferae)

خردل

Khardal.

[263] Mustard, now a widespread weed, is of Eurasian origin. The powdered seeds are an important condiment, used in curries, and medicinally in the preparation of poultices and plasters. Mustard is taken internally as an emetic in cases of narcotic poisoning (G.).

Butea frondosa Roxb. (Leguminosae)

برگ هند ایران

Barg-i-hind īrān, Parakeh-i-hindī (Teh.); Palaspapado (Duk.); Palas Keby (Hind.); seeds of bastard teak or Bengal kino tree.

Field 181; W.H.M.M. 150818.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

marily because the capital cost of all the electrical equipment is 365 eliminated. It is chiefly for this reason that there are over 3,000 377 large diesel-driven irrigation pump installations along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, many of them very close to electric generating stations. In a similar manner, most of the older industrial [375] enterprises and even many of the new ones have followed the same practice of using diesel engines as a source of power. In the field of public transportation, diesel or gasoline engines are universally used as a means of motive power, while kerosene and other fuels meet the country's needs for domestic heating and cooking. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the development of electric power to be on a very small scale and the per capita consumption among the lowest in the world; the total generating capacity in utility plants operating for public use is not more than 65,000 kw. Of this 42,000 kw. serves the city of Baghdad and 9,000 kw. is at Basra

Production and distribution of electricity in Baghdad are carried on by the Baghdad Light and Power Company and in Basra by the Port Authority. In Kirkuk the municipality receives its power from the Iraq Petroleum Company's large plant but is responsible for distribution. In all other municipalities, the electricity system is run by the local Electricity Board. 365

Recent expansions by the Baghdad Light and Power Company 365 and by the electric plant in Basra appear to be adequate for the 371 immediate future, unless new industries or other heavy loads create power demands beyond those now anticipated. Apart from Kirkuk, however, the remaining municipalities are badly in need of power. To meet this need, the Department of Municipalities has established a plan of development which is very practical. This plan calls for the construction of new plants in approximately 56 municipalities having an aggregate population of 175,000 and the expansion of existing plants in 47 municipalities having an aggregate population of approximately 750,000. All plants would be based on the use of relatively small, slow-speed, heavy-duty, diesel-engine generators having a combined capacity of not over 10,000 kw. Fortunately, many of the generating units would be identical, permitting standardization and allowing maintenance to be carried out by central repair facilities. It is estimated that the total cost including

365 371 distribution systems would be approximately ID 1,550,000, of which ID 1,000,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly sterling. The financing of this development will need to be undertaken by the Development Board.

365 It is important, however, that expansion of supply be accompanied by thoroughgoing measures to assure more efficient management. The only utilities that can be said to be operated efficiently are those at Baghdad and Basra. In spite of a considerable burden on its revenue (see Annex D, *Industry*), the Baghdad Light and Power Company charges the lowest rates in the country, pays regular dividends to its stockholders and finances plant expansions from reserves set aside for such purposes.

Rates charged by the municipally-owned plants vary widely, and, generally speaking, are twice those in either Baghdad or Basra. In some localities, the demand for power is so much greater than supply that rates are made exceptionally high for the purpose of discouraging the normal use of electricity by large consumers. Distribution losses are frequently as much as 36 percent and because of poor maintenance an engine generator is seldom capable of operating at more than 50 percent of its designed rating. Records are also very poor and in some cases nonexistent. It is obvious, therefore, that the present form of administration is unsatisfactory and must be changed if the consumer of electricity is [471] to be adequately served. It is recommended, therefore, that all publicly-owned electric utilities be placed under the management of a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company by means of a mutually satisfactory operating contract. The contract should require all operations to be conducted in accordance with sound utility practices and it should include some incentive to reduce rates to the level now enjoyed in Baghdad and Basra.

371 375 It has sometimes been argued that hydroelectric power should be developed as part of the projected water-storage schemes. While the possibility of such development undoubtedly exists, the Mission believes that thermal plants are at present the most economic source of power in Iraq. Hydroelectric plants require a much higher capital investment than thermal plants. They tend to be economical only where fuel costs are relatively high and there is

a comparatively high and steady demand for power. In Iraq, however, fuel is very cheap and electricity is principally used for lighting so that the load factor is low. Moreover, hydroelectric power would have to be transmitted at considerable expense over long distances to the principal centers of consumption, since the potential hydroelectric power sites are all in the North. The possibility of developing hydroelectric power in connection with the Wadi Tharthar project nearer Baghdad appears problematic. 371 375

Power

● 376 In spite of the existence of several large dams, Iraq apparently has no hydroelectric power installations. It is reported, however, that the proposed dam at Bekhme, at the junction of the river Ruwandiz and the Great Zab, which will produce a mountain lake 65 kilometres long, will be used to produce electric power, on the model of the Boulder Dam in the United States.

Postal Service

205 By the end of the financial year 1947–48, Iraq had 171 post and telegraph offices.

The regular postal service of Iraq covers a network of 8,664 kilometres and mail is transported by: railways, over 1,600 kilometres; automobiles, 5,630 kilometres; river boats and barges, 390 kilometres; couriers and beasts of burden, 1,044 kilometres.

An air mail service to Egypt, Greece, Italy, France, Switzerland, Canada and the United States is operated twice a week via Egypt. An air mail service is operated between Iraq and the countries of the Near East and the other countries of the Middle East. By the end of July 1948, the Iraqi air mail network covered 18,910 kilometres.

needed to prove the extent and quality of the ores located. This 135 work has gone till now rather tardily, owing to the inadequate funds at the disposal of the Directorate General on Minerals. There also seems to be no clear policy as to how this wealth should be exploited: whether by the State directly or by concession to national or foreign enterprise.

Another factor delaying work in this field is the difficulty of [489] transport to and from the sites of the ore deposits which are remotely situated in desert and mountain.

Oil and gas are indeed plentiful in Iraq, and the exploitation 382 of oil resources has indirectly helped to finance the industrial development so far achieved. But the cost of oil fuel and other oil products for local consumption is not much lower than in other countries because of the high rate of taxes on consumption. This and the limited range of oil products so far made in Iraq by the Alwand refinery, owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., have led to the import of a number of oil products from abroad. But the situation should change when the State-owned refinery, now under construction, goes into production.

Another problem connected with the supply of fuel is the lack 371 of electric power. Power generation in Iraq is inefficiently organised and power rates, except in Basrah and Baghdad in recent years, are among the highest in the world. This has compelled most industries to generate their own power which has added a great deal to production cost. The recent reduction of power rates and the availability of electricity in Baghdad has been one of the major reasons for the concentration of industry in that city.

(3) *Concentration of Industry*: Industry in Iraq is heavily con- 438 centrated in the city of Baghdad which has a population of 550,000 inhabitants, in other words a little more than ten percent of the country's population. Excluding oil and one or two small textile, tanning, and grain-milling industries, all modern industry has been established in or near Baghdad, thus adding to the population and housing problems of the capital. There are many reasons for this concentration of industry. All routes converge on Baghdad; it has the largest population and, as the seat of Government, it offers easy access to the central authority. As an old trading centre Baghdad [366] has a well-organised market, large financial resources, and managerial and office staffs. Some of the factors that have made Baghdad

majority needs substantial improvement. The Department of 364 Municipalities has drawn up a five-year program to provide or 365 extend water supply systems for 114 municipalities with a total population of 943,000 people. Since such water systems are technically simple and the need is great, the Mission suggests that the Department be authorized to proceed with this program. Water supply systems for villages must, of course, be simple and inexpensive. In some cases, wells may prove to be the solution, although frequently brackish water is encountered; in other cases, water piped from a stream or canal with the help of a small pump and run through simple filters may be possible.

Outside of Baghdad and Basra municipal power plants are 365 generally inadequate, and a considerable number of municipalities 377 with a total population of 175,000 have no electricity at all. Baghdad and Basra, which together account for a generating capacity of 51,000 kilowatts, have a sufficient supply; and Kirkuk is adequately supplied from the large power plant of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Total generating capacity available in the remaining municipalities, however, is only 14,000 kw. A program for the expansion of this capacity and the provision of electricity for all municipalities would involve the installation of generators with an aggregate capacity of 10,000 kw. It would be desirable to proceed with such a program, provided simultaneous steps were taken to improve the management of municipally-owned power plants outside Baghdad and Basra. In these two cities the power plants are owned and managed [471] efficiently by a private company and the Port respectively. At present the machinery in the plants of other municipalities is poorly maintained and little or no attention is paid to depreciation. Power "losses" are as high as 36 percent compared to not more than eight percent in Baghdad and Basra; and the rates charged range from 30 to 55 fils[4] per kw-hr as contrasted with 18 fils and less in Baghdad and Basra. To remedy these evident deficiencies it is recommended that serious consideration be given to entrusting the management of such plants to a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company.

The Mission does not believe that it would be economic to 371 develop hydroelectric power at present. The capital cost of hydro-

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[4] One dinar equals one thousand fils.

sures of production and assistance which tend to shield industry 647
against competition. There is much to be done to help industry 654
to achieve better control of the quality of its products, in reducing waste through material salvage, in analyzing production costs, in making market surveys and in raising labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

IV. Other Suggestions for the Improvement of Industry

Possibilities for Economies in the Use of Capital

Whenever the capital cost of a plant is an important determi- 433
nant of production costs, it becomes essential to utilize the plant to the fullest extent. This may be accomplished, for example, by increasing the number of shifts, by extending the work week and by stepping up machines to their maximum economic speed. Completely integrated plants seldom if ever offer the opportunity for this type of operation, because certain machines are never called upon for continuous use. This is, of course, very noticeable where the plant does all its own maintenance work, even to all of its foundry items. The solution is obviously one of resorting to contracting or sub-contracting with concerns specializing in particular operations. For example, a single finishing and dyeing concern might advantageously serve two or more textile mills, where the capacity of these mills is insufficient to load separate finishing departments to their economic limit.

In Iraq there is a tendency in industry to generate its own 433
power rather than to purchase it. This leads to the installation of 377
expensive facilities which are utilized only part of the day. While 365
industry is operating, many municipal power plants stand virtually idle because they serve primarily lighting needs and their peak load accordingly comes at night. In some cases, where large quantities of process steam are needed, industrial enterprises may be justified in generating their own power, but for the most part, the purchase of power is preferable. Unfortunately, power rates, 433
except in Basra and Baghdad, are so high that the purchase of 365

365 364 The initial step might be to carry out the plan for the east bank according to a schedule based on the relative importance of its various elements. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless connections with the system are made compulsory for all property owners. No new constructions or major building alterations or enlargements should be permitted without adequate provision for such connections. Existing structures which are connected to the water supply system should be required to connect gradually to the sewer, according to a scheme to be worked out by the government and based on sanitary, engineering and financial considerations. The administration of the sewage system would logically come under the jurisdiction of the Water Board. The system might be made to help pay for itself by setting a certain surcharge over the cost of water actually used and then discharged into the system.

For the other larger cities, surveys should be conducted now to gather the data necessary for the actual design of each system. For example, the preliminary studies for the sewage problem of the City of Mosul should be preceded by a topographic survey. It is believed that the entire flow of the sewage and rain water could be designed so that no pumping will be needed. Chemical treatment of the sewage is to be preferred to discharge into the Tigris, because people living in downstream villages get their drinking water directly from the river.

For the smaller towns and villages, efficient and inexpensive individual sewage disposal units should be installed privately according to models prepared and tested by the government. Community bath and toilet facilities should be provided in the poorer sections of towns to supplement private individual units. Public lavatories should also be provided in the cities wherever there are concentrations of people, such as in business areas, parks and other public places.

Electric Power

365 377 Municipal power plants serve primarily public and domestic lighting needs. Most industrial plants supply their own power. Cheap fuel also makes it possible for small direct-connected diesels to compete favorably with electric motors as prime movers, pri-

marily because the capital cost of all the electrical equipment is 365
eliminated. It is chiefly for this reason that there are over 3,000 377
large diesel-driven irrigation pump installations along the Tigris
and Euphrates Rivers, many of them very close to electric generating
stations. In a similar manner, most of the older industrial [375]
enterprises and even many of the new ones have followed the same
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of approximately 750,000. All plants would be based on the
use of relatively small, slow-speed, heavy-duty, diesel-engine generators
having a combined capacity of not over 10,000 kw. Fortunately,
many of the generating units would be identical, permitting
standardization and allowing maintenance to be carried out by
central repair facilities. It is estimated that the total cost including

489 needs of the southern districts are particularly acute:
653 as yet they possess only roads which are not practicable for any traffic, still less for heavy motor
[491] traffic, during the rainy season and for a long time afterwards, and boat-bridges of a very old—almost antediluvian—type across the Euphrates and other rivers.

[508] The government is taking steps to modernize the Baghdad and Basra-Ma'agil airports (the latter, in addition to its modern technical installations, has had since 1937 an air-conditioned hotel, swimming pool, tennis courts, etc.). The aim is to make them into first-class international airports. In addition, a training school for civilian air pilots was established in Iraq in 1937.

● 377 As the country lacks hydroelectric power stations, in spite of the existence of various large dams, there is now a plan to utilize the Bekhme dam for the generation of electric power.

315 In the expectation of the return of normal political conditions in the Near and Middle East, the

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[8] It is interesting to note that for the Basra—Baghdad section (568 km), these coaches are placed on special 1-metre bogies.

35₁ Hooper and Field 8-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

I-I

This plant is a gigantic shrub, remarkable for its legumes, which 278* are several feet long. It has been called Burmese tamarind. The 824* seeds are more or less heart-shaped, flattened, about 2 inches in diameter, with a shining, brown surface. They are used by some hill [515] tribes for washing the hair, as they contain saponin. Aitchison remarks that Kors-i-kamar seeds are exported from India to Iran and employed in medicine. In Tehran they are powdered and, mixed with yolk of egg, made into a plaster for pain in the back.

Equisetum ramosissimum Desf. (Equisetaceae)

قنطريون

Qantaryūn (Teh.); the herb, horsetail.

W.H.M.M. 150859.

The light green stalks of the horsetail with their brittle structure and acute edges appear by some mistake to have been intended to represent the centaury plant (*Erythraea Centaurium* Pers., Gentianaceae). They could not replace the pleasantly bitter centaury herb. *Dianthus anatolicus* Boiss. is called Kanturiyan in Iran, where it is also used as a substitute for the centaury of the European flora. The centaury, like other plants of the gentian family, is a domestic remedy for a general tonic.

Eremurus Aucherianus Boiss. (Liliaceae)

سريش سفيد

Sirish-i-safīd (Isf., Teh.); commercial names: chiresh, sarish, siris, shirias; roots of the giant asphodel.

Field 1, 2 (Isf.); 80A, 240.

The roots of one or more species of asphodel, including *Asphodelus ramosus* L., are found in commerce in Iran and Central Asia, and are trade products in Mosul and Leh, either dried entire or powdered (Sirish-i-narm). They are exported from the Balad Sinjar district in northwestern Iraq to Syria (G.). The roots, whitish, [381] • twisted, hard, light brown, swell and soften and partly dissolve in water, forming a thick mucilage. Water added to the powder forms a glue used for cementing leather, in binding books, and for other [262] industrial purposes. The green part of the plant is eaten.

Erysimum repandum L. (Cruciferae)

تخم خاک شیر

Tukhm-i-khāk-i-shīr (Ham.); Khakshir-talkh (Isf.); Khakechi (Schl.); Khubah (Ar.); Kashir (Bal.); the seeds.

382

382 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES--refining and processing of petroleum; manufacture of coal products (e.g., illuminating gas, coal tar); use of special apparatus and machinery; processing techniques; products and their uses; economic importance of petroleum and coal products industries; organization of labor and production; etc. See also:

Oil and gas wells and pipelines	315	Refining machinery	402
Coal mines	316	Plumbing fixtures	414
Heating and lighting systems	354	Filling stations	495
Thermal power	375		

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

185 Ruṭba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of
654 bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial development
135 proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every
Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its
favour. 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled
433 artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

382 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil
export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in
471 1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the earning of royalties. The agreement once passed by Parliament, at the cost of one ministerial resignation, the Company could plan and execute its twofold desert pipeline and its mid-desert pump-stations: works which called for its utmost efforts, human and financial, for the next three years. These and the continuing field operations in Kirkuk area constituted by far the most important man-made enterprise of 'Iraq's long history and, it could be hoped, the most advantageous to its Treasury and public. 382 471

The internal structure of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was completed by the definite admission of its American shareholders, the Near East Development Corporation, in 1928. The I.P.C. fields headquarters in 'Iraq moved from Ṭuz Khurmatu to Kirkuk in 1931, while that of its pipelines was established at Haifa. The annual payments, of which Turkey received 10 per cent. under the 1926 Treaty (p. 156), were made in sterling at the Bank of England exchange rate as between gold and sterling.

The area of north-western 'Iraq released by the I.P.C. in 1931 was next year allotted by Government to the B.O.D. Company, a British group, with considerable Italian, German, and other foreign shareholding, which had tried vainly to acquire 'plots' under the I.P.C. Concession of 1925, and in 1929 had protested at Geneva against its exclusion. Inheriting the test-drilling results of the I.P.C. west of Tigris, the B.O.D. bound itself to pay in advance of production an annual dead rent of £100,000 (gold), rising to £200,000: to export a stated minimum of 1 million tons per year within a seven-year time limit: and to allot to Government without charge a fifth of its crude production in addition to the royalty of 4 shillings (gold) per ton. The Company proceeded forthwith to the further exploration of its territory, forming an operating company, Mosul Oil Fields, for the purpose.

The Anglo-Persian meanwhile, with its smaller concession in the Transferred Territories and its revised 1926 agreement (p. 174), formed the Khaniqin Oil Company as its subsidiary for production within 'Iraq, and completed its Alwand refinery near Khaniqin in May 1927, when King Fayṣal opened it. Thereafter north and central 'Iraq were supplied at favourable prices with petroleum products from this source; southern 'Iraq still drew from Abadan. A network of distribution facilities soon covered the territory; it was managed by the Rafidain Oil Company, an Anglo-Persian distribution company formed for the purpose. Drilling at the Nafṭkhana field was limited hereafter by the K.O.C. to its actual needs, and at Chiah Surkh, where it had been abandoned in 1904, 1912, and 1924, it was resumed in 1930; but production still proved impracticable.

The daily lives of more 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in 000

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439 Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453 varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656 shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436 in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. 652 The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern 135 multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291 served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi *sidara* in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises men- 433 tioned on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382 significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

382 opening at Kirkuk in January 1935, its twin 12-inch pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli came into operation. This achievement marked the end of ten years of patient and well-directed work since the grant of the first concession, and by its employment of 'Iraqis in their thousands, its expansion of communications and the example which it offered of successful large-scale modern industry, it added great advantages for the 'Iraqi public to the direct enrichment of their Treasury. The gradually developing works in Kirkuk oilfields, the main depots at Bayji and Ḥaditha, the mid-desert pump-station townships with their connecting roads, pipeline, and telegraphs became a characteristic feature of the modern 'Iraqi scene, while its production, of 4 million tons of crude oil a year from 1935 onwards, placed the country immediately as the eighth oil-producing country of the world. The B.O.D. Company, whose shareholding was in these years predominantly Italian, German, and Franco-Swiss, soon found itself embarrassed by its obligation of annual payment to Government, and by its failure, in spite of an active drilling campaign from 1933 onwards, to discover other than viscous, scarcely marketable oil. The Company's plan in 1935 of diminishing their cash payments by building a Qaiyara–Tall Kochek railway, which could convey their oil to seaboard and link 'Iraq with the Turkish railway system, was after 497 hesitation rejected by Government. Their financial position grew desperate, and a reconstruction of their Board in 1936 marked the transfer of control of the Company to the I.P.C. group; and the latter emerged soon afterwards as outright owners of the B.O.D. and Mosul Oil Fields, with the disappearance of all non-British shareholding in it other than that of the I.P.C., French, and American constituents themselves. The problem of its viscous and sulphurous oil remained to be solved. The smaller Rafidain and Khaniqin Companies (p. 211) continued respectively their work of producing and refining oil in the Transferred Territories, and of marketing it throughout 'Iraq. The project of a Government-owned refinery, for which the I.P.C. concession provided, was conceived during this period but was to prove slow of realization.

499 494 Road-surfacing was among the uses of oil products in 'Iraq, but neither this nor the too limited funds available could do much at present to provide the country with roads of high or even tolerable standard. Some further sections such as that from Ramadi to Ruṭba were metalled, others were indifferently or barely maintained, all were at worst passable; road maintenance, costly and inconspicuous, was given habitually a low priority in Government allotments. Traffic on the Najf–Madina route increased. The route from the Euphrates to 'Amman and Haifa developed as a powerful rival of the northern track to Beirut. The Rawanduz road, dis-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped.
A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous
régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp,
in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib
was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles
the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality,
shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously
improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal
Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted
at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling
stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both
pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy-French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it
curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to
full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods
were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce
fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to
a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company,
and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu
Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya
river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit
allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according
to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea
or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the
hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country.
The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt;
trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

433 increased on a small scale: the tanning industry was partly mechanized and the quality of its output improved. The two existing mechanically operated wool factories, the unmodernized distilleries, the three cotton ginneries, the small soap-works and cigarette factories, were increased during the war by an attempt at brewing, a primitive glass-works, a factory for paint and another for wax matches. The long-planned cement factory was not yet in production. An important cotton-spinning and weaving project had been initiated, but had not yet begun to operate. A plan to create a cinema studio in Baghdad was in 1945 the object of a visit by a British expert.

382 722 The necessity of postponing further oil development was, equally to the British companies and to the Government, the more regrettable as it seemed not to apply to comparable enterprises in Persia or Arabia; in the former, aviation spirit and other products were produced on a vast scale for war purposes, and in the latter American industry could find abundant equipment when British could not, and could secure for Sa'udi Arabia a long lead in production. The I.P.C. was forced to renounce until after the war the additional pipelines and consequent additional production which it had planned in 1938; indeed, its output was forced down by events in the Levant in 1941–2 from four to two million tons, and restored to full capacity only in 1944. The damage done to its installations in May 1941 was soon repaired, and it was able to assist the British forces by the provision of quarters and air-fields, loan of personnel, communications facilities, and the supply of refined products. The output of these was increased for war purposes, and plant at Kirkuk was improvised for the supply of motor spirit additional to that from Alwand. Factories for making tins were opened at Kirkuk and Mosul, and the two centres connected by pipeline. In Baṣra area a pipeline was built to connect Abadan and Shu'ayba. The destruction of many wells at Kirkuk as a precautionary measure against enemy invasion was ordered by the Army in 1942, but fortunately did not interfere with current production. Drilling was suspended from mid-1941 until the latter part of the war. In the area of the Mosul Petroleum Company (formerly B.O.D.) no operations were possible during the war at 'Ayn Zala or elsewhere, though at Baṣra exploration continued. These postponements, unavoidable in conditions which made engineering supplies unobtainable, were formally authorized by an agreement between the Companies and the Government in March 1943, whereby in return for a loan of ID 1,500,000 the Government granted a 'period of suspension' to begin in May 1941 and to run until two years after the armistice. Meanwhile the project of a Government refinery remained alive, though at present untimely; and to question the terms—or

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241
was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce
and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease
supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās
and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors,
mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation,
with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities.
Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the
educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had
been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the [166
establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of 464]
these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in
their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time
employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423
committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185
since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout
the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq,
and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās;
but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of
Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was
made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries,
and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now
approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for
model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Govern-
ment land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant
insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized.
On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425
a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166
sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be
gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions
and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and
a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The
Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty care-
fully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused
keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312
continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their 653
studies and planning, though the intended major projects could
not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on
the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the
intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the
return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken.
Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Much progress had been made, under the care of a Hides Association, in the better treatment of local hides and skins, and well-tanned leather was produced. 433 Boot and shoe manufacture, largely by electrically-operated machinery, had increased in scale and quality. The cement factory outside Bahgdad, using lime brought from near Ṭuz Khurmatu, came into important production in 1949 and was soon selling 250 tons a day. The three cotton ginneries erected before the war—one of them an Agricultural Bank enterprise at 'Aziziya—remained in being, with capacity to deal with much more than the available cotton crop. Printing presses, all small except one European-owned and that of the Government, remained substantially as before the war, save in their modernized equipment. The spinning and weaving industry, which in some cases also dyed and finished its fabrics, had by 1950 greatly increased its pre-war development and used in part local cotton; a factory in Mosul made also rayon cloth.

Other industrial projects more or less near to realization in 1950 were for rayon production from straw, for local production of fertilizers, and for sugar-refining. The treatment of tobacco leaf had been intensively studied, but remained defective. The industries likely, it was thought, to develop further, using 'Iraqi raw materials and diminishing the need for import, were those producing cement, soap, alcohol, vegetable oil, leather and shoes, cigarettes, beer, and textiles. The other industries would in all probability keep a lesser though perhaps a useful place; none was likely to produce a considerable surplus for export, unless, as some hoped, an industry could be founded to use, for fertilizers or otherwise, the abundant by-products of petroleum. The Development 185
Board intended considerable expenditure on 'industrial and mining 316]
schemes' in the period 1951 to 1956, upon lines to be later revealed.

'Iraq's poverty in minerals other than petroleum seemed in part 135
to have been corrected by the discovery, in the later forties, of 317
interesting copper and copper pyrites deposits in the mountainous Qal'a Diza area, and by reports from the Government geologist of an outcrop of excellent marble near Rayat and supplies elsewhere of chromite, iron ore, magnesite. These, or some of them, were thought capable of commercial development. A hard limestone suitable for barrage building was sought and found. Local salt, gypsum, brick clay, Mosul building-stone, and cement-making materials were in use as before, and it was planned to renew the activity which during the war had produced up to 15,000 tons a year of Kifri 'coal'.

In spite of the imposed delays and frustrations of the war period, 382
the position achieved in the petroleum industry by 1950 was such as to place 'Iraq in the forefront of oil-producing countries, with

the promise or certainty that still greater developments were closely at hand. The project of a Government-built refinery, revived in 1945, was by the end of 1950 near to fulfilment with plans completed and funds available. The Khaniqin Oil Company's oilfield and small refinery, at Naftkhana and Khaniqin, were still in use on the restricted scale suited to the supply of products to northern and central 'Iraq; distribution of these throughout the country by the Rafidain Company showed no new feature until in 1951 supplies from Abadan ceased to arrive at Baṣra, and others from the north had, with difficulty and cost, to be improvised. The development work of the Mosul Petroleum Company—former B.O.D. reborn as a twin brother of the Iraq Petroleum Company—on the Upper Tigris right bank was pursued from 1947 onwards by the drilling of further wells at 'Ayn Zala and its neighbourhood, but revealed only a field of moderate dimensions and uncertain performance: it had not yet led—but under the B.O.D. concession must shortly lead—to commercial production. A pipeline from 'Ayn Zala to the I.P.C. pump station K.2 near Bayji was in 1950–1 under construction with a view to the export of M.P.C. oil thereby. In the Baṣra area, on the other hand, the B.P.C. had eagerly resumed its exploration after the war; after geophysical operations it started drilling at Nahr 'Umar and Zubayr with immediate success, and concentrated its exploitation upon the latter site, which was situated twelve miles south-west of Baṣra. Further wells were drilled, field installations erected, a pipeline to Fao laid in 1950, and the export of oil, at an initial rate of 2 million tons a year, became possible in the last days of 1951. The Zubayr oilfield, which might well be reinforced by others in the same province, would take its place as a valuable part of 'Iraq's resources.

The operations of the Iraq Petroleum Company itself after the war were still more impressive. The later war years witnessed no more than limited production under restricted war-time conditions and the resumption after 1943 of export to the Mediterranean was on the pre-war level barely exceeding 4 million tons a year. After the armistice, with the gradual removal of restrictions on supplies and man-power, the Company could effectively revive its 1938 project for multiplying its pipeline through-put, and in 1946 it began construction of a 16-inch pipeline[1] parallel to the existing 12-inch line from Kirkuk to Haifa, and another a few months later to Tripoli. The former, complete by early 1948 save for the section through Palestine, was perforce left unfinished in the conditions of war and future uncertainty which followed the establishment of the State of Israel in May of that year, and, with the 12-inch line, could not be operated; the cost to the 'Iraq Government was a loss

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[1] The largest-diameter pipe then obtainable from sterling sources.

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

of nearly 7 million tons of through-put annually and a corresponding loss of royalty revenue. On the northern line to Tripoli, the construction of the 16-inch line was completed in mid-1949; export from Tripoli was thereby trebled and raised 'Iraqi export production to nearly 7 million tons a year. Less than a year later the Company undertook the building of a much greater pipeline, of 30-inch diameter. Designed to run from Kirkuk to the sea coast at Banyas in Syria (an alignment parallel to that of the 12- and 16-inch lines except at its western extremity) it would deliver 'Iraqi oil to the world's markets at a rate of some 14 million tons a year at its lowest rate of through-put, or much more with increased pumping installations.[1] 382

These extensions of the pipeline system were accompanied by important increases to the pumping plant and facilities at seven pumping stations on both sides of the point of bifurcation near Ḥaditha, and in the Kirkuk field itself. The development of the latter was carried out in its northern extension in Arbil liwā, beyond the Lesser Zab, by an active drilling campaign and the manifold operations which accompany it. With drilling went the provision of gathering lines, tankage, additional de-gassing stations, new units in the Stabilization Plant, new administrative and domestic buildings, workshops, stores, depots, laboratories, electric-power plant, and water lines. 'Iraqis were fortunate in their certainty that, in the development of the great wealth in their soil, the most modern and economic methods were being adopted without waste of or danger to its resources. [466] The needs of the labour force were met by the initiation of a modern housing estate for 'Iraqi employees, canteens, sports grounds, transport to and from work, allowances and pay-revisions to meet the high cost of living, a savings fund, hospital extensions, and technical education both in 'Iraq and in the United Kingdom. In spite of the psychological, the material, and the (artificially fostered) 'political' difficulties inseparable from the presence of an advanced industrial enclave in a primitive economy of peasants, the living and working conditions of the oil workers were, while less than perfect, undoubtedly the best in contemporary 'Iraqi industry: and they were undeserving of the blatantly mendacious attacks, common in Baghdad newspapers, on the horrors of oil company employment and the brutality of the foreign exploiter. [511] The industry brought also substantial indirect benefits to the public in local purchases and contracts, the increase of purchasing power, the provision of foreign exchange, the teaching of industrial skill, and the performance of valuable and costly services to Kirkuk municipality. It could in

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[1] The 30-inch line, constructed at great speed, came into initial operation in the late spring of 1952.

382 1951 be anticipated that the continued presence and enlarged operations of the oil companies would remain an outstanding economic and social advantage to the 'Iraqi people: that, especially after the destruction of the great oil industry of Persia by the action of its Government, 'Iraq's position as a supplier of crude petroleum must give it an international importance greater than ever before: but also that the minds and emotions of local patriots, for whom the Persian tragedy had no terrors and no lesson, would not abandon the demand for a 'nationalization' which might or might not (according to its form and manner) permit the continuance of the industry. It was indeed clear that the presence in 'Iraq of successful, wealthy, and well-organized European enterprises with their foreign control, high living standards, and concession-granted privileges must, however correct their conduct and however enlightened their policy, be offensive to the nationalist sentiment of at least one school of local politicians; and the period during which oil development on these lines might be able to continue could not, for all its enormous advantages to the country, be confidently foreseen.

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Meanwhile, to the 'Iraqi Treasury its receipts from oil sources were no longer a mere helpful supplement to other revenues but a main pillar of the Government itself and the foundation of all its hopes of development and improvement. The anxiety of 'Iraqi statesmen to derive still greater revenues from the oil industry than those provided in the 1925 or 1931 concessions—4 shillings (gold) per ton—and their claim that 'gold' should be translated into sterling at unofficial open-market rates led from 1947 to 1951 to repeated discussions between Government and Company. The gold question of which the Company, at 'Iraq's request, agreed in 1949 to allow settlement by a British Court rather than by arbitration, remained still unsettled when the period closed, with indications that the Baghdad Government intended still to press its full claims.[1] The question of royalty revision resulted in 1950 in a partly retroactive and conditional agreement to raise the 4 shillings gold per ton to 6 shillings gold; but this increase, immediately helpful as it was to the 'Iraq Treasury, was in turn to be superseded by further and long-drawn negotiations based on a new principle of half-and-half division of the profits: a principle which, first announced by the Arabian-American Company in Sau'di Arabia on the last day of 1950, could not but abruptly supersede all less favourable terms enjoyed by neighbouring countries. Conversations on this basis were in progress in Baghdad between Company

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[1] These might amount to some £20 million sterling. Agreement upon a compromise figure (£5 million) was reached by the negotiators in 1951, but did not form part of the settlement ratified by Parliament early in 1952.

The ten industries referred to in the table are: cotton spinning and weaving (one establishment), cement (one establishment), wool spinning (two establishments), modern tanning (five establishments), beer (one establishment), alcohol (three establishments), vegetable oil (one establishment), modern soap making (one establishment), artificial and natural silk weaving (six establishments), jute spinning and weaving (one establishment still under construction). The total is 22 establishments all of which enjoy government assistance under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, and practically all have received financial aid in the form of loans or capital participation from the Industrial Bank. None of them employs less than 20 workers, and the majority employ over a hundred workers. All use power-driven machinery. It is interesting to notice that most of these industries are owned by joint-stock companies and that they have distributed profits during the last three years ranging from 9 per cent to 25 per cent. 433 [654] [473]

Obviously the table does not cover the whole field of industrial development in Iraq. It has been constructed on the basis of a selected sample to show the rapid progress made in recent years. The unusual increase in ouput compared with the rate of capital investment as shown in the table is to be explained by the fact that most plants were still under construction or half-completed in the early years. A complete survey of the industrial sector in the economy of Iraq is still to come. The Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of National Economy, is expected soon to embark on this task. Such a survey will have to cover, in addition to those industries included in the above table, the following: 654 433

(a) Other modern industries in the private sector which represent a substantial portion of the whole, such as flour milling, workshops and agricultural machine repair shops, printing, cotton ginning, cigarette manufacture, the building materials industry, shoe-making, etc.

(b) The great oil industry owned and operated by powerful foreign concerns holding concessions from the Government. The oil companies produced nearly 8 million tons of crude oil and 400,000 tons of refined products in 1951, and employ over 12,000 workers. Their production is expected to rise to 20 million tons of crude oil in 1955-56. [392]

needed to prove the extent and quality of the ores located. This 135 work has gone till now rather tardily, owing to the inadequate funds at the disposal of the Directorate General on Minerals. There also seems to be no clear policy as to how this wealth should be exploited: whether by the State directly or by concession to national or foreign enterprise.

Another factor delaying work in this field is the difficulty of [489] transport to and from the sites of the ore deposits which are remotely situated in desert and mountain.

Oil and gas are indeed plentiful in Iraq, and the exploitation 382 of oil resources has indirectly helped to finance the industrial development so far achieved. But the cost of oil fuel and other oil products for local consumption is not much lower than in other countries because of the high rate of taxes on consumption. This and the limited range of oil products so far made in Iraq by the Alwand refinery, owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., have led to the import of a number of oil products from abroad. But the situation should change when the State-owned refinery, now under construction, goes into production.

Another problem connected with the supply of fuel is the lack 371 of electric power. Power generation in Iraq is inefficiently organised and power rates, except in Basrah and Baghdad in recent years, are among the highest in the world. This has compelled most industries to generate their own power which has added a great deal to production cost. The recent reduction of power rates and the availability of electricity in Baghdad has been one of the major reasons for the concentration of industry in that city.

(3) **Concentration of Industry**: Industry in Iraq is heavily con- 438 centrated in the city of Baghdad which has a population of 550,000 inhabitants, in other words a little more than ten percent of the country's population. Excluding oil and one or two small textile, tanning, and grain-milling industries, all modern industry has been established in or near Baghdad, thus adding to the population and housing problems of the capital. There are many reasons for this concentration of industry. All routes converge on Baghdad; it has the largest population and, as the seat of Government, it offers easy access to the central authority. As an old trading centre Baghdad [366] has a well-organised market, large financial resources, and managerial and office staffs. Some of the factors that have made Baghdad

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

433 as 60,000 people are engaged in industrial production (other than oil), virtually all of these are employed in small undertakings where the work is largely done by hand and productivity is accordingly quite low. Probably only about 2,000 are working in what might be characterized as modern industrial plants.

654 651 382 Fortunately prospective increases in government revenues from oil now make it possible for the government to undertake a large-scale program for the development of the country. Past investments in the oil industry will in the future yield large dividends in the form of a rapidly increasing production of petroleum. [471] In accordance with an agreement reached in August 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq have undertaken to raise oil output, which amounted to only about six million tons in 1950, to 30 million tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraqi government half of the profits before the deduction of taxes. On this basis it is anticipated that, over the next five years, the governmen may receive net revenues amounting to as much as 214 million dinars from oil alone. Under the terms of a law passed in 1950 these revenues will be available to finance development. They will be assigned to the Development Board, an autonomous agency established in 1950 to ensure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs.

652 In the past, financial stringencies have severely limited public expenditures. The government has often had difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays had to be kept small; government salaries were not raised in accordance with the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds. In the future the situation will be reversed. The principal task will be to find ways and means of spending rapidly increasing revenues in a manner which will contribute most effectively to the permanent development of the country. It is with this task in view that the Mission has drawn up its recommendations.

180 Any program for realizing the economic potentialities of the country should be broad in conception and well balanced. Investment outlays in dams and irrigation works, transport facilities and industrial plants must be complemented by increased expenditures

000 The Mission has carefully considered what industries might be expanded and what new industries might be established. It has sought to confine its recommendations for industrial development to those industries where there is reasonable prospect of efficient production, competitive with imports, and where production is within the technical capacity available in Iraq, supplemented, where necessary, by outside technical and managerial assistance.

Petroleum and Refining

135 No recommendations need be made on the oil industry. The
oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field
amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons and those of the less well
● 382 explored fields near Basra offering perhaps equal promise. The
development of these resources by the oil companies is proceeding
[466] along sound lines. The oil companies have also been well in
advance of other enterprises in providing housing, health services,
and other amenities for their employees, in instituting labor training schemes and providing better pay for workers. The Mission realizes that there has been some criticism in Iraq of the rate of development, particularly in the Basra field. The expenditure of close to £90,000,000 by the oil companies on oil development in Iraq is now, however, beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Production in recent years might have been much greater if the outbreak of the war with Israel had not resulted in closing the pipeline to Haifa and in preventing the completion of another pipeline
[315] to that city. The existing line has a capacity of 2,000,000 tons and
the projected line would have added another 4,000,000 tons. As already indicated, the government has recently obtained a commitment by the oil companies to increase output, which was a little less than 6,000,000 tons in 1950, to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955. It would not be advantageous to Iraq, however, to have production increased to such levels that the ensuing rise in oil revenues cannot in fact be effectively spent. Oil in the ground is a reserve for the future, and too rapid tapping of this reserve may entail a partial waste of resources.

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471 The government has decided to build a modern oil refinery near Baghdad which it anticipates will cost about £7,000,000. This refinery will use crude oil supplied from the Kirkuk fields at cost. With an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons, it will be able to supply

all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for some time. This decision 382
reflects an understandable desire on the part of Iraq to have a 471
modern refinery of its own, replacing the somewhat inadequate and rather old Alwand refinery at Khanaqin which is owned by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and is capable of supplying not quite 70 percent of Iraq's current requirements.[8] Foreign management of the new refinery will probably be necessary, at least for an initial period. The project will make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery and probably also the small oil field near the Iranian border from which it draws its crude. This field probably cannot be developed on a scale large enough to warrant investment in the pipelines necessary to export the oil.

Expansion of Old Industries

Some industries are now expanding without government finan- 433
cial assistance. The cement plant and the brewery are both doubling their capacity. Recent improvements and expansion have put the woolen industry abreast of the country's needs. Other industries do not for the present require expansion. Flour milling capacity, for instance, appears ample. The tanneries also appear to have sufficient capacity, but to raise the quality of their raw material supply, technical assistance is needed to improve methods of flaying and preserving hides.

Still other industries could usefully be expanded but do not have sufficient financial resources to do so without government
assistance. The cotton and rayon textile factories in Baghdad and [288]
Mosul might well double their designed capacity and extend their facilities to make a wider range of products. At present cotton textile capacity can meet only about a quarter of the country's requirements. Since ample raw material is available and costs of production can become competitive with those abroad, further
expansion would appear to be warranted. In its regular budget for [471]
1951-52 the government has provided ID 1,000,000 for a government textile mill. The Mission believes, however, that government ownership and operation would not be desirable and that it would be vastly preferable to extend capacity with the participation of private capital and enterprise.

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[8] By an agreement reached in December, 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

315 2,500 and 2,800 feet and production costs are accordingly low. Production capacity has been increasing more rapidly than transport capacity. Until 1949 there were only two 12″ pipelines with an annual capacity of over 2,000,000 tons each—one to Tripoli in the Lebanon, the other to Haifa in Palestine. With the outbreak of war with Israel the Haifa pipeline was shut down and work on the completion of an additional 16″ pipeline to Haifa, which was to have an annual capacity of 4,000,000 tons, was halted. Output therefore had to be reduced from 4,354,000 tons in 1947 to 3,017,000 tons in 1948. With the completion of another 16″ line to Tripoli in 1949, it rose again to about 6,000,000 tons in 1950. Work has proceeded steadily on the construction of a new 30″ line, with an annual capacity of 13,000,000 tons, from Banias, Syria, and it is expected that this line will be linked in the spring of 1952 with the disused portions of the two lines to Haifa lying inside Iraq, thus permitting a partial use of the new capacity while the remainder of the line is finished in Iraq. Meanwhile the productive capacity of the Kirkuk field is being increased rapidly to an annual volume of over 20,000,000 tons.

In Mosul, where prospects are much less promising, production is not expected to begin until 1953 and then only at a rate of about 1,000,000 tons per year. Work on the fields near Basra, which are potentially very rich, was begun much later but is now rapidly proceeding. Production costs will be considerably higher than at Kirkuk because oil is found only at a depth of 10,000 feet or more. A pipeline with an annual capacity of about 2,500,000 tons has been completed to the port of Fao on the Persian Gulf, and oil is expected to start flowing early in 1952. The company has undertaken to increase production to 8,000,000 tons by 1955.

● 382 The output of the Khanaqin Oil Company is confined to two wells in the Naft Khaneh field and is used entirely in the company's Alwand refinery, a simple distillation plant which is the only refinery in Iraq. Although drilling is proceeding in the Chia Surkh field north of Khanaqin, it is unlikely that the company's total output will rise substantially. The company's Alwand refinery, which employs approximately 525 people, produces about 70 percent of the petroleum products consumed in Iraq, the remainder being supplied, until recently, from the Abadan refinery in Iran.

Petroleum products are distributed by the Rafidain Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and at prices, exclusive of taxes, which are among the lowest in the world. 382 ●

TABLE 8

PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM AND REFINED PRODUCTS
(in thousand metric tons)

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382

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951 (est'd.)
Crude oil					
Iraq Petroleum Company	4,354	3,017	3,671	5,986	7,500
Khanaqin Oil Company	339	367	365	384	350
Total	4,639	3,384	4,036	6,370	7,850
Refined products	n.a.	373	369	393	—

VI. Transport

The state-owned railway system is the principal means of transport, carrying about 2,000,000 tons of cargo and over 3,000,000 passengers annually. Part of it is standard and part meter gauge. The standard-gauge section is part of the original Berlin-Baghdad railway and runs from Baghdad northward via Mosul into Syria and Turkey. The meter-gauge line extends from the Port of Basra in the South to Baghdad and then beyond to Kirkuk and Erbil in the North, with a branch line to Khanaqin. Over recent years the railways have managed to carry out a considerable capital development program despite serious financial obstacles, but they now face the need of replacing, on a considerable scale, old track, rolling stock and locomotives. 496

Road transport has as yet primarily supplemented rather than replaced railway traffic. There are only about 11,000 passenger cars and a little over 9,000 trucks and buses in the country. Roads are generally inadequate. There are only about 2,500 kilometers of metalled and surfaced roads in all of Iraq. The remaining dirt roads quickly become impassable in bad weather. Some important 494 491

433 expanded will, however, require financial assistance from the Industrial Bank. This should be arranged just as soon as plans can be formulated.

Petroleum Development

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[471] The further development of the oil industry can safely be left to the internationally-owned companies now operating in Iraq. Under an agreement finalized early in October 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three major oil companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—undertook to increase their oil output to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraq Government 50 percent of the profit on their production before the deduction of taxes. Although output in 1950 amounted to only about 6,000,000 tons, there should be no difficulty about attaining the agreed target. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons, with the new fields near Basra offering equal promise. In the development of these fields and means of transport, the oil companies have already made an investment of close to ID 90,000,000, which is now beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Development in the Kirkuk and Mosul field has already proceeded on the assumption that a production capacity of at least 22,000,000 tons would be achieved in a few years, and with the completion of the pipeline to Banias, Syria, there should also be ample transport capacity. The balance of the projected output, namely 8,000,000 tons, will have to come from the newer fields near Basra. This may require some increase in drilling and will necessitate additional pipeline capacity to Fao, but neither of these will be difficult to accomplish.

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466 The oil companies have been among the leaders in Iraq in providing better conditions and amenities for their employees and in instituting schemes for training skilled labor and technicians. They have been criticized, however, for their failure to appoint more Iraqis to leading positions. Under the agreement already cited they have undertaken to send 50 Iraqi students per year to British Universities to study various subjects relating to the oil industry, and also to establish a school in Kirkuk to train 60 Iraqis yearly in technical oil subjects.

By and large this new partnership between the oil companies 382 ●
and the government should prove mutually beneficial.

The Government for several years has been considering the 382
building of a modern oil refinery near Baghdad. In recent months, 655
final plans were formulated and arrangements for its construction have apparently been made. This refinery, estimated to cost at least ID 7,000,000, is designed for an annual capacity of approximately 1,000,000 tons and when completed should be able to supply all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for refined petroleum products except for certain specialties.

The project will probably make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery, owned until recently by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,[1] now producing something less than 70 percent of Iraq's requirements. Likewise, the use of Kirkuk crude, which can be obtained by the Government at cost, will probably make it necessary to close down the small oil field near Khanaqin which supplies the Alwand refinery, since it is unlikely that the oil resources in and near this field can be developed to such an extent that investment in a pipeline for export of the crude would be warranted.

Cotton and Rayon Textiles

In 1947, a cotton spinning and weaving mill was started near 288
Baghdad, with a pilot plant consisting of 5,000 spindles and 84 automatic looms. The second stage, which is something over 70 percent complete, consists of 22,000 spindles and 500 automatic looms. The plant is modern in design and includes dyeing, printing and finishing equipment. About one half of the equipment has been in full operation for over a year, and shows good returns for an uncompleted plant which has not reached stabilized operation conditions. When completed and when operating on a full three-shift basis, it is expected that the spinning mill will produce 6,000,000 lbs. of yarn annually. Part of the spinning capacity is used in making yarn for sale to other small textile mills or even for home industries for weaving into cloth. In Mosul, for example, there are over 1,000 hand looms in various small home industries

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[1] By an agreement reached in December 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

working shops, battery and electrical repair work, shops for repair 433
of automotive and agricultural equipment, bakeries, confectioneries 445
and food processing establishments of various kinds. The amount of capital required in individual cases is quite small but, in the aggregate, it adds up to a considerable sum. The Industrial Bank should arrange for a small-enterprise section to make surveys of small industries in each community, advise them concerning ways of improving their methods of production and assist in getting proper financial help where it is justified. It is estimated that ID 400,000 would be sufficient to meet the needs of these industries over the next five years.

The assistance of small industries by the Industrial Bank is to be preferred to assistance or stimulation of so-called cottage industries. Cottage industries may be of benefit in the over-populated areas of Asia, but for Iraq they do not appear to be an appropriate solution to industrial growth. Iraq's population is small in relation to the resources available. Over the long term its problem is not primarily one of creating a maximum number of jobs with a minimum of capital but rather one of utilizing capital resources in ways which will make a permanent addition to the productive capacity of the country and to the building of modern industrial enterprises.

Establishment of New Industries

The entrance of industry into new fields would help to balance the over-all development of the country and to utilize its resources more fully. At the same time it would increase employment and thereby aid in raising the general standard of living.

Nitrate Fertilizer, Sulphur and Cement Plant

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The largest and perhaps most promising possibility for new 387
industrial development lies in the utilization of the natural gas [316
produced in conjunction with oil. Upon completion of the 30-inch 339]
pipeline, oil production at the Kirkuk field will be at a rate which will make more than 25 billion cu. ft. of gas available per year. For the most part, this gas will be wasted until some means is found for its economic utilization. This gas contains, according

382 to information afforded the Mission, 10.5 percent by volume of
387 hydrogen sulphide with the remaining products being different types of hydrocarbons, chiefly methane. In the same area there are also large deposits of gypsum or hydrous calcium sulphate.

These waste gases and gypsum could be utilized for the economic manufacture of ammonium sulphate, a valuable fertilizer for agriculture; and, in the process, sulphur, carbon black and cement would become available as by-products. A plant of economic size and capable of satisfying approximately one half of Iraq's eventual needs should have an annual capacity of approximately 500,000 tons. In addition to ammonium sulphate, this plant would also produce approximately 100,000 tons of elemental sulphur and 300,000 tons of cement.

The most important part of such a plant would, of course, be that making ammonia. By this process, nitrogen and hydrogen under high pressure are synthesized into ammonia by means of a catalyst. Hydrogen for this process would be obtained by thermally cracking the gas and subsequently removing the carbon black, while nitrogen would be obtained by removing carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide from the flue gases.

The ammonia thus produced would then be combined with the sulphate radical from the gypsum. This is generally done by passing ammonia and carbon dioxide through a slurry of finely ground gypsum and mechanically separating the resultant products of ammonium sulphate and calcium carbonate. The ammonium sulphate which is in solution would be crystallized in evaporators while the calcium carbonate would be used in making cement.

Since the gas used in making ammonia must be free of sulphur, the plant would need to contain facilities for its removal. This could be accomplished in several ways, but a detailed study would probably show a combination of the Girbotal and Claus processes to be best suited for this particular project.

Facilities for the production of the required power and process steam would be conventional in every respect and would use gas for fuel.

In the first few years of operation, all of the products except cement would probably be exported. Later, however, only sulphur

and carbon black might be exported, with the ammonium sulphate 382
being utilized domestically as fertilizer. 387

The integrated plant is estimated to cost approximately ID 25,000,000, including foreign exchange estimated at ID 22,000,000 mainly in pounds sterling. The total estimated cost of the plant may be broken down as follows:

Ammonium Sulphate and Carbon Black	ID 14,750,000
Sulphur Recovery	8,750,000
Cement Plant	1,500,000
Total Cost	ID 25,000,000

Estimates indicate that the plant may show net earnings of 18.5 percent on the investment and may break even when approximately 40 percent of its capacity is utilized. In these estimates the gross income has been figured on the basis of c.i.f. prices currently prevailing in London and the plant has been amortized over 15 years with interest payable at 4½ percent per annum. The underlying calculation is summarized below:

GROSS ANNUAL INCOME			
Ammonium sulphate	500,000 tons @ ID 15 per ton	ID 7,500,000	
Sulphur	100,000 tons @ ID 16 per ton	1,600,000	
Carbon black	10,000 tons @ ID 93 per ton	930,000	
Cement	300,000 tons @ ID 5 per ton	1,500,000	
Total			ID 11,530,000
ANNUAL OPERATION COSTS			
Amortization and interest		2,310,000	
Freight (Rail and Ocean)		2,379,000	
Bags		650,000	
Maintenance		375,000	
Salaries		530,000	
Labor		146,000	
Material and Supplies		55,000	
Gas		135,000	
Contingency		300,000	
Total			ID 6,880,000
Estimated Net Profit			ID 4,650,000

The plant would probably need to be financed in its entirety by the Development Board, and it should be attempted only if a

382 387 reliable foreign chemical firm can be secured to design and construct it and, at least at the outset, operate it under a management contract.

The plant would give permanent employment to about 1,000 workers.

387 237 *Bone Meal Plants*

Another promising field for new industry is the conversion of the waste products from abattoirs to fertilizers for domestic use. Bone meal, for example, is a very valuable fertilizer. Yet at present Iraq, with no domestic plant to utilize them, is exporting approximately 15,000 tons of bones per year to Europe.

There would probably be sufficient demand for fertilizer to support three plants, located at Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Their combined cost would probably amount to roughly ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, principally pounds sterling. With help from the Industrial Bank, this could probably be financed by the abattoir owners. When completed the plants would give employment to about 60 workers.

Steel

327 Iraq is now producing about 5,000 tons of steel scrap per year. It is recommended that a small hand-operated mill and electric melting furnace be set up to convert this scrap into reinforcing bars, window shapes and small angles, all of which are in great demand. This mill ought to be located in Baghdad and arrangements made to obtain off-peak power from the Baghdad power plant or from the railroad shops. As an alternative to electric melting, crucibles might be considered. In either case, the cost of the plant would be approximately ID 300,000, including ID 200,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in hard currency. This mill could not satisfy the whole of Iraq's steel needs; nevertheless, it would furnish about 5,000 tons per year of certain types at probably half the cost of the imported steel it would replace.

The mill could be financed by private capital with help from the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required dur-

refinery on the river Alwand, near the town of Khanaqin.

The production of crude petroleum in Iraq amounted to 4,680,000 tons in 1946, 4,702,000 tons in 1947 and 3,427,000 tons in 1948, and is estimated at 4,326,000 tons for 1949.[2] The figures showing the crude petroleum production of the Middle-Eastern group, including Iraq, are given in an annex (see annex I, table 2).

135 Apart from petroleum, the subsoil of Iraq is rich in other minerals, such as coal, salt, sulphur, marble, limestone and various metals, including iron and copper. But the utilization of these resources has been delayed by the high cost of transport.

● 382 Although Iraq is so rich in petroleum, it has no refineries apart from the stabilization plant at Kirkuk, with an annual capacity of only 480,000 tons, and the Khanaqin Oil Company's small refinery on the Alwand, the daily capacity of which is 1,500 barrels, or 72,000 tons per year.

C. *Transport and communications*

Port

504 Basra is Iraq's only port. The designation "Port of Basra" generally refers to the whole length of the Shatt al-Arab, between the mouth of this river and the Naft-Umar lighthouse situated approximately 163 kilometres up-river from the Persian Gulf. The strip of land on the left bank of the river, between the Gulf and the Khaiyin Canal, is Iranian territory.

3/5 between Kirkuk and Haifa, running from the Jordan frontier to Haifa, remained to be built. When these two new pipe-lines are put into commission, the annual capacity of the four pipe-lines will reach 13 million tons. In view of the heavy demands of consumer countries and the vast resources of the petroleum region of Kirkuk, the Iraq Petroleum Company is planning the construction of a giant pipe-line, 71.1 to 81.3 centimetres (28 to 32 inches) in diameter, from Kirkuk to Bamas (Lebanon). With the exception of the stretch between Homs and Baniyas (80 kilometres), this pipe-line will run parallel (in the north) to the 16-inch pipe-line now under construction. The time estimated for the construction and the cost would appear to be sufficiently favourable to make the scheme feasible, and it is hoped that this pipe-line, with its annual capacity of 14,600,000 tons, can be put into use in 1953. The annual production of the Kirkuk basin would thus amount to 27-28 million tons.

[382] Apart from the large pipe-lines described above, Iraq has a small pipe-line, 39 kilometres long and 10.2 to 15.2 centimetres (4 to 6 inches) in diameter, from the petroleum fields of Naftkhaneh to the Alwand refinery near Khanaqin, which has a refining capacity of 8,600 barrels (1,146 tons) per day, or 420,000 tons per year.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

315 frontier. A 30–32-inch pipeline of 14 million tons' capacity was
433 opened to Banias in Syria (560 miles) in 1952.

In the MPC concessionary area exploration and drilling were carried out before 1931, but it was not until after the Second World War that oil of certain commercial value was discovered and produced, at Ain Zala, north-west of Mosul. In 1952 the field was linked by a 12-inch pipeline to the IPC pipeline system, to permit the export of its crude oil to the Mediterranean coast.

In the BPC concessionary area exploration began in 1939 and, when resumed at the end of the war, was made more effective by the application of new geophysical methods. A field producing oil of good quality was developed in the area of Zubair, the average depth of the wells—some 11,000 feet—being greater than in any neighbouring Persian Gulf oilfield and four times greater than at Kirkuk. Oil is carried the seventy-four miles from the field to a new oil port at Fao, where oil was first shipped in December 1951, through a 12-inch pipeline; a second pipeline, of 24 inches, was completed in 1953 to cope with the company's increased production programme under the terms of the 1952 agreement.

433 Production of crude oil for 1952 (the first year of MPC and BPC production) was as follows: Kirkuk (IPC) 15,553,000 tons, Ain Zala (MPC) 270,000 tons, Zubair (BPC) 2,238,000 tons.

471 The area of eastern Iraq excluded from the concessions of
433 these three companies has been developed by the Khanaqin
Oil Company, a subsidiary of AIOC, on the basis of agreements
382 made in 1925 and 1926. The output of the company's refinery near Khanaqin, together with imports from Abadan, provided Iraq's internal requirements of petroleum products. In accordance with an agreement ratified in 1952, the Iraq Government has bought the refinery, the company undertaking to operate it for ten years and, if requested, to operate also the new government refinery near Baghdad which is to replace it; after the Khanaqin refinery is closed the company will retain its production area on the same terms as those of the IPC 1952 agreement, conditional on exporting an annual minimum of 2 million tons of crude oil.

The government refinery at Daura near Baghdad, on which work started in 1952, is designed to produce a million tons of refined petroleum products per annum, a figure well in excess of the present requirements of the country. Meanwhile a small refinery of some 175,000 tons annual capacity has been erected
[439] at Basra to help make good the deficiency caused by the cessation of petroleum imports from Abadan.

511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

(871 212) Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

651 382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

647 654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

652 654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

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[33] *Economic Development of Iraq.* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 63.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

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initiative and financial assistance of the government.[36] 433

The government has been advised to encourage development of light industries: Cotton textiles, cottonseed oil crushing mills, jute mills, bone fertiliser plants, automobile tire factories, small steel mills, central machine shops, concrete block plants, possibly a paper mill, a chemical factory for making inorganic fertiliser, and possibly salt refineries.

[650

The Mission strongly urged the government not to attempt to own or operate these new factories itself, but to encourage private capital to do so.[37] This recommendation has been followed in the main. The Industrial Bank, created with funds derived from the oil royalties, has been financing private industry in a number of fields, particularly cotton textiles and cottonseed oil crushing and refining. The outstanding exception is the new petroleum refinery being built by the government. 135

OIL

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Oil reserves in Iraq are thought to be tremendous—at least a third of the total Middle Eastern reserves, which are reckoned at 50 billion barrels, or

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—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

Capacity of the Kut Barrage on the Tigris River in Iraq is almost a quarter of a million cubic feet of water per second, which makes it the largest diversion dam of its kind in the world. The dam was built by British contractors for the Iraq Government in 1939. With oil revenues now pouring into the treasury Iraq plans to build several more large-scale irrigation facilities for storage and diversion. New projects are already in progress in the upper reaches of the Tigris River system.

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[36] Ibid., p. 33.
[37] Ibid., pp. 36-37.

Iraq M H1

135 382 about half of the world's total. However, Iraq's past output has been paltry compared to its potential. A year ago Iraq's oil was flowing at the rate of 160,000 barrels a day. The figure is now 185,000, and estimates are that it will jump to 440,000 before long. The handicaps have been transportation and political difficulty. Iraq's wells are hundreds of miles from the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean Sea, which means pipelines have to be constructed. Before this year two pipelines were in operation from the Iraqi fields to Tripoli, Lebanon. A 12-inch pipeline to Haifa, Israel, has been put out of use since Iraq joined the Arab embargo of Israel. A new 16-inch line built almost to the Israeli border has never been completed for the same reason. Early this year one small new line was completed to the head of the Persian Gulf, which will have a capacity of about 40,000 barrels a day. The main addition is the 30-inch line to the Mediterranean just being finished. It runs to Banyas, Syria, and has a capacity of 280,000 barrels a day.

471 Mining is carried out by the Iraq Petroleum Company, owned by United States, Dutch, British, and French interests. Despite this diversified interest, there has been continuous trouble with reactionary groups in Iraq along the same lines, but less serious than those in Iran. Recently the Parliament approved a new oil contract which promises the Iraqi Government 50 per cent of profits before foreign taxes, and (from the western point of view) the political situation seems to have improved.[28]

COTTON TEXTILES

288 Until the erection of the Iraqi Spinning and Weaving Company mill in 1948, cotton was used primarily for filling mattresses, for upholstery work, and for the home industries. Around 2,600 bales of cheap raw cotton and cotton waste normally have been imported from India for this purpose. A small crop of unirrigated indigenous cotton raised in the north around Zakho goes into this market, too.

The Iraqi Spinning and Weaving Company in Baghdad doubled its capacity in 1951 and now has about 27,200 spindles and 580 looms, producing about 18 million yards and finishing 5 million yards annually. The company already has purchased more equipment to give a total of 39,000 spindles and 900 looms, capable of producing about 27 million yards of cloth annually. Several small mills weaving cotton and rayon and three small knitting mills are reported also.

The mill consumed 10,482 bales of cotton in 1951 and expects to use 15,000 bales in 1952. The cotton has been secured almost entirely from the domestic crop. A poor crop forced the mill to buy 1,500 bales from the United States in the early part of 1952, but this unusual situation is not expected to be repeated.

471 288 Funds authorized in the government budget for other cotton textile mills have not been expended, presumably because of the general opposition to government intervention in the field of private enterprise and because of the recent expansion in the Iraqi mill. This expansion was financed by the Industrial Bank, which owns about a third of the company's stock.

288 With this expansion the factory should be able to produce about 40 million yards of cloth annually, or about 60 per cent of the country's requirements of 70 million yards.

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[28] Carmichael, J. H., "Oil from the Middle East Hits a New High Mark," *New York Times*, March 23, 1952.

services. "The disease has been recognized", he said, "what was required was that 657
medicine for the prescription should be supplied and the patient taught how to take
that medicine". The same Minister informed us that he himself, as a young man called 185
upon to draft a new educational programme, had included in it the provision of
community centres, but that unfortunately this feature of the scheme had not
materialized.

45. Community welfare organization on a self-help basis in Iraq is, indeed, as yet in its infancy. Some observers consider that an indispensable preliminary to its development is to create in the minds of a people long under the influence and domination of a feudal tribal system an effective desire for self-government.

46. As is generally known, Iraq is rich in oil resources and it is the policy of the 651
Government to transfer mineral wealth into productive capital for the general
welfare. A statutory Development Board was established in 1950 to ensure continuity 382
of economic policy, regardless of political changes. Seventy per cent of the income 185
from oil revenues is allocated to the Board as revenue for projects of water
conservation, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, etc. The Board 471
is also responsible for co-ordinating the development schemes in these fields
initiated by the various ministerial Departments. Over 200 foreign technicians are
listed as working in Iraq in formulating a variety of development schemes, mostly
relating to economic improvements. Some of the experts are in the direct employ of
the Iraq Government; others have been assigned to the Government for short periods
for specific purposes by agencies and organizations furnishing technical assistance
on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Relatively few technicians have so far been
concerned with social developments, but the country's needs in this respect have, we
understand, been partially surveyed.

47. In the absence of detailed documentation, we left it to the Government agencies 500
most directly concerned with the subject of our mission to determine whom we should
see and to suggest which projects or institutions we should visit.

48. During our short stay in Baghdad we were able to visit at Tal Mohamed a well- 657
constructed modern building designed to serve as a centre for community activities
for the residents of a model housing estate constructed by the Ministry of Social 185
Affairs for low-income government employees. Cheap transport facilities were
available between Baghdad and the new estate, in which some 500 houses were already 362
in occupation and more would be constructed as funds became available. The imposing
building in which it is intended that community activities shall be carried out has
been ready for use for more than a year but only some of the equipment and furniture
(including seven beds for maternity cases) have been installed. A difficulty in
finding suitable qualified staff has delayed the opening of the centre. When it is
in full working order it is planned to offer nursing, educational and indoor and
outdoor recreational facilities on modern lines. The general appearance of the
centre and model village was marred by the state of the roads after heavy rains.

49. It is understood that centres similar to that at Tal Mohamed are planned for other urban areas. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which until recently formed part of the Ministry of Health, has also other plans under consideration for creating, with external technical assistance, pilot projects of community organization or demonstration centres, in urban as well as in rural areas.

50. A survey of Iraq villages jointly conducted by Mr. Gordon MacGregor (TCA adviser 185
to the Ministry of Social Affairs) and Dr. Yusuf Khaddoury, M.D. (Officer in charge 657
of international relations of that Ministry) reveals:

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of the 33rd parallel. Affiliated companies 471
have concessions over the remaining territory—the
Mosul Petroleum Company in the
region west of the Tigris and the Basra
Petroleum Company south of the 33rd
parallel. Oil is extracted from the Kirkuk 315
fields by the Iraq Petroleum Company and 471
conveyed by pipelines to Mediterranean
ports. It was formerly pumped to terminals
in Tripoli and Haifa, but the latter pipeline
has been closed since the Arab-Israeli hostilities
in 1948. A new pipeline, constructed
from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias,
was opened early in 1952.

In 1938, the Basra Petroleum Company began drilling operations in the Persian Gulf area, where the existence of an extensive oil field has since been established. In 1950, a pipeline was completed to its shipping terminal at Fao, at the head of the Gulf. The activities of the Mosul company are still in the exploratory stage, but the production of oil has recently been started at Ain Zala. It is piped to the Mediterranean by a line which joins that from the Kirkuk fields at Baiji, on the Tigris.

A smaller oil field at Naft Khanah, near
the Iranian border, is worked by the
Khanaquin Oil Company, a subsidiary
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This
company operates a refinery on the Alwand
River, near Khanaquin, which supplies petroleum
products for local consumption.
Since 1952, it has also constructed a small 382
refinery at Basra to process products for use 471
in southern Iraq. It obtains the crude oil
from Naft Khanah or from the Basra Petroleum
Company.

Iraq derives a considerable revenue from 788
the pilgrimage traffic. The principal shrines 346
of the Shia sect are located at An Najef,
Kerbela, Kadhimain and Samarra, and, in
addition to local pilgrims, they are visited
annually by thousands of Shiites from Iran,
Pakistan and other Moslem countries. The
privilege of burial near the shrines is also
coveted by devout Shiite Moslems.

Transportation is mainly by roads or 459
waterways. Motor highways link the princi- 491

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The Basrah Petroleum Company Concession

x471 x648 On December 4, 1938, the Basrah Petroleum Company, also a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, obtained a 75-year concession covering all lands not included under previous concessions (about 93,000 square miles). Except that Basrah was to pay dead rent of £200,000 (gold) annually until commercial quantities were exported, all the other provisions were the same as those of the Mosul Petroleum Company agreement.[19] Basrah began producing and exporting oil in 1951.[20]

As discussed in Chapter II above, after the Persian Government granted the concession to D'Arcy, Great Britain succeeded in obtaining recognition by the Turkish Government that the concession covered the strip of territory on the Turco-Persian border which had been transferred from Persia to Turkey in 1913. This strip, known as the "transferred territories," was recognized as part of the Anglo-Persian concession by all the parties involved in the discussions, negotiations and prolonged deals over Iraqi oil. On August 30, 1925, an agreement was concluded between the Government of Iraq and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, granting the concession in the "transferred territories" for thirty-five years and establishing the royalty payments on a percentage of profits basis. The agreement also called for the formation of a subsidiary company to operate within Iraq. The subsidiary company was to erect a refinery for oil products to be consumed in Iraq; all the oil produced was to be for local consumption. The following year, on May 24, 1926, the agreement was revised. Royalties were to be paid on a per metric ton basis, the same as I.P.C.; the subsidiary company was also to become a marketing agency throughout the country; and the concession was extended for an additional thirty-five years.[21]

x471 315 382 The subsidiary organized was the Khanaqin Company. It produced oil from the Naft Khaneh field, and its refinery at Alwand, near Khanaqin, terminus of a twenty-five mile pipeline, was completed in May 1927. Early in 1932 a marketing

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[19] The full text of the concession is reproduced in *Iraq Government Gazette*, Dec. 4, 1938, 686-706; the law ratifying the agreement, 672.

[20] Iraq Petroleum Co., *Iraq Oil in 1951* (London, 1952), 21.

[21] *Special Report*, Col. No. 58, 1931, 222. Six hundred eighty-four square miles were covered by this concession.

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company, the Rafidain Oil Company, was organized for the 471K
purpose of supplying Iraq's petroleum requirements. In May of 315
the same year Khanaqin made over to Rafidain that portion of 382
its business which was concerned with the marketing of oil and oil products in Iraq.[22]

Production

Oil in commercial quantities was discovered as early as 1927.[23] It was not until 1934, however, with the completion of the Company's pipeline, that large quantities of oil were produced.[24] Since the major fields were inland, at Kirkuk, the output was inevitably limited by the capacity of the pipelines. Table III, on the following page, gives total production from 1927 up to and including 1951.

Pipelines and Refineries

The production of oil in Iraq was conditioned, at least in large measure, as was noted above, by transportation, hence the provisions in the original concessions for the transport of the oil.

The first major pipeline built by the Iraq Petroleum Company was a parallel 12-inch line from Kirkuk to Haditha, a distance of 150 miles, where it branched off in two directions, one line going to Haifa (Palestine) for a distance of 470 miles,

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[22] *Report 1932,* 40. A short summary of the various concessions is given in *The Middle East. A Political and Economic Survey* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1954), 281-282, and in *An Introduction to the Past and Present of the Kingdom of Iraq* (by a Committee of Officials, Baltimore, 1946), 43-45. A generalized outline of the terms of the concessions, almost on a schematic basis, appears in Raymond F. Mikesell and Hollis B. Chenery, *Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1949), 44-48; a sketchy outline is also given in *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1949-1950.* United Nations. E1910/Add.2/Rev.1, ST/ECA/9Add. 2, New York, 1951), 58. Henceforth cited U.N., *Review 1949-50;* Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East,* 66-76.

[23] Drilling began in April and in October Baba Gurgur No. 1 well came into production with 60,000 barrels a day. Mohammed al Naqib, "How Iraq's Oil Production Began and Grew," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya,* Feb. 6, 1954; see also *P.D.C.,* 207, col. 658, June 13, 1927.

[24] The Company spent about $62,000,000 from the time of the signing of the concession in 1925 until the oil began to flow through the pipeline for commercial marketing. U.S. Senate, *American Petroleum Interests,* 228.

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Table III. *Iraq Oil Production 1927-1951*

In Metric Tons[25]

1927	45,000	1940	2,514,000
1928	95,000	1941	1,566,000
1929	116,000	1942	2,595,000
1930	121,000	1943	3,572,000
1931	120,000	1944	4,146,000
1932	115,000	1945	4,607,000
1933	123,000	1946	4,680,000
1934	1,031,000	1947	4,702,000
1935	3,729,000	1948	3,427,000
1936	4,011,000	1949	4,067,000
1937	4,255,000	1950	6,479,000
1938	4,298,000	1951	8,351,000
1939	3,963,000		

In Barrels[26]

1927	338,000	1940	24,225,000
1928	713,000	1941	12,650,000
1929	798,000	1942	19,726,000
1930	913,000	1943	24,848,000
1931	830,000	1944	30,943,000
1932	836,000	1945	35,112,000
1933	917,000	1946	35,665,000
1934	7,689,000	1947	35,834,000
1935	27,408,000	1948	26,115,000
1936	30,406,000	1949	30,957,000
1937	31,836,000	1950	46,760,000
1938	32,643,000	1951	61,534,000
1939	30,791,000		

and one to Tripoli (Lebanon) for a distance of 380 miles.[27] The line, which had an annual capacity of 4,000,000 metric tons,

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[25] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1949-1950,* 147, and *1951,* 141. Production in metric tons covering the years 1928, 1933 and 1938-1950 is given in U.N., *Review, 1949-50,* 60; figures in metric tons for I.P.C. in Walter E. Skinner's *Oil and Petroleum Year Book* (London), for the years 1934-1951 in the volumes for 1936, 1940, 1946, 1949, 1951 and 1952. I.P.C. production for 1934, 1938 and 1946-1951 appears diagrammatically in *Iraq Oil in 1951,* 8; the cumulative production from the beginning of operations to the end of 1951 is given as 68 million tons, 9.

[26] *World Oil,* July 15, 1952, 66; see also the graph in *Iraq Oil in 1951,* 8, covering two pre-war years and 1946-1951—limited, however to I.P.C.

[27] A detailed description of this pipeline is given in *American Petroleum Interests,* 212; U.N., *Review 1949-50,* 61. The building of this parallel pipeline

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was completed in 1934. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Dutch-Shell Company received their shares of oil at Haifa where, after the Consolidated Refineries were completed, it was refined. The American and French groups received their crude at Tripoli.

Immediately after World War II (October 1946) a second parallel pipeline to terminate at Haifa and Tripoli was started, but because of the Arab-Israel war the branch to Haifa stopped at the boundary, about 42 miles from the terminus; the branch to Tripoli was completed in July 1949. A 30-inch pipeline from Kirkuk to Banias (Syria) covering a distance of 556 miles and with an annual capacity of 12,000,000 tons, was completed in April 1952 and officially inaugurated on November 18. This large new pipeline made possible a 95 per cent increase in the oil production from Kirkuk as compared with that of 1951.[28]

For the Basrah area a 75-mile 12-inch pipeline, begun in 1948, was completed in October 1951 from the Zubair field to Fao on the Shatt-al-Arab, on the Persian Gulf; a parallel 24-inch line was commissioned on January 1, 1954. The new oil field of Rumaila, 20 miles west of Zubair was connected with the last-named field by a 20-mile 20-inch pipeline.[29]

In July 1952 a 135-mile 12-inch pipeline from Ain Zalah, in the Mosul area, to Station K2 on the main Kirkuk-Mediterranean pipeline, was completed.[30]

The question of refineries was one of the major issues between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company. The former was anxious to have refineries on its territory; they would not only supply refined petroleum products necessary for home consumption, but would also increase the country's income, employ a greater number of workers, and enable the Iraqis to learn the necessary technique in the advanced stages of the oil industry.

A small refinery to meet local needs—but perhaps more because the A.I.O.C. would not build a long pipeline to carry the limited quantity of oil produced at Naft Khaneh in the "trans-

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was provided for in the agreement signed on Mar. 24, 1931 and the British Government had previously obtained agreements from the Governments of Palestine and Transjordan, *P.D.C.*, 248, col. 212, Feb. 10, 1931; *P.D.C.*, 250, col. 1080, Apr. 1, 1931.

[28] U.N., *Review 1949-50*, 61; *Iraq Oil in 1952*, 2. It took seventeen months to complete and cost £41 million.

[29] *Iraq Oil in 1953*, 27; *Iraq Oil in 1954*, 14.

[30] *Iraq Oil in 1952*, 27-30.

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x471 ferred territories"—was erected at Alwand in 1927 by the Khana-
315 qin Oil Company, as mentioned above.[31] It produced about 70
382 per cent of the petroleum products consumed in Iraq; the remainder was supplied by the Abadan refinery in Iran.[32]

In spite of persistent agitation by the Government, until 1951 the Iraq Petroleum Company refused to build more refineries in Iraq; it had two very small refineries at Kirkuk and Haditha, and a processing plant at Kirkuk. The great refineries were in Haifa and in Europe.

Closely connected with the question of refining was that of marketing of oil and oil products for internal consumption. As mentioned above, this was concentrated in the Rafidain Company. On December 25, 1951, the Iraq Government and the Khanaqin and Rafidain Companies signed an agreement providing for the purchase by the Government, at an agreed amount, of the Alwand refinery and the Rafidain facilities. Rafidain, acting on behalf of the Government, was to operate the refinery and, until 1961, was also to act as sole distributing agent for certain oil products for local consumption.[33]

To satisfy all local consumption demands, the Government decided to build a large refinery in the vicinity of Bagdad. Early in July 1951, it announced that it had accepted a bid from W. W. Kellog[34] of New York to erect a refinery south of Bagdad, with an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons. Work on the refinery at Doura started in 1952 and was expected to be finished in 1955, at a cost of £10,000,000. A 135-mile 12-inch pipeline was to bring crude from pumping station K2. In the meantime, as a temporary measure to meet the emergency created by the shutdown of Abadan, a small refinery with a 175,000-ton annual capacity was erected at Muftiya, outside of Basrah. In addition, the stabilizing and topping plants at Kirkuk helped to meet immediate local needs.[35]

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[31] *P.D.C.*, 207, col. 1467, June 20, 1927.

[32] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Iraq. Report of a Mission* (Baltimore, 1952), 150-151. Henceforth cited, International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report.*

[33] Iranian Oil Co. Ltd., *Annual Report and Accounts as at 31st December, 1951*, 21.

[34] *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 6, 1951.

[35] *Iraq Oil in 1952*, 16-17; *The Middle East. A Political and Economic Survey*, 282; United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East 1952-53* (New York, 1954), 49-50. Henceforth cited U.N., *Summary 1952-53.*

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In July 1952 the Iraq Government set up a five-man Refineries Board to administer the refineries, distribution and prices. 471x 382

The problem of lubricating oil was not met by all these refinery projects, and in the middle of May 1954 the Government allotted 3,000,000 dinars (decided upon in September 1953) for the erection of a lubricating oil refinery, in the vicinity of Doura, which would have an annual capacity of 25,000 tons. This project was to be administered by the Refineries Board.[36]

It would thus appear that Iraq was well on the way to meet home requirements for petroleum products; in fact, when the general refinery in Doura is completed, the refined products from Alwand will have to be exported. Such a possibility was anticipated and provisions were made with the Khanaqin Oil Company to operate Alwand on an export basis.[37]

The 1952 Agreement

The Red Line Agreement provided, in addition to the restrictions mentioned above, that in case a group was unable to take its share of oil, that share would be forfeited without compensation. The French group could not take its share during the Vichy regime, nor could C. S. Gulbenkian; Standard of New Jersey could not take deliveries while the Mediterranean was closed to tankers. 471x 648x

When the war was over the Iraq Petroleum Company again expanded operations, and each group took its proportionate share of the crude oil produced. The Compagnie Française des Pétroles and Gulbenkian attempted to obtain a reaffirmation of the restrictive provisions of the Red Line Agreement. This would have guaranteed to the French and Gulbenkian not only increased production in Iraq, but also a proportionate share in any acquisition which Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum might have acquired in the Arabian American Oil Company. The American companies were unwilling to reaffirm

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[36] *Al Zaman*, Sept. 7, 1953. For a description of the Government refinery projects see United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954* (New York, 1955), 117.

[37] Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 193.


IRAQ
▲ Oil fields
═ Oil pipe lines
★ Refineries
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Ain Zalah
Mosul
Quwair
Kirkuk
Suleimaniah
Al Fatha
Baiji
Khanaqin
Naft Khaneh
Alwand
Haditha
Bagdad
Rutba
Tigris
Euphrates
Nahr Umr
Basra
Zubair
Fao

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industrial and handicraft production, but most of those were 433 employed in small undertakings, with only about 2,000 working in what might be classified as modern industrial plants.[14] The United Nations reported in 1951 that industry continued to play a very minor part in the Iraqi economy and that the gross output was estimated at not more than ID 3,000,000.[15]

The general industrial and economic situation could perhaps 382 be gauged by the consumption of oil and oil products, especially since the country had these supplies in such abundance. In 1929, internal oil consumption, including refinery needs, was 70,000 metric tons; in 1937 it had risen to 132,000 tons, but in 1950 it was only 929,000 tons. Excluding refinery needs, consumption in 1937 was only 88,000 tons; in 1949, 518,000; in 1950, 619,000; in 1951, 635,000; and in 1952, 690,000.[16]

The level of civic responsibility and national consciousness 651 is illustrated by the taxpaying practices of the Iraqis. The first 652 income tax law was enacted in 1927, but not before considerable modifications had been made and a long time had elapsed did the Government begin to receive any substantial revenue. The following table shows the annual revenue from income tax, the total revenue, and the percentage of income taxes in the total revenue:

Table IV. *Iraq, Percentage of Income Tax in Total Revenue*

Year	*Income Tax (in I. D.)*	*Total Revenue (in I. D.)*	*Percentage*
1943	1,016,082	18,810,000	5.4
1944	1,293,089	20,700,000	6.2
1945	1,149,394	20,790,000	5.5
1946	1,032,054	25,520,000	4.0
1947	1,081,379	23,510,000	4.6
1950	2,354,000	31,579,000	7.5[17]

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[14] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 2, 129. Another estimate gives the total number of industrial workers in 1950 as not more than 72,000, including those employed in the oil industry. "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.

[15] United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1951-52* (New York, 1953), 43. Henceforth cited U. N., *Review 1951-52*.

[16] U.N., *Review 1951-52*, 62; U. N., *Summary 1952-53*, 57; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd., *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year ending 31st December 1952*, 20;—*Annual 1953*, 19.

[17] Great Britain, *Iraq*, 22; U.N., *Review 1949-50*, 78; *Annual Report of the National Bank of Iraq, July 1949-December 1950*, 53.

Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
315 programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
[496] works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-owned
Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

Petroleum

433 The petroleum industry in Iraq has made striking progress during the post-war
● period. Production and exports, which had been low mainly owing to the lack of
382 transport facilities, increased sharply following construction of new pipelines
to the seacoasts. Exploration activities led to the discovery of new oilfields,
315 which are being developed. As a result of increasing output of petroleum and the
439 revision of the terms of payment, Iraq's oil revenues have multiplied. These
revenues have provided the financial means for development of the country's
resources. Revenue from the oil industry, which is in the form of sterling,
together with the substantial and rising foreign exchange disbursements of the
oil companies for local expenditures, increased considerably the foreign exchange
[464] supplies of the country and made larger imports possible. Availability of
petroleum products, at relatively low cost, has facilitated economic development,
and the consumption of oil products has increased severalfold. In addition, the
petroleum industry has given employment to an increasing number of employees
(see table 27) and is providing them with training. After a setback during the
war years, when production declined to 1.6 million metric tons in 1941, output
of crude petroleum in 1944 recovered to its pre-war level of 4.3 million metric
tons. Construction of two additional pipelines, parallel to the previous lines
and with a yearly capacity of about 4.5 million tons each, started immediately
after the end of the war. The pipeline to Tripoli was completed in 1949, but
construction of the other, destined for Haifa, was interrupted by the Palestine
conflict and it remains incomplete. Another large-diameter pipeline with an
annual throughput capacity of 13.5 million tons, linking the Kirkuk field to
Baniyas in Syria, was completed in 1952 at a cost of ID 41 million. In the
meantime, the activities of the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum
Company, Ltd., both affiliated with the Iraq Petroleum Company, led to the
discovery of Ain Zalah and Butmah oilfields in the Mosul ~~area~~, and Zubair and
Rumaila oilfields near Basra. The development of these fields, especially Zubair,
and the installation of pipelines and oil handling facilities during the past
four years, has increased substantially the crude petroleum export capacity of
Iraq. In addition, another smaller oilfield had been discovered by a subsidiary
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company before the war at Naftkhaneh, near the Iranian
border, and its output, which was refined locally, served the domestic market
exclusively.

As a result of the foregoing developments during the last decade, as well as increasing world demand for petroleum, production of crude oil, which had declined from 4.7 million tons in 1946 and 1947 to 3.4 million tons in 1948, because of the Palestine conflict and the shutdown of the pipeline to Haifa, started to rise sharply, to 6.5 million tons in 1950, 18.9 million in 1952, and 29.6 million in 1954, representing in the latter year 4.3 per cent of the world's crude petroleum output as against 1.5 per cent in 1938. This production may be compared with proved oil reserves, which were estimated at 700 million tons in early 1949, and nearly 2,300 million tons at the end of 1954. Total investment in the petroleum industry of Iraq was estimated in 1952 at approximately ID 90 million, of which the main portion had been for construction of pipelines.

439 Iraq is exclusively an exporter of crude petroleum; the value of petroleum
382 exports was estimated at ID 137 million in 1954 as compared with ID 10 million
in 1938. Exports are handled by the parent companies of the Iraq Petroleum
471 Company and its affiliates, but under the terms of the February 1952 agreement,

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 MI Middle East
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Table 27. Iraq: Operations Of Petroleum Companies, Selected Years

(Output in thousands of metric tons; value in millions of Iraqi dinars)

Year	Production (crude petroleum)	Consumption of petroleum products	Estimated value of crude petroleum exports	Value of imports by petroleum companies	Direct payments by petroleum companies a/	Foreign exchange disbursements by petroleum companies for local expenses	Number of employees in petroleum industry b/
1927-33 ...	105	125	-	...	0.64	...	3.6
1938	4,298	190	10.3	1.0	1.98	0.58	4.5
1941	1,566	265		0.3	1.46	...	3.3
1946	4,680	385	10.8	2.4	2.33	2.14	11.3
1947	4,702	470	14.0	5.0	2.35	5.60	14.6
1948	3,427	505	11.4	9.3	2.01	7.03	14.2
1949	4,067	520	14.1	10.3	3.24	6.40	12.9
1950	6,479	560	28.7	8.4	5.35	4.39	11.4
1951	8,351	610	37.1	8.7	13.21	5.69	11.0
1952	18,843	710	83.0	14.4	37.41 c/	7.18	13.3
1953	28,217	795	125.6	13.2	49.87	...	13.2
1954	29,550	...	136.9	...	67.50 d/	...	...

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook; International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, and International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.); Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract of Iraq (Baghdad); National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin No. 11, July-September 1954 (Baghdad).

a/ Figures are for fiscal years beginning on 1 April of the year stated.

b/ Thousands; end of year data.

c/ Including ID 5 million for settlement of previous claims.

d/ Calendar year.

439 382 471 the Government of Iraq is entitled to take, as part of the payment by the oil companies, up to 12.5 per cent of crude oil produced by the operating oil companies and to develop its own export market. Refining activities are relatively small. There were three refineries at the end of 1953, with a combined annual capacity of nearly 800,000 tons of crude throughput. The output of petroleum products increased from 350,000 tons in 1949 to 690,000 tons in 1952. In order to increase refining capacity to meet rising local demand, the Government is constructing a refinery, with a capacity of over one million tons a year at Dora, near Baghdad. The plans was expected to cost ID 9 million and to start operations in 1955. In addition, the Government approved in 1953 a proposal to construct a lubricating oil plant to meet local needs. These government refineries will be supplied by crude oil, sold by the Iraq Petroleum Company, according to the February 1952 agreement, and delivered to the Government at K.2 pumping station; from there the Government will carry it in its own pipeline. The price of such oil, which will be for sale only in Iraq, is to be five shillings, sixpence, per ton of oil, plus a fixed charge of £63,000 per annum as the cost of pumping such oil to K.2 station. Consumption of petroleum products in Iraq increased from about 190,000 tons in 1938 to 385,000 tons in 1946 and nearly 800,000 in 1953.

651 382 471 Government revenues from oil operations were multiplied because of increasing production and exports and because of changes in the terms of payments by the producing companies. Prior to 1950, Iraq received the equivalent of $1.65 a ton, which was increased to about $2.45 a ton according to the agreement concluded in August 1950. This in turn was superseded, in February 1952, by a new agreement, retroactive to 1 January 1951, between the Government of Iraq on the one hand and the Iraq Petroleum Company, Basrah Petroleum Company and Mosul Petroleum Company, on the other. The agreement provided for an equal sharing of profits, with profits to be determined before deduction of foreign taxes, on the basis of fixed values and costs of petroleum. Under article 9 of this agreement, the share of the Government in profits from crude oil of Kirkuk quality on the Iraqi-Syrian border was calculated to amount to 35s. 6d. per long ton in 1951, increasing to 40s. 6d. in 1953 and thereafter; the corresponding figures on the Persian Gulf at Fao were 29s. 4 1/2d. and 34s. 4 1/2d. per long ton, respectively. This provision involved a discount of 17s. 6d. per long ton for Kirkuk oil from its Iraqi-Syrian border value, and 13s. for southern Iraqi oil from the posted prices in the Persian Gulf. A new agreement reached in March 1955, retroactive to January 1954, reduced this discount to a flat rate of 2 per cent, and resulted in a rise of 7s. per ton in revenue for Iraq. Direct payments to the Government, which were the equivalent of about ID 2 million in the fiscal year 1938/39 and ID 2.3 million in 1946/47, increased to ID 5.4 million in 1950/51 and nearly ID 68 million in 1954, all paid in sterling. Local expenditures by the oil companies for the purchase of local materials and payment of wages to workers, kept pace with the development of the petroleum industry; such sterling disbursements of the oil companies amounted to the equivalent of ID 7.2 million in 1952 as against ID 2.1 million in 1946 and ID 580,000 in 1938.

Other industries

433 Government attempts to promote industrialization began with the "Encouragement of Industries" Law of 1929, which exempted industrial machinery and certain raw materials from customs duties and also exempted new industries from certain taxes;

these schemes would raise annual capacity to over a million tons. Other projects include a sugar factory using locally grown beets to produce 10,000 tons of sugar per annum and refine 25,000 tons of imported sugar, at an estimated cost of ID 1.78 million; a pilot paper plant; a glass factory; a rayon factory; and a tobacco factory. 1/ 433 185

The most important project connected with petroleum is a refinery with an annual capacity of one million tons, at Dora, near Baghdad. Completion was scheduled for 1955 and total costs have been estimated at ID 10.5 million. A pipeline supplying the refinery with crude petroleum, from Baiji, on the Euphrates west of Kirkuk, has been completed and five pipelines are under construction to carry the refined products to Baghdad and Um Al Adham. 2/ An asphalt refinery being built at Qayara, near Mosul, at a cost of ID 1.15 million, is expected to produce 60,000 tons of asphalt per annum, as well as 24,000 tons of gas oil. A smaller plant at Muftiya, near Basra, with an annual capacity of 6,000 tons, was scheduled to start operations at the beginning of 1955. 3/ A lubricating oil refinery has also been approved near Baghdad; it will produce 25,000 tons and cost 3.4 million. 433 382 315 185

The major project under consideration is that for utilizing natural gases from the Kirkuk oil wells to produce chemical fertilizers, cement, sulphur and electric power. Two alternative projects have been submitted, one of which would cost ID 33 million and produce 500,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizers, 200,000 tons of cement and 100,000 tons of sulphur, while the other would cost ID 20 million and produce half these quantities. 185 433

A survey of mineral resources is being carried out by a group of foreign consulting engineers. Negotiations are proceeding with a United States sulphur company regarding the exploitation of Iraq's sulphur deposits, which are believed to be large.

Other development projects include a highway and bridge building programme, the expansion of Baghdad airport and improvement of telecommunications. In addition, a large-scale building programme is under way, including hospitals, schools, low-cost housing and public buildings.

The new Five-Year Plan

The Ministry of Development and the Development Board have approved the new Five-Year Plan for the financial years 1955/56 to 1959/60. Subject to approval by Parliament, the plan calls for an estimated total expenditure of ID 303,306,100. Revenue estimates total ID 252,658,000. These are calculated on an estimated annual revenue of ID 43 million derived from a 70 per cent share of the oil receipts making a total of ID 215 million, plus a sum of about ID 38 million from previous years. The deficit of about ID 50 million is to be balanced by an anticipated increase in oil revenue during this period. 185

1/ The Iraq Times, 20 October 1954.

2/ Ibid., 6 December 1954.

3/ Ibid., 19 November 1954.

in Basra, close to both shipping and the agricultural area which 288 may prove suitable for the growing of jute. It would employ about 300 workers.

Automobile Tires

The importation of automobile and truck tires is increasing 383 at a rate of approximately 15 percent per annum, the value of all [439] tires imported in 1950 being ID 468,000.

A plant of economic size to manufacture tires could be justified with a market of approximately twice that which now exists. Such a market will probably be reached in 1955. Since it would require approximately two years to construct a tire plant, it is recommended that plans be formulated to start such a plant in 1953.

The plant would be so designed as to utilize the maximum amount of labor and, accordingly, should cost no more than ID 750,000, including foreign exchange of ID 600,000, mainly pounds sterling. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required during the first years of its operation.

Salt

Geophysical work gives conclusive evidence of a very large 135 salt dome near Basra. Unfortunately, the analysis is not known. This dome could be the source of very cheap salt for both export and domestic consumption. It might make feasible the establishment [385] of an alkali plant, particularly since the nearby oil field would be able to furnish gas as a source of cheap power. It is recommended, therefore, that core drilling of this dome be started as soon as possible to permit a proper evaluation of the possibilities of its use.

Sugar Mill

Considerable thought has been given to the recommendation 257 of a sugar refinery. Such an enterprise would, of course, have to depend on agriculture to supply the raw material, either in the form of sugar beets or sugar cane. Since this cannot be assured at this time, it is recommended that the development of this industry be held in abeyance for the present.

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I-I

Bizre Kattane (Schl.); the names for linseed in India are Alsi, Atasi, and Alashi; linseed. 278*

Ph. Ind. 1: 239. 824*

Field 21; 63, 67 (Moroccan and River Plate seeds from Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150809, 150920; K.B. 326.

Aitchison informs us that in Afghanistan the flax plant and seed are known as Zagher; the oil of the seed as Roghan-i-zagher; the fiber and linen cloth as Katan or Katun. The plant is cultivated in Turkestan for the oil of its seeds, but, as in India, the fiber is not collected. In Iraq Moroccan linseed has been distributed in considerable quantities as Indian varieties have been severely attacked by rust disease (G.). The oil is valued for various industrial purposes and the seeds are eaten as sweetmeats.—Boiled with *Althaea* sp., the seeds are used as a poultice for boils (H.F.). [385] •

Lolium rigidum Gaud. (Gramineae) 824*

گل چمن [231]

Gul-i-chaman (Teh.); Ziwan (Iraq); rigid rye grass; seeds.

W.H.M.M. 150705.

This is a tufted annual grass grazed by sheep and other animals. It is related to the darnel grass (*L. temutenlum*), "Jamdar," which is regarded as an obnoxious weed, since its seeds are sometimes infected by an ergot fungus generating a narcotic poison. The use of the seeds sold in Tehran is not known.

Loranthus Grewinkii Boiss. and Bunge (Loranthaceae) 824*

کشمش کولی 278*

Kishmish-i-kūlī (Teh.); Kishmish-kawali (Ind. bazaars); Dibk (Ar.); mistletoe berries.

Field 139; W.H.M.M. 150756.

These fruits are called raisins of Kawali, Kawali being the name for gypsies in Iraq and Iran. Le Bode in his "Travels in Lauristan and Arabistan" mentions his being shown in the forests of the Zagros Mountains, on the road from Kermanshah to Baghdad, a fruit called by the natives Angur-i-kauli (Kawali) or grapes of Kauli, a parasite on the oak. The dried berries are rounded, 8 mm. in diameter, soft, dark brown, and shriveled, and have one seed. They are mawkish in taste, containing a form of caoutchouc which can be drawn out in threads. The author of the "Makhzan-el-Adwiya"

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824* **Capparis spinosa L.** (Capparidaceae)

278* ریشه کبار

Rishah-i-kabar (Teh.); Kabar (Pers., Iraq); the bark.

Ph. Ind. 1: 131; Boiss. 1: 420.

Field 200; W.H.M.M. 150803; K.B. 307.

The thorny caper is found in western Asia, Europe, North Africa, and Australia. It is a common shrub in the open country, forming great bushes fully 5 feet high.

[262] Throughout Iran the flower buds are collected to be made into pickles. The light-colored root and the thick root bark are used in medicine, the bark being the Capparis Cortex Radicis of the old "Persian Pharmacopoeia." They are both pungent and bitter and are given for intermittent fever and rheumatism.

Capsicum frutescens L. (Solanaceae)

فلفل مویه

Filfil mūyeh, Filfil-i-surkh (Teh.); Filfil ahmer (Ar.); Lal mirch (Hind.); red pepper, bird pepper, chilies.

Field 96A, 111A; W.H.M.M. 150914.

[263] This species of peppers or chilies, *Capsicum* and *C. annuum*, are cultivated throughout India and Iran for their pungent fruits, and are used throughout the East for culinary purposes. Capsicums and their preparations act as a powerful local irritant. In medicinal doses chilies stimulate the alimentary canal, promoting the flow of gastric juice "to increase appetite and aid digestion."

Carthamus tinctorius L. (Compositae)

کافشه

Kāfshah, Tukhm-i-kāfshah (Teh., Ham.); the seed.

Gul-i-rang (Teh.); Gul-i-kajira, Qurtum (Ar.); Kusam (Hind.); Atractus (Gr.); safflower, the flowers.

Ait.; Post; Schl.; Laufer 324; Ph. Ind. 2: 308.

Field 33, 39A, 195; W.H.M.M. 150866; K.B. 307.

[303] • [386] The safflower plant is cultivated in Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan as a field crop for its red florets, which are used as a dyestuff and cosmetic. The red flowers are often supplied as a cheap substitute for saffron, the stigmas of *Crocus sativus* L.

The fruits or achenes, called parrot seed, the size of barley grains, yield by expression an oil which is used as a salve for sprains and rheumatism.

I-I
824*
278*
[326]

The yellow larkspur is a perennial herb in desert regions of Iran and Iraq, with shoots 2 feet high, each bearing a terminal spike of yellow flowers. The dried petals are of commercial importance, yielding a valuable yellow dye for silk, and are exported for this purpose in large quantities to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and even to India, where the flowers, to a small extent, are employed in medicine.

Dolichos Lablab L. (Leguminosae)

لوبیاگل

Lūbiyā-gul (Teh.); Sim (Hind.); Simbi (Sans.); kidney bean.

Field 99.

This is a climbing perennial, or, under cultivation, an annual, common in India, where the seeds, which vary much in form and color, are employed as food. The beans from Tehran are black and brown, 15 by 10 mm., with a white hilum.

Dorema Ammoniacum Don (Umbelliferae)

وشا

Vashā (Teh.); Ushna ushek (Pers.); Kandal (Afg.); Samagh Hamama (Hind.); gum ammoniacum.

W.H.M.M. 150769.

[314]

The plant yielding this exudation is found in the desert regions of Afghanistan and Iran. The light colored gum-resin occurs in rounded tears, agglutinated masses, or cakes; it breaks with an opaque, shining or yellow conchoidal fracture, forming a milky emulsion with water. The drug has a faint, peculiar odor, and a bitter, nauseous taste. The gum is stimulating, expectorant, and laxative. Externally it acts as a resolvent, and is used as a plaster in asthmatic cases, and for indolent tumors and glandular swellings.

Doronicum Pardalianches L. (Compositae)

درونج اقربی

Darūnaj-i-akrabī (Teh., Ham.); Darvunedge eghrebi (Schl.); Doronic (Gr.); Doronicum Graeci (Ph. Pers.); doronicum root.

Achundow; Boiss. 3: 379; Makhjan-el-Adwiya; Ph. Ind. 2: 292; Kew Museum.

Field 168; K.B. 315.

This ancient drug is said to have come originally from Greece and Syria. *D. scorpioides* Lam. affords some supplies of the drug,

I-1

Indigofera Roxburghii Jaume (Leguminosae) 824*

عدس تلخ 278*

'Adas-i-talkh (Teh.); Bin-i-talkh (Isf.); the seeds.

Field 442; W.H.M.M. 150872.

These seeds are red in color, polished, flattened, oblong, 4 by 2 mm., very hard, and bitter.—They are given to relieve stomach pains (H.F.), and are similar to seeds of an allied plant, *I. trifoliata* L., prescribed in Guzrat as a restorative.

Indigofera tinctoria L. (Leguminosae) 386 •

رنگ کرمانی 824*

Rang-i-kirmānī, Nasābīdah-i-kirmani(?), Rang-i-sābīdah, Rang-i-vasmah (Teh.); Wasma (Punj.); Nil (Hind.); leaves of the indigo plant.

Field 112A, 152; W.H.M.M. 150762, 150790.

It is of historic interest to note that the old name for indigo leaves in the Punjab, Iran, and Turkey is Wasma, the name formerly used for woad, the dye obtained from *Isatis tinctoria*, and used by the early Britons. *Isatis* is indigenous to the Kuram Valley, where it is called Ranjowah or cat's filth. Indigo was known in Avicenna's time, and India has cultivated and produced the dye as a leading industry for several generations. The leaves, like henna, are sold [302] in both coarse and fine powder, and used chiefly as a cosmetic for coloring the skin.

Inula Helenium L. (Compositae) 824*

رأس هندی 278*

Ra's-i-hindī, Ghaza gouzanah (Teh.); Anduz (Ham.); Pil gush, "elephant's ear"; Rasan, Rasna of the Hindus; Andiz otu (Turk., see Boiss. 2: 186); Zanjabil chami, "ginger of Damos"; Zanjabil-i-shami, "Syrian Costus"; Année (Fr.); Helenion (Gr.); Enula Campana (Med. Lat.); elecampane root.

Ph. Pers.; Schl.; Boiss.; Pharmacog. 340; Ph. Ind. 2: 259.

Field 222; K.B. 322.

Elecampane root was an ancient medicine among the Greeks, and its use spread to other parts of Europe and to Asia. The root is hard and horny, grayish brown in color, paler within. Crystals are seen in the interstices of the wood in old commercial samples. The root, which has an agreeable, aromatic odor, and a warm, bitter

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I-I
278* This annual herb is indigenous to the region that extends from the
824* Caucasus to northern India, and is frequently cultivated in India
[262] and Iraq as a winter crop. The seeds are used for human consumption and for feeding animals; as a green manure or forage crop it
[246] surpasses other vetches. It has for a long time been known that a form of paralysis named Lathyrism is believed to result when this pulse is eaten continuously for some length of time. Guest, however, states that there is no evidence that its harmful nature has ever been recorded in Iraq.

Lavandula dentata L. (Labiatae)

اسطوخودوس

Ustūkhūdūs (Teh.); Osthoukhodouce (Schl.); the Persian name is derived from the Greek; flower heads.

See paper on this drug by I. H. Burkill in the Journ. As. Soc. Bengal, N. S., V, No. 3, March, 1909, 67–71; Ph. Ind. 3: 93; Boiss. 4: 540.

Field 18; W.H.M.M. 150737; K.B. 324.

These are the flower heads of a species of lavender sold in Tehran and brought from Shiraz. They constitute an ancient drug used by the Greeks and referred to by Arabian and Persian physicians. The name has also been applied to *L. Stoechas* L., the Staechus of old works on materia medica. The flowering spikes have the odor of rosemary and camphor, and yield an essential oil containing dextro-camphor and dextro-fenchone. In the form of an infusion the drug is given for catarrh and malaria; it is also used for washing wounds and eruptions.

278* **Lawsonia alba Lam.** (Lythraceae)

824* حنا برک

302 Hinnāy-i-barg (Teh.); Hinna (Iraq); Rang-mehndi (Hind.); Camphire (Syr.); henna leaves.

• 386 Field 74, 188, 220; 19, 45 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150819, 150863.

The henna plant is cultivated throughout India on account of its leaves, which yield the henna dye, and as a garden hedge plant. They are sold in the shops in two forms: (1) the broken leaves, and (2) the leaves called "Rangh" reduced to fine powder and mixed with a small quantity of mustard oil. The principal value is as an article of the toilet, for staining the finger nails, hands, and feet a dull orange color, and for dyeing the hair bright red. The use of henna

1/[Chickling vetch (Lathyrus sativus) - - Analyst]

I-I

as a cosmetic dates from very ancient times; it is practiced by 278*
Mohammedan women, and has become a vogue in Europe. Staining 824*
the finger nails with henna to make them resemble hazelnuts is called
"funduq bastan." Henna is also used as an external application for 302
skin diseases, blind boils, and leprosy.—It is painted on the pubic 386 •
region for stoppage of bladder (H.F.). The seeds contain about
10 per cent of fixed oil.

Lecanora esculenta Eversm. (Parmeliaceae) 278*

شير زاد 824*

Shīr-zād (Teh.); Chir zadi, Agalactie (Schl.); the lichen.

Holmes, Manna, Chem. & Drugg. 92: 25 (1920).

Field 418; W.H.M.M. 150752; K.B. 325.

This manna lichen is abundant in North Africa and western Asia, and locally in the desert of Seistan. It varies from the size of a pea to a small nut, clear brown or whitish; the interior is soft, white, with interlacing hyphae and crystals of calcium oxalate. There is a tendency for the thallus to develop excrescences of a nodular form which easily become free and drift about with the wind in the desert. Schlimmer gives references to the use of this lichen as food from the time of Alexander the Great. It contains lichenin. Its nutritive power is very low. The name of the drug means "milk begetting," and it is employed to increase the flow of human milk.

Other lichens referred to in the Field collection:

Usnea sp. (28A), a lichen of Iraq and Iran, called Lihayat-as-shāyib, or "old man's beard." This is mixed with flour in bread-making, and a decoction is sometimes taken to correct bad breath.

An Alpine lichen (87A) called Lachyat-as-sheikh. This is used as a perfume. Perfumed lichens have been observed in the genera *Evernia*, *Ramalina*, and *Zobaria*.

Bouceroseca Aucheri(?), a lichen called Mārmūt, used by Brahuis
in languor and oppression (Ait.). Pāla-mangy and Māhriz are the [302]
Kashmir names of two lichens employed to dye the nails and hands [386]
as substitutes for henna (Ait.). One of these is probably *Squamaria*
chrysoleuca Sm.

Lens esculenta Moench (Leguminosae)

نیسک

Nisik (Kurd. in Iraq); Adas (Turk.); Masūr (Hind.); the lentil.

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says the properties of the berries are resolvent and laxative.—The dried berries mixed with water are used as a depilatory (H.F.).

Luffa acutangula Roxb. (Cucurbitaceae)

طوری

Tūri (Teh.); Tukhm-i-turi (Afg.); loofah or towel gourd; the seeds.

Field 90.

The plant is called, in Sanskrit, Koshataki, a general name for the genus *Luffa,* from Kosha, the cocoon of a silkworm, and in allusion to the way in which the seeds are enclosed in a thin, fibrous network, which when dry is used as a flesh brush or bath sponge. The seeds are gray, oval, flat, 12 to 14 by 8 mm., with a rough surface marked with small, irregular, black specks. The seeds are medicinal; they possess purgative and emetic properties and yield an oil.

Mallotus philippinensis Muell. Arg. (Euphorbiaceae)

قنبلیله

Qunbalilah (Teh.); Kamela (Hind., Bom.); Kapila (Mad.); kamala.

W.H.M.M. 150845.

Kamala consists of the red glands that form on the fruit of this tree, which grows throughout tropical India. The drug is a red, heavy powder, somewhat gritty, insoluble in water, but partly dissolving, with an orange color, in alcohol. This drug is used as an anthelmintic. Formerly employed as a dye for silk and wool, it has been almost entirely replaced by aniline dyes. [386]

Malva sylvestris L. var. mauritiana Boiss. (Malvaceae)

گل پنیرک

Gul-i-panīrak, Tukhm-i-khābāzi (Teh.); Khitmi-i-kuchak, "small khitmi" (Pers.); Penirek, Khib-baze (Schl.); Hamam Komandji (Turk.); flowers and fruits of common mallow.

Boiss. 1: 819; Ph. Ind. 1: 204.

Field 26, 212, 84A; W.H.M.M. 150757, 150796; K.B. 326.

Aitchison says the flowers of the mallow, called Gul-i-khatmi, are collected in northeastern Iran, and exported for medicinal purposes. Khabazi is the Arabic name of the fruits imported into India from Iran. In the samples from Tehran both flowers and fruits of

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children, for fevers and chest troubles (C.).—For this purpose the flowers are often mixed with *Adiantum Capillus-Veneris* L., jujube, violet flowers, oxtongue, and sugar (H.F.).

Ochrocarpus longifolius Benth. & Hook. (Guttiferae)

نور موش

Nūr-mūs, Normush (Ham.); Tambrā (red) nagkeshur (Pers.); the flower buds.

Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 270; Ph. Ind. 1: 172.

K.B. 328.

This tree, called cobra saffron, grows in the western part of the peninsula of India from Canara to the Concan. The flower buds come principally from Rajapur and the Deccan. The reddish brown, globular buds, like cloves, are astringent, and are used for dyeing silk. In Iran, where they seem recently to have been introduced, they are used as an aromatic tonic. [286] •

Ocimum Basilicum L. (Labiatae)

تخم ریحان

Tukhm-i-raihān (Ham., Teh.); Ruhan (Kurd.); Takmeria (Bom.); Semen Basilici (Old Herbals); Alfabaca (Port.); sweet basil.

Ait.; Boiss. 4: 534; Fl. Br. Ind. 4; Ph. Ind. 3: 83. /

Field 84A; W.H.M.M. 150830; K.B. 728.

The sweet, Roman, or garden basil is a native of India and Iran, and is distributed in Africa and Malaya. Raihan is the Arabic name for "the herb," and the plant is a potherb much used for its mint-like aroma. The "seeds," long known in medicine, are said to be the Badranj of Avicenna. Large quantities are imported into India from Iran. The nutlets or "seeds" are blackish, oblong, 2 to 2.5 mm. long, broad, punctulate, slightly arched, with a white umbilicus at the narrow end. When placed in water, they immediately become coated with a semi-opaque mucilage. Schlimmer [262] remarks that the seeds are eaten with bread and cheese.—The seeds are prescribed as a cold infusion for influenza (H.F.).

Ocimum canum Sims (Labiatae)

تخم شربتی

Tukhm-i-sharbatī (Ham., Teh.); Tukhm-chirbati, Reyhane Kouhi, Badroudge ibieze (Schl.); white basil.

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Field 194; W.H.M.M. 150774; K.B. 328.

Schlimmer remarks that Shiraz supplies Iran with these seeds and adds that they are an indispensable ingredient in iced sherbet (sorbets à la glace). The seeds, or nutlets, are black, punctulate, oblong or ellipsoid, 2 by 1 mm., arched on one side, with a bifurcate line on the other. They are smaller than those of the sweet basil, with a less prominent, white umbilicus, but, like them, they become coated with opalescent mucilage when placed in water. The seeds are given locally for lung and chest complaints and as a heart tonic.

Olea europea L. (Oleaceae)

زیتون

Zaitūn; olive.

[262] Cultivated for its fruits and for the extraction of oil, the olive tree provides an important article of diet and medicinal remedy.—Leaves are sometimes prepared as a decoction for coughs (H.F.).

Onosma echioides L. (Boraginaceae)

ریشه هوه چوبه

Rīshah havah-i-chūbah (Ham.); Havah-i-chūbah (Teh.); Ratanjot (Hind.); Indian alkanet root.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 4: 181; Fl. Br. Ind. 4: 178; I.H.B.; Ph. Ind. 2: 54.

Field 165; W.H.M.M. 150718; K.B. 329.

This plant, growing in Afghanistan and Siberia, affords a root which is substituted for European alkanet (*Anchusa tinctoria*), from Al-kanna of the Arabs, employed as a dye and medicine in early times. The root of the allied species, *O. Hookeri* Clarke, is called Ranj-i-badshah, "King's dye." The tapering root has a purplish red color, and the cortical portion easily separates in flakes. It imparts its color to oils and spirits, and is used in coloring medicinal preparations. In Iran the root is powdered and given to horses for coughs and as a condition powder.

• [382]
[231]

Orchis latifolia L. (Orchidaceae)

سعلب

Sa'lab (Teh.); Salab-misri (Ar.); Punjah-i-salaba; Oriental salep.

Field 229; W.H.M.M. 150908.

Palmate or hand-shaped tubers of orchids are considered the best for medicinal purposes. They are deprived of their epidermis by

I-I

The galls are formed by *Pemphigus utricularius* Pass. (figured in "Les Zoöcécidies des Plantes d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Océanie," by C. Houard, 1923, figs. 1010–1012, p. 471, under *P. atlantica* No. 1731). They contain about 40 per cent of gallotannic acid, are ovoid, larger than peas, somewhat fig-shaped, pink in color, turning gray; the wall is thin, brittle, and rugose on the outside, smooth within and translucent. The taste is astringent and slightly terebinthinate. In Persian and Arabic works on medicine the galls are described as cold, dry, and astringent.—Mixed with Indian spikenard they are administered to relieve stomach pains (H.F.). 824* 278*

Pistacia Terebinthus L. (Anacardiaceae)

سقز سفید

Sagiz-i-safid (Teh.); Sages (Stapf); Zunghari, Sukhur; the oleo-resin and leaves.

Field 129; W.H.M.M. 150894.

The turpentine tree grows freely near Banni in the hills of Sherag. Its oleo-resin is a thick, tenacious, white, opaque mass, gradually taking the shape of the bottle in which it is placed; it softens on warming and has a pleasant terebinthinate odor. It is used in Tehran as a chewing gum, and is similar to the Chian turpentine which was recommended about fifty years ago as a remedy for cancer. The leaves are astringent and are used for dyeing. [314] [386] •

Pistacia vera L. (Anacardiaceae) 824* 278* 262

پسته

Pistah (Teh.); pistachio nuts in shells.

Field 265; 49A, 50A, 51A; 124 (Iraq).

پوست پسته

Pust-i-pistah (Teh.); husks of the fruits.

Field 186.

The fruit of the pistachio nut is the size of an olive; its husk is reddish and astringent, its odor terebinthinate. Within the fruit is a woody shell or nut, brownish white in color, with hard, horny, and polished texture and ovoid shape. The kernel or almond is pale green, and covered with a thin, brittle, brown skin, easily removed by scratching. The taste is sweet, oily, and balsamic. The outer husk of the fruit (Pust-i-pistah) is used as an infusion for dysentery and is imported into Bombay from Iran as a dyeing and tanning agent. [386] [281]

35: Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MA1
Iraq MHI
Kurd MA-11

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Quercus infectoria Olivier (Fagaceae) 824 *

مازو 278 *

Māzū (Isf.); Affaz (Teh.); Ajees-aafs (Ar.); Maiphala (Hind.); galls, mad, or Dead Sea apples. 386 •

Field 45A, 447; W.H.M.M. 150783. 281

These galls are excrescences on the twigs of oak trees, resulting from the deposition of eggs of *Cynips gallae-tinctoriae* Olivier. Oak galls are collected in Asiatic Turkey, as well as in the province of Aleppo, and are known commercially as "Aleppo," "Smyrna," or "Turkey" galls. They are nearly spherical in shape, and vary from 12 to 20 mm. in diameter, bluish green externally and yellowish within. They are hard and heavy, and bear short, bluntly pointed projections. The galls contain from 50 to 70 per cent of gallotannic acid, and consequently are used medicinally as a local astringent, to be dusted on wounds. They find an extensive application technically in dyeing and tanning.—In Kurdistan they are sometimes strung as beads and hung over the cradle to ward off the Evil Eye (H.F.). K [789]

Quercus lusitanica Lam. var. tauricola (Fagaceae)

Talkak (?) (Iraq); Basra galls.

Field 102, 120 (Iraq).

These galls are formed by *Cynips insana* Mayr. on the above oak, and also on *Quercus infectoria.* They are much larger than Aleppo galls, dark brown, oval or subspherical, 4 by 3.5 cm., yellowish brown within, a channel leading to the cavity in the center. They are very astringent and rich in tannic acid.

Quercus persica Jaub. & Spach (Fagaceae) 824*

بلوط 278*

Balūt (Teh.); Glans Quercus Ballotae (Ph. Pers.); acorns.

Field 191; W.H.M.M. 150834.

This is one of the most common species of oak throughout the forests of Kurdistan and the Rowandiz area. The acorns are oblong, 3.5 by 1.7 cm., light brown in color, glabrous, shining, and contain a single seed. Acorns have a styptic action because of the tannin they contain; they are used for colic pains in children, and as a gargle. —In Kurdistan acorns are sometimes eaten raw, but they are usually roasted and the flour made into cakes (H.F.). [262]

Quercus sp. (Fagaceae)

Giash mashi (Ham.); Kisa, Kesa; spiny galls.

I-I
824*
278*
[232]

scarlet foliage. The fruit and root-stock of wild rhubarb are collected and employed in medicine; the fruits were official in the "Pharmacopoeia Persica." A decoction of the reddish, triangular-winged fruits is considered a more powerful purgative than that of the rootstock (Aitchison). The fruits are used in Tehran as a vermifuge for horses, and in Hamadan the drug is applied as a poultice for headache. The rhubarb leaves from Isfahan are made into an infusion and used for gonorrhea (C.).

Rhodymenia sp. (Florideae, Rhodymeniaceae)

لقا

Lyka, Leeka (Iraq); Chinai-ghasa or seaweed.

Field 31A.

This alga, obtained in northern Iran, is light brown and gelatinous. A decoction is given for coughs. As a substitute for agar-agar, it is emulcent, emollient, and alterative, and may be used as a cultivating medium for bacteria.

Rhus coriaria L. (Anacardiaceae)

سماق

Summāq, Summāq-i-shakki bī hastah (Teh.); Tirsh (Kurd.); Tartak (Hind.); leaves, bark, and fruits.

Achundow; Schl.; Boiss. 2: 4; Post; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 1: 373.

[245] Field 164, 272; 107 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150800; K.B. 335.

[231]
• [386]

The sumac is a tree cultivated in Khurasan, western Afghanistan, and throughout Central Asia. The leaves have long been used by the Arabs, Turks, Iranis, and in Europe, for dyeing silk and tanning leather. They contain from 15 to 35 per cent of tannin.

The fruit is exported from Iran and used by Mohammedans in India. It is a small, sticky drupe, the size of a lentil, 5 mm. in diameter, red or green, acid, and astringent to the taste, containing one lenticular, polished, brown seed.

—Mixed with *Punica Granatum* L., sumac is applied to relieve painful gums. The seeds in an infusion are used to acidulate foods (H.F.).

Ricinus communis L. (Euphorbiaceae)

گرچک فرنگی

Garchak farangī (Teh.); Karchak (Ham.); Tochme Kertchec (Schl.); Kurwa (Ar., Iraq); Bedanjir, "willow fig"; castor oil seeds.

35: Hooper and Field, S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

I-I

Field 264; 4, 12, 36, 53 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150739; K.B. 335. 824*

The castor oil plant[1] is a native of India, but is common now throughout tropical and subtropical countries. In Iraq and Iran it is cultivated as a windbreak for cotton and other summer crops and in gardens as an ornamental plant. It may attain a height of 10 meters and be a perennial tree, but in cooler climates it is either a shrub or an annual herb. With variations of the plant there are also varieties, large and small, of the seeds. The four samples from Iraq were classed as follows: "Abhangi seeds" 15 by 9 mm., "ordinary" 13 by 10 mm., "Indian red-stemmed" 11 by 8 mm., "Syrian Baladi" 13 by 11 mm. The most important constituent of castor seed is the fixed oil, which exists to the extent of about 50 per cent. The oil is used as a lubricant, as an illuminant, and in medicine as a safe purgative. The oil cake contains all the poisonous property originally present in the seed, hence can not be used as a cattle food; it is, however, an excellent manure and fuel.

278*
372
[247]
[245]
[241]

Roccella Montagnei Bél. (Ascolichenes, Roccellaceae) 824*

دواله

278*

Davālah (Ham.); a lichen.

Field 28A; W.H.M.M. 150824; K.B. 336.

Achundow refers this drug to *Muscus arboreus*, and gives the Persian names as Dawalak and Karbasu and the Arabic name as Aschna (*Usnea* sp.). The Persian name Davālah is applied to more than one kind of lichen, since Dymock gives *Parmelia kamtschadalis* Esch. as the source of this drug in the Indian bazaars (Ph. Ind. 3: 627). In the Field collection from Baghdad, No. 28A, this drug occurs under the name of "Lihayat as-shāyib." Some of the Parmelias are used as a dye. They are gray lichens, in broken pieces, having emollient and astringent properties, used in a bath or as a poultice.

Rosa damascena Mill. (Rosaceae) 824*

گل سرخ

213

Gul-i-surkh, "red flower" (Teh.); Ward (Ar.); flowers of red rose. 278*

Field 42A; W.H.M.M. 150763.

The rose of Damascus is largely cultivated in western Asia. In Turkey, Bulgaria, and the south of France this species yields attar of rose and is the flower from which the official rose water is prepared.

The petals are slightly astringent, and are used chiefly as an agreeable astringent or as a coloring agent. "Gulanjabin," of rose [386]

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[1] [Ricinus communis --ANALYST]

241 [387] yields. As will be indicated later, inorganic fertilizers could probably be produced cheaply in Iraq and organic fertilizers could be produced as by-products of the slaughtering industry.

231 4. Livestock Improvement

The productivity of livestock is extremely low, primarily because of inadequate feed supply. In addition to the production of fodder crops, measures should be taken to improve natural pasture lands, particularly in the northern mountains, which have generally suffered from over-grazing. Reseeding and rotational grazing are necessary. Productivity could be further raised by the establishment of shelters, better breeding methods, especially the introduction of new and improved sires and maintenance of stud stations, and by more effective control of parasitic diseases through an increase in the number of veterinarians and the provision of more extensive diagnostic facilities in the provinces.

The quality of livestock products could be raised considerably by a number of measures. One of these is an improvement in the practices and more stringent sanitary supervision of abattoirs. Others would be the establishment of a number of wool shearing and grading units under the guidance of an appropriate expert; appointment of a hides and skins expert to serve as general manager of the newly established Hides and Skins Association; and recruitment of an abattoir specialist to train local abattoir supervisors in improved methods of flaying and preserving hides and skins.

234 At present, even the major cities are without a clean, safe milk supply. The supply of milk could be substantially improved by better feeding of livestock, concentration of milking cattle in well-equipped settlements on the outskirts of cities, and central collection, transportation and processing of milk under strict sanitary controls. The possibility of cooperative collection and processing of milk should be explored.

231 [233] Since the nomads and semi-nomads, who may number from 200,000 to 500,000, account for a large proportion of the livestock in the country, particularly sheep and goats, their needs must receive special attention. Measures should be taken, for instance, to provide them with better watering facilities, sheep-dipping stations,

In addition to the above-mentioned enterprises, it may well be desirable to establish a paper mill as soon as there is an assured supply of pulp from abroad. As the demand for paper bagging for domestically produced fertilizers and cement increases, it will probably be more economical to produce such paper in Iraq than to import it. A plant for the manufacture of glass bottles, other containers and tumblers might also be started, provided the availability of the right type of sand can be confirmed. 433 [289]

The largest and perhaps the most promising industrial possibility lies in the utilization of the natural gas produced in conjunction with oil and now almost totally wasted. The Mission recommends therefore that early consideration be given to the erection, near Kirkuk, of a plant which, using natural gas and gypsum as raw materials, would be capable of producing annually 500,000 tons of ammonium sulphate fertilizer, 100,000 tons of elemental sulphur, 10,000 tons of carbon black and 300,000 tons of cement. Since the natural gas contains about 10.5 percent of hydrogen sulphide by volume, it would be worthwhile to establish a plant to recover sulphur from all of the gas produced. Part of the cleaned gas would then be cracked thermally, producing hydrogen after removal of the carbon black. In the most important part of the plant the hydrogen and nitrogen won by removing carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide from the flue gases would be synthesized under high pressure into ammonia. Ammonia and carbon dioxide would then be passed through a slurry of finely ground gypsum, yielding calcium carbonate and ammonium sulphate. The latter would be sold as fertilizer and the former used to make cement. Such a plant could produce fertilizer very cheaply, thereby stimulating its use in Iraq; and any fertilizer not consumed domestically would find a ready market abroad. Sulphur and carbon black could be used in the production of rubber tires in Iraq and would also be in great demand abroad; and there will undoubtedly be a growing demand for cement in Iraq. The plant would cost aproximately ID 25,000,000, of which the sulphur recovery plant would account for about ID 8,750,000 and the cement plant for ID 1,500,000. It should be attempted only if a reliable foreign chemical concern can be interested in designing and erecting it and undertaking its operation under a management contract. 339 387

241

possible more intensive utilization of the land. Experiments conducted over a long period in the United States have shown the reaction of wheat yields to fallow, fertilizer and crop rotation. The results indicate that yields respond most favorably to fertilizers used in combination with a crop rotation scheme.[6] There is great need to do more experimental work in Iraq in order to determine the optimum rates of fertilizer applications for various crops, the best time of application and the effect of green manure on production.

The high cost of fertilizers may have deterred their use. This [387] handicap may be overcome if steps are taken to carry out the Mission's proposals to establish a large nitrogen plant at Kirkuk as well as a number of small bonemeal plants.

Tools and Draft Power

In discussing the need for weed control, reference has already been made to the lack of adequate equipment and good draft animals. In some parts of Iraq hand cultivation without the use of draft power may still be seen. In other parts, however, one can see the most modern tractors and combines at work in the fields.

Better tools and draft power will no doubt help to improve the productivity of the land both by destroying weeds and by better preparation of the soil. Similarly, better threshing equipment will raise the quality of the grain. This does not mean, however, that mechanization of agriculture will necessarily be the appropriate solution. Most farmers do not have sufficient land or money to warrant the purchase of a tractor or combine, and cooperative ownership will inevitably develop rather slowly. Moreover, under existing conditions the cost of amortization, operation and maintenance may be too high in relation to the cost of labor. Better plows drawn by sturdy animals may have largely the same effect as tractor-drawn plows in destroying weeds and improving prep-

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[6] Yields under various conditions were as follows in terms of bushels per acre:

1. Continuous wheat, without fertilizer	12.33
2. Continuous wheat, with fertilizer	23.58
3. Wheat after one year of fallow	22.00
4. Wheat in a 4-year rotation, without fertilizer	24.00
5. Wheat in a 4-year rotation, with fertilizer	32.00

working shops, battery and electrical repair work, shops for repair 433
of automotive and agricultural equipment, bakeries, confectioneries 445
and food processing establishments of various kinds. The amount of capital required in individual cases is quite small but, in the aggregate, it adds up to a considerable sum. The Industrial Bank should arrange for a small-enterprise section to make surveys of small industries in each community, advise them concerning ways of improving their methods of production and assist in getting proper financial help where it is justified. It is estimated that ID 400,000 would be sufficient to meet the needs of these industries over the next five years.

The assistance of small industries by the Industrial Bank is to be preferred to assistance or stimulation of so-called cottage industries. Cottage industries may be of benefit in the over-populated areas of Asia, but for Iraq they do not appear to be an appropriate solution to industrial growth. Iraq's population is small in relation to the resources available. Over the long term its problem is not primarily one of creating a maximum number of jobs with a minimum of capital but rather one of utilizing capital resources in ways which will make a permanent addition to the productive capacity of the country and to the building of modern industrial enterprises.

Establishment of New Industries

The entrance of industry into new fields would help to balance the over-all development of the country and to utilize its resources more fully. At the same time it would increase employment and thereby aid in raising the general standard of living.

Nitrate Fertilizer, Sulphur and Cement Plant

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The largest and perhaps most promising possibility for new 387●
industrial development lies in the utilization of the natural gas [316
produced in conjunction with oil. Upon completion of the 30-inch 339]
pipeline, oil production at the Kirkuk field will be at a rate which will make more than 25 billion cu. ft. of gas available per year. For the most part, this gas will be wasted until some means is found for its economic utilization. This gas contains, according

382 387 to information afforded the Mission, 10.5 percent by volume of hydrogen sulphide with the remaining products being different types of hydrocarbons, chiefly methane. In the same area there are also large deposits of gypsum or hydrous calcium sulphate.

These waste gases and gypsum could be utilized for the economic manufacture of ammonium sulphate, a valuable fertilizer for agriculture; and, in the process, sulphur, carbon black and cement would become available as by-products. A plant of economic size and capable of satisfying approximately one half of Iraq's eventual needs should have an annual capacity of approximately 500,000 tons. In addition to ammonium sulphate, this plant would also produce approximately 100,000 tons of elemental sulphur and 300,000 tons of cement.

The most important part of such a plant would, of course, be that making ammonia. By this process, nitrogen and hydrogen under high pressure are synthesized into ammonia by means of a catalyst. Hydrogen for this process would be obtained by thermally cracking the gas and subsequently removing the carbon black, while nitrogen would be obtained by removing carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide from the flue gases.

The ammonia thus produced would then be combined with the sulphate radical from the gypsum. This is generally done by passing ammonia and carbon dioxide through a slurry of finely ground gypsum and mechanically separating the resultant products of ammonium sulphate and calcium carbonate. The ammonium sulphate which is in solution would be crystallized in evaporators while the calcium carbonate would be used in making cement.

Since the gas used in making ammonia must be free of sulphur, the plant would need to contain facilities for its removal. This could be accomplished in several ways, but a detailed study would probably show a combination of the Girbotal and Claus processes to be best suited for this particular project.

Facilities for the production of the required power and process steam would be conventional in every respect and would use gas for fuel.

In the first few years of operation, all of the products except cement would probably be exported. Later, however, only sulphur

and carbon black might be exported, with the ammonium sulphate being utilized domestically as fertilizer. 382 387

The integrated plant is estimated to cost approximately ID 25,000,000, including foreign exchange estimated at ID 22,000,000 mainly in pounds sterling. The total estimated cost of the plant may be broken down as follows:

Ammonium Sulphate and Carbon Black	ID 14,750,000
Sulphur Recovery	8,750,000
Cement Plant	1,500,000
Total Cost	ID 25,000,000

Estimates indicate that the plant may show net earnings of 18.5 percent on the investment and may break even when approximately 40 percent of its capacity is utilized. In these estimates the gross income has been figured on the basis of c.i.f. prices currently prevailing in London and the plant has been amortized over 15 years with interest payable at 4½ percent per annum. The underlying calculation is summarized below:

Gross Annual Income			
Ammonium sulphate	500,000 tons @ ID 15 per ton	ID 7,500,000	
Sulphur	100,000 tons @ ID 16 per ton	1,600,000	
Carbon black	10,000 tons @ ID 93 per ton	930,000	
Cement	300,000 tons @ ID 5 per ton	1,500,000	
Total			ID 11,530,000
Annual Operation Costs			
Amortization and interest		2,310,000	
Freight (Rail and Ocean)		2,379,000	
Bags		650,000	
Maintenance		375,000	
Salaries		530,000	
Labor		146,000	
Material and Supplies		55,000	
Gas		135,000	
Contingency		300,000	
Total			ID 6,880,000
Estimated Net Profit			ID 4,650,000

The plant would probably need to be financed in its entirety by the Development Board, and it should be attempted only if a

382 387 reliable foreign chemical firm can be secured to design and construct it and, at least at the outset, operate it under a management contract.

The plant would give permanent employment to about 1,000 workers.

387 237 *Bone Meal Plants*

Another promising field for new industry is the conversion of the waste products from abattoirs to fertilizers for domestic use. Bone meal, for example, is a very valuable fertilizer. Yet at present Iraq, with no domestic plant to utilize them, is exporting approximately 15,000 tons of bones per year to Europe.

There would probably be sufficient demand for fertilizer to support three plants, located at Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Their combined cost would probably amount to roughly ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, principally pounds sterling. With help from the Industrial Bank, this could probably be financed by the abattoir owners. When completed the plants would give employment to about 60 workers.

Steel

327 Iraq is now producing about 5,000 tons of steel scrap per year. It is recommended that a small hand-operated mill and electric melting furnace be set up to convert this scrap into reinforcing bars, window shapes and small angles, all of which are in great demand. This mill ought to be located in Baghdad and arrangements made to obtain off-peak power from the Baghdad power plant or from the railroad shops. As an alternative to electric melting, crucibles might be considered. In either case, the cost of the plant would be approximately ID 300,000, including ID 200,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in hard currency. This mill could not satisfy the whole of Iraq's steel needs; nevertheless, it would furnish about 5,000 tons per year of certain types at probably half the cost of the imported steel it would replace.

The mill could be financed by private capital with help from the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required dur-

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For the use of soaproots in bathing and laundering see MA1 Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 515, pp. 79 and 123-124.

fully capable of meeting all of the requirements of domestic consumption with the possible exception of minor items of a special nature. The plant's present capacity is 500,000 meters of cloth and 50,000 kilos of yarn. Recent improvements and expansion have brought the woolen textile industry abreast of the needs of the country. 288

Leather

Until recent years, there was little modern tanning of hides, most of the hides being exported. Since the war, however, several tanneries have been constructed and are now producing leather of fair quality sufficient for most of Iraq's needs, with the exception of those grades required to make the higher quality shoes. 282

Tanneries are not showing the profits which were originally anticipated, largely because they have to use hides of very poor quality. In many cases, the hides have been cut during flaying, while in other cases they have not been well preserved. The tanneries also have not attempted to make use of waste products and in some cases do not split the hides, a practice which is essential to low cost production. However, once these various technical problems have been solved, the tanneries should be able to meet all of Iraq's needs.

Shoes

Nearly 90 percent of Iraq's shoes are made by hand in numerous small home industries. There is one fairly modern factory, however, which, using both local and imported leather, now makes over 30,000 pairs of high grade shoes per year. The company has also set up retail outlets in all of the provinces. An increase in the capacity of this plant would do much to reduce shoe prices to the ultimate consumer. Annual production could be raised to 100,000 pairs by the procurement of additional equipment costing approximately ID 50,000, of which ID 45,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly in Swiss francs. These facilities could be put into operation within two years and would increase employment from approximately 40 to 120 workers. 295

Vegetable Oil and Soap 388

A vegetable oil extraction plant has been in successful operation for approximately three years. It is designed to extract oil

388 from the seeds of agricultural crops such as cotton, sesame and linseed. The linseed oil is blended and used in the making of paint, while the sesame and cotton seed oils are purified and distilled into light and heavy fractions, the light fractions being used as an edible oil, while the heavier are retained for soap-making. Although the expellers have a combined capacity of 20 tons of seed per day, the plant fails to satisfy present needs. Capacity should be increased by the installation of two additional mechanical expellers and a single solvent extraction unit to serve the entire plant. A washing plant should be installed for the purpose of reducing maintenance on the expellers. In addition to extending the capacity of the present facilities, new equipment is needed for the hydrogenation of oil for cooking fats.

Operating in conjunction with the oil plant is a soap plant with a capacity of 7.5 tons of laundry soap and 2.5 tons of toilet soap per day. This is estimated to be less than one third of present requirements. These facilities should be increased to take care of at least one half of the country's needs.

In all, the expansion program would cost an estimated ID 600,000, including ID 500,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in pounds sterling. It would probably require approximately two years before all of the facilities could be put into operation. Employment would be increased by approximately 60 workers.

Cement

331 Iraq's new cement plant is one of the more important projects sponsored by the Industrial Bank. The market for cement is expanding at a rapid rate and is well beyond the present plant's capacity of 220 tons per day. Additional equipment now scheduled for operation in 1952 will double the plant's output. Even so, production will fall short of domestic requirements. The larger plant should, however, reduce production costs and the cheaper cement should in turn open up many new markets in the construction and transport fields.

Brick and Tile

Brick is the prime building material. Over 30 private factories are engaged in the manufacture of bricks, and even though most of the plants are very antiquated, production costs are very rea-

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COTTON IN IRAQ

other commodities. As might be expected in such a situation, the system of classification is limited. The cotton is usually sold on types. Ginners indicate they will buy and sell cotton themselves in the future as in many other countries. 442

The one large cotton spinning mill is putting in its own gin to supply the mill with its requirements of around 15,000 bales annually. This will restrict merchandising to exports unless and until another mill is built.

OIL MILLS 388

There is one oil mill which crushes the largest part of the seed produced. The rest is exported. The capacity of this plant is to be increased and facilities for processing oil products are being added.

EXPORTS 439

Iraq has exported approximately 18,000 bales during each of the past two years, mostly to Germany and Japan, with smaller quantities to Holland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 248

The Director General of Agriculture has promulgated an ambitious 10-year program for increasing cotton production to about 500,000 bales. In time, he believes that on the basis of the available land and water Iraqi production can be boosted to more than a million bales. While admitting his program is ambitious, the Director General appears to be firmly convinced it can be accomplished, given adequate technical assistance. 654

United States agricultural experts with the Point Four Program are inclined to agree that the country's natural resources can support a potential cotton production of this magnitude. The rate of increase, they think, will depend on how effectively the technical resources of the country are organized and applied.

The Director General is highly regarded for his technical as well as his administrative ability and particularly for his driving force. He is especially well qualified to direct the cotton improvement program, having graduated in cotton agronomy from Texas A. & M. College.

Long-Range

For long-range improvements he is depending on the agricultural research agencies now being organized to develop better varieties, more effective irrigation and cultural practices, better insect control techniques, and improved methods of classification and marketing. Still in the planning stages, the research program has done some fairly effective work, especially on variety selection, propagation, and fertilization.

Insect Control

One of the main research problems is the control of insects. The government estimates that 75 per cent of the 1951 cotton crop was destroyed by insects, principally by the spiney bollworm, *Earis insulana* (Boisd.), a white fly that attacks the leaves, and by aphids. Fortunately, the Director said, the pink bollworm has not made its appearance in the country. Experiments are 242

433 Further expansion of the vegetable oil extraction plant would be justified, the more so since increasing quantities of cotton seed will be available for crushing and the existing plant does not meet domestic requirements. Hydrogenation equipment for making cooking fats might also be added, and the capacity of the appurtenant soap plant might be enlarged so as to cover about half of Iraq's needs. The capacity of the country's only modern shoe factory, a small enterprise, might well be tripled to reach an output of about 100,000 pairs per year. Similarly, a plant producing aluminum utensils could well be expanded and complemented by facilities for melting and rolling aluminum scrap and pig, thereby substantially reducing costs of production.

Establishment of New Industries

Among the new industrial enterprises which could be advantageously launched are a jute mill, bonemeal fertilizer plants, an automobile tire factory, a small steel mill, a central machine shop, a concrete batching plant and a plant for the manufacture of date boxes. For all of these there is sufficient demand, and production could take place economically on a small scale. The small steel plant would smelt domestically available scrap and produce in a hand-operated mill such items as reinforcing bars, window frames
•[392] and small angles. The central machine shop would replace the numerous small shops now engaged primarily in maintaining the 3,000 irrigation pumps in Iraq. This shop would significantly reduce the cost of maintaining pumps and, since these pumps are of relatively simple construction, would also be able to manufacture them. Small bonemeal plants could be built at Mosul, Baghdad and Basra to convert bones and other offal of abattoirs into a valuable fertilizer for domestic use. The growing demand for jute bagging would justify the installation of a jute mill capable of making about 10,000 tons of jute products per year. A small tire plant to manufacture tires under foreign license and with foreign technical assistance might also be feasible in a few years, particularly since the demand for tires has been growing rapidly and the development of road transport is expected to receive considerable impetus in the future. A concrete batching plant with ready-mix trucks would be useful in providing poured concrete for many small construction projects.

Machine Shop

312 There are about 150 very small machine shops in Baghdad. The total labor force in these shops is approximately 400. They do various types of metal work but by far the most important is the normal maintenance work on more than 3,000 diesel-driven irrigation pumps. While the workmanship is good, costs are very high because of the heavy overhead.

All of this work could be readily accomplished in one small, modern machine shop equipped with metal fabricating facilities, electric repair shops and including a modern foundry. With such facilities, not only could maintenance work on irrigation pumps and engines be carried out, but completely new diesel-driven pumps could be manufactured, replacing those now imported. It would, of course, be necessary to import special items such as fuel pumps, bearings and gears. Likewise, the design should be obtained through a license arrangement with some international firm. This plant would reduce the cost of present maintenance work by about one third and constitute the beginning of a modern equipment manufacturing concern. The shops thus replaced could be moved to rural areas to handle local automotive and agricultural machinery repairs.

The cost of such a machine shop would be about ID 600,000, including ID 500,000 of foreign exchange, mostly pounds sterling. It should be financed by private capital in conjunction with the Industrial Bank.

Jute Mill

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[434] Jute products such as sacks, hessian cloth and twine are now being imported at the rate of about ID 384,000 per annum. The demand for such products is increasing and appears to be large enough to warrant establishment of a jute industry, even though the raw material will need to be imported. Ultimately it may even prove feasible to grow jute in Iraq.

The plant should be capable of making about 10,000 tons of jute products per year. The cost of such a mill would be about ID 500,000, including ID 400,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in pounds sterling. This mill could be financed by private capital and the Industrial Bank. It is recommended that it be located

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

TABLE II

NUMBER AND HORSEPOWER OF IRRIGATION PUMPS AS OF MARCH 1, 1950

Average capacity of pumps: 1948-49 = 36.22 H.P.
1949-50 = 36.40 H.P.

Liwas	Euphrates and canals		Tigris and tributaries		Diyala and tributaries		Shatt al Gharraf		Shatt al Arab		Total 1949-50		Total 1948-49	
	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.	Number	H.P.
Mosul	—	—	74	2,394	—	—	—	—	—	—	74	2,394	71	2,209
Erbil	—	—	2	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	68	2	68
Suleimaniya	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	—	—	3	44	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	44	2	28
Diyala	—	—	54	2,518	68	3,277	—	—	—	—	122	5,795	115	5,386
Baghdad	139	4,453	1,084	33,475	92	3,852	—	—	—	—	1,315	41,780	1,313	41,849
Dulaim	265	7,904	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	265	7,904	268	7,974
Hilla	86	2,032	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	86	2,032	75	1,738
Kerbela	30	651	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	651	29	624
Diwaniya	570	22,610	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	570	22,610	477	18,705
Muntafiq	82	3,364	—	—	—	—	24	1,310	—	—	106	4,674	82	3,362
Kut	—	—	451	21,568	—	—	97	4,508	—	—	548	26,076	552	26,115
Amara	—	—	354	13,656	—	—	—	—	—	—	354	13,656	333	13,002
Basra	5	167	12	448	—	—	—	—	101	2,840	118	3,455	106	2,982
Total	1,177	41,181	2,034	74,171	160	7,129	121	5,818	101	2,840	3,593	131,139	3,425	124,042

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8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a constant 262
current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406 ●
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat complicated, 173
and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

178 Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping
406 engines owned by every tribe send thousands of tons of
871 the brown waters of the Euphrates down the irrigation
channels to make the land fertile and green. Education is spreading to the tribes, and an increasing number of tribesmen hold jobs of every sort in the railways, the port, and the oil companies. Many tribesmen from the Euphrates drove trucks on the great Aid to Russia route through Persia during the war. Others could be found serving the Allied war effort as far apart as Masira at the end of the Persian Gulf and Haifa.

With this development going on all around him, it is not surprising that the amusements of the tribesman are changing. Whereas before he had to amuse himself by listening to stories told by amateur but skilled storytellers, he can now pass the evening listening to a wireless set driven off the battery of his sheikh's or his sirkal's saloon car, or better still, he can jump a bus or lorry into the nearest village and watch an Egyptian, Indian, or American film. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the stories are dying out, and now only a few of the older men know them. These stories fulfilled a need in the days in which the tribes were in constant conflict with the Turkish Government, and in which facilities for written Arabic literature did not exist. Now, in more prosperous times, they must die out. I would stress that the stories were never considered as belonging to any great school of Arabic literature—they were simple little things, either originated by the tribesmen themselves or adapted from some more ancient story, and their intention was merely to evoke a smile on an arduous march, or to help pass a cold desert night; and so they must be judged.

000 To those who want the real beauty of a precise language,
I say that this can be found in written classical Arabic,

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East . . .
Iraq MHI

242 being conducted this year with about nine different insecticides, but a more thorough program is needed.

The FAO is supplying a specialized cotton entomologist, and the Point Four Mission is supplying a general entomologist to help develop an effective program.

656 The country has a law requiring that all cotton stalks must be destroyed, the debris burned, and the land ploughed by the first of January. In fact, the farmer is not given permission to plant cotton again unless he has complied with these regulations. Seed sterilization also is required. But the Director General himself admits the program has been ineffective. There are many host plants on which cotton insects can live, and the people do not understand the law or are not in a position to comply, especially where they are in the habit of saving the stalks for fuel.

One of the real difficulties is the growth habits of the present Acala varieties which are said to set 80 per cent of their bolls on what is called the second flush, after the end of August, when the insect population is highest. Efforts are being directed toward development of varieties that have a shorter maturing period, and early results with Coker Wilt have been encouraging.

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

—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

This irrigation system of a farm in southern Iraq dates back to Biblical times. Mules walk down an inclined track beside the well pulling the goatskin water scoops. The scoops, hauled to ground level by the mules, spill their contents into the irrigation ditch. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Government of Iraq in its extensive projects to modernize and improve irrigation and increase crop output.

CHAPTER FIVE

SIGNIFICANT RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY ADVANCE IN IRAQ

000 Although the various obstacles outlined in the previous chapter are serious ones, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that certain of them are being at any rate partly overcome; some of them in ways which are significant pointers to the directions along which positive advance towards compulsory education may be possible.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCE FAVOURABLE TO EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Certain economic and social advances are taking place which are likely to be favourable to the development of education, both as regards producing more revenue and in improving the standard of life of parents so that they can afford to allow their children to attend school.

241 407 *Evidence of Improved Agricultural Practice.* A few of the more enlightened landowners, especially those who are not absentee landlords and take an active interest in their farms, are engaged in the important business of applying power and science to the land. Large tracts of land in the rainfall region which have not previously been cultivated are being opened up by the mechanical plough. Indeed, it has been fascinating to see land which was hitherto regarded as desert being ploughed at night by modern tractors with headlights. Other landowners and farmers are experimenting, with considerable success, in the growing of relatively new crops such as American cotton of high quality. In some of the northern provinces there are cattle bred to considerably higher standards than formerly. The writer was present at a lively discussion between farmers who were suggesting ways of conserving by modern silage the nutritious spring vegetation most of which is at present only scantily cropped and then left to be burnt up by the summer sun.

654 It has also been gratifying to observe the growing interest which is being taken in certain of the experimental farms organized by the Directorate of Agriculture.

mals offers a more practical answer to their needs at this time. 241 Experience in Iraq shows that tractor plowing may increase yields by 20 to 50 percent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and partly also through better preparation of the soil. Much the same effect could, however, be achieved through better animal-drawn plows replacing those which now, for the most part, barely scratch the surface and fail to uproot the weeds. Means for the acquisition of such tools and improved draft animals should be created through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of better credit facilities.

Mechanization will nevertheless play an increasingly important role in the future, especially as labor becomes more scarce and additional land becomes available for cultivation. Mechanization has already facilitated the expansion of cultivation in the dry-farming areas of Mosul and the new pump-irrigated lands in central Iraq. While certain areas in the irrigation zone are undoubtedly overpopulated in relation to land currently available, in other areas, particularly in the rain-fed zone, labor is scarce relative to the supply of land. As development schemes are launched and new land is opened up for settlement, the available manpower on lands already under cultivation may well be reduced. The government will need therefore to take steps to insure that mechanization will keep pace with developing requirements. In the period immediately ahead, however, the government should be mindful of the possibility that mechanization initiated by landowners may result in a substantial reduction of the portion of the crop going to sharecroppers or in the displacement of sharecroppers before alternative means of employment or settlement become available. Through its control over the importation and distribution of machinery and the extension of credit for the purchase of such machinery, the government will have the power to influence the direction of mechanization and thus minimize to some extent possibly adverse social consequences.

At present only a small portion of Iraqi agriculture is mechanized. Combines and tractors in operation are reported to number 320 and 750 respectively, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. Of these, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned by the Agricultural Machinery

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7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

407 Administration, an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Eco-
475 nomics. The AMA rents this machinery to farmers and, in addi-
427 tion, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery,
647 licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited
supply of spare parts in order to prevent black-marketing.

Some provision for rental of machinery, whether by the government or by private enterprise, will be necessary for some time, partly because it enables farmers to become acquainted with the value of such machinery and partly because many farmers do not have sufficient capital for outright purchase. As long as private enterprise is incapable of providing this service at reasonable rentals or until cooperatives can be established, continuation of the government rental service appears essential. On the whole, therefore, the AMA's three-year program to replace and expand its machinery park and to equip repair shops appears desirable despite the obvious drawbacks of government operation. At present, however, the AMA is operating at a substantial loss. In the calendar year 1951, for instance, its rental income will probably not exceed ID 50,000 compared with estimated operating costs, including depreciation, of about ID 150,000. Since the beginning of 1950, when it started operations as a fiscally autonomous agency, it has had to cover its deficits out of the ID 500,000 capital which the government undertook to provide. While the government should probably defray that part of the AMA's expenditures not directly attributable to the rental operations, the overall deficit should be reduced by gradually increasing rental charges. Rental charges on tractors, in particular, appear unduly low and may be depriving private persons of the incentive to purchase tractors either for their own use or for rental to others.

407 Since the overhead costs of the AMA's rental operations will
471 probably always remain rather high and its machinery must be
647 transported over considerable distances, it is important that the
government encourage as much as possible private purchase and
[452] operation of machinery. The extension of credit for this purpose
appears essential. At present, however, the Agricultural Bank
cannot lend money on farm equipment partly because it is short
of funds and partly because such loans would not afford sufficient
security in the absence of any legal requirement to register title
TO MACHINERY.

to machinery. In the future cooperative ownership and operation, 407
especially in the new settlement areas, should be encouraged as one 471
of the best means of extending the use of machinery on a practicable 647
and economical basis. The experience of the Dujaila cooperative, which, owing to low overhead and transport costs, rents machinery to its members at rates lower than those of the AMA and yet is apparently able to cover the cost of depreciation, seems promising in this respect.

Lack of repair facilities and spare parts have greatly handicapped 407
mechanization. The government is seeking to overcome 445
this difficulty both by establishing its own repair shops and by requiring importers to provide repair facilities and maintain minimum stocks of spare parts. Such centrally located shops will be available, however, only for major repairs. Since local repair facilities are now almost wholly lacking, steps should also be taken to establish a considerable number of small shops equipped to undertake minor repairs. In addition, courses designed to train drivers in elementary maintenance are urgently needed. The cost of mechanization will remain discouragingly high unless the life of machinery is prolonged by more adequate maintenance and repair.

3. Soil-building and Forage Crops: Fertilizers

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The cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is virtually unknown even though the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished and an improvement in feed supply would make the greatest single contribution to an increase in the low productivity of livestock. In the irrigation zone berseem clover, sown in the grain stubble in late summer, would provide a particularly good pasture, soiling and hay crop. In the rain-fed region winter oats and vetch, when cut and cured, would provide a good reserve feed. In the irrigation zone quick-growing crops such as millet could be grown for summer pasture; and more corn, sorghum and legumes such as cowpeas and mungo beans should be cultivated.

Little fertilizer is used and animal manure is generally collected 241
and dried for use as fuel. With the expanding cultivation of crops such as cotton, the use of fertilizer is becoming more urgent. There is need for soil analysis and extensive experimentation to ascertain the fertilizer requirement and the effect of fertilizer on

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For a considerable time to come, however, it will be an important factor in agriculture. Proper fallow will promote nitrification and store in the soil up to 30 percent of the precipitation during the fallow period. This is true, however, only where the fallow land is kept free of vegetation which depletes the soil moisture and uses up the accumulated plant food. In Iraq this is seldom done, either because fallow is used as pasture or because the available tools [407] are not adapted to destroy the deep-rooted perennial weeds. The typical wooden "nail" plow, drawn by ill-fed and ill-kept animals, reduces the annual weeds but only encourages the more persistent, deeper-rooted species which subsequently offer stiff competition for crops following the fallow period.

In the rain-fed zone considerable land is tilled where the rainfall is marginal. The yield on such land is usually very poor. During a 10-year period, for instance, there will generally be five fallow years, two crop failures, two fair crops and one good crop. Better results might on the average be obtained if grain were planted every year on rows two and a half to three feet apart. This would reduce the plant population per unit of area and permit intertillage to control weeds and conserve moisture. Tests of this sort might well be made.

Use of Fertilizers

Although soils are generally fertile and have sufficient potash, phosphorus and nitrogen for crop production under the existing fallow system, experiments have indicated that applications of nitrogen increase yields under certain conditions. This is true of vegetables, of green gram following wheat and barley in the rotation, of cotton following small grain, of dates and citrus fruits and of rice produced in areas where silt does not replenish the soil. On the other hand, in Iraq the application of fertilizer to wheat and barley in the fall has failed to increase yields materially, and its application to small grain frequently promotes excessive vegetative growth. Presumably this lack of response is due to the fact that grain is grown on fallow land which has had a chance to replenish its supply of nitrogen. It is possible, however, that even on such land nitrogen may be deficient in the spring, making a top dressing at that time beneficial. Experience elsewhere has demonstrated that proper crop rotation and use of fertilizers make

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

241 aration of the soil. Similarly, small stationary threshers may offer a better alternative than large harvesting combines to the present methods of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. The government should pay at least as much attention to the task of getting simple, inexpensive tools into the hands of the cultivators as to the much more ambitious program of agricultural mechaniza-
[412] tion. Good hand tools, for example, are almost nonexistent. Improvement in draft animals is also necessary. While the supply of draft animals cannot be increased rapidly, it is possible to get animals of greater strength and endurance by better feeding and selection.

In the longer run, however, there is no doubt that mechanization of agriculture will assume growing importance. Physically, the country with its flat broad plains is ideally suited to mechanization although the canals and ditches in the irrigation zone offer
[464] some impediments to the use of machinery. Moreover, even now there are labor shortages at sowing and harvest times in some parts of the country, particularly in the North. In the future such shortages may become really acute as manpower is drawn from the land to take advantage of the new employment opportunities created by the over-all development program and as some of the fellahin working on land now under cultivation leave to settle new land. Under such circumstances mechanization may become the principal means of maintaining and expanding agricultural output. In its policy respecting mechanization the government will need to steer a careful course. On the one hand, it will want to keep some check on mechanization as long and wherever there is danger of displacing fellahin before alternative means of employment become available; on the other hand, it will find it desirable to accelerate mechanization whenever labor shortages become serious. Through its control over imports and credit, the government possesses effective methods of influencing the rate of mechanization.

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427 The United States Lend-Lease Program gave mechanization its first impetus. At present there are probably about 170 combines and 550 tractors in operation in the country, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. In addition, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned and made

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

available for rental by the Agricultural Machinery Administration, 241 407 ●
an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Economics.[7] 427

Further progress will be seriously impeded, however, unless means are found to prolong the life of machinery which is now less than half what it is in the United States. The shortage of spare parts and repair facilities has been very discouraging to machinery owners. The failure of private dealers to provide these largely [655 inspired the government's original decision to establish the Agricultural Machinery Administration as a monopoly for the importation and distribution of agricultural machinery. In accordance with suggestions made by an earlier International Bank Mission, the government has tried to meet the problem by different measures, namely by licensing dealers only on condition they agree to set up repair facilities and maintain an adequate stock of spare parts. The enforcement of these requirements, however, will not provide a complete solution, even if it is supplemented by completion of the AMA program for setting up its own repair facilities at Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Diwaniya and Kut. The AMA and private dealers should also cooperate in conducting courses in operation and elementary maintenance of machines for drivers. Moreover, simple local facilities to carry out all but major repairs are needed. An adequate number of mechanics both for the central and local repair shops must be trained, and for this purpose foreign shop supervisors and instructors will be necessary. The Industrial Bank may have to cooperate by providing small loans for equipping local shops.

The AMA now performs a number of useful functions. It 655
regulates imports and the distribution of spare parts and tests 407
different types of machinery for their adaptability to conditions in 427
Iraq. Most important, it maintains a pool of machinery for rental. In some respects its operations could undoubtedly be improved.

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[7] An official estimate given to the Mission gives a total of 320 combines and 750 tractors. Customs statistics for the years 1945 to 1950 inclusive, however, show that only 632 tractors and 262 combines were imported. Part of these are already out of commission. An on-the-spot survey in each province by a member of the Mission indicated that only 170 combines and 549 tractors, exclusive of government-owned machines, were in operation. Of the combines, Mosul had 75; Baghdad, 75; seven provinces, one to five each; and five provinces, none. Of the tractors, Baghdad had 250; Mosul, 150; Kut, 40; Kirkuk, 23; Erbil, 15; six provinces, less than 10 each; and three provinces, none.

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With a larger and more qualified staff it could do a better job in advising farmers on the type of machinery best suited to their needs and could undertake the tasks outlined in the preceding paragraph. It might also pay more attention to finding and testing the type of machinery that would be particularly useful on smaller holdings. Above all, in its rental service it should charge rates which will not cause it to run a large deficit or discourage private ownership of machinery.

The rental service itself performs a useful function and should be continued until private enterprise can provide the same service on the basis of a reasonable return or until sufficient cooperatives can be organized to provide machinery for their members. Many landowners cannot now afford to buy a machine, and others will not risk buying until they have had a chance to test its value by renting one. The AMA, however, now sustains heavy losses on its rental operation. For the calendar year 1951 its operating expenditures are expected to be ID 150,463 as compared with a projected rental income of only ID 50,000. For the two years 1950 and 1951, the total cash deficit of the Administration will probably amount to about ID 222,000.[8] It has been able to finance such deficits only by using up the balance of the capital contribution of ID 500,000 which the government originally made to the agency. Since ID 235,750 of this contribution consisted of machinery and buildings, very little of the remaining cash will have been left by the end of 1951. The AMA's financial situation is all the more acute because it now urgently needs funds to purchase new machinery and equipment at a rate of perhaps ID 250,000 per year. In the past there has been no depreciation reserve for the replacement of machinery. To meet this financial emergency it will be necessary to make the rental operation self-sustaining. In part this can be accomplished by reducing expenditures. Probably more important, however, will be an increase in rentals, especially those on tractors which are now relatively low. A continuing government contribution to the total budget of the AMA will probably be merited, but only to the approximate extent to which AMA expenditures are attributable to functions other than the rental of

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[8] For the 1950 and 1951 budgets of the AMA, see Tables I and II in the appendix.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

machinery. At the same time the cost of new machinery and equipment will need to be financed—possibly out of Development Board funds if earlier plans to borrow for this purpose from the International Bank do not materialize. 655 407 427

Government rental of machinery should at best be considered a temporary expedient. It is wasteful, primarily because overhead expenses are high. The transportation of machinery from central shops to the renters tends to be expensive and to expose the machinery to excessive wear and tear. Private and cooperative ownership of machinery should therefore be encouraged. One step in this direction would be to enable the Agricultural Bank to lend money for this purpose on the security of the machinery. In the past the absence of any provision for registering title to such machinery has prevented such loans. Another important measure would be to encourage the establishment of cooperatives for the collective ownership of machinery, especially in the new agricultural areas which are to be opened. At present the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project owns a number of tractors. [474] Because overhead costs are relatively low it is able to rent them out at lower rate than the AMA while still apparently covering the cost of operation and depreciation.

V. Control of Pests and Diseases

Livestock Pests and Mortality 232

More effective control of pests and diseases would also materially help to improve yields. This is particularly true of livestock. Because of lack of funds, equipment and trained personnel, no systematic campaigns for eradicating specific groups of diseases have been undertaken. Many livestock diseases, particularly of the parasitic type, are rife. Among the principal livestock diseases are foot and mouth disease; haemorrhagic septicaemia; anthrax; sheep pox; blackleg; parasitic gastritis; tick-borne diseases (anaplasmosis and piroplasmosis); fowl cholera; Newcastle disease; various manges; and dourine. The available staff is wholly insufficient to control, let alone eradicate, any epidemic which might break out. A serious outbreak of disease would endanger the livestock industry of neighboring countries as well as that of Iraq.

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APPENDIX

TABLE I

AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET FOR 1950
(actual results)

REVENUE		EXPENDITURES	
Rentals of machinery	ID 40,262	Salaries	ID 11,073
Sale of agricultural machinery and tools	7,267	Cost-of-living allowances	4,844
Sale of spare parts	317	Transport	117
Fines	195	Transfer	7
Repairs of agricultural machinery	106	Furniture	1,317
Transport charges	584	Printing & stationery	290
Interest on deposits	2,376	Postal, telegraph and telephone charges	276
Sundry	138	Rent	1,330
		Water and light	1,664
		Machines, cars & fuel	40,981
		Buildings	30,284
		Bonuses	399
		Temporary officials and employees	20,679
		Sundry	4,557
Total	ID 51,245	Total	ID 117,818

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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TABLE II

AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET FOR 1951

(estimates)

I. ORDINARY OR OPERATING BUDGET

REVENUE		EXPENDITURES	
Rentals	ID 50,000	Operation of garages and repair shops	38,726
		Agricultural machinery operation	48,708
		General administration	25,884
		Total cash expenditures	113,318
		Depreciation allowance	37,145
		Total expenditures	ID 150,463

II. CAPITAL BUDGET

REVENUE		EXPENDITURES	
Sale of machinery, tools, etc.	ID 20,000	Purchase of agricultural machinery	54,000
		Purchase of trucks, jeeps and tractors	21,500
		Imports of spare parts for sale	25,000
		Diwaniya shop	3,000
		Requisites for completion of shops	7,500
		Sundry capital expenditures	1,000
		Total	ID 112,000

III. TOTAL BUDGET

Total cash revenue	ID 70,000	Total cash expenditures	ID 225,318
		Total expenditures	262,463

Total cash deficit ID 155,318
Total deficit 192,463

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Tigris, and a large reservoir at Bekhme in the mountains on the Great Zab. 312
The Mission endorsed these projects and recommended others to compensate for diversion and to balance the systems.

The Iraq Irrigation Development Commission believes that the area under irrigation can be increased to 12 million acres by the installation of additional storage facilities, by drainage, rehabilitation, and by new supplies of water.[44]

It is agreed generally that the rain-fed zones in the north must continue to depend primarily on rainfall. Although no accurate estimates are available, the total area which might be available for cultivation in this area is thought to be substantial.

Along with irrigation, an important means of improving productivity is 241
drainage. This would have an immediate effect; other proposals depend on 311
the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation.

As much as 20 to 30 per cent of the cultivated land is said to be abandoned because of salt accumulation. On a large part of the remaining land, yields have declined as much as 50 per cent. Drainage—almost totally neglected—the report concluded, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor.[45]

MECHANIZATION

Because of the cost, the Mission predicted that mechanization would pro- 241
ceed slowly. This conclusion was reached in the face of experience which 407
shows that tractor ploughing may increase yields 20 to 50 per cent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and better preparation of the soil.[46] No doubt mechanization will become increasingly important as additional land is placed under cultivation and labor becomes scarce.

About 750 tractors and 320 combines are in the country at the present time. A government agency owns 75 of the combines and 81 tractors and plans to import an additional 2,500 tractors and 550 combines with auxiliary equipment.[47] About 50 per cent of the machinery will be retained at government-owned tractor stations and rented or let out under contract.[48] The rest will be sold on easy terms to the farmers.

The International Bank approved a modified version of this machinery program but suggested that rental charges be increased to make the project self-sustaining, and adequate repair shops and demonstration and training programs were recommended.

SOIL BUILDING

It is obvious that the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished. [134]

Cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is said to be virtually un- 242
known. Attention needs to be given to the production of legumes. Commercial fertilization must be studied and, if possible, plants should be built to produce inorganic and organic materials. Soil analyses also are generally needed.

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[44] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, p. 16.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[48] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey, op. cit.*, p. 33.

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248 established tenure systems, and the primitive methods likely will disappear slowly.

Earlier British experiments in the area indicated March 15 to April 15 as the optimum sowing dates, but reports are that cotton usually is planted much later, either because of laxness or because of labor competition with other crops. Some farmers try to get wheat off and then plant cotton, which throws the cotton very late. Cotton planted in April will begin opening in August. The Rogers Acala undergoes a dormant period of several weeks after the first bolls open and then continues to set and mature bolls up to January. About 80 per cent of the cotton is made on what is called this second or late flush. Picking goes on during all this period.

GINNING

248 407 Until a few years ago there were only about four saw gins with 10 stands in the country and no roller gins. The large profits in recent years on the limited number of gins and the general interest in expanding the crop have prompted a rush to buy new equipment. A total of seven gins operated last season, of which three were newly constructed by the Murray Gin Company. This company has sold three more new gins with a total of 16 stands, which are in process of erection. All the new gins are fully equipped with overhead Mitchell cleaner-feeders and one has the new incline cleaner. Not only the equipment but also the buildings, offices, and storage houses are very modern.

All the gins, with one exception, are privately owned. However, the government will buy another small gin for experiment station use in ginning pure seed that is produced on the station's farm. All the gins except one near Mosul are in the Baghdad and Kut areas.

A great deal of hand labor is employed in the storage houses for picking out foreign matter and damaged and immature locks of cotton before ginning. There are reports that as much as 35 per cent of the weight of the seed cotton coming to the gins is taken out as extraneous foreign matter added to increase the weight of the bales. The government is making a strenuous effort to protect the reputation of cotton by encouraging better ginning.

To facilitate transportation, the ginners make a light 400-pound bale covered on six sides in light-weight burlap and bound with a continuous narrow steel band which is simply tucked under at the end instead of buckled. There are no other compresses and the cotton must be exported in the form in which it comes from the gin. This results in a heavy freight charge, since the gin bales have a density of only 16 to 18 pounds.

442 MARKETING

489 The farmers themselves take the seed cotton in bags to a central market place, usually located at the gins, and sell to merchants. Transportation is scarce. Oftentimes the cotton is carried by the farmer in sacks on his back or his head for miles.

The merchants make little differentiation in price for fiber quality. They do make allowances for foreign matter and moisture which, merchants claim, are added by the farmers in an effort to increase the weight. The merchants gin the cotton for their own account and retain title to the seed and the lint.

The merchandising system can best be described as haphazard. The volume of cotton is small, and merchants handle the cotton along with many

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

—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

Modern tractors with gang ploughs are now in general use in Iraq for ploughing cotton. Because the land is so heavy, tractors are usually of the heavy-duty track type. Most of the tractors are owned by the government [427] and rented with drivers to farmers on an hourly basis. The Iraq Government is conducting experiments with all types of mechanical equipment in the hope that new lands in the rainfed areas to the north, too sparsely populated to farm with hand labor, may be brought into production with complete mechanization.

These plants have been found to set 75 per cent of their bolls before the end of August. 242

Dr. Shelby Cain, cotton agronomist from Texas A. & M. College supplied by the Point Four Program, is concentrating on this problem in the cotton breeding program. He will be assisted by two Iraqi specialists now being trained at Texas A. & M. To some observers it appears that more work is needed on cultural practices before a full program on cotton breeding is started. For instance, the influence of planting dates, irrigation, fertilization, and cultivation on plant growths in this environment needs to be investigated before the more fundamental research in genetics and breeding can be used effectively.

Fertilization

Research on the problem of maintaining soil fertility is needed also and 242
is included in the broad program for the future. There is an obvious deficiency 134
of nitrogen and humus in the soil, and probably other plant foods. Much of the land in both of the main valleys has been under continuous cultivation

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for centuries, and farmers have depended on the silt deposited from the overflows to maintain the fertility. Increased use of canals and dams for irrigation has made the overflows less frequent. Experiments conducted for the past three or four years with commercial fertilizers have shown no significant benefit, but the United States experts feel the tests are not conclusive and should be continued with various soil conditioners.

While depending on basic research to stimulate long-range production, the Director General is trying to force an immediate improvement through regulations requiring the application of techniques known to be beneficial.

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Controls

In an effort to concentrate cotton production on the better suited lands and to facilitate insect control, seed control, and other beneficial measures, regulations have been promulgated requiring government permits for all cotton acreage planted. These permits, based primarily on suitability of the soil and availability of water and labor, are issued on the recommendation of local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the enforcement system is inadequate, and it is generally admitted that the regulation is not closely followed, especially in areas where the local sheiks are extremely powerful and are practically a law unto themselves.

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

At the government cotton experimental farm near Baghdad a double-handled board is used to level the high spots in a newly ploughed field. Outside the government farms little leveling is done. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Iraq Government in experiments and demonstrations to improve cotton cultural practices.

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x539 THERE was or there was not in ancient times a boy living near to Hilla, and only on God is there belief. Now, the name of this boy was Maqdad. He was the son of a great warrior, but his father was slain in battle, and there was no one to bring money or food to their house. So the boy Maqdad hired himself out to the shepherds and he used to take the sheep out in the morning and bring them back at night, and he earned enough to buy a little food for his mother and himself.

One day, when he reached the age of sixteen years, his mother called him, and told him to open a great chest [411] which lay in their house. He opened the chest and found in it a sword of the finest Damascus steel with a hilt of gold, and a shield of leather and iron, studded with gold, a great spear, a dagger wrought in silver, a rich saddle, a mace of the finest teakwood, studded with iron, and all the accoutrements of a warrior.

Then Maqdad's mother said to him: On that wretched day that your father was carried dead into our house I took these weapons from him and from his horse and cleansed them of his blood, and set them in this chest, that one day you might be a mighty warrior in his place. And here is a bag of gold which I took from his body, and I have not spent a single coin from it, though in all these years we have never eaten meat, but only dates and rice and milk and that food which is suitable for the poor. Now take this bag of gold and buy the best horse in the land. Then shall you ride out to the north. For know you that the army of the Shah of the Persians is camped upon the River Tigris, and the Arabs of the great tribes, of Al Fetla, of As Shammar, of Ed Dulaim, are riding against the Persians and are raiding and harrying them that they may be driven from this Arab land.

x539 on you peace, and the Mercy of God, and His Blessing. I am Thamir your father, O my son. Enter the guest tent and meet your ancestors. And Maqdad and Ibn Ali entered the guest tent and saluted the assembly.

And there were there seated Degaither and Mansur and Maqdad the son of Degaither and Degaither the son of Mansur and Mansur the son of Qais and Qais the son of Hamed, and Hamed the Lame and Mansur the Father of the Sword, and they all returned the salutations of Maqdad and Ibn Ali and bade them to be seated and they brought for them coffee. And Mansur the Father of the Sword spoke and said: Before the rising of the sun we must fold our tents and load our camels and depart for Paradise. Therefore, draw your sword, O Maqdad, that we may
x539 teach you the art of a warrior. Then Maqdad drew his
● 411 sword and they came at him and taught him the use of the sword. Then he drew his dagger and they taught him to use the dagger. Then he took his mace and they taught him the use of the mace. Then they taught him the use of the spear, and they taught him many tricks which are now
x539 forgotten amongst men. Then they taught him how to place troops in battle and how to command an army, and they taught him from their wisdom the entire art of war. And in this manner five hours passed and it was the eleventh hour of night.

Then Thamir said to his son Maqdad: Sleep now, O my beloved son, for you are tired and we also have a journey before us. And they brought blankets and Maqdad and Ibn Ali laid themselves down to sleep in the great guest tent, though first Maqdad embraced and kissed his father and his grandfather and all his ancestors. And Maqdad and Ibn Ali slept for two hours until the sun arose and grew hot and it was the second hour of day. And they then

539 when the farmer sows the seed in the field, perhaps the crop will come early in the year or perhaps it will come late, as is the will of God, and in His time. But know you that I am a man and not a boy, as a sown field is different from the desert, and the crop will come in season. And the Sheikh said: Is your face, then, a field? It is as smooth as the skin of a peach. How, then, can you ride with the warriors in the front of the battle? And Maqdad replied and said: I have slain the Persians and I have taken their horses, and I will challenge the bravest of the Persians to single combat and I will kill him even in front of his Shah, that you may believe my words. And the Sheikh agreed and consented to the words of Maqdad, and a challenge was written and sealed, and a boy took it and delivered it to the camp of the Persians, and it was given and read out to the Shah himself.

And the Shah had heard the words of the naked Persian soldier, as to how the beardless boy had slain five skilled men, and he feared Maqdad, and he ordered the bravest and most skilful Persian soldier to prepare for the combat, and his name was Pahlewan. He had slain more than five hundred men in single combat, and truly his name was feared throughout the land. And a day and an hour was fixed and appointed, and a place was arranged on an island in the River Tigris and the day approached. As for the weapons, the combatants were to use any weapon or method of fighting which they preferred.

[411] And Maqdad ordered Ibn Ali to bring him a shield of Damascus steel, and Ibn Ali executed his command and brought him a shield of the finest steel of Damascus, which was convex in shape like a basin. Then Maqdad ordered Ibn Ali to take out the leather lining of the shield and to burnish the inside until it shone like a mirror, and

361 [539] being mentioned in a nursery rhyme which runs:

Cukukhti, wein ukhti?	Dove, where's my sister?
B'il Hilla.	In Hilla.
Sha takal?	What does she eat?
Bajilla.	Beans.
Wein tenam?	Where does she sleep?
Bab Illah	At God's door.

and which continues for several verses.

The mace. Page 71, Line 16. 'A mace of the finest teakwood.'

● 411 The mace may almost be said to be a traditional weapon in South Iraq. If you meet an Arab tribesman about his normal daily routine in the countryside, he will probably be armed with a mace and dagger. Rifles are weapons of luxury, to be kept away from dust and damp. [535] Many tribal dances are done with the mace, which is sometimes of solid wood carefully carved, and sometimes, a less beautiful weapon but more dangerous, it is made of a wooden shaft with a ball of lead or pitch at the end.

Page 74, Line 22. 'Maqdad took his course from the wind.'

821 Skilled desert guides can often recognise a wind as being from a certain quarter by its force, humidity, and temperature. The phrase here implies that the sun was clouded over and Maqdad was finding his way by the wind, which indicates that he had considerable skill. The only people who can use the wind are those who can detect quickly any change in its direction. I remember once asking some Arabs the way to a well, and they told me, Keep the wind on your left cheek. I had to use methods with which I was more familiar.

Page 81, Line 25. 'Now I shall call myself Ibn Ali.'

601 The kunya, or name defining a person by his relationship to someone else, is recorded both in classical and modern Arabic usage. Ibn Batuta, for example, a famous fourteenth century traveller, is known only by his kunya. The modern tribal practice appears to be to promote a man to a kunya when he becomes the father of a boy. A man who has become father of a boy named Qais will, for example, be hailed by his friends with exceptional heartiness for some weeks afterwards, 'Ahlan wa sahlan ya Ab Qais', and the name may or may not stick

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

241 aration of the soil. Similarly, small stationary threshers may offer a better alternative than large harvesting combines to the present methods of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. The government should pay at least as much attention to the task of getting simple, inexpensive tools into the hands of the cultivators as to the much more ambitious program of agricultural mechanization. • [412] Good hand tools, for example, are almost nonexistent. Improvement in draft animals is also necessary. While the supply of draft animals cannot be increased rapidly, it is possible to get animals of greater strength and endurance by better feeding and selection.

In the longer run, however, there is no doubt that mechanization of agriculture will assume growing importance. Physically, the country with its flat broad plains is ideally suited to mechanization although the canals and ditches in the irrigation zone offer [464] some impediments to the use of machinery. Moreover, even now there are labor shortages at sowing and harvest times in some parts of the country, particularly in the North. In the future such shortages may become really acute as manpower is drawn from the land to take advantage of the new employment opportunities created by the over-all development program and as some of the fellahin working on land now under cultivation leave to settle new land. Under such circumstances mechanization may become the principal means of maintaining and expanding agricultural output. In its policy respecting mechanization the government will need to steer a careful course. On the one hand, it will want to keep some check on mechanization as long and wherever there is danger of displacing fellahin before alternative means of employment become available; on the other hand, it will find it desirable to accelerate mechanization whenever labor shortages become serious. Through its control over imports and credit, the government possesses effective methods of influencing the rate of mechanization.

241 407 427 The United States Lend-Lease Program gave mechanization its first impetus. At present there are probably about 170 combines and 550 tractors in operation in the country, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. In addition, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned and made

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the plants to vegetate without setting squares and bolls and that it also 248
increases the period of maturity, making the plants more susceptible to damage by insects late in the season. This is simply another of many problems in cotton culture which need to be studied carefully if the crop is to be expanded as rapidly as the government hopes.

Cotton usually is thinned to two plants per hill and weeded only about twice. This, together with the heavy irrigations, leaves the patches weedy. Farmers as a rule do very little cultivation except around the plant itself at the time of weeding. Then they try to pull the soil from the top of the ridge to leave the plants in the center.

The equipment used by the tenants themselves is in sharp contrast to the tractors now employed in land preparation. The only tools used in ridging [412]
are a pointed spade and a short-handled hoe. This is the same instrument used for planting, thinning, weeding, and the limited amount of cultivation.

Such practices are obviously laborious and time-consuming. One of the United States observers estimated that it takes three women all day to plant a quarter of an acre. Even at the low wage scale, equivalent to 25 cents a day, [465]
this costs $3.00 per acre. It would be less expensive to use mechanical equipment, even though the tractor drivers are paid the equivalent of about $1.25 per day, five times as much as common labor.

Complete mechanization may come quickly in the thinly settled new areas of the north, but in the denser, old areas labor is tied to the land in long-

—Photo Courtesy of E. R. Collier

In Iraq, as in most of the Middle East, cotton is brought to the gin in large burlap bags, ginned, and pressed into bales weighing between 400 and 500 pounds, when new equipment is used. Gins in Iraq wrap the cotton on all sides and wind a continuous band around the bale.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

to him permanently. Women are almost invariably known by the 601
name of their eldest son, preceded of course by Umm. The other
extremely common practice is that of giving a man a laqab, or nick- 551
name, from some habit or personal peculiarity. The laqab is rarely
complimentary.

8. A Man's Honour is in the Hair of His Moustache

Page 111, Line 14. 'The hub in their house was empty of water.'

The hub is a large porous earthenware jar, which keeps water cool 415
by evaporation.

Page 112, Line 6. 'Nor did he even own the leg of a mare.'

The phrase 'leg of a mare' implies that a man has ownership in a 422
quarter share of the sale price of all foals from the mare. It is quite common for deals to be done in one, two, or three legs of a mare, and for one mare to have four owners.

Page 116, Line 13. 'Then will our sheikh cry, Sheil.'

Sheil, or Take away, is a word commonly used as an order to strike 192
camp.

Page 116, Line 28. 'You should not have to drink the water from a 312
camel's stomach.' 271

When threatened by death from thirst in the desert, Arabs may be forced to slaughter their camels in order to drink the stomach fluids. I have also been told that travellers have made their camels sick by forcing a stick down their throats to get a little fluid. I do not know if this is true. It would appear to me to be a most difficult operation.

Page 118, Line 29. 'Cut my head to keep the secret.'

This should probably have been more properly translated 'Cut my 192
head off to keep the secret,' for I have since been told one man's 539
version of this saying. According to his account there were three brothers of a famous Nejaf family, living in poverty, and they were forced to become thieves. One day they went to raid a Turkish Army camp near to Hindya. In the daytime they watched the camp and saw which was the guard tent in which the treasure chest was hidden. They then waited till night, and, when the camp was asleep, they

more brought into use. The government should take steps to 312
survey the possibilities for small projects and to provide assistance in carrying them out, thus giving aid and security to the farm population of the North which now feels that its needs have been neglected and overlooked.

In general, however, the North will have to remain dependent 311
on rain-fall to sustain its agriculture. There are apparently still considerable rain-fed areas which can be settled and put to the plow. Particular care should be exercised, however, to insure that the areas are not sub-marginal from the standpoint of either rainfall or fertility and that settlers are really available in the North, which is generally more sparsely settled than the central and southern portions of Iraq. For example, the Mission believes that the prospect of scanty and uncertain rainfall will probably make it undesirable to proceed, except on a very restricted, experimental basis, with the settlement scheme near Balad Sinjar in Mosul province which has been projected by the Agriculture Department.

Settlement of New Land

In the past much of the vacant land available for an expansion 425
of crop production which ostensibly belonged to the state has fallen 421
into the hands of big landowners. The so-called Land Settlement Law of 1932, which inaugurated a cadastral survey for the purpose of settling the past confusion regarding land titles and systems of tenure, facilitated this process. It permitted the land settlement committees appointed to administer the law to grant titles (so-called *lazmah* grants) to people who could demonstrate that they had made productive use of land within the previous fifteen years. In practice, it has been possible to obtain title on the presentation of proof that a crop was produced on the land in one year, and the land settlement committees have occasionally accepted even more tenuous proof of cultivation. In this way many sheikhs and other influential persons have managed to obtain title to large tracts of land without any payment whatsoever. Since the cadastral survey is only about half completed, more land may be preempted in this way unless a limit is set on such acquisitions.

Land definitely adjudged to be state (*miri sirf*) property by 425
the land settlement committees has, however, been set aside for 166
421

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

425 ●421 166 distribution to selected settlers under the terms of a law passed by Parliament in the spring of 1951. This law reflects a growing realization that a class of independent small-holders needs to be created. Settlement areas ranging in size from 2,000 donums in the mountains to 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated land and 80,000 donums in the dry-farming zone are to be established. Units up to 20 donums in mountainous land, 100 donums in flow-irrigated lands, 200 donums in lands irrigated by low-lift pumps and 400 donums in dry-farming lands are to be distributed among farmers, with preference to be accorded to those living in or near the settlement areas. Up to 20 percent of each area may also be allotted to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 percent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates, provided that the committee responsible for the administration of the whole scheme is convinced of their agricultural capabilities. Settlers will be given the opportunity to participate in the work of preparing each area for settlement. The committee will plan the whole settlement, including the sites of houses and public buildings which are to be constructed in accordance with its specifications. The committee will also issue instructions regarding the type and method of cultivation. After ten years farmers who have made good will be granted title to their land without charge, and for a further period of ten years they will not be permitted to alienate their land in any way or to mortgage it except to the state Agricultural Bank. The only exception to this kind of distribution and settlement will be made in the case of state lands which can be irrigated only by high-lift pumps. Such lands may still be leased in tracts up to a maximum of 5,000 donums to a single individual.

425 421 This law, properly administered, will undoubtedly result in great benefit to Iraq. The Mission urges, however, that the government insist on the principle that settlers farm their land themselves without resort to sharecroppers. Otherwise there is a danger that a considerable number of minor landlords will be created, thus defeating the fundamental purpose of the scheme. This principle may be jeopardized both by the selection of non-farmers as beneficiaries and by the contemplated allotment of excessively large

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plots to single individuals in the pump-irrigated and dry-farming areas.

While sympathizing with the desire to provide in some way for unemployed school graduates and retired civil servants, army and police personnel, the Mission believes there is serious danger that these types of beneficiaries will tend to become landlords who will entrust the farming of their plots to others. The success of the settlement schemes may easily be endangered if the land falls into the hands of absentee landlords or of people with little or no farming experience. In any event there are many farmers in relatively overcrowded rural areas with better claims to the new land.

The proposed allotments, particularly in the dry-farming and pump-irrigated areas, may well be too large unless there is assurance that the farmers will have access to adequate machinery to till their land. The relatively large allotment in pump-irrigated lands as well as the exemption of lands irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution to small-holders appear to be based on the assumption that only larger landholders can afford the necessary investment in pumps. In the past when capital was scarce, the installation of pumps was left to merchants and landowners who consequently were able to reap high returns in the form of a large proportion of the resulting agricultural output. Now that the government is assured of ample financial means in the future, it might consider financing the construction of pumping stations and providing pumps at cost to groups of settlers organized into cooperatives which would undertake to operate the pumps and gradually repay the government. Under such conditions the justification for larger allotments of pump-irrigated lands would tend to disappear. The Mission therefore suggests that the government review the size of the allocation to each farmer and that it reserve to itself the right to reassign a portion of the allotment if one farmer should prove incapable of cultivating it.

The Mission also makes two other recommendations. The first is that the right of sale after the initial period of 20 years be limited in such a way as to give the government an option to purchase for the purpose of preventing the land from falling into the hands of absentee landlords. The second is that the provision enabling settlers to acquire their land without cost be reconsidered.

425 421 The Mission believes that the settlers should, as a matter of general principle, be required to make some payment for the extensive benefits received. This is all the more necessary in order not to widen unduly the disparity between the economic status of the favored settlers and that of the great majority of cultivators who will continue to work under much less favorable conditions. Such payments need not be excessively burdensome, since they could be spread over a number of years.

241 425 [144] The new law will apply on a broad scale the basic principles of the Dujaila land settlement scheme in south-central Iraq. In the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled there on 100-donum plots allotted from state-owned irrigated land. The Mission was impressed by the results achieved through this scheme. The farmers, who used to be sharecroppers, are conscious of their new-won independence and dignity. By comparison with the fellahin in neighboring areas they appear prosperous and content.
[474] Many of them are members of a cooperative—the only one of its kind in Iraq—which owns 10 tractors, two lorries, a flour mill and a club-house. Although the accounts of this cooperative leave much to be desired, its operations are generally along sound lines and indicative of what can be accomplished through state-assisted self-help. The Dujaila scheme is, however, not without defects. Its success as an agricultural venture is jeopardized by the progressive salination of the land because of failure to provide drainage facilities—an omission which should be promptly remedied. The administrative staff appears to be excessively large. Small-scale "landlordism" has crept in, since some farmers have brought in others to do a large part of their work on a sharecropping basis. The farmers were settled in a scattered fashion without regard to the need for community life. Most important, aside from insisting on small fruit gardens, the committee in charge of the project has effected no improvement in farming methods. The Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee, and there are no agricultural experts in the project capable of assisting farmers in raising their standards of cultivation. The improved economic position of the cultivators in the Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to a landlord. In the

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Turkey	MB1
●Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the organization of agriculture and forms of land tenure and an historical summary of changes in agricultural systems and methods in the countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 127-129, 192-196, Turkey - pp. 129-130, Iraq - pp. 130-133, 189-192, 202-203, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine - pp. 133-135, 188-189, 203-204. /

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be
178 seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships
631 had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads
[423] had become a Government function; more and more the local Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

619 Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old
178 tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came
379 with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

619 The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into
579 Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

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of Naṣir Pasha and later of his son Faliḥ to turn the tribesmen into docile tenants on the Sa'dun estates (which Ottoman land-registration policy had demarcated and bestowed under the feet of the age-long cultivators), and the attempt of Manṣur Pasha and later of his son, Sa'dun, to maintain all their old independence. Thus personal ambition and hatred joined with a clear issue of policy, with Government playing a rôle of vacillating opportunism. Year after year tribal war went on, with Turkish forces sometimes participating; civil government was almost wholly inoperative; yet settlement and tribe-breaking were all the time half-visibly proceeding. The day of a quiet tithe-paying Muntafiq peasantry was still distant; the fear of a united Muntafiq army was long past.

The middle-Euphrates tribes present for this period a confused picture of intricate local history. Typical of them are the Bani Ḥuchaym (Ḥukaym), the Shibil, Fatla, Khaza'il, Bani Ḥasan, and the tribes of 'Afak and Daghara, most of whom had been lately converted to Shi'ism and fell thereby under Mujtahid influence. Their records for the later nineteenth century show the increasing settlement of their shepherd sections, and the gradual introduction of rapacious yet feeble Turkish tax-gatherers. They show the endless bickering between tribes, accompanied by the bluster, looting, and unaimed rifle-fire which passes for tribal warfare; and the bitterer strife for the vacant headship of tribes, in which Mudir or Qa'immaqam would interfere when he could. In spite of the rare emergence of a unifying leader, the tendency was towards levelling, division, disunity. This was aided by the spread of the new land-registry system and by the purchase of whole estates by the Saniya Administration which could develop its lands without tribal agency. The shifting of the Euphrates waters from the eastern to the western channel (p. 32) had profound effects in displacing the tribes, led to clashes, secessions, and invasions, and added to the immediate authority of Government as the only possible controller of Euphrates waters. [423]

On the lower Tigris the close of the century was stormy with civil war. With lesser marsh tribes and the new non-tribal townships, the dominant groups were those of the camel-owning, grain-growing Bani Lam and the rice-growing Albu Muḥammad. The prosperity of both tribes depended on the Government allotment of the *muqaṭa'as*,[1] whose periodical distribution led to bitter quarrelling. To the normal causes of tribal war was thus added a perpetual irritant, and to its normal practices that of preying on the Tigris river traffic. Armed attacks on this were a common

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[1] The *muqaṭa'a* was (and is) a defined area (in some cases of great extent and productive value) of irrigable land, leased for a cash annual rent to a tribal shaykh; possession of a better *muqaṭa'a* was an object of the keenest rivalry.

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 [312] advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallaḥ*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

511 In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of the *badu* and their hungry camels. 511 423 Even where tenure was reasonably secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving productivity; [476] wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

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[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[311] [2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north.

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the 511
resources to initiate new methods or improve the old. 423

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and dis- 511
couraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the 241
lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both 241
of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal 312
functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains
and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are 312
evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage 185
of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq M.HI

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midhat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger. Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments.
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on 647
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 721 The lower Euphrates country of the Muntafiq owed little during these years to Turkish administration. The record of the time is of strife and intrigue connected, to a remarkable degree, with the personalities of the wilaya capital. From 1900 until 1908 the allegiance of the tribe was divided between Sa'dun Pasha and Faliḥ Pasha, the former as heir to his father's policy of resistance to Turkish pretension, the latter inclined to Ottoman service. Turkish military intervention led to a remembered massacre of their troops at Shaṭra in 1904; but the author, Sa'dun Pasha, found pardon and a way to Government favour by ostentatious backing of the C.U.P. Supported in 1910 by Nadhim Pasha, Sa'dun by his oppression involved himself in a general revolt of the tribesmen, followed by the visit of a Turkish commission of inquiry which led to a reversal of policy against him. Military operations ensued for the hundredth time. Sa'dun himself was decoyed on board a gunboat at Baṣra and sent in exile to Aleppo, there to die in suspicious circumstances. This gave the signal for a general rallying of the Muntafiq to his gallant but shallow and unstable son, 'Ujaymi, who succeeded to the precarious headship of a tribe from which unity and loyalty had been by now for ever banished. This alignment of forces on the lower Euphrates remained, not without sudden and bloody vicissitudes, until 1914. The temporary eclipse of the C.U.P. late in 1912 led to the outlawing of 'Ujaymi and the brief ascendancy of the sons of Faliḥ. But the tide turned; 'Ujaymi was again recognized as paramount, could again lead Muntafiq forces against the Dhafir, support the Amir of Ḥa'il, and create panic in Baṣra. The outbreak of war found him encamped near Zubayr, menacing but undecided.

619 721 423 Areas of maximum unsettlement were not only those by their terrain the least accessible to Government and to the penetration of modern forces, but those also where a fair economic background was precluded by a vicious system of landholding. The annual reallotment of the *muqaṭa'as* in 'Amara sanjaq, with its many examples of Turkish clumsiness and venality: the unreal and tribally repugnant landlord-tenant relationship in the Muntafiq: the tangle of rights or claims in the Shamiya and Hindiya areas as between the Sayid families, the heads of warring tribes and the absentee Baghdadi tapu-owners: in these lay the roots of a profound social uneasiness which provided the Turks and their successors with the most baffling and costly of their problems.

619 Central 'Iraq outside the Diwaniya sanjaq had little tribal history from 1900 to 1914. The Rabi'a were settled and accessible, the Zubayd reduced by secession and no longer bellicose, the fragmented tribes of the Diyalā and upper Tigris calling at most for occasional police action. These were areas where living stood at,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administration was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old abuses and sincecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise. 361 185 632 [1923]

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Baṣra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeological wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum, 871 658 172

Their solution must depend on the simultaneous and widespread 241
working of forces of rural education, reliable security, sound land 654
tenure and properly financed enterprise. Meanwhile, the annual locust campaigns in northern 'Iraq were developed jointly with neighbouring countries. Progress was made in hill-country tobacco-growing and treatment of the leaf on modern lines. Silk experiments continued, though with scant success. Cotton-growing was still restricted by unskilled cultivation and by pests. The produce of the great date-groves of southern 'Iraq was bringing difficult problems not only of improved culture but of organization and disposal, and civil war raged between growers and packers. Of the attempts at modern estate development (p. 17) none had yet succeeded. The projected Agricultural Bank could not, it was found, be inaugurated until clearer land-titles gave security for loans. The Aṣfar Concession was limited and revised to provide for the acquisition and development by the Company of the Laṭifiya estate, south of Baghdad; the Irrigation Department constructed the main canal at the Company's expense, and promising operations on the 65,000-acre area began under European management.

The main agricultural development of the time was that of riverside pump irrigation. 312
This had been initiated before 1914 and moderately extended between 1920 and 1925. Aided by important fiscal privileges, it began thereafter to show remarkable increase, to the point of becoming a main feature of 'Iraq's economy. Installations in the liwās of Baghdad, Diwaniya, Kut, 'Amara, and Diyalā had by the end of 1930 brought the number of pumps to over 2,000, representing a million-acre increase of cultivable area. There was evident value in thus attracting capital to agriculture, utilizing the cheap oil available, exploiting the high-lying virgin lands, and avoiding the precarious chances of flood irrigation. But the develop- 311
ment was not free from trouble. The attraction of cultivators to 472
new lands rather diverted them from old than increased their numbers; improvement in yields, due to fresh lands and secure irrigation, was not matched by superior type or purity of crops. Estate management attempted by townsmen was sometimes short-sighted and uneconomic, and the hard times and low prices of
1930–1 brought ruin to many hopeful enterprises. These, more- 423
over, jointly undertaken by an urban capitalist—often a Deputy or city notable—and a tribal shaykh or *sirkal*, were productive of puzzling difficulties of land tenure and rights. Neither the traditional occupancy of the tribe, nor the share claimed by the incoming capitalist, had any basis in law. Agreements between the parties often proved unworkable, and in practice did not always bring blessings to the cultivators. These conditions indicated, yet

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

423 again, 'Iraq's imperative need not only of a land settlement but of new thinking on the subject of land-holding; the connexion of the pervasive instability and frequent injustice of land tenure with the level of security, with progress in agriculture, with social development, and with fiscal methods was long established. The formation of a State Domains Department, the bringing of old land records from Istanbul, the appointment in 1929 of an abortive Muntafiq Land Commission, the uncounted hours spent by every Qa'immaqam and Mutaṣarrif in the piecemeal 'settlement' of land cases were all signs that Government was aware of this, its greatest, problem. In 1929 an expert from the Egyptian Service, Sir Ernest Dowson, was invited to study and report comprehensively on 'Iraqi land settlement. His report, submitted in 1932, contained a full analysis of present evils and their cure. It led to the establishment of a Settlement Department under the Ministry of Finance, the passage of a law recognizing and regularizing rights of *lazma*—heritable occupancy—over Government land, and the appointment of Settlement officers—Ditchburn, Aston, Lyon, and Jardine, all from the ranks of the Administration Inspectorate—as Presidents of Land Settlement Committees to start operations in the field. These were steps of great significance to 'Iraq's economic history.

7. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1927–32

648x The 'Iraq Kingdom during the last years of the Mandate was able, with the help of its ally, to extend and normalize its foreign relations. This was done by adherence to many international conventions,[1] by bilateral treaties or agreements, by consular or diplomatic representation, by stabilization of frontiers and by exchanges of State visits. While much of this represented normal international co-operation or courtesy, some, on the part of a State on the verge of emancipation, indicated eagerness to see and be seen in world circles. The sensitivity of adolescence in matters of prestige was enhanced by Arab pride and the assertion of an Arab national individuality new to the modern world; indeed, the move towards Arab Unity in more than the sphere of mere culture and sentiment was already implicit.

Until 1931 the duties of Foreign Minister were nominal, and the portfolio held always by the Prime Minister. The 'Iraqi representative in London became Minister in 1928, and the dispatch of Ministers to Ankara and Teheran followed the regularization of by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as 425 too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land- 155 developers, and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

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[1] The subjects covered thereby, from 1926 to 1939, included Customs and transit, the rules of war, sea and air navigation, electric and water power, posts and telecommunications, health and drugs, locust control, cinematograph films, and workers' conditions.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding [423] was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallaḥ, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original [166 law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes to construct model villages, good in conception but at present 654] trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increas- 241 ing official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241 was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the [166 establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of 464] these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423 committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185 since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425 a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166 sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312 continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their 653 studies and planning, though the intended major projects could not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

Board[1] at its early meetings in 1951 and they were, with possible 312
modifications, to form the basis of 'Iraq's future irrigation activity, 653
whose full realization, however, must, for all the impatience of the 185
public and the press, occupy not less than fifty years.

Works actually completed before the end of 1951 were the realigned Ḥabbaniya inlet (Warrar channel) and the return outlet to the river (Sinn al-Ḍhibban channel), ensuring flood protection and making possible the use of stored flood water. The Wadi Tharthar inlet channel—a work of very great magnitude—was put to tender by the Development Board in 1951; the Samarrā barrage and headworks, and the greater Ḥabbaniya scheme, were to follow later. Much detailed planning and designing remained to be done, even for the immediately following five years, before a programme, especially in lower 'Iraq—'Amara, Baṣra, and the Gharraf—could be established. The extent, however, to which the Willcocks plans of forty years earlier had stood all tests was indeed remarkable. Only the Faluja and Balad barrages (p. 63) had been abandoned, and development in the Baṣra–Ḥammar area might or might not in the end follow Willcocks's plans. The abiding problem of silt deposit appeared partly soluble, by improved headwork design and by mechanical clearance. Pump irrigation seemed by now to have reached its economic limit in much of the territory, but there was ample room for more intensive cultivation of the pump-lands.

The connexion of reasonable and stable forms of land tenure 423
had long been recognized by Government in its land-settlement 565
activity, and the latter had a creditable volume of achievement to show after eighteen years of sustained effort. Early criticism of the procedures adopted (p. 261) and the progress of the work itself throughout 'Iraq (p. 323) have been elsewhere described. Five more years' work since the end of the war had defined, delimited, and recorded the personal rights in other wide areas. The abiding problem of Muntafiq land rights had not yet been solved; in 'Amara an answer not very different from the *status quo*, but with longer-term security for the shaykhs and greater fragmentation was likely to be found. Elsewhere the hard case of the landless fallaḥ was little changed wherever he had been unable to establish a basis of title and, at the opposite extreme, the good fortune of

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[1] The Board's six-year plan, legalized early in 1952, provided for year-by-year expenditure, from 1951–6 inclusive, on the Tharthar project, to a total of (in thousands of ID) 10,300: on the Ḥabbaniya, 2,200: on the Diyalā dams and canalization, 6,750: on the Dukan dam, Ḥawija barrage, 'Udhaym barrage and canalization, 6,750: on the Bakhma dam, 8,700: on irrigation works in Mosul and Arbil liwās, 1,900: Tigris barrage and canalization, south of 'Udhaym mouth, 1,800: and main drainage, 4,100. New and re-formed canalization on the middle and lower Euphrates, lower Tigris and Gharraf, and Baṣra area were allotted 10,425.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

423 565 those to whom mere shaykhly birth or recent business enterprise had brought title-deeds was obvious and envied. There was indeed room for criticism on various lines. The Government had parted with its right of free disposal of wide lands hitherto legally unencumbered though in fact occupied; this might obstruct later development plans. Vested interests had been over-generously recognized: land reform on an equalitarian pattern was, as the left wing of Baghdad politicians (and some foreign observers) insisted, as far off as ever. Nevertheless, within the limits of society and economics as they were, a great work of stabilization had been done. Disputes were few, confidence had been increased, and a return to the pre-settlement conditions of agrarian jungle law was unthinkable. For both the small and the large holding, for peasant-proprietorship, the capitalist's scientific farm, the Land Development Company and large-scale Government enterprise on its own vast unencumbered estates, there was clearly room in the 'Iraq of the future.

433 Though the limits within which industry was likely to develop were by the mid-century well understood, not least by the Director-General and the Committee for Industrial Research, there had been a measure of expansion during the last five years. The legal basis for its encouragement, which was the policy of every successive Ministry, had been altered by the cancellation of the 1929 law and of licences issued under it in favour of a new law of 1950. The latter granted important privileges to undertakings which were power-operated, employed 90 per cent. or more of local workers, cost at least ID 5,000 to erect, and used more than half 'Iraqi capital. By 1951 thirty-five projects had been accepted as fulfilling these conditions, and the Industrial Bank made loans to a number of them. Of the industrial output of such enterprises some was on the humblest scale and of slight interest; such was the production of sweets, macaroni, date-treacle, articles made in Kurdish marble, ceramics, wax matches, buttons, reprocessed glass, unglazed tiles, and aluminium pots. Manufactures on a less inconsiderable scale were those of flour, vegetable oils, cardboard and wrapping paper (made from wheat and rice stalks), soap, knitted goods, sausages and preserved meat, methylated spirits, 'araq, concrete pipes, plastics, steel windows, and tubular furniture. An earlier brewery having failed, a modern brewery using local barley began the production of excellent beer in 1949. An ambitious enterprise for the manufacture of jute gunny-bags was in course of establishment. Brickworks had continued to develop on modern lines, and were capable of meeting all local needs. 'Iraqi cigarettes had gone far to supply the country's smokers, from modernized as well as hand-operated workshops; only Kurdish-grown tobacco was used.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

An Inquiry

INTO

LAND TENURE AND RELATED QUESTIONS

PART I.—SCOPE AND PROCEDURE OF INQUIRY

185 1. The considerations which led Government to ask me to visit el 'Iraq in the winter-spring season 1929-30 were briefly summarised at the time. The necessity of setting up a sound system of settlement and registration of rights to land as an essential preliminary to agricultural development was urged. It was represented that until effective measures to achieve these ends had been devised and put into operation, agricultural development must either be delayed or based on unstable foundations. It was emphasised that while the country was full of agricultural possibilities and only required development on sound lines, it lacked the necessary basis of a sound system of land registration. And it was explained that the Departments of Revenue, of Land Registration and of State Domains were pursuing reform without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan.

The main objective was the promotion of agricultural development. The particular needs were adjudged to be (i) the execution of a settlement of rights to land throughout the country, (ii) the establishment of an efficient system of book-keeping of those rights, and (iii) the unification of divergent and disconnected Departmental efforts. I was asked to study the problem as a whole and to advise how it should be attacked. As outlined that problem appeared to be essentially one of organisation and procedure for attaining two accepted objectives: a just settlement, and an efficient register, of rights to land. I anticipated that the requisite information regarding existing conditions would be readily available: and I expected that the discussions of previous years would have produced clearly defined issues. But I had not allowed for the peculiar fluidity and diversity of methods of land tenure practised.

423
427 It proved to be common knowledge that the tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all. It was also common knowledge that the land law was defective and uncertain in its application to the other fifth. And it soon appeared that there was an almost complete lack of precise, authoritative and systematic information in the Headquarter Offices of Government in regard to land conditions generally and to the methods of holding, transferring and transmitting land actually practised from day to day by the great mass of landholders and agricultural peasantry throughout all parts of the country.

121 It therefore became necessary to extend the scope of my inquiry to include an investigation of the conditions of land tenure actually operating throughout the country, as distinct (for the most part) from those

121 enshrined in the Statute Books of Government. And since the taxation imposed on agricultural production is one of the most important practical conditions attaching to the utilisation of land, a study of such taxation had to enter into the inquiry. Nor could any investigation of conditions of landholding in el 'Iraq be intelligible or real which did not pay careful regard to the methods of irrigation, public and private, the prevalent forms and standards of cultivation, the distribution and remuneration of agricultural labour. It was not of course possible within the period of a few months to cover this vast field of investigation as thoroughly and completely as the occasion demanded: but owing to the widespread and generous collaboration aroused, the results provide an adequate basis for immediately useful measures.

121 185 This general study of existing conditions had to precede consideration of the three objectives originally indicated, if Government was to be sure of its ground and to be provided with a trustworthy foundation for progressively constructive reform. For settlement of rights to land pre-supposes and requires some stable bases of land law, or at least of legalised custom, on which such rights can be founded. And so far, by common admission, such bases rarely exist, nor do the discussions of previous years appear to have advanced agreement as to the remedy. Again although an efficient Land Register is indispensable in due course, both for the operation of the statutorily registered tenures, and for any orderly regulation of the enormous residue of (so-called) State Domain, yet the execution of a settlement of rights to land must precede the establishment of such a Register. For an effective Land Register is nothing but an intelligible and dependable record. Its function is simply to mirror clearly and faithfully rights to land existing at any and every moment. It is useless to devote money and effort to rectifying and burnishing the mirror, so long as it will only have an unintelligible tangle to reflect. Attention must first be directed to unravelling the tangle.

185 Further, while it is certainly true that no united effort had been made, and no connected plan pursued, by the three public services mentioned, yet it will be recognised that, as subordinate Departments of three separate Ministries, they were not in a position themselves to adopt any general scheme of reform. This is clearly the responsibility of Government as a whole. And, as will appear later, if any well-concerted and effective measures are to be undertaken, the better co-operation and co-ordination of the efforts of these services will not be enough.

423 2. The lack of a well-documented collection of information about existing conditions of land tenure throughout the country was not on consideration surprising, having regard to the vicissitudes of modern el 'Iraq's short history. There must have been an enormous amount of spade work to be done in establishing orderly government throughout the country during the last ten years: and the current needs of administration no doubt completely absorbed the time and energies of those who might otherwise have undertaken a systematic collection of trustworthy information. The collection of such information, particularly in statistical form, is apt to be a slow development in any country. It requires time, a scientific appreciation of the value of exact data, and the resources of a well-established and experienced public service. And in connection with land it requires a more comprehensive and far-sighted outlook than a number of disunited Departments can reasonably be expected to produce.

423 184 The collection of a representative volume of trustworthy information was also attended by peculiar difficulty, owing to the extreme diversity of conditions prevailing throughout the country. This diversity

is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated 423 184 by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman administration present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts.

The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. 423 For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon.

3. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers 122 114 dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were unobtainable, while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape.

A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of 114 185 reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform.

4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the 121 Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country.

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry 124 of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the

121 [233] proper picture of the whole, I have confined myself in these pages to what may be described as the general aspects of the question as distinct from those of particular localities. Nor has anything like the attention the subject deserves been given to pastoral rights. For while settlement of rights to grazing and pasture is also required, they do not call for such rigid definition, nor is settlement of such rights so urgently needed as of rights to cultivable land, unless the two conflict. Consideration of the Land Revenue system in force when I visited the country has also been omitted, as this system has since been superseded (see ii, 4).

121 423 In pursuance of the attempt to restrict attention at this stage to those phases of the problem which call for action first, I have also avoided consideration here of many features or incidentals of existing land tenure, which may be intrinsically of as great importance as others that are examined. Among matters which are not examined in this report for this reason may be mentioned: the various forms of dedication in *waqf*, the conditions of *mulk* tenure, the escheat of tapu tenure for failure to cultivate or failure of heirs, known as *mahlul*, the charge known as *uqr*, the position of newly formed land in a river termed *shati*, the old and new forms of hypothec or mortgage. These almost exclusively affect the registered tenures, and are best considered in the general study and amendment of the land law which is advocated (see vii, 1). Similarly the much-debated question of the conditions under which acquisitive prescription of tapu tenure should come into effect, can have little practical value, until the Government is in a position to implement its statutory tenures. Important established customs affecting State Domain, which are not entered into for the same reason are the *mugharisa* and *ta'aba* systems of planting and tending gardens and groves.

Finally, I have thought it best, on these grounds also, to restrict detailed discussion of proposed measures to those required for the initial execution of reform. While the character of measures that would be required subsequently to conserve the benefits attained by reform have had to be indicated, no attempt is made to formulate them in detail.

000 Even generalised and truncated in these ways the main problem remains a difficult one either to present or to master; but it has not appeared to me possible to simplify it further without distortion. The study of the land tenure of any country, with a view to practical and realisable reform, is no light undertaking; and that undertaking is attended with peculiar difficulties in el 'Iraq for reasons which are explained.

To facilitate reading and reference I have divided this report into nine parts, which I have endeavoured to make as self-contained as possible. This necessitates some repetition and discontinuity on consecutive reading; but it is impossible to present this intricate question in any readily digestible form. The subject matter of each of these parts is given on the contents page and need not be repeated. The last alone calls for explanation. It has been written in response to numerous inquiries, official and otherwise, when I was in el 'Iraq, regarding the wider setting of the problems of land tenure in relation to the general development of the country as a whole and to the other great ameliorative movements needed. It concludes with a summary of the main recommendations made. It is hoped that this part of the report may be of assistance to those who, while impressed with the critical importance of a constructive reform of land tenure, may be unable to study the whole of this report textually.

PART II.—EXISTING CONDITIONS. THE LAND AND THE LAND SURVEY

123 1. The conditions of land tenure throughout el 'Iraq may be described generally as in various stages of divorce from innumerable primitive practices, but still rarely wedded to law. These conditions vary so much not only from province to province, but from locality to locality and from community to community, that no picture of them can be presented which combines fidelity of detail with a comprehensive view. Those who are familiar with the variations, even within one province, will appreciate the extreme difficulty of focussing the whole kaleidoscopic panorama into one generally intelligible picture. And yet it is impossible to plan or proceed with any sober and reasoned national attack on the unhealthy situation prevailing, without some dependable general diagnosis of that situation.

Neither effort nor time has been spared to secure this indispensable foundation for land reform and it is believed that the general analysis of existing conditions is fundamentally reliable; but it must always be remembered that no generalised statement can faithfully reflect the multitudinous local variations which exist everywhere. This does not matter provided the broad outlines of the analysis are sound, its limitations are understood and the need for some latitude in the application of reform later is recognised.

2. Area and Distribution of Cultivated Land

128 2. The data needed to compile a general map of the country showing the distribution of the land by its physical situation and agricultural potentialities not being available in the Headquarter Offices of Government, an attempt was made to remedy this deficiency. In response to a request already mentioned the Provincial authorities compiled a diagrammatic map on a scale of 1:250,000 showing the distribution of the land in each Province (Liwa) in certain broad classes. The Irrigation Department gave invaluable assistance in collecting the information on which the classification was based in the southern liwas, and the Survey Department in the preparation of the maps and the extraction of areas. The Land Registry (*Dairet el Tapu*) spared no effort to contribute, so far as their records allowed, the location of registered holdings. The original map sheets were left for consultation in Baghdad. The broad results are illustrated in Plates I and II, so far as the smaller scale used therein permits. The areas of the different varieties of land shown are given in Table I.

The compilation was a much more difficult and laborious task than the final simplified results suggest. The greatest trouble was taken by all those who collaborated to ensure that the maps represented the facts as faithfully as the conditions permitted. But it will be appreciated that the details given must not be regarded as reliable. This is due to the impossibility of analysing and classifying the land surface of the whole country with any approach to accuracy either in the time, or on the basis of the unavoidably defective general map series, which was alone available for the purpose. But poor as the component detail must be expected to be, the broad conclusions represented on the maps and in the table should constitute a sufficiently reliable analysis of the character of the land surface of the country as a whole, for immediate purposes.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

About four-fifths of the country consists of unproductive or slightly 311
productive desert, steppe, marsh and hill masses. The productive core 132
is divided broadly into two regions within which cultivation is practised
regularly. The northern region is fed by rainfall supplemented by peren- 312
nial streams rising in the mountains and, to a limited extent, by lift from the rivers. The southern region largely depends upon irrigation, supplied by canals drawn from the river system, following winter rainfall. The former may be appropriately called the Rainfall Zone, and the latter the Irrigation Zone. Actually the southward extension of the northern rainfall varies annually, while the date gardens of the Basra Liwa constitute a distinct (and of course economically a very important) study. But this does not affect the correctness of the broad picture presented.

Reference to Table I will show that the region of cultivated and cultivable land within the Rainfall Zone covers about 41,000 square kilometres, and that within the Irrigation Zone about 51,000 square kilometres. These figures represent 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total land surface of the country respectively. The cultivation is preponderantly of an extensive character. Only a fraction of these zones, possibly from a fifth to a tenth, appears to be actually cultivated in any given year. So that land is available for a very great development of agriculture, when other factors are favourable.

TABLE I. APPROXIMATE CLASSIFICATION OF LAND SURFACE, 1930 [423]

Expressed in square kilometres

Liwa	Total area all land	Hill mass	Cultivated Region				Additional potentially cultivable territory	Total cultivated and cultivable region	Territory containing tapu holdings	Size of holdings in mishara*			
			Rainfall Zone		Irrigation Zone								
			† 2% hill mass	Plains	Canal fed territory†	Machine fed territory†				1-100	101 to 500	501 to 1,000	Over 1,000
Mosul	45,600	9,350	190	14,580	—	—	270	15,040	7,870	—	—	—	—
Arbil	16,600	7,620	150	7,010	—	—	—	7,160	2,420	7,418	728	500	—
Sulimani	9,500	6,400	130	2,420	—	—	—	2,550	2,280	—	—	—	—
Kirkuk	20,800	—	—	12,020	—	—	3,240	15,260	6,280	—	—	—	—
Diyala	16,200	—	—	710	2,760	90	260	3,820	3,410	4,092	—	546	—
Baghdad	22,100	—	—	—	1,710	2,270	890	4,870	1,500	162	220	120	360
Dulaim	124,300	—	—	—	920	630	30	1,570	920	2,344	109	121	3
Karbala	21,200	—	—	—	660	—	30	680	620	—	—	—	—
Hilla	8,100	—	—	—	4,570	330	1,630	6,530	2,380	452	364	98	82
Kut	16,400	—	—	—	4,680	3,860	2,170	10,710	2,380	—	—	—	—
Diwaniya	88,000	—	—	—	3,770	2,180	5,520	11,470	2,270	8,378	—	155	69
Muntafiq	38,700	—	—	—	4,440	270	370	5,080	6,260	—	—	—	—
Amara	19,700	—	—	—	5,670	1,010	—	6,680	110	—	10	5	50
Basra	10,900	—	—	—	610‡	60	110	780	1,190	—	—	—	—
Totals	438,500	23,370	470	36,740	29,780	10,700	14,500	92,200	40,090	—	—	—	—

*Where information was available. Such information must not be presumed to be exhaustive. A mishara = 2,500 sq. metres or thereabouts.

†Territories so classified are at present very incompletely irrigated. ‡Tidally watered date gardens.

The information given in the table regarding the size of holdings is derived from fiscal returns. Although the classification of these holdings by area cannot be expected to be accurate, the figures possibly give some indication of the frequency of larger and smaller holdings in the districts actually concerned. The latter must not be taken to coincide with the cultivated areas of the liwas themselves.

3. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION

8. In any general study of the land tenure of a country it is desirable 161
to know the numbers and distribution of the agricultural population. 162
Thus it would greatly assist in planning development in el 'Iraq if trust-

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING PROGRESS OF TRIANGULATION SYSTEM IN 'IRAQ

PLATE III

#473


Frontier
BAGHDĀD
DULAIM
LA
ŪT
KARBALA
A A
DIWĀ
MUNTAFIQ
BASR

[Facing p.13]

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

651 TABLE V. NUMBERS OF SEPARATE LAND REVENUE PAYMENTS, 1929

Expressed in thousands

	Summer crops	Winter crops	Dates	Other fruits	Tobacco	Totals
Mosul	10·2	38·7	—	14·6	1·3	64·8
Arbil	2·1	9·6	—	3·6	—	15·3
Sulaimani ..	4·0	5·0	—	4·3	3·9	17·2
Kirkuk	1·0	9·1	0·1	0·7	—	10·9
Diyala	1·4	6·0	10·6	6·8	—	24·8
Baghdad ..	2·0	7·6	2·1	1·3	0·5	13·5
Dulaim	2·3	4·5	3·0	0·8	—	10·6
Karbala ..	0·4	1·5	8·7	3·6	—	14·2
Hilla	2·5	8·6	9·8	2·3	—	23·2
Kut	0·4	0·6	1·5	0·8	—	3·3
Diwaniya ..	10·0	9·6	16·3	3·6	—	39·5
Muntafiq ..	1·6	1·9	15·5	0·7	a few	19·7
Amara	0·1	0·2	0·2	0·1	a few	0·6
Basra	0·2	0·4	15·4	0·2	—	16·2
Totals	38·2	103·3	83·2	43·4	5·7	273·8

ing tables, which were prepared with a view to such discussion, are still of interest and value. And it should be added that the great difficulty experienced in obtaining precise information about the land, did not refer to the financial statistics of land revenue or to the nature of the methods in force. For a number of past years full and clear reports of the working of the Revenue Department have been published.

The three tables explain themselves: but it should not be overlooked that Table V is concerned with the number of land revenue payments made, not with the number of land revenue payers. Thus the same payer (or group of payers) may pay on a summer crop, on a winter crop and on a date grove. And each payment may represent more than a single parcel. Fuller study of the original returns should enable some idea to be obtained of the total number of holdings in the country.

5. THE LAND SURVEY

● 423 5. Before turning to a consideration of the methods of land tenure in force it is desirable to consider briefly the existing position and prospects of the national land survey. It is the duty of such a survey to provide exact and detailed knowledge of the land surface of the country, primarily—but far from exclusively—in the readily assimilable form of the graphic miniatures of the ground which we term maps. The critical importance of the survey in relation to all measures of land reform, whether of tenure or development, cannot be stressed too emphatically. A scientifically dependable and functionally suitable survey is an indispensable condition of the successful execution and maintenance of any comprehensive measures of land reform. All experience shows that to attempt such reforms in the absence of an adequate survey is to build without a foundation in the dark. The intricacy and magnitude of the task of executing and maintaining a national survey is not usually realised, probably because of the deceptive simplicity of the form in which the mass of information collected is presented to the public. The great gulf between a trustworthy and an untrustworthy survey, and the conditions necessary to secure the latter are even less commonly appreciated. It is most desirable that this should be rectified; for while a trustworthy survey is indispensable to all comprehensive measures of land reform, an untrustworthy survey is a dangerous misuse of public funds.

000 The first and most important condition to be satisfied is the provision and maintenance of a thoroughly dependable framework, on

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

000 which the maps can be built up and by which their accuracy can be controlled. The main components of a survey framework are normally, and preferably, furnished by a network of accurately determined points, arranged for purposes of mathematical control in several series of well-shaped triangles of decreasing size. It is essential that these points should be well marked on the ground and that the marks should be carefully preserved and safeguarded against disturbance. Subsidiary points in such a framework differ according to the nature of the ground, the character of the work and the scale on which it is to be mapped. Such subsidiary points may be added in conjunction with, or just prior to the execution of the detail work.

The selection of the sites of the major, or largest series, of triangulation points calls for special aptitude and experience, while the determination of their geographical positions demands highly skilled observation and mathematical computation. It is only when the major triangulation network has been constructed, observed, computed and linked up as a whole, with the corresponding networks in neighbouring countries, that a finally satisfactory foundation for a national survey has been laid. But this may take a long time; and for immediate practical purposes the important steps are to get (i) the major triangulation completed in large blocks well in advance of all other work, and (ii) the ground marks protected. The subordinate series of triangulation, any subsidiary systems of reference points, and the ultimate detailed survey, are then progressively controlled, so that the land survey is consistent and dependable as a whole and no serious error can pass undetected.

423 Plate III illustrates the progress of the major and minor triangulations in el 'Iraq. It will be seen that the survey framework of the country is in a very unsatisfactory condition. It is absent in the north, while in the south the minor triangulation has preceded the modest backbone of major triangulation projected. And unfortunately the permanence and reliability of the work is being continuously undermined by the removal of the indispensable ground marks by mischievous or ignorant persons. Plate IV illustrates the position of the detail survey throughout the country. It will be seen that several solid blocks of map work mainly on a scale of 1:10,000 have been done in the south on a framework of minor triangulation. The maps are purely topographical maps, sometimes contoured to meet the requirements of the Irrigation Department. The quality of the field work so far as I was able to see it was good; but the publication of the maps is in a very backward state.

The progress as well as the general value of the work has been very adversely affected in the past by uncertainty in programme and in resources, and by continual diversions of survey staff to meet scattered and often ephemeral demands anywhere and everywhere. The number and insistence of these demands emphasises how widely the need for a complete national survey is felt. And it was doubtless impossible to avoid and difficult to restrict these sporadic demands, when endeavouring to introduce modern administrative and technical methods in a country that was virtually unmapped. But nothing has retarded the land survey of the whole country so much as the obstacles to steady and economical progress that have been imposed by continual variations in programme, in general objectives and in resources.

According to the present programme, work on the 1:10,000 scale should be completed throughout the Irrigation Zone by the end of 1933 or 1934. At the same rate of progress the extension of the work over the plain area of the Rainfall Zone may be expected to take another six years. But this forecast will only be realised if a steady programme is adhered to, and if effective measures can be taken to prevent the removal of ground marks. Important weaknesses in the organisation of the Survey Department are considered in Part VIII of this report.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING SURVEYS IN 'IRAQ

PLATE IV


MOSUL
ARBIL
KIRKUK
BAGHDĀD
DULAIM
KŪT
KARBALĀ
AMARA
DIWĀNIYA
MUNTAFIQ
BASRA

[facing p. 15]

PART III.—EXISTING CONDITIONS. STATUTORY TENURES

1 AND 2. STATUTE LAW

423
671
1. The foundations of the statute law governing the tenure of land in el 'Iraq are the (old) Ottoman Land Code of 1274 (1858), and the Land Registration (Tapu)* Law of the following year. These laws were supplemented, amended, modified, amplified and curtailed by subsequent Ottoman legislation, or orders deemed to have the force of law, while the country remained under Ottoman jurisdiction. And there has also been a certain amount of recent el 'Iraqi legislation applying to land tenure. The basic concepts of the two first laws are for the most part generally recognised, although the position of the statute law on land tenure is far from clear on many points and although, as will appear more fully later, throughout the majority of the land, these laws have been largely disregarded.

423 The Land Code recognises five legal categories of land:

(1) **Mulk (El arazi el mumluka).** Land held in undiluted ownership assimilated to that of chattels. Such ownership is governed by the provisions of the Sacred Law and not by those of the Civil Statute Law.†

(2) **Miri (El arazi el amiriya).** State land the usufructuary possession (tesaruf) of which is granted out on the registered tenure prescribed in Book I of the Land Code.

(3) **Waqf (El arazi el muqufa).** Land, some right over which has been dedicated to a pious purpose.

(4) **Matruka (El arazi el matruka).** Land "left" or specially reserved for some public purpose.

(5) **Mewat (El arazi el mewat).** Dead or unreclaimed land.

This classification has never been applied as a whole in el 'Iraq and is not applicable as it stands. The third category (Waqf or Dedicated Land) is redundant. Land must belong to the first category (mulk) to be truly dedicated in waqf in accordance with the Sacred law. The untrue dedication, known as takhsisat (appropriated) waqf, is restricted to interests in the revenue arising from the land (tithe, fees, etc,) and leaves the category of the land unaffected. For practical purposes untrue waqf is confined to dedication of interests arising from land of the second category, but takhsisat waqf in mulk interests (e.g. tithe) may exist.

While the third category is unnecessary no provision is included for cultivated and cultivable land that is retained in the legal possession, as well as the legal ownership, of the State. State land of the second category (miri) is confined to land of which the legal possession is granted out on registered tenure to third parties for exploitation. State land of the fourth category (matruka) is land reserved for public purposes. State land of the fifth category (mewat) is waste unexploited land.

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* Turkish dictionaries derive this word from the verb tap-mak to worship, whence an act of homage, an acknowledgment of oneself a vassal, especially by the acceptance of a feudal fief. Hence a title deed, etc.

† Mulk means property. Everything that is owned, whether movable or immovable, is mulk. Immovables classified as mulk (i.e. property) are in the absolute ownership of the proprietor. "Every man can deal as he likes with his mulk," Majalle Art. 1192.

Even the terminology of the law is generally misunderstood and misapplied. Thus, by a curious but comprehensible reversal, the term miri used in the Land Code to denote State land of the second legal category (granted out on registered tenure) is applied in el 'Iraq to land retained in the legal possession of the State. On the other hand, land conforming to the second legal category is loosely described as tapu, or as arazi mafuwida,* or even sometimes as mulk, in contradistinction to the local use of the term miri just mentioned.

Again the distinction made in law between State land of the second, the fourth and the fifth categories is ignored. Indeed I found the words matruka and mewat, and even mahlul (loosed), used purely descriptively and interchangeably for waste lands. But the formal connotation of the last term was recognised if specifically raised.

Evidently a classification of land that is to constitute a useful basis for the land law should conform to, and comprehend, all real differences which require different treatment. Subject to consideration of points still awaiting decision, four categories may be provisionally suggested as necessary and sufficient to enable present law, present practice and present requirements to be reconciled :

(*a*) Mulk or land held in private ownership as at present.

(*b*) Miri or State land retained in the full legal ownership and possession of the State which may be exploited directly or indirectly at its discretion, subject to due recognition of established occupancy rights.

(*c*) Tapu or State land, the legal possession (tesaruf) of which is granted out on the registered tenure laid down in Book I of the Land Code.

(*d*) Matruka or State land specifically reserved by law for public purposes. This corresponds to the fourth existing legal category but some more readily understood term (e.g. manafa' umumiya) would be preferable.

While this provisional classification recognises two categories of State land (*b* and *c*) since the State retains the full legal ownership (raqaba) in both cases, the term miri is in current practice restricted to State land of which the usufructuary possession (tesaruf) has not been granted out. The term tapu or arazi mafuwida is applied to State land the tesaruf of which has been granted out. Although not in conformity with the terminology of the law, the terms miri and tapu used in this way are clear and understood in the country. They are consequently adhered to throughout the remainder of this report unless otherwise stated.

The utility of category (*d*) may not at present be recognised. As the country develops it should become an extremely important class of land, which may not be leased or granted out or exploited in any way except in accordance with the public purpose enacted. Public utility land should only be created and annulled by law and should receive special protection from encroachment, damage and improper use. Timely provision of this nature will save the loss of many valuable public rights and much public expenditure later if the country develops. As instances of such public utility lands may be cited (i) all widths occupied by or reserved for the service of public roads, railways and waterways of all sorts, (ii) sites of historic importance or public interest, (iii) areas required for reservoir or flood storage, for public buildings or for other innumerable national purposes.

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*This term seems to have no legal basis. *It appears to have been adopted as an equivalent of the expression "alienated lands."*

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2. The introduction of the Ottoman Land Code, and more particularly of tapu tenure, by Midhat Pasha about 1870, was a serious attempt at land reform in el 'Iraq which failed through no want of perseverance or sincerity of purpose. It failed for two reasons, either of which would have been decisive. It was foredoomed to fail, as it failed generally throughout the Ottoman dominions, because the administrative experience and machinery, the technical knowledge and the qualified staff needed to accomplish so formidable a task, were lacking. It was also foredoomed to fail because it attempted prematurely to cast in a rigid (and an alien) mould the fluid practices of a still preponderantly primitive society. Land reform cannot be imposed on a country as an exotic by any outside agency. To be successful it must be suited to local needs, conform to local ideas and conditions and be established gradually by Government and people together. Essential preliminaries to success were a sympathetic adaptation of the Code to meet these requirements and a sympathetic initial investigation and stabilisation of existing occupancy and other customary rights. Moreover the construction and maintenance of a reliable Land register would have been indispensable. These were not the only essentials of success, but they are those that chiefly concern us here. Probably none of them were sufficiently understood at the time. Certainly none of them were satisfied. While the causes of the failure must be analysed if a repetition of these old errors is to be avoided in a modern and better managed effort now, they must be recognised to have been not unusual ones at the time. And although the Ottoman Land Code has never been properly assimilated or generally applied in el 'Iraq, yet it has gradually affected both local concepts and local practice deeply. It would therefore in my opinion be an error resembling that originally made, to abandon this Code now for an entirely strange one as Turkey herself has done. The old Ottoman Land Code is no longer an entirely foreign code and it can be more readily and more closely adapted to local needs than any new importation. It unquestionably requires to be drastically mended, but it certainly should not be ended.

3-5. REGISTERED TENURE

3. Outside of the towns and certain garden reaches the private ownership of land (mulk) is rare in the country. As already noted true waqf land can only be constituted from mulk and is correspondingly limited, while untrue waqf is restricted to a dedication of some financial interest in the land affected. There is little differentiation in the Sacred law between movables and immovables held as private property (mulk). But an Ottoman law of 28 Rajab 1291 (September, 1874) required that the latter (including trees and buildings on miri land) should all be registered and forbade the unregistered ownership of such property subsequently. A certain amount of mulk immovable property is registered in el 'Iraq, but the compulsory registration of such property has never been practicable or systematically attempted.

Land reserved for public or communal use (matruka) is not registered as such. It constitutes a small fraction of the whole and, as noted earlier, the distinction between such land and ordinary State Domain is rarely recognised.

With the relatively minor exceptions mentioned the whole land surface of the country—cultivated land, pasture, waste, forest, mountain, desert, steppe, marsh—is in law State Domain of one or other of the two categories (miri or mewat) laid down in the Ottoman Land Code. The legal ownership (raqaba) of all this land is vested in the State; but, as noted, subject to certain important conditions its usufructuary possession (tesaruf) may be granted out on a permanent, heritable,

assignable tenure, in accordance with the provisions of Book I of the Land Code and connected legislation. This tenure can only exist in virtue of an express grant from the State. To be valid such a grant must be registered in the Land Registry and be vouched for by a certificate of such registration (tapu sanad). A prescriptive right to a grant of State land in tapu tenure (known as haq el qarar) is recognised by the Ottoman Code, although the exact meaning of certain important conditions of such recognition is still debated.

Under the regular operation of the Land Code all State land held and used by the public should be acquired and possessed in tapu tenure. The rights and obligations of this tenure are for the most part admirable. But, as already emphasised, its operation depends upon (i) a systematic initial granting of State land under this form of tenure to those judged best entitled to it, and (ii) the construction and subsequent maintenance to date of an exact and reliable Land Register of the rights conferred or derived thereunder. No systematic initial grant of tapu tenure was made or indeed can have been practicable when the Code was introduced. Consequently tapu tenure remained an occasional and imperfectly realised privilege of the few, instead of the regular tenure of State land it was intended to be. In many cases grants in tapu tenure were no doubt made to those best entitled to enjoy its rights and best able to discharge its obligations. But as a rule grants were made without any satisfactory investigation of conflicting claims. And in nearly all cases the definition of the land, which was purported to be affected, was incredibly ambiguous and vague.

Under these circumstances it would have been impossible to construct and maintain an intelligible and reliable Register of tapu tenure, even if the methods of doing so had been better understood. Actually a study of the working of the Ottoman Land Registries both in el 'Iraq and elsewhere demonstrates that this knowledge was lacking. Indeed the wider experience of the world shows that the construction and maintenance of a reliable Land Register has presented serious difficulties even to the best organised and equipped administrations.

The Ottoman Government had recognised before the war their failure to apply tapu tenure throughout their territories, as well as the basic causes of that failure. And they had enacted legislation empowering a systematic re-investigation and settlement of rights to land to be made vilayet by vilayet. It was intended that this settlement of rights should be based on a cadastral survey and be accompanied by a comprehensive valuation of the land and the establishment of an entirely new Land Register.*

4. The granting of tapu tenure in so many cases throughout el 'Iraq. [579] without proper investigation and settlement either (i) of the rights of those already attached to the soil or (ii) of the boundaries of the parcels which were purported to be affected, sowed a crop of conflicting claims throughout the country, which bore the seed of perpetual discontent and hardship, and in some districts periodically produced violent [427] outbursts of lawlessness. The registered tapu holder (mutasarrif), who possibly had family or economic ties with the land, who probably had conformed with the formalities prescribed by a Land Registry Official, and who no doubt acquired his uncertain rights for valuable or other consideration, claimed the position of landowner (mallak).† As such he demanded the landowner's share (mallakiya) in the produce, and asserted his right to mortgage the land and to bring in new cultivators if he wished.

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* Ottoman Provisional Law of Survey and Registration of Immovable Property, 1 Rabi Awal, 1331.

† *Mallak* should properly be restricted to mulk property. A tapu holder is not an owner, but a *mutasarrif* or the holder of registered usufructuary possession (*tasarruf*).

423 579 But occupying cultivators in the South, while recognising tribal allegiance and the State's legal ownership (raqaba) of the land, commonly regarded their tribal group as possessors of the soil by immemorial right, whatever the period of its occupancy of the land might in fact be. They frequently resented any demand for mallakiya, and indeed any claims to overlordship other than those of the State. It should not be assumed that in such disputes one side was invariably unjustly acquisitive or the other side obstinately recalcitrant. Each party doubtless thought that substantial justice lay on its side. Circumstances alter cases and it is neither possible nor useful to generalise on the point. It is the removal of the injury caused by these longstanding differences, alike to agricultural prosperity and to public peace, that is the objective, not the justification or satisfaction of particular disputants. As is well known this need was so strongly impressed on Government by recurring violence along the Hai and in the Muntafiq, occasioned by the perennial disputes arising out of the differences mentioned, that a law regulating the investigation and settlement of the conflicting claims in these areas was enacted two years ago and is now in course of application.*

621 622 423 178 In the northern rainfall zone the people generally lived in regular villages, under the shadow of a local *agha* or other notable, and cultivated the soil and pastured their flocks round about. As there was ordinarily more land than men to till it, land was brought under cultivation as required and successive generations commonly tilled the same groups of parcels, alternating fallow with sown. When necessary, the local leader became the intermediary between the people and any central Government that could make itself felt. Thus he compounded for the village tithe ('ushr) and collected appropriate contributions from the cultivators. He settled land disputes in village conclave or otherwise, and his jurisdiction to do so was of no material importance so long as these mediæval conditions prevailed. As civilisation developed, towns became more attractive and communications improved, such local leadership sometimes tended to become absentee landlordship; while with the introduction of tapu tenure many village areas appear to have been wholly or partially registered as the personal possessions of local notables, without any consideration of the immemorial rights of those who had regularly occupied and tilled the land or pastured their flocks thereon. The pinch in these cases seems to have been mainly felt when the lands were pledged, and forfeited, to town-dwelling merchants for debt. The personal touch and interdependence that existed between even the most arbitrary local chieftain and the village cultivators appears not infrequently then to have been replaced by more mechanical efforts to exploit the land from outside and by obstruction to such efforts from within.

423 These generalised instances are only intended to serve as illustrations of the evil effects of granting tapu tenure in the past without a thorough study and due safeguard of previously existing rights. No comprehensive or detailed study of these cases is possible here.

5. When the maps from which Plates I and II were prepared were in process of compilation the Tapu Department did its best to show the location and extent of all land held under tapu tenure. Partly owing to the destruction of records by the retreating Turks, but much more owing to the inherent defects of their Land Registry methods, it was not found possible generally to do more than indicate approximately the outside limits of patches of territory thought to be affected. The maximum limits of these groups of territory will be seen, on reference to Table I, to cover about 40,000 square kilometres. It is impossible to say what proportion of the areas included would prove upon due investigation to be reasonably entitled to be held in tapu tenure.

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*Law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq Lands. No. 22 of April 4, 1929.

As already observed the Ottoman Land Code provides that all land other than mulk brought under cultivation shall be held on tapu tenure directly from the State. The actual limitation of tapu tenure throughout the one time vilayets of Baghdad and Basra to a fraction of such land is commonly attributed to two Imperial Ottoman Iradas,* respectively issued about the years 1296 (1880) and 1307 (1891). I was not able to obtain copies of these Iradas; but I understand that the first prohibited further grants in tapu tenure either on payment of valuation fees (bedl mithl) or by auction, and that the second abrogated the right of acquisitive prescription of tapu tenure (haq el qarar) on the ostensible ground that the lands of el 'Iraq were being cultivated on terms of muzara'a (i.e. cultivation in partnership with land labourers). It was held that haq el qarar could only be claimed by persons directly and personally cultivating the lands; while the land labourers were barred because they worked for others. But the practical importance of these Iradas was probably slight. They appear in fact to have been little more than early recognitions by the Ottoman Government of the impracticability of applying tapu tenure under the conditions existing in these vilayets. Reference to Plates I and II and to Table I indicate, so far as the available information goes, that claims to tapu tenure are not appreciably more extensive in the old Deir el Zohr district (corresponding broadly to modern Kirkuk), in which its prescriptive acquisition continued under another Irada expressly to apply, than in the two vilayets in which such prescription was as expressly abolished. In short these legislative decrees were dead letters. Whatever their purport they could not alter, and should not disguise, the failure to apply tapu tenure throughout the country either generally or effectively. This failure still persists and is demonstrated by the well-known inability of Government to-day either to safeguard the rights or to enforce the obligations attaching in law to tapu tenure. The absence or unreliability of the information regarding the position and extent of the majority of the parcels claimed to be held on that tenure is indisputable. This is partially illustrated by the gross uncertainties of the location of such land on Plates I and II.

Nor is the unreliability of the Land Registry records confined to this crucial weakness. They are commonly out of date, and/or incomplete, and/or conflicting, and/or unintelligible, and/or of questionable validity. These defects apply to both forms of registered tenure (mulk and tapu). This state of affairs is generally and rightly realised to be mainly a heritage from the past. It is not due to any ignorance of existing defects or lack of zeal on the part of officers of the present service. On the contrary, I found among them a refreshingly realistic appreciation of past and present weaknesses; while during recent years a sustained and conscientious effort has been made to put the records steadily on to a better basis. There are also excellent features in the Department's procedure which should facilitate the root and branch reform that is needed to enable the Land Registry to discharge its statutory functions satisfactorily, if and when such a reform can be undertaken.

But although a warm measure of appreciation is justly due to the efforts that have been, or are still being, made to improve matters, the important facts that require to be recognised in summing up the existing position dispassionately are:-

(i) that tapu tenure as at present nominally applied, neither accords the security, nor ensures the discharge of the obligations, of that tenure as prescribed by law.

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* Sometimes termed Sultanic *Firmans*.

(ii) that the operation of tapu tenure depends upon the existence, and maintenance to date, of an efficient Land Register recording clear and unimpeachable rights to definite and locatable parcels of land.

(iii) that such a Register has never existed, does not exist, and cannot be quickly, easily or cheaply created.

And it has further to be recognised that the existing Land Registry necessarily confines its attention to mulk and tapu tenures. It is not in any sense a General Land Registry.

PART IV.—EXISTING CONDITIONS.

MIRI LAND (STATE DOMAIN)

1–4. General Situation

1. As ordinarily used in el 'Iraq the term miri land, or State Domain, 423 embraces the entire land surface of the country with the exception of land registered as owned in mulk or held on tapu tenure, the extent 471 of which is unknown. Of the compound total some 78,000 square kilometres is estimated to be occupied by scattered cultivation, and about another 15,000 square kilometres to be capable of cultivation (see Plates I and II and Table I). In the former figure are included the previous Ottoman Crown Estates, which comprised some of the most valuable land in the country. These estates were originally managed by a special estate service (El Dairet el Saniya). The administration, by common repute that has survived both in Palestine and el 'Iraq, was good. These estates were subsequently termed mudawara Lands, apparently because they were "turned over" to the civil administration after the Turkish revolution of 1908. They have since lost their separate identity and become merged in the general category of cultivated miri land, although, of course, their previous circumstances may have to be taken into account when considering the position of the present holders of such lands.

It is desirable at the outset to recognise that the huge agglomeration thus grouped under the name miri, or State Domain, reflects no real uniformity in legal status, customary practice, or actual treatment. Thus, while it is accurate and informative to speak of mulk ownership or of tapu tenure, there is no such thing as miri * tenure in law and an unknown variety of things in practice. Miri land simply represents the overwhelming residue of the country not held in mulk or on tapu tenure. It is none the less reasonable and convenient to maintain this elastic, if negative, category at least provisionally. For it accords with accepted tradition and statutory law (*a*) to regard the State as the basic landlord of all land other than mulk (and its derivative true waqf) and (*b*) to recognise that, whatever the rights of holders of miri land may be, they fall short of those of a duly registered mutasarrif of tapu land. But the powers of the State as such a landlord must evidently be exercised with most careful regard to the history of the land and to over-riding considerations of an equitable, economic and administrative nature, if they are to prove admissible in practice.

The general management and control of miri land, legally vested in 647 the State, is nominally entrusted to the State Domains Section (qism 423 el amlak el amiriya) of the Ministry of Finance, until recently the State Domains Department of the late Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture. Some such central State Domains Office is essential; while the keenness and public spirit that I encountered in this service cannot be too fully recognised. But the Department was quite inadequately staffed and equipped to discharge even the practicable part of its colossal titular duties. Actually in the prevailing absence of intelligible maps and

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* Using the term in its customary sense, as opposed to its legal, connotation (see III. 1).

647 423 records of miri land, such management and control as is possible of these heterogeneous and extensive territories must be carried out primarily in the district by persons in direct touch with the people and the parcels affected. Many questions are no doubt settled by the customary social leaders as elsewhere (e.g. tribal sheikhs) and never reach the administration. Those that do may in some cases be dealt with by one of the few local officers of the State Domains or even by another Department (e.g. on the Yuseflya by the Irrigation). But ordinarily the effective agents of Government in the control of miri lands are the officers of the provincial administration on the spot, who must act for the most part according to their individual judgment or on the instructions of their provincial superiors in each case. This local control is naturally subject to the direction, and occasionally to the intervention, of the State Domains service or the Ministry to which it is responsible. It is also necessarily subject to intervention by the Ministry of the Interior or of any other Ministry, whose public responsibilities may be affected by some action taken. It is further subject to intervention by any Deputy or influential private person who may be concerned or interested.

423 682 In a limited number of cases, disputes affecting the holding of miri land are decided under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, because of their reaction on tribal peace and public security. But since such disputes in theory merely concern the domestic management by Government of its own estates, they do not as a rule fall within the jurisdiction of any regular Court of Justice. Reference has already been made to the general failure to introduce the Land Code and more particularly tapu tenure effectively. Consequently by the side of a truncated and semi-atrophied Statute Law there have survived throughout the greater majority of the land, methods of acquiring and holding land which have never been regulated by law at all.

423 427 2. An attempt has already been made to illustrate in broad outline the conditions under which land has been for the most part occupied and cultivated in the rainfall zone. There are commonly two classes of people concerned. Firstly (*a*) the larger man, who may be the local Agha or a small capitalist who has helped to develop the land by providing funds, seed, etc. Secondly (*b*) the actual cultivator who, in the mountainous districts, has tamed the wilderness by building terraces, constructing water channels, clearing the ground, etc., and who, in the plains, has similarly, if less laboriously, reclaimed the land by regular tillage and fallow. It is evident that in actual fact a partnership commonly existed or exists between these two classes.

Now it is generally accepted that the intention of the Ottoman legislator, when promulgating the Land Code, was to establish the actual cultivator on the land; and when that cultivator has remained on the same land and effected improvements of a capital nature by his labour, his claim is clear. But the claim of the larger man instanced, who will almost invariably have co-operated in some indispensable way (e.g. by according protection, providing capital or essential assistance), who has very likely been acknowledged as landlord (mallak) and perhaps regularly received mallakiya, cannot be equitably or advisedly disregarded. Investigation on the spot would be needed to weigh the respective claims in each case; but it can be seen that, broadly speaking, local conditions have often produced an association in the development and cultivation of the land between local overlord and cultivating holder in these regions, in which both have rights that should be recognised in their mutual interest as well as that of the country at large.

423 619 In the Irrigation Zone and throughout the desert borders the Turks found the land for the most part in the hands of tribal confederations.

The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing 423
personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el 617
'Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country.

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still 423
remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although 233
they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised.

All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or 423
pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use.

8. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of 166
the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the
creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the 178
installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the

166 178 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 423 651 619 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer (mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended, wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective; but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 619 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 427 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

Government Department, certainly beyond the power of the organisation and resources so far devoted to the purpose. 423 427

This is not to say that no systematic efforts have been made to put the tenure of miri land on to a more secure and orderly basis. Many such efforts have been made throughout the country by Provincial Officers, the Irrigation Department, the Survey and others. Foremost among them must be mentioned the periodic revenue settlements in Amara, which not only defined the limits of the various tribal interests there, but have also tended to stabilise many lesser holdings. A valuable fiscal survey of a large part of the Basra Date Gardens has been done. A business-like survey, allotment and record of land accompanied the construction of the Yusefiya, and other canals: and pains have been taken to keep these records up to date. In the Dulaim liwa a careful list of all the holders of recognised parcels of land has been compiled and subsequent changes noted. Other instances could be given. Naturally, all the resulting compilations have serious imperfections regarded as permanent records of the rights admitted to miri land: but this was not usually their primary purpose and such imperfections were inevitable in the conditions under which the investigations had to be made. And whatever the imperfections of such undertakings may be, they deserve grateful recognition and they should materially facilitate further stabilisation of tenure. 427 185

But it must none the less be admitted that these were all detached uncorrelated efforts owing no inspiration to any concerted attempt of the Central Government to improve the position of the mass of holders of miri land. Broadly speaking, those who occupy and cultivate miri land are allowed to do so in the absence of more influential opposition. Possession is ordinarily nine points of the law: but neither long possession nor any other mode of acquisition confers security. Personal influence with the most effective arbiter is commonly the decisive factor at any moment in any particular land dispute: and anyone may find the most convincing claims set aside. Moreover, any dispute may be reopened at any time if circumstances promise a more favourable consideration of a disappointed party's case.

Having regard to the history of the land, the widespread acceptance of tribal rather than individual rights, and the extensive and ill-defined areas affected, this state of affairs is not really remarkable; but it none the less calls for recognition and progressive remedy.

5-7. PUMP DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIVERAIN TRACTS

5. As is well known there has been a rapid and extensive development of irrigation by privately owned pumps during the last ten years throughout the high level tracts bordering the main waterways (see Plates I and II). As is also well known, the confident expectations of an early and profitable return on the considerable sums sunk in this development have been largely disappointed. 312

Persevering efforts have been made to obtain consistent and comprehensive statistics of the numbers of pumps erected, of the horse power of those pumps and of the areas irrigable by them: but owing to the records having been differently dealt with at different times and in the various liwas and departments concerned, it has not been found possible to do so. Although this is disappointing, in view of the interest and importance of this development, it is not surprising. And I have none the less been enabled to illustrate the rapidity and extent of the

changes, canal silting, tribal movements, Central Government action, or 311
other circumstances.

7. With relatively little exception the riverain tracts affected are 311
miri land. It has been noted how the cultivation previously shifted 423
therein in response to changing circumstances. The prescriptive claims
to pasture were naturally even more variable and indeterminate. It is 427
consequently not surprising that as the pump development movement 312
extended, these riverain tracts were found so closely interpenetrated by prescriptive claims (lazma) of one sort or another, that few areas suitable for pump development were unaffected. These claims constituted a serious obstacle to the general development of the riverain tracts by pump installations. For at first the claimants as a whole had neither the desire, nor the enterprise, nor the ability to raise the capital needed to undertake this development themselves.

In discussing these prescriptive claims earlier their primarily tribal 427
origin was mentioned: and it appears that the prescriptive rights recog- 312
nised by the provincial authorities in pump agreements are preponder-
antly of such origin and character. These pump agreements may be 622
made in the name of a sheikh or sirkal, but he stands as the tribal or sub-tribal, representative. No doubt when the sheikh or sirkal is a forcible person, he may engulf in his own person the rights of his tribal associates. Alternatively when the sheikh or sirkal is a man of straw, unable to lead his section or keep it together, he may be displaced, and even lose his strictly tribal share in the common holding. In a number of cases, after the movement started and its potentialities had become more apparent, a sheikh or other leading member of a tribal section which claimed prescriptive rights over a promising area, himself erected a pump and cultivated the area with the labour of the other members of the section. Under these circumstances the difficulties of divided interests and divided control, so frequently attending these pump ventures, may not arise. And so far as my information goes it is pump ventures inaugurated and worked by a capable tribal leader under these conditions that promise to be the most successful.

But enterprising townsmen and others with tribal affiliations, who 427
wished to participate in the movement usually had to search for a suit-
able stretch of miri land and enter into an agreement with some group of 312
claimants to prescriptive rights over it. No very definite procedure was 311
required. The process may be loosely generalised somewhat as follows. An enterprising individual, having some miri land of uncertain limits and subject to uncertain prescriptive claims in mind, decided to buy a pump and engine, the capacity of which usually depended as much on his financial resources as the situation and extent of the land to be watered. He applied to the Governor of the Province for permission to erect the installation. This always necessitated a permit from the Irrigation Department (under the Irrigation and Embankments Law), and when the land was miri (as it usually was) the approval of the State Domains Department and the issue of a lease by them.

The Irrigation Department checked the suitability of the installation to the extent of land, according to the information given; and if they had the means tried to locate the land and check the area on a map. Otherwise the figures had to be accepted as notified. And even when the capacity of the installation and the area of the land (as quoted) were discrepant, it was often found that the pump had already been bought. The Department also tried to ensure that the site of the pumping plant was wisely chosen in regard to flood and low stage river conditions, as well as the distribution of the water for cultivation.

The State Domains Department acted through the provincial authorities, who necessarily had no better information as to the situation

PART V.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS,

LAND REGISTER AND LAND SURVEY

1–5. Preliminary Considerations

1. The growth and maintenance of agricultural prosperity will primarily depend upon the intensification and multiplication of well-directed individual effort and enterprise on the part of the numerous body of persons, large and small, who effectively possess and manage for the time being, the holdings scattered throughout the 90,000 square kilometres of agriculturally productive land in the country. These landholders are the indispensable builders of national prosperity. The legislative and administrative policy of Government should be directed to strengthening, guiding and encouraging them as a body in their struggle on their innumerable estates and holdings to erect the fabric of a stable and progressive agricultural economy. And such an economy can only be established on the foundation of a stable land tenure. 000

No man engaged in the management and cultivation of a landholding, large or small, can be expected to sink his capital in the land and devote his energies unreservedly to its development, if he is uncertain whether he and his heirs will benefit by his husbandry. And the evils of such insecurity are aggravated if taxation of the land is uncertain, may be heavy and is variably assessed. When the development and cultivation of a holding is beyond the unaided powers of the landholder and his family (or is a group interest of any sort) it is no less essential to have unity of control coupled with willing and effective collaboration. In other words, conflicting rights and interests in the land must be reconciled wherever they occur, and adequate remuneration and satisfactory working conditions for agricultural capital, management and labour all be forthcoming.

The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Everyone directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent enquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole. And since the cultivation of the soil and the grazing of flocks comprises the livelihood and well-being of the vast majority of the population, the greater part of the time of officers of the provincial administration is taken up with attempts to regulate spasmodically and 423 427

423 generally the unceasing stream of disputes concerning or arising out
427 of the possession and use of land.

The confusion of land tenure throughout the country generally is not confined to one category of land. While it may be more general in the case of miri land, it is also common in the case of tapu land. The long-standing and bitter disputes in the Muntafiq area regarding land claimed to be held by tapu sanad are the most notorious, but far from the only, illustration of this. Similar uncertainties are common throughout the country, in regard to land claimed in tapu tenure, to land and trees claimed to be mulk possessions, and to land dedicated, or claimed to have been dedicated, under the various forms of waqf.

185 The execution of an effective reform of land tenure throughout el 'Iraq is a formidable undertaking and one which under the most favourable conditions is bound to take a great many years to complete. It is easy enough to draft bills designed to bring about academic reforms and to get these passed into law: but it is a very difficult matter to ensure that such enactments are beneficial and workable in sober practice and even more difficult to ensure their steady, intelligent and impartial application over the long term of years that must intervene between the introduction and the accomplishment throughout the whole country of the thorough-going reforms that are needed. But serious as the difficulties to be encountered are, they will yield, as they have done elsewhere, to intelligent, sincere and persevering attack.

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423 2. The late State Domains Department warmly espoused and steadfastly advocated the implementation of the original attempt of the Ottoman administration to grant out all cultivated miri land on tapu tenure. This policy was loosely and, I venture to think, misleadingly termed the alienation of miri land. For alienation denotes an estrangement of legal ownership whereas such ownership (el raqaba) is specifically reserved to the State under tapu tenure. The correction has more than legal significance; because the expression "alienation of State land" connoted, both to the Department itself and to the public, the adoption of a new, a beneficial, and a feasible policy of distributing land hitherto held by the State to private, and for the most part to peasant, proprietors. Tapu tenure, as already noted, was expressly intended in the country of its origin to promote a body of industrious peasant proprietors and taxpayers.

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427 In sober fact the overwhelming majority of the cultivated holdings, classified as miri in el 'Iraq, has for generations been in the hands of the people. Its possession is sufficiently subject to local or central interference to cause great individual insecurity of tenure, and all the evils resulting therefrom, as we have noticed. But while the legal ownership of the State is indisputable, its exercise of such ownership is, for the most part ineffective, uncertain and spasmodic. This is inevitable under existing conditions and is bound to remain so until they have been remedied.

The reform attempted by the Turks, and advocated again by the State Domains Department, was not, therefore, in any real sense, a substitution of private for public ownership of land. It was essentially no more than the legal regularisation in a prescribed form of the already widely existing private or communal holding of miri land. Some such reconciliation of actual with lawful tenure of miri land is indispensable if general security of tenure is to be established at all: and the greatest sympathy must be felt with the desire to effect this reconciliation through the medium of an established statutory tenure.

But the failure of the Ottoman Government to apply tapu tenure, either generally or effectively, alone constitutes a weighty warning against the adoption of this course. For there is no doubt about the earnestness or the persistence of the Turkish efforts, and nothing to show that el 'Iraq is better situated or equipped to succeed to-day. It has already been noted that even where tapu tenure is nominally in force at present in the country, neither its rights nor its obligations are secured; while the limits to which it purports to apply are rarely known. To a lesser extent the same is true of mulk.

Again, admirable as the underlying principles of tapu tenure for the most part are, the greater part of el 'Iraq is not yet ripe for the complete freedom of individual dealing with and mortgaging land that it confers. So long as tribal and other communal divisions remain strong, unrestricted individual freedom to dispose of land would be dangerous to public peace and contentment. And, until the great mass of smaller holders have gained much greater economic stability and experience than at present they possess, any general freedom to mortgage holdings would merely be an incitement to the piling up of unproductive debt. Moreover, a thorough and carefully considered review of the future needs of the country in the way of public works, of areas to be utilised as extensive pasture, or developed as forests, fisheries, etc., of territories to be otherwise specially ear-marked for communal or other reasons, should precede any appreciable extension of tapu tenure.

8. If the general introduction of tapu tenure of cultivated miri land must, on sober consideration, be dismissed as neither practicable nor desirable under present conditions, what is the alternative? In the first place, no single stereotyped tenure is applicable throughout the whole country or probably ever will be.

Thus, since a considerable part of the country is recognised as lawfully, if loosely and indefinitely, held in tapu tenure already, that tenure can no more be abrogated forthwith than it can be generally extended. Any comprehensive reform of land tenure in the country must include a rigid scrutiny of all existing claims to tapu tenure, the precise definition of the areas affected, and a thorough revision and clarification of the provisions of that tenure to make it workable and consequently recordable. But fresh grants in tapu tenure should be prohibited or very severely restricted, until this had been done.

Again, specific undertakings have been given by successive Governments in respect of the conversion of miri groves and gardens into either tapu or mulk tenure. Owing to the inexactness of the terminology commonly employed, the undertakings have been interpreted in both senses. These undertakings must clearly be honoured in one way or the other. But if the Government's promises permit, it would at least be advisable to restrict mulk proprietorship to the physical limits of well-established groves and gardens. In any case, here again, a systematic investigation of claims, definition of areas and formulation of clearer and more practicable conditions are needed. The areas affected are scattered all over the country.

Yet again, it has been foreshadowed that parcels of miri land—at least within the municipal limits of the more important towns—occupied by buildings which are classed as of a permanent character, shall be regularly recognised as mulk. And there are many other demands of urban tenure requiring attention, which cannot be entered into here.

There also exist numerous stretches of miri land already utilised

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427 for public purposes (e.g. as public waterways, railways, roads) which should be formally reserved forthwith as public utility areas.

It thus appears, on a most cursory examination, that there is a large, a pressing, and a complicated programme of practical reform waiting to be done in the existing legal categories of mulk, tapu and matruka (or manafa' umûmiya) land alone. The complementary task of establishing the overwhelming balance of miri land on a securer and economically sounder basis is even more formidable. This balance, it will be remembered, includes the riverain tracts, the settlement of whose complex problems is probably the most imperative agrarian question of all.

185 The conclusion is inevitable that if any effective reform of existing land tenure is to be established at all throughout the country as a whole within the life-time of the present generation, it must be initiated and maintained on the simplest lines that will satisfy the bare essentials of equitable settlement of existing claims, of substantial security of subsequent tenure, and of even and economical taxation. Simplification of the land law and of the practical working of all tenures; simplification of the procedure of cadastral survey, of settlement and record of rights; simplification of fiscal assessment and collection, must be given the utmost possible consideration throughout.

4. It will be easier to see what simplifications of tapu tenure are desirable and justly possible when the existing provisions of that tenure have been analysed as applied or applicable in el 'Iraq to-day (see vii, 1). But from the point of view of the national interest the necessity of securing a fair and proper valuation of tapu acquisition payments (e.g. tapu mithl or bedl mithl) on all initial grants in this tenure is probably the most important. The enormous territories of miri land now existing constitute the principal capital of the nation and any transfer of rights over such land to individuals should be accompanied by equivalent advantages to the public purse. Timely provision against excessive shareholding, and for the nomination of authorised representatives when there are more than two or three shareholders, should also not be overlooked.

But since the vast majority of the cultivated land in el 'Iraq is miri, the necessity for the general simplification just emphasised applies with greatest force to this category of land. In general the simplest, the quickest and probably the only feasible method of placing the tenure of miri land on to a more satisfactory basis, is to accept to the utmost possible extent the present simple concepts and practices and to concentrate upon making their application more systematic, more equitable and more sure. It is evident that for many years to come at least, the tenure of the great mass of miri land throughout the country must be regulated locally, if it is to be governed by law at all. It is always possible for the central Government to intervene in particular cases here and there: but in the overwhelming majority of cases the questions that arise from day to day must continue to be decided on the spot by the people among themselves, or by the authority of a local public officer (e.g. mudir el nahiya) who is familiar with both the people and the land concerned. Consequently any tenure that is to be operative in practice must be understood by, and commend itself to, the judgment of the mass of actual landholders, social leaders and provincial authorities. Simple principles and simple procedure thus understood and accepted can be made to provide the foundation for an attainable reform which, modest though it may be, is preferable to the pursuit of more theoretically perfect tenures, which will inevitably sleep in the statute books because neither people, nor effective authority, nor conditions are ripe for their application. But desirable as it is to put the land tenure as rapidly as

possible on to a firm and complete basis of law and of fuller economic 185 freedom everywhere, it has to be recognised that the process must be gradual, particularly in the remoter and more backward parts of the country.

Some measure of discretionary control will require to be exercised 423 in regard to the persons accepted as lawful holders of miri land, for two 185 reasons. In the first place, so long as there are tribal areas (dira) which must continue to be recognised, it may be necessary to restrict the holding 428 of miri land within those areas to members of the tribal group concerned. In the second place holdings of miri land are not transmissible on death, and this would be inconsistent with that tenure as outlined. So that on the death of a miri holder a suitable successor has to be agreed upon. As we have seen the claims of the deceased holder's family to such succession are commonly admitted by prevailing custom. This is unquestionably in the public interest, provided the recognised representatives of the family are willing and able to discharge their obligations as miri holders to the community and the State. But it is necessary for the secure and economical working of miri, as of tapu tenure, that the number of representatives of a group of holders of a parcel of miri land shall be limited. In my provisional report I suggested that the number should not exceed three. In the case of holdings below a certain size (e.g. 10 misharas) limitation to a single recognised representative or holder might be advisable.

Such recognised representatives or holders should be in actual control 423 of the land on the spot and thus effectively responsible for its cultivation and management. He or they should preferably be chosen 185 by the deceased holder's family (or the group concerned) with the assistance, if necessary, of the local authority. Commonly he or they would have taken a leading part in the cultivation and management of the holding previously. The responsibility of a recognised holder of miri land to his family must primarily be a matter between himself and that family, as it is now. Complaints of abuse could always, also as now, be brought before the local authority, and possibly in future in certain cases before the *qadi*. Again, when the size and productivity of a miri holding permits it could, if desired, be divided on the death of a previous holder. No mortgage direct or indirect of miri land is reconcilable with the tenure as outlined, nor (for reasons given above) does this appear to me desirable (v, 2). Possibly some restriction should also be exercised over the pledging of produce and of agricultural animals and implements.

In the interests of the nation and the agricultural community as a whole, it is essential to recognise in a practical way, from the first, the economic limitation set on both the fragmentation of holdings and the multiplication of shareholding. The capacity of a parcel of land to provide a livelihood is necessarily restricted, and those who actually develop and work on it, with their immediate households, must evidently have the first call on its production. Moreover, unless there is a surplus of profit to put back into the land the general advance in the standard of agriculture, which is so greatly needed, will be retarded, if not prevented. Security of tenure is one of the primary conditions of such an advance. But security of tenure must be coupled with a wide-spread and general opportunity to make agriculture provide more than a bare and narrow livelihood for the greater mass of the population engaged in it, if any sustained national advance is to be realised. Owing to the sparsity and mobility of the country's existing population and to the backward state of its agricultural development there should be no difficulty for very many years in preventing any uneconomical congestion of the agricultural community on the land. But excessive shareholding

4/23/85 already occur in more intensive holdings (e.g. gardens) and in house property.

5. When considering the position in the riverain tracts, in my provisional report I suggested (iii, 24) that the simplest and the most appropriate means of regularising the holding of miri land was by standard leasehold agreements in accordance with prevailing theory and partially prevailing practice. It never appears to be contested, even by the most firmly entrenched holders of miri land, that the ownership of such land belongs to the State. Nor is it contended that this ownership is titular. But while the effective ownership of the State is recognised, it is claimed that this ownership does not carry the right to evict at will well-established holders from their holdings of miri land. Subject to good behaviour, to maintaining cultivation, to payment to Government of its revenue contribution, and to the satisfactory discharge of certain public duties, such holders of miri land claim a right of undisturbed possession, which in principle is universally admitted.

There will probably be no difficulty in formulating the main rights and obligations of miri holders in standard terms, if and when Government decide to maintain and systematise miri tenure. But within the main framework of this tenure considerable elasticity would have to be allowed for supplementary or even exceptional provisions required to meet varieties of local circumstances, of local customs and of agricultural needs. The rain-watered plains of the north, the valley cultivation of the hills, the pump-fed riverain tracts, the rice-growing fringes of the marshes, the areas supplied with regular free flow irrigation, are instances of such variations which will occur to all.

[651] At first sight the contingent obligations now customarily imposed on miri holders in the form of public duties appear to be impracticably onerous. But the obligation that needs definition most of all is the nature, the method of assessment and the method of payment of the revenue contribution, which represents the miri holder's amalgamated rent and tax to the nation, for the land he holds. General public duties should not fall on miri holders as such. They would more reasonably be discharged by some unpaid local dignitary, who could be accorded appropriate privileges.

In pursuance of the need to establish greater security of tenure and in conformity with customary doctrine, miri leaseholds held by long-established miri holders or their descendants, should normally be renewable in practice, although terminable in form. The duration of miri leaseholds might as a matter of regular routine be fixed at ten years. While such leaseholds should ordinarily be renewable to previous holders, if they had previously discharged their obligations satisfactorily, yet renewal should require a formal act on both sides. This would keep the nature of the tenure in the public mind, and the existing records up to date and reliable. Standard fees should be charged for all issues and renewals of miri leaseholds. These fees should in principle be limited to covering the aggregate cost of the simple administrative and technical procedure needed to maintain the necessary records satisfactorily.

6. THE LAND REGISTER

423 6. As already noted the Land Code only recognises the private holding of land in two ways. Such a holding must either be private property (mulk) or it must be State property* held in tapu tenure. And [625] the acquisition of all private holdings in either of these categories must

be registered to be valid.

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* Miri in law including all cultivated land not owned in mulk.

be registered to be valid. Thus the Ottoman legislators intended and 423 provided that all holdings of cultivated land should be recorded in the Land Register. The inability of the Ottoman administration to put the land law into force, has left the greater part of the cultivated land of the country in parcels occupied on loose and irregular tenures unrecognised by the Statute law and unrecorded in the present limited Land Register. Instead of comprising, as intended, a record of all cultivated holdings that Register probably excludes from its purview between three-quarters and four-fifths of the cultivated zones. To permit the Land 185 Registry to perform its intended national function and constitute the general and dependable custodian of land tenure that is needed, not 647 only must its administration and procedure be drastically reformed, but the scope of its operations must be steadily extended until they include at least all privately held land of every recognised category. It should in fact become a General Land Registry (Daftarkhana umumiya el arazi) instead of being, as at present, a Department of tapu and mulk registration only. (Dairet el tapu.)

There are three points to which reform must more particularly be directed before the Land Registry can perform its functions. The Land Register is at present a register of transactions or deeds. Registration of deeds is an unreliable and incomplete method of recording rights to land. It should be converted into registration of title. There are also at present two decisive external obstacles to the construction and maintenance of an effective register of title. The first of these is the absence of a dependable cadastral survey. The existing service recognises this need and carries out scattered property surveys itself to the best of its ability: but this is no substitute for a properly controlled survey conducted by the technically competent Department. The second obstacle is the absence of practical provision to make the extreme multiplication and sub-division of shares upon inheritance of mulk property and tapu holdings economically workable. Such extreme shareholding may possibly still be rare, but it occurs*; and it would be fostered by the introduction of an efficient record until the position became unmanageable.

Since the major defects of the existing Land Registry are due for the most part to circumstances outside of the control of the Department itself, no useful purpose will be served by examining its internal procedure in detail now. Nor does space permit here of any explanation of the necessary conversion of the Register into a Register of Title. When the immediate questions of constructive reform have been decided the requisite modifications in the methods and machinery of record that should supplement them can be considered in detail if desired.

7. LAND SURVEY

7. Reference to Part II will recall to mind the position and prospects 423 of the national land survey, which it will be remembered is of a purely 647 topographical nature. So far as can be foreseen it will take about another ten years to complete and map this survey on a scale of 1:10,000 through- 185 out the cultivated area of the country, if the staff and efficiency of the Survey Department are sufficiently strengthened to enable them to push ahead with their general framework and to make good certain other weaknesses while continuing detail survey on the present lines. It may be hoped that Government will be able to afford the Department the necessary financial and administrative support to enable at least this modest forecast to be fulfilled.

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* E.g. see "A Report on el 'Iraq," page 22(b), by Ahmed Fehmi Beg, Director-General of Revenue, Government Press, Baghdad, 1926.

423 This forecast could be halved at relatively slight additional expense
647 if a minor expansion of staff of all grades and of resources could be
185 authorised, if land marks could be regularly safeguarded, and if an
uninterrupted programme of work could be maintained. This would make a regular and equitable valuation of the Land for purposes of land revenue practicable within a reasonable period (see vi, 9).

But I see no prospect of any general programme of more detailed or larger scale survey being realisable, nor could it be recommended at present.

423 It has already been stressed that the execution of a methodical and
trustworthy land survey of the country is a requisite condition of all
185 effective land reform. It is a requisite condition not only of the establishment of a stable and secure land tenure and of an equitable assessment of land revenue, but also of any efficient system of irrigation and indeed of any reliable and systematic knowledge, development and use of the territorial resources of the country. It was, for example, to provide essential information for the Irrigation Department that the Survey has concentrated on work in the Irrigation Zone hitherto. It is, therefore, imperative that while devoting closer and more considered attention to the needs of land tenure in future, the Survey should call no halt in meeting these other primary needs.

Unquestionably a detailed cadastral survey, which reliably locates the limits of all individual holdings, is required to place land tenure and land revenue on to a thoroughly satisfactory basis. Only on the basis of such a survey can the unqualified stability and security of tenure be attained which is required to stimulate the development and productive capacity of the country fully. But the change from pronounced confusion now characteristic of land tenure to detailed order, is too great to be effected at a single step. The requisite detailed cadastral survey would be a lengthy and onerous undertaking for a much richer, better prepared and better equipped country. It should not be attempted in el 'Iraq at present.

[651] Doubtless in the vicinity of the larger towns and in other places, in which the higher value of land brings in commensurate receipts in higher fees or in increased rentals or other revenues to Government, true large scale cadastral surveys may be justified exceptionally. And the ultimate extension of a proper cadastral survey elsewhere, as development proceeds and land values increase, should always be kept in view.

But the hopes of establishing orderly record, secure tenure, and fair and dependable taxation of land throughout the overwhelming mass of the cultivated territories of the country within the next ten or fifteen years, must be based on a foundation of simpler and less detailed survey. To be precise, the measures of attainable land reform within any period worth envisaging at present should be such as are applicable, and can be maintained, in conjunction with a 1:10,000 topographical survey of the cultivated terrain of broadly the same character and accuracy as is now being produced. The work should be converted into (what has been aptly termed elsewhere) a topo-cadastral survey, without markedly increasing the complexity and closeness of the detail. The parcels or sub-divisions of the land adopted as cadastral units for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment, must be of considerable size and bounded (at least ordinarily and preponderantly) by easily recognisable physical features. The placing, and still more the subsequent maintenance and control by Government, of a host of artificial boundary beacons outlining individual holdings must be dismissed as entirely impracticable. It will be as much as the country can do to establish and

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

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OUTLINE PLAN OF
MAHĀWĪL VILLAGE, HILLA LIWA
ILLUSTRATING SUBDIVISIONS INTO MAQATA'AS



PLATE V

No.	NAME OF MAQATA'AH
1	[illegible]
2	[illegible]
3	[illegible]
4	" [illegible]
5	" [illegible]
6	[illegible]
7	[illegible]
8	[illegible]
9	[illegible]
10	[illegible]
11	[illegible]
12	[illegible]
13	[illegible]
14	[illegible]
15	[illegible]
16	[illegible]
17	[illegible]
18	[illegible]
19	[illegible]
20	[illegible]
21	[illegible]
22	[illegible]
23	[illegible]
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26	[illegible]
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55	[illegible]
56	[illegible]
57	[illegible]
58	[illegible]
59	[illegible]
60	[illegible]
61	[illegible]
62	[illegible]
63	[illegible]
64	[illegible]
65	[illegible]

[facing p. 211]

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185

protect the framework of survey reference points, which constitutes the one and only indispensable collection of ground marks.

The landed subdivision, cultivation unit, or estate, commonly known as *muqata'a*, which exists in one form or another throughout the greater part of the country, affords an admirable general instance of the type of topo-cadastral unit needed. Plate V shows the actual grouping of land in muqata'as in a village selected at random as well as their considerable variations in size. The term muqata'a itself is usually, if not invariably, applied to large existing agricultural holdings regardless of the method of tenure or the legal category or categories of land included therein. Existing muqata'as should not, of course, be surveyed and accepted as cadastral units without proper scrutiny of their history and tenure, while in some cases they may require subdivision and in others grouping. But subject to necessary investigation and adaptation to the practical requirements of survey and record, they constitute a series of major territorial units of the greatest economical importance agriculturally and the greatest practical importance administratively for the handling and maintenance of land reform. Where muqata'as do not exist, a similar artificial grouping of agricultural land for purposes of survey and record can be substituted. All the more important rights to land can be recorded with respect to some one or other of a series of such major territorial units, not as precisely as if a detailed cadastral survey could be carried out, but with a sufficiently substantial degree of exactness and reliability to provide a solid foundation for the most necessary reforms.

It can, therefore, be concluded that the main objective of survey during the next ten or fifteen years should be the execution of a topo-cadastral survey of the cultivated surface of the country on a scale of 1:10,000 of the existing muqata'as, or of similar artificial territorial groupings of land on the same general lines as at present. In principle this survey should be conducted in association with a preliminary settlement and subsequent record of rights, which will be next considered. And it must be embodied in accurately reproduced published maps, if it is to be of general value and use.

But an extent of territory that would occupy settlement for a number of years has already been mapped on 1:10,000 or some larger scale. So that the survey would be working in advance of settlement for a long time. None the less the co-operation of the Survey staff would be needed on the ground to embody in the maps revisions and additions required during the progress of settlement. The necessary association between the two branches of the work could be secured in this way, although probably not as conveniently or as economically as if the original survey had been done in conjunction with settlement. However, as experience is gained the character of the original survey could be increasingly suited to the later requirements of settlement.

Some reference to surveying from air photographs should be made in view of the discouraging outcome of the work done recently. The difficulties met with appear to have been occasioned by some failure by Government to ensure effective co-operation between the Survey Department and the air work. This should not prevent careful study of the advisability of again utilising air photography under more carefully considered arrangements at least in less accessible areas. The exclusion of all but bold topo-cadastral boundaries should facilitate the use of air photographs in the original survey: but the simplicity of detail, the quality of contouring needed for irrigation purposes and the scale adopted may be expected to continue to make the use of the plane table economical, and of the level necessary, throughout the cultivated terrain. But

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recent advances in the use of air photographs have been great, and further advances should be carefully followed by the Survey Department because of the great acceleration in the rate of survey which the utilisation of air photography secures. But while air work can unquestionably be carried out best by a specialist organisation, such work should be done as part and parcel of the national survey and not as an independent operation.

Finally, emphasis should perhaps again be laid on the necessity of basing all methods of detail survey on a mathematically sound and physically adequate framework of reference points. The provision and the maintenance of such a framework is the first and most important requirement of a dependable survey. It is just as dangerous and short-sighted to build up a survey on an unreliable foundation as a house, or to fail to maintain that foundation subsequently.

PART VI.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. SETTLEMENT OF RIGHTS TO LAND AND LAND VALUATION

1-5. Settlement of Rights to Land

1. The injurious uncertainty and insecurity of tenure now so widely prevailing throughout el 'Iraq can only be terminated by a progressive settlement of rights to all individual holdings throughout the length and breadth of the country. This process may be left to the chances of a gradual consolidation over an indefinite future of the results brought about by the interplay of the innumerable social and economic forces operating among the population; or it may be brought about by the conscious statesmanship of Government aiming at the establishment of a sound basis for the development of national prosperity within as short a period as possible. It is such a deliberately planned settlement of rights to land alone that is considered here. Henceforward for brevity the process will frequently be called settlement of rights or simply settlement.

There are two radically different methods by which a settlement of rights may be undertaken throughout a territory. These may be termed respectively Sporadic settlement and Systematic settlement.

Sporadic settlement aims at allowing the work to be carried out piecemeal here and there as the circumstances of the particular settlement require, until it has been completed throughout the territory concerned. Thus any optional settlement must be sporadic, or any settlement which is compulsory on a specified occasion (e.g. when land changes hands).

Systematic settlement is effected methodically parcel by parcel until the work has been completed throughout the territory dealt with. A systematic settlement must be compulsory.

Sporadic settlement is the more attractive at first sight, because it appears to offer the same opportunity of settlement to all landholders in the country or even the possibility of an entirely voluntary operation. It has indeed been warmly advocated in el 'Iraq on the ground that it would be inequitable not to accord the same facilities to all those claiming rights to land. Actually, it is a delusion to suppose that by any method or expedient the same opportunities for settlement can be provided for all landholders everywhere at the same time. This is unquestionably desirable: but it is unfortunately impossible. Under the most favourable conditions any settlement of rights to land is bound to take many years to complete throughout the country. Consequently somehow or another a drastic selection or restriction must be exercised as to the holdings to be settled in any given period. A voluntary settlement would be unworkable. Applications might be made at the outset which would occupy the Settlement staff for years, or they might be so uncertain and irregular as to dislocate the work completely. Moreover, a voluntary settlement might drag on indefinitely everywhere. Again, a settlement effected when any land changed hands, or upon some such specific occasion, would demand staff and resources greatly beyond the country's means.

A sporadic settlement is sometimes possible in countries in which a great part of the necessary work of defining holdings, tenures and holders has been previously done, or in new countries in which the number of properties to be defined and recorded annually is relatively small. But a sporadic settlement is inevitably more difficult, more protracted and more costly—ordinarily very much more so—simply because it is essentially a settlement conducted in a haphazard and unmethodical manner.

But there are also more concrete obstacles which render any general sporadic settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq impracticable. It would require a numerous and competent staff capable of visiting at short notice over a long period of years an unknown number of holdings indiscriminately scattered throughout the country, and of authoritatively deciding their rightful limits, tenures, holders and many important ancillary details. It would require a Survey Department sufficiently well staffed and equipped, and with its work sufficiently well advanced everywhere, to enable all these scattered holdings to be concurrently mapped and incorporated piecemeal in a national cadastral survey. And it would also require in operation throughout the whole country a General Land Registry capable of recording efficiently the results of each separate settlement as it occurred and of all subsequent changes affecting the land concerned. For unless such changes were regularly recorded the work would rapidly get out of date again and the settlement would never be finished.

Even if it is thought that the first of these three requirements might be satisfied, the second and third unquestionably could not. It is a technically difficult and a prohibitively costly proceeding to build up the cadastral survey of a mosaic of holdings throughout any large territory in a piecemeal way. In el 'Iraq it is impossible to do so, for the basic framework of triangulation on which such a survey must depend is for the most part lacking and will take many years to provide. Moreover, it has been shown already that the execution of a genuine cadastral survey is beyond the capacity of the country, even if it was carried out in an effective and economical manner. A sporadic settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq is also impracticable because no General Land Register exists in which the results could be effectively recorded and subsequently kept up-to-date. Nor could such a General Land Register be readily established, even if the necessary financial provision could be made, as the history of the Tapu Land Register amply demonstrates.

There are further difficulties which need not be entered into. For it should be evident that it is impossible to attack the formidable task of effecting a settlement of rights to land in every part of the country at once. It is very much to be regretted that the long-standing disabilities of landholders cannot be remedied everywhere without delay. But since this is so, it is best to face the fact and at least to make a start at remedying them somewhere. The sporadic settlement of a limited number of parcels selected for some special reason is, of course, feasible, and may even be necessary. Thus the Government appears to be committed to the sporadic settlement of the miri groves and gardens, while the Tapu Department can hardly avoid continuing to seek to reconcile its records with fact whenever occasion demands. And there may be other cases in which public policy may require sporadic operations occasionally and exceptionally. But the main contention that a general sporadic settlement is impracticable holds true none the less, and however unavoidable and even justifiable a limited amount of privileged sporadic settlement may be, it is bound to be costly and to delay the progress of any general settlement out of all proportion to the extent of the territories specially dealt with in this way.

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2. A systematic settlement offers the only realisable prospect of establishing any general certainty and security of land tenure throughout the country. Even a systematic settlement would take many years to accomplish. It is evidently more urgently needed in some parts of the country and under some conditions than others. But, gradually and systematically, settlement of rights to hold or use land under any form of legal tenure should be extended over the whole land surface of the country. And concurrently, as such extension proceeds, measures should be taken to prevent the territory that has been dealt with from reverting again to the confusion of rights and uncertainty of tenure now commonly prevailing. For although a complete survey and settlement would be most beneficial irrespective of subsequent measures, since an immense obstacle to progress would be removed by merely clearing up existing uncertainties and providing a sure starting point for title even for the next few generations alone; yet the full benefits of a settlement will evidently be thrown away if the stability and security of tenure gained thereby are not subsequently maintained.

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The record (or General Land Register) of all holdings and their lawful holders that is needed for this purpose has been mentioned earlier (v, 6). It can be progressively compiled as survey and settlement are carried through the country. This is a very different thing to endeavouring to introduce it everywhere at once. As the compilation extends it can be kept up-to-date in conjunction with the survey by quite simple routine measures, provided the land law and current practice have been reconciled. Settlement should be undertaken, and the General Land Register arranged, geographically and follow the administrative divisions of the country—nahiya, qadha, liwa. When the boundaries of these divisions are doubtful they should be decided before or during settlement and survey. The necessity of adopting large territorial units of the muqata'a type as the main unit of survey and record has already been explained. It will be among the earliest, and not the least important, functions of settlement to subdivide each nahiya into these requisite units. Although existing muqata'as would naturally be adopted as such units when of suitable size and satisfactorily defined physically, yet these units need not in principle be units of property. Indeed, if they are to facilitate simplified operations as intended, they must frequently include a number of smaller parcels of property on the one hand, or they may represent portions of larger properties on the other. They should in short, primarily be chosen as convenient permanent subdivisions of the nahiya for the purposes mentioned, and be carefully distinguished as such from the units of property with whose boundaries they may coincide. To differentiate clearly between the two these units of survey, record and assessment, should be given a distinctive name. For convenience in this report they are provisionally termed Sections of the Nahiya (aqsam el nahiya), or more briefly referred to simply as sections.

3. When a settlement of rights has to be conducted under conditions similar to those in el 'Iraq—particularly in the general absence of a previous survey and reliable records—it must be conducted parcel by parcel in the field in the presence of the rival claimants, landholders and tenants, of their neighbours, and of the members of the local community generally. Only in the local setting can the Settlement Authority (whoever he be) get to understand the many-sided local problems on which he will be called upon to adjudicate. And only in that setting will he be able to obtain and weigh properly all the available evidence. A peasant who becomes befogged or lies in a Court-house or Government office will do so less readily when in local surroundings and in the presence of his neighbours who live on the land affected. His errors will also be more evident and be more easily rectified. Indeed,

185 pushed forward in conjunction with settlement operations without delaying the latter. Broadly speaking this means that settlement can be carried out as extensively as men and resources permit in the Irrigation Zone, but must be limited in the Rainfall Zone to the immediate vicinity of Mosul town (see Plates III and IV).

423 185 In this neighbourhood the land is widely held, or claimed, in tapu tenure (see Plate II) and special efforts have been made by the Tapu Department during recent years to clear up uncertainties and define the parcels justly affected. It was primarily on this account that a considerable block of isolated detailed survey has been completed here. Settlement of this block of territory therefore appears preponderantly to involve an investigation and definition of the parcels held in tapu tenure and, so far as such parcels are concerned, to have been in progress for some time. But rights to tapu tenure should be systematically reviewed and if possible rights to miri land concurrently settled, throughout this area by an independent Settlement Officer in collaboration with the Survey at an early date.

In the Irrigation Zone a considerable amount of detailed survey has been completed in every liwa and there is a wide range of territory in various stages of readiness for systematic settlement.

423 185 651 In el Amara, as is well known, the political and administrative conditions have been retained on an almost exclusively tribal basis, the miri lands (of which the liwa is almost exclusively composed) being farmed out to various tribal sheikhs for triennially assessed payments. It is impossible to discuss the details of these methods here; nor is there any need, since the agrarian conditions of no liwa have been investigated and reported on so regularly or so fully, owing to these periodic assessments. Each successive assessment has built on that which preceded it, but has been carried out in greater detail with increasing attention to the smaller men who hold from the leading sheikhs and really manage and work the land. If public security and genuine national consciousness continue to grow these periodic assessments should crystallise steadily into an effective settlement of rights to land. But the conditions under which the work had to be done in the past were extremely difficult, and if this end is to be obtained (and even if the revenue assessments are to be as equitable and reliable as is now reasonable and practicable) the work must be more closely based upon trustworthy detailed survey and rights be investigated more thoroughly than has so far been possible. A reassessment of the Amara estates (muqata'as) was due, and has doubtless been undertaken, this year. And under the agreements in force with the leading sheikhs the prevailing system terminates and is open to review in 1934. The consideration of fuller and more permanent settlement of rights in this district can therefore properly be left over until this termination approaches, or a further reassessment is arranged.

In the Basra liwa, as already observed, an excellent fiscal survey of the date gardens was carried out several years ago. And the principle of a regular Land Tax has long been familiar through the operation of Midhat Pasha's enlightened *jarib* tax.* The tenure of these gardens (mulk or miri) appears to be rarely, if at all, disputed. For the most part the mulk owners are well known, or could readily be determined. 185 Consequently a relatively minor effort would enable titles to be authoritatively reviewed and, when necessary, settled throughout the Basra reach on the basis of the existing survey. The respective responsibilities of garden owners and the State for the maintenance of the tidal [312] creeks off the Shatt el Arab, from which the gardens are largely watered,

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* A commutation of the Government crop share on date gardens into a tax assessed by quality and area, carried out in 1871. A jarib=[illegible] square metres, or [illegible] of an acre.

should also be decided on grounds of common interest and common 185
sense, not by expositions of the law.

The management of the miri, or State Domain, date gardens must 423
be mentioned as it has been the subject of controversy for some time and calls for some consistent policy. But interesting and important intrinsically as the points of principle and practice involved are, space does not allow of their consideration here. In its relation to the major problems of the land tenure of the country as a whole, this is a domestic question for the separate consideration of Government in its capacity as one landholder among many.

In the Muntafiq liwa, as we have noted, an authoritative settlement 423
of disputes arising out of important and long-standing claims to hold 185
land in tapu tenure was initiated recently under a special law (see iii, 4). But the work appears to be limited to investigations into claims to this tenure alone and thus to fall considerably short of the general settlement of rights to land that is needed throughout the country. If land is declared free of tapu rights it is, I believe, simply recorded as miri without any settlement of the rights of those in occupation of it. Even a successful settlement of tapu rights alone in this, or in any, area is no doubt a valuable contribution to the general introduction of secure land tenure needed: but when all the cost of carrying out investigation of tapu claims is being incurred in a district so honeycombed with them, it would be a great pity to miss the opportunity to effect a thorough and complete settlement.

And although it was natural, and very possibly desirable, to entrust 423
this particular piece of settlement originally to a Commission, it is 185
permissible to doubt whether the diversion of three important members 647
of the judiciary and two important members of the administration from their normal duties will continue to be justified by any persistent delicacy or difficulty in the investigation of tapu rights in this particular district. The general widespread need of settlement in all parts of the country is commonly admitted. I have represented earlier that the only hope of satisfying this need within the lifetime of the present generation is to adopt the simplest and cheapest procedure and machinery possible everywhere. No doubt the size and composition of the Muntafiq Commission helped to inspire confidence among the disputants with whom it had to deal, but with all its qualities and advantages a Commission of this nature is bound to be costly and deliberate, and unduly to absorb for the benefit of one locality, public service and public funds which can be ill spared from the much wider general national effort that is needed. At a suitable opportunity (of which the Commission itself would be the appropriate judge) the work which they have initiated might be transferred to an organisation of the simpler character that I have recommended for adoption elsewhere, without breach of continuity, authority or efficiency.

In the remaining liwas of the Irrigation Zone there are several canal areas already mentioned (e.g. the Yusefiya canal area) which were settled by the Irrigation Department, when the canals irrigating them were remodelled or constructed. The work that I saw appeared to have been well done and was certainly well recorded. It should not be allowed to fall into confusion. Owing to various chances I did not succeed in visiting the Latifiya estate, which I very much regret, as the lessons to be derived from its methods and experience in the field of agricultural development should be extremely valuable; but in respect of land tenure it can no doubt be regarded as a specially granted and administered canal area.

The Dulaim reach is ripe for settlement because of much good in- 423
vestigatory work already done and recorded; but largely for this very 185
reason, settlement (except possibly in its lower portion) can, I think,

be delayed with less disadvantage here than in areas in which the unsolved pump problems cluster more thickly.

7. Throughout the Irrigation Zone as a whole it is the riverain tracts watered by pump installations which appear to me to call most insistently for early and authoritative settlement of rights. Economically it is these mechanically watered territories (whose approximate extent is indicated on Plate II and embraces about 10,000 square kilometres) that present the most urgent as well as the most intricate problems. And it is these territories that the most progressive elements in the nation are particularly endeavouring to develop.

It can be recognised now without reproach or fault-finding that the interests alike of the nation as a whole, of the claimants to prescriptive rights, and of members of the public willing to invest money and energy in the development of these riverain tracts, would have been immeasurably better served if all pre-existing rights had been properly investigated and settled, and if the parcels of land affected had been satisfactorily defined and recorded, before pump permits were granted in increased numbers and before agreements with reputed holders of prescriptive rights had been recognised.

The systematic settlement of rights to land throughout these tracts, that I have already recommended, affords a second opportunity of putting matters on to a stable footing; but it need hardly be repeated that the position of prescriptive holders has been appreciably strengthened and the extent of their claims appreciably increased in the interval. When such holders (corporate or individual) have in effect themselves invested money and effort in pump works, etc., this may be accepted without regret, provided their holdings promise to be effectively developed. Where, what may perhaps be briefly called, dual enterprises are in operation, it is impossible to formulate any general conclusions having regard to the great varieties of conditions in the terms of the agreements made and in the personalities concerned. But it can be said with assurance that a definition of existing rights still remains the first step to a clarification of the relative positions of those associated in these dual enterprises and that such clarification is, in its turn, the doorway towards improvement. Whatever mistakes have been made in the past, whether by the Government itself or by the parties concerned, there will be no hesitation in agreeing that it is in the common interest now, wherever and however reasonably possible, either to reconcile or to separate the interests of those unsuccessfully associated in these joint enterprises.

The complication of conflicting claims and rights in these riverain tracts is very great, but the conditions differ so much from one pump area to the next that there is no general decision that can clear up the existing tangle. This can only be done by a patient investigation and settlement parcel by parcel conducted by a competent and impartial officer equipped with the necessary powers. While I do not pretend that such a settlement of rights in these areas would be easy, I am quite confident that it is practicable. And there can be no doubt that it is most necessary both in the interests of the country as a whole and of the particular parties concerned in each case.

The normally convenient section of survey and record throughout these riverain tracts will tend to conform to the limits worked by a pump, or battery of pumps, as a unified agricultural holding. Sections so indicated will probably be fairly stable; but they may frequently require subdivision for fiscal assessment. High ground not commanded by the pump, or not worth cultivating, would be included or constituted part of an adjoining section, as best suited the general requirements of the work.

185 many pressing problems. I therefore suggest that two settlement areas should be constituted in these tracts, preferably one situated on the Tigris and the other on the Euphrates. From these as starting points, settlement of these tracts could progressively be extended up and down the two rivers until they had been completed.

The above is no doubt an extremely modest programme; but it is better to begin modestly than to continue to postpone these greatly needed land reforms indefinitely. After six months practical experience in the field, and of the cost and speed of the work in three different settlement areas, there would be solid grounds on which to base plans for an extension of operations.

185 423 It will not have escaped attention that the completion of the work already partly done in the Mosul and Basra liwas is not included in this initial programme. This is not because such exclusion can be contentedly acquiesced in, even temporarily, but because it appears to me that a cessation of the appeasement that has been started in the Muntafiq, or still further delay in placing pump cultivation along the river reaches on to a healthy basis, would be even more deplorable.

9. Land Valuation

651 185 9. For reasons given earlier (ii, 4) it has not appeared useful to comment either on the recently superseded land revenue methods or on the two new laws But the old and the new appear mutually to envisage the eventual establishment of a regular land tax or Government rental, if this term is preferable. By this I mean the valuation of the land by appropriate means and the assessment and imposition of an annual payment based thereon. Thus, in the explanation issued with the displaced land tax assessment law,* the Land Revenue policy of Government was described as "the imposition of a fixed assessment in cash per unit of area of land," while the universal application of this method ultimately was foreshadowed. And Article 6 of the law required that the process of assessment should include survey, the classification of the land into grades according to the quantity and value of the produce, and the resulting assessment per unit of area of each grade.

And I understand Article 6 of the second of the new laws to provide for the early completion of the survey and valuation of all cultivated miri land and all irrigated tapu land with a view to the assessment and imposition of an annual rental thereon.

The ultimate objective in this important sphere of reform therefore appears essentially to be unchanged, and it is an objective which, in my opinion, alone offers any prospect of escape from the inequalities, irregularities, uncertainties and hardships inseparable from the wisest and most carefully considered combinations of stop-gap methods lacking a uniform and systematic basis. For pending a methodical valuation of the land there are bound to be seriously unsatisfactory features in any land revenue expedients adopted.

185 The section of the nahiya (qism el nahiya) suggested earlier as the land unit of immediate topo-cadastral survey and record (v, 7, and vi, 2) should also constitute a suitable land unit for revenue purposes, if carefully selected with this further object also in view. No doubt the quality of the land within the limits of such sections will not be strictly uniform, and may frequently include salty or other uncultivable patches on the one hand, and possibly gardens or other exceptionally fertile pieces on the other. When the conditions really justify it, areas differing markedly from the general quality of the land within the section can be excluded or specially treated; but so far as practicable an average valuation of the section should be aimed at, taking the good with the

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* "Law prescribing the methods of assessment of land tax and rent due to Government." No. 40 of 1929.

PART VII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. LEGISLATION, INITIAL FEES, GENERAL CO-OPERATION

1 AND 2. LEGISLATION

185 1. I have neither thought it possible nor useful to endeavour to catalogue the many ambiguities, omissions, contradictions and redundancies of the Statute Law as it stands. The existence of serious defects in all these respects is not likely to be contested; nor that the law must be made consistent, intelligible and adequate, if the tenure of land is to be put on a clear and stable legal basis. But two conditions must be satisfied before any constructive amendment of the law can be advantageously undertaken.

In the first place we should know where we stand. In the second we should know where we are going. The first demands a careful study and authoritative statement of the existing law with a view to as complete an elucidation as possible of the points on which it is ambiguous or defective, in preparation for comprehensive clarification and amendment, as well as as a guide to those dealing with land questions in the meantime. A similar need arose in Palestine and was met by a most valuable "Statement of the Land Law of Palestine" prepared by Messrs. Goadby and Dukhan in 1927. Copies of this work were supplied to the 'Iraqi Government at the time. For although recent legislation in the two countries is different the foundation of their land law is, of course, the same. The preparation of a similar statement of the existing Land Law of el 'Iraq should be greatly facilitated by this previous work. But in el 'Iraq custom and administrative practice exercise so much wider and more powerful an influence on land dealings than the statute law, that special provision should be made to include them in an appropriate manner in such a statement. [423]

I recommend that two competent officers shall be nominated by Government to undertake this important preparatory work. I suggest that one of these shall be an officer with legal training and knowledge of the existing land law and of its administration in the Courts, and that the other shall be an officer with personal knowledge and experience of the actual practices prevailing in the holding, use and transfer of land throughout the country These officers should be instructed to make specific recommendations in due course for the progressive amendment and codification of the Land Law.

The second requisite preliminary is a decision by Government on the critical questions of principle or policy, which occasioned the present inquiry, and on points of law which are presented in the suggested statement.

2. The direct object of a general settlement of rights is the establishment of land tenure progressively throughout the country on a firm foundation of legal right determined in a judicial manner on the spot with reference to actual and physically defined parcels of land. Moreover, to perpetuate the definition and security of tenure thereby obtained, the results should be suitably incorporated in an effective record (or Land Register) which thereafter is continuously kept up-to-date. The whole

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absence of all data on which such an estimate could be dependably based. But the lessons of the Egyptian experience in the conduct of its parallel revenue settlement should not be overlooked. The Egyptian revenue settlement was initiated by Decree dated February 9th, 1879. It was not completed until 1906. The statistics of the progress achieved during these twenty-seven years are instructive. In the first nine the work was an entire failure because it was attempted without a proper basis of land survey. During the following four years it was abandoned in despair. In the next seven years a quarter of the country was done with the aid of an indifferent sectional survey. In 1898 a unified and effective national Survey was at length recognised as indispensable. In the succeeding eight years the remaining three-quarters of the country was finished, and the quality of the work improved even more than the speed, as sound technical methods were introduced and enabled improvements in the general procedure of the settlement to be adopted. It will thus be seen that owing to the initial failure to appreciate the fundamental necessity of a scientifically sound and appropriate cadastral survey, the revenue settlement of Egypt occupied twenty-seven years whereas its final progress shows that it could have been completed in ten.* It will be remembered that the Turkish legislators had also recognised before the war the necessity of a foundation of reliable cadastral survey for land tenure throughout the Ottoman Empire (iii, 3).

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Now while the land surface to be dealt with in el 'Iraq is much greater than in Egypt the individual parcels requiring investigation and settlement will be many fewer although no doubt appreciably larger in extent on the average. Thus three and one third million individual holdings were recorded during the revenue settlement of Egypt, a number which considerably exceeds the total population of el 'Iraq. On a comparable basis the number of individual holdings in the latter might be expected to be about 800,000. As the population is still so largely nomadic half a million is probably nearer the true figure. (See also ii, 4 and Table V).

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Although the fuller benefit of a settlement of rights was not practicable in Egypt at the time, owing to various reasons, the procedure was similar: but unfortunately no deductions can be drawn therefrom as to the speed of settlement of rights in el 'Iraq, because all the conditions in Egypt were so different.

4. THE MAIN PROBLEM OF TENURE

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4. As we have already seen, the land surface of el 'Iraq is more literally than in most similar cases a vast national estate. The extent of land held in private ownership (mulk) is small, and although it is intrinsically important, its legal position is clear and its regulation presents few difficulties. Probably four-fifths of the cultivable area of the country is in law fully and freely owned by the State and when cultivated held in practice under the general administrative control of its representatives. And even the legal ownership (raqaba) of the balance is vested in the State although, subject to important conditions, its usufructuary possession is held on a permanent heritable and assignable tenure. This tenure (known commonly as tapu) is that applicable under the provisions of the Land Code to all State land. The Ottoman Administration persistently sought to give effect to these provisions, but failed to do so because the successful operation of this tenure is impossible without an accompaniment of effective survey and land registration,

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* See Paper 5. Egyptian Government Commission on Registration of Title to Land. 1917-21. Government Press, Cairo.

which the Administration were unable to provide. And even if this radical defect had been remedied the application of this advanced tenure would have been premature throughout the majority of the country. So that to-day—more than half a century after the introduction of the Ottoman Land Code in the country—only a fraction of the cultivated region is somewhat uncertainly held on tapu tenure, while throughout the overwhelming balance, land is for the most part occupied and cultivated on no legal tenure at all. 1123 471

The injurious effects of the prevailing welter of insecurity and confusion both on agricultural productivity and on public order have been emphasised in the body of this report and are too well known to need repetition. The main problem of land tenure may therefore be summarised as the need to establish security and clarity of tenure everywhere by a general definition and settlement on a clear legal basis of both statutory and equitable rights to land. The broad objective should be to confirm and maintain beneficial occupation and use, whenever this is reconcilable with the equitable treatment of third parties and the just interests of the public. 185

It is very understandably urged that the proper course is to extend tapu tenure generally throughout the cultivated territory, subject of course to the requisite clarification of that tenure and its adaptation to national requirements. Excellent as the chief characteristics of tapu tenure are, and advantageous as the suggested course may prove ultimately to be, this is too ambitious a plan to be practicable at present. It is what the Ottoman Government attempted and failed to do, and the causes for their failure must be remedied before that attempt can be successfully repeated. This was implicitly recognised by the Turks themselves some years before the war in a provisional law already cited. No useful purpose will be served by examining here the prospects of practical success of this now defunct measure. But it is certain that it is beyond the present capacity of el 'Iraq to establish the detailed cadastral survey and land register of the requisite accuracy and authority. And without these accompaniments any ostensible general introduction of tapu tenure would be to grasp an attractive shadow in preference to the substance of a solid and attainable reform. To place even the admitted rights to tapu tenure on an intelligible and proper basis will be a most difficult and lengthy undertaking.

Occasional and sporadic grants of miri land in tapu tenure can, of course, be made and implemented in due course if special justification arises and special efforts are taken. But no general grant of tapu tenure can be made effective for many years to come. And while islands of secure tenure and good culture are most valuable, it is the establishment of a general reform giving security of tenure to the mass of existing landholders and cultivating tenants, which is needed to stimulate enterprise and development throughout the length and breadth of the country and thereby promote economic revival on a national scale.

A hardly less important accompanying reform is the establishment of a uniform and equitable basis for land revenue collection. Here again the Turkish administrator perseveringly sought to establish in his land tax (werko) a measure admirable in principle and conception. But here again he was unable to translate his measure effectively and generally from the Statute book to the land. And here again no far-reaching or solid success is practicable in the absence of a reliable land survey, or without a general settlement of rights and a methodical valuation of the land, as was also ultimately recognised by the Ottoman Government.

651 Government officials whose incomes are known and to a minority of the merchants, should be extended to other forms of income, and that provision should also be made for an inheritance tax. There can be no doubt that, if income tax were extended to other forms of income, a wealthy section of the community who at present derive large incomes from land ownership and other sources would contribute much more than they do at present to the national revenue. Another suggestion put forward is that customs and excise duties should be adjusted to *ad valorem* rates to bring them more into accord with post-war prices. They also recommend that the consumption or sales tax, which is at present a fixed rate of 12.5 per cent on produce sold, should be replaced by a form of sliding scale tax related both to land values and to the use made of land. In advocating this important change the reformers maintain that this would produce more revenue, would prevent existing evasions and would also serve as an incentive to increased agricultural production.

It is not within the competence of the writer to comment on the validity or practicability of revenue reforms of this kind. It is clear, however, that there is a fertile field for intelligent enquiry into methods for producing that additional budget revenue without which educational and other advance will be slower than is desirable.

311 *The Problem of Land Tenure.* While it is possible that measures such as those indicated would produce valuable additions to the national revenue, the fact remains that the main source of Iraq's future wealth must be the proper exploitation of the land. Upon this depends that higher standard of life for the bulk of the population, and the concomitant increase of wealth for both private and public use, without which the country will never be able to enjoy that abundant life which the rich natural agricultural resources of Iraq make possible. Unfortunately the country's enormous agricultural potential is greatly hindered by the system of land tenure.

423 The land tenure system of Iraq is far too complicated a subject fully to be examined in this study, but the following extract from Sir Ernest Dowson's classic report on this problem gives some idea of its effects and ramifications:

> The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity

> 423 and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, small or large, held in undisputed possession and free from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole.

423 471 Put very briefly, with the exception of small areas, mainly in Northern Iraq, together with some smaller areas of a few yet hopefully significant State-sponsored schemes of land settlement, the bulk of the cultivated land of Iraq is in the possession of large landowners. Some of them may not enjoy the holding of this land by confirmed legal right but, to all intents and purposes, they own it and derive immense incomes from it. Others, by legal process, the validity of which is disputed by land reformers, have gained possession of lands which were formerly held in common tribal use.

471 427 These landowners, or landholders, are usually sheikhs or absentee urban landlords who let the land to share-tenants through a hierarchy of lessees or agents, at the bottom of which is the landless cultivator who gets an incredibly small share of the produce of his labour. Indeed, the actual cultivator under this invidious system of share-cropping may get anything from ten per cent to thirty per cent of the produce of the land which he works, most of the remainder going to the large landowners, agents or owners of irrigation pumps. The situation may vary from landlord to landlord, and very occasionally the actual cultivator is said to share fifty per cent of the produce. In general, however, the [565] position of the Iraqi countryside is one of great extremes of wealth and poverty. The landowner may live in a sumptuous style with a town house and country palace, while the peasant cultivator may live under conditions of poverty or near-destitution.

471 423 425 It is not possible in this study to attempt more than an outline of the causes and effects of this situation. It arose partly out of ancient confusion of titles which meant that, with the break-up of the tribal system, the most powerful member of the tribe was able to appropriate for his own purposes land which was originally intended for the common good of the tribe. It is due partly to the faulty application of the Ottoman Land Code under which, because the small cultivator was not strong enough to establish his rights of title, these rights fell to the sheikh. The profits derived from the Persian Gulf grain trade in the late 19th and early 20th centuries gave a further impetus to what has been described as 'this wholesale land grabbing'. Finally, with the development

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● 423 of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators
425 were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the
small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of
[565] cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator
into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains
that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

511 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally
642 a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions,
both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of
the population remain at so low a level.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 423
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 511
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 565
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of 166
living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

sumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the 241
North. 245

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an 231
integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive
despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as [262]
camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed.

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently 241
inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained
unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer [372]
is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop
rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for
soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has [134]
materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter.

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq 423
and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central 427
Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. 241
The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

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fellah or peasant generally changes from year to year so that the cultivator has virtually no incentive to improve it. Moreover, the sharecropping system discourages the cultivation of animal fodder crops since the customary apportionment of shares between landlord and tenant does not lend itself readily to such crops. Most of the landowners themselves show little interest in improving agriculture. Enjoying a large share of the crop with the expenditure of little or no effort on their part, they have little incentive to raise output. In recent years, however, an increasing number of landlords have been displaying a direct interest in improving crops and diversifying production. Some of them have been instrumental in raising production by installing pumps for irrigation, introducing new and more remunerative crops such as cotton, and investing in agricultural machinery.

The depressed economic condition of the fellah or sharecropper undoubtedly retards progress. It undermines the health and vigor of the rural population, limits the market for industrial products and may in the long run jeopardize the stability of the social order. The sharecropper's plight is attributable both to his poor economic bargaining position and to the low productivity of agriculture. In the irrigation zone the fellah generally gets only half of the crop even though the state has provided the irrigation works; and his share falls substantially below this percentage whenever the land is irrigated by privately-owned pumps or the landlord supplies seed, draft animals or machinery. In a country where capital is scarce in relation to manpower, the ability to provide the means of production—land, seed, animals and machinery—almost invariably also carries with it the ability to exact a high proportion of the return. In Iraq this is reinforced by a law which forbids the sharecropper to leave the land as long as he is indebted to his landlord, which is generally the case. In the long run the sharecropping system could be made quite tolerable if the productivity of the land were raised; and the economic bargaining power of the sharecropper could be increased by giving him access to the means of production—seeds, animals and implements—on more favorable terms through such institutions as cooperatives. In the shorter run, however, the sharecropper's position is likely to improve only as the landowner takes steps to improve his lot in order to keep him

on the land. There is apt to be increasing pressure on the land- 423
owner to take such steps as a result of the growing opportunities 427
for alternative employment created by a large increase in public 241
expenditures on development, the expansion of industry and the opening of state lands to settlement. In fact, unless the sharecropper's status is improved, there is a great danger that there will be a continued flight of labor from the land, impairing the country's agricultural production.

The government itself has made only a modest contribution 654
to the advancement of agriculture. The Directorate-General of 242
Agriculture is only a subordinate department in the Ministry of Economics and has been severely handicapped by lack of funds and a shortage of competent agricultural officers. While it has had some success in combatting pests and diseases and in the extension of such crops as cotton and citrus fruit, too little attention has been devoted to practical research, and almost no field work has been carried out to assist cultivators in improving their crops and methods of cultivation. The expenditures of the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments were actually cut from ID 1,160,000 in 1948-49 to ID 540,000 in 1950-51 and, at the latter figure, represented only 1.8 percent of the total budget outlay. Expenditures on both agriculture and irrigation 1950-51 amounted to only 6.7 percent of the total.

Plans for the future now envisage large water storage and 654
irrigation projects to provide more water for land already in use 311
and to increase the area under cultivation and provide for the settlement of new land. These plans are in general quite sound. They will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time more stress is placed on arresting the deterioration of land already in use by extensive drainage schemes and on raising the productivity of agriculture by other means. The establishment of an efficient extension service and the provision of incentives to improve methods of cultivation are particularly important in this connection.

Expansion of Area under Cultivation: Irrigation 311

Extension of the area of land under cultivation is vitally important not only to an increase in production, but, above all, as

291 312 has led to the progressive silting and raising of rice lands, thereby pushing rice culture deeper into the marshes.

312 Finally, the Mission wishes to emphasize the importance of improved operation and maintenance of existing irrigation works. To insure proper functioning of the irrigation system the canals must be equipped with an adequate system of regulator intakes and [423] distributors. Rational distribution of water is often impeded by ancient water rights which insure some landowners a disproportionately large share. In times of scarcity the apportionment of water is often hotly disputed and subject to favoritism. The right of access to water across the lands of other farmers is inadequately insured. A sufficient number of adequately compensated irrigation officials of acknowledged probity is necessary to a fair distribution of water. They should be assisted by local councils of farmers who would gradually learn to approach the problem of equitable distribution in a cooperative spirit.

Lack of maintenance has been a serious problem in the past. To facilitate maintenance, irrigation systems should be equipped from the very beginning with such works as roads along canals, canal crossings for people and livestock, water-holes and washing places. To insure adequate operation and maintenance in the future, the Mission recommends that the annual budget of the Irrigation Department, which has averaged only ID 270,000 over the last ten years, should be increased progressively to about ID 1,000,000. The technical supervisory and planning staff also needs to be strengthened

The Rain-fed Zone

Except for some areas west-northwest of Kirkuk and the possibility of ultimately irrigating part of the Erbil plain with the water stored behind the Bekhme dam, large-scale irrigation schemes for the North do not appear feasible. Lack of suitable dam sites and topographical difficulties militate against such schemes. Smaller projects, utilizing the water of small streams, springs or wells are possible, however, and these should not be neglected in favor of the more striking, larger schemes. In many parts small streams and springs are already being used, but with direction and stimulus provided by the government these could be improved and many

TABLE 2

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CULTIVABLE LAND, CROPPED LAND AND LAND IN AGRICULTURE USE
(in millions of donums)

CULTIVABLE AREA		48.1
Irrigation zone	32.1	
Rain-fed zone	16.0	
AREA ACTUALLY IN CROPS		11.1
By area		
Irrigation zone	7.6	
Rain-fed zone	3.5	
By type of crop		
Winter	8.4	
Summer	1.9	
Orchards	0.8	
AREA UNDER CULTIVATION		17.5

These figures would indicate that the area under cultivation, 311
taking into account the assumption that almost half of the area devoted to winter crops is normally left fallow, is only about 36 percent of the total cultivable area. In the rain-fed zone the area under cultivation could theoretically be more than doubled; and in the irrigation zone it could be almost tripled. Unquestionably these figures give a somewhat exaggerated impression for it is likely that the criteria employed in classifying land as cultivable have been rather liberal, but there is little doubt that the area under cultivation can be greatly extended. What would be required in detail to put this additional cultivable land in actual use is not known, but, in the irrigation zone, water and drainage are undoubtedly the prime prerequisites while, in the rain-fed zone, more manpower and machinery may be the principal requirements.

Forms of Land Tenure

Land is held under a complicated system of tenure which has 423
given rise to much confusion and conflict. In accordance with tra- 471
ditional legal concepts the state has retained the ultimate legal title to nearly all the available land. Absolute private ownership, known as *mamloukah* or *mulk,* is confined to urban property and orchards. Rights to the permanent usufructuary possession of a large proportion of state or *miri* land have been acquired by private

423 471 individuals, however, under conditions which are virtually indistinguishable from full private ownership, since the holdings may be sold, mortgaged or transferred to successors. In the past, claims to land were established in most cases quite informally without the benefit of full legal sanction, i.e., by simply occupying the land. Tribal lands were generally regarded as being held in common. As, however, the tribes were converted from nomadic pursuits to settled agriculture, the sheikhs and sub-sheikhs of the tribe gradually established a claim to such lands as their own property and thus became landlords, with their tribesmen as sharecropping tenants.

423 In the 19th century the Turkish government sought to establish a single legal system of tenure, known as *tapu,* but in the end this effort only compounded the confusion. There were no systematic grants of *tapu* tenure. Grants were generally made without any examination of conflicting claims and were used as a means of rewarding the favored few. The grants that were made at that time to the Sadun clan and a few other influential persons in Muntafiq province remain contested to this day by the actual occupiers of the land. With the introduction of *tapu* tenure many village areas in the North apparently were registered in whole or in part as the personal possession of local notables or *aghas* who in the past had acted as tax farmers and served generally as intermediaries between the government and the cultivators. In the twentieth century a further complication was added by the rapid introduction of pump irrigation. City merchants financially able to buy pumps entered into arrangements with occupiers of *miri* land for the supply of water against specified shares in the crop, thus creating new claims to land without resolving the fate of any pre-existing claims.

423 654 Following a study of this question by Sir Ernest Dowson, a British land expert, the government decided in 1932 to end the confusion by inaugurating a cadastral survey to be carried out by a number of so-called Land Settlement Committees. The law of 1932 as well as the law which replaced it in 1938 recognized the following types of land tenure:

- *Mamloukah* or *mulk*—land held in absolute private ownership.
- *Matroukah*—land reserved for public purposes.
- *Mawqufa* or *waqf*—land which is administered in trust (1) for

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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the benefit of religious institutions by the state Awqaf Administration, or (2) for the benefit of private persons by *mutawallis* appointed by religious courts. This type of *waqf* must be distinguished from so-called untrue *waqf*, namely property from which the taxes or revenue were in the past assigned to religious institutions by the Turkish government.

Miri tapu—land held in permanent tenure from the state under conditions enabling the holder to sell or mortgage it and leave it to his successors. Proof of such tenure may be supplied by documentary evidence or by factual evidence that the land has been used productively by the holder or his predecessor for 10 years during which no land rent was paid or that it has been planted with trees meeting specified conditions.

Miri lazmah—land held under generally the same conditions as *miri tapu*, but with the stipulation that the government may veto the transfer of such land if it tends to disturb the peace, a precaution designed to prevent, where necessary, the transfer of tribal lands to people outside the tribe. *Lazmah* grants are made upon proof that a person has made productive use of the land within the preceding 15 years.

Miri sirf—land, particularly vacant or idle land, definitely acknowledged as belonging de facto and de jure to the state.

Although *tapu* and *lazmah* land are still recognized as *miri* or state land, they are in fact hardly distinguishable from full private ownership. In theory, possession of these lands may lapse if they are not productively used for three successive years in the case of *lazmah* and for four years in the case of *tapu*, but this apparently happens rarely, if at all. Prior to 1939 holders of such land were generally required to make to the state a payment for rent and water rights which was lower for *tapu* than for *lazmah* land, but in that year these assessments were abolished in return for amortization of their capitalized value over a period of 10 years. With the abolition of these payments there now remains very little distinction between *tapu* and *lazmah*.

The cadastral survey has now been completed for about half of the land in the 14 provinces in Iraq. The progress achieved is set forth in the table below. It will be noted that 61 percent of the total land surveyed and 51 percent of the cultivable land sur-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 3

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LAND CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TYPES OF TENURE BY CADASTRAL SURVEY*
(in donums)

	Cultivable	Uncultivable	Total
Total area to be classified	—	—	107,045,725
Total area classified by Feb. 8, 1951	38,188,575	12,268,459	50,457,034
Mamlukah (mulk)	150,601	22,366	172,967
Matroukah	9,296	1,686,912	1,696,208
Mawqufa (waqf)	549,198	36,538	585,736
Miri tapu	8,370,595	698,987	9,069,582
Miri lazma	7,371,720	485,291	7,857,011
Miri sirf	21,737,165	9,338,365	31,075,530

* For fuller details, see Table I in the appendix.

veyed has been definitely adjudged to be *miri sirf*. Only a small part of the land is actually being exploited today. About 1.6 million donums is let by the state on triennial leaseholds which may be renewed once by the same holder. Virtually all of the land in Amara province is also leased out by the state. Here, however, it is held under virtually permanent leaseholds by sheikhs who have been rewarded by rather large tracts of land in return for maintaining order and performing other services in this province which has a somewhat unruly past.[2] The remainder of cultivable *miri sirf* land is in theory still available for exploitation. Presumably most of the better and more accessible lands have been alienated to private holders, and that remaining to the state is in large part relatively poor, inaccessible, or not susceptible of irrigation. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a large reservoir of state land which can still be opened to cultivation, particularly if irrigation is provided.

425 A feature of the 1932 law inaugurating the cadastral survey was the introduction of *lazmah* tenure. This type of tenure was designed to recognize prescriptive rights to tribal lands. In practice, the sheikhs rather than the tribesmen have benefited from this provision of the law. *Lazmah* grants could be obtained on proof

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[2] In all there are 290 leaseholds of cultivated state land in Amara of which 13 are between 10,000 and 35,000 donums, 10 between 5,000 and 10,000 donums and 95 between 1,000 and 5,000 donums.

that the land was cultivated and a crop produced in any one year, 425
and the land settlement officers, who have sometimes been inexperienced and subject to influence, have on occasion accepted even more tenuous evidence as proof of a prescriptive claim. In this way a large portion of state land has been alienated to sheikhs and other influential persons, and the number of large landowners has multiplied.

Distribution of Land

Complete data on the distribution of landholdings are not 423
available. For the area covered by the cadastral survey, it is possible to classify private landholdings into various categories according to size. Such a classification, given in the accompanying table, shows that holdings of 1000 donums or less account for only 15.7 percent of the area. This is indicative of the small number of peasant proprietors. On the other hand, holdings of over 1,000 donums accounted for 67.1 percent of the total of privately owned land, while those of more than 10,000 donums comprised 24.3 percent of the area. Moreover, the importance of large holdings is undoubtedly underestimated by these figures. The cadastral survey has proceeded by areas known as *muqata'as.* In a number of cases landowners have holdings in several *muqata'as,* but these have been registered as separate holdings. Thus, according to the cadastral survey, there is only one holding in Kut in excess of 100,000 donums (namely 174,251 donums), although it is generally reported that there are actually several holdings well over 300,000 donums.

The accompanying table indicates that the highest proportion of small holdings is apparently in Basra, Dulaim, Kirkuk and Suleimaniya. The provinces of Kut, Amara, Mosul, Diyala and Kerbela have the highest percentage of large holdings.

The Sharecropping System

Although the amount of land cultivated directly by the land- 427 244
owner has increased since the last war with the use of modern machinery, particularly in Mosul and Baghdad provinces, the great bulk of the land is tilled for the landholder by peasants or fellahin against a share in the crop. The sharecropper is not a tenant in the sense that this word is generally used in the western world. He has no discretion in the use of the land and does not lease a

TABLE 4

Distribution of Private Landholdings According to Cadastral Survey

(*mulk*, *tapu* and *lazmah* holdings)

Province	Percentage of Total Area by Cadastral Survey	Percentage of Area Covered by Cadastral Survey in Holdings of:									
		1-100 donums	101-500 donums	501-1000 donums	1001-10,000 donums	10,001-100,000 donums	100,001-200,000 donums	less than 501 donums	than less 1001 donums	over 1000 donums	over 10,000 donums
Mosul	64.2	17.1	4.1	2.8	48.8	27.2	—	21.2	24.0	76.0	27.2
Erbil	31.7	19.9	12.7	4.7	57.4	5.3	—	32.6	37.3	62.7	5.3
Kirkuk	44.4	32.4	13.9	5.0	29.8	18.9	—	46.3	51.3	48.7	18.9
Suleimaniya	14.3	24.7	18.1	8.9	42.4	5.9	—	42.8	51.7	48.3	5.9
Diyala	37.9	4.1	9.8	11.3	61.3	13.5	—	13.9	25.2	74.8	13.5
Dulaim	46.6	24.0	36.3	8.2	19.0	12.5	—	60.3	68.5	31.5	12.5
Baghdad	68.7	13.8	17.1	10.7	37.5	20.9	—	30.9	41.6	58.4	20.9
Kut	100.0	1.8	5.4	4.4	35.7	45.7	7.0	7.2	11.6	88.4	52.7
Hilla	94.7	18.4	13.7	9.4	41.0	17.5	—	32.1	41.5	58.5	17.5
Kerbela	42.5	15.7	7.6	1.6	43.8	31.3	—	23.3	24.9	75.1	31.3
Diwaniya	26.2	16.4	19.0	9.9	34.1	20.6	—	35.4	45.3	54.7	20.6
Basra	20.6	25.5	16.5	6.8	43.9	7.3	—	42.0	48.8	51.2	7.3
Amara	37.7	2.9	2.7	5.0	13.6	75.8	—	5.6	10.6	89.4	75.8
Total	50.0	15.7	11.0	6.2	42.8	23.2	1.1	26.7	32.9	67.1	24.3

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI
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TABLE I-A

Land Classified According to Types of Tenure by Cadastral Survey up to February 8, 1951

CULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	Total
Baghdad	7,906,800	69,620	6,588	81,360	319,171	1,037,157	3,324,500	4,838,398
Kut	6,208,325	66	—	203	618,974	1,595,466	2,535,439	4,750,149
Kerbela	2,447,600	11	—	2,319	84,652	19,488	23,958	130,429
Basra	4,908,400	63,067	—	15,181	84,576	3,041	61,608	227,473
Amara	7,496,800	—	—	22	7,991	47,043	1,914,865	1,969,921
Diwaniya	5,981,600	28	92	—	187,791	840,588	307,405	1,335,905
Dulaim	18,428,400	6,669	—	13,840	123,181	432,201	3,579,990	4,155,882
Erbil	7,217,200	10	—	645	786,739	817,853	302,540	1,907,787
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	16	—	190	355,373	2,705	51,793	411,076
Mosul	20,129,200	56	913	170,914	2,979,610	1,099,525	7,775,652	12,026,669
Kirkuk	8,132,400	200	1,615	109,878	1,372,423	310,935	991,127	2,786,179
Hilla	2,100,000	3,489	37	27,976	573,148	758,091	262,092	1,624,834
Diyala	6,438,000	7,369	50	126,670	876,964	407,637	605,193	2,023,874
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	150,601	9,296	549,198	8,370,595	7,371,720	21,737,165	38,178,575

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1852 MHI Iraq MHI

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TABLE 1-B

LAND CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TYPES OF TENURE BY CADASTRAL SURVEY UP TO FEBRUARY 8, 1951

UNCULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	Total
Baghdad	7,906,800	14,951	108,756	9,010	41,592	71,131	349,126	594,567
Kut	6,208,325	20	54,148	192	127,504	152,311	1,124,000	1,458,176
Kerbela	2,447,600	96	3,872	160	26,391	1,637	868,073	900,229
Basra	4,908,400	4,447	21,372	441	6,613	113	748,587	781,575
Amara	7,496,800	258	9,271	57	202	7,595	836,648	854,032
Diwaniya	5,981,600	8	23,924	2	31,578	98,093	75,474	229,081
Dulaim	18,428,400	435	81,074	550	7,490	26,693	4,320,580	4,436,823
Erbil	7,217,200	517	202,888	813	9,326	5,970	162,132	381,646
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	15	117,982	2	1,250	—	12,873	132,113
Mosul	20,129,200	116	354,692	4,442	213,207	4,274	324,210	900,942
Kirkuk	8,132,400	135	621,893	2,503	42,381	632	160,035	827,570
Hilla	2,100,000	182	37,821	3,158	65,532	65,442	192,575	364,711
Diyala	6,438,000	1,186	49,218	15,206	125,927	51,408	164,050	406,996
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	22,366	1,686,912	36,538	698,897	485,291	9,338,365	12,268,459

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE I-C

LAND CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TYPES OF TENURE BY CADASTRAL SURVEY UP TO FEBRUARY 8, 1951

TOTAL, CULTIVABLE AND UNCULTIVABLE LAND

(in donums)

Province	Total Area of Province	Area Classified						Grand Total
		Mamlukah (Mulk)	Matrukah	Mawqufa (Waqf)	Miri Tapu	Miri Lazmah	Miri Sirf	
Baghdad	7,906,800	84,571	115,344	90,370	360,763	1,108,288	3,673,626	5,432,965
Kut	6,208,325	86	54,148	395	746,478	1,747,771	3,659,439	6,208,325
Kerbela	2,447,600	107	3,872	2,479	111,043	21,125	891,931	1,030,658
Basra	4,908,400	67,514	21,372	15,622	91,289	3,154	810,195	1,009,048
Amara	7,496,800	258	9,271	79	8,193	54,638	2,751,513	2,823,953
Diwaniya	5,981,600	36	24,016	2	219,369	938,681	382,879	1,564,986
Dulaim	18,428,400	7,104	81,074	14,390	130,671	458,894	7,900,570	8,592,705
Erbil	7,217,200	527	202,888	1,458	796,065	823,823	464,672	2,289,433
Suleimaniya	3,805,600	31	117,982	192	356,623	2,705	64,666	543,189
Mosul	20,129,200	172	355,605	175,356	3,192,817	1,103,799	8,099,862	12,927,611
Kirkuk	8,132,400	335	623,508	112,381	1,414,804	311,567	1,115,162	3,613,749
Hilla	2,100,000	3,671	37,858	31,134	638,680	823,532	454,667	1,989,545
Diyala	6,438,000	8,555	49,268	141,876	2,136,892	459,045	769,243	2,430,870
Muntafiq	5,832,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	107,032,725	172,967	1,696,208	585,736	9,069,582	7,857,011	31,075,530	50,447,034

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along the banks of main and secondary canals although roads 3/2 greatly facilitate inspection and maintenance. The facing of the canals adjoining the control structures is often too short for effective protection of both the canals and the control works. The turbulent water coming up against the earthen embankments may then undermine the embankments or even the control structures themselves. Brick, which lacks adequate resistance to shock and erosion, has sometimes been used as a construction material where concrete or precast concrete blocks would have been definitely preferable. In the future, it might also be desirable to try gabions of iron-wire net, weighted with stones and coarse gravel, in facing canals. These have given excellent and cheap protection against erosion in some countries.

Maintenance is also made more costly by failure to provide originally enough canal crossings for livestock and people, as well as places for washing and drinking. Under such conditions canal banks inevitably deteriorate with resulting leaks and the creation of pools of stagnant water. Crossings, which for the most part can be very simple in construction, should be installed near the villages and at points frequented by cattle. Paved fords will generally be best for cattle since they will provide facilities for drinking at the same time. There is also a need to regulate road crossings of small canals and ditches. Such crossings, which are built by the landowners, are often too short and constructed so poorly that considerable water escapes and the approaches to the crossings are reduced to quagmires.

The operation of the irrigation systems, involving the delivery of water to the actual users, could be considerably improved. Fair distribution is undoubtedly made difficult by chronic shortages of water. Whenever water is short, its distribution tends to be hotly disputed. Under such circumstances the influential landowner is [661] often successful in bringing pressure to bear on the poorly-paid irrigation official who is in charge of distribution. Sometimes landowners resort to more direct action by building temporary dams across canals in order to divert more water to their land. Equitable 3/2 distribution is also impeded by old water rights which are attached 42 ? to individual land parcels, particularly in the Diyala River Valley, and are transferred with such property. They often confer a right

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423 to use a quantity of water out of proportion to the amount of land to be irrigated; and in times of water scarcity they must be taken into account in rationing the available supply even though an objective appraisal of relative requirements might produce quite a different distribution.

312 A larger supply of water would, of course, minimize the difficulties of distribution set forth above, but in the long run it is also vitally important that economies be effected in the amount of water used. The provision of drainage facilities and the installation of an adequate amount of regulators on canals will certainly bring about substantial economies of this character. The cultivators in Iraq, however, have for many years been accustomed to use water rather lavishly; only demonstration will convince them that they
312 can safely manage with a smaller supply. It has already been
651 pointed out that the irrigation duty is very low compared to that in many other countries. For flow-irrigated lands it is about 16,950 masharas gross (equivalent to 7,200 masharas in crops); for land irrigated by pumps from canals, 19,500; and for that irrigated by pumps from rivers, 26,200. Pump-irrigated lands have a somewhat higher duty because they are generally better drained and therefore less salted and because the cost of pumping encourages economy in the use of water. As far as the Mission is aware, the problem of
312 raising the irrigation duty has not been systematically studied. The Mission recommends strongly that fields be set aside in each irrigation system for the purpose of determining through practical experimentation over a number of years the optimum quantity of water to be supplied to each crop. Such experiments should be carried out under the joint direction of the Agriculture and Irrigation Departments.

In the future it would be desirable to associate the landholders in each irrigation area as far as possible with the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. Irrigation should be a truly
[476] cooperative venture. The Mission understands that councils of landowners already exist in some districts, notably along the Diyala, to assist irrigation officials in the distribution of water at times of shortage. Such councils might well be organized in all districts and with the broader function of advising on all problems of maintenance and distribution. They could sponsor the experi-

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7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

312 ments in the best use of water mentioned earlier and could assist in disseminating the findings. They would be an important means of developing the concept of common responsibility for the efficient operation and upkeep of irrigation systems and might ultimately serve also to disseminate information on agriculture.

312 671 423 The legal situation with respect to water rights and the construction, maintenance and operation of irrigation and flood-control works is defined by Articles 1234 to 1238 of the Mejelle, or Ottoman Civil Code, and Law No. 23 of 1923 and its successive amendments. Repeated changes in this legislation have made it difficult to determine the validity of certain provisions. It would be desirable to codify and clarify the legislation and, in the course of such a review, to eliminate some of its defects. It would be advisable, for instance, to ensure a right of passage for canals across the property of third parties with compensation fixed by the Irrigation Department in accordance with defined criteria. At present such a right of passage is recognized but with the proviso that the interested party must buy or lease the necessary land, which, in practice, may lead to extortionate terms. There is also a need for a review of old water rights. While presumably such rights cannot be abolished, the right to use water might well be brought into closer accord with the amount of land to be irrigated.

312 647 The law makes the Directorate General for Irrigation in the Ministry of Communications and Public Works responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation and flood-control schemes. In 1949 the irrigation services had a staff of 1,330 persons, classified approximately as follows:

Engineers	26
Assistant engineers	20
Overseers	94
Office personnel	250
Bund personnel	820
Specialists	120

On the whole, there is an insufficient number of competent, experienced engineers; and pay scales are inadequate to retain able men in a service which often entails considerable hardship. The staff in the provinces is generally not large enough to cope with technical problems along with the many administrative questions

timber, at least 5,000 square kilometers in the valleys of the main rivers in the north ought to be afforested by means of irrigated plantations of quick-growing species such as poplar, eucalyptus, tamarisk, ash, plane and shisham. Such forests should be able to furnish timber in growing amounts in 15 to 20 years. 313

It will be at least equally important, however, to plant trees in irrigated plains of central and southern Iraq. The ultimate goal should be to devote at least 10 percent of the irrigated areas to forestry in the form of farmers' woodlots, plantings along roads and canals, windbreaks and shelter belts. In the new settlement areas farmers might well be required to plant a specified area in trees. Measures such as these will make timber available in the immediate vicinity where it is sorely needed.

The Development Board has recognized the need for some additional expenditure on forestry by tentatively setting aside ID 250,000 for this purpose in its five-year program. It is urged that this amount be raised to a total of ID 750,000 over the next five years. More could probably not be spent in this period because staffing and organization will take time and attention. In the ensuing five-year period, however, the amount might well be doubled.

XIII. Settlement of New Land

In the future much of the increase in agricultural production will inevitably come from the settlement of new land. Iraq is one of the few Middle Eastern countries which have large reserves of cultivable land. While the official estimates, which indicate that the area under cultivation can be almost tripled, may be questioned, there is no doubt that there are vast areas both in the rain-fed zone and in the irrigation zone which can be put to the plow. When water from the Habbaniya and Dokan reservoirs becomes available, for example, it will be possible to extend the area under cultivation from about 11 to 15 million donums; and if the Bekhme dam is built, still additional areas can be irrigated. 311

The way in which these new lands are settled and developed will in many respects be critical for the future of Iraq. If reserved 423

423 for settlement by small-holders, they will make a significant contribution to the social and political stability of Iraq. They may make any strong demand for radical land reform unlikely in the areas now already under cultivation. If developed with the enlightened guidance of the government, the new settlements may ultimately furnish striking demonstrations of the value of more advanced techniques in agriculture and animal husbandry as well as in social organization.

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423 Under a law approved by the Parliament in 1951 land recognized as government-owned *(miri sirf)* in the cadastral survey will apparently be reserved in the main for settlement by small-holders. However, land which can only be irrigated by high-lift pumps can still be granted in tracts up to 5,000 donums to individual holders. Projects for the development of *miri sirf* land are to be drawn up and carried out by the Development Board. Selection of the settlers and administration of the finished projects will be the responsibility of a committee headed by an official with the status of a Director General. Two or three other members will be appointed by the Council of Ministers. The area of each project will be a minimum of 2,000 donums in mountainous lands, 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated lands and 80,000 donums in the rain-fed region. Each settler will be assigned up to 20 donums in the mountainous areas, 100 donums in flow-irrigated areas, 200 donums in pump-irrigated and 400 donums in rain-fed lands.

Under the law every settler must agree to refrain from granting his rights in the land to others and from injuring his fellow settlers in any way, to follow the committee's instructions with respect to the cultivation of the land and the planting of a garden, and to build a house in accordance with plans prepared by the [425] committee. If he fulfills this agreement, he receives title to his allotment after 10 years without payment. For a further period of 10 years he has no right to alienate it or mortgage it except to the Agricultural Bank.

The law does not confine the distribution of land to qualified and experienced farmers. In fact, it specifies that up to 20 percent of the land in each project shall be distributed to retired army and police officers, soldiers and policemen who have served at least four years, and graduates of agricultural schools, provided the

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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committee is convinced of "their agricultural capabilities". Under the same condition the committee is also to distribute up to 25 percent of the land to retired civil servants who have served at least eight years and to unemployed graduates of elementary, secondary and religious schools.

While the general intent of this law will meet with general endorsement, several of its provisions might well be reconsidered. First of all, it appears doubtful that the inclusion of the beneficiaries described in the preceding paragraph will advance the basic purpose of the law—namely, to establish a class of independent small farmers who till their own land. Most of these types of beneficiaries will have neither the ability nor the inclination to do the actual farming themselves. They will bring in others to do their work and may even become absentee landlords. Under such circumstances the evils of "petty landlordism" will tend to creep in.

Secondly, the size of the plots to be assigned to each settler seems in some cases to be too large. Fundamentally the allotment should not be bigger than that which can be managed by the average farm family without outside assistance. The size will, of course, depend on the machinery, tools and draft animals which can be placed at the settler's disposal from the very beginning. It is improbable, however, that a single family will be able to handle more than 100 donums. If a larger allotment is necessary in the rain-fed zone in view of the uncertain yields resulting from irregular rainfall, a special effort may have to be made to organize cooperatives to own and operate the machinery needed to till such units. The proposed assignment of 200 donums in pump-irrigated areas is presumably based on the assumption that some private person will provide the needed pumps against a substantial share in the crop, thus requiring each farmer to have a larger plot of land for a decent livelihood. Now that the government is likely to have ample financial means, there would seem to be no reason why it cannot either install and operate the pumping facilities itself for a nominal charge or finance the cooperative ownership and operation of such pumps.

Thirdly, the provision enabling settlers to acquire land without any payment whatsoever is open to question. In principle it is inequitable that no payment should be required for these exten-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

654 423 sive benefits, particularly in relationship to those who are not fortunate enough to be selected as beneficiaries. Moreover, the value of the benefits conferred may be all the more appreciated if some charge, which need not be burdensome, is made for them.

Fourthly, it may be desirable to reconsider the provision exempting the areas irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution in accordance with the law. Apparently this provision was also dictated by the belief that the requisite pumping facilities would need to be provided by private investment and that such investment was unlikely ~~to be~~ forthcoming unless a comparatively large grant of land was made for development by high-lift pumping. In the future, however, public capital should be made available for the installation of such pumping facilities.

Finally, the safeguards against alienation of the land may need further strengthening. After the two consecutive periods of 10 years each, during which these safeguards would apply, it may still be desirable for the government to retain an option to purchase any of such land offered for sale. In this way it would be possible to prevent, if necessary, the gradual acquisition of excessively large landholdings in these newly developed areas.

A brief comment might be made regarding the settlement possibilities in the rain-fed zone. Much of the land available for such settlement may be submarginal from the standpoint of rainfall. Care must be taken, therefore, not to invest too much in the development of the lands the yield of which will be highly speculative. It is noted that the Department of Agriculture has drawn up an ambitious scheme involving the settlement of 1,000,000 donums and the establishment of 50 villages in northwestern Mosul near Balad Sinjar. There are indications, however, that the rainfall in this region may be insufficient to permit settlers to earn a good livelihood. If attempts are made to carry out this scheme, it is suggested that small-scale tests first be undertaken over a number of years.

654 423 241 166 The law for the development of *miri sirf* lands which has been discussed at length above is basically modelled on the 1945 act under which the Dujaila settlement was established in south-central Iraq near Kut. During the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled in this area on 100 donum plots allotted from

state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is pre- 654
scribed. Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and 423 ●
barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums 244
are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the 166
older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted.

On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously [511] successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines.

The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified [344] success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

654 423 On the new settlements the government will have a unique opportunity to improve on the Dujaila project. To ensure that it becomes a model project, the planning of each settlement should be carried out in close cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry charged with agriculture. There must be an integrated plan with appropriate provision for public health, schools and adult education, agricultural extension, cooperatives and the like.

000 XIV. Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use

The program outlined in this monograph does not involve large expenditures. Detailed estimates of the cost involved will need to be worked out, but it is unlikely that total expenditures over the next five years will be far from ID 7,500,000. The largest outlays—ID 2,900,000 and ID 1,450,000 respectively—would probably be for grain storage facilities and additional capital for the Agricultural Bank. Not much more than ID 250,000 may be needed for new tobacco warehouses. The continuing contribution to the Agricultural Machinery Administration has been assessed at ID 250,000, but more money would be required if plans to borrow from the International Bank for new equipment do not materialize. On forestry, probably not more than ID 750,000 could be spent in the initial five-year period. An arbitrary allowance of ID 500,000 might be made for financial incentives. The remainder of the total outlay would, however, really be the most important, for it would go, except for some miscellaneous projects, to expand and strengthen the agricultural and animal husbandry services which are vital to the future of Iraq.

The improvement of agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry along the lines indicated requires an energetic organizational effort by an agency well staffed and vigorously directed. Within the existing governmental organization in Iraq, agriculture and animal husbandry are not given sufficient importance. These subjects should not be handled by subordinate departments in the Ministry of Economics but by a separate Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

II. Rural Communities

About one third of the people live in towns and cities; of the 162
remainder, a small proportion are nomads and the bulk live in 361
villages. In terms of population, therefore, the villages are the more predominant type of community. Although the distinction between a village and a small municipality is, as already noted, somewhat arbitrary, even the smallest municipalities are centers of local administration and have certain facilities of a higher standard than the villages. The distinction will, in any event, serve for present purposes.

Virtually all the rural population live in villages, isolated dwellings being very rare. Landowners, in fact, frequently count their fellahin by villages. Except for the extreme northwest, where there are seminomadic pastoral tribes who live in settled communities for only part of the year, the inhabitants of the villages are mainly cultivators. A few members of the community may have other occupations such as the tending of sheep and goats, the keeping of small shops and coffee houses or the building and repairing of huts. There are, also, villages where a considerable number of the people are engaged in handicrafts (e.g. weaving) but these are rare.

In the North, stone is generally available and is the common- 342
est material for buildings, while in the South and the Center, mud 333
is the usual material. The mud plaster of walls is reinforced with straw or cow dung to minimize the washing of clay in the mortar when it rains and to prevent temperature cracks. Where the climate is drier and palm leaves or reeds are available, especially in the marshes and palm belt of the South, these materials are more extensively used.

Another feature which distinguishes the North from the rest 361
of the country is the greater permanence of the villages. The main reason is probably that there is a much older tradition of settled cultivation than exists in the recently irrigated areas. Not only are there more small-holders, who would naturally have a close [423]
association with their land, but the fellahin also appear to have
A GREATER SECURITY OF TENURE.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312 water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423 are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427 There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24 per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [241] on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators. This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423 disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433 perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185 which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464 reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large 166 farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the [161] cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

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423 433 185 464 166 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of the low density of population, an improvement in the water-supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. [452] An Agricultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

231 439 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 654 185 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

511 fited the Bahrein pearl diver; it has produced richer merchants in that district. In the same way the land-owners of Mesopotamia are past all comparison richer than the land-owners of the oases in Arabia but the actual cultivators of the soil are far worse off. Improved conditions and an increased return on each man's work have not benefited them at all.

● 423 427 511 Their[1] condition is pitiful. The gardens are owned by men who live far away in distance and farther away still in sympathy. The Sheikh of Kuwait owns large gardens in this district; indeed his principal wealth is reputed to be invested there. The same is true of Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah, the Persian governor for southern Arabistan. Many of the gardens are owned by rich men who live in Basra and Baghdad. Their affairs are administered by a local agent, whose sole interest lies in driving as hard a bargain as possible with the unfortunate cultivator. If an unfavorable year comes, there is no easily available judge or ruler to modify the contract as in Arabia. As a result the gardeners are bitterly oppressed. Men are practically forced into bankruptcy in order to live up to oppressive contracts during a hard year. Competition is keen, and in these large communities where the gardens stretch for scores of miles and where it is not easy to turn to other occupations, where above all there is no public sentiment to appeal to and no ruler with Arab ideas of justice to frown upon the rich oppressor, it is possible to push the gardener down very close to the limit of bare subsistence. His clothes are in tatters. His food is poor. His house is wretched. Above all he is a discouraged and hard-pressed individual with a hopeless and despairing outlook on life.

[1] [Date gardeners -- Analyst]

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

501 erable skill to navigate. They are capable of great speed and are driven either by a sail or by oars as the occasion requires. To a stranger they seem very unstable, but the Marsh Arab, who has practically lived in them ever since he was a baby, finds them abundantly stable and perfectly safe.

342 From a distance the houses occupied by these people are very picturesque. The reeds that grow in great abundance in the marshes of Lower Mesopotamia are gathered and when dry are tied in great bundles perhaps two feet in diameter. They are ten to fifteen feet tall or even more, and two bundles tied together at the tops are bent over to form an arch. Each of these arches forms one of the ribs of the house. They are placed every four to six feet, giving an air of solidity and dignity to the structure that is most unusual for this sort of simple architecture. Over these ribs a mat roof is constructed which is surprisingly tight even in the heaviest rains. The houses vary in size, and the largest ones, which serve as guest halls for the sheikhs and the rich, may be seventy-five feet long and twenty feet broad.

● 423
621 This agricultural district is peculiar in that while it has a settled community engaged in agricultural pursuits, there is no private ownership of land. The Marsh Arabs form a group almost untouched by Europeans. In the one district we visited all land is owned by the government, in this case a sheikh far removed from the district.
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651] The only tax that he levies is a moderate rental for the land.
425 Apparently there is little difficulty in getting land; at least no one complained of any trouble of that sort, nor does there seem to be any difficulty in keeping the same plot of land indefinitely if the cultivator wishes to do so.
000 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
Iraq MH1

I Unlike Egypt, Iraq is a sparsely populated country relative
433 to its land resource. Yet we find there the same conditions of
471 landlessness, and low levels of living among the peasant folk.
311 More serious still, we find in that country a great agricultural
M potential which is threatened by the prevailing destructive system
471 of land tenure.

433 This fertile land of the ancient Tigris and Euphrates rivers
311 has a total potentially cultivable area (mostly by means of expanded irrigation) of some 25 million acres. The present area that is under cultivation each year, however, is less than 6 million acres. There is no doubt that capital and technical aid from the West will make it possible for Iraq to realize this tremendous potential. The serious question, however, is whether development will be attempted on the present shaky foundations of feudalism, absentee ownership, and sharecropping, or on the sounder and more stable foundations of a thriving rural community that is emancipated through its ownership or control of the land. The answer, one way or the other, will be of grave consequence to the future of Iraq.

I The following is a brief summary of the situation as it now
423 exists. Less than 0.5 percent of the land is owned privately in
427 fee simple. About 36 percent is state domain which has been
471 leased out more or less permanently to individuals. Over 58
M percent is held directly and fully by the state, and is leased out
423 on a yearly basis. These figures indicate clearly that the fate
427 of the land resource has not yet been fully decided as in the case
471 of Egypt. The major portion of it is still in the hands of the state, which could dispose of it either in favor of the landless cultivator and tribesmen, or in favor of the absentee owner and the tribal chief.

The land that is now under cultivation (whether privately owned or leased from the state) is predominantly in the hands or under the control of the semi-feudal tribal chief and the large owner from the city. In either case, absenteeism prevails. The peasants, consisting of village folk and semi-settled tribal people, are in the majority of cases landless sharecroppers. They raise crops and receive a share ranging from 20 to 50 percent of the produce, depending upon whether they supply the seed, the

15: Tannous N, G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
Iraq MH1
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equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

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There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

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Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

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On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1

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distributed reclaimed state domain among the peasants. During the past few years the Ministry of Social Affairs, under energetic and progressive leadership, has been increasingly and effectively sponsoring the cause of the peasant. Among other things, it has proposed draft laws aimed at land reform and at improved tenancy terms. In July 1950, the Egyptian Parliament passed one of these bills, stipulating that estate owners should provide tenants with certain housing and health facilities, and with other services. During the last two years certain deputies have proposed two definite draft laws for land reform in Parliament. Similar proposals have been made by other responsible leaders. All of them aim straight at the heart of the problem — stipulating the distribution of state domain among peasants, the restriction of the size of holdings within minimum and maximum limits, the extension of credit to the new small owner, the protection of peasant property, the improvement of tenancy terms, etc.

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A similar consciousness of the magnitude of the problem and the grave consequences it might entail has arisen in Iraq. As far back as 1932 a comprehensive program of land survey and registration was initiated and has been in operation since. At the end of 1947 about 20 million acres (close to 20 percent of the total area of the country) were surveyed and classified. This program constitutes a basic move in the right direction, as it results in clearing the great confusion over title claims.

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In 1945 the Iraqi Parliament passed a bill (Law No. 23) authorizing the Government to distribute state domain among landless peasants or tribesmen on the basis of small private ownership. It was a small beginning as the application of the law was restricted to one specific area, the Dujaylah lands, in the Kut Liwa south of Baghdad. Some 180,000 acres were put under irrigation and divided into plots of about 60 acres each for distribution to farming families. After a probationary period of 10 years under government supervision, the farmer can acquire complete ownership of the land. At the beginning of 1947 about 400 cultivators were settled on the project land. Possibly an equal number has been settled since that time. In 1946 another project, the Hawijah Settlement Scheme, was finished. It involved the distribution of some 200,000 acres of irrigated state land among members of the 'Ubayd tribe.

25: Warriner 8-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

811 which now amounts to one million acres. More might be added
by water storage schemes. At present several large new schemes
812 are under consideration. These involve flood control by the
construction of the Bekhme dam on the Great Zab, and an extension of the Habbaniya reservoir. In addition to the Bekhme
dam a scheme for flood irrigation in the Wadi Tharthar is being
considered. A survey commission is now preparing a report on
these developments, but so far no estimates have been made of
the area of land likely to be brought into cultivation.

464 At present there is no shortage of labour. The population is
161 small in relation to the area cropped, but it is growing rapidly.
In 1931, according to Dowson, the total population was
162 2,824,000, of which 2,246,000 were estimated to be rural, including 895,000 settled population and 1,351,000 still living in
tribal conditions.[1] Estimates for 1943 put the total population at
4,500,000, of which the rural population was 3,500,000. Some
regions, Basra, Karbala, Dulaim, and Muntafiq are densely
settled, while others, chiefly in the north, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk,
811 are settled very sparsely. The area of cropped land per head is 2
acres, and the area of cultivated land perhaps as much as 4 acres.

LAND TENURE

432 It is clear that Iraq has greater prospects of agricultural expansion than any other Middle East country. But to the deve-
423 lopment of these potentialities the greatest obstacle is land
tenure. Sir Ernest Dowson, in his classical report on the subject,
says: 'The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty
and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country
and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly
or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know
many individual cases in which the development and use of the
land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity
and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would
be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of
holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free
000 from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort
of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the

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[1] Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth Garden City Press for the Iraqi Government, 1932), p. 12.

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000 prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole.'[1]

● 423 There are different varieties of tenure in the two zones,
determined by the different conditions of agriculture. In the
471 north, the forms of tenure are similar to those of Syria, with a
class of small proprietors taking some, but not all, of the land.
In the south large owners or sheikhs own virtually all of the
land, letting it to share-tenants, through a series of intermediary
lessees, minor sheikhs, sirkals (formerly sub-sheikhs), or town
notables. At the bottom of this many-storied building the
fellah cultivates the land under a burden of debt. This peculiar
form has originated from the disintegration of the tribal system;
the sheikhs have profited by the confusion of the law to secure
individual ownership of land which by custom is the property of
the tribe.

423 *The Breakdown of the Tribal System.* In the irrigation zone, the practice of shifting cultivation was accompanied until very recently by an equally unstable form of landownership. The basis of the ownership is the tribal *dirah*, a large area not limited to land actually tilled but including also non-cultivated land and submerged marsh land, over which a tribe exercises a customary right of occupation. These areas are considered to be the property of the whole tribe, and until recently were so in fact.

423 The tribal system existed generally until some forty years ago,
and still prevails in parts of the country.[2] Under this system, the
621 usual procedure was to set aside a part of the cultivated area,
622 a third or even a half, to provide revenue for the sheikh to discharge his political duties, which then included the maintenance of a tribal militia, the provision of hospitals, and keeping the *mudhif* (the coffee shop and civic and social centre of the tribe). This revenue accrued to the office of the sheikh, and not to his person. The rest of the land was sometimes distributed among the families of the tribe, according to the numbers of fighters who had helped to seize the land from another tribe,
423 or according to the amount of land reclaimed: more often, how-
427 ever, the land was cultivated in small groups, the tribal sub-

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[1] op. cit., p. 33.

[2] For a detailed account of the historical development of Iraq's land tenure system, see Salih Haider 'Land Problems of Iraq' (London University Ph.D. thesis, 1942).

● 423 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of
427 the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-cropping basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths, or a third of the produce.

423 But even on these individual holdings communal ownership
621 is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-tribal chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal
622 chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and
428 especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

423 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area,
241 it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years. Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants
221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and
241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing re-
233 mains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it pre-
423 vailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the
619 State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organization, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

423 tribal organization there was no clear definition of individual
rights of ownership to the collectively-owned land. It was a
619 system which could exist as long as no one thought about it; as
long, that is, as the tribe was accepted as the unit of political
life, and as long as no individual claims were likely to be made.
It is for this reason that it is impossible, once the tribal system
has ceased to be the political unit, to settle land on a tribal
basis; and yet to settle land on the basis of the supposed indivi-
dual claims creates grave injustice, because in practice it means
that too much land is allotted to the sheikhs and that the cul-
tivators are reduced to the position of tenants or labourers.

439 Since the early years of the twentieth century the tribal
system has been breaking up, and the economic development of
the country in the twenty years between the wars has hastened
its disintegration. When water transport came to the Persian
Gulf towards the end of the nineteenth century, export markets
opened for Iraq grain; the subsistence economy broke down and
production for export began. Exports of grain increased from
65,000 tons in the early eighteen-nineties to 120,000 tons in
1909–13, and to 380,000 tons in 1934–9. The profitability of
556 export has given the tribal chiefs a motive for acquiring land as
their personal property.

The tendency to acquire land for the sake of money income
was much strengthened, in the twenty years between the two
wars, by the rapid extension of pump irrigation and the ac-
companying increase in the cultivated area. Pump installations
512 have increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,000 in 1944, and provide
426 water for some 2½ million acres of land, or over half the culti-
vated land in the irrigated zone. The installation of a pumping
system is comparatively cheap, costing some £2,000 before the
recent war, but it is far beyond the means of the peasants, so that
pumps have been installed by sheikhs, or more frequently by
city notables, who make contracts to supply them to peasants
at extortionate rates of interest, and so gradually acquire the
land in payment of debt. In many cases the sub-chiefs, or sir-
kals, have become pump owners.

423 Thus in the regions of pump irrigation the tribal system has
entirely ceased to function. The land is mainly the property of
427 the pump owners, with the cultivators taking a meagre share
of the crop, varying from one-seventh to one-fourteenth or one-

423 twenty-first part of the total. The position of the share-tenant
427 in Iraq is much worse than that of his counterpart in Syria.

In the districts of flood irrigation the tribal system has dis-
621 integrated, but its superstructure, the sheikhs and sirkals, re-
622 mains. Most of the political functions of the tribe have now
been transferred to the State, and the only economic function
312 now performed by the tribal authorities is the control of irri-
427 gation, digging of canals, and repairing of breaches, which is done by the cultivators under the direction of the sirkal who has become a kind of farm bailiff acting for the sheikh. Under this system the sheikh and sirkal take together up to 80 per cent of the crop, leaving the cultivator some 20–30 per cent.

423 This exploitation is possible because the sheikhs have succeed-
ed in establishing, mainly during the last fifteen years, their title
425 to absolute ownership of the tribal land by means of land settlement. Because in Ottoman times the cultivators had no legal title to the land which they occupied, the landlords were able, during the period of the mandate, to use their political power to secure legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the property of the tribe. In much the same way the English landlords of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enclosed land as their property which was traditionally common property, and ousted small holders whose title was based only on custom. As in nineteenth century England, the process is being hastened by mechanization, which gives the big landowners an advantage as against the small cultivator, and by inflation, which gives them
565 the impetus to invest. The big landowners of Iraq are a comparatively recent creation, and it is the economic and legal changes of the past twenty years which have established their position.

423 *Northern Iraq.* In northern Iraq there is a different type of land tenure and fewer large landowners. South of Mosul, in the fertile
471 Tigris Valley, where pumps have been installed, there is a tribal system resembling that of the south, and the land is owned mainly by tribal sheikhs and notables. West of Mosul, on the rolling uplands with poor rainfall, the land is also held on
471 a tribal system. In this region in recent years there has been a rapid introduction of machinery; and the sheikhs are extending their power to acquire land. In future bigger imports of machinery will probably cause them to extend their influence

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471 over larger areas, much as the pump owners are doing on the Lower Tigris.

But in the north-eastern rain-fed zone, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, the position of the cultivator is better. There is a settled system of cultivation and a large part of the land is held by small proprietors. In the plain lands of Kirkuk and Erbil as much as 75 per cent of the land is held by small cultivators with 241 holdings up to 200 dunums. Here the method of cultivation is much the same as in Syria, a *daim* (i.e. dry) crop being taken every two years.

423 Here too the legal position is different. In this part of the 425 country, the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code remained in force, and most of the land was registered in Turkish times. Frequently the *agha* (or *mukhtar*), who was originally the patriarchal head of the village with the duty of maintaining order, has used his position to acquire land, and registered the land of the village under his own name. This has happened particularly often in the Kurd villages, where in spite of the Land Code's explicit prohibition of granting an entire village in the name of one person, the Turkish authorities, for the sake of peace, registered whole groups of villages in the names of the notables of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya.

427 But even though the landlords have obtained title to land, the share paid to them is much less than in the south, and amounts to only 10–20 per cent of the product.

426 Thus the problem of reforming tenure is here much less acute. As in Syria, peasant indebtedness is the major problem, but in the course of the recent war the high prices of grain have enabled the majority of the peasants to wipe off the burden of debt.

241 In the high mountain regions, however, particularly in the Zibar district, there is acute agricultural distress; a series of bad harvests due to plant disease, insect pests, and insecurity, has caused the agricultural economy to go steeply downhill in the past few years.

423 *Settlement of Title*. During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Government attempted to settle title to land under the Land Code, as it did in the rest of the Turkish Empire. The Code was extended to Iraq under Midhat Pasha with the object of registering occupiers of land and thereby granting them

423 the right of ownership. But owing to the practice of shifting cultivation, few of the cultivators of land in Iraq could prove ten years occupancy. The result was that land was registered as the property of tribal sheikhs, town notables, and Kurdish *aghas* over the heads of the peasants. The title deeds granted were always inaccurate, with the areas and boundaries indefinite.

√79 The grants of *tapu* tenure led to conflict and even actual fighting between sheikhs and tribesmen, and to such confusion that general registration could not be completed. The Ottoman Government, which did not want to strengthen the power of the sheikhs, therefore stopped the process of registration when about one-fifth of the land had been registered and ceased to apply the provisions of the Land Code in the southern part of Iraq. Two decrees issued in 1880 and 1892 declared that the State was to become the landlord and should have the power to evict tenants at will.

Thus in 1919 the greater part of the land of Iraq was in theory the property of the State. This does not mean, as it does in the other territories of the Middle East, that it is land which formerly belonged to the Ottoman crown estates; it is in reality land which is held on no legal tenure at all, and is considered to belong to the State because the occupying owners have no registered title.

Various unco-ordinated and spasmodic attempts to settle land title were made between 1919 and 1930, but they were largely abortive, and in 1931 Sir Ernest Dowson was requested by the Iraq Government to investigate the problem of settlement of title. In his report he summarizes the problem as follows: 000

> 'Probably four-fifths of the cultivable area of the country is in law fully and freely owned by the State and when cultivated held in practice under the general administrative control of its representatives. And even the legal ownership (raqaba) of the balance is vested in the State although, subject to important conditions, its usufructuary possession is held on a permanent heritable and assignable tenure. This tenure (known commonly as tapu) is that applicable under the provisions of the Land Code to all State land. The Ottoman Administration persistently sought to give effect to these provisions, but failed to do so because the successful

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000 operation of this tenure is impossible without an accompaniment of effective survey and land registration, which the Administration were unable to provide. And even if this radical defect had been remedied the application of this advanced tenure would have been premature throughout the majority of the country. So that to-day—more than half a century after the introduction of the Ottoman Land Code in the country—only a fraction of the cultivated region is somewhat uncertainly held on tapu tenure, while throughout the overwhelming balance, land is for the most part occupied and cultivated on no legal tenure at all.'[1]

He recommended that the problem should be tackled in three ways:

First, the work of survey must be unified and completed, since without a survey no settlement of title could be established.

Second, the different departments concerned with land tenure survey, registration, and settlement should be co-ordinated in a central department, a Central Lands Office, though they should continue to work under different ministries.

Third, the settlement of title should be made on the basis of the confirmation and maintenance of beneficial occupational use. Dowson considered that it was important for the State to register the tenure as leasehold, because, in a country with great agricultural potentialities like Iraq, it was important for the State to retain its right of ownership so that it could make use of the land at a later stage for purposes of development. Hence Dowson recommended that the land should be registered legally as a leasehold tenancy from the State.

This idea, that land tenure must be planned with reference to the *future* development of Iraq's agriculture should clearly be the main principle of reform, but it has unfortunately been en-
423 tirely forgotten in practice. As a result of Dowson's recommendations, land settlement was carried out under the direction of British officials on a much more systematic basis than before, but his most important recommendations were not put into effect.

In the first place, a large part of the land was granted freehold and not leasehold. In 1932 a law was passed giving the

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[1] op. cit., p. 74.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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423 Government the right to settle title to land. From 1933 to 1943 5,330,000 hectares of land were settled covering the whole of the agricultural area, in the following categories:

			Hectares	*Acres*
Leasehold (*Miri Sirf*)	..	..	3,000,000	7,413,270
Freehold (*Lazma*)	..	..	1,200,000	2,965,308
Freehold (*Tapu*)	..	..	900,000	2,223,981
Endowed (*Mulk Waqf*)		..	250,000	617,772
TOTAL	..	..	5,350,000	13,220,331

The freehold title, described as *lazma*, was a new legal category, supposedly suitable for tribal conditions. It grants freehold ownership, that is, *tapu* title, to the occupier after ten years' cultivation as a leaseholder, and its special feature is that land so granted cannot be sold outside the tribe. The object of introducing this new type of tenure was to maintain tribal solidarity, but it has not in fact had this effect, and has been mainly used by the pump owners to secure ownership against the customary rights of the tribesmen.

423 647 Nor have Dowson's recommendations as to the creation of a Central Lands Office been carried out. The Survey and Land Settlement Departments are under two separate ministries, Communications and Justice respectively. The Survey Department complains that it has not enough surveyors for its work, and that owing to lack of co-ordination its surveyors are taken off for land settlement work and cannot therefore carry on their regular work of survey. Land registry is undertaken by two departments, the old Turkish Tapu Department which is reported to issue title deeds on the basis of the titles settled, and a newly created office for registration of changes in tenure after settlement; this is an unnecessary duplication of function. Thus there is not any central department charged with the direction of policy, and this defect has had bad practical results.

423 The real problem of settlement has been the decision as to who should be regarded as the real owners of the land, the sheikhs, the sirkals, or the cultivators. The general objective was to settle the land on the basis of the existing rights. If, that is to say, the sheikh has a claim of one-fifth of the produce from each of a hundred cultivators, he should receive a holding of land equivalent to one-fifth of the total land and each cultivator

25: Warriner 2-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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423 should receive a title of ownership to four-fifths of the land he cultivates. This system of subdivision has been generally practised in the Middle Euphrates region, where the *karad* or water-wheel owners form a settled peasant class, and has given satisfaction in the majority of cases.

But in other regions, where the power of the sheikh is still very great, and the tribes still exist as a social unit, the land has been granted to the sheikh as the head of the tribe, and he has thus become entitled to the whole of the land as his individual property. The principle is that the size of the plot varies inversely with the power of the Government: where it is powerful, the small men gain a useful share of the total, and where it is not, the sheikh gets a legal title to the whole. Thus in part the land has been settled in small holdings, in part handed over in very large blocks.

The main criticism of settlement of title in Iraq is, therefore, that settlement commissions have alienated State land in large areas to tribal chiefs and influential pump-owning townsmen.[1] Though this is not entirely true, since some small cultivators have been given title to the land they occupy, yet in the main this has been the effect, and settlement certainly needs amendment from this standpoint.

The second criticism, often voiced by the rural community and those who have had experience of the operations of settlement, is that settlement commissioners have too wide powers and tend to be influenced by political and personal considerations. Very wide powers are in fact necessary for the settlement of complicated long-lasting disputes where documentary evidence is rare, conflicting, and vague, and where false witnesses can be brought on both sides and where the disputes themselves are further complicated by tribal prejudices, family quarrels, and blood feuds. It is generally admitted, however, that settlement commissions tended to become the resort of high officials who were neither energetic nor competent, and did not stay long enough to acquire the experience needed: it is not surprising that they were corrupt.

A third criticism, and the most serious, is that the new settlement is only *tapu* tenure (i.e., the old Ottoman tenure) applied more efficiently and with proper surveys. It has the same weak-

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[1] Salih Haider, op. cit.

423 ness of putting the fluid tribal system into a rigid mould, and a mould which gives the sheikhs undue power. When the tribes have completely disintegrated, it has been not unjust, as in some districts of the north and in Basra liwa. But in the purely tribal areas of Muntafiq, Amara, and Diwaniya liwas and the Kurd hill districts of Ruwandiz and Amadiya it has met with the same incompatibility which was the reason for the failure of the *tapu* system. In these districts the settlement commissioners have confirmed the legal title deeds, in Muntafiq and other areas over the heads of the actual occupants. In Amara, even sirkals and sub-tribal chiefs have no prescriptive rights to the land and have not been able to prove occupancy.

Hence the settlement law really needs drastic changes to enable satisfactory settlement of tribal areas, in particular to give title to tribal occupants of land, even if valid *tapu* titles are possessed by sheikhs.

565 *The Sheikh as Landowner*. This wholesale alienation of the land in large blocks to the sheikhs causes injustice to the cultivators and also creates great obstacles to future development. The sheikhs as a class are wealthy and important, since they control stocks of grain, and hoard the output of their estates; but they have no value in relation to the management of production. 'He is in fact too big a man to be a farmer and too indolent, corrupt and uneducated to make of himself anything else. As regards agricultural activity, the sheikh is completely unimportant; he takes little interest in seed or ground preparation, is more ignorant than his farmers about such matters and performs his large-scale water-sharing functions at the request and on the representations of his farmers and through his agents.'[1] Thus the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous, and oppressive.

423
579 In the areas where the tribal system still functions as a reality no land settlement has really been undertaken at all, that is, in Amara (mainly rice fields), in Diwaniya, where the risks are too great, and in the Muntafiq where there is an endless struggle between the Sadun family, who claim to be the principal

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[1] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Amara Liwa', 1944.

423 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly com-
622 plete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his
secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor
estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short
of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any
terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or
sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and
the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this
district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of
the towns.'[1]

244 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions.
The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
452 rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The
government regulation that land must remain fallow in alter-
nate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area
is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the
report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward
selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears,
at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan
amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

427 In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually
receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical
apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53-E.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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427 Out of this 40 per cent the fellah must also pay a rent for the upkeep of the canals which irrigate the holding; this may amount to 20–45 per cent of his share.

426 At the beginning of the season the fellah receives in advance from the employer:

	Dinars
300 kg wheat	1.800
150 kg barley	.525
Cash in 3 instalments	3.750
	6.075
Seasonal interest 30 per cent	1.800
TOTAL	7.875

1 Dinar = £1 sterling

He is not as a rule able to repay the loans from the sale of the produce, and so gets deeper and deeper into debt to the landowner. Thus there has evolved a particular kind of debt-serfdom: a landowner who needs labour from one estate can pay an advance to a whole village or several villages, and so obtain 'the right to demand the transference of the land workers thus "freed" from their debts to his lands.'[1]

651 Changes in taxation have also benefited the big landowners. To promote the expansion of pump irrigation, land irrigated with pumps was partially exempted from taxation. The reform of taxation under the Istihlak law of 1931 has also operated mainly to the advantage of the large landowners.[2]

427 Thus the former tribesman in Iraq has been reduced to the position of a serf-tenant, who is entangled in crushing indebtedness, and so is tied to the holding which he cultivates.

423 In spite of the wise recommendations of Sir Ernest Dowson's report, and the advisory efforts of British officials to improve
427 the security of the small cultivator, it cannot be said that land
185 settlement has succeeded in removing the oppressive character of the land system. Nor has any reform been made to permit the development of State land.

423 As regards water-rights, there is the same situation as in Palestine and Transjordan; attempts at legislation have been
185 frustrated by local interests, and here the need for legislation is

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[1] ibid., p. 55.

[2] See P. W. Ireland, *Iraq, A Study in Political Development* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1937), pp. 440–1.

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423 185 still greater. Rights are recognized *ab antiquo*, which means by custom established beyond the memory of man, but since all the pumps have been installed in the last thirty years, no rights in connection with them can be recognized. The main problem has been that sheikhs or town notables put in pumps on a holding and then claim the whole of the land. Where there has been a settlement of title, claims have usually been settled on a share basis, but in other cases the pump owner has succeeded in getting the whole of the land. This is not a satisfactory position; in 1938 a draft irrigation law was prepared by the British expert on land tenure, but it has not been enacted.

The Government which came to power in Iraq after the *coup d'état* of 1936 severely criticized the policy of granting enormous blocks of land to individual owners. The fact is of course that previous governments were unable to resist the power of the sheikhs, or of the pump owners, and allowed them to jump claims to land before settlement. As a result of these criticisms, a new act was passed in 1938, which somewhat modified the powers of the pump owners, and gave the existing cultivators stronger rights.

423 185 458 But little progress has been made since that time. The Government's conception of reform was revealed in 1943 when the Ministry of Finance began the sale of the State leasehold (*miri sirf*) lands by auction, as an anti-inflationary measure. This was an illusory remedy for inflation, and threw away some of the State's power to reform land tenure and develop agricultural resources. In view of the fact that cultivation is likely to extend in the future as a result of new irrigation schemes, it is clearly important that the Government should decide on the principles which ought to determine future policy. If Iraq is to receive large loans for development, a settlement of the rights of the cultivators will become even more important.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

185 In Iraq, unlike the other countries of the Middle East, the reform of land tenure is the subject of genuine political discussion. Although in its economic life Iraq is far more backward than Egypt, it is politically more alive, and it is realized by the official class at least that reforms are needed, and that a new 000 system of tenure must be evolved. Discontent with the land

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241 substantial surplus of barley for export. Sugar and tea are about the only agricultural commodities always imported.[39]

PRODUCTION

Agriculture in Iraq is devoted largely to the cultivation of winter crops. Because of the lack of rain in the south, summer crops can be grown only under irrigation. In the rain-fed zone of the north, summer crops can be grown on a moderate scale. In the irrigated zone of central and southern Iraq the limited water supply restricts the area devoted to summer crops to only about one-quarter of that grown to winter crops.

Barley and wheat are the only significant winter crops, while rice and, more recently, cotton are the principal summer crops. The area sown to sesame, corn, millet, and grain sorghum is comparatively insignificant. Tobacco assumes some importance in the mountainous areas of the north. Fruit and vegetables are quite important. Iraq is the world's principal producer and exporter of dates. Excellent citrus fruit is grown, particularly in the Diyala Valley in east central Iraq for domestic consumption, and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the north.

233 Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats as well as camels are kept primarily by pastoral nomads.

YIELDS

241 Crop yields are generally low for a number of reasons. The water supply is frequently inadequate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for soil building crops. Salinity, attributed to poor drainage, has materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigated zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared and weeds detract from yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left in fallow as the means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to grow up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited.

LAND TENURE

423 427 Ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheiks and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare existence. The land assigned to the *Fellah*, or peasant, often changes from year to year so that the cultivator has virtually no incentive to improve it.

About 67 per cent of the privately-owned land is said to be in units exceeding 618 acres.

Most of the landowners are said to show little interest in improving agriculture. In the irrigated zone the *Fellah* generally gets only half of the crop, even though the state provides the irrigation works. His share is even smaller when the land is irrigated by privately-owned pumps or when the landlords supply seed, draft animals, or machinery.

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[39] "Iraq," *International Reference Service*, March, 1950.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

423 The problems of land tenure are generally cited as being a restriction to agricultural development. One United Nations' study states the absence of settlement title is undoubtedly a major obstacle to expansion of cultivation of dry land and intensification of agriculture in irrigated or irrigable zones.[40] The same report also points out that the lack of adequate legislation on water rights is another serious defect.[41]

RESETTLEMENT

166 425 241 Sizable areas are being settled by the state under the provisions of a law passed in 1951 which distributes about 67 acres per family to landless people, agricultural school graduates, former civil service employees, pensioners, and the unemployed. The farming program on these projects is supervised rigorously. On the 75,000-acre Dujaila Project on the Tigris River the prescribed planting program is as follows: 20 per cent in wheat, 15 per cent in barley, 5 per cent in fruit, 4 per cent in cotton and flax, 3 per cent in sesame, and 3 per cent in vegetables. Another 5 per cent will be devoted to housing, and the remaining 45 per cent must lie in fallow because of a water shortage.[42]

The Mission report criticized these land settlement schemes on several bases. The land is given to the farmers, the title being transferred after 10 years of successful operation. The Mission believes the land should be sold. The Mission also criticizes the allocation of land to people who have had no farming experience and who have not necessarily shown themselves to be suited by temperament for farming, and it expresses doubt that the program actually has improved the land or the farmer. The economic report stated: "The improved economic position of the cultivators in the new Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to his landlord."[43]

There are half a dozen other projects, involving 250,000 acres, in various stages of promotion which the Point Four Mission is being urged to assist in planning and supervising.

IRRIGATION

312 At present irrigation water is provided by the Kut and Hilla Barrages on the upper Tigris River, several smaller ones on the lower reaches, and the Hindiya Barrage on the Euphrates River. The water is carried by pumps and canals. About 2 million acres are irrigated by pumps and another 4 to 5 million acres by gravity flow.

Estimates indicated cultivatable land can be expanded almost three times if water is available. Yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not permit even the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers during the spring flood season are clearly essential. The government already has initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage system for the Euphrates River and has let the contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The Development Board is undertaking also construction of three dams on the upper tributaries of the 1^

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[40] *Land Reform*, United Nations, 1951, p. 27.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[42] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, United Nations, December, 1949, p. 31.

[43] Boardman, Frances, "Iraq Moves Toward Land Reform," *Foreign Agriculture*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1951.

1^- [Text continues on p. 97--Analyst]

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647 652 185 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the direct beneficiaries. It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenues resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

000 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the close of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of the departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralized and made available more directly and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

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642 131 161 434 423 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income per capita does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate the distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary of tribal chiefs.

433 185 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

657 185 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing the standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

II. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

A. PRESENT CONDITIONS

369 511 162 The some 4,000,000 more people of Iraq who live the rural areas have been long characterised by many people both within and outside Iraq as suffering from poverty, ill health and illiteracy. These conditions become readily apparent to one visiting the villages of the country today. The characterization of the people can be extended to their being ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed.

369 511 The survey was immediately impressed with the crude and inefficient methods of making a living and the unnecessarily poor and unhealthy home and village life. These conditions can be remedied by instruction and assistance. People farm with primitive equipment and are wasteful of land and water. In village after village there are mud huts without light or fresh air. Families live, sleep and eat in single rooms packed together with animals, food, stores, farming equipment and refuse. Children play in courtyards filled with animal dung and filth, many people suffer from infected eyes, skin sores and diseases caused by unsanitary conditions which could be greatly reduced by better sanitary conditions. In the home food is prepared on the floors where it comes in contact with the accumulated filth, flies, chickens, dogs and other animals. Pots and pans and mixing spoons lie on the ground. They are crudely cleaned with dirty water or old rags. There are no such things as kitchens, screened lockers for food or clean and covered places for drinking water in the homes of the rural villagers. Instruction in home care could overcome much of this.

369 364 511 The lack of pure drinking water is one of the most acute problems in these villages. Some pumps and water tanks and some water piped from springs to collection pools have been installed. However, these facilities frequently lack sanitary protection and show lack of proper maintenance by the communities. Often wells have around them accumulation of stagnant water, mud and animal dung. Another acute problem is the lack of any facilities in many villages, and homes for taking care of human waste. Where toilets exist they are mere uncovered holes open to flies and a source of spreading disease.

369 871 Many villages have not yet received the benefit of schools where children can learn some of the concepts and techniques which would enable them to understand the need for improving their conditions and help their families in doing so. In some villages young girls are not allowed by their elders to attend school or not provided with primary schools, buildings and teachers. Much of a new generation is growing up illiterate and ignorant of how they might help themselves when they grow up.

369 423 471 528 Inquiry among villagers and local officials revealed that although there might be a headman or *mukhtar* of the village, nearly all direction and management of their affairs comes from outside leadership. Communities lack the local leadership and organization by which they might progress through their own efforts. Sheikhs, landlords, their agents (*sirkal*) who are frequently local government representatives as well, direct the farming operations, decide the lands on which the villagers will farm and live, provide much of the seed and equipment, direct the cleaning of ditches, collect the shares of crops and other payments and decide whether or not the farmers may live and work on the land during the next year. Even the farmer who owns his own land is not without obligations to money lenders, tax collectors and government supervision. The farmers and tenants of Iraq are dependent upon

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
471 utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.
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Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
369 of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
433 to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
511 for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
566 land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
423 house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
471 better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
566 more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
571 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
212 and write to obtain more information.

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165 lation, and the death rate, 25 to 35. The discrepancies in reporting are probably less in the case of deaths than of births.

On the basis of the health district populations for 1950, the infant mortality rate was calculated at 98 per 1,000 live births. The death rate of infants under 1 year was 14 per cent of the total deaths, and of children under 5 years, about 23 per cent. Local observers estimate that the mortality in infants under 1 year approximates 300 to 350 per 1,000 live births among most rural and impoverished urban communities, and that it reaches almost 500 per 1,000 live births in children under 5 years of age. Intestinal diseases, undernutrition, respiratory infections and malaria are prominent among the causes of death in infancy and early childhood.

SOCIAL ECONOMY

241 Agriculture and the petroleum industry together form the basis of Iraq's economy. Although this region was one of the chief granaries of the world centuries before the Christian Era, the present agricultural resources of the potentially fertile Tigris and Euphrates river basins are only partially developed. About 75 to 80 per cent of the inhabitants are engaged in farming or pastoral pursuits, but progress is retarded by the prevailing forms of land tenure, shortage of labor supply and inefficient methods
311 of cultivation. In 1950, less than one fifth
241 of the arable land, normally estimated at 25 to 30 million acres, was under production. Extensive areas of the alluvial plain are cultivated by means of irrigation, but improper drainage often results in consider-
427 able annual loss of soil fertility. A system
423 of tenancy farming predominates in most sections of the country. The proportion of land-owning peasants is small and largely restricted to the northern provinces. In cen-
[241] tral and southern Iraq many families are migratory cultivators who work on a sharecropping basis for wealthy and, usually, absentee landlords.

241 Cereals, tobacco and cotton are important

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Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
315 Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
[496] works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-owned
Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

433 311 241 There has been little change in the crop pattern in recent years. In 1950, under the stimulus of rising world prices, the area planted to cotton increased, but the damage caused by pests, together with the fall in prices, caused heavy losses and led to a shift to other crops. There has also been an extension of the area planted to fruits and vegetables.

242 The Government has taken several important measures to aid agriculture. In 1952, in order to improve the quality of dates, the government-owned Iraqi Dates Association contributed 49 per cent of the capital of a company which will market the crop. In 1953, the Government appropriated funds for the building of grain silos with a capacity of 150,000 tons, in order to improve quality, since low grading depresses export prices. The Agricultural Machinery Administration rents "machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts". 1/ The activities of the Agricultural Bank are discussed below.

423 241 Among the major obstacles to agricultural development has been the land tenure system. The uncertainty of land titles has by now been largely eliminated by the work carried out since passage of the land settlement law of 1932. By the end of 1953, titles to 16,126,000 hectares had been settled; this represented 68.4 per cent of the area of the country, excluding the desert regions. Another obstacle is the unequal distribution of land. The agricultural census showed that there were only 125,000 holdings, with an average area of 51 hectares per holding. Of these, 24,000 holdings were under 1 hectare, 26,000 between 1 and 5 hectares, 16,000 between 5 and 10 hectares and 19,000 between 10 and 20 hectares. Thus, 85,000 holders, or 68 per cent of the total, owned about 8 per cent of the total area. At the other extreme, some 33,000 holders, with over 100 hectares each, owned some 85 per cent of the total area. The majority of the agricultural population is landless.

311 241 185 The Government has attempted to remedy this situation by settlement schemes on government-owned land, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of the settled area. Following a successful experiment at Dujaila, 4,284 farmers were settled, in five projects with a total area of 198,000 hectares, and by the end of 1954, 10,200 farmers had been settled on 510,000 hectares. 2/ Farmers are organized in supply and marketing co-operatives. They are given the land free of rent for ten years, after which those who have made good are granted title without charge. 3/ Further projects are under way, including the distribution of 1,125,000 hectares in Mosul province, the distribution of 100,000 hectares near Baghdad, the expansion of the Hawijah settlement and the distribution of land near Basra and along the southern Euphrates. 4/

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, page 20.

2/ The Iraq Times (Baghdad), 25 October 1954.

3/ For further details see United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, Progress in [illegible]d Reform (1954), page 105.

4/ The Iraq Times, 14 December 1954, 4 January 1955, 8 January 1955 and 7 February 1955.

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marriage takes place. The marriages exogamous with respect to the close kinship group — few in any case — will among the Hamawands be with Hamawands of other villages. Thus a caste seperation


minimal lineage of Agha
other
Hamawand
lineages
CASTE BARRIER
semi-endogamous
kinship segments
of tenant farmer
population
individual
families of
laborers

Diagram No. 5. Organization of composite village.

tends to grow up, separating the Hamawand effectively from the Meskjin group, and the composition of the local group might be schematically represented as in diagram No. 5.

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One of the composite Hamawand- *Meskjin* villages was studied briefly. However, due to increased tensions connected with the app-

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roaching review of their case in the Land Settlement Comission[1]), when claims and counter-claims would come to a head, it was impossible to obtain detailed census material.

The village in question was conquered some 40 years ago by a segment of the Rashawand Hamawands, and lies at present on the very edge of Hamawand territory. Villages to the north of it, formerly under Hamawand control, have lately torn themselves lose.

The total population is ca. 100 individuals; of them, 5—6 households are Hamawand, 15—20 households *Meskjin*, subjected tenants, and there are a few families of laborers. The Hamawand faction is led by an *Agha;* the *Meskjin* are led by the *kikha* (official headman of the village). The latter is descended from the former headman, and was elected by the majority of the villagers, so in the face of government approval, the Hamawands had to accept him. Between these factions there has been no intermarriage.

The conflict in this village is related to that in the neighboring village, to which, according to the *Meskjin* version, the Hamawands wish to extend their privileges. The balance of power between the two factions seems at present to be quite labile. The *Meskjin* have been gaining ground through a slowly rising standard of living whereby rifles and ammunition have become increasingly available to them, and through the growing mediating effects of external administration. To fully understand the present tensions, one rule of the Land Settlement Comission which is to review ownership claims shortly should be noted: Where conflicting claims are advanced, any party who has for the last 10 years regularly collected tax on the land is regarded as the de-facto owner. It is thus vital for the Hamawands to retain their power, and for the *Meskjin* to break that power, before the Land Settlement Comission arrives on the spot.

To this end, the factions are mobilizing all available mechanisms.

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[1]) The Land Settlement Comission, established during the British mandatory period, is a court of claims relating to questions of land tenure. Coordinated with a comprehensive program of mapping, its object is systematically to cover all agricultural land, and definitively settle and register proprietory rights (cf. Dowson 1931).

496 British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership, as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest. 499 The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–Nisibin line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek, all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Baṣra–Baghdad–Istanbul system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began, the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qadhās.

509 Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment came into being at Baghdad and Baṣra, and British flying-boats after 1937 used also Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry 206 of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public services from Baghdad and Baṣra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. 207 Broadcasting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to 1937 still experimental and occasional.

425 Good progress was made during these five years in the all-important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up 185 under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land-developers, and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family. 425 185

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding [423] was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallah, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original law was soon restored. [166 654] Meanwhile Government pursued schemes to construct model villages, good in conception but at present trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increasing official consciousness of its inadequacy. 241 The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241
was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the [166
establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of 464]
these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423
committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185
since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425
a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166
sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312
continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their 653
studies and planning, though the intended major projects could not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

423 185 already occurs in more intensive holdings (e.g. gardens) and in house property.

5. When considering the position in the riverain tracts, in my provisional report I suggested (iii, 24) that the simplest and the most appropriate means of regularising the holding of miri land was by standard leasehold agreements in accordance with prevailing theory and partially prevailing practice. It never appears to be contested, even by the most firmly entrenched holders of miri land, that the ownership of such land belongs to the State. Nor is it contended that this ownership is titular. But while the effective ownership of the State is recognised, it is claimed that this ownership does not carry the right to evict at will well-established holders from their holdings of miri land. Subject to good behaviour, to maintaining cultivation, to payment to Government of its revenue contribution, and to the satisfactory discharge of certain public duties, such holders of miri land claim a right of undisturbed possession, which in principle is universally admitted.

There will probably be no difficulty in formulating the main rights and obligations of miri holders in standard terms, if and when Government decide to maintain and systematise miri tenure. But within the main framework of this tenure considerable elasticity would have to be allowed for supplementary or even exceptional provisions required to meet varieties of local circumstances, of local customs and of agricultural needs. The rain-watered plains of the north, the valley cultivation of the hills, the pump-fed riverain tracts, the rice-growing fringes of the marshes, the areas supplied with regular free flow irrigation, are instances of such variations which will occur to all.

[651] At first sight the contingent obligations now customarily imposed on miri holders in the form of public duties appear to be impracticably onerous. But the obligation that needs definition most of all is the nature, the method of assessment and the method of payment of the revenue contribution, which represents the miri holder's amalgamated rent and tax to the nation, for the land he holds. General public duties should not fall on miri holders as such. They would more reasonably be discharged by some unpaid local dignitary, who could be accorded appropriate privileges.

In pursuance of the need to establish greater security of tenure and in conformity with customary doctrine, miri leaseholds held by long-established miri holders or their descendants, should normally be renewable in practice, although terminable in form. The duration of miri leaseholds might as a matter of regular routine be fixed at ten years. While such leaseholds should ordinarily be renewable to previous holders, if they had previously discharged their obligations satisfactorily, yet renewal should require a formal act on both sides. This would keep the nature of the tenure in the public mind, and the existing records up to date and reliable. Standard fees should be charged for all issues and renewals of miri leaseholds. These fees should in principle be limited to covering the aggregate cost of the simple administrative and technical procedure needed to maintain the necessary records satisfactorily.

6. THE LAND REGISTER

423 6. As already noted the Land Code only recognises the private holding of land in two ways. Such a holding must either be private [425] property (mulk) or it must be State property* held in tapu tenure. And the acquisition of all private holdings in either of these categories must be registered to be valid.

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* Miri in law including all cultivated land not owned in mulk.

and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would 423
be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of
holdings, small or large, held in undisputed possession and free
from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort
of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these
unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon
the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare
and contentment of the people as a whole.

Put very briefly, with the exception of small areas, mainly in 423
Northern Iraq, together with some smaller areas of a few yet 471
hopefully significant State-sponsored schemes of land settlement,
the bulk of the cultivated land of Iraq is in the possession of large
landowners. Some of them may not enjoy the holding of this land
by confirmed legal right but, to all intents and purposes, they own
it and derive immense incomes from it. Others, by legal process,
the validity of which is disputed by land reformers, have gained
possession of lands which were formerly held in common
tribal use.

These landowners, or landholders, are usually sheikhs or 471
absentee urban landlords who let the land to share-tenants through 427
a hierarchy of lessees or agents, at the bottom of which is the
landless cultivator who gets an incredibly small share of the produce
of his labour. Indeed, the actual cultivator under this invidious
system of share-cropping may get anything from ten per cent to
thirty per cent of the produce of the land which he works, most
of the remainder going to the large landowners, agents or owners
of irrigation pumps. The situation may vary from landlord to
landlord, and very occasionally the actual cultivator is said to
share fifty per cent of the produce. In general, however, the [565]
position of the Iraqi countryside is one of great extremes of wealth
and poverty. The landowner may live in a sumptuous style with
a town house and country palace, while the peasant cultivator
may live under conditions of poverty or near-destitution.

It is not possible in this study to attempt more than an outline 471
of the causes and effects of this situation. It arose partly out of 423
ancient confusion of titles which meant that, with the break-up 425
of the tribal system, the most powerful member of the tribe was
able to appropriate for his own purposes land which was originally
intended for the common good of the tribe. It is due partly to the
faulty application of the Ottoman Land Code under which,
because the small cultivator was not strong enough to establish
his rights of title, these rights fell to the sheikh. The profits derived
from the Persian Gulf grain trade in the late 19th and early
20th centuries gave a further impetus to what has been described
as 'this wholesale land grabbing'. Finally, with the development

471 423 425 [565] of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

511 642 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHl Iraq MHl

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent 185
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and,
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, 425
allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intelligently
conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract 185
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

166 must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land
185 must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting.
He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

425 (4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and
provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

427 (5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders.
So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila
area, and the total population of adults and children is between
871 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with
a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing
185 for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good
design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of
Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for
a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to
avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish
intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village
which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of
the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the
intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural
streams'.

427 It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which
has been in operation for only four years and is still in process
425 of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it
241 appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless
185 cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average
465 income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of
the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced
from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood
is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the
Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation
the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more
robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators.
Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which,
by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The
men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed,
it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in
the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

427 The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants,
apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging
185 and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they
make a certain contribution to the public purse through the
sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage
an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly
needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that
they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

more brought into use. The government should take steps to 312
survey the possibilities for small projects and to provide assistance in carrying them out, thus giving aid and security to the farm population of the North which now feels that its needs have been neglected and overlooked.

In general, however, the North will have to remain dependent 311
on rain-fall to sustain its agriculture. There are apparently still considerable rain-fed areas which can be settled and put to the plow. Particular care should be exercised, however, to insure that the areas are not sub-marginal from the standpoint of either rainfall or fertility and that settlers are really available in the North, which is generally more sparsely settled than the central and southern portions of Iraq. For example, the Mission believes that the prospect of scanty and uncertain rainfall will probably make it undesirable to proceed, except on a very restricted, experimental basis, with the settlement scheme near Balad Sinjar in Mosul province which has been projected by the Agriculture Department.

Settlement of New Land

In the past much of the vacant land available for an expansion 425 ●
of crop production which ostensibly belonged to the state has fallen 421
into the hands of big landowners. The so-called Land Settlement Law of 1932, which inaugurated a cadastral survey for the purpose of settling the past confusion regarding land titles and systems of tenure, facilitated this process. It permitted the land settlement committees appointed to administer the law to grant titles (so-called *lasmah* grants) to people who could demonstrate that they had made productive use of land within the previous fifteen years. In practice, it has been possible to obtain title on the presentation of proof that a crop was produced on the land in one year, and the land settlement committees have occasionally accepted even more tenuous proof of cultivation. In this way many sheikhs and other influential persons have managed to obtain title to large tracts of land without any payment whatsoever. Since the cadastral survey is only about half completed, more land may be preempted in this way unless a limit is set on such acquisitions.

Land definitely adjudged to be state (*miri sirf*) property by 425
the land settlement committees has, however, been set aside for 166
421

425 421 166 distribution to selected settlers under the terms of a law passed by Parliament in the spring of 1951. This law reflects a growing realization that a class of independent small-holders needs to be created. Settlement areas ranging in size from 2,000 donums in the mountains to 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated land and 80,000 donums in the dry-farming zone are to be established. Units up to 20 donums in mountainous land, 100 donums in flow-irrigated lands, 200 donums in lands irrigated by low-lift pumps and 400 donums in dry-farming lands are to be distributed among farmers, with preference to be accorded to those living in or near the settlement areas. Up to 20 percent of each area may also be allotted to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 percent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates, provided that the committee responsible for the administration of the whole scheme is convinced of their agricultural capabilities. Settlers will be given the opportunity to participate in the work of preparing each area for settlement. The committee will plan the whole settlement, including the sites of houses and public buildings which are to be constructed in accordance with its specifications. The committee will also issue instructions regarding the type and method of cultivation. After ten years farmers who have made good will be granted title to their land without charge, and for a further period of ten years they will not be permitted to alienate their land in any way or to mortgage it except to the state Agricultural Bank. The only exception to this kind of distribution and settlement will be made in the case of state lands which can be irrigated only by high-lift pumps. Such lands may still be leased in tracts up to a maximum of 5,000 donums to a single individual.

425 421 This law, properly administered, will undoubtedly result in great benefit to Iraq. The Mission urges, however, that the government insist on the principle that settlers farm their land themselves without resort to sharecroppers. Otherwise there is a danger that a considerable number of minor landlords will be created, thus defeating the fundamental purpose of the scheme. This principle may be jeopardized both by the selection of non-farmers as beneficiaries and by the contemplated allotment of excessively large

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

plots to single individuals in the pump-irrigated and dry-farming areas.

While sympathizing with the desire to provide in some way for unemployed school graduates and retired civil servants, army and police personnel, the Mission believes there is serious danger that these types of beneficiaries will tend to become landlords who will entrust the farming of their plots to others. The success of the settlement schemes may easily be endangered if the land falls into the hands of absentee landlords or of people with little or no farming experience. In any event there are many farmers in relatively overcrowded rural areas with better claims to the new land.

The proposed allotments, particularly in the dry-farming and pump-irrigated areas, may well be too large unless there is assurance that the farmers will have access to adequate machinery to till their land. The relatively large allotment in pump-irrigated lands as well as the exemption of lands irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution to small-holders appear to be based on the assumption that only larger landholders can afford the necessary investment in pumps. In the past when capital was scarce, the installation of pumps was left to merchants and landowners who consequently were able to reap high returns in the form of a large proportion of the resulting agricultural output. Now that the government is assured of ample financial means in the future, it might consider financing the construction of pumping stations and providing pumps at cost to groups of settlers organized into cooperatives which would undertake to operate the pumps and gradually repay the government. Under such conditions the justification for larger allotments of pump-irrigated lands would tend to disappear. The Mission therefore suggests that the government review the size of the allocation to each farmer and that it reserve to itself the right to reassign a portion of the allotment if one farmer should prove incapable of cultivating it.

The Mission also makes two other recommendations. The first is that the right of sale after the initial period of 20 years be limited in such a way as to give the government an option to purchase for the purpose of preventing the land from falling into the hands of absentee landlords. The second is that the provision enabling settlers to acquire their land without cost be reconsidered.

425 The Mission believes that the settlers should, as a matter of general
421 principle, be required to make some payment for the extensive benefits received. This is all the more necessary in order not to widen unduly the disparity between the economic status of the favored settlers and that of the great majority of cultivators who will continue to work under much less favorable conditions. Such payments need not be excessively burdensome, since they could be spread over a number of years.

241 The new law will apply on a broad scale the basic principles
425 of the Dujaila land settlement scheme in south-central Iraq. In the
[166] period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled there on 100-donum plots allotted from state-owned irrigated land. The Mission was impressed by the results achieved through this scheme. The farmers, who used to be sharecroppers, are conscious of their new-won independence and dignity. By comparison with the fellahin in neighboring areas they appear prosperous and content.
[474] Many of them are members of a cooperative—the only one of its kind in Iraq—which owns 10 tractors, two lorries, a flour mill and a club-house. Although the accounts of this cooperative leave much to be desired, its operations are generally along sound lines and indicative of what can be accomplished through state-assisted self-help. The Dujaila scheme is, however, not without defects. Its success as an agricultural venture is jeopardized by the progressive salination of the land because of failure to provide drainage facilities—an omission which should be promptly remedied. The administrative staff appears to be excessively large. Small-scale "landlordism" has crept in, since some farmers have brought in others to do a large part of their work on a sharecropping basis. The farmers were settled in a scattered fashion without regard to the need for community life. Most important, aside from insisting on small fruit gardens, the committee in charge of the project has effected no improvement in farming methods. The Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee, and there are no agricultural experts in the project capable of assisting farmers in raising their standards of cultivation. The improved economic position of the cultivators in the Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to a landlord. In the

new settlements the government will have a unique opportunity to 241
remedy the shortcomings of the Dujaila project. 425

Improvement in Productivity

While expansion of land under cultivation, particularly through 000 large irrigation schemes, is essential in the long run to provide for a growing population and to establish a socially desirable class of smallholders, it should not be undertaken without a simultaneous vigorous campaign to increase the productivity of agriculture and livestock. The temptation to neglect such an effort in favor of striking new irrigation schemes should be resisted. Among the measures upon which this campaign should concentrate are drainage, the provision of better tools, seeds and draft animals, the introduction of soil-building and forage crops, the use of fertilizers, the improvement of livestock, the planting of trees and the establishment of an effective extension or advisory service to farmers.

1. Drainage

The drainage of existing irrigated lands would make the most 312 important single contribution to increasing the productivity of agriculture. Moreover, it will also have the most immediate effect since it can be carried out by the government while the success of virtually all other measures to raise productivity depends on the necessarily slow process of persuading farmers to abandon age-old methods of cultivation.

The Haigh Irrigation Commission, which made an extensive 311
study of irrigation and flood control for the government, estimated 134
a few years ago that about 60 percent of the land irrigated by flow had been seriously affected by salt. The Mission's own inquiries and observations indicate that as much as 20 to 30 percent of cultivated land has been abandoned over the last few decades because of salt accumulation, while on a large part of the remaining land yields have declined by 20 to 50 percent and even more. In a number of new irrigation projects such as Hawija and Dujaila salting forced abandonment of part of the land within two years after the schemes were initiated. Drainage, almost totally neglected in the past, should therefore be prosecuted with utmost vigor in the future.

The main drainage canals for the whole irrigation zone have 312
been projected, but it is now necessary to proceed with detailed

654* 651 [425] rent tax was abolished in return for certain payments to be made by the landholders over a maximum period of ten years. Thus the tax system discriminates in favor of those who have managed to obtain state lands in *lasmah* grant and against those who have regularly leased land from the state. The latter continue to be assessed for rent whereas the former, who have frequently secured large *lasmah* grants on the basis of rather tenuous proof of occupancy and cultivation, escape any tax or rent assessments on their land.

The application of a graduated income tax to agriculture, while equitable, may not be politically feasible at present and would certainly pose difficult problems of assessment. Consideration should be given, however, to the reintroduction of some type of land tax. The fact that the cadastral survey is only half completed would not be an insuperable obstacle. In most cases the land held by each individual will be well known in the locality where he resides. Landholders could be required to register for taxation all the land they claim with the provision that they would not be allowed to establish claims during the cadastral survey to any lands not so registered; and in case of conflicts between actual occupants and other claimants, the tax could provisionally be levied on the actual occupant. It would probably be desirable to levy the tax on cultivable land rather than land actually under cultivation in order to provide an incentive to production or, alternatively, to release idle land for resettlement. Tax rates would have to vary in accordance with productivity of the land, which could, as in some other countries, be ascertained through tests or control plots located in various parts of the country. The tax rate should presumably also take into account the government contribution to irrigation of the land. The adoption of such a land tax might be linked with the gradual reduction and perhaps ultimate abolition of the *istihlak*.

X. Conclusion

511 Today the people of Iraq for the most part suffer from dire poverty. Although a relatively small number of city merchants and landowners enjoy high incomes, the average standard of life is extremely low. The future would hold little prospect for relief if

7. International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 3

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Land Classified According to Types of Tenure by Cadastral Survey*

(in donums)

	Cultivable	Uncultivable	Total
Total area to be classified	—	—	107,045,725
Total area classified by Feb. 8, 1951	38,188,575	12,268,459	50,457,034
Mamlukah (mulk)	150,601	22,366	172,967
Matroukah	9,296	1,686,912	1,696,208
Mawqufa (waqf)	549,198	36,538	585,736
Miri tapu	8,370,595	698,987	9,069,582
Miri lazma	7,371,720	485,291	7,857,011
Miri sirf	21,737,165	9,338,365	31,075,530

* For fuller details, see Table I in the appendix.

veyed has been definitely adjudged to be *miri sirf*. Only a small part of the land is actually being exploited today. About 1.6 million donums is let by the state on triennial leaseholds which may be renewed once by the same holder. Virtually all of the land in Amara province is also leased out by the state. Here, however, it is held under virtually permanent leaseholds by sheikhs who have been rewarded by rather large tracts of land in return for maintaining order and performing other services in this province which has a somewhat unruly past.[2] The remainder of cultivable *miri sirf* land is in theory still available for exploitation. Presumably most of the better and more accessible lands have been alienated to private holders, and that remaining to the state is in large part relatively poor, inaccessible, or not susceptible of irrigation. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a large reservoir of state land which can still be opened to cultivation, particularly if irrigation is provided.

425 A feature of the 1932 law inaugurating the cadastral survey was the introduction of *lazmah* tenure. This type of tenure was designed to recognize prescriptive rights to tribal lands. In practice, the sheikhs rather than the tribesmen have benefited from this provision of the law. *Lazmah* grants could be obtained on proof

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[2] In all there are 290 leaseholds of cultivated state land in Amara of which 13 are between 10,000 and 35,000 donums, 10 between 5,000 and 10,000 donums and 95 between 1,000 and 5,000 donums.

that the land was cultivated and a crop produced in any one year, 425 and the land settlement officers, who have sometimes been inexperienced and subject to influence, have on occasion accepted even more tenuous evidence as proof of a prescriptive claim. In this way a large portion of state land has been alienated to sheikhs and other influential persons, and the number of large landowners has multiplied.

Distribution of Land

Complete data on the distribution of landholdings are not 423 available. For the area covered by the cadastral survey, it is possible to classify private landholdings into various categories according to size. Such a classification, given in the accompanying table, shows that holdings of 1000 donums or less account for only 15.7 percent of the area. This is indicative of the small number of peasant proprietors. On the other hand, holdings of over 1,000 donums accounted for 67.1 percent of the total of privately owned land, while those of more than 10,000 donums comprised 24.3 percent of the area. Moreover, the importance of large holdings is undoubtedly underestimated by these figures. The cadastral survey has proceeded by areas known as *muqata'as.* In a number of cases landowners have holdings in several *muqata'as,* but these have been registered as separate holdings. Thus, according to the cadastral survey, there is only one holding in Kut in excess of 100,000 donums (namely 174,251 donums), although it is generally reported that there are actually several holdings well over 300,000 donums.

The accompanying table indicates that the highest proportion of small holdings is apparently in Basra, Dulaim, Kirkuk and Suleimaniya. The provinces of Kut, Amara, Mosul, Diyala and Kerbela have the highest percentage of large holdings.

The Sharecropping System

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Although the amount of land cultivated directly by the land- 2041 owner has increased since the last war with the use of modern machinery, particularly in Mosul and Baghdad provinces, the great bulk of the land is tilled for the landholder by peasants or fellahin against a share in the crop. The sharecropper is not a tenant in the sense that this word is generally used in the western world. He has no discretion in the use of the land and does not lease a

423 for settlement by small-holders, they will make a significant contribution to the social and political stability of Iraq. They may make any strong demand for radical land reform unlikely in the areas now already under cultivation. If developed with the enlightened guidance of the government, the new settlements may ultimately furnish striking demonstrations of the value of more advanced techniques in agriculture and animal husbandry as well as in social organization.

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423 Under a law approved by the Parliament in 1951 land recognized as government-owned *(miri sirf)* in the cadastral survey will apparently be reserved in the main for settlement by small-holders. However, land which can only be irrigated by high-lift pumps can still be granted in tracts up to 5,000 donums to individual holders. Projects for the development of *miri sirf* land are to be drawn up and carried out by the Development Board. Selection of the settlers and administration of the finished projects will be the responsibility of a committee headed by an official with the status of a Director General. Two or three other members will be appointed by the Council of Ministers. The area of each project will be a minimum of 2,000 donums in mountainous lands, 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated lands and 80,000 donums in the rain-fed region. Each settler will be assigned up to 20 donums in the mountainous areas, 100 donums in flow-irrigated areas, 200 donums in pump-irrigated and 400 donums in rain-fed lands.

Under the law every settler must agree to refrain from granting his rights in the land to others and from injuring his fellow settlers in any way, to follow the committee's instructions with respect to the cultivation of the land and the planting of a garden, and to build a house in accordance with plans prepared by the
● [425] committee. If he fulfills this agreement, he receives title to his allotment after 10 years without payment. For a further period of 10 years he has no right to alienate it or mortgage it except to the Agricultural Bank.

The law does not confine the distribution of land to qualified and experienced farmers. In fact, it specifies that up to 20 percent of the land in each project shall be distributed to retired army and police officers, soldiers and policemen who have served at least four years, and graduates of agricultural schools, provided the

[Marsh Arabs]

501 erable skill to navigate. They are capable of great speed and are driven either by a sail or by oars as the occasion requires. To a stranger they seem very unstable, but the Marsh Arab, who has practically lived in them ever since he was a baby, finds them abundantly stable and perfectly safe.

342 From a distance the houses occupied by these people are very picturesque. The reeds that grow in great abundance in the marshes of Lower Mesopotamia are gathered and when dry are tied in great bundles perhaps two feet in diameter. They are ten to fifteen feet tall or even more, and two bundles tied together at the tops are bent over to form an arch. Each of these arches forms one of the ribs of the house. They are placed every four to six feet, giving an air of solidity and dignity to the structure that is most unusual for this sort of simple architecture. Over these ribs a mat roof is constructed which is surprisingly tight even in the heaviest rains. The houses vary in size, and the largest ones, which serve as guest halls for the sheikhs and the rich, may be seventy-five feet long and twenty feet broad.

423 This agricultural district is peculiar in that while it
621 has a settled community engaged in agricultural pursuits,
there is no private ownership of land. The Marsh Arabs
form a group almost untouched by Europeans. In the
one district we visited all land is owned by the govern-
ment, in this case a sheikh far removed from the district.
[427 The only tax that he levies is a moderate rental for the
651] land. Apparently there is little difficulty in getting land;
● 425 at least no one complained of any trouble of that sort, nor
does there seem to be any difficulty in keeping the same
plot of land indefinitely if the cultivator wishes to do so.
000 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1

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distributed reclaimed state domain among the peasants. During the past few years the Ministry of Social Affairs, under energetic and progressive leadership, has been increasingly and effectively sponsoring the cause of the peasant. Among other things, it has proposed draft laws aimed at land reform and at improved tenancy terms. In July 1950, the Egyptian Parliament passed one of these bills, stipulating that estate owners should provide tenants with certain housing and health facilities, and with other services. During the last two years certain deputies have proposed two definite draft laws for land reform in Parliament. Similar proposals have been made by other responsible leaders. All of them aim straight at the heart of the problem — stipulating the distribution of state domain among peasants, the restriction of the size of holdings within minimum and maximum limits, the extension of credit to the new small owner, the protection of peasant property, the improvement of tenancy terms, etc.

I 423 M 423

A similar consciousness of the magnitude of the problem and the grave consequences it might entail has arisen in Iraq. As far back as 1932 a comprehensive program of land survey and registration was initiated and has been in operation since. At the end of 1947 about 20 million acres (close to 20 percent of the total area of the country) were surveyed and classified. This program constitutes a basic move in the right direction, as it results in clearing the great confusion over title claims.

I 423 312 166 425 M 423 425 166

In 1945 the Iraqi Parliament passed a bill (Law No. 23) authorizing the Government to distribute state domain among landless peasants or tribesmen on the basis of small private ownership. It was a small beginning as the application of the law was restricted to one specific area, the Dujaylah lands, in the Kut Liwa south of Baghdad. Some 180,000 acres were put under irrigation and divided into plots of about 60 acres each for distribution to farming families. After a probationary period of 10 years under government supervision, the farmer can acquire complete ownership of the land. At the beginning of 1947 about 400 cultivators were settled on the project land. Possibly an equal number has been settled since that time. In 1946 another project, the Hawijah Settlement Scheme, was finished. It involved the distribution of some 200,000 acres of irrigated state land among members of the 'Ubayd tribe.

423 twenty-first part of the total. The position of the share-tenant
427 in Iraq is much worse than that of his counterpart in Syria.

In the districts of flood irrigation the tribal system has disintegrated,
621 but its superstructure, the sheikhs and sirkals, remains.
622 Most of the political functions of the tribe have now
been transferred to the State, and the only economic function
312 now performed by the tribal authorities is the control of irrigation,
427 digging of canals, and repairing of breaches, which is
done by the cultivators under the direction of the sirkal who
has become a kind of farm bailiff acting for the sheikh. Under
this system the sheikh and sirkal take together up to 80 per cent
of the crop, leaving the cultivator some 20–30 per cent.

423 This exploitation is possible because the sheikhs have succeeded
in establishing, mainly during the last fifteen years, their title
425 to absolute ownership of the tribal land by means of land settlement.
Because in Ottoman times the cultivators had no legal title
to the land which they occupied, the landlords were able, during
the period of the mandate, to use their political power to secure
legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the property
of the tribe. In much the same way the English landlords of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enclosed land as their property
which was traditionally common property, and ousted
small holders whose title was based only on custom. As in nineteenth
century England, the process is being hastened by
mechanization, which gives the big landowners an advantage as
against the small cultivator, and by inflation, which gives them
565 the impetus to invest. The big landowners of Iraq are a comparatively
recent creation, and it is the economic and legal changes
of the past twenty years which have established their position.

423 *Northern Iraq*. In northern Iraq there is a different type of land
tenure and fewer large landowners. South of Mosul, in the fertile
471 Tigris Valley, where pumps have been installed, there is a tribal
system resembling that of the south, and the land is owned
mainly by tribal sheikhs and notables. West of Mosul, on the
rolling uplands with poor rainfall, the land is also held on
471 a tribal system. In this region in recent years there has been
a rapid introduction of machinery; and the sheikhs are extending
their power to acquire land. In future bigger imports of
machinery will probably cause them to extend their influence

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

471 over larger areas, much as the pump owners are doing on the Lower Tigris.

But in the north-eastern rain-fed zone, Kirkuk, Erbil, and
Sulaimaniya, the position of the cultivator is better. There is a
settled system of cultivation and a large part of the land is held
by small proprietors. In the plain lands of Kirkuk and Erbil as
much as 75 per cent of the land is held by small cultivators with
244 holdings up to 200 dunums. Here the method of cultivation is
much the same as in Syria, a *daim* (i.e. dry) crop being taken
every two years.

423 Here too the legal position is different. In this part of the
country, the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code remained in
425 force, and most of the land was registered in Turkish times.
Frequently the *agha* (or *mukhtar*), who was originally the patriarchal head of the village with the duty of maintaining order, has used his position to acquire land, and registered the land of the village under his own name. This has happened particularly often in the Kurd villages, where in spite of the Land Code's explicit prohibition of granting an entire village in the name of one person, the Turkish authorities, for the sake of peace, registered whole groups of villages in the names of the notables of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya.

427 But even though the landlords have obtained title to land, the share paid to them is much less than in the south, and amounts to only 10–20 per cent of the product.

426 Thus the problem of reforming tenure is here much less acute. As in Syria, peasant indebtedness is the major problem, but in the course of the recent war the high prices of grain have enabled the majority of the peasants to wipe off the burden of debt.

246 In the high mountain regions, however, particularly in the Zibar district, there is acute agricultural distress; a series of bad harvests due to plant disease, insect pests, and insecurity, has caused the agricultural economy to go steeply downhill in the past few years.

423 *Settlement of Title.* During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Government attempted to settle title to land under the Land Code, as it did in the rest of the Turkish Empire. The Code was extended to Iraq under Midhat Pasha with the object of registering occupiers of land and thereby granting them

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Iraq MH1

COTTON IN IRAQ

The problems of land tenure are generally cited as being a restriction to 423
agricultural development. One United Nations' study states the absence of settlement title is undoubtedly a major obstacle to expansion of cultivation of dry land and intensification of agriculture in irrigated or irrigable zones.[40] The same report also points out that the lack of adequate legislation on water rights is another serious defect.[41]

RESETTLEMENT

Sizable areas are being settled by the state under the provisions of a law 166
passed in 1951 which distributes about 67 acres per family to landless people,
agricultural school graduates, former civil service employees, pensioners, and 425 ●
the unemployed. The farming program on these projects is supervised 241
rigorously. On the 75,000-acre Dujaila Project on the Tigris River the prescribed planting program is as follows: 20 per cent in wheat, 15 per cent in barley, 5 per cent in fruit, 4 per cent in cotton and flax, 3 per cent in sesame, and 3 per cent in vegetables. Another 5 per cent will be devoted to housing, and the remaining 45 per cent must lie in fallow because of a water shortage.[42]

The Mission report criticized these land settlement schemes on several bases. The land is given to the farmers, the title being transferred after 10 years of successful operation. The Mission believes the land should be sold. The Mission also criticizes the allocation of land to people who have had no farming experience and who have not necessarily shown themselves to be suited by temperament for farming, and it expresses doubt that the program actually has improved the land or the farmer. The economic report stated: "The improved economic position of the cultivators in the new Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to his landlord."[43]

There are half a dozen other projects, involving 250,000 acres, in various stages of promotion which the Point Four Mission is being urged to assist in planning and supervising.

IRRIGATION

At present irrigation water is provided by the Kut and Hilla Barrages 312
on the upper Tigris River, several smaller ones on the lower reaches, and the Hindiya Barrage on the Euphrates River. The water is carried by pumps and canals. About 2 million acres are irrigated by pumps and another 4 to 5 million acres by gravity flow.

Estimates indicated cultivatable land can be expanded almost three times if water is available. Yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not permit even the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers during the spring flood season are clearly essential. The government already has initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage system for the Euphrates River and has let the contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The Development Board is undertaking also construction of three dams on the upper tributaries of the $\overset{1}{\wedge}$

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[40] *Land Reform*, United Nations, 1951, p. 27.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[42] *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, United Nations, December, 1949, p. 31.

[43] Boardman, Frances, "Iraq Moves Toward Land Reform," *Foreign Agriculture*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1951.

$\underset{\wedge}{1}$- [Text continues on p. 97--Analyst]

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

453 ID 50,507 and no arrangements for repayment had been made by the end of the year on loans amounting to ID 120,934. A sum of ID 53,303 was received on loans which had fallen due in 1948-49, but in that year the total loans for which due dates were postponed or for which no repayment arrangements were made aggregated ID 98,983. Although the Bank claims it will ultimately be able to collect on all its loans, there appears to be a need for much stricter and prompter collection and perhaps also for more careful scrutiny of loan applications to make sure that they are intended for productive purposes. The Bank must be quite free of any political pressures and capable of granting and collecting loans without fear or favor.

426 One of the most difficult problems is the provision of credit to
453 the sharecropping fellah. Under present conditions he cannot get a loan from the Bank because he is unable to offer adequate security. The Bank generally makes loans only on the security of mortgages, although it can also accept as security tangible, nonperishable, movable property other than crops in the field or stored on the farm. To some extent it also grants loans on the guarantee of the government or on the joint guarantee of a number of recipients. Of the loans outstanding on March 31, 1950, ID 538,752 were secured by immovable property, ID 18,634 by joint guarantee
426 and ID 9,601 by government guarantee. The fellah must turn to the landlord or some private moneylender for credit. Under the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators enacted in 1933 any advances made by the landlord are in theory free of interest. Actually, however, the "advance" is generally in kind—i.e. in seed, draft animals, machinery, etc.—and the return to the landlord is in the form of a larger share of the crop which conceals a very heavy interest charge. One of the prime needs is to give the fellah access to better means of production and on much more reasonable terms. The organization of cooperatives among the fellahin would seem to be the best means of accomplishing this, since the Agricultural Bank is authorized to lend to cooperatives on the joint guarantee of its members.

Iraq MHI

423 tribal organization there was no clear definition of individual rights of ownership to the collectively-owned land. It was a
619 system which could exist as long as no one thought about it; as long, that is, as the tribe was accepted as the unit of political life, and as long as no individual claims were likely to be made. It is for this reason that it is impossible, once the tribal system has ceased to be the political unit, to settle land on a tribal basis; and yet to settle land on the basis of the supposed individual claims creates grave injustice, because in practice it means that too much land is allotted to the sheikhs and that the cultivators are reduced to the position of tenants or labourers.

439 Since the early years of the twentieth century the tribal system has been breaking up, and the economic development of the country in the twenty years between the wars has hastened its disintegration. When water transport came to the Persian Gulf towards the end of the nineteenth century, export markets opened for Iraq grain; the subsistence economy broke down and production for export began. Exports of grain increased from 65,000 tons in the early eighteen-nineties to 120,000 tons in 1909–13, and to 380,000 tons in 1934–9. The profitability of
556 export has given the tribal chiefs a motive for acquiring land as their personal property.

The tendency to acquire land for the sake of money income was much strengthened, in the twenty years between the two wars, by the rapid extension of pump irrigation and the accompanying increase in the cultivated area. Pump installations
312 have increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,000 in 1944, and provide
● 426 water for some 2½ million acres of land, or over half the cultivated land in the irrigated zone. The installation of a pumping system is comparatively cheap, costing some £2,000 before the recent war, but it is far beyond the means of the peasants, so that pumps have been installed by sheikhs, or more frequently by city notables, who make contracts to supply them to peasants at extortionate rates of interest, and so gradually acquire the land in payment of debt. In many cases the sub-chiefs, or sirkals, have become pump owners.

423 Thus in the regions of pump irrigation the tribal system has entirely ceased to function. The land is mainly the property of
427 the pump owners, with the cultivators taking a meagre share of the crop, varying from one-seventh to one-fourteenth or one-

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

471 over larger areas, much as the pump owners are doing on the Lower Tigris.

But in the north-eastern rain-fed zone, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, the position of the cultivator is better. There is a settled system of cultivation and a large part of the land is held by small proprietors. In the plain lands of Kirkuk and Erbil as much as 75 per cent of the land is held by small cultivators with 244 holdings up to 200 dunums. Here the method of cultivation is much the same as in Syria, a *daim* (i.e. dry) crop being taken every two years.

423 Here too the legal position is different. In this part of the country, the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code remained in 425 force, and most of the land was registered in Turkish times. Frequently the *agha* (or *mukhtar*), who was originally the patriarchal head of the village with the duty of maintaining order, has used his position to acquire land, and registered the land of the village under his own name. This has happened particularly often in the Kurd villages, where in spite of the Land Code's explicit prohibition of granting an entire village in the name of one person, the Turkish authorities, for the sake of peace, registered whole groups of villages in the names of the notables of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya.

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25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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427 Out of this 40 per cent the fellah must also pay a rent for the upkeep of the canals which irrigate the holding; this may amount to 20–45 per cent of his share.

● 426 At the beginning of the season the fellah receives in advance from the employer:

	Dinars
300 kg wheat	1.800
150 kg barley	.525
Cash in 3 instalments	3.750
	6.075
Seasonal interest 30 per cent	1.800
TOTAL	7.875

1 Dinar = £1 sterling

He is not as a rule able to repay the loans from the sale of the produce, and so gets deeper and deeper into debt to the landowner. Thus there has evolved a particular kind of debt-serfdom: a landowner who needs labour from one estate can pay an advance to a whole village or several villages, and so obtain 'the right to demand the transference of the land workers thus "freed" from their debts to his lands.'[1]

651 Changes in taxation have also benefited the big landowners. To promote the expansion of pump irrigation, land irrigated with pumps was partially exempted from taxation. The reform of taxation under the Istihlak law of 1931 has also operated mainly to the advantage of the large landowners.[2]

427 Thus the former tribesman in Iraq has been reduced to the position of a serf-tenant, who is entangled in crushing indebtedness, and so is tied to the holding which he cultivates.

423 In spite of the wise recommendations of Sir Ernest Dowson's report, and the advisory efforts of British officials to improve
427 the security of the small cultivator, it cannot be said that land
185 settlement has succeeded in removing the oppressive character of the land system. Nor has any reform been made to permit the development of State land.

423 As regards water-rights, there is the same situation as in Palestine and Transjordan; attempts at legislation have been
185 frustrated by local interests, and here the need for legislation is

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[1] ibid., p. 55.

[2] See P. W. Ireland, *Iraq, A Study in Political Development* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1937), pp. 440–1.

of Naṣir Pasha and later of his son Faliḥ to turn the tribesmen into 619 docile tenants on the Saʿdun estates (which Ottoman land-registration 579 policy had demarcated and bestowed under the feet of the age-long cultivators), and the attempt of Manṣur Pasha and later of his son, Saʿdun, to maintain all their old independence. Thus personal ambition and hatred joined with a clear issue of policy, with Government playing a rôle of vacillating opportunism. Year after year tribal war went on, with Turkish forces sometimes participating; civil government was almost wholly inoperative; yet settlement and tribe-breaking were all the time half-visibly proceeding. The day of a quiet tithe-paying Muntafiq peasantry was still distant; the fear of a united Muntafiq army was long past.

The middle-Euphrates tribes present for this period a confused picture of intricate local history. Typical of them are the Bani Ḥuchaym (Ḥukaym), the Shibil, Fatla, Khazaʿil, Bani Ḥasan, and the tribes of ʿAfak and Daghara, most of whom had been lately converted to Shiʿism and fell thereby under Mujtahid influence. Their records for the later nineteenth century show the increasing settlement of their shepherd sections, and the gradual introduction of rapacious yet feeble Turkish tax-gatherers. They show the endless bickering between tribes, accompanied by the bluster, looting, and unaimed rifle-fire which passes for tribal warfare; and the bitterer strife for the vacant headship of tribes, in which Mudir or Qa'immaqam would interfere when he could. In spite of the rare emergence of a unifying leader, the tendency was towards levelling, division, disunity. This was aided by the spread of the [423] new land-registry system and by the purchase of whole estates by the Saniya Administration which could develop its lands without tribal agency. The shifting of the Euphrates waters from the eastern to the western channel (p. 32) had profound effects in displacing the tribes, led to clashes, secessions, and invasions, and added to the immediate authority of Government as the only possible controller of Euphrates waters.

On the lower Tigris the close of the century was stormy with civil war. With lesser marsh tribes and the new non-tribal townships, the dominant groups were those of the camel-owning, grain-growing Bani Lam and the rice-growing Albu Muḥammad. The prosperity of both tribes depended on the Government allotment of the *muqaṭaʿas*,[1] whose periodical distribution led to bitter L quarrelling. To the normal causes of tribal war was thus added a perpetual irritant, and to its normal practices that of preying on the Tigris river traffic. Armed attacks on this were a common

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[1] The *muqaṭaʿa* was (and is) a defined area (in some cases of great extent and 427 productive value) of irrigable land, leased for a cash annual rent to a tribal shaykh; possession of a better *muqaṭaʿa* was an object of the keenest rivalry.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI.

An Inquiry

INTO

LAND TENURE AND RELATED QUESTIONS

PART I.—SCOPE AND PROCEDURE OF INQUIRY

185 1. The considerations which led Government to ask me to visit el 'Iraq in the winter-spring season 1929-30 were briefly summarised at the time. The necessity of setting up a sound system of settlement and registration of rights to land as an essential preliminary to agricultural development was urged. It was represented that until effective measures to achieve these ends had been devised and put into operation, agricultural development must either be delayed or based on unstable foundations. It was emphasised that while the country was full of agricultural possibilities and only required development on sound lines, it lacked the necessary basis of a sound system of land registration. And it was explained that the Departments of Revenue, of Land Registration and of State Domains were pursuing reform without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan.

The main objective was the promotion of agricultural development. The particular needs were adjudged to be (i) the execution of a settlement of rights to land throughout the country, (ii) the establishment of an efficient system of book-keeping of those rights, and (iii) the unification of divergent and disconnected Departmental efforts. I was asked to study the problem as a whole and to advise how it should be attacked. As outlined that problem appeared to be essentially one of organisation and procedure for attaining two accepted objectives: a just settlement, and an efficient register, of rights to land. I anticipated that the requisite information regarding existing conditions would be readily available: and I expected that the discussions of previous years would have produced clearly defined issues. But I had not allowed for the peculiar fluidity and diversity of methods of land tenure practised.

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427 It proved to be common knowledge that the tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all. It was also common knowledge that the land law was defective and uncertain in its application to the other fifth. And it soon appeared that there was an almost complete lack of precise, authoritative and systematic information in the Headquarter Offices of Government in regard to land conditions generally and to the methods of holding, transferring and transmitting land actually practised from day to day by the great mass of landholders and agricultural peasantry throughout all parts of the country.

121 It therefore became necessary to extend the scope of my inquiry to include an investigation of the conditions of land tenure actually operating throughout the country, as distinct (for the most part) from those

assignable tenure, in accordance with the provisions of Book I of the 423 Land Code and connected legislation. This tenure can only exist in virtue of an express grant from the State. To be valid such a grant must be registered in the Land Registry and be vouched for by a certificate of such registration (tapu sanad). A prescriptive right to a grant of State land in tapu tenure (known as haq el qarar) is recognised by the Ottoman Code, although the exact meaning of certain important conditions of such recognition is still debated.

Under the regular operation of the Land Code all State land held and used by the public should be acquired and possessed in tapu tenure. The rights and obligations of this tenure are for the most part admirable. But, as already emphasised, its operation depends upon (i) a systematic initial granting of State land under this form of tenure to those judged best entitled to it, and (ii) the construction and subsequent maintenance to date of an exact and reliable Land Register of the rights conferred or derived thereunder. No systematic initial grant of tapu tenure was made or indeed can have been practicable when the Code was introduced. Consequently tapu tenure remained an occasional and imperfectly realised privilege of the few, instead of the regular tenure of State land it was intended to be. In many cases grants in tapu tenure were no doubt made to those best entitled to enjoy its rights and best able to discharge its obligations. But as a rule grants were made without any satisfactory investigation of conflicting claims. And in nearly all cases the definition of the land, which was purported to be affected, was incredibly ambiguous and vague.

Under these circumstances it would have been impossible to construct and maintain an intelligible and reliable Register of tapu tenure, even if the methods of doing so had been better understood. Actually a study of the working of the Ottoman Land Registries both in el 'Iraq and elsewhere demonstrates that this knowledge was lacking. Indeed the wider experience of the world shows that the construction and maintenance of a reliable Land Register has presented serious difficulties even to the best organised and equipped administrations.

The Ottoman Government had recognised before the war their failure to apply tapu tenure throughout their territories, as well as the basic causes of that failure. And they had enacted legislation empowering a systematic re-investigation and settlement of rights to land to be made vilayet by vilayet. It was intended that this settlement of rights should be based on a cadastral survey and be accompanied by a comprehensive valuation of the land and the establishment of an entirely new Land Register.*

4. The granting of tapu tenure in so many cases throughout el 'Iraq, [579] without proper investigation and settlement either (i) of the rights of those already attached to the soil or (ii) of the boundaries of the parcels which were purported to be affected, sowed a crop of conflicting claims throughout the country, which bore the seed of perpetual discontent and hardship, and in some districts periodically produced violent outbursts of lawlessness. The registered tapu holder (mutasarrif), who [427] possibly had family or economic ties with the land, who probably had conformed with the formalities prescribed by a Land Registry Official, and who no doubt acquired his uncertain rights for valuable or other consideration, claimed the position of landowner (mallak).† As such he demanded the landowner's share (mallakiya) in the produce, and asserted his right to mortgage the land and to bring in new cultivators if he wished.

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* Ottoman Provisional Law of Survey and Registration of Immovable Property, 1 Rabi Awal, 1331.

† *Mallak* should properly be restricted to mulk property. A tapu holder is not an owner, but a *mutasarrif* or the holder of registered usufructuary possession (*tasarruf*).

647 423 records of miri land, such management and control as is possible of these heterogeneous and extensive territories must be carried out primarily in the district by persons in direct touch with the people and the parcels affected. Many questions are no doubt settled by the customary social leaders as elsewhere (e.g. tribal sheikhs) and never reach the administration. Those that do may in some cases be dealt with by one of the few local officers of the State Domains or even by another Department (e.g. on the Yuseffya by the Irrigation). But ordinarily the effective agents of Government in the control of miri lands are the officers of the provincial administration on the spot, who must act for the most part according to their individual judgment or on the instructions of their provincial superiors in each case. This local control is naturally subject to the direction, and occasionally to the intervention, of the State Domains service or the Ministry to which it is responsible. It is also necessarily subject to intervention by the Ministry of the Interior or of any other Ministry, whose public responsibilities may be affected by some action taken. It is further subject to intervention by any Deputy or influential private person who may be concerned or interested.

423 622 In a limited number of cases, disputes affecting the holding of miri land are decided under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, because of their reaction on tribal peace and public security. But since such disputes in theory merely concern the domestic management by Government of its own estates, they do not as a rule fall within the jurisdiction of any regular Court of Justice. Reference has already been made to the general failure to introduce the Land Code and more particularly tapu tenure effectively. Consequently by the side of a truncated and semi-atrophied Statute Law there have survived throughout the greater majority of the land, methods of acquiring and holding land which have never been regulated by law at all.

423 427 2. An attempt has already been made to illustrate in broad outline the conditions under which land has been for the most part occupied and cultivated in the rainfall zone. There are commonly two classes of people concerned. Firstly (*a*) the larger man, who may be the local Agha or a small capitalist who has helped to develop the land by providing funds, seed, etc. Secondly (*b*) the actual cultivator who, in the mountainous districts, has tamed the wilderness by building terraces, constructing water channels, clearing the ground, etc., and who, in the plains, has similarly, if less laboriously, reclaimed the land by regular tillage and fallow. It is evident that in actual fact a partnership commonly existed or exists between these two classes.

Now it is generally accepted that the intention of the Ottoman legislator, when promulgating the Land Code, was to establish the actual cultivator on the land; and when that cultivator has remained on the same land and effected improvements of a capital nature by his labour, his claim is clear. But the claim of the larger man instanced, who will almost invariably have co-operated in some indispensable way (e.g. by according protection, providing capital or essential assistance), who has very likely been acknowledged as landlord (mallak) and perhaps regularly received mallakiya, cannot be equitably or advisedly disregarded. Investigation on the spot would be needed to weigh the respective claims in each case; but it can be seen that, broadly speaking, local conditions have often produced an association in the development and cultivation of the land between local overlord and cultivating holder in these regions, in which both have rights that should be recognised in their mutual interest as well as that of the country at large.

423 619 In the Irrigation Zone and throughout the desert borders the Turks found the land for the most part in the hands of tribal confederations.

166 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick
178 building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer (mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district
423 (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended,
651 wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many
619 liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective: but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent
619 years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants
427 at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

Government Department, certainly beyond the power of the organisation and resources so far devoted to the purpose. 423 427

This is not to say that no systematic efforts have been made to put the tenure of miri land on to a more secure and orderly basis. Many such efforts have been made throughout the country by Provincial Officers, the Irrigation Department, the Survey and others. Foremost among them must be mentioned the periodic revenue settlements in Amara, which not only defined the limits of the various tribal interests there, but have also tended to stabilise many lesser holdings. A valuable fiscal survey of a large part of the Basra Date Gardens has been done. A business-like survey, allotment and record of land accompanied the construction of the Yusefiya, and other canals: and pains have been taken to keep these records up to date. In the Dulaim liwa a careful list of all the holders of recognised parcels of land has been compiled and subsequent changes noted. Other instances could be given. Naturally, all the resulting compilations have serious imperfections regarded as permanent records of the rights admitted to miri land: but this was not usually their primary purpose and such imperfections were inevitable in the conditions under which the investigations had to be made. And whatever the imperfections of such undertakings may be, they deserve grateful recognition and they should materially facilitate further stabilisation of tenure. 427 185

But it must none the less be admitted that these were all detached uncorrelated efforts owing no inspiration to any concerted attempt of the Central Government to improve the position of the mass of holders of miri land. Broadly speaking, those who occupy and cultivate miri land are allowed to do so in the absence of more influential opposition. Possession is ordinarily nine points of the law: but neither long possession nor any other mode of acquisition confers security. Personal influence with the most effective arbiter is commonly the decisive factor at any moment in any particular land dispute: and anyone may find the most convincing claims set aside. Moreover, any dispute may be reopened at any time if circumstances promise a more favourable consideration of a disappointed party's case.

Having regard to the history of the land, the widespread acceptance of tribal rather than individual rights, and the extensive and ill-defined areas affected, this state of affairs is not really remarkable: but it none the less calls for recognition and progressive remedy.

5-7. PUMP DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIVERAIN TRACTS

5. As is well known there has been a rapid and extensive development of irrigation by privately owned pumps during the last ten years throughout the high level tracts bordering the main waterways (see Plates I and II). As is also well known, the confident expectations of an early and profitable return on the considerable sums sunk in this development have been largely disappointed. 312

Persevering efforts have been made to obtain consistent and comprehensive statistics of the numbers of pumps erected, of the horse power of those pumps and of the areas irrigable by them: but owing to the records having been differently dealt with at different times and in the various liwas and departments concerned, it has not been found possible to do so. Although this is disappointing, in view of the interest and importance of this development, it is not surprising. And I have none the less been enabled to illustrate the rapidity and extent of the

312 seriously, many a decisively, injurious effect on the success of pump development as a whole. These difficulties all call for careful study and for steady and carefully considered ameliorative measures. They are, however, for the most part outside of the scope of this report. But underlying and aggravating all other difficulties there is a widely prevailing uncertainty of rights to hold and to exploit the land affected. This has in many cases poisoned the relations between the two classes mainly interested in the majority of these enterprises and reduced to a minimum the prospects of their successful co-operation. And it has nearly always left the rights and the obligations of those concerned injuriously indefinite towards both the Government and to those associated with them. Consequently the bulk of these pump-fed areas have never received the single-minded and unified agricultural management that was, and is, an essential condition of success. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the other adverse conditions recited would in any case have prevented the general and widespread success anticipated. But a number of instances have been given me of pump ventures that have proved profitable in spite of these handicaps, because unified management was, for one reason or another, possible and realised.

427 311 Be this as it may, it is indisputable that the prospects of general success would have been increased if in all cases the rights to the land affected had been authoritatively settled and the requisite unification of agricultural control had been secured, before capital and energy had been so lavishly expended on these ventures. It was most unfortunate that this remarkable agricultural development should have coincided with the singularly unstable economic period that has followed the war. But it can also be recognised now, in the light of experience, that the rush to develop these riverain tracts was carried out without sufficient preparation and foresight, and at a rate and to an extent which made too drastic demands upon the adaptability and the numbers of the primitive agricultural population upon whose efforts success ultimately depended.

311 312 The riverain tracts, which are primarily affected, are among the most valuable agricultural areas in the country, because (*a*) of their contiguity to the main waterways and roadways, (*b*) of the natural fertility of the alluvium deposited along the river ridges which contain them, and (*c*) of their relatively high levels, which facilitate drainage and minimise the dangers of high floods. But owing to the last quality any regular cultivation of these tracts necessitates the installation of some artificial means of lifting the water from the adjacent waterway on to the land.

312 Prior to the recent pump development such artificial means of water lifting were virtually confined to the local water wheel (kerid) or to other simple devices, operated by animal or man power. Where kerid cultivation exists to-day it seems not infrequently to be more efficient than pump cultivation, since the more laboriously acquired water tends to be more carefully used and the land to be more carefully tilled to receive it. So it may be accepted that where cultivation by kerid or other simple lifting devices existed previously, such cultivation was usually good of its kind.

311 [464] It therefore appears that until recent years cultivation in these valuable tracts was restricted to certain fringes watered by the simple types of lift mentioned, supplemented by rain in good years, and by flood water, through flood channels, when and where conditions permitted. And since land was comparatively plentiful and cultivators comparatively scarce, the parcels of land actually cultivated varied incessantly to meet soil impoverishment, flood devastations, river

changes, canal silting, tribal movements, Central Government action, or 311
other circumstances.

7. With relatively little exception the riverain tracts affected are 311
miri land. It has been noted how the cultivation previously shifted 423
therein in response to changing circumstances. The prescriptive claims
to pasture were naturally even more variable and indeterminate. It is 427
consequently not surprising that as the pump development movement 312
extended, these riverain tracts were found so closely interpenetrated by
prescriptive claims (lazma) of one sort or another, that few areas suitable
for pump development were unaffected. These claims constituted a
serious obstacle to the general development of the riverain tracts by
pump installations. For at first the claimants as a whole had neither the
desire, nor the enterprise, nor the ability to raise the capital needed to
undertake this development themselves.

In discussing these prescriptive claims earlier their primarily tribal 427
origin was mentioned: and it appears that the prescriptive rights recog- 312
nised by the provincial authorities in pump agreements are preponder-
antly of such origin and character. These pump agreements may be 622
made in the name of a sheikh or sirkal, but he stands as the tribal or
sub-tribal, representative. No doubt when the sheikh or sirkal is a forcible person, he may engulf in his own person the rights of his tribal associates. Alternatively when the sheikh or sirkal is a man of straw, unable to lead his section or keep it together, he may be displaced, and even lose his strictly tribal share in the common holding. In a number of cases, after the movement started and its potentialities had become more apparent, a sheikh or other leading member of a tribal section which claimed prescriptive rights over a promising area, himself erected a pump and cultivated the area with the labour of the other members of the section. Under these circumstances the difficulties of divided interests and divided control, so frequently attending these pump ventures, may not arise. And so far as my information goes it is pump ventures inaugurated and worked by a capable tribal leader under these conditions that promise to be the most successful.

But enterprising townsmen and others with tribal affiliations, who 427
wished to participate in the movement usually had to search for a suit- 312
able stretch of miri land and enter into an agreement with some group of
claimants to prescriptive rights over it. No very definite procedure was 311
required. The process may be loosely generalised somewhat as follows. An enterprising individual, having some miri land of uncertain limits and subject to uncertain prescriptive claims in mind, decided to buy a pump and engine, the capacity of which usually depended as much on his financial resources as the situation and extent of the land to be watered. He applied to the Governor of the Province for permission to erect the installation. This always necessitated a permit from the Irrigation Department (under the Irrigation and Embankments Law), and when the land was miri (as it usually was) the approval of the State Domains Department and the issue of a lease by them.

The Irrigation Department checked the suitability of the installation to the extent of land, according to the information given; and if they had the means tried to locate the land and check the area on a map. Otherwise the figures had to be accepted as notified. And even when the capacity of the installation and the area of the land (as quoted) were discrepant, it was often found that the pump had already been bought. The Department also tried to ensure that the site of the pumping plant was wisely chosen in regard to flood and low stage river conditions, as well as the distribution of the water for cultivation.

The State Domains Department acted through the provincial authorities, who necessarily had no better information as to the situation

427 and extent of the land affected than could be furnished to, or provided by, the Irrigation Department.

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312 But probably the two most unsatisfactory features of the proceedings were (i) the failure to settle the rights of prescriptive claimants definitely before allowing agreements to be made with them as *de facto* landholders, and (ii) the loose and unsatisfactory agreements, commonly entered into, between these claimants and the pump owners.

It is apparent now that it would have saved time, money and a great deal of trouble in the long run to have investigated and settled all prescriptive claims at the outset. It was reasonable and equitable that prescriptive claims based on effective exploitation of the soil should be recognised. But such recognition should have been coupled with an equally definite limitation of the claimants' rights to these specifically recognised areas. It was clearly unreasonable and contrary to the public interest that, in addition to such properly recognisable rights, a vague mass of indefinite and shifting claims should be allowed to persist and to interfere with the economic development of these tracts as a whole. It was desirable when the opportunity occurred to define alike the rights of prescriptive holders and the balance of unincumbered miri land free for exploitation by other parties under lease or grant from the State. And since the object of pump development was a much greater extension of cultivation it was evident that the necessarily restricted limits of previously existing cultivation would tend to be obliterated thereby. Consequently, if prescriptive claims were to be recognised on the only clear and equitable basis possible—that of effective exploitation of the land—it was important to investigate and record the existing limits of such exploitation before these limits were effaced.

If this had been more evident at the time, such claimants could no doubt have been justly accorded considerably smaller areas than are now claimed, while the Government would have secured a balance of free miri land irrigable by pump which might have been leased directly to those desirous of erecting pumps. No doubt in these circumstances the areas available for lease to pump owners would often have been awkwardly interspersed with the recognised prescriptive holdings; but this was unavoidable unless such claims had been repudiated. And if both parties had known exactly where they were at the outset, agreements between them could have been entered into on a much more satisfactory basis than was as a rule actually possible.

As it is the peculiar difficulties that have arisen in the tenure of these riverain holdings have been primarily occasioned by the uncertainty of the respective rights of pump owner and prescriptive holder, when these are different parties. When they are united in one person, or in a tribal or other group that displays effective cohesion, current difficulties for the most part resolve into those commonly attaching to the holding of miri land elsewhere. It is true that certain obligations are due to the situation of these holdings in proximity to the main waterways (e.g. the maintenance of flood protection) but these can be separately considered and were neither new nor unexpected.

So the problem of the riverain holdings in which pump development has taken place may be regarded essentially as a particular case of the general problem of the tenure of miri land. But this merely makes at least a provisional solution of this larger question the more imperative. And any such solution, when applied to the pump areas, must also provide for the definition and reconciliation of the respective rights of pump owners and prescriptive holders, when separate parties in a joint undertaking.

PART V.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS,

LAND REGISTER AND LAND SURVEY

1–5. Preliminary Considerations

1. The growth and maintenance of agricultural prosperity will primarily depend upon the intensification and multiplication of well-directed individual effort and enterprise on the part of the numerous body of persons, large and small, who effectively possess and manage for the time being, the holdings scattered throughout the 90,000 square kilometres of agriculturally productive land in the country. These landholders are the indispensable builders of national prosperity. The legislative and administrative policy of Government should be directed to strengthening, guiding and encouraging them as a body in their struggle on their innumerable estates and holdings to erect the fabric of a stable and progressive agricultural economy. And such an economy can only be established on the foundation of a stable land tenure. 000

No man engaged in the management and cultivation of a landholding, large or small, can be expected to sink his capital in the land and devote his energies unreservedly to its development, if he is uncertain whether he and his heirs will benefit by his husbandry. And the evils of such insecurity are aggravated if taxation of the land is uncertain, may be heavy and is variably assessed. When the development and cultivation of a holding is beyond the unaided powers of the landholder and his family (or is a group interest of any sort) it is no less essential to have unity of control coupled with willing and effective collaboration. In other words, conflicting rights and interests in the land must be reconciled wherever they occur, and adequate remuneration and satisfactory working conditions for agricultural capital, management and labour all be forthcoming.

The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Everyone directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent enquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole. And since the cultivation of the soil and the grazing of flocks comprises the livelihood and well-being of the vast majority of the population, the greater part of the time of officers of the provincial administration is taken up with attempts to regulate spasmodically and 423 427

423 ephemerally the unceasing stream of disputes concerning or arising out
427 of the possession and use of land.

The confusion of land tenure throughout the country generally is not confined to one category of land. While it may be more general in the case of miri land, it is also common in the case of tapu land. The long-standing and bitter disputes in the Muntafiq area regarding land claimed to be held by tapu sanad are the most notorious, but far from the only, illustration of this. Similar uncertainties are common throughout the country, in regard to land claimed in tapu tenure, to land and trees claimed to be mulk possessions, and to land dedicated, or claimed to have been dedicated, under the various forms of waqf.

185 The execution of an effective reform of land tenure throughout el 'Iraq is a formidable undertaking and one which under the most favourable conditions is bound to take a great many years to complete. It is easy enough to draft bills designed to bring about academic reforms and to get these passed into law: but it is a very difficult matter to ensure that such enactments are beneficial and workable in sober practice and even more difficult to ensure their steady, intelligent and impartial application over the long term of years that must intervene between the introduction and the accomplishment throughout the whole country of the thorough-going reforms that are needed. But serious as the difficulties to be encountered are, they will yield, as they have done elsewhere, to intelligent, sincere and persevering attack.

185 2. The late State Domains Department warmly espoused and stead-
423 fastly advocated the implementation of the original attempt of the Ottoman administration to grant out all cultivated miri land on tapu tenure. This policy was loosely and, I venture to think, misleadingly termed the alienation of miri land. For alienation denotes an estrangement of legal ownership whereas such ownership (el raqaba) is specifically reserved to the State under tapu tenure. The correction has more than legal significance; because the expression "alienation of State land" connoted, both to the Department itself and to the public, the adoption of a new, a beneficial, and a feasible policy of distributing land hitherto held by the State to private, and for the most part to peasant, proprietors. Tapu tenure, as already noted, was expressly intended in the country of its origin to promote a body of industrious peasant proprietors and taxpayers.

423 In sober fact the overwhelming majority of the cultivated holdings,
427 classified as miri in el 'Iraq, has for generations been in the hands of the people. Its possession is sufficiently subject to local or central interference to cause great individual insecurity of tenure, and all the evils resulting therefrom, as we have noticed. But while the legal ownership of the State is indisputable, its exercise of such ownership is, for the most part ineffective, uncertain and spasmodic. This is inevitable under existing conditions and is bound to remain so until they have been remedied.

The reform attempted by the Turks, and advocated again by the State Domains Department, was not, therefore, in any real sense, a substitution of private for public ownership of land. It was essentially no more than the legal regularisation in a prescribed form of the already widely existing private or communal holding of miri land. Some such reconciliation of actual with lawful tenure of miri land is indispensable if general security of tenure is to be established at all: and the greatest sympathy must be felt with the desire to effect this reconciliation through the medium of an established statutory tenure.

But the failure of the Ottoman Government to apply tapu tenure, either generally or effectively, alone constitutes a weighty warning against the adoption of this course. For there is no doubt about the earnestness or the persistence of the Turkish efforts, and nothing to show that el 'Iraq is better situated or equipped to succeed to-day. It has already been noted that even where tapu tenure is nominally in force at present in the country, neither its rights nor its obligations are secured; while the limits to which it purports to apply are rarely known. To a lesser extent the same is true of mulk.

Again, admirable as the underlying principles of tapu tenure for the most part are, the greater part of el 'Iraq is not yet ripe for the complete freedom of individual dealing with and mortgaging land that it confers. So long as tribal and other communal divisions remain strong, unrestricted individual freedom to dispose of land would be dangerous to public peace and contentment. And, until the great mass of smaller holders have gained much greater economic stability and experience than at present they possess, any general freedom to mortgage holdings would merely be an incitement to the piling up of unproductive debt. Moreover, a thorough and carefully considered review of the future needs of the country in the way of public works, of areas to be utilised as extensive pasture, or developed as forests, fisheries, etc., of territories to be otherwise specially ear-marked for communal or other reasons, should precede any appreciable extension of tapu tenure.

8. If the general introduction of tapu tenure of cultivated miri land must, on sober consideration, be dismissed as neither practicable nor desirable under present conditions, what is the alternative? In the first place, no single stereotyped tenure is applicable throughout the whole country or probably ever will be.

Thus, since a considerable part of the country is recognised as lawfully, if loosely and indefinitely, held in tapu tenure already, that tenure can no more be abrogated forthwith than it can be generally extended. Any comprehensive reform of land tenure in the country must include a rigid scrutiny of all existing claims to tapu tenure, the precise definition of the areas affected, and a thorough revision and clarification of the provisions of that tenure to make it workable and consequently recordable. But fresh grants in tapu tenure should be prohibited or very severely restricted, until this had been done.

Again, specific undertakings have been given by successive Governments in respect of the conversion of miri groves and gardens into either tapu or mulk tenure. Owing to the inexactness of the terminology commonly employed, the undertakings have been interpreted in both senses. These undertakings must clearly be honoured in one way or the other. But if the Government's promises permit, it would at least be advisable to restrict mulk proprietorship to the physical limits of well-established groves and gardens. In any case, here again, a systematic investigation of claims, definition of areas and formulation of clearer and more practicable conditions are needed. The areas affected are scattered all over the country.

Yet again, it has been foreshadowed that parcels of miri land—at least within the municipal limits of the more important towns—occupied by buildings which are classed as of a permanent character, shall be regularly recognised as mulk. And there are many other demands of urban tenure requiring attention, which cannot be entered into here.

There also exist numerous stretches of miri land already utilised

423 for public purposes (e.g. as public waterways, railways, roads) which
427 should be formally reserved forthwith as public utility areas.

It thus appears, on a most cursory examination, that there is a large, a pressing, and a complicated programme of practical reform waiting to be done in the existing legal categories of mulk, tapu and matruka (or manafa' umumiya) land alone. The complementary task of establishing the overwhelming balance of miri land on a securer and economically sounder basis is even more formidable. This balance, it will be remembered, includes the riverain tracts, the settlement of whose complex problems is probably the most imperative agrarian question of all.

185 The conclusion is inevitable that if any effective reform of existing land tenure is to be established at all throughout the country as a whole within the life-time of the present generation, it must be initiated and maintained on the simplest lines that will satisfy the bare essentials of equitable settlement of existing claims, of substantial security of subsequent tenure, and of even and economical taxation. Simplification of the land law and of the practical working of all tenures ; simplification of the procedure of cadastral survey, of settlement and record of rights ; simplification of fiscal assessment and collection, must be given the utmost possible consideration throughout.

4. It will be easier to see what simplifications of tapu tenure are desirable and justly possible when the existing provisions of that tenure have been analysed as applied or applicable in el 'Iraq to-day (see vii, 1). But from the point of view of the national interest the necessity of securing a fair and proper valuation of tapu acquisition payments (e.g. tapu mithl or bedl mithl) on all initial grants in this tenure is probably the most important. The enormous territories of miri land now existing constitute the principal capital of the nation and any transfer of rights over such land to individuals should be accompanied by equivalent advantages to the public purse. Timely provision against excessive shareholding, and for the nomination of authorised representatives when there are more than two or three shareholders, should also not be overlooked.

But since the vast majority of the cultivated land in el 'Iraq is miri, the necessity for the general simplification just emphasised applies with greatest force to this category of land. In general the simplest, the quickest and probably the only feasible method of placing the tenure of miri land on to a more satisfactory basis, is to accept to the utmost possible extent the present simple concepts and practices and to concentrate upon making their application more systematic, more equitable and more sure. It is evident that for many years to come at least, the tenure of the great mass of miri land throughout the country must be regulated locally, if it is to be governed by law at all. It is always possible for the central Government to intervene in particular cases here and there : but in the overwhelming majority of cases the questions that arise from day to day must continue to be decided on the spot by the people among themselves, or by the authority of a local public officer (e.g. mudir el nahiya) who is familiar with both the people and the land concerned. Consequently any tenure that is to be operative in practice must be understood by, and commend itself to, the judgment of the mass of actual landholders, social leaders and provincial authorities. Simple principles and simple procedure thus understood and accepted can be made to provide the foundation for an attainable reform which, modest though it may be, is preferable to the pursuit of more theoretically perfect tenures, which will inevitably sleep in the statute books because neither people, nor effective authority, nor conditions are ripe for their application. But desirable as it is to put the land tenure as rapidly as

> and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would 423
> be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of
> holdings, small or large, held in undisputed possession and free
> from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort
> of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these
> unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon
> the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare
> and contentment of the people as a whole.

Put very briefly, with the exception of small areas, mainly in 423
Northern Iraq, together with some smaller areas of a few yet 471
hopefully significant State-sponsored schemes of land settlement,
the bulk of the cultivated land of Iraq is in the possession of large
landowners. Some of them may not enjoy the holding of this land
by confirmed legal right but, to all intents and purposes, they own
it and derive immense incomes from it. Others, by legal process,
the validity of which is disputed by land reformers, have gained
possession of lands which were formerly held in common
tribal use.

These landowners, or landholders, are usually sheikhs or 471
absentee urban landlords who let the land to share-tenants through 427
a hierarchy of lessees or agents, at the bottom of which is the
landless cultivator who gets an incredibly small share of the produce
of his labour. Indeed, the actual cultivator under this invidious
system of share-cropping may get anything from ten per cent to
thirty per cent of the produce of the land which he works, most
of the remainder going to the large landowners, agents or owners
of irrigation pumps. The situation may vary from landlord to
landlord, and very occasionally the actual cultivator is said to
share fifty per cent of the produce. In general, however, the [565]
position of the Iraqi countryside is one of great extremes of wealth
and poverty. The landowner may live in a sumptuous style with
a town house and country palace, while the peasant cultivator
may live under conditions of poverty or near-destitution.

It is not possible in this study to attempt more than an outline 471
of the causes and effects of this situation. It arose partly out of 423
ancient confusion of titles which meant that, with the break-up 425
of the tribal system, the most powerful member of the tribe was
able to appropriate for his own purposes land which was originally
intended for the common good of the tribe. It is due partly to the
faulty application of the Ottoman Land Code under which,
because the small cultivator was not strong enough to establish
his rights of title, these rights fell to the sheikh. The profits derived
from the Persian Gulf grain trade in the late 19th and early
20th centuries gave a further impetus to what has been described
as 'this wholesale land grabbing'. Finally, with the development

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent 185
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and,
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity. 425

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intellig-
ently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract 185
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

166 must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land
185 must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting.
He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

425 (4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and
provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

427 (5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders.
So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila
area, and the total population of adults and children is between
871 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with
185 a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing
for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good
design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of
Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for
a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to
avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish
intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village
which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of
the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the
intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural
streams'.

427 It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which
has been in operation for only four years and is still in process
425 of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it
241 appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless
185 cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average
465 income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of
the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced
from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood
is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the
Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation
the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more
robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators.
Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which,
by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The
men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed,
it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in
the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

427 The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants,
apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging
185 and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they
make a certain contribution to the public purse through the
sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage
an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly
needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that
they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 423
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 511
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 565
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of 166
living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

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sumption; and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the North. 241 245

Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats, as well as camels, are kept primarily by pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural population. Many peasants, however, have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed. 231 [262]

Crop yields are generally low. The water supply is frequently inadaquate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for soil-building crops. Salinity, attributable to poor drainage, has materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigation zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left fallow as a means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to go up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited. The productivity of livestock is also low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because of poor breeding, disease and insufficient shelter. 241 [372] [134]

Except for some rather limited areas in various parts of Iraq and a promising settlement in the Dujaila district of south-central Iraq, the country is almost wholly devoid of peasant proprietors. The ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheikhs and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare subsistence.[2] The land assigned to the 423 427 241

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[2] According to the cadastral survey which is half completed, 67.1 percent of the privately-owned land is in units exceeding 1,000 donums. (One donum equals 0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres.)

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fellah or peasant generally changes from year to year so that the cultivator has virtually no incentive to improve it. Moreover, the sharecropping system discourages the cultivation of animal fodder crops since the customary apportionment of shares between landlord and tenant does not lend itself readily to such crops. Most of the landowners themselves show little interest in improving agriculture. Enjoying a large share of the crop with the expenditure of little or no effort on their part, they have little incentive to raise output. In recent years, however, an increasing number of landlords have been displaying a direct interest in improving crops and diversifying production. Some of them have been instrumental in raising production by installing pumps for irrigation, introducing new and more remunerative crops such as cotton, and investing in agricultural machinery.

The depressed economic condition of the fellah or sharecropper undoubtedly retards progress. It undermines the health and vigor of the rural population, limits the market for industrial products and may in the long run jeopardize the stability of the social order. The sharecropper's plight is attributable both to his poor economic bargaining position and to the low productivity of agriculture. In the irrigation zone the fellah generally gets only half of the crop even though the state has provided the irrigation works; and his share falls substantially below this percentage whenever the land is irrigated by privately-owned pumps or the landlord supplies seed, draft animals or machinery. In a country where capital is scarce in relation to manpower, the ability to provide the means of production—land, seed, animals and machinery—almost invariably also carries with it the ability to exact a high proportion of the return. In Iraq this is reinforced by a law which forbids the sharecropper to leave the land as long as he is indebted to his landlord, which is generally the case. In the long run the sharecropping system could be made quite tolerable if the productivity of the land were raised; and the economic bargaining power of the sharecropper could be increased by giving him access to the means of production—seeds, animals and implements—on more favorable terms through such institutions as cooperatives. In the shorter run, however, the sharecropper's position is likely to improve only as the landowner takes steps to improve his lot in order to keep him

on the land. There is apt to be increasing pressure on the land- 423
owner to take such steps as a result of the growing opportunities 427
for alternative employment created by a large increase in public 241
expenditures on development, the expansion of industry and the opening of state lands to settlement. In fact, unless the sharecropper's status is improved, there is a great danger that there will be a continued flight of labor from the land, impairing the country's agricultural production.

The government itself has made only a modest contribution 654
to the advancement of agriculture. The Directorate-General of 242
Agriculture is only a subordinate department in the Ministry of Economics and has been severely handicapped by lack of funds and a shortage of competent agricultural officers. While it has had some success in combatting pests and diseases and in the extension of such crops as cotton and citrus fruit, too little attention has been devoted to practical research, and almost no field work has been carried out to assist cultivators in improving their crops and methods of cultivation. The expenditures of the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments were actually cut from ID 1,160,000 in 1948-49 to ID 540,000 in 1950-51 and, at the latter figure, represented only 1.8 percent of the total budget outlay. Expenditures on both agriculture and irrigation 1950-51 amounted to only 6.7 percent of the total.

Plans for the future now envisage large water storage and 654
irrigation projects to provide more water for land already in use 311
and to increase the area under cultivation and provide for the settlement of new land. These plans are in general quite sound. They will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time more stress is placed on arresting the deterioration of land already in use by extensive drainage schemes and on raising the productivity of agriculture by other means. The establishment of an efficient extension service and the provision of incentives to improve methods of cultivation are particularly important in this connection.

Expansion of Area under Cultivation: Irrigation 311

Extension of the area of land under cultivation is vitally important not only to an increase in production but, above all, as

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mals offers a more practical answer to their needs at this time. 241
Experience in Iraq shows that tractor plowing may increase yields by 20 to 50 percent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and partly also through better preparation of the soil. Much the same effect could, however, be achieved through better animal-drawn plows replacing those which now, for the most part, barely scratch the surface and fail to uproot the weeds. Means for the acquisition of such tools and improved draft animals should be created through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of better credit facilities.

Mechanization will nevertheless play an increasingly important role in the future, especially as labor becomes more scarce and additional land becomes available for cultivation. Mechanization has already facilitated the expansion of cultivation in the dry-farming areas of Mosul and the new pump-irrigated lands in central Iraq. While certain areas in the irrigation zone are undoubtedly overpopulated in relation to land currently available, in other areas, particularly in the rain-fed zone, labor is scarce relative to the supply of land. As development schemes are launched and new land is opened up for settlement, the available manpower on lands already under cultivation may well be reduced. The government will need therefore to take steps to insure that mechanization will keep pace with developing requirements. In the period immediately ahead, however, the government should be mindful of the possibility that mechanization initiated by landowners may result in a substantial reduction of the portion of the crop going to sharecroppers or in the displacement of sharecroppers before alternative means of employment or settlement become available. Through its control over the importation and distribution of machinery and the extension of credit for the purchase of such machinery, the government will have the power to influence the direction of mechanization and thus minimize to some extent possibly adverse social consequences.

At present only a small portion of Iraqi agriculture is mecha- 407
nized. Combines and tractors in operation are reported to number 475
320 and 750 respectively, with about half of the number concen- 427
trated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. Of these, 75 com- 647
bines and 81 tractors are owned by the Agricultural Machinery

407 475 427 647 Administration, an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Economics. The AMA rents this machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts in order to prevent black-marketing.

Some provision for rental of machinery, whether by the government or by private enterprise, will be necessary for some time, partly because it enables farmers to become acquainted with the value of such machinery and partly because many farmers do not have sufficient capital for outright purchase. As long as private enterprise is incapable of providing this service at reasonable rentals or until cooperatives can be established, continuation of the government rental service appears essential. On the whole, therefore, the AMA's three-year program to replace and expand its machinery park and to equip repair shops appears desirable despite the obvious drawbacks of government operation. At present, however, the AMA is operating at a substantial loss. In the calendar year 1951, for instance, its rental income will probably not exceed ID 50,000 compared with estimated operating costs, including depreciation, of about ID 150,000. Since the beginning of 1950, when it started operations as a fiscally autonomous agency, it has had to cover its deficits out of the ID 500,000 capital which the government undertook to provide. While the government should probably defray that part of the AMA's expenditures not directly attributable to the rental operations, the overall deficit should be reduced by gradually increasing rental charges. Rental charges on tractors, in particular, appear unduly low and may be depriving private persons of the incentive to purchase tractors either for their own use or for rental to others.

407 471 647 Since the overhead costs of the AMA's rental operations will probably always remain rather high and its machinery must be transported over considerable distances, it is important that the government encourage as much as possible private purchase and [452] operation of machinery. The extension of credit for this purpose appears essential. At present, however, the Agricultural Bank cannot lend money on farm equipment partly because it is short of funds and partly because such loans would not afford sufficient security in the absence of any legal requirement to register title TO MACHINERY.

research. The Mission recommends that in the future such farms 242
should be used primarily as experimental stations. Seed for distri- 816
bution to farmers could be produced on land surplus to the needs of the experimental stations or on a contract basis under appropriate government supervision on private farms. The Mission suggests that immediate steps be taken to secure a research director to coordinate all existing research and to recruit a gradually expanding staff of full-time research experts consisting partly of foreigners and partly of Iraqis.

These measures will bring about an improvement in agri- 242
culture only very gradually. In the short run they will need to be supplemented by positive financial incentives. Most farmers will probably prove unwilling or unable to invest money or time in the cultivation of fodder crops or the use of fertilizers unless they are convinced through practical experience that such an investment is really worthwhile. In order to induce farmers to experiment themselves, the government may wish to consider providing free seed for fodder crops and defraying part of the cost of fertilizer, or, alternatively, making a flat money payment per donum to those undertaking to use fertilizers or grow feed. Such incentives should, of course, be offered only as long as is necessary to demonstrate the value of improved methods. The provision of credit for the acquisition of machinery, fertilizers and other means of production will also be helpful in this respect.

It has already been pointed out that the existing sharecropping 242
system, coupled with the shifting nature of cultivation, militates 427●
against the introduction of soil-building and forage crops. Under present conditions the landlord will find it difficult to compel the fellah to grow such crops unless the fellah is actually paid for doing so. The Mission therefore suggests that the difficulties inherent in the sharecropping system, as well as the advisability of changes in this system, be studied by an expert on land tenure.

Tobacco and the Tobacco Monopoly

The Mission has paid special attention to tobacco, not only 249
because cultivation of this crop is of considerable importance to the 655
Kurdish farmers of the North, but also because tobacco leaf is

that the land was cultivated and a crop produced in any one year, 425 and the land settlement officers, who have sometimes been inexperienced and subject to influence, have on occasion accepted even more tenuous evidence as proof of a prescriptive claim. In this way a large portion of state land has been alienated to sheikhs and other influential persons, and the number of large landowners has multiplied.

Distribution of Land

Complete data on the distribution of landholdings are not 423 available. For the area covered by the cadastral survey, it is possible to classify private landholdings into various categories according to size. Such a classification, given in the accompanying table, shows that holdings of 1000 donums or less account for only 15.7 percent of the area. This is indicative of the small number of peasant proprietors. On the other hand, holdings of over 1,000 donums accounted for 67.1 percent of the total of privately owned land, while those of more than 10,000 donums comprised 24.3 percent of the area. Moreover, the importance of large holdings is undoubtedly underestimated by these figures. The cadastral survey has proceeded by areas known as *muqata'as*. In a number of cases landowners have holdings in several *muqata'as*, but these have been registered as separate holdings. Thus, according to the cadastral survey, there is only one holding in Kut in excess of 100,000 donums (namely 174,251 donums), although it is generally reported that there are actually several holdings well over 300,000 donums.

The accompanying table indicates that the highest proportion of small holdings is apparently in Basra, Dulaim, Kirkuk and Suleimaniya. The provinces of Kut, Amara, Mosul, Diyala and Kerbela have the highest percentage of large holdings.

The Sharecropping System

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Although the amount of land cultivated directly by the landowner has increased since the last war with the use of modern machinery, particularly in Mosul and Baghdad provinces, the great bulk of the land is tilled for the landholder by peasants or fellahin against a share in the crop. The sharecropper is not a tenant in the sense that this word is generally used in the western world. He has no discretion in the use of the land and does not lease a

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specified piece of land for a definite period from the landholder against a fixed rental. The landholder or his agent *(sirkal)* assigns to the sharecropper each year the land to be cropped, determines the type and quantity of seed to be sown and prescribes the time and methods of plowing, watering, harvesting, etc. He generally makes an initial advance to the cultivator and often provides the fellah with seeds, draft animals and other means of production. Under the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators enacted in 1933, the landholder has the power to keep the fellah on the land as long as the latter is indebted to him. Thus the fellah is in reality a laborer who works with his family not for a fixed wage, but for a share of the crop.

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The portion of the crop retained by the fellah varies rather widely. In the northern rain-fed zone it is higher than in the southern irrigation zone. In flow-irrigated areas it is half or two fifths but drops to about one third when the landholder provides the seed. Although, under the law, the landholder is not allowed to charge interest on his advances to cultivators, his share of the crop when he provides the seed increases out of proportion to the cost of the seed he furnishes. When the land is pump-irrigated, the fellah's share is generally only two sevenths or three sevenths of the crop. In date and fruit groves where the landowner must make a heavy investment and the value of the output is high, the fellah may only get a fifth to an eighth of the crop. In the rain-fed zone the fellah usually retains 90 percent of the winter crop and even more if the land is relatively remote from the town or city. His share of summer crops which can only be grown with water furnished by the landowner may range from two thirds to one half provided he supplies his own seeds and implements. In general the fellah's share is larger in the North because manpower is less plentiful in relation to available land, yields tend to be lower owing to uncertain rainfall and the fellah frequently has long-established rights to the cultivation of his land.

The amount of land cultivated by each fellah and his family varies widely. In the irrigation zone the fellah may on the average plant about 20 donums of winter crops, and, owing to the shortage of water, perhaps 15 percent of this area in summer crops. In rice areas, he generally has only about four to five donums on the

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427 241 average; and in date and fruit groves his allotment is likely to be equally small. In each of these cases, however, the output per donum is considerably more valuable. In the rain-fed plains of the North where land is more plentiful and yields more uncertain, he may on the average plant as much as 40 donums in winter crops. In most areas the fellah and his family can probably get as large a winter crop area as they can till, but their capacity is limited by lack of draft animals, primitive agricultural techniques and the debilitating effects of disease and a hot climate. In some areas of the irrigation ~~zone,~~ however, particularly in parts of Hilla, Kerbela and Diwaniya, the fellah appears to get less land than he can till owing to the limited availability of good, irrigated land. The same applies to some rice-growing areas, particularly in Amara.

Lack of sufficient draft animals and implements, low yields and the necessity of turning over a share of the crop to the landlord or pump owner all combine to depress the economic status of the sharecropper. His position can only be improved by enabling him to raise his output or by increasing his bargaining power through the creation of alternative opportunities for employment and the opening up of new lands to settlement.

Minerals: Oil

135 315 Iraq possesses considerable mineral resources. Of these by far the most important is petroleum. There are at present two major oil fields—one near Kirkuk in the North, the other near Basra in the South. The Kirkuk field is generally reputed to have reserves of over 1,000 million tons, while that near Basra, which is less well explored, seems to be almost equally promising. There are also minor oil fields at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin on the Iranian border.

135 Although surface indications of the existence of copper, iron, chromite and other ores have been found in the mountainous belt adjoining Turkey and Iran, the existence of deposits of sufficient size to warrant commercial exploitation must first be confirmed by core drilling.

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651 have yielded only about ID 2,400,000 annually in recent years because income from agriculture and urban property is exempt and rather sweeping exemptions or reductions have also been accorded to Iraqi-owned industrial enterprises. The three principal oil companies have also not been required to pay income taxes in return for annual payments in commutation of all taxes. Income and surtaxes thus bear primarily on salaried employees and individuals and companies engaged in commerce. In 1948-49 all Iraqi companies paid only ID 259,000 in income and surtaxes as compared with ID ~~488,000 paid~~ by foreign companies.

Both land devoted to agriculture and income from agriculture largely escape taxation. A land tax, assessed in accordance with a very complicated set of criteria, was levied until 1931 when it was replaced by a 10 percent tax called *istihlak* on agricultural
651 produce brought to designated centers, presumably for sale. At the
427 same time, the government enacted a Law for the Collection of Land Rent which, after its revision in 1936, came to be called erroneously a land tax. Actually it was a compound of a rent charge on all lands except those alienated in *tapu* to which the state had retained the ultimate title, and a tax on water whether supplied by flow or by pump. The "rent" element was supposed to equal about five percent of the value of the crop and the "water" charge between two and 10 percent, depending on whether the land was irrigated by pump or by flow, and, if by flow, whether or not the flow was regular and assured. The total charges were assessed by various criteria. For government lands, which were regularly leased, they were set either by auction or by triennial assessment of the type and amount of crops grown on the land. This levy, which itself was circumscribed by a number of exemptions, was abolished in 1939, except for *miri* lands leased regularly by the government, in return for certain payments over a maximum period of 10 years. In view of the subsequent inflation these
651 proved to be rather light. Thus virtually the only remaining agricultural tax is the *istihlak*. During recent years this tax has varied from 10 to 12½ percent of the value of produce brought to market as fixed on the basis of market prices. The *istihlak*, however, is paid by the buyer rather than the seller, although the producer may actually bear it insofar as prices are set in the export market

241 aration of the soil. Similarly, small stationary threshers may offer a better alternative than large harvesting combines to the present methods of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. The government should pay at least as much attention to the task of getting simple, inexpensive tools into the hands of the cultivators as to the much more ambitious program of agricultural mechaniza-
[412] tion. Good hand tools, for example, are almost nonexistent. Improvement in draft animals is also necessary. While the supply of draft animals cannot be increased rapidly, it is possible to get animals of greater strength and endurance by better feeding and selection.

In the longer run, however, there is no doubt that mechanization of agriculture will assume growing importance. Physically, the country with its flat broad plains is ideally suited to mechanization although the canals and ditches in the irrigation zone offer
[464] some impediments to the use of machinery. Moreover, even now there are labor shortages at sowing and harvest times in some parts of the country, particularly in the North. In the future such shortages may become really acute as manpower is drawn from the land to take advantage of the new employment opportunities created by the over-all development program and as some of the fellahin working on land now under cultivation leave to settle new land. Under such circumstances mechanization may become the principal means of maintaining and expanding agricultural output. In its policy respecting mechanization the government will need to steer a careful course. On the one hand, it will want to keep some check on mechanization as long and wherever there is danger of displacing fellahin before alternative means of employment become available; on the other hand, it will find it desirable to accelerate mechanization whenever labor shortages become serious. Through its control over imports and credit, the government possesses effective methods of influencing the rate of mechanization.

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The United States Lend-Lease Program gave mechanization its first impetus. At present there are probably about 170 combines and 550 tractors in operation in the country, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. In addition, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned and made

available for rental by the Agricultural Machinery Administration, 244 407
an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Economics.[7] 427

Further progress will be seriously impeded, however, unless means are found to prolong the life of machinery which is now less than half what it is in the United States. The shortage of spare parts and repair facilities has been very discouraging to machinery owners. The failure of private dealers to provide these largely [655
inspired the government's original decision to establish the Agricultural Machinery Administration as a monopoly for the importation and distribution of agricultural machinery. In accordance with suggestions made by an earlier International Bank Mission, the government has tried to meet the problem by different measures, namely by licensing dealers only on condition they agree to set up repair facilities and maintain an adequate stock of spare parts. The enforcement of these requirements, however, will not provide a complete solution, even if it is supplemented by completion of the AMA program for setting up its own repair facilities at Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Diwaniya and Kut. The AMA and private dealers should also cooperate in conducting courses in operation and elementary maintenance of machines for drivers. Moreover, simple local facilities to carry out all but major repairs are needed. An adequate number of mechanics both for the central and local repair shops must be trained, and for this purpose foreign shop supervisors and instructors will be necessary. The Industrial Bank may have to cooperate by providing small loans for equipping local shops.

The AMA now performs a number of useful functions. It 655
regulates imports and the distribution of spare parts and tests 407
different types of machinery for their adaptability to conditions in 427
Iraq. Most important, it maintains a pool of machinery for rental. In some respects its operations could undoubtedly be improved.

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[7] An official estimate given to the Mission gives a total of 320 combines and 750 tractors. Customs statistics for the years 1945 to 1950 inclusive, however, show that only 632 tractors and 262 combines were imported. Part of these are already out of commission. An on-the-spot survey in each province by a member of the Mission indicated that only 170 combines and 549 tractors, exclusive of government-owned machines, were in operation. Of the combines, Mosul had 75; Baghdad, 75; seven provinces, one to five each; and five provinces, none. Of the tractors, Baghdad had 250; Mosul, 150; Kut, 40; Kirkuk, 23; Erbil, 15; six provinces, less than 10 each; and three provinces, none.

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With a larger and more qualified staff it could do a better job in advising farmers on the type of machinery best suited to their needs and could undertake the tasks outlined in the preceding paragraph. It might also pay more attention to finding and testing the type of machinery that would be particularly useful on smaller holdings. Above all, in its rental service it should charge rates which will not cause it to run a large deficit or discourage private ownership of machinery.

The rental service itself performs a useful function and should be continued until private enterprise can provide the same service on the basis of a reasonable return or until sufficient cooperatives can be organized to provide machinery for their members. Many landowners cannot now afford to buy a machine, and others will not risk buying until they have had a chance to test its value by renting one. The AMA, however, now sustains heavy losses on its rental operation. For the calendar year 1951 its operating expenditures are expected to be ID 150,463 as compared with a projected rental income of only ID 50,000. For the two years 1950 and 1951, the total cash deficit of the Administration will probably amount to about ID 222,000.[8] It has been able to finance such deficits only by using up the balance of the capital contribution of ID 500,000 which the government originally made to the agency. Since ID 235,750 of this contribution consisted of machinery and buildings, very little of the remaining cash will have been left by the end of 1951. The AMA's financial situation is all the more acute because it now urgently needs funds to purchase new machinery and equipment at a rate of perhaps ID 250,000 per year. In the past there has been no depreciation reserve for the replacement of machinery. To meet this financial emergency it will be necessary to make the rental operation self-sustaining. In part this can be accomplished by reducing expenditures. Probably more important, however, will be an increase in rentals, especially those on tractors which are now relatively low. A continuing government contribution to the total budget of the AMA will probably be merited, but only to the approximate extent to which AMA expenditures are attributable to functions other than the rental of

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[8] For the 1950 and 1951 budgets of the AMA, see Tables I and II in the appendix.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

machinery. At the same time the cost of new machinery and equipment will need to be financed—possibly out of Development Board funds if earlier plans to borrow for this purpose from the International Bank do not materialize. 655 407 427

Government rental of machinery should at best be considered a temporary expedient. It is wasteful, primarily because overhead expenses are high. The transportation of machinery from central shops to the renters tends to be expensive and to expose the machinery to excessive wear and tear. Private and cooperative ownership of machinery should therefore be encouraged. One step in this direction would be to enable the Agricultural Bank to lend money for this purpose on the security of the machinery. In the past the absence of any provision for registering title to such machinery has prevented such loans. Another important measure would be to encourage the establishment of cooperatives for the collective ownership of machinery, especially in the new agricultural areas which are to be opened. At present the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project owns a number of tractors. [474] Because overhead costs are relatively low it is able to rent them out at lower rate than the AMA while still apparently covering the cost of operation and depreciation.

V. Control of Pests and Diseases

Livestock Pests and Mortality 232

More effective control of pests and diseases would also materially help to improve yields. This is particularly true of livestock. Because of lack of funds, equipment and trained personnel, no systematic campaigns for eradicating specific groups of diseases have been undertaken. Many livestock diseases, particularly of the parasitic type, are rife. Among the principal livestock diseases are foot and mouth disease; haemorrhagic septicaemia; anthrax; sheep pox; blackleg; parasitic gastritis; tick-borne diseases (anaplasmosis and piroplasmosis); fowl cholera; Newcastle disease; various manges; and dourine. The available staff is wholly insufficient to control, let alone eradicate, any epidemic which might break out. A serious outbreak of disease would endanger the livestock industry of neighboring countries as well as that of Iraq.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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VIII. Use of Incentives

Through practical and realistic experimentation and demonstration much progress can undoubtedly be made in persuading farmers and livestock keepers of the value of more modern methods. Throughout the world, however, the farmer and shepherd tend to be conservative. Even though he sees other methods yield good results on experimental farms or even on his neighbor's land, he may still be reluctant to try them himself, particularly if it involves him in higher initial costs. The government cannot, after all, prescribe what he should do, except perhaps on land which it allots for settlement. If it cannot persuade him, the government may find it necessary to give him some financial incentive to induce him to experiment with new crops or fertilizer. Thus it might make seeds or stock of new and improved varieties available free of charge or at nominal prices or subsidize the cultivation of forage or soil-building crops or the use of fertilizer. The use of such incentives to bring about the adoption of new crops or better methods of cultivation has on occasion proved effective in other countries. Experience also indicates, however, that great care must be taken to prevent them from becoming permanent.

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The problem of incentives is particularly acute because the prevailing sharecropping system appears to offer a special obstacle to the introduction of forage and soil-building crops. Although the landlord can in theory direct his fellah to grow any crop, the fellah will in practice resist the cultivation of any crop which involves curtailing other crops he can consume himself or sell for cash. Generally able to eke out only a bare subsistence, the fellah is not likely to have any interest in growing fodder for which there is no cash market, especially when he has little or no livestock of his own. Similarly he is likely to oppose cultivation of a leguminous crop for green manure, especially since he himself may not get back the same parcel for farming the following year. He might ultimately be persuaded of the advantages of a given four-year crop rotation, but only if he were assured tenure of the same land over a sufficiently long period. The ways and means of overcoming these difficulties inherent in the existing tenancy system should be

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

carefully studied by the government. In this study the possibility 241
of offering financial incentives directly to the fellah and of mak- 427
ing certain changes in the conditions of tenancy would need to be explored.

IX. Agricultural Credit

If farmers are to purchase fertilizer, more livestock and better 452
draft animals, tools and machinery, they will need access to credit
facilities. The Agricultural Bank with a nominal capital of 453
ID 1,000,000 does not at present adequately serve their needs. First of all, its resources have been insufficient. As of March 31, 1950, the latest date for which a balance sheet was made available to the Mission, the capital actually paid in amounted to only ID 500,000. Its lending resources were supplemented to some extent by time deposits totalling ID 136,996. Total loans outstanding aggregated only ID 556,609. Since that date a further capital contribution of ID 50,000 has been made to the Bank, its time deposits have increased somewhat and a loan of ID 150,000, repayable in three annual installments, was obtained from the National Bank in April 1951. A shortage of liquid resources compelled the Bank virtually to suspend lending in November 1949. Not until a year later was it possible to resume credit operations and then only on a modest scale. The Bank has never been able to meet the demand for credit. Although authorized to lend up to ID 3,000 to any individual for a maximum term of 10 years, in practice it has limited the size of its loans to ID 1,000 and the duration to five years.

It would be desirable to increase the capital of the Bank substantially—to a total of perhaps ID 2,000,000. The Development Board would seem to be the logical and probably the only available source of funds for this purpose. The Bank would then be able to repay its debt to the National Bank and still extend its loan operations substantially. At the same time, however, there should be a careful review of the Bank's lending policies to make sure they are sound. In the past there has been a tendency for its loans to become frozen. In the fiscal year 1949-50, for example, only ID 108,333 of the total amount of ID 279,975 in loans falling due was actually received. Maturities were postponed on loans totalling

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312
water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423
are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427
There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24 per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [211]
on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators. This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423
disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433
perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185
which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464
reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large 166
farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the [161]
cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

511 fited the Bahrein pearl diver; it has produced richer merchants in that district. In the same way the land-owners of Mesopotamia are past all comparison richer than the land-owners of the oases in Arabia but the actual cultivators of the soil are far worse off. Improved conditions and an increased return on each man's work have not benefited them at all.

423 ● 427 511 Their[1] condition is pitiful. The gardens are owned by men who live far away in distance and farther away still in sympathy. The Sheikh of Kuwait owns large gardens in this district; indeed his principal wealth is reputed to be invested there. The same is true of Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah, the Persian governor for southern Arabistan. Many of the gardens are owned by rich men who live in Basra and Baghdad. Their affairs are administered by a local agent, whose sole interest lies in driving as hard a bargain as possible with the unfortunate cultivator. If an unfavorable year comes, there is no easily available judge or ruler to modify the contract as in Arabia. As a result the gardeners are bitterly oppressed. Men are practically forced into bankruptcy in order to live up to oppressive contracts during a hard year. Competition is keen, and in these large communities where the gardens stretch for scores of miles and where it is not easy to turn to other occupations, where above all there is no public sentiment to appeal to and no ruler with Arab ideas of justice to frown upon the rich oppressor, it is possible to push the gardener down very close to the limit of bare subsistence. His clothes are in tatters. His food is poor. His house is wretched. Above all he is a discouraged and hard-pressed individual with a hopeless and despairing outlook on life.

[1] [Date gardeners -- Analyst]

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 [redacted]

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

It is customary to abuse the Turkish Government as 000 responsible for these conditions. That government has much to answer for, but it is doubtful whether even the efficient and benevolent rule of the British will improve the lot of the date gardener a great deal so long as the present system remains unchanged. The trouble is that 466 the owner has no contact with his gardener except 427 through his agent, and is coerced by no intelligent and effective public sentiment. Whether in Turkish or British territory, he lives under a government built on the theory that contracts made in good faith must be executed at all costs and that knows no redress for the gardener except that he seek employment elsewhere, a thing that is very difficult to do. The adjustments possible in the oases of Arabia, where it is the function of the sheikh to modify oppressive contracts and where it is understood that an unfavorable reputation will speedily endanger the life of the land-owner, are out of the question in Mesopotamia.

In addition to the date gardeners who cultivate the irri- 243 gated land along the last hundred miles of the Arab [162] River from Gurna to the Gulf, there are also a number of 262 so-called Marsh Arabs along the rivers in Lower Mesopotamia, who raise rice, wheat and barley on land that is overflowed in the spring when water is high. Rice is their favorite crop and the one that is most reliable. In that country the visitor is surprised at being served with loaves of bread of the usual flat pancake-shape but snowy white instead of the light brown color of the whole wheat flour which is universal over all Arabia. I asked my host with much surprise whether he imported his flour from Bombay and he laughed. He hardly knew where

[Marsh Arabs]

501 erable skill to navigate. They are capable of great speed and are driven either by a sail or by oars as the occasion requires. To a stranger they seem very unstable, but the Marsh Arab, who has practically lived in them ever since he was a baby, finds them abundantly stable and perfectly safe.

342 From a distance the houses occupied by these people are very picturesque. The reeds that grow in great abundance in the marshes of Lower Mesopotamia are gathered and when dry are tied in great bundles perhaps two feet in diameter. They are ten to fifteen feet tall or even more, and two bundles tied together at the tops are bent over to form an arch. Each of these arches forms one of the ribs of the house. They are placed every four to six feet, giving an air of solidity and dignity to the structure that is most unusual for this sort of simple architecture. Over these ribs a mat roof is constructed which is surprisingly tight even in the heaviest rains. The houses vary in size, and the largest ones, which serve as guest halls for the sheikhs and the rich, may be seventy-five feet long and twenty feet broad.

423 This agricultural district is peculiar in that while it
621 has a settled community engaged in agricultural pursuits, there is no private ownership of land. The Marsh Arabs form a group almost untouched by Europeans. In the one district we visited all land is owned by the government, in this case a sheikh far removed from the district.
● [427 The only tax that he levies is a moderate rental for the
651] land. Apparently there is little difficulty in getting land;
425 at least no one complained of any trouble of that sort, nor does there seem to be any difficulty in keeping the same plot of land indefinitely if the cultivator wishes to do so.
000 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
Iraq MH1

I 433 471 311 M 471

Unlike Egypt, Iraq is a sparsely populated country relative to its land resource. Yet we find there the same conditions of landlessness, and low levels of living among the peasant folk. More serious still, we find in that country a great agricultural potential which is threatened by the prevailing destructive system of land tenure.

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This fertile land of the ancient Tigris and Euphrates rivers has a total potentially cultivable area (mostly by means of expanded irrigation) of some 25 million acres. The present area that is under cultivation each year, however, is less than 6 million acres. There is no doubt that capital and technical aid from the West will make it possible for Iraq to realize this tremendous potential. The serious question, however, is whether development will be attempted on the present shaky foundations of feudalism, absentee ownership, and sharecropping, or on the sounder and more stable foundations of a thriving rural community that is emancipated through its ownership or control of the land. The answer, one way or the other, will be of grave consequence to the future of Iraq.

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The following is a brief summary of the situation as it now exists. Less than 0.5 percent of the land is owned privately in fee simple. About 36 percent is state domain which has been leased out more or less permanently to individuals. Over 58 percent is held directly and fully by the state, and is leased out on a yearly basis. These figures indicate clearly that the fate of the land resource has not yet been fully decided as in the case of Egypt. The major portion of it is still in the hands of the state, which could dispose of it either in favor of the landless cultivator and tribesmen, or in favor of the absentee owner and the tribal chief.

The land that is now under cultivation (whether privately owned or leased from the state) is predominantly in the hands or under the control of the semi-feudal tribal chief and the large owner from the city. In either case, absenteeism prevails. The peasants, consisting of village folk and semi-settled tribal people, are in the majority of cases landless sharecroppers. They raise crops and receive a share ranging from 20 to 50 percent of the produce, depending upon whether they supply the seed, the

equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share I 471
amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions 427
to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord. 423

There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked M
effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness 471
what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation 423
has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, 427
and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; I
but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. 312
In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove
his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even
when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not
able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is
obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply
the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the
merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and
the original occupant becomes permanently a landless share- M
cropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal 178
community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized 565 I
agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee land- 178
owner chief. 565

Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the S
problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of ab- 311
sentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among 471
the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the 427
future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated M
by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous 471
possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely 427
populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

000 prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole.'[1]

423 There are different varieties of tenure in the two zones, determined by the different conditions of agriculture. In the
471 north, the forms of tenure are similar to those of Syria, with a class of small proprietors taking some, but not all, of the land. In the south large owners or sheikhs own virtually all of the land, letting it to share-tenants, through a series of intermediary lessees, minor sheikhs, sirkals (formerly sub-sheikhs), or town notables. At the bottom of this many-storied building the fellah cultivates the land under a burden of debt. This peculiar form has originated from the disintegration of the tribal system; the sheikhs have profited by the confusion of the law to secure individual ownership of land which by custom is the property of the tribe.

423 *The Breakdown of the Tribal System.* In the irrigation zone, the practice of shifting cultivation was accompanied until very recently by an equally unstable form of landownership. The basis of the ownership is the tribal *dirah*, a large area not limited to land actually tilled but including also non-cultivated land and submerged marsh land, over which a tribe exercises a customary right of occupation. These areas are considered to be the property of the whole tribe, and until recently were so in fact.

423 The tribal system existed generally until some forty years ago, and still prevails in parts of the country.[2] Under this system, the
624 usual procedure was to set aside a part of the cultivated area,
622 a third or even a half, to provide revenue for the sheikh to discharge his political duties, which then included the maintenance of a tribal militia, the provision of hospitals, and keeping the *mudhif* (the coffee shop and civic and social centre of the tribe). This revenue accrued to the office of the sheikh, and not to his person. The rest of the land was sometimes distributed among the families of the tribe, according to the numbers of fighters who had helped to seize the land from another tribe,
423 or according to the amount of land reclaimed: more often, how-
● 427 ever, the land was cultivated in small groups, the tribal sub-

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[1] op. cit., p. 33.

[2] For a detailed account of the historical development of Iraq's land tenure system, see Salih Haider 'Land Problems of Iraq' (London University Ph.D. thesis, 1942).

423 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of
427 the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-
cropping basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths,
or a third of the produce.

423 But even on these individual holdings communal ownership
is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-
621 tribal chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal
622 chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the
tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and
428 especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from
inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the
tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the
country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

423 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over
the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area,
241 it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has
a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years.
Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group
shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and
so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants
221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and
241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing re-
233 mains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it pre-
423 vailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the
619 State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organiza-
tion, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

Iraq NH1

423 tribal organization there was no clear definition of individual rights of ownership to the collectively-owned land. It was a
619 system which could exist as long as no one thought about it; as long, that is, as the tribe was accepted as the unit of political life, and as long as no individual claims were likely to be made. It is for this reason that it is impossible, once the tribal system has ceased to be the political unit, to settle land on a tribal basis; and yet to settle land on the basis of the supposed individual claims creates grave injustice, because in practice it means that too much land is allotted to the sheikhs and that the cultivators are reduced to the position of tenants or labourers.

439 Since the early years of the twentieth century the tribal system has been breaking up, and the economic development of the country in the twenty years between the wars has hastened its disintegration. When water transport came to the Persian Gulf towards the end of the nineteenth century, export markets opened for Iraq grain; the subsistence economy broke down and production for export began. Exports of grain increased from 65,000 tons in the early eighteen-nineties to 120,000 tons in 1909–13, and to 380,000 tons in 1934–9. The profitability of
556 export has given the tribal chiefs a motive for acquiring land as their personal property.

The tendency to acquire land for the sake of money income was much strengthened, in the twenty years between the two wars, by the rapid extension of pump irrigation and the accompanying increase in the cultivated area. Pump installations
312 have increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,000 in 1944, and provide
426 water for some 2½ million acres of land, or over half the cultivated land in the irrigated zone. The installation of a pumping system is comparatively cheap, costing some £2,000 before the recent war, but it is far beyond the means of the peasants, so that pumps have been installed by sheikhs, or more frequently by city notables, who make contracts to supply them to peasants at extortionate rates of interest, and so gradually acquire the land in payment of debt. In many cases the sub-chiefs, or sirkals, have become pump owners.

423 Thus in the regions of pump irrigation the tribal system has entirely ceased to function. The land is mainly the property of
427 the pump owners, with the cultivators taking a meagre share of the crop, varying from one-seventh to one-fourteenth or one-

423 twenty-first part of the total. The position of the share-tenant
427 in Iraq is much worse than that of his counterpart in Syria.
In the districts of flood irrigation the tribal system has disintegrated,
621 but its superstructure, the sheikhs and sirkals, remains.
623 Most of the political functions of the tribe have now
312 been transferred to the State, and the only economic function
now performed by the tribal authorities is the control of irrigation,
427 digging of canals, and repairing of breaches, which is
done by the cultivators under the direction of the sirkal who
has become a kind of farm bailiff acting for the sheikh. Under
this system the sheikh and sirkal take together up to 80 per cent
of the crop, leaving the cultivator some 20–30 per cent.

423 This exploitation is possible because the sheikhs have succeeded
in establishing, mainly during the last fifteen years, their title
425 to absolute ownership of the tribal land by means of land settlement.
Because in Ottoman times the cultivators had no legal title
to the land which they occupied, the landlords were able, during
the period of the mandate, to use their political power to secure
legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the property
of the tribe. In much the same way the English landlords of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enclosed land as their property
which was traditionally common property, and ousted
small holders whose title was based only on custom. As in nineteenth
century England, the process is being hastened by
mechanization, which gives the big landowners an advantage as
against the small cultivator, and by inflation, which gives them
565 the impetus to invest. The big landowners of Iraq are a comparatively
recent creation, and it is the economic and legal changes
of the past twenty years which have established their position.

423 *Northern Iraq.* In northern Iraq there is a different type of land
tenure and fewer large landowners. South of Mosul, in the fertile
471 Tigris Valley, where pumps have been installed, there is a tribal
system resembling that of the south, and the land is owned
mainly by tribal sheikhs and notables. West of Mosul, on the
rolling uplands with poor rainfall, the land is also held on
471 a tribal system. In this region in recent years there has been
a rapid introduction of machinery; and the sheikhs are extending
their power to acquire land. In future bigger imports of
machinery will probably cause them to extend their influence

Ec Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

471 over larger areas, much as the pump owners are doing on the Lower Tigris.

But in the north-eastern rain-fed zone, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, the position of the cultivator is better. There is a settled system of cultivation and a large part of the land is held by small proprietors. In the plain lands of Kirkuk and Erbil as much as 75 per cent of the land is held by small cultivators with 241 holdings up to 200 dunums. Here the method of cultivation is much the same as in Syria, a *daim* (i.e. dry) crop being taken every two years.

423 Here too the legal position is different. In this part of the country, the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code remained in 425 force, and most of the land was registered in Turkish times. Frequently the *agha* (or *mukhtar*), who was originally the patriarchal head of the village with the duty of maintaining order, has used his position to acquire land, and registered the land of the village under his own name. This has happened particularly often in the Kurd villages, where in spite of the Land Code's explicit prohibition of granting an entire village in the name of one person, the Turkish authorities, for the sake of peace, registered whole groups of villages in the names of the notables of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya.

● 427 But even though the landlords have obtained title to land, the share paid to them is much less than in the south, and amounts to only 10–20 per cent of the product.

426 Thus the problem of reforming tenure is here much less acute. As in Syria, peasant indebtedness is the major problem, but in the course of the recent war the high prices of grain have enabled the majority of the peasants to wipe off the burden of debt.

241 In the high mountain regions, however, particularly in the Zibar district, there is acute agricultural distress; a series of bad harvests due to plant disease, insect pests, and insecurity, has caused the agricultural economy to go steeply downhill in the past few years.

423 *Settlement of Title.* During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Government attempted to settle title to land under the Land Code, as it did in the rest of the Turkish Empire. The Code was extended to Iraq under Midhat Pasha with the object of registering occupiers of land and thereby granting them

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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423 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.
In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly com-
622 plete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his
secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor
estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of the towns.'[1]

244 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions.
The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The
452 government regulation that land must remain fallow in alter-
nate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears, at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
427 the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually
receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin o* *Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53–E.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

● 427 Out of this 40 per cent the fellah must also pay a rent for the upkeep of the canals which irrigate the holding; this may amount to 20–45 per cent of his share.

426 At the beginning of the season the fellah receives in advance from the employer:

	Dinars
500 kg wheat	1.800
150 kg barley	.525
Cash in 3 instalments	3.750
	6.075
Seasonal interest 30 per cent	1.800
TOTAL	7.875

1 Dinar = £1 sterling

He is not as a rule able to repay the loans from the sale of the produce, and so gets deeper and deeper into debt to the landowner. Thus there has evolved a particular kind of debt-serfdom: a landowner who needs labour from one estate can pay an advance to a whole village or several villages, and so obtain 'the right to demand the transference of the land workers thus "freed" from their debts to his lands.'[1]

651 Changes in taxation have also benefited the big landowners. To promote the expansion of pump irrigation, land irrigated with pumps was partially exempted from taxation. The reform of taxation under the Istihlak law of 1931 has also operated mainly to the advantage of the large landowners.[2]

427 Thus the former tribesman in Iraq has been reduced to the position of a serf-tenant, who is entangled in crushing indebtedness, and so is tied to the holding which he cultivates.

423 In spite of the wise recommendations of Sir Ernest Dowson's
report, and the advisory efforts of British officials to improve
427 the security of the small cultivator, it cannot be said that land
185 settlement has succeeded in removing the oppressive character
of the land system. Nor has any reform been made to permit
the development of State land.

423 As regards water-rights, there is the same situation as in Palestine and Transjordan; attempts at legislation have been
185 frustrated by local interests, and here the need for legislation is

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[1] ibid., p. 55.

[2] See P. W. Ireland, *Iraq, A Study in Political Development* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1937), pp. 440–1.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

241 substantial surplus of barley for export. Sugar and tea are about the only agricultural commodities always imported.[39]

PRODUCTION

Agriculture in Iraq is devoted largely to the cultivation of winter crops. Because of the lack of rain in the south, summer crops can be grown only under irrigation. In the rain-fed zone of the north, summer crops can be grown on a moderate scale. In the irrigated zone of central and southern Iraq the limited water supply restricts the area devoted to summer crops to only about one-quarter of that grown to winter crops.

Barley and wheat are the only significant winter crops, while rice and, more recently, cotton are the principal summer crops. The area sown to sesame, corn, millet, and grain sorghum is comparatively insignificant. Tobacco assumes some importance in the mountainous areas of the north. Fruit and vegetables are quite important. Iraq is the world's principal producer and exporter of dates. Excellent citrus fruit is grown, particularly in the Diyala Valley in east central Iraq for domestic consumption, and other fruits and nuts are cultivated, mainly in the north.

233 Livestock raising is an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Sheep and goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding. Sheep and goats as well as camels are kept primarily by pastoral nomads.

YIELDS

241 Crop yields are generally low for a number of reasons. The water supply is frequently inadequate. Agricultural methods have on the whole remained unchanged for centuries. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied to the soil, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Crop rotation is wholly inadequate and makes little or no provision for soil building crops. Salinity, attributed to poor drainage, has materially lowered the productivity of land in the irrigated zone. Owing to insufficient and poor draft animals and lack of proper equipment, the soil is often poorly prepared and weeds detract from yields. Up to half of the winter crop area is left in fallow as the means of restoring fertility, but since the land is generally allowed to grow up in weeds to afford grazing for animals, the efficacy of the fallow system is limited.

LAND TENURE

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Ownership of cultivated lands is largely in the hands of sheiks and urban proprietors who entrust the actual cultivation in small parcels to sharecroppers. These sharecroppers have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to increase production and for the most part eke out a bare existence. The land assigned to the *Fellah*, or peasant, often changes from year to year so that the cultivator has virtually no incentive to improve it.

About 67 per cent of the privately-owned land is said to be in units exceeding 618 acres.

Most of the landowners are said to show little interest in improving agriculture. In the irrigated zone the *Fellah* generally gets only half of the crop, even though the state provides the irrigation works. His share is even smaller when the land is irrigated by privately-owned pumps or when the landlords supply seed, draft animals, or machinery.

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[39] "Iraq," *International Reference Service*, March, 1950.

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COTTON IN IRAQ



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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

Modern tractors with gang ploughs are now in general use in Iraq for ploughing cotton. Because the land is so heavy, tractors are usually of the heavy-duty track type. Most of the tractors are owned by the government and rented with drivers to farmers on an hourly basis. The Iraq Government is conducting experiments with all types of mechanical equipment in the hope that new lands in the rainfed areas to the north, too sparsely populated to farm with hand labor, may be brought into production with complete mechanization. [427]

These plants have been found to set 75 per cent of their bolls before the end of August. 242

Dr. Shelby Cain, cotton agronomist from Texas A. & M. College supplied by the Point Four Program, is concentrating on this problem in the cotton breeding program. He will be assisted by two Iraqi specialists now being trained at Texas A. & M. To some observers it appears that more work is needed on cultural practices before a full program on cotton breeding is started. For instance, the influence of planting dates, irrigation, fertilization, and cultivation on plant growths in this environment needs to be investigated before the more fundamental research in genetics and breeding can be used effectively.

Fertilization

Research on the problem of maintaining soil fertility is needed also and is included in the broad program for the future. There is an obvious deficiency of nitrogen and humus in the soil, and probably other plant foods. Much of the land in both of the main valleys has been under continuous cultivation 242
134

163 lation, and the death rate, 25 to 35. The
165 discrepancies in reporting are probably less
in the case of deaths than of births.

On the basis of the health district populations for 1950, the infant mortality rate was calculated at 98 per 1,000 live births. The death rate of infants under 1 year was 14 per cent of the total deaths, and of children under 5 years, about 23 per cent. Local observers estimate that the mortality in infants under 1 year approximates 300 to 350 per 1,000 live births among most rural and impoverished urban communities, and that it reaches almost 500 per 1,000 live births in children under 5 years of age. Intestinal diseases, undernutrition, respiratory infections and malaria are prominent among the causes of death in infancy and early childhood.

SOCIAL ECONOMY

241 Agriculture and the petroleum industry
together form the basis of Iraq's economy.
Although this region was one of the chief
granaries of the world centuries before the
Christian Era, the present agricultural re-
sources of the potentially fertile Tigris and
Euphrates river basins are only partially
developed. About 75 to 80 per cent of the
inhabitants are engaged in farming or pas-
toral pursuits, but progress is retarded by
the prevailing forms of land tenure, short-
age of labor supply and inefficient methods
311 of cultivation. In 1950, less than one fifth
241 of the arable land, normally estimated at
25 to 30 million acres, was under produc-
tion. Extensive areas of the alluvial plain
are cultivated by means of irrigation, but
improper drainage often results in consider-
427 able annual loss of soil fertility. A system
423 of tenancy farming predominates in most
sections of the country. The proportion of
land-owning peasants is small and largely
restricted to the northern provinces. In cen-
[241] tral and southern Iraq many families are
migratory cultivators who work on a share-
cropping basis for wealthy and, usually, ab-
sentee landlords.

241 Cereals, tobacco and cotton are important

p. 24(A)

possible on to a firm and complete basis of law and of fuller economic 185
freedom everywhere, it has to be recognised that the process must be gradual, particularly in the remoter and more backward parts of the country.

Some measure of discretionary control will require to be exercised 423
in regard to the persons accepted as lawful holders of miri land, for two 185
reasons. In the first place, so long as there are tribal areas (dira) which
must continue to be recognised, it may be necessary to restrict the hold- 428
ing of miri land within those areas to members of the tribal group concerned. In the second place holdings of miri land are not transmissible on death, and this would be inconsistent with that tenure as outlined. So that on the death of a miri holder a suitable successor has to be agreed upon. As we have seen the claims of the deceased holder's family to such succession are commonly admitted by prevailing custom. This is unquestionably in the public interest, provided the recognised representatives of the family are willing and able to discharge their obligations as miri holders to the community and the State. But it is necessary for the secure and economical working of miri, as of tapu tenure, that the number of representatives of a group of holders of a parcel of miri land shall be limited. In my provisional report I suggested that the number should not exceed three. In the case of holdings below a certain size (e.g. 10 misharas) limitation to a single recognised representative or holder might be advisable.

Such recognised representatives or holders should be in actual con- 423
trol of the land on the spot and thus effectively responsible for its
cultivation and management. He or they should preferably be chosen 185
by the deceased holder's family (or the group concerned) with the assistance, if necessary, of the local authority. Commonly he or they would have taken a leading part in the cultivation and management of the holding previously. The responsibility of a recognised holder of miri land to his family must primarily be a matter between himself and that family, as it is now. Complaints of abuse could always, also as now, be brought before the local authority, and possibly in future in certain cases before the *qadi*. Again, when the size and productivity of a miri holding permits it could, if desired, be divided on the death of a previous holder. No mortgage direct or indirect of miri land is reconcilable with the tenure as outlined, nor (for reasons given above) does this appear to me desirable (v, 2). Possibly some restriction should also be exercised over the pledging of produce and of agricultural animals and implements.

In the interests of the nation and the agricultural community as a whole, it is essential to recognise in a practical way, from the first, the economic limitation set on both the fragmentation of holdings and the multiplication of shareholding. The capacity of a parcel of land to provide a livelihood is necessarily restricted, and those who actually develop and work on it, with their immediate households, must evidently have the first call on its production. Moreover, unless there is a surplus of profit to put back into the land the general advance in the standard of agriculture, which is so greatly needed, will be retarded, if not prevented. Security of tenure is one of the primary conditions of such an advance. But security of tenure must be coupled with a wide-spread and general opportunity to make agriculture provide more than a bare and narrow livelihood for the greater mass of the population engaged in it, if any sustained national advance is to be realised. Owing to the sparsity and mobility of the country's existing population and to the backward state of its agricultural development there should be no difficulty for very many years in preventing any uneconomical congestion of the agricultural community on the land. But excessive shareholding

423 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of
427 the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-
cropping basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths,
or a third of the produce.

428 But even on these individual holdings communal ownership
621 is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-
tribal chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal
622 chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the
tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and
● 428 especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from
inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the
tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the
country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

423 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over
the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area,
241 it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has
a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years.
Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group
shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and
so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants
221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and
241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing re-
233 mains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it pre-
423 vailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the
619 State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organiza-
tion, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 ONCE in the days of the Ottomans there lived in Baghdad a man of an ancient and noble family named Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, and he lived
[651 in a great house by the banks of the Tigris. Yet his estates
731] had been reduced by the taxation and oppression of the Ottomans, and his crops spoiled by locust and by flood until he was reduced to poverty.

So he lived in his house with his only daughter without a single servant or a single slave, nor was there any furniture or silver left in his house, for he had sold all to buy
• [432] food. Yet the house he could not sell, for it would be shameful for him to do so, since it was the house of his ancestors.

The name of his daughter was Nura. She was in the
[203] seventeenth year of her life, yet none had asked for her in marriage, for since there were no servant girls to gossip about her beauty, the boys of great and noble families had not even heard of her. Else surely their sleep would have been troubled by her description, for her hair was as black as the Shatt el Arab on a clear winter's night, and her eyes were as the stars which glisten in its waters, her skin was as golden as the desert sand when tinged by the first rosy red rays of dawn, her back was as supple as the reeds before the wind, and her thighs and breasts had the softness of the feather quilt which allures the tired traveller.

So one day Nura went to her father and she said to him: O my beloved father, my state is thus and thus. Shall I be forever a cook in your household or shall I be the mother of noble sons? And Sheikh Mizeil grieved much at the words of his daughter, and his heart was sad. And on the nights of the full moon Nura would go out on the roof of their great house, and speak to the moon and ask the question:

1. The Story of Hajji Ali, the Great Sultan and his Son, the Amir Kheyyun

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
√56 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often
438 acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they
have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
• 432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
√78 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful
by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own
requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk
and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be
lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan
have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing
fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I
remember a fight three years ago which took place between two
Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This
was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which
nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition
expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the
great tribes in these matters.

2. A Story Concerning the Ignorance of Slaves

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the
end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire.
In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I
have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little
used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

433, 162, 464, 439

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
● Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2
Israel	MF1

/For an account of the economic effects of industrialization after World War II and information on industrial output in countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonne, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 293-298, p. 309, Turkey - pp. 298-300, 307-308, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 300-302, 309-310, Palestine - pp. 302-304, Israel - pp. 310-311./

185, 433, 654
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Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
●Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the program of industrialization in countries of the Middle East after World War I up to 1945, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Turkey - pp. 274-284, Egypt - pp. 285-286, Iraq - pp. 287-289, Palestine - 289-290, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 290-291./

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Iraq MH1

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see M1 Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been 619
formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable as Qa'immaqam. 579
The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it 511
has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. 135
Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya 315
Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Nafṭchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Nafṭkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, 471
significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. 433
There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver ''Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

433 made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made
barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and
thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work
were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—
shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-
[501] craft, of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported
wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of
the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted
downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were
made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These,
with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq dis-
tillation and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the
meagre list.

439 The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has
been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). To it as an 'invisible export'
457 should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—life-
blood of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd
al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by
travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

439 Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory consisted of the import of those needed commodities which the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed through Baṣra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales, coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France, and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes, were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

436 The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper qirsh
(piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a stable
coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian rupee
in Baṣra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns and
Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange
rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. A multitude of local
804 weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district.
453 Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by
the shrewd operations of many local *ṣarrafs*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most 433
consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high 439
percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered 137
a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one- 313
fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and 185
productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and 241
the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

312 work on the new Barrage began. Tenders for the complete con-
185 struction were called for in September 1910, and the contract
653 awarded to the British firm of Sir John Jackson & Co.

The construction of the Barrage, then and now one of the greatest works in 'Iraq, was carried out with extraordinary speed by a staff which included Turks, Indians, Armenians, and some 3,500 'Iraqis. The suspicion of certain elements in Turkish officialdom usually turned to gratified encouragement after a personal visit to Hindiya. Labour troubles were few. Transport, especially that on the Euphrates routes from Baṣra, presented extreme difficulties, with tribal blackmail and navigational obstacles: and the continual struggles needed to obtain funds from an empty Treasury in Istanbul and a harassed Daftardar in Baghdad were successful only after actual stoppage of the work seemed inevitable. The iron gates arrived in the late summer of 1913, and a crowded and triumphant ceremonial opening of the whole work was held in November of that year. Although the Barrage, which had cost less than £500,000, still lacked the canalization which it was designed to support downstream, it conferred immediately enormous benefits on the countryside which it served. These would have been a hundredfold greater if they could have included public security, an equitable land system, and some hope of new agricultural methods.

Elsewhere in 'Iraq, much of the earth-work of the Ḥabbaniya Escape in its first phase was completed, and digging of the Ṣaqlawiya Canal was begun but abandoned. Further surveys produced information of great future value, though no other major enterprise belongs to this period. A scheme for watering the Ḥawija, north-west of Kirkuk, from the Lesser Zab was begun without study and ended in fiasco and scandal. More important, and prophetic of a major development of the future, was the growing riverside use of oil engines for irrigation purposes. These increased from a mere dozen in 1900 to some scores in 1914. Meanwhile, flood-bank protection annually renewed followed its unsure and expensive course, rarely effective and always burdensome. The 'bunds' built by Nadhim Pasha for the safeguarding of Baghdad, though they failed partially in their first year, were an important work.

433 These last years of Turkish rule were marked by little industrial development. Some increase in local shipbuilding and the use of irrigation pumps, ice machines, wool and liquorice-presses called for the first time for mechanical repair facilities. The first motor-
494 car appeared in 'Iraq in 1908 from Aleppo; by 1914 less than a dozen were in use. These included a motor-bus service on the Ba'quba road, and the private cars of a few notables. Efforts to mechanize the Kufa tramway had failed.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

496 two-metre-gauge systems (Baghdad–Başra and Baghdad–Kirkuk) remained a source of delay and trouble, and the floods of 1926 destroyed much railway property. But the reopening of Persian pilgrim traffic after 1924 brought welcome revenue to the railway. [464] The Indian labour disappeared in thousands year by year, replaced by 'Iraqis.

● 433 Industry in modern guise was slow to appear. Cotton-ginning and mechanical transport maintenance, ancillary to other forms of enterprise, have been mentioned. Of modern manufacture there was none, though various possibilities were often discussed. The future source, however, of the country's greatest single enterprise 315 and wealth advanced during these years from the conference-room 471 into the open: mineral oil.

648 The Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913–14 had allotted to Turkey, and therefore ultimately to 'Iraq, the western half of the Naftkhana border area south of Khaniqin; and the Turkish, and thus by inheritance the 'Iraqi, Government had accepted that this Transferred Territory should be treated as still included in the grant made to D'Arcy in 1901. Negotiations on this basis between the Anglo-Persian Company and the 'Iraqi Ministry of Works were concluded in 1925, and later reopened to produce a revised and modernized agreement in May 1926. Drilling had early located a producing well, followed by others, and it was decided to convey the crude oil by pipeline the twenty-mile distance to Khaniqin. The refinery which, with Government encouragement, the Company decided to erect at Alwand outside the town, but still within the Transferred Territory, was begun in June 1926. 'Iraq seemed thus assured of its own petroleum supply, with all the importance of this to mechanical transport, pump-irrigation, and perhaps future industries.

The Vizirial promise given to the Turkish Petroleum Company on 28 June 1914 had in the seven years following been first doubted but later affirmed by the Foreign Office. It was questioned but later accepted by the French who in 1920, under the Cadman–Berthelot agreement at San Remo, inherited the Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent. shareholding in the Company; and it was viewed askance by the Americans who demanded an Open Door to 'Iraqi development with no complication of old unratified promises. This diplomatic obstacle was removed by the allotment of half the Anglo-Persian share to a group of American companies by an agreement reached in principle in 1923, but not implemented formally until 1928. Thus the shares of the Company in its final form were held as to 5 per cent. as ever by Mr. Gulbenkian, and as to 95 per cent. equally between the Shell Group (as the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company), the Anglo-Persian (as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

185 Ruṭba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of
654 bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial develop-
135 ment proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every
Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its
favour. 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled
433 artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

382 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil
471 export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in
1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439
Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable
impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been
under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual
loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's
import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant
across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes,
however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began
to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453
varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656
shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by
insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies,
by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly
in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking.
The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436
in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. 652
The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in
some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern 185
multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still
prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped
to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were
the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private
cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291
served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced
Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi
sidara in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with
ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned 433
on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had
little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged
with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette
factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room
ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was
planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery
and matches came into humble existence. Yasin
Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts,
failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an
English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382
significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies
(p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of
more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter
the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, 511 the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, con- 511 tracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and 439 dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

British forces for their own needs, in part acquired by the United 433
Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to Great Britain or 439
other territories, and in part exported by normal trade channels now regulated by export control. The date crop was still handled for export by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. The cotton which Japan ceased to take after 1941 was sent to India, but in quantities which high grain prices had much reduced; production touched 26,000 bales in 1940, but thereafter dropped for the next nine years to a fifth or even a tenth of that amount. Wool was sent to America, but with this and all other commodities both internal movement by land and water and the provision of shipping space from Baṣra presented difficult problems. A quantity of produce went by rail to the Levant and Turkey, and animals on the hoof, in years of good grazing, were sent to the British forces in Syria. The prices of all commodities were fixed in terms of imperious [435]
war necessity and of ever-growing 'Iraqi inflation, to which these prices contributed.

The import of manufactured articles and certain foodstuffs was 722
limited to quantities below the level of satisfaction, thanks to 434
reduced outputs in the supplying countries and to pressure on shipping space. Help was forthcoming more than once from American lend-lease stocks of drugs, metal goods, tyres, chemicals, and agricultural implements; Paiforce at times could help to meet an urgent shortage, and the British Government organized an emergency grain supply in 1942 from India and Canada; but, as in every country, abiding and irksome shortages remained, aggravated by maldistribution and by a habit of hoarding against which the law and public opinion strove equally in vain. The need at all costs to obtain supplies led to the urgent search for sources to replace Japan and other belligerents. An import licence system was established which, vastly profitable to some, worked with its share of imperfections and abuses; a price-fixing procedure was applied over a wide range of articles, with an attempted control of stocks enforced by occasional raids and prosecutions, but avoided by widespread black-market trading; and a rationing system, first applied to sugar in 1942, was extended next year to coffee and tea and later to cotton and woollen textiles. This control by ration-cards, based on imperfect tribal and urban lists, was a matter of extreme difficulty and gladly abandoned at the earliest moment; nor were the resulting stocks ever sufficient to admit an adequate allowance to the tribal public. Nevertheless, the rationing of essentials was both indispensable and attended with fair success. Late in 1944, in expectation of the war's end and by reaction from the attempted régime of universal close control in 1943–4, a policy of decontrol was substituted, and one commodity after another

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Lynch fleet had been diminished in 1938 by the loss of the 505
Mejidieh, sold to Anglo-Iranian, and in 1941 by that of the
Malamir and the *al-Kadri*, burnt out and scrapped respectively.
Their rivals, notably Ḥannā al-Shaykh and 'Abd al-Karim
Khudhayri (Khedery), were more than holding their own: but the
competition of the railway and the roads must grow rather than
diminish. To the road system, indeed, Paiforce contributed much, 491
notably in the completed trans-desert highway to Jordan, in the
re-surfacing of many road stretches, and in the maintenance in
being of 'Iraqi transport fleets by the provision of tyres. Never-
theless, the upkeep of civil motor vehicles in war-time proved most 494
difficult, and the numbers in use decreased. The air communica-
tions of the territory were not improved during the war; but before 509
its end projects for a national air line were under formation. The
European services crossing and visiting 'Iraq recommenced in
1945 after war-time curtailments, and the Egyptian Misr Airways
restarted its Cairo–Baghdad service. A contract was given in 1945
to the Marconi Company for the erection of a new wireless trans-
mitting station.

The course of foreign trade was notably deflected from its usual 439
channels by the war. In 1939 the United Kingdom was its prin-
cipal customer, followed by the United States, each of these
countries taking approximately one-third of the total visible
exports; but by 1944 the principal buyer was Palestine with Trans-
jordan, followed by Persia. Visible exports, amounting to ID 4
million before the war, reached through enhanced prices ID 9
million before its end. The transit trade, reduced in 1939 to a
value of some ID 3 million, reached ID 13 million five years later,
thanks to the passage of goods to Russia. Imports rose from a
value of ID 9 million before the war to ID 14 million in its last
year; the United Kingdom's share in these fell from 33 to 11 per
cent., that of Japan from 18 per cent. to nothing, while India's
share rose from 8 to 30 per cent., Syria's from 2 to 16, the United
States' from 8 to 12.

The desire for industrial expansion, always a cherished ambition, 433
was stimulated by the war-time shortages and an increased local
market; contrary factors were the shortage of raw materials, com-
petition for skilled workers, and the impossibility of importing
factory equipment. Of the seventy enterprises benefiting in 1944
from the law of 1929 most were on the humblest scale, with the
importance only of pilot projects which could indicate to the
middle class the possibility of a career outside Government service,
the professions, or politics. Some war-time progress was made in
brick manufacture; workshops produced hand-tools from scrap
metal; the crushing of oil-seeds—cotton, sesame, and linseed—

433 increased on a small scale: the tanning industry was partly mechanized and the quality of its output improved. The two existing mechanically operated wool factories, the unmodernized distilleries, the three cotton ginneries, the small soap-works and cigarette factories, were increased during the war by an attempt at brewing, a primitive glass-works, a factory for paint and another for wax matches. The long-planned cement factory was not yet in production. An important cotton-spinning and weaving project had been initiated, but had not yet begun to operate. A plan to create a cinema studio in Baghdad was in 1945 the object of a visit by a British expert.

382 722 The necessity of postponing further oil development was, equally to the British companies and to the Government, the more regrettable as it seemed not to apply to comparable enterprises in Persia or Arabia; in the former, aviation spirit and other products were produced on a vast scale for war purposes, and in the latter American industry could find abundant equipment when British could not, and could secure for Sa'udi Arabia a long lead in production. The I.P.C. was forced to renounce until after the war the additional pipelines and consequent additional production which it had planned in 1938; indeed, its output was forced down by events in the Levant in 1941–2 from four to two million tons, and restored to full capacity only in 1944. The damage done to its installations in May 1941 was soon repaired, and it was able to assist the British forces by the provision of quarters and air-fields, loan of personnel, communications facilities, and the supply of refined products. The output of these was increased for war purposes, and plant at Kirkuk was improvised for the supply of motor spirit additional to that from Alwand. Factories for making tins were opened at Kirkuk and Mosul, and the two centres connected by pipeline. In Baṣra area a pipeline was built to connect Abadan and Shu'ayba. The destruction of many wells at Kirkuk as a precautionary measure against enemy invasion was ordered by the Army in 1942, but fortunately did not interfere with current production. Drilling was suspended from mid-1941 until the latter part of the war. In the area of the Mosul Petroleum Company (formerly B.O.D.) no operations were possible during the war at 'Ayn Zala or elsewhere, though at Baṣra exploration continued. These postponements, unavoidable in conditions which made engineering supplies unobtainable, were formally authorized by an agreement between the Companies and the Government in March 1943, whereby in return for a loan of ID 1,500,000 the Government granted a 'period of suspension' to begin in May 1941 and to run until two years after the armistice. Meanwhile the project of a Government refinery remained alive, though at present untimely; and to question the terms—or

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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those to whom mere shaykhly birth or recent business enterprise had brought title-deeds was obvious and envied. There was indeed room for criticism on various lines. The Government had parted with its right of free disposal of wide lands hitherto legally unencumbered though in fact occupied; this might obstruct later development plans. Vested interests had been over-generously recognized: land reform on an equalitarian pattern was, as the left wing of Baghdad politicians (and some foreign observers) insisted, as far off as ever. Nevertheless, within the limits of society and economics as they were, a great work of stabilization had been done. Disputes were few, confidence had been increased, and a return to the pre-settlement conditions of agrarian jungle law was unthinkable. For both the small and the large holding, for peasant-proprietorship, the capitalist's scientific farm, the Land Development Company and large-scale Government enterprise on its own vast unencumbered estates, there was clearly room in the 'Iraq of the future.

433 Though the limits within which industry was likely to develop were by the mid-century well understood, not least by the Director-General and the Committee for Industrial Research, there had been a measure of expansion during the last five years. The legal basis for its encouragement, which was the policy of every successive Ministry, had been altered by the cancellation of the 1929 law and of licences issued under it in favour of a new law of 1950. The latter granted important privileges to undertakings which were power-operated, employed 90 per cent. or more of local workers, cost at least ID 5,000 to erect, and used more than half 'Iraqi capital. By 1951 thirty-five projects had been accepted as fulfilling these conditions, and the Industrial Bank made loans to a number of them. Of the industrial output of such enterprises some was on the humblest scale and of slight interest; such was the production of sweets, macaroni, date-treacle, articles made in Kurdish marble, ceramics, wax matches, buttons, reprocessed glass, unglazed tiles, and aluminium pots. Manufactures on a less inconsiderable scale were those of flour, vegetable oils, cardboard and wrapping paper (made from wheat and rice stalks), soap, knitted goods, sausages and preserved meat, methylated spirits, 'araq, concrete pipes, plastics, steel windows, and tubular furniture. An earlier brewery having failed, a modern brewery using local barley began the production of excellent beer in 1949. An ambitious enterprise for the manufacture of jute gunny-bags was in course of establishment. Brickworks had continued to develop on modern lines, and were capable of meeting all local needs. 'Iraqi cigarettes had gone far to supply the country's smokers, from modernized as well as hand-operated workshops; only Kurdish-grown tobacco was used.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Much progress had been made, under the care of a Hides Associa- 433 tion, in the better treatment of local hides and skins, and well-tanned leather was produced. Boot and shoe manufacture, largely by electrically-operated machinery, had increased in scale and quality. The cement factory outside Bahgdad, using lime brought from near Ṭuz Khurmatu, came into important production in 1949 and was soon selling 250 tons a day. The three cotton ginneries erected before the war—one of them an Agricultural Bank enterprise at 'Aziziya—remained in being, with capacity to deal with much more than the available cotton crop. Printing presses, all small except one European-owned and that of the Government, remained substantially as before the war, save in their modernized equipment. The spinning and weaving industry, which in some cases also dyed and finished its fabrics, had by 1950 greatly increased its pre-war development and used in part local cotton; a factory in Mosul made also rayon cloth.

Other industrial projects more or less near to realization in 1950 were for rayon production from straw, for local production of fertilizers, and for sugar-refining. The treatment of tobacco leaf had been intensively studied, but remained defective. The industries likely, it was thought, to develop further, using 'Iraqi raw materials and diminishing the need for import, were those producing cement, soap, alcohol, vegetable oil, leather and shoes, cigarettes, beer, and textiles. The other industries would in all probability keep a lesser though perhaps a useful place; none was likely to produce a considerable surplus for export, unless, as some hoped, an industry could be founded to use, for fertilizers or otherwise, the abundant by-products of petroleum. The Development [185 Board intended considerable expenditure on 'industrial and mining 316] schemes' in the period 1951 to 1956, upon lines to be later revealed.

'Iraq's poverty in minerals other than petroleum seemed in part 135 to have been corrected by the discovery, in the later forties, of 317 interesting copper and copper pyrites deposits in the mountainous Qal'a Diza area, and by reports from the Government geologist of an outcrop of excellent marble near Rayat and supplies elsewhere of chromite, iron ore, magnesite. These, or some of them, were thought capable of commercial development. A hard limestone suitable for barrage building was sought and found. Local salt, gypsum, brick clay, Mosul building-stone, and cement-making materials were in use as before, and it was planned to renew the activity which during the war had produced up to 15,000 tons a year of Kifri 'coal'.

In spite of the imposed delays and frustrations of the war period, 382 the position achieved in the petroleum industry by 1950 was such as to place 'Iraq in the forefront of oil-producing countries, with

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is
311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it
is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only
312 twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians. The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims, three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians,
871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some
153 important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

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423 of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators
425 were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of [565] cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

● 433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

511 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally
642 a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN IRAQ

ABDUL GHANI AL DALLI ☆

433 Modern industry in Iraq, as in many other underdeveloped countries, has made significant progress in recent years and especially since the end of World War II. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the causes of this movement in their relation to over-all industrial development and industrialisation in Iraq. The discussion in this paper will, on the whole, be restricted to the problems of industrial enterprise in the private sector of the economy. Consequently, Government industrial plans, as well as the oil industry have not been discussed. Likewise, the paper does not deal with the wider regional aspects of modern industry. As far as Iraq is concerned, the main causes for the progress of industry are to be found in the abundance of natural wealth, especially in the form of oil, the relative plentifulness of cheap labour in urban centers, the hardships suffered by the population during the war owing to the shortage of essential industrial products, the exceptional profits made during the war by proprietors of such modern industries as then existed (e.g. woollen textiles, cigarettes, soap, etc.), the accumulation of large sums of liquid capital in relatively few hands as a result of war and post-war inflation, and finally, the positively helpful attitude of Government towards industrial development.
654 The Iraqi Government has always tried to encourage industry, and
652 has granted it various exemptions from taxation under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, passed in 1929, and its amendments. In 1946 - 47, *however, it took a more effective step in the* creation of the Industrial Bank, with a capital of I.D. 500,000 wholly contributed by the Government. The Bank's function is to grant loans for the establishment of new industries and the expansion and improvement of existing industries, to participate in joint-stock companies formed for industrial purposes, to start new industrial enterprises on its own account if need be, and to offer various services connected with the import of machinery, materials, and the export

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114 ☆ Abdul Ghani Al Dalli is Member of the Iraqi Parliament and Minister of Agriculture, and a former Director General of the Industrial Bank of Iraq.

654 of products.[1] Financial assistance thus provided by the Government,
652 together with the new Law for the Encouragement of Industry issued in 1950, proved of great potency in the development of industry. The capital of the Industrial Bank was increased in 1952, to I.D. 3,000,000 of which I.D. 1,200,000 have already been paid up.

433 These and other measures, such as increases in custom duties
656 and the restriction or prohibition of certain industrial imports, have produced marked progress in the establishment of new industries and the re-equipment and expansion of old ones, especially since the end of World War II.[2] This can be seen from the following table:

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Development of Large-Scale Industry in Iraq 1948 - 1952

Year (1st April - 31st March)	Capital Invested I.D. 1000	Value of Annual Output I.D. 1000	Number of Employees	Wages paid annually I.D. 1000
(Seven large Industries)				
1948 - 49	3,183	1,403	1649	
1949 - 50	3,194	1,555	2626	333
1950 - 51	4,206	2,631	3443	406
1951 - 52	4,415	3,600	3837	486
(Ten large Industries)[3]				
1951 - 52	4,835	4,424	4533	599

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[1] Industrial Bank, Compilation of Laws, Regulations, etc. Government Press, Baghdad 1951.

[2] For pre-World War II industrial development in Iraq see:- *A Handbook of Mesopotamia*, H.M.S.O., 1917. *A Report on the Progress of Iraq*, by H.M. Government to the League of Nations. H.M.S.O.,1931. *The Iraq Directory*, Baghdad, 1935 (English Edition). *The Economic Organisation of Iraq* (In Arabic), Editor Said B. Himadeh, Beirut, 1937.

[3] See the *Annual Report of the Department of Industry 1951-52*, Ministry of National Economy,Baghdad, (In Arabic)
The Report of the National Bank of Iraq, 1949-50, p. 46 (in Arabic) states that national production of cement, beer, vegetable oil, soap, leather.. etc., has been substituted for similar imports with the result that value of imports fell from I.D. 2,984,000 in 1948 to I.D. 1,298,000 in 1950, and the deficit in the balance of trade was reduced by I.D. 1,686,000 due to this reason alone during the same period.

The ten industries referred to in the table are: cotton spinning and weaving (one establishment), cement (one establishment), wool spinning (two establishments), modern tanning (five establishments), beer (one establishment), alcohol (three establishments), vegetable oil (one establishment), modern soap making (one establishment), artificial and natural silk weaving (six establishments), jute spinning and weaving (one establishment still under construction). The total is 22 establishments all of which enjoy government assistance under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, and practically all have received financial aid in the form of loans or capital participation from the Industrial Bank. None of them employs less than 20 workers, and the majority employ over a hundred workers. All use power-driven machinery. It is interesting to notice that most of these industries are owned by joint-stock companies and that they have distributed profits during the last three years ranging from 9 per cent to 25 per cent. 433 [654] [473]

Obviously the table does not cover the whole field of industrial development in Iraq. It has been constructed on the basis of a selected sample to show the rapid progress made in recent years. The unusual increase in ouput compared with the rate of capital investment as shown in the table is to be explained by the fact that most plants were still under construction or half-completed in the early years. A complete survey of the industrial sector in 654 the economy of Iraq is still to come. The Central Bureau of Sta- 433 tistics, Ministry of National Economy, is expected soon to embark on this task. Such a survey will have to cover, in addition to those industries included in the above table, the following:

(a) Other modern industries in the private sector which represent a substantial portion of the whole, such as flour milling, workshops and agricultural machine repair shops, printing, cotton ginning, cigarette manufacture, the building materials industry, shoe-making, etc.

(b) The great oil industry owned and operated by powerful foreign concerns holding concessions from the Government. The oil companies produced nearly 8 million tons of crude oil and 400,000 tons of refined products in 1951, and employ over 12,000 workers. Their production is expected to rise to 20 million tons of crude oil in 1955-56, [392]

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[655] (c) Industrial enterprises being carried out directly by various Government departments and agencies such as the Iraqi State Railways, the Port of Basrah, the Ministry of Defence, the municipalities, and the recently set up State Oil Refinery Administration which has already undertaken the construction near Baghdad of an oil refinery with an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons of refined products, at an expected cost of about I.D. 7,000,000.

(d) Various handicrafts and semi-mechanised industries such as the date-packing industry.[1]

433 It need hardly be said that, although recent industrial development has been marked, it is still quite limited in relation to the economy as a whole and in comparison with industrial development in neighbouring areas. In Lebanon for instance, the industrial sector has been found to contribute approximately LL. 135 million, or 17 per cent of the total national income estimated at 434 LL. 830 million.[2] In our estimation, the industrial sector in Iraq contributes no more than 10 per cent of the total national income estimated at I.D. 150 million.[3]

000 The problems arising from, and the difficulties standing in the way of, industrialisation in Iraq, will now be discussed.

Industrialisation in general means the introduction of modern industry into an area which has been up to that time dependent for its livelihood on agriculture, trade and craftsmanship. Such an area would have had no experience of mechanised industrial processes, the organisation of modern factories, the division of labour inside such factories, nor would it have any clear idea of the material and human resources that such organisations would demand. Assuming that industrialisation of such a "new" or underdeveloped area is a desirable thing, two sets of problems seem likely to emerge. The first set of problems is connected with the ways and means of developing industry with reasonable speed. The second set of problems relates to the psychological, social and political effects that modern industry brings about.

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[1] For a brief but fairly comprehensive survey of industrial output and possibilities in Iraq see: *The Economic Development of Iraq*. Report of a mission organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. p. 148-50, also Annex D. p. 277 and following.

[2] *National Income of Lebanon, Monograph No. 3* by Albert Y. Badre, Ph. D., and Asad Y. Nasr, M.A., Beirut, Lebanon, May 1953. Especially p. 24.

[3] The ratio for more advanced countries is between 30 and 40 per cent.

000 industrial shares or bonds, local capital will continue to be held 455 in hoards, or invested in trade, agriculture and real estate. Speculation in land values, especially urban sites, has come to play a great part in the economy of Iraq, and incidently absorbs a great 000 deal of capital. The problem lies then not in the deficiency of capital resources, but in the utilization of these resources and above all in the creation of a suitable environment to induce private enterprise and capital into the industrial field. In the writer's view the creation of such an environment is the core of the industrialisation problem in under-developed areas. As things are, private enterprise is primarily absorbed in trade, agriculture and speculation — especially in real estate — where easy money can be made, and the whole economy remains stagnant. Once this problem is tackled both local and foreign capital will flow in. The State, that is the highest authority in a society, is called upon to take the initiative. Its action must include financial, technical, educational and administrative measures.

654 In Iraq the State has made attempts to deal with all these as-
433 pects. In the fiscal field it has afforded protection for industry in
[439] the form of high tariff duties on most industrial products and in the exemption of power-driven machinery from such duties. It has prohibited or restricted the import of articles the like of which are being manufactured in Iraq, such as cement, cotton yarn, vegetable oil, soap, tanned leather, beer. Industrial schemes are given priority in the granting of import licences and the allocation of scarce currencies for purchases from abroad.

The new Law for the Encouragement of Industry passed in 1950 consolidated early legislation and made new concessions. Under this Law Iraq-owned industrial enterprises, that is enterprises in which 55 per cent of capital at least is held by Iraqi nationals, are granted exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions from import duties (not included in the tariff exemptions) on machinery, materials, equipment, spare parts and containers; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of Government land free of rent up to 25,000 square meters. Industries enjoy these concessions as long as they use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in cosiderable quantities. In any case they should use chiefly power-driven machinery in their works. These measures without doubt played a significant part in

the development of industry sketched above.[1] Industries which 654 433
existed then or have come into existence since have benefited considerably
from these concessions. But private enterprise remained
shy of industrial activity until the establishment of the Industrial
Bank in 1946-47. Through this Bank, the State showed itself not 652
only willing to forgo some revenue in the interests of industry, 475
but to provide cash, and to share in the risks of industry. As mentioned
above, the Industrial Bank could not only give loans (against
real or personal security), but also participate in the capital of
joint stock companies. Its greatest value in my view lies in the fact
that it can become a founder or promoter of industries and thus
lead the industrial community and the investing public into new
fields. However, the Bank was handicapped in the early stages, 652
by the inadequacy of the financial resources at its disposal and the
absence of economic and technical studies by which the feasibility
of proposed industrial schemes might be judged. Moreover,
the Bank lacked, and to some extent still lacks, a qualified technical
staff. It has often to rely on the judgement of the Board of Directors
or the advice of specialized Government departments such
as the Directorate General of Industry and the Directorate General
of Agriculture, which are not always fully equipped for the task.
The Bank has continually asked for scientific surveys to be made 654
of the mineral, agricultural and animal resources of the country. 433
It has also called for an integrated economic plan covering industry, 652
agriculture and other economic activities, in which the Bank,
like other institutions, will play its particular role.[2] There has
been strong resistance on the part of the Board of Directors to the
allocation of money for technical staff or technical studies by experts,
and often when money was allocated, it could not be spent
because the Board disagreed on the qualifications of such experts
(foreign or national) or the need for inviting them to study particular
problems. However, as years passed and the financial position
of the Bank improved, a section for the study of industrial
schemes was formed and members of it were charged with the
study of certain problems at home or abroad. A number of ad hoc
committees of specialists available in Iraq were set up to study
and report on proposed industrial schemes. Contact was estab-

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[1] No provision was made, however, for direct subsidies to industry, and no legal preference in government contracts was given to home industry.

[2] See First Annual Report, Industrial Bank 1946-47/1947-48, Baghdad. (Arabic)

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● 653 lished with various Government departments,and data were collec-
654 ted, classified and sometimes published for the guidance of would-be entrepreneurs. A number of foreign experts were invited to study either particular schemes (such as paper, sugar, artificial silk fibre, the exploitation of salt, etc.) or to concern themselves with industrial development in general, and make recommendations for improvements in existing industries or for the establish-
652 ment of new industries. In addition to the absence of a general investment policy and planning, and the lack of economic and technical data to guide the activities of the Bank, there was, in the years 1947-50 the handicap of inadequate financial resources. When the Bank opened for business in 1946-47 its nominal capital, in accordance with a decision taken early in 1940, was fixed at I. D. 500,000. This figure was out of proportion with the changed level of prices and incomes, and the expansion of industry which had taken place meanwhile. Furthermore as the capital of the Bank was provided by the Treasury as a loan, it was up to the Treasury to decide what amounts to pay and when to pay them, and its decisions often did not coincide with the Bank's requirements either for funds or for making forward plans.

This situation, however, has completely changed as a result of increased Government revenue from oil in accordance with the Oil Agreement of 1951. The capital of the Bank was raised to I.D. 1,000,000 in 1951 and to I.D. 3,000,000 in 1952. Earlier, in 1948, 1949, and 1950, the Bank was forced to borrow from the reserves of certain Government departments, e.g. the Directorate General of Awqaf, Government Staff Guarantee Fund,and from other banks (especially the National Bank of Iraq). This form of borrowing was found to be less costly and more elastic than borrowing from the public. Another important source of capital which has developed in recent years is the annual net profits of the Bank. These have risen from I.D. 4,066 in 1948-49, to I.D. 7,745 in 1949-50,to I.D. 60,501 in 1950-51, and to I.D. 99,463 in 1951-52. The average rate of loans granted to industry in the last five years has been about I.D. 150,000 annually,[1] with an average loan period of three to four years. Hence a sum of I.D. 40,000 to I.D. 50,000 is repaid annually to the Bank. The paid-up capital of the Bank stood at I.D. 1,200,000

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[1] The rate of interest was reduced from 7 per cent per annum to 5 per cent by decision of the Ministry of Finance in 1951.

135 (2)-The Supply of Raw Materials and Power: Iraqis is potentially

233 241 433 rich in many kinds of raw materials. In the first place it has abundant supplies of oil and gas which provide a cheap source of both raw material and fuel. Secondly, it has pastoral and agricultural products such as wool, camel hair, hides and skins, meat, fish, milk, animal fat. Thirdly, it has fertile land which, with the extension of irrigation, can be a rich source of such raw materials as sugar beets, sugar cane, soybeans and jute, in addition to products already available such as tobacco, cotton, sesame, linseed, and practically all types of grain, fruits and vegetables. Finally, recent geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. There are deposits of sulphurs, apparently of commercial value, in many parts of Iraq, and of salt, especially near Basrah. Yet each of these resources presents a different problem; none is easily exploitable (except oil); quantities available for industry are limited and the quality frequently poor. Agriculture has been kept at a low level of output because of the lack of irrigation schemes in most parts of the country; the difficulties caused by the present land tenure system and the agricultural techniques connected with the tribal system, which covers over 80 per cent of the cultivated area; the absence of an effective agricultural extension service and lack of modern storing facilities; these and other factors have held back both quantity and quality of agricultural and animal products. There was a noticeable extension in the cultivation of cotton in recent years, but the severe failure of the crop in 1951, owing to a pest attack, has been a great set-back. Difficulties in the supply of raw materials have held up many an industrial enterprise. The scheme for a sugar factory which has been under discussion since 1947 has had to be postponed from one year to another owing to the uncertainties connected with the [28] cultivation of both sugar beet and sugar cane. The progress of the leather tanning industry, one of the oldest industries in Iraq, has been retarded due to the existing conditions in which hides and skins have been prepared and preserved, and great losses to this particularly native industry have resulted. The woollen textile [289] mills have had to import certain qualities of Australian wool to mix with Iraqi wool which is of a coarse variety.

135 So far as mineral resources are concerned the surveys that have been made are insufficient.[1] Further exploration work is

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[1] As of writing, in July 1953.

nationals in order that industry may qualify for the concessions 648
granted by that law. This may appear as a discrimination against [656]
foreign capital and some foreign industrialists have raised this 471
point. But considering the great concessions granted by the Law, including the appropriation of state land, and the smallness of the majority reserved for nationals, the "discrimination" is nominal. Past experience of foreign capital investment in the Middle East does not allow the removal of such safeguards. However, the writer believes that proper legislation on these three points mentioned above would give foreign industrialists sufficient assurance; and, given the proper information and contacts, many firms may be induced to establish branches in Iraq to the benefit of all concerned.[1]

7. **Other problems** : There are other less important industrial 433
problems which should be mentioned even though limitations of 471
space prevent full discussion of them.

(a) It should be realized that Iraqi industry labours under a heavy burden of over-capitalization which adds to its costs. There is a tendency to have completely integrated plants; most industries have to maintain a power generating plant either to provide electricity, or as a spare in case of failure in the city supply. Practically all industries have their own workshops. There is a strong desire on the part of all industry owners to be self-sufficient with regard to supply of materials, chemicals and spare parts. Many industries have been induced to purchase more land than they actually need in order to guard against future needs and also to profit from the expected rise in land values. This has led to an insufficient utilization of machinery and to a great amount of working capital, per unit of production, locked up. These facts are reflected in the balance sheets of many industries in the form of Loans from Banks (commercial banks) which in some cases reach 50 per cent of nominal capital and thus increase the fixed charges which industry has to meet. The reason for this desire on the part of industrials to be more or less completely self-sufficient lies in the fact that, owing to the country's industrial immaturity, it is often impossible to rely on efficient service from outside plants when required. The need to keep great stores of

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[1] In accordance with the economic boycott enforced by Arab States, firms having business relations with Israel are excluded.

433 materials and spare parts is due to many factors. First is past
471 experience of the difficulty of obtaining such materials, due either to Iraq's distance from international markets, or to the shortages of world supply, or to the arbitrary attitude of suppliers abroad. Secondly, the fear of interruption of supplies owing to international emergencies and restrictions in the countries of origin. Thirdly, the influence of directors or big share-holders who own agencies for such materials or spare parts.

433 (b) There is great scope in Iraqi industry for improvement in the layout of machinery, flow of material, lighting, noise abatement, and temperature control.

466 (c) The problems of labour recruitment and organisation, systems of wage payment, housing and workers' welfare in general, fall outside the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say that present labour legislation provides for weekly and annual holidays, for compensations in cases of injury or total loss of life, and prohibits the employment of children under twelve years. Industry is subject to inspection by officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs for the purpose of enforcing the labour laws. The formation of trade unions is permitted under the law, but so far labour organisations have played very small part in industry.

433 (8) **State Assistance and Control**: The main characteristics of in-
454 dustry in Iraq should by now be clear. It is of a recent development. It has developed largely under state protection and assistance. It has to operate within a very small market. The fact that industry is still in its infancy makes it hard to predict its future course. The part which government assistance has so far played in its development is of special importance and calls for examination. State assistance has taken various forms; tariff protection, exemptions from various taxes and duties, and financial aid through the Industrial Bank. Except possibly in the last case, government assistance to industry has not been based on any criteria of efficiency, or economic or social objectives. Any firm can obtain the benefits of state encouragement as long as it fulfills two conditions only; that it will use raw materials available in Iraq, or that it will produce goods imported in large quantities. It is necessary, if industry is not to grow lax behind the high walls of protection, to set up standards of efficiency, and to relax protective measures such as the prohibition of competitive imports, as soon as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized. Benefits under

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

the Law for the Encouragement of Industry are granted irrespective 433
of the locality in which the Industry is to be established or the 654
type of industry embarked upon. Industries established in crowded, highly developed areas are given the same advantages as those established in remote, less developed districts. The manufacturer of producer's goods is treated equally with the manufacturer of consumers' goods and luxury goods. The criteria upon which an industry's claim to benefits is judged stand in need of drastic revaluation.

The limitation of the market in Iraq not only restricts the pos- 477
sibilities of large-scale development of most industries but it affords opportunities for monopoly control by one or two plants in certain fields. The danger of monopoly and exorbitant prices is already in sight in such industries as cement, beer, cotton and woollen textiles. The encouragement of new enterprise in these fields, or the relaxation of state protection to allow healthy competition, or direct intervention by the state to fix prices in relation to costs, is necessary to restrict monopoly power in the interests of the consumer and to preserve public confidence in industry. It is only on the basis of such confidence that the government can continue to give support and material aid to industry. The Iraqi Government has ample powers for dealing with the abuses of monopoly under the provisions of the Law for the Organisation of Economic Life of 1941.

The government can also extend its control over industry 473
and prevent abuses by proper amendments to the law governing joint-stock companies. There is need to restrict the grant of free-shares or "water" shares to promotors, the creation of founders' shares with special powers of voting or percentage of profits, the interlocking of directorships, and abuses on the part of management in respect of purchases of materials and equipment, and sales of finished products. In particular, managers of joint-stock companies should be prohibited from trading on their own account especially in goods related to firms under their management.

The Industrial Bank has often been urged, as a shareholder 652
in many industries, and with its representative on their boards, 473
to exercise control over their price and sales policies. This suggestion derives from the prestige which the Bank has acquired in relation to industrial development. It has undoubtedly helped to iron out many difficulties, to improve management, and prevent abuses. But it is going too far to suppose that the Bank can actual-

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241 has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahīn* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 437 features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648 may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433 existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 426 have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647 of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175 economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185 of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.

[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development.
161 With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its
resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north
and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the
country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide
large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is
inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
[135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq
possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap
source of power and raw materials essential to the development of
industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other
mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is
little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger
population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast
to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the
people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most
ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and
many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm
and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment
exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await
reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the
available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
[731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas;
and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is
hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water,
but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and
quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

433 as 60,000 people are engaged in industrial production (other than oil), virtually all of these are employed in small undertakings where the work is largely done by hand and productivity is accordingly quite low. Probably only about 2,000 are working in what might be characterized as modern industrial plants.

654 Fortunately prospective increases in government revenues
651 from oil now make it possible for the government to undertake a
382 large-scale program for the development of the country. Past investments in the oil industry will in the future yield large dividends in the form of a rapidly increasing production of petroleum.
[471] In accordance with an agreement reached in August 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq have undertaken to raise oil output, which amounted to only about six million tons in 1950, to 30 million tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraqi government half of the profits before the deduction of taxes. On this basis it is anticipated that, over the next five years, the governmen may receive net revenues amounting to as much as 214 million dinars from oil alone. Under the terms of a law passed in 1950 these revenues will be available to finance development. They will be assigned to the Development Board, an autonomous agency established in 1950 to ensure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs.

652 In the past, financial stringencies have severely limited public expenditures. The government has often had difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays had to be kept small; government salaries were not raised in accordance with the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds. In the future the situation will be reversed. The principal task will be to find ways and means of spending rapidly increasing revenues in a manner which will contribute most effectively to the permanent development of the country. It is with this task in view that the Mission has drawn up its recommendations.

180 Any program for realizing the economic potentialities of the country should be broad in conception and well balanced. Investment outlays in dams and irrigation works, transport facilities and industrial plants must be complemented by increased expenditures

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

III. Industry

Industry is as yet little developed in Iraq. As already indi- 433
cated, apart from the oil industry which employs about 12,000
people, probably not more than 2,000 are working in modern
industrial plants. These plants represent a total capital investment
of approximately ID 4,000,000 and an annual gross income of about
ID 3,000,000. Industry is largely confined to the processing of
agricultural products, the production of building materials such as
cement and bricks, and the manufacture of consumers' goods like
textiles, soap, matches, cigarettes, shoes and beverages.

Conditions, however, are generally favorable to further
industrial development. An expanding agriculture should provide
more materials, such as fibres and oil seeds, for processing and
when the standard of living among the rural population is raised
there should be a growing domestic market for industrial products.
In oil and natural gas the country possesses a cheap source of [135]
power and fuel as well as an important source of raw materials.
There are surface indications of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores,
as well as of the existence of sulphur and salt deposits. The extent
of such deposits should, however, be confirmed by core drilling
before steps are taken to undertake their commercial exploitation.
n the cities there is adequate manpower for industry, and the [464]
raqi workman with proper training is generally adept at learning
ndustrial processes. Skilled manpower, however, is very limited,
nd, naturally enough, there is little of the technical "know-how"
vhich comes through experience and training. Other limiting
actors in industrial development are the lack of sufficient private
apital and initiative. Much capital, particularly that accumulated [454]
rom agriculture, is hoarded and the balance is generally invested
urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in
ommerce, where investors anticipate a higher rate of return.
Vhile there is a trend toward increased private investment in
dustry, particularly since the war, industrial development in the
mediate future will have to depend very largely upon the initia-
ve or financial assistance of the government.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for some time. This decision 382
reflects an understandable desire on the part of Iraq to have a 471
modern refinery of its own, replacing the somewhat inadequate and rather old Alwand refinery at Khanaqin which is owned by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and is capable of supplying not quite 70 percent of Iraq's current requirements.[8] Foreign management of the new refinery will probably be necessary, at least for an initial period. The project will make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery and probably also the small oil field near the Iranian border from which it draws its crude. This field probably cannot be developed on a scale large enough to warrant investment in the pipelines necessary to export the oil.

Expansion of Old Industries

Some industries are now expanding without government finan- 423
cial assistance. The cement plant and the brewery are both doubling their capacity. Recent improvements and expansion have put the woolen industry abreast of the country's needs. Other industries do not for the present require expansion. Flour milling capacity, for instance, appears ample. The tanneries also appear to have sufficient capacity, but to raise the quality of their raw material supply, technical assistance is needed to improve methods of flaying and preserving hides.

Still other industries could usefully be expanded but do not have sufficient financial resources to do so without government
assistance. The cotton and rayon textile factories in Baghdad and [288]
Mosul might well double their designed capacity and extend their facilities to make a wider range of products. At present cotton textile capacity can meet only about a quarter of the country's requirements. Since ample raw material is available and costs of production can become competitive with those abroad, further
expansion would appear to be warranted. In its regular budget for [471]
1951-52 the government has provided ID 1,000,000 for a government textile mill. The Mission believes, however, that government ownership and operation would not be desirable and that it would be vastly preferable to extend capacity with the participation of private capital and enterprise.

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[8] By an agreement reached in December, 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

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Further expansion of the vegetable oil extraction plant would be justified, the more so since increasing quantities of cotton seed will be available for crushing and the existing plant does not meet domestic requirements. Hydrogenation equipment for making cooking fats might also be added, and the capacity of the appurtenant soap plant might be enlarged so as to cover about half of Iraq's needs. The capacity of the country's only modern shoe factory, a small enterprise, might well be tripled to reach an output of about 100,000 pairs per year. Similarly, a plant producing aluminum utensils could well be expanded and complemented by facilities for melting and rolling aluminum scrap and pig, thereby substantially reducing costs of production.

Establishment of New Industries

Among the new industrial enterprises which could be advantageously launched are a jute mill, bonemeal fertilizer plants, an automobile tire factory, a small steel mill, a central machine shop, a concrete batching plant and a plant for the manufacture of date boxes. For all of these there is sufficient demand, and production could take place economically on a small scale. The small steel plant would smelt domestically available scrap and produce in a hand-operated mill such items as reinforcing bars, window frames [392] and small angles. The central machine shop would replace the numerous small shops now engaged primarily in maintaining the 3,000 irrigation pumps in Iraq. This shop would significantly reduce the cost of maintaining pumps and, since these pumps are of relatively simple construction, would also be able to manufacture them. Small bonemeal plants could be built at Mosul, Baghdad and Basra to convert bones and other offal of abattoirs into a valuable fertilizer for domestic use. The growing demand for jute bagging would justify the installation of a jute mill capable of making about 10,000 tons of jute products per year. A small tire plant to manufacture tires under foreign license and with foreign technical assistance might also be feasible in a few years, particularly since the demand for tires has been growing rapidly and the development of road transport is expected to receive considerable impetus in the future. A concrete batching plant with ready-mix trucks would be useful in providing poured concrete for many small construction projects.

433 [289] In addition to the above-mentioned enterprises, it may well be desirable to establish a paper mill as soon as there is an assured supply of pulp from abroad. As the demand for paper bagging for domestically produced fertilizers and cement increases, it will probably be more economical to produce such paper in Iraq than to import it. A plant for the manufacture of glass bottles, other containers and tumblers might also be started, provided the availability of the right type of sand can be confirmed.

339 387 The largest and perhaps the most promising industrial possibility lies in the utilization of the natural gas produced in conjunction with oil and now almost totally wasted. The Mission recommends therefore that early consideration be given to the erection, near Kirkuk, of a plant which, using natural gas and gypsum as raw materials, would be capable of producing annually 500,000 tons of ammonium sulphate fertilizer, 100,000 tons of elemental sulphur, 10,000 tons of carbon black and 300,000 tons of cement. Since the natural gas contains about 10.5 percent of hydrogen sulphide by volume, it would be worthwhile to establish a plant to recover sulphur from all of the gas produced. Part of the cleaned gas would then be cracked thermally, producing hydrogen after removal of the carbon black. In the most important part of the plant the hydrogen and nitrogen won by removing carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide from the flue gases would be synthesized under high pressure into ammonia. Ammonia and carbon dioxide would then be passed through a slurry of finely ground gypsum, yielding calcium carbonate and ammonium sulphate. The latter would be sold as fertilizer and the former used to make cement. Such a plant could produce fertilizer very cheaply, thereby stimulating its use in Iraq; and any fertilizer not consumed domestically would find a ready market abroad. Sulphur and carbon black could be used in the production of rubber tires in Iraq and would also be in great demand abroad; and there will undoubtedly be a growing demand for cement in Iraq. The plant would cost aproximately ID 25,000,000, of which the sulphur recovery plant would account for about ID 8,750,000 and the cement plant for ID 1,500,000. It should be attempted only if a reliable foreign chemical concern can be interested in designing and erecting it and undertaking its operation under a management contract.

317 The exploitation of salt deposits may ultimately prove to be another industrial possibility. A salt dome known to exist near Basra might provide large quantities of salt for both export and domestic consumption and might make possible the establishment of an alkali plant, for which the gas from the nearby oil field could furnish cheap power. The Mission therefore suggests that core drilling of this dome be undertaken in order to appraise its commercial possibilities.

● 433 In the process of industrial development the host of small enterprises which account in the aggregate for a considerable output should not be neglected. Among these are shops engaged in tire retreading, reclamation of lube oil, battery and electrical repair work, automotive and machinery repair, wood-working, etc. Many of them could be assisted to improve their production through installation of power-operated tools and other equipment.

In starting new plants and expanding old ones it is important that capital charges be kept at a minimum by arranging for maximum possible utilization of the installed equipment. This involves the employment of as many shifts as possible, the use of machines at maximum working speed and, above all, the use of purchased power. In the past, industrial plants have added unnecessarily to their capital overhead by installing their own power plants. Such plants usually prove costly since they operate only part of the time. Single plants catering to both industrial and lighting needs are
365 more economical because of a high and steady load factor. In order to induce industries to purchase power, however, the price of electricity for industrial use will need to be reduced. Such a reduction could be achieved in Baghdad, the principal industrial center, particularly if steps were taken to relieve the Baghdad Light and Power Company from the heavy burden of sharing its profits with the Iraq government and also having its profits taxed by the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, such as in Mosul, a reduction in power prices depends on more efficient management.

Financing of Industrial Development

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471 The Mission believes that complete government ownership of industry should be adopted only where absolutely necessary. In general it will prove necessary only where private capital is not available either because the contemplated investment is too large,

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or because the investment is in a new and untried field which does 433
not for the moment appeal to private capital. For the chemical plant 471
proposed by the Mission the latter would probably be the case. The government apparently is also furnishing all of the capital for the oil refinery. Wherever complete government ownership is considered necessary, it would be desirable to have the Development Board act as the government's agent in putting up the necessary capital.

On the other hand, the existing Industrial Bank should be used 453
as the agency for giving needed assistance to industry in all cases 433
where the need is for expansion of present capacity or where there is a prospect of private participation in establishing new industries. This Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951 it had outstanding loans totaling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicaped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests therefore that the Development Board provide the means for gradually increasing the Bank's capital by about ID 5,000,000 which the Bank would be authorized to use for the making of loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an overall program approved by the Development Board.

Aside from making loans for production facilities, the Indus- 453
trial Bank could assist industry by financing the construction of a 488
bonded warehouse at Baghdad, so that credit could be extended on materials stored therein. The absence of such warehousing facilities has caused a chronic shortage of working capital in most industrial enterprises, for under existing conditions much of their capital is tied up in stocks of supplies.

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving 453
fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares 433
whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and therefore capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to maintain a reserve against possible

453 433 losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

To prepare the Bank for its expanding operations, its staff needs to be strengthened by providing for the appointment of an expert with wide industrial experience to head its Industrial Schemes Section and for the establishment of a small-business branch to pay special attention to the needs of small enterprises. The Bank should, of course, have access to the corps of technical specialists which, at a later point in the report, the Mission recommends should be attached to the Development Board.

Dangers of Excessive Protection

654 433 Particular care should be taken that government assistance does not foster inefficient industries at the expense of the country's standard of living. This danger is by no means unreal. A Law for the Encouragement of Industry, originally enacted in 1929 and replaced by a new act in 1950, provides limited but generous exemptions from income and surtaxes and customs duties, and government land free of rent for 10 years. Iraqi-owned industrial enterprises can qualify for these benefits as long as they primarily use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in considerable quantities. Neither of these conditions is necessarily relevant to efficient production; and it is therefore suggested that the law be amended to stipulate that, in general, such benefits should be accorded only to enterprises which have a reasonable prospect of becoming efficient enough to withstand foreign competition.

Industry is also protected in many cases by high import duties and in some cases, such as cotton yarn, beer and cement, by import prohibitions. In a small country like Iraq, where the limited market affords opportunities for only one or two plants in each field and where the entrepreneurial class is small, there is an acute danger of monopoly and attendant high prices. In Iraq this danger is aggravated by a tendency in some industries to emphasize limited production with high profits per unit rather than mass production with lower unit-profits. While the Mission recognizes the need for

temporary, moderate protection of certain industries, it wishes to 654
emphasize strongly the need for a rapid and progressive reduction 433
in special assistance.

Government Organisation for Industry

Government activities relating to industry, except for the 654
Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in 647
the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present 433
director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. The Mission recommends that a Department of Industries be established to maintain adequate statistical records on industrial production, analyze economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and administer the laws concerning assistance to industry. The research and technical functions now being carried on would then be continued under a separate Department of Industrial Research and Standards.

These two departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future as compared to special measures of protection and assistance which tend to shield industry against competition. Much can be done in the long run to assist industry in better controlling the quality of its products, reducing waste through material salvage, analyzing production costs, making market surveys and increasing labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

Labor and Vocational Education

Finally, it should not be overlooked that a contented, well- 466
trained labor force is of the utmost importance to industrial development. An improvement in working conditions and more attention to the welfare of the worker would tend to increase labor productivity. Such an improvement can to a large extent be brought about only through a growing realization among employers that
it is to their own interest. The government should, of course, lay 467
down minimum standards in this respect, particularly since the 466
absence of real trade unions precludes workers from achieving

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the only remedy available were a more equitable division of income. 511
Fortunately, the future does afford the promise of a large increase in national income as a whole. The country has the natural resources—land, water and oil—which can bring a much higher standard of living to all. The revenues from oil will provide the means for a potentially rapid development of other productive resources. The central objective must be the attainment of a much higher output in a manner that will benefit the people as a whole.

In a country like Iraq principal emphasis will inevitably need 654*
to be placed on the development of agriculture. For this reason 241
schemes for the storage of the flood waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris will be of key importance. They will prevent disastrous floods and control the flow of the rivers so as to bring more water to deficient areas and open up large new areas for settlement by land-hungry peasants. An increase in production, however, will not come simply from an expansion of the area under cultivation. The time will come when further expansion will not be possible except at great cost. This makes it all the more necessary to raise the present low productivity of agriculture. The drainage of lands which have deteriorated owing to salting has accordingly been emphasized by the Mission as one of the first objectives. Great importance is also attached to the early development of an adequate agricultural extension service, supported by an effective practical experimental organization, which would work directly with farmers in improving their methods of production. Other measures recommended to this end include the provision of incentives to use fertilizers and to cultivate soil-building and fodder crops, and the organization of cooperatives and more ample credit facilities so that farmers can have easier access to improved means of production—better plows and draft animals, other agricultural machinery, seeds and fertilizers.

Industrial development can in many ways effectively comple- 654*
ment agriculture. The proposed chemical plant at Kirkuk, supple- 433
mented by bonemeal plants, could provide the cheap fertilizers needed to raise the productivity of Iraqi agriculture. Expansion of cotton textile and vegetable oil extraction capacity would capitalize on the growing output of cotton. The proposed modern machine shop would cater to agriculture by reducing the cost of irrigation

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654* 433 pumps. In other respects industrial development would be geared to supply the growing demand for consumers goods, such as shoes, textiles and utensils, and for construction materials, such as cement, arising out of the development program itself.

654* 489 Rising agricultural and industrial output will necessitate a corresponding increase in transport capacity. Here the development of road transport and the replacement of wornout track, locomotives and rolling stock will be the principal tasks of the future.

654* 871 744 Since the relationship of health and education to production may appear more indirect, there is danger that these two subjects will be neglected in the emphasis on greater national output. Basically, however, it is the productivity of manpower which must be raised, and this can be achieved only if measures are taken to make people better educated and to free them from debilitating disease. In the future the public health effort must concentrate on the prevention of disease through such measures as increasing the number of village dispensaries, the training of midwives, the organization of a corps of sanitarians, elimination of stagnant and polluted water, provision of safe water supplies and sewage disposal, slum clearance and better housing. Community planning should focus largely on such improvements as will contribute to better public health. A great broadening of the educational effort is needed in the future to teach people how to cope more effectively with the problems of everyday living. To this end, compulsory primary education should be gradually introduced over the next 15 years and a vigorous campaign for the education of adults should be launched. At the same time, however, it is vitally important to adapt education to the practical needs of the people, helping them to improve their health and their methods of work.

654* The program which the Mission has outlined in this report is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission has thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a

311 waters of the twin rivers are largely wasted and periodically unloosen disastrous floods upon Baghdad and the alluvial plain to the south.

The Rain-fed Zone

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438 In the upland plains of the rain-fed zone stretching from Northern Mosul to Suleimaniya, wheat and barley are the principal crops. Rainfall is generally inadequate for summer crops, although water from streams and springs permit cultivation of rice and cotton. In part of this area, especially Northern Mosul, there has been a rapid extension of cultivation with the help of modern agricultural machinery.

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241 To the north and northeast lie the mountain massifs of Iraq. Here the raising of cattle, sheep and goats by Kurdish nomads is one of the principal occupations. The mountains are largely barren of trees but offer natural pasture for animals. In the valleys and on hillsides grain, tobacco, timber and fruit are grown. Tobacco, although small in area, is an important cash crop.

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[315] Except for some handicrafts, there is little native industry in this region. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, is principally a commercial center and an outlet for exports to Syria and Lebanon. Kirkuk, however, is the center of most of Iraq's petroleum production and one of the largest and richest oil fields in the world. Oil fields of subsidiary importance also exist at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin in Diyala province. The mountains of the North may ultimately yield other minerals such as copper, chrome and iron.

The Irrigation Zone

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311 South of the rain-fed zone the river valleys may be divided into three major regions: the upper river valleys; the lower river valley down to Amara and Nasiriya; and the triangular area from Nasiriya and Amara to the mouth of the Shatt al Arab.

The first of these regions includes most of the northern Jezireh and the area north of Baghdad and east of the Tigris. The latter area still awaits irrigation for the most part, and the Jezireh is hardly susceptible to irrigation because of the elevation and configuration of the land. The Jezireh is an upland plateau

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V. Production

A considerable part of Iraq's potentially large resources are as 311
yet unutilized or ineffectively utilized. Most of the manpower on 433
the land is underemployed for a large part of the year, and con-
siderable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of
land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used.
Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and
regulation of flow. Oil reserves have as yet been tapped only in
relatively modest quantities. The output of the country is therefore
still very low and the standard of living correspondingly depressed.

Agriculture and Livestock

Estimates of the area and output of the principal crops are 241
given in the table below. Although the statistics are not very
reliable, they give some indication of the relative importance of
the various crops. Barley and wheat are clearly the dominant crops.
Barley is one of the leading exports, and cereals altogether
accounted for 43 percent by value of the country's exports other
than oil in the period 1948-50. Rice is another important cereal.
Cotton is now vying with rice as the leading summer crop. Stimu-
lated by high prices and government encouragement, the area
planted to cotton has risen rapidly in recent years. In 1951, prob-
ably about 580,000 donums were put in cotton—almost five times
the amount in the preceding year. Other summer crops are com-
paratively insignificant. Some sesame is grown for oil, and some
corn, millet and grain sorghum. Tobacco assumes importance only
in the mountainous area of the North. Virtually no crops are grown
for animal fodder, and the production of hay is unknown. The
area devoted to soil-building crops such as legumes is rather small.

Next to cereals, dates are the most important crop. There 245
are about 20.2 million date trees, of which about 9.7 million are 439
along the Shatt al Arab near Basra and the balance in the central
valley districts of the Tigris and the Euphrates and the Diyala
River Valley. Dates are a staple food over most of Iraq and date
exports, particularly from the Basra area, contributed 31 percent by

231 population. Livestock, however, are an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Many fellahin have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only the livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed. Livestock yields are generally very low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because [439] of poor breeding and disease. Yet livestock and livestock products—wool, hides and skins, and casings—accounted for about 13 percent of the total value of Iraq's exports, exclusive of oil, in the period 1948-1950.

Industrial Output

● 433 Industrial production is still very small. Reliable figures on industrial output and employment are unavailable. According to the Department of Labor, there are roughly 2,400 enterprises in industry, exclusive of service industries, employing over four persons. From Department of Labor data as well as certain supplementary sources, it is possible to give a breakdown for approximately 45,000 people engaged in industrial production. As already indicated, the actual number of people so employed is apparently considerably greater if account is taken of small handicraft enterprises. About 11,500 are employed in petroleum production and refining. The textile, apparel and footwear industries probably employ about 11,000 people. The processing of food, beverages, tobacco, other agricultural products and livestock products accounts for an employment of perhaps 9,000; the production of building materials, including bricks, tile and cement, for about 6,000; and wood processing, for approximately 2,000. Metal-working and machinery repair and maintenance account for most of the balance.

These employment figures tend to convey a rather exaggerated impression of possible industrial output. With the exception of those in the petroleum industry, virtually all are employed in small undertakings where the work is predominantly done by hand and productivity is accordingly very low. It is estimated that only about 2,000 people are engaged in what might be characterized as modern plants. Among these are one woolen and one cotton mill, one brewery, several distilleries, a cement plant, a vegetable oil and soap factory, and a number of flour mills.

TABLE 7

ESTIMATED INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT 433 464

Petroleum production and refining	11,500
Food and beverage	4,500
Tobacco	3,500
Wool and cotton processing, textiles, wearing apparel and footwear	11,000
Wood processing and wood products	2,000
Leather (other than footwear)	450
Chemicals (vegetable oils, soap, etc.)	550
Building materials	6,000
Metal-working, including jewelry	1,500
Machinery and machinery repair	2,700
Electricity and water supply	1,100
Miscellaneous	1,000
Total	45,800

Indications of output in the more primitive industries are very 433 scanty, but data on output in some of the more modern industries can be found in the monograph on Industry. Production is, in general, on a modest scale, although some industries such as cement fill most of the country's needs.

Petroleum Production and Refining

Although production of petroleum is now rising rapidly, it 315 has been relatively modest in the past. The exploitation of oil is 471 predominantly in the hands of three companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—all owned in equal shares, except for five percent controlled by Mr. Gulbenkian, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Royal Dutch-Shell, the *Compagnie Française des Petroles* and the Near East Development Corporation (owned jointly by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum). Of these three, the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is exploiting the large field near Kirkuk, is the only one in production. In addition, the Khanaqin Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, has a small concession adjoining the Iranian border.

Efforts to develop production have been concentrated mainly 315 on the Kirkuk field where oil is found at the depth of only between

to supplement its capital by borrowing and accepting time deposits 453
from certain institutions, their resources have been wholly inadequate to the need.

VIII. Domestic and Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments

As noted earlier, trade is probably the second most important 443
occupation. To all appearances, the system of distribution is extremely wasteful. Both in the small towns and in the larger cities there are numerous traders with very small stocks of goods, who cannot possibly earn more than an exiguous income, even if their margin of profit is high. The position is, however, not likely to be cured until the general level of incomes rises and there is alternative opportunity for employment.

Iraq produces most of its food, but apart from fuel, tobacco, 435
and some building materials, most of its other requirements must 439
be imported. Even the small local industries and handicrafts depend to some extent on imported raw materials. Much of the trade is therefore foreign trade. Baghdad is the principal center for the import trade and also has a considerable share in the export trade, although Mosul is the main center for the export of wool and Basra for dates and barley.

Although there are a number of large firms, among them sev- 439
eral foreign companies, engaged in the export-import business, 477
trade is by no means monopolized, as can be seen from the following table which shows the distribution of import licenses granted:

TABLE 9

IMPORT LICENSES: 1951

Import Quota (ID 000)	Number of Importers		Total Allocation (ID million)
	Baghdad	Other Cities	
100-180	36	18	6.6
50-80	60	24	4.9
20-40	344	147	13.1
5-10	1,015	502	[illegible]
	1,453	691	34.9

439 actually less than before the war, so that, although domestic production has increased, consumption per head must have fallen. Since the war, however, the government has encouraged the import of secondhand clothing, licenses being granted for imports from the United States.

433 Iraq usually produces sufficient cereals for its own use, imports
439 in 1948 and 1949 being the consequence of two successive harvest failures. Apart from ghee, spices and some vegetables, most of the other foods are high-quality products consumed by the comparatively rich. Of these the import of beer has recently been prohibited, since a modern brewery now supplies the country's requirements.

Both soap and matches are made in Iraq, but soap manufacture was until recently a "backyard" industry and the quality of the product was poor. The sharp drop in imports of cement and timber in 1950 is a consequence of the new cement plant coming into full production. Imports of timber were also low owing to a depression in the building industry. Timber requirements are, however, likely to increase, as Iraq's own sources of supply are meager. Imports of iron and steel have also been affected by the slump in construction. This category, however, includes a wide range of other articles besides structural steel, the most important in recent years being pipelines for the oil companies. Other articles, such as household ware, should more properly be included with consumer goods.

As Iraq's output of refined petroleum products is limited to a small refinery and the requirements of motor transport, irrigation pumps, agricultural machinery and industry have steadily increased, a growing deficit has had to be made up by imports. The government plans to build a new refinery which should, when completed, remove the need to import virtually all of these products.

Among the most important categories of machinery are irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery, imports of the latter having greatly increased since the war. Other items include equipment for electricity production and distribution, and plants for the various new industries started since the war, such as textiles, distilling and the manufacture of ice.

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The miscellaneous category includes such items as glassware, 433
ceramic products and pharmaceutical products. A number of raw 439
materials or other products used in industry are also included, for example: tanning material; leather for shoemaking; wooden boxes and other materials for packing dates (to the value of about half a million dinars in 1948); oils and oilseeds for the vegetable oil and soap industry; and non-ferrous metals for the small metal-working industries.

Exports

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The three principal groups of exports are dates, cereals and animal products. Although there have been large fluctuations in the quantities exported, particularly of cereals, over the last 25 years their combined value has usually been at least 85 percent of the total value of exports other than oil, and has often been more. Of the remaining export products, cotton has usually been of some importance in the past and promises to be of much greater importance in the future. Prewar and postwar values of the groups of exports are shown in the following table:

TABLE 13

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS
(in millions of dinars)

	1931-35 Av.	1936-39 Av.	1947	1948	1949	1950
Dates	0.9	0.9	4.7	4.7	3.2	4.3
Cereals	0.7	1.3	6.7	0.2	5.8	10.8
Animal products	0.5	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.2	2.2
Other	0.4	0.5	1.2	1.1	1.0	3.1
Total	2.5	3.9	13.8	7.6	11.2	20.4

Dates. Iraq has long been the foremost exporter of dates in 433
the world. The quantity exported has increased steadily from an 439
average of 120,000 tons in the late twenties to 200,000 tons since the war. The crop may vary considerably from year to year. For example, the amount exported in the last quarter of 1949 and the first three quarters of 1950, which represents approximately the exportable surplus from the 1949-50 crop, was about 150,000 tons. The 1950-51 crop, on the other hand, was unprecedentedly large and a record amount of 340,000 tons was exported.

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As Iraq has such a large share in the world's trade, variations in the size of the crop can cause large fluctuations in price and, in a prolific year, marketing difficulties. Since 1939 the burden of marketing the prime quality varieties (Khadrawi, Hallawi and Sayer), which are sold in the United Kingdom, Western Europe, North America and Australia, has been largely removed by a series of bulk contracts between the Date Association and a British company, under which the latter has agreed to purchase at a fixed price all dates of these varieties grown in Basra province.

No such scheme exists for the Zahdi and other lower quality dates. Their principal markets are in India, Egypt and other countries of the Far and Middle East to which much of the trade is carried in the traditional Persian Gulf sailing ships. Disposal of the extremely large 1950-51 crop through the normal channels proved impossible and the price of Zahdi dates fell during 1951 to a point where it was hardly remunerative to transport them to Basra. Faced with this situation, the government sent a trade mission to India and Pakistan and succeeded in making agreements with those countries which provided, among other things, for increased imports of dates.

Cereals. Barley is the only cereal now exported in large quantities, but the quantity is subject to extreme fluctuations owing to the great variability in the crop. On the average, exports have increased considerably over the years. In the latter half of the twenties, they averaged 100,000 tons and before the war 230,000 tons. From 1945 to 1947 they were around 250,000 tons annually, but successive bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 led to a temporary ban on exports in 1948, when less than 3,000 tons were exported. Two bumper crops followed, however, and in 1949 and 1950 exports, which had not before exceeded 300,000 tons, amounted to 326,000 and 462,000 tons respectively.

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There was normally a surplus of wheat for export before the war; in 1937, the best year, over 100,000 tons were exported. Since the war, however, exports have been negligible except in 1950, while in 1948 and 1949 there were considerable imports as a consequence of the bad harvests. On balance, therefore, Iraq cannot at present be considered an exporter of wheat. This is, no doubt, due to the increasing consumption of wheat in the country, as a

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consequence not only of the increase in population, but also of 438
the shift from the rural areas, where barley is often a staple ele- 439
ment in the diet. 262

Large quantities of rice are produced, but the surplus for export has always been very small. The only other cereal exported in any quantity is millet.

Animal Produce. The principal animal products exported 433
by Iraq are wool, live animals, hides and skins and casings (intes- 437
tines), usually in that order of importance. The sheep is the main source of these products, providing all the wool and usually the bulk of the other products. As with dates and cereals, the quantities exported vary greatly from year to year, sheep being vulnerable not only to disease, but also to extremes of winter cold and summer drought. In contrast with the other main exports, however, there has been no tendency for exports of animal products to increase. Exports of wool, hides and skins have, on the whole, been below prewar levels, while those of casings have fallen off badly. As animals are often taken across the frontier on the hoof, customs returns of live animals exported are not reliable. The recorded decrease since before the war, is, however, too large to be discounted.

Information on the animal population and on the domestic consumption of meat and other products is sketchy and unreliable. A rise in the consumption of meat could well explain the loss of exports of live animals, but this in turn would tend to make available a larger, not smaller, supply of most by-products. Part of the [233
explanation of the fall in export products may lie in a declining 162]
sheep population owing to the gradual shift from the pastoral life to settled agriculture and from agriculture to the towns. The monograph on agriculture and animal husbandry discusses the shortcomings of the livestock industry and recommends measures to improve livestock raising and the quality of livestock products. The value of exports of animal products is likely to continue its downward trend unless these measures are undertaken speedily and vigorously.

Sheep are especially important as a potential source of dollars. 437
Wool is the most important export to the United States, which 457
also takes all the casings exported and considerable quantities of

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX C

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

I. Introduction

The main features of agriculture and animal husbandry in Iraq 241
have already been set forth elsewhere and are only briefly recapitu- 231
lated here.[1] Barley, wheat, rice, dates, other fruits and vegetables, and, more recently, cotton are the principal crops. Animal husbandry is of great importance but at present is really not integrated with agriculture. There is virtually no mixed farming. Crop and livestock yields are very low. Poor feeding is the principal cause of the low productivity of livestock. Low crop yields are attributable to poor drainage in the irrigation zone, to the failure to maintain soil fertility through the use of manure and fertilizer and the cultivation of soil-building crops, and to inadequate tools of production. Advances in agricultural techniques are seriously hampered by the poverty and ignorance of the fellahin who cultivate the soil and by the lack of interest displayed by most of the large landowners in improving agriculture. While there are exten- 311
sive lands that can be put to the plow, particularly if more water is 433
made available, a substantial portion of the land now in exploitation may be said to be overpopulated considering the present level of agricultural technique.

An increase in production is urgent. The standard of living 433
which now prevails on the land is deplorably low. At the same time the population is increasing at a rate that can be expected to grow more rapid as public health improves. Output can be greatly increased both by extending the area under cultivation and by raising the productivity of land already being exploited. Primary emphasis has hitherto been placed on the first of these, and large new water storage and irrigation schemes are being planned.[2]

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[1] See Annex A, *Basic Factors and Conditions.*

[2] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage.*

433 Undoubtedly this is important not simply as a means of raising production, but especially as a means of increasing the number of independent peasant proprietors, today so conspicuously few. In the future, however, more attention should be given to increasing productivity. It will take a long time to settle substantial numbers on new land. The living standard of the fellahin who will continue to work the land already in use can be improved only by a rise in productivity, unless there is a drastic redistribution of the output as between the landlord and the cultivator. Moreover, if output per man employed on the land cannot be raised, it may prove difficult to find the needed manpower to carry out the large development program for Iraq as a whole or even to settle newly opened lands without a significant curtailment of production in the existing agricultural areas.

000 This monograph is therefore chiefly concerned with measures to improve productivity. The first section discusses diversification of production, with emphasis on those crops which will bring animal husbandry into a more intimate relationship with agriculture. The second section deals with the possibilities of expanding the output of some of the crops already grown. The third section treats of some of the means by which productivity in general might be raised—better methods of cultivation and better tools, more effective control of pests and diseases and similar measures. In the next section the improvement of livestock and livestock products comes in for special attention. The succeeding section takes up the essential steps in a government program to improve agriculture and animal husbandry—the organization of an extension service, supported by adequate research and experimentation; the provision of more ample credit facilities; and the establishment of cooperatives. Following a brief discussion of forestry, the problems involved in the settlement of new land are examined, with special stress on the opportunities it offers to develop agriculture from the very beginning along more advanced lines. Finally, in the concluding section the organization of the government's agricultural services is considered.

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ANNEX D

INDUSTRY

I. Iraq's Potential for Industrial Development

The economy of Iraq is predominantly agricultural. In recent 433
years, however, a national desire for industrialization has become 654
increasingly evident and is being actively encouraged by the government. In 1929, the government took the first step to assist industry by passing a statute known as "A Law for the Encouragement of Industry". It proved to be of little significance, however, as it failed to provide industry with any financial assistance. It was not until seventeen years later, when the government created the Industrial Bank, that the problem of obtaining the necessary capital was partially solved. As a result, industry has since made some noticeable strides and should continue to do so.

On the whole, however, industry is as yet little developed. 433
Excluding the petroleum industry, modern industrial plants employ only 2,000 people and account for a total capital investment of only about ID 4,000,000 and an annual gross income of roughly ID 3,000,000. The very modern and important oil industry, on the other hand, provides employment for about 12,000 people. During the war a number of important industrial enterprises were started. Rising prices and difficulties in getting materials, however, retarded orderly progress, so that some of these new projects are still in the process of completion.

Natural Resources

There are ample resources for further industrial development. An abundance of oil and gas provides a cheap source of both fuel and raw material. Particularly as irrigation is extended, agriculture will become increasingly important as a source of raw materials such as cotton, sesame, linseed, and possibly sugar beets or sugar cane, soybeans and jute.

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135 Several geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. The extent and quality of these ores, however, will not be known until further exploration work has been accomplished. There are surface indications of 30 percent elemental sulphur mixed with limestone but, as in the case of the ores, these deposits have never been adequately proven. Previous to the large-scale production of oil, some coal was mined, but actual reserves have never been fully ascertained. A large and potentially valuable salt dome was located near Basra when geophysical surveys were being conducted in connection with oil exploration. It would appear, therefore, that Iraq has a fairly broad range of minerals which might be worthy of exploitation.

Some Factors Affecting Industrial Growth

433 454 Some of the basic causes of industry's retarded development are lack of private investment, technical inexperience and inadequate markets. In the past capital has often been hoarded or invested in rural or urban property or in commerce, where the security or rate of return was believed to be higher than in industry. To some extent this tendency has been overcome through tax exemptions, tariff protection and the financial assistance of the Industrial Bank.

464 433 On the other hand, little is being done to increase the number of skilled workers and technicians through education and training. One of the biggest handicaps in apprentice training is the lack of elementary education. Employees who are unable to read and write obviously can neither receive written instructions, maintain material and inventory control, select proper repair parts nor attend advanced in-plant training classes. Until this is corrected, Iraq must continue to rely on skilled foreign technicians and, in some of the larger and more complicated industries, on foreign management.

The supply of common labor is now ample and will probably remain so for many years to come. A shortage of labor, should it occur, could be corrected by the employment of women in greater numbers and by further mechanization. Industry has not, however, reached the stage of development where this should be attempted, for a highly mechanized plant means high capital costs, greater

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overhead, increased maintenance and the need for a higher level of 464
skilled workers. As long as labor is in sufficient supply, it will 433
be better to use the available amount of capital to mechanize a considerable number of plants to a limited degree rather than to establish a few highly mechanized plants.

Limited internal markets, because of a small population of 434
low purchasing power, restrict the number of industries which may be economically justified unless the product can be produced cheaply enough to find a foreign market. This condition, however, would be corrected to some extent through a rising standard of living, especially among the rural population. Improved methods of farming, increased irrigation, better sanitation and more intensive education should help to raise purchasing power gradually. As government measures to these ends begin to take hold, industry can expect the demand for consumer goods to increase at a much faster rate.

Iraq's geographic location is also a factor to be taken into 433
account in planning industrial development. High transportation costs handicap those industries requiring the importation of a high percentage of raw materials from Europe and America. The same obstacle will, of course, confront industries relying chiefly on European markets for their finished product. The best prospects for industrial growth are therefore found in those industries which, through advantageous production costs, are able to absorb the shipping costs or those in which shipping costs represent a very minor component of the market price of their product.

II. Possibilities for Industrial Development

Expansion of Existing Industries

Many industries, such as brewing, cement making and woolen textiles, are now in the process of expansion. Partly because of tax exemptions and reductions granted by the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, these enterprises are able to finance their expansion themselves. Other enterprises which can usefully be

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433 expanded will, however, require financial assistance from the Industrial Bank. This should be arranged just as soon as plans can be formulated.

Petroleum Development

382 315 [471] The further development of the oil industry can safely be left to the internationally-owned companies now operating in Iraq. Under an agreement finalized early in October 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three major oil companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—undertook to increase their oil output to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraq Government 50 percent of the profit on their production before the deduction of taxes. Although output in 1950 amounted to only about 6,000,000 tons, there should be no difficulty about attaining the agreed target. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons, with the new fields near Basra offering equal promise. In the development of these fields and means of transport, the oil companies have already made an investment of close to ID 90,000,000, which is now beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Development in the Kirkuk and Mosul field has already proceeded on the assumption that a production capacity of at least 22,000,000 tons would be achieved in a few years, and with the completion of the pipeline to Banias, Syria, there should also be ample transport capacity. The balance of the projected output, namely 8,000,000 tons, will have to come from the newer fields near Basra. This may require some increase in drilling and will necessitate additional pipeline capacity to Fao, but neither of these will be difficult to accomplish.

382 466 The oil companies have been among the leaders in Iraq in providing better conditions and amenities for their employees and in instituting schemes for training skilled labor and technicians. They have been criticized, however, for their failure to appoint more Iraqis to leading positions. Under the agreement already cited they have undertaken to send 50 Iraqi students per year to British Universities to study various subjects relating to the oil industry, and also to establish a school in Kirkuk to train 60 Iraqis yearly in technical oil subjects.

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Breweries

274 Iraq's only brewery, having a capacity of 50 barrels per day, is not adequate to meet market demands. The owners are therefore in the process of obtaining additional equipment to double the plant's output. The brewery, which has been in operation since 1945, is very modern in design and its product is of excellent quality.

Distillery

Iraq's only source of ethyl alcohol is a small, modern, well-designed distillery located in Baghdad. Surplus dates are used as raw material. Although they are not expensive, they are nevertheless more costly than the raw materials, such as molasses, which are used in the alcohol industry in other countries. Thus the distillery is operating at about one third capacity, since the market will not absorb its entire production at the prices it charges. Most of the current output is used in the making of the national alcoholic drink known as *arak*.

258 Date Packing

Date packing is probably one of the oldest industries in the country. Market requirements have kept the industry very modern and fully capable of meeting all demands on it.

Matches

372 There are two match manufacturing companies in Iraq, both producing matches of very good quality. One company utilizes paper, and the other wood. Their combined production is equivalent to about one half of Iraq's requirements.

Cigarettes

277 The bulk of Iraq's requirements of cigarettes are made in the country from home grown tobacco. The output of 12 factories in 1949 amounted to 2.25 billion cigarettes, but there were in addition many small producers of handmade cigarettes. Even in the factories much of the work is done by hand, but further mechanization cannot be expected until labor becomes more expensive.

Small Enterprises

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445 There are many small enterprises in Iraq which could be expanded, such as tire retreading, reclaiming of lube oil, wood-

working shops, battery and electrical repair work, shops for repair 433
of automotive and agricultural equipment, bakeries, confectioneries 445
and food processing establishments of various kinds. The amount of capital required in individual cases is quite small but, in the aggregate, it adds up to a considerable sum. The Industrial Bank should arrange for a small-enterprise section to make surveys of small industries in each community, advise them concerning ways of improving their methods of production and assist in getting proper financial help where it is justified. It is estimated that ID 400,000 would be sufficient to meet the needs of these industries over the next five years.

The assistance of small industries by the Industrial Bank is to be preferred to assistance or stimulation of so-called cottage industries. Cottage industries may be of benefit in the over-populated areas of Asia, but for Iraq they do not appear to be an appropriate solution to industrial growth. Iraq's population is small in relation to the resources available. Over the long term its problem is not primarily one of creating a maximum number of jobs with a minimum of capital but rather one of utilizing capital resources in ways which will make a permanent addition to the productive capacity of the country and to the building of modern industrial enterprises.

Establishment of New Industries

The entrance of industry into new fields would help to balance the over-all development of the country and to utilize its resources more fully. At the same time it would increase employment and thereby aid in raising the general standard of living.

Nitrate Fertilizer, Sulphur and Cement Plant

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The largest and perhaps most promising possibility for new 387
industrial development lies in the utilization of the natural gas [316
produced in conjunction with oil. Upon completion of the 30-inch 339]
pipeline, oil production at the Kirkuk field will be at a rate which will make more than 25 billion cu. ft. of gas available per year. For the most part, this gas will be wasted until some means is found for its economic utilization. This gas contains, according

Paper Mill

289 Iraq does not have a suitable source of material for a pulp plant at this time. The development of a paper making industry would therefore require the importation of pulp to meet its various requirements. This procedure would ordinarily be both practicable and economical; however, the world market for pulp is now very critical and may remain so for several years. It is recommended, therefore, that the paper mill be held in abeyance until an adequate supply of pulp is assured.

III. State Assistance to Industry

Financial Assistance

454 433 The widespread reluctance of private capital to venture into industry can be overcome only gradually as the profitability of industrial investment is demonstrated in various fields. In the meantime, it will be necessary for the government to furnish most of the capital for industrial development.

Plants which will require a large amount of capital and will need completely foreign management at least in their beginning may have to be financed completely by the government through the Development Board. The oil refinery and the fertilizer plant are projects which fall into this category. Other more modest undertakings will require relatively small amounts of capital and in most cases may be economically operated by Iraqi management even though some foreign technicians may be necessary. This combination lends itself to the use of private capital, which should be encouraged as much as possible by the government, by means of financial assistance where justified.

652 433 The Industrial Bank is now the principal agency for rendering financial assistance to the development of private industry. The Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951, it had outstanding loans totalling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicapped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has

paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests, therefore, that the Development Board gradually supply the funds necessary to increase the Bank's capital by ID 5,000,000. The Bank would be authorized to use this sum for making loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an over-all program approved by the Development Board. 652 +33

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to create a reserve against possible losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

The Bank at present is understaffed. The directors pass on projects without the benefit of expert assistance, and, as a result, some phases of a project may be completely overlooked. With a shortage of staff, the transaction of business with the Bank is also time-consuming and thus discourages applicants.

The Mission recommends that, first, the Bank's staff be both increased ~~and strengthened~~ and, second, that it be reorganized to give greater responsibility to the head of the Industrial Schemes Section who should be a properly qualified man with broad industrial experience. Members of the Industrial Schemes Section should have thorough training and practical experience in power and mechanical engineering with special reference to industrial planning and layout, and in operations, management and control of industry with special reference to cost accounting.

Protection of Industry

The "Law for the Encouragement of Industry" enacted in 1929 was replaced by new legislation in 1950 which grants limited exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions 654 +33 651

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

654 from import duties on machinery, material, equipment and spare
433 parts; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of
651 rent-free government land not in excess of 25,000 square meters for a period of 10 years. Iraq-owned industrial enterprises can qualify for these benefits as long as they primarily use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in considerable quantities. Neither of these conditions is necessarily relevant to efficient production; and it is therefore suggested that the law be amended to stipulate that such benefits should be accorded only to enterprises which have a reasonable prospect of becoming efficient enough to withstand foreign competition.

Industry is protected in many cases by high import duties and in some cases, such as cotton yarn, beer and cement, by import prohibitions. Industrial enterprises have not so far taken full advantage of these restrictions, but if they should do so the demand for their products would undoubtedly diminish significantly.

Foreign competition is always a useful check on inefficiency. Its beneficial effects in bringing about lower production costs and a better product have been demonstrated many times in Iraq. For example, even industries protected by high tariffs have been forced to modernize in order to reduce costs and meet competition. To attempt to shut out foreign competition will, in general, retard, rather than foster, industrial growth. In some cases, it is true, new industries may need protection during the early years of operation. Protection should not, however, be allowed to become a permanent shield for inefficiency; as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized, protective measures should be greatly reduced.

In a country like Iraq where the limited market affords opportunities for only one or two plants in certain fields, there is an acute danger of monopoly and attendant high prices. This danger is aggravated further by a tendency in some industries to emphasize limited production with high profits per unit rather than mass production with lower unit-profits. Foreign competition would appear to be the proper means of restraining trends toward monopoly within a particular field, just as it operates to stimulate modernization in plants suffering from high costs because of obsolete methods.

sures of production and assistance which tend to shield industry 647
against competition. There is much to be done to help industry 654
to achieve better control of the quality of its products, in reducing waste through material salvage, in analyzing production costs, in making market surveys and in raising labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

IV. Other Suggestions for the Improvement of Industry

Possibilities for Economies in the Use of Capital

Whenever the capital cost of a plant is an important determi- 433
nant of production costs, it becomes essential to utilize the plant to the fullest extent. This may be accomplished, for example, by increasing the number of shifts, by extending the work week and by stepping up machines to their maximum economic speed. Completely integrated plants seldom if ever offer the opportunity for this type of operation, because certain machines are never called upon for continuous use. This is, of course, very noticeable where the plant does all its own maintenance work, even to all of its foundry items. The solution is obviously one of resorting to contracting or sub-contracting with concerns specializing in particular operations. For example, a single finishing and dyeing concern might advantageously serve two or more textile mills, where the capacity of these mills is insufficient to load separate finishing departments to their economic limit.

In Iraq there is a tendency in industry to generate its own 433
power rather than to purchase it. This leads to the installation of 377
expensive facilities which are utilized only part of the day. While 365
industry is operating, many municipal power plants stand virtually idle because they serve primarily lighting needs and their peak load accordingly comes at night. In some cases, where large quantities of process steam are needed, industrial enterprises may be justified in generating their own power, but for the most part, the purchase of power is preferable. Unfortunately, power rates, 433
except in Basra and Baghdad, are so high that the purchase of 365

433 365 power by industry is out of the question. It is hoped, however, that in time this may be corrected.

Even in Baghdad the purchase of power by industry would be greatly stimulated by a reduction in the industrial rates of the Baghdad Light and Power Company. Profits, after depreciation [471] but before taxes, are now over half of gross receipts. Under the terms of its concession, the company pays a substantial part of these profits to the Iraq Government, the remainder being allocated to United Kingdom taxes, reserves for capital expenditure and dividends. The Iraq Government's share in the profits effectively constitutes a tax on electricity consumption, which it might be well advised to forego if it could thereby secure an equivalent reduction in power rates to Iraqi industry. The government might, therefore, explore with the Company and with the tax authorities in the United Kingdom the possibility of an equitable arrangement, whereby power rates would be reduced as far as possible, while still providing adequate funds for capital improvement and continuing a fair return to stockholders. A possible arrangement that has to be considered is the exercise by the government at the end of 1954 of its option to purchase the undertaking as a going concern. If such a course should be decided on, it would be desirable to enter into a management contract with the Company in order to ensure the continuance of efficient operation.

433 488 452 The amount of working capital required in Iraq per unit of production is exceedingly high, partly because enterprises want to be as self-sufficient as possible with respect to needed supplies and materials, partly because Iraq is relatively distant from international markets. Probably the best means of reducing the need for working capital would be through the erection and operation of a bonded warehouse which would provide all industries with facilities to store, until needed, supplies, material and chemicals of all types under conditions that would enable banks to extend credits on the stocks in bond. In this way the banks would have assurance that the stored material would not be released prior to full payment plus interest, storage and service charges. In effect, this would permit operations along lines very similar to those in highly developed countries where supplies and materials are obtained in accordance with production schedules.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

348 arranged so that the material flows through the plant with a minimum of handling.

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3. Use of Time Studies and Cost Accounting

Time studies are indispensable in some industries. In textile and machine shops, for example, these studies are essential to break down production costs for proper evaluation. To illustrate, a large costly lathe might show a greater return by speeding up its operation through the use of a different design of cutting tool, or a planer might show such a low return that its replacement by a milling machine would be fully justified. In textiles, time studies might show that it is actually more costly to have one operator tending five looms than to have him tend only four looms; or the reverse could be true, depending on all of the related factors. There are numerous other examples which could be cited to show the need of time studies in certain sectors of industry.

Cost accounting is very important to good operations and must be practiced before an industry can expect to reach maximum operating efficiency. Without it, many losses, which could easily be avoided, go unnoticed by management.

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4. Improved Administration

At present there is very little delegation of responsibility by management to foremen and supervisors. This limits the economic size of plants and tends to complicate the work of management. There are good reasons for this situation, chiefly the widespread lack of education, experience and training, which has already been described. While the basic problem can be overcome only in time, industry can take steps to alleviate the immediate situation through such measures as on-the-job training programs suggested earlier, special courses for supervisory personnel, and better organization of inventories and distribution of stores of spare parts. The result should be an increase in production and, at the same time, a reduction in per-unit cost.

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5. Greater Emphasis on Workers' Welfare

To hire and train a worker requires time and money, and the investment is lost if, because of sickness, the worker is unable to hold his job or to turn out a full day's work. A physical examination prior to hire would insure that a worker is physically

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874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 *Department of Antiquities*. The Department of Antiquities
maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration,
217 research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

Economic Survey

651 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be
439 drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the
world's supply. Her general economic organization is neverthe-
433 less agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the
339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com-
342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 In 1950 a Development Board was established with the func-
652 tion of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing
a general economic and financial plan for developing the
[511] country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

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311 alluvial plain of the centre and south, where agriculture
241 depends on the water of the Tigris and Euphrates for irrigation by pump, flow, or natural inundation. In the first region rainfed winter cereals predominate, with millet, maize, sesame and other summer crops grown as subsidiaries where irrigation is possible. Kurdish mountain crops include tobacco and grapes. In the central canal zone (Faluja–Baghdad–Diala) wheat and barley are the principal winter crops; summer crops include millet, maize, sesame, and the produce of market gardens near Baghdad. From here southward barley and rice predominate, with a great concentration of palm groves in all the riverain land, especially around Basra on the Shatt al-Arab. The deserts of west Iraq afford extensive grazing after the winter rains.

241 Cultivation is based traditionally on the following system. In the south, either half the land is left fallow and half tilled each year, or half is sown with a summer crop, half with a winter. In the north the land may be continuously cropped for two or three years, and then left fallow for the same period. The use of artificial fertilizers is practically unknown, but the land is sometimes manured by allowing shepherd tribes to pasture their flocks on fallow ground.

Although the vast majority of agricultural implements employed are still traditional and primitive, modern machinery is being imported steadily. A high target has been set, especially since the war, and Government service stations have been
[439] established. In 1950 imports were as follows: tractors 166, ploughs 146, cultivators 26, combines 98, threshers 1, grain drills 21, disc harrows 14. Oil pumps for irrigation are even more in demand than tractors; in 1949–50 there were 3,600 in use, with an average horse-power of 36.

[645] The agricultural development of the country is organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, which contains departments for plant breeding and protection, horticulture, forestry, agricultural machinery, animal husbandry and veterinary services.

Crops

433 The principal crops, with their production in 1950 in thousands of metric tons, are *Winter*: barley, 851; wheat, 520; lentils, 6; vetch, 3·5; linseed, 0·2; *Summer*: rice, 242; cotton, 25; sesame, 10; maize, 21; millet 19; green gram, 12; tobacco, 3 (purchased by Government Tobacco Monopoly); dates, 250.[1] Of the two most important crops, barley and dates, the former is grown mainly in the northern plains and the *liwas* of Kut, Muntafiq, Hilla, and Diwaniya in the irrigated zone. With a

[1] ibid. p. 146.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's produc- 245
tion; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312
water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423
are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427
There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24
per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [241]
on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators.
This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423
disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433
perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185
which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464
reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large
farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery 166
is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of
farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the [161]
cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
•433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-
464 supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently
166 go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agri-
[452] cultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
654 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being
185 semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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Oil Industry

Petroleum concessions covering most of Iraq are held by IPC and the associated Mosul and Basra Petroleum Companies (MPC and BPC).[1] The three concessions are all for seventy-five years, from 1925, 1932, and 1938 respectively. They initially provided for the payment of dead rent until oil was produced and thereafter for royalties at the rate of 4*s.* gold per ton of crude oil exported. A new agreement, of 3 February 1952, made retroactive to 1 January 1951, provides that the Iraq Government shall receive 50 per cent of the companies' profits from their operations in Iraq before deduction for foreign taxes, part of the half share consisting of oil in kind (12½ per cent of the net production of each of the companies). In all circumstances except those of *force majeure* the Government's total income from the companies' operations is not to be less than 25 per cent of the seaboard value of all crude oil exported by IPC and MPC, plus 33⅓ per cent of the seaboard value of crude oil exported by BPC; the Government's income is further guaranteed at not less than £20 million sterling per annum during 1953 and 1954 and not less that £25 million during 1955 and subsequent years. Should circumstances of *force majeure* impose a suspension of oil production in the country, the Government will receive from the companies unconditionally a minimum annual revenue of 25 million for two years. In addition, the companies guarantee to produce and dispose of minimum quantities of crude oil annually as follows: IPC 20½ million tons, MPC 1½ million tons as from 1 January 1954, and BPC 8 million tons as from 1 January 1956. This replaces the previous undertaking that IPC should dispose of a minimum of 3 million tons per annum and MPC and BPC a minimum each of 1 million tons per annum. The approximate oil revenues forecast by the Iraq Government on the new basis for the years 1953–5 inclusive are respectively 45 and 59 million dinars. 471

Oil was struck for the first time in Iraq in 1927, near Kirkuk, and by the end of 1934 IPC exported crude oil through two 12-inch pipelines, each of 7 million tons' annual capacity, to Tripoli (530 miles) and Haifa (617 miles) on the Mediterranean coast. In 1949 a 16-inch pipeline of 4 million tons' capacity was opened to Tripoli. In consequence of the Palestine conflict work on a similar pipeline to Haifa stopped short at the Palestinian frontier; for the same reason the Iraq Government closed the 12-inch Haifa line, which has since remained disconnected at the 315 433

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[1] For the location of concession areas, the length of period of the concessions, and the respective share holdings of the parent companies, see Appendix IV, pp. 568–9 below.

Iraq MHI

315 frontier. A 30–32-inch pipeline of 14 million tons' capacity was
433 opened to Banias in Syria (560 miles) in 1952.

In the MPC concessionary area exploration and drilling were carried out before 1931, but it was not until after the Second World War that oil of certain commercial value was discovered and produced, at Ain Zala, north-west of Mosul. In 1952 the field was linked by a 12-inch pipeline to the IPC pipeline system, to permit the export of its crude oil to the Mediterranean coast.

In the BPC concessionary area exploration began in 1939 and, when resumed at the end of the war, was made more effective by the application of new geophysical methods. A field producing oil of good quality was developed in the area of Zubair, the average depth of the wells—some 11,000 feet—being greater than in any neighbouring Persian Gulf oilfield and four times greater than at Kirkuk. Oil is carried the seventy-four miles from the field to a new oil port at Fao, where oil was first shipped in December 1951, through a 12-inch pipeline; a second pipeline, of 24 inches, was completed in 1953 to cope with the company's increased production programme under the terms of the 1952 agreement.

433 Production of crude oil for 1952 (the first year of MPC and BPC production) was as follows: Kirkuk (IPC) 15,553,000 tons, Ain Zala (MPC) 270,000 tons, Zubair (BPC) 2,238,000 tons.

471 The area of eastern Iraq excluded from the concessions of
433 these three companies has been developed by the Khanaqin
Oil Company, a subsidiary of AIOC, on the basis of agreements
382 made in 1925 and 1926. The output of the company's refinery near Khanaqin, together with imports from Abadan, provided Iraq's internal requirements of petroleum products. In accordance with an agreement ratified in 1952, the Iraq Government has bought the refinery, the company undertaking to operate it for ten years and, if requested, to operate also the new government refinery near Baghdad which is to replace it; after the Khanaqin refinery is closed the company will retain its production area on the same terms as those of the IPC 1952 agreement, conditional on exporting an annual minimum of 2 million tons of crude oil.

The government refinery at Daura near Baghdad, on which work started in 1952, is designed to produce a million tons of refined petroleum products per annum, a figure well in excess of the present requirements of the country. Meanwhile a small refinery of some 175,000 tons annual capacity has been erected
[439] at Basra to help make good the deficiency caused by the
cessation of petroleum imports from Abadan.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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Factory Industry

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Iraqi factory industry is mainly directed to processing agricultural products and manufacturing building materials and consumer goods for the local market. Modern industry is of recent introduction and is so far little developed, though a considerable expansion is planned; its products differ little in kind from those of the small enterprises which preceded it. Legislation for the encouragement of industry, passed in 1929 and modified in 1950, remitted customs duty on imported machinery and materials and granted exemption from income and property tax and the use of rent-free state land to predominantly Iraqi-owned industrial establishments with machinery valued at ID5,000 or over which used primarily raw materials available in Iraq or produced goods imported in considerable quantities. In spite of this encouragement there has been a lack of skilled manpower and experience on the one hand and initiative and private capital on the other. The foundation of a state industrial bank in 1946, by helping to supply the capital, has provided a genuine stimulus. The International Bank Report[1] gives the following figures (which have since increased) for what might be called modern industrial plants only: 2,000 persons employed (as compared with 11,500 in the oil companies), out of a total of some 45,000 engaged in industrial undertakings of all types, which are predominantly small workshops; total capital investment, about ID4 million; annual gross income, about ID3 million. At the end of 1951 there were eighty-seven manufacturing concerns which benefited from the law for encouraging industry. The larger factories are electrically run, taking their power from the public supply or, in some cases, generating their own.

The principal industries are cotton ginning, cotton and wool spinning and weaving, rayon weaving, dyeing, milling, vegetable oil extraction and soap manufacture, brewing and distilling, date packing, tanning, and the manufacture of date syrup, cigarettes, footwear, cement, and bricks, for all of which there are modern as well as more primitive plants. There are also works for manufacturing light steel products and aluminium ware.

Small enterprises include bakeries, confectioneries, and establishments for food-processing, ice manufacture, carpentry, processing local marble, battery-charging and repairs to electrical apparatus, motor vehicles, and agricultural equipment. Projected enterprises include three sugar factories in north

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[1] *Economic Development of Iraq*, p. 148.

433 Iraq each capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of sugar per annum from sugar beet to be grown locally, a bitumen plant, and a small steel plant. In addition the Government is investigating the recommendation of the International Bank mission[1] for the erection of a chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur, and carbon black. The mission has also recommended plants for manufacturing bone-meal fertilizer, date-packing crates and motor-car tyres, and for batching concrete, converting steel scrap into building components, and possibly for remelting glass.

Labour

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657 Conditions of work and employment are regulated by a Labour Law (1936–46), which so far relates only to 'workmen' (a term requiring more precise definition) in industrial undertakings. It is in process of revision and extension. Its application is supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security, which maintains a small corps of inspectors. This department, advised by foreign experts, proposes to experiment with employment exchanges, is starting to compile labour statistics, is undertaking a programme of housing for labour, and is examining plans of social security, for which the existing Labour Law already contains some provision in the form of indemnities on discharge, paid sick and confinement leave, and compensation for injuries. Safety and sanitary working conditions are covered generally by the Labour Law and made obligatory in greater detail by a Workshops and Factories Regulation (1937). In January 1953 it was stated that new provisions, for eventual inclusion in the new Labour Law, had been drafted for establishing wage boards, regulating disputes, and determining the rights, obligations, and administration of trade unions, which are not clearly defined in the existing Labour Law. The latter grants industrial workers the right to establish associations to safeguard their special interests, strengthen the spirit of co-operation, effect educational, cultural, hygienic, social, and moral improvements, and develop Iraqi industry. A few trade unions exist; their membership is small and activity slight. Others have been suspended for subversive activity. The movement is still rudimentary. [467]

Communications

496 *Railways.*[2] The railways constructed by the British forces during the Mesopotamian Campaign eventually formed the

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[1] See above, p. 275.

[2] This section is based on the *Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book*, 1952–3.

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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I 433 471 311 M 471 433 311

Unlike Egypt, Iraq is a sparsely populated country relative to its land resource. Yet we find there the same conditions of landlessness, and low levels of living among the peasant folk. More serious still, we find in that country a great agricultural potential which is threatened by the prevailing destructive system of land tenure.

This fertile land of the ancient Tigris and Euphrates rivers has a total potentially cultivable area (mostly by means of expanded irrigation) of some 25 million acres. The present area that is under cultivation each year, however, is less than 6 million acres. There is no doubt that capital and technical aid from the West will make it possible for Iraq to realize this tremendous potential. The serious question, however, is whether development will be attempted on the present shaky foundations of feudalism, absentee ownership, and sharecropping, or on the sounder and more stable foundations of a thriving rural community that is emancipated through its ownership or control of the land. The answer, one way or the other, will be of grave consequence to the future of Iraq.

I 423 427 471 M 423 427 471

The following is a brief summary of the situation as it now exists. Less than 0.5 percent of the land is owned privately in fee simple. About 36 percent is state domain which has been leased out more or less permanently to individuals. Over 58 percent is held directly and fully by the state, and is leased out on a yearly basis. These figures indicate clearly that the fate of the land resource has not yet been fully decided as in the case of Egypt. The major portion of it is still in the hands of the state, which could dispose of it either in favor of the landless cultivator and tribesmen, or in favor of the absentee owner and the tribal chief.

The land that is now under cultivation (whether privately owned or leased from the state) is predominantly in the hands or under the control of the semi-feudal tribal chief and the large owner from the city. In either case, absenteeism prevails. The peasants, consisting of village folk and semi-settled tribal people, are in the majority of cases landless sharecroppers. They raise crops and receive a share ranging from 20 to 50 percent of the produce, depending upon whether they supply the seed, the

811 which now amounts to one million acres. More might be added
by water storage schemes. At present several large new schemes
812 are under consideration. These involve flood control by the
construction of the Bekhme dam on the Great Zab, and an extension of the Habbaniya reservoir. In addition to the Bekhme dam a scheme for flood irrigation in the Wadi Tharthar is being considered. A survey commission is now preparing a report on these developments, but so far no estimates have been made of the area of land likely to be brought into cultivation.

464 At present there is no shortage of labour. The population is
small in relation to the area cropped, but it is growing rapidly.
161 In 1931, according to Dowson, the total population was
162 2,824,000, of which 2,246,000 were estimated to be rural, including 895,000 settled population and 1,351,000 still living in tribal conditions.[1] Estimates for 1943 put the total population at 4,500,000, of which the rural population was 3,500,000. Some regions, Basra, Karbala, Dulaim, and Muntafiq are densely settled, while others, chiefly in the north, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk,
311 are settled very sparsely. The area of cropped land per head is 2
acres, and the area of cultivated land perhaps as much as 4 acres.

LAND TENURE

● 433 It is clear that Iraq has greater prospects of agricultural expansion than any other Middle East country. But to the deve-
422 lopment of these potentialities the greatest obstacle is land
tenure. Sir Ernest Dowson, in his classical report on the subject, says: 'The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free
000 from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort
of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the

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[1] Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth Garden City Press for the Iraqi Government, 1932), p. 12.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

Iraq MHI

COTTON IN IRAQ

The program is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress 652
unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually 654
static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a profound economic and social transformation, with far-reaching repercussions.

The International Bank concludes that the country will need no further foreign loans except possibly to meet part of the hard currency needs.[34] The oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling. However, under a new agreement, the United Kingdom has undertaken to furnish sufficient dollars against sterling to cover Iraq's essential needs.

The International Bank in 1950 already had loaned $12.8 million to Iraq, primarily for flood control, irrigation, and road construction. Apparently the Bank is willing to consider further loans, but the Iraqi are not interested as long as the oil revenues continue and they are able to get sterling converted into dollars.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A number of organizations are providing technical assistance to Iraq in 648
its development program, notably the United States Point Four Program and 654
the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization.

Point Four began its program early in 1952 in such fields as cotton agronomy, farm machinery, agricultural extension and vocational education, irrigation, entomology, rural health, sanitation, and industrial development. About 25 Americans have been employed, and the number may be doubled by the end of the year. Most of the Point Four funds go for salaries; the costs of tools and materials are assumed by the local government. The specialists in Iraq obviously were chosen for their competence, practical experience, and their interest in the assignment. They are anxious to develop the most desirable means of approaching the problem.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has about 11 specialists regularly employed in the country in such fields as soils, cooperatives, bacteriology, veterinary science, nutrition, agricultural statistics, farm mechanization, and home economics. The program may be extended to cover agricultural research, extension, underground water and drainage, forestry, and fisheries.

The FAO operates almost entirely at the government level; Point Four seeks to go beyond government planning to the grass roots.

INDUSTRY

The people of Iraq, in common with their neighbors of the Middle East, 162
live almost entirely by agriculture. About 80 per cent of the population earns 433
its living directly from the soil, and most of the others indirectly.[35] Industry is still relatively undeveloped. Apart from the oil industry, which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 people are employed in what are called modern industrial plants.

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

29: Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East

Iraq MHI

COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

PRODUCTION

433 Industry at present is confined largely to processing agricultural products, producing building materials, and manufacturing consumer goods—matches, soap, cigarettes, shoes, beverages, and textiles.

Conditions are favorable for further industrial development. Opportunities are abundant for producing agricultural raw materials for processing, and indications are that iron, copper, zinc, chrome, sulphur, and salt exist in commercial quantities. With plenty of oil and natural gas, fuel is no problem. Manpower is adequate, and with proper training the Iraqi workman is said to be competent. A higher level of agricultural production would create also a wider market for manufactured products.

There are a number of limitations. The lack of technical "know-how" and the lack of sufficient private capital and initiative are the most important. Much capital, particularly that accumulated from agriculture, is said to be hoarded; and the balance generally is invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce where investors anticipate a 471 high rate of return. It is suggested for this reason that industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

In most of the Middle East countries, cotton harvesting and, to a certain extent, weeding depend on migrant laborers who travel from one area to another. In Iraq, most of the members of the migrant farm worker's family walk, carrying their household goods on their heads. Only the tiniest youngsters and the oldest women ride the burros.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

IRAQ MA1

initiative and financial assistance of the government.[36] 433

The government has been advised to encourage development of light industries: Cotton textiles, cottonseed oil crushing mills, jute mills, bone fertilizer plants, automobile tire factories, small steel mills, central machine shops, concrete block plants, possibly a paper mill, a chemical factory for making inorganic fertilizer, and possibly salt refineries.

The Mission strongly urged the government not to attempt to own or operate these new factories itself, but to encourage private capital to do so.[37] [650 This recommendation has been followed in the main. The Industrial Bank, created with funds derived from the oil royalties, has been financing private industry in a number of fields, particularly cotton textiles and cottonseed oil crushing and refining. The outstanding exception is the new petroleum refinery being built by the government. 135

OIL 388

Oil reserves in Iraq are thought to be tremendous—at least a third of the total Middle Eastern reserves, which are reckoned at 50 billion barrels, or

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

—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Adm...

Capacity of the Kut Barrage on the Tigris River in Iraq is almost a quarter of a million cubic feet of water per second, which makes it the largest diversion dam of its kind in the world. The dam was built by British contractors for the Iraq Government in 1939. With oil revenues now pouring into the treasury Iraq plans to build several more large-scale irrigation facilities for storage and diversion. New projects are already in progress in the upper reaches of the Tigris River system.

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[36] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

Egypt MR1
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647 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large
652 part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the
185 direct beneficiaries It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenues resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

000 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the close of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of the departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralized and made available more directly and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

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642 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles
131 and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic
161 potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income
434 *per capita* does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past
423 the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate the distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary of tribal chiefs.

483 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a
185 larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

657 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing the
185 standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
511 utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.

369 Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
433 described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
511 conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
566 rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
423 house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
471 directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
566 more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
and write to obtain more information.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MHI

SUMMARY

Iraq encompasses the valleys of the 131
Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and is as- 161
sociated historically with Mesopotamia, the 433
home of one of the oldest civilizations on
record. It has been an independent sover-
eign state since 1932. The population, which
was estimated at 4,799,500 in 1947, is 95
per cent Moslem and predominantly Arab.
Extensive petroleum resources and date cul-
tivation contribute to the wealth of the
country, which is still relatively underde-
veloped in other respects. The public health 744
activities of the Iraqi government are cen-
tralized in the Ministry of Health, with
headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry is
responsible for the maintenance of preven-
tive and curative services, which are carried
out in the provinces through subordinate
provincial organizations. Municipal depart-
ments exist in Baghdad and the principal
cities, but in other areas the enforcement
of sanitary regulations devolves upon the
government officers. In 1950, there were 82 743
civilian hospitals in the country, with an
aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly
more than 1 bed per 1,000 population.
Almost one half of the total beds were lo-
cated in the Baghdad area. Approximately
82 per cent of the hospitals are supported
by the government. Also in 1950, 433 dis-
pensaries were functioning in various parts
of the provinces, 403 under the jurisdiction
of the government health authorities.

The water supplies in the towns and the 312
villages of the alluvial plain are derived
from rivers, canals, lakes and wells; in the
northern highlands, from streams, springs
and wells. All the urban supplies are ob-
tained from rivers, except in Erbil and
Sulaimaniya, where spring sources are util-
ized. The water supplies of the larger cities
are treated, but those in the rural areas are
unprotected and often polluted. There are 314
no sewerage systems. In the cities, cesspits
and septic tanks are employed for the dis-
posal of sewage; in the rural villages, the
means are more primitive. The dietary 880

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871 progress, discouraging both to the educators and to the Iraqi people, reflects on the possibilities of development, which in the final analysis depend on the general educational level of the population. To be sure, in the period 1930-1950 the number of schools rose from 262 to 1,100, the number of pupils from 32,750 to 175,000, and the number of primary school teachers from 1,325 to 6,588; nevertheless, out of about 750,000 children of school age only 175,000 were in schools; the percentage of drop-outs as the children advanced to the higher grades was so large as to cause real alarm. The facilities and quality of technical and vocational education were woefully deficient, and adult education was almost completely neglected. As to the quality of the educational program, the Mission stated: "Educational concepts are far too narrow and too little related to everyday problems of living." But what was most alarming was the fact that as late as 1951 about 90 per cent of the total population was still illiterate.[10]

434 Though possessing so much land, so much water, and considerable revenue from oil, Iraq's standard of living was fairly low. Annual per capita income was estimated in 1949 at about $84 and not much higher in 1953.[11] This compared with $140 for Lebanon, $100 for Syria, $125 for Turkey, $100 for Egypt, and $389 for Israel.

● 433 [654] Industrial growth advanced at a very slow pace. In order to stimulate the establishment of industry, the Government passed a law in 1929 granting tax relief and other concessions to those who would develop industrial projects, but almost twenty years later the United States Department of Commerce reported that the development of manufacturing industries was still in the embryonic stage.[12] In 1949 it was reported that in spite of the impetus given to local production by the shortage of import goods during the war, Iraq's industries were still underdeveloped.[13] In 1951 the International Bank Mission reported that industry was little developed; that exclusive of those employed by the oil companies, 60,000 workers were engaged in

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[10] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 62-63; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry* (London), Sept., 1953, 93.

[11] U. N., *Review 1949-50*, 12; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.

[12] U. S., Dept. of Commerce, *International Reference Service*, Dec., 1948, 3.

[13] Great Britain, *Iraq*, 16.

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industrial and handicraft production, but most of those were 433 ●
employed in small undertakings, with only about 2,000 working in what might be classified as modern industrial plants.[14] The United Nations reported in 1951 that industry continued to play a very minor part in the Iraqi economy and that the gross output was estimated at not more than ID 3,000,000.[15]

The general industrial and economic situation could perhaps 382
be gauged by the consumption of oil and oil products, especially since the country had these supplies in such abundance. In 1929, internal oil consumption, including refinery needs, was 70,000 metric tons; in 1937 it had risen to 132,000 tons, but in 1950 it was only 929,000 tons. Excluding refinery needs, consumption in 1937 was only 88,000 tons; in 1949, 518,000; in 1950, 619,000; in 1951, 635,000; and in 1952, 690,000.[16]

The level of civic responsibility and national consciousness 651
is illustrated by the taxpaying practices of the Iraqis. The first 652
income tax law was enacted in 1927, but not before considerable modifications had been made and a long time had elapsed did the Government begin to receive any substantial revenue. The following table shows the annual revenue from income tax, the total revenue, and the percentage of income taxes in the total revenue:

Table IV. *Iraq, Percentage of Income Tax in Total Revenue*

Year	*Income Tax (in I. D.)*	*Total Revenue (in I. D.)*	*Percentage*
1943	1,016,082	18,810,000	5.4
1944	1,293,089	20,700,000	6.2
1945	1,149,394	20,790,000	5.5
1946	1,032,054	25,520,000	4.0
1947	1,081,379	23,510,000	4.6
1950	2,354,000	31,579,000	7.5[17]

[14] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report,* 2, 129. Another estimate gives the total number of industrial workers in 1950 as not more than 72,000, including those employed in the oil industry. "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry,* Sept., 1953, 93.

[15] United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1951-52* (New York, 1953), 43. Henceforth cited U. N., *Review 1951-52.*

[16] U.N., *Review 1951-52,* 62; U. N., *Summary 1952-53,* 57; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd., *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year ending 31st December 1952,* 20;—*Annual 1953,* 19.

[17] Great Britain, *Iraq,* 22; U.N., *Review 1949-50,* 78; *Annual Report of the National Bank of Iraq, July 1949-December 1950,* 53.

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The general progress of the Development Board under the 647
existing conditions was tolerably satisfactory, but the long- 651
range objectives and the conditions necessary for their realiza- 185
tion were not appreciated either by the people or by the politicians. In 1953 the Development Board Law was amended and a new Ministry of Development was created. Though the Development Board was retained, the execution of the development plan was placed under both the Board and the Ministry. The Minister of Development became an additional *ex officio* member of the Board, responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his Ministry and of the Board. The original intent of the law to remove the Board from the vagaries of political change was thus negated. Moreover, because of the general educational and technological level of the population, the Development Board found itself in the unusual, if not unique, position of not being able to spend the constantly increasing revenue.[26] The Board consequently resorted to lending its funds to other Government agencies not concerned with long-range development, and a goodly portion of its income was diverted to other regular expenses.[27]

Despite inherent limitations and basic difficulties, the aware- 433
ness of the people and the Government that the oil revenue 185
could be used as a means of advancing the development of the country has had some positive and some negative effects on Iraq's growth. One might note a general tendency to depend exclusively on oil income, to the exclusion of all other re-
sources of governmental and economic operations. For obvious [651]
reasons the Government adopted a policy of reducing taxes[28] in view of the gigantic income from oil.[29] Such a policy, combined

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[26] In 1952-53, ID11 million of the Board's allotment remained unspent. *The Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 6, 1953.

[27] For a description of the various projects, see U.N., *Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission*, I, 71-74; International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 183-457; Norman Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, IV, Summer, 1951, 362-370; Fuad Jameel, "Development Projects and Economic Progress in Iraq," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954; Mohammed Zaki Abdul Kareem, "Beehive of Construction," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, June 12, 19, 26, July 3, 1954; *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Dec. 13, 1954, 3.

[28] In 1953 the Government lifted the consumption tax on fresh fruits and vegetables, increased the reductions in the real estate tax and announced substantial cuts in customs and excise taxes. Jameel, "Development Projects," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954.

[29] The 1952-53 total Government budget amounted to $134,000,000, of which about 42 per cent came from direct oil revenue (only 30 per cent of total income, the other 70 per cent being assigned to the Development Board). U.N., *Summary 1952-53*, 60.

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433 with enormous spending, brings in its wake a host of problems
185 and dangers: inflation, a great strain on a primitive economy, shortages of human resources (civil servants, teachers, doctors, engineers), and the overburdening and eventual breakdown of transportation and communications. Nevertheless, progress was registered. Many irrigation and drainage projects were undertaken, and some were completed; a beginning of agrarian reform and rehabilitation through such projects as Diyala was made.[30] In 1952 the United Nations reported that a slight expansion in industry had been achieved and a basis for more
454 rapid development laid. Capital investments in major indus-
464 tries rose from a cumulative total of ID5.18 million in 1948-1949 to 5.84 million in 1951-1952; the value of output rose from ID 1.4 million to 4.4 million, and the number of workers increased from 1,650 to 4,550.[31]

In its report for the fiscal years 1952-1953 the Development Board stated that considerable progress had been made on some of the construction and irrigation projects although it had not used up its revenues and had granted ID6.3 million to municipalities and Government departments to carry out new programs.[32]

185 The impact of the oil industry on Iraq was not as great as it could have been. In spite of Government effort, and in spite of the belief held by some governmental leaders that it was an unconditional, integral part of the overall development program, industry made very little progress. There have been some advances in agriculture, but not as much as hoped for. There exists a serious danger that after the irrigation projects are completed and the land available for cultivation increased, unless the Iraqi peasant is educated—psychologically as well as technically—to utilize the additional acreage effectively and constructively and to keep the irrigation machinery in working order, the enormous expenditures may well have been wasted. Neither will the new hospitals and new school buildings be able to fulfil their proper functions unless there are enough trained doctors, nurses and teachers with a social consciousness and a deep-seated and genuine desire to help the impoverished,

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[30] Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal,* V, Summer, 1951, 362-366.

[31] U. N., *Summary 1952-53,* 22.

[32] *Al Zaman,* July 24, 1953.

Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
315 programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
[496] works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-
owned Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

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Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

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In the early post-war period there was little development. Petroleum production, and the revenue accruing to the Government therefrom, remained at the pre-war level or below and agricultural and industrial output showed little change. The deficit in the balance of payments was met by drawing on foreign exchange reserves. The Government budget showed deficits, and little was spent on capital works. By 1950, however, the situation began to change. Output of petroleum increased rapidly, and new agreements with the producing companies greatly raised government receipts. With the technical and financial assistance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a large-scale development plan was drawn up which is at present being carried out. The completion of the various projects under way should result in a considerable increase in the national income.

Production

Agriculture

433 311 241

The increase in area and output achieved during the Second World War was generally maintained during the post-war period (see table 26). In recent years, there seems to have been a further extension in acreage, owing to increased irrigation and greater mechanization. 1/ Yields have continued to fluctuate in response to weather conditions, floods and attacks by locusts and other insect pests; total output has therefore varied considerably from year to year. The experience of recent years, notably that of 1952, has, however, shown that, thanks to the co-operation of other Middle Eastern and foreign governments, locust attacks cause much less damage than they did formerly. Similarly, completion of the irrigation works at present under way should greatly reduce the danger of floods like that of 1954, which destroyed many crops and damaged property.

The agricultural and livestock census 2/ of 1952/53, the first of its kind, puts the total agricultural holdings of Iraq at 6,384,000 hectares, of which

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1/ The number of pumps used in irrigation rose from 2,757, with a total horsepower of 91,332 in 1945, to 4,339, with a horsepower of 167,288 in 1953 (Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract 1953 (Baghdad)). In addition, the construction of canals made it possible to extend appreciably the area irrigated by existing dams. Early in 1951, there were 320 combines and 750 tractors (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, (Baltimore, 1952), page 19). In 1952 and 1953, 625 combines and 502 tractors were sold to farmers; of these over two-thirds were sold in 1953 (Statistical Abstract). There were 2,091 tractors in 1954 (Le Commerce du Levant, 11 August 1954 (Beirut)).

2/ Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract 1953 (Baghdad).

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Table 26. Iraq: Area and Production of Principal Crops, 1934-38, 1945, 1948 and 1950 to 1954

Crop	1934-38	1945	1948	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Area (thousands of hectares):								
Wheat	661	777	963	950	863	882	1,046	...
Barley	743	826	974	1,000	927	700	1,211	...
Rice	152	194	295	218	189	210	129	...
Cotton	16	...	...	32	44	40	24	...
Production (thousands of metric tons):								
Wheat	478	400	301	545	487	480	762	800
Barley	575	650	570	851	839	800	1,111	700
Rice	205	245	350	242	190	250	200	250
Cotton	2	1	2	8	6	3	4	...
Dates	260	...	301 a/	305	350	370	350	...

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics (Rome), Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics; agricultural census of 1952/53; Le Commerce du Levant (Beirut), 25 December 1954.

a/ 1947.

2,752,000 hectares are rainfed, 2,912,000 irrigated 1/ and 644,000 hectares uncultivable. Of the total, 2,527,000 hectares, or 40 per cent, were cropped; 2,795,000 hectares, or 44 per cent, were left fallow; 128,000 hectares, or 2 per cent, was under fruit trees and vines; 231,000 hectares, or 4 per cent, consisted of pastures; and 42,000 hectares, or 1 per cent, consisted of woodland. Double cropping is practised in a few areas.

The census showed that the area planted to the major field crops was as follows: barley 1,211,000 hectares; wheat, 1,046,000; rice, 129,000; maize, 54,000; cotton, 24,000; millet, 22,000; sesame, 22,000; tobacco, 10,000; vegetables, 45,000; others, 38,000; total, 2,601,000 hectares. Barley is to be found in most parts of the country, while wheat is grown mainly in the north, the provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk accounting for half the total area; cotton and fruit trees are grown mainly around Baghdad and in other central provinces, and rice in the south; date cultivation is concentrated around the town of Basra. 2/

1/ Of this total, 1,685,000 hectares are irrigated by flow, 1,120,000 hectares by pumps and 107,000 by water wheels and other means.

2/ The census put livestock on agricultural holdings as follows: horses, 137,000; cattle, 712,000; buffaloes, 47,000; sheep, 4,484,000; goats, 1,613,000; donkeys, 399,000; camels, 38,000; and mules, 57,000.

433 311 241 There has been little change in the crop pattern in recent years. In 1950, under the stimulus of rising world prices, the area planted to cotton increased, but the damage caused by pests, together with the fall in prices, caused heavy losses and led to a shift to other crops. There has also been an extension of the area planted to fruits and vegetables.

242 The Government has taken several important measures to aid agriculture. In 1952, in order to improve the quality of dates, the government-owned Iraqi Dates Association contributed 49 per cent of the capital of a company which will market the crop. In 1953, the Government appropriated funds for the building of grain silos with a capacity of 150,000 tons, in order to improve quality, since low grading depresses export prices. The Agricultural Machinery Administration rents "machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts". 1/ The activities of the Agricultural Bank are discussed below.

423 241 Among the major obstacles to agricultural development has been the land tenure system. The uncertainty of land titles has by now been largely eliminated by the work carried out since passage of the land settlement law of 1932. By the end of 1953, titles to 16,126,000 hectares had been settled; this represented 68.4 per cent of the area of the country, excluding the desert regions. Another obstacle is the unequal distribution of land. The agricultural census showed that there were only 125,000 holdings, with an average area of 51 hectares per holding. Of these, 24,000 holdings were under 1 hectare, 26,000 between 1 and 5 hectares, 16,000 between 5 and 10 hectares and 19,000 between 10 and 20 hectares. Thus, 85,000 holders, or 68 per cent of the total, owned about 8 per cent of the total area. At the other extreme, some 33,000 holders, with over 100 hectares each, owned some 85 per cent of the total area. The majority of the agricultural population is landless.

311 241 185 The Government has attempted to remedy this situation by settlement schemes on government-owned land, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of the settled area. Following a successful experiment at Dujaila, 4,284 farmers were settled, in five projects with a total area of 198,000 hectares, and by the end of 1954, 10,200 farmers had been settled on 510,000 hectares. 2/ Farmers are organized in supply and marketing co-operatives. They are given the land free of rent for ten years, after which those who have made good are granted title without charge. 3/ Further projects are under way, including the distribution of 1,125,000 hectares in Mosul province, the distribution of 100,000 hectares near Baghdad, the expansion of the Hawijah settlement and the distribution of land near Basra and along the southern Euphrates. 4/

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, page 20.

2/ The Iraq Times (Baghdad), 25 October 1954.

3/ For further details see United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, Progress in Land Reform (1954), page 105.

4/ The Iraq Times, 14 December 1954, 4 January 1955, 8 January 1955 and 7 February 1955.

Petroleum

433 The petroleum industry in Iraq has made striking progress during the post-war
period. Production and exports, which had been low mainly owing to the lack of
382 transport facilities, increased sharply following construction of new pipelines
to the seacoasts. Exploration activities led to the discovery of new oilfields,
315 which are being developed. As a result of increasing output of petroleum and the
439 revision of the terms of payment, Iraq's oil revenues have multiplied. These
revenues have provided the financial means for development of the country's
resources. Revenue from the oil industry, which is in the form of sterling,
together with the substantial and rising foreign exchange disbursements of the
oil companies for local expenditures, increased considerably the foreign exchange
[464] supplies of the country and made larger imports possible. Availability of
petroleum products, at relatively low cost, has facilitated economic development,
and the consumption of oil products has increased severalfold. In addition, the
petroleum industry has given employment to an increasing number of employees
(see table 27) and is providing them with training. After a setback during the
war years, when production declined to 1.6 million metric tons in 1941, output
of crude petroleum in 1944 recovered to its pre-war level of 4.3 million metric
tons. Construction of two additional pipelines, parallel to the previous lines
and with a yearly capacity of about 4.5 million tons each, started immediately
after the end of the war. The pipeline to Tripoli was completed in 1949, but
construction of the other, destined for Haifa, was interrupted by the Palestine
conflict and it remains incomplete. Another large-diameter pipeline with an
annual throughput capacity of 13.5 million tons, linking the Kirkuk field to
Baniyas in Syria, was completed in 1952 at a cost of ID 41 million. In the
meantime, the activities of the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum
Company, Ltd., both affiliated with the Iraq Petroleum Company, led to the
discovery of Ain Zalah and Butmah oilfields in the Mosul area, and Zubair and
Rumaila oilfields near Basra. The development of these fields, especially Zubair,
and the installation of pipelines and oil handling facilities during the past
four years, has increased substantially the crude petroleum export capacity of
Iraq. In addition, another smaller oilfield had been discovered by a subsidiary
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company before the war at Naftkhaneh, near the Iranian
border, and its output, which was refined locally, served the domestic market
exclusively.

As a result of the foregoing developments during the last decade, as well as increasing world demand for petroleum, production of crude oil, which had declined from 4.7 million tons in 1946 and 1947 to 3.4 million tons in 1948, because of the Palestine conflict and the shutdown of the pipeline to Haifa, started to rise sharply, to 6.5 million tons in 1950, 18.9 million in 1952, and 29.6 million in 1954, representing in the latter year 4.3 per cent of the world's crude petroleum output as against 1.5 per cent in 1938. This production may be compared with proved oil reserves, which were estimated at 700 million tons in early 1949, and nearly 2,300 million tons at the end of 1954. Total investment in the petroleum industry of Iraq was estimated in 1952 at approximately ID 90 million, of which the main portion had been for construction of pipelines.

439 Iraq is exclusively an exporter of crude petroleum; the value of petroleum
382 exports was estimated at ID 137 million in 1954 as compared with ID 10 million
in 1938. Exports are handled by the parent companies of the Iraq Petroleum
471 Company and its affiliates, but under the terms of the February 1952 agreement,

439 the Government of Iraq is entitled to take, as part of the payment by the oil
382 companies, up to 12.5 per cent of crude oil produced by the operating oil companies and to develop its own export market. Refining activities are
471 relatively small. There were three refineries at the end of 1953, with a combined annual capacity of nearly 800,000 tons of crude throughput. The output of petroleum products increased from 350,000 tons in 1949 to 690,000 tons in 1952. In order to increase refining capacity to meet rising local demand, the Government is constructing a refinery, with a capacity of over one million tons a year at Dora, near Baghdad. The plans was expected to cost ID 9 million and to start operations in 1955. In addition, the Government approved in 1953 a proposal to construct a lubricating oil plant to meet local needs. These government refineries will be supplied by crude oil, sold by the Iraq Petroleum Company, according to the February 1952 agreement, and delivered to the Government at K.2 pumping station; from there the Government will carry it in its own pipeline. The price of such oil, which will be for sale only in Iraq, is to be five shillings, sixpence, per ton of oil, plus a fixed charge of £65,000 per annum as the cost of pumping such oil to K.2 station. Consumption of petroleum products in Iraq increased from about 190,000 tons in 1938 to 385,000 tons in 1946 and nearly 800,000 in 1953.

651 Government revenues from oil operations were multiplied because of increasing
382 production and exports and because of changes in the terms of payments by the producing companies. Prior to 1950, Iraq received the equivalent of $1.65 a ton,
471 which was increased to about $2.45 a ton according to the agreement concluded in August 1950. This in turn was superseded, in February 1952, by a new agreement, retroactive to 1 January 1951, between the Government of Iraq on the one hand and the Iraq Petroleum Company, Basrah Petroleum Company and Mosul Petroleum Company, on the other. The agreement provided for an equal sharing of profits, with profits to be determined before deduction of foreign taxes, on the basis of fixed values and costs of petroleum. Under article 9 of this agreement, the share of the Government in profits from crude oil of Kirkuk quality on the Iraqi-Syrian border was calculated to amount to 35s. 6d. per long ton in 1951, increasing to 40s. 6d. in 1953 and thereafter; the corresponding figures on the Persian Gulf at Fao were 29s. 4 1/2d. and 34s. 4 1/2d. per long ton, respectively. This provision involved a discount of 17s. 6d. per long ton for Kirkuk oil from its Iraqi-Syrian border value, and 13s. for southern Iraqi oil from the posted prices in the Persian Gulf. A new agreement reached in March 1955, retroactive to January 1954, reduced this discount to a flat rate of 2 per cent, and resulted in a rise of 7s. per ton in revenue for Iraq. Direct payments to the Government, which were the equivalent of about ID 2 million in the fiscal year 1938/39 and ID 2.3 million in 1946/47, increased to ID 5.4 million in 1950/51 and nearly ID 68 million in 1954, all paid in sterling. Local expenditures by the oil companies for the purchase of local materials and payment of wages to workers, kept pace with the development of the petroleum industry; such sterling disbursements of the oil companies amounted to the equivalent of ID 7.2 million in 1952 as against ID 2.1 million in 1946 and ID 580,000 in 1938.

Other industries

433 Government attempts to promote industrialization began with the "Encouragement of Industries" Law of 1929, which exempted industrial machinery and certain raw materials from customs duties and also exempted new industries from certain taxes;

in 1935, the Agricultural and Industrial Bank was founded. Little progress was achieved before the outbreak of the Second World War, and during the war the difficulty of importing equipment prevented expansion. However, after 1942, industrial investment began to increase, the total amount from 1943 to 1948 being ID 3,089,000. 1/ Between 1948/49 and 1951/52, the capital invested in the principal industries, other than petroleum, increased from about ID 312 million to ID 4.4 million, the value of production from 1.4 million to ID 3.6 million, and the number employed from 1,649 to 3,837. 2/ Since then, there has been substantial development. In 1954 it was estimated that there were some 70,000 to 80,000 persons engaged in manufacturing. Of these, somewhat less than half were handicraftsmen; some 13,000 were employed in the petroleum industry; 10,000 to 15,000 in the textile and leather industries; about 6,000 in the building materials industry; about 4,500 in the food and beverages industries; and some 3,000 to 4,000 in the tobacco industry. 3/ 433 [463]

Manufacturing is concentrated around Baghdad, which accounts for about 70 per cent of total factory employment. In 1954, a check on firms in Baghdad showed that, of a total of 31,600 workers, 6,700 were in firms with over 1,000 employees; 3,800 were in firms with 500 to 999 employees; 2,000 were in the 250-499 group; 4,300 were in the 100-249 group; 3,000 were in the 20-99 group; 1,500 were in the 10-19 group; and 10,200 worked in firms employing 9 persons or less. 4/ 433 464

Recent surveys have indicated that Iraq may contain appreciable quantities of iron ore, copper, sulphur and sulphur compounds, gypsum, bitumen, dolomite, calcite and different varieties of marble. 5/ However, up to the present, little use has been made of these minerals, and the most important industries are those based on agricultural materials, namely: spinning and weaving of cotton and woollen textiles; rayon weaving; jute spinning and weaving; soap-making (about 7,500 tons); vegetable oils; tanning; tobacco products; beer (1,840,000 litres); alcohol (318,000 litres) and alcoholic drinks (1,560,000 litres). The recently founded cement industry produces about 200,000 tons a year. Consumption of electricity increased from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to 82 million in 1949 and 272 million in 1953. The amount used in manufacturing increased from 20 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to 35 million in 1949 and 159 million in 1953. 6/ 433 135

1/ Industrial Bank, First Annual Report (Baghdad, 1948) (in Arabic).

2/ Hassan Ahmad Salman, "Development of Industry in Modern Iraq", Amgrad, March 1954 (Baghdad).

3/ Carl Iverson, Monetary Policy in Iraq (Baghdad, 1954), page 71.

4/ The Iraq Times Annual, 1954 (Baghdad), page 54.

5/ Salman, loc. cit.

6/ These figures include electricity consumed at the oilfields, which increased from about 11 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to about 21 million in 1949 and about 116 million in 1953; they exclude electricity consumed at pipeline stations, which amounted to 71 million kilowatt-hours in 1953 (Statistical Abstract).

185 647 Previously the Government had carried out several schemes in various fields but development projects had had to be kept small and had been aimed at the more immediate needs. Financing was carried out by means of yearly capital works appropriations, totalling about ID35 million from 1931 to 1950. It is not, however, clear whether these appropriations were fully spent.

647 433 The execution of the Six-Year Plan was entrusted to the Development Board, established in the spring of 1950 under Law No. 23 of 1950 as amended by Law No. 6 of 1952. It was constituted under the presidency of the Prime Minister; the members were the Minister of Finance and six executive members, nominated by the Council of Ministers for a term of five years, including three experts, one each in finance and economics; in irrigations; and in an unspecified field to be prescribed by the Council of Ministers. The Board was entrusted with the duty of preparing "a general economic and financial plan for the development of the resources of Iraq and the raising of the standard of living of the people"; with undertaking "a general survey of the exploited and unexploited resources of Iraq"; with the execution of the plans "in accordance with their determined priority"; and with co-ordinating the various ministries' development schemes in relation to the general development of the country. The Board has its own budget, and its revenue consisted, at the outset, of the total revenue received from the oil companies, but in 1952 this was amended to 70 per cent plus such other sums as may be allotted to it by Parliament and the proceeds of any loans, domestic or foreign.

647 645 433 In July 1953 the Ministry of Development was set up, headed by a new cabinet minister who became the ninth voting member, the Board's representative on the Council of Ministers and the link between Parliament and the Board. The new law did not change the Six-Year Plan or the financial structure of the Board, although it changed the latter's organizational framework and required the new minister to prepare a new development plan to be executed after the completion of the present one. Furthermore, with a view to administrative decentralization, a distinction has been made between "capital development projects" to be carried out entirely by the Board and "small development projects" which, though financed by the Board, are to be entrusted to the appropriate government departments for execution. The Board held its first meeting on 30 November 1950 and in May 1951 prepared its general programme, which was approved by Parliament in June 1951. The Six-Year Plan (1951 to 1957) calls for a total expenditure of ID 155.4 million and an estimated revenue of ID 168.7 million.

433 647 Actual expenditures on development plans for the financial years 1951/52 to 1953/54 totalled ID 26 million. They fell short of planned expenditure, which amounted to ID 58.2 million, thus leaving an unspent balance of ID 31.9 million. The building programme and reclamation of lands and other projects ran nearest to schedule while irrigation and industry lagged behind (see table 31). In addition, the Board has granted a number of loans to municipalities and semi-governmental institutions, to the end of March 1954, as follows (in thousands of Iraqi dinars):

Omnibus service, Baghdad	1,000
Agricultural machinery and tools	500
Oil refinery service	6.000
Baghdad Water Board	660
Directorate General of Iraqi Railways	2.500
Industrial Bank	500
Eight municipalities	3,553
Total	14.113

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Table 31. Iraq: Allotments and Anticipated Expenditure of the Development Board, 1951/52 to 1953/54

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52		1952/53		1953/54		Surplus, 1951/52 to 1953/54
	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	
Administrative and research expenses	170	110	460	260	600	300	560
Irrigation expenses	3,024	1,733	7,100	1,064	10,840	4,000	13,807
Major roads and bridges	2,066	836	3,800	2,933	4,700	2,500	4,398
Buildings	2,368	1,368	2,650	2,650	3,100	2,900	1,200
Reclamation of land etc.	1,736	953	3,450	2,076	4,150	2,150	3,157
Industries	-	-	3,000	5	5,000	500	6,495
Total	9,364	5,000	20,460	8,988	28,390	12,350	31,876

Source: Development Board, Annual Report, 1953/54 (Baghdad, 1954); figures are for fiscal years ending 31 March.

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433 The increase in oil production and other earnings of the Board resulted in a higher revenue during the years 1951/52 to 1953/54 than that originally estimated, in spite of a smaller withdrawal from the $12.8 million Wadi Tharthar project loan granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the meantime, the Board's over-all expenditure during the same period amounted to about ID 40 million, including loans and advances; accounts deposited with the National Bank of Iraq for the disbursement of the Tharthar project; and the sum of ID 10.5 million paid to the Ministry of Finance for the schemes undertaken by the various ministries on behalf of the Board (see table 32). Furthermore the Board has authorized government departments to finance various plans on its behalf, and has awarded several contracts for its major plans to various foreign and national companies. Some of these plans have already been completed and the rest are to be completed in the next few years. Thus the actual expenditure plus the obligated expenditure of the Board have been estimated to be about ID 45 to ID 55 million.

The most important reasons for deferring the expenditure of the allocated amounts provided for in the Board's budgets since its operation have been the delay in the approval of the programme by Parliament; the inability of the different departments, particularly in the first two years, to execute the projects entrusted to them by the Board; and the necessity for providing adequate time to study, survey and prepare the estimated cost and specifications for inviting tenders for the various projects. Most of the projects outlined in the original programme needed further studies and surveys, several of which have since been completed. Many have been submitted by various engineering consultants of international repute, and are under consideration by the Board. The Board hopes to accelerate the execution of such projects as were planned since it has almost reached the end of the planning stage.

Major projects

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433 One of the main purposes of the Six-Year Plan is to control floods in the Tigris and Euphrates by storing surplus water which can be used for irrigation. An over-all programme has been prepared, at an estimated cost of ID 335 million, providing for the construction of ten dams;[1] it is expected to increase the cropped area by 75 per cent and raise net annual agricultural income from its present level of ID 62 million to ID 222 million; part of this programme is being implemented under the Six-Year Plan. The plan also provides for industrial expansion, the building of 3,500 kilometres of metalled roads and improvement of a further 3,000 kilometres.

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[1] See Knappen, Tippets, Abbott and McCarthy, Report on the Development of the Tigris and Euphrates River Systems (Baghdad, 1954).

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312 185 433 There are several other projected dams and barrages on the Tigris and its tributaries (see map). The dam on the Tigris near Eski Mosul is estimated to have a capacity of 8 billion cubic metres and to cost ID 16 million. The Bekhme dam, on the Greater Zab, will have an initial capacity of 3 billion cubic metres and an ultimate capacity of 8.3 billion; its costs are estimated at ID 21.8 million and ID 39.6 million, respectively. The dam would provide irrigation for 625,000 hectares and a capacity of 600,000 kilowatts of electric power.

Two projects are planned on the Diyala, another tributary of the Tigris. A dam at Derbendi-Khan would have a storage capacity of 3.7 billion cubic metres and would increase the water supply for 309,000 hectares at present receiving light irrigation; its costs are put at ID 21 million. Preliminary work has begun. A barrage at Bani Saad, costing ID 1.75 million would, when complemented by the Nahrawan irrigation works, provide water for 223,000 hectares. In addition to the Dokan dam, a barrage is to be built on the Lesser Zab, at Hawija; it could irrigate 50,000 hectares. The Gharraf scheme will channel water from the projected Eski Mosul or Bekhme dams to 429,000 hectares in the Amara region. Another project, falling outside the Six-Year Plan, is a dam at Demir Kapu, on the Adhaim river, providing irrigation for 175,000 hectares, as well as electric power.

The total area which will be irrigated by the various projected schemes on the Tigris and its tributaries was estimated at 1.24 million hectares, and that by the Euphrates schemes at 560,000 hectares, a total of 1.8 million hectares. Work is also proceeding on the drainage of 233,000 hectares, and the Six-Year Plan provides for an expenditure of ID 23 million for land reclamation, agricultural research, afforestation, improvement of animal husbandry, filling swamps and marshes and various other schemes.

433 185 Industrial development plans aim at both increasing the output of consumer goods and utilizing Iraq's petroleum resources to produce certain basic products. A cotton spinning and weaving factory is under construction near Mosul; it will have 20,000 spindles, thus doubling the present capacity 1/ and is expected to produce 20 million square metres of cloth per annum; a sum of ID 3,115,000 has been allocated for the project. 2/ Some expansion and improvement is also taking place in the privately owned woollen and rayon industries. 3/ Cement plants are being built, or planned, by both the Government and private enterprise. The Government is setting up factories at Mosul and Sarchinar, with a daily capacity of 350 tons each; completion is scheduled for 1956 and costs are estimated at ID 2,200,000 and ID 3,115,000, respectively. 4/ In addition, a privately owned plant at Mosul with a capacity of 350 tons a day is scheduled for completion by July 1955, another privately owned plant, near Baghdad, is doubling its present capacity of 800 tons a day, and a third private plant, with a daily capacity of 700 tons, is to be established near Hindiya barrage. 5/ The completion of all

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1/ Salman, loc. cit.; existing capacity is privately owned.

2/ The Iraq Times, 5 February 1955 (Baghdad).

3/ Al Shaab, 28 February 1954 (Baghdad).

4/ The Iraq Times, 5 February 1955 (Baghdad).

5/ Ibid., 26 January 1955.

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these schemes would raise annual capacity to over a million tons. Other projects include a sugar factory using locally grown beets to produce 10,000 tons of sugar per annum and refine 25,000 tons of imported sugar, at an estimated cost of ID 1.78 million; a pilot paper plant; a glass factory; a rayon factory; and a tobacco factory. 1/ 433 185

The most important project connected with petroleum is a refinery with an annual capacity of one million tons, at Dora, near Baghdad. Completion was scheduled for 1955 and total costs have been estimated at ID 10.5 million. A pipeline supplying the refinery with crude petroleum, from Baiji, on the Euphrates west of Kirkuk, has been completed and five pipelines are under construction to carry the refined products to Baghdad and Um Al Adham. 2/ An asphalt refinery being built at Qayara, near Mosul, at a cost of ID 1.15 million, is expected to produce 60,000 tons of asphalt per annum, as well as 24,000 tons of gas oil. A smaller plant at Muftiya, near Basra, with an annual capacity of 6,000 tons, was scheduled to start operations at the beginning of 1955. 3/ A lubricating oil refinery has also been approved near Baghdad; it will produce 25,000 tons and cost 3.4 million. 433 382 315 185

The major project under consideration is that for utilizing natural gases from the Kirkuk oil wells to produce chemical fertilizers, cement, sulphur and electric power. Two alternative projects have been submitted, one of which would cost ID 33 million and produce 500,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizers, 200,000 tons of cement and 100,000 tons of sulphur, while the other would cost ID 20 million and produce half these quantities. 185 433

A survey of mineral resources is being carried out by a group of foreign consulting engineers. Negotiations are proceeding with a United States sulphur company regarding the exploitation of Iraq's sulphur deposits, which are believed to be large.

Other development projects include a highway and bridge building programme, the expansion of Baghdad airport and improvement of telecommunications. In addition, a large-scale building programme is under way, including hospitals, schools, low-cost housing and public buildings.

The new Five-Year Plan

The Ministry of Development and the Development Board have approved the new Five-Year Plan for the financial years 1955/56 to 1959/60. Subject to approval by Parliament, the plan calls for an estimated total expenditure of ID 303,306,100. Revenue estimates total ID 252,658,000. These are calculated on an estimated annual revenue of ID 43 million derived from a 70 per cent share of the oil receipts making a total of ID 215 million, plus a sum of about ID 38 million from previous years. The deficit of about ID 50 million is to be balanced by an anticipated increase in oil revenue during this period. 185

1/ The Iraq Times, 20 October 1954.

2/ Ibid., 6 December 1954.

3/ Ibid., 19 November 1954.

British forces for their own needs, in part acquired by the United 433
Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to Great Britain or 439
other territories, and in part exported by normal trade channels now regulated by export control. The date crop was still handled for export by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. The cotton which Japan ceased to take after 1941 was sent to India, but in quantities which high grain prices had much reduced; production touched 26,000 bales in 1940, but thereafter dropped for the next nine years to a fifth or even a tenth of that amount. Wool was sent to America, but with this and all other commodities both internal movement by land and water and the provision of shipping space from Baṣra presented difficult problems. A quantity of produce went by rail to the Levant and Turkey, and animals on the hoof, in years of good grazing, were sent to the British forces in Syria. The prices of all commodities were fixed in terms of imperious [435]
war necessity and of ever-growing 'Iraqi inflation, to which these prices contributed.

The import of manufactured articles and certain foodstuffs was 722
limited to quantities below the level of satisfaction, thanks to 434
reduced outputs in the supplying countries and to pressure on shipping space. Help was forthcoming more than once from American lend-lease stocks of drugs, metal goods, tyres, chemicals, and agricultural implements; Paiforce at times could help to meet an urgent shortage, and the British Government organized an emergency grain supply in 1942 from India and Canada; but, as in every country, abiding and irksome shortages remained, aggravated by maldistribution and by a habit of hoarding against which the law and public opinion strove equally in vain. The need at all costs to obtain supplies led to the urgent search for sources to replace Japan and other belligerents. An import licence system was established which, vastly profitable to some, worked with its share of imperfections and abuses; a price-fixing procedure was applied over a wide range of articles, with an attempted control of stocks enforced by occasional raids and prosecutions, but avoided by widespread black-market trading; and a rationing system, first applied to sugar in 1942, was extended next year to coffee and tea and later to cotton and woollen textiles. This control by ration-cards, based on imperfect tribal and urban lists, was a matter of extreme difficulty and gladly abandoned at the earliest moment; nor were the resulting stocks ever sufficient to admit an adequate allowance to the tribal public. Nevertheless, the rationing of essentials was both indispensable and attended with fair success. Late in 1944, in expectation of the war's end and by reaction from the attempted régime of universal close control in 1943–4, a policy of decontrol was substituted, and one commodity after another

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

722 434 was exempted from licensing and price-fixing. During 1945 all controls were discontinued as far as sterling-area commerce was concerned, and traders with one accord sought supplies from every quarter; but freedom of traffic was still hampered by shipping shortages, currency restrictions, and world-wide dearth of goods. 457 The country's requirements in 'hard' currencies, chiefly dollars, were met by an arrangement with Great Britain in March 1945, whereby sums up to the equivalent of $14 million could be converted from 'Iraq's accumulated sterling balances, an arrangement which was to be annually re-negotiated. The restricted convertibility of 'Iraq's own dinars into dollars remained incomprehensible to the public, as to publics everywhere.

722 647 In the task of economic control, which fell ultimately to the lot of local officials, helped, it might be, by the municipality or Chamber of Commerce, more than moderate results could not be expected from improvised systems based on no adequate statistics or machinery, and applied by unspecialized and impecunious officials to a puzzled and resentful public. The higher economic control of the territory, under a law repeatedly revised and productive of innumerable regulations, was placed originally in the hands of a Central Supply Committee, later in those of a smaller ministerial body, the High Supply Committee, which long survived the war. Many problems called for resolution at Cabinet level, where they multiplied disagreement between ministers. Departments of Transport, Imports and Local Resources, founded early in the war and served by British as well as 'Iraqi officials—Lloyd, Grice, le Blanc—were grouped early in 1944 under the Ministry of Supply established for the purpose; its first Adviser, Colonel P. Bayliss, after a few months of dynamic and impatient activity, retired through disagreement with his colleagues. An Anglo-American-'Iraqi Co-ordinating Committee lasted for a few months from midsummer 1944. Outside the territory, but concerned with its output and controlling foreign supplies to it, was the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, of which a conference attended by 'Iraqi delegates was held in Cairo in April 1944; and 'Iraq had in 1943 been toured, under M.E.S.C. auspices, by a Scientific Advisory Mission which produced the valuable reports of Dr. B. A. Keen and Dr. E. B. Worthington. The Centre performed important services in conditions where benevolent interterritory control was indispensable; it was, nevertheless, commonly blamed in 'Iraq for its meagre allocation of supplies, and its abolition late in 1945 was unregretted by 'Iraqis to whom their own country's needs were paramount, those of the Allies and of the War remote and meaningless. It was succeeded until 1947 by a Supply Mission which kept control of a few scarce items of supply.

654 433 [655 (c) Industrial enterprises being carried out directly by various Government departments and agencies such as the Iraqi State Railways, the Port of Basrah, the Ministry of Defence, the municipalities, and the recently set up State Oil Refinery Administration which has already undertaken the construction near Baghdad of an oil refinery with an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons of refined products, at an expected cost of about I.D. 7,000,000.

(d) Various handicrafts and semi-mechanised industries such as the date-packing industry.[1]

433 It need hardly be said that, although recent industrial development has been marked, it is still quite limited in relation to the economy as a whole and in comparison with industrial development in neighbouring areas. In Lebanon for instance, the industrial sector has been found to contribute approximately LL. 135 million, or 17 per cent of the total national income estimated at
●434 LL. 830 million.[2] In our estimation, the industrial sector in Iraq contributes no more than 10 per cent of the total national income estimated at I.D. 150 million.[3]

000 The problems arising from, and the difficulties standing in the way of, industrialisation in Iraq, will now be discussed.

Industrialisation in general means the introduction of modern industry into an area which has been up to that time dependent for its livelihood on agriculture, trade and craftsmanship. Such an area would have had no experience of mechanised industrial processes, the organisation of modern factories, the division of labour inside such factories, nor would it have any clear idea of the material and human resources that such organisations would demand. Assuming that industrialisation of such a "new" or underdeveloped area is a desirable thing, two sets of problems seem likely to emerge. The first set of problems is connected with the ways and means of developing industry with reasonable speed. The second set of problems relates to the psychological, social and political effects that modern industry brings about.

[1] For a brief but fairly comprehensive survey of industrial output and possibilities in Iraq see: *The Economic Development of Iraq.* Report of a mission organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. p. 148-50, also Annex D. p. 277 and following.

[2] *National Income of Lebanon, Monograph No. 3* by Albert Y. Badre, Ph. D., and Asad Y. Nasr, M.A., Beirut, Lebanon, May 1953. Especially p. 24.

[3] The ratio for more advanced countries is between 30 and 40 per cent.

438 [365] more attractive for industry than other areas can be corrected by proper action. First and foremost is the relative cheapness of power and fuel in Baghdad. The cost of the electric power unit in most cities is double that of Baghdad and rarely is a municipality-owned plant able to supply sufficient power to industry. The cost of oil fuel is at least ten percent higher outside Baghdad. The correction of these factors, together with a more equal distribution of educational, housing, transport and social welfare facilities, could greatly relieve the situation. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry could also be amended so as to give additional concessions for industries established in other parts of the country. The cost of labour and land is already becoming burdensome for industry in Baghdad. This, in addition to the social evil of overcrowdedness, calls for immediate consideration.

● 434 (4) **Limitation of Markets**: A newly industrialised country can hardly hope to find foreign markets for its finished products. It has to depend on its home market. The market in Iraq, with its small population (about 5 million inhabitants), of low purchasing power (annual income per head is estimated at between £ 20 and £ 30 or $85), affords very limited scope for large-scale industry. Many of the industries studied at one time by the Industrial Bank, such as the making of artificial silk fibres, the manufacture of paper and cardboard from straw, and the printing of cotton piece-goods, had to be abandoned because the smallest economic unit of these plants is much beyond the capacity of the Iraqi market to support. This situation will no doubt improve as the whole economy of the coun-
439 try expands. But it should be possible to deal with this situation
648 more effectively by joint action on the part of the Arab States, along lines already discussed at high political level. These discussions have had the object of reducing or abolishing inter-state tariff barriers so as to make the whole area one market. Such an action is indeed vital to the progress and prosperity of these countries and their peoples. It should be remembered that before World War I, these countries formed one economic and political unit under the Ottoman Empire.

464 (5) **Labour, Technical Staff and Management Problems**: The supply of ordinary labour, owing to the high rate of population increase (estimated to be one and a half per cent per annum) and emigration from country to town, is quite sufficient and will remain so

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

457 certain extent, this has been financed by a net drawing on Iraq's sterling balances, but the most important source of finance has been the oil companies. During the last three years they have transferred to Iraq an average of nearly £10,000,000 in sterling annually. Part of this consists of royalties and other contractual payments paid to the government and subsequently spent by it, mainly on projects in the capital budget. The larger part, however, has been transferred to pay for current expenses of the oil companies for production, construction projects and exploration. These expenditures have directly or indirectly provided income for the people, which in turn has created a demand for imported goods; the foreign exchange has provided the means to pay for them. Thus the activities of the oil companies can be said to have both caused and financed a large part of the gap.

654x The same process will continue as expenditure by the Develop-
439 ment Board rises. The Mission envisages that this may reach
457 ID 50,000,000 in about five years' time. Some imports of materials or machinery will result directly from the requirements of the program. The balance of the Board's expenditures will, however, be for the most part made in Iraq. The large quantity of money, which will thereby be put into circulation, will pass from hand to hand and most of it will eventually be spent on imports. This means that in the next five years imports can be expected to increase by a large proportion of the ID 50,000,000 to be spent by the Development Board. At the least, the value of imports is likely to be double what it has been in the last few years.

654x The magnitude of the program and its effect on the economy
434 may also be illustrated by consideration of the national income. The national income of Iraq in 1949 was estimated by the Statistical Office of the United Nations at a figure in dollars equivalent to either ID 100,000,000 or ID 150,000,000, depending on the exchange rate. On the basis of some rough and incomplete calculations the Mission estimates that the actual figure probably fell near the middle of this range. It may now be nearer the upper end, since the price and the volume of production of some commodities, especially cotton, has greatly increased and some industrial expansion has taken place. Thus an increase in the government's annual income from oil of ID 50,000,000 would alone be equivalent to at

least one third of the national income. Subsequently, of course, 654x
part of this income is used to pay for labor, transport and materials 434
inside Iraq, and then spent again by those who receive these payments, thus generating a further increase in income among the people. The size of the total addition to the national income cannot be forecast, but it is certain to be substantial.

The size of the program can also be gauged in terms of man- 654x
power. The Mission has not attempted to make a detailed estimate 464
of the quantity of labor which will be required to fulfill the program, much less the numbers who will find employment as a result of the higher level of economic activity. But an example will serve to illustrate the orders of magnitude involved. If 100,000 additional workers found employment as a result of the program at an average annual wage of ID 100, this would mean an expenditure on labor of ID 10,000,000, which would be only one fifth of the ID 50,000,000 the Development Board may ultimately spend per year on the projects themselves. Since these Development Board expenditures would, in turn, generate expansion in activity and employment in transport, industry and commerce, a figure of 100,000 cannot be regarded as excessive. It is, of course, not intended as a forecast. The actual figure may be considerably higher or lower, depending, to some extent, on how much machinery is used on the construction projects. But it will serve as an order of magnitude for the number of new jobs which may be created and which would have to be filled by the unemployed, by new additions to the labor force such as the increase in population, or by people shifted from their existing occupations. As such it may be compared with the current labor force outside of agriculture, which, on the basis of the information available to it, the Mission believes is probably not more than half a million.

Thus, on these various hypotheses, great changes can be 654x
expected which will affect the whole pattern of life. The national income will increase at a rate which, though not unparalleled, can certainly be considered exceptional. Large shifts in employment will occur as a consequence. The import trade will grow rapidly and with it, for example, customs revenues and the revenues of the Railways and the Port of Basra. It remains to examine the possible effects of these changes.

654* 464 exteremely primitive and new machines—sometimes merely a simple power tool—would greatly reduce the requirements for labor. On the land, especially, there are a number of areas where there is a heavy concentration of fellahin working small plots with the crudest tools. Mechanization, even of a simple kind, could easily make good the loss of a part of this labor. In fact, in some parts of the country, landlords are reluctant to mechanize for fear of displacing their fellahin. Thus a moderate rise in wages would improve the lot of those who take employment on the development projects and should also provide incentive to industrial and agricultural employers to give more productive and remunerative employment to those who remain.

One point should be stressed at this stage concerning the drain of manpower from the land. To the extent that this drain consists of "surplus" manpower which is already grossly underemployed, the drain can be considered a welcome change for the better. If conditions do not improve on the land, however, the drain might reach proportions which would endanger the future of agricultural production. It is notoriously easy to attract people away from the land with the promise of better opportunities and almost impossible to draw them back once they have left. Improvement in the lot of the fellah is therefore of vital importance.

654* 434 As wages may rise, so may certain prices. Demand will greatly increase, but it is as much its incidence as its volume that matters. If a liberal import policy is followed, there should be no pressure on the price of such imported goods as textiles and sugar, although, of course, changes in world prices cannot be avoided. As incomes increase, greater pressure can be expected on some local products, whose supply cannot be quickly increased and which can only be imported for considerably higher prices. In this category fall a number of foods, especially meat and other animal products such as milk and ghee. Some improvement in supply will occur as a result of diversion from exports, but this possibility is limited. In the short run, at least, somewhat higher prices for these commodities should be accepted as the price of a generally higher standard of living for the mass of the people. The same may be true of fruit (other than dates), the supply of which cannot increase until such time as newly planted trees come into bearing. The production of

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 *MH1 Iraq MH1

vegetables, on the other hand, can be increased more readily and a tendency for prices to rise will probably induce an increase in output fairly quickly. 654* 434

There will also be considerable changes in incomes. Increased or more remunerative employment would of course benefit a large number of workers. Many agricultural workers are likely to benefit. As a result of the greatly increased activity in the import trade, merchants are likely to be very prosperous. In certain localities housing shortages may develop, thus permitting landlords to raise their rents. On the other hand, some classes, particularly civil servants and others employed at fixed salaries, may stand to lose owing to higher prices of some of their essential needs.

It will be an important task of the government to insure that these changes do not result in an inequitable shift in the distribution of incomes. This may be achieved in various ways: by export taxes on agricultural commodities whenever prices rise substantially; by changes in the rates of import duties, the burden of which at present falls heavily on the poorer classes; by raising the exemption limit for income taxes and by enforcing stricter assessment and collection in the higher brackets; or by an increase in allowances to civil servants. The Mission does not recommend specific remedies for a situation whose nature can only be forecast in general terms. It would stress, however, the need to keep a careful watch on the nature of the changes that the economy is undergoing. The Mission therefore recommends strongly that a committee be formed consisting of the proposed economic adviser to the Development Board and high-level representatives of the National Bank and the Ministries of Finance and Economics. This group would recommend directly to the Council of Ministers the adoption of timely measures aimed at checking any dangerous inflationary trends and at offsetting any tendency toward gross inequities in the distribution of income.

No mention has yet been made of the possibility of loss of foreign exchange by the National Bank as a result of the development program. In itself the program cannot cause an increase in expenditure on imports in excess of the outlay on the development program. In fact, as there will be some need on the part of individuals or organizations to hold larger cash balances, they will save 654* 457

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

literacy in the country is a fair guide to the extent to which the 212 Iraqi can be considered educated. According to the census, which recorded the literacy of all those of five years of age or over, literacy in Baghdad among males over five was over 40 percent; in the smaller towns of the province it was about 30 percent and in the villages only 10 percent. These figures are probably well above the average. Cities like Basra and Kirkuk have a male literacy nearer 30 percent, but in many rural *nahiyas* it is five percent or less and in the remoter *nahiyas* of the North as low as two percent.

Literacy is much lower among women than among men. In the cities of Baghdad and Mosul, the proportion of literate females over five was about 20 percent (about half that of the males). Outside of the larger cities, however, female education hardly exists. The proportion of female literates in the rural areas and the smaller towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Basra and Baghdad provinces barely exceeds one percent.

It is not known how literacy was defined in the census, but even if these figures represent a real ability to read and understand rather than a smattering of education, it is clear that illiteracy is a great handicap to even the simplest form of written instruction. In industry this is apt to put a heavy burden of detailed work on the management of a factory. In agriculture it gives little possibility of supplementing the limited amount of oral instruction or visual demonstration which the present agricultural service can render.

III. The Standard of Living

No systematic estimate of the national income has yet been 434 made. A rough estimate by the Statistical Office of the United 511 Nations put the income per head in 1949 at $85. The equivalent in dinars would depend on the exchange rate chosen for conversion, which is necessarily an arbitrary choice; at the old rate, it would be about ID 20, at the new ID 30. The Mission attempted to make an estimate of the national product, but the information

434 511 available to it was often unreliable, if not actually conflicting, and, in certain fields, data were completely lacking. The attempt was, therefore, abandoned, but it was at least possible to draw the conclusion that the estimate quoted above was approximately correct and that the total income per head probably fell somewhere between ID 20 and ID 30.

511 In any event, a broad estimate of this kind which embraces both the very high incomes of the landowners and the very low incomes of the fellahin can do little more than convey a generalized impression of poverty. While it is not possible to give even a rough idea of the distribution of incomes in statistical terms, some description of the standard of living of the people may be of value.

Agriculture, which is the most important occupation in Iraq, is also the most difficult to describe, conditions being extremely varied and information virtually nonexistent. However, a hypothetical example of the condition of a fellah in the irrigation zone, where barley is the principal crop, may serve as a rough guide. In this zone a fellah, who cultivates 25 donums of winter crops annually, is probably above the average. Estimates of yields vary enormously, even apart from the annual variation due to water supply. Landowners tend to give a high estimate (e.g., 500 kilograms per donum), because they believe that the fellahin withhold part of the crop in order to obtain a larger share. This is probably true and accounts for the tendency of the fellah to give a low estimate (e.g., 200 kg). Apart from this, the land varies greatly in quality, pump-irrigated land being generally more productive. The fellah, however, gets a smaller share on pump land.

A yield of 300 kg on flow-irrigated land would probably not be much below average, if at all. The total crop on 25 donums would then be 7.5 tons. Of this the fellah would probably get as his share two fifths or three tons, out of which he has to retain seed for the next year and to pay for some help with the threshing and harvesting, in all amounting to one half to one ton more. The balance would thus be two to two and a half tons. His family might consist of five or six people, including himself, his wife and children, and one or two other relatives such as his parents or an unmarried sister. The minimum retained for food would be one ton and, in practice, it is probably more. He would thus have

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

overhead, increased maintenance and the need for a higher level of 464
skilled workers. As long as labor is in sufficient supply, it will 433
be better to use the available amount of capital to mechanize a considerable number of plants to a limited degree rather than to establish a few highly mechanized plants.

Limited internal markets, because of a small population of 434
low purchasing power, restrict the number of industries which may be economically justified unless the product can be produced cheaply enough to find a foreign market. This condition, however, would be corrected to some extent through a rising standard of living, especially among the rural population. Improved methods of farming, increased irrigation, better sanitation and more intensive education should help to raise purchasing power gradually. As government measures to these ends begin to take hold, industry can expect the demand for consumer goods to increase at a much faster rate.

Iraq's geographic location is also a factor to be taken into 433
account in planning industrial development. High transportation costs handicap those industries requiring the importation of a high percentage of raw materials from Europe and America. The same obstacle will, of course, confront industries relying chiefly on European markets for their finished product. The best prospects for industrial growth are therefore found in those industries which, through advantageous production costs, are able to absorb the shipping costs or those in which shipping costs represent a very minor component of the market price of their product.

II. Possibilities for Industrial Development

Expansion of Existing Industries

Many industries, such as brewing, cement making and woolen textiles, are now in the process of expansion. Partly because of tax exemptions and reductions granted by the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, these enterprises are able to finance their expansion themselves. Other enterprises which can usefully be

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647 652 185 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the direct beneficiaries. It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenues resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

OUU 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the close of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of the departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralized and made available more directly and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

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642 131 161 ●434 423 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income per capita does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate the distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary of tribal chiefs.

433 185 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

657 185 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing the standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
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871 progress, discouraging both to the educators and to the Iraqi people, reflects on the possibilities of development, which in the final analysis depend on the general educational level of the population. To be sure, in the period 1930-1950 the number of schools rose from 262 to 1,100, the number of pupils from 32,750 to 175,000, and the number of primary school teachers from 1,325 to 6,588; nevertheless, out of about 750,000 children of school age only 175,000 were in schools; the percentage of drop-outs as the children advanced to the higher grades was so large as to cause real alarm. The facilities and quality of technical and vocational education were woefully deficient, and adult education was almost completely neglected. As to the quality of the educational program, the Mission stated: "Educational concepts are far too narrow and too little related to everyday problems of living." But what was most alarming was the fact that as late as 1951 about 90 per cent of the total population was still illiterate.[10]

● 434 Though possessing so much land, so much water, and considerable revenue from oil, Iraq's standard of living was fairly low. Annual per capita income was estimated in 1949 at about $84 and not much higher in 1953.[11] This compared with $140 for Lebanon, $100 for Syria, $125 for Turkey, $100 for Egypt, and $389 for Israel.

433 [654] Industrial growth advanced at a very slow pace. In order to stimulate the establishment of industry, the Government passed a law in 1929 granting tax relief and other concessions to those who would develop industrial projects, but almost twenty years later the United States Department of Commerce reported that the development of manufacturing industries was still in the embryonic stage.[12] In 1949 it was reported that in spite of the impetus given to local production by the shortage of import goods during the war, Iraq's industries were still underdeveloped.[13] In 1951 the International Bank Mission reported that industry was little developed; that exclusive of those employed by the oil companies, 60,000 workers were engaged in

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[10] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 62-63; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry* (London), Sept., 1953, 93.

[11] U. N., *Review 1949-50*, 12; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.

[12] U. S., Dept. of Commerce, *International Reference Service*, Dec., 1948, 3.

[13] Great Britain, *Iraq*, 16.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to 563 whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which 439 had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Pro- 435 ● duce prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent, and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was 471 awarded by the Baṣra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs. Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil refinery. A concession for the oil of Baṣra wilaya—more strictly, of all 'Iraq-territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—was granted in 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc* creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a [453] branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited 647 for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience, J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in 1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from the Financial Advisership in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on 648× bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial treaty was signed with the United States, though American Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman. Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary. The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

British forces for their own needs, in part acquired by the United 433
Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to Great Britain or 439
other territories, and in part exported by normal trade channels now regulated by export control. The date crop was still handled for export by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. The cotton which Japan ceased to take after 1941 was sent to India, but in quantities which high grain prices had much reduced; production touched 26,000 bales in 1940, but thereafter dropped for the next nine years to a fifth or even a tenth of that amount. Wool was sent to America, but with this and all other commodities both internal movement by land and water and the provision of shipping space from Baṣra presented difficult problems. A quantity of produce went by rail to the Levant and Turkey, and animals on the hoof, in years of good grazing, were sent to the British forces in Syria.
The prices of all commodities were fixed in terms of imperious [435] •
war necessity and of ever-growing 'Iraqi inflation, to which these prices contributed.

The import of manufactured articles and certain foodstuffs was 722
limited to quantities below the level of satisfaction, thanks to 434
reduced outputs in the supplying countries and to pressure on shipping space. Help was forthcoming more than once from American lend-lease stocks of drugs, metal goods, tyres, chemicals, and agricultural implements; Paiforce at times could help to meet an urgent shortage, and the British Government organized an emergency grain supply in 1942 from India and Canada; but, as in every country, abiding and irksome shortages remained, aggravated by maldistribution and by a habit of hoarding against which the law and public opinion strove equally in vain. The need at all costs to obtain supplies led to the urgent search for sources to replace Japan and other belligerents. An import licence system was established which, vastly profitable to some, worked with its share of imperfections and abuses; a price-fixing procedure was applied over a wide range of articles, with an attempted control of stocks enforced by occasional raids and prosecutions, but avoided by widespread black-market trading; and a rationing system, first applied to sugar in 1942, was extended next year to coffee and tea and later to cotton and woollen textiles. This control by ration-cards, based on imperfect tribal and urban lists, was a matter of extreme difficulty and gladly abandoned at the earliest moment; nor were the resulting stocks ever sufficient to admit an adequate allowance to the tribal public. Nevertheless, the rationing of essentials was both indispensable and attended with fair success. Late in 1944, in expectation of the war's end and by reaction from the attempted régime of universal close control in 1943–4, a policy of decontrol was substituted, and one commodity after another

Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic 722
internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable 647
lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of
M.E.S.C.

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the 722
abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living 511
standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was 435
almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation
had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly de-
teriorated. A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military
expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Govern-
ment had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced
regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and
distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of
living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939.
The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then six- 652
fold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, 435
happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it
from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt
strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation,
or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save
on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but
unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of
gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government
could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement,
thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was
achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs,
already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions
in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society
scarcely healthier.

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. 652
The three years 1941–3, in spite of high costs, showed useful sur-
pluses; foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were
made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully.
But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government
revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services
and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied.
Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million
in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq
approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The
separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Baṣra were
highly prosperous throughout the war.

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

for three or four days. In packing and grading, growers do not 249
separate the bottom, middle and top leaves or take care that pack- 655
ing takes place only when the moisture content and the pliability of the leaves are just right.

The second reason for the poor quality is inadequate grading and manipulation by the Monopoly. Tobacco is graded for the Monopoly by committees whose members are generally untrained. Classification is by color only and a bale given a single grade often has tobacco ranging through all shades of green, yellow and brown. Influential cultivators, or merchants acting on their behalf, can often obtain grades for their tobacco unwarranted by its merits. Thus the grading system offers little or no incentive to the grower to produce the best possible tobacco. Finally, the Monopoly stores tobacco under conditions which contribute to its rapid deterioration. Warehouses are often exposed to the elements and are with- [488]
out temperature and humidity control so that tobacco may alternately ferment and dry out. Little re-grading or manipulation is done in warehouses.

Farmer Income from Tobacco

Whether the Kurdish farmers have on the whole obtained an 249
adequate income from tobacco is less easy to determine. Their 435 ●
income from tobacco has depended on (1) the amount of tobacco 655
purchased from each year's crop by the Monopoly and the prices (less *istihlak* and land tax) paid, and (2) the amount of tobacco sold illicitly and the prices realized thereon. Unfortunately, not enough data are available to permit an estimate of the income of tobacco farmers. Data on prices paid by the Monopoly for the first three years of its operation are lacking; figures on total tobacco production, from which the amount marketed illicitly might be deduced, do not exist; and little or nothing is known about the prices realized on tobacco marketed illegally.

During the war the Monopoly, which was supposed to equate the supply of tobacco with demand by licensing the area under cultivation, apparently made no real effort to use licensing as an instrument for the restriction of production. The area licensed rose steadily from 28,014 donums in 1940 to a peak of 71,730 in 1944. In the period 1943-45 the income of farmers was also considerably

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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increased by classifying a much larger proportion of their output as "extra" or "first" grades which, of course, fetched higher prices. At the same time the Monopoly boosted the prices paid for the 1944 crop to a level more than twice as high as those which had prevailed for the 1943 crop. For the 1945 crop it lowered its prices somewhat but still maintained them at a level approximately twice as high as in 1943. As a result the Kurdish farmers reaped a bonanza. Whereas the Monopoly paid only ID 634,005 for the 1943 crop, it disbursed ID 3,208,032 for the 1944 crop and ID 3,608,997 for the 1945 crop (see table).

TABLE 1

LICENSING AND PURCHASING OPERATIONS OF THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY

Year	Donums Licensed	Prices Paid for Each Grade (1943 = 100)				Total Purchases	
		Extra	First	Second	Third	Quantity (kg)	Value (dinars)
1943	57,747	100	100	100	100	4,080,787	634,005
1944	71,730	247	233	229	250	8,863,022	3,208,032
1945	34,797	210	198	194	211	12,582,734	3,608,997
1946	26,818	140	151	183	214	4,395,166	746,499
1947	19,225	154	167	202	236	4,231,320	757,152
1948	15,500	140	151	183	214	4,347,639	772,729
1949	15,500	140	151	183	214	6,621,905	1,326,291
1950	16,000	140	151	183	214	n.a.	n.a.

Beginning in 1946 the Monopoly began to retrench sharply. The area licensed was reduced successively to 19,225 donums in 1947 and 15,500 in 1948, and it has since been held to approximately this level. Prices were also lowered to some extent. Most important of all, a stricter grading policy was adopted, resulting since 1946 in the virtual elimination of purchases of the "extra" grade and substantial reduction in the proportion of "first" grade tobacco purchased. As a result the Monopoly's disbursements for purchases from the 1946 crop fell to only ID 746,499. They have since been maintained at approximately this annual level except for the amount paid for the 1949 crop which amounted to ID 1,326,291. The quantity purchased of each year's crop fell from a peak of 12,600,000 kilograms in 1945 to about 4,400,000 in 1946,

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

4,200,000 in 1947, 4,300,000 in 1948, and rose again to 6,600,000 249
in 1949. Actually, the Monopoly by no means fully enforced its 435
announced policy of buying no more than the maximum amount 655
that the licensed area could ostensibly produce.[4] Its purchases exceeded the ostensible maximum by about 400,000 kilos for the 1947 crop, 1,200,000 for the 1948 crop and as much as 3,500,000 for the 1949 crop. Much of the 1946, 1947 and 1948 crops evidently found their way into the black market.

Because of the danger of growing stocks, the Director-General, supported by the Prime Minister, issued a warning in advance of the 1950 crop that in the future no more tobacco would be bought than could be produced on the licensed area. Evidently the Monopoly carried out this policy for, up to April 12, 1951, it had bought only 2,250,000 kilos from the 1950 crop out of a theoretical total of 3,200,000 kilos. Since the cultivators apparently did not take the government's declared intention seriously, the actual crop substantially exceeded the permissible total. However, farmers were apparently compelled to sell their surplus illicitly at very low prices, thus giving rise to an expectation that in the next years the limitation on production will be more generally observed. If so, it seems likely that farmers' receipts from tobacco will amount to between ID 600,000 and ID 700,000 per year at prevailing Monopoly prices.

In general, it can probably be said that farmers received more for their tobacco than they would have obtained in the absence of the Monopoly. Since the tobacco produced is generally poor and therefore is unable to find foreign outlets, it is likely that, in the absence of the Monopoly's price support and production control program, prices would have been substantially lower. At the same time, the farmers suffered from the rather erratic policies of the Monopoly which permitted them to realize very high incomes during some of the war years and let them down suddenly immediately after the war.

Tobacco Monopoly Revenues

The government has undoubtedly enjoyed considerable income 651
from the Monopoly. In any discussion of this subject a distinction 655

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[4] The Monopoly has operated on the assumption that each licensed donum would produce up to a maximum of 200 kg. of tobacco.

185 well as many western food products, such as candies and
177 fancy crackers. The country is lighted by kerosene oil,
much of which comes from America. Numbers of automobiles
are to be seen, and in some places even electric
lights. All these things represent the gratification of
wants that did not exist previous to the entrance of western
influence.

439 There has also been a development of the export trade
311 of the country. However, the articles for export are not
many nor of great amount. Dates are the principal product,
together with a certain amount of wheat and rice
and some hides and wool. In the long run, of course, no
more can be brought into the country than is sent out of
it, and the trade of Mesopotamia cannot increase to any
great figure until her own natural resources are developed.

000 Just how far these various modern improvements will
go remains to be seen. If the British continue in power,
there is no doubt that material development will be steady
and sound. If they evacuate the country and leave it to
an independent local government, progress will be much
435 slower, to say the least. During the war wages went up
511 to fabulous heights, and although prices of food and rent
177 advanced even more, there is no doubt that the sum
total of the war's influence was to raise the standard of
185 living in the cities and to stimulate enormously the desire
for many western products and for western education.
Just now there has been a very sharp reaction; times are
hard, work is scarce, wages are poor. Everything western
is discounted, and the cry is for an independent national
development with the elimination of every foreign
000 influence. The common people long for the golden days
of the Turks, forgetting with a completeness quite as-

433 made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-[501] craft, of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These, with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq distillation and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the meagre list.

439 457 The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). To it as an 'invisible export' should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—life-blood of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

439 Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory consisted of the import of those needed commodities which the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed through Basra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales, coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France, and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes, were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

436 The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper qirsh (piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a stable coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian rupee in Baṣra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns and Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. A multitude of local 804 weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district. 453 Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by the shrewd operations of many local *ṣarrafs*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 battalion, and to the men's return to the sluggish pauperization of Ba'quba.

871 The Education branch, founded and first inspired by Major H. E. Bowman, was faced with the problem of providing schooling for the youth of 'Iraq in the absence of funds, buildings, books, equipment or teachers in a tithe of sufficient quantities. At a pace always disappointing, but the fastest financially or functionally practicable, primary schools aiming at fair standards were opened to a total of seventy-five by the end of 1919. Fifty-six of these taught in Arabic, eleven in Turkish, seven in Kurdish, one in Persian. The new-founded Teachers' Training College could supply but a part of their urgent needs, and the scale of secondary classes, confined to the three principal cities, was regrettably humble; nor was the country-wide penetration of 'politics' into the schools, thus early, less to be deplored. Means were found to reopen the Law School, and a commercial and a technical school. The many privately-conducted Mullās' schools, archaic in method, scope, and equipment, continued to produce a bare literacy in their thousands of pupils; but the temptation to multiply inferior Government schools was resisted, and the teaching of English almost wholly withheld in spite of a general clamour for it. Upon the desirability of girls' schools, Muslim opinion was at first divided; five, all primary, had been opened by the first weeks of 1920. The schools of the local Christian and Jewish minorities and those of the foreign missions were fostered by support and subsidy; some of these were of high standard. Some archaeological work was carried out by R. Campbell Thompson at Abu Shahrayn (Eridu) in the spring of 1918, and more under H. R. Hall at Ur and elsewhere in 1919.

204 Printing-presses were operating at Najf in 1918, at Sulaymaniya in 1919, and in Baṣra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the occupation of these places. Newspapers in English were published at Baghdad and Baṣra, in Arabic at those cities and Mosul, in Turkish at Kirkuk, in Kurdish at Sulaymaniya.

439 The great increase of goods entering 'Iraq in 1918–19 taxed
the young Customs administration of C. R. Watkins and Major
A. G. H. Sievwright to the utmost. It was due to cessation of
imports into north Persia from Russia, to the increase of 'Iraq's
own spending power, and to the general depletion of stocks by war
● [436] interruption. The Indian rupee, now the universal currency of
'Iraq, supplied an adequate medium; and the rising volume of
[504] civilian traffic could be handled easily by the now fully developed
Port of Baṣra, which as such came into existence under Colonel J. C.
Ward in the autumn of 1919 and was soon afterwards transferred
000 to the Civil Administration. The Railways, when at their greatest

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 Acting Adviser, and thereafter by E. G. Hogg, from the Sudan, in 1931. Hedgcock and the present writer left the Ministry in 1930 and 1931. Provision for Capital Works under a five-year plan was separated from the current budget, and a main part of the oil revenues, which first accrued in 1932, was allotted to this object. An Economic Advisory Board was set up. Chambers of Commerce were founded in Baghdad and Baṣra. A second advisory visit by Hilton Young, the 'Iraqis' financial consultant of 1925, was paid in 1930, and other foreign experts—notably A. Sainsbury, expert in income tax—assisted in the institution of new taxation and the [651] fixing of civil service establishments. Income tax in modern form was first imposed in 1928, but proved relatively unproductive; in effect it was paid mainly by officials and foreign companies. A major change in the taxation of agricultural produce was made in 1931, based on a new system of tax collection at markets—the 'place of consumption' method—without the need to assess or measure the growing crops. A financial Inspectorate was introduced. Efforts both resolute and skilful were made in 1927 to free 'Iraq from the burden of its share of the Ottoman Debt, of which £ (Turkish) 7 million had fallen to its share, with a further £T2,500,000 of accumulated interest. The Minister of Finance arranged to buy Ottoman Debt securities in the open market and, after handing these to the Debt authority to an extent of £1,228,000 sterling, could arrange to pay off the small remainder by instalments. Thus, at the cost of finding funds from current revenue for debt extinction, the State could enter the League happily unencumbered.

652 The proposed foundation of a National Bank, often discussed, ● 436 was still postponed. The Indian rupee currency, which had served 'Iraq well for fifteen years, was superseded early in 1932 by an 'Iraqi currency employing the dinar (equivalent to a pound sterling), divided into a thousand fils. Currency resources and the note issue were supervised by a Board in London, and rested on a basis of sterling assets. The confident reception of the new currency was the more gratifying as 'Iraq suffered not only temporarily from a number of 'slump' bankruptcies, but chronically from an adverse 437 trade balance. A wide visible gap existed between the value of its 439 exports and that of its unavoidable imports of fuel, manufactured articles, and some foods. The invisible exports which were assumed to fill the gap were the expenditure by the British forces, diplomatic and archaeological missions, charities and foreign schools, pilgrims, tourists and foreign companies, and the profits of the Persian transit trade. The progressive slackening of the last mentioned, in spite of lowered transit dues, was a serious feature of the times. Persian restrictions, Russian competition, the diversion of

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439
Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable
impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453
varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656
shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by
insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies,
by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly
in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking.
The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436
in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. 652
The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in
some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern 185
multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still
prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped
to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were
the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private
cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291
served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced
Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi
sidara in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with
ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises men- 433
tioned on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had
little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged
with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette
factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-
room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was
planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of con-
fectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin
Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts,
failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an
English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382
significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies
(p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of
more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter
the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 439
'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made
by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese
governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by
way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of
a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both
Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of
small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's
foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must
seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's
size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness
and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry,
and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But
the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to
date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase
both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the 453
exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to
trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance
facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies,
and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project
designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on
the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the 436 ●
National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar
based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not
without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and
patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and 241
was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. [162]
Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi
farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to 185
solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide
ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there
were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems
were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of
a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with
politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the
interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning
public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal
shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here
and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient
methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting.
New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping
installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing
dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175* 727* ●434 The introduction of Indian currency followed naturally on the coming of the Expeditionary Force, whose needs were paid for in rupees. A proclamation forbade the use of depreciated Turkish paper money[1], and the inadequate supply of small Turkish coins was driven from the bazaars. Turkish gold *liras*, however, continued to circulate, but their import and export were regulated.

Establishment of a Judicial System

175* 727* 671 For the administration of civil and criminal justice, a special code, known as the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code,[2] was created largely from laws in force in India.[3] The Code, promulgated August 1st, 1915, from which time the legal system of the Occupied Territories may be said to date,[4] established courts for the enforcement of civil rights by legal action, hitherto in abeyance, and criminal courts to supplement the military courts. These courts, functioning under the authority of the General Officer Commanding, were supervised by Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, and by Captain C. F. Mackenzie, Junior Judicial Officer, both of whom were members of the Indian Political Department.

Among the reasons put forward for the substitution of the Anglo-Indian Judicial system for that of the Turkish system, were the impossibility of reproducing within a limited time the hierarchy of courts culminating in the Court of Cassation at Constantinople, the inability to find judges and officials familiar with the Turkish system, as well as other reasons already given

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[1] *Proclamations, notices, etc., relating to the Civil Admin. . . . issued between December 22, 1916, and July 1st, 1918* (Baghdad, 1918), Proc. No. 1, December 22nd, 1916.

[2] *'Iraq Occupied Territories Code*, 1915 (Bombay, 1915). Also six supplements to December 31st, 1918 (hereafter '*I.O.T. Code*).

[3] A preliminary schedule of thirty-four Indian Acts to be applied in the Occupied Territories was annexed to the Code.

[4] Arrangements to reconstitute the courts had begun shortly after the appointment of the Senior Judicial Officer, April 7, 1915.

1-[British Expeditionary Force in 1915 - Analyst]

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 MI Middle East

Iraq MIII

acumen has nevertheless been lost and although the situation 453 has been partly restored, business is still less active than formerly.

Banking deposits in December of 1938, 1946, and subsequent years have been as follows (ID):

Year	*Current Accounts*	*Fixed Deposits*	*Savings Deposits*	*Total*
1938	1,231,130	614,928	387,447	2,233,505
1946	13,613,737	3,414,557	2,965,756	19,994,050
1947	12,543,308	2,799,008	2,719,224	18,061,541
1948	12,253,822	1,421,109*	2,302,416	15,977,347
1949	12,271,965	1,322,216	2,389,604	15,983,785
1950	12,994,226	795,361	1,980,305	15,769,892

* From 1948 onwards the fixed deposit item excludes previously included Government accounts.

(SOURCE: Reports of National Bank of Iraq, 1947–50, p. 32.)

Currency. The currency of Iraq is based on sterling and its 436 unit, the Iraqi dinar (ID), is equivalent to £1 sterling and is divided into 1,000 fils (singular also 'fils'). This currency replaced in 1932 the Indian currency which had been maintained under the Mandate, and was issued and administered by an Iraq Currency Board, sitting in London, until 1 July 1949, when the National Bank of Iraq took over the functions of the Board and put its own notes into circulation.

The circulation of currency, which in August 1939 stood at ID4,700,000, increased during the war to ID42,100,000 in September 1946. It has since, with some fluctuation, declined and in October 1952 was ID36 million.

Public Finance

Immediately before the Second World War the total state 651 revenues amounted to some 7–8 million dinars. During and 652 after the war there was a steep rise in expenditure: in 1942–3 the expenditure had increased to ID11·6 million, in 1947–8 to ID26·6 million, and in 1948–9, the year of the Palestine conflict, to ID32 million, after which it has declined slightly. Loans were raised to meet the consequent deficit, which a considerable increase in taxes and duties were insufficient to prevent and which in 1948–9 had risen to ID5·3 million. A contributory factor was the closure of the Haifa oil pipeline in that year; but in 1949 and 1950 the construction of a new pipeline to Tripoli more than made up the loss. In 1950–1, with increased revenue and a drop in expenditure, the budget showed a surplus for the first time in seven years, amounting to ID5·4 million. The expansion of oil revenues has been maintained by

Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
315 Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
[496] works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-
owned Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

I-I
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925

to be petrified fruits; the name they bear in Delhi, Pathar-ka-ber, signifies the fruits or stones of the jujube tree. The stones are oval, pointed at both ends, 3.5 cm. long and 2 cm. in diameter. They contain 95 per cent of calcium carbonate. These stones are sold all over northern India, Iran, Syria, and Palestine. They are said to be useful for healing wounds, and, internally, for flatulence and diarrhea.

Cypraea moneta L. (Gastropoda)

صدف

Sadaf, Wuda (Ar.); Khar mahra (Pers.); Cowri, Sipi (Hind.); cowrie shells.

Field 269A.

These well-known porcelaneous shells from the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf are used throughout the East for making ornaments, and at one time were a means of barter or medium of exchange. They consist chiefly of calcium carbonate, and in medicine are used as an antacid, alterative, and expectorant. The shells also serve as charms against the Evil Eye for babies, horses, and machines (H. F.).

[321]
[301]
[436] ●

Larinus maculatus Fald. (Coleoptera)

Yielding Tréhala manna; described under the name of the host-plant, *Echinops persicus.*

Bee's wax (Hymenoptera, Apoidea)

موم

Mūm (Teh.); Moma (Hind.); Cera alba; white wax.

Field 216, 260.

White wax is sold in the shops and used for plasters and ointments.

"Camphor candle" (Mūm-i-kāfūri) is a specimen of a crudely made wax candle in the composition of which camphor has been incorporated to diffuse a pleasant odor when burning.

Bombyx fortunatus Hutton (Lepidoptera)

پیله ابریشم

Abrīsham, Pīlāh abrīsham (Teh.); Pileh, cocoon; Resham, silk; Pat (Beng.); Resham-ki-keri (Duk.); cocoons of the silk moth.

W.H.M.M. 150821.

The cocoons of the silk moth or silk worm are said to be styptic and tonic, and are generally administered with other astringents.

x539 She took off her clothes and put them on the bank, and
she stepped into the river. Now, be it known to you that,
556 though she could see him not, there was concealed on the
•437 bank a youth of the Fetla tribes, and his name was Kadhim.
x539 He did not own a single horse or mare, nor did he even
own the leg of a mare. He owned no sheep and he owned
no land, and he lived by eating at the guest tent of his
sheikh. And as for clothes, he used to go to the river and
set snares for the sandgrouse and partridges when they
came to drink, and sell them in the market to buy cloth.

x539 And Kadhim was concealed on the bank of the river
watching his snares when he saw a girl beautiful as a moon
come to the river and divest herself of her clothes. He saw
that she was perfect in figure, for her neck was slender and
her shoulders smooth and soft and her breasts rose firmly
and clearly as do the desert dunes in moonlight. As for her
[304 waist it was slender and her thighs were round and smooth
and around her navel was tattooed a butterfly. And he
watched her and forgot the sandgrouse and he forgot the
partridges. And after she had bathed in the river she dried
herself by lying in the sun. Then she put on her clothes
and filled the jar with water and returned to the town.

And the next day at the rising of the sun Kadhim concealed himself in the same place and awaited the coming of the girl. And about half an hour after dawn she came down and drew water from that very same place. And Kadhim, who was concealed in the tamarisk bushes, watched her, but she did not take off her clothes. She merely filled the pot with water and put it on her shoulder, and she turned and returned to the town. But Kadhim, who was a youth in the seventeenth year of his life and swift of foot, ran ahead behind the fruit groves and date trees and came out on the path ahead of her, and when

was no fear in her heart, for she knew that Abbas Ali el 539x
Qassab would die before he could marry her. And Kad-
him sat watching his snares and thinking: How can I
become a great merchant? Kadhim was so poor that he
had not even a single copper coin in his pocket; he owned [291]
no shoes, he had no headcloth, he was not even wearing
any vest or underclothes, and his only garment was his
thob. And Kadhim decided: I will borrow money, and
trade with my capital and become a great merchant.

Then Kadhim went to the town and he was walking in 539
his bare feet, and he went to the shop of Abdul Rashid and 437 •
saluted the merchant and said: Give me a roll of cloth and 577
a loan of five gold liras and I will give you my pledge.
And Abdul Rashid looked and he saw that the youth was
dressed in a dirty and torn thob and that he was bareheaded
and barefooted, but he saw that he carried his head like
a hawk, so he said: You are, then, from the tribes? And
Kadhim nodded and said: Yes.

Now, let it be known to you that the tribes were much poorer in the days of the Ottomans than they are today, for they were then unable to cultivate their land in peace and prosperity, and it often happened that it was necessary to celebrate a marriage or observe the rites of death when there was no money in the purse of the head of the house. Then would he go to the town and to a merchant and say: Give me cloth and money and take my pledge. And as for the pledge, if he had a gold or silver ring, he would give it, and if he had none then he would give his headcloth to the merchant, or even his riding switch, saying: This contains my honour. And when the pledge was given payment was always made, for this is the custom of the tribes.

Abdul Rashid Mejid looked at the youth Kadhim and

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 he saw that he was truly from the tribes, for his bearing 437 was proud and his gaze the gaze of the peregrine falcon. 577 So he said: Take the money and the cloth and give me your pledge. Then Kadhim's cheeks flushed red, for he had forgotten to bring a pledge with him, nor did he own a ring, and he had no headcloth and he owned no riding switch, for he had no horse. But his brain was quick and he thought and answered: Verily a man's honour is contained in the hair of his moustache, for it is his moustache that distinguishes his face from that of a woman or a boy. Therefore I shall give you one hair of my moustache as a pledge. And Abdul Rashid Mejid was astonished at the words of the youth.

Then Kadhim called for scissors and for a mirror, and he studied his face in the mirror and searched for a hair in his moustache which was less beautiful than the rest. And he found such a hair and snipped it off and gave it to Abdul Rashid Mejid. And Abdul Rashid Mejid took the hair and put it with the pledges, and he put it in a box with the rings and the headcloths and riding switches, and he gave Kadhim five gold liras and a roll of cloth.

Kadhim took the money and the cloth and he went to the shop of a tailor whom he knew and trusted, for the man's father was from the Fetla tribes. He said to the tailor: Take this cloth and this money and make me the clothes of a very rich merchant, and bring me a beard of sheep's wool which I will fasten to my face, and keep this a secret, for it is more important to me than life itself. And x539 the tailor said: Cut my head to keep the secret. Then the 556 tailor made for Kadhim the clothes of a wealthy merchant and he brought for him a beard of sheep's wool, and when Kadhim had put on the beard and put on the clothes he looked so important and distinguished that anyone who

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MHI Iraq MHI

x539 coppersmith, yet I have a bride fit for the Sultan himself. And after a few days spent in married bliss Khalila woke Khalid at the rising of the sun and she said to him: Rise and go to your work, for the house is dirty and it needs cleaning and attention. And Khalid rose and he went to his work.

At the setting of the sun the coppersmiths in the bazaar of Umm el Brum closed their shops and Khalid's master permitted him to go and return to his home. And Khalid entered his house and he stood and rubbed his eyes, for he thought he was in a dream and that what he saw could not be true. For his house was carpeted with the most beautiful carpet made of silk, and it was truly worth not less than one hundred gold liras, and on it stood chairs and tables made of the finest woods, and on the tables were dishes and vases of silver. And Khalid saw that his house looked richer than that of the wealthiest merchant in Basra, and he was amazed at what he saw.

And he said to his wife Khalila: From whence is this wealth? She replied and said: Did you think that I was going to live in a mud hut with no carpet, and with chairs and tables of white deal, and with dishes of earthenware? I am of gentle birth and I need delicate and beautiful things. Therefore have I pledged your credit and brought
•[437] these few poor things we need, and even this was difficult, for the merchants did not seem to think much of your ability to pay. And Khalid became angry and he said: Woman, what have you done? Know you it will take me fifty years to pay for this merchandise? She replied: Am I then to live in squalor? Are you not a man that you cannot pay for the needs of the house?

Then Khalid's fury grew, and it was in his thoughts that he should beat his wife, and he picked up a stick and

4a Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Iraq Bedouin MHI8

I 162 The population of Mosul and Arbil provinces exceeds 630,000, of which 530,000 are Muslims. Of these Muslims, all but 10,000 are Sunnis. There are 60,000 Christians, 32,000 Yezidis and 10,000 Jews. The minorities therefore total only one-fifth of the whole. The Muslims consist of Arabs and Kurds in approximately equal parts, together with some 16,000 Turkomans.

I [162] 438 439 496 Mosul itself is mainly an Arab town with a population of 100,000. It is a great entrepôt for trade in sheep, cattle, wool, grain, hides, intestines, galls and eggs with the thickly populated districts round and also with Syria and Turkey. Its importance in this respect will certainly increase when at long last it is linked by rail with the Syrian frontier at Tel Kuchik and with Baghdad via Baa'iji. Work on this linking is now proceeding, and it is interesting to remember that when it is completed in a couple of years it will form the last stage in the famous Baghdad-Berlin Railway which was the Kaiser's fondest dream. The circumstances under which it will be completed are likely, however, to be very different to those which he visualized.

Arabs

I B 101 Apart from forming the majority of the inhabitants of Mosul itself, Arabs are found as cultivators on the Tigris both north and south of the town and to the south of the Jebal Sinjar (Sinjar mountain) and as bedouin who range the uncultivated areas to the south-west, west and north-west.

B 619 221 721 233 The bedouin consist of more than one tribe, but by far the most important is the Shammar. This great tribe is of Arabian origin and has in the past been pushed steadily northwards by economic forces and the search for new grazing grounds. With the great improvement in public security during recent years, cultivation has extended further and further from the towns and villages and encroached on the haunts of the Shammar. Formerly the means of livelihood of these bedouin were varied if not all respectable. They included the raiding of the flocks and herds of their weaker neighbours and the extortion of "khuwa" or safe-conduct money from merchants, travellers and others. At the same time they made a perfectly legitimate living from acting as shepherds for the flocks of townsmen and by breeding and selling camels. Nowadays raiding and safe-conduct money have been abolished and motor transport has to a great extent ousted the camel as a carrier in 'Iraq and the neighbouring countries and caused a severe slump in the camel market.

Wilson G-3 (no date) 1987 MHI Iraq MHI
Kurd MAII

K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I
168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
648] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Government
K to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popularize
656 summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
439

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHl Iraq MHl
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now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade 438
with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge 439
of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though 173
unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradi- 782
tion at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the
bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, 539
who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with I
all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the K
construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while 653
sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When 185
echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on I
a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn K
Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled 721
by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the 361
Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

Stal Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

needed to prove the extent and quality of the ores located. This 135
work has gone till now rather tardily, owing to the inadequate
funds at the disposal of the Directorate General on Minerals. There
also seems to be no clear policy as to how this wealth should be
exploited: whether by the State directly or by concession to national
or foreign enterprise.

Another factor delaying work in this field is the difficulty of [48 9]
transport to and from the sites of the ore deposits which are remotely
situated in desert and mountain.

Oil and gas are indeed plentiful in Iraq, and the exploitation 382
of oil resources has indirectly helped to finance the industrial development
so far achieved. But the cost of oil fuel and other oil
products for local consumption is not much lower than in other
countries because of the high rate of taxes on consumption. This
and the limited range of oil products so far made in Iraq by the
Alwand refinery, owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., have led to
the import of a number of oil products from abroad. But the situation
should change when the State-owned refinery, now under
construction, goes into production.

Another problem connected with the supply of fuel is the lack 371
of electric power. Power generation in Iraq is inefficiently organised
and power rates, except in Basrah and Baghdad in recent
years, are among the highest in the world. This has compelled
most industries to generate their own power which has added a
great deal to production cost. The recent reduction of power rates
and the availability of electricity in Baghdad has been one of the
major reasons for the concentration of industry in that city.

(3) Concentration of Industry: Industry in Iraq is heavily con- 438
centrated in the city of Baghdad which has a population of 550,000
inhabitants, in other words a little more than ten percent of the
country's population. Excluding oil and one or two small textile,
tanning, and grain-milling industries, all modern industry has been
established in or near Baghdad, thus adding to the population and
housing problems of the capital. There are many reasons for this
concentration of industry. All routes converge on Baghdad; it has
the largest population and, as the seat of Government, it offers easy
access to the central authority. As an old trading centre Baghdad [366]
has a well-organised market, large financial resources, and managerial
and office staffs. Some of the factors that have made Baghdad

438 [365] more attractive for industry than other areas can be corrected by proper action. First and foremost is the relative cheapness of power and fuel in Baghdad. The cost of the electric power unit in most cities is double that of Baghdad and rarely is a municipality-owned plant able to supply sufficient power to industry. The cost of oil fuel is at least ten percent higher outside Baghdad. The correction of these factors, together with a more equal distribution of educational, housing, transport and social welfare facilities, could greatly relieve the situation. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry could also be amended so as to give additional concessions for industries established in other parts of the country. The cost of labour and land is already becoming burdensome for industry in Baghdad. This, in addition to the social evil of overcrowdedness, calls for immediate consideration.

434 (4) **Limitation of Markets** : A newly industrialised country can hardly hope to find foreign markets for its finished products. It has to depend on its home market. The market in Iraq, with its small population (about 5 million inhabitants), of low purchasing power (annual income per head is estimated at between £ 20 and £ 30 or $85), affords very limited scope for large-scale industry. Many of the industries studied at one time by the Industrial Bank, such as the making of artificial silk fibres, the manufacture of paper and cardboard from straw, and the printing of cotton piece-goods, had to be abandoned because the smallest economic unit of these plants is much beyond the capacity of the Iraqi market to support. This situation will no doubt improve as the whole economy of the country expands. 439 But it should be possible to deal with this situation 648 more effectively by joint action on the part of the Arab States, along lines already discussed at high political level. These discussions have had the object of reducing or abolishing inter-state tariff barriers so as to make the whole area one market. Such an action is indeed vital to the progress and prosperity of these countries and their peoples. It should be remembered that before World War I, these countries formed one economic and political unit under the Ottoman Empire.

464 (5) **Labour, Technical Staff and Management Problems**: The supply of ordinary labour, owing to the high rate of population increase (estimated to be one and a half per cent per annum) and emigration from country to town, is quite sufficient and will remain so

311 waters of the twin rivers are largely wasted and periodically unloosen disastrous floods upon Baghdad and the alluvial plain to the south.

The Rain-fed Zone

244 438 In the upland plains of the rain-fed zone stretching from Northern Mosul to Suleimaniya, wheat and barley are the principal crops. Rainfall is generally inadequate for summer crops, although water from streams and springs permit cultivation of rice and cotton. In part of this area, especially Northern Mosul, there has been a rapid extension of cultivation with the help of modern agricultural machinery.

233 438 241 To the north and northeast lie the mountain massifs of Iraq. Here the raising of cattle, sheep and goats by Kurdish nomads is one of the principal occupations. The mountains are largely barren of trees but offer natural pasture for animals. In the valleys and on hillsides grain, tobacco, timber and fruit are grown. Tobacco, although small in area, is an important cash crop.

438 433 Except for some handicrafts, there is little native industry in this region. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, is principally a commercial center and an outlet for exports to Syria and [315] Lebanon. Kirkuk, however, is the center of most of Iraq's petroleum production and one of the largest and richest oil fields in the world. Oil fields of subsidiary importance also exist at Ain Zaleh in Mosul province and near Khanaqin in Diyala province. The mountains of the North may ultimately yield other minerals such as copper, chrome and iron.

The Irrigation Zone

133 311 South of the rain-fed zone the river valleys may be divided into three major regions: the upper river valleys; the lower river valley down to Amara and Nasiriya; and the triangular area from Nasiriya and Amara to the mouth of the Shatt al Arab.

The first of these regions includes most of the northern Jezireh and the area north of Baghdad and east of the Tigris. The latter area still awaits irrigation for the most part, and the Jezireh is hardly susceptible to irrigation because of the elevation and configuration of the land. The Jezireh is an upland plateau

relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major 133
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther
down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162]
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

438 country's foreign trade. Near it is the country's second largest oil field.

133 311 233 To the south and southwest of the irrigation zone lie the vast arid tracts known as the southern and northern deserts which comprise about 40 percent of the land area of Iraq. These are sparsely inhabited by roaming nomads who raise camels, goats and sheep and annually take their flocks into the river valleys in search of summer pasture.

II. The People

161 The first official census of the settled population in Iraq was taken in 1947 and preliminary statistics on the male and female population of each province have already been published.[1] The preliminary estimate of the enumerated population was approximately 4.6 million. This figure has been brought up to 4.8 million in the published statistics by adding a rough estimate of 200,000 for the nomads in Mosul province and in the provinces along the Euphrates. Like all other countries at a similar stage of development, Iraq has a very young population, about half being under the age of 20. Although no reliable vital statistics are available, all indications point on the one hand to a very high rate of mortality among infants and young children, and on the other, to a correspondingly high birth rate. Even under the present poor health conditions the population seems to have been increasing at a rate conjectured to be in the region of one to one and a half percent per annum. Whatever the present rate, however, it is clear that, if full advantage is taken of the ample opportunity to improve health

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[1] Considering the attendant difficulties, this census may be judged a success. The information about the people of Iraq which it has already yielded and, more especially, which it can yield when tabulation is completed, is without doubt far more reliable than any estimates previously made. However, as with most first attempts at census-taking, the results have to be interpreted with great caution. Besides the figures already published, the Mission had access to certain unpublished data on four provinces—Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra. Much of the description of the population which follows is based on this data, but it must be noted that, although allowance was made for the fact that these four provinces are a most imperfect cross-section of the country, this fact is an additional limitation to the validity of any but the broadest conclusions.

361 The Mission has noted elsewhere other defects in the Dujaila settlement: the large administrative staff, the tendency of the settlers to become minor landlords, the lack of participation by the Department of Agriculture, and the rapid deterioration of the soil owing to bad drainage. It has been made too elaborate and there has been insufficient coordination of effort. As a result, the settler relies too much on the benefits he has been given and too little on self-help, largely because self-help has not been aided in the way it should be by the concerted action of the appropriate government departments.

III. Urban Communities

The municipalities in Iraq range from Baghdad, the capital, with well over half a million inhabitants down to small towns with less than a thousand inhabitants. They cannot, therefore, be considered as a homogeneous group. The largest of them have certain distinctive functions.

361 438 Baghdad is the seat of the government, the center of much of the wholesale trade and the hub of the rail and road systems. Since the war, a number of modern factories have been built so that industry is now becoming an important element. It is a rapidly growing city, a particularly large influx having occurred during the war. Growth has taken place along both banks of the Tigris, expansion away from the river being limited by the bunds, which protect the city from flood.

Mosul, the second largest city, has less than a quarter of the population of Baghdad. Lying on the rail line to Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, it is a center of trade to the west, especially in wool. Associated with this trade are industries such as the cleaning and packing of wool and the tanning of hides. In addition, there is a sizeable cotton and rayon textile industry, both factory and handicraft. It is an old city and formerly the capital of the Turkish Vilayet of Mosul; it does not appear to be growing.

Basra, the port on the Shatt al Arab, is really a complex of three towns situated a few miles apart: Magil, the modern sea and air port; Ashar, an older port; and Basra proper. Apart from its

port traffic and such associated activities as the packing of dates, 361
cleaning of barley and flour-milling (a new industry), Basra is 438
closely bound up with the development of the new oil field at Zubair, some 10 miles inland. Basra, like Baghdad, received a large influx of people during the war, especially from nearby Amara.

The population of Kirkuk, the fourth city, is believed to have tripled in the last 25 years as a consequence of the development of Iraq's major oil field. The two holy cities in Kerbela province, Kerbela and Nejf, have a large transient population due to pilgrim traffic from Iran and other Moslem countries. These two cities have many handicraft workers in such trades as jewelry, brasswork and embroidery.

These six cities, together with Amara, are the only ones with 361
a population of over 40,000. With a few exceptions, such as 162
Khanaqin with its small oil field and refinery, the other municipalities function primarily as centers of administration and trade for surrounding districts. Broadly speaking, their size varies with their administrative importance. Of the provincial capitals, other than those already mentioned, five have a population between 20,000 and 40,000 and three between 10,000 and 20,000. Of the remaining municipalities, none has a population exceeding 20,000; less than 30, most of them centers of *qadhas*, have a population of more than 6,000.

Despite differences in size and function, the cities and towns 361
have a number of characteristics in common. The older parts are 342
usually congested with narrow streets and alleys. Houses are 329
built around courtyards, the only opening to the street being the 366
main doorway. The houses usually have a flat roof or a partially open second story for sleeping outside in the summer. Brick is the commonest building material; most of the larger towns have brickworks nearby, many of which are small and primitive. There are also a few modern concrete and steel buildings, mainly in Baghdad. Schools and hospitals can be found in the heart of these congested areas. An important section in every city is the *Suq* or bazaar, a network of alleys, often covered by crude roofs forming a series of arcades. These alleys are lined with the small shops of retail merchants and handicraft workers in textiles and metals. The *Suq* is usually located near the principal mosque.

TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

1. THE STORY OF HAJJI ALI, THE GREAT SULTAN AND HIS SON, THE AMIR KHEYYUN

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
√√6 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
•438 rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
√78 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A STORY CONCERNING THE IGNORANCE OF SLAVES

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

Iraq MH1
Iraq Bedouin MH8

I 438 245 As compared with the southern district the northern part of Mesopotamia grows only a small amount of dates. There are a few gardens around each city, which furnish fresh dates for local consumption during the season, but in this region water has to be raised from the river to the ground level by animals, by the method in use in Arabia. The gardens are small and confined to the river-side and are of no real significance in the economic support of the country. I 243 These northern regions are not devoid of rainfall, and a meager return is secured by sowing wheat and barley on unirrigated land. Such cultivation, however, is uncertain, and in about one year out of every three the crop is a dead failure.

I 162 B 461 233 511 The great mass of the people are nomadic or seminomadic. Everywhere there can be found pasturage for the nomad's flocks and herds and wells for the watering of stock. Many of the Bedouin nomads engage in agriculture occasionally in good seasons. Even among those who refuse to degrade themselves by becoming agriculturists of any degree, the standards of life are considerably higher than among the Bedouins of Central Arabia. The supply of forage is more abundant, and their flocks of camels and sheep and goats are very large. These nomads have better clothes, very much more abundant food, and in every way live a more tolerable life than that of their brothers in the Central Arabian desert. B 231 [556] 492 Horses are common in Mesopotamia. They are a luxury but not such a tax on the resources of the owner as farther south, for there are always forage and water for them. Every Arab of position expects to own and ride one; otherwise he loses caste. Arab horses are beautiful animals and are trained as household pets, much as a fine dog is trained with us. They are ridden without saddle

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Only three cities, Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, have a total population [162
exceeding 100,000. *Baghdad* (population 1943, 300,000) lies on the 361]
Tigris at the head of navigation of the river, and in the 'waist' of the
lowlands, where the Tigris and Euphrates approach closely to each
other, and hence give the best possibility of constructing irrigation
canals. This narrow inter-riverine zone also provides a convenient
crossing-place, since the marshland is reduced in extent and the firmer
platform of steppeland provides a useful east-west route between the
Mediterranean and Iran. The region of Baghdad thus has an
important nodal position at the junction of routes from east and west
across the desert, and from north, north-east, and south along the
river valleys. It should be noted that all the factors mentioned above
apply to a region and not to an actual site.

It is easy to see why a town should have grown up within the
district of Baghdad, but the extra smaller scale features that usually
fix the site of a town in one particular spot are less in evidence.
Local changes in topography due to the shifting of drainage channels
have led to the growth of three separate cities at various periods, and
so within the Baghdad region there has arisen first Babylon, the
ancient capital that lay closer to the Euphrates, some 60 miles to the
south of modern Baghdad. Babylon was in turn succeeded by
Ctesiphon, only a few miles from Baghdad, and this city remained the
nodal centre until superseded by Baghdad in the early Muhammadan
era. Baghdad itself dates only from the 8th century A.D., and a
'golden age' occurred when its Abbasid rulers supplanted the
Omeyyads of Damascus and made it the capital of the Moslem
world. Baghdad suffered greatly from Mongol invasion, and most of
the older buildings have disappeared. The modern city is sprawling
and undistinguished—in fact, an extreme disappointment to visitors
who may wish to evoke the 'Arabian Nights'. Many of the poorer [342
houses are of mud, and flooding is a frequent feature (Fig. 65). 731]

Baghdad is the commercial centre of the region, with numerous,
but small workshops and distributing houses. Industry is, as we 361
have seen, mainly confined to bazaar crafts—textiles, metals, food- 438
stuffs—and to the production of pottery and building materials. 565
Trade is for the most part in the hands of Europeans, Jews, and 463
Armenians, with Iraqi Christians as clerks and supervisors. An upper
class—mainly Sunni Moslems—carries on the administration of the
country; and a third element in the life of the city is a large group of
absentee landlords.

regions for which it acts as commercial outlet and exchange centre. 361
These regions are :

(*a*) The plains of northern Assyria, where there is a dense agricultural population.

(*b*) The hills of Kurdistan, occupied by shepherds practising transhumance.

(*c*) The steppes of the Jezireh, where there is a mixed population of true nomads rearing sheep, cattle and draught animals ; and sedentary farmers.

(*d*) The uplands of the Jebel Sinjar, where pastoralism and agriculture are carried on by the Yezidi.

As a result, there is extreme heterogeneity of peoples within the 563
city. Arabs are in the majority, with smaller groups of Kurds, 438 ●
Christians, Jews, and Yezidi, most of whom speak their own languages. [288]
An important mediaeval textile industry (note the word *muslin*) has now disappeared, though coarser textiles using wool as a raw material are still produced in the bazaars, and a recent feature has been the introduction of artificial silk weaving. Mosul is also important for leather working—a reflexion of its position on the edge of the steppe. Manufacturing is, however, less important than trade : grain, timber, hides, and manufactured goods are exchanged, and there are long distance communications with Baghdad and south-east Turkey. Much of the produce from Turkey comes by kelek (page 364).

Basra is an agglomeration of small sites grouped along the western 361
bank of the Shatt el Arab some 70 miles upstream from the Persian Gulf. Basra proper is situated on a small creek 2 miles distant from the Shatt el Arab, and the principal port is at Ashar, on the main river. Modern docks have also been constructed at Maqil, 4 miles upstream from Ashar, and since 1939, further development has taken place at Tanuma on the eastern bank of the Shatt el Arab, opposite Ashar. Because of the recession of the head of the Persian Gulf, the growth of the port is relatively recent, and dredging on a considerable scale is
necessary to prevent silting of the channel. Basra handles the greater 439
proportion of the foreign trade of Iraq, and is the centre of the date- 438
growing region, being itself surrounded by date-groves. Dates form 361
the chief item in its export trade. Second in importance amongst exports is grain, with wool, liquorice root, and hides as subsidiaries. Imports consist chiefly of manufactured goods (cement, cotton and woollen textiles, machinery), tea, and sugar. Basra can be reached by large ocean going ships, but about 10 per cent. of its commerce is still carried on in small native craft.

241 commercial crops in the rain-fed zones of
the north; dates, cereals and cotton, in the
south. The date-palm groves in the irrigated
lands along the Shatt al Arab and the Eu-
phrates rivers, and in scattered areas along
the Tigris, furnish almost one third of the
233 world's supply of dates. Sheep, goats, cattle
and other livestock are raised in large num-
bers by the nomadic and the seminomadic
429 peoples. The chief agricultural exports are
dates, barley and other grains, cotton, wool,
hides and licorice: this last-named item
grows wild in many localities in the south.
242 The government is promoting the adoption
of modern methods of farming and animal
husbandry and the expansion of irrigation
facilities. It operates special agricultural
schools and experimental farms in different
parts of the country, as well as a date re-
search station near Basra. Within the last
few years it has initiated settlement and
demonstration projects on state lands at
Dujayla, near Kut; at Shahrizor, near
Sulaimaniya; at Huwaija, near Kirkuk;
and at Sinjar, near Mosul.

135 With the exception of the oil reserves,
the mineral resources of Iraq are negligible.
Small deposits of lignite, gypsum, sulfur and
other minerals are known to exist in the
north, while salt beds are found in widely
412 distributed areas. Industrial development is
438 slight, in spite of the impetus supplied by
the shortage of materials during the recent
war years. Small craft industries flourish in
the urban centers, and a few modern fac-
tories have been established in Baghdad and
Mosul for the processing of local products.
These consist primarily of plants for the
manufacture of textiles, cement, bricks, dis-
tilled liquors, soaps and cigarettes.

135 The petroleum industry has expanded
rapidly since the discovery of oil, in 1927,
at Baba Gurgur, in the Kirkuk region. The
reserves, which are reputed to be among the
richest in the Middle East, provide a pri-
471 mary source of wealth for the country. The
Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions,
originally granted in 1925, covering the
lands east of the Tigris River and north

433, 162, 464, 439
●

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
●Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2
Israel	MF1

/For an account of the economic effects of industrialization after World War II and information on industrial output in countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonne, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 293-298, p. 309, Turkey - pp. 298-300, 307-308, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 300-302, 309-310, Palestine - pp. 302-304, Israel - pp. 310-311./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

433 made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-[501] craft, of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These, with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq distillation and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the meagre list.

439 The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has 457 been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). To it as an 'invisible export' should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—lifeblood of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

439 Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory consisted of the import of those needed commodities which the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed through Başra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales, coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France, and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes, were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

436 The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper [illegible] (piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a [illegible] coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian [illegible] in Başra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns [illegible] Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. A multitude of local 804 weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district. 453 Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by the shrewd operations of many local *şarrafs*.

Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most 433 consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high 439 percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered 137 a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one- 313 fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of 185 improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and 241 the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the 579
period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of
Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It 674
was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg, General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings 368
of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra. The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast. Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja under its Jaf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals 743
and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrange- 744
ments in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels 368
appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enter- 185
prise, a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple 439
exports of the territory still varied annually according to the harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates, grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin, partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are elsewhere mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found [453] a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of 178 tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the 579 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud 721 with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

563 battalion, and to the men's return to the sluggish pauperization of Ba'quba.

871 The Education branch, founded and first inspired by Major H. E. Bowman, was faced with the problem of providing schooling for the youth of 'Iraq in the absence of funds, buildings, books, equipment or teachers in a tithe of sufficient quantities. At a pace always disappointing, but the fastest financially or functionally practicable, primary schools aiming at fair standards were opened to a total of seventy-five by the end of 1919. Fifty-six of these taught in Arabic, eleven in Turkish, seven in Kurdish, one in Persian. The new-founded Teachers' Training College could supply but a part of their urgent needs, and the scale of secondary classes, confined to the three principal cities, was regrettably humble; nor was the country-wide penetration of 'politics' into the schools, thus early, less to be deplored. Means were found to reopen the Law School, and a commercial and a technical school. The many privately-conducted Mullās' schools, archaic in method, scope, and equipment, continued to produce a bare literacy in their thousands of pupils; but the temptation to multiply inferior Government schools was resisted, and the teaching of English almost wholly withheld in spite of a general clamour for it. Upon the desirability of girls' schools, Muslim opinion was at first divided; five, all primary, had been opened by the first weeks of 1920. The schools of the local Christian and Jewish minorities and those of the foreign missions were fostered by support and subsidy; some of these were of high standard. Some archaeological work was carried out by R. Campbell Thompson at Abu Shahrayn (Eridu) in the spring of 1918, and more under H. R. Hall at Ur and elsewhere in 1919.

204 Printing-presses were operating at Najf in 1918, at Sulaymaniya in 1919, and in Baṣra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the occupation of these places. Newspapers in English were published at Baghdad and Baṣra, in Arabic at those cities and Mosul, in Turkish at Kirkuk, in Kurdish at Sulaymaniya.

439 The great increase of goods entering 'Iraq in 1918–19 taxed the young Customs administration of C. R. Watkins and Major A. G. H. Sievwright to the utmost. It was due to cessation of imports into north Persia from Russia, to the increase of 'Iraq's own spending power, and to the general depletion of stocks by war
[436] interruption. The Indian rupee, now the universal currency of 'Iraq, supplied an adequate medium; and the rising volume of
[504] civilian traffic could be handled easily by the now fully developed Port of Baṣra, which as such came into existence under Colonel J. C. Ward in the autumn of 1919 and was soon afterwards transferred
000 to the Civil Administration. The Railways, when at their greatest

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

1. TREATY DEADLOCK

648 THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary
Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to
observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the
years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify
optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to
complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds;
it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations.
Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished.
Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function,
and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused
of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased,
with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international
repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome
of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva
which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League.
With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved
normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts.
Its communications by land and air to foreign lands
563 developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the
minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially
unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an
optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of
peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of
619 Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal
resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not
extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous
of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were
less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Meanwhile,
185 the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further
developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a
closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved,
though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was
unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation
questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially
liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines
were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion
of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These
439 progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi
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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady 439
diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they 661
correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq 665
public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, 646
all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness. The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate. Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 665
'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925, were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925 until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, suppressed almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—Ḥizb al-Nahdha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new 645"
Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Baṣra aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927. This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927. It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The 665
first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indica- 565
tions, of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscurantist leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 Acting Adviser, and thereafter by E. G. Hogg, from the Sudan, in 1931. Hedgcock and the present writer left the Ministry in 1930 and 1931. Provision for Capital Works under a five-year plan was separated from the current budget, and a main part of the oil revenues, which first accrued in 1932, was allotted to this object. An Economic Advisory Board was set up. Chambers of Commerce were founded in Baghdad and Basra. A second advisory visit by Hilton Young, the 'Iraqis' financial consultant of 1925, was paid in 1930, and other foreign experts—notably A. Sainsbury, expert in income tax—assisted in the institution of new taxation and the [651] fixing of civil service establishments. Income tax in modern form was first imposed in 1928, but proved relatively unproductive; in effect it was paid mainly by officials and foreign companies. A major change in the taxation of agricultural produce was made in 1931, based on a new system of tax collection at markets—the 'place of consumption' method—without the need to assess or measure the growing crops. A financial Inspectorate was introduced. Efforts both resolute and skilful were made in 1927 to free 'Iraq from the burden of its share of the Ottoman Debt, of which £ (Turkish) 7 million had fallen to its share, with a further £T2,500,000 of accumulated interest. The Minister of Finance arranged to buy Ottoman Debt securities in the open market and, after handing these to the Debt authority to an extent of £1,228,000 sterling, could arrange to pay off the small remainder by instalments. Thus, at the cost of finding funds from current revenue for debt extinction, the State could enter the League happily unencumbered.

652 436 The proposed foundation of a National Bank, often discussed, was still postponed. The Indian rupee currency, which had served 'Iraq well for fifteen years, was superseded early in 1932 by an 'Iraqi currency employing the dinar (equivalent to a pound sterling), divided into a thousand fils. Currency resources and the note issue were supervised by a Board in London, and rested on a basis of sterling assets. The confident reception of the new currency was the more gratifying as 'Iraq suffered not only temporarily from a number of 'slump' bankruptcies, but chronically from an adverse 457 439 trade balance. A wide visible gap existed between the value of its exports and that of its unavoidable imports of fuel, manufactured articles, and some foods. The invisible exports which were assumed to fill the gap were the expenditure by the British forces, diplomatic and archaeological missions, charities and foreign schools, pilgrims, tourists and foreign companies, and the profits of the Persian transit trade. The progressive slackening of the last mentioned, in spite of lowered transit dues, was a serious feature of the times. Persian restrictions, Russian competition, the diversion of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial
operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors.
Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation,
in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and [illegible] 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equipment, 331
the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648' only by the receipt of Persian orders to their Consul to desist. The traditional and resented Shaṭṭ al-'Arab boundary remained a source of Persian rancour. British diplomatic intervention was [439] effective in 1928 in preventing the imposition of maximum Persian import duties on goods from 'Iraq, a measure which threatened ruin to the transit trade; but the presence and grievances of many thousands of Persian subjects in 'Iraq—and of those also who, to escape 'Iraqi obligations, claimed that status when convenient—could not fail to supply endless material for dispute and protest.

563 648' The humiliating refusal of Persian recognition of the 'Iraq State was due in fact less to petty disputes and neighbourly jealousies than to the anomalous position of this large expatriate colony. It had long claimed the privileged status accorded in 'Iraq to the subjects of some Powers of Europe. But Persia had never been a Capitulatory Power in the Ottoman Empire, and was unlikely to grant 'Iraqis in Persia corresponding treatment: and the demand for special rights denied to 'Iraqis themselves was unwelcome to the 'Iraq Government, the more so by reason of the numbers involved. Persia would withhold recognition until its claim be granted: 'Iraq refused to consider such claim until after recognition. Deadlock was complete, and all governmental negotiation between the two States remained perforce in British hands. The revision in 1929–30 of the Anglo-'Iraq Judicial Agreement of 1924 offered, however, an opportunity for removing the root of the trouble. The Persian delegate at Geneva applauded the principle of the new Agreement, which was one of equality for all, and the British Minister in Teheran could assure the Shah's Government that in this and all matters—notably the Shaṭṭ boundary—British good offices were available to remove causes of dissension. The effect was instantaneous. In May 1929 full recognition of the 'Iraq Kingdom was accorded by the Persian Government, whose Minister appeared in Baghdad. A 'Provisonal Agreement', covering most-favoured-nation treatment, consular and diplomatic representation, and trade and transit was signed in August, and 'Iraqi Consuls were posted to the Persian cities. Thenceforward the treatment of common interests and problems proceeded with fair success by direct 'Iraqi-Persian approaches. The 'Provisional Agreement' was annually renewed while drafting of the permanent Treaty proceeded slowly. The troublesome Pishdar movements were kept under control. Kurdish Aghās seeking refuge across frontiers in this or that territory were removed to safety from border districts. The Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh and his sons, dispossessed anachronisms now exiled in 'Iraq, were brought to Baghdad in 1929 when a foolish revolutionary attempt on Persian soil drew attention to them. Joint military operations by forces of the two

* 645 accused the Government of a policy of unjust reprisals and, for himself and his troops, repudiated all Baghdad authority. The Army units in Baghdad were largely favourable to Bakr's faction; 'Umari had, by messages, secured the support of the Diwaniya, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya garrisons; civil war seemed inevitable. But Colonel Sa'id Takriti, commanding the troops stationed at Wishash outside Baghdad West, by siding with 'Umari and the evident majority of the forces, ensured the ascendancy of the element hostile to Bakr. The proclamation which he issued asserted loyalty to the King (who himself favoured the same side), support to Amin al-'Umari and the policy of no reprisals, removal of Bakr's nominees from command, and—vain words!—Army abstention thenceforward from politics. The Prime Minister, who had designated 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri to succeed as Chief of Staff and Madfa'i, hastening home from Syria, as Minister of Defence, realized the preponderance of feeling hostile to his régime and could turn nowhere for support. He resigned office on 17 August. The Royal Irada appointing Jamil al-Madfa'i as Prime Minister was issued on the same day.

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5. LAND, AIR, AND WATER

The foreign trade of the territory, limited in scale as it was, showed in these years a healthy and indeed encouraging picture. The abiding adverse trade balance was still redressed by other elements. The volume of exports increased notably from 1935 to 1937, and steps were taken by the improvement of date-packing, grain-cleaning, and wool-dipping to remove some of the features which damaged the reputation of 'Iraqi produce; but the fluctuation of both quantities and prices of the country's staple exports from year to year was still pronounced. The export of crude oil began late in 1934. That of gold bullion, thanks to high gold prices abroad, continued and largely depleted 'Iraq's stocks. The small exportable cotton crop went regularly, after 1936, *en bloc* to Japan. Imports, generally constant or increasing in volume, were subject to the revised Customs tariff drawn up in 1933 by League of Nations experts on lines favourable to local industry. Great Britain easily maintained its lead as supplier, with the United States almost monopolizing the import of motor vehicles. Germany, with its alert credit-giving marketers and the ubiquitous German-Jewish Haavareh Agency, perceptibly increased its share in chemicals and machinery. Japan by conspicuous efforts raised its proportion of the import market, between 1930 and 1936, from 2 to 20 per cent. This was made up of cotton, woollen, and artificial silk piece-goods and some hardware, and its extent led the 'Iraq Government to insist on Japan's acceptance of 'Iraqi produce

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439 Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453 varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656 shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436 in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. 652 The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern 135 multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291 served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi *sidara* in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned 432 on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382 significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to 563
whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were
established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and
were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured
the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the
return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality
and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which 439
had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Produce 435
prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent,
and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially
unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was 471
awarded by the Baṣra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs.
Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly
approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was
prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the
public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil
refinery. A concession for the oil of Baṣra wilaya—more strictly,
of all 'Iraq territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—
was granted in 1938 to the Baṣra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc*
creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing
the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a [453]
branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited 647
for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of
the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—
a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience,
J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he
remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till
his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in
1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively
by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for
nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from
the Financial Advisership in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two
years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on 648x
bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia
and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain
Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major
demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned
the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial
treaty was signed with the United States, though American
Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed
another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman.
Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary.
The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped.
A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous
régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp,
in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib
was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles
the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality,
shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously
improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal
Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted
at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling
stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both
pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy–French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it
curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to
full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods
were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce
fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to
a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company,
and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu
Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya
river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit
allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according
to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea
or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the
hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country.
The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt;
trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

British forces for their own needs, in part acquired by the United 433
Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to Great Britain or 439
other territories, and in part exported by normal trade channels now regulated by export control. The date crop was still handled for export by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. The cotton which Japan ceased to take after 1941 was sent to India, but in quantities which high grain prices had much reduced; production touched 26,000 bales in 1940, but thereafter dropped for the next nine years to a fifth or even a tenth of that amount. Wool was sent to America, but with this and all other commodities both internal movement by land and water and the provision of shipping space from Baṣra presented difficult problems. A quantity of produce went by rail to the Levant and Turkey, and animals on the hoof, in years of good grazing, were sent to the British forces in Syria.
The prices of all commodities were fixed in terms of imperious [435]
war necessity and of ever-growing 'Iraqi inflation, to which these prices contributed.

The import of manufactured articles and certain foodstuffs was 722
limited to quantities below the level of satisfaction, thanks to 434
reduced outputs in the supplying countries and to pressure on shipping space. Help was forthcoming more than once from American lend-lease stocks of drugs, metal goods, tyres, chemicals, and agricultural implements; Paiforce at times could help to meet an urgent shortage, and the British Government organized an emergency grain supply in 1942 from India and Canada; but, as in every country, abiding and irksome shortages remained, aggravated by maldistribution and by a habit of hoarding against which the law and public opinion strove equally in vain. The need at all costs to obtain supplies led to the urgent search for sources to replace Japan and other belligerents. An import licence system was established which, vastly profitable to some, worked with its share of imperfections and abuses; a price-fixing procedure was applied over a wide range of articles, with an attempted control of stocks enforced by occasional raids and prosecutions, but avoided by widespread black-market trading; and a rationing system, first applied to sugar in 1942, was extended next year to coffee and tea and later to cotton and woollen textiles. This control by ration-cards, based on imperfect tribal and urban lists, was a matter of extreme difficulty and gladly abandoned at the earliest moment; nor were the resulting stocks ever sufficient to admit an adequate allowance to the tribal public. Nevertheless, the rationing of essentials was both indispensable and attended with fair success. Late in 1944, in expectation of the war's end and by reaction from the attempted régime of universal close control in 1943–4, a policy of decontrol was substituted, and one commodity after another

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MHI

The Lynch fleet had been diminished in 1938 by the loss of the 505 *Mejidieh*, sold to Anglo-Iranian, and in 1941 by that of the *Malamir* and the *al-Kadri*, burnt out and scrapped respectively. Their rivals, notably Ḥannā al-Shaykh and 'Abd al-Karim Khuḍhayri (Khedery), were more than holding their own: but the competition of the railway and the roads must grow rather than diminish. To the road system, indeed, Paiforce contributed much, 491 notably in the completed trans-desert highway to Jordan, in the re-surfacing of many road stretches, and in the maintenance in being of 'Iraqi transport fleets by the provision of tyres. Nevertheless, the upkeep of civil motor vehicles in war-time proved most 494 difficult, and the numbers in use decreased. The air communications of the territory were not improved during the war; but before 509 its end projects for a national air line were under formation. The European services crossing and visiting 'Iraq recommenced in 1945 after war-time curtailments, and the Egyptian Misr Airways restarted its Cairo–Baghdad service. A contract was given in 1945 to the Marconi Company for the erection of a new wireless transmitting station.

The course of foreign trade was notably deflected from its usual 439 channels by the war. In 1939 the United Kingdom was its principal customer, followed by the United States, each of these countries taking approximately one-third of the total visible exports; but by 1944 the principal buyer was Palestine with Transjordan, followed by Persia. Visible exports, amounting to ID 4 million before the war, reached through enhanced prices ID 9 million before its end. The transit trade, reduced in 1939 to a value of some ID 3 million, reached ID 13 million five years later, thanks to the passage of goods to Russia. Imports rose from a value of ID 9 million before the war to ID 14 million in its last year; the United Kingdom's share in these fell from 33 to 11 per cent., that of Japan from 18 per cent. to nothing, while India's share rose from 8 to 30 per cent., Syria's from 2 to 16, the United States' from 8 to 12.

The desire for industrial expansion, always a cherished ambition, 433 was stimulated by the war-time shortages and an increased local market; contrary factors were the shortage of raw materials, competition for skilled workers, and the impossibility of importing factory equipment. Of the seventy enterprises benefiting in 1944 from the law of 1929 most were on the humblest scale, with the importance only of pilot projects which could indicate to the middle class the possibility of a career outside Government service, the professions, or politics. Some war-time progress was made in brick manufacture; workshops produced hand-tools from scrap metal; the crushing of oil-seeds—cotton, sesame, and linseed—

652 647 1951 establishing its programme for the ensuing five years and allotting an expenditure of some ID 155 million[1] within that period; but it became apparent soon afterwards that revenues in excess of this would, under revised oil agreements (p. 376) be available. It was at this stage clear to all that the acquisition of this copious revenue, which in the absence of some suicidal folly or grave misfortune would accrue punctually and reliably for many years, must completely transform 'Iraq's economy and rate of evolution. Its history indeed from 1951 onwards should be that of a territory extraordinarily favoured in all that appertains to, or can flow from, the resources at the disposal of its Government. Its curse had for centuries been poverty; thanks to its discovered and exploited oil deposits, it stood now at the threshold of an era of abundant wealth; and this must, besides its blessings, bring accompanying responsibilities, stresses and dangers, both moral and economic.

432 [457] The territory's immediate trade balance, which future opulence would doubtless affect, still showed in 1951 its habitual deficit. This was compensated partly by drawing upon the war-time sterling balances, and partly by invisible items as of old. The country's imports were, as ever, principally those of cotton, woollen, and silk textiles: iron, steel, and machinery: electrical goods: vehicles: tea, coffee, and sugar: chemicals, cement, and timber. Nearly half of these were provided by Great Britain, with India, the United States, and Belgium as other main suppliers and to a lesser extent Italy, Holland, and France; Germany and Japan had disappeared from the list of providers. Exports, which the country's evolution had left little changed over many years, were still those almost exclusively of its agricultural and natural products. Exported barley amounted to a yearly average of some 250,000 tons, wheat was shipped occasionally but irregularly—and not at all between 1940 and 1949; maize, millet, and oil-seeds (cotton, sesame, and linseed) were usually available in small quantities. The co-ordinating authority for all grain exports was the para-statal Grain Board and, working with it, an Agricultural Export and Import Company. Dates, to the important yearly extent of some 250,000 tons, were dispatched to more than forty countries. Cotton had disappeared after 1941, but crept back into the export list in 1947. Other items in the slight volume of exports were animals driven to the Levant countries, wool sent to France and America, and hides and skins, gums and gall-nuts consigned to various countries. Hopes that tobacco might be added to this list depended upon improvement in the structure and products of the local tobacco industry. New

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[1] The provision for 1951 was to be (in thousands of dinars) 9,364: of 1952, 20,460: of 1953, 28,390: of 1954, 31,600: of 1955, 32,335: of 1956, 33,225.

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 439
'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made
by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese
governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by
way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of
a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both
Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of
small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's
foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must
seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's
size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness
and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry,
and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But
the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to
date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase
both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the 453
exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to
trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance
facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies,
and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project
designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on
the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the 436
National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar
based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not
without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and
patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and 241
was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. [162]
Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi
farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to 185
solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide
ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there
were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems
were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of
a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with
politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the
interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning
public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal
shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here
and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient
methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting.
New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping
installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing
dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private ● [439] pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 13, 157, 157, 238, 288, 463 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errrors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort [166] made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 464 465 439 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour, (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

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* A mishara is reckoned =2,500 sq. metres.

PART IX.—GENERAL REVIEW OF PROBLEM

1. Old Conditions and New

000 In conclusion it may be useful to review the problem in the wider setting of the general agricultural development which it is the main purpose to stimulate and serve. The land traversed by the historic rivers of el 'Iraq was one of the cradles of civilisation. It has been the seat of a succession of famous kingdoms. It was one of the birthplaces of artificial irrigation. If not the earliest, it was the best known, source of mineral fuel. And from time immemorial it has been recognised as one of the most fertile areas in the world. The country thus played a part second to none in earlier days and still possesses exceptional natural resources. Unfortunately these initial advantages have been nullified by centuries of unprogressive administration and by the unprecedented progress in human organisation and scientific advance made in the meanwhile elsewhere.

439 In ancient days bursting granaries represented prosperity and constituted wealth. The old world was small and its good grain lands scarce: while those of el 'Iraq were productive and accessible by the leisurely transport of the time. To-day the grain lands of civilised man circle the globe; while science and organisation have enabled him everywhere to enhance quality and yield many fold, as well as to obliterate distance. Moreover, with increasing individual well-being and vastly increased control of the earth's resources, mankind is eating a smaller proportion of bread and demanding a greater proportion of other commodities. And since he has the whole world competing to meet his requirements, everywhere he is selecting higher quality, cleaner, better graded, better packed produce and rejecting inferior supplies. There is a belief prevalent in el 'Iraq, as in other countries, that combines, rings and other marketing associations have power to affect the nation's trade critically. Temporary and restricted effects they may have: but the modern world is too closely knit together and the volume of its trade far too large and too complex to allow such manœuvres to prevent any reliable supply of satisfactory goods from finding its proper market before long. And since solid and efficient trading associations are partners in the nation's prosperity, it is to the interest of all such associations to promote the expansion of the country's trade and the reputation of its goods in the world's markets.

185 But el 'Iraq to-day must be recognised as being in the position of an old estate, previously rich, still very valuable potentially, but now derelict through long bad management, accentuated by changing needs and progress elsewhere. And its difficulties have been enhanced by its unfavourable transport connections with the outside world, as judged by modern requirements. Subject to the over-riding necessity of preserving public order and contentment and to the steady improvement of communications, the country's primary need is the reclamation of its derelict national estate and the regeneration of its agriculture. No intelligent and progressive person inheriting such an estate would fail to recognise the wisdom of spending on it the capital sums needed to bring it to a high pitch of prosperity again. Such expenditure planned on well-considered lines, carefully managed financially, and devoted

312 The inadequacy of the existing irrigation system is generally recognised in so far as it relates to the great incompleteness of the network of engineering works needed, such as storage reservoirs, flood embankments, regulator constructions, delivery and drainage channels: but it appears at present to be insufficiently appreciated in the country that the proper utilisation and maintenance of these expensive works is even more important than their construction and probably calls for greater technical skill at the outset. It is a serious mistake to suppose that the management of a great engineering undertaking, such as a national irrigation system, is a simpler problem than its design and construction, or that such management can be economically and wisely left to inexpert hands or to officials primarily occupied with other duties.

242 The primitive methods of cultivation, stock-keeping and disposal of produce prevalently practised, as well as their marked effect on the quantity and quality of the country's output and on its reputation in the world's markets, have been repeatedly emphasised and need only be mentioned here.

439 To build up her prosperity el 'Iraq must evidently develop her export trade both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is therefore of great importance to follow the statistics of external trade continuously and to endeavour to adjust the country's agricultural output unceasingly to world demand. Unlike the various land statistics, which have proved so difficult to collect and so unreliable when collected, the Trade statistics kept by the Customs and Excise Department appear not only to be in excellent order but to be used. No attempt will be made to discuss these valuable figures here: but the nature, quantity and value of the principal exports of agricultural products during the five years 1925-6 to 1929-30 in the accompanying table should be noted.

TABLE IX. MAIN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS DURING FIVE YEARS 1925-6 TO 1929-30

Product	Quantity in thousands of tons	Value in lakhs of rupees
Living animals (horses, camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc.)	835·6*	87·7
Raw cotton	3·2	32·7
Dates	624·3	902·1
Grain, etc. (barley, pulse, rice, wheat, etc.)	366·2	449·1
Hides (cow, sheep, goats, wild animal, etc.)	9·5	171·9
Intestines (casings)	0·6	70·1
Raw silk	0·005	0·7
Tobacco	0·8	9·2
Raw wool	32·4	368·2

*Thousands of animals.

242 It is in experimenting in the culture of new or improved products required by the world, in adapting them to local environment, in multiplying them for local growth, and in demonstrating their successful cultivation and disposal on a commercial scale, that scientific agricultural research stations, progressive landed estates and well-managed marketing bodies, have such an indispensable part to play in the general development of the country's agriculture.

185 The establishment of an efficient national irrigation system and the application of the lessons of progressive scientific research and experience elsewhere must be recognised as two of the fundamental conditions of

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI
Egypt MRI

any solid economic advance in el 'Iraq. The third is the introduction and maintenance of a simple, secure and equitable land tenure, which term should be understood to include an even and readily met revenue demand. This report is only directly concerned with the last need: but in studying it, its inter-relation to the other two must be continuously kept in mind. No development of the country's agricultural resources can expect to be successful which does not take all these three needs into consideration together. I 185

3. Comparison with Egypt

8. During the progress of my inquiry comparisons were frequently instituted with Egypt, a country with many parallels to el 'Iraq both in its history and its natural conditions. Owing to the courtesy of the Egyptian Government I am able to compare in Table X the respective positions on certain salient points of el 'Iraq in 1929 and of Egypt in successive decades from 1882 onwards. It will be noted that during the last fifty years Egypt has more than doubled her population, added 30 per cent. to her cropped area, quadrupled her trade, and her budget, built up a substantial budgetary reserve, and largely absorbed her original external debt.

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TABLE X. COMPARATIVE FIGURES, EL 'IRAQ AND EGYPT

		EL 'IRAQ	EGYPT					
		1929	1882	1890	1900	1910	1920	1929
Population in millions		2·8	6·8	8·2	10·1	11·8	13·2	14·4
Gross cultivable area, sq. km. ..		90.000	32.000					
Area cropped yearly, sq. km. ..		10.000	24.000*	27.000*	30.000*	32.000*	34,000*	36,000*
Imports	in lakhs of rupees	980	1,100	1.100	1.900	3.200	14.000	7.200
Exports		560	1.800	1,700	2.400	4.000	11.800	7.800
Re-exports		310†	14	40	80	60	350	190
Land Revenue		168	680‡	700‡	600‡	700‡	700‡	720‡
Customs Revenue		274	80	190	330	480	1.370	1.620
Total Budgetary Revenue ..		570	1.300	1,650	1,630	2.260	4.700	5.790
TotalBudgetaryExpenditure		560	1.230	1,560	1,500	2.340	4,000	5.690
Budgetary Reserve Fund ..				300	1,150	790	2.370	5.540
Debt §			10,900	13.100	13.000	13.100	12,900	12.400

*From ½ to ⅔ cropped twice. Net area cultivated in 1929 was 23,000 sq. km.

†Goods in transit, not included in imports.

‡Yield maintained constant on re-assessment following revenue settlement. Fluctuations due to remissions to unwatered land followed by extensions of irrigation.

§Mostly held in Egypt now.

Egypt is more favourably situated geographically than el 'Iraq; while Mahommed Ali Pasha did much to initiate early in the last century the reform of her land tenure which has proceeded since. And it will be seen that even fifty years ago Egypt was considerably more populous and wealthier than el 'Iraq is to-day. But el 'Iraq is by no means devoid of advantages also. She has Egypt's established success before her. Her cultivable area is larger and more diverse, so that she is in a better position to develop a varied export trade. She is free of unproductive debt and can devote all funds not absorbed by current needs, to productive purposes. And her petroliferous deposits provide her with special financial aid at the most useful moment. So that a comparable advance to that made by Egypt may be hoped for, if a comparable effort can be made.

The unavoidably lengthy duration of a general settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq has been emphasised several times in this report: although no precise estimate of the period required is practicable in the 000

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Iraq Bedouin MH8

I 162 The population of Mosul and Arbil provinces exceeds 630,000, of which 530,000 are Muslims. Of these Muslims, all but 10,000 are Sunnis. There are 60,000 Christians, 32,000 Yezidis and 10,000 Jews. The minorities therefore total only one-fifth of the whole. The Muslims consist of Arabs and Kurds in approximately equal parts, together with some 16,000 Turkomans.

I [162] 438 ● 439 496 Mosul itself is mainly an Arab town with a population of 100,000. It is a great entrepôt for trade in sheep, cattle, wool, grain, hides, intestines, galls and eggs with the thickly populated districts round and also with Syria and Turkey. Its importance in this respect will certainly increase when at long last it is linked by rail with the Syrian frontier at Tel Kuchik and with Baghdad via Baa'iji. Work on this linking is now proceeding, and it is interesting to remember that when it is completed in a couple of years it will form the last stage in the famous Baghdad-Berlin Railway which was the Kaiser's fondest dream. The circumstances under which it will be completed are likely, however, to be very different to those which he visualized.

Arabs

I B 101 Apart from forming the majority of the inhabitants of Mosul itself, Arabs are found as cultivators on the Tigris both north and south of the town and to the south of the Jebal Sinjar (Sinjar mountain) and as bedouin who range the uncultivated areas to the south-west, west and north-west.

B 619 221 721 233 The bedouin consist of more than one tribe, but by far the most important is the Shammar. This great tribe is of Arabian origin and has in the past been pushed steadily northwards by economic forces and the search for new grazing grounds. With the great improvement in public security during recent years, cultivation has extended further and further from the towns and villages and encroached on the haunts of the Shammar. Formerly the means of livelihood of these bedouin were varied if not all respectable. They included the raiding of the flocks and herds of their weaker neighbours and the extortion of "khuwa" or safe-conduct money from merchants, travellers and others. At the same time they made a perfectly legitimate living from acting as shepherds for the flocks of townsmen and by breeding and selling camels. Nowadays raiding and safe-conduct money have been abolished and motor transport has to a great extent ousted the camel as a carrier in 'Iraq and the neighbouring countries and caused
a severe slump in the camel market.

I
K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I
168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
648] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
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K
now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade 438
with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge 439
of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though 173
unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradi- 782
tion at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the
bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, 539
who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with I
all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the K
construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while 653
sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When 185
echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on I
a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn K
Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled 721
by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the 361
Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body
of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a
jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

000 industrial shares or bonds, local capital will continue to be held
455 in hoards, or invested in trade, agriculture and real estate. Speculation in land values, especially urban sites, has come to play a great part in the economy of Iraq, and incidently absorbs a great
000 deal of capital. The problem lies then not in the deficiency of capital resources, but in the utilization of these resources and above all in the creation of a suitable environment to induce private enterprise and capital into the industrial field. In the writer's view the creation of such an environment is the core of the industrialisation problem in under-developed areas. As things are, private enterprise is primarily absorbed in trade, agriculture and speculation — especially in real estate — where easy money can be made, and the whole economy remains stagnant. Once this problem is tackled both local and foreign capital will flow in. The State, that is the highest authority in a society, is called upon to take the initiative. Its action must include financial, technical, educational and administrative measures.

654 In Iraq the State has made attempts to deal with all these as-
433 pects. In the fiscal field it has afforded protection for industry in
[439] the form of high tariff duties on most industrial products and in the exemption of power-driven machinery from such duties. It has prohibited or restricted the import of articles the like of which are being manufactured in Iraq, such as cement, cotton yarn, vegetable oil, soap, tanned leather, beer. Industrial schemes are given priority in the granting of import licences and the allocation of scarce currencies for purchases from abroad.

The new Law for the Encouragement of Industry passed in 1950 consolidated early legislation and made new concessions. Under this Law Iraq-owned industrial enterprises, that is enterprises in which 55 per cent of capital at least is held by Iraqi nationals, are granted exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions from import duties (not included in the tariff exemptions) on machinery, materials, equipment, spare parts and containers; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of Government land free of rent up to 25,000 square meters. Industries enjoy these concessions as long as they use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in cosiderable quantities. In any case they should use chiefly power-driven machinery in their works. These measures without doubt played a significant part in

438 more attractive for industry than other areas can be corrected by
[365] proper action. First and foremost is the relative cheapness of power and fuel in Baghdad. The cost of the electric power unit in most cities is double that of Baghdad and rarely is a municipality-owned plant able to supply sufficient power to industry. The cost of oil fuel is at least ten percent higher outside Baghdad. The correction of these factors, together with a more equal distribution of educational, housing, transport and social welfare facilities, could greatly relieve the situation. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry could also be amended so as to give additional concessions for industries established in other parts of the country. The cost of labour and land is already becoming burdensome for industry in Baghdad. This, in addition to the social evil of overcrowdedness, calls for immediate consideration.

434 (4) ***Limitation of Markets*** : A newly industrialised country can hardly hope to find foreign markets for its finished products. It has to depend on its home market. The market in Iraq, with its small population (about 5 million inhabitants), of low purchasing power (annual income per head is estimated at between £ 20 and £ 30 or $85), affords very limited scope for large-scale industry. Many of the industries studied at one time by the Industrial Bank, such as the making of artificial silk fibres, the manufacture of paper and cardboard from straw, and the printing of cotton piece-goods, had to be abandoned because the smallest economic unit of these plants is much beyond the capacity of the Iraqi market to support. This situation will no doubt improve as the whole economy of the coun-
439 try expands. But it should be possible to deal with this situation
648 more effectively by joint action on the part of the Arab States, along lines already discussed at high political level. These discussions have had the object of reducing or abolishing inter-state tariff barriers so as to make the whole area one market. Such an action is indeed vital to the progress and prosperity of these countries and their peoples. It should be remembered that before World War I, these countries formed one economic and political unit under the Ottoman Empire.

464 (5) ***Labour, Technical Staff and Management Problems***: The supply of ordinary labour, owing to the high rate of population increase (estimated to be one and a half per cent per annum) and emigration from country to town, is quite sufficient and will remain so

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CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES VALLEYS

It was trade which first brought the English to the Persian Gulf 175
and into the Tigris and Euphrates valleys,[1] as it had first taken 439
them to India, China and Japan. In 1616, the East India Company, hoping to find new markets for its woollen cloth, no longer a novelty in India, dispatched the *James* under the terms of the three *farmāns*[2] obtained by Richard Steele and John Crowther from Shah Abbas in September, 1615,[3] to Jask, just outside the Clarence Straits. A few years later, 1619, the monopoly of the silk trade through the Persian Gulf was granted to the Company[4] by Shah Abbas.

The Portuguese, for more than a century following a treaty with Shah Ismā'īl in 1515, had dominated trade from Hormuz, but after the capture of the island in 1622 by a combined force of Englishmen and Persians,[5] they speedily lost the ascendancy, not to the English, but to the Dutch. Not until 1766, when the Dutch factory on Kharag Island was destroyed by the Persians and the Dutch threats to sweep England from the seas had come to nothing, were the English merchants able to gain the mastery of trade in the Middle East, a supremacy which they have

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[1] John Newbery, Ralph Fitch and John Elred of the Turkey and Levant Co., founded in 1581, had already passed from Aleppo to Baghdad and thence down the Persian Gulf to India. See: Purchas, *His Pilgrimes* (ed. 1625), lib. viii, p. 449. Hakluyt, Tome II, i, pp. 245-71; also Birdwood, Sir G., *Report on Miscellaneous Old Records at the India Office* (1890), p. 196.

[2] *Farmān*, following the Persian فرمان

[3] Purchas *His Pilgrimes*, lib. IV, cap. xiii, p. 524. For an account of the opening of trade with Persia by the Moscovy Co., see *Early Voyages in Russia and Persia* (Hakluyt Society), edited by Morgan, E. D., and Coote, C. H. (2 vols., 1886).

[4] *State Papers* (East Indies), No. 753.

[5] Low, C. R., *History of the Indian Navy* (1877), Vol. I, pp. 31-7. The terms of co-operation were never fully carried out by the Persians.

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retained to the present time, in spite of acute rivalry from other Powers, notably Germany and Japan in the twentieth century.[1]

From the first, the East India Company had been obliged to undertake more than purely commercial activities. The pioneering nature of their ventures and the distance from the home government made it essential that they, in common with other trading companies of that age, should maintain their own armies and navies, provide their own charts and conduct most of their own political negotiations, activities which, in the end, were to overshadow the commercial origins of the companies. From the beginning, ships of the Company, and later of its Bombay Marine, were stationed in the Gulf to protect trade and on political missions.

Piracy for a time threatened to be a more serious obstacle to English trade than the hostility of European rivals.[2] The freebooters, the most numerous and troublesome of whom were the Jawasim (properly قُواسم) tribes along the Gulf coast from Ras Musandum to Qatar peninsula, whose predatory habits had been stimulated by Wahhābī influence with its emphasis on the Muslim injunction of plunder and death to unbelievers, attacked not only merchant shipping but also Company cruisers. Aroused by the continued attacks, the Company dispatched a series of expeditions from Bombay in 1806, 1809,[3] and 1819,[4] which effectually broke the power of the Pirate Coast tribes,[5] whose chiefs were forced to sign a General Treaty of Peace, January 8th, 1820.[6]

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[1] British imports have declined, however, from 60 per cent of the total in the years immediately before 1914 to 32 per cent in 1934-5. Japanese imports rose from 1·83 per cent in 1930-1 to 20·04 per cent of the total in 1934-5: *Economic Conditions in 'Iraq*, 1933-35, Department of Overseas Trade, No. 627 (1936).

[2] Low, op. cit., pp. 79 ff. Also Miles, S. B., *Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf* (1919), Vol. 1, pp. 223, 266 ff.

[3] Low, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 325.

[4] Ibid., p. 351.

[5] The section of coast inhabited by the Arab pirates was then so-called. After the treaty it became known as the Trucial Coast.

[6] Aitchison, C. U., *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Delhi, 1933, 5th ed.), Vol. xi, Persian Gulf, No. xix.

GROWTH OF BRITISH INTERESTS

175* From the Treaty of 1820, arising primarily from the necessity of safety for commerce, dated the beginnings of the political supremacy of Great Britain over the Arabs of the Gulf. It was eventually replaced in 1853 by a Treaty of Peace in perpetuity which stipulated that 'perfect maritime truce' now established 'for evermore' should be enforced by the British Government. All acts of aggression were to be referred to the British authorities in the Persian Gulf.[1]

175* 439 567 Traffic in slaves in the Gulf had been forbidden in Article 9 of the Treaty of 1820, but it had not been noticeably affected by the prohibition. Additional treaties and agreements attempted to deal with the traffic,[2] but only the presence of British men-of-war on patrol in the Gulf, with orders to seize all slaving ships, effectively suppressed it.

175* Experience gained from the early attempts to deal with the pirates, especially after the expeditions of 1809 and 1819, had shown the necessity for charts of the Persian Gulf. Preliminary surveys had been undertaken in 1772 of the coast, and in 1785 of the Shatt al-'Arab as far as Basra, but not until 1820 was the work resumed under Captain Philip Maughan and later under Captain Guy.[3] The surveys continued for nine years, forming the basis of the present charts of the Gulf. Other surveys, principally in Turkish Arabia, were made throughout the century until the outbreak of the war in 1914.[4]

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[1] Aitchison, *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Delhi, 1933, 5th ed.), Vol. xi, Persian Gulf, No. xxiv.

[2] Ibid., Vol. xiii (Calcutta, 1933, 5th ed.). Persia, Nos. xv, xvi, xix; ibid., Vol. xi, Persian Gulf Nos. ix, xx, xxiii, xxviii, xxix.

[3] Low, op. cit., Vol. i, pp. 185 ff.

[4] Chesney, in 1835-6, made surveys of the Tigris and Euphrates, a work carried on by Cmdr. Henry Blosse Lynch, from 1837 to 1840, when he surveyed the Tigris from Mōsul to Ctesiphon and sections of the Euphrates. Capt. J. C. Hawkins explored the Euphrates with great difficulty for some 500 miles above Basra in 1838. In 1840-2, the Tigris below Baghdad was surveyed by Lieutenant C. D. Campbell. Commander Felix Jones, 1843-54, explored the Persian hills from Baghdad to Mōsul, and made surveys from Musaiyib to Baghdad. In 1841-2, and again in 1856, Captain W. S. Selby made surveys from Babylon to Sāmawa and up the Kārūn river. See: Wilson, Sir A. T., *Persian Gulf* (1928), pp. 281 ff. Low, op. cit., Vol. ii, pp. 31 ff., pp. 403 ff; also, Hoskins, H. L., *British Routes to India* (1928), pp. 180-2.

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manipulating the political situation in Europe, she could safeguard the routes to India. She had not yet fully realized that political control, direct or indirect, would have to be assumed over territories through which lay actual and potential highways to her indispensable Eastern possessions. 175

Protection of the Indians engaged in trade at Basra and Baghdad and of the Indian Muslims on pilgrimage to the four Holy Cities of Turkish Arabia, concern for the sanitary conditions at Basra and the Holy Cities, the distribution of the Oudh bequest, the administration of the India Postal System, established in 1868 at Basra and Baghdad, the irrigation schemes projected by Sir William Willcocks in 1911,[1] and executed by British companies, and, above all, the encouragement and protection of commerce and river navigation continued to be the methods by which British influence and position were maintained and extended. British prestige centred largely about the Residency at Baghdad with its guard of Indian troops,[2] and the armed sloop attached to it, yet so strong was it among the tribes that on a number of occasions British representatives were approached by Arabs who desired Great Britain to establish a protectorate over them.[3]

Great Britain's early interest in communications with India, 175 however, had not been without some valuable results. The expeditions 439 sent out from 1834 onwards and the presence of armed steamers on the Tigris[4] paved the way for the initiation of a

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[1] Willcocks, Sir William, *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, Revised Ed.).

[2] 'Our maintenance of troops as far north as Baghdad . . . could not have been actuated by hope of commercial gain. It must have been due to our strategic position in those regions.' Lord Lamington, former Governor of Bombay, 1903-7, *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1908, p. 17.

[3] In 1899, 1902, 1912; *Official Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, September, 1911; October, 1911; February, 1912.

[4] In 1840 and 1841, four armed steamers of the East India Company, the *Assyria*, *Nitocris*, *Nimrod*, and *Euphrates*, designed to establish further British influence, made periodic trips from Basra to Baghdad with goods, mail and passengers. Surveys were also made on both the Tigris and Euphrates (*supra*, p. 33). All but the *Nitocris* were withdrawn in 1842. *Parl. Papers*, 1840 (323), Pt. II, 299-300.

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175* British mercantile line on the Tigris[1] and for a further expansion
439 of British commerce which, advancing far beyond the days when Basra had first been a centre for part of the Gulf trade, contributed not a little to the predominant position and influence which Great Britain exercised in Turkish Arabia. In 1911 and 1912, imports through Basra and Baghdad averaged for each of the two years, £3,100,000, of which the great proportion were British and Indian goods destined for re-export to Persia by way of Kermanshah. Exports by sea for the same years averaged £3,247,500.[2]

175* The transportation of practically all of these commodities was
505 in British or Anglo-Indian bottoms, while the handling of the largest proportion of the entire river transport had come into the hands of the firm of Lynch Brothers, who from 1860 had assumed the local management of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. It had enjoyed a virtual monopoly until the advent of Midhat Pasha's river service. In spite of constant interference from the Turkish authorities,[3] the company carried on a comparatively efficient service, although at high rates. It also maintained, with a Government subsidy, a line of steamers on the Kārūn River, after it had been opened by the Shah of Persia in 1888.

175* So strategically placed were the river valleys, so firmly was external trade regarded as a British monopoly, so paramount was British influence that British statesmen had come to regard

eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

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[1] This mercantile service was maintained from 1836 on the Tigris, ostensibly under the *firmān* (following the Arabic فرمان) originally granted in 1834 to the British Government for the operation of two steamers for commercial purposes on the Euphrates in connection with the Euphrates Expedition of that year. (Herslet, *Commercial Treaties* (1820-1925), Vol. XIII, pp. 838-9). Just how this *firmān* could be applied to the Tigris is not easily understood. Neither the subsequent one of 1842 (ibid., p. 839) nor the Vizierial Letter of 1861 (ibid., p. 845) defined clearly the rights and privileges which the company exercised and claimed.

[2] *Report on the Conditions of Trade in Mesopotamia* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 13.

[3] Other than purely political reports, the difficulties of the company with Turkish officials occupied more dispatches from the Resident at Baghdad to the Foreign Office than any other subject.

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241 has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahīn* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 437 features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648 may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433 existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466 have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647 of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175 economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185 of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.

[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

655 of a small cash reserve. The resulting loss in revenue can be offset 249 by an increase in the tobacco excises which are relatively easy to collect from the manufacturers. The reduction in illicit production and marketing thus achieved should make it possible to raise the existing limitation on output per donum. This would encourage the better farmers, yet probably would not necessitate a further restriction of the licensed area, which the Mission realizes would be politically impracticable.

The Introduction of Sugar

249 In view of the government's desire to introduce the cultivation of sugar beets in northern Iraq, this subject has also been given [439] special attention by the Mission. The possibility merits serious consideration because Iraq has imported over the last three years, on the average, 75,000 tons of sugar annually. There is, in addition, a serious need for new crops to diversify production and make more effective use of the manpower on the land. The Mission believes, however, that no decision on the production of sugar should be made until there is reasonable assurance that sugar can be produced at a cost competitive with the landed price of imported sugar (thus exclusive of import duty) and that the farmer will derive an income from sugar at least equal to that obtained from alternative crops, such as cotton, which can be grown on the same land. Moreover, before a decision is made in favor of sugar beets, the superiority of this crop over sugar cane, which could be grown in the South, must have been clearly established.

Sugar beets have been successfully grown in northern Iraq in test plantings carried out by the Department of Agriculture. Larger and more extensive test plantings are necessary, however, particularly to study the problems of insect control, yields and costs. The problems of labor supply and transport also need to be more thoroughly explored. The cultivation, transport and processing of sugar beets require close coordination and therefore careful organization. The production of beets is exacting, requiring considerable skill and labor. While preliminary evidence indicates that, on the basis of current price relationships, the yield per donum of sugar beets and cotton would not be significantly different, the balance of advantage may well prove to be on the side of cotton since, owing

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

457 certain extent, this has been financed by a net drawing on Iraq's sterling balances, but the most important source of finance has been the oil companies. During the last three years they have transferred to Iraq an average of nearly £10,000,000 in sterling annually. Part of this consists of royalties and other contractual payments paid to the government and subsequently spent by it, mainly on projects in the capital budget. The larger part, however, has been transferred to pay for current expenses of the oil companies for production, construction projects and exploration. These expenditures have directly or indirectly provided income for the people, which in turn has created a demand for imported goods; the foreign exchange has provided the means to pay for them. Thus the activities of the oil companies can be said to have both caused and financed a large part of the gap.

654x
439 457 The same process will continue as expenditure by the Development Board rises. The Mission envisages that this may reach ID 50,000,000 in about five years' time. Some imports of materials or machinery will result directly from the requirements of the program. The balance of the Board's expenditures will, however, be for the most part made in Iraq. The large quantity of money, which will thereby be put into circulation, will pass from hand to hand and most of it will eventually be spent on imports. This means that in the next five years imports can be expected to increase by a large proportion of the ID 50,000,000 to be spent by the Development Board. At the least, the value of imports is likely to be double what it has been in the last few years.

654x
434 The magnitude of the program and its effect on the economy may also be illustrated by consideration of the national income. The national income of Iraq in 1949 was estimated by the Statistical Office of the United Nations at a figure in dollars equivalent to either ID 100,000,000 or ID 150,000,000, depending on the exchange rate. On the basis of some rough and incomplete calculations the Mission estimates that the actual figure probably fell near the middle of this range. It may now be nearer the upper end, since the price and the volume of production of some commodities, especially cotton, has greatly increased and some industrial expansion has taken place. Thus an increase in the government's annual income from oil of ID 50,000,000 would alone be equivalent to at

relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major /33 one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311 nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438 the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241 River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312 carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162] lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438 generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342 dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262 the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439 ● stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504 marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

V. Production

A considerable part of Iraq's potentially large resources are as 311 yet unutilized or ineffectively utilized. Most of the manpower on 433 the land is underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of flow. Oil reserves have as yet been tapped only in relatively modest quantities. The output of the country is therefore still very low and the standard of living correspondingly depressed.

Agriculture and Livestock

Estimates of the area and output of the principal crops are 241 given in the table below. Although the statistics are not very reliable, they give some indication of the relative importance of the various crops. Barley and wheat are clearly the dominant crops. Barley is one of the leading exports, and cereals altogether accounted for 43 percent by value of the country's exports other than oil in the period 1948-50. Rice is another important cereal. Cotton is now vying with rice as the leading summer crop. Stimulated by high prices and government encouragement, the area planted to cotton has risen rapidly in recent years. In 1951, probably about 580,000 donums were put in cotton—almost five times the amount in the preceding year. Other summer crops are comparatively insignificant. Some sesame is grown for oil, and some corn, millet and grain sorghum. Tobacco assumes importance only in the mountainous area of the North. Virtually no crops are grown for animal fodder, and the production of hay is unknown. The area devoted to soil-building crops such as legumes is rather small.

Next to cereals, dates are the most important crop. There 245 are about 20.2 million date trees, of which about 9.7 million are 439 along the Shatt al Arab near Basra and the balance in the central valley districts of the Tigris and the Euphrates and the Diyala River Valley. Dates are a staple food over most of Iraq and date exports, particularly from the Basra area, contributed 31 percent by

value of the country's total exports, other than oil, in the years 245
1948-1950. Citrus fruit, grown for domestic consumption, is of 439
considerable importance in the Diyala River valley and substantial quantities of other fruits and nuts, although of rather poor quality and marketability, are grown in the North, especially in Suleimaniya and Erbil. Vegetable culture is of particular importance in the neighborhood of large cities.

Agricultural yields are generally low, although most of the 241
soil is inherently quite fertile. Barley yields, for instance, are about 30 to 35 percent less than those in Canada and the United States and probably slightly less than those of Turkey and Iran. Little or no animal manure or fertilizer is applied, animal dung being used largely for fuel. Salinity attributable to poor drainage has materially lowered productivity of land in the irrigation zone. The soil is often poorly prepared, and weeds detract from the yields. Chief reliance is placed on the fallow system to restore soil fertility, but, since fallow land is often allowed to go up in weeds on which animals graze, its efficacy is limited.

The raising of livestock is an important industry. Sheep and 233
goats predominate because they thrive despite poor grazing and feeding.

TABLE 6

ESTIMATE OF LIVESTOCK POPULATION, 1949-50

Sheep	7,489,700
Goats	1,754,300
Cattle	1,034,600
Buffaloes	200,700
Camels	279,200
Horses	183,800
Mules	66,850
Donkeys	326,400

Sheep and goats, as well as camels, are kept primarily by 231
pastoral nomads who probably number well over 200,000. Cattle and water buffaloes are the livestock of the settled agricultural

231 population. Livestock, however, are an adjunct to agriculture rather than an integral part of it. Many fellahin have no livestock at all except for a draft animal or two. Livestock are left to forage for themselves, with only some supplementary feeding with straw and perhaps barley in the winter. Only the livestock in and around the cities are systematically fed. Livestock yields are generally very low, primarily because of inadequate feeding, but also because [439] of poor breeding and disease. Yet livestock and livestock products —wool, hides and skins, and casings—accounted for about 13 percent of the total value of Iraq's exports, exclusive of oil, in the period 1948-1950.

Industrial Output

433 Industrial production is still very small. Reliable figures on industrial output and employment are unavailable. According to the Department of Labor, there are roughly 2,400 enterprises in industry, exclusive of service industries, employing over four persons. From Department of Labor data as well as certain supplementary sources, it is possible to give a breakdown for approximately 45,000 people engaged in industrial production. As already indicated, the actual number of people so employed is apparently considerably greater if account is taken of small handicraft enterprises. About 11,500 are employed in petroleum production and refining. The textile, apparel and footwear industries probably employ about 11,000 people. The processing of food, beverages, tobacco, other agricultural products and livestock products accounts for an employment of perhaps 9,000; the production of building materials, including bricks, tile and cement, for about 6,000; and wood processing, for approximately 2,000. Metal-working and machinery repair and maintenance account for most of the balance.

These employment figures tend to convey a rather exaggerated impression of possible industrial output. With the exception of those in the petroleum industry, virtually all are employed in small undertakings where the work is predominantly done by hand and productivity is accordingly very low. It is estimated that only about 2,000 people are engaged in what might be characterized as modern plants. Among these are one woolen and one cotton mill, one brewery, several distilleries, a cement plant, a vegetable oil and soap factory, and a number of flour mills.

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to supplement its capital by borrowing and accepting time deposits 453
from certain institutions, their resources have been wholly inadequate to the need.

VIII. Domestic and Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments

As noted earlier, trade is probably the second most important 443
occupation. To all appearances, the system of distribution is extremely wasteful. Both in the small towns and in the larger cities there are numerous traders with very small stocks of goods, who cannot possibly earn more than an exiguous income, even if their margin of profit is high. The position is, however, not likely to be cured until the general level of incomes rises and there is alternative opportunity for employment.

Iraq produces most of its food, but apart from fuel, tobacco, 433
and some building materials, most of its other requirements must 439
be imported. Even the small local industries and handicrafts depend to some extent on imported raw materials. Much of the trade is therefore foreign trade. Baghdad is the principal center for the import trade and also has a considerable share in the export trade, although Mosul is the main center for the export of wool and Basra for dates and barley.

Although there are a number of large firms, among them sev- 439
eral foreign companies, engaged in the export-import business, 477
trade is by no means monopolized, as can be seen from the following table which shows the distribution of import licenses granted:

TABLE 9

Import Licenses: 1951

Import Quota (ID 000)	Number of Importers		Total Allocation (ID million)
	Baghdad	Other Cities	
100-180	36	18	6.6
50-80	60	24	4.9
20-40	344	147	13.1
5-10	1,015	502	[illegible]
	1,453	691	34.9

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[455]

Competition, in fact, is quite keen in bulk commodities like sugar, tea and textiles. There is no organized market, either in export or import commodities, so that, as speculation is rife, prices can swing rapidly upward on the basis of rumored or actual shortage.

TABLE 10

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IMPORTS INTO IRAQ (by value)
(in millions of dinars)

	1938	1947	1948	1949	1950
1. Sugar	0.5	1.7	3.7	2.2	4.8
2. Tea	0.4	2.3	2.1	2.8	2.9
3. Cereals and flour	—	0.2	2.3	1.1	—
4. Other food, beverages and tobacco	0.4	2.0	1.4	1.5	0.9
5. Cotton and rayon piece-goods	1.3	7.7	7.7	6.2	6.4
6. Other textiles and clothing[1]	0.9	4.0	3.4	2.9	3.0
7. Soap and matches	0.1	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.7
8. Cement and timber	0.5	1.6	1.6	1.0	0.4
9. Petroleum products	0.3	0.9	1.6	1.3	1.6
10. Iron and steel	1.1	4.8	5.0	4.9	3.7
11. Automobiles, trucks, and parts[2]	0.5	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.2
12. Machinery; electrical and other transport equipment	1.7	4.4	6.8	7.0	5.9
13. Miscellaneous	1.7	7.3	6.4	5.9	5.2
Total	9.4	40.0	45.5	40.5	37.6
Oil company imports[3]	1.0	5.1	9.5	10.3	8.4
Net	8.4	34.9	36.0	30.2	29.2

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[1] Excluding burlap bags, rope, etc.

[2] Including tires and tubes.

[3] The majority of these imports were in categories 9 to 12. For example, oil company imports in these categories were about ID 8,000,000 in 1948 and ID 9,000,000 in 1949, out of a total of ID 16,000,000 in each year. Except for petroleum products, these goods were virtually all for the companies' own use rather than for resale.

Imports

Table 10 gives a list of the principal imports for 1938 and for the last four years. Broadly speaking, categories 1 to 7 represent the principal consumer goods, categories 8 to 12 fuel, building materials and capital equipment, and category 13 some con- [redacted] goods and some industrial raw materials. As the footnote to the table indicates, however, the list as it stands includes imports by the oil companies for their own use, only a very small proportion of which are consumer goods. If these are eliminated, the breakdown in 1948 and 1949 would be roughly as follows:

TABLE 11

IMPORTS
(excluding oil company imports for their own use)

		1948		1949	
		(ID million)	(%)	(ID million)	(%)
1-7.	Principal consumer goods	21.5	59	17.6	56
8-12.	Fuel, capital goods, etc.	11.0	30	9.3	29
13.	Miscellaneous	5.0	13	4.6	15
		37.5	100	31.5	100

Thus about 60 percent of the imports other than those by the oil companies were consumer goods, of which textiles, sugar and tea, which are the bulk commodities purchased by the mass of the people, were much the most important. Quantities of these goods imported during the past years are shown in the following table:

TABLE 12

IMPORTS OF TEXTILES, SUGAR AND TEA
(by quantity)

	Piece goods			Sugar	Tea
	Cotton	Art. silk	Woolen	(000 tons)	
	(in million square meters)				
1930-34 av.	62.2	11.4	1.2	37.6	2.1
1935-39 av.	60.6	17.3	2.2	40.5	3.0
1947	47.2	4.1	1.2	28.7	6.4
1948	56.0	1.5	2.0	85.8	6.2
1949	61.6	4.2	1.6	52.0	8.0
1950	54.3	10.1	1.4	87.2	6.9

It will be observed that imports of sugar and tea are now more than double what they were before the war, which, even after discounting an increase in population, must indicate a large rise in consumption per head. Imports of textiles, on the other hand, are

439 actually less than before the war, so that, although domestic production has increased, consumption per head must have fallen. Since the war, however, the government has encouraged the import of secondhand clothing, licenses being granted for imports from the United States.

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439 Iraq usually produces sufficient cereals for its own use, imports in 1948 and 1949 being the consequence of two successive harvest failures. Apart from ghee, spices and some vegetables, most of the other foods are high-quality products consumed by the comparatively rich. Of these the import of beer has recently been prohibited, since a modern brewery now supplies the country's requirements.

Both soap and matches are made in Iraq, but soap manufacture was until recently a "backyard" industry and the quality of the product was poor. The sharp drop in imports of cement and timber in 1950 is a consequence of the new cement plant coming into full production. Imports of timber were also low owing to a depression in the building industry. Timber requirements are, however, likely to increase, as Iraq's own sources of supply are meager. Imports of iron and steel have also been affected by the slump in construction. This category, however, includes a wide range of other articles besides structural steel, the most important in recent years being pipelines for the oil companies. Other articles, such as household ware, should more properly be included with consumer goods.

As Iraq's output of refined petroleum products is limited to a small refinery and the requirements of motor transport, irrigation pumps, agricultural machinery and industry have steadily increased, a growing deficit has had to be made up by imports. The government plans to build a new refinery which should, when completed, remove the need to import virtually all of these products.

Among the most important categories of machinery are irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery, imports of the latter having greatly increased since the war. Other items include equipment for electricity production and distribution, and plants for the various new industries started since the war, such as textiles, distilling and the manufacture of ice.

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The miscellaneous category includes such items as glassware, 433
ceramic products and pharmaceutical products. A number of raw 439
materials or other products used in industry are also included, for example: tanning material; leather for shoemaking; wooden boxes and other materials for packing dates (to the value of about half a million dinars in 1948); oils and oilseeds for the vegetable oil and soap industry; and non-ferrous metals for the small metal-working industries.

Exports

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The three principal groups of exports are dates, cereals and animal products. Although there have been large fluctuations in the quantities exported, particularly of cereals, over the last 25 years their combined value has usually been at least 85 percent of the total value of exports other than oil, and has often been more. Of the remaining export products, cotton has usually been of some importance in the past and promises to be of much greater importance in the future. Prewar and postwar values of the groups of exports are shown in the following table:

TABLE 13

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS
(in millions of dinars)

	1931-35 Av.	1936-39 Av.	1947	1948	1949	1950
Dates	0.9	0.9	4.7	4.7	3.2	4.3
Cereals	0.7	1.3	6.7	0.2	5.8	10.8
Animal products	0.5	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.2	2.2
Other	0.4	0.5	1.2	1.1	1.0	3.1
Total	2.5	3.9	13.8	7.6	11.2	20.4

Dates. Iraq has long been the foremost exporter of dates in 433
the world. The quantity exported has increased steadily from an 439
average of 120,000 tons in the late twenties to 200,000 tons since the war. The crop may vary considerably from year to year. For example, the amount exported in the last quarter of 1949 and the first three quarters of 1950, which represents approximately the exportable surplus from the 1949-50 crop, was about 150,000 tons. The 1950-51 crop, on the other hand, was unprecedentedly large and a record amount of 340,000 tons was exported.

439 433 As Iraq has such a large share in the world's trade, variations in the size of the crop can cause large fluctuations in price and, in a prolific year, marketing difficulties. Since 1939 the burden of marketing the prime quality varieties (Khadrawi, Hallawi and Sayer), which are sold in the United Kingdom, Western Europe, North America and Australia, has been largely removed by a series of bulk contracts between the Date Association and a British company, under which the latter has agreed to purchase at a fixed price all dates of these varieties grown in Basra province.

No such scheme exists for the Zahdi and other lower quality dates. Their principal markets are in India, Egypt and other countries of the Far and Middle East to which much of the trade is carried in the traditional Persian Gulf sailing ships. Disposal of the extremely large 1950-51 crop through the normal channels proved impossible and the price of Zahdi dates fell during 1951 to a point where it was hardly remunerative to transport them to Basra. Faced with this situation, the government sent a trade mission to India and Pakistan and succeeded in making agreements with those countries which provided, among other things, for increased imports of dates.

Cereals. Barley is the only cereal now exported in large quantities, but the quantity is subject to extreme fluctuations owing to the great variability in the crop. On the average, exports have increased considerably over the years. In the latter half of the twenties, they averaged 100,000 tons and before the war 230,000 tons. From 1945 to 1947 they were around 250,000 tons annually, but successive bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 led to a temporary ban on exports in 1948, when less than 3,000 tons were exported. Two bumper crops followed, however, and in 1949 and 1950 exports, which had not before exceeded 300,000 tons, amounted to 326,000 and 462,000 tons respectively.

433 439 262 There was normally a surplus of wheat for export before the war; in 1937, the best year, over 100,000 tons were exported. Since the war, however, exports have been negligible except in 1950, while in 1948 and 1949 there were considerable imports as a consequence of the bad harvests. On balance, therefore, Iraq cannot at present be considered an exporter of wheat. This is, no doubt, due to the increasing consumption of wheat in the country, as a

consequence not only of the increase in population, but also of 433
the shift from the rural areas, where barley is often a staple ele- 439 ●
ment in the diet. 262

Large quantities of rice are produced, but the surplus for export has always been very small. The only other cereal exported in any quantity is millet.

Animal Produce. The principal animal products exported 433
by Iraq are wool, live animals, hides and skins and casings (intes- 437
tines), usually in that order of importance. The sheep is the main source of these products, providing all the wool and usually the bulk of the other products. As with dates and cereals, the quantities exported vary greatly from year to year, sheep being vulnerable not only to disease, but also to extremes of winter cold and summer drought. In contrast with the other main exports, however, there has been no tendency for exports of animal products to increase. Exports of wool, hides and skins have, on the whole, been below prewar levels, while those of casings have fallen off badly. As animals are often taken across the frontier on the hoof, customs returns of live animals exported are not reliable. The recorded decrease since before the war, is, however, too large to be discounted.

Information on the animal population and on the domestic consumption of meat and other products is sketchy and unreliable. A rise in the consumption of meat could well explain the loss of exports of live animals, but this in turn would tend to make available a larger, not smaller, supply of most by-products. Part of the [233
explanation of the fall in export products may lie in a declining 162]
sheep population owing to the gradual shift from the pastoral life to settled agriculture and from agriculture to the towns. The monograph on agriculture and animal husbandry discusses the shortcomings of the livestock industry and recommends measures to improve livestock raising and the quality of livestock products. The value of exports of animal products is likely to continue its downward trend unless these measures are undertaken speedily and vigorously.

Sheep are especially important as a potential source of dollars. 431
Wool is the most important export to the United States, which 457
also takes all the casings exported and considerable quantities of

439 457 skins. Not all the dollar income accrues to Iraq, however, partly because invoices are regularly undervalued and also because some commodities are sold through intermediaries in the Lebanon.

439 **Other Products.** In the years 1947 to 1949 the remaining exports consisted of the following: bricks and sand exported for use by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the value of about ID 300,000 a year; a variety of agricultural products, whose total value did not exceed ID 500,000 in any one year; and cotton. Iraq has always exported a little cotton, but in the best years, just before the war and again in 1950, its value was only about five percent [248] of all export receipts. The position is now changing radically. Iraq, like several neighboring countries, is experiencing a cotton boom. Under the stimulus of high prices, the area under cultivation has increased rapidly in the last few years and predictions for the 1951 crop have ranged as high as 150,000 tons of seed-cotton, compared with 25,000 tons the year before. If the fellah's traditional aversion to a crop he cannot consume himself has been permanently overcome and if he can acquire the necessary knowledge for good cultivation, cotton could very soon become one of Iraq's most important exports, if not the most important. As a summer crop, however, its cultivation will be hazardous until the control of the rivers gives better assurance of a summer water supply.

Import Policy

439 656 457 All foreign transactions are, with certain exceptions, subject to exchange control. Imports from hard currency areas have been governed by licensing systems and have been limited to goods such as agricultural and industrial machinery, automobiles, trucks and drugs. Before 1948, imports from other areas were not subject to license, except for about 100 items, mainly luxuries. In that year, however, Iraq experienced a very large drain on her foreign exchange reserves and a more complex system was introduced.

Under the system now in force, all imported goods have been placed on one of several lists, the two longest consisting of "unlimited" and "limited" goods. Each merchant is given an annual quota in dinars, within which he can import unlimited goods without restriction, provided he obtains a license for each purchase. Alternatively, he can spend a small part of his quota on "limited" goods, but only up to a fixed amount.

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Unlimited goods consist mainly of the goods purchased by 439
the common people such as tea, sugar and cotton textiles, and a 656
variety of other goods considered essential, such as drugs and medical 457
equipment, educational matter, industrial, electrical and agricultural machinery, transport equipment and raw materials for local industries such as gunny bags, certain vegetable oils, *mastika* (for *arak*), tanning extracts and non-ferrous metals. The principal object of the system, when it was introduced, was to prevent a shortage of these necessities—and hence high prices—at a time when imports as a whole had to be restricted to protect the country's exchange reserves. As an additional safeguard, each application for an import license was scrutinized to insure that the articles being purchased were not too highly priced. Since Iraq's foreign exchange position greatly improved in 1950, the import of unlimited goods is now permitted without any quota limitation.

The goods on the limited list, while not strictly luxuries, consist of goods considered less essential than those in the unlimited list. This includes, for example, ready-made clothing of various kinds, automobiles, matches, and certain types of household utensils and electric ware. Luxuries, such as bananas, confectionery, cosmetics, Persian rugs and nylon stockings, were placed on a third list of goods "without foreign exchange." These goods could be purchased only by merchants who held a special license to import "without foreign exchange," which meant that they had to acquire foreign exchange through other than the official channels. Such licenses also permitted them to purchase goods on the other two lists.

Foreign exchange can be acquired without official license in a number of ways, of which the following are probably the most important: by undervaluation of exports, especially wool, hides and skins; by the export of dates to neighboring countries in small craft (in this case retention of foreign exchange is legally permitted); by smuggling, although there is probably a net inflow of smuggled goods; by sale of dinar notes to foreign pilgrims to the Holy Cities; and by overvaluation of imports. The present system was introduced in order to compel merchants to use these resources instead of drawing on the national exchange reserves. Although the system has been successful in that there has been a very

439 extensive use of private exchange holdings, particularly in 1949
656 when licenses to the value of over ID 10,000,000 were issued, it
457 may well be that it has also encouraged the illegal acquisition of
foreign exchange.

A fourth list consists of prohibited goods. This is purely a protective device, almost all of the goods in this list being produced in Iraq. These include a variety of agricultural products such as sesame seeds and cottonseed or their oils. Several of the newer industries have also been protected by the prohibition of their products, for example, beer, cement, cotton yarn, aluminum ware, alcohol and hides.

Although the improvement in the foreign exchange situation has led to a relaxation of the quota limitation, the other restrictions remain. In particular, import licenses still have to be obtained for each purchase. Although it is maintained that licenses can now be obtained quickly, this appears to act as at least a psychological deterrent to merchants. One of the objects of the licensing system is to restrict importing to bona fide merchants, but if this is considered necessary, it could, of course, be achieved by the issue of a general importer's license, good for a period such as a year.

439 As the economy develops and the standard of living rises,
656 which it may do rapidly in the near future, the demand for goods now on the limited and prohibited lists is likely to increase and restrictions on imports of these goods might easily have an inflationary effect on prices. This would hit the artisan, the clerk and the civil servant, and might increase the cost of the development program. Any extension of prohibition to textiles and other goods produced in Iraq would, of course, hurt the poorest classes. Under these circumstances, it will be very difficult to manage so rigid a system.

A much more flexible instrument would be the customs tariff, but little coordination of the import licensing system with the tariff
[651] seems to have been achieved. At present the tariff is primarily a means for raising revenue and, as such, imposes the greatest burden on those who buy bulk commodities. It hardly conforms to the objectives of a licensing system that aims at a plentiful supply of these goods at low prices. The principal objection put forward to higher duties on luxuries is the increased premium

thereby put on smuggling which is difficult to control in a country 439
with long land frontiers, even with a large police force. On the 656
other hand, smuggled goods can now be purchased quite openly, and it is hard to believe that enforcement could not be made more effective.

In any event, outright restriction of imports could cause prices to rise and so put almost as great a premium on smuggling as a high tariff. The government has tried to prevent excessive mark-ups on certain goods such as radios by price control measures, but the control is by no means fully effective.

The government has also supplemented the system by entering [655]
the market itself. For example, arrangements have been made under the recent Trade Agreement with India for the import of cotton textiles and gunny bags, in part on government account. The government has also made direct purchases from abroad of its own requirements (e.g. tires). The effect has, however, not always been as intended, merchants being hesitant to buy with the prospect of large government stocks hanging over the market.

On the whole, a less complex system of import control would seem better suited to an economy like that of Iraq, whose requirements are likely to change in composition and to increase quite rapidly. Fewer regulations, more strictly enforced, are likely to serve better the two ends of social justice and public revenue.

Balance of Payments

The bulk of foreign transactions are carried out through the 457
commercial banks, which are subject to exchange controls, or [453]
through government channels such as the National Bank. However, numerous transactions pass through other channels and many of them are virtually impossible to estimate. For this reason the Mission has not attempted to construct a true balance of payments. Table 14 shows the foreign exchange transactions passing through the principal official channels, so far as they are known to the Mission. The other items which would enter into a complete balance of payments are discussed subsequently.

As will be seen, even this account, which it should ordinarily be possible to balance, is subject to a wide margin of error for which no explanation is available. The general significance of the

TABLE 15

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MERCHANDISE TRADE
(in millions of dinars)

	1949		1950	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Customs returns	12.4	40.5	22.0	37.6
Less				
Oil Companies trade	− 0.7	−10.3	− 0.8	− 8.4
"Officially" financed	−14.9	−20.0	−20.6	−24.8
Discrepancy	− 3.2	10.2	0.6	4.4

457 Agents). But the principal explanation of the large amount of residual imports is the import of goods "without foreign exchange." Licenses issued (but not necessarily used) amounted to ID 10,800,000 and 7,400,000 in 1949 and 1950. These were paid for with foreign exchange acquired by the methods already described. Part of this foreign exchange was, no doubt, also used for travel abroad, particularly in the Lebanon. Insofar as receipts and expenditures in "unofficial" foreign exchange did not balance in any one year, there must have been a balancing item in these transactions, representing capital export or import. No data is available on this, but it is generally believed that there has been a considerable export of capital in recent years.

IX. Government and the Economy

654 Until recently the goverment, handicapped primarily by a shortage of funds, played a comparatively modest role in promoting economic life. [242] In agriculture the main effort was confined to the production and distribution of seeds, the promotion of cotton and citrus culture and the combating of diseases and pests, particularly the locusts. Some help was given through the establishment of the Agricultural Bank and of a government organization for the rental of agricultural machinery. One project for the settlement of smallholders on newly irrigated government land in the Dujaila district near Kut was initiated. Outlays on irrigation and flood control,

reason the cultivation of more cotton as well as such crops as linseed and sunflower seed will be important to the livestock economy. 248

Sugar Beets and Cane

The value of beet tops and pulp for livestock feeding might also be regarded as one of the principal reasons for introducing the cultivation of sugar beets. Similarly, one of the advantages of cane sugar might be the production of molasses which could also be used for livestock feed. These have been, of course, subordinate considerations in the minds of those who have advocated these crops for Iraq. The principal consideration has been to produce at home the sugar now imported in a volume which averaged 75,000 tons per year in the three-year period 1948 to 1950. 249 [439]

Undoubtedly sugar beets could be cultivated in the northern provinces of Suleimaniya and Mosul and sugar cane in the South, particularly in Amara. The real question is, however, whether either or both of these crops could be grown economically and on a scale large enough to warrant the necessary investment in processing plant. It must be decided whether cane or beet is preferable and whether either of them can compete with cotton for the available land, water and labor. The data available at present do not make it possible to arrive at sound decisions on these questions.

Test plots grown over 10 years indicate that there are several varieties of beet well adapted to Iraq and capable of reasonably high yields in terms of sugar. Experiments on cane sugar production at Abu Ghuraib, Basra and Amara have yielded much less favorable results, although one variety under test held some promise of furnishing sugar at an economic cost. The experiments, however, have not been conducted in a way and on a scale that would permit a satisfactory conclusion. If further experiments prove the feasibility of growing cane, it is likely to be a more economic crop than sugar beet. Experience elsewhere demonstrates that cane yields are generally higher and that the production of cane is less difficult and less demanding of skilled and semi-skilled labor than that of sugar beets. It is suggested therefore that further experiments on a larger scale be undertaken under appropriate expert guidance. In each of the possible beet sugar areas five or more 10-donum plantings might be tried. Special attention

Machine Shop

392 There are about 150 very small machine shops in Baghdad. The total labor force in these shops is approximately 400. They do various types of metal work but by far the most important is the normal maintenance work on more than 3,000 diesel-driven irrigation pumps. While the workmanship is good, costs are very high because of the heavy overhead.

All of this work could be readily accomplished in one small, modern machine shop equipped with metal fabricating facilities, electric repair shops and including a modern foundry. With such facilities, not only could maintenance work on irrigation pumps and engines be carried out, but completely new diesel-driven pumps could be manufactured, replacing those now imported. It would, of course, be necessary to import special items such as fuel pumps, bearings and gears. Likewise, the design should be obtained through a license arrangement with some international firm. This plant would reduce the cost of present maintenance work by about one third and constitute the beginning of a modern equipment manufacturing concern. The shops thus replaced could be moved to rural areas to handle local automotive and agricultural machinery repairs.

The cost of such a machine shop would be about ID 600,000, including ID 500,000 of foreign exchange, mostly pounds sterling. It should be financed by private capital in conjunction with the Industrial Bank.

Jute Mill

288 [439] Jute products such as sacks, hessian cloth and twine are now being imported at the rate of about ID 384,000 per annum. The demand for such products is increasing and appears to be large enough to warrant establishment of a jute industry, even though the raw material will need to be imported. Ultimately it may even prove feasible to grow jute in Iraq.

The plant should be capable of making about 10,000 tons of jute products per year. The cost of such a mill would be about ID 500,000, including ID 400,000 in foreign exchange, mostly in pounds sterling. This mill could be financed by private capital and the Industrial Bank. It is recommended that it be located

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in Basra, close to both shipping and the agricultural area which 288
may prove suitable for the growing of jute. It would employ about 300 workers.

Automobile Tires

The importation of automobile and truck tires is increasing 383
at a rate of approximately 15 percent per annum, the value of all [439]
tires imported in 1950 being ID 468,000.

A plant of economic size to manufacture tires could be justified with a market of approximately twice that which now exists. Such a market will probably be reached in 1955. Since it would require approximately two years to construct a tire plant, it is recommended that plans be formulated to start such a plant in 1953.

The plant would be so designed as to utilize the maximum amount of labor and, accordingly, should cost no more than ID 750,000, including foreign exchange of ID 600,000, mainly pounds sterling. It could be financed by private capital with the assistance of the Industrial Bank. Foreign technicians would be required during the first years of its operation.

Salt

Geophysical work gives conclusive evidence of a very large 135
salt dome near Basra. Unfortunately, the analysis is not known. This dome could be the source of very cheap salt for both export
and domestic consumption. It might make feasible the establish- [385]
ment of an alkali plant, particularly since the nearby oil field would be able to furnish gas as a source of cheap power. It is recommended, therefore, that core drilling of this dome be started as soon as possible to permit a proper evaluation of the possibilities of its use.

Sugar Mill

Considerable thought has been given to the recommendation 257
of a sugar refinery. Such an enterprise would, of course, have to depend on agriculture to supply the raw material, either in the form of sugar beets or sugar cane. Since this cannot be assured at this time, it is recommended that the development of this industry be held in abeyance for the present.

phrases as 'Amir ul Mouminin', that is, 'The Commander of the Faithful". 192

12. THE STORY OF THE TWO DANCERS

Page 171, Line 1. 'Which was full of chests of Kuweit of enormous size.' 489 439

The Kuweit chest is sometimes to be seen in English houses, its owners ignorant of its history. It is normally of polished or carved teakwood studded with brass, and with massive brass hinges and locks which are engraved by hand. In size it may be from four to six feet long; two and a half or three feet high, and of course broad in proportion. It sometimes has a false bottom or secret drawer. I have often hoped that some resident of Kuweit would write a book on these interesting chests. I have seen many of them, beautifully worked, in the bazaars of Baghdad and Basra. I also used to see them when going on board Kuweiti jalbuts from India when they called at Bahrein. There were usually a number of these chests carried as deck cargo, though not as large nor of such good wood as the old ones found in the bazaars. The nakhodas of the craft whom I questioned about these chests informed me that their sailors, in addition to receiving pay, had the right to bring one chest each from India, full of goods to be sold on their own account. I did in fact look through some of these chests and found them in the main stocked with Indian sandals, mirrors, scent, rolls of cloth, saris and similar articles. I was told that in the past Kuweiti sailors would buy the chest in India, stock it with goods, and carve it and put in the heavy brass studs on the voyage back to Kuweit, which might take several months, as the dhows call at a number of small Indian and Persian ports. On arrival at Kuweit or Basra the chests and their contents would be sold, and the price of a well worked chest was an important part of a sailor's earnings. I asked them why the chests on the deck of most of the dhows were without ornament, and was told that at present there was less profit in the sale of the chest than in the goods it contained, and that chests now available in Southern Indian ports were of such poor quality that they did not repay work. They still buy these chests as the sailor's own property is carried as

489 deck cargo, and the goods would be liable to damage by rain or spray
439 if otherwise packed.

13. The Story of Sheikh Mizhil el Qurnachi, a Man of a Noble Family, though His Land Was Poor

804 Page 185, Line 15. 'and ordered fifty mithkals of them.'

The mithkal is a small weight used by goldsmiths.

192 Page 188, Line 20. 'Take soldiers and go to Qasr Qurnachi.'

Qasr—castle. 'Qurnachi Castle.'

Page 191, Line 11. 'Can then the hawk fly without wings.'

539 I was told that this quotation was from a famous Arab poet, but
192 regret that I was unable to place it, and nobody could remember the name of the poet. The quotation as put into the mouth of Sheikh Aqab is particularly apt, as Aqab, though its literal translation is 'eagle,' is a name often given to hawks.

Page 198, Line 24. 'She was clad in an ataq and bag trousers.'

The ataq is a kind of blouse.

14. The Story of Daoud the Camel and of his Misfortunes

Page 204, Line 4. 'The Shammar of the Jezira.'

103 The area in Mosul Liwa which lies to the west of the Tigris, that is,
101 between the Tigris and the Euphrates, is known as the Jezira, or Island. The Shammar in this area are the famous tribe of the late Sheikh Ajil el Yawar.

15. Between Truth and Falsehood Lie Four Fingers

551 Page 214, Line 14. 'The name of this girl was Leila for she was born in the night.'

Leila, 'Night,' is a popular girl's name in South Iraq. I do not think it is restricted only to those girls born at night.

35: Hooper and Field Iraq MH1--1-3

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[For data on the imported or exported products of the following plants, see MAl Iran, 35 : Hooper and Field, category 116, pp. 79-188; licorice (Abrus precatorius), cream of tartar tree (Adansonia digitata), bitter aloes (Aloe perryi), pellitory (Anacyclus pyrethrum), Levant berry (Anamirta paniculata), Persian kohl (Astragalus fasciculaefolius), bamboo (Bambusa arundinacea), bastard teak (Butea frondosa), calamint (Calamintha graveolens), senna (Cassia acutifolia), purging cassia (Cassia fistula), cockscomb (Celosia argentea), -quinine tree (Chinchona calisaya), cinnamon (Cinnamonum cassia), myrrh (Commiphora molmol), Indian bdellium (Commiphora mukul), balm of Gilead (Commiphora opobalsamum), mamiran (Coptis teeta), Indian hazel (Corylus colurna), Oriental hawthorn (Crataegus orientalis), tumeric (Curcuma domestica), long zedoary (Curcuma zedoaria), keshus (Cuscuta planifolia, C. hyalina), yellow larkspur (Delphinium zalil), dragon's blood resin (Dracaena cinnabari), cardamom (Elettaria cardamomum), Embely currants (Embelia ribes), qurs-i-kamar (Entada gigas), chiresh (Eremurus aucherianus), musk root (Ferula sumbul), buqnaq or erok orab kuzzi (Glossostemon bruguieri), licorice (Glycyrrhiza glabra), cotton (Gossypium hirsutum), East Indian screw tree (Helicteres isora), Deccan hemp plant (Hibiscus cannabinus), mivah-i-zaban-i-gunjishk (Holarrhena antidysenterica), barley (Hordeum vulgare), henbane (Hysocyamus reticulatus), star anise (Illicium verum), turpeth (Ipomoea turpethum), graveyard iris (Iris spuria), 35: Hooper and Field

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calumba (Jateorhiza columba), juniper (Juniperus excelsa), lesser galangal (Languas officinarum), henna (Lawsonia alba), cress (Lepidium sativum), kanala (Mallotus philippinensis), mallow (Malva sylvestris), alfalfa (Medicago sativa), musk root or Indian spikenard (Nardostachys jatamansi), cobra saffron (Ochrocarpus longifolius), sweet basil (Ocimum basilicum), Indian alkanet root (Onosma echioides), mountain rue (Peganum harmala), date palm (Phoenix dactylifera), embylic myrobalans (Phyllanthus emblica), aniseed (Pimpinella anisum), tailed pepper (Piper cubeba), false mastich, or turpentine (Pistacia intererrima), pistachio (Pistacio vera), spogul (Plantago ovata), bistort (Polygonum bistorta), perfumed cherry tree (Prunus mahaleb), red sandalwood (Pterocarpus santalinus), quince (Pyrus cydonia), oak (Quercus), Rangoon creeper (Quisqualis indica), rhubarb (Rheum palmatum), sumac (Rhus coriaria), Persian yellow rose (rosa foetida), madder (Rubia cordifolia, R. tinctorum), sugar (Saccharum officinarum), white sandalwood (Santalum album), Indian costus (Saussurea lappa), marking nut tree (Semecarpus anacardium), bittersweet (Solanum dulcamara), wild eggplant (Solanum xanthocarpum), great millet (Sorghum vulgare), Stachys germanica, St. Ignatius' bean (Strychnos ignatii), nux vomica (Strychnos nux vomica), belleric myroba-

35: Hooper and Field Iraq MH1-- --3

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-lans (Terminalia bellerica), tea (Thea sinensis), desert parsnip (Trachydium lehmanni), gum copal (Trachylobium hornemannianum), small caltrops (Tribulus terrestris), white clover (Trifolium repens), wheat (Triticum vulgare), tulip (Tulipa montana), pale catechu (Unçaria gambier), white hellbore (Veratrum album), grape (Vitis vinifera), jujube (Zizyphus vulgaris).]

[For data on the importation or exportation of the following mineral drugs, see category 116, pp. 189-193: alum, ocher (Armenian earth), orpiment (arsenic trisulphide), saltpeter (potassium nitrate), and a series of edible and medicinal earths.]

8;Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 217 *Department of Antiquities*. The Department of Antiquities maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration, research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 439 433 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the world's supply. Her general economic organization is nevertheless agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the 339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com- 342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 652 [511] In 1950 a Development Board was established with the function of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing a general economic and financial plan for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

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311 241 alluvial plain of the centre and south, where agriculture depends on the water of the Tigris and Euphrates for irrigation by pump, flow, or natural inundation. In the first region rainfed winter cereals predominate, with millet, maize, sesame and other summer crops grown as subsidiaries where irrigation is possible. Kurdish mountain crops include tobacco and grapes. In the central canal zone (Faluja–Baghdad–Diala) wheat and barley are the principal winter crops; summer crops include millet, maize, sesame, and the produce of market gardens near Baghdad. From here southward barley and rice predominate, with a great concentration of palm groves in all the riverain land, especially around Basra on the Shatt al-Arab. The deserts of west Iraq afford extensive grazing after the winter rains.

241 Cultivation is based traditionally on the following system. In the south, either half the land is left fallow and half tilled each year, or half is sown with a summer crop, half with a winter. In the north the land may be continuously cropped for two or three years, and then left fallow for the same period. The use of artificial fertilizers is practically unknown, but the land is sometimes manured by allowing shepherd tribes to pasture their flocks on fallow ground.

[439] Although the vast majority of agricultural implements employed are still traditional and primitive, modern machinery is being imported steadily. A high target has been set, especially since the war, and Government service stations have been established. In 1950 imports were as follows: tractors 166, ploughs 146, cultivators 26, combines 98, threshers 1, grain drills 21, disc harrows 14. Oil pumps for irrigation are even more in demand than tractors; in 1949–50 there were 3,600 in use, with an average horse-power of 36.

[645] The agricultural development of the country is organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, which contains departments for plant breeding and protection, horticulture, forestry, agricultural machinery, animal husbandry and veterinary services.

Crops

433 The principal crops, with their production in 1950 in thousands of metric tons, are *Winter*: barley, 851; wheat, 520; lentils, 6; vetch, 3·5; linseed, 0·2; *Summer*: rice, 242; cotton, 25; sesame, 10; maize, 21; millet 19; green gram, 12; tobacco, 3 (purchased by Government Tobacco Monopoly); dates, 250.[1] Of the two most important crops, barley and dates, the former is grown mainly in the northern plains and the *liwas* of Kut, Muntafiq, Hilla, and Diwaniya in the irrigated zone. With a

[1] ibid. p. 146.

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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with 433
farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure [439]
an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers
in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and 243
Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla 439
and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. 433
A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's produc- 245
tion; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation 439
and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where 433
growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is
exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates [262]
are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as [274]
raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the [283]
fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stones for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilo- 185
metres, are of variable density. They were at one time far 137
denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being 313
reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

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[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

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423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-supply
of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
464 shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently
166 go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the
unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An
[452] Agricultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in
1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and
traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
654 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being
185 semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little
attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

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315 frontier. A 30–32-inch pipeline of 14 million tons' capacity was
433 opened to Banias in Syria (560 miles) in 1952.

In the MPC concessionary area exploration and drilling were carried out before 1931, but it was not until after the Second World War that oil of certain commercial value was discovered and produced, at Ain Zala, north-west of Mosul. In 1952 the field was linked by a 12-inch pipeline to the IPC pipeline system, to permit the export of its crude oil to the Mediterranean coast.

In the BPC concessionary area exploration began in 1939 and, when resumed at the end of the war, was made more effective by the application of new geophysical methods. A field producing oil of good quality was developed in the area of Zubair, the average depth of the wells—some 11,000 feet—being greater than in any neighbouring Persian Gulf oilfield and four times greater than at Kirkuk. Oil is carried the seventy-four miles from the field to a new oil port at Fao, where oil was first shipped in December 1951, through a 12-inch pipeline; a second pipeline, of 24 inches, was completed in 1953 to cope with the company's increased production programme under the terms of the 1952 agreement.

433 Production of crude oil for 1952 (the first year of MPC and BPC production) was as follows: Kirkuk (IPC) 15,553,000 tons, Ain Zala (MPC) 270,000 tons, Zubair (BPC) 2,238,000 tons.

471 The area of eastern Iraq excluded from the concessions of
433 these three companies has been developed by the Khanaqin
Oil Company, a subsidiary of AIOC, on the basis of agreements
382 made in 1925 and 1926. The output of the company's refinery near Khanaqin, together with imports from Abadan, provided Iraq's internal requirements of petroleum products. In accordance with an agreement ratified in 1952, the Iraq Government has bought the refinery, the company undertaking to operate it for ten years and, if requested, to operate also the new government refinery near Baghdad which is to replace it; after the Khanaqin refinery is closed the company will retain its production area on the same terms as those of the IPC 1952 agreement, conditional on exporting an annual minimum of 2 million tons of crude oil.

The government refinery at Daura near Baghdad, on which work started in 1952, is designed to produce a million tons of refined petroleum products per annum, a figure well in excess of the present requirements of the country. Meanwhile a small refinery of some 175,000 tons annual capacity has been erected
[439] at Basra to help make good the deficiency caused by the cessation of petroleum imports from Abadan.

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company ceased operations in 1949 but several small private 502
concerns continue to operate barges, mostly propelled by motor launches. Freight is still carried in sailing craft.

Airways. Iraq is served from London, the United States, most 509
European and Middle East capitals, Pakistan, India, the Far East, and Australia. The main international services are maintained by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Holland, and there are Middle East services operated by Iraq, Persia, Egypt, and Lebanon. The administration of Iraqi Airways is integrated with that of the State Railways, with BOAC as technical adviser; in addition to local services it operates regularly to Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Tehran, Kuwait, and Bahrain. There are two international airports, at Baghdad and 508
Basra, both of which are scheduled for further development to accommodate the newest heavy aircraft. There are also landing grounds at Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk and at the locations of the IPC and associated companies, namely Kirkuk, Ain Zala, and the pipeline stations.

Trade

Iraq imports manufactured goods and industrial raw 439
materials, of which the most important are textiles, clothing, iron and steel, especially for constructional purposes, machinery, motor vehicles and accessories, electrical apparatus, aviation spirit and lubricating oil, rubber and its products, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, wooden packing boxes, soap, timber, paper and cardboard and their products, tea, coffee, and sugar. The expansion of local industry[1] can be expected gradually to lessen the demand for a number of these commodities and increase the demand for others, particularly constructional materials, machinery, electrical apparatus, and chemicals. Apart from crude oil, her most valuable export, Iraq's exports are almost entirely agronomical—grains (especially barley), dates, raw wool and cotton, animals on hoof, hides, skins, intestines, seeds for oil manufacture (linseed, cotton, sesame), and a few minor commodities such as gums, gall nuts, and liquorice root. Iraq has in addition an appreciable transit trade, consisting largely of goods passing to or from Persia.

Before the Second World War, Iraq's chief suppliers were Great Britain, with between 20 and 30 per cent of total imports, Japan, with between 15 and 20 per cent, India, Germany, the United States, and Persia. During the war, when supplies were limited in quantity and directed from specific sources, Britain's share automatically decreased and India became

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[1] See above, p. 283.

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431 Iraq's chief supplier. After the war Britain regained her position, but has in the last two years lost some ground to Japan and Germany. In view of the nature of Iraq's non-petroleum exports, the value and direction of trade in them varies considerably from year to year. Iraq's chief customers are Britain, India, Japan, and Holland.

457 439 Iraq has always had an adverse balance of visible trade, which is now largely offset by oil revenues. The volume as well as the value of both imports and exports has increased considerably in recent years. With the relaxation of war-time controls in 1946 a sudden outburst of spending, with no corresponding increase in exports, raised the visible adverse balance from ID8 million in 1945 to over 36 million in 1948, an expansion which was largely met by agreed releases from Iraq's accumulated sterling balances. Thereafter imports diminished in consequence, among other factors, of the decline in purchasing power, stimulation of local industry, imposition of import restrictions, and the effect of the Great Powers' rearmament programmes on the availability of commodities. The stockpiling which these programmes involved, combined with good harvests in Iraq, the devaluation of the dinar, and the relaxation of export restrictions produced at the same time a rapid increase in exports. Accordingly the adverse balance fell, by 1950, to ID15 million, only to rise again with higher commodity prices and shipping charges and local stockpiling against the risk of war. As a result sterling balances were further depleted until greater oil production and the more favourable oil agreement of 1952, by increasing the value and quantity of invisible exports, redressed the overall balance.

MAIN SOURCES OF IMPORTS

Country	*Value of Imports (IDooo)*		
	1950	*1951*	*1952**
Great Britain	18,375	17,200	23,129
U.S.A.	3,079	7,066	11,300
Italy	2,369	3,637	3,580
Japan	829	3,610	3,133
Ceylon	2,269	2,830	3,285
Belgium	451	2,370	2,026
India	3,125	2,302	2,440
Syria	1,013	1,727	1,378
Persia	1,330	1,162	554
Holland	1,053	1,153	1,980
Czechoslovakia	578	1,055	850
Sweden	621	953	896
France	455	850	1,157
Germany, western	99	675	1,325
Total of all countries	37,595	50,871	61,845

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MAIN DESTINATIONS OF EXPORTS

Country	*Value of Exports (IDooo)* 1950	1951	1952*
Great Britain	3,221	8,258	6,737
Holland	3,854	3,850	1,021
India	1,731	2,624	1,225
Lebanon	1,030	2,239	1,017
Japan	1,759	2,002	2,475
Syria	531	510	711
U.S.A.	631	964	491
Egypt	602	763	498
Kuwait	420	591	..
Jordan	286	1,430	500
Total of all countries	20,051	27,010	18,777

BALANCE OF TRADE
(IDooo)

Year	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Re-exports and exports ex-bond*	*Visible adverse balance*
1947	39,946	13,800	1,523	24,623
1948	45,523	7,584	1,590	36,409
1949	40,501	12,076	1,280	27,145
1950	37,595	20,051	1,580	15,964
1951	50,871	27,010	2,001	21,860
1952*	61,845	18,777	1,244	41,824

.. = Not available. * Provisional.

NOTE: Crude oil exports and transit trade excluded.

(SOURCES: GB, Commercial Relations and Export Dept., *Iraq: Economic and Commercial Conditions in Iraq, 1953* by S. Simmonds, London, HMSO, 1953; Iraq Customs Dept., Statistical Section.)

Sterling Balances

During the Second World War Iraq accumulated a considerable balance of sterling; but by the Sterling Balances Agreement of July 1947 the bulk of her sterling assets held at that time were blocked in a special No. 2 Account, sterling subsequently received in respect of current transactions being held in a free No. 1 Account. Certain of the blocked sums were thereafter released annually to No. 1 Account, with a limit imposed on the amounts which could be withdrawn from that account for current transactions with scarce currency areas. Iraq's balances in July 1947 amounted to £57·9 million, of which £11 million were free. The free balances rose to £14·5 million by October 1947 but thereafter dropped suddenly, in consequence of, among other factors, expenditure on the Palestine campaign, and by June 1948 had been reduced to £3·5 million. They have subsequently risen steadily, because of more favourable trade balances and the oil agreement of 1952. The total balances have varied similarly, from £59·8 439

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● 439 million in October 1947 to £43·2 million in December 1949 and £55·5 million in September 1952, and are still rising. In October 1950 the Sterling Balances Agreement was amended to the advantage of Iraq, and in July 1952 the sterling held in No. 2 Account, amounting to some £23 million, was freed from all restrictions.

Banking and Currency

652 Banks in Iraq may be classified as follows:

(1) *The National Bank of Iraq*, whose establishment was authorized in 1947 and completed in 1948. Its functions are laid down as: (*a*) to issue and administer the currency and undertake duties arising therefrom, (*b*) to undertake duties arising from international agreements, (*c*) to undertake duties relating to the control of banking and co-ordination of banking operations, (*d*) to undertake duties arising from the control of foreign exchange, (*e*) to keep the accounts of the Government, (*f*) to undertake transactions relating to Government and semi-Government loans.

(2) *Government Banks* for granting loans of special kinds, namely: Agricultural and Industrial Banks, for the encouragement of agriculture and industry, and separate banks for granting mortgages on movable and immovable property.

453 652 (3) *Commercial Banks* of which one, the Rafidain Bank, is governmental, and four are branches of foreign banks.

453 (4) *Sarrafs*—small local bankers who perform most of the functions of the commercial banks but are more rigidly restricted by law in the extent of their operations. Operating with less formality than the commercial banks, they are widely patronized by business men.

The withdrawal of the Jews from Iraq affected banking profoundly; two large commercial banks and most of the *sarrafs* closed down, with a consequent contraction in the supply of credit, so that rates of interest rose abnormally to the detriment of business. The trade in imported goods suffered particularly, since cash was not available for customs clearance. The problem was solved partly by increased domestic production, partly by the enforcement of a law for the control of banking, which compelled the commercial banks to increase their paid-up capital and reserves held in Iraq, reduce their investments abroad in favour of local investments, and increase the banking facilities afforded to businesses. In consequence commercial banks co-ordinated and expanded their activities, and the opportunities for profit encouraged new *sarrafs* to replace those who had withdrawn. A great deal of banking experience and

185 well as many western food products, such as candies and
177 fancy crackers. The country is lighted by kerosene oil,
much of which comes from America. Numbers of automobiles
are to be seen, and in some places even electric
lights. All these things represent the gratification of
wants that did not exist previous to the entrance of western
influence.

● 439 There has also been a development of the export trade
311 of the country. However, the articles for export are not
many nor of great amount. Dates are the principal product,
together with a certain amount of wheat and rice
and some hides and wool. In the long run, of course, no
more can be brought into the country than is sent out of
it, and the trade of Mesopotamia cannot increase to any
great figure until her own natural resources are developed.

000 Just how far these various modern improvements will
go remains to be seen. If the British continue in power,
there is no doubt that material development will be steady
and sound. If they evacuate the country and leave it to
an independent local government, progress will be much
435 slower, to say the least. During the war wages went up
511 to fabulous heights, and although prices of food and rent
177 advanced even more, there is no doubt that the sum
185 total of the war's influence was to raise the standard of
living in the cities and to stimulate enormously the desire
for many western products and for western education.
Just now there has been a very sharp reaction; times are
hard, work is scarce, wages are poor. Everything western
is discounted, and the cry is for an independent national
development with the elimination of every foreign
00 influence. The common people long for the golden days
of the Turks, forgetting with a completeness quite as-

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245 Iraq produces about 80 per cent. of the total

[439] world supply of dates—that is, of the proportion of dates that form an article of commerce, because most dates are eaten directly by the growers, or else bartered. The general conditions under which date palms thrive have already been touched upon, and it is sufficient to recall that the palms can flourish in dry, saline, sandy, loamy, or even water-logged soils, although the maximum yield of fruit is obtained when abundant water is available.

The region of the Shatt el Arab is pre-eminently suited to date-production, and both banks are lined with date groves extending inland for about a mile and a half. Some 25 to 30 million palms are cultivated throughout the region, and of these, one-half are found close to the Shatt el Arab, the rest occurring along the river banks as far north as Latitude 33° N. A curious feature is the rise of the river under the influence of the incoming tide. Fresh water is ponded back in the Shatt el Arab, and floods the banks to a depth of as much as 3 feet to provide natural and regular irrigation of the groves—a phenomenon that from the point of view of the native farmer is wholly estimable.

In order to ensure a good crop, the land is dug over once every four years; and because of the frequent presence of creeks and water-courses, this must be done by hand. Artificial pollination is, as we have already seen, highly necessary; and though most groves include 3 per cent. of male palms, the district of Fao has developed a special trade in male pollen dust, from which other date-growing regions are supplied.

About 130 varieties of date are known, but three are most widely grown. The *Halawi* palm produces the finest fruit, but gives only a moderate yield (44 lb. per tree) (Dowson), whilst the *Sayir* produces slightly less, but is more tolerant of inferior growing conditions, and is probably the most widely grown. The *Zahidi* does not give a fruit of high quality, but the yield is over 120 lb. per tree, and this compensates for the low price obtained. Fertilisation of the female palm takes place in April, and picking begins in August, when large numbers of nomadic tribesmen move into the date-growing areas to work as seasonal harvesters.

273 231 313 289 Besides forming an extremely important part of local diet, dates are used in the distilling of *arak*—the chief fermented beverage outside the vine-growing areas, and one thought to have value as a prophylactic against malaria. The crushed stones are fed to cattle, and both leaves and trunk of the palm are used in light constructional work (houses, boats, even bridges), and also in the manufacture of paper.

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East

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regions for which it acts as commercial outlet and exchange centre. 361
These regions are :

(*a*) The plains of northern Assyria, where there is a dense agricultural population.

(*b*) The hills of Kurdistan, occupied by shepherds practising transhumance.

(*c*) The steppes of the Jezireh, where there is a mixed population of true nomads rearing sheep, cattle and draught animals ; and sedentary farmers.

(*d*) The uplands of the Jebel Sinjar, where pastoralism and agriculture are carried on by the Yezidi.

As a result, there is extreme heterogeneity of peoples within the 563
city. Arabs are in the majority, with smaller groups of Kurds, 438
Christians, Jews, and Yezidi, most of whom speak their own languages. [288]
An important mediaeval textile industry (note the word *muslin*) has now disappeared, though coarser textiles using wool as a raw material are still produced in the bazaars, and a recent feature has been the introduction of artificial silk weaving. Mosul is also important for leather working—a reflexion of its position on the edge of the steppe. Manufacturing is, however, less important than trade: grain, timber, hides, and manufactured goods are exchanged, and there are long distance communications with Baghdad and south-east Turkey. Much of the produce from Turkey comes by kelek (page 364).

Basra is an agglomeration of small sites grouped along the western 361
bank of the Shatt el Arab some 70 miles upstream from the Persian Gulf. Basra proper is situated on a small creek 2 miles distant from the Shatt el Arab, and the principal port is at Ashar, on the main river. Modern docks have also been constructed at Maqil, 4 miles upstream from Ashar, and since 1939, further development has taken place at Tanuma on the eastern bank of the Shatt el Arab, opposite Ashar. Because of the recession of the head of the Persian Gulf, the growth of the port is relatively recent, and dredging on a considerable scale is necessary to prevent silting of the channel. Basra handles the greater 439
proportion of the foreign trade of Iraq, and is the centre of the date- 438
growing region, being itself surrounded by date-groves. Dates form 361
the chief item in its export trade. Second in importance amongst exports is grain, with wool, liquorice root, and hides as subsidiaries. Imports consist chiefly of manufactured goods (cement, cotton and woollen textiles, machinery), tea, and sugar. Basra can be reached by large ocean going ships, but about 10 per cent. of its commerce is still carried on in small native craft.

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East

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THE FOREIGN TRADE OF IRAQ

(Year 1946-47)

Total Value of Trade in £ Sterling : £67 million
Amount per head of population : £14

Imports	*Percentage of Total*	*Exports*	*of Total*
Cotton Goods	14	Crude Oil	48
Iron & Steel	11	Barley	23
Vehicles	10	Dates	18
Total imports, £40 million		Total exports, £27 million	

Suppliers :	Buyers :
(1) United Kingdom	(1) United Kingdom
(2) India	(2) India
(3) U.S.A.	(3) U.S.A.

423 tribal organization there was no clear definition of individual rights of ownership to the collectively-owned land. It was a 619 system which could exist as long as no one thought about it; as long, that is, as the tribe was accepted as the unit of political life, and as long as no individual claims were likely to be made. It is for this reason that it is impossible, once the tribal system has ceased to be the political unit, to settle land on a tribal basis; and yet to settle land on the basis of the supposed individual claims creates grave injustice, because in practice it means that too much land is allotted to the sheikhs and that the cultivators are reduced to the position of tenants or labourers.

● 439 Since the early years of the twentieth century the tribal system has been breaking up, and the economic development of the country in the twenty years between the wars has hastened its disintegration. When water transport came to the Persian Gulf towards the end of the nineteenth century, export markets opened for Iraq grain; the subsistence economy broke down and production for export began. Exports of grain increased from 65,000 tons in the early eighteen-nineties to 120,000 tons in 1909–13, and to 380,000 tons in 1934–9. The profitability of 556 export has given the tribal chiefs a motive for acquiring land as their personal property.

The tendency to acquire land for the sake of money income was much strengthened, in the twenty years between the two wars, by the rapid extension of pump irrigation and the accompanying increase in the cultivated area. Pump installations 512 have increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,000 in 1944, and provide 426 water for some 2½ million acres of land, or over half the cultivated land in the irrigated zone. The installation of a pumping system is comparatively cheap, costing some £2,000 before the recent war, but it is far beyond the means of the peasants, so that pumps have been installed by sheikhs, or more frequently by city notables, who make contracts to supply them to peasants at extortionate rates of interest, and so gradually acquire the land in payment of debt. In many cases the sub-chiefs, or sirkals, have become pump owners.

423 Thus in the regions of pump irrigation the tribal system has entirely ceased to function. The land is mainly the property of 427 the pump owners, with the cultivators taking a meagre share of the crop, varying from one-seventh to one-fourteenth or one-

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161 311 poverty probably unequalled anywhere in the world. Throughout the centuries, production has declined as neglect and misuse have drained the fertility from the soils and permitted salt to seep in and ruin for cultivation thousands of acres in this Garden of Eden.

[146] 511 The people, undernourished and ravaged by disease, have degenerated as the land has deteriorated. One would never guess that the present inhabitants, oppressed by poverty and ignorance, were in any way related to those men who shaped the history of the world for so many centuries.[1] Many

[1] [Text continues on p. 88--Analyst]

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Table 27

IRAQ: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports
1937, 1949, 1950, and 1951
Value

Item	1937	1949	1950	1951
	Per Cent			
Crude Petroleum	65	53	51	51
Barley	7	20	19	21
Dates	6	11	10	19
Others	22	16	20	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79	92	126	166

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

Table 28

IRAQ: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports
1937, 1949, and 1950
Value

Country	1937	1949	1950
	Per Cent		
France	51	25	38
United Kingdom	18	14	12
United States	7	2	6
India	2	9	3
Netherlands		8	7
Others	22	42	34
Total	100	100	100

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

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Table 29

IRAQ: Specified Imports as Per Cent of Total Imports
1948, 1949, and 1950
Value

Item	1948	1949	1950
	Per Cent		
Cotton Textiles	16	14	14
Wool Textiles	3	3	2
Rayon Textiles	1	2	4
Iron and Steel Products	11	12	10
Others	69	69	70
Total	100	100	100
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	183	148	105

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

Table 30

IRAQ: Imports from Specified Sources as Per Cent of Total Imports
1937, 1949, and 1950
Value

Source	1937	1949	1950
	Per Cent		
United Kingdom	30	43	39
Japan	18	11	2
United States	8	1	7
India	7	5	[1]
Germany	7	1	1
Italy	3	8	8
Others	27	31	43
Total	100	100	100

[1] Included in others.

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

other commodities. As might be expected in such a situation, the system of classification is limited. The cotton is usually sold on types. Ginners indicate they will buy and sell cotton themselves in the future as in many other countries. 442

The one large cotton spinning mill is putting in its own gin to supply the mill with its requirements of around 15,000 bales annually. This will restrict merchandising to exports unless and until another mill is built.

OIL MILLS 388

There is one oil mill which crushes the largest part of the seed produced. The rest is exported. The capacity of this plant is to be increased and facilities for processing oil products are being added.

EXPORTS 439

Iraq has exported approximately 18,000 bales during each of the past two years, mostly to Germany and Japan, with smaller quantities to Holland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 248

The Director General of Agriculture has promulgated an ambitious 10-year program for increasing cotton production to about 500,000 bales. In time, he believes that on the basis of the available land and water Iraqi production can be boosted to more than a million bales. While admitting his program is ambitious, the Director General appears to be firmly convinced it can be accomplished, given adequate technical assistance. 654

United States agricultural experts with the Point Four Program are inclined to agree that the country's natural resources can support a potential cotton production of this magnitude. The rate of increase, they think, will depend on how effectively the technical resources of the country are organized and applied.

The Director General is highly regarded for his technical as well as his administrative ability and particularly for his driving force. He is especially well qualified to direct the cotton improvement program, having graduated in cotton agronomy from Texas A. & M. College.

Long-Range

For long-range improvements he is depending on the agricultural research agencies now being organized to develop better varieties, more effective irrigation and cultural practices, better insect control techniques, and improved methods of classification and marketing. Still in the planning stages, the research program has done some fairly effective work, especially on variety selection, propagation, and fertilization.

Insect Control

One of the main research problems is the control of insects. The government estimates that 75 per cent of the 1951 cotton crop was destroyed by insects, principally by the spiney bollworm, *Earis insulana* (Boisd.), a white fly that attacks the leaves, and by aphids. Fortunately, the Director said, the pink bollworm has not made its appearance in the country. Experiments are 242

241 commercial crops in the rain-fed zones of
the north; dates, cereals and cotton, in the
south. The date-palm groves in the irrigated
lands along the Shatt al Arab and the Eu-
phrates rivers, and in scattered areas along
the Tigris, furnish almost one third of the
233 world's supply of dates. Sheep, goats, cattle
and other livestock are raised in large num-
bers by the nomadic and the seminomadic
439 peoples. The chief agricultural exports are
dates, barley and other grains, cotton, wool,
hides and licorice: this last-named item
grows wild in many localities in the south.
242 The government is promoting the adoption
of modern methods of farming and animal
husbandry and the expansion of irrigation
facilities. It operates special agricultural
schools and experimental farms in different
parts of the country, as well as a date re-
search station near Basra. Within the last
few years it has initiated settlement and
demonstration projects on state lands at
Dujayla, near Kut; at Shahrizor, near
Sulaimaniya; at Huwaija, near Kirkuk;
and at Sinjar, near Mosul.

135 With the exception of the oil reserves,
the mineral resources of Iraq are negligible.
Small deposits of lignite, gypsum, sulfur and
other minerals are known to exist in the
north, while salt beds are found in widely
472 distributed areas. Industrial development is
438 slight, in spite of the impetus supplied by
the shortage of materials during the recent
war years. Small craft industries flourish in
the urban centers, and a few modern fac-
tories have been established in Baghdad and
Mosul for the processing of local products.
These consist primarily of plants for the
manufacture of textiles, cement, bricks, dis-
tilled liquors, soaps and cigarettes.

135 The petroleum industry has expanded
rapidly since the discovery of oil, in 1927,
at Baba Gurgur, in the Kirkuk region. The
reserves, which are reputed to be among the
richest in the Middle East, provide a pri-
471 mary source of wealth for the country. The
Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions,
originally granted in 1925, covering the
lands east of the Tigris River and north

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Petroleum

433 The petroleum industry in Iraq has made striking progress during the post-war
period. Production and exports, which had been low mainly owing to the lack of
382 transport facilities, increased sharply following construction of new pipelines
to the seacoasts. Exploration activities led to the discovery of new oilfields,
315 which are being developed. As a result of increasing output of petroleum and the
● 439 revision of the terms of payment, Iraq's oil revenues have multiplied. These
revenues have provided the financial means for development of the country's
resources. Revenue from the oil industry, which is in the form of sterling,
together with the substantial and rising foreign exchange disbursements of the
oil companies for local expenditures, increased considerably the foreign exchange
[464] supplies of the country and made larger imports possible. Availability of
petroleum products, at relatively low cost, has facilitated economic development,
and the consumption of oil products has increased severalfold. In addition, the petroleum industry has given employment to an increasing number of employees (see table 27) and is providing them with training. After a setback during the war years, when production declined to 1.6 million metric tons in 1941, output of crude petroleum in 1944 recovered to its pre-war level of 4.3 million metric tons. Construction of two additional pipelines, parallel to the previous lines and with a yearly capacity of about 4.5 million tons each, started immediately after the end of the war. The pipeline to Tripoli was completed in 1949, but construction of the other, destined for Haifa, was interrupted by the Palestine conflict and it remains incomplete. Another large-diameter pipeline with an annual throughput capacity of 13.5 million tons, linking the Kirkuk field to Baniyas in Syria, was completed in 1952 at a cost of ID 41 million. In the meantime, the activities of the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company, Ltd., both affiliated with the Iraq Petroleum Company, led to the discovery of Ain Zalah and Butmah oilfields in the Mosul area, and Zubair and Rumaila oilfields near Basra. The development of these fields, especially Zubair, and the installation of pipelines and oil handling facilities during the past four years, has increased substantially the crude petroleum export capacity of Iraq. In addition, another smaller oilfield had been discovered by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company before the war at Naftkhaneh, near the Iranian border, and its output, which was refined locally, served the domestic market exclusively.

As a result of the foregoing developments during the last decade, as well as increasing world demand for petroleum, production of crude oil, which had declined from 4.7 million tons in 1946 and 1947 to 3.4 million tons in 1948, because of the Palestine conflict and the shutdown of the pipeline to Haifa, started to rise sharply, to 6.5 million tons in 1950, 18.9 million in 1952, and 29.6 million in 1954, representing in the latter year 4.3 per cent of the world's crude petroleum output as against 1.5 per cent in 1938. This production may be compared with proved oil reserves, which were estimated at 700 million tons in early 1949, and nearly 2,300 million tons at the end of 1954. Total investment in the petroleum industry of Iraq was estimated in 1952 at approximately ID 90 million, of which the main portion had been for construction of pipelines.

439 Iraq is exclusively an exporter of crude petroleum; the value of petroleum
382 exports was estimated at ID 137 million in 1954 as compared with ID 10 million
in 1938. Exports are handled by the parent companies of the Iraq Petroleum
471 Company and its affiliates, but under the terms of the February 1952 agreement,

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Table 27. Iraq: Operations Of Petroleum Companies, Selected Years

(Output in thousands of metric tons; value in millions of Iraqi dinars)

Year	Production (crude petroleum)	Consumption of petroleum products	Estimated value of crude petroleum exports	Value of imports by petroleum companies	Direct payments by petroleum companies a/	Foreign exchange disbursements by petroleum companies for local expenses	Number of employees in petroleum industry b/
1927-33 ...	105	125	-	...	0.64	...	3.6
1938	4,298	190	10.3	1.0	1.98	0.58	4.5
1941	1,566	265		0.3	1.46	...	3.3
1946	4,680	385	10.8	2.4	2.33	2.14	11.3
1947	4,702	470	14.0	5.0	2.35	5.60	14.6
1948	3,427	505	11.4	9.3	2.01	7.03	14.2
1949	4,067	520	14.1	10.3	3.24	6.40	12.9
1950	6,479	560	28.7	8.4	5.35	4.39	11.4
1951	8,351	610	37.1	8.7	13.21	5.69	11.0
1952	18,843	710	83.0	14.4	37.41 c/	7.18	13.3
1953	28,217	795	125.6	13.2	49.87	...	13.2
1954	29,550	...	136.9	...	67.50 d/	...	...

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook; International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, and International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.); Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract of Iraq (Baghdad); National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin No. 11, July-September 1954 (Baghdad).

a/ Figures are for fiscal years beginning on 1 April of the year stated.

b/ Thousands; end of year data.

c/ Including ID 5 million for settlement of previous claims.

d/ Calendar year.

439 382 471 the Government of Iraq is entitled to take, as part of the payment by the oil companies, up to 12.5 per cent of crude oil produced by the operating oil companies and to develop its own export market. Refining activities are relatively small. There were three refineries at the end of 1953, with a combined annual capacity of nearly 800,000 tons of crude throughput. The output of petroleum products increased from 350,000 tons in 1949 to 690,000 tons in 1952. In order to increase refining capacity to meet rising local demand, the Government is constructing a refinery, with a capacity of over one million tons a year at Dora, near Baghdad. The plans was expected to cost ID 9 million and to start operations in 1955. In addition, the Government approved in 1953 a proposal to construct a lubricating oil plant to meet local needs. These government refineries will be supplied by crude oil, sold by the Iraq Petroleum Company; according to the February 1952 agreement, and delivered to the Government at K.2 pumping station; from there the Government will carry it in its own pipeline. The price of such oil, which will be for sale only in Iraq, is to be five shillings, sixpence, per ton of oil, plus a fixed charge of £65,000 per annum as the cost of pumping such oil to K.2 station. Consumption of petroleum products in Iraq increased from about 190,000 tons in 1938 to 385,000 tons in 1946 and nearly 800,000 in 1953.

651 382 471 Government revenues from oil operations were multiplied because of increasing production and exports and because of changes in the terms of payments by the producing companies. Prior to 1950, Iraq received the equivalent of $1.65 a ton, which was increased to about $2.45 a ton according to the agreement concluded in August 1950. This in turn was superseded, in February 1952, by a new agreement, retroactive to 1 January 1951, between the Government of Iraq on the one hand and the Iraq Petroleum Company, Basrah Petroleum Company and Mosul Petroleum Company, on the other. The agreement provided for an equal sharing of profits, with profits to be determined before deduction of foreign taxes, on the basis of fixed values and costs of petroleum. Under article 9 of this agreement, the share of the Government in profits from crude oil of Kirkuk quality on the Iraqi-Syrian border was calculated to amount to 35s. 6d. per long ton in 1951, increasing to 40s. 6d. in 1953 and thereafter; the corresponding figures on the Persian Gulf at Fao were 29s. 4 1/2d. and 34s. 4 1/2d. per long ton, respectively. This provision involved a discount of 17s. 6d. per long ton for Kirkuk oil from its Iraqi-Syrian border value, and 13s. for southern Iraqi oil from the posted prices in the Persian Gulf. A new agreement reached in March 1955, retroactive to January 1954, reduced this discount to a flat rate of 2 per cent, and resulted in a rise of 7s. per ton in revenue for Iraq. Direct payments to the Government, which were the equivalent of about ID 2 million in the fiscal year 1938/39 and ID 2.3 million in 1946/47, increased to ID 5.4 million in 1950/51 and nearly ID 68 million in 1954, all paid in sterling. Local expenditures by the oil companies for the purchase of local materials and payment of wages to workers, kept pace with the development of the petroleum industry; such sterling disbursements of the oil companies amounted to the equivalent of ID 7.2 million in 1952 as against ID 2.1 million in 1946 and ID 580,000 in 1938.

Other industries

433 Government attempts to promote industrialization began with the "Encouragement of Industries" Law of 1929, which exempted industrial machinery and certain raw materials from customs duties and also exempted new industries from certain taxes;

Foreign trade and balance of payments

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Exports of commodities other than petroleum fluctuate considerably from year to year, with changes in the size of crops, but an upward trend may be discerned in the post-war period. Merchandise exports, excluding petroleum, increased from an average of ID 12.6 million in 1945-47 to ID 22.9 million in 1951-53; this reflects both an increase in quantum and a rise in price. Imports, including goods brought in by the petroleum companies, rose still more rapidly, for the same reasons, from an average of ID 32.3 million in 1945-47 to one of ID 60.5 million in 1951-53. Over the period, the deficit in the balance of trade was covered by the foreign exchange disbursements made by the petroleum companies.

The leading exports continue to be, in addition to petroleum, barley and other grains, dates, cotton and wool. The increase in the quantum of exports shown in table 5 is due mainly to increased exports of grains, wool and cotton. The increase in imports covers all classes of commodities. Capital goods now account for a greater proportion of imports than they did before the Second World War. Excluding imports by petroleum companies, they dropped from 40 per cent of total imports in 1938 to an average of 36 per cent in 1946-48 but rose to 39 per cent in 1949-51 and 46 per cent in 1952-54. The increase has been particularly great in iron and steel products - from 52,000 metric tons in 1938 to 155,000 tons in 1953 - and in machinery and vehicles. Among foodstuffs, the most important increases have been in tea, imports increasing from 3,200 metric tons in 1938 to 12,200 tons in 1953, and in sugar, where the increase was from 44,000 tons to 101,000 tons. Imports of cotton textiles decreased, partly owing to greater local production, but those of rayon goods doubled between 1938 and 1953. Imports of chemicals and pharmaceuticals increased severalfold.

If exports of petroleum are excluded, the United Kingdom is by far the most important market for Iraqi goods; in 1951-53 it took 32 per cent of exports. It was followed by India, the Netherlands, Japan and Lebanon, in that order. If petroleum exports are included, France is the principal market, followed by the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and India. 1/ As regards imports, including those brought in by the petroleum companies, in recent years 36 per cent have originated in the United Kingdom, 16 per cent in the United States, 6 per cent in Japan, 6 per cent in Italy and 6 per cent in Ceylon.

Table 6 shows the movements in terms of trade, excluding exports of petroleum. It will be seen that, since 1946, export prices have shown little change while import prices have risen significantly, resulting in a deterioration in terms of trade. The inclusion of petroleum would greatly change the picture; since, as far as the Iraqi economy is concerned, the "export price" of petroleum is, in effect, the royalties and other payments made by the producing companies to the Government, the more favourable terms obtained by the Government under the agreements of August 1950 and February 1952 represent a sharp increase in receipts per unit of petroleum exports.

Table 28 shows the main items in the balance of payments of Iraq. It will be seen that, in every year except 1950, when exports were high while imports were

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1/ In recent years, France has been taking nearly one-half of Iraqi exports of petroleum, Germany one-ninth and the United Kingdom one-ninth (Carl Iverson, Monetary Policy in Iraq (Baghdad, 1954), page 81).

Table 28. Iraq: Balance of Payments, 1947 to 1953

(Millions of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Transactions of petroleum companies[a]:							
Exports f.o.b. and local sales ..	14.04	11.20	14.10	29.59	39.61	83.28	121.44
Imports c.i.f.	-5.06	-9.55	-10.29	-9.39	-8.77	-14.42	-13.19
Remittances of profits, etc.	-6.35	-2.11	-5.76	-22.46	-18.37	-42.36	-51.33
Recorded capital movements	5.06	11.56	9.59	10.12	6.85	13.23	-3.26
Total	7.69	11.10	7.64	7.86	19.32	39.73	53.66
Other goods and services[a]:							
Exports f.o.b.	17.33	10.34	14.82	26.03	35.01	22.53	23.05
Imports c.i.f.	-35.02	-36.88	-30.97	-28.94	-43.24	-48.61	-56.90
Services	0.13	1.83	2.92	3.86	-0.17	-0.51	0.56
Total	-17.56	-24.71	-13.23	0.95	-8.40	-26.59	-33.29
Private donations and capital[a]....	0.25	-0.23	-0.35	0.83	-0.39	1.53	0.40
Official donations and long-term capital	-0.95	-0.52	-0.02	2.53	0.17	1.12	-1.47
Net errors and omissions	2.18	1.20	4.22	-3.93	-10.26	-4.87	2.50
Total, excluding transactions of petroleum companies	-16.08	-24.26	-9.38	0.38	-18.88	-28.81	-31.86
Monetary movements[b]	8.39	13.16	1.74	-8.24	-0.44	-10.92	-21.80

Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1947-1953 (Washington, D.C., 1954).

[a] Minus sign indicates debit.

[b] Minus sign indicates purchase of securities or increase in assets.

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 ME Middle East
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439 457 reduced by rigid controls, there was a large import surplus, which was only partly covered by such items as expenditures made by pilgrims and tourists in Iraq, receipts from transit trade and expenditure by foreign vessels in Iraqi ports. The main capital transfer items in the non-oil sector were drawings on the Iraqi State Railway Loan and the loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and repayments of loans. Part of the large debit items shown under "errors and omissions" probably represent flight of capital.

The deficit in the non-oil sector has, since 1950, been more than covered by the surplus in the oil sector. In the years 1948 to 1950, the combined value of imports made by the petroleum companies and the profits and salaries remitted abroad by them exceeded the value of the petroleum exported. The large amount of capital brought in by the companies for investment, however, resulted in an over-all surplus in the oil sector. Since 1950, the value of petroleum exports has greatly increased and the surplus has risen considerably.

During the years 1947 to 1949, the surplus in the oil sector failed to cover the deficit in other sectors, and Iraq drew heavily on its sterling balances and other foreign assets. 1/ Beginning with 1950, however, there has been an increase in foreign assets, owing to the surplus on current account; in 1952 and 1953, this surplus was very large. The foreign assets of the National Bank of Iraq increased from ID 35.1 million at the end of 1949 to ID 41.9 million in 1950 and, after a small drop in 1951, to ID 46.7 million in 1952 and ID 64.6 million in 1953; at the end of September 1954, they stood at ID 77.6 million. At the end of 1953, all but ID 1.9 million consisted of sterling assets. 2/

As Iraq is part of the sterling area, its needs for dollars have been met from the dollar pool of that area. Since 1949, annual exports to the United States have been below ID 1 million while imports have ranged between ID 3.1 and ID 11.3 million; both earnings and expenditures of dollars on non-merchandise transactions have been small.

Monetary system and public finance

Money and Banking

652 457 The basis of Iraq's monetary system was determined by the Iraq Currency Law of 1931 entrusting management and note issue to a Currency Board, sitting in London, which functioned until 1 July 1949 when the National Bank of Iraq, established in 1947, assumed control. The Bank is authorized to maintain a reserve "composed of gold and foreign currencies at a ratio of not less than 70 per cent and Iraqi Government securities at a ratio not exceeding 30 per cent". However, the National Bank during its early years of operation continued the Board policy of 100 per cent foreign exchange cover and exercised a passive role towards the amount of the money supply, which is mainly affected by changes in the balance of payments.

1/ Iraq sterling balances fell from £57.2 million at the end of 1947 to £43 million at the end of 1949.

2/ National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin (Baghdad).

441

441 MERCANTILE BUSINESS--extent of specialization in commerce; types and distribution of mercantile businesses; social status and special characteristics of merchants; business men's organizations (e.g., merchant guilds, trade associations, chambers of commerce); general characteristics of merchandising; special mercantile privileges and restrictions; etc. See also:

Urban commercial facilities	366	Competition	477
Occupational specialization	463	Business schools	874
Craft guilds	467		

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1
Iraq Bedouin MH8

B 231 492 or bridle, except as these appurtenances are put on for show, and it is a beautiful sight to see an Arab on his pet mare galloping over the plain, the two appearing almost as one animal.

B 619 421 721 Among these nomads much the same ideas of equality and brotherhood prevail as are seen in Central Arabia. Tribal loyalty is very strong, and no one would think of stealing from a brother tribesman. From another tribe, however, there is a continual effort to steal all the hoofed property that can be abstracted. Conceptions of property are the same sort of semi-communistic ideas that seem to characterize the Bedouin everywhere. The game of compulsory exchange goes on merrily and is the spice of life to those hardy desert rangers. Whatever government eventually prevails may expect to have a hard time in taming them and teaching them some sort of civilized respect for the property of other people.

I 463 565 441 In marked contrast to the more or less primitive existence of these Mesopotamian nomads is the life of the large cities. Indeed Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, the principal cities of Mesopotamia, are more or less similar to cities in America in their organization and in the different classes of people they contain. The merchant class, which is large and prosperous, includes petty shopkeepers and great merchants with every gradation between these two extremes. The bazaars show a bewildering profusion of goods, in part locally manufactured and in part imported. The great bazaar in Baghdad has entire streets devoted to the sale of the peculiar red shoe that is characteristic of that city. Whole streets again have little or nothing except earthenware of every sort and description. Great rooms are piled to the ceiling with these utensils. In a general way

463 each kind of goods has its special section of the bazaar.
565 The brass- and copper-smiths' quarter rings like a small
441 boiler factory all day long. The artisans who are engaged in producing these commodities form a considerable section of the Mesopotamian city population and are fairly prosperous and contented, much more so than the date gardeners of the outside districts. Supreme over them all stands the Mesopotamian silver worker, whose antimony silver work can scarcely be duplicated anywhere in the world.

463 The professional classes in these Mesopotamian cities
871 are fairly well developed. There are teachers of every
794 sort. Some of them have been trained abroad, but many
177 are indigenous and a very great credit to the schools that have turned them out. There are a number of government schools, and in addition the different religious sects maintain schools of their own. In these days when western education is in great demand, the schools of the Jews and the Christians are patronized by an increasing number of Mohammedans. No local medical profession has
463 been developed as yet, but the wealth and the culture of
759 Mosul, Baghdad and Basra have attracted a considerable number of trained physicians from outside. We have therefore the beginnings of a medical profession, and although it is not yet indigenous, it will soon become so. Its ethics are not of a very high order; the campaign of the American College of Surgeons to abolish fee-splitting would not make much headway among Mesopotamian doctors, but time will develop ethical standards, and at the worst the profession is a long way in advance
463 of the quacks that infest Arabia proper. There is also a
693 well-established group of lawyers. One of the results of the governing of the country for hundreds of years by

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442 **WHOLESALE MARKETING**--degree of specialization in wholesale marketing; prevalent types of wholesale business; methods and techniques of wholesale merchandising; buying at wholesale (e.g., specialized buyers, conventions, wholesale lots, discounts); information on specific wholesale businesses; etc.

See also:

Stock exchanges 455

Producers' cooperatives 474

Warehousing 488

29: Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

PRODUCTION

433 Industry at present is confined largely to processing agricultural products, producing building materials, and manufacturing consumer goods—matches, soap, cigarettes, shoes, beverages, and textiles.

Conditions are favorable for further industrial development. Opportunities are abundant for producing agricultural raw materials for processing, and indications are that iron, copper, zinc, chrome, sulphur, and salt exist in commercial quantities. With plenty of oil and natural gas, fuel is no problem. Manpower is adequate, and with proper training the Iraqi workman is said to be competent. A higher level of agricultural production would create also a wider market for manufactured products.

There are a number of limitations. The lack of technical "know-how" and the lack of sufficient private capital and initiative are the most important. Much capital, particularly that accumulated from agriculture, is said to be hoarded; and the balance generally is invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce where investors anticipate a
471 high rate of return. It is suggested for this reason that industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

In most of the Middle East countries, cotton harvesting and, to a certain extent, weeding depend on migrant laborers who travel from one area to another. In Iraq, most of the members of the migrant farm worker's family walk, carrying their household goods on their heads. Only the tiniest youngsters and the oldest women ride the burros.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Iraq MHI

248 established tenure systems, and the primitive methods likely will disappear slowly.

Earlier British experiments in the area indicated March 15 to April 15 as the optimum sowing dates, but reports are that cotton usually is planted much later, either because of laxness or because of labor competition with other crops. Some farmers try to get wheat off and then plant cotton, which throws the cotton very late. Cotton planted in April will begin opening in August. The Rogers Acala undergoes a dormant period of several weeks after the first bolls open and then continues to set and mature bolls up to January. About 80 per cent of the cotton is made on what is called this second or late flush. Picking goes on during all this period.

GINNING

248 407 Until a few years ago there were only about four saw gins with 10 stands in the country and no roller gins. The large profits in recent years on the limited number of gins and the general interest in expanding the crop have prompted a rush to buy new equipment. A total of seven gins operated last season, of which three were newly constructed by the Murray Gin Company. This company has sold three more new gins with a total of 16 stands, which are in process of erection. All the new gins are fully equipped with overhead Mitchell cleaner-feeders and one has the new incline cleaner. Not only the equipment but also the buildings, offices, and storage houses are very modern.

All the gins, with one exception, are privately owned. However, the government will buy another small gin for experiment station use in ginning pure seed that is produced on the station's farm. All the gins except one near Mosul are in the Baghdad and Kut areas.

A great deal of hand labor is employed in the storage houses for picking out foreign matter and damaged and immature locks of cotton before ginning. There are reports that as much as 35 per cent of the weight of the seed cotton coming to the gins is taken out as extraneous foreign matter added to increase the weight of the bales. The government is making a strenuous effort to protect the reputation of cotton by encouraging better ginning.

To facilitate transportation, the ginners make a light 400-pound bale covered on six sides in light-weight burlap and bound with a continuous narrow steel band which is simply tucked under at the end instead of buckled. There are no other compresses and the cotton must be exported in the form in which it comes from the gin. This results in a heavy freight charge, since the gin bales have a density of only 16 to 18 pounds.

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MARKETING

489 The farmers themselves take the seed cotton in bags to a central market place, usually located at the gins, and sell to merchants. Transportation is scarce. Oftentimes the cotton is carried by the farmer in sacks on his back or his head for miles.

The merchants make little differentiation in price for fiber quality. They do make allowances for foreign matter and moisture which, merchants claim, are added by the farmers in an effort to increase the weight. The merchants gin the cotton for their own account and retain title to the seed and the lint.

The merchandising system can best be described as haphazard. The volume of cotton is small, and merchants handle the cotton along with many

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

IraqMHI

other commodities. As might be expected in such a situation, the system of classification is limited. The cotton is usually sold on types. Ginners indicate they will buy and sell cotton themselves in the future as in many other countries. 442

The one large cotton spinning mill is putting in its own gin to supply the mill with its requirements of around 15,000 bales annually. This will restrict merchandising to exports unless and until another mill is built.

OIL MILLS

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There is one oil mill which crushes the largest part of the seed produced. The rest is exported. The capacity of this plant is to be increased and facilities for processing oil products are being added.

EXPORTS

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Iraq has exported approximately 18,000 bales during each of the past two years, mostly to Germany and Japan, with smaller quantities to Holland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

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The Director General of Agriculture has promulgated an ambitious 10-year program for increasing cotton production to about 500,000 bales. In time, he believes that on the basis of the available land and water Iraqi production can be boosted to more than a million bales. While admitting his program is ambitious, the Director General appears to be firmly convinced it can be accomplished, given adequate technical assistance.

United States agricultural experts with the Point Four Program are inclined to agree that the country's natural resources can support a potential cotton production of this magnitude. The rate of increase, they think, will depend on how effectively the technical resources of the country are organized and applied.

The Director General is highly regarded for his technical as well as his administrative ability and particularly for his driving force. He is especially well qualified to direct the cotton improvement program, having graduated in cotton agronomy from Texas A. & M. College.

Long-Range

For long-range improvements he is depending on the agricultural research agencies now being organized to develop better varieties, more effective irrigation and cultural practices, better insect control techniques, and improved methods of classification and marketing. Still in the planning stages, the research program has done some fairly effective work, especially on variety selection, propagation, and fertilization.

Insect Control

One of the main research problems is the control of insects. The government estimates that 75 per cent of the 1951 cotton crop was destroyed by insects, principally by the spiney bollworm, *Earis insulana* (Boisd.), a white fly that attacks the leaves, and by aphids. Fortunately, the Director said, the pink bollworm has not made its appearance in the country. Experiments are 242

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

to supplement its capital by borrowing and accepting time deposits 453
from certain institutions, their resources have been wholly inadequate to the need.

VIII. Domestic and Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments

As noted earlier, trade is probably the second most important 443
occupation. To all appearances, the system of distribution is extremely wasteful. Both in the small towns and in the larger cities there are numerous traders with very small stocks of goods, who cannot possibly earn more than an exiguous income, even if their margin of profit is high. The position is, however, not likely to be cured until the general level of incomes rises and there is alternative opportunity for employment.

Iraq produces most of its food, but apart from fuel, tobacco, 433
and some building materials, most of its other requirements must 439
be imported. Even the small local industries and handicrafts depend to some extent on imported raw materials. Much of the trade is therefore foreign trade. Baghdad is the principal center for the import trade and also has a considerable share in the export trade, although Mosul is the main center for the export of wool and Basra for dates and barley.

Although there are a number of large firms, among them sev- 439
eral foreign companies, engaged in the export-import business, 477
trade is by no means monopolized, as can be seen from the following table which shows the distribution of import licenses granted:

TABLE 9

Import Licenses: 1951

Import Quota (ID 000)	Number of Importers		Total Allocation (ID million)
	Baghdad	Other Cities	
100-180	36	18	6.6
50-80	60	24	4.9
20-40	344	147	13.1
5-10	1,015	502	10.4
	1,453	691	34.9

8;Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

539 So Maqdad took the bag of gold and he went to the
443 market in Hilla where there were offered for sale horses of
231 the finest stock and of the finest blood. And there he saw a horse of between two and three years, and its colour was as black as jet and its beauty surpassed the beauty of all horses, and the horse looked at Maqdad with a look of friendship and affection. So Maqdad turned to the merchant and said: What is his price? Now, the merchant looked at Maqdad and saw that he was dressed as a ragged shepherd boy and he laughed and said: O master of wealth, begone from here and do not trouble us further, for we are afraid that you will offer us so much gold that we cannot lift it from the ground, for we are poor and feeble. Please go from here and do not tantalise us further with your wealth.

Maqdad was angered at the scorn of the merchant and he said: My wealth is greater than your wealth, and I wager you a wager that my purse has more gold than your purse, and the stake shall be my purse against your purse. And the merchant thought: Verily God has deprived this boy of his reason, but let us amuse ourselves and draw a crowd, for it will be good for business. So the merchant called for witnesses, and a crowd collected, and the conditions of the wager were cried out.

Then the merchant drew from his pocket a mighty purse and he said to Maqdad: Let us see your money. And Maqdad's heart went cold when he saw the size of the merchant's purse, and he drew out his own purse and it was smaller than the merchant's. And the merchant spread his coins on a carpet and they saw that there were five hundred dinars of gold and a thousand dirhems of silver and two thousand fils of copper. And Maqdad spread out his coins on the carpet and they saw that he had

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

a thousand dinars in gold, and he had not a single coin in 539K
silver or in copper. And the witnesses said: The shepherd 443
boy wins the wager. 231

Maqdad took the purse of the merchant and put the coins of gold and silver with his own gold, but the copper coins he caused to be thrown to the poor. And he turned to the merchant and asked the price of the horse, and a price was agreed on and paid. Then Maqdad asked the merchant for the pedigree of the horse and for his name. The merchant was astonished, and asked: Do you ask the pedigree of the horse after the price has been agreed and paid? Maqdad replied: His pedigree is written in his legs and his back and his noble head, but it must also be recorded on paper, and that is what I require. And the merchant handed the pedigree to Maqdad, saying: Verily he is descended from the Prophet's noble mare, the feather coated, the most beautiful of all. His name is Rishan, for he is of that noble breed.

Maqdad took the horse Rishan and mounted him bare- 539K
back and rode to his home. And his mother brought out 576
the saddle of his father and it fitted the horse Rishan, and she brought out the weapons which she had cleaned till they gleamed in the sun. And she brought him a bag of dates and a bag of cheese and she said: Now shall you ride to the Tigris and to the camp of the tribes, and there shall you enter the guest tent and salute the assembly, and they will bid you to be seated and bring for you coffee. Then
they will ask your name, for they do not know your face, 539K
then shall you reply: I am Maqdad son of Thamir son of 601
Degaither son of Mansur son of Maqdad son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Qais son of Hamed the Lame son of Mansur the Father of the Sword. And this name is a known name, and wherever you say it, there shall you be

x539 AND Hamed related:
•443 Once in Hilla there was a cloth merchant of moderate wealth, and his name was Abdul Rashid Mejid. This merchant used to buy cloth from the great merchants of Baghdad and he used to sell it in small quantities to the tribesmen and the people of Hilla. He made no great profit from his shop, but he had enough
x539 money for the rent of his house and for his food. He kept
462 no servants in his house, for the work of the house was
356 done by his wife and by his only daughter, a girl of great beauty, in the sixteenth year of her life. The name of the girl was Salma.

And one day it happened that at the hour of noon the hub in their house was empty of water, and the mother of Salma said to her: Go to the river and bring water for the hub. And Salma put a jar on her shoulder and she went to the river. But it was her habit not to go to that part of the river which ran through the town and was near to her house, for she was ashamed that she, a daughter of a merchant, should be seen drawing water, for the women who drew water were the wives and daughters of the porters, and the fellahin, and the leather workers and the coppersmiths, but the daughters of the cloth merchants used to have servants to draw water. Yet her father would have no servant, for his trade was not great. So she went out of the back of her house through the palm trees to a secluded part of the river.

x539 When Salma reached the river she was hot and tired, for the time was noon and the season was summer. She looked around her, but she could see not a single living soul, nor was there a sound from the bazaar or from the town, for the whole world was sleeping. So she thought: I will cool and refresh myself before I return to the house.

to machinery. In the future cooperative ownership and operation, 407
especially in the new settlement areas, should be encouraged as one 471
of the best means of extending the use of machinery on a practicable 647
and economical basis. The experience of the Dujaila cooperative, which, owing to low overhead and transport costs, rents machinery to its members at rates lower than those of the AMA and yet is apparently able to cover the cost of depreciation, seems promising in this respect.

Lack of repair facilities and spare parts have greatly handi- 407
capped mechanization. The government is seeking to overcome 445
this difficulty both by establishing its own repair shops and by requiring importers to provide repair facilities and maintain minimum stocks of spare parts. Such centrally located shops will be available, however, only for major repairs. Since local repair facilities are now almost wholly lacking, steps should also be taken to establish a considerable number of small shops equipped to undertake minor repairs. In addition, courses designed to train drivers in elementary maintenance are urgently needed. The cost of mechanization will remain discouragingly high unless the life of machinery is prolonged by more adequate maintenance and repair.

3. Soil-building and Forage Crops: Fertilizers

The cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is virtually 246
unknown even though the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished and an improvement in feed supply would make the greatest single contribution to an increase in the low productivity of livestock. In the irrigation zone berseem clover, sown in the grain stubble in late summer, would provide a particularly good pasture, soiling and hay crop. In the rain-fed region winter oats and vetch, when cut and cured, would provide a good reserve feed. In the irrigation zone quick-growing crops such as millet could be grown for summer pasture; and more corn, sorghum and legumes such as cowpeas and mungo beans should be cultivated.

Little fertilizer is used and animal manure is generally col- 241
lected and dried for use as fuel. With the expanding cultivation of crops such as cotton, the use of fertilizer is becoming more urgent. There is need for soil analysis and extensive experimentation to ascertain the fertilizer requirement and the effect of fertilizer on

Breweries

274 Iraq's only brewery, having a capacity of 50 barrels per day, is not adequate to meet market demands. The owners are therefore in the process of obtaining additional equipment to double the plant's output. The brewery, which has been in operation since 1945, is very modern in design and its product is of excellent quality.

Distillery

Iraq's only source of ethyl alcohol is a small, modern, well-designed distillery located in Baghdad. Surplus dates are used as raw material. Although they are not expensive, they are nevertheless more costly than the raw materials, such as molasses, which are used in the alcohol industry in other countries. Thus the distillery is operating at about one third capacity, since the market will not absorb its entire production at the prices it charges. Most of the current output is used in the making of the national alcoholic drink known as *arak*.

258 *Date Packing*

Date packing is probably one of the oldest industries in the country. Market requirements have kept the industry very modern and fully capable of meeting all demands on it.

Matches

372 There are two match manufacturing companies in Iraq, both producing matches of very good quality. One company utilizes paper, and the other wood. Their combined production is equivalent to about one half of Iraq's requirements.

Cigarettes

277 The bulk of Iraq's requirements of cigarettes are made in the country from home grown tobacco. The output of 12 factories in 1949 amounted to 2.25 billion cigarettes, but there were in addition many small producers of handmade cigarettes. Even in the factories much of the work is done by hand, but further mechanization cannot be expected until labor becomes more expensive.

Small Enterprises

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445 There are many small enterprises in Iraq which could be expanded, such as tire retreading, reclaiming of lube oil, wood-

7: Internation*l Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

working shops, battery and electrical repair work, shops for repair 433
of automotive and agricultural equipment, bakeries, confectioneries 445
and food processing establishments of various kinds. The amount of capital required in individual cases is quite small but, in the aggregate, it adds up to a considerable sum. The Industrial Bank should arrange for a small-enterprise section to make surveys of small industries in each community, advise them concerning ways of improving their methods of production and assist in getting proper financial help where it is justified. It is estimated that ID 400,000 would be sufficient to meet the needs of these industries over the next five years.

The assistance of small industries by the Industrial Bank is to be preferred to assistance or stimulation of so-called cottage industries. Cottage industries may be of benefit in the over-populated areas of Asia, but for Iraq they do not appear to be an appropriate solution to industrial growth. Iraq's population is small in relation to the resources available. Over the long term its problem is not primarily one of creating a maximum number of jobs with a minimum of capital but rather one of utilizing capital resources in ways which will make a permanent addition to the productive capacity of the country and to the building of modern industrial enterprises.

Establishment of New Industries

The entrance of industry into new fields would help to balance the over-all development of the country and to utilize its resources more fully. At the same time it would increase employment and thereby aid in raising the general standard of living.

Nitrate Fertilizer, Sulphur and Cement Plant

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The largest and perhaps most promising possibility for new 387
industrial development lies in the utilization of the natural gas [316
produced in conjunction with oil. Upon completion of the 30-inch 339]
pipeline, oil production at the Kirkuk field will be at a rate which will make more than 25 billion cu. ft. of gas available per year. For the most part, this gas will be wasted until some means is found for its economic utilization. This gas contains, according

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

407 Administration, an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Eco-
475 nomics. The AMA rents this machinery to farmers and, in addi-
427 tion, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery,
647 licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited
supply of spare parts in order to prevent black-marketing.

Some provision for rental of machinery, whether by the government or by private enterprise, will be necessary for some time, partly because it enables farmers to become acquainted with the value of such machinery and partly because many farmers do not have sufficient capital for outright purchase. As long as private enterprise is incapable of providing this service at reasonable rentals or until cooperatives can be established, continuation of the government rental service appears essential. On the whole, therefore, the AMA's three-year program to replace and expand its machinery park and to equip repair shops appears desirable despite the obvious drawbacks of government operation. At present, however, the AMA is operating at a substantial loss. In the calendar year 1951, for instance, its rental income will probably not exceed ID 50,000 compared with estimated operating costs, including depreciation, of about ID 150,000. Since the beginning of 1950, when it started operations as a fiscally autonomous agency, it has had to cover its deficits out of the ID 500,000 capital which the government undertook to provide. While the government should probably defray that part of the AMA's expenditures not directly attributable to the rental operations, the overall deficit should be reduced by gradually increasing rental charges. Rental charges on tractors, in particular, appear unduly low and may be depriving private persons of the incentive to purchase tractors either for their own use or for rental to others.

407 Since the overhead costs of the AMA's rental operations will
471 probably always remain rather high and its machinery must be
647 transported over considerable distances, it is important that the
government encourage as much as possible private purchase and
●[452] operation of machinery. The extension of credit for this purpose
appears essential. At present, however, the Agricultural Bank
cannot lend money on farm equipment partly because it is short
of funds and partly because such loans would not afford sufficient
security in the absence of any legal requirement to register title
TO MACHINERY.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

to the greater amount of labor required for sugar beets, a single 249 family can probably cultivate a larger area in cotton. Up to the present, tests have not found a variety of sugar cane adapted to Iraq, but both the methods and the scale of the experiments have not been adequate enough to prove conclusive. If further experimentation does result in the discovery of a well- adapted variety, the production of cane may be preferable since cane yields are generally higher than beet sugar yields and cane production requires less skill. Moreover, the farmers in Amara in southern Iraq, where cane would be grown, are at least as much in need of a new crop as those in the North.

The Mission therefore believes that further investigation and experimentation over the next few years are required before a sound decision can be reached on the production of sugar. For this purpose it suggests that two experts be engaged to direct further research, one in beet and the other in sugar cane. During the period of experimentation it may also be desirable to invite a leading foreign sugar company, acquainted with the production and processing of both beet and cane, to make a study and recommendations on the best way of organizing the cultivation and processing of sugar.

Production Credit and Marketing

A considerable increase in farm income could ultimately be 452 achieved through the provision of more ample agricultural credit, the establishment of storage facilities for crops and the organization of cooperatives.

The resources of the state-owned Agricultural Bank, the only 452 agricultural credit institution, are insufficient to meet existing needs 453 for credit. In many cases farmers must either borrow money from private lenders at exorbitant rates of interest or sell their crops in advance of the harvest at substantial discounts. Although the Bank has an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000, the government has paid in only ID 550,000 and the Bank has been compelled to borrow ID 300,000 to supplement its slender resources. In November 1949 the Bank was forced to suspend lending except for small amounts and not until a year later was it able to resume credit operations on a modest scale. It is vital that farmers be

452 enabled to obtain sufficient credit to buy seeds, fertilizer, livestock,
453 machinery and other means of production and to make it unnecessary for them to sell their crops immediately after harvest at extremely low prices. The Mission therefore suggests that the Development Board provide sufficient funds to raise the paid-in capital of the Bank to about ID 2,000,000. This should permit the Bank to expand its credit operations and refund its borrowed resources. Action to enable the Bank to increase its lending will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time greater care is exercised to insure that loans are promptly repaid and that farmers, who are often improvident, borrow only for purposes which will increase their output. In the past a considerable portion of the Bank's capital has become frozen as the result of repeated extensions of the maturity dates on its loans.

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488 Good storage facilities for grain and perhaps other crops would reduce losses due to infestation, improve the quality of grain, assist in the stabilization of prices and provide some assurance against famine. At present grain is often stored in the open or in inadequate buildings and sheds. A modern 5,000-ton grain elevator has recently been erected in Baghdad, and another of 40,000 tons is projected for Basra to serve the export trade. There is, however, an urgent need for less elaborate and smaller storage facilities throughout the grain-growing areas. These could be of simple concrete or corrugated steel construction and range in capacity from 1,000 to 3,000 tons. Simple cleaning machinery would be desirable in order to remove impurities from the grain. Such storage facilities, which might have a total capacity of about 75,000 tons, would presumably be owned and operated by the Grain Board, an autonomous government agency, and would need to be closely controlled so that the Agricultural Bank could with safety make loans against grain stored in them by farmers and merchants. Under such conditions, more merchants would probably enter the market to bid for grain at harvest time and farmers themselves would not be under the necessity of marketing their grain immediately after the harvest irrespective of the level of prices.

474 Although an impressive law on cooperatives has been put on the statute books, almost nothing has been done to organize effec-

modations be built for government officials in the provinces in 362
order to make living conditions attractive enough for capable men.

Self-help in Housing

Any housing program under present conditions should lay primary stress on the encouragement of self-help measures. The great majority of the *sarifa* dwellers, for example, could probably not afford to live in houses built by the state unless really large subsidies were provided, which the Mission does not recommend. These people can best be assisted by setting aside suitable tracts of land for their resettlement and encouraging them to build their own houses of mud and other readily available materials in accordance with models provided by the government. To insure proper siting of structures the government might assist in staking out the foundations and in providing some of the needed materials such as cement for stabilizing the mud floor. As an incentive toward completion, it might also furnish one of the final elements of the self-built house such as the roof or roof timbers or window frames. A project of this kind is particularly needed for the *sarifa* dwellers of Baghdad. The site of such a project should be well-drained, provided with safe water, sanitary facilities, a school, market and health center and located not too far from places of employment. The government actually started a project of this type but it was unfortunately abandoned.

Similar self-help measures are contemplated in connection with 361
the new land settlement schemes. Here the government has a unique opportunity for new forms of community planning. The Mission has for this purpose developed a suggested pattern which seeks to combine most effectively the features to be desired in such a community. Details of this are set forth in the monograph on community planning. Self-help measures can, of course, also be stimulated in existing villages and small towns, particularly in the direction of constructing public latrines and baths, erecting needed community centers and planting shade trees.

Another means of assisting self-help would be the provision 452
of an adequate system of mortgage credit. Private building has always been handicapped by the lack of credit available on reasonable terms. At the end of 1950 the total mortgages outstanding

452 probably amounted to only ID 2,300,000 of which about 70 percent represented urban mortgages. Of the latter the greater part probably consisted of mortgages on buildings other than houses. [652] At the beginning of 1950 a government Mortgage Bank began operations. Only ID 100,000 of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000 has, however, been paid in; and the Bank has had to supplement its resources by borrowing. Moreover, it can make loans only for a maximum of four years and up to ID 2,000. To facilitate an expansion of its operations, the Mission suggests that the Development Board provide funds sufficient to increase its actual capital to about ID 1,500,000 and that the Bank be authorized to extend the duration of its mortgages to at least 15 years where warranted.

344 The Mission has given no special attention to the need for public buildings for which the Development Board has budgeted ID 3,350,000 in its five-year program. Undoubtedly the construction of new buildings for the accommodation of government offices is in certain cases desirable, for existing government buildings are for the most part scattered, overcrowded, poorly lighted and equipped and therefore not conducive to working efficiency. As already indicated, the new railway building in Baghdad should provide some space for government offices.

Water and Electricity Supply

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365 With respect to community facilities, the most urgent tasks appear to be the installation of sewage systems for the major cities, and the provision of safe water supplies and electricity.

It is suggested that a start be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rising level of the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. A plan for such a system has already been prepared by consultants to the government. The initial step might be to carry it out for that portion of the city on the east bank of the Tigris. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless there is a determination to make connections with the system compulsory for all property owners who are supplied with municipal water.

A safe water supply is, as was pointed out earlier, one of the keys to the health problem. While a number of cities and towns now have a reasonably safe water supply, the situation in the great

carefully studied by the government. In this study the possibility 241
of offering financial incentives directly to the fellah and of mak- 427
ing certain changes in the conditions of tenancy would need to
be explored.

IX. Agricultural Credit

If farmers are to purchase fertilizer, more livestock and better 452
draft animals, tools and machinery, they will need access to credit
facilities. The Agricultural Bank with a nominal capital of 453
ID 1,000,000 does not at present adequately serve their needs. First
of all, its resources have been insufficient. As of March 31, 1950,
the latest date for which a balance sheet was made available to the
Mission, the capital actually paid in amounted to only ID 500,000.
Its lending resources were supplemented to some extent by time
deposits totalling ID 136,996. Total loans outstanding aggregated
only ID 556,609. Since that date a further capital contribution of
ID 50,000 has been made to the Bank, its time deposits have
increased somewhat and a loan of ID 150,000, repayable in three
annual installments, was obtained from the National Bank in April
1951. A shortage of liquid resources compelled the Bank virtually
to suspend lending in November 1949. Not until a year later was
it possible to resume credit operations and then only on a modest
scale. The Bank has never been able to meet the demand for
credit. Although authorized to lend up to ID 3,000 to any indi-
vidual for a maximum term of 10 years, in practice it has limited
the size of its loans to ID 1,000 and the duration to five years.

It would be desirable to increase the capital of the Bank substantially—to a total of perhaps ID 2,000,000. The Development Board would seem to be the logical and probably the only available source of funds for this purpose. The Bank would then be able to repay its debt to the National Bank and still extend its loan operations substantially. At the same time, however, there should be a careful review of the Bank's lending policies to make sure they are sound. In the past there has been a tendency for its loans to become frozen. In the fiscal year 1949-50, for example, only ID 108,333 of the total amount of ID 279,975 in loans falling due was actually received. Maturities were postponed on loans totalling

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

followed by cooperatives and to audit the accounts of cooperatives. 474 The necessary staff will have to be trained abroad, preferably in Cyprus where a diversified cooperative movement flourishes. It will also be desirable to give some instruction in cooperatives in the teachers' training colleges and the agricultural schools.

One of the logical places to start with the organization of cooperatives would be in new agricultural settlements as was done in fact in the Dujaila project. People who start afresh in a new settlement will generally be more receptive to new forms of organization. In these new settlements cooperative ownership of tools and machinery will probably be most important. Care must be taken not to overburden the cooperative with too many activities at the beginning. Operations should be expanded only as experience is acquired.

As already indicated, the need of the fellah who continues to farm on a sharecropping basis is the most urgent. He cannot therefore be neglected in the effort to establish cooperatives even though his poverty and his relations to his landlord may make the organization of cooperatives particularly difficult. Among those fellahin, one might begin with the organization of credit cooperatives which would make loans not on the security of the borrower's possessions but on his reputation for work, honesty and thrift. In this way the fellah might be able to obtain credit on more reasonable terms for the purchase of tools, seeds, animals and other requisites. Initially such credit cooperatives would probably need to be financed almost entirely by the Agricultural Bank, but the objective should be to base their operations increasingly on the regular savings of their members.

XI. Storage Facilities and Credit

Farmers are also in need of adequate facilities in which they 488 452 can store their produce and obtain credit against warehouse receipts. At present, prices tend to dip sharply at harvest time because the farmer is generally compelled to sell his crop immediately after or even before harvest in order to obtain needed cash. The merchants with money then reap the benefit of subsequent price advances. More storage and credit facilities would enable

488 452 the farmer to get a fairer share of the price and bring about greater price stability. Even if the merchants primarily used these facilities, the farmer would still benefit indirectly because more merchants would be financially able to compete for his products.

488 256 Grain stores are especially needed. Cotton can at present be stored at ginneries, and the Agricultural Bank is lending money on such cotton. Aside, however, from a 5,000 ton silo at Baghdad, which went into use with the 1951 harvest, the country possesses no modern grain storage facilities. The Grain Board which is charged with responsibility for storage projects is contemplating the construction of a 40,000 ton silo costing about ID 2,145,000 at Basra. This silo would primarily serve the export trade. It would be desirable to supplement these two with a number of smaller stores, less elaborately equipped and located nearer the centers of production. Such stores would afford necessary protection against grain pests and also help to mitigate the fear of famine which is ever present in a country with sharply fluctuating harvests. If equipped with simple cleaning plant they would help greatly to improve the quality of the grain. Grain thrashed by hand according to the prevailing custom contains from 15 to 40 percent foreign matter and from 5 to 15 percent dirt. The number, location and size could only be determined after a thorough survey. It is not unlikely, however, that from 12 to 18 such stores with an individual capacity ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 tons and a total capacity of about 75,000 tons would be needed. For the most part they will not have to be mechanized and can consist basically of simple steel or concrete sheds. The total cost would probably not exceed ID 750,000.

[651] Two possible obstacles to the actual utilization of grain storage facilities should be considered. There may be a disinclination to use them for fear of giving the government knowledge of such stocks and thereby exposing them to taxation. Much grain now escapes taxation. To encourage people to take advantage of the stores it may therefore be necessary to reduce substantially or abolish the *istihlak* tax which is a type of sales or turnover tax. Other reasons for abolishing or reducing this tax have already been advanced elsewhere.[14] Another difficulty in the way of using such

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[14] See the Mission's main report, p. 95.

433 335 power by industry is out of the question. It is hoped, however, that in time this may be corrected.

Even in Baghdad the purchase of power by industry would be greatly stimulated by a reduction in the industrial rates of the Baghdad Light and Power Company. Profits, after depreciation [471] but before taxes, are now over half of gross receipts. Under the terms of its concession, the company pays a substantial part of these profits to the Iraq Government, the remainder being allocated to United Kingdom taxes, reserves for capital expenditure and dividends. The Iraq Government's share in the profits effectively constitutes a tax on electricity consumption, which it might be well advised to forego if it could thereby secure an equivalent reduction in power rates to Iraqi industry. The government might, therefore, explore with the Company and with the tax authorities in the United Kingdom the possibility of an equitable arrangement, whereby power rates would be reduced as far as possible, while still providing adequate funds for capital improvement and continuing a fair return to stockholders. A possible arrangement that has to be considered is the exercise by the government at the end of 1954 of its option to purchase the undertaking as a going concern. If such a course should be decided on, it would be desirable to enter into a management contract with the Company in order to ensure the continuance of efficient operation.

433 488 452 The amount of working capital required in Iraq per unit of production is exceedingly high, partly because enterprises want to be as self-sufficient as possible with respect to needed supplies and materials, partly because Iraq is relatively distant from international markets. Probably the best means of reducing the need for working capital would be through the erection and operation of a bonded warehouse which would provide all industries with facilities to store, until needed, supplies, material and chemicals of all types under conditions that would enable banks to extend credits on the stocks in bond. In this way the banks would have assurance that the stored material would not be released prior to full payment plus interest, storage and service charges. In effect, this would permit operations along lines very similar to those in highly developed countries where supplies and materials are obtained in accordance with production schedules.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

have a mosque, a church, a post office, a cinema, a restaurant, a police station and an institute equipped with reading rooms and a debating chamber. Streets and alleys are laid out to conform to the ground contours and paved with asphalt macadam. The streets are lighted and have recently been planted with trees. The project is much in advance of anything else that has so far been undertaken in Iraq, but its cost and the large element of subsidy involved make it impossible of general emulation. 362

The Iraq Petroleum Company is the only large private industrial concern which has provided substantial housing facilities for its employees, although in 1943 a law was approved compelling industrial project owners to construct houses for their laborers. This law has apparently been ineffective. Although there is much to be said for placing responsibility on industry for housing in out-of-the-way places, the Mission is of the opinion that, in general, provision of housing is an inappropriate burden on industry. [466]

Private Housing; Mortgage Credit

The most spectacular ventures in private housing in recent years were two grandiose developments in Baghdad for the well-to-do. Both of there were financial failures.

Private housing of a more modest character for the middle classes, who cannot afford large outlays, requires assistance in the form of mortgage credit. In the main report, the Mission has recommended that the facilities offered by the Government Mortgage Bank be augmented. Instead of the original capital of ID 100,000, capital resources of ID 1,500,000 are suggested. The duration of loans, which is now limited to four years, should be increased to 15 years where it is considered desirable. [452]

V. Public Utilities

As indicated earlier, considerable progress has been made in providing the larger towns with water and electricity, but sewage systems have been wholly neglected. The Ministry of Interior is, with a few major exceptions, responsible for the planning, installation and general supervision of these public utilities. The actual 365

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-
464 supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
166 shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agri-
● [452] cultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
654 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
185 have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

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423 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly com-
622 plete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his
secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor
estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short
of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any
terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or
sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and
the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this
district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of
the towns.'[1]

244 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions.
The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
● 452 rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The
government regulation that land must remain fallow in alter-
nate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area
is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the
report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward
selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears,
at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan
amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

427 In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually
receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical
apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½ }
Sirkal	2½ }
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53–E.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

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RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

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At present the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and most of their time is said to be devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks.[49] A complete program in research and extension is needed. Such a program is being developed gradually now with the help of the various technical assistance agencies.

CREDIT

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Production credit facilities are almost non-existent. An effort is being made, however, to increase the resources of the state-owned agricultural bank to provide adequate production credit and to establish storage facilities for crops. According to the United Nations' special reports, moneylenders' interest rates to farmers for crop production were 30 to 40 per cent before the government recently established the agricultural bank.

COTTON

248
Cotton has never been particularly important in Iraq, from the standpoint of either the acreage involved or the total production. Its potential, however, is great.

Table 33

IRAQ: Statistics on Cotton Production and Distribution
Specified Years, 1920-1951

Year beginning August 1	Acreage	Yield per Acre	Production	Consumption	Exports	Imports
	Acres	Pounds	Bales			
Average 1920-24	NA	NA	808	NA	NA	NA
Average 1925-29	NA	NA	2,977	NA	NA	NA
Average 1930-34	3,751	159	1,240	NA	NA	NA
Average 1935-39	53,099	97	10,773	NA	NA	NA
Average 1940-44	73,000	62	9,409	NA	10,477	2,846
Average 1945-49	21,019	100	4,493	4,000	3,158	2,783
1950	100,000	183	38,121	7,000	21,000	0
1951	135,000	135	38,000	10,000	1,887[1]	

[1] Exports, August through November.

SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, and International Cotton Advisory Committee.

Before the war, production averaged only about 12,000 bales and slightly less in the postwar years through 1949. Higher prices throughout the world, together with the export controls imposed by the United States and the shortage of cotton, sent production to about 38,000 bales. It would have been three to four times as large on the basis of the planted acreage had it not been for heavy insect damage.

AREA

About two-thirds of the cotton is produced under irrigation in the vicinity of Baghdad and Kut on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. These two areas, together with three or four other smaller ones, account for about 88 per cent of production. Some 10 to 12 per cent is produced in Northern Iraq, mostly around Mosul, and about 2 per cent in Southern Iraq, from Basra north along the river.

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[49] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
511 utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.

Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
369 of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
433 to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
511 conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
566 land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
423 house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
471 directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
566 more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
and write to obtain more information.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

433 made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made
barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and
thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work
were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—
shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-craft,
[501] of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported
wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of
the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted
downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were
made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These,
with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq distillation
and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the
meagre list.

439 The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has
457 been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). To it as an 'invisible export'
should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—lifeblood
of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd
al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by
travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

439 Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory
consisted of the import of those needed commodities which
the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some
part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed
through Baṣra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned
commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and
British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this
came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen
goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales,
coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from
India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France,
and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box
wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities
of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes,
were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural
and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or
mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

436 The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper qirsh
(piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a stable
coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian rupee
in Baṣra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns and
Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange
rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. A multitude of local
804 weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district.
● 453 Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by
the shrewd operations of many local *ṣarrafs*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found ● [453] a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 178 579 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 721 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453 ●
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial
operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors.
Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation,
in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equip- 331
ment, the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies. The 'Iraq 625
Police, with diminished British participation, remained a smart and reliable service adapted well to its increasing duties. It contained, during those years, rather less than 9,000 men, including a mobile force of some 750. The Royal Air Force, which since 1932 played 707
no part in 'Iraq's internal security in spite of occasional requests by Government to do so, maintained its own bases and training installations. Mosul and Hinaydi camps and airports and former R.A.F. landing-grounds throughout 'Iraq were handed to the 'Iraq authorities at the close of this period, and the R.A.F. began to install itself, late in 1936, at Dhibban camp by Lake Ḥabbaniya.

Financial administration continued to show the prudence and 652
orthodoxy with which 'Iraqi finances had been handled from the first. This was the easier since the period of depression ended with 1933, and the years following showed a relatively prosperous situation. Improvements were introduced into income-tax and land-revenue procedure and Customs administration. The currency was stable and respected. The last remnant of foreign debt was extinguished; but discussions on a new loan, to be obtained in London through Baring Bros., had up to 1937 no practical issue. The oil dead-rents first received in 1932, and later the royalties, were allotted to capital works—irrigation projects, buildings, roads—included in a programme of which the items were revised in 1931, 1935, and almost annually thereafter. A law establishing 453
an Agricultural and Industrial Bank was passed in 1935; it commenced operations, humbly at first, in the following year.

4. BAKR ṢIDQI

The Hashimi Ministry, more forceful than any 'Iraq Govern- 645*
ment since 1932, appeared by midsummer 1935 likely to endure for a long spell of office. Yasin Pasha openly anticipated ten years of power, though, little as he esteemed democracy, he had no thought of dictatorship. The tribes were frightened, the Palace weak, the opposition outwardly subdued.

But less obvious forces were at work. The King, his own position enfeebled by his personal shortcomings and the misalliance and flight of his sister with a Rhodian hotel servant and her conversion to Christianity, was willing to see a change of Ministry and even hinted at this to Yasin through intermediaries. In the Cabinet, though a scarcely anticipated harmony reigned between Yasin and Nuri Sa'id, his Foreign Minister, the latter was at constant loggerheads with the Minister of Interior. Rashid 'Āli, indeed, gave offence by his impetuous decisions, his favouritism, and the avarice which in defiance of precedent led him, when Sayid Maḥmud the Naqib died in 1936, himself to assume the

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439
Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453
varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656
shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436
in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. 652
The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern 185
multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291
served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi *sidara* in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had 433
little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382
significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to 563
whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were
established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and
were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured
the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the
return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality
and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which 439
had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Produce 435
prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent,
and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially
unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was 471
awarded by the Baṣra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs.
Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly
approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was
prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the
public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil
refinery. A concession for the oil of Baṣra wilaya—more strictly,
of all 'Iraq territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—
was granted in 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc*
creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing
the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a [453] •
branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited 647
for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of
the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—
a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience,
J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he
remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till
his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in
1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively
by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for
nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from
the Financial Advisership in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two
years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on 648 x
bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia
and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain
Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major
demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned
the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial
treaty was signed with the United States, though American
Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed
another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman.
Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary.
The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped.
A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous
régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp,
in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib
was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles
the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality,
shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously
improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal
Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted
at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling
stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both
pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy–French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it
curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to
full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods
were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce
fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to
a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company,
and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu
Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya
river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit
allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according
to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea
or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the
hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country.
The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt;
trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 439
'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry, and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the 453
exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies, and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the 436
National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and 241
was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. [162]
Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi
farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to 185
solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting. New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

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to the greater amount of labor required for sugar beets, a single 249
family can probably cultivate a larger area in cotton. Up to the present, tests have not found a variety of sugar cane adapted to Iraq, but both the methods and the scale of the experiments have not been adequate enough to prove conclusive. If further experimentation does result in the discovery of a well- adapted variety, the production of cane may be preferable since cane yields are generally higher than beet sugar yields and cane production requires less skill. Moreover, the farmers in Amara in southern Iraq, where cane would be grown, are at least as much in need of a new crop as those in the North.

The Mission therefore believes that further investigation and experimentation over the next few years are required before a sound decision can be reached on the production of sugar. For this purpose it suggests that two experts be engaged to direct further research, one in beet and the other in sugar cane. During the period of experimentation it may also be desirable to invite a leading foreign sugar company, acquainted with the production and processing of both beet and cane, to make a study and recommendations on the best way of organizing the cultivation and processing of sugar.

Production Credit and Marketing

A considerable increase in farm income could ultimately be 452
achieved through the provision of more ample agricultural credit, the establishment of storage facilities for crops and the organization of cooperatives.

The resources of the state-owned Agricultural Bank, the only 452
agricultural credit institution, are insufficient to meet existing needs 453
for credit. In many cases farmers must either borrow money from private lenders at exorbitant rates of interest or sell their crops in advance of the harvest at substantial discounts. Although the Bank has an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000, the government has paid in only ID 550,000 and the Bank has been compelled to borrow ID 300,000 to supplement its slender resources. In November 1949 the Bank was forced to suspend lending execpt for small amounts and not until a year later was it able to resume credit operations on a modest scale. It is vital that farmers be

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452 enabled to obtain sufficient credit to buy seeds, fertilizer, livestock,
453 machinery and other means of production and to make it unnecessary for them to sell their crops immediately after harvest at extremely low prices. The Mission therefore suggests that the Development Board provide sufficient funds to raise the paid-in capital of the Bank to about ID 2,000,000. This should permit the Bank to expand its credit operations and refund its borrowed resources. Action to enable the Bank to increase its lending will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time greater care is exercised to insure that loans are promptly repaid and that farmers, who are often improvident, borrow only for purposes which will increase their output. In the past a considerable portion of the Bank's capital has become frozen as the result of repeated extensions of the maturity dates on its loans.

343 Good storage facilities for grain and perhaps other crops
488 would reduce losses due to infestation, improve the quality of grain, assist in the stabilization of prices and provide some assurance against famine. At present grain is often stored in the open or in inadequate buildings and sheds. A modern 5,000-ton grain elevator has recently been erected in Baghdad, and another of 40,000 tons is projected for Basra to serve the export trade. There is, however, an urgent need for less elaborate and smaller storage facilities throughout the grain-growing areas. These could be of simple concrete or corrugated steel construction and range in capacity from 1,000 to 3,000 tons. Simple cleaning machinery would be desirable in order to remove impurities from the grain. Such storage facilities, which might have a total capacity of about 75,000 tons, would presumably be owned and operated by the Grain Board, an autonomous government agency, and would need to be closely controlled so that the Agricultural Bank could with safety make loans against grain stored in them by farmers and merchants. Under such conditions, more merchants would probably enter the market to bid for grain at harvest time and farmers themselves would not be under the necessity of marketing their grain immediately after the harvest irrespective of the level of prices.

474 Although an impressive law on cooperatives has been put on the statute books, almost nothing has been done to organize effec-

or because the investment is in a new and untried field which does 433
not for the moment appeal to private capital. For the chemical plant 471
proposed by the Mission the latter would probably be the case. The government apparently is also furnishing all of the capital for the oil refinery. Wherever complete government ownership is considered necessary, it would be desirable to have the Development Board act as the government's agent in putting up the necessary capital.

On the other hand, the existing Industrial Bank should be used 453
as the agency for giving needed assistance to industry in all cases 433
where the need is for expansion of present capacity or where there is a prospect of private participation in establishing new industries. This Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951 it had outstanding loans totaling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicaped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests therefore that the Development Board provide the means for gradually increasing the Bank's capital by about ID 5,000,000 which the Bank would be authorized to use for the making of loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an overall program approved by the Development Board.

Aside from making loans for production facilities, the Indus- 453
trial Bank could assist industry by financing the construction of a 488
bonded warehouse at Baghdad, so that credit could be extended on materials stored therein. The absence of such warehousing facilities has caused a chronic shortage of working capital in most industrial enterprises, for under existing conditions much of their capital is tied up in stocks of supplies.

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving 453
fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares 433
whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and therefore capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to maintain a reserve against possibl

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losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

To prepare the Bank for its expanding operations, its staff needs to be strengthened by providing for the appointment of an expert with wide industrial experience to head its Industrial Schemes Section and for the establishment of a small-business branch to pay special attention to the needs of small enterprises. The Bank should, of course, have access to the corps of technical specialists which, at a later point in the report, the Mission recommends should be attached to the Development Board.

Dangers of Excessive Protection

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Particular care should be taken that government assistance does not foster inefficient industries at the expense of the country's standard of living. This danger is by no means unreal. A Law for the Encouragement of Industry, originally enacted in 1929 and replaced by a new act in 1950, provides limited but generous exemptions from income and surtaxes and customs duties, and government land free of rent for 10 years. Iraqi-owned industrial enterprises can qualify for these benefits as long as they primarily use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in considerable quantities. Neither of these conditions is necessarily relevant to efficient production; and it is therefore suggested that the law be amended to stipulate that, in general, such benefits should be accorded only to enterprises which have a reasonable prospect of becoming efficient enough to withstand foreign competition.

Industry is also protected in many cases by high import duties and in some cases, such as cotton yarn, beer and cement, by import prohibitions. In a small country like Iraq, where the limited market affords opportunities for only one or two plants in each field and where the entrepreneurial class is small, there is an acute danger of monopoly and attendant high prices. In Iraq this danger is aggravated by a tendency in some industries to emphasize limited production with high profits per unit rather than mass production with lower unit-profits. While the Mission recognizes the need for

491 494 centers such as Amara and Kut are linked neither by rail nor by all-weather roads to Basra and Baghdad.

504 497 In Basra, Iraq possesses an excellent port capable of handling a considerable increase in traffic. Upcountry cargo into and out of the port is handled almost wholly by railway, for inland river traffic has declined greatly in importance owing to shallow water and other impediments to navigation.

The port and the railways are each run by an autonomous administration operating under a separate budget.

VII. Money and Banking

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The banking system consists of the National Bank, five commercial banks, a number of private banks or *sarrafs,* the post office savings bank, and three state-owned longer-term financing institutions, the Industrial Bank, the Agricultural Bank and the Mortgage Bank.

652 453 The National Bank succeeded the Iraq Currency Board as the currency-issuing authority in 1949. Iraq is a member of the sterling area, so that its currency is backed principally by sterling assets in London. Although the law permits the currency to be backed up to 30 percent by Iraqi government securities, as of March 31, 1951, the total amount of currency in circulation was more than covered by sterling assets. Aside from its note-issuing function, the Bank is charged with the administration of foreign exchange control and the supervision of the banking system in accordance with a bank control law which became effective at the beginning of 1950. This law requires banks to keep the equivalent of 15 percent of their time and demand deposits as a reserve with the National Bank and to keep 50 percent of these deposits in the form of cash and investments in Iraq. The National Bank is empowered to reduce the reserve requirement to 10 percent and to vary the second between 30 and 70 percent. Since the commercial banks have had no need for recourse to the National Bank in order to replenish their cash resources, the Bank's loans and advances have remained very small. As of March 31, 1951, they

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stood at only ID 650,000, consisting almost wholly of advances to 452
the Baghdad Water Board and the Industrial, Agricultural and 453
Mortgage Banks. Almost all of the remaining assets of the Banking Department consist of Iraqi government securities valued at ID 5,490,000.[3]

There are five commercial banks in Iraq, of which three are 453
foreign banks. Of the two Iraqi banks, one, the Rafidain Bank, was organized and is controlled by the government and serves as the depository of government funds. These banks confine themselves principally to the short-term financing of foreign and domestic trade and have always kept themselves very liquid. Thus, as of March 31, 1951, their total liquid assets, including notes and coin, current accounts abroad, discounts and davances, but excluding the statutory 15 percent reserve maintained with the National Bank, amounted to about 87 percent of their current and short-term liabilities, and even 70 percent when advances which are primarily short-term are kept out of account.[4] The operations of the commercial banks are supplemented by the *sarrafs* which are principally engaged in financing small traders. Their number has been drastically reduced in the last year or two, owing partly to the exodus of the Jews and partly to their failure to meet the requirements of the bank control law that they submit their accounts and divorce their banking and trading operations.

The total foreign exchange assets of the banking system are 457
quite considerable. As of March 31, 1951, they amounted to about 459
ID 50,400,000. Total holdings tend to fluctuate primarily because of the influence of harvests upon exports. Thus a harvest failure in 1947, followed by another bad harvest in 1948, as well as the effect of the outbreak of war with Israel in 1948, were instrumental in reducing holdings from ID 64,900,000 at the end of 1946 to ID 43,400,000 in September 1949. As the result of two successive good harvests, reserves then rose in the ensuing year and a half by ID 7,100,000.

Part of Iraq's sterling assets have been frozen since the war, releases being governed by a five-year agreement effec-

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[3] See statement of the National Bank's assets and liabilities in Table II in Appendix.

[4] For a consolidated statement of the principal assets and liabilities of the commercial banks, see Table III in Appendix.

457 tive from July 15, 1947. In a supplementary agreement concluded
453 in February 1951 the National Bank obtained an additional release of £2,000,000 and a guaranty of further releases up to £6,000,000 over the next two years, whenever necessary to maintain its free sterling working balances at a level of £6,000,000. As of March 31, 1951, the banking system still held £29,400,000 in blocked sterling out of total sterling assets of £49,700,000. Since Iraq's foreign exchange assets consist almost entirely of sterling, Iraq must apply to the British government for hard currency releases from the sterling area pool to meet dollar payments. Until February 1951 such releases were limited to specific periodic sums, but a new agreement for one year concluded at that time provided that sufficient releases would be made at all times to cover Iraq's essential requirements. There was no specific provision referring to the large requirements arising out of increasing investment outlays.

454 While short-term financing has not been a problem, the financing of the longer-term capital requirements of industry and agriculture has always been difficult. The amount of savings channeled into the banking system has always been small. Savings accounts in the commercial banks have varied between ID 1,700,000 and ID 2,400,000 over the last two years, and the total savings deposits with the postal system have been less than ID 900,000. Considerably more is undoubtedly saved, but much of it takes the form of hoarding. Thus it is generally assumed in Iraq that virtually all of the 100-dinar notes and a considerable part of the 10-dinar notes in circulation (ID 9,000,000 and ID 9,500,000 respectively as of March 31, 1951) are hoarded. There is a general preference for the investment of capital in urban and rural property, which are regarded as affording a high degree of security, and in commerce which yields a high return. Industry and agriculture have generally been starved of capital, although investments in these fields are slowly becoming more acceptable.

453 As a partial remedy for this shortage of capital, the government has established three institutions to finance industry, agriculture and building. Although each of these is capitalized at ID 1,000,000, the government has actually furnished only ID 550,000 to the Agricultural Bank, ID 600,000 to the Industrial Bank and ID 100,000 to the Mortgage Bank. While each bank has tried

to supplement its capital by borrowing and accepting time deposits 453
from certain institutions, their resources have been wholly inadequate to the need.

VIII. Domestic and Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments

As noted earlier, trade is probably the second most important 443
occupation. To all appearances, the system of distribution is extremely wasteful. Both in the small towns and in the larger cities there are numerous traders with very small stocks of goods, who cannot possibly earn more than an exiguous income, even if their margin of profit is high. The position is, however, not likely to be cured until the general level of incomes rises and there is alternative opportunity for employment.

Iraq produces most of its food, but apart from fuel, tobacco, 433
and some building materials, most of its other requirements must 439
be imported. Even the small local industries and handicrafts depend to some extent on imported raw materials. Much of the trade is therefore foreign trade. Baghdad is the principal center for the import trade and also has a considerable share in the export trade, although Mosul is the main center for the export of wool and Basra for dates and barley.

Although there are a number of large firms, among them sev- 439
eral foreign companies, engaged in the export-import business, 477
trade is by no means monopolized, as can be seen from the following table which shows the distribution of import licenses granted:

TABLE 9

IMPORT LICENSES: 1951

Import Quota (ID 000)	Number of Importers		Total Allocation (ID million)
	Baghdad	Other Cities	
100-180	36	18	6.6
50-80	60	24	4.9
20-40	344	147	13.1
5-10	1,015	502	10.4
	1,453	691	34.9

thereby put on smuggling which is difficult to control in a country 439
with long land frontiers, even with a large police force. On the 656
other hand, smuggled goods can now be purchased quite openly, and it is hard to believe that enforcement could not be made more effective.

In any event, outright restriction of imports could cause prices to rise and so put almost as great a premium on smuggling as a high tariff. The government has tried to prevent excessive markups on certain goods such as radios by price control measures, but the control is by no means fully effective.

The government has also supplemented the system by entering [655]
the market itself. For example, arrangements have been made under the recent Trade Agreement with India for the import of cotton textiles and gunny bags, in part on government account. The government has also made direct purchases from abroad of its own requirements (e.g. tires). The effect has, however, not always been as intended, merchants being hesitant to buy with the prospect of large government stocks hanging over the market.

On the whole, a less complex system of import control would seem better suited to an economy like that of Iraq, whose requirements are likely to change in composition and to increase quite rapidly. Fewer regulations, more strictly enforced, are likely to serve better the two ends of social justice and public revenue.

Balance of Payments

The bulk of foreign transactions are carried out through the 457
commercial banks, which are subject to exchange controls, or [453]
through government channels such as the National Bank. However, numerous transactions pass through other channels and many of them are virtually impossible to estimate. For this reason the Mission has not attempted to construct a true balance of payments. Table 14 shows the foreign exchange transactions passing through the principal official channels, so far as they are known to the Mission. The other items which would enter into a complete balance of payments are discussed subsequently.

As will be seen, even this account, which it should ordinarily be possible to balance, is subject to a wide margin of error for which no explanation is available. The general significance of the

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TABLE III

Consolidated Statement of Assets and Liabilities of Five Commercial Banks

(in dinars)

ASSETS	Feb. 28, 1950	Feb. 28, 1951	LIABILITIES	Feb. 28, 1950	Feb. 28, 1951
Notes and coin in Iraqi currency	3,217,543	5,140,227	Paid-up capital	1,650,000	1,800,000
Credit balances with branches and licensed banks in Iraq	1,806,774	3,366,131	Reserves and provisions	386,723	605,576
Deposits with National Bank	3,271,104	5,549,794	Balance profit and loss account	142,682	164,205
Investments, advances and discounts in Iraq:			Debit balances with branches and licensed banks in Iraq	1,936,609	3,637,427
Government loans	2,578,083	2,176,315	Liabilities against credits opened	2,659,820	5,344,375
Bills discounted	813,129	958,506	Demand deposits	13,770,021	13,759,800
Advances	4,338,362	6,384,214	Time deposits	767,889	613,814
Investments	357,276	435,683	Sundry creditors	155,775	573,498
Sundry	31,650	57,188	All other, including government and quasi-government deposits	6,400,251	9,209,011
Deposits and investments payable abroad:					
Foreign government securities	3,502,870	2,252,870			
Other	7,418,652	9,169,608			
All other	534,327	217,170			
Total	27,869,770	35,707,706	Total	27,869,770	35,707,706

carefully studied by the government. In this study the possibility 241
of offering financial incentives directly to the fellah and of mak- 427
ing certain changes in the conditions of tenancy would need to be explored.

IX. Agricultural Credit

If farmers are to purchase fertilizer, more livestock and better 452
draft animals, tools and machinery, they will need access to credit
facilities. The Agricultural Bank with a nominal capital of 453
ID 1,000,000 does not at present adequately serve their needs. First of all, its resources have been insufficient. As of March 31, 1950, the latest date for which a balance sheet was made available to the Mission, the capital actually paid in amounted to only ID 500,000. Its lending resources were supplemented to some extent by time deposits totalling ID 136,996. Total loans outstanding aggregated only ID 556,609. Since that date a further capital contribution of ID 50,000 has been made to the Bank, its time deposits have increased somewhat and a loan of ID 150,000, repayable in three annual installments, was obtained from the National Bank in April 1951. A shortage of liquid resources compelled the Bank virtually to suspend lending in November 1949. Not until a year later was it possible to resume credit operations and then only on a modest scale. The Bank has never been able to meet the demand for credit. Although authorized to lend up to ID 3,000 to any individual for a maximum term of 10 years, in practice it has limited the size of its loans to ID 1,000 and the duration to five years.

It would be desirable to increase the capital of the Bank substantially—to a total of perhaps ID 2,000,000. The Development Board would seem to be the logical and probably the only available source of funds for this purpose. The Bank would then be able to repay its debt to the National Bank and still extend its loan operations substantially. At the same time, however, there should be a careful review of the Bank's lending policies to make sure they are sound. In the past there has been a tendency for its loans to become frozen. In the fiscal year 1949-50, for example, only ID 108,333 of the total amount of ID 279,975 in loans falling due was actually received. Maturities were postponed on loans totalling

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

453 ID 50,507 and no arrangements for repayment had been made by the end of the year on loans amounting to ID 120,934. A sum of ID 53,303 was received on loans which had fallen due in 1948-49, but in that year the total loans for which due dates were postponed or for which no repayment arrangements were made aggregated ID 98,983. Although the Bank claims it will ultimately be able to collect on all its loans, there appears to be a need for much stricter and prompter collection and perhaps also for more careful scrutiny of loan applications to make sure that they are intended for productive purposes. The Bank must be quite free of any political pressures and capable of granting and collecting loans without fear or favor.

426 453 One of the most difficult problems is the provision of credit to the sharecropping fellah. Under present conditions he cannot get a loan from the Bank because he is unable to offer adequate security. The Bank generally makes loans only on the security of mortgages, although it can also accept as security tangible, nonperishable, movable property other than crops in the field or stored on the farm. To some extent it also grants loans on the guarantee of the government or on the joint guarantee of a number of recipients. Of the loans outstanding on March 31, 1950, ID 538,752 were secured by immovable property, ID 18,634 by joint guarantee 426 and ID 9,601 by government guarantee. The fellah must turn to the landlord or some private moneylender for credit. Under the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators enacted in 1933 any advances made by the landlord are in theory free of interest. Actually, however, the "advance" is generally in kind—i.e. in seed, draft animals, machinery, etc.—and the return to the landlord is in the form of a larger share of the crop which conceals a very heavy interest charge. One of the prime needs is to give the fellah access to better means of production and on much more reasonable terms. The organization of cooperatives among the fellahin would seem to be the best means of accomplishing this, since the Agricultural Bank is authorized to lend to cooperatives on the joint guarantee of its members.

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439 million in October 1947 to £43·2 million in December 1949 and £55·5 million in September 1952, and are still rising. In October 1950 the Sterling Balances Agreement was amended to the advantage of Iraq, and in July 1952 the sterling held in No. 2 Account, amounting to some £23 million, was freed from all restrictions.

Banking and Currency

652 Banks in Iraq may be classified as follows:

(1) *The National Bank of Iraq*, whose establishment was authorized in 1947 and completed in 1948. Its functions are laid down as: (*a*) to issue and administer the currency and undertake duties arising therefrom, (*b*) to undertake duties arising from international agreements, (*c*) to undertake duties relating to the control of banking and co-ordination of banking operations, (*d*) to undertake duties arising from the control of foreign exchange, (*e*) to keep the accounts of the Government, (*f*) to undertake transactions relating to Government and semi-Government loans.

(2) *Government Banks* for granting loans of special kinds, namely: Agricultural and Industrial Banks, for the encouragement of agriculture and industry, and separate banks for granting mortgages on movable and immovable property.

453 652 (3) *Commercial Banks* of which one, the Rafidain Bank, is governmental, and four are branches of foreign banks.

453 (4) *Sarrafs*—small local bankers who perform most of the functions of the commercial banks but are more rigidly restricted by law in the extent of their operations. Operating with less formality than the commercial banks, they are widely patronized by business men.

The withdrawal of the Jews from Iraq affected banking profoundly; two large commercial banks and most of the *sarrafs* closed down, with a consequent contraction in the supply of credit, so that rates of interest rose abnormally to the detriment of business. The trade in imported goods suffered particularly, since cash was not available for customs clearance. The problem was solved partly by increased domestic production, partly by the enforcement of a law for the control of banking, which compelled the commercial banks to increase their paid-up capital and reserves held in Iraq, reduce their investments abroad in favour of local investments, and increase the banking facilities afforded to businesses. In consequence commercial banks co-ordinated and expanded their activities, and the opportunities for profit encouraged new *sarrafs* to replace those who had withdrawn. A great deal of banking experience and

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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acumen has nevertheless been lost and although the situation 453 has been partly restored, business is still less active than formerly.

Banking deposits in December of 1938, 1946, and subsequent years have been as follows (ID):

Year	*Current Accounts*	*Fixed Deposits*	*Savings Deposits*	*Total*
1938	1,231,130	614,928	387,447	2,233,505
1946	13,613,737	3,414,557	2,965,756	19,994,050
1947	12,543,308	2,799,008	2,719,224	18,061,541
1948	12,253,822	1,421,109*	2,302,416	15,977,347
1949	12,271,965	1,322,216	2,389,604	15,983,785
1950	12,994,226	795,361	1,980,305	15,769,892

* From 1948 onwards the fixed deposit item excludes previously included Government accounts.

(SOURCE: Reports of National Bank of Iraq, 1947–50, p. 32.)

Currency. The currency of Iraq is based on sterling and its 436 unit, the Iraqi dinar (ID), is equivalent to £1 sterling and is divided into 1,000 fils (singular also 'fils'). This currency replaced in 1932 the Indian currency which had been maintained under the Mandate, and was issued and administered by an Iraq Currency Board, sitting in London, until 1 July 1949, when the National Bank of Iraq took over the functions of the Board and put its own notes into circulation.

The circulation of currency, which in August 1939 stood at ID4,700,000, increased during the war to ID42,100,000 in September 1946. It has since, with some fluctuation, declined and in October 1952 was ID36 million.

Public Finance

Immediately before the Second World War the total state 651 revenues amounted to some 7–8 million dinars. During and 652 after the war there was a steep rise in expenditure: in 1942–3 the expenditure had increased to ID11·6 million, in 1947–8 to ID26·6 million, and in 1948–9, the year of the Palestine conflict, to ID32 million, after which it has declined slightly. Loans were raised to meet the consequent deficit, which a considerable increase in taxes and duties were insufficient to prevent and which in 1948–9 had risen to ID5·3 million. A contributory factor was the closure of the Haifa oil pipeline in that year; but in 1949 and 1950 the construction of a new pipeline to Tripoli more than made up the loss. In 1950–1, with increased revenue and a drop in expenditure, the budget showed a surplus for the first time in seven years, amounting to ID5·4 million. The expansion of oil revenues has been maintained by

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In fact, as a result of the recent increase in Iraq's income from oil, of which 70 per cent is credited in sterling, to the National Bank for the account of the Development Board, the foreign exchange reserve of the Bank rose from ID 35.1 million in 1949 to ID 83.3 million in 1954, with a corresponding increase in the total assets (excluding cash holdings) of the Bank from ID 41.1 million to ID 94.5 million, respectively. Thus, the foreign exchange reserve has risen from 98 per cent of the total volume of currency issued in 1949, to 177 per cent in 1954, and the National Bank of Iraq's assets from 111 per cent to 201 per cent, respectively. The foreign exchange reserve is principally in sterling, and consists mainly of sterling securities and British Treasury bills. 652 457

It was not until the National Bank of Iraq started operating as the central bank of the State and after passage by Parliament of the Law for the Control of Banking in 1950, that banking institutions assumed a greater role in the financial structure. The banking control law provides that all banks and *sarrafs* 1/ must obtain a licence from the National Bank of Iraq. Private banks, whether established in Iraq or abroad, must dispose of a capital in Iraq of not less than ID 250,000. Banks are required to maintain in Iraq not less than 50 per cent cover, against their total current and fixed deposits, of which 15 per cent must be deposited with the National Bank. However, the National Bank can reduce this proportion to 30 per cent or increase it to 70 per cent. 652 453

The National Bank of Iraq

This bank was established in 1947 as a central bank "to manage the currency and ensure its stability, to serve the State finances, to facilitate internal and external payments and generally to promote and facilitate credits for trade, industry and agriculture". Its capital was fixed at ID 5 million, of which ID 2.5 million was transferred by the Government from the surplus of its Currency Reserve Fund. The other half is "deemed to be reserve guaranteed by the Iraqi Treasury to be covered from the bank's annual profit at the rate of 25 per cent or not more than ID 250,000". In addition to the issue and management of the currency, banking control and exchange control, the bank has issued several small loans to various government and semi-government institutions and non-commercial banks, but its 1954 statements show no outstanding loans or advances. 652

Commercial Banks

Institutions operating according to the Law for the Control of Banking are the *sarrafs* and foreign and Iraqi commercial banks. The Iraqi banks include the Rafidain Bank, which was established in 1941 and is actively engaged in commerce. In addition, applications have been filed for the establishment of two new private banks, the capital of which has been subscribed by Iraqi nationals. One of these banks, the Iraqi Commercial Bank, is reported to be already operating. Foreign banks include branches of British banks, such as the Ottoman Bank, the British 453 652

1/ A *sarraf* is defined as "a person or company licensed to deal in banking in Iraq".

453 Bank of the Middle East and the Eastern Bank, and branches of banks with head
offices in other Arab countries, such as the Arab Bank and the Federal Bank of
Lebanon. These banks have mostly confined their activities to lending money on
652 relatively short term to trading firms, and to financing foreign trade.
However, as a result of the Development Board's expenditure, the increase in economic activities and the growing confidence of the people in the banking system, commercial banks may extend their activities. There has been a considerable increase in the number of banks and their branches operating throughout Iraq; there were five banks and two licensed sarrafs when the banking control law of 1950 came into effect, while today there are seven main commercial banks with about twenty-four branches in various cities and towns, and more than fourteen licensed sarrafs.

652 Other State Banks

In addition to the Rafidain Bank mentioned above, the Government has established four banks to supply medium-term or long-term credit: the Industrial Bank, Agricultural Bank, and Mortgage and Loan Bank.

In 1935 the Government established the Agricultural and Industrial Bank which was divided in 1940 into the Agricultural Bank and the Industrial Bank, but the two branches were not separated until April 1946. The aim of the Agricultural Bank is to assist agriculturists, through the granting of loans and the renting or selling on deferred payment of agricultural machinery, tools, seeds and fertilizers. It acts as agent for the grading and cleaning of crops, assists in the formation of co-operative societies and invests in agricultural enterprises. The Bank has made contributions in these various fields though its efforts have, in some instances, been handicapped by lack of available funds and by administrative shortcomings. Its nominal capital was ID 1 million, later raised to ID 2 million, and its paid-up capital in 1953 was raised from ID 1 million to ID 1.6 million. At the end of 1954, the Government issued a new ordinance advancing the Bank ID 500,000 to enable it to purchase machines and irrigation pumps and their accessories, to aid small farmers and also to increase its loans. Moreover, it is hoped that it will provide greater help to the small farmers who are to receive ownership of land under the Government's own land distribution schemes. Up to 31 March 1952, the Bank had loaned ID 2.05 million to 8,770 borrowers; of this ID 1.07 million had been repaid. In 1952/53, a further sum of ID 660,000 was advanced to 1,246 borrowers, and ID 146,000 on outstanding loans was repaid. 1/ Most of the loans have been medium-term, usually four to five years, and most have apparently been advanced to large landowners. 2/

The aim of the Industrial Bank is "to develop and assist industry in Iraq and to carry on banking business relating thereto". Its nominal capital was ID 500,000 in 1946, raised to ID 3 million in 1953; its paid-up capital in 1953 was ID 2.3 million. It is authorized to borrow money by the issue of negotiable bonds, or any other means decided on by its Board and approved by the Ministry of Finance. In addition the Industrial Bank, like the Agricultural Bank, has contracted loans,

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1/ Statistical Abstract, 1953.

2/ Iverson, op. cit., pages 31 and 32.

241 473 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. [656] A Committee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 312 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new [459] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural [185] affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. 312 653 The first stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

III. Industry

Industry is as yet little developed in Iraq. As already indicated, apart from the oil industry which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 are working in modern industrial plants. These plants represent a total capital investment of approximately ID 4,000,000 and an annual gross income of about ID 3,000,000. Industry is largely confined to the processing of agricultural products, the production of building materials such as cement and bricks, and the manufacture of consumers' goods like textiles, soap, matches, cigarettes, shoes and beverages. 433

Conditions, however, are generally favorable to further industrial development. An expanding agriculture should provide more materials, such as fibres and oil seeds, for processing and when the standard of living among the rural population is raised there should be a growing domestic market for industrial products. In oil and natural gas the country possesses a cheap source of [135] power and fuel as well as an important source of raw materials. There are surface indications of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores, as well as of the existence of sulphur and salt deposits. The extent of such deposits should, however, be confirmed by core drilling before steps are taken to undertake their commercial exploitation. In the cities there is adequate manpower for industry, and the [464] Iraqi workman with proper training is generally adept at learning industrial processes. Skilled manpower, however, is very limited, and, naturally enough, there is little of the technical "know-how" which comes through experience and training. Other limiting factors in industrial development are the lack of sufficient private capital and initiative. Much capital, particularly that accumulated [454] from agriculture, is hoarded and the balance is generally invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce, where investors anticipate a higher rate of return. While there is a trend toward increased private investment in industry, particularly since the war, industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the initiative or financial assistance of the government.

457 tive from July 15, 1947. In a supplementary agreement con-
453 cluded in February 1951 the National Bank obtained an additional release of £2,000,000 and a guaranty of further releases up to £6,000,000 over the next two years, whenever necessary to maintain its free sterling working balances at a level of £6,000,000. As of March 31, 1951, the banking system still held £29,400,000 in blocked sterling out of total sterling assets of £49,700,000. Since Iraq's foreign exchange assets consist almost entirely of sterling, Iraq must apply to the British government for hard currency releases from the sterling area pool to meet dollar payments. Until February 1951 such releases were limited to specific periodic sums, but a new agreement for one year concluded at that time provided that sufficient releases would be made at all times to cover Iraq's essential requirements. There was no specific provision referring to the large requirements arising out of increasing investment outlays.

● 454 While short-term financing has not been a problem, the financing of the longer-term capital requirements of industry and agriculture has always been difficult. The amount of savings channeled into the banking system has always been small. Savings accounts in the commercial banks have varied between ID 1,700,000 and ID 2,400,000 over the last two years, and the total savings deposits with the postal system have been less than ID 900,000. Considerably more is undoubtedly saved, but much of it takes the form of hoarding. Thus it is generally assumed in Iraq that virtually all of the 100-dinar notes and a considerable part of the 10-dinar notes in circulation (ID 9,000,000 and ID 9,500,000 respectively as of March 31, 1951) are hoarded. There is a general preference for the investment of capital in urban and rural property, which are regarded as affording a high degree of security, and in commerce which yields a high return. Industry and agriculture have generally been starved of capital, although investments in these fields are slowly becoming more acceptable.

453 As a partial remedy for this shortage of capital, the government has established three institutions to finance industry, agriculture and building. Although each of these is capitalized at ID 1,000,000, the government has actually furnished only ID 550,000 to the Agricultural Bank, ID 600,000 to the Industrial Bank and ID 100,000 to the Mortgage Bank. While each bank has tried

135 Several geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. The extent and quality of these ores, however, will not be known until further exploration work has been accomplished. There are surface indications of 30 percent elemental sulphur mixed with limestone but, as in the case of the ores, these deposits have never been adequately proven. Previous to the large-scale production of oil, some coal was mined, but actual reserves have never been fully ascertained. A large and potentially valuable salt dome was located near Basra when geophysical surveys were being conducted in connection with oil exploration. It would appear, therefore, that Iraq has a fairly broad range of minerals which might be worthy of exploitation.

Some Factors Affecting Industrial Growth

433 454 Some of the basic causes of industry's retarded development are lack of private investment, technical inexperience and inadequate markets. In the past capital has often been hoarded or invested in rural or urban property or in commerce, where the security or rate of return was believed to be higher than in industry. To some extent this tendency has been overcome through tax exemptions, tariff protection and the financial assistance of the Industrial Bank.

464 433 On the other hand, little is being done to increase the number of skilled workers and technicians through education and training. One of the biggest handicaps in apprentice training is the lack of elementary education. Employees who are unable to read and write obviously can neither receive written instructions, maintain material and inventory control, select proper repair parts nor attend advanced in-plant training classes. Until this is corrected, Iraq must continue to rely on skilled foreign technicians and, in some of the larger and more complicated industries, on foreign management.

The supply of common labor is now ample and will probably remain so for many years to come. A shortage of labor, should it occur, could be corrected by the employment of women in greater numbers and by further mechanization. Industry has not, however, reached the stage of development where this should be attempted, for a highly mechanized plant means high capital costs, greater

Paper Mill

289 Iraq does not have a suitable source of material for a pulp plant at this time. The development of a paper making industry would therefore require the importation of pulp to meet its various requirements. This procedure would ordinarily be both practicable and economical; however, the world market for pulp is now very critical and may remain so for several years. It is recommended, therefore, that the paper mill be held in abeyance until an adequate supply of pulp is assured.

III. State Assistance to Industry

Financial Assistance

● 454 433 The widespread reluctance of private capital to venture into industry can be overcome only gradually as the profitability of industrial investment is demonstrated in various fields. In the meantime, it will be necessary for the government to furnish most of the capital for industrial development.

Plants which will require a large amount of capital and will need completely foreign management at least in their beginning may have to be financed completely by the government through the Development Board. The oil refinery and the fertilizer plant are projects which fall into this category. Other more modest undertakings will require relatively small amounts of capital and in most cases may be economically operated by Iraqi management even though some foreign technicians may be necessary. This combination lends itself to the use of private capital, which should be encouraged as much as possible by the government, by means of financial assistance where justified.

652 433 The Industrial Bank is now the principal agency for rendering financial assistance to the development of private industry. The Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951, it had outstanding loans totalling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicapped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

433 with enormous spending, brings in its wake a host of problems
185 and dangers: inflation, a great strain on a primitive economy, shortages of human resources (civil servants, teachers, doctors, engineers), and the overburdening and eventual breakdown of transportation and communications. Nevertheless, progress was registered. Many irrigation and drainage projects were undertaken, and some were completed; a beginning of agrarian reform and rehabilitation through such projects as Diyala was made.[30] In 1952 the United Nations reported that a slight expansion in industry had been achieved and a basis for more
454 rapid development laid. Capital investments in major indus-
464 tries rose from a cumulative total of ID3.18 million in 1948-1949 to 5.84 million in 1951-1952; the value of output rose from ID 1.4 million to 4.4 million, and the number of workers increased from 1,650 to 4,550.[31]

In its report for the fiscal years 1952-1953 the Development Board stated that considerable progress had been made on some of the construction and irrigation projects although it had not used up its revenues and had granted ID6.3 million to municipalities and Government departments to carry out new programs.[32]

185 The impact of the oil industry on Iraq was not as great as it could have been. In spite of Government effort, and in spite of the belief held by some governmental leaders that it was an unconditional, integral part of the overall development program, industry made very little progress. There have been some advances in agriculture, but not as much as hoped for. There exists a serious danger that after the irrigation projects are completed and the land available for cultivation increased, unless the Iraqi peasant is educated—psychologically as well as technically—to utilize the additional acreage effectively and constructively and to keep the irrigation machinery in working order, the enormous expenditures may well have been wasted. Neither will the new hospitals and new school buildings be able to fulfil their proper functions unless there are enough trained doctors, nurses and teachers with a social consciousness and a deep-seated and genuine desire to help the impoverished,

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[30] Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal,* V, Summer, 1951, 362-366.

[31] U. N., *Summary 1952-53,* 22.

[32] *Al Zaman,* July 24, 1953.

000 industrial shares or bonds, local capital will continue to be held 455 in hoards, or invested in trade, agriculture and real estate. Speculation in land values, especially urban sites, has come to play a great part in the economy of Iraq, and incidently absorbs a great 000 deal of capital. The problem lies then not in the deficiency of capital resources, but in the utilization of these resources and above all in the creation of a suitable environment to induce private enterprise and capital into the industrial field. In the writer's view the creation of such an environment is the core of the industrialisation problem in under-developed areas. As things are, private enterprise is primarily absorbed in trade, agriculture and speculation — especially in real estate — where easy money can be made, and the whole economy remains stagnant. Once this problem is tackled both local and foreign capital will flow in. The State, that is the highest authority in a society, is called upon to take the initiative. Its action must include financial, technical, educational and administrative measures.

654 In Iraq the State has made attempts to deal with all these as- 433 pects. In the fiscal field it has afforded protection for industry in [439] the form of high tariff duties on most industrial products and in the exemption of power-driven machinery from such duties. It has prohibited or restricted the import of articles the like of which are being manufactured in Iraq, such as cement, cotton yarn, vegetable oil, soap, tanned leather, beer. Industrial schemes are given priority in the granting of import licences and the allocation of scarce currencies for purchases from abroad.

The new Law for the Encouragement of Industry passed in 1950 consolidated early legislation and made new concessions. Under this Law Iraq-owned industrial enterprises, that is enterprises in which 55 per cent of capital at least is held by Iraqi nationals, are granted exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions from import duties (not included in the tariff exemptions) on machinery, materials, equipment, spare parts and containers; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of Government land free of rent up to 25,000 square meters. Industries enjoy these concessions as long as they use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in cosiderable quantities. In any case they should use chiefly power-driven machinery in their works. These measures without doubt played a significant part in

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[455]

Competition, in fact, is quite keen in bulk commodities like sugar, tea and textiles. There is no organized market, either in export or import commodities, so that, as speculation is rife, prices can swing rapidly upward on the basis of rumored or actual shortage.

TABLE 10

439

Imports into Iraq (by value)
(in millions of dinars)

	1938	1947	1948	1949	1950
1. Sugar	0.5	1.7	3.7	2.2	4.8
2. Tea	0.4	2.3	2.1	2.8	2.9
3. Cereals and flour	—	0.2	2.3	1.1	—
4. Other food, beverages and tobacco	0.4	2.0	1.4	1.5	0.9
5. Cotton and rayon piece-goods	1.3	7.7	7.7	6.2	6.4
6. Other textiles and clothing[1]	0.9	4.0	3.4	2.9	3.0
7. Soap and matches	0.1	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.7
8. Cement and timber	0.5	1.6	1.6	1.0	0.4
9. Petroleum products	0.3	0.9	1.6	1.3	1.6
10. Iron and steel	1.1	4.8	5.0	4.9	3.7
11. Automobiles, trucks, and parts[2]	0.5	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.2
12. Machinery; electrical and other transport equipment	1.7	4.4	6.8	7.0	5.9
13. Miscellaneous	1.7	7.3	6.4	5.9	5.2
Total	9.4	40.0	45.5	40.5	37.6
Oil company imports[3]	1.0	5.1	9.5	10.3	8.4
Net	8.4	34.9	36.0	30.2	29.2

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[1] Excluding burlap bags, rope, etc.

[2] Including tires and tubes.

[3] The majority of these imports were in categories 9 to 12. For example, oil company imports in these categories were about ID 8,000,000 in 1948 and ID 9,000,000 in 1949, out of a total of ID 16,000,000 in each year. Except for petroleum products, these goods were virtually all for the companies' own use rather than for resale.

Imports

Table 10 gives a list of the principal imports for 1938 and for the last four years. Broadly speaking, categories 1 to 7 represent the principal consumer goods, categories 8 to 12 fuel, building materials and capital equipment, and category 13 some con-[redacted] goods and some industrial raw materials. As the footnote to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

433 made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-[501] craft, of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These, with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq distillation and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the meagre list.

439 The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has 457 been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). To it as an 'invisible export' should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—lifeblood of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

439 Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory consisted of the import of those needed commodities which the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed through Baṣra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales, coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France, and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes, were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

436 The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper qirsh (piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a stable coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian rupee in Baṣra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns and Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. A multitude of local 804 weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district. 453 Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by the shrewd operations of many local *ṣarrafs*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 Acting Adviser, and thereafter by E. G. Hogg, from the Sudan, in
1931. Hedgcock and the present writer left the Ministry in 1930
and 1931. Provision for Capital Works under a five-year plan
was separated from the current budget, and a main part of the oil
revenues, which first accrued in 1932, was allotted to this object.
An Economic Advisory Board was set up. Chambers of Commerce
were founded in Baghdad and Başra. A second advisory visit by
Hilton Young, the 'Iraqis' financial consultant of 1925, was paid in
1930, and other foreign experts—notably A. Sainsbury, expert in
income tax—assisted in the institution of new taxation and the
[651] fixing of civil service establishments. Income tax in modern form
was first imposed in 1928, but proved relatively unproductive; in
effect it was paid mainly by officials and foreign companies. A
major change in the taxation of agricultural produce was made in
1931, based on a new system of tax collection at markets—the
'place of consumption' method—without the need to assess or
measure the growing crops. A financial Inspectorate was introduced.
Efforts both resolute and skilful were made in 1927 to free
'Iraq from the burden of its share of the Ottoman Debt, of which
£ (Turkish) 7 million had fallen to its share, with a further
£T2,500,000 of accumulated interest. The Minister of Finance
arranged to buy Ottoman Debt securities in the open market and,
after handing these to the Debt authority to an extent of £1,228,000
sterling, could arrange to pay off the small remainder by instalments.
Thus, at the cost of finding funds from current revenue for
debt extinction, the State could enter the League happily unencumbered.

652 The proposed foundation of a National Bank, often discussed,
was still postponed. The Indian rupee currency, which had served
436 'Iraq well for fifteen years, was superseded early in 1932 by an
'Iraqi currency employing the dinar (equivalent to a pound sterling),
divided into a thousand fils. Currency resources and the note issue
were supervised by a Board in London, and rested on a basis of
sterling assets. The confident reception of the new currency was
the more gratifying as 'Iraq suffered not only temporarily from a
number of 'slump' bankruptcies, but chronically from an adverse
457 trade balance. A wide visible gap existed between the value of its
439 exports and that of its unavoidable imports of fuel, manufactured
articles, and some foods. The invisible exports which were assumed
to fill the gap were the expenditure by the British forces, diplomatic
and archaeological missions, charities and foreign schools,
pilgrims, tourists and foreign companies, and the profits of the
Persian transit trade. The progressive slackening of the last mentioned,
in spite of lowered transit dues, was a serious feature of the
times. Persian restrictions, Russian competition, the diversion of

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 437
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial
operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors.
Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation,
in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equipment, 331
the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

722 434 was exempted from licensing and price-fixing. During 1945 all controls were discontinued as far as sterling-area commerce was concerned, and traders with one accord sought supplies from every quarter; but freedom of traffic was still hampered by shipping shortages, currency restrictions, and world-wide dearth of goods. 457 The country's requirements in 'hard' currencies, chiefly dollars, were met by an arrangement with Great Britain in March 1945, whereby sums up to the equivalent of $14 million could be converted from 'Iraq's accumulated sterling balances, an arrangement which was to be annually re-negotiated. The restricted convertibility of 'Iraq's own dinars into dollars remained incomprehensible to the public, as to publics everywhere.

722 647 In the task of economic control, which fell ultimately to the lot of local officials, helped, it might be, by the municipality or Chamber of Commerce, more than moderate results could not be expected from improvised systems based on no adequate statistics or machinery, and applied by unspecialized and impecunious officials to a puzzled and resentful public. The higher economic control of the territory, under a law repeatedly revised and productive of innumerable regulations, was placed originally in the hands of a Central Supply Committee, later in those of a smaller ministerial body, the High Supply Committee, which long survived the war. Many problems called for resolution at Cabinet level, where they multiplied disagreement between ministers. Departments of Transport, Imports and Local Resources, founded early in the war and served by British as well as 'Iraqi officials—Lloyd, Grice, le Blanc—were grouped early in 1944 under the Ministry of Supply established for the purpose; its first Adviser, Colonel P. Bayliss, after a few months of dynamic and impatient activity, retired through disagreement with his colleagues. An Anglo-American-'Iraqi Co-ordinating Committee lasted for a few months from midsummer 1944. Outside the territory, but concerned with its output and controlling foreign supplies to it, was the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, of which a conference attended by 'Iraqi delegates was held in Cairo in April 1944; and 'Iraq had in 1943 been toured, under M.E.S.C. auspices, by a Scientific Advisory Mission which produced the valuable reports of Dr. B. A. Keen and Dr. E. B. Worthington. The Centre performed important services in conditions where benevolent interterritory control was indispensable; it was, nevertheless, commonly blamed in 'Iraq for its meagre allocation of supplies, and its abolition late in 1945 was unregretted by 'Iraqis to whom their own country's needs were paramount, those of the Allies and of the War remote and meaningless. It was succeeded until 1947 by a Supply Mission which kept control of a few scarce items of supply.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 1951 establishing its programme for the ensuing five years and
647 allotting an expenditure of some ID 155 million[1] within that period; but it became apparent soon afterwards that revenues in excess of this would, under revised oil agreements (p. 376) be available. It was at this stage clear to all that the acquisition of this copious revenue, which in the absence of some suicidal folly or grave misfortune would accrue punctually and reliably for many years, must completely transform 'Iraq's economy and rate of evolution. Its history indeed from 1951 onwards should be that of a territory extraordinarily favoured in all that appertains to, or can flow from, the resources at the disposal of its Government. Its curse had for centuries been poverty; thanks to its discovered and exploited oil deposits, it stood now at the threshold of an era of abundant wealth; and this must, besides its blessings, bring accompanying responsibilities, stresses and dangers, both moral and economic.

432 The territory's immediate trade balance, which future opulence
[457] would doubtless affect, still showed in 1951 its habitual deficit. This was compensated partly by drawing upon the war-time sterling balances, and partly by invisible items as of old. The country's imports were, as ever, principally those of cotton, woollen, and silk textiles: iron, steel, and machinery: electrical goods: vehicles: tea, coffee, and sugar: chemicals, cement, and timber. Nearly half of these were provided by Great Britain, with India, the United States, and Belgium as other main suppliers and to a lesser extent Italy, Holland, and France; Germany and Japan had disappeared from the list of providers. Exports, which the country's evolution had left little changed over many years, were still those almost exclusively of its agricultural and natural products. Exported barley amounted to a yearly average of some 250,000 tons, wheat was shipped occasionally but irregularly—and not at all between 1940 and 1949; maize, millet, and oil-seeds (cotton, sesame, and linseed) were usually available in small quantities. The co-ordinating authority for all grain exports was the para-statal Grain Board and, working with it, an Agricultural Export and Import Company. Dates, to the important yearly extent of some 250,000 tons, were dispatched to more than forty countries. Cotton had disappeared after 1941, but crept back into the export list in 1947. Other items in the slight volume of exports were animals driven to the Levant countries, wool sent to France and America, and hides and skins, gums and gall-nuts consigned to various countries. Hopes that tobacco might be added to this list depended upon improvement in the structure and products of the local tobacco industry. New

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[1] The provision for 1951 was to be (in thousands of dinars) 9,364: of 1952, 20,460: of 1953, 28,390: of 1954, 31,600: of 1955, 32,335: of 1956, 33,225.

464 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are
472 employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary,
473 sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net
profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country.[1]

648 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation** : Except where foreign enter-
●457 prise has obtained a concession for the development of important
471 resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the
Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation
648 which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enter-
656 prise. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipu-
471 lates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi

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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

651 654x oil. It is possible that the rapid rise in output which may be expected to take place in other Middle Eastern countries, with the possible exception of Iran, will tend to restrain prices. In any event, it would be imprudent to rely on the receipt of all the anticipated revenue. In addition, part of the income should be set aside to meet contingencies and emergencies, particularly further increases in costs. The present low level of wages will unquestionably rise as the development program gets under way and demand for labor increases. Moreover, the rearmament effort under way in the West may exert a constant upward pressure on the prices of materials and equipment.

654x 457 Since the oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling, Iraq should have ample foreign exchange to defray the cost of imports required for the development program. There should be no need for foreign loans except perhaps to meet part of the hard currency needs. As a member of the sterling area, Iraq is dependent on the sterling area dollar pool for allocations of dollars. Until 1951 Iraq received a fixed annual allocation of hard currencies, but under a new arrangement, effective provisionally for one year, the United Kingdom has undertaken simply to furnish sufficient dollars to cover Iraq's essential needs. For part of the extraordinary dollar import requirements arising out of a rapidly expanding development program, Iraq may still have to borrow abroad.

Obstacles to Development

654x While financing the program will present no difficulty, the rate of expenditures envisaged will pose serious problems. To carry out a five-year program involving an outlay of ID 168,000,000, the Development Board would have to spend ID 15,000,000 in 1952-53 and successively larger sums up to a total of ID 50,000,000 in 1956-57. The experience of other countries in process of development illustrates that it is not easy to spend money rapidly and efficiently on well-conceived projects. Expenditures in most cases tend to fall short of the targets. The International Bank, for example, has noted that disbursements on its loans to underdeveloped countries seldom conform to original schedules. In Iraq the development program will require the government to gear itself to an annual rate of expenditures which at the end of the next five years will need

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

an adviser, who should be given a small staff, could assist in 654* determining the impact on the economy of particular projects and the program as a whole and in watching for developing strains and bottlenecks. In view of the importance of economic considerations in the formation of the Board's policy, the economic adviser should have the right to participate in all meetings of the Board. His presence at meetings would also afford the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, who are ex officio members of the Board, an opportunity to receive a direct report on how the development program might affect matters of broad economic policy falling outside the immediate scope of the Board itself.

The adviser would also be able to indicate the types of additional information which should be developed in order that the economic repercussions of the program may be more carefully observed. For this reason the Mission suggests that the fact-finding agencies of the government be greatly strengthened and reorganized by merging into a single statistical organization the Directorate-General of the Census and the Principal Bureau of Statistics, establishing a special section on agricultural statistics within the Ministry charged with agriculture, and expanding the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Social Affairs.[8]

IX. Impact of the Program

The execution of a development program of the magnitude recommended by the Mission is bound to have great repercussions on the economy. The magnitude of the expenditure in comparison with the current rate of government spending has already been noted, but its effect on foreign trade, on national income and on employment can also be assessed in broad terms.

If the trade financed by the oil companies is excluded, imports 457 regularly exceed exports by a large margin. For example, in 1949 imports were valued at ID 30,000,000 and exports at ID 12,000,000, leaving a gap of ID 18,000,000. The gap was much larger in 1948 and much smaller in 1950, so that the figure for 1949 represents approximately the average for the last three years. To a

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[8] See Appendix C, *Statistical Organisation.*

457 certain extent, this has been financed by a net drawing on Iraq's sterling balances, but the most important source of finance has been the oil companies. During the last three years they have transferred to Iraq an average of nearly £10,000,000 in sterling annually. Part of this consists of royalties and other contractual payments paid to the government and subsequently spent by it, mainly on projects in the capital budget. The larger part, however, has been transferred to pay for current expenses of the oil companies for production, construction projects and exploration. These expenditures have directly or indirectly provided income for the people, which in turn has created a demand for imported goods; the foreign exchange has provided the means to pay for them. Thus the activities of the oil companies can be said to have both caused and financed a large part of the gap.

654x 439 457 The same process will continue as expenditure by the Development Board rises. The Mission envisages that this may reach ID 50,000,000 in about five years' time. Some imports of materials or machinery will result directly from the requirements of the program. The balance of the Board's expenditures will, however, be for the most part made in Iraq. The large quantity of money, which will thereby be put into circulation, will pass from hand to hand and most of it will eventually be spent on imports. This means that in the next five years imports can be expected to increase by a large proportion of the ID 50,000,000 to be spent by the Development Board. At the least, the value of imports is likely to be double what it has been in the last few years.

654x 434 The magnitude of the program and its effect on the economy may also be illustrated by consideration of the national income. The national income of Iraq in 1949 was estimated by the Statistical Office of the United Nations at a figure in dollars equivalent to either ID 100,000,000 or ID 150,000,000, depending on the exchange rate. On the basis of some rough and incomplete calculations the Mission estimates that the actual figure probably fell near the middle of this range. It may now be nearer the upper end, since the price and the volume of production of some commodities, especially cotton, has greatly increased and some industrial expansion has taken place. Thus an increase in the government's annual income from oil of ID 50,000,000 would alone be equivalent to at

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vegetables, on the other hand, can be increased more readily and a tendency for prices to rise will probably induce an increase in output fairly quickly. 654* 434

There will also be considerable changes in incomes. Increased or more remunerative employment would of course benefit a large number of workers. Many agricultural workers are likely to benefit. As a result of the greatly increased activity in the import trade, merchants are likely to be very prosperous. In certain localities housing shortages may develop, thus permitting landlords to raise their rents. On the other hand, some classes, particularly civil servants and others employed at fixed salaries, may stand to lose owing to higher prices of some of their essential needs.

It will be an important task of the government to insure that these changes do not result in an inequitable shift in the distribution of incomes. This may be achieved in various ways: by export taxes on agricultural commodities whenever prices rise substantially; by changes in the rates of import duties, the burden of which at present falls heavily on the poorer classes; by raising the exemption limit for income taxes and by enforcing stricter assessment and collection in the higher brackets; or by an increase in allowances to civil servants. The Mission does not recommend specific remedies for a situation whose nature can only be forecast in general terms. It would stress, however, the need to keep a careful watch on the nature of the changes that the economy is undergoing. The Mission therefore recommends strongly that a committee be formed consisting of the proposed economic adviser to the Development Board and high-level representatives of the National Bank and the Ministries of Finance and Economics. This group would recommend directly to the Council of Ministers the adoption of timely measures aimed at checking any dangerous inflationary trends and at offsetting any tendency toward gross inequities in the distribution of income.

No mention has yet been made of the possibility of loss of foreign exchange by the National Bank as a result of the development program. In itself the program cannot cause an increase in expenditure on imports in excess of the outlay on the development program. In fact, as there will be some need on the part of individuals or organizations to hold larger cash balances, they will save 654* 457

654* 457 part of their income in this form and there will be some net gain of foreign exchange by the National Bank.

The effect of the development program on the economy as a whole, however, has to be borne in mind. A general rise in the level of prices and wages will tend to increase consumption at the expense of savings. At the same time, there will be considerable incentive to make more investment outside the development program than in the past. Thus, quite apart from the effect of the program itself, there will be some pressure to expand imports. Whether this pressure could be sufficiently strong to cause an expansion of imports by more than the amount of foreign exchange used to finance the development program is uncertain, but the possibility exists. It will be important, therefore, to avoid any further pressure on the payments position by an excessive expansion of credit to business or by financing a large budget deficit through bank credit.

654* 652 As long as ordinary government expenditures not immediately related to development are kept down and tax income maintained, there should be no serious danger of ordinary budget deficits. In fact, as national income rises as a result of increased development expenditures, ordinary revenues will probably rise more rapidly than ordinary expenditure. The government, however, will have to incur some expenditures which were, in the past, covered by income accruing from oil. Now that this income has been earmarked for the purposes of development, the deficiency has to be made up from ordinary revenue. It may, therefore, be necessary in the first few years for the government to borrow from the Development Board a part of the funds accruing to them, repayment being made when ordinary revenues begin to rise substantially. This should not interfere unduly with development, as the pace of actual expenditure on development is likely to be slow initially.

Measures to curb credit expansion may prove more difficult as long as the banks are extraordinarily liquid. Statutory reserve requirements would have to be greatly increased to permit effective credit controls. The private banks, most of which are foreign-owned, have, in the past, however, concentrated almost exclusively on the financing of trade, particularly foreign trade. Even if increased opportunities arise in the future, they may show little dis-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

stood at only ID 650,000, consisting almost wholly of advances to 452
the Baghdad Water Board and the Industrial, Agricultural and 453
Mortgage Banks. Almost all of the remaining assets of the Banking Department consist of Iraqi government securities valued at ID 5,490,000.[3]

There are five commercial banks in Iraq, of which three are 453
foreign banks. Of the two Iraqi banks, one, the Rafidain Bank, was organized and is controlled by the government and serves as the depository of government funds. These banks confine themselves principally to the short-term financing of foreign and domestic trade and have always kept themselves very liquid. Thus, as of March 31, 1951, their total liquid assets, including notes and coin, current accounts abroad, discounts and davances, but excluding the statutory 15 percent reserve maintained with the National Bank, amounted to about 87 percent of their current and short-term liabilities, and even 70 percent when advances which are primarily short-term are kept out of account.[4] The operations of the commercial banks are supplemented by the *sarrafs* which are principally engaged in financing small traders. Their number has been drastically reduced in the last year or two, owing partly to the exodus of the Jews and partly to their failure to meet the requirements of the bank control law that they submit their accounts and divorce their banking and trading operations.

The total foreign exchange assets of the banking system are 457
quite considerable. As of March 31, 1951, they amounted to about 459
ID 50,400,000. Total holdings tend to fluctuate primarily because of the influence of harvests upon exports. Thus a harvest failure in 1947, followed by another bad harvest in 1948, as well as the effect of the outbreak of war with Israel in 1948, were instrumental in reducing holdings from ID 64,900,000 at the end of 1946 to ID 43,400,000 in September 1949. As the result of two successive good harvests, reserves then rose in the ensuing year and a half by ID 7,100,000.

Part of Iraq's sterling assets have been frozen since the war, releases being governed by a five-year agreement effec-

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[3] See statement of the National Bank's assets and liabilities in Table II in Appendix.

[4] For a consolidated statement of the principal assets and liabilities of the commercial banks, see Table III in Appendix.

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457 tive from July 15, 1947. In a supplementary agreement con-
453 cluded in February 1951 the National Bank obtained an additional release of £2,000,000 and a guaranty of further releases up to £6,000,000 over the next two years, whenever necessary to maintain its free sterling working balances at a level of £6,000,000. As of March 31, 1951, the banking system still held £29,400,000 in blocked sterling out of total sterling assets of £49,700,000. Since Iraq's foreign exchange assets consist almost entirely of sterling, Iraq must apply to the British government for hard currency releases from the sterling area pool to meet dollar payments. Until February 1951 such releases were limited to specific periodic sums, but a new agreement for one year concluded at that time provided that sufficient releases would be made at all times to cover Iraq's essential requirements. There was no specific provision referring to the large requirements arising out of increasing investment outlays.

454 While short-term financing has not been a problem, the financing of the longer-term capital requirements of industry and agriculture has always been difficult. The amount of savings channeled into the banking system has always been small. Savings accounts in the commercial banks have varied between ID 1,700,000 and ID 2,400,000 over the last two years, and the total savings deposits with the postal system have been less than ID 900,000. Considerably more is undoubtedly saved, but much of it takes the form of hoarding. Thus it is generally assumed in Iraq that virtually all of the 100-dinar notes and a considerable part of the 10-dinar notes in circulation (ID 9,000,000 and ID 9,500,000 respectively as of March 31, 1951) are hoarded. There is a general preference for the investment of capital in urban and rural property, which are regarded as affording a high degree of security, and in commerce which yields a high return. Industry and agriculture have generally been starved of capital, although investments in these fields are slowly becoming more acceptable.

453 As a partial remedy for this shortage of capital, the government has established three institutions to finance industry, agriculture and building. Although each of these is capitalized at ID 1,000,000, the government has actually furnished only ID 550,000 to the Agricultural Bank, ID 600,000 to the Industrial Bank and ID 100,000 to the Mortgage Bank. While each bank has tried

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

consequence not only of the increase in population, but also of 438
the shift from the rural areas, where barley is often a staple element 439
in the diet. 262

Large quantities of rice are produced, but the surplus for export has always been very small. The only other cereal exported in any quantity is millet.

Animal Produce. The principal animal products exported 433
by Iraq are wool, live animals, hides and skins and casings (intestines), 437
usually in that order of importance. The sheep is the main source of these products, providing all the wool and usually the bulk of the other products. As with dates and cereals, the quantities exported vary greatly from year to year, sheep being vulnerable not only to disease, but also to extremes of winter cold and summer drought. In contrast with the other main exports, however, there has been no tendency for exports of animal products to increase. Exports of wool, hides and skins have, on the whole, been below prewar levels, while those of casings have fallen off badly. As animals are often taken across the frontier on the hoof, customs returns of live animals exported are not reliable. The recorded decrease since before the war, is, however, too large to be discounted.

Information on the animal population and on the domestic consumption of meat and other products is sketchy and unreliable. A rise in the consumption of meat could well explain the loss of exports of live animals, but this in turn would tend to make available a larger, not smaller, supply of most by-products. Part of the [233
explanation of the fall in export products may lie in a declining 162]
sheep population owing to the gradual shift from the pastoral life to settled agriculture and from agriculture to the towns. The monograph on agriculture and animal husbandry discusses the shortcomings of the livestock industry and recommends measures to improve livestock raising and the quality of livestock products. The value of exports of animal products is likely to continue its downward trend unless these measures are undertaken speedily and vigorously.

Sheep are especially important as a potential source of dollars. 439
Wool is the most important export to the United States, which 457
also takes all the casings exported and considerable quantities of

439 457 skins. Not all the dollar income accrues to Iraq, however, partly because invoices are regularly undervalued and also because some commodities are sold through intermediaries in the Lebanon.

439 **Other Products.** In the years 1947 to 1949 the remaining exports consisted of the following: bricks and sand exported for use by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the value of about ID 300,000 a year; a variety of agricultural products, whose total value did not exceed ID 500,000 in any one year; and cotton. Iraq has always exported a little cotton, but in the best years, just before the war and again in 1950, its value was only about five percent [241] of all export receipts. The position is now changing radically. Iraq, like several neighboring countries, is experiencing a cotton boom. Under the stimulus of high prices, the area under cultivation has increased rapidly in the last few years and predictions for the 1951 crop have ranged as high as 150,000 tons of seed-cotton, compared with 25,000 tons the year before. If the fellah's traditional aversion to a crop he cannot consume himself has been permanently overcome and if he can acquire the necessary knowledge for good cultivation, cotton could very soon become one of Iraq's most important exports, if not the most important. As a summer crop, however, its cultivation will be hazardous until the control of the rivers gives better assurance of a summer water supply.

Import Policy

439 456 457 All foreign transactions are, with certain exceptions, subject to exchange control. Imports from hard currency areas have been governed by licensing systems and have been limited to goods such as agricultural and industrial machinery, automobiles, trucks and drugs. Before 1948, imports from other areas were not subject to license, except for about 100 items, mainly luxuries. In that year, however, Iraq experienced a very large drain on her foreign exchange reserves and a more complex system was introduced.

Under the system now in force, all imported goods have been placed on one of several lists, the two longest consisting of "unlimited" and "limited" goods. Each merchant is given an annual quota in dinars, within which he can import unlimited goods without restriction, provided he obtains a license for each purchase. Alternatively, he can spend a small part of his quota on "limited" goods, but only up to a fixed amount.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Unlimited goods consist mainly of the goods purchased by 439
the common people such as tea, sugar and cotton textiles, and a 656
variety of other goods considered essential, such as drugs and medi- 457
cal equipment, educational matter, industrial, electrical and agricultural machinery, transport equipment and raw materials for local industries such as gunny bags, certain vegetable oils, *mastika* (for *arak*), tanning extracts and non-ferrous metals. The principal object of the system, when it was introduced, was to prevent a shortage of these necessities—and hence high prices—at a time when imports as a whole had to be restricted to protect the country's exchange reserves. As an additional safeguard, each application for an import license was scrutinized to insure that the articles being purchased were not too highly priced. Since Iraq's foreign exchange position greatly improved in 1950, the import of unlimited goods is now permitted without any quota limitation.

The goods on the limited list, while not strictly luxuries, consist of goods considered less essential than those in the unlimited list. This includes, for example, ready-made clothing of various kinds, automobiles, matches, and certain types of household utensils and electric ware. Luxuries, such as bananas, confectionery, cosmetics, Persian rugs and nylon stockings, were placed on a third list of goods "without foreign exchange." These goods could be purchased only by merchants who held a special license to import "without foreign exchange," which meant that they had to acquire foreign exchange through other than the official channels. Such licenses also permitted them to purchase goods on the other two lists.

Foreign exchange can be acquired without official license in a number of ways, of which the following are probably the most important: by undervaluation of exports, especially wool, hides and skins; by the export of dates to neighboring countries in small craft (in this case retention of foreign exchange is legally permitted); by smuggling, although there is probably a net inflow of smuggled goods; by sale of dinar notes to foreign pilgrims to the Holy Cities; and by overvaluation of imports. The present system was introduced in order to compel merchants to use these resources instead of drawing on the national exchange reserves. Although the system has been successful in that there has been a very

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extensive use of private exchange holdings, particularly in 1949 when licenses to the value of over ID 10,000,000 were issued, it may well be that it has also encouraged the illegal acquisition of foreign exchange.

A fourth list consists of prohibited goods. This is purely a protective device, almost all of the goods in this list being produced in Iraq. These include a variety of agricultural products such as sesame seeds and cottonseed or their oils. Several of the newer industries have also been protected by the prohibition of their products, for example, beer, cement, cotton yarn, aluminum ware, alcohol and hides.

Although the improvement in the foreign exchange situation has led to a relaxation of the quota limitation, the other restrictions remain. In particular, import licenses still have to be obtained for each purchase. Although it is maintained that licenses can now be obtained quickly, this appears to act as at least a psychological deterrent to merchants. One of the objects of the licensing system is to restrict importing to bona fide merchants, but if this is considered necessary, it could, of course, be achieved by the issue of a general importer's license, good for a period such as a year.

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As the economy develops and the standard of living rises, which it may do rapidly in the near future, the demand for goods now on the limited and prohibited lists is likely to increase and restrictions on imports of these goods might easily have an inflationary effect on prices. This would hit the artisan, the clerk and the civil servant, and might increase the cost of the development program. Any extension of prohibition to textiles and other goods produced in Iraq would, of course, hurt the poorest classes. Under these circumstances, it will be very difficult to manage so rigid a system.

A much more flexible instrument would be the customs tariff, but little coordination of the import licensing system with the tariff [651] seems to have been achieved. At present the tariff is primarily a means for raising revenue and, as such, imposes the greatest burden on those who buy bulk commodities. It hardly conforms to the objectives of a licensing system that aims at a plentiful supply of these goods at low prices. The principal objection put forward to higher duties on luxuries is the increased premium

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

thereby put on smuggling which is difficult to control in a country 439
with long land frontiers, even with a large police force. On the 656
other hand, smuggled goods can now be purchased quite openly, and it is hard to believe that enforcement could not be made more effective.

In any event, outright restriction of imports could cause prices to rise and so put almost as great a premium on smuggling as a high tariff. The government has tried to prevent excessive mark-ups on certain goods such as radios by price control measures, but the control is by no means fully effective.

The government has also supplemented the system by entering [655]
the market itself. For example, arrangements have been made under the recent Trade Agreement with India for the import of cotton textiles and gunny bags, in part on government account. The government has also made direct purchases from abroad of its own requirements (e.g. tires). The effect has, however, not always been as intended, merchants being hesitant to buy with the prospect of large government stocks hanging over the market.

On the whole, a less complex system of import control would seem better suited to an economy like that of Iraq, whose requirements are likely to change in composition and to increase quite rapidly. Fewer regulations, more strictly enforced, are likely to serve better the two ends of social justice and public revenue.

Balance of Payments

The bulk of foreign transactions are carried out through the 457
commercial banks, which are subject to exchange controls, or [453]
through government channels such as the National Bank. However, numerous transactions pass through other channels and many of them are virtually impossible to estimate. For this reason the Mission has not attempted to construct a true balance of payments. Table 14 shows the foreign exchange transactions passing through the principal official channels, so far as they are known to the Mission. The other items which would enter into a complete balance of payments are discussed subsequently.

As will be seen, even this account, which it should ordinarily be possible to balance, is subject to a wide margin of error for which no explanation is available. The general significance of the

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 14

Official Exchange Transactions—1949 and 1950

(in millions of dinars)

	1949		1950	
I. Items not involving the oil companies				
A. Trade				
Exports	+14.9		+20.6	
Imports	−20.0		−24.8	
		−5.1		−4.2
B. Other Current Items				
Transfers by RAF and foreign companies	+ 1.1		+ 1.3	
Interest and profits (net)	+ 0.4		+ 0.8	
Payments to Crown Agents and foreign contractors	− 0.4		− 2.2	
Other items (net)	− 2.2		− 2.8	
		−1.1		−2.9
C. Capital Items				
Private transfers (net)	− 0.1		+ 0.5	
Public transfers	—		+ 2.5	
		−0.1		+3.0
II. Items involving the oil companies				
Transfer for local expenditure (IPC Group)	+ 6.7		+ 4.4	
Transfer for local expenditure (AIOC)	+ 1.1		+ 0.3	
Royalties, etc. (IPC group)	+ 2.1		+ 3.2	
Net advances (IPC group)	− 1.0		+ 1.0	
		+8.9		+8.9
		+2.7		+4.8
III. Errors and Omissions		−3.9		+1.8
IV. Increase (+) or Decrease (−) in foreign balances of the National and Commercial banks		−1.2		+6.6

table is, however, clear. The transfers made by the oil companies have financed a considerable deficit in trade and a smaller one on other items.

The accounts presented above, however, do not by any means

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

include all foreign transactions. There are, in addition, three major self-balancing accounts. In the first place, there are the additional operations of the IPC group. Goods valued at ID 9,200,000 in 1949 and at ID 7,400,000 in 1950 were imported on their own account by the IPC group for use in their operations, while 3,700,000 and 6,000,000 tons respectively of oil were exported and a small quantity of equipment re-exported. Theoretically it would be possible to enter these items in a balance of payments as merchandise trade and, after subtracting local expenditure and royalties, offset them by appropriate entries for investment and profits. As they do not, in fact, affect the exchange position, it is simpler to omit them than to make what are necessarily arbitrary calculations.

Secondly, there is an important group of transactions by the AIOC and its associated distributing and producing companies, the ROC and the KOC. The ROC imported about ID 1,000,000 worth of goods, mainly petroleum products, in each year. The net proceeds of the sale in Iraq of imported and locally produced petroleum products, after deduction of local expenses and taxes, were for the most part placed in special local accounts on which the AIOC drew to pay for certain expenses in Iraq. The principal items were various shipping dues in the Shatt al Arab amounting to somewhat more than ID 1,000,000 and building materials exported from Basra. The final balancing item was an increase or decrease in the accumulated balances in the AIOC's or the ROC's local accounts, i.e., an increase or decrease in Iraq's liabilities in foreign dinar accounts. It is known that in 1950 there was a considerable accumulation of unused funds by the ROC.

Finally, there is a considerable body of transactions, mainly illegal, which do not pass through official channels. The approximate value of trade not accounted for in the items already discussed is shown in Table 15.

Part of the discrepancy may be explained on grounds of the difference in timing between receipt or dispatch of the goods themselves and payment therefor. Furthermore, the customs returns overestimate imports by recording the valuation of the major part of these goods c.i.f. Baghdad or Mosul, thus including transportation inside Iraq. Some items, which were really trade, may have been included under other headings (e.g. payments to the Crown

7: International Bank I' S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 15

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MERCHANDISE TRADE
(in millions of dinars)

	1949		1950	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Customs returns	12.4	40.5	22.0	37.6
Less				
Oil Companies trade	− 0.7	−10.3	− 0.8	− 8.4
"Officially" financed	−14.9	−20.0	−20.6	−24.8
Discrepancy	− 3.2	10.2	0.6	4.4

457 Agents). But the principal explanation of the large amount of residual imports is the import of goods "without foreign exchange." Licenses issued (but not necessarily used) amounted to ID 10,800,000 and 7,400,000 in 1949 and 1950. These were paid for with foreign exchange acquired by the methods already described. Part of this foreign exchange was, no doubt, also used for travel abroad, particularly in the Lebanon. Insofar as receipts and expenditures in "unofficial" foreign exchange did not balance in any one year, there must have been a balancing item in these transactions, representing capital export or import. No data is available on this, but it is generally believed that there has been a considerable export of capital in recent years.

IX. Government and the Economy

654 Until recently the goverment, handicapped primarily by a shortage of funds, played a comparatively modest role in promoting economic life. [242] In agriculture the main effort was confined to the production and distribution of seeds, the promotion of cotton and citrus culture and the combating of diseases and pests, particularly the locusts. Some help was given through the establishment of the Agricultural Bank and of a government organization for the rental of agricultural machinery. One project for the settlement of smallholders on newly irrigated government land in the Dujaila district near Kut was initiated. Outlays on irrigation and flood control,

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

439 Iraq's chief supplier. After the war Britain regained her position, but has in the last two years lost some ground to Japan and Germany. In view of the nature of Iraq's non-petroleum exports, the value and direction of trade in them varies considerably from year to year. Iraq's chief customers are Britain, India, Japan, and Holland.

457 439 Iraq has always had an adverse balance of visible trade, which is now largely offset by oil revenues. The volume as well as the value of both imports and exports has increased considerably in recent years. With the relaxation of war-time controls in 1946 a sudden outburst of spending, with no corresponding increase in exports, raised the visible adverse balance from ID8 million in 1945 to over 36 million in 1948, an expansion which was largely met by agreed releases from Iraq's accumulated sterling balances. Thereafter imports diminished in consequence, among other factors, of the decline in purchasing power, stimulation of local industry, imposition of import restrictions, and the effect of the Great Powers' rearmament programmes on the availability of commodities. The stockpiling which these programmes involved, combined with good harvests in Iraq, the devaluation of the dinar, and the relaxation of export restrictions produced at the same time a rapid increase in exports. Accordingly the adverse balance fell, by 1950, to ID15 million, only to rise again with higher commodity prices and shipping charges and local stockpiling against the risk of war. As a result sterling balances were further depleted until greater oil production and the more favourable oil agreement of 1952, by increasing the value and quantity of invisible exports, redressed the overall balance.

MAIN SOURCES OF IMPORTS

Country	*Value of Imports (IDooo)*		
	1950	*1951*	*1952**
Great Britain	18,375	17,200	23,129
U.S.A.	3,079	7,066	11,300
Italy	2,969	3,637	3,580
Japan	829	3,610	3,133
Ceylon	2,269	2,830	3,285
Belgium	451	2,370	2,026
India	3,125	2,302	2,440
Syria	1,013	1,727	1,378
Persia	1,330	1,162	554
Holland	1,053	1,153	1,980
Czechoslovakia	578	1,055	850
Sweden	621	953	896
France	455	850	1,157
Germany, western	99	675	1,325
Total of all countries	37,595	50,871	61,845

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MAIN DESTINATIONS OF EXPORTS

Country	*Value of Exports* (*IDooo*) *1950*	*1951*	*1952**
Great Britain	3,221	8,258	6,737
Holland	3,854	3,850	1,021
India	1,731	2,624	1,225
Lebanon	1,030	2,239	1,017
Japan	1,759	2,002	2,475
Syria	531	510	711
U.S.A.	631	964	491
Egypt	602	763	498
Kuwait	420	591	..
Jordan	286	1,490	500
Total of all countries	20,051	27,010	18,777

BALANCE OF TRADE
(IDooo)

Year	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Re-exports and exports ex-bond*	*Visible adverse balance*
1947	39,946	13,800	1,523	24,623
1948	45,523	7,584	1,530	36,409
1949	40,501	12,076	1,280	27,145
1950	37,595	20,051	1,580	15,964
1951	50,871	27,010	2,001	21,860
1952*	61,845	18,777	1,244	41,824

.. = Not available. * Provisional.

NOTE: Crude oil exports and transit trade excluded.

(SOURCES: GB, Commercial Relations and Export Dept., *Iraq: Economic and Commercial Conditions in Iraq, 1953* by S. Simmonds, London, HMSO, 1953; Iraq Customs Dept., Statistical Section.)

Sterling Balances

During the Second World War Iraq accumulated a considerable balance of sterling; but by the Sterling Balances Agreement of July 1947 the bulk of her sterling assets held at that time were blocked in a special No. 2 Account, sterling subsequently received in respect of current transactions being held in a free No. 1 Account. Certain of the blocked sums were thereafter released annually to No. 1 Account, with a limit imposed on the amounts which could be withdrawn from that account for current transactions with scarce currency areas. Iraq's balances in July 1947 amounted to £57·9 million, of which £11 million were free. The free balances rose to £14·5 million by October 1947 but thereafter dropped suddenly, in consequence of, among other factors, expenditure on the Palestine campaign, and by June 1948 had been reduced to £3·5 million. They have subsequently risen steadily, because of more favourable trade balances and the oil agreement of 1952. The total balances have varied similarly, from £59·8 439

Foreign trade and balance of payments

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Exports of commodities other than petroleum fluctuate considerably from year to year, with changes in the size of crops, but an upward trend may be discerned in the post-war period. Merchandise exports, excluding petroleum, increased from an average of ID 12.6 million in 1945-47 to ID 22.9 million in 1951-53; this reflects both an increase in quantum and a rise in price. Imports, including goods brought in by the petroleum companies, rose still more rapidly, for the same reasons, from an average of ID 32.3 million in 1945-47 to one of ID 60.5 million in 1951-53. Over the period, the deficit in the balance of trade was covered by the foreign exchange disbursements made by the petroleum companies.

The leading exports continue to be, in addition to petroleum, barley and other grains, dates, cotton and wool. The increase in the quantum of exports shown in table 5 is due mainly to increased exports of grains, wool and cotton. The increase in imports covers all classes of commodities. Capital goods now account for a greater proportion of imports than they did before the Second World War. Excluding imports by petroleum companies, they dropped from 40 per cent of total imports in 1938 to an average of 36 per cent in 1946-48 but rose to 39 per cent in 1949-51 and 46 per cent in 1952-54. The increase has been particularly great in iron and steel products - from 52,000 metric tons in 1938 to 155,000 tons in 1953 - and in machinery and vehicles. Among foodstuffs, the most important increases have been in tea, imports increasing from 3,200 metric tons in 1938 to 12,200 tons in 1953, and in sugar, where the increase was from 44,000 tons to 101,000 tons. Imports of cotton textiles decreased, partly owing to greater local production, but those of rayon goods doubled between 1938 and 1953. Imports of chemicals and pharmaceuticals increased severalfold.

If exports of petroleum are excluded, the United Kingdom is by far the most important market for Iraqi goods; in 1951-53 it took 32 per cent of exports. It was followed by India, the Netherlands, Japan and Lebanon, in that order. If petroleum exports are included, France is the principal market, followed by the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and India. 1/ As regards imports, including those brought in by the petroleum companies, in recent years 36 per cent have originated in the United Kingdom, 16 per cent in the United States, 6 per cent in Japan, 6 per cent in Italy and 6 per cent in Ceylon.

Table 6 shows the movements in terms of trade, excluding exports of petroleum. It will be seen that, since 1946, export prices have shown little change while import prices have risen significantly, resulting in a deterioration in terms of trade. The inclusion of petroleum would greatly change the picture; since, as far as the Iraqi economy is concerned, the "export price" of petroleum is, in effect, the royalties and other payments made by the producing companies to the Government, the more favourable terms obtained by the Government under the agreements of August 1950 and February 1952 represent a sharp increase in receipts per unit of petroleum exports.

Table 28 shows the main items in the balance of payments of Iraq. It will be seen that, in every year except 1950, when exports were high while imports were

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1/ In recent years, France has been taking nearly one-half of Iraqi exports of petroleum, Germany one-ninth and the United Kingdom one-ninth (Carl Iverson, Monetary Policy in Iraq (Baghdad, 1954), page 81).

Table 28. Iraq: Balance of Payments, 1947 to 1953

(Millions of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Transactions of petroleum companies[a]:							
Exports f.o.b. and local sales ..	14.04	11.20	14.10	29.59	39.61	83.28	121.44
Imports c.i.f.	- 5.06	- 9.55	- 10.29	- 9.39	- 8.77	- 14.42	- 13.19
Remittances of profits, etc.	- 6.35	- 2.11	- 5.76	- 22.46	- 18.37	- 42.36	- 51.33
Recorded capital movements	5.06	11.56	9.59	10.12	6.85	13.23	- 3.26
Total	7.69	11.10	7.64	7.86	19.32	39.73	53.66
Other goods and services[a]:							
Exports f.o.b.	17.33	10.34	14.82	26.03	35.01	22.53	23.05
Imports c.i.f.	- 35.02	- 36.88	- 30.97	- 28.94	- 43.24	- 48.61	- 56.90
Services	0.13	1.83	2.92	3.86	- 0.17	- 0.51	0.56
Total	- 17.56	- 24.71	- 13.23	0.95	- 8.40	- 26.59	- 33.29
Private donations and capital[a]....	0.25	- 0.23	- 0.35	0.83	- 0.39	1.53	0.40
Official donations and long-term capital	- 0.95	- 0.52	- 0.02	2.53	0.17	1.12	- 1.47
Net errors and omissions	2.18	1.20	4.22	- 3.93	- 10.26	- 4.87	2.50
Total, excluding transactions of petroleum companies	- 16.08	- 24.26	- 9.38	0.38	- 18.88	- 28.81	- 31.86
Monetary movements[b]	8.39	13.16	1.74	- 8.24	- 0.44	- 10.92	- 21.80

Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1947-1953 (Washington, D.C., 1954).

[a] Minus sign indicates debit.

[b] Minus sign indicates purchase of securities or increase in assets.

67: United Nations E-5 (1945-1954) 1955
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439 457 reduced by rigid controls, there was a large import surplus, which was only partly covered by such items as expenditures made by pilgrims and tourists in Iraq, receipts from transit trade and expenditure by foreign vessels in Iraqi ports. The main capital transfer items in the non-oil sector were drawings on the Iraqi State Railway Loan and the loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and repayments of loans. Part of the large debit items shown under "errors and omissions" probably represent flight of capital.

The deficit in the non-oil sector has, since 1950, been more than covered by the surplus in the oil sector. In the years 1948 to 1950, the combined value of imports made by the petroleum companies and the profits and salaries remitted abroad by them exceeded the value of the petroleum exported. The large amount of capital brought in by the companies for investment, however, resulted in an over-all surplus in the oil sector. Since 1950, the value of petroleum exports has greatly increased and the surplus has risen considerably.

During the years 1947 to 1949, the surplus in the oil sector failed to cover the deficit in other sectors, and Iraq drew heavily on its sterling balances and other foreign assets. [1] Beginning with 1950, however, there has been an increase in foreign assets, owing to the surplus on current account; in 1952 and 1953, this surplus was very large. The foreign assets of the National Bank of Iraq increased from ID 35.1 million at the end of 1949 to ID 41.9 million in 1950 and, after a small drop in 1951, to ID 46.7 million in 1952 and ID 64.6 million in 1953; at the end of September 1954, they stood at ID 77.6 million. At the end of 1953, all but ID 1.9 million consisted of sterling assets. [2]

As Iraq is part of the sterling area, its needs for dollars have been met from the dollar pool of that area. Since 1949, annual exports to the United States have been below ID 1 million while imports have ranged between ID 3.1 and ID 11.3 million; both earnings and expenditures of dollars on non-merchandise transactions have been small.

Monetary system and public finance

Money and Banking

652 457 The basis of Iraq's monetary system was determined by the Iraq Currency Law of 1931 entrusting management and note issue to a Currency Board, sitting in London, which functioned until 1 July 1949 when the National Bank of Iraq, established in 1947, assumed control. The Bank is authorized to maintain a reserve "composed of gold and foreign currencies at a ratio of not less than 70 per cent and Iraqi Government securities at a ratio not exceeding 30 per cent". However, the National Bank during its early years of operation continued the Board policy of 100 per cent foreign exchange cover and exercised a passive role towards the amount of the money supply, which is mainly affected by changes in the balance of payments.

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[1] Iraq sterling balances fell from £57.2 million at the end of 1947 to £43 million at the end of 1949.

[2] National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin (Baghdad).

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In fact, as a result of the recent increase in Iraq's income from oil, of which 70 per cent is credited in sterling, to the National Bank for the account of the Development Board, the foreign exchange reserve of the Bank rose from ID 35.1 million in 1949 to ID 83.3 million in 1954, with a corresponding increase in the total assets (excluding cash holdings) of the Bank from ID 41.1 million to ID 94.5 million, respectively. Thus, the foreign exchange reserve has risen from 98 per cent of the total volume of currency issued in 1949, to 177 per cent in 1954, and the National Bank of Iraq's assets from 111 per cent to 201 per cent, respectively. The foreign exchange reserve is principally in sterling, and consists mainly of sterling securities and British Treasury bills. 652 457

It was not until the National Bank of Iraq started operating as the central bank of the State and after passage by Parliament of the Law for the Control of Banking in 1950, that banking institutions assumed a greater role in the financial structure. The banking control law provides that all banks and sarrafs 1/ must obtain a licence from the National Bank of Iraq. Private banks, whether established in Iraq or abroad, must dispose of a capital in Iraq of not less than ID 250,000. Banks are required to maintain in Iraq not less than 50 per cent cover, against their total current and fixed deposits, of which 15 per cent must be deposited with the National Bank. However, the National Bank can reduce this proportion to 30 per cent or increase it to 70 per cent. 652 453

The National Bank of Iraq

This bank was established in 1947 as a central bank "to manage the currency and ensure its stability, to serve the State finance, to facilitate internal and external payments and generally to promote and facilitate credits for trade, industry and agriculture". Its capital was fixed at ID 5 million, of which ID 2.5 million was transferred by the Government from the surplus of its Currency Reserve Fund. The other half is "deemed to be reserve guaranteed by the Iraqi Treasury to be covered from the bank's annual profit at the rate of 25 per cent or not more than ID 250,000". In addition to the issue and management of the currency, banking control and exchange control, the bank has issued several small loans to various government and semi-government institutions and non-commercial banks, but its 1954 statements show no outstanding loans or advances. 652

Commercial Banks

Institutions operating according to the Law for the Control of Banking are the sarrafs and foreign and Iraqi commercial banks. The Iraqi banks include the Rafidain Bank, which was established in 1941 and is actively engaged in commerce. In addition, applications have been filed for the establishment of two new private banks, the capital of which has been subscribed by Iraqi nationals. One of these banks, the Iraqi Commercial Bank, is reported to be already operating. Foreign banks include branches of British banks, such as the Ottoman Bank, the British 453 652

1/ A sarraf is defined as "a person or company licensed to deal in banking in Iraq".

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Haydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated 652
expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 731
27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained 647
to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) 473
and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevitably to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension 722 458
of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources' with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would 548r
fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Effect on Incomes and Prices

458 During the war and for a short time afterwards, Iraq experienced a severe inflation. Since then, it has enjoyed a fair degree of monetary stability, largely as a result of the conservative financial policies of the government. In fact special local circumstances have lately induced a certain degree of deflation in spite of the strong inflationary influences prevailing in the world outside. The sharp rise in the level of employment and income which will ensue from the development program is bound to alter the whole structure of the economy. Upward movements in wages and prices can certainly be expected. In part, these will be the unavoidable concomitant of the process of development. In part, they may be the result of a general inflation in world prices, which would be beyond the control of Iraq.

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458 The principal task confronting the government is to prevent an inflation in any way comparable to the wartime one. It is most important to avoid a marked wage and price inflation which would not only make development far more expensive, but might also create serious discontent. The government has, however, ample means at its disposal to avert such a danger, if it allows liberal use of its sterling income from oil to pay for imports.

The principal reason for the wartime inflation was the large expenditure of money by the military forces in Iraq and the lack of imported goods—for obviously cogent reasons—to satisfy the ensuing demand. Given a sufficient supply of consumer goods from abroad, there should be no reason in peacetime to repeat this [51] experience. Accordingly the Mission would recommend that in due course a competent committee re-examine the customs tariff and the system of import licensing. Some of the restrictions in the present licensing system were imposed to meet a passing situation and could well be discarded. Certain objectives, for example, restriction of imports of "luxury" goods in favor of necessities, might be better accomplished by appropriate changes in the customs tariff. Efforts should also be made to discard, if only gradually, the present method of customs valuation for goods assessed ad valorem, whereby the domestic wholesale price is taken as the basis of valuation.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

If these measures are taken to allow a free flow of imported 654x
goods, the possibility of a severe inflation should be remote. There 458
may, of course, be difficulty in obtaining consumer goods from abroad. If this contingency should arise, it will probably be even more difficult to obtain machinery. Thus the government will be confronted, on the one hand, with the need to use a large amount of labor on its construction projects and, on the other, with a lack of goods for them to buy. In this predicament, if inflation is to be avoided and the program is not to be delayed, the government will have to siphon off that part of the increased incomes for which there is no corresponding supply of goods. This can best be done by both direct and indirect taxation at a rate which will insure a budget surplus and by sterilization of this surplus. Initially these funds might be used to retire the public debt, which is for the most part held by the banks.

Nevertheless, even if these steps are followed and severe infla- 654x
tion avoided, some changes in wages and prices will occur. To a 464
large extent, movements in wages will depend on how easy it is to find the additional manpower required on development projects. Undoubtedly there is a reservoir of unemployed and underemployed people which could be tapped. As indicated earlier, considerable unemployment exists in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, and there are many people underemployed who would welcome opportunities for full-time work. The natural growth of population should add at least 15,000 to the labor force yearly. In the country the fellah would probably be unavailable for nonagricultural work even in the off season except perhaps in the immediate neighborhood of his home, but members of his family or relatives living with him might take advantage of new employment opportunities without a significant effect on farm output. The nomadic population may also prove to be a source of labor.

But the point will, no doubt, be reached when competition for manpower will start to drive up wages and to make agricultural workers increasingly scarce in certain districts. This would not necessarily be an unwholesome symptom. Many people are employed in a very unproductive manner, simply because labor is so cheap. Coolies carry heavy loads which should be carried by truck. Production methods in many industries and handicrafts are

[illegible] Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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423 still greater. Rights are recognized *ab antiquo*, which means
185 by custom established beyond the memory of man, but since all the pumps have been installed in the last thirty years, no rights in connection with them can be recognized. The main problem has been that sheikhs or town notables put in pumps on a holding and then claim the whole of the land. Where there has been a settlement of title, claims have usually been settled on a share basis, but in other cases the pump owner has succeeded in getting the whole of the land. This is not a satisfactory position; in 1938 a draft irrigation law was prepared by the British expert on land tenure, but it has not been enacted.

The Government which came to power in Iraq after the *coup d'état* of 1936 severely criticized the policy of granting enormous blocks of land to individual owners. The fact is of course that previous governments were unable to resist the power of the sheikhs, or of the pump owners, and allowed them to jump claims to land before settlement. As a result of these criticisms, a new act was passed in 1938, which somewhat modified the powers of the pump owners, and gave the existing cultivators stronger rights.

423 But little progress has been made since that time. The Govern-
185 ment's conception of reform was revealed in 1943 when the Ministry of Finance began the sale of the State leasehold (*miri*
458 *sirf*) lands by auction, as an anti-inflationary measure. This was an illusory remedy for inflation, and threw away some of the State's power to reform land tenure and develop agricultural resources. In view of the fact that cultivation is likely to extend in the future as a result of new irrigation schemes, it is clearly important that the Government should decide on the principles which ought to determine future policy. If Iraq is to receive large loans for development, a settlement of the rights of the cultivators will become even more important.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

185 In Iraq, unlike the other countries of the Middle East, the reform of land tenure is the subject of genuine political discussion. Although in its economic life Iraq is far more backward than Egypt, it is politically more alive, and it is realized by the official class at least that reforms are needed, and that a new
000 system of tenure must be evolved. Discontent with the land

its educated class should have made the 'Iraqi press both high in 204
quality and great in influence. It was, in fact, superabundant in quantity, with dozens of ephemeral sheets appearing and vanishing,
and it was written not infrequently with point and humour; but [461]
journalism had on the whole, it seemed, failed to attract the best minds and brains of the country, and as a profession was ill regarded by the public. With rare exceptions[1] inconsistency was habitual, and the selection and presentation of news capricious and unskilful and lacking in Western—or even Egyptian or Lebanese—technique. A news-service was scarcely attempted, and mere political rhetoric and the wearisome use of outworn phrases took
the place of fact, analysis, or sober comment. Broadcasting from 207
Radio Baghdad, which after 1951 used the new and fully modern transmitting station of Abu Ghurayb, offered daily a ten-hour Arabic, a three-hour Kurdish, and a one-hour or half-hour English programme. The service, though still uneven, had improved materially in recent years in editing and in reliable audibility. It was aided by some of the best among 'Iraqi writers, and was rich in its Arabic musical programme; but frequent administrative changes had affected its quality and continuity, and many listeners preferred to hear foreign stations, notably London, Paris, and the *Sharq al-adnā* station of Cyprus.

The educational system operating in 1950 represented, with 871
whatever shortcomings, the considerable outcome of a sustained and meritorious effort. An immense work lay ahead: but the period of slow and difficult beginnings lay behind, and ground was being yearly gained. The faults of 'Iraqi education were those of superficiality, impatience, indifferent standards, and the persistent infusion—unchecked by legal prohibitions—of 'politics' in the schools. Its virtues were those of genuine enthusiasm, the use of modern techniques, and much improved teaching and supervisory staffs. Many and better school buildings were, it was hoped, soon to follow. Instruction was free at all levels, the governing Regulations modernized, and primary education in theory compulsory. The High Council of Instruction, representative of all the higher institutions of learning, assisted the Minister and his Directors-

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[1] The best of the papers were two or three independents, notably *al-Zaman* and *al-Sha'b* and those associated with the political parties. The latter were the moderate *al-Ittiḥad al-Dasturi*, *al-Akhbar*, and the evening *al-Ḥawadith* of the Constitutional Union Party: *al-Umma* and *al-Nabā*, of the Socialist Party of the Nation; *Liwā al-Istiqlal*, of the Independence Party: the near-Communist *Ṣadā al-Ahali*, of the National Democratic Party: and the *Jabha al-Sha'biya*, of the Popular Front. These papers appeared in 1951 to be fairly stable and self-supporting and, being party organs, relatively immune from Government suppression. Provincial daily papers included three (and often more) each at Baṣra and Mosul, and others at Sulaymaniya and Kirkuk, in the languages there spoken; they attained a fair standard.

primary school education and much of the investment in their edu- 871 cation accordingly bears little fruit. The facilities and quality of technical or vocational education are seriously deficient and adult education has been almost wholly neglected. Probably about 80 [212] percent of the men and over 95 percent of the women remain illiterate. Moreover, educational concepts are far too narrow and too little related to the everyday problems of living.

As the result of its study of educational needs the Mission has come to the conclusion that the government should launch a three-part program involving (1) the improvement and extension of technical education, (2) the gradual introduction of compulsory primary school education, and (3) fundamental education for adults.

Technical Schooling

The question of technical or vocational education is not treated 874 in detail here, partly because it has already been discussed in connection with agriculture and industry, partly because the government has requested UNESCO to send a special mission on vocational education. Although the number of students in technical schools—about 750—seems very inadequate, Iraq apparently has [461] had difficulty in absorbing the graduates of these institutions largely because they lack sufficient practical training and they show a distaste for manual work. Obviously one of the first steps toward improved technical training will be to give the curriculum of the intermediate and secondary schools a greater vocational bias, with emphasis upon the dignity and value of manual labor. It is also worth emphasizing again that skilled labor and foremen can best be recruited from the ranks of active young workmen through on-the-job training programs, supplemented in some cases by technical schooling. Only the higher supervisory grades of personnel need to be trained in technical schools, and even for these there should be considerable emphasis on practical training in business, industry and agriculture as an integral part of the curriculum.

Introduction of Compulsory Primary Education 871

There is a general consensus both among Iraqi educators and foreign experts who have examined the problem that the time has come for a broad advance in the direction of compulsory education.

874 Baghdad or the larger cities in the province, either employed by the government or by a few well-known technical concerns, it should not be difficult to ascertain how much scientific manpower is actually available. Similarly, it would be comparatively simple to assess the needs of additional technical personnel in the various fields when the projects of development to be put through during the next 10 years have been finally selected.

While detailed recommendations for the reorganization of technical education will be made by these specialists, a few important points which should be taken into consideration in formulating a policy are noted here.

There can be no improvement in the standards of technical education or in the efficiency of trained students, unless general school education is made more practical from the earliest stages and is given an increasing vocational bias in the intermediate and [461] secondary schools. The Mission received evidence from all quarters that there was a general lack of enthusiasm, if not actual antipathy, for manual work on the part of the students, whether trained in general or technical schools. When students from these schools go to technical institutions and take their diplomas and degrees, they are anxious to get government jobs where they can act as "bosses" and "officers" and they fight shy of manual jobs whether on the farms or in the factories and machine shops. There is nothing either in the psychology or the religious and ethical traditions of the Arab race to justify such a mentality. As a tradition of the Prophet of Islam has it: "Al-Kasibo Habeebul-lah," which may be translated as "He who earns his living (by the sweat of his brow) is a friend of God." Eradication of this aversion to manual work should form an important objective of educational policy at all stages.

It is certain that, in view of the proposed technical development, a much larger number of technically trained young men will be required in the coming years and technical education will need to be strengthened both quantitatively and qualitatively. There is fairly general agreement on the part of those who are familiar with the existing technical schools that the training they provide is neither sufficiently practical nor closely enough related to the conditions that obtain in the factories and the market. The result is

Labor and Materials

The Housing Authority could also take the lead in improving 362
the quality of labor and materials in order to bring the costs of 647
building down. In this task, it should cooperate with the Ministry of Education in reorganizing training methods. It could also advise the Industrial Bank on desirable types of specifications of building materials and should estimate probable requirements so that the Bank could initiate investment to this end in partnership with private enterprise.

The materials produced locally for housing construction are 339
on the whole inferior and expensive. For example, a casual inspection of house construction in the cities will reveal that unevenly burnt bricks with cracks and chipped-off edges and corners have been and are being used. To remedy the shortage of good building materials, foreign goods have been imported at high cost. In the case of the IPC housing project, it was estimated that the cost of imported steel window and door sashes alone amounted to as much as 20 percent of the cost of the structures.

The inferiority of building materials is matched by the poor 331
quality of building labor, which again adds to the cost of construc- 464
tion. There is urgent need for good carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians and painters. Unfortunately, attempts to improve skills through vocational schools have not been altogether successful. The schools lack competent instructors, a number of those teaching in Baghdad, for example, being illiterate. Workshop accommodations are restricted and the equipment is out-of-date or in bad condition. These deficiencies might be overcome by importing instructors from neighboring countries, by obtaining new equipment and by running evening classes until more laboratory space is available. This is not, however, the full answer. Graduates from vocational [461]
schools tend to prefer desk jobs to field work. It would be preferable to concentrate more on training schemes on the job under good supervision.

Government Housing

The Ministry of Social Affairs is empowered by Law No. 38 362
of 1941 and Law No. 22 of 1945 to "construct dwellings for

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 O Moon, you shine on youths and maidens,
Where is my lover, where is he,
He who will love me with the strongest love?

And the moon, ashamed at the waste of such beauty, would hide behind the nearest cloud.

x539 And one day Sheikh Mizeil came on his daughter and
•461 found her weeping, so he took her hand and said to her:
762 O my little one, know you that we are more unfortunate than the poorest beggar of the City of Peace. For were I of the general run of men, I could work as a clerk, or as a washerman, or even as a porter or sweeper, and so gain a little money. But our name is a known name and it is shameful for me to work, or that any should know of our poverty. Therefore starvation faces us, and it is in my mind that we should cut the veins in our wrists, and so depart, but first take you this the last of my gold and make yourself a dress fit for a woman of our family, that when the neighbours come in and lay out our bodies for burial they may find you dressed as befits our dignity.

x539 So Nura put on her veil and she took the gold coins from her father, though the tears flowed from her eyes. And Nura went to the market and she went to the sellers of fine stuffs. And she bought the finest silk. Yet there was still some of the money unspent, so she went into a great shop, thinking: I will buy sequins with the last of the money and cover the dress with sequins, that in death they who find me will remember me. So she went to the merchant, who was named Jassim, and she asked of him for sequins, and he showed her jar after jar filled with the finest sequins of every known colour, and also of colours that are no longer remembered. And she gazed at the sequins and she gazed at her silk that she might exactly match its delicate colour. And while comparing the

162 women. The census returns, in fact, record an extraordinarily large excess of women over men in some parts of the country—e.g., 57 percent in the three rural *qadhas* of Muntafiq province—but there is good reason to believe that such figures, while indicative of the true position, are generally exaggerated.

Occupation

162 The major occupation is agriculture and animal husbandry.
463 Nearly two thirds of the people live in the rural villages. As handicrafts are rarely found in the villages and only a few people are absorbed by such secondary occupations as trade and transport, it is likely that 85 to 90 percent of the rural population lives directly off the land.

Many of the inhabitants of the smaller and even some of the larger towns are also engaged in agriculture. In Tel Afar, a town of 20,000 in the principal grain-growing region of Mosul province, over three quarters of the male population whose occupation was recorded gave it as agriculture. This, however, is probably exceptional and the proportion would, no doubt, be considerably less than half in many smaller towns. Even in the largest cities, there is a smaller but far from negligible proportion of the population employed in agriculture, principally in the production of vegetables, dates and other fruits or in raising livestock for the city market.

In all, the number of people in families whose income is derived directly from work on the land is probably in the neighborhood of 60 percent of the total population. This method of expressing the percentage is used advisedly. A much higher figure could certainly be given for the number of people occupied since most
[464] of the rural population is employed to some extent. Unemployment, as opposed to underemployment, is largely an urban problem. In the rural areas the number of men whose occupation was recorded by the census is often nearly as large as the number over
[857 10 years of age. This, no doubt, corresponds closely to the facts,
887] since even young children tend flocks and perform other light work on the land while old men help with such tasks as threshing.
[462] Women, too, are an important source of agricultural labor, particularly at harvest time, although this is inadequately reflected in the census.

In the towns, on the other hand, the occupations of a much 162
smaller proportion of the males were recorded. And, moreover, 163
many of those that were recorded fell into various ill-defined categories, which very probably include a large number of the unemployed or the unproductive (e.g., school children). There is, also, [162]
far less opportunity for work by women in the towns.

The estimate of 60 percent for the agricultural population would leave rather less than two million people in the families of those employed in other occupations. In this sector the labor force may be estimated at about 400,000 to 450,000 men and some 30,000 women or about 450,000 in all, with a considerable margin of error on either side. Some idea of the distribution of these workers is given in the following table.

TABLE 1

NONAGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE
(in thousands)

Commerce	110
Personal and public service	70
Manufacturing and handicraft	75
Transport	45
Government (including police)	55
	355
Other categories; errors and omissions	95
	450

This table, which is necessarily a compound of industrial and occupational classifications and consequently contains a few duplications, must be interpreted as only a rough estimate giving broad orders of magnitude.

After agriculture, commerce is certainly the most important occupational group; the census records nearly 50,000 (including a few women) in the four largest cities alone. There is probably at least an equal number in the rest of the country, since one of the main functions of the smaller towns is to serve as centers of retail

x539 AND Hamed related:
443 Once in Hilla there was a cloth merchant of moderate wealth, and his name was Abdul Rashid Mejid. This merchant used to buy cloth from the great merchants of Baghdad and he used to sell it in small quantities to the tribesmen and the people of Hilla. He made no great profit from his shop, but he had enough
x539 money for the rent of his house and for his food. He kept
● 462 no servants in his house, for the work of the house was
356 done by his wife and by his only daughter, a girl of great beauty, in the sixteenth year of her life. The name of the girl was Salma.

And one day it happened that at the hour of noon the hub in their house was empty of water, and the mother of Salma said to her: Go to the river and bring water for the hub. And Salma put a jar on her shoulder and she went to the river. But it was her habit not to go to that part of the river which ran through the town and was near to her house, for she was ashamed that she, a daughter of a merchant, should be seen drawing water, for the women who drew water were the wives and daughters of the porters, and the fellahin, and the leather workers and the coppersmiths, but the daughters of the cloth merchants used to have servants to draw water. Yet her father would have no servant, for his trade was not great. So she went out of the back of her house through the palm trees to a secluded part of the river.

x539 When Salma reached the river she was hot and tired, for the time was noon and the season was summer. She looked around her, but she could see not a single living soul, nor was there a sound from the bazaar or from the town, for the whole world was sleeping. So she thought: I will cool and refresh myself before I return to the house.

were reported in 1923, 1927 and 1931. Since 164
1931, cholera has been almost completely
absent from the country, although one imported
case was recorded in 1939, when the
disease was epidemic in Afghanistan and
Iran.

Strict quarantine regulations are enforced, 744
and travelers from India, Pakistan 484
and Ceylon, as well as pilgrims from Mecca, 164
without valid certificates of immunization
against cholera are retained in quarantine
centers for a period of 7 days. Mass immunization 751
with cholera vaccine is carried 164
on among the populations in the border
provinces whenever epidemics are reported
from the adjacent territories. At the time
of the recent epidemic in Egypt, in 1947,
immunization was compulsory for all travelers
entering the country and for the inhabitants
of towns and villages along the
Syrian frontier.

Helminthiases. SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schistosomiasis, 164
caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, 136
has probably been present in the
lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins
since ancient times. It is highly endemic in
the southern and the central provinces,
where the intermediate snail host, *Bulinus
truncatus*, is found in widespread but often
localized foci. The disease is prevalent 164
among the children and among the agricultural 462
and other laborers who work in infested
waters, particularly the men and the
boys, who are exposed to infection to a
greater extent than the women. It reaches
maximum proportions between 10 and 20
years of age, but is usually negligible in
early childhood. Transmission is seasonal: 164
it takes place from May to the end of November, 515
but primarily between June and
October, when infected snails are most
abundant. The insanitary customs of the
inhabitants, associated with the frequent
use of the canals for religious ablutions and
the severe summer heat which is conducive
to bathing in any convenient body of water,
are contributory factors. The infection rates 164
average 18 to 25 per cent in the irrigated 361
districts of the delta, but vary from zero

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164 Basra to 75 per cent at Al Qurnah, in the
361 fork between the rivers. In Muntafiq, the
369 mean rate was 47 per cent, and in Diwaniya, 26 per cent, although some districts were heavily infected and others practically free. In central Iraq the disease was more irregular in distribution. In Baghdad *liwa* the infection rates averaged 35 per cent, but approached 80 per cent in some localities. In Kut, the mean was 48 per cent, with a decrease in prevalence toward the Iranian frontier. In Hilla, it was 15 per cent, with variations from 5 to 50 per cent, and in Kerbela, 28 per cent, with variations from 18 to 48 per cent. In the areas studied in Diyala *liwa* it ranged from 28 to 60 per cent, and in Dulaim it approximated 36 per cent. Subsequent surveys have revealed 11 to 18 per cent infection in limited foci near the marshes in Mosul *liwa*.

164 In a survey conducted in Baghdad in
361 1950-51,[57] ova of *S. haematobium* were
369 found in 25 per cent of the urine samples
742 collected from 285 schoolchildren and in 46 per cent of the samples from 242 inhabitants in hut settlements on the outskirts of the city. The prevalence was around 20 to 25 per cent in the suburbs, but reached 83 per cent in foci along the main road to Teheran.

164 Indigenous cases of *S. mansoni* infection
462 have not been reported, but numerous cases of rectal involvement with *S. haematobium* have been observed. A dermatitis produced by nonhuman schistosome cercariae is common in the south and is often responsible for considerable disability among the agricultural workers.

164 Schistosomiasis constitutes one of the
462 most important disease problems in Iraq.
312 It is of major public health and economic
744 significance, and the possibility of its spread with the expansion of irrigation is a matter of considerable concern to the government authorities. An active schistosomiasis control program is carried on by the Bilharzia Section of the Department of Endemic Diseases. This section maintains snail destruction and treatment units in the affected

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164 provinces, and conducts research and field 482 investigations on the distribution and the 312 control of the disease and the intermediate 744 snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from 15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually in government hospitals and dis- 164 pensaries. The disease is considered com- 758 monplace in most areas, however, and probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the infected individuals seek treatment under 743 ordinary conditions. Since 1949, special dis- 164 pensaries have been established in Baghdad, Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour the most seriously infected districts. In 1950, there were 11 mobile units for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Ancylostomiasis is 361 widespread in the irrigated areas, but the exact distribution and severity of the infection in the different provinces are not accu- [136] rately known. *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the only species found in the foci studied. The infection rates are generally estimated at 10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces and at 40 per cent in the southern. They are especially high in the Amarah and the Al Qurnah regions, but decrease toward the south, and are relatively low in the districts 164 along the Shatt al Arab. In a study reported 742 in 1939,[47] fecal specimens from apparently healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from various parts of the country were examined for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was detected in 25 per cent of the specimens from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per cent from 135 men from the rural districts of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per cent of the individuals examined from Diyala *liwa* and from 25 per cent of the individuals from Dulaim. The degree of infection is usually mild, but serious cases with hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent are not infrequent.

164 Treatment facilities are provided by the 758 schistosomiasis control units, as well as by 742 the government hospitals and dispensaries.

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see Ml Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see Ml Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of 162 the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few 184 households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, Kadhimiya, Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar, from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively [795] town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more unmanageable because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to 'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and [463] Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk, with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boatbuilders in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever running water was available for their rites. Their origins and beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants 563
had been largely driven from the field. Western education was 162
widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish
progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The 184
community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was
treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities
and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying
avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position
and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little 563
from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to 795
official Millets headed ~~locally~~ by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch.
Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous 162
in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nestorians, 184
few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Amadiya
qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a
few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites
catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek
Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and
finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nestorians,
had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its
villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians,
whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless
to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but
below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented
and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian
nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and
bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq.
The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but
not in lower 'Iraq, specialized in retail commerce, hotel-keeping,
artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number
of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had [463]
long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All
the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually
schools, served for long years past by the missions of European
churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi
standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls'
schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military
service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both
religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of
their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, 563
were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by 162
families whose property or politics constrained them to live there,
by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

4a Wilson G-8 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Yazidis MH 10

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readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects 795
belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their 167
Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the
Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace 649
terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it 563
was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of 162
the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous
unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large
number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands
as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some
of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred
which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in
'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil,
British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however,
proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council
of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have
been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the
remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria
include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may [I
be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers 463]
of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks,
etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All
these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed
as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are
shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, I
hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are 147
liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught
up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

The Yezidis

Y
The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This 101
is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. 776
They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock
Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the 779
lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is 871
incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that 771
he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult
to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education,
save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

DISCUSSION

Mrs. Soane-Ellis: Might I ask if the lecturer has any information 000
as to the whereabouts of Sheikh Mahmud? The last time I saw him he was a prisoner at Ramadi.

Major Wilson: I cannot say whether he is exactly a prisoner now, but he certainly would not be allowed to go back to Sulaimaniyyeh.

Brigadier J. G. Browne: May I ask what is the position of the 657
Pizhder Kurds under the present Government? 563

Major Wilson: There has been a slight extension of police control, but, as far as I know, real administration has not yet been established over the Pizhder.

The Chairman: It remains, I think, only for me to sum up what 653
we have learnt. We see here again the extraordinary importance of 657
the question of roads in establishing the authority of the Government among mountain peoples. We are building roads on the North-West Frontier of India. And here we have seen the roads that are being built through Kurdistan, like Mr. Hamilton's very fine achievement, the making of the road through the Rowanduz Gorge. I believe the account of the building of that road is going to be published shortly, and it should make a book well worth reading.

We have seen some extraordinarily interesting slides. And we 186
have learnt some valuable information about the present position of the Assyrians. From what the lecturer says, the best plan now would appear to be rather to leave them alone where they are. The other plan was to have been to move them to an extremely suitable site on the Orontes River. But unfortunately the lands chosen had been sequestrated from their original owner, who had been in trouble. When M. Blum came into office, he decided he could deal with this case, reinstated the man in question, and restored his lands. So that scheme necessarily came to nothing, and it is quite impossible on other grounds now for the Assyrians to go there. But one gathers that it is wisest not to agitate on their behalf, nor to stir them up, for that
only makes them very unpopular in the country. They are finding 463
employment to some extent in the oil-fields, and as guards and station masters on the railways and in similar employment, and one can hope things may settle down and that they will stay in their own country.

We must thank our lecturer, not only for the good work he has 000
obviously done in 'Iraq, but also for the excellent and informative lecture he has given us this evening.

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Finally, the Development Board should, as far as possible,
654* enlist the aid and cooperation of other government ministries and
647 agencies and of the provincial and municipal administrations in the task of planning and carrying out a development program. It should actively encourage them to submit suggestions and plans for development, integrate these plans with each other and the Board's own, and, to the maximum extent feasible, allocate money and responsibility for the execution of these plans and projects to other agencies. The establishment of a Community Planning Office and a Housing Authority, as proposed earlier by the Mission, would be in line with this suggestion.

In the last analysis the Development Board would, of course, retain the final responsibility for formulating the overall program, for coordinating those projects such as irrigation which concern many government departments, and for allocating the funds necessary to finance the various parts of the program. In order to enable the Board to carry out this overall coordinating and planning function, it is essential that all major development projects be brought within its purview, even though its financial assistance may not in all instances be necessary. At present, projects for a government petroleum refinery, a government textile mill and a new grain silo are all being kept outside of the Board's jurisdiction. The formulation of an integrated program with a well-conceived system of priorities is difficult as long as this remains the practice. In addition, coordination would be facilitated if the Board, of which only the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance are ex officio members, were to give the Ministers of Economics, Agriculture (a new Ministry proposed by the Mission), Public Works and Social Affairs facilities for attending Board sessions whenever matters of interest to them are being discussed. The possibility of making the Governor of the National Bank also an ex officio member of the Board might be considered.

654* *Technical Assistance*

A substantial increase in the technical staff available to the
463 government will also be of critical importance to the success of the development program. No project should be approved under the program until evidence is submitted that it is technically sound in

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its conception and that technical skills are available to carry it to successful completion. It will not be possible actually to spend the mounting revenues available for development unless, in the period immediately ahead, the Development Board insures that the government is equipped with a staff capable of undertaking the detailed technical preparatory work required by numerous projects.

At present the government service is admittedly deficient in technical talent. In the long run this deficiency can only be overcome by training Iraqis, but in the short run it must be met by the employment of foreign experts for periods of varying duration.

For major projects it will be possible and usually necessary to enlist the assistance of foreign consulting engineering firms and foreign contractors. In general, such projects will be of two types. Most industrial projects will represent one type. Here it will be necessary to formulate basic specifications such as plant capacity, quality of products and production costs, but the plants involved will be based on standardized processes so that bids can be invited directly from manufacturers or contractors on an erected basis with all of the necessary engineering work to be done by the contractor. The contract in a case of this type would specify the details of the equipment to be furnished and would make definite guarantees as to quality of products and production costs. The second type of project involves those for which standardized designs are not available. and where a large amount of civil works is involved. In such cases the preliminary engineering work should be done, before inviting bids on construction, by qualified consulting engineers who will not bid on the construction work. In general it would be desirable to have the firm chosen to make the preliminary studies also prepare the specifications and conditions upon which bids will be invited, as well as select the qualified bidders, analyze the bids received, and later supervise the contractor.

For the large number of smaller projects, however, individual technicians will be needed to assist both in the planning and the implementation. In connection with its recommendations in the various fields of development, the Mission has indicated more specifically the kind and scope of technical assistance required. The government has already made many applications for technical assistance to agencies of the United Nations, and to the United

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Kingdom and the United States, but it is important that the government devise some means for coordinating such requests in the future so that priority will be given to those which will be most helpful to development. Competent foreign technicians are not unlimited in supply and the accommodations and facilities which such experts will require in Iraq are likewise restricted.

In some cases foreign experts will be required only for short periods to make surveys of particular problems or to look into the technical aspects of particular projects. In many other cases, however, technical assistance will be needed over longer periods to carry out specific programs. Qualities of patience and persistence as well as technical competence will be required of foreign experts engaged for such tasks. Frequently it will be desirable to give such experts positions of executive and administrative responsibility in order to insure that the job will be done within the allotted time. Appointments of this character need not be regarded as impairing national sovereignty, since the foreign expert will be carrying out programs approved by the government and arrangements can be made to provide each expert with an Iraqi deputy who would be trained to take his place as rapidly as feasible.

In addition to its recommendations for technical assistance in particular fields, the Mission suggests that a small corps of competent engineers be attached to the Development Board under conditions which would insure more or less autonomous administration. Such a group, which would have to be recruited primarily abroad and necessarily be highly paid, would operate as a pool of technicians who would be available for examining the technical soundness and preparation of projects originating both with the Board and with other government departments. A pool of this character would economize on the number of engineers needed throughout the government. It would also be equipped to find and help recruit foreign experts needed for short-term assignments and to check on the work done by contracting firms. Finally, by operating as a more or less autonomous group under the Development Board, it would relieve the Board of technical details and enable it to devote its attention to overall planning with the confidence that projects coming before it for final approval were technically sound.

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The technical advice thus available to the Board would usefully be 654x
complemented by an economic adviser to whom reference will be 463 ●
made later.

Skilled Labor

Other difficulties may well emerge in the supply of foremen, 654x
skilled and semi-skilled workers. Even now it seems to be difficult 464
to find certain kinds of skilled workers in Iraq, and consequently they are able to command high wages compared with unskilled labor. If acute shortages are not to develop later on, it will be necessary for the Development Board to determine promptly what types of skills are likely to be in greatest demand as a result of the development program and to inquire how appropriate training can be instituted. So far as requirements for major public works are concerned, the Board will, no doubt, be able to obtain useful advice from local and foreign contracting firms with experience in Iraq. Information on requirements for other projects may be obtained from the appropriate organizations such as the railways and the Industrial Bank. Once even a rough idea of the requirements has been ascertained, the extent and quality of the available supply and the methods of training the necessary additional workers should be discussed with the Directorate of Labor, the Ministry of Education and such organizations as could be expected to cooperate in programs of training.

The Mission would not wish to suggest that this kind of manpower budgeting is an infallible way of solving all shortages. It is, however, well known that other countries, which are developing much more slowly than Iraq is likely to do within the next few years, have run up against shortages of skilled labor that might have been avoided with foresight and preparation. The Mission feels that there is sufficient evidence to show that the potential quality of Iraqi labor will not prove an obstacle. On a number of occasions the Mission members saw considerable mechanical ingenuity displayed by men with little training and inadequate tools; and these observations were confirmed by those with experience in Iraq. It would do less than justice to the Iraqi worker if the development of his innate skills were not encouraged in the directions where they are likely to be most urgently needed.

162 women. The census returns, in fact, record an extraordinarily large excess of women over men in some parts of the country—e.g., 57 percent in the three rural *qadhas* of Muntafiq province—but there is good reason to believe that such figures, while indicative of the true position, are generally exaggerated.

Occupation

162 The major occupation is agriculture and animal husbandry.
463 Nearly two thirds of the people live in the rural villages. As handicrafts are rarely found in the villages and only a few people are absorbed by such secondary occupations as trade and transport, it is likely that 85 to 90 percent of the rural population lives directly off the land.

Many of the inhabitants of the smaller and even some of the larger towns are also engaged in agriculture. In Tel Afar, a town of 20,000 in the principal grain-growing region of Mosul province, over three quarters of the male population whose occupation was recorded gave it as agriculture. This, however, is probably exceptional and the proportion would, no doubt, be considerably less than half in many smaller towns. Even in the largest cities, there is a smaller but far from negligible proportion of the population employed in agriculture, principally in the production of vegetables, dates and other fruits or in raising livestock for the city market.

In all, the number of people in families whose income is derived directly from work on the land is probably in the neighborhood of 60 percent of the total population. This method of expressing the percentage is used advisedly. A much higher figure could certainly be given for the number of people occupied since most
[464] of the rural population is employed to some extent. Unemployment, as opposed to underemployment, is largely an urban problem. In the rural areas the number of men whose occupation was recorded by the census is often nearly as large as the number over
[857 10 years of age. This, no doubt, corresponds closely to the facts,
887] since even young children tend flocks and perform other light work on the land while old men help with such tasks as threshing.
[462] Women, too, are an important source of agricultural labor, particularly at harvest time, although this is inadequately reflected in the census.

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In the towns, on the other hand, the occupations of a much 162
smaller proportion of the males were recorded. And, moreover, 463
many of those that were recorded fell into various ill-defined categories, which very probably include a large number of the unemployed or the unproductive (e.g., school children). There is, also, [462]
far less opportunity for work by women in the towns.

The estimate of 60 percent for the agricultural population would leave rather less than two million people in the families of those employed in other occupations. In this sector the labor force may be estimated at about 400,000 to 450,000 men and some 30,000 women or about 450,000 in all, with a considerable margin of error on either side. Some idea of the distribution of these workers is given in the following table.

TABLE 1

Nonagricultural Labor Force
(in thousands)

Commerce	110
Personal and public service	70
Manufacturing and handicraft	75
Transport	45
Government (including police)	55
	355
Other categories; errors and omissions	95
	450

This table, which is necessarily a compound of industrial and occupational classifications and consequently contains a few duplications, must be interpreted as only a rough estimate giving broad orders of magnitude.

After agriculture, commerce is certainly the most important occupational group; the census records nearly 50,000 (including a few women) in the four largest cities alone. There is probably at least an equal number in the rest of the country, since one of the main functions of the smaller towns ~~is~~ to serve as centers of retail

162 trade for the surrounding countryside and as collection centers for
163 its produce. Even in the smallest towns rows of small shopkeepers' booths can be seen and the larger towns usually have extensive bazaars.

Private and public service is another important group of occupations. Besides domestic service it includes such occupations as laundering and catering, the latter a not unimportant category in a country where the coffee-house is a center of social activity. In the four provinces for which data is available, there were 45,000 (of which 6,000 were women) in this group. The estimate given above does not seem excessive for the country as a whole.

A more detailed classification of workers employed in manufacturing will be found in Table 7. This table is based largely on statistics of workers employed in factories which have been compiled by the Labor Directorate from returns by factory inspectors. These figures are, however, acknowledged to be incomplete, particularly as regards the large numbers of handicraft workers who are self-employed with one or two assistants. From the census data it is evident that there are a large number of additional workers occupied in woodworking and allied occupations (e.g., working with palm leaves or reeds) and in tailoring or dressmaking; some addition would also have to be made for jewelry and textile workers. The figure of 75,000 given here includes an estimate for these additions.

The estimate for transportation, which includes all employees of the railways and the Port of Basra, is a particularly rough one. It is believed, however, to be of the right order of magnitude. The figure for government workers is reasonably accurate, although it may duplicate to some extent workers in other categories already specified. The residual figure, of course, is subject to an extremely wide margin of error. It includes all categories not mentioned elsewhere such as construction workers and the professions insofar as they are not employed by the government.

Literacy

212 The acquisition of skill is severely limited by lack of education. Education is, as the monograph on that subject shows, broader than the mere ability to read and write, but the degree of

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Technical Education

If industrial growth is to be accelerated, it is essential that 464 measures be taken to provide industry with skilled labor. The 874 Industrial School at Baghdad was established to meet this need. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training and the graduates show a disinclination to work with their hands or to take secondary positions. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for basic practical training and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workmen and foremen. Those trained in the shop or on the site would then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work.

Apprenticeship systems have worked well for the Iraq Petroleum Company, for the national railways and the Basra Port Administration, all of whom have highly skilled workers trained in their own shops. Each of these organizations possesses large machine shops which could be used to train many more workers than at present. The Mission suggests that the government, through the agency of the Industrial School, enlist their cooperation in enlarging their programs to train workers for industry generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Banking, 463 commercial and industrial firms, as well as the government, 874 are all handicapped by the shortage of competent typists, stenographers, bookkeepers, clerks and accountants. In industry the training of good cost accountants, capable of checking the efficiency of various types of operation, is especially vital. A single secondary commercial school, supplemented by a night school, and a higher College of Commerce and Economics have been established to meet the need for business training. The first appears to be functioning along sound lines, although it suffers from inadequate quarters and a limited teaching staff. As soon as competent teachers can be trained or recruited, secondary commercial schools should be opened in the other principal cities, particularly Basra and Mosul. The College, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of both the curriculum and the standard of instruction. It apparently produces neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants, nor people well grounded

463 874 in economics and finance capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff should be strengthened; and more attention should be paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum. They could assist in arranging for part-time apprenticeship training and would provide a means for checking how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

Effective Government Organization for Industry

647 654 Government activities relating to industry, except for the Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. As industry expands both types of activity will become increasingly important. The Mission therefore recommends a realignment of the present organization to provide for two separate departments within the Ministry, a Department of Industrial Research and Standards and a Department of Industries. Research and technical functions now being carried on would be continued under the Department of Industrial Research and Standards. Its facilities need, however, to be expanded to meet industry's growing requirements for laboratory testing and quality control.

The newly organized Department of Industries would carry on economic research and analysis. Among its functions would be the maintenance of adequate statistical records of industrial production, the analysis of economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and the administration of the laws providing special protection to industry.

Both departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future, as compared to special mea-

Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the 173
Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid
retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true,
occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks,
as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads
with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia 619
tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal
sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is
touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended
pictures of King Feisal and of His Royal Highness the
Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days
when the country was under foreign domination, when
they were the rallying-points of the resistance which
prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or
Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is
less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth
preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not
necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example,
numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the 463 •
capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, 166
lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this growing State a boy 555
may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish
up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the
tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by
way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city.
When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirhem [651]
from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants
are the first to send in their money: though they may be
wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send
in the exact dirhem along with the labourers and artisans.
To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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(*c*) *Jews*

Until recently Iraq contained a large community of Jews 162
whose families had been settled in the country for hundreds or 563
even thousands of years. They lived mostly in the large towns, 463
especially Baghdad, in whose economic life they played an 197
important part as merchants, financiers, manufacturers, and members of the professions. There were also Kurdish-speaking Jews in the north, mostly urban traders and craftsmen but also rural cultivators. A law of 1931 gave Jewish communities self-government in their own affairs, and there was a highly organized communal life, with schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In consequence of events in Palestine the majority of Jews left Iraq in 1950–1, mostly for Israel.

(*d*) *Yazidis*

These are vulgarly known as 'devil-worshippers' but, although 162
their religion includes the propitiation of Satan, it might 771
more justly be described as an amalgam of Christian, Muslim, 795
and Magian elements. They are divided between Jebel Sinjar 197
and the Shaikhan district north of Mosul, speak a Kurdish dialect, except in their rites, where Arabic is used, and are probably of Kurdish origin.

(*e*) *Sabians*

('Baptists'), also called the Mandaeans and the 'Christians 162
of St John'; their religion combines elements of various origins 463
and periods. Most of them are craftsmen—especially silversmiths—in the large towns. 795

(*f*) *Shabak*

Of Kurdish origin, who live in the area of the Yazidis and 162
are not clearly distinguished from them; their religion contains 795
Yazidi and extreme Shii elements.

(*g*) *Other Sects*

Include Bahais, Sarlis, Kakais, Qizilbashis, none of them of any political significance.

POLITICAL HISTORY

Written history began in Iraq at the end of the fourth millennium B.C., but archaeological remains from much earlier periods, first in the north and later also in the south, give evidence of palaeolithic man, of agricultural neolithic man and, from the sixth and fifth millennia, of increasing human progress expressed successively in extensive agriculture, copper 175

[Marsh Arabs]

511 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevolent man and seemed to be very well liked. The group as a whole enjoys a degree of prosperity and comfort most unusual for an Arab community. Everybody has enough to eat and enough to wear and a good house to live in. Crops seem to be quite reliable. If the wheat and barley harvest fails, the rice does not. Taxes are light and the local government good.

515 463 The most conspicuous difference from the typical agricultural community in Arabia lies in the fact that here the old equality of the desert is preserved. There is no class of rich citizens who outshine their fellows. There are a few merchants of a small sort. Amara, the nearest city, is so close to the town we visited that the shops were very small, most of the trading being done in the larger city. We saw few artisans. The community seemed to be free from caste divisions and to enjoy a spirit of equality and brotherhood much like that of the Bedouins themselves.

562 Another surprising thing is the freedom of all classes. The women have discarded the veil completely and associate with the men freely, being seen on the street apparently under no restraint whatever. This is a refreshing contrast to the other communities of Arabs; indeed the Marsh Arabs are far ahead of even the Bedouins in this respect. These women buy and sell in the bazaar and appear to participate in all the activities of the town with no hesitation whatever. They visited the temporary dispensary that we set up and in their self-assertion were sometimes harder to manage than the men. 795 It is interesting to note that these Arabs are all Shiahs. "No," said the guard that accompanied us from Ahwaz as we were coming in for a visit, "there are no infidels in all this district. Every one is a Shiah."

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1
Iraq Bedouin MH8

B
231 or bridle, except as these appurtenances are put on for
492 show, and it is a beautiful sight to see an Arab on his pet mare galloping over the plain, the two appearing almost as one animal.

3
619 Among these nomads much the same ideas of equality
421 and brotherhood prevail as are seen in Central Arabia.
721 Tribal loyalty is very strong, and no one would think of stealing from a brother tribesman. From another tribe, however, there is a continual effort to steal all the hoofed property that can be abstracted. Conceptions of property are the same sort of semi-communistic ideas that seem to characterize the Bedouin everywhere. The game of compulsory exchange goes on merrily and is the spice of life to those hardy desert rangers. Whatever government eventually prevails may expect to have a hard time in taming them and teaching them some sort of civilized respect for the property of other people.

I
463 In marked contrast to the more or less primitive ex-
565 istence of these Mesopotamian nomads is the life of the
441 large cities. Indeed Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, the principal cities of Mesopotamia, are more or less similar to cities in America in their organization and in the different classes of people they contain. The merchant class, which is large and prosperous, includes petty shopkeepers and great merchants with every gradation between these two extremes. The bazaars show a bewildering profusion of goods, in part locally manufactured and in part imported. The great bazaar in Baghdad has entire streets devoted to the sale of the peculiar red shoe that is characteristic of that city. Whole streets again have little or nothing except earthenware of every sort and description. Great rooms are piled to the ceiling with these utensils. In a general way

463 each kind of goods has its special section of the bazaar.
565 The brass- and copper-smiths' quarter rings like a small
441 boiler factory all day long. The artisans who are engaged
in producing these commodities form a considerable
section of the Mesopotamian city population and are
fairly prosperous and contented, much more so than the
date gardeners of the outside districts. Supreme over
them all stands the Mesopotamian silver worker, whose
antimony silver work can scarcely be duplicated anywhere
in the world.

463 The professional classes in these Mesopotamian cities
871 are fairly well developed. There are teachers of every
794 sort. Some of them have been trained abroad, but many
177 are indigenous and a very great credit to the schools that
have turned them out. There are a number of government
schools, and in addition the different religious sects
maintain schools of their own. In these days when western
education is in great demand, the schools of the Jews
and the Christians are patronized by an increasing number
of Mohammedans. No local medical profession has
463 been developed as yet, but the wealth and the culture of
759 Mosul, Baghdad and Basra have attracted a considerable
number of trained physicians from outside. We
have therefore the beginnings of a medical profession,
and although it is not yet indigenous, it will soon become
so. Its ethics are not of a very high order; the campaign
of the American College of Surgeons to abolish fee-splitting
would not make much headway among Mesopotamian
doctors, but time will develop ethical standards,
and at the worst the profession is a long way in advance
463 of the quacks that infest Arabia proper. There is also a
693 well-established group of lawyers. One of the results of
the governing of the country for hundreds of years by

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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463 698 the Turks, a foreign Power, was the development of an elaborate judicial procedure and a vast deal of red tape in all government business. It is not possible to see that the consequent appearance of a legal profession has brought any great blessings in its train.

565 These various professional groups, together with the prosperous merchants, have gradually come to constitute a leisured middle class somewhat similar to that in America. This development is confined to the three large cities, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, with Amara as a possible addition to the list. In these cities the rich merchants and land-owners have fortunes comparable with small fortunes in America. They have accounts in New York, in Manchester and in the Continental centers, and import goods direct from all of these places. Many of them read French or English. They take newspapers and keep in touch with the life of the world. This class of merchants and land-owners is the most civilized of any Arab community to be found anywhere. Many of them have traveled in India and Syria, and no small number have even visited Europe. Some of the doctors and lawyers have studied in Paris and Berlin and Vienna. There is a considerable amount of real culture among these men and women even now, and the next generation promises to show far more.

000 These three large cities are by far the most advanced section of Mesopotamia. They appear to have in them a large degree of modern civilization. Nevertheless, even in these cities there is more tinsel than real gold. One questions in pessimistic moments whether there is anything except tinsel, in spite of all that has been done to give Mesopotamia a good government, general education and modern improvements. As far as population is con-

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East

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Turkish Period M2

with, but even the admittedly great difficulties of her 000
task do not excuse her utter failure. Although she has had hundreds of years of opportunity to exert her abilities in harmonizing the different races which make up her population, they are now more discordant than ever, and we had during the war the hideous spectacle of the dominant race deliberately attempting to exterminate one of the insubordinate subject races in cold blood, certainly a sufficient confession of failure.

The Sabaeans or fire-worshippers of Mesopotamia furnish a notable example of Turkish ineptitude in facing this difficult problem of assimilating alien races. The Sabaeans are the remnants of the pre-Islamic pop- I
ulation of Mesopotamia who refused to become Moslems 101
in the days of the Moslem conquest. They have been, 795
and so far as their diminished numbers permit they 162
still are, a most valuable asset to the country. They are 463
by far the best artisans in the Arab world. Some of their silver work surpasses the best that India can offer. This community, which is absolutely peaceable and knows nothing of the arts of war, has been harried and persecuted until now there remains only the smallest fraction of their original numbers. They now number less than ten thousand, if their own estimates can be trusted, and their complete disappearance is apparently a matter of only a short time.

T
Another indictment that must be brought against the 185
Turk in the Arab world is the fact that he failed utterly as a civilizing force. This was his fault and not simply his misfortune, as might be argued of an Arab ruler who has never seen the vision of the government as a force working to uplift society. In Hasa sanitation was not improved even in the most elementary way. No

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
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Only three cities, Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, have a total population exceeding 100,000. *Baghdad* (population 1943, 300,000) lies on the Tigris at the head of navigation of the river, and in the 'waist' of the lowlands, where the Tigris and Euphrates approach closely to each other, and hence give the best possibility of constructing irrigation canals. This narrow inter-riverine zone also provides a convenient crossing-place, since the marshland is reduced in extent and the firmer platform of steppeland provides a useful east-west route between the Mediterranean and Iran. The region of Baghdad thus has an important nodal position at the junction of routes from east and west across the desert, and from north, north-east, and south along the river valleys. It should be noted that all the factors mentioned above apply to a region and not to an actual site. [162] 361

It is easy to see why a town should have grown up within the district of Baghdad, but the extra smaller scale features that usually fix the site of a town in one particular spot are less in evidence. Local changes in topography due to the shifting of drainage channels have led to the growth of three separate cities at various periods, and so within the Baghdad region there has arisen first Babylon, the ancient capital that lay closer to the Euphrates, some 60 miles to the south of modern Baghdad. Babylon was in turn succeeded by Ctesiphon, only a few miles from Baghdad, and this city remained the nodal centre until superseded by Baghdad in the early Muhammadan era. Baghdad itself dates only from the 8th century A.D., and a 'golden age' occurred when its Abbasid rulers supplanted the Omeyyads of Damascus and made it the capital of the Moslem world. Baghdad suffered greatly from Mongol invasion, and most of the older buildings have disappeared. The modern city is sprawling and undistinguished—in fact, an extreme disappointment to visitors who may wish to evoke the 'Arabian Nights'. Many of the poorer houses are of mud, and flooding is a frequent feature (Fig. 65). [342 731]

Baghdad is the commercial centre of the region, with numerous, but small workshops and distributing houses. Industry is, as we have seen, mainly confined to bazaar crafts—textiles, metals, foodstuffs—and to the production of pottery and building materials. Trade is for the most part in the hands of Europeans, Jews, and Armenians, with Iraqi Christians as clerks and supervisors. An upper class—mainly Sunni Moslems—carries on the administration of the country; and a third element in the life of the city is a large group of absentee landlords. 361 438 565 463

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

CHAPTER III

IRAQ

563 An examination of the development of Muslim-Jewish relations in Iraq reveals two noteworthy features, apparently at variance with each other. On the one hand, probably in no other Muslim country has the Jewish minority been so closely associated with the whole fabric of social and political life as in Iraq. On the other hand, in none has anti-Jewish feeling in recent years been so general and nowhere have anti-Jewish measures been applied so systematically.

The Jews in Iraq constitute, as far as we know, the oldest Jewish settlement outside Palestine. Indeed, even if the origin of the House of Abraham in Ur of the Chaldees is disregarded, Jewish settlements in Iraq can be said to have first taken place about 600 years before Jews from Palestine emigrated to Egypt. The majority of the Jews now living in Iraq are the direct descendants of those Jews who, after the destruction of the First Temple 2,500 years ago, were led into exile in Babylonia and remained there after the return of some of their number to Jerusalem with Ezra.

But the great antiquity of the Jewish community is not, of course, the sole reason for the exceptionally close bonds which unite Iraqi Jews to their country and their non-Jewish neighbours. "They have made themselves an integral part of the nation. Both in business and in politics they have always played a big part." (E. Main: *Iraq*, 1935.)

Their close association with all aspects of the life around them is in part due to the fact that the proportion of the Jewish minority in Iraq to the rest of the population is far higher than in other Muslim
[162] countries. Whereas the Jews in Egypt represent only 0.4 per cent of the total population, in Iraq they amount to about 2.5 per cent, and as much as 25 per cent in the capital, Baghdad.

It should be noted that it is more difficult to determine the total number of Jews in Iraq than in Egypt. For while in Egypt the Jewish population is almost exclusively concentrated in the big towns, in Iraq it is dispersed up and down the country, including some scattered among the Kurdish tribes in the North.

563 The Kurdish Jews live somewhat apart from the rest of the Jewish
[197] community, just as the Kurdish minority lives apart from the Arab population. Both are different from the Arabs in general character and
162 daily habits. The language of some of the Kurdish Jews is Syriac (a form of Aramaic), while those in Mosul speak Kurdish. They are
[463] mainly traders and craftsmen and live scattered among the various Kurdish villages and towns. In the Amadia district, however, there can be found a number of Jews engaged in tilling the land. It is

65: Landshut S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

563 services in the building up of its administration. From the establishment of the new country, the Jewish community, and especially its leading members, have been as much bound up with its development as their Muslim neighbours.

Hezkiel Sassoon was appointed Minister of Finance and continued to hold this office in several successive Cabinets. A Jew, David Jamra, was appointed Vice-President of the Court of Appeal. Other Jews occupied important posts in various departments, particularly those concerned with the administration of ports, railways, and finance.

The large number of Jewish officials in the public service was due to the fact that the sudden demand for officials and clerks could only be satisfied in the main from the Jewish and Christian minorities, with their higher educational standards. During the period of the Mandate (*i.e.*, until 1932), and even in the first years of Iraq's existence as an independent State, the high proportion of Jews in Government service caused no offence. Their talents and skill in office work were most valuable to a Government seeking to prove Iraq's readiness for independence.

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463 The Jewish communities in Baghdad and Basra are among the wealthiest in the entire Middle East. The names of some of the leading families, such as the Sassoons and the Khadooris, are known even in other countries. There also exists a large middle-class of small bankers, retailers, agents, merchants, civil servants, clerks, and physicians and lawyers, together with other members of the liberal professions. There are—among the poorer elements—many small shopkeepers, and likewise many craftsmen of one sort or another—masons, carpenters; and also domestic servants. There is no special Jewish quarter in Baghdad, Jews being found in all parts of the town, though they do tend to congregate in certain streets of different quarters.

563 The community is well organised. In Baghdad it has established a great number of welfare and social services, a hospital, and about 25 schools. By 1930, 7,200 pupils were attending the ten schools under *Alliance* administration. Thanks to these services, the state of health and the general standard of education of the Jews are far above the average level in Iraq. Ninety per cent of the candidates from Iraq for the London matriculation examination, for instance, used to be Jews.

The community is governed by a lay council of 60 members, who are entitled to impose certain taxes (*e.g.*, on meat) and to allocate the necessary funds to the various institutions. These funds have made it possible to admit pupils to elementary schools free of charge.

There is also a religious council, under the Chief Rabbi, Haham Benjamin, which maintains the communal courts dealing with all such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like. Until his resignation at the end of 1949 the overall Head of the community was the universally respected Haham Sasson Khadoori.

[642] This partial communal autonomy arises from Article No. 79 of the Constitution of Iraq. The internal organisation of the Jewish

in 1935, the Agricultural and Industrial Bank was founded. Little progress was achieved before the outbreak of the Second World War, and during the war the difficulty of importing equipment prevented expansion. However, after 1942, industrial investment began to increase, the total amount from 1943 to 1948 being ID 3,089,000. 1/ Between 1948/49 and 1951/52, the capital invested in the principal industries, other than petroleum, increased from about ID 312 million to ID 4.4 million, the value of production from 1.4 million to ID 3.6 million, and the number employed from 1,649 to 3,837. 2/ Since then; there has been substantial development. In 1954 it was estimated that there were some 70,000 to 80,000 persons engaged in manufacturing. Of these, somewhat less than half were handicraftsmen; some 13,000 were employed in the petroleum industry; 10,000 to 15,000 in the textile and leather industries; about 6,000 in the building materials industry; about 4,500 in the food and beverages industries; and some 3,000 to 4,000 in the tobacco industry. 3/ 433 [463].

Manufacturing is concentrated around Baghdad, which accounts for about 70 per cent of total factory employment. In 1954, a check on firms in Baghdad showed that, of a total of 31,600 workers, 6,700 were in firms with over 1,000 employees; 3,800 were in firms with 500 to 999 employees; 2,000 were in the 250-499 group; 4,300 were in the 100-249 group; 3,000 were in the 20-99 group; 1,500 were in the 10-19 group; and 10,200 worked in firms employing 9 persons or less. 4/ 433 464

Recent surveys have indicated that Iraq may contain appreciable quantities of iron ore, copper, sulphur and sulphur compounds, gypsum, bitumen, dolomite, calcite and different varieties of marble. 5/ However, up to the present, little use has been made of these minerals, and the most important industries are those based on agricultural materials, namely: spinning and weaving of cotton and woollen textiles; rayon weaving; jute spinning and weaving; soap-making (about 7,500 tons); vegetable oils; tanning; tobacco products; beer (1,840,000 litres); alcohol (318,000 litres) and alcoholic drinks (1,560,000 litres). The recently founded cement industry produces about 200,000 tons a year. Consumption of electricity increased from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to 82 million in 1949 and 272 million in 1953. The amount used in manufacturing increased from 20 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to 35 million in 1949 and 159 million in 1953. 6/ 433 135

1/ Industrial Bank, *First Annual Report* (Baghdad, 1948) (in Arabic).

2/ Hassan Ahmed Salman, "Development of Industry in Modern Iraq", *Amared*, March 1954 (Baghdad).

3/ Carl Iverson, *Monetary Policy in Iraq* (Baghdad, 1954), page 71.

4/ *The Iraq Times Annual*, 1954 (Baghdad), page 54.

5/ Salman, *loc. cit.*

6/ These figures include electricity consumed at the oilfields, which increased from about 11 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to about 21 million in 1949 and about 116 million in 1953; they exclude electricity consumed at pipeline stations, which amounted to 71 million kilowatt-hours in 1953 (*Statistical Abstract*).

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Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
● Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2
Israel	MF1

/For an account of the economic effects of industrialization after World War II and information on industrial output in countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonne, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 293-298, p. 309, Turkey - pp. 298-300, 307-308, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 300-302, 309-310, Palestine - pp. 302-304, Israel - pp. 310-311./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

496 two-metre-gauge systems (Baghdad–Baṣra and Baghdad–Kirkuk) remained a source of delay and trouble, and the floods of 1926 destroyed much railway property. But the reopening of Persian 464 pilgrim traffic after 1924 brought welcome revenue to the railway. The Indian labour disappeared in thousands year by year, replaced by 'Iraqis.

433 Industry in modern guise was slow to appear. Cotton-ginning and mechanical transport maintenance, ancillary to other forms of enterprise, have been mentioned. Of modern manufacture there was none, though various possibilities were often discussed. The future source, however, of the country's greatest single enterprise 315 and wealth advanced during these years from the conference-room 471 into the open: mineral oil.

648 The Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913–14 had allotted to Turkey, and therefore ultimately to 'Iraq, the western half of the Naftkhana border area south of Khaniqin; and the Turkish, and thus by inheritance the 'Iraqi, Government had accepted that this Transferred Territory should be treated as still included in the grant made to D'Arcy in 1901. Negotiations on this basis between the Anglo-Persian Company and the 'Iraqi Ministry of Works were concluded in 1925, and later reopened to produce a revised and modernized agreement in May 1926. Drilling had early located a producing well, followed by others, and it was decided to convey the crude oil by pipeline the twenty-mile distance to Khaniqin. The refinery which, with Government encouragement, the Company decided to erect at Alwand outside the town, but still within the Transferred Territory, was begun in June 1926. 'Iraq seemed thus assured of its own petroleum supply, with all the importance of this to mechanical transport, pump-irrigation, and perhaps future industries.

The Vizirial promise given to the Turkish Petroleum Company on 28 June 1914 had in the seven years following been first doubted but later affirmed by the Foreign Office. It was questioned but later accepted by the French who in 1920, under the Cadman–Berthelot agreement at San Remo, inherited the Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent. shareholding in the Company; and it was viewed askance by the Americans who demanded an Open Door to 'Iraqi development with no complication of old unratified promises. This diplomatic obstacle was removed by the allotment of half the Anglo-Persian share to a group of American companies by an agreement reached in principle in 1923, but not implemented formally until 1928. Thus the shares of the Company in its final form were held as to 5 per cent. as ever by Mr. Gulbenkian, and as to 95 per cent. equally between the Shell Group (as the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company), the Anglo-Persian (as the

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241
was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the [166
establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of 464]
these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423
committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185
since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425
a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166
sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312
continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their 653
studies and planning, though the intended major projects could not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Habbaniya-Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

pletion of the Kirkuk–Arbil extension and its Lesser Zab bridge: 496
of the railway and road bridge[1] at Baghdad, opened late in 1950: 499
of the Musayib bridge leading to Karbalā: and of new stations at Ba'quba, Diwaniya, Naṣiriya and elsewhere. New rolling stock was ordered and by 1950 delivered. Progress was made in erecting a grandiose combined station and administrative headquarters at Baghdad West, and in redesigning the yards and depots there; but the high cost of these projects, the diminution of receipts by road and air competition (in spite of good traffic in grain and oilfield materials), and losses due to repeated river flooding rapidly exhausted the war-time surplus and led to the need to borrow first from Government in 1946, then from London—a loan of £3 million —in 1950, before supplies and contractors could be paid and work
could proceed. Working conditions in the railway system were [468]
disturbed by the strikes elsewhere mentioned in 1945, 1946, and
1949. The Jewish employees of the traffic branch were replaced in [464]
1949 by imported Pakistani staff, and the training of 'Iraqis to replace these and the few remaining British executives was accelerated. The status and composition of the Railway Board was unchanged, though criticized by the press as outdated and insufficiently 'national'. The post of Director-General was passed by H. C. Smith to W. J. Moffat in 1950, and an 'Iraqi, General Isma'il Ṣafwat, assumed the post in 1952.

'Iraq Airways was initiated by the Railway as a subordinate 509
enterprise in 1945, and started service in 1946 with five light aircraft hired from Great Britain. In the following year the hired aircraft were replaced by its own machines, and it extended its range from Baghdad–Baṣra outwards to Mosul, Cairo, and Damascus, and by 1948 could, thanks to reciprocal agreements, offer transport weekly or monthly to Teheran, Karachi, and Ankara. The service, to which British Overseas Airways Corporation acted as technical advisers and agents, was efficiently maintained but, thanks to competition and high costs, financially unprofitable. British, American, Dutch, French and other foreign airlines continued to use 'Iraqi airports. An expenditure of over ID 2 million on aerodromes formed part of the six-year development plan. The meteorological service, begun in 1936 in a single room, now maintained under the Ministry of Defence a dozen stations and many rainfall-observation posts, used its own wireless links, and broadcast weather reports for Baghdad area half-hourly.

Telecommunications had, by the close of the period, reached a 206
high standard. Trunk land-lines had been overhauled, often duplicated and widely extended; automatic telephone exchanges

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[1] The bridges were built by Messrs. Holloway Bros.; earthwork on the Kirkuk-Arbil line was handled by Messrs. Balfour Beatty.

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private [439] pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 18, 157, 157, 286, 288, 468 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errrors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort [166] made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 464 465 439 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour, (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

* A mishara is reckoned =2,500 sq. metres.

312 seriously, many a decisively, injurious effect on the success of pump development as a whole. These difficulties all call for careful study and for steady and carefully considered ameliorative measures. They are, however, for the most part outside of the scope of this report. But underlying and aggravating all other difficulties there is a widely prevailing uncertainty of rights to hold and to exploit the land affected. This has in many cases poisoned the relations between the two classes mainly interested in the majority of these enterprises and reduced to a minimum the prospects of their successful co-operation. And it has nearly always left the rights and the obligations of those concerned injuriously indefinite towards both the Government and to those associated with them. Consequently the bulk of these pump-fed areas have never received the single-minded and unified agricultural management that was, and is, an essential condition of success. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the other adverse conditions recited would in any case have prevented the general and widespread success anticipated. But a number of instances have been given me of pump ventures that have proved profitable in spite of these handicaps, because unified management was, for one reason or another, possible and realised.

427 311 Be this as it may, it is indisputable that the prospects of general success would have been increased if in all cases the rights to the land affected had been authoritatively settled and the requisite unification of agricultural control had been secured, before capital and energy had been so lavishly expended on these ventures. It was most unfortunate that this remarkable agricultural development should have coincided with the singularly unstable economic period that has followed the war. But it can also be recognised now, in the light of experience, that the rush to develop these riverain tracts was carried out without sufficient preparation and foresight, and at a rate and to an extent which made too drastic demands upon the adaptability and the numbers of the primitive agricultural population upon whose efforts success ultimately depended.

311 312 The riverain tracts, which are primarily affected, are among the most valuable agricultural areas in the country, because (*a*) of their contiguity to the main waterways and roadways, (*b*) of the natural fertility of the alluvium deposited along the river ridges which contain them, and (*c*) of their relatively high levels, which facilitate drainage and minimise the dangers of high floods. But owing to the last quality any regular cultivation of these tracts necessitates the installation of some artificial means of lifting the water from the adjacent waterway on to the land.

312 Prior to the recent pump development such artificial means of water lifting were virtually confined to the local water wheel (kerid) or to other simple devices, operated by animal or man power. Where kerid cultivation exists to-day it seems not infrequently to be more efficient than pump cultivation, since the more laboriously acquired water tends to be more carefully used and the land to be more carefully tilled to receive it. So it may be accepted that where cultivation by kerid or other simple lifting devices existed previously, such cultivation was usually good of its kind.

311 [464] It therefore appears that until recent years cultivation in these valuable tracts was restricted to certain fringes watered by the simple types of lift mentioned, supplemented by rain in good years, and by flood water, through flood channels, when and where conditions permitted. And since land was comparatively plentiful and cultivators comparatively scarce, the parcels of land actually cultivated varied incessantly to meet soil impoverishment, flood devastations, river

872 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General
645 Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age of admission to the primary school should not be less than six and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that 'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when
[681] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

871 By this time the administration of education had been highly systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of
645 Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of Education controlling and supervising the most minute details both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

872 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does
658 not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age, not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940 an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty
● [464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the
[362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other
[696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

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But this obstacle can be exaggerated. As a glance at the figures showing the growth of primary education in Iraq indicates, the proportion of girls to boys attending primary schools is not high, but their enrolment is steadily increasing. Although most of the large urban schools are single sex schools, Iraq has the distinction of having many co-educational village schools. The growing number of kindergartens are co-educational. In all the institutions of higher education young men and women work together.

The emancipation of women in Iraq still has a long way to go, but convincing signs of it are evident. It would, nevertheless, be a considerable advance if the Ministry of Education were to encourage the recruitment of a number of women to the staffs of the boys' primary schools. From visits to many Iraqi primary schools it is evident that the standards of the women teachers in matters of personal cleanliness of the children, care and decoration of the school premises, general decorum and pleasant social conduct are higher than those of their men colleagues. Their influence in boys' schools would be most salutary.

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The position of children is, of course, difficult when parents, especially in the rural areas, are dependent upon the labour of even very young children. Yet an increasing number of poor parents appear to be sending their children to school. It would be a great inducement to more and regular school attendance if means could be devised of providing free midday meals for some of the children, especially in the village schools. At one of the more modern primary schools in Baghdad attractively cooked and served midday meals are provided, but this is a school attended mainly by children from comfortable homes where the parents can afford to pay for this service. In the rural areas, however, simple food is not expensive, cooking devices and service are cheap, and it should be possible to provide free meals for the needy children at relatively low cost.

It should be noted that effective child labour legislation does not exist in Iraq. Until the time comes when such legislation can be enacted and enforced, compulsory education will be most difficult to apply.

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Tribal Organization and Mobility of Population. But the most formidable obstacles of all are those related to tribal organization and mobility of population. There are two particular sets of problems, those of the tribes who are still in a nomadic state, and those of the people who are in the transitional stage of semi-settlement. Between them, it is estimated that these nomadic and semi-settled peoples number nearly 2,000,000 persons, roughly 300,000 of whom are children of primary school age.

438 [365] more attractive for industry than other areas can be corrected by proper action. First and foremost is the relative cheapness of power and fuel in Baghdad. The cost of the electric power unit in most cities is double that of Baghdad and rarely is a municipality-owned plant able to supply sufficient power to industry. The cost of oil fuel is at least ten percent higher outside Baghdad. The correction of these factors, together with a more equal distribution of educational, housing, transport and social welfare facilities, could greatly relieve the situation. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry could also be amended so as to give additional concessions for industries established in other parts of the country. The cost of labour and land is already becoming burdensome for industry in Baghdad. This, in addition to the social evil of overcrowdedness, calls for immediate consideration.

434 (4) **Limitation of Markets**: A newly industrialised country can hardly hope to find foreign markets for its finished products. It has to depend on its home market. The market in Iraq, with its small population (about 5 million inhabitants), of low purchasing power (annual income per head is estimated at between £ 20 and £ 30 or $85), affords very limited scope for large-scale industry. Many of the industries studied at one time by the Industrial Bank, such as the making of artificial silk fibres, the manufacture of paper and cardboard from straw, and the printing of cotton piece-goods, had to be abandoned because the smallest economic unit of these plants is much beyond the capacity of the Iraqi market to support. This situation will no doubt improve as the whole economy of the coun-
439 try expands. But it should be possible to deal with this situation
648 more effectively by joint action on the part of the Arab States,
along lines already discussed at high political level. These discussions have had the object of reducing or abolishing inter-state tariff barriers so as to make the whole area one market. Such an action is indeed vital to the progress and prosperity of these countries and their peoples. It should be remembered that before World War 1, these countries formed one economic and political unit under the Ottoman Empire.

464 (5) **Labour, Technical Staff and Management Problems**: The supply of ordinary labour, owing to the high rate of population increase (estimated to be one and a half per cent per annum) and emigration from country to town, is quite sufficient and will remain so

for some time. Women have been employed so far only in excep- 464
tional cases. A new problem has been recently experienced in the
high turnover of ordinary labour. Owing to the development of
the oil industry in Kuweit and other Persian Gulf areas, and the
high wages being paid there, many workers in Baghdad, and
more still in the depressed farming areas, have been emigrating
there. The turnover in the cotton textile industry of Iraq is esti-
mated at 20 per cent of employed labour.

The main difficulty however lies in the shortage of skilled
and semi-skilled labour. The vast amount of illiteracy among the 212
population, and the failure to make elementary education com- [871]
pulsory has made it difficult to apply any system of apprentice-
ship successfully. Technical education provided by the State has [874]
so far been on a very limited scale - indeed, there are only three
technical secondary schools in the whole of Iraq. Therefore a new
industry has often first to train its own labourers and technicians,
and this of course adds to costs. In the meanwhile, most industries
are dependent on foreign technicians, experts, constructors, heads
of sections, and foremen. The employment of foreign technicians
no doubt is inevitable in the early stages of development, but it
has its own drawbacks and burdens. Foreign skill demands higher
rewards abroad than it would accept at home, the standard of
skill obtained is often not the highest, service is often interrupted
either by ordinary leaves, or illness or inability to fit in with local
conditions.

The lack of qualified labour also applies to the fields of ad- [658
ministration, accounts, and management. Efficient clerks, typists, 874]
store-keepers, accountants and secretaries are in great demand
and very few are available in Iraq. The inadequacy of State com-
mercial education is no less than that of technical education. The
scarcity of able management is a serious obstacle to the progress
of industry. Those few who have entered the field of industry are 464
mostly of the type of proprietor-manager (even in joint-stock 472
companies managers are usually fairly large share-holders); while 473
the members of boards of directors of industrial companies, (about
twenty to twenty-five men) mostly have their own business or
profession to attend to. No wonder they show reluctance to go
into new enterprises. For one reason or another salaried mana-
gers have not made their way into industry, except in very rare
cases. On the other hand foreign management, especially on the

464 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are
472 employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary,
473 sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country.[1]

448 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation**: Except where foreign enter-
457 prise has obtained a concession for the development of important
471 resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enter-
647 prise. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipu-
656 lates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi
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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

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175* servants'.[1] Regulations governed indirect relations, from
722 the control of the carrying of arms among the inhabitants,[2] the
727* sale of liquors and drugs[3] to minute sanitary regulations prescribing floor space per animal in stables or rewards for bringing in dogs for destruction.[4]

In all these relations between the civil population and the military authorities, the fact was never lost sight of that it was a military occupation and that a war had to be won. From the first to the last, the needs of the inhabitants were subordinated to those of the occupying Forces. Food, in certain cases, was admitted to market for sale only when the requirements of the military authorities had been met.[5] Access to piped water was forbidden.[6] Families were evicted from their houses and land requisitioned, sometimes without payment of rent.[7] Restrictions on persons and goods were carried to unnecessary lengths,
●[464] even after the danger from spies had vanished.[8] Labourers in ever-increasing quantities were taken from their fields and villages and from their families and forced to work on military works, such forced labour becoming, as in Egypt, one of the outstanding grievances of the inhabitants against the British authorities.[9]

Delicate handling by the Political Officers was necessary in order to enforce the orders and regulations, harsh and exacting as many of them were, and at the same time to keep the

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[1] *Procs. Basrah*, Reg. No. 12, Sec. 11.

[2] Ibid., Reg. No. 12; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 4.

[3] Ibid., Reg. No. 12, Sec. 9; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 7; Notice No. 5.

[4] Ibid., Notice No. 1, No. 10; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.

[5] *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.

[6] Ibid., Notice No. 3.

[7] No rent was paid from the time of the Occupation on the four or five miles of river frontage occupied by the British at 'Amāra. *Monthly Reports, Political Officers*, December, 1918, 'Amāra, p. 2.

[8] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., pp. 144, 242; *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (1920), Cmd. No. 1061, p. 24 (hereafter *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920).

[9] Telegram No. 7520, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, July 13th, 1919. The telegram indicates that by that date both the Civil Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding were 'fully alive to the importance of abolishing forced labour at the earliest possible moment'.

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development.
161 With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its
resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north
and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the
country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide
large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is
inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
[135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq
possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap
source of power and raw materials essential to the development of
industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other
mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is
little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger
population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast
to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the
people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most
ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and
many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm
and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment
exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await
reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the
available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
[731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas;
and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is
hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water,
but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and
quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] **One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.**

III. Industry

Industry is as yet little developed in Iraq. As already indicated, apart from the oil industry which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 are working in modern industrial plants. These plants represent a total capital investment of approximately ID 4,000,000 and an annual gross income of about ID 3,000,000. Industry is largely confined to the processing of agricultural products, the production of building materials such as cement and bricks, and the manufacture of consumers' goods like textiles, soap, matches, cigarettes, shoes and beverages. 433

Conditions, however, are generally favorable to further industrial development. An expanding agriculture should provide more materials, such as fibres and oil seeds, for processing and when the standard of living among the rural population is raised there should be a growing domestic market for industrial products. In oil and natural gas the country possesses a cheap source of power and fuel as well as an important source of raw materials. [135] There are surface indications of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores, as well as of the existence of sulphur and salt deposits. The extent of such deposits should, however, be confirmed by core drilling before steps are taken to undertake their commercial exploitation. In the cities there is adequate manpower for industry, and the [464] ● Iraqi workman with proper training is generally adept at learning industrial processes. Skilled manpower, however, is very limited, and, naturally enough, there is little of the technical "know-how" which comes through experience and training. Other limiting factors in industrial development are the lack of sufficient private capital and initiative. Much capital, particularly that accumulated [454] from agriculture, is hoarded and the balance is generally invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce, where investors anticipate a higher rate of return. While there is a trend toward increased private investment in industry, particularly since the war, industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the initiative or financial assistance of the government.

466 467 greater benefits through collective bargaining. At present, labor laws set up certain requirements with respect to hours of work, periods of rest, vacations, employment of minors and compensation for disability. The Labor Department, however, is inadequately staffed to enforce the law and the many reported violations are generally allowed to go uncorrected. In 1949-50, of 1,228 enterprises inspected, only 136 were found to comply with the law. Of the remainder, 974 were simply warned and 118 cases were referred to courts. It would be desirable to enforce existing legislation before enacting other labor laws. Efforts are apparently being made to survey the possibility of introducing a social insurance system into Iraq. Under existing conditions, however, any social insurance law might tend to remain a dead letter.

874 ● 464 [212] Training of labor is impeded by the prevailing illiteracy which makes instruction in writing largely impossible. Elementary schooling and adult education are therefore essential to the improvement of labor efficiency. There is in existence a secondary technical school which attempts to train intermediate school graduates in industry. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training; and the graduates of the school show a disinclination to work with their hands. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for the basic practical training, and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workers and foremen. Those who are trained in the shop or on the site through such apprenticeship systems can then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work. Large private companies and public enterprises like the Iraq Petroleum Company, the railways and the Basra port administration all possess large machine shops where varied training can be imparted to many more than at present. It is suggested, therefore, that the government enlist their cooperation in the training of skilled workers for Iraq's requirements generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Government, banking and commercial firms, and industrial concerns are all handicapped by a shortage of competent typists, stenographers, clerks, bookkeepers and accountants which has been aggravated by

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the exodus of the Jews. For industry the training of good cost accountants capable of checking the efficiency of various types of operations is especially vital. A single secondary commercial school, supplemented by a night school, and a higher College of Commerce and Economics have been established to meet the need for business training. The first appears to be functioning along sound lines, although it suffers from inadequate quarters and a shortage of teachers. As soon as competent teachers can be trained or recruited, secondary commercial schools should be opened in the other principal cities, particularly Basra and Mosul. On the other hand, the College leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of both the curriculum and the standard of instruction. It apparently produces neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants, nor people well-grounded in economics and finance, capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff must be strengthened, and more attention paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum, make provision for part-time apprenticeship training and check how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

IV. Transport and Communications

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On the whole, the existing transport system serves the present needs of the country adequately (see map). For the future the principal problems will be to make provision for essential renewals of track and rolling stock and to standardize the gauges on the railways; to develop an adequate network of metalled main roads, supplemented by feeder roads; and to establish effective control over road transport. If these problems are solved, transport capacity should have no difficulty in meeting the growing requirements of agriculture and industry.

The technical advice thus available to the Board would usefully be complemented by an economic adviser to whom reference will be made later. 654x 463

Skilled Labor

Other difficulties may well emerge in the supply of foremen, skilled and semi-skilled workers. Even now it seems to be difficult to find certain kinds of skilled workers in Iraq, and consequently they are able to command high wages compared with unskilled labor. If acute shortages are not to develop later on, it will be necessary for the Development Board to determine promptly what types of skills are likely to be in greatest demand as a result of the development program and to inquire how appropriate training can be instituted. So far as requirements for major public works are concerned, the Board will, no doubt, be able to obtain useful advice from local and foreign contracting firms with experience in Iraq. Information on requirements for other projects may be obtained from the appropriate organizations such as the railways and the Industrial Bank. Once even a rough idea of the requirements has been ascertained, the extent and quality of the available supply and the methods of training the necessary additional workers should be discussed with the Directorate of Labor, the Ministry of Education and such organizations as could be expected to cooperate in programs of training. 654x 464

The Mission would not wish to suggest that this kind of manpower budgeting is an infallible way of solving all shortages. It is, however, well known that other countries, which are developing much more slowly than Iraq is likely to do within the next few years, have run up against shortages of skilled labor that might have been avoided with foresight and preparation. The Mission feels that there is sufficient evidence to show that the potential quality of Iraqi labor will not prove an obstacle. On a number of occasions the Mission members saw considerable mechanical ingenuity displayed by men with little training and inadequate tools; and these observations were confirmed by those with experience in Iraq. It would do less than justice to the Iraqi worker if the development of his innate skills were not encouraged in the directions where they are likely to be most urgently needed.

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Up to the present the Development Board has had no occasion to consider measures to avert particular labor shortages. Training does, however, take time and it is probably not too early to carry out at least a preliminary review of requirements. The Mission recommends that this be done in close cooperation with the Directorate of Labor, which, as recommended elsewhere, requires considerable strengthening.

Finally, where acute shortages do develop, the government could in the last analysis import labor. Thus among the large number of Arab refugees from Palestine there could be found many mechanics, carpenters, electricians, stoneworkers, plumbers, foremen, as well as a large number of unskilled construction workers. Contractors could also obtain foremen and some specialized workers from other countries in the Middle East.

Foreign Supplies

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Now that defense programs in the United States and Western Europe are going into high gear, Iraq may experience difficulties in obtaining equipment and supplies, and this may retard the rate at which development expenditures can be increased. One limiting factor is likely to be steel, especially steel plates and sheets and certain specialty products. This may affect the deliveries of railway equipment, even though, as in Europe, there is open capacity for the manufacture of rolling stock.

Other obstacles may be encountered in the construction projects. The market for construction equipment, particularly for certain kinds of heavy equipment, is becoming increasingly tight and anticipated deliveries may be slow. As a considerable part of the production of this equipment is covered by priority orders in the United States, it may be difficult to obtain unless a priority rating can be secured. European sources of heavy construction equipment are also tight and, although there may be some capacity for manufacture of fairly large-size equipment, overall availability in Europe, especially for heavy types, is much less than in the United States. Accordingly, it may well be desirable to carry out large-scale construction projects, if possible, through those recognized international contractors who possess substantial pools of the necessary machinery. Such an arrangement frequently results in a reduction in the amount of new equipment to be procured. Conceivably, 654x 434 least one third of the national income. Subsequently, of course, part of this income is used to pay for labor, transport and materials inside Iraq, and then spent again by those who receive these payments, thus generating a further increase in income among the people. The size of the total addition to the national income cannot be forecast, but it is certain to be substantial.

654x 464 The size of the program can also be gauged in terms of manpower. The Mission has not attempted to make a detailed estimate of the quantity of labor which will be required to fulfill the program, much less the numbers who will find employment as a result of the higher level of economic activity. But an example will serve to illustrate the orders of magnitude involved. If 100,000 additional workers found employment as a result of the program at an average annual wage of ID 100, this would mean an expenditure on labor of ID 10,000,000, which would be only one fifth of the ID 50,000,000 the Development Board may ultimately spend per year on the projects themselves. Since these Development Board expenditures would, in turn, generate expansion in activity and employment in transport, industry and commerce, a figure of 100,000 cannot be regarded as excessive. It is, of course, not intended as a forecast. The actual figure may be considerably higher or lower, depending, to some extent, on how much machinery is used on the construction projects. But it will serve as an order of magnitude for the number of new jobs which may be created and which would have to be filled by the unemployed, by new additions to the labor force such as the increase in population, or by people shifted from their existing occupations. As such it may be compared with the current labor force outside of agriculture, which, on the basis of the information available to it, the Mission believes is probably not more than half a million.

654x Thus, on these various hypotheses, great changes can be expected which will affect the whole pattern of life. The national income will increase at a rate which, though not unparalleled, can certainly be considered exceptional. Large shifts in employment will occur as a consequence. The import trade will grow rapidly and with it, for example, customs revenues and the revenues of the Railways and the Port of Basra. It remains to examine the possible effects of these changes.

If these measures are taken to allow a free flow of imported 654x
goods, the possibility of a severe inflation should be remote. There 458
may, of course, be difficulty in obtaining consumer goods from abroad. If this contingency should arise, it will probably be even more difficult to obtain machinery. Thus the government will be confronted, on the one hand, with the need to use a large amount of labor on its construction projects and, on the other, with a lack of goods for them to buy. In this predicament, if inflation is to be avoided and the program is not to be delayed, the government will have to siphon off that part of the increased incomes for which there is no corresponding supply of goods. This can best be done by both direct and indirect taxation at a rate which will insure a budget surplus and by sterilization of this surplus. Initially these funds might be used to retire the public debt, which is for the most part held by the banks.

Nevertheless, even if these steps are followed and severe infla- 654x
tion avoided, some changes in wages and prices will occur. To a 464
large extent, movements in wages will depend on how easy it is to find the additional manpower required on development projects. Undoubtedly there is a reservoir of unemployed and underemployed people which could be tapped. As indicated earlier, considerable unemployment exists in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, and there are many people underemployed who would welcome opportunities for full-time work. The natural growth of population should add at least 15,000 to the labor force yearly. In the country the fellah would probably be unavailable for nonagricultural work even in the off season except perhaps in the immediate neighborhood of his home, but members of his family or relatives living with him might take advantage of new employment opportunities without a significant effect on farm output. The nomadic population may also prove to be a source of labor.

But the point will, no doubt, be reached when competition for manpower will start to drive up wages and to make agricultural workers increasingly scarce in certain districts. This would not necessarily be an unwholesome symptom. Many people are employed in a very unproductive manner, simply because labor is so cheap. Coolies carry heavy loads which should be carried by truck. Production methods in many industries and handicrafts are

654x 464 exteremely primitive and new machines—sometimes merely a simple power tool—would greatly reduce the requirements for labor. On the land, especially, there are a number of areas where there is a heavy concentration of fellahin working small plots with the crudest tools. Mechanization, even of a simple kind, could easily make good the loss of a part of this labor. In fact, in some parts of the country, landlords are reluctant to mechanize for fear of displacing their fellahin. Thus a moderate rise in wages would improve the lot of those who take employment on the development projects and should also provide incentive to industrial and agricultural employers to give more productive and remunerative employment to those who remain.

One point should be stressed at this stage concerning the drain of manpower from the land. To the extent that this drain consists of "surplus" manpower which is already grossly underemployed, the drain can be considered a welcome change for the better. If conditions do not improve on the land, however, the drain might reach proportions which would endanger the future of agricultural production. It is notoriously easy to attract people away from the land with the promise of better opportunities and almost impossible to draw them back once they have left. Improvement in the lot of the fellah is therefore of vital importance.

654x 434 As wages may rise, so may certain prices. Demand will greatly increase, but it is as much its incidence as its volume that matters. If a liberal import policy is followed, there should be no pressure on the price of such imported goods as textiles and sugar, although, of course, changes in world prices cannot be avoided. As incomes increase, greater pressure can be expected on some local products, whose supply cannot be quickly increased and which can only be imported for considerably higher prices. In this category fall a number of foods, especially meat and other animal products such as milk and ghee. Some improvement in supply will occur as a result of diversion from exports, but this possibility is limited. In the short run, at least, somewhat higher prices for these commodities should be accepted as the price of a generally higher standard of living for the mass of the people. The same may be true of fruit (other than dates), the supply of which cannot increase until such time as newly planted trees come into bearing. The production of

162 women. The census returns, in fact, record an extraordinarily large excess of women over men in some parts of the country—e.g., 57 percent in the three rural *qadhas* of Muntafiq province—but there is good reason to believe that such figures, while indicative of the true position, are generally exaggerated.

Occupation

162 The major occupation is agriculture and animal husbandry.
463 Nearly two thirds of the people live in the rural villages. As handicrafts are rarely found in the villages and only a few people are absorbed by such secondary occupations as trade and transport, it is likely that 85 to 90 percent of the rural population lives directly off the land.

Many of the inhabitants of the smaller and even some of the larger towns are also engaged in agriculture. In Tel Afar, a town of 20,000 in the principal grain-growing region of Mosul province, over three quarters of the male population whose occupation was recorded gave it as agriculture. This, however, is probably exceptional and the proportion would, no doubt, be considerably less than half in many smaller towns. Even in the largest cities, there is a smaller but far from negligible proportion of the population employed in agriculture, principally in the production of vegetables, dates and other fruits or in raising livestock for the city market.

In all, the number of people in families whose income is derived directly from work on the land is probably in the neighborhood of 60 percent of the total population. This method of expressing the percentage is used advisedly. A much higher figure could certainly be given for the number of people occupied since most
[464] of the rural population is employed to some extent. Unemployment, as opposed to underemployment, is largely an urban problem. In the rural areas the number of men whose occupation was recorded by the census is often nearly as large as the number over
[857 10 years of age. This, no doubt, corresponds closely to the facts,
887] since even young children tend flocks and perform other light work on the land while old men help with such tasks as threshing.
[462] Women, too, are an important source of agricultural labor, particularly at harvest time, although this is inadequately reflected in the census.

TABLE 7

ESTIMATED INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT 433 464

Petroleum production and refining	11,500
Food and beverage	4,500
Tobacco	3,500
Wool and cotton processing, textiles, wearing apparel and footwear	11,000
Wood processing and wood products	2,000
Leather (other than footwear)	450
Chemicals (vegetable oils, soap, etc.)	550
Building materials	6,000
Metal-working, including jewelry	1,500
Machinery and machinery repair	2,700
Electricity and water supply	1,100
Miscellaneous	1,000
Total	45,800

Indications of output in the more primitive industries are very 433 scanty, but data on output in some of the more modern industries can be found in the monograph on Industry. Production is, in general, on a modest scale, although some industries such as cement fill most of the country's needs.

Petroleum Production and Refining

Although production of petroleum is now rising rapidly, it 315 has been relatively modest in the past. The exploitation of oil is 471 predominantly in the hands of three companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—all owned in equal shares, except for five percent controlled by Mr. Gulbenkian, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Royal Dutch-Shell, the *Compagnie Française des Petroles* and the Near East Development Corporation (owned jointly by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum). Of these three, the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is exploiting the large field near Kirkuk, is the only one in production. In addition, the Khanaqin Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, has a small concession adjoining the Iranian border.

Efforts to develop production have been concentrated mainly 315 on the Kirkuk field where oil is found at the depth of only between

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241 aration of the soil. Similarly, small stationary threshers may offer a better alternative than large harvesting combines to the present methods of threshing by flaying and the tramping of animals. The government should pay at least as much attention to the task of getting simple, inexpensive tools into the hands of the cultivators as to the much more ambitious program of agricultural mechanization. [412] Good hand tools, for example, are almost nonexistent. Improvement in draft animals is also necessary. While the supply of draft animals cannot be increased rapidly, it is possible to get animals of greater strength and endurance by better feeding and selection.

In the longer run, however, there is no doubt that mechanization of agriculture will assume growing importance. Physically, the country with its flat broad plains is ideally suited to mechanization although the canals and ditches in the irrigation zone offer ● [464] some impediments to the use of machinery. Moreover, even now there are labor shortages at sowing and harvest times in some parts of the country, particularly in the North. In the future such shortages may become really acute as manpower is drawn from the land to take advantage of the new employment opportunities created by the over-all development program and as some of the fellahin working on land now under cultivation leave to settle new land. Under such circumstances mechanization may become the principal means of maintaining and expanding agricultural output. In its policy respecting mechanization the government will need to steer a careful course. On the one hand, it will want to keep some check on mechanization as long and wherever there is danger of displacing fellahin before alternative means of employment become available; on the other hand, it will find it desirable to accelerate mechanization whenever labor shortages become serious. Through its control over imports and credit, the government possesses effective methods of influencing the rate of mechanization.

241 407 427 The United States Lend-Lease Program gave mechanization its first impetus. At present there are probably about 170 combines and 550 tractors in operation in the country, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. In addition, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned and made

135 Several geological surveys have located outcrops of iron, copper, zinc and chrome ores. The extent and quality of these ores, however, will not be known until further exploration work has been accomplished. There are surface indications of 30 percent elemental sulphur mixed with limestone but, as in the case of the ores, these deposits have never been adequately proven. Previous to the large-scale production of oil, some coal was mined, but actual reserves have never been fully ascertained. A large and potentially valuable salt dome was located near Basra when geophysical surveys were being conducted in connection with oil exploration. It would appear, therefore, that Iraq has a fairly broad range of minerals which might be worthy of exploitation.

Some Factors Affecting Industrial Growth

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454 Some of the basic causes of industry's retarded development are lack of private investment, technical inexperience and inadequate markets. In the past capital has often been hoarded or invested in rural or urban property or in commerce, where the security or rate of return was believed to be higher than in industry. To some extent this tendency has been overcome through tax exemptions, tariff protection and the financial assistance of the Industrial Bank.

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433 On the other hand, little is being done to increase the number of skilled workers and technicians through education and training. One of the biggest handicaps in apprentice training is the lack of elementary education. Employees who are unable to read and write obviously can neither receive written instructions, maintain material and inventory control, select proper repair parts nor attend advanced in-plant training classes. Until this is corrected, Iraq must continue to rely on skilled foreign technicians and, in some of the larger and more complicated industries, on foreign management.

The supply of common labor is now ample and will probably remain so for many years to come. A shortage of labor, should it occur, could be corrected by the employment of women in greater numbers and by further mechanization. Industry has not, however, reached the stage of development where this should be attempted, for a highly mechanized plant means high capital costs, greater

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overhead, increased maintenance and the need for a higher level of 464
skilled workers. As long as labor is in sufficient supply, it will 433
be better to use the available amount of capital to mechanize a considerable number of plants to a limited degree rather than to establish a few highly mechanized plants.

Limited internal markets, because of a small population of 434
low purchasing power, restrict the number of industries which may be economically justified unless the product can be produced cheaply enough to find a foreign market. This condition, however, would be corrected to some extent through a rising standard of living, especially among the rural population. Improved methods of farming, increased irrigation, better sanitation and more intensive education should help to raise purchasing power gradually. As government measures to these ends begin to take hold, industry can expect the demand for consumer goods to increase at a much faster rate.

Iraq's geographic location is also a factor to be taken into 433
account in planning industrial development. High transportation costs handicap those industries requiring the importation of a high percentage of raw materials from Europe and America. The same obstacle will, of course, confront industries relying chiefly on European markets for their finished product. The best prospects for industrial growth are therefore found in those industries which, through advantageous production costs, are able to absorb the shipping costs or those in which shipping costs represent a very minor component of the market price of their product.

II. Possibilities for Industrial Development

Expansion of Existing Industries

Many industries, such as brewing, cement making and woolen textiles, are now in the process of expansion. Partly because of tax exemptions and reductions granted by the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, these enterprises are able to finance their expansion themselves. Other enterprises which can usefully be

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Technical Education

If industrial growth is to be accelerated, it is essential that 464
measures be taken to provide industry with skilled labor. The 874
Industrial School at Baghdad was established to meet this need. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training and the graduates show a disinclination to work with their hands or to take secondary positions. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for basic practical training and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workmen and foremen. Those trained in the shop or on the site would then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work.

Apprenticeship systems have worked well for the Iraq Petroleum Company, for the national railways and the Basra Port Administration, all of whom have highly skilled workers trained in their own shops. Each of these organizations possesses large machine shops which could be used to train many more workers than at present. The Mission suggests that the government, through the agency of the Industrial School, enlist their cooperation in enlarging their programs to train workers for industry generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Bank- 463
ing, commercial and industrial firms, as well as the government, 874
are all handicapped by the shortage of competent typists, stenographers, bookkeepers, clerks and accountants. In industry the training of good cost accountants, capable of checking the efficiency of various types of operation, is especially vital. A single secondary commercial school, supplemented by a night school, and a higher College of Commerce and Economics have been established to meet the need for business training. The first appears to be functioning along sound lines, although it suffers from inadequate quarters and a limited teaching staff. As soon as competent teachers can be trained or recruited, secondary commercial schools should be opened in the other principal cities, particularly Basra and Mosul. The College, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of both the curriculum and the standard of instruction. It apparently produces neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants, nor people well grounded

348 arranged so that the material flows through the plant with a minimum of handling.

000 3. Use of Time Studies and Cost Accounting

Time studies are indispensable in some industries. In textile and machine shops, for example, these studies are essential to break down production costs for proper evaluation. To illustrate, a large costly lathe might show a greater return by speeding up its operation through the use of a different design of cutting tool, or a planer might show such a low return that its replacement by a milling machine would be fully justified. In textiles, time studies might show that it is actually more costly to have one operator tending five looms than to have him tend only four looms; or the reverse could be true, depending on all of the related factors. There are numerous other examples which could be cited to show the need of time studies in certain sectors of industry.

Cost accounting is very important to good operations and must be practiced before an industry can expect to reach maximum operating efficiency. Without it, many losses, which could easily be avoided, go unnoticed by management.

433 4. Improved Administration

464 At present there is very little delegation of responsibility by management to foremen and supervisors. This limits the economic size of plants and tends to complicate the work of management. There are good reasons for this situation, chiefly the widespread lack of education, experience and training, which has already been described. While the basic problem can be overcome only in time, industry can take steps to alleviate the immediate situation through such measures as on-the-job training programs suggested earlier, special courses for supervisory personnel, and better organization of inventories and distribution of stores of spare parts. The result should be an increase in production and, at the same time, a reduction in per-unit cost.

110 5. Greater Emphasis on Workers' Welfare

To hire and train a worker requires time and money, and the investment is lost if, because of sickness, the worker is unable to hold his job or to turn out a full day's work. A physical examination prior to hire would insure that a worker is physically

roads should be kept to four meters until traffic develops. 499 Even on the latter roads, however, space for six-meter lanes and wide verges should be set aside.

2. Earth roads with little or no traffic at present should initially be raised to 50 centimeters, or somewhat less than two feet, above surrounding levels, with proper grading but no metalling until traffic actually appears. In this category should be scheduled such sections as Baghdad-Kut on the right bank of the Tigris, Diwaniya-Ur and Samarra-Shargat. The materials used for foundations ought to be selected from those found in the area, so as to avoid long haulage Suitable stone or gravel or even broken brick of sufficient hardness appears to be found within at most 100 kilometers of any given road section.
3. All depressions styled "Irish Crossings" should be removed.
4. Railway bridges should be disallowed for use by road traffic in trunk roads. The first bridge to be duplicated should be the Baquba bridge.

Feeder Roads

Agricultural and forestry development areas need feeder roads to the nearest railway station or main road or both, and provision for them should be made in development schemes for these areas. For the most part this could probably be done by improving existing country roads or tracks by grading, draining, and sometimes raising them. Good maintenance of these feeder roads is essential and might appropriately be assured by the provincial governments; generally only hand labor and a grader would be required. No hard surface is recommended for these roads. Assuming a total length of 8,000 kilometers for this system of secondary country roads, construction and maintenance of such a network would probably demand an expenditure of ID 100 per kilometer per year, i.e., ID 800,000 per annum in the initial period of five years.

One problem remains to be solved. The Public Works Department [444] has no trained or skilled technical staff to carry out detailed surveys of existing or new roads. It is all important that correct location, alignment, levels, gradients, transition curves, camber and cant, etc., be established and maintained. It is therefore recommended that competent consulting engineers be engaged to do the plans and surveys and supervise the first large-scale construction, and that a nucleus of Iraqi surveyors be recruited to carry on

It is expected that once this work is completed, the personnel 654 problem will ease somewhat.

The development program of the service provides for a survey and mapping to a scale of 1:20,000 at an estimated cost of ID 200,000. For the appropriate housing of the service, a new building with 10,000 square meters of floor space is now under construction and is expected to be completed in January or February 1952. This will facilitate administration of the service which is now scattered in three widely separated buildings. The new building will also house the up-to-date printing plant ordered in Great Britain. Funds for building and plant have already been sanctioned. Air surveys now in progress should be continued at an annual cost of approximately ID 40,000.

XI. General Observations

Teamwork

Not only the development of the transport services but also 647 489 the general development program, with all its implications of temporary and seasonal demands for transport of construction materials and imports of machinery and plant, will materially affect the tasks before the transport managements. The teamwork in the existing transport departments is exemplary. It is therefore emphatically urged that no change be made in the present organizations and their leading personnel until after the main development programs are completed.

Intermediary Staff

In all the transport services there is a great dearth of inter- 489 mediary staff—foremen, inspectors, surveyors, supervisors, and the 464 like—for whom practical training in workshops and on construction sites is far more important than school or college education. In all transport development projects, special courses should be provided to train adaptable Iraqi apprentices under skilled teachers in shops, factories and on tracks and roads in the country.

These observations apply to all forms of transport, port, railways, roads, airways and communications. Unless continuity is maintained with a gradual, cautious transfer of responsibility from foreign to Iraqi personnel, efficiency will be seriously jeopardized.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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In this Annex it is intended to describe more fully their functions and the principles which should guide them and to illustrate this description by reference to particular conditions in Iraq. It may, however, be well to note at the outset that the men needed to discharge the functions of these offices adequately will have to be trained, as there are very few now in Iraq who have even part-time training in community planning and housing. The sooner a start is made, the quicker the offices can be built up. Promising men, who have had some experience, could be sent abroad for further training and experience. In Iraq, courses on the subjects might be introduced into the engineering and architecture curricula for those who intend to pursue a career in either of the two new government offices. Initially, it might be necessary to employ an experienced foreign technician to give these courses and to act in an advisory capacity to the government.

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The Functions of Community Planning and Housing

Community planning is the process of effecting the orderly layout of a community and the continuous improvement of that community for the physical, economic and social welfare of its residents. It involves the task of thinking ahead so that proposals may be appropriate, timely, and based on factual analysis in the light of the objective sought. In an industrial community, for example, it would mean, after a survey of conditions, preparing a plan which would allocate various sections of the land to the category of use, industrial, business, residential, recreational, and so forth, for which they are best suited, considering the needs and existing facilities of the community. At all times, consideration has to be given to the future growth of the community, both in relation to the existing development and to the bigger metropolitan area or region of which it is a part.

Housing is not as broad a field as community planning, but the two are closely related, especially as housing affects the standards and development of residential areas. Housing has for its goal the most effective utilization of available resources for sheltering for the people and providing for them, or helping them to provide for themselves, the facilities and services for pleasant living. This involves the analysis of the composition and characteristics of the population, the determination of their ability to pay for hous-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Labor and Materials

The Housing Authority could also take the lead in improving 362
the quality of labor and materials in order to bring the costs of 447
building down. In this task, it should cooperate with the Ministry of Education in reorganizing training methods. It could also advise the Industrial Bank on desirable types of specifications of building materials and should estimate probable requirements so that the Bank could initiate investment to this end in partnership with private enterprise.

The materials produced locally for housing construction are 339
on the whole inferior and expensive. For example, a casual inspection of house construction in the cities will reveal that unevenly burnt bricks with cracks and chipped-off edges and corners have been and are being used. To remedy the shortage of good building materials, foreign goods have been imported at high cost. In the case of the IPC housing project, it was estimated that the cost of imported steel window and door sashes alone amounted to as much as 20 percent of the cost of the structures.

The inferiority of building materials is matched by the poor 331
quality of building labor, which again adds to the cost of construc- 464
tion. There is urgent need for good carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians and painters. Unfortunately, attempts to improve skills through vocational schools have not been altogether successful. The schools lack competent instructors, a number of those teaching in Baghdad, for example, being illiterate. Workshop accommodations are restricted and the equipment is out-of-date or in bad condition. These deficiencies might be overcome by importing instructors from neighboring countries, by obtaining new equipment and by running evening classes until more laboratory space is available.
This is not, however, the full answer. Graduates from vocational [461]
schools tend to prefer desk jobs to field work. It would be preferable to concentrate more on training schemes on the job under good supervision.

Government Housing

The Ministry of Social Affairs is empowered by Law No. 38 362
of 1941 and Law No. 22 of 1945 to "construct dwellings for

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of 312
water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation 423
are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. 427
There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is
held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish
aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land
in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision
of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30
per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey,
67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24
per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, [241]
on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique
because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in
organization and development and because of the ignorance,
poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord
secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators.
This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The 423
disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been 433
perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, 185
which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made 464
reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large 166
farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery
is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of
farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the [161]
cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the
sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-
supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
•464 shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently
166 go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agri-
[452] cultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
654 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being
185 semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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811 which now amounts to one million acres. More might be added
by water storage schemes. At present several large new schemes
812 are under consideration. These involve flood control by the construction of the Bekhme dam on the Great Zab, and an extension of the Habbaniya reservoir. In addition to the Bekhme dam a scheme for flood irrigation in the Wadi Tharthar is being considered. A survey commission is now preparing a report on these developments, but so far no estimates have been made of the area of land likely to be brought into cultivation.

● 464 At present there is no shortage of labour. The population is small in relation to the area cropped, but it is growing rapidly.
161 In 1931, according to Dowson, the total population was
162 2,824,000, of which 2,246,000 were estimated to be rural, including 895,000 settled population and 1,351,000 still living in tribal conditions.[1] Estimates for 1943 put the total population at 4,500,000, of which the rural population was 3,500,000. Some regions, Basra, Karbala, Dulaim, and Muntafiq are densely settled, while others, chiefly in the north, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk,
811 are settled very sparsely. The area of cropped land per head is 2 acres, and the area of cultivated land perhaps as much as 4 acres.

LAND TENURE

432 It is clear that Iraq has greater prospects of agricultural expansion than any other Middle East country. But to the deve-
422 lopment of these potentialities the greatest obstacle is land tenure. Sir Ernest Dowson, in his classical report on the subject, says: 'The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in el 'Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, large or small, held in undisputed possession and free
000 from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the

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[1] Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth Garden City Press for the Iraqi Government, 1932), p. 12.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

423 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly complete
622 power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his
secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor
estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of the towns.'[1]

241 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions.
The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
452 rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The
government regulation that land must remain fallow in alternate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears, at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
427 the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually
receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53-E.

29: Dunn S-4 (1952) 1952 M1 Middle East

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

PRODUCTION

433 Industry at present is confined largely to processing agricultural products, producing building materials, and manufacturing consumer goods—matches, soap, cigarettes, shoes, beverages, and textiles.

Conditions are favorable for further industrial development. Opportunities are abundant for producing agricultural raw materials for processing, and indications are that iron, copper, zinc, chrome, sulphur, and salt exist in commercial quantities. With plenty of oil and natural gas, fuel is no problem. Manpower is adequate, and with proper training the Iraqi workman is said to be competent. A higher level of agricultural production would create also a wider market for manufactured products.

There are a number of limitations. The lack of technical "know-how" and the lack of sufficient private capital and initiative are the most important. Much capital, particularly that accumulated from agriculture, is said to be hoarded; and the balance generally is invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce where investors anticipate a 471 high rate of return. It is suggested for this reason that industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the

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—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

In most of the Middle East countries, cotton harvesting and, to a certain extent, weeding depend on migrant laborers who travel from one area to another. In Iraq, most of the members of the migrant farm worker's family walk, carrying their household goods on their heads. Only the tiniest youngsters and the oldest women ride the burros.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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to use as schools are found principally in the cities of Mosul, Baghdad, and 346
Basrah and most of the capitals of the provinces. 872x

A government primary school built within the last twelve to fifteen years in the cities usually has ten to twelve rooms about 5 × 7 meters (16.4 × 22.96 feet) or 5.5 × 8 meters (18.04 × 26.24 feet). In addition, there may be two to four smaller rooms used as offices or storerooms. Toilet facilities are outside the building. Drinking water is in large earthenware containers provided with taps from which the children can drink. School buildings need improved plumbing and sanitary facilities, but the [464]
country as a whole suffers from a lack of skilled plumbers.

School buildings dating from the twenties are not as good as the more recently constructed ones, being less substantial and having smaller rooms. There are a few exceptions to this rule in the provinces of Basrah and ʻAmarah where the erection of some schools was financed by the Maud[1] Memorial Fund and subscriptions collected by a particularly energetic governor of ʻAmarah. Some buildings show signs of the rapid growth of the system, having started as two- or three-room constructions and then having a room or two added as needed.

The typical village school building has four to eight small, narrow, inadequately lighted and ventilated rooms. Some schoolrooms visited by the Commission were absolutely dark. Some first-grade rooms were badly overcrowded; in one instance the children had overflowed to the floor and filled the windows. Poor construction materials are often used for village schools, especially when hurriedly built by local authorities. Dripping ceilings were a commonplace. Some rural schools in the south, particularly in the province of ʻAmarah, were housed in reed huts. After 1934, however, the government built a number of village schools of from two to six rooms of standard size with adequate lighting and ventilation.

The large number of rented houses serving as school buildings in urban Iraq is explained in terms of the growth of the school system which has been so rapid that the building program fell far short. Most of the rented buildings are not suitable for school purposes, the rooms being too small for classroom use. Play space is limited to the central courtyard, which is usually small. Repairs and readjustments are neglected because owners are reluctant to spend money on the property since prewar rental ceilings have been maintained by law. Government-owned schools, too, have deteriorated in the war years.

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[1] The name of the British general who conquered Baghdad from the Turks in 1917.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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section. This policy is likely to remain in force until the Ministry of Education has enough women teachers to permit establishing a girls secondary school in each province. 873

Vocational Education

874 Iraq has a variety of postprimary schools aside from the regular intermediate and secondary schools and the institutions which train teachers for secondary schools. These special schools are designed to fill the country's need for skilled workers—mechanical, clerical, and professional—and [464] range from simple trade schools, requiring only a public primary-school certificate for admission, to the College of Law and the Royal College of Medicine. Because of the shortage of trained workers and professional people, the government offers training in these institutions free, in most cases, to qualified applicants. (The colleges preparing professional workers will be described in the next chapter.)

TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

Technical education on a trade-school level is provided in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk for boys who have passed the public primary-school examinations. This is a four-year course, and the schools at Baghdad and Mosul have a registration of approximately 100 boys each. The school at Kirkuk was opened in the fall of 1945. Provision has been made for 400 boarding students at Baghdad; but since these facilities are in excess of the present enrollment, they are being utilized by boys from the Commercial High School and by students in the preparatory year of the Higher Teachers College. No fees are charged, and boarding students receive clothing and laundry service as well as board and room without charge. The Mosul school has no boarding students at present, though facilities are available.

In spite of such favorable provisions, enrollment in these schools is low. The advantages offered seem to be in large part nullified by the Compulsory [702] Military Service Law which does not treat the graduates of vocational schools in the same way as those of secondary schools but requires them to spend two years in the military service as privates. Students, therefore, prefer to go to secondary schools because after graduation they can enter the reserve officers training course of nine months.

The school at Mosul provides training in weaving, carpentry, machine-shop practice, motor-car repair, and electrical wiring. During each of the first and second years twenty-two hours per week are devoted to theoretical work, and twenty hours are spent in the shops. The student in his first

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Sephardic origin. The majority have since 593
migrated to Israel, while probably less than
10,000 remain, subject to certain restric- 162
tions. Over 130,000 were transported to
Israel by the Iraqi government in 1950-51.
About 5,000 Palestinian refugees have settled
in the country since the Arab-Israeli
conflict in 1948. Small numbers of British,
American and other nationalities also reside
in the larger cities.

As a whole, Iraq is sparsely settled, with 361
the population concentrated in the river 161
valleys and in the rain-irrigated highland
districts of the north. The most densely
populated areas are found in the river
valleys of the northern delta. In 1947, the
density of population in the provinces of
the upper delta region was calculated at 131
per square mile in Hilla and 104 in Baghdad.
In the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk
and Erbil it averaged 31 to 39 per square
mile, and in Sulaimaniya, on the eastern
frontier, 62 per square mile. In the south,
it ranged from 75 per square mile in Basra
province to 42 in Amarah, while in Dulaim,
on the upper reaches of the Euphrates, it
did not exceed 10 per square mile. The pop- 369
ulation is essentially rural: over three quar- 161
ters of the inhabitants live in some 8,000
small villages or in semipermanent settlements.
The Bedouin, representing about 5 [464]
to 8 per cent of the total population, roam
the deserts with their flocks, but many migrate
seasonally to the towns in search of
work. There are only 7 cities with over 369
40,000 inhabitants. The population of 162
Baghdad, the capital, was estimated at
between 900,000 and 1 million in 1952,
including over 500,000 in the metropolitan
area and several hundred thousand in the
surrounding suburbs. The population of
Mosul, a commercial center on the upper
Tigris, totaled about 150,000, and of Kirkuk,
the metropolis of the oil region, almost
75,000. Basra, the chief port, located on the
Shatt al Arab, had a population of 90,000
to 100,000.

In spite of considerable progress in edu- 212
cation within the last 30 years, the majority 872

163 lation, and the death rate, 25 to 35. The
165 discrepancies in reporting are probably less
in the case of deaths than of births.

On the basis of the health district populations for 1950, the infant mortality rate was calculated at 98 per 1,000 live births. The death rate of infants under 1 year was 14 per cent of the total deaths, and of children under 5 years, about 23 per cent. Local observers estimate that the mortality in infants under 1 year approximates 300 to 350 per 1,000 live births among most rural and impoverished urban communities, and that it reaches almost 500 per 1,000 live births in children under 5 years of age. Intestinal diseases, undernutrition, respiratory infections and malaria are prominent among the causes of death in infancy and early childhood.

SOCIAL ECONOMY

241 Agriculture and the petroleum industry
together form the basis of Iraq's economy.
Although this region was one of the chief
granaries of the world centuries before the
Christian Era, the present agricultural resources of the potentially fertile Tigris and
Euphrates river basins are only partially
developed. About 75 to 80 per cent of the
inhabitants are engaged in farming or pastoral pursuits, but progress is retarded by
the prevailing forms of land tenure, shortage of labor supply and inefficient methods
311 of cultivation. In 1950, less than one fifth
241 of the arable land, normally estimated at
25 to 30 million acres, was under production. Extensive areas of the alluvial plain
are cultivated by means of irrigation, but
improper drainage often results in considerable
427 able annual loss of soil fertility. A system
423 of tenancy farming predominates in most
sections of the country. The proportion of
land-owning peasants is small and largely
restricted to the northern provinces. In central
[341] tral and southern Iraq many families are
migratory cultivators who work on a sharecropping basis for wealthy and, usually, absentee landlords.

341 Cereals, tobacco and cotton are important

p. 24(A)

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
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433 with enormous spending, brings in its wake a host of problems
185 and dangers: inflation, a great strain on a primitive economy,
shortages of human resources (civil servants, teachers, doctors,
engineers), and the overburdening and eventual breakdown of
transportation and communications. Nevertheless, progress was
registered. Many irrigation and drainage projects were under-
taken, and some were completed; a beginning of agrarian re-
form and rehabilitation through such projects as Diyala was
made.[30] In 1952 the United Nations reported that a slight
expansion in industry had been achieved and a basis for more
454 rapid development laid. Capital investments in major indus-
464 tries rose from a cumulative total of ID3.18 million in 1948-
1949 to 5.84 million in 1951-1952; the value of output rose
from ID 1.4 million to 4.4 million, and the number of workers
increased from 1,650 to 4,550.[31]

In its report for the fiscal years 1952-1953 the Development Board stated that considerable progress had been made on some of the construction and irrigation projects although it had not used up its revenues and had granted ID6.3 million to municipalities and Government departments to carry out new programs.[32]

185 The impact of the oil industry on Iraq was not as great as it could have been. In spite of Government effort, and in spite of the belief held by some governmental leaders that it was an unconditional, integral part of the overall development program, industry made very little progress. There have been some advances in agriculture, but not as much as hoped for. There exists a serious danger that after the irrigation projects are completed and the land available for cultivation increased, unless the Iraqi peasant is educated—psychologically as well as technically—to utilize the additional acreage effectively and constructively and to keep the irrigation machinery in working order, the enormous expenditures may well have been wasted. Neither will the new hospitals and new school buildings be able to fulfil their proper functions unless there are enough trained doctors, nurses and teachers with a social consciousness and a deep-seated and genuine desire to help the impoverished,

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[30] Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal,* V, Summer, 1951, 362-366.

[31] U. N., *Summary 1952-53,* 22.

[32] *Al Zaman,* July 24, 1953.

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Petroleum

433 382 315 439 [464] The petroleum industry in Iraq has made striking progress during the post-war period. Production and exports, which had been low mainly owing to the lack of transport facilities, increased sharply following construction of new pipelines to the seacoasts. Exploration activities led to the discovery of new oilfields, which are being developed. As a result of increasing output of petroleum and the revision of the terms of payment, Iraq's oil revenues have multiplied. These revenues have provided the financial means for development of the country's resources. Revenue from the oil industry, which is in the form of sterling, together with the substantial and rising foreign exchange disbursements of the oil companies for local expenditures, increased considerably the foreign exchange supplies of the country and made larger imports possible. Availability of petroleum products, at relatively low cost, has facilitated economic development, and the consumption of oil products has increased severalfold. In addition, the petroleum industry has given employment to an increasing number of employees (see table 27) and is providing them with training. After a setback during the war years, when production declined to 1.6 million metric tons in 1941, output of crude petroleum in 1944 recovered to its pre-war level of 4.3 million metric tons. Construction of two additional pipelines, parallel to the previous lines and with a yearly capacity of about 4.5 million tons each, started immediately after the end of the war. The pipeline to Tripoli was completed in 1949, but construction of the other, destined for Haifa, was interrupted by the Palestine conflict and it remains incomplete. Another large-diameter pipeline with an annual throughput capacity of 13.5 million tons, linking the Kirkuk field to Baniyas in Syria, was completed in 1952 at a cost of ID 41 million. In the meantime, the activities of the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company, Ltd., both affiliated with the Iraq Petroleum Company, led to the discovery of Ain Zalah and Butmah oilfields in the Mosul area, and Zubair and Rumaila oilfields near Basra. The development of these fields, especially Zubair, and the installation of pipelines and oil handling facilities during the past four years, has increased substantially the crude petroleum export capacity of Iraq. In addition, another smaller oilfield had been discovered by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company before the war at Naftkhaneh, near the Iranian border, and its output, which was refined locally, served the domestic market exclusively.

As a result of the foregoing developments during the last decade, as well as increasing world demand for petroleum, production of crude oil, which had declined from 4.7 million tons in 1946 and 1947 to 3.4 million tons in 1948, because of the Palestine conflict and the shutdown of the pipeline to Haifa, started to rise sharply, to 6.5 million tons in 1950, 18.9 million in 1952, and 29.6 million in 1954, representing in the latter year 4.3 per cent of the world's crude petroleum output as against 1.5 per cent in 1938. This production may be compared with proved oil reserves, which were estimated at 700 million tons in early 1949, and nearly 2,300 million tons at the end of 1954. Total investment in the petroleum industry of Iraq was estimated in 1952 at approximately ID 90 million, of which the main portion had been for construction of pipelines.

439 382 471 Iraq is exclusively an exporter of crude petroleum; the value of petroleum exports was estimated at ID 137 million in 1954 as compared with ID 10 million in 1938. Exports are handled by the parent companies of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its affiliates, but under the terms of the February 1952 agreement,

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 MI Middle East

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Table 27. Iraq: Operations Of Petroleum Companies, Selected Years

(Output in thousands of metric tons; value in millions of Iraqi dinars)

Year	Production (crude petroleum)	Consumption of petroleum products	Estimated value of crude petroleum exports	Value of imports by petroleum companies	Direct payments by petroleum companies a/	Foreign exchange disbursements by petroleum companies for local expenses	Number of employees in petroleum industry b/
1927-33 ...	105	125	-	...	0.64	...	3.6
1938	4,298	190	10.3	1.0	1.98	0.58	4.5
1941	1,566	265		0.3	1.46	...	3.3
1946	4,680	385	10.8	2.4	2.33	2.14	11.3
1947	4,702	470	14.0	5.0	2.35	5.60	14.6
1948	3,427	505	11.4	9.3	2.01	7.03	14.2
1949	4,067	520	14.1	10.3	3.24	6.40	12.9
1950	6,479	560	28.7	8.4	5.35	4.39	11.4
1951	8,351	610	37.1	8.7	13.21	5.69	11.0
1952	18,843	710	83.0	14.4	37.41 c/	7.18	13.3
1953	28,217	795	125.6	13.2	49.87	...	13.2
1954	29,550	...	136.9	...	67.50 d/	...	...

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook; International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, and International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.); Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract of Iraq (Baghdad); National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin No. 11, July-September 1954 (Baghdad).

a/ Figures are for fiscal years beginning on 1 April of the year stated.

b/ Thousands; end of year data.

c/ Including ID 5 million for settlement of previous claims.

d/ Calendar year.

in 1935, the Agricultural and Industrial Bank was founded. Little progress was achieved before the outbreak of the Second World War, and during the war the difficulty of importing equipment prevented expansion. However, after 1942, industrial investment began to increase, the total amount from 1943 to 1948 being ID 3,089,000. 1/ Between 1948/49 and 1951/52, the capital invested in the principal industries, other than petroleum, increased from about ID 312 million to ID 4.4 million, the value of production from 1.4 million to ID 3.6 million, and the number employed from 1,649 to 3,837. 2/ Since then, there has been substantial development. In 1954 it was estimated that there were some 70,000 to 80,000 persons engaged in manufacturing. Of these, somewhat less than half were handicraftsmen; some 13,000 were employed in the petroleum industry; 10,000 to 15,000 in the textile and leather industries; about 6,000 in the building materials industry; about 4,500 in the food and beverages industries; and some 3,000 to 4,000 in the tobacco industry. 3/ 433 [463]

Manufacturing is concentrated around Baghdad, which accounts for about 70 per cent of total factory employment. In 1954, a check on firms in Baghdad showed that, of a total of 31,600 workers, 6,700 were in firms with over 1,000 employees; 3,800 were in firms with 500 to 999 employees; 2,000 were in the 250-499 group; 4,300 were in the 100-249 group; 3,000 were in the 20-99 group; 1,500 were in the 10-19 group; and 10,200 worked in firms employing 9 persons or less. 4/ 433 464

Recent surveys have indicated that Iraq may contain appreciable quantities of iron ore, copper, sulphur and sulphur compounds, gypsum, bitumen, dolomite, calcite and different varieties of marble. 5/ However, up to the present, little use has been made of these minerals, and the most important industries are those based on agricultural materials, namely: spinning and weaving of cotton and woollen textiles; rayon weaving; jute spinning and weaving; soap-making (about 7,500 tons); vegetable oils; tanning; tobacco products; beer (1,840,000 litres); alcohol (318,000 litres) and alcoholic drinks (1,560,000 litres). The recently founded cement industry produces about 200,000 tons a year. Consumption of electricity increased from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to 82 million in 1949 and 272 million in 1953. The amount used in manufacturing increased from 20 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to 35 million in 1949 and 159 million in 1953. 6/ 433 135

1/ Industrial Bank, First Annual Report (Baghdad, 1948) (in Arabic).

2/ Hassan Ahmad Salman, "Development of Industry in Modern Iraq", Angrad, March 1954 (Baghdad).

3/ Carl Iverson, Monetary Policy in Iraq (Baghdad, 1954), page 71.

4/ The Iraq Times Annual, 1954 (Baghdad), page 54.

5/ Salman, loc. cit.

6/ These figures include electricity consumed at the oilfields, which increased from about 11 million kilowatt-hours in 1946 to about 21 million in 1949 and about 116 million in 1953; they exclude electricity consumed at pipeline stations, which amounted to 71 million kilowatt-hours in 1953 (Statistical Abstract).

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas** per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private [439] pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 13, 157, 157, 288, 288, 468 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort [166] made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was
444 hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among
465 these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour,
439 (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

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* A mishara is reckoned =2,500 sq. metres.

166 must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land
must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting.
185 He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

425 (4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and
provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

427 (5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders.
So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila
area, and the total population of adults and children is between
871 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with
a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing
185 for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good
design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural streams'.

427 It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which
has been in operation for only four years and is still in process
425 of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it
241 appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless
185 cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average
income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of
465 the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced
from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators. Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which, by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed, it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

427 The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants,
apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging
185 and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they
make a certain contribution to the public purse through the sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

654 of products.[1] Financial assistance thus provided by the Government,
652 together with the new Law for the Encouragement of Industry issued in 1950, proved of great potency in the development of industry. The capital of the Industrial Bank was increased in 1952, to I.D. 3,000,000 of which I.D. 1,200,000 have already been paid up.

433 These and other measures, such as increases in custom duties
656 and the restriction or prohibition of certain industrial imports, have produced marked progress in the establishment of new industries and the re-equipment and expansion of old ones, especially since the end of World War II.[2] This can be seen from the following table:

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Development of Large-Scale Industry in Iraq 1948 - 1952

Year (1st April - 31st March)	Capital Invested I.D. 1000	Value of Annual Output I.D. 1000	Number of Employees	Wages paid annually I.D. 1000
(Seven large Industries)				
1948 - 49	3,183	1,403	1649	
1949 - 50	3,194	1,555	2626	333
1950 - 51	4,206	2,631	3443	406
1951 - 52	4,415	3,600	3837	486
(Ten large Industries)[3]				
1951 - 52	4,835	4,424	4533	599

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[1] Industrial Bank, Compilation of Laws, Regulations, etc. Government Press, Baghdad 1951.

[2] For pre-World War II industrial development in Iraq see:- *A Handbook of Mesopotamia*, H.M.S.O., 1917. *A Report on the Progress of Iraq*, by H.M. Government to the League of Nations. H.M.S.O.,1931. *The Iraq Directory*, Baghdad, 1935 (English Edition). *The Economic Organisation of Iraq* (In Arabic), Editor Said B. Himadeh, Beirut, 1937.

[3] See the *Annual Report of the Department of Industry 1951-52*, Ministry of National Economy, Baghdad. (In Arabic)
The Report of the National Bank of Iraq, 1949-50, p. 46 (in Arabic) states that national production of cement, beer, vegetable oil, soap, leather.. etc., has been substituted for similar imports with the result that value of imports fell from I.D. 2,984,000 in 1948 to I.D. 1,298,000 in 1950, and the deficit in the balance of trade was reduced by I.D. 1,686,000 due to this reason alone during the same period.

654x 647 irrigation works among agricultural officials in the Ministry of Economics, the Irrigation Department of the Ministry of Public Works and health officials in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The efficiency of civil servants seems to have declined since before the war. Certainly the increase in the number of government employees (excluding police) from about 11,000 before the war to almost 20,000 in 1950 has been considerably out of proportion to the expansion in the government's functions. Many government offices appear to be overstaffed, while others cannot obtain extra personnel for essential increases in services. Officials are frequently shifted from one position to another without regard for their qualifications and experience. Often government officials both in the provinces and in the capital do not enjoy sufficient continuity in office to enable them to become really useful. Promotion appears to be based almost entirely on seniority and other considerations rather than on merit. The morale among government servants is generally low.

647 465 The two most important factors contributing to inefficiency and morale are probably the low level of government salaries and the lack of any sense of real participation in constructive work. Since before the war salaries and allowances have risen only 20 percent for high government officials and 160 percent for the lowest paid officials, while the official cost-of-living index has increased by about 400 percent. To some extent, however, there has been an increase in salaries through shifts to higher grades, so that, judging from comparative total disbursements of salaries and allowances, it may be concluded that average salaries have risen by about 130 percent since before the war.[7] Nevertheless, salaries, particularly of officials in the higher classes of the civil service, are very [661] inadequate. The probity of officials is thus put to a severe test and to the extent that some successfully utilize their positions as opportunities for personal gain, the morale of others suffers. Moreover, many civil servants are compelled to supplement their salaries by engaging in business or accepting other employment with resulting neglect of their official duties.

654x 647 The lack of a real sense of participation in constructive tasks is conspicuous in the civil service. The Mission found a wide-

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[7] Total disbursements of ID 14,700,000 on salaries and allowances in 1949-50 compared with a sum of about ID 3,500,000 before the war.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

As a consequence they have a far healthier diet and are obviously better dressed. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a farmer who himself employs a fellah. Although this is partly a consequence of the large size of his plot (100 donums including fallow), it is indicative of his much higher standard of living. 511

In the towns, workers with regular employment would be much better off than the poor fellah, but in cities such as Basra and Baghdad where there has been a great influx of people from the country, there is considerable underemployment in addition to unemployment. Although, at the current rate of wages for casual labor (about 200 to 250 fils a day) a man might theoretically earn an annual income of ID 75 or more, there must be many who work irregularly and earn less than ID 50. Bread and rice are comparatively costly and, together with the rent of a room for a man's family, might take nearly half his income. 511 465

Wages are probably not much higher in many of the smaller and more primitive industries, but artisans such as plumbers and electricians are scarce and can command much higher wages. In the more modern industries, such as the oil industry, the Port of Basra and the new factories in Baghdad, a skilled machinist can earn a dinar a day or more. On the clerical side, in the lowest grade of the regular civil service a married official with more than one child receives ID 13 per month.

The higher income of the city-dweller with regular employment enables him to purchase a reasonable diet, better clothing and better housing. He also has access to educational and health services. Nevertheless, congestion and sanitary conditions are often very bad in certain parts of the cities and disease is common. 511 369

Above these various classes is the small rich group of landowners and merchants. No estimate of the proportion of the national income accruing to this group is possible, but some indication can be gleaned from the fact that a landowner in the South normally gets at least half the net value of the output from the land, while, in industry, profits may exceed the total payroll. 565 511

7: International Bank N S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

242 trained agriculturists.[11] In each province there is an agricultural staff of five to 20 men, but the officers are not qualified to direct research or extension work. The trained staff of the Veterinary Department is correspondingly restricted. It has already been mentioned that there are only 17 trained veterinarians in its field [465] service. In 1950 the Agricultural and Veterinary Departments had only 108 and 40 officers respectively with a base pay of over ID 15 per month.[12]

The field services operate under great handicaps. The officers are underpaid and thus often supplement their income by engaging in other work or by extending special favors. Neither their pay nor their standing in the community is such as to attract promising talent. Transport or other equipment such as laboratory facilities is frequently lacking. Excessive centralization leaves little room for initiative. Even the taking of a field trip requires the consent of the central office. The staff is preoccupied with routine tasks, generally of a regulatory or control nature, to the virtual exclusion of real research or extension work. They grow and distribute seed and nursery stock, do some control work on pests and diseases, carry out inspections and collect rather inadequate information on production. Moreover, their work is rigidly compartmentalized. There is little or no contact between those dealing with livestock and those concerned with agronomy and no coordination between agriculture and irrigation.

Organization of an Extension Service

One of the principal tasks of the future should be to organize an extension or advisory service to farmers and livestock keepers. Such a service, adequately equipped with transport, would devote itself entirely to assisting the farmers and shepherds in the field. Its main emphasis would be on education through demonstration. For this purpose it would need to establish crop, livestock and

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[11] These include in the Central Office at Baghdad, the director-general, two junior agricultural officers, one plant protection officer, one extension officer and one technical assistant; in the agricultural station at Abu Ghuraib, one senior livestock officer, two plant pathologists, one senior entomologist and four junior assistants; in the agricultural school at Abu Ghuraib, one director and two teachers; and in the horticultural station at Zafanaria, one director, two assistants and two junior officers.

[12] With living allowances, this ranges from ID 23.750 to ID 26.750.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

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COTTON IN IRAQ

the plants to vegetate without setting squares and bolls and that it also 248
increases the period of maturity, making the plants more susceptible to damage by insects late in the season. This is simply another of many problems in cotton culture which need to be studied carefully if the crop is to be expanded as rapidly as the government hopes.

Cotton usually is thinned to two plants per hill and weeded only about twice. This, together with the heavy irrigations, leaves the patches weedy. Farmers as a rule do very little cultivation except around the plant itself at the time of weeding. Then they try to pull the soil from the top of the ridge to leave the plants in the center.

The equipment used by the tenants themselves is in sharp contrast to the tractors now employed in land preparation. The only tools used in ridging [412]
are a pointed spade and a short-handled hoe. This is the same instrument used for planting, thinning, weeding, and the limited amount of cultivation.

Such practices are obviously laborious and time-consuming. One of the United States observers estimated that it takes three women all day to plant a
quarter of an acre. Even at the low wage scale, equivalent to 25 cents a day, [465]
this costs $3.00 per acre. It would be less expensive to use mechanical equipment, even though the tractor drivers are paid the equivalent of about $1.25 per day, five times as much as common labor.

Complete mechanization may come quickly in the thinly settled new areas of the north, but in the denser, old areas labor is tied to the land in long-

—Photo Courtesy of E. R. Collier

In Iraq, as in most of the Middle East, cotton is brought to the gin in large burlap bags, ginned, and pressed into bales weighing between 400 and 500 pounds, when new equipment is used. Gins in Iraq wrap the cotton on all sides and wind a continuous band around the bale.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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vocational schools; and according to control into government, private, and 871
foreign schools. The law sets forth in a general way the conditions for admission of students to the various kinds of schools and of their promotion from one school level to another. It authorizes the Ministry of Education to declare attendance compulsory in those localities where adequate primary-school facilities exist. It defines the level of training required for teachers in each type of school, makes provisions for sending students abroad for study, and lays down rather careful stipulations for the supervision of private and foreign schools.

The Law on the Distribution of Grants-in-Aid to Private Schools and Institutions, enacted in 1926, stipulates that points to be considered in making grants are the standards of the school and the number of classes in it, quality of teaching, the number and preparation of the teachers, similarity of the syllabus to that of the public education system, the degree of the school's participation in public examinations—and the degree of success achieved by the students in such examinations—and the revenues and expenditures of the school. The recommendations of the regional educational director and the reports of the inspectors are taken into account, and the Ministry has the privilege of converting a sum granted into salaries to be paid to one or two teachers selected by the Ministry.

Other laws not primarily concerned with education have a definite bearing upon it. The Local Languages Law of 1931 defines the areas in northern Iraq where Kurdish, Turkish, or Arabic shall be the official language. In areas where any of these languages is that of the majority of the pupils, instruction in primary schools is in that language.

TEACHERS' SALARIES AND PENSIONS

The Civil Service Law of 1939, which applies to all government em- 875
ployees, governs the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of teachers. It 465
links appointment and initial salaries to graduation from various levels of schools and makes promotion beyond 25 dinars ($100) conditional upon a university degree or a parallel examination. It allows teachers a vacation of three months annually, but also allows the Minister to ask any teacher to work without additional pay for a period not to exceed six weeks of that time. It provides for study leave with half pay for a maximum of two years, with an additional year at least three years after expiration of the first leave. Officials are allowed three months' sick leave at any one time on full pay and an additional three months at half pay. Men and women are paid equal salaries if their qualifications are equal.

The State Cadre Law of 1940 as amended by the Cadre Law of 1942

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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x875 fixes the types of government posts existing in each Ministry, with the
465 minimum and maximum pay for each type. Primary-school teachers begin with 6 to 12 dinars ($24 to $48) per month according to their qualifications, and may reach a maximum of 25 dinars ($100). Teachers on the secondary cadre, including teachers of primary- and rural-teachers colleges and of vocational schools, begin at 15 to 30 dinars ($60 to $120) per month, the latter sum being the initial salary of teachers holding doctorates of British, American, French, or Egyptian universities, but not of central European universities. The maximum for a secondary-school teacher is 40 dinars ($160), with the exception of principals and holders of the doctorate, who may reach 50 dinars ($200). Instructors at higher institutions start at 18 dinars ($72), which is the initial salary for a new appointee holding the B.A. degree or its equivalent; if they achieve full professorial rank, they may reach a maximum salary of 70 dinars ($280). This is the maximum salary paid ordinarily to a Director General and is the highest salary paid to a civil servant. A few posts exist at 80 dinars ($320) for directors general of a "distinguished grade"—mainly former ministers or directors general of long standing and service. The policy of including the full professors among the most highly paid civil servants was adopted in the amendments to the Cadre Law of 1942 to encourage some of the ablest men in the country to turn to scientific work. This policy has extended to a degree into secondary education to lessen the pay differential between secondary-school teachers and holders of official administrative posts in government offices. Provincial-education directors and inspectors may reach a maximum of 40 dinars ($160), and specialized inspectors, a maximum of 50 dinars ($200).

x875 It will be seen that the civil service and the state cadre laws have on
466 the whole made liberal provision for making teaching an attractive career for young men and young women. It is understood that amendments to the Civil Service Law are pending which will make educational service even more attractive, particularly in encouraging study abroad.

The Civil Pensions Law of 1940 provides that a civil servant of thirty years' service receives a retirement allowance equal to one-half of his average salary over the last seven years of his employment. A shorter or longer period of service pays proportionately. In case of death, the pension is paid to the wife and minor children in accordance with the inheritance law.

The Discipline of State Officials Law of 1936 provides for disciplinary boards in each Ministry to try officials, including teachers, for offenses com-

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*875 American Council Commission visited some schools in which the major-
*872 ity of teachers had been recently transferred, and in one province about a third of the principals had been shifted before the start of the school year. This practice makes for instability and lack of continuity of policy in the school and at the same time destroys personal interest on the part of teachers and principals in their own schools. As it is, teachers and principals tend to lay the blame for the shortcomings of the school on the shoulders of their predecessors. Responsibility for good or bad school management is lost, and it is difficult for the Ministry to appraise the work of the teachers. Appraisal is made by inspectors on the basis of short visits and reports of the conduct of the teachers rather than on long-term achievement.

No one cause explains the frequency of transfers, but a variety of reasons may be found. Among these are lack of cooperation or personal quarrels among teachers or between teachers and their principals and differences between teachers and the local populations or the administrative authorities, the fact that transfers drag other transfers in their trail, and the fact that dissatisfaction with their posts leads teachers to exert continuous pressure on the educational authorities for transfers to more favorable situations. Some of this is a natural and legitimate desire for advancement, but much of it arises from nostalgia for the home province or from
[369] the extreme discomfort of living in an outlying village. It is impossible to deny that most of the outlying villages lack the simplest and most necessary amenities of life: satisfactory living quarters are unavailable; there are frequently no facilities for buying fresh meat and vegetables or for medical care. Under such conditions conscientious work and professional enthusiasm do not flourish, however capable and well-intentioned the teacher may be.

A housing program for village teachers and their families would go a long way toward solving this problem and toward raising the morale of the teaching profession. The dividend secured in increase in teaching efficiency would be worth the cost. Moreover, at least some of the expense could be recovered in the form of rent.

SALARIES AND PROMOTIONS

*895 Graduates of rural- and elementary-teachers colleges have a beginning
•465 salary of eight dinars ($32) per month; graduates of the three-year course in the primary-teachers colleges begin at ten dinars ($40) per month; and graduates of the four-year course—two years beyond secondary—receive 12 dinars ($48) per month. Salaries are paid for all twelve months, and teachers have a three-month summer vacation.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

x875 cial condition of teachers unsatisfactory. Unquestionably economic necessity urged a number of primary teachers to leave their profession for more lucrative jobs during the war, and the Ministry of Education lost many good teachers.

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PRESERVICE AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING OF TEACHERS

x875 The Ottoman Turks had maintained 3 teachers colleges, 1 in each of the larger cities of Iraq. Two of these were established after 1910 and had produced only a small number of teachers by the time World War I began in 1914. Moreover, these teachers were trained to teach in Turkish and were unfamiliar with literary Arabic. When the British occupied Basrah in 1915, they were moved by the paucity of teachers to start a short training course for a few young men at the American School for Boys. In Baghdad the supply of teachers was inadequate, and most of those available were considered unsatisfactory—whether for political or academic reasons—by the authorities. A three-month training course was started for anybody who was available. Out of this emergency beginning there later developed the Primary Teachers College for Men. First the course was lengthened to six months, then gradually to four years above primary school. In 1929 it was made two years, and later three years, above intermediate school. Finally, it was changed to a two-year course above secondary education. Parallel with this school was the "elementary course" for teachers which was started with two years and was lengthened to three years above primary school before it was metamorphosed into the present rural-teachers college with its five-year course above primary school. The teachers colleges for women had a similar course of development, though a later start.

All these shades of training are reflected in the composition of the present teaching body—with some additional varieties. Early in the twenties the authorities were forced to utilize disbanded officers from the Turkish army as teachers or principals. Later secondary- or even intermediate-school graduates as well as people who had a background of "private study" and products of private schools were appointed.

Table 25 gives the distribution of primary-school teachers in government schools according to qualifications.

The table shows that more than 85 percent of the teachers have had some sort of professional training, while the remainder have had none. However, both groups contain numerous teachers who have not even completed the secondary school. Graduates of the teachers colleges themselves are of widely varying standards. These facts suggest the need of a vigor-

44;Matthews and Akrawi S. G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

Of the total of 613 teachers on the secondary cadre, 440, or 71.7 percent, have had degrees based on four or more years of college or university study; 123, or 20.1 percent, have had one, two, or three years of study above the secondary school; and 50, or 8.2 percent, are of secondary or lower standard. Of these, all of the Higher Teachers College graduates and some of the other university graduates have had professional education. 875X

Besides the Iraqi teachers there is a fairly large, but diminishing, number of non-Iraqi teachers on the secondary cadre. These numbered 125 teachers in 1944–45 of whom 80 were men and 45 were women. In addition, an undetermined number of part-time teachers is employed. These are paid by the hour and are not included in the cadre.

Secondary-school teachers' salaries as of January 12, 1946, were as follows; salaries being paid on a twelve-month basis: 875X 465●

Monthly Salary	Number of Teachers
8–12 dinars ($32–$48)	9
15 dinars ($60)	16
18 dinars ($72)	312
21 dinars ($85)	156
25 dinars ($100)	47
30 dinars ($120)	46
35 dinars ($140)	19
40 dinars ($160)	2
Total number of teachers	613

The average salary of the Iraqi secondary-school teacher was 20.6 dinars ($82.40). These salaries do not include cost-of-living allowances. The salaries may appear low, but they should be compared with the maximum civil service salary (for professors and directors general) of 70 dinars ($280), with a few "distinguished grade" posts at 80 dinars ($320). The large number of salaries at the intermediate level is partially explained by the fact that the majority of the teachers are young and have entered the service rather recently. Of the 613 teachers, 492, or 80 percent, entered the service in the last ten years; 389, or 63 percent, in the last five years. The average service of secondary teachers of Iraq in 1946 was only 6.7 years.

SPECIAL TYPES OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS

Before closing this section on secondary-school education, mention must be made of two special types of secondary schools—King Faysal College and the secondary section of Queen 'Aliyah Institute which bring together boarding students from all the provinces of Iraq. 873X

European dress was
291 ever more generally adopted in the larger towns, and spread
significantly to urbanized tribesmen. Among upper-class women,
though the veil was still almost universal among Muslims, Western
556 clothing was worn increasingly. The desire for material progress
was reflected in the eagerness of the rich to acquire motor-cars,
gramophones, and the toys and amenities of Europe; but inability
to pay for these gave rise to demands for limitless credit.

466 Interest at the International Labour Office in conditions among 'Iraq's industrial workers led to some answering efforts to produce suitable legislation; but the smallness of this class in an unindustrialized country made European criteria and standards largely inapplicable. The first seeds were sown, however, of a social interest in labour matters.

744 To the whole community and to urban society in particular with its still prevalent poverty and low purchasing power the Government's Health and Education services contributed valuably. The former improved its quarantine and pilgrim services, multiplied its countryside dispensaries, improved its specialist institutes, and dealt well with the cholera epidemics of 1927 and 1931. It was significant that out-patient attendances, less than 750,000 in 1921, had more than doubled by 1926 and quadrupled by 1930. In response to foreign purchasers' outcry, the Health Department imposed measures of cleanliness in the date industry. In 1927 it founded the Royal Medical College; this, a medical school of good standards, took at once a high place in 'Iraq's higher and professional education. A School of Pharmacy had existed since 1922. The Government adhered during these years to a number of international conventions on medical as on many other matters.

871 The 'Iraqi schools seemed to foreign observers at this period—
and indeed at others—to lack something of the best spirit of
education. There was criticism of lax discipline, uncritical self-
flattery, a worship of modernity and materialism; politics pervaded
too many of the schools, always in the form of a crude xenophobia
eager for street demonstrations. Nevertheless, an educational
system grew and multiplied its facilities, fought for budget allot-
ments, developed an Inspectorate, codified its Regulations. A
Hygiene Directorate was formed in the Education Ministry, later
[562] greatly to develop. The year 1930 saw the first Government
secondary schools for girls; the days of Muslim hesitation over
female education were almost over. For boys the secondary period
was prolonged from four to five years, three 'intermediate' and two
'senior'. The dispatch of students for higher education abroad
grew commoner. Technical education remained unpopular: it did
not lead quickly enough to the goal chiefly envisaged, a Govern-

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
● 466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply,
improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
184 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was
not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission
constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq
Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong,
was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab Companies.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began ● 466 to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemploy- 467 ment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and 468 conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

635 An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would [661] call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945 701 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active opera- 625 tions could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

of nearly 7 million tons of through-put annually and a corresponding 382 loss of royalty revenue. On the northern line to Tripoli, the construction of the 16-inch line was completed in mid-1949; export from Tripoli was thereby trebled and raised 'Iraqi export production to nearly 7 million tons a year. Less than a year later the Company undertook the building of a much greater pipeline, of 30-inch diameter. Designed to run from Kirkuk to the sea coast at Banyas in Syria (an alignment parallel to that of the 12- and 16-inch lines except at its western extremity) it would deliver 'Iraqi oil to the world's markets at a rate of some 14 million tons a year at its lowest rate of through-put, or much more with increased pumping installations.[1]

These extensions of the pipeline system were accompanied by important increases to the pumping plant and facilities at seven pumping stations on both sides of the point of bifurcation near Ḥaditha, and in the Kirkuk field itself. The development of the latter was carried out in its northern extension in Arbil liwā, beyond the Lesser Zab, by an active drilling campaign and the manifold operations which accompany it. With drilling went the provision of gathering lines, tankage, additional de-gassing stations, new units in the Stabilization Plant, new administrative and domestic buildings, workshops, stores, depots, laboratories, electric-power plant, and water lines. 'Iraqis were fortunate in their certainty that, in the development of the great wealth in their soil, the most modern and economic methods were being adopted without waste of or danger to its resources. The needs of the labour [466] force were met by the initiation of a modern housing estate for 'Iraqi employees, canteens, sports grounds, transport to and from work, allowances and pay-revisions to meet the high cost of living, a savings fund, hospital extensions, and technical education both in 'Iraq and in the United Kingdom. In spite of the psychological, the material, and the (artificially fostered) 'political' difficulties inseparable from the presence of an advanced industrial enclave in a primitive economy of peasants, the living and working conditions of the oil workers were, while less than perfect, undoubtedly the best in contemporary 'Iraqi industry: and they were undeserving of the blatantly mendacious attacks, common in Baghdad newspapers, on the horrors of oil company employment and the brutality of the foreign exploiter. The industry brought also substantial [511] indirect benefits to the public in local purchases and contracts, the increase of purchasing power, the provision of foreign exchange, the teaching of industrial skill, and the performance of valuable and costly services to Kirkuk municipality. It could in

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[1] The 30-inch line, constructed at great speed, came into initial operation in the late spring of 1952.

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Baṣra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

• 466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

311 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the modernization
362 classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes
than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise
above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private
life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their
domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of
interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two
177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance
and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more
generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much
ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now
562 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women
learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law,
followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work,
and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the
franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded
were still considerable, and included the households of many
leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families,
by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western
type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop
[265 kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within
the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and
business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include
575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class professional
526 clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various
branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

433 471 materials and spare parts is due to many factors. First is past experience of the difficulty of obtaining such materials, due either to Iraq's distance from international markets, or to the shortages of world supply, or to the arbitrary attitude of suppliers abroad. Secondly, the fear of interruption of supplies owing to international emergencies and restrictions in the countries of origin. Thirdly, the influence of directors or big share-holders who own agencies for such materials or spare parts.

433 (b) There is great scope in Iraqi industry for improvement in the layout of machinery, flow of material, lighting, noise abatement, and temperature control.

466 (c) The problems of labour recruitment and organisation, systems of wage payment, housing and workers' welfare in general, fall outside the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say that present labour legislation provides for weekly and annual holidays, for compensations in cases of injury or total loss of life, and prohibits the employment of children under twelve years. Industry is subject to inspection by officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs for the purpose of enforcing the labour laws. The formation of trade unions is permitted under the law, but so far labour organisations have played very small part in industry.

433 654 (8) **State Assistance and Control**: The main characteristics of industry in Iraq should by now be clear. It is of a recent development. It has developed largely under state protection and assistance. It has to operate within a very small market. The fact that industry is still in its infancy makes it hard to predict its future course. The part which government assistance has so far played in its development is of special importance and calls for examination. State assistance has taken various forms; tariff protection, exemptions from various taxes and duties, and financial aid through the Industrial Bank. Except possibly in the last case, government assistance to industry has not been based on any criteria of efficiency, or economic or social objectives. Any firm can obtain the benefits of state encouragement as long as it fulfills two conditions only; that it will use raw materials available in Iraq, or that it will produce goods imported in large quantities. It is necessary, if industry is not to grow lax behind the high walls of protection, to set up standards of efficiency, and to relax protective measures such as the prohibition of competitive imports, as soon as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized. Benefits under

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241 has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahīn* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 439 features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648 may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433 existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466 have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647 of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175 economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185 of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.

[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

080 The Mission has carefully considered what industries might be expanded and what new industries might be established. It has sought to confine its recommendations for industrial development to those industries where there is reasonable prospect of efficient production, competitive with imports, and where production is within the technical capacity available in Iraq, supplemented, where necessary, by outside technical and managerial assistance.

Petroleum and Refining

135 No recommendations need be made on the oil industry. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons and those of the less well
382 explored fields near Basra offering perhaps equal promise. The development of these resources by the oil companies is proceeding
● [446] along sound lines. The oil companies have also been well in advance of other enterprises in providing housing, health services, and other amenities for their employees, in instituting labor training schemes and providing better pay for workers. The Mission realizes that there has been some criticism in Iraq of the rate of development, particularly in the Basra field. The expenditure of close to £90,000,000 by the oil companies on oil development in Iraq is now, however, beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Production in recent years might have been much greater if the outbreak of the war with Israel had not resulted in closing the pipeline to Haifa and in preventing the completion of another pipeline
[315] to that city. The existing line has a capacity of 2,000,000 tons and the projected line would have added another 4,000,000 tons. As already indicated, the government has recently obtained a commitment by the oil companies to increase output, which was a little less than 6,000,000 tons in 1950, to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955. It would not be advantageous to Iraq, however, to have production increased to such levels that the ensuing rise in oil revenues cannot in fact be effectively spent. Oil in the ground is a reserve for the future, and too rapid tapping of this reserve may entail a partial waste of resources.

382 The government has decided to build a modern oil refinery
471 near Baghdad which it anticipates will cost about £7,000,000. This refinery will use crude oil supplied from the Kirkuk fields at cost. With an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons, it will be able to supply

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

temporary, moderate protection of certain industries, it wishes to 654
emphasize strongly the need for a rapid and progressive reduction 433
in special assistance.

Government Organisation for Industry

Government activities relating to industry, except for the 654
Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in 647
the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present 433
director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. The Mission recommends that a Department of Industries be established to maintain adequate statistical records on industrial production, analyze economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and administer the laws concerning assistance to industry. The research and technical functions now being carried on would then be continued under a separate Department of Industrial Research and Standards.

These two departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future as compared to special measures of protection and assistance which tend to shield industry against competition. Much can be done in the long run to assist industry in better controlling the quality of its products, reducing waste through material salvage, analyzing production costs, making market surveys and increasing labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

Labor and Vocational Education

Finally, it should not be overlooked that a contented, well- 466
trained labor force is of the utmost importance to industrial development. An improvement in working conditions and more attention to the welfare of the worker would tend to increase labor productivity. Such an improvement can to a large extent be brought about only through a growing realization among employers that
it is to their own interest. The government should, of course, lay 467
down minimum standards in this respect, particularly since the 466
absence of real trade unions precludes workers from achieving

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467 greater benefits through collective bargaining. At present, labor laws set up certain requirements with respect to hours of work, periods of rest, vacations, employment of minors and compensation for disability. The Labor Department, however, is inadequately staffed to enforce the law and the many reported violations are generally allowed to go uncorrected. In 1949-50, of 1,228 enterprises inspected, only 136 were found to comply with the law. Of the remainder, 974 were simply warned and 118 cases were referred to courts. It would be desirable to enforce existing legislation before enacting other labor laws. Efforts are apparently being made to survey the possibility of introducing a social insurance system into Iraq. Under existing conditions, however, any social insurance law might tend to remain a dead letter.

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[212] Training of labor is impeded by the prevailing illiteracy which makes instruction in writing largely impossible. Elementary schooling and adult education are therefore essential to the improvement of labor efficiency. There is in existence a secondary technical school which attempts to train intermediate school graduates in industry. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training; and the graduates of the school show a disinclination to work with their hands. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for the basic practical training, and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workers and foremen. Those who are trained in the shop or on the site through such apprenticeship systems can then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work. Large private companies and public enterprises like the Iraq Petroleum Company, the railways and the Basra port administration all possess large machine shops where varied training can be imparted to many more than at present. It is suggested, therefore, that the government enlist their cooperation in the training of skilled workers for Iraq's requirements generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Government, banking and commercial firms, and industrial concerns are all handicapped by a shortage of competent typists, stenographers, clerks, bookkeepers and accountants which has been aggravated by

433 expanded will, however, require financial assistance from the Industrial Bank. This should be arranged just as soon as plans can be formulated.

Petroleum Development

382 315 [471] The further development of the oil industry can safely be left to the internationally-owned companies now operating in Iraq. Under an agreement finalized early in October 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three major oil companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—undertook to increase their oil output to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraq Government 50 percent of the profit on their production before the deduction of taxes. Although output in 1950 amounted to only about 6,000,000 tons, there should be no difficulty about attaining the agreed target. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons, with the new fields near Basra offering equal promise. In the development of these fields and means of transport, the oil companies have already made an investment of close to ID 90,000,000, which is now beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Development in the Kirkuk and Mosul field has already proceeded on the assumption that a production capacity of at least 22,000,000 tons would be achieved in a few years, and with the completion of the pipeline to Banias, Syria, there should also be ample transport capacity. The balance of the projected output, namely 8,000,000 tons, will have to come from the newer fields near Basra. This may require some increase in drilling and will necessitate additional pipeline capacity to Fao, but neither of these will be difficult to accomplish.

382 466 The oil companies have been among the leaders in Iraq in providing better conditions and amenities for their employees and in instituting schemes for training skilled labor and technicians. They have been criticized, however, for their failure to appoint more Iraqis to leading positions. Under the agreement already cited they have undertaken to send 50 Iraqi students per year to British Universities to study various subjects relating to the oil industry, and also to establish a school in Kirkuk to train 60 Iraqis yearly in technical oil subjects.

fit. After hire, improved working conditions and the provision of simple health services and adequate sanitary facilities would help to maintain his efficiency. 000

Living conditions outside the plant must also be maintained in a manner which gives the worker some degree of contentment and satisfaction. This might require new housing, better food, improved sanitary conditions or other changes, depending on the locality and type of industry. Most of these will, of course, involve further capital investment. The increase in worker efficiency when such measures are properly planned and implemented should, however, fully justify their cost.

Improvement in the workers' welfare ought to be a matter of concern both to the employers and the government. Inside the plant it is the primary responsibility of the employer; outside, that of the government. In neither sphere, however, is the jurisdiction or interest exclusive. For example, while a considerable improvement in working conditions in the plant can be brought about only if the employer realizes it is to his own interest, the government can and should intervene to maintain certain minimum standards. Legislation[1] with respect to working hours, holidays, sick leaves, disability compensation, child labor and the like, is already on the statute books, but the law has been poorly enforced. The staff of the Labor Department in the Ministry for Social Affairs needs to be strengthened to enable it to do an effective job. At the same time a special effort should be made to educate employers to the role of better working conditions in raising labor productivity. 46 ●

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[1] [IN IRAQ -- ANALYST.]

[304 IS BLANK]

have a mosque, a church, a post office, a cinema, a restaurant, a 362 police station and an institute equipped with reading rooms and a debating chamber. Streets and alleys are laid out to conform to the ground contours and paved with asphalt macadam. The streets are lighted and have recently been planted with trees. The project is much in advance of anything else that has so far been undertaken in Iraq, but its cost and the large element of subsidy involved make it impossible of general emulation.

The Iraq Petroleum Company is the only large private industrial concern which has provided substantial housing facilities for [466] its employees, although in 1943 a law was approved compelling industrial project owners to construct houses for their laborers. This law has apparently been ineffective. Although there is much to be said for placing responsibility on industry for housing in out-of-the-way places, the Mission is of the opinion that, in general, provision of housing is an inappropriate burden on industry.

Private Housing; Mortgage Credit

The most spectacular ventures in private housing in recent years were two grandiose developments in Baghdad for the well-to-do. Both of there were financial failures.

Private housing of a more modest character for the middle [452] classes, who cannot afford large outlays, requires assistance in the form of mortgage credit. In the main report, the Mission has recommended that the facilities offered by the Government Mortgage Bank be augmented. Instead of the original capital of ID 100,000, capital resources of ID 1,500,000 are suggested. The duration of loans, which is now limited to four years, should be increased to 15 years where it is considered desirable.

V. Public Utilities

As indicated earlier, considerable progress has been made in 365 providing the larger towns with water and electricity, but sewage systems have been wholly neglected. The Ministry of Interior is, with a few major exceptions, responsible for the planning, installation and general supervision of these public utilities. The actual

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

433 Iraq each capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of sugar per annum from sugar beet to be grown locally, a bitumen plant, and a small steel plant. In addition the Government is investigating the recommendation of the International Bank mission[1] for the erection of a chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur, and carbon black. The mission has also recommended plants for manufacturing bone-meal fertilizer, date-packing crates and motor-car tyres, and for batching concrete, converting steel scrap into building components, and possibly for remelting glass.

Labour

466 Conditions of work and employment are regulated by a
647 Labour Law (1936–46), which so far relates only to 'workmen'
(a term requiring more precise definition) in industrial under-
657 takings. It is in process of revision and extension. Its application is supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security, which maintains a small corps of inspectors. This department, advised by foreign experts, proposes to experiment with employment exchanges, is starting to compile labour statistics, is undertaking a programme of housing for labour, and is examining plans of social security, for which the existing Labour Law already contains some provision in the form of indemnities on discharge, paid sick and confinement leave, and compensation for injuries. Safety and sanitary working conditions are covered generally by the Labour Law and made obligatory in greater detail by a Workshops and Factories Regulation (1937). In January 1953 it was stated that new provisions, for eventual inclusion in the new Labour Law, had been drafted for establishing wage boards, regulating disputes, and determining the rights, obligations, and administration of trade unions, which are not clearly defined in the existing Labour Law. The latter grants industrial workers the right to establish associations to safeguard their special interests, strengthen the spirit of co-operation, effect educational, cultural, hygienic, social, and
[467] moral improvements, and develop Iraqi industry. A few trade unions exist; their membership is small and activity slight. Others have been suspended for subversive activity. The movement is still rudimentary.

Communications

496 *Railways.*[2] The railways constructed by the British forces during the Mesopotamian Campaign eventually formed the

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[1] See above, p. 275.

[2] This section is based on the *Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book*, 1952–3.

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

It is customary to abuse the Turkish Government as 000
responsible for these conditions. That government has
much to answer for, but it is doubtful whether even the
efficient and benevolent rule of the British will improve
the lot of the date gardener a great deal so long as the
present system remains unchanged. The trouble is that 166
the owner has no contact with his gardener except 427
through his agent, and is coerced by no intelligent and
effective public sentiment. Whether in Turkish or British
territory, he lives under a government built on the
theory that contracts made in good faith must be executed
at all costs and that knows no redress for the gardener
except that he seek employment elsewhere, a thing that
is very difficult to do. The adjustments possible in the
oases of Arabia, where it is the function of the sheikh to
modify oppressive contracts and where it is understood
that an unfavorable reputation will speedily endanger
the life of the land-owner, are out of the question in
Mesopotamia.

In addition to the date gardeners who cultivate the irrigated 243
land along the last hundred miles of the Arab [162]
River from Gurna to the Gulf, there are also a number of 262
so-called Marsh Arabs along the rivers in Lower Mesopotamia,
who raise rice, wheat and barley on land that is
overflowed in the spring when water is high. Rice is
their favorite crop and the one that is most reliable. In
that country the visitor is surprised at being served with
loaves of bread of the usual flat pancake-shape but snowy
white instead of the light brown color of the whole wheat
flour which is universal over all Arabia. I asked my
host with much surprise whether he imported his flour
from Bombay and he laughed. He hardly knew where

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
IRAQ MHI

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fixes the types of government posts existing in each Ministry, with the minimum and maximum pay for each type. Primary-school teachers begin with 6 to 12 dinars ($24 to $48) per month according to their qualifications, and may reach a maximum of 25 dinars ($100). Teachers on the secondary cadre, including teachers of primary- and rural-teachers colleges and of vocational schools, begin at 15 to 30 dinars ($60 to $120) per month, the latter sum being the initial salary of teachers holding doctorates of British, American, French, or Egyptian universities, but not of central European universities. The maximum for a secondary-school teacher is 40 dinars ($160), with the exception of principals and holders of the doctorate, who may reach 50 dinars ($200). Instructors at higher institutions start at 18 dinars ($72), which is the initial salary for a new appointee holding the B.A. degree or its equivalent; if they achieve full professorial rank, they may reach a maximum salary of 70 dinars ($280). This is the maximum salary paid ordinarily to a Director General and is the highest salary paid to a civil servant. A few posts exist at 80 dinars ($320) for directors general of a "distinguished grade"—mainly former ministers or directors general of long standing and service. The policy of including the full professors among the most highly paid civil servants was adopted in the amendments to the Cadre Law of 1942 to encourage some of the ablest men in the country to turn to scientific work. This policy has extended to a degree into secondary education to lessen the pay differential between secondary-school teachers and holders of official administrative posts in government offices. Provincial-education directors and inspectors may reach a maximum of 40 dinars ($160), and specialized inspectors, a maximum of 50 dinars ($200).

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It will be seen that the civil service and the state cadre laws have on the whole made liberal provision for making teaching an attractive career for young men and young women. It is understood that amendments to the Civil Service Law are pending which will make educational service even more attractive, particularly in encouraging study abroad.

The Civil Pensions Law of 1940 provides that a civil servant of thirty years' service receives a retirement allowance equal to one-half of his average salary over the last seven years of his employment. A shorter or longer period of service pays proportionately. In case of death, the pension is paid to the wife and minor children in accordance with the inheritance law.

The Discipline of State Officials Law of 1936 provides for disciplinary boards in each Ministry to try officials, including teachers, for offenses com-

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-S (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

IRAQ MHI

mitted in office. A Higher Disciplinary Board handles appeals and disputes regarding the rights of officials. 875^{x} 466 ●

The Educational Ladder

The educational ladder in Iraq is based on a primary school, which children enter at the age of six and attend for six years, a secondary school of five years, and a number of colleges of three to six years; there are also numerous professional and vocational schools. (See Chart IV.) The secondary school is of two levels: an intermediate school of three years' duration is an approximation of the American junior-high school; a two-year preparatory school is a shorter version of the American senior-high school. Thus, Iraqi primary and secondary schools operate on the 6-3-2 plan as compared with the American 8-4 or 6-3-3 year plans. Below the primary-school level, a few kindergartens are maintained by the Ministry of Education or by some private agencies. 871^{K}

PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS

The public primary school is free to all children who have reached the age of six years and offers a uniform curriculum extending over six grades. It is the common school which most Iraqi children, whatever their class, religion, or race, attend, and it is the medium through which the educational authorities of Iraq hope to develop a sense of citizenship and national unity. Attendance is compulsory wherever adequate facilities exist. Article 36 of the Public Education Law prohibits Iraqi children from attending foreign primary schools; and as native private schools follow rather closely the curriculum of the government schools, it is safe to conclude that all Iraqi children of primary school age who attend school at all receive a standard type of primary education. 872^{K} [182]

The primary-school course ends in a special public primary examination, set by the Ministry for all the schools of Iraq. No pupil can be promoted to a postprimary school, whether public, private, or foreign, without first passing the public primary examination or presenting a certificate showing that he has pursued similar studies abroad.

POSTPRIMARY EDUCATION

Of 5,416 graduates of primary schools in 1942–43, 4,214 pupils, or 77.6 percent, continued their education the following year. The great majority of these, 3,921 pupils, entered the intermediate schools, while the remainder, 293, entered some vocational or professional school. The boys 873^{K}

imprisonment not exceeding two months or to both, fine and imprisonment. 312
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The Directorate-General of Irrigation may undertake the clearance of irrigation canals by machinery, and the persons benefiting from such work shall refund the costs so incurred. (Last para. of Art. 14, added by Amending Law of 1945).

3) Offences and Penalties under the Irrigation and Embankments Law 312
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Articles 15 to 18 deal with offences and penalties, in addition to those already mentioned.

Article 15 prescribes the death penalty for whomsoever wilfully and maliciously damages or alters any irrigation work thereby causing injury to life or to property and with penal servitude for life, or a term not exceeding 15 years, if it does not.

Article 16 lists a series of offences punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two months or a fine not exceeding 500 rupees of to both imprisonment and fine. Among the offences stipulated herein are:

Damage, alteration and obstruction to any irrigation work, interference with the supply of water; fouling of water; destruction, tampering with, or alteration of land, level marks or water gauges; damages caused to canal or flood enbankments by grazing cattle; refusal or neglect to supply labor; neglect to prevent waste of water; obstruction to Government official from executing their duties; etc. Addition to or cancellation or alteration to the above list may be made by Regulation (Article 20).

Article 17 prescribes a fine not exceeding 30 rupees for persons failing to comply with a notice to execute repairs, within the time specified in such notice.

4) Miscellaneous Provisions

In any proceedings on offences mentioned in Articles 12 and 312
16 thereof, before a Magistrate, a report signed by an assistant 681
engineer or by any senior official in the Irrigation Department
may be accepted as evidence in court. The recovery of sums due 694

Jordan MG1
IRAQ MM1

10. 1/500 for every mashara of land cultivated with rice without a permit or in excess of the permitted areas (Article 5). I [illegible] 681

7. Forcible Assistance Law

In addition to the provision of Article 13 of the Irrigation and Embankments Law for emergency requisition of labor, the Ministry of Interior may under the Forcible Assistance Law No. 27 of 31 March 1923, as subsequently amended by Law No. 24 of 30 March 1936, in sudden and unforeseen circumstances such as water floods, fire, locusts, etc. authorize the mutasarrifs with the power of collecting and employing labor at rates to be prescribed by the Government. 466

Every laborer who contravenes the order shall be forcibly taken to the place of the work and shall afterwards be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding Rs. 100.

Persons having jurisdiction to collect laborers who refuse to supply the necessary number of labor or to give the necessary assistance shall upon conviction be liable to imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding Rs. 1000 or to both imprisonment and fine.

JORDAN

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Since the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire, the Mejelle Civil Code has remained in force there. Subsequently, another law supplementing water legislation, No. 38 dated 8 August 1946 (15 Muharram 1366) has been enacted. Jordan authorities are considering amending this latter law at the present time, but the draft is still under study by the interested departments. 1/ This law consists of five sections with 41 articles.

1/Schwang, L. D. Expanded Technical Assistance Program of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy. Private letter.

Iran MA1
Iraq MH1

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this pension is reduced in proportion to the degree of incapacity in accordance with a prescribed schedule. Pensions based on the employee's last wages are payable in case of death to the widow (20 per cent.), children (15 to 40 per cent. for one to four or more children) and to parents if no children survive. A burial benefit of up to 20 days of wages is also provided.

Social Welfare Institute

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An Imperial Social Welfare Institute was established by an Order of 22 March 1947 to promote the welfare of the poorer working classes of Iran. The Institute depends on voluntary contributions for its support. Among other activities, it has set up dispensaries in different parts of the country, surgical clinics, a nursing school and relief offices for needy mothers and children and tuberculous persons.

IRAQ

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There is no scheme of social insurance in Iraq, but its Labour Act (Act No. 72 of 25 April 1936, amended by Act No. 36 of 13 May 1942) fixes the liability of individual employers for payment of compensation in case of employment injury. Employers may insure this liability with a commercial insurer. The provisions apply to wage earners in industrial undertakings, including factories, mines, construction and transport. Foreign workers and their dependants are guaranteed the same treatment in respect of compensation as that received by Iraqi workers, provided such foreign workers are nationals of countries adhering to the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925, which Iraq ratified in 1940.

Compensation is payable not only for injury but also for a listed occupational poisoning or disease, Iraq having ratified the Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention (Revised), 1934, in 1941. The compensation afforded by the employer consists of medical care and cash benefits for incapacity and death. In the event of temporary or permanent partial incapacity, up to 50 per cent. of wages is payable for a maximum of one year in the event of temporary incapacity and of two years in that of permanent incapacity. In the event of permanent total incapacity, a lump-sum grant equal to two years of wages is payable. The same lump-sum amount is payable in case of death, for distribution among surviving dependent relatives according to prescribed rules. The Minister of the Interior is responsible for enforcing the Act.

62: I. L. O. S-5 (1947-1950) 1950 MI Middle East
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Employers are also required to pay full wages to women employees who are absent from work by reason of confinement, for two weeks before and three weeks following the confinement.

ISRAEL

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The only laws at present in force in Israel which deal with contingencies directly related to social security consist of Ordinances concerning workmen's compensation and the employment of women. These Ordinances, which fix the liability of individual employers in the event of employment injury or maternity, were taken over from the Mandatory Government and confirmed by the Provisional State Council of the new Jewish State in 1948.

Workmen's Compensation

The workmen's compensation provisions which date from 1927 were extended and consolidated by the Ordinances of 16 August 1947 and 20 December 1948. They apply with only a few exceptions to all employees ordinarily resident in Israel, and make the employer liable to pay compensation in respect of injuries from employment-connected accidents and listed diseases. An employer may insure his liability with a commercial carrier or may carry the risk himself.

A totally disabled worker receives a weekly benefit normally equal to 75 per cent. of his past earnings, with a maximum of £I. 8 weekly[1]; if his earnings are below £I. 6.660 weekly, 100 per cent. of wages is payable up to £I. 5. There is no waiting period and the compensation continues for the duration of disablement. Compensation for partial disability is equal to between 75 and 100 per cent. of earnings loss with a normal maximum of £I. 8. Medical care, including surgery, hospitalisation, medicines and transport, must be provided by the employer up to a maximum value of £I. 150 or £I. 250, as well as necessary accessories or artificial limbs.

In case of death, adult dependants receive a lump sum equivalent to three years of the victim's past earnings, with a minimum of £I. 750 and a maximum of £I. 1,500. In addition, an allowance is payable in respect of each surviving dependent child under 16, equal to £I. 2 multiplied by the number of months to elapse between the worker's death and the date when the child attains age 16. Part dependants receive terization plant near Baghdad and seeks to improve the standards of agriculture which should be reflected in better nutrition among the people. The Ministry of Communications and Works maintains health and medical facilities at the port of Basra, and furnishes medical care for railway personnel. 744

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[1] The Israeli pound, which contains 1,000 prutoth, equals \$2.80.

Several voluntary agencies carry on health work, usually in co-operation with the Ministry of Health. The Children's Welfare Society conducts an extensive program for the promotion of maternal and child health, and operates welfare centers in Baghdad and the administrative centers of the remaining provinces. The Red Crescent Society supports a child health center in Baghdad, and provides training for girls in first aid and home nursing through branches in Baghdad, Basra, Hilla, Amarah and Kirkuk. The Anti-Tuberculosis Society campaigns against tuberculosis, and contributed toward the erection of a sanatorium, opened in 1951, near Baghdad. The Catholic Nuns Society runs a small general hospital and dispensary, and the Society of Buyout el Umma an ophthalmic hospital and dispensaries in Baghdad. 746 751 743

The Board of Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church of America maintains a medical mission in the Amarah region. It operates a hospital and founded the leper colony, which has since been taken over by the government. The Seventh Day Adventists also have a hospital in Baghdad. The Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company, provide medical and health services for the benefit of their employees. 797 743 [466]

MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1950, there were 82 civilian hospitals in Iraq with an aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly over 1 bed per 1,000 population. Of this number, 2,086 beds were located in Baghdad, 534 in Basra and 412 in Mosul provinces. Sixty-seven hospitals, with a 743

p. 33(A)

combined capacity of 4,330 beds, were operated by the government health authorities; 4 hospitals with 153 beds by other governmental agencies; and 11 hospitals with 418 beds by industrial, mission or private organizations. Free medical care was provided in 4,475 beds, representing over 90 per cent of the hospital beds available in the country.

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The Royal Hospital in Baghdad is foremost among the institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. It has medical, surgical, pediatric and infectious disease sections, with a total capacity of 650 to 750 beds. The remaining hospitals of the Ministry now come under the authority of the Director of Curative Medicine. According to the statistics for 1950, they included 42 general hospitals, with an aggregate capacity of about 2,300 beds, of which one or more in each province were Grade 1 hospitals under the supervision of medical officers. Maternity and child welfare divisions were incorporated in the general hospitals, which provided 962 beds for maternity cases and 134 beds for children. The special institutions consisted of 6 isolation hospitals with a total capacity of 596 beds, 3 ophthalmic hospitals with 79 beds, 2 venereal disease hospitals with 52 beds, 2 child welfare hospitals with 155 beds, 3 maternity and children's hospitals with 71 beds, a mental hospital of 120 beds, a leper hospital of 180 beds and 6 prison hospitals with 92 beds. A 400-bed tuberculosis sanatorium, which was sponsored in part by the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, was opened near Baghdad in 1951. Another 120-bed hospital in Basra was completed in 1952.

The American Mission hospital, with [illegible] beds, in Amarah and the new Seventh Day Adventist hospital, with 60 beds, in Baghdad are prominent among the private institutions. As of 1951, 3 hospitals with a combined capacity of 170 beds were operated by the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk region. The medical facilities of the company in the oil field and the pipeline areas also included 20 detention camps, with

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p. 83(B)

743 466 82 beds for emergency care, and field ambulance services. The Basra Petroleum Company maintained a 15-bed hospital at Basra, a 16-bed hospital at Fao and 12 emergency beds in 2 detention camps. The Mosul Petroleum Company had 10 beds for emergency cases in a camp near its exploration activities.

743 In addition to the regular hospital clinics, 433 dispensaries were scattered throughout the provinces in 1950. Of this number, 403 belonged to the government health services: 145 were staffed by physicians and the remainder by assistant medical personnel. There were also 11 mobile dispensaries, which covered the more remote villages and tribal areas, and 2 floating dispensaries on the river in Basra and Muntafiq provinces. Only 7 tuberculosis dispensaries existed in 1950, but 13 dispensaries, some with facilities for 20 beds, were under construction in the provincial capitals. The Ministry operated 5 ophthalmic dispensaries and 4 "institutes" for the treatment of venereal diseases. A diagnostic and research center was organized in Baghdad in 1950, in connection with the syphilis-bejel control project being conducted under the auspices of the World Health Organization.

743 744 The infant and child welfare centers functioning in 1950 totaled 21, most of which were supported by the Children's Welfare Society. Ten centers were located in the Baghdad region. An expanded maternal and child health program is now being developed by the Ministry of Health. In 1952, it started a demonstration and training project at Samawa, with assistance from the Technical Co-operation Administration of the United States government. Another demonstration center for the training of local medical personnel in the principles of maternal and child health is scheduled to be opened in Baghdad in 1953-54, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The proposed program of the Ministry calls for the crea-

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

x471 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was more interested in ex-
x648 panding production in Iran than in Iraq. The French, on their part, while agreeing with this argument, feared an additional curtailment of Iraqi production—their major supply—if the participating American companies were permitted to enter into other oil undertakings in the area. To the French, therefore, the Red Line Agreement was a guarantee, because of the limitations it placed on the American companies, of a steady, and even of an increased, supply of oil from Iraq.

x471 The Iraqis were dissatisfied with the royalties they were re-
● 466 ceiving; nor were they satisfied with the number of their na-
651 tionals in the higher positions of oil production operations. They complained of the lack of training facilities for Iraqis for the conduct of the industry. A constant source of irritation between the Government and the Company was the lack of refining facilities in the country. Another issue, of a technical nature, was the evaluation of gold shillings paid as royalties. Difficulties developed when the Company's second payment fell due in January 1932, after the British pound went off the gold standard. A temporary arrangement, without prejudice to either party, was made after Premier Nuri es Said Pasha went to London and discussed the issue with the Company; Iraq was paid £578,000 instead of the £409,000 provided by the agreement. Subsequently, it was agreed that payments be made in sterling at the current price of gold.[44] Later a serious difference arose as to the interpretation of the "current price of gold." The Company maintained that the gold shilling must be based on the official London rate of exchange of gold, while the Iraqis argued that it should be based on the free market value, which was, of course, considerably higher.

x471 Against the Iraqis' contention that production was being
x648 methodically kept down by the Company, the latter argued that
651 the relatively low rate of production of Iraq oil was due to transport difficulties; that the Company was investing huge sums for pipelines, but the process of building the pipelines was conditioned by the exigencies of war which limited the supply of steel. It pointed out that immediately after the war, in spite of a serious steel shortage, the parallel 16-inch pipeline to Haifa and Tripoli had been built, alongside the existing

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[44] *Report 1932*, 38; *Survey of International Affairs 1934*, 192-193.

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x471 all the crude oil necessary for local consumption at 5.5 shillings per ton.

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8. If, in future agreements between oil companies and neighboring Near Eastern countries, royalties were increased, Iraq to have the right to request similar increases.

9. Each of the three companies to appoint two Iraqi directors.

[466] 10. The companies to send at their own expense fifty Iraqi students annually to British universities for specialized studies in the oil industry, and I.P.C. to establish a school in Kirkuk to train Iraqi workers.

11. Should production be halted because of *force majeure* or "an act of God," the companies to pay the Government a minimum of £5 million a year for two years.[45]

With the signing of the new agreement, Iraq entered a new era. The complete shutdown of the Iranian oil sources, combined with the terms of the new agreement, increased production beyond normal proportions and made the oil revenue a decisive factor in the development of Iraq. Oil production in 1952 jumped to 18,066,797 tons, in 1953 to 27,220,199 tons, and in 1954, to 29,550,000 tons, considerably above the estimates of the agreement. Royalty income in 1951 was £13,700,000, and in 1952 £33,000,000, plus the £5,000,000 paid in settlement of past claims; in 1953 it jumped to £51,400,000, and to £68,390,000 in 1954.[46]

x471
+648 The expansion in production was in all three areas. The Kirkuk field (I.P.C.) produced 15,522,715 tons in 1952, and 22,865,538 tons in 1953 and 23,719,672 tons in 1954. The Zubair field (B.P.C.) produced 2,238,177 tons in 1952 and 3,077,522 tons in 1953, and together with the new field Rumaila produced 4,584,358 tons in 1954. The Ain Zalah field[47]

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[45] Iraq Petroleum Company Ltd., Mosul Petroleum Company Ltd., Basrah Petroleum Company Ltd., *Agreement with the Government of Iraq Made on the Third Day of February, 1952 Together with Law No. 4 of 1952 Ratifying the Agreement* (English and Arabic Texts); *Iraq Oil in 1951*, 15-18. The companies also agreed to pay a lump sum of £5 million in settlement of past disputes. United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East 1950-1951* (New York, 1952), 36. Henceforth cited U.N., *Summary 1950-1951.*

[46] U.N., *Summary 1952-53*, 60; U.N., Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954* (New York, 1955), 97, henceforth cited: U.N., *Economic Developments 1945 to 1954;* "Oil and Social Change in the Middle East," *The Economist*, CLXXVI, 3, July 2, 1955.

[47] Ain Zalah, which is in the Mosul area and is operated by the Mosul Petroleum Co., was developed in 1940, but early in 1941, because of the war, operations were suspended; they were resumed in 1952. After the completion of the pipeline from Ain Zalah to K2 station on the Kirkuk-Mediterranean pipeline, oil began to flow. *Iraq Oil in 1952*, 25.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
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added pipelines. When the Arabian American Oil Company introduced the fifty-fifty profit basis arrangement in Saudi Arabia, and the agitation for nationalization in Iran was growing in volume, Iraq also obtained a fifty-fifty profit-sharing arrangement.[36]

The Company's Employment Practices

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The question of the employment of Iraqis in the industry was next in importance. Because I.P.C. did not build its refineries in Iraq, as did the A.I.O.C. in Abadan, the number of Iraqis employed in the oil industry was considerably smaller than Iranians in Iran. At the end of 1947 it employed a total of 14,556 workers, of whom 13,900 were Iraqis.[37] The number was not much greater in 1951, and as was inevitable, the higher positions, both technical and administrative, were filled by non-Iraqis.[38]

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[36] The basis of calculating the profit, since all the transactions between the partners in the Iraq Petroleum Co. are in crude, became a source of friction. In the 1952 agreement, in which specific provisions were made for calculating the profits, the Company had decided advantages. Late in 1953 Iraq, seconded by Saudi Arabia began to demand changes in the arrangements. *The New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1954. Early in 1955 it was reported from Bagdad that an agreement in principle for a new price-fixing formula had been arrived at, and as a result the Government's oil revenue would increase by one-fifth. *The New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1955. The 1952 agreement provided that the profits be calculated by deducting production costs from the base selling price for crude oil in the Middle East. The companies were permitted to discount this base by about 17 per cent. The new formula would reduce this discount to only 2 per cent. On March 24, 1955 a new arrangement was agreed upon between the Government and the I.P.C. which reduced the brokerage rates from 17 to 2 per cent. This increased the royalty for 1954 by ID 10.5 million, making a total of ID 58 million for the year. *Mid-East Mirror*, 14, March 26, 1955.

[37] International Labor Organization, *Manpower Problems, Vocational Training, and Employment Service* (Geneva, 1951). Regional Conference for the Near and Middle East, Teheran, 1951, 10. The total number employed at the end of Dec. 1948 is given by the UN as 14,241, of whom 13,465 were Iraqis. U.N., *Review 1949-50*, 63.

[38] The breakdown of locally engaged personnel at the end of 1951 is given as follows:

Company	*Clerical and Supervisory*	*Other*	*Total*
I.P.C.	1,134	5,961	7,095
B.P.C.	438	2,259	2,697
M.P.C.	93	545	638
Total	1,665	8,765	10,430

Iraq Oil in 1951, 11. The figures given in *Iraq Oil in 1952*, 29, apparently include personnel employed by the I.P.C. also in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, as well as non-local personnel.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East

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In 1951 the I.P.C. established at Kirkuk an industrial training center with a five-year course for clerical and technical personnel for the Company's needs. The training is closely integrated with practical work in the Company's plants. During the course the apprentices are paid a monthly wage which increases progressively from ID 10 on entry to ID 21 during the last year.[39] In the same year the Company undertook to send fifty students to England to continue their studies both in the technical and scientific fields. The maximum number of such students in Britain at any given time was to be two hundred and fifty. Before leaving, the students were obliged to pledge themselves to work either for the Iraq Government or for the Company for twice the length of time they spent on their studies abroad.[40] This training, together with the development of the Government refineries, will introduce more Iraqis into the higher positions of the oil industry.

While there can be no doubt that a number of company-trained employees have served in other parts of the industrial sector of Iraq's economy, the overall effect could not possibly be too great. The physical conditions of the industry and the general background history of the concession—so different from those in Iran—made Company employment a much greater attraction and carried with it greater permanency, so that local industry could not bid for the trainees. Nevertheless, the Company's great need was and still is for skilled, trained technical and administrative workers, which its own efforts failed to supply.[41]

Although not to the same extent as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, I.P.C. has provided its employees with medical services and social amenities. In 1952 the Company had three modern hospitals, eleven clinics and twenty-three dispensaries in the Kirkuk area; one hospital, two clinics and three dispensaries in the Basrah area.[42]

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[39] "Training Schemes That Will Benefit Iraqis," *Al Asr*, Sept. 18, 25, Oct. 2, 1954.

[40] *Iraq Oil in 1953*, 5. The Company also made provision for a limited period —six to twelve months—of special training in Britain for Company employees sent by their respective Company departments. In 1953 twelve trainees were in Britain for this training. *Ibid.*

[41] For a description of the benefits and advantages which the Company employees enjoy, as compared with other industrial workers, see Great Britain, *Iraq Review*, 29-30.

[42] *Iraq Oil in 1952*, 18, 24.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

×645 composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began 466 to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemploy- 467 ment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and 468 conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

635 An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would [661] call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945 701 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active opera- 625 tions could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

temporary, moderate protection of certain industries, it wishes to 654
emphasize strongly the need for a rapid and progressive reduction 433
in special assistance.

Government Organization for Industry

Government activities relating to industry, except for the 654
Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in 647
the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present 433
director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. The Mission recommends that a Department of Industries be established to maintain adequate statistical records on industrial production, analyze economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and administer the laws concerning assistance to industry. The research and technical functions now being carried on would then be continued under a separate Department of Industrial Research and Standards.

These two departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future as compared to special measures of protection and assistance which tend to shield industry against competition. Much can be done in the long run to assist industry in better controlling the quality of its products, reducing waste through material salvage, analyzing production costs, making market surveys and increasing labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

Labor and Vocational Education

Finally, it should not be overlooked that a contented, well- 466
trained labor force is of the utmost importance to industrial development. An improvement in working conditions and more attention to the welfare of the worker would tend to increase labor productivity. Such an improvement can to a large extent be brought about only through a growing realization among employers that
it is to their own interest. The government should, of course, lay 467 ●
down minimum standards in this respect, particularly since the 466
absence of real trade unions precludes workers from achieving

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

466 467 greater benefits through collective bargaining. At present, labor laws set up certain requirements with respect to hours of work, periods of rest, vacations, employment of minors and compensation for disability. The Labor Department, however, is inadequately staffed to enforce the law and the many reported violations are generally allowed to go uncorrected. In 1949-50, of 1,228 enterprises inspected, only 136 were found to comply with the law. Of the remainder, 974 were simply warned and 118 cases were referred to courts. It would be desirable to enforce existing legislation before enacting other labor laws. Efforts are apparently being made to survey the possibility of introducing a social insurance system into Iraq. Under existing conditions, however, any social insurance law might tend to remain a dead letter.

874 464 [2/12] Training of labor is impeded by the prevailing illiteracy which makes instruction in writing largely impossible. Elementary schooling and adult education are therefore essential to the improvement of labor efficiency. There is in existence a secondary technical school which attempts to train intermediate school graduates in industry. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training; and the graduates of the school show a disinclination to work with their hands. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for the basic practical training, and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workers and foremen. Those who are trained in the shop or on the site through such apprenticeship systems can then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work. Large private companies and public enterprises like the Iraq Petroleum Company, the railways and the Basra port administration all possess large machine shops where varied training can be imparted to many more than at present. It is suggested, therefore, that the government enlist their cooperation in the training of skilled workers for Iraq's requirements generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Government, banking and commercial firms, and industrial concerns are all handicapped by a shortage of competent typists, stenographers, clerks, bookkeepers and accountants which has been aggravated by

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

433 Iraq each capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of sugar per annum from sugar beet to be grown locally, a bitumen plant, and a small steel plant. In addition the Government is investigating the recommendation of the International Bank mission[1] for the erection of a chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur, and carbon black. The mission has also recommended plants for manufacturing bone-meal fertilizer, date-packing crates and motor-car tyres, and for batching concrete, converting steel scrap into building components, and possibly for remelting glass.

Labour

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657 Conditions of work and employment are regulated by a Labour Law (1936–46), which so far relates only to 'workmen' (a term requiring more precise definition) in industrial undertakings. It is in process of revision and extension. Its application is supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security, which maintains a small corps of inspectors. This department, advised by foreign experts, proposes to experiment with employment exchanges, is starting to compile labour statistics, is undertaking a programme of housing for labour, and is examining plans of social security, for which the existing Labour Law already contains some provision in the form of indemnities on discharge, paid sick and confinement leave, and compensation for injuries. Safety and sanitary working conditions are covered generally by the Labour Law and made obligatory in greater detail by a Workshops and Factories Regulation (1937). In January 1953 it was stated that new provisions, for eventual inclusion in the new Labour Law, had been drafted for establishing wage boards, regulating disputes, and determining the rights, obligations, and administration of trade unions, which are not clearly defined in the existing Labour Law. The latter grants industrial workers the right to establish associations to safeguard their special interests, strengthen the spirit of co-operation, effect educational, cultural, hygienic, social, and
• [467] moral improvements, and develop Iraqi industry. A few trade unions exist; their membership is small and activity slight. Others have been suspended for subversive activity. The movement is still rudimentary.

Communications

496 *Railways.*[2] The railways constructed by the British forces during the Mesopotamian Campaign eventually formed the

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[1] See above, p. 275.

[2] This section is based on the *Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book*, 1952–3.

*645 northern 'Iraq. In June 1937 continued lawlessness at Samawa
668 led to military operations on the habitual pattern, with destruction
of villages, tribal attacks on the qadhā town, and (it was said) the
shooting of hostages by the Army. Deep as was the impression
made on the tribes by this treatment, peace never returned to these
troubled regions during the life-time of the Sulaymani Ministry.
In the towns, security was reasonably maintained, and isolated acts
of anti-Jewish violence which had occurred in Baghdad in 1936
were not repeated.

646 The Ministry remained unhappy in the political sphere. The
665 general elections ordered in November 1936 and completed in
February 1937 produced a Chamber from which indispensable
compliance with Ṣidqi's wishes had excluded the bulk of former
Deputies and all but twelve of the Reformists; but had admitted,
as a conciliatory favour, some ill-chosen wildlings from the
Euphrates tribes. In the four months of the Extraordinary Session
from February to June 1937 the Chamber was uneasy and divided,
with painful friction between the Ministry's own ill-assorted fol-
lowers. This, and the frustrations of their minority position, and
their dislike of the re-adopted harsh policy at Samawa, led in June
to the resignation of the four Reformist ministers. While still in
● 468 office their influence, especially that of Chadirchi, had inspired,
perhaps encouraged, serious strikes among industrial workers.
So were explained the successive strikes at the Kut barrage, in the
drilling-areas of the B.O.D. Company, in the Railway workshops,
among the Port workers and the Najf weavers, and among the
'Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk. These strikes,
whether industrially justified or not, reflected a new spirit of labour
self-consciousness not necessarily unhealthy—and a new political
weapon.

*645 Ḥikmat's hopes of strengthening his Cabinet by the inclusion in
665 it of leading statesmen—Nuri Sa'id himself, or Jamil al-Madfa'i—
could not but fail since few now trusted Bakr or the uneasy régime
itself. Of the four new ministers, two, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and
Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, were Sunni lawyer-politicians and
functionaries, and two, 'Abbas Mahdi and Ja'far Ḥamandi, were
Shi'is of similar background. They were posted to the Ministries
of Justice, Finance, Works, and Education respectively; but they
were politically of little weight. The breach between the Reform
movement and the Government was now complete; the People's
Reform League was suppressed, and prominent Communists, real
or alleged, were arrested. Two of the most active, 'Abd al-Qadir
and Yusif, sons of Isma'il, fled to Paris. The Army dominated,
ever more obviously, the Prime Minister and his Government.

*645 The position was one which Bakr Ṣidqi could not but abuse. He

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625 tions could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of 668 the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan, where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the [468] Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to blame the Company itself.

668 In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy 661 of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some 3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question. In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker* x645 was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps, which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry, approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan (at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the Panjwin earthquake victims.

'645 In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status 648 which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946, and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views'; and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

pletion of the Kirkuk–Arbil extension and its Lesser Zab bridge: 496
of the railway and road bridge[1] at Baghdad, opened late in 1950: 499
of the Musayib bridge leading to Karbalā: and of new stations at Ba'quba, Diwaniya, Naṣiriya and elsewhere. New rolling stock was ordered and by 1950 delivered. Progress was made in erecting a grandiose combined station and administrative headquarters at Baghdad West, and in redesigning the yards and depots there; but the high cost of these projects, the diminution of receipts by road and air competition (in spite of good traffic in grain and oilfield materials), and losses due to repeated river flooding rapidly exhausted the war-time surplus and led to the need to borrow first from Government in 1946, then from London—a loan of £3 million —in 1950, before supplies and contractors could be paid and work could proceed. [468] Working conditions in the railway system were disturbed by the strikes elsewhere mentioned in 1945, 1946, and 1949. [464] The Jewish employees of the traffic branch were replaced in 1949 by imported Pakistani staff, and the training of 'Iraqis to replace these and the few remaining British executives was accelerated. The status and composition of the Railway Board was unchanged, though criticized by the press as outdated and insufficiently 'national'. The post of Director-General was passed by H. C. Smith to W. J. Moffat in 1950, and an 'Iraqi, General Isma'il Ṣafwat, assumed the post in 1952.

'Iraq Airways was initiated by the Railway as a subordinate 509
enterprise in 1945, and started service in 1946 with five light aircraft hired from Great Britain. In the following year the hired aircraft were replaced by its own machines, and it extended its range from Baghdad–Baṣra outwards to Mosul, Cairo, and Damascus, and by 1948 could, thanks to reciprocal agreements, offer transport weekly or monthly to Teheran, Karachi, and Ankara. The service, to which British Overseas Airways Corporation acted as technical advisers and agents, was efficiently maintained but, thanks to competition and high costs, financially unprofitable. British, American, Dutch, French and other foreign airlines continued to use 'Iraqi airports. An expenditure of over ID 2 million on aerodromes formed part of the six-year development plan. The meteorological service, begun in 1936 in a single room, now maintained under the Ministry of Defence a dozen stations and many rainfall-observation posts, used its own wireless links, and broadcast weather reports for Baghdad area half-hourly.

Telecommunications had, by the close of the period, reached a 206
high standard. Trunk land-lines had been overhauled, often duplicated and widely extended; automatic telephone exchanges

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[1] The bridges were built by Messrs. Holloway Bros.; earthwork on the Kirkuk-Arbil line was handled by Messrs. Balfour Beatty.

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Iraq MHl

[For information as to the international repercussion of the oil industry in Iraq, see 64: Shwadran Ml Middle East, category 116, pp. 194-250; 255-264.]

[For data on the organization, activities, royalties and exploitation of oil by the international oil companies operating in Iraq, see 64: Shwadran Ml Middle East, category 116, pp. 193-199; 201-216; 218-223; 233-235; 237-264; 276-281.]

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been 619
formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable as Qa'immaqam. 579 The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it 511
has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. 135
Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya 315
Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Nafṭchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Nafṭkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, 471 ●
significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. 433
There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver "Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

towards equality of treatment. Their own savagery had been in 619 part tamed by the severities of the 'nineties, and their shrine of Shaykh 'Adi was restored to them in 1907. Their Mir retained his authority and the friendless community their half-secret cult and practices; but there were signs of closer Government penetration after 1909. The application of conscription produced armed resistance in 1913, but a corrective visit of Turkish troops was not seriously opposed.

4. PROJECTS, BY LAND AND WATER

Far away from shabby, backward, and turbulent 'Iraq, Baghdad 499 Railway negotiations vitally affecting it continued as the century 648x opened. The results reached between the Deutsche Bank, the Anatolian Railways, and the Turkish Government were contained [471] in the Royal Irada of January 1902. This, re-cast in March 1903, revealed that the Germans had obtained excellent terms. A railway was to be built from Konia to the Persian Gulf, branches within 'Iraq were envisaged, financial provisions were generous, and a new Turkish company, the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, was to be formed.

The publication of the concession excited world-wide interest. The French, who in 1899 had agreed in principle to participate, now showed little enthusiasm. British co-operation was eagerly sought by the German promoters; but opinion in London, formerly indifferent or favourable to the project, was shocked now at the threat to India and to British interests in 'Iraq and the Gulf. The tide of opinion turned decisively against it, and Mr. Balfour was compelled, unwillingly, to announce British abstention. The Germans were bitterly disappointed. In Turkey itself the scheme had many critics; others favoured the project as one of hopeful development far beyond unaided Turkish capacity. In 'Iraq awareness of the enterprise grew slowly, and the same two bodies of opinion declared themselves: the one welcomed progress in any guise, the other dreaded foreign and Christian penetration.

The section Konia–Eregli was finished by October 1904 and the line prolonged to Bulgurlu, where it halted until 1909. In 1914 the Amanus tunnel was begun, the Euphrates bridged, and earth-work was proceeding towards Ras al-'Ayn. In the meanwhile other railway schemes had been propounded: a British line to run by Port Said, 'Aqaba, and Jawf to Baṣra, a French line to pass by Homs, Palmyra, and Dayr al-Zur to Baghdad and Mosul. Both were rejected by the Ottoman Government. German attempts to secure British support for their Bagdadbahn continued, only to be met by the reply, given in 1907, that opposition would cease if and when a Baghdad–Baṣra line was under all-British construction.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The infant oil industry in neighbouring Persia will be mentioned 315
later (p. 71). In 'Iraq, in spite of some enlargement of the primi- 471
tive extraction and refining plants at Qaiyara and elsewhere, no modern oilfield enterprise appeared. Nevertheless, the presence of important oil deposits in the Mosul and Baghdad wilayas was universally believed, and was affirmed by German visitors in 1907. The first move was the allotment of a twenty-metre strip of territory, athwart the railway alignment, to the Anatolian Railway in its 1902 and 1903 Conventions; the Sultan reaffirmed in December 1903 his previous Iradas declaring the Privy Purse to be sole owner of 'Iraq oil; and in July 1904 an option for exploration was given by that administration to the Baghdad Railway who passed it to the Deutsche Bank. It was not pursued, and after two renewals the option was treated by the Turks (though never by the Bank) as having lapsed.

Meanwhile W. K. D'Arcy, after gaining his Persian Concession 315
(p. 71), had sent a representative to Istanbul in 1901 and after 471
three years of negotiation and a ministerial promise that a con-
cession would later be forthcoming, firm application was made 648*
by his new-formed Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate. Success was almost achieved in 1908; but the revolution interfered, Royal Iradas retransferred Turkish oil rights to the Treasury, and all negotiators perforce started again. The latter by now included another British group associated with Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian, an able and progressive Armenian, and representatives of Admiral Chester, an American ex-officer with long-standing Turkish connexions and now a candidate for railway and mineral privileges.

The aspirants for 'Iraq oil development—for this was chiefly though not exclusively in question—regrouped and returned to the attack in 1910. In January 1911 Mr. Gulbenkian's group formed African and Eastern Concessions Ltd., with substantial holdings by the newly founded (British) National Bank of Turkey, the Shell interests, the Deutsche Bank, and Mr. Gulbenkian himself. The Company was late in 1912 renamed the Turkish Petroleum Company, with doubled capital, and the Deutsche Bank agreed to transfer to it the options which it claimed for railway-strip exploration. The D'Arcy interests, merged in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company since 1909, continued to press its candidature, which in 1913 again narrowly failed of success. Meanwhile, late in 1909, a Turkish Parliamentary Committee had voted for the grant of mineral rights on a 900 mile railway strip to Admiral Chester; and strong German opposition was needed to thwart his efforts to achieve ratification.

By 1913 the desirability of reconciling the rival applicants and enabling field work to commence was clear to all. Anglo-German

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

315 agreement on the diplomatic level was added to that of the Companies. 471 The Turkish Petroleum Company was again reorganized. A quarter of its capital was allotted to the Deutsche Bank, a quarter 648x to the Shell group, and a half to Anglo-Persian, with an interest of 5 per cent. to Gulbenkian. Confident application could now be made to the Grand Vizier, with the backing of both British and German Ambassadors. The result was a letter to these from Sa'id Ḥalim Pasha on 28 June 1914. It stated that the Minister of Finance agreed to lease to the T.P.C. all oil deposits discovered or to be discovered in the Mosul and Baghdad wilayas, and 'reserved the right later on to fix its own share, as well as the general terms of the Agreement'. Upon this letter, precisely, was based the application of the T.P.C. to the 'Iraq Government in 1923 for an oil concession to cover northern and central 'Iraq.

5. NEIGHBOURS AND FOREIGNERS

648x The increase in foreign interest and interests in 'Iraq during this period was rapid beyond precedent. It is explained by 'Iraq's more active participation in the nationalist movement, in Istanbul politics, and in educational foundations such as the Tribal College and the American University of Beirut; and it was aided by the railway and irrigation works projected and under execution, and the considerations of strategy and development suggested by them.

The Germans had, from 1900, included 'Iraq in their area of eastern expansion. They had taken the lead in archaeological work by nearly two decades of excavation by Koldewey at Babylon, and initiated excavation elsewhere in 'Iraq, for which their Consuls alleged the personal interest of the Kaiser. They founded a German school in Baghdad, and invited the French Carmelite fathers to teach German. They appointed a regular Consul in Baghdad in 1905 with his Vice-Consul at Baṣra, and planned a German-dominated quarter of the town with the Consulate, railway station, wharves, and Customs house. Since the earliest arrivals of German steamers at Baṣra in 1899, the subsidized traffic of these had steadily increased. The Hamburg-Amerika Line started regular sailings in 1906, to be followed by an influx of German commercial travellers and resident agents—notably the firm of Wonckhaus at Baṣra—and by the appearance of their goods in the Baghdad shops. 'Iraq, in fact, seemed destined to afford a stage for full German penetration.

Russian enterprise still kept to limited and uncommercial lines. Having failed at Kuwayt, they felt their way towards acquiring rights in a Persian port, and projected a trans-Persian railway; but the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 1907 helped to remove from these projects the element of menace to British interests in the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The railways, when at their greatest extent they were handed over by the Army in April 1920, consisted 496 of nearly 1,000 miles of track.[1] The absorption into the 'Iraq economy of this rapidly constructed and ill-equipped system, with its decrepit engines and rolling-stock and an alignment designed to serve military purposes, was to be no easy task. The Director in 1919–20 was Colonel G. Lubbock. The labour which the Railway used was, at this stage, almost entirely Indian.

The financial procedures for handing over to a Civil Administra- 000 tion the capital works constructed from Army funds were the subject of a mission sent to 'Iraq under Sir John Hewitt; the assets were valued at £2 million, excluding the Railway, and had mostly taken forms unrelated to civilian needs. The giant river fleet of the 505 (military) Inland Water Transport, on the other hand, was never 471 transferred to the Administration nor were its units sold locally by auction, as was the great mass of unneeded military stores. They were instead, amid storms of protest from the Civil Commissioner and 'Iraqi and British commercial interests, disposed of at Bombay by Lord Inchcape on behalf of the British Government. The civilian Tigris fleet was thereafter by degrees reduced to its pre-war scale. The Lynch (Euphrates and Tigris) Company had lost the *Julnar* and some minor craft, but in 1920 acquired the imposing *Zenobia* and *Zobaida* (both built in 1916), modernized its equipment and installations, and retained in operation the veteran *Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*, and the *Malamir* from their pre-war Karun service. The Lynch management of the E.T.S.N. Company's fleet was after 1919 merged in a fusion of their interests with those of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., forming the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation—'Mespers'—at Baghdad and Baṣra. Local competition on the river was no longer Government-organized, and most of the pre-war vessels had disappeared;[2] but it still handled an appreciable share of the traffic.

In the provincial Government, a close approximation to the 635 Turkish administrative units was retained. The Division repre- 631 sented usually the former sanjaq or liwā, and the District the qaḍhā, while the naḥiyas were little changed. The sixteen Divisions

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[1] The mileages of metre-gauge line were: Baghdad–Baṣra 352 miles, Baghdad–Persian frontier 130, Baghdad–Kut 158, Zubayr–Jabal Sanam 23, Ur–Naṣiriya 10, Qaraghan (on the Khaniqin line) to Kinqarban (outside Kifri) 23, with 36 miles in the port area of Baṣra and Ma'qil. The standard-gauge line, Baghdad–Sharqat, was of 186 miles; the narrow-gauge, Baghdad–Kifl 21, and Baghdad–Faluja 38.

[2] The *Baghdadi*, Asfar's *Étoile de l'Orient*, the *Furat*, the *Risafa*, and a number of German-owned launches of the Société de Transports Fluviaux, had been sunk by the Turks to block waterways and impede British operations. The *Basra* was sent to Europe but did not get farther than Malta. The *Barhaniya* and *Hamidiya* were blown up by the Turks to avoid capture. The *Baghdad* reached Mosul—the first steamer to do so—and was there captured by the British.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

496 two-metre-gauge systems (Baghdad–Basra and Baghdad–Kirkuk) remained a source of delay and trouble, and the floods of 1926 destroyed much railway property. But the reopening of Persian pilgrim traffic after 1924 brought welcome revenue to the railway. [464] The Indian labour disappeared in thousands year by year, replaced by 'Iraqis.

433 Industry in modern guise was slow to appear. Cotton-ginning and mechanical transport maintenance, ancillary to other forms of enterprise, have been mentioned. Of modern manufacture there was none, though various possibilities were often discussed. The future source, however, of the country's greatest single enterprise 315 and wealth advanced during these years from the conference-room 471 into the open: mineral oil.

648 The Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913–14 had allotted to Turkey, and therefore ultimately to 'Iraq, the western half of the Naftkhana border area south of Khaniqin; and the Turkish, and thus by inheritance the 'Iraqi, Government had accepted that this Transferred Territory should be treated as still included in the grant made to D'Arcy in 1901. Negotiations on this basis between the Anglo-Persian Company and the 'Iraqi Ministry of Works were concluded in 1925, and later reopened to produce a revised and modernized agreement in May 1926. Drilling had early located a producing well, followed by others, and it was decided to convey the crude oil by pipeline the twenty-mile distance to Khaniqin. The refinery which, with Government encouragement, the Company decided to erect at Alwand outside the town, but still within the Transferred Territory, was begun in June 1926. 'Iraq seemed thus assured of its own petroleum supply, with all the importance of this to mechanical transport, pump-irrigation, and perhaps future industries.

The Vizirial promise given to the Turkish Petroleum Company on 28 June 1914 had in the seven years following been first doubted but later affirmed by the Foreign Office. It was questioned but later accepted by the French who in 1920, under the Cadman–Berthelot agreement at San Remo, inherited the Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent. shareholding in the Company; and it was viewed askance by the Americans who demanded an Open Door to 'Iraqi development with no complication of old unratified promises. This diplomatic obstacle was removed by the allotment of half the Anglo-Persian share to a group of American companies by an agreement reached in principle in 1923, but not implemented formally until 1928. Thus the shares of the Company in its final form were held as to 5 per cent. as ever by Mr. Gulbenkian, and as to 95 per cent. equally between the Shell Group (as the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company), the Anglo-Persian (as the

Lt Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

D'Arcy Exploration Company), the French Government-sponsored 315 Compagnie Française des Pétroles, and the American companies 471 grouped *ad hoc* into the Near East Development Corporation. This 648 shareholding was unchanged thirty years later, except in the internal holdings within the American group, where the six early participants narrowed finally to two, the Standard Oil (New Jersey) and the Socony. The Turkish Petroleum Company approached the successor Government first in 1924 for a suitable implementation of Sa'id Ḥalim Pasha's promise. Discussions were prolonged, Government a hard bargainer, and the Company's ideal of an all-'Iraq 'blanket' concession impossible of realization. The agreement signed in March 1925 covered the whole of Mosul and Baghdad wilayas and, since Parliament did not yet exist, was ratified by the Council of Ministers and the King. It provided for exploration by the T.P.C. within a time limit, for the selection of limited plots for the Company's own exploitation, with the obligation to let the remaining territory pass for development into the hands of the highest bidders. The royalty payable on petroleum obtained was to be four shillings (gold) per ton. Upon these bases, later to be revised, geological work in the field could begin, with great energy and expense, before the end of 1925. Concentrating first upon the known seepages and visible surface structures of the southern districts of Mosul wilaya, the Company devoted 1926 to extensive exploration. It was accompanied by the making of roads, the laying of water and fuel pipelines, and the erection of buildings. Fifty British and 2,500 'Iraqis took part. Drilling sites were selected in the Jabal Ḥamrin, near Ṭuz Khurmatu, in the neighbourhood of Kirkuk, and near Qaiyara and south of Sharqaṭ on the right bank of the Tigris. Drilling was to begin early in 1927. The claims put forward by the heirs of the late Sultan Abd al-Ḥamid, a formidable body of Turkish princes and princesses, to the ownership of all the oil of the old Ottoman Empire, and much besides, were not then or later taken seriously in 'Iraq.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

494 were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into 499 the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty & Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932. A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the 'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The 'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a direct Baghdad–'Amman route, and the first experiments in developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

505 The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and road competition, and had little scope for development. The veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927, *Mejidieh* in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S.*16 and *S.*14 were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris* in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after 503 1929. At Baṣra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928–30. They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 20 feet in 1920) and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port 505 traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from Abadan, but the Shaṭṭ was used regularly also by the Strick, British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German) Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of 504 Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930 Treaty, was not yet in sight.

496 The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful. 471 Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1940) MHI Iraq MSG

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Air-
ways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air com-
munications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was com-
pleted in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for pack-
ages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold con-
cession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

185 Rutba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of
654 bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial develop-
135 ment proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its favour.
433 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

382 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil
471 export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in
● 1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the earning of royalties. The agreement once passed by Parliament, 312
at the cost of one ministerial resignation, the Company could 471
plan and execute its twofold desert pipeline and its mid-desert pump-stations: works which called for its utmost efforts, human and financial, for the next three years. These and the continuing field operations in Kirkuk area constituted by far the most important man-made enterprise of 'Iraq's long history and, it could be hoped, the most advantageous to its Treasury and public.

The internal structure of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was completed by the definite admission of its American shareholders, the Near East Development Corporation, in 1928. The I.P.C. fields headquarters in 'Iraq moved from Ṭuz Khurmatu to Kirkuk in 1931, while that of its pipelines was established at Haifa. The annual payments, of which Turkey received 10 per cent. under the 1926 Treaty (p. 156), were made in sterling at the Bank of England exchange rate as between gold and sterling.

The area of north-western 'Iraq released by the I.P.C. in 1931 was next year allotted by Government to the B.O.D. Company, a British group, with considerable Italian, German, and other foreign shareholding, which had tried vainly to acquire 'plots' under the I.P.C. Concession of 1925, and in 1929 had protested at Geneva against its exclusion. Inheriting the test-drilling results of the I.P.C. west of Tigris, the B.O.D. bound itself to pay in advance of production an annual dead rent of £100,000 (gold), rising to £200,000: to export a stated minimum of 1 million tons per year within a seven-year time limit: and to allot to Government without charge a fifth of its crude production in addition to the royalty of 4 shillings (gold) per ton. The Company proceeded forthwith to the further exploration of its territory, forming an operating company, Mosul Oil Fields, for the purpose.

The Anglo-Persian meanwhile, with its smaller concession in the Transferred Territories and its revised 1926 agreement (p. 174), formed the Khaniqin Oil Company as its subsidiary for production within 'Iraq, and completed its Alwand refinery near Khaniqin in May 1927, when King Fayṣal opened it. Thereafter north and central 'Iraq were supplied at favourable prices with petroleum products from this source; southern 'Iraq still drew from Abadan. A network of distribution facilities soon covered the territory; it was managed by the Rafidain Oil Company, an Anglo-Persian distribution company formed for the purpose. Drilling at the Nafṭkhana field was limited hereafter by the K.O.C. to its actual needs, and at Chiah Surkh, where it had been abandoned in 1904, 1912, and 1924, it was resumed in 1930; but production still proved impracticable.

The daily lives of more 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in 000

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

382 opening at Kirkuk in January 1935, its twin 12-inch pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli came into operation. This achievement marked the end of ten years of patient and well-directed work since the grant of the first concession, and by its employment of 'Iraqis in their thousands, its expansion of communications and the example which it offered of successful large-scale modern industry, it added great advantages for the 'Iraqi public to the direct enrichment of their Treasury. The gradually developing works in Kirkuk oilfields, the main depots at Bayji and Ḥaditha, the mid-desert pump-station townships with their connecting roads, pipeline, and telegraphs became a characteristic feature of the modern 'Iraqi scene, while its production, of 4 million tons of crude oil a year from 1935 onwards, placed the country immediately as the eighth oil-producing country of the world. The B.O.D. Company, whose shareholding was in these years predominantly Italian, German, and Franco-Swiss, soon found itself embarrassed by its obligation of annual payment to Government, and by its failure, in spite of an active drilling campaign from 1933 onwards, to discover other than viscous, scarcely marketable oil. The Company's plan in 1935 of diminishing their cash payments by building a Qaiyara–Tall Kochek railway, which could convey their oil to seaboard and link 'Iraq with the Turkish railway system, was after 477 hesitation rejected by Government. Their financial position grew desperate, and a reconstruction of their Board in 1936 marked the transfer of control of the Company to the I.P.C. group; and the latter emerged soon afterwards as outright owners of the B.O.D. and Mosul Oil Fields, with the disappearance of all non-British shareholding in it other than that of the I.P.C., French, and American constituents themselves. The problem of its viscous and sulphurous oil remained to be solved. The smaller Rafidain and Khaniqin Companies (p. 211) continued respectively their work of producing and refining oil in the Transferred Territories, and of marketing it throughout 'Iraq. The project of a Government-owned refinery, for which the I.P.C. concession provided, was conceived during this period but was to prove slow of realization.

499 Road-surfacing was among the uses of oil products in 'Iraq, but 494 neither this nor the too limited funds available could do much at present to provide the country with roads of high or even tolerable standard. Some further sections such as that from Ramadi to Ruṭba were metalled, others were indifferently or barely maintained, all were at worst passable; road maintenance, costly and inconspicuous, was given habitually a low priority in Government allotments. Traffic on the Najf–Madina route increased. The route from the Euphrates to 'Amman and Haifa developed as a powerful rival of the northern track to Beirut. The Rawanduz road, dis-

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to 563
whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were
established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and
were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured
the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the
return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which 439
had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Pro- 435
duce prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent, and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially
unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was 471
awarded by the Baṣra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs.
Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly
approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was
prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the
public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil
refinery. A concession for the oil of Baṣra wilaya—more strictly,
of all 'Iraq territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—
was granted in 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc*
creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing
the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a [453]
branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited 647
for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of
the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience, J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in 1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from the Financial Advisership in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on 649 ✓
bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia
and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial treaty was signed with the United States, though American Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman. Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary. The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

382 1951 be anticipated that the continued presence and enlarged operations of the oil companies would remain an outstanding economic and social advantage to the 'Iraqi people: that, especially after the destruction of the great oil industry of Persia by the action of its Government, 'Iraq's position as a supplier of crude petroleum must give it an international importance greater than ever before: but also that the minds and emotions of local patriots, for whom the Persian tragedy had no terrors and no lesson, would not abandon the demand for a 'nationalization' which might or might not (according to its form and manner) permit the continuance of the industry. It was indeed clear that the presence in 'Iraq of successful, wealthy, and well-organized European enterprises with their foreign control, high living standards, and concession-granted privileges must, however correct their conduct and however enlightened their policy, be offensive to the nationalist sentiment of at least one school of local politicians; and the period during which oil development on these lines might be able to continue could not, for all its enormous advantages to the country, be confidently foreseen.

65! 648 471 Meanwhile, to the 'Iraqi Treasury its receipts from oil sources were no longer a mere helpful supplement to other revenues but a main pillar of the Government itself and the foundation of all its hopes of development and improvement. The anxiety of 'Iraqi statesmen to derive still greater revenues from the oil industry than those provided in the 1925 or 1931 concessions—4 shillings (gold) per ton—and their claim that 'gold' should be translated into sterling at unofficial open-market rates led from 1947 to 1951 to repeated discussions between Government and Company. The gold question of which the Company, at 'Iraq's request, agreed in 1949 to allow settlement by a British Court rather than by arbitration, remained still unsettled when the period closed, with indications that the Baghdad Government intended still to press its full claims.[1] The question of royalty revision resulted in 1950 in a partly retroactive and conditional agreement to raise the 4 shillings gold per ton to 6 shillings gold; but this increase, immediately helpful as it was to the 'Iraq Treasury, was in turn to be superseded by further and long-drawn negotiations based on a new principle of half-and-half division of the profits: a principle which, first announced by the Arabian-American Company in Sau'di Arabia on the last day of 1950, could not but abruptly supersede all less favourable terms enjoyed by neighbouring countries. Conversations on this basis were in progress in Baghdad between Company

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[1] These might amount to some £20 million sterling. Agreement upon a compromise figure (£5 million) was reached by the negotiators in 1951, but did not form part of the settlement ratified by Parliament early in 1952.

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Government throughout the first half of 1951 and were to 651
embrace the production obligations of all the companies operating 648
in 'Iraq and the royalties or taxes expected from them.[1] Under the 471
influence of the 'nationalization' movement—but in more moderate form than the brutal self-mutilation of Persia—the 'Iraq Government decided in 1951 to nationalize the refining and distribution of its oil in so far as this was consumed in 'Iraq itself: the operation, that is, of the Khaniqin and Rafidain Oil Companies. Negotiations with these and with Anglo-Iranian, their parent, led to agreement on the basis that the Companies were to transfer their plant and assets to the State at a valuation, and to remain for ten years as operating agents on its behalf.

The Port of Baṣra in the period 1946–50 maintained and sub- 504
stantially improved its services—wharves and sheds, cranes and machinery—and, in spite of the increased cost of labour and supplies, could show a profit on each year's operations. It continued annually to pay off its capital debt, completing that process in 1951. It maintained and largely increased its electric-power and water supplies to Baṣra city. The airport, with its wireless service and its enlarged hotel, remained Port property. The dredging-depot at Fao was extended, an all-weather road constructed to link it by land to Baṣra. A shore depot was built at Ḥarmaq, opposite Abadan. The traffic using Ma'qil wharves decreased abruptly from the level of the previous five war years, but the tanker traffic of the Anglo-Iranian increased, until the spring of 1951, more than sufficiently to compensate for this. The development of a subsidiary port at Umm Qaṣr, on the Khur 'Abdullah, was a

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[1] The new Oil Agreement, based on acceptance in August 1951 of the principle of equal division of profits between Government and Company, was ratified by Parliament in February 1952, and made retroactive to 1 January 1951. With the probable initial through-put (in a full year) of the 30-inch line (some 14 to 15 million tons a year) additional to the existing through-put (nearly 8 million) of the 12-inch and 16-inch lines to Tripoli, 'Iraq's revenues from this source were expected—on existing cost and price bases—to surpass £30 million in 1952 and to reach £60 million in 1955. Minimum production was agreed at 22 million tons a year (for I.P.C. and M.P.C. combined) from 1954 onwards, and 8 million from B.P.C. from the end of 1955. Government was assured that its receipts would be not less than a quarter of the seaboard value of I.P.C. and M.P.C. crude oil, and a third of that of B.P.C. Fluctuation of costs and of world oil prices was to be taken into account in ascertaining the divisible 'profits', and Government might, if it wished, take in kind 12½ per cent. of the crude produced, and either dispose of it or sell it back to the Companies. A large part of the balance of Government's revenue was to be received in the form of income tax. Minimum receipts to Government, guaranteed subject only to *force majeure*, were to be £20 million sterling in 1953 and 1954, and £25 million in 1955 and thereafter; in the event of a physically unavoidable failure in production a smaller minimum would be payable for two years. The Agreement covered in addition the doubling of 'Iraqi representation on the Boards of the Companies, restrictions on the appointment of non-'Iraqis to positions in the Companies, an increase (up to fifty per year) of 'Iraqis maintained in British universities for higher studies, and the extension of technical education organized by the Company in Kirkuk fields.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI.

PART IV.—EXISTING CONDITIONS.

MIRI LAND (STATE DOMAIN)

1–4. General Situation

1. As ordinarily used in el 'Iraq the term miri land, or State Domain, 423 embraces the entire land surface of the country with the exception of land registered as owned in mulk or held on tapu tenure, the extent 471 of which is unknown. Of the compound total some 78,000 square kilometres is estimated to be occupied by scattered cultivation, and about another 15,000 square kilometres to be capable of cultivation (see Plates I and II and Table I). In the former figure are included the previous Ottoman Crown Estates, which comprised some of the most valuable land in the country. These estates were originally managed by a special estate service (El Dairet el Saniya). The administration, by common repute that has survived both in Palestine and el 'Iraq, was good. These estates were subsequently termed mudawara Lands, apparently because they were "turned over" to the civil administration after the Turkish revolution of 1908. They have since lost their separate identity and become merged in the general category of cultivated miri land, although, of course, their previous circumstances may have to be taken into account when considering the position of the present holders of such lands.

It is desirable at the outset to recognise that the huge agglomeration thus grouped under the name miri, or State Domain, reflects no real uniformity in legal status, customary practice, or actual treatment. Thus, while it is accurate and informative to speak of mulk ownership or of tapu tenure, there is no such thing as miri* tenure in law and an unknown variety of things in practice. Miri land simply represents the overwhelming residue of the country not held in mulk or on tapu tenure. It is none the less reasonable and convenient to maintain this elastic, if negative, category at least provisionally. For it accords with accepted tradition and statutory law (*a*) to regard the State as the basic landlord of all land other than mulk (and its derivative true waqf) and (*b*) to recognise that, whatever the rights of holders of miri land may be, they fall short of those of a duly registered mutasarrif of tapu land. But the powers of the State as such a landlord must evidently be exercised with most careful regard to the history of the land and to over-riding considerations of an equitable, economic and administrative nature, if they are to prove admissible in practice.

The general management and control of miri land, legally vested in 647 the State, is nominally entrusted to the State Domains Section (qism 423 el amlak el amiriya) of the Ministry of Finance, until recently the State Domains Department of the late Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture. Some such central State Domains Office is essential; while the keenness and public spirit that I encountered in this service cannot be too fully recognised. But the Department was quite inadequately staffed and equipped to discharge even the practicable part of its colossal titular duties. Actually in the prevailing absence of intelligible maps and

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* Using the term in its customary local, as opposed to its legal, connotation (see iii. 1).

Egypt MRI

000 E 651 absence of all data on which such an estimate could be dependably based. But the lessons of the Egyptian experience in the conduct of its parallel revenue settlement should not be overlooked. The Egyptian revenue settlement was initiated by Decree dated February 9th, 1879. It was not completed until 1906. The statistics of the progress achieved during these twenty-seven years are instructive. In the first nine the work was an entire failure because it was attempted without a proper basis of land survey. During the following four years it was abandoned in despair. In the next seven years a quarter of the country was done with the aid of an indifferent sectional survey. In 1898 a unified and effective national Survey was at length recognised as indispensable. In the succeeding eight years the remaining three-quarters of the country was finished, and the quality of the work improved even more than the speed, as sound technical methods were introduced and enabled improvements in the general procedure of the settlement to be adopted. It will thus be seen that owing to the initial failure to appreciate the fundamental necessity of a scientifically sound and appropriate cadastral survey, the revenue settlement of Egypt occupied twenty-seven years whereas its final progress shows that it could have been completed in ten.[*] It will be remembered that the Turkish legislators had also recognised before the war the necessity of a foundation of reliable cadastral survey for land tenure throughout the Ottoman Empire (iii, 3).

E 651 471 I 651 471 Now while the land surface to be dealt with in el 'Iraq is much greater than in Egypt the individual parcels requiring investigation and settlement will be many fewer although no doubt appreciably larger in extent on the average. Thus three and one third million individual holdings were recorded during the revenue settlement of Egypt, a number which considerably exceeds the total population of el 'Iraq. On a comparable basis the number of individual holdings in the latter might be expected to be about 800,000. As the population is still so largely nomadic half a million is probably nearer the true figure. (See also ii, 4 and Table V).

000 Although the fuller benefit of a settlement of rights was not practicable in Egypt at the time, owing to various reasons, the procedure was similar: but unfortunately no deductions can be drawn therefrom as to the speed of settlement of rights in el 'Iraq, because all the conditions in Egypt were so different.

4. THE MAIN PROBLEM OF TENURE

I 423 471 4. As we have already seen, the land surface of el 'Iraq is more literally than in most similar cases a vast national estate. The extent of land held in private ownership (mulk) is small, and although it is intrinsically important, its legal position is clear and its regulation presents few difficulties. Probably four-fifths of the cultivable area of the country is in law fully and freely owned by the State and when cultivated held in practice under the general administrative control of its representatives. And even the legal ownership (raqaba) of the balance is vested in the State although, subject to important conditions, its usufructuary possession is held on a permanent heritable and assignable tenure. This tenure (known commonly as tapu) is that applicable under the provisions of the Land Code to all State land. The Ottoman Administration persistently sought to give effect to these provisions, but failed to do so because the successful operation of this tenure is impossible without an accompaniment of effective survey and land registration,

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[*] See Paper 5. Egyptian Government Commission on Registration of Title to Land. 1917-21. Government Press. Cairo.

which the Administration were unable to provide. And even if this 1123
radical defect had been remedied the application of this advanced 471
tenure would have been premature throughout the majority of the country. So that to-day—more than half a century after the introduction of the Ottoman Land Code in the country—only a fraction of the cultivated region is somewhat uncertainly held on tapu tenure, while throughout the overwhelming balance, land is for the most part occupied and cultivated on no legal tenure at all.

The injurious effects of the prevailing welter of insecurity and con- 185
fusion both on agricultural productivity and on public order have been emphasised in the body of this report and are too well known to need repetition. The main problem of land tenure may therefore be summarised as the need to establish security and clarity of tenure everywhere by a general definition and settlement on a clear legal basis of both statutory and equitable rights to land. The broad objective should be to confirm and maintain beneficial occupation and use, whenever this is reconcilable with the equitable treatment of third parties and the just interests of the public.

It is very understandably urged that the proper course is to extend tapu tenure generally throughout the cultivated territory, subject of course to the requisite clarification of that tenure and its adaptation to national requirements. Excellent as the chief characteristics of tapu tenure are, and advantageous as the suggested course may prove ultimately to be, this is too ambitious a plan to be practicable at present. It is what the Ottoman Government attempted and failed to do, and the causes for their failure must be remedied before that attempt can be successfully repeated. This was implicitly recognised by the Turks themselves some years before the war in a provisional law already cited. No useful purpose will be served by examining here the prospects of practical success of this now defunct measure. But it is certain that it is beyond the present capacity of el 'Iraq to establish the detailed cadastral survey and land register of the requisite accuracy and authority. And without these accompaniments any ostensible general introduction of tapu tenure would be to grasp an attractive shadow in preference to the substance of a solid and attainable reform. To place even the admitted rights to tapu tenure on an intelligible and proper basis will be a most difficult and lengthy undertaking.

Occasional and sporadic grants of miri land in tapu tenure can, of course, be made and implemented in due course if special justification arises and special efforts are taken. But no general grant of tapu tenure can be made effective for many years to come. And while islands of secure tenure and good culture are most valuable, it is the establishment of a general reform giving security of tenure to the mass of existing landholders and cultivating tenants, which is needed to stimulate enterprise and development throughout the length and breadth of the country and thereby promote economic revival on a national scale.

A hardly less important accompanying reform is the establishment of a uniform and equitable basis for land revenue collection. Here again the Turkish administrator perseveringly sought to establish in his land tax (werko) a measure admirable in principle and conception. But here again he was unable to translate his measure effectively and generally from the Statute book to the land. And here again no far-reaching or solid success is practicable in the absence of a reliable land survey, or without a general settlement of rights and a methodical valuation of the land, as was also ultimately recognised by the Ottoman Government.

and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would 423
be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of
holdings, small or large, held in undisputed possession and free
from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort
of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these
unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon
the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare
and contentment of the people as a whole.

Put very briefly, with the exception of small areas, mainly in 423
Northern Iraq, together with some smaller areas of a few yet 471
hopefully significant State-sponsored schemes of land settlement,
the bulk of the cultivated land of Iraq is in the possession of large
landowners. Some of them may not enjoy the holding of this land
by confirmed legal right but, to all intents and purposes, they own
it and derive immense incomes from it. Others, by legal process,
the validity of which is disputed by land reformers, have gained
possession of lands which were formerly held in common
tribal use.

These landowners, or landholders, are usually sheikhs or 471
absentee urban landlords who let the land to share-tenants through 427
a hierarchy of lessees or agents, at the bottom of which is the
landless cultivator who gets an incredibly small share of the produce
of his labour. Indeed, the actual cultivator under this invidious
system of share-cropping may get anything from ten per cent to
thirty per cent of the produce of the land which he works, most
of the remainder going to the large landowners, agents or owners
of irrigation pumps. The situation may vary from landlord to
landlord, and very occasionally the actual cultivator is said to
share fifty per cent of the produce. In general, however, the [565]
position of the Iraqi countryside is one of great extremes of wealth
and poverty. The landowner may live in a sumptuous style with
a town house and country palace, while the peasant cultivator
may live under conditions of poverty or near-destitution.

It is not possible in this study to attempt more than an outline 471
of the causes and effects of this situation. It arose partly out of 423
ancient confusion of titles which meant that, with the break-up 425
of the tribal system, the most powerful member of the tribe was
able to appropriate for his own purposes land which was originally
intended for the common good of the tribe. It is due partly to the
faulty application of the Ottoman Land Code under which,
because the small cultivator was not strong enough to establish
his rights of title, these rights fell to the sheikh. The profits derived
from the Persian Gulf grain trade in the late 19th and early
20th centuries gave a further impetus to what has been described
as 'this wholesale land grabbing'. Finally, with the development

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423 of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators
425 were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the
small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of
[563] cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator
into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains
that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from
whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and
which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization
is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners
appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants
than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping
peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty
which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

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642 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, 185
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultiv- 425
ation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intellig- 185
ently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their
contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 423
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 511
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 565
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of 166
living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

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In this paper we shall deal mainly with the first set of problems; that is, the problems that concern the establishment of an efficient and expanding industry in Iraq; we shall only touch casually upon the social and political problems arising therefrom. This limitation is necessary to simplify treatment of the subject and it in no way implies an underrating of the social effects of industrialisation. Further, I have limited this article to a consideration of the problems of only one out of three types of industry. These are: 000 471

(a) Industries wholly or partially owned and managed by private individuals.

(b) Publicly owned and managed industries, such as the Iraqi State Railway workshops, armament factories and workshops, and the various light, power and watersupply companies owned and run by local authorities.

(c) Industries owned and managed by foreign enterprise holding a concession or monopoly from the State. Outstanding examples of this type of activity are the oil companies and the Baghdad Light and Power Co. Ltd.

Our treatment will center round the first type of industrial activity, that is private competitive industry, but many of the observations made upon this type are likely to throw light on the problems of other types of industry. 000

(1) **Financial and Entrepreneurial Problems:** It is often said that the main obstacle to industrialisation of under-developed areas is the lack of financial resources and the scarcity of local capital. This is only partially true. Many under-developed areas own a great deal of liquid wealth held in the form of cash deposits, or gold and silver hoards.[1] The difficulty is to induce the *investment* of this wealth in *industry*. This difficulty can only be solved by first making industrial investment possible, and then more attractive than other avenues for investment. Unless the banking system and the money market are so organized as to make it relatively safe and remunerative, as well as possible, for capital to be invested in

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[1] It has been estimated for instance by the Clapp Mission in 1948 (The United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East - *Final Report*, Parts I and II, Lake Success, N.Y., 1949) that hoarded capital in Syria alone amounts to some $ 150,000,000. No estimates are available for Iraq.

464 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are
472 employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary,
473 sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net
profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country.[1]

648 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation**: Except where foreign enter-
457 prise has obtained a concession for the development of important
471 resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the
Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation
648 which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enter-
656 prise. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipu-
471 lates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi

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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

nationals in order that industry may qualify for the concessions 648 granted by that law. This may appear as a discrimination against [656] foreign capital and some foreign industrialists have raised this 477 point. But considering the great concessions granted by the Law, including the appropriation of state land, and the smallness of the majority reserved for nationals, the "discrimination" is nominal. Past experience of foreign capital investment in the Middle East does not allow the removal of such safeguards. However, the writer believes that proper legislation on these three points mentioned above would give foreign industrialists sufficient assurance; and, given the proper information and contacts, many firms may be induced to establish branches in Iraq to the benefit of all concerned.[1]

7. **Other problems** : There are other less important industrial 433 problems which should be mentioned even though limitations of 471 space prevent full discussion of them.

(a) It should be realized that Iraqi industry labours under a heavy burden of over-capitalization which adds to its costs. There is a tendency to have completely integrated plants; most industries have to maintain a power generating plant either to provide electricity, or as a spare in case of failure in the city supply. Practically all industries have their own workshops. There is a strong desire on the part of all industry owners to be self-sufficient with regard to supply of materials, chemicals and spare parts. Many industries have been induced to purchase more land than they actually need in order to guard against future needs and also to profit from the expected rise in land values. This has led to an insufficient utilization of machinery and to a great amount of working capital, per unit of production, locked up. These facts are reflected in the balance sheets of many industries in the form of Loans from Banks (commercial banks) which in some cases reach 50 per cent of nominal capital and thus increase the fixed charges which industry has to meet. The reason for this desire on the part of industrials to be more or less completely self-sufficient lies in the fact that, owing to the country's industrial immaturity, it is often impossible to rely on efficient service from outside plants when required. The need to keep great stores of

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[1] In accordance with the economic boycott enforced by Arab States, firms having business relations with Israel are excluded.

433 materials and spare parts is due to many factors. First is past
471 experience of the difficulty of obtaining such materials, due either to Iraq's distance from international markets, or to the shortages of world supply, or to the arbitrary attitude of suppliers abroad. Secondly, the fear of interruption of supplies owing to international emergencies and restrictions in the countries of origin. Thirdly, the influence of directors or big share-holders who own agencies for such materials or spare parts.

433 (b) There is great scope in Iraqi industry for improvement in the layout of machinery, flow of material, lighting, noise abatement, and temperature control.

466 (c) The problems of labour recruitment and organisation, systems of wage payment, housing and workers' welfare in general, fall outside the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say that present labour legislation provides for weekly and annual holidays, for compensations in cases of injury or total loss of life, and prohibits the employment of children under twelve years. Industry is subject to inspection by officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs for the purpose of enforcing the labour laws. The formation of trade unions is permitted under the law, but so far labour organisations have played very small part in industry.

433 (8) **State Assistance and Control**: The main characteristics of in-
654 dustry in Iraq should by now be clear. It is of a recent development. It has developed largely under state protection and assistance. It has to operate within a very small market. The fact that industry is still in its infancy makes it hard to predict its future course. The part which government assistance has so far played in its development is of special importance and calls for examination. State assistance has taken various forms; tariff protection, exemptions from various taxes and duties, and financial aid through the Industrial Bank. Except possibly in the last case, government assistance to industry has not been based on any criteria of efficiency, or economic or social objectives. Any firm can obtain the benefits of state encouragement as long as it fulfills two conditions only; that it will use raw materials available in Iraq, or that it will produce goods imported in large quantities. It is necessary, if industry is not to grow lax behind the high walls of protection, to set up standards of efficiency, and to relax protective measures such as the prohibition of competitive imports, as soon as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized. Benefits under

433 as 60,000 people are engaged in industrial production (other than oil), virtually all of these are employed in small undertakings where the work is largely done by hand and productivity is accordingly quite low. Probably only about 2,000 are working in what might be characterized as modern industrial plants.

654 Fortunately prospective increases in government revenues
651 from oil now make it possible for the government to undertake a
382 large-scale program for the development of the country. Past investments in the oil industry will in the future yield large dividends in the form of a rapidly increasing production of petroleum.
[471] In accordance with an agreement reached in August 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq have undertaken to raise oil output, which amounted to only about six million tons in 1950, to 30 million tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraqi government half of the profits before the deduction of taxes. On this basis it is anticipated that, over the next five years, the governmen may receive net revenues amounting to as much as 214 million dinars from oil alone. Under the terms of a law passed in 1950 these revenues will be available to finance development. They will be assigned to the Development Board, an autonomous agency established in 1950 to ensure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs.

652 In the past, financial stringencies have severely limited public expenditures. The government has often had difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays had to be kept small; government salaries were not raised in accordance with the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds. In the future the situation will be reversed. The principal task will be to find ways and means of spending rapidly increasing revenues in a manner which will contribute most effectively to the permanent development of the country. It is with this task in view that the Mission has drawn up its recommendations.

180 Any program for realizing the economic potentialities of the country should be broad in conception and well balanced. Investment outlays in dams and irrigation works, transport facilities and industrial plants must be complemented by increased expenditures

407 Administration, an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Eco-
475 nomics. The AMA rents this machinery to farmers and, in addi-
427 tion, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery,
647 licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited
supply of spare parts in order to prevent black-marketing.

Some provision for rental of machinery, whether by the government or by private enterprise, will be necessary for some time, partly because it enables farmers to become acquainted with the value of such machinery and partly because many farmers do not have sufficient capital for outright purchase. As long as private enterprise is incapable of providing this service at reasonable rentals or until cooperatives can be established, continuation of the government rental service appears essential. On the whole, therefore, the AMA's three-year program to replace and expand its machinery park and to equip repair shops appears desirable despite the obvious drawbacks of government operation. At present, however, the AMA is operating at a substantial loss. In the calendar year 1951, for instance, its rental income will probably not exceed ID 50,000 compared with estimated operating costs, including depreciation, of about ID 150,000. Since the beginning of 1950, when it started operations as a fiscally autonomous agency, it has had to cover its deficits out of the ID 500,000 capital which the government undertook to provide. While the government should probably defray that part of the AMA's expenditures not directly attributable to the rental operations, the overall deficit should be reduced by gradually increasing rental charges. Rental charges on tractors, in particular, appear unduly low and may be depriving private persons of the incentive to purchase tractors either for their own use or for rental to others.

407 Since the overhead costs of the AMA's rental operations will
● 471 probably always remain rather high and its machinery must be
647 transported over considerable distances, it is important that the
government encourage as much as possible private purchase and
[452] operation of machinery. The extension of credit for this purpose
appears essential. At present, however, the Agricultural Bank
cannot lend money on farm equipment partly because it is short
of funds and partly because such loans would not afford sufficient
security in the absence of any legal requirement to register title
TO MACHINERY.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

to machinery. In the future cooperative ownership and operation, especially in the new settlement areas, should be encouraged as one of the best means of extending the use of machinery on a practicable and economical basis. The experience of the Dujaila cooperative, which, owing to low overhead and transport costs, rents machinery to its members at rates lower than those of the AMA and yet is apparently able to cover the cost of depreciation, seems promising in this respect. 407 471● 647

Lack of repair facilities and spare parts have greatly handicapped mechanization. The government is seeking to overcome this difficulty both by establishing its own repair shops and by requiring importers to provide repair facilities and maintain minimum stocks of spare parts. Such centrally located shops will be available, however, only for major repairs. Since local repair facilities are now almost wholly lacking, steps should also be taken to establish a considerable number of small shops equipped to undertake minor repairs. In addition, courses designed to train drivers in elementary maintenance are urgently needed. The cost of mechanization will remain discouragingly high unless the life of machinery is prolonged by more adequate maintenance and repair. 407 445

3. Soil-building and Forage Crops: Fertilizers

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The cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is virtually unknown even though the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished and an improvement in feed supply would make the greatest single contribution to an increase in the low productivity of livestock. In the irrigation zone berseem clover, sown in the grain stubble in late summer, would provide a particularly good pasture, soiling and hay crop. In the rain-fed region winter oats and vetch, when cut and cured, would provide a good reserve feed. In the irrigation zone quick-growing crops such as millet could be grown for summer pasture; and more corn, sorghum and legumes such as cowpeas and mungo beans should be cultivated.

Little fertilizer is used and animal manure is generally collected and dried for use as fuel. With the expanding cultivation of crops such as cotton, the use of fertilizer is becoming more urgent. There is need for soil analysis and extensive experimentation to ascertain the fertilizer requirement and the effect of fertilizer on 241

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

080 The Mission has carefully considered what industries might be expanded and what new industries might be established. It has sought to confine its recommendations for industrial development to those industries where there is reasonable prospect of efficient production, competitive with imports, and where production is within the technical capacity available in Iraq, supplemented, where necessary, by outside technical and managerial assistance.

Petroleum and Refining

135 No recommendations need be made on the oil industry. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons and those of the less well 382 explored fields near Basra offering perhaps equal promise. The development of these resources by the oil companies is proceeding [166] along sound lines. The oil companies have also been well in advance of other enterprises in providing housing, health services, and other amenities for their employees, in instituting labor training schemes and providing better pay for workers. The Mission realizes that there has been some criticism in Iraq of the rate of development, particularly in the Basra field. The expenditure of close to £90,000,000 by the oil companies on oil development in Iraq is now, however, beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Production in recent years might have been much greater if the outbreak of the war with Israel had not resulted in closing the pipeline to Haifa and in preventing the completion of another pipeline [315] to that city. The existing line has a capacity of 2,000,000 tons and the projected line would have added another 4,000,000 tons. As already indicated, the government has recently obtained a commitment by the oil companies to increase output, which was a little less than 6,000,000 tons in 1950, to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955. It would not be advantageous to Iraq, however, to have production increased to such levels that the ensuing rise in oil revenues cannot in fact be effectively spent. Oil in the ground is a reserve for the future, and too rapid tapping of this reserve may entail a partial waste of resources.

382 The government has decided to build a modern oil refinery
471 near Baghdad which it anticipates will cost about £7,000,000. This refinery will use crude oil supplied from the Kirkuk fields at cost. With an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons, it will be able to supply

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for some time. This decision 382 reflects an understandable desire on the part of Iraq to have a 471 modern refinery of its own, replacing the somewhat inadequate and rather old Alwand refinery at Khanaqin which is owned by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and is capable of supplying not quite 70 percent of Iraq's current requirements.[8] Foreign management of the new refinery will probably be necessary, at least for an initial period. The project will make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery and probably also the small oil field near the Iranian border from which it draws its crude. This field probably cannot be developed on a scale large enough to warrant investment in the pipelines necessary to export the oil.

Expansion of Old Industries

Some industries are now expanding without government finan- 423 cial assistance. The cement plant and the brewery are both doubling their capacity. Recent improvements and expansion have put the woolen industry abreast of the country's needs. Other industries do not for the present require expansion. Flour milling capacity, for instance, appears ample. The tanneries also appear to have sufficient capacity, but to raise the quality of their raw material supply, technical assistance is needed to improve methods of flaying and preserving hides.

Still other industries could usefully be expanded but do not have sufficient financial resources to do so without government assistance. The cotton and rayon textile factories in Baghdad and [288] Mosul might well double their designed capacity and extend their facilities to make a wider range of products. At present cotton textile capacity can meet only about a quarter of the country's requirements. Since ample raw material is available and costs of production can become competitive with those abroad, further expansion would appear to be warranted. In its regular budget for [471] 1951-52 the government has provided ID 1,000,000 for a government textile mill. The Mission believes, however, that government ownership and operation would not be desirable and that it would be vastly preferable to extend capacity with the participation of private capital and enterprise.

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[8] By an agreement reached in December, 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

317 The exploitation of salt deposits may ultimately prove to be another industrial possibility. A salt dome known to exist near Basra might provide large quantities of salt for both export and domestic consumption and might make possible the establishment of an alkali plant, for which the gas from the nearby oil field could furnish cheap power. The Mission therefore suggests that core drilling of this dome be undertaken in order to appraise its commercial possibilities.

433 In the process of industrial development the host of small enterprises which account in the aggregate for a considerable output should not be neglected. Among these are shops engaged in tire retreading, reclamation of lube oil, battery and electrical repair work, automotive and machinery repair, wood-working, etc. Many of them could be assisted to improve their production through installation of power-operated tools and other equipment.

In starting new plants and expanding old ones it is important that capital charges be kept at a minimum by arranging for maximum possible utilization of the installed equipment. This involves the employment of as many shifts as possible, the use of machines at maximum working speed and, above all, the use of purchased power. In the past, industrial plants have added unnecessarily to their capital overhead by installing their own power plants. Such plants usually prove costly since they operate only part of the time. Single plants catering to both industrial and lighting needs are
365 more economical because of a high and steady load factor. In order to induce industries to purchase power, however, the price of electricity for industrial use will need to be reduced. Such a reduction could be achieved in Baghdad, the principal industrial center, particularly if steps were taken to relieve the Baghdad Light and Power Company from the heavy burden of sharing its profits with the Iraq government and also having its profits taxed by the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, such as in Mosul, a reduction in power prices depends on more efficient management.

Financing of Industrial Development

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471 The Mission believes that complete government ownership of industry should be adopted only where absolutely necessary. In general it will prove necessary only where private capital is not available either because the contemplated investment is too large,

or because the investment is in a new and untried field which does 433
not for the moment appeal to private capital. For the chemical plant 471
proposed by the Mission the latter would probably be the case. The
government apparently is also furnishing all of the capital for the
oil refinery. Wherever complete government ownership is considered necessary, it would be desirable to have the Development Board act as the government's agent in putting up the necessary capital.

On the other hand, the existing Industrial Bank should be used 453
as the agency for giving needed assistance to industry in all cases 433
where the need is for expansion of present capacity or where there
is a prospect of private participation in establishing new industries. This Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951 it had outstanding loans totaling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicaped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests therefore that the Development Board provide the means for gradually increasing the Bank's capital by about ID 5,000,000 which the Bank would be authorized to use for the making of loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an overall program approved by the Development Board.

Aside from making loans for production facilities, the Indus- 453
trial Bank could assist industry by financing the construction of a 488
bonded warehouse at Baghdad, so that credit could be extended on
materials stored therein. The absence of such warehousing facilities has caused a chronic shortage of working capital in most industrial enterprises, for under existing conditions much of their capital is tied up in stocks of supplies.

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving 453
fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares 433
whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and therefore capable of
attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to maintain a reserve against possible

majority needs substantial improvement. The Department of 364 Municipalities has drawn up a five-year program to provide or 365 extend water supply systems for 114 municipalities with a total population of 943,000 people. Since such water systems are technically simple and the need is great, the Mission suggests that the Department be authorized to proceed with this program. Water supply systems for villages must, of course, be simple and inexpensive. In some cases, wells may prove to be the solution, although frequently brackish water is encountered; in other cases, water piped from a stream or canal with the help of a small pump and run through simple filters may be possible.

Outside of Baghdad and Basra municipal power plants are 365 generally inadequate, and a considerable number of municipalities 377 with a total population of 175,000 have no electricity at all. Baghdad and Basra, which together account for a generating capacity of 51,000 kilowatts, have a sufficient supply; and Kirkuk is adequately supplied from the large power plant of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Total generating capacity available in the remaining municipalities, however, is only 14,000 kw. A program for the expansion of this capacity and the provision of electricity for all municipalities would involve the installation of generators with an aggregate capacity of 10,000 kw. It would be desirable to proceed with such a program, provided simultaneous steps were taken to improve the management of municipally-owned power plants outside Baghdad and Basra. In these two cities the power plants are owned and man- [471] aged efficiently by a private company and the Port respectively. At present the machinery in the plants of other municipalities is poorly maintained and little or no attention is paid to depreciation. Power "losses" are as high as 36 percent compared to not more than eight percent in Baghdad and Basra; and the rates charged range from 30 to 55 fils[4] per kw-hr as contrasted with 18 fils and less in Baghdad and Basra. To remedy these evident deficiencies it is recommended that serious consideration be given to entrusting the management of such plants to a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company.

The Mission does not believe that it would be economic to 371 develop hydroelectric power at present. The capital cost of hydro-

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[4] One dinar equals one thousand fils.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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TABLE 2

CULTIVABLE LAND, CROPPED LAND AND LAND IN AGRICULTURE USE
(in millions of donums)

CULTIVABLE AREA		48.1
Irrigation zone	32.1	
Rain-fed zone	16.0	
AREA ACTUALLY IN CROPS		11.1
By area		
Irrigation zone	7.6	
Rain-fed zone	3.5	
By type of crop		
Winter	8.4	
Summer	1.9	
Orchards	0.8	
AREA UNDER CULTIVATION		17.5

These figures would indicate that the area under cultivation, 311 taking into account the assumption that almost half of the area devoted to winter crops is normally left fallow, is only about 36 percent of the total cultivable area. In the rain-fed zone the area under cultivation could theoretically be more than doubled; and in the irrigation zone it could be almost tripled. Unquestionably these figures give a somewhat exaggerated impression for it is likely that the criteria employed in classifying land as cultivable have been rather liberal, but there is little doubt that the area under cultivation can be greatly extended. What would be required in detail to put this additional cultivable land in actual use is not known, but, in the irrigation zone, water and drainage are undoubtedly the prime prerequisites while, in the rain-fed zone, more manpower and machinery may be the principal requirements.

Forms of Land Tenure

Land is held under a complicated system of tenure which has 423 given rise to much confusion and conflict. In accordance with tra- 471 ditional legal concepts the state has retained the ultimate legal title to nearly all the available land. Absolute private ownership, known as *mamloukah* or *mulk*, is confined to urban property and orchards. Rights to the permanent usufructuary possession of a large proportion of state or *miri* land have been acquired by private

423 471 individuals, however, under conditions which are virtually indistiguishable from full private ownership, since the holdings may be sold, mortgaged or transferred to successors. In the past, claims to land were established in most cases quite informally without the benefit of full legal sanction, i.e., by simply occupying the land. Tribal lands were generally regarded as being held in common. As, however, the tribes were converted from nomadic pursuits to settled agriculture, the sheikhs and sub-sheikhs of the tribe gradually established a claim to such lands as their own property and thus became landlords, with their tribesmen as sharecropping tenants.

423 In the 19th century the Turkish government sought to establish a single legal system of tenure, known as *tapu,* but in the end this effort only compounded the confusion. There were no systematic grants of *tapu* tenure. Grants were generally made without any examination of conflicting claims and were used as a means of rewarding the favored few. The grants that were made at that time to the Sadun clan and a few other influential persons in Muntafiq province remain contested to this day by the actual occupiers of the land. With the introduction of *tapu* tenure many village areas in the North apparently were registered in whole or in part as the personal possession of local notables or *aghas* who in the past had acted as tax farmers and served generally as intermediaries between the government and the cultivators. In the twentieth century a further complication was added by the rapid introduction of pump irrigation. City merchants financially able to buy pumps entered into arrangements with occupiers of *miri* land for the supply of water against specified shares in the crop, thus creating new claims to land without resolving the fate of any pre-existing claims.

423 654 Following a study of this question by Sir Ernest Dowson, a British land expert, the government decided in 1932 to end the confusion by inaugurating a cadastral survey to be carried out by a number of so-called Land Settlement Committees. The law of 1932 as well as the law which replaced it in 1938 recognized the following types of land tenure:

- *Mamloukah* or *mulk*—land held in absolute private ownership.
- *Matroukah*—land reserved for public purposes.
- *Mawqufa* or *waqf*—land which is administered in trust (1) for

7- International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 7

Estimated Industrial Employment

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Petroleum production and refining	11,500
Food and beverage	4,500
Tobacco	3,500
Wool and cotton processing, textiles, wearing apparel and footwear	11,000
Wood processing and wood products	2,000
Leather (other than footwear)	450
Chemicals (vegetable oils, soap, etc.)	550
Building materials	6,000
Metal-working, including jewelry	1,500
Machinery and machinery repair	2,700
Electricity and water supply	1,100
Miscellaneous	1,000
Total	45,800

Indications of output in the more primitive industries are very 433 scanty, but data on output in some of the more modern industries can be found in the monograph on Industry. Production is, in general, on a modest scale, although some industries such as cement fill most of the country's needs.

Petroleum Production and Refining

Although production of petroleum is now rising rapidly, it 315 has been relatively modest in the past. The exploitation of oil is 471 predominantly in the hands of three companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—all owned in equal shares, except for five percent controlled by Mr. Gulbenkian, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Royal Dutch-Shell, the *Compagnie Française des Petroles* and the Near East Development Corporation (owned jointly by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum). Of these three, the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is exploiting the large field near Kirkuk, is the only one in production. In addition, the Khanaqin Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, has a small concession adjoining the Iranian border.

Efforts to develop production have been concentrated mainly 315 on the Kirkuk field where oil is found at the depth of only between

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

433 expanded will, however, require financial assistance from the Industrial Bank. This should be arranged just as soon as plans can be formulated.

Petroleum Development

382 315 [471] The further development of the oil industry can safely be left to the internationally-owned companies now operating in Iraq. Under an agreement finalized early in October 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three major oil companies—the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company—undertook to increase their oil output to 30,000,000 tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraq Government 50 percent of the profit on their production before the deduction of taxes. Although output in 1950 amounted to only about 6,000,000 tons, there should be no difficulty about attaining the agreed target. The oil resources of Iraq are immense, the reserves of the Kirkuk field amounting reputedly to 1,000 million tons, with the new fields near Basra offering equal promise. In the development of these fields and means of transport, the oil companies have already made an investment of close to ID 90,000,000, which is now beginning to yield a rapidly rising output. Development in the Kirkuk and Mosul field has already proceeded on the assumption that a production capacity of at least 22,000,000 tons would be achieved in a few years, and with the completion of the pipeline to Banias, Syria, there should also be ample transport capacity. The balance of the projected output, namely 8,000,000 tons, will have to come from the newer fields near Basra. This may require some increase in drilling and will necessitate additional pipeline capacity to Fao, but neither of these will be difficult to accomplish.

382 466 The oil companies have been among the leaders in Iraq in providing better conditions and amenities for their employees and in instituting schemes for training skilled labor and technicians. They have been criticized, however, for their failure to appoint more Iraqis to leading positions. Under the agreement already cited they have undertaken to send 50 Iraqi students per year to British Universities to study various subjects relating to the oil industry, and also to establish a school in Kirkuk to train 60 Iraqis yearly in technical oil subjects.

433 35 power by industry is out of the question. It is hoped, however, that in time this may be corrected.

Even in Baghdad the purchase of power by industry would be greatly stimulated by a reduction in the industrial rates of the Baghdad Light and Power Company. Profits, after depreciation [471] but before taxes, are now over half of gross receipts. Under the terms of its concession, the company pays a substantial part of these profits to the Iraq Government, the remainder being allocated to United Kingdom taxes, reserves for capital expenditure and dividends. The Iraq Government's share in the profits effectively constitutes a tax on electricity consumption, which it might be well advised to forego if it could thereby secure an equivalent reduction in power rates to Iraqi industry. The government might, therefore, explore with the Company and with the tax authorities in the United Kingdom the possibility of an equitable arrangement, whereby power rates would be reduced as far as possible, while still providing adequate funds for capital improvement and continuing a fair return to stockholders. A possible arrangement that has to be considered is the exercise by the government at the end of 1954 of its option to purchase the undertaking as a going concern. If such a course should be decided on, it would be desirable to enter into a management contract with the Company in order to ensure the continuance of efficient operation.

433 488 452 The amount of working capital required in Iraq per unit of production is exceedingly high, partly because enterprises want to be as self-sufficient as possible with respect to needed supplies and materials, partly because Iraq is relatively distant from international markets. Probably the best means of reducing the need for working capital would be through the erection and operation of a bonded warehouse which would provide all industries with facilities to store, until needed, supplies, material and chemicals of all types under conditions that would enable banks to extend credits on the stocks in bond. In this way the banks would have assurance that the stored material would not be released prior to full payment plus interest, storage and service charges. In effect, this would permit operations along lines very similar to those in highly developed countries where supplies and materials are obtained in accordance with production schedules.

365 distribution systems would be approximately ID 1,550,000, of
371 which ID 1,000,000 would be in foreign exchange, mostly sterling. The financing of this development will need to be undertaken by the Development Board.

365 It is important, however, that expansion of supply be accompanied by thoroughgoing measures to assure more efficient management. The only utilities that can be said to be operated efficiently are those at Baghdad and Basra. In spite of a considerable burden on its revenue (see Annex D, *Industry*), the Baghdad Light and Power Company charges the lowest rates in the country, pays regular dividends to its stockholders and finances plant expansions from reserves set aside for such purposes.

Rates charged by the municipally-owned plants vary widely, and, generally speaking, are twice those in either Baghdad or Basra. In some localities, the demand for power is so much greater than supply that rates are made exceptionally high for the purpose of discouraging the normal use of electricity by large consumers. Distribution losses are frequently as much as 36 percent and because of poor maintenance an engine generator is seldom capable of operating at more than 50 percent of its designed rating. Records are also very poor and in some cases nonexistent. It is obvious, therefore, that the present form of administration is unsatisfactory and must be changed if the consumer of electricity is
● [471] to be adequately served. It is recommended, therefore, that all publicly-owned electric utilities be placed under the management of a competent private firm like the Baghdad Light and Power Company by means of a mutually satisfactory operating contract. The contract should require all operations to be conducted in accordance with sound utility practices and it should include some incentive to reduce rates to the level now enjoyed in Baghdad and Basra.

371 It has sometimes been argued that hydroelectric power should
375 be developed as part of the projected water-storage schemes. While the possibility of such development undoubtedly exists, the Mission believes that thermal plants are at present the most economic source of power in Iraq. Hydroelectric plants require a much higher capital investment than thermal plants. They tend to be economical only where fuel costs are relatively high and there is

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

505 In 1947, the number of steam and motor boats fell slightly to 172 vessels with a total tonnage of 10,645 tons. On the other hand, the number of special motor boats for passenger transport increased to 388.

Railways

496 The railway network and railway transport in Iraq are not yet sufficiently developed; but the authorities are making considerable efforts to remedy this state of affairs.

● [471] In 1902 the Germans obtained a concession for building the Istanbul—Baghdad railway line—the "Baghdad Bahn"—a project in keeping with the *Drang nach Osten;* they began the work in 1903, but had only completed a few sections by the eve of the First World War. The work resumed under very different conditions after the First World War, and was completed in July 1940, when the Baiji—Mosul—Tel Kochek section was opened in the territory of Iraq.

[655] The Iraqi railway network, which is owned by the State, now consists of the following lines:

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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Oil Industry

Petroleum concessions covering most of Iraq are held by IPC and the associated Mosul and Basra Petroleum Companies (MPC and BPC).[1] The three concessions are all for seventy-five years, from 1925, 1932, and 1938 respectively. They initially provided for the payment of dead rent until oil was produced and thereafter for royalties at the rate of 4*s.* gold per ton of crude oil exported. A new agreement, of 3 February 1952, made retroactive to 1 January 1951, provides that the Iraq Government shall receive 50 per cent of the companies' profits from their operations in Iraq before deduction for foreign taxes, part of the half share consisting of oil in kind (12½ per cent of the net production of each of the companies). In all circumstances except those of *force majeure* the Government's total income from the companies' operations is not to be less than 25 per cent of the seaboard value of all crude oil exported by IPC and MPC, plus 33⅓ per cent of the seaboard value of crude oil exported by BPC; the Government's income is further guaranteed at not less than £20 million sterling per annum during 1953 and 1954 and not less that £25 million during 1955 and subsequent years. Should circumstances of *force majeure* impose a suspension of oil production in the country, the Government will receive from the companies unconditionally a minimum annual revenue of 25 million for two years. In addition, the companies guarantee to produce and dispose of minimum quantities of crude oil annually as follows: IPC 20¾ million tons, MPC 1½ million tons as from 1 January 1954, and BPC 8 million tons as from 1 January 1956. This replaces the previous undertaking that IPC should dispose of a minimum of 3 million tons per annum and MPC and BPC a minimum each of 1 million tons per annum. The approximate oil revenues forecast by the Iraq Government on the new basis for the years 1953–5 inclusive are respectively 45 and 59 million dinars. 471

Oil was struck for the first time in Iraq in 1927, near Kirkuk, and by the end of 1934 IPC exported crude oil through two 12-inch pipelines, each of 7 million tons' annual capacity, to Tripoli (530 miles) and Haifa (617 miles) on the Mediterranean coast. In 1949 a 16-inch pipeline of 4 million tons' capacity was opened to Tripoli. In consequence of the Palestine conflict work on a similar pipeline to Haifa stopped short at the Palestinian frontier; for the same reason the Iraq Government closed the 12-inch Haifa line, which has since remained disconnected at the 315 433

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[1] For the location of concession areas, the length of period of the concessions, and the respective share holdings of the parent companies, see Appendix IV, pp. 568–9 below.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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315 frontier. A 30–32-inch pipeline of 14 million tons' capacity was
433 opened to Banias in Syria (560 miles) in 1952.

In the MPC concessionary area exploration and drilling were carried out before 1931, but it was not until after the Second World War that oil of certain commercial value was discovered and produced, at Ain Zala, north-west of Mosul. In 1952 the field was linked by a 12-inch pipeline to the IPC pipeline system, to permit the export of its crude oil to the Mediterranean coast.

In the BPC concessionary area exploration began in 1939 and, when resumed at the end of the war, was made more effective by the application of new geophysical methods. A field producing oil of good quality was developed in the area of Zubair, the average depth of the wells—some 11,000 feet—being greater than in any neighbouring Persian Gulf oilfield and four times greater than at Kirkuk. Oil is carried the seventy-four miles from the field to a new oil port at Fao, where oil was first shipped in December 1951, through a 12-inch pipeline; a second pipeline, of 24 inches, was completed in 1953 to cope with the company's increased production programme under the terms of the 1952 agreement.

433 Production of crude oil for 1952 (the first year of MPC and BPC production) was as follows: Kirkuk (IPC) 15,553,000 tons, Ain Zala (MPC) 270,000 tons, Zubair (BPC) 2,238,000 tons.

• 471 The area of eastern Iraq excluded from the concessions of
433 these three companies has been developed by the Khanaqin
Oil Company, a subsidiary of AIOC, on the basis of agreements
382 made in 1925 and 1926. The output of the company's refinery near Khanaqin, together with imports from Abadan, provided Iraq's internal requirements of petroleum products. In accordance with an agreement ratified in 1952, the Iraq Government has bought the refinery, the company undertaking to operate it for ten years and, if requested, to operate also the new government refinery near Baghdad which is to replace it; after the Khanaqin refinery is closed the company will retain its production area on the same terms as those of the IPC 1952 agreement, conditional on exporting an annual minimum of 2 million tons of crude oil.

The government refinery at Daura near Baghdad, on which work started in 1952, is designed to produce a million tons of refined petroleum products per annum, a figure well in excess of the present requirements of the country. Meanwhile a small refinery of some 175,000 tons annual capacity has been erected
[439] at Basra to help make good the deficiency caused by the cessation of petroleum imports from Abadan.

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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Unlike Egypt, Iraq is a sparsely populated country relative to its land resource. Yet we find there the same conditions of landlessness, and low levels of living among the peasant folk. More serious still, we find in that country a great agricultural potential which is threatened by the prevailing destructive system of land tenure.

This fertile land of the ancient Tigris and Euphrates rivers has a total potentially cultivable area (mostly by means of expanded irrigation) of some 25 million acres. The present area that is under cultivation each year, however, is less than 6 million acres. There is no doubt that capital and technical aid from the West will make it possible for Iraq to realize this tremendous potential. The serious question, however, is whether development will be attempted on the present shaky foundations of feudalism, absentee ownership, and sharecropping, or on the sounder and more stable foundations of a thriving rural community that is emancipated through its ownership or control of the land. The answer, one way or the other, will be of grave consequence to the future of Iraq.

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The following is a brief summary of the situation as it now exists. Less than 0.5 percent of the land is owned privately in fee simple. About 36 percent is state domain which has been leased out more or less permanently to individuals. Over 58 percent is held directly and fully by the state, and is leased out on a yearly basis. These figures indicate clearly that the fate of the land resource has not yet been fully decided as in the case of Egypt. The major portion of it is still in the hands of the state, which could dispose of it either in favor of the landless cultivator and tribesmen, or in favor of the absentee owner and the tribal chief.

The land that is now under cultivation (whether privately owned or leased from the state) is predominantly in the hands or under the control of the semi-feudal tribal chief and the large owner from the city. In either case, absenteeism prevails. The peasants, consisting of village folk and semi-settled tribal people, are in the majority of cases landless sharecroppers. They raise crops and receive a share ranging from 20 to 50 percent of the produce, depending upon whether they supply the seed, the

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 MI Middle East MI
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equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

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Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

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On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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On February 16, 1950, the Prime Minister issued a statement of governmental policy in which he gave emphasis to land reform. He stated that small family farm ownership will be made the basis for agricultural expansion as undertaken by the Government in the future. In June and July 1950 the Government issued decrees by means of which the application of Law No. 23 of 1945 was extended to additional areas of state domain: in the provinces of Hilla and Kerbala in the south, in Diyala in central Iraq, in Suleimaniya and at the Hawijah irrigation project in the north.

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It might be argued that all of these measures do not amount to much as yet. This is true; but the important fact remains that the present governments of the region are doing something about the matter. This is an indication of at least some concern on the part of national leadership. Through the extension of moral, technical, and material support by the United States and other cooperating countries, these beginnings could be transformed into great national realities for the whole Middle East.

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2. *Progressive elements and groups are working at land reform.* In Egypt and Syria, in Lebanon and Iraq, there are leading individuals and organized groups who have been giving serious thought to the problem. Some have begun to do something about it; others stand ready to lend their support once a national project is launched. Some have worked out sound plans and proposed draft laws for reform; others have established improved tenancy terms on their estates; and many others have written pointedly on the subject, depicting the problem and urging a solution. These enlightened elements have been increasing in numbers and in influence; they constitute the real hope of the Middle East. The encouraging reality is that we find these elements not only among the intellectuals and professional groups, but also among the tribal chiefs and large landowners.

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In November 1950 a large group of professional and governmental leaders, representing most of the Arab countries, met in Cairo in a Social Welfare Seminar under the auspices of the United Nations. Reports already received indicate that the subject of land tenure and land reform received serious consideration, the gravity of the problem and possible solutions being discussed in detail.

000 prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole.'[1]

423 There are different varieties of tenure in the two zones,
determined by the different conditions of agriculture. In the
● 471 north, the forms of tenure are similar to those of Syria, with a
class of small proprietors taking some, but not all, of the land.
In the south large owners or sheikhs own virtually all of the
land, letting it to share-tenants, through a series of intermediary
lessees, minor sheikhs, sirkals (formerly sub-sheikhs), or town
notables. At the bottom of this many-storied building the
fellah cultivates the land under a burden of debt. This peculiar
form has originated from the disintegration of the tribal system;
the sheikhs have profited by the confusion of the law to secure
individual ownership of land which by custom is the property of
the tribe.

423 *The Breakdown of the Tribal System.* In the irrigation zone, the practice of shifting cultivation was accompanied until very recently by an equally unstable form of landownership. The basis of the ownership is the tribal *dirah*, a large area not limited to land actually tilled but including also non-cultivated land and submerged marsh land, over which a tribe exercises a customary right of occupation. These areas are considered to be the property of the whole tribe, and until recently were so in fact.

423 The tribal system existed generally until some forty years ago,
and still prevails in parts of the country.[2] Under this system, the
621 usual procedure was to set aside a part of the cultivated area,
622 a third or even a half, to provide revenue for the sheikh to discharge
his political duties, which then included the maintenance
of a tribal militia, the provision of hospitals, and keeping
the *mudhif* (the coffee shop and civic and social centre of the
tribe). This revenue accrued to the office of the sheikh, and not
to his person. The rest of the land was sometimes distributed
among the families of the tribe, according to the numbers of
fighters who had helped to seize the land from another tribe,
423 or according to the amount of land reclaimed: more often, however,
427 the land was cultivated in small groups, the tribal sub-

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[1] op. cit., p. 33.

[2] For a detailed account of the historical development of Iraq's land tenure system, see Salih Haider 'Land Problems of Iraq' (London University Ph.D. thesis, 1942).

28: Warriner S-5 to date 1948 MI Middle East
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423 twenty-first part of the total. The position of the share-tenant
427 in Iraq is much worse than that of his counterpart in Syria.

In the districts of flood irrigation the tribal system has dis-
621 integrated, but its superstructure, the sheikhs and sirkals, re-
622 mains. Most of the political functions of the tribe have now been transferred to the State, and the only economic function
312 now performed by the tribal authorities is the control of irri-
427 gation, digging of canals, and repairing of breaches, which is done by the cultivators under the direction of the sirkal who has become a kind of farm bailiff acting for the sheikh. Under this system the sheikh and sirkal take together up to 80 per cent of the crop, leaving the cultivator some 20–30 per cent.

423 This exploitation is possible because the sheikhs have succeeded in establishing, mainly during the last fifteen years, their title
425 to absolute ownership of the tribal land by means of land settlement. Because in Ottoman times the cultivators had no legal title to the land which they occupied, the landlords were able, during the period of the mandate, to use their political power to secure legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the property of the tribe. In much the same way the English landlords of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enclosed land as their property which was traditionally common property, and ousted small holders whose title was based only on custom. As in nineteenth century England, the process is being hastened by mechanization, which gives the big landowners an advantage as against the small cultivator, and by inflation, which gives them
√565√ the impetus to invest. The big landowners of Iraq are a comparatively recent creation, and it is the economic and legal changes of the past twenty years which have established their position.

423 *Northern Iraq*. In northern Iraq there is a different type of land tenure and fewer large landowners. South of Mosul, in the fertile
● 471 Tigris Valley, where pumps have been installed, there is a tribal system resembling that of the south, and the land is owned mainly by tribal sheikhs and notables. West of Mosul, on the rolling uplands with poor rainfall, the land is also held on
471 a tribal system. In this region in recent years there has been a rapid introduction of machinery; and the sheikhs are extending their power to acquire land. In future bigger imports of machinery will probably cause them to extend their influence

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East Iraq MHI

471 over larger areas, much as the pump owners are doing on the Lower Tigris.

But in the north-eastern rain-fed zone, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, the position of the cultivator is better. There is a settled system of cultivation and a large part of the land is held by small proprietors. In the plain lands of Kirkuk and Erbil as much as 75 per cent of the land is held by small cultivators with
241 holdings up to 200 dunums. Here the method of cultivation is much the same as in Syria, a *daim* (i.e. dry) crop being taken every two years.

423 Here too the legal position is different. In this part of the country, the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code remained in
425 force, and most of the land was registered in Turkish times. Frequently the *agha* (or *mukhtar*), who was originally the patriarchal head of the village with the duty of maintaining order, has used his position to acquire land, and registered the land of the village under his own name. This has happened particularly often in the Kurd villages, where in spite of the Land Code's explicit prohibition of granting an entire village in the name of one person, the Turkish authorities, for the sake of peace, registered whole groups of villages in the names of the notables of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya.

427 But even though the landlords have obtained title to land, the share paid to them is much less than in the south, and amounts to only 10–20 per cent of the product.

426 Thus the problem of reforming tenure is here much less acute. As in Syria, peasant indebtedness is the major problem, but in the course of the recent war the high prices of grain have enabled the majority of the peasants to wipe off the burden of debt.

241 In the high mountain regions, however, particularly in the Zibar district, there is acute agricultural distress; a series of bad harvests due to plant disease, insect pests, and insecurity, has caused the agricultural economy to go steeply downhill in the past few years.

423 *Settlement of Title.* During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Government attempted to settle title to land under the Land Code, as it did in the rest of the Turkish Empire. The Code was extended to Iraq under Midhat Pasha with the object of registering occupiers of land and thereby granting them

423 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly com-
622 plete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his
secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
● 471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor
estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short
of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any
terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or
sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and
the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this
district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of
the towns.'[1]

241 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions.
The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
452 rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The
government regulation that land must remain fallow in alternate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears, at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
427 the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53-E.

29: Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

PRODUCTION

433 Industry at present is confined largely to processing agricultural products, producing building materials, and manufacturing consumer goods—matches, soap, cigarettes, shoes, beverages, and textiles.

Conditions are favorable for further industrial development. Opportunities are abundant for producing agricultural raw materials for processing, and indications are that iron, copper, zinc, chrome, sulphur, and salt exist in commercial quantities. With plenty of oil and natural gas, fuel is no problem. Manpower is adequate, and with proper training the Iraqi workman is said to be competent. A higher level of agricultural production would create also a wider market for manufactured products.

471 There are a number of limitations. The lack of technical "know-how" and the lack of sufficient private capital and initiative are the most important. Much capital, particularly that accumulated from agriculture, is said to be hoarded; and the balance generally is invested in urban or rural property, which is regarded as less risky, or in commerce where investors anticipate a high rate of return. It is suggested for this reason that industrial development in the immediate future will have to depend very largely upon the

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

In most of the Middle East countries, cotton harvesting and, to a certain extent, weeding depend on migrant laborers who travel from one area to another. In Iraq, most of the members of the migrant farm worker's family walk, carrying their household goods on their heads. Only the tiniest youngsters and the oldest women ride the burros.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East

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[135] 382 about half of the world's total. However, Iraq's past output has been paltry compared to its potential. A year ago Iraq's oil was flowing at the rate of 160,000 barrels a day. The figure is now 185,000, and estimates are that it will jump to 440,000 before long. The handicaps have been transportation and political difficulty. Iraq's wells are hundreds of miles from the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean Sea, which means pipelines have to be constructed. Before this year two pipelines were in operation from the Iraqi fields to Tripoli, Lebanon. A 12-inch pipeline to Haifa, Israel, has been put out of use since Iraq joined the Arab embargo of Israel. A new 16-inch line built almost to the Israeli border has never been completed for the same reason. Early this year one small new line was completed to the head of the Persian Gulf, which will have a capacity of about 40,000 barrels a day. The main addition is the 30-inch line to the Mediterranean just being finished. It runs to Banyas, Syria, and has a capacity of 280,000 barrels a day.

[471] Mining is carried out by the Iraq Petroleum Company, owned by United States, Dutch, British, and French interests. Despite this diversified interest, there has been continuous trouble with reactionary groups in Iraq along the same lines, but less serious than those in Iran. Recently the Parliament approved a new oil contract which promises the Iraqi Government 50 per cent of profits before foreign taxes, and (from the western point of view) the political situation seems to have improved.[28]

COTTON TEXTILES

288 Until the erection of the Iraqi Spinning and Weaving Company mill in 1948, cotton was used primarily for filling mattresses, for upholstery work, and for the home industries. Around 2,600 bales of cheap raw cotton and cotton waste normally have been imported from India for this purpose. A small crop of unirrigated indigenous cotton raised in the north around Zakho goes into this market, too.

The Iraqi Spinning and Weaving Company in Baghdad doubled its capacity in 1951 and now has about 27,200 spindles and 580 looms, producing about 18 million yards and finishing 5 million yards annually. The company already has purchased more equipment to give a total of 39,000 spindles and 900 looms, capable of producing about 27 million yards of cloth annually. Several small mills weaving cotton and rayon and three small knitting mills are reported also.

The mill consumed 10,482 bales of cotton in 1951 and expects to use 15,000 bales in 1952. The cotton has been secured almost entirely from the domestic crop. A poor crop forced the mill to buy 1,500 bales from the United States in the early part of 1952, but this unusual situation is not expected to be repeated.

471 288 Funds authorized in the government budget for other cotton textile mills have not been expended, presumably because of the general opposition to government intervention in the field of private enterprise and because of the recent expansion in the Iraqi mill. This expansion was financed by the Industrial Bank, which owns about a third of the company's stock.

288 With this expansion the factory should be able to produce about 40 million yards of cloth annually, or about 60 per cent of the country's requirements of 70 million yards.

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[28] Carmichael, J. H., "Oil from the Middle East Hits a New High Mark," *New York Times*, March 23, 1952.

services. "The disease has been recognized", he said, "what was required was that medicine for the prescription should be supplied and the patient taught how to take that medicine". The same Minister informed us that he himself, as a young man called upon to draft a new educational programme, had included in it the provision of community centres, but that unfortunately this feature of the scheme had not materialized. 657 185

45. Community welfare organization on a self-help basis in Iraq is, indeed, as yet in its infancy. Some observers consider that an indispensable preliminary to its development is to create in the minds of a people long under the influence and domination of a feudal tribal system an effective desire for self-government.

46. As is generally known, Iraq is rich in oil resources and it is the policy of the Government to transfer mineral wealth into productive capital for the general welfare. A statutory Development Board was established in 1950 to ensure continuity of economic policy, regardless of political changes. Seventy per cent of the income from oil revenues is allocated to the Board as revenue for projects of water conservation, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, etc. The Board is also responsible for co-ordinating the development schemes in these fields initiated by the various ministerial Departments. Over 200 foreign technicians are listed as working in Iraq in formulating a variety of development schemes, mostly relating to economic improvements. Some of the experts are in the direct employ of the Iraq Government: others have been assigned to the Government for short periods for specific purposes by agencies and organizations furnishing technical assistance on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Relatively few technicians have so far been concerned with social developments, but the country's needs in this respect have, we understand, been partially surveyed. 651 382 185 471

47. In the absence of detailed documentation, we left it to the Government agencies most directly concerned with the subject of our mission to determine whom we should see and to suggest which projects or institutions we should visit. 800

48. During our short stay in Baghdad we were able to visit at Tal Mohamed a well-constructed modern building designed to serve as a centre for community activities for the residents of a model housing estate constructed by the Ministry of Social Affairs for low-income government employees. Cheap transport facilities were available between Baghdad and the new estate, in which some 500 houses were already in occupation and more would be constructed as funds became available. The imposing building in which it is intended that community activities shall be carried out has been ready for use for more than a year but only some of the equipment and furniture (including seven beds for maternity cases) have been installed. A difficulty in finding suitable qualified staff has delayed the opening of the centre. When it is in full working order it is planned to offer nursing, educational and indoor and outdoor recreational facilities on modern lines. The general appearance of the centre and model village was marred by the state of the roads after heavy rains. 657 185 362

49. It is understood that centres similar to that at Tal Mohemed are planned for other urban areas. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which until recently formed part of the Ministry of Health, has also other plans under consideration for creating, with external technical assistance, pilot projects of community organization or demonstration centres, in urban as well as in rural areas.

50. A survey of Iraq villages jointly conducted by Mr. Gordon MacGregor (TCA adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs) and Dr. Yusuf Khaddoury, M.D. (Officer in charge of international relations of that Ministry) reveals: 185 657

Iraq [illegible] #1

II. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

A. PRESENT CONDITIONS

369 511 162 The some 4,000,000 more people of Iraq who live the rural areas have been long characterised by many people both within and outside Iraq as suffering from poverty, ill health and illiteracy. These conditions become readily apparent to one visiting the villages of the country today. The characterization of the people can be extended to their being ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed.

369 511 The survey was immediately impressed with the crude and inefficient methods of making a living and the unnecessarily poor and unhealthy home and village life. These conditions can be remedied by instruction and assistance. People farm with primitive equipment and are wasteful of land and water. In village after village there are mud huts without light or fresh air. Families live, sleep and eat in single rooms packed together with animals, food, stores, farming equipment and refuse. Children play in courtyards filled with animal dung and filth, many people suffer from infected eyes, skin sores and diseases caused by unsanitary conditions which could be greatly reduced by better sanitary conditions. In the house food is prepared on the floors where it comes in contact with the accumulated filth, flies, chickens, dogs and other animals. Pots and pans and mixing spoons lie on the ground. They are crudely cleaned with dirty water or old rags. There are no such things as kitchens, screened lockers for food or clean and covered places for drinking water in the homes of the rural villagers. Instruction in home care could overcome much of this.

369 364 511 The lack of pure drinking water is one of the most acute problems in these villages. Some pumps and water tanks and some water piped from springs to collection pools have been installed. However, these facilities frequently lack sanitary protection and show lack of proper maintenance by the communities. Often wells have around them accumulation of stagnant water, mud and animal dung. Another acute problem is the lack of any facilities in many villages, and homes for taking care of human waste. Where toilets exist they are mere uncovered holes open to flies and a source of spreading disease.

369 871 Many villages have not yet received the benefit of schools where children can learn some of the concepts and techniques which would enable them to understand the need for improving their conditions and help their families in doing so. In some villages young girls are not allowed by their elders to attend school or not provided with primary schools, buildings and teachers. Much of a new generation is growing up illiterate and ignorant of how they might help themselves when they grow up.

369 423 471 588 Enquiry among villagers and local officials revealed that although there might be a headman or mukhtar of the village, nearly all direction and management of their affairs comes from outside leadership. Communities lack the local leadership and organization by which they might progress through their own efforts. Shaikhs, landlords, their agents (sirkal) who are frequently local government representatives as well, direct the farming operations, decide the lands on which the villagers will farm and live, provide much of the seed and equipment, direct the cleaning of ditches, collect the shares of crops and other payments and decide whether or not the farmers may live and work on the land during the next year. Even the farmer who owns his own land is not without obligations to money lenders, tax collectors and government supervision. The farmers and tenants of Iraq are dependent upon

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
511 utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.

Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
369 of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
433 to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
511 for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
566 land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
423 of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
471 directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
566 more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
and write to obtain more information.

241 commercial crops in the rain-fed zones of
the north; dates, cereals and cotton, in the
south. The date-palm groves in the irrigated
lands along the Shatt al Arab and the Euphrates
rivers, and in scattered areas along
the Tigris, furnish almost one third of the
233 world's supply of dates. Sheep, goats, cattle
and other livestock are raised in large numbers
by the nomadic and the seminomadic
439 peoples. The chief agricultural exports are
dates, barley and other grains, cotton, wool,
hides and licorice: this last-named item
grows wild in many localities in the south.
242 The government is promoting the adoption
of modern methods of farming and animal
husbandry and the expansion of irrigation
facilities. It operates special agricultural
schools and experimental farms in different
parts of the country, as well as a date research
station near Basra. Within the last
few years it has initiated settlement and
demonstration projects on state lands at
Dujayla, near Kut; at Shahrizor, near
Sulaimaniya; at Huwaija, near Kirkuk;
and at Sinjar, near Mosul.

235 With the exception of the oil reserves,
the mineral resources of Iraq are negligible.
Small deposits of lignite, gypsum, sulfur and
other minerals are known to exist in the
north, while salt beds are found in widely
472 distributed areas. Industrial development is
438 slight, in spite of the impetus supplied by
the shortage of materials during the recent
war years. Small craft industries flourish in
the urban centers, and a few modern factories
have been established in Baghdad and
Mosul for the processing of local products.
These consist primarily of plants for the
manufacture of textiles, cement, bricks, distilled
liquors, soaps and cigarettes.

235 The petroleum industry has expanded
rapidly since the discovery of oil, in 1927,
at Baba Gurgur, in the Kirkuk region. The
reserves, which are reputed to be among the
richest in the Middle East, provide a primary
471 mary source of wealth for the country. The
Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions,
originally granted in 1925, covering the
lands east of the Tigris River and north

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of the 33rd parallel. Affiliated companies 471 have concessions over the remaining territory—the Mosul Petroleum Company in the region west of the Tigris and the Basra Petroleum Company south of the 33rd parallel. Oil is extracted from the Kirkuk 315 fields by the Iraq Petroleum Company and 471 conveyed by pipelines to Mediterranean ports. It was formerly pumped to terminals in Tripoli and Haifa, but the latter pipeline has been closed since the Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1948. A new pipeline, constructed from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias, was opened early in 1952.

In 1938, the Basra Petroleum Company began drilling operations in the Persian Gulf area, where the existence of an extensive oil field has since been established. In 1950, a pipeline was completed to its shipping terminal at Fao, at the head of the Gulf. The activities of the Mosul company are still in the exploratory stage, but the production of oil has recently been started at Ain Zala. It is piped to the Mediterranean by a line which joins that from the Kirkuk fields at Baiji, on the Tigris.

A smaller oil field at Naft Khanah, near the Iranian border, is worked by the Khanaquin Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This company operates a refinery on the Alwand River, near Khanaquin, which supplies petroleum products for local consumption. Since 1952, it has also constructed a small 382 refinery at Basra to process products for use 471 in southern Iraq. It obtains the crude oil from Naft Khanah or from the Basra Petroleum Company.

Iraq derives a considerable revenue from 788 the pilgrimage traffic. The principal shrines 346 of the Shia sect are located at An Najef, Kerbela, Kadhimain and Samarra, and, in addition to local pilgrims, they are visited annually by thousands of Shiites from Iran, Pakistan and other Moslem countries. The privilege of burial near the shrines is also coveted by devout Shiite Moslems.

Transportation is mainly by roads or 489 waterways. Motor highways link the principal- 491

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Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
315 Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
[496] works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-owned Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

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Petroleum

433 The petroleum industry in Iraq has made striking progress during the post-war period. Production and exports, which had been low mainly owing to the lack of
382 transport facilities, increased sharply following construction of new pipelines to the seacoasts. Exploration activities led to the discovery of new oilfields,
315 which are being developed. As a result of increasing output of petroleum and the
439 revision of the terms of payment, Iraq's oil revenues have multiplied. These revenues have provided the financial means for development of the country's resources. Revenue from the oil industry, which is in the form of sterling, together with the substantial and rising foreign exchange disbursements of the oil companies for local expenditures, increased considerably the foreign exchange supplies of the country and made larger imports possible. Availability of
[464] petroleum products, at relatively low cost, has facilitated economic development, and the consumption of oil products has increased severalfold. In addition, the petroleum industry has given employment to an increasing number of employees (see table 27) and is providing them with training. After a setback during the war years, when production declined to 1.6 million metric tons in 1941, output of crude petroleum in 1944 recovered to its pre-war level of 4.3 million metric tons. Construction of two additional pipelines, parallel to the previous lines and with a yearly capacity of about 4.5 million tons each, started immediately after the end of the war. The pipeline to Tripoli was completed in 1949, but construction of the other, destined for Haifa, was interrupted by the Palestine conflict and it remains incomplete. Another large-diameter pipeline with an annual throughput capacity of 13.5 million tons, linking the Kirkuk field to Baniyas in Syria, was completed in 1952 at a cost of ID 41 million. In the meantime, the activities of the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company, Ltd., both affiliated with the Iraq Petroleum Company, led to the discovery of Ain Zalah and Butmah oilfields in the Mosul area, and Zubair and Rumaila oilfields near Basra. The development of these fields, especially Zubair, and the installation of pipelines and oil handling facilities during the past four years, has increased substantially the crude petroleum export capacity of Iraq. In addition, another smaller oilfield had been discovered by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company before the war at Naftkhaneh, near the Iranian border, and its output, which was refined locally, served the domestic market exclusively.

As a result of the foregoing developments during the last decade, as well as increasing world demand for petroleum, production of crude oil, which had declined from 4.7 million tons in 1946 and 1947 to 3.4 million tons in 1948, because of the Palestine conflict and the shutdown of the pipeline to Haifa, started to rise sharply, to 6.5 million tons in 1950, 18.9 million in 1952, and 29.6 million in 1954, representing in the latter year 4.3 per cent of the world's crude petroleum output as against 1.5 per cent in 1938. This production may be compared with proved oil reserves, which were estimated at 700 million tons in early 1949, and nearly 2,300 million tons at the end of 1954. Total investment in the petroleum industry of Iraq was estimated in 1952 at approximately ID 90 million, of which the main portion had been for construction of pipelines.

439 Iraq is exclusively an exporter of crude petroleum; the value of petroleum
382 exports was estimated at ID 137 million in 1954 as compared with ID 10 million in 1938. Exports are handled by the parent companies of the Iraq Petroleum
471 Company and its affiliates, but under the terms of the February 1952 agreement,

Table 27. Iraq: Operations Of Petroleum Companies, Selected Years

(Output in thousands of metric tons; value in millions of Iraqi dinars)

Year	Production (crude petroleum)	Consumption of petroleum products	Estimated value of crude petroleum exports	Value of imports by petroleum companies	Direct payments by petroleum companies a/	Foreign exchange disbursements by petroleum companies for local expenses	Number of employees in petroleum industry b/
1927-33 ...	105	125	-	...	0.64	...	3.6
1938	4,298	190	10.3	1.0	1.98	0.58	4.5
1941	1,566	265		0.3	1.46	...	3.3
1946	4,680	385	10.8	2.4	2.33	2.14	11.3
1947	4,702	470	14.0	5.0	2.35	5.60	14.6
1948	3,427	505	11.4	9.3	2.01	7.03	14.2
1949	4,067	520	14.1	10.3	3.24	6.40	12.9
1950	6,479	560	28.7	8.4	5.35	4.39	11.4
1951	8,351	610	37.1	8.7	13.21	5.69	11.0
1952	18,843	710	83.0	14.4	37.41 c/	7.18	13.3
1953	28,217	795	125.6	13.2	49.87	...	13.2
1954	29,550	...	136.9	...	67.50 d/	...	...

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook; International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, and International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.); Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract of Iraq (Baghdad); National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin No. 11, July-September 1954 (Baghdad).

a/ Figures are for fiscal years beginning on 1 April of the year stated.

b/ Thousands; end of year data.

c/ Including ID 5 million for settlement of previous claims.

d/ Calendar year.

439 382 471 the Government of Iraq is entitled to take, as part of the payment by the oil companies, up to 12.5 per cent of crude oil produced by the operating oil companies and to develop its own export market. Refining activities are relatively small. There were three refineries at the end of 1953, with a combined annual capacity of nearly 800,000 tons of crude throughput. The output of petroleum products increased from 350,000 tons in 1949 to 690,000 tons in 1952. In order to increase refining capacity to meet rising local demand, the Government is constructing a refinery, with a capacity of over one million tons a year at Dora, near Baghdad. The plans was expected to cost ID 9 million and to start operations in 1955. In addition, the Government approved in 1953 a proposal to construct a lubricating oil plant to meet local needs. These government refineries will be supplied by crude oil, sold by the Iraq Petroleum Company, according to the February 1952 agreement, and delivered to the Government at K.2 pumping station; from there the Government will carry it in its own pipeline. The price of such oil, which will be for sale only in Iraq, is to be five shillings, sixpence, per ton of oil, plus a fixed charge of £63,000 per annum as the cost of pumping such oil to K.2 station. Consumption of petroleum products in Iraq increased from about 190,000 tons in 1938 to 385,000 tons in 1946 and nearly 800,000 in 1953.

651 382 471 Government revenues from oil operations were multiplied because of increasing production and exports and because of changes in the terms of payments by the producing companies. Prior to 1950, Iraq received the equivalent of $1.65 a ton, which was increased to about $2.45 a ton according to the agreement concluded in August 1950. This in turn was superseded, in February 1952, by a new agreement, retroactive to 1 January 1951, between the Government of Iraq on the one hand and the Iraq Petroleum Company, Basrah Petroleum Company and Mosul Petroleum Company, on the other. The agreement provided for an equal sharing of profits, with profits to be determined before deduction of foreign taxes, on the basis of fixed values and costs of petroleum. Under article 9 of this agreement, the share of the Government in profits from crude oil of Kirkuk quality on the Iraqi-Syrian border was calculated to amount to 35s. 6d. per long ton in 1951, increasing to 40s. 6d. in 1953 and thereafter; the corresponding figures on the Persian Gulf at Fao were 29s. 4 1/2d. and 34s. 4 1/2d. per long ton, respectively. This provision involved a discount of 17s. 6d. per long ton for Kirkuk oil from its Iraqi-Syrian border value, and 13s. for southern Iraqi oil from the posted prices in the Persian Gulf. A new agreement reached in March 1955, retroactive to January 1954, reduced this discount to a flat rate of 2 per cent, and resulted in a rise of 7s. per ton in revenue for Iraq. Direct payments to the Government, which were the equivalent of about ID 2 million in the fiscal year 1938/39 and ID 2.3 million in 1946/47, increased to ID 5.4 million in 1950/51 and nearly ID 68 million in 1954, all paid in sterling. Local expenditures by the oil companies for the purchase of local materials and payment of wages to workers, kept pace with the development of the petroleum industry; such sterling disbursements of the oil companies amounted to the equivalent of ID 7.2 million in 1952 as against ID 2.1 million in 1946 and ID 580,000 in 1938.

Other industries

433 Government attempts to promote industrialization began with the "Encouragement of Industries" Law of 1929, which exempted industrial machinery and certain raw materials from customs duties and also exempted new industries from certain taxes;

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Their solution must depend on the simultaneous and widespread 241 working of forces of rural education, reliable security, sound land 654 tenure and properly financed enterprise. Meanwhile, the annual locust campaigns in northern 'Iraq were developed jointly with neighbouring countries. Progress was made in hill-country tobacco-growing and treatment of the leaf on modern lines. Silk experiments continued, though with scant success. Cotton-growing was still restricted by unskilled cultivation and by pests. The produce of the great date-groves of southern 'Iraq was bringing difficult problems not only of improved culture but of organization and disposal, and civil war raged between growers and packers. Of the attempts at modern estate development (p. 17) none had yet succeeded. The projected Agricultural Bank could not, it was found, be inaugurated until clearer land-titles gave security for loans. The Aṣfar Concession was limited and revised to provide for the acquisition and development by the Company of the Laṭifiya estate, south of Baghdad; the Irrigation Department constructed the main canal at the Company's expense, and promising operations on the 65,000-acre area began under European management.

The main agricultural development of the time was that of riverside 312 pump irrigation. This had been initiated before 1914 and moderately extended between 1920 and 1925. Aided by important fiscal privileges, it began thereafter to show remarkable increase, to the point of becoming a main feature of 'Iraq's economy. Installations in the liwās of Baghdad, Diwaniya, Kut, 'Amara, and Diyalā had by the end of 1930 brought the number of pumps to over 2,000, representing a million-acre increase of cultivable area. There was evident value in thus attracting capital to agriculture, utilizing the cheap oil available, exploiting the high-lying virgin lands, and avoiding the precarious chances of flood irrigation. But the development 311 was not free from trouble. The attraction of cultivators to 472 new lands rather diverted them from old than increased their numbers; improvement in yields, due to fresh lands and secure irrigation, was not matched by superior type or purity of crops. Estate management attempted by townsmen was sometimes short-sighted and uneconomic, and the hard times and low prices of 1930–1 brought ruin to many hopeful enterprises. These, moreover, 423 jointly undertaken by an urban capitalist—often a Deputy or city notable—and a tribal shaykh or *sirkal*, were productive of puzzling difficulties of land tenure and rights. Neither the traditional occupancy of the tribe, nor the share claimed by the incoming capitalist, had any basis in law. Agreements between the parties often proved unworkable, and in practice did not always bring blessings to the cultivators. These conditions indicated, yet

for some time. Women have been employed so far only in excep- 464
tional cases. A new problem has been recently experienced in the
high turnover of ordinary labour. Owing to the development of
the oil industry in Kuweit and other Persian Gulf areas, and the
high wages being paid there, many workers in Baghdad, and
more still in the depressed farming areas, have been emigrating
there. The turnover in the cotton textile industry of Iraq is esti-
mated at 20 per cent of employed labour.

The main difficulty however lies in the shortage of skilled
and semi-skilled labour. The vast amount of illiteracy among the [212]
population, and the failure to make elementary education com- [871]
pulsory has made it difficult to apply any system of apprentice-
ship successfully. Technical education provided by the State has [874]
so far been on a very limited scale - indeed, there are only three
technical secondary schools in the whole of Iraq. Therefore a new
industry has often first to train its own labourers and technicians,
and this of course adds to costs. In the meanwhile, most industries
are dependent on foreign technicians, experts, constructors, heads
of sections, and foremen. The employment of foreign technicians
no doubt is inevitable in the early stages of development, but it
has its own drawbacks and burdens. Foreign skill demands higher
rewards abroad than it would accept at home, the standard of
skill obtained is often not the highest, service is often interrupted
either by ordinary leaves, or illness or inability to fit in with local
conditions.

The lack of qualified labour also applies to the fields of ad- [658
ministration, accounts, and management. Efficient clerks, typists, 874]
store-keepers, accountants and secretaries are in great demand
and very few are available in Iraq. The inadequacy of State com-
mercial education is no less than that of technical education. The
scarcity of able management is a serious obstacle to the progress
of industry. Those few who have entered the field of industry are 464
mostly of the type of proprietor-manager (even in joint-stock 472 ●
companies managers are usually fairly large share-holders); while 473
the members of boards of directors of industrial companies, (about
twenty to twenty-five men) mostly have their own business or
profession to attend to. No wonder they show reluctance to go
into new enterprises. For one reason or another salaried mana-
gers have not made their way into industry, except in very rare
cases. On the other hand foreign management, especially on the

464 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are
● 472 employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary,
473 sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country.[1]

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471 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation :** Except where foreign enterprise has obtained a concession for the development of important resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enterprise.
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471 The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipulates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi

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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

241 commercial crops in the rain-fed zones of
the north; dates, cereals and cotton, in the
south. The date-palm groves in the irrigated
lands along the Shatt al Arab and the Eu-
phrates rivers, and in scattered areas along
the Tigris, furnish almost one third of the
233 world's supply of dates. Sheep, goats, cattle
and other livestock are raised in large num-
bers by the nomadic and the seminomadic
431 peoples. The chief agricultural exports are
dates, barley and other grains, cotton, wool,
hides and licorice: this last-named item
grows wild in many localities in the south.
242 The government is promoting the adoption
of modern methods of farming and animal
husbandry and the expansion of irrigation
facilities. It operates special agricultural
schools and experimental farms in different
parts of the country, as well as a date re-
search station near Basra. Within the last
few years it has initiated settlement and
demonstration projects on state lands at
Dujayla, near Kut; at Shahrizor, near
Sulaimaniya; at Huwaija, near Kirkuk;
and at Sinjar, near Mosul.

135 With the exception of the oil reserves,
the mineral resources of Iraq are negligible.
Small deposits of lignite, gypsum, sulfur and
other minerals are known to exist in the
north, while salt beds are found in widely
472 distributed areas. Industrial development is
428 slight, in spite of the impetus supplied by
the shortage of materials during the recent
war years. Small craft industries flourish in
the urban centers, and a few modern fac-
tories have been established in Baghdad and
Mosul for the processing of local products.
These consist primarily of plants for the
manufacture of textiles, cement, bricks, dis-
tilled liquors, soaps and cigarettes.

135 The petroleum industry has expanded
rapidly since the discovery of oil, in 1927,
at Baba Gurgur, in the Kirkuk region. The
reserves, which are reputed to be among the
richest in the Middle East, provide a pri-
471 mary source of wealth for the country. The
Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions,
originally granted in 1925, covering the
lands east of the Tigris River and north

p. 24(B)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

241 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The
473 Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and
exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more
explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it:
the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one
side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash
of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative
of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the
industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the
passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of
all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived
from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. A Com-
[656] mittee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and
found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of
a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying,
cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object
of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period.
The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop
almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000
bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya
Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself
early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking
to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control
was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with
fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the
progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was
to remain under single and personal British management for the
next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was
unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929-31 and the
312 prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages,
recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature
of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new
[454] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped
thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural
[185] affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation
the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly
available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first
312 stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates
left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable
653 commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the
Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Ḥaydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated 652
expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great
loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 731
27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished
only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack
demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained 647
to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) 473 ●
and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association
in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a
field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of
growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service
as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early
act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed
dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevit- 722
ably to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension 458
of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources' with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would 648
fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

241 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in
185 operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize
and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those
473 of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of
export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices,
throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension
granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the
last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year
would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist.
Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the
Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers
and exporters.

654 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-year
242 course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for
agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya
185 (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at
Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry
station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected,
tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield,
quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust campaigns
in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world:
caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another
and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many
centres. The department was in touch with local industry which
could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley,
beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments
in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would
diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intolerably
[474] wasteful. It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative
societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspectorate,
and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself
in rural education and established agricultural schools in every
[381] liwā. It was promoting village settlement, in which field the interesting
and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323)
was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the
Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board
allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six
years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechanization
of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of
depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly
under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all
the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties
of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of
a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under
controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

The ten industries referred to in the table are: cotton spin- 433 ning and weaving (one establishment), cement (one establishment), wool spinning (two establishments), modern tanning (five establishments), beer (one establishment), alcohol (three establishments), vegetable oil (one establishment), modern soap making (one establishment), artificial and natural silk weaving (six establishments), jute spinning and weaving (one establishment still under construction). The total is 22 establishments all of which [654] enjoy government assistance under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, and practically all have received financial aid in the form of loans or capital participation from the Industrial Bank. None of them employs less than 20 workers, and the majority employ over a hundred workers. All use power-driven machinery. It is interesting to notice that most of these industries are [473] owned by joint-stock companies and that they have distributed profits during the last three years ranging from 9 per cent to 25 per cent.

Obviously the table does not cover the whole field of industrial development in Iraq. It has been constructed on the basis of a selected sample to show the rapid progress made in recent years. The unusual increase in ouput compared with the rate of capital investment as shown in the table is to be explained by the fact that most plants were still under construction or half-completed in the early years. A complete survey of the industrial sector in 654 the economy of Iraq is still to come. The Central Bureau of Sta- 433 tistics, Ministry of National Economy, is expected soon to embark on this task. Such a survey will have to cover, in addition to those industries included in the above table, the following:

(a) Other modern industries in the private sector which represent a substantial portion of the whole, such as flour milling, workshops and agricultural machine repair shops, printing, cotton ginning, cigarette manufacture, the building materials industry, shoe-making, etc.

(b) The great oil industry owned and operated by powerful fo- [392] reign concerns holding concessions from the Government. The oil companies produced nearly 8 million tons of crude oil and 400,000 tons of refined products in 1951, and employ over 12,000 workers. Their production is expected to rise to 20 million tons of crude oil in 1955-56.

in 1952, but it can safely count on an annual payment by the Treasury 652 on capital account of no less than I.D. 200,000. The Bank therefore can be said to be now in a sufficiently liquid position to meet any legitimate demands made upon it.

The International Bank Mission[1] has recommended that 652 "the Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. 654 The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever 473 an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital." This view is no doubt inspired by the shortage of capital from which the Industrial Bank, as well as other financial institutions, had suffered before the Oil Agreement of 1951. It is clear that the Bank must not, however, be hasty in disposing of shares if it is to perform its important function of encouraging enterprises and capital investment in industry. This can be seen more clearly from the following considerations. First, most of the industrial concerns in which the Bank participates are still under construction (a process which requires two to four years in Iraq), and the few which have gone into production and distributed profits have only done so in the last three or four years. Any large sell-out by the Bank, which holds between 25 and 40 per cent of their shares, is likely to shake confidence in these concerns and create unforseen difficulties for them. Secondly, there is no organised stock exchange in Iraq and the market for shares is so limited that any large sale of shares may lead to a fall in prices which would hit small investors and benefit speculators, while it might harm the credit of the Bank. Thirdly, the stake which the Government now has in the capital of so many industrial concerns helps to reassure private enterprise that it will not retreat from the generous policy it has so far adopted towards industry. Another important consideration in this respect is that Government participation in industry through the Bank gives it a useful instrument, if it wishes to make use of it, for the supervision and control of industry.[2] It seems obvious therefore that the Bank cannot easily use its capital as a revolving fund.

(2) The Supply of Raw Materials and Power: Iraq is potentially 000

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[1] See the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. *The Economic Development of Iraq*, Report by a Mission of the Bank. Washington 1952. Annex D. p. 295.

[2] During the past five years, the Bank has made, only one sale, 3,000 shares out of 24,000 shares it then held in the Iraq Cement Co., in 1951, by public auction.

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tional cases. A new problem has been recently experienced in the
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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

433 654 the Law for the Encouragement of Industry are granted irrespective of the locality in which the Industry is to be established or the type of industry embarked upon. Industries established in crowded, highly developed areas are given the same advantages as those established in remote, less developed districts. The manufacturer of producer's goods is treated equally with the manufacturer of consumers' goods and luxury goods. The criteria upon which an industry's claim to benefits is judged stand in need of drastic revaluation.

477 The limitation of the market in Iraq not only restricts the possibilities of large-scale development of most industries but it affords opportunities for monopoly control by one or two plants in certain fields. The danger of monopoly and exorbitant prices is already in sight in such industries as cement, beer, cotton and woollen textiles. The encouragement of new enterprise in these fields, or the relaxation of state protection to allow healthy competition, or direct intervention by the state to fix prices in relation to costs, is necessary to restrict monopoly power in the interests of the consumer and to preserve public confidence in industry. It is only on the basis of such confidence that the government can continue to give support and material aid to industry. The Iraqi Government has ample powers for dealing with the abuses of monopoly under the provisions of the Law for the Organisation of Economic Life of 1941.

473 The government can also extend its control over industry and prevent abuses by proper amendments to the law governing joint-stock companies. There is need to restrict the grant of free-shares or "water" shares to promotors, the creation of founders' shares with special powers of voting or percentage of profits, the interlocking of directorships, and abuses on the part of management in respect of purchases of materials and equipment, and sales of finished products. In particular, managers of joint-stock companies should be prohibited from trading on their own account especially in goods related to firms under their management.

652 473 The Industrial Bank has often been urged, as a shareholder in many industries, and with its representative on their boards, to exercise control over their price and sales policies. This suggestion derives from the prestige which the Bank has acquired in relation to industrial development. It has undoubtedly helped to iron out many difficulties, to improve management, and prevent abuses. But it is going too far to suppose that the Bank can actual-

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473 ly control the price, sales and purchases policies of such industries. In the first place, though the Bank holds a large proportion of the capital (varying between 20 and 40 per cent) of every industry, it is always in the minority on the Boards of Directors ; moreover it appoints its own representatives and is excluded from taking part in the election of other directors by the articles of association of the companies concerned. This course has been deliberately taken so as to ensure private enterprise against arbitrary action on the part of the government. Secondly, the Bank itself is, in the last analysis, a profit seeking institution and therefore it is not likely to stand in the way of any measures likely to increase profits, unless they are of an obviously oppressive or abusive nature. Thirdly, the main duty of the Bank is to promote industry. Promotion and control are not always compatible.

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475 For these reasons the State has to look for other ways, and to use more fully the legal powers which it already possesses, for effective control over industry. The fact that it owns a share in industry through the Industrial Bank puts it in a better position to exercise such control. But to rely mainly on the Industrial Bank for this purpose is to escape responsibility.

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Dates

Dates, one of the principal foods of Iraq, are also a main export 245
crop. While Iraq's pre-eminence in the world date market will not easily be threatened, the quality of dates has apparently declined and replacement of old trees has been far from adequate. Not more than 15 percent of the old gardens have under way a tree-planting program sufficient to replace old and deteriorating stands. More than 60 percent of the gardens are in poor condition owing to inadequate cultivation. Halfa, Johnson and Bermuda grasses have been allowed to become serious pests, causing considerable damage. Yields could be improved by better cultivation, manuring, fertilization, reduction of other fruit trees planted in date gardens and improvement in irrigation through the cleaning of canals and the installation of more pumps. Processing of the crop could also be improved, for old packing sheds where primitive methods of handling are employed are still in use.

Responsibility for promotion and improvement of the date 654
industry is entrusted to the Date Association under a law approved 246
in 1935. Ever since 1939 the Association has had a contract with 473
the Andrew Weir Company whereby the latter undertakes to buy at fixed prices and export all the dates of the best varieties offered for sale from the Basra district. There is general agreement among the growers that this arrangement has helped to stabilize prices. On the expiration of the current contract with Andrew Weir after the 1952 season, the Association hopes to conclude a similar agreement with a newly-formed Iraqi company. The Association, the growers and the foreign companies engaged in the date trade are each expected to subscribe one third of this company's capital of ID 500,000. Consideration is also being given to extending its price-support operations to the dates grown in the Tigris-Euphrates valley. In addition, the Date Association is contemplating a distillery to convert into alcohol dates which are surplus to market needs.

There is considerable danger that in carrying out these ambi- 654
tious plans the Association will neglect the need for better cul- 245
tural practices stressed above. The Association has already been criticized for doing little to improve the production of dates. It would be unfortunate if it followed the precedent set by the Tobacco

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped.
A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous
régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp,
in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib
was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles
the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality,
shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously
improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal
Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted
at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling
stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both
pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy–French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it
curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to
full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods
were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce
fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to
a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company,
and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu
Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya
river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit
allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according
to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea
or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the
hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country.
The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt;
trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

241 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in
185 operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize
and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those
473 of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of
export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices,
throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension
granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the
last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year
would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist.
Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the
Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers
and exporters.

654 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-
242 year course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for
agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya
185 (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at
Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry
station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected,
tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield,
quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust cam-
paigns in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world:
caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another
and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many
centres. The department was in touch with local industry which
could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley,
beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments
in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would
diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intoler-
[474] ably wasteful. It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative
societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspec-
torate, and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself
in rural education and established agricultural schools in every
[361] liwā. It was promoting village settlement, in which field the in-
teresting and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323)
was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the
Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board
allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six
years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechan-
ization of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of
depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly
under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all
the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties
of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of
a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under
controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

425 421 The Mission believes that the settlers should, as a matter of general principle, be required to make some payment for the extensive benefits received. This is all the more necessary in order not to widen unduly the disparity between the economic status of the favored settlers and that of the great majority of cultivators who will continue to work under much less favorable conditions. Such payments need not be excessively burdensome, since they could be spread over a number of years.

241 425 [166] The new law will apply on a broad scale the basic principles of the Dujaila land settlement scheme in south-central Iraq. In the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled there on 100-donum plots allotted from state-owned irrigated land. The Mission was impressed by the results achieved through this scheme. The farmers, who used to be sharecroppers, are conscious of their new-won independence and dignity. By comparison with the fellahin in neighboring areas they appear prosperous and content. [477] Many of them are members of a cooperative—the only one of its kind in Iraq—which owns 10 tractors, two lorries, a flour mill and a club-house. Although the accounts of this cooperative leave much to be desired, its operations are generally along sound lines and indicative of what can be accomplished through state-assisted self-help. The Dujaila scheme is, however, not without defects. Its success as an agricultural venture is jeopardized by the progressive salination of the land because of failure to provide drainage facilities—an omission which should be promptly remedied. The administrative staff appears to be excessively large. Small-scale "landlordism" has crept in, since some farmers have brought in others to do a large part of their work on a sharecropping basis. The farmers were settled in a scattered fashion without regard to the need for community life. Most important, aside from insisting on small fruit gardens, the committee in charge of the project has effected no improvement in farming methods. The Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee, and there are no agricultural experts in the project capable of assisting farmers in raising their standards of cultivation. The improved economic position of the cultivators in the Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to a landlord. In the

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452 453 enabled to obtain sufficient credit to buy seeds, fertilizer, livestock, machinery and other means of production and to make it unnecessary for them to sell their crops immediately after harvest at extremely low prices. The Mission therefore suggests that the Development Board provide sufficient funds to raise the paid-in capital of the Bank to about ID 2,000,000. This should permit the Bank to expand its credit operations and refund its borrowed resources. Action to enable the Bank to increase its lending will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time greater care is exercised to insure that loans are promptly repaid and that farmers, who are often improvident, borrow only for purposes which will increase their output. In the past a considerable portion of the Bank's capital has become frozen as the result of repeated extensions of the maturity dates on its loans.

343 488 Good storage facilities for grain and perhaps other crops would reduce losses due to infestation, improve the quality of grain, assist in the stabilization of prices and provide some assurance against famine. At present grain is often stored in the open or in inadequate buildings and sheds. A modern 5,000-ton grain elevator has recently been erected in Baghdad, and another of 40,000 tons is projected for Basra to serve the export trade. There is, however, an urgent need for less elaborate and smaller storage facilities throughout the grain-growing areas. These could be of simple concrete or corrugated steel construction and range in capacity from 1,000 to 3,000 tons. Simple cleaning machinery would be desirable in order to remove impurities from the grain. Such storage facilities, which might have a total capacity of about 75,000 tons, would presumably be owned and operated by the Grain Board, an autonomous government agency, and would need to be closely controlled so that the Agricultural Bank could with safety make loans against grain stored in them by farmers and merchants. Under such conditions, more merchants would probably enter the market to bid for grain at harvest time and farmers themselves would not be under the necessity of marketing their grain immediately after the harvest irrespective of the level of prices.

474 Although an impressive law on cooperatives has been put on the statute books, almost nothing has been done to organize effec-

tive cooperatives. As already indicated, the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project is the only promising venture in this field. The organization of cooperatives is at present entrusted to a department in the Ministry of Economics whose entire staff consists of a part-time director, one assistant and one clerk. About forty cooperatives are now registered with the department, but most of these are apparently inoperative and all but one are consumers' cooperatives for which there seems to be less need. The Mission urges that in the future efforts be concentrated on the organization of agricultural cooperatives and that therefore the responsibility for cooperatives be transferred to the Department of Agriculture. Such cooperatives can become an important means of self-help and saving by farmers. Gradually they may become an important vehicle for the extension of credit to small farmers by the Agricultural Bank.

Undoubtedly progress in inculcating farmers with the necessary cooperative spirit and a knowledge of the benefits of cooperation will be slow. Strong guidance and control will need to be provided initially by the government, and the cooperatives will have to be held to strict accountability in the use of their assets. Yet the experience with the Dujaila cooperative and, to some extent, with cooperatives in other Moslem countries, such as Egypt, indicates that beneficial results can be achieved by persistent, well-directed efforts. Cooperatives for the purchase and distribution of seeds, fertilizer and other tools of production and for the joint ownership and operation of machinery should be made an integral part of the new settlement schemes. While primary emphasis should be put on this task, efforts should also be made to organize cooperatives on a small, experimental scale among existing sharecroppers. Such cooperatives, assisted by the Agricultural Bank, might confine themselves initially to relatively modest operations such as the provision of seed and simple tools. Success in this field will depend on the existence of a small cadre of enthusiastic government officials properly trained in the organization and operation of cooperatives. It is therefore suggested that the government take prompt steps to have a number of such officials trained in a country like Cyprus where a well-developed cooperative movement exists.

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machinery. At the same time the cost of new machinery and equipment will need to be financed—possibly out of Development Board funds if earlier plans to borrow for this purpose from the International Bank do not materialize. 655 407 427

Government rental of machinery should at best be considered a temporary expedient. It is wasteful, primarily because overhead expenses are high. The transportation of machinery from central shops to the renters tends to be expensive and to expose the machinery to excessive wear and tear. Private and cooperative ownership of machinery should therefore be encouraged. One step in this direction would be to enable the Agricultural Bank to lend money for this purpose on the security of the machinery. In the past the absence of any provision for registering title to such machinery has prevented such loans. Another important measure would be to encourage the establishment of cooperatives for the collective ownership of machinery, especially in the new agricultural areas which are to be opened. At present the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project owns a number of tractors. [474] ● Because overhead costs are relatively low it is able to rent them out at lower rate than the AMA while still apparently covering the cost of operation and depreciation.

V. Control of Pests and Diseases

Livestock Pests and Mortality 232

More effective control of pests and diseases would also materially help to improve yields. This is particularly true of livestock. Because of lack of funds, equipment and trained personnel, no systematic campaigns for eradicating specific groups of diseases have been undertaken. Many livestock diseases, particularly of the parasitic type, are rife. Among the principal livestock diseases are foot and mouth disease; haemorrhagic septicaemia; anthrax; sheep pox; blackleg; parasitic gastritis; tick-borne diseases (anaplasmosis and piroplasmosis); fowl cholera; Newcastle disease; various manges; and dourine. The available staff is wholly insufficient to control, let alone eradicate, any epidemic which might break out. A serious outbreak of disease would endanger the livestock industry of neighboring countries as well as that of Iraq.

X. Cooperatives

Cooperatives have unfortunately made little progress. There 474 is an impressive law on cooperatives which provides, among other things, for their registration and the auditing of their accounts by the government. The government also received an excellent report on cooperative possibilities made by an expert in 1947. Neither the law nor the report have really been implemented. Responsibility for cooperatives is now vested in a Department of Cooperatives within the Ministry of Economics. Its entire staff consists of one part-time director, another officer and a clerk. By May 1951 it had registered 40 cooperatives of which all but one were consumers' cooperatives. Apparently nearly all of these are either dormant or of small importance. The Department has obviously been unable to give constructive, practical assistance in the organization and operation of cooperatives or even to take the initial step of sending some people abroad for training in cooperative management. It has neither received nor audited the financial accounts of any of the existing cooperatives.

The only really worthwhile cooperative in existence appears to be the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project where over 1,000 small-holders were settled at government expense. This cooperative, which was formed in 1947, owned in the spring of 1951 ten tractors with tillers, two trucks, a small flour mill and a clubhouse. The cooperative rents the tractors at a reasonable rate to its members and at a higher rate to nonmembers. Operation of the flour mill is contracted out under an arrangement which fixes the milling charges. The trucks provide transport for men and goods both within the settlement and to the nearby town of Kut. Although its accounts leave much to be desired, the cooperative appears to be in a sound financial condition. (See Note 13 on following page.) It needs expert advice, however, on the proper methods of setting up its books and controlling its expenditures, and its accounts should be subject periodically to an independent audit. A consumers' cooperative also operates in the Dujaila project, but it aparently runs at a loss owing to high selling expenses and low turnover. It would be advisable either to dis-continue it entirely or at least to replace its existing three shops with a mobile store which might sell more at lower cost in this scattered settlement.

The experience with the Dujaila producers' cooperative indicates that useful results can be obtained. Under existing conditions cooperatives will not, however, be organized spontaneously by the farmers themselves. They will need the impetus, assistance and supervision of the government. The cooperative is a rather advanced form of social organization and can therefore be expected to develop only at a slow rate. The necessary spirit of cooperation and sense of collective responsibility will have to be carefully nurtured in any program of adult education sponsored by the Ministry of Education and in any educational programs carried out by the proposed agricultural extension service.

The first step should be to transfer responsibility for cooperatives to the Department of Agriculture. It would be well to concentrate entirely on rural cooperatives for these are most urgently needed. The next step would be to recruit and train personnel. The staff need not be large initially, but should be sufficient to permit considerable field work. It should consist of people genuinely interested in cooperatives and preferably drawn from rural backgrounds. It must include one or two accountants equipped to draw up a standardized system of bookkeeping to be

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[18] The cooperative has not drawn up a balance sheet of its assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude from data made available by the Dujaila Committee in Baghdad that the cooperative has apparently not operated at a loss. From February 1, 1950 to April 20, 1951, its current revenues amounted to ID 6,024.991 and its current operating expenditures on salaries, wages, fuel, and sundries to ID 3,955.695, so that the operating account showed a surplus of ID 2,069.296 which could be reinvested. A provisional balance sheet as of April 1951 could be struck about as follows:

Assets		Liabilities	
Property (at cost)....ID	14,055.734	Capital paid-in ....ID	8,207.066
Accounts receivable	856.052	Debts owed	2,128.000
Cash (approximate)	260.000	Depreciation (balance)..	4,836.720
Total ....ID	15,171.786	Total ....ID	15,171.786

The depreciation allowance made above represents the difference between the known assets and liabilities. This amount corresponds in fact closely to an allowance of around ID 5,000 which should be allowed on the basis of sound accounting practice to cover actual depreciation on the various items in the capital inventory (20 percent annually on tractors and lorries; 10 percent on mill equipment and buildings).

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followed by cooperatives and to audit the accounts of cooperatives. 474 The necessary staff will have to be trained abroad, preferably in Cyprus where a diversified cooperative movement flourishes. It will also be desirable to give some instruction in cooperatives in the teachers' training colleges and the agricultural schools.

One of the logical places to start with the organization of cooperatives would be in new agricultural settlements as was done in fact in the Dujaila project. People who start afresh in a new settlement will generally be more receptive to new forms of organization. In these new settlements cooperative ownership of tools and machinery will probably be most important. Care must be taken not to overburden the cooperative with too many activities at the beginning. Operations should be expanded only as experience is acquired.

As already indicated, the need of the fellah who continues to farm on a sharecropping basis is the most urgent. He cannot therefore be neglected in the effort to establish cooperatives even though his poverty and his relations to his landlord may make the organization of cooperatives particularly difficult. Among those fellahin, one might begin with the organization of credit cooperatives which would make loans not on the security of the borrower's possessions but on his reputation for work, honesty and thrift. In this way the fellah might be able to obtain credit on more reasonable terms for the purchase of tools, seeds, animals and other requisites. Initially such credit cooperatives would probably need to be financed almost entirely by the Agricultural Bank, but the objective should be to base their operations increasingly on the regular savings of their members.

XI. Storage Facilities and Credit

Farmers are also in need of adequate facilities in which they 488 452 can store their produce and obtain credit against warehouse receipts. At present, prices tend to dip sharply at harvest time because the farmer is generally compelled to sell his crop immediately after or even before harvest in order to obtain needed cash. The merchants with money then reap the benefit of subsequent price advances. More storage and credit facilities would enable

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the development of industry sketched above.[1] Industries which 654 existed then or have come into existence since have benefited con- 433 siderably from these concessions. But private enterprise remained shy of industrial activity until the establishment of the Industrial Bank in 1946-47. Through this Bank, the State showed itself not 652 only willing to forgo some revenue in the interests of industry, 475 but to provide cash, and to share in the risks of industry. As mentioned above, the Industrial Bank could not only give loans (against real or personal security), but also participate in the capital of joint stock companies. Its greatest value in my view lies in the fact that it can become a founder or promoter of industries and thus lead the industrial community and the investing public into new fields. However, the Bank was handicapped in the early stages, 652 by the inadequacy of the financial resources at its disposal and the absence of economic and technical studies by which the feasibility of proposed industrial schemes might be judged. Moreover, the Bank lacked, and to some extent still lacks, a qualified technical staff. It has often to rely on the judgement of the Board of Directors or the advice of specialized Government departments such as the Directorate General of Industry and the Directorate General of Agriculture, which are not always fully equipped for the task. The Bank has continually asked for scientific surveys to be made 654 of the mineral, agricultural and animal resources of the country. 433 It has also called for an integrated economic plan covering indus- 652 try, agriculture and other economic activities, in which the Bank, like other institutions, will play its particular role.[2] There has been strong resistance on the part of the Board of Directors to the allocation of money for technical staff or technical studies by experts, and often when money was allocated, it could not be spent because the Board disagreed on the qualifications of such experts (foreign or national) or the need for inviting them to study particular problems. However, as years passed and the financial position of the Bank improved, a section for the study of industrial schemes was formed and members of it were charged with the study of certain problems at home or abroad. A number of ad hoc committees of specialists available in Iraq were set up to study and report on proposed industrial schemes. Contact was estab-

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[1] No provision was made, however, for direct subsidies to industry, and no legal preference in government contracts was given to home industry.

[2] See First Annual Report, Industrial Bank 1946-47/1947-48, Baghdad. (Arabic)

652 473 ly control the price, sales and purchases policies of such industries. In the first place, though the Bank holds a large proportion of the capital (varying between 20 and 40 per cent) of every industry, it is always in the minority on the Boards of Directors ; moreover it appoints its own representatives and is excluded from taking part in the election of other directors by the articles of association of the companies concerned. This course has been deliberately taken so as to ensure private enterprise against arbitrary action on the part of the government. Secondly, the Bank itself is, in the last analysis, a profit seeking institution and therefore it is not likely to stand in the way of any measures likely to increase profits, unless they are of an obviously oppressive or abusive nature. Thirdly, the main duty of the Bank is to promote industry. Promotion and control are not always compatible.

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mals offers a more practical answer to their needs at this time. 241 Experience in Iraq shows that tractor plowing may increase yields by 20 to 50 percent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and partly also through better preparation of the soil. Much the same effect could, however, be achieved through better animal-drawn plows replacing those which now, for the most part, barely scratch the surface and fail to uproot the weeds. Means for the acquisition of such tools and improved draft animals should be created through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of better credit facilities.

Mechanization will nevertheless play an increasingly important role in the future, especially as labor becomes more scarce and additional land becomes available for cultivation. Mechanization has already facilitated the expansion of cultivation in the dry-farming areas of Mosul and the new pump-irrigated lands in central Iraq. While certain areas in the irrigation zone are undoubtedly overpopulated in relation to land currently available, in other areas, particularly in the rain-fed zone, labor is scarce relative to the supply of land. As development schemes are launched and new land is opened up for settlement, the available manpower on lands already under cultivation may well be reduced. The government will need therefore to take steps to insure that mechanization will keep pace with developing requirements. In the period immediately ahead, however, the government should be mindful of the possibility that mechanization initiated by landowners may result in a substantial reduction of the portion of the crop going to sharecroppers or in the displacement of sharecroppers before alternative means of employment or settlement become available. Through its control over the importation and distribution of machinery and the extension of credit for the purchase of such machinery, the government will have the power to influence the direction of mechanization and thus minimize to some extent possibly adverse social consequences.

At present only a small portion of Iraqi agriculture is mechanized. Combines and tractors in operation are reported to number 320 and 750 respectively, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. Of these, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned by the Agricultural Machinery

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407 Administration, an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Eco-
475 nomics. The AMA rents this machinery to farmers and, in addi-
427 tion, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery,
647 licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts in order to prevent black-marketing.

Some provision for rental of machinery, whether by the government or by private enterprise, will be necessary for some time, partly because it enables farmers to become acquainted with the value of such machinery and partly because many farmers do not have sufficient capital for outright purchase. As long as private enterprise is incapable of providing this service at reasonable rentals or until cooperatives can be established, continuation of the government rental service appears essential. On the whole, therefore, the AMA's three-year program to replace and expand its machinery park and to equip repair shops appears desirable despite the obvious drawbacks of government operation. At present, however, the AMA is operating at a substantial loss. In the calendar year 1951, for instance, its rental income will probably not exceed ID 50,000 compared with estimated operating costs, including depreciation, of about ID 150,000. Since the beginning of 1950, when it started operations as a fiscally autonomous agency, it has had to cover its deficits out of the ID 500,000 capital which the government undertook to provide. While the government should probably defray that part of the AMA's expenditures not directly attributable to the rental operations, the overall deficit should be reduced by gradually increasing rental charges. Rental charges on tractors, in particular, appear unduly low and may be depriving private persons of the incentive to purchase tractors either for their own use or for rental to others.

407 Since the overhead costs of the AMA's rental operations will
471 probably always remain rather high and its machinery must be
647 transported over considerable distances, it is important that the
government encourage as much as possible private purchase and
[452] operation of machinery. The extension of credit for this purpose appears essential. At present, however, the Agricultural Bank cannot lend money on farm equipment partly because it is short of funds and partly because such loans would not afford sufficient security in the absence of any legal requirement to register title TO MACHINERY.

491 are unsurfaced and impassable for long periods in wet weather. All-weather roads are at present found only in the Baghdad area and in the mountains in the North. The only passable trunk roads are those from Baghdad to Khanaqin, Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul, and Baghdad to Rutba and Syria. Even these have shorter or longer sections in very poor condition. There is no all-season road between Baghdad and Basra.

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509 Two civilian airports, Baghdad and Basra, serve the principal air routes between Europe, Asia and beyond. Internal air services are limited to one line between Baghdad and Basra. Military airfields and landing grounds and a few private air strips are available in certain places, but demand for internal air transport has so far been negligible.

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475 One state air line, Iraqi Airways, operates services with neighbor countries and Egypt through Baghdad and Basra with a small fleet of four aircraft. Administration and management of the airline are combined with those of the state railways.

315 Oil from the oil fields at Kirkuk is carried by pipelines across the country to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa, but the line to Haifa is now out of operation. A shorter pipeline connects the southern Iraq oilfield with the Shatt al Arab oil port at Fao.

489 Transport connections with the outside world are well served by the Port of Basra for ocean-going traffic, by the airports of Baghdad and Basra in international air traffic and by the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean. At present only one railway line, beginning at Baghdad, connects Iraq with Syria, and via Syria with Turkey and Europe. A desert road exists for through road traffic between Iraq and Syria and Lebanon. A private company, Nairn Transport, operates an international bus service on this route. There are two main roads for exchange of traffic with Iran, one from Baghdad via Khanaqin, and one from Erbil via the Rowanduz Valley and Rayat. Future economic developments may perhaps demand new traffic outlets to the Mediterranean, shorter and better equipped than the existing railway and road routes, but at present there are few signs of such a demand.

Tigris, although during each of the two World Wars there was a temporary railway connection with Kut. 496

The railways are state-owned and operated under the management of a Director General who is responsible to a Railway Board appointed by the government. The administration is autonomous and has its own budget which must, however, be submitted annually to Parliament for approval. The administration is well organized, the management capable and the operation efficient and economical. [475]

Capacity

The railway system consists entirely of single track lines built to light standards, and the permitted axle loads are very low. This limits the capacity of the lines and increases the operation problems. There is no doubt, however, that the system's capacity is ample for present demands. During several war years it actually carried about twice the tonnage of goods transported in recent years, even though the length of the system was only about one third greater through the temporary construction of military branch lines (see Table 4). 496 489

Railway carrying capacity is in reality rather elastic. The railways could carry as a minimum 15 percent more goods, and, in a pinch, could probably carry considerably more. In consequence of the over-all development program, traffic requirements will undoubtedly increase quite rapidly. For example, the value of imports may double within about five years, and the amount of

TABLE 4

TRAFFIC ON STATE RAILWAYS

		PASSENGERS		GOODS	
Year	Route Kilometers	Passenger Journeys	Passenger Kilometers	Total Revenue Tonnage Carried	Total Revenue Ton Kilometers
1943-44	2,011	4,418,590	662,256,369	3,586,081	905,104,309
1944-45	1,555	4,869,523	669,987,674	2,390,402	648,482,848
1945-46	1,555	5,292,441	775,107,476	1,970,107	513,643,871
1946-47	1,555	4,300,413	630,705,454	1,860,296	600,138,802
1947-48	1,555	3,725,463	529,066,676	1,714,290	556,623,270
1948-49	1,555	3,340,034	473,075,056	1,674,289	497,306,309
1949-50	1,648	3,609,337	517,939,859	1,980,795	657,097,000

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

241 [312] advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallaḥ*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

511 In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of the *badu* and their hungry camels. 511 423 Even where tenure was reasonably secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving productivity; [476] wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

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[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[311]

[2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north.

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

312 423 to use a quantity of water out of proportion to the amount of land to be irrigated; and in times of water scarcity they must be taken into account in rationing the available supply even though an objective appraisal of relative requirements might produce quite a different distribution.

312 A larger supply of water would, of course, minimize the difficulties of distribution set forth above, but in the long run it is also vitally important that economies be effected in the amount of water used. The provision of drainage facilities and the installation of an adequate amount of regulators on canals will certainly bring about substantial economies of this character. The cultivators in Iraq, however, have for many years been accustomed to use water rather lavishly; only demonstration will convince them that they 312 651 can safely manage with a smaller supply. It has already been pointed out that the irrigation duty is very low compared to that in many other countries. For flow-irrigated lands it is about 16,950 masharas gross (equivalent to 7,200 masharas in crops); for land irrigated by pumps from canals, 19,500; and for that irrigated by pumps from rivers, 26,200. Pump-irrigated lands have a somewhat higher duty because they are generally better drained and therefore less salted and because the cost of pumping encourages economy in the use of water. As far as the Mission is aware, the problem of 312 raising the irrigation duty has not been systematically studied. The Mission recommends strongly that fields be set aside in each irrigation system for the purpose of determining through practical experimentation over a number of years the optimum quantity of water to be supplied to each crop. Such experiments should be carried out under the joint direction of the Agriculture and Irrigation Departments.

In the future it would be desirable to associate the landholders in each irrigation area as far as possible with the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. Irrigation should be a truly ● [476] cooperative venture. The Mission understands that councils of landowners already exist in some districts, notably along the Diyala, to assist irrigation officials in the distribution of water at times of shortage. Such councils might well be organized in all districts and with the broader function of advising on all problems of maintenance and distribution. They could sponsor the experi-

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

243 Bombay was. "No," he said, "here we make our bread
262 from rice flour. When the wheat crop is a failure, as in
the past year, we have almost nothing else."

312 These overflow districts,^ which are marshes in the
spring when the rivers overflow, dry down to hard soil
later in the year. To keep the water high for a few
weeks longer than it would naturally remain so, temporary
dams are constructed across some of the smaller
streams, leaving an opening to allow boats to pass and
water to run through. These dams persist in the face
[342] of a strong current in a way that is surprising. Mud,
tree branches, mats, soil and the like seem to be the only
building material, for there is no stone within hundreds of
[476] miles. The dams require a large amount of labor, and
of course are coöperative enterprises. Possibly because
of this necessity for coöperative effort, the Marsh Arab
communities appear to have developed a good degree of
community spirit.

361 Like their race everywhere, these Marsh Arabs do not
live in isolated individual houses in the midst of their
fields but collect in larger or smaller towns, some of them
of considerable size. These towns are located usually
in the fork of a river, or where several streams
come together. In Lower Mesopotamia there are many
small channels that carry water either out of the main
501 river or into it. The Marsh Arabs get about in picturesque,
high-prowed, black river boats, black because they
are covered with a thick coat of native bitumen which
wells from the ground in one or two places in Mesopotamia
[135] and is an indication, so the engineers tell us, that
petroleum is to be found in that country. These river
boats, which are the one means of transportation, are
built somewhat on the lines of a canoe and take consid-

^[along the last 100 miles of the Arab river from Gurna to the Gulf -- Analyst]

the Law for the Encouragement of Industry are granted irrespective 433 of the locality in which the Industry is to be established or the 654 type of industry embarked upon. Industries established in crowded, highly developed areas are given the same advantages as those established in remote, less developed districts. The manufacturer of producer's goods is treated equally with the manufacturer of consumers' goods and luxury goods. The criteria upon which an industry's claim to benefits is judged stand in need of drastic revaluation.

The limitation of the market in Iraq not only restricts the possibilities 477 of large-scale development of most industries but it affords opportunities for monopoly control by one or two plants in certain fields. The danger of monopoly and exorbitant prices is already in sight in such industries as cement, beer, cotton and woollen textiles. The encouragement of new enterprise in these fields, or the relaxation of state protection to allow healthy competition, or direct intervention by the state to fix prices in relation to costs, is necessary to restrict monopoly power in the interests of the consumer and to preserve public confidence in industry. It is only on the basis of such confidence that the government can continue to give support and material aid to industry. The Iraqi Government has ample powers for dealing with the abuses of monopoly under the provisions of the Law for the Organisation of Economic Life of 1941.

The government can also extend its control over industry 473 and prevent abuses by proper amendments to the law governing joint-stock companies. There is need to restrict the grant of free-shares or "water" shares to promotors, the creation of founders' shares with special powers of voting or percentage of profits, the interlocking of directorships, and abuses on the part of management in respect of purchases of materials and equipment, and sales of finished products. In particular, managers of joint-stock companies should be prohibited from trading on their own account especially in goods related to firms under their management.

The Industrial Bank has often been urged, as a shareholder 652 in many industries, and with its representative on their boards, 473 to exercise control over their price and sales policies. This suggestion derives from the prestige which the Bank has acquired in relation to industrial development. It has undoubtedly helped to iron out many difficulties, to improve management, and prevent abuses. But it is going too far to suppose that the Bank can actual-

: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

to supplement its capital by borrowing and accepting time deposits 453
from certain institutions, their resources have been wholly inadequate to the need.

VIII. Domestic and Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments

As noted earlier, trade is probably the second most important 443
occupation. To all appearances, the system of distribution is extremely wasteful. Both in the small towns and in the larger cities there are numerous traders with very small stocks of goods, who cannot possibly earn more than an exiguous income, even if their margin of profit is high. The position is, however, not likely to be cured until the general level of incomes rises and there is alternative opportunity for employment.

Iraq produces most of its food, but apart from fuel, tobacco, 439
and some building materials, most of its other requirements must 439
be imported. Even the small local industries and handicrafts depend to some extent on imported raw materials. Much of the trade is therefore foreign trade. Baghdad is the principal center for the import trade and also has a considerable share in the export trade, although Mosul is the main center for the export of wool and Basra for dates and barley.

Although there are a number of large firms, among them several 439
foreign companies, engaged in the export-import business, 477
trade is by no means monopolized, as can be seen from the following table which shows the distribution of import licenses granted:

TABLE 9

IMPORT LICENSES: 1951

Import Quota (ID 000)	Number of Importers		Total Allocation (ID million)
	Baghdad	Other Cities	
100-180	36	18	6.6
50-80	60	24	4.9
20-40	344	147	13.1
5-10	1,015	502	[illegible]
	1,453	691	34.9

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

439
•477
[455]

Competition, in fact, is quite keen in bulk commodities like sugar, tea and textiles. There is no organized market, either in export or import commodities, so that, as speculation is rife, prices can swing rapidly upward on the basis of rumored or actual shortage.

439

TABLE 10

IMPORTS INTO IRAQ (by value)
(in millions of dinars)

	1938	1947	1948	1949	1950
1. Sugar	0.5	1.7	3.7	2.2	4.8
2. Tea	0.4	2.3	2.1	2.8	2.9
3. Cereals and flour	—	0.2	2.3	1.1	—
4. Other food, beverages and tobacco	0.4	2.0	1.4	1.5	0.9
5. Cotton and rayon piece-goods	1.3	7.7	7.7	6.2	6.4
6. Other textiles and clothing[1]	0.9	4.0	3.4	2.9	3.0
7. Soap and matches	0.1	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.7
8. Cement and timber	0.5	1.6	1.6	1.0	0.4
9. Petroleum products	0.3	0.9	1.6	1.3	1.6
10. Iron and steel	1.1	4.8	5.0	4.9	3.7
11. Automobiles, trucks, and parts[2]	0.5	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.2
12. Machinery; electrical and other transport equipment	1.7	4.4	6.8	7.0	5.9
13. Miscellaneous	1.7	7.3	6.4	5.9	5.2
Total	9.4	40.0	45.5	40.5	37.6
Oil company imports[3]	1.0	5.1	9.5	10.3	8.4
Net	8.4	34.9	36.0	30.2	29.2

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[1] Excluding burlap bags, rope, etc.

[2] Including tires and tubes.

[3] The majority of these imports were in categories 9 to 12. For example, oil company imports in these categories were about ID 8,000,000 in 1948 and ID 9,000,000 in 1949, out of a total of ID 16,000,000 in each year. Except for petroleum products, these goods were virtually all for the companies' own use rather than for resale.

Imports

Table 10 gives a list of the principal imports for 1938 and for the last four years. Broadly speaking, categories 1 to 7 represent the principal consumer goods, categories 8 to 12 fuel, building materials and capital equipment, and category 13 some consumer goods and some industrial raw materials. As the footnote to

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered 575
by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526
survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in 'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling, was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America. Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542
well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the 484
poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying 369
the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529
summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in 212
the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world 178
upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts, easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development, an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted, was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of 1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology 814
apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

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[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monotonous 164
diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484 ●
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

IRAQ MH1

164 parently of primary importance in all parts of the country, particularly in the lower delta region. Local authorities estimate that 25 to 35 per cent of the inhabitants in Baghdad harbor cysts of *Endamoeba histolytica*, while in Basra the carrier rate probably approximates 60 to 70 per cent. Liver abscesses are frequently encountered.

The actual distribution of bacillary infections is unknown, since the proportion of cases treated by medical officers is unduly small, and few facilities for confirmatory diagnosis are available. According to the official statistics for 1944 through 1949, from 17,000 to 30,000 cases of amebic dysentery and from 180 to 1,100 cases of bacillary dysentery were reported each year. Correspondingly, an analysis of the cases treated annually in the hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field and pipeline areas, in the 4 years 1946-50, shows that from 478 to 1,603 were amebic infections and from 58 to 175 bacillary. The Flexner group predominates among the *Shigella* strains isolated in dysentery cases at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad, but Sonne, Schmitz and Shiga types are also numerous.

136 515 164 165 The abundance of flies and the insanitary habits of the people favor the spread of intestinal infections. Diarrhea and enteritis are major causes of illness and death, especially in early childhood. Giardiasis is common. Outbreaks of food poisoning, undoubtedly caused by various strains of *Salmonella*, are frequent.

164 484 Cholera. Epidemics of cholera were formerly recurrent in the border districts and along the trade routes from India and the East. Although some authorities believe that an endemic focus may have existed in the Shatt al Arab region in the past, most epidemics have resulted from the introduction of the disease by way of traffic through the Persian Gulf ports or by overland travel through Iran, often in connection with pilgrimages to Mecca or local Shia shrines. 164 Within recent decades extensive outbreaks, each totaling from 1,500 to 2,500 cases,

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IRAQ MN1

were reported in 1923, 1927 and 1931. Since 164
1931, cholera has been almost completely
absent from the country, although one imported
case was recorded in 1939, when the
disease was epidemic in Afghanistan and
Iran.

Strict quarantine regulations are enforced, 744
and travelers from India, Pakistan 484 ●
and Ceylon, as well as pilgrims from Mecca, 164
without valid certificates of immunization
against cholera are retained in quarantine
centers for a period of 7 days. Mass immunization 751
with cholera vaccine is carried 164
on among the populations in the border
provinces whenever epidemics are reported
from the adjacent territories. At the time
of the recent epidemic in Egypt, in 1947,
immunization was compulsory for all travelers
entering the country and for the inhabitants
of towns and villages along the
Syrian frontier.

Helminthiases. SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schistosomiasis, 164
caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, 136
has probably been present in the
lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins
since ancient times. It is highly endemic in
the southern and the central provinces,
where the intermediate snail host, *Bulinus
truncatus*, is found in widespread but often
localized foci. The disease is prevalent 164
among the children and among the agricultural 462
and other laborers who work in infested
waters, particularly the men and the
boys, who are exposed to infection to a
greater extent than the women. It reaches
maximum proportions between 10 and 20
years of age, but is usually negligible in
early childhood. Transmission is seasonal: 164
it takes place from May to the end of November, 515
but primarily between June and
October, when infected snails are most
abundant. The insanitary customs of the
inhabitants, associated with the frequent
use of the canals for religious ablutions and
the severe summer heat which is conducive
to bathing in any convenient body of water,
are contributory factors. The infection rates 164
average 18 to 25 per cent in the irrigated 361
districts of the delta, but vary from zero

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

THE INFECTION IS FREQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY means of the pilgrimage traffic or tribal 164 migrations from the neighboring territories, 484 and is believed to smolder continuously in 167 the northeastern mountain districts. Cases 164 are usually observed during the winter and the spring months, with the maximum incidence in March and April. Serious outbreaks, with a total of over 1,300 known cases, were reported in 1942-43 in conjunction with epidemics prevailing throughout the entire Middle East. The actual prevalence was probably several times the official estimates. The greatest numbers of cases were noted in Baghdad, and in Basra, Mosul, Diyala and Sulaimaniya *liwas*, along the main routes from Iran. The congestion 164 and the shortage of food, clothing, 722 soaps and other supplies existing in that area as the result of military operations during World War II favored the spread of the infection among the louse-infested populations. About 800 cases of typhus were 164 reported in 1944, but the annual incidence subsequently declined to a low of 72 cases in 1949. No differentiation is made as to type, and the recorded cases include both louse-borne and flea-borne infections. On the basis of laboratory investigations, authorities at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad suggest that many outbreaks in the north, where louse-borne typhus is supposedly endemic, are caused by strains which are serologically intermediate between *Rickettsia* [136] *prowazeki* and *R. mooseri*.

Murine typhus is endemic, and probably predominates in the rural areas in the absence of a large-scale epidemic. Tick-borne infections are not specifically reported, and are undoubtedly rare. In the event of a 164 typhus outbreak, control measures, including 744 the use of DDT preparations and mass immunization of the inhabitants with antityphus vaccines, are carried on in the affected communities by the government health authorities.

Plague. Epidemics of plague were fre- 164 quent in the past, particularly in the region around Baghdad, but the disease has been almost completely absent within recent YEARS.

p. 45 (B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

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only 1 case, in which the diagnosis was confirmed by laboratory examination, had been recorded. Potential sandfly vectors of kala-azar are apparently absent in the southern and the central provinces, but they may exist in the northern highlands. 164 369

Other Infections. Sandfly fever is endemic, and, in the delta region, reaches epidemic proportions every few years. From 842 to 4,688 cases were recorded annually in 1944-49. The sandfly vector, *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is widely distributed. The season of transmission usually extends from May to November, with a peak in June or July. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the south. 164

Cases of elephantiasis of undetermined origin are occasionally encountered, but *Wuchereria bancrofti* is not known to be present. Guinea worm infections are sometimes seen in pilgrims from southern Iran, but no indigenous cases have been recorded. [484]

NUTRITIONAL DISEASES

Undernutrition, anemia and avitaminosis are prevalent, especially among the wage-earning classes in the cities and the impoverished peasants of the south. Clinical manifestations of vitamin A and vitamin C deficiencies are widespread. In general, serious nutritional diseases tend to be more or less localized in distribution, depending upon the dietary habits and the standards of living of the people. Rickets is common, and from 100 to 2,387 cases were treated annually in the government institutions in 1944-49. Cases of scurvy and of osteomalacia are numerous. Beriberi and pellagra are sporadic, but minor symptoms of riboflavin deficiency are frequently observed. Protein edema is rare. A form of cirrhosis of the liver is encountered in which malnutrition is believed by some authorities to be a contributory factor. 146 511 361

MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS

Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and large-scale epidemics are reported occasionally. Encephalitis lethargica is sporadic. 164

p. 41 (A)

312 185 Although by 1900 these conditions were not unrealized either in Baghdad or Istanbul, they had not been formulated as connected problems for solution. Governmental activity in this sphere had consisted, at the caprice of Pashas, in no more than some measure of organization of petty local works. The Administration had in fact neither the knowledge nor control nor finance necessary to formulate or organize a comprehensive irrigation system. Heedless alike of present evils and of rich possibilities, the governors of 'Iraq were doing and planning nothing while irrigation in Egypt and India was making great and fruitful progress. Nor was the contribution of the public more promising; the shiftless tribal cultivators carried out with low efficiency such minimum of silt-clearance and flood-dyke repairs as was forced upon them, erected temporary canal-heads of reed-bundles or brushwood, multiplied their primeval devices of water-lift, wastefully prolonged or resited their canals, and ruined area after area with neglected salting.

An outstanding case of deterioration in irrigation conditions was occurring in these years on the middle Euphrates. Up to 1880 the Ḥilla branch had been maintained as the principal waterway, the Hindiya branch being a canal deriving from it. But the closing of the Ṣaqlawiya head up-stream, and the operation of natural forces of silting and scouring, allowed the Hindiya branch to gain in width and discharge. The problem of maintaining the flow of the Ḥilla branch had become first critically difficult and finally impossible. French engineers in 1891 completed a masonry dam which still held precariously in 1900, but failed to arrest the increasing ruin of Ḥilla branch irrigation.

487 The ancient land routes of the territory had remained constant since many centuries. Camel caravans used the desert ways of Damascus and Aleppo, mule-trains the time-worn hill tracks into Luristan, Kirmanshah, Persian Kurdistan, and the Van wilaya. 491 Within 'Iraq the routes were fixed by custom based on convenience; but here there were signs of recent progress in the provision of wayside Khans, new toll-bridges of stone or brick or resting on fragile pontoons. The roads, varying by districts in surface and security, were everywhere unsurfaced and neglected, deep in summer dust or flooded to seas of mud by rain or the overflow of canals.

499 Railways had, for many years, been hailed from a distance by 'Iraqis of every class as the bringers of ease and progress, and schemes in plenty had been propounded—those of Chesney in the eighteen-thirties, of Andrew in the 'fifties, and later of the Austrian von Pressel, the Italian Tonetti, the Frenchman Cottard, the Russian Kapnist. A local company had been formed in the 'eighties to construct a Khaniqin–Baghdad line, which lack of

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619
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
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ALEPPO
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LATAKIA
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HAMA
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TRIPOLI
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BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
J. TENF
HAIFA
Burqu
JAFFA
AMMAN
Qasr Azraq
JERUSALEM
TRANSJORDANIA
PALESTINE
TRANS-DESER
RAILWAYS
BOUNDARIES
TRIBAL NAMES
OIL PIPE LINES
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[following p. 96 (a)]

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

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315


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MOSUL
Erbil
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Altun Kopri
KIRKUK
Qala Sherqat
LEPPO
R I A
Deir ez Zur
Euphrates
PALMYRA
Baiji
Tikrit
Samarra
Abu Kamal
Ana
Al Qaim
HADITHA
Khan Baghdadi
Hit
Ramadi
Al Kadhimain
Al Falluja
Al Mahmudiya
Al Musaiyib
KARBALA
Tuwairij
J. TENF
Rutba
Burqu
'I R A Q
Al Kifl
AN NAJAF
Abu Sukhair
'A
Shabicha
TRANS-DESERT ROUTES
RAILWAYS
BOUNDARIES
TRIBAL NAMES
OIL PIPE LINES
Scale of Miles
100
0
100
200

[following p. 96(b)]

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

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496
619
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
I R A N
Ruwandiz
Ranja
Koi Sanjak
Sulaimaniya
Chemchemal
Tauq
Tuz Khurmatli
Kifri
Khanaqin
Karind
KERMANSHAH
Qizil Ribat
Deli Abbas
Naft Khanah
Shahraban
BA'QUBA
Mandali
Marut
BAGHDAD
Salman Pak
Al Aziziya
Hindiya
HILLA
Bughaila
Kut al Amara
Ali Gharbi
Ali Sharqi
Kifl
Afaq
Kut al Hai
Al Kufa
Al Diwaniya
Amara
Qala Sikar
Qala Salih
Rumaitha
Shatra
Euphrates
Samawa
Al Khidhr
An Nasiriya
Al Qurna
SUK ASH SHUYUKH
Al Khamisiya
BASRA
Abul Khasib
Shuaiba
MOHAMMERAH
Az Zubair
Safwan
Umm Qasr
FAO
As Sulman
Busaiya
Al Amghar
Ansab
Jahra
AL KUWAIT
KUWAIT
46°
36°
32°

[following p. 96(c)]

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Map No. 1


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TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAN
JORDAN
Tel Kochek
Aqra
Mosul
Erbil
Koi Sanjaq
Rowanduz
Rayat
Al Badi
Penjwin
Halabja
Qal'a Sharqat
Kirkuk
Baiji
Abu Kemal
Ana
Haditha
Samarra
Tell Droite
Rutba
Ramadi
Lake Habbaniya
Al Falluja
BAGHDAD
Naft-i-Shah
Naftkhaneh
Mandali
Balad Ruz
Badra
Kut al Imara
Al Musaiyib
Hilla
Hashimiya
Al Kufa
Shithatha
Nukhaib
Afac
Amara

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
IRAQ
PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT ROUTES
Railway
Paved road
Unpaved road
Selected trail
Main oil pipelines
Airfield
0 50 100 200
MILES
0 50 100 200
KILOMETRES
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL TERRITORY
PERSIAN GULF
Nukhaib
Al Kufa
Najaf
'Afaq
Ad Diwaniya
An Nasiriya
Ur
Al Athamin
Fao
32
30
28
26
40
42
44
46
48
AIR ROUTES AND AIRFIELDS
0 300 MILES
0 500 KILOMETRES
USSR
IRAN
JORDAN
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
Mosul
Erbil
Kirkuk
Beirut
Damascus
Baghdad
Basra
to Cairo
to Dhahran
MAP NO. 312
50-25080

487 Land Communications with Foreign Countries

496 Iraq has direct connexions:

By *railway:* with Turkey, through Syria, the frontier station of Nusaybin, to Haidar Pasha (suburb of Istanbul, on the sea of Marmora, at the southern end of the Anatolian shore of the Bosporus); with Syria, where the Baghdad line intersects the Syrian line to Damascus near Aleppo; with Lebanon, through Syria, by the junction at Raiat with the Damascus—Beirut line, and at Homs with the Homs—Tell Kalakh—Tripoli—Beirut line; with the State of Israel, by the Damascus—Jordan line and the narrow-gauge Dera—Haifa branch line; with the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan, by the Damascus—Dera—Nassib—Amman—Maan line; with Egypt, by the Haifa—Rafah—Cairo railway; with Iran, from the terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway at Khurramshahr, on the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab (24.4 kilometres from Basra), towards Ahwaz—Teheran—Bandar-Shah, on the Caspian Sea;

487
491 By *motor transport roads:* with Turkey, directly through Zakho, and through Syria, by the Mosul—Tel Kochek—Nusaybin—Diyarbekir roads; with Syria (and beyond) by the Mosul—Tel Kochek, Mosul—El Badi—Mineveh, Kirkuk—Haditha—Jalib-Akashe, Baghdad—Rutba—Tell Droite—Palmyra, and Baghdad—Rutba—Damascus roads; with Jordan: by the Baghdad—Ramadi—Rutba—Mafrak roads; with Saudi Arabia: by the Baghdad—Karbala—Nukhaib—Judaidal al Arar, and El Jauf

487 (Nefud Desert) roads; with Kuwait: Basra—Az
491 Zubair—Safwan, to Jahra; with Iran: Basra—(ferryboat)—Tanwa—to Ahwaz, Baghdad—Khosrovi—Kermanshah—Hamadan—Kazvin—Teheran, Kirkuk—Sulaimaniya—Penjwin—Bashmak (frontier) towards Sinneh, Mosul—Erbil—Ruwandiz—Raiat.

Civil Aviation

508 Iraq has two airports for long distance international service, one at Baghdad and one at Basra. Each of these airports also has a seaplane base, the first on Lake Habbaniye, about 100 kilometres from the city of Baghdad; and the second, at Ma'agil, 7 kilometres from the town of Basra, near the land airport. The two airports are provided with modern technical equipment and with all the facilities for the comfort of the passengers, such as hotels, restaurants, etc. The country has several other aerodromes and landing fields, the most important of which are at Rutba and at Mosul. In 1948 and 1949, thorough-going repairs had to be made to the runways of the Baghdad airport, during which time it was only accessible to aircraft not exceeding eighteen tons. Nearly all the Baghdad traffic was
509 diverted to the Basra airport. In 1948, Basra airport was used by the Iraqi Airways Company and by seven international aviation companies, including

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

452 enabled to obtain sufficient credit to buy seeds, fertilizer, livestock,
453 machinery and other means of production and to make it unnecessary for them to sell their crops immediately after harvest at extremely low prices. The Mission therefore suggests that the Development Board provide sufficient funds to raise the paid-in capital of the Bank to about ID 2,000,000. This should permit the Bank to expand its credit operations and refund its borrowed resources. Action to enable the Bank to increase its lending will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time greater care is exercised to insure that loans are promptly repaid and that farmers, who are often improvident, borrow only for purposes which will increase their output. In the past a considerable portion of the Bank's capital has become frozen as the result of repeated extensions of the maturity dates on its loans.

343 Good storage facilities for grain and perhaps other crops
488 would reduce losses due to infestation, improve the quality of grain, assist in the stabilization of prices and provide some assurance against famine. At present grain is often stored in the open or in inadequate buildings and sheds. A modern 5,000-ton grain elevator has recently been erected in Baghdad, and another of 40,000 tons is projected for Basra to serve the export trade. There is, however, an urgent need for less elaborate and smaller storage facilities throughout the grain-growing areas. These could be of simple concrete or corrugated steel construction and range in capacity from 1,000 to 3,000 tons. Simple cleaning machinery would be desirable in order to remove impurities from the grain. Such storage facilities, which might have a total capacity of about 75,000 tons, would presumably be owned and operated by the Grain Board, an autonomous government agency, and would need to be closely controlled so that the Agricultural Bank could with safety make loans against grain stored in them by farmers and merchants. Under such conditions, more merchants would probably enter the market to bid for grain at harvest time and farmers themselves would not be under the necessity of marketing their grain immediately after the harvest irrespective of the level of prices.

474 Although an impressive law on cooperatives has been put on the statute books, almost nothing has been done to organize effec-

or because the investment is in a new and untried field which does 433
not for the moment appeal to private capital. For the chemical plant 471
proposed by the Mission the latter would probably be the case. The government apparently is also furnishing all of the capital for the oil refinery. Wherever complete government ownership is considered necessary, it would be desirable to have the Development Board act as the government's agent in putting up the necessary capital.

On the other hand, the existing Industrial Bank should be used 453
as the agency for giving needed assistance to industry in all cases 433
where the need is for expansion of present capacity or where there is a prospect of private participation in establishing new industries. This Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951 it had outstanding loans totaling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicaped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests therefore that the Development Board provide the means for gradually increasing the Bank's capital by about ID 5,000,000 which the Bank would be authorized to use for the making of loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an overall program approved by the Development Board.

Aside from making loans for production facilities, the Indus- 453
trial Bank could assist industry by financing the construction of a 488
bonded warehouse at Baghdad, so that credit could be extended on materials stored therein. The absence of such warehousing facilities has caused a chronic shortage of working capital in most industrial enterprises, for under existing conditions much of their capital is tied up in stocks of supplies.

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving 453
fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares 433
whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and therefore capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to maintain a reserve ~~against possible~~

for three or four days. In packing and grading, growers do not 249
separate the bottom, middle and top leaves or take care that packing 655
takes place only when the moisture content and the pliability of the leaves are just right.

The second reason for the poor quality is inadequate grading and manipulation by the Monopoly. Tobacco is graded for the Monopoly by committees whose members are generally untrained. Classification is by color only and a bale given a single grade often has tobacco ranging through all shades of green, yellow and brown. Influential cultivators, or merchants acting on their behalf, can often obtain grades for their tobacco unwarranted by its merits. Thus the grading system offers little or no incentive to the grower to produce the best possible tobacco. Finally, the Monopoly stores tobacco under conditions which contribute to its rapid deterioration. Warehouses are often exposed to the elements and are without [488]
temperature and humidity control so that tobacco may alternately ferment and dry out. Little re-grading or manipulation is done in warehouses.

Farmer Income from Tobacco

Whether the Kurdish farmers have on the whole obtained an 249
adequate income from tobacco is less easy to determine. Their 435
income from tobacco has depended on (1) the amount of tobacco 655
purchased from each year's crop by the Monopoly and the prices (less *istihlak* and land tax) paid, and (2) the amount of tobacco sold illicitly and the prices realized thereon. Unfortunately, not enough data are available to permit an estimate of the income of tobacco farmers. Data on prices paid by the Monopoly for the first three years of its operation are lacking; figures on total tobacco production, from which the amount marketed illicitly might be deduced, do not exist; and little or nothing is known about the prices realized on tobacco marketed illegally.

During the war the Monopoly, which was supposed to equate the supply of tobacco with demand by licensing the area under cultivation, apparently made no real effort to use licensing as an instrument for the restriction of production. The area licensed rose steadily from 28,014 donums in 1940 to a peak of 71,730 in 1944. In the period 1943-45 the income of farmers was also considerably

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

followed by cooperatives and to audit the accounts of cooperatives. 474 The necessary staff will have to be trained abroad, preferably in Cyprus where a diversified cooperative movement flourishes. It will also be desirable to give some instruction in cooperatives in the teachers' training colleges and the agricultural schools.

One of the logical places to start with the organization of cooperatives would be in new agricultural settlements as was done in fact in the Dujaila project. People who start afresh in a new settlement will generally be more receptive to new forms of organization. In these new settlements cooperative ownership of tools and machinery will probably be most important. Care must be taken not to overburden the cooperative with too many activities at the beginning. Operations should be expanded only as experience is acquired.

As already indicated, the need of the fellah who continues to farm on a sharecropping basis is the most urgent. He cannot therefore be neglected in the effort to establish cooperatives even though his poverty and his relations to his landlord may make the organization of cooperatives particularly difficult. Among those fellahin, one might begin with the organization of credit cooperatives which would make loans not on the security of the borrower's possessions but on his reputation for work, honesty and thrift. In this way the fellah might be able to obtain credit on more reasonable terms for the purchase of tools, seeds, animals and other requisites. Initially such credit cooperatives would probably need to be financed almost entirely by the Agricultural Bank, but the objective should be to base their operations increasingly on the regular savings of their members.

XI. Storage Facilities and Credit

Farmers are also in need of adequate facilities in which they 488 452 can store their produce and obtain credit against warehouse receipts. At present, prices tend to dip sharply at harvest time because the farmer is generally compelled to sell his crop immediately after or even before harvest in order to obtain needed cash. The merchants with money then reap the benefit of subsequent price advances. More storage and credit facilities would enable

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

488 the farmer to get a fairer share of the price and bring about
452 greater price stability. Even if the merchants primarily used these facilities, the farmer would still benefit indirectly because more merchants would be financially able to compete for his products.

488 Grain stores are especially needed. Cotton can at present be
256 stored at ginneries, and the Agricultural Bank is lending money on such cotton. Aside, however, from a 5,000 ton silo at Baghdad, which went into use with the 1951 harvest, the country possesses no modern grain storage facilities. The Grain Board which is charged with responsibility for storage projects is contemplating the construction of a 40,000 ton silo costing about ID 2,145,000 at Basra. This silo would primarily serve the export trade. It would be desirable to supplement these two with a number of smaller stores, less elaborately equipped and located nearer the centers of production. Such stores would afford necessary protection against grain pests and also help to mitigate the fear of famine which is ever present in a country with sharply fluctuating harvests. If equipped with simple cleaning plant they would help greatly to improve the quality of the grain. Grain thrashed by hand according to the prevailing custom contains from 15 to 40 percent foreign matter and from 5 to 15 percent dirt. The number, location and size could only be determined after a thorough survey. It is not unlikely, however, that from 12 to 18 such stores with an individual capacity ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 tons and a total capacity of about 75,000 tons would be needed. For the most part they will not have to be mechanized and can consist basically of simple steel or concrete sheds. The total cost would probably not exceed ID 750,000.

Two possible obstacles to the actual utilization of grain storage
[651] facilities should be considered. There may be a disinclination to use them for fear of giving the government knowledge of such stocks and thereby exposing them to taxation. Much grain now escapes taxation. To encourage people to take advantage of the stores it may therefore be necessary to reduce substantially or abolish the *istihlak* tax which is a type of sales or turnover tax. Other reasons for abolishing or reducing this tax have already been advanced elsewhere.[14] Another difficulty in the way of using such

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[14] See the Mission's main report, p. 95.

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storage facilities lies in the wide variation in the quality of the grain. Those with better quality grain may refuse to store it except under conditions which will ensure that it will be kept as a separate parcel. While this may be possible in the smaller, non-mechanized sheds, it will be impossible in the silos at Baghdad or Basra. There, however, it will be desirable at least to have means for weighing each parcel of grain after as well as before cleaning. At present there are no such facilities in the Baghdad silo and none are apparently contemplated for the Basra silo. Under such conditions there will be a premium on the storage of grain with a large percentage of foreign matter. Those with relatively clean grain harvested by combines will, on the other hand, refuse to use the silos. 488 256

If credit is to be extended on grain stored in silos, there must be adequate supervision to insure the issuance of proper warehouse receipts and to prevent the release of any stored grain except against the surrender of such receipts. Presumably any new facilities would be owned and supervised by the Grain Board. This Board, however, would hardly be in the position to finance all the proposed additional facilities. In 1950 the International Bank was approached with respect to the financing of the Basra silo, but now that Iraq is assured ample sterling revenue from oil and only a small part of the necessary expenditures is likely to be in dollars, the government may consider it undesirable to contract a loan for this purpose. Financing by the Development Board would then appear to be the only alternative. The Grain Board might even have difficulty in financing the smaller storage facilities. Although its assets as of March 31, 1951, amounted to ID 1,123,969, over 30 percent or ID 321,113 consisted of "fixed assets" and another item of ID 687,222 designated as "sundry debtors" represented almost entirely a claim on the Treasury. Over [651] a number of years the government has levied a one percent tax on grain for the benefit of the Board but it has retained the proceeds provisionally for its own needs. As long as the ordinary budget remains tight, as is likely over the next few years, the government may find it difficult to convert this claim into cash. Under such circumstances the Development Board may find it necessary to give financial assistance for the smaller projects.

433
315 power by industry is out of the question. It is hoped, however, that in time this may be corrected.

Even in Baghdad the purchase of power by industry would be greatly stimulated by a reduction in the industrial rates of the Baghdad Light and Power Company. Profits, after depreciation [471] but before taxes, are now over half of gross receipts. Under the terms of its concession, the company pays a substantial part of these profits to the Iraq Government, the remainder being allocated to United Kingdom taxes, reserves for capital expenditure and dividends. The Iraq Government's share in the profits effectively constitutes a tax on electricity consumption, which it might be well advised to forego if it could thereby secure an equivalent reduction in power rates to Iraqi industry. The government might, therefore, explore with the Company and with the tax authorities in the United Kingdom the possibility of an equitable arrangement, whereby power rates would be reduced as far as possible, while still providing adequate funds for capital improvement and continuing a fair return to stockholders. A possible arrangement that has to be considered is the exercise by the government at the end of 1954 of its option to purchase the undertaking as a going concern. If such a course should be decided on, it would be desirable to enter into a management contract with the Company in order to ensure the continuance of efficient operation.

433
● 488
452 The amount of working capital required in Iraq per unit of production is exceedingly high, partly because enterprises want to be as self-sufficient as possible with respect to needed supplies and materials, partly because Iraq is relatively distant from international markets. Probably the best means of reducing the need for working capital would be through the erection and operation of a bonded warehouse which would provide all industries with facilities to store, until needed, supplies, material and chemicals of all types under conditions that would enable banks to extend credits on the stocks in bond. In this way the banks would have assurance that the stored material would not be released prior to full payment plus interest, storage and service charges. In effect, this would permit operations along lines very similar to those in highly developed countries where supplies and materials are obtained in accordance with production schedules.

needed to prove the extent and quality of the ores located. This 135
work has gone till now rather tardily, owing to the inadequate
funds at the disposal of the Directorate General on Minerals. There
also seems to be no clear policy as to how this wealth should be
exploited: whether by the State directly or by concession to national
or foreign enterprise.

Another factor delaying work in this field is the difficulty of [48 9]
transport to and from the sites of the ore deposits which are remotely
situated in desert and mountain.

Oil and gas are indeed plentiful in Iraq, and the exploitation 382
of oil resources has indirectly helped to finance the industrial development
so far achieved. But the cost of oil fuel and other oil
products for local consumption is not much lower than in other
countries because of the high rate of taxes on consumption. This
and the limited range of oil products so far made in Iraq by the
Alwand refinery, owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., have led to
the import of a number of oil products from abroad. But the situation
should change when the State-owned refinery, now under
construction, goes into production.

Another problem connected with the supply of fuel is the lack 371
of electric power. Power generation in Iraq is inefficiently organised
and power rates, except in Basrah and Baghdad in recent
years, are among the highest in the world. This has compelled
most industries to generate their own power which has added a
great deal to production cost. The recent reduction of power rates
and the availability of electricity in Baghdad has been one of the
major reasons for the concentration of industry in that city.

(3) *Concentration of Industry*: Industry in Iraq is heavily concentrated 438
in the city of Baghdad which has a population of 550,000
inhabitants, in other words a little more than ten percent of the
country's population. Excluding oil and one or two small textile,
tanning, and grain-milling industries, all modern industry has been
established in or near Baghdad, thus adding to the population and
housing problems of the capital. There are many reasons for this
concentration of industry. All routes converge on Baghdad; it has
the largest population and, as the seat of Government, it offers easy
access to the central authority. As an old trading centre Baghdad [366]
has a well-organised market, large financial resources, and managerial
and office staffs. Some of the factors that have made Baghdad

the exodus of the Jews. For industry the training of good cost 874
accountants capable of checking the efficiency of various types of 464
operations is especially vital. A single secondary commercial school, supplemented by a night school, and a higher College of Commerce and Economics have been established to meet the need for business training. The first appears to be functioning along sound lines, although it suffers from inadequate quarters and a shortage of teachers. As soon as competent teachers can be trained or recruited, secondary commercial schools should be opened in the other principal cities, particularly Basra and Mosul. On the other hand, the College leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of both the curriculum and the standard of instruction. It apparently produces neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants, nor people well-grounded in economics and finance, capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff must be strengthened, and more attention paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum, make provision for part-time apprenticeship training and check how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

IV. Transport and Communications

On the whole, the existing transport system serves the present 489
needs of the country adequately (see map). For the future the principal problems will be to make provision for essential renewals of track and rolling stock and to standardize the gauges on the railways; to develop an adequate network of metalled main roads, supplemented by feeder roads; and to establish effective control over road transport. If these problems are solved, transport capacity should have no difficulty in meeting the growing requirements of agriculture and industry.

654x
433
pumps. In other respects industrial development would be geared to supply the growing demand for consumers goods, such as shoes, textiles and utensils, and for construction materials, such as cement, arising out of the development program itself.

654x
489
Rising agricultural and industrial output will necessitate a corresponding increase in transport capacity. Here the development of road transport and the replacement of wornout track, locomotives and rolling stock will be the principal tasks of the future.

654x
871
744
Since the relationship of health and education to production may appear more indirect, there is danger that these two subjects will be neglected in the emphasis on greater national output. Basically, however, it is the productivity of manpower which must be raised, and this can be achieved only if measures are taken to make people better educated and to free them from debilitating disease. In the future the public health effort must concentrate on the prevention of disease through such measures as increasing the number of village dispensaries, the training of midwives, the organization of a corps of sanitarians, elimination of stagnant and polluted water, provision of safe water supplies and sewage disposal, slum clearance and better housing. Community planning should focus largely on such improvements as will contribute to better public health. A great broadening of the educational effort is needed in the future to teach people how to cope more effectively with the problems of everyday living. To this end, compulsory primary education should be gradually introduced over the next 15 years and a vigorous campaign for the education of adults should be launched. At the same time, however, it is vitally important to adapt education to the practical needs of the people, helping them to improve their health and their methods of work.

654x
The program which the Mission has outlined in this report is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission has thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a

ANNEX E

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

● 489 Iraq's transport system, which is concentrated in the populated and cultivated eastern half of the country, converges on two points, Baghdad, the capital and trade center, and Basra, the country's only port.

504 The Port of Basra lies about 140 kilometers (85 miles) upstream from the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al Arab and is accessible to ocean-going ships of all sizes entering the Persian Gulf. Its site serves the economy of Iraq well, the junction of the cheaper ocean transport with the dearer inland transport being at the farthest practical point inland.

503 The Tigris and the Euphrates, together with their tributaries, offer natural transport routes. However, they have remained untrained and largely uncontrolled for centuries and, apart from a few short stretches on the rivers and their tributaries which are usable by local traffic, limited and restricted inland navigation is possible today only on the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad.

496 The railway system consists of three main lines, two of narrow gauge, one of standard gauge. One of the two meter-gauge lines is the main line from Baghdad to Basra, serving the most densely populated provinces besides connecting the two principal centers. The other links Baghdad with the northeastern provinces, east of the Tigris. The standard-gauge line runs from Baghdad on the right bank of the Tigris to Mosul, Iraq's second city, and beyond through a tip of Syria to Turkey, the Mediterranean and Europe. Until a year ago no physical junctions existed between the three main lines. Goods carried on both meter-gauge lines had to be ferried across the Tigris at Baghdad and then transshipped. The ferry has now been replaced by a bridge but the transshipment to and from the standard-gauge line remains necessary. Through passenger traffic between the three main lines is negligible.

491 A road system of approximately 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) covers the eastern half of the country, but most of the roads

491 are unsurfaced and impassable for long periods in wet weather. All-weather roads are at present found only in the Baghdad area and in the mountains in the North. The only passable trunk roads are those from Baghdad to Khanaqin, Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul, and Baghdad to Rutba and Syria. Even these have shorter or longer sections in very poor condition. There is no all-season road between Baghdad and Basra.

508
509 Two civilian airports, Baghdad and Basra, serve the principal air routes between Europe, Asia and beyond. Internal air services are limited to one line between Baghdad and Basra. Military airfields and landing grounds and a few private air strips are available in certain places, but demand for internal air transport has so far been negligible.

509
475 One state air line, Iraqi Airways, operates services with neighbor countries and Egypt through Baghdad and Basra with a small fleet of four aircraft. Administration and management of the airline are combined with those of the state railways.

315 Oil from the oil fields at Kirkuk is carried by pipelines across the country to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa, but the line to Haifa is now out of operation. A shorter pipeline connects the southern Iraq oilfield with the Shatt al Arab oil port at Fao.

489 Transport connections with the outside world are well served by the Port of Basra for ocean-going traffic, by the airports of Baghdad and Basra in international air traffic and by the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean. At present only one railway line, beginning at Baghdad, connects Iraq with Syria, and via Syria with Turkey and Europe. A desert road exists for through road traffic between Iraq and Syria and Lebanon. A private company, Nairn Transport, operates an international bus service on this route. There are two main roads for exchange of traffic with Iran, one from Baghdad via Khanaqin, and one from Erbil via the Rowanduz Valley and Rayat. Future economic developments may perhaps demand new traffic outlets to the Mediterranean, shorter and better equipped than the existing railway and road routes, but at present there are few signs of such a demand.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MHI

On the whole the existing transport system serves the present 489 needs of the country well, but there are certain shortcomings and problems. The principal difficulties are:

Insufficient means of transport in the Tigris valley between Baghdad and Basra, serving the Kut and Amara districts;

The lack of roads, shortage of surfaced trunk roads and non-existence of rural feeder roads;

The lack of control over road transport, urban as well as inter-urban and rural; and

The renewals and the gauge problems of the railways.

I. Ports

The Port of Basra was developed as a modern port from 504 initial installations constructed during the first World War. During the second World War, the Port had to cope with a vast increase in traffic. Certain extensions, necessitated by military requirements, were carried out, including supply lines into Iran and through Iran to Russia, but normal maintenance, renewal and improvement works were severely restricted. The postwar period presented the problem of overcoming the arrears in maintenance and renewals, under an additional handicap of shortage of technical staff. Today the Port operates efficiently; it is equipped to handle all traffic, incoming and outgoing, without congestion and there is sufficient margin to cope with the increase in traffic to be expected from further economic development of the country. Particular credit must be given to the Directorate of the Port and a depleted but devoted staff for the results achieved.

The activities of the Port extend along the Shatt al Arab from the main wharves at Magil to the mouth at Fao. In addition to handling export and import traffic for Iraq, it also performs certain services for the Iranian oil port of Abadan; in recent years the number of ships calling at Abadan has been five to six times the number at Basra. The principal developments in the postwar period are set out in Table I. The activities of the Port cover a wide field. Besides actual port services such as harbor, wharves, sheds, pilotage, lighting and buoyage, civil, mechanical and elec-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Tigris, although during each of the two World Wars there was a temporary railway connection with Kut. 496

The railways are state-owned and operated under the management of a Director General who is responsible to a Railway Board appointed by the government. The administration is autonomous and has its own budget which must, however, be submitted annually to Parliament for approval. The administration is well organized, the management capable and the operation efficient and economical. [475]

Capacity

The railway system consists entirely of single track lines built to light standards, and the permitted axle loads are very low. This limits the capacity of the lines and increases the operation problems. There is no doubt, however, that the system's capacity is ample for present demands. During several war years it actually carried about twice the tonnage of goods transported in recent years, even though the length of the system was only about one third greater through the temporary construction of military branch lines (see Table 4). 496 489

Railway carrying capacity is in reality rather elastic. The railways could carry as a minimum 15 percent more goods, and, in a pinch, could probably carry considerably more. In consequence of the over-all development program, traffic requirements will undoubtedly increase quite rapidly. For example, the value of imports may double within about five years, and the amount of

TABLE 4

TRAFFIC ON STATE RAILWAYS

Year	Route Kilometers	PASSENGERS		GOODS	
		Passenger Journeys	Passenger Kilometers	Total Revenue Tonnage Carried	Total Revenue Ton Kilometers
1943-44	2,011	4,418,590	662,256,369	3,586,081	905,104,309
1944-45	1,555	4,869,523	669,987,674	2,390,402	648,482,848
1945-46	1,555	5,292,441	775,107,476	1,970,107	513,643,871
1946-47	1,555	4,300,413	630,705,454	1,860,296	600,138,802
1947-48	1,555	3,725,463	529,066,676	1,714,290	556,623,270
1948-49	1,555	3,340,034	473,075,056	1,674,289	497,306,309
1949-50	1,648	3,609,337	517,939,859	1,980,795	657,097,000

#96 #89 internal traffic, particularly in building materials, will also rise substantially.[2] The burden on the main trunk line from Basra to Baghdad will increase especially. If steps are taken, however, to carry out the necessary replacement and rehabilitation measures outlined in this monograph, the railways should be able to handle much of the increased traffic. Part of the increase will presumably be absorbed by the roads.

#96 The financial position of the railways has not been wholly satisfactory in recent years. To be sure, they have had a considerable operating surplus until the last few years, as is indicated in Table 5. Since 1945-46, however, this surplus would have actually disappeared or been converted into a deficit if it had not been for the fact that the sum set aside for renewals and depreciation was rather inadequate. In 1948-49 a small surplus was achieved only because the amount appropriated to the renewals account was cut from ID 400,000 to ID 250,000; and when the

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[2] See the Mission's main report, pp. 88 *et seq.*

TABLE 5

RAILWAY FINANCE
(in dinars)

Year	Operating or Ordinary Budget			Capital Expenditure
	Revenues	Expenditures	Balance	
1938-39	733,613	753,063	−19,450	938,115
1939-40	752,546	733,530	+29,016	559,492
1940-41	953,379	800,712	+152,667	176,866
1941-42	2,241,657	1,440,546	+801,111	159,937
1942-43	4,775,646	2,316,576	+2,459,070	161,905
1943-44	5,067,899	3,781,525	+1,286,374	137,258
1944-45	4,141,110	3,132,064	+1,009,046	112,366
1945-46	3,769,823	3,241,988	+537,835	387,684
1946-47	3,436,403	3,206,164	+230,239	789,095
1947-48	3,794,003	3,549,115	+244,888	1,761,123
1948-49	3,633,022	3,614,569	+18,453	2,778,902
1949-50	3,991,297	3,705,542	+285,755	1,068,558
1950-51*	3,949,200	4,041,400	−92,200	1,734,000
1951-52*	4,211,100	4,274,100	−63,000	902,500

* Budget estimates.

494 Transport licenses should be granted only if the proposed operator appears responsible and sufficiently well equipped to perform the transport services and if there is evidence of present or prospective need. Operators should be required to take out insurance, to adhere to published rates, routes and schedules, and to conform to loading regulations.

Maintenance

491 The maintenance of the new road system when once completed is even more important than its initial construction. Service and funds must be assured to keep the roads in the condition in which they have been built. The Minister of Finance should budget for annual expenditures, to be estimated by the Public Works Department, for maintenance of the road systems and all accessories including sign posting, for improvements necessitated by increased traffic, for inspection and control of road traffic and for the traffic police required. The expenditures should, in general, be covered by revenue from those who actually use the roads.

Subsidiary Roads and Urban Streets

●489 It is recommended that at the earliest opportunity a system of cooperation between the Public Works Department and provincial and municipal road departments be established to bring maintenance, traffic control and municipal licensing in line with the government's policy in these matters and that appropriate provision for this cooperation be made in the budget.

City Transport

365 An essential part of the country's transport system is passenger transport service in the capital. Baghdad and its suburbs form a city of a population of over half a million spread over an area with a radius of four to eight miles. In 1938 it was decided to establish a municipal passenger service to be operated with buses. The war intervened and limited services were brought into operation in 1942 with converted army trucks equipped with locally built bodies. A loan of ID 500,000 was raised, more vehicles purchased and workshops and garages of sorts installed. The services deteriorated with the poor equipment, which was all that was available in wartime, and the municipality was unable to carry the financial burden. Early in 1950 the service was taken over by

It is expected that once this work is completed, the personnel 654 problem will ease somewhat.

The development program of the service provides for a survey and mapping to a scale of 1:20,000 at an estimated cost of ID 200,000. For the appropriate housing of the service, a new building with 10,000 square meters of floor space is now under construction and is expected to be completed in January or February 1952. This will facilitate administration of the service which is now scattered in three widely separated buildings. The new building will also house the up-to-date printing plant ordered in Great Britain. Funds for building and plant have already been sanctioned. Air surveys now in progress should be continued at an annual cost of approximately ID 40,000.

XI. General Observations

Teamwork

Not only the development of the transport services but also 647 the general development program, with all its implications of 489 temporary and seasonal demands for transport of construction materials and imports of machinery and plant, will materially affect the tasks before the transport managements. The teamwork in the existing transport departments is exemplary. It is therefore emphatically urged that no change be made in the present organizations and their leading personnel until after the main development programs are completed.

Intermediary Staff

In all the transport services there is a great dearth of inter- 489 mediary staff—foremen, inspectors, surveyors, supervisors, and the 464 like—for whom practical training in workshops and on construction sites is far more important than school or college education. In all transport development projects, special courses should be provided to train adaptable Iraqi apprentices under skilled teachers in shops, factories and on tracks and roads in the country.

These observations apply to all forms of transport, port, railways, roads, airways and communications. Unless continuity is maintained with a gradual, cautious transfer of responsibility from foreign to Iraqi personnel, efficiency will be seriously jeopardized.

phrases as 'Amir ul Mouminin', that is, 'The Commander of the Faithful". 192

12. THE STORY OF THE TWO DANCERS

Page 171, Line 1. 'Which was full of chests of Kuweit of enormous size.' 489 439

The Kuweit chest is sometimes to be seen in English houses, its owners ignorant of its history. It is normally of polished or carved teakwood studded with brass, and with massive brass hinges and locks which are engraved by hand. In size it may be from four to six feet long, two and a half or three feet high, and of course broad in proportion. It sometimes has a false bottom or secret drawer. I have often hoped that some resident of Kuweit would write a book on these interesting chests. I have seen many of them, beautifully worked, in the bazaars of Baghdad and Basra. I also used to see them when going on board Kuweiti jalbuts from India when they called at Bahrein. There were usually a number of these chests carried as deck cargo, though not as large nor of such good wood as the old ones found in the bazaars. The nakhodas of the craft whom I questioned about these chests informed me that their sailors, in addition to receiving pay, had the right to bring one chest each from India, full of goods to be sold on their own account. I did in fact look through some of these chests and found them in the main stocked with Indian sandals, mirrors, scent, rolls of cloth, saris and similar articles. I was told that in the past Kuweiti sailors would buy the chest in India, stock it with goods, and carve it and put in the heavy brass studs on the voyage back to Kuweit, which might take several months, as the dhows call at a number of small Indian and Persian ports. On arrival at Kuweit or Basra the chests and their contents would be sold, and the price of a well worked chest was an important part of a sailor's earnings. I asked them why the chests on the deck of most of the dhows were without ornament, and was told that at present there was less profit in the sale of the chest than in the goods it contained, and that chests now available in Southern Indian ports were of such poor quality that they did not repay work. They still buy these chests as the sailor's own property is carried as

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

489 deck cargo, and the goods would be liable to damage by rain or spray
439 if otherwise packed.

13. The Story of Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, a Man of a Noble Family, though His Land Was Poor

804 Page 185, Line 15. 'and ordered fifty mithkals of them.'
The mithkal is a small weight used by goldsmiths.

192 Page 188, Line 20. 'Take soldiers and go to Qasr Qurnachi.'
Qasr—castle. 'Qurnachi Castle.'

Page 191, Line 11. 'Can then the hawk fly without wings.'
539 I was told that this quotation was from a famous Arab poet, but
192 regret that I was unable to place it, and nobody could remember the name of the poet. The quotation as put into the mouth of Sheikh Aqab is particularly apt, as Aqab, though its literal translation is 'eagle,' is a name often given to hawks.

Page 198, Line 24. 'She was clad in an ataq and bag trousers.'
The ataq is a kind of blouse.

14. The Story of Daoud the Camel and of his Misfortunes

Page 204, Line 4. 'The Shammar of the Jezira.'
103 The area in Mosul Liwa which lies to the west of the Tigris, that is,
101 between the Tigris and the Euphrates, is known as the Jezira, or Island. The Shammar in this area are the famous tribe of the late Sheikh Ajil el Yawar.

15. Between Truth and Falsehood Lie Four Fingers

551 Page 214, Line 14. 'The name of this girl was Leila for she was born in the night.'
Leila, 'Night,' is a popular girl's name in South Iraq. I do not think it is restricted only to those girls born at night.

A 306 communications with Pakistan, India, the USSR, various European countries and the United States of America. Kabul has a radio station broadcasting
207 in the Pushtu language.

IV. GENERAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS

ME 101 Geographers point out that formidable mountain barriers, which can only be crossed by difficult passes, separate Asia Minor from Asia proper and that the latter really begins only at the Mesopotamia plateau. As a matter of fact, although forming part of the same geographical group, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, generally speaking, have no natural connexions with each other. Furthermore, there is often no cohesion between the various regions in each of these countries.

241 From ancient times, the three countries have been essentially agricultural and they still remain so. The main occupation of the population, largely nomad, is agriculture and stock-raising.

I 489 [504] [315] In different ways and to varying degrees, the economy of these countries is seriously handicapped by the lack of means of communication. Iraq, as we have seen, has for its foreign trade the excellent deep port of Basra, with its modern installations, and a long river channel, the Shatt al-Arab, linking it to the Persian Gulf. However, there are permanent obstructions at the river mouth which are a constant preoccupation to the Basra port authorities. In the case of crude petroleum, Iraq's chief export, the transport problem has been solved by the construction of the remarkable pipe-lines which vastly facilitate operations, save time and reduce cost. Lastly,

● 4/89 [509] air traffic—useful only to a small number of travellers and for valuable goods—is very heavy in Iraq, which forms a veritable turn-table, a sort of Belgium or Switzerland in Western Asia: Iraq's two airports serve as junctions between the United States and Europe on the one hand and the Far East on the other.

For inland transport on the other hand, Iraq is much less well served: shipping on the historically famous "twin rivers" is very limited and in fact only uses part of the Tigris. The country's railway system is inadequate, there is no standard gauge and the rolling-stock needs to be increased and modernized. [731] The road system has been developed and motor transport (mainly by lorry) is steadily increasing; but it is paralysed on many roads during the rainy season and in numerous places it is at the mercy of the floods: the disastrous flooding of the Tigris in May 1950, particularly serious around Baghdad, will be remembered.

Observers point out that a matter deserving special attention is the co-ordination of river and rail

● 489 transport, in other words, a rationally organized goods-tariff service, which so far does not exist.

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653 Although lacking data on which to base an exact appreciation of the Iraqi Government's plans concerning transport and communications, various sources state that it is making great efforts to improve the means of communication and installations. It supervises the maintenance of the entry to the Shatt al-Arab, and is allocating funds for the purchase of new dredges for the cutting of a new channel. It is reported by authorized sources that the programme for the railways, at the end of 1949, consisted of thirty-five work plans at an estimated total cost of 10,178,000 dinars. New railway lines are being built to serve the economically important districts, as well as railway bridges and a new station and locomotive depot at Baghdad. According to a recent report in the British technical Press, three modern sleeping coaches, with kitchen and air-conditioning, for the Baghdad-Mosul standard-gauge railway (1.435 metres) and beyond, have recently arrived at Basra; two other modern first-class non-air-conditioned coaches are about to arrive.[8] Authorized sources state that the Iraqi Government is arranging for the gradual building (or rebuilding and improvement) of the country's road system, to the extent of its resources. Its main concern is to build new roads across the passes and valleys of the northern plateaux. Hundreds of new bridges for motor traffic have been completed in the last twenty years (including two steel bridges at Baghdad, and one steel bridge, 300 metres long, at Mosul). The

● 489 655 [491] needs of the southern districts are particularly acute: as yet they possess only roads which are not practicable for any traffic, still less for heavy motor traffic, during the rainy season and for a long time afterwards, and boat-bridges of a very old—almost antediluvian—type across the Euphrates and other rivers.

[508] The government is taking steps to modernize the Baghdad and Basra-Ma'agil airports (the latter, in addition to its modern technical installations, has had since 1937 an air-conditioned hotel, swimming pool, tennis courts, etc.). The aim is to make them into first-class international airports. In addition, a training school for civilian air pilots was established in Iraq in 1937.

377 As the country lacks hydroelectric power stations, in spite of the existence of various large dams, there is now a plan to utilize the Bekhme dam for the generation of electric power.

315 In the expectation of the return of normal political conditions in the Near and Middle East, the

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[8] It is interesting to note that for the Basra—Baghdad section (568 km), these coaches are placed on special 1-metre bogies.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

248 established tenure systems, and the primitive methods likely will disappear slowly.

Earlier British experiments in the area indicated March 15 to April 15 as the optimum sowing dates, but reports are that cotton usually is planted much later, either because of laxness or because of labor competition with other crops. Some farmers try to get wheat off and then plant cotton, which throws the cotton very late. Cotton planted in April will begin opening in August. The Rogers Acala undergoes a dormant period of several weeks after the first bolls open and then continues to set and mature bolls up to January. About 80 per cent of the cotton is made on what is called this second or late flush. Picking goes on during all this period.

GINNING

248 407 Until a few years ago there were only about four saw gins with 10 stands in the country and no roller gins. The large profits in recent years on the limited number of gins and the general interest in expanding the crop have prompted a rush to buy new equipment. A total of seven gins operated last season, of which three were newly constructed by the Murray Gin Company. This company has sold three more new gins with a total of 16 stands, which are in process of erection. All the new gins are fully equipped with overhead Mitchell cleaner-feeders and one has the new incline cleaner. Not only the equipment but also the buildings, offices, and storage houses are very modern.

All the gins, with one exception, are privately owned. However, the government will buy another small gin for experiment station use in ginning pure seed that is produced on the station's farm. All the gins except one near Mosul are in the Baghdad and Kut areas.

A great deal of hand labor is employed in the storage houses for picking out foreign matter and damaged and immature locks of cotton before ginning. There are reports that as much as 35 per cent of the weight of the seed cotton coming to the gins is taken out as extraneous foreign matter added to increase the weight of the bales. The government is making a strenuous effort to protect the reputation of cotton by encouraging better ginning.

To facilitate transportation, the ginners make a light 400-pound bale covered on six sides in light-weight burlap and bound with a continuous narrow steel band which is simply tucked under at the end instead of buckled. There are no other compresses and the cotton must be exported in the form in which it comes from the gin. This results in a heavy freight charge, since the gin bales have a density of only 16 to 18 pounds.

442 MARKETING

489 The farmers themselves take the seed cotton in bags to a central market place, usually located at the gins, and sell to merchants. Transportation is scarce. Oftentimes the cotton is carried by the farmer in sacks on his back or his head for miles.

The merchants make little differentiation in price for fiber quality. They do make allowances for foreign matter and moisture which, merchants claim, are added by the farmers in an effort to increase the weight. The merchants gin the cotton for their own account and retain title to the seed and the lint.

The merchandising system can best be described as haphazard. The volume of cotton is small, and merchants handle the cotton along with many

of the 33rd parallel. Affiliated companies 471
have concessions over the remaining territory—the Mosul Petroleum Company in the region west of the Tigris and the Basra Petroleum Company south of the 33rd parallel. Oil is extracted from the Kirkuk 315
fields by the Iraq Petroleum Company and 471
conveyed by pipelines to Mediterranean ports. It was formerly pumped to terminals in Tripoli and Haifa, but the latter pipeline has been closed since the Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1948. A new pipeline, constructed from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias, was opened early in 1952.

In 1938, the Basra Petroleum Company began drilling operations in the Persian Gulf area, where the existence of an extensive oil field has since been established. In 1950, a pipeline was completed to its shipping terminal at Fao, at the head of the Gulf. The activities of the Mosul company are still in the exploratory stage, but the production of oil has recently been started at Ain Zala. It is piped to the Mediterranean by a line which joins that from the Kirkuk fields at Baiji, on the Tigris.

A smaller oil field at Naft Khanah, near the Iranian border, is worked by the Khanaquin Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This company operates a refinery on the Alwand River, near Khanaquin, which supplies petroleum products for local consumption. Since 1952, it has also constructed a small 382
refinery at Basra to process products for use 471
in southern Iraq. It obtains the crude oil from Naft Khanah or from the Basra Petroleum Company.

Iraq derives a considerable revenue from 788
the pilgrimage traffic. The principal shrines 346
of the Shia sect are located at An Najef, Kerbela, Kadhimain and Samarra, and, in addition to local pilgrims, they are visited annually by thousands of Shiites from Iran, Pakistan and other Moslem countries. The privilege of burial near the shrines is also coveted by devout Shiite Moslems.

Transportation is mainly by roads or 489
waterways. Motor highways link the princi- 491

pal population centers and radiate from 489
Baghdad and Mosul to cities in Syria, Iran 491
and Turkey. The Tigris is navigable to 505
barges from Basra to Baghdad throughout
the year, and to smaller craft as far as
Mosul during the high-water season. The
Shatt al Arab is open to ocean-going vessels,
and Basra, about 85 miles from the
Persian Gulf, is one of the major ports of
the Middle East. A government-operated 496
railroad, part of the famous "Berlin to
Baghdad" railway, runs from Basra to
Baghdad and Mosul, with connections
through Aleppo to Istanbul. A branch line
extends from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and
Khanaquin. A government-owned airline 509
serves Iraq and the neighboring countries,
while international lines from Europe to
Africa and the Far East stop at Baghdad
and Basra.

FOOD AND NUTRITION

The nutrition of the people is governed 146
by the cultural habits of the different racial
and social communities, the economic status
of the individual families and the food supplies
available under diverse climatic conditions.
Undernutrition is prevalent among
the poorer inhabitants—tenant cultivators,
urban laborers and nomadic tribes—who
make up over three quarters of the population.
Wheat, barley, rice and dates are the 241
staple food crops of the country, while vegetables
and fruits, other than dates, are frequently
scarce. Wheat is widely grown, primarily
in the rainfall areas of the north,
but also in the irrigated riverain zones of
the south. Barley is cultivated extensively,
and, like wheat, is used in the preparation [262]
of breads and of *burghul*, a coarse-grained
cereal product typical of this region. Millet
and maize are common crops in the south.
Rice is produced in certain lowland districts
in the Kurdish highlands and on the fringes
of the southern marshes, and is a popular
food among all sections of the population.
Peas, beans and lentils are usually consumed
throughout the year, and tomatoes,
eggplant and different root and green vege-

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see M1 Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312 185 Although by 1900 these conditions were not unrealized either in Baghdad or Istanbul, they had not been formulated as connected problems for solution. Governmental activity in this sphere had consisted, at the caprice of Pashas, in no more than some measure of organization of petty local works. The Administration had in fact neither the knowledge nor control nor finance necessary to formulate or organize a comprehensive irrigation system. Heedless alike of present evils and of rich possibilities, the governors of 'Iraq were doing and planning nothing while irrigation in Egypt and India was making great and fruitful progress. Nor was the contribution of the public more promising; the shiftless tribal cultivators carried out with low efficiency such minimum of silt-clearance and flood-dyke repairs as was forced upon them, erected temporary canal-heads of reed-bundles or brushwood, multiplied their primeval devices of water-lift, wastefully prolonged or resited their canals, and ruined area after area with neglected salting.

An outstanding case of deterioration in irrigation conditions was occurring in these years on the middle Euphrates. Up to 1880 the Ḥilla branch had been maintained as the principal waterway, the Hindiya branch being a canal deriving from it. But the closing of the Ṣaqlawiya head up-stream, and the operation of natural forces of silting and scouring, allowed the Hindiya branch to gain in width and discharge. The problem of maintaining the flow of the Ḥilla branch had become first critically difficult and finally impossible. French engineers in 1891 completed a masonry dam which still held precariously in 1900, but failed to arrest the increasing ruin of Ḥilla branch irrigation.

487 The ancient land routes of the territory had remained constant since many centuries. Camel caravans used the desert ways of Damascus and Aleppo, mule-trains the time-worn hill tracks into Luristan, Kirmanshah, Persian Kurdistan, and the Van wilaya. 491 Within 'Iraq the routes were fixed by custom based on convenience; but here there were signs of recent progress in the provision of wayside Khans, new toll-bridges of stone or brick or resting on fragile pontoons. The roads, varying by districts in surface and security, were everywhere unsurfaced and neglected, deep in summer dust or flooded to seas of mud by rain or the overflow of canals.

499 Railways had, for many years, been hailed from a distance by 'Iraqis of every class as the bringers of ease and progress, and schemes in plenty had been propounded—those of Chesney in the eighteen-thirties, of Andrew in the 'fifties, and later of the Austrian von Pressel, the Italian Tonetti, the Frenchman Cottard, the Russian Kapnist. A local company had been formed in the 'eighties to construct a Khaniqin–Baghdad line, which lack of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group,
651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an
ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving
the construction of the Ḥabbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and
a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable
success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton
Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards
called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist
nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale
which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method,
came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated
in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable
harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness,
664 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small
Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with
231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it
could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi
flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual
losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility
of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship
494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay
in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in
mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The
mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased
threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars
plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying
repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much
● 491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by
Ramadi and Ruṭba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated
in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters
was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's
foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian)
competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the
victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The
Ruṭba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in
the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year
thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through
205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails
by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services
superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi
administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive
and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

1: Longrigg G-4, 6 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The Lynch fleet had been diminished in 1938 by the loss of the 505 *Mejidieh*, sold to Anglo-Iranian, and in 1941 by that of the *Malamir* and the *al-Kadri*, burnt out and scrapped respectively. Their rivals, notably Ḥannā al-Shaykh and 'Abd al-Karim Khudhayri (Khedery), were more than holding their own: but the competition of the railway and the roads must grow rather than diminish. To the road system, indeed, Paiforce contributed much, 491 notably in the completed trans-desert highway to Jordan, in the re-surfacing of many road stretches, and in the maintenance in being of 'Iraqi transport fleets by the provision of tyres. Nevertheless, the upkeep of civil motor vehicles in war-time proved most 494 difficult, and the numbers in use decreased. The air communications of the territory were not improved during the war; but before 509 its end projects for a national air line were under formation. The European services crossing and visiting 'Iraq recommenced in 1945 after war-time curtailments, and the Egyptian Misr Airways restarted its Cairo–Baghdad service. A contract was given in 1945 to the Marconi Company for the erection of a new wireless transmitting station.

The course of foreign trade was notably deflected from its usual 439 channels by the war. In 1939 the United Kingdom was its principal customer, followed by the United States, each of these countries taking approximately one-third of the total visible exports; but by 1944 the principal buyer was Palestine with Transjordan, followed by Persia. Visible exports, amounting to ID 4 million before the war, reached through enhanced prices ID 9 million before its end. The transit trade, reduced in 1939 to a value of some ID 3 million, reached ID 13 million five years later, thanks to the passage of goods to Russia. Imports rose from a value of ID 9 million before the war to ID 14 million in its last year; the United Kingdom's share in these fell from 33 to 11 per cent., that of Japan from 18 per cent. to nothing, while India's share rose from 8 to 30 per cent., Syria's from 2 to 16, the United States' from 8 to 12.

The desire for industrial expansion, always a cherished ambition, 433 was stimulated by the war-time shortages and an increased local market; contrary factors were the shortage of raw materials, competition for skilled workers, and the impossibility of importing factory equipment. Of the seventy enterprises benefiting in 1944 from the law of 1929 most were on the humblest scale, with the importance only of pilot projects which could indicate to the middle class the possibility of a career outside Government service, the professions, or politics. Some war-time progress was made in brick manufacture; workshops produced hand-tools from scrap metal; the crushing of oil-seeds—cotton, sesame, and linseed—

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

206 existed in Baṣra and Baghdad and their suburbs; and the telephone
and telegraph had become familiar or indispensable to all classes
save the most backward. The new wireless transmitting station
completed in 1951 at Abu Ghurayb, with the most modern design
and range, secured communication with Europe and America and
was used for the national broadcasting. The Development Board
planned an expenditure of ID 2 million on telecommunications
between 1951 and 1956.

499 Progress in road improvement was delayed during 1946–50 by
the financial narrowness of the post-war years. This and bridge-
building formed an important part of the projects[1] intended for
realization in 1951–6 through the Development Board. The
completion of this programme would fundamentally transform the
conditions of transport and travel in 'Iraq, with far-reaching
economic consequences. The 'Nairn route' to Damascus was still
491 in regular use; its traffic was highly organized, with air-conditioned
vehicles, by the original company and its imitators. The Rawanduz
road was little used; the tracks leading into Najd and Persia carried
no important traffic; and the trunk route to Jordan or Palestine
(p. 321) lost its value when the State of Israel blocked the sea-outlet
it had offered.

5. TOWN AND COUNTRY, MID-CENTURY

161 The population of 'Iraq, declared by the census of 1947 to be
162 4,800,000, had by then doubled since the century opened. Its dis-
tribution[2] was in general unchanged as between towns, inlying
villages, tribal country districts, and nomads; about a quarter were
town-dwellers, a fifteenth nomads, the remainder settled cultiva-
311 tors. Wide areas of steppe desert and of barren mountain remained,
as for the foreseeable future they must, almost uninhabited; the
widest of such regions, those of the administratively separated
northern and southern provinces of the Shamiya desert, amounted
to some two-fifths of 'Iraq's whole surface. The average density
161 of population for the whole territory was of the order of eleven
persons to the square kilometre, or, omitting the desert provinces,
eighteen. The liwā with the greatest population was that of
Baghdad with 800,000 people; next came Diwaniya, Muntafiq,
and 'Amara. The greatest density was of 49 persons to the square

---

[1] The projects considered as 'main roads', with their bridges, were estimated to cost: Baṣra–'Amara–Kut–Baghdad, ID 2,800,000: Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil, 2,500,000: Baghdad–Sharqat, 3,450,00. Elsewhere, ID 4,450,000 was allotted for 'mountain roads', 6,176,000 for miscellaneous bridges, 1,550,000 for a Ḥilla–Najf road, 1,300,000 for Ḥilla–Diwaniya–Shamiya, and 5,250,000 for numerous other routes.

[2] For distribution of the population by administrative units, see Appendix B.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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
40°
42°
RAILWAYS
ROADS
METALLED
UNMETALLED
WATERWAYS
NAVIGABLE
SEASONAL NAVIGABLE
OTHER
OIL PIPELINE
AIRPORT
ZAKHO
TEL KOTCHEK
SINJAR
MOSUL
S Y R I A
T1
K3
H1
H2
H3
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
TRANS JORDAN
NORTHERN DESERT
S A U D I A R A B I A
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

TRANSPORT SYSTEM

FACING P. 44(A)

496
491
316
508
133

MAP III


TURKEY
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
ZAKHO
AMADIA
DOHUK
AQRA
TEL KAIF
MOSUL
ERBIL
HAJ OMRAN
ROWANDUZ
SHAQLAWA
SALAHUDIN
RANIA
MIRZA RUSTAM
MAKHMUR
TAQTAQ
SULEIMANIYA
PENJWIN
SHARQAT
KIRKUK
TAL ALI
HALEBJA
TUZ
KHANAQIN
JOULOULA JUNCTION
SAMARRA
TIGRIS RIVER
I R A N
BAQUBA
MENDELI
DELTAWA
RAMADI
EUPHRATES RIVER
FALUJA
BAGHDAD
AZIZIYA
HINDIYA JUNCTION
KERBELA
HILLA
KUT
HAI
KUFA
NAJAF
ABU SUKHAIR
SHAMIYA
DIWANIYA
AMARA
QADISIYA
SHATTRA
NASIRIYA
UR JUNCTION
HAMMAR LAKE
QURNA
BASRA
ZUBAIR
FAO
SOUTHERN DESERT
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF

FACING P. 44 (B)

and meteorological services. At the Baghdad airport it would be 508 desirable to build an entirely new runway and to use a wing of the new railway building as the air terminal. The Port of Basra can finance the necessary work there, but that at Baghdad, costing probably between ID 250,000 and ID 300,000, will presumably have to be financed out of Development Board funds. The Mission 509 has no specific recommendations to make on Iraqi Airways, which assures some internal and international services with a small fleet of four planes, except to suggest that its finances be completely divorced from those of the railways. It is neither logical nor sound financially to require the railways to defray the deficits of the airways. It would be desirable to carry out any future development of the airways in cooperation with other Middle Eastern countries.

Inland water navigation has steadily declined in importance 503 and is now rather insignificant. While irrigation rather than navigation will always be the primary consideration in the use of available water resources, it is possible that the better regulation of the Tigris and Euphrates will ultimately result in some improvement in the navigability of these rivers. Limited but uninterrupted navigation might be insured if the river bed were trained by dams, locks and groynes into a narrow channel at low water and progressively wider channels at higher water levels. The feasibility and cost of such a scheme might ultimately be submitted for study to experts from the Netherlands where similar conditions have long been encountered.

Roads and Road Transport

Road transport has not assumed great importance in the past, 491 primarily because most roads are unsurfaced and impassible for a 499 large part of the year. Even large communities like Kut and Amara, although not situated on railway lines, are not served by all-weather roads. An interdepartmental committee worked out and presented in 1950 a 10-year program for the construction or improvement of 37 main surfaced roads involving a total length of 3,463 kilometers at an aggregate cost of ID 14,500,000. Both the program and the proposed specifications of the roads are sound. In addition, the building or improvement of about 8,000 kilometers of secondary or feeder roads, which do not need to be surfaced, will ultimately

491 499 be necessary. Such a program will need to be coordinated particularly with the development of new agricultural areas. Earth excavated in the construction of new irrigation and drainage canals can be used in the building of such roads. The surfaced roads should be constructed by contractors of repute capable of furnishing their own road-making plant. It is generally recognized that the Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra and the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul roads should have first priority. The first of these is at present only a dirt road but the latter has sections which are already surfaced.

494 As road transport develops, it will be vital to institute some controls, particularly since most of the operators now provide only irregular and unreliable service. Limitations on loads and regular inspection of vehicles should be instituted and enforced. Operators of transport services should be licensed to make sure that they are equipped to provide adequate and reliable service at reasonable rates and that they carry insurance.

The Mission has also given some attention to the municipal bus service in Baghdad. Operations at present are seriously handicapped by the diversity and age of its transport equipment and high maintenance costs. A sound decision has been made to standardize equipment. The central workshop should also be modernized and re-equipped and a central garage and four auxiliary garages provided. To carry out this program financial assistance from the Development Board will be necessary. It is also suggested that more efficient management of municipal transport might be achieved through the appointment of a single Director General in place of the present Board, and that a stricter control over the collection of passenger fares be instituted to improve revenues.

Communications

206 For communications, capital outlays will be required primarily in connection with the extension of the telephone system. The needs are well-known in Iraq and do not require elaboration here. Although the communications services are operated at a profit which is credited to the government budget, it is suggested that future capital expenditures be financed by the Development Board. This will not only make it easier to balance the government budget, but will enable the Board to insist on better synchronization of the

Petroleum products are distributed by the Rafidain Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and at prices, exclusive of taxes, which are among the lowest in the world. 382

TABLE 8

PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM AND REFINED PRODUCTS
(in thousand metric tons) 315 382

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951 (est'd.)
Crude oil					
Iraq Petroleum Company	4,354	3,017	3,671	5,986	7,500
Khanaqin Oil Company	339	367	365	384	350
Total	4,639	3,384	4,036	6,370	7,850
Refined products	n.a.	373	369	393	—

VI. Transport

The state-owned railway system is the principal means of 496 transport, carrying about 2,000,000 tons of cargo and over 3,000,000 passengers annually. Part of it is standard and part meter gauge. The standard-gauge section is part of the original Berlin-Baghdad railway and runs from Baghdad northward via Mosul into Syria and Turkey. The meter-gauge line extends from the Port of Basra in the South to Baghdad and then beyond to Kirkuk and Erbil in the North, with a branch line to Khanaqin. Over recent years the railways have managed to carry out a considerable capital development program despite serious financial obstacles, but they now face the need of replacing, on a considerable scale, old track, rolling stock and locomotives.

Road transport has as yet primarily supplemented rather than 494 replaced railway traffic. There are only about 11,000 passenger 491 cars and a little over 9,000 trucks and buses in the country. Roads are generally inadequate. There are only about 2,500 kilometers of metalled and surfaced roads in all of Iraq. The remaining dirt roads quickly become impassable in bad weather. Some important

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

491 centers such as Amara and Kut are linked neither by rail nor by
494 all-weather roads to Basra and Baghdad.

504 In Basra, Iraq possesses an excellent port capable of handling
497 a considerable increase in traffic. Upcountry cargo into and out of the port is handled almost wholly by railway, for inland river traffic has declined greatly in importance owing to shallow water and other impediments to navigation.

The port and the railways are each run by an autonomous administration operating under a separate budget.

VII. Money and Banking

453

The banking system consists of the National Bank, five commercial banks, a number of private banks or *sarrafs,* the post office savings bank, and three state-owned longer-term financing institutions, the Industrial Bank, the Agricultural Bank and the Mortgage Bank.

652 The National Bank succeeded the Iraq Currency Board as the
453 currency-issuing authority in 1949. Iraq is a member of the sterling area, so that its currency is backed principally by sterling assets in London. Although the law permits the currency to be backed up to 30 percent by Iraqi government securities, as of March 31, 1951, the total amount of currency in circulation was more than covered by sterling assets. Aside from its note-issuing function, the Bank is charged with the administration of foreign exchange control and the supervision of the banking system in accordance with a bank control law which became effective at the beginning of 1950. This law requires banks to keep the equivalent of 15 percent of their time and demand deposits as a reserve with the National Bank and to keep 50 percent of these deposits in the form of cash and investments in Iraq. The National Bank is empowered to reduce the reserve requirement to 10 percent and to vary the second between 30 and 70 percent. Since the commercial banks have had no need for recourse to the National Bank in order to replenish their cash resources, the Bank's loans and advances have remained very small. As of March 31, 1951, they

ANNEX E

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

489 Iraq's transport system, which is concentrated in the populated and cultivated eastern half of the country, converges on two points, Baghdad, the capital and trade center, and Basra, the country's only port.

504 The Port of Basra lies about 140 kilometers (85 miles) upstream from the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al Arab and is accessible to ocean-going ships of all sizes entering the Persian Gulf. Its site serves the economy of Iraq well, the junction of the cheaper ocean transport with the dearer inland transport being at the farthest practical point inland.

503 The Tigris and the Euphrates, together with their tributaries, offer natural transport routes. However, they have remained untrained and largely uncontrolled for centuries and, apart from a few short stretches on the rivers and their tributaries which are usable by local traffic, limited and restricted inland navigation is possible today only on the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad.

496 The railway system consists of three main lines, two of narrow gauge, one of standard gauge. One of the two meter-gauge lines is the main line from Baghdad to Basra, serving the most densely populated provinces besides connecting the two principal centers. The other links Baghdad with the northeastern provinces, east of the Tigris. The standard-gauge line runs from Baghdad on the right bank of the Tigris to Mosul, Iraq's second city, and beyond through a tip of Syria to Turkey, the Mediterranean and Europe. Until a year ago no physical junctions existed between the three main lines. Goods carried on both meter-gauge lines had to be ferried across the Tigris at Baghdad and then transshipped. The ferry has now been replaced by a bridge but the transshipment to and from the standard-gauge line remains necessary. Through passenger traffic between the three main lines is negligible.

491 A road system of approximately 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) covers the eastern half of the country, but most of the roads

491 are unsurfaced and impassable for long periods in wet weather. All-weather roads are at present found only in the Baghdad area and in the mountains in the North. The only passable trunk roads are those from Baghdad to Khanaqin, Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul, and Baghdad to Rutba and Syria. Even these have shorter or longer sections in very poor condition. There is no all-season road between Baghdad and Basra.

508
509 Two civilian airports, Baghdad and Basra, serve the principal air routes between Europe, Asia and beyond. Internal air services are limited to one line between Baghdad and Basra. Military airfields and landing grounds ~~and a~~ few private air strips are available in certain places, but demand for internal air transport has so far been negligible.

509
475 One state air line, Iraqi Airways, operates services with neighbor countries and Egypt through Baghdad and Basra with a small fleet of four aircraft. Administration and management of the airline are combined with those of the state railways.

315 Oil from the oil fields at Kirkuk is carried by pipelines across the country to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa, but the line to Haifa is now out of operation. A shorter pipeline connects the southern Iraq oilfield with the Shatt al Arab oil port at Fao.

489 Transport connections with the outside world are well served by the Port of Basra for ocean-going traffic, by the airports of Baghdad and Basra in international air traffic and by the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean. At present only one railway line, beginning at Baghdad, connects Iraq with Syria, and via Syria with Turkey and Europe. A desert road exists for through road traffic between Iraq and Syria and Lebanon. A private company, Nairn Transport, operates an international bus service on this route. There are two main roads for exchange of traffic with Iran, one from Baghdad via Khanaqin, and one from Erbil via the Rowanduz Valley and Rayat. Future economic developments may perhaps demand new traffic outlets to the Mediterranean, shorter and better equipped than the existing railway and road routes, but at present there are few signs of such a demand.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

V. Roads

Organization

Iraq's road system is controlled and maintained by the Public 491 Works Department under the Minister of Communications and 647 Public Works. It is headed by the Director General of Public Works and under his direction five divisional engineers assure the maintenance and works service in divisions centered in Baghdad (four provinces), Hilla (three provinces), Basra (three provinces), Kirkuk (two provinces) and Mosul (two provinces). A sixth divisional engineer is in charge of central operations in the capital. District engineers, usually stationed at the provincial capitals, are in charge of day-to-day maintenance. Planning is carried out at the headquarters of the Director General. There is a lack of technical staff to carry out surveys in the field. Except for this fact, the organization is efficient and effective. It may have to be expanded as the road construction program progresses. Provincial governments and municipalities control secondary and urban roads and streets.

At present the road system controlled and maintained by the 491 Public Works Department consists of approximately

2,500 kilometers	metalled and surfaced,
500 kilometers	metalled only,
5,000 kilometers	earth roads.

Many of the metalled roads were built in the two war periods, and most of them are concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the capital, between Baghdad and the East and North, and in the North. All the roads in the southern plains are earth roads, and their maintenance and use suffers from the effects of rains on the salt-impregnated soil. Roads within municipal boundaries are generally [363] in a very poor state of repair, not excluding the streets in the capital. Roads in the Basra Port area are controlled and maintained by the Port Directorate and are in good repair.

Maintenance was, until a few years ago, extremely poor, but today every effort is being made, and with conspicuous success, at least to prevent further deterioration. Maintenance costs are allocated on the Ministry's budget and calculated at ID 40 per

●491 kilometer treated. For the present this appears to be about sufficient, but costs will increase as the system expands and traffic develops. On the completion of a metalled system of 7,000 kilometers, as planned, the costs would rise to approximately ID 70 per kilometer per year, a total of ID 490,000.

Road Construction

499 A program was drawn up in 1950 by a Committee appointed by order of the Minister of Communications and Public Works on February 7, 1950. The Committee consisted of the Directors General of Public Works, State Railways, Irrigation, and Surveys, and the Chief Engineer, a British road expert from the London Ministry of Transport temporarily attached to the Public Works Department in Baghdad. This Committee is a laudable example of departmental coordination, and the plan drawn up by the Committee shows unmistakably the value of this cooperation.

The program schedules 37 roads, of a total length of 3,463 kilometers, to be built, or improved as the case may be, in a period of 10 years at a total cost estimated at ID 14,500,000. Construction costs are expected to vary from ID 3,500 to ID 7,500 per kilometer, including drainage, culverts, bridges and costs of supervision. The program assigns first priority to the main trunk road, Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra, now an earth road, and the trunk road, Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul, some sections of which are already metalled.

The roads are to be built to accommodate two traffic lanes, together six meters (20 feet) wide with verges for pedestrians, pack animals and cattle. Specifications drawn up by the Public Works Engineers provide for three types of foundation—stone blocks, broken stone or gravel, eight to nine inches thick; and for two types of surfacing—bituminous macadam or graveled macadam, three inches thick.

The program is sound and the specifications are effective. The Mission recommends that both be adopted as the basis of the future road construction plan, but with the following qualifications:

1. Although trunk roads like the Baghdad-Basra and Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul arteries and a few others should have a metalled width of six meters and wide verges on each side, the initial width of metalled surface on other

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

494 Transport licenses should be granted only if the proposed operator appears responsible and sufficiently well equipped to perform the transport services and if there is evidence of present or prospective need. Operators should be required to take out insurance, to adhere to published rates, routes and schedules, and to conform to loading regulations.

Maintenance

• 491 The maintenance of the new road system when once completed is even more important than its initial construction. Service and funds must be assured to keep the roads in the condition in which they have been built. The Minister of Finance should budget for annual expenditures, to be estimated by the Public Works Department, for maintenance of the road systems and all accessories including sign posting, for improvements necessitated by increased traffic, for inspection and control of road traffic and for the traffic police required. The expenditures should, in general, be covered by revenue from those who actually use the roads.

Subsidiary Roads and Urban Streets

489 It is recommended that at the earliest opportunity a system of cooperation between the Public Works Department and provincial and municipal road departments be established to bring maintenance, traffic control and municipal licensing in line with the government's policy in these matters and that appropriate provision for this cooperation be made in the budget.

City Transport

365 An essential part of the country's transport system is passenger transport service in the capital. Baghdad and its suburbs form a city of a population of over half a million spread over an area with a radius of four to eight miles. In 1938 it was decided to establish a municipal passenger service to be operated with buses. The war intervened and limited services were brought into operation in 1942 with converted army trucks equipped with locally built bodies. A loan of ID 500,000 was raised, more vehicles purchased and workshops and garages of sorts installed. The services deteriorated with the poor equipment, which was all that was available in wartime, and the municipality was unable to carry the financial burden. Early in 1950 the service was taken over by

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
RAILROADS
ROADS
ROADS TO BE ABANDONED
N
TO BAGHDAD NORTH EAST.
LOCAL GOODS
NEW LAYOUT
LOCO
MOSUL

p. 343 (a)


KIRKUK
TIGRIS RIVER
PRESENT RAILWAY STATIONS AND YARDS TO BE ABANDONED
ACCESS TO
NEW MAIN LINE
MARSHALLING YARD

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● 491

p. 343 (b)

APPENDIX A

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491

IRAQI STATE RAILWAYS REVISED LAYOUT BAGHDAD RAILWAYS & ROADS IN NEW TOWN PLAN


0
0.5
1.0
MILES
0
0.5
1.0
KILOMETERS

p. 343 (c)

2: United Nations U-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

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● 491
508
315

Map No. 1


TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAN
JORDAN
40
42
44
46
48
36
34
32
Mosul
Al Badi
Qal'a Sharqat
Baiji
Ana
Haditha
Samarra
Tell Draile
Rutba
Ramadi
Lake Habbaniya
Al Fallaja
BAGHDAD
Al Musaiyib
Hilla
Hashimiya
Shithatha
Nukhaib
Al Kufa
Aqra
Great Zab
Rayat
Erbil
Koi Sanjaq
Little Zab
Kirkuk
Penjwin
Badra
Kut al Imara
Afak
Amara

2½ United Nations U-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH 1

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491
508
315


IRAQ
PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT ROUTES
Railway
Paved road
Unpaved road
Selected trail
Main oil pipelines
Airfield
0 50 100 200
MILES
0 50 100 200
KILOMETRES
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL TERRITORY
PERSIAN GULF
Nukhaib
Jadaidet al 'Aror
Al Kufa
Najaf
Afaq
Ad Diwaniya
Samawa
An Nasiriya
Ur
Amara
Tigris
Suq ash Shuyukh
Shu'aiba
Az Zubair
Al Atwaniya
Fao
AIR ROUTES AND AIRFIELDS
0 300 MILES
0 300 KILOMETRES
USSR
IRAN
IRAQ
JORDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
Beirut
Damascus
Mosul
Erbil
Kirkuk
Rutba
Baghdad
Basra
Kuwait
to Cyprus
to Cairo
to Tehran
to Karachi
to Dhahran
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MAP NO. 312

50-28088

496 By contrast, various railway sections built during the war (Baquba—Kut-al-Imara, Tanua—Hashimiya) were abandoned or dismantled after the war.

497 The railway traffic is shown by the following table, in which the years refer to fiscal years beginning on 1 April of the year stated:

	Passenger-kilometres	*Freight net ton-kilometres*
	(in millions)	
1928	89	147
1932	144	156
1937	251	302
1942	566	814
1947	631	606

There is a daily passenger and goods service (in both directions) on the Basra—Baghdad—Kirkuk—Khanaqin line; the traffic between the railway centres and the inland markets of Iraq and Iran is carried by road.

In 1946, the rolling-stock consisted of 114 engines, 324 passenger carriages and 6,642 goods vans.

Road Network

491 The actual construction of a road network in Iraq was begun after the First World War. At present (these figures relate to the end of 1948), the country has 7,320 kilometres of road; these roads are inspected and maintained by the government and are made up as follows:

● 491

	Kilometres
Macadamized (asphalt) roads	2,270
Improved roads (paved, but not macadamized)	405
Unpaved roads	4,645
	7,320

In addition, there is a network of roads (approximately 3,500 kilometres) which have not yet been improved and are inspected by the local authorities.

The principal roads of Iraq which are regarded as passable for vehicles are as follows:

	Kilometres
(Region of date cultivation) macadamized road: Baghdad—Al Musaiyib—Hilla; unpaved: Hilla—Diwaniya—Samawa—Ur—Basra	622[5]
(Cereals, dates) unpaved road: Baghdad—Kut-al-Imara—Amara—Basra, with the Kut-al-Imara—Basra—Iranian frontier branch road	718
(Petroleum region) macadamized road: Baghdad — Baquba — Khanaqin — Khosrovi (Iranian frontier)	176
(Petroleum) macadamized road: Baghdad—Kirkuk—Erbil—Mosul	485
(Cereals, cattle) Baghdad—Samara—Baiji—Qal'a Shargat—Mosul	433
(Cereals) road almost entirely macadamized: Baghdad—Al Falluja (leads to the seaplane base) — Habbaniye — Ramadi — Rutba — Mafrak (Jordan frontier), with the Al Falluja—Ramadi branch road round Lake Habbaniye	650

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[5] Approximate figures.

	Kilometres
•491 (Petroleum) macadamized: Erbil—Ruwandiz—Raiat (Iranian frontier)	154
(Petroleum) macadamized: Kirkuk—Sulaimaniya (116 km)—Halabja—Iranian frontier	220
(Mosul)—Mineveh—El-Badi (Syrian frontier)	165
(Along the pipe-line) Kirkuk—Baiji—neighbourhood of Haditha—Rutba, with branch roads leading to Syria	682
(Cereals, cattle, petroleum) macadamized: Erbil—Kōi Sanjaq—neighbourhood of Kirkuk and neighbourhood of Sulaimaniya	242
Ramadi—Shithatha	132
Macadamized: (near Al Musaiyib)—Karbala; Karbala—Noukhaib (Saudi Arabian frontier)	352
Junction of the Karbala—Noukhaib—Bir el-Lussuf—Saudi Arabian frontier road	330
Hilla—Al Kufa—Najaf (across the Southern Desert)—Al Athamin (Saudi Arabian frontier), with the Najaf—Samawa branch road (on the Baghdad—Basra road)	396
Mosul—'Aqra	100
Baquba—Mandali—Khanaqin	180
Hashimiya	93
Al Kufa—Diwaniya—Afej	110
Basra—(ferry boat)—Tanua (Iranian frontier)	38
	6,278

The Baghdad—Rutba—Mafrak road, sections of the Baghdad—Al Musaiyib road, the Shahraban—Khanaqin—Khosrovi road, the Kirkuk—Sulaimaniya road, the Kirkuk—Erbil road and the Mosul—Erbil—Ruwandiz—Raiat road seem to be the best of all these roads, and most likely to be fit for fast motor transport throughout the year. The topography and climatic conditions of the country are such that, except during the rainy season (especially November and December), roads which are neither macadamized nor paved can be used extensively.

4/87 **Land Communications with Foreign Countries**

4/96 Iraq has direct connexions:

By *railway:* with Turkey, through Syria, the frontier station of Nusaybin, to Haidar Pasha (suburb of Istanbul, on the sea of Marmora, at the southern end of the Anatolian shore of the Bosporus); with Syria, where the Baghdad line intersects the Syrian line to Damascus near Aleppo; with Lebanon, through Syria, by the junction at Raiat with the Damascus—Beirut line, and at Homs with the Homs—Tell Kalakh—Tripoli—Beirut line; with the State of Israel, by the Damascus—Jordan line and the narrow-gauge Dera—Haifa branch line; with the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan, by the Damascus—Dera—Nassib—Amman—Maan line; with Egypt, by the Haifa—Rafah—Cairo railway; with Iran, from the terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway at Khurramshahr, on the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab (24.4 kilometres from Basra), towards Ahwaz—Teheran—Bandar-Shah, on the Caspian Sea;

4/87
● 4/91 By *motor transport roads:* with Turkey, directly through Zakho, and through Syria, by the Mosul—Tel Kochek—Nusaybin—Diyarbekir roads; with Syria (and beyond) by the Mosul—Tel Kochek, Mosul—El Badi—Mineveh, Kirkuk—Haditha—Jalib-Akashe, Baghdad—Rutba—Tell Droite—Palmyra, and Baghdad—Rutba—Damascus roads; with Jordan: by the Baghdad—Ramadi—Rutba—Mafrak roads; with Saudi Arabia: by the Baghdad—Karbala—Nukhaib—Judaidal al Arar, and El Jauf

487 (Nefud Desert) roads; with Kuwait: Basra—Az Zubair—Safwan, to Jahra; with Iran: Basra—(ferry-
491 boat)—Tanwa—to Ahwaz, Baghdad—Khosrovi —Kermanshah—Hamadan—Kazvin—Teheran, Kirkuk—Sulaimaniya—Penjwin—Bashmak (frontier) towards Sinneh, Mosul—Erbil—Ruwandiz—Raiat.

Civil Aviation

508 Iraq has two airports for long distance international service, one at Baghdad and one at Basra. Each of these airports also has a seaplane base, the first on Lake Habbaniye, about 100 kilometres from the city of Baghdad; and the second, at Ma'agil, 7 kilometres from the town of Basra, near the land airport. The two airports are provided with modern technical equipment and with all the facilities for the comfort of the passengers, such as hotels, restaurants, etc. The country has several other aerodromes and landing fields, the most important of which are at Rutba and at Mosul. In 1948 and 1949, thorough-going repairs had to be made to the runways of the Baghdad airport, during which time it was only accessible to aircraft not exceeding eighteen tons. Nearly all the Baghdad traffic was
509 diverted to the Basra airport. In 1948, Basra airport was used by the Iraqi Airways Company and by seven international aviation companies, including

489 needs of the southern districts are particularly acute:
653 as yet they possess only roads which are not prac-
•[491] ticable for any traffic, still less for heavy motor traffic, during the rainy season and for a long time afterwards, and boat-bridges of a very old—almost antediluvian—type across the Euphrates and other rivers.

[508] The government is taking steps to modernize the Baghdad and Basra-Ma'agil airports (the latter, in addition to its modern technical installations, has had since 1937 an air-conditioned hotel, swimming pool, tennis courts, etc.). The aim is to make them into first-class international airports. In addition, a training school for civilian air pilots was established in Iraq in 1937.

377 As the country lacks hydroelectric power stations, in spite of the existence of various large dams, there is now a plan to utilize the Bekhme dam for the generation of electric power.

315 In the expectation of the return of normal political conditions in the Near and Middle East, the

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[*] It is interesting to note that for the Basra—Baghdad section (568 km), these coaches are placed on special 1-metre bogies.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq/MH1

496 basis of the Iraqi State Railways, which were made over to the civil authorities set up by the British Government in 1920, and in 1923 to the newly-formed Government of Iraq. They became the property of the Iraq Government on 1 April 1946. They consist at present of two gauges. A metre-gauge line runs from the Port of Basra to Baghdad, and thence across the River Tigris by the new bridge to Kirkuk and Arbil. This line has branches from Shuaiba Junction to Shuaiba, Zubair, and Jebel Sanam Quarry, from Ur Junction to Nasiriya and from Jalula Junction to Khanaqin. A standard-gauge line connects Baghdad to Tel Kochek on the Syrian frontier. A through rail service with air-conditioned coaches on the section Basra to Baghdad connects with the Taurus express from Baghdad via Mosul to Istanbul and thence to continental Europe and Great Britain. The through standard-gauge connexion from Baghdad to Tel Kochek was opened for traffic on 15 July 1940. An extension of the metre-gauge main line from Kirkuk to Arbil was opened to traffic on 6 June 1949. There is a total of 1,050 miles open, of which 328 miles are standard (4 ft 8½ in.) gauge and 722 miles metre gauge.

497 For the year ending 31 March 1951 the total receipts were ID3,870,174, total expenditure ID3,816,974, number of passengers carried 3,809,412, goods 1,890,413 tons.

491 *Roads.* At the end of 1948 Iraq contained some 1,400 miles of surfaced metalled roads, 250 miles of unsurfaced metalled roads, and 5,000 miles of earth roads. Most of the metalled roads are in the immediate vicinity of Baghdad, between Baghdad and the east and north, and in the north. Elsewhere their lack is due mainly to the absence of suitable road material and the expense of bringing it to the site. The earth roads which take their place, especially in the southern plains, are levelled and where necessary embanked and bridged but are vulnerable to the rains. Their defects are to some extent offset by the flatness of the construction and repair.

The main transport routes are: Baghdad to Mosul via Samarra; Baghdad to Mosul via Kirkuk and Irbil; Kirkuk to Sulaimania and Halabja; Irbil to Rowanduz from north-west Persia; Mosul to Amadiya; Mosul to Zakho; Mosul to Tel Kochek for north-east Syria and Turkey; Baghdad to Khanaqin for Persia; Baghdad to Basra via Kut and Amara; Baghdad to Basra via Hilla and Samawa; Baghdad to Kerbela; Baghdad to Rutba for Syria and Jordan.

In 1950 a governmental committee drew up a ten-year programme which provided for the construction or improvement of some 2,150 miles of road. First priority was accorded to

491 the main roads Baghdad–Kut–Amara–Basra and Baghdad–Kirkuk–Irbil–Mosul, which are at present unmetalled or only partially metalled. The Development Board has allocated nearly ID27 million to these projects.

493 Road traffic is light. At the beginning of 1953 the number of registered motor vehicles was given as follows, most of them 494 operating in or around the larger towns: private cars 8,000; taxis 3,500; buses 2,900; lorries 6,500; motor cycles 1,900. In Baghdad an efficient bus service is operated by a State Passenger Transport Board. A private cross-desert bus service links Baghdad with Damascus, and there are private bus services between Iraq and Persia.

504 *Basra Port*,[1] lying some eighty miles up the Shatt al-Arab from the Persian Gulf, is the only commercial port of Iraq; an 505 oil port is being constructed at Fao, near the mouth of the Shatt. A small port established during the Second World War at Umm Qasr, on a sea inlet south of the Shatt al-Arab entrance, has since been dismantled. The authority of the Port, which is controlled by a special department of the Iraq Government, extends from the outer bar of the Shatt to a point seventeen miles above the town of Basra. The Shatt is sufficiently deep to admit large ocean-going vessels, but the Fao bar at its mouth requires constant dredging to clear an entrance for the larger of them. During the Second World War extensions were carried out in view of the increased volume of traffic; in consequence there are now 4,500 feet of continuous jetty, providing berthing for eight large vessels at a time and two or three smaller ones, in addition to barge and lighterage berths. Basra Port handles a large proportion of the country's trade. During 1952 some 400 ocean-going vessels, with a net registered tonnage of 1,132,000, and some 260 tankers and water-carriers, with a net registered tonnage of 927,000, were handled by the Port Authority in Basra, Fao, Abadan, and Khorramshahr. During the financial year 1951–2 cargo imported at Basra totalled 511,600 tons and [651] cargo exported 800,000 tons. The closure of Abadan has occasioned the Port a severe loss of revenue, estimated at ID100,000 a month; port and dredging facilities have nevertheless been maintained.

502 *Inland Waterways*. The Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels of up to four feet draught from February to August except for short flood periods in April and May in some years; during the remaining five months navigation is impeded for long periods. Inland water transport has lost much of its former importance. The last remaining regular navigation

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[1] See *Port of Basrah*, official publication of the Port Authority.

IRAQ MH1

of the 33rd parallel. Affiliated companies 471
have concessions over the remaining territory—the
Mosul Petroleum Company in the
region west of the Tigris and the Basra
Petroleum Company south of the 33rd
parallel. Oil is extracted from the Kirkuk 315
fields by the Iraq Petroleum Company and 471
conveyed by pipelines to Mediterranean
ports. It was formerly pumped to terminals
in Tripoli and Haifa, but the latter pipeline
has been closed since the Arab-Israeli hostilities
in 1948. A new pipeline, constructed
from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias,
was opened early in 1952.

In 1938, the Basra Petroleum Company began drilling operations in the Persian Gulf area, where the existence of an extensive oil field has since been established. In 1950, a pipeline was completed to its shipping terminal at Fao, at the head of the Gulf. The activities of the Mosul company are still in the exploratory stage, but the production of oil has recently been started at Ain Zala. It is piped to the Mediterranean by a line which joins that from the Kirkuk fields at Baiji, on the Tigris.

A smaller oil field at Naft Khanah, near
the Iranian border, is worked by the
Khanaquin Oil Company, a subsidiary
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This
company operates a refinery on the Alwand
River, near Khanaquin, which supplies petroleum
products for local consumption.
Since 1952, it has also constructed a small 382
refinery at Basra to process products for use 471
in southern Iraq. It obtains the crude oil
from Naft Khanah or from the Basra Petroleum
Company.

Iraq derives a considerable revenue from 788
the pilgrimage traffic. The principal shrines 346
of the Shia sect are located at An Najef,
Kerbela, Kadhimain and Samarra, and, in
addition to local pilgrims, they are visited
annually by thousands of Shiites from Iran,
Pakistan and other Moslem countries. The
privilege of burial near the shrines is also
coveted by devout Shiite Moslems.

Transportation is mainly by roads or 489
waterways. Motor highways link the princi- 491

62 Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH I

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pal population centers and radiate from 489
Baghdad and Mosul to cities in Syria, Iran 491
and Turkey. The Tigris is navigable to 505
barges from Basra to Baghdad throughout
the year, and to smaller craft as far as
Mosul during the high-water season. The
Shatt al Arab is open to ocean-going vessels,
and Basra, about 85 miles from the
Persian Gulf, is one of the major ports of
the Middle East. A government-operated 496
railroad, part of the famous "Berlin to
Baghdad" railway, runs from Basra to
Baghdad and Mosul, with connections
through Aleppo to Istanbul. A branch line
extends from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and
Khanaquin. A government-owned airline 509
serves Iraq and the neighboring countries,
while international lines from Europe to
Africa and the Far East stop at Baghdad
and Basra.

FOOD AND NUTRITION

The nutrition of the people is governed 146
by the cultural habits of the different racial
and social communities, the economic status
of the individual families and the food supplies
available under diverse climatic conditions.
Undernutrition is prevalent among
the poorer inhabitants—tenant cultivators,
urban laborers and nomadic tribes—who
make up over three quarters of the population.
Wheat, barley, rice and dates are the 241
staple food crops of the country, while vegetables
and fruits, other than dates, are frequently
scarce. Wheat is widely grown, primarily
in the rainfall areas of the north,
but also in the irrigated riverain zones of
the south. Barley is cultivated extensively,
and, like wheat, is used in the preparation [262]
of breads and of *burghul*, a coarse-grained
cereal product typical of this region. Millet
and maize are common crops in the south.
Rice is produced in certain lowland districts
in the Kurdish highlands and on the fringes
of the southern marshes, and is a popular
food among all sections of the population.
Peas, beans and lentils are usually consumed
throughout the year, and tomatoes,
eggplant and different root and green vege-

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493 The country's rolling-stock (horse-drawn and motor vehicles), excluding military and other official vehicles, is increasing, as the following statistics show:

	1946	*1947*
Horse-drawn vehicles:		
Carts	936	
Wagons	459	
Motor vehicles:		
Passenger cars	5,903	7,422
Vans and omnibuses	3,497	5,136

An order for 100 new medium-sized omnibuses was placed in the United States in 1949.

The use of motor lorries is becoming increasingly wide-spread and this method of transport is setting up serious competition with the Iraqi railways.

494 Road passenger traffic, especially from Baghdad to the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan and beyond, is carried by large omnibuses with regular schedules.

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[1] See *Port of Basrah*, official publication of the Port Authority.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312
185
653 work on the new Barrage began. Tenders for the complete construction were called for in September 1910, and the contract awarded to the British firm of Sir John Jackson & Co.

The construction of the Barrage, then and now one of the greatest works in 'Iraq, was carried out with extraordinary speed by a staff which included Turks, Indians, Armenians, and some 3,500 'Iraqis. The suspicion of certain elements in Turkish officialdom usually turned to gratified encouragement after a personal visit to Hindiya. Labour troubles were few. Transport, especially that on the Euphrates routes from Baṣra, presented extreme difficulties, with tribal blackmail and navigational obstacles; and the continual struggles needed to obtain funds from an empty Treasury in Istanbul and a harassed Daftardar in Baghdad were successful only after actual stoppage of the work seemed inevitable. The iron gates arrived in the late summer of 1913, and a crowded and triumphant ceremonial opening of the whole work was held in November of that year. Although the Barrage, which had cost less than £500,000, still lacked the canalization which it was designed to support downstream, it conferred immediately enormous benefits on the countryside which it served. These would have been a hundredfold greater if they could have included public security, an equitable land system, and some hope of new agricultural methods.

Elsewhere in 'Iraq, much of the earth-work of the Ḥabbaniya Escape in its first phase was completed, and digging of the Ṣaqlawiya Canal was begun but abandoned. Further surveys produced information of great future value, though no other major enterprise belongs to this period. A scheme for watering the Ḥawija, north-west of Kirkuk, from the Lesser Zab was begun without study and ended in fiasco and scandal. More important, and prophetic of a major development of the future, was the growing riverside use of oil engines for irrigation purposes. These increased from a mere dozen in 1900 to some scores in 1914. Meanwhile, flood-bank protection annually renewed followed its unsure and expensive course, rarely effective and always burdensome. The 'bunds' built by Nadhim Pasha for the safeguarding of Baghdad, though they failed partially in their first year, were an important work.

433 These last years of Turkish rule were marked by little industrial development. Some increase in local shipbuilding and the use of irrigation pumps, ice machines, wool and liquorice-presses called for the first time for mechanical repair facilities. The first motor-
● 494 car appeared in 'Iraq in 1908 from Aleppo; by 1914 less than a dozen were in use. These included a motor-bus service on the Ba'quba road, and the private cars of a few notables. Efforts to mechanize the Kufa tramway had failed.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group,
651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an
ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving
the construction of the Ḥabbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and
a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable
success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton
Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards
called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist
nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale
which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method,
came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated
in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable
harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness,
654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small
Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with
231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it
could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi
flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual
losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility
of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship
● 494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay
in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in
mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The
mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased
threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars
plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying
repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much
491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by
Ramadi and Rutba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated
in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters
was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's
foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian)
competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the
victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The
Ruṭba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in
the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year
thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through
205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails
by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services
superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi
administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive
and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

619

the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater freedom of Turkish times. 656

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Ḥilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Lu', and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and co-ordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell. 172

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily developed during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Fayṣal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders. 494 499

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

494 were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into 499 the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty & Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932. A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the 'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The 'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a direct Baghdad–'Amman route, and the first experiments in developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

505 The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and road competition, and had little scope for development. The veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927, *Mejidieh* in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S.*16 and *S.*14 were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris* in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after 503 1929. At Baṣra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928–30. They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 20 feet in 1920) and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port 505 traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from Abadan, but the Shaṭṭ was used regularly also by the Strick, British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German) Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of 504 Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930 Treaty, was not yet in sight.

496 The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful. 471 Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

382 opening at Kirkuk in January 1935, its twin 12-inch pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli came into operation. This achievement marked the end of ten years of patient and well-directed work since the grant of the first concession, and by its employment of 'Iraqis in their thousands, its expansion of communications and the example which it offered of successful large-scale modern industry, it added great advantages for the 'Iraqi public to the direct enrichment of their Treasury. The gradually developing works in Kirkuk oilfields, the main depots at Bayji and Ḥaditha, the mid-desert pump-station townships with their connecting roads, pipeline, and telegraphs became a characteristic feature of the modern 'Iraqi scene, while its production, of 4 million tons of crude oil a year from 1935 onwards, placed the country immediately as the eighth oil-producing country of the world. The B.O.D. Company, whose shareholding was in these years predominantly Italian, German, and Franco-Swiss, soon found itself embarrassed by its obligation of annual payment to Government, and by its failure, in spite of an active drilling campaign from 1933 onwards, to discover other than viscous, scarcely marketable oil. The Company's plan in 1935 of diminishing their cash payments by building a Qaiyara–Tall Kochek railway, which could convey their oil to seaboard and link 'Iraq with the Turkish railway system, was after
471 hesitation rejected by Government. Their financial position grew desperate, and a reconstruction of their Board in 1936 marked the transfer of control of the Company to the I.P.C. group; and the latter emerged soon afterwards as outright owners of the B.O.D. and Mosul Oil Fields, with the disappearance of all non-British shareholding in it other than that of the I.P.C., French, and American constituents themselves. The problem of its viscous and sulphurous oil remained to be solved. The smaller Rafidain and Khaniqin Companies (p. 211) continued respectively their work of producing and refining oil in the Transferred Territories, and of marketing it throughout 'Iraq. The project of a Government-owned refinery, for which the I.P.C. concession provided, was conceived during this period but was to prove slow of realization.

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Road-surfacing was among the uses of oil products in 'Iraq, but neither this nor the too limited funds available could do much at present to provide the country with roads of high or even tolerable standard. Some further sections such as that from Ramadi to Ruṭba were metalled, others were indifferently or barely maintained, all were at worst passable; road maintenance, costly and inconspicuous, was given habitually a low priority in Government allotments. Traffic on the Najf–Madina route increased. The route from the Euphrates to 'Amman and Haifa developed as a powerful rival of the northern track to Beirut. The Rawanduz road, dis-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

appointingly, carried little traffic other than some oil supplies to 499
northern Persia. Following completion of the great Faluja bridge [1940]
(p. 208) other steel bridges were constructed: on the Lesser Zab at Altun Kupri, the Greater Zab at Aski Kellek, and elsewhere. In Baghdad the replacement of the two pontoon crossings by permanent steel bridges was at last decided, and contracts were awarded to Messrs. Holloway Bros. in 1936, a major step in the development of the capital. The new spans of the Mosul bridge were finished. Municipal street-making proceeded everywhere, and not least in Baghdad.

Little changed in the field of Tigris river navigation. Fears that 505
the Kut barrage would make steamship navigation impossible 504
were aroused but could be allayed; a move made in 1934 by local rivals to question the rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Company led to nothing. River traffic on the whole diminished. The *Zobaida* was sold to India in 1935, the *Blosse Lynch* and *Tigris* as scrap in the same year and the *Khalifa* in 1937. In 1936 the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation split again into its original components, the Lynch Company and Messrs. Gray Mackenzie. Four small gunboats were acquired by Government in 1937 for riverain police work, but were little used. The Port of Baṣra rendered steady service to the country. Its volume of traffic permitted it to pay regularly its capital instalments to the British Government, and by 1937 a debt of only £300,000 remained. The Port Trust, to be set up under the 1930 Treaty, did not appear; the Port was still administered by a Directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Its bar-dredging scheme operated with great success, repaid its loans, and kept open and improved the deep channel.[1] Two new dredgers were acquired. The Port administration completed a modern airport at Baṣra, furnished with a hotel and all facilities, and provided Baṣra city and suburbs with electric power and a modern water-supply. The ocean traffic using the Port increased substantially after 1935: first two, and later four, Japanese lines appeared, with one each of German, Indian, and Italian ownership and an occasional Russian, Swedish, and Greek steamer. The great bulk of the tonnage remained, as of old, British and British-Indian.

The 'Iraq Railways maintained their solvency and functions in 496
spite of tribal interference, fluctuating traffic, largely obsolescent equipment, and serious road competition. The operation of the system was modernized as far as was practicable, and a rapid Baghdad–Baṣra daily service introduced. Negotiations with the

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[1] The low-water depths in the Rooka channel (p. 208), achieved by successive phases of the bar-dredging scheme, were in 1926, 18 ft., in 1928–9, 20ft., in 1935–8, 23 or 24 ft.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Lynch fleet had been diminished in 1938 by the loss of the 505
Mejidieh, sold to Anglo-Iranian, and in 1941 by that of the
Malamir and the *al-Kadri*, burnt out and scrapped respectively.
Their rivals, notably Ḥannā al-Shaykh and 'Abd al-Karim
Khuḍhayri (Khedery), were more than holding their own: but the
competition of the railway and the roads must grow rather than
diminish. To the road system, indeed, Paiforce contributed much, 491
notably in the completed trans-desert highway to Jordan, in the
re-surfacing of many road stretches, and in the maintenance in
being of 'Iraqi transport fleets by the provision of tyres. Nevertheless, 494
the upkeep of civil motor vehicles in war-time proved most
difficult, and the numbers in use decreased. The air communications
of the territory were not improved during the war; but before 509
its end projects for a national air line were under formation. The
European services crossing and visiting 'Iraq recommenced in
1945 after war-time curtailments, and the Egyptian Misr Airways
restarted its Cairo–Baghdad service. A contract was given in 1945
to the Marconi Company for the erection of a new wireless transmitting
station.

The course of foreign trade was notably deflected from its usual 439
channels by the war. In 1939 the United Kingdom was its principal
customer, followed by the United States, each of these
countries taking approximately one-third of the total visible
exports; but by 1944 the principal buyer was Palestine with Transjordan,
followed by Persia. Visible exports, amounting to ID 4
million before the war, reached through enhanced prices ID 9
million before its end. The transit trade, reduced in 1939 to a
value of some ID 3 million, reached ID 13 million five years later,
thanks to the passage of goods to Russia. Imports rose from a
value of ID 9 million before the war to ID 14 million in its last
year; the United Kingdom's share in these fell from 33 to 11 per
cent., that of Japan from 18 per cent. to nothing, while India's
share rose from 8 to 30 per cent., Syria's from 2 to 16, the United
States' from 8 to 12.

The desire for industrial expansion, always a cherished ambition, 433
was stimulated by the war-time shortages and an increased local
market; contrary factors were the shortage of raw materials, competition
for skilled workers, and the impossibility of importing
factory equipment. Of the seventy enterprises benefiting in 1944
from the law of 1929 most were on the humblest scale, with the
importance only of pilot projects which could indicate to the
middle class the possibility of a career outside Government service,
the professions, or politics. Some war-time progress was made in
brick manufacture; workshops produced hand-tools from scrap
metal; the crushing of oil-seeds—cotton, sesame, and linseed—

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

491 be necessary. Such a program will need to be coordinated particularly
499 with the development of new agricultural areas. Earth excavated in the construction of new irrigation and drainage canals can be used in the building of such roads. The surfaced roads should be constructed by contractors of repute capable of furnishing their own road-making plant. It is generally recognized that the Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra and the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul roads should have first priority. The first of these is at present only a dirt road but the latter has sections which are already surfaced.

● 494 As road transport develops, it will be vital to institute some controls, particularly since most of the operators now provide only irregular and unreliable service. Limitations on loads and regular inspection of vehicles should be instituted and enforced. Operators of transport services should be licensed to make sure that they are equipped to provide adequate and reliable service at reasonable rates and that they carry insurance.

The Mission has also given some attention to the municipal bus service in Baghdad. Operations at present are seriously handicapped by the diversity and age of its transport equipment and high maintenance costs. A sound decision has been made to standardize equipment. The central workshop should also be modernized and re-equipped and a central garage and four auxiliary garages provided. To carry out this program financial assistance from the Development Board will be necessary. It is also suggested that more efficient management of municipal transport might be achieved through the appointment of a single Director General in place of the present Board, and that a stricter control over the collection of passenger fares be instituted to improve revenues.

Communications

206 For communications, capital outlays will be required primarily in connection with the extension of the telephone system. The needs are well-known in Iraq and do not require elaboration here. Although the communications services are operated at a profit which is credited to the government budget, it is suggested that future capital expenditures be financed by the Development Board. This will not only make it easier to balance the government budget, but will enable the Board to insist on better synchronization of the

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Petroleum products are distributed by the Rafidain Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and at prices, exclusive of taxes, which are among the lowest in the world. 382

TABLE 8

PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM AND REFINED PRODUCTS
(in thousand metric tons)

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	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951 (est'd.)
Crude oil					
Iraq Petroleum Company	4,354	3,017	3,671	5,986	7,500
Khanaqin Oil Company	339	367	365	384	350
Total	4,639	3,384	4,036	6,370	7,850
Refined products	n.a.	373	369	393	—

VI. Transport

The state-owned railway system is the principal means of transport, carrying about 2,000,000 tons of cargo and over 3,000,000 passengers annually. Part of it is standard and part meter gauge. The standard-gauge section is part of the original Berlin-Baghdad railway and runs from Baghdad northward via Mosul into Syria and Turkey. The meter-gauge line extends from the Port of Basra in the South to Baghdad and then beyond to Kirkuk and Erbil in the North, with a branch line to Khanaqin. Over recent years the railways have managed to carry out a considerable capital development program despite serious financial obstacles, but they now face the need of replacing, on a considerable scale, old track, rolling stock and locomotives. 496

Road transport has as yet primarily supplemented rather than replaced railway traffic. There are only about 11,000 passenger cars and a little over 9,000 trucks and buses in the country. Roads are generally inadequate. There are only about 2,500 kilometers of metalled and surfaced roads in all of Iraq. The remaining dirt roads quickly become impassable in bad weather. Some important 494 491

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

491 centers such as Amara and Kut are linked neither by rail nor by
• 494 all-weather roads to Basra and Baghdad.

504 In Basra, Iraq possesses an excellent port capable of handling
497 a considerable increase in traffic. Upcountry cargo into and out of the port is handled almost wholly by railway, for inland river traffic has declined greatly in importance owing to shallow water and other impediments to navigation.

The port and the railways are each run by an autonomous administration operating under a separate budget.

VII. Money and Banking

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The banking system consists of the National Bank, five commercial banks, a number of private banks or *sarrafs,* the post office savings bank, and three state-owned longer-term financing institutions, the Industrial Bank, the Agricultural Bank and the Mortgage Bank.

652 The National Bank succeeded the Iraq Currency Board as the
453 currency-issuing authority in 1949. Iraq is a member of the sterling area, so that its currency is backed principally by sterling assets in London. Although the law permits the currency to be backed up to 30 percent by Iraqi government securities, as of March 31, 1951, the total amount of currency in circulation was more than covered by sterling assets. Aside from its note-issuing function, the Bank is charged with the administration of foreign exchange control and the supervision of the banking system in accordance with a bank control law which became effective at the beginning of 1950. This law requires banks to keep the equivalent of 15 percent of their time and demand deposits as a reserve with the National Bank and to keep 50 percent of these deposits in the form of cash and investments in Iraq. The National Bank is empowered to reduce the reserve requirement to 10 percent and to vary the second between 30 and 70 percent. Since the commercial banks have had no need for recourse to the National Bank in order to replenish their cash resources, the Bank's loans and advances have remained very small. As of March 31, 1951, they

499 the work in the future. The work should be carried out by contractors of repute. Since they will generally possess the appropriate plant, it should not be necessary for the government to purchase any large amount of roadbuilding machinery.

Traffic

494 Road traffic is still extremely light in the country. As Table 6 indicates, the number of motor vehicles operating in Iraq is still very modest, and of this number most operate in or around the large cities. The personal observation of Mission members confirms that traffic density even on the most travelled roads is very low.

TABLE 6

REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES

Year	Passenger Cars	Buses	Trucks	Motorcycles
1942	4,522	n.a.	1,942	82
1943	4,333	n.a.	1,900	100
1944	3,972	n.a.	1,720	116
1945	3,771	n.a.	2,017	127
1946	5,902	n.a.	3,497	524
1947	7,422	n.a.	5,136	1,015
1948	8,678	n.a.	6,088	577
1949	9,601	n.a.	7,262	1,029
1950	11,438	3,007	6,381	1,636

n.a.—not available.

Road Usage

The improvement and construction of roads will undoubtedly bring about a rapid increase in road traffic in the future. It will then become necessary to regulate the usage of the roads. At present both the condition of the vehicles using the roads and their loading can only be described as extremely dangerous. On the many tours made on Iraq's existing roads, far too many of the very few vehicles seen on the roads were observed to be overloaded both with respect to the weight and to the height of the load. Top-heavy vehicles are particularly dangerous, especially on the sharply curved roads in mountains and gorges. Many bridges have been heightened—often in a way which is unsound structurally—to accommodate such vehicles. Vehicles unfit to operate endanger the safety

of all road users as well as their passengers and cargoes. The 444 expectation of increased road traffic makes it imperative that appropriate measures of control be devised without delay.

The following measures are suggested for adoption:

1. Construction of road weighbridges at suitable check points.
2. Compulsory inspection of all vehicles carrying passengers for payment and of all trucks before a periodic license is issued.
3. Appointment of qualified inspectors with sufficient authority and responsibility to ensure adequate enforcement of vehicle regulations.

With the development of traffic on the new highways it will be necessary to introduce and enforce proper traffic rules and regulations. The Mission, therefore, recommends that a highway code be drawn up and that traffic police be instructed and trained in the application and enforcement of the code.

Traffic conditions in the capital are at certain times of the day [363] chaotic, even though city traffic is by no means dense. It would [625] appear that, with training, the formidable force of traffic police now regulating the city's traffic could without expansion serve for traffic control on the country's highway system as well. It would pay the government to engage the services of a traffic expert, preferably from a metropolitan police such as London's, for a limited period, to design the highway code and to instruct the traffic police.

Public Road Transport

It will become increasingly necessary to regulate public road transport of passengers and goods by a licensing system. If this transport is left entirely free and uncontrolled, chaos will be the result; too many operators are likely to engage in public transport, run their services on borrowed money, find their vehicles run down before the loans are repaid and end in bankruptcy. The country's economy will suffer both from the waste of resources involved in such uneconomic ventures and from the probable need of protecting the railways by subsidies from the consequences of such wasteful operations. A reasonable number of capable private operators should provide healthy competition among themselves and with the railway.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

● 494 Transport licenses should be granted only if the proposed operator appears responsible and sufficiently well equipped to perform the transport services and if there is evidence of present or prospective need. Operators should be required to take out insurance, to adhere to published rates, routes and schedules, and to conform to loading regulations.

Maintenance

491 The maintenance of the new road system when once completed is even more important than its initial construction. Service and funds must be assured to keep the roads in the condition in which they have been built. The Minister of Finance should budget for annual expenditures, to be estimated by the Public Works Department, for maintenance of the road systems and all accessories including sign posting, for improvements necessitated by increased traffic, for inspection and control of road traffic and for the traffic police required. The expenditures should, in general, be covered by revenue from those who actually use the roads.

Subsidiary Roads and Urban Streets

489 It is recommended that at the earliest opportunity a system of cooperation between the Public Works Department and provincial and municipal road departments be established to bring maintenance, traffic control and municipal licensing in line with the government's policy in these matters and that appropriate provision for this cooperation be made in the budget.

City Transport

365 An essential part of the country's transport system is passenger transport service in the capital. Baghdad and its suburbs form a city of a population of over half a million spread over an area with a radius of four to eight miles. In 1938 it was decided to establish a municipal passenger service to be operated with buses. The war intervened and limited services were brought into operation in 1942 with converted army trucks equipped with locally built bodies. A loan of ID 500,000 was raised, more vehicles purchased and workshops and garages of sorts installed. The services deteriorated with the poor equipment, which was all that was available in wartime, and the municipality was unable to carry the financial burden. Early in 1950 the service was taken over by

493 The country's rolling-stock (horse-drawn and motor vehicles), excluding military and other official vehicles, is increasing, as the following statistics show:

	1946	*1947*
Horse-drawn vehicles:		
Carts	936	
Wagons	459	
Motor vehicles:		
Passenger cars	5,903	7,422
Vans and omnibuses	3,497	5,136

An order for 100 new medium-sized omnibuses was placed in the United States in 1949.

The use of motor lorries is becoming increasingly wide-spread and this method of transport is setting up serious competition with the Iraqi railways.

● 494 Road passenger traffic, especially from Baghdad to the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan and beyond, is carried by large omnibuses with regular schedules.

491 the main roads Baghdad–Kut–Amara–Basra and Baghdad–Kirkuk–Irbil–Mosul, which are at present unmetalled or only partially metalled. The Development Board has allocated nearly ID27 million to these projects.

493 Road traffic is light. At the beginning of 1953 the number of
registered motor vehicles was given as follows, most of them
494 operating in or around the larger towns: private cars 8,000;
taxis 3,500; buses 2,900; lorries 6,500; motor cycles 1,900. In
Baghdad an efficient bus service is operated by a State Passenger
Transport Board. A private cross-desert bus service links
Baghdad with Damascus, and there are private bus services
between Iraq and Persia.

504 *Basra Port*,[1] lying some eighty miles up the Shatt al-Arab
from the Persian Gulf, is the only commercial port of Iraq; an
505 oil port is being constructed at Fao, near the mouth of the
Shatt. A small port established during the Second World War
at Umm Qasr, on a sea inlet south of the Shatt al-Arab entrance,
has since been dismantled. The authority of the Port, which is
controlled by a special department of the Iraq Government,
extends from the outer bar of the Shatt to a point seventeen
miles above the town of Basra. The Shatt is sufficiently deep to
admit large ocean-going vessels, but the Fao bar at its mouth
requires constant dredging to clear an entrance for the larger
of them. During the Second World War extensions were carried
out in view of the increased volume of traffic; in consequence
there are now 4,500 feet of continuous jetty, providing berthing
for eight large vessels at a time and two or three smaller ones,
in addition to barge and lighterage berths. Basra Port handles a
large proportion of the country's trade. During 1952 some 400
ocean-going vessels, with a net registered tonnage of 1,132,000,
and some 260 tankers and water-carriers, with a net registered
tonnage of 927,000, were handled by the Port Authority in
Basra, Fao, Abadan, and Khorramshahr. During the financial
year 1951–2 cargo imported at Basra totalled 511,600 tons and
[651] cargo exported 800,000 tons. The closure of Abadan has
occasioned the Port a severe loss of revenue, estimated at
ID100,000 a month; port and dredging facilities have nevertheless been maintained.

502 *Inland Waterways*. The Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels of up to four feet draught from February to August except for short flood periods in April and May in some years; during the remaining five months navigation is impeded for long periods. Inland water transport has lost much of its former importance. The last remaining regular navigation

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[1] See *Port of Basrah*, official publication of the Port Authority.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

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
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ALEXANDRETTA
ALEPPO
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LATAKIA
SYRIA
Dara
HAMA
HOMS
TRIPOLI
PALMYRA
BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
HAIFA
JAFFA
AMMAN
Qasr Azraq
JERUSALEM
TRANSJORDANIA
PALESTINE
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TRANS-DESER
RAILWAYS
BOUNDARIES
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

TURKEY
SYRIA
'IRAQ
ALEPPO
NISIBIN
Tell Ziwan
Zakho
Dohuk
Amadia
Aqra
Tall Afar
Balad Sinjar
MOSUL
Erbil
Koi Sanjaq
Altun Kupri
KIRKUK
Qala Sharqat
Dar az Zor
Euphrates
Tigris
PALMYRA
Baiji
Tikrit
Samarra
Abu Kamal
Al Qaim
Ana
HADITHA
Ihr
Ramadi
Al Falluja
Al Kadhimain
Al Mahmudiya
Al Musaiyib
KARBALA
Tuwairij
Al Kifl
AN NAJAF
Abu Sukhair
J. TENF
Rutba
Burqa
Shabicha
TRANS-DESERT ROUTES
RAILWAYS
BOUNDARIES
TRIBAL NAMES
OIL PIPE LINES
Scale of Miles
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200

[following p. 96(b)]

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

IRAN
40°
36°
32°
Nuwandiz
Ranja
Koi Sanjak
RKUK
Sulaimaniya
Chamchemal
Tauq
Tuz Khurmatli
Kifri
Khanaqin
Karind
KERMANSHAH
Qizil Ribat
Delli Abbas
Naft Khanah
Shahraban
BA'QUBA
Mandali
Marut
BAGHDAD
Salman Pak
Al Aziziya
Hindiya
HILLA
Bughaila
Kut al Amara
Ali Gharbi
Ali Sharqi
Afaq
Kut al Hai
Al Kufa
Al Diwaniya
Qala Sikar
Amara
Qala Salih
Rumaitha
Shatra
Euphrates
Tigris
Samawa
Al Khidhr
An Nasiriya
Al Qurna
SUK ASH SHUYUKH
Al Khamisiya
BASRA
Abul Khasib
MOHAMMERAH
Shuaiba
Az Zubair
Safwan
Umm Qasr
FAO
As Suliman
Busaiya
Al Amghar
Ansab
Jahra
AL KUWAIT
KUWAIT

[Following p. 96(c)]

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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basis of the Iraqi State Railways, which were made over to the 496
civil authorities set up by the British Government in 1920, and in 1923 to the newly-formed Government of Iraq. They became the property of the Iraq Government on 1 April 1946. They consist at present of two gauges. A metre-gauge line runs from the Port of Basra to Baghdad, and thence across the River Tigris by the new bridge to Kirkuk and Arbil. This line has branches from Shuaiba Junction to Shuaiba, Zubair, and Jebel Sanam Quarry, from Ur Junction to Nasiriya and from Jalula Junction to Khanaqin. A standard-gauge line connects Baghdad to Tel Kochek on the Syrian frontier. A through rail service with air-conditioned coaches on the section Basra to Baghdad connects with the Taurus express from Baghdad via Mosul to Istanbul and thence to continental Europe and Great Britain. The through standard-gauge connexion from Baghdad to Tel Kochek was opened for traffic on 15 July 1940. An extension of the metre-gauge main line from Kirkuk to Arbil was opened to traffic on 6 June 1949. There is a total of 1,050 miles open, of which 328 miles are standard (4 ft 8½ in.) gauge and 722 miles metre gauge.

For the year ending 31 March 1951 the total receipts were 497
ID3,870,174, total expenditure ID3,816,974, number of passengers carried 3,809,412, goods 1,890,413 tons.

Roads. At the end of 1948 Iraq contained some 1,400 miles 491
of surfaced metalled roads, 250 miles of unsurfaced metalled roads, and 5,000 miles of earth roads. Most of the metalled roads are in the immediate vicinity of Baghdad, between Baghdad and the east and north, and in the north. Elsewhere their lack is due mainly to the absence of suitable road material and the expense of bringing it to the site. The earth roads which take their place, especially in the southern plains, are levelled and where necessary embanked and bridged but are vulnerable to the rains. Their defects are to some extent offset by the flatness of the construction and repair.

The main transport routes are: Baghdad to Mosul via Samarra; Baghdad to Mosul via Kirkuk and Irbil; Kirkuk to Sulaimania and Halabja; Irbil to Rowanduz from north-west Persia; Mosul to Amadiya; Mosul to Zakho; Mosul to Tel Kochek for north-east Syria and Turkey; Baghdad to Khanaqin for Persia; Baghdad to Basra via Kut and Amara; Baghdad to Basra via Hilla and Samawa; Baghdad to Kerbela; Baghdad to Rutba for Syria and Jordan.

In 1950 a governmental committee drew up a ten-year programme which provided for the construction or improvement of some 2,150 miles of road. First priority was accorded to

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

433 Iraq each capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of sugar per annum from sugar beet to be grown locally, a bitumen plant, and a small steel plant. In addition the Government is investigating the recommendation of the International Bank mission[1] for the erection of a chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur, and carbon black. The mission has also recommended plants for manufacturing bone-meal fertilizer, date-packing crates and motor-car tyres, and for batching concrete, converting steel scrap into building components, and possibly for remelting glass.

Labour

466 647 657 Conditions of work and employment are regulated by a Labour Law (1936–46), which so far relates only to 'workmen' (a term requiring more precise definition) in industrial undertakings. It is in process of revision and extension. Its application is supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security, which maintains a small corps of inspectors. This department, advised by foreign experts, proposes to experiment with employment exchanges, is starting to compile labour statistics, is undertaking a programme of housing for labour, and is examining plans of social security, for which the existing Labour Law already contains some provision in the form of indemnities on discharge, paid sick and confinement leave, and compensation for injuries. Safety and sanitary working conditions are covered generally by the Labour Law and made obligatory in greater detail by a Workshops and Factories Regulation (1937). In January 1953 it was stated that new provisions, for eventual inclusion in the new Labour Law, had been drafted for establishing wage boards, regulating disputes, and determining the rights, obligations, and administration of trade unions, which are not clearly defined in the existing Labour Law. The latter grants industrial workers the right to establish associations to safeguard their special interests, strengthen the spirit of co-operation, effect educational, cultural, hygienic, social, and [467] moral improvements, and develop Iraqi industry. A few trade unions exist; their membership is small and activity slight. Others have been suspended for subversive activity. The movement is still rudimentary.

Communications

496 *Railways.*[2] The railways constructed by the British forces during the Mesopotamian Campaign eventually formed the

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[1] See above, p. 275.

[2] This section is based on the *Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book*, 1952–3.

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Iraq MH1

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see Ml Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see Ml Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

1: Longrigg
496, 315, 631

MH1 Iraq MH1

The map following page 436 has been reproduced according to the following schedule:

d	e	f
a	b	c

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The railways, when at their greatest extent they were handed over by the Army in April 1920, consisted of nearly 1,000 miles of track.[1] The absorption into the 'Iraq economy of this rapidly constructed and ill-equipped system, with its decrepit engines and rolling-stock and an alignment designed to serve military purposes, was to be no easy task. The Director in 1919–20 was Colonel G. Lubbock. The labour which the Railway used was, at this stage, almost entirely Indian. 496●

The financial procedures for handing over to a Civil Administration the capital works constructed from Army funds were the subject of a mission sent to 'Iraq under Sir John Hewitt; the assets were valued at £2 million, excluding the Railway, and had mostly taken forms unrelated to civilian needs. The giant river fleet of the (military) Inland Water Transport, on the other hand, was never transferred to the Administration nor were its units sold locally by auction, as was the great mass of unneeded military stores. They were instead, amid storms of protest from the Civil Commissioner and 'Iraqi and British commercial interests, disposed of at Bombay by Lord Inchcape on behalf of the British Government. The civilian Tigris fleet was thereafter by degrees reduced to its pre-war scale. The Lynch (Euphrates and Tigris) Company had lost the *Julnar* and some minor craft, but in 1920 acquired the imposing *Zenobia* and *Zobaida* (both built in 1916), modernized its equipment and installations, and retained in operation the veteran *Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*, and the *Malamir* from their pre-war Karun service. The Lynch management of the E.T.S.N. Company's fleet was after 1919 merged in a fusion of their interests with those of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., forming the Mesopotamia-Persia Corporation—'Mespers'—at Baghdad and Baṣra. Local competition on the river was no longer Government-organized, and most of the pre-war vessels had disappeared;[2] but it still handled an appreciable share of the traffic. 000 505 471

In the provincial Government, a close approximation to the Turkish administrative units was retained. The Division represented usually the former sanjaq or liwā, and the District the qadhā, while the naḥiyas were little changed. The sixteen Divisions 635 631

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[1] The mileages of metre-gauge line were: Baghdad–Baṣra 352 miles, Baghdad–Persian frontier 130, Baghdad–Kut 158, Zubayr–Jabal Sanam 23, Ur–Naṣiriya 10, Qaraghan (on the Khaniqin line) to Kinqarban (outside Kifri) 23, with 36 miles in the port area of Baṣra and Ma'qil. The standard-gauge line, Baghdad–Sharqat, was of 186 miles; the narrow-gauge, Baghdad–Kifl 21, and Baghdad–Faluja 38.

[2] The *Baghdadi*, Asfar's *Étoile de l'Orient*, the *Furat*, the *Risafa*, and a number of German-owned launches of the Société de Transports Fluviaux, had been sunk by the Turks to block waterways and impede British operations. The *Basra* was sent to Europe but did not get farther than Malta. The *Barhaniya* and *Hamidiya* were blown up by the Turks to avoid capture. The *Baghdad* reached Mosul—the first steamer to do so—and was there captured by the British.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

[illegible]

reconstructed, offices multiplied, and a mid-desert wireless-station 206
was installed at Ruṭba.[1]

Tigris river navigation did not, and was unlikely to, exceed 505 substantially its pre-1914 scale. The pace was slow, navigation difficult and the Railway in powerful rivalry. The 'Euphrates and Tigris' fleet, managed by 'Mespers', still handled the bulk of the traffic, with its three ancient and two modern paddle-steamers (p. 111). These were increased in 1924 by the acquisition of two stern-wheelers, the *Kadri* and the *Ihsan* both built in 1918, and of the 1908-built *Baghdad*, originally owned by the Idara Nahriya. These three had belonged to the long-established Khudhayri company which was absorbed by 'Euphrates and Tigris' in 1924. A few other Khudhayri boats remained in commission, and the Royal Air Force maintained both the Inland Water Transport dockyard at Baṣra and a few vessels for their own supplies. The 504 Port of Baṣra, administered by J. C. Ward as Port Director under the Finance Ministry of the 'Iraq Government since 1920, was still in 1926 owned by the British Government pending completion of capital repayment by instalments and the creation of a Port Trust. From 1922 onwards the Port was organized on a permanent and self-supporting peace-time basis and supplied all normal facilities both for 'Iraqi trade and for the oil-tanker fleet of Abadan. In 1923 it undertook, by a loan from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the dredging of a deep channel through the Fao bar which before 1920 was impassable at high water by any ship drawing more than 20 feet. The agreement provided for a channel of 28-foot depth at high water and 300-foot width, and 12 miles long. Work began in 1924, and the Rooka Channel of these dimensions was opened for traffic in 1926.

The status of 'Iraq Railways, directed by J. R. Tainsh since 1921, 496 was similar to that of the Port: they were British-owned and after 1923 'Iraqi-administered with the aid of British executives and technicians, in anticipation of future purchase and adjustment. The Baṣra–Baghdad line was reopened in April 1921, and thereafter a Musaiyib–Karbalā extension, a line from Mafraq to the Hindiya Barrage and spurs giving access to Khaniqin and to Baṣra city were completed between 1921 and 1924. The Kut–Baghdad line, the Jabal Sanam quarry line south of Zubayr, and that from near Khaniqin to the Persian frontier at Tiaruq (Qurait) were closed in the same period. Permanent bridges were built in 1924 and 1925 at the Euphrates crossings and an extension from the Khaniqin line across the Diyalā to Kifri and Kirkuk was finished in 1925. The main workshops were brought from Shu'ayba to Shalchiya, in the western outskirts of Baghdad, in the same year. The Tigris wagon-ferry link at Baghdad between the

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

496 two-metre-gauge systems (Baghdad–Baṣra and Baghdad–Kirkuk) remained a source of delay and trouble, and the floods of 1926 destroyed much railway property. But the reopening of Persian pilgrim traffic after 1924 brought welcome revenue to the railway. [464] The Indian labour disappeared in thousands year by year, replaced by 'Iraqis.

433 Industry in modern guise was slow to appear. Cotton-ginning and mechanical transport maintenance, ancillary to other forms of enterprise, have been mentioned. Of modern manufacture there was none, though various possibilities were often discussed. The future source, however, of the country's greatest single enterprise 35 and wealth advanced during these years from the conference-room 471 into the open: mineral oil.

648 The Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913–14 had allotted to Turkey, and therefore ultimately to 'Iraq, the western half of the Naftkhana border area south of Khaniqin; and the Turkish, and thus by inheritance the 'Iraqi, Government had accepted that this Transferred Territory should be treated as still included in the grant made to D'Arcy in 1901. Negotiations on this basis between the Anglo-Persian Company and the 'Iraqi Ministry of Works were concluded in 1925, and later reopened to produce a revised and modernized agreement in May 1926. Drilling had early located a producing well, followed by others, and it was decided to convey the crude oil by pipeline the twenty-mile distance to Khaniqin. The refinery which, with Government encouragement, the Company decided to erect at Alwand outside the town, but still within the Transferred Territory, was begun in June 1926. 'Iraq seemed thus assured of its own petroleum supply, with all the importance of this to mechanical transport, pump-irrigation, and perhaps future industries.

The Vizirial promise given to the Turkish Petroleum Company on 28 June 1914 had in the seven years following been first doubted but later affirmed by the Foreign Office. It was questioned but later accepted by the French who in 1920, under the Cadman–Berthelot agreement at San Remo, inherited the Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent. shareholding in the Company; and it was viewed askance by the Americans who demanded an Open Door to 'Iraqi development with no complication of old unratified promises. This diplomatic obstacle was removed by the allotment of half the Anglo-Persian share to a group of American companies by an agreement reached in principle in 1923, but not implemented formally until 1928. Thus the shares of the Company in its final form were held as to 5 per cent. as ever by Mr. Gulbenkian, and as to 95 per cent. equally between the Shell Group (as the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company), the Anglo-Persian (as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

494 were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into
499 the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at
Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty &
Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed
in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad
and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932.
A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable
engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the
'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The
'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed
through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the
Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to
divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was
doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a
direct Baghdad–'Amman route, and the first experiments in
developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

505 The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their
local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and
road competition, and had little scope for development. The
veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927,
Mejidieh in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S.*16 and
*S.*14 were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be
renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris*
in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after
503 1929. At Baṣra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally
completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928–30.
They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead
of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 20 feet in 1920)
and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port
505 traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from
Abadan, but the Shaṭṭ was used regularly also by the Strick,
British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German)
Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of
504 Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most
imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the
Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi
for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port
administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was
normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the
years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual
instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation
of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930
Treaty, was not yet in sight.

496 The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful.
471 Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1916-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Air-
ways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air com-
munications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was com-
pleted in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for pack-
ages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold con-
cession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

appointingly, carried little traffic other than some oil supplies to 499
northern Persia. Following completion of the great Faluja bridge [494]
(p. 208) other steel bridges were constructed: on the Lesser Zab at Altun Kupri, the Greater Zab at Aski Kellek, and elsewhere. In Baghdad the replacement of the two pontoon crossings by permanent steel bridges was at last decided, and contracts were awarded to Messrs. Holloway Bros. in 1936, a major step in the development of the capital. The new spans of the Mosul bridge were finished. Municipal street-making proceeded everywhere, and not least in Baghdad.

Little changed in the field of Tigris river navigation. Fears that 505
the Kut barrage would make steamship navigation impossible 504
were aroused but could be allayed; a move made in 1934 by local rivals to question the rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Company led to nothing. River traffic on the whole diminished. The *Zobaida* was sold to India in 1935, the *Blosse Lynch* and *Tigris* as scrap in the same year and the *Khalifa* in 1937. In 1936 the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation split again into its original components, the Lynch Company and Messrs. Gray Mackenzie. Four small gunboats were acquired by Government in 1937 for riverain police work, but were little used. The Port of Baṣra rendered steady service to the country. Its volume of traffic permitted it to pay regularly its capital instalments to the British Government, and by 1937 a debt of only £300,000 remained. The Port Trust, to be set up under the 1930 Treaty, did not appear; the Port was still administered by a Directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Its bar-dredging scheme operated with great success, repaid its loans, and kept open and improved the deep channel.[1] Two new dredgers were acquired. The Port administration completed a modern airport at Baṣra, furnished with a hotel and all facilities, and provided Baṣra city and suburbs with electric power and a modern water-supply. The ocean traffic using the Port increased substantially after 1935: first two, and later four, Japanese lines appeared, with one each of German, Indian, and Italian ownership and an occasional Russian, Swedish, and Greek steamer. The great bulk of the tonnage remained, as of old, British and British-Indian.

The 'Iraq Railways maintained their solvency and functions in 496
spite of tribal interference, fluctuating traffic, largely obsolescent equipment, and serious road competition. The operation of the system was modernized as far as was practicable, and a rapid Baghdad–Baṣra daily service introduced. Negotiations with the

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[1] The low-water depths in the Rooka channel (p. 208), achieved by successive phases of the bar-dredging scheme, were in 1926, 18 ft., in 1928–9, 20ft., in 1935–8, 23 or 24 ft.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

49½ British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership, as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest. 499 The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–Nisibin line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek, all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Basra–Baghdad–Istanbul system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began, the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qadhās.

509 Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment came into being at Baghdad and Basra, and British flying-boats after 1937 used also Lake Habbaniya and the Shatt al-'Arab. A French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry 208 of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public services from Baghdad and Basra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broad- 207 casting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to 1937 still experimental and occasional.

425 185 Good progress was made during these five years in the all-important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x to ensure Arab rights in the Holy Land, or by that of the Foreign Minister 'Ali Jawdat to Sa'udi Arabia in June.

The child-King was taken to the Lebanon for the summer, and there hailed by village enthusiasts by the roadside as 'King of Syria'. In Baghdad a new British Ambassador, Sir Basil Newton, to whom the Middle East and its problems were unfamiliar, succeeded Peterson in March 1939.

652 The financial needs of the State, which thanks to over-spending were now serious, were met by a grant of credits by the British Government for the pressing needs of the Railway, and equipment for the Army. Nearly £4 million was thus made available on the security of 'Iraq's oil revenues and with conditions of moderate interest and repayment spaced over seventeen years. An interest-free loan was granted at the same time by the 'Iraq Petroleum Company in return for a seven-year postponement of its export obligation under the B.O.D. Company's concession; it was payable in six half-yearly instalments of £500,000 each, and repayable at leisure out of royalties.

653 The Railway section from Tall Kochek to Mosul was completed,
[496] at unexpectedly high cost, and trains could now run from that city to Istanbul. The Kut barrage and Gharraf headworks were com-
3:2 pleted in March 1939: the official opening had been King Ghazi's last public act. With its fifty-six mechanically-operated gates, overall width of 1,615 feet, lock, and fish-ladder, this important work had cost £1,200,000 and, given full dependent canalization (at present lacking), was capable of the controlled irrigation of a million acres. The seven-gate Yau regulator, at the end of that branch of the Kufa channel, was erected in 1939–40, also by Messrs. Balfour Beatty. A new and improved Diyalā weir (p. 263) was undertaken in 1939 and completed by the end of 1940. Execution of the Ḥabbaniya project, which had been revived urgently after the Euphrates floods of 1938, was entrusted in June 1939 by contract to Messrs. Balfour Beatty for £700,000 for the first phase, that of the intake canal to the lake at Ramadi and the controlled outlet from the lake to the vast Abu Dibis depression. Work on these was pressed forward. The first of the two steel bridges at Baghdad, built under contract by Messrs. Holloway Bros., was completed; it formed an imposing structure, 700 ft. long and 50 ft. wide, and, named al-Ma'mun Bridge, was opened with ceremony by the Regent. Bridge tolls were abolished through-
652 out the country. A long-standing project drew nearer to realization when a Government bank, to be known as the Rafidain Bank, was established by law though not yet opened; its initial capital was fixed at £500,000, subscribed in part by the State. A revised version of the capital works programme was evolved by Rustum

652 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years. The loans, regarded as experimental, were well received but too small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year and handled Government accounts; by 1945 its trading began to show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry, was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch in Baghdad in the same year.

722 The material development of the territory, which proceeded hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the 496 end of the war. But 'Iraq was at least fortunate in that, far from a record of destruction or retrogression—the common fate of Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented by war-time loans from the military authorities, current maintenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for movement to Baṣra—were amicably handled. The military Kut-499 'Aziziya–Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge (in replacement of the old waggon-ferry), a bridge at Musayib to give access to Karbalā, a modern station and office block and new marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lesser Zab bridge.[1]

722 The important developments at the Port of Baṣra and its vicinity 504 carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and approaches, storage facilities, the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab bridge, and a Ma'qil–Ahwaz railway line. Considerable parts of these additions survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties at Umm Qaṣr on the Khawr 'Abdullah, and the railway joining these to Baṣra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance 505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

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[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–Homs line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Karbalā–Najf–Kufa line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–Diyarbakr connexion. None of these materialized.

504 [503] considered project; and meanwhile, Fao bar-dredging operations, designed to maintain a low-water depth of 23 feet in a substantially widened Rooka channel, proceeded throughout 1943 to 1950. But heavy floods and consequent silt movement caused serious difficulties and, the existing channel proving barely maintainable, the project of a new channel re-aligned in terms of the changed sea-bed conditions was in 1951 under close consideration. To its realization—the more necessary since 'Iraq's own oil traffic from the Zubayr field was likely to increase many-fold—the loss of the rich Abadan tanker revenue was a serious impediment;[1] but in general the future of the vital Fao channel, and indeed that of the Port in general, was under wise and far-sighted review.

505 The tonnage of steamers using the Port was more than half—and in some years more than two-thirds—British, with Dutch, American, Greek, Swedish, and Norwegian shipping well represented. The establishment of an all-'Iraqi Shipping Company continued to be an object of ambition among the interested and the nationally-minded, as a means of undercutting the freight rates charged by foreign lines. The post of Port Director was assumed, after two short tenures, in 1947 by Colonel G. T. Johnson, and in 1951 by R. C. Kelt. Accelerated steps were taken from 1948 onwards for the training, largely in Europe, of 'Iraqis for all posts in the administration, including the highest: an 'Iraqi Port Director was a probability of the near future.

Though transport by the 'Iraq waterways had as ever its irreplaceable part both in the lives of the riverain towns and as a main Baṣra–Baghdad artery, available traffic did not permit—as for a generation it had not permitted, save in war-time—any considerable development of the Tigris steamships. Military transport ceasing with the war, and competition by road and rail and air ever increasing, the Euphrates and Tigris Company in 1946 disposed of most of its surviving fleet, including the *Zenobia*; and early in 1951 it went into voluntary liquidation and sold the bulk of its towing-units and barges to its principal local competitor, Ḥannā al-Shaykh. The latter and members of the Khuḍhayri family remained active on the river to fill the place which, after ninety years, was now abandoned as unprofitable by the Lynch enterprise.

496 499 The 'Iraq Railways, which had embarked in 1945 (p. 320) on important projects of construction, were faced also by a heavy programme of needed rehabilitation, improvement of services, and addition to rolling-stock. The five following years saw the com-

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[1] The action of the Persian Government in bringing its oil industry to a standstill involved, besides its own ruin, a loss of at least £1 million a year to the finances of Baṣra Port and its dredging scheme.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

pletion of the Kirkuk–Arbil extension and its Lesser Zab bridge: 496
of the railway and road bridge[1] at Baghdad, opened late in 1950: 499
of the Musayib bridge leading to Karbalā: and of new stations at Ba'quba, Diwaniya, Naṣiriya and elsewhere. New rolling stock was ordered and by 1950 delivered. Progress was made in erecting a grandiose combined station and administrative headquarters at Baghdad West, and in redesigning the yards and depôts there; but the high cost of these projects, the diminution of receipts by road and air competition (in spite of good traffic in grain and oilfield materials), and losses due to repeated river flooding rapidly exhausted the war-time surplus and led to the need to borrow first from Government in 1946, then from London—a loan of £3 million —in 1950, before supplies and contractors could be paid and work could proceed. Working conditions in the railway system were [468] disturbed by the strikes elsewhere mentioned in 1945, 1946, and 1949. The Jewish employees of the traffic branch were replaced in [464] 1949 by imported Pakistani staff, and the training of 'Iraqis to replace these and the few remaining British executives was accelerated. The status and composition of the Railway Board was unchanged, though criticized by the press as outdated and insufficiently 'national'. The post of Director-General was passed by H. C. Smith to W. J. Moffat in 1950, and an 'Iraqi, General Isma'il Ṣafwat, assumed the post in 1952.

'Iraq Airways was initiated by the Railway as a subordinate 509
enterprise in 1945, and started service in 1946 with five light aircraft hired from Great Britain. In the following year the hired aircraft were replaced by its own machines, and it extended its range from Baghdad–Baṣra outwards to Mosul, Cairo, and Damascus, and by 1948 could, thanks to reciprocal agreements, offer transport weekly or monthly to Teheran, Karachi, and Ankara. The service, to which British Overseas Airways Corporation acted as technical advisers and agents, was efficiently maintained but, thanks to competition and high costs, financially unprofitable. British, American, Dutch, French and other foreign airlines continued to use 'Iraqi airports. An expenditure of over ID 2 million on aerodromes formed part of the six-year development plan. The meteorological service, begun in 1936 in a single room, now maintained under the Ministry of Defence a dozen stations and many rainfall-observation posts, used its own wireless links, and broadcast weather reports for Baghdad area half-hourly.

Telecommunications had, by the close of the period, reached a 206
high standard. Trunk land-lines had been overhauled, often duplicated and widely extended; automatic telephone exchanges

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[1] The bridges were built by Messrs. Holloway Bros.; earthwork on the Kirkuk–Arbil line was handled by Messrs. Balfour Beatty.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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
NOR
Oil pipe line
DE
52
JORDAN
BULGARIA
U. S. S. R.
Tbilisi
Istanbul
Batum
Ankara
TURKEY
Aleppo
Euphrates
SYRIA
O.P.L.
CRETE
CYPRUS
Beirut
LEBANON
Damascus
O.P.L.
IRAQ
Tigris
Bag
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv
JORDAN
Amman
Jerusalem
Alexandria
O.P.L.
Cairo
Suez
Nile
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA

End Map (A)

Iz Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

102
496
315
631


D
Khan Baghdadi
Hit
Kubeysa
EUPHRATES
Ramadi
Habbaniya
Falluja
Sumaykha
Ba'quba
Baghdad
DIYA
KUT A
Mahmudiya
Musaiyib
Hindiya Barrage
Babylon
Karbala
Hilla
Hashimi
Rahaliya
BAHR AL MILH
Shithatha
Khan Hammad
HILLA
Kifl
Kufa
Najf
Shamiya
Abu Sukhair
Faysaliya
Kharm
Shinafiya
DIW
HERN
I R A
SERT
KARBALA
Baku
Tabriz
Teheran
Hamadan
PERSIA
Baghdad
Basra
0 200 M.
Railways
Oil pipe lines
Oil pipe line
SOUTHERN
Salman
DESERT
44

E-d map (B)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI


Badra
Jassan
KUT AL AMARA
'Aziziya
Bughayla (Nu'maniya)
Kut al Amara
Shaykh Sa'ad
'Ali al-Gharbi
Dizful
Shushtar
Masjid-i-Sulaiman
Hashimiya
Daghghara
'Afak
Hai
Kumayt
'Amara
Shamiya
Sukhayr
Rifa'i
Qal'at Sikr
Karradi
Qal'at Salih
Rumaytha
'Uzayr
Shatra
Suwayj
MUNTAFIQ
Hammar
Chubaish
Qurna
Samawa
Khidhr
Nasiriya
Ur
Madina
Suq al-Shuyukh
HAMMAR LAKE
Ahwaz
KARUN
KHUZISTAN
Muhammara
Bandar Shapur
Abadan
Qusayr
Salman
Rumayla
Shu'aiba
Basra
Zubayr
BASRA
abu Ghar
JABAL SANAM
Busaiya
Umm Qasr
Fao
Bubyan Is.
KUWAYT
Kuwayt
PERSIAN GULF
NEUTRAL ZONE
NEUTRAL ZONE
32
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46
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R.W. FORD

102
496
315
631

End map (c)

102
496
315
631


36
38
40
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36
34
T U R K E
Diyarbakr
KHA
Alexandretta
Banyas
O.P.L.
Dayr al-Zur
S Y R I A
Oil pipe line
Ab

End Map (d)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

102
496
315
631


42
44
LAKE VAN
E
Y
LAKE URMIA
Tall Kochak
Tall 'Uwaynat
JABAL SINJAR
Balad Sinjar
Tall 'Afar
Tall Kayf
Mosul
GREATER ZAB
Arbil
Quwayr
New Sanjaq
Makhmur
Qaiyara
Altun Kupri
Chamchamal
Shargat
LESSER ZAB
HAWIJA
Kirkuk
Taza Khurmatu
Daquq (Tawuq)
M O S U L
A R B I L
K I R K U K
Baiji
Tuz Khurmatu
Kifri
WADI THARTHAR
Takrit
JABAL HAMRIN
Kingarban
Qara Tepe
Abu Kamal
'Ana
Rawa
al-Qa'im
TIGRIS
Samarra
Haditha
Deli 'Abbas
Khalis
Daltawa
Sumayka
Ba'aubah
DIYALA
D U L A I M
B A G H D A D

End Map (E)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

102
496
315
631


46
48
50
38
36
34
CASPIAN
SEA
Tabriz
Sauj Bulaq (Mahabad)
PERSIA
Sulaymaniya
Marivan
Hamadan
Kirmanshah
Qasr-i-Shirin
Khaniqin
Karind
Qizil Ribat
Naft Khana
Naft-i-Shah
Mandali
Balad Ruz
0
100
MILES
International frontiers
Provincial boundaries
Land above 1500 ft.
" " 5000 ft.
Railways

End Map (F)

I The population of Mosul and Arbil provinces exceeds 630,000, of
162 which 530,000 are Muslims. Of these Muslims, all but 10,000 are Sunnis. There are 60,000 Christians, 32,000 Yezidis and 10,000 Jews. The minorities therefore total only one-fifth of the whole. The Muslims consist of Arabs and Kurds in approximately equal parts, together with some 16,000 Turkomans.

I Mosul itself is mainly an Arab town with a population of 100,000.
[162] It is a great entrepôt for trade in sheep, cattle, wool, grain, hides,
438 intestines, galls and eggs with the thickly populated districts round
439 and also with Syria and Turkey. Its importance in this respect will
496 certainly increase when at long last it is linked by rail with the Syrian frontier at Tel Kuchik and with Baghdad via Baa'iji. Work on this linking is now proceeding, and it is interesting to remember that when it is completed in a couple of years it will form the last stage in the famous Baghdad-Berlin Railway which was the Kaiser's fondest dream. The circumstances under which it will be completed are likely, however, to be very different to those which he visualized.

Arabs

I
B Apart from forming the majority of the inhabitants of Mosul itself,
101 Arabs are found as cultivators on the Tigris both north and south of the town and to the south of the Jebal Sinjar (Sinjar mountain) and as bedouin who range the uncultivated areas to the south-west, west and north-west.

B The bedouin consist of more than one tribe, but by far the most
619 important is the Shammar. This great tribe is of Arabian origin and
221 has in the past been pushed steadily northwards by economic forces
721 and the search for new grazing grounds. With the great improve-
233 ment in public security during recent years, cultivation has extended further and further from the towns and villages and encroached on the haunts of the Shammar. Formerly the means of livelihood of these bedouin were varied if not all respectable. They included the raiding of the flocks and herds of their weaker neighbours and the extortion of "khuwa" or safe-conduct money from merchants, travellers and others. At the same time they made a perfectly legitimate living from acting as shepherds for the flocks of townsmen and by breeding and selling camels. Nowadays raiding and safe-conduct money have been abolished and motor transport has to a great extent ousted the camel as a carrier in 'Iraq and the neighbouring countries and caused a severe slump in the camel market.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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MAP I


40°
42°
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
PROVINCIAL (LIWA) BOUNDARY
QADHA BOUNDARY
RAILWAYS
RIVERS
PROVINCIAL (LIWA) CENTER
QADHA CENTER
NOTE: THE PROVINCES HAVE THE SAME NAME AS THEIR CENTERS EXCEPT WHERE MARKED
SINJAR
TEL AFAR
MOSUL
SYRIA
DULAIM LIWA
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
FALUJA
NORTHERN DESERT
TRANS JORDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

POLITICAL DIVISIONS

631
●496
133


TURKEY
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
IRAN
ERBIL
KIRKUK
SULEIMANIYA
HALABJA
BAQUBA
DIYALA LIWA
BAGHDAD
BEDRA
KERBELA
HILLA
KUT
DIWANIYA
AMARA
QALAT SALIH
MUNTAFIQ LIWA
NASIRIYA
SHATRA
RIFAI
SAMAWA
NAJAF
HAMMAR LAKE
QURNA
BASRA
SOUTHERN DESERT
KUWAIT
IRANIAN GULF
TIGRIS RIVER
EUPHRATES RIVER

The Port

504 The Port of Basra, an autonomous public agency which also operates the civil airport, is efficiently run and capable of handling a considerable increase in traffic. In view of the adequacy of this port, the Mission sees no justification for the construction of another port at Umm Qasr as has been suggested from time to 503 time. The Port of Basra has been able to finance necessary capital improvements, as well as to pay off its debts, out of current surpluses and should be able to do so in the future except for the task of financing the dredging of a new and urgently needed channel across the Fao bar. The existing channel is subject to heavy silting which necessitates extensive dredging operations at a cost of ID 500,000 to ID 600,000 per year. Until recently it was expected that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would advance the funds necessary for this new channel, but recent developments in Iran, coupled with the fact that ample oil revenues will be available to Iraq for investment, appear to make it desirable that the Development Board finance this project.

The Railways

• 496 The state railways, which are the principal means of transport, are also well managed and have been fully able to meet traffic requirements. They have come in for considerable criticism, however, because of the serious financial difficulties in which they have become involved. The major source of these difficulties lies in the fact that, in 1944, the railways, with the full approval of the government, began a major capital development program without assurance of adequate financing. To defray the cost, the railways have had to use a fund of about ID 2,500,000 set aside for renewals and to borrow ID 1,000,000 from the government as well as £3,000,000 in the United Kingdom with the help of the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The program was for the most part soundly conceived and is now largely completed. However, it has left the railways without adequate funds not only for essential renewals but also for other construction pro-
499 jects. One of the major and more controversial projects affected
496 is the erection in Baghdad West of a rather imposing terminal station and railway headquarters together with relocation of railway

496
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315
508
133


RAILWAYS
ROADS
METALLED
UNMETALLED
WATERWAYS
NAVIGABLE
SEASONAL NAVIGABLE
OTHER
OIL PIPELINE
AIRPORT
40°
42°
ZAKHO
DOHUK
TEL KOTCHEK
SINJAR
MOSUL
T1
K3
H1
H2
H3
HIT
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
SYRIA
TRANS JORDAN
NORTHERN DESERT
SAUDI ARABIA
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

TRANSPORT SYSTEM

FACING P. 44 (A)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

496
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316
508
133

MAP III


TURKEY
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
ZAKHO
AMADIYA
SARSANG
DOHUK
ATRUSH
AQRA
AIN SIFNI
TEL KAIF
MOSUL
RAIAT
HAJ OMRAN
ROWANDUZ
SHAQLAWA
SALAHUDDIN
RANIA
MIRZA RUSTAM
ERBIL
KOI SANJAK
MAKHMUR
TAQTAQ
SULEIMANIYA
PENJWIN
SHARGAT
KIRKUK
TAL ALI
HALEBJA
TUZ
TIGRIS RIVER
JOULOULA JUNCTION
KHANAQIN
SAMARRA
BAQUBA
MENDALI
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
FALUJA
BAGHDAD
AZIZIYA
HINDIYA JUNCTION
KERBELA
HILLA
KUT
NAMANIYA
HAI
KUFA
NAJAF
ABU SUKHAIR
DIWANIYA
SHAMIYA
AMARA
SHATTRA
NASIRIYA
UR JUNCTION
SOUTHERN DESERT
BASRA
ZUBAIR
MAQIL
ABADAN
FAO
KUWAIT
IRANIAN GULF

FACING P. 44 (B)

496 lines and rebuilding and extension of railway goods and marshal-
498 ling yards. Much of the latter project is really part of Baghdad town planning and its cost should therefore not be completely charged to the railways.

496 These problems, as well as that of tractive power on the railways, have recently been studied by a British engineering firm. With some modifications, the Mission endorses the conclusions contained in its report. The railways should be enabled to carry out a program involving essential renewals of track and rolling stock, gradual conversion to diesel traction and the completion of the Baghdad-West scheme on a drastically modified basis which would entail finishing the railway station but postponing most of the balance of this project. The Mission suggests, however, some modifications in the British firm's proposals on the latter scheme, the details of which are set forth in the monograph on transportation. The railway station when completed should serve also as the airport terminal and provide offices for the railway administration and the government.

Since the railways can finance only a small portion of this program out of their own resources, the Mission recommends that the Development Board supply the bulk of the required funds. In addition, the Board might take over amortization of the £3,000,000 loan contracted by the government on behalf of railway development. This must be repaid over a six-year period from June 30, 1952.

The Mission also urges that immediate consideration be given to the problem of standardizing the gauges on the railway lines. The Basra-Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil line and the branch line to Khanaqin are meter gauge while the line from Baghdad to Mosul, which links Iraq with the railway systems of Syria and Turkey, is standard gauge. The two gauges not only necessitate transshipment, but, above all, make the task of operation complicated and costly. They require a large amount of duplication in activities, of reserves, standbys and spares in all departments. The need for transshipment is likely to be a growing handicap to the railways as traffic requirements increase and the demand for more rapid transport grows.

It is particularly important to consider standardization at this time because the railways face the necessity of carrying out exten-

496 sive renewals of track and rolling stock and must make decisions as to the type of traction. Final decisions on the Baghdad-West scheme can also be more intelligently taken if the issue of standardization is promptly settled. It is unlikely that such favorable circumstances for an economical conversion operation will ever recur.

Conversion of the meter-gauge lines should not be too costly because the construction gauge, formation and bridges of these lines were originally designed with a view to later conversion to standard gauge. Conversion could probably be accomplished within six years. Meanwhile meter-gauge renewals would be kept to an absolutely indispensable minimum. Within a preparatory five-year period detailed plans and cost estimates would be worked out, necessary standard-gauge track and rolling stock ordered and assembled, and diesel locomotives tested with a view to transfer to diesel traction at the end of the period. The actual conversion operation would take only a few days and could probably be carried out at the end of five years for the Basra-Baghdad line and at the end of another year for the Baghdad-Erbil line. It is possible that the total cost of conversion would not exceed ID 6,000,000. The Mission therefore recommends that the advisability of standardizing gauges, together with a program for such standardization, be promptly studied by the railway staff with the cooperation of outside experts.

Finally, in line with the recommendations of the British engineering firm, the Mission suggests that the services of an expert be obtained to make recommendations on the railway rate structure. A general rate increase of about 12½ percent, with some exceptions, was put into effect in the summer of 1951. This did not affect the rate structure which is characterized by certain anomalous differences in the charges made on various sections of the railway system as well as those imposed on various commodities.

Air Transport and Inland Navigation

508 With respect to air transport, the Mission recommends that the civil airports at Basra and Baghdad be built up to the specifications required by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of class B standard airports. This would involve longer runways and improvements in navigational aids, communications

Petroleum products are distributed by the Rafidain Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and at prices, exclusive of taxes, which are among the lowest in the world. 382

TABLE 8

PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM AND REFINED PRODUCTS
(in thousand metric tons)

315
382

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951 (est'd.)
Crude oil					
Iraq Petroleum Company	4,354	3,017	3,671	5,986	7,500
Khanaqin Oil Company	339	367	365	384	350
Total	4,639	3,384	4,036	6,370	7,850
Refined products	n.a.	373	369	393	—

VI. Transport

The state-owned railway system is the principal means of transport, carrying about 2,000,000 tons of cargo and over 3,000,000 passengers annually. Part of it is standard and part meter gauge. The standard-gauge section is part of the original Berlin-Baghdad railway and runs from Baghdad northward via Mosul into Syria and Turkey. The meter-gauge line extends from the Port of Basra in the South to Baghdad and then beyond to Kirkuk and Erbil in the North, with a branch line to Khanaqin. Over recent years the railways have managed to carry out a considerable capital development program despite serious financial obstacles, but they now face the need of replacing, on a considerable scale, old track, rolling stock and locomotives. 496

Road transport has as yet primarily supplemented rather than replaced railway traffic. There are only about 11,000 passenger cars and a little over 9,000 trucks and buses in the country. Roads are generally inadequate. There are only about 2,500 kilometers of metalled and surfaced roads in all of Iraq. The remaining dirt roads quickly become impassable in bad weather. Some important 494 491

ANNEX E

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

489 Iraq's transport system, which is concentrated in the populated and cultivated eastern half of the country, converges on two points, Baghdad, the capital and trade center, and Basra, the country's only port.

504 The Port of Basra lies about 140 kilometers (85 miles) upstream from the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al Arab and is accessible to ocean-going ships of all sizes entering the Persian Gulf. Its site serves the economy of Iraq well, the junction of the cheaper ocean transport with the dearer inland transport being at the farthest practical point inland.

503 The Tigris and the Euphrates, together with their tributaries, offer natural transport routes. However, they have remained untrained and largely uncontrolled for centuries and, apart from a few short stretches on the rivers and their tributaries which are usable by local traffic, limited and restricted inland navigation is possible today only on the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad.

496 The railway system consists of three main lines, two of narrow gauge, one of standard gauge. One of the two meter-gauge lines is the main line from Baghdad to Basra, serving the most densely populated provinces besides connecting the two principal centers. The other links Baghdad with the northeastern provinces, east of the Tigris. The standard-gauge line runs from Baghdad on the right bank of the Tigris to Mosul, Iraq's second city, and beyond through a tip of Syria to Turkey, the Mediterranean and Europe. Until a year ago no physical junctions existed between the three main lines. Goods carried on both meter-gauge lines had to be ferried across the Tigris at Baghdad and then transshipped. The ferry has now been replaced by a bridge but the transshipment to and from the standard-gauge line remains necessary. Through passenger traffic between the three main lines is negligible.

491 A road system of approximately 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) covers the eastern half of the country, but most of the roads

503 of the Tigris into the marshes would leave more water in the river bed.[1] Navigability might be improved further if the river bed were trained by dams, locks, groins and cribs into a narrow channel at low water and progressively wider channels at higher water levels. Through such measures, limited but uninterrupted navigation could be made possible. It would be necessary, however, to consider whether the cost would not be such as to make river transport uneconomic. As a first step it might be advisable to have the feasibility and cost of training the river bed studied by engineers from the Netherlands who have had experience with similar problems.

IV. Railways

496 The railways are the principal means of inland transport, carrying by far the greater part of the country's imports, exports and internal traffic. The chief commodities carried in bulk are oil, bricks, cement and other building materials, grains and dates.

The total length of the railway system is 1,030 miles (1,648 kilometers) of which 330 route miles (529 kilometers) are standard gauge and 700 route miles (1,119 kilometers) meter gauge. The first railway line in Iraq was completed in 1914 and ran north from Baghdad to Samarra as part of the projected Berlin-Baghdad railway. The Iraqi portion of this standard-gauge railway was not fully completed until 1940 and it is now the only railway link between Iraq and neighboring countries. The balance of the railway network consists of meter-gauge lines, large portions of which were first constructed during World War I when only meter-gauge rolling stock was readily available. One of these lines runs from Basra to Baghdad, following the Euphrates River. The other extends from Baghdad to Erbil via Kirkuk, with a short spur to Khanaqin. The part from Kirkuk to Erbil was finished only in 1949. Until 1950 when a railway bridge was completed across the Tigris, the two meter-gauge lines were connected only by a wagon ferry. Even now there is virtually no through passenger traffic on the two lines. It should be noted that there is no longer a railway south of Baghdad serving the towns along or near the

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[1] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage*, pp. 202-203.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Tigris, although during each of the two World Wars there was a temporary railway connection with Kut. 496

The railways are state-owned and operated under the management of a Director General who is responsible to a Railway Board appointed by the government. The administration is autonomous and has its own budget which must, however, be submitted annually to Parliament for approval. The administration is well organized, the management capable and the operation efficient and economical. [475]

Capacity

The railway system consists entirely of single track lines built 496 to light standards, and the permitted axle loads are very low. This 489 limits the capacity of the lines and increases the operation problems. There is no doubt, however, that the system's capacity is ample for present demands. During several war years it actually carried about twice the tonnage of goods transported in recent years, even though the length of the system was only about one third greater through the temporary construction of military branch lines (see Table 4).

Railway carrying capacity is in reality rather elastic. The railways could carry as a minimum 15 percent more goods, and, in a pinch, could probably carry considerably more. In consequence of the over-all development program, traffic requirements will undoubtedly increase quite rapidly. For example, the value of imports may double within about five years, and the amount of

TABLE 4

TRAFFIC ON STATE RAILWAYS

Year	Route Kilometers	PASSENGERS Passenger Journeys	 Passenger Kilometers	GOODS Total Revenue Tonnage Carried	 Total Revenue Ton Kilometers
1943-44	2,011	4,418,590	662,256,369	3,586,081	905,104,309
1944-45	1,555	4,869,523	669,987,674	2,390,402	648,482,848
1945-46	1,555	5,292,441	775,107,476	1,970,107	513,643,871
1946-47	1,555	4,300,413	630,705,454	1,860,296	600,138,802
1947-48	1,555	3,725,463	529,066,676	1,714,290	556,623,270
1948-49	1,555	3,340,034	473,075,056	1,674,289	497,306,309
1949-50	1,648	3,609,337	517,939,859	1,980,795	657,097,000

496 489 internal traffic, particularly in building materials, will also rise substantially.[2] The burden on the main trunk line from Basra to Baghdad will increase especially. If steps are taken, however, to carry out the necessary replacement and rehabilitation measures outlined in this monograph, the railways should be able to handle much of the increased traffic. Part of the increase will presumably be absorbed by the roads.

496 The financial position of the railways has not been wholly satisfactory in recent years. To be sure, they have had a considerable operating surplus until the last few years, as is indicated in Table 5. Since 1945-46, however, this surplus would have actually disappeared or been converted into a deficit if it had not been for the fact that the sum set aside for renewals and depreciation was rather inadequate. In 1948-49 a small surplus was achieved only because the amount appropriated to the renewals account was cut from ID 400,000 to ID 250,000; and when the

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[2] See the Mission's main report, pp. 88 *et seq.*

TABLE 5

RAILWAY FINANCE
(in dinars)

Year	Operating or Ordinary Budget			Capital Expenditure
	Revenues	Expenditures	Balance	
1938-39	733,613	753,063	−19,450	938,115
1939-40	752,546	733,530	+29,016	559,492
1940-41	953,379	800,712	+152,667	176,866
1941-42	2,241,657	1,440,546	+801,111	159,937
1942-43	4,775,646	2,316,576	+2,459,070	161,905
1943-44	5,067,899	3,781,525	+1,286,374	137,258
1944-45	4,141,110	3,132,064	+1,009,046	112,366
1945-46	3,769,823	3,241,988	+537,835	387,684
1946-47	3,436,403	3,206,164	+230,239	789,095
1947-48	3,794,003	3,549,115	+244,888	1,761,123
1948-49	3,633,022	3,614,569	+18,453	2,778,902
1949-50	3,991,297	3,705,542	+285,755	1,068,558
1950-51*	3,949,200	4,041,400	−92,200	1,734,000
1951-52*	4,211,100	4,274,100	−63,000	902,500

* Budget estimates.

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provision for renewals was raised to more adequate amounts in the 1950-51 and 1951-52 budgets (ID 600,000 and ID 875,000 respectively) deficits developed.

The primary cause of financial difficulties was the large postwar capital development program. Following the prosperous war years, the government authorized the Railway Administration by Law No. 25, 1944, to carry out a major capital development program at a cost of ID 5,250,000. The program itself was, on the whole, sound and necessary, with the exception of the ambitious project for Baghdad-West involving the construction of an imposing new station and an entirely new railway layout. In included, among other things, the extension of the railway from Kirkuk to Erbil and the building of several new railway bridges, including one at Baghdad. It proved extremely difficult, however, to finance these and other capital expenditures. When the program was authorized, it was established that the railways themselves would be able to defray only half the cost. The rest was presumably to come from future government and railway revenues. Railway traffic and revenues, however, fell off rather sharply after the war, and beginning in 1948 the government became involved in serious difficulties as a result of the outbreak of war with Israel, the closing of the Haifa pipeline and two successive poor harvests. After making an initial 15-year four percent loan of ID 1,000,000 to the railways in 1947, the government could give no further financial assistance. In order to finance the rest of the program, the railways used up such balances as were available in the general reserve fund as the result of past surpluses and then depleted the funds set aside for depreciation and renewals. The latter, by the end of the fiscal year 1949-50, amounted to almost ID 2,600,000. Even then it was necessary in 1950 to meet overdue bills by placing a loan of £3,000,000[8] through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. By the end of the 1950-51 fiscal year only £407,000 of this loan remained unutilized and this amount was earmarked for further payments to contractors for works already being executed.

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[8] The interest on this loan is four percent and the principal is repayable over six years from June 30, 1952.

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As of the spring of 1951, when the Mission visited Iraq, the financial situation was about as follows. Capital expenditures had been reduced far below the amounts budgeted. Preliminary actual budget figures for the first half of 1950-51 indicated that total capital expenditures for the year might be only about one fourth of the amount authorized by the budget. For 1951-52, projected capital expenditures had been slashed well below the original estimates of the preceding year. The railways needed about ID 1,500,000 to meet commitments for the completion of capital works under way. More important, deferred renewals of locomotives, rolling stock and track were becoming more urgent just when no money was available to meet the cost.

The Palmer Report

Growing concern and anxiety about the railways' financial position led to a decision in 1950 to seek advice from independent consulting engineers. In May 1950 Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton, consulting engineers of Westminster, London, were invited to investigate and report on certain affairs of the railways in accordance with the following terms of reference:

1. To examine the railway accounts and ascertain the true financial position;
2. To examine and advise on the sanctioned Major Development Program in its economic aspects, with particular regard to the financial position of the Railways;
3. To advise on the rehabilitation and modernization of the system; and
4. To investigate and advise on the most suitable form of motive power for the system.

The investigations were completed and the Report issued in March 1951.

The Report is lucid and valuable, and its recommendations and suggestions should be implemented as far as practicable. Since it is clearly limited, however, to advice on developments with a view only to the economic and financial aspects of the railways, its recommendations may have to be supplemented and in some cases amended when considered in a wider framework.

The main conclusions of the Palmer Report can be briefly summarized. With respect to the accounts and financial position

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of the railways, the Report recommends that the renewals fund be restored and adequate allocations made for renewals in the future, that the financial department be reorganized to some extent and that the structure of rates and fares be studied and revised. On the Major Development Program the Report suggests completion of the Baghdad-West railway layout but on the basis of a revised plan. For the rehabilitation and modernization of the railways it proposes a detailed renewals program for a 10 year period and makes several minor recommendations. Finally, with respect to motive power, the Report recommends the conversion of the meter-gauge lines to diesel traction within 10 years. 496

The Mission approves these recommendations in general, but offers below a number of comments, amendments and additional recommendations so as to fit them into the wider field of coordinated economic development.

Financial Situation and Accounts

The Palmer Report envisages a renewals program costing ID 10,600,000 over an 11 year period. Of this sum it anticipates that the railways may be able to finance ID 8,175,000 out of current revenues on the assumption that the total set aside for this purpose from operating income can be gradually increased from ID 600,000 in the first year to ID 875,000 in the last year. A balance of ID 2,425,000 would therefore have to come from other sources. If it is decided, in accordance with a recommendation made later in this monograph, to standardize the railway gauge, the whole program of renewals will have to be considerably accelerated. The amount of financing required over the next five years will then be substantially increased.

The railways would undoubtedly be in a better position to finance these renewals out of their own resources if the administration were not burdened with expenses for other government operations, unconnected with the railways. For example, the railways have carried all the losses of the government airways throughout their existence, and the government has taken valuable railway land without compensation for projects entirely unconnected with railway operations while, at the same time, forcing the railways to pay high costs for new land required for railway use. The

496 railways maintain at their own expense the many bridges used for the dual purpose of rail and road traffic, and they supply the necessary signalling and guarding services. The railway administration has built a costly rail and road crossing of the Tigris at Baghdad but must wait for the Road Department to contribute its share of the expense even though the latter requires the railways to pay for certain stores in advance of delivery. Finally, although the new Baghdad station with the elaborate new layout was conceived largely in the interests of town planning, the railways are expected to finance the entire cost and are also blamed for extravagance.

Some financial readjustments are clearly necessary to enable the railways to carry out the proposed essential renewals program. Further financial difficulties in the future can be avoided only if advance provision is made for additional capital projects and if the railways are adequately repaid for services rendered. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that, unless these steps are taken, the railways will, in a few years, become incapable of coping with normal traffic demands and those imposed by the country's development schemes; and there will be no alternative transport agency available.

In the field of financial administration the Palmer Report recommends the establishment of a Financial Committee inside the railway organization and the appointment of a Financial Secretary in addition to the Chief Accountant and the Auditor already in service. The Mission believes, however, that for a railway administration of the present size this may require too many leading officials in a single department. It suggests that no more than two persons will be needed to assure the three services, namely financial secretariat, accounts and audit.

The prevailing structure of rates and fares is not unsound but it is characterized by certain anomalies. In 1948-49 average goods earnings were only 209 percent higher than a decade ago although the wholesale price index in Baghdad had risen by 363 percent from 1939 to 1949. Moreover, the rate increases have been somewhat haphazard, varying from 50 percent for dates to 530 percent for tea, sugar and piece goods. In the summer of 1951 a further general rate increase of 12½ percent, with some exceptions, was put into effect. The rate structure is also defective in that all fares

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and rates per kilometer or ton-kilometer unit vary between the different sections of the system. They should be standardized. The abnormally wide variations in rates between commodities should be adjusted. The Palmer Report recommends the appointment of a rates and fares expert to study the matter. The Mission agrees that a traffic research officer with expert knowledge of tariff structure should be appointed as a temporary consultant to the railways. It is particularly important that he be conversant with traffic research so that he may provide for rate adjustments when traffic in certain commodities declines or increases exceptionally. With increased road traffic competition such research will become imperative in the very near future. 496

Baghdad-West Railway Developments

The plan for this major development scheme consists of a new terminal station building and railway headquarters to replace the existing separate Baghdad-West meter-gauge and standard-gauge stations, and the rebuilding and extension of the goods and marshalling yards. The plan was inspired chiefly by two desires, one to provide Baghdad with a modern central station, the other to make room for a town extension in the southeastern area planned on modern principles free from railway level crossings. The plans would necessitate the realignment of the line to Basra, around the development area so that it enters Baghdad terminal station from the northwest. 498 496

The Palmer Report rejects the official scheme principally because (1) increased length of the line to Basra would mean increased operating costs for the Railway and higher rates and fares for the public and (2) the operation of Baghdad station as a terminal instead of a "through" station would further increase operating difficulties and reduce the station's capacity. The Report submits a revised scheme in which the passenger terminal station is retained for the Mosul and Kirkuk lines, and the Basra line is retained along its present alignment with its own platforms, connected with the new terminal building. A plan for a provisional Stage I to bring the new station building into operation is also submitted.

The Report is on sound ground in pointing out the disadvantages of the increased mileage on the Baghdad-Basra lines

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and in stressing the disadvantages of operating the station as a terminal in so far as goods traffic is concerned. An additional major disadvantage of the plan would be that in the new alignments the two meter-gauge railway yards would be on opposite sides of the standard-gauge railway yard, thus presenting very serious operating difficulties. A terminal station for passenger traffic, however, presents a different case and would actually offer advantages in concentrated operations, safe and easy circulation of passengers, luggage, mail and parcels. But it is obviously out of the question to build a new passenger line outside the town and at the same time retain the existing line for goods traffic through the town.

It is obvious that a considerable time must elapse before a final decision as to the town planning, including government buildings, will be reached, and it is essential that at least the new terminal station, now nearing completion, be brought into operation. It is also desirable that no major reconstruction of yards be carried out until a final decision is reached. It is recommended, therefore, that a provisional plan be carried out, but on a modified, simpler scale than the Palmer Report Stage I. A modified plan is attached to this monograph as Appendix A. Its cost would be approximately one third of the Stage I project scheduled in the Palmer Report. In any case the Basra line platform should be sited immediately alongside the station building. It is indefensible to erect a terminal station costing ID 4,000,000 with the principal main-line platforms as appendices far away from the circulating area.

If future decisions for Baghdad town expansion demand the removal of the Basra line from its present alignment, the whole layout should be revised and the goods-marshalling yards constructed as a through yard, outside the present area, as indicated in outline on the plan attached to this Report as Appendix B. This layout would overcome the disadvantages of increased mileage and higher operating costs.

The Mission therefore recommends that the funds be made available for completing and bringing into operation the railway terminal station and headquarters and that an additional sum for a simplified provisional layout be also allocated. It suggests further that the new station building be used as follows:

Ground Floor—half railway station, half airways terminal.[4] 496
First Floor —railway headquarters 498
Second Floor—non-railway offices

Other Developments

The Baghdad-West layout is not the only development project 496 for which financial provision is needed. As the Director General of Railways indicated in a memorandum of March 17, 1951 to the Minister of Communications and Public Works, there are in all 22 projects, which are either completed or too far advanced to be abandoned. A list of these is given in Appendix C. On some of those completed, payments are still due; and others cannot now be finished for lack of funds, even though their completion is in the interest of the country's economy as well as the railway's operating efficiency. It is important, therefore, that the necessary funds be made available to the railways.

On the other hand, it will not be necessary at this time to provide for extensions of the railway network. Projects have been studied or suggested for new railways lines and extensions between

Kerbela—Kufa,
Baghdad—Kut, on the right bank of the Tigris,
Kut—Nasiriya,
Kut—Amara,
Amara—Basra

All these projects are in principle worth studying, but no decision as to their usefulness can be reached until the effects of road building and organized road transport on general traffic flow has been further investigated.

Rehabilitation and Modernization

In principle the suggestions of the Palmer Report should be adopted, although the extent to which they can be implemented in practice can be determined only after further study and recommendations by the head of each department concerned. Undoubtedly some further allocation of Development Board funds will be needed to carry out the ultimate recommendations.

Diesel Traction

Iraq's oil resources favor diesel traction, especially in view of the problems involved in supplying the water that steam traction requires. The Palmer Report has proved the case for diesel trac-

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[4] See the subsequent section on airports.

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tion, and it is recommended that the trial period be begun at the earliest possible date with due regard to considerations set out in the following paragraphs dealing with possible gauge conversion. The cost of converting to diesel traction, estimated in the Palmer Report at ID 4,155,000, has already been almost entirely included in the projected outlay on renewals given earlier.

Gauge Conversion

One major problem remains practically untouched, that of unification of the railways' gauge. The problem has never been studied in detail. At various times estimates have been produced, usually at short notice and always based on the assumption of the necessity of complete replacement of track and rolling stock. It has often been forgotten that the construction gauge, formation, bridges, etc., of the meter-gauge lines were originally designed with a view to ultimate conversion to standard gauge.

There is no doubt that the division of the railway system in two gauges with a transshipment point at the center is a handicap to full traffic development. The question is whether the cost of conversion and the temporary disturbance of the free flow of traffic can be reduced sufficiently to be outbalanced by the increased efficiency and cheaper operation that the unified system would bring.

There are several reasons why the problem should now be studied in minute detail.

1. The long-term general development program of the country will probably entail capital expenditures of about ID 160,000,000 over the next five years and perhaps even larger amounts in later periods. Such an expenditure must result in increased production and consumption and in consequence increased transport. With this in view it might be sound and reasonable to include in the capital program a project for rail gauge conversion which would make railway transport more efficient.
2. Although existing administration, operation, service of workshops, stores, etc., for the two gauges are admirably integrated, there exists, of necessity, a large amount of duplication in activities, of reserves, of stand-bys and spares, in all departments.
3. The developments contemplated in the areas now served by the standard-gauge line north of Baghdad will be handicapped by transshipment on the main export and import route.

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4. The meter-gauge system is completely isolated from the standard-gauge systems in all adjacent countries; and such isolation may become a growing handicap to Iraq if additional rail connections become desirable in the interest of security or international trade. 496
5. Serious consideration must be given from now on to road transport. The proper economic use of both road and rail transport facilities will be much more difficult as long as the railway system suffers from a transshipment handicap.

A decision on gauge conversion should be taken now, in view of the major developments contemplated in the next five or ten years. Once these major developments are achieved with retention of the existing system, an opportunity for conversion, however desirable, will not recur again under circumstances as favorable as the present.

The major developments contemplated and directly affected by possible gauge conversion are:

1. Diesel traction to replace steam;
2. The intensive renewal program of track and rolling stock, which is now required in view of the age of the railway, and which must be carried out in any event;
3. The Baghdad-West layout in conjunction with town development.

It is emphatically recommended that the problem of gauge conversion of all meter-gauge lines be made the subject of a serious and thorough study in all its details. The existing railway staff is fully capable of doing this work; its members know all the local possibilities and difficulties, but, already overburdened in their day-to-day duties, they cannot possibly find the time to carry out the study alone. They should therefore be assisted by consultants for a period of, say, three to six months; and the consultants Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton might accordingly be recalled to carry out the study under the direction of the Director General and in close cooperation with the railway staff.

Such a study should cover the following subjects:

1. Assessment of the principal reasons for conversion;
2. A possible conversion program, completely integrated with the programs for renewals, introduction of diesel traction and completion of the Baghdad-West scheme;

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3. A five-year program of preparation involving:
   a. An initial test period of diesel locomotives and final transfer to diesel traction at the end of the fifth year;
   b. A concentration into five years of the program for track and rolling stock renewals projected by the Palmer Report. All the renewals to be for standard gauge, and no meter-gauge renewals beyond absolutely essential replacements from now on;
   c. A careful calculation of the extra capital cost involved, due consideration being given to expenses to be met in any case under existing operations, within the next five years or at some later time;
   d. A careful estimate of the savings in administration, operation, maintenance and renewal expenditures the unified system would afford.

A technical essay on the actual conversion work is attached to this report as Appendix D.

It is difficult to estimate the cost of the conversion operation in advance of this proposed study, but it may not be far from ID 6,000,000. As already indicated, however, it will also necessitate compressing the projected renewals program in a much shorter period. Thus, prior to conversion it would be necessary to carry out not only the renewals projected in the Palmer Report for the first five years, but also those contemplated for the meter-gauge lines in the rest of the period. Under those circumstances the outlay in renewals would be approximately as follows:

Mechanical (other than traction)	ID 2,000,000
Civil	3,400,000
Diesel traction	4,155,000
Total	ID 9,555,000

During this five-year period the railways would be able to finance only about ID 3,250,000 out of their own resources, i.e., through allocations out of current operating revenue. An estimated renewals deficit of ID 6,300,000 would therefore have to be financed over the next five years. Part of this might later be repaid out of railway revenues.

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
RAILROADS
ROADS
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
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EXISTING M.G. SIDINGS
NEW PASSENGER LINE
S.G./M.G. CROSSING
EXISTING S.G. SIDINGS
EXISTING S.G. MAIN LINE
METRE GAUGE
STANDARD GAUGE
STANDARD GAUGE REMOVED
0
0.1
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KILOMETERS

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
KIRKUK
TIGRIS RIVER
PRESENT RAILWAY STATIONS AND YARDS TO BE ABANDONED
TO BE ABANDONED
NEW MAIN LINE
MARSHALLING YARD

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7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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
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M.G. PLATFORMS
NEW PASSENGER STATION YARD
S.G. PLATFORMS
NEW
APRO
TAXI WAY FROM RUNWAY

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APPENDIX A

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IRAQI STATE RAILWAYS REVISED LAYOUT BAGHDAD RAILWAYS & ROADS IN NEW TOWN PLAN


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MILES
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KILOMETERS

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APPENDIX B

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
EXISTING M.G. SIDINGS
FUTURE APPROACH ROAD
EXISTING S.G. SIDINGS
PROVISIONAL APPROACH ROAD
M.G. MAIN LINE MAQIL (NEW)
RAIL
PROJECTED BOULEVARD
TRAFFIC ROUND ABOUT IN ORIGINAL PLAN
NEW APRON
NEW ROAD

IRAQI STATE RAILWAYS
BAGHDAD NEW DEVELOPMENT
SIMPLIFIED STAGE I

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7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX D

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Notes on Conversion from Meter to Standard Gauge of the Basra-Baghdad-Erbil Main Line and Branches

The conversion plan, if carried out, should establish an approximate D-day of conversion for the Basra-Baghdad line five years ahead and a second D-day of conversion for the Baghdad-Erbil line in the following year, i.e. in six years' time.

As a preliminary step there should be a careful survey of the number of tracks in yards, loops and sidings in stations which are unused or in excess of requirements, so that the conversion can be concentrated on tracks and sidings truly necessary. The conversion mileage can thereupon be determined.

A further preliminary step would involve a study of revised timetables, which take account of the new form of traction and the reduction in motive power units and rolling stock resulting therefrom.

The conversion will require the substitution of standard-gauge sleepers for the entire length of track to be converted from meter gauge. On certain sections this will involve broadening of the existing earth or stone ballast bed. On some bridges slight structural alterations to longitudinal girders may also be necessary. No other substitution or expansion is required for the conversion since any strengthening of the track by new rails, new turnouts, stone ballast or earth, etc., should properly be considered a replacement or development requirement, not a conversion requirement.

The conversion will also require the substitution of standard-gauge rolling stock for existing meter-gauge stock. New diesel locomotives will in any case be required by the change-over to diesel traction, and since carriage and wagon bodies have been built to standard-gauge dimension, the only change rolling stock conversions will require is the substitution of standard-gauge undercarriages for the existing meter-gauge. Any replacement, renewal or expansion of rolling stock carried out at the same time should be considered, therefore, a development rather than a conversion requirement.

The raising of platforms and loading bank levels may be considered a conversion requirement, but it is not an essential part of conversion, and it may, in most stations, be postponed or even dispensed with. Buildings, fencing, signalling, communications system, water supply, power plant and machinery are, for the most part, not directly affected by the conversion. To the limited extent that they may be affected, as in the case of machinery and stores, there is a reduction, rather than an expansion, involved. 456

The two D-days for conversion should be determined inside two successive years' seasons of low traffic. The conversion program before and on D-day, and the completion program after D-day are scheduled in outline in the following paragraphs.

Standard-gauge sleepers in the existing track scheduled for conversion after the survey prescribed earlier should be substituted for meter-gauge sleepers, over as long a period as practicable, well in advance of D-day. This can be done by the ordinary maintenance gangs, strengthened where required, in slack periods.

Special gangs or contractors, or both, should proceed to put out of service approximately half the number of sidings in the yards and wharves, etc., at Magil and Baghdad, and at the most important intermediate stations bring these to standard gauge. At each crossing station which has more than one crossing loop, one or more loops would be put out of service and similarly converted, including the turn-outs at either end, in or by the side of the track.

If agreement is reached on remodelling of the yards in Baghdad-West, the new yards will need to be built for standard gauge, leaving the abandonment of the meter-gauge yards until after the conversion.

Some days before D-day a proportion of the rail fastenings in the remaining track would be loosened, and key turnouts at entrances and exits to stations and yards built at the side of their final position.

On D-day the conversion would be carried out with might and main over the entire length of the line, joining the already converted halves of yards and at least one loop at crossing stations, all within an allowed space of not more than 24 hours.

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● 496 The special gangs and contractors would then continue to convert the remaining halves of yards and loops and remove surplus sidings.

Rolling stock and locomotive requirements will have to be met as follows:

1. **Motive power.** Diesel engine types will have to be ordered forthwith for standard-gauge trial. After a suitable period of trials under all conditions and circumstances, including try-out of alterations resulting from the trials, the order for the full requirements must be placed so that delivery of the absolutely essential number of units can be made before the two D-days of conversion.
2. **New rolling stock.** No new rolling stock for meter-gauge lines should be ordered from the day the conversion is decided upon, and new units of coaching stock and wagons which would have been ordered under the meter-gauge renewal program will need to be ordered for standard gauge. The number should be increased so as to cover a renewal program of 10 years concentrated in a period of five years.
3. **Conversion of old rolling stock.** With due regard to the reduced number of coaching and wagon units as calculated by the preliminary survey, any deficiency remaining after the provisions outlined under paragraph 2, will have to be met by rebuilding of meter-gauge to standard-gauge stock from existing bodies on new undercarriages.

New standard-gauge rolling stock imported through Basra port should be held at Basra on the converted portions of wharves and yards in readiness for operation from D-day. Converted stock, handled at Baghdad workshops, plus the surplus now existing on the standard-gauge line, is to be similarly held ready at the Baghdad end.

Traffic must be interrupted for a few days before D-day, probably three days or less in the down direction and one day in the up direction. These days must be used to bring all meter-gauge stock, except the units to be sold or scrapped, under load or empty from Magil to Baghdad for use on the Erbil line. All units to be sold must be brought to Magil before D-day. This process will already have started several weeks before by a judiciously planned distribution operation. Both the public and the trade must be warned in advance so that traffic, though interrupted for a few days, need not suffer.

The same procedures, on a far smaller scale, would be repeated a year later on the Baghdad-Erbil line. In the planning arrangements outlined above the estimates of costs may be calculated in considerable detail.

The cost of conversion of track and accessories will consist of (1) the actual cost of labor, materials and supervisions involved in the operation of 800-plus miles of standard-gauge sleepers, less the cost of 10 years' replacement of meter-gauge sleepers and the scrap value of removed meter-gauge sleepers, and (2) the cost of widened earth or ballast section and of some structural alterations to bridges. The difference in cost between the 75-pound rails required for standard gauge and the 60-pound rails that would otherwise be used for renewals might also be included, although this item is not a real conversion cost. There is no doubt that developments in any case would demand heavier rail than 60-pounds even if the meter gauge is retained.

The conversion cost in terms of motive power and rolling stock will consist of (1) the difference in cost of standard-gauge and meter-gauge diesel locomotives; (2) the difference in cost of standard-gauge and meter-gauge coaching stock and wagons scheduled for renewal; and (3) the cost of extra standard-gauge rolling stock required to reach the numbers necessary for operation.

From the costs so calculated must be deducted the saving in new procurement resulting from the smaller numbers of locomotives, carriages and wagons as standard-gauge and former meter-gauge stocks are pooled. The resulting savings in maintenance and renewal costs will accrue over a period of 15 to 30 years during which old stock will be completely replaced by new stock.

Finally an attempt should be made to assess in some detail the savings in operation, maintenance, warehouses, stores and administration generally resulting from the conversion; also the saving in transshipment costs plus the increase in revenues from the larger traffic which will undoubtedly develop once transshipment has been abolished.

One further factor will affect the cost of rolling stock. Standard-gauge wagon stock should comply with the requirements of the European Wagons Union (RIV) but the designs should follow the existing simple standards of meter-gauge rolling stock.

496 The wagons of most European railways, including the present standard-gauge wagon stock of Iraq State Railways, are unnecessarily luxurious and far too heavy for Iraq's needs. The railways' traffic consists largely of smaller than bogie load consignments, and the four-wheeled wagon type should be retained in preference to a switch to bogies stock.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

505 In 1947, the number of steam and motor boats fell slightly to 172 vessels with a total tonnage of 10,645 tons. On the other hand, the number of special motor boats for passenger transport increased to 388.

Railways

● 496 The railway network and railway transport in Iraq are not yet sufficiently developed; but the authorities are making considerable efforts to remedy this state of affairs.

[471] In 1902 the Germans obtained a concession for building the Istanbul—Baghdad railway line—the "Baghdad Bahn"—a project in keeping with the *Drang nach Osten;* they began the work in 1903, but had only completed a few sections by the eve of the First World War. The work resumed under very different conditions after the First World War, and was completed in July 1940, when the Baiji—Mosul—Tel Kochek section was opened in the territory of Iraq.

[655] The Iraqi railway network, which is owned by the State, now consists of the following lines:

● 496

	Kilometres
(Standard gauge, 1.435 metres) Baghdad—Baiji—Mosul—Tel Kochek (to the Syrian frontier) . .	529.4[4]
(One-metre gauge) Baghdad—Kirkuk (323.4 km)—Erbil (111 km), with the Julula—Khanaqin branch (29 km)	463.4
(One-metre gauge) Baghdad—Ma'agil (548 km)—Basra town (9.6 km), with the Al Musaiyib—Karbala—Hindiya branch (50.5 km) Ur—Nasiriya (16.1 km), Shuiaiba—Az Zubair quarries (46.7 km)	690.9
Cross-overs and sidings (one-metre gauge): Baghdad-West—Baghdad-North (8 km), Baghdad-East—Moaskar Rashid (8 km)	16
	1,699.7

According to recent reliable information, the extension of the Baghdad—Kirkuk line to Erbil, an extension which is very important for the agriculture of that region and was far advanced in 1949, has already been completed. Much progress has also been made in constructing a railway line between Karbala and Najaf; a railway and road bridge across the Tigris at Baghdad, which will replace the existing ferry-boat between Baghdad-West and Baghdad-North (on the Baghdad—Kirkuk railway line); and a railway bridge across the Euphrates at Al Musaiyib, by the Hindiya Dam (on the Hindiya—Karbala section); the construction of a new railway station and engine shed at Baghdad has also been begun.

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[4] Contrary to information from various sources, which give the length of this line as 329 (English) miles, recent information from authoritative sources gives the figur as 403.7 miles, or 649 kilometres; this would lead t the assumption that the Baghdad—Hindiya branch of thi line, which was built during the war, is still in use.

● 496 By contrast, various railway sections built during the war (Baquba—Kut-al-Imara, Tanua—Hashimiya) were abandoned or dismantled after the war.

497 The railway traffic is shown by the following table, in which the years refer to fiscal years beginning on 1 April of the year stated:

	Passenger-kilometres	*Freight net ton-kilometres*
	(in millions)	
1928	89	147
1932	144	156
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There is a daily passenger and goods service (in both directions) on the Basra—Baghdad—Kirkuk—Khanaqin line; the traffic between the railway centres and the inland markets of Iraq and Iran is carried by road.

In 1946, the rolling-stock consisted of 114 engines, 324 passenger carriages and 6,642 goods vans.

Road Network

491 The actual construction of a road network in Iraq was begun after the First World War. At present (these figures relate to the end of 1948), the country has 7,320 kilometres of road; these roads are inspected and maintained by the government and are made up as follows:

487 Land Communications with Foreign Countries

● 496 Iraq has direct connexions:

By *railway:* with Turkey, through Syria, the frontier station of Nusaybin, to Haidar Pasha (suburb of Istanbul, on the sea of Marmora, at the southern end of the Anatolian shore of the Bosporus); with Syria, where the Baghdad line intersects the Syrian line to Damascus near Aleppo; with Lebanon, through Syria, by the junction at Raiat with the Damascus—Beirut line, and at Homs with the Homs—Tell Kalakh—Tripoli—Beirut line; with the State of Israel, by the Damascus—Jordan line and the narrow-gauge Dera—Haifa branch line; with the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan, by the Damascus—Dera—Nassib—Amman—Maan line; with Egypt, by the Haifa—Rafah—Cairo railway; with Iran, from the terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway at Khurramshahr, on the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab (24.4 kilometres from Basra), towards Ahwaz—Teheran—Bandar-Shah, on the Caspian Sea;

487 491 By *motor transport roads:* with Turkey, directly through Zakho, and through Syria, by the Mosul—Tel Kochek—Nusaybin—Diyarbekir roads; with Syria (and beyond) by the Mosul—Tel Kochek, Mosul—El Badi—Mineveh, Kirkuk—Haditha—Jalib-Akashe, Baghdad—Rutba—Tell Droite—Palmyra, and Baghdad—Rutba—Damascus roads; with Jordan: by the Baghdad—Ramadi—Rutba—Mafrak roads; with Saudi Arabia: by the Baghdad—Karbala—Nukhaib—Judaidal al Arar, and El Jauf

Iraq MH1

433 Iraq each capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of sugar per annum from sugar beet to be grown locally, a bitumen plant, and a small steel plant. In addition the Government is investigating the recommendation of the International Bank mission[1] for the erection of a chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur, and carbon black. The mission has also recommended plants for manufacturing bone-meal fertilizer, date-packing crates and motor-car tyres, and for batching concrete, converting steel scrap into building components, and possibly for remelting glass.

Labour

466 647 657 Conditions of work and employment are regulated by a Labour Law (1936–46), which so far relates only to 'workmen' (a term requiring more precise definition) in industrial undertakings. It is in process of revision and extension. Its application is supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security, which maintains a small corps of inspectors. This department, advised by foreign experts, proposes to experiment with employment exchanges, is starting to compile labour statistics, is undertaking a programme of housing for labour, and is examining plans of social security, for which the existing Labour Law already contains some provision in the form of indemnities on discharge, paid sick and confinement leave, and compensation for injuries. Safety and sanitary working conditions are covered generally by the Labour Law and made obligatory in greater detail by a Workshops and Factories Regulation (1937). In January 1953 it was stated that new provisions, for eventual inclusion in the new Labour Law, had been drafted for establishing wage boards, regulating disputes, and determining the rights, obligations, and administration of trade unions, which are not clearly defined in the existing Labour Law. The latter grants industrial workers the right to establish associations to safeguard their special interests, strengthen the spirit of co-operation, effect educational, cultural, hygienic, social, and moral improvements, and develop Iraqi industry. [467] A few trade unions exist; their membership is small and activity slight. Others have been suspended for subversive activity. The movement is still rudimentary.

Communications

● 496 *Railways.*[2] The railways constructed by the British forces during the Mesopotamian Campaign eventually formed the

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[1] See above, p. 275.

[2] This section is based on the *Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book*, 1952-3.

177 try rather than fostering the development of something
indigenous and natural. Under such a system the enforcement
of law may become of necessity very mechanical,
as when an Indian Sepoy nearly knocks down an inoffensive
Arab pedestrian by a blow with his fist for no
greater crime than walking on the wrong side of the
road to avoid a mud puddle. In the courts, too, a crowd
of lawyers and an abundance of red tape, with venal
underlings, may serve to make the paths of justice tortuous
and uncertain in spite of the best intentions on the
part of the presiding judge.

185 Nevertheless, even under such handicaps as those we
177 have indicated, there is no questioning the very great
material progress that is to be seen in Mesopotamia.
[363] Even before the war one of Baghdad's streets was paved,
and since the British have taken over the administration
of the kingdom, all sorts of improvements have been introduced.
[496] The railroad system of the country now extends
360 miles from Basra to Baghdad and from there
on nearly to Mosul. There are several subsidiary lines,
the total amounting to over 1000 miles. By far the
greater part of this mileage was constructed by the British
[312] for war purposes. Under British rule, also, the Hindiya
Barrage and other less important irrigation works
have been kept in order and improved and extensive harbor
improvements at Basra undertaken.

364 British sanitary and health officers have been appointed
744 for Mesopotamia and no praise is too high for
their largely unappreciated but nevertheless unselfish and
extremely efficient labors in that country. The hospital
work that has been undertaken in Basra, Baghdad and
Amara, the inspection of eating houses, and the maintaining
of sanitary conditions have been excellently done.

[illegible] Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH 1

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pal population centers and radiate from 489
Baghdad and Mosul to cities in Syria, Iran 491
and Turkey. The Tigris is navigable to 505
barges from Basra to Baghdad throughout the year, and to smaller craft as far as Mosul during the high-water season. The Shatt al Arab is open to ocean-going vessels, and Basra, about 85 miles from the Persian Gulf, is one of the major ports of
the Middle East. A government-operated 496
railroad, part of the famous "Berlin to Baghdad" railway, runs from Basra to Baghdad and Mosul, with connections through Aleppo to Istanbul. A branch line extends from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and
Khanaquin. A government-owned airline 509
serves Iraq and the neighboring countries, while international lines from Europe to Africa and the Far East stop at Baghdad and Basra.

FOOD AND NUTRITION

The nutrition of the people is governed 146
by the cultural habits of the different racial and social communities, the economic status of the individual families and the food supplies available under diverse climatic conditions. Undernutrition is prevalent among the poorer inhabitants—tenant cultivators, urban laborers and nomadic tribes—who make up over three quarters of the popula-
tion. Wheat, barley, rice and dates are the 241
staple food crops of the country, while vegetables and fruits, other than dates, are frequently scarce. Wheat is widely grown, primarily in the rainfall areas of the north, but also in the irrigated riverain zones of the south. Barley is cultivated extensively,
and, like wheat, is used in the preparation [262]
of breads and of *burghul*, a coarse-grained cereal product typical of this region. Millet and maize are common crops in the south. Rice is produced in certain lowland districts in the Kurdish highlands and on the fringes of the southern marshes, and is a popular food among all sections of the population. Peas, beans and lentils are usually consumed throughout the year, and tomatoes, eggplant and different root and green vege-

p. 25(e)

Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
315 Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
[496] in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-
owned Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

491 centers such as Amara and Kut are linked neither by rail nor by
494 all-weather roads to Basra and Baghdad.

504 In Basra, Iraq possesses an excellent port capable of handling
497 a considerable increase in traffic. Upcountry cargo into and out
of the port is handled almost wholly by railway, for inland river traffic has declined greatly in importance owing to shallow water and other impediments to navigation.

The port and the railways are each run by an autonomous administration operating under a separate budget.

VII. Money and Banking

453

The banking system consists of the National Bank, five commercial banks, a number of private banks or *sarrafs,* the post office savings bank, and three state-owned longer-term financing institutions, the Industrial Bank, the Agricultural Bank and the Mortgage Bank.

652 The National Bank succeeded the Iraq Currency Board as the
453 currency-issuing authority in 1949. Iraq is a member of the sterling
area, so that its currency is backed principally by sterling assets in London. Although the law permits the currency to be backed up to 30 percent by Iraqi government securities, as of March 31, 1951, the total amount of currency in circulation was more than covered by sterling assets. Aside from its note-issuing function, the Bank is charged with the administration of foreign exchange control and the supervision of the banking system in accordance with a bank control law which became effective at the beginning of 1950. This law requires banks to keep the equivalent of 15 percent of their time and demand deposits as a reserve with the National Bank and to keep 50 percent of these deposits in the form of cash and investments in Iraq. The National Bank is empowered to reduce the reserve requirement to 10 percent and to vary the second between 30 and 70 percent. Since the commercial banks have had no need for recourse to the National Bank in order to replenish their cash resources, the Bank's loans and advances have remained very small. As of March 31, 1951, they

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1950

496 By contrast, various railway sections built during the war (Baquba—Kut-al-Imara, Tanua—Hashimiya) were abandoned or dismantled after the war.

497 The railway traffic is shown by the following table, in which the years refer to fiscal years beginning on 1 April of the year stated:

	Passenger-kilometres	*Freight net ton-kilometres*
	(in millions)	
1928	89	147
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There is a daily passenger and goods service (in both directions) on the Basra—Baghdad—Kirkuk—Khanaqin line; the traffic between the railway centres and the inland markets of Iraq and Iran is carried by road.

In 1946, the rolling-stock consisted of 114 engines, 324 passenger carriages and 6,642 goods vans.

Road Network

491 The actual construction of a road network in Iraq was begun after the First World War. At present (these figures relate to the end of 1948), the country has 7,320 kilometres of road; these roads are inspected and maintained by the government and are made up as follows:

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

basis of the Iraqi State Railways, which were made over to the civil authorities set up by the British Government in 1920, and in 1923 to the newly-formed Government of Iraq. They became the property of the Iraq Government on 1 April 1946. They consist at present of two gauges. A metre-gauge line runs from the Port of Basra to Baghdad, and thence across the River Tigris by the new bridge to Kirkuk and Arbil. This line has branches from Shuaiba Junction to Shuaiba, Zubair, and Jebel Sanam Quarry, from Ur Junction to Nasiriya and from Jalula Junction to Khanaqin. A standard-gauge line connects Baghdad to Tel Kochek on the Syrian frontier. A through rail service with air-conditioned coaches on the section Basra to Baghdad connects with the Taurus express from Baghdad via Mosul to Istanbul and thence to continental Europe and Great Britain. The through standard-gauge connexion from Baghdad to Tel Kochek was opened for traffic on 15 July 1940. An extension of the metre-gauge main line from Kirkuk to Arbil was opened to traffic on 6 June 1949. There is a total of 1,050 miles open, of which 328 miles are standard (4 ft 8½ in.) gauge and 722 miles metre gauge. 496

For the year ending 31 March 1951 the total receipts were ID3,870,174, total expenditure ID3,816,974, number of passengers carried 3,809,412, goods 1,890,413 tons. 497

Roads. At the end of 1948 Iraq contained some 1,400 miles of surfaced metalled roads, 250 miles of unsurfaced metalled roads, and 5,000 miles of earth roads. Most of the metalled roads are in the immediate vicinity of Baghdad, between Baghdad and the east and north, and in the north. Elsewhere their lack is due mainly to the absence of suitable road material and the expense of bringing it to the site. The earth roads which take their place, especially in the southern plains, are levelled and where necessary embanked and bridged but are vulnerable to the rains. Their defects are to some extent offset by the flatness of the construction and repair. 491

The main transport routes are: Baghdad to Mosul via Samarra; Baghdad to Mosul via Kirkuk and Irbil; Kirkuk to Sulaimania and Halabja; Irbil to Rowanduz from north-west Persia; Mosul to Amadiya; Mosul to Zakho; Mosul to Tel Kochek for north-east Syria and Turkey; Baghdad to Khanaqin for Persia; Baghdad to Basra via Kut and Amara; Baghdad to Basra via Hilla and Samawa; Baghdad to Kerbela; Baghdad to Rutba for Syria and Jordan.

In 1950 a governmental committee drew up a ten-year programme which provided for the construction or improvement of some 2,150 miles of road. First priority was accorded to

The Port

504 The Port of Basra, an autonomous public agency which also operates the civil airport, is efficiently run and capable of handling a considerable increase in traffic. In view of the adequacy of this port, the Mission sees no justification for the construction of another port at Umm Qasr as has been suggested from time to
503 time. The Port of Basra has been able to finance necessary capital improvements, as well as to pay off its debts, out of current surpluses and should be able to do so in the future except for the task of financing the dredging of a new and urgently needed channel across the Fao bar. The existing channel is subject to heavy silting which necessitates extensive dredging operations at a cost of ID 500,000 to ID 600,000 per year. Until recently it was expected that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would advance the funds necessary for this new channel, but recent developments in Iran, coupled with the fact that ample oil revenues will be available to Iraq for investment, appear to make it desirable that the Development Board finance this project.

The Railways

496 The state railways, which are the principal means of transport, are also well managed and have been fully able to meet traffic requirements. They have come in for considerable criticism, however, because of the serious financial difficulties in which they have become involved. The major source of these difficulties lies in the fact that, in 1944, the railways, with the full approval of the government, began a major capital development program without assurance of adequate financing. To defray the cost, the railways have had to use a fund of about ID 2,500,000 set aside for renewals and to borrow ID 1,000,000 from the government as well as £3,000,000 in the United Kingdom with the help of the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The program was for the most part soundly conceived and is now largely completed. However, it has left the railways without adequate funds not only for essential renewals but also for other construction pro-
● 498 jects. One of the major and more controversial projects affected
496 is the erection in Baghdad West of a rather imposing terminal station and railway headquarters together with relocation of railway

496 lines and rebuilding and extension of railway goods and marshal-
● 498 ling yards. Much of the latter project is really part of Baghdad town planning and its cost should therefore not be completely charged to the railways.

496 These problems, as well as that of tractive power on the railways, have recently been studied by a British engineering firm. With some modifications, the Mission endorses the conclusions contained in its report. The railways should be enabled to carry out a program involving essential renewals of track and rolling stock, gradual conversion to diesel traction and the completion of the Baghdad-West scheme on a drastically modified basis which would entail finishing the railway station but postponing most of the balance of this project. The Mission suggests, however, some modifications in the British firm's proposals on the latter scheme, the details of which are set forth in the monograph on transportation. The railway station when completed should serve also as the airport terminal and provide offices for the railway administration and the government.

Since the railways can finance only a small portion of this program out of their own resources, the Mission recommends that the Development Board supply the bulk of the required funds. In addition, the Board might take over amortization of the £3,000,000 loan contracted by the government on behalf of railway development. This must be repaid over a six-year period from June 30, 1952.

The Mission also urges that immediate consideration be given to the problem of standardizing the gauges on the railway lines. The Basra-Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil line and the branch line to Khanaqin are meter gauge while the line from Baghdad to Mosul, which links Iraq with the railway systems of Syria and Turkey, is standard gauge. The two gauges not only necessitate transshipment, but, above all, make the task of operation complicated and costly. They require a large amount of duplication in activities, of reserves, standbys and spares in all departments. The need for transshipment is likely to be a growing handicap to the railways as traffic requirements increase and the demand for more rapid transport grows.

It is particularly important to consider standardization at this time because the railways face the necessity of carrying out exten-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

and rates per kilometer or ton-kilometer unit vary between the different sections of the system. They should be standardized. The abnormally wide variations in rates between commodities should be adjusted. The Palmer Report recommends the appointment of a rates and fares expert to study the matter. The Mission agrees that a traffic research officer with expert knowledge of tariff structure should be appointed as a temporary consultant to the railways. It is particularly important that he be conversant with traffic research so that he may provide for rate adjustments when traffic in certain commodities declines or increases exceptionally. With increased road traffic competition such research will become imperative in the very near future. 496

Baghdad-West Railway Developments

The plan for this major development scheme consists of a new terminal station building and railway headquarters to replace the existing separate Baghdad-West meter-gauge and standard-gauge stations, and the rebuilding and extension of the goods and marshalling yards. The plan was inspired chiefly by two desires, one to provide Baghdad with a modern central station, the other to make room for a town extension in the southeastern area planned on modern principles free from railway level crossings. The plans would necessitate the realignment of the line to Basra, around the development area so that it enters Baghdad terminal station from the northwest. 498 496

The Palmer Report rejects the official scheme principally because (1) increased length of the line to Basra would mean increased operating costs for the Railway and higher rates and fares for the public and (2) the operation of Baghdad station as a terminal instead of a "through" station would further increase operating difficulties and reduce the station's capacity. The Report submits a revised scheme in which the passenger terminal station is retained for the Mosul and Kirkuk lines, and the Basra line is retained along its present alignment with its own platforms, connected with the new terminal building. A plan for a provisional Stage I to bring the new station building into operation is also submitted.

The Report is on sound ground in pointing out the disadvantages of the increased mileage on the Baghdad-Basra lines

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MHI Iraq MHI

and in stressing the disadvantages of operating the station as a terminal in so far as goods traffic is concerned. An additional major disadvantage of the plan would be that in the new alignments the two meter-gauge railway yards would be on opposite sides of the standard-gauge railway yard, thus presenting very serious operating difficulties. A terminal station for passenger traffic, however, presents a different case and would actually offer advantages in concentrated operations, safe and easy circulation of passengers, luggage, mail and parcels. But it is obviously out of the question to build a new passenger line outside the town and at the same time retain the existing line for goods traffic through the town.

It is obvious that a considerable time must elapse before a final decision as to the town planning, including government buildings, will be reached, and it is essential that at least the new terminal station, now nearing completion, be brought into operation. It is also desirable that no major reconstruction of yards be carried out until a final decision is reached. It is recommended, therefore, that a provisional plan be carried out, but on a modified, simpler scale than the Palmer Report Stage I. A modified plan is attached to this monograph as Appendix A. Its cost would be approximately one third of the Stage I project scheduled in the Palmer Report. In any case the Basra line platform should be sited immediately alongside the station building. It is indefensible to erect a terminal station costing ID 4,000,000 with the principal main-line platforms as appendices far away from the circulating area.

If future decisions for Baghdad town expansion demand the removal of the Basra line from its present alignment, the whole layout should be revised and the goods-marshalling yards constructed as a through yard, outside the present area, as indicated in outline on the plan attached to this Report as Appendix B. This layout would overcome the disadvantages of increased mileage and higher operating costs.

The Mission therefore recommends that the funds be made available for completing and bringing into operation the railway terminal station and headquarters and that an additional sum for a simplified provisional layout be also allocated. It suggests further that the new station building be used as follows:

Ground Floor—half railway station, half airways terminal.[4] 496
First Floor —railway headquarters 498
Second Floor—non-railway offices

Other Developments

The Baghdad-West layout is not the only development project for which financial provision is needed. As the Director General of Railways indicated in a memorandum of March 17, 1951 to the Minister of Communications and Public Works, there are in all 22 projects, which are either completed or too far advanced to be abandoned. A list of these is given in Appendix C. On some of those completed, payments are still due; and others cannot now be finished for lack of funds, even though their completion is in the interest of the country's economy as well as the railway's operating efficiency. It is important, therefore, that the necessary funds be made available to the railways. 496

On the other hand, it will not be necessary at this time to provide for extensions of the railway network. Projects have been studied or suggested for new railways lines and extensions between

Kerbela—Kufa,
Baghdad—Kut, on the right bank of the Tigris,
Kut—Nasiriya,
Kut—Amara,
Amara—Basra

All these projects are in principle worth studying, but no decision as to their usefulness can be reached until the effects of road building and organized road transport on general traffic flow has been further investigated.

Rehabilitation and Modernization

In principle the suggestions of the Palmer Report should be adopted, although the extent to which they can be implemented in practice can be determined only after further study and recommendations by the head of each department concerned. Undoubtedly some further allocation of Development Board funds will be needed to carry out the ultimate recommendations.

Diesel Traction

Iraq's oil resources favor diesel traction, especially in view of the problems involved in supplying the water that steam traction requires. The Palmer Report has proved the case for diesel trac-

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[4] See the subsequent section on airports.

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
EXISTING M.G. SIDINGS
EXISTING M.G. MAIN LINE
NEW PASSENGER LINE
S.G./M.G. CROSSING
EXISTING S.G. SIDINGS
EXISTING S.G. MAIN LINE
METRE GAUGE
STANDARD GAUGE
STANDARD GAUGE REMOVED
0
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MILES
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KILOMETERS

FOLL. P. 343 (a)

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
EXISTING S.C.
M.G. PLATFORMS
NEW PASSENGER STATION YARD
S.G. PLATFORMS
NEW
APPRO
TAXI WAY FROM RUNWAY

FOLL. P. 343(b)

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX B

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
EXISTING M.G. SIDINGS
FUTURE APPROACH ROAD
EXISTING S.G. SIDINGS
PROVISIONAL APPROACH ROAD
M.G. MAIN LINE MAQIL (NEW)
PROJECTED BOULEVARD
RAIL.
ORIGINAL PLAN
NEW APRON
TRAFFIC ROUND ABOUT IN
NEW ROAD

IRAQI STATE RAILWAYS
BAGHDAD NEW DEVELOPMENT
SIMPLIFIED STAGE I

FOLL. P. 343 (c)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312 185 Although by 1900 these conditions were not unrealized either in Baghdad or Istanbul, they had not been formulated as connected problems for solution. Governmental activity in this sphere had consisted, at the caprice of Pashas, in no more than some measure of organization of petty local works. The Administration had in fact neither the knowledge nor control nor finance necessary to formulate or organize a comprehensive irrigation system. Heedless alike of present evils and of rich possibilities, the governors of 'Iraq were doing and planning nothing while irrigation in Egypt and India was making great and fruitful progress. Nor was the contribution of the public more promising; the shiftless tribal cultivators carried out with low efficiency such minimum of silt-clearance and flood-dyke repairs as was forced upon them, erected temporary canal-heads of reed-bundles or brushwood, multiplied their primeval devices of water-lift, wastefully prolonged or resited their canals, and ruined area after area with neglected salting.

An outstanding case of deterioration in irrigation conditions was occurring in these years on the middle Euphrates. Up to 1880 the Ḥilla branch had been maintained as the principal waterway, the Hindiya branch being a canal deriving from it. But the closing of the Saqlawiya head up-stream, and the operation of natural forces of silting and scouring, allowed the Hindiya branch to gain in width and discharge. The problem of maintaining the flow of the Ḥilla branch had become first critically difficult and finally impossible. French engineers in 1891 completed a masonry dam which still held precariously in 1900, but failed to arrest the increasing ruin of Ḥilla branch irrigation.

487 The ancient land routes of the territory had remained constant since many centuries. Camel caravans used the desert ways of Damascus and Aleppo, mule-trains the time-worn hill tracks into Luristan, Kirmanshah, Persian Kurdistan, and the Van wilaya. 491 Within 'Iraq the routes were fixed by custom based on convenience; but here there were signs of recent progress in the provision of wayside Khans, new toll-bridges of stone or brick or resting on fragile pontoons. The roads, varying by districts in surface and security, were everywhere unsurfaced and neglected, deep in summer dust or flooded to seas of mud by rain or the overflow of canals.

499 Railways had, for many years, been hailed from a distance by 'Iraqis of every class as the bringers of ease and progress, and schemes in plenty had been propounded—those of Chesney in the eighteen-thirties, of Andrew in the 'fifties, and later of the Austrian von Pressel, the Italian Tonetti, the Frenchman Cottard, the Russian Kapnist. A local company had been formed in the 'eighties to construct a Khaniqin–Baghdad line, which lack of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

capital rendered abortive; and a successor enterprise in 1890 was 499 no more fortunate. At the close of the century talk of the 'Baghdad Railway' was more than ever persistent since, from the year 1888, the Germans had begun their career of Eastern ambition. The completion by the 'Ottoman Company of Anatolian Railways' of its line to Ankara in 1893 was followed by its prolongation to Konia in 1896; and in the same year permission was obtained for an extension to Diyarbakr, and ultimately through 'Iraq. But immediate Russian objection was raised, the proposed alignment by Diyarbakr was abandoned, and a pause of two years followed. Thereafter the Kaiser paid the second of his visits to the Ottoman dominions, swore devotion to the Caliph and to Islam, and secured in 1899 the arrangement of a draft concession for a line from Konia to Mosul, Baghdad, and the Persian Gulf. A German envoy visited 'Iraq to report on routes, a German cruiser appeared in the Gulf, and a technical Commission in 1900 toured the probable alignment through 'Iraq to Kuwayt, where British suspicions were abruptly aroused. Meanwhile the diplomats of Turkey and Germany met to prepare a definitive convention, watched with interest from Whitehall and Delhi. The public of 'Iraq, far from these conclaves, had as yet seen no enterprise on steel rails more imposing than the Baghdad–Kadhimiya horse tramway, relic of Midḥat Pasha.

The natural highways of 'Iraq had been, since the dawn of 505 history, its great rivers, and on these the dozen types of sailing-boat and skiff, raft and coracle still plied. But since the eighteen-forties steam navigation on the rivers had played its part in 'Iraq economics. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, formed in 1861 by the Lynch family and managed in Baghdad and Baṣra by companies bearing their name, had maintained a Tigris service for two generations, interrupted only by the obstructions of an officialdom dully resentful of foreign enterprise, by the low-water difficulties of navigation, and by the rifle-fire of riverain tribesmen. The Firman of authority, dating from 1834, seemed to limit the Company to simultaneous use of two steamers,[1] and the Lynch efforts were ceaseless for authority to increase this number and to employ barges. Their interests were, from 1879 onwards, closely associated with the British India Steam Navigation Company. Various Turkish or 'Iraqi single-ship enterprises had been amalgamated, a generation earlier, into a single 'Oman-Ottoman Administration', under the Turkish Ministry of Marine. Its fleet of small, barely river-worthy steamers took about half of the total factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal 701 parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

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[1] The *City of London* launched in 1862 was lost in 1881, the *Dijla* launched in 1865 was lost in 1876. The *Blosse Lynch* (1878), *Khalifa* (1880), and *Mejidieh* (1882) were in service in 1900.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained 706 decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this 499 period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to 206 most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert 205 postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of 647 this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq 661 today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

towards equality of treatment. Their own savagery had been in 619 part tamed by the severities of the 'nineties, and their shrine of Shaykh 'Adi was restored to them in 1907. Their Mir retained his authority and the friendless community their half-secret cult and practices; but there were signs of closer Government penetration after 1909. The application of conscription produced armed resistance in 1913, but a corrective visit of Turkish troops was not seriously opposed.

4. PROJECTS, BY LAND AND WATER

Far away from shabby, backward, and turbulent 'Iraq, Baghdad 499 Railway negotiations vitally affecting it continued as the century 648x opened. The results reached between the Deutsche Bank, the [471] Anatolian Railways, and the Turkish Government were contained in the Royal Irada of January 1902. This, re-cast in March 1903, revealed that the Germans had obtained excellent terms. A railway was to be built from Konia to the Persian Gulf, branches within 'Iraq were envisaged, financial provisions were generous, and a new Turkish company, the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, was to be formed.

The publication of the concession excited world-wide interest. The French, who in 1899 had agreed in principle to participate, now showed little enthusiasm. British co-operation was eagerly sought by the German promoters; but opinion in London, formerly indifferent or favourable to the project, was shocked now at the threat to India and to British interests in 'Iraq and the Gulf. The tide of opinion turned decisively against it, and Mr. Balfour was compelled, unwillingly, to announce British abstention. The Germans were bitterly disappointed. In Turkey itself the scheme had many critics; others favoured the project as one of hopeful development far beyond unaided Turkish capacity. In 'Iraq awareness of the enterprise grew slowly, and the same two bodies of opinion declared themselves: the one welcomed progress in any guise, the other dreaded foreign and Christian penetration.

The section Konia–Eregli was finished by October 1904 and the line prolonged to Bulgurlu, where it halted until 1909. In 1914 the Amanus tunnel was begun, the Euphrates bridged, and earth-work was proceeding towards Ras al-'Ayn. In the meanwhile other railway schemes had been propounded: a British line to run by Port Said, 'Aqaba, and Jawf to Baṣra, a French line to pass by Homs, Palmyra, and Dayr al-Zur to Baghdad and Mosul. Both were rejected by the Ottoman Government. German attempts to secure British support for their Bagdadbahn continued, only to be met by the reply, given in 1907, that opposition would cease if and when a Baghdad–Baṣra line was under all-British construction.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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The Turkish revolution had immediate effects. The Germans became unpopular, their railway was bitterly opposed, not least by Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey, a Kurdish deputy from Baghdad; and the British enjoyed a brief return of popularity. But by 1911 the old positions were resumed, with Germany again as the acceptable Power and the railway tolerated. Great Britain still refused participation and declined equally to agree to a requested raising of Turkish Customs rates. Suggestions in 1910 for a British-dominated southern section of the railway came to nothing, and early in 1911 a Turkish plan for a Turkish-French-British Company to construct the Baṣra–Baghdad section was again rejected. But a Convention was drafted soon afterwards, in March 1911, on the basis of German renunciation of its Company's exclusive rights in southern 'Iraq, in return for assurance of participation in whatever other non-Turkish company might undertake these works.

Meanwhile by the Potsdam Agreement of 1910 Germany had accepted Russia's position in north Persia, and agreed not to oppose a Russian railway from Teheran to Khaniqin. France, disturbed by this Agreement, was pacified; and her favour to the Baghdad Railway was secured by a Franco-German arrangement which admitted a French privileged position in Syria, and removed other causes of friction or suspicion.

Before the conclusion of this Agreement, further Anglo-Turkish talks in 1911 and 1912 had dealt with the construction of the railway through southern 'Iraq, and in May 1913 terms were at last agreed though in fact never ratified. They covered, besides the railway, the quasi-independent status of Kuwayt within the Ottoman Empire, and the special British position in the Gulf. The Baghdad Railway terminus was to be at Baṣra itself, unless and until Great Britain should agree to its prolongation to the coast. The Company's Board was to be increased by two British Directors; the British position in river navigation was secured; and, in exchange, an increase of the Turkish Customs duties to 15 per cent. was to be allowed.

To consolidate all these results an Anglo-German Convention was initialed on 15 June 1914, by Sir Edward Grey and Lichnowsky, and but for the War would have been signed in August. It confirmed the cessation of British opposition to the railway with its terminal at Baṣra, established an open-door policy in 'Iraq with acknowledgement of British interests in the sphere of irrigation, and confirmed the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of May 1913. Southern Persia was accepted by the Germans as a British area for oil development, and to aid this a Kut–Mandali railway would not be opposed. These provisions, against which many voices were raised among Turkish patriots, offered neverthe-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

less a prospect of the completion of the railway, object of so many 499
hopes and fears for twenty years. 648x

Meissner Pasha, brilliant and dynamic, polished Orientalist and 499 courtier, appeared in Baghdad in July 1911 and opened his offices in the house of Kadhim Pasha, destined but ten years later to accommodate the British High Commission and later Embassy. The site of the future railway station was selected on the right bank, and the first sod for the projected first section of the line, from Baghdad to Samarrā, was cut in the Wali's presence in July 1912. Difficulties of labour and of river transport, of docks and barges were somehow overcome. The hair of Meissner Pasha turned, as Lorimer reported, from black to white in three years of struggle; but forty-one miles of line to Sumayka were finished in May 1914, and eighty to Samarrā a few weeks after the declaration of war.

The history of river steam-navigation in this period is closely 505 tied to that of the Railway. A clause in the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1903 alarmed both the Lynchs' Euphrates and Tigris Company and the Oman-Ottoman Administration by its threat of privileged competition; but it was never applied. In 1904 the Saniya Administration, for a derisory payment, took over from the Oman-Ottoman their whole fleet and equipment which included four passenger steamers—*Baghdadi*, *Furat*, *Rasafa*, *Mosul*—and a number of smaller craft. The Ḥamidiya Navigation Administration, now so named, proceeded next to bring into service two new and relatively palatial Scottish-built paddle-steamers, the *Hamidiya* and *Burhaniya*, which Oman-Ottoman had ordered three years before, and four new barges. It operated during its five years of life with a greater efficiency than its predecessor; an English visitor, indeed, pronounced it in 1908 ‘wonderfully well run’, and prophesied its final displacement of the Lynch boats, unless the Railway should first displace both. The Lynch Company meanwhile strove continually for greater freedom of development, which was tenaciously withheld, though a third steamer was permitted to sail regularly after 1907. The difficulties of low-water Tigris navigation and the tribal insecurity above and below ‘Amara at times stopped all traffic and distracted the Lynch managers, Mr. Parry and Mr. Tod. The *Julnar*, the most pretentious of their fleet, was acquired in 1908; the other Lynch steamers already time-honoured (*Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*) continued in service under their tough veteran officers and Tall Kayfi crews. Free lances on the river—two Shi'i merchants and a head of the rich Khudhayri (Khedery) family—continued to take a share of the traffic, and schemes for further competition, such as that of an Anglo-Greek combine in 1905, were not infrequent. The Turkish revolution led to a retransfer of the Ḥamidiya Administration steamers from the

Government no ground even for diplomatic representations; he rebelled feebly, only to be crushed, superseded, and removed to Teheran. After an abortive uprising by the local Arab tribesmen—Cha'ab and Muḥaysin—and the usual sequence of protests and counter-protests between Baghdad and Teheran, 'Arabistan—henceforward Khuzistan—became a normal province of Persia. 648*

Minor cross-frontier raiding was thereafter settled normally between the nearest officials of the two States. More serious trouble in the areas of Khaniqin and Qaṣr-i-Shirin late in 1925 was composed by a more formal joint meeting in March 1926. A hopeful sign of co-operation was the Persian request (conveyed, as was habitual, through the British Minister in Teheran and High Commissioner in Baghdad) for 'Iraqi help in establishing a new trade route from the Kirkuk railhead to Tabriz. It was necessitated by [499 the Kurdish rebellion in eastern Anatolia, and would involve a 653] mountain road by way of Ṣawj Bulaq and Rawanduz. The 'Iraq Government began its surveys and ordered bridging material from Europe. Farther south, an old disturber of the peace reappeared, Salar al-Dawla. This unbalanced but persistent royal pretender, basing new hopes on the change of dynasty, entered and crossed 'Iraq disguised in the spring of 1925, made for his old haunts in the Kirmanshah province, and sought to raise the Persian Kurdish tribesmen once again to his threadbare standard. The outlaw band of Shaykh Maḥmud was the first to join him, but they had few imitators. The High Commissioner was able by messages to dissuade all but a handful from so hopeless an enterprise, and the Air Officer Commanding flew to concert plans with the Persians at Teheran to prevent a rising. It lacked all serious support, and Salar al-Dawla retired to Syria. But in August 1926 he returned, again reached the Hawraman area, and raised some force of hungry riff-raff which looted a few villages before dispersing. No other help was forthcoming. The Prince re-entered 'Iraq in disguise, was recognized and arrested at Arbil, and was detained at Baghdad while his disposal was considered.

Towards Syria the attitude of the 'Iraqi political public was one of resentment against the French Mandatary; it led to sympathy for all Syrian nationalists and for such rebels against the régime as the Druz in 1925, but it was certainly without ideas, such as have been sometimes ascribed to King Fayṣal, of armed intervention. Syrian doctors and teachers were employed in 'Iraq, and Syrians were well represented on the King's personal staff. The reopening of the routes from 'Iraq, whether by Euphrates-side to Dayr al-Zur or across the Jazira from Mosul, was a desideratum which led to a series of conferences at Mosul, Dayr, al-Qa'im, and Albu Kamal between 'Iraqi and Syrian, French and British representatives from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

701 the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

625 The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British
inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services.
Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the
Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force,
some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist
branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security.
In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi
inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years
later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrong-
doers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal
—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-
frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely
197 policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well
conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with
flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

499 Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude
of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inacces-
sible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechaniza-
619 tion of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made
towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance
656 on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

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the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater freedom of Turkish times. 656

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Ḥilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Lu', and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and coordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell. 172

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily developed during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Fayṣal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders. 494 499

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

494 were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into
499 the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at
Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty &
Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932. A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the 'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The 'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a direct Baghdad–'Amman route, and the first experiments in developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

505 The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their
local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and road competition, and had little scope for development. The veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927, *Mejidieh* in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S.*16 and *S.*14 were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris* in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after
503 1929. At Baṣra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928–30. They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 20 feet in 1920) and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port
505 traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from
Abadan, but the Shaṭṭ was used regularly also by the Strick, British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German) Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of
504 Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most
imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930 Treaty, was not yet in sight.

496 The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful.
471 Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Air-
ways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air com-
munications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was com-
pleted in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for pack-
ages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold con-
cession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

382 opening at Kirkuk in January 1935, its twin 12-inch pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli came into operation. This achievement marked the end of ten years of patient and well-directed work since the grant of the first concession, and by its employment of 'Iraqis in their thousands, its expansion of communications and the example which it offered of successful large-scale modern industry, it added great advantages for the 'Iraqi public to the direct enrichment of their Treasury. The gradually developing works in Kirkuk oilfields, the main depots at Bayji and Ḥaditha, the mid-desert pump-station townships with their connecting roads, pipeline, and telegraphs became a characteristic feature of the modern 'Iraqi scene, while its production, of 4 million tons of crude oil a year from 1935 onwards, placed the country immediately as the eighth oil-producing country of the world. The B.O.D. Company, whose shareholding was in these years predominantly Italian, German, and Franco-Swiss, soon found itself embarrassed by its obligation of annual payment to Government, and by its failure, in spite of an active drilling campaign from 1933 onwards, to discover other than viscous, scarcely marketable oil. The Company's plan in 1935 of diminishing their cash payments by building a Qaiyara–Tall Kochek railway, which could convey their oil to seaboard and link 'Iraq with the Turkish railway system, was after 471 hesitation rejected by Government. Their financial position grew desperate, and a reconstruction of their Board in 1936 marked the transfer of control of the Company to the I.P.C. group; and the latter emerged soon afterwards as outright owners of the B.O.D. and Mosul Oil Fields, with the disappearance of all non-British shareholding in it other than that of the I.P.C., French, and American constituents themselves. The problem of its viscous and sulphurous oil remained to be solved. The smaller Rafidain and Khaniqin Companies (p. 211) continued respectively their work of producing and refining oil in the Transferred Territories, and of marketing it throughout 'Iraq. The project of a Government-owned refinery, for which the I.P.C. concession provided, was conceived during this period but was to prove slow of realization.

● 499 494 Road-surfacing was among the uses of oil products in 'Iraq, but neither this nor the too limited funds available could do much at present to provide the country with roads of high or even tolerable standard. Some further sections such as that from Ramadi to Ruṭba were metalled, others were indifferently or barely maintained, all were at worst passable; road maintenance, costly and inconspicuous, was given habitually a low priority in Government allotments. Traffic on the Najf–Madina route increased. The route from the Euphrates to 'Amman and Haifa developed as a powerful rival of the northern track to Beirut. The Rawanduz road, dis-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

appointingly, carried little traffic other than some oil supplies to 499
northern Persia. Following completion of the great Faluja bridge [494]
(p. 208) other steel bridges were constructed: on the Lesser Zab at Altun Kupri, the Greater Zab at Aski Kellek, and elsewhere. In Baghdad the replacement of the two pontoon crossings by permanent steel bridges was at last decided, and contracts were awarded to Messrs. Holloway Bros. in 1936, a major step in the development of the capital. The new spans of the Mosul bridge were finished. Municipal street-making proceeded everywhere, and not least in Baghdad.

Little changed in the field of Tigris river navigation. Fears that 505
the Kut barrage would make steamship navigation impossible 504
were aroused but could be allayed; a move made in 1934 by local rivals to question the rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Company led to nothing. River traffic on the whole diminished. The *Zobaida* was sold to India in 1935, the *Blosse Lynch* and *Tigris* as scrap in the same year and the *Khalifa* in 1937. In 1936 the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation split again into its original components, the Lynch Company and Messrs. Gray Mackenzie. Four small gunboats were acquired by Government in 1937 for riverain police work, but were little used. The Port of Baṣra rendered steady service to the country. Its volume of traffic permitted it to pay regularly its capital instalments to the British Government, and by 1937 a debt of only £300,000 remained. The Port Trust, to be set up under the 1930 Treaty, did not appear; the Port was still administered by a Directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Its bar-dredging scheme operated with great success, repaid its loans, and kept open and improved the deep channel.[1] Two new dredgers were acquired. The Port administration completed a modern airport at Baṣra, furnished with a hotel and all facilities, and provided Baṣra city and suburbs with electric power and a modern water-supply. The ocean traffic using the Port increased substantially after 1935: first two, and later four, Japanese lines appeared, with one each of German, Indian, and Italian ownership and an occasional Russian, Swedish, and Greek steamer. The great bulk of the tonnage remained, as of old, British and British-Indian.

The 'Iraq Railways maintained their solvency and functions in 496
spite of tribal interference, fluctuating traffic, largely obsolescent equipment, and serious road competition. The operation of the system was modernized as far as was practicable, and a rapid Baghdad–Baṣra daily service introduced. Negotiations with the

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[1] The low-water depths in the Rooka channel (p. 208), achieved by successive phases of the bar-dredging scheme, were in 1926, 18 ft., in 1928–9, 20 ft., in 1935–8, 23 or 24 ft.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

493 British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership, as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest. ● 499 The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–Nisibin line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek, all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Baṣra–Baghdad–Istanbul system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began, the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qadhās.

509 Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment came into being at Baghdad and Baṣra, and British flying-boats after 1937 used also Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry 206 of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public services from Baghdad and Baṣra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broad- 207 casting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to 1937 still experimental and occasional.

425 185 Good progress was made during these five years in the all-important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 imprisonment for 'exciting hatred against the Government'; all the other accused were acquitted for lack of evidence.

Ṣaliḥ Jabr, dissatisfied, resigned from the Cabinet; nor was this the only evidence of Cabinet disunion. Tired and ill at ease, and likely to be pressed by public opinion and the Army clique further from his policy acclaimed as 'pro-British', Nuri was more than willing to relinquish the premiership, and on 17 March again resigned office.

619 These vicissitudes of Baghdad politics had, as usual, no great effect on events outside the council chambers. Tribal life was scarcely conscious of the current crises—or, indeed, of the World War itself. A violent tribal battle between two sections of the 'Aniza cost, it was said, 200 lives. Hostilities between the 'Ubayd and Shammar, which flared up late in 1939, were not prolonged. 'Ajil al-Yawir, Paramount Chief of the Shammar, great in stature and shaykhly qualities, died late in 1940 and was succeeded by his son, Sufuk. Northern 'Iraq watched with head-shakings a scandal among the Yazidis, where the child-wife of Sa'id Bey, their Mir, fled in dudgeon to Syria. A military mission of 'Iraqi officers left Baghdad for the Yaman, at the Imam's request. The second of the 499 Baghdad steel bridges built by Holloways, 900 feet in length and named after King Fayṣal, was completed.

4. GAYLANI AND HASHIMI

*645 The advice of Rashid 'Āli, as head of the Royal Diwan, to the Regent was to install, if he could, an all-party Ministry capable of uniting loyalties and avoiding the pressures of the Army. A meeting at the palace was attended by all ex-Prime Ministers—Nuri Sa'id, both the Suwaydis, Madfa'i, Naji Shawkat, 'Ali Jawdat. These offered the Regent their promise to support whatever constitutional Government should be appointed. Nuri himself proposed the appointment of Rashid 'Āli, to which the Regent agreed; and thus was formed the first Ministry for four years to assume office in 'Iraq without military pressure. It carried high hopes of stability. The Cabinet announced by the new Prime Minister on 31 March contained Naji Shawkat at the Ministry of Justice, Naji al-Suwaydi at Finance, Nuri Sa'id at Foreign Affairs, Ṭaha al-Hashimi at Defence, 'Umr Nadhmi at Works, Muḥammad Amin Zaki at Economics, and the two Shi'is, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam and Ra'uf Baḥrani, at Social Affairs and Education. Rashid 'Āli retained the portfolio of Interior in his own hands. The reappointment of Nuri and Ṭaha seemed to stand for continuity, and suggested the united front of a 'National Coalition Government' which it claimed to be. The ministerial programme declared an attitude of perfect correctness towards the British alliance.

territory as a communication and defensive area. This was 721 achieved by the expansion of inland bases and of the Port, where new wharves were constructed, cranes erected, roads and buildings provided: by assuming control of and greatly extending the Inland Water Transport services (on lines reminiscent of the First World War), with the import of a score of small steamers and many barges from India and America, and the requisition of the bulk of existing 'Iraqi resources: by perfected telegraphic and wireless networks: and by the improvement and local duplication of the railway line, and the construction of a new line from Kut to Ba'quba. A German threat, against which these preparations were designed, could come by way of Anatolia or, after Hitler's invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, by the Caucasus and Adharbayjan. The whole of northern 'Iraq must, therefore, be strengthened, and General Quinan prepared positions for this purpose within the triangle contained by the Turkish frontier, the Diyalā, and the Tigris. These works involved great efforts and no small hardship; they called for the use of large forces of local labour and for the provision of the camps, transport and equipment, and the feeding and medical arrangements necessary to maintain them; and they absorbed the two weak Indian divisions—the 8th and 10th, after the departure of the 6th for Persia—which with miscellaneous units formed the 'Iraq garrison at the time. The decision to assist the supply of the Russian armies by supplies conveyed from the Gulf across Persia demanded a formidable organization for procurement and forwarding, based on Baṣra; and in this the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the British companies at Baṣra played an invaluable pioneer part. It 499 led to a great expansion in the Persian railway and road systems, not least in the close neighbourhood of Baṣra and the 'Iraq frontier where the teak-built 1,150-ft. Hull Bridge across the Shaṭṭ-al-'Arab was the first bridge in history to span this river. The railway terminal at Khaniqin became simultaneously an important forwarding base.

So passed the winter of 1941–2. The British forces in 'Iraq and Persia, then as always predominantly Indian in composition, were regrouped in the early days of January 1942 as the Xth Army, and passed again to the Middle East Command. During the spring the tasks of the winter were continued, with the scale of traffic constantly increasing on rail and river, on the desert highway to Palestine, and in base and advanced areas. If the invasion of Egypt by Axis forces in the spring of 1942 led to the dispatch of some combatant units from the Xth Army to the Levant, the deeper penetration of Nazi forces into south Russia in the summer, with the threat of access to Persia and 'Iraq by the Caucasus, seemed to

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years.
The loans, regarded as experimental, were well received but too
small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared
in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year
and handled Government accounts; by 1945 its trading began to
show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed
within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division
into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry,
was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and
Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch
in Baghdad in the same year.

722 The material development of the territory, which proceeded
hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the
496 end of the war. But 'Iṛaq was at least fortunate in that, far from
a record of destruction or retrogression—the common fate of
Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its
communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented
by war-time loans from the military authorities, current main-
tenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment
from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of
imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—
notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for
movement to Baṣra—were amicably handled. The military Kut–
499 'Aziziya–Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was
possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major
development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge
(in replacement of the old waggon-ferry), a bridge at Musayib to
give access to Karbalā, a modern station and office block and new
marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the
line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lesser Zab bridge.[1]

722 The important developments at the Port of Baṣra and its vicinity
504 carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and
approaches, storage facilities, the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab bridge, and a
Ma'qil–Ahwaz railway line. Considerable parts of these additions
survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties
at Umm Qaṣr on the Khawr 'Abdullah, and the railway joining
these to Baṣra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris
river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy
of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance
505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again
dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

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[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–Homs line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Karbalā–Najf–Kufa line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–Diyarbakr connexion. None of these materialized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

504 considered project; and meanwhile, Fao bar-dredging operations, [503] designed to maintain a low-water depth of 23 feet in a substantially widened Rooka channel, proceeded throughout 1943 to 1950. But heavy floods and consequent silt movement caused serious difficulties and, the existing channel proving barely maintainable, the project of a new channel re-aligned in terms of the changed sea-bed conditions was in 1951 under close consideration. To its realization—the more necessary since 'Iraq's own oil traffic from the Zubayr field was likely to increase many-fold—the loss of the rich Abadan tanker revenue was a serious impediment;[1] but in general the future of the vital Fao channel, and indeed that of the Port in general, was under wise and far-sighted review.

505 The tonnage of steamers using the Port was more than half—and in some years more than two-thirds—British, with Dutch, American, Greek, Swedish, and Norwegian shipping well represented. The establishment of an all-'Iraqi Shipping Company continued to be an object of ambition among the interested and the nationally-minded, as a means of undercutting the freight rates charged by foreign lines. The post of Port Director was assumed, after two short tenures, in 1947 by Colonel G. T. Johnson, and in 1951 by R. C. Kelt. Accelerated steps were taken from 1948 onwards for the training, largely in Europe, of 'Iraqis for all posts in the administration, including the highest: an 'Iraqi Port Director was a probability of the near future.

Though transport by the 'Iraq waterways had as ever its irreplaceable part both in the lives of the riverain towns and as a main Baṣra–Baghdad artery, available traffic did not permit—as for a generation it had not permitted, save in war-time—any considerable development of the Tigris steamships. Military transport ceasing with the war, and competition by road and rail and air ever increasing, the Euphrates and Tigris Company in 1946 disposed of most of its surviving fleet, including the *Zenobia*; and early in 1951 it went into voluntary liquidation and sold the bulk of its towing-units and barges to its principal local competitor, Ḥannā al-Shaykh. The latter and members of the Khudhayri family remained active on the river to fill the place which, after ninety years, was now abandoned as unprofitable by the Lynch enterprise.

496 499 The 'Iraq Railways, which had embarked in 1945 (p. 320) on important projects of construction, were faced also by a heavy programme of needed rehabilitation, improvement of services, and addition to rolling-stock. The five following years saw the com-

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[1] The action of the Persian Government in bringing its oil industry to a standstill involved, besides its own ruin, a loss of at least £1 million a year to the finances of Baṣra Port and its dredging scheme.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

pletion of the Kirkuk–Arbil extension and its Lesser Zab bridge: 496 of the railway and road bridge[1] at Baghdad, opened late in 1950: 499 of the Musayib bridge leading to Karbalā: and of new stations at Ba'quba, Diwaniya, Naṣiriya and elsewhere. New rolling stock was ordered and by 1950 delivered. Progress was made in erecting a grandiose combined station and administrative headquarters at Baghdad West, and in redesigning the yards and depots there; but the high cost of these projects, the diminution of receipts by road and air competition (in spite of good traffic in grain and oilfield materials), and losses due to repeated river flooding rapidly exhausted the war-time surplus and led to the need to borrow first from Government in 1946, then from London—a loan of £3 million —in 1950, before supplies and contractors could be paid and work could proceed. Working conditions in the railway system were [468] disturbed by the strikes elsewhere mentioned in 1945, 1946, and 1949. The Jewish employees of the traffic branch were replaced in [464] 1949 by imported Pakistani staff, and the training of 'Iraqis to replace these and the few remaining British executives was accelerated. The status and composition of the Railway Board was unchanged, though criticized by the press as outdated and insufficiently 'national'. The post of Director-General was passed by H. C. Smith to W. J. Moffat in 1950, and an 'Iraqi, General Isma'il Ṣafwat, assumed the post in 1952.

'Iraq Airways was initiated by the Railway as a subordinate 509 enterprise in 1945, and started service in 1946 with five light aircraft hired from Great Britain. In the following year the hired aircraft were replaced by its own machines, and it extended its range from Baghdad–Baṣra outwards to Mosul, Cairo, and Damascus, and by 1948 could, thanks to reciprocal agreements, offer transport weekly or monthly to Teheran, Karachi, and Ankara. The service, to which British Overseas Airways Corporation acted as technical advisers and agents, was efficiently maintained but, thanks to competition and high costs, financially unprofitable. British, American, Dutch, French and other foreign airlines continued to use 'Iraqi airports. An expenditure of over ID 2 million on aerodromes formed part of the six-year development plan. The meteorological service, begun in 1936 in a single room, now maintained under the Ministry of Defence a dozen stations and many rainfall-observation posts, used its own wireless links, and broadcast weather reports for Baghdad area half-hourly.

Telecommunications had, by the close of the period, reached a 206 high standard. Trunk land-lines had been overhauled, often duplicated and widely extended; automatic telephone exchanges

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[1] The bridges were built by Messrs. Holloway Bros.; earthwork on the Kirkuk–Arbil line was handled by Messrs. Balfour Beatty.

206 existed in Baṣra and Baghdad and their suburbs; and the telephone
and telegraph had become familiar or indispensable to all classes
save the most backward. The new wireless transmitting station
completed in 1951 at Abu Ghurayb, with the most modern design
and range, secured communication with Europe and America and 1
was used for the national broadcasting. The Development Board
planned an expenditure of ID 2 million on telecommunications
between 1951 and 1956.

● 499 Progress in road improvement was delayed during 1946–50 by
the financial narrowness of the post-war years. This and bridge-building formed an important part of the projects[1] intended for
realization in 1951–6 through the Development Board. The
completion of this programme would fundamentally transform the
conditions of transport and travel in 'Iraq, with far-reaching
economic consequences. The 'Nairn route' to Damascus was still
491 in regular use; its traffic was highly organized, with air-conditioned
vehicles, by the original company and its imitators. The Rawanduz
road was little used; the tracks leading into Najd and Persia carried
no important traffic; and the trunk route to Jordan or Palestine
(p. 321) lost its value when the State of Israel blocked the sea-outlet
it had offered.

5. TOWN AND COUNTRY, MID-CENTURY

161 The population of 'Iraq, declared by the census of 1947 to be
162 4,800,000, had by then doubled since the century opened. Its distribution[2] was in general unchanged as between towns, inlying
villages, tribal country districts, and nomads; about a quarter were
town-dwellers, a fifteenth nomads, the remainder settled cultiva-
311 tors. Wide areas of steppe desert and of barren mountain remained,
as for the foreseeable future they must, almost uninhabited; the
widest of such regions, those of the administratively separated
northern and southern provinces of the Shamiya desert, amounted
to some two-fifths of 'Iraq's whole surface. The average density
161 of population for the whole territory was of the order of eleven
persons to the square kilometre, or, omitting the desert provinces,
eighteen. The liwā with the greatest population was that of
Baghdad with 800,000 people; next came Diwaniya, Muntafiq,
and 'Amara. The greatest density was of 49 persons to the square

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[1] The projects considered as 'main roads', with their bridges, were estimated to cost: Baṣra–'Amara–Kut–Baghdad, ID 2,800,000: Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil, 2,500,000: Baghdad–Sharqat, 3,450,00. Elsewhere, ID 4,450,000 was allotted for 'mountain roads', 6,176,000 for miscellaneous bridges, 1,550,000 for a Ḥilla–Najf road, 1,300,000 for Ḥilla–Diwaniya–Shamiya, and 5,250,000 for numerous other routes.

[2] For distribution of the population by administrative units, see Appendix B.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

and meteorological services. At the Baghdad airport it would be 508
desirable to build an entirely new runway and to use a wing of the new railway building as the air terminal. The Port of Basra can finance the necessary work there, but that at Baghdad, costing probably between ID 250,000 and ID 300,000, will presumably have to be financed out of Development Board funds. The Mission 509
has no specific recommendations to make on Iraqi Airways, which assures some internal and international services with a small fleet of four planes, except to suggest that its finances be completely divorced from those of the railways. It is neither logical nor sound financially to require the railways to defray the deficits of the airways. It would be desirable to carry out any future development of the airways in cooperation with other Middle Eastern countries.

Inland water navigation has steadily declined in importance 503
and is now rather insignificant. While irrigation rather than navigation will always be the primary consideration in the use of available water resources, it is possible that the better regulation of the Tigris and Euphrates will ultimately result in some improvement in the navigability of these rivers. Limited but uninterrupted navigation might be insured if the river bed were trained by dams, locks and groynes into a narrow channel at low water and progressively wider channels at higher water levels. The feasibility and cost of such a scheme might ultimately be submitted for study to experts from the Netherlands where similar conditions have long been encountered.

Roads and Road Transport

Road transport has not assumed great importance in the past, 491
primarily because most roads are unsurfaced and impassible for a 499
large part of the year. Even large communities like Kut and Amara, although not situated on railway lines, are not served by all-weather roads. An interdepartmental committee worked out and presented in 1950 a 10-year program for the construction or improvement of 37 main surfaced roads involving a total length of 3,463 kilometers at an aggregate cost of ID 14,500,000. Both the program and the proposed specifications of the roads are sound. In addition, the building or improvement of about 8,000 kilometers of secondary or feeder roads, which do not need to be surfaced, will ultimately

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

491 be necessary. Such a program will need to be coordinated particu-
499 larly with the development of new agricultural areas. Earth excavated in the construction of new irrigation and drainage canals can be used in the building of such roads. The surfaced roads should be constructed by contractors of repute capable of furnishing their own road-making plant. It is generally recognized that the Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra and the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul roads should have first priority. The first of these is at present only a dirt road but the latter has sections which are already surfaced.

494 As road transport develops, it will be vital to institute some controls, particularly since most of the operators now provide only irregular and unreliable service. Limitations on loads and regular inspection of vehicles should be instituted and enforced. Operators of transport services should be licensed to make sure that they are equipped to provide adequate and reliable service at reasonable rates and that they carry insurance.

The Mission has also given some attention to the municipal bus service in Baghdad. Operations at present are seriously handicapped by the diversity and age of its transport equipment and high maintenance costs. A sound decision has been made to standardize equipment. The central workshop should also be modernized and re-equipped and a central garage and four auxiliary garages provided. To carry out this program financial assistance from the Development Board will be necessary. It is also suggested that more efficient management of municipal transport might be achieved through the appointment of a single Director General in place of the present Board, and that a stricter control over the collection of passenger fares be instituted to improve revenues.

Communications

206 For communications, capital outlays will be required primarily in connection with the extension of the telephone system. The needs are well-known in Iraq and do not require elaboration here. Although the communications services are operated at a profit which is credited to the government budget, it is suggested that future capital expenditures be financed by the Development Board. This will not only make it easier to balance the government budget, but will enable the Board to insist on better synchronization of the

491 kilometer treated. For the present this appears to be about sufficient, but costs will increase as the system expands and traffic develops. On the completion of a metalled system of 7,000 kilometers, as planned, the costs would rise to approximately ID 70 per kilometer per year, a total of ID 490,000.

Road Construction

● 499 A program was drawn up in 1950 by a Committee appointed by order of the Minister of Communications and Public Works on February 7, 1950. The Committee consisted of the Directors General of Public Works, State Railways, Irrigation, and Surveys, and the Chief Engineer, a British road expert from the London Ministry of Transport temporarily attached to the Public Works Department in Baghdad. This Committee is a laudable example of departmental coordination, and the plan drawn up by the Committee shows unmistakably the value of this cooperation.

The program schedules 37 roads, of a total length of 3,463 kilometers, to be built, or improved as the case may be, in a period of 10 years at a total cost estimated at ID 14,500,000. Construction costs are expected to vary from ID 3,500 to ID 7,500 per kilometer, including drainage, culverts, bridges and costs of supervision. The program assigns first priority to the main trunk road, Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basra, now an earth road, and the trunk road, Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul, some sections of which are already metalled.

The roads are to be built to accommodate two traffic lanes, together six meters (20 feet) wide with verges for pedestrians, pack animals and cattle. Specifications drawn up by the Public Works Engineers provide for three types of foundation—stone blocks, broken stone or gravel, eight to nine inches thick; and for two types of surfacing—bituminous macadam or graveled macadam, three inches thick.

The program is sound and the specifications are effective. The Mission recommends that both be adopted as the basis of the future road construction plan, but with the following qualifications:

1. Although trunk roads like the Baghdad-Basra and Baghdad-Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul arteries and a few others should have a metalled width of six meters and wide verges on each side, the initial width of metalled surface on other

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

roads should be kept to four meters until traffic develops. 499 Even on the latter roads, however, space for six-meter lanes and wide verges should be set aside.

2. Earth roads with little or no traffic at present should initially be raised to 50 centimeters, or somewhat less than two feet, above surrounding levels, with proper grading but no metalling until traffic actually appears. In this category should be scheduled such sections as Baghdad-Kut on the right bank of the Tigris, Diwaniya-Ur and Samarra-Shargat. The materials used for foundations ought to be selected from those found in the area, so as to avoid long haulage Suitable stone or gravel or even broken brick of sufficient hardness appears to be found within at most 100 kilometers of any given road section.
3. All depressions styled "Irish Crossings" should be removed.
4. Railway bridges should be disallowed for use by road traffic in trunk roads. The first bridge to be duplicated should be the Baquba bridge.

Feeder Roads

Agricultural and forestry development areas need feeder roads to the nearest railway station or main road or both, and provision for them should be made in development schemes for these areas. For the most part this could probably be done by improving existing country roads or tracks by grading, draining, and sometimes raising them. Good maintenance of these feeder roads is essential and might appropriately be assured by the provincial governments; generally only hand labor and a grader would be required. No hard surface is recommended for these roads. Assuming a total length of 8,000 kilometers for this system of secondary country roads, construction and maintenance of such a network would probably demand an expenditure of ID 100 per kilometer per year, i.e., ID 800,000 per annum in the initial period of five years.

One problem remains to be solved. The Public Works Department [464] has no trained or skilled technical staff to carry out detailed surveys of existing or new roads. It is all important that correct location, alignment, levels, gradients, transition curves, camber and cant, etc., be established and maintained. It is therefore recommended that competent consulting engineers be engaged to do the plans and surveys and supervise the first large-scale construction, and that a nucleus of Iraqi surveyors be recruited to carry on

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

● 499 the work in the future. The work should be carried out by contractors of repute. Since they will generally possess the appropriate plant, it should not be necessary for the government to purchase any large amount of roadbuilding machinery.

Traffic

494 Road traffic is still extremely light in the country. As Table 6 indicates, the number of motor vehicles operating in Iraq is still very modest, and of this number most operate in or around the large cities. The personal observation of Mission members confirms that traffic density even on the most travelled roads is very low.

TABLE 6

REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES

Year	Passenger Cars	Buses	Trucks	Motorcycles
1942	4,522	n.a.	1,942	82
1943	4,333	n.a.	1,900	100
1944	3,972	n.a.	1,720	116
1945	3,771	n.a.	2,017	127
1946	5,902	n.a.	3,497	524
1947	7,422	n.a.	5,136	1,015
1948	8,678	n.a.	6,088	577
1949	9,601	n.a.	7,262	1,029
1950	11,438	3,007	6,381	1,636

n.a.—not available.

Road Usage

The improvement and construction of roads will undoubtedly bring about a rapid increase in road traffic in the future. It will then become necessary to regulate the usage of the roads. At present both the condition of the vehicles using the roads and their loading can only be described as extremely dangerous. On the many tours made on Iraq's existing roads, far too many of the very few vehicles seen on the roads were observed to be overloaded both with respect to the weight and to the height of the load. Top-heavy vehicles are particularly dangerous, especially on the sharply curved roads in mountains and gorges. Many bridges have been heightened—often in a way which is unsound structurally—to accommodate such vehicles. Vehicles unfit to operate endanger the safety

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

XII. Projected Cost of Proposed Programs

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The projects recommended for consideration are summarized below as to cost and time of realization. The total cost which the Development Board might have to defray over the next five years would be approximately ID 31,000,000.

TABLE 11

COST OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS SUGGESTED FOR DEVELOPMENT BOARD FINANCING

Project	Costs (in dinars)	Period (years)
PORT		
New channel	2,000,000	4
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT		
Study of river training by experts	Token	2
RAILWAYS		
Baghdad Station commitment	143,000	1
Baghdad new layout, provisional	100,000	1
22 continuation and completion projects		
under way	213,770	1
labor quarters	341,000	4
Rehabilitation and modernization projects	500,000	5
Renewals including diesel traction	6,300,000[a]	5
Extra for gauge conversion (tentative)	6,000,000	6
ROADS		
Trunk road system	14,500,000	10
Secondary road system	4,000,000	5
Road transport control	Token	1
URBAN TRANSPORT		
Baghdad transport services, workshops, garages and vehicles	500,000	3
AIRPORTS		
Baghdad development	300,000	2
Basra development	[b]	2
AIRLINES		
Iraqi Airways	600,000	4
POST, TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, RADIO		
Telephone extensions and buildings (if not financed from Communications budget)	300,000	Annually
Auxiliary power plant for transmitter	30,000	1
SURVEYS AND MAPPING		
Air surveys	40,000	Annually

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[a] On assumption of gauge conversion.
[b] To be financed by Port of Basra.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX C

• 499

Additional Railway Projects

1. Railroad bridge across Tigris at Baghdad—completed and financed.
2. Kirkuk-Erbil line—ID 100,000 required of which ID 85,000 for land already occupied.
3. Musayib bridge—ID 3,500 for land occupied, but not yet paid for.
4. Machinery for workshop—ID 11,000 for installation of plant already purchased and paid for.
5. Railway station and headquarters—ID 143,000 commitment plus ID 100,000 for provisional plan.
6. Rolling stock—no allocation required.
7. Crane—no allocation required.
8. Labor quarters—ID 341,000 required to be spread over three to four years.
9. Signalling—ID 4,620 for installation of equipment already procured.
10. Workshop extension—completed.
11. Power house—ID 4,700 for installation of plant already procured.
12. Aircraft to be provided for under air transport allocations.
13. Construction of stations—not urgent.
14. Construction of officials' quarters—not urgent.
15. Army assets—completed.
16. Land already purchased for station extensions—ID 41,000 for two years.
17. Shamiya station—scheme abandoned.
18. Electric plant—ID 12,000 for installation of plant already procured.
19. Accounting machines—ID 20,000.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

20. Electric plant—ID 6,050 for installation of plant already procured. 499
21. Permanent way—ID 5,000 for installation of plant already procured.
22. Weighbridges—ID 5,900 for installation of plant already procured.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

433 made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made
barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and
thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work
were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—
shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-
[501] craft, of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported
wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of
the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted
downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were
made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These,
with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq distillation
and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the
meagre list.

439 The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has
457 been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). To it as an 'invisible export'
should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—life-blood
of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd
al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by
travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

439 Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory
consisted of the import of those needed commodities which
the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some
part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed
through Baṣra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned
commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and
British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this
came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen
goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales,
coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from
India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France,
and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box
wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities
of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes,
were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural
and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or
mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

436 The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper qirsh
(piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a stable
coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian rupee
in Baṣra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns and
Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange
rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. A multitude of local
804 weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district.
453 Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by
the shrewd operations of many local *ṣarrafs*.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

501



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A BOAT ON THE TIGRIS RIVER

facing page 106

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

243 Bombay was. "No," he said, "here we make our bread
262 from rice flour. When the wheat crop is a failure, as in
the past year, we have almost nothing else."

312 These overflow districts^ which are marshes in the
spring when the rivers overflow, dry down to hard soil
later in the year. To keep the water high for a few
weeks longer than it would naturally remain so, temporary
dams are constructed across some of the smaller
streams, leaving an opening to allow boats to pass and
water to run through. These dams persist in the face
[342] of a strong current in a way that is surprising. Mud,
tree branches, mats, soil and the like seem to be the only
building material, for there is no stone within hundreds of
[476] miles. The dams require a large amount of labor, and
of course are coöperative enterprises. Possibly because
of this necessity for coöperative effort, the Marsh Arab
communities appear to have developed a good degree of
community spirit.

361 Like their race everywhere, these Marsh Arabs do not
live in isolated individual houses in the midst of their
fields but collect in larger or smaller towns, some of them
of considerable size. These towns are located usually
in the fork of a river, or where several streams
come together. In Lower Mesopotamia there are many
small channels that carry water either ~~out~~ of the main
501 river or into it. The Marsh ~~Arabs~~ get about in picturesque,
high-prowed, black river boats, black because they
are covered with a thick coat of native bitumen which
wells from the ground in one or two places in Mesopotamia
135] and is an indication, so the engineers tell us, that
petroleum is to be found in that country. These river
boats, which are the one means of transportation, are
built somewhat on the lines of a canoe and take consid-

^[along the last 100 miles of the Arab river from Gurna to the Gulf -- Analyst]

[Marsh Arabs]

501 erable skill to navigate. They are capable of great speed and are driven either by a sail or by oars as the occasion requires. To a stranger they seem very unstable, but the Marsh Arab, who has practically lived in them ever since he was a baby, finds them abundantly stable and perfectly safe.

342 From a distance the houses occupied by these people are very picturesque. The reeds that grow in great abundance in the marshes of Lower Mesopotamia are gathered and when dry are tied in great bundles perhaps two feet in diameter. They are ten to fifteen feet tall or even more, and two bundles tied together at the tops are bent over to form an arch. Each of these arches forms one of the ribs of the house. They are placed every four to six feet, giving an air of solidity and dignity to the structure that is most unusual for this sort of simple architecture. Over these ribs a mat roof is constructed which is surprisingly tight even in the heaviest rains. The houses vary in size, and the largest ones, which serve as guest halls for the sheikhs and the rich, may be seventy-five feet long and twenty feet broad.

423
621 This agricultural district is peculiar in that while it has a settled community engaged in agricultural pursuits, there is no private ownership of land. The Marsh Arabs form a group almost untouched by Europeans. In the one district we visited all land is owned by the government, in this case a sheikh far removed from the district.
[427
651] The only tax that he levies is a moderate rental for the land.
425 Apparently there is little difficulty in getting land; at least no one complained of any trouble of that sort, nor does there seem to be any difficulty in keeping the same plot of land indefinitely if the cultivator wishes to do so.
000 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-

501
505

Si Harrison D-4 (1918-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

facing p. 120

© Asia

BASRA CUSTOM HOUSES

,21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1, Middle East
Iraq MH1

Kifri (on the edge of the Zagros foothills, south-east of Kirkuk), but 500 annual production over the period 1940–45 averaged only 2,000 tons. Salt and gypsum are the only other minerals produced in any significant quantity.

Industry is on an equally restricted scale. There are small craft industries chiefly concerned with textiles, building, food processing, metal work, and tanning, but most products are of indifferent quality, and none but home markets are supplied. Textile products include rugs, carpets, and materials for Arab style of dress, using wool, cotton, silk, and a little mohair; and it is significant that the better quality carpets sold in Iraq are imported from Iran and Turkey.

A few modern factories and installations have come into existence during the past 20 years, but the number is exceedingly small. Brick and tile making machinery accounted for almost one-third of all modern plant, and three spinning and weaving mills (for wool only, none for cotton), three cotton ginning factories, and one rayon factory represent all the modern textile plant in the country.

Over 90 per cent. of Iraqi industry (craft and modern) is located in Baghdad, and the only other 'industrial' centre is Mosul, with a distillery and the rayon factory already alluded to. It will thus be clearly apparent that industry plays an exceedingly small part in the general life of the region—smaller, on average, than in most Middle Eastern countries, and considerably smaller than in the neighbouring region of the Levant.

VIII. COMMUNICATIONS

Unlike Iran, where mountain ranges and deserts have proved severe obstacles to movement, the riverine lowlands stand out as a region of easy access. On either side of the two rivers the undulating plains are not entirely without water and vegetation, and have for many centuries furnished a variety of easy routes from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. Though in the lower valley routes must avoid the lakes and marshland, keeping to the steppes on either side, the rivers themselves are navigable for hundreds of miles, even though with some difficulty at certain seasons of the year. Here is a considerable contrast with Iran, where a short stretch of the Karun river below Ahwaz is the only navigable waterway in the country.

In the upper parts of both the Euphrates and Tigris and their 501 larger tributaries, a special form of water transport has for long been a

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East

Geog MH1

501 feature. This is by *kelek*—a raft made of brushwood and small pieces of timber, supported by inflated animal skins. The usual number of skins in one raft is 50 to 100, but keleks of 250 skins are known, and these can carry loads of 50 tons. These rafts are almost unsinkable, and carry timber, hides, and charcoal from the forests of Asia Minor to the practically treeless lowland region. Because of the numerous rapids and gorges on the headstreams of the rivers, transport by any other craft is impossible. An extra hazard to a journey by kelek is the possibility of attack by Kurds, who for centuries have been accustomed to take toll of river traffic by wrecking occasional keleks and appropriating the cargo.

Because of the swiftness of the current, upstream navigation is not possible, and on arrival at their downstream terminus the kelek is broken up; the brushwood sold, and the timber framework and deflated skins carried by pack animal back to the starting point, where they are used again to construct another kelek.

Further downstream where the waters are quieter, numerous types of boat are found, ranging from *mashufs*—small canoes for use in the marshes—to sailing craft large enough to carry 40 to 70 tons of cargo. Below Baghdad there are river steamers that tow barges between the capital and Basra; but these are small, since the Tigris has no more than 4 feet of water in winter, and only 3 feet in summer. Navigation on the Euphrates is less easy, since the average depth of water in the regions of Hindiya and Lake Hammar is only 2 feet 6 inches, and motor launches or small sailing craft replace the steamers of the Tigris.

000 Besides the waterways, which carry the greatest traffic, railways and roads must be considered. The first railway to be laid was a short section between Baghdad and Samarra, built by German engineers as part of the projected Berlin-Baghdad system. This was of standard gauge. During the war of 1914, the British laid a number of lines, of metre and 2 feet 6 inches gauge, using material and stock from India. The disposition of the lines was governed by immediate strategic and economic considerations, so considerable alteration became necessary when the war ended. The 2 feet 6 inches lines were relaid to a metre gauge, but there are still two gauges in use—standard and metre, with the break at Baghdad. Metre gauge lines connect Baghdad and Basra via Hilla, Samarra, Nasiriya, and the Euphrates valley; and another branch runs from Baghdad to Kirkuk and Khanaqin. The former line was routed via the Euphrates partly because of the denser

3;Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

491 the main roads Baghdad–Kut–Amara–Basra and Baghdad–Kirkuk–Irbil–Mosul, which are at present unmetalled or only partially metalled. The Development Board has allocated nearly ID27 million to these projects.

493 Road traffic is light. At the beginning of 1953 the number of
registered motor vehicles was given as follows, most of them
494 operating in or around the larger towns: private cars 8,000; taxis 3,500; buses 2,900; lorries 6,500; motor cycles 1,900. In Baghdad an efficient bus service is operated by a State Passenger Transport Board. A private cross-desert bus service links Baghdad with Damascus, and there are private bus services between Iraq and Persia.

504 *Basra Port*,[1] lying some eighty miles up the Shatt al-Arab
from the Persian Gulf, is the only commercial port of Iraq; an
505 oil port is being constructed at Fao, near the mouth of the Shatt. A small port established during the Second World War at Umm Qasr, on a sea inlet south of the Shatt al-Arab entrance, has since been dismantled. The authority of the Port, which is controlled by a special department of the Iraq Government, extends from the outer bar of the Shatt to a point seventeen miles above the town of Basra. The Shatt is sufficiently deep to admit large ocean-going vessels, but the Fao bar at its mouth requires constant dredging to clear an entrance for the larger of them. During the Second World War extensions were carried out in view of the increased volume of traffic; in consequence there are now 4,500 feet of continuous jetty, providing berthing for eight large vessels at a time and two or three smaller ones, in addition to barge and lighterage berths. Basra Port handles a large proportion of the country's trade. During 1952 some 400 ocean-going vessels, with a net registered tonnage of 1,132,000, and some 260 tankers and water-carriers, with a net registered tonnage of 927,000, were handled by the Port Authority in Basra, Fao, Abadan, and Khorramshahr. During the financial
year 1951–2 cargo imported at Basra totalled 511,600 tons and
[651] cargo exported 800,000 tons. The closure of Abadan has occasioned the Port a severe loss of revenue, estimated at ID100,000 a month; port and dredging facilities have nevertheless been maintained.

502 *Inland Waterways*. The Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels of up to four feet draught from February to August except for short flood periods in April and May in some years; during the remaining five months navigation is impeded for long periods. Inland water transport has lost much of its former importance. The last remaining regular navigation

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[1] See *Port of Basrah*, official publication of the Port Authority.

3eRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq M111

company ceased operations in 1949 but several small private 502 concerns continue to operate barges, mostly propelled by motor launches. Freight is still carried in sailing craft.

Airways. Iraq is served from London, the United States, most 509 European and Middle East capitals, Pakistan, India, the Far East, and Australia. The main international services are maintained by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Holland, and there are Middle East services operated by Iraq, Persia, Egypt, and Lebanon. The administration of Iraqi Airways is integrated with that of the State Railways, with BOAC as technical adviser; in addition to local services it operates regularly to Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Tehran, Kuwait, and Bahrain. There are two international airports, at Baghdad and 508 Basra, both of which are scheduled for further development to accommodate the newest heavy aircraft. There are also landing grounds at Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk and at the locations of the IPC and associated companies, namely Kirkuk, Ain Zala, and the pipeline stations.

Trade

Iraq imports manufactured goods and industrial raw 439 materials, of which the most important are textiles, clothing, iron and steel, especially for constructional purposes, machinery, motor vehicles and accessories, electrical apparatus, aviation spirit and lubricating oil, rubber and its products, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, wooden packing boxes, soap, timber, paper and cardboard and their products, tea, coffee, and sugar. The expansion of local industry[1] can be expected gradually to lessen the demand for a number of these commodities and increase the demand for others, particularly constructional materials, machinery, electrical apparatus, and chemicals. Apart from crude oil, her most valuable export, Iraq's exports are almost entirely agronomical—grains (especially barley), dates, raw wool and cotton, animals on hoof, hides, skins, intestines, seeds for oil manufacture (linseed, cotton, sesame), and a few minor commodities such as gums, gall nuts, and liquorice root. Iraq has in addition an appreciable transit trade, consisting largely of goods passing to or from Persia.

Before the Second World War, Iraq's chief suppliers were Great Britain, with between 20 and 30 per cent of total imports, Japan, with between 15 and 20 per cent, India, Germany, the United States, and Persia. During the war, when supplies were limited in quantity and directed from specific sources, Britain's share automatically decreased and India became

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[1] See above, p. 283.

494 were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into
499 the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at
Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty &
Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed
in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad
and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932.
A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable
engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the
'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The
'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed
through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the
Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to
divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was
doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a
direct Baghdad–'Amman route, and the first experiments in
developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

505 The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their
local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and
road competition, and had little scope for development. The
veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927,
Mejidieh in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S*.16 and
S.14 were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be
renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris*
in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after
503 1929. At Baṣra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally
completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928–30.
They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead
of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 20 feet in 1920)
and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port
505 traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from
Abadan, but the Shaṭṭ was used regularly also by the Strick,
British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German)
Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of
504 Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most
imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the
Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi
for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port
administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was
normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the
years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual
instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation
of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930
Treaty, was not yet in sight.

496 The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful.
471 Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

504 considered project; and meanwhile, Fao bar-dredging operations,
[503] designed to maintain a low-water depth of 23 feet in a substantially widened Rooka channel, proceeded throughout 1943 to 1950. But heavy floods and consequent silt movement caused serious difficulties and, the existing channel proving barely maintainable, the project of a new channel re-aligned in terms of the changed sea-bed conditions was in 1951 under close consideration. To its realization—the more necessary since 'Iraq's own oil traffic from the Zubayr field was likely to increase many-fold—the loss of the rich Abadan tanker revenue was a serious impediment;[1] but in general the future of the vital Fao channel, and indeed that of the Port in general, was under wise and far-sighted review.

505 The tonnage of steamers using the Port was more than half—and in some years more than two-thirds—British, with Dutch, American, Greek, Swedish, and Norwegian shipping well represented. The establishment of an all-'Iraqi Shipping Company continued to be an object of ambition among the interested and the nationally-minded, as a means of undercutting the freight rates charged by foreign lines. The post of Port Director was assumed, after two short tenures, in 1947 by Colonel G. T. Johnson, and in 1951 by R. C. Kelt. Accelerated steps were taken from 1948 onwards for the training, largely in Europe, of 'Iraqis for all posts in the administration, including the highest: an 'Iraqi Port Director was a probability of the near future.

Though transport by the 'Iraq waterways had as ever its irreplaceable part both in the lives of the riverain towns and as a main Baṣra–Baghdad artery, available traffic did not permit—as for a generation it had not permitted, save in war-time—any considerable development of the Tigris steamships. Military transport ceasing with the war, and competition by road and rail and air ever increasing, the Euphrates and Tigris Company in 1946 disposed of most of its surviving fleet, including the *Zenobia*; and early in 1951 it went into voluntary liquidation and sold the bulk of its towing-units and barges to its principal local competitor, Ḥannā al-Shaykh. The latter and members of the Khuḏhayri family remained active on the river to fill the place which, after ninety years, was now abandoned as unprofitable by the Lynch enterprise.

496 The 'Iraq Railways, which had embarked in 1945 (p. 320) on
499 important projects of construction, were faced also by a heavy programme of needed rehabilitation, improvement of services, and addition to rolling-stock. The five following years saw the com-

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[1] The action of the Persian Government in bringing its oil industry to a standstill involved, besides its own ruin, a loss of at least £1 million a year to the finances of Baṣra Port and its dredging scheme.

The Port

504 The Port of Basra, an autonomous public agency which also operates the civil airport, is efficiently run and capable of handling a considerable increase in traffic. In view of the adequacy of this port, the Mission sees no justification for the construction of another port at Umm Qasr as has been suggested from time to
503 time. The Port of Basra has been able to finance necessary capital improvements, as well as to pay off its debts, out of current surpluses and should be able to do so in the future except for the task of financing the dredging of a new and urgently needed channel across the Fao bar. The existing channel is subject to heavy silting which necessitates extensive dredging operations at a cost of ID 500,000 to ID 600,000 per year. Until recently it was expected that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would advance the funds necessary for this new channel, but recent developments in Iran, coupled with the fact that ample oil revenues will be available to Iraq for investment, appear to make it desirable that the Development Board finance this project.

The Railways

496 The state railways, which are the principal means of transport, are also well managed and have been fully able to meet traffic requirements. They have come in for considerable criticism, however, because of the serious financial difficulties in which they have become involved. The major source of these difficulties lies in the fact that, in 1944, the railways, with the full approval of the government, began a major capital development program without assurance of adequate financing. To defray the cost, the railways have had to use a fund of about ID 2,500,000 set aside for renewals and to borrow ID 1,000,000 from the government as well as £3,000,000 in the United Kingdom with the help of the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The program was for the most part soundly conceived and is now largely completed. However, it has left the railways without adequate funds not only for essential renewals but also for other construction pro-
499 jects. One of the major and more controversial projects affected
496 is the erection in Baghdad West of a rather imposing terminal station and railway headquarters together with relocation of railway

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

and meteorological services. At the Baghdad airport it would be 508
desirable to build an entirely new runway and to use a wing of the
new railway building as the air terminal. The Port of Basra can
finance the necessary work there, but that at Baghdad, costing
probably between ID 250,000 and ID 300,000, will presumably
have to be financed out of Development Board funds. The Mission 509
has no specific recommendations to make on Iraqi Airways, which
assures some internal and international services with a small fleet
of four planes, except to suggest that its finances be completely
divorced from those of the railways. It is neither logical nor sound
financially to require the railways to defray the deficits of the airways.
It would be desirable to carry out any future development
of the airways in cooperation with other Middle Eastern countries.

Inland water navigation has steadily declined in importance 503
and is now rather insignificant. While irrigation rather than navigation
will always be the primary consideration in the use of available
water resources, it is possible that the better regulation of the
Tigris and Euphrates will ultimately result in some improvement
in the navigability of these rivers. Limited but uninterrupted navigation
might be insured if the river bed were trained by dams,
locks and groynes into a narrow channel at low water and progressively
wider channels at higher water levels. The feasibility
and cost of such a scheme might ultimately be submitted for study
to experts from the Netherlands where similar conditions have long
been encountered.

Roads and Road Transport

Road transport has not assumed great importance in the past, 491
primarily because most roads are unsurfaced and impassible for a 499
large part of the year. Even large communities like Kut and Amara,
although not situated on railway lines, are not served by all-weather
roads. An interdepartmental committee worked out and presented
in 1950 a 10-year program for the construction or improvement of
37 main surfaced roads involving a total length of 3,463 kilometers
at an aggregate cost of ID 14,500,000. Both the program and the
proposed specifications of the roads are sound. In addition, the
building or improvement of about 8,000 kilometers of secondary or
feeder roads, which do not need to be surfaced, will ultimately

ANNEX E

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

489 Iraq's transport system, which is concentrated in the populated and cultivated eastern half of the country, converges on two points, Baghdad, the capital and trade center, and Basra, the country's only port.

504 The Port of Basra lies about 140 kilometers (85 miles) upstream from the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al Arab and is accessible to ocean-going ships of all sizes entering the Persian Gulf. Its site serves the economy of Iraq well, the junction of the cheaper ocean transport with the dearer inland transport being at the farthest practical point inland.

503 The Tigris and the Euphrates, together with their tributaries, offer natural transport routes. However, they have remained untrained and largely uncontrolled for centuries and, apart from a few short stretches on the rivers and their tributaries which are usable by local traffic, limited and restricted inland navigation is possible today only on the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad.

496 The railway system consists of three main lines, two of narrow gauge, one of standard gauge. One of the two meter-gauge lines is the main line from Baghdad to Basra, serving the most densely populated provinces besides connecting the two principal centers. The other links Baghdad with the northeastern provinces, east of the Tigris. The standard-gauge line runs from Baghdad on the right bank of the Tigris to Mosul, Iraq's second city, and beyond through a tip of Syria to Turkey, the Mediterranean and Europe. Until a year ago no physical junctions existed between the three main lines. Goods carried on both meter-gauge lines had to be ferried across the Tigris at Baghdad and then transshipped. The ferry has now been replaced by a bridge but the transshipment to and from the standard-gauge line remains necessary. Through passenger traffic between the three main lines is negligible.

491 A road system of approximately 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) covers the eastern half of the country, but most of the roads

TABLE 2

Port of Basra Budget*
(in millions of dinars)

504

Year	Revenue	Expenditures Ordinary	Expenditures Capital	Expenditures Total	Balance
1942-43	1.11	0.71	0.04	0.75	+0.36
1943-44	1.19	0.90	0.03	0.93	+0.26
1944-45	1.19	0.93	0.04	0.97	+0.22
1945-46	1.14	1.05	0.09	1.14	—
1946-47	1.25	1.14	0.10	1.24	+0.01
1947-48	1.51	1.27	0.22	1.49	+0.02
1948-49	1.66	1.50	0.18	1.68	−0.02
1949-50	1.62	1.43	0.19	1.62	—
1950-51	1.52	1.45	0.65	2.10	−0.58
1951-52	1.53	1.53	0.65	2.18	−0.65

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* Actual budget figures for the years up to and including 1949-50; revised estimates for 1950-51, and budget estimates for 1951-52.

It will be noted that until recent years there was a surplus of income over both ordinary and capital expenditures. Current deficits are being met from the cumulative surplus of the past.

Development programs of the Port now in progress consist of an extension to the power station, extensions and improvement of roads in the Port area, machinery and plant for road maintenance, improvements of the airport, an extension of the hotel, new buildings, staff quarters, laborers' dwellings, river conservation work, and extensions and improvements to wharves and warehouses, including handling equipment. For the financial year 1951-52 the cost of this capital budget program has been estimated at about ID 650,000. Similar expenditures will be required in the years to follow.

The Dredging Scheme

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The Port's most important maintenance works program is concerned with the dredging of the entrance channel through the Fao Bar, so much so that a separate budget is maintained for the Bar Dredging Scheme with its own revenues from dredging dues levied on shipping. Up to four and a half million cubic yards must be dredged in a year to maintain the channel's width and depth, at a cost of from ID 500,000 to 600,000 per year covered

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

by dues received from Abadan and Basra shipping. The budgets of the Dredging Scheme are summarized in Table 3. It will be noted that until the last two years surpluses accrued even after allowing for capital expenditures.

TABLE 3

FAO BAR DREDGING SCHEME BUDGET[1]
(in millions of dinars)

Year	Revenue	Expenditures Ordinary	Expenditures Capital	Expenditures Total	Balance
1942-43	0.44	0.34	0.01	0.35	+0.09
1943-44	0.51	0.39	0.01	0.40	+0.11
1944-45	0.69	0.45	—[2]	0.45	+0.24
1945-46	0.73	0.49	0.04	0.53	+0.20
1946-47	0.70	0.48	0.05	0.53	+0.17
1947-48	0.76	0.54	0.07	0.61	+0.15
1948-49	0.91	0.54	0.17	0.71	+0.20
1949-50	0.95	0.61	0.19	0.80	+0.15
1950-51	0.94	0.73	0.36	1.09	−0.15
1951-52	0.95	0.79	1.10	1.89	−0.94

[1] Actual budget figures for the years up to and including 1949-50; revised estimates for 1950-51, and budget estimates for 1951-52.
[2] Negligible.

Thorough investigations and studies by the Port's engineers and consultants, supplemented by experiments on a tidal model of the river constructed by the National Physical Laboratory at Teddington, England, have now reasonably well established that the dredging of a new channel straight from the mouth of the river should ensure reduced maintenance dredging after completion. The present channel, though shorter, has a bend near the river mouth and now runs at right angles to cross currents which deposit more and more silt in the channel. There is no doubt that the new channel should be constructed.

The dredging of this new channel is the only major development facing the Port authorities. The cost would be at least ID 2,000,000 spread over a few years, but the ultimate savings in current dredging expeditures would make it a very worthwhile investment. Part of the cost is already reflected in the Dredging Scheme's capital budget for 1951-52 which, for instance, provides

ID 400,000 for the purchase of a new dredger. The Port cannot, 503 however, be expected to finance the construction of a new channel out of its own resources. The combined current receipts of the Port and the Dredging Scheme, together with the surpluses of the past, should be sufficient to cover the cost of ordinary capital improvements, but not of a large project such as the channel. It was originally expected that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company might lend the necessary funds for the channel. Recent developments have made this possibility more remote, and in any event it may now be much more advisable to finance the project out of the oil revenues which will accrue to the Development Board.

Proposed Port at Umm Qasr

From time to time proposals have been put forward for the 504 construction of a new port at Umm Qasr, on an inlet from the Gulf, south of Basra. Temporary installations at this site and a military branch line of the railway from Basra were in operation during the war. The alternative was warranted in those exceptional years, in case war operations should impede the operation of Basra Port. The Umm Qasr port installations have since been abandoned and there is now nothing left which might be used as a nucleus for port development. The advantage of a shorter entrance channel which would require less dredging than the river to Basra is offset by the considerably greater cost of inland transport over sea-going transport. The entrance is not free from silting, and the Fao bar will still have to be kept passable for Shatt al Arab shipping.

For several other reasons this project should not be pursued further at present. Basra Port is capable of handling much larger volumes of traffic than at present. The construction of a new port would be expensive; a new town would have to be built; the port would duplicate, not supplement, existing facilities; and the port would require communications with the hinterland involving additional capital expenditures for railways and roads. As mentioned earlier the new port's site would be nearer the sea, thereby shortening the cheaper ocean haul and materially lengthening the expensive overland haul. Trade concerns now well established at Basra would be reluctant to duplicate their operations at the new port, let alone transfer their business there.

504 *Staff*

The Port Directorate has done its best to train Iraqi personnel in every level of employment. It takes time to develop the highly specialized skills required but the training process is well advanced. In May 1951 two senior and seven assistant posts of primary importance remained unoccupied in the Port Administration, and two senior and two assistant posts of the same urgency were unfilled in the Bar Dredging Scheme offices. These should be filled promptly for a period of years by qualified foreign nominees. The training of Iraqi staff members in the Port's own territory and abroad should be continued and extended as much as is practical.

In summary, the Mission's recommendations concerning the Port's development problems are:

1. The training program to overcome the shortage of technical staff experienced in port operation, administration, maintenance and construction should be continued and expanded as much as possible.
2. The dredging of the new entrance channel should be carried out.
3. Construction of a new port at Umm Qasr should not be undertaken.

II. Maritime Shipping

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The Port of Basra is extremely well served by many experienced world shipping lines. There is, therefore, no justification for the creation of an Iraq shipping line. Coastal shipping is nonexistent, since Iraq possesses only one port and neighboring countries can provide no traffic for such a venture.

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III. Inland Water Transport

Nature has provided Iraq with a number of important waterways in its two large rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and their many tributaries. Until a few years ago, the Tigris, in its lower reaches in the plains, was navigable at all seasons from

above Baghdad to Basra, but this is no longer so. The variations 503● in the flow of water are wide, floods occur at high water, there is heavy silting at low water, the river bed steadily rises and the curvature increases more and more—features typical of the behavior of rivers which remain untrained for centuries.

The Port Directorate of Basra has control over inland navigation. The control is nominal, however, and is limited to the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad and the Gharraf canal, a tributary joining at Kut. There is a separate budget for the purpose but it amounts to only a few thousand dinars annually, spent on navigation aids, few and far apart. The last remaining regular navigation [505] company, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, ceased operations in 1949, and only small private concerns continue to operate barges which are mostly propelled by low-powered motor launches.

At the present time the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels up to four feet draught during the seven months from February to August, except for short flood periods in April and May in some years. Navigation during the remaining five months, September to January, is impeded for long periods by:

1. Low water in the Narrows in the lower reaches below Amara, for periods up to three weeks,
2. Low water at Amara, causing the floating bridge to ground, for periods up to six weeks,
3. Closure of the Kut barrage lock for irrigation requirements, for periods up to eight weeks.

Between seasons the water levels vary up to 25 feet at Baghdad, up to 35 feet south of Kut barrage and up to 7 feet at the Narrows.

Inland water transport has ceased to be a factor of importance in the country's transport system. The waters of the rivers are used primarily for irrigation and their flow is controlled only with a view to serving irrigation requirements. In the future irrigation will continue to have the principal claim on the available water supply. This does not mean, however, that a revival of inland navigation will be incompatible with irrigation. In the monograph on flood control and irrigation it has already been pointed out that measures to control the dissipation of water from the lower reaches

•503 of the Tigris into the marshes would leave more water in the river bed.[1] Navigability might be improved further if the river bed were trained by dams, locks, groins and cribs into a narrow channel at low water and progressively wider channels at higher water levels. Through such measures, limited but uninterrupted navigation could be made possible. It would be necessary, however, to consider whether the cost would not be such as to make river transport uneconomic. As a first step it might be advisable to have the feasibility and cost of training the river bed studied by engineers from the Netherlands who have had experience with similar problems.

IV. Railways

496 The railways are the principal means of inland transport, carrying by far the greater part of the country's imports, exports and internal traffic. The chief commodities carried in bulk are oil, bricks, cement and other building materials, grains and dates.

The total length of the railway system is 1,030 miles (1,648 kilometers) of which 330 route miles (529 kilometers) are standard gauge and 700 route miles (1,119 kilometers) meter gauge. The first railway line in Iraq was completed in 1914 and ran north from Baghdad to Samarra as part of the projected Berlin-Baghdad railway. The Iraqi portion of this standard-gauge railway was not fully completed until 1940 and it is now the only railway link between Iraq and neighboring countries. The balance of the railway network consists of meter-gauge lines, large portions of which were first constructed during World War I when only meter-gauge rolling stock was readily available. One of these lines runs from Basra to Baghdad, following the Euphrates River. The other extends from Baghdad to Erbil via Kirkuk, with a short spur to Khanaqin. The part from Kirkuk to Erbil was finished only in 1949. Until 1950 when a railway bridge was completed across the Tigris, the two meter-gauge lines were connected only by a wagon ferry. Even now there is virtually no through passenger traffic on the two lines. It should be noted that there is no longer a railway south of Baghdad serving the towns along or near the

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[1] See Annex B, *Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage*, pp. 202-203.

504 The port of Basra proper, which was founded in A.D. 636 or 637, a few years after the conquest of Mesopotamia by the Arabs, and has been razed and rebuilt through the centuries, is situated some 130 kilometres from the mouth of the river. The town of Basra, which, together with the port, constitutes an important commercial centre and is the terminal point of the caravan route between Arabia and the coast, is situated 3 kilometres from the port, on the bank of a small creek which joins the Shatt al-Arab. [503] The river[1] is sufficiently navigable up to and just beyond Basra to admit seagoing vessels of up to 10,000 tons. Nevertheless, access to the river is limited by the circumstance that dredging is constantly required in the Ruka Channel (7.2 kilometres) and the Fao Channel (nearly 10 kilometres); it is endeavoured by dredging to maintain a depth of 7 to 7.3 metres.

The maritime district of Basra is called Ma'agil. Its main pier is 1,525 metres long and has nine points where vessels may dock for unloading goods and five for loading; the draught varies between 7.3 and

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[2] According to recent Press reports, the productior of Iraq is expected to reach 5.5 to 6 million tons in 1950.

1. [the Shatt al-Arab--Analyst]

504 9.1 metres and is 9.7 metres by the buoys. The port has a floating crane with a capacity of thirty tons; a derrick with a capacity of eighty tons; seven general wharves, which cover an area of 13,000 square metres, are equipped with cranes with a capacity of up to eight tons and are served by the railway; and eight warehouses with an area of altogether 18,600 square metres.

According to authoritative sources, the port installations of Basra have been improved greatly in recent years by the addition of approximately 600 metres of docking space, by new cranes and more railway lines. The port of Basra is equipped with tugs and many barges and lighters; it also has a life-boat and two barges for life-saving, some divers and workshops for minor repairs. A railway links the port to Baghdad. Ma'agil has a modern airport.

The anchorage at Fao has a wooden jetty with a depth of 0.91 metres, and there is also a five-ton mobile crane and a repair shop for the dredgers.[3]

505 The port of Basra is in regular shipping communication with the United Kingdom, the United States, various European countries, India and the ports of the Persian Gulf. Basra is a regular port of call of many foreign shipping companies. Attempts to set up an Iraqi merchant marine have not yet succeeded.

● 503 Apart from the maintenance of the Ruka Channel, funds have been allocated for the purchase of new dredgers, in order to dig a new, more direct channel south of the existing one.

505 traffic. One or two free-lance enterprises were additional to these—a Başra-owned steamer plying to Baghdad, another weekly from Baghdad to Samarrā; many abortive projects had been formed for larger development. The Saniya Administration had advanced plans, in 1890, for an extended service to include voyages to Mosul and even to Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and a new survey of the Euphrates was ordered in preparation for free navigation from Maskana or Jarablus to Başra. Nothing resulted from these projects, but the advancing shadow of the Baghdad Railway, with which their authors loved to connect them, gave encouragement. A ship-building yard was established at Baghdad in 1890.

504 The port of Başra, sole sea gateway of 'Iraq, carried by far the greatest part of its trade and traffic, of which in 1900 a negligible part was other than British or British-Indian. Russian and German trade was not yet established, while the 'Iraqis contributed little to the movements of the port. The Shaţţ al-'Arab waterway, thanks to survey and buoying by British hands, gave access and security to anchorages opposite the 'Ashar and Khandaq creeks which connected it with Başra city. The management of the port was primitive, quarantine and customs provisions inept, vexatious, and venal. No wharves, cranes, sheds or other port equipment were provided; loading and discharging overside to and from lighters in midstream were slow and costly operations.

206 Since the 'sixties of the century 'Iraq had had its place in the world's telegraphic system. It was connected through Fao with India, through Mosul and Jazira-ibn-'Umar with the rest of Turkey, through Khaniqin (or through Fao and Bushire) with Persia. The handling of traffic was slow and unreliable. But the extension of the system to most parts of 'Iraq, vulnerable and faltering as it was, and with Kurdish districts still unpenetrated, had yet done
205 much to assist administration and to modernize society. Postal services dated in some form from the eighteenth century. In the 'sixties of the nineteenth, British-Indian steamers began to carry the Indian and European mails to Başra, where the service connected with the river steamers. The Indian Post Offices opened in 1868. The British camel mail to Damascus, discontinued in 1886 after a century of service, was replaced by a Turkish mail along the same route, carried by 'Aniza tribal riders. The time-honoured horse-borne Tatar mail left Baghdad every Monday for Istanbul, by way of Mosul and Diyarbakr.

7. THE GOVERNMENT

631 The enormous difficulties of governing the three wilayas arose, it is now clear, from a complex of elements. The territory was ill provided with means of communication, and much of it was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 battalion, and to the men's return to the sluggish pauperization of Ba'quba.

871 The Education branch, founded and first inspired by Major H. E. Bowman, was faced with the problem of providing schooling for the youth of 'Iraq in the absence of funds, buildings, books, equipment or teachers in a tithe of sufficient quantities. At a pace always disappointing, but the fastest financially or functionally practicable, primary schools aiming at fair standards were opened to a total of seventy-five by the end of 1919. Fifty-six of these taught in Arabic, eleven in Turkish, seven in Kurdish, one in Persian. The new-founded Teachers' Training College could supply but a part of their urgent needs, and the scale of secondary classes, confined to the three principal cities, was regrettably humble; nor was the country-wide penetration of 'politics' into the schools, thus early, less to be deplored. Means were found to reopen the Law School, and a commercial and a technical school. The many privately-conducted Mullās' schools, archaic in method, scope, and equipment, continued to produce a bare literacy in their thousands of pupils; but the temptation to multiply inferior Government schools was resisted, and the teaching of English almost wholly withheld in spite of a general clamour for it. Upon the desirability of girls' schools, Muslim opinion was at first divided; five, all primary, had been opened by the first weeks of 1920. The schools of the local Christian and Jewish minorities and those of the foreign missions were fostered by support and subsidy; some of these were of high standard. Some archaeological work was carried out by R. Campbell Thompson at Abu Shahrayn (Eridu) in the spring of 1918, and more under H. R. Hall at Ur and elsewhere in 1919.

204 Printing-presses were operating at Najf in 1918, at Sulaymaniya in 1919, and in Baṣra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the occupation of these places. Newspapers in English were published at Baghdad and Baṣra, in Arabic at those cities and Mosul, in Turkish at Kirkuk, in Kurdish at Sulaymaniya.

439 The great increase of goods entering 'Iraq in 1918–19 taxed the young Customs administration of C. R. Watkins and Major A. G. H. Sievwright to the utmost. It was due to cessation of imports into north Persia from Russia, to the increase of 'Iraq's own spending power, and to the general depletion of stocks by war
[436] interruption. The Indian rupee, now the universal currency of 'Iraq, supplied an adequate medium; and the rising volume of
● [504] civilian traffic could be handled easily by the now fully developed Port of Baṣra, which as such came into existence under Colonel J. C. Ward in the autumn of 1919 and was soon afterwards transferred to the Civil Administration. The Railways, when at their greatest

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

reconstructed, offices multiplied, and a mid-desert wireless-station 206
was installed at Rutba.

Tigris river navigation did not, and was unlikely to, exceed 505
substantially its pre-1914 scale. The pace was slow, navigation difficult and the Railway in powerful rivalry. The 'Euphrates and Tigris' fleet, managed by 'Mespers', still handled the bulk of the traffic, with its three ancient and two modern paddle-steamers (p. 111). These were increased in 1924 by the acquisition of two stern-wheelers, the *Kadri* and the *Ihsan* both built in 1918, and of the 1908-built *Baghdad*, originally owned by the Idara Nahriya. These three had belonged to the long-established Khudhayri company which was absorbed by 'Euphrates and Tigris' in 1924. A few other Khudhayri boats remained in commission, and the Royal Air Force maintained both the Inland Water Transport dockyard at Başra and a few vessels for their own supplies. The 504
Port of Başra, administered by J. C. Ward as Port Director under the Finance Ministry of the 'Iraq Government since 1920, was still in 1926 owned by the British Government pending completion of capital repayment by instalments and the creation of a Port Trust. From 1922 onwards the Port was organized on a permanent and self-supporting peace-time basis and supplied all normal facilities both for 'Iraqi trade and for the oil-tanker fleet of Abadan. In 1923 it undertook, by a loan from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the dredging of a deep channel through the Fao bar which before 1920 was impassable at high water by any ship drawing more than 20 feet. The agreement provided for a channel of 28-foot depth at high water and 300-foot width, and 12 miles long. Work began in 1924, and the Rooka Channel of these dimensions was opened for traffic in 1926.

The status of 'Iraq Railways, directed by J. R. Tainsh since 1921, 496
was similar to that of the Port: they were British-owned and after 1923 'Iraqi-administered with the aid of British executives and technicians, in anticipation of future purchase and adjustment. The Başra–Baghdad line was reopened in April 1921, and thereafter a Musaiyib–Karbalā extension, a line from Mafraq to the Hindiya Barrage and spurs giving access to Khaniqin and to Başra city were completed between 1921 and 1924. The Kut–Baghdad line, the Jabal Sanam quarry line south of Zubayr, and that from near Khaniqin to the Persian frontier at Tiaruq (Qurait) were closed in the same period. Permanent bridges were built in 1924 and 1925 at the Euphrates crossings and an extension from the Khaniqin line across the Diyalā to Kifri and Kirkuk was finished in 1925. The main workshops were brought from Shu'ayba to Shalchiya, in the western outskirts of Baghdad, in the same year. The Tigris wagon-ferry link at Baghdad between the

1 - [1920 - 25 - - Analyst

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

494 were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into
499 the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at
Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty &
Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed
in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad
and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932.
A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable
engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the
'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The
'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed
through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the
Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to
divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was
doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a
direct Baghdad-'Amman route, and the first experiments in
developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

505 The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their
local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and
road competition, and had little scope for development. The
veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927,
Mejidieh in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S.*16 and
*S.*14 were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be
renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris*
in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after
503 1929. At Basra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally
completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928-30.
They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead
of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 20 feet in 1920)
and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port
505 traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from
Abadan, but the Shaṭṭ was used regularly also by the Strick,
British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German)
Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of
504 Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most
imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the
Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi
for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port
administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was
normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the
years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual
instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation
of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930
Treaty, was not yet in sight.

496 The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful.
471 Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

appointingly, carried little traffic other than some oil supplies to 499
northern Persia. Following completion of the great Faluja bridge [494]
(p. 208) other steel bridges were constructed: on the Lesser Zab at Altun Kupri, the Greater Zab at Aski Kellek, and elsewhere. In Baghdad the replacement of the two pontoon crossings by permanent steel bridges was at last decided, and contracts were awarded to Messrs. Holloway Bros. in 1936, a major step in the development of the capital. The new spans of the Mosul bridge were finished. Municipal street-making proceeded everywhere, and not least in Baghdad.

Little changed in the field of Tigris river navigation. Fears that 505
the Kut barrage would make steamship navigation impossible 504
were aroused but could be allayed; a move made in 1934 by local rivals to question the rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Company led to nothing. River traffic on the whole diminished. The *Zobaida* was sold to India in 1935, the *Blosse Lynch* and *Tigris* as scrap in the same year and the *Khalifa* in 1937. In 1936 the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation split again into its original components, the Lynch Company and Messrs. Gray Mackenzie. Four small gunboats were acquired by Government in 1937 for riverain police work, but were little used. The Port of Baṣra rendered steady service to the country. Its volume of traffic permitted it to pay regularly its capital instalments to the British Government, and by 1937 a debt of only £300,000 remained. The Port Trust, to be set up under the 1930 Treaty, did not appear; the Port was still administered by a Directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Its bar-dredging scheme operated with great success, repaid its loans, and kept open and improved the deep channel.[1] Two new dredgers were acquired. The Port administration completed a modern airport at Baṣra, furnished with a hotel and all facilities, and provided Baṣra city and suburbs with electric power and a modern water-supply. The ocean traffic using the Port increased substantially after 1935: first two, and later four, Japanese lines appeared, with one each of German, Indian, and Italian ownership and an occasional Russian, Swedish, and Greek steamer. The great bulk of the tonnage remained, as of old, British and British-Indian.

The 'Iraq Railways maintained their solvency and functions in 496
spite of tribal interference, fluctuating traffic, largely obsolescent equipment, and serious road competition. The operation of the system was modernized as far as was practicable, and a rapid Baghdad–Baṣra daily service introduced. Negotiations with the

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[1] The low-water depths in the Rooka channel (p. 208), achieved by successive phases of the bar-dredging scheme, were in 1926, 18 ft., in 1928–9, 20ft., in 1935–8, 23 or 24 ft.

652 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years. The loans, regarded as experimental, were well received but too small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year and handled Government accounts; by 1945 its trading began to show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry, was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch in Baghdad in the same year.

722 The material development of the territory, which proceeded hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the
496 end of the war. But 'Iraq was at least fortunate in that, far from a record of destruction or retrogression—the common fate of Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented by war-time loans from the military authorities, current maintenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for movement to Baṣra—were amicably handled. The military Kut–
499 'Aziziya–Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge (in replacement of the old waggon-ferry), a bridge at Musayib to give access to Karbalā, a modern station and office block and new marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lesser Zab bridge.[1]

722 The important developments at the Port of Baṣra and its vicinity
504 carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and approaches, storage facilities, the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab bridge, and a Ma'qil–Ahwaz railway line. Considerable parts of these additions survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties at Umm Qaṣr on the Khawr 'Abdullah, and the railway joining these to Baṣra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance
505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

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[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–Homs line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Karbalā–Najf–Kufa line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–Diyarbakr connexion. None of these materialized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Government throughout the first half of 1951 and were to 651
embrace the production obligations of all the companies operating 648
in 'Iraq and the royalties or taxes expected from them.[1] Under the 471
influence of the 'nationalization' movement—but in more moderate form than the brutal self-mutilation of Persia—the 'Iraq Government decided in 1951 to nationalize the refining and distribution of its oil in so far as this was consumed in 'Iraq itself: the operation, that is, of the Khaniqin and Rafidain Oil Companies. Negotiations with these and with Anglo-Iranian, their parent, led to agreement on the basis that the Companies were to transfer their plant and assets to the State at a valuation, and to remain for ten years as operating agents on its behalf.

The Port of Baṣra in the period 1946–50 maintained and sub- 504
stantially improved its services—wharves and sheds, cranes and machinery—and, in spite of the increased cost of labour and supplies, could show a profit on each year's operations. It continued annually to pay off its capital debt, completing that process in 1951. It maintained and largely increased its electric-power and water supplies to Baṣra city. The airport, with its wireless service and its enlarged hotel, remained Port property. The dredging-depot at Fao was extended, an all-weather road constructed to link it by land to Baṣra. A shore depot was built at Ḥarmaq, opposite Abadan. The traffic using Ma'qil wharves decreased abruptly from the level of the previous five war years, but the tanker traffic of the Anglo-Iranian increased, until the spring of 1951, more than sufficiently to compensate for this. The development of a subsidiary port at Umm Qaṣr, on the Khur 'Abdullah, was a

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[1] The new Oil Agreement, based on acceptance in August 1951 of the principle of equal division of profits between Government and Company, was ratified by Parliament in February 1952, and made retroactive to 1 January 1951. With the probable initial through-put (in a full year) of the 30-inch line (some 14 to 15 million tons a year) additional to the existing through-put (nearly 8 million) of the 12-inch and 16-inch lines to Tripoli, 'Iraq's revenues from this source were expected—on existing cost and price bases—to surpass £30 million in 1952 and to reach £60 million in 1955. Minimum production was agreed at 22 million tons a year (for I.P.C. and M.P.C. combined) from 1954 onwards, and 8 million from B.P.C. from the end of 1955. Government was assured that its receipts would be not less than a quarter of the seaboard value of I.P.C. and M.P.C. crude oil, and a third of that of B.P.C. Fluctuation of costs and of world oil prices was to be taken into account in ascertaining the divisible 'profits', and Government might, if it wished, take in kind 12½ per cent. of the crude produced, and either dispose of it or sell it back to the Companies. A large part of the balance of Government's revenue was to be received in the form of income tax. Minimum receipts to Government, guaranteed subject only to *force majeure*, were to be £20 million sterling in 1953 and 1954, and £25 million in 1955 and thereafter; in the event of a physically unavoidable failure in production a smaller minimum would be payable for two years. The Agreement covered in addition the doubling of 'Iraqi representation on the Boards of the Companies, restrictions on the appointment of non-'Iraqis to positions in the Companies, an increase (up to fifty per year) of 'Iraqis maintained in British universities for higher studies, and the extension of technical education organized by the Company in Kirkuk fields.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

504 [503] considered project; and meanwhile, Fao bar-dredging operations, designed to maintain a low-water depth of 23 feet in a substantially widened Rooka channel, proceeded throughout 1943 to 1950. But heavy floods and consequent silt movement caused serious difficulties and, the existing channel proving barely maintainable, the project of a new channel re-aligned in terms of the changed sea-bed conditions was in 1951 under close consideration. To its realization—the more necessary since 'Iraq's own oil traffic from the Zubayr field was likely to increase many-fold—the loss of the rich Abadan tanker revenue was a serious impediment;[1] but in general the future of the vital Fao channel, and indeed that of the Port in general, was under wise and far-sighted review.

505 The tonnage of steamers using the Port was more than half—and in some years more than two-thirds—British, with Dutch, American, Greek, Swedish, and Norwegian shipping well represented. The establishment of an all-'Iraqi Shipping Company continued to be an object of ambition among the interested and the nationally-minded, as a means of undercutting the freight rates charged by foreign lines. The post of Port Director was assumed, after two short tenures, in 1947 by Colonel G. T. Johnson, and in 1951 by R. C. Kelt. Accelerated steps were taken from 1948 onwards for the training, largely in Europe, of 'Iraqis for all posts in the administration, including the highest: an 'Iraqi Port Director was a probability of the near future.

Though transport by the 'Iraq waterways had as ever its irreplaceable part both in the lives of the riverain towns and as a main Baṣra–Baghdad artery, available traffic did not permit—as for a generation it had not permitted, save in war-time—any considerable development of the Tigris steamships. Military transport ceasing with the war, and competition by road and rail and air ever increasing, the Euphrates and Tigris Company in 1946 disposed of most of its surviving fleet, including the *Zenobia*; and early in 1951 it went into voluntary liquidation and sold the bulk of its towing-units and barges to its principal local competitor, Ḥannā al-Shaykh. The latter and members of the Khudhayri family remained active on the river to fill the place which, after ninety years, was now abandoned as unprofitable by the Lynch enterprise.

496 499 The 'Iraq Railways, which had embarked in 1945 (p. 320) on important projects of construction, were faced also by a heavy programme of needed rehabilitation, improvement of services, and addition to rolling-stock. The five following years saw the com-

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[1] The action of the Persian Government in bringing its oil industry to a standstill involved, besides its own ruin, a loss of at least £1 million a year to the finances of Baṣra Port and its dredging scheme.

The Port

504 The Port of Basra, an autonomous public agency which also operates the civil airport, is efficiently run and capable of handling a considerable increase in traffic. In view of the adequacy of this port, the Mission sees no justification for the construction of another port at Umm Qasr as has been suggested from time to
503 time. The Port of Basra has been able to finance necessary capital improvements, as well as to pay off its debts, out of current surpluses and should be able to do so in the future except for the task of financing the dredging of a new and urgently needed channel across the Fao bar. The existing channel is subject to heavy silting which necessitates extensive dredging operations at a cost of ID 500,000 to ID 600,000 per year. Until recently it was expected that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would advance the funds necessary for this new channel, but recent developments in Iran, coupled with the fact that ample oil revenues will be available to Iraq for investment, appear to make it desirable that the Development Board finance this project.

The Railways

496 The state railways, which are the principal means of transport, are also well managed and have been fully able to meet traffic requirements. They have come in for considerable criticism, however, because of the serious financial difficulties in which they have become involved. The major source of these difficulties lies in the fact that, in 1944, the railways, with the full approval of the government, began a major capital development program without assurance of adequate financing. To defray the cost, the railways have had to use a fund of about ID 2,500,000 set aside for renewals and to borrow ID 1,000,000 from the government as well as £3,000,000 in the United Kingdom with the help of the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The program was for the most part soundly conceived and is now largely completed. However, it has left the railways without adequate funds not only for essential renewals but also for other construction pro-
499 jects. One of the major and more controversial projects affected
496 is the erection in Baghdad West of a rather imposing terminal station and railway headquarters together with relocation of railway

relieved by low ranges and depressed areas of which the major 133
one is the Wadi Tharthar. It is sparsely inhabited by pastoral 311
nomads although in the North some settled farming, made speculative by irregular rainfall, is carried on.

The second region, extending downstream from Ramadi on 438
the Euphrates and Baghdad on the Tigris and including the Diyala 241
River Valley, is the area where most irrigation projects have been 312
carried out in the past. Pump irrigation predominates on the banks of the three rivers where the land is high and water is easily accessible. For the more remote areas flow irrigation is provided by canals dependent on the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut barrage on the Tigris and the Diyala weir on the Diyala River. Here flow irrigation between the two main rivers is facilitated by the fact that in the Baghdad region the Euphrates is higher than the Tigris, while below Baghdad the Tigris is above the Euphrates. In this region barley is the principal winter crop, followed by wheat. Summer crops are limited by lack of water, but among them cotton has become in recent years by far the most prominent, leaving sorghum, sesame, green gram, corn and millet far behind. Fruit culture is important. Dates are widely grown, both for domestic consumption and for export; and the Diyala Valley in particular produces excellent citrus fruit. Rice is an important crop between Nejf and Diwaniya on the Euphrates and around Rumaitha farther
down the river. The country's major concentration of population [162]
lies in the region comprising the district about Baghdad and the provinces of Hilla, Kerbela and parts of Kut and Diwaniya. It includes the capital, Baghdad, a city with a population of 550,000 and the leading commercial and industrial center of the country.

The third region—the Basra, Nasiriya, Amara triangle—is 438
generally one vast marsh during the spring floods. Here the rural 342
dwellings are of reeds and brushwood, in contrast to the rest of 262
the country where mud huts and, in the mountains of the North, 439
stone houses predominate. Rice grown in the naturally inundated 504
marshland is the staple food, varied by fish; and the water buffalo is the prevailing type of livestock. Here also is the world's largest date palm belt stretching along both sides of the Shatt al Arab and contributing one of Iraq's principal exports. Basra, Iraq's only port, is the largest city of this region and handles most of the country's foreign trade.

491 centers such as Amara and Kut are linked neither by rail nor by
494 all-weather roads to Basra and Baghdad.

•504 In Basra, Iraq possesses an excellent port capable of handling
497 a considerable increase in traffic. Upcountry cargo into and out of the port is handled almost wholly by railway, for inland river traffic has declined greatly in importance owing to shallow water and other impediments to navigation.

The port and the railways are each run by an autonomous administration operating under a separate budget.

VII. Money and Banking

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The banking system consists of the National Bank, five commercial banks, a number of private banks or *sarrafs,* the post office savings bank, and three state-owned longer-term financing institutions, the Industrial Bank, the Agricultural Bank and the Mortgage Bank.

652 The National Bank succeeded the Iraq Currency Board as the
453 currency-issuing authority in 1949. Iraq is a member of the sterling area, so that its currency is backed principally by sterling assets in London. Although the law permits the currency to be backed up to 30 percent by Iraqi government securities, as of March 31, 1951, the total amount of currency in circulation was more than covered by sterling assets. Aside from its note-issuing function, the Bank is charged with the administration of foreign exchange control and the supervision of the banking system in accordance with a bank control law which became effective at the beginning of 1950. This law requires banks to keep the equivalent of 15 percent of their time and demand deposits as a reserve with the National Bank and to keep 50 percent of these deposits in the form of cash and investments in Iraq. The National Bank is empowered to reduce the reserve requirement to 10 percent and to vary the second between 30 and 70 percent. Since the commercial banks have had no need for recourse to the National Bank in order to replenish their cash resources, the Bank's loans and advances have remained very small. As of March 31, 1951, they

ANNEX E

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

489 Iraq's transport system, which is concentrated in the populated and cultivated eastern half of the country, converges on two points, Baghdad, the capital and trade center, and Basra, the country's only port.

● 504 The Port of Basra lies about 140 kilometers (85 miles) upstream from the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al Arab and is accessible to ocean-going ships of all sizes entering the Persian Gulf. Its site serves the economy of Iraq well, the junction of the cheaper ocean transport with the dearer inland transport being at the farthest practical point inland.

503 The Tigris and the Euphrates, together with their tributaries, offer natural transport routes. However, they have remained untrained and largely uncontrolled for centuries and, apart from a few short stretches on the rivers and their tributaries which are usable by local traffic, limited and restricted inland navigation is possible today only on the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad.

496 The railway system consists of three main lines, two of narrow gauge, one of standard gauge. One of the two meter-gauge lines is the main line from Baghdad to Basra, serving the most densely populated provinces besides connecting the two principal centers. The other links Baghdad with the northeastern provinces, east of the Tigris. The standard-gauge line runs from Baghdad on the right bank of the Tigris to Mosul, Iraq's second city, and beyond through a tip of Syria to Turkey, the Mediterranean and Europe. Until a year ago no physical junctions existed between the three main lines. Goods carried on both meter-gauge lines had to be ferried across the Tigris at Baghdad and then transshipped. The ferry has now been replaced by a bridge but the transshipment to and from the standard-gauge line remains necessary. Through passenger traffic between the three main lines is negligible.

491 A road system of approximately 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) covers the eastern half of the country, but most of the roads

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MHI

On the whole the existing transport system serves the present 489 needs of the country well, but there are certain shortcomings and problems. The principal difficulties are:

Insufficient means of transport in the Tigris valley between Baghdad and Basra, serving the Kut and Amara districts;

The lack of roads, shortage of surfaced trunk roads and nonexistence of rural feeder roads;

The lack of control over road transport, urban as well as interurban and rural; and

The renewals and the gauge problems of the railways.

I. Ports

The Port of Basra was developed as a modern port from 504 initial installations constructed during the first World War. During the second World War, the Port had to cope with a vast increase in traffic. Certain extensions, necessitated by military requirements, were carried out, including supply lines into Iran and through Iran to Russia, but normal maintenance, renewal and improvement works were severely restricted. The postwar period presented the problem of overcoming the arrears in maintenance and renewals, under an additional handicap of shortage of technical staff. Today the Port operates efficiently; it is equipped to handle all traffic, incoming and outgoing, without congestion and there is sufficient margin to cope with the increase in traffic to be expected from further economic development of the country. Particular credit must be given to the Directorate of the Port and a depleted but devoted staff for the results achieved.

The activities of the Port extend along the Shatt al Arab from the main wharves at Magil to the mouth at Fao. In addition to handling export and import traffic for Iraq, it also performs certain services for the Iranian oil port of Abadan; in recent years the number of ships calling at Abadan has been five to six times the number at Basra. The principal developments in the postwar period are set out in Table I. The activities of the Port cover a wide field. Besides actual port services such as harbor, wharves, sheds, pilotage, lighting and buoyage, civil, mechanical and elec-

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trical engineering maintenance and works, the Port Directorate is responsible for the Magil airport and hotel and for radio communications, meteorological service, road construction and maintenance, power and light supply, fire service and water supply, health and education services over a wide area.

TABLE 1

Operations of the Port of Basra

Year[1]	Cargo in Transit[2]	Total Tonnage Through Port[3]	Number of Ships		Gross Tonnage of Ships		Number of Staff
			Abadan	Basra	Abadan	Basra	
1942-43	273,847	341,415	814	637	5,554,550	3,659,127	652
1943-44	983,779	1,232,233	728	517	5,172,650	3,153,025	805
1944-45	759,111	1,061,525	902	439	6,904,399	2,619,431	806
1945-46	725,265	1,002,437	1,321	218	10,359,785	1,273,878	909
1946-47	724,334	1,199,459	1,500	244	11,118,810	1,434.178	989
1947-48	796,811	1,161,865	1,716	275	12,305,896	1,639,490	1,090
1948-49	713,100	1.583,318	2,018	352	14,755,192	2,011,566	1,059
1949-50	1,290,444	2,002,789	2,082	403	16,117,210	2,234,405	1,030
1950-51	439,153[4]	1,358,200[4]	1,936[5]	338[5]	15,321,115[5]	1,823,017[5]	1,025[5]

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[1] Beginning April 1.
[2] Tonnage handled in the transit area at Magil.
[3] Total tonnage passed over wharf, overside and river.
[4] First 9 months.
[5] First 11 months.

The financial position of the Port is healthy in every respect. Practical economies have been pursued in the Port's operations; a general reserve has been built up; extensions, improvements, renewals and rehabilitation after the war have been carried out from revenues and properly maintained reserve accounts. Amortization and interest payments on the capital debt in respect of the Port's installations and equipment, supplied and financed by the British Government, have been made regularly, and the Port is now free from debt. The Port's dues and charges structure is well devised and, as shippers testified, reasonable in its levies on shipping.

A comparative statement of revenue and expenditure, covering all activities, for the war and postwar years is shown in the following table.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE 2

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Port of Basra Budget*
(in millions of dinars)

Year	Revenue	Expenditures			Balance
		Ordinary	Capital	Total	
1942-43	1.11	0.71	0.04	0.75	+0.36
1943-44	1.19	0.90	0.03	0.93	+0.26
1944-45	1.19	0.93	0.04	0.97	+0.22
1945-46	1.14	1.05	0.09	1.14	—
1946-47	1.25	1.14	0.10	1.24	+0.01
1947-48	1.51	1.27	0.22	1.49	+0.02
1948-49	1.66	1.50	0.18	1.68	−0.02
1949-50	1.62	1.43	0.19	1.62	—
1950-51	1.52	1.45	0.65	2.10	−0.58
1951-52	1.53	1.53	0.65	2.18	−0.65

* Actual budget figures for the years up to and including 1949-50; revised estimates for 1950-51, and budget estimates for 1951-52.

It will be noted that until recent years there was a surplus of income over both ordinary and capital expenditures. Current deficits are being met from the cumulative surplus of the past.

Development programs of the Port now in progress consist of an extension to the power station, extensions and improvement of roads in the Port area, machinery and plant for road maintenance, improvements of the airport, an extension of the hotel, new buildings, staff quarters, laborers' dwellings, river conservation work, and extensions and improvements to wharves and warehouses, including handling equipment. For the financial year 1951-52 the cost of this capital budget program has been estimated at about ID 650,000. Similar expenditures will be required in the years to follow.

The Dredging Scheme

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The Port's most important maintenance works program is concerned with the dredging of the entrance channel through the Fao Bar, so much so that a separate budget is maintained for the Bar Dredging Scheme with its own revenues from dredging dues levied on shipping. Up to four and a half million cubic yards must be dredged in a year to maintain the channel's width and depth, at a cost of from ID 500,000 to 600,000 per year covered

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ID 400,000 for the purchase of a new dredger. The Port cannot, 503 however, be expected to finance the construction of a new channel out of its own resources. The combined current receipts of the Port and the Dredging Scheme, together with the surpluses of the past, should be sufficient to cover the cost of ordinary capital improvements, but not of a large project such as the channel. It was originally expected that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company might lend the necessary funds for the channel. Recent developments have made this possibility more remote, and in any event it may now be much more advisable to finance the project out of the oil revenues which will accrue to the Development Board.

Proposed Port at Umm Qasr

From time to time proposals have been put forward for the 504 construction of a new port at Umm Qasr, on an inlet from the Gulf, south of Basra. Temporary installations at this site and a military branch line of the railway from Basra were in operation during the war. The alternative was warranted in those exceptional years, in case war operations should impede the operation of Basra Port. The Umm Qasr port installations have since been abandoned and there is now nothing left which might be used as a nucleus for port development. The advantage of a shorter entrance channel which would require less dredging than the river to Basra is offset by the considerably greater cost of inland transport over sea-going transport. The entrance is not free from silting, and the Fao bar will still have to be kept passable for Shatt al Arab shipping.

For several other reasons this project should not be pursued further at present. Basra Port is capable of handling much larger volumes of traffic than at present. The construction of a new port would be expensive; a new town would have to be built; the port would duplicate, not supplement, existing facilities; and the port would require communications with the hinterland involving additional capital expenditures for railways and roads. As mentioned earlier the new port's site would be nearer the sea, thereby shortening the cheaper ocean haul and materially lengthening the expensive overland haul. Trade concerns now well established at Basra would be reluctant to duplicate their operations at the new port, let alone transfer their business there.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

504 *Staff*

The Port Directorate has done its best to train Iraqi personnel in every level of employment. It takes time to develop the highly specialized skills required but the training process is well advanced. In May 1951 two senior and seven assistant posts of primary importance remained unoccupied in the Port Administration, and two senior and two assistant posts of the same urgency were unfilled in the Bar Dredging Scheme offices. These should be filled promptly for a period of years by qualified foreign nominees. The training of Iraqi staff members in the Port's own territory and abroad should be continued and extended as much as is practical.

In summary, the Mission's recommendations concerning the Port's development problems are:

1. The training program to overcome the shortage of technical staff experienced in port operation, administration, maintenance and construction should be continued and expanded as much as possible.
2. The dredging of the new entrance channel should be carried out.
3. Construction of a new port at Umm Qasr should not be undertaken.

II. Maritime Shipping

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The Port of Basra is extremely well served by many experienced world shipping lines. There is, therefore, no justification for the creation of an Iraq shipping line. Coastal shipping is nonexistent, since Iraq possesses only one port and neighboring countries can provide no traffic for such a venture.

III. Inland Water Transport

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Nature has provided Iraq with a number of important waterways in its two large rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and their many tributaries. Until a few years ago, the Tigris, in its lower reaches in the plains, was navigable at all seasons from

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

XII. Projected Cost of Proposed Programs

499
363
504
508
206
654

The projects recommended for consideration are summarized below as to cost and time of realization. The total cost which the Development Board might have to defray over the next five years would be approximately ID 31,000,000.

TABLE 11

COST OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS SUGGESTED FOR DEVELOPMENT BOARD FINANCING

Project	Costs (in dinars)	Period (years)
PORT		
New channel	2,000,000	4
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT		
Study of river training by experts	Token	2
RAILWAYS		
Baghdad Station commitment	143,000	1
Baghdad new layout, provisional	100,000	1
22 continuation and completion projects		
under way	213,770	1
labor quarters	341,000	4
Rehabilitation and modernization projects	500,000	5
Renewals including diesel traction	6,300,000[a]	5
Extra for gauge conversion (tentative)	6,000,000	6
ROADS		
Trunk road system	14,500,000	10
Secondary road system	4,000,000	5
Road transport control	Token	1
URBAN TRANSPORT		
Baghdad transport services, workshops, garages and vehicles	500,000	3
AIRPORTS		
Baghdad development	300,000	2
Basra development	[b]	2
AIRLINES		
Iraqi Airways	600,000	4
POST, TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, RADIO		
Telephone extensions and buildings (if not financed from Communications budget)	300,000	Annually
Auxiliary power plant for transmitter	30,000	1
SURVEYS AND MAPPING		
Air surveys	40,000	Annually

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[a] On assumption of gauge conversion.
[b] To be financed by Port of Basra.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MNI

491 the main roads Baghdad–Kut–Amara–Basra and Baghdad–Kirkuk–Irbil–Mosul, which are at present unmetalled or only partially metalled. The Development Board has allocated nearly ID27 million to these projects.

493 Road traffic is light. At the beginning of 1953 the number of registered motor vehicles was given as follows, most of them
494 operating in or around the larger towns: private cars 8,000; taxis 3,500; buses 2,900; lorries 6,500; motor cycles 1,900. In Baghdad an efficient bus service is operated by a State Passenger Transport Board. A private cross-desert bus service links Baghdad with Damascus, and there are private bus services between Iraq and Persia.

504 *Basra Port,*[1] lying some eighty miles up the Shatt al-Arab from the Persian Gulf, is the only commercial port of Iraq; an
505 oil port is being constructed at Fao, near the mouth of the Shatt. A small port established during the Second World War at Umm Qasr, on a sea inlet south of the Shatt al-Arab entrance, has since been dismantled. The authority of the Port, which is controlled by a special department of the Iraq Government, extends from the outer bar of the Shatt to a point seventeen miles above the town of Basra. The Shatt is sufficiently deep to admit large ocean-going vessels, but the Fao bar at its mouth requires constant dredging to clear an entrance for the larger of them. During the Second World War extensions were carried out in view of the increased volume of traffic; in consequence there are now 4,500 feet of continuous jetty, providing berthing for eight large vessels at a time and two or three smaller ones, in addition to barge and lighterage berths. Basra Port handles a large proportion of the country's trade. During 1952 some 400 ocean-going vessels, with a net registered tonnage of 1,132,000, and some 260 tankers and water-carriers, with a net registered tonnage of 927,000, were handled by the Port Authority in Basra, Fao, Abadan, and Khorramshahr. During the financial year 1951–2 cargo imported at Basra totalled 511,600 tons and
[651] cargo exported 800,000 tons. The closure of Abadan has occasioned the Port a severe loss of revenue, estimated at ID100,000 a month; port and dredging facilities have nevertheless been maintained.

502 *Inland Waterways.* The Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels of up to four feet draught from February to August except for short flood periods in April and May in some years; during the remaining five months navigation is impeded for long periods. Inland water transport has lost much of its former importance. The last remaining regular navigation

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[1] See *Port of Basrah*, official publication of the Port Authority.

refinery on the river Alwand, near the town of Khanaqin.

The production of crude petroleum in Iraq amounted to 4,680,000 tons in 1946, 4,702,000 tons in 1947 and 3,427,000 tons in 1948, and is estimated at 4,326,000 tons for 1949.[2] The figures showing the crude petroleum production of the Middle-Eastern group, including Iraq, are given in an annex (see annex I, table 2).

135 Apart from petroleum, the subsoil of Iraq is rich in other minerals, such as coal, salt, sulphur, marble, limestone and various metals, including iron and copper. But the utilization of these resources has been delayed by the high cost of transport.

382 Although Iraq is so rich in petroleum, it has no refineries apart from the stabilization plant at Kirkuk, with an annual capacity of only 480,000 tons, and the Khanaqin Oil Company's small refinery on the Alwand, the daily capacity of which is 1,500 barrels, or 72,000 tons per year.

C. *Transport and communications*

Port

● 504 Basra is Iraq's only port. The designation "Port of Basra" generally refers to the whole length of the Shatt al-Arab, between the mouth of this river and the Naft-Umar lighthouse situated approximately 163 kilometres up-river from the Persian Gulf. The strip of land on the left bank of the river, between the Gulf and the Khaiyin Canal, is Iranian territory.

● 504 The port of Basra proper, which was founded in A.D. 636 or 637, a few years after the conquest of Mesopotamia by the Arabs, and has been razed and rebuilt through the centuries, is situated some 130 kilometres from the mouth of the river. The town of Basra, which, together with the port, constitutes an important commercial centre and is the terminal point of the caravan route between Arabia and the coast, is situated 3 kilometres from the port, on the bank of a small creek which joins the Shatt al-Arab.
[503] The river[1] is sufficiently navigable up to and just beyond Basra to admit seagoing vessels of up to 10,000 tons. Nevertheless, access to the river is limited by the circumstance that dredging is constantly required in the Ruka Channel (7.2 kilometres) and the Fao Channel (nearly 10 kilometres); it is endeavoured by dredging to maintain a depth of 7 to 7.3 metres.

The maritime district of Basra is called Ma'agil. Its main pier is 1,525 metres long and has nine points where vessels may dock for unloading goods and five for loading; the draught varies between 7.3 and

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[2] According to recent Press reports, the production of Iraq is expected to reach 5.5 to 6 million tons in 1950.

1. [the Shatt al-Arab--Analyst]

● 504 9.1 metres and is 9.7 metres by the buoys. The port has a floating crane with a capacity of thirty tons; a derrick with a capacity of eighty tons; seven general wharves, which cover an area of 13,000 square metres, are equipped with cranes with a capacity of up to eight tons and are served by the railway; and eight warehouses with an area of altogether 18,600 square metres.

According to authoritative sources, the port installations of Basra have been improved greatly in recent years by the addition of approximately 600 metres of docking space, by new cranes and more railway lines. The port of Basra is equipped with tugs and many barges and lighters; it also has a life-boat and two barges for life-saving, some divers and workshops for minor repairs. A railway links the port to Baghdad. Ma'agil has a modern airport.

The anchorage at Fao has a wooden jetty with a depth of 0.91 metres, and there is also a five-ton mobile crane and a repair shop for the dredgers.[3]

505 The port of Basra is in regular shipping communication with the United Kingdom, the United States, various European countries, India and the ports of the Persian Gulf. Basra is a regular port of call of many foreign shipping companies. Attempts to set up an Iraqi merchant marine have not yet succeeded.

503 Apart from the maintenance of the Ruka Channel, funds have been allocated for the purchase of new dredgers, in order to dig a new, more direct channel south of the existing one.

A 206 communications with Pakistan, India, the USSR, various European countries and the United States of America. Kabul has a radio station broadcasting 207 in the Pushtu language.

IV. GENERAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS

ME 101 Geographers point out that formidable mountain barriers, which can only be crossed by difficult passes, separate Asia Minor from Asia proper and that the latter really begins only at the Mesopotamia plateau. As a matter of fact, although forming part of the same geographical group, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, generally speaking, have no natural connexions with each other. Furthermore, there is often no cohesion between the various regions in each of these countries.

241 From ancient times, the three countries have been essentially agricultural and they still remain so. The main occupation of the population, largely nomad, is agriculture and stock-raising.

I 489 ● [504] [315] In different ways and to varying degrees, the economy of these countries is seriously handicapped by the lack of means of communication. Iraq, as we have seen, has for its foreign trade the excellent deep port of Basra, with its modern installations, and a long river channel, the Shatt al-Arab, linking it to the Persian Gulf. However, there are permanent obstructions at the river mouth which are a constant preoccupation to the Basra port authorities. In the case of crude petroleum, Iraq's chief export, the transport problem has been solved by the construction of the remarkable pipe-lines which vastly facilitate operations, save time and reduce cost. Lastly,

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf discussed as one geographical unit rather than by political boundary, see Ml Middle East, Cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see Ml Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

499 capital rendered abortive; and a successor enterprise in 1890 was no more fortunate. At the close of the century talk of the 'Baghdad Railway' was more than ever persistent since, from the year 1888, the Germans had begun their career of Eastern ambition. The completion by the 'Ottoman Company of Anatolian Railways' of its line to Ankara in 1893 was followed by its prolongation to Konia in 1896; and in the same year permission was obtained for an extension to Diyarbakr, and ultimately through 'Iraq. But immediate Russian objection was raised, the proposed alignment by Diyarbakr was abandoned, and a pause of two years followed. Thereafter the Kaiser paid the second of his visits to the Ottoman dominions, swore devotion to the Caliph and to Islam, and secured in 1899 the arrangement of a draft concession for a line from Konia to Mosul, Baghdad, and the Persian Gulf. A German envoy visited 'Iraq to report on routes, a German cruiser appeared in the Gulf, and a technical Commission in 1900 toured the probable alignment through 'Iraq to Kuwayt, where British suspicions were abruptly aroused. Meanwhile the diplomats of Turkey and Germany met to prepare a definitive convention, watched with interest from Whitehall and Delhi. The public of 'Iraq, far from these conclaves, had as yet seen no enterprise on steel rails more imposing than the Baghdad–Kadhimiya horse tramway, relic of Midhat Pasha.

505 The natural highways of 'Iraq had been, since the dawn of history, its great rivers, and on these the dozen types of sailing-boat and skiff, raft and coracle still plied. But since the eighteen-forties steam navigation on the rivers had played its part in 'Iraq economics. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, formed in 1861 by the Lynch family and managed in Baghdad and Baṣra by companies bearing their name, had maintained a Tigris service for two generations, interrupted only by the obstructions of an officialdom dully resentful of foreign enterprise, by the low-water difficulties of navigation, and by the rifle-fire of riverain tribesmen. The Firman of authority, dating from 1834, seemed to limit the Company to simultaneous use of two steamers,[1] and the Lynch efforts were ceaseless for authority to increase this number and to employ barges. Their interests were, from 1879 onwards, closely associated with the British India Steam Navigation Company. Various Turkish or 'Iraqi single-ship enterprises had been amalgamated, a generation earlier, into a single 'Oman-Ottoman Administration', under the Turkish Ministry of Marine. Its fleet of small, barely river-worthy steamers took about half of the total

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[1] The *City of London* launched in 1862 was lost in 1881, the *Dijla* launched in 1865 was lost in 1876. The *Blosse Lynch* (1878), *Khalifa* (1880), and *Mejidieh* (1882) were in service in 1900.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

505 traffic. One or two free-lance enterprises were additional to these—a Baṣra-owned steamer plying to Baghdad, another weekly from Baghdad to Samarrā; many abortive projects had been formed for larger development. The Saniya Administration had advanced plans, in 1890, for an extended service to include voyages to Mosul and even to Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and a new survey of the Euphrates was ordered in preparation for free navigation from Maskana or Jarablus to Baṣra. Nothing resulted from these projects, but the advancing shadow of the Baghdad Railway, with which their authors loved to connect them, gave encouragement. A shipbuilding yard was established at Baghdad in 1890.

304 The port of Baṣra, sole sea gateway of 'Iraq, carried by far the greatest part of its trade and traffic, of which in 1900 a negligible part was other than British or British-Indian. Russian and German trade was not yet established, while the 'Iraqis contributed little to the movements of the port. The Shaṭṭ al-'Arab waterway, thanks to survey and buoying by British hands, gave access and security to anchorages opposite the 'Ashar and Khandaq creeks which connected it with Baṣra city. The management of the port was primitive, quarantine and customs provisions inept, vexatious, and venal. No wharves, cranes, sheds or other port equipment were provided; loading and discharging overside to and from lighters in midstream were slow and costly operations.

206 Since the 'sixties of the century 'Iraq had had its place in the world's telegraphic system. It was connected through Fao with India, through Mosul and Jazira-ibn-'Umar with the rest of Turkey, through Khaniqin (or through Fao and Bushire) with Persia. The handling of traffic was slow and unreliable. But the extension of the system to most parts of 'Iraq, vulnerable and faltering as it was, and with Kurdish districts still unpenetrated, had yet done
205 much to assist administration and to modernize society. Postal services dated in some form from the eighteenth century. In the 'sixties of the nineteenth, British-Indian steamers began to carry the Indian and European mails to Baṣra, where the service connected with the river steamers. The Indian Post Offices opened in 1868. The British camel mail to Damascus, discontinued in 1886 after a century of service, was replaced by a Turkish mail along the same route, carried by 'Aniza tribal riders. The time-honoured horse-borne Tatar mail left Baghdad every Monday for Istanbul, by way of Mosul and Diyarbakr.

7. THE GOVERNMENT

631 The enormous difficulties of governing the three wilayas arose, it is now clear, from a complex of elements. The territory was ill provided with means of communication, and much of it was

less a prospect of the completion of the railway, object of so many 499 648x
hopes and fears for twenty years.

Meissner Pasha, brilliant and dynamic, polished Orientalist and 499
courtier, appeared in Baghdad in July 1911 and opened his offices in the house of Kadhim Pasha, destined but ten years later to accommodate the British High Commission and later Embassy. The site of the future railway station was selected on the right bank, and the first sod for the projected first section of the line, from Baghdad to Samarrā, was cut in the Wali's presence in July 1912. Difficulties of labour and of river transport, of docks and barges were somehow overcome. The hair of Meissner Pasha turned, as Lorimer reported, from black to white in three years of struggle; but forty-one miles of line to Sumayka were finished in May 1914, and eighty to Samarrā a few weeks after the declaration of war.

The history of river steam-navigation in this period is closely 505
tied to that of the Railway. A clause in the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1903 alarmed both the Lynchs' Euphrates and Tigris Company and the Oman-Ottoman Administration by its threat of privileged competition; but it was never applied. In 1904 the Saniya Administration, for a derisory payment, took over from the Oman-Ottoman their whole fleet and equipment which included four passenger steamers—*Baghdadi*, *Furat*, *Rasafa*, *Mosul*—and a number of smaller craft. The Ḥamidiya Navigation Administration, now so named, proceeded next to bring into service two new and relatively palatial Scottish-built paddle-steamers, the *Hamidiya* and *Burhaniya*, which Oman-Ottoman had ordered three years before, and four new barges. It operated during its five years of life with a greater efficiency than its predecessor; an English visitor, indeed, pronounced it in 1908 'wonderfully well run', and prophesied its final displacement of the Lynch boats, unless the Railway should first displace both. The Lynch Company meanwhile strove continually for greater freedom of development, which was tenaciously withheld, though a third steamer was permitted to sail regularly after 1907. The difficulties of low-water Tigris navigation and the tribal insecurity above and below 'Amara at times stopped all traffic and distracted the Lynch managers, Mr. Parry and Mr. Tod. The *Julnar*, the most pretentious of their fleet, was acquired in 1908; the other Lynch steamers already time-honoured (*Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*) continued in service under their tough veteran officers and Tall Kayfi crews. Free lances on the river—two Shi'i merchants and a head of the rich Khudhayri (Khedery) family—continued to take a share of the traffic, and schemes for further competition, such as that of an Anglo-Greek combine in 1905, were not infrequent. The Turkish revolution led to a retransfer of the Ḥamidiya Administration steamers from the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

505 Privy Purse to an organization of the central Government, the Ottoman River (Nahriya) Administration; but the service deteriorated in spite of new and important units acquired in 1912, the *Basra* and the *Baghdad*. Negotiations for a merger between Lynch and the Nahriya were persistent after 1909, but were long delayed by strong hostile outcry, both locally and in Istanbul, against such an example of foreign dominance, and were incomplete on the outbreak of war.

505 648x The subject, indeed, was among those covered by the never-ratified Anglo-Turkish Agreement of May 1913. This provided that, in the interests of the steamers, no 'navigable streams' were to be diverted from their courses; navigation rights were to be awarded for sixty years to a new Ottoman River Navigation Company, to be formed upon a basis of equal participation by Turkish and British interests. A fourth steamer (but under the Turkish flag) was to be allowed to the Euphrates Company. But while this arrangement was acceptable to the Baghdad Railway Company, which guaranteed the new Company a high minimum of tonnage, the damage to Lynch interests was clear. This in turn was met by a further agreement of March 1914 which was to bring the Lynch interest itself into the Ottoman Navigation Company. The Railway's rights of port-construction at Baṣra were to be passed to an Ottoman Port Company with participation for each of Lynch, Lord Inchcape, and the British India interests, and the Baghdad Railway. World events, however, were to prevent any of these arrangements from coming into force; before the end of 1914 German and Turkish interest in Tigris steam navigation was for ever extinguished.

Meanwhile, the immediate task of moving the Baghdad Railway materials from Baṣra led to the formation in 1912 of an *ad hoc* company, the Société de Transports Fluviaux en Orient, with equal participation of the Lynch Company and the Deutsche Bank; it acquired suitable small craft for its purposes, and was controlled locally by the Euphrates and Tigris management.

312 In the all-important sphere of irrigation, the new century was to see great and promising developments. The year 1900 and succeeding years found, indeed, the same evils as ever flourishing unchecked: disastrous annual flooding, deficiency of irrigation water in the season of greatest need, lack of control, lack of drainage. The same helplessness of the unled and unrecognized cultivators, the same archaic methods, the same vague and abortive projects formed in high circles, continued to provide no practical cure. Conditions in the mid-Euphrates area turned from bad to worse, with lands abandoned, canals drying, and tribes fighting for existence. The Hindiya Barrage again partially collapsed in 1903

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The railways, when at their greatest

extent they were handed over by the Army in April 1920, consisted 496 of nearly 1,000 miles of track.[1] The absorption into the 'Iraq economy of this rapidly constructed and ill-equipped system, with its decrepit engines and rolling-stock and an alignment designed to serve military purposes, was to be no easy task. The Director in 1919–20 was Colonel G. Lubbock. The labour which the Railway used was, at this stage, almost entirely Indian.

The financial procedures for handing over to a Civil Administra- 000 tion the capital works constructed from Army funds were the subject of a mission sent to 'Iraq under Sir John Hewitt; the assets were valued at £2 million, excluding the Railway, and had mostly taken forms unrelated to civilian needs. The giant river fleet of the 505 (military) Inland Water Transport, on the other hand, was never 471 transferred to the Administration nor were its units sold locally by auction, as was the great mass of unneeded military stores. They were instead, amid storms of protest from the Civil Commissioner and 'Iraqi and British commercial interests, disposed of at Bombay by Lord Inchcape on behalf of the British Government. The civilian Tigris fleet was thereafter by degrees reduced to its pre-war scale. The Lynch (Euphrates and Tigris) Company had lost the *Julnar* and some minor craft, but in 1920 acquired the imposing *Zenobia* and *Zobaida* (both built in 1916), modernized its equipment and installations, and retained in operation the veteran *Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*, and the *Malamir* from their pre-war Karun service. The Lynch management of the E.T.S.N. Company's fleet was after 1919 merged in a fusion of their interests with those of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., forming the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation—'Mespers'—at Baghdad and Baṣra. Local competition on the river was no longer Government-organized, and most of the pre-war vessels had disappeared;[2] but it still handled an appreciable share of the traffic.

In the provincial Government, a close approximation to the 635 Turkish administrative units was retained. The Division repre- 631 sented usually the former sanjaq or liwā, and the District the qadhā, while the naḥiyas were little changed. The sixteen Divisions

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[1] The mileages of metre-gauge line were: Baghdad–Baṣra 352 miles, Baghdad–Persian frontier 130, Baghdad–Kut 158, Zubayr–Jabal Sanam 23, Ur–Naṣiriya 10, Qaraghan (on the Khaniqin line) to Kinqarban (outside Kifri) 23, with 36 miles in the port area of Baṣra and Ma'qil. The standard-gauge line, Baghdad–Sharqaṭ, was of 186 miles; the narrow-gauge, Baghdad–Kifl 21, and Baghdad–Faluja 38.

[2] The *Baghdadi*, Asfar's *Étoile de l'Orient*, the *Furat*, the *Risafa*, and a number of German-owned launches of the Société de Transports Fluviaux, had been sunk by the Turks to block waterways and impede British operations. The *Basra* was sent to Europe but did not get farther than Malta. The *Barhaniya* and *Hamidiya* were blown up by the Turks to avoid capture. The *Baghdad* reached Mosul—the first steamer to do so—and was there captured by the British.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

[illegible]

reconstructed, offices multiplied, and a mid-desert wireless-station 206 was installed at Ruṭba.

Tigris river navigation did not, and was unlikely to, exceed 505 substantially its pre-1914 scale. The pace was slow, navigation difficult and the Railway in powerful rivalry. The 'Euphrates and Tigris' fleet, managed by 'Mespers', still handled the bulk of the traffic, with its three ancient and two modern paddle-steamers (p. 111). These were increased in 1924 by the acquisition of two stern-wheelers, the *Kadri* and the *Ihsan* both built in 1918, and of the 1908-built *Baghdad*, originally owned by the Idara Nahriya. These three had belonged to the long-established Khudhayri company which was absorbed by 'Euphrates and Tigris' in 1924. A few other Khudhayri boats remained in commission, and the Royal Air Force maintained both the Inland Water Transport dockyard at Baṣra and a few vessels for their own supplies. The 504 Port of Baṣra, administered by J. C. Ward as Port Director under the Finance Ministry of the 'Iraq Government since 1920, was still in 1926 owned by the British Government pending completion of capital repayment by instalments and the creation of a Port Trust. From 1922 onwards the Port was organized on a permanent and self-supporting peace-time basis and supplied all normal facilities both for 'Iraqi trade and for the oil-tanker fleet of Abadan. In 1923 it undertook, by a loan from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the dredging of a deep channel through the Fao bar which before 1920 was impassable at high water by any ship drawing more than 20 feet. The agreement provided for a channel of 28-foot depth at high water and 300-foot width, and 12 miles long. Work began in 1924, and the Rooka Channel of these dimensions was opened for traffic in 1926.

The status of 'Iraq Railways, directed by J. R. Tainsh since 1921, 496 was similar to that of the Port: they were British-owned and after 1923 'Iraqi-administered with the aid of British executives and technicians, in anticipation of future purchase and adjustment. The Baṣra–Baghdad line was reopened in April 1921, and thereafter a Musaiyib–Karbalā extension, a line from Mafraq to the Hindiya Barrage and spurs giving access to Khaniqin and to Baṣra city were completed between 1921 and 1924. The Kut–Baghdad line, the Jabal Sanam quarry line south of Zubayr, and that from near Khaniqin to the Persian frontier at Tiaruq (Qurait) were closed in the same period. Permanent bridges were built in 1924 and 1925 at the Euphrates crossings and an extension from the Khaniqin line across the Diyalā to Kifri and Kirkuk was finished in 1925. The main workshops were brought from Shu'ayba to Shalchiya, in the western outskirts of Baghdad, in the same year. The Tigris wagon-ferry link at Baghdad between the

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

494 were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into
499 the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at
Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty &
Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932. A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the 'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The 'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a direct Baghdad–'Amman route, and the first experiments in developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

505 The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their
local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and road competition, and had little scope for development. The veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927, *Mejidieh* in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S.16* and *S.14* were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris* in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after
503 1929. At Basra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928–30. They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 20 feet in 1920) and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port
505 traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from
Abadan, but the Shatt was used regularly also by the Strick, British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German) Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of
504 Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most
imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930 Treaty, was not yet in sight.

496 The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful.
471 Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

appointingly, carried little traffic other than some oil supplies to 499
northern Persia. Following completion of the great Faluja bridge [494]
(p. 208) other steel bridges were constructed: on the Lesser Zab at Altun Kupri, the Greater Zab at Aski Kellek, and elsewhere. In Baghdad the replacement of the two pontoon crossings by permanent steel bridges was at last decided, and contracts were awarded to Messrs. Holloway Bros. in 1936, a major step in the development of the capital. The new spans of the Mosul bridge were finished. Municipal street-making proceeded everywhere, and not least in Baghdad.

Little changed in the field of Tigris river navigation. Fears that 505
the Kut barrage would make steamship navigation impossible 504
were aroused but could be allayed; a move made in 1934 by local rivals to question the rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Company led to nothing. River traffic on the whole diminished. The *Zobaida* was sold to India in 1935, the *Blosse Lynch* and *Tigris* as scrap in the same year and the *Khalifa* in 1937. In 1936 the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation split again into its original components, the Lynch Company and Messrs. Gray Mackenzie. Four small gunboats were acquired by Government in 1937 for riverain police work, but were little used. The Port of Baṣra rendered steady service to the country. Its volume of traffic permitted it to pay regularly its capital instalments to the British Government, and by 1937 a debt of only £300,000 remained. The Port Trust, to be set up under the 1930 Treaty, did not appear; the Port was still administered by a Directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Its bar-dredging scheme operated with great success, repaid its loans, and kept open and improved the deep channel.[1] Two new dredgers were acquired. The Port administration completed a modern airport at Baṣra, furnished with a hotel and all facilities, and provided Baṣra city and suburbs with electric power and a modern water-supply. The ocean traffic using the Port increased substantially after 1935: first two, and later four, Japanese lines appeared, with one each of German, Indian, and Italian ownership and an occasional Russian, Swedish, and Greek steamer. The great bulk of the tonnage remained, as of old, British and British-Indian.

The 'Iraq Railways maintained their solvency and functions in 496
spite of tribal interference, fluctuating traffic, largely obsolescent equipment, and serious road competition. The operation of the system was modernized as far as was practicable, and a rapid Baghdad–Baṣra daily service introduced. Negotiations with the

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[1] The low-water depths in the Rooka channel (p. 208), achieved by successive phases of the bar-dredging scheme, were in 1926, 18 ft., in 1928–9, 20ft., in 1935–8, 23 or 24 ft.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years. The loans, regarded as experimental, were well received but too small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year and handled Government accounts; by 1945 its trading began to show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry, was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch in Baghdad in the same year.

722 The material development of the territory, which proceeded
496 hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the
end of the war. But 'Iraq was at least fortunate in that, far from
a record of destruction or retrogression—the common fate of
Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its
communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented
by war-time loans from the military authorities, current main-
tenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment
from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of
imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—
notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for
movement to Baṣra—were amicably handled. The military Kut–
499 'Aziziya–Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was
possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major
development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge
(in replacement of the old waggon-ferry), a bridge at Musayib to
give access to Karbalā, a modern station and office block and new
marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the
line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lesser Zab bridge.[1]

722 The important developments at the Port of Baṣra and its vicinity
504 carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and
approaches, storage facilities, the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab bridge, and a
Ma'qil–Ahwaz railway line. Considerable parts of these additions
survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties
at Umm Qaṣr on the Khawr 'Abdullah, and the railway joining
these to Baṣra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris
river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy
of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance
505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again
dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

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[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–Homs line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Karbalā–Najf–Kufa line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–Diyarbakr connexion. None of these materialized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Lynch fleet had been diminished in 1938 by the loss of the 505
Mejidieh, sold to Anglo-Iranian, and in 1941 by that of the
Malamir and the *al-Kadri*, burnt out and scrapped respectively.
Their rivals, notably Ḥannā al-Shaykh and 'Abd al-Karim
Khuḍhayri (Khedery), were more than holding their own: but the
competition of the railway and the roads must grow rather than
diminish. To the road system, indeed, Paiforce contributed much, 491
notably in the completed trans-desert highway to Jordan, in the
re-surfacing of many road stretches, and in the maintenance in
being of 'Iraqi transport fleets by the provision of tyres. Nevertheless,
the upkeep of civil motor vehicles in war-time proved most 494
difficult, and the numbers in use decreased. The air communications
of the territory were not improved during the war; but before 509
its end projects for a national air line were under formation. The
European services crossing and visiting 'Iraq recommenced in
1945 after war-time curtailments, and the Egyptian Misr Airways
restarted its Cairo–Baghdad service. A contract was given in 1945
to the Marconi Company for the erection of a new wireless transmitting
station.

The course of foreign trade was notably deflected from its usual 439
channels by the war. In 1939 the United Kingdom was its principal
customer, followed by the United States, each of these
countries taking approximately one-third of the total visible
exports; but by 1944 the principal buyer was Palestine with Transjordan,
followed by Persia. Visible exports, amounting to ID 4
million before the war, reached through enhanced prices ID 9
million before its end. The transit trade, reduced in 1939 to a
value of some ID 3 million, reached ID 13 million five years later,
thanks to the passage of goods to Russia. Imports rose from a
value of ID 9 million before the war to ID 14 million in its last
year; the United Kingdom's share in these fell from 33 to 11 per
cent., that of Japan from 18 per cent. to nothing, while India's
share rose from 8 to 30 per cent., Syria's from 2 to 16, the United
States' from 8 to 12.

The desire for industrial expansion, always a cherished ambition, 433
was stimulated by the war-time shortages and an increased local
market; contrary factors were the shortage of raw materials, competition
for skilled workers, and the impossibility of importing
factory equipment. Of the seventy enterprises benefiting in 1944
from the law of 1929 most were on the humblest scale, with the
importance only of pilot projects which could indicate to the
middle class the possibility of a career outside Government service,
the professions, or politics. Some war-time progress was made in
brick manufacture; workshops produced hand-tools from scrap
metal; the crushing of oil-seeds—cotton, sesame, and linseed—

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

504 [503] considered project; and meanwhile, Fao bar-dredging operations, designed to maintain a low-water depth of 23 feet in a substantially widened Rooka channel, proceeded throughout 1943 to 1950. But heavy floods and consequent silt movement caused serious difficulties and, the existing channel proving barely maintainable, the project of a new channel re-aligned in terms of the changed sea-bed conditions was in 1951 under close consideration. To its realization—the more necessary since 'Iraq's own oil traffic from the Zubayr field was likely to increase many-fold—the loss of the rich Abadan tanker revenue was a serious impediment;[1] but in general the future of the vital Fao channel, and indeed that of the Port in general, was under wise and far-sighted review.

505 The tonnage of steamers using the Port was more than half—and in some years more than two-thirds—British, with Dutch, American, Greek, Swedish, and Norwegian shipping well represented. The establishment of an all-'Iraqi Shipping Company continued to be an object of ambition among the interested and the nationally-minded, as a means of undercutting the freight rates charged by foreign lines. The post of Port Director was assumed, after two short tenures, in 1947 by Colonel G. T. Johnson, and in 1951 by R. C. Kelt. Accelerated steps were taken from 1948 onwards for the training, largely in Europe, of 'Iraqis for all posts in the administration, including the highest: an 'Iraqi Port Director was a probability of the near future.

Though transport by the 'Iraq waterways had as ever its irreplaceable part both in the lives of the riverain towns and as a main Baṣra–Baghdad artery, available traffic did not permit—as for a generation it had not permitted, save in war-time—any considerable development of the Tigris steamships. Military transport ceasing with the war, and competition by road and rail and air ever increasing, the Euphrates and Tigris Company in 1946 disposed of most of its surviving fleet, including the *Zenobia*; and early in 1951 it went into voluntary liquidation and sold the bulk of its towing-units and barges to its principal local competitor, Ḥannā al-Shaykh. The latter and members of the Khuḍhayri family remained active on the river to fill the place which, after ninety years, was now abandoned as unprofitable by the Lynch enterprise.

496 499 The 'Iraq Railways, which had embarked in 1945 (p. 320) on important projects of construction, were faced also by a heavy programme of needed rehabilitation, improvement of services, and addition to rolling-stock. The five following years saw the com-

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[1] The action of the Persian Government in bringing its oil industry to a standstill involved, besides its own ruin, a loss of at least £1 million a year to the finances of Baṣra Port and its dredging scheme.

'IRAQ

175* 439 British mercantile line on the Tigris[1] and for a further expansion of British commerce which, advancing far beyond the days when Basra had first been a centre for part of the Gulf trade, contributed not a little to the predominant position and influence which Great Britain exercised in Turkish Arabia. In 1911 and 1912, imports through Basra and Baghdad averaged for each of the two years, £3,100,000, of which the great proportion were British and Indian goods destined for re-export to Persia by way of Kermanshah. Exports by sea for the same years averaged £3,247,500.[2]

175* 525 The transportation of practically all of these commodities was in British or Anglo-Indian bottoms, while the handling of the largest proportion of the entire river transport had come into the hands of the firm of Lynch Brothers, who from 1860 had assumed the local management of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. It had enjoyed a virtual monopoly until the advent of Midhat Pasha's river service. In spite of constant interference from the Turkish authorities,[3] the company carried on a comparatively efficient service, although at high rates. It also maintained, with a Government subsidy, a line of steamers on the Kārūn River, after it had been opened by the Shah of Persia in 1888.

175* So strategically placed were the river valleys, so firmly was external trade regarded as a British monopoly, so paramount was British influence that British statesmen had come to regard

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[1] This mercantile service was maintained from 1836 on the Tigris, ostensibly under the *firmān* (following the Arabic فرمان) originally granted in 1834 to the British Government for the operation of two steamers for commercial purposes on the Euphrates in connection with the Euphrates Expedition of that year. (Herslet, *Commercial Treaties* (1820-1925), Vol. XIII, pp. 838-9). Just how this *firmān* could be applied to the Tigris is not easily understood. Neither the subsequent one of 1842 (ibid., p. 839) nor the Vizierial Letter of 1861 (ibid., p. 845) defined clearly the rights and privileges which the company exercised and claimed.

[2] *Report on the Conditions of Trade in Mesopotamia* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 13.

[3] Other than purely political reports, the difficulties of the company with Turkish officials occupied more dispatches from the Resident at Baghdad to the Foreign Office than any other subject.

504 ***Staff***

The Port Directorate has done its best to train Iraqi personnel in every level of employment. It takes time to develop the highly specialized skills required but the training process is well advanced. In May 1951 two senior and seven assistant posts of primary importance remained unoccupied in the Port Administration, and two senior and two assistant posts of the same urgency were unfilled in the Bar Dredging Scheme offices. These should be filled promptly for a period of years by qualified foreign nominees. The training of Iraqi staff members in the Port's own territory and abroad should be continued and extended as much as is practical.

In summary, the Mission's recommendations concerning the Port's development problems are:

1. The training program to overcome the shortage of technical staff experienced in port operation, administration, maintenance and construction should be continued and expanded as much as possible.
2. The dredging of the new entrance channel should be carried out.
3. Construction of a new port at Umm Qasr should not be undertaken.

II. Maritime Shipping

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The Port of Basra is extremely well served by many experienced world shipping lines. There is, therefore, no justification for the creation of an Iraq shipping line. Coastal shipping is nonexistent, since Iraq possesses only one port and neighboring countries can provide no traffic for such a venture.

III. Inland Water Transport

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Nature has provided Iraq with a number of important waterways in its two large rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and their many tributaries. Until a few years ago, the Tigris, in its lower reaches in the plains, was navigable at all seasons from

above Baghdad to Basra, but this is no longer so. The variations 503 in the flow of water are wide, floods occur at high water, there is heavy silting at low water, the river bed steadily rises and the curvature increases more and more—features typical of the behavior of rivers which remain untrained for centuries.

The Port Directorate of Basra has control over inland navigation. The control is nominal, however, and is limited to the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad and the Gharraf canal, a tributary joining at Kut. There is a separate budget for the purpose but it amounts to only a few thousand dinars annually, spent on navigation aids, few and far apart. The last remaining regular naviga- [505] tion company, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, ceased operations in 1949, and only small private concerns continue to operate barges which are mostly propelled by low-powered motor launches.

At the present time the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels up to four feet draught during the seven months from February to August, except for short flood periods in April and May in some years. Navigation during the remaining five months, September to January, is impeded for long periods by:

1. Low water in the Narrows in the lower reaches below Amara, for periods up to three weeks,
2. Low water at Amara, causing the floating bridge to ground, for periods up to six weeks,
3. Closure of the Kut barrage lock for irrigation requirements, for periods up to eight weeks.

Between seasons the water levels vary up to 25 feet at Baghdad, up to 35 feet south of Kut barrage and up to 7 feet at the Narrows.

Inland water transport has ceased to be a factor of importance in the country's transport system. The waters of the rivers are used primarily for irrigation and their flow is controlled only with a view to serving irrigation requirements. In the future irrigation will continue to have the principal claim on the available water supply. This does not mean, however, that a revival of inland navigation will be incompatible with irrigation. In the monograph on flood control and irrigation it has already been pointed out that measures to control the dissipation of water from the lower reaches

504 9.1 metres and is 9.7 metres by the buoys. The port has a floating crane with a capacity of thirty tons; a derrick with a capacity of eighty tons; seven general wharves, which cover an area of 13,000 square metres, are equipped with cranes with a capacity of up to eight tons and are served by the railway; and eight warehouses with an area of altogether 18,600 square metres.

According to authoritative sources, the port installations of Basra have been improved greatly in recent years by the addition of approximately 600 metres of docking space, by new cranes and more railway lines. The port of Basra is equipped with tugs and many barges and lighters; it also has a life-boat and two barges for life-saving, some divers and workshops for minor repairs. A railway links the port to Baghdad. Ma'agil has a modern airport.

The anchorage at Fao has a wooden jetty with a depth of 0.91 metres, and there is also a five-ton mobile crane and a repair shop for the dredgers.[8]

505 The port of Basra is in regular shipping communication with the United Kingdom, the United States, various European countries, India and the ports of the Persian Gulf. Basra is a regular port of call of many foreign shipping companies. Attempts to set up an Iraqi merchant marine have not yet succeeded.

503 Apart from the maintenance of the Ruka Channel, funds have been allocated for the purchase of new dredgers, in order to dig a new, more direct channel south of the existing one.

Inland Navigation

505 Apart from the Shatt al-Arab, which, for the purposes of navigation, is treated as being one with the port of Basra, inland navigation exists only on the Tigris, the Euphrates and on the Shatt al-Gharraf, a tributary of the Tigris, although owing to the permanent alluvial deposit the two rivers last mentioned are navigable by small sailing boats only. By contrast, the Tigris carries a lively traffic serving the agricultural region between Baghdad and Basra. As a rule, the Tigris is navigable throughout the year by vessels with a draught not exceeding 1.2 metres. The upper Tigris, between Baghdad and Mosul, is navigable by small vessels under conditions which are often difficult in the flood season.

The tonnage of Iraqi river vessels amounted to 60,000 tons in 1939 and consisted of six steamboats, numerous tugs, barges, lighters and other craft. In 1945-46, the number of river craft consisted of 181 small steam and motor boats with a total tonnage of 11,051 tons, 2,208 small vessels (including 462 barges) with a total tonnage of 149,724 tons and 312 small motor vessels for passenger transport.

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[a] For particulars relating to the ports of Abadan and Khurramshahr, see the chapter dealing with Iran (pp. 26-36).

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

● 505 In 1947, the number of steam and motor boats fell slightly to 172 vessels with a total tonnage of 10,645 tons. On the other hand, the number of special motor boats for passenger transport increased to 388.

Railways

496 The railway network and railway transport in Iraq are not yet sufficiently developed; but the authorities are making considerable efforts to remedy this state of affairs.

[471] In 1902 the Germans obtained a concession for building the Istanbul—Baghdad railway line—the "Baghdad Bahn"—a project in keeping with the *Drang nach Osten;* they began the work in 1903, but had only completed a few sections by the eve of the First World War. The work resumed under very different conditions after the First World War, and was completed in July 1940, when the Baiji—Mosul—Tel Kochek section was opened in the territory of Iraq.

[655] The Iraqi railway network, which is owned by the State, now consists of the following lines:

491 the main roads Baghdad–Kut–Amara–Basra and Baghdad–Kirkuk–Irbil–Mosul, which are at present unmetalled or only partially metalled. The Development Board has allocated nearly ID27 million to these projects.

493 494 Road traffic is light. At the beginning of 1953 the number of registered motor vehicles was given as follows, most of them operating in or around the larger towns: private cars 8,000; taxis 3,500; buses 2,900; lorries 6,500; motor cycles 1,900. In Baghdad an efficient bus service is operated by a State Passenger Transport Board. A private cross-desert bus service links Baghdad with Damascus, and there are private bus services between Iraq and Persia.

504 505 *Basra Port,*[1] lying some eighty miles up the Shatt al-Arab from the Persian Gulf, is the only commercial port of Iraq; an oil port is being constructed at Fao, near the mouth of the Shatt. A small port established during the Second World War at Umm Qasr, on a sea inlet south of the Shatt al-Arab entrance, has since been dismantled. The authority of the Port, which is controlled by a special department of the Iraq Government, extends from the outer bar of the Shatt to a point seventeen miles above the town of Basra. The Shatt is sufficiently deep to admit large ocean-going vessels, but the Fao bar at its mouth requires constant dredging to clear an entrance for the larger of them. During the Second World War extensions were carried out in view of the increased volume of traffic; in consequence there are now 4,500 feet of continuous jetty, providing berthing for eight large vessels at a time and two or three smaller ones, in addition to barge and lighterage berths. Basra Port handles a large proportion of the country's trade. During 1952 some 400 ocean-going vessels, with a net registered tonnage of 1,132,000, and some 260 tankers and water-carriers, with a net registered tonnage of 927,000, were handled by the Port Authority in Basra, Fao, Abadan, and Khorramshahr. During the financial year 1951–2 cargo imported at Basra totalled 511,600 tons and [651] cargo exported 800,000 tons. The closure of Abadan has occasioned the Port a severe loss of revenue, estimated at ID100,000 a month; port and dredging facilities have nevertheless been maintained.

502 *Inland Waterways.* The Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels of up to four feet draught from February to August except for short flood periods in April and May in some years; during the remaining five months navigation is impeded for long periods. Inland water transport has lost much of its former importance. The last remaining regular navigation

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[1] See *Port of Basrah,* official publication of the Port Authority.

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5: Harrison D-4 (1919-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

facing p. 120



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BASRA CUSTOM HOUSES

pal population centers and radiate from 489
Baghdad and Mosul to cities in Syria, Iran 491
and Turkey. The Tigris is navigable to 505
barges from Basra to Baghdad throughout
the year, and to smaller craft as far as
Mosul during the high-water season. The
Shatt al Arab is open to ocean-going vessels,
and Basra, about 85 miles from the
Persian Gulf, is one of the major ports of
the Middle East. A government-operated 496
railroad, part of the famous "Berlin to
Baghdad" railway, runs from Basra to
Baghdad and Mosul, with connections
through Aleppo to Istanbul. A branch line
extends from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and
Khanaquin. A government-owned airline 509
serves Iraq and the neighboring countries,
while international lines from Europe to
Africa and the Far East stop at Baghdad
and Basra.

FOOD AND NUTRITION

The nutrition of the people is governed 146
by the cultural habits of the different racial
and social communities, the economic status
of the individual families and the food supplies
available under diverse climatic conditions.
Undernutrition is prevalent among
the poorer inhabitants—tenant cultivators,
urban laborers and nomadic tribes—who
make up over three quarters of the population.
Wheat, barley, rice and dates are the 241
staple food crops of the country, while vegetables
and fruits, other than dates, are frequently
scarce. Wheat is widely grown, primarily
in the rainfall areas of the north,
but also in the irrigated riverain zones of
the south. Barley is cultivated extensively,
and, like wheat, is used in the preparation [262]
of breads and of *burghul*, a coarse-grained
cereal product typical of this region. Millet
and maize are common crops in the south.
Rice is produced in certain lowland districts
in the Kurdish highlands and on the fringes
of the southern marshes, and is a popular
food among all sections of the population.
Peas, beans and lentils are usually consumed
throughout the year, and tomatoes,
eggplant and different root and green vege-

p. 25(a)

000 years. The infection is believed to be enzootic
164 among the field rodents in sections
133 of the eastern and the southern provinces,
505 since outbreaks have sometimes coincided
with floods which caused the rats to seek
shelter in the villages. It has also been
introduced on occasion by way of steamer
traffic through Basra and the river towns.
164 With the exception of 34 cases, associated
with a localized outbreak in the vicinity of
Amarah in 1945, no instance of human
plague was reported from 1937 through
1952. The 1945 outbreak started in a small
village on the edge of the marshes near
Amarah, in which 16 cases and 4 deaths
were recorded within a period of 20 days.
164 Quarantine measures were enforced by the
744 government health organization and the
Allied military authorities. DDT spraying
was resisted by the inhabitants, who fled
to the marshes, and the most seriously infected
village was finally evacuated and
burned to the ground.

In Baghdad and Basra, captured rats are often examined for the presence of plague, but rodent control is not attempted in the various cities and towns unless an epidemic is threatened. Plague-infected rats were found in Baghdad up to 1938.

164 Relapsing Fever. Both louse-borne and tick-borne relapsing fever are sporadic: from 25 to 100 cases are usually reported each year. Small localized outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever occur from time to time, primarily in the northern provinces. More extensive outbreaks were recorded in 1945-47, undoubtedly part of the epidemic wave which swept through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46. According to official statistics, 243 cases were treated in government institutions in 1945, 334 in 1946 and 379 in 1947, in contrast with 52 cases in 1944 and 26 to 33 in 1948-49.

Occasional cases of tick-borne relapsing
fever are encountered in northern Iraq.
[134] *Ornithodorus tholozani* is regarded as the
probable vector.

164
329 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis

p. 46 (A)

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Air-
ways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air com-
munications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was com-
pleted in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for pack-
ages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold con-
cession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

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

40°
42°
RAILWAYS
ROADS
METALLED
UNMETALLED
WATERWAYS
NAVIGABLE
SEASONAL NAVIGABLE
OTHER
OIL PIPELINE
AIRPORT
ZAKHO
TEL KOTCHEK
SINJAR
MOSUL
T1
K3
H1
H2
H3
RAMADI
TRANS JORDAN
NORTHERN DESERT
SAUDI ARABIA
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

TRANSPORT SYSTEM

FACING P. 44(A)

7: International Bank N. 5-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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MAP III


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46°
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36°
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ZAKHO
AMADIYA
SORSAQ
DOHUK
ATRUSH
TEL KAIF
MOSUL
AKRE
SALAHUDIN
RAWAT
HAJ OMRAN
ROWANDUZ
SHAQLAWA
RANIA
QALA DIZA
KOI SANJAQ
ERBIL
MAKHMUR
TAQTAQ
SHARGAT
SULEIMANIYA
PENJWIN
KIRKUK
TAL ALI
TUZ
HALABJA
TIGRIS RIVER
JOULOULA JUNCTION
KHANAQIN
SAMARRA
BAQUBA
MENDALI
DELTAWA
HIT
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
FALUJA
BAGHDAD
AZIZIYA
HINDIYA JUNCTION
KERBELA
HILLA
KUT
NAMANIYA
HAI
KUFA
NAJAF
ABU SUKHAIR
DIWANIYA
SHAMIYA
AMARA
KADISIYA
SHATTRA
NASIRIYA
UR JUNCTION
HAMMAR LAKE
MAQIL
BASRA
ZUBAIR
ABADAN
FAO
SOUTHERN DESERT
KUWAIT
IRANIAN GULF
IRAN

FACING P. 44 (B)

#96 sive renewals of track and rolling stock and must make decisions as to the type of traction. Final decisions on the Baghdad-West scheme can also be more intelligently taken if the issue of standardization is promptly settled. It is unlikely that such favorable circumstances for an economical conversion operation will ever recur.

Conversion of the meter-gauge lines should not be too costly because the construction gauge, formation and bridges of these lines were originally designed with a view to later conversion to standard gauge. Conversion could probably be accomplished within six years. Meanwhile meter-gauge renewals would be kept to an absolutely indispensable minimum. Within a preparatory five-year period detailed plans and cost estimates would be worked out, necessary standard-gauge track and rolling stock ordered and assembled, and diesel locomotives tested with a view to transfer to diesel traction at the end of the period. The actual conversion operation would take only a few days and could probably be carried out at the end of five years for the Basra-Baghdad line and at the end of another year for the Baghdad-Erbil line. It is possible that the total cost of conversion would not exceed ID 6,000,000. The Mission therefore recommends that the advisability of standardizing gauges, together with a program for such standardization, be promptly studied by the railway staff with the cooperation of outside experts.

Finally, in line with the recommendations of the British engineering firm, the Mission suggests that the services of an expert be obtained to make recommendations on the railway rate structure. A general rate increase of about 12½ percent, with some exceptions, was put into effect in the summer of 1951. This did not affect the rate structure which is characterized by certain anomalous differences in the charges made on various sections of the railway system as well as those imposed on various commodities.

Air Transport and Inland Navigation

● 508 With respect to air transport, the Mission recommends that the civil airports at Basra and Baghdad be built up to the specifications required by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of class B standard airports. This would involve longer runways and improvements in navigational aids, communications

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

and meteorological services. At the Baghdad airport it would be 508
desirable to build an entirely new runway and to use a wing of the
new railway building as the air terminal. The Port of Basra can
finance the necessary work there, but that at Baghdad, costing
probably between ID 250,000 and ID 300,000, will presumably
have to be financed out of Development Board funds. The Mission 509
has no specific recommendations to make on Iraqi Airways, which
assures some internal and international services with a small fleet
of four planes, except to suggest that its finances be completely
divorced from those of the railways. It is neither logical nor sound
financially to require the railways to defray the deficits of the airways. It would be desirable to carry out any future development
of the airways in cooperation with other Middle Eastern countries.

Inland water navigation has steadily declined in importance 503
and is now rather insignificant. While irrigation rather than navigation will always be the primary consideration in the use of available water resources, it is possible that the better regulation of the Tigris and Euphrates will ultimately result in some improvement in the navigability of these rivers. Limited but uninterrupted navigation might be insured if the river bed were trained by dams, locks and groynes into a narrow channel at low water and progressively wider channels at higher water levels. The feasibility and cost of such a scheme might ultimately be submitted for study to experts from the Netherlands where similar conditions have long been encountered.

Roads and Road Transport

Road transport has not assumed great importance in the past, 491
primarily because most roads are unsurfaced and impassible for a 499
large part of the year. Even large communities like Kut and Amara, although not situated on railway lines, are not served by all-weather roads. An interdepartmental committee worked out and presented in 1950 a 10-year program for the construction or improvement of 37 main surfaced roads involving a total length of 3,463 kilometers at an aggregate cost of ID 14,500,000. Both the program and the proposed specifications of the roads are sound. In addition, the building or improvement of about 8,000 kilometers of secondary or feeder roads, which do not need to be surfaced, will ultimately

491 are unsurfaced and impassable for long periods in wet weather. All-weather roads are at present found only in the Baghdad area and in the mountains in the North. The only passable trunk roads are those from Baghdad to Khanaqin, Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul, and Baghdad to Rutba and Syria. Even these have shorter or longer sections in very poor condition. There is no all-season road between Baghdad and Basra.

508 509 Two civilian airports, Baghdad and Basra, serve the principal air routes between Europe, Asia and beyond. Internal air services are limited to one line between Baghdad and Basra. Military airfields and landing grounds ~~and a~~ few private air strips are available in certain places, but demand for internal air transport has so far been negligible.

509 475 One state air line, Iraqi Airways, operates services with neighbor countries and Egypt through Baghdad and Basra with a small fleet of four aircraft. Administration and management of the airline are combined with those of the state railways.

315 Oil from the oil fields at Kirkuk is carried by pipelines across the country to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa, but the line to Haifa is now out of operation. A shorter pipeline connects the southern Iraq oilfield with the Shatt al Arab oil port at Fao.

489 Transport connections with the outside world are well served by the Port of Basra for ocean-going traffic, by the airports of Baghdad and Basra in international air traffic and by the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean. At present only one railway line, beginning at Baghdad, connects Iraq with Syria, and via Syria with Turkey and Europe. A desert road exists for through road traffic between Iraq and Syria and Lebanon. A private company, Nairn Transport, operates an international bus service on this route. There are two main roads for exchange of traffic with Iran, one from Baghdad via Khanaqin, and one from Erbil via the Rowanduz Valley and Rayat. Future economic developments may perhaps demand new traffic outlets to the Mediterranean, shorter and better equipped than the existing railway and road routes, but at present there are few signs of such a demand.

365 The operating position may be judged from a summary of the sanctioned budget for the current financial year, ending March 31, 1952.

Administrative expenses include a contribution of ID 2,000 to the Baghdad Municipality for maintenance of roads. The ID 90,000 for maintenance of vehicles is alarming. This high figure is caused chiefly by the large number of different types, the difficulties of procuring parts, the high cost of manufacturing substitutes and the large ~~number of break~~akages of vehicle springs, axles and other parts due in great measure to Baghdad's bad roads.

A program to put the service on a sound operating, administrative and financial basis would include the following features:

1. Modernization of the central workshop and equipment, preferably moved to a site in the industrial section of the town.
2. Establishment of one central garage and four auxiliary terminal garages, all largely open air compounds, the latter to accommodate early and late services.
3. A fleet of 180 to 200 standard buses, to allow for reasonable running shifts and sufficient time for maintenance and servicing.

The Mission suggests that the cost of this program, estimated at ID 500,000, be financed by the Development Board. At the same time, however, it might be considered whether economies in administration could not be achieved by entrusting management entirely to a Director General rather than a Board, and whether revenues could not be increased by a stricter check on the collection of passenger fares.

VI. Airports

• 508

Both Iraq's international airports are very favorably situated within the town limits of Baghdad and Basra Port (Magil). This great advantage should be preserved and any developments should be on the present sites. Climatic conditions are favorable, and only a runway in one direction is required to accommodate traffic at all seasons. Town developments need suffer no inconveniences from

the present sites, nor is surface transport by rail, road or water in 508
any way hindered. Plans for removal of either airport away from the present site have been abandoned and ought not to be revived.

Development

Both airports are now scheduled to be built up to the specifications required for an International Civil Aviation Organization's Class B standard airport. The development projects embody the following works:

1. A runway of 2,500 meters to accommodate the newest heavy aircraft;
2. Navigation aids;
3. Communication, point to point, and ground to aircraft; and
4. Meteorological service.

It is recommended that these projects be carried out without delay. Some of the work is under way; equipment has been purchased, some has arrived on site. Work on the runways is still to begin. At the Baghdad airport an entirely new runway, parallel to the existing one, should be constructed and the existing runway, constructed as a temporary structure five years ago and now showing signs of deterioration, used as an aircraft taxi-way.

In addition to these projects already prepared and ready for execution, the present air terminal building at Baghdad, which has become too small, should be removed, and the wing of the new railway building facing the airport should be adapted for use as a new air terminal.

The capital expenditure involved in the projects may be estimated at between ID 250,000 and ID 300,000 for all works at Baghdad and between ID 100,000 and ID 150,000 at Basra airport. The latter expenditure appears to be within limits which can be financed from the Port's revenues. The former, however, will need to be financed out of the revenues of the Development Board.

VII. Air Transport

Since 1945 internal air transport has been assured as a part of 509
air services to neighbor countries by the government-owned Iraqi Airways. The administration and management of Iraqi Airways are integrated with those of the State Railways, and for the sake

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

XII. Projected Cost of Proposed Programs

449
363
504
●508
206
654

The projects recommended for consideration are summarized below as to cost and time of realization. The total cost which the Development Board might have to defray over the next five years would be approximately ID 31,000,000.

TABLE 11

COST OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS
SUGGESTED FOR DEVELOPMENT BOARD FINANCING

Project	Costs (in dinars)	Period (years)
PORT		
New channel	2,000,000	4
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT		
Study of river training by experts	Token	2
RAILWAYS		
Baghdad Station commitment	143,000	1
Baghdad new layout, provisional	100,000	1
22 continuation and completion projects		
under way	213,770	1
labor quarters	341,000	4
Rehabilitation and modernization projects	500,000	5
Renewals including diesel traction	6,300,000[a]	5
Extra for gauge conversion (tentative)	6,000,000	6
ROADS		
Trunk road system	14,500,000	10
Secondary road system	4,000,000	5
Road transport control	Token	1
URBAN TRANSPORT		
Baghdad transport services, workshops, garages and vehicles	500,000	3
AIRPORTS		
Baghdad development	300,000	2
Basra development	[b]	2
AIRLINES		
Iraqi Airways	600,000	4
POST, TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, RADIO		
Telephone extensions and buildings (if not financed from Communications budget)	300,000	Annually
Auxiliary power plant for transmitter	30,000	1
SURVEYS AND MAPPING		
Air surveys	40,000	Annually

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[a] On assumption of gauge conversion.
[b] To be financed by Port of Basra.

2: United Nations U-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

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● 508
315

Map No. 1



TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAN
JORDAN
40
42
44
46
48
36
34
32
Diyarbekir
Tigris
Nusaybin
Tell Kochek
Mosul
Aqra
Great Zab
Erbil
Rowandiz
Rayat
Mahabad
Miyandoab
Koi Sanjaq
Penjwin
Halabja
Al Badi
Qal'a Sharqat
Little Zab
Kirkuk
Sulaimaniya
Baiji
Euphrates
Abu Kemal
Ana
Haditha
Samarra
Quraghan
Qasr-i-Shirin
Kermanshah
Naft-i-Shah
Naft Khaneh
Mandali
Shahraban
Diyala
Baquba
Balad Ruz
Al Falluja
BAGHDAD
Ramadi
Lake Habbaniya
Badra
Kut al Imara
Tell Droite
Rutba
Al Musaiyib
Hilla
Shithatha
Karbala
Hashimiya
Al Kufa
Nukhaib
Afaq
Amara

2; United Nations U-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH 1

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

IRAQ
PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT ROUTES

Railway
Paved road
Unpaved road
Selected trail
Main oil pipelines
Airfield
0 30 100 200 MILES
0 50 100 200 KILOMETRES
SAUDI ARABIA
Nukhaib
Judaidat al 'Arar
Al Kufa
Najaf
'Afaq
Ad Diwaniya
Samawa
Euphrates
An Nasiriya
Ur
Amara
Tigris
Basra
Az Zubair
Shu'aiba
Fao
Safwan
Al'Athamin
NEUTRAL TERRITORY
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF
NEUTRAL TERRITORY
SAUDI ARABIA
32
30
28
26
40
42
44
46
48
AIR ROUTES AND AIRFIELDS
0 500 MILES
0 800 KILOMETRES
USSR
IRAN
Mosul
Erbil
Kirkuk
Beirut
to Cyprus
Damascus
JORDAN
Rutba
Baghdad
to Cairo
to Tehran
IRAQ
Basra
to Karachi
Kuwait
to Dhahran
SAUDI ARABIA

MAP NO. 312

50-28085

487 (Nefud Desert) roads; with Kuwait: Basra—Az
491 Zubair—Safwan, to Jahra; with Iran: Basra—(ferryboat)—Tanwa—to Ahwaz, Baghdad—Khosrovi—Kermanshah—Hamadan—Kazvin—Teheran, Kirkuk—Sulaimaniya—Penjwin—Bashmak (frontier) towards Sinneh, Mosul—Erbil—Ruwandiz—Raiat.

Civil Aviation

● 508 Iraq has two airports for long distance international service, one at Baghdad and one at Basra. Each of these airports also has a seaplane base, the first on Lake Habbaniye, about 100 kilometres from the city of Baghdad; and the second, at Ma'agil, 7 kilometres from the town of Basra, near the land airport. The two airports are provided with modern technical equipment and with all the facilities for the comfort of the passengers, such as hotels, restaurants, etc. The country has several other aerodromes and landing fields, the most important of which are at Rutba and at Mosul. In 1948 and 1949, thorough-going repairs had to be made to the runways of the Baghdad airport, during which time it was only accessible to aircraft not exceeding eighteen tons. Nearly all the Baghdad traffic was
509 diverted to the Basra airport. In 1948, Basra airport was used by the Iraqi Airways Company and by seven international aviation companies, including

489 needs of the southern districts are particularly acute:
653 as yet they possess only roads which are not practicable
[491] for any traffic, still less for heavy motor traffic, during the rainy season and for a long time afterwards, and boat-bridges of a very old—almost antediluvian—type across the Euphrates and other rivers.

[508] The government is taking steps to modernize the Baghdad and Basra-Ma'agil airports (the latter, in addition to its modern technical installations, has had since 1937 an air-conditioned hotel, swimming pool, tennis courts, etc.). The aim is to make them into first-class international airports. In addition, a training school for civilian air pilots was established in Iraq in 1937.

377 As the country lacks hydroelectric power stations, in spite of the existence of various large dams, there is now a plan to utilize the Bekhme dam for the generation of electric power.

315 In the expectation of the return of normal political conditions in the Near and Middle East, the

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[8] It is interesting to note that for the Basra—Baghdad section (568 km), these coaches are placed on special 1-metre bogies.

company ceased operations in 1949 but several small private 502 concerns continue to operate barges, mostly propelled by motor launches. Freight is still carried in sailing craft.

Airways. Iraq is served from London, the United States, most 509 European and Middle East capitals, Pakistan, India, the Far East, and Australia. The main international services are maintained by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Holland, and there are Middle East services operated by Iraq, Persia, Egypt, and Lebanon. The administration of Iraqi Airways is integrated with that of the State Railways, with BOAC as technical adviser; in addition to local services it operates regularly to Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Tehran, Kuwait, and Bahrain. There are two international airports, at Baghdad and 508 Basra, both of which are scheduled for further development to accommodate the newest heavy aircraft. There are also landing grounds at Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk and at the locations of the IPC and associated companies, namely Kirkuk, Ain Zala, and the pipeline stations.

Trade

Iraq imports manufactured goods and industrial raw 439 materials, of which the most important are textiles, clothing, iron and steel, especially for constructional purposes, machinery, motor vehicles and accessories, electrical apparatus, aviation spirit and lubricating oil, rubber and its products, ~~chemicals~~ and pharmaceuticals, wooden packing boxes, soap, ~~timber,~~ paper and cardboard and their products, tea, coffee, and sugar. The expansion of local industry[1] can be expected gradually to lessen the demand for a number of these commodities and increase the demand for others, particularly constructional materials, machinery, electrical apparatus, and chemicals. Apart from crude oil, her most valuable export, Iraq's exports are almost entirely agronomical—grains (especially barley), dates, raw wool and cotton, animals on hoof, hides, skins, intestines, seeds for oil manufacture (linseed, cotton, sesame), and a few minor commodities such as gums, gall nuts, and liquorice root. Iraq has in addition an appreciable transit trade, consisting largely of goods passing to or from Persia.

Before the Second World War, Iraq's chief suppliers were Great Britain, with between 20 and 30 per cent of total imports, Japan, with between 15 and 20 per cent, India, Germany, the United States, and Persia. During the war, when supplies were limited in quantity and directed from specific sources, Britain's share automatically decreased and India became

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[1] See above, p. 283.

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Airways.
In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air communications—the
'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was completed
in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for packages;
communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts 135
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold concession
granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

491 British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership, as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest.
499 The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–Nisibin line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek, all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Baṣra–Baghdad–Istanbul system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began, the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qadhās.

509 Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment came into being at Baghdad and Baṣra, and British flying-boats after 1937 used also Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry
206 of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public services from Baghdad and Baṣra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broad-
207 casting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to 1937 still experimental and occasional.

425
185 Good progress was made during these five years in the all-important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

The Lynch fleet had been diminished in 1938 by the loss of the 505
Mejidieh, sold to Anglo-Iranian, and in 1941 by that of the *Malamir* and the *al-Kadri*, burnt out and scrapped respectively. Their rivals, notably Ḥannā al-Shaykh and 'Abd al-Karim Khudhayri (Khedery), were more than holding their own: but the competition of the railway and the roads must grow rather than diminish. To the road system, indeed, Paiforce contributed much, 491
notably in the completed trans-desert highway to Jordan, in the re-surfacing of many road stretches, and in the maintenance in being of 'Iraqi transport fleets by the provision of tyres. Nevertheless, the upkeep of civil motor vehicles in war-time proved most 494
difficult, and the numbers in use decreased. The air communications of the territory were not improved during the war; but before 509
its end projects for a national air line were under formation. The European services crossing and visiting 'Iraq recommenced in 1945 after war-time curtailments, and the Egyptian Misr Airways restarted its Cairo–Baghdad service. A contract was given in 1945 to the Marconi Company for the erection of a new wireless transmitting station.

The course of foreign trade was notably deflected from its usual 439
channels by the war. In 1939 the United Kingdom was its principal customer, followed by the United States, each of these countries taking approximately one-third of the total visible exports; but by 1944 the principal buyer was Palestine with Transjordan, followed by Persia. Visible exports, amounting to ID 4 million before the war, reached through enhanced prices ID 9 million before its end. The transit trade, reduced in 1939 to a value of some ID 3 million, reached ID 13 million five years later, thanks to the passage of goods to Russia. Imports rose from a value of ID 9 million before the war to ID 14 million in its last year; the United Kingdom's share in these fell from 33 to 11 per cent., that of Japan from 18 per cent. to nothing, while India's share rose from 8 to 30 per cent., Syria's from 2 to 16, the United States' from 8 to 12.

The desire for industrial expansion, always a cherished ambition, 433
was stimulated by the war-time shortages and an increased local market; contrary factors were the shortage of raw materials, competition for skilled workers, and the impossibility of importing factory equipment. Of the seventy enterprises benefiting in 1944 from the law of 1929 most were on the humblest scale, with the importance only of pilot projects which could indicate to the middle class the possibility of a career outside Government service, the professions, or politics. Some war-time progress was made in brick manufacture; workshops produced hand-tools from scrap metal; the crushing of oil-seeds—cotton, sesame, and linseed—

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

pletion of the Kirkuk–Arbil extension and its Lesser Zab bridge: 496 of the railway and road bridge[1] at Baghdad, opened late in 1950: 499 of the Musayib bridge leading to Karbalā: and of new stations at Ba'quba, Diwaniya, Naṣiriya and elsewhere. New rolling stock was ordered and by 1950 delivered. Progress was made in erecting a grandiose combined station and administrative headquarters at Baghdad West, and in redesigning the yards and depots there; but the high cost of these projects, the diminution of receipts by road and air competition (in spite of good traffic in grain and oilfield materials), and losses due to repeated river flooding rapidly exhausted the war-time surplus and led to the need to borrow first from Government in 1946, then from London—a loan of £3 million —in 1950, before supplies and contractors could be paid and work could proceed. Working conditions in the railway system were [468] disturbed by the strikes elsewhere mentioned in 1945, 1946, and 1949. The Jewish employees of the traffic branch were replaced in [464] 1949 by imported Pakistani staff, and the training of 'Iraqis to replace these and the few remaining British executives was accelerated. The status and composition of the Railway Board was unchanged, though criticized by the press as outdated and insufficiently 'national'. The post of Director-General was passed by H. C. Smith to W. J. Moffat in 1950, and an 'Iraqi, General Isma'il Ṣafwat, assumed the post in 1952.

'Iraq Airways was initiated by the Railway as a subordinate 509 ● enterprise in 1945, and started service in 1946 with five light aircraft hired from Great Britain. In the following year the hired aircraft were replaced by its own machines, and it extended its range from Baghdad–Baṣra outwards to Mosul, Cairo, and Damascus, and by 1948 could, thanks to reciprocal agreements, offer transport weekly or monthly to Teheran, Karachi, and Ankara. The service, to which British Overseas Airways Corporation acted as technical advisers and agents, was efficiently maintained but, thanks to competition and high costs, financially unprofitable. British, American, Dutch, French and other foreign airlines continued to use 'Iraqi airports. An expenditure of over ID 2 million on aerodromes formed part of the six-year development plan. The meteorological service, begun in 1936 in a single room, now maintained under the Ministry of Defence a dozen stations and many rainfall-observation posts, used its own wireless links, and broadcast weather reports for Baghdad area half-hourly.

Telecommunications had, by the close of the period, reached a 206 high standard. Trunk land-lines had been overhauled, often duplicated and widely extended; automatic telephone exchanges

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[1] The bridges were built by Messrs. Holloway Bros.; earthwork on the Kirkuk-Arbil line was handled by Messrs. Balfour Beatty.

and meteorological services. At the Baghdad airport it would be 508
desirable to build an entirely new runway and to use a wing of the new railway building as the air terminal. The Port of Basra can finance the necessary work there, but that at Baghdad, costing probably between ID 250,000 and ID 300,000, will presumably have to be financed out of Development Board funds. The Mission 509
has no specific recommendations to make on Iraqi Airways, which assures some internal and international services with a small fleet of four planes, except to suggest that its finances be completely divorced from those of the railways. It is neither logical nor sound financially to require the railways to defray the deficits of the airways. It would be desirable to carry out any future development of the airways in cooperation with other Middle Eastern countries.

Inland water navigation has steadily declined in importance 503
and is now rather insignificant. While irrigation rather than navigation will always be the primary consideration in the use of available water resources, it is possible that the better regulation of the Tigris and Euphrates will ultimately result in some improvement in the navigability of these rivers. Limited but uninterrupted navigation might be insured if the river bed were trained by dams, locks and groynes into a narrow channel at low water and progressively wider channels at higher water levels. The feasibility and cost of such a scheme might ultimately be submitted for study to experts from the Netherlands where similar conditions have long been encountered.

Roads and Road Transport

Road transport has not assumed great importance in the past, 491
primarily because most roads are unsurfaced and impassible for a 499
large part of the year. Even large communities like Kut and Amara, although not situated on railway lines, are not served by all-weather roads. An interdepartmental committee worked out and presented in 1950 a 10-year program for the construction or improvement of 37 main surfaced roads involving a total length of 3,463 kilometers at an aggregate cost of ID 14,500,000. Both the program and the proposed specifications of the roads are sound. In addition, the building or improvement of about 8,000 kilometers of secondary or feeder roads, which do not need to be surfaced, will ultimately

491 are unsurfaced and impassable for long periods in wet weather. All-weather roads are at present found only in the Baghdad area and in the mountains in the North. The only passable trunk roads are those from Baghdad to Khanaqin, Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul, and Baghdad to Rutba and Syria. Even these have shorter or longer sections in very poor condition. There is no all-season road between Baghdad and Basra.

508 Two civilian airports, Baghdad and Basra, serve the principal
509 air routes between Europe, Asia and beyond. Internal air services
are limited to one line between Baghdad and Basra. Military airfields and landing grounds and ~~a~~ few private air strips are available in certain places, but demand for internal air transport has so far been negligible.

509 One state air line, Iraqi Airways, operates services with
475 neighbor countries and Egypt through Baghdad and Basra with a
small fleet of four aircraft. Administration and management of the airline are combined with those of the state railways.

315 Oil from the oil fields at Kirkuk is carried by pipelines across the country to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa, but the line to Haifa is now out of operation. A shorter pipeline connects the southern Iraq oilfield with the Shatt al Arab oil port at Fao.

489 Transport connections with the outside world are well served by the Port of Basra for ocean-going traffic, by the airports of Baghdad and Basra in international air traffic and by the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean. At present only one railway line, beginning at Baghdad, connects Iraq with Syria, and via Syria with Turkey and Europe. A desert road exists for through road traffic between Iraq and Syria and Lebanon. A private company, Nairn Transport, operates an international bus service on this route. There are two main roads for exchange of traffic with Iran, one from Baghdad via Khanaqin, and one from Erbil via the Rowanduz Valley and Rayat. Future economic developments may perhaps demand new traffic outlets to the Mediterranean, shorter and better equipped than the existing railway and road routes, but at present there are few signs of such a demand.

the present sites, nor is surface transport by rail, road or water in any way hindered. Plans for removal of either airport away from the present site have been abandoned and ought not to be revived. 508

Development

Both airports are now scheduled to be built up to the specifications required for an International Civil Aviation Organization's Class B standard airport. The development projects embody the following works:

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VII. Air Transport

509

Since 1945 internal air transport has been assured as a part of air services to neighbor countries by the government-owned Iraqi Airways. The administration and management of Iraqi Airways are integrated with those of the State Railways, and for the sake

509 of efficiency and economy this should remain so. The British Overseas Airways Corporation acts as technical adviser, deputizes personnel to the airways and trains Iraqi personnel.

Iraqi Airways operate regular services between:

Baghdad-Basra-Kuwait-Bahrein
Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut
Baghdad-Damascus-Cairo
Baghdad-Teheran.

The first route serves as an internal traffic link. The fleet consists of four aircraft: three Vikings and one Dove. In addition to the regular service, special flights with chartered aircraft assure seasonal traffic of pilgrims.

The first route serves as an internal traffic link. The fleet consists as is indicated in Table 8. The financial results, however, leave much to be desired. The operating accounts shown in Table 9 reveal substantial deficits which have been met from the State Railways' revenues. The Railways have also paid the initial capital outlay of ID 259,976 for aircraft and ground installations.

TABLE 8

Airways Traffic

Year	Regular Lines Traffic					Pilgrims Charter Passenger Miles
	Mileage	Passenger Journeys	Excess Baggage Ton Miles	Mail Ton Miles	Cargo Ton Miles	
1945-46	80,953	559	709	0	86	7,770
1946-47	669,083	6,386	11,456	2,495	12,757	104,072
1947-48	779,159	12,397	26,694	9,314	64,087	175,563
1948-49	846,810	15,237	30,838	8,774	98,792	608,957

TABLE 9

Airways Budget

(in dinars)

Year	Cash Revenue	Cash Expenditure	Deficit
1945-46	5,504	13,587	8,083
1946-47	89,130	133,719	44,589
1947-48	106,580	187,600	81,020
1948-49	265,024	302,470	37,446
1949-50	257,280	363,172	105,892

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Future Developments

It must be expected that Iraqi Airways will continue to operate at a loss for some years to come. This should be accepted because the air services serve a real traffic need and there are reasonable prospects of reducing and perhaps ultimately eliminating operating deficits. The Airways Accounts are separate from the Railway Accounts and the steps recommended in the Palmer Report for complete separation of the finances of the Railways and the Airways should be adopted. There is no reason why the Railways should be expected to defray the deficits of the Airways. 509

There appears to be room for expansion of services in the area where Europe, Asia and Africa meet; and the government should encourage Iraqi Airways to play an increasingly important part in air traffic in this area. Internal demands appear to be negligible at present but may be expected to develop in conjunction with extended international services. These services appear to present an opportunity for far-reaching economies through closer cooperation between Middle Eastern airlines in their services, their administration and agencies outside the home countries.

VIII. Post, Telegraph, Telephone, Radio Communications

Organization

Responsibility for communications is concentrated in the Directorate General of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services in the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. Iraq is a full member of the International Postal Union and the communications services of the country, including their tariffs, comply with the standards of the Union. 647 205 206

The number of post, telepragh and telephone offices has developed as follows: 205 206

TYPE OF OFFICE	1940	1951
24 hrs. service	14	46
16 hrs. service	12	37
12 hrs. service	18	4
7 hrs. service	42	54
Local and rural agencies	155	171

● 509 the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), the American Trans World Airlines (TWA) from March 1948, Air-France, the Scandinavian SAS and aircraft of the Indian and Pakistani lines. The Basra airport is a stopping place for the great air-lines plying between the United States and most of the European capitals, on the one hand, and India, Pakistan and the Far East, on the other. The traffic of the Basra—Ma'agil airport was as follows:

	1947	*1948*
Number of aircraft	3,272	4,197
Passengers: in transit	27,524	45,673
Departures	5,920	9,973
Arrivals	5,776	10,485

According to American official sources, the volume of air freight and air mail also increased in the same proportion between 1947 and 1948. The same sources attribute the increase in traffic to and out of Basra to the expansion of the activities of petroleum companies.

The BOAC now operates extremely busy direct services, with stops at Basra, between the United Kingdom (and even Canada) and India, Pakistan, the Far East and Australia.

The American Trans World Airlines (TWA), which began its services to Iraq in March 1948 with one weekly flight, was serving Basra with four passenger flights and one air-freight service per week by the end of 1948; it was joined in 1949 by the Pan American World Airways company (PAA).

● 509 Since August 1949, the Dutch KLM line has been flying four weekly services. The Swiss company SWISS/AIR has a weekly Zurich—Geneva—Cairo—Basra service. The Air India International company operates two services a week on the Bombay—Basra—Cairo—Geneva—London route. Iraqi Airways offers two connexions to Baghdad.

Iraq's international civil aviation traffic was as follows, in thousands:

	1947	*1948*	*1949*
Kilometres flown	423.3	877.7	1,107.2
Passenger-kilometres	3,996.	7,673.	[illegible]
Freight ton-kilometres	105.6	220.6	174.6
Mail ton-kilometres	8.70	12.58	12.48

Pipe-lines

315 As a country whose principal asset is its petroleum and whose reserves offer the prospect of a great development in the near future, Iraq is chiefly interested in the satisfactory transmission of its crude petroleum. The country's vast petroleum deposits now being worked are some 900 kilometres from the port of Basra. Hence nearly all the petroleum exported, which means in effect the production of the Kirkuk basin, is carried by pipe-lines leading to the Mediterranean ports of Tripoli and Haifa whence it is transported by boat to the various countries of destination.

489 [509] air traffic—useful only to a small number of travellers and for valuable goods—is very heavy in Iraq, which forms a veritable turn-table, a sort of Belgium or Switzerland in Western Asia: Iraq's two airports serve as junctions between the United States and Europe on the one hand and the Far East on the other.

For inland transport on the other hand, Iraq is much less well served: shipping on the historically famous "twin rivers" is very limited and in fact only uses part of the Tigris. The country's railway system is inadequate, there is no standard gauge and the rolling-stock needs to be increased and modernized. [731] The road system has been developed and motor transport (mainly by lorry) is steadily increasing; but it is paralysed on many roads during the rainy season and in numerous places it is at the mercy of the floods: the disastrous flooding of the Tigris in May 1950, particularly serious around Baghdad, will be remembered.

Observers point out that a matter deserving special attention is the co-ordination of river and rail

company ceased operations in 1949 but several small private 502 concerns continue to operate barges, mostly propelled by motor launches. Freight is still carried in sailing craft.

Airways. Iraq is served from London, the United States, most 509 European and Middle East capitals, Pakistan, India, the Far East, and Australia. The main international services are maintained by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Holland, and there are Middle East services operated by Iraq, Persia, Egypt, and Lebanon. The administration of Iraqi Airways is integrated with that of the State Railways, with BOAC as technical adviser; in addition to local services it operates regularly to Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Tehran, Kuwait, and Bahrain. There are two international airports, at Baghdad and 508 Basra, both of which are scheduled for further development to accommodate the newest heavy aircraft. There are also landing grounds at Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk and at the locations of the IPC and associated companies, namely Kirkuk, Ain Zala, and the pipeline stations.

Trade

Iraq imports manufactured goods and industrial raw 439 materials, of which the most important are textiles, clothing, iron and steel, especially for constructional purposes, machinery, motor vehicles and accessories, electrical apparatus, aviation spirit and lubricating oil, rubber and its products, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, wooden packing boxes, soap, timber, paper and cardboard and their products, tea, coffee, and sugar. The expansion of local industry[1] can be expected gradually to lessen the demand for a number of these commodities and increase the demand for others, particularly constructional materials, machinery, electrical apparatus, and chemicals. Apart from crude oil, her most valuable export, Iraq's exports are almost entirely agronomical—grains (especially barley), dates, raw wool and cotton, animals on hoof, hides, skins, intestines, seeds for oil manufacture (linseed, cotton, sesame), and a few minor commodities such as gums, gall nuts, and liquorice root. Iraq has in addition an appreciable transit trade, consisting largely of goods passing to or from Persia.

Before the Second World War, Iraq's chief suppliers were Great Britain, with between 20 an[illegible]0 per cent of total imports, Japan, with between 15 and 20 per cent, India, Germany, the United States, and Persia. During the war, when supplies were limited in quantity and directed from specific sources, Britain's share automatically decreased and India became pal population centers and radiate from Baghdad and Mosul to cities in Syria, Iran and Turkey. The Tigris is navigable to barges from Basra to Baghdad throughout the year, and to smaller craft as far as Mosul during the high-water season. The Shatt al Arab is open to ocean-going vessels, and Basra, about 85 miles from the Persian Gulf, is one of the major ports of the Middle East. A government-operated railroad, part of the famous "Berlin to Baghdad" railway, runs from Basra to Baghdad and Mosul, with connections through Aleppo to Istanbul. A branch line extends from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil and Khanaquin. A government-owned airline serves Iraq and the neighboring countries, while international lines from Europe to Africa and the Far East stop at Baghdad and Basra. 489 491 505 496 509

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[1] See above, p. 283.

Food and Nutrition

The nutrition of the people is governed by the cultural habits of the different racial and social communities, the economic status of the individual families and the food supplies available under diverse climatic conditions. Undernutrition is prevalent among the poorer inhabitants—tenant cultivators, urban laborers and nomadic tribes—who make up over three quarters of the population. Wheat, barley, rice and dates are the staple food crops of the country, while vegetables and fruits, other than dates, are frequently scarce. Wheat is widely grown, primarily in the rainfall areas of the north, but also in the irrigated riverain zones of the south. Barley is cultivated extensively, and, like wheat, is used in the preparation of breads and of *burghul*, a coarse-grained cereal product typical of this region. Millet and maize are common crops in the south. Rice is produced in certain lowland districts in the Kurdish highlands and on the fringes of the southern marshes, and is a popular food among all sections of the population. Peas, beans and lentils are usually consumed throughout the year, and tomatoes, eggplant and different root and green vege- 146 241 [262]

p. 25 (a)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The social development which these processes entailed represented 177 no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue.

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the 181 merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by 511 serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and [164] combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied.

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 361 changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the 363 same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Baṣra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Baṣra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen-contractors whose

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been 619
formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable 579
as Qa'immaqam. The nomadic Harki passed annually
across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their
path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to
cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the
religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe'
across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern
frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari
group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups.
The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of
Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it 511
has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the
country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of
old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government
—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. 135
Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some
low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but
none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages
of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the
Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote
antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and
coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya 315
Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited
them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages
of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Naftchi
family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited
at Naftkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba
in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by
Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but
German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been
sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, [471]
significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy
purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. 433
There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns,
some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs.
Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver
''Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian
craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad
coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

241 [312] advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallah*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

511 In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of 511 423 the *badu* and their hungry camels. Even where tenure was reasonably secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving productivity; [476] wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

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[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[311] [2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north.

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the 511 resources to initiate new methods or improve the old. 423

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and dis- 511 couraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the 241 lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both 241 of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal 312 functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are 312 evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage 185 of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

1. MIDSUMMER 1914

To few countries in the world were greater changes brought by 178 the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Govern- 511
ment by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was 178
clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, con- 186
fined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile 642
to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater 619
efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation,
of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great progress
697 was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi
management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
• 511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development
by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities
and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
291 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional
circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed,
185 with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings,
366 and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-'Aṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries,
a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared
with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects
for which local pride was clamoring.

182 563 795 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development, and in ʿIraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymāniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shiʿi which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shiʿi leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the ʿUlamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shiʿism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to ʿIraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the ʿIraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the ʿIraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic 722
internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable 647
lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of
M.E.S.C.

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the 722
abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living 511
standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was 435
almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly deteriorated. A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Government had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939.
The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then six- 652
fold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, 435
happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation, or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement, thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs, already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society scarcely healthier.

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. 652
The three years 1941-3, in spite of high costs, showed useful surpluses; foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully. But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied. Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Baṣra were highly prosperous throughout the war.

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

of nearly 7 million tons of through-put annually and a corresponding loss of royalty revenue. On the northern line to Tripoli, the construction of the 16-inch line was completed in mid-1949; export from Tripoli was thereby trebled and raised 'Iraqi export production to nearly 7 million tons a year. Less than a year later the Company undertook the building of a much greater pipeline, of 30-inch diameter. Designed to run from Kirkuk to the sea coast at Banyas in Syria (an alignment parallel to that of the 12- and 16-inch lines except at its western extremity) it would deliver 'Iraqi oil to the world's markets at a rate of some 14 million tons a year at its lowest rate of through-put, or much more with increased pumping installations.[1] 382

These extensions of the pipeline system were accompanied by important increases to the pumping plant and facilities at seven pumping stations on both sides of the point of bifurcation near Ḥaditha, and in the Kirkuk field itself. The development of the latter was carried out in its northern extension in Arbil liwā, beyond the Lesser Zab, by an active drilling campaign and the manifold operations which accompany it. With drilling went the provision of gathering lines, tankage, additional de-gassing stations, new units in the Stabilization Plant, new administrative and domestic buildings, workshops, stores, depots, laboratories, electric-power plant, and water lines. 'Iraqis were fortunate in their certainty that, in the development of the great wealth in their soil, the most modern and economic methods were being adopted without waste of or danger to its resources. The needs of the labour [466] force were met by the initiation of a modern housing estate for 'Iraqi employees, canteens, sports grounds, transport to and from work, allowances and pay-revisions to meet the high cost of living, a savings fund, hospital extensions, and technical education both in 'Iraq and in the United Kingdom. In spite of the psychological, the material, and the (artificially fostered) 'political' difficulties inseparable from the presence of an advanced industrial enclave in a primitive economy of peasants, the living and working conditions of the oil workers were, while less than perfect, undoubtedly the best in contemporary 'Iraqi industry: and they were undeserving of the blatantly mendacious attacks, common in Baghdad newspapers, on the horrors of oil company employment and the brutality of the foreign exploiter. The industry brought also sub- [511] stantial indirect benefits to the public in local purchases and contracts, the increase of purchasing power, the provision of foreign exchange, the teaching of industrial skill, and the performance of valuable and costly services to Kirkuk municipality. It could in

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[1] The 30-inch line, constructed at great speed, came into initial operation in the late spring of 1952.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and mountain units, seemed to be well suited to its probable internal duties; for service abroad, other than token or ceremonial, it was not at present adapted. Whether the leading spirits of the Army would in future resist the temptation to assert themselves not as servants but as masters of the State remained to be seen. There had been, in the ten years since the adventure of the Golden Square, no sign of repeating the coups of 1935 to 1941, or of imitating the Syrian Dictator-Colonels of the day. But the danger was real; the Army leaders lacked a sincere sense of service and subordination to the State, felt little respect for its civil institutions or solidarity with the public, and could not but be aware that there was no power anywhere to withstand them. 701

We turn now to the various elements of which 'Iraqi society was composed. Among the true bedouin, still leading their hard, hungry and unenvied lives, the visitor to their tents would find every scene and circumstance seemingly unchanged for the last five or fifty decades. The 'Aniza, the remoter Shammar, the D͟hafir had little of novelty to show. Their extreme poverty forbade them any less primitive material equipment, and their social organization and isolation precluded almost every means of cultural progress. It was true that some greater bedouin shaykhs now owned motor-cars, carried wireless sets, and frequented towns, while their sons on occasion adopted an expatriate life of Western ways. It was clear also that the mechanized forces of Government now could penetrate the farthest areas of the *badiya*, that the ease of contact with Government had, since Turkish times, been helped by the use, in the Administration, of the language of the country instead of a foreign tongue known to no tribesman: that the tendency to settle family by family on the desert fringes of cultivation was not less, perhaps was greater, than it had ever been, and that Kurdish mountain nomadism was now restricted partly by the seductions of a sedentary life, partly by more sophisticated and less feebly enforced frontier restrictions. All these elements were operative, and had much diminished the nomad chieftains' power to defy Government or harass neighbours; but they had changed neither the manner and fashion of their existence nor its social or economic bases. Among the true nomads the tribal organization provided still the essential rallying unit, and the shaykhs or aghās would still be followed. 619 511

In the countryside of sedentary tribesmen, the continuity of outward appearance—scene, dress, dwelling, dialect, and food—half concealed the changes which fifty years had wrought. If the area occupied by tribal life had been locally reduced by the weakening of tribalism in the inlying villages, yet for the rest a first glance reveals a world seemingly unaltered from that of fifty years earlier:

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their
● 511 tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting
backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the
sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnutrition,
disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty
619 years since Independence, there had been change in directions
179 which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first
511 was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and
private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there
had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards
[177 security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it
was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include
some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census, police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally, detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries, lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures, while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself transitional and unformed—of the country at large and of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in 1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both 619 178
economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 511

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361
the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change,
if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it
was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless,
and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same
goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet
in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and
unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public
State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the
sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved
approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole
areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and
modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman
Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been
forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363
labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well
maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible.
Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362
or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor
and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building
was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers,
the development of town amenities, and the need for
outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365
service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—
supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been,
imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere
abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the
ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363
Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and
Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366
shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide
buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered
a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well
established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown
in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368
services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified
themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365
power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

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[1] The mausoleum of King Fayṣal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company,
that of Basra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with
current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the
Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office
literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British
expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the
Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective
interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to
trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges,
housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose
realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited
welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—
were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the
Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They
were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a compre-
hensive organization, by the oil companies.

511 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the moderniza-
tion and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle
362 classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes
than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise
above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private
life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their
domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of
interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two
177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance
and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more
generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much
ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now
562 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women
learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law,
followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work,
and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the
franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded
were still considerable, and included the households of many
leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families,
by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western
type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop
[265] kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within
the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and
business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include
575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class profes-
526 sional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various
branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

471 423 425 of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of [565] cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

511 642 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 423
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant 511
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 565
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 166
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development.
161 With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its
resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north
and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the
country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide
large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is
inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
[135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq
possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap
source of power and raw materials essential to the development of
industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other
mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is
little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger
population on a considerably higher standard of living.

● 511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast
to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the
people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most
ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and
many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm
and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[444] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment
exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await
reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the
available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
[131] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas;
and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is
hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water,
but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and
quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

654* 651 [425] rent tax was abolished in return for certain payments to be made by the landholders over a maximum period of ten years. Thus the tax system discriminates in favor of those who have managed to obtain state lands in *lazmah* grant and against those who have regularly leased land from the state. The latter continue to be assessed for rent whereas the former, who have frequently secured large *lazmah* grants on the basis of rather tenuous proof of occupancy and cultivation, escape any tax or rent assessments on their land.

The application of a graduated income tax to agriculture, while equitable, may not be politically feasible at present and would certainly pose difficult problems of assessment. Consideration should be given, however, to the reintroduction of some type of land tax. The fact that the cadastral survey is only half completed would not be an insuperable obstacle. In most cases the land held by each individual will be well known in the locality where he resides. Landholders could be required to register for taxation all the land they claim with the provision that they would not be allowed to establish claims during the cadastral survey to any lands not so registered; and in case of conflicts between actual occupants and other claimants, the tax could provisionally be levied on the actual occupant. It would probably be desirable to levy the tax on cultivable land rather than land actually under cultivation in order to provide an incentive to production or, alternatively, to release idle land for resettlement. Tax rates would have to vary in accordance with productivity of the land, which could, as in some other countries, be ascertained through tests or control plots located in various parts of the country. The tax rate should presumably also take into account the government contribution to irrigation of the land. The adoption of such a land tax might be linked with the gradual reduction and perhaps ultimate abolition of the *istihlak*.

X. Conclusion

● 511 Today the people of Iraq for the most part suffer from dire poverty. Although a relatively small number of city merchants and landowners enjoy high incomes, the average standard of life is extremely low. The future would hold little prospect for relief if

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

the only remedy available were a more equitable division of income. 511
Fortunately, the future does afford the promise of a large increase in national income as a whole. The country has the natural resources—land, water and oil—which can bring a much higher standard of living to all. The revenues from oil will provide the means for a potentially rapid development of other productive resources. The central objective must be the attainment of a much higher output in a manner that will benefit the people as a whole.

In a country like Iraq principal emphasis will inevitably need 654x
to be placed on the development of agriculture. For this reason 241
schemes for the storage of the flood waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris will be of key importance. They will prevent disastrous floods and control the flow of the rivers so as to bring more water to deficient areas and open up large new areas for settlement by land-hungry peasants. An increase in production, however, will not come simply from an expansion of the area under cultivation. The time will come when further expansion will not be possible except at great cost. This makes it all the more necessary to raise the present low productivity of agriculture. The drainage of lands which have deteriorated owing to salting has accordingly been emphasized by the Mission as one of the first objectives. Great importance is also attached to the early development of an adequate agricultural extension service, supported by an effective practical experimental organization, which would work directly with farmers in improving their methods of production. Other measures recommended to this end include the provision of incentives to use fertilizers and to cultivate soil-building and fodder crops, and the organization of cooperatives and more ample credit facilities so that farmers can have easier access to improved means of production—better plows and draft animals, other agricultural machinery, seeds and fertilizers.

Industrial development can in many ways effectively comple- 654x
ment agriculture. The proposed chemical plant at Kirkuk, supple- 433
mented by bonemeal plants, could provide the cheap fertilizers needed to raise the productivity of Iraqi agriculture. Expansion of cotton textile and vegetable oil extraction capacity would capitalize on the growing output of cotton. The proposed modern machine shop would cater to agriculture by reducing the cost of irrigation

literacy in the country is a fair guide to the extent to which the 212 Iraqi can be considered educated. According to the census, which recorded the literacy of all those of five years of age or over, literacy in Baghdad among males over five was over 40 percent; in the smaller towns of the province it was about 30 percent and in the villages only 10 percent. These figures are probably well above the average. Cities like Basra and Kirkuk have a male literacy nearer 30 percent, but in many rural *nahiyas* it is five percent or less and in the remoter *nahiyas* of the North as low as two percent.

Literacy is much lower among women than among men. In the cities of Baghdad and Mosul, the proportion of literate females over five was about 20 percent (about half that of the males). Outside of the larger cities, however, female education hardly exists. The proportion of female literates in the rural areas and the smaller towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Basra and Baghdad provinces barely exceeds one percent.

It is not known how literacy was defined in the census, but even if these figures represent a real ability to read and understand rather than a smattering of education, it is clear that illiteracy is a great handicap to even the simplest form of written instruction. In industry this is apt to put a heavy burden of detailed work on the management of a factory. In agriculture it gives little possibility of supplementing the limited amount of oral instruction or visual demonstration which the present agricultural service can render.

III. The Standard of Living

No systematic estimate of the national income has yet been 434 made. A rough estimate by the Statistical Office of the United 511 Nations put the income per head in 1949 at $85. The equivalent ● in dinars would depend on the exchange rate chosen for conversion, which is necessarily an arbitrary choice; at the old rate, it would be about ID 20, at the new ID 30. The Mission attempted to make an estimate of the national product, but the information

424 511 available to it was often unreliable, if not actually conflicting, and, in certain fields, data were completely lacking. The attempt was, therefore, abandoned, but it was at least possible to draw the conclusion that the estimate quoted above was approximately correct and that the total income per head probably fell somewhere between ID 20 and ID 30.

511 In any event, a broad estimate of this kind which embraces both the very high incomes of the landowners and the very low incomes of the fellahin can do little more than convey a generalized impression of poverty. While it is not possible to give even a rough idea of the distribution of incomes in statistical terms, some description of the standard of living of the people may be of value.

Agriculture, which is the most important occupation in Iraq, is also the most difficult to describe, conditions being extremely varied and information virtually nonexistent. However, a hypothetical example of the condition of a fellah in the irrigation zone, where barley is the principal crop, may serve as a rough guide. In this zone a fellah, who cultivates 25 donums of winter crops annually, is probably above the average. Estimates of yields vary enormously, even apart from the annual variation due to water supply. Landowners tend to give a high estimate (e.g., 500 kilograms per donum), because they believe that the fellahin withhold part of the crop in order to obtain a larger share. This is probably true and accounts for the tendency of the fellah to give a low estimate (e.g., 200 kg). Apart from this, the land varies greatly in quality, pump-irrigated land being generally more productive. The fellah, however, gets a smaller share on pump land.

A yield of 300 kg on flow-irrigated land would probably not be much below average, if at all. The total crop on 25 donums would then be 7.5 tons. Of this the fellah would probably get as his share two fifths or three tons, out of which he has to retain seed for the next year and to pay for some help with the threshing and harvesting, in all amounting to one half to one ton more. The balance would thus be two to two and a half tons. His family might consist of five or six people, including himself, his wife and children, and one or two other relatives such as his parents or an unmarried sister. The minimum retained for food would be one ton and, in practice, it is probably more. He would thus have

little more than one ton left to sell and he might even have to 511 keep part of this for his draft animals, if they are unable to find enough stubble and other natural fodder.

The price which a fellah gets for his grain is usually very much less than the wholesale market price in Basra or Baghdad. Although rail transport is very cheap for grains, the other costs such as local transport, bagging, weighing and storage are high; the merchants' profit and the *istihlak* tax also have to be deducted. Finally, the fellah's funds are usually exhausted before the harvest season and he frequently accepts a low forward price on his crop before it is gathered. For the 1950-51 crop, prices have been high (over ID 20 per ton), but many fellahin undoubtedly sold forward at prices little over ID 10. This would not be an unusual price in past seasons. Thus, ID 10 for the winter crop and perhaps another ID 10 for a small summer crop of sesame would constitute his total cash income for the year.

This income would usually be spent on food, clothing and possibly some low-grade domestic tobacco. Two of the most [662] important items in food expenditure are sugar and tea. Dates, particularly in the South, and a few vegetables such as onions are also purchased, but, on the whole, most fruit and vegetables are beyond the reach of the fellah and are sold in the towns. Meat is only eaten occasionally, although fish is available in the marsh areas of the South. Nor does the fellah who owns no animals other than his draft animals consume much milk or *leban* (sour milk). Clothing would consist of some cheap cotton sheeting sufficient for a few garments and occasionally a second-hand jacket; few fellahin wear shoes. Hardly anything is spent on housing or furniture, the living quarters being a small mud hut without windows and hardly any furnishing but a few mats and cooking utensils. Soap, for example, is undoubtedly a luxury. Life is not far above the subsistence level and must often be below it.

In the process of selling his surplus crop and making his small 511 purchases, the fellah is taxed. While with crops consumed in 651 Iraq the *istihlak* tax is largely borne by the buyer, in the case of an export crop such as barley, which is influenced by world prices, the tax falls most heavily on the producer. At the end of 1950, customs duties on sugar were about one fifth to one quarter of the

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Baghdad retail price; on tea, about one sixth. Duties on textiles are also high, but cannot be so easily measured in terms of the retail price, while excise and other revenue collected on tobacco are also very large. In the case of barley, these indirect taxes on sale and purchase might reduce the fellah's real income from his saleable surplus by as much as one third.

511 Although the villager contributes to the revenue of the country, he receives little in the way of benefits from its expenditure. He is usually without any kind of education, which in itself militates against the improvement of his position. Thus the average fellah would not be able to read even the simplest leaflets, which might be published to improve his methods of cultivation. Government officials, who might impart this knowledge by personal contact, are too few or too hampered by lack of transport to be able to reach him. Much the same applies to his health, which is generally poor in the first instance because he is unable to afford an adequate diet.

Apart from a few generalizations, lack of information prevents comparison with other types of agriculture such as rice cultivation in the marsh areas of the South, date-gardening along the Euphrates and in Basra or grain-growing in the North. In general, the rice areas appear to be extremely congested and living standards are probably the lowest of all. Land in the North is more plentiful, the smallholder is more common, and, in any case, the share of the landlord is far lower, but rainfall is uncertain and yields vary disastrously from year to year.

There are, of course, fellahin who have additional sources of income. The principal source is livestock. A fellah, who, in addition to working the land, owns a few cows or water buffalo is, by comparison, a rich man, but such people are not common. The capital required to purchase an animal may be several times the annual cash income of the poor fellah. Some may seek casual work during the long off-season, but again these are the minority.

The condition of the settlers in the Dujaila project is in striking contrast to that of the average fellah. The principal reason for their improved standard of living is the fact that they do not have to pay any share to a landlord. Their income is for that reason alone more than double. In addition, they have been able to acquire cows, sheep, goats and chickens. Many of them have fruit gardens.

As a consequence they have a far healthier diet and are obviously 511
better dressed. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a farmer who himself employs a fellah. Although this is partly a consequence of the large size of his plot (100 donums including fallow), it is indicative of his much higher standard of living.

In the towns, workers with regular employment would be 571
much better off than the poor fellah, but in cities such as Basra 465
and Baghdad where there has been a great influx of people from the country, there is considerable underemployment in addition to unemployment. Although, at the current rate of wages for casual labor (about 200 to 250 fils a day) a man might theoretically earn an annual income of ID 75 or more, there must be many who work irregularly and earn less than ID 50. Bread and rice are comparatively costly and, together with the rent of a room for a man's family, might take nearly half his income.

Wages are probably not much higher in many of the smaller and more primitive industries, but artisans such as plumbers and electricians are scarce and can command much higher wages. In the more modern industries, such as the oil industry, the Port of Basra and the new factories in Baghdad, a skilled machinist can earn a dinar a day or more. On the clerical side, in the lowest grade of the regular civil service a married official with more than one child receives ID 13 per month.

The higher income of the city-dweller with regular employ- 511
ment enables him to purchase a reasonable diet, better clothing 369
and better housing. He also has access to educational and health services. Nevertheless, congestion and sanitary conditions are often very bad in certain parts of the cities and disease is common.

Above these various classes is the small rich group of land- 565
owners and merchants. No estimate of the proportion of the 511
national income accruing to this group is possible, but some indication can be gleaned from the fact that a landowner in the South normally gets at least half the net value of the output from the land, while, in industry, profits may exceed the total payroll.

state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is prescribed. Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted. 654 423 241 166

On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines. [511]

The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers. [134]

Expansion of Health Education

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751 Iraq has a small, wealthy upper class and a small middle class. The great majority of the people are poor and ignorant, most especially in regard to health measures. Health education is badly needed and there is no doubt that the people would respond readily to teaching. Large groups enthusiastically attended all the shows put on for the health week held in Diwaniya province; competitions for the best eating-house, butcher's shop and barber's shop were keenly contested and visitors thronged to see the model house and the medical exhibition. The oil company in Kirkuk employs a British sanitary inspector and the Railways Administration in Baghdad recently sent their Iraqi sanitary inspector to take a course of study in the United Kingdom. The response of the householders in these places to sanitary measures is striking; their pride in their homes is obvious and the absence of flies conspicuous.

751
871 To begin with, every doctor should have a thorough understanding of the relation of environmental factors to disease. Greater emphasis on the teaching of preventive medicine and particularly of social medicine in the medical school, as has already been recommended, would help to inculcate a wider appreciation of the importance of the preventive outlook in all medical work. Like doctors, nurses have a unique opportunity to teach their patients, and personal and domestic hygiene should take their proper place in the training courses for nurses. Every hospital should be an object lesson in hygiene and every patient should learn by his stay in it.

Health education must be given an important place in the curriculum of the teachers' training schools, and special courses in the prevention of the diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be included in the syllabus of the School of Agriculture and of the School of Engineering.

Hygiene is already taught in the schools but ought to be given greater emphasis. Personal hygiene is essentially a matter of habit formation and young school children should be trained in good habits as a daily routine. Special classes could be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases—possibly, in some cases, by the school medical officer. It is for the Health Department to

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874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 *Department of Antiquities*. The Department of Antiquities
maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration,
217 research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be
439 drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the
world's supply. Her general economic organization is neverthe-
433 less agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the
339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com-
342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 In 1950 a Development Board was established with the func-
652 tion of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing
a general economic and financial plan for developing the
● [511] country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

311 162 which may play a prominent part in the economic development of the country, Mesopotamia may be regarded as a purely agricultural land. From this standpoint it is best considered in two sections. There is the river-irrigated date-growing district to the south, with Basra as its center, and there is the district to the north inhabited by nomads, semi-nomads and river agriculturists, with its principal center in Baghdad and a second capital further north in Mosul.

312 245 The date gardeners along the river in the Basra territory resemble in many ways the cultivators that can be seen in any oasis town in Arabia. Their work is very similar. Irrigation systems must be constructed. Channels must be provided to carry the water to the roots of the date palms and to the squares of alfalfa and other crops. There is this difference, however, that the water flows of itself. Twice a day the tide of the ocean backs up the water of the great Arab River as far as Gurna, about a hundred miles from the sea. The extensive cultivation of dates stops at that point. The water can be shut out of a field if so desired, or the gates can be opened and as much allowed to enter as is needed. The supply is unlimited and can be had twice a day the year around. The soil is ideal. It is rich and hundreds of feet deep. In natural endowment Mesopotamia is a paradise for date gardeners.

511 As a matter of fact, however, that country is far from a paradise for date gardeners. The favorable conditions ought to make their work easier and their remuneration greater, but the facts are otherwise. Their condition is worse than that of the cultivators in Hasa. It is the story of the Bahrein pearl banks over again. The increased wealth of the Bahrein pearl banks has not bene-

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● 511 fited the Bahrein pearl diver; it has produced richer merchants in that district. In the same way the land-owners of Mesopotamia are past all comparison richer than the land-owners of the oases in Arabia but the actual cultivators of the soil are far worse off. Improved conditions and an increased return on each man's work have not benefited them at all.

423 427 511 Their[1] condition is pitiful. The gardens are owned by men who live far away in distance and farther away still in sympathy. The Sheikh of Kuwait owns large gardens in this district; indeed his principal wealth is reputed to be invested there. The same is true of Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah, the Persian governor for southern Arabistan. Many of the gardens are owned by rich men who live in Basra and Baghdad. Their affairs are administered by a local agent, whose sole interest lies in driving as hard a bargain as possible with the unfortunate cultivator. If an unfavorable year comes, there is no easily available judge or ruler to modify the contract as in Arabia. As a result the gardeners are bitterly oppressed. Men are practically forced into bankruptcy in order to live up to oppressive contracts during a hard year. Competition is keen, and in these large communities where the gardens stretch for scores of miles and where it is not easy to turn to other occupations, where above all there is no public sentiment to appeal to and no ruler with Arab ideas of justice to frown upon the rich oppressor, it is possible to push the gardener down very close to the limit of bare subsistence. His clothes are in tatters. His food is poor. His house is wretched. Above all he is a discouraged and hard-pressed individual with a hopeless and despairing outlook on life.

[1] [Date gardeners --Analyst]

[Marsh Arabs]

511 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevolent man and seemed to be very well liked. The group as a whole enjoys a degree of prosperity and comfort most unusual for an Arab community. Everybody has enough to eat and enough to wear and a good house to live in. Crops seem to be quite reliable. If the wheat and barley harvest fails, the rice does not. Taxes are light and the local government good.

515 463 The most conspicuous difference from the typical agricultural community in Arabia lies in the fact that here the old equality of the desert is preserved. There is no class of rich citizens who outshine their fellows. There are a few merchants of a small sort. Amara, the nearest city, is so close to the town we visited that the shops were very small, most of the trading being done in the larger city. We saw few artisans. The community seemed to be free from caste divisions and to enjoy a spirit of equality and brotherhood much like that of the Bedouins themselves.

562 Another surprising thing is the freedom of all classes. The women have discarded the veil completely and associate with the men freely, being seen on the street apparently under no restraint whatever. This is a refreshing contrast to the other communities of Arabs; indeed the Marsh Arabs are far ahead of even the Bedouins in this respect. These women buy and sell in the bazaar and appear to participate in all the activities of the town with no hesitation whatever. They visited the temporary dispensary that we set up and in their self-assertion were 795 sometimes harder to manage than the men. It is interesting to note that these Arabs are all Shiahs. "No," said the guard that accompanied us from Ahwaz as we were coming in for a visit, "there are no infidels in all this district. Every one is a Shiah."

185 well as many western food products, such as candies and
177 fancy crackers. The country is lighted by kerosene oil,
much of which comes from America. Numbers of automobiles
are to be seen, and in some places even electric
lights. All these things represent the gratification of
wants that did not exist previous to the entrance of western
influence.

439 There has also been a development of the export trade
311 of the country. However, the articles for export are not
many nor of great amount. Dates are the principal product,
together with a certain amount of wheat and rice
and some hides and wool. In the long run, of course, no
more can be brought into the country than is sent out of
it, and the trade of Mesopotamia cannot increase to any
great figure until her own natural resources are developed.

000 Just how far these various modern improvements will
go remains to be seen. If the British continue in power,
there is no doubt that material development will be steady
and sound. If they evacuate the country and leave it to
an independent local government, progress will be much
435 slower, to say the least. During the war wages went up
511 to fabulous heights, and although prices of food and rent
177 advanced even more, there is no doubt that the sum
185 total of the war's influence was to raise the standard of
living in the cities and to stimulate enormously the desire
for many western products and for western education.
Just now there has been a very sharp reaction; times are
hard, work is scarce, wages are poor. Everything western
is discounted, and the cry is for an independent national
development with the elimination of every foreign
000 influence. The common people long for the golden days
of the Turks, forgetting with a completeness quite as-

20: Hourani 5-6 (1946) 1947 M1 Mid[illegible]
[illegible]

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563 the Acting High Commissioner and the Acting Prime Minister visited Kurdistan together, and made statements in which, while condemning separation and emphasizing the unity of Iraq, they spoke of the Government's resolve to satisfy the linguistic and other demands of the Kurds. On the other hand, a number of conciliatory measures, both legislative and administrative, were taken. The most important of them was the Local Languages Law already mentioned.

[669] In spite of this, revolt once more broke out among the Kurds, first under Shaikh Mahmud (1930–1) and then under Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan (1932). The causes of these revolts were partly political and partly personal. They were only subdued through the intervention of the R.A.F.

The Kurds since the Treaty

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198 From 1932 to 1943 the Kurds did not revolt again, but continued to be restless and unwilling to accept the authority of the Government. There were two main reasons for their restlessness. The first was the growth of Kurdish national spirit, due partly to the gradual appearance of a class of educated Kurds, partly to a natural reaction against Pan-Arabism. The encouragement given by the French to Kurdish nationalism in the Syrian Jazirah, and by the Russians to Kurdish autonomy in the Caucasus, may also have had a certain although a limited influence. The second and more fundamental reason was to be found in the particular administrative grievances of the Kurdish tribes. The Iraqi Government made little attempt to carry out the provisions of the various laws passed during the mandatory period. Government departments in Baghdad tended to neglect the claims of districts so far away from the capital; and the Kurds had no way of making their voice heard effectively and compelling the Government to pay attention to their needs. In general, Arab officials in the northern provinces failed to understand the mentality and needs of the Kurdish people (although Kurdish officials in Arab districts were often highly successful). The gap between administration and inhabitants was perhaps greatest in the Mosul liwa, where the administration was largely under the influence of the Arab townspeople of Mosul itself.

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511 The Government's neglect showed itself in every sphere. There were few facilities for education, and those which existed were mainly for education in Arabic. Again, nothing was done

to extend and improve the cultivation of the land and raise the standard of living. This had serious consequences when the war came and brought with it urgent economic problems. The mountain districts did not produce enough cereals to feed the population, and importation on an adequate scale was rendered difficult by the poverty of the Kurdish peasants, the lack of a food-supply organization and the insufficiency of transport. The sense of grievance was further stimulated by the example of the Kurds in Persia, who had thrown off the authority of the Persian Government since the Allied occupation of 1941. In 1943 Mulla Mustafa, the brother of Shaikh Ahmad, rose in revolt in the Barzan district. His rising lasted for several months. Attempts to suppress it failed and it was finally called off after negotiations, and an undertaking by the Government to look into Kurdish grievances. Majid Mustafa himself a Kurd and a distinguished administrator, was appointed Minister without Portfolio with the special duty of devoting himself to Kurdish affairs. His report outlined a scheme of economic and administrative reforms. In the course of 1944 little was done to carry out these or any reforms, and Mulla Mustafa's movement still smouldered; the condition of the Kurds was somewhat improved, however, by the increased cultivation of tobacco, their most important cash-crop.

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The Assyrians

The Assyrians form a distinct community, not only by reason of their Nestorian faith, but also through their language, a Syriac dialect, and their traditions. They are probably the descendants of tribes which moved from the plains of Iraq into the mountains to the north during the period of the Mongol invasion, and remained there until the present generation. In their mountain-home they lived as shepherds, feudally organized under their *maliks* with their Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, as their temporal as well as spiritual ruler. They paid a yearly tribute to the Ottoman Sultan, but were in practice autonomous, although their autonomy was always subject to interference by their neighbours the Kurds.

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At the beginning of the First World War they were divided into three main groups: first, the mountaineers in the Hakkiari district of what is now Turkey; secondly, those in the plains to the west of Lake Urmiyah, in Persia; and, thirdly those in the

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161 311 poverty probably unequalled anywhere in the world. Throughout the centuries, production has declined as neglect and misuse have drained the fertility from the soils and permitted salt to seep in and ruin for cultivation thousands of acres in this Garden of Eden.

[146] 511 The people, undernourished and ravaged by disease, have degenerated as the land has deteriorated. One would never guess that the present inhabitants, oppressed by poverty and ignorance, were in any way related to those men who shaped the history of the world for so many centuries.[1] Many

[1] [Text continues on p. 88--Analyst]

Table 27

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IRAQ: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports

1937, 1949, 1950, and 1951

Value

Item	1937	1949	1950	1951
	Per Cent			
Crude Petroleum	65	53	51	51
Barley	7	20	19	21
Dates	6	11	10	19
Others	22	16	20	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79	92	126	166

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

Table 28

IRAQ: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports

1937, 1949, and 1950

Value

Country	1937	1949	1950
	Per Cent		
France	51	25	38
United Kingdom	18	14	12
United States	7	2	6
India	2	9	3
Netherlands		8	7
Others	22	42	34
Total	100	100	100

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

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● 511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

871 212 Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

651 382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

647 654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

652 654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

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[33] *Economic Development of Iraq*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 63.

II. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

A. PRESENT CONDITIONS

369 511 162 The some 4,000,000 more people of Iraq who live the rural areas have been long characterized by many people both within and outside Iraq as suffering from poverty, ill health and illiteracy. These conditions become readily apparent to one visiting the villages of the country today. The characterization of the people can be extended to their being ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed.

369 511 The survey was immediately impressed with the crude and inefficient methods of making a living and the unnecessarily poor and unhealthy home and village life. These conditions can be remedied by instruction and assistance. People farm with primitive equipment and are wasteful of land and water. In village after village there are mud huts without light or fresh air. Families live, sleep and eat in single rooms packed together with animals, food, stores, farming equipment and refuse. Children play in courtyards filled with animal dung and filth, many people suffer from infected eyes, skin sores and diseases caused by unsanitary conditions which could be greatly reduced by better sanitary conditions. In the homes food is prepared on the floors where it comes in contact with the accumulated filth, flies, chickens, dogs and other animals. Pots and pans and mixing spoons lie on the ground. They are crudely cleaned with dirty water or old rags. There are no such things as kitchens, screened lockers for food or clean and covered places for drinking water in the homes of the rural villagers. Instruction in home care could overcome much of this.

369 364 511 The lack of pure drinking water is one of the most acute problems in these villages. Some pumps and water tanks and some water piped from springs to collection pools have been installed. However, these facilities frequently lack sanitary protection and show lack of proper maintenance by the communities. Often wells have around them accumulation of stagnant water, mud and animal dung. Another acute problem is the lack of any facilities in many villages, and homes for taking care of human wastes. Where toilets exist they are mere uncovered holes open to flies and a source of spreading disease.

369 871 Many villages have not yet received the benefit of schools where children can learn some of the concepts and techniques which would enable them to understand the need for improving their conditions and help their families in doing so. In some villages young girls are not allowed by their elders to attend school or not provided with primary schools, buildings and teachers. Much of a new generation is growing up illiterate and ignorant of how they might help themselves when they grow up.

369 423 471 511 Inquiry among villagers and local officials revealed that although there might be a headman or mukhtar of the village, nearly all direction and management of their affairs comes from outside leadership. Communities lack the local leadership and organization by which they might progress through their own efforts. Sheikhs, landlords, their agents (sirkal) who are frequently local government representatives as well, direct the farming operations, decide the lands on which the villagers will farm and live, provide much of the seed and equipment, direct the cleaning of ditches, collect the shares of crops and other payments and decide whether or not the farmers may live and work on the land during the next year. Even the farmer who owns his own land is not without obligations to money lenders, tax collectors and government supervision. The farmers and tenants of Iraq are dependent upon

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
511 utilise for participation in family and village development programmes.

Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
369 of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
433 to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
511 conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
566 land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
423 house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
471 better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
566 more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
and write to obtain more information.

244 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
853 particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

milk products, or from contact with infected 164
animals. From 5 to 97 cases were 232
treated annually in government institutions 758
in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination 742
of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to 164
the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 232
1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella
antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br.
melitensis* was isolated from 5 of the 13
samples from which bacteriologic cultures
were made.

DISEASES SPREAD CHIEFLY THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the 164
most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49,
from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and
from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuberculosis
were recorded annually. Such figures
are of little value in assessing the problem,
however, due to inadequate reporting and
the shortage of diagnostic and treatment
facilities. Local authorities estimate that
the prevalence of latent or active infections
approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in
many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and
Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas.
Widespread undernutrition and low standards 164
of living, associated with overcrowding 146
and ignorance of the basic principles of 511
hygiene, are factors contributing to the 165
spread of the disease. The death rates are
known to be high, but little precise information
is available. It is believed that a
considerable number of tuberculosis deaths
are erroneously attributed to pneumonia
and other respiratory infections. Moreover, [183]
the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit
the presence of tuberculosis in the family
due to the stigma customarily attached to
the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an average 164
of 760 cases were treated in government 758
hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of
about 25 per cent. The maximum number
of cases occurred in the group from 16 to
30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. 164
Involvement of the bones or the glands accounts
for a large proportion of the non-

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countered. The prevalence rarely exceeds 5 164 to 20 cases a year, but, in 1948, outbreaks totaling 185 cases were recorded. Rheumatic fever is one of the most important diseases of childhood, particularly in Baghdad. From 10,000 to 23,000 cases were treated annually [758] in the government hospitals and dispensaries throughout the country in 1944-49. Poliomyelitis was formerly regarded as sporadic, but cases are being recognized with increasing frequency. With improved diagnostic facilities, 70 to 100 cases have been reported annually since 1949 from the children's hospital in Baghdad.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Contact

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal 164 disease are encountered, especially in the urban communities. Syphilis predominates among the recognized cases; congenital syphilis is common. The prevalence of the disease in Baghdad and other cities is estimated locally at between 2 and 10 per cent. Chancroid and gonorrhea are widespread, but the extent of infection in the general population is not accurately known. Lymphogranuloma venereum and granuloma inguinale are relatively rare. The cases of venereal disease treated in government institutions averaged about 38,600 annually in the 6 years 1944-49. Roughly 65 per cent were diagnosed as syphilis, 26 per cent as gonorrhea and 9 per cent as chancroid. Treatment is provided by the health authorities in the various general hospitals [758] and dispensaries, as well as in 2 special venereal disease hospitals.

Bejel is widely distributed among the 164 nomadic and the seminomadic peoples in 361 the Tigris and the Euphrates valleys and 511 around the marshes and the lakes in the lower delta region. Apparently a form of syphilis transmitted by nonvenereal contact, the disease is characterized by a predominance of mucocutaneous lesions, usually with a high degree of oral and pharyngeal involvement. It is associated with primitive conditions of living, and is most extensive

p. 41(A)

63:Simm[illegible] et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East

IRAQ MH1

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361
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

Bejel in Iraq. Areas of Greatest Prevalence

in the settlements bordering the larger rivers and the marshes, where it is known locally by different names, chiefly *bejel, lawath* and *abou khisian*. It is believed that at least two thirds of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the maximum transmission between 2 and 5 years of age. Serious foci, in which the disease sometimes reaches epidemic proportions, exist in the southeastern provinces and along the Tigris and its tributaries in Mosul *liwa*. The districts around the Amarah marshes are probably the most severely affected, but infection rates of over 50 per cent are found in many villages in Amarah, Muntafiq, Basra and Mosul *liwas*. An important focus also persists in Dulaim *liwa*, in the vicinity of Hit and Ramadi. Surveys have shown moderately high infection rates in some villages, while in others the existence of 20 to 25 per cent of seropositive latent cases is suggestive of epidemic conditions in the recent past. The disease is present among the Bedouin tribes of the desert, but is absent among the Kurdish populations of the northeastern mountain districts. Indigenous cases are seldom seen in the towns, although a focus has been established in Baghdad,

164
369

p. 41(B)

164
369 is endemic in the alluvial plain region, within a radius of about 100 miles around Baghdad, which is one of the major foci in the Middle East. There the infection rates average 20 to 60 per cent, and probably approach 95 per cent in many localities, especially in the older parts of the city. Outside of this traditional focus, the infection is distributed irregularly. Some of the agricultural districts to the south are relatively free from the disease, but in the more compact towns and villages the infection rates are as high as 40 per cent. In Basra and Muntafiq *liwas*, the extent of infection is slight, and even in the towns the prevalence probably does not exceed 3 to 4 per cent. North of Baghdad the disease appears to be confined to isolated foci. It is widespread in the city of Mosul and in the towns of Beled, Samarrah and 'Aqra, but is almost completely absent from the steppe country and from the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan.

164
158 In the 6-year period 1944-49, the cases of Oriental sore treated annually in government institutions ranged between a minimum of 2,910 in 1948 and a maximum of 10,502 in 1945. All ages are affected, but most of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the greatest susceptibility between 1 and 4 years of age. Multiple lesions [511] are frequent, particularly among individuals living in congested and unhygienic surroundings. Ulcerative sores predominate, but the nodular type is seen in a large percentage of the cases. Secondary tuberculoid lesions, arising in healing ulcers, are also common in children. The largest number of cases is usually observed in August, September and October. *Phlebotomus sergenti* is apparently the only important vector in [136] Iraq, as in Pakistan. Cutaneous infections occur among the dogs and the cats found in the cities, but they are thought to play a minor role in the spread of the human disease.

164
369 Visceral leishmaniasis, or kala-azar, is suspected of being sporadic in the northern part of the country, although up to 1950

p. 46 (B)

164 369 only 1 case, in which the diagnosis was confirmed by laboratory examination, had been recorded. Potential sandfly vectors of kala-azar are apparently absent in the southern and the central provinces, but they may exist in the northern highlands.

164 Other Infections. Sandfly fever is endemic, and, in the delta region, reaches epidemic proportions every few years. From 842 to 4,688 cases were recorded annually in 1944-49. The sandfly vector, *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is widely distributed. The season of transmission usually extends from May to November, with a peak in June or July. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the south.

[484] Cases of elephantiasis of undetermined origin are occasionally encountered, but *Wuchereria bancrofti* is not known to be present. Guinea worm infections are sometimes seen in pilgrims from southern Iran, but no indigenous cases have been recorded.

NUTRITIONAL DISEASES

146 511 361 Undernutrition, anemia and avitaminosis are prevalent, especially among the wage-earning classes in the cities and the impoverished peasants of the south. Clinical manifestations of vitamin A and vitamin C deficiencies are widespread. In general, serious nutritional diseases tend to be more or less localized in distribution, depending upon the dietary habits and the standards of living of the people. Rickets is common, and from 100 to 2,387 cases were treated annually in the government institutions in 1944-49. Cases of scurvy and of osteomalacia are numerous. Beriberi and pellagra are sporadic, but minor symptoms of riboflavin deficiency are frequently observed. Protein edema is rare. A form of cirrhosis of the liver is encountered in which [illegible] nutrition is believed by some authorit[illegible] be a contributory factor.

MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS

164 Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and large-scale epidemics are reported occasionally. Encephalitis lethargica is sporadic.

x539 against my uncle. I must not reveal my identity to him.

So Rejab sat in the guest-house, and he was thinking:
It is my right to marry this girl. How can I prevent the
marriage? And Hamed looked around his guest-house and
he saw a strange youth of great beauty seated there, and he
asked: Who is he? They answered: He is one of the
Shammar princes from Hail, and we do not know his
name. Then Rejab rose and thanked his host and left the
assembly, and he took his horse and rode off. But when
he was in the cover of the palm trees he halted and turned
[525 to look at the house of Hamed, for he thought: I must
839] carry off the girl this very day. He saw that the women's
quarter was heavily guarded by slaves and eunuchs armed
with swords, and all the doors to the courtyard were
guarded, nor was it possible to gain entrance. But he saw
•[514] also that the House of the Dawn was situated at a distance
from the house, that its odours (may they be far from you)
should not disturb the people of the house, and he cursed
himself and thought: Had I come one day earlier I could
have carried off the girl when she comes at dawn to visit
the House of the Dawn, but now there is no time to wait
another day. Then an idea came to him, and he took his
horse and rode at a canter to Samawa.

*539 In the bazaar of Samawa, Rejab bought first a woman's
757 dress, and he wrapped it up and concealed it in his cloak.
Then he went to the pharmacist and he bought three
Roman pills. Now, let it be known to you that in these
days we have many and complicated medicines, but then
we had only simple remedies, and the Roman pill served
both for a man and for his animals, for verily it was said,
One for a man, two for a horse, three for a camel. And
he took the three Roman pills and he went to the shop of
the sweet maker and he bought from him a tray of the

x539 And how bitter was the centre of her sweet. For the Lady
757 Aliya knew not that the sweet contained three Roman
514 pills, the dose for a camel.

When Rejab reached his horse he stripped off the clothes of a girl and he put on his own clothes, and he strapped on his sword, and he stood by his horse, watching the House of the Dawn and thinking: It will not be long now. And after ten minutes he saw the Lady Aliya come out of the gate of the courtyard and her step was the step of one in haste, and she made towards the House of the Dawn. And when the Lady Aliya was near the House of the Dawn, but before she could enter it, Rejab rode down on her and seized her in his arms and pulled her across his horse, and he covered her mouth with his hand, nor could she utter a scream, and he turned his horse and galloped off in the direction of the desert. And with such dash and speed did he do this that the sentries saw nothing, for they were looking into the courtyard thinking: It is not fitting that we stare at the Lady Aliya while she walks towards the House of the Dawn.

x539 When they had galloped some distance from the house of Hamed, Rejab released his hand from Aliya's mouth, and she looked at his face and she saw that he had the face of the pretty gypsy girl. And she thought: If my captor is indeed a man, and so it appears, then I am indeed in luck, for he is handsomer by far than that horrible old landowner to whom my father was going to marry me. But there was agony and pain in the stomach of Aliya, and she said: O noble stranger, let me down for a moment that I may ease myself. And Rejab replied: Wait until we are in the desert when we may see if we are pursued.

After they had entered the desert, and when there was a clear mile behind them to watch for pursuit, Rejab per-

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 joined the caravan. It marched at the sixth hour, and its destination was Baghdad.

x539 And when they had been two days on the road, and
721 the caravan was traversing the territories of the Shammar of the Jezira, they came on Bedawin, raiders, mounted on horses and on fine camels, and the riders rode up to the caravan and cried: Who be you, where do you go, from whence do you come, and by whose permission? And the Turkish officers and soldiers who were guarding the caravan cried out: We march by order of the Government. Make way! Make way! And the raiders shouted: Are the Ottomans, then, a Government? Know you that we are the Government here, and this is our customs post, and here we levy excise. And as for the caravan, we permit it to proceed when we have levied the tax, and as for the soldiers, we disarm them and permit them to return from whence they have come, but they shall go on foot.

And the Turkish officers saw that the tribesmen were many, well mounted and well armed, so they ordered their soldiers to lay down their arms, crying: Moslems! Spare our lives! And the tribesmen said; Our pledge is given. And the Turks dismounted from their horses and turned back on foot towards Mosul, and their arms they left on the ground.

Then the tribesmen cried out: Merchants, unload your camels and open your loads, that we may inspect the merchandise and levy the tax. And the merchants and camel men made the camels kneel and commenced un-
x539 loading them. And Daoud was standing by a load of
● 514 copper vessels and he saw that they were copper water
721 pots of that shape which has a narrow neck through
which the hand cannot pass and which has a long straight

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

spout, and which has only one use, and that is known to 539x
you. For is it not used for cleansing in the closet? And 514 ●
Daoud thought after this manner: Why should I not slip 721
my jewels into one of these pots, for do the Bedawin use these water pots? They will never levy a tax on these goods.

So Daoud took his bag of gold and jewels and made it 539x
long and thin and he slipped it down the neck of a water 721
pot, nor did any see him do it. And the tribesmen came and inspected the loads, crying: Merchants, the tax is half to us and half to you, for you failed to notify us of your coming, that we might come to some other agreement. And they inspected the loads and from each load they took half and left half. And verily those Bedawin took those things that their hearts desired, of silks and linens and Mosul cloth, of rugs and carpets, of sugar and tobacco, of watches and clocks, of saddles and blankets and almonds and honey, of threads and needles and cheeses and charcoal, and they even took an umbrella. But when they came to the load of water pots they laughed and said: We permit these goods to pass exempt and tax free.

And men from amongst the men, the raiders, searched each of the merchants and took from them their purses and opened them, saying: These gold coins bear the cipher of the Ottomans and are confiscated, for we do not permit their circulation in our land. And they came on Daoud and searched him, but they found with him neither goods not gold, so they questioned him, saying: Merchant, where are your goods and where is your wealth? And Daoud replied, saying: I am not a wealthy merchant. I am only a poor coppersmith making enough for my needs, and I go to Baghdad where my mother is sick, and not for purposes of trade. And they took him and led him away,

164 parently of primary importance in all parts of the country, particularly in the lower delta region. Local authorities estimate that 25 to 35 per cent of the inhabitants in Baghdad harbor cysts of *Endamoeba histolytica*, while in Basra the carrier rate probably approximates 60 to 70 per cent. Liver abscesses are frequently encountered.

The actual distribution of bacillary infections is unknown, since the proportion of cases treated by medical officers is unduly small, and few facilities for confirmatory diagnosis are available. According to the official statistics for 1944 through 1949, from 17,000 to 30,000 cases of amebic dysentery and from 180 to 1,100 cases of bacillary dysentery were reported each year. Correspondingly, an analysis of the cases treated annually in the hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field and pipeline areas, in the 4 years 1946-50, shows that from 478 to 1,603 were amebic infections and from 58 to 175 bacillary. The Flexner group predominates among the *Shigella* strains isolated in dysentery cases at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad, but Sonne, Schmitz and Shiga types are also numerous.

136 The abundance of flies and the insanitary
●515 habits of the people favor the spread of
164 intestinal infections. Diarrhea and enteritis
165 are major causes of illness and death, especially in early childhood. Giardiasis is common. Outbreaks of food poisoning, undoubtedly caused by various strains of *Salmonella*, are frequent.

164 Cholera. Epidemics of cholera were for-
484 merly recurrent in the border districts and along the trade routes from India and the East. Although some authorities believe that an endemic focus may have existed in the Shatt al Arab region in the past, most epidemics have resulted from the introduction of the disease by way of traffic through the Persian Gulf ports or by overland travel through Iran, often in connection with pilgrimages to Mecca or local Shia shrines.
164 Within recent decades extensive outbreaks, each totaling from 1,500 to 2,500 cases,

were reported in 1923, 1927 and 1931. Since 164
1931, cholera has been almost completely absent from the country, although one imported case was recorded in 1939, when the disease was epidemic in Afghanistan and Iran.

Strict quarantine regulations are enforced, 744
and travelers from India, Pakistan 484
and Ceylon, as well as pilgrims from Mecca, 164
without valid certificates of immunization against cholera are retained in quarantine
centers for a period of 7 days. Mass immunization 751
with cholera vaccine is carried 164
on among the populations in the border provinces whenever epidemics are reported from the adjacent territories. At the time of the recent epidemic in Egypt, in 1947, immunization was compulsory for all travelers entering the country and for the inhabitants of towns and villages along the Syrian frontier.

Helminthiases. SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schistosomiasis, 164
caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, 136
has probably been present in the lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins since ancient times. It is highly endemic in the southern and the central provinces, where the intermediate snail host, *Bulinus truncatus*, is found in widespread but often
localized foci. The disease is prevalent 164
among the children and among the agricultural 462
and other laborers who work in infested waters, particularly the men and the boys, who are exposed to infection to a greater extent than the women. It reaches maximum proportions between 10 and 20 years of age, but is usually negligible in
early childhood. Transmission is seasonal: 164
it takes place from May to the end of November, 515
but primarily between June and October, when infected snails are most abundant. The insanitary customs of the inhabitants, associated with the frequent use of the canals for religious ablutions and the severe summer heat which is conducive to bathing in any convenient body of water,
are contributory factors. The infection rates 164
average 18 to 25 per cent in the irrigated 361
districts of the delta, but vary from zero

p. 37(A)

IRAQ MH1

164 prevalent. In most areas the prominence of
eye lesions is aggravated by the frequency
of dust-laden winds and by the glare of the
sun. Conjunctivitis is the leading cause of
morbidity among the employees of the Iraq
Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field
and pipeline stations. It comprises almost
one half of the cases of infectious disease
treated each year. Gonococcal ophthalmia is
responsible for considerable blindness, par-
743 ticularly in the urban communities. The
164 Ministry of Health operates 3 ophthalmic
hospitals and 5 dispensaries in Baghdad
and other cities, and provides special fa-
cilities for the treatment of eye diseases
in the provincial hospitals and dispen-
saries.

164 **Diseases of the Skin.** The low standards
515 of hygiene prevailing among both urban and
rural populations are conducive to the
164 spread of skin infections. Mycotic infec-
tions of various types are seen in large
numbers. Favus predominates: from 10 to
15 cases constitute the usual daily quota at
the clinic of the Royal Hospital in Baghdad.
Cases of actinomycosis and Madura foot are
often observed. Impetigo and erysipelas are
common. Scabies is widespread. Phagedenic
ulcers and cases of human myiasis are en-
136 countered from time to time. A form of
164 dermatitis, caused by contact with cercariae
of nonhuman strains of *Schistosoma*, is fre-
quent in the southern provinces. The bites
of sandflies produce skin lesions in suscep-
tible individuals, and are apt to become
infected.

164 **Leprosy.** Leprosy is endemic, especially
in the marsh and the lake districts of the
south. The actual prevalence of the disease
is uncertain, but local observers estimate
that it probably does not exceed 400 to 500
cases. From 179 to 279 cases were reported
annually in 1944-49, with from 46 to 86 new
infections. A focus formerly existed around
Baghdad, but within recent years relatively
few indigenous cases have been found in the
743 central and the northern provinces. A leper
colony is maintained by the government on
an island near Amarah: it usually has 250
TO 300 PATIENTS IN RESIDENCE.

p. 42(B)

35; Hooper and Field 9-5 (1934) 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

I-I

This plant is a gigantic shrub, remarkable for its legumes, which 278* are several feet long. It has been called Burmese tamarind. The 824* seeds are more or less heart-shaped, flattened, about 2 inches in diameter, with a shining, brown surface. They are used by some hill [515] tribes for washing the hair, as they contain saponin. Aitchison remarks that Kors-i-kamar seeds are exported from India to Iran and employed in medicine. In Tehran they are powdered and, mixed with yolk of egg, made into a plaster for pain in the back.

Equisetum ramosissimum Desf. (Equisetaceae)

قنطريون

Qantaryūn (Teh.); the herb, horsetail.

W.H.M.M. 150859.

The light green stalks of the horsetail with their brittle structure and acute edges appear by some mistake to have been intended to represent the centaury plant (*Erythraea Centaurium* Pers., Gentianaceae). They could not replace the pleasantly bitter centaury herb. *Dianthus anatolicus* Boiss. is called Kanturiyan in Iran, where it is also used as a substitute for the centaury of the European flora. The centaury, like other plants of the gentian family, is a domestic remedy for a general tonic.

Eremurus Aucherianus Boiss. (Liliaceae)

سريش سفيد

Sirish-i-safid (Isf., Teh.); commercial names: chiresh, sarish, siris, shirias; roots of the giant asphodel.

Field 1, 2 (Isf.); 80A, 240.

The roots of one or more species of asphodel, including *Asphodelus ramosus* L., are found in commerce in Iran and Central Asia, and are trade products in Mosul and Leh, either dried entire or powdered (Sirish-i-narm). They are exported from the Balad Sinjar district in northwestern Iraq to Syria (G.). The roots, whitish, [381] twisted, hard, light brown, swell and soften and partly dissolve in water, forming a thick mucilage. Water added to the powder forms a glue used for cementing leather, in binding books, and for other [262] industrial purposes. The green part of the plant is eaten.

Erysimum repandum L. (Cruciferae)

تخم خاك شير

Tukhm-i-khāk-i-shīr (Ham.); Khakshir-talkh (Isf.); Khakechi (Schl.); Khubah (Ar.); Kashir (Bal.); the seeds.

[illegible] Hooper and Field 8-6 [illegible] 1937 MAI Iran MAI
Iraq MHI

Iraq

G. mexicanum Tod. Mexican cotton introduced into India in 1804. The seeds yield a copious, woolly floss. (Field 13 [Iraq]; 1A.) 824* 248

At Rustam Farm the following varieties of cotton are also grown:

(*a*) Rustam No. 65. Field 3A. Origin Iraq.

(*b*) Rustam No. 124. Field 5A, 9A. Origin Punjab, India.

(*c*) Mosul White. Field 4A. Origin Mosul, Iraq.

(*d*) *G. peruvianum.* Ish-muny. Field 11A, 12A. Origin Egypt.

(*e*) Rustam No. 123. Field 7A. Origin Acala.

Guest (p. 39) records the following information: "*Gossypium* (Malvaceae). Cotton. Qutn (Ar.), Pambuq (Turk.), Lukah (Kurd.), Pambu (Kurd.).

"Iraqi or Indian Cotton, *G. herbaceum* L. (Qutn Iraqi), a well-known, short-stapled type, is probably indigenous or has at least been cultivated in Iraq for many centuries. It is still grown to some extent as a summer crop, especially on the northern plains where springs or streams provide irrigation water. The lint is used chiefly for stuffing. It is the local practice to pick this type of cotton with the boll intact, the dry boll and other rubbish being removed later.

"After the War the Department of Agriculture tried many foreign varieties of cotton and eventually issued seed of 'Mesowhite,' a derivative of the long-stapled American Upland cotton, *G. hirsutum* L. (Qutn Amrikani). A ginnery was erected by the British Cotton Growing Association, who did much to encourage this crop. The cultivation of Mesowhite cotton as an irrigated summer crop rapidly became popular in lower Iraq and after ten years (in 1928) the annual export of cotton exceeded 5,000 bales of 400 pounds each. Since that year the size of the crop has fallen off very rapidly, chiefly owing to the slump in world prices which has discouraged the local farmers. In 1932 the export of bales of cotton from Iraq amounted to only about four hundred. One or two other varieties of American cotton, such as Acala, have done well in trials at Rustam Farm; this is a cotton inferior to Mesowhite but gives a higher yield and ginning percentage.

"Egyptian cottons (Qutn Misri) have also been tried but have not proved successful under local conditions."

I-I

Gypsophila paniculata L. (Caryophyllaceae) 824*

الصابونيه 296

El-sābūniyeh (Ar.); Zuleh (Ham.); Saoumfid, Bekh (Ait.); Kundur, Kundusch (Achundow); soap-root. 515 •

I-I

824* Ait.; Post; Boiss. 1: 542; Ph. Ind. 1:155.

296 K.B. 319.

• 515 This is a shrubby plant of northern Iran, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, 3 to 4 feet high, with numerous stems springing from the perennial rootstock. The underground rootstocks are collected and used as soap for washing the hair and clothes. The Irani drug is no doubt a substitute for the older Roman and Egyptian Struthium, the root of *G. Struthium* L. of southern Europe. The roots contain from 6 to 16 per cent saponin.

824* **Halimodendron argenteum Fisch.** (Leguminosae)

278* Field 14, 31 (Iraq).

Halimodendron is a thorny shrub found in Iran, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Fruits of this plant were collected without a local name, from Yezd-i-Khast between Isfahan and Shiraz. The thorns are used in native surgical operations. Inflated pods, 2 cm. long and oblique, are brown, and contain two or three seeds like chick peas.

824* **Helianthus annuus L.** (Compositae)

262 افتاب کردن

Aftāb gardan (Teh.); Ward-ash-shams, Shams-wa-qamar (Iraq); Qunah baqan (Turk.); sunflower seeds.

Field 122 (Teh.), 72, 73 (Iraq).

Two kinds of sunflower seeds are represented in these collections: black, ovate-elongate, 12 by 6 mm.; and white, smooth, broader achenes, 12 by 7 mm. There is a good market for these seeds, which [262] are used for human consumption and for bird food, and yield by [231] expression an oil for cooking purposes. Many tons of the seeds are produced annually in the U.S.S.R.

824* **Helicteres Isora L.** (Sterculiaceae)

278* بهمن پیچ

Bahman-i-pich, Pachman-i-puh (Teh.); Kisht bar Kisht (Pers.); Pechak, Marorphali (Hind.); Avartin (Sans.); the Persian and Sanskrit names signify the furrows on a ploughed field; the spiral fruits.

Ibn Baitar; Achundow; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 365; Ph. Ind. 1: 231.

Field 137; K.B. 320.

The East Indian screw tree occurs in dry forests throughout central and western India and in Ceylon, Java, and northern Australia. The spirally curved fruits are sold in all Indian bazaars and

The power
wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formid- 793
able not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was 565
always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of
State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their
considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse
of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were
exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable
element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish,
anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could
be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local
politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no
means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd
and Shumurd of Najf were notorious.

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without 517 ●
its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social 181
observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations
of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of
information regarding the world, past or present, and that of
æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the
towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were
represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remem-
bered Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected
poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of
handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars
of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmel-
ite), and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans,
Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries
and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing,
book production, or generally readable literary output there was
nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excava-
tion, 'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to
'Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery. The professional classes—
lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish
sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard
admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—
agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost
nothing to show. Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a 812
class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body
of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and 779
the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy 793
Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since
no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime
of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale
disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion,
this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Baṣra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

511 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the modernization and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle
362 classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two
177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now
562 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law, followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work, and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded were still considerable, and included the households of many leading notables and the royal family itself.

● 517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families, by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop
[265] kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include
575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class profes-
526 sional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

871 found to be entirely preoccupied with the classical and literary
876 tradition. It is true that the Arab mind has a flair for language and
[517 literature and delights in oral self-expression, and young children
181] learn to read and write quickly and speak with a fluency and feeling for words which children of other lands would find difficult to emulate. But with the increased importance of science and technology and the need of improving productive efficiency in industry, agriculture and other occupations, the people of Iraq cannot afford to remain content with a system of education which does not equip the younger generation to play its part in the projected plans of development.

Once educational authorities clearly recognize that the introduction of activity-centered methods and curricula and of craft work is basic to the whole idea of educational reconstruction, it should not be difficult to work out the necessary measures. In many other countries, such a reorientation of education has been actually achieved, and not only detailed theoretical discussion but records of concrete, practically worked-out schemes are available for consultation and guidance. It will, of course, not be possible—and even if it were possible, it would not be desirable—to copy these methods and schemes mechanically, because education is a creative field in which ideas have to be applied to the particular situation in which one is working. It will be necessary for Iraqi educators to work out their own pattern of "activity schools" and their appropriate forms of craft work. In fact, some gifted educators have already envisaged this problem in its true perspective. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis on *Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of Iraq* (published in 1942) is an effective presentation of the case for reorganized methods and curricula breaking with the narrow academic tradition. What is more, it gives concrete instances of how units in social studies and health education can be worked out in such a way as to break down the barriers between schooling and life.

What kind of crafts can be introduced in the village and city schools which will appeal to the children and will also be related to their environment so that they can leave school with trained skill and aptitudes and participate effectively in the work of their communities? The answer to this question can be given only after

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Baṣra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

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44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

Iraq AHI

Perhaps the most common activity is some form of Arabic club or society. 873x English societies are also springing up, especially in the preparatory schools. Occasionally schools put on dramatic performances, the revenue from which usually is spent in helping clothe poor students. Some of the schools issue magazines which vary from handwritten sheets hung on the walls or bulletin boards, to mimeographed or printed magazines. Most of these are in Arabic, but some are also in English. Occasionally a school may issue a yearbook or a book of essays by students on various subjects, mainly literary.

Much greater activity in the field of sports is manifest. Aside from the [526]● regular class periods devoted partly to formal exercises and partly to such games as basketball and volleyball, most of the schools have interclass and interschool competitions in soccer, basketball, and volleyball. The interschool competition usually culminates in a championship series which ends in games played at Baghdad by the finalists. Similar competitions in track and field events lead to a final field day in which secondary schools from all over Iraq participate, with a shield, cups, and medals distributed by the King or a member of the royal family.

Excursions of various sorts are popular in the schools. Some of these are of a general character, such as visits to the archeological sites which abound in Iraq, to the oil fields, the main dams, and the like. Others are of a sporting character, such as bicycle trips, hiking trips, and camping trips. In the summer the Department of Physical Education of the Ministry of Education maintains a number of swimming centers and some summer camps for the benefit of schoolboys. This program has for the last few years culminated in a camping visit to the summer resort at Salah al-Din in the northern mountains, at the expense of H.R.H. the Regent, for some of the boys of high scholastic standing.

TEACHERS

Teachers of secondary and vocational schools and of rural- and primary- 875x teachers colleges are all put in one category known as the "secondary cadre." For its supply of secondary-school teachers, Iraq has relied on four main sources: (1) importation of teachers from abroad, mainly from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, and Egypt, but also from England; (2) Iraqi graduates of foreign universities and colleges, whether studying at their own expense or as members of the government missions; (3) graduates of the Higher Teachers College, whether in the first stage (1923–31) or the second stage (1935——) of its existence; and (4) teachers advanced from the primary cadre because of their ability, notably in Arabic. This last practice has now been stopped.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

x874 varies from six periods a week as a minimum for professors to twelve
x875 periods as a maximum for instructors.

Student life and activities.—Most of the men students and about half the women are boarders, their accommodations being in dormitories, for private rooms do not exist. A student committee, elected each term, looks after the physical arrangements, setting down the weekly menu, superintending the reception of provisions from the contractor, and supervising kitchen and dining-room. It has the power to reject any food supply that it considers unfit, and the contractor is obliged to replace it.

[575] There are various student societies and clubs that hold regular meetings and receptions. Some societies, such as the Arab Culture Society, the English Society, the Social Science Society, the Science Society, and the Art Society, follow subject lines. The Mirth and Entertainment Society occasionally holds parties at which skits and comic plays are presented, and there is a more serious dramatic group. The Cooperative Society, established with capital collected from selling shares to students, maintains a shop on the campus, chiefly for selling tea, coffee, and other refreshments. At the end of each year profits are distributed to the students. Recently a Students' Union was started to coordinate the activities of students and societies and to represent student interests before the College administration. Its members are elected from the student body and serve on a committee with two faculty members who are appointed by the dean. The Students' Union developed plans for issuing a College magazine, the first numbers of which have already appeared. It is hoped that the Students' Union will so develop as to increase the measure of self-government enjoyed by the students.

●[526] The athletics program is limited by the nature of the College grounds, which are not yet well prepared for sports. However, soccer is played to some extent, and among indoor games basketball and volleyball, ping-pong, and badminton are popular. Competitions between classes and between individuals are common, and there are occasional intercollegiate competitions. Track and field sports occupy some of the students part of the year, and an annual field-day competition among the higher colleges has been held for the last five years.

THE QUEEN 'ALIYAH INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN TEACHERS

The reorganization of the Primary Teachers College for Women as the Queen 'Aliyah Institute in October 1945, which opened a three-year course for training intermediate-school teachers, was an attempt to overcome the shortage of women teachers for intermediate schools at a time when it was

*539 of my ministers, my advisers, and my troops, then,
626 through shame, he cannot disobey me. And he summoned his court, his ministers, and his troops, and he sent for the sheikhs and leading men of the country, and the palace was thronged with a great crowd, and he sent for his son, the Amir Kheyyun.

*539 And the Sultan spoke and said: It is long since we have
527 had celebrations and rejoicing as is fitting in a great city
● on the occasion of a royal marriage or the birth of an heir to the throne. I therefore command and order the Minister of Finance to produce a sum of one hundred thousand dirhems, and that each of the sheikhs of the tribes shall bring one thousand Syrian sheep, and each of the great merchants shall bring one thousand bags of the finest rice of Amara and of El Huweiza, and the Governor of Basra shall bring one thousand boatloads of the sweetest dates in Basra, and the Maadan shall bring milk, and the people of Mosul shall bring honey, and of Baquba, fruit, and from each town and village shall come the fruits and crops and vegetables of that village. And for every day of the first month of the new year one thousand sheep shall be killed and roasted and stuffed with walnuts and almonds, nor shall any man in the city go hungry, and the travellers and the people of the desert shall also be satisfied, for in that auspicious month will be celebrated the wedding of my son, the Amir Kheyyun, the beloved.

*539 And the Amir Kheyyun stood up in front of his father,
593 and he said: No. Then the faces of the great sheikhs and the great merchants and the captains of ships and the commanders of troops and the learned men became red with shame, for amongst the Arabs it is not fitting that a son speak in front of his father and into his father's face.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 LET it be known to you that once there was a prince in Kermanshah and he had such wealth as had never been known before in these lands. His escort was a thousand horsemen, and their horses were shod with gold, their horses were of the finest Arab stock, their clothing was of Chinese silk, the leather of their saddles was of the skin of lions, and gold and silver were the only metals used at that Court, save in the blades of their swords, which were of Damascus steel.

And in the course of years that prince took as wife the daughter of the Sultan of the Persians, and she was beautiful as a pearl from Kuweit, nor was there any flaw in her face or in her body, and it was necessary to keep her hidden from the eyes of men, lest after seeing her they became blinded to lesser things, for he who looks into the sun cannot see the glow of a cigarette.

So he took the girl to his palace, and they lived together
in pleasure and in joy, and many months passed in the
*539 making of love and its enjoyment. And it became apparent
527 that she was with child, and finally a son was born to the
prince, and he rejoiced and ordered that there should be such a feast as had never been known before amongst the Persians. And he ordered to be slain a thousand sheep and a thousand geese and a thousand ducks and a thousand peacocks, and they were prepared with rice and limes and walnuts and truffles, and there was laid out a feast so tremendous that it took a man over an hour to ride from one end to the other on a fast horse. And they brought barrels and filled them with the wines of Mosul and the wines of Shiraz and the wines of the Russians and the Franks. And there came kings and princes and nobles and great sheikhs and the heads of tribes and captains of armies and great merchants and they gathered together to

*539 honour Rustam, the great prince of Kermanshah, and
527 they ate of the feast and the Prince Rustam also ate of the feast and drank of the wines until he was satisfied.

*539 Now amongst the guests was the Sultan of the Persians,
576 the father of the girl, the wife of Rustam. So when all had laid aside their hands from eating, Rustam rose to give thanks to the Sultan and to the noble guests for their coming. And on the gathering fell a great silence when the prince rose up, that all might hear him with respect. So great was this silence that in the distance could be heard the buzzing of a bee and should a fly alight on the silken tablecloth, then the sound of its alighting was audible to all. Now, as the prince arose he noised a Noise. (May it be far from you.) Now let it not be hidden from you that the Persians have also some civilisation, and amongst them, as amongst us, though a man may sneeze or cough, and even a belch need not bury him in shame, there is a Noise which none may make without lasting disgrace, and it was this Noise which came from His Highness, the Prince Rustam, Ruler of Kermanshah.

And the Sultan and the great sheikhs and great nobles and merchants and captains heard and were astonished. And from the distance came the sound of a laugh of a slave, for truly slaves are without dignity and they do not know that conduct which is proper and seemly. And the face of the Prince Rustam became black with shame, and he turned from the assembly and went.

And the Prince Rustam returned from that multitude to his palace, nor did he look on the faces of his friends. He took from his treasury a bag of gold and ordered to be saddled his swiftest horse and he prepared for departure. Of all his servants and attendants there came to him only one, and this was a boy, a page, who loved him. And the

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by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526
survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in 'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling, was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America. Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542
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the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529
summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

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41 Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Kurd MAII

K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I
168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
648] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful. Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
439

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

814 antiquities, Kurdish lore and tribal traditions, some of whom had produced monographs of interest and value. Returning graduates from foreign universities had reached, at the least, the standard indicated by their doctorates, but few had been attracted by the deeper or more humane culture of the West. The study of Islamic dogma and history was still practised in both Sunni and Shi'i circles of the professional divines, and still attracted pupils; but its seeming divorce from the living world repelled the more active and vital of the rising generation; it offered a career less interesting than the professions or politics; and its appeal was without force to a society in which Islam seemed to have lost much (and in politics 874 nearly all) of its hold. Professional standards, on the other hand, in medicine, archaeology, police and military studies, engineering, economics, and the applied sciences had risen beyond comparison above those of a generation earlier, and gave scope for the best qualities of the 'Iraqi mind.

538 [213] [214] The output of original literary work was small. The modern (linotype) presses installed since the Second World War produced mainly governmental or institutional works or pamphlets, largely educational. Western publishing methods were not in use; books were printed at the author's expense and sold with difficulty through a bookseller; workmanship in book production, especially in binding and illustration, was notably poor. The lack of demand (especially after the Jewish exodus), the unwillingness of the rich to patronize letters, and at times a capricious censorship, had discouraged writers; there were but humble traces of creative effort, and these confined to the fields of poetry (in which 'Iraq had always held its own in the Arab world) and to a lesser extent of fiction writing; women writers had earned a place in both. Interest in contemporary Arabic literature other than newspapers was slight, and the study of earlier Arabic works, though regarded as something of a national asset, did not greatly attract a younger generation, who preferred the writings of modern Europe. 204 The dozen of monthly or quarterly magazines, which appeared at Ḥilla, Mosul, Baṣra, Najf, Arbil, and Kirkuk as well as at Baghdad, were in most cases the organs of various societies or government departments, and though competently written they had few subscribers and no great literary pretension. Kurdish literary activity, though on a diminutive scale, was of vitality and promise. 532 'Iraqi artists, on the other hand, were producing work of some interest, if almost wholly Western in inspiration; 533 musical and dramatic studies were pursued at the Institute of Fine Arts, and more than one 'Iraqi musician—and at least one 'Iraqi cinema actress—had attained a creditable place.

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x539 for over a month. And the ladies and the eunuch looked into the box and they were amazed what they saw. And the eunuch said: I will go to order the guards of the Palace to seize the camel men that they may feel the bastinado until they die, for verily they have stolen the cloth which our Lord the Sultan had ordered for the ladies of his imperial harem.

Nasirulla heard the words of the eunuch and his heart stopped through very fear, and he said to his sister: Do you know where we are? We are in the Harem of the Sultan himself, the most closely guarded place in the whole empire of the Ottomans, of which it is said that no man can enter it and no man can depart from it alive, and in this place there are only girls and eunuchs.

Nasirulla turned to the dresses in which they were hiding, and he took a dress which fitted him and he put it on, and his own clothes he hid. Salma also selected a new
535 dress and put it on, for her dress was dirty, and after they had put on the dresses Nasirulla and Salma looked like sisters, nor could anyone who saw him tell that Nasirulla was a boy, for he wore his hair long after the fashion of the dancing boys, and his moustache was not grown.

Then they heard the eunuchs call out: Ladies, come to your food. Nasirulla turned to his sister and he said: Let us go and eat, for we are hungry. And Salma replied: What, shall we go amongst them? Nasirulla said: We will go and eat. There are many hundreds of girls here and two new faces will never be noticed amongst them.

So Nasirulla and Salma went out into the hall, and they went into another hall, which was even larger than the first, and in it was laid out a great feast. And they saw before them a hundred roast sheep, and a hundred roast peacocks, and many hundreds of chickens and ducks and

361 [539] being mentioned in a nursery rhyme which runs:

Cukukhti, wein ukhti?	Dove, where's my sister?
B'il Hilla.	In Hilla.
Sha takal?	What does she eat?
Bajilla.	Beans.
Wein tenam?	Where does she sleep?
Bab Illah	At God's door.

and which continues for several verses.

The mace. Page 71, Line 16. 'A mace of the finest teakwood.'

411 The mace may almost be said to be a traditional weapon in South Iraq. If you meet an Arab tribesman about his normal daily routine in the countryside, he will probably be armed with a mace and dagger. Rifles are weapons of luxury, to be kept away from dust and damp. [535] Many tribal dances are done with the mace, which is sometimes of solid wood carefully carved, and sometimes, a less beautiful weapon but more dangerous, it is made of a wooden shaft with a ball of lead or pitch at the end.

Page 74, Line 22. 'Maqdad took his course from the wind.'

821 Skilled desert guides can often recognise a wind as being from a certain quarter by its force, humidity, and temperature. The phrase here implies that the sun was clouded over and Maqdad was finding his way by the wind, which indicates that he had considerable skill. The only people who can use the wind are those who can detect quickly any change in its direction. I remember once asking some Arabs the way to a well, and they told me, Keep the wind on your left cheek. I had to use methods with which I was more familiar.

Page 81, Line 25. 'Now I shall call myself Ibn Ali.'

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814 antiquities, Kurdish lore and tribal traditions, some of whom had
produced monographs of interest and value. Returning graduates
from foreign universities had reached, at the least, the standard
indicated by their doctorates, but few had been attracted by the
deeper or more humane culture of the West. The study of Islamic
dogma and history was still practised in both Sunni and Shiʿi
circles of the professional divines, and still attracted pupils; but its
seeming divorce from the living world repelled the more active and
vital of the rising generation; it offered a career less interesting
than the professions or politics; and its appeal was without force to
a society in which Islam seemed to have lost much (and in politics
874 nearly all) of its hold. Professional standards, on the other hand, in
medicine, archaeology, police and military studies, engineering,
economics, and the applied sciences had risen beyond comparison
above those of a generation earlier, and gave scope for the best
qualities of the ʿIraqi mind.

538 The output of original literary work was small. The modern
[213] (linotype) presses installed since the Second World War produced
mainly governmental or institutional works or pamphlets, largely
educational. Western publishing methods were not in use; books
[214] were printed at the author's expense and sold with difficulty
through a bookseller; workmanship in book production, especially
in binding and illustration, was notably poor. The lack of demand
(especially after the Jewish exodus), the unwillingness of the rich
to patronize letters, and at times a capricious censorship, had discouraged
writers; there were but humble traces of creative effort,
and these confined to the fields of poetry (in which ʿIraq had always
held its own in the Arab world) and to a lesser extent of fiction
writing; women writers had earned a place in both. Interest in
contemporary Arabic literature other than newspapers was slight,
and the study of earlier Arabic works, though regarded as something
of a national asset, did not greatly attract a younger generation,
204 who preferred the writings of modern Europe. The dozen of
monthly or quarterly magazines, which appeared at Ḥilla, Mosul,
Baṣra, Najf, Arbil, and Kirkuk as well as at Baghdad, were in most
cases the organs of various societies or government departments,
and though competently written they had few subscribers and no
great literary pretension. Kurdish literary activity, though on a
diminutive scale, was of vitality and promise. ʿIraqi artists, on the
532 other hand, were producing work of some interest, if almost wholly
Western in inspiration; musical and dramatic studies were pursued
533 at the Institute of Fine Arts, and more than one ʿIraqi musician—
and at least one ʿIraqi cinema actress—had attained a creditable
place.

204 The circumstances of its public life and the lively intelligence of

but I warn them that Arabic is an Everest of languages, 000 not to be stormed by some carefree explorer bent on a year or so of study. Seven years of steady plodding may bring the explorer to the snowline, but the icy peaks still tower above him in all their clear beauty, as they have stood for over two thousand years, nor are their slopes safe for any but Arab feet to tread. In the words of Ibn ed Dahhan they may well say:

'Do not think that you will be a poet such as we, for 538 though the hen is feathered, it does not fly.'

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

A MAN'S HONOUR IS IN THE HAIR OF HIS MOUSTACHE

x539
577
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

On the morning after the night in which we had heard the story of Maqdad, we halted for breakfast near Mussayib. Hamed said: You heard the story of Maqdad and you heard how the Persian Prince said that a man's honour is in the hair of his moustache. Now this is a true proverb of the Fetla tribes and I will relate how this saying originated, though truly the Prince was a man without honour, for he shaved off his moustache. And Abed said: If you know the true facts of the origin of this proverb, then tell us the story.

I
K
now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade 438
with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge 439
of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though 173
unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradi- 782
tion at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the
bridge. 539 It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with I
all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the K
construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while 653
sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When 185
echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on I
a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn K
Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled 721
by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the 361
Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

8: Campbell MHl Iraq MHl
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/For the text of the tribal tales of the Muntafiq, the Al Fetla and the Beni Huchaim tribes, see category 116, complete text./

was no fear in her heart, for she knew that Abbas Ali el 539x
Qassab would die before he could marry her. And Kad-
him sat watching his snares and thinking: How can I
become a great merchant? Kadhim was so poor that he
had not even a single copper coin in his pocket; he owned [291]
no shoes, he had no headcloth, he was not even wearing
any vest or underclothes, and his only garment was his
thob. And Kadhim decided: I will borrow money, and
trade with my capital and become a great merchant.

Then Kadhim went to the town and he was walking in 539●
his bare feet, and he went to the shop of Abdul Rashid and 437
saluted the merchant and said: Give me a roll of cloth and 577
a loan of five gold liras and I will give you my pledge.
And Abdul Rashid looked and he saw that the youth was
dressed in a dirty and torn thob and that he was bareheaded
and barefooted, but he saw that he carried his head like
a hawk, so he said: You are, then, from the tribes? And
Kadhim nodded and said: Yes.

Now, let it be known to you that the tribes were much poorer in the days of the Ottomans than they are today, for they were then unable to cultivate their land in peace and prosperity, and it often happened that it was necessary to celebrate a marriage or observe the rites of death when there was no money in the purse of the head of the house. Then would he go to the town and to a merchant and say: Give me cloth and money and take my pledge. And as for the pledge, if he had a gold or silver ring, he would give it, and if he had none then he would give his headcloth to the merchant, or even his riding switch, saying: This contains my honour. And when the pledge was given payment was always made, for this is the custom of the tribes.

Abdul Rashid Mejid looked at the youth Kadhim and

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

539 776 WHAT do you know of El Iraq, you who are boys? I was an old man before the First German War, and I know the country and its history, yet you say there is no monster in the Hor el Hammar. I have seen it, thirty years ago, for this monster takes on the shape of a woman, and it beckons to a man that he may enter the lake, and every twelve years it must eat a man. I have seen it beckoning on the edge of the lake on the nights when there was no moon, but I did not follow it, for I knew its history, and I know that a man must carry a needle when away from his house at night, yet you know nothing of these things, and you are like Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan, who was so ignorant that he desired nothing but money, and who was so foolish that he tried to rob the dead without listening to warnings or heeding cautions that the sons of Adam shall not meddle with magic and strange matters, nor shall they interfere with those that live beyond the end of the world, nor shall they disturb those that await the Last Day.

X539 Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan was a carpenter of Basra, and he lived in his house with a young and lovely wife and with a fine son, yet he was not happy, for his earnings [342 were few and his house was a poor house of bowari 262] matting and his food was but dates and bread. And winter came and the rains fell and everything in Abdul Rehman's house was wet, even to the blankets of his bed, for the matting did not keep out the rain, and the cold wind whistled through the walls of his house, and he was in a miserable and desperate state, so he went to the coffee-house to get warm and he met there his friends, and he discussed his condition, saying: How can I get money to buy a dry house, and a sheep for the feast and clothes for my wife? And they replied, and said: Did we but know a

361 [539] being mentioned in a nursery rhyme which runs:

Cukukhti, wein ukhti?	Dove, where's my sister?
B'il Hilla.	In Hilla.
Sha takal?	What does she eat?
Bajilla.	Beans.
Wein tenam?	Where does she sleep?
Bab Illah	At God's door.

and which continues for several verses.

The mace. Page 71, Line 16. 'A mace of the finest teakwood.'

411 The mace may almost be said to be a traditional weapon in South Iraq. If you meet an Arab tribesman about his normal daily routine in the countryside, he will probably be armed with a mace and dagger. Rifles are weapons of luxury, to be kept away from dust and damp. [535] Many tribal dances are done with the mace, which is sometimes of solid wood carefully carved, and sometimes, a less beautiful weapon but more dangerous, it is made of a wooden shaft with a ball of lead or pitch at the end.

Page 74, Line 22. 'Maqdad took his course from the wind.'

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8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

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The hub is a large porous earthenware jar, which keeps water cool 415 by evaporation.

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The phrase 'leg of a mare' implies that a man has ownership in a 422 quarter share of the sale price of all foals from the mare. It is quite common for deals to be done in one, two, or three legs of a mare, and for one mare to have four owners.

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When threatened by death from thirst in the desert, Arabs may be forced to slaughter their camels in order to drink the stomach fluids. I have also been told that travellers have made their camels sick by forcing a stick down their throats to get a little fluid. I do not know if this is true. It would appear to me to be a most difficult operation.

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192 crept up to the guard tent. One of the brothers slit the tent wall with 539 his knife and crept inside. Inside the tent he found a box of silver dollars, and he was passing it out through the slit in the tent to his two brothers when he trod on one of the Turks, who woke up and grabbed him by the legs. The Turk was shouting to raise the alarm, and the Nejafi, seeing that he could not get away, and fearing that if he was identified, his whole family would be punished, put his head out through the slit in the tent and implored his brothers to cut it off and take it away. This, according to the story, they did, getting away both with the chest of silver and their brother's head, the identity of the family remaining undiscovered. The word for 'cut' in Arabic does imply cutting off and removing when applied to heads.

10. THE STORY OF THE SON OF THE PILGRIM

Page 148, Line 7. 'He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail.'

619 The Shammar are mentioned in other stories and a reader may be confused by the different areas from which they appear to come. To write a note on this extensive tribe would require considerable knowledge both of Syria and of Saoudi Arabia, and I myself cannot do it. The Shammar best known to the Muntafiq tribes are the Shammar of Nejd, who send caravans legally to Zobeir, and with less authority to other areas. Some of the Nejdi Shammar do graze in Iraqi territory and in the Neutral Zones. However, the most famous Shammar of Iraq are those of Mosul Liwa. There are also Shammar, some of whom have adopted the Shia religion, living in Baghdad Liwa. Many of them have entered Iraq as refugees after defeat by Ibn Saoud. When a prince of the Shammar from Hail is mentioned, I should think that a member of the Rashid family is indicated. This family were once rulers in Nejd, and their capital was for a time at Hail. They were finally defeated by the Wahabis under Ibn Saoud. The word Amir which I have here translated as prince, is a somewhat deceptive one. [601] The sons of an Arab king carry, it is true, the title of Amir, but the 192 word has a larger usage. The tribes of Northern Arabia and Syria use it in their sheikhly houses, and in the Persian Gulf the word implies little more than a minor local official. The root of Amir is from the Arabic word for 'command' and is most literally translated in such

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The ataq is a kind of blouse.

14. THE STORY OF DAOUD THE CAMEL AND OF HIS MISFORTUNES

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103 The area in Mosul Liwa which lies to the west of the Tigris, that is,
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15. BETWEEN TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD LIE FOUR FINGERS

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Leila, 'Night,' is a popular girl's name in South Iraq. I do not think it is restricted only to those girls born at night.

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered [575]
by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526
survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in
'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling,
was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place
in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America.
Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542
well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by
two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs
and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course
in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now
under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of
a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's
patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the 484
poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying 369
the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is
true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to
Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape
from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in
austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529
summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in 212
the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world 178
upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts,
easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development,
an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and
local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world
and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted,
was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of
1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those
affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology 814
apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

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[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

and the boys take the public certificate examinations. Instruction in mathematics 872x
and science and some other subjects is in English, but care is 873x
taken to cover the appropriate vocabularies in Arabic. An extensively equipped laboratory makes individual experiment possible in physics, chemistry, and biology. A large library circulates many books for collateral reading. Informal organizations include religious groups, the International Relations Club, various sports associations, a debating society, and a staff which publishes a school paper.

Another foreign agency which is making an important contribution to education in Iraq is the British Council. Institutes have been established in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk in which young men and young women are given an opportunity to prepare for proficiency examinations in English as well as for the London matriculation and intermediate examinations. Classes are held in the mornings for women and in the late afternoons and evenings for men. Fees are nominal and the classes are popular. A model kindergarten has also been established in Baghdad which is attended largely by children of English-speaking parents. Clubs which [575
have both social and educational aims have been established in the larger 544]
cities. Lecture series, musical evenings, and discussion programs are regularly scheduled for these clubs. Educational films are distributed to schools and organizations in Baghdad. Although not a responsibility of the British [217]
Council, the reading rooms established in the smaller towns and larger villages by the Public Relations Department of the British Embassy are much used. Current magazines in English and Arabic are regularly supplied to these reading rooms and a small library of selected titles is available. A radio is usually supplied also.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a con- 262
stant current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat compli- 173
cated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

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Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded
civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of
French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession
and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated
State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the
shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties
of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired
mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments.
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on 647
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the
Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply, improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934, devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
184 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies.

standards of nursing are not high. However, the three-year nursing 759
course given at the Royal Hospital is comprehensive and includes all the common branches of nursing.

Unfortunately in Iraq, as in many other Moslem countries, [554] ●
nursing is not at present looked upon as a suitable career for Moslem girls of good family. Probably one of the best means of inducing girls to take up nursing is to demonstrate through the employment of foreign nursing sisters that nursing is regarded abroad as a highly qualified and reputable profession. More women might also be attracted to this profession if they were given suitable living quarters and accorded a position in the government service equivalent to that of elementary school teachers.

The one central nursing school in Baghdad will not supply 759
the needs of the country. Since many young girls will not leave 874
their homes to go to school, it will be necessary to set up local schools for nurses and also for dressers. Training for practical nurses should be started at Basra, Mosul and Karkh hospitals and eventually every province should have such a school. Candidates should have had at least six years of preliminary schooling and the course itself should last a year. It is suggested that two foreign nursing sisters, preferably English-speaking, be appointed to each province to act as nursing supervisor in the chief hospitals and as "principal" of the local nursing schools. It would also be desirable to assign to each school a sister-tutor—a graduate of the central school.

At the same time, nursing supervision needs strengthening in 759
the Royal Hospital where at present there are only three foreign nursing sisters for 680 beds. For efficient operation the Royal Hospital needs the following foreign nursing sisters:

1. One matron
2. One assistant matron
3. One sister tutor
4. One sister for the maternity block
5. One for the children's wards
6. One for infectious diseases hospital, and
7. Two for general duties.

It is most important that every foreign nursing sister should get to know, as quickly as possible, something of the language, mode of life and habits of the people.

875 this meets the needs of the situation fully and would strongly recommend a careful and sympathetic examination of the whole problem in the light of existing conditions. Such an examination should include also the question of providing housing accommodation for teachers, particularly women teachers, in villages.

The question is not, however, merely one of salaries but rather of raising the whole dignity and status of the profession. [554] In Iraq teachers do not, as a whole, apparently suffer from a sense of social inferiority as is the case in some other countries. This is good but not good enough. It is necessary to insure for them a position of honor and prestige and to accord conspicuous recognition to any meritorious work done by them. The government should endeavor to have the public realize the basic value of their work as nation builders.

School Construction and Equipment

346
872 Whether or not there is an immediate extension of primary education, school construction has to be tackled urgently. The number of schools is inadequate even for existing needs and they are ill-planned and overcrowded. About 40 percent of the schools are said to be housed in rented buildings, which are generally poorly constructed and lighted. Many of the government buildings and those built out of public subscriptions are only a little better. Almost all of the schools, whether government or rented, have now become too small for the number of students enrolled, and the introduction of the compulsory principle will bring a large further increase in enrollment. It will, therefore, be necessary to undertake without delay a carefully planned and large-scale program involving the construction of new school buildings and the improvement and extension of existing buildings.

Much of the new building will have to take place in rural areas. The Ministry should, therefore, arrange for a competent study of the problem of village school buildings—in which teachers, builders and the school architect will all be associated—in order to prepare two or three types of plans suited to different climatic regions. The buildings can be economical without being ugly or cramped or deprived of proper lighting and ventilation, and should reflect local traditions and utilize local materials. It would be a

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MHI Iraq MHI

Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the 173 Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true, occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks, as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia 619 tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended pictures of King Feisal and of His Royal Highness the Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days when the country was under foreign domination, when they were the rallying-points of the resistance which prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example, numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the 463 capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, 166 lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this growing State a boy 555 may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city. When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirhem [651] from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants are the first to send in their money: though they may be wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send in the exact dirhem along with the labourers and artisans. To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

x873 Of 1,011 graduates of secondary schools in 1942–43, only 470, or 46.5 percent, entered higher institutions in Iraq or went abroad to study. Admission to the colleges is based primarily upon scholastic standing and proportional representation of each province.

With the exception of the Law College,[1] instruction in the colleges is free, the student signing a contract to serve the government after graduation for a specified number of years. The Colleges of Medicine, Pharmacy, and Law have no boarding arrangements, but all other colleges maintain boarding departments at government expense. Other government aid for students studying at its expense includes books, medical care, travel, and in some cases clothing.

x871 The Iraqi public-school system is essentially democratic in character, affording a large measure of equality of opportunity to students. It is largely a free system, fees charged in secondary schools being small and provision being made for a large percentage of exemptions for the poor student of little better than average standing.[2] Even higher education is almost entirely free, the Law College being the only important exception —and there the bright poor student is exempted from payment of fees. [658] Moreover, the government has taken up the heavy burden of providing vocational and professional education entirely at its own expense.

Recently the Ministry of Education has taken steps to extend post-primary educational opportunities for village boys. Formerly the only courses available to poor village boys were in the rural-teachers colleges or the technical schools in Baghdad or Mosul. If a village boy wanted to proceed to the intermediate and secondary schools in the capitals of the provinces, he had to have means to support himself—and few did. ● [555] In September 1945 the Ministry of Education adopted the policy of opening a boarding department in the capital of each province where 10 bright village boys can be taken annually at government expense and so allowed to pursue their secondary education. In addition, some of the brightest primary-school graduates are admitted annually from each province to King Faysal College for boys where they receive their secondary-school education in English at government expense. Some of the brighter girls from each province are admitted after graduation from the intermediate schools into the secondary section of the Queen 'Aliyah Institute at government expense.

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[1] A College of Commerce was founded in 1946-47 and charges fees at the same rate as the College of Law—15 dinars ($60.00) per annum.

[2] Secondary-school fees were abolished entirely in 1946.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

291 European dress was ever more generally adopted in the larger towns, and spread significantly to urbanized tribesmen. Among upper-class women, though the veil was still almost universal among Muslims, Western 556 clothing was worn increasingly. The desire for material progress was reflected in the eagerness of the rich to acquire motor-cars, gramophones, and the toys and amenities of Europe; but inability to pay for these gave rise to demands for limitless credit.

466 Interest at the International Labour Office in conditions among 'Iraq's industrial workers led to some answering efforts to produce suitable legislation; but the smallness of this class in an unindustrialized country made European criteria and standards largely inapplicable. The first seeds were sown, however, of a social interest in labour matters.

744 To the whole community and to urban society in particular with its still prevalent poverty and low purchasing power the Government's Health and Education services contributed valuably. The former improved its quarantine and pilgrim services, multiplied its countryside dispensaries, improved its specialist institutes, and dealt well with the cholera epidemics of 1927 and 1931. It was significant that out-patient attendances, less than 750,000 in 1921, had more than doubled by 1926 and quadrupled by 1930. In response to foreign purchasers' outcry, the Health Department imposed measures of cleanliness in the date industry. In 1927 it founded the Royal Medical College; this, a medical school of good standards, took at once a high place in 'Iraq's higher and professional education. A School of Pharmacy had existed since 1922. The Government adhered during these years to a number of international conventions on medical as on many other matters.

871 The 'Iraqi schools seemed to foreign observers at this period—and indeed at others—to lack something of the best spirit of education. There was criticism of lax discipline, uncritical self-flattery, a worship of modernity and materialism; politics pervaded too many of the schools, always in the form of a crude xenophobia eager for street demonstrations. Nevertheless, an educational system grew and multiplied its facilities, fought for budget allotments, developed an Inspectorate, codified its Regulations. A Hygiene Directorate was formed in the Education Ministry, later [562] greatly to develop. The year 1930 saw the first Government secondary schools for girls; the days of Muslim hesitation over female education were almost over. For boys the secondary period was prolonged from four to five years, three 'intermediate' and two 'senior'. The dispatch of students for higher education abroad grew commoner. Technical education remained unpopular: it did not lead quickly enough to the goal chiefly envisaged, a Govern-

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would know the difference.' They went on to point out 101
large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and 361
they explained that had there been a large number of 233
camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been
indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with
a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to
explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning [241]
Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates,
barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their
sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some
of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, 342
cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a con- 262
stant current of air through the hut, and prevents the 406
temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, 556
like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large 551
guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a
background of sound varying from that of the cooking of
a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump,
thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve
mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and
source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that
a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more
common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst
Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after
the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom
stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which 186
they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat compli- 173
cated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as
told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than
this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that
great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

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x539 She took off her clothes and put them on the bank, and
●556 she stepped into the river. Now, be it known to you that,
437 though she could see him not, there was concealed on the
x539 bank a youth of the Fetla tribes, and his name was Kadhim. He did not own a single horse or mare, nor did he even own the leg of a mare. He owned no sheep and he owned no land, and he lived by eating at the guest tent of his sheikh. And as for clothes, he used to go to the river and set snares for the sandgrouse and partridges when they came to drink, and sell them in the market to buy cloth.

x539 And Kadhim was concealed on the bank of the river watching his snares when he saw a girl beautiful as a moon come to the river and divest herself of her clothes. He saw that she was perfect in figure, for her neck was slender and her shoulders smooth and soft and her breasts rose firmly and clearly as do the desert dunes in moonlight. As for her [304] waist it was slender and her thighs were round and smooth and around her navel was tattooed a butterfly. And he watched her and forgot the sandgrouse and he forgot the partridges. And after she had bathed in the river she dried herself by lying in the sun. Then she put on her clothes and filled the jar with water and returned to the town.

And the next day at the rising of the sun Kadhim concealed himself in the same place and awaited the coming of the girl. And about half an hour after dawn she came down and drew water from that very same place. And Kadhim, who was concealed in the tamarisk bushes, watched her, but she did not take off her clothes. She merely filled the pot with water and put it on her shoulder, and she turned and returned to the town. But Kadhim, who was a youth in the seventeenth year of his life and swift of foot, ran ahead behind the fruit groves and date trees and came out on the path ahead of her, and when

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x539 he saw that he was truly from the tribes, for his bearing
437 was proud and his gaze the gaze of the peregrine falcon.
577 So he said: Take the money and the cloth and give me
your pledge. Then Kadhim's cheeks flushed red, for he had forgotten to bring a pledge with him, nor did he own a ring, and he had no headcloth and he owned no riding switch, for he had no horse. But his brain was quick and he thought and answered: Verily a man's honour is contained in the hair of his moustache, for it is his moustache that distinguishes his face from that of a woman or a boy. Therefore I shall give you one hair of my moustache as a pledge. And Abdul Rashid Mejid was astonished at the words of the youth.

Then Kadhim called for scissors and for a mirror, and he studied his face in the mirror and searched for a hair in his moustache which was less beautiful than the rest. And he found such a hair and snipped it off and gave it to Abdul Rashid Mejid. And Abdul Rashid Mejid took the hair and put it with the pledges, and he put it in a box with the rings and the headcloths and riding switches, and he gave Kadhim five gold liras and a roll of cloth.

Kadhim took the money and the cloth and he went to the shop of a tailor whom he knew and trusted, for the man's father was from the Fetla tribes. He said to the tailor: Take this cloth and this money and make me the clothes of a very rich merchant, and bring me a beard of sheep's wool which I will fasten to my face, and keep this a secret, for it is more important to me than life itself. And
x539 the tailor said: Cut my head to keep the secret. Then the
•556 tailor made for Kadhim the clothes of a wealthy merchant
and he brought for him a beard of sheep's wool, and when Kadhim had put on the beard and put on the clothes he looked so important and distinguished that anyone who

saw him would say: This is a merchant whose shop is 539x
worth ten thousand gold liras. 556 •

Kadhim, dressed as a wealthy merchant, went out from the shop of the tailor and he returned to the shop of Abdul Rashid Mejid. He entered the shop and greeted Abdul Rashid Mejid and wished him the peace of God. And Abdul Rashid Mejid rose when he saw the wealthy mer- [576]
chant enter his shop, and he returned his greeting, and he ordered the shop boy to bring a glass of tea from the coffee house for the distinguished visitor. And Kadhim sat in the chair which Abdul Rashid Mejid placed for him.

Now, Kadhim, though a simple tribal boy, had travelled as far as Basra with the Sheikh, for in ancient times when the Sheikh travelled to Baghdad or to Basra he took fifty men in his retinue, that all who saw him might recognise his dignity and position and, as Kadhim had no land and no sheep, he used to accompany the Sheikh and eat at his expense in the hotels of Basra. So he had some knowledge of affairs.

Kadhim drank the glass of tea in the shop of Abdul 539x
Rashid Mejid and he asked after the health of his host. He said: Know you that I am a merchant of Basra and my trade is a general trade, and I deal in every article and every commodity, for my firm is a great firm with branches in India and in Persia and in Nejd. And let it be known to you that I have come to Hilla to seek a merchant of honesty and repute to act as my agent that I may transact various kinds of business at this place. So I asked from the great merchants and bankers of Baghdad that they give me the names of those merchants at Hilla who are reliable in their dealings, and they told me the name of your honour and of his honour our brother Abbas Ali el Qassab. But they said of the last named that water drips from his

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TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

1. THE STORY OF HAJJI ALI, THE GREAT SULTAN AND HIS SON, THE AMIR KHEYYUN

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
• √56 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
438 rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
√78 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A STORY CONCERNING THE IGNORANCE OF SLAVES

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MHI

423 tribal organization there was no clear definition of individual rights of ownership to the collectively-owned land. It was a 619 system which could exist as long as no one thought about it; as long, that is, as the tribe was accepted as the unit of political life, and as long as no individual claims were likely to be made. It is for this reason that it is impossible, once the tribal system has ceased to be the political unit, to settle land on a tribal basis; and yet to settle land on the basis of the supposed individual claims creates grave injustice, because in practice it means that too much land is allotted to the sheikhs and that the cultivators are reduced to the position of tenants or labourers.

439 Since the early years of the twentieth century the tribal system has been breaking up, and the economic development of the country in the twenty years between the wars has hastened its disintegration. When water transport came to the Persian Gulf towards the end of the nineteenth century, export markets opened for Iraq grain; the subsistence economy broke down and production for export began. Exports of grain increased from 65,000 tons in the early eighteen-nineties to 120,000 tons in 1909–13, and to 380,000 tons in 1934–9. The profitability of ● 556 export has given the tribal chiefs a motive for acquiring land as their personal property.

The tendency to acquire land for the sake of money income was much strengthened, in the twenty years between the two wars, by the rapid extension of pump irrigation and the accompanying increase in the cultivated area. Pump installations 312 have increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,000 in 1944, and provide 426 water for some 2½ million acres of land, or over half the cultivated land in the irrigated zone. The installation of a pumping system is comparatively cheap, costing some £2,000 before the recent war, but it is far beyond the means of the peasants, so that pumps have been installed by sheikhs, or more frequently by city notables, who make contracts to supply them to peasants at extortionate rates of interest, and so gradually acquire the land in payment of debt. In many cases the sub-chiefs, or sirkals, have become pump owners.

423 Thus in the regions of pump irrigation the tribal system has entirely ceased to function. The land is mainly the property of 427 the pump owners, with the cultivators taking a meagre share of the crop, varying from one-seventh to one-fourteenth or one-

European dress was

291 ever more generally adopted in the larger towns, and spread significantly to urbanized tribesmen. Among upper-class women, though the veil was still almost universal among Muslims, Western 556 clothing was worn increasingly. The desire for material progress was reflected in the eagerness of the rich to acquire motor-cars, gramophones, and the toys and amenities of Europe; but inability to pay for these gave rise to demands for limitless credit.

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365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Baṣra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

511 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the modernization and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle 362 classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two 177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now • 562 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law, followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work, and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded were still considerable, and included the households of many leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families, by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop [265] kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include 575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class profes- 526 sional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

SOCIAL FACTORS

Alongside these economic and administrative problems are a number of social factors which inhibit educational development. 000

Illiteracy and Health Problems. For many years it is likely that illiteracy among the adult population, and the state of the public health, will constitute obstacles to the extension of primary education, especially in the rural areas. The reasons for this are obvious. Parents who are themselves illiterate and living at a low standard of life are not easily persuaded that schooling is a worthwhile substitute for the work of their children. Neither are they able to provide in their homes those standards and values which, if the training of the schoolroom is not be negatived, are such necessary reinforcements to public education. Similarly, the prevalence of epidemic and endemic disease, together with inadequate sanitation, also contributes to a major health problem which must be taken into account in attempting to ensure regular school attendance. 212 164 871

Yet while obstacles of this kind exist, they are diminishing. The Public Health Service is developing slowly but surely, and one has only to see a doctor at work in a remote rural area to appreciate the devoted service which is beginning to contribute to a solution of some of the health problems. Again, although illiteracy and poverty are not the best friends of education, one has only to visit remote little village schools to realize that some of the poorest parents are making sacrifices to send their children to school. 657 212

Before compulsory education can be achieved, however, even assuming that the money for it will be forthcoming, a vigorous attack on adult illiteracy will be essential. To this end, what is needed in the rural areas is a type of school which, in addition to meeting the needs of the children, provides in a practical and non-academic fashion realistic fundamental education for the parents. The teacher training institutions would make a most valuable contribution if, quite apart from training the future teachers to attend to the needs of children, they also initiated them into the more practical techniques of teaching illiterates the fundamentals of better living. 871

The Position of Women and Children. Another obstacle to educational and social development which is often quoted is the position of women in a society which is predominantly Muslim. Traditionally women are discouraged from taking part in public life, and this attitude is bound to be reflected in education. 562

562 872 But this obstacle can be exaggerated. As a glance at the figures showing the growth of primary education in Iraq indicates, the proportion of girls to boys attending primary schools is not high, but their enrolment is steadily increasing. Although most of the large urban schools are single sex schools, Iraq has the distinction of having many co-educational village schools. The growing number of kindergartens are co-educational. In all the institutions of higher education young men and women work together.

The emancipation of women in Iraq still has a long way to go, but convincing signs of it are evident. It would, nevertheless, be a considerable advance if the Ministry of Education were to encourage the recruitment of a number of women to the staffs of the boys' primary schools. From visits to many Iraqi primary schools it is evident that the standards of the women teachers in matters of personal cleanliness of the children, care and decoration of the school premises, general decorum and pleasant social conduct are higher than those of their men colleagues. Their influence in boys' schools would be most salutary.

464 872 The position of children is, of course, difficult when parents, especially in the rural areas, are dependent upon the labour of even very young children. Yet an increasing number of poor parents appear to be sending their children to school. It would be a great inducement to more and regular school attendance if means could be devised of providing free midday meals for some of the children, especially in the village schools. At one of the more modern primary schools in Baghdad attractively cooked and served midday meals are provided, but this is a school attended mainly by children from comfortable homes where the parents can afford to pay for this service. In the rural areas, however, simple food is not expensive, cooking devices and service are cheap, and it should be possible to provide free meals for the needy children at relatively low cost.

It should be noted that effective child labour legislation does not exist in Iraq. Until the time comes when such legislation can be enacted and enforced, compulsory education will be most difficult to apply.

162 166 871 *Tribal Organization and Mobility of Population.* But the most formidable obstacles of all are those related to tribal organization and mobility of population. There are two particular sets of problems, those of the tribes who are still in a nomadic state, and those of the people who are in the transitional stage of semi-settlement. Between them, it is estimated that these nomadic and semi-settled peoples number nearly 2,000,000 persons, roughly 300,000 of whom are children of primary school age.

871 only in relation to some predetermined goal. The Mission considers that this goal should be to bring primary education to all children of school age; currently they number about 750,000 but only 175,000 are actually in school. Despite the growing recognition of the value of education, it would be unrealistic to suppose that this goal could be achieved without compulsory attendance. In many cases the value of education will be appreciated only after children are brought into contact with it through some measure of compulsion. This will be true particularly of education in rural [562] areas and of education of girls. In 1948-49, for instance, there were only 43,000 girls in primary schools as compared with about 132,000 boys. Moreover, compulsory attendance is necessary not merely to get children into school initially but also to make sure they will stay there long enough to acquire permanent literacy and the modicum of basic education necessary to improve and enrich their lives. In the cities educational facilities have been much more easily available than in the country, but without compulsion there has been a sharp drop in attendance with each successive school grade. Dr. Akrawi in his work, *Education in the Arab Countries*, presents figures showing the following distribution of enrollment in primary schools in 1944-45:

Grade I	Grade II	Grade III	Grade IV	Grade V	Grade VI
32%	18.3%	14.9%	12.8%	11.7%	10.1%

This suggests that there is a high percentage of wastage in the first year and that the roll in Grade VI is less than one third of that in Grade I. In fact, there were only 9,500 children in Grade VI as compared with 22,000 in Grade I six years before. More recent figures for certain specific areas show some improvement but it is not so marked as to alter the general situation. Thus, in the city of Baghdad where educational awakening is greatest and educational facilities most generous, out of 6,970 children in Grade I in 1945-46, only 5,315 passed on to Grade II in 1947-48 and 3,587 to Grade VI in 1950-51; i.e., about 50 percent dropped out before completing the primary stage. In the city of Kerbela only 209 out of 645 children in Grade I reached Grade VI, a wastage of about 66 percent.

The investment in the education of children who remain in school no more than three years represents a dead loss. Even that

[Marsh Arabs]

The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-
511 lent man and seemed to be very well liked. The group as a whole enjoys a degree of prosperity and comfort most unusual for an Arab community. Everybody has enough to eat and enough to wear and a good house to live in. Crops seem to be quite reliable. If the wheat and barley harvest fails, the rice does not. Taxes are light and the local government good.

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463 The most conspicuous difference from the typical agricultural community in Arabia lies in the fact that here the old equality of the desert is preserved. There is no class of rich citizens who outshine their fellows. There are a few merchants of a small sort. Amara, the nearest city, is so close to the town we visited that the shops were very small, most of the trading being done in the larger city. We saw few artisans. The community seemed to be free from caste divisions and to enjoy a spirit of equality and brotherhood much like that of the Bedouins themselves.

562 Another surprising thing is the freedom of all classes. The women have discarded the veil completely and associate with the men freely, being seen on the street apparently under no restraint whatever. This is a refreshing contrast to the other communities of Arabs; indeed the Marsh Arabs are far ahead of even the Bedouins in this respect. These women buy and sell in the bazaar and appear to participate in all the activities of the town with no hesitation whatever. They visited the temporary dispensary that we set up and in their self-assertion were sometimes harder to manage than the men.
795 It is interesting to note that these Arabs are all Shiahs. "No," said the guard that accompanied us from Ahwaz as we were coming in for a visit, "there are no infidels in all this district. Every one is a Shiah."

44:Matthews and Akrawi S,G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

Chapter 9

PUBLIC PRIMARY EDUCATION

*872 FREE public primary education extends over six grades and is offered to any Iraqi child who has reached the age of six years. In theory, primary education is compulsory in areas where adequate facilities exist; in practice, in the few instances in which the Ministry of Education has declared attendance to be compulsory in given areas, social and economic conditions, together with inadequate planning, have made the ruling ineffective.

Except for certain modifications in schools in Kurdish or Turkish districts, or in the few so-called "model rural primary schools," the primary course is uniform throughout Iraq. Thus, a child moving from one district to another, from urban to rural or tribal district, is not handicapped by basic variation in the curriculum.

To a large extent, primary education segregates boys from girls, with [562 boys schools taught by men and girls schools by women. The Ministry 178] of Education, however, has made considerable progress in recent years, especially in the cities, in overcoming the traditional prejudice against coeducation. In 1933–34 the Ministry opened kindergartens, later called "junior schools," which admitted both boys and girls and employed women teachers. In the larger cities, particularly in Baghdad, the kindergartens soon were enlarged to include first- and second-grade classes. Rather hesitant about adding classes at first, the Ministry was encouraged by the popularity of this experiment to enlarge the program. By 1938–39 junior schools had sprung up in the capitals of almost all the provinces, and in spite of the war these schools continued to flourish, increasing in number and attendance until in 1944–45 there were 56 schools attended by 8,512 children, 4,322 boys and 4,190 girls. At the present time the typical junior school consists of the first four grades and parallels the work of those grades in the public primary school. A few junior schools offer a five- or six-year course. Apart from these planned coeducational schools, coeducation at the primary level is tolerated in many rural villages where no girls schools or only incomplete ones exist.

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Iraq MH1

[For information on the customs of the Muntafiq tribes in Iraq, see MI1 Kuwait, 1: Dickson, Category 116, scattered references on pp. 110, 111, 124, 147, 164-171, 179, 191, 375, 421, 443-444, 518, 543, 545-560, 607-608, and 615.]

● 563 Iraq MH1

[For information on the Kurds resident in Iran and Iraq see 72: Johnson, MA1 Iran, category 116, complete text. In this article the annual activities of the nomadic, semi-nomadic and settled Kurds, the life history of a Kurd from birth to marriage, and the tobacco and mercantile business among the Kurds are described. The attitudes of the Kurdish people, and the pertinent economic and social changes, which tend, both, to keep the Kurds a "backward" tribal group, and to make them settle and become an integral part of the modern world, are discussed.]

184 the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged
795 generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i,
[578] while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated.
Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and
their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little
social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own
will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided
by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government
itself.

563 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of
162 the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—
perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which
occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the
Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid
Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of
563 which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear
621 racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement
and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority
to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in
character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled
them in a social organization which represented an identical
response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with
sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes;
but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district
interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization.
About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided
into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the
whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur.
563 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds
795 of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their
197 homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of
the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan
Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran
between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan
(Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other
two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and
speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary
status.

563 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long
621 been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment
by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil,
and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for
563 the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley
dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish
Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

established at every qadhā and naḥiya; and the Kurds, in turn, 563
supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in 563
type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, 181
fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh ʿAdi, lay
in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been 795
reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal 563
organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, 621
Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Ṭuz 181
Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall ʿAfar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by ʿAbbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shiʿism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined 563
almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with 162
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563 the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of
162 the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few
184 households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, Kad͟himiya, Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to
which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian
and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar,
from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively
town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more un-
[795] manageable because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to
'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni
empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and
[463] Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk, with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boatbuilders in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever running water was available for their rites. Their origins and beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants 563
had been largely driven from the field. Western education was 162
widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish 184
progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The
community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was
treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities
and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying
avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position
and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little 563
from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to 795
official Millets headed locally by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch. 162
Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous 184
in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nes-
torians, few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Ama-
diya qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a
few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites
catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek
Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and
finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nes-
torians, had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its
villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians,
whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless
to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but
below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented
and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian
nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and
bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq.
The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but
not in lower 'Iraq, sp~~ecialized in~~ retail commerce, hotel-keeping,
artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number
of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had [563]
long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All
the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually
schools, served for long years past by the missions of European
churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi
standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls'
schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military
service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both
religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of
their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, 563
were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by 162
families whose property or politics constrained them to live there,
by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 162 perhaps a fifth part of the military forces and a tenth of the gendarmerie. But this minority was disproportionately powerful by dint of the authority of Government, and by the contact of its leaders with the ante-rooms of Istanbul and with Turkish culture. [177] It followed that some 'Iraqis, but not many, were thus attracted to the prestige of Turkish circles and all they signified, and, before the day of an Arab nationalism—or even after it—identified themselves with that element. Turkish was everywhere the language of Government, the courts, and the State schools.

3. PERSIAN AND ARABIAN NEIGHBOURS

648 With their Persian neighbour, Turkey and 'Iraq had a long tradition of discord. If, by the nineteenth century, the days of major aggressive war were over, there remained material for ill will between two unsympathetic peoples who differed in language, culture, and character. This was not diminished by the Persian Consular representatives—some of dubious status—at a dozen of the 'Iraq cities. The two Empires, devoted respectively to the Sunni and Shi'i faiths, were passing also through different stages of their evolution: Turkey struggling with modernism and western aspirations, Persia still medieval and uneasy with half-independent vassals in her midst. Reaction in its crudest forms was in the ascendant at Teheran since the accession in 1896 of the amiable spendthrift Mudhaffar al-Din Shah.

The frontier itself had proved a major irritant. Its line had been settled by nothing more stable than the fortunes of many wars and the fickle adherences of tribes. It cut through the featureless flatlands east of the lower Tigris and across the tumbled mountains of Kurdistan; it divided homogeneous peoples, often migratory and always incapable of loyalty to a distant throne. The 1847 Treaty of Erzerum had been followed by thirty years of conventions, commissions, and map-making, and by as many, in the last quarter of the century, of minor forays, counter-interventions, and angry protests. The close of the century found the Turks still claiming Persian-occupied towns and valleys—Urmiya, Wazna, Bana, Sardasht, Zuhab—and the Persians demanding the Gul'ambar Plain, the Hawraman Mountain, and lands near Khaniqin. These squabbles, which forbade all border tranquillity, were echoed in the extreme south by the pretensions of both to possess the shoals and islands of the Shaṭṭ. Turkish claims to Muhammara had indeed by now been abandoned; but jealousies and reprisals on the Shaṭṭ offered a fertile field for piracy, which led in turn to British intervention, the threat of a British Consul at Fao, and the stationing of a gunboat on the river in 1898.

The great pilgrimages by Persians to Najf, Karbalā, Kadhimiya

home, at Neri village, of Sayid Muḥammad Sadīq, son of the 648×
notorious Christian-murderer, Shaykh 'Ubaydullah—to the Tigris at Jazira-ibn-'Umar. This zone, governed from Julamark the capital of Ḥakkari, was inhabited or was traversed in their migrations by tribes of great renown—the Goyan, Sharnakhi, and Artushi, whose chiefs twenty years earlier had welcomed the prestige and profit of raising Ḥamidiya cavalry regiments for their Caliph.

In place of the free Kurdish dynasties at Bitlis, Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and Julamark of half a century earlier, there straggled now on both sides of the Mosul frontier a régime of fragmented tribal life and feudal authority penetrated, sometimes half-effectively sometimes nominally, by the agencies of the Turkish Government. Scattered amid the Kurdish villages in both wilayas were communities of Armenians, Chaldaeans, Jews, and Assyrians.

The last-mentioned community was a generation later to play, 563 ●
transplanted and half-destroyed, a dismal part in 'Iraq history. 795
These East Syrian or Nestorian or Assyrian shepherds and cultiva- 648×
tors were an ancient Christian Millet, Syriac in speech, uncertain of origin and of blood, and hardly distinguishable in their manner of life, dress, and custom from the Kurds, in whose truculent or tolerant midst they had existed for many centuries. They were protected by their resolute character and jealous loyalty to their own faith and leadership. The Mar Sham'un of the time, their spiritual head and community ruler, resident at Kuchanis, had been for half a generation supported by a mission of the Church of England. This divided its efforts between the Ḥakkari Assyrian clans, with their fighting maliks and rough illiterate bishops, and the more peaceful, less harassed branch of the people who had settled at Urmiya. The former group, Turkish subjects, were in part *'ashiret*—tribute-paying tribes—and in part *ra'ayā*, peasantry. The nation contained perhaps one hundred thousand souls in Turkish territory. Faithful to an ancient Church, isolated in savage mountains, poor and threatened by every whim of powerful neighbours, though capable of a virile resistance and even of harsh aggression, its plight was watched by anxious eyes in Europe.

To the west of 'Iraq lay the steppe-desert where roamed the bedouin tribe-group of the 'Aniza. Southward of these, beyond the Dhafir and Muṭayr nomads, lay the communities of true Arabia: the small harbour State of Kuwayt, established a century earlier under the house of Ṣubaḥ; the coastlands of al-Aḥsā with its oases and its vigorous life of nomadic tribes; and, finally, central Arabia where for years past two dynasties had disputed for supremacy.

Of these districts, Kuwayt and the Wahhabi Amirate of ibn 648×
Sa'ud were static Arab sultanates; al-Aḥsā (part of the Sa'udi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

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182 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the
668 Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in
563 the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unim-
369 portant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Ḥilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

579 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained,
and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the
674 sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation
[731] of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913) the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 721 between Turkish claims to govern and Jaf adherence to their traditional way of life.

The religious Shaykh of Barzan, true latter-day Dere Bey, still held his inaccessible and lawless court across the Greater Zab from the Zibari country. He failed regularly to render to Government even the demanded minimum of respect, and annually embroiled himself with the savage Harki in their migrations. The dispatch of Turkish forces was met by mere retirement to the higher mountains, and the authorities' use of the Harki as agents of punishment was dangerous. Conditions worsened with the half-crazy oppression and Christian-baiting of the young Shaykh, 'Abd al-Salīm, who succeeded in 1908; an expedition of Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha was inconclusive; and it was left to Na͟dhim again prudently to accept the Shaykh's excuses and restore him to a short-lived favour. He was again outlawed in 1911 and 1912, crossed to Urmiya to join the Russians, and from there survived major operations against his tribesmen in 1913 and 1914.

Rival of the Barzani Shaykh dwelt, across the Van border, the equally holy and not less tyrannous lord of Shamdinan, Shaykh Ṣadiq of Neri. His brother, 'Abd al-Qadir, was high in the politics of Istanbul; he himself, detested for his greed and cruelty, lived on robbery and the odour of sanctity, reduced his Christian villagers to serfdom, murdered a bishop, and escaped all but occasional chastisement by Turkish armies. His death in 1911 brought Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir hotfoot to claim the inheritance, in vain. Shaykh Ṣadiq's son, Sayid Ṭaha, famed for his obesity, made good his succession and consolidated his family's position on both sides of the Turco-Persian border.

563 In the heart of Ḥakkari country the Assyrian clans still held their own, still attracted the interest of Protestant Europe. Benjamin, a weak unenterprising Mar Sham'un, succeeded in 1903 to the harassed patriarchate and headship of the Millet. Supported by the loyalty and hardihood of his people and notably that of his cultured and resolute sister, Surma, he was yet assailed by the intrigues of jealous cousins and by Turkish suspicions of disaffection. The Archbishop of Canterbury's mission, based on Urmiya and later also on Mosul, could do something for the spiritual, nothing for the temporal standing of the community. The protection offered by Russia at Urmiya was, as the event proved, neither a reliable standby in trouble nor acceptable to the Wali of Van; yet the Assyrians in their plight were ready to turn anywhere for support, and must have turned ever more definitely to the Russians had not war come to apply to their problem the most terrible of solutions.

619 The grim Yazidis gained some ground during this period

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

806 Maḥmud, and even in the districts of Keui Sanjaq, Raniya, and Rawanduz his authority was for a brief period acclaimed. In Sulaymaniya town the ruins and ravages of war were, under British initiative, rapidly made good. Food and seed were imported, buildings repaired; salaries were distributed, caravans came and went. Kurdish was the only official language and none but Kurdish officials were appointed.

563 The dream of Kurdistan for the Kurds, under British patronage, seemed for a few weeks to have come true as the Aghās flocked to and from Sulaymaniya, the Turks had vanished, the British were encouraging, tactful, and generous. But it was not to be. The experiment lacked in fact all the substance of practical success. Shaykh Maḥmud was, with his personal following and prestige, the only candidate for south Kurdish Government; but he was unbalanced, violent-tempered, and childish. His alleged subjects—that is, their chieftains—were willing enough to receive gifts and honours, but not to accept obligations or to subordinate themselves to the Shaykh's or any other authority. Their political conceptions and experience, their social background, their character and level of evolution all forbade the possibility that Shaykh Maḥmud's empire could, even at the lowest and loosest standard of government, be coherent or lasting. Within a few weeks the interest of the outlying tribes had cooled, the claims of the Ḥukumdar were reconsidered, and as the novelty faded returning prosperity led to a general revulsion against him. The Jaf at Ḥalabja were allowed to secede, and a British officer was installed there; and the place of Noel at Sulaymaniya was taken by E. B. Soane, cynical realist and disillusioned critic of the Shaykh. Relations grew difficult, the ruler had neither wisdom nor knowledge to oppose to his bad counsellors. A crisis could not be long postponed. Late in May 1919 the Shaykh suddenly invoked a band of supporters from across the Persian frontier, imprisoned the British officers in Sulaymaniya, cut all communications, and proclaimed the independence of Kurdistan. The Political Officer at Ḥalabja escaped with the aid of the ruling Lady, 'Adila Khanim; the prisoners at Sulaymaniya were held but not ill-treated. An improvised relief force of Indian troops and armoured cars was immediately dispatched from Kirkuk but at Tasluja Pass was forced to retire. The Shaykh's forces, however, did not increase; no major tribe rallied to him. The collection of more effective British forces, from depleted garrisons in Mosul division, took a month. It was followed by a second advance by two brigades from Kirkuk. Battle was joined on 17 June at the Bazyan Pass, and ended in the rout of Shaykh Maḥmud's forces and his own capture, severely wounded. He was taken to Baghdad and there, recovered from his wound, was sentenced to death; but

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

this was commuted by the Commander-in-Chief to a long term of imprisonment. The British force in Kurdistan broke up into a number of columns which visited many unpenetrated areas, restoring order and confidence. A normal administration with its departments and services was installed at Sulaymaniya under Soane. The area was now to enjoy a tranquil period of revival and progress, with gratifying security produced by a new police force and trade assisted by pioneer road construction. The main bodies of opinion in the area, however, still dreaded unification with 'Iraq.

In the turbulent Rawanduz district, where a Political Officer was first appointed in December 1918, it proved impossible to maintain him without military backing. He was withdrawn in July 1919 to Batas, and a Kurdish aristocrat left to do his best at Rawanduz. The district, under the baleful influence of tribal aspirants to power and an outlawed ex-officer, grew even more lawless and distracted after the 'Aqra disturbances in October. Early in 1920 it revealed conditions of chaos. The Political Officer at Arbil, on a dangerous visit designed to rescue it from these, considered the least of evils to be the installation of a young educated Kurd, Isma'il Bey, as Government representative.

The picture of 'Iraqi Kurdistan in 1919 is, therefore, in spite of incidents of violence, one of restoration in most districts to social and economic normality, and fair hopes of progress. The year ended with the outer areas—'Amadiya, Barzan, Rawanduz—beyond control, while the inner—those of Kifri and Kirkuk, Arbil and Keui Sanjaq, the Mosul plain and foothills, and Sulaymaniya—were peaceably and normally administered. The charm of the Kurdish countryside, its pure air and beauty, its wealth of striking personalities, greatly impressed the officers called to administer or visit it.

The Arab, Christian, or Yazidi villagers of the Mosul plain settled down easily under British rule. Security was good, and surviving Turkish police forces could be largely utilized. Prosperity soon returned to a city and countryside desolated by wartime famine and misery. New hopes and signs of progress were abroad. Rivalries among the Mosul Yazidis were composed, while those of Jabal Sinjar were placed under their aged but forceful Headman-of-the-Mountain, Ḥamu Sharu. The squabbles and intrigues of local Christian elements taxed sorely the patience of their Political Officers. The best of the village headmen were reappointed, encouraged, and subsidized. Destitute Armenian refugees from Turkey, who abounded in Mosul, were collected in a camp in southern 'Iraq. The missionary enterprise of the Dominicans, whose devoted work the War had interrupted, was eagerly restarted.

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and often over-strained Administration. That of Agriculture was, 000
for the first time in 'Iraq, scientifically conceived and served by specialists in botany, soil chemistry, cotton-growing, wool, cattle-breeding, and other branches. Directed by Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. D. Graham in 1920, and thereafter by Roger Thomas, it conducted demonstrations, published research pamphlets, distributed seed, imported animals; but the times did not permit the development of a department—or indeed the tenth part of one—adequate to 'Iraq's agricultural needs. The Irrigation service, under Brigadier L. W. Lewis and later Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. Aitken till 1921, was deep in the study of its problems and in the practical tasks of flood protection and major water distribution, but was equally prevented by the demand for post-war economy from undertaking important works, however desirable; it was perforce contented with some headworks and regulators erected, canal reaches re-aligned or cleared, the Hindiya Barrage in part repaired. These two departments, and that of Surveys, were transferred, with diminished staffs and funds, from Army to civil control in 1919.

The Police, built up by Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Prescott as successor in 1918 to Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Gregson, soon extended their control throughout 'Iraq and gained by their honesty and prowess a general respect such as no *Zaptié* or *polis* had ever known. The 'Iraq Levies, successors of the earlier Shabana forces, were like them military striking-forces organized in the Divisions from varying local material under British officers, with a common headquarters in Baghdad; their function was to relieve the outgoing Army of many duties and to reinforce the Police. A civil Veterinary Department under Major C. R. Chadwick was established in January 1920.

The costly administration of the Assyrian and Armenian refugees 563
devolved upon a separate civil department, at Ba'quba camp, under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Cunliffe-Owen. Repatriation, desired by all, seemed sadly impracticable for any: for the Urmiya families by reason of Persian resistance and anti-Christian bitterness, and for the ex-Turkish mountaineers because their homes were in Turkish territory and the future of Mosul itself still doubtful. Signs of divided leadership among the clansmen appeared, and threatened the general allegiance to the Mar Sham'un; and with the passing months of idle waiting, moral deterioration increased. Nevertheless, a strong battalion was raised under British officers from the excellent fighting material in the Camp, and could be used effectively in the 'Amadiya operations of September 1919. This revived hopes of some measure of repatriation, for which the Civil Commissioner and Assyrian well-wishers pleaded; but the vacillations and silences of Whitehall policy led to the disbanding of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 battalion, and to the men's return to the sluggish pauperization of Ba'quba.

871 The Education branch, founded and first inspired by Major H. E. Bowman, was faced with the problem of providing schooling for the youth of 'Iraq in the absence of funds, buildings, books, equipment or teachers in a tithe of sufficient quantities. At a pace always disappointing, but the fastest financially or functionally practicable, primary schools aiming at fair standards were opened to a total of seventy-five by the end of 1919. Fifty-six of these taught in Arabic, eleven in Turkish, seven in Kurdish, one in Persian. The new-founded Teachers' Training College could supply but a part of their urgent needs, and the scale of secondary classes, confined to the three principal cities, was regrettably humble; nor was the country-wide penetration of 'politics' into the schools, thus early, less to be deplored. Means were found to reopen the Law School, and a commercial and a technical school. The many privately-conducted Mullās' schools, archaic in method, scope, and equipment, continued to produce a bare literacy in their thousands of pupils; but the temptation to multiply inferior Government schools was resisted, and the teaching of English almost wholly withheld in spite of a general clamour for it. Upon the desirability of girls' schools, Muslim opinion was at first divided; five, all primary, had been opened by the first weeks of 1920. The schools of the local Christian and Jewish minorities and those of the foreign missions were fostered by support and subsidy; some of these were of high standard. Some archaeological work was carried out by R. Campbell Thompson at Abu Shahrayn (Eridu) in the spring of 1918, and more under H. R. Hall at Ur and elsewhere in 1919.

204 Printing-presses were operating at Najf in 1918, at Sulaymaniya in 1919, and in Baṣra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the occupation of these places. Newspapers in English were published at Baghdad and Baṣra, in Arabic at those cities and Mosul, in Turkish at Kirkuk, in Kurdish at Sulaymaniya.

439 The great increase of goods entering 'Iraq in 1918–19 taxed
the young Customs administration of C. R. Watkins and Major
A. G. H. Sievwright to the utmost. It was due to cessation of
imports into north Persia from Russia, to the increase of 'Iraq's
own spending power, and to the general depletion of stocks by war
[436] interruption. The Indian rupee, now the universal currency of
'Iraq, supplied an adequate medium; and the rising volume of
[504] civilian traffic could be handled easily by the now fully developed
Port of Baṣra, which as such came into existence under Colonel J. C.
Ward in the autumn of 1919 and was soon afterwards transferred
000 to the Civil Administration. The Railways, when at their greatest

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Wilson in July 1920, when Damascus fell to the French; and Colonel K. Cornwallis, an ex-Sudan officer and Arabist who had served in Syria with Fayṣal and gained his close friendship, had been authorized by Curzon in December to offer him the 'Iraq throne. The Prince had refused it, alleging the higher claim of the Amir 'Abdullah, his elder brother. But to the king-seekers of Cairo he remained the only tolerable choice, and a programme whereunder his candidature and election should proceed was forthwith elaborated. The rôle of Great Britain was to encourage him to visit 'Iraq and offer himself as King, and thereafter to 'raise no objection' to his election; but while no forcible imposition was contemplated, such an experiment could, it was evident, scarcely be allowed to fail. 643

Regarding the Kurds, no decision was reached. It was already clear that the Kurdish State visualized at Sèvres would never exist, and that the Treaty itself had been rendered inoperative by Kamal's unimagined national revival in Turkey. The Kurds of Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya, too obviously unfit for self-government, might yet be ill at ease in an Arab State; but the High Commissioner's willingness in that event to govern them directly did not appeal to the 'Iraqi ministers, in whose view the Kurds must form an integral part of 'Iraq. No expedient remained but that which was tacitly accepted, both in Cairo and on the spot: to admit the distinctness of Kurd from Arab by a measure of administrative variation, to treat them with sympathy, and to hope for their ultimate willing adhesion to the 'Iraq State, to which in any case they could not but be economically united. Kirkuk had in fact accepted a Mutaṣarrif in February 1921, and Arbil became a sub-liwā of it under a Deputy Mutaṣarrif; Mosul since the murder of December 1920 remained under a British Political Officer, though unity with 'Iraq had been accepted. Sulaymaniya liwā refused, for the moment, any rule but that of the High Commissioner. 563

Important decisions were reached at Cairo on defence questions. The British forces were to be further reduced; the Royal Air Force was in 1922 to take over control from the Army. The Levies, increased by the addition not of further Arab but of Assyrian and Kurdish units, were to be handed over by the Minister of the Interior to the High Commissioner and therefrom later to the British Military Command, which would support the expenses of the force. 000

The Cairo Conference broke up on 25 March. Cox was back in Baghdad by mid-April, to find that the selection of a ruler now dominated all political thought. The lesser local candidates faded from the picture. The Naqib, whose own following was 643

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 721 25 January 1920 had asserted that non-Arab Muslim territories whether enemy-occupied or not, 'could not be divided' from Turkey; Kurdistan was the obvious reference. From this followed the propaganda campaign of 1920: the absurd pretensions to a throne in Baghdad put forward on behalf of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Sanusi, who was brought by the Turks to Diyarbakr in 1921: their resumed control of the border districts and tribes of Van and Julamark: their seduction of the Kurdish chieftains of Rawanduz area, and their mission thither of a civil official with troops. With the wild Surchi predominantly pro-Turkish, and the Pishdar divided, Turkish penetration made progress in the summer of 1921. It was checked by the Royal Air Force, the 'Iraq Police, and loyal tribal Levies in the autumn, only to restart with a sudden murderous stroke by 'Ubaydullah of the Surchi, who ambushed a Levy party and was repulsed again by major operations of the 'Iraq Levies and R.A.F. in mid-winter. But the tribal submission which followed was precarious; 'Ubaydullah remained at large; and early in 1922 Turkish troop movements on the frontier, based on Nisibin and Jazira, presaged a further offensive. Meanwhile the Sulaymaniya area was relatively quiet in the absence of Shaykh Maḥmud and his near relations; but a group of Persian Kurds from the frontier were able to range the Ḥalabja plain, collect 'taxes', ambush a Levy force, and threaten the town until Air Force reprisals scattered them.

563 657 A further problem of desperate difficulty, and closely connected with the Turkish claims, was that of the Assyrians. Their recruitment, first reluctant then eager, into the 'Iraq Levies did not solve the riddle of their ever-demanded repatriation, nor even of their settlement as a compact community in 'Iraq. The death of Paulus Mar Sham'un in 1920 left the succession to a feeble boy of eleven, Ishai. It led to the rapid loss of much of his house's authority to such livelier adventurers as the notorious A͟ghā Petros of Baz, an international 'crook' with murder, blackmail, and fraud to his credit in both hemispheres—and a brave man. The latter's plan, a desperate *pis aller* reluctantly authorized by the British, was to lead his rabble of vindictive tribesmen in their thousands across hill and dale by 'Aqra to Urmiya. The project ended late in 1920 in wayside looting, savage reprisals, and final débâcle; and the Assyrian community were reconcentrated in their camp at Shaykh Mindan outside Mosul. From here the Urmiya sections of the nation decided early in 1921 to attempt to make their own way back to Persia by way of Baghdad; but of thousands who drew money and departed, the great majority were kept from reaching their homes by the cruel hardships of the road and by Persian opposition. They scattered and disappeared, or returned to seek

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

work in Baghdad. The Ḥakkari clans were settled, as far as great 563
efforts and British expenditure could effect it, in the Government- 657
owned villages of Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, while hundreds of their more optimistic households passed over—ill-led, distraught by faction, and weakened by malaria—into their native hills across the border. Aghā Petros, their evil genius, was thankfully dispatched to Europe where he died in Paris soon afterwards. The Patriarchal household settled at Baybad, near 'Amadiya, sustained by the vigour and loyalty of Surma Khanim, the boy Patriarch's aunt. But the troubles of the hapless Assyrians, due so largely to their own fierce indiscipline, folly, and disunion, were not at or near their end.

For the Armenian refugees, who numbered some 15,000 at the time of their dispatch late in 1920 from Ba'quba to camp at Nahr 'Umar near Baṣra, other means of dispersal were sought. But their passive non-co-operation and sullen refusal to accept work in 'Iraq long defeated all the efforts made for them. Some measure of absorption in the cities or into Persia or among the Assyrians reduced their numbers, and most of the surviving main body of some 8,000 could at last be transported by ship to Batum—at the cost, as ever, of the British Government—by agreement with the new Armenian Government in Transcaucasia. The residue, still resisting all suggested forms of self-help, were induced by March 1922 to leave Nahr 'Umar, and the camp was closed.

2. THE FIRST TREATY

The proposal of the British Government to express the Anglo- 648x
'Iraq relationship by treaty, rather than by undisguised mandatory 186
Government, was approved by the Amir before his arrival in 'Iraq, and seemed not to be opposed, initially, by nationalist spokesmen there. To both sides it appeared likely to minimize the odium of a humiliating guardian–ward relationship, and to invest 'Iraq from the outset with the dignity of an independent treaty-making State. It was, in fact, unquestionably the most prudent and most imaginative way to handle a situation which lacked all precedent; but, to the resentment of 'Iraqi patriots and the poisoning of Anglo-'Iraq relations for the next ten years, the Mandate itself remained. Unmentioned in the draft Treaty, it had nevertheless notoriously been awarded to and accepted by Great Britain, and was even now in draft and awaiting League ratification in the last days of 1921. The remoteness of such a situation from the 'Complete Independence' claimed by the nationalists was all too obvious, however the Mandate be interpreted, excused, or kept out of sight.

A view hostile to the Mandate, and suspicious of a Treaty however otherwise generous which merely veiled it, was inevitably

648 inhabitants, could Curzon agree to the value or feasibility of a plebiscite. The Conference broke up on 2 February 1923, with every difficulty unsolved and with the Turks resolutely rejecting Curzon's offer or threat to refer the matter to the arbitration of the League.

The Turkish National Assembly proceeded, early in April, to award to the veteran American concession-seeker, Admiral Chester, a railway and mineral concession stretching far into 'Iraq; but at the second Lausanne Conference, which was convened on 23 April, wiser councils were manifest. British pressure for reference of the Mosul issue to League decision, a step wholly consonant with world opinion at the time, could no longer be resisted. Ismet maintained all his claims but agreed that, failing direct Anglo-Turkish agreement within twelve months (later reduced to nine), the Council of the League should be asked to arbitrate the dispute. The search for such agreement, pursued in conferences which Sir Percy Cox attended in Istanbul in May and June 1924, remained fruitless. Neither side yielded, and the problem was referred by Great Britain, in face of great Turkish reluctance, back to the League Council. This was to meet on 20 September.

721 These moves of diplomacy in Europe did nothing, meanwhile, to allay movement and violence in Kurdistan. Shaykh Maḥmud, 648 supporting his band of cut-throat followers by looting the helpless, welcomed Turkish officers at Sulaymaniya, sent delegates to Kirkuk to consult the local Turkophiles, and dispatched envoys even to Karbalā and Najf to enlist support. Refusing the order of the High Commissioner to report himself in Baghdad, he was finally evicted from Sulaymaniya by the bombs of the Royal Air Force and made for temporary refuge at Sardasht with whatever funds and followers he could collect. The vigilance of the Air Force prevented a reoccupation of Sulaymaniya by his bands, and touch was kept with his more reasonable brother Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir. The Jaf and other tribes showed every eagerness to be detached effectively from the orbit of the Sulaymaniya 'Government'.

On the northern frontier the Turks' treatment of their own Kurds was confirming, within the 'Iraq border, Kurdish resistance to their return. Their troop concentrations at Nisibin and Jazira-ibn-'Umar remained alarming, and their occupation of Rawanduz left, while it lasted, a centre for aggressive intrigue within 'Iraq. 563 [166] In the debated land, astride the frontier, Assyrian resettlement had proceeded. Hundreds of their houses had been established in the areas of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, and Zakho. Others had attained their original homes in Tiyari and neighbouring country, and more, seeking to do the same early in 1923, had met the resistance of the

Oramar Aghās and returned to 'Amadiya in time to help in repelling Zibari and Turkish attacks on it. 563 The frontier line of the future was still unknown. Some Assyrians were content to stay in new homes in 'Iraq, a few had already returned to Persia, others had proved resolute and successful in regaining their ancestral mountains. All were intensely community-conscious, although the unifying authority of the Mar Sham'un, now resident at Baybad, was sadly weakened. Service in the 'Iraq Levies provided employment for 3,000 to 4,000 Assyrians whose families accompanied them, and whose military prowess under British and Assyrian officers, who were often their own tribal Maliks, was admired. It was the more unfortunate that stories of a vast Greater Assyria to be achieved by French assistance gained credence and helped to poison Assyrian-'Iraqi relations, which the apparent British favour to a foreign and Christian community made anyhow delicate, and which was unassisted by any pretence of Assyrian devotion to Arab and Muslim 'Iraq. A riot in Mosul in August 1923 between Mosulawis and Assyrians was a visible danger-signal; the general 'Iraqi resentment at the arrival of 800 Assyrian refugees from Turkey by way of Syria was another. The warnings of both King Fayṣal and Sir Percy Cox on the need for mutual restraint and discipline did not prevent further animosity, and in May 1924 a petty squabble in Kirkuk bazaar led to a murderous stampede of Assyrian Levy troops there, with great loss of Muslim life and a legacy of bitter anti-Assyrian feeling.

The recovery of Rawanduz from the Turks, by a well-conducted 648× military operation of the 'Iraq Army, the Levies, and the Police in April 1923 marked a stage in the fall of Turkish influence. 721 Sayid Ṭaha of Neri was installed as Qa'immaqam with a garrison of the Levies. The same military column proceeded next to Sulaymaniya where, since the reduction of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty period by the Protocol to four years (p. 148), it was now essential to make early arrangements for this region's future place in the 'Iraq State. Sulaymaniya was entered in mid-May 1923, and the future discussed with Aghās and townsfolk eager for peace and a secure Government; but since no troops, it was alleged, could be maintained there, the authority of the local Council, left in charge by the retiring column, was short-lived. It was possible to transfer outlying districts of Sulaymaniya liwā—Chamchamal, Ḥalabja, Sangau—to the direct care of the Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk, leaving but a narrow area still exposed to the brutal follies of Shaykh Maḥmud; but the latter, heralded by a few days of Hamawand looting, returned in July. Ignoring again the order of the High Commissioner to come to Baghdad, he terrorized the countryside, trespassed into areas now under 'Iraq Government authority,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

*645 Education was entrusted to a learned Shi'i politician, Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, and Awqaf to a venerable ex-Shaykh al-Islam lately returned from Istanbul, Ibrahim Effendi al-Ḥaydari. The Prime Minister held the portfolio of Defence, and with it that of a new Ministry which he created as a timely gesture, that of Foreign Affairs. Nuri Pasha Sa'id became deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, of which the King was titular head.

648* The British Government submitted to the Council of the League on 17 July an Instrument embodying the terms of all the documents now ratified as between itself and 'Iraq. This was adopted on 27 September 1924, in terms which provided for the submission of an annual Report by Great Britain to the Council on its 'Iraq trusteeship: for the assumption by His Majesty's Government of full responsibility for the carrying out of the Treaty: and for abstention from all modification of it by the British or by 'Iraq without League of Nations consent. The Treaty was ratified by King George on 10 November, and by King Fayṣal on 12 December 1924.

5. THE MOSUL SETTLEMENT

635 In the liwā of Sulaymaniya, far from the stresses of Baghdad State-building, the régime of 'Kurdish Government' under Shaykh Maḥmud, which had ruined the countryside and depopulated the town, was by the spring of 1924 drawing to its close. The Chamchamal and Ḥalabja qadhās, now loosely administered from Kirkuk, elected to the Constituent Assembly deputies who included Shaykh Maḥmud's own brother; but the Shaykh himself, after ignoring one more ultimatum and a warning of impending punishment—the warning which was invariably given, on humanitarian grounds, to the people of all villages where as a last resort bombing was to take place—was visited by aircraft of the Royal Air Force in May 1924 and was finally evicted from the town. Sulaymaniya was entered in July by ground troops, cavalry of the 'Iraq Army, and a force of Levies. The administration was thenceforward assumed by the 'Iraq Government, which provided funds to remedy the miserable conditions prevailing. The population of the almost uninhabited city could return with infinite relief to their homes, and by the end of the year had increased to 20,000. Shaykh Maḥmud, skulking in the mountain villages and crossing to and from Persian territory, maintained the hunted existence of a bandit.

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721 On the northern frontier the re-establishment in their old mountain homes of some thousands of returning Assyrians was to lead to trouble after two years of peaceful resettlement. The district concerned lay just north of the old wilaya frontier, but

within the area now claimed by the British Government for 'Iraq 563 as an indispensable safeguard for Assyrian resettlement. The pro- 721 vocative arrest and release by Assyrians of the Turkish Wali of Julamark, while visiting Chal in July 1924, abruptly embittered trans-frontier feeling. It was followed by the advance of considerable and long-prepared Turkish forces across the Ḥazil river into 'Iraq. They were evicted for the moment by Air Force action, helped by Assyrian irregulars gallantly mustered and led—but only to sweep back to attack and burn Assyrian villages and 'Iraqi police posts. Assyrian settlers, to a number of some 8,000 and largely destitute, were driven from their homes to seek safety around 'Amadiya. Neither the usual exchange of protests nor the debates of Geneva could prevent reprisals and repetitions, which achieved all too thoroughly the devastation of Kurdish as well as Assyrian areas of the frontier. Relief work and ultimately house- 657 by-house resettlement, with Government help and taxation remissions for settlers, were provided in 'Iraq for the hapless refugees.

In Geneva the 30th Session of the League Council listened on 648x and after 20 September to the now familiar arguments of the Turkish and British spokesmen, Fatḥi Bey and Lord Parmoor. The same historical, ethnological, economic, strategic, and political claims were advanced, to meet the same rebuttals and counterclaims. No line of agreement or compromise appeared. The decision accepted in the end by both sides provided for the mission to Mosul of a League Commission of Inquiry, whose verdict, if endorsed by the Council, was to be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile telegrams reaching Geneva and containing mutual charges of frontier violation compelled the establishment of an interim frontier line. This was fixed at a meeting held at Brussels on 29 October, to be known thenceforward as the 'Brussels Line'. It ran somewhat to the south of the alignment claimed by Great Britain, and thereby excluded some Assyrian areas; nevertheless, it was destined to form, scarcely amended, the permanent national frontier.

The Mosul Commission consisted of M. de Wirsen, a Swedish diplomat, as President, and as members Count Teleki, a former Prime Minister of Hungary and distinguished jurist and geographer, and Colonel Paulis, a retired officer of the Belgian Army. After visiting Istanbul and London it arrived in Baghdad in mid-January 1925, and was there joined by its secretariat, by assessors from both sides and—to the dismay of 'Iraqis and British—by two renegade ex-'Iraqis in the guise of Turkish experts, one a Kirkukli of the Naftchi family, the other a brother-in-law of Shaykh Maḥmud.

The Commission and its assessors and staff spent some days in

648 Baghdad, interviewing leading citizens and distracted by foolish and provocative demonstrations. In Mosul, their next stopping place, popular feeling ran high. Police protection was offered to the Commissioners, but refused. The maintenance of public order, threatened by the emotions of an excited and demonstrative population, of many heterogeneous elements and predilections, was difficult. Much of the Commission's inquiry was held in secret. Witnesses, often self-contradictory in their replies to questions, were in some cases reluctant to speak or, fearing reprisals, would speak to the Commissioners only in strict privacy; in others, appeared to be largely animated by personal ambitions or animosities; in others again, were little appreciative of the alternatives involved. Some were influenced by racial, others by tribal, others by economic considerations, and many evidently by personal frustrations or by the aspiration not for a better but for an ineffective government. The Commission passed in all two months in the disputed wilaya, and spent themselves freely in painstaking and discreet inquiry from every source and class.

The Report, a creditable and enlightening document, was handed to the Council of the League in July 1925, and debated in the first days of September. The Commissioners dismissed the possibility of partition of the wilaya. They reviewed the racial content of the disputed area, accepting generally, though not without reserve, the facts and figures proffered by the British. They found that economic considerations on the whole bound Mosul to 'Iraq. They approved the Brussels Line as being strategically tenable, and, to the dismay of Assyrian well-wishers, disallowed the claim to attach part of the Ḥakkari territory to Mosul. They described conditions in 'Iraq as still unstable, in spite of progress made under the mandated Government, rejected the claim to possession founded upon right of conquest or upon international law: but admitted finally that the bulk of the inhabitants appeared to favour inclusion in 'Iraq as at present constituted and governed, rather than return to Turkey. The Commission's recommendation was, therefore, for the continued union with 'Iraq of the whole territory south of the Brussels Line, on two conditions: the one, [563] that 'Iraq should remain under Mandate for twenty-five years, the other that the racial distinctness and self-consciousness of the Kurds should be recognized by the official use of their own language and by the employment of Kurds in the Kurdish qaḍhās as administrators, judges, and teachers.

The Turkish representatives at Geneva, hotly nationalist and self-confident, and unimpressed by the Commissioners' facts or judgments, rejected the Report *in toto*, withdrew their promise to accept it as binding if approved by the Council of the League, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered 648x
districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to
secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in
robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to
maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no
direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended
by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern 563
frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's 167
visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from
Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which 657
the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in
February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or
fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by
a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother
of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq
territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further
large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul
wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in
February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the
Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by
a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by
nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya
area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and
evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these
unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to
re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 563
'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising 631
and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an
elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in 185
a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance
was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities
in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment
of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State
in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own
countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army,
Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or
improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the
tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government
was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber
of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete
integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 563
still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least 657
passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to 166

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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Turkey. The frontier was now established, and the impossibility of settlement in their old homes was cruelly manifest. Schemes for the establishment of the Assyrians in Canada or elsewhere overseas had been considered in London, and abandoned. In spite of 'Iraqi frowns at the self-conscious, ever discontented, and hardly manageable community, it seemed that they must settle in 'Iraq or nowhere. The surviving community of some 20,000 souls could never be concentrated in a single enclave, since 'Iraq afforded none which was sufficient, cultivable, and unoccupied. Hundreds of households of the Baz and Jelu clans had dispersed over the Mosul plain, the upper Tiyari and Takhuma in Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, the lower Tiyari around Barwari Bala. It was hoped next to find room for a thousand households in the Baradost area of Rawanduz qadhā, and for more again in Barwari Zayr. Money was collected in England to assist them, seed and cattle were supplied. Pay earned in the Levies kept many families together; but the preservation of their communal identity, their pride of religion and tradition must devolve upon themselves, as it had devolved for so long on others of the Christian minorities in 'Iraq.

6. THE OTHER NEIGHBOURS

648× The relations of 'Iraq with its eastern neighbour were unsatisfactory; with persistent Persian denial of recognition of the new Kingdom, and with habitual bickering across a thousand-mile open frontier, they could not be otherwise. They grew worse with the controversy arising from the self-exile from 'Iraq of the Persian Mujtahids in 1923 (p. 149), and so persisted after their return next year and after the reopening in 1925 of the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Cities, in its new railway-borne fashion. They were not improved by the frontier tergiversations of Simko and the Persian Kurds, nor by quarrels, reminiscent of the days before 1914, between Persian and Baṣrawi Customs authorities on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab: nor by the relations of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh with the Bani Lam, though these improved in 1924: nor by the perennial squabble over the Mandali water.

The supersession of the effete Qajar dynasty of Persia in the last days of 1924 by the virile but savage and uneducated adventurer and autocrat Ridhā Shah Pahlavi at once revolutionized Persian public life in every region, and closely affected its neighbours. The lord of Pusht-i-Kuh, after a panic flight to 'Iraq, returned home to make the best terms he could with the rigidly centralizing dictator. The Shaykh of Muḥammara, Khaz'al Khan, so long the close friend of the British and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, unwisely failed to adapt himself to the new exigencies, and quarrelled with the Persian Government in conditions which gave the British

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VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

1. TREATY DEADLOCK

648 THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds; it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations. Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands
563 developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of
619 Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Mean-
13 while, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These
419 progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi
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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Euphrates towns had led to bloodshed and police intervention, 648x that the agitation died down: the product, it seemed, of a new and 665 sinister type of 'Iraqi politics. The Brotherhood, successful in this 668 effort, proceeded next (said its enemies) to make what capital it could from the dangerous uneasiness of Kurd–Arab and Assyrian–Kurd relationships.

The attitude of the minorities to the forthcoming emancipation 563 of 'Iraq and withdrawal of British control could not, indeed, be 648x other than a serious preoccupation of the 'Iraq Government as well as of Great Britain and of the League itself. In Baghdad the privileges claimed by or on behalf of the Kurdish districts, and the future of the Assyrians, were questions the more insistent as the attention of the League was concentrated on these aspects of 'Iraq life. The Government did its best at reassurance by repeated tours of the King and his Ministers in the Kurdish areas, by legislation on the use of the Kurdish language, by promises to honour all pledges given in the past, and by such practical gestures of goodwill as were available; but the whispers of the ill disposed were effective, nevertheless, in increasing the alarm of Kurd and Assyrian alike.

With minor Cabinet changes—the loss of Madfa'i to preside in 645x the Deputies, and the addition of Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs—and a re-formation in October 1930, the Ministry of Nuri Pasha maintained itself, in spite of Brotherhood intrigues and assaults, from its formation in March 1930 until November 1932. His second Cabinet, which took office on 19 October, brought Naji Shawkat to Interior, Rustum to Finance, Jamal Baban to Justice, Ja'far to Foreign Affairs, Amin Zaki and Chalabi to Works and Education. Little was heard for the moment of Sunni–Shi'i friction, save implicitly in minor disorders: and nothing of the threat or hope of conscription, which the Sa'idi Government wisely postponed until the obligation to listen to High Commissioners was no more. The major interest of the time was, 648x evidently, that of securing 'Iraq's admission to the League, for which 1932 was the appointed year.

The intention of His Majesty's Government to make this recommendation had been communicated to the League Council in September 1929, and was likely thenceforward to raise questions of procedure for which no precedent existed. The Permanent Mandates Commission, to which annually since 1921 spokesmen of the mandatory Power had presented its Report with full verbal explanations, had never relaxed its interest in 'Iraqi affairs and the British trusteeship. It now scrutinized the 1929 Report for signs of 'Iraq's adequacy or inadequacy for emancipation, closely questioned the British 'accredited representative' at Geneva, and

standards—and non-Muslims at that!—and without, perhaps quite 000 involuntarily, adopting something of the airs of superiority and social exclusiveness which are of all things the least tolerable to the educated society of the modern East. These dangers the British were ill equipped to avoid; it followed that their unpopularity in 'Iraq, after years of Mandate, was widespread. It prevailed, with many individual exceptions, not only in ministerial and official circles but also among the very classes to whom their work had been the most advantageous.

It is certain that some measure of reform and reorganization was, in the clear interests of human welfare, desirable in the 'Iraq of 1918; certain too that it could never have been carried out without damage to the immediate interests of some loudly protesting class, be they Shi'i 'Ulamā, intellectuals, landlords or tribal shaykhs. Could such reforms have come from within, without Mandate or imposed foreign help? Only, one may judge, too slowly, too uncertainly, and in the end inadequately. Or would a Mandateless 'Iraq State, with its 'full independence' from the outset, have been willing of itself to employ foreign helpers and give them adequate authority and continuity? It is improbable; but if so, such a method might have yielded better results than a Mandate, if genuine popular goodwill is, as it must be, the true criterion. But to neither the excited spokesmen of nationalist 'Iraq in the Baghdad or the Damascus of 1919, nor to a British Government then harassed with the stresses and counter-claims of inexpert peace-making, was such a solution likely to occur. The Mandate was inevitable; its administration had had great merits, with real but less tangible defects; and its conclusion was welcome to all.

4. THE MINORITIES

The problem presented to the Sunni government and governing 795 class by the Shi'i element, a minority in political status though a majority in numbers and containing eminent men of religion, landlords, business men, and the most militant tribes, was little considered at Geneva. Nevertheless, it equalled that of the Kurds in delicacy and in its need of a solution, and its dangers were to be notably shown within a few months of 'Iraq's attainment of independence. But as the Shi'is were 'Iraqis, lived in the heart of its territory and included no elements of obvious interest to any outside Power save Persia, the Shi'i problem lay beyond the observation of the world's statesmen. It was indeed a question less of minority rights than of a temptation which 'Iraqi politicians found irresistible: that of using the weight of Shi'i religion and tribal power as a weapon, fatally dangerous, in domestic politics.

The lesser true minorities—the Christian sects, Yazidis, Jews, 563 795

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 795 and Turkomans—made little history. The first-mentioned were accepted as equals in 'Iraqi society and administration as completely as any non-Muslim could expect; and when the announcement of British withdrawal led in 1929 to some heart-searching among the timorous, the heads of the communities had no difficulty in reassuring their flocks and urging continued loyalty to their King. A ministerial tour among them in 1931 led to great cordiality and the official thanks of the Apostolic Delegate. It was found not too difficult in 1930 to draft and pass into law new statutes for some of these Christian minorities, defining the powers of their priesthoods and councils. The measure of self-management which they accepted was bound, in a modern State, to fall far short of old millet autarchy.

The tiny community of inoffensive Baha'is in Baghdad was in these years the victim of an episode—that of the long-famous case of the Baha'i Houses—sadly destructive of confidence in 'Iraqi justice. They had begun in the middle 'twenties to repair their properties in the city. Fanatical Shi'i neighbours resisted this, petitioned the King and obtained from him, although the case was still *sub judice* in the Baghdad Peace Court (which later gave judgement for the Baha'is), a direct order for the eviction of the owners and confiscation of the keys. This action and the subsequent majority verdict of the Court of Appeal in favour of the Shi'i aggressors represented to objective observers an apparent overruling of justice by the rancours of local politics. It was ventilated at Geneva and was the subject of repeated protest by the High Commissioner, but in vain. The case, in itself petty and embarrassing enough to the 'Iraqi authorities, was a sinister warning to other non-Muslim elements.

563 The unselfconscious Turkomans of Kirkuk, Kifri, and their villages made no efforts to emerge from a useful and honest obscurity; they created no problems since the Mosul settlement, and were represented in 'Iraqi officialdom far beyond their numerical proportion. The Jews were still compact, assiduous, self-sufficient, and unambitious. They had had their outstanding Finance Minister, kept their place in the Government offices, dominated many of the markets, owned property, and supported their own schools and hospitals; and when 'Iraq approached its independence, were not so foolish as to compromise their future by open protest. The art of living in 'Iraq, and surviving bad times, was no new one to them. It was true that 'Iraqi, like all Arab, feeling was strong against the Zionist movement in Palestine; ugly and violent street demonstrations, accompanied by the usual marshalled schoolboys and armed roughs, greeted Sir Alfred Mond when he visited Baghdad on business in February 1928; and in the

year following demonstrations in the mosques and city, a two-minute silence in Parliament, black-edged newspapers, and telegrams to London marked 'Iraqi disapproval of the 'pro-Jewish' policy of Great Britain. But the day when these feelings would descend with personal violence on the heads of the timid and law-abiding Baghdadi Jews, anxious only to find a secure place in the State and to dissociate themselves from Zionism, lay still some years ahead. 563

The Yazidis, no longer eminent as of old either as harriers or as harried in tribal warfare, turned to restlessness towards the end of this period through the heedless and dissolute ways of their Mir, Sa'id Bey. He was accused of misusing the revenues and neglecting the shrine of Shaykh 'Adi and its pilgrims. A meeting of the Yazidi notables was held in Mosul in 1931, attended by the High Commissioner. Government attempted to produce a satisfactory statute for the outlandish community; but it proved intractable, and the Yazidi elders reported after full deliberation that no way could be devised to change their Mir except assassination. Rival Mirs nevertheless claimed support, and faction tore their settlements in the Mosul plain and Sinjar, to be settled only by time, intrigue, and murder.

The Kurds were a far more formidable minority. Added to the other elements making for separatism—those of locality, character, culture, and tradition—their specific nationalism, which flourished in a restricted circle centred in Sulaymaniya town, had survived their incorporation in the 'Iraq State, the failure of successive campaigns, the stern suppression of their Kurdish brothers in Turkey and Persia, and even their own profound disunion. The 'Iraq Government had made meanwhile a not discreditable effort to honour in their favour the League of Nations recommendations of 1925. They were given a generous share of Government appointments, a minister in the Baghdad Cabinet, and their quota of Deputies delighted to serve as such. Nevertheless, a petition submitted by some of the last-mentioned in 1929, asking for increased expenditure in Kurdistan and the formation of an all-Kurdish four-liwā province of their own, showed their determination to maintain all of their special claims; nor did their spokesmen forget that the twenty-year prolongation of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty of 1922—a specific condition of the Mosul settlement—was largely on their account. 563 668

Meanwhile it was possible in 1927 to arrange tolerable terms of surrender with Shaykh Maḥmud. But he refused, after all, to honour them, and it proved necessary to dislodge him from his last stronghold in Panjwin by forces of the 'Iraq Army and the Levies, and by bombing and cavalry patrols to disperse his widely-ranging

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 murderous Hamawand allies. The Shaykh's retirement to Persia
668 removed for a time the greatest obstacle to orderly government in Sulaymaniya liwā. It could now be resumed, with improved roads and rebuilt police posts. His son, Baba 'Ali, was brought to school in Baghdad—and later to Victoria College, Alexandria—as part of the terms of settlement; he was, years later, to become a graduate of Columbia, and a minister of the Government. The place of Shaykh Maḥmud as leading Kurdish disturber of the peace was taken in the same year, 1927, by Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan in whose territory 'Iraqi troops had recently manœuvred. This half-witted Dere Bey, obscurely prompted by some resentful megalomania, now proclaimed himself Almighty and gained some converts by the preaching of a devoted Mullā. But the reaction of horrified listeners led to a scuffle in which lives, including his brother's, were lost. It was followed by an intervention of police and the reinforcement of the Army garrison at Bilih, near Barzan. The new religion died out; but the Shaykh, talking and writing war and sedition to all who would listen and spreading rumours of Assyrian trespass, remained a menacing figure.

The Kurdish reaction in 1929–30 to threatened British withdrawal was one of apprehension. The elections of September 1929 produced, as has been recorded, a riot in Sulaymaniya; questions had been asked already by the Kurds in the 'Iraq Parliament as to safeguarding in the new Treaty the 'rights of the Kurdish areas', and had been answered only by the Treaty's silence on the subject.
563 Expecting support based on the same claims, Shaykh Maḥmud in
September 1930 again invaded 'Iraq territory, in spite of specific
669 warnings to desist. He established himself, addressed the High
721 Commissioner to demand a united Kurdistan under British Mandate to stretch from Zakho to Khaniqin, and again occupied Panjwin. Troops of the 'Iraq Army, with Royal Air Force bombers, dislodged him successively from Panjwin and Sardasht, but failed for some months to encircle or drive him across the frontier. Guerrilla war continued through the winter of 1930–1. In March his movement to raise the tribes of Kifri and Khaniqin was stopped by a concerted operation of the Army, Police, and Air Force, and a major engagement took place at Au-i-Barika twenty miles north-east of Ṭuz Khurmatu, leaving a score of dead. The Shaykh fled into Persia, but thanks to preventive action by the Persian Government failed to find there his usual refuge. At an interview at Panjwin terms were once more arranged. His life was spared, an allowance granted, and his place of residence fixed at Naṣiriya on the lower Euphrates.

Between 1928 and 1931 an uneasy peace reigned in Barzan country, where the Shaykh was visited by an Administrative

Inspector and received the admonitions of Baghdad. In July of 563
the latter year he again lost his wits, accepted and imposed 'Christianity', 669
and ordered his scared followers to conform to his new
faith by roasting and eating pork. A number of the horrified 721
retinue obeyed; but a neighbour, Shaykh Rashid of Baradost, expressed his disapproval by raids which kindled all the fires of tribal warfare. Shaykh Aḥmad's brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, and other well-wishers tried in vain by diplomacy to extinguish them: but he himself, restored to the Muslim faith, led forays of unusual savagery into Baradost country. By December intervention by regular troops was ordered, in spite of the wintry conditions. An 'Iraq Army column, penetrating the mountains as far as the Shaykh's village, was there severely defeated and indeed rescued from débâcle only by Air Force intervention. Aḥmad, chastened by severe bombing, released the prisoners he had taken, protested humble obedience, and withdrew from Baradost country. But he remained unsubdued. In the early spring of 1932, after warnings from the High Commissioner which he ignored, 'Iraqi troops again advanced into his country, occupied Margasur, and threatened Barzan; but a sudden assault on them by tribesmen in difficult country involved them in a second defeat and heavy losses. The R.A.F. was again able decisively to intervene, and a second 'Iraqi column, with strong air support, now occupied Barzan and much of its dependent territory. After a pause for the release of a captured pilot, and further attempts at peace-making on generous terms, land and air operations were resumed. In midsummer the Shaykh, driven finally to bay, crossed into Turkish territory, where he was arrested and removed from the frontier. It was then possible to install a normal or nearly normal administration in Barzan country, with police posts and patrols, and to pardon the miserable remnant of the Shaykh's followers who trickled back.

If these warlike interludes were of a type normal in Kurdistan 563
for millennia, the same is less true of the political action now taken 668
by Kurdish leaders. A petition to Geneva by ten notables of Sulaymaniya in July 1930 demanded a League-supervised Kurdish Government. The Permanent Mandates Commission commented that the League had never envisaged a Kurdish Government but merely a measure of 'special treatment', of which it urged the Mandatary to ensure full application before it be too late. A series of further and similar Kurdish petitions, written in 1930 to 1931, were considered at Geneva in the latter year. They led to the recommendation that Britain should impress on the 'Iraq Government the need of tolerance to evoke the loyalty of its Kurdish subjects: who in turn, however, should earn respect and the League's consideration by a correct attitude to the 'Iraqi Kingdom.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

563 657 182 Government had in fact, not without lapses, maintained the principle of employing Kurdish officials, other than technical, in Kurdish areas. It now proceeded to reaffirm this and to enact a Language Law in the interests of Kurdish-speakers, to set up a translation bureau, to appoint a Kurdish Inspector of Education for north-eastern 'Iraq, and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior. Local committees were next formed to determine the language of instruction to be used in each school, to specify the dialect of Kurdish required, and to replace non-Kurdish-speaking staff. Repeated visits were paid to north and north-east 'Iraq by the King, the Amir Ghazi, the High Commissioner, and 'Iraqi ministers with the purpose of allaying suspicion, increasing personal contact, and collecting such information as would satisfy the still uneasy Mandates Commission. It was possible, at this stage, to hope for increasing coalescence of the Kurdish areas of 'Iraq, and that their nationalism, wisely handled, would weaken: hopes not impossible but unduly optimistic, since the high statesmanship which could have achieved these ends was not in sight. Yet, in adopting a hesitant attitude to Kurdish claims, the 'Iraq Government was not always unreasonable. These claims were at times frankly separatist, incompatible with an 'Iraq State as constituted, exacerbated by the abiding antipathy felt mutually between the two races, and not lessened by the signs of a more sympathetic or more generous attitude towards the Kurds by the British advisers than by 'Iraqi statesmen. The fear existed, in addition, that privileges granted to the Kurds would be demanded immediately by the Shi'is of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question. It resulted that the entry of 'Iraq into the League was unmarked by any true solution of the problem of its unassimilated Kurdish minority. The Government, the British sponsors, and the League itself had to be content with palliatives and hopes.

563 166 657 The same is true of that far smaller, more alien, and still less assimilable community, the Assyrians. Substantial numbers of these had by 1926 been settled in scattered Kurd-surrounded villages in Mosul liwā (p. 158). The completion of this process, further resettlement of the less satisfied, and improvement of the settlements were the tasks of the years 1927 to 1930. The High Commissioner's interest was shown by visits to the areas, by many conferences, and by invitations to Government to show all reasonable favour to the Assyrians, even though these, by their attitude of grumbling non-cooperation, in part frustrated the efforts of their well-wishers. A well-qualified Settlement Officer was employed, more villages cleared and reoccupied in the Ḥarir area of Rawanduz qadhā, advances of seed and money given to the reluctant settlers.

Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for 563 a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions. 166

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. 657 The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Ḥarir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian 563 —continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in 701 Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Maḥmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition for self-protection in their new homes. The Levies, besides the [157] contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retro-
701 spect, to be regretted.

The announcement of the impending end of the Mandate pro-
563 foundly disturbed the Assyrian community, which under the 1930
668 Treaty was so shortly to be left at the sole mercy of the 'Iraq Government. The latter's attitude, though still correct, was growing less favourable. Taxation remissions were granted on a decreasing scale; normal minor taxation, outrageous to the long-pampered settlers, was beginning to be demanded; and Government action in admitting parties of destitute Assyrians from Russia was reluctant and unpopular. Persistent British support for Assyrian claims, or part of them, was galling to successive Cabinets. Worse than this, the exploitation of bad relations between Kurd and Assyrian appealed to certain Baghdad politicians as an easy method of trouble-making. It bore fruit in a series of untraced murders and revived anti-Assyrian outcry among the Kurds. Nevertheless, if the Assyrian community had, with patience and avoidance of provocation, accepted its new position in 'Iraq—which was that or better than that of the Chaldaeans or Armenians—its future could have been peaceful if inglorious, its ecclesiastical and social individuality preserved, and its homes secure and happy. But its leaders chose other paths, which led to tragedy. They clung to every point of their reiterated case: that they had been officially 'allies' in the 1914–18 War, but as such never rewarded; that their Levies had performed outstanding services—indeed had acquired and saved southern Kurdistan; that the League had in 1925 recommended rebestowal of their 'ancient privileges', now still withheld; that the British had ruined their hopes of Turkish favour and resettlement in Ḥakkari, and had betrayed them at Geneva. The twenty-year-old Ishai Mar Sham'un, at school in England from 1925 to 1929 and wholly ignorant of 'Iraq realities, was unfitted to guide the community and obsessed by unrealistic conceptions. Chief among these was that of the 'temporal power' which he felt to belong to the headship of a Millet almost self-governing in olden days, however unacceptable and unconstitutional it must be in modern 'Iraq. His father was ultra-conservative; in his aunt, Surma Khanim, the fervour of community feeling had by now vanquished judgement; the bishops and maliks failed in wisdom or pursued sectional aims, and in conspicuous cases even led factions against their Patriarch. Enthusiastic well-wishers from outside—one an Anglicized grandson of Layard's assistant, Hormuzd Rassam, and one an Englishman, Matthew Cope—misused their well-meant influence to organize petitions, to raise false hopes, and further to prejudice Assyrian-'Iraqi relations.

The High Commissioner's deputy at Geneva in November 1930 gave reassurances, which he believed to be justified, on the future prospects of this and the other minorities. In the same year Sir Francis Humphrys dealt with the Rassam petitions and pledged the 'moral responsibility' of Great Britain for the future attitude of the 'Iraq Government. Returned to 'Iraq, and faced with a situation deteriorating largely through the Assyrians' own activities, he again recommended the Government to show all possible goodwill by resuming its taxation-remission policy. This was done, with good effect. It would have been followed by re-attempting, on attractive terms, the long postponed Baradost settlement, had not the outbreak of Barzan–Baradost hostilities precluded it.

In October 1931 a conference of Assyrians convened at Mosul by the Mar Sham'un dispatched petitions to Geneva. They requested that since the community could not face conditions in 'Iraq after termination of the Mandate, it should be transferred *en bloc* to some Western-governed territory elsewhere, or to Syria. These petitions, however, were not considered by the Mandates Commission for thirteen months, and meanwhile the alarmed Assyrians decided on direct action. The Mar Sham'un prepared in May 1932 a plan to concentrate the whole community in the area of Dohuk–'Amadiya in July, and a general 'cessation of service' by all the Levies on 1 June was threatened in a memorial handed at Hinaydi to their Commander, Brigadier J. G. Browne, himself a tireless upholder of Assyrian rights and later historian of the Levies. The intervention of the High Commissioner postponed a crisis, and yet another petition to Geneva was prepared; but the threat of mass resignation was repeated in the event of its having no early or favourable issue. This petition demanded recognition of an Assyrian Millet and of its Patriarch's temporal and spiritual authority, with an Assyrian deputy in Parliament, community schools, and a subsidy for the Patriarch himself and for his Church. It asked also for the annexation of Ḥakkari territory to 'Iraq, or alternatively the formation in 'Iraq of an all-Assyrian liwā to the north of Mosul, with a new and well-considered Settlement and clear land-titles.

The Levy strike was in fact averted by the arrival by air—an operation then hailed as remarkable—of a battalion of British troops from Egypt. Its four companies were posted to the four main Levy stations. The Mar Sham'un, influenced by this step and by Humphrys's representations, agreed to order the Levies to remain at duty until the petition of 17 June should have been considered at Geneva. The Levy personnel at Hinaydi, who alone continued insubordinate, were reduced by the release of some 250 men; elsewhere the impending reductions of Levy strength

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

563 were postponed at the Mar Sham'un's request. The Northampton-
668 shires returned to Egypt.

In partial compliance with requests in the petition, the 'Iraq Government set up a further land-finding committee. It discovered but little land both cultivable and available, but recommended expenditure on an irrigation scheme to produce more. The Cabinet accepted this report, which was sent to Geneva. The King visited 'Amadiya, talked at length with the Mar Sham'un, and used every means to win his confidence; but the young and intransigent Patriarch would commit himself to nothing in advance of the League's answer, and himself left for Switzerland. He was followed there by a counter-petition of those Assyrians whose original homes had been in Barwari Bala (that is, in present 'Iraq territory), expressing their complete satisfaction with present arrangements.

The final debates of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council on the Assyrian issue, after rehearsing that community's well-known grievances and the desirability (but impossibility) of providing the homogeneous group-settlement which they demanded, could result in no more than hopes for the best. The gap between the full Millet autonomy demanded by the Mar Sham'un, and the favourable minority treatment available at best from the 'Iraq Government, was a wide one. The League Council formally rejected the Millet proposal, 'noted with satisfaction' the impending appointment of a foreign settlement expert, and left the subject with misgivings which were soon to be tragically justified.

5. GOVERNORS AND GOVERNED

642 In a community at 'Iraq's current stage of evolution the central
647 Administration was both significant of and powerful in the society
of the territory; and great and not unsuccessful efforts were made
from 1925 to 1932 by the 'Iraqi and British elements alike to
improve it. The reduction of the British part,[1] though accom-
panied by a variously assessed loss of efficiency and authority, was
clearly necessary as part of 'Iraq's planned evolution; and it pro-
ceeded so far that the steps taken towards 'Iraqi administrative
independence in these years left relatively little for the post-
647 mandatory period. By 1932 further departments had been taken
over by 'Iraqi directors—those of Revenue and State Domains

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[1] The number of Administrative Inspectors fell from 24 in 1923 to 18 in 1925, 14 in 1930, 10 in 1933. The total of British officials of 'gazetted' status in 1920 was 364, in 1923: 181, in 1926: 148, in 1929: 130, in 1931: 118 (38 advisory, 80 executive). For British 'non-gazetted' staff the corresponding numbers were: for 1920: 484; for 1923: 361; for 1926: 52; for 1929: 34; for 1931: 28; for Indian officials, in 1920: 2,035, in 1923: 1,270, in 1926: 250, in 1929: 53, and in 1931: 36.

648' only by the receipt of Persian orders to their Consul to desist. The traditional and resented Shaṭṭ al-'Arab boundary remained a source of Persian rancour. [439] British diplomatic intervention was effective in 1928 in preventing the imposition of maximum Persian import duties on goods from 'Iraq, a measure which threatened ruin to the transit trade; but the presence and grievances of many thousands of Persian subjects in 'Iraq—and of those also who, to escape 'Iraqi obligations, claimed that status when convenient—could not fail to supply endless material for dispute and protest.

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648 The humiliating refusal of Persian recognition of the 'Iraq State was due in fact less to petty disputes and neighbourly jealousies than to the anomalous position of this large expatriate colony. It had long claimed the privileged status accorded in 'Iraq to the subjects of some Powers of Europe. But Persia had never been a Capitulatory Power in the Ottoman Empire, and was unlikely to grant 'Iraqis in Persia corresponding treatment: and the demand for special rights denied to 'Iraqis themselves was unwelcome to the 'Iraq Government, the more so by reason of the numbers involved. Persia would withhold recognition until its claim be granted: 'Iraq refused to consider such claim until after recognition. Deadlock was complete, and all governmental negotiation between the two States remained perforce in British hands. The revision in 1929–30 of the Anglo-'Iraq Judicial Agreement of 1924 offered, however, an opportunity for removing the root of the trouble. The Persian delegate at Geneva applauded the principle of the new Agreement, which was one of equality for all, and the British Minister in Teheran could assure the Shah's Government that in this and all matters—notably the Shaṭṭ boundary—British good offices were available to remove causes of dissension. The effect was instantaneous. In May 1929 full recognition of the 'Iraq Kingdom was accorded by the Persian Government, whose Minister appeared in Baghdad. A 'Provisonal Agreement', covering most-favoured-nation treatment, consular and diplomatic representation, and trade and transit was signed in August, and 'Iraqi Consuls were posted to the Persian cities. Thenceforward the treatment of common interests and problems proceeded with fair success by direct 'Iraqi-Persian approaches. The 'Provisional Agreement' was annually renewed while drafting of the permanent Treaty proceeded slowly. The troublesome Pishdar movements were kept under control. Kurdish Aghās seeking refuge across frontiers in this or that territory were removed to safety from border districts. The Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh and his sons, dispossessed anachronisms now exiled in 'Iraq, were brought to Baghdad in 1929 when a foolish revolutionary attempt on Persian soil drew attention to them. Joint military operations by forces of the two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

countries were directed with good results in 1931 and 1932 against 648K
the veteran trouble-makers of the Hawraman, Maḥmud Khan 563
Dizli and Ja'far Sulṭan. The annual movement of the Jaf migrants from the Ḥalabja and Kifri plains into Persia met in 1931 with tightened control from the Shah's modernizing officials; taxation and attempted arms-control caused outcry which a reasonable inter-governmental compromise was able to placate. No source of justifiable trouble, it seemed, was now outstanding except—a major exception—the river boundary below Baṣra. A visit by the High Commissioner to Teheran early in 1932 was followed by another, made with full formality, by King Fayṣal and his Prime Minister in April of that year.

Relations far more cordial than could have been expected were 648K
maintained with the Turkish Republic. The now feasible re-establishment of social contacts restored many friendships and offered much familiar common ground; nor, once the settlement of 1926 was loyally accepted, was there any substantial clash of interest. The rehabilitation of trans-frontier trade and communications was, however, a slow process in the disturbed condition of eastern Turkey.

The standing Frontier Commission was first convened in the autumn of 1926, and thenceforward met six-monthly in great amity for some years; later meetings were infrequent, since there was little to be done. A joint Delimitation Committee, under a Swiss president, worked for six months in 1927 and, with its careful mapping and its hundred concrete boundary pillars implanted, produced acceptable results. Ministers were exchanged between Baghdad and Ankara; the genial Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, early among these, died in the Turkish capital. The trans-frontier raiding of Kurdish tribes, the safety-seeking manœuvres of Simko (whose type of, and fortunes in, Kurdish nationalism matched those of Shaykh Maḥmud), the incursion of Turkish tribal subjects in search of refuge in 'Iraq's most inaccessible corners: none of these affected Turco-'Iraqi goodwill, nor disturbed what passed for security in central Kurdistan. The King and Ministers visited the Turkish capital in state in July 1931, escorted by his own Air Force; and early in 1932 Nuri Pasha revisited it for the signing of Turco-'Iraqi treaties of Residence, Commerce, and Extradition. The Amir Zayd accepted the post of 'Iraqi Minister to Turkey and stayed there for some years.

'Iraqi-Syrian relations were on two levels: those of neighbouring Arab countries, and those of the French and British Mandataries. The latter had much improved since the strains and ill-feeling of the period from 1918 to 1921; common interests in the carriage of mails, desert security, extradition, transport and transit, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

I. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had 000 travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. 648x It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous 311 territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average 181 of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience 642 or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: 182 the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too 563 ● favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in 795 which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

182 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development,
● 563 and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and out-
795 standing differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses
511 were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

arrived in London on 20 June accompanied by three ministers, 643 Yasin Pasha, Nuri Saʿid, and Rustum Ḥaydar. The visit was completely successful. The King, after his stay at Buckingham Palace, visited Scotland and Devonshire, then spent some days in London and some in Switzerland. But his health appeared to be seriously affected by the strains of the last twenty years, and he would willingly have rested for a further period in Europe, had not grave events recalled him urgently to Baghdad.

These events arose from the small, alien, unhappy Assyrian 563 community of whose dilemma and attempted settlement much has 657 been said in these pages. The Mar Shamʿun, who spent the last six months of 1932 at Geneva but could accomplish nothing, returned in January 1933 to his restless and divided flock. Assyrian Levy officers, notably Yaqu son of Ismaʿil, had conducted a strong campaign in the Mar Shamʿun's favour in the Dohuk–ʿAmadiya area. The ʿIraqi authorities had, on the contrary, weakened his prestige by their strict limitation of his powers to the spiritual field, and their treatment of Assyrians as normal members of the public. A strong anti-Patriarchal faction led by a Malik Khoshaba, with bishops and other Maliks, had secured the appointment of Khoshaba himself as President of the Advisory Committee for land settlement. The Mar Shamʿun on his return, with his position weakened and all prospect of national migration or local consolidation dissipated, assumed an attitude of total refusal to co-operate with the Government-sponsored settlement, to conduct which the expected 'foreign expert', Major Thompson, arrived in Mosul in May 1933. The Patriarch, not content with spreading false suggestions regarding the settlement itself, threatened excommunication to any Assyrian who might participate in it; he was ready, some observers could not but feel, to sacrifice the interests of the community to the claims of his personal or hierarchical ambitions and resentments. In Mosul city Muslim-Assyrian feeling showed no improvement. An incident of stone-throwing at the windows of ʿIraqi Army officers was attributed to the Assyrians.

The Minister of Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, at this point wisely invited the Mar Shamʿun to Baghdad, hoping for a personal understanding. But the antagonism was irremovable. The Minister, intelligibly if perhaps on the broadest view needlessly, bade his visitor surrender all claims to temporal power, even in the form urged by the Patriarch, which was that of adherence to the 'traditional customs of his people'. The Mar Shamʿun addressed a letter full of complaints to the King on the eve of his departure for Europe, accusing both ʿIraqis and British of persecution. Three weeks of vain conversations and waiting ended with irritation on both sides and the order of Ḥikmat Sulayman on 24 June that the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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Patriarch should not leave Baghdad until further notice. He remained accordingly at the Y.M.C.A. hostel. Telegraphed directions from King Fayṣal in London on and after 19 June ('under British pressure', as Baghdad statesmen averred) bade his ministers pacify and release the prelate; but these were not merely set aside as being too clearly destructive of Government prestige, but aroused anger in Baghdad at so misplaced an intervention. The Ikhā Government was in fact already gaining credit even from its critics for firmness against the 'Assyrian menace'. Moderating suggestions for the removal of General Bakr Ṣidqi from the military command at Mosul had been refused. This officer, a harsh and ambitious egoist not destitute of some social and considerable military gifts, had long been bitterly anti-Assyrian and already saw himself, perhaps, as their authorized destroyer.

The situation in the Assyrian areas and in Mosul deteriorated as summer set in. Yaqu and his friends had for months been touring with a formidable armed party, flouting Government's authority and orders and urging non-cooperation with the Settlement. Only after the dispatch of 'Iraqi troops to posts in the Dohuk area, with the object of assuring order and discouraging Yaqu, was it possible for Lieutenant-Colonel Stafford, the Administrative Inspector of Mosul liwā (and subsequent historian of these events) to make contact with Yaqu and with friendly firmness bring him to Mosul. News of this submission was telegraphed to the King in London, who again suggested the release of the Mar Sham'un, to be again refused. Yaqu's submission, however hesitating and insincere, was clinched at Mosul by a written promise to desist from agitation. This was followed by a meeting on 10 July at which a full statement of the Assyrian position in 'Iraq, and the difficulties which confronted their emigration from it, was made to them by the acting Mutaṣarrif and by Stafford. The next day all was cordiality between Government representatives and those of the party opposed to the Mar Sham'un. The latter's following, to whom the reasons for his detention in Baghdad were patiently re-explained, agreed to send spokesmen to visit him there. They left Mosul, Yaqu and Luqo among them.

They proceeded, however, not as expected to Baghdad but forthwith across the Tigris into Syria, there to demand permission to enter from the French officer at 'Ayn Diwar post; nor can it now be certainly established whether this decision was a sudden unpremeditated gesture of despair (as upholders of the Assyrians allege) or part of a plan inspired by, or at least known to, either the Mar Sham'un (who denied it) or his family in Mosul. Without waiting for permission, for which the frontier officer telegraphed to Beirut, the impetuous leaders sent word back to their villages alleging, with patent falsity, that the French welcome to Syria had been cordial, land was available, taxes on crops would be remitted. The clansmen, to a number of some 1,000, leaving their homes and families unprotected—certain sign that no act of violence was at that time contemplated—swarmed across the river at Faysh Khabur and below it, at a point where frontier rectification was presently intended (p. 218) in accordance with the recent delimitation.

The news of these moves reached Mosul on 20 July. It was received with suspicion, not unmixed with hopes that riddance of the Assyrians was in sight. Reports of river crossings multiplied, and qadhā officials did nothing to check the welcome exodus. The Army command, who not unwillingly saw in these movements a menace by the redoubtable Assyrian fighting men, dispatched troops to the Tigris to watch events from forward posts, and to deal, by disarmament, with any parties who might return into 'Iraq.

A new phase opened with information, on 27 July, that the French were allowing no more Assyrians to enter: if indeed any had yet entered Syria, since the western river bank was at the moment still 'Iraqi territory, untransferred. They declined also to apply, as might have been possible and as the 'Iraqi Foreign Minister specifically requested from the French chargé d'affaires, the Syro-'Iraqi Frontier Agreement whereunder tribal immigrants would be disarmed and moved inland from the border. A meeting between French and 'Iraqi officers was held at Faysh Khabur on 26 July, another on 2 August. At the latter, the French officer declared that the Assyrians would not be accepted in Syria, and that 336 rifles had been taken from the 415 armed men who had approached the frontier; and he took note of the emphatic 'Iraqi request that no armed Assyrians should recross into 'Iraq or that, if recross they must, sufficient notice should be given to the 'Iraqi authorities. The failure to observe this agreement, due rather to inefficiency than to malice, was a main factor in the tragedy which followed, and caused much of the 'Iraqi bitterness against the French.

News of these events, represented as a dangerous movement, aroused violent anti-Assyrian and anti-Christian feeling in Baghdad. The Government, delighted to play the rôle of protector of 'Iraqi interests against a grave danger, did not minimize 'the menace', did not contradict whispers that Great Britain was behind this plot of their protégés, and let the public offer an indifferent welcome to the King as he returned alarmed and apprehensive from Europe on 2 August. He was to stay for a month in his capital, powerless to influence a position whose facts he never appreciated, and whose emotional violence swept all before it.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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During the first three days of August a few individual Assyrians recrossed the river to 'Iraq to surrender their arms after angry quarrelling with their too hopeful leaders. On the afternoon of the 4th considerable parties, to whom the French had restored their arms, began unannounced to recross, determined to regain their unguarded families. Animated by whatever disastrous folly or malice, some individuals from among them discharged shots at 'Iraqi troops whose pickets faced the river and who were prepared to receive the surrendered arms. The scale of the fighting increased as more of the excitable mountaineers hurried to the front; the Army replied with spirit and substantially held their positions; and a hotly contested combat continued all night and until long after sunrise. The losses of the Army were some thirty killed and forty wounded, those of the Assyrians about half these numbers. In the early morning some 200 of the Assyrians made for the hills in small parties, seeking their homes; the rest with Yaqu and Luqo again crossed to the Syrian side where they were bombed by the 'Iraqi Air Force and, to a number of 533, were interned by the French. The broken stragglers together with villagers and wayfarers on the left bank were rounded up over a wide area and shot by the Army out of hand.

At no time, it is certain, could any Assyrian movement, however widespread and determined, have in any degree threatened the 'Iraqi State; yet such was the feeling aroused by past rancours, by fear and present anger, and by stories (not, it is probable, all untrue) of Assyrian atrocities to the dead or captured, that the 'Iraq Army launched from this point onwards a campaign of singular truculence. It was accompanied by a wave of unprecedented bitterness against the British. Anti-Assyrian measures taken during the following days included the hasty arming of Kurdish irregulars, the search of all roads and tracks for stray Assyrians who were shot at sight, the raising of a force of supernumerary police, and the terrorization by the Army of civil officials who might attempt (as some did) to interfere. The Minister of Defence, Jalal Baban, and the Director-General of Police, Ṣubiḥ Najib, on a flying visit on the 7th showed their zeal by projects to arm and inflame the Kurds against the Christians. Patrols of the R.I.A.F. vied with each other in reports of 'dangerous concentrations' of the now terrified Assyrian villagers. 'Iraq Army troops in Dohuk and Zakho massacred in cold blood not fewer than 100 Christian peasants in those villages. The Kurdish and Arab tribes—of the Kurds, the Sindi, Quli, Sulayvani: of the Arabs, the Jubur, Shammar, Ḥadidiyin—and parties of Yazidis were allowed to understand that the Assyrian settlements would not be protected; and looting, wholesale and unchecked, stripped and ruined almost

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

all their villages in Dohuk, Shaykhan, and Zakho qadhās. Those in 563
the qadhās of 'Amadiya, 'Aqra, Zibar, and Rawanduz, where the 721
civil Government could maintain its powers, were unmolested. Refugees, penniless and hungry, poured into Mosul and into the large central villages of Al Qush and Simayl (Simmel).

The Minister of the Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, toured the affected areas from 11–15 August. He became aware that the immediate requirement of policy was not to continue the current butcheries and lootings but to conceal from the world the truth, which with horror he learnt for the first time; for he had visited Simayl. Here, from 8–11 August, Assyrians belonging to the village and from outside it had clustered for safety round the police station, disarmed but solemnly reassured by the sergeant. Their terror increased when tribesmen were allowed unchecked to enter and loot their homes, their priest was removed, and their Arab fellow villagers moved out with the flocks. On the morning of 11 August, a motor machine-gun company of the 'Iraq Army entered the village in good order under its officers, and proceeded methodically to the massacre of every man in the village. The work was complete by early afternoon, and the troops withdrew in their vehicles. They returned next day to bury the dead, some 315 in number, including 4 women and 6 children.

It is not doubtful that this operation, revolting in its senseless cruelty, was planned and ordered by the Commanding General, Bakr Ṣidqi Pasha, though he had arranged himself to be absent in Mosul on that day. He intended, it was believed, a similar exploit at Al Qush, but was dissuaded. The 'Iraqi official account of the Simayl massacre as the work of tribesmen is contrary to the facts.

The historian has neither need nor wish to pass judgement upon 563
the series of events—not without their parallels, of St. Bartholomew or Glencoe—which began with the foolish and provocative manœuvres of, or indeed the actual attack launched by, Assyrian fanatics and ended with the shocking climax of the Simayl massacre. With their motives of folly, falsehood, hatred, and brutality they show humanity at its lowest. The attitude of the 'Iraqi authorities, central and local, to the Assyrian problem and people had been up to 4 August forbearing and indeed generous: the conduct of the 'Iraq Army thereafter was, in its sustained brutality, beyond defence. These actions were in large part concealed from the public, who were instead deceived by stories of widespread Assyrian rebellion, the gallantry of 'Iraqi troops, and the treacherous designs of Great Britain. This must explain the failure by Government or the public to give expression to any feeling of regret more forthright than the half-excuses of Yasin

Pasha at Geneva, or to any condemnation of the guilty officers. These were, on the contrary, fêted and promoted amid acclamation. The Mar Sham'un, on his side, was successful in disseminating an almost equally false picture of the Assyrian part and of his own misleading of his community; he sustained with complete success in Europe and America the part of an injured martyr.

As the storm passed gradually from the Mosul hills, troops withdrew and the villagers counted their dead and surveyed their ruined homes, a camp was opened at Government expense at Mosul for the destitute—strange reversion to the conditions of Ba'quba in 1919! Hundreds of Assyrian Levy dependants were transported to their lines at Hinaydi. Mosul filled with unemployed and unemployable refugees. Restoration of the villages was slow, the fields unsown, the population cowed and spiritless. Official orders for restoration of the loot by tribesmen were almost wholly ignored, promised compensation was never forthcoming. The rift between the Assyrians and the 'Iraq Government was complete; hatred and distrust had triumphed. In Mosul anti-Assyrian popular feeling was rabid, and leading members of the now terrified community, including the father, brother, and aunt of the Mar Sham'un, were deported from the town. Fantastic rumours of impending British or French action were believed, and the press surpassed all previous exploits. The Amir Ghazi, visiting the town on 27 August, was hailed enthusiastically by the exponents of an anti-British bitterness without precedent. In the Kirkuk oilfield there was tension but no demonstrations; at Bayji some anti-Assyrian rioting cost lives and property. The political public of central and southern 'Iraq, fed on stories of rebellion gallantly mastered, raged against the British and the expectation that they would intervene on their protégés' behalf. The Army soared heavenward in popular enthusiasm, its units and commanders returning to Baghdad were accorded the welcome of war-scarred heroes. The ministers indeed, rescued by this unifying enthusiasm from serious trouble on the Euphrates, dared adopt no other policy. The King, whose intervention on behalf of the Mar Sham'un in July was not forgiven, and from whom much of the ugly truth was concealed, found himself almost ignored amid the plaudits for his son and the generals; he returned, ill and dispirited, on 2 September to Europe for medical treatment.

The Mar Sham'un, whose personal safety in Baghdad could no longer be assured and was indeed hourly threatened, was removed to security in Cyprus by the Royal Air Force, to be there joined by his family. The 'Iraq Government granted him a monthly living-allowance on the condition of abstention from further provocative politics, a condition which he contravened from the first hour of accepting it. From Cyprus he continued to bombard the League of Nations with petitions. 563

The return of Sir Francis Humphrys to Baghdad on 23 August, with the realization that no British pro-Assyrian intervention was imminent, gave some relief, not least to the uneasy but defiant Cabinet. The tension and emotion of mid-August gradually died down. Then, on 8 September, the news reached Baghdad that King Fayṣal, with King 'Ali, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Ḥaydar at his bedside, had died suddenly of heart failure at Berne. 643

3. THE HASHIMI MINISTRY

The shock of this irreparable loss, dramatically sudden and coinciding with a wave of ungrateful depreciation, transformed public opinion in an hour. The late King regained, and deservedly, all his place in 'Iraqi esteem: esteem which was indicated, on the arrival of his body from Trieste and Haifa on 14 September, by a funeral without precedent in 'Iraq in its expression of nation-wide grief. His services had indeed been beyond price to the State of which he was both the spirit and the embodiment; and in days to come they were to prove irreplaceable. None could take his place as balancer of forces, nor preserve his equal relations with his own extremists and with the British, with town intelligentsia and with wild tribesmen; none could control, by personal prestige, the ruling class and its factious ministers. Many of the troubles of the period from 1933 to 1941 would, it may be, have been avoided if his wisdom and experience had been spared to the 'Iraq State for those years.

The heir apparent, succeeding to the throne as Ghazi I, swore his oath of office, exchanged telegrams with King George V, and received the resignation of the Cabinet. He was twenty-one. Active, warmly patriotic, and not unamiable, he was popular with the public and with the young 'Iraqi officers with whom, after an unsuccessful period at Harrow, he had been educated; but his lack of intellectual equipment and of interest in public affairs, and his devotion to pleasure and to sport, forbade the hope that he would prove adequate to the royal functions in 'Iraq.

Rashid 'Āli Gaylani, reinstated as Premier without change of ministers, could profit by the Sunni–Shi'i peace which, following the Assyrian crisis, had descended upon the Euphrates, and from the return of Anglo-'Iraqi relations to normal after the savage press attacks and public demonstrations of August. But, whatever his past commitments, he could not now do other than reaffirm 'Fayṣal's policy', which was that of the Treaty and friendship with Great Britain. Abu al-Timman's Nationalist Party, persistent even in these circumstances, issued on the third day of the new reign 645*

652 these to any party other than the 'Iraq Government itself. A much less favourable offer, of a loan of £1 million only, was the result. It was duly negotiated, but neither the Government nor the British lenders escaped criticism. This was 'Iraq's first self-incurred external debt.

*645 The presence of forces hostile to the régime did not materially interfere with an Administration equal in quality to its predecessors but, in disappointment of early hopes, not superior to them. In foreign affairs and in some internal developments, which later
● 563 pages will describe, some progress was made. But to one problem
648* no approach to a solution appeared—that of the Assyrians. Their case, after the massacre of August 1933, had been hurried on to the agenda of the League Council by the Mar Sham'un's telegrams from Cyprus; and in October the 'Iraq Government, through the mouth of Yasin Pasha, offered a disarming admission of 'unjustifiable severity' by the Army and regrettable tribal looting. He pleaded for a fresh start for the Assyrians—in another country! The British attitude, disappointing to the more fervid partisans of the Assyrians, was determined by the desire to preserve and support the independent 'Iraq State: by realization of the grave consequences of any physical intervention, to which anyhow British opinion could never be reconciled: and by awareness that the faults were far from being all on one side. The Council agreed, accordingly, that a Committee of six, composed of representatives of Great Britain, Italy, France, Denmark, Mexico, and Spain, should by every means seek alternative accommodation, somewhere in the world, for the Assyrian community.

This Committee's attempts were immediate and vigorous, but sadly unsuccessful. A project for settlement in Brazil seemed promising, but fell to the ground when the Brazilian Government reversed its welcoming attitude. A British plan for settlement in Guiana, and a French project for the banks of the Niger, came equally to nothing after League missions, with Brigadier Browne, had visited the territories. By the end of 1934 no progress had been made.

563 In 'Iraq their resettlement on the land proceeded with weary
657 slowness in spite of Government encouragement and the offer of a house-by-house subsidy. The great majority of the community favoured withdrawal from 'Iraq; and false hopes of this were kept alive by the Mar Sham'un's partisans, while the anti-Patriarchal party declared roundly that they would never settle in the same territory as the Mar Sham'un and his following. The camp at Mosul was, with increasing reluctance, kept in existence at Government expense, but was reduced by encouraged departures; its inmates fell from 1,250 to 650 during 1934. More hopeful was

the French reception in Syria of the families of the 550 Assyrians 563 interned there since August 1933. Aided by a grant of money from 657 'Iraq, these women and children joined their men on the upper Khabur in September 1934 to a number of over 1,500. Movement from the Mosul camp and streets to the Khabur continued in 1935 to a number of some 1,500, and a more grandiose scheme for a large-scale settlement in the Ghab lands on the Orontes in Syria was formulated by the League Committee. A project for its finances, with 'Iraq and Great Britain as main contributors, was established and a Trustee Board appointed. In 1936 an immediate transfer of 15,000 Assyrians was planned, which would dispose of almost the whole remaining community except those native to 'Iraq; but the difficulties of the Ghab project were found insurmountable, and its abandonment made possible a move only of smaller numbers, 2,500 in all, to the Khabur settlements. No further progress was made under the Ḥikmat–Ṣidqi régime, and the permanence of the Assyrian remnant in 'Iraq was perforce accepted. Their economic rehabilitation was by now fairly advanced, and their final adaptation to 'Iraqi conditions and citizenship could be hoped.

The event which caused the fall of the Sulaymani Ministry after 645* less than nine months of uneasy life was due neither to constitutional procedures, which rarely operated to change Governments in 'Iraq, nor to any grouping of the Opposition forces. Its origin lay in rancour within the Army itself, where careers had been ruined and malevolence excited by the abused omnipotence of Bakr. The bodyguard by which at all times he went surrounded 669 had saved him from previous attempts on his life during 1937; but when on 8 August, *en route* for a visit to Turkish manœuvres, he waited on the Mosul airport, his murderers, by whomever instructed, could carry out one of the alternative plans prepared. He was shot dead at point-blank range by an 'Iraqi soldier, and his companion Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, chief of the R.I.A.F., lived but a minute longer.

The bodies were taken to Baghdad and buried with full military honours. Little regret, but rather the almost unanimous relief of public and press, accompanied the General to his grave: not unjustly, since the pages of 'Iraq history which he had written were in all ways deplorable. In Mosul the Military Commander, General Amin al-'Umari, arrested the murderer, cordoned the airport, and assumed sole charge of the city. Ordered by Baghdad to arrest further named individuals as accomplices, he at first complied, then realized the dangerous possibilities of a general purge of Bakr's known opponents. Six days after the murder he took the grave step of publishing a proclamation in which he

646 665 The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

566 Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qaḍhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qaḍhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of [668] Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

701 Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

563 The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to 563 whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which 439 had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Produce 435 prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent, and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was 471 awarded by the Basra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs. Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil refinery. A concession for the oil of Basra wilaya—more strictly, of all 'Iraq territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—was granted in 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc* creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a [453] branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited 647 for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience, J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in 1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from the Financial Advisership in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on 648× bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial treaty was signed with the United States, though American Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman. Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary. The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

5. KURDISH ALARMS

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During the bad days of 1941 and throughout 1942 the Kurds did nothing to add to the anxieties of Government, though close observers were aware of the lack of loyalty, sometimes of scornful dislike, still felt towards Baghdad in the Kurdish mountains. Since nothing would induce them to forget their un-Arab distinctness and racial pride, the preservation of peaceful administration would depend, it seemed, on minimizing friction, on ensuring for the Kurds a maximum of sympathetic discrimination, and on the power to strike effectively at need. Nothing occurred to simplify dealing with this greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, and the near presence of a disturbing influence in north-west Persia was to prove an added embarrassment.

Shaykh Maḥmud, whose foolish movement of defiance continued even after the restoration of the lawful Regent and constitutional government, had been allowed to live in one of his own villages. In Persian Kurdistan the Anglo-Russian invasion of Persia in that year led to collapse of the central authority; and the vacuum of power was soon filled by the self-appointment of Kurdish chiefs to local rule, with the enforced acquiescence of Teheran. Among many old unwanted trouble-makers who returned from exile was Ḥama Rashid Khan, an 'Iraqi by birth but now claiming dual nationality; he achieved a brief independence at Saqiz until 1942 when he was driven out, re-crossed to 'Iraq, and submitted to detention at Kirkuk. Approaches from Persian Kurdish leaders to the British Embassy in Baghdad for inclusion in a 'British Zone' were (as so often before) refused, to the bewilderment of the chieftains, who found incomprehensible the British support of Persian or 'Iraqi Governments; but after some months the endless squabbles among the Aghās enabled Persian troops to re-enter most of the towns, assert some sort of authority, and drive a number of leaders into 'Iraq. Mahabad (Ṣawj Bulaq) alone the Persians failed to enter, and it became the centre of an all-Kurdish enclave. A vigorous Kurdish society, the Jiyana Kurd or Kurdish Resurrection (called also simply the Komalla Kurd), was formed in Mahabad, and its publication, the *Nishtman* (Homeland) magazine, reached 'Iraq. Similar clubs were founded in the northern liwās, and the Kurdish intelligentsia had formed a Hewa (Hope) Society, later to be joined or superseded by a Rezgari (Rescue) Group, insistent on 'national rights' against all oppressors.

No overt trouble, however, arose for a time, and the Barzani leaders, Shaykh Aḥmad and his younger brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, who were living on allowances away from their homes, gave no offence until the midsummer of 1943. In that month Mullā

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Muṣṭafā, always unbalanced and now inflamed by new grievances at the cost of living, escaped from Sulaymaniya, regained Barzan, and raised a force to join that of a Turkish-Kurdish outlaw, Sa'id Birokhi. The latter was captured by a Turkish column, but the Mullā, waxing in strength, successfully attacked Government posts and carried out profitable raids. A message from Nuri Pasha, conveyed through the still detained Shaykh Aḥmad, urged him to surrender. He refused, flouted all authority, and tampered with the loyalty of Kurdish officers of the Army. A column of the latter, accompanied by the Chief of Staff, left Margasur to deal with the rebels, but poor leadership and many desertions led to ignominious failure, and a column of Indian troops occupied Diyana as a precaution against further loss. The Government, forced now to prefer negotiations to force, offered Mullā Muṣṭafā the chance to cross into Persia, or to live with the Pishdar; he declined both offers, again demanded 'Kurdish rights', and was warned by the British Ambassador (to whom as usual he appealed) that British support would be given not to him but to the Government he was offending.

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A visit in January 1944 by the Kurdish Minister without portfolio, Mājid Muṣṭafā, was successful in restoring some sort of relations, and the Mullā was claimed in Baghdad communiqués to have 'submitted unconditionally to the Regent'. Thereafter, Mājid Muṣṭafā toured the Kurdish area, removed unpopular officials, arranged for a distribution of barley, and installed an able Kurdish General and graduate of the British Staff College, Baha al-Din Nuri, as Mutaṣarrif of Sulaymaniya.

But a policy of sympathy in the Kurdish liwās, supported generally by the Premier, was opposed by some of his colleagues; the undertakings given to the Mullā were likely to be lost in delays and evasions, and the Barzani leader in his frustration again demanded British intervention. The last ministerial tour of Nuri Pasha, in May 1944, was to Kurdistan, where threats of renewed trouble were now persistent and Kurdish-Arab feeling ran high in the Army. He proposed the establishment of an all-Kurdish liwā formed from the Kurdish qadhās of Mosul, and the appointment of officials to it by the Kurdish representative minister in the Cabinet; he added the offer of a Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Education, the improvement of social services in the north, the grant of agricultural loans, and reconsideration of the unpopular tobacco monopoly. But his Cabinet colleagues refused to support him, the plan for the liwā of Dohuk was unacceptable to the Regent, and the Sa'idi Ministry fell amid doubt and disunity. The anti-Kurdish feeling in much of the Baghdad political world had again prevailed: it was based, as ever, on the fear of separatism,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 on the certainty that indulgence in the north would be followed by
668 equal or greater Shi'i demands, and on the crudely selfish ambitions of the Kurdish leaders. The Kurds were, moreover, represented in the Cabinet only by individuals long denationalized, and in the Chamber by deputies selected for their tractability.

The Pachachi Ministry did little to honour the undertakings of Nuri Pasha, though the Prime Minister and Arshad approved them against the opposition of Muṣṭafā al-'Umari and Taḥsin 'Ali. Baha al-Din was removed from Sulaymaniya; but after a meeting of Kurdish leaders there in July 1944, the Cabinet sent up two Kurdish Mutaṣarrifs to take charge of that liwā and Arbil, and dispatched the Minister of Economics, Tawfiq Wahbi, on a goodwill mission in Kurdistan. He was forced to realize the extent of ill will towards Baghdad, and found that Barzani power had redoubled by a recent marriage alliance with Zibar. On the Minister's departure Mullā Muṣṭafā helped himself to Government grain stores, looted police posts, conducted a futile correspondence with the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, and demanded from Baghdad the fulfilment of Nuri Pasha's promises—and a loan for himself. In November, four 'Iraqis were dropped in Mosul liwā by parachute from a German plane; two were captured, two escaped. The year closed with uneasiness at the likely prospect of another Kurdish campaign, this time in midwinter: a blow which the Government attempted to forestall by free distributions of grain and cloth.

These fears proved in part groundless. Peace was outwardly undisturbed throughout the winter of 1944–5, though Kurdish restless dissatisfaction and the increase of Russian influence precluded confidence. A connexion between Kurdish nationalism—of the type favoured by the intelligentsia rather than that of the feudal leaders—and some type of Communism became more evident; two Kurdish-language Communist magazines, later combined into one (the *Azadi*, or Freedom), appeared in 'Iraq in 1934 produced, like *al-Qa'ida*, by the Communist Party; and some of the organizers, who included Army officers, were no doubt in touch with the Russians. The forms taken by both nationalism and Communism were various; *Azadi* was purely Communist and advocated a united front with the Arabs against reaction and feudalism, while the Persian or Adharbayjani *Nishtman* spoke for exclusive Kurdish unity and rights, and bade the feudal leaders modernize themselves.

563 In March 1945 an Amnesty Bill was placed before Parliament,
669 and passed with the reluctance of many deputies; it pardoned all Kurdish offenders up to February 1944, the date of the Mullā's submission. He himself visited Mosul, and was received there by

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 669 the Minister of the Interior; and Barzan area was transferred from Mosul liwā to Arbil. But the restless ambition of the Barzani was incorrigible. Alleging British support—a fantastic fiction believed by many both in Barzan and in Baghdad—he harried the valleys far beyond his own area, seized Government stores at Margasur, and occupied police posts. Forced to act, the Army advanced in September in three columns towards his fastnesses, while the R.I.A.F. bombed his followers and properties. A police column advanced from 'Amadiya, and the Turks aided by closing their frontier. The Army column from 'Aqra was soon in trouble and its line of retreat threatened. It was rescued, and the position restored, only by the success of the Minister of Interior in raising, for ready money, irregular tribal forces under such of the Barzani's neighbours as welcomed the chance to pay off old scores and be subsidized for doing it. Mullā Muṣṭafā and his army, hard pressed from every side, crossed now 2,000 strong into Persia, there to find ready welcome and support. He could now drink deep of Russian-sponsored Kurdish nationalism in its active centre at Mahabad: could consult with the ambitious Qadhi Muḥammad, leader of the movement, with open Russian support: and could concert plans with him and his Democratic Party for a Kurdish State astride the frontier, a State to be closely associated with the Adharbayjan Republic now similarly forming under the Russians at Tabriz. On 15 December 1945 a Kurdish People's Government was inaugurated at Mahabad by Qadhi Muḥammad in the honoured presence of Mullā Muṣṭafā and Soviet officers. A week later Qadhi Muḥammad was elected President, a Parliament was formed, and the Mullā with other supporting tribal leaders was promoted Field-Marshal and decked in full Russian uniform.

563 657 It was natural that Baghdad's request for the disarming and extradition of its rebel subjects should be unheeded. But at least the campaign was over and the enemy, by whatever means, dispersed; the Army could be thanked for its efforts and decorated by the Regent, while the Prime Minister himself toured the north. All efforts were made to re-establish administration and show goodwill by the early erection of schools, dispensaries, and police posts. A court martial was convened at Arbil for the trial of Barzani rebels, and summoned more than a hundred, including Mullā Muṣṭafā and Shaykh Aḥmad, to appear before it. The two brothers and thirty of their followers, including three Army officers, were condemned to death in absence, and seventy more to life imprisonment.

563 Though a period of peace followed, no part of the Kurdish problem had been solved. With their social structure, ideas of 'Government', and feudal leadership, any early prospect of a real national autonomy must be fanciful, unless total anarchy be

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 tolerated; but much, it seemed, could yet be gained in goodwill, and thereby in tranquillity, by a greater sympathy in Baghdad for Kurdish prejudices and their more innocuous demands. But the policy of the Cabinet seemed, on the contrary, to be one of assimilation and claimed obedience: the attitude of the C.U.P. to the Arab territories a generation earlier! The Kurds, reached now by waves of suitably adapted Communist-Nationalist propaganda from north-west Persia, and unhappy as ever in their subjection to an Arab Government, represented a profoundly unsatisfactory and even a menacing element in the national life.

6. THE ARAB LEAGUE

648* The connexion between 'Iraq and Persia was, throughout the war, less one of peoples or of Governments than of military forces and communications common to both. For the vast Paiforce traffic of men and supplies, the Perso-'Iraqi frontier did not exist; the two territories formed a single unit for defence and for affording access to the Russian forces. Contact between the States and peoples was restricted by limited movement, communications almost monopolized by military needs, and diminished pilgrimages: only in north-eastern 'Iraq the Kurdish cross-frontier movements brought subjects of the two countries closely together. A futile gesture of revolution in Khuzistan in 1943, by a son of the deposed Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, was easily quelled and its author brought back to Baṣra. The Sa'dabad Pact, under which there had been talk of action early in the war, was in fact inoperative, though it formed an official bond not only with Persia but with Turkey.

'Iraq's connexions with the latter were, as ever, close in the social and considerable in the commercial fields, but slight in the political. Frontier dealings were friendly, neighbourly co-operation frequent. Both desired to maintain trans-frontier trade in spite of wagon shortage on the railway and the dearth of goods, and a Turkish commercial mission visited Baghdad in 1945. Arab displeasure at the loss of Alexandretta in 1938 lessened with time. The presence of the Amir Zayd, with a Turkish wife, as Minister at Ankara, and the frequent visits to that capital and to Istanbul of 'Iraqi personalities, made for good relations. The Regent, whose impending marriage to a daughter of President Inünü was a picturesque if absurd rumour of 1945, visited Turkey more than once.

But the heart of the political world was engaged far more with its Arab sister-States. Contacts with Transjordan were slight but cordial, with exchange of royal and ministerial visits and a link of British military traffic. Towards Sa'udi Arabia, feeling was cool; the ruling houses were mutually repugnant, the Sa'udi conception of Arab Unity was not the 'Iraqi, and the safe refuge of Rashid 'Āli

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of 648×
an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand
late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab
nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep
troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to
refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government
for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte
proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government
while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully
rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it 722
was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this
régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the dis- 656
turbing hostilities between civil and military authorities continued,
and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a
battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local
general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with
Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in
Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street [668]
demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the
Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground
organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the
seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective 563
alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Com-
munism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish 579
separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to
endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an
uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration
of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and
the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes
were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 Mutaṣarrifs protested to the Minister of Interior at the military
579 reign of terror in their liwās and forced the resignation of the Minister of Defence, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam. The arrest of the Chief Rabbi and the conviction and hanging of a rich Jewish merchant, Shafiq Adis—but not of his Muslim associates—was disapproved by much of the public. The press was allowed full freedom to attack the British as having created all the troubles of Palestine as well as of ʿIraq: to call the oil companies truculently to account: and to assail with rage the well-reasoned pamphlet which Nuri Saʿid issued, on his return home at midsummer, in justification of the Portsmouth Treaty.

x645 The reinstatement of the Treaty supporters was, indeed, a feature of these months; Ṣaliḥ Jabr was welcomed back to Baghdad in July, Nuri could re-enter politics in the same summer, Shakir al-Wadi succeeded Baṣṣam as Minister of Defence in October, Jamali was sent as Minister to Cairo, and all were once again
665 candidates for high office by the end of the year. Party activity was limited by the abnormal conditions, and the National Democrat and the Liberal Parties, both handicapped by shortage of funds, complained of undue restriction and ceased active operation in December. The Independence Party remained vigorous. A series
x645 of Cabinet changes was made in October, after months in which portfolios passed from hand to hand among acting ministers. Shakir al-Wadi came to Defence, ʿUmar Nadhmi to Interior, and ʿAli Jawdat from Washington to Foreign Affairs. Muḥammad al-Sayhud, Amir al-Rabiʿa, rejoined the Cabinet as minister without portfolio, and Muṣṭafā al-ʿUmari, who while under medical treatment in London gave up his post at Interior but remained in the Cabinet, resigned a month later. ʿAli Mumtaz, resigning from Finance in November, was replaced after an interval by the experienced Director-General of Customs, Khalil Ismaʿil, and ʿAbd al-Wahhab Mirjan on becoming President of the Chamber was succeeded at Economics by ʿAli Ḥaydar Sulayman, the Minister of Social Affairs. Najib al-Rawi, Minister of Education and ʿIraqi representative at Lake Success, returned home. The Speech from the Throne on 1 December, when Parliament met, was politically colourless.

The Pachachi Ministry, clearly unable to master its manifold problems, survived the last weeks of 1948 only by the support of the Portsmouth Treaty-makers, Nuri Saʿid and Ṣaliḥ Jabr. Muzaḥim's favour of Egypt as the strongest Arab Power and his favourable response to interventionist demonstrations on 30 and 31 December clashed with Army views—indeed, with those of every realist—and created an impasse from which a change of Government was the only outlet. He resigned office on 6 January 1949.

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exchanged; and even this support had to be limited when, at the 648x League meeting in April, the member States indicted Jordan for alleged negotiations with the Jews. The task of justifying the incorporation of the Arab remainder of Palestine into the Jordan Kingdom (a step to which in practice no alternative appeared) was difficult to reconcile with the desirability of placating Egypt. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the League meeting in April voted for a resolution declaring Palestine to be a 'trust territory of the whole League', and in May for another which declared Jordan's act of unification a breach of the principle thus established. He then with difficulty secured postponement of the decision to expel the Hashimite Kingdom, and succeeded in substituting a compromise formula acceptable to all save Jordan herself, asserting that Palestine should, after complete liberation, be disposed of by a collective decision of the League.

Disunity was not less evident in connexion with the Collective Security Pact proposed by Egypt in 1949. The Pact was not for many months accepted by 'Iraq, whose spokesmen saw little value in an agreement which did not include Jordan; but this clash of views, unresolved by the end of 1950, did not prevent the 'Iraqi Premier from offering his verbal support to Egypt in her current diplomatic struggle with Britain. With Israel the successive Governments in Baghdad continued to refuse all negotiation; and the Cabinet, with the implacable politicians of other States, professed to see a new threat of 'imperialism' in the would-be sedative declaration of Britain, the United States, and France on 25 May that they were opposed to the use of aggressive force by any Middle Eastern State, including Israel, and would supply thenceforward only the armaments necessary to each country's defence. The declaration was accepted by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with reserves which he was at pains to indicate to the British and American Ambassadors.

The year 1950 was peaceful in Kurdistan. There was no sign of 563 Mullā (or Marshal) Muṣṭafā's return, though the wireless campaign from the Soviet Armenian 'Post of the Kurdish Democratic Party' persisted; and 'Iraqi policy in Kurdistan, where Nuri Sa'id in conciliatory mood toured in September 1950, seemed to show increased sympathy with its wayward Kurdish subjects, and there were less frequent schoolboy outbursts in Sulaymaniya. In the Police the former Director-General, 'Alwan Ḥusayn, had resumed 625 command after an attempted coup (it was said) had led to the dismissal of 'Ali Khalid, and the force regained their discipline and prowess. The Army, still dissatisfied with the equipment provided 701 for it and with the fewness of cadet vacancies made available in England, tried genuinely to improve its efficiency, sought in vain

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

701 American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow
631 start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available.
665 Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when
668 they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

● 563 If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

eminent; and many who reached Palestine bitterly regretted their change of home. 563

An episode in the Chamber on 7 March, early in the Suwaydi 645 Ministry's life, led to the resignation—in despair, they said, of fair 665 parliamentary treatment—of the whole body of deputies opposed to Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party who in fact maintained the Ministry in power and dominated the Chamber. The gesture was regrettable as ending all pretence of government on party lines; but the sympathy accorded to the retiring members did not survive their own squabbles and evident lack of common purpose, and the elections held early in June to fill their places produced amenable members. No considerable Opposition elements remained thereafter in the Chamber, before which stretched a life of two or three more years. But within the Cabinet a tripartite balance of power was uneasily maintained between the Prime Minister, the supporters of Nuri Pasha (himself absent), and those of Ṣaliḥ Jabr; between the latter two statesmen the old cordiality was fast disappearing, and Ṣaliḥ Jabr's share in building the party itself was little remembered. The Prime Minister was by midsummer maintaining himself with difficulty; favourite projects of his own, such as a new press law, were frustrated by his colleagues. The absence of the Regent and of Nuri in London precluded a change of Ministry until the autumn, but on 12 September Suwaydi was forced to resign.

Four days later the formation of an eleventh Sa'idi Ministry was proclaimed. Even in the process of its establishment Nuri found something of Suwaydi's difficulty in reconciling personalities each in itself valuable; he could not use simultaneously both Tawfiq and Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and preferred for the moment to be content with a skeleton Cabinet which he proposed to strengthen and broaden as opportunity might offer into a real Ministry of National Union intended, as he announced, for urgent economic and administrative work. As it was, he kept the post of Interior in his own hands, combined Defence and Foreign Affairs under Shakir al-Wadi, Works and Finance under 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, and gave the Ministries of Justice, Education, Social Affairs, and Economics respectively to Ḥasan Sami Tatar, Khalil Kunna, Mājid Muṣṭafā, and Ḍhiya' Ja'far. But it became early apparent that the breach with the followers of Ṣaliḥ Jabr was widening; and the latter, in whom many observers recognized Nuri's ultimate successor, founded early in 1951 his own Socialist Party of the Nation, a group generally conservative (in spite of its singularly ill-chosen name) and, while largely personal to Ṣaliḥ, relying also on organized Shi'ism and seeking Kurdish support. The Iṣlaḥ Party of Sami Shawkat merged itself in the new group. At the same time

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by 161 Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanageable public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some 182 795 progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt—gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost [771] much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities.

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial— 563 within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—
692 a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included
697 a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

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[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 I that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
● 563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
648] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
439

000 of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

K
137 Kurdistan is a beautiful country. It is in the main well wooded, with scrub or stunted oak on the hillsides and poplars, walnuts and mulberries near the villages. Pines grow in two areas only and chinārs (planes) along the streams. Unfortunately, deforestation is proceeding apace, and unless immediate and drastic steps are taken by the 'Iraq Government, heavy soil erosion and a tremendous decrease in grazing facilities will take place. Few new walnut trees are to be found owing to a prevalent superstition that the planter of a walnut tree will die with the appearance of the first nuts. It might be supposed that the oldest inhabitants could be employed in planting, but apparently the grandfathers look askance at this suggestion!

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181 The Kurds are a virile and cheerful people. They have been called treacherous, and undoubtedly stories can be quoted in support of this accusation. Yet it must be remembered that the annals of our own Scottish highlands are by no means clean in this respect.

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342 In the summer the valleys of Kurdistan are, unfortunately, very malarial, and this is fostered by the cultivation of rice with its invariable accompaniment of mosquitoes. During this season most of the flock-owners move to their "zōzāns" or summer sheilings on the mountain tops, where, in shelters of oak branches, they pass the time pleasantly enough.

Christians

I
795 The Christians of the northern provinces are divided into numerous sects, several of which are relics of the old schismatic divisions of the Eastern Communion. They include Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics, who are under the control of Rome, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians and Seventh Day Adventists.

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● 563
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162 Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics and Jacobites are found in Mosul and many villages on the left bank of the Tigris. Chaldeans are also found in the Supna valley near Amadia and in one large village near Arbil. Seventh Day Adventists only flourish in Mosul. Many people in England know something of the Assyrians and their recent history. The Assyrians themselves claim to be descendants of the famous kingdom of Nineveh and are certainly semitic. The term "Assyrian" now includes ex-Ottoman members of the Nestorian Church who were domiciled either within what is now the 'Iraq state or who were ejected from Hakkari by the Turks during the Great War and refused

4a Wilson G-8 (no date) 1937 MH1 Iraq MH1
Yazidis MH 10

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readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects 795
belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their 167
Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the 649
Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace 563 ●
terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it 162
was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in 'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil, British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however, proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may [I
be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers 463]
of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks, etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are
shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, I
hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are 147
liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

The Yezidis

Y
The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This 101
is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. 776
They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock 779
Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the 871
lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is 771
incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education, save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Yazidis MH 10

The Yezidis in 'Iraq practically all dwell either in the Sinjār or I 162
Shaikhān districts. Each of these districts has a brass peacock and that Y
belonging to Shaikhān must never cross the Tigris. If it did so the
world would come to an end! Non-Yezidis cannot view the peacocks 101
or the other sacred emblems, which include the "shema'dan" or 778
candlestick and the "bairaqs" or banners. When not touring, all Y
emblems are kept at the residence of the *Mir* at Baa'dhra in Shaikhān, [793
though a few years ago the Sinjār Yezidis, who were at variance with 795
the *Mir*, seized their peacock and collected subscriptions on their I
account until compelled by Government to return it to its lawful 659]
keeper. Yezidis object strongly to the use of the word "Shaitān" Y
(Satan) or any word resembling it. Terms meaning "curse" are also 776
never used less Satan construes them as a tactless reminder of his fall. 784

Owing to these difficulties and restrictions, Yezidis are not "good Y
mixers" and rarely enter Government service. A few were formerly 186
employed by the British Government in the transport company of the 463
'Iraq Levies, but did not prove very satisfactory. Occasionally they 669
have enlisted in the 'Iraq army, but an attempt to apply a light measure I 563
of conscription to the Sinjār Yezidis resulted in an armed revolt by 781 702
five villages. This necessitated punitive action with, unfortunately, 669
heavy casualties on both sides. The Yezidis speak a form of Kurdish, Y [197]
but many also know Arabic. Ain Sifni or Ain-i-Safina (Spring of the 174
Boat) is the chief market town of the Shaikhān Yezidis. It derives its 438
name from a tradition that the Ark touched ground there.

Yezidis are to be found outside 'Iraq in the Caucasus and also a Y
few thousand north of Aleppo. 101

It is difficult to believe that this curious religion can long survive Y
in 'Iraq under present-day conditions. The *Mir* is unpopular and 793
there is no better successor amongst his in-bred and degenerate relatives. 774
The Yezidis have recently refused to yield him many of his 578
former rights and have severely criticised his squandering of the religious
revenues. Most of the members of the hierarchy have concentrated
their energies on trying to divert funds to their own pockets and
have quarrelled furiously. A certain number of stalwarts have defied Y
the priests and attended schools. In the Sinjār prior to the Great War 771
religious pressure induced a considerable number of Yezidis to adopt [871]
Islam, and it is within the bounds of possibility that ere long there 797
may be a regular landslide to either the Christian or Islamic faith or
both.

Levantine
Jews MF'

Jews

J The Jews in 'Iraq are said to be the descendants of those taken
174 captive by Nebuchadnezzar and brought to Babylon, where they were
employed on the rebuilding of that city and on the upkeep of the
canals on which its wealth depended.

J In Mosul till recently the Jewish standard of education was lament-
871 ably low and their religious observances entirely out of keeping with
176 those of modern Jewry. Even there, however, an astute Jewish brain
784 invented an instrument controlled by clockwork to turn on and off
403 electric switches at fixed hours and so avoid the sin of making fire on
the Sabbath.

J The very generous Jewish philanthropist Sir Elly Khaduri, has in
871 recent years provided funds to build excellent schools for the community, and it is hoped that a great improvement in the education of the Jewish children will result.

I 162 In Kurdistan, Jews of whom many are weavers are found in all the
563 J small towns and also in many otherwise purely Kurdish villages,
286 101 where they live in perfect amity with their Muslim neighbours. In
142 463 dress they are practically indistinguishable from the Kurds but easily
J recognizable by their facial features. In the most remote mountain
101 areas Jewish villages exist the inhabitants of which are cultivators and
463 possess vineyards and orchards. The reason for the survival of these
631 villages in the lawless past is that they and their inhabitants were the property of powerful Kurdish Aghas who were strong to protect their serfs as they would have protected their sheep, cattle or mules. Throughout Kurdistan the ubiquitous itinerant Jewish pedlar may be met who, quite unarmed, is surprisingly immune from molestation.
J 181 The Jews of northern 'Iraq are not at all interested in Zionism and
186 form a very useful, law-abiding, hard-working section of the population.

I 162 It is difficult, if not impossible, within the compass of a short
I 563 lecture, to give an adequate description of the curious elements who
657 make up the attractive mosaic of northern 'Iraq. In the not very distant past the 'Iraq Government has incurred, and rightly incurred, strong criticism of its treatment of some of the peoples who go to make up this mosaic. It should be realized, however, that the administration of the Mosul and Arbil provinces and the solution of the diverse and difficult problems they present is a matter which might well test the skill and patience of any government, even if far more experienced than that of the new state of 'Iraq.

DISCUSSION

MRS. SOANE-ELLIS: Might I ask if the lecturer has any information as to the whereabouts of Sheikh Mahmud? The last time I saw him he was a prisoner at Ramadi. 000

Major WILSON: I cannot say whether he is exactly a prisoner now, but he certainly would not be allowed to go back to Sulaimaniyyeh.

Brigadier J. G. BROWNE: May I ask what is the position of the Pizhder Kurds under the present Government? 657 563

Major WILSON: There has been a slight extension of police control, but, as far as I know, real administration has not yet been established over the Pizhder.

The CHAIRMAN: It remains, I think, only for me to sum up what we have learnt. We see here again the extraordinary importance of the question of roads in establishing the authority of the Government among mountain peoples. We are building roads on the North-West Frontier of India. And here we have seen the roads that are being built through Kurdistan, like Mr. Hamilton's very fine achievement, the making of the road through the Rowanduz Gorge. I believe the account of the building of that road is going to be published shortly, and it should make a book well worth reading. 653 657

We have seen some extraordinarily interesting slides. And we have learnt some valuable information about the present position of the Assyrians. From what the lecturer says, the best plan now would appear to be rather to leave them alone where they are. The other plan was to have been to move them to an extremely suitable site on the Orontes River. But unfortunately the lands chosen had been sequestrated from their original owner, who had been in trouble. When M. Blum came into office, he decided he could deal with this case, reinstated the man in question, and restored his lands. So that scheme necessarily came to nothing, and it is quite impossible on other grounds now for the Assyrians to go there. But one gathers that it is wisest not to agitate on their behalf, nor to stir them up, for that only makes them very unpopular in the country. They are finding employment to some extent in the oil-fields, and as guards and station masters on the railways and in similar employment, and one can hope things may settle down and that they will stay in their own country. 186 463

We must thank our lecturer, not only for the good work he has obviously done in 'Iraq, but also for the excellent and informative lecture he has given us this evening. 000

647 As a result, officials, even those nominally responsible, have tended to become mere head clerks in their own departments, while Ministers have found themselves overburdened with work. The British Advisers, especially before October, 1932, were able to assist in reducing the burden of the Ministers but elsewhere the administration was retarded in pace and was lowered in quality.

[563] Among officials belonging to minority communities, as the Jews and Christians, the lack of security and the desire to avoid responsibility has been doubly apparent as the result of widespread opposition to the employment of any but 'Iraqis professing Islam. This opposition was evinced as early as 1921, when Jews and Christians were included in the outcry against the employment of foreigners. Although members of these communities have been employed especially in posts attached to the Financial and Technical departments and have even occupied Ministerial positions,[1] the tendency seems to have been to retard their advancement, as evinced in June, 1936, when promotions of Jewish employees as made by the Director of the 'Iraq Government Railway were cancelled by order of the Minister,[2] or to eliminate them as far as possible from Government service, a trend which has been more apparent in recent years.

Finance

652 In the development of 'Iraq's financial system from 1925, three major problems presented themselves: the reorganization of the land-revenue system including its purification from abuses and the development of land-settlement, the equalization of the

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[1] Sasūn Effendi Haskail, a Jew, and Yūsuf Ghanīma, a Christian, served repeatedly as Ministers of Finance.

[2] So vehement was the outcry in the vernacular press over the promotion of the Jewish employees that not only were the promotions cancelled, but disciplinary action had to be taken by the Bureau of Press and Propaganda and an order issued that no promotions should be made without prior sanction of the Minister. See *Great Britain and the East*, July 2nd, 16th, 1936.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq NHI

(c) *Jews*

Until recently Iraq contained a large community of Jews 162
whose families had been settled in the country for hundreds or 5630
even thousands of years. They lived mostly in the large towns,
especially Baghdad, in whose economic life they played an 463
important part as merchants, financiers, manufacturers, and 197
members of the professions. There were also Kurdish-speaking Jews in the north, mostly urban traders and craftsmen but also rural cultivators. A law of 1931 gave Jewish communities self-government in their own affairs, and there was a highly organized communal life, with schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In consequence of events in Palestine the majority of Jews left Iraq in 1950–1, mostly for Israel.

(d) *Yazidis*

These are vulgarly known as 'devil-worshippers' but, although 162
their religion includes the propitiation of Satan, it might 771
more justly be described as an amalgam of Christian, Muslim, 795
and Magian elements. They are divided between Jebel Sinjar
and the Shaikhan district north of Mosul, speak a Kurdish 197
dialect, except in their rites, where Arabic is used, and are probably of Kurdish origin.

(e) *Sabians*

('Baptists'), also called the Mandaeans and the 'Christians 162
of St John'; their religion combines elements of various origins 463
and periods. Most of them are craftsmen—especially silversmiths 795
—in the large towns.

(f) *Shabak*

Of Kurdish origin, who live in the area of the Yazidis and 162
are not clearly distinguished from them; their religion contains 795
Yazidi and extreme Shii elements.

(g) *Other Sects*

Include Bahais, Sarlis, Kakais, Qizilbashis, none of them of any political significance.

POLITICAL HISTORY

Written history began in Iraq at the end of the fourth millennium 175
B.C., but archaeological remains from much earlier periods, first in the north and later also in the south, give evidence of palaeolithic man, of agricultural neolithic man and, from the sixth and fifth millennia, of increasing human progress expressed successively in extensive agriculture, copper

Iraq M111

Chapter Eleven

IRAQ

Distribution of Minorities

THERE are no complete and up-to-date statistics of the population of Iraq, and estimates of the size of the minorities must therefore be treated with caution. The following figures have been arrived at by a comparison of several estimates, but are no more than rough approximations : 162

Kurds	800,000
Turcomans	75,000
Persians	80,000
Assyrians	30,000
Other Christians	60,000
Jews	100,000
Yazidis	30,000
Mandaeans	3,000
Shabak	12,000
Total	about 1,200,000
Total population	about 4,500,000

These figures show that the minorities between them form about a quarter of the population of Iraq. Of the minority-population itself three-quarters consist of groups which differ from the majority not in religion but in race and language. The minority-problem is much more one of relations between Arabs and non-Arabs than in the other countries.

The greater part of the minorities inhabit the north of the 563 country. Almost all the Kurds dwell in the mountainous north and north-east, in which they constitute a majority. The Yazidis are a compact community in Jebel Sinjar in the north-west ; the Assyrians dwell largely in the Kurdish mountains and the plains around Mosul, although they are also scattered in other parts of the country. The majority of the other Christians live in and around Mosul, the remainder mostly in Baghdad and Basra. The Turcomans are to be found in a line of towns and villages running roughly south-east from Mosul in the border-districts between the predominantly Kurdish and predominantly Arab parts of the country ; their main centre is Kirkuk. The Shabak live on the banks of the Tigris, south of Mosul.

Most of the Persians live in the Shi'i Holy Cities of Nejf,

20: Hourani S-5 (1946) 1947 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

563 Kerbela, Samarra and Kadhimain. Two-thirds of the Jews inhabit Baghdad, the others living mainly in Mosul and Basra. The Mandaeans dwell on the banks of rivers in Southern Iraq.

Written Guarantees

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563 In 1932 the Council of the League of Nations gave its approval to the termination of the Mandatory regime and decided to admit Iraq to membership of the League on condition that the Iraqi Government gave formal guarantees for, among other things, the effective protection of minorities, containing the same general provisions as the minority-treaties accepted by several European States and any special provisions which the Council might think necessary.

In accordance with this decision the Iraqi Government issued a declaration, Chapter I of which safeguarded the rights of indigenous minorities. They were guaranteed full protection of life and liberty; the free exercise of any creed, religion or belief; equality before the law and of civil and political rights; freedom in the use of any language; the right to maintain their own institutions and educational establishments and to have questions of personal status settled in accordance with their customs and usages; full protection for the religious establishments of religious minorities and the right to administer their own endowments; and an adequate share for minorities in public funds for educational, religious and charitable purposes. These stipulations were recognized as fundamental laws of Iraq and were declared to constitute obligations of international concern and to be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

Even before the issue of this declaration, the Iraqi Constitution, promulgated in 1925, had given similar full guarantees. Article 6 declares the absolute equality of all Iraqis before the law. Article 13 states that Islam is the official religion of the State, but guarantees complete freedom of conscience and worship in conformity with accepted customs, in so far as forms of worship do not conflict with the maintenance of order or public morality. Article 16 gives communities the right of establishing and maintaining schools for the instruction of their members in their own languages; Article 17, however, states that Arabic is the official language except as may be prescribed by a special law. Article 18 provides that government appointments shall be made without

discrimination in accordance with capacity. Finally, Article 37 641
states that the method of election to the Chamber of Deputies 563
shall take into account the necessity for the representation of non-Islamic minorities.

Some of these guarantees have been reinforced by particular
laws. Thus the Electoral Law of 1924 allotted four deputies [646]
to the Christians and four to the Jews; it is a matter for dispute whether the law permits individual Christians and Jews to be elected as representatives of the ordinary constituencies. Similarly the non-Moslem communities were given representation in local and municipal councils by special laws.

As for the linguistic minorities, the Local Languages Law of [656]
1931 provided that the official language should be Kurdish or Turkish in a number of districts, and in addition that in all elementary and primary schools in those districts the language of instruction should be the mother-tongue of the majority of the pupils.

Personal Status and Communal Organization

The grant to religious minorities of jurisdiction in personal 692
and other matters has not met with the same difficulties as those 563
which have occurred in Syria. Articles 75 and 78 of the Constitution provided for the establishment of Christian and Jewish Spiritual Councils, with powers of jurisdiction to be conferred upon them by special laws. Their functions were defined in Article 79 as including matters relating to marriage, dowry, divorce, separation, alimony, attestation of wills and any other matters relating to personal status if the parties concerned consented. Every religious community was also, according to Article 112, to have the right to establish bodies competent to administer Waqf property.

In application of these provisions, several laws have been issued for particular communities, defining the method of appointment of the spiritual heads of the communities and of their councils, both spiritual and lay, and their functions in regard not only to personal status but also the decision of religious questions, the training of ecclesiastics, the administration of Waqf property, and the administration of schools and charitable institutions. For those communities for which special laws have not yet been issued, the old Turkish law on the subject remains valid.

The Minorities and the Iraqi State

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The Iraqi Government has on the whole tried to be correct in its dealings with the minorities. There are usually one or two Kurds in each Cabinet and there have been one Jewish and one Christian Minister; the minorities have a share, although perhaps an inadequate one, in government and army appointments, and in government subsidies to schools. Apart from the Assyrian incidents of 1933, the peculiar circumstances of which are explained below, and the Baghdad pogrom of 1941, at a time when government had practically ceased to function, there has been no physical persecution of minorities. Nevertheless, they are all restless and apprehensive, and have not yet come to regard themselves, nor are they regarded by others, as full and loyal citizens of the Iraqi State.

The explanation for this is not to be found in the bad will either of majority or of minorities. Its fundamental cause is to be looked for in the amorphous nature of the State. Iraq was created artificially by joining together three Ottoman provinces. It is too large to have the natural unity which each of those provinces possesses by itself, too small to have the unity of the Fertile Crescent or Arab Asia as a whole. It has not yet acquired a unity or structure of its own, and cannot do so until two fundamental questions are faced and answered: first, what are to be the relations between Sunnis and Shi'is in Iraq; secondly, what is to be the relation of Iraq to the rest of the Arab world?

The first is perhaps the most important of all questions for the future of the country. There are more Sunnis than Shi'is in Iraq as a whole, but the Sunnis are divided into Kurds and Arabs, so that the Shi'is form the largest single community. Nevertheless, they have less than their due share in the Government, mainly because there are fewer men of education among them than among the Sunnis. Thus they are discontented, and the political balance between them and the Sunnis is very precarious.

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There are to-day two political tendencies in Iraq, based upon two possible solutions of this fundamental problem. Many Iraqis, mainly among the Sunni Arabs, advocate the incorporation of Iraq into an Arab State or federation, in the hope that this will ease the local situation: the Shi'is will be in a minority in the large Arab State, and in course of time will come to look upon themselves as Arabs rather than as Shi'is. The other tendency, which has many adherents among the Shi'is, is towards the

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development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without 641
distinction as equal citizens of the State. 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one 668
another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at least some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling.

The Kurds: Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority 563
in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are con- 221
centrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and
Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous,
and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic
pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals,
moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the
cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains [241]
and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not
all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being
semi-sedentary.

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority 563
belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve 619
their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts 178
they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized. Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly

563 acknowledge no law except their own customs, and no leadership
617 except that of their chief families, some of which, like the Baban
178 family, were virtually independent princes in Ottoman days.

Tribal feeling is still, as it has always been, stronger than Kurdish national feeling; and the Kurds have never formed a nation, still less a nation-state. In the last generation or so, however, new factors of unity have been arising. One is the growth of a Kurdish town-population. In the past the Kurds tended to leave commercial crafts to Jews and Christians, but now a Kurdish burgeoisie has appeared, in whom tribal loyalties are weaker and national ideals stronger. Another factor is the emergence of a Kurdish intelligentsia. Its education has been mainly non-Kurdish: Turkish in the days of the Ottoman Empire, Arabic and Western in the present generation; in consequence many of the educated Kurds have been assimilated to the Turks or Arabs. The majority, however, have remained Kurds, and have begun to develop a modern Kurdish press and literature, with its centres in Baghdad and Sulaimania. They are in contact with the centres of Kurdish life in Syria, Persia, Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Republic, and are forming and spreading the ideas of Kurdish independence and unity.

The Kurds under the Mandate

648 Before the war of 1914–18, the majority of the Kurds were
563 subject to Ottoman rule. It was natural, therefore, that the Allies should favour the idea of Kurdish autonomy: an ideal embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which provided for local autonomy for the Kurds still to be left in Turkey, or, if they themselves desired it, an independent state to include the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, of which the disposal was still undecided. The Treaty was never carried out, and was replaced in 1923 by that of Lausanne, which said nothing about a Kurdish State or about autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan. In the meantime, an Iraqi Government under British Mandate had been established, and, as it had been found impossible for economic and other reasons to establish a separate government for the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, it had been decided to incorporate them in the unitary State of Iraq. On the whole, the Kurds of the Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk regions accepted this, but those of Sulaimania did not. In 1922 they revolted under the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud. The revolt was only with difficulty suppressed; and it was not

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until 1924 that the Iraqi Government was able to establish its authority in Sulaimania.

In the next year the Frontier Commission, which had been appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to decide upon the disposal of the Mosul Vilayet and the frontier between Iraq and Turkey, visited the Kurdish areas in the Vilayet. In its report it is recommended that, while the Vilayet should be allotted to Iraq, so far as possible the officials of administration, justice and education in the Kurdish areas should be Kurds, and Kurdish should be recognized as an official language. This recommendation was adopted by the League Council, which stated, in its decision on the Mosul issue, that

> the British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations . . . the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the Commission. . . .[1]

There can be no doubt that both the mandatory authorities and the Iraqi Government did on the whole carry out the recommendation of the League Commission. But administrative concessions did not satisfy the Kurds, or at least those of the Sulaimania region. It was not only that they had been promised autonomy by the Treaty of Sèvres and deprived of their hope by the Treaty of Lausanne; even more important was it that they interpreted the recommendation of the Commission as promising them not simply administrative conveniences but also some sort of regional autonomy, and this misunderstanding was never removed. Their discontent found its expression in another revolt, again led by Shaikh Mahmud, in 1927. It was increased by the unfriendly policy towards their fellow-nationals pursued by the Governments of Turkey and Iran, and more especially by the signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which contained no safeguards for minorities. Quite apart from the dislike of most Kurds for most Arabs, the former could not view with any pleasure the prospect of their being subjected to a Government which was likely to be similar in spirit to those of Turkey and Iran.

Efforts were made to dispel these fears. On the one hand,

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[1] Decision Relating to Turco-Iraq Frontier. Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations, Geneva, December 16, 1925. H.M. Stationery Office, Misc. 17. Cmd. 2562, 1925.

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618 the Acting High Commissioner and the Acting Prime Minister
563 visited Kurdistan together, and made statements in which, while condemning separation and emphasizing the unity of Iraq, they spoke of the Government's resolve to satisfy the linguistic and other demands of the Kurds. On the other hand, a number of conciliatory measures, both legislative and administrative, were taken. The most important of them was the Local Languages Law already mentioned.

[669] In spite of this, revolt once more broke out among the Kurds, first under Shaikh Mahmud (1930–1) and then under Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan (1932). The causes of these revolts were partly political and partly personal. They were only subdued through the intervention of the R.A.F.

The Kurds since the Treaty

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648 From 1932 to 1943 the Kurds did not revolt again, but continued to be restless and unwilling to accept the authority of the Government. There were two main reasons for their restlessness. The first was the growth of Kurdish national spirit, due partly to the gradual appearance of a class of educated Kurds, partly to a natural reaction against Pan-Arabism. The encouragement given by the French to Kurdish nationalism in the Syrian Jazirah, and by the Russians to Kurdish autonomy in the Caucasus, may also have had a certain although a limited influence. The second and more fundamental reason was to be found in the particular administrative grievances of the Kurdish tribes. The Iraqi Government made little attempt to carry out the provisions of the various laws passed during the mandatory period. Government departments in Baghdad tended to neglect the claims of districts so far away from the capital; and the Kurds had no way of making their voice heard effectively and compelling the Government to pay attention to their needs. In general, Arab officials in the northern provinces failed to understand the mentality and needs of the Kurdish people (although Kurdish officials in Arab districts were often highly successful). The gap between administration and inhabitants was perhaps greatest in the Mosul liwa, where the administration was largely under the influence of the Arab townspeople of Mosul itself.

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511 The Government's neglect showed itself in every sphere. There were few facilities for education, and those which existed were mainly for education in Arabic. Again, nothing was done

to extend and improve the cultivation of the land and raise the 563
standard of living. This had serious consequences when the 668
war came and brought with it urgent economic problems. The 511
mountain districts did not produce enough cereals to feed the population, and importation on an adequate scale was rendered difficult by the poverty of the Kurdish peasants, the lack of a food-supply organization and the insufficiency of transport. The sense of grievance was further stimulated by the example of the Kurds in Persia, who had thrown off the authority of the Persian Government since the Allied occupation of 1941. In 1943 Mulla Mustafa, the brother of Shaikh Ahmad, rose in revolt in the Barzan district. His rising lasted for several months. Attempts to suppress it failed and it was finally called off after negotiations, and an undertaking by the Government to look into Kurdish grievances. Majid Mustafa himself a Kurd and a distinguished administrator, was appointed Minister without Portfolio with the special duty of devoting himself to Kurdish affairs. His report outlined a scheme of economic and administrative reforms. In the course of 1944 little was done to carry out these or any reforms, and Mulla Mustafa's movement still smouldered; the condition of the Kurds was somewhat improved, however, by the increased cultivation of tobacco, their most important cash-crop.

The Assyrians

The Assyrians form a distinct community, not only by reason 563
of their Nestorian faith, but also through their language, a Syriac 621
dialect, and their traditions. They are probably the descendants of tribes which moved from the plains of Iraq into the mountains to the north during the period of the Mongol invasion, and remained there until the present generation. In their mountain-home they lived as shepherds, feudally organized under their *maliks* with their Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, as their temporal as well as spiritual ruler. They paid a yearly tribute to the Ottoman Sultan, but were in practice autonomous, although their autonomy was always subject to interference by their neighbours the Kurds.

At the beginning of the First World War they were divided into 563
three main groups: first, the mountaineers in the Hakkiari dis- 166
trict of what is now Turkey; secondly, those in the plains to the west of Lake Urmiyah, in Persia; and, thirdly those in the

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lowlands to the south of Hakkiari, in what is now Iraq. When the war broke out, the Hakkiari group revolted against the Turks, largely in the hope of Russian help. Driven from their homes, they joined up with their fellow-countrymen and with the Russians around Urmiyah; but the collapse of Russia destroyed their position, and after resisting the Turks for a time, they were forced to flee southwards to Hamadan, where the British military authorities disarmed them and sent them on to the refugee camp at Baqubah near Baghdad.

When the war ended, the problem arose of what to do with the refugees on Baqubah. In 1919 there were some 25,000 of them; most of them were from the Hakkiari group and wanted nothing except to be allowed to return to their native mountains. This, which would have been possible immediately after the war, became impossible when in 1925 the Council of the League of Nations settled the question of the Turco-Iraqi frontier in a way which left the Hakkiari region inside Turkey. Thus, the land which the Assyrian refugees regarded as theirs was placed on one side of the frontier while they themselves were on the other; and since the Turkish Government refused to allow them to return, and deported such of them as had returned, the mandatory and Iraqi authorities were left with the problem of finding new homes for them.

By 1930 a great deal had been done to solve the problem. Some thousands had been settled in villages in the northern district of the country (this in addition to those who had returned to their homes to the south of the Hakkiari mountains, and whose position was unaffected by subsequent disturbances). In addition, several thousands had found work in Mosul, Baghdad and other towns. Only a few hundreds still remained unsettled. All this work had been helped by the privileges granted to the refugees by the Iraqi Government and the interest taken in them by the mandatory Power, which had special obligations towards them because of what they had suffered for the Allied cause during the war.

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Nevertheless, the Assyrians were not contented with their position. Their discontent was partly due to the general unrest and demoralization which their experiences in the war and as refugees living on charity had implanted in them. But it was also due to more particular causes. First, there was their continuing desire to return to their own country, and their refusal

to accept their stay in Iraq as more than temporary. Secondly, 563
even if they had to remain in Iraq, they wished to go on living 641
the same sort of independent life under the Mar Shimun as they had lived before the war. They were not satisfied with the privileges which they shared with other minorities; they claimed complete autonomy, and their claims were expressed in the most intransigent form by the Mar Shimun himself. Finally, they distrusted the Iraqi Government, and regarded themselves as in a special way the protégés of the British Government; when the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was signed, they thought themselves to have been abandoned by their protectors, and feared the worst. Their fears were intensified by the work among them of a small group of agitators.

Nor was the Iraqi Government more satisfied with the situation. It resented the special position accorded to the Assyrians, no less than the refusal of the Assyrians to be contented with their position as citizens of Iraq. What is more important, it feared them. Throughout the mandatory period, Assyrian Levies had 701
been trained and used by the British authorities for guarding 563
aerodromes as well as for the repression of the Kurdish revolts. They had proved to be good soldiers; both they and the Iraqis believed that they would be more than a match for the young Iraqi Army. After 1930 they were gradually disbanded, but they retained their arms, and the Iraqi Government feared that in view of the prevailing discontent among the Assyrians they might revolt and the revolt would be difficult to crush; it feared also that the British Government might instigate a revolt, as an excuse for recovering control over the country.

By the summer of 1933 tension between the Assyrians and the 563
Government was very great. Although some of the former were 641
willing to come to terms with the Government, others, the fore- 669
most among them being the Mar Shimun, were still demanding autonomy; and asked, if this was not possible, to be allowed to cross the frontier into Syria. Relations between the Mar Shimun and the Government had reached such a state that he was not allowed to return from Baghdad to the north. The Government and the Army were becoming increasingly frightened of the possibility of a revolt, and resolved, if given an opportunity, to end the danger once and for all. King Feisal and several of the more experienced Ministers were away in Europe, and the

563 Ministers left in Iraq were too weak or disinclined to resist the
641 extremism of the Army and of public opinion.

669 At this moment, in June, a group of Assyrians decided to take matters into their own hands and cross the Tigris into Syria. On the other side of the river they were disarmed by the French authorities; but later their arms were returned to them and many of them crossed back into Iraq. There they met a detachment of the Iraqi Army; fighting broke out (it cannot be established who began it), and both sides suffered casualties. When the news of this incident spread through Iraq, Government, Army and public alike were seized with mass hysteria; the action of the Assyrians was considered as the beginning of a revolt, and it was resolved to take decisive action. The Army organized and carried out a series of massacres in which some hundreds of Assyrians were killed.

These massacres, and the fear of further ones, completely broke the spirit of the Assyrians. Some 6,000 of them crossed over into the Upper Khabur region in Syria, and about 15,000 others subsequently expressed their desire to leave Iraq. The Council of the League of Nations set up a special committee to deal with the question of settling them. After several proposals for their settlement in Brazil, in British Guiana and in the Orontes Valley in Syria had been considered and rejected, it was finally decided that those already in Syria should be permanently settled in the Upper Khabur Valley in the Jazirah, while the remainder should stay in Iraq.

563 The situation of the Assyrians in the Khabur Settlement has already been discussed. Of those who remained in Iraq or have returned to it, some are still in their old homes round Amadia and Ruwanduz; some have settled down again in villages around Mosul; others are working in the big towns. A British Commission appointed by the Iraqi Government reported in 1938 that their economic position in the northern plains was at least as good as that of the other inhabitants. No further incidents have occurred; the Assyrians are no longer disposed to be intransigent, and the Government is no longer obsessed by the idea that they are dangerous. It is not impossible, however, that a dangerous situation will once more arise. During the recent war a very large proportion of the Assyrian men were enrolled in the R.A.F. levies or were working for Great Britain in other ways. It was calculated that 75 per cent of them were

economically dependent on the British. Quite apart from the economic dangers of this, there were signs that they once more hoped for autonomy under British protection. The danger of such hopes is too obvious to need explanation. 563

The Other Christians

Apart from the Assyrians, the Christians in Iraq are mainly Chaldaeans, Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox and Catholics, with smaller numbers of Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and other Uniates, and Protestants. The communities are recognized by the Government as possessing competence in matters of personal status and other internal affairs. 563 795

Here, as in the other countries, the Christians are more fully an urban community than the Moslems, and show a peculiar aptitude for commerce, crafts and the professions; but there is also a large peasant community, Chaldaean, Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic, in the plains around Mosul. In Iraq, as elsewhere, the proportion of educated Christians is higher than that of educated Moslems, and they are further advanced on the road to Westernization, thanks to the work of foreign missions and schools. 563 369 871

The Armenians are a trading community in the towns. They preserve their language and traditions carefully, but they are too few to be able to avoid some measure of external assimilation. The other Christians are partly Syriac-speaking, partly Arabic. This cannot, however, be regarded as a sharp distinction, since the language used depends upon the environment in which they are living, and many of them are bi-lingual. In general, it is true that those whose native language is now Arabic spoke Syriac until recent generations, and that with few exceptions they are not conscious of belonging to the Arab nation. 563

In spite of efforts to spread the conception of a 'Syriac' people, the general tendency among the Christians is towards at least a superficial Arabization. This raises the question of their relation towards the Arab nationalist movement. So far, they have regarded it with fear and hostility, apart from some individuals who have supported it with enthusiasm. The nationalists too have tended to suspect them, although the existence of the much greater Kurdish and Shi'i problems has diverted attention from them. What the future relationship will be depends very 563 668

563 668 largely on the line of development which the nationalist movement takes.

The Jews

563 The organization of the Jewish community is regulated by a law passed in 1931, which laid down the composition and functions of the various institutions of the three communities of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. (A fourth community, that of Diala, was added in 1932.) Through these institutions the communities possess self-government in their own affairs.

The majority of Jews in Iraq are Arabic-speaking and belong to families which have been settled in the country for hundreds or even thousands of years. They live mainly in the large towns, in the economic life of which they have a large part. They are manufacturers, merchants, financiers, and follow the free professions. Their influence is particularly great in Baghdad. In the north of the country Kurdish-speaking Jews are to be found; they are mainly traders and craftsmen in the Kurdish towns, but a number of Jewish agricultural villages exist in the Amadia district.

Their communal life is highly organized. There is a large number of Jewish schools, some of them subsidized by the Government, and many of them reaching a comparatively high standard. There is a class of highly cultivated and Westernized Jews.

There is no open and official discrimination against them. Individual Jews are to be found in Parliament, the Civil Service and the Army; the first and greatest Minister of Finance, Sassoon Heskail, was a Jew. There is, however, a considerable hostility towards them, because of traditional religious hatred and their economic power. This has increased greatly in recent years as a natural consequence of Arab opposition to Zionism. It is true that the Iraqi Jews, like the Oriental Jews, are for the most part not Zionists by conviction; some of them indeed profess to be Arab nationalists and are hostile to Zionism. It is inevitable, however, that some of the hostility which Arabs feel for Jewish designs on Palestine should be directed to the Jews in their midst. The growing hostility showed itself most clearly in the incidents which followed the collapse of Rashid Ali's movement in Baghdad in 1941. In the past few years, many Iraqi Jews, aware that their future in Iraq is dark, have emigrated to Palestine and America in search of greater security or opportunity.

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

Other Minorities

Of the other minorities, the Turcomans, Mandaeans and Shabak raise no problems. There have been occasional movements of unrest among the Yazidis and they have more than once come into conflict with the authorities; a punitive expedition was sent against them during the period of Bekr Sidqi. Like the Assyrians, they are a community with a tradition of autonomy in Ottoman days, and it has proved difficult to reconcile them to becoming citizens of a modern centralized State; they need above all tactful and enlightened local administration.

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq M#1

regions for which it acts as commercial outlet and exchange centre. 361
These regions are :

(*a*) The plains of northern Assyria, where there is a dense agricultural population.

(*b*) The hills of Kurdistan, occupied by shepherds practising transhumance.

(*c*) The steppes of the Jezireh, where there is a mixed population of true nomads rearing sheep, cattle and draught animals ; and sedentary farmers.

(*d*) The uplands of the Jebel Sinjar, where pastoralism and agriculture are carried on by the Yezidi.

As a result, there is extreme heterogeneity of peoples within the 563
city. Arabs are in the majority, with smaller groups of Kurds, 438
Christians, Jews, and Yezidi, most of whom speak their own languages. [288]
An important mediaeval textile industry (note the word *muslin*) has now disappeared, though coarser textiles using wool as a raw material are still produced in the bazaars, and a recent feature has been the introduction of artificial silk weaving. Mosul is also important for leather working—a reflexion of its position on the edge of the steppe. Manufacturing is, however, less important than trade: grain, timber, hides, and manufactured goods are exchanged, and there are long distance communications with Baghdad and south-east Turkey. Much of the produce from Turkey comes by kelek (page 364).

Basra is an agglomeration of small sites grouped along the western 361
bank of the Shatt el Arab some 70 miles upstream from the Persian Gulf. Basra proper is situated on a small creek 2 miles distant from the Shatt el Arab, and the principal port is at Ashar, on the main river. Modern docks have also been constructed at Maqil, 4 miles upstream from Ashar, and since 1939, further development has taken place at Tanuma on the eastern bank of the Shatt el Arab, opposite Ashar. Because of the recession of the head of the Persian Gulf, the growth of the port is relatively recent, and dredging on a considerable scale is
necessary to prevent silting of the channel. Basra handles the greater 439
proportion of the foreign trade of Iraq, and is the centre of the date- 438
growing region, being itself surrounded by date-groves. Dates form 361
the chief item in its export trade. Second in importance amongst exports is grain, with wool, liquorice root, and hides as subsidiaries. Imports consist chiefly of manufactured goods (cement, cotton and woollen textiles, machinery), tea, and sugar. Basra can be reached by large ocean going ships, but about 10 per cent. of its commerce is still carried on in small native craft.

69:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954

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[181] inhabit the mountainous districts near the
162 northeastern frontiers, constitute the largest
195 Moslem minority group. Racially and linguistically distinct, they make up about 15 to 20 per cent of the population. Other non-Arabic Moslem communities include about 50,000 each of Turkomans and Iranians, the majority of whom are also found in the northern provinces. Most of the Kurds and the Turkomans are Sunnites, but some adhere to minor heterodox sects; the Iranians are Shiites.

From 150,000 to 200,000 native Christians reside in Iraq. The Chaldeans, a sect which observes early Nestorian rites but owes allegiance to the Vatican, comprise the most numerous group. Other communities include some 30,000 Assyrians (Nestorians), refugees from Asia Minor in 1918, and smaller contingents belonging to the Armenian Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox, the Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) and the Syrian
563 Catholic churches. Most of the Christian peoples live together in more or less separate ethnic and religious groups: about 70 per cent are settled in the northern provinces of Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil, and a large proportion of the remainder in the cities of Baghdad and Basra. Prominent among other indigenous sects are the Yezidis, or so-called "devil-worshipers," about 30,000 of whom dwell in the districts near the Syrian border. A few thousand Sabians, famous as silver craftsmen, also live in Baghdad, Amarah and Basra.

191 Arabic is spoken by over three quarters of the population. Kurdish, Syriac and Turki, however, are recognized as official languages in limited areas in the north, while English is extensively used in the
593 larger cities. Although the Iraqi are pre-
162 dominantly Arabs, marked gradations in social structure are represented by the nomadic Bedouin tribes of the deserts, the "marsh Arabs" or primitive tribesmen of the Amarah and Hammar lakes region of the southern delta, the rural peasants and the townspeople. Up to 1950, the population included about 200,000 Jews, primarily of

p. 22(B)

66:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

CHAPTER III

IRAQ

563 An examination of the development of Muslim-Jewish relations in Iraq reveals two noteworthy features, apparently at variance with each other. On the one hand, probably in no other Muslim country has the Jewish minority been so closely associated with the whole fabric of social and political life as in Iraq. On the other hand, in none has anti-Jewish feeling in recent years been so general and nowhere have anti-Jewish measures been applied so systematically.

The Jews in Iraq constitute, as far as we know, the oldest Jewish settlement outside Palestine. Indeed, even if the origin of the House of Abraham in Ur of the Chaldees is disregarded, Jewish settlements in Iraq can be said to have first taken place about 600 years before Jews from Palestine emigrated to Egypt. The majority of the Jews now living in Iraq are the direct descendants of those Jews who, after the destruction of the First Temple 2,500 years ago, were led into exile in Babylonia and remained there after the return of some of their number to Jerusalem with Ezra.

But the great antiquity of the Jewish community is not, of course, the sole reason for the exceptionally close bonds which unite Iraqi Jews to their country and their non-Jewish neighbours. "They have made themselves an integral part of the nation. Both in business and in politics they have always played a big part." (E. Main: *Iraq*, 1935.)

Their close association with all aspects of the life around them
is in part due to the fact that the proportion of the Jewish minority
in Iraq to the rest of the population is far higher than in other Muslim
[162] countries. Whereas the Jews in Egypt represent only 0.4 per cent of
the total population, in Iraq they amount to about 2.5 per cent, and
as much as 25 per cent in the capital, Baghdad.

It should be noted that it is more difficult to determine the total number of Jews in Iraq than in Egypt. For while in Egypt the Jewish population is almost exclusively concentrated in the big towns, in Iraq it is dispersed up and down the country, including some scattered among the Kurdish tribes in the North.

563 The Kurdish Jews live somewhat apart from the rest of the Jewish
[197] community, just as the Kurdish minority lives apart from the Arab
population. Both are different from the Arabs in general character and
162 daily habits. The language of some of the Kurdish Jews is Syriac (a
form of Aramaic), while those in Mosul speak Kurdish. They are
[463] mainly traders and craftsmen and live scattered among the various
Kurdish villages and towns. In the Amadia district, however, there
can be found a number of Jews engaged in tilling the land. It is

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difficult to make even an approximate estimate of how many Jews live 563
in these villages—perhaps 5,000-6,000 at most. They have remained 162
relatively untouched by the events of the past few years, which have had such a revolutionary effect on the rest of the Jewish community.

The total Jewish population of Iraq is estimated at 120,000. Although this figure may be out of date, it is probably not far wrong, if allowance is made for emigration, on the one hand, and increase in the birthrate, on the other. Of these, between 90,000 and 100,000 live in Baghdad. But neither is it the larger number of Jews in the country as a whole nor their concentration in the capital which accounts for the difference of their position, at least in the past, from that of their coreligionists in Egypt.

Most important is the fact that Western influence on Iraqi Jews, 563
being no stronger than it was on the town-bred Muslims, was much 177
weaker in Iraq than in Egypt. Middle-class Jews in Iraq took to European dress at about the same time as the Muslims. Likewise, in [197]
their daily habits, their houses, and, last but not least, in their language, there was no marked difference between the two communities. Arabic has always been, and still is to-day, the mother-tongue of both Jew and Muslim.

True, as a result of the higher educational facilities provided by the activities of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and the Anglo-Jewish Association, knowledge of French or English is more common among the Jews than the Muslims. But this difference has never been sufficient to detract from the central fact that Western influence on the Jews has not been much stronger than on other Iraqi communities. All this is in strong contrast to the situation in Egypt and—again unlike Egypt—there has been no noticeable immigration of Jews from European countries.

During the nineteenth century the Jewish community in Iraq was 563
fairly prosperous; and freedom to develop was assisted to no small degree by the two proclamations issued by the Sultan of Turkey in 1839 and 1856. At that time there was already a considerable number of well-to-do families. The schools of the *Alliance* helped to raise the community's educational standard. When the first Chamber of Deputies was opened in Istanbul in 1876, it included a representative of the Iraqi Jews (Menahem Danyiel) and, later, after the Constitution of 1900, the community was represented by Hezkiel Sassoon, a retired senior Ottoman Government official.

During the First World War, however, the Jewish community suffered great hardships at the hands of Turkish governors. Just prior to the fall of Baghdad in 1917, some of its leading members suffered death, torture, and imprisonment.

When, therefore, the Arabs rose against the Turks and made common cause with the Allies, the Jews regarded the fight for liberation as their own. They welcomed the establishment of the new Iraq under British Mandate, and many immediately offered their

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563 services in the building up of its administration. From the establishment of the new country, the Jewish community, and especially its leading members, have been as much bound up with its development as their Muslim neighbours.

Hezkiel Sassoon was appointed Minister of Finance and continued to hold this office in several successive Cabinets. A Jew, David Jamra, was appointed Vice-President of the Court of Appeal. Other Jews occupied important posts in various departments, particularly those concerned with the administration of ports, railways, and finance.

The large number of Jewish officials in the public service was due to the fact that the sudden demand for officials and clerks could only be satisfied in the main from the Jewish and Christian minorities, with their higher educational standards. During the period of the Mandate (*i.e.*, until 1932), and even in the first years of Iraq's existence as an independent State, the high proportion of Jews in Government service caused no offence. Their talents and skill in office work were most valuable to a Government seeking to prove Iraq's readiness for independence.

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463 The Jewish communities in Baghdad and Basra are among the wealthiest in the entire Middle East. The names of some of the leading families, such as the Sassoons and the Khadooris, are known even in other countries. There also exists a large middle-class of small bankers, retailers, agents, merchants, civil servants, clerks, and physicians and lawyers, together with other members of the liberal professions. There are—among the poorer elements—many small shopkeepers, and likewise many craftsmen of one sort or another—masons, carpenters; and also domestic servants. There is no special Jewish quarter in Baghdad, Jews being found in all parts of the town, though they do tend to congregate in certain streets of different quarters.

563 The community is well organised. In Baghdad it has established a great number of welfare and social services, a hospital, and about 25 schools. By 1930, 7,200 pupils were attending the ten schools under *Alliance* administration. Thanks to these services, the state of health and the general standard of education of the Jews are far above the average level in Iraq. Ninety per cent of the candidates from Iraq for the London matriculation examination, for instance, used to be Jews.

The community is governed by a lay council of 60 members, who are entitled to impose certain taxes (*e.g.*, on meat) and to allocate the necessary funds to the various institutions. These funds have made it possible to admit pupils to elementary schools free of charge.

There is also a religious council, under the Chief Rabbi, Haham Benjamin, which maintains the communal courts dealing with all such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like. Until his resignation at the end of 1949 the overall Head of the community was the universally respected Haham Sasson Khadoori.

[642] This partial communal autonomy arises from Article No. 79 of the Constitution of Iraq. The internal organisation of the Jewish

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community is regulated by a special law passed in 1931, which laid down the composition and functions of the various institutions of the four communities in Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and Diyalah (near Baghdad).

The position of religious minorities, including the Jews and Christians, was laid down by the electoral law of 1924, which allotted four deputies to represent each of these communities in the Chamber of Deputies. There has been some argument as to whether the law permits individual Jews or Christians to be elected as representatives of general constituencies. But the argument has been purely academic, since no Jews or Christians have ever presented themselves as candidates

Apart from this, Iraqi law recognises equal citizenship for non-Muslim minorities and their right to a full share in the public affairs of the State. This right had until recently always been respected and was much valued by the leading personalities of the Jewish community.

Except for a natural interest in developments in Palestine, there has never been any feeling of solidarity with the political aspirations of Zionism. The repeated assurances of loyalty to Iraq, which the Chief Rabbi and other leading Jewish personalities have felt it necessary to make during the Palestine crisis, were not merely the result of outside pressure but were statements of fact. (For the declarations of the Jewish community in Baghdad, and of the then Head of the community Sasson Khadoori, see *The Jewish Chronicle*, December 30, 1949; *New York Times*, April 9, 1947, and March 27, 1948; and *Manchester Guardian*, December 10, 1947.)

It is against this background of a prosperous Jewish community, closely associated with the country since time immemorial, and not less interested in the common well-being and development of Iraq than their Muslim fellow-citizens, that the gradual deterioration in mutual relations and the growing aggressiveness of the Muslim majority towards the Jews must be examined.

The first signs of the storm to come appeared—far earlier than in any other Muslim country—in 1928, when the first Lord Melchett, on a visit to Palestine, journeyed on to Baghdad. Wild rumours circulated about the nature of his visit, which was alleged to be connected with designs concerning the National Home in Palestine. This caused hostile demonstrations. As far as the Jewish minority in Iraq itself was concerned, however, there was not at that time the slightest indication of any hostility on this ground towards it. Neither was there any suspicion of Zionist sympathies among Iraqi Jews.

There was also an economic factor. Not only were Jews prominent in the public service but most of the employees in large Arab business firms were also Jewish, owing to the difficulty of finding suitably qualified personnel among the Muslim population. Since secondary and higher education in Baghdad had always been freely available to Jews, and many had been granted State scholarships for study abroad,

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563 the community's educational standards were higher than those of the Muslims.

In the first years of Iraq's newly-won independence, this liberal attitude began to wane. In 1935 the Iraqi Government prohibited the teaching of Hebrew. Only after repeated remonstrances was permission finally granted for the use of Hebrew, but for strictly religious instruction only. By 1937, Philip W. Ireland, in his book on Iraq, was already remarking on the increased difficulties encountered by non-Muslims wishing to enter the Government service. Doubtless this restriction was occasioned by the increasing number of qualified young Muslim candidates in search of appointments. In July, 1939, the importation of any "Zionist" literature was banned.

On the whole, it would be true to say that these measures were occasioned less by any policy directed against the Jewish minority, as such, than by a nationalist reaction against Zionism, which the Iraqis saw as a rival nationalism to their own, and rooted in Europe at that. In any case, Iraq was the only Muslim country where the recommendations of the Bludan Conference were carried into effect.

By the outbreak of the Second World War, the Palestine-Arab Revolt, the continuous spate of Axis propaganda, and, finally, the arrival in Baghdad of Amin al-Husseini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, from his Syrian exile, had combined to heighten enormously the prevalent anti-Zionism and to merge much of this feeling with the strong latent Anglophobia of the people.

Axis propaganda was especially effective among officers of the Iraq Army; and Axis wooing of Arab nationalism explains in part both the anti-British revolt of 1941, headed by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, and the rapid intensification of more specifically anti-Jewish, rather than anti-Zionist, feeling.

Apologists for Rashid Ali claim that he himself was opposed to the Jew-hatred of the Nazis and their supporters. Be that as it may, it is undoubtedly true that no physical harm came to the Jewish community while he himself was at the head of the Government. But during the three-day interval between his flight and the arrival of the British in Baghdad a terrible massacre broke out.

A raging mob, maddened by agitators to the highest pitch of frenzy, fell upon Jewish shops and houses, burning, looting, and murdering. According to official sources, 110 Jews were killed, 240 wounded, while 586 Jewish business premises were looted and 911 Jewish houses destroyed. Unofficial accounts put the number of deaths at 150 and the number of wounded at more than 900. Less serious outbreaks also occurred at Basra, Mosul, and other places in the provinces.

This dreadful massacre could not but leave an ominous mark on the memories of both Jews and Muslims in Iraq. From this point dates Jewish emigration in any serious number, most of it to Palestine.

000 When, in 1945, with the formation of the Arab League, the

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when, in 1945, with the formation of the Arab League, the 661

Palestine question became a vital—if not the only—foundation of 563 common purpose in the Arab national movement, the Jewish minority in Iraq inevitably came to be identified with what the feverish minds of the populace had come to regard as a menace to Arab aspirations. Even before the United Nations voted in favour of the establishment of a Jewish State, Jews in Iraq were being accused of the most fantastic crimes and subjected to many restrictions.

In May, 1947, for instance, an Arab newspaper alleged, in spite of an official police denial, that a Jew had given poisoned sweets to an Arab child. In December of the same year another Jew was arrested on suspicion of having placed a tube containing cholera germs in a stream (*Daily Telegraph,* December 29, 1947). From the beginning of 1947 Jews were not allowed to leave the country unless they gave the Government a guarantee in the form of a £2,000 deposit. In the summer of 1947 Muhammad Fadhil Bey al-Jamali, then Iraqi Foreign Minister, stated bluntly to the United Nations Committee on Palestine that "the fate of the Jews in Muslim countries depends on developments in Palestine." The threat materialised when Iraqi troops joined in the invasion of Palestine.

The State of Emergency, which was then declared, was used as a *carte blanche* for all kinds of anti-Jewish measures, largely at the hands of the apparatus of State. Sentences without appeal were passed by courts martial, thus avoiding the necessity of introducing special legislation which might have had to be explained and justified later. As much was openly admitted by the Prime Minister, al-Pachachi Pasha, when he reassured some members of the Opposition (who had expressed their fear of the possible misuse of the Government's emergency powers) that these measures would be applied to Jews only.

The sole attempt to provide the Government with a legal basis for its anti-Jewish policy was an amendment to Article 51 of the Criminal Code. The first paragraph of this amendment enumerates those doctrines whose propagation is punishable in Iraq. In August, 1948, the crime of "Zionism" was added to the list. In fact, however, this legal gesture was quite superfluous, as the system of discrimination against the Jews had long been perfected. The sum of £2,000 deposit, guaranteeing the return of Jews wishing to go abroad, was increased to £3,000 on May 15, 1948; and even then an exit permit, granted only in exceptional cases, was necessary.

Many Jewish officials were arbitrarily dismissed from their posts in the public service, though some of the more senior among them were given the privilege of being either retired on pension or simply suspended from their duties. Even in the prevalent atmosphere of excitement the absurdity of these dismissals was felt. A case in point is that of Ibrahim al-Kebir, the Jewish Controller-General of the Treasury, who was retired on pension only a fortnight after he had been sent to London to negotiate a new financial agreement between Britain and Iraq.

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Finally, following the Israeli victories in Palestine, the Government vented its spleen on the Jews of Iraq by issuing, in October, 1948, a circular instructing all Government departments to dismiss their Jewish employees. In this way most of the Jewish public servants were got rid of without notice, pension, or compensation. Only a small number remained.

It must be said that most reports published in the West about the requisitioning of Jewish buildings in Iraq have been greatly exaggerated. Only two Jewish club-houses were taken over for more than a short time, to be used as shelter for Arab refugees from Palestine. All other requisitioned buildings were eventually returned to their owners.

So far as can be ascertained, the only other anti-Jewish measure taken by the Iraqi Government openly is a decree issued on July 17, 1948, by the Iraqi Minister of Defence, Sadiq al-Bassam Pasha, whereby all Jewish-owned banks were forbidden to have any transactions with foreign countries.

So long as legislative anti-Jewish steps were on a comparatively restricted scale, the campaign was left to the police and to military courts. This gave an opportunity to narrow-minded officials and officers to vent their spite on the Jewish community. Police searches of Jewish houses, denunciations, arrests, the application of brutal "third degree" methods to those accused of "Zionist activities" or "endangering the security of the State" were the order of the day. Old letters containing a reference to Palestine, and even the mere mention of that country's name in conversation, were liable to lead to arrest. In one case, a map of the Holy Land attached to a Bible was taken as evidence of "Zionist affiliations."

It goes without saying that these police raids presented a tempting opportunity for blackmail; and not a few officials made good use of it.

On the other hand, this also must be said: thanks to the Government's ban on demonstrations, there were no mob onslaughts on Jewish property. The only evidence of lawless disorder is provided by the practice of small groups of Muslims which, under the pretext of collecting funds for the Palestinian Arab refugees, went from one Jewish shop or house to another, robbing the intimidated and unresisting owners.

But these incidents were insignificant compared with the large-scale campaign of financial extortion carried on by the Government itself. The careful use of trials by court martial provided the authorities with an excellent cloak under which they were able to squeeze the wealthy elements of the Jewish minority as a source of funds wherewith to cover the heavy cost of military adventure in Palestine, an adventure made all the more costly by the fact that it was undertaken at a time when the country's long-standing financial difficulties were particularly acute.

Even a cursory glance at the list of trials is sufficient to make two

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things stand out clearly: first, the absurd vagueness of the indictments; and, second, the Government's determination to make the best possible financial use of the proceedings.

In many cases, the Iraqi press, reporting these trials, did not even find it necessary to state the nature of the crimes of which the accused had been found guilty. Here are two typical examples:

> Hezkiel Zaki has been condemned to two years' imprisonment and fined 500 dinars. (*Al-Shaab*, February 7, 1949.) (1 dinar=£1 sterling.)
>
> Sadik Nahum has been found a danger to the security of the State and fined 3,000 dinars as a guarantee of good conduct (*Liwa al-Istiqlal*, March 14, 1949.)

When mention was made of alleged "offences," their nature is revealing of the prevailing state of affairs. One man was condemned for having made some remarks "against the honour of the army." An accused group were found guilty of having "shown sympathy with the Zionists. . . ." The fact that in many cases the expressions "Zionism" and "Communism" were made to mean the same thing is symptomatic of the flimsiness of these charges.

It is difficult to establish the exact number of cases in which Jews were accused of "Zionist activities" or "Zionist sympathies." In many instances the courts martial had before them Muslims and Christians as well as Jews, jointly charged with "Communist activities." But wherever a Jew was concerned, the sentence invariably included a heavy fine. In the light of this, there can be no doubt that the main duty of the courts martial was to obtain funds for the empty Treasury.

The following are a few examples of typical cases:

> The court martial rules that Shaul Yahya must deposit a guarantee of 200 dinars as it is alleged that he has committed acts which have disturbed public order. (*Saut al-Ahrar*, December 19, 1948.)
>
> R. Sassoon Ghazale and Nissim Rahim must pay 500 dinars guarantee for their good conduct and the maintenance of order, as it is alleged that Nissim Rahim has received a letter from his aunt, Therese Rahim, who is now in Palestine. (*Al-Shaab*, December 30, 1948.)
>
> It is ruled that Ezra Hezkiel and Murad Abraham must each pay 1,000 dinars as a guarantee that they will observe good conduct. (*Al-Shaab*, January 6, 1949.)

And there were many similar cases. The almost invariable stipulation that these fines should be paid to the Ministry of Defence leaves no doubt as to the purpose for which the money was used.

The most vivid example, both of vague indictment and of the Government's financial greed, was the case of the Jewish multimillionaire, Shafiq Ades, of Basra (the only one of the accused, by the way, who was sentenced to death and hanged in public).

Although his trial was reported and discussed in detail by all the newspapers, it was never clearly established whether there was any connection between his sale of surplus British military equipment to

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563 Italy in 1946 and the alleged discovery of the same material in Palestine two years later. The proceedings were held mostly behind closed doors, and the court went so far as to refuse the defence counsel admission to the courtroom. Among many other curious details in this trial, this extremely wealthy capitalist was accused both of "Communism" and "Zionism"! The point to note is that Ades's sentence enriched the Government's treasury by £5,000,000.

The day of his execution was turned into a festival. It was declared a public holiday; thousands of people flooded into Basra from the countryside, and photographs depicting every detail of the hanging appeared in all the newspapers.

There is little doubt that the majority of contributions towards the fund raised for the prosecution of the Palestine campaign and, later, for the assistance of Arab refugees, came from Jews. During May and June, 1948, Baghdad radio broadcast a long list of Jewish names and their contributions. According to reliable estimates, these total about 500,000 dinars.

Over and above the swelling of the Iraqi war-chest, most of the methods adopted in the anti-Jewish campaign suggest that generally the Government, with popular support, was actively engaged in extorting as much money as it could from the Jewish community.

Early in July, 1948, for instance, 40 leading Jewish business men were arrested on a charge of trading with the Soviet Union and thus allegedly supporting a Communist régime. It so happens that many Muslim commercial firms had engaged in similar transactions, many of which had taken place several years before. It also happens that these transactions were the direct result of the Soviet-Iraqi trade agreement. But in the case of the 40 Jews these factors were quietly ignored. The true motives for their being charged became quite obvious when it was learnt that all 40 were released on payment of various sums of up to 10,000 dinars.

In October of the same year the Treasury issued an order to the effect that all Iraqi Jews living abroad would forfeit their property unless they returned to Iraq at once.

The total sum which the Government obtained by means of fines, confiscations, "guarantees," and forfeiture of property was certainly a substantial proportion of Jewish-owned wealth in Iraq. It may be computed at something well over £10,000,000. This official draining of Jewish resources, moreover, was accompanied by a great deal of private blackmail, made possible by the helplessness of the victims.

To a Western observer this record might appear proof of systematic persecution. The thinly disguised extortions from the Jewish community, the arbitrary, and often stupid accusations, the onslaught on a helpless minority whose loyalty could not reasonably be questioned—all this would appear at first glance as something more than an attempt to make certain of public security in an emergency; the record seems to bear all the signs of deeply-rooted anti-Jewish hostility. But

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if that were true, how would it be possible to explain the excellence of the relations between the communities but a few years ago and the obvious recognition in former years of the Jewish population as an integral part of the nation? 661 563

The answer must be sought in the workings of the Eastern mind. There would be no room in a survey of this kind to attempt a description of the subtle blend of human passions, age-old habits, and deep-seated prejudices which have gone into the forging of the Oriental tradition of thought or to estimate how that tradition of thought has reacted to the impact of Western civilisation, with its conception of law and human rights. It is, however, necessary to draw attention to certain points.

To begin with, the Arab States which emerged from the First World War represented an attempt to create the whole fabric of the Western nation-state out of a galaxy of various semi-independent tribes, self-conscious and self-centred city populations, rival clans, powerful landowners, interspersed with minorities of different races and religions. This complex had no common tradition beyond the allegiance of the majority to Islam. 186

The consequence was that from the beginning the Arab States rested on social foundations of the most insecure kind. Symptoms of this have been a very characteristic shrill aggressiveness of national outlook and an almost comic attachment to national dignity, coupled with an exaggerated anxiety lest the State's new-found independence should be threatened in any way or its sovereignty infringed.

In the case of Iraq, no sooner had the new State come into existence than this excessive national sensitiveness resulted in a wave of feeling against its very creator and helper—Britain. And when King Faisal, whose great ability and authority had succeeded in surmounting many initial difficulties, died just at the end of the mandatory period (1933), the struggle for key positions in the Government was intensified, thereby adding a new element of insecurity.

Rival tribal chieftains, with their dependants and hangers-on, began competing with each other for the favours of extremist parties, and contributed to making every change of Government an event of greater or lesser violence. Rashid Ali's *coup d'état* in April, 1941, was merely one of a series of such changes; it was only the most striking because of its dangerous political and strategic implications in the middle of a world war.

This ever-present latent tension was aggravated by the inability of succeeding Governments to cope with urgent problems of social reform, agricultural development, finance, and administration. As early as 1942, the budget showed a deficit of £1,334,733, despite the big royalties paid to the Government by the oil companies for the exploitation of the oilfields. During the first six months of 1948, imports exceeded exports by £17,000,000, while the country's whole foreign trade amounted to only £27,000,000. Hence the prevailing nervousness

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186 in official circles of Communist propaganda, a fear which frequently reached hysterical proportions.

563 186 To cap everything, there has been the problem of minorities. The absence of ethnical homogeneity has always been the weak spot of newly created States; the more so when religious and racial differences alienate the minorities from the majority, making the latter—rightly or wrongly—always suspicious of the minorities.

Ever since the formation of the State of Iraq, the Kurds, a close-knit minority numbering more than 700,000 in the mountains of the North, have repeatedly revolted against the Government in Baghdad—and not without grounds.

The unsatisfactory nature of the State's relations with the minorities was made worse by a shocking event in 1933. In that year, a large group of Christian (Nestorian) Assyrians, who had crossed into Syria and wanted to re-enter Iraq, was brutally massacred by a detachment of the Iraqi Army.

The event sent a wave of horror among all the Christian minorities dwelling in the country. (Under considerable official pressure, the Christians—coreligionists of the victims—and, of course, the Jews, were forced to contribute large sums towards a fund in aid of the survivors, whereas the amount of money subscribed by the Muslim majority was, in the absence of any such pressure, small.)

In any case, the position of any minority dwelling amongst a Muslim population must always be delicate. Constitutional guarantees and protection by law will never induce the Muslim masses, with their innate conservatism and lack of education, to abandon their inborn distrust of the non-believer.

In the case of Iraq, whose rise as a nation-state was threatened at the outset by minority troubles, this factor was particularly important, especially as the predominance of British influence for many years had made the populace hyper-sensitive about the country's national independence.

As for the Jews, so long as general attention was not focused on them specifically, their position was no worse than was normal for any non-Muslim minority in an Islamic country. If anything, their age-old connection with the country, their important economic and social position, and the obvious absence of any separatist tendency among them made their position rather better than that of most of the other minorities.

But the steadily growing atmosphere of political insecurity and distrust was bound in the long run to bring about a deterioration. That deterioration became serious as soon as it became possible for the Muslims to suspect any sense of solidarity between Iraqi Jews and those in Palestine.

On balance this much can be said: the nature and extent of recent persecution does not mean that, in altered circumstances, there can

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be no ultimate return of the peaceful relationship which existed between Muslims and Jews in Iraq formerly.

Indeed, once the fever of the anti-Jewish campaign had passed its peak—that is, by the end of 1948—there is plenty of evidence to show that many educated Muslims had begun to have second thoughts. Here and there Jewish officials who had been dismissed were asked to resume their posts. The return to the premiership of Nuri Pasha al-Said (the most experienced and esteemed of all Iraqi politicians) raised hopes of better relations, especially as the fanatically nationalist Minister of Defence, Sadiq al-Bassam—the man largely responsible for the sinister activities of the courts martial—was forced to resign.

It was then that the Jewish representative in the Senate, the universally respected Ezra Danyiel, was able to appeal to the Government for justice and to remind the Senate of the long-standing loyalty of the Jewish community. On the whole, this speech had a favourable effect, and resulted in official assurances that in future the rights of the Jews to treatment as citizens enjoying equal rights with other citizens would be respected. Since then, Jews have been able to reopen their businesses.

Yet the future must remain uncertain. As this Survey goes to press, reports are being published to the effect that the Iraqi Government has now decided to allow Iraqi Jews to emigrate—on condition that they give up their Iraqi citizenship. It is not clear, at the time of writing, whether there are any other conditions attached. In view of what has happened in recent years, however, there can be little doubt that a large-scale exodus from Iraq to Israel is to be expected in the near future.

As for those who remain, it would be idle to pretend that their future prospects are bright. In so far as they can expect a measure of stability and security, this must—to a large extent—depend on the Governments of Israel and Iraq reaching, if not agreement, at any rate a satisfactory *modus vivendi*. At the present time there is not even an armistice agreement between the two countries; and Iraq, which does not border upon Israel territory, has shown no anxiety to improve relations.

642, 728, 177, 565

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
● Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the political regime, social stratification, and Westernizing of administration under the British and French Mandates following the First World War, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 88-101./

The power

wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formidable 793 not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was 565 always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish, anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd and Shumurd of Najf were notorious.

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without 517 its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social 181 observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of information regarding the world, past or present, and that of æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remembered Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmelite), and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans, Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing, book production, or generally readable literary output there was nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excavation, 'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to 'Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery. The professional classes—lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost nothing to show. Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a 812 class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body 779 of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and 793 the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion, this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631
foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of
the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the
greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The
'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, [181]
unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal
warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between [579
town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administra-
tion; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shiʿi com- 182]
munities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the
Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western
opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642
these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631
generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which
was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood
at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and
was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule
was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the
Sharaʿ, capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the
local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, includ-
ing those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642
dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats,
which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And 185
while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the
conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law
and procedure, and a new class of officials, other modernizing
agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational
foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and
a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the
attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe
to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached
from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-
modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government
of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had
enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its
Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every
new meticulous Ordinance in Midḥat Pasha's revised wilaya
system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565
a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the
effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647
were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by
race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part
of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

565 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims 647 or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe, or professedly cosmopolitan, every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, 661 persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent 662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land [623] revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish representa- 625 tives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardi- 631 hood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendiles--Analyst]

economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady 439
diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they 661
correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq 665
public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be
prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and
ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative
Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of
the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, 646
all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with
nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness.
The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate.
Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 665
'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though
it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the
creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died
in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925,
were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular
Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925
until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, suppressed
almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued
vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—
Ḥizb al-Nahdha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did
nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new 645*
Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber
was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Baṣra aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927. This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927. It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The 665
first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indications, 565
of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of
Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscurantist
leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

165 565 ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927, the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni schoolmaster, began a sequence of events which involved ministerial intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the
665 565 182 668 Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day, by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned, and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i 'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between 'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January 1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

702 668 The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect 'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

565 184 as speakers and writers, this element which aspired increasingly to the leadership of the nation contained a number of able, sincere, and progressive men; but too large a proportion showed also the defects of the 'Iraqi political character—emotional hastiness, irresponsibility, egoism—and in spite of their claim to be the 'enlightened' they seemed at present not greatly to excel the 'old school' in disinterestedness or in wisdom. The 'old school', meanwhile, the ruling and minister-providing order which held most of the power in 1932, derived from the wealthier Sunni families of the greater cities, landowning or otherwise: from the ranks of senior ex-officials, who often belonged also to these families, and from the higher ex-officers, who rarely did so: and from a small class of rich Shi'i notables. These in all formed a body of established and experienced men of the world. Devoted often to sectional interests, they were not incapable of transcending them, and while willing to accept democratic forms they were reluctant to welcome disturbing elements from outside or from below.

182 Such elements composed the 'Iraqi political public of 1932, or claimed to lead it. Future years must reveal how far they could be reconciled, absorbed, or proved capable of self-subordination. Meanwhile, with material enough for divided councils, intrigue and faction, and for personal interests and ambitions, there were important unifying factors also, in addition to the general bonds of common religion, culture, and citizenship. All the public alike had been subject to the mandatory régime, with its control and its well-intentioned counsels—and almost all had, to some degree, reacted against it. In the future, with the passing of the direct control which Great Britain had exercised, the services of a few British servants of the 'Iraq Government would remain to be used in whatever manner and degree 'Iraqis might approve. The help of the British Ambassador,[1] successor to the High Commissioner, was equally to be available to future 'Iraqi Prime Ministers. These were and had long been factors of stability and continuity. Another had been the monarchy itself; and there was in 1932 no expectation

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[1] British Ambassadors to 'Iraq in the period 1932–51 (all of whom are mentioned in the text) were: Sir Francis Humphrys, 1932–5, having been High Commissioner since 1929: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 1935–8: Sir Maurice Peterson, 1938–9: Sir Basil Newton, 1939–41: Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (ex-Adviser to Interior, 1921–35), 1941–5: Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird, 1945–7: Sir Henry Mack, 1947–50: Sir John Troutbeck, 1951.

The services rendered to 'Iraq by senior members of their staffs were in some cases very appreciable, though entirely unknown to the public. Those who held the position of Counsellor—and usually acted for considerable periods as chargé d'affaires—were: G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, 1932–5: C. H. Bateman, 1935–8: W. E. Houstoun-Boswall, 1938–40: A. Holman, 1940–2: G. H. Thompson, 1942–5: D. L. Busk, 1946–8: H. Trevelyan, 1948–50: H. Beeley, 1950. Oriental Secretaries of the period were V. Holt, 1932–44, S. H. Perowne, 1945–7, J. C. B. Richmond, 1948–51.

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Board[1] at its early meetings in 1951 and they were, with possible 312
modifications, to form the basis of ʿIraq's future irrigation activity, 653
whose full realization, however, must, for all the impatience of the 185
public and the press, occupy not less than fifty years.

Works actually completed before the end of 1951 were the realigned Ḥabbaniya inlet (Warrar channel) and the return outlet to the river (Sinn al-Ḍhibban channel), ensuring flood protection and making possible the use of stored flood water. The Wadi Tharthar inlet channel—a work of very great magnitude—was put to tender by the Development Board in 1951; the Samarrā barrage and headworks, and the greater Ḥabbaniya scheme, were to follow later. Much detailed planning and designing remained to be done, even for the immediately following five years, before a programme, especially in lower ʿIraq—ʿAmara, Baṣra, and the Gharraf—could be established. The extent, however, to which the Willcocks plans of forty years earlier had stood all tests was indeed remarkable. Only the Faluja and Balad barrages (p. 63) had been abandoned, and development in the Baṣra–Ḥammar area might or might not in the end follow Willcocks's plans. The abiding problem of silt deposit appeared partly soluble, by improved headwork design and by mechanical clearance. Pump irrigation seemed by now to have reached its economic limit in much of the territory, but there was ample room for more intensive cultivation of the pump-lands.

The connexion of reasonable and stable forms of land tenure 423
had long been recognized by Government in its land-settlement 565
activity, and the latter had a creditable volume of achievement to show after eighteen years of sustained effort. Early criticism of the procedures adopted (p. 261) and the progress of the work itself throughout ʿIraq (p. 323) have been elsewhere described. Five more years' work since the end of the war had defined, delimited, and recorded the personal rights in other wide areas. The abiding problem of Muntafiq land rights had not yet been solved; in ʿAmara an answer not very different from the *status quo*, but with longer-term security for the shaykhs and greater fragmentation was likely to be found. Elsewhere the hard case of the landless fallaḥ was little changed wherever he had been unable to establish a basis of title and, at the opposite extreme, the good fortune of

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[1] The Board's six-year plan, legalized early in 1952, provided for year-by-year expenditure, from 1951–6 inclusive, on the Tharthar project, to a total of (in thousands of ID) 10,300: on the Ḥabbaniya, 2,200: on the Diyalā dams and canalization, 6,750: on the Dukan dam, Ḥawija barrage, ʿUdhaym barrage and canalization, 6,750: on the Bakhma dam, 8,700: on irrigation works in Mosul and Arbil liwās, 1,900: Tigris barrage and canalization, south of ʿUdhaym mouth, 1,800: and main drainage, 4,100. New and re-formed canalization on the middle and lower Euphrates, lower Tigris and Gharraf, and Baṣra area were allotted 10,425.

423 565 those to whom mere shaykhly birth or recent business enterprise had brought title-deeds was obvious and envied. There was indeed room for criticism on various lines. The Government had parted with its right of free disposal of wide lands hitherto legally unencumbered though in fact occupied; this might obstruct later development plans. Vested interests had been over-generously recognized: land reform on an equalitarian pattern was, as the left wing of Baghdad politicians (and some foreign observers) insisted, as far off as ever. Nevertheless, within the limits of society and economics as they were, a great work of stabilization had been done. Disputes were few, confidence had been increased, and a return to the pre-settlement conditions of agrarian jungle law was unthinkable. For both the small and the large holding, for peasant-proprietorship, the capitalist's scientific farm, the Land Development Company and large-scale Government enterprise on its own vast unencumbered estates, there was clearly room in the 'Iraq of the future.

433 Though the limits within which industry was likely to develop were by the mid-century well understood, not least by the Director-General and the Committee for Industrial Research, there had been a measure of expansion during the last five years. The legal basis for its encouragement, which was the policy of every successive Ministry, had been altered by the cancellation of the 1929 law and of licences issued under it in favour of a new law of 1950. The latter granted important privileges to undertakings which were power-operated, employed 90 per cent. or more of local workers, cost at least ID 5,000 to erect, and used more than half 'Iraqi capital. By 1951 thirty-five projects had been accepted as fulfilling these conditions, and the Industrial Bank made loans to a number of them. Of the industrial output of such enterprises some was on the humblest scale and of slight interest; such was the production of sweets, macaroni, date-treacle, articles made in Kurdish marble, ceramics, wax matches, buttons, reprocessed glass, unglazed tiles, and aluminium pots. Manufactures on a less inconsiderable scale were those of flour, vegetable oils, cardboard and wrapping paper (made from wheat and rice stalks), soap, knitted goods, sausages and preserved meat, methylated spirits, 'araq, concrete pipes, plastics, steel windows, and tubular furniture. An earlier brewery having failed, a modern brewery using local barley began the production of excellent beer in 1949. An ambitious enterprise for the manufacture of jute gunny-bags was in course of establishment. Brickworks had continued to develop on modern lines, and were capable of meeting all local needs. 'Iraqi cigarettes had gone far to supply the country's smokers, from modernized as well as hand-operated workshops; only Kurdish-grown tobacco was used.

87a response, and there is not much evidence of handicraft or art. Outdoor physical education follows the prescribed syllabus which, [87b] however, seems to be more modern in technique than some of the other subjects.

[34b] Generally speaking, the older buildings look as depressing as their counterparts in some of the western countries. Unfortunately there are not many very recent buildings.

While these conditions apply to many of the schools, however, in the larger towns there are some noteworthy exceptions to which reference will be made later.

[34b] *A Typical Village School.* A village school may consist of two or three rooms housing from twenty to seventy pupils of both sexes, but it is rarely a complete six-class school. Lighting and sanitation are usually inferior to that of the town schools. In the northern provinces some of the schools are built of stone, but mostly they are made of dried mud bricks. In parts of the south, especially in the marsh districts, the buildings are reed huts.

The curriculum and teaching techniques in the village school are identical with those of the town school. The children rarely enjoy activity methods, and sit in their desks most of the time.

In many of the village schools children cannot complete their full period of primary schooling because the numbers are too small to permit the organization of the full six classes. In a minority of these schools, however, an increasing number of teachers are learning the technique of simultaneously teaching more than one attainment group and are thus able to provide a complete primary school course in an incomplete school.

Most of the village schools have no garden, handicraft or livestock. But the newly established agricultural primary schools, to which detailed reference will be made later, provide exceptions to this rule.

Because of the absence of compulsory school attendance and the consequent late admission to school of a number of pupils, there is a great variety of age-range in both urban and village schools. Within the limits of the curriculum, however, the teachers meet these difficulties with commendable patience, and both the older and the younger children in any one class are usually a [56b] happy family. Another happy feature of the Iraqi primary school is the absence of social distinctions within the class-room. A wealthy sheikh's son may rub shoulders with a poorly clad lad from a very humble home.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE MET QUANTITATIVELY

The Rapid Growth of the Primary Schools System. As will have been

> and confusion of rights. Indeed the most diligent inquiry would 423
> be unlikely to reveal anywhere any appreciable number of holdings, small or large, held in undisputed possession and free from hampering and conflicting claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing throughout the country, upon the prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole.

Put very briefly, with the exception of small areas, mainly in 423
Northern Iraq, together with some smaller areas of a few yet 471
hopefully significant State-sponsored schemes of land settlement, the bulk of the cultivated land of Iraq is in the possession of large landowners. Some of them may not enjoy the holding of this land by confirmed legal right but, to all intents and purposes, they own it and derive immense incomes from it. Others, by legal process, the validity of which is disputed by land reformers, have gained possession of lands which were formerly held in common tribal use.

These landowners, or landholders, are usually sheikhs or 471
absentee urban landlords who let the land to share-tenants through 427
a hierarchy of lessees or agents, at the bottom of which is the landless cultivator who gets an incredibly small share of the produce of his labour. Indeed, the actual cultivator under this invidious system of share-cropping may get anything from ten per cent to thirty per cent of the produce of the land which he works, most of the remainder going to the large landowners, agents or owners of irrigation pumps. The situation may vary from landlord to landlord, and very occasionally the actual cultivator is said to share fifty per cent of the produce. In general, however, the [565]
position of the Iraqi countryside is one of great extremes of wealth and poverty. The landowner may live in a sumptuous style with a town house and country palace, while the peasant cultivator may live under conditions of poverty or near-destitution.

It is not possible in this study to attempt more than an outline 471
of the causes and effects of this situation. It arose partly out of 423
ancient confusion of titles which meant that, with the break-up 425
of the tribal system, the most powerful member of the tribe was able to appropriate for his own purposes land which was originally intended for the common good of the tribe. It is due partly to the faulty application of the Ottoman Land Code under which, because the small cultivator was not strong enough to establish his rights of title, these rights fell to the sheikh. The profits derived from the Persian Gulf grain trade in the late 19th and early 20th centuries gave a further impetus to what has been described as 'this wholesale land grabbing'. Finally, with the development

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423 of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators
were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the
425 small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of
[565] cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

511 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally
642 a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their
contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 423
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 511
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 565
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of 166
living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

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were dismissed, although their power over the masses was 186
enormous, as too ignorant of modern state-craft, too self- 175
centred and too alien to be allowed to influence the creation of 727
a new state. 648

The Nationalist elements, composed of those who had worked [565] for Arab autonomy before the war, those who prided themselves on being the intelligentsia of ʻIraq, and the religious leaders, were brushed aside, although they were destined to grow in power and influence during the coming months, especially under the stimulus of Nationalism in Syria, as being too negligible, too irresponsible and too full of sound and fury to merit consideration. No inferences seem to have been drawn from the fact that the anti-British declarations, almost identical in tenor and phraseology, pointed to a carefully organized opposition, just as the close resemblance of many of the pro-British declarations indicated the care and attention which the Civil Administration had devoted to the conduct of the plebiscite.

The failure of the plebiscite to represent all these elements of current opinion in their relative importance and to reflect local opinion in its true proportions, was destined to mislead H.M. Government in its attempts to set up a new State satisfactory to the inhabitants of ʻIraq, and, by making it complacently unaware of the need for quick and decisive action in settling the future of the country, to prepare the ground for the disastrous events of 1920.

6;Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

and 286 in the period 1904 to 1914.[1] In Egypt and in the 000 United States, the Arabic press,[2] with a wide circulation even in the Ottoman Empire,[3] was a powerful agent, by its constant and bitter denunciation of the Turks, in arousing Nationalist sentiment among Arab peoples.[4]

In 'Iraq, no less than in Syria and Arabia, the 'Ottomanizing' policy of the Young Turks stimulated the Nationalist Movement. It continued, however, to lag behind the Movement across the desert, even as it had been slower to develop. Cut off by its geographical position and by its lack of communication from the West, 'Iraq lay torpid, a potentially rich Turkish Siberia but lacking educational facilities and the stimulus of new ideas and of political thought such as prevailed along the Mediterranean coast. Conservative in thought, the Sunnī Muslims were slow to withdraw their political allegiance from the Sultan whom both religion and tradition had established as their religious head.[5] The Shī'a priesthood, Persian for the most part, hated the Osmanlis both as Sunnīs and as oppressors, but possessed little community of interest with the Arabs, although Arabs of the Shī'a sect formed a majority of the population of 'Iraq.

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The social structure, based fundamentally on the soil, and not far removed from feudalism, was stony ground for Nationalism. Landlords sought only relief from taxation. Shaikhs desired individual freedom for themselves and their tribes. Merchants, principally Jews, perhaps the most progressive single element in the land, had little deep feeling for either

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[1] The life of a journal during the Turkish regime was often not long, particularly if in opposition to the Government. Suppressed journals frequently reappeared under new names. 204 656

[2] From 1904 to 1914, 385 Arabic newspapers and magazines were founded in Egypt, North and South America: Tarazi, op. cit.

[3] Although banned from Turkey, they were distributed through the foreign post offices.

[4] Djemal Pasha, in particular, resented the part played by the Arabic Press abroad: Turkish Red Book, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne*, pp. 12-13.

[5] *Infra*, p. 235, for typical view on the sanctity of the Ottoman regime.

175* 156* 668* 565 Turk or Arab except as productive of order, stable finance and equity in the courts, essential for their commerce. There were few professional men, such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and civil officials, who formed the backbone of the Movement across the desert. Nevertheless, from them and from the Arab Army officers came the leaven of pre-war Nationalism in 'Iraq. Trained for the most part in the professional and technical schools of Constantinople, they had been touched by the Western political theories permeating the capital. They had been in contact with separatists from Syria and from other parts of the Empire. The Arab officers of the army, in particular, as members of the only numerous and organized class in the Empire which received a systematic Western training and which, therefore, was exposed to Western thought, assumed important roles in the Movement.

175* 668* 156* Not merely the policy of crushing Arab feeling and sentiment and of turning Arabs into good Turks aroused the 'Iraqis. The secularizing policy and the irreligiousness of the Young Turks had offended many religious dignitaries who wielded great power and influence. The Naqīb of Baghdad, Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī, for instance, found little to command his respect or obedience in the new regime. Although he himself habitually refrained from political activities, his son, Saiyid Mahmūd al-Gailānī, described as an Arab of the Arabs and knowing no Turkish, took a prominent part in the opposition to the C.U.P.

175* 668* 186* In spite of the discontent in 'Iraq, rife and acute as it was, little trace appeared on the surface before late 1910. The measures employed by the C.U.P. to stamp out disaffection were too vigorous and too harsh for opposition to show itself openly. In the Chamber of Deputies, however, from the midst of the group of Arab Deputies, to which all the 'Iraqī members, except Isma'īl Haqqi Beg Baban the Kurd, had attached themselves, 'Iraqī feeling was publicly voiced.

Underground, however, the Movement had taken on form

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Political Officers, however, believed that the Sharifian influence 175*
would have little effect in the Muntafiq because of the self- 186*
interests of the *fallahin* and *sarkals*. The Officers stated, how- 668'
ever, that it would take low taxation and firm treatment to 619
ensure the maintenance of these friendly relations, the Muntafiq Arabs being like gunpowder: the slightest spark would send them off. The tribes were reported as being quiet at that moment, but with arms at hand, their towers still standing and with a consciousness of their fighting ability, they were dangerous potentialities. They could be persuaded to do almost anything by agitators with a free hand and plenty of money.[1]

Opposed to the British for entirely different reasons but 175*
nevertheless joining actively in the agitation against them were 186*
the many ex-officials of the former regime repatriated in 'Iraq. 668*
Some of these, discontented with the pensions paid them from 565 ●
the Civil Treasury, favoured any regime which would give them employment. Most of them, however, hated Great Britain and sought the return of the Turks or else desired a Muslim Government joined to a pan-Islamic Federation headed by Turkey.

The Nationalists could also count upon the support of many of the landlord class who, accustomed under the Turkish regime to exercise their privilege of collecting their rent to the last piastre without obligation either to the land or tenant, now found a strong arm imposed between them and the *fallahin*. Tenants, also, who had managed by devious means to escape payment of rent, had little reason to wish for the continuance of a Government which insisted on the payment of rent as well as of revenue. To them, as well as to many other classes, the insistence of the British Administration on its standards of justice, order, punctuality, the conduct of public business and sanitation, had little counterpart in their customs and in their habits of thought. Its unrelenting efficiency and thoroughness and even

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[1] Shatra District Report in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 92.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

643 new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of
666 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory before candidates received government support.

643 In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the
[653] interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,[1] whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.[2]
[166] To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes on the land, and the development of residential amenities about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early inclination to find employment for those who had served him in western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion to its contribution to the welfare of 'Iraq enabled him to take a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although 'Iraqīs universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly asserted their competence to run them, conditions in 'Iraq were
● [565] far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

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[1] By the Prime Minister, Nūrī Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

[2] Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, 'Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years* 1930 *and* 1931 *and Capital Development Works Budget for* 5 *Years* 1931-35.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

provide adequate methods of auditing and accounting in 651 order to remove as far as possible opportunities for speculation either by officials or private individuals.

2. To set a definite and fixed rate of demand, payable in cash, applicable to each type of land according to whether it was privately or State-owned, and to the method of irrigation employed on it.
3. To devise methods whereby it would be possible to dispense with the actual annual estimates of agricultural yields, a costly and vexatious task, disturbing to the cultivator as well as affording latitude for bribery and corruption.

These objectives meant that eventually fixed demands would be based upon cadastral units of the land itself, in relation to their potential or assumed average rate of production.

Four obstacles stood between existing conditions and the achievement of these desired aims:

1. The lack of a cadastral survey, the prime essential to any system of land-revenue administration.
2. The lack of knowledge of the taxing authorities as to exact agricultural and marketing conditions, and of the potentialities and the actual yields of agricultural produce.
3. The presence of an agricultural class, from landowners [565] to cultivators, unwilling from motives of self-interest to co-operate with the Government in agricultural assessments.
4. The existence of official personnel, which in many cases was insufficiently trained and was susceptible to outside influence.

If many of the problems remained unsolved to-day as they were in 1932, it has not been for the lack of conscientious effort on the part of both 'Iraqī officials and their British Advisers. The long delayed cadastral survey has been pushed forward. Sir Ernest Dowson, formerly Surveyor-General of Egypt, was

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

As a consequence they have a far healthier diet and are obviously 511 better dressed. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a farmer who himself employs a fellah. Although this is partly a consequence of the large size of his plot (100 donums including fallow), it is indicative of his much higher standard of living.

In the towns, workers with regular employment would be 571 much better off than the poor fellah, but in cities such as Basra 465 and Baghdad where there has been a great influx of people from the country, there is considerable underemployment in addition to unemployment. Although, at the current rate of wages for casual labor (about 200 to 250 fils a day) a man might theoretically earn an annual income of ID 75 or more, there must be many who work irregularly and earn less than ID 50. Bread and rice are comparatively costly and, together with the rent of a room for a man's family, might take nearly half his income.

Wages are probably not much higher in many of the smaller and more primitive industries, but artisans such as plumbers and electricians are scarce and can command much higher wages. In the more modern industries, such as the oil industry, the Port of Basra and the new factories in Baghdad, a skilled machinist can earn a dinar a day or more. On the clerical side, in the lowest grade of the regular civil service a married official with more than one child receives ID 13 per month.

The higher income of the city-dweller with regular employ- 511 ment enables him to purchase a reasonable diet, better clothing 369 and better housing. He also has access to educational and health services. Nevertheless, congestion and sanitary conditions are often very bad in certain parts of the cities and disease is common.

Above these various classes is the small rich group of land- 565● owners and merchants. No estimate of the proportion of the 511 national income accruing to this group is possible, but some indication can be gleaned from the fact that a landowner in the South normally gets at least half the net value of the output from the land, while, in industry, profits may exceed the total payroll.

Expansion of Health Education

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Iraq has a small, wealthy upper class and a small middle class. The great majority of the people are poor and ignorant, most especially in regard to health measures. Health education is badly needed and there is no doubt that the people would respond readily to teaching. Large groups enthusiastically attended all the shows put on for the health week held in Diwaniya province; competitions for the best eating-house, butcher's shop and barber's shop were keenly contested and visitors thronged to see the model house and the medical exhibition. The oil company in Kirkuk employs a British sanitary inspector and the Railways Administration in Baghdad recently sent their Iraqi sanitary inspector to take a course of study in the United Kingdom. The response of the householders in these places to sanitary measures is striking; their pride in their homes is obvious and the absence of flies conspicuous.

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To begin with, every doctor should have a thorough understanding of the relation of environmental factors to disease. Greater emphasis on the teaching of preventive medicine and particularly of social medicine in the medical school, as has already been recommended, would help to inculcate a wider appreciation of the importance of the preventive outlook in all medical work. Like doctors, nurses have a unique opportunity to teach their patients, and personal and domestic hygiene should take their proper place in the training courses for nurses. Every hospital should be an object lesson in hygiene and every patient should learn by his stay in it.

Health education must be given an important place in the curriculum of the teachers' training schools, and special courses in the prevention of the diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be included in the syllabus of the School of Agriculture and of the School of Engineering.

Hygiene is already taught in the schools but ought to be given greater emphasis. Personal hygiene is essentially a matter of habit formation and young school children should be trained in good habits as a daily routine. Special classes could be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases—possibly, in some cases, by the school medical officer. It is for the Health Department to

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

Iraq MHI

648 Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

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Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the economic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and continued action against Communism and incipient plans for national development have not so far availed to counteract. The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

511 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevolent man and seemed to be very well liked. The group as a whole enjoys a degree of prosperity and comfort most unusual for an Arab community. Everybody has enough to eat and enough to wear and a good house to live in. Crops seem to be quite reliable. If the wheat and barley harvest fails, the rice does not. Taxes are light and the local government good.

●515 463 The most conspicuous difference from the typical agricultural community in Arabia lies in the fact that here the old equality of the desert is preserved. There is no class of rich citizens who outshine their fellows. There are a few merchants of a small sort. Amara, the nearest city, is so close to the town we visited that the shops were very small, most of the trading being done in the larger city. We saw few artisans. The community seemed to be free from caste divisions and to enjoy a spirit of equality and brotherhood much like that of the Bedouins themselves.

562 Another surprising thing is the freedom of all classes. The women have discarded the veil completely and associate with the men freely, being seen on the street apparently under no restraint whatever. This is a refreshing contrast to the other communities of Arabs; indeed the Marsh Arabs are far ahead of even the Bedouins in this respect. These women buy and sell in the bazaar and appear to participate in all the activities of the town with no hesitation whatever. They visited the temporary dispensary that we set up and in their self-assertion were sometimes harder to manage than the men. 795 It is interesting to note that these Arabs are all Shiahs. "No," said the guard that accompanied us from Ahwaz as we were coming in for a visit, "there are no infidels in all this district. Every one is a Shiah."

Iraq MH1
Iraq Bedouin MH8

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231 492 or bridle, except as these appurtenances are put on for show, and it is a beautiful sight to see an Arab on his pet mare galloping over the plain, the two appearing almost as one animal.

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619 421 721 Among these nomads much the same ideas of equality and brotherhood prevail as are seen in Central Arabia. Tribal loyalty is very strong, and no one would think of stealing from a brother tribesman. From another tribe, however, there is a continual effort to steal all the hoofed property that can be abstracted. Conceptions of property are the same sort of semi-communistic ideas that seem to characterize the Bedouin everywhere. The game of compulsory exchange goes on merrily and is the spice of life to those hardy desert rangers. Whatever government eventually prevails may expect to have a hard time in taming them and teaching them some sort of civilized respect for the property of other people.

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463 ● 565 441 In marked contrast to the more or less primitive existence of these Mesopotamian nomads is the life of the large cities. Indeed Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, the principal cities of Mesopotamia, are more or less similar to cities in America in their organization and in the different classes of people they contain. The merchant class, which is large and prosperous, includes petty shopkeepers and great merchants with every gradation between these two extremes. The bazaars show a bewildering profusion of goods, in part locally manufactured and in part imported. The great bazaar in Baghdad has entire streets devoted to the sale of the peculiar red shoe that is characteristic of that city. Whole streets again have little or nothing except earthenware of every sort and description. Great rooms are piled to the ceiling with these utensils. In a general way

463 each kind of goods has its special section of the bazaar.
● 565 The brass- and copper-smiths' quarter rings like a small
441 boiler factory all day long. The artisans who are engaged
in producing these commodities form a considerable section of the Mesopotamian city population and are fairly prosperous and contented, much more so than the date gardeners of the outside districts. Supreme over them all stands the Mesopotamian silver worker, whose antimony silver work can scarcely be duplicated anywhere in the world.

463 The professional classes in these Mesopotamian cities
871 are fairly well developed. There are teachers of every
794 sort. Some of them have been trained abroad, but many
177 are indigenous and a very great credit to the schools that
have turned them out. There are a number of government schools, and in addition the different religious sects maintain schools of their own. In these days when western education is in great demand, the schools of the Jews and the Christians are patronized by an increasing number of Mohammedans. No local medical profession has
463 been developed as yet, but the wealth and the culture of
759 Mosul, Baghdad and Basra have attracted a considerable
number of trained physicians from outside. We have therefore the beginnings of a medical profession, and although it is not yet indigenous, it will soon become so. Its ethics are not of a very high order; the campaign of the American College of Surgeons to abolish fee-splitting would not make much headway among Mesopotamian doctors, but time will develop ethical standards, and at the worst the profession is a long way in advance
463 of the quacks that infest Arabia proper. There is also a
693 well-established group of lawyers. One of the results of
the governing of the country for hundreds of years by

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

463 698 the Turks, a foreign Power, was the development of an elaborate judicial procedure and a vast deal of red tape in all government business. It is not possible to see that the consequent appearance of a legal profession has brought any great blessings in its train.

565 These various professional groups, together with the prosperous merchants, have gradually come to constitute a leisured middle class somewhat similar to that in America. This development is confined to the three large cities, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, with Amara as a possible addition to the list. In these cities the rich merchants and land-owners have fortunes comparable with small fortunes in America. They have accounts in New York, in Manchester and in the Continental centers, and import goods direct from all of these places. Many of them read French or English. They take newspapers and keep in touch with the life of the world. This class of merchants and land-owners is the most civilized of any Arab community to be found anywhere. Many of them have traveled in India and Syria, and no small number have even visited Europe. Some of the doctors and lawyers have studied in Paris and Berlin and Vienna. There is a considerable amount of real culture among these men and women even now, and the next generation promises to show far more.

000 These three large cities are by far the most advanced section of Mesopotamia. They appear to have in them a large degree of modern civilization. Nevertheless, even in these cities there is more tinsel than real gold. One questions in pessimistic moments whether there is anything except tinsel, in spite of all that has been done to give Mesopotamia a good government, general education and modern improvements. As far as population is con-

16: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 MI Middle East MI
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equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

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There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

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Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

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On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Only three cities, Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, have a total population [162] exceeding 100,000. 361 *Baghdad* (population 1943, 300,000) lies on the Tigris at the head of navigation of the river, and in the 'waist' of the lowlands, where the Tigris and Euphrates approach closely to each other, and hence give the best possibility of constructing irrigation canals. This narrow inter-riverine zone also provides a convenient crossing-place, since the marshland is reduced in extent and the firmer platform of steppeland provides a useful east-west route between the Mediterranean and Iran. The region of Baghdad thus has an important nodal position at the junction of routes from east and west across the desert, and from north, north-east, and south along the river valleys. It should be noted that all the factors mentioned above apply to a region and not to an actual site.

It is easy to see why a town should have grown up within the district of Baghdad, but the extra smaller scale features that usually fix the site of a town in one particular spot are less in evidence. Local changes in topography due to the shifting of drainage channels have led to the growth of three separate cities at various periods, and so within the Baghdad region there has arisen first Babylon, the ancient capital that lay closer to the Euphrates, some 60 miles to the south of modern Baghdad. Babylon was in turn succeeded by Ctesiphon, only a few miles from Baghdad, and this city remained the nodal centre until superseded by Baghdad in the early Muhammadan era. Baghdad itself dates only from the 8th century A.D., and a 'golden age' occurred when its Abbasid rulers supplanted the Omeyyads of Damascus and made it the capital of the Moslem world. Baghdad suffered greatly from Mongol invasion, and most of the older buildings have disappeared. The modern city is sprawling and undistinguished—in fact, an extreme disappointment to visitors who may wish to evoke the 'Arabian Nights'. [342 Many of the poorer houses are of mud, and flooding is a frequent feature (Fig. 65). 731]

Baghdad is the commercial centre of the region, with numerous, but small workshops and distributing houses. 361 Industry is, as we have seen, mainly confined to bazaar crafts—textiles, metals, food- 438 stuffs—and to the production of pottery and building materials. 565 ● Trade is for the most part in the hands of Europeans, Jews, and 463 Armenians, with Iraqi Christians as clerks and supervisors. An upper class—mainly Sunni Moslems—carries on the administration of the country; and a third element in the life of the city is a large group of absentee landlords.

25: Warriner S-5 no date 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

423 twenty-first part of the total. The position of the share-tenant
427 in Iraq is much worse than that of his counterpart in Syria.

In the districts of flood irrigation the tribal system has
621 disintegrated, but its superstructure, the sheikhs and sirkals,
623 remains. Most of the political functions of the tribe have now
312 been transferred to the State, and the only economic function
now performed by the tribal authorities is the control of
427 irrigation, digging of canals, and repairing of breaches, which is
done by the cultivators under the direction of the sirkal who
has become a kind of farm bailiff acting for the sheikh. Under
this system the sheikh and sirkal take together up to 80 per cent
of the crop, leaving the cultivator some 20–30 per cent.

423 This exploitation is possible because the sheikhs have
succeeded in establishing, mainly during the last fifteen years, their title
425 to absolute ownership of the tribal land by means of land
settlement. Because in Ottoman times the cultivators had no legal title
to the land which they occupied, the landlords were able, during
the period of the mandate, to use their political power to secure
legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the property
of the tribe. In much the same way the English landlords of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enclosed land as their
property which was traditionally common property, and ousted
small holders whose title was based only on custom. As in
nineteenth century England, the process is being hastened by
mechanization, which gives the big landowners an advantage as
against the small cultivator, and by inflation, which gives them
● 565 the impetus to invest. The big landowners of Iraq are a
comparatively recent creation, and it is the economic and legal changes
of the past twenty years which have established their position.

423 *Northern Iraq.* In northern Iraq there is a different type of land
tenure and fewer large landowners. South of Mosul, in the fertile
471 Tigris Valley, where pumps have been installed, there is a tribal
system resembling that of the south, and the land is owned
mainly by tribal sheikhs and notables. West of Mosul, on the
rolling uplands with poor rainfall, the land is also held on
471 a tribal system. In this region in recent years there has been
a rapid introduction of machinery; and the sheikhs are extending
their power to acquire land. In future bigger imports of
machinery will probably cause them to extend their influence

423 ness of putting the fluid tribal system into a rigid mould, and a mould which gives the sheikhs undue power. When the tribes have completely disintegrated, it has been not unjust, as in some districts of the north and in Basra liwa. But in the purely tribal areas of Muntafiq, Amara, and Diwaniya liwas and the Kurd hill districts of Ruwandiz and Amadiya it has met with the same incompatibility which was the reason for the failure of the *tapu* system. In these districts the settlement commissioners have confirmed the legal title deeds, in Muntafiq and other areas over the heads of the actual occupants. In Amara, even sirkals and sub-tribal chiefs have no prescriptive rights to the land and have not been able to prove occupancy.

Hence the settlement law really needs drastic changes to enable satisfactory settlement of tribal areas, in particular to give title to tribal occupants of land, even if valid *tapu* titles are possessed by sheikhs.

● √65 *The Sheikh as Landowner*. This wholesale alienation of the land in large blocks to the sheikhs causes injustice to the cultivators and also creates great obstacles to future development. The sheikhs as a class are wealthy and important, since they control stocks of grain, and hoard the output of their estates: but they have no value in relation to the management of production. 'He is in fact too big a man to be a farmer and too indolent, corrupt and uneducated to make of himself anything else. As regards agricultural activity, the sheikh is completely unimportant; he takes little interest in seed or ground preparation, is more ignorant than his farmers about such matters and performs his large-scale water-sharing functions at the request and on the representations of his farmers and through his agents.'[1] Thus the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous, and oppressive.

423 In the areas where the tribal system still functions as a reality no land settlement has really been undertaken at all, that is,
√79 in Amara (mainly rice fields), in Diwaniya, where the risks are too great, and in the Muntafiq where there is an endless struggle between the Sadun family, who claim to be the principal

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[1] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Amara Liwa', 1944.

Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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The difficulty in the way of these proposals is that they all presuppose some limitation on the power of the large proprietors which the Government must carry though. Yet the Government itself is composed of the large proprietors. In many parts of the country the sheikhs are still an essential part of the administrative system, and are local authorities who can, if need be, oppose the central Government. In the programme of the present Iraqi Government it is stated that one of the aims of economic policy should be 'to encourage small ownership and make it a basis for agricultural development in all parts of Iraq, and to set maximum and minimum limits for ownership on all future agricultural projects to be undertaken by the Government in *miri sirf* lands.' But it seems improbable that this proposal, which would necessitate revision of the titles granted under land settlement in recent years, will actually be put into effect. Indeed it is as useless to expect that the existing regime will take steps to reverse or check the extension of large ownership as it would have been to expect the oligarchic governments of nineteenth-century England to stop the advance of enclosures. There is as yet no political force to counterbalance the large landowners, and until one develops there is not likely to be any limitation on their power.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIETY

Something of the composition of society in Rowanduz 565 has been seen in the preceding pages, as well as the distinction between "wealthier" and "poorer" families, but the social structure of the town is much more complex than its cleavages along lines of occupation or of wealth, and requires more extended discussion, of particular importance inasmuch as this has proven the most significant area of change in recent decades. To approach this problem it is again necessary to have initial reference to the country as a whole, for in this larger province certain things of relevance to the life of the town must be appreciated. The [114] sociology of Iraq does not appear to have had any single, adequate exposition in recent years, although much of what will be said in this connection can be found scattered in a wide variety of publications, and is commonplace to residents and travelers in the region.

Of the several divisions of the society of Iraq, the 779 582 first is that between Muslims and non-Muslims. The adherents of Islam represent by far the greater part of the population, and, according to Quranic law, a Muslim girl cannot marry outside this group unless the suitor, if accepted, becomes a convert himself, a rule which is rigidly

k Dickson G-5 (1929-47) 1951 MI 1 Kuwait

Bedouins MJ4
Muntafiq

Iraq MH1

B 619 101 dismemberment, accompanied by regrouping, is the process which governs all Arab tribal evolution. Within the Bani Malik are two ancient and powerful federations which have from time immemorial been at strife, the Bani Khaiqan and the Mujarrah. There is some doubt as to whether either is of Bani Malik stock, which may account for the secular feud which exists between them.* The Bani Khaiqan are at present gathered under the hold of the Al Mughashghash, a clan of one of their largest sub-tribes, but the Mujarrah are split into a number of inferior groups and have no common head.

B 619 622 101 I 565 The history of the Muntafiq league is inseparably linked with that of the Sa'adun. The very name of Muntafiq, as used in 'Iraq, refers only to the ruling family and to its slaves and dependants who are reckoned to be an integral part of it. No tribesman in 'Iraq would call himself Muntafiq though he might use the word if he were in Mecca or Damascus where his own small tribe would be unknown, while the fame of the Muntafiq would be familiar to every Arabic-speaking community. The position of the Sa'adun, a matter of considerable importance in Southern Mesopotamian politics, has been determined partly by their origins and partly by Turkish official ignorance or intentional misunderstanding of their relation to the tribes. It must be borne in mind that the Sa'adun belong to the social order of the desert and have not succumbed to the local influences which have affected the tribal population of 'Iraq, who are, like themselves, immigrants from Arabia, but usually immigrants of an earlier period, and as settlers on the soil have been brought into more I 565 B [795] 622 intimate contact with Mesopotamian traditions. The Sa'adun have preserved the characteristics of Badawin Arabia. They are Sunnis and Ahl al Baiyir, people of the camel; their *dirahs* are in the Hamad west of the Hai or south of the Euphrates, where they have dug or re-opened wells in their accustomed camping grounds. Here they repair after the early rains, and here they assume their natural part as independent chieftains of the desert. The 'Iraq tribes, who have acknowledged them as overlords, differ from them in every particular. They are Shi'ahs, settled or half-settled cultivators and marshmen, whose link with the desert people has long been broken; socially inferior,

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* The Bani Khaiqan are said to be originally 'Ajwad and the Mujarrah to be Bani Sa'id.

Muntafiq

Iraq MH1

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but strong numerically, and stronger still in their hereditary hold upon the land they occupy.

The Muntafiq league under the Sa'adun remained until the time of Mid-hat Pasha, in 1871, almost independent of Turkish rule. From the middle of the sixteenth century onwards, however, they seem to have paid tribute to the Turks. The first mention of this tribute is in 1747, when the Resident at Basra reported that the Muntafiq were in rebellion against the Turks because of the tribute imposed on them. In 1769 they again rebelled under their shaikh 'Abdullah on account of arrears of the tribute which the Turks had attempted to exact. In 1776 the Muntafiq helped the Turks to defend Basra against the Persians under Karim Khan, but were defeated and presumably submitted to the Persians during the three years of the Persian occupation, which ended in 1779. In May 1787 the Sa'adun Shaikh Thuwaini entered Basra with a large force, took possession of the town and the Turkish fleet and imprisoned the Musallim, but was expelled from Basra by the Pasha of Baghdad in October 1787.

Between 1797 and 1802 the Muntafiq formed the chief bulwark of Basra against the Wahhabis. In 1798 they marched with the Turks into Hasa against the Wahhabis, and in 1801 the Shaikh Thuwaini, already mentioned, led an expedition against the Wahhabi capital, but was murdered not far from Kuwait.

Between 1810 and 1817 the Muntafiq seem to have been in open rebellion against the Pasha of Baghdad. In 1813 'Abdullah Pasha of Baghdad marched against the Muntafiq chief, Humud al Thamir, but was defeated near Basra, captured and put to death. Upon this the Sa'adun greatly extended their power and ruled up to Samawah. Da'ud Pasha of Baghdad attempted about 1817 to break up the tribe by nominating a rival chief in opposition to Humud, but the intrigue failed, and after the deposition of Da'ud Pasha in 1831 Humud's son, Majid, regained the old independence and ascendancy of the Sa'adun. In 1850 the Muntafiq districts were torn by feuds in which the Turks feebly interfered, Faris ibn 'Ajil being finally recognised as the principal chief.

From this time onward the Turks began getting a firmer hold over the Muntafiq by constantly changing the shaikhs and setting them one against the other, increasing on the occasion of each change the tribute

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
511 utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.

Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
369 of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
433 to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
511 for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
566 land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
423 house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
471 directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
566 more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
and write to obtain more information.

Iraq m#1

000 and write to obtain more information. Most rural people have not yet learned such
369 fundamental principles as crop rotation to enrich the land, the concept of germs, or the principles of infection and contagion. Under their circumstances they
311 have not been able to acquire a growing store of knowledge or of experience to pass down for the advancement of each successive generation. In other words, the people of rural Iraq have had little cultural heritage or growth.

5. Attitudes and Social Organization

369 Also fundamental to their poverty are attitudes derived from their social position and relationships with their sheikhs and landowners. Virtually imprisoned
566 by their condition of total dependence and debt, rural people have developed deep feelings of powerlessness and futility. Many of these attitudes stem from a
181 weakening of historical tribal relationship in which there were greater reciprocal
178 obligations between leaders and the people. Now they become unbalanced when the traditional tribal social system degenerates as sheikhs abandon their tribal responsibilities and take tribal lands as their personal possessions. The tribesman becomes detached from his social group. His dependence becomes greater upon the whims of his sheikh. This leader feels less and less obligation as the state and local governments assume those responsibilities for the welfare of the people which the sheikh formerly performed.

III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL PEOPLE

000 A. A PROBLEM REQUIRING TOTAL GOVERNMENT ACTION

The causes of the rural problems as briefly described obviously indicate that nothing less than a full scale attack upon them by all ministries and agencies of the government will bring about the desirable changes and improvements. Economic and social development of the rural people is not only necessary for their own welfare but for the welfare and progress of Iraq as a whole. A national economic and social development programme for rural peoples under the co-operative planning and direction of government leaders is needed. This programme should integrate into single, national, social plan of action the present and planned government activities of land and water development. The provisions should include as well as new plans for making ownership of farms available to tenants and landless people, credit, accessible to these small farmers at reasonable rates, instruction in new agricultural practices, establishment of public health and professional medical services available for all people, provision of education for every child, advice and demonstration in the improvement of housing, instruction in home and child care, establishment of social services for the needy, ill, blind and orphaned, construction of access roads to allow marketing of farm products from every village, development of village industries and the organization of communities for participation in an ultimate direction of their local affairs. This will take time, effort, money, careful study and planning, and increased inter-ministry and agency co-operation before it can be put into effect. The information and skills now exist to undertake this national campaign. It is a programme on which national leaders and with technical assistance from abroad can unite in their thinking and their efforts to build a solid agricultural economy as the foundation of Iraq.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

GROWTH OF BRITISH INTERESTS

From the Treaty of 1820, arising primarily from the necessity 175
of safety for commerce, dated the beginnings of the political supremacy of Great Britain over the Arabs of the Gulf. It was eventually replaced in 1853 by a Treaty of Peace in perpetuity which stipulated that 'perfect maritime truce' now established 'for evermore' should be enforced by the British Government. All acts of aggression were to be referred to the British authorities in the Persian Gulf.[1]

Traffic in slaves in the Gulf had been forbidden in Article 9 175*
of the Treaty of 1820, but it had not been noticeably affected 439
by the prohibition. Additional treaties and agreements 567
attempted to deal with the traffic,[2] but only the presence of British men-of-war on patrol in the Gulf, with orders to seize all slaving ships, effectively suppressed it.

Experience gained from the early attempts to deal with the 175*
pirates, especially after the expeditions of 1809 and 1819, had shown the necessity for charts of the Persian Gulf. Preliminary surveys had been undertaken in 1772 of the coast, and in 1785 of the Shatt al-'Arab as far as Basra, but not until 1820 was the work resumed under Captain Philip Maughan and later under Captain Guy.[3] The surveys continued for nine years, forming the basis of the present charts of the Gulf. Other surveys, principally in Turkish Arabia, were made throughout the century until the outbreak of the war in 1914.[4]

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[1] Aitchison, *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Delhi, 1933, 5th ed.), Vol. XI, Persian Gulf, No. XXIV.

[2] Ibid., Vol. XIII (Calcutta, 1933, 5th ed.). Persia, Nos. XV, XVI, XIX; ibid., Vol. XI, Persian Gulf Nos. IX, XX, XXIII, XXVIII, XXIX.

[3] Low, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 185 ff.

[4] Chesney, in 1835-6, made surveys of the Tigris and Euphrates, a work carried on by Cmdr. Henry Blosse Lynch, from 1837 to 1840, when he surveyed the Tigris from Mōsul to Ctesiphon and sections of the Euphrates. Capt. J. C. Hawkins explored the Euphrates with great difficulty for some 500 miles above Basra in 1838. In 1840-2, the Tigris below Baghdad was surveyed by Lieutenant C. D. Campbell. Commander Felix Jones, 1843-54, explored the Persian hills from Baghdad to Mōsul, and made surveys from Musaiyib to Baghdad. In 1841-2, and again in 1856, Captain W. S. Selby made surveys from Babylon to Sāmawa and up the Kārūn river. See: Wilson, Sir A. T., *Persian Gulf* (1928), pp. 281 ff. Low, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 31 ff., pp. 403 ff; also, Hoskins, H. L., *British Routes to India* (1928), pp. 180-2.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

1. THE STORY OF HAJJI ALI, THE GREAT SULTAN AND HIS SON, THE AMIR KHEYYUN

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
√56 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
438 rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
√78 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A STORY CONCERNING THE IGNORANCE OF SLAVES

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
● 567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

365 power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Basra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

466 The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

511 In domestic living standards, if it was true that the moderniza-
tion and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle
362 classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes
than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise
above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private
life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their
domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of
interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two
177 generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance
and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more
generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much
ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now
562 narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women
learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law,
followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work,
and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the
franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded
were still considerable, and included the households of many
leading notables and the royal family itself.

517 Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families,
by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western
type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop
[265] kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within
the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and
business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include
● 575 the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class profes-
526 sional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various
branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered [575]
by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526
survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in
'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling,
was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place
in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America.
Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542
well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by
two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs
and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course
in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now
under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of
a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's
patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the 434
poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying 369
the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is
true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to
Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape
from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in
austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529
summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in 212
the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world 178
upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts,
easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development,
an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and
local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world
and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted,
was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of
1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those
affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology 814
apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

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[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

x874 varies from six periods a week as a minimum for professors to twelve
x875 periods as a maximum for instructors.

Student life and activities.—Most of the men students and about half the women are boarders, their accommodations being in dormitories, for private rooms do not exist. A student committee, elected each term, looks after the physical arrangements, setting down the weekly menu, superintending the reception of provisions from the contractor, and supervising kitchen and dining-room. It has the power to reject any food supply that it considers unfit, and the contractor is obliged to replace it.

●[575] There are various student societies and clubs that hold regular meetings and receptions. Some societies, such as the Arab Culture Society, the English Society, the Social Science Society, the Science Society, and the Art Society, follow subject lines. The Mirth and Entertainment Society occasionally holds parties at which skits and comic plays are presented, and there is a more serious dramatic group. The Cooperative Society, established with capital collected from selling shares to students, maintains a shop on the campus, chiefly for selling tea, coffee, and other refreshments. At the end of each year profits are distributed to the students. Recently a Students' Union was started to coordinate the activities of students and societies and to represent student interests before the College administration. Its members are elected from the student body and serve on a committee with two faculty members who are appointed by the dean. The Students' Union developed plans for issuing a College magazine, the first numbers of which have already appeared. It is hoped that the Students' Union will so develop as to increase the measure of self-government enjoyed by the students.

[526] The athletics program is limited by the nature of the College grounds, which are not yet well prepared for sports. However, soccer is played to some extent, and among indoor games basketball and volleyball, ping-pong, and badminton are popular. Competitions between classes and between individuals are common, and there are occasional intercollegiate competitions. Track and field sports occupy some of the students part of the year, and an annual field-day competition among the higher colleges has been held for the last five years.

THE QUEEN 'ALIYAH INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN TEACHERS

The reorganization of the Primary Teachers College for Women as the Queen 'Aliyah Institute in October 1945, which opened a three-year course for training intermediate-school teachers, was an attempt to overcome the shortage of women teachers for intermediate schools at a time when it was

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East

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and the boys take the public certificate examinations. Instruction in mathematics and science and some other subjects is in English, but care is taken to cover the appropriate vocabularies in Arabic. An extensively equipped laboratory makes individual experiment possible in physics, chemistry, and biology. A large library circulates many books for collateral reading. Informal organizations include religious groups, the International Relations Club, various sports associations, a debating society, and a staff which publishes a school paper. 872ᵛ 873ᵛ

Another foreign agency which is making an important contribution to education in Iraq is the British Council. Institutes have been established in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk in which young men and young women are given an opportunity to prepare for proficiency examinations in English as well as for the London matriculation and intermediate examinations. Classes are held in the mornings for women and in the late afternoons and evenings for men. Fees are nominal and the classes are popular. A model kindergarten has also been established in Baghdad which is attended largely by children of English-speaking parents. Clubs which have both social and educational aims have been established in the larger cities. Lecture series, musical evenings, and discussion programs are regularly scheduled for these clubs. Educational films are distributed to schools and organizations in Baghdad. Although not a responsibility of the British Council, the reading rooms established in the smaller towns and larger villages by the Public Relations Department of the British Embassy are much used. Current magazines in English and Arabic are regularly supplied to these reading rooms and a small library of selected titles is available. A radio is usually supplied also. [575 544] [217]

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MHI Iraq MHI

*539 honour Rustam, the great prince of Kermanshah, and
527 they ate of the feast and the Prince Rustam also ate of the feast and drank of the wines until he was satisfied.

*539 Now amongst the guests was the Sultan of the Persians,
●576 the father of the girl, the wife of Rustam. So when all had laid aside their hands from eating, Rustam rose to give thanks to the Sultan and to the noble guests for their coming. And on the gathering fell a great silence when the prince rose up, that all might hear him with respect. So great was this silence that in the distance could be heard the buzzing of a bee and should a fly alight on the silken tablecloth, then the sound of its alighting was audible to all. Now, as the prince arose he noised a Noise. (May it be far from you.) Now let it not be hidden from you that the Persians have also some civilisation, and amongst them, as amongst us, though a man may sneeze, or cough, and even a belch need not bury him in shame, there is a Noise which none may make without lasting disgrace, and it was this Noise which came from His Highness, the Prince Rustam, Ruler of Kermanshah.

And the Sultan and the great sheikhs and great nobles and merchants and captains heard and were astonished. And from the distance came the sound of a laugh of a slave, for truly slaves are without dignity and they do not know that conduct which is proper and seemly. And the face of the Prince Rustam became black with shame, and he turned from the assembly and went.

And the Prince Rustam returned from that multitude to his palace, nor did he look on the faces of his friends. He took from his treasury a bag of gold and ordered to be saddled his swiftest horse and he prepared for departure. Of all his servants and attendants there came to him only one, and this was a boy, a page, who loved him. And the

page Qais said to Rustam, the prince: Permit me to 539*
accompany you, O my master. And that thing was 576
permitted him.

So they set forth, intending to reach the lands of the Russians, where the name of the prince and his history would not be known nor rumoured, and they rode on a path through the high mountains, and with them was neither guard nor escort. So it happened when they were 539*
traversing the lands of the Kurds that thieves seized the road and attacked them, and these thieves were of the tribes of the Hamavand. And the Prince Rustam drew his sword and as the thieves came he slew them till the road was piled with corpses, and the boy Qais drew his dagger and protected the back of Rustam his master.

But the tribes of the Kurds are numerous. Is it not said, El kurad, jurad (Kurds are locusts)? And in the morning of the second day the Hamavand came and prevailed over Rustam, and he fell wounded to the ground. They took from him his sword and his horse and his bag of gold, and his clothes and his shoes, but they left him lying on the ground, for they thought him dead. And the boy Qais they took to sell as a slave.

In the morning at the rising of the sun Rustam recovered and found himself lying naked on a road in Kurdistan, and he wandered and found a village and asked of them water and they gave it. But when he asked news of Qais the boy they did not answer nor did they comprehend his words. And from village to village he asked until finally the information was accorded him, and they said: There was such a boy as you describe, and he was bought by a rajah of the Hindus, and we saw him in his retinue on the road to India, and he was chained by both hands in a state of nakedness.

a thousand dinars in gold, and he had not a single coin in 539K
silver or in copper. And the witnesses said: The shepherd 443
boy wins the wager. 231

Maqdad took the purse of the merchant and put the coins of gold and silver with his own gold, but the copper coins he caused to be thrown to the poor. And he turned to the merchant and asked the price of the horse, and a price was agreed on and paid. Then Maqdad asked the merchant for the pedigree of the horse and for his name. The merchant was astonished, and asked: Do you ask the pedigree of the horse after the price has been agreed and paid? Maqdad replied: His pedigree is written in his legs and his back and his noble head, but it must also be recorded on paper, and that is what I require. And the merchant handed the pedigree to Maqdad, saying: Verily he is descended from the Prophet's noble mare, the feather coated, the most beautiful of all. His name is Rishan, for he is of that noble breed.

Maqdad took the horse Rishan and mounted him bare- 539K
back and rode to his home. And his mother brought out 576
the saddle of his father and it fitted the horse Rishan, and she brought out the weapons which she had cleaned till they gleamed in the sun. And she brought him a bag of dates and a bag of cheese and she said: Now shall you ride to the Tigris and to the camp of the tribes, and there shall you enter the guest tent and salute the assembly, and they will bid you to be seated and bring for you coffee. Then they will ask your name, for they do not know your face, 539K
then shall you reply: I am Maqdad son of Thamir son of 601
Degaither son of Mansur son of Maqdad son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Qais son of Hamed the Lame son of Mansur the Father of the Sword. And this name is a known name, and wherever you say it, there shall you be

X539 Maqdad came not. Rather he took another course, he turned and mounted Rishan, that noble horse, and he took up his great spear and he rode down on the Persian with the speed of the wind, nor could an arrow hit him, and in this manner he speared that Persian and killed him. Then he rode on to the two Persians who stood near the well and he came with such dash and speed that they had no time to draw the bow. And one of them he killed with his spear and the other fell down on the ground before him and begged mercy from him in the most abject manner. And Maqdad commanded the Persian to take off his clothes and the man did so and stood naked before Maqdad.

And Maqdad commanded and said to him: Go to your King, the Shah of the Persians, and enter his presence and salute him, and you shall be in your present naked state. And then shall you say to him: O mighty Shah, look to my condition and see my nakedness, for this shall be the condition of the land of Persia should you desist not from war with the Arabs. For when the men are slain who shall sow the fields? And the land of Persia shall become as barren and naked as I am now. And this is the message of Maqdad son of Thamir, the Arab warrior, and he is from the Fetla tribes. And Maqdad gave the Persian a horse from the six horses, and he mounted and rode off according to the order of Maqdad, nor was he wearing a single stitch of clothing.

Then Maqdad and Ibn Ali watered the horse Rishan,
and they continued their journey, taking with them the
five horses of the Persians, and their intention was to reach
X539 the camp of the tribes. And they rode until the sun was in
361 the west, then they saw the black tents. And they rode up
576 to the greatest tent of all, and it was the guest tent of the

Fetla, and they tethered the horses and entered and saluted 539x
the assembly. And seated there were the sheikhs and the 361
warriors of the tribe. They bade them be seated and they 576
brought for them coffee. And the Sheikh spoke to them and said: O strangers who have honoured us, may we know your names, and from whence you come, and from what tribe? And Maqdad replied and answered thus: My tribe is your tribe, for it was the tribe of my father Thamir son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Maqdad son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Qais son of Hamed the Lame son of Mansur the Father of the Sword. But know you I have not before entered amongst you as was fitting, nor have I fought in battle with you, as before I was of tender years, but now I am a man, and I am skilled in the art of war.

And the Sheikhs and the great men of the tribes who 539x
were there assembled said: Your name is a known name, for well we remember your father and your grandfather. And out of his great courtesy the Sheikh asked of them concerning their journey, and Maqdad related those events which are known to you, my listeners, nor did he omit any word from the account. And the Sheikh spoke and said: Concerning the magician Zoro, we had information that such a one existed, and we had searched for him, but we did not find him. You have done well to encompass his destruction, for God was with you. But as for these five Persians you say you have killed, know you that boasting is unseemly, and how could a beardless boy do this deed.

And Maqdad looked and he saw disbelief written in the faces of those there present, nor did they believe his words. So he said: Look not at my face, for it is smooth, and neither my moustache nor my beard is grown, but

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saw him would say: This is a merchant whose shop is worth ten thousand gold liras. 539x 556

Kadhim, dressed as a wealthy merchant, went out from the shop of the tailor and he returned to the shop of Abdul Rashid Mejid. He entered the shop and greeted Abdul Rashid Mejid and wished him the peace of God. And Abdul Rashid Mejid rose when he saw the wealthy merchant enter his shop, and he returned his greeting, and he ordered the shop boy to bring a glass of tea from the coffee house for the distinguished visitor. And Kadhim sat in the chair which Abdul Rashid Mejid placed for him. [576] •

Now, Kadhim, though a simple tribal boy, had travelled as far as Basra with the Sheikh, for in ancient times when the Sheikh travelled to Baghdad or to Basra he took fifty men in his retinue, that all who saw him might recognise his dignity and position and, as Kadhim had no land and no sheep, he used to accompany the Sheikh and eat at his expense in the hotels of Basra. So he had some knowledge of affairs.

Kadhim drank the glass of tea in the shop of Abdul Rashid Mejid and he asked after the health of his host. He said: Know you that I am a merchant of Basra and my trade is a general trade, and I deal in every article and every commodity, for my firm is a great firm with branches in India and in Persia and in Nejd. And let it be known to you that I have come to Hilla to seek a merchant of honesty and repute to act as my agent that I may transact various kinds of business at this place. So I asked from the great merchants and bankers of Baghdad that they give me the names of those merchants at Hilla who are reliable in their dealings, and they told me the name of your honour and of his honour our brother Abbas Ali el Qassab. But they said of the last named that water drips from his 539x

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x539
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A MAN'S HONOUR IS IN THE HAIR OF HIS MOUSTACHE

On the morning after the night in which we had heard the story of Maqdad, we halted for breakfast near Mussayib. Hamed said: You heard the story of Maqdad and you heard how the Persian Prince said that a man's honour is in the hair of his moustache. Now this is a true proverb of the Fetla tribes and I will relate how this saying originated, though truly the Prince was a man without honour, for he shaved off his moustache. And Abed said: If you know the true facts of the origin of this proverb, then tell us the story.

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was no fear in her heart, for she knew that Abbas Ali el 539x
Qassab would die before he could marry her. And Kadhim sat watching his snares and thinking: How can I become a great merchant? Kadhim was so poor that he had not even a single copper coin in his pocket; he owned [291]
no shoes, he had no headcloth, he was not even wearing any vest or underclothes, and his only garment was his thob. And Kadhim decided: I will borrow money, and trade with my capital and become a great merchant.

Then Kadhim went to the town and he was walking in 539
his bare feet, and he went to the shop of Abdul Rashid and 437
saluted the merchant and said: Give me a roll of cloth and 577
a loan of five gold liras and I will give you my pledge. And Abdul Rashid looked and he saw that the youth was dressed in a dirty and torn thob and that he was bareheaded and barefooted, but he saw that he carried his head like a hawk, so he said: You are, then, from the tribes? And Kadhim nodded and said: Yes.

Now, let it be known to you that the tribes were much poorer in the days of the Ottomans than they are today, for they were then unable to cultivate their land in peace and prosperity, and it often happened that it was necessary to celebrate a marriage or observe the rites of death when there was no money in the purse of the head of the house. Then would he go to the town and to a merchant and say: Give me cloth and money and take my pledge. And as for the pledge, if he had a gold or silver ring, he would give it, and if he had none then he would give his headcloth to the merchant, or even his riding switch, saying: This contains my honour. And when the pledge was given payment was always made, for this is the custom of the tribes.

Abdul Rashid Mejid looked at the youth Kadhim and

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x539 he saw that he was truly from the tribes, for his bearing
437 was proud and his gaze the gaze of the peregrine falcon.
577 So he said: Take the money and the cloth and give me your pledge. Then Kadhim's cheeks flushed red, for he had forgotten to bring a pledge with him, nor did he own a ring, and he had no headcloth and he owned no riding switch, for he had no horse. But his brain was quick and he thought and answered: Verily a man's honour is contained in the hair of his moustache, for it is his moustache that distinguishes his face from that of a woman or a boy. Therefore I shall give you one hair of my moustache as a pledge. And Abdul Rashid Mejid was astonished at the words of the youth.

Then Kadhim called for scissors and for a mirror, and he studied his face in the mirror and searched for a hair in his moustache which was less beautiful than the rest. And he found such a hair and snipped it off and gave it to Abdul Rashid Mejid. And Abdul Rashid Mejid took the hair and put it with the pledges, and he put it in a box with the rings and the headcloths and riding switches, and he gave Kadhim five gold liras and a roll of cloth.

Kadhim took the money and the cloth and he went to the shop of a tailor whom he knew and trusted, for the man's father was from the Fetla tribes. He said to the tailor: Take this cloth and this money and make me the clothes of a very rich merchant, and bring me a beard of sheep's wool which I will fasten to my face, and keep this a secret, for it is more important to me than life itself. And
x539 the tailor said: Cut my head to keep the secret. Then the
556 tailor made for Kadhim the clothes of a wealthy merchant and he brought for him a beard of sheep's wool, and when Kadhim had put on the beard and put on the clothes he looked so important and distinguished that anyone who

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x539 ONCE, in the days of Haroun er Rashid, Abu Nawas the friend and companion of the Commander of the Faithful was walking amongst the tents and reed huts of the poor people who lived on the outskirts of Baghdad, in search of amusement for his master. And as he was passing a tent he heard in it voices and they were raised in anger, and they were speaking in the slow tones of the people of the high desert, and Abu Nawas stopped to listen to their words.

x539 And a man's voice was speaking and its tones were the
• 577 tones of fury and it said: O daughter, you shall tell me the name of the man who is the father of this child, that I may kill him and I may kill you and our name may be again among the honourable. And a girl's voice answered and said: O my father, verily there was no man. Know you that one night last winter I had gone to fetch water, and the ground was frosty and the night had the coldness of death, and I was trembling with cold and the fear of the night air, when I saw on the ground a man's cloak, and I picked it up and wrapped it around me and I became warm. But, alas, from the smell of that cloak there came in my stomach a child.

Abu Nawas thought: Verily this is an affair in which my master will be interested, for does he not take an interest in everything touching the welfare of his subjects? So Abu Nawas entered the tent, and he found there an old man whose face was creased in fury, and a young girl beautiful of the face who was weeping in a manner to turn the heart, and in the hand of her father was a dagger.

x539 Abu Nawas commanded the man to lay his dagger aside and he said: Know you that I am a high officer of the State, and to disobey my orders will lose you your head. There is much in this affair of interest to justice. Therefore

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x539 IN the days of the Ottomans there was a wealthy merchant in Basra, and in God only is there belief. The name of the merchant was Mahmud, and his wealth exceeded that of all the merchants of Basra. He was rich with exceeding riches, and he had a wife like unto a star, for she was as graceful as the gazelle, her eyes were like spring pools in the desert, her skin was as delicate as rose petals, her breasts were as two ripe peaches towards which the hand desires to stretch, her waist was slender as a young sapling and her thighs were smooth and lovely. And in virtue she was beyond compare, for she was as the golden shelduck, who pairs only with her mate, and dies if she is deprived of him. The name of this girl was Leila, for she was born in the night, and she was in the seventeenth year of her life.

So Mahmud the Merchant had abundance of those things which make for pleasure in this world. Yet he was not happy nor were the great merchants and bankers his friends, for he was a miser greatly given to suspicion and
x539 doubt. His trade was a great trade and it was his custom
577 to go to the shroffs and bankers and he would give them
bags of Turkish gold, saying: Here are two thousand Hamidiya liras. Give me their equivalent in Indian rupees or in Persian tomans. The great bankers would take the bag and put it with their gold without opening it or counting it, for this was the custom of men of honour. But when they gave a bag to Mahmud, saying: Take these twenty-five thousand rupees, Mahmud would open the bag and count out the rupees one by one, biting each coin to see that it was good. A crowd would collect to watch him, and the people would say: See how Mahmud counts the money. The banker must be a cheat or the merchant would not behave like this.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

184 the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged
795 generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i,
[578] while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated. Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government itself.

563 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of
162 the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of
563 which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear
621 racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled them in a social organization which represented an identical response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes; but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization. About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur.
563 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds
795 of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their
197 homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan (Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary status.

563 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long
621 been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil, and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for
563 the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

embracing the State. Not yet had a sense of loyalty and duty 643 to the nation arisen to surmount the differences between tribes- [578 men and townsmen, between Sunnī and Shī'ī, and between 186] Muslims and minority communities or to replace personal opportunism. Patriotism still denoted independence without obligations to the State.

In his impatience with these materials at hand for the 643 creation of the new State, King Faisal may have gone farther than he was justified in attempting to mould the political institutions to his own will. On the other hand, it seems possible that had he not assumed the role of a benevolent despot, the political system of 'Iraq might have faltered and even collapsed entirely and the stable government insisted upon by the League of Nations as one of its criteria of 'Iraq's readiness for independence[1] would have been absent in 1932. It is equally probable that without King Faisal's guiding influence, supported by Great Britain, the 'Iraqī people in their impatience would have refused to agree to the obligations imposed by Great Britain as the price of her assistance. In the latter circumstance, Great Britain would have been forced to resume direct control or to withdraw from 'Iraq. Either course would undoubtedly have retarded for many years the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations and her acceptance as a member of the international community.

Upon the accession of King Ghāzī I, September 9th, 1933, the young King, barely turned twenty-one and not less of a Nationalist nor less mindful of his position than his father, attempted to use the immense popularity he had acquired as the result of his openly displayed approval of the campaign against the Assyrians,[2] to exert the power of the crown and to take the reins of control into his own hands, after the example of his late father. The Prime Minister, Rashīd 'Alī al Gailānī, although

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[1] *Official Journal*, November, 1931, pp. 2057 ff.

[2] *The Times*, September 1st, 11th, 1933. 'Iraqī-Assyrian relations are held to be outside the scope of this study. See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (1935), pp. 135 ff.

1. THE STORY OF HAJJI ALI, THE GREAT SULTAN AND HIS SON, THE AMIR KHEYYUN

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
556 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often
438 acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they
have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
578 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful
by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A STORY CONCERNING THE IGNORANCE OF SLAVES

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the
end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

619 from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be
178 seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships
631 had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads
[423] had become a Government function; more and more the local Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

619 Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old
177 tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came
369 with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

619 The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into
577 Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

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of Naṣir Pasha and later of his son Faliḥ to turn the tribesmen into docile tenants on the Saʿdun estates (which Ottoman land-registration policy had demarcated and bestowed under the feet of the age-long cultivators), and the attempt of Manṣur Pasha and later of his son, Saʿdun, to maintain all their old independence. Thus personal ambition and hatred joined with a clear issue of policy, with Government playing a rôle of vacillating opportunism. Year after year tribal war went on, with Turkish forces sometimes participating; civil government was almost wholly inoperative; yet settlement and tribe-breaking were all the time half-visibly proceeding. The day of a quiet tithe-paying Muntafiq peasantry was still distant; the fear of a united Muntafiq army was long past.

The middle-Euphrates tribes present for this period a confused picture of intricate local history. Typical of them are the Bani Ḥuchaym (Ḥukaym), the Shibil, Fatla, Khazaʿil, Bani Ḥasan, and the tribes of ʿAfak and Daghara, most of whom had been lately converted to Shiʿism and fell thereby under Mujtahid influence. Their records for the later nineteenth century show the increasing settlement of their shepherd sections, and the gradual introduction of rapacious yet feeble Turkish tax-gatherers. They show the endless bickering between tribes, accompanied by the bluster, looting, and unaimed rifle-fire which passes for tribal warfare; and the bitterer strife for the vacant headship of tribes, in which Mudir or Qa'immaqam would interfere when he could. In spite of the rare emergence of a unifying leader, the tendency was towards levelling, division, disunity. This was aided by the spread of the [423] new land-registry system and by the purchase of whole estates by the Saniya Administration which could develop its lands without tribal agency. The shifting of the Euphrates waters from the eastern to the western channel (p. 32) had profound effects in displacing the tribes, led to clashes, secessions, and invasions, and added to the immediate authority of Government as the only possible controller of Euphrates waters.

On the lower Tigris the close of the century was stormy with civil war. With lesser marsh tribes and the new non-tribal townships, the dominant groups were those of the camel-owning, grain-growing Bani Lam and the rice-growing Albu Muḥammad. The prosperity of both tribes depended on the Government allotment of the *muqaṭaʿas*,[1] whose periodical distribution led to bitter quarrelling. To the normal causes of tribal war was thus added a perpetual irritant, and to its normal practices that of preying on the Tigris river traffic. Armed attacks on this were a common

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[1] The *muqaṭaʿa* was (and is) a defined area (in some cases of great extent and productive value) of irrigable land, leased for a cash annual rent to a tribal shaykh; possession of a better *muqaṭaʿa* was an object of the keenest rivalry. 427

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

feature of 'Amara life, involving *Zaptié* escorts on the paddle-boats, protests to the Wali, telegrams to London by the Lynch managers, and punitive expeditions, often unsuccessful. Shaykh Bunaya was by wealth and guile paramount in the Bani Lam for twenty years, till his death in 1903. Power among the Albu Muḥammad lay, subject to endless rivalries, in the ruling house of Khalifa.

The central Tigris groups of the Rabi'a and Zubayd had outlived their days of united insurgence. They were fully settled since the mid-century, and the Zubayd had suffered the secession of large elements to the Ḥilla district. The growth of the steamer-fuelling townships—'Aziziya, Ṣuwayra, Bughayla, and Kut itself—had brought a measure of Government control and economic opportunity.

Across the Jabal Ḥamrin in the submontane region of Mosul wilaya, Government had at all times been relatively strong and the tribes—Bayat, Da'udiya, Diza'i—in general unaggressive if pettily lawless. In the higher foothills and the true mountain country of the southern and central Kurds, which included wide patches of non-tribal territory, dwelt under their hereditary Aghās such strong communities as the Zangana, Jabbari, Ṭalabani, Shaykh Bizayni, Girdi, Surchi, Khushnau, Piran, Pishdar, Baradost, and a score of lesser names. These, generally homogeneous in speech and habit, were well armed and mounted, proud of their traditions, not unprosperous, suspicious or scornful of Turkish pretension; and the authority of their Aghās far exceeded that of the unhappy Mudir or Qa'immaqam sent to govern them. Their lawless self-centred life was still that of a millennium of ungoverned valley lordship; Turkish claims were in great part unenforceable, and strife endemic; yet the penetration of more modern ways had been for fifty years insistent, and with many a local setback and humiliation continued to gain ground.

Turkish control, at its best in the accessible flatter lands, was at its feeblest, to vanishing point, in the mountains. The Hamawand of Bazyan district, most famous of robber tribes, had raided as far afield as Russian territory, terrorized the Kirkuk countryside, returned intact from distant banishment, and lived on varying terms with the venerated Barzinji Sayids. The Jaf, with settled sections in Persia and the Gul'anbar Plain, were still nomadic between the two countries. Under united leadership—that of Maḥmud Pasha over the nomads and his brother 'Uthman Pasha in Ḥalabja, which he and his emancipated Persian wife 'Adila Khanim had largely built and wholly controlled—they could defy Government, refuse taxation, uproot telegraph lines, and recall the ways of the ancient Dere Beys. Attitudes no more amenable prevailed in the frontier territory of the Pishdar, who since 1893, when

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been 619 formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable as Qa'immaqam. 579 The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it 511 has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. 135 Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya 315 Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Naftchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Naftkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, 471 significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. 433 There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver "Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631 foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The 'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, [181] unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between [579 town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. 182] Such was the territory which for four centuries the Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642 these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631 generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642 dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, 185 which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every new meticulous Ordinance in Midḥat Pasha's revised wilaya system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565 a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647 were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

369 182 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

668 563 369 The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unimportant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Hilla, Başra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

● 579 674 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained, and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation [731] of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913) the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Başra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the 579
period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of
Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It 674
was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest
eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq
of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg,
General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in
June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant
of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings 368
of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in
the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra.
The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Ḳurdish, developed fast.
Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja
under its Jāf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals 743
and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The
Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building
for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their
Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrange- 744
ments in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely
a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to
combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels 368
appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enter- 185
prise, a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple 439
exports of the territory still varied annually according to the
harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates,
grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and
the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage
and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The
increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly
the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin,
partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater
demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate
inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are else-
where mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at [453] Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 178 579 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 721 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

*645 669 confessions made by alleged participants, death sentences were passed on five of the accused, including Ḥikmat, and long terms of imprisonment on others, while some were acquitted. The commutation of the death sentence for one of imprisonment on four of the condemned was soon afterwards announced by Royal Irada; that of Ḥikmat Sulayman was mitigated only after persuasive pressure by the British Ambassador and by private British as well as 'Iraqi friends. There remained—and remain today—among persons well qualified to judge, many who, in spite of the confessions, believed and believe the whole plot to be fictitious and its 'discovery' designed merely to serve political or personal ends.

643 A part of the objects of the alleged conspiracy was after all to be achieved, and this by a tragic accident. The King, driving his car with habitual recklessness late in the night of 3 April, crashed into an electric-power standard near his palace, and died a few hours later of the severe fractures of the skull which he had sustained. The announcement of his death was made early on the 4th. The Council of Ministers, urgently convened, received the written testimony of Queen 'Aliya that Ghazi had wished to be succeeded, should the case ever arise during the infancy of his son, by a Regency of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah, son of the late King 'Ali. A sufficient number of members of the dissolved Chamber were gathered to ratify this in accordance with the Constitution; and the succession of King Fayṣal II, then aged almost four years, and the Regency of the Amir were proclaimed.

King Ghazi was twenty-seven. He had reigned for nearly six years. Little interested in the formal functions of his office, and barely persuaded to fulfil them, his faults of heedlessness and frivolity, his impatience of protocol and of advice, had been embarrassing to his successive Governments, and at times discourteous to his subjects. But at his best he lacked neither intelligence nor charm. He was a good sportsman, a brilliant high-speed motor driver, and popular with the young Army officers who were his chosen and natural associates. He was beloved, at a distance, by many of his subjects for his youth, vitality, and evident patriotism. The little Fayṣal II, attended always by an English nurse and later an English governness, was known to be an intelligent and attractive child. The new Regent, brother of Queen 'Aliya and uncle of the King, was now aged twenty-seven. He had been educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and although hitherto unversed in public affairs was considered serious and intelligent, and likely to turn his personal charm and excellent social gifts to good account.

643 579 The King's funeral at the Royal Mausoleum was attended by many Arab visitors from abroad and by tens of thousands of his

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

own subjects. It evoked extraordinary emotion. The fantastic 643 story that his death had been 'arranged' by the British Secret 579 Service was propagated by the German wireless, and perhaps also by Dr. Grobba. It was believed by the more feeble-minded part of the hysterical city mob, and was responsible for a shameful and brutal attack, immediately following a memorial service to King Ghazi, on the British Consul at Mosul, Mr. G. E. A. C. Monck-Mason. Surrounded by a rabble of excited demonstrators, he was stoned and then struck fatally on the head, on the veranda of his own Consulate. The Prime Minister, deeply afflicted by this outrage, offered apologies to the British Ambassador and ordered compensation to be paid to the Consul's widow. His funeral at Mosul was public and impressive; 'Iraqi officialdom and the Army were well represented. Severe sentences were passed on a small number of the participants in the attack, in which as usual students had been prominent; the murderer himself was not discovered.

3. FIRST MONTHS OF WAR

The five months preceding the outbreak of the Second World 645 War were a period of outward tranquillity in 'Iraq. The King's funeral visitors returned home, the Regent settled to his task. The Sa'idi Ministry, resigning office on 4 April in accordance with the Constitution, was reinstated by Royal Irada two days later, without change of personnel. The Minister of Interior, Naji Shawkat, whose tepid support on the conspiracy case and on others had created a breach between him and the Premier, resigned late in April. Nuri Pasha himself took the portfolio of Interior, and brought 'Ali Jawdat to Foreign Affairs. The elections were completed in May, though martial law was still in force until August in Mosul and Baghdad. Parliament was opened by the Regent on 12 June. His Speech from the Throne appealed to all for tranquillity and restraint. Chosen by the habitual procedures, the Chamber included a large majority of Nuri Pasha's supporters and, contrary to all precedent, was destined for a life of four years. Nevertheless, the shadow of the Army still lay heavily over 'Iraqi politics, and the Chamber itself contained deputies enough willing to renew all the old animosities. Among them were followers of the German lead which was still ceaselessly offered, convinced Anglophobes still resentful of the 1930 Treaty and its alleged limitations on 'Iraqi freedom, thwarted members of the intelligentsia, and pan-Arabs bitter at the Palestine White Paper which 'Iraq, at this stage, rejected. The cause of the Palestinian Arabs 648 was not visibly advanced by the journeys of the Prime Minister to 'Amman, Beirut, and Cairo in August, ever seeking a formula

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

721 648x lately back in Baghdad triumphant—left hurriedly for Syria, preceded by such of their aircraft as could fly. The Regent Sharaf accompanied ministers to Persia. Yunis Sab'awi, Minister of Economics, appointed himself Military Governor of the capital, and exhorted the demoralized public to organize a final resistance; but his power, if any, lasted barely a day. He fled; and the Generals were not far behind, abandoning their posts and duties as their ill-judged and mischievous adventure ended in fiasco. The steadfast Mayor, Arshad al-'Umari, alone remained to preserve what order he could, to direct dissolution of the armed gangs of the Youth Movement, and on 30 May to form a Committee of Internal Security with the strong support of law-abiding opinion. On the evening of that day, sponsored by Knabenshue, he appeared at the British Embassy. Cornwallis at his instance sent a wireless message to the G.O.C. at Ḥabbaniya to receive, if he would, a flag of truce that night. 728 648x Terms of armistice—not of peace, since war had never been declared—were without difficulty arranged between the Ambassador and the Security Committee. They provided for a cease-fire, the continued independence of the country and retention of its Army intact, release of prisoners, arrest of enemy (German or Italian) forces, and the opening of all communications in 'Iraq in accordance with the Treaty: conditions which showed both magnanimity and good sense. A detachment of British troops entered Baghdad on the following day, and British residents in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk could emerge from a month-long captivity which, not without its humours, had been galling, humiliating, and anxious, to find many of their houses looted. The attitude of the Baghdad crowds was sullen and bitter; the effects of dashed expectations and the aftermath of long-drawn Axis propaganda were slow to disappear.

727 579 The Regent had passed three weeks in Palestine and Jordan. He returned to 'Iraq on 22 May escorted by his faithful ministers and by a British representative, Colonel G. de Gaury, and broadcast once more to his people. The Guard of Honour which welcomed him to Ḥabbaniya was composed of 'Iraqi troops and officers who had surrendered to the British at Sinn al-Dhibban while fighting for his enemies and supplanters, and who now without effort changed sides again. The Amir entered Baghdad on 1 June, welcomed by the British Ambassador and by crowds of his own well-wishers. But the sinister possibilities of the hour, and the urgent need to install a Government, were overlooked in the glow of acclamation and victory; the night of 1 June and part of 2 June were disgraced by serious bloodshed and looting in quarters of Baghdad, with violent hooliganism directed against the Jews. The outbreak had in large part been organized by the fugitive military

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

officers on the scale, they hoped, of a counter-revolution; it represented partly also reprisals by the Youth Movement, of whom many were caught red-handed, and partly the brutality and avarice of the lowest mob elements. The Committee of Internal Security was caught unawares, the Police proved unreliable and impotent, and order was restored only by troops brought in from outside. At noon on 2 June Jamil al-Madfaʿi assumed with reluctance the task of forming a Ministry, and set himself to the restoration of normal tranquillity. A reliable Mutaṣarrif assumed charge at Baṣra. 727 579

The movement thus overcome will long bear, in obloquy or praise, the name of Rashid ʿĀli. His part in it was in fact both unsought and limited. Willing himself to keep in good outward relations with Britain, at least until her defeat was certain, and never as rabidly xenophobe as many another, he was forced first to specific disagreement and then to actual hostilities with the ex-Mandatary by the pressure of his military backers, whom in spite of all precedent he had hoped to control, and by the impatience of his own closest followers. Unmoved by any principle of loyalty to treaties, basically unfriendly to Great Britain, and impetuous and self-confident by nature, he had yet never committed himself to Germany, as had the Generals and Naji Shawkat; he had hoped always to achieve a subtle neutrality and to gain, if possible, for his country from both sides. Rashid ʿĀli's acts in his last premiership represent no settled conviction or resolute policy; he drifted or was forced from step to step. Whoever, indeed, had assumed the premiership on 1 April, in conditions which made the Army leaders all-powerful, must either have played a part not unlike Gaylani's, or soon made way for another to do so. There were other policies, other convictions in the ʿIraq of the moment—but no other power than the Army. 721 648x

If timing had been concerted with the Germans, and their help punctual, the movement, however achieved, could scarcely have failed. A few hundred German troops, a few score of aircraft, could have occupied ʿIraq and vitalized its Army, could have dominated Persia and its oil, closed the southern doors to Russia, and threatened the Levant from the east. That such was not the outcome followed from three factors: the feeble irresolution of the ʿIraq Army at Ḥabbaniya and thereafter; the failure of the Axis to provide timely help, thanks to the British resistance in Crete and to Hitler's plans for the invasion of Russia; and the rapidity and successful bluff of the light British forces. The British intervention, still today condemned by ʿIraqi irreconcilables as unjustifiable 'interference', in fact saved the country first from military dictatorship, then from certain German occupation, and finally from identification with the losing side in the War.

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of 648ˣ
an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand
late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab
nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep
troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to
refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government
for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte
proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government
while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully
rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it 722
was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this
régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the disturbing 656
hostilities between civil and military authorities continued,
and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a
battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local
general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with
Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in
Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street [668]
demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the
Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground
organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the
seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective 563
alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism,
which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish 579
separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to
endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an
uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration
of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and
the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes
were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 Mutaṣarrifs protested to the Minister of Interior at the military 579 reign of terror in their liwās and forced the resignation of the Minister of Defence, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam. The arrest of the Chief Rabbi and the conviction and hanging of a rich Jewish merchant, Shafiq Adis—but not of his Muslim associates—was disapproved by much of the public. The press was allowed full freedom to attack the British as having created all the troubles of Palestine as well as of 'Iraq: to call the oil companies truculently to account: and to assail with rage the well-reasoned pamphlet which Nuri Sa'id issued, on his return home at midsummer, in justification of the Portsmouth Treaty.

×645 The reinstatement of the Treaty supporters was, indeed, a feature of these months; Ṣaliḥ Jabr was welcomed back to Baghdad in July, Nuri could re-enter politics in the same summer, Shakir al-Wadi succeeded Baṣṣam as Minister of Defence in October, Jamali was sent as Minister to Cairo, and all were once again 665 candidates for high office by the end of the year. Party activity was limited by the abnormal conditions, and the National Democrat and the Liberal Parties, both handicapped by shortage of funds, complained of undue restriction and ceased active operation in December. The Independence Party remained vigorous. A series ×645 of Cabinet changes was made in October, after months in which portfolios passed from hand to hand among acting ministers. Shakir al-Wadi came to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Interior, and 'Ali Jawdat from Washington to Foreign Affairs. Muḥammad al-Sayhud, Amir al-Rabi'a, rejoined the Cabinet as minister without portfolio, and Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, who while under medical treatment in London gave up his post at Interior but remained in the Cabinet, resigned a month later. 'Ali Mumtaz, resigning from Finance in November, was replaced after an interval by the experienced Director-General of Customs, Khalil Isma'il, and 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan on becoming President of the Chamber was succeeded at Economics by 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, the Minister of Social Affairs. Najib al-Rawi, Minister of Education and 'Iraqi representative at Lake Success, returned home. The Speech from the Throne on 1 December, when Parliament met, 7 was politically colourless.

The Pachachi Ministry, clearly unable to master its manifold problems, survived the last weeks of 1948 only by the support of the Portsmouth Treaty-makers, Nuri Sa'id and Ṣaliḥ Jabr. Muzaḥim's favour of Egypt as the strongest Arab Power and his favourable response to interventionist demonstrations on 30 and 31 December clashed with Army views—indeed, with those of every realist—and created an impasse from which a change of Government was the only outlet. He resigned office on 6 January 1949.

assignable tenure, in accordance with the provisions of Book I of the Land Code and connected legislation. This tenure can only exist in virtue of an express grant from the State. To be valid such a grant must be registered in the Land Registry and be vouched for by a certificate of such registration (tapu sanad). A prescriptive right to a grant of State land in tapu tenure (known as haq el qarar) is recognised by the Ottoman Code, although the exact meaning of certain important conditions of such recognition is still debated. 423

Under the regular operation of the Land Code all State land held and used by the public should be acquired and possessed in tapu tenure. The rights and obligations of this tenure are for the most part admirable. But, as already emphasised, its operation depends upon (i) a systematic initial granting of State land under this form of tenure to those judged best entitled to it, and (ii) the construction and subsequent maintenance to date of an exact and reliable Land Register of the rights conferred or derived thereunder. No systematic initial grant of tapu tenure was made or indeed can have been practicable when the Code was introduced. Consequently tapu tenure remained an occasional and imperfectly realised privilege of the few, instead of the regular tenure of State land it was intended to be. In many cases grants in tapu tenure were no doubt made to those best entitled to enjoy its rights and best able to discharge its obligations. But as a rule grants were made without any satisfactory investigation of conflicting claims. And in nearly all cases the definition of the land, which was purported to be affected, was incredibly ambiguous and vague.

Under these circumstances it would have been impossible to construct and maintain an intelligible and reliable Register of tapu tenure, even if the methods of doing so had been better understood. Actually a study of the working of the Ottoman Land Registries both in el 'Iraq and elsewhere demonstrates that this knowledge was lacking. Indeed the wider experience of the world shows that the construction and maintenance of a reliable Land Register has presented serious difficulties even to the best organised and equipped administrations.

The Ottoman Government had recognised before the war their failure to apply tapu tenure throughout their territories, as well as the basic causes of that failure. And they had enacted legislation empowering a systematic re-investigation and settlement of rights to land to be made vilayet by vilayet. It was intended that this settlement of rights should be based on a cadastral survey and be accompanied by a comprehensive valuation of the land and the establishment of an entirely new Land Register.*

4. The granting of tapu tenure in so many cases throughout el 'Iraq, [579] without proper investigation and settlement either (i) of the rights of those already attached to the soil or (ii) of the boundaries of the parcels which were purported to be affected, sowed a crop of conflicting claims throughout the country, which bore the seed of perpetual discontent and hardship, and in some districts periodically produced violent outbursts of lawlessness. The registered tapu holder (mutassarif), who [427] possibly had family or economic ties with the land, who probably had conformed with the formalities prescribed by a Land Registry Official, and who no doubt acquired his uncertain rights for valuable or other consideration, claimed the position of landowner (mallak).† As such he demanded the landowner's share (mallakiya) in the produce, and asserted his right to mortgage the land and to bring in new cultivators if he wished.

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* Ottoman Provisional Law of Survey and Registration of Immovable Property, 1 Rabi Awal, 1331.

† *Mallak* should properly be restricted to *mulk* property. A tapu holder is not an owner, but a *mutassarif* or the holder of registered usufructuary possession (*tasarruf*).

423 579 But occupying cultivators in the South, while recognising tribal allegiance and the State's legal ownership (raqaba) of the land, commonly regarded their tribal group as possessors of the soil by immemorial right, whatever the period of its occupancy of the land might in fact be. They frequently resented any demand for mallakiya, and indeed any claims to overlordship other than those of the State. It should not be assumed that in such disputes one side was invariably unjustly acquisitive or the other side obstinately recalcitrant. Each party doubtless thought that substantial justice lay on its side. Circumstances alter cases and it is neither possible nor useful to generalise on the point. It is the removal of the injury caused by these longstanding differences, alike to agricultural prosperity and to public peace, that is the objective, not the justification or satisfaction of particular disputants. As is well known this need was so strongly impressed on Government by recurring violence along the Hai and in the Muntafiq, occasioned by the perennial disputes arising out of the differences mentioned, that a law regulating the investigation and settlement of the conflicting claims in these areas was enacted two years ago and is now in course of application.*

621 622 423 178 In the northern rainfall zone the people generally lived in regular villages, under the shadow of a local *agha* or other notable, and cultivated the soil and pastured their flocks round about. As there was ordinarily more land than men to till it, land was brought under cultivation as required and successive generations commonly tilled the same groups of parcels, alternating fallow with sown. When necessary, the local leader became the intermediary between the people and any central Government that could make itself felt. Thus he compounded for the village tithe ('ushr) and collected appropriate contributions from the cultivators. He settled land disputes in village conclave or otherwise, and his jurisdiction to do so was of no material importance so long as these mediæval conditions prevailed. As civilisation developed, towns became more attractive and communications improved, such local leadership sometimes tended to become absentee landlordship; while with the introduction of tapu tenure many village areas appear to have been wholly or partially registered as the personal possessions of local notables, without any consideration of the immemorial rights of those who had regularly occupied and tilled the land or pastured their flocks thereon. The pinch in these cases seems to have been mainly felt when the lands were pledged, and forfeited, to town-dwelling merchants for debt. The personal touch and interdependence that existed between even the most arbitrary local chieftain and the village cultivators appears not infrequently then to have been replaced by more mechanical efforts to exploit the land from outside and by obstruction to such efforts from within.

423 These generalised instances are only intended to serve as illustrations of the evil effects of granting tapu tenure in the past without a thorough study and due safeguard of previously existing rights. No comprehensive or detailed study of these cases is possible here.

5. When the maps from which Plates I and II were prepared were in process of compilation the Tapu Department did its best to show the location and extent of all land held under tapu tenure. Partly owing to the destruction of records by the retreating Turks, but much more owing to the inherent defects of their Land Registry methods, it was not found possible generally to do more than indicate approximately the outside limits of patches of territory thought to be affected. The maximum limits of these groups of territory will be seen, on reference to Table I, to cover about 40,000 square kilometres. It is impossible to say what proportion of the areas included would prove upon due investigation to be reasonably entitled to be held in tapu tenure.

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*Law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq Lands. No. 23 of April 4, 1929.

423 the right of ownership. But owing to the practice of shifting cultivation, few of the cultivators of land in Iraq could prove ten years occupancy. The result was that land was registered as the property of tribal sheikhs, town notables, and Kurdish *aghas* over the heads of the peasants. The title deeds granted were always inaccurate, with the areas and boundaries indefinite.

579 The grants of *tapu* tenure led to conflict and even actual fighting between sheikhs and tribesmen, and to such confusion that general registration could not be completed. The Ottoman Government, which did not want to strengthen the power of the sheikhs, therefore stopped the process of registration when about one-fifth of the land had been registered and ceased to apply the provisions of the Land Code in the southern part of Iraq. Two decrees issued in 1880 and 1892 declared that the State was to become the landlord and should have the power to evict tenants at will.

Thus in 1919 the greater part of the land of Iraq was in theory the property of the State. This does not mean, as it does in the other territories of the Middle East, that it is land which formerly belonged to the Ottoman crown estates; it is in reality land which is held on no legal tenure at all, and is considered to belong to the State because the occupying owners have no registered title.

Various unco-ordinated and spasmodic attempts to settle land title were made between 1919 and 1930, but they were largely abortive, and in 1931 Sir Ernest Dowson was requested by the Iraq Government to investigate the problem of settlement of title. In his report he summarizes the problem as
000 follows:

> 'Probably four-fifths of the cultivable area of the country is in law fully and freely owned by the State and when cultivated held in practice under the general administrative control of its representatives. And even the legal ownership (raqaba) of the balance is vested in the State although, subject to important conditions, its usufructuary possession is held on a permanent heritable and assignable tenure. This tenure (known commonly as tapu) is that applicable under the provisions of the Land Code to all State land. The Ottoman Administration persistently sought to give effect to these provisions, but failed to do so because the successful

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423 ness of putting the fluid tribal system into a rigid mould, and a mould which gives the sheikhs undue power. When the tribes have completely disintegrated, it has been not unjust, as in some districts of the north and in Basra liwa. But in the purely tribal areas of Muntafiq, Amara, and Diwaniya liwas and the Kurd hill districts of Ruwandiz and Amadiya it has met with the same incompatibility which was the reason for the failure of the *tapu* system. In these districts the settlement commissioners have confirmed the legal title deeds, in Muntafiq and other areas over the heads of the actual occupants. In Amara, even sirkals and sub-tribal chiefs have no prescriptive rights to the land and have not been able to prove occupancy.

Hence the settlement law really needs drastic changes to enable satisfactory settlement of tribal areas, in particular to give title to tribal occupants of land, even if valid *tapu* titles are possessed by sheikhs.

√565 *The Sheikh as Landowner*. This wholesale alienation of the land in large blocks to the sheikhs causes injustice to the cultivators and also creates great obstacles to future development. The sheikhs as a class are wealthy and important, since they control stocks of grain, and hoard the output of their estates: but they have no value in relation to the management of production. 'He is in fact too big a man to be a farmer and too indolent, corrupt and uneducated to make of himself anything else. As regards agricultural activity, the sheikh is completely unimportant; he takes little interest in seed or ground preparation, is more ignorant than his farmers about such matters and performs his large-scale water-sharing functions at the request and on the representations of his farmers and through his agents.'[1] Thus the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous, and oppressive.

423 In the areas where the tribal system still functions as a reality no land settlement has really been undertaken at all, that is,
● √579 in Amara (mainly rice fields), in Diwaniya, where the risks are too great, and in the Muntafiq where there is an endless struggle between the Sadun family, who claim to be the principal

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[1] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Amara Liwa', 1944.

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423 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly com-
622 plete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his
secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor
estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of the towns.'[1]

244 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions.
The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
452 rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The
government regulation that land must remain fallow in alternate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears, at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

427 In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53-E.

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579 Discontent with the land system often takes a very active form: clashes between officials and peasants in regard to the collection of revenue, for instance, are quite common, and there are long-drawn-out conflicts about land occupancy, as for instance in the Muntafiq district.

185 But although there is discontent, there is not much hope that the land-tenure system will be reformed with reference to standards of social equality or economic efficiency. Land tenure is mainly a controversial subject because it has been linked with British administration, and its abuses attributed to British mistakes. The difficulty has been that the British influence was only advisory, and that the Government did not control an administration efficient enough to carry out the recommendations of the expert advisers, nor could it take measures against the landowners.

Hence there is no agreement as to the object of reform. Some consider that the small cultivator ought to be given freehold tenure; others consider that settlement in larger units, with the sirkals as owners, is desirable.

The real problem is to propose a reform of tenure on lines which would reconcile the need for national planning with security for the small cultivators. From this standpoint the only proposals which have been made are those drawn up by an official of the Land Department, who has had long experience in this field.

These are:

1. Reform of the present system of *tapu* tenure (i.e., the freehold type by making non-cultivation a cause for loss of title, as is at present the case for land held on *lazma* tenure.

2. Reform of the *miri sirf* category of land by dividing it into two categories:

(*a*) Those which Government intends to develop by canalization, for example, land covered by the Greater Iskandariya scheme, or by the scheme for development at Abu Ghuraib and on the Greater Musaiyib. Grants of title should not be made in these regions without decision of a special committee, and should be approved by the Council of Ministers. These regions should be reserved for grants of *tapu* land in plots of not more than 100 dunums, and no person should be allowed more than one

bride of fifteen or sixteen years, and he is Abbas Ali el 539x
Qassab, that wealthy merchant. His shop is said to be 584
worth three thousand gold liras. And the matter was discussed and the broker passed much between the two merchants, and all was ready for a formal proposal. And Abdul Rashid Mejid said: First I will ask the mother of the girl and the girl, for this matter affects them. Then let matters take a formal course.

Abdul Rashid Mejid went back to his house, and his daughter and his wife brought him food. And when he had eaten of the food he said: There is good news for our little Salma. I will arrange for her to marry Abbas Ali el Qassab, so that she can live in a fine house and have servants of her own, nor shall she have to draw water or soil her hands with cooking, and she will be too grand to come and see her poor parents.

But Salma started crying and sobbing and she said: 539x
Abbas Ali has no front teeth and he dyes his beard and 581
water runs always from his nose in the manner that it drips from the fronds of the palm trees when it rains. And she flung herself on the ground and her body was racked with sobs. And her mother said to her father: Don't worry, I will talk her round. I was like this when they told me I had to marry you.

Next morning at dawn Salma ran to the river and 539x
Kadhim took her in his arms, for she was sobbing and trembling like a tent in the wind. And she related to Kadhim what had passed between her and her father. And [583]
he asked: What price does your father want for you? And she replied: Eighty gold liras.

Then Kadhim said to the girl Salma: Do not weep and do not fear, for on the day that Abbas Ali el Qassab puts on his sword and mounts his horse to ride in procession to

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x539 ONCE, in the days when the Turks ruled Iraq, there was a coppersmith of Basra, and Khalid was his name. He was born in Nasiriya, and lived there until the sixteenth year of his life. Then, when his father died, he took his mother and went to Basra and he worked as a coppersmith in the bazaar of Umm el Brum, that he might earn enough with which to live. Now, the amount he earned each month from the owner of the coppershop was only enough for food and rent and clothes for his mother and himself, nor could he save money enough to buy a shop of his own or to marry a wife. And Khalid and his mother lived in a poor house, and she did the cooking and all the work of the house was in her hands.

x539 There came a day that the mother of Khalid fell sick
•581 and died and he was left alone in the house, nor was there anyone to do the cooking and the work of the house. As for Khalid, he had to go to work from the rising of the sun until its setting, so he could not go to the bazaar to buy vegetables and meat, nor could he cook his food. He therefore thought: Since I do not earn enough to keep a servant it is necessary that I marry a wife, and this course I would surely take if I had the money, since it is incumbent on a man to take to himself a wife. But since I have little money, let me seek out one who is less desired by men for some reason, that she may be cheap, and though she may not be perfect in all the requirements of a wife, she will at least buy the supplies from the market and cook them and clean the house.

x539 Then Khalid sent for a wise woman who acted as a go-
584 between for those about to marry, and he said to her:
581 Know you that my income is small and my capital is none
and I desire to marry a wife. Therefore seek out one whose

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father will not require of me more than one gold lira, 539x
and if she is lame or has only one eye, it matters not, but 584
let her be able to cook. And the wise woman replied and 581
said: I already know of such a one. Her father requires only a date stone. She is perfect in figure and in her face she has the beauty of the moon, she can recite poetry, and as for her cooking, verily it is said that there is a commotion in the heavens, for it is necessary to restrain the angels that they come not down to partake of it whenever she cooks a dish.

Khalid then said to the wise woman: If she be indeed as you say, then why the date stone? Perchance her name is dishonoured and such a one I do not want. But the woman said: If she be not a virgin, then return her to her father. Verily she is honourable, and as for the reason for the date stone, let it be known to you that this girl has the temper of a fiery steed, and her father has recently taken a wife of the same age as this girl, and she beats and torments the new wife of her father without mercy, nor is there peace in his house. Therefore he will give her to you in marriage and her name is Khalila. But she needs a firm hand on the reins. Khalid was happy that he should get a wife beautiful in face and figure, so he said to the wise woman: It shall be as you say. I shall marry this girl, and I shall control her, nor can her temper matter to me, for I am a man, and she is but a woman.

And so the arrangements were made and a day came on 539x
which Khalid sat in his house and his friends went and brought the girl Khalila to him and he took her in marriage. And Khalid's heart was filled with joy, for he found that the girl was beautiful of face and beautiful of figure and he spent the night in the delights and joy of matrimony, and he was happy and thought: I am only a poor

camped here without benefit, for no plan presents itself 539x by which I may regain my estates, and verily if I say to the people, I am the son of Hassan and I lived for a year in my mother's tomb, no man will believe me. Rather should I go to my uncle's guest-house and see what manner of man he be, and if he be not evil, I should say, I am your nephew. But the slave Ahmed said: Verily he is evil. And Rejab replied: How can this be, for he is of my own blood?

So Rejab and his slave rode to the guest-house of Hamed and Rejab entered and saluted the assembly. He saw that there was a great coming and going of people. So when the slave brought him coffee he asked: What is this great throng? And the slave replied: Know you that tonight the daughter of our master will be given in marriage, and people have come in from the whole district to be at the feast. And Rejab asked the slave: Is she beautiful? And the slave answered: Verily when my mistress comes out at night, then the moon hides its face, for it is jealous of her beauty. Rejab thought: It is my right as her cousin to [582] marry this girl. I should see my uncle and declare myself.

Rejab sat for half an hour in the guest-house. Then there was a commotion and the people rose, for the landowner Hamed entered to partake of his morning coffee, and Rejab saw the face of his uncle. And he was amazed, for Hamed had only one eye. And Rejab turned to his neighbour in the assembly and he said: I never knew our host was one-eyed. The man replied: It was only a month ago that it happened. Our master was stroking and petting his hawks, and the falconer had put a new bird with them and he knew it not, and this hawk took out his eye as cleanly as it would take out the eye of a hare. And Rejab thought: The saying of the old man was surely a warning

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mitted the girl Aliya to get down and ease herself. And 539K
when she had done this she returned to his horse, nor did he have to catch her, and Rejab saw that she came with him freely. And she mounted the horse, and she said: Pardon the delay, but now let us ride on, that we may put many miles between my father and me. Then Rejab replied: As for the delay, it was necessary, for I gave you three Roman pills, the dose for a camel, that I might make sure. And Aliya answered: Verily you made sure that I would leave the house, for one of those Roman pills would have been enough. And Aliya laughed much at the stratagem of Rejab and she said: So this was the bitterness in the sweet of love. Then Rejab said: My darling, you who have tasted the bitterness at the beginning of our love will never have to taste it again, for there will be no end to our loving. And Aliya and Rejab discovered that they were of one heart.

Rejab took Aliya and he rode for eight hours into the desert until he came to the mound on the unfrequented track, and there they awaited the coming of the slave Ahmed with the animals. And after an hour's wait the slave arrived with the camels. They put up a black tent of the Arabs, and Aliya cooked food for them. And when they had eaten of the food, Rejab took Aliya into the black tent, and the slave Ahmed he ordered to stand on guard. And the girl Aliya trembled as Rejab took her into 539K
the tent, and Rejab said to her: Do not fear, for I am close 582 ●
to you, nor am I far, and I am he who has the right to marry you and the right to kill you. Then Aliya was astonished, and she said: But he who would have the right to marry me and the right to kill me would be my cousin, yet cousin have I none. And Rejab replied: I am 539K
indeed he. And he related the full story of his birth and

103 Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

•582 The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still maintained
178 in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to
[619] force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

6. THE STORY OF THE LOST SOUL

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

764 The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy
788 families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for burial in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIETY

Something of the composition of society in Rowanduz 565
has been seen in the preceding pages, as well as the distinction between "wealthier" and "poorer" families, but the social structure of the town is much more complex than its cleavages along lines of occupation or of wealth, and requires more extended discussion, of particular importance inasmuch as this has proven the most significant area of change in recent decades. To approach this problem it is again necessary to have initial reference to the country as a whole, for in this larger province certain things of relevance to the life of the town must be appreciated. The
sociology of Iraq does not appear to have had any single, [114]
adequate exposition in recent years, although much of what will be said in this connection can be found scattered in a wide variety of publications, and is commonplace to residents and travelers in the region.

Of the several divisions of the society of Iraq, the 779
first is that between Muslims and non-Muslims. The ad- 582
herents of Islam represent by far the greater part of the population, and, according to Quranic law, a Muslim girl cannot marry outside this group unless the suitor, if accepted, becomes a convert himself, a rule which is rigidly

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enforced. Of the non-Muslims, the Jews might be mentioned first, and their own custom of marriage is like that of Islam. By long tradition, heightened by the recent Israeli War, the Jews are greatly despised, but most of them have already migrated to their new country. The departure of the Jewish craftsmen and shopkeepers from Rowanduz has already been noticed. Of the Christians, an unconscious distinction is made in the Muslim mind between those who come from the Western world, and those who are native to the area or the Eastern Mediterranean. The military prowess and advanced culture of Europe or America are recognized, and almost any male from these countries is *ipso facto* an *effendi* or gentleman. The Briton, because of the part of his country's imperialism in the Middle East, may be disliked, but he is usually respected. On the other hand, Christians such as the Armenians, Chaldaeans, Greeks, and Nestorians, who have been Islamic subjects in the past, are looked upon with some contempt. The Armenians and Greeks are largely urban minorities, engaged in commerce, and are generally vilified, as are Jews and certain Syrians in the cities, as cheats and thieves. The Chaldaeans and the Nestorians, most of the latter displaced from their homeland in Turkey after the first World War, were once exclusively engaged in agriculture, and, as a peaceful folk, were not considered particularly different from Muslim peasants. Kurdish chieftains and their men have been invited to Nestorian festivals and there has been

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bride of fifteen or sixteen years, and he is Abbas Ali el 539^{x}
Qassab, that wealthy merchant. His shop is said to be 584
worth three thousand gold liras. And the matter was discussed and the broker passed much between the two merchants, and all was ready for a formal proposal. And Abdul Rashid Mejid said: First I will ask the mother of the girl and the girl, for this matter affects them. Then let matters take a formal course.

Abdul Rashid Mejid went back to his house, and his daughter and his wife brought him food. And when he had eaten of the food he said: There is good news for our little Salma. I will arrange for her to marry Abbas Ali el Qassab, so that she can live in a fine house and have servants of her own, nor shall she have to draw water or soil her hands with cooking, and she will be too grand to come and see her poor parents.

But Salma started crying and sobbing and she said: 539^{x}
Abbas Ali has no front teeth and he dyes his beard and 581
water runs always from his nose in the manner that it drips from the fronds of the palm trees when it rains. And she flung herself on the ground and her body was racked with sobs. And her mother said to her father: Don't worry, I will talk her round. I was like this when they told me I had to marry you.

Next morning at dawn Salma ran to the river and 539^{x}
Kadhim took her in his arms, for she was sobbing and trembling like a tent in the wind. And she related to Kadhim what had passed between her and her father. And
he asked: What price does your father want for you? And [583] ●
she replied: Eighty gold liras.

Then Kadhim said to the girl Salma: Do not weep and do not fear, for on the day that Abbas Ali el Qassab puts on his sword and mounts his horse to ride in procession to

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x539 she drew near he greeted her and wished her the peace of God and His blessing. And Salma drew her veil across her face and she averted her eyes and she did not reply to the greeting of the strange youth. Then Kadhim drew level with her and he bent his head towards her and whispered: Did it hurt much when they tattooed the butterfly? When Salma heard these words her face grew red with shame. But she looked at Kadhim's face and saw that he was laughing, so she, too, laughed, and she dropped her veil and said: Since you have seen the butterfly you may as well see my face.

x539 Then Kadhim and Salma sat down by a tamarisk bush,
304 and he told her his name and situation and she told him her name and details of her life, and they laughed much about the butterfly and she said: It did not hurt, for it was done when I was in the fifth year of my life, and it was only a little one, but it has grown larger with me. And they discovered that they were of one heart.

x539 Each day and every day that Salma went to draw water from the river Kadhim waited for her, and he helped her fill the jar with water, and they would sit down by a tamarisk bush and pass a few minutes in laughter and happiness. And when Salma returned to her house her eyes were like stars and her cheeks were like the blossoms of the rose. And the mother of Salma said to her husband, the merchant Abdul Rashid: See how happy our daughter is? What can cause this happiness? And Abdul Rashid said: She needs a husband. Perhaps she is falling in love. I will see the marriage broker today.

x539 So that very day, when he had closed his shop, Abdul
584 Rashid went to the house of that discreet man, the marriage broker, and he said: My daughter is of an age to marry. And the broker said: There is one who seeks a

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bride of fifteen or sixteen years, and he is Abbas Ali el 539x
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x539 ONCE, in the days when the Turks ruled Iraq, there was a coppersmith of Basra, and Khalid was his name. He was born in Nasiriya, and lived there until the sixteenth year of his life. Then, when his father died, he took his mother and went to Basra and he worked as a coppersmith in the bazaar of Umm el Brum, that he might earn enough with which to live. Now, the amount he earned each month from the owner of the coppershop was only enough for food and rent and clothes for his mother and himself, nor could he save money enough to buy a shop of his own or to marry a wife. And Khalid and his mother lived in a poor house, and she did the cooking and all the work of the house was in her hands.

x539 581 There came a day that the mother of Khalid fell sick and died and he was left alone in the house, nor was there anyone to do the cooking and the work of the house. As for Khalid, he had to go to work from the rising of the sun until its setting, so he could not go to the bazaar to buy vegetables and meat, nor could he cook his food. He therefore thought: Since I do not earn enough to keep a servant it is necessary that I marry a wife, and this course I would surely take if I had the money, since it is incumbent on a man to take to himself a wife. But since I have little money, let me seek out one who is less desired by men for some reason, that she may be cheap, and though she may not be perfect in all the requirements of a wife, she will at least buy the supplies from the market and cook them and clean the house.

x539 ●584 581 Then Khalid sent for a wise woman who acted as a go-between for those about to marry, and he said to her: Know you that my income is small and my capital is none and I desire to marry a wife. Therefore seek out one whose

father will not require of me more than one gold lira, 539X
and if she is lame or has only one eye, it matters not, but 584●
let her be able to cook. And the wise woman replied and 581
said: I already know of such a one. Her father requires only a date stone. She is perfect in figure and in her face she has the beauty of the moon, she can recite poetry, and as for her cooking, verily it is said that there is a commotion in the heavens, for it is necessary to restrain the angels that they come not down to partake of it whenever she cooks a dish.

Khalid then said to the wise woman: If she be indeed as you say, then why the date stone? Perchance her name is dishonoured and such a one I do not want. But the woman said: If she be not a virgin, then return her to her father. Verily she is honourable, and as for the reason for the date stone, let it be known to you that this girl has the temper of a fiery steed, and her father has recently taken a wife of the same age as this girl, and she beats and torments the new wife of her father without mercy, nor is there peace in his house. Therefore he will give her to you in marriage and her name is Khalila. But she needs a firm hand on the reins. Khalid was happy that he should get a wife beautiful in face and figure, so he said to the wise woman: It shall be as you say. I shall marry this girl, and I shall control her, nor can her temper matter to me, for I am a man, and she is but a woman.

And so the arrangements were made and a day came on 539X
which Khalid sat in his house and his friends went and brought the girl Khalila to him and he took her in marriage. And Khalid's heart was filled with joy, for he found that the girl was beautiful of face and beautiful of figure and he spent the night in the delights and joy of matrimony, and he was happy and thought: I am only a poor

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x539 to slaughter ten sheep every day to feed the poor, but now the old sheikh lives there with his only daughter, without any servant or slave, nor does anybody else go in, nor does anybody else come out.

And Jassim thought and pondered, and he said to himself: Qurnachi is a great name. I would be unwise to meddle with that girl, for her father would surely kill me. Rather should I take a better course. Why should I not marry her? Then not only could I enjoy her beauty without fear, but I could also remark to my friends in the coffee-house: My latest wife is a model housekeeper. Of course, you know she is a Qurnachi. And then they will eye me with the eye of respect and my sons will mingle with those of noble blood, and since the sheikh is so poor I will offer him a handsome price and he will accept.

So on the next day Jassim the merchant called at the house of Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, and he knocked on the great door, for he was not acquainted with that conduct which is seemly. And Sheikh Mizeil opened the door himself and bade him welcome and entrance, for the Sheikh was a true Arab. And he said to him: I am honoured by your visit, respected merchant, but pardon me for the poorness of your reception, for I gave all my servants and staff permission to go to their homes and take a day's rest. Nor have I anyone here to prepare for you food or coffee, so pardon my rudeness, and pray tell me your name and your business with speed, that you may not linger in discomfort.

x539 And Jassim replied, and his reply was an abrupt reply,
584 lacking in dignity and form, and he said: Noble sheikh, as for my name, it is Jassim Kuweity, and I own the great cloth shop. And as for my business, it is marriage, for I hear you have a daughter, and as for the sum, I will pay

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one hundred thousand gold liras. Sheikh Mizeil was 539x
amazed at the words of the merchant and his face went 584●
black, and he said: You have lost your way. Are you looking for a brothel? I know your name and I have heard of you. Is it not said that your grandfather sold milk? Does then the vulture mate with the peacock? Were you other than a donkey's droppings you would not live after making this suggestion. As it is, I will give you a lesson in respect even as it is taught to slaves.

And Sheikh Mizeil seized Jassim in a grip of iron and he commenced beating the merchant about the head and ears with his riding-switch until the blood flowed. And when Sheikh Mizeil was satisfied with beating Jassim he 539x
took him and cast him out into the dust. And Nura saw these events from a window of the inner courtyard, and she was amazed, thinking: Was not that the merchant from whom I bought the sequins? How then did he know our house? Then Nura, for she was a clever girl, remembered that the bag of sequins had been half empty on her arrival, and she looked out of the door and saw that the threshold was still sprinkled with sequins, and she thought: This was the stratagem of the lustful merchant.

And as for Jassim, he picked himself up from the dusty street and walked back to his shop, and his heart was full of anger and the desire for revenge. And he pondered: How can I bring this old maniac to ruin, he who has dared to treat me in this manner, he who has not even enough copper coins to put together to make a pair? And he returned to his shop and he went to his treasure chest and he opened it and he counted out ten thousand gold liras. He put the coins in a handkerchief of the finest silk, and he left his shop and he went to the house of the Turkish pasha, Commandant of Police, and he entered

[291] √84 THE youth sees a girl on the road or in the fields, for the women of the tribes are not veiled, and he falls in love with her. He speaks to his mother, or if he has no mother, to his sister or his aunt, and she goes to the house of the girl and she sees any of the women of the house, but preferably she sees the mother of the girl. And she asks: Does your daughter agree to marry So-and-so? And the mother asks the girl and a reply is given.

If the reply is favourable the youth goes to his sheikh, or if his sheikh is away to one of the sons of his sheikh, and if there are no sons available he goes to a sayyid and he says: O Your Honour the Sheikh, I want to marry the daughter of So-and-so, for I love her and I want her and I cannot live without her. And will you be an intermediary in the affair? The sheikh usually agrees, for the man is of his tribe. Then the sheikh will send one of his servants to the father of the girl, and the servant will say: The sheikh wishes to visit you at such and such a time.

At that time the father of the girl remains ready in his house, and he has prepared a meal for the sheikh and for his retainers. The sheikh arrives in his car, and he is accompanied by three or four men to support his dignity. And the sheikh sits down in the house and he converses with the father of the girl for half an hour, but he does not mention the marriage. Then they have food, and after the meal the sheikh sits for a while and then he says: We must take our leave and go. And the father of the girl says: You have honoured me with a visit, and there must be some reason for it. Command me as to what service I can do. And the sheikh says: Let it be known to you that the business of our visit is marriage. And the sheikh continues and asks: Do you consent to the marriage of your daughter to So-and-so, and surely you must give your consent?

The father of the girl says: Let me ask the women of the 584
house for I cannot compel them if they do not agree. And if the reply comes back that the women of the house agree, the sheikh says: How much do you ask of us? And the man replies: Give according to your pleasure. The sheikh says: No, you must name the sum. And the man says: One hundred dinars.

The next day the father of the youth, or if he has no 585
father, one of his male relatives, takes the hundred dinars 201
and he goes to the father of the girl and he gives him the hundred dinars. And when the father of the youth has gone, the father of the girl gives the money to the mother of the girl, and the mother goes out and buys a gold necklace, gold earrings, gold bangles and silver anklets for the girl, also clothes and shoes.

Then between three and ten days after the payment of 585
the money, at the time of sunset, the bridegroom sits in his house to await his bride, and he sends all his female relatives to bring her to him. His mother and his grandmother and his sisters and his aunts march in procession with a band to the house of the bride, and they are escorted by all the friends of the bridegroom belonging to the tribe, armed with their revolvers and rifles, and there should be fifty armed men in the procession for a fashionable wedding.

When the procession reaches the house of the bride the men fire their rifles, and the bride, who is ready, comes out, accompanied by her female relations, and her male relations sit quietly in their house and they do not come out. Then the bride goes back in procession to the house of the groom, surrounded by the female relations of the groom.

When the procession reaches the bridegroom's house

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So-and-so, and do you consent to the consummation? The 585 bride replies: I consent.

Then the moumin returns to the groom, and he says: O husband, congratulations on your marriage. Then he asks: O my boy, do you consent to this bride and her age is eighteen years? And the groom says: I consent. Then the moumin asks: Do you consent to the consummation? And the groom says: I consent. When the moumin has finished with the groom, the groom rises, and accompanied by his two 'wazirs', his father, brother, and close friends he enters the house. Those that rise with the groom say: Blessed be the Prophet of God.

The groom thus escorted walks to the door of the women's room and he enters. The men who have escorted him turn back at the door and return to the guests. The groom sits down with the bride and her relatives. Then, one by one, the relatives get up and bid the bride good night, and they go out to another room, leaving only the bride and the groom sitting there. Then the groom goes over to the bride and very slowly he raises her veil and takes it off her face; he then looks at her face for a minute or so, and gives her one kiss on the brow.

Then the mother and sisters of the groom come in and serve the wedding feast to the bride and groom, who eat it alone in their room. After they have eaten they drink coffee. Then the groom takes the hand of the bride and he leads her into the bedroom. Then he takes off the cloak of the bride and he lays it on the floor and he prays on it.

The guests are served with dinner at the same time as the bride and groom, and when they have finished eating they amuse themselves with music, watching the dancing, and firing their rifles until about 3 a.m.

In the morning the groom sits in his guest room, and

585 he receives congratulations from all his friends. For three days he stays in his house. Then after three days he goes and calls on the father of the bride. The bride may not go near her house until the thirtieth day after the marriage, when she goes to call on her father.

The male relatives of the bride are, of course, not present at the wedding feast, nor do they go to congratulate the groom on the morning after. They may, however, go and call on the groom ten days after the marriage, but they do not congratulate him. They are supposed to be sad at losing their daughter or sister as the case may be.

In the above account I have tried to give the details of what actually happens in a tribal marriage, rather than the theory of what should happen. The above refers to a tribesman who owns a small piece of land and who works in addition as a farm labourer. He owns a small house. A wedding for a sheikh or sirkal would be much more elaborate than this, and would include a reading from the Holy Quran. The customs of townspeople are also quite different. There appears to be only one point of resemblance and that is that the money expended is out of proportion to the means of the bridegroom, but he may only get married once in his life and the feast and entertainment will be talked about for a long time, and there is no doubt that the guests enjoy themselves far more than the guests, say, at an English wedding.

covered with red plaster, and who else has this plaster in their house? Look, then, at your friend's left arm and shoulder, for has it not been rubbing against that plaster. And the man looked and saw that it was true, so he drew his knife and leapt at the man, crying: A death to cleanse an injury. But the other man also drew his knife and before they could be restrained both were lying on the ground, one with his stomach ripped open and the other with his throat dashed open and the blood of their lives was flowing away. And the Tongue said to Abdul Rehman: Can any mock the Master of the World? But Abdul Rehman thought: They were my friends. And Abdul Rehman came to his house, and his loved wife, his girl Aina, came out to welcome him and she cried: Thanks be to God for your safe return; your presence is a present
x √39 of happiness. But the Tongue cried out: Come, neigh-
586 bours. Come, witnesses. And all who heard were astonished. Then in a great voice the Tongue commenced saying the Oath of Divorce, and the girl Aina burst out sobbing and weeping, but those present said: She is better gone from him, for see, he is like a madman; though the words come clearly from his mouth, it is as if his hands were trying to stop them and his face is a face of horror and disgust. And when the divorce was completed and the girl Aina had gone weeping away Abdul Rehman entered his house and he saw there his boy Sultan, a fine boy in the tenth year of his age, and the boy was weeping, for he had heard the words of Divorce. And Abdul
x √39 Rehman tried to speak to his son and excuse himself, but no words came; instead the Tongue spoke, saying: O my son, I test your obedience. Climb on to the wooden shaft above the well. And the boy was obedient, and he climbed up and stood on the shaft. But Abdul Rehman thought:

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was filled with a great joy, and as for the master of the shop, he thought: I knew that Khalid was a handsome young man, but I never thought that he would come to this, for it must be his beauty that the secretary admires, for as for his skill, it is not great. 539K

Khalid thanked the secretary and he got up and left the coppersmith's shop, nor did he continue to work. And he went to his house to tell his wife to pack the furniture that they might move from the mud house to a house of marble and fine stones. And Khalid entered his house and he said to his wife: Pack the carpet and furniture that we may move to a palace fit for our high estate.

Khalila heard the words of her husband and her heart was filled with grief, and she thought: Truly I have driven this poor man mad, for he is only a poor coppersmith unable to find the money for even this house. Yet he talks of moving to a palace. How unlucky is my lot, for even if he divorces me, who will marry a divorced woman? And it appears I shall spend my life married to a madman, and never again shall I taste of the joys of marriage. [587]

So Khalila cast herself at her husband's feet, and her body vibrated with sobs, and she said: O my husband, only be as you were on the night of our wedding, and you may take a stick and beat me as much as your heart desires, for I merit a beating. And Khalid thought: She indeed merits a beating, and if I do this to her she will be obedient in future. So he took a stick and beat his wife until the blood came, nor did she fight or resist him.

Then Khalid took his wife and he moved to a fine house and he spent many years in the enjoyment of love and in drawing the emoluments of his high office. And Khalila returned his love exceedingly and she obeyed him in everything, and as for the Governor of Basra, he was

*539 NOW there was a Sultan from amongst the Sultans who ruled Iraq before the days of the Ottomans, and his name was Hajji Ali. And this Sultan had only one son, the Amir Kheyyun, who was a youth of twenty years, so handsome of the face that when he passed through the city the people would come out and throng the streets, and so dense were the crowds that not even a flea could pass through the town. And the Amir Kheyyun was famous in battle, for he commanded the armies of the Sultan, and he challenged the enemies of the Sultan his father to single combat, and used to kill them
•[593] in front of their armies. And he obeyed the commands of the Sultan his father in everything, for this is the custom of the Arabs.

So one day the Sultan, Hajji Ali, sent for his son, Kheyyun, and he said: In this world only one thing is certain and only one thing is known, and that is that death comes to every man, nor can a single man escape from it. And the time is not long nor shall many years pass before you are Sultan of this land in my place, but (may it be far from you) when you are dead who shall replace you? Therefore it is now suitable that you take a wife. But Kheyyun, the obedient son, refused the command of his father, nor did he heed his words. And he said: I have studied the matter, and I have read every book concerning women, which has been written by every wise man and philosopher of Iraq, of Persia, of India, of China and of Rome, and I have come to the conclusion that women are evil, and they are witches, nor is there truth and goodness in them. Therefore, how can a man take one of them for a wife?

*539 And the Sultan thought: This is only the foolishness of
626 youth. I will command my son to marry in the presence

his relations take the bride into a special room which has been made ready with the best chairs and carpets the family possesses. There the mother of the groom gives tea and cakes to the bride and to the relations who have accompanied her, and one hour is spent on this entertainment. There are, of course, no men present in this room. The men are all sitting in the garden, as there are too many to entertain in the house, and they are being given tea by the father of the groom, and they are watching dancers who have been engaged to entertain them.

The bridegroom is sitting in the highest place in this party on a special throne, and he has his two 'wazirs', one on each side of him, and they should be dressed exactly as he is dressed, for when the groom bought cloth for his wedding suit he bought cloth also for the 'wazirs' and [593] gave it to them. In this gathering the father of the groom sits in a lower place and the groom does not get up when his father rises, and he may smoke and address the gathering in front of his father, which he would normally be prevented from doing by Arab custom.

The moumin is sitting with them, and after they have been sitting for an hour or so the father of the groom says to the moumin: Let us go and bring the words of the girl. Then the moumin and the father of the groom go to the room of the women, and they knock on the door and cry: Clear the way, clear the way. And when the women of the house hear this they leave the room, and the bride is left sitting amongst her own relatives. And the moumin enters the room and he says to the girl: Good evening, and how are you? And after she has replied the moumin says: Do you consent, O my girl, to the happy marriage, and to the sum of one hundred dinars paid by So-and-so the son of So-and-so, to you, So-and-so the daughter of

[131] inhabit the mountainous districts near the
162 northeastern frontiers, constitute the largest
175 Moslem minority group. Racially and linguistically distinct, they make up about 15 to 20 per cent of the population. Other non-Arabic Moslem communities include about 50,000 each of Turkomans and Iranians, the majority of whom are also found in the northern provinces. Most of the Kurds and the Turkomans are Sunnites, but some adhere to minor heterodox sects; the Iranians are Shiites.

From 150,000 to 200,000 native Christians reside in Iraq. The Chaldeans, a sect which observes early Nestorian rites but owes allegiance to the Vatican, comprise the most numerous group. Other communities include some 30,000 Assyrians (Nestorians), refugees from Asia Minor in 1918, and smaller contingents belonging to the Armenian Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox, the Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) and the Syrian
563 Catholic churches. Most of the Christian peoples live together in more or less separate ethnic and religious groups: about 70 per cent are settled in the northern provinces of Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil, and a large proportion of the remainder in the cities of Baghdad and Basra. Prominent among other indigenous sects are the Yezidis, or so-called "devil-worshipers," about 30,000 of whom dwell in the districts near the Syrian border. A few thousand Sabians, famous as silver craftsmen, also live in Baghdad, Amarah and Basra.

191 Arabic is spoken by over three quarters of the population. Kurdish, Syriac and Turki, however, are recognized as official languages in limited areas in the north, while English is extensively used in the
593 larger cities. Although the Iraqi are pre-
162 dominantly Arabs, marked gradations in social structure are represented by the nomadic Bedouin tribes of the deserts, the "marsh Arabs" or primitive tribesmen of the Amarah and Hammar lakes region of the southern delta, the rural peasants and the townspeople. Up to 1950, the population included about 200,000 Jews, primarily of

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Sephardic origin. The majority have since migrated to Israel, while probably less than 10,000 remain, subject to certain restrictions. Over 130,000 were transported to Israel by the Iraqi government in 1950-51. About 5,000 Palestinian refugees have settled in the country since the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. Small numbers of British, American and other nationalities also reside in the larger cities. 593 162

As a whole, Iraq is sparsely settled, with the population concentrated in the river valleys and in the rain-irrigated highland districts of the north. The most densely populated areas are found in the river valleys of the northern delta. In 1947, the density of population in the provinces of the upper delta region was calculated at 131 per square mile in Hilla and 104 in Baghdad. In the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk and Erbil it averaged 31 to 39 per square mile, and in Sulaimaniya, on the eastern frontier, 62 per square mile. In the south, it ranged from 75 per square mile in Basra province to 42 in Amarah, while in Dulaim, on the upper reaches of the Euphrates, it did not exceed 10 per square mile. The population is essentially rural: over three quarters of the inhabitants live in some 8,000 small villages or in semipermanent settlements. The Bedouin, representing about 5 to 8 per cent of the total population, roam the deserts with their flocks, but many migrate seasonally to the towns in search of work. There are only 7 cities with over 40,000 inhabitants. The population of Baghdad, the capital, was estimated at between 900,000 and 1 million in 1952, including over 500,000 in the metropolitan area and several hundred thousand in the surrounding suburbs. The population of Mosul, a commercial center on the upper Tigris, totaled about 150,000, and of Kirkuk, the metropolis of the oil region, almost 75,000. Basra, the chief port, located on the Shatt al Arab, had a population of 90,000 to 100,000. 361 161 369 161 [464] 369 162

In spite of considerable progress in education within the last 30 years, the majority 212 892

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x539 against my uncle. I must not reveal my identity to him.

So Rejab sat in the guest-house, and he was thinking: It is my right to marry this girl. How can I prevent the marriage? And Hamed looked around his guest-house and he saw a strange youth of great beauty seated there, and he asked: Who is he? They answered: He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail, and we do not know his name. Then Rejab rose and thanked his host and left the assembly, and he took his horse and rode off. But when ● he was in the cover of the palm trees he halted and turned [595 839] to look at the house of Hamed, for he thought: I must carry off the girl this very day. He saw that the women's quarter was heavily guarded by slaves and eunuchs armed with swords, and all the doors to the courtyard were guarded, nor was it possible to gain entrance. [514] But he saw also that the House of the Dawn was situated at a distance from the house, that its odours (may they be far from you) should not disturb the people of the house, and he cursed himself and thought: Had I come one day earlier I could have carried off the girl when she comes at dawn to visit the House of the Dawn, but now there is no time to wait another day. Then an idea came to him, and he took his horse and rode at a canter to Samawa.

x539 757 In the bazaar of Samawa, Rejab bought first a woman's dress, and he wrapped it up and concealed it in his cloak. Then he went to the pharmacist and he bought three Roman pills. Now, let it be known to you that in these days we have many and complicated medicines, but then we had only simple remedies, and the Roman pill served both for a man and for his animals, for verily it was said, One for a man, two for a horse, three for a camel. And he took the three Roman pills and he went to the shop of the sweet maker and he bought from him a tray of the x539 pigeon and doves and partridge and quail, and from every direction hundreds of the most beautiful girls in the world were coming and sitting down to the meal and wine was brought for them by Negro slave girls.

Nasirulla and Salma sat down and ate of the feast until their stomachs were bursting, nor did anyone question who they were. And when all hands were withdrawn from eating, the Chief of the Eunuchs came round and he talked to some of the girls, and he came to Nasirulla and Salma and he said to them: Your faces are new. Were you part of the last present to our Lord? And Salma replied: Verily we are new here, and our desire is to be of service to our Lord and Master. But the eunuch sighed and he said: How can this be? It was different in the days when our master was a young man, though even then he rarely needed more than three hundred girls a year. But now he is old and his beard is white and his eyes are dim and even
[838 one girl would be too much for him. Yet we have three
595] thousand in this place, and every month another hundred arrive as presents from the great rulers and governers, and these poor girls are condemned to live unloved and unseen in this vast harem, until they kiss and make love to each other from very sadness of heart.

And Nasirulla was amazed at the words of the eunuch, and he thought: While I am here and until I find a way out of this closely guarded place I will at least comfort some of these poor girls.

On the next day and on the following days Nasirulla examined all the doors and windows of the harem, but they were all guarded by eunuchs armed with swords, nor could anyone pass in or out. And the days lengthened into months, but Nasirulla could find no place unguarded save one, and this was a window which was covered by

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a thousand dinars in gold, and he had not a single coin in silver or in copper. And the witnesses said: The shepherd boy wins the wager. 539K 443 231

Maqdad took the purse of the merchant and put the coins of gold and silver with his own gold, but the copper coins he caused to be thrown to the poor. And he turned to the merchant and asked the price of the horse, and a price was agreed on and paid. Then Maqdad asked the merchant for the pedigree of the horse and for his name. The merchant was astonished, and asked: Do you ask the pedigree of the horse after the price has been agreed and paid? Maqdad replied: His pedigree is written in his legs and his back and his noble head, but it must also be recorded on paper, and that is what I require. And the merchant handed the pedigree to Maqdad, saying: Verily he is descended from the Prophet's noble mare, the feather coated, the most beautiful of all. His name is Rishan, for he is of that noble breed.

Maqdad took the horse Rishan and mounted him bareback and rode to his home. And his mother brought out the saddle of his father and it fitted the horse Rishan, and she brought out the weapons which she had cleaned till they gleamed in the sun. And she brought him a bag of dates and a bag of cheese and she said: Now shall you ride to the Tigris and to the camp of the tribes, and there shall you enter the guest tent and salute the assembly, and they will bid you to be seated and bring for you coffee. Then they will ask your name, for they do not know your face, then shall you reply: I am Maqdad son of Thamir son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Maqdad son of Degaither son of Mansur son of Qais son of Hamed the Lame son of Mansur the Father of the Sword. And this name is a known name, and wherever you say it, there shall you be 539K 576 539K 601

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 •601 recognised. For your father was a warrior, and your grandfather, and your great-grandfather and all those before him were warriors. Then Maqdad kissed his mother and bid her farewell. And Umm Maqdad wept as she saw her son depart.

*539 224 Maqdad rode out and took the road to the north and he rode over the desert which was carpeted with the flowers of spring, and the grace and pace of Rishan was beyond compare. As they went over the desert Maqdad would take his great spear and hurl it in front of him a distance of two hundred paces, and he would put Rishan to a gallop and catch the spear and pluck it from the air before it could touch the ground. In this manner they had travelled many miles when Maqdad saw a gazelle. He put Rishan to a gallop, thinking: Rishan is faster than the gazelle. The gazelle left the track and went off into the desert with Maqdad in pursuit, and Rishan was as fast as the gazelle and drew level with it. But when Maqdad put out his spear to kill it, it turned more sharply than the horse, and in this manner escaped them.

They were now far from the track, and to return to it Maqdad took his course from the wind, and they travelled on and came to a wadi which was both wide and deep, and in its further bank Maqdad saw a cave. The mouth of this cave was covered by a net, its shape as a spider's web, but each strand was as thick as a man's wrist, and through the meshes of the web it could be seen that in the cave was a boy. He was naked save for an iron band around his neck, and he was chained to the wall, and he was in the twelfth year of his life.

Then Maqdad rode down into the wadi; he dismounted and drew his sword, and he cried out to the boy: I will release you from this misfortune. The boy answered,

361 [539] being mentioned in a nursery rhyme which runs:

Cukukhti, wein ukhti?	Dove, where's my sister?
B'il Hilla.	In Hilla.
Sha takal?	What does she eat?
Bajilla.	Beans.
Wein tenam?	Where does she sleep?
Bab Illah	At God's door.

and which continues for several verses.

The mace. Page 71, Line 16. 'A mace of the finest teakwood.'

411 The mace may almost be said to be a traditional weapon in South Iraq. If you meet an Arab tribesman about his normal daily routine in the countryside, he will probably be armed with a mace and dagger. Rifles are weapons of luxury, to be kept away from dust and damp. [535] Many tribal dances are done with the mace, which is sometimes of solid wood carefully carved, and sometimes, a less beautiful weapon but more dangerous, it is made of a wooden shaft with a ball of lead or pitch at the end.

Page 74, Line 22. 'Maqdad took his course from the wind.'

821 Skilled desert guides can often recognise a wind as being from a certain quarter by its force, humidity, and temperature. The phrase here implies that the sun was clouded over and Maqdad was finding his way by the wind, which indicates that he had considerable skill. The only people who can use the wind are those who can detect quickly any change in its direction. I remember once asking some Arabs the way to a well, and they told me, Keep the wind on your left cheek. I had to use methods with which I was more familiar.

Page 81, Line 25. 'Now I shall call myself Ibn Ali.'

601 The kunya, or name defining a person by his relationship to someone else, is recorded both in classical and modern Arabic usage. Ibn Batuta, for example, a famous fourteenth century traveller, is known only by his kunya. The modern tribal practice appears to be to promote a man to a kunya when he becomes the father of a boy. A man who has become father of a boy named Qais will, for example, be hailed by his friends with exceptional heartiness for some weeks afterwards, 'Ahlan wa sahlan ya Ab Qais', and the name may or may not stick

to him permanently. Women are almost invariably known by the 601
name of their eldest son, preceded of course by Umm. The other
extremely common practice is that of giving a man a laqab, or nick- 551
name, from some habit or personal peculiarity. The laqab is rarely
complimentary.

8. A Man's Honour is in the Hair of His Moustache

Page 111, Line 14. 'The hub in their house was empty of water.'

The hub is a large porous earthenware jar, which keeps water cool 415
by evaporation.

Page 112, Line 6. 'Nor did he even own the leg of a mare.'

The phrase 'leg of a mare' implies that a man has ownership in a 422
quarter share of the sale price of all foals from the mare. It is quite common for deals to be done in one, two, or three legs of a mare, and for one mare to have four owners.

Page 116, Line 13. 'Then will our sheikh cry, Sheil.'

Sheil, or Take away, is a word commonly used as an order to strike 192
camp.

Page 116, Line 28. 'You should not have to drink the water from a 312
camel's stomach.' 271

When threatened by death from thirst in the desert, Arabs may be forced to slaughter their camels in order to drink the stomach fluids. I have also been told that travellers have made their camels sick by forcing a stick down their throats to get a little fluid. I do not know if this is true. It would appear to me to be a most difficult operation.

Page 118, Line 29. 'Cut my head to keep the secret.'

This should probably have been more properly translated 'Cut my 192
head off to keep the secret,' for I have since been told one man's 539
version of this saying. According to his account there were three brothers of a famous Nejaf family, living in poverty, and they were forced to become thieves. One day they went to raid a Turkish Army camp near to Hindya. In the daytime they watched the camp and saw which was the guard tent in which the treasure chest was hidden. They then waited till night, and, when the camp was asleep, they

192 crept up to the guard tent. One of the brothers slit the tent wall with
539 his knife and crept inside. Inside the tent he found a box of silver
dollars, and he was passing it out through the slit in the tent to his two
brothers when he trod on one of the Turks, who woke up and grabbed
him by the legs. The Turk was shouting to raise the alarm, and the
Nejafi, seeing that he could not get away, and fearing that if he was
identified, his whole family would be punished, put his head out
through the slit in the tent and implored his brothers to cut it off and
take it away. This, according to the story, they did, getting away both
with the chest of silver and their brother's head, the identity of the
family remaining undiscovered. The word for 'cut' in Arabic does
imply cutting off and removing when applied to heads.

10. The Story of the Son of the Pilgrim

Page 148, Line 7. 'He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail.'

619 The Shammar are mentioned in other stories and a reader may be
confused by the different areas from which they appear to come. To
write a note on this extensive tribe would require considerable know-
ledge both of Syria and of Saoudi Arabia, and I myself cannot do it.
The Shammar best known to the Muntafiq tribes are the Shammar of
Nejd, who send caravans legally to Zobeir, and with less authority to
other areas. Some of the Nejdi Shammar do graze in Iraqi territory
and in the Neutral Zones. However, the most famous Shammar of
Iraq are those of Mosul Liwa. There are also Shammar, some of whom
have adopted the Shia religion, living in Baghdad Liwa. Many of
them have entered Iraq as refugees after defeat by Ibn Saoud. When
a prince of the Shammar from Hail is mentioned, I should think that
a member of the Rashid family is indicated. This family were once
rulers in Nejd, and their capital was for a time at Hail. They were
finally defeated by the Wahabis under Ibn Saoud. The word Amir
which I have here translated as prince, is a somewhat deceptive one.
[601] The sons of an Arab king carry, it is true, the title of Amir, but the
192 word has a larger usage. The tribes of Northern Arabia and Syria use
it in their sheikhly houses, and in the Persian Gulf the word implies
little more than a minor local official. The root of Amir is from the
Arabic word for 'command' and is most literally translated in such

and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal 619
memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of
time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups
of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or
Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis,
well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a
secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original 619
kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread 602
wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in
sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over
centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and
is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great con- 619
federacies embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen
tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal
life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the
tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One
authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities,
birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable.
The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal
authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the
tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in 619
the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, 369
their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk;
and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable
range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed
to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might
feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—
whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess
the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found
equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord
of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the
Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' 619
material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer 178
fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had 631
been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the
town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The
Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal
areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern
military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be
ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal
jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal
refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*dhabṭiya*) could appear

she pretended to be Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi's page boy 539x
rather than his daughter. And she said: As for Sheikh
Mizeil's beautiful daughter, I know not what became of
her. Perhaps she has thrown herself in the river to escape
from shame. And the Sheikh spoke and said: This affair 539x
shall be my affair, for I know Sheikh Mizeil's name, and 602
I think there is some blood connection between us and
that we are distant cousins, and does not the poet say:

A man has cousins,
They are like his wings.
Can then the hawk,
Fly without wings?

And when the food was eaten Sheikh Aqab ordered 539x
that the page boy be given a hair tent of his own to sleep in, and he whispered to Abood el Matrood: Guard her well in the night. Then the Sheikh sat in his own tent, passing his rosary through his fingers, thinking: How can I overcome the sequin seller and release Mizeil from the Turks, that I may earn the love of this girl? And by the time that the Star of Dawn was clear he had formed a plan. And when the first glow of dawn was in the East the Sheikh ordered the striking of the camp, and they took to the road, and as for their destination, it was Baghdad.

And on the morning of the second day the merchant Jassim rose from his bed and left his house and went to his shop as was his custom, and he called his assistants and slaves and shop boys and asked them and said: Have you yet found this runaway girl, daughter of the traitor Mizeil, and did you search for her throughout the night? And they replied: Master, we have searched every quarter in Baghdad, yet we cannot find her. Yet there is a matter of which we desire to acquaint you, for it fills us with fear, and that is that last night after you had left the shop there

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

tonishing the nature of those golden days, now only ten 000
years and less in the past.

The fundamental difficulty is that the new régime, with 177
all its virtues, is essentially an alien system imposed upon 609
the country from without by virtue of superior military 186
power. Thus it shares the unpopularity of alien systems the world over. The opposition to the present ruler and his British advisers is not simply the frothing of irresponsible and ambitious nationalist agitators. It is all that, but there is something far more significant underneath. I was once entertained for an afternoon by a rabid nationalist of Mesopotamia who attempted to show that the system of education introduced by the British was inferior in curriculum and in number of students to the pre-war system of the Turks, which proposition was about as reasonable as that two and two make twenty. But it would have been a great mistake to conclude that the man was primarily concerned to vindicate the Turks. He was not even primarily concerned over the educational system of Mesopotamia. Nor was he simply a fool. The thing that troubled him was the fact that his country was ruled by aliens. The tremendous following that such men have is not due to any outstanding ability they possess and still less to any profound insight into the various problems of the day, but rather to the fact that the average Arab, the man in the street in Mesopotamia, also resents that alien domination very intensely. It is hard for the unimaginative Westerner to realize that what the Arab wants is not efficient government or even good government. What he wants is self-government.

On the whole, in spite of many encouraging signs of 185
progress, a more intimate acquaintance with affairs in 177

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

812 stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who
779 claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

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5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

369 If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded, on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The
619 tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of
795 intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects. Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some, notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy. Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence and embarrassment.

619 The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but
621 its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Ḳurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muḥammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the
619 vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

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memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis, well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original 619
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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be
178 seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships
631 had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in
the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads
[423] had become a Government function; more and more the local
Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

619 Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old
177 tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came
369 with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steam-
ship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

619 The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into
579 Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr
and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

of Naṣir Pasha and later of his son Faliḥ to turn the tribesmen into docile tenants on the Sa'dun estates (which Ottoman land-registration policy had demarcated and bestowed under the feet of the age-long cultivators), and the attempt of Manṣur Pasha and later of his son, Sa'dun, to maintain all their old independence. Thus personal ambition and hatred joined with a clear issue of policy, with Government playing a rôle of vacillating opportunism. Year after year tribal war went on, with Turkish forces sometimes participating; civil government was almost wholly inoperative; yet settlement and tribe-breaking were all the time half-visibly proceeding. The day of a quiet tithe-paying Muntafiq peasantry was still distant; the fear of a united Muntafiq army was long past. 619 579

The middle-Euphrates tribes present for this period a confused picture of intricate local history. Typical of them are the Bani Ḥuchaym (Ḥukaym), the Shibil, Fatla, Khaza'il, Bani Ḥasan, and the tribes of 'Afak and Daghara, most of whom had been lately converted to Shi'ism and fell thereby under Mujtahid influence. Their records for the later nineteenth century show the increasing settlement of their shepherd sections, and the gradual introduction of rapacious yet feeble Turkish tax-gatherers. They show the endless bickering between tribes, accompanied by the bluster, looting, and unaimed rifle-fire which passes for tribal warfare; and the bitterer strife for the vacant headship of tribes, in which Mudir or Qa'immaqam would interfere when he could. In spite of the rare emergence of a unifying leader, the tendency was towards levelling, division, disunity. This was aided by the spread of the [423] new land-registry system and by the purchase of whole estates by the Saniya Administration which could develop its lands without tribal agency. The shifting of the Euphrates waters from the eastern to the western channel (p. 32) had profound effects in displacing the tribes, led to clashes, secessions, and invasions, and added to the immediate authority of Government as the only possible controller of Euphrates waters.

On the lower Tigris the close of the century was stormy with civil war. With lesser marsh tribes and the new non-tribal townships, the dominant groups were those of the camel-owning, grain-growing Bani Lam and the rice-growing Albu Muḥammad. The prosperity of both tribes depended on the Government allotment of the *muqaṭa'as*,[1] whose periodical distribution led to bitter quarrelling. To the normal causes of tribal war was thus added a perpetual irritant, and to its normal practices that of preying on the Tigris river traffic. Armed attacks on this were a common

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[1] The *muqaṭa'a* was (and is) a defined area (in some cases of great extent and productive value) of irrigable land, leased for a cash annual rent to a tribal shaykh; possession of a better *muqaṭa'a* was an object of the keenest rivalry. 427

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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feature of 'Amara life, involving *Zaptié* escorts on the paddle-boats, protests to the Wali, telegrams to London by the Lynch managers, and punitive expeditions, often unsuccessful. Shaykh Bunaya was by wealth and guile paramount in the Bani Lam for twenty years, till his death in 1903. Power among the Albu Muḥammad lay, subject to endless rivalries, in the ruling house of Khalifa.

The central Tigris groups of the Rabi'a and Zubayd had outlived their days of united insurgence. They were fully settled since the mid-century, and the Zubayd had suffered the secession of large elements to the Ḥilla district. The growth of the steamer-fuelling townships—'Aziziya, Ṣuwayra, Bughayla, and Kut itself—had brought a measure of Government control and economic opportunity.

Across the Jabal Ḥamrin in the submontane region of Mosul wilaya, Government had at all times been relatively strong and the tribes—Bayat, Da'udiya, Diza'i—in general unaggressive if pettily lawless. In the higher foothills and the true mountain country of the southern and central Kurds, which included wide patches of non-tribal territory, dwelt under their hereditary Aghās such strong communities as the Zangana, Jabbari, Ṭalabani, Shaykh Bizayni, Girdi, Surchi, Khushnau, Piran, Pishdar, Baradost, and a score of lesser names. These, generally homogeneous in speech and habit, were well armed and mounted, proud of their traditions, not unprosperous, suspicious or scornful of Turkish pretension; and the authority of their Aghās far exceeded that of the unhappy Mudir or Qa'immaqam sent to govern them. Their lawless self-centred life was still that of a millennium of ungoverned valley lordship; Turkish claims were in great part unenforceable, and strife endemic; yet the penetration of more modern ways had been for fifty years insistent, and with many a local setback and humiliation continued to gain ground.

Turkish control, at its best in the accessible flatter lands, was at its feeblest, to vanishing point, in the mountains. The Hamawand of Bazyan district, most famous of robber tribes, had raided as far afield as Russian territory, terrorized the Kirkuk countryside, returned intact from distant banishment, and lived on varying terms with the venerated Barzinji Sayids. The Jaf, with settled sections in Persia and the Gul'anbar Plain, were still nomadic between the two countries. Under united leadership—that of Maḥmud Pasha over the nomads and his brother 'Uthman Pasha in Ḥalabja, which he and his emancipated Persian wife 'Adila Khanim had largely built and wholly controlled—they could defy Government, refuse taxation, uproot telegraph lines, and recall the ways of the ancient Dere Beys. Attitudes no more amenable prevailed in the frontier territory of the Pishdar, who since 1893, when

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been 619 formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable as Qa'immaqam. 579 The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it 511 has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. 135 Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya 315 Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Naftchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Naftkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred [471] significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. 433 There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver ''Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the 642
example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self- 661
interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 643
'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the 185
important town families—and notably those of religious pretension —by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which 631
any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the 619
impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could 668
not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the
former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch,
Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with
the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At
Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of
Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found
[453] a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at
Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the
Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being
unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank
opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable,
paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much
damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the
direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs
in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing
stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of
178 tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the
579 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that
standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly
repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had
been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police
posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse)
greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from
the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading
that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the
country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too,
with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign
interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or
bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed
as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and
thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was
ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town
life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its
eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of
the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was
reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud
721 with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete
picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of
Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour;
the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza
alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies
did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the
Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

Dulaym in 1909 brought columns under Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha 619
against them. Two years later a settlement with the tribe was 721
reached by Nadhim Pasha's chief of staff, Ḥasan Ridhā Bey, accompanied as usual by recovery of loot and oaths of obedience. But the new order did not long survive; outrages on the roads recommenced, strife and rivalry for the proud and lucrative shaykhship persisted.

The Dulaym, all-powerful from 'Ana to Faluja, gave little trouble to Government or to travellers after the accession of the stalwart 'Ali Sulayman to shaykhship in 1903. New Khans were built along the route—al-Qa'im in 1907, Khan Baghdadi in 1908. Episodes of disorder in 1909 were followed by one of Nadhim Pasha's negotiated settlements; the region was one in which evident advance had been made by Government in the last generation.

The far-flung 'Aniza underwent no visible change. The two groups of the 'Amarat, with ibn Mijlad the resentful rival of ibn Hadhdhal, remained on bad terms, and raids against ibn Rashid in Najd, against Kurdish villagers in the northernmost Jazira, and against the Euphrates tribes show the range of 'Aniza activity. Fahad ibn Hadhdhal, Shaykh of the Jabal section of the 'Amarat, was still in 1914 nominal Qa'immaqam of Razaza.

Conditions in the lower Delta were as bad as Turkish 'Iraq could show. The tribes of the Ḥilla and Hindiya rivers, profoundly disturbed by the changes in the river levels elsewhere described, showed all the lawlessness of a society unpenetrated by modern communications and unstable in its loyalties as between Government, tribalism, and a reactionary priesthood. The feuds of tribe against tribe furnished sometimes the occasion for a Turkish military intervention, not rarely a fiasco and capable of dragging on into months of war. Passing through these territories was risky for the wayfarer, and the German professors digging at Babylon felt themselves to be surrounded by anarchy. On the lower Tigris the period perpetuated the internecine shaykhly struggles within both the Bani Lam and Albu Muḥammad, with rivals' appeals for Turkish aid and on occasion for British 'protection'; rare but bloody interventions by Turkish troops could not end the recurrent wars between the two tribes, with their volleys of cross-river shooting and refuge sought by the Albu Muḥammad shaykhs at Muḥammara. Interruption of the river steamers by these conditions reached its height in 1908. Nadhim Pasha in 1911 attempted a pacification; but the causes of unrest were too deep for easy removal and the outbreak of world war in 1914 found the two tribe-groups still bitterly hostile, while the outstanding personalities in each, rivals for paramountcy, still led irreconcilable factions in their remote rice-swamps and on Tigris-side.

1z Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 721 The lower Euphrates country of the Muntafiq owed little during these years to Turkish administration. The record of the time is of strife and intrigue connected, to a remarkable degree, with the personalities of the wilaya capital. From 1900 until 1908 the allegiance of the tribe was divided between Sa'dun Pasha and Faliḥ Pasha, the former as heir to his father's policy of resistance to Turkish pretension, the latter inclined to Ottoman service. Turkish military intervention led to a remembered massacre of their troops at Shaṭra in 1904; but the author, Sa'dun Pasha, found pardon and a way to Government favour by ostentatious backing of the C.U.P. Supported in 1910 by Nadhim Pasha, Sa'dun by his oppression involved himself in a general revolt of the tribesmen, followed by the visit of a Turkish commission of inquiry which led to a reversal of policy against him. Military operations ensued for the hundredth time. Sa'dun himself was decoyed on board a gunboat at Baṣra and sent in exile to Aleppo, there to die in suspicious circumstances. This gave the signal for a general rallying of the Muntafiq to his gallant but shallow and unstable son, 'Ujaymi, who succeeded to the precarious headship of a tribe from which unity and loyalty had been by now for ever banished. This alignment of forces on the lower Euphrates remained, not without sudden and bloody vicissitudes, until 1914. The temporary eclipse of the C.U.P. late in 1912 led to the outlawing of 'Ujaymi and the brief ascendancy of the sons of Faliḥ. But the tide turned; 'Ujaymi was again recognized as paramount, could again lead Muntafiq forces against the Dhafir, support the Amir of Ḥa'il, and create panic in Baṣra. The outbreak of war found him encamped near Zubayr, menacing but undecided.

619 721 423 Areas of maximum unsettlement were not only those by their terrain the least accessible to Government and to the penetration of modern forces, but those also where a fair economic background was precluded by a vicious system of landholding. The annual reallotment of the *muqaṭa'as* in 'Amara sanjaq, with its many examples of Turkish clumsiness and venality: the unreal and tribally repugnant landlord-tenant relationship in the Muntafiq: the tangle of rights or claims in the Shamiya and Hindiya areas as between the Sayid families, the heads of warring tribes and the absentee Baghdadi tapu-owners: in these lay the roots of a profound social uneasiness which provided the Turks and their successors with the most baffling and costly of their problems.

619 Central 'Iraq outside the Diwaniya sanjaq had little tribal history from 1900 to 1914. The Rabi'a were settled and accessible, the Zubayd reduced by secession and no longer bellicose, the fragmented tribes of the Diyalā and upper Tigris calling at most for occasional police action. These were areas where living stood at,

or just above, a fair subsistence level, taxation was not too irregularly collected, and Baghdadi landlords could make some show of administering their estates. 619

In the Persian border areas of Badra, Mandali, and Khaniqin, distracted as they were at times by trans-frontier disturbance and bickering, these parochial troubles were no general menace to peace. The submontane Kurdish areas of Mosul wilaya passed a half-generation of comparative peace and the slow decay of tribalism. Feuds between rival Aghās or occasional raiding parties of the 'young bloods' need call for no more than a patrol of *Zaptié* or a half-company of the local garrison. In the mountains 619 the case was otherwise. All the elements of a tradition of brigandage, difficult terrain, easy crossings to Persia, and Kurdish resentment 721 of increasing Turkish pretension combined to maintain areas of aggressive independence. The chief of these were those of the Hamawand, the Jaf, and the Barzan tribesmen. The Hamawand during these years more than confirmed their position as a pestilent affliction to all society but their own. With intervals of quietness, their young tribesmen continued to prefer raiding to the dull virtues of cultivation, and for months on end flouted Government orders, grossly insulted Turkish officials, refused to pay revenue, and terrorized the roads. In 1908 their condition of revolt became chronic, and the years following were passed in resistance to, or in eluding, military expeditions which brought no laurels to the Turkish generals. In 1910 a number of the lesser Hamawand Aghās were pardoned; but the truce was brief, their forces besieged Chamchamal, and wider disorders were prevented only by a face-saving settlement by Nadhim Pasha. It lasted for two years. From 1912 to the mid-summer of 1914 conditions in the Bazyan and Qaradagh areas were intermittently as bad as ever, and the passage of most of their tribal force into Persia added there to the confusion in the area of Salar al-Dawla's occupation (p. 72).

The Jaf were less savage but scarcely more amenable than the Hamawand. The death of 'Uthman Pasha in 1910 did not diminish Jaf supremacy in Ḥalabja, which 'Adila Khanim continued to administer; Turkish interference was not permitted, despite the harmless presence of a Qa'immaqam. The nomadic sections under Maḥmud Pasha—accounted in Baghdad as the greatest of Kurdish chieftains, though in person an insignificant, spectacled figure—had no outside contacts save with the settled folk through whose villages they passed, dreaded and unwelcome. The Pasha, after spending months in Mosul arranging the revenue-assessments on his tribe, visited Baghdad in 1911 to be lionized by Nadhim Pasha. Jaf forces were among those fighting in western Kirmanshah in 1912. The period closed without suggesting a *modus vivendi* as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 721 between Turkish claims to govern and Jaf adherence to their traditional way of life.

The religious Shaykh of Barzan, true latter-day Dere Bey, still held his inaccessible and lawless court across the Greater Zab from the Zibari country. He failed regularly to render to Government even the demanded minimum of respect, and annually embroiled himself with the savage Harki in their migrations. The dispatch of Turkish forces was met by mere retirement to the higher mountains, and the authorities' use of the Harki as agents of punishment was dangerous. Conditions worsened with the half-crazy oppression and Christian-baiting of the young Shaykh, 'Abd al-Salīm, who succeeded in 1908; an expedition of Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha was inconclusive; and it was left to Nadhim again prudently to accept the Shaykh's excuses and restore him to a short-lived favour. He was again outlawed in 1911 and 1912, crossed to Urmiya to join the Russians, and from there survived major operations against his tribesmen in 1913 and 1914.

Rival of the Barzani Shaykh dwelt, across the Van border, the equally holy and not less tyrannous lord of Shamdinan, Shaykh Ṣadiq of Neri. His brother, 'Abd al-Qadir, was high in the politics of Istanbul; he himself, detested for his greed and cruelty, lived on robbery and the odour of sanctity, reduced his Christian villagers to serfdom, murdered a bishop, and escaped all but occasional chastisement by Turkish armies. His death in 1911 brought Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir hotfoot to claim the inheritance, in vain. Shaykh Ṣadiq's son, Sayid Ṭaha, famed for his obesity, made good his succession and consolidated his family's position on both sides of the Turco-Persian border.

563 In the heart of Ḥakkari country the Assyrian clans still held their own, still attracted the interest of Protestant Europe. Benjamin, a weak unenterprising Mar Sham'un, succeeded in 1903 to the harassed patriarchate and headship of the Millet. Supported by the loyalty and hardihood of his people and notably that of his cultured and resolute sister, Surma, he was yet assailed by the intrigues of jealous cousins and by Turkish suspicions of disaffection. The Archbishop of Canterbury's mission, based on Urmiya and later also on Mosul, could do something for the spiritual, nothing for the temporal standing of the community. The protection offered by Russia at Urmiya was, as the event proved, neither a reliable standby in trouble nor acceptable to the Wali of Van; yet the Assyrians in their plight were ready to turn anywhere for support, and must have turned ever more definitely to the Russians had not war come to apply to their problem the most terrible of solutions.

619 The grim Yazidis gained some ground during this period

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

towards equality of treatment. Their own savagery had been in 619 part tamed by the severities of the 'nineties, and their shrine of Shaykh 'Adi was restored to them in 1907. Their Mir retained his authority and the friendless community their half-secret cult and practices; but there were signs of closer Government penetration after 1909. The application of conscription produced armed resistance in 1913, but a corrective visit of Turkish troops was not seriously opposed.

4. PROJECTS, BY LAND AND WATER

Far away from shabby, backward, and turbulent 'Iraq, Baghdad 499 Railway negotiations vitally affecting it continued as the century 648 opened. The results reached between the Deutsche Bank, the [471] Anatolian Railways, and the Turkish Government were contained in the Royal Irada of January 1902. This, re-cast in March 1903, revealed that the Germans had obtained excellent terms. A railway was to be built from Konia to the Persian Gulf, branches within 'Iraq were envisaged, financial provisions were generous, and a new Turkish company, the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, was to be formed.

The publication of the concession excited world-wide interest. The French, who in 1899 had agreed in principle to participate, now showed little enthusiasm. British co-operation was eagerly sought by the German promoters; but opinion in London, formerly indifferent or favourable to the project, was shocked now at the threat to India and to British interests in 'Iraq and the Gulf. The tide of opinion turned decisively against it, and Mr. Balfour was compelled, unwillingly, to announce British abstention. The Germans were bitterly disappointed. In Turkey itself the scheme had many critics; others favoured the project as one of hopeful development far beyond unaided Turkish capacity. In 'Iraq awareness of the enterprise grew slowly, and the same two bodies of opinion declared themselves: the one welcomed progress in any guise, the other dreaded foreign and Christian penetration.

The section Konia–Eregli was finished by October 1904 and the line prolonged to Bulgurlu, where it halted until 1909. In 1914 the Amanus tunnel was begun, the Euphrates bridged, and earth-work was proceeding towards Ras al-'Ayn. In the meanwhile other railway schemes had been propounded: a British line to run by Port Said, 'Aqaba, and Jawf to Baṣra, a French line to pass by Homs, Palmyra, and Dayr al-Zur to Baghdad and Mosul. Both were rejected by the Ottoman Government. German attempts to secure British support for their Bagdadbahn continued, only to be met by the reply, given in 1907, that opposition would cease if and when a Baghdad–Baṣra line was under all-British construction.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

I. MIDSUMMER 1914

To few countries in the world were greater changes brought by 178 the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Govern- 511 ment by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was 178 clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, con- 186 fined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile 642 to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater 619 efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 distant, hated, interfering bugbear and, to the shaykhs, the enemy 619 whose every advance must be at the cost of their power and livelihood. This was no less true among the Kurds, who, hating the Turks, were unlikely to welcome the substitution of Arabs as rulers; indeed, a national consciousness of their own had already come, feebly, to birth. And on the Euphrates the theocratic Shi'i priesthood were likely under any régime to maintain their own pretensions, incompatible as these were with any secular Government. Nevertheless, the tendency of the period prior to 1914 642 had been on the whole towards extension of the authority of 185 Government, a process likely or certain to continue under the newer-fashioned post-1909 Administration: for this, tactless and over-centralizing, was nevertheless more vital and more modern-minded than any previous Ottoman Government. Its administrative record even in the excessively embarrassed period of 1908 to 1914 contained creditable features: better attention was being paid to education, health services, town planning; the gendarmerie had been improved, town police perfected, the Army reorganized, the judicial system in part revised. And the international agreements of 1913 and 1914 between Turkey, Great Britain, and Germany seemed to clear away many obstacles to development.

In the latter field, indeed, there was room for fair hopes. Though many problems were untackled—those of improved agriculture, use of water resources, land tenure—yet a notable beginning had been made with irrigation works, and the Baghdad Railway was at last, it seemed, to be completed. River navigation was likely to be improved under the 1913 arrangements. The eventual opening up of productive areas and markets would encourage trade and agriculture, and perhaps create industry. A concession for the oil of Baghdad and Mosul wilayas had been promised, and that to parties well able to develop that wealth, if it existed.

000 Thus a prudent observer of 'Iraq in the midsummer of 1914 might have prophesied a future of increasing development of resources and communications. These, directed by a vigorous Government free at last from international strife, might have produced by degrees the wealth necessary to maintain stronger forces, to impose security, to pay an improving civil service, to remedy, in fact, the more glaring evils of the Administration. Society would almost inevitably progress towards higher standards. The movement of local nationalism was likely to gain further ground in the direction of a privileged, even an autonomous, status in the Empire; but a complete secession of the Arab provinces was unlikely because it was backed neither by any military force, nor by any especial sympathy of Europe such as the Balkan Christians had enjoyed, nor by any unity of aim among the Arabs.

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca, 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary clubs. 747 814

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyalā tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi Dhafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the Dhafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood. 619 ● 166

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of 648^K 721

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

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622
In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

I. TREATY DEADLOCK

648x THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary
Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to
observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the
years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify
optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to
complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds;
it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations.
Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished.
Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function,
and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused
of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased,
with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international
repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome
of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva
which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League.
With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved
normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts.
Its communications by land and air to foreign lands
543 developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the
minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially
unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an
optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of
peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of
619 Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal
resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not
extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous
of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were
less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Mean-
185 while, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further
developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a
closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved,
though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was
unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation
questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially
liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines
were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion
of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These
459 progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi
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701 the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to
their mountain-born enemy.

625 The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British
inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services.
Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the
Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force,
some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist
branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security.
In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi
inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years
later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrong-
doers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal
—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-
frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely
697 policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well
conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with
flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

499 Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude
of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inacces-
sible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechaniza-
619 tion of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made
towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance
636 on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupa-
tion days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little
to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the
Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently,
though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect
of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the
Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture
to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of
Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals'
Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the
policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended
in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their
landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor
the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which
led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish
frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish
tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926
were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without
precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian
frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless.
Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was
said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates
townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

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the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater 656 freedom of Turkish times.

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that 172 archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Ḥilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Lu', and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and co-ordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell.

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily de- 494 veloped during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern 499 Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Fayṣal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders.

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

It was succeeded immediately by a diluted Ikhā Ministry under 645* Yasin Pasha, summoned to power this time, on 17 March 1935, without conditions. Destined to rule 'Iraq for twenty months, it included Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ja'far Pasha at Defence, Nuri at Foreign Affairs, two Shi'is—Ra'uf Baḥrani, a former Finance Inspector, at Finance, and Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, a figure in the learned and literary world, at Education—and Amin Zaki at Works. There was no representative of the left-wing group (that of the *Ahali* newspaper) under Abu al-Timman; and the omission of Ḥikmat Sulayman, to his keen resentment, was to lead later to serious results.

The tribal situation to which, from Ḥilla to Naṣiriya, the new 619 Ministry had forthwith to address itself, was in large measure 645 significant of the mere anti-Government lawlessness of tribes and of the patriarchal feudalism always preferred by the Shi'i leader- 664 ship. As such it was a familiar 'Iraqi phenomenon from Ottoman times. But in so far as it had been produced by intrigue from Baghdad and from Najf in support of the 'political' aims of statesmen—themselves but little concerned with tribal or Shi'i advantage—it recalled the similarly evoked anti-British *Thawra* of 1920. Indeed, the history of the Euphrates in 1935 and 1936 reproduces faithfully the episodes of 1920 on a smaller but important scale. It shows again the ease with which the shaykhs were willing to follow, as they followed in 1920, any movement which seemed to offer them personal or tribal advantage—Government-appointed paramountcy in the tribe, a seat in the Chamber, a reopened land dispute, or a grant of rice-lands—with motives of no wider a patriotism than those similarly exploited by the Baghdadis fifteen years earlier.

Yasin Pasha achieved, by an air-dropped Proclamation to the tribes, a substantial immediate pacification. It was followed by visits to Baghdad by the Ikhā-favoured shaykhs. Their car-loads of festive armed followers filled the capital, with the complacent permission of the Minister of the Interior but to the alarm of onlookers. Eager for some immediate gain from their recent 'patriotic' uprisings, they mingled in street and ante-room with the Kurdish deputations from the northern liwās which, organized by the Ikhā to protest against the misdeeds of the Ayubi and Madfa'i Ministries, arrived in time to congratulate their successors. A serious episode at Kadhimiya, in which bloodshed resulted from a clash between police and a crowd demonstrating against the desecration of a graveyard, was without political meaning and could be composed without wider repercussions. The King, whose mother died in March, was acclaimed as father of a son and heir apparent—the later Fayṣal II—on 2 May. Parliament adjourned early in April and general elections were ordered in May.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 645 668 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 619 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests
[687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

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[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

cessions to their peculiar beliefs and customs, and met their active and passive resistance by sending a brigade of troops in September 1935. This bloodless operation was followed by the institution of courts martial which, with savage severity and no adequate trials, hanged nine of their leaders, including two Christians, and imprisoned 350 alleged resisters. These were later progressively released: but Da'ud al-Da'ud remained a fugitive in Syria, where numbers of his followers tried persistently to join him. The Barzani Kurds, subdued by joint 'Iraqi-Turkish operations in 1933 which captured Shaykh Aḥmad, gave further trouble in 1934 and 1935 under the truculent leader of a considerable force, Khalil Khushawi. This bandit, who for long defied the combined operations of 'Iraqis and Turks, dodged across frontiers from valley to valley and destroyed the villages of all who denounced him. Later in 1935 most of his followers were rounded up, and a dozen hanged; he himself vanished, to reappear in mid-winter and to be caught and shot in March 1936. In Sulaymaniya liwā a similar character, Sayid Muḥammad Pichkola, led looting parties in 'Iraq from a base in Persia. After long-drawn police operations he surrendered in August 1935, and was pardoned. In the same weeks, deep in southern 'Iraq, resistance to conscription was leading the Mudayna village of Qurna to armed protest which called for military suppression.

The year 1936 brought no peace to rural 'Iraq. The incitements to lawlessness first set afoot in 1934, the rancour of never-settled land disputes, the fear and hatred of conscription, and maladroit or corrupt local administration were added to the endemic causes of tribal restlessness. In February insurgence among the Shaṭra tribes brought troops to the Gharraf, and the usual measures quelled the rising in a few weeks. In the Muntafiq an assault on a police post in the Suq area was punished by fines and prison-sentences. In April a section of the Bani Ḥuchaym in Rumaytha district cut the railway, rallied a force of 1,200 armed tribesmen, and heavily engaged troops sent to suppress them. Casualties were heavy, the Army lost ninety men and two aircraft. Reprisals of corresponding severity, with the hanging of rebel leaders after little or no trial and the burning of villages, were reported in Baghdad, there to distress the squeamish and help the Opposition. The 'Akra district of Diwaniya witnessed a rising of the notorious Sha'lan al-'Aṭiya, unsatisfied by his rewards for opposing the Ministry of 'Ali Jawdat. It was not less brutally suppressed by Bakr Ṣidqi in June 1936; and in August a force of the Ṣafwan tribe, near Khidhr in Samawa qadhā, attacked the Government office and, though dispersed, were still unsubdued in the autumn of the year.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 imprisonment for 'exciting hatred against the Government'; all the other accused were acquitted for lack of evidence.

Ṣaliḥ Jabr, dissatisfied, resigned from the Cabinet; nor was this the only evidence of Cabinet disunion. Tired and ill at ease, and likely to be pressed by public opinion and the Army clique further from his policy acclaimed as 'pro-British', Nuri was more than willing to relinquish the premiership, and on 17 March again resigned office.

619 These vicissitudes of Baghdad politics had, as usual, no great effect on events outside the council chambers. Tribal life was scarcely conscious of the current crises—or, indeed, of the World War itself. A violent tribal battle between two sections of the 'Aniza cost, it was said, 200 lives. Hostilities between the 'Ubayd and Shammar, which flared up late in 1939, were not prolonged. 'Ajil al-Yawir, Paramount Chief of the Shammar, great in stature and shaykhly qualities, died late in 1940 and was succeeded by his son, Sufuk. Northern 'Iraq watched with head-shakings a scandal among the Yazidis, where the child-wife of Sa'id Bey, their Mir, fled in dudgeon to Syria. A military mission of 'Iraqi officers left Baghdad for the Yaman, at the Imam's request. The second of the
499 Baghdad steel bridges built by Holloways, 900 feet in length and named after King Fayṣal, was completed.

4. GAYLANI AND HASHIMI

*645 The advice of Rashid 'Āli, as head of the Royal Diwan, to the Regent was to install, if he could, an all-party Ministry capable of uniting loyalties and avoiding the pressures of the Army. A meeting at the palace was attended by all ex-Prime Ministers—Nuri Sa'id, both the Suwaydis, Madfa'i, Naji Shawkat, 'Ali Jawdat. These offered the Regent their promise to support whatever constitutional Government should be appointed. Nuri himself proposed the appointment of Rashid 'Āli, to which the Regent agreed; and thus was formed the first Ministry for four years to assume office in 'Iraq without military pressure. It carried high hopes of stability. The Cabinet announced by the new Prime Minister on 31 March contained Naji Shawkat at the Ministry of Justice, Naji al-Suwaydi at Finance, Nuri Sa'id at Foreign Affairs, Ṭaha al-Hashimi at Defence, 'Umr Nadhmi at Works, Muḥammad Amin Zaki at Economics, and the two Shi'is, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam and Ra'uf Baḥrani, at Social Affairs and Education. Rashid 'Āli retained the portfolio of Interior in his own hands. The reappointment of Nuri and Ṭaha seemed to stand for continuity, and suggested the united front of a 'National Coalition Government' which it claimed to be. The ministerial programme declared an attitude of perfect correctness towards the British alliance.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

'Iraqi-Turkish bloc would be—worst of all crimes—acceptable to Great Britain. Nevertheless it was ratified, and a State visit by the Turkish President was anticipated. Some urged revival of the Sa'dabad Pact, others disliked it as un-Arab. The Treaty of Brotherhood with the Jordan Kingdom was duly approved, amid the black looks and street demonstrations of the anti-Hashimite factions. 648x

The early fall of the Suwaydi Ministry, due to opposition in the Chamber and Senate and lack of Palace support, occurred on 3 May. In spite of popular hopes for a neutral or all-party Government, perhaps under the Amir Zayd, to hold elections and consolidate the structure of Government, it was followed on 1 June by a Ministry of indifferent quality led by the forceful authoritarian Arshad al-'Umari. He was to remain in office for six months, with a marked personal domination of his colleagues and of all departments, and to deal characteristically with the political freedoms permitted by his predecessor. He named 'Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab to Interior, Yusif Ghanima to Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba to Justice. The other ministers were all newcomers to Cabinet position: the Shi'i 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi (son of old 'Abd al-Ḥusayn) at Works, Babā 'Ali, the modernized and Americanized son of Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji, at Economics, Sa'id Ḥaqqi, another Kurd, at Defence, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, Dr. 'Abd al-Hadi al-Pachachi—cousin of Ḥamdi and Muzaḥim—at Social Affairs, and Nuri al-Qadhi, a lawyer and judge of the old school, at Education. In August Qaṣṣab resigned his portfolio, which the Prime Minister assumed, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh took that of Supplies. 645x

In spite of Arshad's will to impose discipline and peace, his period of office was troubled. In the tribes an unusually bloody clash occurred in August between the Shammar and the Albu Muṭaywit, with the loss of 200 lives. Danger in Kurdistan seemed to diminish as the Russian attempt to consolidate its puppet Republics across the frontier failed, and disillusioned and starving Barzani families trickled homewards to be disarmed. Many of the rebels in Persian Kurdistan, including Qadhi Muḥammad, were hanged by their Government on re-entry; but Mullā Muṣṭafā refused all terms, escaped capture, and after failing to re-enter 'Iraq reached Soviet territory. The Government accepted the unconditional surrender of his brother Shaykh Aḥmad and of his son Shaykh 'Ubaydullah. Four Kurdish officers who had fought for the Mullā and a few other ex-ringleaders were sentenced to death, and the need to deal with the armed insurgence of Muḥammad Khalid, the son of Shaykh Aḥmad, forced Government to keep troops in the neighbourhood. In Sulaymaniya liwā hostilities 619 668

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of
668 the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan, where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the
[468] Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to blame the Company itself.

668 In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy
661 of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some 3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question. In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker*
x645 was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps, which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry, approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan (at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the Panjwin earthquake victims.

'645 In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status
648 which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946, and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views'; and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and mountain units, seemed to be well suited to its probable 701 internal duties; for service abroad, other than token or ceremonial, it was not at present adapted. Whether the leading spirits of the Army would in future resist the temptation to assert themselves not as servants but as masters of the State remained to be seen. There had been, in the ten years since the adventure of the Golden Square, no sign of repeating the coups of 1935 to 1941, or of imitating the Syrian Dictator-Colonels of the day. But the danger was real; the Army leaders lacked a sincere sense of service and subordination to the State, felt little respect for its civil institutions or solidarity with the public, and could not but be aware that there was no power anywhere to withstand them.

We turn now to the various elements of which 'Iraqi society was 619 composed. Among the true bedouin, still leading their hard, 511 hungry and unenvied lives, the visitor to their tents would find every scene and circumstance seemingly unchanged for the last five or fifty decades. The 'Aniza, the remoter Shammar, the D̲hafir had little of novelty to show. Their extreme poverty forbade them any less primitive material equipment, and their social organization and isolation precluded almost every means of cultural progress. It was true that some greater bedouin shaykhs now owned motor-cars, carried wireless sets, and frequented towns, while their sons on occasion adopted an expatriate life of Western ways. It was clear also that the mechanized forces of Government now could penetrate the farthest areas of the *badiya*, that the ease of contact with Government had, since Turkish times, been helped by the use, in the Administration, of the language of the country instead of a foreign tongue known to no tribesman: that the tendency to settle family by family on the desert fringes of cultivation was not less, perhaps was greater, than it had ever been, and that Kurdish mountain nomadism was now restricted partly by the seductions of a sedentary life, partly by more sophisticated and less feebly enforced frontier restrictions. All these elements were operative, and had much diminished the nomad chieftains' power to defy Government or harass neighbours; but they had changed neither the manner and fashion of their existence nor its social or economic bases. Among the true nomads the tribal organization provided still the essential rallying unit, and the shaykhs or aghās would still be followed.

In the countryside of sedentary tribesmen, the continuity of outward appearance—scene, dress, dwelling, dialect, and food—half concealed the changes which fifty years had wrought. If the area occupied by tribal life had been locally reduced by the weakening of tribalism in the inlying villages, yet for the rest a first glance reveals a world seemingly unaltered from that of fifty years earlier:

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their
511 tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting
backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the
sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnutrition, disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty
619 years since Independence, there had been change in directions
179 which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first
511 was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and
private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there
had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards
[177] security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it
was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census, police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally, detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries, lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures, while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself transitional and unformed—of the country at large and of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in 1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both economically and politically valuable to a modern State. 811

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with 361
the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change, if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the 363
labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible. Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, 362
or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus 365
service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been, imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. 363
Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern 366
shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire 368
services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for 365
power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

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[1] The mausoleum of King Fayṣal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

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records of miri land, such management and control as is possible of these heterogeneous and extensive territories must be carried out primarily in the district by persons in direct touch with the people and the parcels affected. Many questions are no doubt settled by the customary social leaders as elsewhere (e.g. tribal sheikhs) and never reach the administration. Those that do may in some cases be dealt with by one of the few local officers of the State Domains or even by another Department (e.g. on the Yuseflya by the Irrigation). But ordinarily the effective agents of Government in the control of miri lands are the officers of the provincial administration on the spot, who must act for the most part according to their individual judgment or on the instructions of their provincial superiors in each case. This local control is naturally subject to the direction, and occasionally to the intervention, of the State Domains service or the Ministry to which it is responsible. It is also necessarily subject to intervention by the Ministry of the Interior or of any other Ministry, whose public responsibilities may be affected by some action taken. It is further subject to intervention by any Deputy or influential private person who may be concerned or interested.

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In a limited number of cases, disputes affecting the holding of miri land are decided under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, because of their reaction on tribal peace and public security. But since such disputes in theory merely concern the domestic management by Government of its own estates, they do not as a rule fall within the jurisdiction of any regular Court of Justice. Reference has already been made to the general failure to introduce the Land Code and more particularly tapu tenure effectively. Consequently by the side of a truncated and semi-atrophied Statute Law there have survived throughout the greater majority of the land, methods of acquiring and holding land which have never been regulated by law at all.

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2. An attempt has already been made to illustrate in broad outline the conditions under which land has been for the most part occupied and cultivated in the rainfall zone. There are commonly two classes of people concerned. Firstly (*a*) the larger man, who may be the local Agha or a small capitalist who has helped to develop the land by providing funds, seed, etc. Secondly (*b*) the actual cultivator who, in the mountainous districts, has tamed the wilderness by building terraces, constructing water channels, clearing the ground, etc., and who, in the plains, has similarly, if less laboriously, reclaimed the land by regular tillage and fallow. It is evident that in actual fact a partnership commonly existed or exists between these two classes.

Now it is generally accepted that the intention of the Ottoman legislator, when promulgating the Land Code, was to establish the actual cultivator on the land; and when that cultivator has remained on the same land and effected improvements of a capital nature by his labour, his claim is clear. But the claim of the larger man instanced, who will almost invariably have co-operated in some indispensable way (e.g. by according protection, providing capital or essential assistance), who has very likely been acknowledged as landlord (mallak) and perhaps regularly received mallakiya, cannot be equitably or advisedly disregarded. Investigation on the spot would be needed to weigh the respective claims in each case; but it can be seen that, broadly speaking, local conditions have often produced an association in the development and cultivation of the land between local overlord and cultivating holder in these regions, in which both have rights that should be recognised in their mutual interest as well as that of the country at large.

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In the Irrigation Zone and throughout the desert borders the Turks found the land for the most part in the hands of tribal confederations.

The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el 'Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country. 423 619

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised. 423 233

All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use. 423

8. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the 166 178

166 178 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 423 651 619 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer (mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended, wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective; but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 619 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 427 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

Some eight per cent of these tribal dwellers are still nomadic, 162
and educational arrangements for them will obviously be most
difficult to apply. People who are on the move, even if this be in 166
regular seasonal cycles or over more or less fixed areas, are never 871
susceptible to organized education. Even in countries where
compulsory education laws have been in effect for several years
and where school accommodation for the entire child population
exists, it is not easy to make arrangements for the schooling of
the children of mobile persons such as caravan and boat dwellers.
Clearly, in a country like Iraq where the problem of mobility of
population is of much greater magnitude, the conventional type
of fixed village school is useless for these peoples. Some of them
are not averse to education, and, especially in places where a
sheikh is anxious that his own children shall be educated, there
is an opportunity for providing educational facilities which would
be shared by the other children of the tribal group. It is suggested,
therefore, that the time is opportune for giving serious consideration
to the training of peripatetic teachers of the kind recommended
by the Monroe Commission in 1932.

The more urgent problem of tribal education relates to that 166
majority of the tribal peoples who are in the stage of transition 871
from nomadism to a more settled agricultural life. People who
are passing through this transitional stage present great problems 619
but also great opportunities to the educator. They are alleged to
lose some of the simpler virtues of people who are forced to submit
to the strict tribal laws and codes while they are still wandering
in the desert. Be that as it may, they undoubtedly need practical
education in the amenities of the more settled life, particularly
in matters of health, child care under primitive housing conditions
and agricultural practice. Their children also need schooling.
These educational needs are becoming more acute because, as
has been indicated in a previous chapter when discussing the
problem of land tenure, the tribal peoples are losing their former
wholesome relationship with the sheikh, who is becoming more
of a landlord interested in the produce of his tenants and less
of a leader with a responsibility for their welfare.

These needs of the tribal dwellers, therefore, and especially 876
those who are in the semi-settled stage, present a formidable 166
challenge to the Iraqi educator. What is probably needed to meet
their peculiar requirements is a team of peripatetic teachers who
could travel with the tribes while they are on the move, and who
could establish simple schools-cum-community-centres in the places
where the tribesmen and their families are gradually settling. So
far as is known, devices of this kind are as yet untried; it would
be well if a few young men and women of ingenuity and a practical

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MHl Iraq MHl

876 166 turn of mind, and preferably from the tribal areas themselves, could be specially trained as intensely practical teachers and then appointed to establish pilot projects of tribal education.

871 619 Some people with whom these possibilities have been discussed are not optimistic about such attempts to meet the educational needs of the tribes. They maintain that the tribal dweller has a strong suspicion of anything that smacks of Government interference and that he would have nothing to do with publicly-provided education. There is, however, another point of view. The writer and an Iraqi inspector of schools were sitting in a Bedouin guest tent one evening recently, together with two sheikhs, one of whom is reputed to be amassing land for his own purposes and the other who is the more liberal minded son of a sheikh who once established two schools. The following conversation was heard and, for what it is worth, is quoted verbatim:

First sheikh: 'I hear that you have offered to provide a school building if the Government will provide teachers.'

Second sheikh: 'Yes, I would like a school for my son Silah and for the other boys of his age.'

First sheikh: 'If your people become educated they will be demanding more rights. You will be laying up trouble for the future.'

Second sheikh: 'I want my people to be educated so that they may become better human beings. The future is with those who are educated.'

There is, of course, always more than one point of view about educational matters. The point of view of the second sheikh is expressed in another way by an Iraqi educator who writes, 'The problem which the Iraq Government faces as regards the tribes, the solution of which should form one of the main civic aims of education in Iraq, is the broadening of the outlook and allegiance of the tribesmen from their narrow tribal limits to a national horizon'.

000 These then, are some of the economic, political and social problems which must be taken into consideration before any ambitious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. It is only against this background that the realism of possible solutions to present educational difficulties can be judged. But these problems are not new and, despite the obstacles which they constitute, definite quantitative progress in the field of primary education has undoubtedly been achieved in recent years.

The next step must be to consider the practicability of making

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by October, 1916, when Mr. Dobbs was invalided to India, a 175*
working administrative machinery had been set up, not only 727*
for revenue but also for other branches of administration 652
which had been taken under the wing of the Revenue Department. A certain amount of confidence in the British regime had been gained. Data and information on revenue, land tenure and other subjects had been embodied for future guidance in a series of notes which for clarity of judgment and succinctness have probably never been surpassed in the history of 'Iraq Administration.

Administration of Tribal Areas

To the establishment of a government for the tribal areas, 175*
both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs gave particular attention. 727*
The greatest need of the moment was for peace and order in 619 ●
tribal areas and for the restriction of all assistance to the Turks from the Arabs, in order that the Expeditionary Force might devote itself to its main objective of defeating the Turks.

Both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs believed that these conditions might be attained by making use of the natural leaders of the tribes: the shaikhs. The alternative of direct government, either by a British or Arab staff, was calculated to be contrary to immediate ends if not impossible, due to the lack of a suitable staff and to the semi-barbaric character of the tribes. Their efforts were, therefore, directed towards building up forms of administration and of justice which, while conforming as far as possible to Western standards, were based on tribal organization, on recognition of tribal habits and customs and on support of the shaikhs as instruments of government.

The policy adopted was, in reality, an adaptation of the system so successfully developed and applied in Baluchistan by Sir Robert Sandeman, of whom it has been said: 'Every great

175+ 727+ colonial administrator has, wittingly or unwittingly, taken him as their example or followed in his footsteps.'[1]

619 When Sir Robert Sandeman first began to develop his system in Baluchistan, about 1875, he had found 'the tribal organization in a state of rapid decay and the power and influence of the tribal leaders much diminished'.[2] In 'Iraq, at the outbreak of the war, the tribes, especially those on the lower Euphrates, were in much the same state as a result of Ottoman attempts alternately to crush or settle them and to break or conciliate their leaders. The Turkish Government had at all times regarded the tribal Arabs as savages who, from sheer maliciousness, opposed the Government while in reality they were primitive communities still leading an existence so untouched by the benefits of civilized government that they could comprehend no other form of life than that postulated by their own codes and customs. The Government policy until the appointment of Midhat Pasha as *Wali* of Baghdad in 1869 aimed at the forcible conversion of the tribesmen from outlaws to obedient citizens without providing the means to live as such, or without arousing even a spark of the respect by which tribal obedience might be secured.

175+ 727 617 Midhat Pasha[3] approached the tribal problem from the standpoint of the land. His method was to sell *mīrī* or state lands for small periodical payments, giving *mīrī tāpū sanads* (state-land title-deeds) which, while not conferring actual ownership, gave security of tenure. These *tāpū sanads* were to be open to holders of doubtful titles, to villagers who cleaned a canal or planted a garden and to all shaikhs of tribes for their

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[1] Bruce, Col. C. E., *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1932, p. 60. For details of Sir Robert Sandeman and his system, see the article cited; Thornton, T. H., *Sir R. Sandeman; his Life* (1895); Hittu Ram, *Sandeman in Baluchistan* (Calcutta, 1916); *The Times*, February 26th, 1935; and *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, April, 1935.

[2] *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1932, p. 51.

[3] For the career of this noted Turkish official, whose reforming influence extended throughout the Ottoman Empire, and to whom the Turkish Constitution of 1878 owed much, see the interesting but uncritical *Life of Midhat Pasha* (1903), by his son, 'Alī Haydar Midhat.

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tribal area. He intended thereby to reclaim wide tracts for the 175*
plough, to increase revenue and to subdue tribal ʻIraq by 727*
giving the tribesmen new interests and relations in agricultural 619
life. The shaikhs, to whom the grants were to be made, would be won to the government in self-interest, and would therefore lose their terror as rallying-points of anti-government forces. As chiefs of agricultural communities, they would be accessible because rooted to the land, taxable because crops could not be hidden, vulnerable because of government control of water, and dependent on the government as guarantor of their acquired rights to collect the landlord's share of crops.

This agrarian policy, although the only one which could permanently solve the tribal problem, never achieved more than partial success, either during Midhat Pasha's regime, 1869-72, or during those of his successors previous to 1908, who, while nominally committed to land settlement, followed their own devices in dealing with the tribes.[1] The machinery for registering the land was inadequate and tended to become corrupt. The majority of the tribal leaders feared the new policy and shunned the new status as a machination of government to rob them of freedom and to impose conscription. Urban speculators, friendly with *ṭāpū* officers, forestalled other would-be tribal purchasers.[2]

The attempt to settle the tribes had one definite result. It 175*
split the shaikhs as in the case of the Saʻdūns of the Muntafiq 727*
into groups, one hostile to the innovations, the other, willing 619
tools of the Government, bought by gifts of land. Between the two groups the Government vacillated. It was easier at times to acquiesce in the domination of the countryside by powerful, reactionary shaikhs and in the consequent nullification of their

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[1] After the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks reaffirmed the policy of settling such tribes as were still nomad, such as the *firmān* appointing Jamal Bey (better known as Djemal Pasha) as *Walī* of Baghdad, August, 1911: 'The *Walī* is to formulate a scheme with the least possible delay for the settlement of the nomad tribes on the land.'

[2] *Revenue Circulars*, Nos. 1-22 (Baghdad, 1920), No. 15, p. 25.

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175 727 619 land policy rather than to maintain its own partisans. Whatever plan for winning over the shaikhs had existed, it was soon abandoned by the Young Turks who, desiring to stamp out all other power than their own, sought to establish direct relations between the Government and tribesmen. Great shaikhs were struck down wherever possible, as was Sa‘dūn Pasha in June, 1911, when he was treacherously captured and imprisoned in Aleppo where he died suddenly. The authorities went deliberately ‘out of their way to break the power of the individual shaikhs by multiplying their number everywhere to a bewildering degree. Anarchy reigned and nothing could be done to prevent it, owing to the lack of a strong hand in each tribe’.[1]

The struggle between the Government and the tribes in the lower Euphrates valley had been further complicated by the disruption of the prevailing feudal system, through the unskilful application to the Muntafiq country of Midhat Pasha's otherwise sound policy of land-settlement.[2] The whole of the arable land, although occupied and cultivated for many years by the tribes and therefore claimed as their own by prescriptive right, was parcelled out between the Turkish crown and the Sa‘dūns, *tāpū* title deeds being issued to the new landlords.[3] The degradation in status of the tribesmen to tenants, much as the Irish cultivators had been reduced on their own tribal lands by the English adventurers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, together with the necessity of paying both rent to the newly created Sa‘dūn landlords — who formerly had exercised only a form of lordship over the Muntafiq and had held none of the land as private property[4] — and revenue to the Government in the form of shares of their crops, stirred tribal feeling to revolt

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[1] *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, in *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917.

[2] Nāsir Pasha, the great Sa‘dūn and founder of Nāsirīya is credited with introducing the *tāpū* system into the Muntafiq, whereby the Sa‘dūns became great landlords. Note on the Sa‘dun Problem (confidential) by the Revenue Commissioner, 1916; *Admin. Report of the Muntafiq Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), pp. 1-2.

[3] Note on the Sa‘dun Problem; *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2.

[4] Ibid., also *Revenue Rep.*, 1919, p. 24.

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in which they were joined by the party of landless Sa'dūn hostile to the Government.[1] An era of bitter strife ensued between tribesmen and landlords, many of whom lived in the towns, occasionally by choice but more often by necessity, and between tribesmen and the Government. In some areas, accessible to gunboats and troops, the tribesmen had begun to pay these dues regularly[2] until the weakening of the Government hold, due to the Revolution of 1908 and later to the Italian and Balkan wars. The tribes soon relapsed into their former state of truculence, expelling their landlords and paying scant attention to the Government.[3] In other districts revenue had not been paid by the tribes for years, as in the Hammār Lake area,[4] and in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh region which had been free of any government control for fifteen years or more.[5] In still others the Turkish writ did not run outside the towns.[6]

Thus, by the time that British Administrators appeared in the tribal areas, the only attempt to settle the tribes had failed for want of will and of means to execute it. Disputes over land and water had embittered relations between tribesmen and landlords on the one hand, and between tribesmen and the Government on the other. The authority of the shaikhs, where it had not been entirely destroyed by the Government, was antagonistic to it. Government had for the most part broken down. 'Iraq, in the words of one competent observer, which though written with reference to the situation in 1900, may be applied with equal force to that in 1914, was

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[1] *Revenue Circular No.* 15, p. 25; *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2.

[2] *Review of Civil Admin. of the Occupied Territories of al-'Iraq*, 1914-1918 (Baghdad, 1918), p. 44 (hereafter *Review C. Admin. O.T.*, 1914-1918).

[3] The disturbances eventually led the Turkish Government in 1911, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, which 'attributed the Muntafiq troubles to the fact that the arable lands of the tribes are in the hands of a few powerful shaikhs who oppress their fellow tribesmen and keep them at variance . . . The proper remedy is a thorough partition of the lands'. Cited: Note on Sa'dun Problem.

[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917; *Admin. Report Hammar Lake Area*, p. 56.

[5] Ibid., *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, p. 39.

[6] *Arab of Mesopotamia* (Basra, 1917). Hereafter this semi-official publication by Miss G. L. Bell: Bell, *Arab of Meso.*

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> 175 a country of tribesmen fast losing the old loyalties, less and
> 727 less able to revert to the old livelihood, attracting local
> 619 rather than tribal relations, more dependent on order and control . . . yet still tribal in material equipment, in speech, in ignorance, still easily inflamed to ruin their own interests, still resentful of government and all its works.[1]

The full application of the policy of rebuilding the tribal organization under competent shaikhs, advised, controlled and supervised by British Political Officers, which was the essence of Sandeman's policy, had to wait until the force of Turkish arms had been broken.[2] In the meantime, however, every means of strengthening the power of the shaikhs was undertaken, on the basis that 'both the attitude and action of a tribe depend almost entirely on its most influential chiefs'.[3]

[622] A single leading shaikh was recognized in every tribe, as in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh district where H. R. P. Dickson, Assistant Political Officer, reported that he had 'managed during 1916-17, more or less to get the power into the hands of one shaikh in the case of each of the 22 Suq tribes'.[4]

Each shaikh so selected was made responsible for peace and order in his tribe, for the apprehension of wrongdoers, for the protection of lines of communication and of British Government property, for the cutting off of supplies and aid to the Turks and for the collection of such revenue as was levied. In return, he was given the support of British officials, prestige and, if necessary, arms. Possession of his lands was confirmed, and his tribal boundaries were defined as closely as possible. His natural importance in the tribal *majlis* was enhanced by

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[1] Longrigg, S. H., *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq*, p. 309.

[2] For instance, Nāsiriya was occupied July, 1915, but not until 1918 was administrative progress possible among the tribes, because of their anti-British feeling. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2; *Revenue Report*, 1919, p. 24.

[3] *Provisional Note on the Tribes within and fringing Mesopotamian Boundaries, North of Latitude* 33° 20' (*Baghdad*). For official use only, General Staff, M.E.F. (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1 (hereafter *Note on Tribes for General Staff*). Although written in 1920 of tribes of Baghdad wilayet, it is generally applicable to practically all tribes from 1914.

[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917: *Admin. Rep., Suq esh-Shuyukh*, p. 43.

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the measures of the Tribal Disputes Regulations. Added to these 175* was the policy of 'large doles, subsidies and no taxation',[1] which 727* one Political Officer, at Nāsiriya, held to be 'chiefly responsible for 619● the remarkable state of law and order which now exists', since 'the shaikh . . . will obey any order than risk losing it (his subsidy)'.[2]

As advantageous for immediate military ends as was the policy of restoring the cohesion of the tribes and the patriarchal rule of their shaikhs and as well suited as it was to many aspects of tribal life, it was nevertheless fraught with difficulties for the future.

The tribal organization had so far deteriorated, especially among the rice-growing and date-producing tribes, that it could only be restored by supporting the shaikhs with force, and, as Sir Henry Dobbs said in 1916: 'Once a shaikh has to rely on Government for support, he has lost the sympathy of his tribesmen.'[3] Endowed with power as they were and motivated by self-interest no less than the meanest tribesmen, the shaikhs found it difficult to restrain themselves from even petty tyrannies, which, by 1920 had assumed such proportions in tribal eyes as to form a cause of the insurrection of that year.

From the standpoint of government, the efforts to restore tribal organization meant the reimposition of feudalism, contrary to the principle of the evolution of political institutions. Purely bureaucratic government, with its lack of flexibility and sympathetic contacts, was manifestly unsuited to tribes at the time, a fact which Mr. Dobbs realized and made every effort to combat. Nevertheless, the introduction of the Sandeman system, depending for its successful operation on maintenance of the tribal *status quo*, gave little opportunity for the operation of civilizing processes, for the growth of less primitive social codes and of more progressive forms of government. The system in 'Iraq tended to become a method of control rather than a system of government in its broadest sense.

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[1] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921 (confidential, Baghdad, 1922), p. 18.

[2] *Reports Admin.*, 1918: *Nasiriyah Division*, p. 351.

[3] Cited, *Admin. Report, Suq al-Shuyukh District*, in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 56.

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

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
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Shabicha
TRANS-DESERT ROUTES
RAILWAYS
BOUNDARIES
TRIBAL NAMES
OIL PIPE LINES
Scale of Miles
100
0
100
200

[following p. 96(b)]

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

487
496
● 619
315


I R A N
Ruwandiz
Rania
Koi Sanjak
Sulaimaniya
RKUK
Chemchemal
Tauq
Tuz Khurmatli
Kifri
Khanaqin
Karind
KERMANSHAH
Qizil Ribat
Delli Abbas
Naft Khanah
Shahraban
Deltawa
BA'QUBA
Mandali
Marut
BAGHDAD
Salman Pak
Al Aziziya
Hindiya
HILLA
Bughaila
Kut al Amara
Ali Gharbi
Ali Sharqi
Afaq
Kut al Hai
Kifl
Al Kufa
JAF
Al Diwaniya
Amara
Qala Sikar
Qala Salih
Rumaitha
Shatra
Euphrates
Tigris
Samawa
Al Khidhr
An Nasiriya
Al Qurna
Ur
SUK ASH SHUYUKH
Al Khamisiya
BASRA
Abul Khasib
Shuaiba
Az Zubair
MOHAMMERAH
As Sulman
Safwan
Umm Qasr
FAO
Busaiya
Al Amghar
Jahra
AL KUWAIT
KUWAIT
Ansab
40°
36°
32°

[following p. 96 (c)]

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Shī'is of the Holy Cities and of the tribes of the Euphrates 175*
Valley maintain, in substantiation of their claims to a greater 186*
share in the Government of 'Iraq,[1] that it was they who brought 668*
about the Insurrection of 1920 and, therefore, brought independence to 'Iraq. It was also doubtful for a time whether the Movement would degenerate into a localized *Jihād*, such as actually occurred in the Muntafiq in 1920, or whether it would pave the way for the creation of an Arab state under a Hāshimī ruler as the political leaders desired.

To the tribes, as the most powerful single weapon at their 175*
disposal, the Nationalist leaders paid particular attention, 186*
although they, as townsmen, normally feared the tribesmen as 668*
much as they professed to despise them as uncivilized. The 619
tribes, north of Najaf, along the Euphrates and in the Jazīra, being more accessible to Damascus and Aleppo, were susceptible to Sharifian propaganda emanating from those centres. Among the tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, predominantly Shī'a, the Nationalists from the Holy Cities and Baghdad found the most fertile ground for their politico-religious propaganda, although the Banī Tamīm, the 'Azza and other tribes between Baghdad and Ba'qūbā were not unaffected.

Normally inter-tribal and inter-sectional politics dictate tribal attitude and behaviour. Concerted action among the tribes becomes possible only when they are moved by an idea or motive transcending their local and sectional interests, a rare occurrence. The 'Iraq tribes had not been untouched by pre-war National aspirations, which had, in fact, accentuated tribal antipathy to the Turks,[2] but a feeling of national consciousness had never taken firm hold among them or become a compelling motive of action. It is unlikely that Nationalist propaganda spread by Sharifian agents or from Shī'a centres would have taken root in tribal minds had it not been for the

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[1] As in the tribal risings of the spring of 1935. See an illuminating article, MacDonald, A. D., *J. R. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xxiii (1936), Pt. 1, pp. 27 ff.

[2] *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, p. 3.

175 186* 668* fact that the propagandists concentrated strongly and persuasively on matters nearer to their hearts and to their personal advantage than the abstract concept of a national existence.

619 651 National independence thus became attractive to the tribes not because of any theory of indigenous administration or any hope of an Islamic state,[1] but because it promised an escape from Government, particularly one insistent on the payment of taxes. Their concept of the ideal government was one with bread in one hand and a club in the other: that is to say, dispensing benefits for which they were not called upon to pay, and maintaining a strong justice with impartiality. The Turks had in no way lived up to this conception. The British Administration at its inception had been promising, but it had gradually lost its ideal character. Tribal districts were now forced to pay revenue such as they had never paid before[2] and as they were never to pay again.[3] In the Muntafiq, for instance, the collection of revenue per capita had increased from less than one-fifth of a rupee (As.2 Ps.10 or 3d.) in 1916[4] to Rs.5 As. 10 in 1919 (about 8s. 6d. in sterling). It fell again to Rs.1 As.4 (about 1s. 11d.) in 1922,[5] rising to Rs.4 As.5 (6s. 6d.) in 1929, above which it has never risen. Nor did the tribesmen see

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[1] *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 4; ibid., 1921, p. 5.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 118, 145. The Bani Hûchaim paid heavy taxation for the first time in their history in 1919: *Admin. Report, Diwaniyah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

[3] The collection of Revenue in the Muntafiq, 1916 to 1928 was:

1916	Rs. 52,464 (*)	Only Nâsiriya and Sûq ash-Shuyûkh districts occupied.
1919	16,61,823 (*)	
1922	3,68,508 (†)	April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.
1926	10,02,659 (‡)	
1928	12,77,233 (§)	The peak year before fall in prices.

(*) *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 31; (†) *Report of the Accountant-General*, 1922-23 (Baghdad, 1924), pp. 11-12; (‡) *Report on the Operations of the Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance*, 1926-27 (Baghdad, 1927), p. 23; (§) Ibid., 1928-29 (Baghdad, 1929), p. 32.

[4] Based on a population of 295,537, the average of the estimate 320,000 in 1918-19 and that of 271,074, made in 1930-1 for the League of Nations. Ditchburn in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 1, estimated the Muntafiq population at 300,000.

[5] April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.

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benefits flowing directly to their districts in proportion to the 175*
taxation. The receipts for the great tribal Divisions of Muntafiq, 186*
Dīwānīya and Shāmīya in 1920 were estimated at Rs.55,33,100 668*
or nearly one-quarter of the total local revenue of the fourteen 619
divisions.[1] The purely divisional expenditures in the three [651]
divisions were Rs.19,29,440 or 18·8 per cent of the total divisional expenditure.[2]

Another grievance dominated tribal feeling. The tribal policy adopted by the British authorities in 1915-16 for restoring the power of the shaikhs, largely for military reasons, had been extremely valuable but it had been carried beyond its original and logical conclusions. It had carried with it the necessity of supporting the paramount shaikh in all but the most flagrant uses of his power. Events had proved, however, that these shaikhs had abused their authority, using it for their personal aggrandizement. The other shaikhs and tribesmen, sullen and resentful of the growing autocracy of the Government shaikhs, found in Nationalism a promise of release both from the shaikhs and from the Government which supported them.[3] It is a fact that in the Insurrection of 1920 the enmity of the insurgent shaikhs and tribesmen in many centres was directed less against the British, in spite of Shī'a incitement, than at the paramount Government shaikhs[4] who, in many cases, were forced into the towns from which they dared not stir. In this atmosphere the exhortations of the religious firebrands to rise, slay and loot produced results far greater than the intrinsic merit of their Nationalist propaganda would justify.

Nevertheless, in spite of the undeniable power of fanatical religion among the turbulent tribesmen and in spite of the tribal grievances and hatreds which both Shī'a and Sharifian

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[1] *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iv.

[2] Ibid., p. v.

[3] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 143. But cf. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, pp. 2-3.

[4] Ibid., p. 9 (78); Shelswell, G. H., A.P.O. Samāwa: *Official Report on the Causes of the Tribal Disturbances in the Samāwah District*, August 9th, 1920.

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175* propaganda fused into action, it was not until the rumours of a 186* weakening government seemed to be borne out by its inability 668* to control the situation, that the tribes were emboldened to 619 rise. To the tribal mind, it would have then been a mistake not to have struck when there was a likelihood of the British being overwhelmed and folly to have supported the regime if it were falling. Until that time, however, little evidence of tribal disaffection was apparent. Thus, when reviewing the local political situation in 1919, the Political Officer of Hilla Division reported that a mild form of unrest, connected with the anti-British propaganda emanating from Karbalā, had passed over his Division. It had manifested itself in lawlessness, in murders, attacks on pilgrims and by desertion of Levies with rifles, but prompt action such as the deportation of the ringleaders, the operations of gunboats and the imposition of fines had brought peace.[1] He believed little genuine anti-British feeling existed, except at the Holy City. He warned the Civil Administration, however, that the 'whole series of episodes is instructive of what may recur any time until the future of 'Iraq is definitely announced'.[2] In Dīwānīya, Major C. K. Daly, the Political Officer, reported that an undercurrent of Sharifian propaganda had blown through the Division without leaving any appreciable effect,[3] but that the natural lawlessness and truculence of the Samāwa and Rumaitha tribes were causing difficulties in administration.[4] In the Shāmīya Division, in which Najaf was located, the annual report stated that while the religious authorities had co-operated thus far with the Government, the tribes obviously were 'marking time' with an eye on the future, and that they would act accordingly as the Government seemed strong enough to reach them.[5] In the Muntafiq, the influence of propaganda aided by Sharifian gold[6] had made itself felt. Certain of the

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[1] *Admin. Report, Hillah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

[2] *Monthly Reports, August*, 1919, Hilla, p. 22.

[3] Ibid., Dīwānīya, p. 25.

[4] *Admin. Report, Diwaniyah*, 1919, p. 1.

[5] Ibid., *Shamiyah Division* 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

[6] Ibid., *Muntafiq*, 1920.

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Political Officers, however, believed that the Sharifian influence 175*
would have little effect in the Muntafiq because of the self- 186*
interests of the *fallahin* and *sarkals*. The Officers stated, how- 668*
ever, that it would take low taxation and firm treatment to 619
ensure the maintenance of these friendly relations, the Muntafiq Arabs being like gunpowder: the slightest spark would send them off. The tribes were reported as being quiet at that moment, but with arms at hand, their towers still standing and with a consciousness of their fighting ability, they were dangerous potentialities. They could be persuaded to do almost anything by agitators with a free hand and plenty of money.[1]

Opposed to the British for entirely different reasons but 175*
nevertheless joining actively in the agitation against them were 186+
the many ex-officials of the former regime repatriated in 'Iraq. 668+
Some of these, discontented with the pensions paid them from 565
the Civil Treasury, favoured any regime which would give them employment. Most of them, however, hated Great Britain and sought the return of the Turks or else desired a Muslim Government joined to a pan-Islamic Federation headed by Turkey.

The Nationalists could also count upon the support of many of the landlord class who, accustomed under the Turkish regime to exercise their privilege of collecting their rent to the last piastre without obligation either to the land or tenant, now found a strong arm imposed between them and the *fallahin*. Tenants, also, who had managed by devious means to escape payment of rent, had little reason to wish for the continuance of a Government which insisted on the payment of rent as well as of revenue. To them, as well as to many other classes, the insistence of the British Administration on its standards of justice, order, punctuality, the conduct of public business and sanitation, had little counterpart in their customs and in their habits of thought. Its unrelenting efficiency and thoroughness and even

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[1] Shatra District Report in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 92.

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that eventually all cases involving Religious Law will be heard 692 in the Civil Courts, along the lines of the Judicial system in force in present-day Turkey. Steps towards that end have been the appointment wherever possible of Civil Judges to act also as *Qādhīs* of the *Shara'* Courts,[1] and the passing of a law legalizing the transfer of law cases from *Shara'* Courts to Civil Courts. These steps have been facilitated both by the ability of the 'Iraqī Civil Judges to administer the *Shara'* Law and by the evident approval of a substantial portion of the public who have found in Turkey, both past and present, the model for 'Iraqī statecraft.

In the administration of justice in tribal areas, the application 671 of the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations[2] has 619 continued but with much controversy. On the one hand, it has been held that the tribes represent a class unfamiliar with the laws and conventions applicable in a more highly civilized society, but possessing a code which, although harsh and even repellent, is definite and is recognized among themselves. The code, according to this view, should be applied to the tribes through the Tribal Disputes Regulations until such time as the normal system of justice can be brought into force among them. This has been the viewpoint of the Ministry of Interior charged with administering the Regulations. On the other hand, it is contended that two systems of justice should not exist side by side in 'Iraq; that much evasion of justice has already occurred through non-tribesmen claiming the right to be tried under the Regulations; and that tribesmen must be assimilated by the body politic. This opinion, although it may not be put forward officially by the Ministry of Justice, has nevertheless influenced the policy of responsible 'Iraqī officials in the Ministry. It has also been repeatedly presented in the Chamber, principally by urban deputies who in their speeches have voiced the prejudices of the greater part of the townsmen of 'Iraq.

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[1] In 1931, Civil Court Judges were also *Shara' Qādhīs* in 24 places.

[2] As amended, December 28th, 1924. See *Compilation*, 1924, p. 63.

'IRAQ

671 There can be no escape from the fact that the Regulations
619 have been open to abuse and that revolting crimes have been
committed by men who, in spite of their long familiarity with the legal codes, have taken advantage of almost untraceable tribal connections to escape punishment strictly due them.

It would seem, however, that now as in 1932 the Regulations represent the only equitable way of dealing with tribesmen. Reforms are no doubt needed, particularly in the definitions between tribesmen and townsmen, but it would also seem that the tribal viewpoint cannot be changed by the mere application of laws to the tribal areas. Until education, land settlement and a liberal-minded official class have brought greater knowledge and familiarity with the customs and conventions prevailing in the rest of 'Iraq, the extension of the legal system in its entirety will be fraught with injustice and with the gravest political and social dangers.

671 A great portion of the work of drafting and formulating the legislation which fell to the Ministry of Justice arose from the necessity both of filling in the outline set forth in the Constitution and of bringing into existence the special laws which by the express stipulations of that document were to govern the application of the principles contained in it.

Legislation of the first category which, after being drafted in the Ministry, was passed by Parliament, included the *Liwā* and Municipal Administration Laws;[1] the Jewish and Christian Communal Court Laws, cited above; the Currency Law;[2] and a series of Regulations for the various Ministries, as well as a number of other laws which put form and substance on the skeleton of the Constitution. Legislation implementing provisions of the Constitution included the Judges and *Qādhīs* Law;[3] Employment of Foreigners Law;[4] a Law for determining

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[1] *Compilation*, 1927, *Liwā* Administration Law, No. 58 of 1927; ibid., 1931 Municipalities Administration Law, No. 84 of 1931.

[2] Ibid., 1931, 'Iraq Currency Law, No. 44 of 1931.

[3] Ibid., 1929, No. 31 of 1929.

[4] Ibid., 1927, No. 36 of 1927.

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Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the 173 Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true, occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks, as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia 619 tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended pictures of King Feisal and of His Royal Highness the Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days when the country was under foreign domination, when they were the rallying-points of the resistance which prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example, numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the 463 capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, 166 lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this growing State a boy 555 may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city. When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirhem [651] from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants are the first to send in their money: though they may be wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send in the exact dirhem along with the labourers and artisans. To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

TALES FROM THE ARAB TRIBES

1. THE STORY OF HAJJI ALI, THE GREAT SULTAN AND HIS SON, THE AMIR KHEYYUN

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

619 ~~The Maadan~~ are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in
361 scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and
556 lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two
rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often
438 acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they
have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was
[231] in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being
432 derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd),
578 and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A STORY CONCERNING THE IGNORANCE OF SLAVES

Slaves.

192 'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and
567 does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

[192] The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course
136 there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

103 Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

582 The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still main-
178 tained in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to
[619] force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

6. The Story of the Lost Soul

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

764 The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy
788 families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for burial in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

192 crept up to the guard tent. One of the brothers slit the tent wall with 539 his knife and crept inside. Inside the tent he found a box of silver dollars, and he was passing it out through the slit in the tent to his two brothers when he trod on one of the Turks, who woke up and grabbed him by the legs. The Turk was shouting to raise the alarm, and the Nejafi, seeing that he could not get away, and fearing that if he was identified, his whole family would be punished, put his head out through the slit in the tent and implored his brothers to cut it off and take it away. This, according to the story, they did, getting away both with the chest of silver and their brother's head, the identity of the family remaining undiscovered. The word for 'cut' in Arabic does imply cutting off and removing when applied to heads.

10. The Story of the Son of the Pilgrim

Page 148, Line 7. 'He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail.'

619 The Shammar are mentioned in other stories and a reader may be confused by the different areas from which they appear to come. To write a note on this extensive tribe would require considerable knowledge both of Syria and of Saoudi Arabia, and I myself cannot do it. The Shammar best known to the Muntafiq tribes are the Shammar of Nejd, who send caravans legally to Zobeir, and with less authority to other areas. Some of the Nejdi Shammar do graze in Iraqi territory and in the Neutral Zones. However, the most famous Shammar of Iraq are those of Mosul Liwa. There are also Shammar, some of whom have adopted the Shia religion, living in Baghdad Liwa. Many of them have entered Iraq as refugees after defeat by Ibn Saoud. When a prince of the Shammar from Hail is mentioned, I should think that a member of the Rashid family is indicated. This family were once rulers in Nejd, and their capital was for a time at Hail. They were finally defeated by the Wahabis under Ibn Saoud. The word Amir which I have here translated as prince, is a somewhat deceptive one. [601] The sons of an Arab king carry, it is true, the title of Amir, but the 192 word has a larger usage. The tribes of Northern Arabia and Syria use it in their sheikhly houses, and in the Persian Gulf the word implies little more than a minor local official. The root of Amir is from the Arabic word for 'command' and is most literally translated in such

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● 619
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[For information on the customs of the Muntafiq tribes in Iraq, see MI1 Kuwait, 1: Dickson, Category 116, scattered references on pp. 110, 111, 124, 147, 164-171, 179, 191, 375, 421, 443-444, 518, 543, 545-560, 607-608, and 615.]

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development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without 641
distinction as equal citizens of the State. 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one 668
another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at lea[illegible] some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling.

The Kurds : Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority 563
in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are con- 221
centrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous, and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals, moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the
cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains [241]
and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being semi-sedentary.

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority 563
belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve 619
their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts 178
they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized. Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly

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563 ● 619 178 acknowledge no law except their own customs, and no leadership except that of their chief families, some of which, like the Baban family, were virtually independent princes in Ottoman days.

Tribal feeling is still, as it has always been, stronger than Kurdish national feeling; and the Kurds have never formed a nation, still less a nation-state. In the last generation or so, however, new factors of unity have been arising. One is the growth of a Kurdish town-population. In the past the Kurds tended to leave commercial crafts to Jews and Christians, but now a Kurdish burgeoisie has appeared, in whom tribal loyalties are weaker and national ideals stronger. Another factor is the emergence of a Kurdish intelligentsia. Its education has been mainly non-Kurdish: Turkish in the days of the Ottoman Empire, Arabic and Western in the present generation; in consequence many of the educated Kurds have been assimilated to the Turks or Arabs. The majority, however, have remained Kurds, and have begun to develop a modern Kurdish press and literature, with its centres in Baghdad and Sulaimania. They are in contact with the centres of Kurdish life in Syria, Persia, Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Republic, and are forming and spreading the ideas of Kurdish independence and unity.

The Kurds under the Mandate

648 563 Before the war of 1914–18, the majority of the Kurds were subject to Ottoman rule. It was natural, therefore, that the Allies should favour the idea of Kurdish autonomy: an ideal embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which provided for local autonomy for the Kurds still to be left in Turkey, or, if they themselves desired it, an independent state to include the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, of which the disposal was still undecided. The Treaty was never carried out, and was replaced in 1923 by that of Lausanne, which said nothing about a Kurdish State or about autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan. In the meantime, an Iraqi Government under British Mandate had been established, and, as it had been found impossible for economic and other reasons to establish a separate government for the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, it had been decided to incorporate them in the unitary State of Iraq. On the whole, the Kurds of the Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk regions accepted this, but those of Sulaimania did not. In 1922 they revolted under the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud. The revolt was only with difficulty suppressed; and it was not

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423 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of
427 the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a sharecropping
basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths,
or a third of the produce.

428 But even on these individual holdings communal ownership
is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that subtribal
621 chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal
622 chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the
tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and
428 especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from
inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the
tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the
country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

428 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over
the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area,
241 it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has
a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years.
Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group
shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and
so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants
221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and
241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing remains
233 an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it prevailed
423 generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the
● 619 State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organization,
and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

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423 tribal organization there was no clear definition of individual
rights of ownership to the collectively-owned land. It was a
•619 system which could exist as long as no one thought about it; as
long, that is, as the tribe was accepted as the unit of political
life, and as long as no individual claims were likely to be made.
It is for this reason that it is impossible, once the tribal system
has ceased to be the political unit, to settle land on a tribal
basis; and yet to settle land on the basis of the supposed individual
claims creates grave injustice, because in practice it means
that too much land is allotted to the sheikhs and that the cultivators
are reduced to the position of tenants or labourers.

439 Since the early years of the twentieth century the tribal
system has been breaking up, and the economic development of
the country in the twenty years between the wars has hastened
its disintegration. When water transport came to the Persian
Gulf towards the end of the nineteenth century, export markets
opened for Iraq grain; the subsistence economy broke down and
production for export began. Exports of grain increased from
65,000 tons in the early eighteen-nineties to 120,000 tons in
1909–13, and to 380,000 tons in 1934–9. The profitability of
556 export has given the tribal chiefs a motive for acquiring land as
their personal property.

The tendency to acquire land for the sake of money income
was much strengthened, in the twenty years between the two
wars, by the rapid extension of pump irrigation and the accompanying
increase in the cultivated area. Pump installations
312 have increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,000 in 1944, and provide
426 water for some 2½ million acres of land, or over half the cultivated
land in the irrigated zone. The installation of a pumping
system is comparatively cheap, costing some £2,000 before the
recent war, but it is far beyond the means of the peasants, so that
pumps have been installed by sheikhs, or more frequently by
city notables, who make contracts to supply them to peasants
at extortionate rates of interest, and so gradually acquire the
land in payment of debt. In many cases the sub-chiefs, or sirkals,
have become pump owners.

423 Thus in the regions of pump irrigation the tribal system has
entirely ceased to function. The land is mainly the property of
427 the pump owners, with the cultivators taking a meagre share
of the crop, varying from one-seventh to one-fourteenth or one-

184 the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged
795 generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i,
[578] while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated. Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government itself.

563 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of
162 the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of
563 which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear
621 racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled them in a social organization which represented an identical response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes; but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization. About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur.
563 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds
795 of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their
197 homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan (Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary status.

563 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long
621 been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil, and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for
563 the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

established at every qaḍhā and naḥiya; and the Kurds, in turn, 563
supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in 563
type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, 181
fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh ʿAdi, lay
in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been 795
reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal 563
organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, 621●
Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Ṭuz 181
Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall ʿAfar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by ʿAbbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shiʿism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined 563
almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with 162
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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

technique included blackmail. Rickety boat-bridges served a 361
dozen of the riverain towns. Street lighting consisted, at the best, 363
of a few battered oil-lamps. Water was supplied by donkey-borne [365]
waterskins from the river, or from polluted wells in private courtyards;
only in Baghdad was a single quarter of the town furnished
by pipes with silt-laden untreated water. Municipal street-sweepers
maintained some appearance of decency in the main lanes and
bazaars, while filth and stenches abounded in the rest. Every
town and larger village had cemeteries in its midst or on its
fringes. Khans for caravans or wayfarers were found everywhere;
hotels approaching the lowest European standard existed only in
Baghdad.

Municipal administration was entrusted, save in unorganized 632
villages, to a Mayor and his council. These functionaries, elected
by procedures which could amount to Government nomination,
enjoyed some local prestige; but their powers in practice were
limited so rigidly that the local Governor in fact controlled all projects
and all expenditure. Baghdad in the 'nineties was divided into
three *baladiyas*, two for the left bank and one for the right. The
Mayor was a member or nominee of one of its leading families or,
rarely, a Government official. Municipal law was not inadequate,
the code of taxation and procedure meticulous, its sphere of
nominal activity reasonable. But in practice these administrations
were corrupt and futile, and effective chiefly in providing a salary
for a city notable and free servants for the local Governor. Nevertheless,
pride of city was not lacking and schemes of town improvement
were popular topics throughout decades of inactivity.

The picture of urban society of the period must embrace varying 361
scenes. Baṣra with its miles of date gardens and network of tidal
creeks, the activity of its riverain suburb—the sole seaport of 621
ʿIraq—its daily contacts with Najd and Muḥammara, its rich
garden-owning notables, its cosmopolitan merchants and agents,
had a character unique in ʿIraq. Of the other towns of Baṣra
sanjaq, Qurna was tribe-dominated, the growing village of Abu
al-Khaṣib non-tribal, and Zubayr a desert-fringe town ruled by
a hereditary Shaykh. Among Baṣra's leading families were those of
the Naqib, and the houses of Bashaʿyan, Mandil, and Ṣaniʿ.

Baghdad city with a mainly Sunni right bank and an all-Shiʿi and
largely Persian left, and its important suburbs of Kadhimiya,
Muʿadhdham, and Qarara formed by far the greatest commercial
centre in the wilayas. It was industrially important, administratively
and militarily dominant. The city was mean, without
modern improvements, without protection against river floods; it
was adorned only by two or three monuments and mosques of
interest and by the great shrine of ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Gaylani. With

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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its greater society of high officials, its circle of famous Sunni Muslim families, its half-Europeanized wealthy Jews—the houses of Daniel and Sasun (Sassoon)—its doctors and lawyers, its men of affairs and their busy agents, Baghdad could claim at least equality with Baṣra in the vanguard of 'Iraqi progress. In both cities a small European society, led by the Consulates and predominantly British, maintained its comfortable homes, its clubs and sports, and found life pleasant.

Mosul fell far behind; lesser in status and remoter from Westernizing influences save those of French Catholicism, the city acted as entrepôt for the Jazira and the Kurdish highlands, and maintained a restless yet unprogressive atmosphere among its mixed population. Despite the dignity of the leading families—Pashas of the province in bygone days, the houses of the Jalilis and 'Umaris—and some Christian families of repute, it was ill famed for its criminal brawling, its fanaticism, and its dirt. Its dusty and treeless glare, subdued only by the smoke of lime-kilns, attracted few visitors.

In the lesser cities of 'Iraq, Arab or Kurdish, the atmosphere and condition of society varied widely with the environment. Many towns had no interest but that of staging-post for caravans, produce market for an agricultural area, fuelling point for river steamers, or cantonment for troops. Others had more individual character. Such were Hit with its industry of bitumen: Kirkuk and Arbil as main entrepôts for Kurdistan and nurseries of Turkish-speaking effendis: Khaniqin as the frontier post for Persia. Mandali and Badra looked east to Pusht-i-Kuh in much of their sentiment and interests. Sulaymaniya was the capital of the southern Kurds, and dominated by its oppressive 'holy' family of the Barzinji Sayids. Ḥalabja was the urban centre of the great Jaf tribe, as was 'Amara of the Tigris marshmen and Naṣiriya of the Muntafiq. Kadhimiya and Samarrā were eminent as Shi'i shrines and pilgrim-places, Ba'quba, Shahroban, and Daltawa as centres for the estates of the landed gentry. The mid-Euphrates Shi'i towns were suffering at the time from a tragic disturbance of Euphrates irrigation. On the upper Euphrates, settlements of the Dulaym were turning into villages or miniature townships. In the qadhā headquarter towns of Mosul province—'Aqra, Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, Raniya, Rawanduz, Keui Sanjaq—urban life was developing and a class of town notables, sometimes religious, was holding its own against the tribal Aghās.

Yet more particular was the function of the Euphrates Holy Cities, Karbalā and Najf. These were at once the twin hearts of 'Iraqi Shi'ism (the greatest non-Turkish influence in the territory) and centres of the pilgrim and corpse-burial industries. The power

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

812 stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who
777 claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

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5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

369 If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded, on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The
619 tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of
795 intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects. Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some, notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy. Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence and embarrassment.

619 The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but
62 its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muhammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as
their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the
619 vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

423 579 But occupying cultivators in the South, while recognising tribal allegiance and the State's legal ownership (raqaba) of the land, commonly regarded their tribal group as possessors of the soil by immemorial right, whatever the period of its occupancy of the land might in fact be. They frequently resented any demand for mallakiya, and indeed any claims to overlordship other than those of the State. It should not be assumed that in such disputes one side was invariably unjustly acquisitive or the other side obstinately recalcitrant. Each party doubtless thought that substantial justice lay on its side. Circumstances alter cases and it is neither possible nor useful to generalise on the point. It is the removal of the injury caused by these longstanding differences, alike to agricultural prosperity and to public peace, that is the objective, not the justification or satisfaction of particular disputants. As is well known this need was so strongly impressed on Government by recurring violence along the Hai and in the Muntafiq, occasioned by the perennial disputes arising out of the differences mentioned, that a law regulating the investigation and settlement of the conflicting claims in these areas was enacted two years ago and is now in course of application.*

621 622 423 178 In the northern rainfall zone the people generally lived in regular villages, under the shadow of a local *agha* or other notable, and cultivated the soil and pastured their flocks round about. As there was ordinarily more land than men to till it, land was brought under cultivation as required and successive generations commonly tilled the same groups of parcels, alternating fallow with sown. When necessary, the local leader became the intermediary between the people and any central Government that could make itself felt. Thus he compounded for the village tithe ('ushr) and collected appropriate contributions from the cultivators. He settled land disputes in village conclave or otherwise, and his jurisdiction to do so was of no material importance so long as these mediæval conditions prevailed. As civilisation developed, towns became more attractive and communications improved, such local leadership sometimes tended to become absentee landlordship; while with the introduction of tapu tenure many village areas appear to have been wholly or partially registered as the personal possessions of local notables, without any consideration of the immemorial rights of those who had regularly occupied and tilled the land or pastured their flocks thereon. The pinch in these cases seems to have been mainly felt when the lands were pledged, and forfeited, to town-dwelling merchants for debt. The personal touch and interdependence that existed between even the most arbitrary local chieftain and the village cultivators appears not infrequently then to have been replaced by more mechanical efforts to exploit the land from outside and by obstruction to such efforts from within.

423 These generalised instances are only intended to serve as illustrations of the evil effects of granting tapu tenure in the past without a thorough study and due safeguard of previously existing rights. No comprehensive or detailed study of these cases is possible here.

5. When the maps from which Plates I and II were prepared were in process of compilation the Tapu Department did its best to show the location and extent of all land held under tapu tenure. Partly owing to the destruction of records by the retreating Turks, but much more owing to the inherent defects of their Land Registry methods, it was not found possible generally to do more than indicate approximately the outside limits of patches of territory thought to be affected. The maximum limits of these groups of territory will be seen, on reference to Table I, to cover about 40,000 square kilometres. It is impossible to say what proportion of the areas included would prove upon due investigation to be reasonably entitled to be held in tapu tenure.

*Law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq Lands. No. 23 of April 4, 1929.

[Marsh Arabs]

501 erable skill to navigate. They are capable of great speed and are driven either by a sail or by oars as the occasion requires. To a stranger they seem very unstable, but the Marsh Arab, who has practically lived in them ever since he was a baby, finds them abundantly stable and perfectly safe.

342 From a distance the houses occupied by these people are very picturesque. The reeds that grow in great abundance in the marshes of Lower Mesopotamia are gathered and when dry are tied in great bundles perhaps two feet in diameter. They are ten to fifteen feet tall or even more, and two bundles tied together at the tops are bent over to form an arch. Each of these arches forms one of the ribs of the house. They are placed every four to six feet, giving an air of solidity and dignity to the structure that is most unusual for this sort of simple architecture. Over these ribs a mat roof is constructed which is surprisingly tight even in the heaviest rains. The houses vary in size, and the largest ones, which serve as guest halls for the sheikhs and the rich, may be seventy-five feet long and twenty feet broad.

423
621 This agricultural district is peculiar in that while it has a settled community engaged in agricultural pursuits, there is no private ownership of land. The Marsh Arabs form a group almost untouched by Europeans. In the one district we visited all land is owned by the government, in this case a sheikh far removed from the district.
[427 The only tax that he levies is a moderate rental for the
651] land. Apparently there is little difficulty in getting land;
425 at least no one complained of any trouble of that sort, nor does there seem to be any difficulty in keeping the same plot of land indefinitely if the cultivator wishes to do so.
000 The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-

Iraq MH1

to extend and improve the cultivation of the land and raise the standard of living. This had serious consequences when the war came and brought with it urgent economic problems. The mountain districts did not produce enough cereals to feed the population, and importation on an adequate scale was rendered difficult by the poverty of the Kurdish peasants, the lack of a food-supply organization and the insufficiency of transport. The sense of grievance was further stimulated by the example of the Kurds in Persia, who had thrown off the authority of the Persian Government since the Allied occupation of 1941. In 1943 Mulla Mustafa, the brother of Shaikh Ahmad, rose in revolt in the Barzan district. His rising lasted for several months. Attempts to suppress it failed and it was finally called off after negotiations, and an undertaking by the Government to look into Kurdish grievances. Majid Mustafa himself a Kurd and a distinguished administrator, was appointed Minister without Portfolio with the special duty of devoting himself to Kurdish affairs. His report outlined a scheme of economic and administrative reforms. In the course of 1944 little was done to carry out these or any reforms, and Mulla Mustafa's movement still smouldered; the condition of the Kurds was somewhat improved, however, by the increased cultivation of tobacco, their most important cash-crop. 563 668 511

The Assyrians

The Assyrians form a distinct community, not only by reason of their Nestorian faith, but also through their language, a Syriac dialect, and their traditions. They are probably the descendants of tribes which moved from the plains of Iraq into the mountains to the north during the period of the Mongol invasion, and remained there until the present generation. In their mountain-home they lived as shepherds, feudally organized under their *maliks* with their Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, as their temporal as well as spiritual ruler. They paid a yearly tribute to the Ottoman Sultan, but were in practice autonomous, although their autonomy was always subject to interference by their neighbours the Kurds. 563 621

At the beginning of the First World War they were divided into three main groups: first, the mountaineers in the Hakkiari district of what is now Turkey; secondly, those in the plains to the west of Lake Urmiyah, in Persia; and, thirdly those in the 563 166

000 prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole.'[1]

423 There are different varieties of tenure in the two zones, determined by the different conditions of agriculture. In the
471 north, the forms of tenure are similar to those of Syria, with a class of small proprietors taking some, but not all, of the land. In the south large owners or sheikhs own virtually all of the land, letting it to share-tenants, through a series of intermediary lessees, minor sheikhs, sirkals (formerly sub-sheikhs), or town notables. At the bottom of this many-storied building the fellah cultivates the land under a burden of debt. This peculiar form has originated from the disintegration of the tribal system; the sheikhs have profited by the confusion of the law to secure individual ownership of land which by custom is the property of the tribe.

423 *The Breakdown of the Tribal System.* In the irrigation zone, the practice of shifting cultivation was accompanied until very recently by an equally unstable form of landownership. The basis of the ownership is the tribal *dirah*, a large area not limited to land actually tilled but including also non-cultivated land and submerged marsh land, over which a tribe exercises a customary right of occupation. These areas are considered to be the property of the whole tribe, and until recently were so in fact.

423 The tribal system existed generally until some forty years ago, and still prevails in parts of the country.[2] Under this system, the
● 621 usual procedure was to set aside a part of the cultivated area,
622 a third or even a half, to provide revenue for the sheikh to discharge his political duties, which then included the maintenance of a tribal militia, the provision of hospitals, and keeping the *mudhif* (the coffee shop and civic and social centre of the tribe). This revenue accrued to the office of the sheikh, and not to his person. The rest of the land was sometimes distributed among the families of the tribe, according to the numbers of fighters who had helped to seize the land from another tribe,
423 or according to the amount of land reclaimed: more often, how-
427 ever, the land was cultivated in small groups, the tribal sub-

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[1] op. cit., p. 33.

[2] For a detailed account of the historical development of Iraq's land tenure system, see Salih Haider 'Land Problems of Iraq' (London University Ph.D. thesis, 1942).

423 427 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-cropping basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths, or a third of the produce.

423 621 622 428 But even on these individual holdings communal ownership is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-tribal chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

423 241 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area, it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years. Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants 221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and 241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing re- 233 mains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it pre- 423 vailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the 619 State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organization, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

423 twenty-first part of the total. The position of the share-tenant
427 in Iraq is much worse than that of his counterpart in Syria.

In the districts of flood irrigation the tribal system has disintegrated,
621 but its superstructure, the sheikhs and sirkals, remains.
622 Most of the political functions of the tribe have now
been transferred to the State, and the only economic function
312 now performed by the tribal authorities is the control of irrigation,
427 digging of canals, and repairing of breaches, which is
done by the cultivators under the direction of the sirkal who
has become a kind of farm bailiff acting for the sheikh. Under
this system the sheikh and sirkal take together up to 80 per cent
of the crop, leaving the cultivator some 20–30 per cent.

423 This exploitation is possible because the sheikhs have succeeded
in establishing, mainly during the last fifteen years, their title
425 to absolute ownership of the tribal land by means of land settlement.
Because in Ottoman times the cultivators had no legal title
to the land which they occupied, the landlords were able, during
the period of the mandate, to use their political power to secure
legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the property
of the tribe. In much the same way the English landlords of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enclosed land as their property
which was traditionally common property, and ousted
small holders whose title was based only on custom. As in nineteenth
century England, the process is being hastened by
mechanization, which gives the big landowners an advantage as
against the small cultivator, and by inflation, which gives them
565 the impetus to invest. The big landowners of Iraq are a comparatively
recent creation, and it is the economic and legal changes
of the past twenty years which have established their position.

423 *Northern Iraq.* In northern Iraq there is a different type of land
tenure and fewer large landowners. South of Mosul, in the fertile
471 Tigris Valley, where pumps have been installed, there is a tribal
system resembling that of the south, and the land is owned
mainly by tribal sheikhs and notables. West of Mosul, on the
rolling uplands with poor rainfall, the land is also held on
471 a tribal system. In this region in recent years there has been
a rapid introduction of machinery; and the sheikhs are extending
their power to acquire land. In future bigger imports of
machinery will probably cause them to extend their influence

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

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In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

123 But occupying cultivators in the South, while recognising tribal
allegiance and the State's legal ownership (raqaba) of the land, commonly
579 regarded their tribal group as possessors of the soil by immemorial right, whatever the period of its occupancy of the land might in fact be. They frequently resented any demand for mallakiya, and indeed any claims to overlordship other than those of the State. It should not be assumed that in such disputes one side was invariably unjustly acquisitive or the other side obstinately recalcitrant. Each party doubtless thought that substantial justice lay on its side. Circumstances alter cases and it is neither possible nor useful to generalise on the point. It is the removal of the injury caused by these longstanding differences, alike to agricultural prosperity and to public peace, that is the objective, not the justification or satisfaction of particular disputants. As is well known this need was so strongly impressed on Government by recurring violence along the Hai and in the Muntafiq, occasioned by the perennial disputes arising out of the differences mentioned, that a law regulating the investigation and settlement of the conflicting claims in these areas was enacted two years ago and is now in course of application.*

621 In the northern rainfall zone the people generally lived in regular
622 villages, under the shadow of a local *agha* or other notable, and cultivated
the soil and pastured their flocks round about. As there was ordinarily
423 more land than men to till it, land was brought under cultivation as
178 required and successive generations commonly tilled the same groups of parcels, alternating fallow with sown. When necessary, the local leader became the intermediary between the people and any central Government that could make itself felt. Thus he compounded for the village tithe ('ushr) and collected appropriate contributions from the cultivators. He settled land disputes in village conclave or otherwise, and his jurisdiction to do so was of no material importance so long as these mediæval conditions prevailed. As civilisation developed, towns became more attractive and communications improved, such local leadership sometimes tended to become absentee landlordship; while with the introduction of tapu tenure many village areas appear to have been wholly or partially registered as the personal possessions of local notables, without any consideration of the immemorial rights of those who had regularly occupied and tilled the land or pastured their flocks thereon. The pinch in these cases seems to have been mainly felt when the lands were pledged, and forfeited, to town-dwelling merchants for debt. The personal touch and interdependence that existed between even the most arbitrary local chieftain and the village cultivators appears not infrequently then to have been replaced by more mechanical efforts to exploit the land from outside and by obstruction to such efforts from within.

423 These generalised instances are only intended to serve as illustrations of the evil effects of granting tapu tenure in the past without a thorough study and due safeguard of previously existing rights. No comprehensive or detailed study of these cases is possible here.

5. When the maps from which Plates I and II were prepared were in process of compilation the Tapu Department did its best to show the location and extent of all land held under tapu tenure. Partly owing to the destruction of records by the retreating Turks, but much more owing to the inherent defects of their Land Registry methods, it was not found possible generally to do more than indicate approximately the outside limits of patches of territory thought to be affected. The maximum limits of these groups of territory will be seen, on reference to Table I, to cover about 40,000 square kilometres. It is impossible to say what proportion of the areas included would prove upon due investigation to be reasonably entitled to be held in tapu tenure.

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*Law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq Lands. No. 23 of April 4, 1929.

changes, canal silting, tribal movements, Central Government action, or other circumstances. 311

7. With relatively little exception the riverain tracts affected are miri land. It has been noted how the cultivation previously shifted therein in response to changing circumstances. The prescriptive claims to pasture were naturally even more variable and indeterminate. It is consequently not surprising that as the pump development movement extended, these riverain tracts were found so closely interpenetrated by prescriptive claims (lazma) of one sort or another, that few areas suitable for pump development were unaffected. These claims constituted a serious obstacle to the general development of the riverain tracts by pump installations. For at first the claimants as a whole had neither the desire, nor the enterprise, nor the ability to raise the capital needed to undertake this development themselves. 311 423 427 312

In discussing these prescriptive claims earlier their primarily tribal origin was mentioned: and it appears that the prescriptive rights recognised by the provincial authorities in pump agreements are preponderantly of such origin and character. These pump agreements may be made in the name of a sheikh or sirkal, but he stands as the tribal or sub-tribal, representative. No doubt when the sheikh or sirkal is a forcible person, he may engulf in his own person the rights of his tribal associates. Alternatively when the sheikh or sirkal is a man of straw, unable to lead his section or keep it together, he may be displaced, and even lose his strictly tribal share in the common holding. In a number of cases, after the movement started and its potentialities had become more apparent, a sheikh or other leading member of a tribal section which claimed prescriptive rights over a promising area, himself erected a pump and cultivated the area with the labour of the other members of the section. Under these circumstances the difficulties of divided interests and divided control, so frequently attending these pump ventures, may not arise. And so far as my information goes it is pump ventures inaugurated and worked by a capable tribal leader under these conditions that promise to be the most successful. 427 312 622

But enterprising townsmen and others with tribal affiliations, who wished to participate in the movement usually had to search for a suitable stretch of miri land and enter into an agreement with some group of claimants to prescriptive rights over it. No very definite procedure was required. The process may be loosely generalised somewhat as follows. An enterprising individual, having some miri land of uncertain limits and subject to uncertain prescriptive claims in mind, decided to buy a pump and engine, the capacity of which usually depended as much on his financial resources as the situation and extent of the land to be watered. He applied to the Governor of the Province for permission to erect the installation. This always necessitated a permit from the Irrigation Department (under the Irrigation and Embankments Law), and when the land was miri (as it usually was) the approval of the State Domains Department and the issue of a lease by them. 427 312 311

The Irrigation Department checked the suitability of the installation to the extent of land, according to the information given; and if they had the means tried to locate the land and check the area on a map. Otherwise the figures had to be accepted as notified. And even when the capacity of the installation and the area of the land (as quoted) were discrepant, it was often found that the pump had already been bought. The Department also tried to ensure that the site of the pumping plant was wisely chosen in regard to flood and low stage river conditions, as well as the distribution of the water for cultivation.

The State Domains Department acted through the provincial authorities, who necessarily had no better information as to the situation

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

> 175 a country of tribesmen fast losing the old loyalties, less and
> 727 less able to revert to the old livelihood, attracting local
> 619 rather than tribal relations, more dependent on order and
> control . . . yet still tribal in material equipment, in speech,
> in ignorance, still easily inflamed to ruin their own interests,
> still resentful of government and all its works.[1]

The full application of the policy of rebuilding the tribal organization under competent shaikhs, advised, controlled and supervised by British Political Officers, which was the essence of Sandeman's policy, had to wait until the force of Turkish arms had been broken.[2] In the meantime, however, every means of strengthening the power of the shaikhs was undertaken, on the basis that 'both the attitude and action of a tribe depend almost entirely on its most influential chiefs'.[3]

[622] A single leading shaikh was recognized in every tribe, as in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh district where H. R. P. Dickson, Assistant Political Officer, reported that he had 'managed during 1916-17, more or less to get the power into the hands of one shaikh in the case of each of the 22 Suq tribes'.[4]

Each shaikh so selected was made responsible for peace and order in his tribe, for the apprehension of wrongdoers, for the protection of lines of communication and of British Government property, for the cutting off of supplies and aid to the Turks and for the collection of such revenue as was levied. In return, he was given the support of British officials, prestige and, if necessary, arms. Possession of his lands was confirmed, and his tribal boundaries were defined as closely as possible. His natural importance in the tribal *majlis* was enhanced by

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[1] Longrigg, S. H., *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq*, p. 309.

[2] For instance, Nāsiriya was occupied July, 1915, but not until 1918 was administrative progress possible among the tribes, because of their anti-British feeling. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2; *Revenue Report*, 1919, p. 24.

[3] *Provisional Note on the Tribes within and fringing Mesopotamian Boundaries, North of Latitude* 33° 20′ (*Baghdad*). For official use only, General Staff, M.E.F. (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1 (hereafter *Note on Tribes for General Staff*). Although written in 1920 of tribes of Baghdad wilayet, it is generally applicable to practically all tribes from 1914.

[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917: *Admin. Rep., Sūq esh-Shuyukh*, p. 43.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

Iraq MH1

000 prosperity of the main national industry and the welfare and contentment of the people as a whole.'[1]

423 471 There are different varieties of tenure in the two zones, determined by the different conditions of agriculture. In the north, the forms of tenure are similar to those of Syria, with a class of small proprietors taking some, but not all, of the land. In the south large owners or sheikhs own virtually all of the land, letting it to share-tenants, through a series of intermediary lessees, minor sheikhs, sirkals (formerly sub-sheikhs), or town notables. At the bottom of this many-storied building the fellah cultivates the land under a burden of debt. This peculiar form has originated from the disintegration of the tribal system; the sheikhs have profited by the confusion of the law to secure individual ownership of land which by custom is the property of the tribe.

423 *The Breakdown of the Tribal System.* In the irrigation zone, the practice of shifting cultivation was accompanied until very recently by an equally unstable form of landownership. The basis of the ownership is the tribal *dirah*, a large area not limited to land actually tilled but including also non-cultivated land and submerged marsh land, over which a tribe exercises a customary right of occupation. These areas are considered to be the property of the whole tribe, and until recently were so in fact.

423 621 622 The tribal system existed generally until some forty years ago, and still prevails in parts of the country.[2] Under this system, the usual procedure was to set aside a part of the cultivated area, a third or even a half, to provide revenue for the sheikh to discharge his political duties, which then included the maintenance of a tribal militia, the provision of hospitals, and keeping the *mudhif* (the coffee shop and civic and social centre of the tribe). This revenue accrued to the office of the sheikh, and not to his person. The rest of the land was sometimes distributed among the families of the tribe, according to the numbers of fighters who had helped to seize the land from another tribe, 423 or according to the amount of land reclaimed: more often, how- 427 ever, the land was cultivated in small groups, the tribal sub-

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[1] op. cit., p. 33.

[2] For a detailed account of the historical development of Iraq's land tenure system, see Salih Haider 'Land Problems of Iraq' (London University Ph.D. thesis, 1942).

423 sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of
427 the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-cropping
basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths, or a third of the produce.

423 But even on these individual holdings communal ownership
621 is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-tribal
chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal
● 622 chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the
tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and
428 especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

428 Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over
the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area,
241 it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years. Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants
221 themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and
241 outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing re-
233 mains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it pre-
423 vailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the
619 State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organization, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

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[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

423 twenty-first part of the total. The position of the share-tenant
427 in Iraq is much worse than that of his counterpart in Syria.

In the districts of flood irrigation the tribal system has dis-
621 integrated, but its superstructure, the sheikhs and sirkals, re-
● 622 mains. Most of the political functions of the tribe have now
been transferred to the State, and the only economic function
312 now performed by the tribal authorities is the control of irri-
427 gation, digging of canals, and repairing of breaches, which is done by the cultivators under the direction of the sirkal who has become a kind of farm bailiff acting for the sheikh. Under this system the sheikh and sirkal take together up to 80 per cent of the crop, leaving the cultivator some 20–30 per cent.

423 This exploitation is possible because the sheikhs have succeed-
ed in establishing, mainly during the last fifteen years, their title
425 to absolute ownership of the tribal land by means of land settlement. Because in Ottoman times the cultivators had no legal title to the land which they occupied, the landlords were able, during the period of the mandate, to use their political power to secure legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the property of the tribe. In much the same way the English landlords of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enclosed land as their property which was traditionally common property, and ousted small holders whose title was based only on custom. As in nineteenth century England, the process is being hastened by mechanization, which gives the big landowners an advantage as against the small cultivator, and by inflation, which gives them
565 the impetus to invest. The big landowners of Iraq are a comparatively recent creation, and it is the economic and legal changes of the past twenty years which have established their position.

423 *Northern Iraq.* In northern Iraq there is a different type of land
tenure and fewer large landowners. South of Mosul, in the fertile
471 Tigris Valley, where pumps have been installed, there is a tribal system resembling that of the south, and the land is owned mainly by tribal sheikhs and notables. West of Mosul, on the rolling uplands with poor rainfall, the land is also held on
471 a tribal system. In this region in recent years there has been a rapid introduction of machinery; and the sheikhs are extending their power to acquire land. In future bigger imports of machinery will probably cause them to extend their influence

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423 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly com-
622 plete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of the towns.'[1]

244 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions. The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
452 rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The government regulation that land must remain fallow in alternate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears, at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
427 the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53-E.

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185 plot; they should, in fact, be reserved for peasant proprietorship.

(*b*) Those which the Government does not intend to develop by canalization. In this category development will of necessity be by utilization of private enterprise and capital. It is recommended that this land should be granted in *tapu* ownership by auction in plots of not more than 10,000 dunums.

This last proposal seems difficult to approve in the districts where tribal system still holds sway, since in these districts the granting of large areas of land would serve simply to bolster up the powers of the sheikhs and would not necessarily lead to 622 development. Some of the sheikhs are modern business men (as, 185 for instance, the sheikh of the Beni Shammar who, although illiterate, has converted his enormous properties into a limited company registered in New York). Others are still tribal chiefs whose authority rests on the traditions of religion and war, and who are not likely to plan for the development of their land.

185 Other proposals which have been made are:

1. The development of colonization schemes on new land, with favourable leasehold conditions for the small cultivator, which would attract labour from the sheikh's estates by offering better conditions. By causing a shortage of labour, this would induce the large proprietors to offer better conditions.

This proposal has been advocated by Salih Jaber, the present Prime Minister, and is probably the most practicable under present conditions.

2. Settlement of title on the basis of sirkal ownership. The sirkals are, as has been explained, minor sheikhs or agents of the large sheikhs. They perform an indispensable service in organizing production, because they organize the digging of canals and the planting of the cultivated area in relation to it. They are in fact a sort of irrigation service, and a type of farm manager which does not occur elsewhere. Whether they should really become the basis of the property system seems doubtful, but the proposal is mentioned because it does take into account an essential feature of the Iraqi land system which might be difficult to replace.

565 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims
647 or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan,
every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, persistent
661 Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit,
uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt
and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body
politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator.
Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit
alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected.
The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary
Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all
times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs,
qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded
generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill
conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of
new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all,
four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer
qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first,
second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population,
and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others
wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than
nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial
decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent
662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue
and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads
of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs.
The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands.
He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied
settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar
influenced or controlled the all-important field of land
[623] revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an
Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of
elected members who included Christian and Jewish representatives.
625 The maintenance of law and order depended upon the
Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This
force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered
by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local
Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt
and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even
domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardihood,
631 and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendies--Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

destined to attain fame in the Second World War—remained to 700
render invaluable help to the 'Iraqi authorities on many occasions. These willing services, and the personalities of the Air Officers Commanding,[1] were largely invisible to, and unthanked by, the 'Iraq public. The strength rose from four squadrons in 1921 to six and then eight in the period 1922 to 1926, then was reduced again to five and to four squadrons in 1928 and 1930. Their most fre- 701
quent collaboration was with the Levies.

This latter force which, with changes of location and organization since its scattered early beginnings, had shown remarkable steadfastness in the dark days of 1920, took its place early in 1922 as a British-paid and British-commanded force[2] at the disposal, for all purposes helpful to the 'Iraqi authorities, of the General Officer (later Air Officer) Commanding. Late in 1922 the Levies contained three cavalry regiments, two Kurdish and one Assyrian; one Kurdish, two Assyrian and marsh-Arab infantry battalions, and an Assyrian pack-battery. The total strength of the force was some 7,500, its officers British, Arab, Assyrian, and Kurdish, its record already creditable in tribal and mountain war, and its value obvious as a relief for outgoing British garrisons in northern 'Iraq. It was unfortunate that, through differences of loyalty and character, feeling between the Assyrian element in the Levies, which became largely predominant in its later years, and the 'Iraqi authorities was never cordial. But their services to 'Iraq were in fact valuable and respected, and the economic advantage of Levy service to the Assyrian community was important.

The 'Iraq Police grew during these years into a force generally 625
admired for their high efficiency and good morale. Everywhere under 'Iraqi executive command, assisted and inspected by Prescott and his excellent officers, they were well selected, equipped, trained, and officered; and though crime might still occur almost unchecked in outlying tribes, the Police assumed the duties of the old Shabana, penetrated more deeply than ever before into rural districts, patrolled the routes, supported administrative officials, and collaborated on active service with the military. Specially adapted forces, camel-riding or equipped with armoured cars as need dictated, were organized for desert work in the Jazira, the

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[1] The commanders of British forces in 'Iraq from 1922, when Royal Air Force was substituted for Army command, until the Second World War were: Air Vice-Marshals Sir J. Salmond, 1922; Sir F. A. Higgins, 1925; Sir E. L. Ellington, 1927; Sir R. Brooke-Popham, 1929; E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt, 1931; C. S. Burnett, 1933; W. G. S. Mitchell, 1935; C. L. Courtney, 1937; J. H. S. Tyssen, 1939; H. G. Smart, 1940.

[2] Successive commanders of the Levies, from their first organization as a single formation, were: Major C. A. Boyle, 1920; Colonel-Commandant G. R. Frith, 1921; Brigadier-General L. W. de V. Sadleir-Jackson, 1921; Colonel H. T. Dobbin, 1922; Brigadier J. G. Browne, 1926.

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation,
of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great
697 progress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-
'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development
by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities
and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
291 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional
circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed,
185 with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings,
366 and gardens. Baṣra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-'Aṣima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries,
a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared
with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects
for which local pride was clamoring.

701 the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

625 The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British
inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services.
Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the
Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force,
some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist
branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security.
In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi
inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years
later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrong-
doers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal
—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-
frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely
697 policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well
conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with
flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

499 Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude
of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inacces-
sible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechaniza-
619 tion of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made
towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance
656 on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupa-
tion days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies. The 'Iraq 625 Police, with diminished British participation, remained a smart and reliable service adapted well to its increasing duties. It contained, during those years, rather less than 9,000 men, including a mobile force of some 750. The Royal Air Force, which since 1932 played 707 no part in 'Iraq's internal security in spite of occasional requests by Government to do so, maintained its own bases and training installations. Mosul and Hinaydi camps and airports and former R.A.F. landing-grounds throughout 'Iraq were handed to the 'Iraq authorities at the close of this period, and the R.A.F. began to install itself, late in 1936, at Dhibban camp by Lake Ḥabbaniya.

Financial administration continued to show the prudence and 652 orthodoxy with which 'Iraqi finances had been handled from the first. This was the easier since the period of depression ended with 1933, and the years following showed a relatively prosperous situation. Improvements were introduced into income-tax and land-revenue procedure and Customs administration. The currency was stable and respected. The last remnant of foreign debt was extinguished; but discussions on a new loan, to be obtained in London through Baring Bros., had up to 1937 no practical issue. The oil dead-rents first received in 1932, and later the royalties, were allotted to capital works—irrigation projects, buildings, roads—included in a programme of which the items were revised in 1931, 1935, and almost annually thereafter. A law establishing 453 an Agricultural and Industrial Bank was passed in 1935; it commenced operations, humbly at first, in the following year.

4. BAKR ṢIDQI

The Hashimi Ministry, more forceful than any 'Iraq Government- 645* ment since 1932, appeared by midsummer 1935 likely to endure for a long spell of office. Yasin Pasha openly anticipated ten years of power, though, little as he esteemed democracy, he had no thought of dictatorship. The tribes were frightened, the Palace weak, the opposition outwardly subdued.

But less obvious forces were at work. The King, his own position enfeebled by his personal shortcomings and the misalliance and flight of his sister with a Rhodian hotel servant and her conversion to Christianity, was willing to see a change of Ministry and even hinted at this to Yasin through intermediaries. In the Cabinet, though a scarcely anticipated harmony reigned between Yasin and Nuri Sa'id, his Foreign Minister, the latter was at constant loggerheads with the Minister of Interior. Rashid 'Āli, indeed, gave offence by his impetuous decisions, his favouritism, and the avarice which in defiance of precedent led him, when Sayid Maḥmud the Naqib died in 1936, himself to assume the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

✓645 composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began
466 to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemploy-
467 ment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and
468 conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

635 An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would
[661] call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945
701 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active opera-
625 tions could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the 625
Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards
such limited development and improvement of the personnel as 657
was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced
to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds
made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and 665
at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political
activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square,
Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged
in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought
to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Āli, refused
entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by
way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab
attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for
extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplica- 204
tion of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and
partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had
well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with
Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the
foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand
bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave
congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and
indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it
appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the
British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was
heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and
the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no
longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when out- 668
lawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years.
Communists had supported Rashid 'Āli in 1941, but on the Nazi
invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for
the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though
mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of
'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership,
followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Com-
munist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther),
alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* news-
paper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the
proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hope-
ful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now
learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It
spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted
(not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

exchanged; and even this support had to be limited when, at the 648 ×
League meeting in April, the member States indicted Jordan for alleged negotiations with the Jews. The task of justifying the incorporation of the Arab remainder of Palestine into the Jordan Kingdom (a step to which in practice no alternative appeared) was difficult to reconcile with the desirability of placating Egypt. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the League meeting in April voted for a resolution declaring Palestine to be a 'trust territory of the whole League', and in May for another which declared Jordan's act of unification a breach of the principle thus established. He then with difficulty secured postponement of the decision to expel the Hashimite Kingdom, and succeeded in substituting a compromise formula acceptable to all save Jordan herself, asserting that Palestine should, after complete liberation, be disposed of by a collective decision of the League.

Disunity was not less evident in connexion with the Collective Security Pact proposed by Egypt in 1949. The Pact was not for many months accepted by 'Iraq, whose spokesmen saw little value in an agreement which did not include Jordan; but this clash of views, unresolved by the end of 1950, did not prevent the 'Iraqi Premier from offering his verbal support to Egypt in her current diplomatic struggle with Britain. With Israel the successive Governments in Baghdad continued to refuse all negotiation; and the Cabinet, with the implacable politicians of other States, professed to see a new threat of 'imperialism' in the would-be sedative declaration of Britain, the United States, and France on 25 May that they were opposed to the use of aggressive force by any Middle Eastern State, including Israel, and would supply thenceforward only the armaments necessary to each country's defence. The declaration was accepted by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with reserves which he was at pains to indicate to the British and American Ambassadors.

The year 1950 was peaceful in Kurdistan. There was no sign of 563
Mullā (or Marshal) Muṣṭafā's return, though the wireless campaign from the Soviet Armenian 'Post of the Kurdish Democratic Party' persisted; and 'Iraqi policy in Kurdistan, where Nuri Saʿid in conciliatory mood toured in September 1950, seemed to show increased sympathy with its wayward Kurdish subjects, and there were less frequent schoolboy outbursts in Sulaymaniya. In the
Police the former Director-General, 'Alwan Ḥusayn, had resumed 625 ●
command after an attempted coup (it was said) had led to the dismissal of 'Ali Khalid, and the force regained their discipline and
prowess. The Army, still dissatisfied with the equipment provided 701
for it and with the fewness of cadet vacancies made available in England, tried genuinely to improve its efficiency, sought in vain

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 692 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 697 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

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[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

choice between the two alternatives was not difficult. Both the 175-*
magnitude of the task and the military situation demanded 727*
immediate returns and a maximum of efficiency with a minimum of effort from those delegated to the initiation of the civil aspect of administration. None of the responsible officials of the Turkish regime remained. Few of the British officers of the Army of Occupation possessed any specialized knowledge of the previous administration. Such little administrative experience as existed had been gained in Indian systems which, from the British point of view, were vastly preferable to the inefficient and clumsy Turkish methods. In addition, the confident expectation within inner circles that the Government of India would assume the future permanent control of Basra and its hinterland at least, stimulated the adoption of the Indian administrative methods and practices which would aid in the assimilation of the occupied territories.

Within a week of the occupation of Basra, a Civil Police 625
service modelled on Indian lines replaced the Military Police, 175*
under the supervision of Mr. E. G. Gregson of the Indian Police 727
Service, who had had wide experience on the North West Frontier and in the Persian Gulf. Employment of the ex-Turkish police, even had they been available, was not desirable. Constables were therefore imported from India and Aden. A similar force was organized at 'Amāra, and a little later at Nāsiriya and at Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, but not with great success.[1] Local police, or *Shabana*, for use in the outlying villages and districts, were recruited from the Arabs themselves.

Foundations were thus laid on which later officials from India, including Colonel H. C. Prescott, I.A., Late Inspector-General of 'Iraq Police, were to construct the present 'Iraq Police system, in which the *Shabana* provided the nucleus of the native element.

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[1] *Administration Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, in *Reports of Political Officers in Occupied Territories of 'Iraq*, 1916-1917 (March 31). Submitted by Sir P. Cox under No. 8850, Baghdad, November 18th, 1917 (hereafter *P.O. Reports*, 1916-17).

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

of all road users as well as their passengers and cargoes. The 444 expectation of increased road traffic makes it imperative that appropriate measures of control be devised without delay.

The following measures are suggested for adoption:

1. Construction of road weighbridges at suitable check points.
2. Compulsory inspection of all vehicles carrying passengers for payment and of all trucks before a periodic license is issued.
3. Appointment of qualified inspectors with sufficient authority and responsibility to ensure adequate enforcement of vehicle regulations.

With the development of traffic on the new highways it will be necessary to introduce and enforce proper traffic rules and regulations. The Mission, therefore, recommends that a highway code be drawn up and that traffic police be instructed and trained in the application and enforcement of the code.

Traffic conditions in the capital are at certain times of the day [343] chaotic, even though city traffic is by no means dense. It would [625 appear that, with training, the formidable force of traffic police now regulating the city's traffic could without expansion serve for traffic control on the country's highway system as well. It would pay the government to engage the services of a traffic expert, preferably from a metropolitan police such as London's, for a limited period, to design the highway code and to instruct the traffic police.

Public Road Transport

It will become increasingly necessary to regulate public road transport of passengers and goods by a licensing system. If this transport is left entirely free and uncontrolled, chaos will be the result; too many operators are likely to engage in public transport, run their services on borrowed money, find their vehicles run down before the loans are repaid and end in bankruptcy. The country's economy will suffer both from the waste of resources involved in such uneconomic ventures and from the probable need of protecting the railways by subsidies from the consequences of such wasteful operations. A reasonable number of capable private operators should provide healthy competition among themselves and with the railway.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

probably at the instigation of the Agha, because he was held to have K 607
corrupted the morals of the youth.

Health services need not concern us. In the area studied 758
there is no resident doctor outside the city of Erbil.

The Government have made various experiments in agricultural Iraq 635
reform chiefly with a view to improving the breed of livestock and the
quality of valuable crops such as tobacco. The Government's interest K
in the improvement of the tobacco crop is especially relevant to the 249
area here described. Details will be discussed later but it may be
pointed out that Government assistance of this kind is not a
philanthropic enterprise. The heavy excise duty levied on all
saleable tobacco much more than repays any expenses incurred.

The independent judiciary functions through its court in Iraq
Erbil. In practice however it is in the nature of appeal court, 635
since in the first instance cases come before the Mudir (sub-district 692
magistrate) and then before the Qa'im Maqam (district magistrate)
before being referred to the court. I am not clear as to the rules
governing "appeal" of this sort, nor as to the limits of sentence that
can be imposed by the magistrates' courts. So far as I know, only
serious cases such as homicide automatically go before the court at
Erbil.

During time of peace the military are stationed only at Erbil 635
and Rowanduz. There appears to be a general attitude of suspicion 701
and conflict as between the civil and the military authorities. In K
this area the civil service is staffed mainly by Kurds and Turks and 578
is thus in general inclination Kurdo-phil. The army on the other
hand is staffed mainly by Iraqi-Arabs whose hatred and fear of the
"barbarous Kurd" can be taken for granted.

The Liwa is divided into several districts (Khaza) each Iraq
presided over by a district magistrate (Qa'im Maqam). Area A, Map 1 635
with which this account is mainly concerned lies wholly within the
Khaza of Rowanduz. The Qa'im Maqam is responsible for his district
in much the same way as the Mutasarrif is responsible for his Liwa.

The Khaza in turn is subdivided into several sub-districts
(nahiya) over which presides a Mudir. The Balik tribe all reside
within the nahiya Balik - the administrative district in this case
coinciding with the tribal one. Dergala on the other hand is
administered from Rowanduz.

The Mudir has in his direct control a number of policemen who
provide the direct liaison between the external authority and the
tribe. It is the venality of these junior officials which is the Iraq
worst feature of the system, and which is the real source of 635 625

Iraq
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Government unpopularity among the tribes. Hay describes the gendarmerie of his time as "hardened ruffians without training and without principles; they used their authority to commit innumerable extortions". It does not appear that the position is much changed today.

*Below the Mudir there should be in each village a Mukhtar, his functions being basically those of registrar and tax collector. Among the hill Kurds the Mukhtar is invariably the Agha of the village concerned and the term is little used.

This summarises briefly the normal functions of the various elements of Government within the area under discussion. A more dynamic view of the interaction between Government and tribe will emerge in the course of what follows.

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* Iraq has had conscription since Turkish times and nominally all Kurds are liable for military service. It is part of the duties of the Mukhtar to record births and report to the Mudir the names of those liable for service. Until very recently however no real records have been kept, so to avoid military service it was merely necessary to produce suitable presents for the right people at the right moment. Contrarywise military service provides the Agha with a convenient means of getting rid of undesirable characters. That at least summarises the position as outlined to me by my interpreter. But I obtained no figures as to the actual numbers conscripted.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 NOW there was a Sultan from amongst the Sultans who ruled Iraq before the days of the Ottomans, and his name was Hajji Ali. And this Sultan had only one son, the Amir Kheyyun, who was a youth of twenty years, so handsome of the face that when he passed through the city the people would come out and throng the streets, and so dense were the crowds that not even a flea could pass through the town. And the Amir Kheyyun was famous in battle, for he commanded the armies of the Sultan, and he challenged the enemies of the Sultan his father to single combat, and used to kill them [593] in front of their armies. And he obeyed the commands of the Sultan his father in everything, for this is the custom of the Arabs.

So one day the Sultan, Hajji Ali, sent for his son, Kheyyun, and he said: In this world only one thing is certain and only one thing is known, and that is that death comes to every man, nor can a single man escape from it. And the time is not long nor shall many years pass before you are Sultan of this land in my place, but (may it be far from you) when you are dead who shall replace you? Therefore it is now suitable that you take a wife. But Kheyyun, the obedient son, refused the command of his father, nor did he heed his words. And he said: I have studied the matter, and I have read every book concerning women, which has been written by every wise man and philosopher of Iraq, of Persia, of India, of China and of Rome, and I have come to the conclusion that women are evil, and they are witches, nor is there truth and goodness in them. Therefore, how can a man take one of them for a wife?

*539 626 And the Sultan thought: This is only the foolishness of youth. I will command my son to marry in the presence

*539 of my ministers, my advisers, and my troops, then,
• 626 through shame, he cannot disobey me. And he summoned his court, his ministers, and his troops, and he sent for the sheikhs and leading men of the country, and the palace was thronged with a great crowd, and he sent for his son, the Amir Kheyyun.

*539 And the Sultan spoke and said: It is long since we have
527 had celebrations and rejoicing as is fitting in a great city on the occasion of a royal marriage or the birth of an heir to the throne. I therefore command and order the Minister of Finance to produce a sum of one hundred thousand dirhems, and that each of the sheikhs of the tribes shall bring one thousand Syrian sheep, and each of the great merchants shall bring one thousand bags of the finest rice of Amara and of El Huweiza, and the Governor of Basra shall bring one thousand boatloads of the sweetest dates in Basra, and the Maadan shall bring milk, and the people of Mosul shall bring honey, and of Baquba, fruit, and from each town and village shall come the fruits and crops and vegetables of that village. And for every day of the first month of the new year one thousand sheep shall be killed and roasted and stuffed with walnuts and almonds, nor shall any man in the city go hungry, and the travellers and the people of the desert shall also be satisfied, for in that auspicious month will be celebrated the wedding of my son, the Amir Kheyyun, the beloved.

*539 And the Amir Kheyyun stood up in front of his father,
593 and he said: No. Then the faces of the great sheikhs and the great merchants and the captains of ships and the commanders of troops and the learned men became red with shame, for amongst the Arabs it is not fitting that a son speak in front of his father and into his father's face.

175* Frontier Crimes Regulation and was promulgated in February,
627* 1916. It gave authority to the Political Officers to invoke a
692 tribal *majlis* or other arbitrating body to deal, in accordance with tribal custom, with all cases in which any of the parties concerned was a tribesman.[1]

In all arbitration procedure, the Political Officer had the final word, although the Chief Political Officer might review the case. The Political Officer had to confirm the findings of the *majlis*, and he might set aside or add to the sentences imposed.[2] He was also invested with magisterial power to try cases which did not lend themselves to the application of tribal arbitration.[3]

The Regulation in its application proved congenial to the tribes, for it enabled them to settle disputes in ways long familiar to themselves. It also aided in tribal settlement and pacification by giving effect to tribal opinion obtained by arbitration, and it raised the importance of the shaikhs by giving them a recognized place in the political and legal system. The Political Officers, on their side, found that considerable work was taken off their shoulders.[4]

175* Over one point of tribal justice the views of the tribesmen and
627* of the Political Officers often clashed. In cases of murder
● 628 arising out of a blood-feud, the tribesmen were accustomed to
681 regard *fasl*[5] or payments of money and usually, of women, as sufficient to settle the score and to end the feud. Imprisonment or capital punishment was thus considered not only harsh but unnecessary. In many cases where a woman violated or had been even accused of violating the desert code of morality, the death of the offender was demanded by the code in the name

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[1] *Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation*, G.O.C. Proclamation No. 2 of 1916, ch. iii, Sec. 7.

[2] Ibid., Sections 10, 11, 13.

[3] Ibid., ch. iv and v.

[4] *Reports of Admin. for* 1918 *of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia* (Calcutta, n.d.): Qurna Report, p. 306 (hereafter *Admin. Report*, 1918).

[5] For valuable first-hand observations on *fasl*: *Monthly Reports of Political Officers of the Occupied Territories, November*, 1919 (hereafter *Monthly Rep'ts*): Nāsiriya, pp. 94-5.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

of honour (*namūs*).[1] Capital punishment for such murders, 175*
which were frequent and usually premeditated and brutal, 727*
cut across tribal justice. The Political Officers, on their side, 628
found such customs abhorrent and contrary to their ideas of 681
justice.[2] Their natural tendency was to override the decisions of the tribal *majlis* and to impose imprisonment or death penalties. The problem was partially solved by the gradual recognition of the tribal point of view by the British authorities, but the modification of tribal custom has taken longer. At the present, it still constitutes one of the major problems in the administration of the tribal areas of 'Iraq.

The Revenue Department

No single task of greater magnitude faced the British ad- 175*
ministrators of the Occupied Territories than that of organizing 727*
the Revenue Department. The collection and administration 652
of revenue in accordance with the Turkish system but freed from abuse and corruption were not the only problems. Associated problems of land tenure, of revenue assessment, of *Auqāf* administration, in all their strangeness and complexity, had to be studied and solved. Responsibility for other activities, such as Excise and Customs, control of Hostile Trading Concerns, of the Public Debt, and of Education had to be assumed. To render the task more difficult, papers and records where they had not been destroyed, were out of date and, with the exception of land-registration, in confusion, requiring weeks of careful sorting.[3] Responsible officials had fled, and although

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[1] See Thomas, Bertram, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, 1931, pp. 86-7.

[2] *Admin. Report*, 1918: Hills Division, pp. 126, 133; *Monthly Rep'ts, December*, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 59; Ibid., *August*, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 74.

[3] Cf. the excellent unsigned article (by C. C. Garbett, I.C.S.): *Turkish Rule and British Administration in Mesopotamia* in *Quarterly Review*, Vol. ccxxx, pp. 403 ff. The claim made there (p. 411), however, that demand-statements for the annual tax on date trees as prepared by the Turks, were found intact and collection of this as well as other revenue were begun within a few days of the occupation of Basra, is not borne out by the records of the period, as *Revenue Admin. Report, January-March*, 1915 (confidential), nor by personal testimony of the officials on the spot at the time.

1: Longrigg
496, 315, 631

MHl Iraq MHl

The map following page 436 has been reproduced according to the following schedule:

d	e	f
a	b	c

and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal 619
memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of
time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups
of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or
Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis,
well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a
secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original 619
kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread 602
wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in
sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over
centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and
is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great 619
confederacies embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities, birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable. The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in 619
the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, 369
their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk; and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' 619
material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer 178
fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had 631
been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the
town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*ḍhabṭiya*) could appear

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 178 •631 from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads had become a Government function; more and more the local [423] Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

619 178 349 Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

619 573 The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

505 traffic. One or two free-lance enterprises were additional to these—a Baṣra-owned steamer plying to Baghdad, another weekly from Baghdad to Samarrā; many abortive projects had been formed for larger development. The Saniya Administration had advanced plans, in 1890, for an extended service to include voyages to Mosul and even to Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and a new survey of the Euphrates was ordered in preparation for free navigation from Maskana or Jarablus to Baṣra. Nothing resulted from these projects, but the advancing shadow of the Baghdad Railway, with which their authors loved to connect them, gave encouragement. A ship-building yard was established at Baghdad in 1890.

504 The port of Baṣra, sole sea gateway of 'Iraq, carried by far the greatest part of its trade and traffic, of which in 1900 a negligible part was other than British or British-Indian. Russian and German trade was not yet established, while the 'Iraqis contributed little to the movements of the port. The Shaṭṭ al-'Arab waterway, thanks to survey and buoying by British hands, gave access and security to anchorages opposite the 'Ashar and Khandaq creeks which connected it with Basra city. The management of the port was primitive, quarantine and customs provisions inept, vexatious, and venal. No wharves, cranes, sheds or other port equipment were provided; loading and discharging overside to and from lighters in midstream were slow and costly operations.

206 Since the 'sixties of the century 'Iraq had had its place in the world's telegraphic system. It was connected through Fao with India, through Mosul and Jazira-ibn-'Umar with the rest of Turkey, through Khaniqin (or through Fao and Bushire) with Persia. The handling of traffic was slow and unreliable. But the extension of the system to most parts of 'Iraq, vulnerable and faltering as it was, and with Kurdish districts still unpenetrated, had yet done
205 much to assist administration and to modernize society. Postal services dated in some form from the eighteenth century. In the 'sixties of the nineteenth, British-Indian steamers began to carry the Indian and European mails to Basra, where the service connected with the river steamers. The Indian Post Offices opened in 1868. The British camel mail to Damascus, discontinued in 1886 after a century of service, was replaced by a Turkish mail along the same route, carried by 'Aniza tribal riders. The time-honoured horse-borne Tatar mail left Baghdad every Monday for Istanbul, by way of Mosul and Diyarbakr.

7. THE GOVERNMENT

631 The enormous difficulties of governing the three wilayas arose, it is now clear, from a complex of elements. The territory was ill provided with means of communication, and much of it was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631
foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of
the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the
greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The
'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, [181]
unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal
warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between
town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; [579
to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. 182]
Such was the territory which for four centuries the
Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western
opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642
these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631
generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which
was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood
at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and
was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule
was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the
Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the
local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including
those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642
dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, 185
which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And
while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the
conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law
and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing
agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational
foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and
a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the
attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe
to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached
from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern,
pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government
of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had
enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its
Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every
new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya
system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565
a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the
effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647
were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by
race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part
of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

565 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims
647 or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe, or professedly cosmopolitan,
every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, per-
661 sistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

● 631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent
662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land
[628] revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish representa-
625 tives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardi-
631 hood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendis--Analyst]

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded
civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of
French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midhat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession
and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated
State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the
shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties
of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired
mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments.
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on 647
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the
Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the 642
example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self- 661
interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all,
'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards:
'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in
1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant
alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by
adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with
corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz
alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by
playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with
false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of
which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking.
From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its
ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and
to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 643
'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the 185
important town families—and notably those of religious pretension
—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and
charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as
planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic
preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal
bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which 631
any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the 619
impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom,
and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power
permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of
direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by
nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own
favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless
struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the
shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and
the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was
it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful
punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook
flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to
name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and
sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his
requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and
the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could 668
not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature
of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the
Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

The railways, when at their greatest extent they were handed over by the Army in April 1920, consisted of nearly 1,000 miles of track.[1] The absorption into the 'Iraq economy of this rapidly constructed and ill-equipped system, with its decrepit engines and rolling-stock and an alignment designed to serve military purposes, was to be no easy task. The Director in 1919–20 was Colonel G. Lubbock. The labour which the Railway used was, at this stage, almost entirely Indian. 496

The financial procedures for handing over to a Civil Administration the capital works constructed from Army funds were the subject of a mission sent to 'Iraq under Sir John Hewitt; the assets were valued at £2 million, excluding the Railway, and had mostly taken forms unrelated to civilian needs. The giant river fleet of the (military) Inland Water Transport, on the other hand, was never transferred to the Administration nor were its units sold locally by auction, as was the great mass of unneeded military stores. They were instead, amid storms of protest from the Civil Commissioner and 'Iraqi and British commercial interests, disposed of at Bombay by Lord Inchcape on behalf of the British Government. The civilian Tigris fleet was thereafter by degrees reduced to its pre-war scale. The Lynch (Euphrates and Tigris) Company had lost the *Julnar* and some minor craft, but in 1920 acquired the imposing *Zenobia* and *Zobaida* (both built in 1916), modernized its equipment and installations, and retained in operation the veteran *Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*, and the *Malamir* from their pre-war Karun service. The Lynch management of the E.T.S.N. Company's fleet was after 1919 merged in a fusion of their interests with those of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., forming the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation—'Mespers'—at Baghdad and Baṣra. Local competition on the river was no longer Government-organized, and most of the pre-war vessels had disappeared;[2] but it still handled an appreciable share of the traffic. 000 505 471

In the provincial Government, a close approximation to the Turkish administrative units was retained. The Division represented usually the former sanjaq or liwā, and the District the qadhā, while the naḥiyas were little changed. The sixteen Divisions 635 631

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[1] The mileages of metre-gauge line were: Baghdad–Baṣra 352 miles, Baghdad–Persian frontier 130, Baghdad–Kut 158, Zubayr–Jabal Sanam 23, Ur–Naṣiriya 10, Qaraghan (on the Khaniqin line) to Kinqarban (outside Kifri) 23, with 36 miles in the port area of Baṣra and Ma'qil. The standard-gauge line, Baghdad–Sharqaṭ, was of 186 miles; the narrow-gauge, Baghdad–Kifl 21, and Baghdad–Faluja 38.

[2] The *Baghdadi*, Asfar's *Étoile de l'Orient*, the *Furat*, the *Risafa*, and a number of German-owned launches of the Société de Transports Fluviaux, had been sunk by the Turks to block waterways and impede British operations. The *Basra* was sent to Europe but did not get farther than Malta. The *Barhaniya* and *Hamidiya* were blown up by the Turks to avoid capture. The *Baghdad* reached Mosul—the first steamer to do so—and was there captured by the British.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

635 631 in 1919 were those of 'Amara, Baghdad, Ba'quba, Baṣra, Dayr al-Zur, Diwaniya, Dulaym, Ḥilla (including Karbalā), Khaniqin, Kirkuk, Kut al-Amara, Mosul, Muntafiq, Samarrā, Shamiya (including Najf), Sulaymaniya. Of these, Dayr was soon to pass from 'Iraqi to Syrian keeping, Khaniqin and Ba'quba were later to form a single liwā, Kut was to lose its divisional status (but to regain it in 1922), Shamiya to be degraded into a district of Diwaniya, and Samarrā into one of Baghdad; but Karbalā with Najf was later to form a separate Division, as was Arbil. Each Division was the command of a Political Officer, and within it under his Assistants were grouped two or more districts, within which the familiar naḥiyas under 'Iraqi Mudirs preserved the routine and 631 nomenclature of their predecessors. At Divisional headquarters the formation of nominated advisory Divisional Councils of notables and officials, under the Political Officer's chairmanship, was a step taken in early post-war days. It intended to associate the public, to some formal and limited extent, with the Administration; but the Councils, however well chosen, were too powerless to be of effective service, and did not survive the stormy days of 1920. The Political Officer represented the authority of the Civil Commissioner (indeed, that of His Majesty's Government itself) and controlled all departments. His powers—administrative, financial, and judicial—were delegated in a suitable measure to his Assistants in districts, whose primary functions were to keep the peace, to know and to handle the tribes, and to collect the revenues.

000 The merits and shortcomings of this improvised Administration form a study of some interest. To an unusual extent its tone was determined by the high-minded, dominating character of A. T. Wilson, which imposed itself upon the small body of officers who essayed to carry out his policy: a policy of forthright, efficient, paternal Government in the interest of the masses—and especially of the tribesmen—but unsympathetic to local politics or nationalist aspirations. The problem created for his Administration by post-war demobilization and the claims of other services was solved by retaining some but not all of his best officers, and borrowing others from other Arabic-speaking territories, or from regiments leaving 'Iraq. The resulting standard, while not unmixed with inferior elements, was generally high in energy, personal integrity, and good intentions. The complexities of their tasks, and the deeper currents of opposition which developed, were commonly underrated—often with immediately tragic results—by these light-hearted amateur administrators, and even by the few experienced veterans eminent among them. The day-by-day attitude of the Administration was neither illiberal nor repressive, the establishment of cordial relations between governor and governed was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 own status and procedure. The supreme authority of the High
645K Commissioner was recognized, and was required for confirmation of almost all Acts of State and the higher administrative appointments. The rôle of the ministerial British Advisers was heavy and all-pervasive. Nevertheless, Cox could announce on 11 November 1920 that, pending the calling of the General Elective Assembly authorized by the Notification of 17 June, a provisional National Government had been established: that its Council of State consisted of a President and Ministers for Interior, Finance, Justice, Education and Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce, and Awqaf, and other ministers without portfolio: and that 'until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect the Council of State Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations, and in general military affairs except as concerned solely the locally recruited forces'.

The British Advisers to the Ministries were appointed at the same time: H. St. J. B. Philby to Interior, S. H. Slater to Finance and to act in Commerce, Major-General Atkinson to Communications and Works, Major G. F. Eadie to act in Defence, Sir E. Bonham-Carter in Justice, E. L. Norton in Health and Education, and R. S. Cooke in Awqaf.

645K The Council of Ministers, dignified and deliberate, proceeded to the dispatch of business. Arrangements were made under pressure from Ja'far Pasha for the organized repatriation from Syria of Fayṣal's 'Iraqi officers, who, hotly nationalist and as yet doubtfully disposed towards the new British-sponsored compromise régime, could not but form an important element in 'Iraq politics. A number of politicians deported in 1920 from 'Iraq to Hanjam Island in the Persian Gulf for subversive agitation were permitted to return; the remainder were to be released under the general amnesty proclaimed in June 1921. Work was begun in Committee on a revision of the all-important Electoral Law, a task begun by Sayid Ṭalib Pasha's conclave of ex-deputies in August. It proved intractable; the High Commissioner favoured, the ministers disliked, separate representation for the tribes. These, though they formed a great majority of the population, would without such a provision secure no parliamentary spokesmen at all. A first draft of the revised law was unsatisfactory, if only because, among other defects, it ignored the special rights of the Kurds under the Sèvres Treaty. The completion of the draft was willingly postponed by the Minister of the Interior, Sayid Ṭalib, whose own ambitions, it seemed to some, made him reluctant for elections to be held at all until his own plans were mature.

631 The reorganization of the provincial government on a plan

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

published in December 1920 involved a general restoration of Turkish administrative units, with the temporary loss of improvements made in 1918 to 1920. It involved also the complete separation of judicial from executive functions, an innovation—or restoration of Turkish methods, in this case salutary—which led to the immediate need at all levels for more judges and magistrates; and these the Ministry of Justice, progressive from the first in the use of responsible 'Iraqis, was not unsuccessful in supplying. The 'Iraqi Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams who, except in Sulaymaniya liwā and with caution on the middle Euphrates, were now everywhere substituted for British Political Officers and their Assistants as the effective governors of the provinces, represented all types, all ages, and all degrees of merit and honesty among ex-Turkish officialdom. The almost exclusively Sunni Government followed Turkish tradition by making, it was remarked, no Shi'i appointments save, inevitably, in the Holy Cities. The new provincial régime which allowed initially for 10 liwās, 35 qadhās, and 85 nahiyas, was the most obvious indication to the public that an 'Iraq Government was now a reality. It incorporated in each liwā one or more British officers as Advisers (later, Administrative Inspectors), an arrangement which promised to work on the whole satisfactorily and to the credit of both elements. There were in places regrettable lapses to Turkish standards, and elsewhere signs of administration on lines of political partiality; at Mosul the incoming Mutaṣarrif was promptly murdered; and in some cases the 'Iraqi executive, more experienced and not less able than his British supervisory colleague, resented the relationship. But on the whole the new machine worked with general acceptance and little friction. 631

Progress was made early in 1921 towards the construction of an 'Iraq Army. It was intended firstly for the defence functions which must devolve upon it with the withdrawal of British forces which, already in progress, was vociferously urged by press and politicians in Great Britain; and, secondly, to offer employment to the potentially dangerous military caste. To absorb the existing Levies, now a force over 2,000 strong with excellent discipline and record, into the 'Iraq Army would involve fundamental changes in the former, with the replacement of almost all its officers by newcomers. This plan was rejected; the Levies were instead placed temporarily under the Minister of the Interior, and retained a separate existence. The Ministry of Defence spent the first half of 1921 in elaborating departments, a staff, terms of service, and all other preliminaries for the Army. Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id, brother-in-law of Ja'far Pasha and himself a brilliant officer and pre-1914 'Iraqi patriot, returned from Syria to become its Chief of Staff. A Military College was opened in July 1921. 701

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager development. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained: schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

631 In the liwās,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwā early in 1922. Arbil, a sub-liwā of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Ḥilla. No more was heard of Baṣra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwā and qadhā. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

632 In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1922 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative —cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three
204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned
save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq
747 *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable
814 institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

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[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwās or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* S. G. C. Murray, H. M. Flaxman, E. C. H. Alban,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. S. Berry,* L. Kettlewell, S. E. Hedgcock, H. C. Pulley, R. E. Alderman,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. D. Jeffreys, L. W. Reed, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Grice, A. J. B. Chapman, J. B. Glubb (p. 291). Gillan, Murray, Flaxman, Kettlewell, Reed, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Pulley had died, and Longrigg and Hedgcock had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928–33), from the Sudan.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x 186 adopted by the King and his entourage from the first. He had been led by Mr. Churchill in London, he complained, to envisage a very different form of Treaty: the Mandate must go, disappear, be repudiated! And if it be urged that a debatable nicety of constitutional or international law was an unrealistic or scarcely sufficient basis—and one important only to a tiny minority of ʿIraqis—on which to found, as did the political ʿIraqis of 1921 to 1930, a ten-year campaign of political struggle, marked by civil resistance, murder, and intended insurrection, it remains true that the Mandate did in fact involve an imperfect independence and an affront to national pride damaging, it was claimed, to ʿIraq in Islamic eyes everywhere.

648x 186 As Treaty discussions in the Cabinet proceeded early in 1922, the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the Shiʿi ʿUlamā and leading supporters and even intimates of the King, cried out against mandated 'slavery' and demanded complete British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by reaction an 'English' party of notables and shaykhs favourable, they said, to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists, whose views the King personally shared, stood for abrogation of the Mandate, a friendly and equal Treaty, and continued British support. The cleavage in opinion grew more specific after a conference called at Karbalā in April 1922, nominally to protest against Ikhwan raiding, by Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi, a Shiʿi ʿAlim devoted to politics. The conference, attended by some 200 Shiʿi notables, ʿUlamā, and tribesmen, was watched with uneasiness by the moderate parties, and, in spite of the colourless resolution finally passed, was effective in rallying anti-Treaty opinion; it was productive also of indiscipline and near-anarchy in the sensitive
631 Muntafiq and Shamiya districts. A further evil now clearly visible
186 and likely to increase was the 'political' administration in some of the Euphrates areas, by strongly nationalistic Mutaṣarrifs and
668 Qa'immaqams. These, ignoring their advisory British colleagues, openly favoured the 'patriot' shaykhs in their land disputes and revenue assessments, and frowned upon the 'English' faction. Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad, deputations waited
x645 upon the King. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922, by the resignation of five ministers, who included Naji al-Suwaydi, ʿIzzat Pasha of Kirkuk, and ʿAbd al-Laṭif Mandil of Baṣra. The ministers who replaced these included Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi, a senior official of superior type who had been a Turkish deputy and lately Mayor of Baghdad: Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, a Turko-Kurd of outstanding energy and rich humour: ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Bey al-Saʿdun,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered 648x
districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to
secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in
robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to
maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no
direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended
by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern 563
frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Com- 167
mission's visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from
Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which 657
the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in
February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or
fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by
a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother
of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq
territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further
large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul
wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in
February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the
Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by
a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by
nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya
area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and
evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these
unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to
re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 563
'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising 631 ●
and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an 185
elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in
a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance
was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities
in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment
of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State
in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own
countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army,
Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or
improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the
tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government
was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber
of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete
integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 563
still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least 657
passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to 166

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

wise and moderate 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab. By the summer of 646 1926 the routine of parliamentary procedure was established; but it was already clear that the backwardness of the electorate, and the freely used power of the Government to secure the election of deputies of its own choice, could not but preclude any early possibility of genuine democracy.

The Administration, on lines half inherited from the Turks and 645× half established by the British, had well begun. With many short- 631 comings and omissions it operated already more widely and more 647 effectively than had any Turkish Government, and aimed at a superior standard of service. In Baghdad the departments under each Ministry improved their organization, sifted their staffs, advanced towards complete 'Iraqi control. By 1926 not only were all Ministries in effective 'Iraqi control but most of the larger departments had been handed to 'Iraqi directors, notably those of Health, Education, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Government Accounts, Police, Prisons, the Census; those of Irrigation, Tapu, Customs, Revenue and State Domains, Veterinary services, Public Works, the Port of Baṣra, and 'Iraq Railways remained for a further period under British executive control. In the provinces, new qaḍhās and nahiyas were formed or regrouped. The position of the British 'Administrative Inspectorate' was satisfactorily defined by law. A Standing Board selected 'Iraqi officials for higher posts, and the formation of a regulated civil service on modern lines was taken in hand. The Ministry of Finance, where R. V. Vernon assumed the Advisership in 1925 after an interregnum under L. M. Swan, had developed and specialized its organization, reduced its non-'Iraqi staff to a minimum, and founded a Finance Inspectorate. The post of Auditor-General, reporting to the Cabinet direct, was created in 1924 and held by J. Parlby, who had worked in 'Iraqi finances since 1917. The Advisership of Communications and Works was held by Wheatley until the arrival of L. E. Bury in 1925, and again after the latter's departure three years later. In Interior, Cornwallis was assisted by a senior member of his Administrative Inspectorate—Pulley, Wilson, or Edmonds—and by one or more juniors.

The Courts offered justice and accessibility to an extent far 692 superior to that of alien and corrupt Ottoman tribunals; during these years both civil and criminal courts multiplied at liwā and qaḍhā headquarters as need declared itself, and the statistics of cases heard showed an increasing recourse to law. Civil jurisdiction lay with the Peace Courts of the Qaḍhis—who after 1923 included Shi'i Qaḍhis—and junior judges, the Courts of First Instance at three or four liwā headquarters, and a single Court of Appeal and Cassation, with a British President, at Baghdad. This President

(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of 647
Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman, who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. Progress towards 647
raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards, commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one 661
minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn 692
general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhās and naḥiyas—were formed 631
by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years 1929 to 1932.

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq 652
into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Advisership to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
●631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply,
improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features
of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imperfect.
184 Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was
not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission
constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq
Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

701 American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow
631 start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers
which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial
administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth
a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available.
665 Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when
668 they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality
was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

563 If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX B

Table showing (1) *area and population of each liwā;* (2) *qadhās of each liwā, including H.Q. area;* (3) *area* (*sq. km.*) *of each qadhā;* (4) *population of each qadhā.*

631
162
361

Liwā	*Area in sq. km.*	*Population*	*Qadhās with* (1) *area,* (2) *population*
Baghdad	20,000	805,000	Baghdad (1,900: 552,000); Kadhimiya (1,100: 114,000); Samarrā (15,600: 91,000); Maḥmudiya (1,450: 48,500).
Mosul	48,000	602,000	Mosul (12,900: 340,000); 'Amadiya (2,700: 50,000); Zakho (2,250: 37,000); Dohuk (2,250: 40,000); 'Aqra (1,950: 32,000); Sinjar (16,900: 32,000); Shaykhan (1,400: 24,700); Tall 'Afar (8,250: 45,500).
Baṣra	12,300	352,000	Baṣra (4,700: 206,000); Abu al-Khaṣib (4,000: 81,000); Qurna (3,650: 65,000).
Kirkuk	19,900	286,000	Kirkuk (7,000: 148,000); Kifri (5,300: 48,000); Chamchamal (2,400: 30,000); Ta'uq (5,200: 59,000).
Arbil	18,400	240,000	Arbil (3,500: 86,000); Makhmur (3,500: 44,000); Keui Sanjaq (1,900: 31,000); Rawanduz (5,500: 46,000); Raniya (2,100: 27,000); Zibar (1,950: 6,600).
Sulaymaniya	9,400	223,000	Sulaymaniya (3,000: 77,600); Ḥalabja (3,100: 71,000); Shahribazar (2,000: 38,000); Pishdar (1,250: 35,600).
Dulaym (H.Q., Ramadi)	45,400	193,000	Ramadi (15,600: 111,000); Faluja (4,750: 49,000); 'Ana (25,000: 33,600).
Ḥilla	5,300	262,000	Ḥilla (960: 81,000); Hashimiya (1,900: 52,000); Hindiya (1,200: 82,000); Musayib (1,200: 46,000).
Kut	16,000	225,000	Kut (4,000: 82,000); Ḥai (3,000: 67,500); Badra (3,800: 16,200); Ṣuwayra (5,250: 59,250).
Karbalā	6,000	277,000	Karbalā (5,600: 150,000); Najf (400: 127,000).
Diwaniya	14,900	384,000	Diwaniya (1,800: 63,000); Samawa (4,700: 82,000); Shamiya (2,900: 114,000); Abu Ṣukhayr (1,300: 79,000); 'Afaq (4,200: 46,000).
Muntafiq (H.Q., Naṣiriya)	14,150	370,000	Naṣiriya (5,500: 111,000); Rifa'i (3,200: 82,000); Suq al-Shuyukh (3,800: 109,000); Shaṭra (1,600: 68,000).
Diyalā (H.Q., Ba'quba)	16,000	273,500	Ba'quba (2,050: 94,500); Khaliṣ (3,600: 69,000); Khaniqin (3,750: 57,000); Mandali (6,500: 53,000).
'Amara	18,750	308,000	'Amara (8,650: 184,000); 'Ali al-Gharbi (5,750: 36,000); Qal'at Ṣaliḥ (4,350: 88,500).
Northern desert province	94,700		Population nomadic, and included in adjacent liwās.
Southern desert province	75,700		

P. 400

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

102
496
315
631


JORDAN
Oil pipe line
N O R
D E
32
BULGARIA
Istanbul
Batum
U.S.S.R.
Tbilisi
Ankara
TURKEY
Aleppo
EUPHRATES
SYRIA
O.P.L.
TIGRIS
CRETE
CYPRUS
Beirut
LEBANON
Damascus
Bag
ISRAEL
IRAQ
Tel Aviv
JORDAN
Alexandria
Amman
Jerusalem
Cairo
Suez
NILE
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA

End Map (A)

In Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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631


D
THERN
Rutba
I R A
SERT
Khan Baghdadi
Hit
Kubaysa
EUPHRATES
'AQARQUF
Ramadi
Habbaniya
Faluja
Sumayka
Dali'awa
Ba'quba
DIYA
Kadhimiya
Baghdad
Ctesiphon
KUT
Mahmudiya
Suwayra
Musaiyib
Hindiya Barrage
Rahaliya
BAHR AL MILH
Karbala
Babylon
Shithatha
Hilla
Hashimi
Khan Hammad
HILLA
KARBALA
Kifl
Kufa
Najf
Shamiya
Abu Sukhair
Faysaliya
Kharm
Shinafiya
DIW
Sam
Baku
Tabriz
Teheran
Hamadan
PERSIA
Baghdad
Basra
0 200 M.
Railways
Oil pipe lines
Oil pipe line
SOUTHERN
Salma
DESERT
44

End map (B)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

102
49b
315
631



Mandali
Balad Ruz
KUT AL AMARA
Badra
Jassan
'Aziziya
Bughayla (Na'umiya)
Kut al Amara
PUSHT-I-KUH
Shaykh Sa'ad
'Ali al-Gharbi
AMARA
Hashimiya
Daghara
'Afak
Hai
Kumayt
'Amara
Qal'at Sikr
Shamiya
Sukhayr
Rifa'i
Karradi
Rumaytha
Qal'at Salih
'Uzayr
Shatra
Suwayq
MUNTAFIQ
Hammar
Chubaish
Qurna
Semawa
Khidhr
Nasiriya
Madina
Suq al Shuyukh
HAMMAR LAKE
Dizful
Shushtar
Masjid-i-Sulaiman
Ahwaz
KARUN
KHUZISTAN
Bandar Shapur
Khorramshahr
Abu al Khasib
Abadan
Basra
Sha'aiba
Zubayr
Rumayla
Qusayr
Salman
abu Ghar
BASRA
JABAL SANAM
Busaiya
Umm Qasr
Fao
Bubiyan Is.
KUWAYT
Kuwayt
PERSIAN GULF
NEUTRAL ZONE
NEUTRAL ZONE
32
30
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R.W.FORD

End map (c)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1


36
38
40
T U R K E
Diyarbakr
Alexandretta
Banyas
O.P.L.
SYRIA
Dayr al-Zur
Oil pipe line
Ab
KHA
38
36
34

102
496
315
631 ●

End Map (d)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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315
631


42
44
LAKE VAN
Van
E Y
Mardin
Nisibin
Zakho
Simayl
Dohuk
Tall Kochek
'Ayn Zala
Tall 'Uwaynat
KHABUR
JABAL SINJAR
Balad Sinjar
Tall 'Afar
Tall Kayf
Mosul
GREATER ZAB
Barzan
Zibar
'Aqra
Rawanduz
Raniya
Arbil
ARBIL
Quwayr
Makhmur
Keui Sanjaq
MOSUL
Qaiyara
Altun Kupri
Chamchamal
Kirkuk
Shargat
LESSER ZAB
HAWIJA
Taza Khurmatu
Daquq (Tauq)
KIRKUK
Tuz Khurmatu
Kifri
W. THARTHAR
Baiji
BAGHDAD
JABAL HAMRIN
Takrit
TIGRIS
Kingarban
Qara Tepe
Abu Kamal
'Ana
al-Qa'im
Rawa
Haditha
Samarra
Deli 'Abbas
Khalis
DIYALA
Sumayka
Daltawa
Ba'quba
DULAIM
Urmia

End Map (E)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

102
496
315
031


46
48
50
CASPIAN
SEA
38
36
34
Tabriz
Sauj Bulaq (Mahabad)
PERSIA
Sulaymaniya
Marivan
Hawraman
Hamadan
Kermanshah
Karind
Qasr-i-Shirin
Khaniqin
Qizil Rubat
Naft Khana
Naft-i-Shah
Mandali
Balad Ruz
0
100
MILES
International frontiers
Provincial boundaries
Land above 1500 ft.
" " 6000 ft.
Railways

End Map (F)

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

CHAPTER VI

INITIATION OF ADMINISTRATION IN BAGHDAD WILAYET

In view of the divergence of opinion, both between London and 175*
Baghdad, and, to a lesser extent, between the local military 727*
authorities and Sir Percy Cox, both as regards the policy and the character of the administration to be set up in Baghdad, it is not surprising that those in charge of the Civil Administration in ‘Iraq did not strictly adhere to the instructions laid down for their guidance; that the administration should have taken on aspects beyond the limits prescribed by H.M. Government; and that the immediate differentiation between the administration of Basra and Baghdad should be confined to a separation of administrative organization rather than to any appreciable alteration of spirit or character of the administration except in the Judicial System.[1]

Administrative Organization

Under the organization adopted after the fall of Baghdad a 175*
Deputy Chief Political Officer remained in charge at Basra 727*
while Sir Percy Cox took up his headquarters at Baghdad. 631 ●
Later, when Sir Percy became Civil Commissioner, September 1st, 1917, both wilayets were separated into divisions. Basra Wilayet, with the addition of Kūt, remained the same as in Turkish days. Its five divisions were: Basra, Qurna, Nāsirīya, ‘Amāra and Kūt. Baghdad was divided into eight divisions: Baghdad, Sāmarrā, Ba‘qūbā, Khānaqīn, Ramādī, Shāmīya, and Samāwa. To each of these a Political Officer was posted, as well as to ‘Azīzīya and to Karbalā. Under each Political

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[1] *Infra*, pp. 128 ff.

175* 727* 631 Officer, Assistant Political Officers administered subdivisions or districts. A Deputy Civil Commissioner assumed control of the Basra divisions until September, 1918, when the two wilayets, largely for political reasons, were merged and the administration directed from Baghdad.

Political Control and Revenue Administration

175* 727* As at Basra, military exigencies largely controlled the situation. General Maude's own attitude to the Civil Administration had been in accordance with his views as to the necessity of establishing the unquestioned authority of the military authorities rather than with the spirit of the proclamation issued in his name after the fall of Baghdad. The appointment, often without reference to the Chief Political Officer, of military officials, many of whom knew nothing of Arab conditions or of Arabic, to civil administrative positions, gave no suggestion that he took seriously the statement 'I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army'.[1] The Government by proclamation, with its harassing and sometimes unnecessary regulations, gave as little hint to the people of Baghdad as earlier regulations had given to the people of Basra, that the armies had 'not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors or enemies but as Liberators'.[2]

652 175* 727 Nevertheless, Sir Percy Cox, concerned with the future as well as the present, deemed it essential to extend political control throughout the wilayet, as much as permitted by the military authorities and by General Maude's centralization of authority into his own hands. Such control could be best attained, as had been discovered in Basra Wilayet, by extending

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Proc. No. 9, p. 5. Text: App. I.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

numerous individuals, English, American and French. The 175* atmosphere, in his opinion, was dominated by the Western 727* Arabia viewpoint, the experts being lamentably ignorant of 648* conditions in 'Iraq and even in Persia.[1] On the other hand, he himself created the impression that he was out of touch with conditions under which the Peace Conference was proceeding, and that he had little conception of the strength of Arab Nationalism or of the forces which had given rise to it.

In London, his appeals for an official pronouncement of the intentions of H.M. Government regarding 'Iraq were not fruitful. It was felt that until further progress had been made toward the settlement of peace, the telegram of February 14th must suffice.[2] The Secretary of State for India agreed that the Acting Civil Commissioner should make specific proposals, and suggested that Lord Curzon might help him in formulating a policy and in obtaining sanction for his plans.

The Acting Civil Commissioner bespoke the aid of Lord Curzon in obtaining an agreed scheme on which to build and an accepted policy by which he might be guided. His constitutional proposals, drawn up in February, were placed, by the arrangement of Lord Curzon, before the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs on April 6th, at a meeting before which he appeared personally. His proposals for pro- [631] ●
vinces (five instead of four proposed) in ' 'Iraq proper' were sanctioned, together with Provincial Councils for each. Divisional and Municipal Councils were to be developed and consolidated. Arab Advisers were to be appointed to the British heads of three Departments of State: Revenue, Justice and Education. The Arab Secretaries of the Divisional Councils were sanctioned as Advisers to the Political Officers, and Arabs were to be appointed Presidents of the Municipal Councils of Baghdad, Basra, and 'Amāra.

In deference, however, to Lord Curzon's *idée fixe* that nothing should be done to anticipate the decisions of the Peace Con-

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[1] Wilson, op. cit., p. 116.

[2] Cited *supra*, p. 180.

175x become the residuary legatee of the ~~Empire~~ whereby its constitution,
642x its electoral laws, its judicial system, its revenue system,
727x its attitude to minorities and its very spirit approximated those of the former regime. In addition, the ground was laid for the continuous struggle within the administration itself between those who preferred the customary ways and those who, educated in the scientific atmosphere of the West, maintained that 'Iraq must break away from her Ottoman traditions and that more up-to-date forms, imbued with modern ideas and a progressive spirit, must dominate the administration if they and their fellow countrymen were to be 'able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world'.[1]

175x In the re-division of the country into ten *Liwās*, thirty-five
642x *Qādhas* and eighty-five *Nahīyas*, approximating the former
727x Turkish divisions, the Council, on December 12th, exhibited
631 one of its first tendencies to revert to the Ottoman system. The major new divisions, replacing the fourteen divisions of the British Civil Administration which, for the most part had been drawn on carefully considered tribal and ethnological lines, were: Mōsul, Kirkūk, Baghdad, Karbalā, Diyālā, Basra, 'Amāra, Dulaim, Hilla and Muntafiq.[2]

In accordance with the Turkish administrative system, the Council also proposed, on December 12th, that an 'Iraqī *Mutasarrif* should replace in each *Liwā* the British Political Officer who was to become the Divisional Adviser without executive functions. In each *Qādha* a *Qaimmāqam* was to become the responsible official, while a *Nahīya* was to be placed in charge of a *Mudīr*. To each larger *Liwā*, former Assistant Political Officers were to be appointed Assistant Advisers.

To this arrangement the High Commissioner agreed. He asked, however, that it be not applied to the Hilla *Liwā* until the return of the special Commission, headed by Ja'far Pasha, which

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[1] Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations.

[2] Kūt *Liwā*, formed of portions of surrounding *Liwās*, was added January, 1922.

1. [1921-ANALYST]

had been sent to the Euphrates area by the Council to study 175x
civil reorganization; to the Muntafiq *Liwā*, until the British 642x
troops had been withdrawn; and to the Kurdish districts until 727'
their future status had been decided. Sir Percy Cox had already 631
approved of the creation of the Baghdad Municipal Council which, although sanctioned under the previous regime, had been so mistrusted and so hedged with limitations as to be valueless as an instrument of government. The new Council had full executive and financial powers, subject to the general supervision of the *Mutasarrif* of the *Liwā*.

Appointments to administrative offices were vested in the 175'
Council of State, subject to the approval of the High Com- 642'
missioner, by Section XIV of the Instructions.[1] In practice, 727x
this arrangement was applied by the Council of State only to 647
those posts for which the Sultan's *firmān* had been required under the Ottoman regime. For other posts, appointments were made on the authority of the Minister concerned. In all cases, however, it was understood that no appointments involving the displacement of British or Indian officials were to be proposed to the Council without previous consultation with the High Commissioner.

The actual transfer of power in the provinces awaited the re-establishment of comparative peace and stability. Not until January 10th, therefore, following the return of Ja'far Pasha and the Commission from the Euphrates area, was the Minister of Interior permitted to put forward his first list of administrative appointments.[2]

The principal criticism of the list came from Shī'a sources. 175'
Their original grievances, other than inherent opposition to 642
the British-controlled provisional Government itself, had been 727'
647
795

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[1] Appendix VI.

[2] Only four major administrative appointments had been made previously by the Council, all in Baghdad and vicinity; Mahmūd Nādim Beg Tabaqjalī, *Qaimmāqam* of Mandalī, November 19th, 1920; Mumtaz Beg al'Daftarī, *Qaimmāqam* of Kādhimain, November 21st, 1920; 'Ahmad Beg, *Qaimmāqam* of Sāmarrā, December 1st, 1920; Rashīd Beg al-Khojah, *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, December 11th, 1920.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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496
133

MAP I


40°
42°
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
PROVINCIAL (LIWA) BOUNDARY
QADHA BOUNDARY
RAILWAYS
RIVERS
PROVINCIAL (LIWA) CENTER
QADHA CENTER
NOTE: THE PROVINCES HAVE THE SAME NAME AS THEIR CENTERS EXCEPT WHERE MARKED
SYRIA
SINJAR
TEL AFAR
MOSUL
DULAIM LIWA
EUPHRATES RIVER
RAMADI
NORTHERN DESERT
TRANS JORDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
0 20 40 60 80 100
MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
KILOMETERS

POLITICAL DIVISIONS

-ii(a)

631
496
133


TURKEY
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°
ERBIL
SULEIMANIYA
KIRKUK
TAUQ
TIGRIS RIVER
BAQUBA
DIYALA LIWA
BAGHDAD
BEDRA
KERBELA
KUT
HILLA
HASHIMIYAH
AFAK
DIWANIYA
NAJAF
RIFAI
AMARA
SHATRA
MUNTAFIQ LIWA
NASIRIYA
HAMMAR LAKE
QURNA
BASRA
SOUTHERN DESERT
KUWAIT

-ii (b)

a little over five percent of the total. Expenditures on education, health and other social services, although still very inadequate, rose slightly so that they absorbed almost 21 percent of the total budget in 1951. Capital outlays have been extremely modest. Total new government investment outlays for civilian purposes have averaged only ID 2,700,000 annually in the period 1948-49 to 1950-51. Expenditures on public works and housing, excluding irrigation, absorbed on the average less than six percent of total government outlays in this period. 652

Economies have also been effected in recent years at the expense of the municipal and provincial administrations. By law, these were supposed to have assigned to them, in equal shares, the proceeds of the property and petrol taxes less the expenses of collection incurred by the central government. Actually very little of these taxes has been turned over to the local and provincial governments. For example, in the three years 1947-48 to 1949-50 the provincial administrations received only ID 175,000 out of a total of ID 2,626,000 due to them. Municipalities were similarly handicapped. The ability of local governments to carry out improvements and even to maintain existing facilities was correspondingly curtailed. 631 652

Characteristic Features of Government Revenues

The fiscal system in the past has been characterized by (1) the high proportion of revenues derived from indirect taxation, (2) light taxation of agriculture, and (3) considerable tax evasion and poor tax collection. 651

Indirect taxation is generally predominant in all underdeveloped countries, and Iraq is no exception. In the three-year period 1948-49 to 1950-51 indirect taxes contributed about 82 percent of all tax income and 59 percent of total budget receipts. Customs duties and excises accounted during these years for 71.5 percent of total revenues from indirect taxes, while taxes on agricultural produce, fish, and livestock brought to market (the so-called *istihlak* and *koda* taxes) contributed most of the remainder. Direct taxes—the so-called land tax, the property tax and the income tax—accounted for only 18 percent of total tax revenues and 13 percent of all government receipts. Income and surtaxes

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

361 have been newly constructed do not appear at all on the records
647 of the Planning Office. The Mission, in fact, found that many major details of developments such as civic centers, markets and the like, either were not shown in the plans or were contrary to the plans as prepared and filed. There were also instances where planned projects under construction were suddenly changed or stopped by a new mayor on his assuming office.

Cooperation of the central government with the local authorities has also been noticeably lacking. The Ministry of Education, without consultation with local officials, prepares school plans, showing not only the details of structures but also their location and distribution. Likewise, the Ministry of Social Affairs, without reference to local administration, prepares plans for hospitals, clinics, social centers, and housing schemes which form definite parts of the community. And, in similar fashion, the Ministry of Communications and Public Works prepares many plans for public works such as bridges, national highways and streets, and government structures designating details not only of construction but also of alignment, orientation and location. All these specialized planning activities are carried on with little or no coordination with the Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Even in Baghdad, where better cooperation between the municipality and the various government departments might be expected, a large school building was recently completed, abutting on a busy major thoroughfare, the proximity of which was dangerous for school children. The location was approved despite objections by the Planning Office.

Financial Difficulties

361 Financial difficulties have contributed to the failure of the
631 municipalities to plan more effectively. A large part of their
[651] revenues, which are in any case small, is derived from a share in the petrol and property taxes, the proceeds of which are handed over to the central government and, in theory at least, reallotted to the provincial and municipal governments. In years of financial stringency, however, the government has withheld a large part of these taxes for itself.

For capital funds, the municipalities have to rely on occasional loans—or, in rare cases, grants—from the central govern-

ment, which are usually forthcoming only at irregular intervals. 361 The loans usually have to be amortized over a period of 10 years 631 or less, which places an onerous burden on municipal finances. The municipal authorities in a number of northern cities, which were allocated funds in the fall of 1950 and had spent a large part of them at the time of the Mission's visit, were still in doubt as to whether they had received a grant or a loan. Uncertainty as to income or capital funds inhibits advance planning. Moreover, when the authorities do receive funds, they are apt to spend them as fast as possible for fear that, if they have not actually been spent, they may otherwise be withheld. The usual way of overcoming this situation, and possibly the only way in the circumstances, has been to build new streets, which are relatively easy to plan and execute. In addition, the municipality is by law entitled to recoup part of its expenses from the owners of land that has increased in value.

The provincial authorities, who are responsible for carrying out the projects of the central government and who might be expected to cooperate more closely with the municipalities, have been faced with similar difficulties. They, too, have had hand-to-mouth experience with capital expenditures. Nearly completed buildings have sometimes been left standing for months, because funds ran out before the construction could be finished. Furthermore, the projects to be undertaken are normally prescribed by the central government. Apparently, some advance on this procedure has been made recently and the *Mutasarrif* and the Provincial Administrative Councils have been given more latitude in planning their own development.

Planning in the Future

The opportunity now exists to substitute an entirely new 361 approach to urban development for the old haphazard methods. An 185 example of how well the development of a town can proceed, given the right spirit of cooperation, is provided by the small town of Bedrah, which lies near the Iranian border in Kut province and which has a population of about 4,000. This project involves the reconstruction of the old town on a new site.

Several streets had been constructed and 24 dwelling units were ready for occupancy when the Mission was in Iraq. Thirty more units were scheduled to be finished during the year. Besides

133 phrates join together in their lower courses to form the Shatt al-Arab, which is 185 kilometres long, navigable throughout its length, passes by the port of Basra, and flows into the Persian Gulf. In some places, this river is one kilometre wide. Baghdad is on the Tigris.

There are also several lakes in Iraq; the largest is Al-Hammar, with an area of 5,200 square kilometres.

132 The climate in the west of the country is Mediterranean and sub-tropical, with a long dry summer (lasting over seven months), frequent changes of temperature, with an average of 33.8° C.; in winter the average temperature is 9° to 10° C. In the east of the country, the average is the same in the summer, but the winter in the north-east is colder, with an average of 7° to 7.7° C. The rainfall varies from a yearly average of 38 to 40 centimetres in the highlands (probably twice as much in the mountains) to a maximum annual precipitation of 10 centimetres in the south-western desert region.

● 63/ The country is divided administratively into the following fourteen provinces or "liwas": Baghdad, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, Karbala, Hilla, Diwaniya, Kut, Amara, Basra, Diyala (chief town: Baquba), Dulaim (chief town: Ramadi), Muntafiq (chief town: Nasi-RIYA), AND SULAIMANIYA.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

technique included blackmail. Rickety boat-bridges served a 361
dozen of the riverain towns. Street lighting consisted, at the best, 363
of a few battered oil-lamps. Water was supplied by donkey-borne [365]
waterskins from the river, or from polluted wells in private courtyards; only in Baghdad was a single quarter of the town furnished by pipes with silt-laden untreated water. Municipal street-sweepers maintained some appearance of decency in the main lanes and bazaars, while filth and stenches abounded in the rest. Every town and larger village had cemeteries in its midst or on its fringes. Khans for caravans or wayfarers were found everywhere; hotels approaching the lowest European standard existed only in Baghdad.

Municipal administration was entrusted, save in unorganized 632 ●
villages, to a Mayor and his council. These functionaries, elected by procedures which could amount to Government nomination, enjoyed some local prestige; but their powers in practice were limited so rigidly that the local Governor in fact controlled all projects and all expenditure. Baghdad in the 'nineties was divided into three *baladiyas*, two for the left bank and one for the right. The Mayor was a member or nominee of one of its leading families or, rarely, a Government official. Municipal law was not inadequate, the code of taxation and procedure meticulous, its sphere of nominal activity reasonable. But in practice these administrations were corrupt and futile, and effective chiefly in providing a salary for a city notable and free servants for the local Governor. Nevertheless, pride of city was not lacking and schemes of town improvement were popular topics throughout decades of inactivity.

The picture of urban society of the period must embrace varying 361
scenes. Baṣra with its miles of date gardens and network of tidal
creeks, the activity of its riverain suburb—the sole seaport of 621
'Iraq—its daily contacts with Najd and Muḥammara, its rich garden-owning notables, its cosmopolitan merchants and agents, had a character unique in 'Iraq. Of the other towns of Baṣra sanjaq, Qurna was tribe-dominated, the growing village of Abu al-Khaṣib non-tribal, and Zubayr a desert-fringe town ruled by a hereditary Shaykh. Among Baṣra's leading families were those of the Naqib, and the houses of Basha'yan, Mandil, and Ṣani'.

Baghdad city with a mainly Sunni right bank and an all-Shi'i and largely Persian left, and its important suburbs of Kadhimiya, Mu'adhdham, and Qarara formed by far the greatest commercial centre in the wilayas. It was industrially important, administratively and militarily dominant. The city was mean, without modern improvements, without protection against river floods; it was adorned only by two or three monuments and mosques of interest and by the great shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani. With

652 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager development. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained: schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

631 In the liwās,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwā early in 1922. Arbil, a sub-liwā of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Ḥilla. No more was heard of Baṣra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwā and qadhā. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

632 In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1922 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative —cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three
204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq
747 *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable
814 institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

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[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwās or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* S. G. C. Murray, H. M. Flaxman, E. C. H. Alban,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. S. Berry,* L. Kettlewell, S. E. Hedgcock, H. C. Pulley, R. E. Alderman,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. D. Jeffreys, L. W. Reed, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Grice, A. J. B. Chapman, J. B. Glubb (p. 291). Gillan, Murray, Flaxman, Kettlewell, Reed, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Pulley had died, and Longrigg and Hedgcock had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928–33), from the Sudan.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administra- 361
tion was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and 185
a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old 632
abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans [423]
were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on
specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise.

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and 871
showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way 658
haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Baṣra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeo- 172
logical wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it
seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across
Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the
foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of
United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial
operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors.
Imported goods found favour less by quality than by
cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to
intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods
and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from
America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from
India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and
machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of
dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live
animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily
during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe
led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary
stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632 ●
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish
regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred
townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street
improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric
power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation,
in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and
a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equipment, 331
the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

conditions in the future, the rate could rise to two percent per 161
annum or even higher within a comparatively short period. Obviously this possibility will have to be borne in mind in planning the development of social services such as education and housing. It also has important implications in agriculture. As the limited supply of water is more fully utilized, most of the increase in population may ultimately have to be absorbed in nonagricultural pursuits, unless water is used much more efficiently than it is now.

As the standard of social services such as health and education 162
is higher in the cities and the opportunities for employment are [369]
more varied, the distinction between urban and rural population is an important one in considering the age and sex distribution of the people, their occupations and their standard of living. About 550,000 people live in the municipality of Baghdad, another 300,000 in the next three largest cities of Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk and some 350.000 in other towns having a population of over 15,000. Thus about 1.2 million people or a quarter of the population live in sizeable urban communities. In addition, there are about a hundred smaller municipalities having an aggregate population of under half a million. These towns are usually the administrative 632 ●
and market centers of the minor political subdivisions such as *qadhas* and *nahiyas* and many of them are little more than large villages; in many respects they form a semirural category intermediate between the larger towns and the villages.

There has been a strong migration from the country to the 166
cities in recent years, particularly during the last war. The most 369
striking examples of this can be seen in Baghdad and Basra where many thousands of "squatters" from Amara province are crowded together in makeshift huts under extremely unhygienic conditions. The peculiarly adverse conditions of life in Amara have made that province the principal source of migrants to the large cities and, indeed, to most parts of the country, but there has evidently been a substantial movement from the rural areas in general. As it is 162
prima facie likely that these migrants would consist principally of young adults or adolescents, especially men, it is not surprising to find that the census shows a much higher proportion of the very young (under 10) and the old (over 50) in the rural areas, the disparity being even more marked among men than among

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

647 661 capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

635 663 Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just Ṭahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Ridhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 1912: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Baṣra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the 635 661 aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

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[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated 635
secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming 661
C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim 636
Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of 663
ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the 185
town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless 369
showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew 192
rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their 668
reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be 369
different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

The railways, when at their greatest extent they were handed over by the Army in April 1920, consisted of nearly 1,000 miles of track.[1] The absorption into the 'Iraq economy of this rapidly constructed and ill-equipped system, with its decrepit engines and rolling-stock and an alignment designed to serve military purposes, was to be no easy task. The Director in 1919–20 was Colonel G. Lubbock. The labour which the Railway used was, at this stage, almost entirely Indian. 496

The financial procedures for handing over to a Civil Administration the capital works constructed from Army funds were the subject of a mission sent to 'Iraq under Sir John Hewitt; the assets were valued at £2 million, excluding the Railway, and had mostly taken forms unrelated to civilian needs. The giant river fleet of the (military) Inland Water Transport, on the other hand, was never transferred to the Administration nor were its units sold locally by auction, as was the great mass of unneeded military stores. They were instead, amid storms of protest from the Civil Commissioner and 'Iraqi and British commercial interests, disposed of at Bombay by Lord Inchcape on behalf of the British Government. The civilian Tigris fleet was thereafter by degrees reduced to its pre-war scale. The Lynch (Euphrates and Tigris) Company had lost the *Julnar* and some minor craft, but in 1920 acquired the imposing *Zenobia* and *Zobaida* (both built in 1916), modernized its equipment and installations, and retained in operation the veteran *Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*, and the *Malamir* from their pre-war Karun service. The Lynch management of the E.T.S.N. Company's fleet was after 1919 merged in a fusion of their interests with those of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., forming the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation—'Mespers'—at Baghdad and Baṣra. Local competition on the river was no longer Government-organized, and most of the pre-war vessels had disappeared;[2] but it still handled an appreciable share of the traffic. 000 505 471

In the provincial Government, a close approximation to the Turkish administrative units was retained. The Division represented usually the former sanjaq or liwā, and the District the qaḍhā, while the naḥiyas were little changed. The sixteen Divisions 635 631

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[1] The mileages of metre-gauge line were: Baghdad–Baṣra 352 miles, Baghdad–Persian frontier 130, Baghdad–Kut 158, Zubayr–Jabal Sanam 23, Ur–Naṣiriya 10, Qaraghan (on the Khaniqin line) to Kinqarban (outside Kifri) 23, with 36 miles in the port area of Baṣra and Ma'qil. The standard-gauge line, Baghdad–Sharqat, was of 186 miles; the narrow-gauge, Baghdad–Kifl 21, and Baghdad–Faluja 38.

[2] The *Baghdadi*, Aṣfar's *Étoile de l'Orient*, the *Furat*, the *Risafa*, and a number of German-owned launches of the Société de Transports Fluviaux, had been sunk by the Turks to block waterways and impede British operations. The *Basra* was sent to Europe but did not get farther than Malta. The *Barhaniya* and *Hamidiya* were blown up by the Turks to avoid capture. The *Baghdad* reached Mosul—the first steamer to do so—and was there captured by the British.

635 in 1919 were those of 'Amara, Baghdad, Ba'quba, Baṣra, Dayr
631 al-Zur, Diwaniya, Dulaym, Ḥilla (including Karbalā), Khaniqin, Kirkuk, Kut al-Amara, Mosul, Muntafiq, Samarrā, Shamiya (including Najf), Sulaymaniya. Of these, Dayr was soon to pass from 'Iraqi to Syrian keeping, Khaniqin and Ba'quba were later to form a single liwā, Kut was to lose its divisional status (but to regain it in 1922), Shamiya to be degraded into a district of Diwaniya, and Samarrā into one of Baghdad; but Karbalā with Najf was later to form a separate Division, as was Arbil. Each Division was the command of a Political Officer, and within it under his Assistants were grouped two or more districts, within which the familiar naḥiyas under 'Iraqi Mudirs preserved the routine and
631 nomenclature of their predecessors. At Divisional headquarters the formation of nominated advisory Divisional Councils of notables and officials, under the Political Officer's chairmanship, was a step taken in early post-war days. It intended to associate the public, to some formal and limited extent, with the Administration; but the Councils, however well chosen, were too powerless to be of effective service, and did not survive the stormy days of 1920. The Political Officer represented the authority of the Civil Commissioner (indeed, that of His Majesty's Government itself) and controlled all departments. His powers—administrative, financial, and judicial—were delegated in a suitable measure to his Assistants in districts, whose primary functions were to keep the peace, to know and to handle the tribes, and to collect the revenues.

000 The merits and shortcomings of this improvised Administration form a study of some interest. To an unusual extent its tone was determined by the high-minded, dominating character of A. T. Wilson, which imposed itself upon the small body of officers who essayed to carry out his policy: a policy of forthright, efficient, paternal Government in the interest of the masses—and especially of the tribesmen—but unsympathetic to local politics or nationalist aspirations. The problem created for his Administration by post-war demobilization and the claims of other services was solved by retaining some but not all of his best officers, and borrowing others from other Arabic-speaking territories, or from regiments leaving 'Iraq. The resulting standard, while not unmixed with inferior elements, was generally high in energy, personal integrity, and good intentions. The complexities of their tasks, and the deeper currents of opposition which developed, were commonly underrated—often with immediately tragic results—by these light-hearted amateur administrators, and even by the few experienced veterans eminent among them. The day-by-day attitude of the Administration was neither illiberal nor repressive, the establishment of cordial relations between governor and governed was

*645 Education was entrusted to a learned Shi'i politician, Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, and Awqaf to a venerable ex-Shaykh al-Islam lately returned from Istanbul, Ibrahim Effendi al-Ḥaydari. The Prime Minister held the portfolio of Defence, and with it that of a new Ministry which he created as a timely gesture, that of Foreign Affairs. Nuri Pasha Sa'id became deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, of which the King was titular head.

648* The British Government submitted to the Council of the League on 17 July an Instrument embodying the terms of all the documents now ratified as between itself and 'Iraq. This was adopted on 27 September 1924, in terms which provided for the submission of an annual Report by Great Britain to the Council on its 'Iraq trusteeship: for the assumption by His Majesty's Government of full responsibility for the carrying out of the Treaty: and for abstention from all modification of it by the British or by 'Iraq without League of Nations consent. The Treaty was ratified by King George on 10 November, and by King Fayṣal on 12 December 1924.

5. THE MOSUL SETTLEMENT

● 635 In the liwā of Sulaymaniya, far from the stresses of Baghdad State-building, the régime of 'Kurdish Government' under Shaykh Maḥmud, which had ruined the countryside and depopulated the town, was by the spring of 1924 drawing to its close. The Chamchamal and Ḥalabja qadhās, now loosely administered from Kirkuk, elected to the Constituent Assembly deputies who included Shaykh Maḥmud's own brother; but the Shaykh himself, after ignoring one more ultimatum and a warning of impending punishment—the warning which was invariably given, on humanitarian grounds, to the people of all villages where as a last resort bombing was to take place—was visited by aircraft of the Royal Air Force in May 1924 and was finally evicted from the town. Sulaymaniya was entered in July by ground troops, cavalry of the 'Iraq Army, and a force of Levies. The administration was thenceforward assumed by the 'Iraq Government, which provided funds to remedy the miserable conditions prevailing. The population of the almost uninhabited city could return with infinite relief to their homes, and by the end of the year had increased to 20,000. Shaykh Maḥmud, skulking in the mountain villages and crossing to and from Persian territory, maintained the hunted existence of a bandit.

563 721 On the northern frontier the re-establishment in their old mountain homes of some thousands of returning Assyrians was to lead to trouble after two years of peaceful resettlement. The district concerned lay just north of the old wilaya frontier, but

*645 composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The
Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began
466 to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women
workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensa-
tion for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the
Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment
of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers
from British military employment was already creating unemploy-
467 ment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, includ-
ing those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers,
and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers
whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce.
Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and
468 conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers,
whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways,
and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which
demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance
system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in
April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike
and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the
organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with
little regard to their actual grievances.

635 An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its
dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā
Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on
local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local
development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code
was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad
spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a
number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to
recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical,
medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would
[661] call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate
corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945
701 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of
inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in
aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not
without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in
standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service con-
ditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent,
began in fact again to approach a condition in which active opera-
625 tions could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have
lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards,
the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHl Iraq MHl

Programmes of study, especially those for the rural and agricultural 871
schools, need much thought and study by those who administer 645
them. Ultimately, local development plans for advance towards compulsory schooling will need most careful consideration. These vital tasks cannot be undertaken adequately until the Ministry of Education is relieved of much of its present stifling day-to-day detail.

THE CREATION OF LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITIES

As was indicated in the preceding chapter, one of the significant 871
social and educational developments in Iraq is the growth of local
interest in education which is accompanied by some vigorous local 635
administrative initiative and a preparedness to find money for local development. This suggests that, quite apart from the Ministry of Education being able to clear its own decks for action by passing on much of the details of administration to the provincial education officers, there exist in the localities valuable means by which a policy of advance towards compulsory education could be facilitated.

A movement in the direction of enlisting the aid of the provinces in the increase of educational provision was considered a few years ago. Under the Provincial Administration Law of 1945, a General Provincial Council was established in each province. It was empowered, in a limited way, to levy local taxes to support various local services, including some aspects of education. For one reason or another, the exercise of these local taxing powers in relation to education appears to have been restricted by the administrative action of the central Government departments. It is understood, however, that a more vigorous attempt is about to be made to give the General Provincial Council in every province wider powers of control over education up to and including the primary schools.

It is to be hoped that, when this transfer of certain powers to the General Provincial Councils takes place, it will be done in such a way that local interest in education is given full opportunity. It would be a great aid to local desire for educational powers and advance if each General Provincial Council were instructed to create amongst its members a Provincial Education Committee to which would be delegated the task both of controlling local primary schools and of developing primary education. There can be no doubt from conversations which have taken place that local people are anxious to exercise these powers. There is equally no doubt that, with some exceptions, the Provincial Directors of

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635 Education would, if the transfer of control from the centre were effected by stages and with adequate advice, be able to serve their Provincial Education Committees well.

One great advantage of giving local representatives control of their primary schools would be that it would enhance the increasing local interest which is being taken in educational affairs. Increased local control, with the power both to levy local taxes in addition to the existing voluntary contributions, would also help to spread the burden of educational expenditure which is so essential to development. Further, as will be suggested later, these Provincial Education Committees might after a time provide the machinery for preparing detailed plans for local provision of compulsory education.

It is very much to be hoped that this opportunity of establishing Local Education Authorities will be neither lost nor frustrated, because it may well be that it will provide the only suitable arrangement both for ascertaining local needs and for raising the additional monies which will be required from local sources before compulsory education can ever become a reality. This hope needs to be reiterated because it is understood that although the Government have the proposal under active consideration, it is not popular in certain sections of the Ministry of Education. Apparently some of the senior officials fear that the transfer of primary education functions from the centre to the localities would jeopardize existing educational arrangements. Such fears may or may not be justified. It is, however, part of the democratic process to provide local governing bodies with the opportunity of learning from the mistakes they may make. In any event, if one of the main sources of additional revenues for education is to be found in the provinces, it is only appropriate that those who are to find the money should have their say as to the way it is to be used.

THE FINANCING OF THE NEW EDUCATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

000 *Sharing of National and Local Expenditure—a Grants System.* On the assumption that the proposed transfer of powers in respect of primary education from the Ministry of Education to Local Education Authorities will take place, early consideration will have to be given to the financing of education under the new arrangement. If the Provincial Education Committees are to be created, it is essential that, through the General Provincial Councils, they should be given the power to levy local taxes for education, both to augment existing voluntary contributions and

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

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x871 647 The Educational Missions Section has charge of the affairs of students selected for study abroad at government expense and keeps records of all students who study abroad at their own expense.

744 The Medicine and Hygiene Section[1] safeguards the health of the school children. It inspects school buildings, conducts regular health examinations of pupils, treats those who suffer from diseases, trains teachers in first aid and simple treatments, propagates health information, and supplies schools with drugs and first-aid materials. In addition, it gives physical examinations at government expense to all teachers and officials entering the service of the Ministry of Education and all students entering the various schools and colleges. This section has set itself the task of fighting the three endemic diseases—trachoma, malaria, and bilharziasis—prevalent among school children. In 1943–44, 67,415 pupils out of the total public-school registration of 104,359 were examined; and of those examined, 16,599 were found to have trachoma, while 3,253 suffered other eye diseases; 5,864 had malaria, and 1,299 had bilharziasis. Treatment of those afflicted with bilharziasis resulted in steady improvement. The fight against trachoma has proceeded systematically, and the percentage of school children suffering from it is being reduced. Much effort has been expended on the campaign against malaria in all the provinces. The Medicine and Hygiene Section began very humbly in 1931 with the appointment of one doctor. By 1942–43 it had twenty-one doctors, two dentists, ten women nurses for the provinces, and more than seventy other health workers. In 1943–44 it maintained twenty-nine clinics throughout the country, and more recently a special hospital for students was established in Baghdad. Treatment at the clinics and at the hospital is free.

Provincial directors of education

x871 ● 635 There is a provincial director of education for each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq. He is responsible to the Director General for the proper functioning of all schools and educational institutions in his province with the exception of teacher-training colleges, some of the vocational and special schools, and higher institutions; these exceptions are the direct concern of the central office of the Ministry. It is the function of the provincial director to make sure that teaching in the schools within his jurisdiction is in accordance with accepted syllabuses, to supervise the behavior of teachers and education officers in his province, and to carry out instructions of the Director General. The regulations of 1945 provide for provincial advisory education councils under the chairmanship of the governor and with the director of education as secretary. These councils

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[1] -[Of the Ministry of Education -- Analyst]

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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were to act in an advisory capacity, reviewing the educational situation 871^K in the province and making proposals for the improvement and extension 635 of education.

However, a new Provincial Administration Law, passed by Parliament in 1945, effective early in 1946, provides for a general provincial council in each province to meet yearly in the month of March. The councils are empowered to levy local taxes to support various local services, such as the opening of technical classes and schools, the teaching about industries that will fit the local needs, the establishment of agricultural schools, and the founding, administration, and supervision, according to the provisions of the Public Education Law, of primary schools and of schools for workers and illiterates. It is not yet clear what the relation will be between the provincial educational councils, provided for by the regulations of the Ministry of Education, and the general provincial councils provided for in the new Provincial Administration Law.

THE INSPECTORATE

Side by side with the administrative service is the inspectoral service 871^K headed by a chief inspector responsible to the Director General. Inspectors 647 are of three kinds: specialized inspectors, provincial inspectors, and women inspectors. Those in the first category are specialists in subject-matter fields who visit classes and teachers in their own fields in intermediate and secondary schools, teacher-training colleges, and special schools on the secondary-school level. They report on the performance of individual teachers, as well as on the general situation with regard to textbooks, library books, equipment, and laboratories. There is also a specialized administrative inspector who inspects the general administration of the school systems of the provinces.

Provincial inspectors make their headquarters in the education offices of the provinces and visit primary and secondary schools, but not technical schools or teachers colleges. In the secondary schools these inspectors have to ask the help of specialized inspectors in matters concerning the various subject-matter fields. Provincial inspectors are under the jurisdiction of the chief inspector and are independent of the provincial director of education. Women inspectors visit and report on girls schools, under the direction of a first woman inspector.

Inspectors' reports are sent to the chief inspector with copies to the provincial directors of education, and the substance of the reports is sent to the individuals about whom the reports are made. The chief inspector presents semiannual reports to the Director General of Education, de-

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East

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of expenditure arising out of treaties approved by Parliament, or 642
the Constituent Assembly, unless approved by the King. 652

Art. 107. Should the new financial year have begun before the promulgation of the Budget Law relating thereto, and should Parliament have assembled, the Minister of Finance shall submit a draft law containing provisional budget estimates for a period not exceeding two months. On the expiration of the period covered by such estimates, the Minister of Finance may submit a fresh draft law of a similar nature. This procedure may be repeated on such occasions as may be necessary. Should Parliament not be sitting, the budget of the preceding year shall be followed without prejudice to the right of issuing the ordinances referred to in Article 102.

Art. 108 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The coinage of the State shall be determined by law.

PART VII

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROVINCES

Art. 109. The administrative districts of Iraq, their classes, names, 642
manner of institution, the powers of the officials and their titles shall 635
be prescribed by a special law.

Art. 110. The law referred to in the preceding article shall provide that steps shall be taken in certain of the administrative divisions to ensure the performance of any obligations relating thereto, arising out of treaties concluded by the King and approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly.

Art. 111. Municipal affairs in Iraq shall be administered by means of Municipal Councils in accordance with a special law. In the administrative divisions, Administrative Councils shall perform such duties as may be prescribed for them by law.

Art. 112. Each Community shall have the right of establishing Councils in important administrative districts, competent to administer buildings and properties dedicated to waqfs (pious foundations) and bequests for charitable purposes. They shall be competent to deal with the collection of income derived therefrom, and the expenditure thereof, in accordance with the wishes of the donor or with the custom in use among the Community. Such Communities shall also undertake the supervision of the property of orphans in accord-

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
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642 ance with law. The Councils referred to above shall be under the
•635 supervision of the Government.

PART VIII

CONFIRMATION OF LAWS AND JUDGMENTS

642 Art. 113. Ottoman Laws published before November 5th, 1914,
671 and laws published on or after that date and which have remained in force in Iraq up to the time of the publication of this law, shall remain in force in Iraq so far as circumstances permit, subject to any modification or repeal in conformity with the proclamations, regulations and laws referred to in the following article, and until they are altered or repealed by the legislative power, or the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

Art. 114. All proclamations, regulations and laws issued by the Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Iraq, the Civil Commissioner, and the High Commissioner, and those issued by the Government of His Majesty King Faisal, during the period between November 5th, 1914, and the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, shall be considered to be valid as from the date on which they came into force. Any portion thereof still unrepealed by that date shall remain in force until changed or repealed by the legislative power, or until the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void, in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

Art. 115. Every person shall be considered to be released and exempt from all claims relating to any acts performed by him in good faith in conformity with instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Iraq, the Civil Commissioner, the High Commissioner, the Government of His Majesty King Faisal, or by an official duly authorised thereunto, whether in a military or civil capacity, with a view to the suppression of hostilities, the establishment and consolidation of order and public security, or the carrying out of orders issued in accordance with martial law between November 5th, 1914, and the date of the coming into force of the Constitution. Every act referred to in this article shall be considered to have been done in good faith, unless the complainant can furnish proofs to the contrary. Any action or judicial

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4: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA1 Iran
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marriage takes place. The marriages exogamous with respect to the close kinship group — few in any case — will among the Hamawands be with Hamawands of other villages. Thus a caste separation


minimal lineage of Agha
other
Hamawand
lineages
CASTE BARRIER
semi-endogamous
kinship segments
of tenant farmer
population
individual
families of
laborers

Diagram No. 5. Organization of composite village.

tends to grow up, separating the Hamawand effectively from the Meskjin group, and the composition of the local group might be schematically represented as in diagram No. 5.

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One of the composite Hamawand- *Meskjin* villages was studied briefly. However, due to increased tensions connected with the app-

4: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MAl Iran
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roaching review of their case in the Land Settlement Comission[1]), when claims and counter-claims would come to a head, it was impossible to obtain detailed census material.

The village in question was conquered some 40 years ago by a segment of the Rashawand Hamawands, and lies at present on the very edge of Hamawand territory. Villages to the north of it, formerly under Hamawand control, have lately torn themselves lose.

The total population is ca. 100 individuals; of them, 5—6 households are Hamawand, 15—20 households *Meskjin*, subjected tenants, and there are a few families of laborers. The Hamawand faction is led by an *Agha;* the *Meskjin* are led by the *kikha* (official headman of the village). The latter is descended from the former headman, and was elected by the *majority of the villagers, so in the face of* government approval, the Hamawands had to accept him. Between these factions there has been no intermarriage.

The conflict in this village is related to that in the neighboring village, to which, according to the *Meskjin* version, the Hamawands wish to extend their privileges. The balance of power between the two factions seems at present to be quite labile. The *Meskjin* have been gaining ground through a slowly rising standard of living whereby rifles and ammunition have become increasingly available to them, and through the growing mediating effects of external administration. To fully understand the present tensions, one rule of the Land Settlement Comission which is to review ownership claims shortly should be noted: Where conflicting claims are advanced, any party who has for the last 10 years regularly collected tax on the land is regarded as the de-facto owner. It is thus vital for the Hamawands to retain their power, and for the *Meskjin* to break that power, before the Land Settlement Comission arrives on the spot.

To this end, the factions are mobilizing all available mechanisms.

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[1]) The Land Settlement Comission, established during the British mandatory period, is a court of claims relating to questions of land tenure. Coordinated with a comprehensive program of mapping, its object is systematically to cover all agricultural land, and definitively settle and register proprietory rights (cf. Dowson 1931).

4: Barth E 5 (1951) 1953 MAl Iran
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Unless a certain sum of money is paid, all young male citizens of 702
Iraq are liable to two years of military training and service. This is k
much resented by most villagers, and they attempt to avoid being 621
called up. According to the *Meskjin*, the Hamawands have an arrangement 578
with the police whereby they give the names of all *Meskjin* men in the two village who are liable for such service, in return for being left in peace themselves. Thus, it is said, the fighting strength of the *Meskjin* is constantly kept down.

The *Meskjin*, on the other hand, are accused of manipulating the religious brotherhood of Derwishes for political purpose, so as to organize all the *Meskjin* of the neighboring villages in a movement of resistance. To counteract this influence, the Hamawand *Agha* is at pains to expose the derwishes as fraudulent, and attempts to enhace the position of the local mullah, the recognized leader of the local mosque. — The final verdict, however, rests with the Land Settlement Comission, an institution the integrity of which few persons choose to question.

The rigidity of the Kurdish tribal system is here clearly illustrated, 171
and might profitably be contrasted to that of the Nuer, as described 619
by Evans-Pritchard (1940). The Nuer have, in spite of extensive conquests and various vicissitudes, retained a system of patrilineal *exogamous* lineages as the basis of their political organization. These lineages however are *not* corporate localized groups, but are conceptually identified with certain areas, where they tend to form the organizing core of the local villages. Through a system of adoption of conquered Dinka tribesmen to specific lineages, and by reckoning descent through females, a larger community is built around this
core, based on «sociological» kinship. Among the Kurds, on the other 619
hand, the general practice of FaBrDa marriage and other close family endogamy makes any initial *rapprochement* impossible between conqueror and conquered, and encourages caste separation. Furthermore, kinship through female links is given no political recognition. The principle of «sociological» kinship is unfamiliar and would be in conflict with Islamic doctrine — the kinship terminology describes actual, genealogical distance, and practices of adoption into lineages would be unacceptable. The only way two groups could fuse in the

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The Nomads. In addition to the permanent settled inhabitants 101
of the three areas here discussed there are certain nomadic groups who 221
move seasonally from one area to another and even out of the district
altogether. These nomads are again in many respects a distinct 184
cultural group; their economy is based exclusively on pastoralism as
opposed to the pastoral-agriculturalism of the settled peoples. The
largest of the nomad tribes are the Herki. They are normally resident
in Persia near the southernmost end of Lake Urmia. These high
altitudes cannot provide sufficient fodder for their herds throughout
the year and during the late autumn the bulk of the tribe migrates down
the Rowandus river and spreads out through the foothills (Area B) and
the northern fringe of the plains. They return to Persia with the
melting of the snows in the late spring. I have no first hand
evidence concerning these people and the second hand evidence appears
to be both fabulous and contradictory. There is reason to think that
their tribal organisation at the present time functions more perfectly
than that of the settled groups, presumably owing to less government
interference. They possess definite grazing rights in certain areas, [233]
even in districts nominally under the control of settled groups*
though in other areas they pay some sort of rental for the right to
herd their flocks. Their migration is linked with important trade
activities. They bring salt with them from Persia to Iraq, and take [439]
back wheat and barley. Wool is disposed of on the Erbil market as
well as large numbers of their livestock. The duty-free import of
salt is of course strictly illegal but is winked at by the authorities.
It was reported in the summer of 1938 that the Persian authorities
intended to compel the Herki to adopt a settled habitat. It is thus
unlikely that it will ever be possible to determine the precise
position of this group in the political and economic organisation of
the Kurdish area as a whole.

In my field work I stayed nearly all the time in villages [114]
occupied by members of the Soran and Balik tribes (see Map 2).

*The Iraq government authorities are able to carry on all 619
negotiations with the Herki through the agency of a single paramount
Agha, this despite the fact that the tribe itself scatters into small 628
family groups throughout a very wide area; this seems to imply a high
degree of tribal integration. During the summer of 1938 a law case
was proceeding between the Agha paramount of the Herki and Jemil Agha Iraq
of Bahrika (Gerdi tribe) as to whether the former need pay any rent to 635
the latter for the grazing rights of what appeared to be Gerdi land.
Jemil Agha complained to me bitterly that the Herki seemed likely to
win their case owing to their greater wealth and resources for
corruption. The case however establishes the point that they might
claim traditional grazing rights in land seemingly within the sphere
of influence of permanently settled groups.

9 K

Apart from these two non-tribal villages, all the groups in the Balik and Dergala areas are at least 95% pure Kurdish. The intrusive element is provided by a few Jews and Assyrian Christians who as a rule carry on some special trade such as weaving or carpentry and are thus tolerated as useful members of the community. 563 463

Method of Analysis.

As is clear from what has already been said, the tribal organisation of the various groups throughout the area under review have all to a greater or less degree been effected by contact with, and interference by the external administrative authority. If we go so far as to assume that at one time there was a form of social organisation which could be regarded as the typical norm for all the hill tribes of this region, it is certain that such a norm can nowhere now be found functioning in its complete state. Kurdish society as it exists today is a society undergoing extremely rapid and at times violent social change. As we shall see there are powerful and perhaps irresistable forces at work tending not so much to the modification as to the total destruction and disintegration of existing forms of tribal organisation. In such circumstances, in order to make the description intelligible at all, some degree of idealisation seems essential. In the main therefore I shall seek to describe Kurdish society as if it were a functioning whole and then show up existing circumstances as variations from this idealised norm. I am aware that such a method makes the resulting description to some extent subjective and that on many points I have not the empirical data to check the validity of my hypothetical norm. In the circumstances however it appears to be the most reasonable procedure to adopt. 177 121

The External Administration

The precise form of the external administration has no very direct bearing on the Kurdish social system as described in this monograph. But at various points in the argument especially in the section dealing with economic problems reference will have to be made to elements in the administrative organisation, and it seems desirable therefore to give first a brief description of the functions and relationships of the various members of this external organisation. 177 Iraq 635

The administrative system of Iraq has been developed out of that of the old Ottoman Empire. The terminology remains in many respects unaltered. The whole of the Kurdish area here under

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discussion lies within the Province (liwa) of Erbil. *The civil head of the liwa is Mutasarrif who is directly responsible for the police administration and the magistracy and indirectly for such social services as Health, Education, Agricultural Reform etc. The tax organisation is closely associated with the police and also comes under the administration of the Mutasarrif. Outside his control however are the military and the judiciary.

Iraq 635 871 K 664

Within the field of our discussion the social services of the government are very limited, though the education system is worthy of note. There are primary and secondary schools at Erbil and a primary school at Rowandus. There was for a while a secondary school also at Rowandus but this was closed following a nationalist strike by the students who demanded to be taught in the Kurdish language instead of Arabic. For obvious economic reasons these schools effect only a very small stratum of society - the sons of important Aghas and town merchants. Some of the larger villages have in addition a paid government teacher.

K 871 875 609

Though the intention is good, the practice is less so. The wages offered and the facilities for advancement are so poor that only the very poorest type of indolent scholar offers himself for such posts. In the Balik area anyway the experience of government education has so far proved unfortunate. The current opinion seemed to be that all government education officers are moral perverts. Two examples serve to show the basis for such an attitude. The only schoolmaster among the Balik at the time of my visit was attached to the village of Rayat. Formerly he had been attached to the village of Rust where he had married one of the Agha's daughters; this lady he had now divorced or rather deserted and the Agha of Rust was suing him in the courts for maintenance. In Rayat he had seduced the daughter of the Mulla and to avoid scandal had now married her, but this in itself was a

K 609

scandalous proceeding since the Mulla and the schoolmaster are regarded as enemies by nature - (since from the traditional viewpoint education is the Mulla's chief function). In another case which is described more fully later the Agricultural Adviser of Walash was murdered,

Iraq 135

* At the time of my visit the post of Mutasarrif of Erbil was held by Ahmad Beg i Taufiq Beg, a Kurd from the relatively sophisticated district of Sulaimani, a man of great intelligence and personal integrity. I am directly indebted to him for the facilities and assistance which enabled me to carry out this piece of field work, the more especially since his own political position at the time was somewhat delicate. Being related by marriage to the chiefs of the Pisdah tribes, at that time in revolt, he was regarded with a certain amount of suspicion by some of the Arab elements in the Baghdad government. This fact, coupled with a mild reputation for being pro-British - by no means a desirable sentiment in modern Iraq, - made my request for travel facilities a decided inconvenience. In the circumstances his help was deeply appreciated.

probably at the instigation of the Agha, because he was held to have corrupted the morals of the youth. K 609

Health services need not concern us. In the area studied there is no resident doctor outside the city of Erbil. 758

The Government have made various experiments in agricultural reform chiefly with a view to improving the breed of livestock and the quality of valuable crops such as tobacco. The Government's interest in the improvement of the tobacco crop is especially relevant to the area here described. Details will be discussed later but it may be pointed out that Government assistance of this kind is not a philanthropic enterprise. The heavy excise duty levied on all saleable tobacco much more than repays any expenses incurred. Iraq 635 K 249

The independent judiciary functions through its court in Erbil. In practice however it is in the nature of appeal court, since in the first instance cases come before the Mudir (sub-district magistrate) and then before the Qa'im Maqam (district magistrate) before being referred to the court. I am not clear as to the rules governing "appeal" of this sort, nor as to the limits of sentence that can be imposed by the magistrates' courts. So far as I know, only serious cases such as homicide automatically go before the court at Erbil. Iraq 635 692

During time of peace the military are stationed only at Erbil and Rowandus. There appears to be a general attitude of suspicion and conflict as between the civil and the military authorities. In this area the civil service is staffed mainly by Kurds and Turks and is thus in general inclination Kurdo-phil. The army on the other hand is staffed mainly by Iraqi-Arabs whose hatred and fear of the "barbarous Kurd" can be taken for granted. 635 701 K 578

The liwa is divided into several districts (khasa) each presided over by a district magistrate (Qa'im Maqam). Area A, Map 1 with which this account is mainly concerned lies wholly within the khasa of Rowandus. The Qa'im Maqam is responsible for his district in much the same way as the Mutasarrif is responsible for his liwa. Iraq 635

The khasa in turn is subdivided into several sub-districts (nahiya) over which presides a Mudir. The Balik tribe all reside within the nahiya Balik - the administrative district in this case coinciding with the tribal one. Dergala on the other hand is administered from Rowandus.

The Mudir has in his direct control a number of policemen who provide the direct liaison between the external authority and the tribe. It is the venality of these junior officials which is the worst feature of the system, and which is the real source of Iraq 635 625

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Government unpopularity among the tribes. Hay describes the gendarmerie of his time as "hardened ruffians without training and without principles; they used their authority to commit innumerable extortions". It does not appear that the position is much changed today.

*Below the Mudir there should be in each village a Mukhtar, his functions being basically those of registrar and tax collector. Among the hill Kurds the Mukhtar is invariably the Agha of the village concerned and the term is little used.

This summarises briefly the normal functions of the various elements of Government within the area under discussion. A more dynamic view of the interaction between Government and tribe will emerge in the course of what follows.

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* Iraq has had conscription since Turkish times and nominally all Kurds are liable for military service. It is part of the duties of the Mukhtar to record births and report to the Mudir the names of those liable for service. Until very recently however no real records have been kept, so to avoid military service it was merely necessary to produce suitable presents for the right people at the right moment. Contrarywise military service provides the Agha with a convenient means of getting rid of undesirable characters. That at least summarises the position as outlined to me by my interpreter. But I obtained no figures as to the actual numbers conscripted.

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464 241 late June and threshing proceeds steadily from July to October. The much smaller rice harvest comes about the end of September. With less wheat and no rice, threshing could be finished by mid-september leaving labour free for the main work of the tobacco harvest. On the other hand the tobacco plant requires a good deal of finicky attention during the early stages of its growth which coincide with the wheat harvest. It is possible therefore that any radical increase in the tobacco cultivation is dependent upon the introduction of improved methods of threshing. A much greater difficulty arises from the fact that the change in labour requirements would not be equally distributed as between different households. Whereas at present each household has approximately the same programme of work, the situation would be greatly complicated if one man's land was devoted to tobacco and his neighbour's only to wheat. The difficulty could be avoided if all the tobacco cultivation were 'owned' by the Agha; - the commoner being under obligation to work for his Agha but not for a fellow commoner. Such a development would never be countenanced by the Government however since the system would be regarded as "exploitation" of the tribesman by his chief.*

249 Iraq 635 654 Capital. The additional capital required for tobacco as opposed to cereal cultivation is not very significant. The Government is prepared to supply seed and expert advice; so far as I know the process of drying does not require any special technical apparatus. The re-organisation of the irrigation system would of course be an initial 'capital' expenditure for the community concerned.

Technique. On the other hand the mere statement that Government is prepared to offer expert advice rather oversimplifies the social aspects of the technical problem. I have already mentioned that the native Kurdish tobacco cured in the traditional manner results in a powdery substance that is quite useless for the purposes of a modern factory. In order to produce a marketable product, the farmer has to be taught entirely new methods. The reformer is here up against several types of difficulty. Firstly there is a simple conservative resistance, the dislike of new methods, not simply because they are new but because the practitioner in the old methods thinks he knows best. But there are other difficulties of a much more intricate kind. Here is an example.

K 249 609 Iraq 635 654 The Government are prepared to supply approved villages with a trained expert to supervise the growing and harvesting of tobacco. Such a man was supplied to the village of Walash. He was a Kurd, but a townsman from the plains and by mountain standards a man of low moral

* In Batas, where in functional terms the Assyrian Bishop takes the place of the Agha, the tobacco crop is owned by the Church, and difficulties over individual labour requirements thus avoided. But then a Christian Bishop is obviously not the same thing as a tribal Agha!

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character; it was alleged that he corrupted the villagers with alcohol and gambling and attempted to seduce their daughters, in particular the Mulla's daughter, in fact he was altogether a scoundrel. In due course he was found in the high road with two bullets through his body. The police took action. Two harmless looking nomads from another tribe were brought before the courts and on the basis of somewhat elaborate circumstantial evidence convicted of murder. Sentence however was never carried out since the "criminals" curiously disappeared a few days after the trial. Whatever was the truth of this matter, local rumour had no doubts on the subject. The bullet wounds, the arrest and conviction of the nomads were all a frame up by the police, who had the sense not to fish in troubled waters. The murdered man had really died of strangulation - hanged in the Guest House of Sheikh Mohammed, Agha of Walash and chief of the Balik.

This story was told me by Hamid Amin of Naupurdan who was always eager to cast a slur on his cousin Sheikh Mohammed. It appeared however to have some general currency since, when I was discussing the misdemeanours of the local schoolmaster with the Agha of Rayat, he referred to the Walash story. "These small Government servants! What do you expect? They're all scoundrels".

Whether the story is true or not is irrelevant, its effect among the Balik is the same as if it had been true. Even though Sheikh Mohammed's prestige is not so great as formerly, the fact, or even the rumour, that he had to hang his first and only agricultural adviser is a sufficient deterrent for any lesser Aghas who may be contemplating agricultural reform within their own communities. This example brings out well how a problem which on the surface is purely economic may in practice be affected by a mass of seemingly irrelevant considerations in the field of ethics, tribal law, politics and religion.

433 249 178

To sum up then. We have seen how the necessity for developing an export trade implies the necessity for increasing the tobacco acreage at the expense of cereal acreage, and I have tried to analyse out the forces of resistance which serve to prevent any immediate response to this incentive. Nevertheless the incentive is clearly very great. I was told for instance in Batas that whereas in the old days the crops of the entire village had been worth barely £50 in cash, the tobacco sales in 1937 alone totalled £2,500. I believe therefore that in the hills also some radical alteration in the emphasis of agriculture must take place in the near future.

But it must be recognised that any such development must bring about fundamental changes both in the ideology of the people and of their social organisation. As things are, the hill country farmer sets out first of all to grow sufficient food for himself and his family. Only when he is assured of that does he turn his attention to the cultivation of luxury products such as tobacco. In short he aims at

701 the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

625 The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services. Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force, some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security. In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrongdoers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely
197 policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

499 Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inaccessible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechaniza-
619 tion of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance
636 on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

563 Kerbela, Samarra and Kadhimain. Two-thirds of the Jews inhabit Baghdad, the others living mainly in Mosul and Basra. The Mandaeans dwell on the banks of rivers in Southern Iraq.

Written Guarantees

● 641 563 In 1932 the Council of the League of Nations gave its approval to the termination of the Mandatory regime and decided to admit Iraq to membership of the League on condition that the Iraqi Government gave formal guarantees for, among other things, the effective protection of minorities, containing the same general provisions as the minority-treaties accepted by several European States and any special provisions which the Council might think necessary.

In accordance with this decision the Iraqi Government issued a declaration, Chapter I of which safeguarded the rights of indigenous minorities. They were guaranteed full protection of life and liberty; the free exercise of any creed, religion or belief; equality before the law and of civil and political rights; freedom in the use of any language; the right to maintain their own institutions and educational establishments and to have questions of personal status settled in accordance with their customs and usages; full protection for the religious establishments of religious minorities and the right to administer their own endowments; and an adequate share for minorities in public funds for educational, religious and charitable purposes. These stipulations were recognized as fundamental laws of Iraq and were declared to constitute obligations of international concern and to be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

Even before the issue of this declaration, the Iraqi Constitution, promulgated in 1925, had given similar full guarantees. Article 6 declares the absolute equality of all Iraqis before the law. Article 13 states that Islam is the official religion of the State, but guarantees complete freedom of conscience and worship in conformity with accepted customs, in so far as forms of worship do not conflict with the maintenance of order or public morality. Article 16 gives communities the right of establishing and maintaining schools for the instruction of their members in their own languages; Article 17, however, states that Arabic is the official language except as may be prescribed by a special law. Article 18 provides that government appointments shall be made without

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discrimination in accordance with capacity. Finally, Article 37 641
states that the method of election to the Chamber of Deputies 563
shall take into account the necessity for the representation of non-Islamic minorities.

Some of these guarantees have been reinforced by particular laws. Thus the Electoral Law of 1924 allotted four deputies [646]
to the Christians and four to the Jews; it is a matter for dispute whether the law permits individual Christians and Jews to be elected as representatives of the ordinary constituencies. Similarly the non-Moslem communities were given representation in local and municipal councils by special laws.

As for the linguistic minorities, the Local Languages Law of [656]
1931 provided that the official language should be Kurdish or Turkish in a number of districts, and in addition that in all elementary and primary schools in those districts the language of instruction should be the mother-tongue of the majority of the pupils.

Personal Status and Communal Organization

The grant to religious minorities of jurisdiction in personal 692
and other matters has not met with the same difficulties as those 563
which have occurred in Syria. Articles 75 and 78 of the Constitution provided for the establishment of Christian and Jewish Spiritual Councils, with powers of jurisdiction to be conferred upon them by special laws. Their functions were defined in Article 79 as including matters relating to marriage, dowry, divorce, separation, alimony, attestation of wills and any other matters relating to personal status if the parties concerned consented. Every religious community was also, according to Article 112, to have the right to establish bodies competent to administer Waqf property.

In application of these provisions, several laws have been issued for particular communities, defining the method of appointment of the spiritual heads of the communities and of their councils, both spiritual and lay, and their functions in regard not only to personal status but also the decision of religious questions, the training of ecclesiastics, the administration of Waqf property, and the administration of schools and charitable institutions. For those communities for which special laws have not yet been issued, the old Turkish law on the subject remains valid.

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The Minorities and the Iraqi State

641 563 The Iraqi Government has on the whole tried to be correct in its dealings with the minorities. There are usually one or two Kurds in each Cabinet and there have been one Jewish and one Christian Minister; the minorities have a share, although perhaps an inadequate one, in government and army appointments, and in government subsidies to schools. Apart from the Assyrian incidents of 1933, the peculiar circumstances of which are explained below, and the Baghdad pogrom of 1941, at a time when government had practically ceased to function, there has been no physical persecution of minorities. Nevertheless, they are all restless and apprehensive, and have not yet come to regard themselves, nor are they regarded by others, as full and loyal citizens of the Iraqi State.

The explanation for this is not to be found in the bad will either of majority or of minorities. Its fundamental cause is to be looked for in the amorphous nature of the State. Iraq was created artificially by joining together three Ottoman provinces. It is too large to have the natural unity which each of those provinces possesses by itself, too small to have the unity of the Fertile Crescent or Arab Asia as a whole. It has not yet acquired a unity or structure of its own, and cannot do so until two fundamental questions are faced and answered: first, what are to be the relations between Sunnis and Shi'is in Iraq; secondly, what is to be the relation of Iraq to the rest of the Arab world?

The first is perhaps the most important of all questions for the future of the country. There are more Sunnis than Shi'is in Iraq as a whole, but the Sunnis are divided into Kurds and Arabs, so that the Shi'is form the largest single community. Nevertheless, they have less than their due share in the Government, mainly because there are fewer men of education among them than among the Sunnis. Thus they are discontented, and the political balance between them and the Sunnis is very precarious.

641 563 668 There are to-day two political tendencies in Iraq, based upon two possible solutions of this fundamental problem. Many Iraqis, mainly among the Sunni Arabs, advocate the incorporation of Iraq into an Arab State or federation, in the hope that this will ease the local situation: the Shi'is will be in a minority in the large Arab State, and in course of time will come to look upon themselves as Arabs rather than as Shi'is. The other tendency, which has many adherents among the Shi'is, is towards the

development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without 641
distinction as equal citizens of the State. 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one 668
another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at least some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling.

The Kurds : Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority 563
in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are con- 221
centrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and
Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous,
and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic
pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals,
moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the
cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains [241]
and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being semi-sedentary.

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority 563
belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve 619
their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts 178
they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized. Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly

563 166 lowlands to the south of Hakkiari, in what is now Iraq. When the war broke out, the Hakkiari group revolted against the Turks, largely in the hope of Russian help. Driven from their homes, they joined up with their fellow-countrymen and with the Russians around Urmiyah; but the collapse of Russia destroyed their position, and after resisting the Turks for a time, they were forced to flee southwards to Hamadan, where the British military authorities disarmed them and sent them on to the refugee camp at Baqubah near Baghdad.

When the war ended, the problem arose of what to do with the refugees on Baqubah. In 1919 there were some 25,000 of them; most of them were from the Hakkiari group and wanted nothing except to be allowed to return to their native mountains. This, which would have been possible immediately after the war, became impossible when in 1925 the Council of the League of Nations settled the question of the Turco-Iraqi frontier in a way which left the Hakkiari region inside Turkey. Thus, the land which the Assyrian refugees regarded as theirs was placed on one side of the frontier while they themselves were on the other; and since the Turkish Government refused to allow them to return, and deported such of them as had returned, the mandatory and Iraqi authorities were left with the problem of finding new homes for them.

By 1930 a great deal had been done to solve the problem. Some thousands had been settled in villages in the northern district of the country (this in addition to those who had returned to their homes to the south of the Hakkiari mountains, and whose position was unaffected by subsequent disturbances). In addition, several thousands had found work in Mosul, Baghdad and other towns. Only a few hundreds still remained unsettled. All this work had been helped by the privileges granted to the refugees by the Iraqi Government and the interest taken in them by the mandatory Power, which had special obligations towards them because of what they had suffered for the Allied cause during the war.

563 641 Nevertheless, the Assyrians were not contented with their position. Their discontent was partly due to the general unrest and demoralization which their experiences in the war and as refugees living on charity had implanted in them. But it was also due to more particular causes. First, there was their continuing desire to return to their own country, and their refusal

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to accept their stay in Iraq as more than temporary. Secondly, 563
even if they had to remain in Iraq, they wished to go on living 641
the same sort of independent life under the Mar Shimun as they
had lived before the war. They were not satisfied with the
privileges which they shared with other minorities; they claimed
complete autonomy, and their claims were expressed in the most
intransigent form by the Mar Shimun himself. Finally, they
distrusted the Iraqi Government, and regarded themselves as in a
special way the protégés of the British Government; when the
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was signed, they thought themselves
to have been abandoned by their protectors, and feared the worst.
Their fears were intensified by the work among them of a small
group of agitators.

Nor was the Iraqi Government more satisfied with the situation.
It resented the special position accorded to the Assyrians, no less
than the refusal of the Assyrians to be contented with their
position as citizens of Iraq. What is more important, it feared
them. Throughout the mandatory period, Assyrian Levies had 701
been trained and used by the British authorities for guarding 563
aerodromes as well as for the repression of the Kurdish revolts.
They had proved to be good soldiers; both they and the Iraqis
believed that they would be more than a match for the young
Iraqi Army. After 1930 they were gradually disbanded,
but they retained their arms, and the Iraqi Government
feared that in view of the prevailing discontent among the
Assyrians they might revolt and the revolt would be difficult
to crush; it feared also that the British Government might
instigate a revolt, as an excuse for recovering control over the
country.

By the summer of 1933 tension between the Assyrians and the 563
Government was very great. Although some of the former were 641
willing to come to terms with the Government, others, the foremost 669
among them being the Mar Shimun, were still demanding
autonomy; and asked, if this was not possible, to be allowed to
cross the frontier into Syria. Relations between the Mar Shimun
and the Government had reached such a state that he was not
allowed to return from Baghdad to the north. The Government
and the Army were becoming increasingly frightened of the
possibility of a revolt, and resolved, if given an opportunity, to
end the danger once and for all. King Feisal and several of the
more experienced Ministers were away in Europe, and the

563 641 Ministers left in Iraq were too weak or disinclined to resist the extremism of the Army and of public opinion.

669 At this moment, in June, a group of Assyrians decided to take matters into their own hands and cross the Tigris into Syria. On the other side of the river they were disarmed by the French authorities; but later their arms were returned to them and many of them crossed back into Iraq. There they met a detachment of the Iraqi Army; fighting broke out (it cannot be established who began it), and both sides suffered casualties. When the news of this incident spread through Iraq, Government, Army and public alike were seized with mass hysteria; the action of the Assyrians was considered as the beginning of a revolt, and it was resolved to take decisive action. The Army organized and carried out a series of massacres in which some hundreds of Assyrians were killed.

These massacres, and the fear of further ones, completely broke the spirit of the Assyrians. Some 6,000 of them crossed over into the Upper Khabur region in Syria, and about 15,000 others subsequently expressed their desire to leave Iraq. The Council of the League of Nations set up a special committee to deal with the question of settling them. After several proposals for their settlement in Brazil, in British Guiana and in the Orontes Valley in Syria had been considered and rejected, it was finally decided that those already in Syria should be permanently settled in the Upper Khabur Valley in the Jazirah, while the remainder should stay in Iraq.

563 The situation of the Assyrians in the Khabur Settlement has already been discussed. Of those who remained in Iraq or have returned to it, some are still in their old homes round Amadia and Ruwanduz; some have settled down again in villages around Mosul; others are working in the big towns. A British Commission appointed by the Iraqi Government reported in 1938 that their economic position in the northern plains was at least as good as that of the other inhabitants. No further incidents have occurred; the Assyrians are no longer disposed to be intransigent, and the Government is no longer obsessed by the idea that they are dangerous. It is not impossible, however, that a dangerous situation will once more arise. During the recent war a very large proportion of the Assyrian men were enrolled in the R.A.F. levies or were working for Great Britain in other ways. It was calculated that 75 per cent of them were

CONSTITUTION (ORGANIC LAW) OF IRAQ[1]

Passed by the Constituent Assembly, July 10, 1924, and promulgated by the King on March 21, 1925, as amended by the laws of July 29, 1925, and October 27, 1943. 642

INTRODUCTION

Art. 1. This law shall be known as "The Iraq Constitution," its provisions shall be in force in all parts of the Kingdom of Iraq.

Art. 2 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. Iraq is a sovereign State, independent and free. Her territories shall not be partitioned and no part thereof shall be given up. The Government is a hereditary monarchy, and its form is representative.

Art. 3 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. The city of Baghdad is the Capital of Iraq. In case of need some other place may be adopted as the Capital, as a temporary measure.

Art. 4 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. The Iraq flag shall be of the following form and dimensions:—

Its length shall be double its breadth and it shall be divided horizontally into three parallel and equal strips, the uppermost being black, the next white and the next green. Next to the staff it shall bear a red truncated cone, of which the greater base shall be equal to the breadth of the flag, the smaller base equal to the breadth of the white strip and the height equal to one-fourth of the length of the flag. In the middle of the cone shall be two white stars of seven points placed in a perpendicular line parallel to the staff.

The use of the flag and the arms, insignia and decorations of the State shall be prescribed by law.

PART I

THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE

Art. 5 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. Iraq nationality and the rules applicable thereto will be prescribed by law. 642
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[1] English text, League of Nations, Geneva, 1929 (C. 49 1929, VI) (Series of *League of Nations Publications*. VI. A. Mandates. 1929. VI. A. I.); Amendments of 1943: *Iraq Government Gazette*, Baghdad, November 28, 1943, pp. 469-476.

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Art. 6. There shall be no differentiation in the rights of Iraqis before the law, whatever differences may exist in language, race or creed.

Art. 7. There shall be no violation of, or interference with, the personal liberty of any of the inhabitants of Iraq. None of them shall be arrested, detained, punished or obliged to change their place of residence, or be placed in bonds, or compelled to serve in the armed forces, except in conformity with law.

Torture and the deportation of Iraqis from the Kingdom of Iraq are absolutely forbidden.

Art. 8. The inviolability of all places of residence is guaranteed. They may not be entered or searched except in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 9. No person shall be prevented from having recourse to the Courts, or be obliged to have recourse to a Court other than the Court competent to deal with his case, except in accordance with law.

Art. 10 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) Rights of ownership shall be safeguarded. No person's goods or property shall be expropriated except for the public benefit, and in the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law, and on condition that just compensation is paid.

2) Forced loans may not be imposed, nor may goods or property be seized or prohibited goods confiscated, except in accordance with law.

3) Unpaid forced labour and the general confiscation of movable and immovable property are absolutely forbidden.

Art. 11 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* No tax or duty shall be imposed except by law, the provisions whereof shall include all the persons liable to pay the tax.

Art. 12. Freedom of expression of opinion, liberty of publication, of meeting together, and of forming and joining associations is guaranteed to all Iraqis with such limits as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 13. Islam is the official religion of the State. Freedom to practise the rites of the different sects of that religion, as observed in Iraq, is guaranteed. Complete freedom of conscience and freedom

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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to practice the various forms of worship, in conformity with accepted 642
customs, is guaranteed to all inhabitants of the country, provided 641
that such forms of worship do not conflict with the maintenance of
order and discipline or public morality.

Art. 14. *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Iraq nationals have the right to present petitions of complaint and memorials, in matters concerning themselves personally or in public matters, to the King and to Parliament and to the public authorities, in the manner and in the circumstances to be prescribed by law.

It is not permitted, except to official bodies and juristic persons, to address the authorities in the name of a number of persons.

Art. 15. All postal and telegraphic correspondence and all telephonic communications shall be secret and free from censorship or detention, except in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 16. The various communities shall have the right of establishing and maintaining schools for the instruction of their members in their own tongues, provided that such instruction is carried out in conformity with such general programmes as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 17. Arabic shall be the official language, except as may be prescribed by a special law.

Art. 18 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Iraq nationals are equal in the enjoyment of civil and political rights and the performance of public duties and obligations. No distinction shall be made between them on account of origin, language or religion. To them alone shall public appointments, civil or military, be entrusted, and foreigners may not hold such appointments except in the exceptional circumstances to be prescribed by law.

PART II

THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN

Art. 19. The sovereignty of the constitutional Kingdom of Iraq 642
resides in the people. It is a trust confided by them to King Faisal 643
son of Husain, and to his heirs after him.

Art. 20 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The Heir Apparent shall be the eldest son of the King, in the

642, 728, 177, 565
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Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
●Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the political regime, social stratification, and Westernizing of administration under the British and French Mandates following the First World War, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 88-101./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631
foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of
the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the
greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The
'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, [181]
unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal
warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between [579
town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration;
to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. 182]
Such was the territory which for four centuries the
Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western
opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642
these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631
generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which
was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood
at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and
was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule
was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the
Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the
local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including
those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642
dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, 185
which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And
while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the
conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law
and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing
agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational
foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and
a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the
attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe
to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached
from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-
modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government
of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had
enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its
Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every
new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya
system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565
a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the
effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647
were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by
race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part
of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

647 and sale of tobacco products; the Customs Department; all these likewise were of no direct concern to the Wali. The same applies to the rare public works entrusted to the wilaya engineer, and to the Department of Pious Bequests (Awqaf) The Wali could venture on no official interference in the Oman-Ottoman Administration, none in the favoured Saniya. The last-named had, by 1900, acquired for its master by favourable 'purchase' almost one-third of the cultivable lands of Baghdad wilaya, and very large estates in Baṣra and Mosul.

701 The VIth Army, whose territorial area was coterminus with 'Iraq, was reckoned as the least excellent of the main Turkish formations. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, a cavalry division, and a formation of artillery. The units of every arm were widely scattered, and constantly changed station according to the needs of the tribal warfare. Transport was hired for the occasion, supply and medical arrangements were primitive, equipment was shabby and deficient. The staffs and organization of the Army were in general those of modern forces; but the troops were misused, discipline was lax, pay irregular. Service with the Army was
702 by conscription, from which non-Muslims and many classes of Muslims were free on payment; tribesmen were wholly exempt. Compulsory service was commonly prolonged beyond the legal three-year period, and this, with the liability to be sent to a grave in the Yaman or Europe, combined to make conscription of all Turkish institutions the most resented. Nevertheless, no Arab province supplied more officers to the Turkish Army, or of higher standard, than did 'Iraq.

706 The Navy at Baṣra, a puny and decayed service, was commanded by a commodore. Its ostensible duty was that of river police, in which it signally failed. With a shore establishment of some two hundred, its only craft in 1900 were an ancient corvette unable to leave its moorings, the *Kilid al-Bahr*, and a small armed paddle-steamer, the *Alus*.

642 This Turkish Government of 'Iraq, at whose task, evolution, and organization we have now glanced, had irreproachable nominal objectives—order, progress, and public advantage. Its regulations were comprehensive and repeatedly revised: its administrators contained men of education, experience, and knowledge of local conditions. It was, nevertheless, severely criticized by its own servants and not less by outside observers. Excessively centralized, it was bound by a thousand ill-applicable rules which precluded local initiative; it was ill-served, ill-housed, ill-equipped, and incapable of maintaining forces adequate to its clearest needs. It lacked a breed of loyal and vigorous men able to grasp the essentials of ruling a backward tribal territory, and trusted by their superiors.

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the 642 example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self-interested 661 elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 643 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the 185 important town families—and notably those of religious pretension —by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which 631 any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the 619 impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could 668 not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

1. MIDSUMMER 1914

To few countries in the world were greater changes brought by 178
the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Govern- 511
ment by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for
some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was 178
clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or 186
modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, confined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile 642
to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater 619
efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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distant, hated, interfering bugbear and, to the shaykhs, the enemy whose every advance must be at the cost of their power and livelihood. This was no less true among the Kurds, who, hating the Turks, were unlikely to welcome the substitution of Arabs as rulers; indeed, a national consciousness of their own had already come, feebly, to birth. And on the Euphrates the theocratic Shi'i priesthood were likely under any régime to maintain their own pretensions, incompatible as these were with any secular Government. Nevertheless, the tendency of the period prior to 1914 had been on the whole towards extension of the authority of Government, a process likely or certain to continue under the newer-fashioned post-1909 Administration: for this, tactless and over-centralizing, was nevertheless more vital and more modern-minded than any previous Ottoman Government. Its administrative record even in the excessively embarrassed period of 1908 to 1914 contained creditable features: better attention was being paid to education, health services, town planning; the gendarmerie had been improved, town police perfected, the Army reorganized, the judicial system in part revised. And the international agreements of 1913 and 1914 between Turkey, Great Britain, and Germany seemed to clear away many obstacles to development.

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In the latter field, indeed, there was room for fair hopes. Though many problems were untackled—those of improved agriculture, use of water resources, land tenure—yet a notable beginning had been made with irrigation works, and the Baghdad Railway was at last, it seemed, to be completed. River navigation was likely to be improved under the 1913 arrangements. The eventual opening up of productive areas and markets would encourage trade and agriculture, and perhaps create industry. A concession for the oil of Baghdad and Mosul wilayas had been promised, and that to parties well able to develop that wealth, if it existed.

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Thus a prudent observer of 'Iraq in the midsummer of 1914 might have prophesied a future of increasing development of resources and communications. These, directed by a vigorous Government free at last from international strife, might have produced by degrees the wealth necessary to maintain stronger forces, to impose security, to pay an improving civil service, to remedy, in fact, the more glaring evils of the Administration. Society would almost inevitably progress towards higher standards. The movement of local nationalism was likely to gain further ground in the direction of a privileged, even an autonomous, status in the Empire; but a complete secession of the Arab provinces was unlikely because it was backed neither by any military force, nor by any especial sympathy of Europe such as the Balkan Christians had enjoyed, nor by any unity of aim among the Arabs.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

669 Provisional Government had existed for some weeks and from which the British prisoners captured in July, of the Manchesters and other regiments, were recovered in good condition.

A variety of minor punitive expeditions were led in the little-visited marsh country, and military marches and demonstrations carried out throughout the winter of 1920–1. Communications including the Baghdad–Baṣra railway were progressively restored. Loyal tribal leaders were thanked and rewarded. The submission of ex-insurgents was accepted, save for some few who, through fear or principle, fled to Syria or the Ḥijaz. Fines of rifles imposed on tribes by the Commander-in-Chief were effectively collected; some 70,000, including 21,000 of modern type, were handed in within six months by mid-Euphrates tribesmen alone. From the Muntafiq, exceptionally, no arms were collected, and only one expedition in January 1921 visited the Gharraf.

In mid-October Sir Percy Cox returned to 'Iraq as planned to relieve Wilson, his deputy, and to carry out the constitutional programme announced four months earlier. After consultations in southern 'Iraq, he reached Baghdad on 11 October and could rightly wonder, in a proclamation issued on 17 October, what aims the few still active insurgent tribesmen could be seeking. The attempt of the Mujtahids to regain a seriously though but temporarily shaken position by claiming to act as mediators between the Government and the Shi'i tribesmen was frustrated by Cox's refusal. Week by week conditions normalized, and the deferred progress in State-building could be resumed.

5. THE KING

642 Immediate 'complete independence' for 'Iraq formed no part of the programme which Cox was to carry out; after the failure of the insurrectionist movement organized to obtain it, and the collapse in July 1920 of the Amir Fayṣal's Government in Syria, even its warmest advocate could now scarcely expect it. A Mandate for 'Iraq had been accepted by Great Britain, with all the tutelage which that, however interpreted, must involve; the belated Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, signed on 10 August 1920, was to permit the 'Iraqi Kurds to adhere, if they wished, to the State into which central Kurdistan might or might not evolve. Cox himself and his advisers, however sympathetic to 'Iraqi aspirations, were convinced that the intended substitution of 'Iraqi for British government, must, for soundness and permanence, be gradual and progressive; indeed, the actual British Administration visibly operating in every department, liwā, and qadhā was a reality which no politics could, for the moment, dissipate. At the same time the more prudent programme of erecting an 'Iraqi Administration,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

sketchy at first but to gain increasing reality, on the intended lines 642 of the Bonham-Carter proposals as considerably modified by Whitehall and by Cox himself, could expect support from the body of moderate or non-political opinion now consolidated by the frightening experiences of July and August, as well as from the British officers who were by a great majority willing and indeed eager to help in establishing a new régime. Extremism was, for the moment, under a cloud with some of its exponents abroad, others temporarily silent. Many or most sincere nationalists were willing for a time to participate in a new order which, incompletely as it could satisfy them, at least represented a substantial advance.

Within a week of reaching Baghdad, where as throughout 'Iraq 642 his reception was cordial, Cox with his advisers—Bonham-Carter, 645 Howell, Philby, Slater, Bullard, Miss Bell—elaborated plans for an interim 'Iraq Government. A Council of responsible ministers was to be assisted by British advisers, and a comprehensive 'Iraqi civil service to assume the reins of Government in the provinces. For the post of President of the Council, Cox was able to overcome the genuine reluctance of the venerable Naqib of Baghdad, Sayid 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani; and the latter on 25 October issued invitations to eminent fellow countrymen selected by himself and Cox for Cabinet positions. The Council which, after only two refusals to serve in it, met on 2 November, contained Sayid Ṭalib Pasha who, but for his too evident personal ambitions, would have been considered for the Presidency: Ja'far al-'Askari, a Baghdadi ex-Turkish officer of unusual personality, who had left the Turkish for the Arab armies during the War and attained high rank under Fayṣal (p. 119): and Sasun Ḥasqayl, a Jewish financier and ex-deputy who had held high positions in Istanbul. The other ministers were a Baṣra landowner notable, 'Abd al-Laṭif al-Mandil, at the Ministry of Commerce; a retired Turkish General from Kirkuk, 'Izzat Pasha, at that of Works; an ex-Mayor of Mosul, Muḥammad 'Ali Fadhil, at that of Awqaf; a former Qadhi of Baghdad and Mecca, Muṣṭafā al-Alusi, as Minister of Justice; with these, who were all Sunnis, the Naqib was persuaded to appoint a Shi'i divine, Sayid Muḥammad Mahdi Ṭabaṭaba'i, as Minister of Education and Health; and to them were added, without portfolio, a half-dozen[1] of the leading notables of the three cities, including two Christians and a Shi'i, and three outstanding Shi'i tribal leaders. A Kurd of the Baban family refused to take part.

The earliest meetings of the Council discussed and agreed on its

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[1] These were: 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Ḥaydari: 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Khayyaṭ: Fakhri al-Jamil: Ḥajj 'Abd al-Ghani Kubba: Shaykh 'Ajil al-Samarmad: 'Abd al-Majid al-Shawi: Shaykh Muḥammad al-Sayhud, the Amir of the Rabi'a: Da'ud al-Yusifani: Shaykh Sālim al-Khayyun: Aḥmad Pasha al-Ṣani' of Baṣra: Ḥajj Najm al-Badrawi: and Shaykh Ḍhari al-Sa'dun.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 own status and procedure. The supreme authority of the High
645x Commissioner was recognized, and was required for confirmation of almost all Acts of State and the higher administrative appointments. The rôle of the ministerial British Advisers was heavy and all-pervasive. Nevertheless, Cox could announce on 11 November 1920 that, pending the calling of the General Elective Assembly authorized by the Notification of 17 June, a provisional National Government had been established: that its Council of State consisted of a President and Ministers for Interior, Finance, Justice, Education and Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce, and Awqaf, and other ministers without portfolio: and that 'until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect the Council of State Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations, and in general military affairs except as concerned solely the locally recruited forces'.

The British Advisers to the Ministries were appointed at the same time: H. St. J. B. Philby to Interior, S. H. Slater to Finance and to act in Commerce, Major-General Atkinson to Communications and Works, Major G. F. Eadie to act in Defence, Sir E. Bonham-Carter in Justice, E. L. Norton in Health and Education, and R. S. Cooke in Awqaf.

645x The Council of Ministers, dignified and deliberate, proceeded to the dispatch of business. Arrangements were made under pressure from Ja'far Pasha for the organized repatriation from Syria of Fayṣal's 'Iraqi officers, who, hotly nationalist and as yet doubtfully disposed towards the new British-sponsored compromise régime, could not but form an important element in 'Iraq politics. A number of politicians deported in 1920 from 'Iraq to Hanjam Island in the Persian Gulf for subversive agitation were permitted to return; the remainder were to be released under the general amnesty proclaimed in June 1921. Work was begun in Committee on a revision of the all-important Electoral Law, a task begun by Sayid Ṭalib Pasha's conclave of ex-deputies in August. It proved intractable; the High Commissioner favoured, the ministers disliked, separate representation for the tribes. These, though they formed a great majority of the population, would without such a provision secure no parliamentary spokesmen at all. A first draft of the revised law was unsatisfactory, if only because, among other defects, it ignored the special rights of the Kurds under the Sèvres Treaty. The completion of the draft was willingly postponed by the Minister of the Interior, Sayid Ṭalib, whose own ambitions, it seemed to some, made him reluctant for elections to be held at all until his own plans were mature.

631 The reorganization of the provincial government on a plan

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 By the early weeks of that year the situation in 'Iraq had vastly
improved; there was now time and opportunity to proceed further
with constitutional and administrative development, and not least
with the selection of a ruler. The insurrection was over, though
tribal disquiet persisted in the Muntafiq and in various degrees
elsewhere. In spite of obvious imperfections, a Government by
'Iraqis was operating. Ministers were showing goodwill and
patience, and the lone hand evidently played by Sayid Ṭalib was
648* not for the moment menacing. A frontier agreement had been
made with the French in Syria in December 1920; and though it
fixed a boundary which, since it appeared to bisect both the Jabal
Sinjar and Albu Kamal, was in fact ignored, frontier relations were
by now at least non-violent. The persistent propaganda and
trouble-making from across the Turkish frontier had not seriously
perverted the 'Iraqi-Kurdish or the Euphrates tribes. Peace
between the Allies and Turkey had been made, even though the
new conditions now supervening in that country already condemned
the Sèvres Treaty to nullity.

000 In London 'Iraq affairs from 1921 onwards were handled by a newly created Middle Eastern department of the Colonial Office; and the first action of Mr. Winston Churchill, transferred from the War Office as Colonial Secretary, was to convene a Conference at Cairo which should decide, once and for all, the many outstanding Middle Eastern questions. It met on 12 March 1921, attended by the highest Service personalities, Foreign Office and Treasury experts, Churchill's Eastern advisers including Lawrence, and, from 'Iraq, Sir Percy Cox accompanied by General Haldane, Ja'far al-'Askari, Sasun Ḥaṣqayl, Gertrude Bell, and two of the ministerial Advisers. The agenda, as far as concerned 'Iraq, included the selection of a ruler, the treatment of the 'Iraqi Kurds, the early reduction of British expenditure, and the composition of the forces designed to secure the defence of 'Iraq after the withdrawal of British garrisons.

643 For the post of Amir or King of 'Iraq, no local candidate had commanded anything approaching adequate support. The Naqib was advanced in age, nor could his family produce an acceptable successor; Sayid Ṭalib with his past record and cynically unscrupulous character was more feared than accepted; a Turkish prince, probably Burhan al-Din, suggested in some quarters of Baghdad or Kirkuk, could scarcely be welcome to the British Government; the Agha Khan, gravely proposed, could not be a serious candidate, and the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh still less; the Shaykh of Muḥammara, a self-proposed pretender, was unthinkable, and the Najdi Amir, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, scarcely less so. But the Amir Fayṣal was now available. His candidature had been suggested by A. T.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

V

THE 'IRAQ KINGDOM

I. A REIGN BEGINS

643 THE new King was to reign in 'Iraq for twelve years. Aged 36 at the time of his accession, he possessed unusual qualities of dignity, leadership, and sympathy; and his political adroitness, which reflected a high intelligence used always devotedly, sometimes perilously, in the service of his adopted country, enabled him and it to survive grave dangers and to establish, in so few years, the structure of a State both more imposing and more promising than most observers could have expected. The British decision to encourage the candidature of this dethroned and non-'Iraqi prince for the 'Iraq throne had contained, indeed, the seeds of many blessings for that country.

The King's family joined him at Baghdad from Mecca. His young half-brother the Amir Zayd, then aged 21, was earliest with him, before going, a year later, to spend three years at Oxford. The material surroundings of a throne were soon, humbly enough, provided, and the royal figure became the unquestioned centre of all 'Iraqi political and social life. His name was used in the Khuṭba—official prayers—on and after his first Friday as King. By his tours in all areas and his accessibility he quickly became known to thousands of his subjects; indeed, no contributions made by Fayṣal were greater or more personal than his equal appeal to town and tribe—a reflection of his own half-urban half-desert background and education—and his power (which at moments failed him) to balance the forces of extreme 'Iraqi nationalism with the exigencies of the British connexion. His relations with the High Commission—now established on the Tigris right bank, physically and officially separated from the Government of 'Iraq across the river—and with the British element inevitably preponderant in Government during the early months, were cordial and appreciative, though his 'Iraqi entourage contained, as was soon to appear, some elements of a less realistic or more fanatical nationalism, which could be damaging. Cornwallis, Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior since August 1921, acted also as the King's personal Adviser.

642 The constitutional position of the territory was yet singularly unclear. Its elements were a Turkish sovereignty still existing, though dormant: an unratified Mandate, accepted by Great Britain but unwelcome to 'Iraq itself: a constitutional monarchy,

1a Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

with no Constitution; and an intended treaty relationship with 642 Great Britain, but as yet no treaty. These features, however, did not disturb the administration of the country, which in Faysal's first half-year proceeded without interruption. The Naqib and his Council, correctly resigning on the King's accession, were reinstated with changes. The new Cabinet formed on 10 September included Naji al-Suwaydi, a lawyer and patriot of distinguished 645* name and record, as Minister of Justice: a Mosul Christian doctor Ḥanna Khayyaṭ as Minister (later Director-General) of Health: and most of the former Ministers, including Ja'far Pasha in Defence and Sasun Ḥasqayl in Finance. Ḥajj Ramzi, a nonentity who had succeeded Sayid Ṭalib at Interior, retained that office. The Ministers of Justice, Works, and Awqaf were unchanged. The now separate Ministry of Education was entrusted to the learned Shi'i divine Sayid Muḥammad 'Ali al-Shahristani. This Cabinet was unaltered till March 1922. Among the Advisers, Cornwallis was to remain in Interior for the next fourteen years; Bonham-Carter retired in May 1921, replaced for a year by Nigel Davidson also from the Sudan and thereafter by E. M. Drower: Atkinson, leaving for India, was succeeded by his deputy H. H. Wheatley. Lionel Smith became adviser to Education, Colonel P. Joyce—a colleague of the Amir Fayṣal and of Lawrence in the Arabian campaign—to Defence. Slater and Cooke were unchanged.

The grouping of departments differed widely from that practised 647 under the Secretariats of the Wilson régime (p. 108). The Ministry 645 of Interior covered, besides tribal, 'political', and municipal affairs, the 'Iraq Police, the civil prisons, the Agricultural and Veterinary departments, the Health service (when it ceased to be a Ministry), the Press Bureau and the department of Revenue until its transfer to Finance in October 1921. The Ministry of Finance dealt with its normal revenue, expenditure, accounting, budgeting, currency, and establishment functions, and controlled the Port of Baṣra; that of Communications and Works covered the departments of Irrigation, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys, and the Railways.

The Ministry's task of governing was embarrassed by a financial 652 stringency which was aggravated by the disorders of the last year, by the continuance of post-war economic depression, and by the need to provide funds for the Ministry of Defence and for the Throne itself; nor, with a press and public outcry in Great Britain demanding ruthless economy in 'Iraq—or indeed outright evacuation from it—could funds be expected from that quarter. The new State started without debts, but with such liquid assets only as it could earn. The public services of Health, Education, Works, and the rest were confronted with unavoidable reductions at a

1[1921---Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

exhortations, refusals. By late afternoon there was no result, and 648x Dobbs categorically refused a twenty-four hour postponement. Before midnight, however, the Prime Minister, Ja'far Pasha, succeeded in convening 69 out of the 100 delegates in the Assembly Hall. Thirty-seven votes for the unamended Treaty were in the end obtained, with 24 in opposition; the 8 abstentions were due, beyond doubt, to intimidation. Acceptance of the Treaty, even ratified in this sadly abnormal manner, was hedged with conditions which Ja'far Pasha found it necessary to specify—that the British Government should honour its reassurances by amending the Financial Agreement in 'Iraq's favour: that the King of 'Iraq should hasten to negotiate with the British Government to this end: and that the whole Treaty should be null and void 'if the British Government fail to safeguard the rights of 'Iraq in the Mosul wilaya in its entirety'.

The stormy days and nights of Treaty ratification were followed in 'Iraq at large by a period of relative peace; a peace in which every anti-Treaty or anti-British element remained dormant but alive. In the Assembly, a peaceful passage of the Organic and the Electoral Laws marked the jaded weariness of deputies.

The Organic Law, a reasonably adequate result of repeated 642 redrafting, endowed 'Iraq with a semi-rigid Constitution which, proclaiming it 'a sovereign State, independent and free' with a constitutional hereditary monarchy and a representative Government, set forth the rights of the people and the Crown, the legislature and the ministers, established the Courts, and regulated financial and administrative responsibilities. The Electoral Law 666 enfranchised every adult male tax-paying 'Iraqi, and provided for a procedure of primary and secondary election, whereby the secondary electors, one for every 250 primary, elected a deputy to represent every 20,000 voters. The deputy must belong to the same electoral circle, consisting of a group of liwās, as the voter. Separate representation was enjoyed by tribesmen and by the Christian and Jewish minority communities of the liwās of Baghdad, Baṣra, and Mosul.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly gave Ja'far Pasha 645* the opportunity, which he had been seeking, to resign from the premiership. A new Cabinet was formed on 2 August under Yasin Pasha, to be confronted by pressing questions of the northern frontier and of financial stringency. 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun was called to the Ministry of the Interior, Sasun Ḥasqayl to Finance. To the Ministry of Justice came a young and clever, but unstable and hasty lawyer of good family, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani; and to that of Communications and Works an imposing and not incompetent younger member of the Pachachi house, Muzaḥim Bey.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and
721 although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1921–6

642 These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality
186 a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a nahiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-
642 twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroit-
178 ness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

644 There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Ḥaydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners simi-
648x larly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic

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[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 were postponed at the Mar Sham'un's request. The Northamptonshires returned to Egypt.

668 In partial compliance with requests in the petition, the 'Iraq Government set up a further land-finding committee. It discovered but little land both cultivable and available, but recommended expenditure on an irrigation scheme to produce more. The Cabinet accepted this report, which was sent to Geneva. The King visited 'Amadiya, talked at length with the Mar Sham'un, and used every means to win his confidence; but the young and intransigent Patriarch would commit himself to nothing in advance of the League's answer, and himself left for Switzerland. He was followed there by a counter-petition of those Assyrians whose original homes had been in Barwari Bala (that is, in present 'Iraq territory), expressing their complete satisfaction with present arrangements.

The final debates of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council on the Assyrian issue, after rehearsing that community's well-known grievances and the desirability (but impossibility) of providing the homogeneous group-settlement which they demanded, could result in no more than hopes for the best. The gap between the full Millet autonomy demanded by the Mar Sham'un, and the favourable minority treatment available at best from the 'Iraq Government, was a wide one. The League Council formally rejected the Millet proposal, 'noted with satisfaction' the impending appointment of a foreign settlement expert, and left the subject with misgivings which were soon to be tragically justified.

5. GOVERNORS AND GOVERNED

642 In a community at 'Iraq's current stage of evolution the central
647 Administration was both significant of and powerful in the society of the territory; and great and not unsuccessful efforts were made from 1925 to 1932 by the 'Iraqi and British elements alike to improve it. The reduction of the British part,[1] though accompanied by a variously assessed loss of efficiency and authority, was clearly necessary as part of 'Iraq's planned evolution; and it proceeded so far that the steps taken towards 'Iraqi administrative independence in these years left relatively little for the post-
647 mandatory period. By 1932 further departments had been taken over by 'Iraqi directors—those of Revenue and State Domains

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[1] The number of Administrative Inspectors fell from 24 in 1923 to 18 in 1925, 14 in 1930, 10 in 1933. The total of British officials of 'gazetted' status in 1920 was 364, in 1923: 181, in 1926: 148, in 1929: 130, in 1931: 118 (38 advisory, 80 executive). For British 'non-gazetted' staff the corresponding numbers were: for 1920: 484; for 1923: 361; for 1926: 52; for 1929: 34; for 1931: 28; for Indian officials, in 1920: 2,035, in 1923: 1,270, in 1926: 250, in 1929: 53, and in 1931: 36.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

I. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had 000 travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. 648x It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous 311 territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average 181 of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience 642 or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: 182 the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too 563 favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in 795 which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tures; and the introduction of these, with the gradual rescue of agriculture from primitive method and low yield, was a certain feature of the future. 'Iraq's irrigation problems—flood-protection, conservation of dry-season water, distribution, drainage—had been partly solved at least on paper, and more than one important scheme was formulated in readiness for execution; smaller works had been carried out, others were imminent. The complex problem of stultifying and perverse forms of land tenure had been unravelled, the way was open for clearance and rebuilding, and Settlement Committees were already in the field. Mineral wealth had been sought—but found wanting, save in the vastly important presence of a single asset, petroleum. The development of this had begun well, its potentialities were unlimited, and its contribution to 'Iraq's finances could already be foreseen as essential to all its hopes. Industry, willingly fostered, had indeed lagged behind for lack of raw materials, markets, and aptitudes, but could be expected to find a modestly increasing place in 'Iraqi economy. Trade was at the level, and on the lines, indicated by tradition and by present needs, and had well survived a world-wide depression. The means of communication of every type had immensely developed in the last half-generation, and would certainly be improved to meet the needs of an expanding economy and social and international needs. At least the elements of well-conceived public services already existed, and if funds permitted would gradually increase the social area of their activity.

This security and these beneficent developments and social 642 services had called and would call firstly for a reasonably efficient and comprehensive Administration, and secondly, for a sound and benevolent authority in the State itself, with a political life based on stable foundations. As to the first, the Administration which existed in 1932, while imperfect and in places rudimentary, not only was far superior to its Turkish predecessor, but seemed likely with time to shed the features which at present depressed it below the level of which the best 'Iraqi officials—keen, intelligent, honourable—were certainly capable. As to the second, the main bases of public life and legislation, there is more to be said.

'Iraq had adopted, as its form of government, representative parliamentary democracy. The choice could be criticized; but there had been no alternative. 'Iraq was no Najd, with full consent to a patriarchal tyranny: and no Persia or Turkey, which could throw up an efficient military dictator. It had as its only guide a political class which claimed to be liberal, wished to go on where the revolution of 1908 had left off, and was scornful of earlier forms; nor did it contain a personality capable of single rule, or a group capable of acceptable oligarchy. Neither to the British,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to
install the forms of government both familiar at home and seem-
ingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of con-
stitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq
with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that
the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better
alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in
fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions.
181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradi-
665 tion of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free
204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations'
in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic
features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill
informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe.
The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any
politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of
personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any
consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of
speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence
or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or
sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed
doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived
society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have
wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and
insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in
646 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the
666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed
electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the
Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of
Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent excep-
tions, that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of
662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the
stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the
actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on
the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the minis-
terial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint
to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative pro-
grammes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived
Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of
Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies
capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind
their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative
hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—
that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

bility, for some other power to intervene with decision; a part 642
which, in the event, was to be that of the Army. 662

It may be asked, would a frankly authoritarian government— 000
dictatorship, acknowledged oligarchy or mere Arab patriarchy—have been preferable? It would in all likelihood have been still less acceptable to its public than the pseudo-democracy actually imposed; the procedures of democracy, however ill conducted, were at least educative and might later show a narrowing gulf between form and spirit. Even a semi-nominated Chamber contained enough of intelligence, experience, and public spirit to be a valuable deliberative and critical body; politics and press at least provided an arena of action for the intelligentsia, whose suppression would be dangerous as well as improper. The only alternative to 'democracy' might well prove to be a tyranny oppressive within and, by its probable international adhesions, dangerous without. 'Iraqi political history for the ten years following its achievement of independence was to be one of the alternation in short cycles of the imposition and the relaxation of authority: the former accompanied by protests and violent intrigues against 'slavery', the latter always abused by licence turning to anarchy.

There was reference above to a ruling class. In fact, claimants 665
to leadership were more than one, and their claims if permitted 184
could be scarcely consistent with a democratic régime. In tribal society the position of the shaykhs, with all their intestine rivalries and schisms, was still unchallenged though no longer State-sponsored. Among the Shi'i population, and especially among the tribes of the Euphrates, the influence of the 'Ulamā was still considerable and rarely exercised in the direction favoured by Government. Officialdom, an alternative source of leadership and itself a main social element, was now broadened by full admission of the Shi'is, and its standard of education, conduct, and efficiency had risen markedly since Turkish times; but nothing in its position or allegiances could lead it to a sense of solidarity with the masses. The same is true of the non-official part of that important middle class whose upper edges touched the ministerial, the lower the proletariat class, and which included the lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shop-keepers, commercial employees, higher technicians, middlemen, and ex-officers. Extending from bare literacy to some learned pretensions, the class was self-conscious as the evolved and progressive element in their country; but it was frustrated by lack of active outlets in public life and especially by failure to break into the ruling circle. From it were arising, already before 1932, the new politicians and publicists. Not without quick intelligence and shrewdness, and often effective

secondary boarding school on European lines was founded in 971
Baghdad in 1941, the King Fayṣal College. Mosul Technical School was reopened in 1942, and another in Kirkuk in 1945. The Queen 'Aliya Institute for the higher training of women teachers was founded in 1945, and a higher Engineering College in 1942; but a College for Physical Education, opened in the latter year, survived only four years. The Institute of Fine Arts, with separate faculties of Music, Painting, Sculpture, and Dramatic Art, was founded in 1941. Professor H. R. Hamley served as Adviser to the Ministry of Education—the first after a lapse of ten years—in 1942–3, K. J. Ritchie in 1944–5, and C. H. Scaife of Cairo University thereafter for two years. The Department of Antiquities 172
was fully active; it carried out excavation at Tall 'Uqayr, fifty miles south of Baghdad, in 1940–1: at Dayr on the Yusifiya Canal in 1941; at the 'Aqar Quf in 1942–4; at Tall Ḥasuna near Mosul in 1943–4: at Ḥira near Kufa and Tall Harmal near Baghdad in 1945. The greatest part of these works was carried out by 'Iraqi scholars, who had acquired high qualifications.

The Administration itself, gravely shaken by the events of 1941 645+
and the strains which followed, and confronted with new tasks and new temptations, lapsed perceptibly both in efficiency and integrity. Neither ministerial unity nor the administrative grasp required to correct this weakness was forthcoming, and resulting conditions led to renewed complaints against 'the old gang' by critics who pressed for the infusion of new blood into the Cabinet, preferably their own. The middle and later periods of the war gave, indeed, no scope for military coups, the incitement of tribesmen, or inspired strikes; but they permitted all too much of the personal intrigues, the intemperate mutual criticism, and the irritated frustrations of normal times.

The inspiring war news from Libya and Tunis in the winter of 721
1942–3 was greeted by public holidays and the renaming of streets, and extinguished the lingering hopes of Nazi sympathizers: hopes which the capture in July of three German officers, dropped near Mosul by parachute with a Kurdish guide, did nothing to restore. The improved atmosphere led to a turn of ministerial policy towards increased indulgence to the internees of the 'Amara camp and Rhodesia; the resulting releases, considered sadly premature by the British Embassy, were followed by the reinstatement in public functions of men known for violent anti-British and anti-Hashimite sympathies.

Useful non-political work had been done meanwhile by a Com- 642
mittee of Senators and Jurists, with Drower and Edmonds as advisers, on an amendment to the Constitution designed to correct some evident present inadequacies. The Committee met early in

642 1943 and the draft law resulting from their efforts was passed by the deputies and Senate in May and June. Requiring, under the Constitution, ratification by a new Parliament, it was accordingly re-presented to and passed by the Chamber which after general elections—the first since 1939—met on 9 October. The amendment provided that, for the succession to the Throne in the absence of an heir apparent, a male heir presumptive from the family of the late King Ḥusayn—in this case the Regent himself—should be nominated. The prerogative of the King was increased by empowering him to dismiss a Prime Minister, a provision the previous lack of which had led repeatedly to violent and illegal changes of Government. The number of Cabinet Ministers could be increased without limit, and could include a Deputy Premier and ministers without portfolio; but it could not be less than seven. Senators ceased to be limited to twenty, but were not to exceed a quarter of the deputies. Parliament was deprived of the power to pardon persons convicted of crimes against the State. Meetings of the Chamber could be held, if need be, outside the capital—a clear echo of the Regent's sojourn in Diwaniya and Baṣra in 1941. Finally, it provided that constitutional practices current in other countries, could, if not contrary to the Constitution, be adopted by resolution of both Chambers.

*645 The general election of mid-1943, which followed the dissolution of the Chamber in June, had been preceded by yet another reconstruction of the Cabinet. Ṣaliḥ Jabr moved to Interior, Taḥsin al-'Askari to Works; the Ministers of Economics and Social Affairs, al-Uzri and al-Barrak, were unchanged; Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban came to Justice, vacated by Da'ud al-Ḥaydari. The able lawyer Naṣrat al-Farsi was appointed to Foreign Affairs, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Education, and Jalal Baban to Finance. Taḥsin 'Ali went to the Royal Diwan. But the reformed Cabinet was from the first uneasy; with the heat of summer, the frequent absences of the Prime Minister in Syria and Egypt, and a Palace attitude of little confidence, it could do little. It was further weakened in September by disagreements both among ministers themselves and between the Premier and the Regent as to the personnel of the new Parliament, in whose selection the executive was to play, as usual, a major part. The first week of October witnessed the resignation of Naṣrat, whose portfolio was assumed temporarily by al-'Askari: of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, who was replaced by a competent Mutaṣarrif, Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab, nephew of 'Abd al-'Aziz Qaṣṣab; and of Jalal Baban,
646 whose duties fell to 'Abd al-Ila Ḥafidh. The new Chamber contained sixty-five of the former deputies, some of doubtful quality but none notably Anglophobe; fifty-one of its members had in April 1941 voted, under whatever pressures, for the deposition of

648 to join with Pakistan and the Sa'dabad Powers in an Eastern bloc securely Islamic and free from all Western exigencies and 'imperialism'. It could not but seem clear to contemporary observers that 'Iraqi thinking on these matters lacked realism, and that in its bewildered hesitations, its willing involvement of foreign policy with domestic factions, its patent inability to stand alone against the dangers of the time, it was typical of small nations who cried indignantly for a 'complete independence' which, in the modern world, could exist only on most precarious sufferance, unless firmly allied to the defending power of stronger friends.

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647 In internal administration, whereas the Turkish Government had exercised rarely more than a partial control never at one time operative over the whole country, and the 'Iraq Government in its earlier years could claim a wider but still not truly pervasive authority, in 1950 no surviving enclaves of non-government remained in desert or marsh or mountain. From Mudir to minister, from clerk to Director-General, the administration as an operating and governing machine could by that date face comparison with that of any comparable country, and might be thought superior to those of many longer-established nations. The period from 1930 to 1950 had done less than might have been feared to weaken or corrupt it, and had been survived with a lowering of standards which though considerable was not disastrous. If it had benefited from its three years of British rule and twelve more of discreet tutelage, yet it derived its merits primarily from the qualities of its own personnel: qualities which, common as it was for visitors and many 'Iraqis to deride them, were most appreciated by those who knew them best. The faults endemic in all bureaucracies, the relative newness of the machine, the discontinuity of its guiding Ministries, the paucity of experienced high executives, and occasional moral lapses: all these together failed to outweigh the good intentions, the intelligence and the honesty of the majority of civil servants. And the machine itself, the interrelation and subdivision of its parts, the control of departments and their relation to the district Governors, and of the latter to their Ministries and publics: all these had, after a mere thirty years, reached a state of tolerable efficiency adapted, as the Turkish régime never was, to the conditions of the territory.

642 With 'Iraq's remarkable natural advantages and resources, coming at last within sight of full development: with its benevolent and generally popular monarchy vested in an ancient royal house and its not inadequate governmental machine: and with the efforts of its society to evolve on modern lines by manifold borrowing from Western thought and method as well as technology, there was, indeed, a fair measure of hope for a stable as well as a pros-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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perous future. To those who contrasted the space, life, wealth, and potentiality of the country with the misfortunes of some of its neighbours—the stark economic misery of Israel, the tragic self-destruction of Persia, the brief dictatorships of Syria, the corrupting wealth and now failing ruler of Sa'udi Arabia, the menace of over-population and the mob-brutality of Egypt—it seemed indeed that 'Iraq, its troubles in part surmounted, was well set in the way of security and advance. It could by an optimistic prophet be foreseen that, given a few years of tranquillity, a measure of harmony, and no unforeseen blows of fortune—in fact 'if all went well', as an earlier Treaty had stipulated—the nation would take without rival the lead among the Arab countries, and a respectable place in the wider international world.

But there was an alternative and less pleasing probability. It was, that the instability of which the last twenty years had given almost continuous illustration, might not after all be surmounted, but would continue to pervade the structure of 'Iraqi nationhood and prove the ruin of its people. In an age when Government can be seized and held by a dominant armed minority, it is the more necessary for a 'democratic' régime to base itself firmly upon a loyal and politically integrated public. In 'Iraq this had not been done: the merits of its Administration, and even the good intentions of much of its ruling and political class, could not, it was felt by the less hopeful observers, secure it from pervasive instability.

The phenomena of political life which seemed likely for many years to come to preclude the hope of a genuine democracy, have been elsewhere mentioned (p. 224) as prevailing in 1932; they prevailed scarcely less in 1950. The deputies were inadequately representative of the electorate, while the Ministry itself could and did ignore the deputies. The Cabinet, whose members were chosen by the Prime Minister and the Regent on lines of personal acceptability, was indeed normally a body of capable and eminent men; but it represented neither a parliamentary majority nor a stable body of principles, and the forty-seven Ministries for which the first thirty years of constitutional life had found room had fallen always by reason of internal quarrels, deadlock, or royal disfavour, never through organized public or parliamentary withdrawal of support. This was not parliamentary democracy, but Cabinet Government. The Chamber of Deputies was itself a body competent in debate, and full of experienced and intelligent members[1] but it was concerned to excess with factious controversy and, as regarded the majority of 'independent' deputies, was accustomed to conform to the wishes of the Government of the

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[1] All Jewish deputies and senators had resigned by 1950: a Governmental Committee was early in 1952 considering their future representation, if any.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

642 day. It did not regard itself as the battleground of rival policies, nor, as under the Constitution it should be, as the arbiter of Ministries which, on the contrary, enjoyed an almost independent existence. At the same time by their manner of two-stage Government-controlled election, and by the wide gulf between most of the deputies and their constituents, the activity of the former was almost independent of the electorate: a position reflecting not so much defects in the Constitution as the backwardness of an illiterate electorate capable neither of exercising an enlightened free choice in selecting its spokesmen, nor of controlling them when selected. And even should the political parties occupy the Mutaṣarrif's place as the effective selectors of deputies, and electoral processes be basically altered (as opposition parties ceased not to demand), this situation in its essentials must still subsist for many years.

665 The working of parliamentary democracy which had been imposed on 'Iraq in its political infancy has seemed everywhere to demand responsible parties to represent rival policies and therewith to contend for power. But these in 'Iraq, in a form adequate to their task, did not exist. These pages have indeed made many references to the parties which, after some years' intermission, came into existence in 1946 or thereafter. They were, by 1951, responsible for the greatest part of specifically political activity in the country, and their scale and perhaps their permanence had to some degree increased by comparison with their predecessors of a generation earlier. The parties active at the mid-century, if we ignore the illegal Communist Party still working in the shadows, were five in number. One[1] of these, a party in little more than name, seemed to stand less for a policy or principle than for the personalities and hopes of a miscellaneous group of ex-ministers not unwilling to reappear in office. Two[2] of the parties, appealing to the more progressive elements in urban educated or intelligentsia circles, advocated rapid advance along many lines, with emphasis as ever on complete independence, neutrality, and social and cultural reform; they had a militant and indeed an over-violent press, and were able at times to arouse, but not to control, the emotion of the mob; but they had no considerable support from the mass of citizens. The two remaining parties were those of Nuri Sa'id (p. 355) and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr (p. 363), both standing for a mixed and various body of the possessing and substantially satisfied classes including notables, landowners, shaykhs, and their respec-

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[1] The United Popular Front of Ṭaha al-Hashimi (pp. 364 and 389). It showed, late in 1951, signs of disintegration.

[2] The National Democratic Party of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the Independence Party of Muḥammad Mahdi Kubba and Fa'iq Samarrā'i (pp. 335 and 336).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively 665
responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it 642
appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism 181
as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local 642
nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over- 186
sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the
186 chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence
and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign
well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters
of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses.
642 The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its
182 widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its
648* strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or
'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of
recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen
untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature: the loss of Fayṣal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi
empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages
of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young
State, and had gravely unsettled it.

172 Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties
and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as
182 between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and
innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing,
and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international
menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer
how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise,
frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in
which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement,
000 tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce
to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to
describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and
organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-standards of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the
conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with
reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people
might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as
human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of
which they were inescapably members, might allow.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHl Iraq MHl

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education
is not possible without some reference to the history and present 136
circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization
flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country
remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the
sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the
port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the
people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an
uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932
as an independent nation with membership of the League of
Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an
administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Ad- 185
ministrative reforms and some social advance were attempted 735
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became
an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority
of the population. Attempts have been made by successive
Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain
directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But
economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain,
all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 642
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent 212
years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective
participation in the government of the country must inevitably
be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to 361
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and
Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of
Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

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425 of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of [565] cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

433 Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

241 Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

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642 Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS

Although the main obstacle to further educational development in Iraq is that of finance, and although it is difficult to see how sufficient money will be forthcoming for this and other social purposes until fiscal and land reforms are undertaken, there exist other obstacles to educational progress which are more of a political and administrative nature. 871

Lack of Continuity in Educational Policy. An undoubted obstacle to the pursuance of a consistent and steady development in the direction of compulsory education is a lack of continuity and positive direction in educational policy. This seems to have obtained for a long time. It is a somewhat delicate matter to discuss but, looking back over the history of educational administration since the formation of the first Iraqi Government, one is confronted with very frequent changes of Minister of Education, less frequent but still too frequent changes both of officials and in the organization of the Ministry of Education, and lack of consistency in policy with constantly fluctuating emphasis on this or that aspect of educational development. One type of school or administration may be here one year and gone the next. This is particularly true of devices for the training of rural teachers; institutions have been started and then discarded before an evaluation of their real usefulness has been possible. 871 645

These changes of policy and of personnel have been due to both political and sectarian factors which it is not possible fully to discuss in this investigation, but of which those concerned with them or affected by them are only too well aware.

Circumstances of this kind tend to produce even in the best officials and educators a sense of frustration. They also make it extremely difficult for the most able Minister of Education to promote a well-founded policy with any assurance that it will be carried out by his successors.

The Problem of the Administration of Education. Administration of the public services in Iraq is generally characterized by its high degree of centralization. This was perhaps inevitable when Iraq as an independent nation was still young and had neither the time nor the resources to work out new arrangements whereby the localities might participate more in the business of government. Further, a somewhat 'tight' central administration was part of the process of ensuring national unity. [640]

Educational administration provides no exception to this practice of centralization. Curricula are laid down by the Ministry of

/For the development of Iraqi participation in government of Iraq after the First World War, see category 116, pp. 277-302. For the development of Iraqi administration and the drafting of a constitution for Iraq, see pp. 362-392./

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648 the complete and definitive liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions France and Great Britain are agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, which have already in fact been liberated by the Allies, and in countries whose liberation they are endeavouring to effect, and to recognize the latter as soon as they shall be effectively established. Far from wishing to impose any particular institution on these lands, they have no other care but to assure by their support and effective aid the normal working of the Governments and Administrations, which they shall have adopted of their free will. To ensure impartial and equal justice, to facilitate economic development by evoking and encouraging indigenous initiative, to foster the spread of education and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy — such is the rôle which the two allied Governments assume in the liberated territories.

APPENDIX V

642 TENTATIVE DRAFT OF ARAB INSTITUTIONS[1]

Central Government

Arab Ministers with English Advisers.

Say: For Interior, Finance, Justice, Education, Public Works, Commerce or Agriculture(?), Waqf(?).

Council of Ministers

Consisting of Arab Ministers and Advisers.

To be the Supreme Legislative body for the whole country.

No elected legislative body at present.

Local Government

English Commissioners — Arab Deputy Commissioners or vice versa.

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[1] Memorandum by Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Baghdad, 1919.

Provincial Council

General powers of legislation; exception of subjects reserved for Council of Ministers, e.g., cf. laws relating to India Local Councils.

All local laws to be submitted to this body, but Commissioners to have power not to accept their amendments or to issue law not withstanding their rejection.

I see no reason why this body should not be elected, special plans to be made for initial representation.

APPENDIX VI

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COUNCIL OF STATE[1]

I. The Council of State should realize that at any rate until the convening of a National Assembly for the purpose of deciding the future Constitution of 'Iraq, I, as High Commissioner, am personally and directly responsible to His Majesty's Government for the administration of the country. Accordingly, in the event of difference of opinion between myself and the Council of State in reference to matters under disposal, the final decision will rest with me.

II. In view of the fact that the elections for an Assembly and its convocation must necessarily take some time, I have decided upon taking preparatory measures for the conduct of the actual administration (with the exception of such questions as concern foreign policy and military considerations) under my supervision by the formation of a Council of State under the presidency of His Highness the Naqib as President. Such Council shall consist of Ministers, some of whom will preside over the various Departments of State, while the others will be Members of Council without portfolio.

III. The Head of each State Department will be the Minister in charge of it and the administration of such Department will vest in him subject —

(*a*) To the control of the Council over the action of the Ministers.

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[1] *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B. 363, November 30th, 1920, pp. 4-5.

(*b*) To the hearing of the views expressed by the British officers selected by me as Advisers to the several Departments.

As regards the functions of these Advisers, they are to be not executive but advisory, but I trust that the Council and the members in charge of Departments will realize that the officers whom I select for the post of Adviser, having been so selected owing to their long experience of the working of the administration and their knowledge of the conduct of the departments attached to the said Ministries, it is necessary both that attention should be paid to their views and that the latter should be taken into careful consideration.

(*c*) To the fact that in the last resort supreme control will vest in my own person.

IV. It seems to me that the best method of conducting the affairs of the Departments of State will be by the reference of all matters concerning a particular Ministry to its Minister through his Adviser, and it will be incumbent on the latter to refer communications and papers received to his Minister without delay, in order that the Minister may be able to take action for the disposal of the matter after consulting the Adviser. Similarly, if a Minister desires to initiate action in regard to any matter concerning his Ministry, it is necessary either that he should call his Adviser into consultation in the first instance or that he should send his orders to the Department concerned through the Adviser so that the latter may be able to put forward his views before the matter takes final shape.

V. Such being the position, it is necessary to make provision for the contingency of a difference of opinion on any matter between the Minister and his Adviser, thus:

(*a*) If in any case the Adviser tenders advice to his Minister and the latter feels unable to accept such advice, the Minister should call the Adviser into consultation. If they are unable to arrive at an agreement after discussion of the matter, and if the Adviser considers the matter of sufficient importance to be pursued further, he will have the right to ask the Minister to refer the matter to the Council of State for consideration. It will then be incumbent on the Minister to suspend action on the matter until the next meeting of the Council, when the subject will be brought before it.

(*b*) In the interval which occurs while the matter is being referred to the Council the Minister and Adviser have full discretion to refer the matter to me as High Commissioner. I shall thus have an opportunity of conveying my views to the Council of State without the least prejudice to the procedure provided for in Article x of this programme.

VI. As regards the Council, it is necessary that it should hold regular meetings at least once a week or even more, as may be necessary.

VII. To facilitate the business of efficient administration the Council requires a competent Secretary and a clerical staff, for the appointment of whom steps should be taken without delay.

VIII. All business to be brought before the Council meeting for discussion should be intimated by the Minister concerned to the Secretary of the Council, who will prepare a list of agenda for each meeting in time for circulation —

(*a*) To the High Commissioner,
(*b*) To all Ministers and Advisers,

at least twenty-four hours before the time fixed for the meeting. As a general rule no question not included on the agenda paper should be discussed at such meeting. At any rate, no formal resolution should be taken on it, except in the case of any matter of great urgency the prompt disposal of which is essential.

IX. The Secretary will attend all meetings of the Cabinet and will prepare a record of the proceedings of such meetings in the form of a list and statement of matters in respect of which resolutions have been passed. These lists will be circulated within twenty-four hours of such meeting under the Secretary's signature —

(*a*) To the High Commissioner.
(*b*) To all Ministers and Advisers.

Each Minister will be responsible to give effect to resolutions of the Council affecting it and to report such action to the Secretary for the information of the Council at subsequent meetings. In accordance with the usual practice the deliberations of the Council are to be considered confidential and it is not permitted to disclose them outside the Council.

X. All resolutions of the Council will be final, subject to their confirmation by myself as Head of the Government. I must also reserve for myself the right inherent in me as High Commissioner to veto or modify on grounds of expediency any resolution passed by the Council.

XI. In order that the Council may be kept informed of all matters appertaining to the subjects included in the agenda, the presence of the Adviser will be necessary at the meetings of the Council while any matter affecting the Ministry to which he belongs is under discussion. He will have the right in the course of the proceedings to tender his advice regarding the matter under consideration, but he will not take part in the recording of votes.

XII. It is my confident hope that the instructions above set forth in regard to the working of the Council of State and the several Ministries and their relations with myself on the one hand and with the Advisers on the other will conduce to the smooth progress of the administrative machinery at Headquarters.
As regards the central departments at present engaged in the work of administration, in view of the fact that for several years past they have been working smoothly, the attachment of them to the new scheme of Government, after the necessary adjustments, should offer no serious difficulty. As regards the administration of the provinces, it is probable that we shall be confronted with a good many difficulties — but In'Shallah they will admit of solution.

XIII. As you all know, the administration of the various districts and sub-districts of 'Iraq is still, as it has been for some time past, conducted by an organization of British Political Officers, with suitable local personnel in minor administrative posts as D.A.P.O.s and Mudirs, etc.; some districts are still in a disturbed state and British troops are still present therein; consequently in such places it is difficult to make the change from British to indigenous personnel in the immediate circumstances; on the other hand, there are districts in which it is possible to take the necessary steps in the desired direction as soon as competent personnel is forthcoming.

XIV. And whereas it is among the duties of the Council of State to devise administrative measures to promote the speedy pacification of the provinces, the said Council should give their early attention to the selection of experienced and suitable candidates from indigenous elements of the population for appointment by degrees to those posts where such appointment is expedient. Having done so, they should formulate their proposals with the names of candidates recommended in each case for my consideration and orders.

APPENDIX VII

SPEECHES MADE BY AMĪR FAISAL

(Excerpts from, after his arrival in Baghdad, 1921)[1]

(i) *Speech of Amīr Faisal to the Mōsul Delegation*

'I say to you that the British Government is taking a wise line and fully intends to fulfil the promises made to my father in order to make the Arab Nation a true ally in the Middle East. The painful events which took place between me and the French have forced me to persevere in my efforts in the cause for which we arose in some other Arab country. Whereas 'Iraq is of importance to us as well as to the Arabs, my father delegated me in accordance with the wishes of 'Iraqis to perform this duty. I assure you that 'Iraq will remain independent with a constitutional government, free from all errors. Very shortly the national congress will be summoned and will introduce the constitutional law of this new Kingdom. I add, that in accordance with Mr. Churchill's declaration, 'Iraq will be an independent ally of Great Britain.'

(ii) *Speech at a Dinner given by Amīr Faisal to the Ministers and Notables of Baghdad, 16 July*[2]

'I assure you that the British Government has determined to assist the inhabitants to establish an Independent Constitutional Government, thus fulfilling the promise made to my father.

'Moreover, the British Government has declared its readiness to help you as a friend to a friend in accordance with its historical tradition. . . . I am certain that when the permanent government is established and the Congress held, that it will look on this matter as I do and that we will be able to establish friendship between Great

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, July 7th, 1921.

[2] *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 18th, 1921.

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161 taken, in 1947, gave the total population as 4,799,500; before that there were periodical official estimates as follows:

1930	2,824,000
1935	3,560,000
1943	3,995,000

The present population is probably about 5 million. According to the census, Baghdad has a population of 364,000, Mosul 302,000, Basra 94,000, and Kirkuk 69,000, Hilla being the only other town of over 50,000 inhabitants. Significant figures for density of population could be determined only after defining habitable land and distinguishing rural populations; the accepted density figure for the country as a whole (27·4 per square mile) means little. In the total cultivable area as calculated by an English authority the average density is 102 per square mile, but in many areas the density is much more than this for the rural population alone, and in the Baghdad and Basra districts exceeds 300 and 800 respectively per square mile.

163 165 164 *Vital Statistics.* For a number of reasons, which include the inaccessibility of large areas of Iraq and the lack of doctors in the rural districts, vital statistics are not available for the country as a whole. Statistics of possibly fair accuracy are, however, published for the population of some 1,160,000 served by the health centres in the main cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul; the latest, compiled for 1950, show a birth-rate of 27 and a death-rate of 12 per 1,000, with an infant mortality figure of 97 per 1,000 live births. The main causes of death were stated as old age, respiratory diseases other than tuberculosis, malaria, heart diseases, and tuberculosis.

197 *Language.* Arabic is the official and most widely spoken language. The 800,000 odd Kurds speak an Iranian language in various forms. Turkish dialects are spoken in Irbil, Kirkuk, to some extent in Khanaqin and in smaller intervening towns, and Syriac by Christian communities in northern Iraq. Other minority languages, such as Armenian, also occur, while in the Holy Cities of the south (Kerbela and Najaf) Persian is widely spoken.

RELIGIONS[1]

642 The constitution declares Islam to be the official religion of the state, but guarantees complete freedom of conscience and worship in conformity with accepted customs subject only to the maintenance of public order and morality, declares the absolute equality of all Iraqis before the law, gives communities

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[1] See above, p. 51ff.

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the right to establish and maintain schools for the instruction 642 of their members in their own languages, and provides that government appointments shall be made without discrimination in accordance with capacity. Parliament must, by law, contain six Christian deputies; the provision for a similar number of Jewish deputies was cancelled after the emigration of 1951–2 had left the Jewish community insufficient members to qualify for representation.

It is absolutely impossible to reckon with any accuracy the 162 strength of the various religious communities. At a very rough approximation the Muslims might be estimated at 4¾ million, Christians at 150,000, Jews (since the emigration of some 130,000) at something less than 10,000, and other groups at 50,000.

(a) *Islam*

The Sunni and Shii sects are suspicious and intolerant of 798 each other, as are also the Arab and Kurdish members of the 162 Sunni group. Statistics are lacking, but it would appear that the Shiis slightly outnumber the Sunni Arabs and are less than Sunni Arabs and Kurds combined.

The Sunnis live mainly in the north of Iraq and in the *liwas* 778 of Baghdad, Diala, and Dulaim. There is one notable Sunni shrine in the country, that of Shaikh Abdul-Qadir al-Gailani, whose mosque and tomb in Baghdad are a centre of pilgrimage from regions as remote as India.

The Shiis form a majority in the central *liwas* of Kut, 795 Diwaniya, Kerbela, and Hilla and in the southern *liwas* of 162 Basra, Amara, and Muntafiq. Their religious life has as its 778 background the four Holy Cities of Kerbela, Najaf, Kadhimain, and Samarra and their shrines. Najaf is the burial place of Ali, the first Imam; Kerbela of Hussain, the third Imam. Thousands of Shiis from Persia, Afghanistan, and India take part in the traditional pilgrimages to the Holy Cities, where, during the first ten days of the religious month of Muharram, is enacted the famous Passion Play commemorating the death of Hussain ibn Ali at the battle of Kerbela in A.D. 680. The Shii Mujtahids exercise not only religious but at times also political influence, as was demonstrated in the tribal insurrection of 1920 and on numerous subsequent occasions. The Shiis are rectifying their exclusion under Ottoman rule from political and administrative power and their non-participation in advanced education; some recent Cabinets have contained more than four Shiis, and in 1953–4 there was a Shii Prime Minister.

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175 fluence under Arab rule, the zone between this area and the province of Mosul; the latter was to fall in the French sphere of interest but was included by the Clemenceau–Lloyd George Agreement of December 1918 in the British sphere in exchange for French participation in the north Mesopotamian oil deposits.

British official opinion was divided in its policy towards Iraq. The civil administration in Iraq was for long uncertain whether Iraq, including even the Mosul area, might not be annexed and come under direct rule of the Indian pattern. In the interest of imperial security and administrative efficiency they distrusted the Arab nationalism which had inspired the Arab Revolt in the west. The Arab Bureau in Cairo, on the other hand, favoured Hashimi rule of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The British Government, beset by conflicting advice and embarrassed by its war-time agreements, attempted, through the agency of the administration in the country, to sound Iraqi opinion on the most acceptable form of control.

With the consequent delay in making a definite pronouncement of policy and with practical indications that the administration on the spot was preparing for British rule rather than for Iraqi independence, there was considerable discontent among Iraqi nationalists and pan-Arabists, who consisted chiefly of educated townsmen. Resentment was fanned by Turkish propaganda and by the fiercely enthusiastic Iraqi officers serving with Amir Faisal ibn Hussain in Syria and aggravated by the war-time measures of a foreign, non-Muslim administration. These weighed particularly heavily on the tribal and landowning rural population, especially the Shii tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, who, self-interested rather than strongly nationalist, were assailed by the propaganda of the urban nationalists and the Shii divines of the Holy Cities. The assignment of the Mandate for Iraq to Great Britain at San Remo in 1920 and an attempt at tribal disarmament were followed by disturbances which, in July of that year, developed into an insurrection which, while it left large areas of the country unaffected, required considerable forces to suppress it. It was not completely suppressed till early 1921; but by October 1920 Sir Percy Cox, the first High Commissioner under the mandatory system, had terminated military rule and established an Arab Council of State advised by British officials.

642 By March 1921 the Amir Faisal ibn Hussain, expelled from
648 Damascus by the French the previous year, agreed at the instance of the British Government to accept the throne of Iraq;

his nomination, accepted at the Cairo Conference of 1921, was 642 approved, in spite of some opposition, by the Iraqi Council of 648 State and confirmed in a referendum, and he was enthroned on 23 August 1921. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, through which the mandatory Power had decided to embody its obligations towards the League of Nations, was signed by the Iraq Government on 10 October 1922 against the determined opposition of nationalist elements, who insisted that the Treaty should terminate the Mandate and British influence, whereas it in fact incorporated the provisions of the Mandate, gave guarantees on judicial matters to make up for the abolition of the Capitulations, and guaranteed Great Britain's special interests in Iraq. Its period of validity, twenty years, was reduced the following year to four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey, which followed in July 1923; this, and the subsequent evolution of the British Government's attitude towards Iraq, were due largely to the increasing demand in Great Britain to terminate British commitments there. In March 1924, in spite of national- [186] ist and Shii threats to boycott the elections, a Constituent Assembly was elected and was induced, in the face of considerable political and popular resentment, to accept the Treaty (June 1924), and later ratified it and the Organic Law, which had been drawn up on the basis of an Iraqi draft, after considerable disagreement between the King and the British Government on one side and Iraqi political opinion on the other over the royal powers.

In November the Council of the League of Nations awarded 648 the major part of the Mosul vilayet to Iraq. In the same year a treaty between Turkey, Great Britain, and Iraq accepted the new frontiers as definitive and inviolable, while Iraq agreed to pay to Turkey 10 per cent on Mosul oil royalties on condition that the mandatory regime, as expressed in the Treaty, should continue for twenty-five years unless Iraq were previously admitted as a member of the League; this provision was embodied in a new Treaty in 1926. In September 1929 the British Government undertook to support Iraq's candidature for membership in 1932 and in 1930 a further new Treaty was signed, which provided for a close Anglo-Iraqi alliance, to last for twenty-five years from the admission of Iraq to the League. There was to be full and frank consultation between the parties in matters of foreign policy which might affect their common interest; mutual assistance in the event of war, including Iraq's provision of communications and all other facilities and assistance and the right of passage to British troops; and lease of sites for air bases near Basra and west of the Euphrates at which

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in
January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former
opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge
of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally
showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither
the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have
affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect
of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in
spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred.
The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently
abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for
little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the
time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election
of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals
of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September
by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the
Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree
on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume
their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the
646 Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed
by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained
the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an
honourable past in the service of the Government and the
country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

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CONSTITUTION (ORGANIC LAW) OF IRAQ[1]

Passed by the Constituent Assembly, July 10, 1924, and promulgated by the King on March 21, 1925, as amended by the laws of July 29, 1925, and October 27, 1943. 642

INTRODUCTION

Art. 1. This law shall be known as "The Iraq Constitution," its provisions shall be in force in all parts of the Kingdom of Iraq.

Art. 2 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. Iraq is a sovereign State, independent and free. Her territories shall not be partitioned and no part thereof shall be given up. The Government is a hereditary monarchy, and its form is representative.

Art. 3 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. The city of Baghdad is the Capital of Iraq. In case of need some other place may be adopted as the Capital, as a temporary measure.

Art. 4 (*as amended October 27, 1943)*. The Iraq flag shall be of the following form and dimensions:—

Its length shall be double its breadth and it shall be divided horizontally into three parallel and equal strips, the uppermost being black, the next white and the next green. Next to the staff it shall bear a red truncated cone, of which the greater base shall be equal to the breadth of the flag, the smaller base equal to the breadth of the white strip and the height equal to one-fourth of the length of the flag. In the middle of the cone shall be two white stars of seven points placed in a perpendicular line parallel to the staff.

The use of the flag and the arms, insignia and decorations of the State shall be prescribed by law.

PART I

THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE

Art. 5 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. Iraq nationality and the rules applicable thereto will be prescribed by law. 642 641

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[1] English text, League of Nations, Geneva, 1929 (C. 49 1929, VI) (Series of *League of Nations Publications*. VI. A. Mandates. 1929. VI. A. I.); Amendments of 1943: *Iraq Government Gazette*, Baghdad, November 28, 1943, pp. 469-476.

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Art. 6. There shall be no differentiation in the rights of Iraqis before the law, whatever differences may exist in language, race or creed.

Art. 7. There shall be no violation of, or interference with, the personal liberty of any of the inhabitants of Iraq. None of them shall be arrested, detained, punished or obliged to change their place of residence, or be placed in bonds, or compelled to serve in the armed forces, except in conformity with law.

Torture and the deportation of Iraqis from the Kingdom of Iraq are absolutely forbidden.

Art. 8. The inviolability of all places of residence is guaranteed. They may not be entered or searched except in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 9. No person shall be prevented from having recourse to the Courts, or be obliged to have recourse to a Court other than the Court competent to deal with his case, except in accordance with law.

Art. 10 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*.

1) Rights of ownership shall be safeguarded. No person's goods or property shall be expropriated except for the public benefit, and in the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law, and on condition that just compensation is paid.

2) Forced loans may not be imposed, nor may goods or property be seized or prohibited goods confiscated, except in accordance with law.

3) Unpaid forced labour and the general confiscation of movable and immovable property are absolutely forbidden.

Art. 11 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. No tax or duty shall be imposed except by law, the provisions whereof shall include all the persons liable to pay the tax.

Art. 12. Freedom of expression of opinion, liberty of publication, of meeting together, and of forming and joining associations is guaranteed to all Iraqis with such limits as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 13. Islam is the official religion of the State. Freedom to practise the rites of the different sects of that religion, as observed in Iraq, is guaranteed. Complete freedom of conscience and freedom

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to practice the various forms of worship, in conformity with accepted 642
customs, is guaranteed to all inhabitants of the country, provided 641
that such forms of worship do not conflict with the maintenance of order and discipline or public morality.

Art. 14. *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Iraq nationals have the right to present petitions of complaint and memorials, in matters concerning themselves personally or in public matters, to the King and to Parliament and to the public authorities, in the manner and in the circumstances to be prescribed by law.

It is not permitted, except to official bodies and juristic persons, to address the authorities in the name of a number of persons.

Art. 15. All postal and telegraphic correspondence and all telephonic communications shall be secret and free from censorship or detention, except in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 16. The various communities shall have the right of establishing and maintaining schools for the instruction of their members in their own tongues, provided that such instruction is carried out in conformity with such general programmes as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 17. Arabic shall be the official language, except as may be prescribed by a special la[illegible]

Art. 18 *(as amended [illegible]ober 27, 1943).* Iraq nationals are equal in the enjoyment of civil and political rights and the performance of public duties and obligations. No distinction shall be made between them on account of origin, language or religion. To them alone shall public appointments, civil or military, be entrusted, and foreigners may not hold such appointments except in the exceptional circumstances to be prescribed by law.

PART II

THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN

Art. 19. The sovereignty of the constitutional Kingdom of Iraq 642
resides in the people. It is a trust confided by them to King Faisal 643
son of Husain, and to his heirs after him.

Art. 20 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The Heir Apparent shall be the eldest son of the King, in the

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direct line, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of the Succession.

2) If there be no Heir Apparent according to the Law of Succession, the ablest adult male Iraqi of the sons of the eldest of the sons of King Hussein ibn Ali shall be the heir until there is an Heir Apparent.

Art. 21 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* On accession to the throne the King shall swear an oath before the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, assembled in joint session under the presidency of the President of the Senate, that he will uphold the Constitution and the independence of the country, and will be loyal to the nation and fatherland.

Art. 22 *(as amended July 29, 1925).* The King shall attain his majority on completion of his eighteenth year. In the event of the throne passing to a person below that age, the King's prerogatives shall be exercised by a Regent chosen by the former King, until such time as the King attains his majority. The Regent, however, may not assume this dignity, nor carry out the functions thereof, unless Parliament approves of his appointment. Should Parliament not approve, or should the former King fail to appoint a Regent, the Regent shall be appointed by Parliament. The Regent shall swear an oath before Parliament, as prescribed in the preceding article. Until such time as the Regent has been appointed and has taken the oath, the constitutional prerogatives of the King shall be exercised by the Council of Ministers on behalf of the people of Iraq, the Council being responsible therefor. No modification may be introduced into the Constitution during the Regency concerning the King's prerogatives and succession to the throne.

Whenever the necessity for the appointment of a Regent arises, Parliament shall be convoked immediately. Should the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved, and the election of the new Chamber be not yet completed, the former Chamber shall be convoked for this purpose.

Art. 23 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The King may, in case of need, absent himself from Iraq, by decision of the Council of Ministers, which must be published. Before leaving, the King will, with the approval of the Council of

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Ministers, appoint a Regent or Council of Regency, and define the powers which he delegates to him or them.

2) Neither a Regent nor any member of a Council of Regency shall exercise any right of the King until after he has taken the oath prescribed by Article 21 of this law.

3) If Parliament is sitting, the oath shall be sworn before it, in the manner described in Article 21; otherwise it shall be sworn before the Council of Ministers in the presence of the Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, or those acting for them.

4) A Minister cannot be Regent or a member of a Council of Regency. If a member of Parliament is Regent or a member of a Council of Regency he shall not, during the period of the Regency, participate in the business of the Assembly to which he belongs.

5) If the absence of the King extends to more than four months and Parliament is not sitting, it shall be summoned immediately to consider the matter.

6) The Regent and the members of a Council of Regency must be Iraq nationals and not less than thirty years of age. A male relative of the King, who has completed the eighteenth year of his age, may be appointed.

Art. 24. The King may not ascend a throne outside Iraq, except with the consent of Parliament.

Art. 25. The King is safeguarded and is not responsible.

Art. 26 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*.

1) The King is Head of the State. He confirms laws, orders the publication, and supervises the execution thereof. By his order Regulations are issued for purpose of carrying out laws, within the express provisions thereof.

2) The King issues orders for holding General Elections for the Chamber of Deputies and for the convocation of Parliament. He opens Parliament, adjourns and prorogues it, and dissolves the Chamber of Deputies, in conformity with the provisions of this law.

3) If necessity shall arise, when Parliament is not sitting, for taking urgent measures to maintain order and public security, to repel a public danger, to incur urgent expenditure not sanctioned by the budget or by a special law, or to carry out the obligations of treaties, the King may, with the approval of the Council of Ministers

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issue ordinances, having the force of law, prescribing the measures to be taken, as may be necessary in the circumstances, provided that they shall not contravene the Constitution. All ordinances must be submitted to Parliament at its next session, except those which have been issued for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations of treaties which have been approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly. If Parliament does not confirm the ordinances, the Government shall notify the termination of the operation thereof, and they shall stand repealed from the date of such notification. All Ministers must sign the ordinances.

The expression "Law" includes ordinances issued under this Article unless there is anything to the contrary in the context.

4) The King concludes treaties, provided that he shall not ratify them without the approval of Parliament.

5) The King selects the Prime Minister and, on his recommendation, appoints the Ministers and accepts their resignation from office.

6) The King may dismiss the Prime Minister if the public interest renders it necessary so to do.

7) The King appoints the members of the Senate and accepts their resignation from their office.

8) The King, on the recommendation of the responsible Minister, appoints and dismisses all diplomatic representatives, civil officials, qadhis and judges, and grants military rank and appoints divisional commanders and those above them, unless he delegates these powers, by law, to some other authority. He bestows decorations and titles and other marks of honour.

9) The King is Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces. He declares war with the consent of the Council of Ministers. He concludes treaties of peace, on condition that he shall not ratify them without the approval of Parliament. He declares Martial Law and the State of Emergency in conformity with the provisions of this law.

10) The coinage shall be struck in the name of the King.

11) The death sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the King. The King may reduce sentences or remit them

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by special pardon and, with the consent of both Assemblies of Parliament, he may proclaim a general amnesty. 642 643

PART III

THE LEGISLATURE

Art. 27. The King shall exercise his powers by means of Royal Iradas. They shall issue upon the proposal of the responsible Minister or Ministers, with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, and shall be signed by them. 642 646

Art. 28. Legislative power is vested in Parliament and the King. Parliament is composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The legislature has the right of making laws and of amending and repealing them in conformity with the provisions of this law.

Art. 29. The King shall open Parliament in person or depute the Prime Minister or one of the Ministers for that purpose to perform the opening ceremony and deliver the speech from the throne.

Art. 30 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. No person shall be a member of either Assembly of Parliament:—

1) If he is not an Iraq national who has acquired Iraq nationality at birth or by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne[1] or by naturalisation, provided that, if he is naturalised, he belongs to an Ottoman family ordinarily resident in Iraq before the year 1914, and has been an Iraq national for ten years.

2) If he is less than thirty years old in the case of a deputy, or less than forty in the case of a senator.

3) If he has been adjudged bankrupt and has not been reinstated.

4) If he has been interdicted by the Court and the interdiction has not been removed.

5) If he has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year for an offense which is not of a political nature, or if he has been sentenced to imprisonment for any period for theft, bribery, breach of trust, forgery, fraud or any other offence adversely affecting his honour.

6) If he holds an official appointment in the Government or the departments connected therewith, or any office, appointment or employment under a person or institution which has a contract with a

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[1] See Turkey, Note on Treaties, p. 503 below.

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public department, or if he has any material interest, direct or indirect, with such contractor, unless the interest arise out of his being a share-holder in a Company composed of more than twenty-five persons. From this rule are excepted the lessees of Government lands and property, and those who are engaged in the duties described in paragraph 2 of Article 31 of this law.

7) If he is mad or an idiot.

8) If he is a relative of the King, within such degree as may be prescribed by law.

9) A person cannot be a member of both Assemblies of Parliament.

Art. 31 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The Senate shall be composed of a number of persons not exceeding one quarter of the total number of Deputies, to be appointed by the King from among those who have, by their acts, secured the confidence and esteem of the people, and from among those who have served the State and fatherland with distinction in the past.

2) A Senator or Deputy may, with the approval of the Assembly to which he belongs, be deputed to undertake important duties in the service of the State for a period not exceeding two years.

Art. 32 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The period of membership of the Senate is eight years from the date of appointment. A former senator may be again appointed.

Art. 33 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The Senate will elect a President and two Vice-Presidents from among its members, for a period extending from the beginning of the ordinary session until the beginning of the ordinary session in the following year. The result of the election will be submitted to the King for his confirmation. In the event of the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, their term of office will not terminate until the new Parliament has assembled, unless they have ceased to be members of the Senate.

Art. 34. The Senate shall assemble and disperse at the same time as the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 35 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* A senator will receive, in addition to travelling allowance, a monthly allowance of fifty Dinars during the whole period of his membership.

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Art. 36. The Chamber of Deputies shall be constituted by election on the basis of one deputy for every twenty thousand males. 642 646

Art. 37. *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The election of deputies shall be done under a special law, which shall prescribe the manner of proposing candidates, of secret voting at elections, and the necessary representation of the Christian and Jewish minorities.

Art. 38 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The term of the Chamber of Deputies is four ordinary sessions, one in each year, beginning on the first day of December and, if that day falls on a legal holiday, then on the day following, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 26.

2) The Chamber will be six months in session and six months in recess in each year. Subject to paragraph 1, the periods of session and recess in each year shall be determined by Royal Irada.

3) The Chamber will sit in the Capital but, if that is impossible, may sit elsewhere.

Art. 39 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The King will summon the Chamber of Deputies to meet in session; if he fails so to do on the appointed day, it will meet by virtue of this law. It will remain in session as prescribed by the preceding Article unless the King dissolves it before the end of its term.

2) The Chamber may adjourn its sittings from time to time in accordance with its Internal Regulations, and shall be deemed to be in session during such adjournments.

Art. 40 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) If the Chamber is dissolved, new elections shall be proceeded with and the new Chamber will be summoned to meet in extraordinary session within a period not exceeding four months from the date of dissolution. This session shall be subject to the rules set out in Articles 38 and 39 in what concerns recess and adjournments. In any event the session must terminate on the thirtieth day of November, so that the first ordinary session of the term may begin, but if the extraordinary session begins in the months of December or January, it shall be regarded as the first ordinary session of the term.

2) If the Chamber is dissolved for any reason the new Chamber may not be dissolved for the same reason.

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3) The King may summon Parliament to assemble outside the period prescribed by Article 38 in order to decide matters to be specified in the summons; the session will be terminated by Royal Irada.

Art. 41. A former deputy is eligible for re-election.

Art. 42 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Every male Iraq national who has completed the thirtieth year of his age, and is not disqualified in any manner set out in Article 30, may be elected a deputy. He shall not represent more than one of the electoral districts described in the Electoral Law and, if he is elected to more than one district, he must, within eight days after having been so informed, select the district which he desires to represent. Officials, not being Ministers or delegated senators or deputies, who are elected may choose between accepting or refusing their seats, and those who accept must vacate their Government appointments within the period aforesaid.

Art. 43 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The Chamber of Deputies decides matters connected with the electoral qualifications of deputies, objections made against elections, vacant seats, and resignations.

Art. 44. The Chamber of Deputies shall elect a President, two Vice-Presidents and two Secretaries from among their number each year, during the first sitting of the Chamber. The result of this election shall be made known to the King and shall be confirmed by him. When necessary, one of the Vice-Presidents shall act for the President.

Art. 45. Every member of the Chamber of Deputies has the right to propose the enactment of a draft law, except in what concerns the financial matters referred to hereinafter, provided that he has the support of ten of his colleagues. If such proposal is accepted by the Chamber, it shall be sent to the Council of Ministers, in order that a draft law may be prepared. Any proposal which is rejected by the Chamber may not be reintroduced during the same session.

Art. 46. *(as amended October 27, 1943).* A deputy may resign his seat by presenting his resignation in writing to the President, but the resignation shall be of no effect until it is accepted by the Chamber of Deputies.

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Art. 47 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* If a seat in the Chamber of Deputies becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation, loss of legal qualification, or absence, a new election must be held forthwith, at the request of the President. 642 646

Art. 48 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* A deputy is deemed to represent the whole of Iraq and not merely his own electoral district.

Art. 49. A member absent from the Chamber without leave or without just cause for a period of one month is considered to have resigned, subject to the terms of Art. 46.

Art. 50 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) A deputy will receive, in addition to travelling allowance, a monthly allowance of forty Dinars during the whole period of his membership.

2) If the Chamber is dissolved on the first day of December or thereafter, the deputy shall receive his allowance for the remaining months of the sessional year, up to the end of November in such year.

Art. 51 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Senators and deputies, before entering on their duties, shall individually swear an oath, before the Assemblies to which they belong, that they will be loyal to the King, preserve the Constitution, serve the nation and fatherland, and perform their duties diligently.

Art. 52 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The Senate shall not begin business unless more than one half of the members actually appointed are present.

2) The Chamber of Deputies shall not begin business unless more than half of the members actually elected are present.

Art. 53. Decisions shall be taken by a majority of votes of the members present, unless otherwise provided by this law. If the voting is equal, the President shall have a casting vote. No majority shall be obtained unless half the members present cast their vote. Each member shall vote in person. The method of voting shall be prescribed in the Internal Regulations of the Assembly.

Art. 54. Every member of Parliament has the right to put questions and demand explanations from Ministers. Discussions arising therefrom and from answers given in reply thereto shall be carried

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642 646 on in the manner prescribed by the Internal Regulations of each Assembly, provided that such discussion shall not take place until eight days at least have elapsed from the day on which such questions or demands for explanations were put. This procedure may be departed from in urgent cases or by consent of the Minister.

Art. 55 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* An Assembly will pass its decisions on draft laws article by article and then as a whole, but it may resolve that it is enough to decide on the draft as a whole only, in which case the members shall have the right to discuss the articles.

Art. 56. No armed force may enter the Assembly or remain near its precincts, unless requested to do so by the President.

Art. 57. The meetings of both Assemblies shall be open to the public. At the request, however, of one of the Ministers, or four of the Senators, or ten of the Deputies, the debate on the question under discussion shall be conducted *in camera.*

Art. 58. No person may enter either Assembly and speak therein except members, Ministers or high officials deputed by Ministers during their absence, or persons invited so to do by the Assembly.

Art. 59. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall have the right of issuing rules and regulations concerning the following matters:

1) The manner of exercising and maintaining the powers, privileges and safeguards conferred upon the Assembly by this law.

2) The transaction of the business of both Assemblies and the conduct of debates, whether sitting separately or jointly.

Art. 60. *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) Every member has complete freedom of speech subject to the Internal Regulations of the Assembly to which he belongs. No legal proceedings shall be taken against him on account of any vote which he gives or any opinion which he expresses, or any speech which he makes in the course of the deliberations and discussions of the Assembly.

2) A member of Parliament shall not be arrested or tried unless the Assembly to which he belongs resolves, by majority, that sufficient grounds exist for his being charged, or unless he is arrested, *flagrante delicto,* for a crime. If a member is arrested for any reason while Parliament is in recess the Government shall so inform the Assembly when it meets, furnishing explanations and reasons.

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Art. 61. A Minister who is a member of either the Senate or Chamber of Deputies shall have the right of voting in the Assembly of which he is a member and the right of speaking in both Assemblies. Ministers who are not members of either Assembly shall have the right of speaking in both, but not of voting. Ministers, or persons representing them in their absence, shall have the right of precedence over other members in addressing the Assemblies.

Art. 62. *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) Draft laws will be submitted to one of the Assemblies and, if accepted, will be submitted to the other Assembly. They shall not become law unless accepted by both Assemblies and confirmed by the King.

2) If a draft law is submitted to one Assembly and the Prime Minister, or one of the Ministers mentioned in the draft, demands a joint session, and the Senate approves the demand, then the Assemblies shall meet under the presidency of the President of the Senate. The decision as to the draft shall be by a two-thirds majority of the joint assembly, but the draft shall not become law until the King has confirmed it.

3) Both Chambers shall decide on drafts submitted to them by the Government. After acceptance the drafts will be presented to the King, who will either confirm them or return them for reconsideration with a statement of reasons therefor, within a period of three months, provided that if either of the Assemblies resolves that a draft is urgent then it must be confirmed, or returned for reconsideration, within fifteen days, with a statement of reasons therefor. Drafts not returned within the prescribed period shall be regarded as confirmed.

4) Draft laws rejected by both Assemblies shall not be introduced again into either Assembly during the Session.

Art. 63. In the event of one of the Assemblies rejecting a draft law twice, and the other Assembly insisting upon its acceptance, a joint meeting of the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies shall be held, presided over by the President of the Senate, with the object of discussing the articles regarding which a divergence of opinion exists. If the draft law is accepted, with or without amendment, by a majority composed of two-thirds of the members of the

642 646 joint meeting, such draft law shall be considered to have been passed by both Assemblies, but shall not become law until it has been confirmed by the King. If not passed in this manner, such draft law shall not be reintroduced into either Assembly during the current session.

PART IV

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

642 645 Art. 64 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The number of Ministers shall not be less than seven, including the Prime Minister. No person shall be a Minister who is under any disqualification described in Article 30.

A Minister who is not a member of either Assembly shall not remain in office longer than six months unless he is appointed a senator or elected a deputy before the end of that period. A Minister who receives the salary of a minister shall not, at the same time, receive the membership allowance in either Assembly. A Minister shall not buy or lease any of the property or possessions of the State.

2) Deputy Ministers may be appointed provided that they must be members of Parliament.

3) In case of necessity the King may appoint Ministers without portfolio, in order to obtain the benefit of their experience and talents.

Art. 65 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The Council of Ministers will undertake the direction of the affairs of the State. It will meet, under the presidency of the Prime Minister, to decide the measures to be taken in matters which concern more than one Ministry and in all important matters which concern the Ministries. The Prime Minister will submit the decisions of the Council to the King, for his confirmation.

Art. 66. Ministers of State shall be jointly responsible to the Chamber of Deputies for affairs dealt with by the various Ministries and responsible severally for acts relating to each of the Ministries and Departments attached thereto. Should the Chamber of Deputies pass a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet by a majority of members present, the Cabinet must resign. If the resolution in question relates to one Minister only, such Minister must resign.

At the request of the Prime Minister or of the Minister concerned, the Chamber shall, once only, postpone a vote of no confi-

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dence for a period not exceeding eight days. The Chamber shall 642
not be dissolved during that period. 645

Art. 67. A Minister shall despatch all business relating to his Ministry and departments attached thereto in manner prescribed by law.

PART V

THE JUDICATURE

Art. 68. Judges shall be appointed by Royal Irada and may only 642
be removed in the circumstances mentioned in the special law dealing 692
with the conditions governing their qualifications, appointment, grades and method of dismissal.

Art. 69. The Courts shall be divided into three classes:

1. Civil Courts.
2. Religious Courts.
3. Special Courts.

Art. 70. The manner of instituting the Courts, the places where they are to be established, the grades, divisions, jurisdiction and supervision thereof, and the execution of judgments, shall be determined by special laws, subject to the provisions of this law.

Art. 71. The Courts shall be free from all interference in the conduct of their affairs.

Art. 72. All sittings of the Courts shall be open to the public, unless some legal justification exists for holding sittings *in camera*. Judgments of the Courts, as well as the proceedings thereof, may be published, except those relating to sittings held *in camera*. All judgments shall issue in the name of the King.

Art. 73. The Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction over all persons in Iraq, in all actions and civil and criminal matters, and those brought by or against the Iraq Government, with the exception of actions and matters coming within the jurisdiction of the religious or special Courts, as stated hereinafter in this law, or in any other law in force.

Art. 74. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts includes civil, commercial and criminal matters, in accordance with the laws in force, provided that, in matters relating to the personal status of foreigners and in other civil and commercial matters in which by international custom the terms of the law of a foreign country are to be applied,

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642 such law shall be applied in manner to be prescribed by special law.

692 Art. 75. The religious Courts shall be divided into:

1. Shara' Courts.
2. The Spiritual Councils of the Communities.

Art. 76. The Shara' Courts alone shall be competent to deal with actions relating to the personal status of Muslims and actions relating to the administration of Waqf foundations.

Art. 77. Justice shall be administered in the Shara' Courts in accordance with the terms of the Shara' doctrine peculiar to each of the Islamic sects, in conformity with the terms of a special law. The Qadhi shall be a member of the sect to which the majority of the inhabitants of the place to which he is appointed belong, maintaining the appointment of both *Sunni* and *Ja'feri* Qadhis in the cities of Baghdad and Basra.

Art. 78. The Spiritual Councils of the Communities include the Jewish Spiritual Councils and the Christian Spiritual Councils. Such Councils shall be established, and powers of jurisdiction conferred upon them, by a special law.

Art. 79. The Spiritual Councils shall be competent to deal with the following matters:

1. Matters relating to marriage, dowry, divorce, separation, alimony, attestations of wills other than those attested by a notary public (with the exception of those matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts relating to members of the community), but excluding foreigners who are members of such community.

2. Any other matter of personal status relating to members of the communities, if the parties so agree.

Art. 80. The procedure to be followed and the fees to be levied in the Spiritual Councils of the Communities shall be prescribed by special law. Succession, freedom of testamentary disposition and similar matters relating to personal status not coming within the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Councils of the Communities shall be regulated by law.

Art. 81 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. The High Court will assemble to try Ministers and members of Parliament for political offences or offences connected with their public duties, and to try judges of the Court of Cassation for offences arising out of their duties, and to decide matters connected with the interpretation of this law and the conformity of other laws to this law. 642 692

Art. 82 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*.

1) If it be necessary to hold a trial before the High Court the case shall be submitted to the Court by a resolution of accusation, passed by the Chamber of Deputies, separately in each case, by a majority composed of two thirds of the members present.

2) Other matters shall be submitted to the High Court by decision of the Council of Ministers or of one of the Assemblies of Parliament.

3) The High Court shall be constituted of eight members, beside the President, to be chosen by the Senate, four of them being senators and four of them being judges of the Court of Cassation or other senior judges. The Court will sit under the presidency of the President of the Senate or, if he cannot be present, his deputy.

Art. 83 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. If it is required to decide a matter connected with the interpretation of the provisions of this law, or to decide whether a law in force contravenes the provisions of this law, the High Court will assemble by virtue of a Royal Irada, to be issued with the consent of the Council of Ministers, after the Court has been constituted as prescribed by paragraph 3 of the preceding article. If Parliament is not in session the members shall be appointed by decision of the Council of Ministers and Royal Irada.

Art. 84 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. If it is necessary to interpret laws or regulations in circumstances other than those described in the preceding article, or if it is necessary to decide whether a regulation contravenes the law on which it is based, a Diwan Khas shall, at the request of the Minister concerned, be constituted under the presidency of the President of the Civil Court of Cassation or, if he is unable to attend, the Vice-President. The members shall be chosen as prescribed by a special law, three of them from the judges of the Court of Cassation and three from the senior military officers if the law in question concerns the armed forces, or three from the senior administrative officials if the law concerns administrative matters.

Art. 85 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. Cases tried by the High Court shall be decided according to law. An accused person shall not be declared guilty except by a majority of two thirds of the Court.

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The decisions of the Court are final. Persons who are accused by the Chamber of Deputies shall forthwith relinquish their duties. Resignation shall not be a bar to prosecution.

Art. 86 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*.

1) Every decision of the High Court declaring that a law or any provision of a law contravenes the provisions of this law shall issue by majority of two thirds of the Court. If a decision of this nature is issued, then the law, or the offending portion thereof, will stand repealed from the date on which the decision was issued, provided that the Government shall introduce legislation providing for compensation for damage which may have been caused by the application of the repealed provisions.

2) Every decision issuing from the Diwan Khas, declaring that a regulation, or some provision thereof, contravenes the law on which it is based, shall be by a majority of two thirds of the Diwan. If a decision of this kind is issued, then the regulation, or the offending part thereof, shall stand repealed from the date of the issue of the decision.

Art. 87. Decisions taken by the High Court regarding matters referred to in Article 83 (with the exception of those matters referred to in Article 86) and taken by the Diwan Khas regarding matters referred to in Article 84 shall be taken by a majority of the Court of Diwan Khas. Such decisions shall apply to all Courts and Government Departments.

Art. 88. Special Courts or Committees shall be set up when necessary for dealing with the following matters:

1) For the trial of members of the Iraq Military Forces for offences mentioned in the Military Penal Code.

2) For settling criminal and civil cases relating to the tribes in accordance with tribal custom as provided for by special law.

3 For the settlement of disputes arising between the Government and Government servants concerning their duties.

4) For investigating disputes relating to the possession or boundaries of lands.

5) *(as added October 27, 1943)*. Courts-martial and Special Courts set up in the circumstances described in Article 120 of this law.

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Art. 89 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The procedure in the 642
Special Courts and the fees to be collected therein and the manner of 672
appeal against, or revision of, the judgments thereof, shall be prescribed by law.

PART VI

FINANCIAL MATTERS

Art. 90. All taxes and excise dues shall remain unaltered as from 642
the coming into force of this law, until changed by law. 652

Art. 91 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Taxes and dues shall not be imposed except by law, provided that this shall not apply to charges collected by Government Departments in return for public services rendered by them or in return for the enjoyment of State property. Taxes and duties may not be imposed by ordinance.

Art. 92 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Taxes and dues must be collected from the tax payers without distinction and none of them shall be exempted therefrom except by law.

Art. 93. No property of the State may be sold, granted, leased or otherwise disposed of except in accordance with law.

Art. 94. No monopoly or concession shall be granted for dealing with or using any of the natural resources of the land, or for any public service, nor shall the State revenues be farmed out, except in accordance with law, provided that, where the period relating to them exceeds three years, they must in each case be the subject of a special law.

Art. 95. The Government may not contract any loan, nor undertake anything involving payment out of public monies, except in accordance with a special law, unless the Budget Law makes provision therefor.

Art. 96. All monies received by Government officials must be paid into the State Treasury and accounted for in accordance with such procedure as is prescribed by law.

Art. 97. No salary may be allotted, nor remuneration paid, nor any monies belonging to the State Treasury expended for any reason whatsoever, except in accordance with law. No item in the budget estimates shall be expended except in such manner as is prescribed by law.

Art. 98. The budget estimates shall be sanctioned by an annual

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●642 law known as the "Budget Law." The Budget Law must contain
652 an estimate of the income and expenditure for the year in question.

Art. 99. Parliament must approve the budget in the session preceding the commencement of the financial year to which the law in question relates.

Art. 100. The Minister of Finance must in the first place submit to the Chamber of Deputies all draft laws for the appropriation of monies or for increasing, decreasing or cancelling the approved budget estimates. Similarly, the Budget Law and all draft laws relating to loans to be contracted by the Government must be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 101. The debate on the Budget Law and voting thereon shall take place article by article separately. It shall then be voted upon as a whole. The budget shall be voted upon vote by vote.[1]

Art. 102. Should it be found necessary to expend sums of money urgently while Parliament is not sitting, the expenditure of which has not been sanctioned by the budget or by a special law, the King may, with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers, issue royal ordinances directing that financial measures shall be taken as provided by paragraph 3 of Article 26.

Art. 103. Parliament may pass a law for the appropriation of specified sums of money, to be expended over a period of years.

Art. 104. A law shall be passed providing for the setting up of a Department for the purpose of examining all expenditure and for the drawing up of a report for presentation to Parliament, at least once in each year, as to whether such expenditure is in conformity with the appropriations as approved by Parliament and has been expended in accordance with the procedure laid down by law.

Art. 105. No draft law may be introduced, nor any proposal put forward in either Assembly, involving the expenditure of any portion of the public revenues, except by a Minister.

Art. 106. The Chamber of Deputies may not make any decision, nor propose any amendment to a draft law, involving the reduction

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[1] The debate on the budget may take place in respect of every item of expenditure, but it is each head of expenditure (chapter of the Budget Law) which when it comes to vote is taken as a unit (for instance, vote for health service, vote for police, vote for education, etc.) Information through the courtesy of Professor M. F. Abcarius, Beirut.—ED.

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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of expenditure arising out of treaties approved by Parliament, or 642
the Constituent Assembly, unless approved by the King. 652

Art. 107. Should the new financial year have begun before the promulgation of the Budget Law relating thereto, and should Parliament have assembled, the Minister of Finance shall submit a draft law containing provisional budget estimates for a period not exceeding two months. On the expiration of the period covered by such estimates, the Minister of Finance may submit a fresh draft law of a similar nature. This procedure may be repeated on such occasions as may be necessary. Should Parliament not be sitting, the budget of the preceding year shall be followed without prejudice to the right of issuing the ordinances referred to in Article 102.

Art. 108 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The coinage of the State shall be determined by law.

PART VII

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROVINCES

Art. 109. The administrative districts of Iraq, their classes, names, 642
manner of institution, the powers of the officials and their titles shall 635
be prescribed by a special law.

Art. 110. The law referred to in the preceding article shall provide that steps shall be taken in certain of the administrative divisions to ensure the performance of any obligations relating thereto, arising out of treaties concluded by the King and approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly.

Art. 111. Municipal affairs in Iraq shall be administered by means of Municipal Councils in accordance with a special law. In the administrative divisions, Administrative Councils shall perform such duties as may be prescribed for them by law.

Art. 112. Each Community shall have the right of establishing Councils in important administrative districts, competent to administer buildings and properties dedicated to waqfs (pious foundations) and bequests for charitable purposes. They shall be competent to deal with the collection of income derived therefrom, and the expenditure thereof, in accordance with the wishes of the donor or with the custom in use among the Community. Such Communities shall also undertake the supervision of the property of orphans in accord-

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642 ance with law. The Councils referred to above shall be under the
635 supervision of the Government.

PART VIII

CONFIRMATION OF LAWS AND JUDGMENTS

642 Art. 113. Ottoman Laws published before November 5th, 1914,
671 and laws published on or after that date and which have remained in force in Iraq up to the time of the publication of this law, shall remain in force in Iraq so far as circumstances permit, subject to any modification or repeal in conformity with the proclamations, regulations and laws referred to in the following article, and until they are altered or repealed by the legislative power, or the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

Art. 114. All proclamations, regulations and laws issued by the Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Iraq, the Civil Commissioner, and the High Commissioner, and those issued by the Government of His Majesty King Faisal, during the period between November 5th, 1914, and the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, shall be considered to be valid as from the date on which they came into force. Any portion thereof still unrepealed by that date shall remain in force until changed or repealed by the legislative power, or until the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void, in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

Art. 115. Every person shall be considered to be released and exempt from all claims relating to any acts performed by him in good faith in conformity with instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Iraq, the Civil Commissioner, the High Commissioner, the Government of His Majesty King Faisal, or by an official duly authorised thereunto, whether in a military or civil capacity, with a view to the suppression of hostilities, the establishment and consolidation of order and public security, or the carrying out of orders issued in accordance with martial law between November 5th, 1914, and the date of the coming into force of the Constitution. Every act referred to in this article shall be considered to have been done in good faith, unless the complainant can furnish proofs to the contrary. Any action or judicial

proceeding with regard to any such act shall not be entertained and 642 shall be considered null and void in the absence of such proof brought 671 forward by the complainant.

Art. 116. All judgments passed in Civil and Shara' actions by the Ottoman Courts before the occupation by His Britannic Majesty's Forces, and likewise judgments passed in Civil and Shara' actions by the Courts set up after the said occupation, or by Political and Assistant Political Officers, in matters which came within their jurisdiction, shall be considered to have been given by the regularly constituted Courts of Iraq.

Art. 117. All judgments and decisions in criminal matters given by the Courts set up after the occupation of His Britannic Majesty's Forces or by Courts-martial, Military Courts or by any Military Governor or Political or Assistant Political Officer or other officials authorised to try criminal offences and also the penalties imposed upon those persons tried in the Courts referred to above, or by the persons referred to, shall all be considered to have been passed by the regularly constituted Courts of Iraq.

PART IX

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Art. 118. Parliament may, within one year from the coming into 642 force of this law, amend any of the subsidiary matters contained therein or add to them, in order that the objects of this law may be given effect, provided that Parliament shall agree by a two-thirds' majority of votes in both Chambers.

Art. 119. Subject to the provisions of the preceding article, no amendment whatsoever may be made in the Constitution for a period of five years from the date of the coming into force thereof, nor after the expiration of that period, except in the following manner:

Every amendment must be approved by a two-thirds' majority of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. After such amendment has been approved, the Chamber of Deputies shall be dissolved and a new Chamber elected. An amendment which has been approved by the former Chamber shall be submitted again to the new Chamber and Senate. If approved by a two-thirds' majority of each

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642 Assembly, the amendment shall be submitted to the King for confirmation and promulgation.

PART X

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 120. Should disturbances occur, or should anything happen indicating the likelihood of the occurrence of events of such a character in any part whatsoever of Iraq, or should there be a menace of hostile attack upon any part whatsoever of Iraq, the King shall have power, subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers, to proclaim martial law provisionally in those districts of Iraq exposed to the danger of disturbances or attacks. The application of the existing laws and regulations may be suspended by the proclamation declaring martial law in force, in such places and to such extent as may be prescribed in such proclamation, provided that those charged with the execution of the proclamation shall be subject to any legal consequences of their acts, until a special law has been passed by Parliament exempting them therefrom. The method of administration of the places in which martial law has been declared to be in force shall be prescribed by Royal Irada.

(as added October 27, 1943) Upon the occurrence of danger or rebellion or anything which disturbs the peace, in any part of Iraq, the King may, with the consent of the Council of Ministers, notify a state of emergency in the whole of Iraq, or in any part thereof. The districts affected by the notification shall be administered in accordance with a special law, which shall provide for trial, by Special Courts, of those who commit specified offenses, and prescribe the administrative measures to be taken by specified authorities.

Art. 121. Should it be necessary to interpret any provision of law:

1) Should the interpretation relate to the provisions of this Constitution, it shall appertain to the High Court, as stated in Part V of this law.

2) Should the interpretation relate to any law connected with the administration of public affairs, it shall appertain to the Diwan Khas as stated in Part V of this law.

3) Any other matters requiring interpretation shall appertain to

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the Courts of Justice having jurisdiction in the cases in which need for interpretation arises.

Art. 122. The Department of Islamic Waqfs shall be considered to be an official Government Department, its affairs being administered and its finances regulated in accordance with a special law.

Art. 123 *(as added October 27, 1943)*. Parliament may not pass any law granting pardon to persons who have committed offences which are directed to changing the form of Government or changing the Government or constraining the King or the Government, by pressure or threats, to do any act.

Art. 124 *(as added October 27, 1943)*. Constitutional methods which are not mentioned in, nor forbidden by, this law, but are practised by Constitutional States, may be adopted by decision of Parliament in joint Assembly, and observed as constitutional rules.

Art. 125. This law shall come into force from the date on which it is confirmed by the King.

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DECLARATION OF THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ, MADE AT BAGHDAD ON MAY 30, 1932, ON THE OCCASION OF THE TERMINATION OF THE MANDATORY REGIME IN IRAQ, AND CONTAINING THE GUARANTEES GIVEN TO THE COUNCIL BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT[1]

CHAPTER I

PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

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Art. 1. The stipulations contained in the present chapter are recognised as fundamental laws of Iraq, and no law, regulation or official

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[1] English text: League of Nations, Geneva 1932 (A. 17 1932. VII) (Series *League of Nations Publications*, VII, Political, 1932, VII, 9). On January 28, 1932, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution under which Iraq was to make before the Council a Declaration concerning the protection of minorities, the Declaration being considered as a condition for the termination of the British mandatory regime. On May 19, 1932, the Council approved the text of that Declaration and at the same time recommended that the various countries renounce the privileges of the Capitulations which they enjoyed in that country.

Upon this Declaration the Sixth Committee (Political Questions) of the 13th Assembly of the League of Nations approved a report of its Sub-Committee on the application of the Kingdom of Iraq for admission to membership in the League of Nations. The Sub-Committee's report stated that the general conditions laid down by the Council for the termination of the mandatory regime had been fulfilled. On October 1, 1932, the Committee unanimously recommended that the Assembly should admit the Kingdom of Iraq to the League of Nations. On October 3, 1932, the Assembly, in its Sixth Plenary Meeting, admitted Iraq to the League. All fifty-two delegations taking part in the ballot voted for the admission of Iraq. See League of Nations *Official Journal*, July, 1932, p. 1212; *ibid.*, Special Supplement no. 109, Records of the 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, 1932, Meetings of the Committees, *Minutes of the Sixth Committee* (Political Questions), pp. 9, 14-16, September 29 and October 1, 1932; *ibid.*, *Special Supplement* no. 104, pp. 46-48 (Sixth Plenary Meeting, October 3, 1932). The termination of the mandatory regime was preceded by a Treaty of Alliance with the United Kingdom. See pp. 191-196 above. As to the present legal validity of the measures undertaken by the League of Nations for the protection of minorities, the Secretary General of the United Nations has made a study of this question upon the request of the Economic and Social Council (see United Nations Documents—GENERAL—E/CN 4/367— April 7, 1950). With regard to Iraq the Secretary General came to the following conclusion (*ibid.*, pp. 50-51): "As regards ordinary causes of extinction of obligations, since Iraq was bound by a Declaration made before the Council of the League of Nations, the dissolution of the latter suspended the obligation, which would return into force only if the United Nations decided to take the place of the League of Nations." The Commission on Human Rights decided at its sixth session in 1950 to postpone consideration of this study. The question cannot be considered to have been finally settled, and the document is therefore reproduced in this volume.—ED.

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6 42 action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action now or in the future prevail over them.

Art. 2. (1) Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all inhabitants of Iraq without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

(2) All inhabitants of Iraq will be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

Art. 3. Ottoman subjects habitually resident in the territory of Iraq on August 6th, 1924, shall be deemed to have acquired on that date Iraqi nationality to the exclusion of Ottoman nationality in accordance with Article 30 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty[1] and under the conditions laid down in the Iraqi Nationality Law of October 9th, 1924.

Art. 4. (1) All Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

(2) The electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to racial, religious and linguistic minorities in Iraq.

(3) Differences of race, language or religion shall not prejudice any Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions or industries.

(4) No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any Iraqi national of any language, in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

(5) Notwithstanding the establishment by the Iraqi Government of Arabic as the official language, and notwithstanding the special arrangements to be made by the Iraqi Government, under Article 9 of the present Declaration, regarding the use of the Kurdish and Turkish languages, adequate facilities will be given to all Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

Art. 5. Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic

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[1] See Turkey, note on Treaties, p. 503 below.

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minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Iraqi nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own expense, or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

Art. 6. The Iraqi Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law and personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs and usage of the communities to which those minorities belong.

The Iraqi Government will communicate to the Council of the League of Nations information regarding the manner in which these measures have been executed.

Art. 7. (1) The Iraqi Government undertakes to grant full protection, facilities and authorisation to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries and other religious establishments, charitable works and pious foundations of minority religious communities existing in Iraq.

(2) Each of these communities shall have the right of establishing councils, in important administrative districts, competent to administer pious foundations and charitable bequests. These councils shall be competent to deal with the collection of income derived therefrom, and the expenditure thereof in accordance with the wishes of the donor or with the custom in use among the community. These communities shall also undertake the supervision of the property of orphans, in accordance with law. The councils referred to above shall be under the supervision of the Government.

(3) The Iraqi Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious or charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which may be guaranteed to existing institutions of that nature.

Art. 8. (1) In the public educational system in towns and districts in which are resident a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, the Iraqi Government will make provision for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language; it being under-

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642 stood that this provision does not prevent the Iraqi Government from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said schools.

(2) In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities will be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

Art. 9. (1) Iraq undertakes that in the liwas of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be Kurdish in the qadhas in which the population is predominantly of Kurdish race.

In the qadhas of Kifri and Kirkuk, however, in the liwa of Kirkuk, where a considerable part of the population is of Turcoman race, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be either Kurdish or Turkish.

(2) Iraq undertakes that in the said qadhas the officials shall, subject to justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or Turkish as the case may be.

(3) Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will be, as in the rest of Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather than race, Iraq undertakes that the officials shall, as hitherto, be selected, so far as possible, from among Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas.

Art. 10. The stipulations of the foregoing articles of this Declaration, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, are declared to constitute obligations of international concern and will be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be made in them without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Any Member of the League represented on the Council shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the Council may thereupon take such measures and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles between Iraq and any Member of the League

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represented on the Council shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant. 642

CHAPTER II

Art. 11. *Most-favoured-nation Clause.* (1) Subject to reciprocity, Iraq undertakes to grant to Members of the League most-favoured-nation treatment for a period of ten years from the date of its admission to membership of the League of Nations. 642 648

Nevertheless, should measures taken by any Member of the League of Nations, whether such measures are in force at the above-mentioned date or are taken during the period contemplated in the preceding paragraph, be of such a nature as to disturb to the detriment of Iraq the balance of trade between Iraq and the Member of the League of Nations in question, by seriously affecting the chief exports of Iraq, the latter, in view of its special situation, reserves to itself the right to request the Member of the League of Nations concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of restoring the balance.

Should an agreement not be reached by negotiation within three months from its request, Iraq declares that it will consider itself as freed, *vis-à-vis* of the Member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down in the first sub-paragraph above.

(2) The undertaking contained in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to any advantages which are, or may in the future be accorded by Iraq to any adjacent country in order to facilitate frontier traffic, or to those resulting from a Customs union concluded by Iraq. Nor shall the undertaking apply to any special advantages in Customs matters which Iraq may grant to goods the produce or manufacture of Turkey or of any country whose territory was in 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

Art. 12. *Judicial Organisation.* A uniform system of justice shall be applicable to all, Iraqis and foreigners alike. It shall be such as effectively to ensure the protection and full exercise of their rights both to foreigners and to nationals.

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648 The judicial system at present in force, and based on Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Agreement between the Mandatory Power and Iraq, signed on March 4th, 1931, shall be maintained for a period of 10 years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

Appointments to the posts reserved for foreign jurists by Article 2 of the said Agreement shall be made by the Iraqi Government. Their holders shall be foreigners, but selected without distinction of nationality; they must be fully qualified.

Art. 13. *International Conventions.* Iraq considers itself bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which it has become a party, whether by its own action or by that of the Mandatory Power acting on its behalf. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by Iraq throughout the period for which they were concluded.

Art. 14. *Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations.* Iraq, taking note of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of September 15th, 1925:

(1) Declares that all rights of whatever nature acquired before the termination of the mandatory regime by individuals, associations or juridical persons shall be respected.

(2) Undertakes to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on Iraq's behalf by the Mandatory Power during the period of the Mandate.

Art. 15. *Freedom of Conscience.* Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of public order and morality, Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee throughout its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions or of their members.

Art. 16. *Final Clause.* The provisions of the present chapter constitute obligations of international concern. Any Member of the League of Nations may call the attention of the Council to any infraction of these provisions. They may not be modified except by

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agreement between Iraq and the Council of the League of Nations acting by a majority vote. 642 648

Any difference of opinion which may arise between Iraq and any Member of the League of Nations represented on the Council, with regard to the interpretation or the execution of the said provisions, shall, by an application by such Member, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The undersigned, duly authorised, accepts on behalf of Iraq, subject to ratification, the above provisions, being the declaration provided for by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of May 19th, 1932.

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647 652 185 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the direct beneficiaries. It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenues resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

000 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the clos of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of th departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralized and made available more directl and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

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642 131 161 434 423 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income *per capita* does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate th distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary o tribal chiefs.

433 185 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

657 185 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing th standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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Iraq

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Iraq is a constitutional monarchy which 642
has been an independent sovereign state 648
since the termination, in 1932, of the mandate awarded Great Britain by the League of Nations. Historically, it is identified 131
with Mesopotamia, the "land between the rivers" and the home of one of the oldest civilizations known to man. Modern Iraq 131
has an area of about 170,000 square miles, 133
encompassing the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, a fringe of highlands in the north and an expanse of desert in the southwest. It extends from the Persian Gulf and Arabia in the south to Turkey in the north, and from Iran in the east to Syria and Jordan in the west. The country is conveniently divided into four geographic regions—the alluvial plains of the rivers, the mountain ranges backing the northern and the northeastern frontiers, the intervening uplands and the desert.

Rising in the mountains of eastern Anatolia, 133
the Tigris River flows for 770 miles through Iraq, and in its northern course receives several tributaries, the most important in Iraqi territory being the Great Zab, the Little Zab and the Diyala. The Euphrates River also takes its source in Anatolia but meanders across central Syria and, subsequently, for 750 miles in Iraq before converging with the Tigris at Al Qurnah. The Shatt al Arab, formed by the union of the two rivers, flows for about 100 miles to the Persian Gulf, and for part of its length marks the boundary with Iran. The lower Euphrates and Tigris valleys form a great deltaic plain which reaches back from the Gulf to a zone north of Baghdad. It is

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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563 services in the building up of its administration. From the establishment of the new country, the Jewish community, and especially its leading members, have been as much bound up with its development as their Muslim neighbours.

Hezkiel Sassoon was appointed Minister of Finance and continued to hold this office in several successive Cabinets. A Jew, David Jamra, was appointed Vice-President of the Court of Appeal. Other Jews occupied important posts in various departments, particularly those concerned with the administration of ports, railways, and finance.

The large number of Jewish officials in the public service was due to the fact that the sudden demand for officials and clerks could only be satisfied in the main from the Jewish and Christian minorities, with their higher educational standards. During the period of the Mandate (*i.e.*, until 1932), and even in the first years of Iraq's existence as an independent State, the high proportion of Jews in Government service caused no offence. Their talents and skill in office work were most valuable to a Government seeking to prove Iraq's readiness for independence.

563 463 The Jewish communities in Baghdad and Basra are among the wealthiest in the entire Middle East. The names of some of the leading families, such as the Sassoons and the Khadooris, are known even in other countries. There also exists a large middle-class of small bankers, retailers, agents, merchants, civil servants, clerks, and physicians and lawyers, together with other members of the liberal professions. There are—among the poorer elements—many small shopkeepers, and likewise many craftsmen of one sort or another—masons, carpenters; and also domestic servants. There is no special Jewish quarter in Baghdad, Jews being found in all parts of the town, though they do tend to congregate in certain streets of different quarters.

563 The community is well organised. In Baghdad it has established a great number of welfare and social services, a hospital, and about 25 schools. By 1930, 7,200 pupils were attending the ten schools under *Alliance* administration. Thanks to these services, the state of health and the general standard of education of the Jews are far above the average level in Iraq. Ninety per cent of the candidates from Iraq for the London matriculation examination, for instance, used to be Jews.

The community is governed by a lay council of 60 members, who are entitled to impose certain taxes (*e.g.*, on meat) and to allocate the necessary funds to the various institutions. These funds have made it possible to admit pupils to elementary schools free of charge.

There is also a religious council, under the Chief Rabbi, Haham Benjamin, which maintains the communal courts dealing with all such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like. Until his resignation at the end of 1949 the overall Head of the community was the universally respected Haham Sasson Khadoori.

● [642] This partial communal autonomy arises from Article No. 79 of the Constitution of Iraq. The internal organisation of the Jewish

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the 642
example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self- 661
interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 643
'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the 185
important town families—and notably those of religious pretension —by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which 631
any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the 619
impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could 668
not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

642 By the early weeks of that year the situation in 'Iraq had vastly improved; there was now time and opportunity to proceed further with constitutional and administrative development, and not least with the selection of a ruler. The insurrection was over, though tribal disquiet persisted in the Muntafiq and in various degrees elsewhere. In spite of obvious imperfections, a Government by 'Iraqis was operating. Ministers were showing goodwill and patience, and the lone hand evidently played by Sayid Ṭalib was 648x not for the moment menacing. A frontier agreement had been made with the French in Syria in December 1920; and though it fixed a boundary which, since it appeared to bisect both the Jabal Sinjar and Albu Kamal, was in fact ignored, frontier relations were by now at least non-violent. The persistent propaganda and trouble-making from across the Turkish frontier had not seriously perverted the 'Iraqi-Kurdish or the Euphrates tribes. Peace between the Allies and Turkey had been made, even though the new conditions now supervening in that country already condemned the Sèvres Treaty to nullity.

000 In London 'Iraq affairs from 1921 onwards were handled by a newly created Middle Eastern department of the Colonial Office; and the first action of Mr. Winston Churchill, transferred from the War Office as Colonial Secretary, was to convene a Conference at Cairo which should decide, once and for all, the many outstanding Middle Eastern questions. It met on 12 March 1921, attended by the highest Service personalities, Foreign Office and Treasury experts, Churchill's Eastern advisers including Lawrence, and, from 'Iraq, Sir Percy Cox accompanied by General Haldane, Ja'far al-'Askari, Sasun Ḥasqayl, Gertrude Bell, and two of the ministerial Advisers. The agenda, as far as concerned 'Iraq, included the selection of a ruler, the treatment of the 'Iraqi Kurds, the early reduction of British expenditure, and the composition of the forces designed to secure the defence of 'Iraq after the withdrawal of British garrisons.

643 For the post of Amir or King of 'Iraq, no local candidate had commanded anything approaching adequate support. The Naqib was advanced in age, nor could his family produce an acceptable successor; Sayid Ṭalib with his past record and cynically unscrupulous character was more feared than accepted; a Turkish prince, probably Burhan al-Din, suggested in some quarters of Baghdad or Kirkuk, could scarcely be welcome to the British Government; the Agha Khan, gravely proposed, could not be a serious candidate, and the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh still less; the Shaykh of Muḥammara, a self-proposed pretender, was unthinkable, and the Najdi Amir, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, scarcely less so. But the Amir Fayṣal was now available. His candidature had been suggested by A. T.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Wilson in July 1920, when Damascus fell to the French; and Colonel K. Cornwallis, an ex-Sudan officer and Arabist who had served in Syria with Fayṣal and gained his close friendship, had been authorized by Curzon in December to offer him the 'Iraq throne. The Prince had refused it, alleging the higher claim of the Amir 'Abdullah, his elder brother. But to the king-seekers of Cairo he remained the only tolerable choice, and a programme whereunder his candidature and election should proceed was forthwith elaborated. The rôle of Great Britain was to encourage him to visit 'Iraq and offer himself as King, and thereafter to 'raise no objection' to his election; but while no forcible imposition was contemplated, such an experiment could, it was evident, scarcely be allowed to fail. 643

Regarding the Kurds, no decision was reached. It was already clear that the Kurdish State visualized at Sèvres would never exist, and that the Treaty itself had been rendered inoperative by Kamal's unimagined national revival in Turkey. The Kurds of Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya, too obviously unfit for self-government, might yet be ill at ease in an Arab State; but the High Commissioner's willingness in that event to govern them directly did not appeal to the 'Iraqi ministers, in whose view the Kurds must form an integral part of 'Iraq. No expedient remained but that which was tacitly accepted, both in Cairo and on the spot: to admit the distinctness of Kurd from Arab by a measure of administrative variation, to treat them with sympathy, and to hope for their ultimate willing adhesion to the 'Iraq State, to which in any case they could not but be economically united. Kirkuk had in fact accepted a Mutaṣarrif in February 1921, and Arbil became a sub-liwā of it under a Deputy Mutaṣarrif; Mosul since the murder of December 1920 remained under a British Political Officer, though unity with 'Iraq had been accepted. Sulaymaniya liwā refused, for the moment, any rule but that of the High Commissioner. 563

Important decisions were reached at Cairo on defence questions. The British forces were to be further reduced; the Royal Air Force was in 1922 to take over control from the Army. The Levies, increased by the addition not of further Arab but of Assyrian and Kurdish units, were to be handed over by the Minister of the Interior to the High Commissioner and therefrom later to the British Military Command, which would support the expenses of the force. 000

The Cairo Conference broke up on 25 March. Cox was back in Baghdad by mid-April, to find that the selection of a ruler now dominated all political thought. The lesser local candidates faded from the picture. The Naqib, whose own following was 643

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the terms of Mandates. Cox's intention had been to convene a Constituent Assembly for the King's election, but this must lead to a delay of some months, during which the possibility of an extremist coup d'état—no good beginning for a constitutional reign—could not be ignored. It was decided to shorten the procedure. On 11 July, a few days after Philby had left a service from whose policy he differed, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution declaring the Amir to be King of 'Iraq 'provided that His Highness's Government shall be constitutional, representative, and liberal and limited by law.' Accepting the resolution, Cox declared that to obtain due validity it must be confirmed by popular consent evoked by referendum.

This was held late in July. The formula of approval provided by the Government was in some liwās modified or supplemented, and in one words were added demanding complete freedom from foreign control; in another, a Constituent Assembly within three months was demanded. Mosul declarations, generally favourable, spoke of safeguarding Kurdish and other minority rights. Euphrates liwās asked for continued British control. The Kurds of Sulaymaniya abstained from voting. Kirkuk rejected, but Arbil accepted, the Amir. But on the whole a large majority—substantially less, it may be, than the 96 per cent. claimed officially—accepted the new King, and such leading tribesmen as ibn Hadhdhal of the 'Amarat and 'Ali Sulayman of the Dulaym offered their oaths of allegiance even before the enthronement.

Whitehall's last-minute and remarkably maladroit instruction that the Amir, in his very speech of acceptance of the throne, should emphasize the ultimate authority of the High Commissioner, was fortunately withdrawn. No further obstacles remained to the official enthronement. It took place with due ceremony in the early morning of 23 August 1921, at the height of the summer heat, in the Saray courtyard in Baghdad. Fayṣal I ruled in 'Iraq, inheriting from Sir Percy Cox the official headship of the State.

1z Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

considerable but heterogeneous, had no personal ambition and veered gradually from an attitude of opposition to one of support for a Sharifian ruler, since the British seemed so to desire. The foreign candidates other than Fayṣal made no general appeal. The conduct of Sayid Ṭalib in Interior, with his many unguarded remarks and profuse expenditure of public money, seemed to indicate a determination somehow to secure the throne, either immediately or as successor to the Naqib. His increasingly intemperate attitude could not be longer ignored; a personality which could have been valuable to 'Iraq, and had been so in fact during the bad days of 1920, seemed too likely to be used for selfish and dangerous ends. After the Pasha had, at a dinner party, threatened to mobilize and use tribal forces in their thousands 'to prevent British influence being used in favour of one of the candidates' (that is, Fayṣal), Cox thought it expedient to have him removed from the scene. He was arrested by the military authorities and deported to Ceylon. The attitude of the High Commission and of British officers in the Government became more openly favourable to the cause of the Sharifian Amir; Philby, Ṭalib's intimate, remained staunchly republican. The expected general amnesty for political prisoners was published on 30 May.

The Amir, synchronizing his arrangements with the British plan, left Jidda with Cornwallis and a small party of supporters on 12 June. Friendly telegrams were exchanged with the Naqib, and even with a possible opponent, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud. Cox suggested to the public of 'Iraq, by communiqué on 17 June, that the British Government would, in the best interests of Iraq, 'place no obstacle in the way' of the election of a Sharifian ruler. Organized by the Naqib and the Mayor of Baghdad, a strong reception committee from the capital proceeded to Baṣra. At this city, which had recently petitioned Cox for a separate and half-independent régime, the Amir's reception on 23 June was reasonably cordial. At the Euphrates towns, especially Karbalā and Najf, it was tepid, but at Baghdad enthusiastic. The Amir's own personality and attitude were, it was soon obvious, his greatest assets, and won him support even from previous partisans of the Naqib or Sayid Ṭalib. He gained ground everywhere. The question became one scarcely of the probability, but only of the mode of his election and enthronement.

It would have been unreasonable and in practice irrelevant to await a second and still distant peace treaty with the ex-suzerain, Turkey, or to prolong exchanges of views with the interested Governments of France and of India. It was possible also to pass over the complaints of the United States spokesmen at Geneva, that their Government had been less than properly consulted on

V

THE 'IRAQ KINGDOM

I. A REIGN BEGINS

643 THE new King was to reign in 'Iraq for twelve years. Aged 36 at the time of his accession, he possessed unusual qualities of dignity, leadership, and sympathy; and his political adroitness, which reflected a high intelligence used always devotedly, sometimes perilously, in the service of his adopted country, enabled him and it to survive grave dangers and to establish, in so few years, the structure of a State both more imposing and more promising than most observers could have expected. The British decision to encourage the candidature of this dethroned and non-'Iraqi prince for the 'Iraq throne had contained, indeed, the seeds of many blessings for that country.

The King's family joined him at Baghdad from Mecca. His young half-brother the Amir Zayd, then aged 21, was earliest with him, before going, a year later, to spend three years at Oxford. The material surroundings of a throne were soon, humbly enough, provided, and the royal figure became the unquestioned centre of all 'Iraqi political and social life. His name was used in the Khuṭba—official prayers—on and after his first Friday as King. By his tours in all areas and his accessibility he quickly became known to thousands of his subjects; indeed, no contributions made by Fayṣal were greater or more personal than his equal appeal to town and tribe—a reflection of his own half-urban half-desert background and education—and his power (which at moments failed him) to balance the forces of extreme 'Iraqi nationalism with the exigencies of the British connexion. His relations with the High Commission—now established on the Tigris right bank, physically and officially separated from the Government of 'Iraq across the river—and with the British element inevitably preponderant in Government during the early months, were cordial and appreciative, though his 'Iraqi entourage contained, as was soon to appear, some elements of a less realistic or more fanatical nationalism, which could be damaging. Cornwallis, Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior since August 1921, acted also as the King's personal Adviser.

642 The constitutional position of the territory was yet singularly unclear. Its elements were a Turkish sovereignty still existing, though dormant: an unratified Mandate, accepted by Great Britain but unwelcome to 'Iraq itself: a constitutional monarchy,

*645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

*645 661 The formation of a Government under Rashid 'Āli, in the presence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-Ikhā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Āli began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Ḥikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Ḥaydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muḥammad Zaki al-Baṣri, in Justice.

*645 668 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national cooperation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

arrived in London on 20 June accompanied by three ministers, 643 Yasin Pasha, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Ḥaydar. The visit was completely successful. The King, after his stay at Buckingham Palace, visited Scotland and Devonshire, then spent some days in London and some in Switzerland. But his health appeared to be seriously affected by the strains of the last twenty years, and he would willingly have rested for a further period in Europe, had not grave events recalled him urgently to Baghdad.

These events arose from the small, alien, unhappy Assyrian 563 community of whose dilemma and attempted settlement much has 657 been said in these pages. The Mar Sham'un, who spent the last six months of 1932 at Geneva but could accomplish nothing, returned in January 1933 to his restless and divided flock. Assyrian Levy officers, notably Yaqu son of Isma'il, had conducted a strong campaign in the Mar Sham'un's favour in the Dohuk–'Amadiya area. The 'Iraqi authorities had, on the contrary, weakened his prestige by their strict limitation of his powers to the spiritual field, and their treatment of Assyrians as normal members of the public. A strong anti-Patriarchal faction led by a Malik Khoshaba, with bishops and other Maliks, had secured the appointment of Khoshaba himself as President of the Advisory Committee for land settlement. The Mar Sham'un on his return, with his position weakened and all prospect of national migration or local consolidation dissipated, assumed an attitude of total refusal to co-operate with the Government-sponsored settlement, to conduct which the expected 'foreign expert', Major Thompson, arrived in Mosul in May 1933. The Patriarch, not content with spreading false suggestions regarding the settlement itself, threatened excommunication to any Assyrian who might participate in it; he was ready, some observers could not but feel, to sacrifice the interests of the community to the claims of his personal or hierarchical ambitions and resentments. In Mosul city Muslim-Assyrian feeling showed no improvement. An incident of stone-throwing at the windows of 'Iraqi Army officers was attributed to the Assyrians.

The Minister of Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, at this point wisely invited the Mar Sham'un to Baghdad, hoping for a personal understanding. But the antagonism was irremovable. The Minister, intelligibly if perhaps on the broadest view needlessly, bade his visitor surrender all claims to temporal power, even in the form urged by the Patriarch, which was that of adherence to the 'traditional customs of his people'. The Mar Sham'un addressed a letter full of complaints to the King on the eve of his departure for Europe, accusing both 'Iraqis and British of persecution. Three weeks of vain conversations and waiting ended with irritation on both sides and the order of Ḥikmat Sulayman on 24 June that the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

accepting it. From Cyprus he continued to bombard the League 563
of Nations with petitions.

The return of Sir Francis Humphrys to Baghdad on 23 August, with the realization that no British pro-Assyrian intervention was imminent, gave some relief, not least to the uneasy but defiant Cabinet. The tension and emotion of mid-August gradually died down. Then, on 8 September, the news reached Baghdad that 643
King Fayṣal, with King 'Ali, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Ḥaydar at his bedside, had died suddenly of heart failure at Berne.

3. THE HASHIMI MINISTRY

The shock of this irreparable loss, dramatically sudden and coinciding with a wave of ungrateful depreciation, transformed public opinion in an hour. The late King regained, and deservedly, all his place in 'Iraqi esteem: esteem which was indicated, on the arrival of his body from Trieste and Haifa on 14 September, by a funeral without precedent in 'Iraq in its expression of nation-wide grief. His services had indeed been beyond price to the State of which he was both the spirit and the embodiment; and in days to come they were to prove irreplaceable. None could take his place as balancer of forces, nor preserve his equal relations with his own extremists and with the British, with town intelligentsia and with wild tribesmen; none could control, by personal prestige, the ruling class and its factious ministers. Many of the troubles of the period from 1933 to 1941 would, it may be, have been avoided if his wisdom and experience had been spared to the 'Iraq State for those years.

The heir apparent, succeeding to the throne as Ghazi I, swore his oath of office, exchanged telegrams with King George V, and received the resignation of the Cabinet. He was twenty-one. Active, warmly patriotic, and not unamiable, he was popular with the public and with the young 'Iraqi officers with whom, after an unsuccessful period at Harrow, he had been educated; but his lack of intellectual equipment and of interest in public affairs, and his devotion to pleasure and to sport, forbade the hope that he would prove adequate to the royal functions in 'Iraq.

Rashid 'Āli Gaylani, reinstated as Premier without change of 645*
ministers, could profit by the Sunni–Shi'i peace which, following the Assyrian crisis, had descended upon the Euphrates, and from the return of Anglo-'Iraqi relations to normal after the savage press attacks and public demonstrations of August. But, whatever his past commitments, he could not now do other than reaffirm 'Fayṣal's policy', which was that of the Treaty and friendship with Great Britain. Abu al-Timman's Nationalist Party, persistent even in these circumstances, issued on the third day of the new reign

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 669 confessions made by alleged participants, death sentences were passed on five of the accused, including Ḥikmat, and long terms of imprisonment on others, while some were acquitted. The commutation of the death sentence for one of imprisonment on four of the condemned was soon afterwards announced by Royal Irada; that of Ḥikmat Sulayman was mitigated only after persuasive pressure by the British Ambassador and by private British as well as 'Iraqi friends. There remained—and remain today—among persons well qualified to judge, many who, in spite of the confessions, believed and believe the whole plot to be fictitious and its 'discovery' designed merely to serve political or personal ends.

643 A part of the objects of the alleged conspiracy was after all to be achieved, and this by a tragic accident. The King, driving his car with habitual recklessness late in the night of 3 April, crashed into an electric-power standard near his palace, and died a few hours later of the severe fractures of the skull which he had sustained. The announcement of his death was made early on the 4th. The Council of Ministers, urgently convened, received the written testimony of Queen 'Aliya that Ghazi had wished to be succeeded, should the case ever arise during the infancy of his son, by a Regency of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah, son of the late King 'Ali. A sufficient number of members of the dissolved Chamber were gathered to ratify this in accordance with the Constitution; and the succession of King Fayṣal II, then aged almost four years, and the Regency of the Amir were proclaimed.

King Ghazi was twenty-seven. He had reigned for nearly six years. Little interested in the formal functions of his office, and barely persuaded to fulfil them, his faults of heedlessness and frivolity, his impatience of protocol and of advice, had been embarrassing to his successive Governments, and at times discourteous to his subjects. But at his best he lacked neither intelligence nor charm. He was a good sportsman, a brilliant high-speed motor driver, and popular with the young Army officers who were his chosen and natural associates. He was beloved, at a distance, by many of his subjects for his youth, vitality, and evident patriotism. The little Fayṣal II, attended always by an English nurse and later an English governness, was known to be an intelligent and attractive child. The new Regent, brother of Queen 'Aliya and uncle of the King, was now aged twenty-seven. He had been educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and although hitherto unversed in public affairs was considered serious and intelligent, and likely to turn his personal charm and excellent social gifts to good account.

643 579 The King's funeral at the Royal Mausoleum was attended by many Arab visitors from abroad and by tens of thousands of his

own subjects. It evoked extraordinary emotion. The fantastic 643 story that his death had been 'arranged' by the British Secret 579 Service was propagated by the German wireless, and perhaps also by Dr. Grobba. It was believed by the more feeble-minded part of the hysterical city mob, and was responsible for a shameful and brutal attack, immediately following a memorial service to King Ghazi, on the British Consul at Mosul, Mr. G. E. A. C. Monck-Mason. Surrounded by a rabble of excited demonstrators, he was stoned and then struck fatally on the head, on the veranda of his own Consulate. The Prime Minister, deeply afflicted by this outrage, offered apologies to the British Ambassador and ordered compensation to be paid to the Consul's widow. His funeral at Mosul was public and impressive; 'Iraqi officialdom and the Army were well represented. Severe sentences were passed on a small number of the participants in the attack, in which as usual students had been prominent; the murderer himself was not discovered.

3. FIRST MONTHS OF WAR

The five months preceding the outbreak of the Second World 645 War were a period of outward tranquillity in 'Iraq. The King's funeral visitors returned home, the Regent settled to his task. The Sa'idi Ministry, resigning office on 4 April in accordance with the Constitution, was reinstated by Royal Irada two days later, without change of personnel. The Minister of Interior, Naji Shawkat, whose tepid support on the conspiracy case and on others had created a breach between him and the Premier, resigned late in April. Nuri Pasha himself took the portfolio of Interior, and brought 'Ali Jawdat to Foreign Affairs. The elections were completed in May, though martial law was still in force until August in Mosul and Baghdad. Parliament was opened by the Regent on 12 June. His Speech from the Throne appealed to all for tranquillity and restraint. Chosen by the habitual procedures, the Chamber included a large majority of Nuri Pasha's supporters and, contrary to all precedent, was destined for a life of four years. Nevertheless, the shadow of the Army still lay heavily over 'Iraqi politics, and the Chamber itself contained deputies enough willing to renew all the old animosities. Among them were followers of the German lead which was still ceaselessly offered, convinced Anglophobes still resentful of the 1930 Treaty and its alleged limitations on 'Iraqi freedom, thwarted members of the intelligentsia, and pan-Arabs bitter at the Palestine White Paper which 'Iraq, at this stage, rejected. The cause of the Palestinian Arabs 648 was not visibly advanced by the journeys of the Prime Minister to 'Amman, Beirut, and Cairo in August, ever seeking a formula

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

least some of her statesmen. Her delegates attended the Food Conference at Hot Springs in May 1943, and the Bretton Woods meeting on Currency and Exchange questions in August 1944, the resulting agreement being ratified by Parliament late next year. The meetings at Atlantic City and at Chicago on Trade and on Civil Aviation respectively included 'Iraqi spokesmen, as well as the more important Conference at San Francisco in April 1945 at which the bases of the United Nations organization were laid. It was attended by Arshad al-'Umari, Foreign Minister, accompanied by Nasrat al-Farsi, and by a young American-educated Shi'i official, Fadhil al-Jamali. The part taken by the delegation was creditable; but on the refusal of Arshad to subscribe to certain phraseology in the Charter (in which 'self-government' as distinct from 'independence' was given as the goal of countries under tutelage) Fadhil was authorized to sign instead, and his persistence cost Arshad his position as Foreign Minister. The World Security Charter was ratified by Parliament in October and in the Preparatory Commission which met in London late in the year the 'Iraqi chargé d'affaires, Shakir al-Wadi, a former staff officer of Bakr Sidqi, represented his country. It was contemporary with the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Cultural and Educational Organization, also held in London, at which Dr. Naji al-Asil, now Director of Antiquities, was present. 648 x

The Regent, a developing personality, generally popular, keenly interested in affairs and willing to play his full part in them, was now exercising an influence on Government greater than any Palace influence since the death of Faysal I. The Administration, whose continuity he helped to ensure, kept the peace, allowed wide latitude to the press and the bitter tirades of the ex-internees, and played a leading part in the Arab Unity movement; but it did little for social reform and refused, until its last month of power, to authorize the formation of political parties now struggling to birth. The Regent's speech at the opening of Parliament in December 1945, however, foreshadowed a new policy in this regard by promising the readmission of parties, the development of 'true democracy', a greater measure of equality and social justice, and the training of a younger element of citizens for power. This speech, welcome to the eager and half-thwarted political world—and disturbing to the elderly and privileged—led to increased criticism of the Pachachi Ministry in Parliament, and to clashes between the left wing of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the extreme right, or ex-Nazi, following of Sami Shawkat. The latter now abandoned his appointment as Director-General of Social Affairs to form a National Revival Party. The Pachachi Ministry resigned at the end of January 1946. 643 645 x 665

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

x645 665 opposition leaders of various records and tendencies—Ṭaha al-Hashimi, Muzaḥim al-Pachachi, Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, Naṣrat al-Farsi, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Dhahir, Ja'far Ḥamandi, and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam—were drawing together towards a fragile but imposing Popular Front whose formation with a vague programme they announced towards the middle of 1951. The National Democrat Party returned to full activity during 1950. There seemed, however, no reason why, with his parliamentary majority and with a personal authority which for years past had exceeded that of any other 'Iraqi, Nuri Sa'id should not, subject to unforeseeable changes and chances, remain in power as long as his health and restless nature might permit. In the last days of 1950 he brought 'Umar Nadhmi, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba, and Baṣṣam to the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio, appointed 'Abd al-Majid Maḥmud, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, to the Ministry of Economics, moved Dhiya' Ja'far to Works, and retained 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan at Finance. But no real coalition had emerged, and internal politics showed no sign of rising above the habitual strife of rival personalities. A formidable range of unsolved problems, inter-Arab and international, political and financial, confronted Nuri Sa'id, none more conspicuously than those of Israel and the Palestine refugees, revision of the 1930 Treaty, and the extraction of greater oil profits. To these the veteran statesman now turned.

643 King Fayṣal II, whose fifteenth birthday fell on 2 May 1950, had completed his preparatory school days in England and since the spring of 1949 had been a happy and successful Harrow schoolboy. He was to attain his majority on 2 May 1953. His family had acquired a house near Staines where the Queen Mother 'Aliya spent most of the year. Her health, however, began to cause alarm in 1949 and after a long illness and operation she returned home to die in Baghdad in September 1950, aged only thirty-nine; a tragic loss to the King and to her devoted brother, the Regent.

4. WEALTH OF A NATION

652 There have been references on earlier pages to the serious position of the State finances in the period 1947–9 and to the substantial recovery therefrom by the end of 1950. It could be foreseen by the latter date that, so far from financial stringency, the resources at the Government's disposal would in future be ample not only for normal purposes of the public services as hitherto conceived but also for an expanding programme of development. Provided that control of expenditure were maintained as efficiently as it had been (except in 1948) in the past, which there was no reason to doubt: that the probity and efficiency of Government personnel did not deteriorate: that the efforts made to perfect the

6: Ireland
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/For an account of the search for a ruler of Iraq after the First World War and of the accession of King Faisal in 1921, see category 116, pp. 303-337./

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H.M. KING GHAZI I

Frontpiece

CHAPTER XVII

THE SEARCH FOR A RULER

In the coffee houses, in the tents of the shaikhs, wherever 175*
'Iraqīs met in social and political gatherings during the winter 727*
of 1920 and the spring of 1921, the question as to the form of 643
the permanent Government and of the person of its ruler was constantly under discussion. The problem of the ruler, both to 'Iraqīs and to the responsible British officials in Baghdad and in Whitehall, was much the same as it had been just after the Armistice of Mudros: the discovery of an individual who would command the greatest support among the inhabitants of 'Iraq.

The desire on the part of H.M. Government to set up a ruler who had the support of the people, as reiterated by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords, June 25th, 1920, when he said: 'No announcement would be more welcome to us than a genuine and general expression of opinion in favour of a particular system or even of a particular ruler,'[1] was something more than mere platitude calculated to win the goodwill of the 'Iraqīs. A candidate possessing popular support and willing to co-operate with Great Britain in maintaining her interests was inherent in the pattern of the State which H.M. Government had in mind for 'Iraq which, in spite of the implications of its public declarations, was still an 'indigenous government' under 'effective and indisputable British control'.[2] Without such a head, clothed with executive authority and ostensibly supported by the people, no façade could exist behind which ultimate British control might function without the open employment of armed force. All negotiations, whether unilateral or bilateral, unsupported by public opinion, would fall to the ground for

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), p. 880.

[2] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, February 14th, 1919, cited *supra*, pp. 180-1.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

175x 727x 643 lack of a contracting party, as occurred in the case of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, the Treaty of Sèvres, and as characterized by the early efforts of the French to set up a government in Syria.

No candidate who fulfilled these conditions had been revealed in the Acting Civil Commissioner's summary of 'Iraqī public opinion, in November, 1918,[1] or by the plebiscite of the winter of 1918-19, initiated and rigorously supervised by the Acting Civil Commissioner, who himself was bitterly opposed to an Arab Amīr. The plebiscite had revealed that while a strong desire for an Amīr existed, rival ambitions, local jealousies and lack of outstanding ability made it impossible for the country to settle on any one candidate.[2]

From that time, although the desire for an Amīr had steadily grown, the difficulty of settling on any single candidate had remained. One section of the ex-Turkish officials, practically all Sunnīs of Baghdad, afraid of being swamped by the Shī'a majority, was imbued with the idea that a Sunnī Turk, as found in the person of Prince Burhan ed-Dīn,[3] might better serve their interests than a local candidate or a Hāshimī known to be on comparatively friendly terms with the Shī'īs.[4] Opposing them, however, was an even larger element of ex-Turkish officials, both civil and military, concentrated largely in Baghdad, Mōsul and Kirkūk, who encouraged the belief, substantiated by persistent propaganda arising across the frontiers, that the return of the Turks was but a question of time.

Among the possible local candidates the Naqīb of Baghdad stood high, although his acceptance of the presidency of the Council and his seeming subservience to the British had earned the disapproval of the ardent Nationalists. In British circles, his great age, his feeble health and lack of suitable dynastic successors counted against him, although, according to members

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[1] Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 172 ff.

[3] *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 4.

[4] Bell, *Letters*, p. 585.

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of his family, the throne was offered him but under such 175x conditions and limitations as would have made him, in his own 727x words, no more than an '‘Iraqī Rajah'. He himself did not seek 643 the throne, although he felt that if it were freely offered him by the people he would be obliged to accept the honour and the duties.

Saiyid Talib Pasha of Basra, Minister of Interior, by his ability, his energy and his influence, was the most outstanding local candidate. Since his return from Egypt, where he had rendered valuable services to the Allies in arousing the Arabs against the Turks, he had continued to work as before the war for ‘Iraqī Nationalism. He had, however, stopped short of advocating violence to eject the British and during the Insurrection he had rendered further services to the British Authorities, both as intermediary with the insurgents and as Chairman of the Electoral Law Committee. His enemies maintained, nevertheless, that, as in the days of the Turks, his activities were directed primarily towards furthering his own ambitions. Indeed, he freely admitted to the High Commissioner his expectations of becoming Amīr of ‘Iraq, which, he predicted in February, 1921, would be accomplished by the autumn of the same year. So great was the alarm and opposition aroused by Saiyid Talib Pasha that any original intention the High Commissioner may have had of using him as head of either provisional or permanent Government[1] was effectually checked by the knowledge that if Saiyid Talib had many followers who professed their willingness to die on his behalf, there were others who would go to the same lengths to prevent him from becoming head of the State.[2] The High Commissioner's disapproval of Saiyid Talib's activities was not lessened

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, p. 562.

[2] Much of the reluctance of Sasūn Effendi and others to support the provisional Government, has been explained by the fear that the British Government intended to support Talib Pasha. Ja'far Pasha is stated to have said in private that 'If he had not hesitated to enter the Cabinet, it was only with the object of defeating Talib Pasha, whose ambitions he regarded as a menace to the country'. *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 4.

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

H.M. KING FAISAL

[facing p. 306]

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175x 727x 643 by the knowledge that the Nationalists in many quarters regarded him as the one strong candidate able to oppose the British nor by the fact that his propaganda was ostensibly in favour of the Naqīb into whose place he expected to fall if the Naqīb refused the honour or when his death left it vacant.

Other candidates had been mentioned. The Shaikh of Mohammerah, whose name had been put forward in 1918-19, again announced his candidature on April 5th in a letter to the High Commissioner. Ibn Sa'ūd was also proposed, largely, it was believed in official circles, to offset the possible success of the sons of the Sharīf of Mecca, of whom both 'Abdullāh and Faisal were freely mentioned. The Agha Khan[1] and even the *Walī* of Push ti-Kuh were also suggested. In some circles, the possibility of a republic was also discussed.

Sentiment in favour of a Sharifian ruler had not been lacking in 'Iraq at the end of the war, as the Acting Civil Commissioner had noted in November, 1918,[2] and as the plebiscite had confirmed.[3] At that time it had been vigorously opposed by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by those who held the same opinions on the Arab question. His efforts to exclude and to counter Hāshimī influence, whether engendered locally or in London, as in Colonel T. E. Lawrence's proposal to divide Arab-Asia into four Hāshimī kingdoms under British influence,[4] had been negatived not only by H.M. Government but also by the efforts of the 'Iraqis themselves. The establishment of the Arab Government at Damascus under British aegis and the activities of the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, in 1919 and 1920, to induce and finally to force Great Britain to keep her promises concerning 'Iraq, had, as already indicated[5] encouraged 'Iraqī Nationalism and, after the election of Sharīf 'Abdullāh as King

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[1] For the comments of the Agha Khan on the situation in 'Iraq in 1920, see Haldane, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[2] Telegram, No. 10250, November 24th, 1918.

[3] Three declarations, the most secured by any candidate, had demanded a son of the Sharīf of Mecca. See *supra*, p. 172.

[4] Telegram, S/S for India, to Political, Baghdad, November 18th, 1918.

[5] *Supra*, Ch. x, xiii.

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of 'Iraq, had stimulated sentiment on behalf of the Sharif. The fall of the Arab Government in Syria and the flight of Faisal had taken the wind temporarily from Sharifian sails, as at Mōsul, where the agitation in favour of a Hāshimī candidate had subsided precipitately.[1] The sentiment had rapidly revived, however. By late December, the Shī'a *'Ulamā* were credited with saying 'The country will not be content until complete independence, under a son of the Sharīf, is achieved'. Much of the support of the Shī'īs who, in particular, seemed in favour of a son of the Sharīf,[2] was due, it was held officially, to the fact that they believed that Sharīf Husain, generally known to be of liberal religious views, was secretly a member of their sect. The Sharifian officers returning to 'Iraq in early 1921 had also given an impetus to public opinion in favour of a Hāshimī, although they were divided among themselves over the respective merits of 'Abdullāh and Faisal.

The movement towards a Hāshimī was not hindered by the knowledge that a number of the British officials, including the Adviser to the Minister of Justice, the Oriental Secretary and the Private Secretary to the High Commissioner, in private conversations had advocated a Hāshimī and Faiṣal in particular. As early as November, 1920, Miss Gertrude Bell wrote, as she had already urged upon the Acting Civil Commissioner in the previous July, that the only solution in her opinion was a son of the Sharīf for whom, she believed, the Constituent Assembly when convened, would ask.[3] A little later, she again wrote: 'I feel quite clear in my own mind that there is only one workable solution, a son of the Sharif, and, for choice, Faiṣal: very much the first choice.'[4] The necessity for rapid action in setting up a king to check adverse currents against the new Government, she also recognized, as when she wrote: 'I believe if we could put up a son of the Sharif at once he might

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[1] *Admin. Report, Mosul*, 1920, pp. 3-4.

[2] See letters cited *supra*, p. 261.

[3] Bell, op. cit., p. 574.

[4] Ibid., p. 581.

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175x yet sweep the board; if we hesitate the tide of public opinion
121x may turn overwhelmingly to the Turks. . . .'[1]

643 The High Commissioner had maintained, however, the strictly official view that the provisional Government had been established with the aim of providing machinery whereby the wishes of the people as to the form of the permanent Government and the person of the ruler might be freely expressed. The plan, involving delay, found critics even among the 'Iraqīs.

'You British wish to build the Government of 'Iraq in the usual solid English fashion,' an 'Iraqī high official, with a reputation for sagacity and insight, is reported to have said to Miss Bell at a dinner in the winter of 1920-1. 'You want to begin with the foundations and then follow with the walls, the roof and then the decorations. That is not my idea of the way to build now for 'Iraq.'

'What do you mean?' he was asked.

'Begin with a roof, supported by a few pillars. The roof will encourage us to continue. Otherwise the slowness of building may discourage us. Give us a king. He will be our roof and we will work downwards.'

From the events of the next few months it would seem that both the British officials in Baghdad, including the High Commissioner, and H.M. Government came to the same conclusion: that the roof could not wait for the walls and that the head of the permanent State must be installed before convoking the Assembly. The Assembly came to be considered as a body which was to ratify the choice by H.M. Government of a ruler and to approve of the steps which had already been taken by the provisional Government under British guidance.

Among the members of the Interdepartmental Committee in London, a Hāshimī candidate found the most favour, although the Naqīb and Saiyid Talib Pasha each had their supporters. Lord Curzon, although he strongly disapproved of the action of the 'Iraqī Covenanters in Damascus in March,

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[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 585.

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1920, had come to regard 'Abdullāh as the prospective Amīr 175'
of 'Iraq. He had demurred, therefore, at the proposal which 727'
the Acting Civil Commissioner had telegraphed following the 643
collapse of the Syrian Government. The telegram, in part, was as follows:

> 'Will His Majesty's Government consider possibility of offering him Amirate of Mesopotamia? Objections entertained on this side to creation of Amirate have hitherto been primarily that no suitable person could be found. We have always regarded Faisal as booked for Syria. Nothing that I have heard during the last few months has led me to modify my views of unsuitability of 'Abdullah and our experience of last few weeks in Baghdad makes it fairly clear that no local candidate will be successful in obtaining sufficient support here to enable him to make good.'[1]

Mr. Montagu, on behalf of the India Office, had favourably received the suggestion, but it was dropped[2] in deference to Lord Curzon and to the Quai d'Orsay which made it clear that Amīr Faisal's 'employment in Mesopotamia immediately after his expulsion from Syria, would be regarded by French opinion as an unfriendly act'.[3]

Lord Curzon in the following months experienced a change of heart. Once the provisional Government was well under way he adopted, with the approval of the Middle East Committee, the policy of installing Faisal in 'Iraq.

On December 17th, Lord Curzon, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs, deputed Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis, then attached to the Foreign Office, to call on the same day upon Amīr Faisal, who was then in London, and to offer him the throne of 'Iraq. Colonel Cornwallis had been in close touch with Arab affairs in general and had been closely

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[1] Cited Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p. 306.

[2] Nevertheless, Sharīf 'Abdullāh felt it necessary to deny in October, 1920, in *Al-Fallāh* (Mecca) that Faisal would take his place in 'Iraq.

[3] Telegram No. 1539, India Office to Viceroy, Simla, for Sir Percy Cox, September 10th, 1920.

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175 727 associated with Amīr Faisal in Damascus, where a close personal friendship had developed.[1]

643 Not until one o'clock in the morning, after the Amīr had returned from the theatre, did the interview take place. The offer from the Foreign Office was met with refusal although the conversation lasted until after three o'clock. Faisal remained obdurate. The throne, he declared, belonged to his brother 'Abdullāh and he, Faisal, could not and would not accept it.

Shortly afterwards, Colonel T. E. Lawrence was asked to approach Sharīf 'Abdullāh and to attempt to remove his objections to the installation of his younger brother in 'Iraq. Amīr 'Abdullāh has since stated that Colonel Lawrence went so far as to offer him a kingdom in Syria if he would renounce the throne of 'Iraq and that, on the basis of the promise, he, 'Abdullāh, was gathering his forces preparatory to taking over his kingdom when the British Government intervened, in February, 1921, and compelled him to accept only the southern portion of his brother's former kingdom, the Amīrate of Kerak or Transjordan.[2]

Following the report by Colonel Lawrence that Sharīf 'Abdullāh would offer no serious objections to the proposal that Faisal should take his place in 'Iraq,[3] Amīr Faisal was again approached. The conversations were continued after the conduct of 'Iraq affairs fell to the new Middle East Department, created in the early spring of 1921 through the initiative of Mr. Winston Churchill, who was transferred from the War Office to the Colonial Office for the purpose.[4] By the time of

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[1] Later Personal Adviser to King Faisal, 1921-33, and Adviser to Minister of Interior, 'Iraq, 1921-35.

[2] Colonel Lawrence was non-committal regarding this statement by Amīr Abdullāh. A search through his papers after his death revealed no reference to the episode.

[3] 'Abdullāh, however, held it against Faisal for a number of years that he had usurped the crown which was his ('Abdullāh's) by right.

[4] Mr. Churchill had formulated his plans for the Department by the middle of January (*Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1921), p. 268), but did not go from the War Office to the Colonial Office until February 14th. The Department formally assumed supervision of Middle East Affairs, March 2nd, *Colonial Office List*, 1921, p. 448.

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the Cairo Conference in March, most of the outstanding points 175x
between H.M. Government and the Amir had been settled. 727x
It remained for the Cairo Conference to confirm his candida- 643
ture and to outline the procedure by which he was to be installed in 'Iraq.

The Cairo Conference, March 12th-24th, 1921

The Middle East Division of the Colonial Office had owed 175x
its creation to the necessity of devising a less costly British 727x
policy for the Near and Middle East and of replacing by unified 643
control the complicated and cumbersome system of divided 648
authority among the Foreign, the India and the Colonial Offices.[1] Mr. Churchill, in taking charge of Near and Middle East affairs, was faced, on the one hand, by the insistent demand of the British public for a radical reduction in expenditure[2] and, on the other hand, by the necessity, with which his whole political creed was in sympathy, of maintaining and consolidating the territorial gains and the strategical vantage points won in the East as the result of a vast outlay of British blood and treasure. To aid in formulating new lines of procedure in order to achieve these ends, he called a conference of the principal political and military officials of the areas concerned to meet in Cairo on March 12th, 1921.[3]

The questions considered by the Conference included as problems concerning 'Iraq: the immediate reduction of British expenditure with the consequent revision of policy involving (*a*) the future relationship of the new State to Great Britain;

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 268.

[2] Ibid., Vol. CXXVII (1920), pp. 644-5; Vol. CXXX (1920), pp. 2223-84; H. of L., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 848-94; *The Times*, April 5th, 1921, May 9th, 1921; *The Daily Telegraph*, June 25th, 1920.

[3] The representatives of 'Iraq who were summoned to the Conference were: the High Commissioner, accompanied by Sir Aylmer Haldane, K.C.M.G., K.C.B., the Commander-in-Chief; Sasūn Effendi, Minister of Finance; Ja'far Pasha, C.M.G., D.S.O., Minister of Defence; Maj.-Gen. E. H. de Vere Atkinson, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Works; Lt.-Col. S. H. Slater, C.I.E., Financial Adviser; Miss Gertrude Bell, C.B.E., Oriental Secretary.

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175ˣ (*b*) the person of the future ruler of 'Iraq; and (*c*) the nature 727ˣ and composition of the defence forces of the new State which ● 643 was to assume an increasing share of its own defence. The 648 status of the Kurdish regions in their relations to 'Iraq was also discussed.

It was apparent, in view of the decreasing revenue, of falling agricultural prices and of the large burdens to be assumed in taking over the Railways, the Port of Basra and other public works from the Army at the latter's own valuation, that the prospects were not bright for the immediate assumption by the new State of the cost of its defence. Anticipating a discussion of the question, vital from the British standpoint, at Cairo, the High Commissioner after consultation with Sir Aylmer Haldane and the Minister of Defence had, nevertheless, formulated proposals involving substantial saving for the ensuing year and further reductions in the future, consequent on 'Iraq assuming an increasing share in the responsibilities hitherto devolving on Great Britain.[1] Mr. Churchill was thus able to announce a preliminary reduction of the original estimate of British expenditure in the Middle East for 1921-2, from £35,000,000 to £27,500,000, a figure which was expected to fall to nine or ten million pounds in 1922-3.[2] The reduction in the British budget, however, necessitated a stipulation that the 'Iraq budget should provide not less than 55 lacs for the National Army, the strength of which should eventually amount to 15,000 men, and that ordinarily her contributions to defence should not fall below 15 per cent of her revenue,[3] a proportion later increased to 25 per cent.[4]

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[1] Cox, Sir P. Z, 'Historical Summary' in Bell, op. cit., p. 531.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 271. Also ibid., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1547. The actual expenditures in 'Iraq by the British Treasury, 1920-5 have been stated to be (ibid., Vol. CXCII (1926), p. 4):

1920-1	£32,000,000	1923-4	£5,740,358
1921-2	£23,355,950	1924-5	£4,479,754
1922-3	£7,807,384	1925-6	£4,118,400

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

[4] Article IV of Military Agreement and Article IV of Financial Agreement, subsidiary to the Treaty with King Faisal, October 10th, 1922, Cmd. 2120.

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In order to enable the High Commissioner to achieve the proposed economies for the relief of the British taxpayer, the Conference agreed that until the 'Iraqī Army could be recruited, equipped and trained, the Levies should be increased from 4000 to 7500 and that they were to be financed by H.M. Government and to be administered by the High Commissioner. The Levies, hitherto, had been composed for the most part of Arabs, with a small number of Kurds. Assyrians were now to be recruited.[1] In addition, six squadrons of the Air Force, stationed at strategic points, were to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order.[2]

The success of the proposed withdrawal of British troops from 'Iraq depended almost entirely on the creation and maintenance of friendly relations between the 'Iraqis and the Mandatory Power, which had been temporarily improved by the establishment of the provisional Government. The continuance of strong Nationalist agitation, however, directed against the Mandate on the ground that the relationship which it created had no basis either in British promises or in Arab Nationalism, seemed to indicate that the mandatory regime, as originally conceived and outlined in the draft document, could not be imposed without prolonged military occupation on a scale which British public opinion rendered impossible. The mere prospect of increased hostility, leading inevitably in the absence of adequate military forces in the country to disturbances similar to those of 1920 or even worse, would not only paralyse the efforts of British officials to apply the Mandate and to develop the country but would also lead to an irresistible renewal of British public opinion for the complete evacuation of a country where the game was not worth the candle.

It had already been suggested to H.M. Government, in May, 1920, by Mr. Montagu, that if Nationalist agitation were to

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, pp. 44-5.
[2] Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xx (1933), p. 399.

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be cut at its roots and if a friendly government co-operating with Great Britain were to be established in 'Iraq, a further step in defining the relations between the two countries might be necessary.[1] This step would consist of an attempt to satisfy national aspirations by disguising the relationship, sanctioned under the terms of the mandatory document then already in existence, by means of a treaty of alliance. Lord Curzon, who had difficulty in agreeing with Mr. Montagu on any subject, had rejected the suggestion at the time. Mr. Churchill took up the idea, all his conversations with Amīr Faisal being conducted on the basis of negotiating a treaty similar to that between Great Britain and Egypt, which would establish Faisal as King of an independent State in alliance with Great Britain. Under such a treaty, the scope of British authority might be more restricted than originally projected, but under skilful handling, the ultimate authority could be made not less effective. It would have the added merit of enabling Great Britain to maintain with less expense her position before the League of Nations without sacrificing her Imperial interests.

When Mr. Churchill arrived at Cairo for the Conference, he had made up his mind that Faisal was the only possible candidate with whom such a treaty might be negotiated. In agreement with him were Sir Percy Cox and many friends and supporters of the Amir at the Conference: T. E. Lawrence, Miss Bell, Ja'far Pasha, H. W. Young, and others. Amīr Faisal's high birth, as a son of Husain, Sharif of Mecca and King of the Hijāz, assured his position among Arabs in general and gave his person a sanctity among the religiously minded, even among the Shi'is. He possessed experience in the ways of men and in diplomatic usage gleaned from his early life among the Turks at Istanbul, from his sojourn in the desert in the days of peace and of war against the Turks, from his participation at the Peace Conference at Versailles and from his brief day as King at Damascus. Among the Nationalists, his early

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[1] Young, Major Sir H. W., op. cit., p. 313.

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espousal of the Arab cause in Syria,[1] his leadership of the Arab 175x
forces in the Hijāz and in Syria and his election as the first 727x
Arab ruler of Damascus since the Ummayads, secured his 643
standing as an Arab patriot. His personality and his character 648
which had won and were to continue to win the affection of British officials with whom he associated, were expected to gain the adherence of the 'Iraqīs among whom a strong sentiment in his favour already existed.

His short-lived kingship at Damascus, it was believed, had revealed to him the difficulties of a purely Arab administration and the danger of relying entirely on an Arab army.[2] British advice and assistance to the new kingdom would, therefore, it was hoped, be welcomed for their own sake and be regarded not merely as onerous conditions imposed by the Power which had given him his throne.

As a secondary consideration, it was felt that Faisal's nomination would, in part, redeem the promises made during the war to the Sharīf in particular and to the Arabs in general and thus rehabilitate British prestige in the Arab world. It would, in addition, mitigate Faisal's bitterness against the British Government for what he believed to be its responsibility in his overthrow at Damascus.[3]

Mr. Churchill believed, moreover, that if Faisal were installed in 'Iraq, the British Government would acquire increased control both over him and over his father, the Sharīf of Mecca, who was still proving intractable and exasperating in his relations with Great Britain. At a meeting of the Special

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[1] His efforts to secure the release of the Syrians accused of treason during the war nearly cost him his own life. See Djemal Pasha, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

[2] Amīr Faisal, in his unpublished Memoirs, written during his sojourn in Italy in 1920, spoke, however, in glowing terms of his own Arab forces of the desert campaign, and declared that had they fought at Maisalun the French would not have won the engagement.

[3] In his *Memoirs*, Amīr Faisal maintained, not always correctly, that he had followed faithfully the advice of his British Advisers in all his relations with the French, relying on the help which they promised; that they had discouraged his summoning of his Hijāzī followers; and that in the crucial hour of his need, they had abandoned him to the French.

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175 Committee dealing with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq, on
727 the opening day of the Conference, March 12th, Mr. Churchill
643 declared that Faisal should be made to realize that his father's
648 subsidy as well as the British guarantee to the Sharif of non-aggression from Wahhābī sources depended on Faisal's own behaviour.

Although the approval of Amīr Faisal's candidature was almost a foregone certainty, the merits of the other candidates were not overlooked at the Conference. The High Commissioner, speaking on March 12th, did not believe that any local candidate could be elected. The Agha Khan, whose interests had become European rather than Asiatic, would not accept the nomination. Sentiment for a Turkish Prince was not strong enough to be considered. By the process of elimination as well as by his own merits, Faisal appeared to be the only possible candidate.

The difficulties attending the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq were not ignored. Warning notes were sounded as to the undoubted opposition of Saiyid Talib Pasha to any nominee other than himself[1] and as to the probable effect on Ibn Sa'ūd, an ally of Great Britain, of the establishment of the two new Hāshimī kingdoms: 'Iraq on the north and Transjordan on the north-west. To counter possible active hostility from Ibn Sa'ūd who had already shown interest in the political situation in 'Iraq, the Conference resolved that he should be acquainted with the attitude of H.M. Government to Faisal's candidature. The High Commissioner, accordingly, telegraphed to the Wahhābī leader shortly after the Conference had adjourned. He received in reply a letter, dated May 7th, 1921, expressing Ibn Sa'ūd's thanks for the consideration shown him at the Conference.[2] After Faisal's departure for 'Iraq and Mr. Churchill's

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[1] Expected to take the form of anti-Mandate agitation.

[2] Kohn's statement, *History of Nationalism in the Near East*, p. 308, that the effect on Ibn Sa'ūd of the setting up of the Hāshimī princes was overlooked by the British Government, is not borne out by the records of the Cairo Conference. See *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 265 ff. Also *supra*, p. 157.

announcement, Ibn Sa'ūd again wrote, on June 21st, to the 175
High Commissioner stating his willingness to accept the 727
decision of the British Government, but asking that his own 643
position be determined and safeguarded. Some time afterwards 648
he replied in friendly terms to a message from Faisal.[1]

A further question arose at the Conference as to whether an 'Iraqī Congress or Assembly should propose Faisal as King. It was pointed out by a member of the special Committee that a concrete proposal must be placed before the Assembly if it were convened or the results of its deliberations would not be satisfactory. Mr. Churchill stated that he knew of no precedent for allowing a Constituent Assembly to choose its own ruler. It was eventually agreed that convocation of the Assembly before the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq was undesirable but that the High Commissioner should use his discretion according to the situation existing at the time. It was also agreed, in order that 'Iraq should appear to choose its own ruler, that a line of procedure should be followed which would give the 'Iraqīs the opportunity of demanding Amīr Faisal. The following schedule was provisionally proposed:

April 18th — The High Commissioner would arrive in Baghdad.

April 18th to 21st — Announcement by the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs that H.M. Government approved of Amīr Faisal as a candidate for the throne of 'Iraq. This would be accompanied by a proclamation of a general amnesty issued by the High Commissioner.

April 23rd — Amīr Faisal would send telegrams to Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd, to Talib Pasha and to the Naqīb of Baghdad

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[1] Letter, Ibn Sa'ūd to Amīr Faisal, July 29th, 1921:

After compliments, etc., 'We thank God for your safety and beg that you will be always safe. May you prosper.

'There is no doubt that you are fit to be the foremost in good action as is proved by the capacity you have shown in solving difficulties and maintaining mutual support for the upkeep of the glory of the Arabs. You may be sure that your brother has no thought nor aspiration other than this.'

175 announcing his candidature and saying that he, Faisal, hoped
727 that he would have their co-operation.

643 April 23rd to May 8th — Nūrī Pasha and other 'Iraqīs
648 would send telegrams to Amīr Faisal, inviting him to come
to 'Iraq as its prospective King.

May 8th to June 8th — Amīr Faisal would come to 'Iraq or would send his representatives, the arrival to take place about the middle of May. He or his representatives would be met by such a welcome and response from 'Iraqīs as to make it unnecessary to convene the Constituent Assembly, except to ratify or to confirm his election as King.

This schedule, finally adopted after minor alterations as to details and dates, implied that the Amīr should come to agreement with H.M. Government in regard to the future treaty, to Great Britain's position in 'Iraq and towards the League of Nations and to his own position generally.[1] It also implied that the Sharifian party in Baghdad, stimulated by the announcement of approval by H.M. Government and by judicious promptings emanating from the British Residency, would prove to be sufficiently representative and powerful to merit the invitation to the Amīr to come to 'Iraq where he could appear only when the ground had been carefully ploughed and harrowed.

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq during the Period* 1920-1931 (Special Report by H.M. Government to Council of League of Nations, Colonial No. 58 (1931) (hereafter *Progress of 'Iraq*), p. 14).

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE ACCESSION OF FAISAL

To the High Commissioner, on his return from Cairo, fell the delicate task of ensuring that the choice of the 'Iraqis, when expressed, should fall upon the candidate approved at Cairo. 175ʳ 727ʳ 643

The undertaking was to prove no sinecure. During his absence, the various candidates and their partisans had increased the intensity of their campaigns, their intrigues and their agitations. The Hāshimī party had not been idle, the most recently returned group of 'Iraqī officers adding new recruits. The Shī'īs appeared to be increasingly in favour of a Hāshimī, although neither they nor the 'Iraqī officers had yet been able to come to a decision as to whether 'Abdullāh or Faisal was to be their nominee. Faisal had the greater reputation as a protagonist of Arab Nationalism, but many held that he was too pro-British. His frequent visits abroad also tended to show that he had become a foreigner. 'Abdullāh was regarded as more of a true Arab.[1]

The hostility of the pro-Turkish party had been somewhat decreased by the decisions of the London Conference in February and March.[2] Evidence was not lacking, however, that many of those who had been advocating a Turkish prince were now supporting the Naqīb, in order to prevent the election of a Hāshimī. 'Alī as-Sulaimān of the Dulaim had long been working for the Naqīb,[3] for whom, it was also reported, Ibn Sa'ūd was exercising his influence in order to oppose the Sharifians. The Shaikh of Mohammerah was still in the field

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, in a leading article, December 17th, 1920, maintained that 'Abdullāh's election at Damascus had been final and binding.

[2] *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 32-3, 65-8, 89-96.

[3] See letter by 'Alī as-Sulaimān '*Al-Iraq*, April 19th, 1921.

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175x and did not withdraw his candidature or announce his support
727x of Faisal until Faisal’s departure for ‘Iraq.[1]

The Naqīb himself had shown irreconcilable aversion to a
643 son of the Sharīf. As early as February 6th, 1919, he had expressed himself in no uncertain terms, saying:

> I am a relative of the Sharīf. I come of the same stock and I share the same religious opinions. You will therefore understand that I am not actuated by difference of blood or of thought when I tell you that I would never consent to the appointment of the Sharif or of his son as Amir. The Hijaz is one and ‘Iraq is one, there is no connection but that of the faith . . . I would rather a thousand times have the Turks back in ‘Iraq than see the Sharif or his sons installed here.[2]

He now desired a public announcement definitely excluding sons of the Sharīf. Failing that, he sought assurances that no ruler would be imposed on the people of ‘Iraq contrary to their wishes. He professed himself, however, as satisfied with the High Commissioner’s expressions of British official neutrality.

The candidature of Faisal, therefore, had to reckon on the combined opposition of the pro-Turks, the Naqīb, Ibn Sa‘ūd and Saiyid Talib Pasha who, of them all, was held to be the most formidable. The High Commissioner realized that Saiyid Talib Pasha, in his strategic position as Minister of Interior and as one of the most powerful and influential men in ‘Iraq, might wreck Faisal’s chances in ‘Iraq and thus upset all the carefully laid plans of H.M. Government. Saiyid Talib had been undoubtedly gaining ground in Baghdad, where his extraordinary influence over the public mind had been increased by a series of murders, wrongfully ascribed to his revenge against his enemies.[3] In the absence of the High Commissioner at the Cairo Conference, which was popularly believed to have been

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[1] His letter was published in *Al-‘Iraq*, June 14th, 1921.

[2] Bell, *Note on Political Views of the Naqib*, p. 10.

[3] *Admin. Report, Baghdad Liwa*, 1921 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 2.

convened to declare Faisal as King,[1] Saiyid Talib had toured 175x
the *Liwās* below Baghdad as far south as Rumaitha and Dīwānī- 727x
ya, spending several thousand pounds on propaganda in the 643
name of the Naqīb, but in reality with an eye to his own interests.[2] More of a realist than the Naqīb and therefore more sceptical of the High Commissioner's assurances, he had also encouraged the widespread belief that whether 'Iraqīs wished for a son of the Sharīf or not, a Hāshimī would be set on the throne by Great Britain. Apprehension was felt in official circles lest his next move would be to stir up active opposition to the Mandate.

It had been planned by the High Commissioner that the Arab Ministers should be suspended and their functions carried on by the British Advisers during the critical period when Faisal's candidature was in abeyance.[3] The Ministers who favoured Faisal could thus work unimpeded by their official position, Talib Pasha would be removed from a position where he could use official pressure on his own behalf and British officials would be placed in the vital points of control.

The High Commissioner saw, however, that this plan would not be a sufficient check on Saiyid Talib. The opportunity for removing him completely from the scene was found in remarks made by Saiyid Talib at a dinner, given in his own house, April 14th, to which he had invited the French and Persian Consuls, Mr. Percival Landon, of the *Daily Telegraph* of London, other British guests, the Amīr ar-Rabī'a, Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn and Saiyid Husain al-Afnan, Secretary of the Council of State, the whole gathering numbering thirteen. Following the dinner, Saiyid Talib addressed Mr. Landon in Arabic, his words being translated by a member of the party.

Saiyid Talib questioned Mr. Landon as to the measure of

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[1] Bell, *Letters*, p. 590.

[2] *Admin. Report, Hilla Liwa*, 1921 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 3; *Daily Mail*, March 12th, 1921.

[3] Bell, op. cit., pp. 590-1. Nūrī Pasha, Nājī Pasha and other Sharifians had previously suggested the plan.

175* confidence which could be placed in the undertaking of H.M.
727* Government to ensure the freedom of the coming elections. He
643 proceeded to point out that some of the British officers in the employment of the High Commissioner were exercising undue influence in favour of one of the candidates to the throne of ʻIraq. He inquired whether he should appeal to King George or to the High Commissioner for their removal.

Mr. Landon replied that there might also be officers who were known to be in favour of a local condidate, but that the removal of one group would involve that of another. On a whispered word of advice from the interpreter, Saiyid Talib pursued the subject no farther. He went on to say that should there be indications that the declared policy of the British Government was not being carried out, the Amīr ar-Rabīʻa, with 20,000 rifles and Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn, with all his tribesmen, were ready to see it done. He added that the Naqīb would not hesitate to lodge complaints in India, Cairo, Constantinople and Paris.[1]

On receiving what he believed to be a well-substantiated report of Saiyid Talib's speech, the High Commissioner asked the General Officer Commanding to arrange for Saiyid Talib's removal. On the same day he was arrested by British soldiers and, under military guard, was removed to Basra and from there deported to Ceylon.[2]

The High Commissioner felt his drastic action to be necessary. No man, particularly one so prominent, could be allowed to call in question the sincerity of the promises of the British Government or to threaten it with force. Even more imperative, however, was the risk that the continued presence of Saiyid

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[1] See also *Communiqué*, April 18th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920–1922, App. 6; also *Baghdad Times*, April 18th, 1921.

[2] *The Times* (London), April 23rd, 1921, published two versions of the incident; (*a*) from Tehran, dated April 20th, inaccurate and garbled; (*b*) from Allahabad, April 20th, based on the official *communiqué*. *Daily Telegraph*, April 23rd, also published the Allahabad version. Cf. statement, Coke, R.: *Heart of the Middle East*, p. 230, that owing to censorship, the incident 'was not reported in the London Press until many months had elapsed'.

Talib might nullify the decision reached at Cairo: the final 175ᵖ effort of H.M. Government to settle the future status of 'Iraq. 727ᵖ

The action of the High Commissioner convinced the great 643 mass of the 'Iraqis that the British authorities would not hesitate to use strong measures if the occasion demanded it. This widespread conviction probably did more to ensure the acquiescence of the masses of the population in Faisal's candidature, once it was announced, than the absence of Talib Pasha's opposition or the existence of any definite desire among them for a son of the Sharīf of Mecca. In any case Faisal's prospects of success immediately improved. The Naqīb withdrew his opposition to a Hāshimī, declaring that it would be best to follow the wishes of H.M. Government. A moderate Sharifian party having a definite programme was formed, with the approval of the High Commissioner who, while aware of the immense influence which the Sharifians could exert in creating and enlarging public opinion for Faisal, also realized the necessity of controlling them and of preventing the extremists from using Faisal for their own ends in opposition to the Mandate. Encouragement to the Sharifians was also extended [204] by the vernacular press, particularly by *Ash-Sharq*, under the editorship of the Secretary to the Council of State;[1] by *Al-'Iraq* which took the most prominent part;[2] by *Lisān al-'Arab* which, under its editor, Ibrāhīm Hilmī al-'Umarī, was pro-Faisal and, for the moment, pro-British;[3] and by *Al-Auqāt al-'Irāqīya* of Basra and *Al-Mūsil* of Mōsul.[4] The *Baghdad Times*, the English newspaper owned by the Government, also published a few pro-Faisal articles.

In the creation of sentiment on behalf of Amīr Faisal and in

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[1] Established August 30th, 1920, by Saiyid Husain al-Afnan.

[2] See particularly its issues of April 25th, 26th, 28th, 29th; May 4th, 7th, 9th to 13th, 21st, 23rd; June 4th, 13th, 14th.

[3] Originally published in Damascus, its editor had transferred it to Baghdad, its first number, 401, appearing on June 23rd, 1921. It had not always given its support to Faisal as King of 'Iraq. Cf. issue of November 13th, 1920.

[4] Founded in 1921 and on November 14th, 1918, respectively. Both were owned by the Government.

175x 727x 643 the encouragement of his partisans, the High Commissioner, although obliged to maintain an outwardly neutral attitude, could not in so important a question refrain from taking a hand behind the scenes. The eventual success of Faisal's candidature must be attributed in no small degree to his guiding direction. 'He is a master hand at the game of politics,' wrote Miss Bell on June 12th, 1921, 'it's an education to watch him playing it.'[1]

Members of his staff and the British Advisers throughout the country, although nominally neutral, were not so restricted in practice, as Saiyid Talib had pointed out on April 14th. It devolved particularly on Miss Bell, as an enthusiastic supporter of Amīr Faisal, rather than as Oriental Secretary, although the prestige of her position and the knowledge acquired through it contributed greatly to her effectiveness, to take the leading personal role in developing and organizing public opinion for Faisal.[2]

The early statement by H.M. Government of its approval of the candidature of Amīr Faisal, followed by Faisal's own announcement that he intended to present himself as a candidate, the declaration of a general amnesty and the efforts of the Amīr's supporters in 'Iraq had been expected, in accordance with the schedule approved of at Cairo, to start the ball rolling in his direction.

Neither the announcements nor the amnesty were immediately forthcoming, however, although they had been foreshadowed in the High Commissioner's *communiqué* of April 12th,[3] following his return from Cairo. H.M. Government had felt it inexpedient to make its announcement until it had secured the formal approval of the League of Nations for the Mandate. This was being delayed in deference to the inquiries of the United States Government as to Great Britain's intentions

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[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 598; also pp. 599, 602, 606-8.

[2] Miss Bell's letters during this period, ibid., pp. 582-624, partially indicate the decisive role she played in the installation of Faisal. According to Amin Rihānī, *Ibn Sa'oud*, p. 8, she later seemed to regret the role she had played.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, April 12th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 4.

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regarding the 'Open Door' in 'Iraq, where, the former main- 175x
tained, citing the San Remo Agreement as evidence, that 727y
Great Britain had assumed a position inconsistent with the 643
draft Mandate which was specific on the point of economic equality.[1] The amnesty did not appear until May 30th,[2] due to prolonged consultations with the Quai d'Orsay and the Government of India.

Without the announcements, the situation in 'Iraq hung fire in spite of the strenuous efforts made by Faisal's partisans in the expectation that the Cairo schedule would be followed. It was clear that many of the 'Iraqīs were holding back for a definite lead. The answers of Sharīf Husain to the telegrams sent him by 'Iraqī notables, asking that he send one of his sons to 'Iraq, were too vague to give the desired stimulus, although they were regarded by many as having been inspired by H.M. Government — it was generally known that he had drawn a subsidy from the British Government.[3] In Mōsul, where strong sentiment existed in favour of Amīr Faisal, the efforts of the Baghdad Sharifian party to secure co-operation in sending letters to Sharīf Husain were deemed an attempt to force the issue, which should be left to the Constituent Assembly.

Not until early June did the official machinery begin to move, and then according to a modified form of the original Cairo schedule. In the first week of June, H.M. Government telegraphed permission to the Hijāz that Faisal might leave for 'Iraq. Accordingly telegrams from the Sharīf, announcing that he was sending his son Faisal to the Arabs of 'Iraq, were

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[1] Article 11 of the Draft Mandate for Mesopotamia, *Accts. and Papers*, 1921 (Cmd. 1176), xliii, 721. For this controversy, which aroused much ill feeling on both sides, see ibid., 1921 (Cmd. 1226) xliii, 481; 1921 (Cmd. 1351), xliii, 493. Also Gerig, B., *The Open Door and the Mandate System* (1930), Ch. vi; Secretary Hughes, *New York Times*, October 24th, 1924.

[2] Text: *Baghdad Times* and *Basrah Times*, May 30th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 5.

[3] His subsidy had ceased in February, 1920. It was renewed subsequent to Faisal's enthronement, but only a single payment of £5000 was made in August, 1921, as the Sharīf failed to live up to the conditions imposed: *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., Vol. XLIX (1922), pp. 241-3.

175✓ dispatched to 'Iraqī notables.[1] Accompanied by three A.D.C.s,
727✓ his private secretary, Colonel Cornwallis (his personal Adviser)
and a party of 'Iraqī notables,[2] Amīr Faisal left Jidda on
● 643 June 12th, on R.I.M.S. *Northbrook*.[3]

The Election of Faisal

The Amīr arrived at Basra on June 23rd. Three weeks later, the Council of State unanimously declared him King of 'Iraq.

In spite of the delays, the stage was well set for his reception. Mr. Churchill's long awaited statement in the House of Commons, June 14th,[4] was published in 'Iraq, June 17th.[5] The Naqīb and the Turkish party were disappointed at its pro-Sharifian tone. They held that Mr. Churchill's statement that:

> They [H.M. Government] wish to make it clear, however, as they have repeatedly stated, that there is no intention or desire whatever of forcing a particular ruler on the people. On the contrary, it is desired that there will be complete freedom of choice and expression of opinion,

hardly harmonized with his declaration:

> H.M. Government consider the Amīr Faisal a suitable candidate, indeed, the most suitable candidate in the field, and hope that he will secure the support of the majority of the people of 'Iraq.

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 13th and 21st, 1921. Sharīf Husain's telegram to the Naqīb is as follows:

'Having regard to the needs of the nation and the desire of the inhabitants, my son Faisal has left for your region. Owing to our relationship, I must say to you that it behoves us all to unite so as to give rest to the land, fulfilling its hopes and safeguarding its future. All this will come to pass through your good intentions and your religious and national sentiments. May God prosper you. – Husain.'

[2] These included a number of Nationalist leaders responsible for the Insurrection, as Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Saiyid Nūr, Saiyid Hādī Mūqutar, 'Alī Bazirgān, and 'Alī Jaudāt Beg. See *Al-'Iraq*, June 27th, 1921.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 18th, 1921.

[4] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C, 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 265 ff.

[5] *Al-'Iraq*. June 17th, 1921. The version as published in the official *communiqué*, which is cited above, differs somewhat from that appearing in *Parliamentary Debates* (q.v.). See also *Baghdad Times*, June 17th, 1921, and *Basrah Times*, June 19th, 1921.

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Nor did his first statement agree with the intimation that no 175x
other candidate would be considered, since H.M. Government 127x
regarded a republic as unsuitable for 'Iraq and they would not 643
'tolerate the alternative of a Turkish Prince'.

The Sharifian party, on the other hand, was delighted and the public as a whole, it was believed, was glad to have a definite lead from the British Government.[1]

The Naqīb's attitude to the Amīr, however, was above reproach.[2] He led the Council in giving a national aspect to the Amīr's reception. Five Council members were appointed, on June 16th,[3] to arrange for ceremonies and for lodging befitting the distinguished visitor: the former King of Syria and the son of a King. A mass meeting of some five hundred people, on June 17th, held under the auspices of Nājī Pasha and the *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, at the suggestion of Miss Bell and with the approval of the High Commissioner, arranged for Baghdad's share in the Amīr's reception. It also selected sixty notables to go to Basra to welcome Faisal on his arrival there. In addition, the Mayor of Baghdad sent telegrams to the principal towns, suggesting that they send delegations to greet Faisal.

Amīr Faisal arrived at Baghdad, June 29th, somewhat shaken by the manner of his reception in the south. He and his entourage had been led to believe, before arriving at Basra, that the country was solidly supporting him. His reception at Basra by the notables of that city[4] and of Baghdad, headed by Ja'far

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 17th, 1921, and *Lisān al-'Arab*, June 24th, 1921. The latter wrote: 'The Arabs welcome it with great pleasure.'

[2] The Naqīb telegraphed the following welcome to Faisal:

'To the light of the Candle of the family of the Prophet, the Pearly Star in the heaven of honour, H. H. the Amīr Faisal.

'I have received with respect Your Highness' telegram which proves your Hāshimī sentiments towards me and gives me the happy news of your arrival. Our hearts have been filled with pleasure. We thank you for your speedy and safe arrival. The ministers and the nation welcome you.' (*Al-'Iraq*, June 24th, 1921).

[3] June 11th as recorded in *Political Developments in Mēso.*, p. 5, is obviously erroneous.

[4] Three days before Faisal's arrival, the High Commissioner had been forced to discourage severely a petition from Basra bearing about 4500 signatures, asking that Basra be given a separate legislature and full independence in financial, military and police affairs, under the king chosen by 'Iraq.

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175x Pasha, Mr. Philby, representing the High Commissioner, Major 727x W. C. F. Wilson, Adviser of the Basra *Liwā* and Colonel J. H. F. 643 Lakin, representing the General Officer Commanding, had been excellent.[1] His reception elsewhere had been decidely disappointing. At Ur Junction, the gathering from Nāsirīya had been small and cold. At Samāwa, a large number of shaikhs and tribesmen had turned out and at Dīwānīya, the audience had been fair, but there had been little enthusiasm. At Karbalā, the Indian *Qaimmaqām*, who had little faith in Arab self-government, had left the town the day before Faisal's arrival, without indicating the official attitude towards the Amīr. After an interview with the High Commissioner, however, he had returned to Karbalā and attempted to make suitable preparations, but there had been no spontaneity and the '*Ulamā* stood markedly aloof. At Najaf, the '*Ulamā* had been reserved, if not hostile. At Tuwairijī and at Hilla, however, Faisal had been more cordially received.[2]

At the capital, however, where he was greeted on his arrival by the High Commissioner, his staff and a huge crowd of 'Iraqī notables, the enthusiasm of his welcome was reassuring. The dense and cheering crowds which filled the capital, bedecked with the Sharifian colours, green, red, and black, gave additional proof that the city accepted him.[3] The ovation given him the next day at Kādhimain, where he prayed in the mosque according to the Shī'a rite, was as remarkable as that of Baghdad.

The enthusiasm of these receptions, regarding which his

[1] *Basrah Times*, June 24th, 25th; *Al-'Iraq* and *Baghdad Times*, June 27th, 1921. The Baghdad and Basra Committees were not present when Faisal arrived. They had gone down stream to meet the *Northbrook*, but they failed to recognize it until too late.

[2] The lack of enthusiasm and of adequate preparations in the Lower and Middle Euphrates areas was probably not unrelated to the predilection of the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, who was in charge of making arrangements, for a republic and with his subsequent relinquishment of office in early July. *Communiqué, Al-'Iraq*, July 7th, 1921; also Cox, Sir P. Z.: 'Historical Summary' in Bell, op. cit., p. 528.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 30th, 1921.

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supporters had been genuinely concerned, tended to simplify 175
the situation, but anxious moments were by no means over. 727
The failure of the inhabitants of the lower Euphrates to come 643
forward as expected and the aloofness of the Shī'a divines were disconcerting. It was believed that the Muntafiq tribes were preparing a great manifesto in favour of a republic. Rumours of the formal disapproval of the *Mujtahids* were in the air. The pro-Turks were coldly hostile; the supporters of Saiyid Talib Pasha were sullen; and many people outside the cities were still indifferent. Against these unfavourable manifestations, however, could be set the stream of delegates from the towns of northern 'Iraq, the approbation of Basra and Baghdad, the prospect of approval from Mōsul which had sent a strong and substantial delegation and the gradual winning over of the shaikhs and notables, including the Naqīb's strongest supporter, 'Alī as-Sulaimān, through the efforts of Sir Percy Cox, Miss Bell and Faisal himself. Of the latter Miss Bell wrote, on July 7th, 1922: 'What helps everything is that Faisal's personality goes three quarters of the way. He has been roping in adherents.'[1] His simple dignity, great personal charm and his eloquent speeches, heartwarming and full of wisdom, continued to win the confidence and support of the communities before which he appeared: Christians,[2] Jews,[3] Sunnīs,[4] and Shī'is,[5] although his reception at Najaf and Karbalā had been markedly restrained.

Anxiety for the success of his candidature had not diminished the apprehension lest the more ardent Nationalists should

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[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 608.

[2] As at a reception given by the Catholic Christian Community, Baghdad, July 30th, 1921. For excerpts from his speech see Appendix VII (v).

[3] For excerpts of speech made at the House of the Grand Rabbi see Appendix VII (iii).

[4] For speech to the Mōsul delegation see Appendix VII (i); also various speeches, as at the Ja'fariya School, July 9th; *Al-Dijla*, July 11th, 1921. The outburst demanding complete independence at the latter meeting was toned down in *Al-Dijla*.

[5] As at Kādhimain, June 30th, and at the Husainīya School, July 4th, 1921. See *Al-Dijla*, July 10th, 1921.

175x 727x ●643 attempt to turn the popular enthusiasm into a *coup d'état*. Outbursts coupling complete independence and an immediate declaration of allegiance to Faisal as King of ‘Iraq had already occurred, as at meetings held in Faisal's honour on July 4th and 9th.[1] Suggestions that Faisal might be immediately acclaimed King had also come to the ears of the High Commissioner.[2] Neither he nor Faisal wished it to be said in the future that Faisal owed his throne, not to the will of the people, constitutionally expressed, but rather to a *coup d'état* initiated by the Nationalists who, in return, would expect to influence policy in the direction of complete independence and to share in the administration of the kingdom. The Residency, moreover, had borne the brunt of the battle and it must enjoy the fruits of the victory. Faisal, on his side, had little wish to be placed so soon under obligations to any group, which, if its expectations were not fulfilled, would be the first to turn against him.

The agreement reached at the Cairo Conference that the country should be made, if possible, to declare itself without the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, found support with large groups of Faisal's more moderate adherents. It was now echoed, apparently without inspiration from the Residency, in the vernacular press which dropped its original insistence on the immediate convocation of the National Assembly in order to press for a referendum.[3] Faisal himself joined in the insistence for prompt action.

The High Commissioner, feeling that the propitious moment had arrived, took immediate steps. In reply to a letter, July 8th, from the Council of State, inquiring, at his suggestion,[4]

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[1] *Al-Dijla*, July 10th and 11th, 1921.

[2] Bell, op. cit., pp. 601, 602; also *Al-Dijla*, July 2nd, 1921. The Mayor of Mu‘adhdham, on July 12th, called together the leading citizens and shaikhs, who declared Faisal to be their King, *Al-‘Iraq*, July 13th, 1921.

[3] *Lisān al-‘Arab*, on July 2nd and 5th, urged the convocation of the Assembly, but on July 6th, recommended a referendum, also on July 8th, 9th and 13th. *Al-‘Iraq* insisted on a referendum on July 8th, 9th and 11th; also *Al-Fallāh*, July 10th, 1921.

[4] Bell, op. cit., pp. 607-8.

as to the immediate cause of the delay in promulgating the 175ˣ
Election Law and as to whether he had any objection to its 727ˣ
immediate publication,[1] he stated that the delay had been due 643
to the difficulty 'in finding a formula which would cover the cases of several Kurdish Communities in 'Iraq'. In view of 'the cogent reasons' now before the Council, he was ready to promulgate the Law if suitable arrangements could be made for the Kurds. He feared, however, that the time required for convening the Assembly would be not less than three months. He then pointed out:

> There appears to be an increasingly insistent demand on the part of the public for an immediate opportunity to decide who shall be ruler.
>
> To obtain this early decision less centralized machinery will have to be devised and the High Commissioner, in so far as it rests with him, will be glad to facilitate any appropriate special measures which the Council may recommend for the purpose.[2]

Without further suggestion from the High Commissioner, the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the President, the Naqīb, on July 11th passed a unanimous resolution declaring:

> H.H. Amīr Faisal King of 'Iraq, provided that His Highness's Government shall be constitutional, representative and democratic and limited by law.[3]

The Council passed a further unanimous resolution to communicate its decision to the Minister of Interior in order that it might take necessary action.

Both the High Commissioner and Faisal were delighted with the Council's action, but they agreed that it was still necessary

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[1] Letter No. 131/S, Secretary, Council of Ministers, to Secretary to the High Commissioner, July 8th, 1921.

[2] Letter SD/1631, Secretary to the High Commissioner to Secretary, Council of State, July 8th, 1921.

[3] Extract from Minutes of Council of Ministers, July 11th, 1921: *Al-'Iraq* and *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 15th, 1921.

175+ to hold a referendum in order to prove to the world that Amir
727 Faisal really had the voice of the people. Using his prerogative
643 of confirming resolutions of the Council,[1] the High Commissioner announced that the resolution of July 11th must be supported by the assent of the people, ascertained by a referendum, before he would grant his approval.

In initiating the referendum, every effort was taken to ensure the desired results. Opinion on the resolution was expressed in most *Liwās* by the *Mutasarrif* and the British Advisers. In other *Liwās*, as Karbalā, the meetings were summoned by the British Adviser or by trusted Government officials. In Basra *Liwā*, selected representatives of the population were called in groups to make their declarations in the presence of an Election Committee. Official *madhbatas* were printed, any deviation from which by the addition of Nationalist proposals, was punished,[2] while riders declaring for further British support were not only permitted but encouraged.[3] In addition, the manner of registering the decisions, whereby the vote of the majority of a town or district was counted as its unanimous vote and the 'politics running on wheels greased with extremely well-melted grease'[4] tended to produce the desired decision.

Nevertheless, the Government did not have its own way entirely. The official *madhbata* did not meet the approval of the Shī'is. Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, a Shī'a '*Alim* of high standing drew up a formula strongly insisting on freedom from external control[5] and a party was formed to stir up agitation on its behalf. On July 28th, at a mass meeting in Baghdad, ostensibly summoned to sign the official *madhbata*, a modified declaration

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[1] Instructions for Council of State, Sec. 10.

[2] The *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad was forced to resign for permitting the additions to the *madhbatas*.

[3] The High Commissioner telegraphed permission for the addition of riders asking for continued British control. The Advisers, as at Diwāniya, used this permission to obtain such declarations.

[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 611.

[5] Cited in *Al-'Iraq*, July 16th, 1921.

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was presented and approved without a dissenting vote.[1] The 175ˣ
altered form was presented to the voters of Baghdad, July 29th, 727ˣ
with the result that sixty-six of the eighty declarations of 643
Baghdad made the acceptance of Faisal conditional on two points: that 'Iraq should be independent of foreign sovereignty and that the Constituent Assembly should be convened in three months. Kirkūk *Liwā*, still hesitating between joining 'Iraq or the Kurdish enclaves, voted against Faisal. Sulaimānīya took no part in the referendum. In Mōsul, many of the declarations accepted Faisal on the condition that the rights of the Kurds and the minorities should be protected.

Elsewhere, the referendum proceeded quietly. Both at Karbalā and at Najaf, through the skill and assiduity of the *Mutasarrif*, the official formula was signed without additions. In Hilla, many of the forty-one declarations contained a rider, added by permission telegraphed by the High Commissioner, that Faisal was accepted on condition that the British Mandate would continue. Sixteen of the twenty-six Dulaim declarations, five of the seven 'Amāra statements and a number of those from Mōsul added similar provisos. In the Shāmīya country, as at Dīwānīya, voters made a similar condition after the Adviser had informed them that they might add any words they liked. So certain was the result of the referendum that, before it was half completed and a month before his formal accession, Amīr Faisal, at Ramādī, August 25th, received the oath of allegiance as King of 'Iraq from the shaikhs and tribesmen of the Dulaim and the 'Anaiza and from the towns of the Upper Euphrates from Ramādī to Al-Qaim.[2] On August 15th the Naqīb was asked to undertake the formation of the first Cabinet for the new kingdom.[3]

The referendum, as it was carried out, was hardly a gauge

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[1] The altered declaration is given in *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 27th, 1921.

[2] *Al-Dijla*, August 1st; *Baghdad Times*, August 5th, 1921 (Fahād Beg's pro-British outburst was omitted); Bell, op. cit., pp. 613-15. For excerpts from Faisal's speech to the Shaikhs, see Appendix VII.

[3] Bell, op. cit., p. 618.

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175x of spontaneous popular support for Amīr Faisal, as official
127x Reports would suggest,[1] nor was it entirely the 'hasty pretence'
643 assumed by some popular writers.[2] It undoubtedly reflected the views of 'Iraq's leading inhabitants at the time, as had the plebiscite of 1918-19, which it resembled in a number of aspects. Its result, as published, however, did not constitute a true cross-section of 'Iraqī opinion, as might have been obtained at a general election or in a Constituent Assembly. It is quite probable that the anxiety of the High Commissioner and of Faisal for an immediate declaration, backed by a referendum, was not due only to the fear of a *coup d'état* or to the necessity of vindicating the assurances of H.M. Government. It may have been based on the knowledge that any election would increase the chances against Faisal, although the majority of the country's natural leaders, the shaikhs, the landlords and the notables, would probably have voted then for Faisal as they did in the referendum, either from a genuine regard for him or from the more likely desire to follow the lead of the Government, a factor on which the High Commissioner and his staff had steadfastly counted. In view of the altered tone of the country in the next few months, subsequent to the revelation that the proposed treaty did not mean abrogation of the Mandate, a fact hitherto suppressed, it seems possible that had the decision been left to an Assembly elected by the country, no verdict for Faisal as favourable as a 96 per cent majority vote of the population could have been announced.[3]

Not all the difficulties which faced the Residency in these crucial days had their origin in the state of public opinion in 'Iraq. The Colonial Office, in the middle of August, sent a

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 9; *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 14.

[2] Kohn, Hans: *Nationalism and Imperialism*, p. 212; *History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 309; Coke, R.: *The Arab's place in the Sun*, p. 245.

[3] It is difficult to understand how this figure was obtained. The population of Kirkūk, whether taken on the basis of the 1918-19 census or on that of 1930, forms approximately 6 per cent of the population of 'Iraq, exclusive of Sulaimāniya.

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cable to the High Commissioner stating that Faisal in his coronation speech must declare that the ultimate authority in 'Iraq lay with the High Commissioner.

Faisal immediately protested that he could not go on if such a statement were required. He pointed out that in the conversations held in London, he had accepted the candidature for the throne on the understanding that a treaty of alliance to replace the Mandate would be negotiated and that his prestige and dignity as king would be safeguarded. It was essential that he appear as an independent sovereign in alliance with Great Britain if he were to win over the extreme Nationalists. The High Commissioner also pointed out to the Colonial Office the unfavourable effect which the announcement would have on the country as well as on Faisal. He submitted that sufficient control could be exercised by less obvious methods. The order was eventually modified, a few days before the enthronement on August 23rd, the day selected by Faisal.[1]

Long before the hour set for the ceremony of accession, six o'clock of the morning of August 23rd, all available space in the great *Sarai* Square was filled with tribal shaikhs, religious dignitaries, civil and military officials and notables from all parts of 'Iraq, save Kirkūk and Sulaimānīya. The *Sarai* itself had been decorated with multitudes of 'Iraqī flags of black, white, green and red, and with banners bearing loyal inscriptions. Smart recruits of the National Army were drawn up around the Square. The 1st Royal Berkshires furnished the guard of honour.[2]

Promptly at six o'clock, Amīr Faisal made his appearance, accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Colonel Cornwallis and A.D.C.s and proceeded across the Square to the raised dais. After Amīr Faisal's salutations to

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[1] This day was chosen by Faisal because it coincided with the Shī'a feast of Al-Ghadir, commemorating the nomination of 'Alī as master of the people by the Prophet Muhammad.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, August 24th, 1921; but cf. Bell, op. cit., pp. 620-1, where the Dorsets are mentioned.

175ʳ the assembly, the party was seated, Sir Percy Cox on the right
643 and Sir Aylmer Haldane on the left of the Amīr.
727ᵛ Saiyid Husain al-Afnan, Secretary to the Council of Ministers, read the High Commissioner's proclamation which stated that, in accordance with the referendum on the resolution of the Council of State of July 11th, the Amīr Faisal had been elected King of 'Iraq by 96 per cent of the people. He then cried 'Long live the King'. The 'Iraq standard was broken out, the military band played 'God Save the King' — there was no Arab National Anthem — and a royal salute of twenty-one guns was fired.

After a short oration by Saiyid Mahmūd, eldest son of the Naqīb, Faisal spoke with great dignity. He thanked the 'Iraq nation for its generous and freely given allegiance and the British nation for its support of Arab independence, in which cause he called to mind the services of his father and of the Arabs associated with him. He also thanked

> the provisional Government for its zealous services and His Excellency the High Commissioner for his sincere friendship and the Great British Government for its reception of me as King of the Independent State of 'Iraq, to which high office I am called by the direct will of the Nation.

He outlined the aims of the nation, to achieve which, unity among all classes and the assistance of the friendly British nation would be necessary. He then made known his policy as head of the kingdom:

> I will spare no effort to profit by the qualities of every man of the nation, irrespective of religion or class. All to me shall be equal. There shall be no distinction between townsman and Bedui; for me the sole distinction shall be that of knowledge and capacity. The whole nation is my party and I have no other. The interests of the country as a whole are my interest and I have no other.
>
> My first task will be to proceed with the elections and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The nation should

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understand that it is this congress that will in consultation 175
with me draw up the Constitution of its independence on the 727
basis of democratic government and define the fundamental 643
principles of political and social life. Finally it will confirm the Treaty which I shall lay before it, regarding the relations which are to exist between our Government and the Great British Government. Furthermore, the Congress will establish the freedom of religion and worship so that all men may follow their own law and religion provided it does not conflict with security and public morals.

It will also enact certain Judicial Laws which will safeguard the interests of foreigners and insure them against any interference with their religion, race or language and will guarantee equity of commercial dealings with the foreign countries. In this connection I am confident that in consultation with Sir Percy Cox who has proved his friendship to the Arabs in a manner which will ever live in their affectionate memory, we shall, please God, reach our goal.

I appeal to you for union and co-operation, deep deliberation and insight. You must seek knowledge and must work. For the rest, it is for God to help us and grant us success.[1]

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, August 24th, 1921.

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175* and the civic spirit in which the political institutions and the departments of State have evolved from 1925 to 1932. The Permanent Mandates Commission itself had been inclined to consider that these considerations were in reality far more indicative of 'Iraq's fitness for emancipation than the mere possession of the machinery of a modern State.[1]

The Crown

● 643 On the promulgation of the Constitution, King Faisal, in accordance with his declaration to the High Commissioner, September 10th,[2] privately announced his withdrawal from direct participation in the affairs of State. Although this self-denying ordinance was received with some scepticism in ministerial circles, the King did refrain for a period of time from his former active intervention in administrative affairs. As time passed, however, and acting on the advice of the British authorities, including that given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies,[3] King Faisal not only resumed his place as the actual executive of the State but even exceeded the powers explicitly assigned him by the Constitution. His natural tendency was not uninfluenced by the fact that, as the point of balance between Great Britain and his own people, he had every encouragement to concentrate power within himself. To him the High Commissioner looked for the assurance that the Treaty would be observed. Through him British control was to be exercised over the Council of Ministers, over Parliament and the conduct of administration. The necessity of strengthening the King's hands to enable the High Commissioner to achieve these ends had been recognized from the first by the British drafters of the Constitution.[4] Wide powers had been assured to the King by the provisions in the Constitution, in spite of the

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[1] *Official Journal*, League of Nations, November, 1931, pp. 2056 ff.
[2] *Supra*, p. 361.
[3] Dobbs, H. R. C., in Bell, *Letters*, p. 554.
[4] *Supra*, Ch. xix.

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insistence of the 'Iraqī ministers that the original proposals 643 be altered. In addition, in the practical application of the powers so assured him, it seems clear that the responsible British officials in 'Iraq, in their privileged position as guardians of the Constitution, not only acquiesced in but also encouraged the King to exercise his personal influence and prerogative beyond a strict interpretation of the Constitution in order that their own control might be made more complete. No clearer example of such action exists than the resignation of Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī in March, 1930, at the instigation of the Residency, due to the fact that his policy aimed at achieving 'complete independence' before 1932.

On the other hand, King Faisal himself, under the sustained stimulus of his own desire and that of the Nationalists for complete independence, made every effort to concentrate as much personal power as possible in his own hands. It need not be imputed that he sought power for its own sake. He desired it both because it would enable him to meet the responsibilities and obligations thrust upon him by the Treaties and also because it would place him in a stronger position to win concessions from Great Britain, thus bringing 'Iraq nearer to the goal of independence. By the concentration of power in his own hands he believed that he could command the support of the various sections and groups in 'Iraq which, by their quarrels and animosities, would otherwise mar 'Iraq's prospects for national development and ultimate independence. He was only too well aware of the slight foundation of public support on which his early authority had rested. It seems to have been his plan to identify himself with the nation's needs as far as his British Advisers would permit; to be sovereign in fact as well as in name; and to lead the country to prosperity and to independent Statehood. In the fulfilment of these objectives there can be no doubt that King Faisal made many mistakes, particularly in placing his confidence in Nationalist groups whose ambitions for 'Iraq were possibly less impersonal than

643 his own. Nevertheless, it is also true that had he not so identified himself with their programmes, he would not have won the esteem and regard of his subjects so markedly shown on his death.

643 645 In no field was King Faisal's assumption of power more evident than in the circumstances attending the formation and the fall of the Ministries. In spite of Article 66 of the Constitution which, contrary to the wishes of the King at the time of drafting, had made the Ministers collectively and individually responsible to the Chamber,[1] not one of the fifteen Ministries during his reign, 1921-33, owed its downfall to a direct vote of no confidence by the Chamber.[2] In almost every instance, the resignation of the Cabinet was due either to the direct wish of the King or to the belief that it no longer possessed His Majesty's confidence. Thus, in early April, 1922, the reorganization of the Naqīb's Cabinet was occasioned by the King's dislike of four Ministers and his determination to remove them from office. The fall of the Naqīb's second Cabinet, August 14th, 1922, was due to resentment on the part of the Ministers at the King's interference and his obvious desire for its resignation.[3] The retirement from office of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn, November 16th, 1923, was in large measure the result of His Majesty's objection to the strong line adopted by the Council, particularly aginst the *'Ulamā* in June of that year.[4] The King's desire for a more aggressive Cabinet was known to be directly responsible for the resignation of Taufīq Beg as-Sūwaidī, August 25th, 1929.[5] Nūrī Pasha's resignation, October 24th, 1932, although attributed to a number of causes, was in reality due to the King's wish for a change of Ministers, if not to more personal reasons.

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[1] It may be argued with reason that this article did not make the ministers exclusively responsible to the Chamber.

[2] 'Abdul Muhsin Beg resigned, however, November 1st, 1926, when the Chamber elected its President from the Opposition, as the result of a temporary defection of the Kurdish section of the *Taqāddam* or Government Party. Yāsin Pasha has given as the reason for his resignation, June 26th, 1925, that he felt he could not command the confidence of Parliament.

[3] *Supra*, p. 357

[4] Ibid., pp. 392-3.

[5] Ibid., p. 412

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Every Prime Minister in forming a Cabinet was faced with 643
the necessity of choosing Ministers compliant not only with the 645
High Commissioner's requirement that they 'deal sensibly with relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq' but also with His Majesty's personal wishes, likes and dislikes. It was generally recognized that Ja'far Pasha's first Cabinet, November 3rd, 1923, was composed of members in sympathy with the King's ideas and pledged to pass the Treaty of 1922. In January, 1928, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, who had been suggested by the High Commissioner as the only available Minister capable of bringing about the ratification of the Treaty of 1927, formed his Cabinet with great difficulty owing to the King's secret opposition to a strong Ministry for reasons connected with the Treaty.

In the Parliamentary elections, the King, not uninfluenced 643
by lessons learned from the intractability of the Constituent 666
Assembly, likewise exerted his influence. He insisted in some cases, as in the elections of 1925, on the addition to the list of official candidates the names of men he particularly desired to see in the Chamber, and on the deletion of others which were not acceptable to him personally.

In the second elections, during the spring of 1928, his interference took a curious form. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg had come to office, pledged to secure ratification of the Treaty of 1927, on the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, a step approved by the High Commissioner, as the Opposition in the Chamber had been steadily growing. The Prime Minister's suggestion that the usual confidential letters be sent to the *Mutasarrifs* to ensure the return of deputies favourable to the Treaty, was opposed by the King. By permitting free elections, His Majesty hoped to bring an anti-Treaty Chamber into opposition with the Cabinet to prove to H.B.M. Government that, contrary to the High Commissioner's contention in late 1927,[1] the Treaty and the new Agreements were unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq.

In the parliamentary elections of 1930, the King, seeking a

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 410-411.

613 new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of
666 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory before candidates received government support.

643 In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the
[653] interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,[1] whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.[2]
[166] To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes on the land, and the development of residential amenities about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early inclination to find employment for those who had served him in western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion to its contribution to the welfare of 'Iraq enabled him to take a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although 'Iraqis universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly asserted their competence to run them, conditions in 'Iraq were
[565] far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

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[1] By the Prime Minister, Nūrī Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

[2] Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, 'Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years* 1930 *and* 1931 *and Capital Development Works Budget for* 5 *Years* 1931-35.

embracing the State. Not yet had a sense of loyalty and duty 643
to the nation arisen to surmount the differences between tribes- [578
men and townsmen, between Sunnī and Shī'ī, and between 156]
Muslims and minority communities or to replace personal opportunism. Patriotism still denoted independence without obligations to the State.

In his impatience with these materials at hand for the 643
creation of the new State, King Faisal may have gone farther than he was justified in attempting to mould the political institutions to his own will. On the other hand, it seems possible that had he not assumed the role of a benevolent despot, the political system of 'Iraq might have faltered and even collapsed entirely and the stable government insisted upon by the League of Nations as one of its criteria of 'Iraq's readiness for independence[1] would have been absent in 1932. It is equally probable that without King Faisal's guiding influence, supported by Great Britain, the 'Iraqī people in their impatience would have refused to agree to the obligations imposed by Great Britain as the price of her assistance. In the latter circumstance, Great Britain would have been forced to resume direct control or to withdraw from 'Iraq. Either course would undoubtedly have retarded for many years the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations and her acceptance as a member of the international community.

Upon the accession of King Ghāzī I, September 9th, 1933, the young King, barely turned twenty-one and not less of a Nationalist nor less mindful of his position than his father, attempted to use the immense popularity he had acquired as the result of his openly displayed approval of the campaign against the Assyrians,[2] to exert the power of the crown and to take the reins of control into his own hands, after the example of his late father. The Prime Minister, Rashīd 'Alī al Gailānī, although

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[1] *Official Journal*, November, 1931, pp. 2057 ff.

[2] *The Times*, September 1st, 11th, 1933. 'Iraqī-Assyrian relations are held to be outside the scope of this study. See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (1935), pp. 135 ff.

643 requested to remain in office at the death of King Faisal, was speedily convinced by conversations with King Ghāzī that he did not enjoy His Majesty's confidence.[1] His resignation, tendered October 28th, was immediately accepted to the great surprise of political circles. It was apparent that the young monarch desired not only a Cabinet amenable to his wishes but also a Parliament of his own creation. He was persuaded, however, by his British and 'Iraqī advisers against this course. Parliament was not dissolved and the new ministry, although headed by Jamīl Beg Midfai, was less Nationalist in tinge than he had desired.

On the whole, during the reign of King Ghāzī the personal power and influence of the Crown has tended to be less than under the former regime. His Majesty's youth, his inexperience and lack of training in statecraft have made it natural that he should be forced to give more scope than his father to the men about him, in his Palace and in the Cabinet, and to rely upon their advice and that of His Britannic Majesty's representatives at his Court. [645] Thus few if any of the seven ministerial crises of the reign seem directly traceable to His Majesty's influence but have been due rather to discord within the Cabinets, as when Jamīl Beg Midfai resigned, February 13th, 1934, to lack of confidence to meet emergencies, as at the time of the tribal revolts in March, 1935,[2] or to military intervention as in the *coup d'état* of October 29th, 1936.

669 On this last occasion, General Baqir Sidqī,[3] in charge of army manoeuvres to the north-east of Baghdad, suddenly moved the troops with the Air Force on the capital. In manifestoes dropped from the air, he demanded in the name of the army the dismissal of the Yāsīn Pasha ministry, with which 'the army had lost patience' and the appointment of one 'composed of

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[1] See translation of Rashid 'Ali's letter of resignation, *The Times*, October 30th, 1933.

[2] *The Times*, March 17th, 1935.

[3] Baqir Sidqī led the 'Iraqī forces against the Assyrians in 1933, when he won great popularity and promotion. His campaigns in 1935 against the tribes added to his reputation for military ability and ruthlessness.

ous elements of the population for appointment by degrees to those posts where such appointment is expedient. Having done so, they should formulate their proposals with the names of candidates recommended in each case for my consideration and orders.

APPENDIX VII

SPEECHES MADE BY AMĪR FAISAL

(Excerpts from, after his arrival in Baghdad, 1921)[1]

(i) *Speech of Amīr Faisal to the Mōsul Delegation*

'I say to you that the British Government is taking a wise line and fully intends to fulfil the promises made to my father in order to make the Arab Nation a true ally in the Middle East. The painful events which took place between me and the French have forced me to persevere in my efforts in the cause for which we arose in some other Arab country. Whereas 'Iraq is of importance to us as well as to the Arabs, my father delegated me in accordance with the wishes of 'Iraqis to perform this duty. I assure you that 'Iraq will remain independent with a constitutional government, free from all errors. Very shortly the national congress will be summoned and will introduce the constitutional law of this new Kingdom. I add, that in accordance with Mr. Churchill's declaration, 'Iraq will be an independent ally of Great Britain.'

(ii) *Speech at a Dinner given by Amīr Faisal to the Ministers and Notables of Baghdad, 16 July*[2]

'I assure you that the British Government has determined to assist the inhabitants to establish an Independent Constitutional Government, thus fulfilling the promise made to my father.

'Moreover, the British Government has declared its readiness to help you as a friend to a friend in accordance with its historical tradition. . . . I am certain that when the permanent government is established and the Congress held, that it will look on this matter as I do and that we will be able to establish friendship between Great

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, July 7th, 1921.

[2] *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 18th, 1921.

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Britain and the Arabs on such foundation as cannot be shaken and on promises which will preserve our honour and independence and safeguard our material interests.

'Our duty is to maintain our independence on a strong basis that we may keep it forever.'

(iii) *Speech to the Jewish Community of Baghdad, 18 July*[1]

'There is no meaning in the words Jews, Muslims and Christians in the terminology of patriotism, there is simply a country called 'Iraq, and all are 'Iraqis.'

'I ask my countrymen the 'Iraqīs to be only 'Iraqīs because we all belong to one stock, the stock of our ancestor Shem; we all belong to that noble race, and there is no distinction between Muslim, Christian and Jew. To-day we have but one means to our end: the race.'

(iv) *Speech to the Shaikhs, Ramadi, 25 July, 1921*[2]

'Brothers! my word is yours and I deal with you as brother towards his brother, and as a friend towards his friend and not as a ruler towards his subjects. I am not a foreigner to you. You may accept my word in all confidence. I came to you knowing you to be Arabs and Beduin, and for the last four years I have not been in similar surroundings. All Muslims should be brothers. I have no doubt that you approach me with requests as subjects approach their ruler. I, in turn, ask you, tribesmen, to keep the peace. I must ask the tribesmen like Fahād Beg and 'Alī as-Sulaimān each of whom is equal to a thousand, and those who are present to act on behalf of those who are absent. The past has passed away. In the future you and I will demand certain things from each other just as I now ask the Arabs to guard themselves and to be done with past evils and troubles. We have had enough of pillage and robbery. Now that God has granted us our wish, we should give our thoughts rest and devote ourselves to the promotion of our best interests and the building up of our country, which things are in the interests of both the ruler and the ruled. Such things are attainable only by peace and loyalty.

'In the future, when the tribes gather together, we will look into any differences existing between them. I shall call the tribal chiefs

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, July 19th, 1921.

[2] *Al-Dijla*, August 1st, 1921.

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and speak to them of the past. Muslims are brothers. They look up to no one but to me and the Government. Those present shall inform those who are absent. No one may raid another. This is what I want to tell you.'

At this point Fahād Beg rose and addressed the Shaikhs, saying: 'Do you want other than this?'

They all answered: 'No! No!'

Amīr Faisal then said: 'Will you be responsible to me for those who disobey?'

They replied: 'Your orders shall be obeyed and God shall bear witness to this.'

'What you order shall be done,' said 'Alī as-Sulaimān.

Fahād Beg added: 'We shall obey your orders because the British Government is your ally.'[1]

Amīr Faisal replied: 'We are in agreement with them [the British] and we must settle our affairs among ourselves.'

To this Fahād Beg replied: 'As to the Arabs, we will be responsible to you that 'Anaiza and Dulaim will be under your orders.'

'Alī as-Sulaimān then said: 'I undertake the same responsibility.'

Amīr Faisal said: 'There is another matter. Under a proper settlement, Arab traditions and the word of Arab rulers will be respected. I will be present among them, and will call together tribal chiefs and settle their disputes.'

(v) *Speech to the Catholic Christians of Baghdad, 30 July*[2]

'I thank this noble community which has given this reception. I make no difference between one community and another, because we are all noble 'Iraqis, and I, therefore, thank them for their confidence in my person, firstly, as an Arab and secondly, as an 'Iraqī. I desire to benefit from all the inhabitants of this country, whatever community or religion they belong to, and from every individual as well, so that we may regain our ancient glory. I also desire to make use of the qualifications and efficiency of each individual with-

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[1] Amīr Faisal was clearly taken aback by this frank definition of the situation. See also Bell, op. cit., p. 615.

[2] *Al-Fallah*, July 31st, 1921.

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643 out consideration of personality or religion. All present or absent, must know that this is my belief. All must know that there is neither majority nor minority in this country. The minority are the majority and vice versa. We must make use of any person whomsoever he may be and choose him to carry on the work which he can do; and I therefore desire the nation to help me by maintaining tranquillity and peace. All 'Iraq looks to independence and civilization, the Beduin and the villager alike. For I see the Beduin who never came before to the cities are now asking for a piece of ground to cultivate and a canal to irrigate it. This also makes me hope for success.

'We need two things: firstly, the maintenance of peace in all parts of 'Iraq and secondly, patience. Let me say that 'Iraq for eight hundred years has been governed by foreigners, passing from one tyranny to another till it reached its present stage. Give me one year for every hundred, or one for every two hundred — in four years time come and ask me for an account of what I have done. But you must not be in too great a hurry, you must not be rash: do not let the sentiments of race and patriotism boil in your blood. The nation is busy with the swearing of allegiance. There may be some difference of formulas but all aim at one goal — independence. We must work with tranquillity and not hurry, lest we fall before reaching fundamental needs.

'I, Faisal, say to you, that my desire is Arab independence. Who does not wish for independence? The very beasts of the field desire it. If I did not hope to attain it I would not be here. I am determined to overcome obstacles and I am certain the nation will support me.

'Let me say a word of a more general kind about the interrelation of states. All are busy with their own affairs and every nation that desires to live must form a part of the community of people so that the interests of all may be realized. We are wanting in men of learning and experts, and money, materials and all that is necessary to civilization. These will not drop from heaven but we must ask for them from one of the nations of the world. The nearest nation to us, geographically and economically, is Great Britain, and our interests agree with theirs. So we stretch out our hand for mutual support as a free independent people and ask

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

assistance as a younger brother demands from an elder, as a freeman from a freeman, not as a slave from a master, but as a friend from a friend. 643

'I am the friend of the British, and I ask the nation to hold towards them the friendship of the free to the free.'

APPENDIX VIII

H.M. KING FAISAL'S ACCESSION

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(Telegrams Exchanged on the Occasion of)

(i) *Telegram from H.M. King George V to H.M. King Faisal*[1]

'I offer Your Majesty my sincere congratulations on this historical and moving occasion when by the overwhelming vote of the people of 'Iraq the ancient city of Baghdad has once again become the seat of an Arab Kingdom. It is a source of deep gratification to myself and my people that combined military effort of British and Arab forces and those of their Allies has culminated in this memorable event. The treaty which will shortly be concluded between us to consecrate the alliance into which we entered during the dark days of the war, will, I am confident, enable me to fulfil my solemn obligations by inaugurating an era of peace and renewed prosperity for 'Iraq.'

(Signed) GEORGE, R.I.

(ii) *Telegram in reply from H.M. King Faisal*

'I am profoundly touched and greatly rejoice at the Royal and gracious favour which you have extended towards me and towards my people in Your Majesty's message.

'On this auspicious day when Baghdad the city of the Khalifs has become for the second time the capital of an Arab Kingdom, I recall with pride how white has been the hand of Your Majesty and Your noble people in the achievement of Arab aspirations. I am confident that the Arab Nation will justify Your Majesty's

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[1] *Iraq Admin. Report, October*, 1920, *to March*, 1922, pp. 9-10.

6;Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

643 reliance on the success of their efforts to regain their pristine glory
648 provided that they continue to enjoy the support and friendship of Great Britain. I doubt not that the treaty which will be concluded between us, will strengthen the bonds of alliance already cemented with the mingled blood of Briton and Arab on the battle-fields of the Great War and that it will be established on unshakeable foundation.

'Finally, I wish Your Majesty and your honoured Nation continued prosperity and enduring glory.'

(Signed) Faisal

APPENDIX IX

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PROTOCOL OF 30 APRIL, 1923

(To the Treaty with King Faisal, Signed 10 October, 1922)[1]

We, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of His Britannic Majesty and of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq respectively, having been duly authorized, met together this 30th day of April, 1923, corresponding to the Ramazan, 1341, in order to sign the following Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Their Majesties aforesaid on the 10th of October, 1922, corresponding to 19th Sa'far, 1341, Hijrah, subject to ratification.

PROTOCOL

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 18, the present Treaty shall terminate upon 'Iraq becoming a Member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a fresh agreement from being concluded with a view to regulating the subsequent relations between them before the expiration of the above period.

In witness of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures thereto. Done at Baghdad in duplicate this

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[1] Cmd. 2120.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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648 forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction
[186] and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the
• 643 ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was
645 inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets
668 which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the
669 factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in
[185] assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

648 In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 MI Middle East

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Afghanistan, which provided for consultation in all disputes 648 that might affect the common interests of the four states.

Relations with Great Britain

During the period of independence the hostility of Iraqi 648 nationalists towards Great Britain in no way diminished. The 186 mandate had been replaced by a treaty that they had from the first opposed as denying full independence and their sentiments were strengthened by Syrian and Palestinian nationalists, deeply critical of British policy in Palestine, who took refuge in Iraq. A further stimulus was provided by Axis propaganda, which produced among nationalist groups not only hostility to Great Britain but a positive admiration for the totalitarian states. When King Ghazi killed himself in a motor accident in [643] April 1939, to be succeeded by his infant son Faisal II, with the Amir Abdul-Ilah, Ghazi's cousin and brother-in-law, as Regent, there was a violent outburst of anti-British feeling in the belief that the accident was British-inspired.

Consequently, although the Iraqi Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany in September 1939, political opinion was divided on the measure of assistance to be granted to Great Britain under the Treaty; nationalists, especially in the all-important army, demanded non-belligerency and even the resumption of relations with Germany; and diplomatic relations with Italy were maintained. In 1941 the routine of political intrigue combined with nationalist and anti-British feeling and the effect of allied reverses, five years of Axis propaganda, and the presence of the Mufti of Jerusalem in Baghdad, to produce a chain of events which culminated in April 1941 in the last of the coups d'état. Rashid Ali al-Gailani seized 669 power with the support of an army group more violently 645 nationalist and anti-British than himself and formed a Government which was pledged to maintain Iraq's non-belligerency and displayed considerable sympathy towards the Axis. The Regent and several senior statesmen quitted the country. Relations were strained between the new Cabinet and the British Government, which was reluctant to recognize it, and on 2 May a disagreement over the passage of British troops through Iraq, on the basis of the Treaty, led to Anglo-Iraqi hostilities. These were terminated, after the introduction of further British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion, on 29 May; by this time the Regent had returned to Iraq, the Rashid Ali Government had fled, and armistice negotiations were in progress. Shortly after the outbreak of Anglo-Iraqi hostilities the Iraqi Government had been in touch with

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (20 date)1954 M1 Middle East

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties including
666 the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in
January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former
opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge
of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally
showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither
the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have
affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect
of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in
spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred.
The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently
abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for
little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the
time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election
of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals
of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September
by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the
Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree
on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume
their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

• 643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed
by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained
the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an
honourable past in the service of the Government and the
country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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to practice the various forms of worship, in conformity with accepted 642
customs, is guaranteed to all inhabitants of the country, provided 641
that such forms of worship do not conflict with the maintenance of
order and discipline or public morality.

Art. 14. *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Iraq nationals have the right to present petitions of complaint and memorials, in matters concerning themselves personally or in public matters, to the King and to Parliament and to the public authorities, in the manner and in the circumstances to be prescribed by law.

It is not permitted, except to official bodies and juristic persons, to address the authorities in the name of a number of persons.

Art. 15. All postal and telegraphic correspondence and all telephonic communications shall be secret and free from censorship or detention, except in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 16. The various communities shall have the right of establishing and maintaining schools for the instruction of their members in their own tongues, provided that such instruction is carried out in conformity with such general programmes as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 17. Arabic shall be the official language, except as may be prescribed by a special law.

Art. 18 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Iraq nationals are equal in the enjoyment of civil and political rights and the performance of public duties and obligations. No distinction shall be made between them on account of origin, language or religion. To them alone shall public appointments, civil or military, be entrusted, and foreigners may not hold such appointments except in the exceptional circumstances to be prescribed by law.

PART II

THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN

Art. 19. The sovereignty of the constitutional Kingdom of Iraq 642
resides in the people. It is a trust confided by them to King Faisal 643
son of Husain, and to his heirs after him.

Art. 20 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The Heir Apparent shall be the eldest son of the King, in the

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
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direct line, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of the Succession.

2) If there be no Heir Apparent according to the Law of Succession, the ablest adult male Iraqi of the sons of the eldest of the sons of King Hussein ibn Ali shall be the heir until there is an Heir Apparent.

Art. 21 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* On accession to the throne the King shall swear an oath before the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, assembled in joint session under the presidency of the President of the Senate, that he will uphold the Constitution and the independence of the country, and will be loyal to the nation and fatherland.

Art. 22 *(as amended July 29, 1925).* The King shall attain his majority on completion of his eighteenth year. In the event of the throne passing to a person below that age, the King's prerogatives shall be exercised by a Regent chosen by the former King, until such time as the King attains his majority. The Regent, however, may not assume this dignity, nor carry out the functions thereof, unless Parliament approves of his appointment. Should Parliament not approve, or should the former King fail to appoint a Regent, the Regent shall be appointed by Parliament. The Regent shall swear an oath before Parliament, as prescribed in the preceding article. Until such time as the Regent has been appointed and has taken the oath, the constitutional prerogatives of the King shall be exercised by the Council of Ministers on behalf of the people of Iraq, the Council being responsible therefor. No modification may be introduced into the Constitution during the Regency concerning the King's prerogatives and succession to the throne.

Whenever the necessity for the appointment of a Regent arises, Parliament shall be convoked immediately. Should the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved, and the election of the new Chamber be not yet completed, the former Chamber shall be convoked for this purpose.

Art. 23 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The King may, in case of need, absent himself from Iraq, by decision of the Council of Ministers, which must be published. Before leaving, the King will, with the approval of the Council of

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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Ministers, appoint a Regent or Council of Regency, and define the powers which he delegates to him or them. 642 643

2) Neither a Regent nor any member of a Council of Regency shall exercise any right of the King until after he has taken the oath prescribed by Article 21 of this law.

3) If Parliament is sitting, the oath shall be sworn before it, in the manner described in Article 21; otherwise it shall be sworn before the Council of Ministers in the presence of the Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, or those acting for them.

4) A Minister cannot be Regent or a member of a Council of Regency. If a member of Parliament is Regent or a member of a Council of Regency he shall not, during the period of the Regency, participate in the business of the Assembly to which he belongs.

5) If the absence of the King extends to more than four months and Parliament is not sitting, it shall be summoned immediately to consider the matter.

6) The Regent and the members of a Council of Regency must be Iraq nationals and not less than thirty years of age. A male relative of the King, who has completed the eighteenth year of his age, may be appointed.

Art. 24. The King may not ascend a throne outside Iraq, except with the consent of Parliament.

Art. 25. The King is safeguarded and is not responsible.

Art. 26 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*.

1) The King is Head of the State. He confirms laws, orders the publication, and supervises the execution thereof. By his order Regulations are issued for purpose of carrying out laws, within the express provisions thereof.

2) The King issues orders for holding General Elections for the Chamber of Deputies and for the convocation of Parliament. He opens Parliament, adjourns and prorogues it, and dissolves the Chamber of Deputies, in conformity with the provisions of this law.

3) If necessity shall arise, when Parliament is not sitting, for taking urgent measures to maintain order and public security, to repel a public danger, to incur urgent expenditure not sanctioned by the budget or by a special law, or to carry out the obligations of treaties, the King may, with the approval of the Council of Ministers

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
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642 issue ordinances, having the force of law, prescribing the measures to
643 be taken, as may be necessary in the circumstances, provided that they shall not contravene the Constitution. All ordinances must be submitted to Parliament at its next session, except those which have been issued for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations of treaties which have been approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly. If Parliament does not confirm the ordinances, the Government shall notify the termination of the operation thereof, and they shall stand repealed from the date of such notification. All Ministers must sign the ordinances.

The expression "Law" includes ordinances issued under this Article unless there is anything to the contrary in the context.

4) The King concludes treaties, provided that he shall not ratify them without the approval of Parliament.

5) The King selects the Prime Minister and, on his recommendation, appoints the Ministers and accepts their resignation from office.

6) The King may dismiss the Prime Minister if the public interest renders it necessary so to do.

7) The King appoints the members of the Senate and accepts their resignation from their office.

8) The King, on the recommendation of the responsible Minister, appoints and dismisses all diplomatic representatives, civil officials, qadhis and judges, and grants military rank and appoints divisional commanders and those above them, unless he delegates these powers, by law, to some other authority. He bestows decorations and titles and other marks of honour.

9) The King is Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces. He declares war with the consent of the Council of Ministers. He concludes treaties of peace, on condition that he shall not ratify them without the approval of Parliament. He declares Martial Law and the State of Emergency in conformity with the provisions of this law.

10) The coinage shall be struck in the name of the King.

11) The death sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the King. The King may reduce sentences or remit them

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 MI Middle East
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by special pardon and, with the consent of both Assemblies of Parliament, he may proclaim a general amnesty. 642 643

PART III

THE LEGISLATURE

Art. 27. The King shall exercise his powers by means of Royal Iradas. They shall issue upon the proposal of the responsible Minister or Ministers, with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, and shall be signed by them. 642 646

Art. 28. Legislative power is vested in Parliament and the King. Parliament is composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The legislature has the right of making laws and of amending and repealing them in conformity with the provisions of this law.

Art. 29. The King shall open Parliament in person or depute the Prime Minister or one of the Ministers for that purpose to perform the opening ceremony and deliver the speech from the throne.

Art. 30 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* No person shall be a member of either Assembly of Parliament:—

1) If he is not an Iraq national who has acquired Iraq nationality at birth or by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne[1] or by naturalisation, provided that, if he is naturalised, he belongs to an Ottoman family ordinarily resident in Iraq before the year 1914, and has been an Iraq national for ten years.

2) If he is less than thirty years old in the case of a deputy, or less than forty in the case of a senator.

3) If he has been adjudged bankrupt and has not been reinstated.

4) If he has been interdicted by the Court and the interdiction has not been removed.

5) If he has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year for an offense which is not of a political nature, or if he has been sentenced to imprisonment for any period for theft, bribery, breach of trust, forgery, fraud or any other offence adversely affecting his honour.

6) If he holds an official appointment in the Government or the departments connected therewith, or any office, appointment or employment under a person or institution which has a contract with a

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[1] See Turkey, Note on Treaties, p. 503 below.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x 721 Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1921–6

642 186 These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a naḥiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-
642 178 twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroitness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

644 There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Ḥaydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners simi-
648' larly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic
Loss

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[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg
645, 175

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[For the rise and fall of various ministries, their policies and internal politics from 1900 to 1950 in Iraq, see category 116, entire source.]

with no Constitution; and an intended treaty relationship with 642
Great Britain, but as yet no treaty. These features, however, did not disturb the administration of the country, which in Faysal's first half-year proceeded without interruption. The Naqib and his Council, correctly resigning on the King's accession, were reinstated with changes. The new Cabinet formed on 10 September included Naji al-Suwaydi, a lawyer and patriot of distinguished 645*
name and record, as Minister of Justice: a Mosul Christian doctor Ḥanna Khayyaṭ as Minister (later Director-General) of Health: and most of the former Ministers, including Ja'far Pasha in Defence and Sasun Ḥasqayl in Finance. Ḥajj Ramzi, a nonentity who had succeeded Sayid Ṭalib at Interior, retained that office. The Ministers of Justice, Works, and Awqaf were unchanged. The now separate Ministry of Education was entrusted to the learned Shi'i divine Sayid Muḥammad 'Ali al-Shahristani. This Cabinet was unaltered till March 1922. Among the Advisers, Cornwallis was to remain in Interior for the next fourteen years; Bonham-Carter retired in May 1921, replaced for a year by Nigel Davidson also from the Sudan and thereafter by E. M. Drower: Atkinson, leaving for India, was succeeded by his deputy H. H. Wheatley. Lionel Smith became adviser to Education, Colonel P. Joyce—a colleague of the Amir Fayṣal and of Lawrence in the Arabian campaign—to Defence. Slater and Cooke were unchanged.

The grouping of departments differed widely from that practised 647
under the Secretariats of the Wilson régime (p. 108). The Ministry 645
of Interior covered, besides tribal, 'political', and municipal affairs, the 'Iraq Police, the civil prisons, the Agricultural and Veterinary departments, the Health service (when it ceased to be a Ministry), the Press Bureau and the department of Revenue until its transfer to Finance in October 1921. The Ministry of Finance dealt with its normal revenue, expenditure, accounting, budgeting, currency, and establishment functions, and controlled the Port of Baṣra; that of Communications and Works covered the departments of Irrigation, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys, and the Railways.

The Ministry's task of governing was embarrassed by a financial 652
stringency which was aggravated by the disorders of the last year, by the continuance of post-war economic depression, and by the need to provide funds for the Ministry of Defence and for the Throne itself; nor, with a press and public outcry in Great Britain demanding ruthless economy in 'Iraq—or indeed outright evacuation from it—could funds be expected from that quarter. The new State started without debts, but with such liquid assets only as it could earn. The public services of Health, Education, Works, and the rest were confronted with unavoidable reductions at a

1[1921--- Amalgpt]

by British troops, who will decline the task.' The National Service 702
Bill, introduced into Parliament, met the urgent Shi'i and Kurdish 668
opposition already described. Detested by Shi'ism and dreaded by the little-considered man-in-the-street, the project became the darling of the 'Iraqi press which saw in British caution a proof of their sinister desire to keep 'Iraq weak and helpless. Successive Cabinets were in doubt whether to drop the project amid the scorn of newspaper patriots and the Army itself, or to press it to the point of probable explosion with Shi'i and Kurd.

Under the Treaty of January 1926 the question of 'Iraq's mem- 648x
bership of the League was to be reviewed in January 1928 and thereafter four-yearly. The British Government notified 'Iraq in July 1927 that it would consider a recommendation for such membership in 1932, but not in 1928; but this, disappointing as it was to eager 'Iraqi statesmen, did not preclude attempts to obtain a better interim status. Conversations were held in London late in 1927. The King, the Prime Minister and other ministers, and the High Commissioner participated in these with Colonial Office spokesmen; and, after a position approaching deadlock had been reached, terms were agreed. A new Treaty was signed by Ja'far Pasha and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on 14 December. Its validity, subject to approval by the League Council as well as by the 'Iraq Parliament, was dependent also on a revision of the Military and Financial Agreements.

The new Treaty marked a certain, but no great, advance. It admitted that the 1922 and 1926 Treaties had been already in a measure superseded by events, notably that of 'Iraq's own progress; it treated 'Iraq explicitly as an independent sovereign State, and dealt with its internal and international obligations as such; and by its terms the British Government undertook to support 'Iraq's candidature for League membership in 1932 'provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval'. It was largely by reason of this proviso that the draft Treaty was coldly greeted in 'Iraq by almost all political elements.

It formed, nevertheless, part of the inheritance assumed by the 645
Ministry which, under 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, succeeded that 648v
of Ja'far Pasha on 14 January 1928: a Ministry which included two Shi'is, a Christian, and a body of experienced politicians. The moderate and experienced ex-Mutaṣarrif 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab was at Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman at Justice, the Christian economist and business man Yusif Ghanima at Finance, the Najf banker Muḥsin al-Shallash at Works, and another shrewd and experienced Shi'i, Salman Barrak of Ḥilla, as Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture. Naji al-Suwaydi's clever and progressive younger brother, Tawfiq, came to the Ministry of Education, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The
648* former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called
[665] for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

665 The Sunni-Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the
668 efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahdha Party lost
186 support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

*645 'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

It was succeeded immediately by a diluted Ikhā Ministry under 645*
Yasin Pasha, summoned to power this time, on 17 March 1935, without conditions. Destined to rule 'Iraq for twenty months, it included Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ja'far Pasha at Defence, Nuri at Foreign Affairs, two Shi'is—Ra'uf Baḥrani, a former Finance Inspector, at Finance, and Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, a figure in the learned and literary world, at Education—and Amin Zaki at Works. There was no representative of the left-wing group (that of the *Ahali* newspaper) under Abu al-Timman; and the omission of Ḥikmat Sulayman, to his keen resentment, was to lead later to serious results.

The tribal situation to which, from Ḥilla to Naṣiriya, the new 619
Ministry had forthwith to address itself, was in large measure 645 ●
significant of the mere anti-Government lawlessness of tribes and 664
of the patriarchal feudalism always preferred by the Shi'i leadership. As such it was a familiar 'Iraqi phenomenon from Ottoman times. But in so far as it had been produced by intrigue from Baghdad and from Najf in support of the 'political' aims of statesmen—themselves but little concerned with tribal or Shi'i advantage—it recalled the similarly evoked anti-British *Thawra* of 1920. Indeed, the history of the Euphrates in 1935 and 1936 reproduces faithfully the episodes of 1920 on a smaller but important scale. It shows again the ease with which the shaykhs were willing to follow, as they followed in 1920, any movement which seemed to offer them personal or tribal advantage—Government-appointed paramountcy in the tribe, a seat in the Chamber, a reopened land dispute, or a grant of rice-lands—with motives of no wider a patriotism than those similarly exploited by the Baghdadis fifteen years earlier.

Yasin Pasha achieved, by an air-dropped Proclamation to the tribes, a substantial immediate pacification. It was followed by visits to Baghdad by the Ikhā-favoured shaykhs. Their car-loads of festive armed followers filled the capital, with the complacent permission of the Minister of the Interior but to the alarm of onlookers. Eager for some immediate gain from their recent 'patriotic' uprisings, they mingled in street and ante-room with the Kurdish deputations from the northern liwās which, organized by the Ikhā to protest against the misdeeds of the Ayubi and Madfa'i Ministries, arrived in time to congratulate their successors. A serious episode at Kadhimiya, in which bloodshed resulted from a clash between police and a crowd demonstrating against the desecration of a graveyard, was without political meaning and could be composed without wider repercussions. The King, whose mother died in March, was acclaimed as father of a son and heir apparent—the later Fayṣal II—on 2 May. Parliament adjourned early in April and general elections were ordered in May.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one
● 645 major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its
rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents
668 they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near
619 Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests
[687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

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[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Ḥay- 645
dari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their col- 669
leagues in Palestine. The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad
on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save
that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained in-
visible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new
régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Āli personally there was
little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a
Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert.
The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful [722]
factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage
of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it.

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey 721
and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy 648 ×
the reverse of their own. In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya.

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid 'Āli first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately

In advance of settlement, and pending the establishment subsequently of a General Land Register, map records should be constituted showing the position of all land authoritatively reserved for public purposes, or forming the subject of special concessions. These should be kept in duplicate through the agency of the Survey Department at the Headquarters of each liwa and in the capital. All Departments should be instructed to collaborate in the preparation and maintenance of these records, whereby the waste of public funds and the injury to public interests occasioned by conflicting arrangements and authorisations to utilise land might be quickly eliminated, without waiting for the gradual advance of settlement.

All proposed reservations of miri land, all proposed concessions and all proposed expropriations of mulk or tapu land should be examined by a small committee representing the bodies principally concerned in the administration of land or of its use for public purposes. These proposals might then be submitted with the committee's recommendations to the proper Minister, who I take it would normally be the Minister of Finance as custodian both of the public purse and of miri land. In this way all important public interests would receive consideration before land was reserved, conceded or expropriated for any special purpose. To make the record as complete as possible the location of all existing reservations, concessions, etc., should be examined and defined, so far as available information permits. In the case of urban areas the local record would most conveniently be kept in the town concerned.

Since the proposed record is in the form of maps indicating specific locations of land, the work of constructing and maintaining it should be entrusted to the Survey Department. The Headquarter Offices of the Survey would also be the best place to keep the authorised duplicates of the local maps, so that all changes could be regularly and easily incorporated. A Survey Officer might also conveniently act as the Secretary of the suggested Examining Committee.

7 AND 8. MINISTERIAL GROUPING OF SERVICES

7. If settlement of rights and land valuation are undertaken on the lines recommended, four Departments of State will be required to perform important functions; but there is a sharp division in the nature of those functions, as already noted.

Two Departments will be charged with the execution of these reforms, viz. the Central Lands Office (with its settlement and valuation field parties) and the Survey Department. Two other Departments, viz. the combined Land Revenue and State Domains Department, and the Tapu Department will be charged respectively with the presentation and support during settlement and valuation (*a*) of the interests of the State as the largest landowner and the collector of land revenue and (*b*) of the registered rights to mulk, tapu and waqf interests.

The two former will be called upon to discharge the functions of impartial and disinterested investigators and recorders of duly established rights. The two latter will be called upon to expound and support as strongly and ably as possible the particular public interests or private rights for which they are responsible.

The first of these services has still to be created and attached to some Ministry. The other three are already in existence, attached respectively to the Ministries of Economics, Communications and Works, of Finance and of Justice. In pursuance of the general inadvisability of

making avoidable changes at this stage these existing arrangements should not be disturbed. The Central Lands Office would in my opinion be most advantageously attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The supreme importance, for speedy and economical working, of the general and widespread co-operation of the provincial staff of the Ministry of the Interior, both during and in advance of settlement, has previously been emphasised. Indeed, the conduct of settlement, which so closely affects the security, contentment and peacefulness of the whole mass of landholders and peasantry throughout the country, must in any case be a dominant interest and responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. It is better that this interest should be directly safeguarded and this responsibility directly discharged, by the Ministry most intimately concerned. The arrangements in the field for securing the attendance of claimants and witnesses, as well as for orderly conduct of operations would in any case have to be made by the provincial staff of this Ministry. Settlement Officers and their principal assistants must also for the most part be drawn from the same staff, for that staff constitutes the only body of public servants who combine the necessary qualifications with the necessary experience. Moreover if the Ministry of the Interior undertakes administrative charge of the work, it will be a simpler matter to make changes in the personnel, than it would be if such changes involved transfers to and from another Ministry each time. For while it can be said with confidence that Settlement Officers and Assistant Settlement Officers should normally be recruited from the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, it is not to be expected that all those selected will find the work congenial or will prove successful.

8. I understand that the Ministry of Finance incline to the view that the general administration of settlement and land valuation operations might more appropriately be undertaken by that Ministry. This course would, in my opinion, be inadvisable both in the financial interests of the State and in those of the proposed reforms.

It must, I think, be recognised that the Ministry of Finance occupies an essentially different position and performs essentially different functions to, all other Ministries of State. It is the primary duty of all other Ministries to administer efficiently the specific branches of the public service, executive or judicial, allotted to their control. On the other hand, the distinctive and all-important duties of the Ministry of Finance are (i) to inspire, supervise and control all the operations of Government in so far as they affect the financial position of the State, and (ii) to nurse the economic resources of the country, to study all potential sources of revenue and to make these contribute fairly and without injurious reaction to the income of the State.

The Ministry of Finance must necessarily administer its own financial services ; but I venture to think that, otherwise it should aim at as complete a detachment as possible from those administrative and executive functions of Government, which it is its duty to criticise impartially and control closely from a financial standpoint. Not only do the Ministry of Finance's wide and supremely important range of financial and economic functions demand its exclusive and fullest attention, if they are to be performed with any approach to the high standard needed ; but the Ministry's duty as the financial watchdog of the State cannot be discharged with the same detachment, and is unlikely to be credited with the same disinterestedness, when applied to its own proceedings.

On these grounds alone it appears to me highly undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should itself assume administrative conduct and control of a new and formidable undertaking which is no part of its financial duties.

I also believe that the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the public purse, regards itself as the natural trustee and manager of State land and I imagine that it was on this account that the duties of the late State Domains Department were resumed by the Ministry of Finance. Subject to the considerations just urged, no exception to this view is called for, and the transfer was logical. But it should be recognised that (*a*) the current management of, what may be termed, the national estate (miri) and (*b*) the proposed systematic settlement of rights and valuation of land, are not only different but mutually incompatible, undertakings.

During the process of settlement innumerable cases are bound to arise in which the immediate and direct interests of the State, as landowner, will conflict with those of private individuals. It is essential that the former shall be presented as wholeheartedly and singlemindedly as the latter, at every stage of settlement operations. This is a duty which very properly pertains to the Ministry of Finance as custodian of the public purse. For the vast territories of the national estate (miri) represent by far the most important capital asset which el 'Iraq possesses, not excepting her petroliferous deposits. As custodian and advocate of the landed interests of the State in its capacity as landowner, the Ministry of Finance occupies the position, and should be free to act without distraction, as a profoundly interested party. Subject to the general conditions of the settlement law, it should, as a general matter of principle during settlement, offer a healthy opposition through its appropriate Department to all claims to rights over land statutorily in the ownership of the State.

And similar considerations apply to the general methodical valuation of land for fiscal purposes. Here again the organisation charged with execution of the task should occupy a position of cold scientific detachment. Here again there should be provision for appeal from the decisions of the settlement authorities under proper safeguards against obstruction or frivolous abuse. Here again the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the financial interests of the State, should act as the vigilant and unhampered exponent of those interests. And here again landholders and other parties directly concerned may be relied on to exercise no less vigilance in their endeavours to ensure that the approved results do not unduly favour at their expense, either their neighbours or the State.

In short, the successful and satisfactory execution of settlement of rights and valuation of land for fiscal purposes, requires complete freedom on the part of the Ministry of Finance to defend the financial interests of the State, whether represented by its capital assets in land or its prospective revenue. And such a successful and satisfactory execution also requires a position of recognised and unchallengeable impartiality on the part of the Ministry responsible for the administrative conduct of these operations. On these further grounds also it appears to me most undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should undertake this part of the general task.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHl Iraq MHl

through institutions of higher education, seems to develop into an 181
extraordinary mental agility. Those who are politically articulate
share a high concern for the future of Iraq as a nation. 153

A visitor to the country is also struck by a number of contradictions. Iraq has a brilliant cultural inheritance, yet the bulk of the population is illiterate. It is a country of great economic possibilities, yet the majority of the people exist at a meagre standard of life. The soil is of high fertility, yet it continues to be farmed by primitive methods. Above all, although the future prosperity of the country depends upon the application of science and power to the land, agricultural development is inhibited by a most unsatisfactory system of land tenure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Primary education on any large scale in Iraq is of recent growth. 872
It began with the traditional Arabic mullah school, in which small groups of boys under the direction of a religious teacher memorized religious lore in a monotonous and repetitive manner. Traces of this verbal technique are still obvious in many of the primary schools.

Under the Ottoman régime the nucleus of a schools system was introduced, and it is said that by 1913 there were some 6,000 children attending primary schools of a sort. Soon after the next military conquest the British promoted some further educational development and, in particular, substituted Arabic instead of the alien Turkish language as the medium of instruction. By 1921 there were reputed to be more than 15,000 children attending public primary schools.

It is significant, however, that no real approach to a system of public primary schooling was made until the nation took its educational affairs into its own hands. Since the meeting of the first Iraqi Parliament in 1925 a real impetus appears to have been given to the development of primary education. By 1931 there existed 316 public primary schools with an enrolment of some 35,000 pupils. By 1950 extraordinary quantitative progress had been made, for by that year 175,000 children were enrolled in over 1,000 public primary schools.

THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

By 1940 the development of primary education, and of higher 872
education, had gone on at such a pace that it was necessary to 645

872 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General 645 Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age of admission to the primary school should not be less than six and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that 'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when [681] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

871 By this time the administration of education had been highly systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of 645 Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of Education controlling and supervising the most minute details both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

872 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does 658 not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age, not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940 an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty [464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the [362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other [696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS

Although the main obstacle to further educational development in Iraq is that of finance, and although it is difficult to see how sufficient money will be forthcoming for this and other social purposes until fiscal and land reforms are undertaken, there exist other obstacles to educational progress which are more of a political and administrative nature. 871

Lack of Continuity in Educational Policy. An undoubted obstacle to the pursuance of a consistent and steady development in the direction of compulsory education is a lack of continuity and positive direction in educational policy. This seems to have obtained for a long time. It is a somewhat delicate matter to discuss but, looking back over the history of educational administration since the formation of the first Iraqi Government, one is confronted with very frequent changes of Minister of Education, less frequent but still too frequent changes both of officials and in the organization of the Ministry of Education, and lack of consistency in policy with constantly fluctuating emphasis on this or that aspect of educational development. One type of school or administration may be here one year and gone the next. This is particularly true of devices for the training of rural teachers; institutions have been started and then discarded before an evaluation of their real usefulness has been possible. 871 645

These changes of policy and of personnel have been due to both political and sectarian factors which it is not possible fully to discuss in this investigation, but of which those concerned with them or affected by them are only too well aware.

Circumstances of this kind tend to produce even in the best officials and educators a sense of frustration. They also make it extremely difficult for the most able Minister of Education to promote a well-founded policy with any assurance that it will be carried out by his successors.

The Problem of the Administration of Education. Administration of the public services in Iraq is generally characterized by its high degree of centralization. This was perhaps inevitable when Iraq as an independent nation was still young and had neither the time nor the resources to work out new arrangements whereby the localities might participate more in the business of government. Further, a somewhat 'tight' central administration was part of the process of ensuring national unity. [648]

Educational administration provides no exception to this practice of centralization. Curricula are laid down by the Ministry of

645 871 Education, as are textbooks and the conduct of examinations. The central authority trains the teachers, appoints and dismisses them. Salaries are paid from the central treasury. Apparently no Government school or training institution has funds of its own, and the schools appear to have little freedom in the choice of books and equipment. The daily time-table of the school is determined by the national Primary School Regulations. As has been stated earlier, there are Provincial Directors of Education, but these are direct employees of the Ministry of Education and are their local representatives.

Such a highly centralized system was, of course, indispensable in the early stages when administrative talent was at a premium and when local government institutions did not exist. But it is accompanied by disadvantages and may, in the long run, as schools increase and the amount of detailed central administration grows, have the adverse effect of hindering the Ministry of Education from concentrating on their essential task of promoting a broad policy of national educational development. From conversations with senior officials of the Ministry of Education, the writer gained the impression that, through sheer pressure of daily detail, they were prevented from devoting sufficient of their time and talents to consideration of major issues.

This degree of centralization in a capital city which is so distant from many of the provincial centres and schools, and under which schools must inevitably be treated *en masse*, is also possibly a contributory factor in maintaining the over-rigidity which applies in many of the schools. Schools which are required to work in detail according to central regulations may fail to develop individuality and personality.

871 *The Problem of Differing Regional Needs.* Another feature which suggests that the time is arriving when it will be necessary to decentralize some of the administration of education is that, although the total population of Iraq is relatively small, there exist great regional differences. The needs of urban Baghdad and its surrounding province differ greatly from those of the nomads in Muntifiq and Northern Mosul. The problems of the Marsh Arabs of Amara are not those of the Kurds in Erbil and Sulaimaniya.

000 National unity is an imperative consideration, but it would be unfortunate if the requirements of conformity to a centrally conceived educational system had the effect in any way of conflicting with regional cultures and distinctively local ways of life. If this were so it might, in the long run, not serve the cause of unity.

875 teaching which are now appearing in the top classes of the primary schools suggest that the Iraqi teacher is by no means rigidly conservative in method, and is quick to apply new techniques when his eyes have been opened to them.

During the last year or two, however, possibly because of the need to find money to cope with the additional numbers of children who are presenting themselves for admission into primary schools, it has apparently been difficult to finance courses for teachers. It is to be hoped that the time will soon come when it is possible to organize courses for serving teachers, not only in specific subjects, but also of a more general nature. The necessarily brief and restricted training which has had to be provided for many of the teachers in the past means that the educational horizons of some of the serving teachers are not as broad as they might well be. If it is still felt that the cost of many residential courses of a general nature cannot yet be met, consideration might be given to the possibility of taking short courses to the teachers themselves in the teachers' clubs which exist up and down the country.

THE ADVANCE OF EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVE IN THE PROVINCES

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645 In addition to these evidences of advance in the schools and among the teachers, there are also signs of certain trends in the provinces which, as will be seen later, may be highly significant as aids to the ultimate implementation of plans for the promotion of compulsory education.

The Beginnings of Local Educational Administration. Until very recently, the impetus for educational development in Iraq has, as already pointed out, come from the centre. The Ministry of Education has not only supervised the national system but has also provided most of the schools and most of the money. It has also taken the administrative initiative. There are now indications, even in the remoter provinces, that the people are wanting to have their share in educational development. If these trends, as some of the people in the provinces maintain, are real evidence of the beginnings of a public concern about education they are, indeed, most important.

One hopeful sign is that, despite their very limited powers and the fact that certain of the Provincial Directors of Education are afraid to take any initiative without previous sanction from the Ministry of Education, some of the Directors are exhibiting considerable energy and initiative in promoting local educational advance. In some of the provinces the Directors complain about

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the lack of suitable school buildings and the fact that they have to refuse children admission to schools, but pessimistically maintain that no progress can be made because the Ministry of Education cannot or will not find the money for them. But others are showing real enterprise and, in co-operation with the Provincial Governor, are building new schools with money obtained from local contributions. 871 645

In one province, through the initiative and persistence of an energetic Director of Education who has that commendable combination of qualities desirable in an educational administrator, namely a sense of vocation and a love of children, five well-designed new primary schools and three similar intermediate schools are being built at the time of writing, mainly out of local contributions. In the same province the Director of Education has built a new and well furnished kindergarten school, and has provided a central playing field and changing rooms through money collected locally. When he came to the province some four years ago there were twenty-eight primary schools. There are now fifty-four and the number will soon have increased to sixty. 871

Local initiative of this kind is of great significance. It suggests that the way to advance is not only through schemes that may be produced in the Ministry of Education itself, but also through the energies of people on the spot who know local needs and the ways and means of meeting them. This provincial effort also suggests that, despite limitations imposed by the central budget, money for educational development on no modest scale can be obtained from local resources when there is local initiative and enterprise. True, local voluntary contributions towards the building of new schools are not in the long run the best means of financing local educational provision, because such sources may not be regular and may dry up with changes in the circumstances of the charitable donors. Ultimately, such contributions will need to be supplemented by more regularly and equitably distributed local taxes. But these attempts to meet locally some of the costs of the educational provision are likely to be important future means of financing educational advance at a greater pace than appears to be practicable by reliance on central exchequer sources alone. Extra taxes are of course never popular but, when additional monies for educational purposes have to be found, it may prove that the levying of local taxes by a local administration is likely to prove less obnoxious to the psychology of people of tribal origin who have an inherent dislike of distant central government.

Awakening Educational Consciousness in the Localities. After travelling through most of the provinces of Iraq, and discussing possibilities

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CHAPTER SIX

A POLICY OF ADVANCE TOWARDS COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

So far in this study an attempt has been made to ascertain the 000 main educational needs of Iraq, to evaluate recent developments in primary education both quantitatively and qualitatively, to demonstrate the enormous obstacles to further advance and to illustrate, from examples, the ways in which some of these obstacles are being overcome. It is clear, however, that while some circumstances and conditions exist which suggest that the time for further advance is propitious, such advance will only be possible by the adoption and persistent implementation of a policy which takes into account both the desired objective and the obstacles which still have to be surmounted. The obstacles are clear enough. The desired objective is also clear, always provided it is appreciated that quantitative advance is not in itself sufficient. What is needed is not only a policy of advance which will get more children into school, but one which will ensure that children enjoy forms of primary education which are related to their individual needs and to the special needs of Iraq.

Before considering possible lines of advance towards compulsory 871 education for all children in schools of the right type, it is necessary to call to mind the magnitude of the task quantitatively. With a potential primary school population of 750,000 children which is rising daily, with not more than twenty-four per cent of this number now attending school for periods of varying duration, with a national budget which is barely balanced, with a country which is badly in need of other public services, it would appear to be unrealistically idealistic to assume that any effective advance towards universal compulsory education could be achieved over any short period of years. The present total education budget would have to be more than doubled to provide primary education for all children at existing standards, some 15,000 additional teachers would have to be trained, and a sum of money which it is not possible to estimate would be required for capital expenditure on school buildings.

The magnitude of the problem, however, is not new to the 871 Ministry of Education. In 1946 a special committee of the Ministry 645 drew up a 'Ten-Year Plan' in which it was suggested that, provided 185

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871 certain administrative reforms were introduced into the Ministry
645 itself, and provided a vigorous educational drive was made, it
185 should prove possible within ten years to achieve a total school attendance of fifty per cent of all children of primary school age. Under this plan it was hoped that it would be possible to train 400 additional teachers in the first year and provide for an increased school attendance of some 12,000 children. At this rate of progress some 42,000 additional children should have been attending primary schools by the end of 1949. Actually the total increased primary school attendance between 1946 and 1949 amounted to some 34,000 children. This increase took place despite the fact that, apart from some not too satisfactory measures for the short-term training of teachers, the reforms advocated by the special committee of the Ministry of Education were never put into operation. In other words, the recent quantitative advance appears to have resulted not so much through any 'Ten-Year Plan' as because of continued public pressure.

871 There is no doubt that this public pressure for more schools will
185 continue and that, unless a more vigorous policy of coping with the demand is initiated, quantitative demand will continue for some years to outstrip primary school provision. Indeed, when one looks back over a period of years and realizes that, whereas in 1931 there were not more than 35,000 children attending primary schools, there are now 175,000 children, there is little cause for any immediate pessimism so far as numerical advance is concerned. It is for this reason that some Iraqi educational reformers maintain that, on the assumption that quantitative development goes on at the same total pace, i.e., another five-fold increase over the next twenty years, compulsory education of a type could be achieved by 1970. It is not possible, however, to predict the future rate of progress even in general terms because, although quantitative growth has been rapid since 1930, it cannot go on beyond a certain point until some of the economic, political and social obstacles already outlined have been solved. Although numerical development has increased five-fold since 1930, that rate of increase will undoubtedly drop when the children of the relatively higher income groups are in school and when the Ministry of Education is confronted with the task of meeting the needs of the children of very poor parents and those who are living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions.

If these suppositions are valid, the broad lines of a policy of genuine advance towards compulsory education become clearer. First, steps must be taken to cope with the present unsatisfied demand for primary education. Secondly, consideration will sooner or later have to be given to the measures which will need to be

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000 the floating of local public loans which could be partly redeemed by the gradual release of the large sums of 'dead money' which are at present being spent on rented premises which cannot be used economically.

In other words, what is needed at the present time is a vigorous administrative gesture which would assure the public that the Ministry of Education is controlling the existing pressure for primary schools rather than being jockeyed along by it.

REFORM OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

871 But perhaps before the Ministry of Education can itself promote
185 immediate measures of this kind with the vigour required, consideration will have to be given once more to two major
645 administrative reforms which were advocated by the special committee appointed to draw up the 'Ten-Year Plan' in 1946.

The Minister as a Trustee of the Public Educational Interest. Until very recently the advent of a new Minister of Education has tended to be accompanied by abrupt changes and reverses of educational policy, and sometimes by changes in official personnel. This is certainly not calculated to assist that continuity and persistence in educational policy which is so essential at the present time.

Some maintain that this unfortunate tendency has been due to the intrusion of party politics and sectarian interests into the Ministry. If this is true, it should be emphasized that a Ministry of Education, while being responsive to sound educational opinion, should always endeavour independently to attach itself to national educational policy which is free from these non-educational considerations.

It is probably nearer the truth to suggest that these fluctuations in educational policy are due as much to the influence of the individual opinions and plans of the Ministers themselves. It is perhaps natural in a young and rapidly developing country that Ministers should wish to leave their own impress on the country's educational affairs. It is not desirable, however, that they should have the unrestricted power to do this, and in any event they should be required to justify proposed changes before men who have had long experience of education and educational administration. It is refreshing, therefore, to gather from conversations with some of the recent holders of this important office that the time may be approaching when the Minister tends more and more to regard himself, not as one who is entitled to control

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educational policy in the light of opinions and schemes based on 871
his own inevitably limited educational experience, or by con- 185
siderations of his own political group or sect, but as a trustee of
the educational interest of the whole country. 645

The Formation of a National Council of Education. It was also suggested [647] by the special committee referred to that a means of assisting successive Ministers to pursue a consistent policy of educational advance would be the creation of a National Council of Education which would be composed of Directors-General of Education, the Deans of Institutions of Higher Education, representatives from other Ministries whose co-operation is essential in educational progress, representatives appointed by Parliament, and other leading personalities in the country. It was suggested that 'the principle function of this National Council of Education should be to ensure that educational policy is well-founded and that there is stability in its application'. In other words, the National Council of Education would be a continuing body pledged to an agreed national policy of educational development from which successive Ministers of Education would find it difficult to depart.

It appears that a properly constituted National Council of Education has never been formed. Some such bodies have been established and abolished from time to time at the discretion of successive Ministers. One reason given for failure to maintain a National Council of Education is that the Minister should justify himself, not to a Committee of 'experts' but to public opinion. Theoretically there is much to be said for such an explanation but, in a country where the bulk of the population have not had educational opportunity and cannot therefore be articulate in public affairs, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a sound public opinion in matters educational.

A new Education Law giving the Ministry of Education the necessary powers and duties to cope with present pressing demands and needs is overdue. Such a law should include categorical provision for the establishment of a well-balanced National Council of Education with a dignified status. It should have definite powers and duties and meet at regular and legally stipulated intervals. The Minister should be required to consult the Council on major changes of policy, and should not make changes without a majority decision by it. The Council should approve all major plans and developments and regulations of the Ministry before they become effective. Most important, the National Council should have the power of initiating discussion and enquiry as it thinks fit, and should not necessarily await the invitation of the Minister before so doing.

871 185 645 There are signs that the present time is opportune for the formation of this body. The writer had the privilege of being present at a recent *ad hoc* gathering of men prominent in the educational affairs of Iraq, presided over by the Minister of Education. The level of discussion was exceptionally high, and one advantage of the meeting was that the Minister was both able to be made aware of trends of opinion and in turn to bring to the notice of the 'experts' practical administrative considerations which might prevent him from applying all their advice. If such a body could be transformed into a regularly meeting National Council of Education and given the powers indicated, it is likely that that consistent policy without which advance in the direction of compulsory education cannot be achieved would be considerably assisted.

871 645 *Concentration of the Ministry of Education on Major Issues of National Educational Policy.* If the Minister were guided in the formation of policy by a properly constituted National Council of Education, the way to consideration of an agreed national policy of educational advance would be facilitated. However, before these reforms could achieve their object, they would need to be accompanied by a reformed conception of the Ministry of Education itself. At the present time, the Ministry is more in the nature of a national administrative office than a policy-making body. In addition to controlling all forms of education and exercising most minute financial control in small matters, the senior officials of the Ministry appear to be occupied with a mass of detailed administration, much of which could very well be left to the Provincial Directors of Education.

It is suggested that, at any rate in the sphere of primary education, many of the existing administrative tasks performed by officers of the Ministry of Education should be transferred to the offices of the Provincial Directors of Education. If this were done it would enable the senior officials of the Ministry to concentrate their talents on major issues of national policy which, at the present time, need considerable thought and investigation. If compulsory education of quality is ever to become a reality, matters of major policy which at present receive insufficient consideration must be investigated by officers of the Ministry before the facts concerning them can be adequately considered by the Minister and the National Council of Education which it is hoped he may soon have to assist him. Plans for improved training and distribution of teachers badly need mature consideration, as do investigations into the most suitable types of school building for a country with the climatic conditions of Iraq.

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Programmes of study, especially those for the rural and agricultural 871
schools, need much thought and study by those who administer
them. Ultimately, local development plans for advance towards 645
compulsory schooling will need most careful consideration. These vital tasks cannot be undertaken adequately until the Ministry of Education is relieved of much of its present stifling day-to-day detail.

THE CREATION OF LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITIES

As was indicated in the preceding chapter, one of the significant 871
social and educational developments in Iraq is the growth of local
interest in education which is accompanied by some vigorous local 635
administrative initiative and a preparedness to find money for local development. This suggests that, quite apart from the Ministry of Education being able to clear its own decks for action by passing on much of the details of administration to the provincial education officers, there exist in the localities valuable means by which a policy of advance towards compulsory education could be facilitated.

A movement in the direction of enlisting the aid of the provinces in the increase of educational provision was considered a few years ago. Under the Provincial Administration Law of 1945, a General Provincial Council was established in each province. It was empowered, in a limited way, to levy local taxes to support various local services, including some aspects of education. For one reason or another, the exercise of these local taxing powers in relation to education appears to have been restricted by the administrative action of the central Government departments. It is understood, however, that a more vigorous attempt is about to be made to give the General Provincial Council in every province wider powers of control over education up to and including the primary schools.

It is to be hoped that, when this transfer of certain powers to the General Provincial Councils takes place, it will be done in such a way that local interest in education is given full opportunity. It would be a great aid to local desire for educational powers and advance if each General Provincial Council were instructed to create amongst its members a Provincial Education Committee to which would be delegated the task both of controlling local primary schools and of developing primary education. There can be no doubt from conversations which have taken place that local people are anxious to exercise these powers. There is equally no doubt that, with some exceptions, the Provincial Directors of

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and of 'Iraqis in general to forsake time-honoured systems and procedure may have risen from reluctance to abandon that which had been sanctified by usage and by religious sanction, as well as from an innate shrewdness in avoiding what had not yet been proven to their satisfaction.

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642×
827×

The immediate demands of practical administration may have required the British sponsors of the new Government to acquiesce to a great extent in this attitude. Nevertheless, the failure of the provisional council to consolidate such gains as had been made by the Civil Administration and to throw itself whole-heartedly into the task of creating a new state in accordance with the best examples before it, bound the new regime to antiquated systems at the very moment when they were being rejected by the lineal heirs of the Ottoman Empire as unsuitable for the new Turkish State. It marked the tendency of 'Iraq to

TABLE IV

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENTS AMONG MINISTRIES*

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(a) Ministry of Interior:
  - General Administration
  - Police
  - Land Revenue and Excise
  - Agriculture
  - Jails
  - Printing and Publishing

(b) Ministry of Finance:
  - Finance
  - Accounts
  - Audit
  - Ottoman Debt and special revenues

(c) Ministry of Justice:
  - Judicial, etc.
  - Tapu

(d) Ministry of Defence:
  - Levies
  - Gendarmes
  - Local Forces

(e) Ministry of Education and Health:
  - Education
  - Health Services
  - Municipalities (as temporary measure)

(f) Ministry of Works and Communications:
  - Buildings
  - Roads
  - Railways
  - Posts and Telegraphs
  - Irrigation
  - Surveys

(g) Ministry of Commerce:
  - Commerce
  - Customs
  - Port

(h) Ministry of Auqaf:
  - Waqfs
  - Trusts

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* *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B.363, p. 3.

1-[1921-=Analysis]

643 his own. Nevertheless, it is also true that had he not so identified himself with their programmes, he would not have won the esteem and regard of his subjects so markedly shown on his death.

643 In no field was King Faisal's assumption of power more
•645 evident than in the circumstances attending the formation and the fall of the Ministries. In spite of Article 66 of the Constitution which, contrary to the wishes of the King at the time of drafting, had made the Ministers collectively and individually responsible to the Chamber,[1] not one of the fifteen Ministries during his reign, 1921-33, owed its downfall to a direct vote of no confidence by the Chamber.[2] In almost every instance, the resignation of the Cabinet was due either to the direct wish of the King or to the belief that it no longer possessed His Majesty's confidence. Thus, in early April, 1922, the reorganization of the Naqīb's Cabinet was occasioned by the King's dislike of four Ministers and his determination to remove them from office. The fall of the Naqīb's second Cabinet, August 14th, 1922, was due to resentment on the part of the Ministers at the King's interference and his obvious desire for its resignation.[3] The retirement from office of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn, November 16th, 1923, was in large measure the result of His Majesty's objection to the strong line adopted by the Council, particularly aginst the '*Ulamā* in June of that year.[4] The King's desire for a more aggressive Cabinet was known to be directly responsible for the resignation of Taufīq Beg as-Sūwaidī, August 25th, 1929.[5] Nūrī Pasha's resignation, October 24th, 1932, although attributed to a number of causes, was in reality due to the King's wish for a change of Ministers, if not to more personal reasons.

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[1] It may be argued with reason that this article did not make the ministers exclusively responsible to the Chamber.

[2] 'Abdul Muhsin Beg resigned, however, November 1st, 1926, when the Chamber elected its President from the Opposition, as the result of a temporary defection of the Kurdish section of the *Taqāddam* or Government Party. Yāsīn Pasha has given as the reason for his resignation, June 26th, 1925, that he felt he could not command the confidence of Parliament.

[3] *Supra*, p. 357

[4] Ibid., pp. 392-3.

[5] Ibid., p. 412

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PROGRESS OR RETROGRESSION?

Every Prime Minister in forming a Cabinet was faced with 643
the necessity of choosing Ministers compliant not only with the 645
High Commissioner's requirement that they 'deal sensibly with relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq' but also with His Majesty's personal wishes, likes and dislikes. It was generally recognized that Ja'far Pasha's first Cabinet, November 3rd, 1923, was composed of members in sympathy with the King's ideas and pledged to pass the Treaty of 1922. In January, 1928, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, who had been suggested by the High Commissioner as the only available Minister capable of bringing about the ratification of the Treaty of 1927, formed his Cabinet with great difficulty owing to the King's secret opposition to a strong Ministry for reasons connected with the Treaty.

In the Parliamentary elections, the King, not uninfluenced 643
by lessons learned from the intractability of the Constituent 666
Assembly, likewise exerted his influence. He insisted in some cases, as in the elections of 1925, on the addition to the list of official candidates the names of men he particularly desired to see in the Chamber, and on the deletion of others which were not acceptable to him personally.

In the second elections, during the spring of 1928, his interference took a curious form. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg had come to office, pledged to secure ratification of the Treaty of 1927, on the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, a step approved by the High Commissioner, as the Opposition in the Chamber had been steadily growing. The Prime Minister's suggestion that the usual confidential letters be sent to the *Mutasarrifs* to ensure the return of deputies favourable to the Treaty, was opposed by the King. By permitting free elections, His Majesty hoped to bring an anti-Treaty Chamber into opposition with the Cabinet to prove to H.B.M. Government that, contrary to the High Commissioner's contention in late 1927,[1] the Treaty and the new Agreements were unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq.

In the parliamentary elections of 1930, the King, seeking a

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 410-411.

643 requested to remain in office at the death of King Faisal, was speedily convinced by conversations with King Ghāzī that he did not enjoy His Majesty's confidence.[1] His resignation, tendered October 28th, was immediately accepted to the great surprise of political circles. It was apparent that the young monarch desired not only a Cabinet amenable to his wishes but also a Parliament of his own creation. He was persuaded, however, by his British and 'Iraqī advisers against this course. Parliament was not dissolved and the new ministry, although headed by Jamīl Beg Midfai, was less Nationalist in tinge than he had desired.

On the whole, during the reign of King Ghāzī the personal power and influence of the Crown has tended to be less than under the former regime. His Majesty's youth, his inexperience and lack of training in statecraft have made it natural that he should be forced to give more scope than his father to the men about him, in his Palace and in the Cabinet, and to rely upon their advice and that of His Britannic Majesty's representatives at his Court. [645] Thus few if any of the seven ministerial crises of the reign seem directly traceable to His Majesty's influence but have been due rather to discord within the Cabinets, as when Jamīl Beg Midfai resigned, February 13th, 1934, to lack of confidence to meet emergencies, as at the time of the tribal revolts in March, 1935,[2] or to military intervention as in the *coup d'état* of October 29th, 1936.

669 On this last occasion, General Baqir Sidqī,[3] in charge of army manœuvres to the north-east of Baghdad, suddenly moved the troops with the Air Force on the capital. In manifestoes dropped from the air, he demanded in the name of the army the dismissal of the Yāsīn Pasha ministry, with which 'the army had lost patience' and the appointment of one 'composed of

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[1] See translation of Rashid 'Alī's letter of resignation, *The Times*, October 30th, 1933.

[2] *The Times*, March 17th, 1935.

[3] Baqir Sidqī led the 'Iraqī forces against the Assyrians in 1933, when he won great popularity and promotion. His campaigns in 1935 against the tribes added to his reputation for military ability and ruthlessness.

667 that personal ambition of the leaders had no small part in the events of October 29th and afterwards.

At one time it was suspected th[illegible] King Ghāzī might have been cognizant of the plot, his impatience at the limitations placed on his power being well-known.[1] His assurances to the contrary appeared to be sincere, particularly in the light of subsequent events. Indeed, Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat Sulaimān, supported by the armed forces, may be regarded as possessing sole power in 'Iraq to-day, despite published statements that General Sidqī would concern himself solely with the re-organization of the army, that the Government would work with a freely elected Parliament and that the rights of all section of the people would be respected.

Council of Ministers

● 645 Among the principal factors which have adversely affected the position and the functioning of the Council of State may be listed its susceptibility to outside influence, its instability, not altogether unrelated as has already been indicated, and the lack of a sufficiently large class of 'Iraqīs of Cabinet rank.

In the period from August, 1921, to October, 1932, the average life of the fourteen Cabinets was less than ten months each. Four Ministries, the second of the Naqīb, that of Taufiq Beg, the fourth of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg and that of Nājī Pasha, lasted less than four months each. Nūrī Pasha's first Cabinet, by remaining in office from March 23rd, 1930,[2] to October 19th 1931, had the longest existence although its tenure was not undisturbed by internal dissensions. Such instability, due largely to the King's influence, to the conflict of British and

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[1] *Al-Ayyām* (Damascus), November 3rd, 1936, cites Baqir Sidqī, however, as saying: 'In no way have I proceeded in any action against the will of H.M. the King and of the Supreme Power.'

[2] *Waqayi' al-'Iraqiya* (Government Gazette), No. 844, March 27th, 1930.

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'Iraqī viewpoints[1] and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confidence by Parliament[2] had unfortunate consequences. On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased. 645

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects. [775]

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqīs have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat 665-669

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[1] Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Irāqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nājī Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

[2] *Supra*, p. 422, note.

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645 669 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2] Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many 'Iraqīs held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 185 [307] Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 648 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other 'Iraqī Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

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[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 5th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *At-Tariq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936.

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Complete support, however, of the country has yet to be won 645 668 by the new Government. It must count on the opposition of the exiled ‘Iraqīs and of the adherents of the late Ja‘far Pasha. It must count also on the potential opposition of all ‘Iraqīs who for motives of self-interest have kept a foot in both camps.[1] Its real test will come, therefore, in its inability to carry out its promises and to meet other problems which face the country: placating the shaikhs at the same time that the land is divided, applying conscription to the tribal areas, bringing Shī‘is and Sunnīs into harmony and of meeting the rising cost of living.

The Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies, although a dignified body meeting 646 regularly since its establishment in 1925 and conducting its deliberations as a rule with sobriety and moderation, has failed to take its full and rightful place in the political life of ‘Iraq, as foreshadowed by the provisions of the Constitution. The failure seems directly due to its inability to command public confidence. The wave of scepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions which recently swept over ‘Iraq, in common with other countries with a more substantial democratic tradition, prepared the way for the present military dictatorship. The slow progress of ‘Iraq as compared with that of Turkey and Persia under dictatorial regimes was conveniently explained away as being due to the democratic institutions. The critics pointed out that the parliamentary system of ‘Iraq was adopted from foreign models and was unsuited to conditions and needs of ‘Iraq. They indicated and with more reason that the elec- 646
tions to the Chamber, without exception, have been rigidly 666
controlled by the Government, often under pressure from the Residency as in 1928 and 1930.[2] In all districts except Baghdad

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[1] See Macdonald, A. D., *Euphrates Exile* (1936), pp. 53 ff. for a discussion of this characteristic in ‘Iraqīs.

[2] Principally because the Treaties of 1927 and of 1930 were to be ratified by the newly elected Chambers.

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648 forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction
[186] and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists,
but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3
October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British
Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an
independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to
govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal
development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but
retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the
Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the
643 ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September
1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents
had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between
nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on
the other between the antagonistic elements in the country
itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of
twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was
• 645 inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first,
government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets
668 which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the
669 factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to
determined military intervention, in order to displace their
rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing
against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian
Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who
inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist
young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in
imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought
to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by
General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an
admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in
[185] assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges
of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had
neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army
was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed
and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in
politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and
again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same
factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

648 In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had
three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi
Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact
between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in
January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former
opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge
of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally
showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither
the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have
affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect
of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in
spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred.
The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently
abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for
little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the
time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election
of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals
of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September
by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the
Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree
on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume
their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
642 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the
646 Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed
by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained
the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an
honourable past in the service of the Government and the
country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

3 Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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311 241 alluvial plain of the centre and south, where agriculture depends on the water of the Tigris and Euphrates for irrigation by pump, flow, or natural inundation. In the first region rainfed winter cereals predominate, with millet, maize, sesame and other summer crops grown as subsidiaries where irrigation is possible. Kurdish mountain crops include tobacco and grapes. In the central canal zone (Faluja–Baghdad–Diala) wheat and barley are the principal winter crops; summer crops include millet, maize, sesame, and the produce of market gardens near Baghdad. From here southward barley and rice predominate, with a great concentration of palm groves in all the riverain land, especially around Basra on the Shatt al-Arab. The deserts of west Iraq afford extensive grazing after the winter rains.

241 Cultivation is based traditionally on the following system. In the south, either half the land is left fallow and half tilled each year, or half is sown with a summer crop, half with a winter. In the north the land may be continuously cropped for two or three years, and then left fallow for the same period. The use of artificial fertilizers is practically unknown, but the land is sometimes manured by allowing shepherd tribes to pasture their flocks on fallow ground.

Although the vast majority of agricultural implements employed are still traditional and primitive, modern machinery is being imported steadily. A high target has been set, especially since the war, and Government service stations have been [439] established. In 1950 imports were as follows: tractors 166, ploughs 146, cultivators 26, combines 98, threshers 1, grain drills 21, disc harrows 14. Oil pumps for irrigation are even more in demand than tractors; in 1949–50 there were 3,600 in use, with an average horse-power of 36.

[645] The agricultural development of the country is organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, which contains departments for plant breeding and protection, horticulture, forestry, agricultural machinery, animal husbandry and veterinary services.

Crops

433 The principal crops, with their production in 1950 in thousands of metric tons, are *Winter*: barley, 851; wheat, 520; lentils, 6; vetch, 3·5; linseed, 0·2; *Summer*: rice, 242; cotton, 25; sesame, 10; maize, 21; millet 19; green gram, 12; tobacco, 3 (purchased by Government Tobacco Monopoly); dates, 250.[1] Of the two most important crops, barley and dates, the former is grown mainly in the northern plains and the *liwas* of Kut, Muntafiq, Hilla, and Diwaniya in the irrigated zone. With a

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[1] ibid. p. 146.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 MI Middle East
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642 646 joint meeting, such draft law shall be considered to have been passed by both Assemblies, but shall not become law until it has been confirmed by the King. If not passed in this manner, such draft law shall not be reintroduced into either Assembly during the current session.

PART IV

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

642 645 Art. 64 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The number of Ministers shall not be less than seven, including the Prime Minister. No person shall be a Minister who is under any disqualification described in Article 30.

A Minister who is not a member of either Assembly shall not remain in office longer than six months unless he is appointed a senator or elected a deputy before the end of that period. A Minister who receives the salary of a minister shall not, at the same time, receive the membership allowance in either Assembly. A Minister shall not buy or lease any of the property or possessions of the State.

2) Deputy Ministers may be appointed provided that they must be members of Parliament.

3) In case of necessity the King may appoint Ministers without portfolio, in order to obtain the benefit of their experience and talents.

Art. 65 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The Council of Ministers will undertake the direction of the affairs of the State. It will meet, under the presidency of the Prime Minister, to decide the measures to be taken in matters which concern more than one Ministry and in all important matters which concern the Ministries. The Prime Minister will submit the decisions of the Council to the King, for his confirmation.

Art. 66. Ministers of State shall be jointly responsible to the Chamber of Deputies for affairs dealt with by the various Ministries and responsible severally for acts relating to each of the Ministries and Departments attached thereto. Should the Chamber of Deputies pass a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet by a majority of members present, the Cabinet must resign. If the resolution in question relates to one Minister only, such Minister must resign.

At the request of the Prime Minister or of the Minister concerned, the Chamber shall, once only, postpone a vote of no confi-

dence for a period not exceeding eight days. The Chamber shall not be dissolved during that period. 642 645

Art. 67. A Minister shall despatch all business relating to his Ministry and departments attached thereto in manner prescribed by law.

PART V

THE JUDICATURE

Art. 68. Judges shall be appointed by Royal Irada and may only be removed in the circumstances mentioned in the special law dealing with the conditions governing their qualifications, appointment, grades and method of dismissal. 642 692

Art. 69. The Courts shall be divided into three classes:

1. Civil Courts.
2. Religious Courts.
3. Special Courts.

Art. 70. The manner of instituting the Courts, the places where they are to be established, the grades, divisions, jurisdiction and supervision thereof, and the execution of judgments, shall be determined by special laws, subject to the provisions of this law.

Art. 71. The Courts shall be free from all interference in the conduct of their affairs.

Art. 72. All sittings of the Courts shall be open to the public, unless some legal justification exists for holding sittings *in camera*. Judgments of the Courts, as well as the proceedings thereof, may be published, except those relating to sittings held *in camera*. All judgments shall issue in the name of the King.

Art. 73. The Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction over all persons in Iraq, in all actions and civil and criminal matters, and those brought by or against the Iraq Government, with the exception of actions and matters coming within the jurisdiction of the religious or special Courts, as stated hereinafter in this law, or in any other law in force.

Art. 74. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts includes civil, commercial and criminal matters, in accordance with the laws in force, provided that, in matters relating to the personal status of foreigners and in other civil and commercial matters in which by international custom the terms of the law of a foreign country are to be applied,

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647 Previously the Government had carried out several schemes in various fields but development projects had had to be kept small and had been aimed at the more immediate needs. Financing was carried out by means of yearly capital works appropriations, totalling about ID35 million from 1931 to 1950. It is not, however, clear whether these appropriations were fully spent.

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433 The execution of the Six-Year Plan was entrusted to the Development Board, established in the spring of 1950 under Law No. 23 of 1950 as amended by Law No. 6 of 1952. It was constituted under the presidency of the Prime Minister; the members were the Minister of Finance and six executive members, nominated by the Council of Ministers for a term of five years, including three experts, one each in finance and economics; in irrigations; and in an unspecified field to be prescribed by the Council of Ministers. The Board was entrusted with the duty of preparing "a general economic and financial plan for the development of the resources of Iraq and the raising of the standard of living of the people"; with undertaking "a general survey of the exploited and unexploited resources of Iraq"; with the execution of the plans "in accordance with their determined priority"; and with co-ordinating the various ministries' development schemes in relation to the general development of the country. The Board has its own budget, and its revenue consisted, at the outset, of the total revenue received from the oil companies, but in 1952 this was amended to 70 per cent plus such other sums as may be allotted to it by Parliament and the proceeds of any loans, domestic or foreign.

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● 645
433 In July 1953 the Ministry of Development was set up, headed by a new cabinet minister who became the ninth voting member, the Board's representative on the Council of Ministers and the link between Parliament and the Board. The new law did not change the Six-Year Plan or the financial structure of the Board, although it changed the latter's organizational framework and required the new minister to prepare a new development plan to be executed after the completion of the present one. Furthermore, with a view to administrative decentralization, a distinction has been made between "capital development projects" to be carried out entirely by the Board and "small development projects" which, though financed by the Board, are to be entrusted to the appropriate government departments for execution. The Board held its first meeting on 30 November 1950 and in May 1951 prepared its general programme, which was approved by Parliament in June 1951. The Six-Year Plan (1951 to 1957) calls for a total expenditure of ID 155.4 million and an estimated revenue of ID 168.7 million.

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647 Actual expenditures on development plans for the financial years 1951/52 to 1953/54 totalled ID 26 million. They fell short of planned expenditure, which amounted to ID 58.2 million, thus leaving an unspent balance of ID 31.9 million. The building programme and reclamation of lands and other projects ran nearest to schedule while irrigation and industry lagged behind (see table 31). In addition, the Board has granted a number of loans to municipalities and semi-governmental institutions, to the end of March 1954, as follows (in thousands of Iraqi dinars):

Omnibus service, Baghdad	1,000
Agricultural machinery and tools	500
Oil refinery service	6,000
Baghdad Water Board	660
Directorate General of Iraqi Railways	2,500
Industrial Bank	500
Eight municipalities	3,553
Total	14,113

excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of 668 the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P.[1] committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, [646] followed four months later by another for the accession of Muḥammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sulṭan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 665 1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable 186 as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and 668 frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

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[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Bey (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Bey: Fu'ad Bey al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1 [Turkish Committee of Union & Progress -- analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645 Ministries; Sasun Ḥasqayl was omitted for the first time. A State visit by the King to Karbalā and Najf in December was an outstanding success. The substitution in March 1924 of the name of King Ḥusayn, newly self-styled Caliph, for that of the Sultan of Turkey in the Khuṭba when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished, raised the prestige of the royal family, and was accepted with surprising willingness by Sunni and Shi'i alike.

646 The Constituent Assembly was opened with due ceremonial
648× by the King on 27 March 1924. Under the presidency of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey it proceeded to its first task, ratification of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty and its Protocol. A favourable majority seemed assured, and initially was in fact present; but the atmosphere quickly changed. The 'severity' of some of the Treaty conditions, notably those of the Financial Agreement, was emphasized by Opposition orators, and the whole force of anti-Mandate sentiment was rapidly remobilized. Kurdish deputies for their own reasons withdrew from the proceedings; those of Mosul could think of nothing but the danger threatening their wilaya. The tribal shaykhs, moving in a world wholly strange to them, saw and seized the chance of bargaining their support on the Treaty issue for personal or tribal advantages. The nationalist lawyer-politicians, who soon emerged as the most convinced and active element in the Assembly, launched a campaign first of insistence upon major or indeed basic changes in the Treaty, then of vicious intimidation, and finally of actual violence; two pro-Treaty deputies were severely wounded in the streets, others threatened
664] with death. Deliberately fostered terrorism outside the Assembly building itself reached proportions beyond police control, and necessitated the presence of troops to maintain order.

618× The constant efforts of the High Commissioner were devoted, with little success, to exposition of the basic nature of the Treaty and the facts of 'Iraq's situation. He pointed out Great Britain's accepted obligations to the League, and gave assurances of later modification of the Treaty in 'Iraq's favour. A score of interviews between the High Commissioner, the King, the Prime Minister, ministers, Cornwallis, Yasin Pasha, and Opposition leaders produced no formula which could reconcile the 'Waṭanis' to ratification. Dobbs announced finally that 'Iraqi rejection of the Treaty, such as now appeared inevitable, must with all regret be reported to the League Council at its forthcoming meeting, unless ratification had occurred by 10 June; after that date Great Britain must seek means other than a friendly and generous Treaty to fulfil its mandatory functions. From this and from his refusal to bargain or to consider amendments Sir Henry was immovable. Like every preceding day, 10 June was filled with conclaves, submissions, 652 recommended higher Customs-duty rates. A large part of its suggestions, especially as regards new taxation and reorganization, was not adopted. The 'Iraq Government was destined, indeed, to remain solvent but impecunious for years to come. The country was visited in the same period by Cabinet Ministers from England, Mr. L. S. Amery and Sir Samuel Hoare.

*645 The Hashimi Ministry, the last to govern without a Parliament, served with valuable results for a year. Among other measures it legislated for the Fao bar-dredging scheme, the 1925 oil concessions, a trade agreement with Syria, and the regularization of the position of British officials. Promulgation of the Organic Law was postponed from July 1924 to March 1925, to permit the preparation of election rolls, a lengthy and difficult task, and the liquidation of the Mosul Question before the new régime, awaited as a great stride forward from mere Cabinet government, was attempted. Preparations for the assembly of Parliament in Extraordinary Session (since an Ordinary Session could open only in November) were completed by late June 1925, and a change of Ministry due to differences between Yasin Pasha and his Minister of Interior, 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, gave to a new Government the task of inaugurating the parliamentary régime.

The premiership was entrusted to 'Abd al-Muḥsin. His Ministry included Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, the shrewd cosmopolitan lawyer Ra'uf al-Chadirchi for a short period, Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, the worthy Shi'i 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, Naji al-Suwaydi, Ḥikmat Sulayman (younger brother of the Turkish General Maḥmud Shawkat Pasha), the keen nationalist Ḥamdi al-Pachachi, and by later substitution Nuri Sa'id and the Kurdish artillery officer and writer, Muḥammad Amin Zaki. The elections completed, and the twenty senators duly appointed by the King, Parliament was opened with ceremony on 16 July 1925. The selection of Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani as President of the Chamber brought Ḥikmat Sulayman to his place in Interior. The veteran nationalist Yusif al-Suwaydi, father of Naji and Tawfiq, became President of the Senate.

646 Parliamentary government, in the procedures of which the British had no part, began creditably. The standard of debate was respectable, the Opposition, headed by Yasin Pasha, not immoderate. The life of Parliament in this its first session was twice prolonged, and lasted until June 1926. It dealt with a heavy programme of legislation, including a first amendment to the Organic Law designed to provide for a possible Regency and for extraordinary sittings. The budget was adopted and passed. An altercation in the Chamber led to the retirement from the Presidency of Rashid 'Āli, to be succeeded by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The latter's place in Interior was taken by the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

646 wise and moderate 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab. By the summer of 1926 the routine of parliamentary procedure was established; but it was already clear that the backwardness of the electorate, and the freely used power of the Government to secure the election of deputies of its own choice, could not but preclude any early possibility of genuine democracy.

645x 631 647 The Administration, on lines half inherited from the Turks and half established by the British, had well begun. With many shortcomings and omissions it operated already more widely and more effectively than had any Turkish Government, and aimed at a superior standard of service. In Baghdad the departments under each Ministry improved their organization, sifted their staffs, advanced towards complete 'Iraqi control. By 1926 not only were all Ministries in effective 'Iraqi control but most of the larger departments had been handed to 'Iraqi directors, notably those of Health, Education, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Government Accounts, Police, Prisons, the Census; those of Irrigation, Tapu, Customs, Revenue and State Domains, Veterinary services, Public Works, the Port of Baṣra, and 'Iraq Railways remained for a further period under British executive control. In the provinces, new qadhās and naḥiyas were formed or regrouped. The position of the British 'Administrative Inspectorate' was satisfactorily defined by law. A Standing Board selected 'Iraqi officials for higher posts, and the formation of a regulated civil service on modern lines was taken in hand. The Ministry of Finance, where R. V. Vernon assumed the Advisership in 1925 after an interregnum under L. M. Swan, had developed and specialized its organization, reduced its non-'Iraqi staff to a minimum, and founded a Finance Inspectorate. The post of Auditor-General, reporting to the Cabinet direct, was created in 1924 and held by J. Parlby, who had worked in 'Iraqi finances since 1917. The Advisership of Communications and Works was held by Wheatley until the arrival of L. E. Bury in 1925, and again after the latter's departure three years later. In Interior, Cornwallis was assisted by a senior member of his Administrative Inspectorate—Pulley, Wilson, or Edmonds—and by one or more juniors.

692 The Courts offered justice and accessibility to an extent far superior to that of alien and corrupt Ottoman tribunals; during these years both civil and criminal courts multiplied at liwā and qadhā headquarters as need declared itself, and the statistics of cases heard showed an increasing recourse to law. Civil jurisdiction lay with the Peace Courts of the Qadhis—who after 1923 included Shi'i Qadhis—and junior judges, the Courts of First Instance at three or four liwā headquarters, and a single Court of Appeal and Cassation, with a British President, at Baghdad. This President

economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady 439
diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they 661
correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq 665
public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, 646
all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness. The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate.
Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 665
'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925, were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925 until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, suppressed almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—Ḥizb al-Nahḍha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new 645*
Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Baṣra aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927. This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927. It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The 665
first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indica- 565
tions, of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscurantist leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

648 and the fullest activity of their press articles, hand-bills, and
668 oratory, did not hesitate to invoke the authority of the Shi'i
Mujtahids in condemnation of the new Treaty. These, however,
666 declined for once to intervene, except partially at Samarrā, and the elections were peacefully conducted in the districts; only at Sulaymaniya a major clash between violent demonstrators and the police resulted in bloodshed and the loss of a score of lives. All results were known by the end of October 1930, and showed a sweeping victory of the Government party. The ratification of the Treaty by Parliament, which met as usual on 1 November, could not now be prevented by the fierce denunciations of die-hard patriots; the voting was in favour by 69 against 13 in the Chamber, 11 against 5 in the Senate.

648x But much remained to be done, both in Baghdad and in Geneva.
Parliament sat on, immersed in legislation and in vehement
● 646 politics, until the midsummer of 1931. The opposition to the Sa'idi Ministry had by that time been reorganized in a grouping more formidable than the isolated Nationalist Party which, thanks to the usual control exercised by the liwā officials, had made so poor
648 a showing in the elections. Political leaders hostile to Nuri and,
with reservations, to the Treaty—Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-
665 Suwaydi, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, and 'Ali Jawdat who had
668 resigned from the Cabinet in September and been succeeded by Rustum Ḥaydar from the Palace—formed from the Nationalist and the People's Parties and like-thinking elements a Party of National Brotherhood—Ḥizb al-Ikhā al-Waṭani. At its inaugural meeting in March 1931 its objects were stated to include the dissolution of a flagrantly unrepresentative Parliament and the formation of a new Government 'pledged to reconsider the external relations of 'Iraq'. Certain of its members as a gesture thought fit to resign their seats in the Chamber; all resolved to pursue their campaign in the press and country. Nuri Pasha on his side had already formed, from deputies favourable to him, the 'Ahd (Covenant) Party, with an appeal to the great days of al-'Ahd and a programme of Treaty implementation.

Among the first acts of the Ikhā was the organization in July 1931 of a series of strikes in the 'Iraq townships without precedent for their concerted timing and wide extent. They had little object but the embarrassment of Government. The trades' organizations in the bazaars took fright—or were maliciously alarmed—at a clause in the newly passed Municipal Taxation Law which could be read as unfavourable to them. The misunderstanding, which was easily elucidated by Government, was encouraged to persist, and it was not until late in July, after attempts had been made to spread unrest to northern 'Iraq, and disorder in Baṣra and the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions.
181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradi-
665 tion of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free
204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations' in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe. The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in
646 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the
666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions, that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of
662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

passage of a law authorizing conscription, at long last, was received 645* with seeming indifference.

Late in August Madfa'i offered his resignation. The Chief of the Royal Diwan, 'Ali Jawdat, whose favourable position to influence the King and to arrange suitable alliances had not been neglected, himself accepted the premiership and the Ministry of the Interior on 28 August. His place in the Palace was taken by Rustum Ḥaydar. Nuri Sa'id re-entered the Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Madfa'i in that of Defence. To the Ministry of Works came Arshad al-'Umari, a Turkish-trained civil engineer of the famous Mosul family, to Finance the Christian economist, Yusif Ghanima, and to Education 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi.

The first act of 'Ali Jawdat was to dissolve Parliament—a step 646 doubtfully constitutional and condemned by the Ikhā, but necessary 668 to secure parliamentary support. He went to lengths unusual 666 even in 'Iraq, it was claimed by his opponents, in instructing the liwā officials on the personalities to be returned to the Chamber. The resulting Parliament met in the first week of 1934. Packed with the Premier's nominees, it was unrepresentative of the Ikhā opposition, poor in tribal spokesmen, and proportionately unjust to the Shi'is; nor did 'Ali Jawdat's initiative in founding a Party of National Unity, which barely attained life before expiring, produce the desired co-operation. The election procedure was strongly criticized in the Chamber of Deputies; the Senate opposed the régime to the extent of absenting themselves from their House; Baghdad political circles raged at their own exclusion and at the many illegalities alleged; hostile posters and pamphlets appeared on walls and in coffee-shops. All administrative shortcomings were once again, and unreasonably, attributed to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet itself was unhappy, Madfa'i and 'Umari were felt to be doubtfully loyal, Yusif Ghanima a political nonentity. Far 668 more sinister, however, was the stream of subversive propaganda which poured insistently from the capital, inciting tribesmen to emotions bound to end in anti-Government violence. It was understood to emanate from a group of opposition statesmen, bitter in their frustration and led by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The propaganda was addressed to potentially malcontent Kurds in the far north, and more regularly to the Najf-dominated tribes of the Euphrates, where such shaykhly politicians as 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr of the Fatla had been unwisely excluded from Parliament and had everything, private and public, to hope from a change of Government. With 'Abd al-Waḥid were men of similar stamp, Sayid Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh, 'Alwan al-Yasiri, and others. Simultaneously, and by reaction against the claim of these to leadership, another half of the tribal world, not less unquiet and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 The failure of Yasin Pasha to impose the peace and security which he had promised was due to causes already analysed, and in some measure to the hasty ineptitude of his Minister of Interior. But, as in 1920, disturbance on the Euphrates and locally and temporarily elsewhere did not greatly affect the rest of the territory. The cities were secure and tranquil, the northern liwās and the whole of Tigris-side untroubled. The period of Yasin Pasha's premiership was indeed by 'Iraqi standards one of firm and reasonable government, and seemed, even in the late summer of 1936, likely to be prolonged. The coming event of violent military intervention cast no shadow before it.

646 [659] The general election ordered in April 1935 produced in August a Chamber swollen from 88 to 108 members: the additional seats arose from increased population-figures revealed by the Census Department, and were useful in placating more shaykhs and partisans. Early sessions of Parliament were disturbed by fierce recriminations between factions for the crime of inciting the tribes—a crime peculiar, in fact, to no single party. The Administration proceeded to a general amnesty of the political offenders of recent months, to a purge of suspect officials, and to the preferment, as the spoils of office, of more reliable personnel.

647 Genuine efforts were made, indeed, to arrest the deterioration of the Administration, though the further reduction of senior British officials may have told in the opposite sense. It cost 'Iraq in 1935 the services of Sir K. Cornwallis, whose work for Fayṣal and for 'Iraq had been outstanding; Edmonds, profoundly versed in 'Iraqi and especially Kurdish affairs, succeeded him. In the same year Prescott, the creator of the 'Iraq Police, resigned from the service and left Cones for a further ten years as Inspector of Constabulary. Sievwright, veteran of the Customs, retired and was succeeded until 1941 by Swan of Finance. Parlby, Auditor-General, returned to India. Hallinan had ceased in 1933 to be Inspector-General of Health Services, and was replaced by an 'Iraqi doctor. The Tapu Department dispensed with British help after the death of Alderman (himself successor of Royds in 1930) in 1934. The same is true of the Department of Agriculture, which Webster left in the same year. B. C. Newland, Director of Surveys, relinquished his post in 1935 to his deputy, A. J. Booth, who still held it sixteen years later. Chadwick left the Veterinary Department in 1934, but was to have a second tenure of the Directorship in 1942 to 1947. The Government Geologist Dr. Macfadyen left 'Iraq in 1937 after two years' service there, and was not immediately replaced. Allard retired in 1934 from Irrigation, in which an 'Iraqi had already succeeded him as Director-General; a British Chief Engineer and British regional staff still served there, and the

*645 668 northern 'Iraq. In June 1937 continued lawlessness at Samawa led to military operations on the habitual pattern, with destruction of villages, tribal attacks on the qadhā town, and (it was said) the shooting of hostages by the Army. Deep as was the impression made on the tribes by this treatment, peace never returned to these troubled regions during the life-time of the Sulaymani Ministry. In the towns, security was reasonably maintained, and isolated acts of anti-Jewish violence which had occurred in Baghdad in 1936 were not repeated.

● 646 665 The Ministry remained unhappy in the political sphere. The general elections ordered in November 1936 and completed in February 1937 produced a Chamber from which indispensable compliance with Ṣidqi's wishes had excluded the bulk of former Deputies and all but twelve of the Reformists; but had admitted, as a conciliatory favour, some ill-chosen wildlings from the Euphrates tribes. In the four months of the Extraordinary Session from February to June 1937 the Chamber was uneasy and divided, with painful friction between the Ministry's own ill-assorted followers. This, and the frustrations of their minority position, and their dislike of the re-adopted harsh policy at Samawa, led in June to the resignation of the four Reformist ministers. While still in 468 office their influence, especially that of Chadirchi, had inspired, perhaps encouraged, serious strikes among industrial workers. So were explained the successive strikes at the Kut barrage, in the drilling-areas of the B.O.D. Company, in the Railway workshops, among the Port workers and the Najf weavers, and among the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk. These strikes, whether industrially justified or not, reflected a new spirit of labour self-consciousness not necessarily unhealthy—and a new political weapon.

*645 665 Ḥikmat's hopes of strengthening his Cabinet by the inclusion in it of leading statesmen—Nuri Sa'id himself, or Jamil al-Madfa'i—could not but fail since few now trusted Bakr or the uneasy régime itself. Of the four new ministers, two, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, were Sunni lawyer-politicians and functionaries, and two, 'Abbas Mahdi and Ja'far Ḥamandi, were Shi'is of similar background. They were posted to the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Works, and Education respectively; but they were politically of little weight. The breach between the Reform movement and the Government was now complete; the People's Reform League was suppressed, and prominent Communists, real or alleged, were arrested. Two of the most active, 'Abd al-Qadir and Yusif, sons of Isma'il, fled to Paris. The Army dominated, ever more obviously, the Prime Minister and his Government.

*645 The position was one which Bakr Ṣidqi could not but abuse. He

646 665 The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

000 Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of [668] Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

701 Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

563 The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Nuri Pash, perhaps with the reluctance which he professed, accepted the premiership for the fifth time on Christmas Day 1938. 645x

2. DEATH OF THE KING

The new Ministry was greeted by the usual hopes for a firm and stable régime at last, the usual apprehension of faction, reprisal, and further military intervention. A Cabinet of average merit was announced; but once again no firm basis of shared principles was present to unite the ministers. Naji Shawkat was summoned from the 'Iraqi Legation at Ankara to be Minister of the Interior, Rustum Ḥaydar went to Finance, the capable Turkoman, 'Umar Nadhmi, to Works, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari to Justice, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Education, Ṭaha al-Hashimi to Defence. Rashid 'Āli was taken to preside over the Royal Diwan. The Prime Minister's inaugural speech was admirably balanced, wise, and high-minded; it deprecated military adventures and urged all parties to accept the rule of law and true democracy. The banned newspapers were relicensed, the exiled politicians returned. Postal censorship was abolished, dismissed officials were reinstated, and permission was given for the formation of political parties, though these failed for the moment to take shape. Words of mingled reproof and encouragement were addressed to assembled Euphrates shaykhs.

In Parliament, however, the usual asperities were not slow to 646
repeat themselves, and redoubled after the departure of Nuri 665
Pasha to London early in 1939. The exiled victims of the Madfa'i Ministry demanded vengeance for its high-handed illegalities, and as a first step pressed for reference of disputed points of law to the Special Court provided by the Organic Law; and the Ministry, itself indifferently united, decided to reinforce its position by general elections which might produce a more amenable Chamber. The Irada ordering the dissolution of Parliament appeared on 22 February, a few days before the State visit paid to Baghdad by the Crown Prince of Persia.

The return of the Prime Minister from London late in February 645x
was followed by the issue of a ministerial programme on the habitual 669
lines. A few days later the discovery of a conspiracy was announced, understood to involve not only Ḥikmat Sulayman—the *bête noire* of Nuri Pasha—but a formidable list of other politicians and officers. The plot, it was revealed, had aimed at the murder of no less than fifty leading personalities, the assassination of the King, and the enthronement of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah—or, as some preferred, of the Amir Zayd. A State of Emergency was immediately proclaimed at al-Rashid Camp, a number of arrests were made, and a special court martial was convened with civilian judges as equal members with the military. On the strength of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 1943 and the draft law resulting from their efforts was passed by the deputies and Senate in May and June. Requiring, under the Constitution, ratification by a new Parliament, it was accordingly re-presented to and passed by the Chamber which after general elections—the first since 1939—met on 9 October. The amendment provided that, for the succession to the Throne in the absence of an heir apparent, a male heir presumptive from the family of the late King Ḥusayn—in this case the Regent himself—should be nominated. The prerogative of the King was increased by empowering him to dismiss a Prime Minister, a provision the previous lack of which had led repeatedly to violent and illegal changes of Government. The number of Cabinet Ministers could be increased without limit, and could include a Deputy Premier and ministers without portfolio; but it could not be less than seven. Senators ceased to be limited to twenty, but were not to exceed a quarter of the deputies. Parliament was deprived of the power to pardon persons convicted of crimes against the State. Meetings of the Chamber could be held, if need be, outside the capital—a clear echo of the Regent's sojourn in Diwaniya and Baṣra in 1941. Finally, it provided that constitutional practices current in other countries, could, if not contrary to the Constitution, be adopted by resolution of both Chambers.

*645 The general election of mid-1943, which followed the dissolution of the Chamber in June, had been preceded by yet another reconstruction of the Cabinet. Ṣaliḥ Jabr moved to Interior, Taḥsin al-'Askari to Works; the Ministers of Economics and Social Affairs, al-Uzri and al-Barrak, were unchanged; Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban came to Justice, vacated by Da'ud al-Ḥaydari. The able lawyer Naṣrat al-Farsi was appointed to Foreign Affairs, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafid͟h to Education, and Jalal Baban to Finance. Taḥsin 'Ali went to the Royal Diwan. But the reformed Cabinet was from the first uneasy; with the heat of summer, the frequent absences of the Prime Minister in Syria and Egypt, and a Palace attitude of little confidence, it could do little. It was further weakened in September by disagreements both among ministers themselves and between the Premier and the Regent as to the personnel of the new Parliament, in whose selection the executive was to play, as usual, a major part. The first week of October witnessed the resignation of Naṣrat, whose portfolio was assumed temporarily by al-'Askari: of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, who was replaced by a competent Mutaṣarrif, Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab, nephew of 'Abd al-'Aziz Qaṣṣab; and of Jalal Baban, 646 whose duties fell to 'Abd al-Ila Ḥafid͟h. The new Chamber contained sixty-five of the former deputies, some of doubtful quality but none notably Anglophobe; fifty-one of its members had in April 1941 voted, under whatever pressures, for the deposition of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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the Regent. The opening of Parliament and passage of the Constitutional Amendment was followed by the departure of the Prime Minister once again to Egypt, in pursuance of his now absorbed interest in the pursuit of Arab Unity.

645X

Late in October, just as news was reaching Baghdad of incipient trouble in the Barzan mountains (p. 324), the Regent (now also Crown Prince) left for Britain in response to an invitation from King George VI. He had been preceded there by Da'ud al-Ḥaydari as Minister, and was accompanied by Dr. Sinderson Pasha and a military staff. He was met by the Duke of Gloucester, stayed for two days at Buckingham Palace and later elsewhere in London before returning to Baghdad in mid-December by way of Lisbon. He both received and created an excellent impression.

At his capital he faced immediately the task of installing a Ministry more united and more competent. But his relations with Nuri Pasha were passing through an unusual phase of impatience or mistrust, and their conversations were uneasy. Ibrahim Kamal, whose abilities had been too little used, was unwilling or unable to accept the premiership, of which it was believed that he had the offer; and Nuri, who had resigned office, was after all invited to form another Cabinet, his eighth. Announcing it on Christmas Day 1943, he was supported for the first time by a Deputy Prime Minister, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and by new ministers in the person of Mājid Muṣṭafā, an influential Kurdish ex-official, as Minister without portfolio for Kurdish affairs, and by Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba, a Shi‘i judge. The other ministers were all, to the dismay of reformists, stalwart representatives of the long-established governing clique. They included two Shi‘is besides Kubba—Salman Barrak at Economics and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Works—‘Umar Nadhmi the Turkoman at Interior and Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari, ‘Ali Mumtaz, and ‘Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh at Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Education respectively. Nuri's offer of the Cabinet post of Social Affairs to Kamil al-Chadirchi, and on his refusal to Muḥammad Ḥadid, was declined.

3. THE PACHACHI MINISTRY

The eighth Sa‘idi Ministry was from the first an unhappy one. Its leader, never interested for long in domestic administration, was now exhausted by his many cares and frequently absented himself on visits to the Arab countries. His team included personalities doubtfully acceptable to the Regent, and Court circles led by Taḥsin ‘Ali joined the opposition in a policy of pin-pricks. The appointment of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as deputy to Nuri Pasha was questioned, and he resigned in March 1944. Arab Unity, the visits of Arab statesmen from abroad, and the increasing threat of

x645 with the promise of full freedom of choice. But his hopes of secur-
ing a strong Chamber and satisfied parties by inviting their co-
665 operation were but partially gratified; the Liberals and National
Democrats, invited to name representatives for Cabinet posts, did
so in the persons of 'Ali Mumtaz at the Ministry of Works and
Muḥammad Ḥadid at that of Supply; but both these and two Shi'i
ministers, Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Education,
resigned their offices in the following month to devote themselves
to an election campaign. Most of the parties, including Ṣaliḥ Jabr's
parliamentary Political Bloc, took part and one, the unauthorized
National Liberation Party, was the cause of a scuffle with the police
at Kadhimiya. The Cabinet was, with consequent changes, re-
formed to include 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi at Works, 'Abd al-Ilah
Ḥafidh at Supply and temporarily at Finance, Shakir al-Wadi
(reputed to be in the close confidence of the Regent) at Defence,
Babā 'Ali at Economics, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab at Social Affairs
and for a time at Education, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, and
'Umar Nadhmi at Justice.

665 The conduct of the elections, which began in February, did not
prevent Nuri Pasha from locating hotbeds of Communism and
661 claiming by his arrests and searches to have suppressed them. The
followers of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh were involved, and
from these or other groups such leaders as Ibrahim Naji Shummal,
Zaki Muḥammad Baṣim, and two score of their associates were
arrested. With the exposure of the Communist cells in every liwā,
the Premier could hope that a fatal blow had been dealt to the
movement; but gratitude for this did little to diminish the fury of
press attacks on himself and on targets provided by the British,
notably Reuter's Agency and local branches of the British Council.

646 The Chamber of Deputies which, amid the usual outcries against
'Government interference', emerged from the elections, showed a
665 large majority of independent members or supporters of Nuri and
of Ṣaliḥ Jabr. The National Democratic Party secured five seats,
-645 the other parties none. When Parliament opened Nuri, who had
accepted the premiership on this understanding, now made way
for Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and was ready to support a Ministry led by him—
the first to be formed under a Shi'i Premier. Ṣaliḥ reserved for
himself the Ministry of the Interior and relied upon experienced
colleagues in the other appointments: he retained Jamali, Shakir
al-Wadi, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh, and Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab in their
former posts, and brought Jamal Baban to Justice and temporarily
to Economics, Ghanima to Finance, the Kurdish scholar Tawfiq
Wahbi to Education, the Shi'i Dhiyā' Ja'far—a Birmingham
graduate in oil engineering—to Works. The Opposition, itself
fragmentary, was formed mainly by the five parties not represented

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

x645 theme for hostile schoolboy agitation in the streets of the capital.
668 The Ministry's appeal for unity and tranquillity, and another by al-Ṣadr in person, were alike unheeded, and the work of administration, in which the Prime Minister had neither interest nor competence, was largely ignored.
[731] The near-famine conditions among the poorer classes could not be cured until after the harvest, which itself promised to be scanty; meanwhile an Australian grain ship was by British initiative diverted to Baṣra and its urgently needed stores distributed.

x645 The death of Ḥamdi al-Pachachi on 27 March led to changes among the uneasy ministers. 'Umar Nadhmi had resigned and been replaced at Justice by Najib al-Rawi, who handed his portfolio of Social Affairs to Ḥaydari. Naṣrat had succeeded Madfa'i at Interior when the latter became President of the Senate, and was himself succeeded when he moved to Foreign Affairs by Muṣṭafā al-'Umari who could thus 'control' the forthcoming elections. The Amir al-Rabi'a resigned and went home in April. Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba left the Ministry early in June. The frequent absences of the Ministers of Finance and Justice at Arab League meetings led to constant interchange of ministerial duties, from which the shaken and demoralized Administration suffered.

● 646 The Chamber met on 26 June, after elections in which legal and illegal parties alike had put forth all their efforts, and which had produced street fighting in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniya. The Independence Party secured four seats, the National Democrats two, the Liberals one. All other deputies were free of party attachment and as such were likely to vote for any Ministry in power; it was clear that the enthusiasm, or the leadership, of the parties had still too little appeal to seduce the electorate from the familiar candidates of local importance in their constituencies or to resist the conservative influence of controlling officialdom. A Chamber—or an electorate—divided on true party lines was still an unrealizable conception.

648x The new Parliament was confronted, to its dismay, with a situation
721 containing new and alarming features which events in Palestine had created. The United Nations decision for Partition, taken in November 1947, had led in 'Iraq as elsewhere to angry remonstrance, and in the Arab League to emergency meetings. But no hopeful measures could be taken or planned at these; the lines of cleavage within the League were already too clear, and most of the States members too doubtful of their own stability. The earlier decision to encourage the infiltration of guerrilla fighters from each country into Palestine, for the stiffening of local resistance, was carried out to a limited extent. Some hundreds—or, as some said, two battalions—of young and a few veteran

6: Ireland
● 646

MHl Iraq MHl

/For the first election to the Constituent Assembly of Iraq in 1922 and the activity of the Assembly after its convention, see category 116, pp. 391-405./

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175ˣ fifteen others arrived in Baghdad from Kubaisa on March 14th.
727ˣ The main body of officers and their families, numbering 396
642ˣ in all, sailed from Port Said in a special boat, on February 13th, arriving in Baghdad in early March.

The return of these officers added to the heated atmosphere of Baghdad. Although the expectation of the British officials that they would render assistance in promoting the candidacy of a Sharifian Amīr was not disappointed, a number became active partisans of other candidates, especially Saiyid Talib Pasha who made determined efforts to win their support. In addition, considerable jealousy was aroused by their return among 'Iraqī ex-officials formerly in Turkish service as well as local notables who regarded the officers with suspicion and fear, lest they appropriate all the best posts.

175ˣ The High Commissioner had repeatedly stated that the
727ˣ Council of State was to be provisional until it was possible to
● 646 set up a permanent government,[1] the precise form of which, he
642ˣ declared, 'must be decided by the people themselves and this can only be properly done by a convocation of a National Congress, fully representative of the people.'[2] He also awaited the convocation of the Assembly since he 'found himself confronted with questions of policy affecting the future of 'Iraq with which he did not feel justified in dealing without consultation with representatives of the people of the country.'[3]

Every reason seemed to exist for the inauguration of the National Assembly within the two or three months which Sir Percy had stated, on November 7th,[4] to be necessary to com-

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[1] *Communiqué* by the High Commissioner, November 7th, 1920: *Al-'Iraq*, November 15th, 1920: *Political Developments in Meso.*, pp. 7-8. Also Letter No. SD. 170A, High Commissioner to All Officers of Civil Admin. in Mesopotamia, November 30th, 1920.

[2] *Communiqué*, November 7th, 1920. Also Telegram, High Commissioner to S/S for India, October 26th, 1920.

[3] *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 3. Also *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 3.

[4] *Communiqué*, November 7th, 1920. In his telegram to S/S for India, October 26th, however, he had stated: 'at least three or probably more months must elapse before the election can be completed and a decision reached on the fundamental issues.'

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

plete the electoral law, to restore the country to peace and to 175*
carry out the elections.[1] A draft law, adapted from the Ottoman 727*
Electoral Law for use in 'Iraq was presented to the High 642*
Commissioner on November 7th[2] by a Committee composed 646 ●
of ex-deputies of the Ottoman Chamber and of co-opted members under the presidency of Saiyid Talib Pasha, set up according to instructions of the Acting Civil Commissioner, July 9th, 1920.[3] Both the High Commissioner and the Council of State gave their early attention to the draft, the latter referring it to a special Committee which first met on November 30th. The restoration of order, on which the elections were to depend, was accomplished by February, 1921.[4]

Nevertheless, the law was not promulgated until March 4th, 1922,[5] nor did the Assembly convene until March 27th, 1924, although an '*Irāda* convoking it had been issued on October 19th, 1922,[6] by which time Amīr Faisal had been placed on the throne and the main lines of the government and the principal questions of policy had been settled. Its deliberations, moreover, were specifically restricted, both by the '*Irāda* of 1922 and that of 1924, to the ratification of three documents to be placed before it: the Organic Law or Constitution, the Electoral Law for a Chamber of Deputies and the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty of 1922.[7]

The delay was due in part to difficulties incurred in formulating and in putting into operation a law suited to 'Iraq. One

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[1] The Nationalists, in this expectation, formed committees and began to work actively for their candidates during November and December, 1920.

[2] Letter, High Commissioner to members of the Electoral Law Committee, November 12th, 1920: *Note on Council of State*, pp. 5-6; *Political Developments in Meso.*, pp. 10-11.

[3] *Compilation*, 1919-1920, Notification No. 50, p. 101.

[4] Historical summary by Sir Percy Cox: Bell, op. cit., pp. 528-9.

[5] *Compilation of Proclamations, Laws and Regulations, issued between* 1 *October*, 1920, and 31 *December*, 1923 (Baghdad, 1924), (hereafter *Compilation*, 1920-1923), pp. 34-42.

[6] '*Irāda*, convoking the Constituent Assembly, October 19th, 1922; *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 82.

[7] Ibid.; '*Irāda* for the Opening of the Constituent Assembly, March 22nd, 1924: *Compilation of Laws and Regulations, issued between January* 1*st and December* 31*st*, 1924 (Baghdad, 1926) (hereafter *Compilation*, 1924), p. 7.

175x of these difficulties arose early in December when the Council 642x disagreed violently over the provisions for tribal representation. 727x It had been originally proposed that thirty tribal representa- ●646 tives should be present in the Assembly: twenty shaikhs of the major tribes and ten members for the smaller tribes, grouped together in each of the new *Liwās*. The Council (with the exception of five members), owing to the traditional fear of townsmen and landowners for the tribes, opposed any special tribal representation, although Sir Percy Cox pointed out that it was essential that every section of the population should be represented in the Assembly which was to decide upon the future of 'Iraq. Not until Ja'far Pasha proposed an alternative scheme of two tribal representatives for each *Liwā* with the proviso that tribesmen might register and vote as all other 'Iraqīs if they so desired, was the question settled.

It would appear, however, that these and other obstacles to the drafting and application of the law, including Saiyid Talib Pasha's opposition to it,[1] were used by the British authorities as excuses to postpone the inauguration of the Assembly, notwithstanding the official *communiqué* of May 30th, 1921,[2] assuring the 'Iraqīs that the elections would soon be held. 175x Evidence was not lacking that attempts would be made to 727x force the Assembly, if convened, to declare for a local and 642x unacceptable candidate such as Saiyid Talib Pasha and to 668 force it to make anti-British declarations. It was known that the Nationalist leaders, including some of the *Mandubīn*, were again active and that the National School party had been revived. It was also reported that several tribes, as those of the 'Afaq district and the Shammar Dhafīr, were contemplating another revolt at Nationalist, Turkish and Bolshevist instigation. Letters had been intercepted in January from Muhammad Ridhā, outlining anti-British plans and giving instructions for

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 5.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, May 30th, 1921. See also correspondence between the High Commissioner and the Council of State in *Lisān al'Arab* and in *Al-'Iraq*, July 15th, 1921.

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The Electoral Law by which the Parliament (the powers of 642
which had given the drafters of the Organic Law great concern) 646
was to be brought into being, had early occupied the attention 666
of British and 'Iraqī officials.

The draft law, as presented and passed by the Constituent Assembly,[1] provided for an indirect system of election in accordance with the Turkish model on which both it and the Constituent Assembly Election Regulations[2] had been based. Deputies, in accordance with Article 36 of the Constitution, were to be elected in the proportion of one to every 20,000 primary voters who, among other qualifications (Article 33), were to be every male 'Iraqī, 21 years of age, paying taxes to the Government. Additional deputies, representing the Christians and the Jews, were also to be elected in the *Liwās* of Mōsul, Baghdad and Basra, in the following numbers:

Mōsul *Liwā*	2 Christians, 1 Jew.
Baghdad *Liwā*	1 Christian, 2 Jews.
Basra *Liwā*	1 Christian, 1 Jew.[3]

Primary electors, inscribed in registers by the electoral authorities of their electoral districts, into which the country had been divided, were to elect by secret ballot (Chapter I) the secondary electors in proportion of one to every 250 primary voters (Article 7). The secondary electors, assembling at the headquarters of their district, were to elect the deputies who, in addition to the qualifications enumerated in Articles 30 and 42 of the Constitution, had to reside within the electoral circle for which they were elected (Article 8).[4] To provide for by-elections, the secondary electors were to retain their office from one election until the next, and were to reconvene whenever called upon to elect a new deputy (Article 42).

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[1] *Infra*, Ch. XXI. Text: *Compilation*, 1924, pp. 45-51.

[2] *Compilation*, 1923, pp. 34-42, 47, 83, 157.

[3] Article 6.

[4] First circle: *Liwās* of Mōsul, Kirkūk, Sulaimānīya and 'Arbīl. Second circle: *Liwās* of Baghdad, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla, Karbalā, Kūt and Dīwānīyā. Third circle: *Liwās* of Muntafiq, 'Amarā and Basra.

642x Each step in the preparation of the registers, in the election
646 procedure, and in the certifying of deputies was minutely
666 prescribed by the law, penalties being laid down in accordance with modern practice for every possible contravention of the regulations.

642x The actual setting up of Parliament and the institution of the constitutional system were to await the ratification and the promulgation of the Organic Law and the Electoral Law. Nevertheless, in the two laws, through the efforts of their drafters, ample provision had been made along liberal lines, with the exception perhaps of the articles imposed in the interests of British policy, for the machinery and paraphernalia of a modern democratic State: a Sovereign, limited by law, a Council of Ministers responsible to Parliament, a Parliament consisting of a Senate and a representative Chamber of Deputies, and Judicial, Financial and Administrative systems. Provision had been made for the regulation of each institution. An outline had been provided into which further developments could be fitted in conformity with law as new circumstances made them essential. Comprehensive safeguards had been imposed for the rights of all sections of the population. Whether the machinery, the outlines and the safeguards so provided, however, were to be equal to the task of regenerating the country, to the progressive development of the new Kingdom and to the assurance of justice and equity to each member of the State, regardless of 'language, race or creed',[1] or whether they were to remain, as their Turkish prototypes had often remained, paper principles, depended on future circumstances, on the spirit and on the efficient zeal with which they were to be applied.

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[1] Constitution, Article 6.

Complete support, however, of the country has yet to be won 645
by the new Government. It must count on the opposition of the 668
exiled 'Iraqīs and of the adherents of the late Ja'far Pasha. It must count also on the potential opposition of all 'Iraqīs who for motives of self-interest have kept a foot in both camps.[1] Its real test will come, therefore, in its inability to carry out its promises and to meet other problems which face the country: placating the shaikhs at the same time that the land is divided, applying conscription to the tribal areas, bringing Shī'īs and Sunnīs into harmony and of meeting the rising cost of living.

The Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies, although a dignified body meeting 646
regularly since its establishment in 1925 and conducting its deliberations as a rule with sobriety and moderation, has failed to take its full and rightful place in the political life of 'Iraq, as foreshadowed by the provisions of the Constitution. The failure seems directly due to its inability to command public confidence. The wave of scepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions which recently swept over 'Iraq, in common with other countries with a more substantial democratic tradition, prepared the way for the present military dictatorship. The slow progress of 'Iraq as compared with that of Turkey and Persia under dictatorial regimes was conveniently explained away as being due to the democratic institutions. The critics pointed out that the parliamentary system of 'Iraq was adopted from foreign models and was unsuited to conditions and needs of 'Iraq. They indicated and with more reason that the elec- 646
tions to the Chamber, without exception, have been rigidly 666
controlled by the Government, often under pressure from the Residency as in 1928 and 1930.[2] In all districts except Baghdad

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[1] See Macdonald, A. D., *Euphrates Exile* (1936), pp. 53 ff. for a discussion of this characteristic in 'Iraqis.

[2] Principally because the Treaties of 1927 and of 1930 were to be ratified by the newly elected Chambers.

646 where the electoral body is not so amenable to control as else-
666 where, the confidential orders of the Government to the provincial officials proved sufficient to secure the election of its candidates whether they were residents of the district or even known there. Thus in 1925, all but four of the government candidates were returned, two of these being from Baghdad *Liwā*.[1] In 1928 the deputies returned from Basra, 'Amāra, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla and 'Arbīl *Liwās* were government nominees.[2] Of the thirteen Baghdad deputies, all but five were Government candidates. In these two elections, as well as in that of 1930, a number of Opposition candidates were conscientiously included by the Government on the principle advocated by the King that talented members of the Opposition would raise more difficulties outside Parliament from feelings of personal dissatisfaction than if they were actually members. Thus in 1928, half of the twenty-two Opposition members returned to the Chamber had been previously given the government coupon.

646 The deputies, on the other hand, by their proneness to con-
661 sider parliamentary office as a means to personal aggrandisement, persistently refused the opportunity to win the respect and confidence of the nation. In 1925, it had been somewhat difficult to secure candidates to come forward. It soon became apparent, however, that deputyship meant an assured income and, even more attractive, the exercise of influence. In 'Iraq, as in other countries, the principal value attached to official position has been its effectiveness in securing official favours and financial gain.

646 Examination of the statute books of 'Iraq, not only from 1925
661 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the
656 deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, June 10th, 1925. These four, with five others, were, according to a confidential report of the time, accounted to be 'unsatisfactory from the British standpoint'.

[2] Cf. *Baghdad Times*, May 10th, 1928.

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revenue[1] and of other financial legislation,[2] while passed by the 646
Chamber for the benefit of 'Iraq as a whole, particularly after 661
the agricultural crisis of 1931, have especially favoured the 656
land-owning class which has been predominant in Parliament. Other evidence seems to point to the exercise by the deputies of their influence outside of Parliament, either to secure preferential treatment from revenue officials or to obtain appointments for their protégés.

In spite of these deficiencies, Parliament, judged by its com- 646
plete record before 1932 as well as afterwards, has filled an important function in the political life of 'Iraq. It has attracted the most agile brains in the country; it has reflected although imperfectly, public opinion; and it has served as a brake on legislation which might otherwise have been forced on the country more quickly than it could be assimilated. It has served to curb the attempts of individual Ministers to assume a dictatorial attitude. Its right of interrogation, while sometimes checking the initiative of Ministers, has also served to reveal irregularities in administration. It has, moreover, furnished an outlet for Shi'a aspirations for participation in the Government and has given tribal opinion a limited means of expression through the tribal representatives, although discontent with the number of tribal representatives and the manner of their election was given by the leaders of the tribal revolt of 1935 as one of the primary reasons for that rising.[3]

The Chamber, together with the conservative Senate of twenty appointed notables, has, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, laid the foundations upon which democratic government, if it is to come to 'Iraq, must be built. If Parliament were to be given a broader base of an enlightened electorate, a reasonable degree of freedom of election, leadership and new

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[1] Particularly Laws: No. 38 of 1927; No. 55 of 1929; Nos. 38, 43, 69 of 1931; Nos. 1, 5, 10, 34, 35 of 1932; Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 of 1933.

[2] Particularly Pump Law of February 13th, 1926; No. 72 of 1926; No. 38 of 1929; No. 37 of 1930; No. 66 of 1931, etc.

[3] *Near East and India*, June 27th, 1935; also *The Times*, August 5th, 1936.

646 blood from the ranks of those who have absorbed with their education a modicum of civil spirit and a sense of duty to the State, it might yet prove to be the vital political institution of 'Iraq.

Whether these conditions will be attained or whether parliamentary institutions themselves will be retained under the present Government, it is too soon to determine.[1] It is not too much to believe, however, bearing in mind the historical pattern of other dictatorships based on military force, that should the Chamber attempt to take an independent attitude, or should an opposition party arise, the Chamber will have a short life, and that the eventual overthrow of the constitution must follow, together with the loss of such rights and liberties as are now valued by the people of 'Iraq and the destruction of all those conditions essential for the development and maintenance of democracy.

Administrative Services

647 A major difficulty which has faced 'Iraq in the development of her administration has been the lack of a regularly organized Civil Service with regulations governing cadres, appointments, promotions and conditions of service.

Attempts to organize cadres for the various branches of administration, made as early as 1923 when a Cadre Commission was appointed[2] and renewed from time to time, as in 1926[3] and 1928,[4] have not been productive of a systematic

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[1] Freedom of voting and introduction of new blood marked the elections to the new Chamber which convened on February 27th, 1937. It was apparent, however, even before the secondary elections had been held that the candidates, as in all past elections, had been selected so that there would be little or no opposition in the Chamber.

[2] By a decision of the Council of Ministers, March 5th, 1923: see also *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 124.

[3] Ibid., 1926, p. 70.

[4] The Cadre Commission was reorganized by the Council, October 6th, 1928. See also ibid., 1928, pp. 66-7.

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in
January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former
opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge
of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally
showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither
the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have
affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect
of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in
spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred.
The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently
abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for
little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the
time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election
of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals
of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September
by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the
Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree
on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume
their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

Government and Constitution

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the
646 Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed
by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained
the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an
honourable past in the service of the Government and the
country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

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discrimination in accordance with capacity. Finally, Article 37 641
states that the method of election to the Chamber of Deputies 563
shall take into account the necessity for the representation of non-Islamic minorities.

Some of these guarantees have been reinforced by particular laws. Thus the Electoral Law of 1924 allotted four deputies [646]
to the Christians and four to the Jews; it is a matter for dispute whether the law permits individual Christians and Jews to be elected as representatives of the ordinary constituencies. Similarly the non-Moslem communities were given representation in local and municipal councils by special laws.

As for the linguistic minorities, the Local Languages Law of [656]
1931 provided that the official language should be Kurdish or Turkish in a number of districts, and in addition that in all elementary and primary schools in those districts the language of instruction should be the mother-tongue of the majority of the pupils.

Personal Status and Communal Organization

The grant to religious minorities of jurisdiction in personal 692
and other matters has not met with the same difficulties as those 563
which have occurred in Syria. Articles 75 and 78 of the Constitution provided for the establishment of Christian and Jewish Spiritual Councils, with powers of jurisdiction to be conferred upon them by special laws. Their functions were defined in Article 79 as including matters relating to marriage, dowry, divorce, separation, alimony, attestation of wills and any other matters relating to personal status if the parties concerned consented. Every religious community was also, according to Article 112, to have the right to establish bodies competent to administer Waqf property.

In application of these provisions, several laws have been issued for particular communities, defining the method of appointment of the spiritual heads of the communities and of their councils, both spiritual and lay, and their functions in regard not only to personal status but also the decision of religious questions, the training of ecclesiastics, the administration of Waqf property, and the administration of schools and charitable institutions. For those communities for which special laws have not yet been issued, the old Turkish law on the subject remains valid.

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by special pardon and, with the consent of both Assemblies of Parliament, he may proclaim a general amnesty. 642 643

PART III

THE LEGISLATURE

Art. 27. The King shall exercise his powers by means of Royal Iradas. They shall issue upon the proposal of the responsible Minister or Ministers, with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, and shall be signed by them. 642 646

Art. 28. Legislative power is vested in Parliament and the King. Parliament is composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The legislature has the right of making laws and of amending and repealing them in conformity with the provisions of this law.

Art. 29. The King shall open Parliament in person or depute the Prime Minister or one of the Ministers for that purpose to perform the opening ceremony and deliver the speech from the throne.

Art. 30 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. No person shall be a member of either Assembly of Parliament:—

1) If he is not an Iraq national who has acquired Iraq nationality at birth or by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne[1] or by naturalisation, provided that, if he is naturalised, he belongs to an Ottoman family ordinarily resident in Iraq before the year 1914, and has been an Iraq national for ten years.

2) If he is less than thirty years old in the case of a deputy, or less than forty in the case of a senator.

3) If he has been adjudged bankrupt and has not been reinstated.

4) If he has been interdicted by the Court and the interdiction has not been removed.

5) If he has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year for an offense which is not of a political nature, or if he has been sentenced to imprisonment for any period for theft, bribery, breach of trust, forgery, fraud or any other offence adversely affecting his honour.

6) If he holds an official appointment in the Government or the departments connected therewith, or any office, appointment or employment under a person or institution which has a contract with a

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[1] See Turkey, Note on Treaties, p. 503 below.

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public department, or if he has any material interest, direct or indirect, with such contractor, unless the interest arise out of his being a share-holder in a Company composed of more than twenty-five persons. From this rule are excepted the lessees of Government lands and property, and those who are engaged in the duties described in paragraph 2 of Article 31 of this law.

7) If he is mad or an idiot.

8) If he is a relative of the King, within such degree as may be prescribed by law.

9) A person cannot be a member of both Assemblies of Parliament.

Art. 31 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The Senate shall be composed of a number of persons not exceeding one quarter of the total number of Deputies, to be appointed by the King from among those who have, by their acts, secured the confidence and esteem of the people, and from among those who have served the State and fatherland with distinction in the past.

2) A Senator or Deputy may, with the approval of the Assembly to which he belongs, be deputed to undertake important duties in the service of the State for a period not exceeding two years.

Art. 32 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The period of membership of the Senate is eight years from the date of appointment. A former senator may be again appointed.

Art. 33 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The Senate will elect a President and two Vice-Presidents from among its members, for a period extending from the beginning of the ordinary session until the beginning of the ordinary session in the following year. The result of the election will be submitted to the King for his confirmation. In the event of the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, their term of office will not terminate until the new Parliament has assembled, unless they have ceased to be members of the Senate.

Art. 34. The Senate shall assemble and disperse at the same time as the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 35 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* A senator will receive, in addition to travelling allowance, a monthly allowance of fifty Dinars during the whole period of his membership.

Art. 36. The Chamber of Deputies shall be constituted by election on the basis of one deputy for every twenty thousand males. 642
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Art. 37. *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The election of deputies shall be done under a special law, which shall prescribe the manner of proposing candidates, of secret voting at elections, and the necessary representation of the Christian and Jewish minorities.

Art. 38 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The term of the Chamber of Deputies is four ordinary sessions, one in each year, beginning on the first day of December and, if that day falls on a legal holiday, then on the day following, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 26.

2) The Chamber will be six months in session and six months in recess in each year. Subject to paragraph 1, the periods of session and recess in each year shall be determined by Royal Irada.

3) The Chamber will sit in the Capital but, if that is impossible, may sit elsewhere.

Art. 39 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The King will summon the Chamber of Deputies to meet in session; if he fails so to do on the appointed day, it will meet by virtue of this law. It will remain in session as prescribed by the preceding Article unless the King dissolves it before the end of its term.

2) The Chamber may adjourn its sittings from time to time in accordance with its Internal Regulations, and shall be deemed to be in session during such adjournments.

Art. 40 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) If the Chamber is dissolved, new elections shall be proceeded with and the new Chamber will be summoned to meet in extraordinary session within a period not exceeding four months from the date of dissolution. This session shall be subject to the rules set out in Articles 38 and 39 in what concerns recess and adjournments. In any event the session must terminate on the thirtieth day of November, so that the first ordinary session of the term may begin, but if the extraordinary session begins in the months of December or January, it shall be regarded as the first ordinary session of the term.

2) If the Chamber is dissolved for any reason the new Chamber may not be dissolved for the same reason.

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3) The King may summon Parliament to assemble outside the period prescribed by Article 38 in order to decide matters to be specified in the summons; the session will be terminated by Royal Irada.

Art. 41. A former deputy is eligible for re-election.

Art. 42 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Every male Iraq national who has completed the thirtieth year of his age, and is not disqualified in any manner set out in Article 30, may be elected a deputy. He shall not represent more than one of the electoral districts described in the Electoral Law and, if he is elected to more than one district, he must, within eight days after having been so informed, select the district which he desires to represent. Officials, not being Ministers or delegated senators or deputies, who are elected may choose between accepting or refusing their seats, and those who accept must vacate their Government appointments within the period aforesaid.

Art. 43 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The Chamber of Deputies decides matters connected with the electoral qualifications of deputies, objections made against elections, vacant seats, and resignations.

Art. 44. The Chamber of Deputies shall elect a President, two Vice-Presidents and two Secretaries from among their number each year, during the first sitting of the Chamber. The result of this election shall be made known to the King and shall be confirmed by him. When necessary, one of the Vice-Presidents shall act for the President.

Art. 45. Every member of the Chamber of Deputies has the right to propose the enactment of a draft law, except in what concerns the financial matters referred to hereinafter, provided that he has the support of ten of his colleagues. If such proposal is accepted by the Chamber, it shall be sent to the Council of Ministers, in order that a draft law may be prepared. Any proposal which is rejected by the Chamber may not be reintroduced during the same session.

Art. 46. *(as amended October 27, 1943).* A deputy may resign his seat by presenting his resignation in writing to the President, but the resignation shall be of no effect until it is accepted by the Chamber of Deputies.

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Art. 47 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* If a seat in the Chamber of Deputies becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation, loss of legal qualification, or absence, a new election must be held forthwith, at the request of the President.

Art. 48 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* A deputy is deemed to represent the whole of Iraq and not merely his own electoral district.

Art. 49. A member absent from the Chamber without leave or without just cause for a period of one month is considered to have resigned, subject to the terms of Art. 46.

Art. 50 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) A deputy will receive, in addition to travelling allowance, a monthly allowance of forty Dinars during the whole period of his membership.

2) If the Chamber is dissolved on the first day of December or thereafter, the deputy shall receive his allowance for the remaining months of the sessional year, up to the end of November in such year.

Art. 51 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Senators and deputies, before entering on their duties, shall individually swear an oath, before the Assemblies to which they belong, that they will be loyal to the King, preserve the Constitution, serve the nation and fatherland, and perform their duties diligently.

Art. 52 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The Senate shall not begin business unless more than one half of the members actually appointed are present.

2) The Chamber of Deputies shall not begin business unless more than half of the members actually elected are present.

Art. 53. Decisions shall be taken by a majority of votes of the members present, unless otherwise provided by this law. If the voting is equal, the President shall have a casting vote. No majority shall be obtained unless half the members present cast their vote. Each member shall vote in person. The method of voting shall be prescribed in the Internal Regulations of the Assembly.

Art. 54. Every member of Parliament has the right to put questions and demand explanations from Ministers. Discussions arising therefrom and from answers given in reply thereto shall be carried

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on in the manner prescribed by the Internal Regulations of each Assembly, provided that such discussion shall not take place until eight days at least have elapsed from the day on which such questions or demands for explanations were put. This procedure may be departed from in urgent cases or by consent of the Minister.

Art. 55 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. An Assembly will pass its decisions on draft laws article by article and then as a whole, but it may resolve that it is enough to decide on the draft as a whole only, in which case the members shall have the right to discuss the articles.

Art. 56. No armed force may enter the Assembly or remain near its precincts, unless requested to do so by the President.

Art. 57. The meetings of both Assemblies shall be open to the public. At the request, however, of one of the Ministers, or four of the Senators, or ten of the Deputies, the debate on the question under discussion shall be conducted *in camera*.

Art. 58. No person may enter either Assembly and speak therein except members, Ministers or high officials deputed by Ministers during their absence, or persons invited so to do by the Assembly.

Art. 59. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall have the right of issuing rules and regulations concerning the following matters:

1) The manner of exercising and maintaining the powers, privileges and safeguards conferred upon the Assembly by this law.

2) The transaction of the business of both Assemblies and the conduct of debates, whether sitting separately or jointly.

Art. 60. *(as amended October 27, 1943)*.

1) Every member has complete freedom of speech subject to the Internal Regulations of the Assembly to which he belongs. No legal proceedings shall be taken against him on account of any vote which he gives or any opinion which he expresses, or any speech which he makes in the course of the deliberations and discussions of the Assembly.

2) A member of Parliament shall not be arrested or tried unless the Assembly to which he belongs resolves, by majority, that sufficient grounds exist for his being charged, or unless he is arrested, *flagrante delicto*, for a crime. If a member is arrested for any reason while Parliament is in recess the Government shall so inform the Assembly when it meets, furnishing explanations and reasons.

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Art. 61. A Minister who is a member of either the Senate or Chamber of Deputies shall have the right of voting in the Assembly of which he is a member and the right of speaking in both Assemblies. Ministers who are not members of either Assembly shall have the right of speaking in both, but not of voting. Ministers, or persons representing them in their absence, shall have the right of precedence over other members in addressing the Assemblies.

Art. 62. *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) Draft laws will be submitted to one of the Assemblies and, if accepted, will be submitted to the other Assembly. They shall not become law unless accepted by both Assemblies and confirmed by the King.

2) If a draft law is submitted to one Assembly and the Prime Minister, or one of the Ministers mentioned in the draft, demands a joint session, and the Senate approves the demand, then the Assemblies shall meet under the presidency of the President of the Senate. The decision as to the draft shall be by a two-thirds majority of the joint assembly, but the draft shall not become law until the King has confirmed it.

3) Both Chambers shall decide on drafts submitted to them by the Government. After acceptance the drafts will be presented to the King, who will either confirm them or return them for reconsideration with a statement of reasons therefor, within a period of three months, provided that if either of the Assemblies resolves that a draft is urgent then it must be confirmed, or returned for reconsideration, within fifteen days, with a statement of reasons therefor. Drafts not returned within the prescribed period shall be regarded as confirmed.

4) Draft laws rejected by both Assemblies shall not be introduced again into either Assembly during the Session.

Art. 63. In the event of one of the Assemblies rejecting a draft law twice, and the other Assembly insisting upon its acceptance, a joint meeting of the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies shall be held, presided over by the President of the Senate, with the object of discussing the articles regarding which a divergence of opinion exists. If the draft law is accepted, with or without amendment, by a majority composed of two-thirds of the members of the

642 646 joint meeting, such draft law shall be considered to have been passed by both Assemblies, but shall not become law until it has been confirmed by the King. If not passed in this manner, such draft law shall not be reintroduced into either Assembly during the current session.

PART IV

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

642 645 Art. 64 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The number of Ministers shall not be less than seven, including the Prime Minister. No person shall be a Minister who is under any disqualification described in Article 30.

A Minister who is not a member of either Assembly shall not remain in office longer than six months unless he is appointed a senator or elected a deputy before the end of that period. A Minister who receives the salary of a minister shall not, at the same time, receive the membership allowance in either Assembly. A Minister shall not buy or lease any of the property or possessions of the State.

2) Deputy Ministers may be appointed provided that they must be members of Parliament.

3) In case of necessity the King may appoint Ministers without portfolio, in order to obtain the benefit of their experience and talents.

Art. 65 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The Council of Ministers will undertake the direction of the affairs of the State. It will meet, under the presidency of the Prime Minister, to decide the measures to be taken in matters which concern more than one Ministry and in all important matters which concern the Ministries. The Prime Minister will submit the decisions of the Council to the King, for his confirmation.

Art. 66. Ministers of State shall be jointly responsible to the Chamber of Deputies for affairs dealt with by the various Ministries and responsible severally for acts relating to each of the Ministries and Departments attached thereto. Should the Chamber of Deputies pass a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet by a majority of members present, the Cabinet must resign. If the resolution in question relates to one Minister only, such Minister must resign.

At the request of the Prime Minister or of the Minister concerned, the Chamber shall, once only, postpone a vote of no confi-

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IRAQ ELECTORAL LAW OF MAY 27, 1946[1]
LAW NO. 11 OF 1946

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With the approval of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, we hereby order the promulgation of the following Law:—

Chapter I—Qualifications and Establishments

Art. 1. Primary Elector: shall mean any person entitled to elect Secondary Electors.

Secondary Elector: shall mean any person entitled to elect Deputies.

Art. 2. Every male Iraqi who has completed his twentieth year and whose name is entered in the electoral registers as prescribed in Chapter II shall be considered a primary elector, excluding any male person who:—

Firstly: has been judged bankrupt and has not been legally rehabilitated.

Secondly: has had an order of inhibition passed against him by a Court which has not been released.

Thirdly: has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than one year on account of a crime other than political, or has been sentenced to imprisonment on account of theft or bribery or any other crime absolutely affecting his honour, unless his forfeited rights are restored to him.

Fourthly: is a lunatic or is mentally defective.

Art. 3. Any person possessing the qualifications of a primary elector may be a secondary elector.

Art. 4. He shall not become a deputy:

(1) Who is not an Iraqi having acquired his Iraqi nationality by birth, or under the Treaty of Lausanne,[2] or by naturalization, provided that a naturalized person should belong to an Ottoman family which habitually resided in Iraq before 1914 and that 10 years should have elapsed over his naturalization.

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[1] Arabic text in *Waqayi' al 'Iraqiya*, Baghdad, no. 2377, June 8, 1946. English translation taken *textually* from *Iraq Government Gazette*, Baghdad, January 5, 1947.

[2] See Turkey, Note on Treaties, p. 503 below.

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(2) Who is below his thirtieth year of age.

(3) Who has been judged bankrupt and has not been legally rehabilitated. 646 666

(4) Who has had an order of inhibition passed by a Court against him which has not been released.

(5) Who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than one year on account of a crime other than political, or has been sentenced to imprisonment on account of theft, bribery, breach of trust, forgery, fraud, or any other crime absolutely affecting his honour.

(6) Who holds a post or an appointment or is in the service of a person or an establishment under contract with a public department, or has any material interest, direct or indirect, with such contractor, unless such interest arises through his being a shareholder in a company composed of more than 25 persons, excepting lessees of Government lands and property.

(7) Who is a lunatic or is mentally defective.

(8) Who is related to the King up to the fifth degree.

Art. 5. (1). Electoral circles shall be set up in Qadhas on the basis of the number of males registered in census registers, and every Qadha containing a number of registered males not less than 15,000 and not exceeding 70,000 shall be considered an Electoral circle, provided that it shall be permissible to detach a part of such Quadha for the purpose of enforcing paragraph 2 of this article.

(2) If a Qadha contains less than 15,000 registered males, such a Qadha shall be amalgamated with a neighbouring Qadha to form an electoral circle containing a number of registered males not less than 20,000 and not exceeding 70,000. A Qadha may also be amalgamated with a part of a neighbouring Qadha for this purpose, provided that the number of the remaining registered males in the neighbouring Qadha is not less than 20,000.

(3) If the number of registered males exceeds 70,000 in a Qadha or a remaining part after the detachment of a part thereof for the purpose of the enforcement of paragraph 2 of this article, it shall be divided into 2 or more electoral circles each containing a number of registered males not less than 20,000 and not exceeding 70,000.

(4) If the number of registered males in an electoral circle does

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not exceed 30,000, one deputy shall be elected therein, if it exceeds 30,000 two deputies shall be elected, and if it exceeds 50,000 three deputies shall be elected.

(5) Every Nahiya or Mahallat shall be an Election Section, provided that it shall be permissible to join certain Mahallas in one section by a decision of the committee of inspection appointed under this Law. Should differences arise over the boundary of a section, the committee in question shall give a final decision thereon.

Art. 6. (1) The Minister of Interior should produce authenticated lists from the Directorate General of Census containing the number of registered males in every Qadha, Nahiya and Mahallat, and submit such lists to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, within *one month* from the date of the coming into force of this Law, together with his views concerning the manner of the enforcement of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 5 in such way as to ensure that the total number of deputies shall, as far as possible, be at the rate of one deputy to every 20,000 registered males in Iraq.

(2) The President of the Chamber of Deputies should pass the lists, together with the views of the Minister, to the Home Affairs Committee at the Chamber of Deputies, which after perusing the Minister's views, should draft the list of electoral circles and the number of deputies who should be elected in each circle.

(3) The President of the Chamber of Deputies should submit to the Chamber the list approved by the Committee and the Chamber should give a final decision thereon and publish it.

Art. 7. (1) The list will be reconsidered every fourth year in accordance with the procedures indicated herein above. It is, however, not permissible to issue a decision approving a new list except after the lapse of four years over the date of approval of the existing list.

(2) If the new list necessitates the addition of a number of seats in the Chamber, elections for such seats should be carried out immediately.

(3) If the new list necessitates the abolition of a number of seats in the Chamber, a deputy does not relinquish his appointment immediately but retains it until the termination of his membership, as indicated in the Organic Law.

Art. 8. (a) Should it be necessary to carry out elections before

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the publication of the first list proposed in accordance with Article 646
6 above, elections will be carried out on the basis of an interim list 666
to be prepared by the Minister of Interior and approved by the
Council of Ministers, and such list will be put into application until
the publication of the former list.

(b) Until such time as a general census registration is carried out, election will be effected on the basis of the former electoral lists, subject to consideration being given to the alterations effected therein.

Art. 9. The Jewish and Christian minorities shall have the following number of deputies:—

	Jews	*Christians*
In the Qadha of Baghdad Liwa Hqrs.	3	2
In the Qadha of Basrah Liwa Hqrs.	2	1
In the Qadha of Mosul Liwa Hqrs.	1	3

This number shall be in addition to the number determined in Articles 5 and 6 which should be elected from the majority in proportion to the total number of males registered in the above-mentioned administrative units.

Art. 10. Secondary electors shall be elected at the rate of one secondary elector to every one hundred primary electors, on condition that a fraction of a hundred shall be dropped unless it exceeds 70.

Art. 11. All obligations coming within the competence of a judge in this Law shall be carried out by the Judge of the Civil Court found in the Electoral circle. If more than one judge existed in the court, the President of the Court of Cassation shall appoint one of its judges. In case no civil court exists in an electoral circle, the President of the Court of Cassation shall appoint a judge to carry out these obligations in the headquarters of the electoral circle.

Art. 12, All obligations imposed upon an administrative official in this law shall be carried out by the Qaimmaqam in a Qadha forming an electoral circle or by the Mutasarrif if the Qadha was a Liwa headquarters. If, however, the electoral circle had no Qadha headquarters, the Minister of Interior will determine the circle's headquarters and the administrative official. In regard to sections which are smaller than Nahiyas and sub-sections, administrative officials should determine headquarters therefor.

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Art. 13. (1) The Committee of Inspection in each electoral circle shall be composed of seven members in a circle of one deputy, 11 members in a circle of two deputies, and of 15 members in a circle of three deputies.

(2) When the election of a Committee of Inspection is announced the body of eldermen in each Mahallat of an electoral circle Headquarters should elect five individuals from among the residents of the Mahallat. Individuals elected from each Mahallat should meet to elect the Committee of Inspection by secret ballot. After the election of the Committee, its members should elect a President from among themselves by secret ballot.

(3) The judge should issue an invitation for the meeting in question and should attend it to control the proper carrying out of election of the Committee of Inspection and its president.

CHAPTER II.—PREPARATION OF LISTS OF PRIMARY ELECTIONS

Art. 14. If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved or its term expires, the administrative official should immediately announce the necessity of the preparation of lists of primary electors, upon which the notables in each Mahallat or village should elect from among themselves three individuals who should meet with the Mukhtar or such person replacing him to prepare the lists. This operation should be completed within ten days.

Art. 15. The lists will contain (the names of) every male who has completed his twentieth year of age whose name is entered in the census Register. If any person who is disqualified to be a primary elector, under Article 2 of this Law, a note to that effect should be entered against his name, indication being made of official documents to this effect, if available.

Art. 16. Two copies of the Lists shall be forwarded to the Mudir of the Nahiya. In the headquarters of Qadhas and Liwas, these shall be forwarded to the administrative official. The lists so received shall be amalgamated and entered in one single register for every electoral section, two copies of such register being forwarded to the administrative official and one copy to the Committee of Inspection.

Art. 17. The Committee of Inspection shall check the registers

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received by it and ascertain that they are prepared in accordance with the instructions issued for the purpose and are free from omission, errors, fraud and forgery. For the purpose of ascertaining facts, it may, when necessary, summon before it any person from the nearby localities whom it may desire to summon or send some of its members to the villages. It should complete this checking within 15 days.

Art. 18. On completion of the checking and correction, the Committee of Inspection shall return to each section one copy of its register, the other copy being retained by it, and shall draw up a document embodying the number of primary electors in each electoral section and the total number of primary electors in the electoral circle and forward it to the administrative official.

Art. 19. Upon receipt of the correct registers at the electoral section, the Mudirs of Nahiyas or the administrative officials, as the case may be, shall enter the necessary corrections in the lists of villages or Mahallas and shall return them to the Mukhtars. The corrected registers shall be posted in the headquarters of electoral sections, while the corrected lists will be posted for 7 days in suitable places in the Mahallas and villages for the inhabitants to inspect their contents, the act that the registers and lists have been so posted shall be announced by such means as may be available.

Art. 20. (1) Any person may, within the above-mentioned period of 7 days, object to the undue registration of any name or to the omission of any name which should have been registered. Such objection shall be made unstamped to the Committee of Inspection, who should examine it within 3 days at most and notify the objector of its decision taken by a majority of votes embodying the reason therefor. If the objection is upheld, the registers shall be corrected accordingly, and if rejected the objector may, if he is not satisfied, bring the case before the judge by submitting an unstamped application within 3 days from the date of serving at him of the committee's decision, and if the judge decide to uphold the objection, the registers shall be corrected. After the expiry of the above-mentioned period his objection shall not be entertained and the judge should give his decision within 3 days which should be final, and no fee whatever shall be collected from the applicant.

(2) After the expiry of seven days, the lists which have been posted shall be removed and no further objection shall be heard.

Art. 21. The lists, registers and documents mentioned herein above should be revised every year and corrected in accordance with the procedures laid down in the preceding articles, provided that the work of revision and correction in the electoral sections shall be completed before the end of January in each year.

CHAPTER III.—ELECTION OF SECONDARY ELECTORS

Art. 22. (1) The elections shall be held at the headquarters of each electoral section, on the date fixed by the Committee of Inspection, under the supervision of a committee known as the "Electoral Committee" composed of five individuals selected by the Committee of Inspection from among those possessing the qualifications of a secondary elector at the headquarters of the sections, and the presidency of a member of the Committee of Inspection selected by this Committee by drawing lots.

(2) With a view to facilitating the conduct of elections a large section may be divided into several sections and different days may also be fixed for the carrying out of elections.

(3) The Committee of Inspection should fix the days mentioned herein above in such a manner as to ensure the completion of elections at least thirty days before the date fixed for the election of deputies under Article 24.

Art. 23. The voting papers shall be prepared and sealed by the Committee of Inspection. The number forwarded to electoral sections shall be equal to the number of primary electors registered therein.

Art. 24. The voting boxes shall be such size and shape as may be prescribed by the Committee of Inspection. Each box shall have in its top an oblong aperture large enough to receive a folded voting paper and shall have different locks not capable of being opened by the same key.

Art. 25. The member of the Committee of Inspection presiding over the Electoral Committee should arrive at the headquarters of the electoral section sufficiently before the date fixed for the election, taking with him the voting box and the voting papers belonging to that section. On his arrival there, he will invite the Electoral Com-

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mittee to hold a meeting and announce the day, hour and place of election in his section. The committee shall explain to all the primary electors, by such means as may be possible, the purpose of the election and the manner of conducting it, as laid down in this law.

Art. 26. On the day fixed for voting the electoral committee shall assemble at the appointed place and shall call the electors of the villages and Mahallas at the time assigned to them. The voting box shall be opened and shown to be empty and then locked, one key being kept with the President of the Electoral Committee and the other with the eldest member of the Committee. Each elector shall receive a voting paper on which he shall write the names and surnames of those he desires to elect according to the proportion prescribed in Article 10 of this Law. An elector who cannot write may depute some other person to write for him. If more names than the correct number are written, the names first written up to the correct number shall be accepted and the remainder disregarded. If the same name be written more than once, it shall be reckoned once only. Illegible and ambiguous names shall be disregarded.

Art. 27. A sufficient period being allowed after the distribution of the voting papers, they should be collected from the electors present, beginning with the members of the committee if they are entitled to vote in that section. The clerk of the committee shall ask every elector who presents his voting paper to state his name, surname and domicile, and if this statement is verbally confirmed by the Mukhtar, the clerk shall make a vote[1] against his name in the register and he shall be allowed to cast his voting paper in the box. The Electoral Committee should watch the electors lest some of them should cast into the box more than one paper.

Art. 28. When the electors of a village or Mahallat have cast their voting papers in the box, the mukhtar shall announce that the electors of that village or Mahallat have voted. The clerk shall then write on the list of the electors the number of those who attended and those who did not attend. The list shall then be signed by the President and members of the Electoral Committee. This process shall be repeated in the elections of each village and Mahallat.

Art. 29. (1) If a person produces a voting paper on the conclusion of election in his village or Mahallat and the withdrawal of its electors, he shall not be allowed to cast his voting paper.

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[1] Mark.—Ed.

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646 (2) Voting by *wakala*[1] shall not be allowed, and no one may
666 forward his voting paper though he may have an excuse.

(3) If by the evening the voting remains incompleted, the Electoral Committee shall paste a piece of paper over the aperture of the box and fasten it with a string. This string shall then be sealed on both sides with the seals of all the members, if possible, who shall also seal the locks. The box shall then be kept in a safe place appointed by the Committee and special care shall be taken in guarding it. On the following day, the seals shall be removed after it has been ascertained that they were not tampered with, and the casting of voting papers shall be resumed.

Art. 30. After all the electors have cast their voting papers, the box shall be opened in the presence of the President of the Committee and not less than three of its members. The papers shall be counted and replaced in the box without being read and a statement shall be forthwith drawn up showing the number of electors who have voted in that section and the number of papers found in the box.

Art. 31. Any paper not bearing the seal of the Committee of Inspection shall be considered as *batila*.[2] If it is discovered that the number of papers in the box exceeds the number of electors, and if such increase is more than 10 per cent, the election shall be considered as null and void and shall be repeated. If, however, the increase does not exceed 10 per cent, the voting operation will be resumed after a number of papers equal to that found in excess are removed from the box and cancelled.

Art. 32. (1) After the papers have been counted, the names written thereon shall be recorded as follows:

The names shall be read out and shall be written on a sheet of paper, and as each name is read out, the figure (1) shall be marked against it. In order that the box may not be left open so many papers should be taken out as can be dealt with during the day and the box shall be locked, fastened with a string and sealed on both sides of the string and on the aperture with the seals of all the members of the Committee present. It shall then be kept in a secure place, the door of which shall be likewise sealed. Every evening the papers which have been sorted shall be placed in a bag which shall be sealed and a statement shall be drawn showing the number of votes won by each of the secondary electors.

[1] Proxy.—ED.

[2] Null and void.—ED.

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(2) After all the papers have been sorted, the Electoral Committee shall give to each person who has won a majority of votes a document to the effect that he is a secondary elector. The Committee will draw up a statement of the result of the election which shall be signed by the President and all members of the Electors Committee. The President should submit this statement to the Committee of Inspection. 646 666

(3) If for any reason the place of a secondary elector falls vacant, his place shall be filled by the winner of the next largest number of votes.

Art. 33. On receipt of the statements mentioned in the preceding article, the Committee of Inspection shall enter the names of all secondary electors in a special register for each section separately. Such register will remain valid until the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies for the termination of its term.

Chapter IV.—Election of Deputies

Art. 34. Subject to the provisions of Article 44, general elections in all electoral circles will be carried out on the same day appointed by the Minister of Interior. This day will be appointed by such means of publicity as may be available within a period not less than forty days before the prescribed date.

Art. 35—Elections will be carried out on the basis of candidature. Any person who desires to nominate himself as a deputy for an electoral circle should submit an application to this effect to the administrative official of such circle. The application should be written on a special form embodying a declaration, which should be signed by the candidate, to the effect that he possesses the qualifications of a deputy mentioned in Article 4 of this law. This application should be received in a period not less than 20 days before the date appointed for elections. The administrative official should, on receipt of the application, register it against a receipt.

Art. 36. No person may nominate himself for more than 3 electoral circles, except as provided for in Article 47.

Art. 37. A candidate should deposit with the Qadha Treasury a sum of ID. 100. This sum will be credited as revenue to the Qadha municipality if the candidate does not obtain 10 per cent of the votes of the circle.

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Art 38. (1) The administrative official should forward all applications together with the documents of candidature to the Committee of Inspection on the day following the termination of the period prescribed for the submission of the applications for candidature. The committee should examine these documents in order to ascertain that the preceding articles of this chapter have been fully complied with and will furnish the administrative official with its views as to whether or not the documents were correct, stating the reasons if it considered that the documents were incorrect.

(2) The administrative official should submit to the judge immediately any application which the committee considered as being incorrect, and the judge should give an urgent and final decision in the matter and transmit his decision to the administrative official within a period not less than 15 days before the date prescribed for the carrying out of election.

(3) If the committee has any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate in accordance with Article 4 of this law, it should state its objection on the document and the administrative official should comply therewith in accordance with Article 46 (4) of this Law.

Art. 39. (1) The administrative official should post the names of candidates whose applications are found to be correct in a public place in the headquarters of the electoral circle as early as possible after the examination, provided that this should not be less than 10 days before the date prescribed for the elections. The names should also be announced to the public through the official and other possible means.

(2) The administrative official will enforce the procedure outlined in Article 47 with regard to the announcement of the names of Christian and Jewish candidates.

Art. 40. All candidates shall be deemed as elected *tazkiyah* if their number do not exceed the number of deputies who should be elected in the electoral circle. In such an event, no voting shall take place and the administrative official should state the fact on announcing the names of candidates, otherwise voting shall be carried out according to the following articles.

Art. 41. (1) On the date and the hour fixed by the Committee of Inspection, the secondary electors should present themselves at the place of elections and shall be given voting papers sealed with

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the seal of the committee and indicating the number of deputies to be elected and the names of candidates, provided that the names shall be written serially as prescribed by the committee by drawing lots. This serial will be adopted in all voting papers. 646 666

(2) The provisions of Article 47 (3) shall be enforced with regard to the manner of distribution of the list of candidates in the circumstances indicated therein.

(3) The judge should attend the meeting to supervise the progress of the election.

Art. 42. The voting box shall be placed on a table in front of the Committee of Inspection and the judge. It shall be opened before the voting papers are dropped into it in order that those present should be assured that it is empty. It shall then be closed and a sheet of paper sealed by the Committee of Inspection and three of the secondary electors shall be fastened upon the lock.

Art. 43. (1) The Committee of Inspection shall call up the secondary electors one after another for voting in the order in which their names are registered. The dropping of papers into the box should be watched lest an elector should place more than one paper. No person shall vote unless his document shall have been checked by the Committee of Inspection either before or at the time of voting.

(2) Each elector shall give his vote by writing the names of those candidates whom he wishes to elect on the voting paper.

(3) The procedure adopted in Article 26 shall be enforced with regard to the names in excess of the determined number or names which have been repeated.

Art. 44. (1) If the number of secondary electors who give their votes is not less than 60 per cent of their total number, the Committee of Inspection should announce that the voting operation has been completed. If their number is, however, less than 60 per cent the committee should decide the adjournment of completion of voting to another day which should be announced by such means as may be possible. A sheet of paper shall be on the aperture of the box and shall be sealed by the Committee of Inspection before it is removed from the place of meeting.

(2) The voting operation shall be completed on the adjourned day irrespective of the number of votes.

Art. 45. (1) The Committee of Inspection shall open the box

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646 after the completion of voting. No voting paper shall be dropped
666 in it after it has been opened.

(2) After the box has been opened, the papers shall be counted and read publicly, and all the names of all candidates shall be written down. As each name is read out the figure (1) shall be marked against it until all the papers have been read. The votes gained by each candidate shall be counted, and a statement showing in figures and words, the number of votes gained by each shall be drawn up and transmitted to the administrative official.

Art. 46. (1) On the same day or the following day, the President of the Committee of Inspection should announce the result of the election in the presence of the administrative official, the judge, the candidates present and others.

(2) The candidates who obtain a majority of votes shall become deputies. In the case of equality of votes, the Committee of Inspection shall decide the matter by drawing lots.

(3) A statement shall be prepared signed by the judge, the administrative official and the Committee of Inspection showing the result of election. A copy of this statement shall be given to each one who has been elected to be a deputy and copies shall be sent to the Ministry of Interior and the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies.

(4) If the Committee of Inspection raises an objection against the qualification of a candidate as outlined in Article 38(3), the text of the objection should be written on copies of the statement to be given to the deputy and those to be sent to the Ministry of Interior and the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 47. The election of Minorities in the administrative units outlined in Article 9 shall be carried out in the following manner:

(1) Every Christian or Jew who desires to nominate himself for election should submit an application of candidature, together with the documents to the administrative official in the electoral circle forming the headquarters of the unit concerned, and should not nominate himself in more than one administrative unit.

(2) After the checking of the applications and the documents of candidature, and before the announcement of names under Article 39, the administrative official should furnish the administrative officials of all the electoral circles in the unit with names of Jewish and Christian candidates of all the circles in question.

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(3) The list of candidates shall be divided into 3 parts in the voting papers in each electoral circle in the unit. The first part shall not contain the names of Christians and Jews. The second part shall contain the names of Jews, while the third part shall contain the names of Christians. The number of deputies to be elected shall be indicated at the top of each part of the list.

CHAPTER V.—OFFENCES AND PENALTIES

Art. 48. Any person who commits any of the following crimes shall be deemed as having offended against this law:

(1) Knowing, or having good reasons to believe that he is disqualified from being an elector, votes at an election.

(2) Knowingly votes under the name of another.

(3) Votes more than once in the same election.

(4) Knowingly inscribes or assists in the inscription of any name in an electoral list or register contrary to the provisions of this law.

(5) Knowingly omits, or causes to be omitted, any name from a list or register which ought to be inscribed therein.

(6) Uses violence or threats or fraud or influence for the purpose of *ta'thir*[1] the elections.

(7) Gives or promises any gift or advantage for the purpose of *ta'thir* the elections.

(8) Accepts or solicits such gift or advantage above-mentioned for himself or a primary elector.

(9) Being employed by a primary or secondairy elector to write the names of the persons for whom he wishes to vote, knowingly writes the names of other persons.

(10) Distributions[2] the course of an election by the publication of false rumours or false allegation against the candidates for election.

And shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or with a fine not exceeding ID. 100, or by both imprisonment and fine, any one who commits one of the offences mentioned above.

All complaints in connection with interference on the part of Government officials with the elections shall be submitted to the Committee of Inspection who shall make the preliminary investigations and forward the charge sheets direct to the courts. If, however, the complaint is against the Committee of Inspection itself, it shall

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[1] Influencing.—ED.

[2] *Sic;* probably "disturbs."—ED.

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646 be submitted direct to the courts, who will take the necessary legal
666 proceedings against the officials.

Art. 49. Any person who refuses to give information concerning himself for the purpose of compiling electoral lists and registers shall be punished with a fine not exceeding ID. 5.

Art. 50. Whoever, with a view to affecting the result of an election, destroys or makes away with any voting box or any voting paper or any official document concerning the election, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding two years or with a fine not exceeding ID. 200, or by both imprisonment and fine.

CHAPTER VI.—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Art. 51. (1) If a person is elected as deputy in more than one electoral circle, he should within 8 days from the date of his being informed, choose the circle which he wishes to represent. A new election will be carried out immediately in the circle relinquished by him.

(2) If an official is elected as deputy, he should relinquish his appointment within 8 days from the date of his being informed. This provision will also apply to officers actually serving in the armed forces.

Art. 52. Armed forces and the police shall not participate in the elections. This provision, however, does not prevent officers from nominating themselves to be elected as deputies.

Art. 53. No person shall be arrested for a debt due to the Government while proceeding to, returning from, or at a place of voting.

Art. 54. Mutasarrifs, Qaimmaqams, Mudirs of Nahiyas, judges, Commandants of Police or Military Commandants may not nominate themselves for election in the electoral circles within their competence.

Art. 55. This law shall come into force from the date of dissolution of the existing Chamber of Deputies or the termination of its term. Article 6, however, will come into force from the date of the publication of this Law in the Official Gazette.

Art. 56. The Ministers of the Interior and Justice are charged with the execution of this Law.

Made at Baghdad this 26th day of Jamadi al Thani, 1366, and the 27th day of May, 1946.

1: Longrigg MHl Iraq MHl

● 647, 721, 727, 728

[For an account of the British invasion and campaign in Iraq in 1914, the subsequent occupation and the British war-time administration of Iraq in 1917-18, the civil administration by the British from the end of the war in 1918 to 1920, see category 116, pp. 77-121.]

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was 631
foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of
the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the
greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The
'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, [181]
unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal
warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between
town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; 579
to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. 182]
Such was the territory which for four centuries the
Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western
opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to 642
these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three 631
generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which
was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood
at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and
was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule
was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the
Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the
local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including
those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman 642
dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, 185
which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And
while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the
conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law
and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing
agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational
foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and
a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the
attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe
to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached
from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern,
pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government
of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had
enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its
Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every
new meticulous Ordinance in Midḥat Pasha's revised wilaya
system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, 565
a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the
effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they 647
were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by
race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part
of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

565 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims ● 647 or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe, or professedly cosmopolitan, every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, 661 persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and naḥiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer naḥiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent 662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land [623] revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish representa- 625 tives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardi- 631 hood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendiles -- Analyst]

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded
civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of
French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession
and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated
State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the
shaykh-tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties
of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired
mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments.
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on 647
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the
Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

647 and sale of tobacco products; the Customs Department; all these likewise were of no direct concern to the Wali. The same applies to the rare public works entrusted to the wilaya engineer, and to the Department of Pious Bequests (Awqaf) The Wali could venture on no official interference in the Oman-Ottoman Administration, none in the favoured Saniya. The last-named had, by 1900, acquired for its master by favourable 'purchase' almost one-third of the cultivable lands of Baghdad wilaya, and very large estates in Baṣra and Mosul.

701 The VIth Army, whose territorial area was coterminus with 'Iraq, was reckoned as the least excellent of the main Turkish formations. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, a cavalry division, and a formation of artillery. The units of every arm were widely scattered, and constantly changed station according to the needs of the tribal warfare. Transport was hired for the occasion, supply and medical arrangements were primitive, equipment was shabby and deficient. The staffs and organization of the Army were in general those of modern forces; but the troops were misused, discipline was lax, pay irregular. Service with the Army was
702 by conscription, from which non-Muslims and many classes of Muslims were free on payment; tribesmen were wholly exempt. Compulsory service was commonly prolonged beyond the legal three-year period, and this, with the liability to be sent to a grave in the Yaman or Europe, combined to make conscription of all Turkish institutions the most resented. Nevertheless, no Arab province supplied more officers to the Turkish Army, or of higher standard, than did 'Iraq.

706 The Navy at Baṣra, a puny and decayed service, was commanded by a commodore. Its ostensible duty was that of river police, in which it signally failed. With a shore establishment of some two hundred, its only craft in 1900 were an ancient corvette unable to leave its moorings, the *Kilid al-Bahr*, and a small armed paddle-steamer, the *Alus*.

642 This Turkish Government of 'Iraq, at whose task, evolution, and organization we have now glanced, had irreproachable nominal objectives—order, progress, and public advantage. Its regulations were comprehensive and repeatedly revised: its administrators contained men of education, experience, and knowledge of local conditions. It was, nevertheless, severely criticized by its own servants and not less by outside observers. Excessively centralized, it was bound by a thousand ill-applicable rules which precluded local initiative; it was ill-served, ill-housed, ill-equipped, and incapable of maintaining forces adequate to its clearest needs. It lacked a breed of loyal and vigorous men able to grasp the essentials of ruling a backward tribal territory, and trusted by their superiors.

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, 186
to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn 668
Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khudhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some 000
well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the 185
efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee 661
647

185 for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the civil service,
661 dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intru-
647 sion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Bequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Ḥilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zūr. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

701 The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal 701
parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and southwestern Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained 706
decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this 499
period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to 206
most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert 205
postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of 647
this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq 661
today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

647 capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find 661 in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

635 Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just 663 Ṭahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Riḍhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 1912: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Baṣra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the 635 aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for 661 his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

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[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

with no Constitution; and an intended treaty relationship with 642 Great Britain, but as yet no treaty. These features, however, did not disturb the administration of the country, which in Faysal's first half-year proceeded without interruption. The Naqib and his Council, correctly resigning on the King's accession, were reinstated with changes. The new Cabinet formed on 10 September included Naji al-Suwaydi, a lawyer and patriot of distinguished 645* name and record, as Minister of Justice: a Mosul Christian doctor Ḥanna Khayyaṭ as Minister (later Director-General) of Health: and most of the former Ministers, including Ja'far Pasha in Defence and Sasun Ḥasqayl in Finance. Ḥajj Ramzi, a nonentity who had succeeded Sayid Ṭalib at Interior, retained that office. The Ministers of Justice, Works, and Awqaf were unchanged. The now separate Ministry of Education was entrusted to the learned Shi'i divine Sayid Muḥammad 'Ali al-Shahristani. This Cabinet was unaltered till March 1922. Among the Advisers, Cornwallis was to remain in Interior for the next fourteen years; Bonham-Carter retired in May 1921, replaced for a year by Nigel Davidson also from the Sudan and thereafter by E. M. Drower: Atkinson, leaving for India, was succeeded by his deputy H. H. Wheatley. Lionel Smith became adviser to Education, Colonel P. Joyce—a colleague of the Amir Fayṣal and of Lawrence in the Arabian campaign—to Defence. Slater and Cooke were unchanged.

The grouping of departments differed widely from that practised 647 under the Secretariats of the Wilson régime (p. 108). The Ministry 645 of Interior covered, besides tribal, 'political', and municipal affairs, the 'Iraq Police, the civil prisons, the Agricultural and Veterinary departments, the Health service (when it ceased to be a Ministry), the Press Bureau and the department of Revenue until its transfer to Finance in October 1921. The Ministry of Finance dealt with its normal revenue, expenditure, accounting, budgeting, currency, and establishment functions, and controlled the Port of Baṣra; that of Communications and Works covered the departments of Irrigation, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys, and the Railways.

The Ministry's task of governing was embarrassed by a financial 652 stringency which was aggravated by the disorders of the last year, by the continuance of post-war economic depression, and by the need to provide funds for the Ministry of Defence and for the Throne itself; nor, with a press and public outcry in Great Britain demanding ruthless economy in 'Iraq—or indeed outright evacuation from it—could funds be expected from that quarter. The new State started without debts, but with such liquid assets only as it could earn. The public services of Health, Education, Works, and the rest were confronted with unavoidable reductions at a

1[1921--- [illegible]]

loss. In the 'Iraq Government service, 'Iraqis of goodwill and 647
sometimes of admirable gifts—not unmixed, inevitably, with 663
others of less ability or less integrity—were found to fill the higher
as well as lower positions in provincial and central government.
The body of British officials, mainly advisory but in a few cases
still executive, included some figures of outstanding merit—and
many who offered years, twenty or more, of quiet efficient service
to 'Iraq.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its portfolio held always in the 648x
early period by the Prime Minister himself, was the creation of
Yasin Pasha in 1925. Under the overriding responsibility of
Great Britain to the League for the fulfilment of 'Iraqi international
obligations, the Ministry could have but limited scope. It was at
first represented only in London, and intermittently at Geneva, by
Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari. Foreign Consuls, however, began early to
be posted to Baghdad, where their presence implied recognition
of the 'Iraq State by France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany,
and Greece. The 'Iraq Government as such subscribed to various
international conventions. Persia, though represented in 'Iraq by
a number of Consuls and bound to it by the closest interests,
withheld official recognition of the Kingdom, to the damage of both.

Successive Cabinets up to that of Yasin Pasha in 1924 have been 645*
elsewhere mentioned. Yasin's was a Ministry of all the talents, and
since no alternative programmes backed by parties existed in the
'Iraq politics of the time, it like others must fall or survive by
virtue of its own unanimity and the royal approval, or lack of
these. Its months of power were marked by preoccupation with 652
the politics of the Mosul Question, and by the frustrations of an
empty Treasury. This poverty, the common misfortune of nascent
Governments, was accentuated in the 'Iraq of 1925 by depressed
trade conditions, the loss of part of the date market, the diminished
Persian transit trade, and the bad harvest and low revenue
of the year; and the times called insistently for more, not less,
expenditure. It was necessary to find funds for an Army now under
formation and soon to be called to vital responsibilities: for the
acquisition of assets from the British Government, which itself was
in no mood for munificent gestures: for the service of the Ottoman
Public Debt, of which a substantial fraction devolved upon 'Iraq:
and for public services conceived on a scale reputed the minimum
tolerable, but still far in advance of financial capacity. The
arithmetical impossibilities thus involved led to the advent by invitation
in March 1924 of a financial mission from Whitehall, consisting
of Commander E. Hilton-Young and R. V. Vernon. The
mission studied and reviewed, advocated limited economies, strove
to palliate the resented blow of Public Debt obligations, and

1-[1921-26--Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

wise and moderate 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab. By the summer of 646
1926 the routine of parliamentary procedure was established; but it was already clear that the backwardness of the electorate, and the freely used power of the Government to secure the election of deputies of its own choice, could not but preclude any early possibility of genuine democracy.

The Administration, on lines half inherited from the Turks and 645K
half established by the British, had well begun. With many short- 631
comings and omissions it operated already more widely and more 647
effectively than had any Turkish Government, and aimed at a superior standard of service. In Baghdad the departments under each Ministry improved their organization, sifted their staffs, advanced towards complete 'Iraqi control. By 1926 not only were all Ministries in effective 'Iraqi control but most of the larger departments had been handed to 'Iraqi directors, notably those of Health, Education, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Government Accounts, Police, Prisons, the Census; those of Irrigation, Tapu, Customs, Revenue and State Domains, Veterinary services, Public Works, the Port of Baṣra, and 'Iraq Railways remained for a further period under British executive control. In the provinces, new qadhās and naḥiyas were formed or regrouped. The position of the British 'Administrative Inspectorate' was satisfactorily defined by law. A Standing Board selected 'Iraqi officials for higher posts, and the formation of a regulated civil service on modern lines was taken in hand. The Ministry of Finance, where R. V. Vernon assumed the Advisership in 1925 after an interregnum under L. M. Swan, had developed and specialized its organization, reduced its non-'Iraqi staff to a minimum, and founded a Finance Inspectorate. The post of Auditor-General, reporting to the Cabinet direct, was created in 1924 and held by J. Parlby, who had worked in 'Iraqi finances since 1917. The Advisership of Communications and Works was held by Wheatley until the arrival of L. E. Bury in 1925, and again after the latter's departure three years later. In Interior, Cornwallis was assisted by a senior member of his Administrative Inspectorate—Pulley, Wilson, or Edmonds—and by one or more juniors.

The Courts offered justice and accessibility to an extent far 692
superior to that of alien and corrupt Ottoman tribunals; during these years both civil and criminal courts multiplied at liwā and qadhā headquarters as need declared itself, and the statistics of cases heard showed an increasing recourse to law. Civil jurisdiction lay with the Peace Courts of the Qadhis—who after 1923 included Shi'i Qadhis—and junior judges, the Courts of First Instance at three or four liwā headquarters, and a single Court of Appeal and Cassation, with a British President, at Baghdad. This President

563 were postponed at the Mar Sham'un's request. The Northamptonshires returned to Egypt.

668 In partial compliance with requests in the petition, the 'Iraq Government set up a further land-finding committee. It discovered but little land both cultivable and available, but recommended expenditure on an irrigation scheme to produce more. The Cabinet accepted this report, which was sent to Geneva. The King visited 'Amadiya, talked at length with the Mar Sham'un, and used every means to win his confidence; but the young and intransigent Patriarch would commit himself to nothing in advance of the League's answer, and himself left for Switzerland. He was followed there by a counter-petition of those Assyrians whose original homes had been in Barwari Bala (that is, in present 'Iraq territory), expressing their complete satisfaction with present arrangements.

The final debates of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council on the Assyrian issue, after rehearsing that community's well-known grievances and the desirability (but impossibility) of providing the homogeneous group-settlement which they demanded, could result in no more than hopes for the best. The gap between the full Millet autonomy demanded by the Mar Sham'un, and the favourable minority treatment available at best from the 'Iraq Government, was a wide one. The League Council formally rejected the Millet proposal, 'noted with satisfaction' the impending appointment of a foreign settlement expert, and left the subject with misgivings which were soon to be tragically justified.

5. GOVERNORS AND GOVERNED

642 In a community at 'Iraq's current stage of evolution the central
647 Administration was both significant of and powerful in the society of the territory; and great and not unsuccessful efforts were made from 1925 to 1932 by the 'Iraqi and British elements alike to improve it. The reduction of the British part,[1] though accompanied by a variously assessed loss of efficiency and authority, was clearly necessary as part of 'Iraq's planned evolution; and it proceeded so far that the steps taken towards 'Iraqi administrative independence in these years left relatively little for the post-
647 mandatory period. By 1932 further departments had been taken over by 'Iraqi directors—those of Revenue and State Domains

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[1] The number of Administrative Inspectors fell from 24 in 1923 to 18 in 1925, 14 in 1930, 10 in 1933. The total of British officials of 'gazetted' status in 1920 was 364, in 1923: 181, in 1926: 148, in 1929: 130, in 1931: 118 (38 advisory, 80 executive). For British 'non-gazetted' staff the corresponding numbers were: for 1920: 484; for 1923: 361; for 1926: 52; for 1929: 34; for 1931: 28; for Indian officials, in 1920: 2,035, in 1923: 1,270, in 1926: 250, in 1929: 53, and in 1931: 36.

(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of 647
Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman, who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. Progress towards 647
raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards, commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one 661
minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn 672
general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhās and nahiyas—were formed 631
by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years 1929 to 1932.

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq 652
into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Advisership to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 The failure of Yasin Pasha to impose the peace and security which he had promised was due to causes already analysed, and in some measure to the hasty ineptitude of his Minister of Interior. But, as in 1920, disturbance on the Euphrates and locally and temporarily elsewhere did not greatly affect the rest of the territory. The cities were secure and tranquil, the northern liwās and the whole of Tigris-side untroubled. The period of Yasin Pasha's premiership was indeed by 'Iraqi standards one of firm and reasonable government, and seemed, even in the late summer of 1936, likely to be prolonged. The coming event of violent military intervention cast no shadow before it.

646 [659] The general election ordered in April 1935 produced in August a Chamber swollen from 88 to 108 members: the additional seats arose from increased population-figures revealed by the Census Department, and were useful in placating more shaykhs and partisans. Early sessions of Parliament were disturbed by fierce recriminations between factions for the crime of inciting the tribes —a crime peculiar, in fact, to no single party. The Administration proceeded to a general amnesty of the political offenders of recent months, to a purge of suspect officials, and to the preferment, as the spoils of office, of more reliable personnel.

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647 Genuine efforts were made, indeed, to arrest the deterioration of the Administration, though the further reduction of senior British officials may have told in the opposite sense. It cost 'Iraq in 1935 the services of Sir K. Cornwallis, whose work for Fayṣal and for 'Iraq had been outstanding; Edmonds, profoundly versed in 'Iraqi and especially Kurdish affairs, succeeded him. In the same year Prescott, the creator of the 'Iraq Police, resigned from the service and left Cones for a further ten years as Inspector of Constabulary. Sievwright, veteran of the Customs, retired and was succeeded until 1941 by Swan of Finance. Parlby, Auditor-General, returned to India. Hallinan had ceased in 1933 to be Inspector-General of Health Services, and was replaced by an 'Iraqi doctor. The Tapu Department dispensed with British help after the death of Alderman (himself successor of Royds in 1930) in 1934. The same is true of the Department of Agriculture, which Webster left in the same year. B. C. Newland, Director of Surveys, relinquished his post in 1935 to his deputy, A. J. Booth, who still held it sixteen years later. Chadwick left the Veterinary Department in 1934, but was to have a second tenure of the Directorship in 1942 to 1947. The Government Geologist Dr. Macfadyen left 'Iraq in 1937 after two years' service there, and was not immediately replaced. Allard retired in 1934 from Irrigation, in which an 'Iraqi had already succeeded him as Director-General; a British Chief Engineer and British regional staff still served there, and the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

same was true of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs. 647
Tainsh after fifteen years as Director left the Railways, handing over to Ward who combined the post for three years with the Port Directorate. Wheatley left the Advisership to Communications and Works early in 1937.

The relation of Yasin Pasha to the British Embassy, where Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had succeeded Humphrys in March 1935, were close and cordial. The Census Department was strengthened, that of Publicity represented a development of the old Press Bureau. The Courts, with their complement of British judges 192
under the Agreement of 1930, were well maintained. The general desire for a more comprehensive educational system could be met 871
only in part. Primary and secondary schools showed a limited development, with increased use of borrowed Egyptian teachers, and the beginning of book publication by the Ministry. Technical education, studied by visiting foreign experts, advanced little. The university project stood still. The Higher Teachers' Training- 875
College was reopened in 1935. A Directorate of Female Education was formed in 1934, but abolished next year. A Rural Teachers' College—a recommendation of the Monroe Report—was established in 1934 at Shaṭra on the Gharraf, and later moved to Rustumiya outside Baghdad. An Elementary Teachers' College for Women was opened at Diwaniya in 1934, but did not survive. The College of Pharmacy was founded in 1936. The schools of 871
the minority communities and of the missions, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, flourished. The proposal for a public school on the British pattern was not yet realized, and a British adviser to the Minister of Education ceased to be employed. German teaching increased. School books in use became increasingly nationalist and xenophobe in tone. Military instruction was first given in the schools in 1935, and grew thereafter to be a popular feature of school life, with a developed Youth Movement in uniform.

Ancient sites of 'Iraq continued each winter to attract foreign 172
archaeological missions. Valuable excavations were carried out by the representatives of university, museum, or other learned bodies, American, German, British, French, and Italian, from 1933 to 1939 at sites in northern 'Iraq—Gawra, Nineveh, Saydawa, and Khorsabad: in the Baghdad area, at Khafaja on the Diyalā, and at Seleucia: and in the centre and south at the Sumerian cities of Warqa and Larsa. A setback to this activity was caused, indeed, by the intervention in 1933 of the Shi'i Minister of Education, who produced a draft Antiquities Law calculated by its one-sided severities to discourage all future excavation; but under the Hashimi Ministry an improved draft was accepted, and work could proceed in reasonable conditions.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to 563 whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which 439 had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Pro- 435 duce prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent, and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was 471 awarded by the Baṣra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs. Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil refinery. A concession for the oil of Baṣra wilaya—more strictly, of all 'Iraq territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—was granted in 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc* creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a [453] branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited 647 for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience, J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in 1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from the Financial Advisership in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on 648x bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial treaty was signed with the United States, though American Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman. Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary. The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Ḥaydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated 652
expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great
loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 731
27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished
only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack
demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained 647
to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) 473
and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association
in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a
field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of
growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service
as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early
act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year
monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed
dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevitably 722
to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension 458
of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources' with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would 648x
fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

722 was exempted from licensing and price-fixing. During 1945 all
434 controls were discontinued as far as sterling-area commerce was
concerned, and traders with one accord sought supplies from every quarter; but freedom of traffic was still hampered by shipping shortages, currency restrictions, and world-wide dearth of goods.
457 The country's requirements in 'hard' currencies, chiefly dollars, were met by an arrangement with Great Britain in March 1945, whereby sums up to the equivalent of $14 million could be converted from 'Iraq's accumulated sterling balances, an arrangement which was to be annually re-negotiated. The restricted convertibility of 'Iraq's own dinars into dollars remained incomprehensible to the public, as to publics everywhere.

722 In the task of economic control, which fell ultimately to the lot
of local officials, helped, it might be, by the municipality or
647 Chamber of Commerce, more than moderate results could not be
expected from improvised systems based on no adequate statistics or machinery, and applied by unspecialized and impecunious officials to a puzzled and resentful public. The higher economic control of the territory, under a law repeatedly revised and productive of innumerable regulations, was placed originally in the hands of a Central Supply Committee, later in those of a smaller ministerial body, the High Supply Committee, which long survived the war. Many problems called for resolution at Cabinet level, where they multiplied disagreement between ministers. Departments of Transport, Imports and Local Resources, founded early in the war and served by British as well as 'Iraqi officials—Lloyd, Grice, le Blanc—were grouped early in 1944 under the Ministry of Supply established for the purpose; its first Adviser, Colonel P. Bayliss, after a few months of dynamic and impatient activity, retired through disagreement with his colleagues. An Anglo-American-'Iraqi Co-ordinating Committee lasted for a few months from midsummer 1944. Outside the territory, but concerned with its output and controlling foreign supplies to it, was the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, of which a conference attended by 'Iraqi delegates was held in Cairo in April 1944; and 'Iraq had in 1943 been toured, under M.E.S.C. auspices, by a Scientific Advisory Mission which produced the valuable reports of Dr. B. A. Keen and Dr. E. B. Worthington. The Centre performed important services in conditions where benevolent interterritory control was indispensable; it was, nevertheless, commonly blamed in 'Iraq for its meagre allocation of supplies, and its abolition late in 1945 was unregretted by 'Iraqis to whom their own country's needs were paramount, those of the Allies and of the War remote and meaningless. It was succeeded until 1947 by a Supply Mission which kept control of a few scarce items of supply.

Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic 722
internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable 647
lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of
M.E.S.C.

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the 722
abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living 511
standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was 435
almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation
had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly deteriorated.
A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military
expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Government
had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced
regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and
distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of
living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939.
The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then six- 652
fold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, 435
happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it
from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt
strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation,
or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save
on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but
unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of
gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government
could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement,
thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was
achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs,
already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions
in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society
scarcely healthier.

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. 652
The three years 1941–3, in spite of high costs, showed useful surpluses;
foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were
made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully.
But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government
revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services
and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied.
Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million
in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq
approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The
separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Baṣra were
highly prosperous throughout the war.

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

648× the Prime Minister and the Regent both visited London during the year. The objectives of all politicians (save only the vehement minority who would break every form of British connexion) were the removal of all limitation to their independence and free choice, the end of all treatment of the country as a junior partner, and the abolition of provisions which, offensively to their *amour propre*, left Ḥabbaniya and Shu'ayba as British cantonments in the heart of 'Iraq. The early negotiations with the British Ambassador appeared to run smoothly, and the Ministry could hope that early 1948 would see a happy solution. Newspaper attacks on Great Britain, unhelpful in these circumstances, were as ever the commonplace of every journalist, and were suspended only in part and temporarily in the summer of 1947, when a party of 'Iraqi editors visited London.

● 647 In the two years following the armistice most of the remaining British officials of the Administration—a tiny remnant of the body so active and so hopeful in 1919–20—left 'Iraq. Edmonds had retired in 1945, succeeded in Interior by A. H. Ditchburn. In 1946 Drower of Justice, Sinderson of the Medical Services, Atkinson of Irrigation, Caparn of Communications and Works, H. I. Lloyd of the Date Board, and Grice of Interior were among the losses sustained by the Government. They were followed next year by Swan of Finance, Seton Lloyd of Antiquities, and Chadwick of the Veterinary Department.

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It was regrettable that Ṣaliḥ Jabr's best-meaning of Governments was compelled, like its predecessors, to take steps against press and party agitation which passed all reasonable limits. Its Palestine policy was more than correct, its moves towards Treaty revision active and popular; but this was not enough. Exclusion from power and sheer hatred of the 'old gang'—and of the British allegedly behind them—still led the parties to frenzies of anti-Government zeal. A newspaper was suppressed in April, and two more in June. Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim were charged with sedition. The premises of the People's Party were seized and 'Aziz Sharif arrested, but released. Trials of Communists detained under the last Sa'idi Ministry, some months ago, led to a score of long sentences of imprisonment and to death sentences[1] on Yusif Salman, Zaki Baṣim, and Naji Shummal for inciting troops and police against the State; these were later commuted to long terms of imprisonment. Baghdad bookshops were raided and the premises of the more extreme parties searched.

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[1] The *Daily Worker*'s later (17 February 1949) description of the 'Iraq Government was that of a 'corrupt and murderous puppet of British imperialism'; *L'Humanité* (8 February 1949) attributed 'Iraq's anti-Communist steps to 'the Anglo-American millionaires who are preparing war'.

assessment and collection of the main customary sources of revenue 652
—Customs and Excise, taxation on natural commodities, the tobacco monopoly, income and property taxes—were continued with the full use of improved records, techniques, and expert advice: it was probable that, even apart from the expected oil revenues, the position of the Treasury need not again cause anxiety. From this should follow the liquidation of Government debts and loans, the better housing and payment of the Administration itself, and the possibility of a gratifying expansion of the social services.

The estimates for 1950–1 allotted, out of a total ordinary expenditure of ID 24 million, 30 per cent. to the Army and R.I.A.F., 16 per cent. to education, 13 to general administration purposes, 11 to the Police, 8 to health services, and 22 in all to other departments and functions. Capital works expenditure in that year was to amount to just under ID 4 million.

Receipts from the territory's greatest single source of wealth, its oil deposits and the industry developing them, had since their first appearance normally been allotted to capital development. This 647
rule, partly broken in lean times, was reinforced by the structure of the Development Board set up in 1950 under a law which called 652
for the diversion to it of all revenues from oil.[1] These receipts, amounting to less than ID 4 million in 1949 and little more than 6 million in 1950, would, it was already clear, be more than doubled, more than quadrupled, in future years (p. 376). The division of the State estimates into an ordinary and a capital-works budget ceased with the establishment of the Development Board.

The Board, disliked by some 'Iraqis as an irremovable Government-within-Government, seemed to others and to most foreign observers to offer hopes of a continuity, efficiency, and freedom from political considerations which had scarcely existed before.[2] It consisted of eight members, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the time, and six non-official salaried members to be named by Royal Irada and to hold office for five years. Three of these were to be expert in Finance, Irrigation, and another (unspecified) field and, in defiance of anti-foreign prejudice, a British Secretary-General and Finance expert, Sir E. Miller, and an American irrigation engineer were recruited. The Board, in which Arshad al-'Umari seemed likely to be the leading figure, was in

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[1] This was modified in 1952 by amending legislation which provided for the Board's retention of 70 per cent. of oil revenues and the allotment of 30 per cent. to 'general revenues': an arrangement which wisely permitted the devolution to provincial authorities of many smaller development works and services.

[2] The Board, however, was soon under attack by part of the press, irresponsible and malicious as ever, for having failed in a few weeks to 'raise the standard of life of the masses'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 647 1951 establishing its programme for the ensuing five years and allotting an expenditure of some ID 155 million[1] within that period; but it became apparent soon afterwards that revenues in excess of this would, under revised oil agreements (p. 376) be available. It was at this stage clear to all that the acquisition of this copious revenue, which in the absence of some suicidal folly or grave misfortune would accrue punctually and reliably for many years, must completely transform 'Iraq's economy and rate of evolution. Its history indeed from 1951 onwards should be that of a territory extraordinarily favoured in all that appertains to, or can flow from, the resources at the disposal of its Government. Its curse had for centuries been poverty; thanks to its discovered and exploited oil deposits, it stood now at the threshold of an era of abundant wealth; and this must, besides its blessings, bring accompanying responsibilities, stresses and dangers, both moral and economic.

439 [457] The territory's immediate trade balance, which future opulence would doubtless affect, still showed in 1951 its habitual deficit. This was compensated partly by drawing upon the war-time sterling balances, and partly by invisible items as of old. The country's imports were, as ever, principally those of cotton, woollen, and silk textiles: iron, steel, and machinery: electrical goods: vehicles: tea, coffee, and sugar: chemicals, cement, and timber. Nearly half of these were provided by Great Britain, with India, the United States, and Belgium as other main suppliers and to a lesser extent Italy, Holland, and France; Germany and Japan had disappeared from the list of providers. Exports, which the country's evolution had left little changed over many years, were still those almost exclusively of its agricultural and natural products. Exported barley amounted to a yearly average of some 250,000 tons, wheat was shipped occasionally but irregularly—and not at all between 1940 and 1949; maize, millet, and oil-seeds (cotton, sesame, and linseed) were usually available in small quantities. The co-ordinating authority for all grain exports was the para-statal Grain Board and, working with it, an Agricultural Export and Import Company. Dates, to the important yearly extent of some 250,000 tons, were dispatched to more than forty countries. Cotton had disappeared after 1941, but crept back into the export list in 1947. Other items in the slight volume of exports were animals driven to the Levant countries, wool sent to France and America, and hides and skins, gums and gall-nuts consigned to various countries. Hopes that tobacco might be added to this list depended upon improvement in the structure and products of the local tobacco industry. New

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[1] The provision for 1951 was to be (in thousands of dinars) 9,364: of 1952, 20,460: of 1953, 28,390: of 1954, 31,600: of 1955, 32,335: of 1956, 33,225.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

226 Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

312 The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable. [731] The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the [647] resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

312 653 185 The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jābal Ḥamrin, and by the Duḳan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Isḥaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Duḳan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

648 to join with Pakistan and the Sa'dabad Powers in an Eastern bloc securely Islamic and free from all Western exigencies and 'imperialism'. It could not but seem clear to contemporary observers that 'Iraqi thinking on these matters lacked realism, and that in its bewildered hesitations, its willing involvement of foreign policy with domestic factions, its patent inability to stand alone against the dangers of the time, it was typical of small nations who cried indignantly for a 'complete independence' which, in the modern world, could exist only on most precarious sufferance, unless firmly allied to the defending power of stronger friends.

642 647 In internal administration, whereas the Turkish Government had exercised rarely more than a partial control never at one time operative over the whole country, and the 'Iraq Government in its earlier years could claim a wider but still not truly pervasive authority, in 1950 no surviving enclaves of non-government remained in desert or marsh or mountain. From Mudir to minister, from clerk to Director-General, the administration as an operating and governing machine could by that date face comparison with that of any comparable country, and might be thought superior to those of many longer-established nations. The period from 1930 to 1950 had done less than might have been feared to weaken or corrupt it, and had been survived with a lowering of standards which though considerable was not disastrous. If it had benefited from its three years of British rule and twelve more of discreet tutelage, yet it derived its merits primarily from the qualities of its own personnel: qualities which, common as it was for visitors and many 'Iraqis to deride them, were most appreciated by those who knew them best. The faults endemic in all bureaucracies, the relative newness of the machine, the discontinuity of its guiding Ministries, the paucity of experienced high executives, and occasional moral lapses: all these together failed to outweigh the good intentions, the intelligence and the honesty of the majority of civil servants. And the machine itself, the interrelation and subdivision of its parts, the control of departments and their relation to the district Governors, and of the latter to their Ministries and publics: all these had, after a mere thirty years, reached a state of tolerable efficiency adapted, as the Turkish régime never was, to the conditions of the territory.

642 With 'Iraq's remarkable natural advantages and resources, coming at last within sight of full development: with its benevolent and generally popular monarchy vested in an ancient royal house and its not inadequate governmental machine: and with the efforts of its society to evolve on modern lines by manifold borrowing from Western thought and method as well as technology, there was, indeed, a fair measure of hope for a stable as well as a pros-

PART IV.—EXISTING CONDITIONS.

MIRI LAND (STATE DOMAIN)

1-4. General Situation

1. As ordinarily used in el 'Iraq the term miri land, or State Domain, 423 embraces the entire land surface of the country with the exception of land registered as owned in mulk or held on tapu tenure, the extent 471 of which is unknown. Of the compound total some 78,000 square kilometres is estimated to be occupied by scattered cultivation, and about another 15,000 square kilometres to be capable of cultivation (see Plates I and II and Table I). In the former figure are included the previous Ottoman Crown Estates, which comprised some of the most valuable land in the country. These estates were originally managed by a special estate service (El Dairet el Saniya). The administration, by common repute that has survived both in Palestine and el 'Iraq, was good. These estates were subsequently termed mudawara Lands, apparently because they were "turned over" to the civil administration after the Turkish revolution of 1908. They have since lost their separate identity and become merged in the general category of cultivated miri land, although, of course, their previous circumstances may have to be taken into account when considering the position of the present holders of such lands.

It is desirable at the outset to recognise that the huge agglomeration thus grouped under the name miri, or State Domain, reflects no real uniformity in legal status, customary practice, or actual treatment. Thus, while it is accurate and informative to speak of mulk ownership or of tapu tenure, there is no such thing as miri* tenure in law and an unknown variety of things in practice. Miri land simply represents the overwhelming residue of the country not held in mulk or on tapu tenure. It is none the less reasonable and convenient to maintain this elastic, if negative, category at least provisionally. For it accords with accepted tradition and statutory law (*a*) to regard the State as the basic landlord of all land other than mulk (and its derivative true waqf) and (*b*) to recognise that, whatever the rights of holders of miri land may be, they fall short of those of a duly registered mutasarrif of tapu land. But the powers of the State as such a landlord must evidently be exercised with most careful regard to the history of the land and to over-riding considerations of an equitable, economic and administrative nature, if they are to prove admissible in practice.

The general management and control of miri land, legally vested in 647 the State, is nominally entrusted to the State Domains Section (qism 423 el amlak el amiriya) of the Ministry of Finance, until recently the State Domains Department of the late Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture. Some such central State Domains Office is essential; while the keenness and public spirit that I encountered in this service cannot be too fully recognised. But the Department was quite inadequately staffed and equipped to discharge even the practicable part of its colossal titular duties. Actually in the prevailing absence of intelligible maps and

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* Using the term in its customary local, as opposed to the legal, connotation (see III. 1).

647 423 records of miri land, such management and control as is possible of these heterogeneous and extensive territories must be carried out primarily in the district by persons in direct touch with the people and the parcels affected. Many questions are no doubt settled by the customary social leaders as elsewhere (e.g. tribal sheikhs) and never reach the administration. Those that do may in some cases be dealt with by one of the few local officers of the State Domains or even by another Department (e.g. on the Yuseffya by the Irrigation). But ordinarily the effective agents of Government in the control of miri lands are the officers of the provincial administration on the spot, who must act for the most part according to their individual judgment or on the instructions of their provincial superiors in each case. This local control is naturally subject to the direction, and occasionally to the intervention, of the State Domains service or the Ministry to which it is responsible. It is also necessarily subject to intervention by the Ministry of the Interior or of any other Ministry, whose public responsibilities may be affected by some action taken. It is further subject to intervention by any Deputy or influential private person who may be concerned or interested.

423 692 In a limited number of cases, disputes affecting the holding of miri land are decided under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, because of their reaction on tribal peace and public security. But since such disputes in theory merely concern the domestic management by Government of its own estates, they do not as a rule fall within the jurisdiction of any regular Court of Justice. Reference has already been made to the general failure to introduce the Land Code and more particularly tapu tenure effectively. Consequently by the side of a truncated and semi-atrophied Statute Law there have survived throughout the greater majority of the land, methods of acquiring and holding land which have never been regulated by law at all.

423 427 2. An attempt has already been made to illustrate in broad outline the conditions under which land has been for the most part occupied and cultivated in the rainfall zone. There are commonly two classes of people concerned. Firstly (*a*) the larger man, who may be the local Agha or a small capitalist who has helped to develop the land by providing funds, seed, etc. Secondly (*b*) the actual cultivator who, in the mountainous districts, has tamed the wilderness by building terraces, constructing water channels, clearing the ground, etc., and who, in the plains, has similarly, if less laboriously, reclaimed the land by regular tillage and fallow. It is evident that in actual fact a partnership commonly existed or exists between these two classes.

Now it is generally accepted that the intention of the Ottoman legislator, when promulgating the Land Code, was to establish the actual cultivator on the land; and when that cultivator has remained on the same land and effected improvements of a capital nature by his labour, his claim is clear. But the claim of the larger man instanced, who will almost invariably have co-operated in some indispensable way (e.g. by according protection, providing capital or essential assistance), who has very likely been acknowledged as landlord (mallak) and perhaps regularly received mallakiya, cannot be equitably or advisedly disregarded. Investigation on the spot would be needed to weigh the respective claims in each case; but it can be seen that, broadly speaking, local conditions have often produced an association in the development and cultivation of the land between local overlord and cultivating holder in these regions, in which both have rights that should be recognised in their mutual interest as well as that of the country at large.

423 619 In the Irrigation Zone and throughout the desert borders the Turks found the land for the most part in the hands of tribal confederations.

be registered to be valid. Thus the Ottoman legislators intended and provided that all holdings of cultivated land should be recorded in the Land Register. The inability of the Ottoman administration to put the land law into force, has left the greater part of the cultivated land of the country in parcels occupied on loose and irregular tenures unrecognised by the Statute law and unrecorded in the present limited Land Register. Instead of comprising, as intended, a record of all cultivated holdings that Register probably excludes from its purview between three-quarters and four-fifths of the cultivated zones. To permit the Land Registry to perform its intended national function and constitute the general and dependable custodian of land tenure that is needed, not only must its administration and procedure be drastically reformed, but the scope of its operations must be steadily extended until they include at least all privately held land of every recognised category. It should in fact become a General Land Registry (Daftarkhana umumiya el arazi) instead of being, as at present, a Department of tapu and mulk registration only. (Dairet el tapu.) 423 185 647

There are three points to which reform must more particularly be directed before the Land Registry can perform its functions. The Land Register is at present a register of transactions or deeds. Registration of deeds is an unreliable and incomplete method of recording rights to land. It should be converted into registration of title. There are also at present two decisive external obstacles to the construction and maintenance of an effective register of title. The first of these is the absence of a dependable cadastral survey. The existing service recognises this need and carries out scattered property surveys itself to the best of its ability: but this is no substitute for a properly controlled survey conducted by the technically competent Department. The second obstacle is the absence of practical provision to make the extreme multiplication and sub-division of shares upon inheritance of mulk property and tapu holdings economically workable. Such extreme shareholding may possibly still be rare, but it occurs*; and it would be fostered by the introduction of an efficient record until the position became unmanageable.

Since the major defects of the existing Land Registry are due for the most part to circumstances outside of the control of the Department itself, no useful purpose will be served by examining its internal procedure in detail now. Nor does space permit here of any explanation of the necessary conversion of the Register into a Register of Title. When the immediate questions of constructive reform have been decided the requisite modifications in the methods and machinery of record that should supplement them can be considered in detail if desired.

7. LAND SURVEY

7. Reference to Part II will recall to mind the position and prospects of the national land survey, which it will be remembered is of a purely topographical nature. So far as can be foreseen it will take about another ten years to complete and map this survey on a scale of 1:10,000 throughout the cultivated area of the country, if the staff and efficiency of the Survey Department are sufficiently strengthened to enable them to push ahead with their general framework and to make good certain other weaknesses while continuing detail survey on the present lines. It may be hoped that Government will be able to afford the Department the necessary financial and administrative support to enable at least this modest forecast to be fulfilled. 423 647 185

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* E.g. see "A Report on al 'Iraq," page [illegible], by Ahmed Fehmi Beg, Director-General of Revenue, Government Press, Baghdad, [illegible].

423 647 185 This forecast could be halved at relatively slight additional expense if a minor expansion of staff of all grades and of resources could be authorised, if land marks could be regularly safeguarded, and if an uninterrupted programme of work could be maintained. This would make a regular and equitable valuation of the Land for purposes of land revenue practicable within a reasonable period (see vi, 9).

But I see no prospect of any general programme of more detailed or larger scale survey being realisable, nor could it be recommended at present.

423 185 It has already been stressed that the execution of a methodical and trustworthy land survey of the country is a requisite condition of all effective land reform. It is a requisite condition not only of the establishment of a stable and secure land tenure and of an equitable assessment of land revenue, but also of any efficient system of irrigation and indeed of any reliable and systematic knowledge, development and use of the territorial resources of the country. It was, for example, to provide essential information for the Irrigation Department that the Survey has concentrated on work in the Irrigation Zone hitherto. It is, therefore, imperative that while devoting closer and more considered attention to the needs of land tenure in future, the Survey should call no halt in meeting these other primary needs.

Unquestionably a detailed cadastral survey, which reliably locates the limits of all individual holdings, is required to place land tenure and land revenue on to a thoroughly satisfactory basis. Only on the basis of such a survey can the unqualified stability and security of tenure be attained which is required to stimulate the development and productive capacity of the country fully. But the change from pronounced confusion now characteristic of land tenure to detailed order, is too great to be effected at a single step. The requisite detailed cadastral survey would be a lengthy and onerous undertaking for a much richer, better prepared and better equipped country. It should not be attempted in el 'Iraq at present.

[651] Doubtless in the vicinity of the larger towns and in other places, in which the higher value of land brings in commensurate receipts in higher fees or in increased rentals or other revenues to Government, true large scale cadastral surveys may be justified exceptionally. And the ultimate extension of a proper cadastral survey elsewhere, as development proceeds and land values increase, should always be kept in view.

But the hopes of establishing orderly record, secure tenure, and fair and dependable taxation of land throughout the overwhelming mass of the cultivated territories of the country within the next ten or fifteen years, must be based on a foundation of simpler and less detailed survey. To be precise, the measures of attainable land reform within any period worth envisaging at present should be such as are applicable, and can be maintained, in conjunction with a 1:10,000 topographical survey of the cultivated terrain of broadly the same character and accuracy as is now being produced. The work should be converted into (what has been aptly termed elsewhere) a topo-cadastral survey, without markedly increasing the complexity and closeness of the detail. The parcels or sub-divisions of the land adopted as cadastral units for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment, must be of considerable size and bounded (at least ordinarily and preponderantly) by easily recognisable physical features. The placing, and still more the subsequent maintenance and control by Government, of a host of artificial boundary beacons outlining individual holdings must be dismissed as entirely impracticable. It will be as much as the country can do to establish and

might embrace all land cases, whether arising from the settlement or not: but if any considered programme of settlement is undertaken, probably more than one Land Court would be required. 185

4. The conduct of settlement operations in the field will be carried out more rapidly, more economically and more effectively by suitable individual executive officers than by Commissions of any sort or by officers with preponderantly judicial experience and training. Executive officers entrusted with the conduct of settlement operations (henceforward called Settlement Officers) should be very carefully selected for qualities of independence, integrity, judgment and experience of the people and the land, as well as for administrative capacity. And they must be capable of conducting simple cases in a judicial manner and exercising simple judicial powers with competence and dignity. For there are bound to be a number of marginal cases on which a minor dispute arises which requires investigation in a judicial manner, but which can most appropriately and economically be dealt with by the Settlement Officer acting in a judicial capacity on the spot.

The regular reference of such minor disputes to the suggested Land Court (or other competent Court) would make settlement impracticable by imposing innumerable delays on its progress and greatly increasing its cost. Such reference would also greatly augment the volume of formal court work. Nor is any gain in justice or efficiency to be expected thereby. A competent officer on the spot is in a much better position to decide the majority of such disputes equitably than a distant court. He will certainly do so more speedily and economically. The majority of more difficult and more doubtful cases alone should be referred to the regular court designated, whose proceedings will gain in value from being able to devote attention exclusively to them.

It is well known that experienced and capable Iraqi officials are at present far too few for the multifarious needs of the country. This is sufficiently evidenced by the enactment of the recent Discipline Law and the proceedings taken under it. Every first class Iraqi will be needed for some time ahead in the regular grades and for the regular work of Government. Settlement of rights is a temporary need apart from the current administration, and Government could not do better than entrust its conduct to some of the present Administrative Inspectors, who are being released from their current duties. It would be impossible to find anywhere a body of officers better fitted to discharge these onerous and responsible functions. They have served the Government of el 'Iraq devotedly for a number of years. They are familiar with the working of the various public services and have long been accustomed to collaborate with them. They have, for the most part, long since shown their knowledge of, and their interest in, the land problems with which they would be required to deal. They are familiar with the fundamental provisions of the current Ottoman Land Code, with post-war legislation affecting land and with the customary practices of the country. They have already had considerable judicial experience as magistrates. They know the country and the language of the people. They know, and are known by, all leading Iraqis. They understand and sympathise with the difficulties of landholders and cultivators, and they would spare no pains to help them. 647 185

5. It would occupy too much space to outline the procedure of settlement in any detail here. Nor will it serve any useful purpose to do so, until the Government have reached a decision on their general policy. But certain broad features of the work may perhaps be usefully indicated. 185

Each Settlement Officer should be entirely responsible for the conduct of settlement operations within a specified Settlement Area and be given the necessary judicial powers for the purpose, subject to such

should also be decided on grounds of common interest and common 185
sense, not by expositions of the law.

The management of the miri, or State Domain, date gardens must 423
be mentioned as it has been the subject of controversy for some time and calls for some consistent policy. But interesting and important intrinsically as the points of principle and practice involved are, space does not allow of their consideration here. In its relation to the major problems of the land tenure of the country as a whole, this is a domestic question for the separate consideration of Government in its capacity as one landholder among many.

In the Muntafiq liwa, as we have noted, an authoritative settlement 123
of disputes arising out of important and long-standing claims to hold 185
land in tapu tenure was initiated recently under a special law (see iii, 4). But the work appears to be limited to investigations into claims to this tenure alone and thus to fall considerably short of the general settlement of rights to land that is needed throughout the country. If land is declared free of tapu rights it is, I believe, simply recorded as miri without any settlement of the rights of those in occupation of it. Even a successful settlement of tapu rights alone in this, or in any, area is no doubt a valuable contribution to the general introduction of secure land tenure needed: but when all the cost of carrying out investigation of tapu claims is being incurred in a district so honeycombed with them, it would be a great pity to miss the opportunity to effect a thorough and complete settlement.

And although it was natural, and very possibly desirable, to entrust 123
this particular piece of settlement originally to a Commission, it is 185
permissible to doubt whether the diversion of three important members 647
of the judiciary and two important members of the administration from their normal duties will continue to be justified by any persistent delicacy or difficulty in the investigation of tapu rights in this particular district. The general widespread need of settlement in all parts of the country is commonly admitted. I have represented earlier that the only hope of satisfying this need within the lifetime of the present generation is to adopt the simplest and cheapest procedure and machinery possible everywhere. No doubt the size and composition of the Muntafiq Commission helped to inspire confidence among the disputants with whom it had to deal, but with all its qualities and advantages a Commission of this nature is bound to be costly and deliberate, and unduly to absorb for the benefit of one locality, public service and public funds which can be ill spared from the much wider general national effort that is needed. At a suitable opportunity (of which the Commission itself would be the appropriate judge) the work which they have initiated might be transferred to an organisation of the simpler character that I have recommended for adoption elsewhere, without breach of continuity, authority or efficiency.

In the remaining liwas of the Irrigation Zone there are several canal areas already mentioned (e.g. the Yusefiya canal area) which were settled by the Irrigation Department, when the canals irrigating them were remodelled or constructed. The work that I saw appeared to have been well done and was certainly well recorded. It should not be allowed to fall into confusion. Owing to various chances I did not succeed in visiting the Latifiya estate, which I very much regret, as the lessons to be derived from its methods and experience in the field of agricultural development should be extremely valuable; but in respect of land tenure it can no doubt be regarded as a specially granted and administered canal area.

The Dulaim reach is ripe for settlement because of much good in- 123
vestigatory work already done and recorded; but largely for this very 185
reason, settlement (except possibly in its lower portion) can, I think,

PART VIII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

1–8. Unified Planning and Direction of Reform

1. It will be remembered that among the defects which Government expressly sought to cure was the pursuit of reform by three independent Departments of State without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan. I have ventured earlier to express the view that these Departments were not in a position to adopt a suitable common plan or to pursue it unitedly. But it is also important to realise that their Departmental duties are not properly reconcilable with the conduct of the requisite reforms. 185 641

In considering the administrative organisation of reform it is desirable to distinguish clearly between the men, measures and machinery needed: (i) to produce order initially out of the chaos inherited from past centuries, and (ii) to consolidate and perpetuate this order as it is secured. These two processes may be conveniently called the execution, and the conservation, of reform. 185

The executive programme of reform should co-ordinate in one carefully balanced and united effort:

(i) The study and revision of the land law.

(ii) The completion of the topo-cadastral survey.

(iii) The systematic valuation of the land for revenue purposes.

(iv) The general settlement of rights to land.

The economy, speed and quality of the results will depend upon the efficiency of the combination secured. But although the importance of the initial execution of reform is supreme, and although it will necessarily occupy many years, yet administratively, legally and financially it should be recognised to be a special, terminable, capital effort.

The conservation subsequently of the benefits secured by this initial capital effort would necessitate administratively

(i) The progressive establishment, and maintenance up-to-date thereafter, of a General Land Register or Land Book.

(ii) The corresponding maintenance up-to-date of the complementary topo-cadastral survey.

(iii) The establishment of suitable ancillary land revenue records based on the above.

Throughout this Report I have avoided any detailed discussion of these conservancy measures: because the execution of initial reform is a sufficiently complex matter and is independently justified. And it seems more reasonable to defer consideration of methods of conserving reform, until it has been decided whether such reform will be undertaken. It may, however, be observed that if the requisite reforms are carried out successfully, there should be no intrinsic difficulty about subsequent conservation of the results; although it will demand a thoroughly efficient

185 organisation. Moreover, the current cost of such conservation should be balanced by current fees.

But if it is reasonable and proper to defer consideration of conservancy measures which may or may not be needed, consideration of the administrative organisation best suited to give effect to these measures can also be deferred.

2. If the activities to be co-ordinated in the execution of the initial programme of reform are again referred to, it will be seen how slight is any functional aptitude of any of the three specified Departments to undertake this work, and how strong are the reasons of public policy that should preclude them from participation in its conduct. The necessary study and revision of the land law must in any case be taken up by specially selected individuals. The completion of the land survey is the express business of quite another department. Land valuation could no doubt be undertaken by the Revenue Department and the Survey Departments in co-operation, if this was a solitary measure; but it will be more easily, cheaply and satisfactorily effected as part of the general programme of reform. Moreover, it is really preferable that this valuation should be carried out by an organisation occupying a midway position between the fisc and the taxpayer, and not functionally concerned with raising revenue. Again a general settlement of rights is a process that none of the three departments mentioned are in any way organised or equipped to undertake. Such a settlement will necessitate a special staff and special arrangements in any event; while it is imperative that the judicial character and independence of the proceedings shall be unchallengeable. This dominant consideration should preclude all idea of settlement being conducted by either the State Domains or the Tapu Departments. For the State Domains should be responsible for presenting the State's rights as a landholder throughout the whole course of settlement and will thus occupy a partisan position, although most rightly and properly. And during the course of the work the settlement authorities will be continuously required to scrutinise, interpret and adjudicate on Tapu documents and records. It will be the duty of the officials of the Tapu Department to do their best to expound and explain such material to the settlement officers; but the latter must be open to no charge of departmental bias influencing their decisions.

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647 But although the Departments of Revenue, of State Domains and of Tapu should be dissociated from any participation in the execution of reform, and although they cannot be justly held responsible for failure to unite to produce and promote a programme of such reform in the past, yet the serious character of the defect in organisation indicated by Government, is only emphasised thereby. It is to the lack of a competent executive authority charged with the unified study and conduct of the necessary reforms, that the persistent failure of successive governments throughout the last decade to proceed from discussion to action must be primarily attributed. For the volume of memoranda and correspondence on the subject from the early days of the administration onwards, shows a constant and clearly understood appreciation of the need to put the systems of land tenure and land revenue on to a healthier basis. In the early days settlement of rights indeed appears to have been actually started in one or more districts. But during the latter half of the period the discussions have been characterised by uncertainty and disagreement as to the methods and means whereby the necessary objectives might be attained.

185 If a single central authority, possessing vigour and initiative, had been responsible to Government for the planning and general direction of the requisite reforms, a mass of sterile interdepartmental discussions

4 AND 5. LAND SURVEY

185 4. The general direction and control of all survey work should be left to the technical head of that service. Any administrative subordination of the Survey Department to the small Central Lands Office would only be an inconvenience to both sides and nothing is to be gained by it, if it is clearly recognised that the Survey Department's primary duty is to co-operate as closely and effectively as possible with the Lands Office in carrying out the Government's general plan of land reform. For purposes of the programme of land survey, that plan must provide for the progressive requirements of concurrent development in other branches of work, notably of irrigation; but no departures from the approved national programme of survey should be permitted without the concurrence of the Central Lands Office, as the plan of general land reform, its cost and its speed, will be dependent upon a steady and punctual performance of that programme.

185 647 The Survey Department is rightly recognised to be a specialist scientific service; and good work has been done in organising and equipping it for its duties. But its importance as an agent of economic progress appears to me to be insufficiently appreciated, while circumstances have interfered with its vigorous use in the steady execution of a national programme of land survey drawn up in consultation with the public services primarily concerned. It also possesses serious weaknesses which must be cured if it is to play its essential part in the well-co-ordinated effort without which the successful development of the country will remain a dream.

The land survey of a large, varied and previously unmapped country, like el 'Iraq, is a formidable scientific operation. It would be wasteful and short-sighted to an extreme degree to grudge the few additional specialist officers and the gradual addition to its accommodation and resources that are needed to enable this indispensable service to carry out its work punctually, reliably and to proper general advantage. A first-class Observer to push on with the primary triangulation is long overdue. Effective measures must be taken to protect survey reference marks. Additional specialist assistance is greatly needed in the Mathematical Office and in the performance of the chain of scientific processes whereby the surveyors' field work is reproduced and published as series of national maps. Map drawing, map reproduction by modern photo-metal processes and map printing, under the difficult climatic conditions existing in Baghdad, call for great skill, knowledge and experience, if they are to be successfully and economically performed. The publication of the Department's maps is very much in arrear, as has been already noted. And yet the value of national expenditure on survey operations is seriously minimised if the work remains locked away in the Department's cupboards in the form of original drawings, instead of being published in printed maps available to all. More systematic provision for the training of Iraqi staff in the technical operations of survey is also very necessary.

And timely consideration should be given to the whole question of the situation of the Survey Department and the arrangements for its present and future accommodation. The present site of the Department is, or is likely to become, valuable; and it is by no means the most suitable for the delicate processes of map reproduction. Again a fireproof map store is badly needed. The original field sheets and records of the Survey (and to a lesser extent its eventually published map series) represent the capitalised value of all the expenditure of past years on this branch of work. The set back to the country if all these records were destroyed as development of all sorts was at length getting well

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under way, would take many years and a large expenditure of money to retrieve. And such wholesale destructions of valuable public documents have quite frequently occurred elsewhere. Perhaps an opportunity might be found to transfer the whole Department to less valuable, less busy and less dusty, but more commodious precincts, where its map reproduction offices, its map stores, etc., might be planned for gradual expansion as the Land Survey of the country extends. Scientific organisations, such as this, depending upon the punctual co-operation of numerous specialist branches are wasteful to administer if badly arranged and they are costly to move after they have been long established. A central urban situation is neither necessary nor desirable, for the Headquarter Offices of a national land survey.

5. Another matter calling for early consideration is the amalgamation of the two existing organisations charged with the conduct of land survey—the Survey Department proper and the Survey branch of the Tapu Department. The Survey Department has had a somewhat chequered career; but two important steps in the direction of constituting it the single unified national service that is required for the economical and effective conduct of land surveys, appear to have been previously taken. In 1922 about half of the survey staff of the Tapu Department were absorbed by the Survey Department proper; while in 1925 the Irrigation Department, which had previously carried out its own surveys, transferred its Survey Division to the Survey Department. The process should now be completed.

When I was in el 'Iraq the comparable field staff of these two existing land survey services were returned to me as follows:

Survey Department	*Tapu Survey Branch*
8 Survey Officers	1 Director (Mudir)
14 Inspectors	4 Inspectors
100 Surveyors	58 Surveyors

I wish to make it clear that the development of its own little Survey Department by the Tapu Department is a matter for commendation: not for reproach. That Department realised acutely the need to define with some approach to accuracy the parcels of land which were purported to be held on tapu tenure. The National Survey were either non-existent or too weak at the time to assist, so that two parallel survey organisations were established.

The arrangement is none the less indefensible and absurd from the national standpoint. If the land surveys carried out by the smaller organisation are necessary in the public interest they should be carried out under the technical direction and control of the competent public service. In the course of this report various weaknesses in the Survey Department proper have been indicated. Of the lesser service it may be briefly said that, in spite of much keenness and appreciation of technical needs it is not, and cannot be, either properly organised and equipped or adequately directed technically to execute land surveys of the quality and permanence which expenditure of public funds should secure. No country, and particularly no country which requires the utmost economy and efficiency of effort to promote its primary development, should attempt to maintain two organisations to carry out the indivisible task of a national land survey. It is otherwise with what may be called engineering surveying or lay-outs for railways, roads, etc. These are sectional operations which can be best performed by the Engineering services concerned; but even these services should, and no

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185 doubt would, make the fullest use of the National Land Survey and leave all genuine land survey operations to it.

I do not advocate any hasty change. That would probably do more harm than good. But I venture to urge that it should be accepted in principle that this duality must be terminated as rapidly as the mutual convenience of the Survey Department proper and the Tapu Department permit. And among the duties of the proposed Central Lands Office should be the examination at an early date, in consultation with the Tapu Department and the Survey Department, of the comparative public advantages (i) of continuing to carry out the Tapu Department's special programme unabated, or (ii) of employing a portion of the resulting addition to the Survey Department's resources on the greatly needed acceleration of the national programme. I am not questioning the intrinsic value of the former, and so far as it meets specific Land Registry needs which are covered by fees received, it should doubtless be continued; but it may well be that on mature and comprehensive consideration the acceleration of the national programme of survey may justify some sacrifice of the more purely departmental work.

6. ADMINISTRATION OF AREAS AWAITING SETTLEMENT

6. However intensively, and by whatsoever methods, a general settlement of rights to land is conducted, there will for many years be a large balance of unsettled holdings, which balance can only be very gradually redressed. The satisfactory administration of these unsettled holdings pending their turn for settlement, is one of the most serious problems of the transition period; but it is clearly one that will be more manageable and better understood, if homogeneous settled and unsettled areas are maintained so far as possible. Any attempts to effect a general settlement sporadically would not only dissipate energy and resources (as previously pointed out), but also further complicate the administration of unsettled land by causing settled and unsettled holdings to occur increasingly intermixed side by side. It has already been recognised that sporadic settlement of some special holdings will be necessary; but this should not occasion undue difficulty if it is restricted to really necessary cases.

185 647 It is the current mangement of the enormous extent of miri land during the years preceding settlement that is however the main problem. This must in practice be conducted for the most part, as at present, by the local officers of the provincial administration, except in areas under some form of tribal or sectional occupation. Some measure of central supervision and control must be maintained. This can continue to be exercised most suitably by the State Domains Section, which, I believe, is now administered in association with Land Revenue, under the Ministry of Finance. In advance of settlement this association of functions appears to me to be both an economical and a convenient 185 arrangement. If land valuation is undertaken methodically in the manner suggested, there will gradually be formed in advance of settlement a national roll of land revenue payers who will also for the most part be claimants to prescriptive rights to hold and use miri land. So that the connection between the supervision of miri land and of land revenue will throughout the pre-settlement stage be close. After settlement the work of both services should be greatly simplified and new arrangements would probably be required; but these can be more usefully discussed after the measures of executive reform to be undertaken have been decided.

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, 185
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, allowed families to settle. 425
The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intellig-
ently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract 185
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHl Iraq MHl

educational policy in the light of opinions and schemes based on his own inevitably limited educational experience, or by considerations of his own political group or sect, but as a trustee of the educational interest of the whole country.

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[647]

The Formation of a National Council of Education. It was also suggested by the special committee referred to that a means of assisting successive Ministers to pursue a consistent policy of educational advance would be the creation of a National Council of Education which would be composed of Directors-General of Education, the Deans of Institutions of Higher Education, representatives from other Ministries whose co-operation is essential in educational progress, representatives appointed by Parliament, and other leading personalities in the country. It was suggested that 'the principle function of this National Council of Education should be to ensure that educational policy is well-founded and that there is stability in its application'. In other words, the National Council of Education would be a continuing body pledged to an agreed national policy of educational development from which successive Ministers of Education would find it difficult to depart.

It appears that a properly constituted National Council of Education has never been formed. Some such bodies have been established and abolished from time to time at the discretion of successive Ministers. One reason given for failure to maintain a National Council of Education is that the Minister should justify himself, not to a Committee of 'experts' but to public opinion. Theoretically there is much to be said for such an explanation but, in a country where the bulk of the population have not had educational opportunity and cannot therefore be articulate in public affairs, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a sound public opinion in matters educational.

A new Education Law giving the Ministry of Education the necessary powers and duties to cope with present pressing demands and needs is overdue. Such a law should include categorical provision for the establishment of a well-balanced National Council of Education with a dignified status. It should have definite powers and duties and meet at regular and legally stipulated intervals. The Minister should be required to consult the Council on major changes of policy, and should not make changes without a majority decision by it. The Council should approve all major plans and developments and regulations of the Ministry before they become effective. Most important, the National Council should have the power of initiating discussion and enquiry as it thinks fit, and should not necessarily await the invitation of the Minister before so doing.

175* ment or official discrimination, were now forced to pay in full.

787* The political unrest of 1920 was not primarily due to this
651 heavy taxation, as Lord Islington declared in the House of Lords,[1] but the fact remains that the taxation was harassing. The inability of the landlords, dignitaries, and tribes to evade taxation as they had once escaped it influenced them to throw their weight against a regime which was determined to collect what it demanded. Moreover, gratitude for the fact that for the first time in the lives of the tax-payers, tangible and concrete returns for their money were visible, was often lost in the knowledge that they had no voice in the initiation or incidence of taxation or in the choice of the objects of expenditure which, because they were essentially desirable in the eyes of the British administrators, were placed in the budget estimates regardless of whether or not the expenditure had corresponding value in the desires and standards of the tax-payers or whether it was necessary for the peculiar needs of the country.

175* Notwithstanding early instructions to the contrary, as on
727* March 29th, 1917, the Civil Administration employed com-
647 paratively few Arabs in responsible administrative positions. Arabs drawing Rs. 600 or more per month[2] on August 1st, 1920, numbered 20 and formed but 3·74 per cent of the 534 officers in the same category.[3] The remaining 514 officers were British or Indian officials. Nor were the various advisory Councils, of which so much has been made as indicating the participation of responsible Arabs in their own government,[4] of any practical value, having been so organized as to make their effect negligible on the conduct of the Administration except in minor local affairs.

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 850-1.

[2] Following the official division as in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 122.

[3] The Arabs so employed were distributed among the departments as follows: Judicial Department, 10; Divisional Political Staff, 4; Irrigation, 3; Tāpū, 2; Waqf, 1. Telegram No. 9804, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August 14th, 1920.

[4] *Review Civil Admin.*, *O.T.*, 1914-1918, pp. 24-6. Ibid., 1914-1920, pp. 131-2.

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This situation was due partly to the lack of 'Iraqls who, by 175*
training, education and character, could stand comparison 727+
with the ability and efficiency of the British and Indian officials, 647
and partly to the view, in accordance with the local official policy that direct British control must be maintained, that 'the interests of the country will be served by having a large proportion of British personnel in all branches of the Administration'[1]. Indeed, it was from Indian rather than Arab sources that both administrative methods and officials were drawn. In 1917, 29 of the 59 officers serving in the Civil Administration of Baghdad Wilayet, came from services in India, either directly or on loan from the military authorities. The proportion, roughly, held good in Basra Wilayet as well.[2] In 1920, although only 79 of the 507 British Officers drawing over Rs. 600 per month were on the active lists of the Indian Government services, a much greater proportion of these as well as of the 515 British Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 had Indian training and experience. No less than 1280 of the Indian and British officials in the latter category came from the Civil Service of India.[3] A total of 2216 Indians was employed, who with the 1022 British officials, composed 50·5 per cent of the total administrative personnel, excluding the railroad staff and the non-administrative ranks of the Police and the Levies.[4] Of the railway personnel, numbering 24,928 of all grades on April 1st, 1920, 80 per cent were Indians, 3 per cent were Europeans and 17 per cent were inhabitants of the country, including Arabs, Kurds, and Jews.[5]

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[1] *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 3. The figures above, together with the Acting Civil Commissioner's persistent refusal to set up an Arab Government in Môsul, as ordered by H.M. Government, May 9th, 1919, make it difficult to understand his later statement (Wilson, op. cit., p: 313), 'from the outset I did my best to induce H.M. Government to allow me to introduce a very large Arab element into the Civil Administration'.

[2] *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 2.

[3] Telegram No. 9268, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, July 31st, 1920.

[4] Table III. Also, Telegram No. 9804, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August 14th, 1920.

[5] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118.

175' The Acting Civil Commissioner has disclaimed with perfect
727' sincerity all intention on his part for thus organizing Mesopo-
641 tamia along Anglo-Indian lines.[1] Nevertheless, the fact remains
that whatever his personal intentions may have been, the great strides toward creating a bureaucracy, staffed and administered on Indian lines as has been indicated above, took place during his period of office. The early division of the country into political districts as in British India with a British officer at each key position, responsible to the central administration, to which voluminous reports and statistics were dispatched in

Table III

Officers and Personnel
Employed by the Civil Administration, August 1st, 1920.*

		British	*Indian*	*Inhabitants Occupied Territory*
Part I	Officers and Personnel drawing over Rs. 600 per month			
	Central Administration	5	—	—
	Divisional ,,	106	—	4
	Other branches	396	7	16
	Total	507	7	20
Part II	Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 per month			
	Central Administration	55	62	123
	Divisional ,,	28	316	862
	Other branches	432	1,831	2,167
	Total	515	2,209	3,152
	Grand Total	1,022	2,216	3,172

Total non-Arab staff 3,238

Above does not include Railways or non-administrative rank and file of Police and Levies (less than Rs. 600).

* Based on *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 122, and on various monthly *Lists of Officers (Part I and II) Serving Under the Civil Commissioner, M.E.F.*

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[1] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 304.

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accordance with Indian practice for every aspect of life within 175'
the division, was extended and the hierarchy of officials 727'
increased from 1918 to 1920. The very titles borne in India, 647 ●
Civil Commissioner, Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Revenue Officer, Judicial Officer and others were reproduced in the 'Iraq administration.[1]

Whether or not the Acting Civil Commissioner desired to extend the Indian system or not, the shadow of India was over him at all times. Such administrative practices as he had learned by 1914, when at the age of thirty he was inducted into the political service in Mesopotamia, had been learned in India. His early assistants with a few notable exceptions, had been trained in Indian methods and with a tenacity characteristic of Indian Civil Servants, refused to acknowledge that methods applicable to Indians might not be suitable for Arabs. Officers came from other parts of the Empire but the Indian tradition remained.[2]

Much of the Indian influence on the character of the admin- 175*
istration in 'Iraq was undoubtedly due to the fact that India 727*
had provided both the motive and the personnel for the 648
Expeditionary Force. The original intention of making Mesopotamia a dependency of India had been given up but the rumour persisted and had to be officially denied.[3] The early suggestion that 'Iraq might provide an outlet for India's surplus population[4] had subsided but had not entirely died out even in official circles.[5] The strongest claim, however, which India

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[1] Political Officer H. R. P. Dickson had suggested in 1917 that familiar Arab titles be given to the British officers. *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, 1916-1917, p. 20.

[2] There has been a suggestion of a Civil Service on the lines of the Indian Civil Service, but comprising 'Iraq, the Sudan and the Levant generally Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917; also Ormsby Gore, W., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920).

[3] Telegram No. 3070, Balfour, Paris, to Political, Baghdad, February 10th, 1919.

[4] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IV (1917), p. 87.

[5] The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, writing in February, 1918, in *My Indian Diary* (1930), p. 250, seems to have had in mind some colonizing scheme for Mesopotamia.

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had been sent to the Euphrates area by the Council to study 175x 642x 727x 631 civil reorganization; to the Muntafiq *Liwā*, until the British troops had been withdrawn; and to the Kurdish districts until their future status had been decided. Sir Percy Cox had already approved of the creation of the Baghdad Municipal Council which, although sanctioned under the previous regime, had been so mistrusted and so hedged with limitations as to be valueless as an instrument of government. The new Council had full executive and financial powers, subject to the general supervision of the *Mutasarrif* of the *Liwā*.

Appointments to administrative offices were vested in the 175x 642x 727x 647 Council of State, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, by Section XIV of the Instructions.[1] In practice, this arrangement was applied by the Council of State only to those posts for which the Sultan's *firmān* had been required under the Ottoman regime. For other posts, appointments were made on the authority of the Minister concerned. In all cases, however, it was understood that no appointments involving the displacement of British or Indian officials were to be proposed to the Council without previous consultation with the High Commissioner.

The actual transfer of power in the provinces awaited the re-establishment of comparative peace and stability. Not until January 10th, therefore, following the return of Ja'far Pasha and the Commission from the Euphrates area, was the Minister of Interior permitted to put forward his first list of administrative appointments.[2]

The principal criticism of the list came from Shī'a sources. 175x 642 727x 647 795 Their original grievances, other than inherent opposition to the British-controlled provisional Government itself, had been

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[1] Appendix VI.

[2] Only four major administrative appointments had been made previously by the Council, all in Baghdad and vicinity; Mahmūd 'Nādīm Beg Tabaqjalī, *Qaimmāqam* of Mandalī, November 19th, 1920; Mumtaz Beg al'Daftarī, *Qaimmāqam* of Kādhimain, November 21st, 1920; 'Ahmad Beg, *Qaimmāqam* of Sāmarrā, December 1st, 1920; Rashīd Beg al-Khojah, *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, December 11th, 1920.

175ˣ that no Shīʻī held a portfolio on the Council. Their resentment
642ˣ was not decreased by the fact that of five *Mutasarrifs* and nine
727ˣ *Qaimmāqams* on the list, only one, a *Qaimmāqam*, was of their
●647 sect. The High Commissioner, however, realized the difficulty
795 of avoiding Sunnī appointments. Only a few trained and experienced Shīʻis were available as a result both of their habitual boycott of Turkish service and professional schools and of official Turkish discouragement to the entrance of Shīʻis into office and schools. The list with minor alterations was, therefore, approved in late January, 1921. When, however, the predominantly Sunnī Council continued to indicate, by appointing Sunnīs to the almost entirely Shīʻa districts along the Euphrates, that it was prepared to do little to conciliate hostile opinion of the sect, the High Commissioner felt obliged to make a firm stand for the appointment of Shīʻis to such places, at least, where members of the sect predominated. After considerable persuasion, also, a place in the Council was found for a Shīʻī, the Ministry of Education being offered to Saiyid Muhammad Mahdī Tobatabai of Karbalā.

175ˣ The reorganization of the Judicial Department under the
642ˣ new administration entailed comparatively few changes.
727ˣ Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who now became Adviser to the
692 Ministry of Justice, had early adopted the policy of making the fullest use of ʻIraqīs as judges and officials, and of making no alterations in the institutions and laws with which the people were familiar, except in cases of clear necessity. The idea itself of an Arab Minister was not new. Sir Edgar had suggested such an appointment in early 1919,[1] but it had been deemed premature.

Reorganization of the Criminal Courts became necessary, however, when the Council of State adopted its scheme of reconstructing provincial administration along the lines of the Turkish system. One of the essential features of that system was the complete separation of the executive from the judicial

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[1] Memorandum on Place of the Arab in Administration, February 5th, 1919.

646 blood from the ranks of those who have absorbed with their education a modicum of civil spirit and a sense of duty to the State, it might yet prove to be the vital political institution of 'Iraq.

Whether these conditions will be attained or whether parliamentary institutions themselves will be retained under the present Government, it is too soon to determine.[1] It is not too much to believe, however, bearing in mind the historical pattern of other dictatorships based on military force, that should the Chamber attempt to take an independent attitude, or should an opposition party arise, the Chamber will have a short life, and that the eventual overthrow of the constitution must follow, together with the loss of such rights and liberties as are now valued by the people of 'Iraq and the destruction of all those conditions essential for the development and maintenance of democracy.

Administrative Services

647 A major difficulty which has faced 'Iraq in the development of her administration has been the lack of a regularly organized Civil Service with regulations governing cadres, appointments, promotions and conditions of service.

Attempts to organize cadres for the various branches of administration, made as early as 1923 when a Cadre Commission was appointed[2] and renewed from time to time, as in 1926[3] and 1928,[4] have not been productive of a systematic

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[1] Freedom of voting and introduction of new blood marked the elections to the new Chamber which convened on February 27th, 1937. It was apparent, however, even before the secondary elections had been held that the candidates, as in all past elections, had been selected so that there would be little or no opposition in the Chamber.

[2] By a decision of the Council of Ministers, March 5th, 1923: see also *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 124.

[3] Ibid., 1926, p. 70.

[4] The Cadre Commission was reorganized by the Council, October 6th, 1928. See also ibid., 1928, pp. 66-7.

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organization of the services. The Civil Service Law of 1931,[1] 647 although it attempted to provide detailed regulations for the Civil Service, has not produced adequate and satisfactory results, not even being generally applied before October, 1932. Its comparative lack of success has been due in part to the constant reorganization of departments and in part to the tendency, restrained as far as possible while the British officials were in authority, to provide posts, either by turning out former occupants or by creating new positions, for applicants whose qualifications were too often those of relationship or personal influence rather than those of ability and capacity.

The result has been a general feeling of insecurity among practically all appointed officials, even those who might be expected to occupy permanent posts, a feeling not appreciably altered by the manner in which the State Official Discipline Law of 1929[2] has been applied. The sense of insecurity, accentuated by dismissals on a large order which have frequently followed Ministerial changes or which have been made in the name of economy as in 1931 or in February 1936, when over 300 officials, many of them highly placed, were dismissed[3] has no doubt contributed to the aversion, amounting in individual cases to fear, which most officials have evinced towards the assumption of responsibility and initiative. All executive authority within departments of State tend to be centralized in the offices of the Ministers. This has been due partially to the system of dual control and responsibility between British and ʻIraqī officials and partially to practices inherited from the Ottoman regime. Every official, as a result, has looked to the official above him to assume the initiative and the responsibility for every action which he has performed, fearing to launch any new idea or plan or to risk any departure from routine for fear of censure and dismissal.

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[1] *Compilation*, 1931, p. 191: Civil Service Law No. 103 of 1931.

[2] State Officials Discipline Law No. 41 of 1929 in *Compilation*, 1929, p. 24.

[3] *Great Britain and the East*, March 5th, 26th, 1936.

647 As a result, officials, even those nominally responsible, have tended to become mere head clerks in their own departments, while Ministers have found themselves overburdened with work. The British Advisers, especially before October, 1932, were able to assist in reducing the burden of the Ministers but elsewhere the administration was retarded in pace and was lowered in quality.

[563] Among officials belonging to minority communities, as the Jews and Christians, the lack of security and the desire to avoid responsibility has been doubly apparent as the result of widespread opposition to the employment of any but 'Iraqis professing Islam. This opposition was evinced as early as 1921, when Jews and Christians were included in the outcry against the employment of foreigners. Although members of these communities have been employed especially in posts attached to the Financial and Technical departments and have even occupied Ministerial positions,[1] the tendency seems to have been to retard their advancement, as evinced in June, 1936, when promotions of Jewish employees as made by the Director of the 'Iraq Government Railway were cancelled by order of the Minister,[2] or to eliminate them as far as possible from Government service, a trend which has been more apparent in recent years.

Finance

652 In the development of 'Iraq's financial system from 1925, three major problems presented themselves: the reorganization of the land-revenue system including its purification from abuses and the development of land-settlement, the equalization of the

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[1] Sasūn Effendi Haskail, a Jew, and Yūsuf Ghanima, a Christian, served repeatedly as Ministers of Finance.

[2] So vehement was the outcry in the vernacular press over the promotion of the Jewish employees that not only were the promotions cancelled, but disciplinary action had to be taken by the Bureau of Press and Propaganda and an order issued that no promotions should be made without prior sanction of the Minister. See *Great Britain and the East*, July 2nd, 16th, 1936.

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eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241
has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallaḥīn* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective
co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 439
features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648
may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433
existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466
have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647
of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175
economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185
of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937.
[2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.
[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

mals offers a more practical answer to their needs at this time. 241
Experience in Iraq shows that tractor plowing may increase yields by 20 to 50 percent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and partly also through better preparation of the soil. Much the same effect could, however, be achieved through better animal-drawn plows replacing those which now, for the most part, barely scratch the surface and fail to uproot the weeds. Means for the acquisition of such tools and improved draft animals should be created through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of better credit facilities.

Mechanization will nevertheless play an increasingly important role in the future, especially as labor becomes more scarce and additional land becomes available for cultivation. Mechanization has already facilitated the expansion of cultivation in the dry-farming areas of Mosul and the new pump-irrigated lands in central Iraq. While certain areas in the irrigation zone are undoubtedly overpopulated in relation to land currently available, in other areas, particularly in the rain-fed zone, labor is scarce relative to the supply of land. As development schemes are launched and new land is opened up for settlement, the available manpower on lands already under cultivation may well be reduced. The government will need therefore to take steps to insure that mechanization will keep pace with developing requirements. In the period immediately ahead, however, the government should be mindful of the possibility that mechanization initiated by landowners may result in a substantial reduction of the portion of the crop going to sharecroppers or in the displacement of sharecroppers before alternative means of employment or settlement become available. Through its control over the importation and distribution of machinery and the extension of credit for the purchase of such machinery, the government will have the power to influence the direction of mechanization and thus minimize to some extent possibly adverse social consequences.

At present only a small portion of Iraqi agriculture is mecha- 407
nized. Combines and tractors in operation are reported to number 475
320 and 750 respectively, with about half of the number concen- 427
trated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. Of these, 75 com- 647
bines and 81 tractors are owned by the Agricultural Machinery

407 Administration, an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Eco-
475 nomics. The AMA rents this machinery to farmers and, in addi-
427 tion, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery,
647 licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited
supply of spare parts in order to prevent black-marketing.

Some provision for rental of machinery, whether by the government or by private enterprise, will be necessary for some time, partly because it enables farmers to become acquainted with the value of such machinery and partly because many farmers do not have sufficient capital for outright purchase. As long as private enterprise is incapable of providing this service at reasonable rentals or until cooperatives can be established, continuation of the government rental service appears essential. On the whole, therefore, the AMA's three-year program to replace and expand its machinery park and to equip repair shops appears desirable despite the obvious drawbacks of government operation. At present, however, the AMA is operating at a substantial loss. In the calendar year 1951, for instance, its rental income will probably not exceed ID 50,000 compared with estimated operating costs, including depreciation, of about ID 150,000. Since the beginning of 1950, when it started operations as a fiscally autonomous agency, it has had to cover its deficits out of the ID 500,000 capital which the government undertook to provide. While the government should probably defray that part of the AMA's expenditures not directly attributable to the rental operations, the overall deficit should be reduced by gradually increasing rental charges. Rental charges on tractors, in particular, appear unduly low and may be depriving private persons of the incentive to purchase tractors either for their own use or for rental to others.

407 Since the overhead costs of the AMA's rental operations will
471 probably always remain rather high and its machinery must be
647 transported over considerable distances, it is important that the
government encourage as much as possible private purchase and
[452] operation of machinery. The extension of credit for this purpose
appears essential. At present, however, the Agricultural Bank
cannot lend money on farm equipment partly because it is short
of funds and partly because such loans would not afford sufficient
security in the absence of any legal requirement to register title
TO MACHINERY.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

to machinery. In the future cooperative ownership and operation, 407
especially in the new settlement areas, should be encouraged as one 471
of the best means of extending the use of machinery on a practicable 447
and economical basis. The experience of the Dujaila cooperative, which, owing to low overhead and transport costs, rents machinery to its members at rates lower than those of the AMA and yet is apparently able to cover the cost of depreciation, seems promising in this respect.

Lack of repair facilities and spare parts have greatly handi- 407
capped mechanization. The government is seeking to overcome 445
this difficulty both by establishing its own repair shops and by requiring importers to provide repair facilities and maintain minimum stocks of spare parts. Such centrally located shops will be available, however, only for major repairs. Since local repair facilities are now almost wholly lacking, steps should also be taken to establish a considerable number of small shops equipped to undertake minor repairs. In addition, courses designed to train drivers in elementary maintenance are urgently needed. The cost of mechanization will remain discouragingly high unless the life of machinery is prolonged by more adequate maintenance and repair.

3. Soil-building and Forage Crops: Fertilizers

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The cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is virtually unknown even though the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished and an improvement in feed supply would make the greatest single contribution to an increase in the low productivity of livestock. In the irrigation zone berseem clover, sown in the grain stubble in late summer, would provide a particularly good pasture, soiling and hay crop. In the rain-fed region winter oats and vetch, when cut and cured, would provide a good reserve feed. In the irrigation zone quick-growing crops such as millet could be grown for summer pasture; and more corn, sorghum and legumes such as cowpeas and mungo beans should be cultivated.

Little fertilizer is used and animal manure is generally col- 241
lected and dried for use as fuel. With the expanding cultivation of crops such as cotton, the use of fertilizer is becoming more urgent. There is need for soil analysis and extensive experimentation to ascertain the fertilizer requirement and the effect of fertilizer on

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

and trained medical and veterinary assistants to control disease. In 231
the North, livestock shelters would reduce the high mortality in the winter. In the long run, however, livestock raising is likely to become increasingly the preoccupation of settled farmers, particularly as the area under cultivation is gradually extended and natural pastures correspondingly restricted. Mixed farming, in which livestock raising based on the production of fodder crops would have its appropriate place, would greatly enhance incomes, especially because it would give more year-around employment to farmers who now, with the concentration on winter crop production, are underemployed for the greater part of the year.

5. Research and Education: Incentives

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While is it relatively easy to point out what should be done to improve agriculture and livestock, devising the means to accomplish the improvement is incomparably more difficult. The means available to the state for a direct attack on low productivity are necessarily limited. The government can, of course, lay out drainage schemes, make more water available, provide facilities for combatting plant and animal diseases and pests, establish livestock shelters, assist in organizing cooperatives, and furnish more ample credit facilities. However, except perhaps in the new settlement areas, the state cannot prescribe better crop rotation, the use of improved seeds, better methods of cultivation and the like. These depend on private initiative which can at best only be stimulated and encouraged by the government. In some circumstances farmers can be relied upon to seize the initiative, as in the case of cotton where high prices have stimulated a rapid expansion of production. In the main, however, greater productivity depends on the success of efforts to persuade large numbers of landowners and cultivators to change their time-hallowed methods and techniques. For this reason principal reliance will have to be placed on education, supported by practical research and supplemented where feasible by financial incentives provided by the government.

First of all, steps should be initiated immediately to organize 242
an effective extension or advisory service to farmers. At present 647
the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and much of their

242 647 attention is devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks. The relatively small number of agricultural officers in the provinces are engaged primarily in the distribution of seed, in the collection of rather inadequate statistics and in administrative tasks. They lack the time, the transport facilities, and, often, the ability to counsel farmers on methods of improving their output. While shortages of trained personnel will prevent the immediate establishment of a full-time extension service, the Mission recommends the early appointment of a director of extension and education whose first responsibility would be the recruitment and training of personnel for such a service. The need is for people well-grounded in [874] practical, general agriculture rather than specialists. The facilities of the secondary agricultural school and the higher agricultural institute at Abu Ghuraib might well be used to train the required people, provided the quality of the staff is improved and the curriculum revised, especially in the direction of giving more practical training in agriculture. It will be impossible, however, to attract properly qualified people to an extension service unless the status of agricultural officers in the provinces is considerably raised and their conditions of service, particularly housing and pay, are greatly improved.

The effectiveness of such an extension service would be greatly enhanced by the organization of demonstration units on strategically located government and private farms. There, farmers could be brought to see with their own eyes the practical advantages of improved methods of raising livestock, poultry and farm crops. At the same time the extension service might work closely with the public schools in the rural areas and small towns to insure that a knowledge of the rudimentary principles of agriculture is instilled in children at an early age. Rural primary and secondary schools should give agriculture an appropriate place in their curriculum.

816 242 An extension service must be backed up by sound, practical research which will develop new crops and more productive varieties, improved livestock breeds, better methods of cultivation, and more effective control of pests and diseases. At present there are few people engaged in full-time research. Government farms are devoted primarily to the commercial production of seed, serving neither as demonstration farms nor as centers for extensive

tive cooperatives. As already indicated, the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project is the only promising venture in this field. The organization of cooperatives is at present entrusted to a department in the Ministry of Economics whose entire staff consists of a part-time director, one assistant and one clerk. About forty cooperatives are now registered with the department, but most of these are apparently inoperative and all but one are consumers' cooperatives for which there seems to be less need. The Mission urges that in the future efforts be concentrated on the organization of agricultural cooperatives and that therefore the responsibility for cooperatives be transferred to the Department of Agriculture. Such cooperatives can become an important means of self-help and saving by farmers. Gradually they may become an important vehicle for the extension of credit to small farmers by the Agricultural Bank.

Undoubtedly progress in inculcating farmers with the necessary cooperative spirit and a knowledge of the benefits of cooperation will be slow. Strong guidance and control will need to be provided initially by the government, and the cooperatives will have to be held to strict accountability in the use of their assets. Yet the experience with the Dujaila cooperative and, to some extent, with cooperatives in other Moslem countries, such as Egypt, indicates that beneficial results can be achieved by persistent, well-directed efforts. Cooperatives for the purchase and distribution of seeds, fertilizer and other tools of production and for the joint ownership and operation of machinery should be made an integral part of the new settlement schemes. While primary emphasis should be put on this task, efforts should also be made to organize cooperatives on a small, experimental scale among existing sharecroppers. Such cooperatives, assisted by the Agricultural Bank, might confine themselves initially to relatively modest operations such as the provision of seed and simple tools. Success in this field will depend on the existence of a small cadre of enthusiastic government officials properly trained in the organization and operation of cooperatives. It is therefore suggested that the government take prompt steps to have a number of such officials trained in a country like Cyprus where a well-developed cooperative movement exists.

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Forestry

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3/3 In a country where the plains are almost entirely devoid of trees and only the mountain valleys contain a few scattered forests, the importance of forests as a means of controlling erosion and floods and overcoming the acute shortage of timber needs no emphasis. The Mission did not give special attention to this problem because the government has already received an excellent detailed report and recommendations from a British expert. It wishes only ~~to stress~~ that it is important not only to protect and extend the forests in the mountain areas, but also to undertake the planting of trees in the plains to serve as windbreaks and as sources of fuel and building timber. In the Dujaila project an encouraging beginning has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundaries. In future settlement schemes it might be well to require farmers to plant and maintain small wood lots. To carry out a proper program the Forestry Department, which is now only a division within the Department of Agriculture, should be given an independent status and headed, as at present, by a well-trained foreigner. The training of an adequate number of foresters should also be undertaken.

Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture

●647 Agriculture, livestock-raising and forestry are of such critical importance to Iraq that they merit a separate ministry in the government. The Mission recommends therefore the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use. Within this Ministry and directly under a permanent secretary, it is suggested that directorates-general be organized for each of the following subjects: agriculture and horticulture; animal husbandry; forestry and soil conservation; land settlement; and research. Special sections for administrative and personnel questions, legal affairs, economic research and statistics, and extension and education might form part of the immediate staff of a permanent secretary. Within the Ministry there should also be grouped the more or less autonomous organizations such as the Tobacco Monopoly, the Grain Board, the Agricultural Machinery Administration, the Date Association and the Chambers of Agriculture. The Mission believes that such a ministry would greatly facilitate more effective direction of the government's efforts to improve agriculture and related pursuits.

temporary, moderate protection of certain industries, it wishes to 654
emphasize strongly the need for a rapid and progressive reduction 433
in special assistance.

Government Organization for Industry

Government activities relating to industry, except for the 654
Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in 647 ●
the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present 433
director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. The Mission recommends that a Department of Industries be established to maintain adequate statistical records on industrial production, analyze economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and administer the laws concerning assistance to industry. The research and technical functions now being carried on would then be continued under a separate Department of Industrial Research and Standards.

These two departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future as compared to special measures of protection and assistance which tend to shield industry against competition. Much can be done in the long run to assist industry in better controlling the quality of its products, reducing waste through material salvage, analyzing production costs, making market surveys and increasing labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

Labor and Vocational Education

Finally, it should not be overlooked that a contented, well- 466
trained labor force is of the utmost importance to industrial development. An improvement in working conditions and more attention to the welfare of the worker would tend to increase labor productivity. Such an improvement can to a large extent be brought about only through a growing realization among employers that
it is to their own interest. The government should, of course, lay 467
down minimum standards in this respect, particularly since the 466
absence of real trade unions precludes workers from achieving

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759 ence has already been made to the importance of special training for medical assistants who will generally be in charge of village dispensaries.

278 Many people will continue to be far removed from hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies. For these it is important to make available such simple "household remedies" as anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, tincture of iodine, DDT powder and Epsom salts. It is suggested that the government make arrangements to supply through village shops such drugs in suitable packets carrying simple directions for use. The general availability of these remedies at a reasonable price will also help to reduce the large number of visits to dispensaries for comparatively trivial ailments.

Organization of Public Health Administration

744 647 The measures outlined above require a number of changes in the administration of the public health program. The present organization, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, does not lend itself to an effective attack on the problem of disease prevention. Like most of the other central administrations, it suffers from excessive centralization. There is too little contact with other ministries whose activities are of importance to public health. The Mission suggests that a public health administrator, together with an epidemiologist and a sanitary expert, be recruited abroad to advise the Minister on the organization and further development of the health services. The epidemiologist would concentrate on the principal endemic diseases and the sanitary expert would advise on measures to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene. While a detailed reorganization should await their advice, it would seem best to group health services according to two main divisions, one concerned with the curative, the other with the preventive services.

In the future the reorganized health services will need to work much more closely with the departments concerned with irrigation and agriculture and, on the problem of health education, with the Ministry of Education. In carrying out a much needed decentralization considerable responsibility must, above all, be placed on the chief medical officer in every province. This officer, who now also carries on a private practice, should be given more adequate pay so

that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also 744
be important to provide both the provincial and district medical 647
officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather 361
haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great 166
congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have [362]
simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities. [364]

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. 362
They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly con- 342
structed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

362 however, they are poorly built and too small; and they are crowded
342 together on sites and under conditions which breed disease.

Need for Community Planning

361 In recent decades there has been a growing awareness of the need for community planning, better housing and community facilities. With respect to villages, little has as yet been done except for the planned development of the Dujaila project. Here some effort was made to have houses erected according to standard specifications and to depart from the village-type of settlement by requiring that houses be erected in groups of four on the adjoining corners of four land allotments. As an aid to town and city planning there has been created within the Department of Municipalities of the Ministry of Interior a small planning section to provide "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles". The municipalities themselves have been charged with "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specifications of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places and buildings in such areas". The final responsibility for planning has, however, remained unclear. The surveys, plans and partial plans have generally been hastily drawn and with little regard for the actual conditions prevailing in the community. In any event, municipalities have for the most part continued to develop without reference to any plans. In many towns new streets have been arbitrarily cut through residential and commercial districts with little concern for real needs or for the people affected. The various ministries concerned with the erection of schools, hospitals, public buildings and bridges generally locate their projects without reference to an overall plan and without consultation with each other.

361 There is today a real need for integrated community planning.
647 The Mission believes that it would be desirable to work towards the establishment of a genuine Community Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Such an office should ultimately be staffed with an adequate number of experts versed in architecture, engineering and other aspects of town planning. The first step might be to strengthen the existing planning section in the Department of

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Municipalities by appointing a capable, experienced town planner 361
as director and giving him authority to build up a trained staff 647
gradually. It could serve both the Development Board and local authorities in coordinating development projects on the community level and in ascertaining whether the projects for schools, hospitals, and similar facilities in any given community are properly related to the needs and facilties of neighboring communities.

Housing Developments

Public and quasi-public housing has received increased attention in recent years. 362 The Ministry of Social Affairs, which is authorized to construct houses for workers, has built 204 units and has 185 units under construction. The low rentals on completed units constitute a definite subsidy to the occupants. The city of Basra is now building 750 low-cost houses in accordance with a plan that unfortunately was hastily and inexpertly prepared. Probably the best municipal housing project is near the old city of Bedra in Kut province where a new town site is being developed. The Railway Administration has provided housing for more than 2,400 of its employees, and the Port of Basra is also building accommodations, primarily for its junior officials.

Laws which require the construction of houses by industrial firms and large landowners have remained unenforced. Industrial housing is still little developed. The outstanding project of this kind is at Kirkuk where the Iraq Petroleum Company has been building a large housing development, consisting of 1,028 units, for its skilled artisans and officials. The cost of this project is such, however, that it is unlikely to be widely copied.

Most of the public and quasi-public housing is open to criticism on several counts. Use of poor materials, improper spacing and orientation, poor planning and site engineering have characterized some of these projects. The few public housing projects undertaken have been launched without adequate attention to the problem of how much rent the potential occupants could pay.

Establishment of a Housing Authority

In the light of these considerations, the Mission suggests that 362
the responsibility for planning and supervising housing be entrusted 647
ultimately to a Housing Authority located in the Ministry of Social

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362 647 Affairs and staffed by men trained in house design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, public health, housing and land economics, and project management. Initially a nucleus for such an Authority might be created by strengthening the existing housing section of the Department of Labor. At present the section is staffed only by one part-time architect with one part-time assistant, a superintendent, and a few clerks and accountants. The Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid. Maintenance and repairs could thus be financed without constant resort to the Treasury.

[816] The Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an *Applied Building Research Station* attached to the proposed Department of Industrial Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station would conduct research designed to develop improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing. In particular, it would experiment with the most economical and effective combination of locally available materials and try them in actual housing units. It would test, for example, such possibilities as the utilization of date-palm fronds for the manufacture of pressed boards, of rice husk and asphalt mixed and pressed into blocks or bricks for interior partitions, and of reed mats and bitumen to form waterproof sheets for roofing materials.

362 How much public housing should be undertaken is difficult to determine in the absence of sample surveys to ascertain the needs of different parts of the population, particularly in the light of what they can afford to pay for housing. Housing will, of course, automatically improve as the productivity and the incomes of the people rise, but this does not mean that some portion of the revenue from increased production of oil should not be used to provide housing for those in urgent need. Pending a more thorough study, an amount of about ID 400,000 annually might be taken as a provisional target for expenditures. Presumably public housing should cater primarily to the needs of low-paid employees and industrial workers. While a large public housing program is not a matter of high priority at present, it is vitally important that adequate accom-

to be about two and a half times the combined outlays (ID 37,200,000) of the government, the railways and the Port of Basra in 1950-51. Moreover, actual development expenditures, which require proportionately far more technical and administrative organization and preparation than ordinary outlays, will need to rise to a rate about 10 times the total public capital expenditures (ID 5,200,000) in 1950-51. 654x

Such a rate of expenditure will be achieved only with great effort and by careful planning. It will necessitate substantial improvement in the efficiency of public administration so that the government will be capable of coordinated planning and execution of the program. It will be necessary to take full advantage of technical assistance available abroad and to enlist experienced foreign firms for the purpose of planning and designing as well as executing major works.

Improvement in Public Administration

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Improvement in public administration is of key importance. The multiplicity of projects in the development program will require an enormous amount of detailed administrative and technical preparation, all of which must be properly coordinated. As indicated by the nature of the Mission's recommendations, the work involved will fall on many ministries and departments and not simply on the Development Board. Moreover, in order to avoid overburdening the Development Board, the latter should be in the position to decentralize as far as possible the detailed planning and execution, reserving to itself principally the task of overall planning and coordination. Decentralization would also contribute to morale by giving the entire government service a sense of participation in constructive endeavor which now appears to be lacking.

Public administration in Iraq, as in many other underdeveloped countries, requires improvement in many respects. Excessive centralization causes ministers and high officials to be overburdened with detail to the neglect of policy formulation and planning. Inadequate use is made of such talent and knowledge as is available elsewhere in the government, including the local administrations. Coordination of related activities is frequently lacking, so that, for instance, there is no cooperation in the planning and operation of

654x 647 irrigation works among agricultural officials in the Ministry of Economics, the Irrigation Department of the Ministry of Public Works and health officials in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The efficiency of civil servants seems to have declined since before the war. Certainly the increase in the number of government employees (excluding police) from about 11,000 before the war to almost 20,000 in 1950 has been considerably out of proportion to the expansion in the government's functions. Many government offices appear to be overstaffed, while others cannot obtain extra personnel for essential increases in services. Officials are frequently shifted from one position to another without regard for their qualifications and experience. Often government officials both in the provinces and in the capital do not enjoy sufficient continuity in office to enable them to become really useful. Promotion appears to be based almost entirely on seniority and other considerations rather than on merit. The morale among government servants is generally low.

647 465 The two most important factors contributing to inefficiency and morale are probably the low level of government salaries and the lack of any sense of real participation in constructive work. Since before the war salaries and allowances have risen only 20 percent for high government officials and 160 percent for the lowest paid officials, while the official cost-of-living index has increased by about 400 percent. To some extent, however, there has been an increase in salaries through shifts to higher grades, so that, judging from comparative total disbursements of salaries and allowances, it may be concluded that average salaries have risen by about 130 percent since before the war.[7] Nevertheless, salaries, particularly of officials in the higher classes of the civil service, are very [461] inadequate. The probity of officials is thus put to a severe test and to the extent that some successfully utilize their positions as opportunities for personal gain, the morale of others suffers. Moreover, many civil servants are compelled to supplement their salaries by engaging in business or accepting other employment with resulting neglect of their official duties.

654x 647 The lack of a real sense of participation in constructive tasks is conspicuous in the civil service. The Mission found a wide-

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[7] Total disbursements of ID 14,700,000 on salaries and allowances in 1949-50 compared with a sum of about ID 3,500,000 before the war.

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spread feeling that nothing was being accomplished. Although the establishment of the Development Board and the large prospective increase in oil revenues appears to put Iraq on the threshold of an era of potentially great progress, the Mission discovered very little awareness of these developments among officials both at the center and in the provinces. Where this awareness existed, it was often accompanied by an inclination to disparage the results likely to be achieved. Thus it appears that the government has largely neglected the opportunity to acquaint its officials with its program for the future and to enlist their enthusiastic cooperation in lifting Iraq to a higher plane of economic development.

In order to remedy some of these shortcomings, the Mission urges that a small commission, consisting of high Iraqi officials assisted by two foreign experts in public administration and personnel, be appointed to make a complete survey of the system of public administration and recommend improvements therein. This commission should inquire into the training, classification and promotion of government officials and the appropriate staffing of government departments. It should devise a new and adequate pay scale which should take into account inequities in the existing salary structure and provide relatively higher pay and improved amenities for officials working in the provinces. It should examine also the measures which might be taken to improve the coordination of government activities and to bring about a gradual decentralization of administrative functions.

Pending the commission's study and recommendations, the government might take certain interim steps to improve its operations. One of these might be the appointment of a permanent Secretary in each ministry who would be responsible for the coordinated administration of the ministry. He would relieve the Minister of as much detail as possible and would brief the Minister on major policy questions requiring his decision. The other might be an interim, perhaps initially modest, general increase in the salaries or allowances of government officials. It might be desirable to cover at least part of the cost of the interim and final increase in salaries out of additional taxes, but some resort to the funds at the disposal of the Development Board may not be inappropriate in view of the importance of more efficient public administration to development.

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Finally, the Development Board should, as far as possible, 654* enlist the aid and cooperation of other government ministries and 647 agencies and of the provincial and municipal administrations in the task of planning and carrying out a development program. It should actively encourage them to submit suggestions and plans for development, integrate these plans with each other and the Board's own, and, to the maximum extent feasible, allocate money and responsibility for the execution of these plans and projects to other agencies. The establishment of a Community Planning Office and a Housing Authority, as proposed earlier by the Mission, would be in line with this suggestion.

In the last analysis the Development Board would, of course, retain the final responsibility for formulating the overall program, for coordinating those projects such as irrigation which concern many government departments, and for allocating the funds necessary to finance the various parts of the program. In order to enable the Board to carry out this overall coordinating and planning function, it is essential that all major development projects be brought within its purview, even though its financial assistance may not in all instances be necessary. At present, projects for a government petroleum refinery, a government textile mill and a new grain silo are all being kept outside of the Board's jurisdiction. The formulation of an integrated program with a well-conceived system of priorities is difficult as long as this remains the practice. In addition, coordination would be facilitated if the Board, of which only the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance are ex officio members, were to give the Ministers of Economics, Agriculture (a new Ministry proposed by the Mission), Public Works and Social Affairs facilities for attending Board sessions whenever matters of interest to them are being discussed. The possibility of making the Governor of the National Bank also an ex officio member of the Board might be considered.

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Technical Assistance

A substantial increase in the technical staff available to the 463 government will also be of critical importance to the success of the development program. No project should be approved under the program until evidence is submitted that it is technically sound in

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however, had to be kept small. In the field of industry the govern- 654
ment sought to stimulate private enterprise by according special tax benefits and protection and by establishing the Industrial Bank.

The Development Board

With the prospect of a rapid rise in oil production and there- 654
fore in government oil revenues, the promise of a much wider field 185
of activity developed. Accordingly a law was enacted in 1950 estab- 647
lishing a Development Board and assigning to it all the oil revenues as well as the proceeds of any loans contracted by it or by the government on its behalf. The Board consists of two ex officio members—the Prime Minister, who functions as its president, and the Minister of Finance—and six executive members appointed for five years. The Board was directed to draw up a general program for the development of Iraq and, upon its approval by Parliament, to proceed with the detailed plans and specifications of the projects included in the program and with their execution in accordance with an approved order of priorities. Each year any revisions in the program, an annual budget and an annual report are to be presented to the Parliament. The Board is also to consider and coordinate development schemes which may originate in the various ministries of the government.

The establishment of this Board is evidence of the government's determination to see the extraordinary oil revenues used for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living and to insure some continuity in development which frequent changes in governments have made virtually impossible in the past.

The Board was constituted and began operations toward the end of 1950. The British and American governments each nominated one of the executive members in accordance with a request by Iraq. In the spring of 1951 the Board submitted its preliminary over-all program involving a total outlay of ID 65,674,000 over a five-year period beginning with the fiscal year 1951-52. About ID 29,401,000 of the Board's projected revenues, consisting of the income from oil anticipated at that time and nearly all of the proceeds of the $12.8 million loan obtained from the International Bank for the Wadi Tharthar flood control project, were reserved

654 for subsequent programming. Expenditures for the five-year period 185 were allocated by broad fields as follows (in dinars):[5]

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Water storage and irrigation schemes	30,044,000
Roads	15,826,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	12,618,000
Miscellaneous projects	6,216,000
Administrative expenditures	970,000
Unprogrammed reserve	29,401,000

Because of the brief time devoted to its preparation, this program will necessarily undergo modification as more detailed study is given to requirements and the cost of individual projects and as some of the over-all allocations are programmed in detail.

652 The magnitude of this projected outlay is in startling contrast to the financial stringency which has characterized public expenditures in the past. The government has had great difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays were pared; government salaries were not increased despite the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds.

Government Budgets

The trend of government finances is indicated in Table 16.

It will be noted that, despite economies and tax increases, the government's total budget showed substantial deficit in 1948-49 and 1949-50, primarily because of the bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 and the effects of the war with Israel. Of the government's principal autonomous enterprises, the railways also ran considerable deficits on capital account which were defrayed only by using reserve funds, by borrowing ID 1,000,000 from the government and contracting a loan of ID 3,000,000 through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The Iraqi government borrowed at home to meet its own needs, its domestic debt rising from ID 4,500,000 on March 31, 1948, to ID 10,800,000 on March 31, 1951. Borrowing had to be limited, however, because the market for government securities was virtually restricted to the banking system. As of March 31, 1951, the National Bank and the commercial banks held ID 9,200,000 of the domestic debt.

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[5] For a more detailed breakdown, see Table V in Appendix.

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TABLE IV

EXPENDITURES PROJECTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD

(in millions of dinars)

	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56	Total
Irrigation projects:						
Wadi Tharthar	1.3	3.6	3.1	1.5	0.2	9.6
Habbaniya	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	—	2.1
Diyala Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.1	2.2	1.9	6.1
Dokan Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.0	1.8	2.0	5.7
General drainage	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Other irrigation projects:						
New projects	0.4	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.9	4.2
Completion of projects begun previously	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.3
Total	3.0	6.6	7.4	7.5	5.5	30.0
Roads and bridges:						
Main roads across Iraq from south to north (Basra - Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc.)	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.6
Other roads	1.3	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	9.4
Total	2.1	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.5	15.9
Buildings:						
Hospitals	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Schools	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Other buildings	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.0
Total	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	12.6
Other projects:						
Small settlement projects	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Artesian wells and water for drinking purposes	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Special projects in northern Iraq	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.3
Reforestation and filling of swamps and marshes	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5
Telegraphs & telephones	0.5	—	—	—	—	0.5
Other projects	0.2	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.4
Expropriations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	—	1.1
Total	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	6.2
Administrative expenses	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0
Grand Total	9.4	13.7	14.8	15.0	12.8	65.7

Note:—Totals do not necessarily add up because of rounding.

ments in the best use of water mentioned earlier and could assist 312
in disseminating the findings. They would be an important means of developing the concept of common responsibility for the efficient operation and upkeep of irrigation systems and might ultimately serve also to disseminate information on agriculture.

The legal situation with respect to water rights and the con- 312
struction, maintenance and operation of irrigation and flood-control 671
works is defined by Articles 1234 to 1238 of the Mejelle, or 423
Ottoman Civil Code, and Law No. 23 of 1923 and its successive amendments. Repeated changes in this legislation have made it difficult to determine the validity of certain provisions. It would be desirable to codify and clarify the legislation and, in the course of such a review, to eliminate some of its defects. It would be advisable, for instance, to ensure a right of passage for canals across the property of third parties with compensation fixed by the Irrigation Department in accordance with defined criteria. At present such a right of passage is recognized but with the proviso that the interested party must buy or lease the necessary land, which, in practice, may lead to extortionate terms. There is also a need for a review of old water rights. While presumably such rights cannot be abolished, the right to use water might well be brought into closer accord with the amount of land to be irrigated.

The law makes the Directorate General for Irrigation in the 312
Ministry of Communications and Public Works responsible for the 447
construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation and flood-control schemes. In 1949 the irrigation services had a staff of 1,330 persons, classified approximately as follows:

Engineers	26
Assistant engineers	20
Overseers	94
Office personnel	250
Bund personnel	820
Specialists	120

On the whole, there is an insufficient number of competent, experienced engineers; and pay scales are inadequate to retain able men in a service which often entails considerable hardship. The staff in the provinces is generally not large enough to cope with technical problems along with the many administrative questions

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centering particularly about the distribution of water. Young engineers are often sent as beginners to outlying posts where they work without adequate technical supervision. The service has lacked an experienced Chief Engineer who could, through frequent visits in the field, provide advice and guidance and support the staff with the weight of his authority. The Mission understands that such a Chief Engineer has now been appointed. It would be desirable to provide him with several experienced assistants specialized in drainage and irrigation questions.

In the past the planning of new works has been characterized by two defects: inadequate coordination with other government departments, particularly those dealing with agriculture and health, and failure to make full use of the knowledge and experience of the divisional irrigation engineers.

Although irrigation obviously serves agriculture, the Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Economics has been virtually ignored in the planning of new irrigation schemes. The same has been true of the health service which is vitally interested in the layout of irrigation projects in connection with its fight against malaria and bilharzia. In its capacity as an over-all planning and coordinating agency the Development Board will be able to insist that all interested government departments be consulted in the planning of projects. A committee consisting of representatives of the Irrigation, Agriculture and Health Departments might be established to pass on irrigation and drainage projects and advise on their priority.

This committee might be complemented by a technical committee which would direct the experiments to ascertain the optimum use of water, to which reference has already been made, and perhaps to study other technical operating problems.

In the future planning of irrigation works it would be desirable to make greater use of the divisional irrigation engineers in the provinces. These officials have often acquired an experience and knowledge of local conditions which could greatly aid realistic planning.

The cost of new flood-control and irrigation works will in the future be defrayed out of the budget of the Development Board.

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The cost of operation, however, will have to be met out of the ordinary budget. In the past the ordinary budget of the Irrigation Department has been wholly inadequate to insure efficient operation and maintenance of the existing irrigation systems. In the last ten years an average of only ID 270,000 has been spent annually under the ordinary budget.[7] Expenses for operation and maintenance should actually be about 150 fils per gross mashara under flow irrigation. With a gross area of approximately 6,800,000 masharas under flow irrigation, the appropriate total would therefore be about ID 1,000,000 per year, inclusive of the salaries of the requisite personnel. The Mission therefore suggests that the budget of the Irrigation Department be progressively increased to reach that sum within the next five years, with the additional cost to be borne by the Development Board. 312 647

V. Costs of the Program

The Mission estimates that the total cost of the over-all program it has recommended would amount over the next five years (1952-53 to 1956-57) to about ID 55,000,000. Of this ID 27,600,000 would be for water reservoirs, ID 7,000,000 for drainage, ID 2,000,000 for improved maintenance and the balance for new irrigation works. A more detailed breakdown is given in Table V of the appendix. These estimates are exclusive of the provision made in the first year's budget of the Development Board. They are based upon cost estimates made in Iraq by the Haigh Commission and others, but make allowances of 10 to 20 percent for intervening price increases. A further rise in prices in the future would, of course, raise the aggregate cost. 312

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[7] See Table IV in the appendix.

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APPENDIX

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TABLE I

Agricultural Machinery Administration Budget for 1950

(actual results)

Revenue		Expenditures	
Rentals of machinery	ID 40,262	Salaries	ID 11,073
Sale of agricultural machinery and tools	7,267	Cost-of-living allowances	4,844
Sale of spare parts	317	Transport	117
Fines	195	Transfer	7
Repairs of agricultural machinery	106	Furniture	1,317
Transport charges	584	Printing & stationery	290
Interest on deposits	2,376	Postal, telegraph and telephone charges	276
Sundry	138	Rent	1,330
		Water and light	1,664
		Machines, cars & fuel	40,981
		Buildings	30,284
		Bonuses	399
		Temporary officials and employees	20,679
		Sundry	4,557
Total	ID 51,245	Total	ID 117,818

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TABLE II

Agricultural Machinery Administration Budget for 1951
(estimates)

I. Ordinary or Operating Budget

Revenue		Expenditures	
Rentals	ID 50,000	Operation of garages and repair shops	38,726
		Agricultural machinery operation	48,708
		General administration	25,884
		Total cash expenditures	113,318
		Depreciation allowance	37,145
		Total expenditures	ID 150,463

II. Capital Budget

Revenue		Expenditures	
Sale of machinery, tools, etc.	ID 20,000	Purchase of agricultural machinery	54,000
		Purchase of trucks, jeeps and tractors	21,500
		Imports of spare parts for sale	25,000
		Diwaniya shop	3,000
		Requisites for completion of shops	7,500
		Sundry capital expenditures	1,000
		Total	ID 112,000

III. Total Budget

Total cash revenue	ID 70,000	Total cash expenditures	ID 225,318
		Total expenditures	262,463

Total cash deficit ID 155,318

Total deficit 192,463

463 in economics and finance capable of acting as company secretaries 374 or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff should be strengthened; and more attention should be paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum. They could assist in arranging for part-time apprenticeship training and would provide a means for checking how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

Effective Government Organization for Industry

● 647 654 Government activities relating to industry, except for the Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. As industry expands both types of activity will become increasingly important. The Mission therefore recommends a realignment of the present organization to provide for two separate departments within the Ministry, a Department of Industrial Research and Standards and a Department of Industries. Research and technical functions now being carried on would be continued under the Department of Industrial Research and Standards. Its facilities need, however, to be expanded to meet industry's growing requirements for laboratory testing and quality control.

The newly organized Department of Industries would carry on economic research and analysis. Among its functions would be the maintenance of adequate statistical records of industrial production, the analysis of economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and the administration of the laws providing special protection to industry.

Both departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future, as compared to special mea-

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sures of production and assistance which tend to shield industry 647
against competition. There is much to be done to help industry 654
to achieve better control of the quality of its products, in reducing waste through material salvage, in analyzing production costs, in making market surveys and in raising labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

IV. Other Suggestions for the Improvement of Industry

Possibilities for Economies in the Use of Capital

Whenever the capital cost of a plant is an important determi- 433
nant of production costs, it becomes essential to utilize the plant to the fullest extent. This may be accomplished, for example, by increasing the number of shifts, by extending the work week and by stepping up machines to their maximum economic speed. Completely integrated plants seldom if ever offer the opportunity for this type of operation, because certain machines are never called upon for continuous use. This is, of course, very noticeable where the plant does all its own maintenance work, even to all of its foundry items. The solution is obviously one of resorting to contracting or sub-contracting with concerns specializing in particular operations. For example, a single finishing and dyeing concern might advantageously serve two or more textile mills, where the capacity of these mills is insufficient to load separate finishing departments to their economic limit.

In Iraq there is a tendency in industry to generate its own 433
power rather than to purchase it. This leads to the installation of 377
expensive facilities which are utilized only part of the day. While 365
industry is operating, many municipal power plants stand virtually idle because they serve primarily lighting needs and their peak load accordingly comes at night. In some cases, where large quantities of process steam are needed, industrial enterprises may be justified in generating their own power, but for the most part,
the purchase of power is preferable. Unfortunately, power rates, 433
except in Basra and Baghdad, are so high that the purchase of 365

V. Roads

Organization

Iraq's road system is controlled and maintained by the Public 491 Works Department under the Minister of Communications and 647 Public Works. It is headed by the Director General of Public Works and under his direction five divisional engineers assure the maintenance and works service in divisions centered in Baghdad (four provinces), Hilla (three provinces), Basra (three provinces), Kirkuk (two provinces) and Mosul (two provinces). A sixth divisional engineer is in charge of central operations in the capital. District engineers, usually stationed at the provincial capitals, are in charge of day-to-day maintenance. Planning is carried out at the headquarters of the Director General. There is a lack of technical staff to carry out surveys in the field. Except for this fact, the organization is efficient and effective. It may have to be expanded as the road construction program progresses. Provincial governments and municipalities control secondary and urban roads and streets.

At present the road system controlled and maintained by the 491 Public Works Department consists of approximately

2,500 kilometers metalled and surfaced,
500 kilometers metalled only,
5,000 kilometers earth roads.

Many of the metalled roads were built in the two war periods, and most of them are concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the capital, between Baghdad and the East and North, and in the North. All the roads in the southern plains are earth roads, and their maintenance and use suffers from the effects of rains on the salt-impregnated soil. Roads within municipal boundaries are generally [363] in a very poor state of repair, not excluding the streets in the capital. Roads in the Basra Port area are controlled and maintained by the Port Directorate and are in good repair.

Maintenance was, until a few years ago, extremely poor, but today every effort is being made, and with conspicuous success, at least to prevent further deterioration. Maintenance costs are allocated on the Ministry's budget and calculated at ID 40 per

Future Developments

It must be expected that Iraqi Airways will continue to 509 operate at a loss for some years to come. This should be accepted because the air services serve a real traffic need and there are reasonable prospects of reducing and perhaps ultimately eliminating operating deficits. The Airways Accounts are separate from the Railway Accounts and the steps recommended in the Palmer Report for complete separation of the finances of the Railways and the Airways should be adopted. There is no reason why the Railways should be expected to defray the deficits of the Airways.

There appears to be room for expansion of services in the area where Europe, Asia and Africa meet; and the government should encourage Iraqi Airways to play an increasingly important part in air traffic in this area. Internal demands appear to be negligible at present but may be expected to develop in conjunction with extended international services. These services appear to present an opportunity for far-reaching economies through closer cooperation between Middle Eastern airlines in their services, their administration and agencies outside the home countries.

VIII. Post, Telegraph, Telephone, Radio Communications

Organization

Responsibility for communications is concentrated in the 647 Directorate General of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services in 205 the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. Iraq is a 206 full member of the International Postal Union and the communications services of the country, including their tariffs, comply with the standards of the Union.

The number of post, telepragh and telephone offices has developed as follows: 205 206

TYPE OF OFFICE	1940	1951
24 hrs. service	14	46
16 hrs. service	12	37
12 hrs. service	18	4
7 hrs. service	42	54
Local and rural agencies	155	171

It is expected that once this work is completed, the personnel problem will ease somewhat. 654

The development program of the service provides for a survey and mapping to a scale of 1:20,000 at an estimated cost of ID 200,000. For the appropriate housing of the service, a new building with 10,000 square meters of floor space is now under construction and is expected to be completed in January or February 1952. This will facilitate administration of the service which is now scattered in three widely separated buildings. The new building will also house the up-to-date printing plant ordered in Great Britain. Funds for building and plant have already been sanctioned. Air surveys now in progress should be continued at an annual cost of approximately ID 40,000.

XI. General Observations

Teamwork

Not only the development of the transport services but also the general development program, with all its implications of temporary and seasonal demands for transport of construction materials and imports of machinery and plant, will materially affect the tasks before the transport managements. The teamwork in the existing transport departments is exemplary. It is therefore emphatically urged that no change be made in the present organizations and their leading personnel until after the main development programs are completed. 647 459

Intermediary Staff

In all the transport services there is a great dearth of intermediary staff—foremen, inspectors, surveyors, supervisors, and the like—for whom practical training in workshops and on construction sites is far more important than school or college education. In all transport development projects, special courses should be provided to train adaptable Iraqi apprentices under skilled teachers in shops, factories and on tracks and roads in the country. 459 464

These observations apply to all forms of transport, port, railways, roads, airways and communications. Unless continuity is maintained with a gradual, cautious transfer of responsibility from foreign to Iraqi personnel, efficiency will be seriously jeopardized.

V. Organization of Health Services

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● 647 It is most important that a properly organized program should be established to carry out the suggested medical services and preventive health measures.

The existing organization for the health services is highly centralized—first within the Ministry of Social Affairs in Baghdad, then in the hands of the Chief Medical Officers of each province. The whole system appears to be too rigid throughout, without sufficient delegation of responsibility and without enough consultation among departments of the Ministry or with those of other Ministries. Certain medical problems (e.g. health in irrigation schemes, nutrition, etc.) concern other ministries or departments (irrigation, agriculture, education, etc.). To be really effective, boards or committees should include representatives of all groups concerned.

There is no general board of public health but there are various committees with different functions. The Director General of Health is responsible for the licensing of private practitioners and pharmacists, and he has a committee to assist him. But it is the Minister who sets up a committee to consider disciplinary Cases brought against practitioners or pharmacists by the Director General of Health. There is also a committee consisting of three Directors General and two other members nominated by the Minister who act in an advisory capacity to the Minister. It would be reasonable to expect the Directors General to be given wide powers without need for frequent reference to the Minister.

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747 The health services have been repeatedly reorganized. The latest reorganization still does not appear to have defined very clearly the principal lines of responsibility. The Director General of Health is to be largely responsible for the curative services; a Director General of Health Affairs, for the public health servic[illegible] of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk, for the mobile dispensar[illegible] and for health projects in cities, villages, and the countrysi[illegible] and a Director General of Social Services, for the supervision [illegible] the administration of the institutions for the disabled and the blind, supervision of reformatories and health conditions in prisons and

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for the promotion of 'social centers'. It is understood he will also 744 647
"take an interest" in the numerous voluntary societies that under- 732
take work of a social and medical nature. 747

While this organization does not seem satisfactory, no alterna- 744
tive can be suggested at the moment without further study. The 647
Mission would recommend that a foreign public health administrator be appointed to advise the Minister of Social Affairs on the organization and further development of the health services. His appointment, incidentally, would enable the Professor of Preventive Medicine in the Royal Faculty of Medicine, who is at present also acting as adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs, to devote his full time to teaching and research.

The public health administrator should have had wide experience in the Middle East or in a tropical or sub-tropical country. He should have a good knowledge of the English language. To assist him he will require the services on temporary appointment of a foreign epidemiologist and a public health or sanitary engineer. The epidemiologist would undertake a study of the most prevalent diseases and recommend the best methods of attacking them. The public health engineer should have had considerable experience, preferably in a state medical service in a tropical or sub-tropical country, and be able to speak English. He would advise on measures to be taken to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene throughout Iraq and assist, if necessary, in teaching at the Royal Faculty of Medicine.

The public health administrator would require sufficient and suitable transport for himself and his staff; he would also need adequate office accommodation and office staff for himself and his own expert staff (epidemiologist and public health engineer). He should have at all times direct access to the Minister of Social Affairs.

As a result of the studies made by this team of advisers, it may be possible to give the organization of the health services a clearer focus. In any such scheme the preventive aspects of public health will need to be featured much more prominently. Although the borderline between curative and prophylactic measures may not always be clear, it may prove feasible to have one division responsible for all the services primarily curative

and another division responsible for those characterized as principally preventive.

Meanwhile one important improvement could be effected by delegating more responsibility to the chief medical officer in each province and enabling him to devote his entire time to his public duties. The chief medical officer is responsible for all medical work, both preventive and curative, within the boundaries of the province. As such, his main duties should be to inspect the health institutions, to appraise the state of public health and to guide, advise and encourage his subordinate staff. To carry out this task effectively he needs to devote his full time to the job and should be free to travel freely about the province. At present, however, the chief medical officer usually has a private practice on the side. Without means of transportation at his disposal and, in fact, unable to travel without express permission from the Director General, he seldom leaves his headquarters. It is strongly recommended that these officers be paid salaries commensurate with their responsibilities and the importance of their post. Further, they should be provided with suitable transport and be required to submit a monthly report on the inspection work undertaken throughout the province. When necessary, a director (or medical superintendent) should be appointed to the hospital of the chief town of the province to free the chief medical officer for general inspection of all medical facilities under his direction. Similarly, doctors in charge of districts or *qadhas* should be provided with suitable transport to enable them to visit the dispensaries in their area. In certain districts they should also be provided with suitable housing.

It should be remembered, however, that without qualified personnel no reorganization, no matter how effective on paper, will succeed. In the health service, as in many other branches of the administration, conditions of employment must be considerably improved, particularly outside of Baghdad. Unless adequate salaries and accommodations are provided for the health services staff, doctors and trained personnel will continue to prefer private practice and specialized work in Baghdad and other cities.

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V. Administration

It is an obvious truism that no educational policy or program 647 can be implemented with any chance of success unless there is rea- 871 sonable stability in the administration and approved schemes are carried on without being affected by ministerial changes and the varying fortunes of party politics. Such, however, has not been the case in the country during the last few decades. There have been quick changes not only of government but also, and in consequence, in the higher administrative personnel of the Ministry of Education. It has been calculated, for instance, that during the 18 years between 1927 and 1945, there were 14 different Directors General of Education, although the post is supposed to be permanent and the person in charge is expected to work as the head of the administration. The Departmental Committee which formulated the Ten Year Plan has itself rightly and courageously drawn attention to this distressing situation; its report points out that frequent changes of Ministers has led to instability in personnel and programs and that officials at the Ministry have often been too weak to defend programs and policies before successive Ministers who wished to make changes before they had been long enough in office to study the needs of the situation carefully. The Mission believes, therefore, that the government should take immediate steps to insure that there is reasonable stability of administration in the Ministry so that, once basic educational policies and programs are approved, they are not subject to change without mature consideration. In order to secure this objective, the following measures relating to the operation of the Ministry of Education are put forward:

1. A statutory Board or Council of Education, consisting of appropriate officials and nonofficials conversant with different types of educational problems, should be established to assist the Ministry of Education in the formulation of educational policies and programs and to guard against the possibility of hasty and ill-considered changes or the abandonment of approved programs. If the Board is created by statute, its constitution and personnel will not be easily upset as an incident of changes in the Ministry.

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2. There should be a permanent secretary in continuous charge of the Ministry and reporting directly to the Minister. He ought to be a qualified and experienced educator who would serve as a connecting link between successive Ministers and thus help to assure reasonable continuity of policy. The government might consider whether to merge the existing position of Director General of Education with that of permanent secretary or to have two separate positions. In any event, the present arrangement, under which separate and independent Directors General of primary, secondary and higher education work directly under the Minister, is administratively and educationally unsound and makes integration and coordination of educational effort extremely difficult.
3. An effort should be made to build up within the Ministry a body of competent educators, possessing vision and enthusiasm as well as experience, and enjoying reasonable security of tenure, who would specialize in different aspects of education. They should be able to speak with authority and confidence in their respective fields and guide and advise teachers in all types of schools. If they are to do so, it is essential that they be relieved of much of the petty administrative detail which at present hinders them from devoting themselves to larger issues. This would involve a certain amount of delegation of power to local educational officers, which would need to be carefully worked out but which is sound in principle.
4. It is certainly desirable to associate local administration and influential local persons with the working out of the program that the Mission has recommended. Such association will go a long way to stimulate public interest and cooperation in education. The Mission is, however, of the opinion that, at this stage, this assistance should be enlisted chiefly in an advisory capacity and that the over-all direction and supervision of the new and far-reaching educational reforms and measures should remain in the hands of the Ministry for the present. The Mission strongly questions the wisdom of the steps recently taken to entrust the provincial councils with the responsibility for primary education. Experience in other countries has shown that a sudden devolution of authority to local administration may lead to serious complications and difficulties and endanger the success of the entire program. This should not be taken to imply that many of the functions and powers which are at present exercised by the officials at the center need not be delegated, say, to the

Directors of Education. It is meant rather as a warning 871
against transferring the supervision and control and the 647
general responsibility for compulsory or adult education to local bodies or officials who have had little or no experience in dealing with such problems.

The people in each locality should unquestionably be given a sense of participation in the educational effort. The Mission has already stressed the importance of enlisting local support for the introduction of compulsory primary education and the inauguration of adult education. Local participation can take the form of voluntary self-help through the provision of free midday meals, books and stationery, or shoes and clothing to needy children, improvements in school equipment and school gardens and the like. Local self-help in constructing or adding to school buildings should also be encouraged.

VI. Conclusion

The Mission has considered already the financial implications of the educational program and has expressed the view that it is within the resources of the state—actual and potential—to undertake the suggested program of educational expansion and reconstruction. It trusts that the government will definitely adopt the view that increased expenditure on education is a long-range productive investment likely to give the country a generous return in the form of a more prosperous, cooperative, socially conscious and enlightened population. This return is no less real, though less tangible, than those that may be expected from investments in industry or even agriculture. Thus it requires courage and vision to make a large investment in education, for the purpose not only of multiplying schools, but also of raising the quality of education they provide.

The Mission's approach in the educational field is founded on the conviction that education is one of the most important means of raising production levels and living standards and thereby assuring the economic health of the country. It is for this reason that the Mission has given it a high priority in its recommended projects for development. If national development is to be balanced and har-

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ANNEX H

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES

I. Introduction

In its main report the Mission has expressed in general terms 361
its view that more attention needs to be given to the problems of community planning and housing. Well-planned communities and a well-housed population are clearly desirable social assets; but it may not be so generally realized that they are also economic assets. The extra cost of good design and careful planning is small compared with the waste that ensues if they are ignored. In purely financial terms it is costly to maintain, and far more costly to improve, a city which has extensive slums and congested streets and whose growth does not follow lines that permit the provision of efficient public services.

The Mission has advocated the strengthening and improve- 647 ●
ment of the Planning Office of the Directorate General of Munici- 361
palities in the Ministry of Interior to take care of community planning, both rural and urban, and of the Housing Section attached to the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Social Affairs to take care of housing in all its phases. It believes that these related agencies should ultimately be developed into a genuine Community Planning Office and a central Housing Authority with separate and well-defined functions and with the power necessary to discharge those functions effectively and adequately. As a tech- [816]
nical supplement to the Housing Authority, the Mission has recommended the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station which would conduct research on improved methods of construction and on the new use of available building material and, as such, would most suitably be attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. The broad functions of these offices have been described in the main report.

647 In this Annex it is intended to describe more fully their
361 functions and the principles which should guide them and to illustrate this description by reference to particular conditions in Iraq. It may, however, be well to note at the outset that the men
[424] needed to discharge the functions of these offices adequately will have to be trained, as there are very few now in Iraq who have even part-time training in community planning and housing. The sooner a start is made, the quicker the offices can be built up. Promising men, who have had some experience, could be sent abroad for further training and experience. In Iraq, courses on the subjects might be introduced into the engineering and architecture curricula for those who intend to pursue a career in either of the two new government offices. Initially, it might be necessary to employ an experienced foreign technician to give these courses and to act in an advisory capacity to the government.

000 *The Functions of Community Planning and Housing*

Community planning is the process of effecting the orderly layout of a community and the continuous improvement of that community for the physical, economic and social welfare of its residents. It involves the task of thinking ahead so that proposals may be appropriate, timely, and based on factual analysis in the light of the objective sought. In an industrial community, for example, it would mean, after a survey of conditions, preparing a plan which would allocate various sections of the land to the category of use, industrial, business, residential, recreational, and so forth, for which they are best suited, considering the needs and existing facilities of the community. At all times, consideration has to be given to the future growth of the community, both in relation to the existing development and to the bigger metropolitan area or region of which it is a part.

Housing is not as broad a field as community planning, but the two are closely related, especially as housing affects the standards and development of residential areas. Housing has for its goal the most effective utilization of available resources for sheltering for the people and providing for them, or helping them to provide for themselves, the facilities and services for pleasant living. This involves the analysis of the composition and characteristics of the population, the determination of their ability to pay for hous-

with little regard for the consequences; the remnants of buildings 361
which have been sliced through at odd angles can still be seen.

By law, the Ministry of Interior, through its Directorate 361
General of Municipalities, is already responsible for the planning 147
of municipalities. The Directorate General of Municipalities in turn has under it the Technical Section for Planning and Organization (or Planning Office) which has among its duties the submission of "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles" and the carrying out of "any of the said schemes which are required to be performed . . .".[8] This office with a staff of 17 does topographic surveys of towns and prepares development plans from such surveys. It also plans for and supervises construction of some municipal structures, including housing, and attends to legal matters concerning land sub-division and assessment.

Also by law, the Ministry of Interior has jurisdiction over the administration of municipalities. Law No. 84 of 1931, as amended, provides that municipalities should attend to "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specification of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places, and buildings in such areas." This particular duty concerning planning is assigned to the Office of the Municipal Engineer.

Although both the Planning Office and the Office of the Municipal Engineer are under the Ministry of Interior, the two entities involved with planning are quite distinct from each other. Duplication of work and conflict in jurisdiction both occur. Municipalities prepare their own plans and then forward them to the Ministry of Interior but apparently they do so only for information, and not for approval. Some plans are merely sketches. Others have been made without surveys. Where surveys have been undertaken, they are mainly topographic surveys showing the existing layout of streets and buildings, and not the diagnostic surveys required by scientific planning. In several cases plans have been altered without submission to the Ministry. Some streets which

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[8] Regulation of the Ministry of Interior, No. 39 of 1947.

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have been newly constructed do not appear at all on the records of the Planning Office. The Mission, in fact, found that many major details of developments such as civic centers, markets and the like, either were not shown in the plans or were contrary to the plans as prepared and filed. There were also instances where planned projects under construction were suddenly changed or stopped by a new mayor on his assuming office.

Cooperation of the central government with the local authorities has also been noticeably lacking. The Ministry of Education, without consultation with local officials, prepares school plans, showing not only the details of structures but also their location and distribution. Likewise, the Ministry of Social Affairs, without reference to local administration, prepares plans for hospitals, clinics, social centers, and housing schemes which form definite parts of the community. And, in similar fashion, the Ministry of Communications and Public Works prepares many plans for public works such as bridges, national highways and streets, and government structures designating details not only of construction but also of alignment, orientation and location. All these specialized planning activities are carried on with little or no coordination with the Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Even in Baghdad, where better cooperation between the municipality and the various government departments might be expected, a large school building was recently completed, abutting on a busy major thoroughfare, the proximity of which was dangerous for school children. The location was approved despite objections by the Planning Office.

Financial Difficulties

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Financial difficulties have contributed to the failure of the municipalities to plan more effectively. A large part of their revenues, which are in any case small, is derived from a share in the petrol and property taxes, the proceeds of which are handed over to the central government and, in theory at least, reallotted to the provincial and municipal governments. In years of financial stringency, however, the government has withheld a large part of these taxes for itself.

For capital funds, the municipalities have to rely on occasional loans—or, in rare cases, grants—from the central govern-

361 185 these residential structures, there were a number of community facilities: a dispensary staffed by the Ministry of Social Affairs; a primary school building for 200 students and a secondary school building for an initial enrollment of 30 students constructed by the Ministry of Education; and a clubhouse which had been paid for by the people themselves. The municipality intended to erect a market and to install an electric generator. Residences for the *Qaimmaqam* (the administrator of the *qadha*) and the physician were also scheduled to be constructed.

Plans for the development of the new site for Bedrah were prepared by the Planning Office and followed by the local officials in the construction of the project. Work has been proceeding for several years and has been financed largely out of past savings. The whole project has, in fact, been carefully thought out and planned ahead. The initiative was due largely to the *Mutasarrif* of Kut and the success of the project to his close personal relation with the Planning Office.

361 647 This example is, unfortunately, an isolated one. In fact, the present status of the Technical Section for Planning and Organization in the Ministry of Interior does not permit comprehensive planning. It has neither the authority nor the staff to guide the planning of public works or buildings that are currently the concern of other ministries. The need for coordinated planning undoubtedly exists, but the function can only be discharged adequately if the Authority is given sufficient staff, trained not only in architecture and civil engineering, but in all the economic and sociological aspects of town planning.

General plans for the development of each municipality could then be based on facts and drawn up with a schedule of priorities, and future work should only be sanctioned if it is in conformity with these plans. Such plans should be practical and preferably designed so that they could be carried out in stages and changed and improved as conditions may demand. The new Community Planning Office should be made clearly responsible for approval of these plans or any changes in them. As a safeguard, funds for municipal development should be disbursed only for purposes which are in accordance with approved plans. This will require amendment of the present Roads and Buildings Regulations, which

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are at present an amalgam of a building code and zoning regulations. These two distinct parts need to be separated and each properly administered. 361 647

While the Community Planning Office will have to take the lead in organizing the program, it is essential that it should not attempt to do all the detailed work itself. Although, in some cases, technically good plans may be prepared in this way, the result will be neither popular nor lasting and the planning authority may become a bottleneck. On the other hand, if plans are prepared independently by local authorities or by other government departments, the results will probably be uncorrelated and, therefore, unsatisfactory. The most desirable kind of planning is likely to be achieved by a combination of the two. Although plans should be initiated and later executed by the agencies immediately concerned, the central planning body should guide and coordinate them throughout the various stages. In the larger cities it could probably confine its activity to stimulating interest in the benefits of planning, advising on the preparation of plans and reviewing them at intervals in the course of preparation. In the smaller municipalities, it may have to do more of the actual work, but it should certainly endeavor to enlist as much local advice and cooperation as possible. As was noted earlier, imposition from above is undesirable.

Once plans have been drawn up, the financing of development should be placed on a more satisfactory footing. The principal source of funds for capital expenditure should be the Development Board. Whether they are in the form of loans or grants, they should be committed (although not actually credited) sufficiently far ahead for the municipalities to arrange a schedule of work with some degree of confidence. Loans should be made for a longer period and on less burdensome terms, especially as regards amortization. A careful study of a municipality's finances should be made to assess its probable ability to repay.

Slum Clearance

One of the major problems confronting the municipal authorities is the eradication of the worst slum areas of the cities. In Baghdad and Basra, this is a formidable undertaking, since the influx of people from Amara has been very large. Estimates vary 362 166

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

IV. Housing

Although the resettlement of slum dwellers and the improvement of living conditions in the villages constitute by far the largest housing needs of the country, the provision of adequate housing on reasonable terms to workers on a somewhat higher income level is also important. Efforts in this direction have been started by the central and municipal governments, by the two quasi-public transport organizations and by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Private entrepreneurs have found it profitable to concentrate largely on construction for the well-to-do. Some of the projects have good features, particularly that carried out by the IPC. Generally, however, defects are such that there is clearly much that a Housing Authority could accomplish. 362

The Need for a Housing Authority

The need for a Housing Authority is twofold. First, it is required to take the initiative in providing suitable housing for the lowest economic strata of the population, such as the Baghdad sarifa dwellers. This is a special kind of problem, which cannot be expected to be undertaken by other agencies. Secondly, it is required as a general, policy-making, coordinating and advisory agency. In this there is no suggestion that it should try to undertake housing for the whole country. On the contrary, initiative from municipalities, quasi-government agencies and private concerns should be welcomed. The function of the Authority should be to give technical, legal and financial assistance where it is required; to prescribe certain minimum standards; and to act on its own initiative only in cases where there seems to be both an urgent need and no alternative. 362 647

It will be necessary for the Authority to initiate a systematic survey in order to assemble all the necessary data for the formulation of a national housing program. Census data will be helpful, but probably additional assistance will be required from the statistics department of the Ministry of Economics in devising sampling techniques in order to determine the requirements. These would be especially useful in resettlement projects for sarifa dwellers.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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Due to the nature and magnitude of the work involved, the Housing Authority should be firmly established in the Ministry of Social Affairs and provided with powers commensurate with its responsibilities so that it may perform its functions effectively. It should ultimately have a staff composed of technical men trained in housing design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, law and project management. As in the Community Planning Office, they should also have some knowledge of the sociological and economic aspects.

On the financial side, the Housing Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid so that maintenance and repairs could be financed without constant resort to the Treasury. Pending a housing survey the amounts set aside for housing in the five-year program of the Development Board, namely ID 300,000 annually, might be increased to ID 400,000 as a provisional target for housing expenditures.

[816] On the technical side, the Housing Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station should test, develop and demonstrate improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing; collect and disseminate technical housing and building information; experiment with and develop new uses of local building materials, construction methods and house designs; and carry on other useful research in the housing field. The Station should be staffed as far as possible with local technicians, but for the first year or so one or two building research experts from abroad should be engaged to start and run the Station and train the local technicians in order to enable them to operate the Station themselves after a time. A new building should be constructed for the Station and equipped with the basic instruments and machines necessary for starting tests and experiments. It will clearly be necessary for the Authority to work closely with the Station and to insure that the broad outlines of its work conform with the need of the country.

Labor and Materials

The Housing Authority could also take the lead in improving 362
the quality of labor and materials in order to bring the costs of 647
building down. In this task, it should cooperate with the Ministry
of Education in reorganizing training methods. It could also advise
the Industrial Bank on desirable types of specifications of building
materials and should estimate probable requirements so that the
Bank could initiate investment to this end in partnership with
private enterprise.

The materials produced locally for housing construction are 339
on the whole inferior and expensive. For example, a casual inspection of house construction in the cities will reveal that unevenly burnt bricks with cracks and chipped-off edges and corners have been and are being used. To remedy the shortage of good building materials, foreign goods have been imported at high cost. In the case of the IPC housing project, it was estimated that the cost of imported steel window and door sashes alone amounted to as much as 20 percent of the cost of the structures.

The inferiority of building materials is matched by the poor 331
quality of building labor, which again adds to the cost of construc- 464
tion. There is urgent need for good carpenters, masons, plumbers,
electricians and painters. Unfortunately, attempts to improve skills
through vocational schools have not been altogether successful.
The schools lack competent instructors, a number of those teaching in
Baghdad, for example, being illiterate. Workshop accommoda-
tions are restricted and the equipment is out-of-date or in bad con-
dition. These deficiencies might be overcome by importing instruc-
tors from neighboring countries, by obtaining new equipment and
by running evening classes until more laboratory space is available.
This is not, however, the full answer. Graduates from vocational [461]
schools tend to prefer desk jobs to field work. It would be pre-
ferable to concentrate more on training schemes on the job under
good supervision.

Government Housing

The Ministry of Social Affairs is empowered by Law No. 38 362
of 1941 and Law No. 22 of 1945 to "construct dwellings for

433 Iraq each capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of sugar per annum from sugar beet to be grown locally, a bitumen plant, and a small steel plant. In addition the Government is investigating the recommendation of the International Bank mission[1] for the erection of a chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur, and carbon black. The mission has also recommended plants for manufacturing bone-meal fertilizer, date-packing crates and motor-car tyres, and for batching concrete, converting steel scrap into building components, and possibly for remelting glass.

Labour

466 Conditions of work and employment are regulated by a
• 647 Labour Law (1936–46), which so far relates only to 'workmen' (a term requiring more precise definition) in industrial under-
657 takings. It is in process of revision and extension. Its application is supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security, which maintains a small corps of inspectors. This department, advised by foreign experts, proposes to experiment with employment exchanges, is starting to compile labour statistics, is undertaking a programme of housing for labour, and is examining plans of social security, for which the existing Labour Law already contains some provision in the form of indemnities on discharge, paid sick and confinement leave, and compensation for injuries. Safety and sanitary working conditions are covered generally by the Labour Law and made obligatory in greater detail by a Workshops and Factories Regulation (1937). In January 1953 it was stated that new provisions, for eventual inclusion in the new Labour Law, had been drafted for establishing wage boards, regulating disputes, and determining the rights, obligations, and administration of trade unions, which are not clearly defined in the existing Labour Law. The latter grants industrial workers the right to establish associations to safeguard their special interests, strengthen the spirit of cooperation, effect educational, cultural, hygienic, social, and
[467] moral improvements, and develop Iraqi industry. A few trade unions exist; their membership is small and activity slight. Others have been suspended for subversive activity. The movement is still rudimentary.

Communications

496 *Railways.*[2] The railways constructed by the British forces during the Mesopotamian Campaign eventually formed the

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[1] See above, p. 275.

[2] This section is based on the *Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book*, 1952–3.

25: Warriner 8-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East

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423 Government the right to settle title to land. From 1933 to 1943 5,330,000 hectares of land were settled covering the whole of the agricultural area, in the following categories:

	Hectares	*Acres*
Leasehold (*Miri Sirf*)	3,000,000	7,413,270
Freehold (*Lazma*)	1,200,000	2,965,308
Freehold (*Tapu*)	900,000	2,223,981
Endowed (*Mulk Waqf*) ..	250,000	617,772
TOTAL	5,350,000	15,220,331

The freehold title, described as *lazma*, was a new legal category, supposedly suitable for tribal conditions. It grants freehold ownership, that is, *tapu* title, to the occupier after ten years' cultivation as a leaseholder, and its special feature is that land so granted cannot be sold outside the tribe. The object of introducing this new type of tenure was to maintain tribal solidarity, but it has not in fact had this effect, and has been mainly used by the pump owners to secure ownership against the customary rights of the tribesmen.

423 647 Nor have Dowson's recommendations as to the creation of a Central Lands Office been carried out. The Survey and Land Settlement Departments are under two separate ministries, Communications and Justice respectively. The Survey Department complains that it has not enough surveyors for its work, and that owing to lack of co-ordination its surveyors are taken off for land settlement work and cannot therefore carry on their regular work of survey. Land registry is undertaken by two departments, the old Turkish Tapu Department which is reported to issue title deeds on the basis of the titles settled, and a newly created office for registration of changes in tenure after settlement; this is an unnecessary duplication of function. Thus there is not any central department charged with the direction of policy, and this defect has had bad practical results.

423 The real problem of settlement has been the decision as to who should be regarded as the real owners of the land, the sheikhs, the sirkals, or the cultivators. The general objective was to settle the land on the basis of the existing rights. If, that is to say, the sheikh has a claim of one-fifth of the produce from each of a hundred cultivators, he should receive a holding of land equivalent to one-fifth of the total land and each cultivator

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

871 212 Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

651 382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

● 647 654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

652 654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

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[33] *Economic Development of Iraq*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 63.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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Chapter 8

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

THE PUBLIC-SCHOOL system is an integral part of the 871x
government in Iraq, being under the control of the Ministry of Education. It attempts to reach all levels from kindergarten through institutions of higher learning, embracing specialized instruction as well as general culture Like other departments of the Iraqi government, the administration of the public-school system is highly centralized, and the Ministry of Education not only issues regulations, instructions, and orders, but also is responsible for the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of teachers, the founding, financial support, and closing of public schools, the determination of curriculums and textbooks, the training of teachers, and the formulation and grading of public examinations. This intensive government control to a large extent determines the policies, curriculums, and methods of private and foreign schools. The regulations of the Ministry of Education went through repeated revisions in the period from 1933 to 1945.[1]

The Ministry of Education

The Minister of Education, a Cabinet member, is the supreme head of 871x
the Ministry. He is responsible for its administration and for the satis- 647
factory performance of various duties by all of its officials. All orders, decisions, and instructions are issued in his name and executed under his supervision and control. All new appointments, promotions, and dismissals require his approval, as does the expenditure of sums exceeding 37.5 dinars (about $150). Under the Minister are the Director General of Antiquities, the Director General of Education, the deans of the Law College and of the Higher Teachers College, the Technical Adviser, and the chief of the Private Bureau. (See Chart III.) The latter is a comparatively minor

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[1] Another revision took place in the summer of 1946, nine months after the American Council Commission left Iraq.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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x871 official who acts as secretary to the Minister. The Director General of
647 Antiquities has charge of all the museums and the archeological activities
[172] conducted by his department and also supervises the work of foreign archeological expeditions and the preservation of monuments and remains of historical value. Although an agency for informal education, the Antiquities Department is not an integral part of the educational system.

In the days of the mandate a British adviser was attached to the Ministry of Education, but the office was abolished after 1930, prior to the termination of the mandate. It was re-established in 1943. The function of the adviser was to render an opinion on questions referred to him by the Minister and to make recommendations for the improvement of the work of the Ministry. The post of adviser was abolished in 1946.

The deans of the Law College and of the Higher Teachers College are directly responsible to the Minister for the proper functioning of their respective institutions. Both colleges are run under the supervision of their own faculty councils, whose decisions are subject to the approval of the Minister. They develop their own curriculums and conduct their own examinations. The faculty council of the Law College recommends candidates for its teaching posts, but in the Higher Teachers College this function is performed by the dean.

The Minister serves also as president of the Advisory Council on Education, a body created by the regulations of 1943 and consisting of the Minister, the Director General of Education, the Technical Adviser, the Director General of Antiquities, the deans of the Law College and of the Higher Teachers College, and four permanent members appointed—one each—by the Ministers of Finance, Communications and Works, Social Affairs, and Economics. All these persons meeting together elect four private citizens known for their experience and interest in education to supplement their number. The council meets at least twice a year, in October and April, and makes recommendations to the Minister of Education.

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF EDUCATION

x871 The Director General of Education is the real administrative head of
647 the public-school system. He is expected to be a man of experience in educational administration and in matters of teaching in the schools. He is responsible to the Minister for the proper operation and inspection of all the schools in order to insure that all Iraqi youth shall receive the right moral, intellectual, and physical education regardless of their race, lan-

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
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Permanent Education Council
Council of Educational Directors
Provincial Advisory Education Councils
A
Committee on Purchases
Sections of:
1. Educational Missions
2. Accounts
3. School Equipment
4. Medicine and Hygiene
5. Physical Education
6. Personnel
7. Administration and Archives
8. Buildings
9. Publication and Translation
10. Examinations
Directo
1. Teach Educa
2. Prima
3. Secon
4. Privat Educa
5. Rese
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Committee on Equivalence
Central Educational Committee
Provi
Vocational Schools
Prima

—— Solid lines indicate administrative authority
- - - - Broken lines lead to councils and committees

Following p. 122 (a)

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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
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Sections of:
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2. Accounts
3. School Equipment
4. Medicine and Hygiene
5. Physical Education
6. Personnel
7. Administration and Archives
8. Buildings
9. Publication and Translation
10. Examinations
Directors of:
1. Teacher Training and Educational Missions
2. Primary Education
3. Secondary Education
4. Private and Foreign School Education
5. Research and Statistics
6. Vocational Education
Provincial Directors of Education
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
Authorship, Translation,
Publication
DEAN,
AW COLLEGE
TECHNICAL ADVISER
Chief of Minister's Private Bureau
Principals of Primary, Rural, and Elementary Teachers Colleges
Chief Inspector
Provincial Inspectors
Specialized Inspectors
First Woman Inspector
Assistant Inspectors
Women Inspectors

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44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

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guage, or any other difference. Actually, the Director General of Education is the key man of the Ministry. It is he who implements the policies initiated by the Minister or by himself or laid down in various councils and committees. As the Minister is the political head of the Ministry and usually changes with the changes in the administration, it devolves upon the Director General to provide the administrative and professional direction of the system as well as the continuity of policies desirable in any educational system. He is the equivalent of a permanent under secretary and is supposed to be professionally well trained. In practice, however, the Directors General have changed frequently, fourteen having held office between 1927 and 1945, with an average tenure of 15.5 months.

The Director General is aided by one assistant and by directors for each of the six fields of educational activity: primary education, secondary education, teacher training and educational missions abroad, vocational education, educational research and statistics, and private- and foreign-school education. The post of Director of Education for Women, established in 1934, was abolished the following year. The post of Director of Rural Education was twice instituted and abolished—in a country having 75 percent of its population rural. The Directorates of Teacher Training and of Private- and Foreign-School Education are recent innovations, originating in 1945.

Within the office of the Director General there are also ten sections which are shown in Chart III. Their titles are self-explanatory, but four require special comment.

The Publication and Translation Section has charge of the publication of all texts for public primary and secondary schools and of various other publications issued by the central office of the Ministry. At one time the publication of approved textbooks for public schools was left to the authors, who usually agreed with the Ministry about the sale price of the books. In 1935, however, the Ministry, in an attempt to produce textbooks more economically and adequately, inaugurated the policy of buying the authors' rights and publishing the books at its own expense. Although the policy has not been consistently followed, an appreciable number of approved texts are now published by the Ministry.

The Examinations Section has charge of all public examinations conducted at the end of the sixth grade of the primary school and the third and fifth years of the secondary school. Each year the section establishes committees for setting the questions and other committees for grading the papers. It keeps complete records of the results of the examinations.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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x871 The Educational Missions Section has charge of the affairs of students
●647 selected for study abroad at government expense and keeps records of all
students who study abroad at their own expense.

744 The Medicine and Hygiene Section[1] safeguards the health of the school children. It inspects school buildings, conducts regular health examinations of pupils, treats those who suffer from diseases, trains teachers in first aid and simple treatments, propagates health information, and supplies schools with drugs and first-aid materials. In addition, it gives physical examinations at government expense to all teachers and officials entering the service of the Ministry of Education and all students entering the various schools and colleges. This section has set itself the task of fighting the three endemic diseases—trachoma, malaria, and bilharziasis—prevalent among school children. In 1943–44, 67,415 pupils out of the total public-school registration of 104,359 were examined; and of those examined, 16,599 were found to have trachoma, while 3,253 suffered other eye diseases; 5,864 had malaria, and 1,299 had bilharziasis. Treatment of those afflicted with bilharziasis resulted in steady improvement. The fight against trachoma has proceeded systematically, and the percentage of school children suffering from it is being reduced. Much effort has been expended on the campaign against malaria in all the provinces. The Medicine and Hygiene Section began very humbly in 1931 with the appointment of one doctor. By 1942–43 it had twenty-one doctors, two dentists, ten women nurses for the provinces, and more than seventy other health workers. In 1943–44 it maintained twenty-nine clinics throughout the country, and more recently a special hospital for students was established in Baghdad. Treatment at the clinics and at the hospital is free.

PROVINCIAL DIRECTORS OF EDUCATION

x871 There is a provincial director of education for each of the fourteen
635 provinces of Iraq. He is responsible to the Director General for the proper functioning of all schools and educational institutions in his province with the exception of teacher-training colleges, some of the vocational and special schools, and higher institutions; these exceptions are the direct concern of the central office of the Ministry. It is the function of the provincial director to make sure that teaching in the schools within his jurisdiction is in accordance with accepted syllabuses, to supervise the behavior of teachers and education officers in his province, and to carry out instructions of the Director General. The regulations of 1945 provide for provincial advisory education councils under the chairmanship of the governor and with the director of education as secretary. These councils

[1] -[Of The Ministry of Education... Analyst]

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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were to act in an advisory capacity, reviewing the educational situation 871K
in the province and making proposals for the improvement and extension 635
of education.

However, a new Provincial Administration Law, passed by Parliament in 1945, effective early in 1946, provides for a general provincial council in each province to meet yearly in the month of March. The councils are empowered to levy local taxes to support various local services, such as the opening of technical classes and schools, the teaching about industries that will fit the local needs, the establishment of agricultural schools, and the founding, administration, and supervision, according to the provisions of the Public Education Law, of primary schools and of schools for workers and illiterates. It is not yet clear what the relation will be between the provincial educational councils, provided for by the regulations of the Ministry of Education, and the general provincial councils provided for in the new Provincial Administration Law.

THE INSPECTORATE

Side by side with the administrative service is the inspectoral service 871K
headed by a chief inspector responsible to the Director General. Inspectors 647
are of three kinds: specialized inspectors, provincial inspectors, and women inspectors. Those in the first category are specialists in subject-matter fields who visit classes and teachers in their own fields in intermediate and secondary schools, teacher-training colleges, and special schools on the secondary-school level. They report on the performance of individual teachers, as well as on the general situation with regard to textbooks, library books, equipment, and laboratories. There is also a specialized administrative inspector who inspects the general administration of the school systems of the provinces.

Provincial inspectors make their headquarters in the education offices of the provinces and visit primary and secondary schools, but not technical schools or teachers colleges. In the secondary schools these inspectors have to ask the help of specialized inspectors in matters concerning the various subject-matter fields. Provincial inspectors are under the jurisdiction of the chief inspector and are independent of the provincial director of education. Women inspectors visit and report on girls schools, under the direction of a first woman inspector.

Inspectors' reports are sent to the chief inspector with copies to the provincial directors of education, and the substance of the reports is sent to the individuals about whom the reports are made. The chief inspector presents semiannual reports to the Director General of Education, de-

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x871 •647 scribing the condition of the schools, and he makes an annual report to the Minister. It is his duty to insure the proper inspection of schools, the dissemination of information about improved methods of teaching together with the giving of demonstration lessons before teachers, the inspection of extraclass and out-of-school activities, the behavior of both teachers and pupils, and the condition of school buildings, equipment, and furnishings.

COUNCILS AND COMMITTEES

x871 In addition to the previously mentioned Advisory Council on Education, the provincial educational councils and the general provincial councils, there are various other councils and committees which carry on some of the most important work of the Ministry.

Foremost among these is the Permanent Education Council with its two committees, the Central Education Committee and the Committee on the Equivalence of Diplomas and Degrees. The Permanent Council, a kind of executive board for the Ministry, is composed of the Director General of Education as chairman, the Director of Antiquities, the deans of the Law College and the Higher Teachers College, and the chief inspector. The Technical Adviser may be invited to meetings, but has no vote. The council meets at least once a month at the request of the Minister to deal with the general policies and trends of education, curriculums, budget, educational missions, laws and regulations, and employment of foreign teachers, and acts upon decisions made by committees.

The Central Education Committee is composed of the Director General as chairman, the assistants to the Director General and the six directors of the various types of education. Its principal function is to do the groundwork for the Permanent Education Council as regards curriculums and educational missions; in addition, it sanctions the purchase of books for the public libraries. The Committee on the Equivalence of Diplomas and Degrees decides on the value of degrees and diplomas received abroad.

Another important body is the Council of the Provincial Educational Directors, which meets annually in the summer. It consists of the provincial directors, the higher officials of the Ministry of Education, the dean of the Higher Teachers College, and the principals of the primary-, elementary-, and rural-teachers colleges. Its chief function is to study the progress of education in the provinces and correlate the work of the central office with that of the regional offices. At its meetings the annual budget is apportioned among the provinces, new graduates of the teachers colleges are assigned to the several provinces, transfers of teachers from one province

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tributed into small plots for purpose of development shall be entrusted with the distribution of water within the project's areas (Article 11, para. 3) and water distribution shall be confined to the lands of the project (Article 11, para. 1).

1) The Use of Water for Irrigation Purposes

Notification No. 226 of the Minister of Communications and Works dated 9 June 1927, issued under the Irrigation Law of 1923, declares all rivers (anhar) and waterways (majari) in Iraq to be "Irrigation Works." This term covers irrigation and flood protection works as well as areas, occupied by or required for the construction or maintenance of such works. The right of undertaking irrigation works on privately owned lands is granted (Art. 3) to the Government, provided the land so required for the works is expropriated according to Law, once the proposed works have been declared to be of public utility. A private owner wishing to carry out works on or through another person's property shall obtain a certificate from the Executive Irrigation Engineer, stating the necessity of such works together with their extent and probable effect on neighboring lands. The applicant remains responsible for the acquisition, lease, or arrangement with the interposed owners (Art. 4).

Requests from particulars for constructing any irrigation works are submitted to the mutassarrif of the Liwa concerned. If such requests are not rejected for administrative reasons, they are transmitted to the Executive Irrigation Engineer who may reject them on technical ground or otherwise issue the necessary permit on Irrigation Form No. 44, embodying instructions constituting the specifications of the work for which approval has been granted. The Law does not confer "water rights," but when a permit is issued and implies use of water, it is henceforth recognized that the land to be brought under cultivation shall enjoy the use of water under conditions similar to others within the same district.

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All irrigation works of public importance shall be constructed, repaired and maintained by and remain under the control and supervision of the Irrigation Department, even when such works have been declared to have ceased to be of public importance (Art. 6). The Executive Irrigation Engineer may require the person responsible with the maintenance of watercourses (channels not maintained by the Government, Art. 2, para. 4),

to carry out the necessary repair work and in the event of failure, the said Engineer may execute such work at the expense of the defaulter. If damage has been caused to structures and the offender is not found then the owners of the lands depending on the watercourse shall be held jointly responsible (Article 7). A "Notice of Repair or Removal" on Irrigation Form No. 45, is used for the repair, removal or reconstruction of works as defined under Articles 4, 7, and 11 of the Law.

The Irrigation Engineers shall determine the dimensions of canals and watercourses, the lands and areas which may be irrigated from such canals and watercourses (Article 5). The distribution of water is carried out by the Irrigation Department up to a point below the heads of the watercourses (Article 8). Interference with another person's water supply, or the opening of any outlet which has been closed by competent authority or the taking of water from a source other than that prescribed by the Executive Irrigation Engineer, are not permitted (Article 10).

Article 9 prescribes that the Executive Irrigation Engineer shall have the power to stop the water supply to any watercourse in the following cases:

a) for the purpose of executing irrigation works;

b) whenever the watercourse is not maintained in such repair as to prevent the wasteful escape of water;

c) to supply water in rotation;

d) whenever wastage or misuse of water takes place;

e) whenever notices issued or demands made have not been complied with regarding (i) maintenance and repair of works (Article 7); (ii) supply of able-bodied persons for undertaking either work or repairs to works for preventing loss of life or serious damage to property and land (Article 13) or repairs and maintenance of irrigation works (Article 14). This notice shall be called "Notice of Stoppage of Water."

Article 11 states that no person shall construct any building, canal or watercourse, erect any pump, water lift or water wheel, plant any crops within the boundaries of any irrigation area without the written approval of the Executive Engineer, who

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may order the offender to remove the unauthorized structure within 15 days of the date of notice served on Irrigation Form No. 45. Should he fail to comply with the instructions contained in the Notice, the work of removal may then be carried out by the Executive Engineer and cost recovered from the offender.

If the water supplied is used in an unauthorized manner or causes damage to the lands, and if the persons responsible cannot be discovered, the person or persons on whose land such water flowed shall be held responsible. Such person shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 20 rupees per mashara [1] of inundated land.

2) Requisition of Labour

Article 13 provides for the recruiting at rates of pay to be fixed by the Executive Engineer in consultation with the Mutassarrif, of able-bodied persons whenever workers for the immediate execution of emergency or repair works for preventing loss of life or serious damage to land and property cannot be obtained in the ordinary manner. For the purpose of the repair and maintenance of irrigation works, the person who will benefit from their being in good condition and will lose if otherwise, may be called on to furnish the necessary labor (Article 14).

The Executive Engineer may call on the mutassarrif or qaimaqam (sub-prefect or sub-governor) to raise the necessary labor contingent. To this end, the mutassarrifs shall furnish the Director of Irrigation with two statements every year, before the tenth of August: the first statement (Irrigation Form No. 47) shall show the total number of able-bodied men of laboring class residing in the Liwa, for purpose of Article 13. The second statement (Irrigation Forms 48 and 48A) shall show the total labor residing in the Liwa available for work under Article 14, during three different periods, i.e.: September to December - January to April - May to August. The requisition of labor, urgent (Art. 13) or otherwise (Art. 14) is made on Irrigation Forms 49 and 50 respectively.

Any person who refuses or neglects to supply labor as provided for in the two above-mentioned articles of the Law, shall upon conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding Rs. 500 or to

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[1] 20 rupees = ID. 1/500 = $6.00; mashara = 1/4 hectares = 0.618 acres

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East
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portant of these, prior to the International Bank Mission, was 185
perhaps the Haigh Irrigation Commission, which worked from 651
1946 to 1949 and recommended a £100 million development plan which would have increased the irrigated area from 8 to 17 million acres.[22] Yet in 1949 the United Nations Survey Mission reported that the financial resources available to the Iraq Government, not only from oil royalties but also from the accumulated wartime sterling surplus, had been largely diverted to financing consumption imports and the operating expenses of the State.[23]

In this statement the Mission touched on the basic problem 000
of the area, even of those sections which have available financial resources for development projects. The realization of the importance of investment in development projects which will bear returns in the future necessitates self-denial of immediate consumption goods. Such long-range visualization, especially when resources for gratification of immediate needs are readily available, is, however, a quality with which neither the masses nor many of the political leaders are endowed. It is perhaps in the lack of this quality that the explanation for the failure of all the numerous development plans of the Middle Eastern oil producing countries may be found. The ability to curtail current spending for the sake of investments which will increase not merely the individual's returns but the wealth-producing potential of the nation as a whole would be a *sine qua non* for any growing and even highly developed economy, and certainly for underdeveloped areas. But the temptation to utilize the "external" income—from oil—for current needs which could never before be afforded, for alleviating the tax burden, for improving political standing with the electorate, proved too strong, and sooner or later all succumbed.

The Development Board

To return to Iraq. In May 1950 the Government promul- 647
gated a law (1950 No. 23) creating a Development Board to 651
which was to be assigned the revenue derived from the oil com- 185

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[22] U. N., *Review 1949-50*, 29; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.

[23] United Nations, *Final Report of the Survey Mission*, I, 36.

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panies; in 1952 the law was amended assigning only seventy per cent of the revenue to the Board. The Board with the Premier as chairman, the Minister of Finance as member *ex officio*, and six non-political full time executive members, was charged with preparing an overall development plan and given the authority to execute major capital development projects. On October 10 of that year Iraq officially requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a survey mission to review the economic potentialities of the country and make recommendations for a development program.[24] The Mission arrived in Iraq on February 25, 1951 and a year later, on February 11, 1952, the report was submitted to Premier Nuri es Said. It proposed a development plan for the years 1952-1956 involving a total expenditure of some $470,000,000, to be derived from the oil revenue for the same period. Basing itself on the Mission's report, the Development Board worked out the following five-year plan:

Table V. *Iraq Development Board Program*

Projects	*Cost* (in I.D.)
Irrigation schemes	53,400,000
Roads	26,700,000
Other communications	4,100,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	18,000,000
Public utilities	4,100,000
Agriculture	7,500,000
Industry (including erection of a chemical factory)	31,000,000
Miscellaneous	10,600,000
Total	155,400,000[25]

As far as the financing was concerned, the Development Board had no difficulty. As mentioned in the previous chapter, oil production in 1952 and 1953 ran ahead of schedule, and the Board's share of revenue in those two years alone was about ID30,000,000.

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[24] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report,* ix. The terms of reference agreed to were: "The Mission will be expected to undertake a general review of Iraq's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the Government of Iraq to formulate a long-term program for the further development of the country's productive resources." *Ibid.*

[25] This differs in some respects from the recommendations of the Survey Mission both in total expenditure as well as in the allotments for the various items. See International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report,* 73.

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The general progress of the Development Board under the 647
existing conditions was tolerably satisfactory, but the long- 651
range objectives and the conditions necessary for their realiza- 185
tion were not appreciated either by the people or by the politicians. In 1953 the Development Board Law was amended and a new Ministry of Development was created. Though the Development Board was retained, the execution of the development plan was placed under both the Board and the Ministry. The Minister of Development became an additional *ex officio* member of the Board, responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his Ministry and of the Board. The original intent of the law to remove the Board from the vagaries of political change was thus negated. Moreover, because of the general educational and technological level of the population, the Development Board found itself in the unusual, if not unique, position of not being able to spend the constantly increasing revenue.[26] The Board consequently resorted to lending its funds to other Government agencies not concerned with long-range development, and a goodly portion of its income was diverted to other regular expenses.[27]

Despite inherent limitations and basic difficulties, the aware- 433
ness of the people and the Government that the oil revenue 185
could be used as a means of advancing the development of the country has had some positive and some negative effects on Iraq's growth. One might note a general tendency to depend exclusively on oil income, to the exclusion of all other resources of governmental and economic operations. For obvious [651]
reasons the Government adopted a policy of reducing taxes[28] in view of the gigantic income from oil.[29] Such a policy, combined

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[26] In 1952-53, ID11 million of the Board's allotment remained unspent. *The Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 6, 1953.

[27] For a description of the various projects, see U.N., *Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission*, I, 71-74; International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 183-457; Norman Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, IV, Summer, 1951, 362-370; Fuad Jameel, "Development Projects and Economic Progress in Iraq," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954; Mohammed Zaki Abdul Kareem, "Beehive of Construction," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, June 12, 19, 26, July 3, 1954; *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Dec. 13, 1954, 3.

[28] In 1953 the Government lifted the consumption tax on fresh fruits and vegetables, increased the reductions in the real estate tax and announced substantial cuts in customs and excise taxes. Jameel, "Development Projects," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954.

[29] The 1952-53 total Government budget amounted to $134,000,000, of which about 42 per cent came from direct oil revenue (only 30 per cent of total income, the other 70 per cent being assigned to the Development Board). U.N., *Summary 1952-53*, 60.

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obtained in 1950. It was not fully drawn upon, and has been repaid. The other major foreign debt was a loan of $12.8 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 1950, to meet the foreign exchange requirements of the Wadi Tharthar irrigation scheme. In addition, the Government obtained several advances free of interest from the oil companies, totalling ID 4.5 million, which have now been repaid.

Five domestic loans, totalling ID 7 million, were used to finance the railways and irrigation schemes. Two of these, of ID 1 million each, at 3 per cent interest, issued in 1944 and 1947 with maturities of 3 and 5 years respectively, were redeemed. Other outstanding bond issues comprised a one ID 1 million loan with 3 1/2 per cent interest, issued in 1948, and two twenty year loans, issued in 1944 and 1948, for ID 1 million and ID 3 million respectively. The above mentioned total does not include outstanding Treasury bills and the loans and advances made by the National Bank, commercial banks or other institutions. However, the public debt of Iraq is comparatively small and does not constitute a real burden on the economy of the country. In fact, the Government now has almost no difficulty as far as revenues are concerned, in redeeming not only foreign debts but also domestic ones as well. It is believed that the floating of domestic loans is intended to absorb "idle money" and is an anti-inflationary measure, while the foreign loans were to provide foreign exchange required for various development schemes. The repayment of the United Kingdom loan and the announcement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that the Government of Iraq had cancelled the unused balance of $6.5 million on its loan are evidence of Iraq's ability to meet its needs from its own resources.

Development programme

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The rapid increase in revenue anticipated from the expansion of petroleum production and the revision of the terms of payment by the oil companies led the Government to initiate an over-all plan to develop the resources of the country. In 1950, a Development Board was established and a comprehensive five-year (1951 to 1956) development plan, involving an estimated expenditure of ID 65.8 million, was drawn up.

In 1951, at the request of the Iraqi Government, a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development visited Iraq and submitted a report, which included a five-year plan with an estimated expenditure of ID 168.5 million. 1/ The Iraqi Government accordingly, in the light of the Bank's recommendation, replaced its earlier plan by a six-year plan (1 April 1951 to 31 March 1957) calling for expenditure of ID 155.4 million (table 30).

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq (Baltimore, 1952).

Table 30. Iraq: Proposed Expenditure and Revenue of the Development Board, 1951/52 to 1956/57

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1954/55	1955/56	1956/57	Total
Revenue:							
Oil revenue	10,150	18,690	32,900	34,300	34,300	34,300	164,640
Proceeds of Tharthar project loan ...	320	1,850	970	640	185	-	3,965
Miscellaneous receipts	2	8	50	35	20	20	135
Total	10,472	20,548	33,928	34,975	34,505	34,320	168,740
Expenditure:							
Administrative and research expenses.	170	460	600	650	650	650	3,180
Irrigation projects:							
Tharthar	1,250	3,600	3,140	1,450	185	675	10,300
Habbaniya	450	300	500	500	200	250	2,200
Diyala reservoir	200	450	1,800	2,100	1,700	1,000	7,250
Dokan reservoir	200	600	1,400	1,700	1,550	1,250	6,700
Bekhme reservoir	200	1,000	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	8,700
Udhaim barrage and construction of canals	-	550	250	500	500	500	1,800
Other irrigation projects	724	1,500	2,000	2,450	2,700	2,950	12,324
Major drainage projects	200	400	750	750	1,000	1,000	4,100
Total, irrigation projects	3,024	7,100	10,840	11,950	10,335	10,125	53,374
Roads and bridges	2,066	3,800	4,700	5,300	5,450	5,450	26,766
Buildings	2,368	2,650	3,100	3,300	3,300	3,300	18,018
Reclamation of land, etc.	1,686	3,450	4,150	4,400	4,600	4,700	22,986
Industries	050	3,000	5,000	6,000	8,000	9,000	31,050
Total	9,364	20,460	28,390	31,600	32,335	33,225	155,374

Source: Compilation of Laws concerning the Development Board (revised), Schedule A (Baghdad, 1952), pages 8 and 9. Figures represent planned expenditure and revenue for fiscal years ending 31 March.

185 647 Previously the Government had carried out several schemes in various fields but development projects had had to be kept small and had been aimed at the more immediate needs. Financing was carried out by means of yearly capital works appropriations, totalling about ID35 million from 1931 to 1950. It is not, however, clear whether these appropriations were fully spent.

647 433 The execution of the Six-Year Plan was entrusted to the Development Board, established in the spring of 1950 under Law No. 23 of 1950 as amended by Law No. 6 of 1952. It was constituted under the presidency of the Prime Minister; the members were the Minister of Finance and six executive members, nominated by the Council of Ministers for a term of five years, including three experts, one each in finance and economics; in irrigations; and in an unspecified field to be prescribed by the Council of Ministers. The Board was entrusted with the duty of preparing "a general economic and financial plan for the development of the resources of Iraq and the raising of the standard of living of the people"; with undertaking "a general survey of the exploited and unexploited resources of Iraq"; with the execution of the plans "in accordance with their determined priority"; and with co-ordinating the various ministries' development schemes in relation to the general development of the country. The Board has its own budget, and its revenue consisted, at the outset, of the total revenue received from the oil companies, but in 1952 this was amended to 70 per cent plus such other sums as may be allotted to it by Parliament and the proceeds of any loans, domestic or foreign.

647 645 433 In July 1953 the Ministry of Development was set up, headed by a new cabinet minister who became the ninth voting member, the Board's representative on the Council of Ministers and the link between Parliament and the Board. The new law did not change the Six-Year Plan or the financial structure of the Board, although it changed the latter's organizational framework and required the new minister to prepare a new development plan to be executed after the completion of the present one. Furthermore, with a view to administrative decentralization, a distinction has been made between "capital development projects" to be carried out entirely by the Board and "small development projects" which, though financed by the Board, are to be entrusted to the appropriate government departments for execution. The Board held its first meeting on 30 November 1950 and in May 1951 prepared its general programme, which was approved by Parliament in June 1951. The Six-Year Plan (1951 to 1957) calls for a total expenditure of ID 155.4 million and an estimated revenue of ID 168.7 million.

433 647 Actual expenditures on development plans for the financial years 1951/52 to 1953/54 totalled ID 26 million. They fell short of planned expenditure, which amounted to ID 58.2 million, thus leaving an unspent balance of ID 31.9 million. The building programme and reclamation of lands and other projects ran nearest to schedule while irrigation and industry lagged behind (see table 31). In addition, the Board has granted a number of loans to municipalities and semi-governmental institutions, to the end of March 1954, as follows (in thousands of Iraqi dinars):

Omnibus service, Baghdad	1,000
Agricultural machinery and tools	500
Oil refinery service	6,000
Baghdad Water Board	660
Directorate General of Iraqi Railways	2,500
Industrial Bank	500
Eight municipalities	3,553
Total	14,113

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Table 31. Iraq: Allotments and Anticipated Expenditure of the Development Board, 1951/52 to 1953/54

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52		1952/53		1953/54		Surplus, 1951/52 to 1953/54
	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	
Administrative and research expenses	170	110	460	260	600	300	560
Irrigation expenses	3,024	1,733	7,100	1,064	10,840	4,000	13,807
Major roads and bridges	2,066	836	3,800	2,933	4,700	2,500	4,398
Buildings	2,368	1,368	2,650	2,650	3,100	2,900	1,200
Reclamation of land etc.	1,736	953	3,450	2,076	4,150	2,150	3,157
Industries	-	-	3,000	5	5,000	500	6,495
Total	9,364	5,000	20,460	8,988	28,390	12,350	31,876

Source: Development Board, Annual Report, 1953/54 (Baghdad, 1954); figures are for fiscal years ending 31 March.

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433 The increase in oil production and other earnings of the Board resulted in a higher revenue during the years 1951/52 to 1953/54 than that originally estimated, in spite of a smaller withdrawal from the $12.8 million Wadi Tharthar project loan granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the meantime, the Board's over-all expenditure during the same period amounted to about ID 40 million, including loans and advances: accounts deposited with the National Bank of Iraq for the disbursement of the Tharthar project; and the sum of ID 10.5 million paid to the Ministry of Finance for the schemes undertaken by the various ministries on behalf of the Board (see table 32). Furthermore the Board has authorized government departments to finance various plans on its behalf, and has awarded several contracts for its major plans to various foreign and national companies. Some of these plans have already been completed and the rest are to be completed in the next few years. Thus the actual expenditure plus the obligated expenditure of the Board have been estimated to be about ID 45 to ID 55 million.

The most important reasons for deferring the expenditure of the allocated amounts provided for in the Board's budgets since its operation have been the delay in the approval of the programme by Parliament; the inability of the different departments, particularly in the first two years, to execute the projects entrusted to them by the Board; and the necessity for providing adequate time to study, survey and prepare the estimated cost and specifications for inviting tenders for the various projects. Most of the projects outlined in the original programme needed further studies and surveys, several of which have since been completed. Many have been submitted by various engineering consultants of international repute, and are under consideration by the Board. The Board hopes to accelerate the execution of such projects as were planned since it has almost reached the end of the planning stage.

Major projects

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433 One of the main purposes of the Six-Year Plan is to control floods in the Tigris and Euphrates by storing surplus water which can be used for irrigation. An over-all programme has been prepared, at an estimated cost of ID 335 million, providing for the construction of ten dams; 1/ it is expected to increase the cropped area by 75 per cent and raise net annual agricultural income from its present level of ID 62 million to ID 222 million; part of this programme is being implemented under the Six-Year Plan. The plan also provides for industrial expansion, the building of 3,500 kilometres of metalled roads and improvement of a further 3,000 kilometres.

1/ See Knappen, Tippets, Abbott and McCarthy, Report on the Development of the Tigris and Euphrates River Systems (Baghdad, 1954).

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Table 32. Iraq: Revenue and Expenditure of the Development Board, 1951/52 to June 1954

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1954 April to June
Revenue:				
Oil receipts	6,702	22,876	34,824	9,471
Proceeds of loan for Tharthar project	764	1,118	227	49
Miscellaneous receipts ..	1	5	226	95
Total	7,467	23,999	35,277	9,615
Expenditure:				
Development expenditure .	3,131	12,838	7,282	2,116
Net balance of loans and advances	769	6,227	9,799	2,245
Net balance of deposit accounts	- 267	- 2,591	2,676	- 5
Total	3,633	16,474	19,757	4,356
Surplus	3,834	7,525 a/	15,520	5,259

Source: National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin, No. 11, July-September 1954 (Baghdad). Figures are provisional returns for fiscal years ending 31 March.

a/ Including ID 5 million transferred to the ordinary budget according to ordinance No. 7 of 1952.

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Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
● Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

1: Longrigg
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[For an account of the relations of Iraq with Great Britain, the Arab League nations, and with Turkey from 1900 to 1950, see category 116, entire source.]

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[For information as to the international repercussion of the oil industry in Iraq, see 64: Shwadran Ml Middle East, category 116, pp. 194-250; 255-264.]

[For data on the organization, activities, royalties and exploitation of oil by the international oil companies operating in Iraq, see 64: Shwadran Ml Middle East, category 116, pp. 193-199; 201-216; 218-223; 233-235; 237-264; 276-281.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 accepted gladly a *Special Report on the Progress of 'Iraq* for the period from 1921 to 1930. The Commission was requested by the Council in June 1930 to formulate the conditions which should be fulfilled by a mandated territory for which the claim of emancipation was made. In the debates which followed, extending over two years, the part of the British spokesmen at Geneva was consistently to emphasize 'Iraqi progress, to explain observed deficiencies, and to adopt towards the future an attitude of optimism which reflected a sincere desire (whether believed or not by the political world of Baghdad) to be rid finally of mandatory responsibilities; nor was it unrealized in Whitehall that a League refusal to accept 'Iraq as a member would infallibly be ascribed by the latter to British contrary intrigues.

The many petitions received at Geneva from the 'Iraq minorities offered the clearest field in which 'Iraqi pretensions could be questioned: that is, the probable fate of the Kurds and the Assyrians—most persistent of petitioners—after British withdrawal. 'Iraqi policy on these matters seemed in fact at this time to be correct and reasonable, and the High Commissioner, cross-questioned, could specify the favourable steps already taken, could expect their continuance, and could accept British (as distinct from corporate League) 'moral responsibility' in this field should 'Iraq prove after all unworthy. The Mandates Commission reported accordingly to the Council in June 1931 that the conditions for emancipation seemed to be fulfilled—a settled and self-defending Government, good public security, sound finance, a respectable judiciary, a competent Administration—but that certain specific guarantees should still be given by the liberated nation. These were to concern the rights of minorities and of foreigners, freedom of conscience and religion, the honouring of financial obligations assumed for it by the Mandatary, the protection of previously acquired foreign rights, the observance of international Conventions, and most-favoured-nation treatment for all States-members of the League. A draft Declaration containing these guarantees was in due course prepared at Geneva and handed to the 'Iraq Government, whose Parliament debated and ratified it, with surprising complacence, in its session of 1931–2.

Satisfied by these provisions and procedures, with whatever tacit doubts, the League Council expressed on 28 January 1932 its readiness to terminate the Mandate as soon as the 'Iraq Declaration had been received. It was transmitted to Geneva in the summer of 1932 and, duly binding 'Iraq to correct and liberal treatment of all its nationality, minority, religious, and linguistic problems, it included a series of specific obligations assumed by 'Iraq towards the League. These assurances were accepted by a Committee of

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

the League in October 1932 and in turn satisfied the Assembly, 648 still inclined as it was to uneasiness on the Assyrians' behalf, that no further formalities were needed. Those nations who had formerly benefited by Ottoman Capitulations and who had accepted the 1930 Anglo-'Iraq Judicial Agreement as safeguarding their subjects during its validity were now asked, and agreed, to renounce such rights henceforward permanently. With the continuing pressure of Great Britain, and the evident impatience of 'Iraq, no opposition remained to be faced; a unanimous vote of the Assembly, with the participation of fifty-two States, approved 'Iraq's membership of the League on 3 October 1932. Speeches of welcome and appreciation marked an occasion of great cordiality and some historic interest. Nuri Sa'id Pasha spoke for 'Iraq to the British representative, Sir John Simon, of the 'sincere and abiding gratitude to the British people': which indeed he, his King, and a number of the more responsible 'Iraqis may, not without reason, have briefly felt.

3. REFLECTIONS ON A MANDATE

The termination of the Mandate, popular with the main body of 000 British opinion, had also its critics in the United Kingdom. It was by these pronounced to be premature, to represent a precedent for the abandonment of imperial interests, to fail fully to secure all-important strategic communications, and to be dangerous or fatal to the 'Iraq minorities. Such criticisms, freely ventilated in press and Parliament, were shared in part by other European and American opinion, especially in so far as they suggested that confidence in an unaided 'Iraq Government's treatment of its smaller communities was misplaced. Observers in France regretted that an internationally supervised sphere was to become an all-British preserve, while this emancipation of Arab ex-Ottoman wilayas could not but react lamentably in Syria, where French policy was following very different lines. The world's verdict, however, not only on the British abandonment of this Mandate but retrospectively on their conduct of it, was by majority eulogistic. Life and reality seemed to have been given for the first time to the ideas which had inspired the mandatory conception; a politically backward population had indeed been formed into a nation, helped with its Constitution-building and administration, advised by experts, protected by armed forces, and at the earliest moment freed from tutelage. Such a record, in praise of which many of the great and good, and many 'Iraqi and non-'Iraqi Arabs, have joined, was hailed as representing something of a 'reversal of imperialism'. Scarcely conceivable before the twentieth century, it belonged characteristically to the climate of the Western political thought

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of
the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely
668 kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in
Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan,
where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able
to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for
the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a pre-
caution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the
[468] Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by
politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq
Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and con-
ditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It
was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the
interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had
led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to
blame the Company itself.

668 In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by
the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy
661 of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made
after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some
3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal
from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question.
In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflam-
matory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was
declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were
sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker*
×645 was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps,
which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly
to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between
the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to
power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification
of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry,
approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little
favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan
(at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such
gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition
of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the
Panjwin earthquake victims.

645 In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy
was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status
● 648 which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the
Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946,
and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a con-
ference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views';
and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

722 verbal support in every quarter and the Baghdad Jews vied ostentatiously with Muslims in anti-Zionist fervour and subscribed heavily to funds for the refugees.

But the campaign was from the first feebly and unfortunately 721 648 conducted. The higher leadership was uninspiring, supply arrangements inadequate, and the discipline and bearing of the 'Iraqi troops, though judged to be superior to those of other Arab States except Jordan, carried them to little glory. Units entered Palestine on 15 May between Geshen and Wadi Yabis and marched on Tul Karm and Nablus, areas unoccupied by the Jews; their attempt on Tiberias was unsuccessful, but they effectively occupied the Nablus–Tiberias–Janin triangle and advanced to within twelve miles of Tel Aviv. This hopeful move was frustrated by Jewish resistance in front of Nathaniya and by counter-pressure which forced the 'Iraqis to abandon Bayt Tima and give ground in the occupied triangle. The Security Council's cease-fire order of 22 May had been at first ignored by all, but both sides accepted a four-weeks' truce operative on 11 June. The impetus of Arab invasion had by that time been lost, their weakness exposed, and their initial superiority in heavy arms, which was never to recur, had availed them little; and during the truce period equipment poured into the Jewish Army, none into the Arab. After the rejection of proposals evolved by the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, and his Truce Commission for a federation of Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and Jordan, fighting was renewed on 9 July. A further 'Iraqi attempt to take Nathaniya was foiled, the Jews swept into Galilee, and their deeper advance was stopped only by the second truce which was observed from 18 July. This at the Arab League meeting at Aley was rejected only by the 'Iraq Government, and that for reasons of pride and policy; but it was in fact operative and the war, for 'Iraq, was over.

The many attempts to restore peace to Palestine and solve its insoluble problems, the murder of Bernadotte by the Jews, the renewal of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities from October to the end of 1948, form no part of the history of 'Iraq. 'Iraq Army units remained in occupation of the east Palestine triangle for some months, dependent as ever on their long line of communications through Jordan and receiving their pay irregularly from the almost empty Treasury at home. Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib was recalled to 'Iraq as Chief of Staff, to return again to Palestine later as Commander-in-Chief of the combined 'Iraqi-Jordan forces; but this experiment in joint command lasted but a few weeks, and the wider project of a unified command for all League forces—a clear military necessity—was frustrated by division among the States and by Egyptian refusal. No real effect was given to the resolution of the 'Iraqi

382 1951 be anticipated that the continued presence and enlarged operations of the oil companies would remain an outstanding economic and social advantage to the 'Iraqi people: that, especially after the destruction of the great oil industry of Persia by the action of its Government, 'Iraq's position as a supplier of crude petroleum must give it an international importance greater than ever before: but also that the minds and emotions of local patriots, for whom the Persian tragedy had no terrors and no lesson, would not abandon the demand for a 'nationalization' which might or might not (according to its form and manner) permit the continuance of the industry. It was indeed clear that the presence in 'Iraq of successful, wealthy, and well-organized European enterprises with their foreign control, high living standards, and concession-granted privileges must, however correct their conduct and however enlightened their policy, be offensive to the nationalist sentiment of at least one school of local politicians; and the period during which oil development on these lines might be able to continue could not, for all its enormous advantages to the country, be confidently foreseen.

651 Meanwhile, to the 'Iraqi Treasury its receipts from oil sources
648 were no longer a mere helpful supplement to other revenues but a
471 main pillar of the Government itself and the foundation of all its hopes of development and improvement. The anxiety of 'Iraqi statesmen to derive still greater revenues from the oil industry than those provided in the 1925 or 1931 concessions—4 shillings (gold) per ton—and their claim that 'gold' should be translated into sterling at unofficial open-market rates led from 1947 to 1951 to repeated discussions between Government and Company. The gold question of which the Company, at 'Iraq's request, agreed in 1949 to allow settlement by a British Court rather than by arbitration, remained still unsettled when the period closed, with indications that the Baghdad Government intended still to press its full claims.[1] The question of royalty revision resulted in 1950 in a partly retroactive and conditional agreement to raise the 4 shillings gold per ton to 6 shillings gold; but this increase, immediately helpful as it was to the 'Iraq Treasury, was in turn to be superseded by further and long-drawn negotiations based on a new principle of half-and-half division of the profits: a principle which, first announced by the Arabian-American Company in Sau'di Arabia on the last day of 1950, could not but abruptly supersede all less favourable terms enjoyed by neighbouring countries. Conversations on this basis were in progress in Baghdad between Company

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[1] These might amount to some £20 million sterling. Agreement upon a compromise figure (£5 million) was reached by the negotiators in 1951, but did not form part of the settlement ratified by Parliament early in 1952.

and Government throughout the first half of 1951 and were to 651
embrace the production obligations of all the companies operating 648 ●
in 'Iraq and the royalties or taxes expected from them.[1] Under the 471
influence of the 'nationalization' movement—but in more moderate form than the brutal self-mutilation of Persia—the 'Iraq Government decided in 1951 to nationalize the refining and distribution of its oil in so far as this was consumed in 'Iraq itself: the operation, that is, of the Khaniqin and Rafidain Oil Companies. Negotiations with these and with Anglo-Iranian, their parent, led to agreement on the basis that the Companies were to transfer their plant and assets to the State at a valuation, and to remain for ten years as operating agents on its behalf.

The Port of Baṣra in the period 1946–50 maintained and substantially improved its services—wharves and sheds, cranes and 504
machinery—and, in spite of the increased cost of labour and supplies, could show a profit on each year's operations. It continued annually to pay off its capital debt, completing that process in 1951. It maintained and largely increased its electric-power and water supplies to Baṣra city. The airport, with its wireless service and its enlarged hotel, remained Port property. The dredging-depot at Fao was extended, an all-weather road constructed to link it by land to Baṣra. A shore depot was built at Ḥarmaq, opposite Abadan. The traffic using Ma'qil wharves decreased abruptly from the level of the previous five war years, but the tanker traffic of the Anglo-Iranian increased, until the spring of 1951, more than sufficiently to compensate for this. The development of a subsidiary port at Umm Qaṣr, on the Khur 'Abdullah, was a

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[1] The new Oil Agreement, based on acceptance in August 1951 of the principle of equal division of profits between Government and Company, was ratified by Parliament in February 1952, and made retroactive to 1 January 1951. With the probable initial through-put (in a full year) of the 30-inch line (some 14 to 15 million tons a year) additional to the existing through-put (nearly 8 million) of the 12-inch and 16-inch lines to Tripoli, 'Iraq's revenues from this source were expected—on existing cost and price bases—to surpass £30 million in 1952 and to reach £60 million in 1955. Minimum production was agreed at 22 million tons a year (for I.P.C. and M.P.C. combined) from 1954 onwards, and 8 million from B.P.C. from the end of 1955. Government was assured that its receipts would be not less than a quarter of the seaboard value of I.P.C. and M.P.C. crude oil, and a third of that of B.P.C. Fluctuation of costs and of world oil prices was to be taken into account in ascertaining the divisible 'profits', and Government might, if it wished, take in kind 12½ per cent. of the crude produced, and either dispose of it or sell it back to the Companies. A large part of the balance of Government's revenue was to be received in the form of income tax. Minimum receipts to Government, guaranteed subject only to *force majeure*, were to be £20 million sterling in 1953 and 1954, and £25 million in 1955 and thereafter; in the event of a physically unavoidable failure in production a smaller minimum would be payable for two years. The Agreement covered in addition the doubling of 'Iraqi representation on the Boards of the Companies, restrictions on the appointment of non-'Iraqis to positions in the Companies, an increase (up to fifty per year) of 'Iraqis maintained in British universities for higher studies, and the extension of technical education organized by the Company in Kirkuk fields.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education
is not possible without some reference to the history and present 186
circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an
administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Ad- 185
ministrative reforms and some social advance were attempted
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became 735
an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 642
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent 212
years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to 361
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

4e Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

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Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe 534
resembling the chanter of a bagpipe and has often a pleasant lilt. 535
Kurdish dancing, however, is by no means as strenuous as Scottish.
Kurds and all other mountain dwellers in Kurdistan dance what is
known as the chain-dance, similar to that which is, I believe, commonly
seen in the Balkans. The dancers join hands and form a ring. The
piper and a drummer with a sort of tenor drum stand in the middle,
and the dance consists of fairly intricate footwork while the circle
moves slowly round. Often star dancers who fancy themselves as [K
budding Nijinskys do solo dances inside the circle. Amongst the 562]
Kurds the men and women dance separately, but with the Christian
sects the two sexes dance together. This does not mean, however, that
Kurdish women are completely segregated or kept by themselves. As
a matter of fact, they possess considerable freedom and may be seen
gathering firewood, tending animals or engaged in other tasks on the
mountainside, often far from their villages.

Up to five years ago the Barzan district of Kurdistan retained all K
of its savage and primitive features. Government had not penetrated 619
and Shaikh Ahmed, a religious fanatic, was dictator. With the help 643
of his brothers and a standing army of several hundred men he completely 641 726
dominated the impoverished inhabitants, who had the shaikh's 792
bodyguard perpetually billeted on them and who had to provide them
with food, clothing and tobacco and anything else they might fancy.
Any protests on the part of the villagers were discouraged by the K
strongest methods. Such complete ascendancy did Shaikh Ahmed gain [212]
over his savage and illiterate people that they began to look upon him
as a god and, though Muslims in name, turned their faces towards him K
in prayer rather than towards Mecca, as tradition demands. There 792
was a Mullah in the district called Mullah Juj, who represented himself 779
to be the prophet of this new god. The Mullah was a very fiery and 682
eloquent speaker and, unfortunately for himself, his fame began to 784
surpass even that of the deity. This could not of course be tolerated, 661
and one of Shaikh Ahmed's brothers "bumped off" the presumptuous 671
prophet. Up to that time the Koran had been revered, but now the K
Shaikh issued orders for the destruction of all copies to be found. He [136]
also withdrew the ban on the eating of pork, for wild pig were plentiful I
in Barzan. Armed missionaries were sent out beyond the Barzan K
bounds, and villages which refused to accept the Shaikh were burned 721
and a number of the male inhabitants put to death. This state of 657
affairs could not be allowed to continue, and the 'Iraq Government 648
was forced to take action in conjunction with the British Royal K
Air Force. 697

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K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I
168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
64x] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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000 of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

K 137 Kurdistan is a beautiful country. It is in the main well wooded, with scrub or stunted oak on the hillsides and poplars, walnuts and mulberries near the villages. Pines grow in two areas only and chinārs (planes) along the streams. Unfortunately, deforestation is proceeding apace, and unless immediate and drastic steps are taken by the 'Iraq Government, heavy soil erosion and a tremendous decrease in grazing facilities will take place. Few new walnut trees are to be found owing to a prevalent superstition that the planter of a walnut tree will die with the appearance of the first nuts. It might be supposed that the oldest inhabitants could be employed in planting, but apparently the grandfathers look askance at this suggestion!

K 181 The Kurds are a virile and cheerful people. They have been called treacherous, and undoubtedly stories can be quoted in support of this accusation. Yet it must be remembered that the annals of our own Scottish highlands are by no means clean in this respect.

K 164 221 342 In the summer the valleys of Kurdistan are, unfortunately, very malarial, and this is fostered by the cultivation of rice with its invariable accompaniment of mosquitoes. During this season most of the flock-owners move to their "zōzāns" or summer sheilings on the mountain tops, where, in shelters of oak branches, they pass the time pleasantly enough.

Christians

I 795 The Christians of the northern provinces are divided into numerous sects, several of which are relics of the old schismatic divisions of the Eastern Communion. They include Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics, who are under the control of Rome, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians and Seventh Day Adventists.

I 795 167 563 648 162 Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics and Jacobites are found in Mosul and many villages on the left bank of the Tigris. Chaldeans are also found in the Supna valley near Amadia and in one large village near Arbil. Seventh Day Adventists only flourish in Mosul. Many people in England know something of the Assyrians and their recent history. The Assyrians themselves claim to be descendants of the famous kingdom of Nineveh and are certainly semitic. The term "Assyrian" now includes ex-Ottoman members of the Nestorian Church who were domiciled either within what is now the 'Iraq state or who were ejected from Hakkari by the Turks during the Great War and refused

4s Wilson G-8 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Yazidis MH 10

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readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects 795
belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their 167
Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the 648
Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace 563
terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it 162
was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in 'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil, British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however, proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may [I
be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers 463]
of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks, etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, I
hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are 147
liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

The Yezidis

The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This Y
is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. 101
They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock 776
Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the 779
lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is 871
incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that 771
he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education, save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

438 [365] more attractive for industry than other areas can be corrected by proper action. First and foremost is the relative cheapness of power and fuel in Baghdad. The cost of the electric power unit in most cities is double that of Baghdad and rarely is a municipality-owned plant able to supply sufficient power to industry. The cost of oil fuel is at least ten percent higher outside Baghdad. The correction of these factors, together with a more equal distribution of educational, housing, transport and social welfare facilities, could greatly relieve the situation. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry could also be amended so as to give additional concessions for industries established in other parts of the country. The cost of labour and land is already becoming burdensome for industry in Baghdad. This, in addition to the social evil of overcrowdedness, calls for immediate consideration.

434 **(4) Limitation of Markets** : A newly industrialised country can hardly hope to find foreign markets for its finished products. It has to depend on its home market. The market in Iraq, with its small population (about 5 million inhabitants), of low purchasing power (annual income per head is estimated at between £ 20 and £ 30 or $85), affords very limited scope for large-scale industry. Many of the industries studied at one time by the Industrial Bank, such as the making of artificial silk fibres, the manufacture of paper and cardboard from straw, and the printing of cotton piece-goods, had to be abandoned because the smallest economic unit of these plants is much beyond the capacity of the Iraqi market to support. This situation will no doubt improve as the whole economy of the 439 country expands. But it should be possible to deal with this situation 648 more effectively by joint action on the part of the Arab States, along lines already discussed at high political level. These discussions have had the object of reducing or abolishing inter-state tariff barriers so as to make the whole area one market. Such an action is indeed vital to the progress and prosperity of these countries and their peoples. It should be remembered that before World War I, these countries formed one economic and political unit under the Ottoman Empire.

464 **(5) Labour, Technical Staff and Management Problems:** The supply of ordinary labour, owing to the high rate of population increase (estimated to be one and a half per cent per annum) and emigration from country to town, is quite sufficient and will remain so

464 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are
472 employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary,
473 sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net
profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country.[1]

648 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation:** Except where foreign enter-
457 prise has obtained a concession for the development of important
471 resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the
Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation
which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enter-
648 prise. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipu-
656 lates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi
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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

nationals in order that industry may qualify for the concessions 648
granted by that law. This may appear as a discrimination against [656]
foreign capital and some foreign industrialists have raised this 477
point. But considering the great concessions granted by the Law, including the appropriation of state land, and the smallness of the majority reserved for nationals, the "discrimination" is nominal. Past experience of foreign capital investment in the Middle East does not allow the removal of such safeguards. However, the writer believes that proper legislation on these three points mentioned above would give foreign industrialists sufficient assurance; and, given the proper information and contacts, many firms may be induced to establish branches in Iraq to the benefit of all concerned.[1]

7. **Other problems** : There are other less important industrial 433
problems which should be mentioned even though limitations of 471
space prevent full discussion of them.

(a) It should be realized that Iraqi industry labours under a heavy burden of over-capitalization which adds to its costs. There is a tendency to have completely integrated plants; most industries have to maintain a power generating plant either to provide electricity, or as a spare in case of failure in the city supply. Practically all industries have their own workshops. There is a strong desire on the part of all industry owners to be self-sufficient with regard to supply of materials, chemicals and spare parts. Many industries have been induced to purchase more land than they actually need in order to guard against future needs and also to profit from the expected rise in land values. This has led to an insufficient utilization of machinery and to a great amount of working capital, per unit of production, locked up. These facts are reflected in the balance sheets of many industries in the form of Loans from Banks (commercial banks) which in some cases reach 50 per cent of nominal capital and thus increase the fixed charges which industry has to meet. The reason for this desire on the part of industrials to be more or less completely self-sufficient lies in the fact that, owing to the country's industrial immaturity, it is often impossible to rely on efficient service from outside plants when required. The need to keep great stores of

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[1] In accordance with the economic boycott enforced by Arab States, firms having business relations with Israel are excluded.

6: Ireland MHl Iraq MHl

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/For an account of policies and developments in the relations between Iraq and Great Britain after the First World War, see category 116, pp. 151-189. For treaty negotiations between Iraq and Great Britain see pp. 338-361 and 393-418./

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

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century. The entry of Germany into Turkey and the Persian Gulf, although ostensibly based on commercial ventures[1] and on concessions from the Porte to build a railroad through Anatolia to the Persian Gulf,[2] came to be regarded as a greater threat than Russia to the *status quo* in those areas which Great Britain had come to look upon as her own special spheres. Lord Lansdowne's official statement of policy was directed as much at Germany as at Russia, although Germany chose to regard it as applicable only to Russia.

Germany's early interest in Turkey had not been regarded with alarm. The decision of 'Abdul Hamīd, in 1899, to grant the concession for a railroad to the Persian Gulf had been welcomed in England as a check to both Russian and French

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[1] Details cannot be given here of the activities of the firm of Wonckhaus in the Persian Gulf, of the negotiations for the railroad concessions, of the political significance attached to the railway project both in Germany and elsewhere, and of the increase of German prestige and influence in Turkey generally. Of the mass of literature existing on this whole subject, the following may be consulted: *The Times History of the World War*, Vol. III, ch. lii; *Report on the Condition and Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia*, Lloyd, George, 1908 (confidential). Rohrbach, P., *Die Bagdadbahn* (Berlin, 1903); Helfferich, K., *Die deutsche Türkenpolitik* (Berlin, 1921); Schaefer, C. A., *Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik* (Weimar, 1916); Muller, K. H., *Die Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn* (Hamburg, 1916); Cheradame, André, *La Question d'Orient: la Macédoine, le chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Paris, 1903); also, *The Baghdad Railway, Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, 1911; Lewin, Evans, *The German Road to the East* (New York, 1917); Earle, Edward M., *Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923). See also Lynch, H. F. B., 'The Bagdad Railway', *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1911; *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917, pp. 491-528 (by Sir Alwyn Parker, Foreign Office).

[2] For texts of the concessions: *Actes de la concession du chemin de fer Eski Shehr-Konia* (Constantinople, 1893); also, *Report of the Anatolian Railway Company* (1896), pp. 4, 9, preliminary concession, 1899; Young, G., *Corps de droit Ottoman*, Vol. III, pp. 342-51; cf. *Report of the Anatolian Railway Company*, 1902, p. 8; provisional convention, 1902: Lecoq, R., *Un chemin de fer en Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1907), appendix; definitive convention, March 5th, 1903: *Parl. Papers*, 1911 (Cd. 5635), CIII, I. This also contains the additional convention of 1908, as well as the Statutes of the Imperial Bagdad Railroad Company, Specifications, the Loan Contract, First Series, 1903; Loan Contract, Second and Third Series, 1908; third and fourth additional conventions, March 21st, 1911: *troisième convention additionelle et quatrième convention additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars, 1903, relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Constantinople, 1911).

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ambitions.[1] The phenomenal expansion of Germany's industries and of her overseas commerce, the penetration of markets hitherto regarded as Britain's own, the sudden growth of Germany's mercantile marine, her Navy bills of 1899 and 1900, the colonial demands and aspirations of German diplomatists, the noisy anti-British demonstrations at the time of the Boer War, however, led the English public, stimulated by the Press, to believe that not only Great Britain's markets but also her political prestige in the East and in Africa were being seriously challenged.

The possibility of curbing German political expansion in Turkish Arabia by means of British participation in the Baghdad Railway had, at first, seemed likely, but the suggestion of the Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur Balfour, April 7th and 8th, 1903,[2] that H.M. Government should approve of the investment of British capital in the railway at the invitation of the German financiers,[3] providing such participation were on the basis of equality with any other Power, raised a storm of disapproval in the House and in the press.[4] Protests of the shipping companies serving India, of the owners of the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company, and of the British-owned Railways in Asia Minor may have also added to the

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[1] Lord Salisbury is reported to have said in 1900: 'We are in no way unfavourably impressed by the grant of the concessions in question. On the contrary we welcome them for in this way Germany comes into line with our interests in the Persian Gulf.' *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, 1871-1914 (hereafter *G.P.*), (Berlin, 1922-7), Vol. XVII, No. 5212, p. 373. Also Lord Lansdowne to F. Lascelles, March 18th, 1902, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 204, pp. 177-8; *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CI (1902), pp. 129, 597, 628, 669; Vol. CXXII (1903), p. 1371.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXX (1903), pp. 1207-8, 1358-78.

[3] von Gwinner, A., 'The Baghdad Railway and the Question of British Co-operation', *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1909.

[4] *The Times*, April 9th, 14th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 24th; *Daily Mail*, April 9th, 18th, 22nd; *The Daily Telegraph*, April 8th, 9th; *Pall Mall Gazette*, April 9th, 11th, 22nd, 24th; *Spectator*, April 4th, 11th, 18th, 25th; *Manchester Guardian*, April 15th, 1903. Yate, Col. A. C., *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, May 22nd, 1911, p. 19; Johnson, Sir H. H., *Common Sense in Foreign Policy* (London, 1913), pp. v-vii. Cf., also, Lord Curzon, *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), pp. 583-7, 589.

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125* 648 opposition[1] which, without doubt, extended to his own cabinet. Mr. Balfour was forced to declare to the House of Commons, April 23rd, 1903, that H.M. Government would give no support to British financial participation in the project.[2]

What the British Government had failed to secure by financial participation, it attempted to secure through diplomatic negotiations. The *rapprochement* between England and France already in the air soon became a reality.[3] The three agreements signed on April 8th, 1904,[4] settled the outstanding points of friction, initiated the *Entente Cordiale* and paved the way for the defensive alliance between the two countries.[5]

The period of 'splendid isolation' for Great Britain had come to an end. Instead there was inaugurated an era of diplomacy among the Powers which aimed, on the one hand, at securing on the basis of compensations[6] a recognition of spheres of interest in Asia and in Africa, thus avoiding points of conflict, and, on the other hand, at providing for collective security in the event that rival ambitions, either commercial or territorial, could not be reconciled.

Tentative negotiations towards an Anglo-Russian *rapproche-*

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[1] *The Times*, April 18th, 19th, 24th, 1903.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. cxxi (1903), pp. 271-2. Lord Lansdowne seems to have believed that 'the scuttle of British financiers' at the newspaper opposition made [illegible] impossible for the Government to give assurances of its support. *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, Minute on No. 224, p. 196. Cf., Earle, op. cit., p. 186.

[3] For early indications of the *rapprochement*, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français* (hereafter *Docs. Fr.*) (Paris, 1922-9), 2nd Series, Vol. ii, No. 524 (December 12th, 1902), p. 653; Vol. iii, No. 138 (March 14th, 1903), p. 186; Vol. iii, No. 192 (April 23rd, 1903), p. 258. Also, Tardieu, A., *La France et les Alliances* (Paris, 1908), pp. 51-72.

[4] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, Nos. 356-416, pp. 292-373; *Docs. Fr.*, 2nd Series, Vol. iii, Nos. 362, 363, 381, 384, 387, 392, 419; Vol. iv, Secs. ii, iiiA, viD, viiB. Texts of the three agreements: *Accts. and Papers*, 1904 (Cd. 1952), cx, 323-4, 340-1, 1905 (Cd. 2383), ciii, 241; 1905 (Cmd. 2384), ciii, 265; 1905 (Cmd. 2385), ciii, 285. Secret articles of Egyptian Declaration; ibid., 1911 (Cd. 5969), ciii, 353 ff. Also in *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, pp. 374-98, with earlier drafts in parallel columns.

[5] On discussions from 1906, on the Anglo-French defensive alliance, see *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. iii, Nos. 210-21, pp. 170-203.

[6] A 'give and take arrangement', as Lord Lansdowne expressed it, July 2nd, 1903, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. ii, No. 356, p. 293.

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ment had been interrupted by the Russo-Japanese war.[1] Russia's defeat and her domestic difficulties in 1905 made her more amenable to settlement of her Middle East differences with Great Britain on August 31st, 1907, when an Anglo-Russian Convention was signed.[2] By it Persia, without her consent, was partitioned into spheres of influence, as foreshadowed by the suggestion of the Government of India in 1899.[3] No reference was made, however, to the Persian Gulf or to Turkish Arabia, although Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had pressed urgently for the inclusion of a clause recognizing the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf.[4] To remedy the omission, Sir Edward, in a dispatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 27th, 1907, noted, on behalf of H.M. Government, that the Russian Government had explicitly stated that they did not deny the special interest of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. He added: 'H.M. Government think it advisable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy and to affirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them.'[5]

The Convention was not so much an attempt at territorial expansion as an attempt to recognize the *status quo*, to check

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[1] Lansdowne to P. Cambon, October 26th, 1903; ibid., Vol. II, No. 250, pp. 217-18. Also: ibid., Vol. IV, Nos. 181-8, pp. 183-94, especially, Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, November 17th, 1903, No. 181a, p. 183.

[2] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 339, p. 388; Nos. 341-517, pp. 389-576; *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CLVII (1906), p. 1416, Sir E. Grey's statement, May 24th, 1906. For part played by Baghdad Railway, Driault, E., *La Question d'Orient depuis ses Origines* (Paris, 1921), pp. 273 ff. For text: Treaty Series, No. 34 (1907), in *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3753), CXXV, 489; also, ibid., 1908 (Cd. 3750), CXXV, 477; *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, C, 276-7.

[3] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), CXXV, 465. But *cf.*: Hardinge to Grey, December 23rd, 1905, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 322, 276-7.

[4] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 417, p. 465; No. 421, p. 470; No. 425, p. 473; Minutes on No. 428, pp. 476-7; Enclosure to No. 429, pp. 480-1; No. 430, pp. 481-2; No. 434, p. 484.

[5] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3750), CXXV, 477, Dispatch No. 1, Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, August 27th, 1907. For previous declarations of policy, see Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty* (4 vols., 1875-91), Vol. IV, pp. 2615-17, 2624-7; Lord Lansdowne, *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXXI (1903), pp. 1347-8; Lord Salisbury, July, 1878; Hoskins, op. cit., p. 446.

175 648 further Russian advances and to free England to deal with Germany's 'Drang nach Osten'. It was received in England, however, with great disapproval. Of those opposed to the Convention, some alleged that it needlessly sacrificed British interests. Others voiced their misgivings lest Persian opinion, hitherto friendly to Great Britain, should be alienated. These apprehensions were not unjustified, the ill-feeling which the partition aroused in Persia being exploited to the fullest extent by Germany during the Great War. Nevertheless, the Convention served its purpose, particularly in relieving pressure on India and the Persian Gulf at a time when it was most needed.[1]

Early attempts at an Anglo-German understanding had failed.[2] Following, however, the Anglo-Russian Convention, Great Britain turned to negotiations with Germany and with Turkey on the question of the Baghdad Railroad which had continued to grow in international importance. To Turkey, consent to the increase in customs was held out in return for concessions which would both safeguard and consolidate England's acquired position in Turkish Arabia. To Germany, Great Britain was willing to make concessions in order to secure her original demands as stated by Lord Haldane to Emperor William II at Windsor in November, 1907:[3] the right to construct and control the section of the Baghdad Railway from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, thereby securing 'the gate 175* to India'.[1] In 1909 she was prepared to grant Germany a free 648 hand in Turkey north of Baghdad in return for the recognition of similar privileges for Great Britain in southern Mesopotamia.[2]

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[1] Sir E. Grey to Committee of Imperial Defence, May 26th, 1911; *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, App. 5, pp. 788-9. Also, MacCaulay, Capt. D. I., *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, October 10th, 1909. The convention was probably not sincerely observed by either Russia or England. See, *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), p. 605; Vol. 10, pp. 678, 694, 697; Cox to Grey, September 28th, 1913; Minute by H. G. Chick, Commercial Adviser to the Persian Gulf Residency; Government of India to Marquess of Crewe (Confidential), January 22nd, 1914, cited in *Behind the Veil in Persia* (Amsterdam, 1917), pp. 148-57.

[2] For these early negotiations, see: *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. I, No. 122 (August 21st, 1898), pp. 100-1; Vol. II, No. 77 (March 18th, 1901), pp. 60-1 and documents ff.; Vol. III, No. 1 (May 18th, 1904), p. 1; *G.P.*, Vol. XIV, ch. XCI; Vol. XVII, ch. CIX. For an official review of Anglo-German relations, see *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. III, App. A, pp. 397 ff.

[3] Haldane, Viscount R. B., *Before the War* (1920), p. 48; *Autobiography* (1929), p. 220; also, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, Nos. 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, pp. 91-9. From the German side: *G.P.*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 17-22; Baron von Schoen, *Memoirs of an Ambassador* (1922), pp. 59-63.

A settlement along these lines was not out of keeping with the attitude of the Powers, including Austria and Italy, during the period 1907 to 1914,[3] in which there 'was an approach to a general agreement among the European nations with reference to their interests',[4] i.e. the creation of special economic and political spheres of influence. Russia and England had already partitioned Persia in 1907. By the Potsdam Agreement, August 19th, 1911, Germany and Russia recognized each other's special interests in Asia Minor and in Persia.[5] France and Germany brought their commercial interests in the Near and

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[1] This arrangement, proposed to Dr. A. von Gwinner, December 13th, 1903, was accepted by him as far as the financial interests were concerned. Nothing came of it, however: *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 224, p. 195. It was put forward officially as the basis of British policy, April 25th, 1907, Grey to Bertie, ibid., Vol. VI, No. 249, p. 355. Also, Grey to Cambon and to Benckdorf, June 4th, 1907; ibid., No. 250, p. 355. For the renewal of the proposals: Grey to Goschen, October 28th, 1909, ibid., No. 277, p. 379; Marling to Grey, ibid., No. 282, pp. 384-5; and Memo. by Sir H. Babington Smith, ibid., App. 7, pp. 793-4 Enclosure to No. 309, p. 410.

[2] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, No. 277, p. 379; No. 287, p. 388. Also, the confidential letter from the Russian Ambassador, Constantinople, to Iswolsky, November 25th, 1909, de Siebert, B., *Entente Diplomacy and the World War*, 1909-1914 (New York, 1922), No. 576, p. 510: 'The projected treaty is equivalent to partition of Turkey into a British and a German sphere of interest: England granting Germany freedom of action in Turkey, in Europe and Asia Minor, and claiming such for herself only in the Turkish territories in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. The projected treaty with Germany completes England's sovereignty in the Persian Gulf.' Also, Russian Ambassador, London, to Iswolsky, ibid., No. 570, p. 507.

[3] For an able account of these pre-war aspirations: Howard, H. N., *Partition of Turkey* (Norman, 1931), pp. 50-60.

[4] *Official Report on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913.

[5] Text: *Die Kriegschuldfrage*, March, 1924, p. 63. The Potsdam Agreement undoubtedly had its origin in fear of an Anglo-German understanding. In such an event, as the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople wrote to Iswolsky, November 25th, 1909: 'France and Russia would stand alone, which has to be prevented . . . Hence there remains only direct though parallel negotiations between . . . Germany and Russia and Germany and France.' de Siebert, op. cit., No. 576, p. 510. Also, ibid., No. 582, p. 515; No. 619, p. 543. For negotiations, see *G.P.*, Vol. XXVII, Nos. 10218-25, pp. 950-62; *Un Livre Noir* (R. Marchand, ed., 3 vols., Paris, 1922-27), Vol. II, pp. 501-76.

Middle East into agreement between 1910 and 1914.[1] From Great Britain, France had secured in 1912 a pledge of disinterestedness in Syria.[2]

Negotiations with Turkey had been opened in 1909 but not until 1913 was an agreement possible, Great Britain having been forced to give way on many of her original proposals.[3] By Agreements signed July 29th, 1913, Great Britain secured the recognition of her special position in the Persian Gulf and of the validity of her existing treaties with Kuwait and Bahrain. The terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, beyond which the railway was not to extend without the consent of Great Britain. Two British subjects were to be appointed to the Board of the railway. Equal charges, dues and treatment on the railway were guaranteed to all nations. The development and future of the port of Basra were to be partially entrusted to British hands. Exclusive rights of navigation were secured for a new company, eventually formed by Lord Inchcape and the existing Lynch Line, whose privileges were extended.[4] Turkey recognized the right of Great Britain to buoy, light and police the Shatt al-'Arab and the Persian Gulf.[5]

During this period of negotiations, both the Foreign Office[6] and British representatives in Turkish Arabia were concerned

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[1] The Franco-German Agreement was signed February 15th, 1914. See Earle, op. cit., p. [illegible]. also *Docs. Fr.*, 3rd Series, Vol. III, No. 239, p. 317.

[2] M. Pichon at Secret Meeting of the Four Powers, Paris, March 20th, 1919: Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (3 vols., 1922-3), Vol. III, p. 3.

[3] A long series of drafts and counter-drafts had been made as on March 1st, 1911, April 15, 1912, etc. Various sections of the Agreements had been initialed on May 6th and June 11th, 1913.

[4] Hakki Pasha and Lord Inchcape signed a concession, December 12th, 1913. Lord Inchcape and the Lynch Line came to an agreement, March 27th, 1914.

[5] Great Britain, however, made its adherence to the Agreements and consent to the increase in Custom dues, sought by Turkey, contingent on the removal of the Ottoman veto on Egyptian borrowing powers, on further railway concessions and on recognition of the D'Arcy Concession to Turkish oil fields. *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917, pp. 517-21; *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. LIII (1913), pp. 392-5; de Siebert, op. cit., ch. xx; *The Times*, May 17th and 31st, 1913.

[6] Minute by Sir E. Grey, March 12, 1910, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, No. 325, p. 433.

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with increasing Great Britain's influence and prestige, not only 175+ to counteract the importance of the Baghdad Railway, but also 648 to provide a greater claim to Mesopotamia as her sphere of influence in the event of the break-up of Turkey. The Resident of Baghdad had telegraphed, June 23rd, 1913, to the Government of India and to H.M. Ambassador at Constantinople:

> In view of the possible break-up of Turkey and in the meantime the development of preparatory foreign spheres of interest, it seems incumbent on the British Government to preserve every kind of priority which they already possessed in Mesopotamia, their natural sphere in the Ottoman dominions. Hence any abolition of British Post Offices in Turkey should not extend to those at Baghdad and Basra. The Residency guard and the R.I.M.S. *Comet* are appurtenances to be jealously guarded, for the present.[1]

A month later, the Acting Resident in Baghdad presented a full plan for extending Great Britain's position.[2] He advocated an extension of the irrigation system under British auspices, as one of the most important means to that end, saying: 'To gain control of this system and create an *imperium imperio* is important. Control of water will give control of revenue assessment, perhaps control of collection.' As to railways, they would be auxiliary to irrigation and to the agriculture which it would encourage,[3] while steam navigation, he believed, would have to give way both to irrigation and to the railways. The importance of oil, in his opinion, had not been proven.[4]

Germany was not unwilling that Great Britain should possess these special interests in Turkish Arabia, although she was not willing to recognize the full British claims. The process of reconciling the differences between the two Powers was restricted by the necessity of bringing Germany and Turkey into agreement, of considering the wishes of France, Italy and Russia, and of finding compensations for them in order to avoid that obsession of the early twentieth century: a general European war. Not until June 15th, 1914, was a treaty initialled, subject to ratification, following the conclusion of separate Turco-German negotiations.

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[1] Cited: *Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, June, 1913.

[2] He had already urged that increased efforts should be made to add Môsul, not then belonging to any sphere of influence, to Great Britain's sphere. He had suggested that the Church Missionary Society might be aided financially and that Sir Edward Grey should approach the Jewish Colonization Society to subvent schools where English would be taught. Nestorians should also be encouraged. Ibid., February, 1913.

[3] 'Give the Tigris and Euphrates escapes into the deserts, and Babylon will again rival Egypt and the railways will be one of the best paying concerns in the world.' Willcocks, Sir W., *Near East*, June 6th, 1913.

[4] *Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913.

By the terms of the agreement,[1] Germany abandoned all hope of a port in her own name on the Persian Gulf. She secured, however, cessation of obstruction to the Baghdad Railway, the recognition of her own special spheres in Anatolia, North Syria and northern Mesopotamia, in exchange for recognition of Great Britain's dominant position in southern Mesopotamia and in the Persian Gulf. The terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, any further construction to be made only after a complete agreement had been previously reached by the Ottoman, German and British Governments. Both Powers were to observe strictly the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July 29th, 1913, together with the agreement between Lord Inchcape and the Baghdad Railway Company regarding important navigation rights, port and terminal facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates and the agreement between the Smyrna-Aidin Railway and the Baghdad Railway regarding important extensions to the former line. As an essential preliminary to the negotiations regarding the transfer of the Turkish oilfields to a British controlled company, the German Government was forced, in March, 1914, to recognize southern Mesopotamia as well as central and southern Persia as the exclusive fields of operation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and, in addition, to agree to the construction of a railway from Kūt al-'Amāra to Mandalī in order to facilitate the shipment of

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[1] *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1923, pp. 29 ff.

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petroleum. Both Germany and Great Britain undertook to 775
observe their respective interests in the irrigation of the Cilician 648
plain and lower Mesopotamian valley.

Thus, on the eve of the World War, Great Britain's long tenure as the dominant European Power in Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf was about to enter a new phase. Three centuries of British efforts to extend and to protect trade had culminated, through the new concessions contained in the negotiated Agreements, in fresh opportunities for British capital, talent and products in the development of irrigation, of navigation, of the ports of Basra and Baghdad and in the anticipated increase in prosperity of Turkish Arabia. A share of the potential riches of the petroleum fields of Kirkūk had also been won for British exploitation.

Even more important, the long series of British activities in the Persian Gulf and in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys: the suppression of pirates, the establishment of suzerainty over Arab chiefs of the Gulf, the surveys and investigations for river and railway communication projects, and the initiation of diplomatic and military measures, all of which had been successfully directed towards protecting trade and forestalling other powers from reaching the Gulf and thus menacing India, had broken the force of the latest and most dangerous of the attempts to disturb the *status quo* in Persian Gulf regions. Great Britain's claim to special consideration and position in south-west Asia had achieved recognition both by the Powers and by Turkey itself. She had, in effect, with their consent, completed the peaceful annexation of the Persian Gulf as an Indian Lake and the establishment of her special position in the Mesopotamian wilayets of the Ottoman Empire.

The agreements, however, had not been all pure gain for Great Britain. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway was to have its outlet to the Gulf. Germany, although greatly restricted, was to be admitted into the hitherto jealously guarded Garden of Eden. Nor was there any guarantee as to how long the new

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relations could be expected to last. In the face of previous successes in hitherto British markets already won by German commercial rivals and of the bellicose attitude and unfriendly actions of Germans, within the few months following the initialling of the Anglo-German Agreement, it is not too much to conjecture that the agreement might have been, in reality, only an uneasy truce.

It may be reasonably doubted whether these breaches in Great Britain's traditional policy would ever have taken place, whether the negotiations themselves would ever have been necessary, or whether Great Britain would have been forced to suffer nearly 100,000 casualties[1] or to sacrifice £200,000,000[2] in a war in Turkish Arabia had she taken the early opportunities repeatedly offered her of building the trans-Mesopotamian railroad. Had she built the railroad, the wilayets of Baghdad and Basra would probably have taken on the status of Egypt before the war, owing nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan but under the protection of Great Britain. Had there not been the opportunity for economic and political expansion in Turkish Arabia to draw Germany onwards, the latter might never have sought and acquired her predominating influence at the Sublime Porte, without which Turkey would have never entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Without the stimulus of Allied war-time promises of independence, Arab nationalism would not have risen in such power for at least another decade, the Sharifians would not have gained their chance at leadership, and the creation of the kingdom of 'Iraq might have been delayed to the dim future.

Whatever the new relations between Turkey, Germany and Great Britain in Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf might have been as the result of their agreements, it was clear, immediately on the outbreak of war in Europe that the whole

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[1] Casualties from all sources in the Mesopotamia Campaign were 92,501, according to *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 331; 98,018, according to Robertson, Sir William, *Soldiers and Statesmen* (2 vols., 1926), Vol. II, p. 80.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1546.

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situation had been thrown once again into the melting pot. All for which Great Britain had striven, consciously or unconsciously, for nearly three hundred years was now in danger of being swept away. The whole history of the part played by Great Britain in the Middle East made it inevitable, once resort to arms had begun, that she should make some effort, not only to maintain that which she had won but also to secure, once and for all, by the establishment of political control, the Mesopotamian portion of the land route to India.

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accordance with Indian practice for every aspect of life within 175'
the division, was extended and the hierarchy of officials 927'
increased from 1918 to 1920. The very titles borne in India, 647
Civil Commissioner, Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Revenue Officer, Judicial Officer and others were reproduced in the 'Iraq administration.[1]

Whether or not the Acting Civil Commissioner desired to extend the Indian system or not, the shadow of India was over him at all times. Such administrative practices as he had learned by 1914, when at the age of thirty he was inducted into the political service in Mesopotamia, had been learned in India. His early assistants with a few notable exceptions, had been trained in Indian methods and with a tenacity characteristic of Indian Civil Servants, refused to acknowledge that methods applicable to Indians might not be suitable for Arabs. Officers came from other parts of the Empire but the Indian tradition remained.[2]

Much of the Indian influence on the character of the admin- 175'
istration in 'Iraq was undoubtedly due to the fact that India 727'
had provided both the motive and the personnel for the 647
Expeditionary Force. The original intention of making Mesopotamia a dependency of India had been given up but the rumour persisted and had to be officially denied.[3] The early suggestion that 'Iraq might provide an outlet for India's surplus population[4] had subsided but had not entirely died out even in official circles.[5] The strongest claim, however, which India

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[1] Political Officer H. R. P. Dickson had suggested in 1917 that familiar Arab titles be given to the British officers. *Admin. Report, Suq ash-Shuyukh*, 1916-1917, p. 40.

[2] There has been a suggestion of a Civil Service on the lines of the Indian Civil Service, but comprising 'Iraq, the Sudan and the Levant generally. Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917; also Ormsby Gore, W., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. vii (1920).

[3] Telegram No. 3070, Balfour, Paris, to Political, Baghdad, February 10th, 1919.

[4] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. iv (1917), p. 87.

[5] The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, writing in February, 1918, in *My Indian Diary* (1930), p. 250, seems to have had in mind some colonizing scheme for Mesopotamia.

175* and Indian methods had in 'Iraq lay in the interests of the
727* Indian Empire in the future of the country[1] to which it had
648 been bound so long by political and economic ties. The political relation might be severed but these interests had to be safeguarded, as none knew better than the Acting Civil Commissioner. To him, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for India, who had lent his support to the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force in 1914, wrote on March 12th, 1918:

> Entirely different currents are flowing now, and we must shape our course to them if we are to get what we want in 'Iraq. The old watchwords are obsolete, and the question is how we are to secure what is essential under the new ones. The thing can be done, but a certain re-orientation is necessary. The 'Arab façade' may have to be something rather more solid than we had originally contemplated.[2]

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[1] The recognition of the interests of India in the House of Commons, 'The matter cannot be settled without a great deal of careful study and conference with the Indian authorities and others' (*Parl. Debates, H. of C.*, 5th S., Vol. cxx (1919), p. 1798), tended to confirm the Arabs in their belief that India might take over 'Iraq. Also *supra*, p. 240.

[2] Cited Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

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175* 'Iraq state stretching from Raqqah on the Euphrates and
927* Jazir ibn 'Umar on Tigris to Basrah and the head waters of
648 the Greater and Lower Zab. This question only arises in Kurdistan, Mosul Wilayet and Dair uz-Zor. But it is of greatest importance. Alternative is establishment of separate state, roughly Mosul Wilayet not under British Protection.

As regards second point the correspondence annexed to this memorandum sufficiently indicates the arguments for and against and the possible alternatives.

As regards third point, answer is of course inseparable from the decision in point two. Here again the correspondence is sufficiently explicit as regards possible choices. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the importance of avoiding the exacerbation of religious differences which might follow upon an indiscreet selection in this connection. . . .

As soon as you conveniently can after the receipt of this letter, you should discuss the questions raised therein confidentially with the principal personalities in your area, and ascertain from them what the trend of public opinion is likely to be, and inform me accordingly.

When public opinion appears likely, under the guidance of the persons you have consulted, to take a definitely satisfactory line, you are authorized to convene an assembly of all leading notables and shaikhs with a view to placing before them the above questions, informing them that their answers will be communicated to me for submission to Government. When public opinion appears likely to be sharply divided or in the unlikely event of its being unfavourable, you should defer holding a meeting and report to me for instructions.

In such cases, it may be anticipated that the favourable verdict of neighbouring districts will tend to have a favourable effect in forming public opinion.

When opinion is favourable, it is desirable it should be reduced to writing and signed by as many as possible.[1]

The task of conducting the plebiscite presented grave difficulties, of which the Acting Civil Commissioner as Chief

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[1] Memorandum 27190, Civil Commissioner to Political Officers, Baghdad, November 30th, 1918.

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CHAPTER IX

THE PLEBISCITE OF 1918-1919

815 727 648 666 In obtaining 'the views held by the local population',[1] the Acting High Commissioner believed that the extension of the plebiscite to the rank and file of the inhabitants was both impracticable and unnecessary. The masses were too illiterate, too ignorant and dependent on their leaders to merit consideration. The garden cultivators and date growers of the Tigris and the Euphrates, the orange growers of Ba'qûbâ, the shepherds of the Dulaim, the rice cultivators of Dîwânîya and Shâmîya, the marsh dwellers of 'Amâra and Qurna, the tribesmen throughout the land and the townsmen of little substance were regarded as having neither opinions of their own nor ability to form them other than as echoes at the behest of their religious and secular leaders. The attention of the Civil Administration was therefore directed to those elements of the population who by position and by character were presumed to be favourable to continued British control, and whose opinions might be put forward as representative.

In the tribal districts and in small towns the plebiscite was confined to the shaikhs and land-owning dignitaries, called together in assemblies where they gave their declarations under their seals and signatures. Among the shaikhs, dependent on the British for support of their position,[2] for possession of their lands, as at 'Amâra, or for their highly-prized subsidies,[3] and the Cairo Conference in March, most of the outstanding points at issue between H.M. Government and the Amir had been settled. It remained for the Cairo Conference to confirm his candidature and to outline the procedure by which he was to be installed in 'Iraq.

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 29th, 1918. Cited, *supra*, p. 161.

[2] During the troubles of 1920, many shaikhs were forced into the towns, as they had no power to maintain themselves otherwise over their tribes.

[3] As in Dîwânîya Division, where every shaikh until 1920 received a subsidy from the Civil Administration.

The Cairo Conference, March 12th–24th, 1921

The Middle East Division of the Colonial Office had owed its creation to the necessity of devising a less costly British policy for the Near and Middle East and of replacing by unified control the complicated and cumbersome system of divided authority among the Foreign, the India and the Colonial Offices.[1] Mr. Churchill, in taking charge of Near and Middle East affairs, was faced, on the one hand, by the insistent demand of the British public for a radical reduction in expenditure[2] and, on the other hand, by the necessity, with which the whole political creed was in sympathy, of maintaining and consolidating the territorial gains and the strategic vantage points won in the East as the result of a vast outlay of British blood and treasure. To aid in formulating new lines of procedure in order to achieve these ends, he called a conference of the principal political and military officials of the areas concerned to meet in Cairo on March 12th, 1921.[3]

The questions considered by the Conference included, in problems concerning 'Iraq, the immediate reduction of British expenditure with the consequent revision of policy involving (*a*) the future relationship of the new State to Great Britain,

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. [illegible] (1921), c. [illegible]

[2] Ibid., Vol. [illegible] (1920), [illegible]; Vol. [illegible] (1921), [illegible]; H. of L., Vol. [illegible] (1921), [illegible]; *The Times*, [illegible]; *Daily Telegraph*, June [illegible], 1920.

[3] The representatives of 'Iraq who were summoned to the Conference were the High Commissioner, accompanied by the [illegible]; the Commander-in-Chief, [illegible]; [illegible], C.M.G., D.S.O., Minister of Defence, [illegible], C.M.G., C.I.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Works, [illegible], Financial Adviser, Miss Gertrude Bell, C.B.E., Oriental Secretary.

195' (*b*) the person of the future ruler of 'Iraq; and (*c*) the nature
327' and composition of the defence forces of the new State which
643 was to assume an increasing share of its own defence. The
648 status of the Kurdish regions in their relations to 'Iraq was also discussed.

It was apparent, in view of the decreasing revenue, of falling agricultural prices and of the large burdens to be assumed in taking over the Railways, the Port of Basra and other public works from the Army at the latter's own valuation, that the prospects were not bright for the immediate assumption by the new State of the cost of its defence. Anticipating a discussion of the question, vital from the British standpoint, at Cairo, the High Commissioner after consultation with Sir Aylmer Haldane and the Minister of Defence had, nevertheless, formulated proposals involving substantial saving for the ensuing year and further reductions in the future, consequent on 'Iraq assuming an increasing share in the responsibilities hitherto devolving on Great Britain.[1] Mr. Churchill was thus able to announce a preliminary reduction of the original estimate of British expenditure in the Middle East for 1921-2, from £35,000,000 to £27,500,000, a figure which was expected to fall to nine or ten million pounds in 1922-3.[2] The reduction in the British budget, however, necessitated a stipulation that the 'Iraq budget should provide not less than 55 lacs for the National Army, the strength of which should eventually amount to 15,000 men, and that ordinarily her contributions to defence should not fall below 15 per cent of her revenue,[3] a proportion later increased to 25 per cent.[4]

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[1] Cox, Sir P. Z., 'Historical Summary' in Bell, op. cit., p. 531.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 271. Also ibid., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1547. The actual expenditures in 'Iraq by the British Treasury, 1920-5 have been stated to be (ibid., Vol. CXCII (1926), p. 4):

1920-1	£32,000,000	1923-4	£3,740,358
1921-2	£23,333,030	1924-5	£4,679,734
1922-3	£7,807,384	1925-6	£4,118,400

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

[4] Article IV of Military Agreement and Article IV of Financial Agreement, subsidiary to the Treaty with King Faisal, October 10th, 1922, Cmd. 2120.

SEARCH FOR A RULER

In order to enable the High Commissioner to achieve the 175'
proposed economies for the relief of the British taxpayer, the 227'
Conference agreed that until the 'Iraqi Army could be recruited, 643
equipped and trained, the Levies should be increased from 648
4000 to 7500 and that they were to be financed by H.M. Government and to be administered by the High Commissioner. The Levies, hitherto, had been composed for the most part of Arabs, with a small number of Kurds. Assyrians were now to be recruited.[1] In addition, six squadrons of the Air Force, stationed at strategic points, were to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order.[2]

The success of the proposed withdrawal of British troops from 'Iraq depended almost entirely on the creation and maintenance of friendly relations between the 'Iraqis and the Mandatory Power, which had been temporarily improved by the establishment of the provisional Government. The continuance of strong Nationalist agitation, however, directed against the Mandate on the ground that the relationship which it created had no basis either in British promises or in Arab Nationalism, seemed to indicate that the mandatory regime, as originally conceived and outlined in the draft document, could not be imposed without prolonged military occupation on a scale which British public opinion rendered impossible. The mere prospect of increased hostility, leading inevitably in the absence of adequate military forces in the country to disturbances similar to those of 1920 or even worse, would not only paralyse the efforts of British officials to apply the Mandate and to develop the country but would also lead to an irresistible renewal of British public opinion for the complete evacuation of a country where the game was not worth the candle.

It had already been suggested to H.M. Government, in May, 1920, by Mr. Montagu, that if Nationalist agitation were to

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920–1922, pp. 44–5.

[2] Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xx (1933), p. 399.

175x be cut at its roots and if a friendly government co-operating
727x with Great Britain were to be established in 'Iraq, a further
643 step in defining the relations between the two countries might
648 be necessary.[1] This step would consist of an attempt to satisfy national aspirations by disguising the relationship, sanctioned under the terms of the mandatory document then already in existence, by means of a treaty of alliance. Lord Curzon, who had difficulty in agreeing with Mr. Montagu on any subject, had rejected the suggestion at the time. Mr. Churchill took up the idea, all his conversations with Amir Faisal being conducted on the basis of negotiating a treaty similar to that between Great Britain and Egypt, which would establish Faisal as King of an independent State in alliance with Great Britain. Under such a treaty, the scope of British authority might be more restricted than originally projected, but under skilful handling, the ultimate authority could be made not less effective. It would have the added merit of enabling Great Britain to maintain with less expense her position before the League of Nations without sacrificing her Imperial interests.

When Mr. Churchill arrived at Cairo for the Conference, he had made up his mind that Faisal was the only possible candidate with whom such a treaty might be negotiated. In agreement with him were Sir Percy Cox and many friends and supporters of the Amir at the Conference: T. E. Lawrence, Miss Bell, Ja'far Pasha, H. W. Young, and others. Amir Faisal's high birth, as a son of Husain, Sharif of Mecca and King of the Hijāz, assured his position among Arabs in general and gave his person a sanctity among the religiously minded, even among the Shī'is. He possessed experience in the ways of men and in diplomatic usage gleaned from his early life among the Turks at Istanbul, from his sojourn in the desert in the days of peace and of war against the Turks, from his participation at the Peace Conference at Versailles and from his brief day as King at Damascus. Among the Nationalists, his early

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[1] Young, Major Sir H. W., op. cit., p. 313.

espousal of the Arab cause in Syria,[1] his leadership of the Arab 195
forces in the Hijāz and in Syria and his election as the first 727
Arab ruler of Damascus since the Ummayads, secured his 643
standing as an Arab patriot. His personality and his character 648
which had won and were to continue to win the affection of British officials with whom he associated, were expected to gain the adherence of the 'Iraqis among whom a strong sentiment in his favour already existed.

His short-lived kingship at Damascus, it was believed, had revealed to him the difficulties of a purely Arab administration and the danger of relying entirely on an Arab army.[2] British advice and assistance to the new kingdom would, therefore, it was hoped, be welcomed for their own sake and be regarded not merely as onerous conditions imposed by the Power which had given him his throne.

As a secondary consideration, it was felt that Faisal's nomination would, in part, redeem the promises made during the war to the Sharif in particular and to the Arabs in general and thus rehabilitate British prestige in the Arab world. It would, in addition, mitigate Faisal's bitterness against the British Government for what he believed to be its responsibility in his overthrow at Damascus.[3]

Mr. Churchill believed, moreover, that if Faisal were installed in 'Iraq, the British Government would acquire increased control both over him and over his father, the Sharif of Mecca, who was still proving intractable and exasperating in his relations with Great Britain. At a meeting of the Special

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[1] His efforts to secure the release of the Syrians accused of treason during the war nearly cost him his own life. See Djemal Pasha, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

[2] Amir Faisal, in his unpublished Memoirs, written during his sojourn in Italy in 1920, spoke, however, in glowing terms of his own Arab forces of the desert campaign, and declared that had they fought at Maisalun the French would not have won the engagement.

[3] In his *Memoirs*, Amir Faisal maintained, not always correctly, that he had followed faithfully the advice of his British Advisers in all his relations with the French, relying on the help which they promised; that they had discouraged his summoning of his Hijāzi followers; and that in the crucial hour of his need, they had abandoned him to the French.

175 Committee dealing with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq, on
727 the opening day of the Conference, March 12th, Mr. Churchill
643 declared that Faisal should be made to realise that his father's
648 subsidy as well as the British guarantee to the Sharif of non-aggression from Wahhâbî sources depended on Faisal's own behaviour.

Although the approval of Amîr Faisal's candidature was almost a foregone certainty, the merits of the other candidates were not overlooked at the Conference. The High Commissioner, speaking on March 12th, did not believe that any local candidate could be elected. The Agha Khan, whose interests had become European rather than Asiatic, would not accept the nomination. Sentiment for a Turkish Prince was not strong enough to be considered. By the process of elimination as well as by his own merits, Faisal appeared to be the only possible candidate.

The difficulties attending the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq were not ignored. Warning notes were sounded as to the undoubted opposition of Saiyid Talib Pasha to any nominee other than himself[1] and as to the probable effect on Ibn Sa'ûd, an ally of Great Britain, of the establishment of the two new Hâshimî kingdoms: 'Iraq on the north and Transjordan on the north-west. To counter possible active hostility from Ibn Sa'ûd who had already shown interest in the political situation in 'Iraq, the Conference resolved that he should be acquainted with the attitude of H.M. Government to Faisal's candidature. The High Commissioner, accordingly, telegraphed to the Wahhâbî leader shortly after the Conference had adjourned. He received in reply a letter, dated May 7th, 1921, expressing Ibn Sa'ûd's thanks for the consideration shown him at the Conference.[2] After Faisal's departure for 'Iraq and Mr. Churchill's

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[1] Expected to take the form of anti-Mandate agitation.

[2] Kohn's statement, *History of Nationalism in the Near East*, p. 308, that the effect on Ibn Sa'ûd of the setting up of the Hâshimî princes was overlooked by the British Government, is not borne out by the records of the Cairo Conference. See *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 263 ff. Also *supra*, p. 137.

announcement, Ibn Sa'ūd again wrote, on June 21st, to the 175
High Commissioner stating his willingness to accept the 727
decision of the British Government, but asking that his own 642
position be determined and safeguarded. Some time afterwards 640
he replied in friendly terms to a message from Faisal.[1]

A further question arose at the Conference as to whether an 'Iraqi Congress or Assembly should propose Faisal as King. It was pointed out by a member of the special Committee that a concrete proposal must be placed before the Assembly if it were convened or the results of its deliberations would not be satisfactory. Mr. Churchill stated that he knew of no precedent for allowing a Constituent Assembly to choose its own ruler. It was eventually agreed that convocation of the Assembly before the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq was undesirable but that the High Commissioner should use his discretion according to the situation existing at the time. It was also agreed, in order that 'Iraq should appear to choose its own ruler, that a line of procedure should be followed which would give the 'Iraqis the opportunity of demanding Amir Faisal. The following schedule was provisionally proposed:

April 18th – The High Commissioner would arrive in Baghdad.

April 18th to 21st – Announcement by the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs that H.M. Government approved of Amir Faisal as a candidate for the throne of 'Iraq. This would be accompanied by a proclamation of a general amnesty issued by the High Commissioner.

April 23rd – Amir Faisal would send telegrams to Nūri Pasha as-Sa'īd, to Talib Pasha and to the Naqib of Baghdad

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[1] Letter, Ibn Sa'ūd to Amir Faisal, July 29th, 1921:
After compliments, etc., 'We thank God for your safety and beg that you will be always safe. May you prosper.
'There is no doubt that you are fit to be the foremost in good action as is proved by the capacity you have shown in solving difficulties and maintaining mutual support for the upkeep of the glory of the Arabs. You may be sure that your brother has no thought nor aspiration other than this.'

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announcing his candidature and saying that he, Faisal, hoped that he would have their co-operation.

April 23rd to May 8th – Nūrī Pasha and other 'Iraqis would send telegrams to Amīr Faisal, inviting him to come to 'Iraq as its prospective King.

May 8th to June 8th – Amīr Faisal would come to 'Iraq or would send his representatives, the arrival to take place about the middle of May. He or his representatives would be met by such a welcome and response from 'Iraqis as to make it unnecessary to convene the Constituent Assembly, except to ratify or to confirm his election as King.

This schedule, finally adopted after minor alterations as to details and dates, implied that the Amīr should come to agreement with H.M. Government in regard to the future treaty, to Great Britain's position in 'Iraq and towards the League of Nations and to his own position generally.[1] It also implied that the Sharifian party in Baghdad, stimulated by the announcement of approval by H.M. Government and by judicious promptings emanating from the British Residency, would prove to be sufficiently representative and powerful to merit the invitation to the Amīr to come to 'Iraq where he could appear only when the ground had been carefully ploughed and harrowed.

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq during the Period 1920–1931* (Special Report by H.M. Government to Council of League of Nations, Colonial No. 58 (1931)) (hereafter *Progress of 'Iraq*), p. 14).

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Organic Law and to ensure religious and educational freedom, contained in Articles One and Eight of the Mandate, were thus reproduced in Article III of the Treaty,[1] with the additional proviso that the Organic Law should prescribe constitutional procedure within the country.

Article V of the Treaty replaced Article Three of the Mandate providing, in terms suitable to the regime, for 'Iraqi representatives abroad, and for representation of foreign Powers in 'Iraq, subject to the approval of His Britannic Majesty. Article VII of the Treaty reproduced Article Four of the Mandate, which had forbidden the ceding or leasing of 'Iraq territory. Article IX noted the non-application of immunities under the capitulations, which Article Five of the Mandate had definitely abrogated. Article VIII also contained the first section of Article Six, providing for the establishment of a judicial system to safeguard the interests of foreigners. The King of 'Iraq now agreed to 'accept and give effect to such reasonable provisions as His Britannic Majesty may consider necessary in judicial matters'. Article XI reproduced almost exactly that section of Article Eleven of the mandatory document which had ensured economic equality in the mandated territory to all members of the League. One important addition was made, however. A new clause extended economic equality to 'any State to which His Britannic Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same rights should be ensured as if it were a member of the said League'. This addition had its origin in the satisfactory termination of the Colby-Curzon correspondence over the 'Open Door' principle in mandated territories.[2]

The final section of Article Eleven, which had sanctioned the arrangement of a Customs union with other Arab States,

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[1] Numbers written in full are employed throughout in reference to the mandatory document (Cmd. 1500); Roman numerals refer to articles of the Treaty of 1922. Ibid., 1922 (Cmd. 1757), iv, 769.

[2] Ibid., 1921 (Cmd. 1226), xliii, 2181; 1921 (Cmd. 1351), xliii, 495; U.S. Senate Document No. 97, Oil Concessions in Foreign Countries, 68th Congress, 1st session, p. 55; Gerig, op. cit., pp. 140-1, 143-4.

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together and on March 24th had pledged themselves to support 641 the Treaty and to take no other action without common consent.

Discordant elements, however, both inside and outside the Assembly, soon began to make themselves felt. In the Assembly, a group, of which Yāsīn Pasha, Nājī Pasha as-Suwaidī and Muzāhim Pāchahjī were leaders, opposed the Treaty and the Agreements on the grounds that they limited independence, that the Agreements, particularly the British Official and Financial Agreements, were more than the country could bear, and that they did not in return assure adequate support for 'Iraq, especially in the Mōsul frontier dispute. The party's vigorous advocacy of these arguments, particularly the last two, with which even supporters of the Treaty were in sympathy, drew many of the wavering deputies to their side.

Another group was formed, theoretically in opposition to the Treaty but in reality, it was maintained in official circles, in opposition to the Cabinet, whose fall it hoped to bring about. Still another group, led by Ra'ūf Beg Chādarchī, opposed the Treaty on technical grounds, alleging that in form it was not a treaty which could be honourably signed by two nations. It was merely the Mandate re-written.[3]

In addition, a large section of the tribal representatives, led by Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn of the Muntafiq, broke away from the tribal group, declaring that it would not agree to ratification unless the Organic Law guaranteed the shaikhs special privileges: increased use of the Tribal Disputes Regulations, the perpetual lease of government lands then held by the shaikhs and consultation with a tribal *majlis* of twelve shaikhs of any *Liwā* where martial law was about to be declared.

Outside the Assembly, where the sole subject of conversation was the Treaty, the religious leaders, the lawyers and law students, school teachers and Nationalists generally, including the young leaders of the *Ma'hadu'l 'Ilmī* and the *Nādī'l 'Islāh*,

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[3] Such was the tenor of Ra'ūf Beg's speech, June 2nd: *Mudhakkarāt*, 19th session, pp. 300 ff.

645 669 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2] Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many 'Iraqis held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 185 [207] Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 648 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realised as have other 'Iraqi Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

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[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqi friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimi died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Bilād*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 9th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *Al-Tariq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 10 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936.

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eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 16 ✓

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 21 ✓ has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahin* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 453 features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 468 may take 'Iraqi wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically non- 455 existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466 have been under consideration for some time. The Department 467 of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqi labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175 economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 176 of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 10th, 1937.
[2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.
[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 16th, 1935.

‘IRAQ

176 185 927 have had little effect on British policy. Although agreeing to the progressive restatement of its relations with ‘Iraq, the British Government diminished no whit of its insistence that its advice, through the High Commissioner and the British officials, be taken; that its assistance, as outlined in the Treaty and the Agreements, be employed; and that its will as the mandatory Power be the ultimate authority.

175 185 If the formal relinquishment, October, 1932, by Great Britain of her right to control the affairs of ‘Iraq except in accordance with the Treaty and Agreements still in force, marked another stage in ‘Iraq's political existence, the work of development has not been completed. In the continued reorganization of finances, in the perfection of the Judicial system, in the raising of education standards, and in the extension of agriculture, irrigation and means of communication still lie much to be done. Hopeful signs of governmental action would seem to appear in the current version of the frequently altered Five Year Capital Works Plan with its provision for irrigation projects, roads, bridges, 130 schools and numerous health centres,[1] in the proposed Health Campaign,[2] and in the recently created Agricultural Bank,[3] and in the many new proposals laid before the Chamber by the new Government.

● [2vt] ‘Iraq's recent treaty of friendship with Sa'udi Arabia, April 2nd, 1936,[4] and her amiable relations with Turkey seem to point to the removal of these two external dangers. Within the country still lie the problems of the creation of a social class of citizens, now beginning to appear, capable and willing to assume political duties from a sense of public duty and not of personal aggrandisement, the evolution of a free Press motivated by public spirit rather than by individual or party grievances, the assurance of free elections, and the elimination of sectarian and sectional animosities which will eradicate the antipathies between tribesmen and townsmen, will bring the Shi'is into

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[1] C.S. and E., April 9th, 23rd, 1936.
[2] [illegible] and [illegible], August 8th, 22nd, 1933.
[3] C.S. and E., March 16th, 1936.
[4] Times ibid., April 23rd, 1936.

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GENERAL MAUDE'S PROCLAMATION[1]

To the People of the Baghdad Vilayet

In the name of my King and in the name of the peoples over whom he rules, I address you as follows:

Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy and the driving of him from these territories. In order to complete this task I am charged with absolute and supreme control of all regions in which British Forces operate, but our Armies have not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors, or enemies, but as Liberators.

Since the days of Hulaku your Citizens have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunken in desolation and your forefathers and yourselves have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered in distant places.

Since the days of Midhat Pasha the Turks have talked of reforms yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify to the vanity of those promises?

It is the wish, not only of my King and his peoples, but is also the wish of the Great Nations with whom he is in alliance, that you should prosper, even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science and art and Baghdad was one of the wonders of the world.

Between your people and the Dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest and for 200 years have the Merchants of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks, who have despoiled you and yours, have for twenty years made Baghdad a centre of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British in Persia and Arabia. Therefore, the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your country, now or in the future, for, in duty to the interests of the British people and their Allies, the British Government cannot risk

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1914-1919, Proclamation No. 9, pp. 5-6.

648 that being done in Baghdad again which has been done by the Turks and Germans during the war.

But you, the people of Baghdad, whose commercial professions and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government, to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realised once again. The people of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In the Hejaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them and have proclaimed Sharif Husain as their King and His Lordship rules in independence and freedom and is the ally of the Nations who are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany. So, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of Nejd, Koweit and Asir.

Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of freedom at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the Great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the desire and hope of the British people and Nations in alliance with them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the peoples of the Earth and that it shall bind itself to this end in unity and concord.

O! People of Baghdad. Remember that for twenty-six generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the North, East, South and West in realising the aspirations of your race.

Army Headquarters,
Baghdad

F. S. Maude, Lieut.-General,
Commanding British Forces
in 'Iraq

The 19th March, 1917
(24th Juma-al-Awal, 1335)

Sc:Ireland S-3 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

APPENDICES

APPENDIX II

BALFOUR DECLARATION[1]

2 November, 1917

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

APPENDIX III

PRESIDENT WILSON'S TWELFTH POINT[2]

8 January, 1918

POINT XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guaranties.

APPENDIX IV

THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION[3]

The end which France and Great Britain have in view in their prosecution in the East of the war let loose by German ambition is

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[1] From facsimile of original letter, Stein, op. cit.
[2] *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. cxi (1918), p. 950 ff.
[3] *Proclamations*, 1914-1919, Proclamation No. 32, November 8th, 1918, p. 21.

648 the complete and definitive liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions France and Great Britain are agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, which have already in fact been liberated by the Allies, and in countries whose liberation they are endeavouring to effect, and to recognize the latter as soon as they shall be effectively established. Far from wishing to impose any particular institution on these lands, they have no other care but to assure by their support and effective aid the normal working of the Governments and Administrations, which they shall have adopted of their free will. To ensure impartial and equal justice, to facilitate economic development by evoking and encouraging indigenous initiative, to foster the spread of education and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy – such is the rôle which the two allied Governments assume in the liberated territories.

APPENDIX V

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TENTATIVE DRAFT OF ARAB INSTITUTIONS[1]

Central Government

Arab Ministers with English Advisers.

Say: For Interior, Finance, Justice, Education, Public Works, Commerce or Agriculture(?), Waqf(?).

Council of Ministers

Consisting of Arab Ministers and Advisers.

To be the Supreme Legislative body for the whole country.

No elected legislative body at present.

Local Government

English Commissioners – Arab Deputy Commissioners or vice versa.

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[1] Memorandum by Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Baghdad, 1919.

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assistance as a younger brother demands from an elder, as a freeman from a freeman, not as a slave from a master, but as a friend from a friend. 643

'I am the friend of the British, and I ask the nation to hold towards them the friendship of the free to the free.'

APPENDIX VIII

H.M. KING FAISAL'S ACCESSION

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(Telegrams Exchanged on the Occasion of)

(i) *Telegram from H.M. King George V to H.M. King Faisal*[1]

'I offer Your Majesty my sincere congratulations on this historical and moving occasion when by the overwhelming vote of the people of 'Iraq the ancient city of Baghdad has once again become the seat of an Arab Kingdom. It is a source of deep gratification to myself and my people that combined military effort of British and Arab forces and those of their Allies has culminated in this memorable event. The treaty which will shortly be concluded between us to consecrate the alliance into which we entered during the dark days of the war, will, I am confident, enable me to fulfil my solemn obligations by inaugurating an era of peace and renewed prosperity for 'Iraq.'

(Signed) GEORGE, R.I.

(ii) *Telegram in reply from H.M. King Faisal*

'I am profoundly touched and greatly rejoice at the Royal and gracious favour which you have extended towards me and towards my people in Your Majesty's message.

'On this auspicious day when Baghdad the city of the Khalifs has become for the second time the capital of an Arab Kingdom, I recall with pride how white has been the hand of Your Majesty and Your noble people in the achievement of Arab aspirations. I am confident that the Arab Nation will justify Your Majesty's

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[1] *Iraq Admin. Report, October, 1920, to March, 1922*, pp. 9-10.

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643 648 reliance on the success of their efforts to regain their pristine glory provided that they continue to enjoy the support and friendship of Great Britain. I doubt not that the treaty which will be concluded between us, will strengthen the bonds of alliance already cemented with the mingled blood of Briton and Arab on the battle-fields of the Great War and that it will be established on unshakeable foundation.

'Finally, I wish Your Majesty and your honoured Nation continued prosperity and enduring glory.'

(Signed) Faisal

APPENDIX IX

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PROTOCOL OF 30 APRIL, 1923

(To the Treaty with King Faisal, Signed 10 October, 1922)[1]

We, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of His Britannic Majesty and of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq respectively, having been duly authorized, met together this 30th day of April, 1923, corresponding to the Ramazan, 1341, in order to sign the following Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Their Majesties aforesaid on the 10th of October, 1922, corresponding to 19th Sa'far, 1341, Hijrah, subject to ratification.

PROTOCOL

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 18, the present Treaty shall terminate upon 'Iraq becoming a Member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a fresh agreement from being concluded with a view to regulating the subsequent relations between them before the expiration of the above period.

In witness of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures thereto. Done at Baghdad in duplicate this thirtieth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three of the Christian Era, corresponding with the fourteenth day of Ramazan, one thousand three hundred and forty-one, Hijrah. 618

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[1] Cmd. 2120.

P. Z. Cox
His Britannic Majesty's High
Commissioner in 'Iraq

Abdul Muhsin al Sa'adun
Prime Minister of the 'Iraq
Government

653 already existing water shortage in the Kut and Amara regions in
3/2 southern Iraq would become more acute. Its construction is all the more urgent because the Wadi Tharthar reservoir will not supply supplementary water for the Tigris for another decade at best. In fact, some geologists believe that loss of water in the reservoir may be such that little or no water for irrigation will ever be furnished by the Wadi Tharthar. Should the Wadi Tharthar ultimately prove able to supply water for irrigation, the water impounded by the Bekhme dam could be utilized for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in northern Iraq.

Completion of the final stage of the Habbaniya project calls for the storage in the Abu Dibis and related depressions of water in excess of the expanded capacity of Habbaniya Lake and, in theory, would also permit a substantial extension of irrigation in the Euphrates Valley. Further study is required before beginning this stage of that project, however, because there is great danger that the salt in the depression may make the water unfit for irrigation, or at least dangerous to use, until after the completion of drainage facilities for all the areas irrigated from the Euphrates. At the same time the technical possibility of providing alternative storage capacity through the erection of a dam on the upper Euphrates near Ana should be explored.

•[648] The irrigation projects outlined above necessitate agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the conservation and utilization of the water of the Euphrates and the Tigris and their tributaries. An agreement with Syria is particularly urgent, since the extensive irrigation development possible in that country might adversely affect Iraq. With Turkey and Iran it is important to conclude understandings for joint afforestation and other water conservation measures in the watershed of the Tigris and its tributaries. Afforestation and other anti-erosion measures in the international watersheds of the two rivers will effectively complement the flood-control features of the water storage schemes.

080 In the monograph on irrigation the Mission has given a tentative selection of the irrigation projects which it believes should be initiated to utilize the waters of the new reservoirs. In view of the inadequacy of the information at its disposal, the Mission suggests, however, that its recommendations be reviewed in the light of a

3/2 653 As a result irrigation in the Lower Tigris basin, particularly in the area served by the Shatt al Gharraf where water is already acutely short, would inevitably suffer in consequence unless water were made available from some alternative source. Although the deficit may be made good from the Wadi Tharthar in the end it is by no means certain, as has already been pointed out, that the Wadi Tharthar depression will be able to supply water for irrigation. If the Wadi Tharthar reservoir can ultimately supply the Lower Tigris, it will still be possible to use the water stored behind the Bekhme dam for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in the North.

Nor should the cost be regarded as out of proportion to the results that will be achieved. In 1948 Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther estimated the cost of a gravity dam in concrete at ID 9,000,000, but in 1950 they came to the conclusion that a buttress dam could be built at considerably lower cost, namely about ID 6,300,000. The dam would provide a net storage capacity of 1.66 billion cubic meters and would increase the usable discharge of the river from 120 meters to about 300 meters. This would furnish additional water sufficient to irrigate an area of two million mesharas gross. On this area it would be possible to grow winter cereals on 620,000 mesharas which might have a total value of ID 3,700,000, assuming conservatively a yield of one quarter of a ton per donum and a price of ID 10 per ton. If, in addition, summer crops were grown on one third of the area devoted to winter crops and yielded about the same value per meshara, the total value of the crops grown on the area of two million mesharas gross could be put at about ID 5,000,000 per year. The resulting increase in national income would far outweigh the cost of the scheme. Even the tax yield would exceed the cost of amortization.

International Agreements

3/2 647 The construction of these reservoirs makes it necessary to reach agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the control of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris. For the Euphrates this is particularly urgent because half of the course of the river is in Turkish and Syrian territory and nearly all of its basin is in a foreign country. There are irrigation possibilities in Syria which could seriously reduce the flow of water into Iraq. Works which would raise the water level 10 to 20 meters upstream would con-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

mand an area for irrigation of 1,000,000 to 1,360,000 masharas in 312
Syria. Irrigation of 1,000,000 masharas would require a flow of 648
almost 60 cumecs. In Turkey and Iran the mountainous nature of the watershed of the rivers makes it much less likely that significant quantities of water will be diverted for irrigation. With these countries, however, it will be important to reach agreements regarding joint anti-erosion measures. Such measures will effectively complement water-storage schemes as means of flood control, the more so since silting will otherwise substantially reduce the effective life of reservoirs. Cooperation in afforestation of the watershed areas of these rivers is therefore highly desirable.

At present no such agreements exist. With Syria, there is no accord whatever. With Iran, there is only an old protocol of 1914 governing the use of the waters of a small stream, the Gangir. A protocol annexed to the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness, concluded with Turkey on March 29, 1946, set up a flood-warning service, permitted Iraq to investigate possible sites for flood-control dams in Turkey and gave agreement in principle, subject to confirmation in each case, for construction of works recognized to be necessary. Turkey also undertook to inform Iraq of any contemplated works on any of the two rivers. The scope of the agreement is thus rather limited.

II. Irrigation Works

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It is now necessary to consider what irrigation works will be needed to utilize the additional water that will ultimately be made available by the water reservoirs discussed above and what further works should be undertaken to ensure better utilization of water.

Aside from flood control, the most important consequence of the new reservoirs will be the expansion of the area under irrigation. As Table 1 indicates, the area now under irrigation has been estimated by the Haigh Commission at 12,696,000 masharas gross, of which 4,671,000 are irrigated by the waters of the Euphrates and 8,025,000 by those of the Tigris and its tributaries.

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[For data on international relations and the Iraqi bid for independence and comments on nationalistic movements, see Category 116, pp. 56-78; and 146-159.]

3;Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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175 fluence under Arab rule, the zone between this area and the province of Mosul; the latter was to fall in the French sphere of interest but was included by the Clemenceau–Lloyd George Agreement of December 1918 in the British sphere in exchange for French participation in the north Mesopotamian oil deposits.

British official opinion was divided in its policy towards Iraq. The civil administration in Iraq was for long uncertain whether Iraq, including even the Mosul area, might not be annexed and come under direct rule of the Indian pattern. In the interest of imperial security and administrative efficiency they distrusted the Arab nationalism which had inspired the Arab Revolt in the west. The Arab Bureau in Cairo, on the other hand, favoured Hashimi rule of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The British Government, beset by conflicting advice and embarrassed by its war-time agreements, attempted, through the agency of the administration in the country, to sound Iraqi opinion on the most acceptable form of control.

With the consequent delay in making a definite pronouncement of policy and with practical indications that the administration on the spot was preparing for British rule rather than for Iraqi independence, there was considerable discontent among Iraqi nationalists and pan-Arabists, who consisted chiefly of educated townsmen. Resentment was fanned by Turkish propaganda and by the fiercely enthusiastic Iraqi officers serving with Amir Faisal ibn Hussain in Syria and aggravated by the war-time measures of a foreign, non-Muslim administration. These weighed particularly heavily on the tribal and landowning rural population, especially the Shii tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, who, self-interested rather than strongly nationalist, were assailed by the propaganda of the urban nationalists and the Shii divines of the Holy Cities. The assignment of the Mandate for Iraq to Great Britain at San Remo in 1920 and an attempt at tribal disarmament were followed by disturbances which, in July of that year, developed into an insurrection which, while it left large areas of the country unaffected, required considerable forces to suppress it. It was not completely suppressed till early 1921; but by October 1920 Sir Percy Cox, the first High Commissioner under the mandatory system, had terminated military rule and established an Arab Council of State advised by British officials.

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648 By March 1921 the Amir Faisal ibn Hussain, expelled from Damascus by the French the previous year, agreed at the instance of the British Government to accept the throne of Iraq;

3.Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 MI Middle East

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his nomination, accepted at the Cairo Conference of 1921, was 642 approved, in spite of some opposition, by the Iraqi Council of 648 State and confirmed in a referendum, and he was enthroned on 23 August 1921. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, through which the mandatory Power had decided to embody its obligations towards the League of Nations, was signed by the Iraq Government on 10 October 1922 against the determined opposition of nationalist elements, who insisted that the Treaty should terminate the Mandate and British influence, whereas it in fact incorporated the provisions of the Mandate, gave guarantees on judicial matters to make up for the abolition of the Capitulations, and guaranteed Great Britain's special interests in Iraq. Its period of validity, twenty years, was reduced the following year to four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey, which followed in July 1923; this, and the subsequent evolution of the British Government's attitude towards Iraq, were due largely to the increasing demand in Great Britain to terminate British commitments there. In March 1924, in spite of national- [186] ist and Shii threats to boycott the elections, a Constituent Assembly was elected and was induced, in the face of considerable political and popular resentment, to accept the Treaty (June 1924), and later ratified it and the Organic Law, which had been drawn up on the basis of an Iraqi draft, after considerable disagreement between the King and the British Government on one side and Iraqi political opinion on the other over the royal powers.

In November the Council of the League of Nations awarded 648 the major part of the Mosul vilayet to Iraq. In the same year a treaty between Turkey, Great Britain, and Iraq accepted the new frontiers as definitive and inviolable, while Iraq agreed to pay to Turkey 10 per cent on Mosul oil royalties on condition that the mandatory regime, as expressed in the Treaty, should continue for twenty-five years unless Iraq were previously admitted as a member of the League; this provision was embodied in a new Treaty in 1926. In September 1929 the British Government undertook to support Iraq's candidature for membership in 1932 and in 1930 a further new Treaty was signed, which provided for a close Anglo-Iraqi alliance, to last for twenty-five years from the admission of Iraq to the League. There was to be full and frank consultation between the parties in matters of foreign policy which might affect their common interest; mutual assistance in the event of war, including Iraq's provision of communications and all other facilities and assistance and the right of passage to British troops; and lease of sites for air bases near Basra and west of the Euphrates at which

648 forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction [186] and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the 643 ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was 645 inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets 668 which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the 669 factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in [185] assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

648 In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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Afghanistan, which provided for consultation in all disputes 648 that might affect the common interests of the four states.

Relations with Great Britain

During the period of independence the hostility of Iraqi 648 nationalists towards Great Britain in no way diminished. The 186 mandate had been replaced by a treaty that they had from the first opposed as denying full independence and their sentiments were strengthened by Syrian and Palestinian nationalists, deeply critical of British policy in Palestine, who took refuge in Iraq. A further stimulus was provided by Axis propaganda, which produced among nationalist groups not only hostility to Great Britain but a positive admiration for the totalitarian states. When King Ghazi killed himself in a motor accident in [643] April 1939, to be succeeded by his infant son Faisal II, with the Amir Abdul-Ilah, Ghazi's cousin and brother-in-law, as Regent, there was a violent outburst of anti-British feeling in the belief that the accident was British-inspired.

Consequently, although the Iraqi Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany in September 1939, political opinion was divided on the measure of assistance to be granted to Great Britain under the Treaty; nationalists, especially in the all-important army, demanded non-belligerency and even the resumption of relations with Germany; and diplomatic relations with Italy were maintained. In 1941 the routine of political intrigue combined with nationalist and anti-British feeling and the effect of allied reverses, five years of Axis propaganda, and the presence of the Mufti of Jerusalem in Baghdad, to produce a chain of events which culminated in April 1941 in the last of the coups d'état. Rashid Ali al-Gailani seized 669 power with the support of an army group more violently 645 nationalist and anti-British than himself and formed a Government which was pledged to maintain Iraq's non-belligerency and displayed considerable sympathy towards the Axis. The Regent and several senior statesmen quitted the country. Relations were strained between the new Cabinet and the British Government, which was reluctant to recognize it, and on 2 May a disagreement over the passage of British troops through Iraq, on the basis of the Treaty, led to Anglo-Iraqi hostilities. These were terminated, after the introduction of further British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion, on 29 May; by this time the Regent had returned to Iraq, the Rashid Ali Government had fled, and armistice negotiations were in progress. Shortly after the outbreak of Anglo-Iraqi hostilities the Iraqi Government had been in touch with

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648 649 German representatives for the provision of military aid. A number of aircraft were in fact dispatched with an advance party to Baghdad and Mosul and armaments were supplied by the Vichy Government of Syria, who also put its aerodromes at the disposal of German aircraft; but the coup was premature from the point of view of the German Command, whose forces were required for the immediate conquest of Crete and the all-essential invasion of the Soviet Union, and the assistance given was too late and limited to prevent collapse.

Succeeding Governments co-operated effectively with the Allied war effort, and Iraq became a base for operations against the Levant and Persia (1941) and for aid to Russia, and in January 1943 she declared war on the Axis Powers and signed the Declaration of the United Nations. In 1945 a rebellion of the Kurdish Barzani tribe, which had continued intermittently since 1943, was finally suppressed, and the rebels took refuge in the so-called Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (north-west Persia) which had newly been formed under Soviet inspiration, and, after its collapse, in the Soviet Union itself.

Relations with Other Middle East Countries

648 In 1945 Iraq signed the Arab League Pact, towards whose realization Nuri as-Said, Prime Minister from 1941 to 1944, played a leading part, though the Arab states rejected as premature his further proposal for the union of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan in one state. A project in 1946 for a close union between Iraq and Jordan was criticized both in the Arab League and in Iraq and Jordan, and was diluted into a treaty of alliance and eternal brotherhood between the two countries, which provided for consultation in the event of aggression by a third party and military intervention by one party to suppress disorders or rebellion in the other. In 1947, in spite of internal opposition, a treaty of friendship with Turkey was ratified. It was intended that Turkey should sign similar treaties with other Arab states to form a Middle East bloc in replacement of the moribund Saadabad Pact, but in the event Jordan was the only other state to sign.

[665] In 1946 permission was given for the formation of political parties, of which none had existed since the mid-thirties. Licences were granted to five, of which two were subsequently suppressed, but were refused to the Communist groups, which continued to operate, as they had done both before and after their reinforcement in 1941, in secret. Though considerably weakened by official action against them in 1947, they are alleged to have played an active part in the disturbances at

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the time of the Portsmouth Treaty, in which the remaining authorized parties also played an important part in opposition to the Government. After the withdrawal in 1947 of British forces, except those of the Royal Air Force stationed in the two Treaty bases, negotiations had been instituted for the revision of the Treaty itself and in January 1948 Salih Jabr, the Prime Minister, visited Great Britain and signed a new treaty at Portsmouth, by which the air bases were to be handed over to Iraq on the conclusion of peace treaties with the enemy Powers and thenceforth to be placed at the free disposal of British aircraft in transit, and an Anglo-Iraqi Joint Defence Board was to be established to co-ordinate defence matters. The Treaty was signed against a background of hostility towards the post-war Governments (and consequently against the Western Powers, who were supposed to provide their backing), aggravated by a grain crisis and the United Nations resolution to partition Palestine. Its announcement was greeted with student demonstrations; these were inadequately dealt with by the administration and, with the instigation of overt and probably clandestine political groups, developed into riots in which there were several casualties. Confronted with political opposition and mob violence, the Regent disowned the Treaty, after at first accepting it, and the Prime Minister with reluctance resigned. The Treaty was rejected by a new Government which, with its successors, restored outward calm. The Treaty of 1930 has since remained in force, although all political elements are pledged to revise or abrogate it. 645 [668]

The Palestine conflict evoked the strongest feelings in Iraq. Iraqi contingents fought there and were not withdrawn until 1949; and the closure of the Haifa oil pipeline has been maintained, at considerable financial loss. Similarly, at the time of the Lake Huleh incident in 1951, Iraqi anti-aircraft units were sent to Syria with considerable popular applause. In Iraq itself Zionist activity has been declared, like Communism, a criminal offence. There has been no overt retaliation against Iraqi Jews, but, in view of strong public feeling and governmental encouragement, some 130,000 from an approximate total of 150,000 quitted Iraq in 1951 and 1952, most of them for Israel, leaving an economic and financial vacuum which is only now being filled. The exodus was hastened by the discovery in 1951 of caches of arms and explosives on Jewish premises in Baghdad, together with documents which were stated to prove the existence of a Zionist organization for espionage and terrorism and its responsibility for several bomb outrages; a number of sentences were passed, two of death. 648 668

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9 Iraq 1811

648 Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

668 Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the econo-
665 mic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified
the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and
[575] continued action against Communism and incipient plans for
national development have not so far availed to counteract.
[565] The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely
[370] lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but
the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

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cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 and is estimated at ID155,374,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

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By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of an annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 48 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

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[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1952).

20. Hourani 5-5 (1946) 1947 M1 Middle East
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563 acknowledge no law except their own customs, and no leadership
619 except that of their chief families, some of which, like the Baban
178 family, were virtually independent princes in Ottoman days.

Tribal feeling is still, as it has always been, stronger than Kurdish national feeling; and the Kurds have never formed a nation, still less a nation-state. In the last generation or so, however, new factors of unity have been arising. One is the growth of a Kurdish town-population. In the past the Kurds tended to leave commercial crafts to Jews and Christians, but now a Kurdish bourgeoisie has appeared, in whom tribal loyalties are weaker and national ideals stronger. Another factor is the emergence of a Kurdish intelligentsia. Its education has been mainly non-Kurdish: Turkish in the days of the Ottoman Empire, Arabic and Western in the present generation; in consequence many of the educated Kurds have been assimilated to the Turks or Arabs. The majority, however, have remained Kurds, and have begun to develop a modern Kurdish press and literature, with its centres in Baghdad and Sulaimania. They are in contact with the centres of Kurdish life in Syria, Persia, Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Republic, and are forming and spreading the ideas of Kurdish independence and unity.

The Kurds under the Mandate

619 Before the war of 1914–18, the majority of the Kurds were
563 subject to Ottoman rule. It was natural, therefore, that the Allies should favour the idea of Kurdish autonomy: an ideal embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which provided for local autonomy for the Kurds still to be left in Turkey, or, if they themselves desired it, an independent state to include the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, of which the disposal was still undecided. The Treaty was never carried out, and was replaced in 1923 by that of Lausanne, which said nothing about a Kurdish State or about autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan. In the meantime, an Iraqi Government under British Mandate had been established, and, as it had been found impossible for economic and other reasons to establish a separate government for the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, it had been decided to incorporate them in the unitary State of Iraq. On the whole, the Kurds of the Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk regions accepted this, but those of Sulaimania did not. In 1922 they revolted under the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud. The revolt was only with difficulty suppressed; and it was not

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East

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until 1924 that the Iraqi Government was able to establish its authority in Sulaimania.

In the next year the Frontier Commission, which had been appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to decide upon the disposal of the Mosul Vilayet and the frontier between Iraq and Turkey, visited the Kurdish areas in the Vilayet. In its report it is recommended that, while the Vilayet should be allotted to Iraq, so far as possible the officials of administration, justice and education in the Kurdish areas should be Kurds, and Kurdish should be recognised as an official language. This recommendation was adopted by the League Council, which stated, in its decision on the Mosul issue, that

> the British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations . . . the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the Commission. . . .[1]

There can be no doubt that both the mandatory authorities and the Iraqi Government did on the whole carry out the recommendation of the League Commission. But administrative concessions did not satisfy the Kurds, or at least those of the Sulaimania region. It was not only that they had been promised autonomy by the Treaty of Sèvres and deprived of their hope by the Treaty of Lausanne; even more important was it that they interpreted the recommendation of the Commission as promising them not simply administrative conveniences but also some sort of regional autonomy, and this misunderstanding was never removed. Their discontent found its expression in another revolt, again led by Shaikh Mahmud, in 1927. It was increased by the unfriendly policy towards their fellow-nationals pursued by the Governments of Turkey and Iran, and more especially by the signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which contained no safeguards for minorities. Quite apart from the dislike of most Kurds for most Arabs, the former could not view with any pleasure the prospect of their being subjected to a Government which was likely to be similar in spirit to those of Turkey and Iran.

Efforts were made to dispel these fears. On the one hand,

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[1] Decision Relating to Turco-Iraq Frontier. Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations, Geneva, December 16, 1925. H.M. Stationery Office, Misc. 17. Cmd. 2562, 1925.

20: Hourani 5-5 (1946) 1947 M1 Middle East
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148 563 the Acting High Commissioner and the Acting Prime Minister visited Kurdistan together, and made statements in which, while condemning separation and emphasising the unity of Iraq, they spoke of the Government's resolve to satisfy the linguistic and other demands of the Kurds. On the other hand, a number of conciliatory measures, both legislative and administrative, were taken. The most important of them was the Local Languages Law already mentioned.

[669] In spite of this, revolt once more broke out among the Kurds, first under Shaikh Mahmud (1930–1) and then under Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan (1932). The causes of these revolts were partly political and partly personal. They were only subdued through the intervention of the R.A.F.

The Kurds since the Treaty

563 668 148 From 1932 to 1943 the Kurds did not revolt again, but continued to be restless and unwilling to accept the authority of the Government. There were two main reasons for their restlessness. The first was the growth of Kurdish national spirit, due partly to the gradual appearance of a class of educated Kurds, partly to a natural reaction against Pan-Arabism. The encouragement given by the French to Kurdish nationalism in the Syrian Jazirah, and by the Russians to Kurdish autonomy in the Caucasus, may also have had a certain although a limited influence. The second and more fundamental reason was to be found in the particular administrative grievances of the Kurdish tribes. The Iraqi Government made little attempt to carry out the provisions of the various laws passed during the mandatory period. Government departments in Baghdad tended to neglect the claims of districts so far away from the capital; and the Kurds had no way of making their voice heard effectively and compelling the Government to pay attention to their needs. In general, Arab officials in the northern provinces failed to understand the mentality and needs of the Kurdish people (although Kurdish officials in Arab districts were often highly successful). The gap between administration and inhabitants was perhaps greatest in the Mosul liwa, where the administration was largely under the influence of the Arab townspeople of Mosul itself.

563 668 601 The Government's neglect showed itself in every sphere. There were few facilities for education, and those which existed were mainly for education in Arabic. Again, nothing was done

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COTTON IN IRAQ

The program is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress 652
unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually 654
static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a profound economic and social transformation, with far-reaching repercussions.

The International Bank concludes that the country will need no further foreign loans except possibly to meet part of the hard currency needs.[19] The oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling. However, under a new agreement, the United Kingdom has undertaken to furnish sufficient dollars against sterling to cover Iraq's essential needs.

The International Bank in 1950 already had loaned $12.8 million to Iraq, primarily for flood control, irrigation, and road construction. Apparently the Bank is willing to consider further loans, but the Iraqi are not interested as long as the oil revenues continue and they are able to get sterling converted into dollars.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A number of organizations are providing technical assistance to Iraq in 648
its development program, notably the United States Point Four Program and 659
the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization.

Point Four began its program early in 1952 in such fields as cotton agronomy, farm machinery, agricultural extension and vocational education, irrigation, entomology, rural health, sanitation, and industrial development. About 25 Americans have been employed, and the number may be doubled by the end of the year. Most of the Point Four funds go for salaries; the costs of tools and materials are assumed by the local government. The specialists in Iraq obviously were chosen for their competence, practical experience, and their interest in the assignment. They are anxious to develop the most desirable means of approaching the problem.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has about 11 specialists regularly employed in the country in such fields as soils, cooperatives, bacteriology, veterinary science, nutrition, agricultural statistics, farm mechanization, and home economics. The program may be extended to cover agricultural research, extension, underground water and drainage, forestry, and fisheries.

The FAO operates almost entirely at the government level; Point Four seeks to go beyond government planning to the grass roots.

INDUSTRY

The people of Iraq, in common with their neighbors of the Middle East, 162
live almost entirely by agriculture. About 80 per cent of the population earns 413
its living directly from the soil, and most of the others indirectly.[20] Industry is still relatively undeveloped. Apart from the oil industry, which employs about 15,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 people are employed in what are called modern industrial plants.

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[19] Ibid., p. [illegible].
[20] Ibid., p. [illegible].

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY IN RESPECT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ[1]

June 30, 1930

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, 648

And His Majesty the King of Iraq,

Whereas they desire to consolidate the friendship and to maintain and perpetuate the relations of good understanding between their respective countries; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty undertook in the Treaty of Alliance signed at Baghdad on the 13th of January, 1926, that he would take into active consideration at successive intervals of four years the question whether it was possible for him to press for the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations; and

Whereas His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland informed the Iraq Government without qualification or proviso on the 14th of September, 1929, that they were prepared to support the candidature of Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in the year 1932 and announced to the Council of the League on the 4th of November, 1929, that this was their intention; and

Whereas the mandatory responsibilities accepted by His Britannic Majesty in respect of Iraq will automatically terminate upon the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations; and

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[1] English text in "Treaty Series No. 15" (1931), Cmd. 3797, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1931. Cf. also the Convention between the United States, Great Britain, and Iraq, signed at London, January 9, 1930, *Rights of the United States of America and of Its Nationals in Iraq*, "Treaty Series No. 835," Washington, Government Printing Office, 1931. A new Treaty of Alliance designed to replace this Treaty was signed at Portsmouth on January 15, 1948, by Mr. Ernest Bevin, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Saiyid Salih Jabr, Prime Minister of Iraq. But the new Treaty met with opposition in Iraq, and the Prime Minister of Iraq resigned office. The Treaty has not been ratified; see text with annexure and exchange of letters in *Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Majesty the King of Iraq*, "Iraq No. 1" (1948), Cmd. 7309, London H. M. Stationery Office.—Ed.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
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Whereas His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq consider that the relations which will subsist between them as independent sovereigns should be defined by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance and Amity:

Have agreed to conclude a new Treaty for this purpose on terms of complete freedom, equality and independence which will become operative upon the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations. . .[1]

Art. 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq.

There shall be established between the High Contracting Parties a close alliance in consecration of their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations, and there shall be full and frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or might create difficulties for the other party thereto.

Art. 2. Each High Contracting Party will be represented at the Court of the other High Contracting Party by a diplomatic representative duly accredited.

Art. 3. Should any dispute between Iraq and a third State produce a situation which involves the risk of a rupture with that State, the High Contracting Parties will concert together with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of any other international obligations which may be applicable to the case.

Art. 4. Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 above, either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the provisions of Article 9 below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. In the event of an imminent menace of war the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence. The aid of His Majesty the King of Iraq in the event of war or the imminent menace of war will consist in furnishing to His Britannic Majesty on Iraq territory all facilities and

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[1] Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations October 3, 1932. See p. 197 below. —Ed.

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle Eas
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assistance in his power including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication.

Art. 5. It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in Iraq and, subject to the provisions of Article 4 above, for the defence of Iraq from external aggression rests with His Majesty the King of Iraq. Nevertheless, His Majesty the King of Iraq recognises that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty is in the common interest of the High Contracting Parties. For this purpose and in order to facilitate the discharge of the obligations of His Britannic Majesty under Article 4 above His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes to grant to His Britannic Majesty for the duration of the Alliance sites for air bases to be selected by His Britannic Majesty at or in the vicinity of Basra and for an air base to be selected by His Britannic Majesty to the west of the Euphrates. His Majesty the King of Iraq further authorises his Britannic Majesty to maintain forces upon Iraq territory at the above localities in accordance with the provisions of the Annexure of this Treaty on the understanding that the presence of those forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Iraq.

Art. 6. The Annexure hereto shall be regarded as an integral part of the present Treaty.

Art. 7. This Treaty shall replace the Treaties of Alliance signed at Baghdad on the 10th day of October, 1922, and on the 13th day of January, 1926, and the subsidiary agreements thereto, which shall cease to have effect upon the entry into force of this Treaty. It shall be executed in duplicate, in the English and Arabic languages, of which the former shall be regarded as the authoritative version.

Art. 8. The High Contracting Parties recognize that, upon the entry into force of this Treaty, all responsibilities devolving under the Treaties and Agreements referred to in Article 7 hereof upon His Britannic Majesty in respect of Iraq will, in so far as His Britannic Majesty is concerned, then automatically and completely come to an end, and that such responsibilities, in so far as they continue at all, will devolve upon His Majesty the King of Iraq alone.

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648 It is also recognised that all responsibilities devolving upon His Britannic Majesty in respect of Iraq under any other international instrument, in so far as they continue at all, should similarly devolve upon His Majesty the King of Iraq alone, and the High Contracting Parties shall immediately take such steps as may be necessary to secure the transference to His Majesty the King of Iraq of these responsibilties.

Art. 9. Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris on the 27th day of August, 1928.

Art. 10. Should any difference arise relative to the application or the interpretation of this Treaty and should the High Contracting Parties fail to settle such difference by direct negotiation, then it shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Art. 11. This Treaty shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force as soon as Iraq has been admitted to membership of the League of Nations.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty-five years from the date of its coming into force. At any time after twenty years from the date of the coming into force of this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, conclude a new Treaty which shall provide for the continued maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty. In case of disagreement in this matter the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

ANNEXURE TO THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE

1. The strength of the forces maintained in Iraq by His Britannic Majesty in accordance with the terms of Article 5 of this Treaty shall be determined by His Britannic Majesty from time to time after consultation with His Majesty the King of Iraq.

His Britannic Majesty shall maintain forces at Hinaidi for a period of five years after the entry into force of this Treaty in order to enable His Majesty the King of Iraq to organise the necessary

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forces to replace them. By the expiration of that period the said forces of His Britannic Majesty shall have been withdrawn from Hinaidi. It shall be also open to His Britannic Majesty to maintain forces at Mosul for a maximum period of five years from the entry into force of this Treaty. Thereafter it shall be open to His Britannic Majesty to station his forces in the localities mentioned in Article 5 of this Treaty, and His Majesty the King of Iraq will grant to His Britannic Majesty for the duration of the Alliance leases of the necessary sites for the accommodation of the forces of His Britannic Majesty in those localities.

2. Subject to any modifications which the two High Contracting Parties may agree to introduce in the future, the immunities and privileges in jurisdictional and fiscal matters, including freedom from taxation, enjoyed by the British forces in Iraq will continue to extend to the forces referred to in Clause 1 above and to such of His Britannic Majesty's forces of all arms as may be in Iraq in pursuance of the present Treaty and its annexure or otherwise by agreement between the High Contracting Parties, and the existing provisions of any local legislation affecting the armed forces of His Britannic Majesty in Iraq shall also continue. The Iraq Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that the altered conditions will not render the position of the British forces as regards immunities and privileges in any way less favourable than that enjoyed by them at the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.

3. His Majesty the King of Iraq agrees to provide all possible facilities for the movement, training and maintenance of the forces referred to in Clause 1 above and to accord to those forces the same facilities for the use of wireless telegraphy as those enjoyed by them at the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty.

4. His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes to provide at the request and at the expense of His Britannic Majesty and upon such conditions as may be agreed between the High Contracting Parties special guards from his own forces for the protection of such air bases as may, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, be occupied by the forces of His Britannic Majesty, and to secure the enactment of such legislation as may be necessary for the fulfilment of the conditions referred to above.

5. His Britannic Majesty undertakes to grant whenever they may

57; Davis S-4 (no date) [illegible]

represented on the Council shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

Chapter II

Art. 11. *Most-favoured-nation Clause.* (1) Subject to reciprocity, Iraq undertakes to grant to Members of the League most-favoured-nation treatment for a period of ten years from the date of its admission to membership of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, should measures taken by any Member of the League of Nations, whether such measures are in force at the above-mentioned date or are taken during the period contemplated in the preceding paragraph, be of such a nature as to disturb to the detriment of Iraq the balance of trade between Iraq and the Member of the League of Nations in question, by seriously affecting the chief exports of Iraq, the latter, in view of its special situation, reserves to itself the right to request the Member of the League of Nations concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of restoring the balance.

Should an agreement not be reached by negotiation within three months from its request, Iraq declares that it will consider itself as freed, *vis-à-vis* of the Member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down in the first sub-paragraph above.

(2) The undertaking contained in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to any advantages which are, or may in the future be accorded by Iraq to any adjacent country in order to facilitate frontier traffic, or to those resulting from a Customs union concluded by Iraq. Nor shall the undertaking apply to any special advantages in Customs matters which Iraq may grant to goods the produce or manufacture of Turkey or of any country whose territory was in 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

Art. 12. *Judicial Organisation.* A uniform system of justice shall be applicable to all, Iraqis and foreigners alike. It shall be such as effectively to ensure the protection and full exercise of their rights both to foreigners and to nationals.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
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648 The judicial system at present in force, and based on Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Agreement between the Mandatory Power and Iraq, signed on March 4th, 1931, shall be maintained for a period of 10 years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

Appointments to the posts reserved for foreign jurists by Article 2 of the said Agreement shall be made by the Iraqi Government. Their holders shall be foreigners, but selected without distinction of nationality; they must be fully qualified.

Art. 13. *International Conventions.* Iraq considers itself bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which it has become a party, whether by its own action or by that of the Mandatory Power acting on its behalf. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by Iraq throughout the period for which they were concluded.

Art. 14. *Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations.* Iraq, taking note of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of September 15th, 1925:

(1) Declares that all rights of whatever nature acquired before the termination of the mandatory regime by individuals, associations or juridical persons shall be respected.

(2) Undertakes to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on Iraq's behalf by the Mandatory Power during the period of the Mandate.

Art. 15. *Freedom of Conscience.* Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of public order and morality, Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee throughout its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions or of their members.

Art. 16. *Final Clause.* The provisions of the present chapter constitute obligations of international concern. Any Member of the League of Nations may call the attention of the Council to any infraction of these provisions. They may not be modified except by

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agreement between Iraq and the Council of the League of Nations acting by a majority vote. 642
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Any difference of opinion which may arise between Iraq and any Member of the League of Nations represented on the Council, with regard to the interpretation or the execution of the said provisions, shall, by an application by such Member, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The undersigned, duly authorised, accepts on behalf of Iraq, subject to ratification, the above provisions, being the declaration provided for by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of May 19th, 1932.

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NOTE ON TREATIES

648 1. Treaty of Friendship between Afghanistan and Iraq.[1]

2. Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq,[2] signed at Baghdad on April 14, 1947. The Treaty came into force on June 6, 1947, after the exchange of ratifications had been completed on that day.

3. Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey[3] (with six annexed Protocols), signed at Ankara on March 29, 1946. The Treaty came into force on May 10, 1948, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Baghdad.

4. Iraq is a party to the Saadabad Pact,[4] the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood with Saudi Arabia to which Yemen adhered,[5] the Pact of the Arab League[6] and the Cultural Treaty of the Arab League.[7]

5. Iraq is an original member of the United Nations and deposited its ratification of the Charter on October 30, 1945.

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[1] See above, p. 24.

[2] Text in United Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 23 (1948-1949), No. 345, pp. 147-154. In the preamble it is stated that the Treaty is concluded "in execution of Article 9 of the Charter of the Arab League" (see below, p. 530).

[3] Text in United Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 37 (1949), pp. 281-331.

[4] See below, p. 523.

[5] See below, p. 518.

[6] See below, p. 527.

[7] See below, p. 534.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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Iraq

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Iraq is a constitutional monarchy which 642
has been an independent sovereign state 648
since the termination, in 1932, of the mandate
awarded Great Britain by the League
of Nations. Historically, it is identified 131
with Mesopotamia, the "land between the
rivers" and the home of one of the oldest
civilizations known to man. Modern Iraq 131
has an area of about 170,000 square miles, 133
encompassing the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, a fringe of highlands in the north and an expanse of desert in the southwest. It extends from the Persian Gulf and Arabia in the south to Turkey in the north, and from Iran in the east to Syria and Jordan in the west. The country is conveniently divided into four geographic regions—the alluvial plains of the rivers, the mountain ranges backing the northern and the northeastern frontiers, the intervening uplands and the desert.

Rising in the mountains of eastern Anatolia, 133
the Tigris River flows for 770 miles through Iraq, and in its northern course receives several tributaries, the most important in Iraqi territory being the Great Zab, the Little Zab and the Diyala. The Euphrates River also takes its source in Anatolia but meanders across central Syria and, subsequently, for 750 miles in Iraq before converging with the Tigris at Al Qurnah. The Shatt al Arab, formed by the union of the two rivers, flows for about 100 miles to the Persian Gulf, and for part of its length marks the boundary with Iran. The lower Euphrates and Tigris valleys form a great deltaic plain which reaches back from the Gulf to a zone north of Baghdad. It is

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1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group,
● 651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an
ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving
the construction of the Habbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and
a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable
success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton
Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards
called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist
nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale
which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method,
came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated
in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable
harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness,
654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small
Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with
231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it
could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi
flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual
losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility
of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship
494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay
in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in
mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The
mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased
threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars
plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying
repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much
491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by
Ramadi and Rutba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated
in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters
was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's
foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian)
competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the
victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The
Rutba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in
the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year
thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through
205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails
by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services
superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi
administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive
and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

652 Acting Adviser, and thereafter by E. G. Hogg, from the Sudan, in
1931. Hedgcock and the present writer left the Ministry in 1930
and 1931. Provision for Capital Works under a five-year plan
was separated from the current budget, and a main part of the oil
revenues, which first accrued in 1932, was allotted to this object.
An Economic Advisory Board was set up. Chambers of Commerce
were founded in Baghdad and Basra. A second advisory visit by
Hilton Young, the 'Iraqis' financial consultant of 1925, was paid in
1930, and other foreign experts—notably A. Sainsbury, expert in
[651] income tax—assisted in the institution of new taxation and the
fixing of civil service establishments. Income tax in modern form
was first imposed in 1928, but proved relatively unproductive; in
effect it was paid mainly by officials and foreign companies. A
major change in the taxation of agricultural produce was made in
1931, based on a new system of tax collection at markets—the
'place of consumption' method—without the need to assess or
measure the growing crops. A financial Inspectorate was introduced.
Efforts both resolute and skilful were made in 1927 to free
'Iraq from the burden of its share of the Ottoman Debt, of which
£ (Turkish) 7 million had fallen to its share, with a further
£T2,500,000 of accumulated interest. The Minister of Finance
arranged to buy Ottoman Debt securities in the open market and,
after handing these to the Debt authority to an extent of £1,228,000
sterling, could arrange to pay off the small remainder by instalments.
Thus, at the cost of finding funds from current revenue for
debt extinction, the State could enter the League happily unencumbered.

652 The proposed foundation of a National Bank, often discussed,
436 was still postponed. The Indian rupee currency, which had served
'Iraq well for fifteen years, was superseded early in 1932 by an
'Iraqi currency employing the dinar (equivalent to a pound sterling),
divided into a thousand fils. Currency resources and the note issue
were supervised by a Board in London, and rested on a basis of
sterling assets. The confident reception of the new currency was
the more gratifying as 'Iraq suffered not only temporarily from a
number of 'slump' bankruptcies, but chronically from an adverse
457 trade balance. A wide visible gap existed between the value of its
439 exports and that of its unavoidable imports of fuel, manufactured
articles, and some foods. The invisible exports which were assumed
to fill the gap were the expenditure by the British forces, diplomatic
and archaeological missions, charities and foreign schools,
pilgrims, tourists and foreign companies, and the profits of the
Persian transit trade. The progressive slackening of the last mentioned,
in spite of lowered transit dues, was a serious feature of the
times. Persian restrictions, Russian competition, the diversion of

L: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

382 1951 be anticipated that the continued presence and enlarged operations of the oil companies would remain an outstanding economic and social advantage to the 'Iraqi people: that, especially after the destruction of the great oil industry of Persia by the action of its Government, 'Iraq's position as a supplier of crude petroleum must give it an international importance greater than ever before: but also that the minds and emotions of local patriots, for whom the Persian tragedy had no terrors and no lesson, would not abandon the demand for a 'nationalization' which might or might not (according to its form and manner) permit the continuance of the industry. It was indeed clear that the presence in 'Iraq of successful, wealthy, and well-organized European enterprises with their foreign control, high living standards, and concession-granted privileges must, however correct their conduct and however enlightened their policy, be offensive to the nationalist sentiment of at least one school of local politicians; and the period during which oil development on these lines might be able to continue could not, for all its enormous advantages to the country, be confidently foreseen.

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Meanwhile, to the 'Iraqi Treasury its receipts from oil sources were no longer a mere helpful supplement to other revenues but a main pillar of the Government itself and the foundation of all its hopes of development and improvement. The anxiety of 'Iraqi statesmen to derive still greater revenues from the oil industry than those provided in the 1925 or 1931 concessions—4 shillings (gold) per ton—and their claim that 'gold' should be translated into sterling at unofficial open-market rates led from 1947 to 1951 to repeated discussions between Government and Company. The gold question of which the Company, at 'Iraq's request, agreed in 1949 to allow settlement by a British Court rather than by arbitration, remained still unsettled when the period closed, with indications that the Baghdad Government intended still to press its full claims.[1] The question of royalty revision resulted in 1950 in a partly retroactive and conditional agreement to raise the 4 shillings gold per ton to 6 shillings gold; but this increase, immediately helpful as it was to the 'Iraq Treasury, was in turn to be superseded by further and long-drawn negotiations based on a new principle of half-and-half division of the profits: a principle which, first announced by the Arabian-American Company in Sau'di Arabia on the last day of 1950, could not but abruptly supersede all less favourable terms enjoyed by neighbouring countries. Conversations on this basis were in progress in Baghdad between Company

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[1] These might amount to some £20 million sterling. Agreement upon a compromise figure (£5 million) was reached by the negotiators in 1951, but did not form part of the settlement ratified by Parliament early in 1952.

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and Government throughout the first half of 1951 and were to embrace the production obligations of all the companies operating in 'Iraq and the royalties or taxes expected from them.[1] Under the influence of the 'nationalization' movement—but in more moderate form than the brutal self-mutilation of Persia—the 'Iraq Government decided in 1951 to nationalize the refining and distribution of its oil in so far as this was consumed in 'Iraq itself: the operation, that is, of the Khaniqin and Rafidain Oil Companies. Negotiations with these and with Anglo-Iranian, their parent, led to agreement on the basis that the Companies were to transfer their plant and assets to the State at a valuation, and to remain for ten years as operating agents on its behalf.

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The Port of Basra in the period 1946–50 maintained and substantially improved its services—wharves and sheds, cranes and machinery—and, in spite of the increased cost of labour and supplies, could show a profit on each year's operations. It continued annually to pay off its capital debt, completing that process in 1951. It maintained and largely increased its electric-power and water supplies to Basra city. The airport, with its wireless service and its enlarged hotel, remained Port property. The dredging-depot at Fao was extended, an all-weather road constructed to link it by land to Basra. A shore depot was built at Harmaq, opposite Abadan. The traffic using Ma'qil wharves decreased abruptly from the level of the previous five war years, but the tanker traffic of the Anglo-Iranian increased, until the spring of 1951, more than sufficiently to compensate for this. The development of a subsidiary port at Umm Qasr, on the Khur 'Abdullah, was a time, than if attempts have to be made to carry out development in a scattered and incomplete manner throughout the whole country at once.

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[1] The new Oil Agreement, based on acceptance in August 1951 of the principle of equal division of profits between Government and Company, was ratified by Parliament in February 1952, and made retroactive to 1 January 1951. With the probable initial through-put (in a full year) of the 30-inch line (some 14 to 15 million tons a year) additional to the existing through-put (nearly 8 million) of the 12-inch and 16-inch lines to Tripoli, 'Iraq's revenues from this source were expected—on existing cost and price bases—to surpass £30 million in 1952 and to reach £60 million in 1955. Minimum production was agreed at 22 million tons a year (for I.P.C. and M.P.C. combined) from 1954 onwards, and 8 million from B.P.C. from the end of 1955. Government was assured that its receipts would be not less than a quarter of the seaboard value of I.P.C. and M.P.C. crude oil, and a third of that of B.P.C. Fluctuation of costs and of world oil prices was to be taken into account in ascertaining the divisible 'profits', and Government might, if it wished, take in kind 12½ per cent. of the crude produced, and either dispose of it or sell it back to the Companies. A large part of the balance of Government's revenue was to be received in the form of income tax. Minimum receipts to Government, guaranteed subject only to *force majeure*, were to be £20 million sterling in 1953 and 1954, and £25 million in 1955 and thereafter; in the event of a physically unavoidable failure in production a smaller minimum would be payable for two years. The Agreement covered in addition the doubling of 'Iraqi representation on the Boards of the Companies, restrictions on the appointment of non-'Iraqis to positions in the Companies, an increase (up to fifty per year) of 'Iraqis maintained in British universities for higher studies, and the extension of technical education organized by the Company in Kirkuk fields.

4. LAND REVENUE REFORM

4. It was my original intention to devote one part of this report entirely to a study of land revenue questions. For although it seemed to [illegible] a matter for independent consideration, the effect upon all tenures of land of the burden of any land revenue demand (whether in cash or kind) and the methods by which it is imposed, is profound. But since I left in 1930 a drastic change in the land revenue system has been enacted.* It will clearly not be helpful to comment on land revenue methods that have been superseded. And I understand that the new laws are of a specifically provisional nature and that their imperfections are realised, so that it seems of equally little use to comment on them. But although no useful purpose seems likely to be served by the discussion of the displaced land revenue system now, the three accompanying

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* [illegible]

TABLE III. ANNUAL COLLECTIONS OF LAND REVENUE, [illegible]

In lakhs of rupees

Year	Summer Crops	Winter Crops	Dates	Vegetables	Other fruits	Tobacco	Miscellaneous	Totals
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Totals	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Averages	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE LAND REVENUE, [illegible]

[illegible]

Crops	Average receipts		Percentage distribution [illegible]									
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Summer crops	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	—	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Winter crops	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	[illegible]	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dates	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	[illegible]	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vegetables	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	—	—	—	[illegible]	—	[illegible]	—	—
Other fruits	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	[illegible]	—	[illegible]	—	—	—	[illegible]
Tobacco	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	—	—	—	—	—	[illegible]	—	—	—
Miscellaneous	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	—	—	—	—	—	[illegible]	—	—	—
Totals	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

451 TABLE V. [illegible]

[illegible]

	Summer crop	Winter crop	Dates	[illegible]	[illegible]	Total
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Totals	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

ing tables, which were prepared with a view to such discussion, are still of interest and value. And it should be added that the great difficulty experienced in obtaining precise information about the land, did not refer to the financial statistics of land revenue or to the nature of the methods in force. For a number of past years full and clear reports of the working of the Revenue Department have been published.

The three tables explain themselves; but it should not be overlooked that Table V is concerned with the number of land revenue payments made, not with the number of land revenue payers. Thus the same payer (or group of payers) may pay on a summer crop, on a winter crop and on fruit trees. And each payment may represent more than a single parcel. Fuller study of the original returns should enable some idea to be obtained of the total number of holdings in the country.

4. The Land Survey

4.2[illegible] 1. Before turning to a consideration of the methods of land tenure in Iraq it is desirable to consider briefly the existing position and prospects of the national land survey. It is the duty of such a survey to provide exact and detailed knowledge of the land surface of the country, primarily—but by no means exclusively—in the readily assimilable form of the graphic presentation of the ground which we term maps. The critical importance of the survey in relation to all measures of land reform, whether of tenure or development, cannot be stressed too emphatically. A scientifically dependable and functionally suitable survey is an indispensable condition of the successful execution and maintenance of any comprehensive measure of land reform. All experience shows that to attempt such reform in the absence of an adequate survey is to build without a foundation in the dark. The intricacy and magnitude of the task of executing and maintaining a national survey is not usually realised, probably because of the deceptive simplicity of the form in which the mass of information collected is presented to the public. The great gulf between a trustworthy and an untrustworthy survey, and the conditions necessary to secure the latter are even less commonly appreciated. It is most desirable that this should be realised; for while a trustworthy survey is indispensable to all comprehensive measures of land reform, an untrustworthy survey is a dangerous misuse of public funds.

[illegible] The first and most important condition to be satisfied is the provision and maintenance of a thoroughly dependable framework, or

1/23 / 85 already occurs in more intensive holdings (e.g. gardens) and in house property.

5. When considering the position in the riverain tracts, in my provisional report I suggested (II, 34) that the simplest and the most appropriate means of regularising the holding of miri land was by standard leasehold agreements in accordance with prevailing theory and partially prevailing practice. It never appears to be contested, even by the most firmly entrenched holders of miri land, that the ownership of such land belongs to the State. Nor is it contended that this ownership is titular. But while the effective ownership of the State is recognised, it is claimed that this ownership does not carry the right to evict at will well-established holders from their holdings of miri land. Subject to good behaviour, to maintaining cultivation, to payment to Government of its revenue contribution, and to the satisfactory discharge of certain public duties, such holders of miri land claim a right of undisturbed possession, which in principle is universally admitted.

There will probably be no difficulty in formulating the main rights and obligations of miri holders in standard leases, if and when Government [illegible] main framework of this tenure considerable elasticity would have to be allowed for supplementary or even exceptional provisions required to meet variation of local circumstances, of local customs and of agricultural needs. The rain-watered plains of the north, the valley cultivation of the hills, the pump-fed riverain tracts, the rice-growing fringes of the marshes, the areas supplied with regular free flow irrigation, are instances of such variations which will occur to all.

[651] At first sight the contingent obligations now customarily imposed on miri holders in the form of public duties appear to be impracticably onerous. But the obligation that needs definition most of all is the nature, the method of assessment and the method of payment of the revenue contribution, which represents the miri holder's amalgamated rent and tax to the nation, for the land he holds. General public duties should not fall on miri holders as such. They would more reasonably be discharged by some unpaid local dignitary, who could be accorded appropriate privileges.

In pursuance of the need to establish greater security of tenure and in conformity with customary doctrine, miri leaseholds held by long-established miri holders or their descendants, should normally be renewable in practice, although terminable in form. The duration of miri leaseholds might as a matter of regular routine be fixed at ten years. While such leaseholds should ordinarily be renewable to previous holders, if they had previously discharged their obligations satisfactorily, yet renewal should require a formal act on both sides. This would keep the nature of the tenure in the public mind, and the existing records up to date and reliable. Standard fees should be charged for all issues and renewals of miri leaseholds. These fees should in principle be limited to covering the aggregate cost of the simple administrative and technical procedure needed to maintain the necessary records satisfactorily.

6. THE LAND RESERVE

1/23 6. As already noted the Land Code only recognises the private holding of land in two ways. Such a holding must either be private property (mulk) or it must be State property* held in tapu tenure. And [L25] the acquisition of all private holdings in either of these categories must be registered to be valid.

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* [illegible]

[illegible] This [illegible] could be [illegible] at relatively slight additional expense, a minor expansion of staff of all grades and of equipment could be authorised, if land marks could be [illegible] safeguarded, and if an uninterrupted programme of work could be maintained. This would make a regular and equitable valuation of the land for purposes of land revenue practicable within a reasonable period (see [illegible]).

But I am no proponent of any general programme of more detailed or larger scale survey being undertaken, nor could it be recommended at present.

[illegible] It has already been stressed that the execution of a methodical and [illegible] land survey of the country is a requisite condition of all effective land reform. It is a requisite condition not only of the establishment of a stable and secure land tenure and of an equitable assessment of land revenue, but also of any efficient system of irrigation and indeed of any reliable and systematic knowledge, development and use of the territorial resources of the country. It was, for example, to provide essential information for the Irrigation Department that the Survey has concentrated on work in the Irrigation Zone hitherto. It is, therefore, [illegible] in meeting these other primary needs.

Unquestionably a detailed cadastral survey, which reliably locates the limits of all individual holdings, is required to place land tenure and land revenue on to a thoroughly satisfactory basis. Only on the basis of such a survey can the unqualified stability and security of tenure be attained which is required to stimulate the development and productive capacity of the country fully. But the change from present confusion now characteristic of land tenure to detailed order, is too great to be effected at a single step. The requisite detailed cadastral survey would be a lengthy and onerous undertaking for a much older, better prepared and better equipped country. It should not be attempted in al 'Iraq at present.

[illegible] Doubtless in the vicinity of the larger towns and in other places, in which the higher value of land brings in commensurate receipts in higher fees or in increased rentals or other revenue to Government, true large scale cadastral surveys may be justified exceptionally. And the ultimate extension of a proper cadastral survey elsewhere, as development proceeds and land values increase, should always be kept in view.

But the hopes of establishing orderly tenure, secure tenure, and fair and dependable taxation of land throughout the overwhelming mass of the cultivated territories of the country within the next ten or fifteen years, must be based on a foundation of simpler and less detailed survey. To be precise, the measures of attainable land reform within any period worth envisaging at present should be such as are applicable, and can be maintained, in conjunction with a 1:20,000 topographical survey of the cultivated terrain of broadly the same character and accuracy as is now being produced. The work should be converted into (what has been aptly termed elsewhere) a topo-cadastral survey, without markedly increasing the complexity and closeness of the detail. The parcels or sub-divisions of the land adopted as cadastral units for purposes of survey, record and land assessment, must be of considerable size and bounded (at least ordinarily and approximately) by easily recognisable physical features. The placing, and still more the subsequent maintenance and control by Government, of a host of artificial boundary beacons outlining individual holdings must be dismissed as entirely impracticable. It will be as much as the country can do to establish and

186 pushed forward in conjunction with settlement operations without delaying the latter. Broadly speaking this means that settlement can be carried out as extensively as men and resources permit in the Irrigation Zone, but must be limited in the Rainfall Zone to the immediate vicinity of Mosul town (see Plates III and IV).

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185 In this neighbourhood the land is widely held, or claimed, in tapu tenure (see Plate II) and special efforts have been made by the Tapu Department during recent years to clear up uncertainties and define the parcels [illegible] affected. It was primarily on this account that a considerable block of isolated detailed survey has been completed here. Settlement of this block of territory therefore appears preponderantly to involve an investigation and definition of the parcels held in tapu tenure and, so far as such parcels are concerned, to have been in progress for some time. But rights to tapu tenure should be systematically reviewed, and if possible rights to such land concurrently settled, throughout this area by an independent Settlement Officer in collaboration with the Survey at an early date.

In the Irrigation Zone a considerable amount of detailed survey has been completed in every liwa and there is a wide range of territory in various stages of readiness for systematic settlement.

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651 In [illegible] Amara, as is well known, the political and administrative conditions have been retained on an almost exclusively tribal basis, the miri lands (of which the liwa is almost exclusively composed) being farmed out to various tribal shaikhs for triennially assessed payments. It is impossible to discuss the details of these methods here; nor is there any need, since the agrarian conditions of no liwa have been investigated and reported on so regularly or so fully, owing to these periodic assessments. Each successive assessment has built on that which preceded it, but has been carried out in greater detail with increasing attention to the smaller men who hold from the leading shaikhs and really manage and work the land. If public security and [illegible] national considerations continue to grow these periodic assessments should crystallise steadily into an effective settlement of rights to land. But the conditions under which the work had to be done in the past were extremely difficult, and if this end is to be attained (and even if the revenue assessments are to be as equitable and reliable as is now manageable and practicable) the work must be more closely based upon trustworthy detailed survey and rights be investigated more thoroughly than has so far been possible. A reassessment of the Amara estates (muqata'as) was due, and has doubtless been undertaken, this year. And under the agreements in force with the leading shaikhs the prevailing system terminates and is open to review in 1934. The consideration of fuller and more permanent settlement of rights in this district can therefore properly be left over until this termination approaches, or a further reassessment is arranged.

In the Basra liwa, as already observed, an excellent local survey of the date gardens was carried out several years ago. And the principle of a regular Land Tax has long been familiar through the operation of Midhat Pasha's enlightened [illegible] tax.* The tenure of these gardens (mulk or miri) appears to be rarely, if at all, disputed. For the most part the mulk owners are well known, or could readily be determined.
186 Consequently a relatively minor effort would enable titles to be authoritatively reviewed and, when necessary, settled throughout the Basra [illegible] on the basis of the existing survey. The respective responsibilities of garden owners and the State for the maintenance of the tidal
[212] creeks off the Shatt al Arab, from which the gardens are largely watered,

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* [illegible]

185 many pressing problems. I therefore suggest that two settlement areas should be constituted in these tracts, preferably one situated on the Tigris and the other on the Euphrates. From these as starting points, settlement of these tracts could progressively be extended up and down the two rivers until they had been completed.

The above is no doubt an extremely modest programme; but it is better to begin modestly than to continue to postpone these greatly needed land reforms indefinitely. After six months practical experience in the field, and of the cost and speed of the work in three different settlement areas, there would be solid grounds on which to base plans for an extension of operations.

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It will not have escaped attention that the completion of the work already partly done in the Mosul and Basra liwas is not included in this initial programme. This is not because such exclusion can be contentedly acquiesced in, even temporarily, but because it appears to me that a cessation of the appeasement that has been started in the Muntafiq, or still further delay in placing pump cultivation along the river reaches on to a healthy basis, would be even more deplorable.

9. Land Valuation

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9. For reasons given earlier (ii, 4) it has not appeared useful to comment either on the recently superseded land revenue methods or on the two new laws. But the old and the new appear mutually to envisage the eventual establishment of a regular land tax or Government rental, if this term is preferable. By this I mean the valuation of the land by appropriate means and the assessment and imposition of an annual payment based thereon. Thus, in the explanation issued with the displaced land tax assessment law,* the Land Revenue policy of Government was described as "the imposition of a fixed assessment in cash per unit of area of land," while the universal application of this method ultimately was foreshadowed. And Article 6 of the law required that the process of assessment should include survey, the classification of the land into grades according to the quantity and value of the produce, and the resulting assessment per unit of area of each grade.

And I understand Article 6 of the second of the new laws to provide for the early completion of the survey and valuation of all cultivated rain land and all irrigated tapu land with a view to the assessment and imposition of an annual rental thereon.

The ultimate objective in this important sphere of reform therefore appears essentially to be unchanged, and it is an objective which, in my opinion, alone offers any prospect of escape from the inequalities, irregularities, uncertainties and hardships inseparable from the wisest and most carefully considered combinations of stop-gap methods lacking a uniform and systematic basis. For pending a methodical valuation of the land there are bound to be seriously unsatisfactory features in any land revenue expedients adopted.

185 The section of the nahiya (quarter of nahiya) suggested earlier as the land unit of immediate tapu-cadastral survey and record (v, 7, and vi, 8) should also constitute a suitable land unit for revenue purposes, if carefully selected with this further object also in view. No doubt the quality of the land within the limits of such sections will not be strictly uniform, and may frequently include salty or other uncultivable patches on the one hand, and possibly gardens or other exceptionally fertile pieces on the other. When the conditions really justify it, areas differing markedly from the general quality of the land within the section can be excluded or specially treated; but so far as practicable an average valuation of the section should be aimed at, taking the good with the

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* "Law prescribing the methods of assessment of land tax and rent due to Government." No. 40 of 1926.

Although public funds will benefit directly by methodical and equitable assessment and imposition of land revenue, and indirectly by the steady increase in prosperity which should follow if settlement is accompanied by complementary developments in irrigation and agricultural conditions, yet these financial returns will not be immediate. The immediate problem of finding the funds needed to initiate settlement would be lightened or removed, if the cost could be promptly recovered from the individuals whose rights to land are thereby recognized and secured. Now settlement is essentially the clearing up of disputes and uncertainties inherited from an indefinite past. It has been accumulated in al 'Iraq by the failure of past governments to keep their records of mulk, tapu and miri land property. It is now required in the interests of the nation as a whole, and the national budget will benefit generously by it in the future if it is accompanied by appropriate complementary measures. While therefore it is proper that individuals and corporate bodies should pay fees for the recognition of their rights in mulk, in tapu and in waqf (just as they would legally have been required to do if the existing Land Registers had been functioning properly hitherto and registration of all changes had been required, as they occurred): it is not equitable that they should repeat any payments they themselves have already made to the existing Land Registry or pay on a higher scale than may be needed to maintain the General Land Register in the future. It will, of course, be understood that the fees referred to here are genuine registration fees only, not acquisition payments on obtaining land in tapu tenure initially. 185 651

The settlement and record of rights to hold and use miri land stands on a different footing. It would not intrinsically be in any way inequitable to charge a suitable fee upon recognition and record of these rights also; but it would, I think, be inexpedient and inadvisable to do so upon initial settlement. If settlement is to be carried out with the utmost practicable speed and economy it is essential that everything possible should be done to encourage and ensure the presentation of all claims promptly at the appropriate moment. The degree of smooth and punctual co-operation secured between the great mass of claimants and the Settlement parties will primarily determine the speed and success of the work, while these in turn will primarily govern its cost. The bulk of mulk and tapu claimants and of custodians of waqf interests may reasonably be relied upon to appreciate the advantage of assisting the settlement and of consolidating their recognized rights by due and proper record; but the bulk of holders and users of miri land may be expected to be illiterate and very possibly suspicious of ulterior designs on the part of Government. Nothing will facilitate, accelerate and therefore cheapen, settlement so much as waiving all fees on the initial settlement of miri land. The poverty of the majority of such land is too great to admit of any really adequate scale of fees being imposed. And it may be predicted with some confidence that the saving in the cost of the work occasioned by foregoing such fees will more than compensate for any effective revenue lost thereby. 185

6. GENERAL CO-OPERATION

6. In previous sections attention has been primarily devoted to the objectives, methods and procedure of the various agents directly concerned in one way or another with the conduct of reform. But a really national effort will be required if success is to be achieved. The necessity of winning the confidence and securing the prompt and willing co-operation of the great mass of landholders and cultivators has probably been sufficiently stressed already. The necessity of ensuring the continuous and effective co-operation of all branches of the public service,

solely to the productive regeneration of the estate, should soon prove a 185
profitable investment. If the accompanying returns of Budgetary Revenue and Expenditure during the nine years 1921-29 are referred to, it 652
will be seen how small a sum, both absolutely and relatively, the Government has been able so far to allot to land development services. And 651

TABLE VII. TOTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE, 1921-1929

Nature of Service	Expenditure in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total expenditure
General National Charges*	333·5	6·9
Finance	619·4	13·1
Interior	1,080·3	22·7
Health	221·9	4·7
Defence	990·1	20·9
Justice	130·3	2·8
Education	253·2	5·3
Communications and works ..	680·6	14·3
Lands Services†	464·0	9·8
Total ..	4,669·2	100·0

*Civil List of H.M. the King, Parliament, Council of Ministers, Comptroller and Auditor-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Debt and Pensions, Antiquities and Census Departments.

†Departments of Irrigation, Agriculture, Veterinary Service, Land Survey, Tapu, State Domains and Ministerial Services of the Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture during its existence.

necessarily only a modicum of that sum could be utilised for capital improvements. If expenditure on capital development continues to be limited to what can be spared from current resources, it is to be feared that the economic revival of the country must be indefinitely retarded.

TABLE VIII. TOTAL BUDGETARY REVENUE, 1921-1929

Nature of Revenue	Revenue in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total revenue
Direct Revenue from land*	1,610·3	33·7
Customs and Excise	2,240·4	45·4
Post and Telegraph Receipts ..	237·1	5·0
Other revenues	736·7	16·1
Total ..	4,830·5	100·0

*Land revenue, animal tax, receipts of land services, [illegible], rents of Government property, etc.

2. THREE SPHERES OF REFORM

7. In the northern Rainfall Zone the effects of past neglect are less 185
obvious and the problem of agricultural development less intricate owing to this area being predominantly independent of irrigation: but otherwise there is just as great a need for a steady programme of agrarian reform here as in the South.

The three great obstacles to the agricultural development, and, therefore, to the economic advance of el 'Iraq may be summarised as:

in the south (a) the absence of an adequate irrigation system, and throughout the country

(b) the crude methods of cultivation and stock-keeping practised, and

(c) the chaotic state of land tenure.

000 E 651 absence of all data on which such an estimate could be dependably based. But the lessons of the Egyptian experience in the conduct of its parallel revenue settlement should not be overlooked. The Egyptian revenue settlement was initiated by Decree dated February 9th, 1879. It was not completed until 1906. The statistics of the progress achieved during these twenty-seven years are instructive. In the first nine the work was an entire failure because it was attempted without a proper basis of land survey. During the following four years it was abandoned in despair. In the next seven years a quarter of the country was done with the aid of an indifferent sectional survey. In 1898 a unified and effective national Survey was at length recognised as indispensable. In the succeeding eight years the remaining three-quarters of the country was finished, and the quality of the work improved even more than the speed, as sound technical methods were introduced and enabled improvements in the general procedure of the settlement to be adopted. It will thus be seen that owing to the initial failure to appreciate the fundamental necessity of a scientifically sound and appropriate cadastral survey, the revenue settlement of Egypt occupied twenty-seven years whereas its final progress shows that it could have been completed in ten.* It will be remembered that the Turkish legislators had also recognised before the war the necessity of a foundation of reliable cadastral survey for land tenure throughout the Ottoman Empire (iii, 3).

E 651 471 I ● 651 471 Now while the land surface to be dealt with in el 'Iraq is much greater than in Egypt the individual parcels requiring investigation and settlement will be many fewer although no doubt appreciably larger in extent on the average. Thus three and one third million individual holdings were recorded during the revenue settlement of Egypt, a number which considerably exceeds the total population of el 'Iraq. On a comparable basis the number of individual holdings in the latter might be expected to be about 800,000. As the population is still so largely nomadic half a million is probably nearer the true figure. (See also ii, 4 and Table V).

000 Although the fuller benefit of a settlement of rights was not practicable in Egypt at the time, owing to various reasons, the procedure was similar: but unfortunately no deductions can be drawn therefrom as to the speed of settlement of rights in el 'Iraq, because all the conditions in Egypt were so different.

4. The Main Problem of Tenure

I 423 471 4. As we have already seen, the land surface of el 'Iraq is more literally than in most similar cases a vast national estate. The extent of land held in private ownership (mulk) is small, and although it is intrinsically important, its legal position is clear and its regulation presents few difficulties. Probably four-fifths of the cultivable area of the country is in law fully and freely owned by the State and when cultivated held in practice under the general administrative control of its representatives. And even the legal ownership (raqaba) of the balance is vested in the State although, subject to important conditions, its usufructuary possession is held on a permanent heritable and assignable tenure. This tenure (known commonly as tapu) is that applicable under the provisions of the Land Code to all State land. The Ottoman Administration persistently sought to give effect to these provisions, but failed to do so because the successful operation of this tenure is impossible without an accompaniment of effective survey and land registration,

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* See Paper 6. Egyptian Government Commission on Registration of Title to Land. 1917-21. Government Press, Cairo.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

may be danger in holding up consideration of radical educational 658 reforms until all the necessary financial provision is within sight. Those who wish for advance towards compulsory education but who are fearful of the consequent financial commitments could well be reminded that experience in some other countries has shown that, when the desire for educational advance really exists, the money necessary for its realization is likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, it is quite possible that in Iraq there exist monies which could be made available for educational purposes if means could be devised of extracting them into the public purse. This view may be the more valid when it is remembered that public education in Iraq is financed almost entirely from the central Government budget and that primary education, which is essentially a local service, makes little demand on local financial resources. More will be said later about the possibility of augmenting existing educational revenues from local sources.

Apart from the possibility of raising local revenue for educational purposes, before educational and other social services can be greatly extended, there will need to be larger contributions from the national budget. Some consideration must, therefore, be given to the wider question of the practicability of increasing the country's taxable wealth from which more money for public services may be derived. This inevitably leads to some discussion of two other important economic problems, the potential revenue capacity of the country and the related problem of land tenure.

The Potential Revenue Capacity of the Country. It is beyond the scope 651 of this particular study to attempt to assess the potential revenue capacity of Iraq. This is a matter for fiscal experts. Some of the more authoritative of these maintain that the task of considerably augmenting the budget so that additional monies could be devoted to educational and other social services is not insuperable. They feel that, although in the early years of the creation of Iraq as an independent State the Government might not have felt itself sufficiently strong to make too many taxation demands, it is now able to do so. They suggest that it is now possible both to tighten up existing fiscal arrangements and also to obtain more revenue by increased or new taxes. These financial experts hold the view that, despite minor fiscal reforms in recent years, the taxation system remains traditional and too rigid and that effective attempts have not been made to increase revenue by bringing taxation into line with higher prices and the changed economic conditions of the post-war period.

One fiscal change advocated by these would-be revenue reformers is that income tax, which is practically confined to

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MHL Iraq MHL

651 Government officials whose incomes are known and to a minority of the merchants, should be extended to other forms of income, and that provision should also be made for an inheritance tax. There can be no doubt that, if income tax were extended to other forms of income, a wealthy section of the community who at present derive large incomes from land ownership and other sources would contribute much more than they do at present to the national revenue. Another suggestion put forward is that customs and excise duties should be adjusted to *ad valorem* rates to bring them more into accord with post-war prices. They also recommend that the consumption or sales tax, which is at present a fixed rate of 12.5 per cent on produce sold, should be replaced by a form of sliding scale tax related both to land values and to the use made of land. In advocating this important change the reformers maintain that this would produce more revenue, would prevent existing evasions and would also serve as an incentive to increased agricultural production.

It is not within the competence of the writer to comment on the validity or practicability of revenue reforms of this kind. It is clear, however, that there is a fertile field for intelligent enquiry into methods for producing that additional budget revenue without which educational and other advance will be slower than is desirable.

311 *The Problem of Land Tenure.* While it is possible that measures such as those indicated would produce valuable additions to the national revenue, the fact remains that the main source of Iraq's future wealth must be the proper exploitation of the land. Upon this depends that higher standard of life for the bulk of the population, and the concomitant increase of wealth for both private and public use, without which the country will never be able to enjoy that abundant life which the rich natural agricultural resources of Iraq make possible. Unfortunately the country's enormous agricultural potential is greatly hindered by the system of land tenure.

423 The land tenure system of Iraq is far too complicated a subject fully to be examined in this study, but the following extract from Sir Ernest Dowson's classic report on this problem gives some idea of its effects and ramifications:

> The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country and public order can hardly be exaggerated. Every one directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture in Iraq must know many individual cases in which the development and use of the land has been gravely obstructed by the widespread insecurity

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, 185
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity. 425

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intellig-
ently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract 185
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be 427
considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works 185
and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the 471
Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer 185
towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. 428
As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other 185
regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage 651
of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant 511
in relation to the future development of education in that, if it 565
continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more 166
taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a 000
bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

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the administration and collection of revenue, which, in the eyes 652 of the tribes, was regarded as a sign of government authority, 175* similarly as revenue payment was considered an outward sign 727* of their submission. Much of the confidence engendered by the Political Officers in Basra Wilayet had been the result of their revenue activities,[1] which included far more than the collection of taxes following the enforced assumption by the Revenue Board of a far wider range of responsibilities than merely financial duties. In addition, the extension of land-revenue collections in kind from the fertile areas of the middle Euphrates would produce local foodstuffs for the army and thereby release much precious tonnage. Hence, after the fall of Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox's chief efforts were directed, not only to the establishment of friendly relations with leading dignitaries, but also, through the First Revenue Officer, to the collection of information as to the customary rates of demand; the sorting of a mass of papers; the foundation of a Revenue system capable of extension; the inceptions of departments such as *Auqāf*, Education, etc., and the actual collection of revenue in Baghdad and surrounding districts.[2] The complexities and inconsistencies of the Turkish Revenue system, to which reference has already been made, proved, as in Basra Wilayet, one of the greatest obstacles in the way of a rapid establishment in Baghdad Wilayet of a system based on its principles.

The Turkish Revenue System

Under the Turks, general revenues in each wilayet had been 651 collected under the authority of the *Daftardar* (Provincial 175* Director of Finance), either directly or through departments. Among the taxes collected directly were land revenue in its various aspects, *koda* (animal head-tax), *tamattu* (income or

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[1] 'I have been long convinced that Revenue work is the most important part of their duties.' Deputy Civil Commissioner in *Admin. Report, Basrah*, 1917, p. 8.

[2] *Administration Report, Revenue Board, Baghdad, March* 22 *to December* 31, 1917 (Baghdad, 1918), p. 1 (hereafter *Revenue Report*, 1917).

651 175 professional tax), conscription exemption-tax and several minor taxes. Tax-collecting Departments controlled by the *Defterdar* included the *Dairāt al Limān* (Marine Department) and the *Nufūs* or Statistical Department. Twelve other heads of revenue, together with one-quarter of three per cent of the customs receipts which had been assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, by the decree of Muharram, December 20th, 1881, following the default of the Ottoman Government on its European-held debts, were collected by a special Civil Service.[1]

A few other revenues, provincial in character,[2] were accredited to the *Muhāsiba al Khusūsīya* (Special Accounts Department) created by the Young Turks as a sop to the outcry that the Central Government drained the Arab provinces of all funds. Customs were also in charge of a special staff.

In any account of land revenue, the most important of the 651 175 general revenues, it must be clearly recognized that the Ottoman Government made a distinction between its right over land as Sovereign and its right as actual possessor or owner of the soil as well as between the dues exacted in accordance with each right.

In 'Iraq, the Ottoman Government, by right of conquest, deemed itself in theory both Sovereign and sole owner of all land save in so far as it had divested itself of its rights of ownership by a specific act of alienation to individual owners. Lands so alienated absolutely, under the Land Code or *Qanūn Arādhi* of 7 Ramadhan, 1274 (1858)[3] were known as *Sirf Mulk.*[4] Those

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[1] For the decree, and full list of the assigned revenues, Young, Sir George, *Droit Ottoman*, Vol. v, pp. 69 ff.

[2] The 'public works' and 'education' cesses on land revenue; 5 per cent cess on *bedel*; 10 per cent cess on income tax; half the proceeds of the slaughterhouse fees; rents and profits of education trust property.

[3] Text: Ongley, F., *Ottoman Land Code* (1892), Bk. I, pp. 1 ff; Young, Sir G., op. cit., Vol. vi, pp. 45 ff; Fisher, Stanley, *Ottoman Land Laws* (1919). Under the Code five legal categories of land were recognised:

1. *Arādhi Mamlūka*, land held in undiluted ownership.
2. *Arādhi Amīrīya*, state land, the usufructuary possession of which is granted on a registered tenure.

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alienated conditionally by *ṭāpū sanads* were known as *Arādhī Amīrīya* under the Code but were more commonly called *ṭāpū* lands in 'Iraq. Such alienated lands formed but a small proportion of the arable of 'Iraq. Most of it, although great sections had been in the actual possession and cultivation of the tribes for years, had never been granted on *sanads*, and was, therefore, *Arādhī Amīrīya* or *mīrī* land in 'Iraq.[1] Other large sections had found their way to the personal possession of the Sultan or Ottoman royal family, and thence to *Arādhī Mudawwara*.[2]

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In the case of the unalienated state lands, the Government was entitled to exact from the user both rent as landlord or owner, and revenue as accruing to it as Sovereign. The distinctions between these exactions had tended to become obscure since the two were usually paid as a single contribution.

In the case of *mulk* or *ṭāpū* land, the Government demanded revenue only since it possessed merely dominion. The possessors of the titles to such lands had the right to demand the landlord's share, normally the same as the revenue share, which was, on the principle of the 'Ashar, the tenth part of the fruits of the earth. On lands watered by flow irrigation, an additional tenth part of the crops was demanded as representing the fruits of the water.

Numerous graduations and variation of these shares had

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[1] 'The tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all.' Dowson, Sir E. M., *An Enquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth, 1932), p. 5.

[2] *Arādhī Sanniya* or Crown Lands until 1909, when the Young Turks transferred them to general revenues.

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3. *Arādhī Mauqufa*, land dedicated to pious purposes.
4. *Arādhī Matrūka*, land especially reserved for some public purpose.
5. *Arādhī Mawat*, waste land.

These classifications had never been applied as a whole to 'Iraq. Terms were also misapplied. Thus *Arādhī Amīrīya* is known as *ṭāpū* land in 'Iraq, while land held in legal possession of the state is called *mīrī*. Category 4 seems not to have been generally recognised in 'Iraq.

[3] See Howell, Sir E., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IX (1922), pp. 20 ff. for an authoritative article: *The Qanun al-Arādhi*.

grown up, however, in recognition of the general principle that
651 land taxation and rent were proportional to profits made on the
175 land, which varied yearly on account of faulty water control, weather vagaries, floods, pests, dust storms, and lack of security from marauding neighbours or nomadic tribes. Annual assessments were also made on most crops in accordance with the same principle. Such assessments were usually made by sight estimation of grain shortly before it was reaped, or on the threshing floor, or by a combination of these methods.[1] The measurement of small sample areas was another method commonly used in numerous sections of the Hilla and Shâmiya divisions.[2] Occasionally fixed assessment existed, as on the number of pumping engines or lift machines on an estate,[3] or where taxes were farmed for a period of years at a fixed sum.[4]

651 The Turkish theory of variation in rates of demand[5] and in
175 assessment[6] which took into account local conditions was, on the whole, well suited to a land of violent contrasts such as 'Iraq. Behind the variations also existed a substratum of custom and of habit so firmly entrenched in the life of the country that Turkish legislation often did no more than formalize or commit to paper the habit of ages, as for instance Midhat Pasha's *firmân* on '*Uqr*.[7] Even the Civil Administration and, later, the 'Iraq Government, although condemning the lack of uniformity of the Turks and aiming at fixed assessments, had to recognize the validity of the variations with constantly recurring rebates and

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[1] Outlines of Turkish Assessment methods in *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18, *Admin. Report of Revenue Department, Baghdad*, 1918 (hereafter *Revenue Report*, 1918), (Baghdad, 1919), pp. 6-7; ibid., 1919, p. 6.

[2] *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18.

[3] Ibid., p. 13; ibid., 1918, p. 7.

[4] Ibid., 1917, p. 18.

[5] A comprehensive list of Turkish demands, together with those adopted by the Civil Administration (never higher, often lower) in: *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 8; ibid., 1919, App. B., pp. 45-7; *Revenue Circular, No. 7, 26 February*, 1919; also *Report on Mesopotamian Spring Harvest* (Baghdad, 1919), p. 6.

[6] For instance, land irrigated by lift on the right bank of the Tigris, above Kâdhimain, paid fixed assessments in cash. Land opposite on the left bank paid fluctuating demands, *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 13.

[7] Cited *Revenue Report*, 1917, pp. 11 ff.

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remissions of taxes to meet difficulties caused by abnormal 6.51 weather, flood or agricultural conditions. The system in application was not without its abuses. 175* Once a variation had been made, either in increase or in reduction of demand, valid enough at the time it was made, it was often assumed to be permanent after the original circumstances had passed into oblivion. Thus inconsistencies had grown up side by side with elasticity.

The right to collect the assessment was frequently put up to auction or sold by negotiation. In Basra Wilayet, the practice was also followed of making each shaikh responsible for the revenue of his tribe. In Baghdad Wilayet, however, the practice had been to make the *sarkals* (invariably pronounced *sarkals*) or sub-lessees directly responsible for cultivation, and also responsible for revenue payments.

The system of annual estimates no less than the method of collection had afforded opportunities for bribery and corruption. The assessors, without adequate supervision, varied the assessments according to the inducement offered them; auctioneers who sold the right of collection could be bought or intimidated into selling to particular bidders. Shaikhs had to be placated to permit collection, while official machinery had to be oiled in case it was necessary to employ gendarmes to overcome opposition by the tax-payers.

British Revenue Administration

From the occupation of Basra Wilayet onwards, British 6.51 officials had deemed the opportunities for corruption, the lack 727* of encouragement of agricultural development by means of 175* fixed assessments and, above all, the inconsistencies of the system as sufficient reasons for frowning upon the system, particularly the fluctuations in assessments and the variations in demand. 'The ultimate aim', the Revenue Secretary wrote in 1918, 'of our revenue policy is to make a fixed assessment at equable

651 rates and payable in cash, instead of the present arrangement.'[1]
727 Fixed assessments, however, were found to be impossible for
185 the time, as was the immediate creation of a revenue system which, while based on the familiar fiscal system in accordance with the instructions of H.M. Government, would embrace the improvement of the revenue staff, the settlement of 'Iraq's fundamental agricultural problem, that is, the definition of the rights of labourer, tenants, landowner and state over the land, and the resuscitation of agricultural prosperity in a manner that should be politically sound. Nevertheless, steps were taken in that direction. Consolidation of position occupied most of 1917. By the end of 1918 it was claimed by the Revenue Department that, although Turkish methods were still employed, the results were better than under the Turks, even after years of effort on their part.[2] In fact, in that year the British authorities issued demands for and collected more land revenues than had the Turks in any pre-war year. The latter in 1911-12 collected approximately Rs.96,97,000 or about £690,000 in tithes, *koda* and minor land taxes.[3] In 1918, similar categories of taxation produced Rs.157,47,430 or £1,124,817,[4] or one and two-thirds times the receipts of 1911. Even greater progress was made in 1919, the civil authorities collecting Rs.182,23,497 or £1,301,784,[5] or nearly double the 1911 receipts.[6]

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[1] Revenue Circular No. 7, February 26th, 1919. Cf. *Revenue Report*, 1917, pp. 1 and 42.

[2] *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 6.

[3] *Bulletin Annuel de Statistique*, 1327 (1911), Imperial Ottoman Ministry of Finance (Constantinople). Turkish piastres converted throughout at 7⅓ per rupee and 110 per pound sterling.

[4] Exclusive of revenue grains supplied to the Army, valued at 60 lacs—*Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118. Rupees converted throughout to sterling at fourteen to the pound.

[5] *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. ii.

[6] Notwithstanding the statement 'the land-revenue receipts for 1919-20 were substantially lower than in Turkish times', Wilson, op. cit., p. 264. Cf. comment in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 88, an official report prepared under the Acting Civil Commissioner's supervision: 'The country has paid more in taxation than it used to pay.' Also Telegram No. 8784, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to India Office, July 21st, 1920. For further comparison of revenue receipts see *infra*, p. 143.

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Koda, the Turkish head-tax on camels, buffaloes, sheep and goats from time immemorial, had been, at the time of the occupation of Basra, converted to a slaughter-house tax in order to lower the price of meat for the army. In other regions, as in lower 'Iraq, where the Turks had given up the attempt to collect the tax, the British made no effort to revive it until 1919.[1] Elsewhere, the tax was collected by a variety of methods at the rate of a rupee per camel or buffalo, and eight annas per sheep or goat. The most common method in the tribal areas was to assess the tribe and, in accordance with the policy of using the shaikhs to govern, lay the collection on the shaikhs and *sarkals*, giving them a percentage for their efforts. It was hoped to extend this method throughout the country.[2]

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Other former Turkish sources of revenue, such as the military tax, fell into abeyance. Others, such as the income tax, *temettu*, were abandoned.[3]

In Baghdad Wilayet, the Revenue Department included, as it had in Basra, a number of duties other than purely revenue work. It dealt with Customs, Public Debt, *Waqf* Administration, Land Regulation, Education and, under military supervision, with Irrigation and Agriculture. During 1918, however, as the staff increased and organization extended, each department tended to become a separate unit. Nevertheless, the Revenue Department continued to expand, dealing with seventeen varied aspects of administration in September, 1919.[4] By April, 1920, its activities had extended to some twenty-two branches of the Administration.[5]

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[1] *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 4.

[2] Ibid., p. 14.

[3] Dobbs, H. R. C., *Collection of Notes on Revenue Matters*, 1915-1916 (confidential).

[4] *Note on the Organization of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, September 1st, 1919* (Baghdad, 1919).

[5] Ibid., *April 1st*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1920).

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175 did undoubtedly confer great benefits on the country, causing
927 a development within a period of two or three years under the stimulus of war, such as it otherwise would not have gained in as many decades.

It must not be concluded, however, that these works and expenditures were originally undertaken to facilitate winning the war to which they contributed no less than many manifold activities on which no other return had been demanded or expected, a fact recognized by Sir John Hewitt, who, in his report to the Army Council in 1919, stated:

> We are unanimously and emphatically of opinion that there is no ground for the suggestion that the expenditure of Army funds has been prompted by the desire to provide for after-peace developments, and we consider that they have been uniformly expended with the primary object of securing the efficiency and comfort of the force.[1]

Nevertheless, the demands made by the military authorities for repayment of their expenditures, incurred at unprecedented rates, for objects which they considered, often arbitrarily, would prove useful to the civil population, and the enforced necessity of taking over unfinished programmes of Irrigation and other departments, conceived and executed on a war-time scale, often without proper supervision or trained personnel,[2] placed an undue strain on the budgets of the Occupied Territories.

175 To meet these budgets, including the expenditure on those
927 objects 'which could only be justified or explained' as Mr.
£51 Asquith declared in the House of Commons, 'on the assumption that you are going to deal with 'Iraq as a province or

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[1] Hewitt, op. cit., p. 27.

[2] A typical example, cited Hewitt, op. cit., pp. [illegible] and App. [illegible], is that of the purchase of irrigation pumps by an inexperienced officer, dispatched to India without adequate instructions. Two hundred pumps were asked for, of which the pre-war price, in new condition, averaged £[illegible], delivered in Basra. After months of delay [illegible] second-hand pumps were delivered, at a price averaging £[illegible] in Bombay. The pumps were eventually resold by the Director of Agriculture at a considerable loss.

district which is going to be governed in the Anglo-Indian fashion',[1] revenue collection was pressed forward on the basis of the former Turkish demands but with rigid insistence on the payment of the full demand whenever presented, such as the Turk had never been able to do. In the two years, 1918 and 1919, the Civil Administration collected Rs. [illegible],[2] or an average of twice the revenue collected in 1911, which had been equivalent to Rs. [illegible].[3] In 1920 the revenue receipts were Rs. [illegible], excluding railway revenues,[4] or three and a third times the Turkish receipts of 1911. The original estimate had been Rs. [illegible].[5] The surplus for 1919 alone was one-half the total receipts of the Turks in the pre-war year just mentioned, while the entire surplus accumulated in the period of the Military Occupation was one and a half times the revenue collected in the same pre-war year. These figures are all the more remarkable when the amounts remitted as subsidies or for political services, as in the 'Amara and Dulaim Divisions, are taken into consideration.

It need not be supposed, however, that taxation was unduly oppressive, although it tended to press most heavily on the agricultural worker to whom the burden was eventually passed under the prevailing land tenure. Prosperity was general: trade was flourishing, the price of agricultural products was high, wages had risen beyond the bounds of imagination, and rents had soared. In addition, classes who had never paid taxes were no longer able to evade payment by bribery or force as in pre-war days.[6] Others who had paid little, escaping through faulty assessment or official discrimination, were now forced to pay in full. The political unrest of 1920 was not primarily due to this heavy taxation, as Lord Islington declared in the House of Lords,[1] but the fact remains that the taxation was harassing. The inability of the landlords, dignitaries, and tribes to evade taxation as they had once escaped it influenced them to throw their weight against a regime which was determined to collect what it demanded. Moreover, gratitude for the fact that for the first time in the lives of the tax-payers, tangible and concrete returns for their money were visible, was often lost in the knowledge that they had no voice in the initiation or incidence of taxation or in the choice of the objects of expenditure which, because they were essentially desirable in the eyes of the British administrators, were placed in the budget estimates regardless of whether or not the expenditure had corresponding value in the desires and standards of the tax-payers or whether it was necessary for the peculiar needs of the country.

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[1] *Parl. Debates, H. of C.*, 5th S., Vol. [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible]; also ibid., Vol. [illegible] ([illegible]), p. [illegible].

[2] This total [illegible] of revenue [illegible] supplied to the Army, [illegible] *Review C. Admin.*, [illegible], p. [illegible]) is based on [illegible] in *Budget Estimates*, [illegible], p. [illegible].

[3] [illegible] *Annual de Statistique*, [illegible]. For comparisons of land-revenue receipts see supra, p. [illegible].

[4] *Admin. Rep.*, [illegible], pp. [illegible]. [5] *Budget Estimates*, [illegible], p. [illegible].

[6] *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, Vol. [illegible], p. [illegible], estimates that in pre-war days [illegible] of the population of the Vilayet of Basra escaped taxation of all [illegible] and paid nothing whatever except perhaps bribes.

Notwithstanding early instructions to the contrary, as on March 19th, 1915, the Civil Administration employed comparatively few Arabs in responsible administrative positions. Arabs drawing Rs. 600 or more per month[2] on August 1st, 1920, numbered 20 and formed but 3·74 per cent of the 534 officers in the same category.[3] The remaining 514 officers were British or Indian officials. Nor were the various advisory Councils, of which so much has been made as indicating the participation of responsible Arabs in their own government,[4] of any practical value, having been so organized as to make their effect negligible on the conduct of the Administration except in minor local affairs.

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. [illegible] (1920), pp. [illegible].

[2] Following the official division as in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914–1920, p. [illegible].

[3] The Arabs so employed were distributed among the departments as follows: Judicial Department, [illegible]; Divisional Political Staff, [illegible]; Irrigation, [illegible]; Tapu, [illegible]; Waqf, [illegible]. Telegram No. [illegible], Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August [illegible], 1920.

[4] *Review Civil Admin.*, O.T., 1914–1918, pp. [illegible]. *Ibid.*, 1914–1920, pp. [illegible].

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175 fact that the propagandists concentrated strongly and per-
176 suasively on matters nearer to their hearts and to their personal
468 advantage than the abstract concept of a national existence.

619 National independence thus became attractive to the tribes
651 not because of any theory of indigenous administration or any hope of an Islamic state,[1] but because it promised an escape from Government, particularly one insistent on the payment of taxes. Their concept of the ideal government was one with bread in one hand and a club in the other: that is to say, dispensing benefits for which they were not called upon to pay, and maintaining a strong justice with impartiality. The Turks had in no way lived up to this conception. The British Administration at its inception had been promising, but it had gradually lost its ideal character. Tribal districts were now forced to pay revenue such as they had never paid before[2] and as they were never to pay again.[3] In the Muntafiq, for instance, the collection of revenue per capita had increased from less than one-fifth of a rupee (As.2 Ps.10 or 3d.) in 1916[4] to Rs.5 As. 10 in 1919 (about 8s. 6d. in sterling). It fell again to Rs.1 As.4 (about 1s. 11d.) in 1922,[5] rising to Rs.4 As.5 (6s. 6d.) in 1929, above which it has never risen. Nor did the tribesmen see

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[1] *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 4; Ibid., 1921, p. 5.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 118, 143. The Bani Hachaim paid heavy taxation for the first time in their history in 1919: *Admin. Report, Diwaniyah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

[3] The collection of Revenue in the Muntafiq, 1916 to 1928 was:

1916	Rs. 32,464 (*)	Only Nasiriya and Suq ash-Shuyukh districts occupied.
1919	18,61,823 (*)	
1922	3,68,928 (†)	April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.
1926	10,02,699 (‡)	
1928	14,77,033 (§)	The peak year before fall in prices.

(*) *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 30; (†) *Report of the Accountant-General*, 1922-23 (Baghdad, 1924), pp. 11-12; (‡) *Report on the Operations of the Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance*, 1926-27 (Baghdad, 1927), p. 23; (§) Ibid., 1928-29 (Baghdad, 1929), p. 30.

[4] Based on a population of 295,337, the average of the estimate 320,000 in 1918-19 and that of 271,674, made in 1920-1 for the League of Nations. Dickburn in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 1, estimated the Muntafiq population at 300,000.

[5] April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.

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benefits flowing directly to their districts in proportion to their taxation. The receipts for the great tribal Divisions of Muntafiq, Diwaniya and Hillah in 1920 were estimated at Rs.33,33,100 or nearly one-quarter of the total local revenues of the fourteen divisions.[1] The purely divisional expenditures in the three divisions were Rs.19,29,440 or 18·8 per cent of the total divisional expenditure.[2]

Another grievance dominated tribal feeling. The tribal policy adopted by the British authorities in 1915-18 for restoring the power of the shaikhs, largely for military reasons, had been extremely valuable but it had been carried beyond its original and logical conclusions. It had carried with it the necessity of supporting the paramount shaikh in all but the most flagrant uses of his power. Events had proved, however, that these shaikhs had abused their authority, using it for their personal aggrandisement. The other shaikhs and tribesmen, sullen and resentful of the growing autocracy of the Government shaikhs, found in Nationalism a promise of release both from the shaikhs and from the Government which supported them.[3] It is a fact that in the Insurrection of 1920 the enmity of the insurgent shaikhs and tribesmen in many centres was directed less against the British, in spite of Shi'a incitement, than at the paramount Government shaikhs[4] who, in many cases, were forced into the towns from which they dared not stir. In this atmosphere the exhortations of the religious firebrands to rise, they and less produced results far greater than the intrinsic merit of their Nationalist propaganda would justify.

Nevertheless, in spite of the undeniable power of fanatical religion among the turbulent tribesmen and in spite of the tribal grievances and hatreds which both Shi'a and Sharifian

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[1] *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. 80.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

[3] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 129. See cf. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 6-9.

[4] Ibid., p. 8 (ix); Dickson, G. H., A.P.O. Samawa: *Official Report on the Causes of the Tribal Disturbances in the Samawah District, August 9th, 1920.*

mutahids went there on pilgrimage. Later, at a tribal gathering /25
at Shumali, the leading shaikhs between Shāmiyya and Hilla /26
unanimously determined to follow the lead of Yūsuf as-Suwaidi and Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. As a result of incitement from Baghdad, the Holy Cities and Syria, the tribes and towns became increasingly restless. A train was derailed above Baghdad in late May, and others below Hilla in early June. Petty crimes increased at an alarming rate. Arabs in government service began to resign. The collection of revenue on winter crops became more and more difficult. In Shatra, in the Muntafiq, it had already been intimated to Captain Mead, the Assistant Political Officer, on May 17th, that should he persist in carrying out chain or rope measurement of crops, he would be forcibly resisted.[1] The arrest of six agitators at Hilla[2] relieved the tension there, but the arrest and deportation to Henjam[3] of Mirza Muhammad Ridha and nine others at Karbala on June 22nd added to the perilousness of the situation on the middle Euphrates. The arrest of Hajji Mahlil, the principal agitator in Diwaniya, did nothing to check the rising there. Signs of incipient unrest were manifest everywhere and a lapse into former lawlessness and anarchy seemed imminent. It was clear that only a spark would be needed to send off the train of insurrection.

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[1] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 1-2. This method of crop measurement, (27) practised by the Turks, is described in detail in *Revenue Report*, [illegible], p. [illegible]. As late as 1919, rope measurement was employed in the Muntafiq and elsewhere in 'Iraq as a normal method of crop assessment. *Report of Revenue Department*, [illegible], pp. [illegible], also App. [illegible]. See A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. [illegible].

[2] Telegram No. [illegible], Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to P.O. Hilla, June [illegible], 1920.

[3] According to the official *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf*, p. [illegible] B., Henjam 13 1 is a small, rocky and desert island in the Persian Gulf not far from the Clarence Straits. Its climate in summer is 'barely tolerable', the heat being terrific and aggravated by mosquitoes, sandflies and other insects.

650 handed over to the Debt Commission. The balance of £383,009 sterling was to be spread over a period of seven years.

Examination of the method of balancing the budgets and of meeting the demands of the Ottoman Debt bondholders indicates, however, that the results have been secured by the wholesale reduction of salaries and by the reduction of appropriations to government services which vitally concern the regeneration of 'Iraq: Irrigation, Agriculture and Public Works. In 1923, salaries of 'Iraqi officials were reduced by amounts varying from 2½ to 25 per cent on the recommendation of the Economic Committee of 1922.[1] In March, 1926, following recommendations by Mr. Hilton Young,[2] additional reductions were made, while in November, 1930, following the financial crises arising from the fall in agricultural prices, salaries were further reduced by amounts varying from 5 to 8 per cent.[3] The result was that official salaries fell out of proportion to the cost of living; much dissatisfaction was produced, particularly since British officials under contract suffered no such reductions; and encouragement was given to the return to other methods of supplementing salaries which, prevalent under the Ottoman regime, had been severely discouraged by the British Advisers and Administrative Inspectors.

651 In the assessment and collection of land revenue, progress had been undoubtedly made by early Finance Ministers and their Advisers in removing some of the defects inherent in the Turkish system as adopted by Revenue Officers of the Civil Administration. Nevertheless, in 1925, the primary objectives before the 'Iraq Government were still those which had faced the Civil Administration in 1919.[4] These objectives were:

1. To organize the means of revenue collection, as, for example, the elimination of the tax-farmers, and to

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[1] Report of the Economic Committee, 1922 (Confidential), (Baghdad, 1922).
[2] Report of Financial Commission, 1925.
[3] Young, Sir E. Hilton, Report on Economic Condition and Loan Policy (Baghdad, 1930).
[4] Supra, Ch. vi.

provide adequate methods of auditing and accounting in [S-5] order to remove as far as possible opportunities for speculation either by officials or private individuals.

2. To set a definite and fixed rate of demand, payable in cash, applicable to each type of land according to whether it was privately or State-owned, and to the method of irrigation employed on it.
3. To devise methods whereby it would be possible to dispense with the actual annual estimates of agricultural yields, a costly and vexatious task, disturbing to the cultivator as well as affording latitude for bribery and corruption.

These objectives meant that eventually fixed demands would be based upon cadastral units of the land itself, in relation to their potential or assumed average rate of production.

Four obstacles stood between existing conditions and the achievement of these desired aims:

1. The lack of a cadastral survey, the prime essential to any system of land-revenue administration.
2. The lack of knowledge of the taxing authorities as to exact agricultural and marketing conditions, and of the potentialities and the actual yields of agricultural produce.
3. The presence of an agricultural class, from landowners [S6-5] to cultivators, unwilling from motives of self-interest to co-operate with the Government in agricultural assessments.
4. The existence of official personnel, which in many cases was insufficiently trained and was susceptible to outside influence.

If many of the problems remained unsolved to-day as they were in 1930, it has not been for the lack of conscientious effort on the part of both 'Iraqi officials and their British Advisers. The long delayed cadastral survey has been pushed forward. Sir Ernest Dowson, formerly Surveyor-General of Egypt, was

657 asked in 1929 to study land-tenure and, on the basis of his recommendations,[1] a Land Settlement Department was created in the Ministry of Finance. The deep-rooted conservatism of town and tribe, the lack of experienced staff and the undesirability of sudden changes involving possible serious political consequences made sweeping changes impracticable. Nevertheless, from 1926 onwards, legislation aiming at the simplification of existing methods both of assessment and collection found their way on to the statute books[2] until a radical change was made by the introduction of the *Istihlak* or Consumption Tax, June 22nd, 1931.[3]

The *Istihlak* Law, based on the principle of collecting a fixed proportion of the value of a commodity at the time of its sale, has aroused sharp differences of opinion as to its merits. It has been regarded as costly, complicated and difficult of application, affording opportunities of evasion. On the other hand, in spite of its imperfections, it seems to be a step in the right direction towards the simplification of taxation and the relief of a portion of the burden on the small landowners. Although no ostensible effort seems to have been spared to make the incidence of taxation more equitable, there seems to have been a tendency for returns from land-revenue to decrease while other forms of receipts, particularly customs and excise duties, increase. In 1921, land-revenue produced 21.1 per cent of the total receipts, and customs and excise 38 per cent. In 1928, customs and excise returns rose to 43.5 per cent and in 1931, to 48.2 per cent, while land-revenue fell to 20.3 per cent in 1928 and to 9.5 per cent in 1931.

Iraqi officials are apt to attribute this phenomenon, on the

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[1] Dowson, Sir E. M., *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth, 1932).

[2] Law No. [illegible] of [illegible]: Compilation, [illegible], p. [illegible]; *Amendment of Assessment of Land Tax Law*, No. [illegible] of [illegible]: ibid., p. [illegible]; Law No. 23 of 1929: ibid., p. [illegible]; Law No. [illegible] of [illegible], ibid., [illegible], p. 6.

[3] *Istihlak* Law No. [illegible] of 1931, ibid., 1931, p. [illegible]. This Law after being repeatedly amended was repealed when a new Law, No. [illegible] of 1933, incorporating the amendments, was passed July [illegible], 1933. Ibid., 1933, p. 123.

one hand, to recognition of the long existing necessity of 657
lightening the burdens on agricultural produce, and, on the
other, to the fall in world prices. The former argument might
be more effective if the principal benefit of the reduction of
land-revenue had been widespread and not restricted thus far
to the comparatively few large landowners. The fall in world
prices did no doubt cause a tremendous decrease in land-revenue
but the decrease has been out of all proportion to the
fall in prices. It must be observed also that no proportionate
decrease occurred in the animal head-tax although the price of
animals fell as sharply in 1930 as that of agricultural produce.
Thus, while *koda* produced 5.2 per cent of the total receipts in
1921, it produced 7 per cent in 1928 and 6.2 per cent in 1931.
The comparatively steady returns are hardly explained by
increasing efficiency in collections and by increase in
flocks but rather by the fact that most of the animals were
owned by tribes whose voices counted for little in official
circles.

Less tangible evidence seems to exist for the success of the 657
attempts to eradicate corruption from revenue assessment and 661
collection and from financial administration than for any other
aspect of administrative activity, although every British official
in the Ministry of Finance has striven for that end. The
existence of dishonesty and of jobbery for financial favours,
which seems to have increased from 1929-30 onwards, has been
one of the most unsatisfactory features of administrative life,
as most 'Iraqis admit. The tendency has been to lay the blame
upon Turkish ex-officials and upon practices inherited from
Turkish days, but the evil seems to be too prevalent to be thus
accounted for. The true explanation seems to lie in the fact
that public spirit has not yet been able to rise above the natural
desire to avoid taxation, no less strong in 'Iraq than in other
countries. The attitude of Parliament to personal aggrandisement 661
at the expense of national interests has already been
indicated. Even Ministers have been known to take advantage

435 as 60,000 people are engaged in industrial production (other than oil), virtually all of these are employed in small undertakings where the work is largely done by hand and productivity is accordingly quite low. Probably only about 2,000 are working in what might be characterized as modern industrial plants.

654 Fortunately prospective increases in government revenues
● 651 from oil now make it possible for the government to undertake a
382 large-scale program for the development of the country. Past
investments in the oil industry will in the future yield large divi-
dends in the form of a rapidly increasing production of petroleum.
[471] In accordance with an agreement reached in August 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq have undertaken to raise oil output, which amounted to only about six million tons in 1950, to 30 million tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraqi government half of the profits before the deduction of taxes. On this basis it is anticipated that, over the next five years, the governmen may receive net revenues amounting to as much as 214 million dinars from oil alone. Under the terms of a law passed in 1950 these revenues will be available to finance development. They will be assigned to the Development Board, an autonomous agency established in 1950 to ensure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs.

652 In the past, financial stringencies have severely limited public expenditures. The government has often had difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays had to be kept small; government salaries were not raised in accordance with the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds. In the future the situation will be reversed. The principal task will be to find ways and means of spending rapidly increasing revenues in a manner which will contribute most effectively to the permanent development of the country. It is with this task in view that the Mission has drawn up its recommendations.

[illegible] Any program for realizing the economic potentialities of the country should be broad in conception and well balanced. Investment outlays in dams and irrigation works, transport facilities and industrial plants must be complemented by increased expenditures

654x In this program, the Mission has not included the expenditures already provided for in the 1951-52 budget of the Development Board. For the period 1952-53 to 1956-57, inclusive, the Mission has, however, taken into account not only those projects which it has studied and recommended, but also certain others which it has not examined in detail and which the government has already decided to carry out. The latter include the oil refinery, and a variety of projects such as public buildings and summer resorts, for which the Development Board has provided in its five-year program.

The program includes not only investment expenditures, but also increases in recurrent outlays which the Mission considers important to development. Since the ordinary budget out of which these recurring expenditures are generally defrayed will remain tight for a number of years, the Mission strongly recommends that any increases be financed by Development Board funds. Pressures for a reallocation of a designated portion of the oil revenues might well become irresistible if the Development Board insisted on confining its expenditures to purely investment projects and allowed the activities which are normally financed out of the regular budget to become starved of funds, no matter how important they might be. Such a development would seriously impair the prospects of carrying out a coherent program. Although in principle the segregation of revenues for particular purposes is open to serious question and the allocation of oil income to the Development Board will probably give the latter, within a few years, more than twice as much revenue as that accruing to the ordinary budget, the Mission believes that the continuation of this arrangement will be, on the whole, beneficial. It provides more definite assurance that the oil revenues will actually be used in the interest of an integrated program of development rather than dispersed over the whole field of the government's operations without making an effective, permanent contribution to a rise in the standard of living.

Financing the Program

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658* As long as the oil revenues continue to be assigned t[illegible] Board, no serious difficulty in financing the contemplated devel[illegible]ment program should be encountered. As already indicated, the

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oil companies have assured the government an increase in the 657
annual rate of production to 30 million tons by the end of 1955 658
and a division of profits which, it is estimated, may increase the government's revenues from oil to ID 59,000,000 in 1956-57. After allowing for Iraq's obligation to surrender to the Turkish government 10 percent of its revenues from the output of the Kirkuk and Mosul fields and for the repayment of ID 2,400,000 of past oil royalty advances, the government's net income from oil over the five-year period, 1952-53 to 1956-57, may reach about ID 214,000,000. This sum, plus about ID 3,000,000 representing the increase in revenue for 1951-52 not programmed in the Development Board's first annual budget, may thus be available to the Board for financing its program. The total amount would be ID 49,000,000 in excess of the entire developmental outlay contemplated by the Mission.

The Mission would strongly advise against any attempt to program this potential "surplus" at this time. First of all, such an attempt would be highly unrealistic in view of the enormous difficulties already involved in the appropriate expenditure of the sum suggested by the Mission. Secondly, the income from oil may fall below estimates. Finally, the cost of the program may well increase substantially under the impact of world-wide inflationary pressures. To the first of these, the Mission will later revert in some detail. The second is worth emphasizing because the new arrangement with the oil companies provides a variable rather than a fixed rate of return in the form of half of the profits before taxes. The revenue estimates cited above apparently rest on the assumption that the current price of oil will be maintained and that wages and new equipment costs will not rise significantly. If the anticipated relationship between costs of production and the price of oil is upset in such a way that the former rises more rapidly, profits and therefore income will fall below the expected levels. Although the oil companies have already made the bulk of their investment, future increases in wages and in the cost of additional equipment are not unlikely and may make future costs of production somewhat higher than current estimates. Whether such an eventual increase in costs would be offset by higher prices for crude oil depends on developments in world production and demand for

651 oil. It is possible that the rapid rise in output which may be
652* expected to take place in other Middle Eastern countries, with the possible exception of Iran, will tend to restrain prices. In any event, it would be imprudent to rely on the receipt of all the anticipated revenue. In addition, part of the income should be set aside to meet contingencies and emergencies, particularly further increases in costs. The present low level of wages will unquestionably rise as the development program gets under way and demand for labor increases. Moreover, the rearmament effort under way in the West may exert a constant upward pressure on the prices of materials and equipment.

653* Since the oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling,
457 Iraq should have ample foreign exchange to defray the cost of imports required for the development program. There should be no need for foreign loans except perhaps to meet part of the hard currency needs. As a member of the sterling area, Iraq is dependent on the sterling area dollar pool for allocations of dollars. Until 1951 Iraq received a fixed annual allocation of hard currencies, but under a new arrangement, effective provisionally for one year, the United Kingdom has undertaken simply to furnish sufficient dollars to cover Iraq's essential needs. For part of the extraordinary dollar import requirements arising out of a rapidly expanding development program, Iraq may still have to borrow abroad.

Obstacles to Development

654* While financing the program will present no difficulty, the rate of expenditures envisaged will pose serious problems. To carry out a five-year program involving an outlay of ID 168,000,000, the Development Board would have to spend ID 13,000,000 in 1952-53 and successively larger sums up to a total of ID 30,000,000 in 1956-57. The experience of other countries in process of development illustrates that it is not easy to spend money rapidly and efficiently on well-conceived projects. Expenditures in most cases tend to fall short of the targets. The International Bank, for example, has noted that disbursements on its loans to underdeveloped countries seldom conform to original schedules. In Iraq the development program will require the government to gear itself to an annual rate of expenditures which at the end of the next five years will need

Effect on Incomes and Prices

453 During the war and for a short time afterwards, Iraq experienced a severe inflation. Since then, it has enjoyed a fair degree of monetary stability, largely as a result of the conservative financial policies of the government. In fact special local circumstances have lately induced a certain degree of deflation in spite of the strong inflationary influences prevailing in the world outside. The sharp rise in the level of employment and income which will ensue from the development program is bound to alter the whole structure of the economy. Upward movements in wages and prices can certainly be expected. In part, these will be the unavoidable concomitant of the process of development. In part, they may be the result of a general inflation in world prices, which would be beyond the control of Iraq.

454x 455 The principal task confronting the government is to prevent an inflation in any way comparable to the wartime one. It is most important to avoid a marked wage and price inflation which would not only make development far more expensive, but might also create serious discontent. The government has, however, ample means at its disposal to avert such a danger, if it allows liberal use of its sterling income from oil to pay for imports.

The principal reason for the wartime inflation was the large expenditure of money by the military forces in Iraq and the lack of imported goods—for obviously cogent reasons—to satisfy the ensuing demand. Given a sufficient supply of consumer goods from abroad, there should be no reason in peacetime to repeat this ● [51] experience. Accordingly the Mission would recommend that in due course a competent committee re-examine the customs tariff and the system of import licensing. Some of the restrictions in the present licensing system were imposed to meet a passing situation and could well be discarded. Certain objectives, for example, restriction of imports of "luxury" goods in favor of necessities, might be better accomplished by appropriate changes in the customs tariff. Efforts should also be made to discard, if only gradually, the present method of customs valuation for goods assessed ad valorem, whereby the domestic wholesale price is taken as the basis of valuation.

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position to finance investment expenditures. The National Bank should operate essentially as a banker for the commercial banks and therefore should not finance long-term investment. To discourage credit expansion on the basis of the larger foreign income which will accrue from oil, the Mission suggests that, instead of selling sterling receipts to the National Bank, the government segregate them in a special account in London apart from the country's regular foreign exchange reserves until such time as they are spent abroad or the dinar equivalent is spent in Iraq.

Tax Reform

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Total tax revenues will probably not need to be increased provided any temporary ordinary budget deficit can be met by short-term borrowing of idle funds at the disposal of the Development Board. The only exception might be taxation to pay part of the cost of raising government salaries. On the other hand, some revision in the tax structure to provide a more equitable apportionment of the burden would be desirable. In common with many other underdeveloped countries Iraq relies strongly on indirect taxes which bear heavily on consumers without taking into account capacity to pay. Thus in the last three fiscal years indirect taxes contributed about 82 percent of all tax receipts and 71.5 percent of all budget income, while direct taxes accounted for only 18 percent of all tax revenues and 13 percent of total government receipts. While drastic changes in the tax structure may not be feasible, some decrease in the burden of indirect taxes appears desirable. There might well be a reduction in import duties on some essential goods such as sugar and cheap cotton and rayon textiles, offset, perhaps, by an excise tax on luxuries. Likewise it may be desirable to decrease and gradually abolish, except in its application to exports, the so-called *istihlak* tax which is levied on produce brought to market and at a rate varying in recent years between 10 and 12½ percent of approximate market prices. Except for the partial incidence of this tax, agriculture in Iraq is hardly taxed at all. The income tax which bears very heavily on the salaried classes, whose income is already comparatively low, does not apply to income from either agricultural land or urban property. Agricultural land in private hands has not been taxed since 1936 when a land and water

654* 651 [825] rent tax was abolished in return for certain payments to be made by the landholders over a maximum period of ten years. Thus the tax system discriminates in favor of those who have managed to obtain state lands in *lazmah* grant and against those who have regularly leased land from the state. The latter continue to be assessed for rent whereas the former, who have frequently secured large *lazmah* grants on the basis of rather tenuous proof of occupancy and cultivation, escape any tax or rent assessments on their land.

The application of a graduated income tax to agriculture, while equitable, may not be politically feasible at present and would certainly pose difficult problems of assessment. Consideration should be given, however, to the reintroduction of some type of land tax. The fact that the cadastral survey is only half completed would not be an insuperable obstacle. In most cases the land held by each individual will be well known in the locality where he resides. Landholders could be required to register for taxation all the land they claim with the provision that they would not be allowed to establish claims during the cadastral survey to any lands not so registered; and in case of conflicts between actual occupants and other claimants, the tax could provisionally be levied on the actual occupant. It would probably be desirable to levy the tax on cultivable land rather than land actually under cultivation in order to provide an incentive to production or, alternatively, to release idle land for resettlement. Tax rates would have to vary in accordance with productivity of the land, which could, as in some other countries, be ascertained through tests or control plots located in various parts of the country. The tax rate should presumably also take into account the government contribution to irrigation of the land. The adoption of such a land tax might be linked with the gradual reduction and perhaps ultimate abolition of the *istihlak*.

X. Conclusion

527 Today the people of Iraq for the most part suffer from dire poverty. Although a relatively small number of city merchants and landowners enjoy high incomes, the average standard of life is extremely low. The future would hold little prospect for relief if

little more than one ton left to sell and he might even have to keep part of this for his draft animals, if they are unable to find enough stubble and other natural fodder. 871

The price which a fellah gets for his grain is usually very much less than the wholesale market price in Basra or Baghdad. Although rail transport is very cheap for grains, the other costs such as local transport, bagging, weighing and storage are high; the merchants' profit and the *istihlak* tax also have to be deducted. Finally, the fellah's funds are usually exhausted before the harvest season and he frequently accepts a low forward price on his crop before it is gathered. For the 1950-51 crop, prices have been high (over ID 20 per ton), but many fellahin undoubtedly sold forward at prices little over ID 10. This would not be an unusual price in past seasons. Thus, ID 10 for the winter crop and perhaps another ID 10 for a small summer crop of sesame would constitute his total cash income for the year.

This income would usually be spent on food, clothing and possibly some low-grade domestic tobacco. Two of the most important items in food expenditure are sugar and tea. Dates, particularly in the South, and a few vegetables such as onions are also purchased, but, on the whole, most fruit and vegetables are beyond the reach of the fellah and are sold in the towns. Meat is only eaten occasionally, although fish is available in the marsh areas of the South. Nor does the fellah who owns no animals other than his draft animals consume much milk or *laban* (sour milk). Clothing would consist of some cheap cotton sheeting sufficient for a few garments and occasionally a second-hand jacket; few fellahin wear shoes. Hardly anything is spent on housing or furniture, the living quarters being a small mud hut without windows and hardly any furnishing but a few mats and cooking utensils. Soap, for example, is undoubtedly a luxury. Life is not far above the subsistence level and must often be below it. 843

In the process of selling his surplus crop and making his small purchases, the fellah is taxed. While with crops consumed in Iraq the *istihlak* tax is largely borne by the buyer, in the case of an export crop such as barley, which is influenced by world prices, the tax falls most heavily on the producer. At the end of 1950, customs duties on sugar were about one fifth to one quarter of the 819 4.57

371 657 Baghdad retail price; on tea, about one sixth. Duties on textiles are also high, but cannot be so easily measured in terms of the retail price, while excise and other revenue collected on tobacco are also very large. In the case of barley, these indirect taxes on sale and purchase might reduce the fellah's real income from his saleable surplus by as much as one third.

591 Although the villager contributes to the revenue of the country, he receives little in the way of benefits from its expenditure. He is usually without any kind of education, which in itself militates against the improvement of his position. Thus the average fellah would not be able to read even the simplest leaflets, which might be published to improve his methods of cultivation. Government officials, who might impart this knowledge by personal contact, are too few or too hampered by lack of transport to be able to reach him. Much the same applies to his health, which is generally poor in the first instance because he is unable to afford an adequate diet.

Apart from a few generalizations, lack of information prevents comparisons with other types of agriculture such as rice cultivation in the marsh areas of the South, date-gardening along the Euphrates and in Basra or grain-growing in the North. In general, the rice areas appear to be extremely congested and living standards are probably the lowest of all. Land in the North is more plentiful, the smallholder is more common, and, in any case, the share of the landlord is far lower, but rainfall is uncertain and yields vary disastrously from year to year.

There are, of course, fellahin who have additional sources of income. The principal source is livestock. A fellah, who, in addition to working the land, owns a few cows or water buffalo is, by comparison, a rich man, but such people are not common. The capital required to purchase an animal may be several times the annual cash income of the poor fellah. Some may seek casual work during the long off-season, but again these are the minority.

The condition of the settlers in the Dujaila project is in striking contrast to that of the average fellah. The principal reason for their improved standard of living is the fact that they do not have to pay any share to a landlord. Their income is for that reason alone more than double. In addition, they have been able to acquire cows, sheep, goats and chickens. Many of them have fruit gardens.

[illegible] extensive use of private exchange holdings, particularly in 1949 when licenses to the value of over ID 10,000,000 were issued, it may well be that it has also encouraged the illegal acquisition of foreign exchange.

A fourth list consists of prohibited goods. This is purely a protective device, almost all of the goods in this list being produced in Iraq. These include a variety of agricultural products such as sesame seeds and cottonseed or their oils. Several of the newer industries have also been protected by the prohibition of their products, for example, beer, cement, cotton yarn, aluminum ware, alcohol and hides.

Although the improvement in the foreign exchange situation has led to a relaxation of the quota limitation, the other restrictions remain. In particular, import licenses still have to be obtained for each purchase. Although it is maintained that licenses can now be obtained quickly, this appears to act as at least a psychological deterrent to merchants. One of the objects of the licensing system is to restrict importing to bona fide merchants, but if this is considered necessary, it could, of course, be achieved by the issue of a general importer's license, good for a period such as a year.

[illegible] As the economy develops and the standard of living rises, which it may do rapidly in the near future, the demand for goods now on the limited and prohibited lists is likely to increase and restrictions on imports of these goods might easily have an inflationary effect on prices. This would hit the artisan, the clerk and the civil servant, and might increase the cost of the development program. Any extension of prohibition to textiles and other goods produced in Iraq would, of course, hurt the poorest classes. Under these circumstances, it will be very difficult to manage so rigid a system.

A much more flexible instrument would be the customs tariff, but little coordination of the import licensing system with the tariff seems to have been achieved. At present the tariff is primarily a means for raising revenue and, as such, imposes the greatest burden on those who buy bulk commodities. It hardly conforms to the objectives of a licensing system that aims at a plentiful supply of these goods at low prices. The principal objection put forward to higher duties on luxuries is the increased premium a little over five percent of the total. Expenditures on education, health and other social services, although still very inadequate, rose slightly so that they absorbed almost 21 percent of the total budget in 1951. Capital outlays have been extremely modest. Total new government investment outlays for civilian purposes have averaged only ID 2,700,000 annually in the period 1948-49 to 1950-51. Expenditures on public works and housing, excluding irrigation, absorbed on the average less than six percent of total government outlays in this period. 4-62

Economies have also been effected in recent years at the expense of the municipal and provincial administrations. By law, these were supposed to have assigned to them, in equal shares, the proceeds of the property and petrol taxes less the expenses of collection incurred by the central government. Actually very little of these taxes has been turned over to the local and provincial governments. For example, in the three years 1947-48 to 1949-50 the provincial administrations received only ID 171,000 out of a total of ID 2,626,000 due to them. Municipalities were similarly handicapped. The ability of local governments to carry out improvements and even to maintain existing facilities was correspondingly curtailed. 4-37 4-52

Characteristic Features of Government Revenues

The fiscal system in the past has been characterized by (1) the high proportion of revenues derived from indirect taxation, (2) light taxation of agriculture, and (3) considerable tax evasion and poor tax collection. 4-57

Indirect taxation is generally predominant in all underdeveloped countries, and Iraq is no exception. In the three-year period 1948-49 to 1950-51 indirect taxes contributed about 82 percent of all tax income and 59 percent of total budget receipts. Customs duties and excises accounted during these years for 71.5 percent of total revenues from indirect taxes, while taxes on agricultural produce, fish, and livestock brought to market (the so-called istihlak and koda taxes) contributed most of the remainder. Direct taxes—the so-called land tax, the property tax and the income tax—accounted for only 18 percent of total tax revenues and 13 percent of all government receipts. Income and surtaxes

9. International Bank R., 3-4 (1952) 1952 [illegible] Iraq [illegible]

667 have yielded only about ID 2,400,000 annually in recent years because income from agriculture and urban property is exempt and rather sweeping exemptions or reductions have also been accorded to Iraqi-owned industrial enterprises. The three principal oil companies have also not been required to pay income taxes in return for annual payments in commutation of all taxes. Income and surtaxes thus bear primarily on salaried employees and individuals and companies engaged in commerce. In 1948-49 all Iraqi companies paid only ID 270,000 in income and surtaxes as compared with ID 408,000 paid by foreign companies.

Both land devoted to agriculture and income from agriculture largely escape taxation. A land tax, assessed in accordance with a very complicated set of criteria, was levied until 1931 when it was replaced by a 10 percent tax called istihlak on agricultural 667 produce brought to designated centers, presumably for sale. At the 617 same time, the government enacted a Law for the Collection of Land Rent which, after its revision in 1936, came to be called erroneously a land tax. Actually it was a compound of a rent charge on all lands except those alienated in tapu to which the state had retained the ultimate title, and a tax on water whether supplied by flow or by pump. The "rent" element was supposed to equal about five percent of the value of the crop and the "water" charge between two and 10 percent, depending on whether the land was irrigated by pump or by flow, and, if by flow, whether or not the flow was regular and assured. The total charges were assessed by various criteria. For government lands, which were regularly leased, they were set either by auction or by triennial assessment of the type and amount of crops grown on the land. This levy, which itself was circumscribed by a number of exemptions, was abolished in 1939, except for miri lands leased regularly by the government, in return for certain payments over a transitional period of 10 years. In view of the subsequent inflation these 667 proved to be rather light. Thus virtually the only outstanding agricultural tax is the istihlak. During recent years this tax has varied from 10 to 12½ percent of the value of produce brought to market as fixed on the basis of market prices. The istihlak, however, is paid by the buyer rather than the seller, although the producer may actually bear it insofar as prices are set in the export market.

[illegible]

TABLE [illegible]

Composition of Government Receipts
(In millions of dinars)

	Actual results			Estimates
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
A. Taxes				
Direct taxes:				
Land tax [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Property tax	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Income tax	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total direct taxes	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Indirect taxes:				
Consumer tax on agricultural produce and animals	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Customs	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Excises				[illegible]
Stamp duties	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Tobacco Monopoly (net) [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total indirect taxes	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total tax receipts	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
B. Other receipts				
Share in National Bank's profits	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
Oil royalties	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Posts and telegraphs (gross)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
All other receipts	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total other receipts	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Grand Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

● 4.57 or prices cannot be correspondingly increased because domestic demand is too elastic.

At the same time, the tax system discriminates in favor of those who have managed to obtain state lands in *lazmah* grant and against those who have regularly leased land from the state. The latter continue to be assessed for rent whereas the former, who have frequently secured large *lazmah* grants on the basis of rather tenuous proof of occupancy and cultivation, escape any tax or rent assessments on their land.

Agriculture probably also profits to a greater extent than other sectors of the economy from tax evasion. It is generally acknowledged that only between 60 and 70 percent of the *istihlak* is actually collected and that part of the tax is collected at reduced rates by downgrading the produce subject to taxation. Moreover, many leaseholders of government land simply fail to pay the rent tax. Thus of the ID 874,332 assessed in 1949-50, only ID 188,713 was actually collected. The leaseholders in Amara province accounted for ID 605,000 of the arrears. Their failure to pay may reflect in part a feeling that they are the victims of the discrimination cited above.

312 to use a quantity of water out of proportion to the amount of land
423 to be irrigated; and in times of water scarcity they must be taken into account in rationing the available supply even though an objective appraisal of relative requirements might produce quite a different distribution.

312 A larger supply of water would, of course, minimize the difficulties of distribution set forth above, but in the long run it is also vitally important that economies be effected in the amount of water used. The provision of drainage facilities and the installation of an adequate amount of regulators on canals will certainly bring about substantial economies of this character. The cultivators in Iraq, however, have for many years been accustomed to use water rather lavishly; only demonstration will convince them that they
312 can safely manage with a smaller supply. It has already been
651 pointed out that the irrigation duty is very low compared to that in many other countries. For flow-irrigated lands it is about 16,900 masharas gross (equivalent to 7,200 masharas in crops); for land irrigated by pumps from canals, 19,500; and for that irrigated by pumps from rivers, 26,200. Pump-irrigated lands have a somewhat higher duty because they are generally better drained and therefore less salted and because the cost of pumping encourages economy in the use of water. As far as the Mission is aware, the problem of
312 raising the irrigation duty has not been systematically studied. The Mission recommends strongly that fields be set aside in each irrigation system for the purpose of determining through practical experimentation over a number of years the optimum quantity of water to be supplied to each crop. Such experiments should be carried out under the joint direction of the Agriculture and Irrigation Departments.

In the future it would be desirable to associate the landholders in each irrigation area as far as possible with the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. Irrigation should be a truly
[476] cooperative venture. The Mission understands that councils of landowners already exist in some districts, notably along the Diyala, to assist irrigation officials in the distribution of water at times of shortage. Such councils might well be organized in all districts and with the broader function of advising on all problems of maintenance and distribution. They could sponsor the experi-

4,200,000 in 1947, 4,300,000 in 1948, and rose again to 6,000,000 in 1949. Actually, the Monopoly by no means fully enforced its announced policy of buying no more than the maximum amount that the licensed area could conceivably produce.* Its purchases exceeded the conceivable maximum by about 400,000 kilos for the 1947 crop, 1,200,000 for the 1948 crop and as much as 3,300,000 for the 1949 crop. Much of the 1946, 1947 and 1948 crops evidently found their way into the black market. 3.49 4.27 4.75

Because of the dangers of growing stocks, the Director-General, supported by the Prime Minister, issued a warning in advance of the 1950 crop that in the future no more tobacco would be bought than could be produced on the licensed area. Evidently the Monopoly carried out this policy for, up to April 12, 1951, it had bought only 2,250,000 kilos from the 1950 crop out of a theoretical total of 3,200,000 kilos. Since the cultivators apparently did not take the government's declared intention seriously, the actual crop substantially exceeded the permissible total. However, farmers were apparently compelled to sell their surplus illicitly at very low prices, thus giving rise to an expectation that in the next years the limitation on production will be more generally observed. If so, it seems likely that farmers' receipts from tobacco will amount to between ID 600,000 and ID 700,000 per year at prevailing Monopoly prices.

In general, it can probably be said that farmers received more for their tobacco than they would have obtained in the absence of the Monopoly. Since the tobacco produced is generally poor and therefore is unable to find foreign outlets, it is likely that, in the absence of the Monopoly's price support and production control program, prices would have been substantially lower. At the same time, the farmers suffered from the earlier erratic policies of the Monopoly which permitted them to realize very high incomes during some of the war years and let them down suddenly immediately after the war.

Tobacco Monopoly Revenues

The government has undoubtedly enjoyed considerable income from the Monopoly. In any discussion of this subject a distinction 6.49 6.65

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* The Monopoly has operated on the assumption that each licensed donum would produce up to a maximum of 200 kg. of tobacco.

must be made between (1) the actual cash income and cash expenditures of the Monopoly, which is of particular importance to the Treasury and (2) the Monopoly's accounting contribution to the budget. These two differ markedly, as is indicated below.

TABLE [illegible]

CASH AND ACCOUNTING REVENUE OF THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY
(In Dinars)

	Cash or Treasury Account			Contribution to the Budget
	Cash Income	Cash Expenditures	Balance	
Sept. 1, 1939– Mar. 31, 1946	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1946-47	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1947-48	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1948-49	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1949-50	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

The accounting contribution to the budget is figured by (1) calculating the difference between cash income and cash expenditures realized by the Monopoly in its transactions in tobacco, tombak and cigarette paper, (2) adding or subtracting the net change in the value of the Monopoly's stocks during the year, and (3) adding sundry revenues from confiscated tobacco, license fees, storage, etc. Thus in 1946-47, the accounting contribution to the budget was large despite the cash deficit incurred by the Monopoly because stocks rose markedly. In 1948-49, on the other hand, the contribution to the budget was small in relation to the cash surplus of the Monopoly because stocks of tobacco and tombak during the year fell from [illegible] to 6,700,000 kilos. Finally, the contribution to the budget in 1949-50 was small because at the end of that year stocks were valued for the first time at purchase price instead of sales price as hitherto. As a result the valuation of stocks was substantially reduced despite the fact that the quantity of tobacco and tombak on hand had increased from 6,700,000 to [illegible] kilos.

By and large it certainly can be said that the Monopoly has yielded substantial revenues to the government. This revenue has

accrued despite rather inefficient operation because the Monopoly has consistently charged tobacco manufacturers prices two to two and a half times higher than those it paid for tobacco and it has been able to compel them to accept tobacco at the grade which it has specified, despite the marked deterioration of such tobacco in the Monopoly's warehouses.

Recommendations

In the future the first concern should be improvement in the quality of tobacco. To accomplish this it would be desirable first of all to recruit abroad at least two or three experts on the growing of tobacco. These, assisted by a selected number of Iraqis, would work directly with the growers in a campaign to raise the standards of cultivation, picking and curing. In addition, a minimum of two leaf experts should be engaged to give instruction in the proper methods of grading or classifying tobacco. In order to provide a check on the work of the grading committees, the appointment of an expert buyer to approve all tobacco for final purchase by the Monopoly is recommended. He would presumably need to be a foreigner initially, but would have an Iraqi deputy who would be trained to take his place. In the warehouses, several experienced foremen-manipulators are needed to supervise and teach the staff correct methods of handling and storing the tobacco. The inadequate existing warehouses should be replaced with four to five new ones constructed of brick and concrete, equipped with dust extracting and humidifying plant and portable storage racks. Each of these new warehouses would have four floors, the first three devoted to storage and the fourth to manipulation.

The Monopoly itself might be retained, principally because there will need to be some agency to limit production so long as the tobacco is not of such quality that it can readily be sold abroad. Moreover, the large number of small tobacco growers might otherwise be at the mercy of the merchants and manufacturers, who would have incomparably more bargaining power in the fixing of prices. It is suggested, however, that the Monopoly be reorganized into a financially autonomous agency with its own budget, its own accounts and its own funds. As an autonomous government enterprise it would be required to turn over annually to the Treasury the farmer to get a fairer share of the price and bring about greater price stability. Even if the merchants primarily used these facilities, the farmer would still benefit indirectly because more merchants would be financially able to compete for his products.

Grain stores are especially needed. Cotton can at present be stored at ginneries, and the Agricultural Bank is lending money on such cotton. Aside, however, from a 3,000 ton silo at Baghdad, which went into use with the 1951 harvest, the country possesses no modern grain storage facilities. The Grain Board which is charged with responsibility for storage projects is contemplating the construction of a 40,000 ton silo costing about ID 2,145,000 at Basra. This silo would primarily serve the export trade. It would be desirable to supplement these two with a number of smaller stores, less elaborately equipped and located nearer the centers of production. Such stores would afford necessary protection against grain pests and also help to mitigate the fear of famine which is ever present in a country with sharply fluctuating harvests. If equipped with simple cleaning plant they would help greatly to improve the quality of the grain. Grain threshed by hand according to the prevailing custom contains from 17 to 40 percent foreign matter and from 3 to 15 percent dirt. The number, location and size could only be determined after a thorough survey. It is not unlikely, however, that from 12 to 20 such stores with an individual capacity ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 tons and a total capacity of about 75,000 tons would be needed. For the most part they will not have to be mechanized and can consist basically of simple steel or concrete sheds. The total cost would probably not exceed ID 750,000.

Two possible obstacles to the actual utilization of grain storage facilities should be considered. There may be a disinclination to use them for fear of giving the government knowledge of such stocks and thereby exposing them to taxation. Much grain now escapes taxation. To encourage people to take advantage of the stores it may therefore be necessary to reduce substantially or abolish the istihlak tax which is a type of sales or turnover tax. Other reasons for abolishing or reducing this tax have already been advanced elsewhere.[16] Another difficulty in the way of using such storage facilities lies in the wide variation in the quality of the grain. Those with better quality grain may refuse to store it except under conditions which will ensure that it will be kept as a separate parcel. While this may be possible in the smaller, non-mechanized sheds, it will be impossible in the silos at Baghdad or Basra. There, however, it will be desirable at least to have means for weighing each parcel of grain after as well as before cleaning. At present there are no such facilities in the Baghdad silo and none are apparently contemplated for the Basra silo. Under such conditions there will be a premium on the storage of grain with a large percentage of foreign matter. Those with relatively clean grain harvested by machines will, on the other hand, refuse to use the silos.

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[16] See the Mission's main report, p. 56.

If credit is to be extended on grain stored in silos, there must be adequate supervision to insure the issuance of proper warehouse receipts and to prevent the release of any stored grain except against the surrender of such receipts. Presumably any new facilities would be owned and supervised by the Grain Board. This Board, however, would hardly be in the position to finance all the proposed additional facilities. In 1950 the International Bank was approached with respect to the financing of the Basra silo, but now that Iraq is assured ample sterling income from oil and only a small part of the necessary expenditures is likely to be in dollars, the government may consider it undesirable to contract a loan for this purpose. Financing by the Development Board would then appear to be the only alternative. The Grain Board might even have difficulty in financing the smaller storage facilities. Although its assets as of March 31, 1951, amounted to ID 1,122,900, over 20 percent or ID 321,113 consisted of "fixed assets" and another item of ID 687,222 designated as "sundry debtors" represented almost entirely a claim on the Treasury. Over a number of years the government has levied a one percent tax on grain for the benefit of the Board but it has retained the proceeds provisionally for its own needs. As long as the ordinary budget remains tight, as is likely over the next few years, the government may find it difficult to convert this claim into cash. Under such circumstances the Development Board may find it necessary to give financial assistance for the smaller projects.

paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests, therefore, that the Development Board gradually supply the funds necessary to increase the Bank's capital by ID 5,000,000. The Bank would be authorized to use this sum for making loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an over-all program approved by the Development Board. 4.12 #77

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to create a reserve against possible losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

The Bank at present is understaffed. The directors pass on projects without the benefit of expert assistance, and, as a result, some phases of a project may be completely overlooked. With a shortage of staff, the transaction of business with the Bank is also time-consuming and thus discourages applicants.

The Mission recommends that, first, the Bank's staff be both increased and strengthened and, second, that it be reorganized to give greater responsibility to the head of the Industrial Schemes Section who should be a properly qualified man with broad industrial experience. Members of the Industrial Schemes Section should have thorough training and practical experience in power and mechanical engineering with special reference to industrial planning and layout, and in operations, management and control of industry with special reference to cost accounting.

Promotion of Industry

The "Law for the Encouragement of Industry" enacted in 1929 was replaced by new legislation in 1950 which grants limited exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions 4.19 #23 4.21

Y: International Bank N, 5-4 (1951) 1952 MF1 Iraq MF1

from import duties on machinery, material, equipment and spare parts; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of rent-free government land not in excess of 25,000 square meters for a period of 10 years. Iraq-owned industrial enterprises can qualify for these benefits as long as they primarily use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in considerable quantities. Neither of these conditions is necessarily relevant to efficient production; and it is therefore suggested that the law be amended to stipulate that such benefits should be accorded only to enterprises which have a reasonable prospect of becoming efficient enough to withstand foreign competition.

Industry is protected in many cases by high import duties and in some cases, such as cotton yarn, beer and cement, by import prohibitions. Industrial enterprises have not so far taken full advantage of these restrictions, but if they should do so the demand for their products would undoubtedly diminish significantly.

Foreign competition is always a useful check on inefficiency. Its beneficial effects in bringing about lower production costs and a better product have been demonstrated many times in Iraq. For example, even industries protected by high tariffs have been forced to modernize in order to reduce costs and meet competition. To attempt to shut out foreign competition will, in general, retard, rather than foster, industrial growth. In some cases, it is true, new industries may need protection during the early years of operation. Protection should not, however, be allowed to become a permanent shield for inefficiency; as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized, protective measures should be greatly reduced.

In a country like Iraq where the limited market affords opportunities for only one or two plants in certain fields, there is an acute danger of monopoly and attendant high prices. This danger is aggravated further by a tendency in some industries to emphasize limited production with high profits per unit rather than mass production with lower unit-profits. Foreign competition would appear to be the proper means of restraining trends toward monopoly within a particular field, just as it operates to stimulate modernization in plants suffering from high costs because of obsolete methods.

36.1 have been newly constructed do not appear at all on the record
6.47 of the Planning Office. The Mission, in fact, found that many major details of developments such as civic centers, markets and the like, either were not shown in the plans or were contrary to the plans as prepared and filed. There were also instances where planned projects under construction were suddenly changed or stopped by a new mayor on his assuming office.

Cooperation of the central government with the local authorities has also been noticeably lacking. The Ministry of Education, without consultation with local officials, prepares school plans, showing not only the details of structures but also their locatio and distribution. Likewise, the Ministry of Social Affairs, without reference to local administration, prepares plans for hospitals, clinics, social centers, and housing schemes which form definit parts of the community. And, in similar fashion, the Ministry of Communications and Public Works prepares many plans for public works such as bridges, national highways and streets, and government structures designating details not only of construction but also of alignment, orientation and location. All these specialized planning activities are carried on with little or no coordination with the Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Even in Baghdad, where better cooperation between the municipality and the various government departments might be expected, a large school building was recently completed, abutting on a busy major thoroughfare, the proximity of which was dangerous for school children. The location was approved despite objections by the Planning Office.

Financial Difficulties

36.1 Financial difficulties have contributed to the failure of the
6.48 municipalities to plan more effectively. A large part of their
[illegible] revenues, which are in any case small, is derived from a share in the petrol and property taxes, the proceeds of which are handed over to the central government and, in theory at least, reallocated to the provincial and municipal governments. In years of financial stringency, however, the government has withheld a large part of these taxes for itself.

For capital funds, the municipalities have to rely on occasional loans—or, in rare cases, grants—from the central govern

R.Campbell T-3 (no date) 1949 MEI Iraq MEI

Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the 173
Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true, occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks, as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia 619
tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended pictures of King Faisal and of His Royal Highness the Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days when the country was under foreign domination, when they were the rallying-points of the resistance which prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example,
numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the 963
capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, 64
lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this generation a boy 365
may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city.
When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirham [5.1]
from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants are the first to send in their money; though they may be wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send in the exact dirham along with the labourers and artisans. To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

539 beauty is reserved to carpets only, nor do women have any share of it, for women are all alike. They have hair as black as a spider's legs, a pair of eyes similar to the eyes of a dog, mouths like monkeys' mouths, breasts like the udders of a water buffalo, and their skin is the colour of mud. How, then, can a man love a woman? But you, dear carpet, are of many gay colours, you have the colour of red roses, the blue of the morning sky, the green of young grass, and the yellow sheen of gold. What is more, you have the precious gift of silence, nor do you speak in shrill tones as do the cats when they fight in the moonlight. And that night and on the next night and on every night Khalid rolled up the carpet and took it with him to bed, nor did he speak to his wife. And as for Khalda, she thought: Unhappy is my lot, for I am married to a mad man.

539 .451 Now, let it be known to you that in those days the Turkish Governor of Basra kept a spy at Baghdad, that he might receive information and warning that he be not surprised by his superiors, for truly the revenue of Basra was great, and the Governor took more than three quarters of it for himself and for the expenses of his house, and the remainder he sent to Baghdad, saying: Basra i but a poor city.

539 One day the Governor received a letter from his spy at Baghdad, and the letter read as follows:

O honoured and respected Governor, Let it be known to you that through the exercise of my secret trade I have discovered that a spy has been sent to Basra, and he has been ordered to report on your administration, and on the several revenues of the City. And as for his name, I know it not, and even if I knew it, then it would be of no value for he would change it. But he is said to be such a man a

'539 ONCE in the days of the Ottomans there lived in Baghdad a man of an ancient and noble family named Sheikh Misril el Quraschi, and he lived
T651 in a great house by the banks of the Tigris. Yet his estates
920] had been reduced by the taxation and oppression of the Ottomans, and his crops spoiled by locust and by flood until he was reduced to poverty.

So he lived in his house with his only daughter without a single servant or a single slave, nor was there any furniture or silver left in his house, for he had sold all to buy
[923] food. Yet the house he could not sell, for it would be shameful for him to do so, since it was the house of his ancestors.

The name of his daughter was Nura. She was in the
[303] seventeenth year of her life, yet none had asked for her in marriage, for since there were no servant girls to gossip about her beauty, the boys of great and noble families had not even heard of her. Else surely their sleep would have been troubled by her description, for her hair was as black as the Shatt el Arab on a clear winter's night, and her eyes were as the stars which glisten in its waters, her skin was as golden as the desert sand when tinged by the first rosy red rays of dawn, her back was as supple as the reeds before the wind, and her thighs and breasts had the softness of the feather quilt which allures the tired traveller.

So one day Nura went to her father and she said to him: O my beloved father, my state is thus and thus. Shall I be forever a cook in your household or shall I be the mother of noble sons? And Sheikh Misril grieved much at the words of his daughter, and his heart was sad. And on the nights of the full moon Nura would go out on the roof of their great house, and speak to the moon and ask the question:

874 ies in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial*: secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science*: Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 217 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration, research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 927 423 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the world's supply. Her general economic organization is nevertheless agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

125 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the 357 362 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the common building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 652 511 In 1950 a Development Board was established with the function of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing a general economic and financial plan for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living. It was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programmes the Board has been allocated 70 per

Royal Institute of International Affairs [illegible]
Iraq [illegible]

491 the main roads Baghdad–Kut–Amara–Basra and Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil–Mosul, which are at present unmetalled or only partially metalled. The Development Board has allocated nearly ID17 million to these projects.

492 494 Road traffic is light. At the beginning of 1953 the number of registered motor vehicles was given as follows, most of them operating in or around the larger towns: private cars 8,000; taxis 3,900; buses 2,500; lorries 6,700; motor cycles 1,900. In Baghdad an efficient bus service is operated by a State Passenger Transport Board. A private trans-desert bus service links Baghdad with Damascus, and there are private bus services between Iraq and Persia.

504 505 *Basra Port*,[1] lying some eighty miles up the Shatt al-Arab from the Persian Gulf, is the only commercial port of Iraq; an oil port is being constructed at Fao, near the mouth of the Shatt. A small port established during the Second World War at Umm Qasr, on a sea inlet south of the Shatt al-Arab entrance, has since been dismantled. The authority of the Port, which is controlled by a special department of the Iraq Government, extends from the outer bar of the Shatt to a point seventeen miles above the town of Basra. The Shatt is sufficiently deep to admit large ocean-going vessels, but the Fao bar at its mouth requires constant dredging to clear an entrance for the larger of them. During the Second World War extensions were carried out in view of the increased volume of traffic; in consequence there are now 2,700 feet of continuous jetty, providing berthing for eight large vessels at a time and two or three smaller ones, in addition to barge and lighterage berths. Basra Port handles a large proportion of the country's trade. During 1952 some 900 ocean-going vessels, with a net registered tonnage of 1,750,000, and some 380 tankers and water-carriers, with a net registered tonnage of 900,000, were handled by the Port Authority at Basra, Fao, Abadan, and Khorramshahr. During the financial year 1952–3 cargo imported at Basra totalled 900,800 tons and cargo exported 800,000 tons. The closure of Abadan has occasioned the Port a severe loss of revenue, estimated at ID100,000 a month; port and dredging facilities have nevertheless been maintained.

512 *Inland Waterways.* The Tigris between Basra and Baghdad is navigable for vessels of up to four feet draught from February to August except for short flood periods in April and May in some years; during the remaining five months navigation is impeded for long periods. Inland water transport has lost much of its former importance. The last remaining regular navigation

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[1] See *Port of Basrah*, official publication of the Port Authority.

economy has nevertheless been hit and although the situation has been partly restored, business is still less active than formerly. [illegible]

Banking deposits in December of 1938, 1946, and subsequent years have been as follows (ID):

Year	Current Accounts	Fixed Deposits	Savings Deposits	Total
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

* [illegible]

([illegible] National Bank of Iraq [illegible])

Currency. The currency of Iraq is based on sterling and its unit, the Iraqi dinar (ID), is equivalent to £1 sterling and is divided into 1,000 fils (singular also 'fils'). This currency replaced in 1932 the Indian currency which had been in circulation under the Mandate, and was issued and administered by an Iraq Currency Board, sitting in London, until 1 July 1949, when the National Bank of Iraq took over the functions of the Board and put its own notes into circulation. [illegible]

The circulation of currency, which in August 1939 stood at ID[illegible], increased during the war to ID[illegible] in September 1948. It has since, with some fluctuation, declined and in October 1950 was ID[illegible] million.

Public Finance

Immediately before the Second World War the total state revenue amounted to some [illegible] million dinars. During and after the war there was a steep rise in expenditure: in [illegible] the expenditure had increased to ID[illegible] million, in [illegible] to ID[illegible] million, and in [illegible], the year of the Palestine conflict, to ID[illegible] million, after which it has declined slightly. Loans were raised to meet the consequent deficit, which a considerable increase in taxes and duties were insufficient to prevent and which in [illegible] had risen to ID[illegible] million. A contributory factor was the closure of the Haifa oil pipeline in that year, but in [illegible] and [illegible] the construction of a new pipeline to Tripoli more than made up the loss. In [illegible], with increased revenue and a drop in expenditure, the budget showed a surplus for the first time in seven years, amounting to ID[illegible] million. The expansion of oil revenue has been accompanied by [illegible]

[illegible]

[Marsh Arabs]

[illegible] erable skill to navigate. They are capable of great speed and are driven either by a sail or by oars as the occasion requires. To a stranger they seem very unstable, but the Marsh Arab, who has practically lived in them ever since he was a baby, finds them abundantly stable and perfectly safe.

[illegible] From a distance the houses occupied by these people are very picturesque. The reeds that grow in great abundance in the marshes of Lower Mesopotamia are gathered and when dry are tied in great bundles perhaps two feet in diameter. They are ten to fifteen feet tall or even more, and two bundles tied together at the tops are bent over to form an arch. Each of these arches forms one of the ribs of the house. They are placed every four to six feet, giving an air of solidity and dignity to the structure that is most unusual for this sort of simple architecture. Over these ribs a mat roof is constructed which is surprisingly tight even in the heaviest rains. The houses vary in size, and the largest ones, which serve as guest halls for the sheikhs and the rich, may be seventy-five feet long and twenty feet broad.

[illegible] This agricultural district is peculiar in that while it has a settled community engaged in agricultural pursuits, there is no private ownership of land. The Marsh Arabs form a group almost untouched by Europeans. In the one district we visited all land is owned by the government, in this case a sheikh far removed from the district. [illegible] The only tax that he levies is a moderate rental for the land. Apparently there is little difficulty in getting land; at least no one complained of any trouble of that sort, nor does there seem to be any difficulty in keeping the same plot of land indefinitely if the cultivator wishes to do so. [illegible] The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-

[illegible]

[illegible]

LAND TENURE

Out of this 50 per cent the fellah must also pay a sum for the upkeep of the canals which irrigate the holding; this may amount to 20–25 per cent of his share.

At the beginning of the season the fellah receives in advance from the employer:

	Dinars
[illegible] kg wheat	[illegible]
[illegible] kg barley	[illegible]
Cash in 9 instalments	[illegible]
	[illegible]
Seasonal interest 50 per cent	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]

1 Dinar = £1 sterling

He is not as a rule able to repay the loans from the sale of the produce, and so gets deeper and deeper into debt to the landowner. Thus there has evolved a particular kind of debt-serfdom: a landowner who needs labour from one estate can pay an advance to a whole village or several villages, and so obtain the right to demand the transference of the local workers thus "freed" from their debts to his lands.[1]

Changes in taxation have also benefited the big landowners. To promote the expansion of pump irrigation, land irrigated with pumps was partially exempted from taxation. The reform of taxation under the Istihlak law of 1931 has also operated mainly to the advantage of the large landowners.[2]

Thus the former tribesman in Iraq has been reduced to the position of a serf-tenant, who is entangled in crushing indebtedness, and so is tied to the holding which he cultivates.

In spite of the wise recommendations of Sir Ernest Dowson's report, and the advisory efforts of British officials to improve the security of the small cultivator, it cannot be said that land settlement has succeeded in removing the oppressive character of the land system. Nor has any reform been made to prevent the development of State land.

As regards water-rights, there is the same situation as in Palestine and Transjordan; attempts at legislation have been frustrated by local interests, and here the need for legislation is

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[1] Ibid., p. [illegible].

[2] See P. W. Ireland, Iraq, A Study in Political Development (London, Jonathan Cape, 1937), pp. [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
		[illegible]	[illegible]			
	[illegible]				[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]						
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]						
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]						
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]						
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]						
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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AGRICULTURE

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[illegible] 185 657

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 ME Middle East
IRAQ 1931

ican group, each 23 3/4 per cent, and S. C. Gulbenkian, 5 per cent. The American group, composed of five companies, was organized in February 1928 as the Near East Development Corporation; of the seven original companies, Sinclair and Texas withdrew.[10] Subsequently, the name of the Turkish Petroleum Company was changed to Iraq Petroleum Company.[11]

Iraq Petroleum Concession

According to the agreement, the Iraq Petroleum Company was to choose 24 plots, each eight square miles, and the Government of Iraq was to offer the remaining territory for competitive bidding.[12] Instead, a new agreement was signed on March 24, 1931. The new concession gave the Company the sole right to exploit all lands situated to the east of the Tigris River, covering an area of 32,000 square miles. The Company was to construct a pipeline with a total capacity of not less than 3,000,000 tons per annum. Royalties to be paid to Iraq were four shillings (gold) per metric ton, with a minimum required payment of £400,000 (gold) for the first twenty years beginning with the first export. Until the commencement of export, the Company was to pay the Government the same sum, of £400,000 (gold) annually, of which half, £200,000, would be recoverable by the Company from future royalties in excess of £400,000, while £200,000 was to be dead rent. The Company was exempt from taxation in consideration of yearly payments to the Government of £9,000 (gold) up to the time of commercial export, and thereafter £60,000 (gold) on the first 4,000,000 tons produced and pro rata, and £20,000 (gold) on each additional million metric tons produced and pro rata.[illegible]

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[10] A few years later Gulf, Atlantic and Mexican sold their interests to Standard Oil of N.J. and Standard Oil of N.Y.; the latter became Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. in 1931.

[11] The prolonged negotiations between the U.S. and Great Britain regarding the rights of American nationals in Iraq were finally formalized in a treaty signed on Jan. 9, 1930. Art 2 provided: "The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured . . . to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations." *Rights of the United States of America and of Its Nationals in Iraq, Convention and Protocol between the United States of America, and Great Britain and Iraq*, (Treaty Series No. 835, Washington, 1931), 2.

[12] Under the Mar. 14, 1925 convention, T.P.C. was to make its selection within thirty-two months from the date of the convention, and the Iraq Government was to make its selection of 24 plots, to be offered for competition by sealed bids, within *four years*. Selection by the Company was therefore to have taken place by Nov. 1927, and the Government's selection by Mar., 1929. Instead, the Company asked for more time, and in Aug. 1927 the Iraq Government granted a year's extension. In May 1928 the Company sought a further extension.

In the meantime, an independent British-Italian syndicate, the British Oil Development Co. (B.O.D.), approached King Faisal to obtain oil leases outside the 24 plots selected by T.P.C., for which it would build a railway from Iraq to the Mediterranean. To counter this, T.P.C. offered to make a survey for the pipeline and a railway to the Mediterranean if it were granted a two-year extension. At the same time, the Company was also negotiating for a modification of the 1925 concession.

Discussions for modification took place in June 1929, while the Company prepared to make a tentative selection of its plots to comply with the provisions of the agreement and thus obviate the necessity of getting a time extension. In 1931 the revised concession was signed. U. S. Senate, *International Petroleum Cartel*, 68-70.

The Mosul Petroleum Company Concession

That the British had never meant to abide by the system of subleasing and the provision eliminating the Turkish Petroleum Company as a bidder at public auctions (a provision inserted in the concession simply to meet the stubborn insistence of the State Department),[illegible] was evidenced not only from the negotiations leading up to the revised agreement of March 24, 1931, but also from the negotiations carried on by the British Oil Development Company for concessions in the rest of the area. When the Iraq Government was about to begin negotiations with B.O.D., Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson instructed Charles Dawes, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, in the middle of April 1931, to remind the British Foreign Office that according to the tripartite convention of January 9, 1930, the Government of Iraq was not to grant a concession covering any of the oil lands in question without affording Americans, individuals and corporations, an equal opportunity to bid, and that the United States expected the British Government to intervene with the Iraq Government to protect their rights. The British Government replied on July 17, 1931 that while it had brought the view of the United States to the attention of the Iraq Government, it took the position that the provisions of the tripartite treaty barred discrimination between

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[illegible] Special Report, Iraq, No. 40, [illegible]; F.O.C., [illegible], vol. [illegible], May [illegible], 1931; F.O.C., [illegible], vol. [illegible], June [illegible], 1932.

[illegible] See above, Chap. VIII, footnote [illegible]; also footnote [illegible] of this chapter.

[illegible]

the different nationals when bids came up, but that there was no obligation on the part of the Iraq Government to put every concession up for public tender before granting it. However, to meet the objections of the United States, the Iraqi Government went through the motions of accepting four tenders for the concession of oil-bearing fields in the rest of the country, and at the end of 1931 announced that since the bid made by the British Oil Development Company was the best, the others had been rejected.

On April 20, 1932, the British Oil Development Company obtained a 75-year concession covering all the lands in the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad west of the Tigris River and north of the 33rd parallel (about 46,000 square miles). Until commercial quantities of oil were found, B.O.D. was to pay dead rent: £100,000 (gold) in 1933, increasing this by £25,000 (gold) annually up to £200,000. It was to construct a pipeline with a minimum annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons, or to make arrangements for the transfer for export of that minimum quantity. The Iraq Government was entitled to take, free of charge, up to 20 per cent of the oil for local consumption and for resale to the Company. Royalties were to be four shillings (gold) per metric ton; the Company was to be tax exempt in consideration of £7,000 paid to the Government annually until commercial production, and then to be the same as that paid by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Ten years later this concession was transferred to the Mosul Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Foreign Relations, 1931, II, [illegible].

Ibid., [illegible].

Great Britain, Foreign Office, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the period January to October, 1932 (London, 1933), [illegible].

In Nov. 1928 the Mosul Oil Fields, Ltd., with British, Italian, German, Swiss, French-Dutch and Iraqi holdings, was organized for the purpose of acquiring the share capital of the British Oil Development Co. [illegible]

[illegible] Shwadran [illegible] 1955 [illegible] Middle East

[illegible]

the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was more interested in expanding production in Iran than in Iraq. The French, on their part, while agreeing with this argument, feared an additional curtailment of Iraqi production—their major supply—if the participating American companies were permitted to obtain from other oil undertakings in the area. To the French, therefore, the Red Line Agreement was a guarantee, because of the limitations it placed on the American companies, of a steady, and even of an increased, supply of oil from Iraq.

The Iraqis were dissatisfied with the royalties they were receiving; nor were they satisfied with the number of their nationals in the higher positions of oil production operations. They complained of the lack of training facilities for Iraqis for the conduct of the industry. A constant source of irritation between the Government and the Company was the lack of refining facilities in the country. Another issue, of a technical nature, was the evaluation of gold shillings paid in royalties. Difficulties developed when the Company's second payment fell due in January 1932, after the British pound went off the gold standard. A temporary arrangement, without prejudice to either party, was made after Premier Nuri as-Said Pasha went to London and discussed the issue with the Company; Iraq was paid £[illegible] instead of the £400,000 provided by the agreement. Subsequently, it was agreed that payments be made in sterling at the current price of gold.[illegible] Later a serious difference arose as to the interpretation of the "current price of gold." The Company maintained that the gold shilling must be based on the official London rate of exchange of gold, while the Iraqis argued that it should be based on the free market value, which was, of course, considerably higher.

Against the Iraqis' contention that production was being deliberately kept down by the Company, the latter argued that the relatively low rate of production of Iraq oil was due to transport difficulties; that the Company was investing huge sums for pipelines, but the process of building the pipelines was conditioned by the exigencies of war which limited the supply of steel. It pointed out that immediately after the war, in spite of a serious steel shortage, the parallel 16-inch pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli had been built, alongside the existing

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[illegible] Report [illegible], Survey of International Affairs [illegible]

12-inch lines, but that Iraq's refusal to allow the oil to flow to Haifa (Israel) had cut down production to practically half the potentialities of the pipelines.

In the middle of 1950—despite the fact that the original concession provided that only after 1963 should royalty payments be reconsidered—the Iraq Government asked I.P.C. for an increase in royalties. After prolonged negotiations, the Government announced, on November 11, 1950, that the discussions with the Company had resulted in an increase from four to six shillings (gold) per metric ton of oil. No agreement could be reached, however, on the question of the gold evaluation of the shilling, and the Iraq Government decided to take the issue to court.

Two important events which had occurred in the meantime complicated upon Iraq's royalty increase and necessitated a different arrangement based on the new realities in the Middle East. Early in 1951, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Aramco replacing its existing royalty payments with a 50-50 profit-sharing arrangement (to be dealt with in the next section), and agitation in Iran against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company culminated in the nationalization of that country's oil industry in April.

Two weeks after the nationalization of oil in Iran, Premier Nuri Said, addressing the Finance Committee of the House of Deputies, threatened the oil companies that if they did not meet Iraq's demands for higher royalties—equal to those paid to Saudi Arabia and Iran, and payment in the value of gold on a free market basis—they might lose their concessions.

It would appear that this threat was the result of a deadlock in negotiations, and was an effort to intimidate the oil companies in view of the agitation by some political parties for the nationalization of the oil industry. It apparently attained its objective, for on the following day the Iraq Government announced in Baghdad that the companies had agreed to increase royalties to levels similar to those received by neighboring countries, and that negotiations for a detailed agreement were to begin immediately. At the end of May, Nuri Said announced in the House that the Iraq Government and I.P.C. had agreed in principle on a new level of royalty payments; this was confirmed by the Company in London at the end of July.

A hitch, however, developed when the Iraq representative

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insisted on, and the Company refused to agree to, the insertion of a clause providing for the reopening of the contract to adjust royalty payments to any changes in the neighboring countries. Finally, on August 13, 1951, it was announced that I.P.C. and its subsidiaries had reached agreement with the Iraq Government; on February 3, 1952, the new agreement was signed. It was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on the 14th, and by the Senate on the 17th.

Agreement Provisions

The major provisions of the agreement and its enclosures were:

1. The Government to share on a fifty-fifty basis in the profits resulting from the operation of the companies before deduction of taxes. In addition, each of the companies to pay annually £20,000 for the concessions (Arts. 2 and 9).
2. Should the Government so decide, it could take in kind up to 12.5 per cent of the net production of each of the companies as part of its share of the profits and dispose of it in the open market or sell it back to the companies at current world prices (Art. 5).
3. The companies to guarantee the Government's share in each calendar year to be not less than 25 per cent of the net production value at posted prices of the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company, and 33⅓ per cent of the Basrah Petroleum Company (Art. 4).
4. The Iraq Petroleum Company to guarantee a production minimum of 22.5 million tons of crude oil annually beginning January 1, 1955; the Mosul Petroleum Company to guarantee an annual minimum of 1.50 million tons beginning January 1, 1955; and the Basrah Petroleum Company to guarantee an annual minimum of 8 million tons beginning January 1, 1956. These guarantees to be effective for the life of the concessions (Art. 7).
5. All the companies jointly and severally to guarantee that the Government's share be not less than £20 million annually for the years 1953 and 1954, and not less than £25 million for 1955 and each year thereafter (Art. 6).
6. The agreement, signed in the name of the Government by Dhiya Ja'far, Minister of Economics, and for the companies by Herbert Stephen Gibson, Managing Director, was drawn up both in Arabic and English, both to be equally valid but in the event of discrepancies between the two, English text to prevail (Art. 13).
7. The companies to supply the Government refineries with

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all the crude oil necessary for local consumption at 3.5 shillings per ton.

8. If, in future agreements between oil companies and neighboring Near Eastern countries, royalties were increased, Iraq to have the right to request similar increases.

9. Each of the three companies to appoint two Iraqi directors.

10. The companies to send at their own expense fifty Iraqi students annually to British universities for specialized studies in the oil industry, and I.P.C. to establish a school in Kirkuk to train Iraqi workers.

11. Should production be halted because of *force majeure* or "an act of God," the companies to pay the Government a minimum of £5 million a year for two years.*

With the signing of the new agreements, Iraq entered a new era. The complete shutdown of the Iranian oil sources, combined with the terms of the new agreements, increased production beyond normal proportions and made the oil revenue a decisive factor in the development of Iraq. Oil production in 1952 jumped to 18,[illegible] tons, in 1953 to 27,[illegible] tons, and in 1954, to [illegible] tons, considerably above the minimum of the agreements. Royalty income in 1951 was £15,700,000, and in 1952 £[illegible], plus the £5,000,000 paid in settlement of past claims; in 1953 it jumped to £[illegible], and to £[illegible] in 1954.†

The expansion in production was in all three areas. The Kirkuk field (I.P.C.) produced [illegible] tons in 1952, and [illegible] tons in 1953 and [illegible] tons in 1954. The Zubair field (B.P.C.) produced [illegible] tons in 1952 and [illegible] tons in 1953, and together with the new field Rumaila produced [illegible] tons in 1954. The Ain Zalah field‡ industrial and handicraft production, but most of these were employed in small undertakings, with only about 1,000 working in what might be classified as modern industrial plants.[1] The United Nations reported in 1951 that industry continued to play a very minor part in the Iraqi economy and that the gross output was estimated at not more than ID 1,000,000.[2]

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* Iraq Petroleum Company Ltd., Mosul Petroleum Company Ltd., Basrah Petroleum Company Ltd., Agreement with the Government of Iraq Made on the Third Day of February, 1952 [illegible]

† U.N. Summary [illegible]; U.S. Department of Commerce [illegible]

‡ Ain Zalah, [illegible]

The general industrial and economic situation could perhaps be gauged by the consumption of oil and oil products, especially since the country had these supplies in such abundance. In 1939, internal oil consumption, including refinery needs, was 70,000 metric tons; in 1937 it had risen to 133,000 tons, but in 1950 it was only 821,000 tons. Excluding refinery needs, consumption in 1937 was only 99,000 tons; in 1946, 315,000; in 1950, 615,000; in 1951, 651,000; and in 1952, 690,000.[3]

The level of civic responsibility and national consciousness is illustrated by the taxpaying practices of the Iraqis. The first income tax law was enacted in 1927, but not before considerable modifications had been made and a long time had elapsed did the Government begin to receive any substantial revenue. The following table shows the annual revenue from income tax, the total revenue, and the percentage of income taxes in the total revenue.

Table 23. *Iraq, Percentage of Income Tax to Total Revenue*

Year	*Income Tax (in I.D.)*	*Total Revenue (in I.D.)*	*Percentage*
1942	1,011,000	16,016,000	6.3
1944	1,330,000	21,100,000	6.4
1945	1,140,826	21,700,000	5.2
1946	1,035,000	32,500,000	3.6
1947	1,481,779	26,210,000	5.6
1950	4,355,000	61,270,000	7.2[4]

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[1] International Bank, Iraq Mission Report, p. 139. Another estimate gives the total number of industrial workers in 1950 as not more than 70,000, excluding those employed by the oil industry. "The Economic Development of Iraq," The [illegible] Ministry of Economics, Sept. 1950, 36.

[2] United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1951-52 (New York, 1953), 56. Supplement to World Economic Report 1951-52.

[3] U.N. Review 1951-52, 60; U.N. Summary 1952-53, 80; [illegible] Annual Report and Accounts for the Year ending 31st December 1952, [illegible] 1953, 33.

[4] Iraqi Statistical Year, 86; U.N. Review 1950-51, 76; Annual Report of the National Bank of Iraq, July 1952-December 1952, 33.

639 The methods of collection reveal the attitude of the general public to personal taxes. In 1947 the total number of individuals who paid income taxes were 13,485; one-third of these were Government employees, ten per cent were from other selected groups.[6]

125 641 These random facts about Iraq and its population indicate, on the one hand, a low standard of living and general underdevelopment; and on the other hand, excellent potentialities for expansion and improvement in agriculture and industry. The importance of the income from oil and its utilization for capital improvements were realized from the very beginning. In 1931 the Five Year Capital Works Program was enacted in order to hypothecate the revenues from advance oil royalties and dead rent. The monies earmarked for the Capital Development Works Scheme Account were never, however, completely used for capital works projects, and from time to time the Government used the funds to cover the accumulated deficit.[7] The Iraqi Parliament subsequently adopted two yearly budgets, ordinary and extraordinary.[8] The latter, for development schemes, was derived mainly from oil revenues and income from the Iraq Currency Board, but its revenues were frequently diverted to other than the intended purposes.[9]

The various Iraqi governments—as a rule they had a high frequency of change and a low rate of duration—not only realized the importance of the oil revenue to the general development of the country, but also the need for expert surveys and development plans. From time to time specialists were invited to prepare reports for the Government. The most im-program of them, prior to the International Bank Mission, was perhaps the Haigh Irrigation Commission, which worked from 1944 to 1949 and recommended a £100 million development plan which would have increased the irrigated area from 8 to 17 million acres. Yet in 1949 the United Nations Survey Mission reported that the financial resources available to the Iraq Government, not only from oil royalties but also from the accumulated wartime sterling surplus, had been largely diverted to financing consumption imports and the operating expenses of the State.

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[6] United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, Public Finance Information Papers: Iraq (New York, 1951), [illegible]

[7] From [illegible]

[8] For a table of both ordinary and extraordinary budgets for the years [illegible]

[9] In the period [illegible]

In this statement the Mission touched on the basic problem of the area, even of those sections which have available financial resources for development projects. The realization of the importance of investment in development projects which will bear returns in the future necessitates self-denial of immediate consumption goods. Such long-range visualization, especially when resources for gratification of immediate needs are readily available, is, however, a quality with which neither the masses nor many of the political leaders are endowed. It is perhaps in the lack of this quality that the explanation for the failure of all the numerous development plans of the Middle Eastern oil producing countries may be found. The ability to curtail current spending for the sake of investments which will increase not merely the individual's returns but the wealth-producing potential of the nation as a whole would be a sine qua non for any growing and even highly developed economy, and certainly for underdeveloped areas. But the temptation to utilize the "unearned" income from oil for current needs which could never before be afforded, for alleviating the tax burden, for improving political standing with the electorate, proved too strong, and seems to have all succeeded.

The Development Board

To return to Iraq. In May 1950 the Government promulgated a law (1950 No. 23) creating a Development Board to which was to be assigned the revenue derived from the oil com-

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[illegible] "The Economic Development of Iraq," [illegible]

[illegible] Final Report of the Survey Mission, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]. In 1952 the law was amended assigning only seventy per cent of the revenues to the Board. The Board with the Premier as chairman, the Minister of Finance as member ex officio and six non-political full-time executive members, was charged with preparing an overall development plan and given the authority to execute major capital development projects. On October [illegible] of that year Iraq officially requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a survey mission to review the economic potentialities of the country and make recommendations for a development program.[illegible] The Mission arrived in Iraq on February [illegible], 1951 and a year later, on February [illegible], 1952, the report was submitted to Premier Nuri as Said. It proposed a development plan for the years 1951-1956 involving a total expenditure of some [illegible], to be derived from the oil revenue for the same period. Basing itself on the Mission's report, the Development Board worked out the following five-year plan:

Table V. *Iraq Development Board Program*

Project	Cost (Dinars)
Irrigation schemes	[illegible]
Roads	[illegible]
Other communications	[illegible]
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	[illegible]
Public utilities	[illegible]
Agriculture	[illegible]
Industry (including services of a chemical survey)	[illegible]
Miscellaneous	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]

As far as the financing was concerned, the Development Board had no difficulty. As mentioned in the previous chapter, oil production in 1952 and 1953 was ahead of schedule, and the Board's share of revenue in these two years alone was above [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

The general progress of the Development Board under the existing conditions was tolerably satisfactory, but the long-range objectives and the conditions necessary for their realization were not appreciated either by the people or by the politicians. In 1959 the Development Board Law was amended and a new Ministry of Development was created. Though the Development Board was retained, the execution of the development plan was placed under both the Board and the Ministry. The Minister of Development became an additional ex officio member of the Board, responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his Ministry and of the Board. The original intent of the law to remove the Board from the vagaries of political change was thus impaired. Moreover, because of the general educational and technological level of the population, the Development Board found itself in the unusual, if not unique, position of not being able to spend the constantly increasing revenue. The Board consequently resorted to lending its funds to other Government agencies not concerned with long-range development, and a goodly portion of its income was diverted to other regular expenses.

Despite inherent limitations and basic difficulties, the awareness of the people and the Government that the oil revenue could be used as a means of advancing the development of the country has had some positive and some negative effects on Iraq's growth. One might note a general tendency to depend exclusively on oil income, to the exclusion of all other resources of governmental and economic operations. For obvious reasons the Government adopted a policy of reducing taxes in view of the gigantic income from oil. Such a policy, combined

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

Unfortunately, the Iraqis were not prepared and are not ready for long-range development projects; neither were they educated to understand them. Nor has the leadership—the implementors of such projects—displayed the qualities necessary to convince and educate the masses not only of the good to be derived, but of the difficulties to be overcome. Nevertheless, the oil industry and the revenue derived from it did one thing for the Iraqis. It made them realize the possibilities of improving their conditions; it made them lose their fatalistic acceptance of their lot and created dissatisfaction with their situation as it was. The oil industry also opened up to some Iraqis, even though to a very limited extent, the world of modern Western technology which is based on petroleum. The result is a stirring, a disturbance, in the social, cultural and economic patterns of the country. The fabulous revenue from the oil can direct this discontent, and in some instances even impatience, into constructive and coordinated channels. The supreme test for the Iraqi leadership will be the constructive direction of the political, social and economic forces.

The Company's Policies

Table VI, on the following page, shows the income contributed to the national budget from oil royalties up to the establishment of the Development Board.

In addition to these direct payments, the Company contributed in wages, salaries, social and health services, and building and administrative expenses which helped considerably not only in the country's direct economic expansion, but also in assisting its foreign currency needs.[illegible]

The main bones of contention between the Company and the Government were the royalties paid to Iraq and the employment of Iraqis in the industry. Unlike the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Iraq Petroleum Company paid its royalties on a per ton production basis. [illegible] the Khanaqin concession, in the "transferred territories," which was part of the original Anglo-Iranian concession, paid on a percentage basis, as in the

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[illegible] Economic Cooperation Administration, Special Mission to the United Kingdom, *The Sterling Area: An American Analysis* (London, 1951), [illegible]

Table VI. Iraq Royalty Payments[a]

Year	Payments (in I.D.)	Per cent of Revenue (from all sources)
[illegible] (average)	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

rate of its concession; later, however, this was converted to a per ton basis. This arrangement made the Iraqis constantly demand increased production so that their income would be larger; they argued that the Company was not exploiting all the oil-bearing possibilities and was even pursuing a policy of limited production. In view of changed world conditions following World War II, the Company was willing to increase the per ton royalty and to increase production with the aim,

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[a] [illegible]

[illegible]

ambitious pipelines. When the Arabian American Oil Company introduced the fifty-fifty profit basis arrangement in Saudi Arabia, and the agitation for nationalization in Iran was growing in volume, Iraq also obtained a fifty-fifty profit-sharing arrangement.[6]

The Company's Employment Practices

The question of the employment of Iraqis in the industry was also an important one. Because I.P.C. did not build up an industry in Iraq, as did the A.I.O.C. in Abadan, the number of Iraqis employed in the oil industry was considerably smaller than Iranians in Iran. At the end of 1947 it employed a total of 14,500 workers, of whom 12,900 were Iraqis.[7] The number was not much greater in 1951, and as was inevitable, the higher positions, both technical and administrative, were filled by non-Iraqis.[8]

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[6] [illegible]

[7] [illegible]

[8] [illegible]

Company	Technical and Supervisory	Other	Total
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

with no Constitution; and an intended treaty relationship with Great Britain, but as yet no treaty. These features, however, did not disturb the administration of the country, which in Faysal's first half-year proceeded without interruption. The Naqib and his Council, correctly resigning on the King's accession, were reinstated with changes. The new Cabinet formed on 10 September included Naji al-Suwaydi, a lawyer and patriot of distinguished name and record, as Minister of Justice; a Mosul Christian doctor Hanna Khayyat as Minister (later Director-General) of Health; and most of the former Ministers, including Ja'far Pasha in Defence and Sasun Hasqail in Finance. Hajj Ramzi, a commoner who had succeeded Sayid Talib at Interior, retained that office. The Ministers of Justice, Works, and Awqaf were unchanged. The new separate Ministry of Education was entrusted to the learned Shi'i divine Sayid Muhammad 'Ali al-Shahristani. This Cabinet was unaltered till March 1922. Among the Advisers, Cornwallis was to remain in Interior for the next fourteen years; Bonham-Carter retired in May 1921, replaced for a year by Nigel Davidson also from the Sudan and thereafter by E. M. Drower; Atkinson, leaving for India, was succeeded by his deputy H. H. Wheatley. Lionel Smith became adviser to Education, Colonel P. Joyce—a colleague of the Amir Faysal and of Lawrence in the Arabian campaign—to Defence. Slater and Cooke were unchanged.

The grouping of departments differed widely from that practised under the Secretariats of the Wilson régime (p. 108). The Ministry of Interior covered, besides tribal, 'political', and municipal affairs, the 'Iraq Police, the civil prisons, the Agricultural and Veterinary departments, the Health service (when it ceased to be a Ministry), the Press Bureau and the department of Revenue until its transfer to Finance in October 1921. The Ministry of Finance dealt with its normal revenue, expenditure, accounting, budgeting, currency, and establishment functions, and controlled the Port of Basra; that of Communications and Works covered the departments of Irrigation, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys, and the Railways.

The Ministry's task of governing was embarrassed by a financial stringency which was aggravated by the disorders of the last year, by the continuance of post-war economic depression, and by the need to provide funds for the Ministry of Defence and for the Throne itself; nor, with a press and public outcry in Great Britain demanding ruthless economy in 'Iraq—or indeed outright evacuation from it—could funds be expected from that quarter. The new State started without debts, but with such liquid assets only as it could earn. The public services of Health, Education, Works, and the rest were confronted with unavoidable reductions at a

1[1921 . . . Analyst]

S. Longrigg [illegible] (1920-1950) [illegible]

152 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager developments. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained; schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

In the liwas,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwa early in 1921. Arbil, a sub-liwa of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Hilla. No more was heard of Basra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwa and qadha. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutasarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1921 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative—cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three 204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

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[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwas or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* E. G. C. Murray, H. M. Pinsent, E. C. D. Allen,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. L. Berry,* L. Bretherwell, E. E. Chalgrove, D. C. Fuller, B. S. Ditchburn,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. H. Jeffreys, L. W. Scott, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Crisp, A. J. B. Chapman, J. D. Clark (d. 1925); Gillan, Murray, Pinsent, Bretherwell, Scott, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Fuller had died, and Longrigg and Chalgrove had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928-35), from the Sudan.

S. Longrigg. [illegible]

ties. In the 'Iraq Government service[1] 'Iraqis of goodwill and sometimes of admirable gifts—not unmixed, inevitably, with others of less ability or less integrity—were found to fill the higher as well as lower positions in provincial and central government. The body of British officials, mainly advisers but in a few cases still executive, included some figures of outstanding merit—and many who offered years, twenty or more, of quite devoted service to 'Iraq. [illegible]

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its portfolio held always in the early period by the Prime Minister himself, was the creation of Yasin Pasha in 1925. Under the overriding responsibility of Great Britain to the League for the fulfilment of 'Iraq international obligations, the Ministry could have but limited scope. It was at first represented only in London, and intermittently at Geneva, by Ja'far Pasha al 'Askari. Foreign Consuls, however, began early to be posted to Baghdad, where their presence implied recognition of the 'Iraq State by France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Greece. The 'Iraq Government as such subscribed to various international conventions. Persia, though represented in 'Iraq by a number of Consuls and bound to it by the closest interests, withheld official recognition of the Kingdom, to the damage of both. [illegible]

Successive Cabinets up to that of Yasin Pasha in 1924 have been elsewhere mentioned. Yasin's was a Ministry of all the talents, and since no alternative programmes backed by parties existed in the 'Iraq politics of the time, it like others must fall or survive by virtue of its own unanimity and the royal approval, or lack of them. Its months of power were marked by preoccupation with the politics of the Mosul Question, and by the frustrations of an empty Treasury. This poverty, the common misfortune of emergent Governments, was accentuated in the 'Iraq of 1925 by depressed trade conditions, the loss of part of the date market, the diminished Persian transit trade, and the bad harvest and low revenue of the year; and the times called insistently for more, not less, expenditure. It was necessary to find funds for an Army now under formation and soon to be called to vital responsibilities; for the acquisition of assets from the British Government, which itself was in no mood for munificent gestures; for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, of which a substantial fraction devolved upon 'Iraq; and for public services conceived on a scale equated the minimum tolerable, but still far in advance of financial capacity. The arithmetical impossibilities thus involved led to the advent by invitation in March 1925 of a financial mission from Whitehall, consisting of Commander E. Hilton Young and R. V. Vernon. The mission studied and reviewed, advocated limited economies, strove to palliate the seasonal blows of Public Debt obligations, and

1 - [1921-24 - omitted]

[illegible] recommended higher Customs-duty rates. A large part of its suggestions, especially as regards land taxation and land-registration, was not adopted. The 'Iraq Government was destined, indeed, to remain solvent but impecunious for years to come. The country was visited in the same period by Cabinet Ministers from England, Mr. L. S. Amery and Sir Samuel Hoare.

[illegible] The Hashimi Ministry, left free to govern without a Parliament, moved with tolerable success for a year. Among other measures it legislated for the [illegible] tax-dredging scheme, the [illegible] of [illegible]ation, a trade agreement with Syria, and the regularization of the position of British officials. Promulgation of the Organic Law was postponed from July 1924 to March 1925, to permit the preparation of election rolls, a lengthy and difficult task; and the liquidation of the Mosul Question before the new régime, counted as a great point forward from mere Cabinet government, was attempted. Preparations for the assembly of Parliament in Extraordinary Session (since an Ordinary Session could open only in November) were completed by late June 1925, and a change of Ministry due to differences between Yasin Pasha and his Minister of Interior, 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa'dun, gave to a new Government the task of inaugurating the parliamentary régime.

The premiership was entrusted to 'Abd al-Muhsin. His Ministers included Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani, the shrewd cosmopolitan Sayyid Ja'far al-'Askari for a short period, [illegible], the worthy Shi'i 'Abd al-Husain al-Chalabi, Naji al-Suwaidi, Hikmat Sulaiman (younger brother of the Turkish General Mahmud Shaukat Pasha), the keen nationalist [illegible], and by later substitution Nuri Sa'id and the Kurdish artillery officer and writer, Muhammad Amin Zaki. The elections completed, and the twenty senators duly appointed by the King, Parliament was opened with ceremony on 16 July 1925. The selection of Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani as President of the Chamber brought Hikmat Sulaiman to his place in Interior. The veteran nationalist Yusuf al-Suwaidi, father of Naji and Tawfiq, became President of the Senate.

[illegible] Parliamentary government, in the procedure of which the British had no part, began creditably. The standard of debate was respectable, the Opposition, headed by Yasin Pasha, not immoderate. The life of Parliament in this its first session was twice prolonged, and lasted until June 1926. It dealt with a heavy programme of legislation, including a first amendment to the Organic Law designed to provide for a possible Regency and for extraordinary sittings. The budget was adopted and passed. An altercation in the Chamber led to the retirement from the Presidency of Rashid 'Ali, to be succeeded by Hikmat Sulaiman. The latter's place in Interior was taken by the Mutasarrif of Mosul, the (from the present writer), of Income Tax (from [illegible]), of Public Works (from [illegible]). These were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from [illegible]) in [illegible], of [illegible] (from [illegible], who died in [illegible]) and of [illegible] in [illegible]. Progress towards raising the standard of officials, the object of [illegible] boards, commissions, and examinations, was [illegible] the work of one minister in [illegible] selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal favour. In the task of fixing establishments and expenditure, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn general support. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some Iraqi judges were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew constantly: [illegible] Peace Court cases were heard in [illegible], [illegible] in [illegible]. Seventy [illegible] advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, [illegible] in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhas and nahiyas—were formed by separating and subdividing, as need occurred; examples were [illegible] in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in [illegible] for tribal frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years [illegible] to [illegible].

The years of poverty and insecurity preceding the entry of Iraq into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural produce led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had Iraq been an importer of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Advisership to the Ministry in [illegible], succeeded for three years by Ewart as

Setting Advisers and Accountants by E. C. Hogg, from the Sudan, in 1931. Hedgcock and the present writer left the Ministry in 1930 and 1931. Provision for Capital Works under a five-year plan was separated from the current budget, and a main part of the oil revenues, which first accrued in 1931, was allotted to this object. An Economic Advisory Board was set up. Chambers of Commerce were founded in Baghdad and Basra. A second advisory visit by Hilton Young, the 'League' financial consultant of 1925, was paid in 1930, and other foreign experts—notably A. Sainsbury, expert in income tax—assisted in the institution of new taxation and the fixing of civil service establishments. Income tax in modern form was first imposed in 1928, but proved relatively unproductive; in effect it was paid mainly by officials and foreign companies. A major change in the taxation of agricultural produce was made in 1931, based on a new system of tax collection at markets—the 'place of consumption' method—without the need to assess or estimate the growing crops. A Financial Inspectorate was introduced. Efforts both cautious and skilful were made in 1931 to free 'Iraq from the burden of its share of the Ottoman Debt, of which £ (Turkish) 7 million had fallen to its share, with a further £T1.3 million of accumulated interest. The Minister of Finance arranged to buy Ottoman Debt securities in the open market and, after handing these to the Debt authority to an extent of £1,008,000 sterling, could arrange to pay off the small remainder by instalments. Thus, at the cost of finding funds from current revenue for debt redemption, the State could enter the League happily unencumbered.

The proposed foundation of a National Bank, often discussed, was still postponed. The Indian rupee currency, which had served 'Iraq well for fifteen years, was superseded early in 1932 by an 'Iraqi currency employing the dinar (equivalent to a pound sterling), divided into a thousand fils. Currency resources and the note issue were supervised by a Board in London, and rested on a basis of sterling assets. The confident reception of the new currency was the more gratifying as 'Iraq suffered not only temporarily from a number of 'slump' bankruptcies, but chronically from an adverse trade balance. A wide visible gap existed between the value of its exports and that of its unavoidable imports of fuel, manufactured articles, and some foods. The invisible exports which were assumed to fill the gap were the expenditure by the British forces, diplomatic and archaeological missions, charities and foreign schools, pilgrims, tourists and foreign companies, and the profits of the Persian transit trade. The progressive slackening of the last mentioned, in spite of lowered transit dues, was a serious feature of the times. Persian restrictions, Russian competition, the diversion of ment appointment. A School of Agriculture, founded hastily and insufficiently in 1926, was perforce discontinued for lack of pupils five years later—to be afterwards refounded. A Health Officials' school, in connexion with the College of Medicine, in 1930 replaced the existing Pharmaceutical School; a year later a Nursing school was inaugurated, to which a midwifery section was to be added in 1936. The training of rural teachers at the primary teachers' stage was discontinued, but its necessity, urged by the American mission which visited Iraq under Dr. Paul Monroe in 1932, was later to be recognized. The provisional plan of 1925 for higher teacher-training was also discontinued, for later reconsideration. Another American secondary school, this time a Jesuit enterprise, was founded in Baghdad in 1932, and accepted pupils of all faiths. Government secondary schools by 1932 numbered fifteen, primary nearly 300. The theological college of Al al Bait closed its doors in 1930. The Law School, Iraq's nearest approach to a university course, kept all its popularity and produced civil servants as well as advocates. Separate Assyrian schools taught little but their own brand of religion. Kurdish schools, thirty in number by 1932, included one intermediate, and one for girls. Annual grants were made to the schools of the minority communities and foreign missions; their standard, not least in European languages, was generally higher than in those of the State. About 6 per cent. of all Government revenues was at this time spent on education. Lionel Smith retired from the Advisership in Education in 1931, and was not replaced. 771 [772] 423

Greater sums than this were needed for the services of security: a fifth or more of Government income maintained the Iraq Army and nearly a ninth the Police Force. Since the Levies, reduced to two battalions in 1928, were used decreasingly on operations, and the Royal Air Force, reduced from eight squadrons in the period 1922 to 1928 to four in 1932, was soon to be no longer available for internal operations, reliance must be on the Police and the Iraq Army: no pains, therefore, were spared to augment and improve them. The Royal Iraqi Air Force came into existence in 1931, with five light aircraft. The Army, to which Great Britain contributed a grant until 1931, was developed with the close guidance of a British Military Mission which, increased from six officers in 1921 to forty-six in 1932, was then reduced to twenty-six. It trained its own officers at military and staff colleges, and by the dispatch of selected men to Sandhurst or Quetta. Recruiting in the period 1928 to 1932 was voluntary, numbers sufficient, training and maintenance adequate, discipline good. The strength of the Army by 1932 approximated to two brigades. It was unfortunate that its most frequent operations, against Kurdish insurgents, were in [illegible] by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies. The Iraq Police, with diminishing British participation, remained a smart and reliable service adapted well to its increasing duties. It numbered, during these years, rather less than 9,000 men, including a mobile force of some 1,500. The Royal Air Force, which since 1932 played no part in Iraq's internal security in spite of occasional requests by Government to do so, maintained its two bases and training installations. Mosul and Hinaydi camps and airports and former R.A.F. landing-grounds throughout Iraq were handed to the Iraqi authorities at the close of this period, and the R.A.F. began to install itself, late in 1936, at Dhibban camp by Lake Habbaniya.

Financial administration continued to show the prudence and orthodoxy with which Iraqi finances had been handled from the first. This was the easier since the period of depression ended with 1933, and the years following showed a relatively prosperous situation. Improvements were introduced into income-tax and land-revenue procedure and Customs administration. The currency was stable and respected. The last remnant of Ottoman debt was extinguished, but discussions on a new loan, to be obtained in London through Baring Bros., led up to 1936 to no practical issue. The oil dead-rents first received in 1931, and later the royalties, were allotted to capital works—irrigation projects, buildings, roads—included in a programme of which the items were revised in 1931, 1934, and almost annually thereafter. A law establishing an Agricultural and Industrial Bank was passed in 1935; it commenced operations, humbly at first, in the following year.

5. BAKR SIDQI

The Hashimi Ministry, more forceful than any Iraqi Government since 1920, appeared by midsummer 1936 likely to endure for a long spell of office. Yasin Pasha openly anticipated ten years of power, though, little as he esteemed democracy, he had no thought of dictatorship. The tribes were frightened, the Palace weak, the opposition outwardly subdued.

But less obvious forces were at work. The King, his own position unfortified by his personal shortcomings and the misalliance and flight of his sister with a Rhodian hotel servant and her conversion to Christianity, was willing to see a change of Ministry and even hinted at this to Yasin through intermediaries. In the Cabinet, though a scarcely anticipated harmony reigned between Yasin and Nuri Sa'id, his Foreign Minister, the latter was at constant loggerheads with the Minister of Interior. Rashid 'Ali, indeed, gave offence by his imperious decisions, his favouritism, and the presumption which in defiance of precedent led him, when Sayid Mahmud the Naqib died in 1936, himself to assume the and his entourage, further exaggerated by gossip, lost him the support of the better elements by their [illegible] and arrogance. His marriage to a Viennese dancing girl was frowned upon. His part in the murder of Ja'far Pasha, ex-Secretary of the Council of Ministers and friend of the exiled Yasin Pasha, was everywhere believed, and not less his directing hand in an assault made on a veteran Arab patriot and fighter [illegible] Maulud Pasha Mukhlis. The death in Damascus of Yasin himself in June 1937 added popular feeling to the side of this strong and [illegible], half-charming personality, whose services his country had so ill requited. The [illegible] of [illegible] brother, the death of other [illegible] simultaneously with that of Yasin, and the murder of a Baghdad notable, [illegible] by a [illegible] whom Bakr protected, led to grave [illegible] at the General's expense.

The impatient demands for Army expansion were financially embarrassing to the Government, and heavy service spending, accompanied by the raising of funds for the forces by public subscription, did not make them more popular with the political public. All officers concerned in the coup d'état of October 1936 were indemnified under a law of April 1937; but the sycophantic suggestion to erect a statue to Bakr Sidqi, as Hero of the Revolution, was not adopted. The conscription machinery still worked largely amiss, though against less resistance, and most units were below strength. Relations with the British Military Mission were for a time uncordial. The provision by Great Britain of armaments and equipment raised questions of particular difficulty; the time coincided with large-scale rearmament in the United Kingdom, and many 'Iraqi demands for guns, aircraft, and equipment remained, to their angry impatience, unsatisfied. This failure, exploited by the adroit propaganda of Herr Grobba, the German Minister, and on a passing visit by Dr. Schacht himself, was in pointed contrast to the flattering offers of German and Czech arms manufacturers, and led to the placing of 'Iraqi orders for armaments with the Krupp and Skoda Companies and elsewhere, and for aircraft—of types wholly unsuitable—with Italian suppliers. Some of the material so ordered was delivered; the rest, to a value of some £[illegible], was countermanded when the Ministry fell.

It was not for the Army alone that funds were needed. Hikmat's ambition was to signalize his 'revolution' by the initiation of the important works so long projected—roads, buildings, the railway extension, and completion of the Kut Barrage. Messrs. Baring Bros., again approached, could offer £[illegible] million on favourable terms, and Parliament in the spring of 1937 authorized this borrowing. The 'Iraq Petroleum Company, however, whose royalties were the preferred security, declined on principle to pay

[illegible]

them to any party other than the 'Iraq Government itself. A result-less favourable offer, of a loan of £½ million only, was the result. It was duly negotiated, but [illegible] the Government to the British lenders' stringent criticism. This was 'Iraq's first self-incurred external debt.

The presence of Kurdish bands in the regions did not seriously interfere with an Administration equal in quality to its predecessors but, to disappointment of early hopes, not superior to them. In foreign affairs and in some internal developments, which later pages will describe, some progress was made. But in one problem no approach to a solution appeared: that of the Assyrians. Their case, after the massacres of August 1933, had been brought on to the agenda of the League Council by the Mar Sham'un's telegram from Cyprus; and in October the 'Iraq Government, through the mouth of Yasin Pasha, offered a disarming admission of 'insoluble [illegible]' by the [illegible] and [illegible], [illegible] pleaded for a fresh start for the Assyrians in another country! The British attitude, disappointing to the more fervid partisans of the Assyrians, was determined by the desire to preserve and support the independent 'Iraq State, by realization of the grave consequences of any physical intervention, to which [illegible] British opinion could never be reconciled, and by awareness that the [illegible] were far from being all on one side. The Council agreed, accordingly, that a Committee of six, composed of representatives of Great Britain, Italy, France, Denmark, Mexico, and Spain, should by every means seek alternative accommodation, somewhere in the world, for the Assyrian community.

The Committee's attempts were immediate and vigorous, but vainly unsuccessful. A project for settlement in Brazil seemed promising, but fell to the ground when the Brazilian Government reversed its welcoming attitude. A British plan for settlement in Guiana, and a French project for the banks of the Niger, came equally to nothing after League missions, with Brigadier Browne, had visited the territories. By the end of 1934 no progress had been made.

In 'Iraq their resettlement on the land proceeded with every slowness in spite of Government encouragement and the offer of a house-by-house subsidy. The great majority of the community favoured withdrawal from 'Iraq, and false hopes of this were kept alive by the Mar Sham'un's partisans, while the anti-Patriarchal party declared roundly that they would never settle in the same territory as the Mar Sham'un and his following. The camp at Mosul was, with increasing reluctance, kept in existence at Government expense, but was reduced by encouraged departures; its inmates fell from 1,450 to 850 during 1934. More hopeful was equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 32 per cent. of the Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small transit trade from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraq routes, however, continued, and Muhammerah (now Khurramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained at its sterling parity, the Board in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was to some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They served a public in which the townsman had in hundreds exchanged Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi sidara in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned on earlier pages (p. 202) the years from 1932 to 1937 had little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators, more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, more ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial to ensure Arab rights in the Holy Land, as by that of the Foreign Minister 'Ali Jaudat to Sa'udi Arabia in June.

The child-King was taken to the Lebanon for the summer, and there hailed by village enthusiasts by the soubriquet of 'King of Syria'. In Baghdad a new British Ambassador, Sir Basil Newton, to whom the Middle East and its problems were unfamiliar, succeeded Peterson in March 1939.

The financial needs of the State, which thanks to over-spending were now serious, were met by a grant of credits by the British Government for the pressing needs of the Railway, and equipment for the Army. Nearly £3 million was thus made available on the security of 'Iraq's oil revenues and with conditions of moderate interest and repayment spread over seventeen years. An interest-free loan was granted at the same time by the 'Iraq Petroleum Company in return for a seven-year postponement of its export obligations under the B.O.D. Company's concession: it was payable in six half-yearly instalments of £200,000 each, and repayable at leisure out of royalties.

The Railway section from Tell Kochek to Mosul was completed, at unexpectedly high cost, and trains could now run from that city to Istanbul. The Kut barrage and Gharraf headworks were completed in March 1939; the official opening had been King Ghazi's last public act. With its fifty-six mechanically-operated gates, overall width of 1,805 feet, lock and fish-ladder, this important work had cost £1,200,000 and, given full dependent canalization (at present lacking), was capable of the controlled irrigation of a million acres. The seven-gate Tao regulator, at the end of that branch of the Hilla channel, was erected in 1939-40, also by Messrs. Balfour Beatty. A new and improved Diyala weir (p. 263) was undertaken in 1939 and completed by the end of 1940. Execution of the Habbaniya project, which had been revived urgently after the Euphrates floods of 1938, was entrusted in June 1939 by contract to Messrs. Balfour Beatty for £700,000 for the first phase, that of the intake canal to the lake at Ramadi and the controlled outlet from the lake to the vast Abu Dibbis depression. Work on these was pressed forward. The first of the two steel bridges at Baghdad, built under contract by Messrs. Holloway Bros., was completed; it formed an imposing structure, 700 ft. long and 50 ft. wide, and, named al-Ma'mun Bridge, was opened with ceremony by the Regent. Bridge tolls were abolished throughout the country. A long-standing project drew nearer to realization when a Government bank, to be known as the Rafidain Bank, was established by law though not yet opened; its initial capital was fixed at £500,000, subscribed in part by the State. A revised version of the capital works programme was evolved by Rustam

Haidar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated expenditure of £10 million in four years. For the moment, great loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 21 August in the [illegible] of Baghdad and was extinguished only after great efforts. The floods, as usual, were [illegible]. Slack demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 revealed to expose the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of growing and marketing. M. S. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevitably to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraq barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 5 September that 'Iraq would fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Tehran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

[illegible] conditions in the country throughout 1940 were as normal and tolerable as could be hoped. [illegible] was brought to an end. [illegible] The completion of the [illegible] section of the railway, with its long tunnels, permitted at last a direct Baghdad–[illegible] service, though rolling stock available [illegible]. Work on the [illegible] was pressed forward. Oil production was resumed again after the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping on the Tripoli branch into Vichy French territory in July 1940. The [illegible] of cotton [illegible] increased [illegible]. The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the chagrin of many [illegible]. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, and some progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to a new ginnery at [illegible], took shares in the Iraq Cement Company, and helped a vegetable oil extraction plant. Work proceeded on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenue to the Army, found room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the [illegible] Gharraf, and for the Diyala project, the [illegible] weir, the [illegible] river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit allowed by the banks and *sarrafs* was curtailed or restricted; according to the war news, market prices rose and fell. Government's control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles was a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Basra with the hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country. The loss of French purchases of Iraq wool was severely felt; trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

S. Longrigg [illegible]

832 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years. The issue, regarded as experimental, went well received but too small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year and handled Government accounts; by 1943 its trading began to show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry, was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch in Baghdad in the same year.

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498 The material development of the territory, which proceeded hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the end of the war. But 'Iraq was at least fortunate in that, far from a record of destruction or retrogression—the common lot of Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented by war-time loans from the military authorities, current maintenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for movement to Basra—were admirably handled. The military Kut-
499 'Amara-Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge (in replacement of the old wagon-ferry), a bridge at Musaiyib to give access to Karbala, a modern station and office block and new marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lower Zab bridge.[1]

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504 The important developments at the Port of Basra and its vicinity carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and approaches, storage facilities, the Shatt al-'Arab bridge, and a Ma'qil–[illegible] railway line. Considerable parts of these additions survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties at Umm Qasr on the Khaur 'Abdullah, and the railway joining them to Basra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance
505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

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[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–[illegible] line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Kirkuk–[illegible] line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–[illegible] extension. None of these materialized.

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X

END OF THE HALF-CENTURY

1. GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

660 The resignation of the Pachachi Government was followed by a month of interregnum while the choice of a successor Cabinet was delayed. Despite the alleged misgivings of the Regent, the premiership fell on 5 February 1950 to Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, a statesman whose many gifts did not include that of creating confidence. He retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, brought the able and vigorous 'Ali Mumtaz to Works, General Isma'il Namiq to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Justice, and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban to Social Affairs. To the three all-important Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Supply he appointed respectively Sa'd Salih, a Shi'i ex-Mutasarrif (cousin to Salih Jabr), 'Abd al-Wahhab Mahmud, a Basra lawyer with a stormy political past, and another Shi'i, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Chalabi, of American education and unusual ability. Two more newcomers assumed duty at the Ministries of Economics and Education: 'Abd al-[illegible]—a Basra Shi'i and ex-official—and Najib al-Rawi. The composition of this Cabinet was modified in April by the substitution of Dr. [illegible] al-Zahawi, a Kurdish pathologist, for Baban at Social Affairs; and, in the last days of its short life, by the move of 'Ali Mumtaz to Foreign Affairs and Chalabi to Works.

662 Inspired by liberal views, the Ministry started with fair hopes. Although, surprisingly, no budget for 1950–1 was submitted, the State finances were still treated as giving no cause for immediate alarm. The 'hard currency' agreement made with the British in 1949 was renewed for a year, and a British trade mission under [664] Lord Davidson was welcomed in Baghdad. The new Electoral Law long under preparation was passed; substantially improving and liberalizing the existing procedures, it provided for the giving of due notice and publicity to forthcoming elections and to the candidates who offered themselves, and for the fragmentation of Iraq into constituencies which would produce 138 instead of 115 deputies. It did not, however, introduce direct one-stage election, for which the Opposition parties continued to press as likely to be 'freer'. The Local Administration Law, passed in February, gave promise of greater zeal and initiative in local government, and of independent action in case of disorder.

668 Countryside security was well maintained. Winter passed into spring without the appearance of the expected trouble in Kurdistan,

in Government and notably by the Liberal Party under Sa'd Ṣaliḥ: their programme was generally one of neutrality (or, as some said, friendship) towards Russia, armed intervention in Palestine, and comprehensive hostility to the British. The Prime Minister spoke of revision of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty, help to local industry, a State-owned oil refinery, a National Bank, more and better education and a university, public works, greater administrative devolution, encouragement to trade unionism, and the firmest resistance to Communism. He could count upon the Regent's support and that of Nuri Sa'id, and could well hope thereby for a successful term of office. 645*

But, politics apart, he was faced by serious difficulties. One of these was the deterioration of the administration, which little was done to restore. Another and more pressing was the worsening financial position. A budget submitted tardily for 1947–8 showed that the main revenues had since 1944 been far from keeping pace with increasing costs, and represented a proportion of the national wealth far smaller than before the war; many fixed dues and charges remained at their old levels, neither land-revenue nor customs receipts had moved upward proportionately to costs, and the social services had been allowed to develop since the war with more generosity than prudence. The year opened with but a small residue of the war-time surplus, and a clear deficit in the year's estimates. A galling shortage of hard currency was felt by merchants eager to import, and the year's harvest was so far below average that it was necessary to take thought for the import of grain; hoarding and unwise exporting had by the later months of 1947 led already to a serious deficiency of food stocks. The flotation of an internal loan of ID 1 million at 3 per cent., ostensibly for capital works, could serve only for current exigencies, and the issue of a second million at 3½ per cent., reluctantly subscribed in January 1948, did no more. The sensitive question of 'Iraqi sterling balances in Britain (which amounted currently to some £60 million) was settled after long consultations by an agreement of 13 August 1947 whereby a sum of £15 million, with further releases for special purposes, was to be made available in instalments between that date and July 1952. In November a supplementary agreement, replacing various interim arrangements, regulated Iraq's allowance of hard currencies, and permitted an expenditure in hard currency of £5,500,000 for the twelve months from June 1948. 645* 652

The withdrawal of the last British troops in October, with large transfers of war material to the 'Iraq Army, left only the Shu'ayba and Ḥabbaniya garrisons authorized by the 1930 Treaty. But the Treaty itself was under heavy political fire throughout the year. Talks proceeded in the Embassy, Ministries, and the Palace, and 648* deputies and Senate in November that 'unified military and political plans for the redemption of Palestine' should be adopted; the idea was already unrealistic before the end of the year. Units in Palestine and Jordan were visited repeatedly by the Regent, who did more than the ministers of his bewildered and irresolute Government to inspire such national effort as was possible. The nominal and absentee 'Government of all Palestine' announced by the Mufti, Ḥajj Amin—an irritant certain to envenom inter-Arab relations—was recognized by 'Iraq to please the Egyptians. 721 648x

3. *PLUS ÇA CHANGE . . .*

The general elections were carried out four days after the first truce in Palestine had become effective, and when Parliament met on 21 June the resignation of Muḥammad al-Ṣadr's Ministry was offered and accepted; it had possessed little authority, had failed to restore order save by imposing martial law, had neglected current administration, had allowed an alarming financial deterioration, and now bequeathed a disheartening legacy at home and abroad. 645x

The Regent's choice of a successor fell unexpectedly upon a statesman formerly prominent but, through long residence in Europe, now in imperfect touch with current politics: Muzaḥim al-Pachachi. He claimed to be of no party and selected a Cabinet of long-familiar figures; Muṣṭafā al-'Umari was to serve at Interior, 'Ali Mumtaz at Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba at Justice, Baṣṣam at Defence, Jalal Baban at Works and Social Affairs, Rawi at Education, and a single newcomer, 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, a young Ḥilla landowner, at Economics. 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, a Beirut-educated Kurdish deputy from Ruwanduz, who had been interned in 1941, relieved Jalal Baban in Social Affairs in August. These ministers, whose appointment showed once more the small part played by party affiliations in the making of Ministries, were with changes to remain in office for half a year, and could achieve something but not much towards redressing 'Iraq's present misfortunes of penury, insecurity, and foreign entanglement.

The finances of the State went from bad to worse. No budget for 1948–9 was submitted until the end of the financial year; normal revenues fell off through bad trade, another bad harvest, tax evasion, and feeble administration; and a certain deficit on the year's work could not prevent the allotment to the Army of nearly 40 per cent. of available funds, and a substantial contribution for the care of the Palestine refugees. Oil royalties were halved by the stoppage of the Haifa pipeline, which, whatever the resulting losses to the Treasury, no Cabinet would dare to reopen in spite of approaches made by the British, French, and American Governments 652

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 and by the Company itself; the Ministry and the parties, on the contrary, launched a demand for higher royalties on such oil as was still exported, and negotiations with the 'Iraq Petroleum Company on this and other issues[1] were begun. A loan from Egypt was discussed and a visit received from Ḥafidh 'Afifi Pasha; another internal loan was proposed but not issued; and late in the year experts of the International Bank, to whom application for a Development Loan had been made, were welcomed in Baghdad. An extended scarce currency agreement concluded with the British Government in July 1948 allotted $25 million for a twelve-month period. An import licensing system, intended to relieve the highly adverse trade balance and exchange position, was imposed in the autumn. With all this, the Treasury remained empty, was subjected to abnormal demands by the Army, and, without hope of paying its debts, faced the further necessity to import and distribute grain. Reductions in officialdom, a partial standstill in public works, royalty advances from the I.P.C., were expedients which barely maintained its solvency. The stronger remedies proposed by 'Ali Mumtaz were not supported by his colleagues, and he resigned. The depression and general indigence led to food riots in Baghdad, Baṣra, Kirkuk, Arbil, and Khaniqin, and to strikes which included one among the oil workers and another among railwaymen. The contribution of these conditions to the political restlessness of 1948–9 was considerable.

648x Meanwhile a large part of the Army remained in Palestine and Jordan. To restart active operations was altogether impracticable; but to recall the forces would have clashed dangerously with the emotional patriotism of the students who, having suffered no inconvenience from the war, pressed by demonstrations for further fighting and especially for help to the still-engaged Egyptian Army. The Palestine position was indeed the greatest of Muzaḥim's problems, and not least by its exposure of the sad disunity of the League in its first severe trial; the Arab States' varying attitudes to the war and the truce, to armistice proposals, to a unified military command, to the Mufti's absurd 'Government of all Palestine' and to Jordan's administration of eastern Palestine, showed how little of unity save its bare façade had survived. Nor did unanimity exist even at home; the pro-Mufti and pro-Hashimite groups could not agree; realists and visionaries saw the whole Palestine issue with different eyes; the problem of the refugees, indifferent to some, cried aloud to others; the Kurds, and not they

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[1] The other demands were for the payment of royalties, expressed in 'shillings (gold)', at the free-market conversion rate of gold as opposed to the Bank of England rate (p. 211): 'Iraqi participation in the enterprise: and the allotment of more and higher posts in it to 'Iraqis.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

668 Muslims) were condemned to death and, this time, executed amid 661 the angry protests of the world's Communist press; another suffered the same fate in May. The Central Committee and records of the Communist Party were, it was claimed, located and disrupted, and the Government were satisfied that the back of the movement was at last broken. Lesser offenders against the State—or, as the malicious murmured, against the Prime Minister—received varying sentences. Kamil al-Chadirchi was sent to prison for four months. Demonstrations on the anniversary of the Portsmouth Treaty were strictly controlled, but led nevertheless to some rioting and many arrests. The procedures of martial law worked with less friction during the year, but Nuri felt still unable, in such times, to restore a normal régime. In spite of alarming rumours in the spring the return of Mullā Muṣṭafā from Russia and his expected invasion of 'Iraq were still delayed.

648 Relations with Great Britain, which in 1948 had deteriorated more over Palestine than over the Treaty issue, and most of all over the British refusal to provide arms, improved in 1949 with a less Anglophobe Ministry and with the resumption of the supply of modern weapons to the Army as soon as it had left Palestine. Visits to London were paid by the Regent, the Prime Minister, and ministers during the year, loans were gladly received and British experts recruited; but it remained inconceivable that any younger politician, or indeed any party except the Prime Minister's, should not, by conviction or mere habit or 'patriotic' duty, blame Great Britain for all the evils of the State.

652 If a substantial reassertion of Government authority was one of the Pasha's achievements in his tenth premiership, he was able also to prevent further financial deterioration. The rate of annual deficit was checked, borrowing for current needs was avoided, and after a precarious year the latter months of 1949 showed less anxious prospects. A budget for 1949–50, balancing at ID 25 million of revenue and expenditure, was produced without excessive delay and provided for enhanced Customs revenues and for some economies in administration. Proposals made for higher taxation or for greater retrenchment were, for political reasons, not pursued, and the trade and economic position, in spite of a good 1949 harvest which permitted the resumption of grain exports, remained unfavourable; but military expenditure on account of Palestine ended in July, and help was forthcoming from the sale of Government stores and from oil royalties received in advance. The promise of loans from London and from the International Bank for development purposes was obtained by negotiations in Europe in the summer of 1949, and an advance of £3 million from the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was offered conditionally upon the

reopening of the Haifa pipeline; but this to 'Iraqi ministers (whatever their own views as expressed in private) was a political impossibility, and the loan was withheld. The dinar followed the pound sterling in its devaluation. The National Bank of 'Iraq opened its doors on 1 July 1949 and assumed charge of the note issue from the Currency Board which, now disappearing, had given 'Iraq good service for twenty years. 652

Successful extraction of 'Iraq from its costly, dangerous, and ineffective position in Palestine was by now urgently necessary, and the bellicose enthusiasm of the last days of the Pachachi Ministry gave no lead towards a reasonable policy. Militarily, the war was lost and over; politically, the need was to save for the Palestine Arabs as much as possible from an Israel now firmly established and possibly expansionist. Nuri Pasha was prepared to accept Partition in the form proposed in November 1947, but not as modified by later Jewish conquests. He postulated an Arab Jerusalem, a disarmed Israel, an internationalized Haifa, and the repatriation of the refugees. These terms were unobtainable; and a visit by Madfa'i to Arab capitals to secure unity in demanding them revealed disunity instead, and could not prevent one Arab State after another signing separate armistices with Israel and going their separate ways. By March the Prime Minister saw the position as hopeless; by April the removal of 'Iraqi troops had begun, by July it was complete, and the reabsorption of the army into 'Iraq and its distribution to peace-time stations was carried out without mishap. It was thereafter 'Iraqi policy to shun the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne, and to hope for an internationally imposed settlement more tolerable than the present. The nation stood alone with Jordan in demanding an all-Arab Jerusalem but joined other States in November in their approach to Washington to compel Israel to carry out the 1947 territorial arrangements which the Lausanne protocol of May 1949 confirmed. 648×

With Palestine lost and its lessons partly learned, and Greater Syria—the *bête noire* of Egypt, Sa'udi Arabia, and two-thirds of Syria itself—now a dead issue save in the tenacious mind of King 'Abdullah, 'Iraqi thoughts turned again to the unity of the Fertile Crescent, or at least of 'Iraq with neighbouring Syria. A memorable booklet, *The Warning of Palestine*, published by Musā al-'Alami, and popular enthusiasm for the young Faysal II when he passed through Syria in 1948, had brought the old project again into prominence. The coup d'état of Colonel Ḥusni Za'im in Damascus on 30 March removed a chief opponent of the plan, President Shukri Quwatli, and Za'im's need of support might lead him, it was thought, to welcome a fraternal 'Iraq. But a rapid visit by Nuri Pasha to Damascus produced only a strong mutual antipathy;

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 a Kurdish deputy from Zakho with long parliamentary experience: Jamil al-Urfali and Khalil Kunna, an internee of 1941 days but now related by marriage with Nuri Sa'id.

The Suwaydi policy was announced as one of Arab fraternity, closer relations with other eastern Powers, internal and legal reform, and industrial and economic development. In fact the 652 year 1950 was one of marked material improvement; the financial year 1949–50, itself better than its predecessor, had ended with a smaller deficit and during 1950 the Treasury began to refill. Considerable economies were made in the costs of administration, elsewhere than in the social services. New taxation and Customs revenue began to be productive, and by the end of the year the Minister of Finance could announce that the bad times were over; and in fact the financial year 1950–1 was to end, thanks to increased oil royalties, with comfortable balances in both current and capital works budgets. The loss, nevertheless, of Jewish skill and enterprise in the field of trade and banking, and the new and onerous obligations under the Banking Law of January 1950, proved economically a handicap. More import licences could not at present be allowed and stocks in the country remained short. Prices of imports, including food, rose with the outbreak of the Korean war. The harvest of 1950 was good in spite of disastrous floods and a phenomenal hurricane at Baṣra in May; the value of exports nearly doubled as compared with 1949, and greatly increased oil revenues were now in imminent prospect (p. 365). A new hard currency agreement was made with Great Britain in August 1950, and negotiations reopened shortly afterwards for its prolongation or amendment. A substantial loan in dollars was granted by the International Bank in July towards the Tharthar scheme (p. 370) and another by London in sterling for railway works already in progress.

648 The Suwaydi and its successor the eleventh Sa'idi Ministries found the Arab inter-statal position no less baffling than before. In addition to the normal clashes of interest and sentiment between the nations, special features of embarrassment were present in the fact of Israeli establishment and consolidation, the disposal of eastern Palestine, the usurpation of power in Syria (where a third coup d'état early in 1950 removed Colonel Hinawi to install Colonel Shishakli), and in the strained relations between Egypt and Great Britain arising from their unfruitful negotiations. No decisive steps were taken towards union with Syria in 1950, though the Syrian Prime Minister visited Baghdad during the year; the 'Iraqi attitude was one of 'We are ready, whenever you are. . . .!' The prime cause of the country's uneasy position in the League was her support of Jordan, with whose ruler further visits were

x645 665 opposition leaders of various records and tendencies—Ṭaha al-Hashimi, Muzaḥim al-Pachachi, Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, Naṣrat al-Farsi, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Dhahir, Ja'far Ḥamandi, and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam—were drawing together towards a fragile but imposing Popular Front whose formation with a vague programme they announced towards the middle of 1951. The National Democrat Party returned to full activity during 1950. There seemed, however, no reason why, with his parliamentary majority and with a personal authority which for years past had exceeded that of any other 'Iraqi, Nuri Sa'id should not, subject to unforeseeable changes and chances, remain in power as long as his health and restless nature might permit. In the last days of 1950 he brought 'Umar Nadhmi, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba, and Baṣṣam to the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio, appointed 'Abd al-Majid Maḥmud, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, to the Ministry of Economics, moved Dhiya' Ja'far to Works, and retained 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan at Finance. But no real coalition had emerged, and internal politics showed no sign of rising above the habitual strife of rival personalities. A formidable range of unsolved problems, inter-Arab and international, political and financial, confronted Nuri Sa'id, none more conspicuously than those of Israel and the Palestine refugees, revision of the 1930 Treaty, and the extraction of greater oil profits. To these the veteran statesman now turned.

643 King Fayṣal II, whose fifteenth birthday fell on 2 May 1950, had completed his preparatory school days in England and since the spring of 1949 had been a happy and successful Harrow schoolboy. He was to attain his majority on 2 May 1953. His family had acquired a house near Staines where the Queen Mother 'Aliya spent most of the year. Her health, however, began to cause alarm in 1949 and after a long illness and operation she returned home to die in Baghdad in September 1950, aged only thirty-nine; a tragic loss to the King and to her devoted brother, the Regent.

4. WEALTH OF A NATION

• 652 There have been references on earlier pages to the serious position of the State finances in the period 1947–9 and to the substantial recovery therefrom by the end of 1950. It could be foreseen by the latter date that, so far from financial stringency, the resources at the Government's disposal would in future be ample not only for normal purposes of the public services as hitherto conceived but also for an expanding programme of development. Provided that control of expenditure were maintained as efficiently as it had been (except in 1948) in the past, which there was no reason to doubt: that the probity and efficiency of Government personnel did not deteriorate: that the efforts made to perfect the assessment and collection of the main customary sources of revenue 652 —Customs and Excise, taxation on natural commodities, the tobacco monopoly, income and property taxes—were continued with the full use of improved records, techniques, and expert advice: it was probable that, even apart from the expected oil revenues, the position of the Treasury need not again cause anxiety. From this should follow the liquidation of Government debts and loans, the better housing and payment of the Administration itself, and the possibility of a gratifying expansion of the social services.

The estimates for 1950–1 allotted, out of a total ordinary expenditure of ID 24 million, 30 per cent. to the Army and R.I.A.F., 16 per cent. to education, 13 to general administration purposes, 11 to the Police, 8 to health services, and 22 in all to other departments and functions. Capital works expenditure in that year was to amount to just under ID 4 million.

Receipts from the territory's greatest single source of wealth, its oil deposits and the industry developing them, had since their first appearance normally been allotted to capital development. This 647 rule, partly broken in lean times, was reinforced by the structure of the Development Board set up in 1950 under a law which called 652 for the diversion to it of all revenues from oil.[1] These receipts, amounting to less than ID 4 million in 1949 and little more than 6 million in 1950, would, it was already clear, be more than doubled, more than quadrupled, in future years (p. 376). The division of the State estimates into an ordinary and a capital-works budget ceased with the establishment of the Development Board.

The Board, disliked by some 'Iraqis as an irremovable Government-within-Government, seemed to others and to most foreign observers to offer hopes of a continuity, efficiency, and freedom from political considerations which had scarcely existed before.[2] It consisted of eight members, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the time, and six non-official salaried members to be named by Royal Irada and to hold office for five years. Three of these were to be expert in Finance, Irrigation, and another (unspecified) field and, in defiance of anti-foreign prejudice, a British Secretary-General and Finance expert, Sir E. Miller, and an American irrigation engineer were recruited. The Board, in which Arshad al-'Umari seemed likely to be the leading figure, was in

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[1] This was modified in 1952 by amending legislation which provided for the Board's retention of 70 per cent. of oil revenues and the allotment of 30 per cent. to 'general revenues': an arrangement which wisely permitted the devolution to provincial authorities of many smaller development works and services.

[2] The Board, however, was soon under attack by part of the press, irresponsible and malicious as ever, for having failed in a few weeks to 'raise the standard of life of the masses'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 647 1951 establishing its programme for the ensuing five years and allotting an expenditure of some ID 155 million[1] within that period; but it became apparent soon afterwards that revenues in excess of this would, under revised oil agreements (p. 376) be available. It was at this stage clear to all that the acquisition of this copious revenue, which in the absence of some suicidal folly or grave misfortune would accrue punctually and reliably for many years, must completely transform 'Iraq's economy and rate of evolution. Its history indeed from 1951 onwards should be that of a territory extraordinarily favoured in all that appertains to, or can flow from, the resources at the disposal of its Government. Its curse had for centuries been poverty; thanks to its discovered and exploited oil deposits, it stood now at the threshold of an era of abundant wealth; and this must, besides its blessings, bring accompanying responsibilities, stresses and dangers, both moral and economic.

439 [457] The territory's immediate trade balance, which future opulence would doubtless affect, still showed in 1951 its habitual deficit. This was compensated partly by drawing upon the war-time sterling balances, and partly by invisible items as of old. The country's imports were, as ever, principally those of cotton, woollen, and silk textiles: iron, steel, and machinery: electrical goods: vehicles: tea, coffee, and sugar: chemicals, cement, and timber. Nearly half of these were provided by Great Britain, with India, the United States, and Belgium as other main suppliers and to a lesser extent Italy, Holland, and France; Germany and Japan had disappeared from the list of providers. Exports, which the country's evolution had left little changed over many years, were still those almost exclusively of its agricultural and natural products. Exported barley amounted to a yearly average of some 250,000 tons, wheat was shipped occasionally but irregularly—and not at all between 1940 and 1949; maize, millet, and oil-seeds (cotton, sesame, and linseed) were usually available in small quantities. The co-ordinating authority for all grain exports was the para-statal Grain Board and, working with it, an Agricultural Export and Import Company. Dates, to the important yearly extent of some 250,000 tons, were dispatched to more than forty countries. Cotton had disappeared after 1941, but crept back into the export list in 1947. Other items in the slight volume of exports were animals driven to the Levant countries, wool sent to France and America, and hides and skins, gums and gall-nuts consigned to various countries. Hopes that tobacco might be added to this list depended upon improvement in the structure and products of the local tobacco industry. New

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[1] The provision for 1951 was to be (in thousands of dinars) 9,364: of 1952, 20,460: of 1953, 28,390: of 1954, 31,600: of 1955, 32,335: of 1956, 33,225.

solely to the productive regeneration of the estate, should soon prove a 185
profitable investment. If the accompanying returns of Budgetary Revenue and Expenditure during the nine years 1921-29 are referred to, it 652
will be seen how small a sum, both absolutely and relatively, the Government has been able so far to allot to land development services. And 651

TABLE VII. TOTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE, 1921-1929

Nature of Service	Expenditure in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total expenditure
General National Charges*	325·5	6·9
Finance	619·4	13·1
Interior	1,068·3	22·7
Health	221·9	4·7
Defence	980·1	20·9
Justice	125·2	2·6
Education	223·2	5·0
Communications and works ..	680·6	14·5
Lands Services†	454·0	9·6
Total ..	4,696·2	100·0

*Civil List of H.M. the King, Parliament, Council of Ministers, Comptroller and Auditor-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Debt and Pensions, Antiquities and Census Departments.

†Departments of Irrigation, Agriculture, Veterinary Service, Land Survey, Tapu, State Domains and Ministerial Services of the Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture during its existence.

necessarily only a modicum of that sum could be utilised for capital improvements. If expenditure on capital development continues to be limited to what can be spared from current resources, it is to be feared that the economic revival of the country must be indefinitely retarded.

TABLE VIII. TOTAL BUDGETARY REVENUE, 1921-1929

Nature of Revenue	Revenue in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total revenue
Direct Revenues from land*	1,619·3	32·7
Customs and Excise	2,248·4	45·4
Post and Telegraph Receipts ..	287·1	5·8
Other revenues	795·7	16·1
Total ..	4,950·5	100·0

*Land revenue, animal tax, receipts of land services, mines, rents of Government property, etc.

2. Three Spheres of Reform

2. In the northern Rainfall Zone the effects of past neglect are less 185
obvious and the problem of agricultural development less intricate owing to this area being predominantly independent of irrigation: but otherwise there is just as great a need for a steady programme of agrarian reform here as in the South.

The three great obstacles to the agricultural development, and, therefore, to the economic advance of el 'Iraq may be summarised as:

in the south (*a*) the absence of an adequate irrigation system, and throughout the country

(*b*) the rude methods of cultivation and stock-keeping practised, and

(*c*) the chaotic state of land tenure.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl

Egypt MRI

any solid economic advance in el 'Iraq. The third is the introduction and maintenance of a simple, secure and equitable land tenure, which term should be understood to include an even and readily met revenue demand. This report is only directly concerned with the last need : but in studying it, its inter-relation to the other two must be continuously kept in mind. No development of the country's agricultural resources can expect to be successful which does not take all these three needs into consideration together. I 185

3. Comparison with Egypt

3. During the progress of my inquiry comparisons were frequently instituted with Egypt, a country with many parallels to el 'Iraq both in its history and its natural conditions. Owing to the courtesy of the Egyptian Government I am able to compare in Table X the respective positions on certain salient points of el 'Iraq in 1929 and of Egypt in successive decades from 1882 onwards. It will be noted that during the last fifty years Egypt has more than doubled her population, added 50 per cent. to her cropped area, quadrupled her trade, and her budget, built up a substantial budgetary reserve, and largely absorbed her original external debt.

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TABLE X. COMPARATIVE FIGURES, EL 'IRAQ AND EGYPT

		EL 'IRAQ	EGYPT					
		1929	1882	1890	1900	1910	1920	1929
Population in millions		2·8	6·8	8·2	10·1	11·8	13·2	14·4
Gross cultivable area, sq. km. ..		90,000	32,000					
Area cropped yearly, sq. km. ..		10,000	24,000*	27,000*	30,000*	32,000*	34,000*	36,000*
Imports	In lakhs of rupees	980	1.100	1.100	1.900	3.200	14.000	7.200
Exports		360	1.800	1.700	2.400	4.000	11.800	7.800
Re-exports		310†	14	40	80	60	350	190
Land Revenue		168	680‡	700‡	600‡	700‡	700‡	720‡
Customs Revenue		274	80	190	330	480	1.370	1.620
Total Budgetary Revenue ..		570	1.300	1.650	1.630	2.260	4.700	5.790
Total Budgetary Expenditure		560	1.230	1.560	1.500	2.340	4.000	5.690
Budgetary Reserve Fund ..				200	1,150	790	2.370	5.540
Debt §			10,900	13.100	13.000	13.100	12,900	12.400

*From [illegible] to [illegible] cropped twice. Net area cultivated in 1929 was 23,000 sq. km.

†Goods in transit, not included in imports.

‡Yield maintained constant on re-assessment following revenue settlement. Fluctuations due to remissions to unwatered land followed by extensions of irrigation.

§Mostly held in Egypt now.

Egypt is more favourably situated geographically than el 'Iraq ; while Mahommed Ali Pasha did much to initiate early in the last century the reform of her land tenure which has proceeded since. And it will be seen that even fifty years ago Egypt was considerably more populous and wealthier than el 'Iraq is to-day. But el 'Iraq is by no means devoid of advantages also. She has Egypt's established success before her. Her cultivable area is larger and more diverse, so that she is in a better position to develop a varied export trade. She is free of unproductive debt and can devote all funds not absorbed by current needs, to productive purposes. And her petroliferous deposits provide her with special financial aid at the most useful moment. So that a comparable advance to that made by Egypt may be hoped for, if a comparable effort can be made.

The unavoidably lengthy duration of a general settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq has been emphasised several times in this report : although no precise estimate of the period required is practicable in the 000

658 which the Government have been prepared to find money for education is shown by the following table of national educational expenditure compared with total budget expenditure:

● [652] EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION

Year	*For all purposes*	*For all education*	*Per cent of education to all purposes*
	£	£	
1920–21	5,556,574	130,360	2.35
1930–31	3,994,337	294,262	7.37
1938–39	5,469,813	708,056	12.94
1939–40	6,369,148	810,477	12.72
1940–41	7,144,910	848,168	11.87
1941–42	7,701,178	855,540	11.11
1942–43	10,620,822	1,131,414	10.65
1943–44	13,749,321	1,515,542	11.02
1944–45	15,484,752	1,335,475	8.62
1945–46	17,563,230	1,611,843	9.18
1946–47	18,428,567	1,737,604	9.43
1947–48	18,742,657	2,157,315	11.51
1948–49	21,947,994	2,572,625	11.72
1949–50	24,095,300	3,783,309	15.70

When one attempts to compare present national expenditure on education with what it would cost to finance compulsory education for all children, however, it cannot be suggested with even the most realistic optimism that there is much prospect of the money being available for some time to come. It is estimated that, at the present time, the cost of providing primary education is £8 per pupil per year. Thus the cost of providing compulsory primary education for the 750,000 children of primary school age, even at the existing level, would amount to considerably more than £6,000,000 per annum, i.e., probably twice as much as the total current educational budget. And this estimate does not take into account the cost of providing the new schools, of bringing existing school buildings up to better standards and of training the many more teachers who would be necessary. It also ignores the fact of the rapidly growing school population.

For this reason many responsible educators, when confronted with the cost, feel that no serious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. This may or may not be true. There is always a need for financial realism, but there

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

as a means of spreading the burden of local educational provision 000
equitably amongst the community.

This will create a dual or complementary system of educational finance, partly national and partly local. The most satisfactory system of fairly distributing educational expenditure as between the national and the local budgets would be the devising of a grants system. Under this grants system each Provincial Education Committee would annually receive monies from the national education budget to supplement the taxes and other contributions raised locally. If the amount of the annual Ministry of Education grant for each province could, subject to the limitations of the national budget, be increased—for a time at any rate—proportionately to the local monies raised, this would probably act as a strong incentive to local self-help.

The Financing of School Building. Under existing arrangements for 653
the public use of royalties received from the oil companies, money 871
from this important and steadily increasing source is wisely devoted to the Capital Works Budget. In the past it has apparently not been considered possible to devote monies from this Capital Works Budget on any large scale to capital works for educational purposes such as schools and teachers' houses. Indeed, as during the last financial year this Capital Works Budget showed a deficit, it would have been difficult to impose educational demands on it. As, however, it is understood that the revenue from oil royalties is likely to increase three-fold during the next few years, a shrewd Minister of Education with an eye to future progress towards compulsory education would doubtless do his utmost to persuade Parliament to earmark a fair share of this additional revenue for capital works of an educational nature.

Financing Material Inducements to School Attendance. Although during 000
the first period of this short-term policy of advance towards compulsory education the task will be mainly that of coping with existing and potential demands for admission into primary schools, some financial provision will need to be made for assisting the children of the very low income groups. It would be desirable, therefore, if powers could be given to the Provincial Education Committees to devote part of the money derived from local taxes or contributions towards the provision of meals and clothes for really needy children. This would enable the Provincial Education Committees to gain experience of what will be an important aspect of educational administration when the time comes to compel the attendance at school of the many children whose parents are too poor to take advantage of educational provision unless it is accompanied by material assistance.

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN IRAQ

ABDUL GHANI AL DALLI ☆

433 Modern industry in Iraq, as in many other underdeveloped countries, has made significant progress in recent years and especially since the end of World War II. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the causes of this movement in their relation to over-all industrial development and industrialisation in Iraq. The discussion in this paper will, on the whole, be restricted to the problems of industrial enterprise in the private sector of the economy. Consequently, Government industrial plans, as well as the oil industry have not been discussed. Likewise, the paper does not deal with the wider regional aspects of modern industry. As far as Iraq is concerned, the main causes for the progress of industry are to be found in the abundance of natural wealth, especially in the form of oil, the relative plentifulness of cheap labour in urban centers, the hardships suffered by the population during the war owing to the shortage of essential industrial products, the exceptional profits made during the war by proprietors of such modern industries as then existed (e.g. woollen textiles, cigarettes, soap, etc.), the accumulation of large sums of liquid capital in relatively few hands as a result of war and post-war inflation, and finally, the positively helpful attitude of Government towards industrial development. 654 The Iraqi Government has always tried to encourage industry, and 652 has granted it various exemptions from taxation under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, passed in 1929, and its amendments. In 1946 - 47, however, it took a more effective step in the creation of the Industrial Bank, with a capital of I.D. 500,000 wholly contributed by the Government. The Bank's function is to grant loans for the establishment of new industries and the expansion and improvement of existing industries, to participate in joint-stock companies formed for industrial purposes, to start new industrial enterprises on its own account if need be, and to offer various services connected with the import of machinery, materials, and the export

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654 of products.[1] Financial assistance thus provided by the Government,
652 together with the new Law for the Encouragement of Industry issued in 1950, proved of great potency in the development of industry. The capital of the Industrial Bank was increased in 1952, to I.D. 3,000,000 of which I.D. 1,200,000 have already been paid up.

433 These and other measures, such as increases in custom duties
656 and the restriction or prohibition of certain industrial imports, have produced marked progress in the establishment of new industries and the re-equipment and expansion of old ones, especially since the end of World War II.[2] This can be seen from the following table:

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Development of Large-Scale Industry in Iraq 1948 - 1952

Year (1st April - 31st March)	Capital Invested I.D. 1000	Value of Annual Output I.D. 1000	Number of Employees	Wages paid annually I.D. 1000
(Seven large Industries)				
1948 - 49	3,183	1,403	1649	
1949 - 50	3,194	1,555	2626	333
1950 - 51	4,206	2,631	3443	406
1951 - 52	4,415	3,600	3837	486
(Ten large Industries)[3]				
1951 - 52	4,835	4,424	4533	599

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[1] Industrial Bank, Compilation of Laws, Regulations, etc. Government Press, Baghdad 1951.

[2] For pre-World War II industrial development in Iraq see:- *A Handbook of Mesopotamia*, H.M S.O., 1917. *A Report on the Progress of Iraq*, by H.M. Government to the League of Nations. H.M.S O.,1931. *The Iraq Directory*, Baghdad, 1935 (English Edition). *The Economic Organisation of Iraq* (in Arabic), Editor Said B. Himadeh, Beirut, 1937.

[3] See the *Annual Report of the Department of Industry 1951-52*, Ministry of National Economy, Baghdad. (In Arabic)
The Report of the National Bank of Iraq, 1949-50, p. 46 (in Arabic) states that national production of cement, beer, vegetable oil, soap, leather., etc., has been substituted for similar imports with the result that value of imports fell from I.D. 2,984,000 in 1948 to I.D. 1,298,000 in 1950, and the deficit in the balance of trade was reduced by I.D. 1,686,000 due to this reason alone during the same period.

the development of industry sketched above.[1] Industries which 654 existed then or have come into existence since have benefited considerably 433 from these concessions. But private enterprise remained shy of industrial activity until the establishment of the Industrial Bank in 1946-47. Through this Bank, the State showed itself not 652 only willing to forgo some revenue in the interests of industry, 475 but to provide cash, and to share in the risks of industry. As mentioned above, the Industrial Bank could not only give loans (against real or personal security), but also participate in the capital of joint stock companies. Its greatest value in my view lies in the fact that it can become a founder or promoter of industries and thus lead the industrial community and the investing public into new fields. However, the Bank was handicapped in the early stages, 652 by the inadequacy of the financial resources at its disposal and the absence of economic and technical studies by which the feasibility of proposed industrial schemes might be judged. Moreover, the Bank lacked, and to some extent still lacks, a qualified technical staff. It has often to rely on the judgement of the Board of Directors or the advice of specialized Government departments such as the Directorate General of Industry and the Directorate General of Agriculture, which are not always fully equipped for the task. The Bank has continually asked for scientific surveys to be made 654 of the mineral, agricultural and animal resources of the country. 433 It has also called for an integrated economic plan covering industry, 652 agriculture and other economic activities, in which the Bank, like other institutions, will play its particular role.[2] There has been strong resistance on the part of the Board of Directors to the allocation of money for technical staff or technical studies by experts, and often when money was allocated, it could not be spent because the Board disagreed on the qualifications of such experts (foreign or national) or the need for inviting them to study particular problems. However, as years passed and the financial position of the Bank improved, a section for the study of industrial schemes was formed and members of it were charged with the study of certain problems at home or abroad. A number of ad hoc committees of specialists available in Iraq were set up to study and report on proposed industrial schemes. Contact was estab-

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[1] No provision was made, however, for direct subsidies to industry, and no legal preference in government contracts was given to home industry.

[2] See First Annual Report, Industrial Bank 1946-47/1947-48, Baghdad. (Arabic)

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433 lished with various Government departments, and data were collected, 654 classified and sometimes published for the guidance of would-be entrepreneurs. A number of foreign experts were invited to study either particular schemes (such as paper, sugar, artificial silk fibre, the exploitation of salt, etc.) or to concern themselves with industrial development in general, and make recommendations for improvements in existing industries or for the establish- 652 ment of new industries. In addition to the absence of a general investment policy and planning, and the lack of economic and technical data to guide the activities of the Bank, there was, in the years 1947-50 the handicap of inadequate financial resources. When the Bank opened for business in 1946-47 its nominal capital, in accordance with a decision taken early in 1940, was fixed at I. D. 500,000. This figure was out of proportion with the changed level of prices and incomes, and the expansion of industry which had taken place meanwhile. Furthermore as the capital of the Bank was provided by the Treasury as a loan, it was up to the Treasury to decide what amounts to pay and when to pay them, and its decisions often did not coincide with the Bank's requirements either for funds or for making forward plans.

This situation, however, has completely changed as a result of increased Government revenue from oil in accordance with the Oil Agreement of 1951. The capital of the Bank was raised to I.D. 1,000,000 in 1951 and to I.D. 3,000,000 in 1952. Earlier, in 1948, 1949, and 1950, the Bank was forced to borrow from the reserves of certain Government departments, e.g. the Directorate General of Awqaf, Government Staff Guarantee Fund, and from other banks (especially the National Bank of Iraq). This form of borrowing was found to be less costly and more elastic than borrowing from the public. Another important source of capital which has developed in recent years is the annual net profits of the Bank. These have risen from I.D. 4,066 in 1948-49, to I.D. 7,745 in 1949-50, to I.D. 60,591 in 1950-51, and to I.D. 99,463 in 1951-52. The average rate of loans granted to industry in the last five years has been about I.D. 150,000 annually,[1] with an average loan period of three to four years. Hence a sum of I.D. 40,000 to I.D. 50,000 is repaid annually to the Bank. The paid-up capital of the Bank stood at I.D. 1,200,000

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[1] The rate of interest was reduced from 7 per cent per annum to 5 per cent by decision of the Ministry of Finance in 1951.

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in 1952, but it can safely count on an annual payment by the Treasury on capital account of no less than I.D. 200,000. The Bank therefore can be said to be now in a sufficiently liquid position to meet any legitimate demands made upon it. 652

The International Bank Mission[1] has recommended that "the Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital." This view is no doubt inspired by the shortage of capital from which the Industrial Bank, as well as other financial institutions, had suffered before the Oil Agreement of 1951. It is clear that the Bank must not, however, be hasty in disposing of shares if it is to perform its important function of encouraging enterprises and capital investment in industry. This can be seen more clearly from the following considerations. First, most of the industrial concerns in which the Bank participates are still under construction (a process which requires two to four years in Iraq), and the few which have gone into production and distributed profits have only done so in the last three or four years. Any large sell-out by the Bank, which holds between 25 and 40 per cent of their shares, is likely to shake confidence in these concerns and create unforseen difficulties for them. Secondly, there is no organised stock exchange in Iraq and the market for shares is so limited that any large sale of shares may lead to a fall in prices which would hit small investors and benefit speculators, while it might harm the credit of the Bank. Thirdly, the stake which the Government now has in the capital of so many industrial concerns helps to reassure private enterprise that it will not retreat from the generous policy it has so far adopted towards industry. Another important consideration in this respect is that Government participation in industry through the Bank gives it a useful instrument, if it wishes to make use of it, for the supervision and control of industry.[2] It seems obvious therefore that the Bank cannot easily use its capital as a revolving fund. 652 654 473

(2) **The Supply of Raw Materials and Power;** Iraq is potentially 000

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[1] See the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. *The Economic Development of Iraq*, Report by a Mission of the Bank. Washington 1952. Annex D. p. 295.

[2] During the past five years, the Bank has made, only one sale, 3,000 shares out of 24,000 shares it then held in the Iraq Cement Co., in 1951, by public auction.

433 654 the Law for the Encouragement of Industry are granted irrespective of the locality in which the Industry is to be established or the type of industry embarked upon. Industries established in crowded, highly developed areas are given the same advantages as those established in remote, less developed districts. The manufacturer of producer's goods is treated equally with the manufacturer of consumers' goods and luxury goods. The criteria upon which an industry's claim to benefits is judged stand in need of drastic revaluation.

477 The limitation of the market in Iraq not only restricts the possibilities of large-scale development of most industries but it affords opportunities for monopoly control by one or two plants in certain fields. The danger of monopoly and exorbitant prices is already in sight in such industries as cement, beer, cotton and woollen textiles. The encouragement of new enterprise in these fields, or the relaxation of state protection to allow healthy competition, or direct intervention by the state to fix prices in relation to costs, is necessary to restrict monopoly power in the interests of the consumer and to preserve public confidence in industry. It is only on the basis of such confidence that the government can continue to give support and material aid to industry. The Iraqi Government has ample powers for dealing with the abuses of monopoly under the provisions of the Law for the Organisation of Economic Life of 1941.

473 The government can also extend its control over industry and prevent abuses by proper amendments to the law governing joint-stock companies. There is need to restrict the grant of free-shares or "water" shares to promotors, the creation of founders' shares with special powers of voting or percentage of profits, the interlocking of directorships, and abuses on the part of management in respect of purchases of materials and equipment, and sales of finished products. In particular, managers of joint-stock companies should be prohibited from trading on their own account especially in goods related to firms under their management.

652 473 The Industrial Bank has often been urged, as a shareholder in many industries, and with its representative on their boards, to exercise control over their price and sales policies. This suggestion derives from the prestige which the Bank has acquired in relation to industrial development. It has undoubtedly helped to iron out many difficulties, to improve management, and prevent abuses. But it is going too far to suppose that the Bank can actual-

652 473 ly control the price, sales and purchases policies of such industries. In the first place, though the Bank holds a large proportion of the capital (varying between 20 and 40 per cent) of every industry, it is always in the minority on the Boards of Directors ; moreover it appoints its own representatives and is excluded from taking part in the election of other directors by the articles of association of the companies concerned. This course has been deliberately taken so as to ensure private enterprise against arbitrary action on the part of the government. Secondly, the Bank itself is, in the last analysis, a profit seeking institution and therefore it is not likely to stand in the way of any measures likely to increase profits, unless they are of an obviously oppressive or abusive nature. Thirdly, the main duty of the Bank is to promote industry. Promotion and control are not always compatible.

656 475 For these reasons the State has to look for other ways, and to use more fully the legal powers which it already possesses, for effective control over industry. The fact that it owns a share in industry through the Industrial Bank puts it in a better position to exercise such control. But to rely mainly on the Industrial Bank for this purpose is to escape responsibility.

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of honour (*namūs*).[1] Capital punishment for such murders, 175*
which were frequent and usually premeditated and brutal, 727*
cut across tribal justice. The Political Officers, on their side, 628
found such customs abhorrent and contrary to their ideas of
justice.[2] Their natural tendency was to override the decisions 681
of the tribal *majlis* and to impose imprisonment or death penalties. The problem was partially solved by the gradual recognition of the tribal point of view by the British authorities, but the modification of tribal custom has taken longer. At the present, it still constitutes one of the major problems in the administration of the tribal areas of 'Iraq.

The Revenue Department

No single task of greater magnitude faced the British ad- 175*
ministrators of the Occupied Territories than that of organizing 727*
the Revenue Department. The collection and administration 652
of revenue in accordance with the Turkish system but freed from abuse and corruption were not the only problems. Associated problems of land tenure, of revenue assessment, of *Auqāf* administration, in all their strangeness and complexity, had to be studied and solved. Responsibility for other activities, such as Excise and Customs, control of Hostile Trading Concerns, of the Public Debt, and of Education had to be assumed. To render the task more difficult, papers and records where they had not been destroyed, were out of date and, with the exception of land-registration, in confusion, requiring weeks of careful sorting.[3] Responsible officials had fled, and although

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[1] See Thomas, Bertram, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, 1931, pp. 86-7.

[2] *Admin. Report*, 1918: Hilla Division, pp. 126, 133; *Monthly Rep'ts, December*, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 59; Ibid., *August*, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 74.

[3] Cf. the excellent unsigned article (by C. C. Garbett, I.C.S.): *Turkish Rule and British Administration in Mesopotamia* in *Quarterly Review*, Vol. CCXXX, pp. 403 ff. The claim made there (p. 411), however, that demand-statements for the annual tax on date trees as prepared by the Turks, were found intact and collection of this as well as other revenue were begun within a few days of the occupation of Basra, is not borne out by the records of the period, as *Revenue Admin. Report, January-March*, 1915 (confidential), nor by personal testimony of the officials on the spot at the time.

175 important aid was rendered by residents of Basra and 'Amāra
227 and later by the discovery of old registers, the essential informa-
652 tion concerning the complicated and often inconsistent system
had to be gleaned by investigation and experience.

British Military authorities had at first no time to deal with Revenue or Fiscal matters except Customs. With the arrival, however, of Mr. Dobbs in January, 1915, as Revenue Commissioner, the work was taken in hand. The taxes demanded by the Turks had to be ascertained, the proportion paid before the arrival of the Expeditionary Force had to be discovered, and a collecting agency improvised.[1] Methods of assessment had to be learned. In the first months, the process of learning was by trial and error, tempered by the desire to win the confidence and goodwill of the Arabs and to impress them with the difference between the Turkish and the British methods of government. In some sections, as around 'Amāra, the revenue was farmed out to great landowners on terms which kept them loyal to the British. In other sections it was remitted in part,[2] and in still others, entirely, as at Qurna in 1915.[3] In some districts the tax on date trees alone was collected, and this in small proportion to former Turkish demands.[4] In other districts where the landowners were obviously paying on too few trees, the number was raised, with the alternative that owners might demand a recount. No such demands occurred. Considering the difficulties, it is not surprising that only Rs. 20,000 (approximately £1400) in land revenue was collected in the five months of the first fiscal year (ending March 31st, 1915) following the British occupation.[5]

Full development of the Revenue Department was to come after Baghdad wilayet had been taken over.[6] Nevertheless,

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[1] *Revenue Administration Report*, 1915, p. 1.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917: *Hammar Lake Area*, 1916-1917, p. 57.

[5] *Revenue Admin. Report*, 1915.

[6] The Turkish system and the British methods in the various aspects of the Revenue Department will be described in greater detail in a later section dealing with the development of the Administration from 1917 onwards. *Infra*, pp. 112 ff.

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by October, 1916, when Mr. Dobbs was invalided to India, a 175*
working administrative machinery had been set up, not only 727*
for revenue but also for other branches of administration 652
which had been taken under the wing of the Revenue Department. A certain amount of confidence in the British regime had been gained. Data and information on revenue, land tenure and other subjects had been embodied for future guidance in a series of notes which for clarity of judgment and succinctness have probably never been surpassed in the history of 'Iraq Administration.

Administration of Tribal Areas

To the establishment of a government for the tribal areas, 175*
both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs gave particular attention. 727*
The greatest need of the moment was for peace and order in 619
tribal areas and for the restriction of all assistance to the Turks from the Arabs, in order that the Expeditionary Force might devote itself to its main objective of defeating the Turks.

Both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs believed that these conditions might be attained by making use of the natural leaders of the tribes: the shaikhs. The alternative of direct government, either by a British or Arab staff, was calculated to be contrary to immediate ends if not impossible, due to the lack of a suitable staff and to the semi-barbaric character of the tribes. Their efforts were, therefore, directed towards building up forms of administration and of justice which, while conforming as far as possible to Western standards, were based on tribal organization, on recognition of tribal habits and customs and on support of the shaikhs as instruments of government.

The policy adopted was, in reality, an adaptation of the system so successfully developed and applied in Baluchistan by Sir Robert Sandeman, of whom it has been said: 'Every great

175* 727* 631 Officer, Assistant Political Officers administered subdivisions or districts. A Deputy Civil Commissioner assumed control of the Basra divisions until September, 1918, when the two wilayets, largely for political reasons, were merged and the administration directed from Baghdad.

Political Control and Revenue Administration

175* 727* As at Basra, military exigencies largely controlled the situation. General Maude's own attitude to the Civil Administration had been in accordance with his views as to the necessity of establishing the unquestioned authority of the military authorities rather than with the spirit of the proclamation issued in his name after the fall of Baghdad. The appointment, often without reference to the Chief Political Officer, of military officials, many of whom knew nothing of Arab conditions or of Arabic, to civil administrative positions, gave no suggestion that he took seriously the statement 'I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army'.[1] The Government by proclamation, with its harassing and sometimes unnecessary regulations, gave as little hint to the people of Baghdad as earlier regulations had given to the people of Basra, that the armies had 'not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors or enemies but as Liberators'.[2]

652 175* 727 Nevertheless, Sir Percy Cox, concerned with the future as well as the present, deemed it essential to extend political control throughout the wilayet, as much as permitted by the military authorities and by General Maude's centralization of authority into his own hands. Such control could be best attained, as had been discovered in Basra Wilayet, by extending

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Proc. No. 9, p. 5. Text: App. I.
[2] Ibid., p. 6.

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the administration and collection of revenue, which, in the eyes 652
of the tribes, was regarded as a sign of government authority, 175+
similarly as revenue payment was considered an outward sign 727+
of their submission. Much of the confidence engendered by the Political Officers in Basra Wilayet had been the result of their revenue activities,[1] which included far more than the collection of taxes following the enforced assumption by the Revenue Board of a far wider range of responsibilities than merely financial duties. In addition, the extension of land-revenue collections in kind from the fertile areas of the middle Euphrates would produce local foodstuffs for the army and thereby release much precious tonnage. Hence, after the fall of Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox's chief efforts were directed, not only to the establishment of friendly relations with leading dignitaries, but also, through the First Revenue Officer, to the collection of information as to the customary rates of demand; the sorting of a mass of papers; the foundation of a Revenue system capable of extension; the inceptions of departments such as *Auqāf*, Education, etc., and the actual collection of revenue in Baghdad and surrounding districts.[2] The complexities and inconsistencies of the Turkish Revenue system, to which reference has already been made, proved, as in Basra Wilayet, one of the greatest obstacles in the way of a rapid establishment in Baghdad Wilayet of a system based on its principles.

The Turkish Revenue System

Under the Turks, general revenues in each wilayet had been 651
collected under the authority of the *Daftardar* (Provincial 175*
Director of Finance), either directly or through departments. Among the taxes collected directly were land revenue in its various aspects, *koda* (animal head-tax), *tamattū* (income or

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[1] 'I have been long convinced that Revenue work is the most important part of their duties.' Deputy Civil Commissioner in *Admin. Report, Basrah*, 1917, p. 8.

[2] *Administration Report, Revenue Board, Baghdad, March* 22 *to December* 31, 1917 (Baghdad, 1918), p. 1 (hereafter *Revenue Report*, 1917).

175* 642* wedded, triumphed. The erection of the Court was sanctioned.
727 Owing to financial and other reasons, it was not instituted,
692 however, until December 24th, 1925.[1]

175* The transfer of function and authority in financial matters
642 from the British Administration to the National Government,
727 perhaps the most complicated and difficult task of all, was
652 hampered not only by the abnormal conditions resulting from the Insurrection, but also by the inheritance of a tangled web of financial transaction between the Military and the Civil authorities of the previous regime. This legacy conspired to unsettle the Ministry's operations even after the Cairo Conference, in March, 1921, at which the Finance Minister, Sasūn Effendi, himself taking part, had presumably settled the issues at stake among the various British authorities.[2]

An outstanding difficulty also lay in the fact that all matters pertaining to Finance were not placed under the supervision of the Ministry. This non-centralization of authority may have been due to the desire to establish checks on possible unsound administration. It is more probable that it came about as the result of the inherited British system which in this case had been taken over without great alteration. Following the system in vogue in India, the Civil Administration had introduced two secretariats, those of Revenue and of Finance, and eventually a third, that of Commerce, to deal with financial matters.[3] Upon the establishment of the provisional Government, the duties of the Finance Secretary were vested in the Minister of

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[1] Royal *'Irâda* for formation of a Court of Cassation, December 24th, 1925: *Compilation of Laws and Regulations from 1st January*, 1925, *to 31st December*, 1925 (Baghdad, 1926), p. 36.

[2] For résumé of financial arrangements reached at the Cairo Conference and their effect on 'Iraq finances, see *Note on the Administration of the Public Finances of 'Iraq, 1st April, to November*, 1924 (Baghdad, 1925), pp. 11-18.

[3] For the manifold duties of the Revenue Department, see *supra*, p. 119. The Finance Department had dealt with all expenditure, currency and resource matters, Budget estimates, accounts and audits. The Secretary for Commerce had been also Chief Collector of Customs until the abolition of the Secretaryship, August, 1920, brought Customs under the Finance Department. See *Note on Organization of Civil Admin. of Meso.*, April, 1920.

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Finance, but those of the Revenue Secretary were absorbed by 175
the Minister of Interior, and those of the Commerce Secretary 642
by the Minister of Commerce.[1] Not until March, 1931, did 727
Excise pass to the Ministry of Finance, and not until October, 652
1921, following the decision of the Council of State, September 28th, did land revenue, *koda* and other financial duties of the Ministry of Interior come under the control of the Minister of Finance. The result was that while the initial organization approximated that of the original Finance Department, the progressive absorption of additional duties, with the attendant periodic reorganization, produced considerable confusion particularly in the *Liwās*.

In addition to the difficulties of reorganization, the major problem of the Finance Minister was economy, all the more urgent in the face of the unconsidered enthusiasm of some of the Council members, who were ready to remake 'Iraq in the twinkling of an eye. The Ministry had to face a serious loss of revenue attendant on the Insurrection as well as on the fall of prices. The destruction of crops and of gardens and the inability to enforce payments in certain areas, as in the Muntafiq,[2] resulted in a deficit of 61 lacs of rupees of revenue from agricultural sources alone, while the almost complete stoppage of commercial traffic on the railways, together with the damage to its equipment, produced a deficit of nearly 55 lacs in the Railway Accounts.[3] The cost, however, of reorganization and the enforced assumption of the costly programmes already initiated under the policy of the Civil Administration,[4] much of which was a 'fruitless burden upon the revenue,[5] largely negatived the expected saving for the year 1920-1. Expenditures, in fact, exceeded receipts by 183 lacs, although a

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[1] See Table IV.

[2] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, pp. 16-18, App. E, F; ibid., Report of Gharrāf Area, pp. 46-8; ibid., Report of Sūq ash-Shuyūkh District, pp. 57-8, App. A.

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 24.

[4] *Supra*, Ch. vii.

[5] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 22.

175* surplus of 5 lacs was reported when items properly charge-
642* able to the two regimes existing in the financial year had been
727* 652 taken into consideration.[1]

The future was not brightened by the necessity of providing immediately for defence and for the maintenance of order, on a scale larger than anticipated at first, due to the unexpectedly rapid withdrawal of British troops. Defence forces in 1921-2, exclusive of Levies, the cost of which was assumed by H.M. Government, were to cost Rs. 127,09,455,[2] whereas in the previous year they had cost Rs. 88,50,000 inclusive of Levies.[3]

175* Although Defence Forces for the time being took the form of
642* Levies and Police, the Council had provided, on January 6th,
727* 1921, the nucleus of an 'Iraq General Staff, with Major J. I.
701 Eadie as temporary Adviser until the arrival of Col. P. C.
Joyce in April. The creation of a national army was stimulated by the necessity of absorbing as far as possible, the large and articulate group of unemployed and discontented ex-officers from the Turkish army. The problem was further aggravated by the acute jealousy between the ex-Sharifian and ex-Turkish officers. Many of the latter would take no office and publicly predicted the early return of the Turks.

The entire question of the development of the defence forces, together with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq were among the principal questions brought before the Cairo Conference in March, 1921.

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 23.

[2] *Budget of 'Iraq Government*, 1921-1922 (Baghdad, 1921), Ch. viA, viB, vii, pp. 10, 12.

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

647 As a result, officials, even those nominally responsible, have tended to become mere head clerks in their own departments, while Ministers have found themselves overburdened with work. The British Advisers, especially before October, 1932, were able to assist in reducing the burden of the Ministers but elsewhere the administration was retarded in pace and was lowered in quality.

[563] Among officials belonging to minority communities, as the Jews and Christians, the lack of security and the desire to avoid responsibility has been doubly apparent as the result of widespread opposition to the employment of any but 'Iraqis professing Islam. This opposition was evinced as early as 1921, when Jews and Christians were included in the outcry against the employment of foreigners. Although members of these communities have been employed especially in posts attached to the Financial and Technical departments and have even occupied Ministerial positions,[1] the tendency seems to have been to retard their advancement, as evinced in June, 1936, when promotions of Jewish employees as made by the Director of the 'Iraq Government Railway were cancelled by order of the Minister,[2] or to eliminate them as far as possible from Government service, a trend which has been more apparent in recent years.

Finance

652 In the development of 'Iraq's financial system from 1925, three major problems presented themselves: the reorganization of the land-revenue system including its purification from abuses and the development of land-settlement, the equalization of the

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[1] Sasūn Effendi Haskail, a Jew, and Yūsuf Ghanima, a Christian, served repeatedly as Ministers of Finance.

[2] So vehement was the outcry in the vernacular press over the promotion of the Jewish employees that not only were the promotions cancelled, but disciplinary action had to be taken by the Bureau of Press and Propaganda and an order issued that no promotions should be made without prior sanction of the Minister. See *Great Britain and the East*, July 2nd, 16th, 1936.

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incidence of taxation, and the provision of financial means, not only for the Government's essential services but also for the discharge of the obligations laid on it by the various treaties and by the Financial Agreements.

Judged by its ability to meet this last problem, the financial history of the 'Iraq Government may be regarded as comparatively successful. Budget deficits occurred as in 1921 and 1922 and in the years from 1929 to 1931,[1] but the financial crises, including that of 1930-1 were safely weathered without resort to foreign loans. The accumulated deficits were reduced by the conversion of oil revenue, of which the first instalment was received in August, 1931,[2] from the Capital Development Works Scheme to which they had been originally assigned. In addition, the 'Iraq Government's share of the Ottoman Public Debt,[3] set at a nominal total of L.T.8,358,126,[4] was practically extinguished by an agreement, October, 1928, by which Ottoman Debt securities to the value of £1,228,000 sterling were

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[1] Summary of financial results, 1921-2 to 1931-2, in lacs of rupees:

	Expenditure	*Revenue*	*Deficit*	*Surplus*
1921–22	572·13	528·25	43·88	—
1922–23	485·82	474·67	11·15	—
1923–24	242·26	509·41	—	85·15
1924–25	464·85	527·33	—	62·48
1925–26	513·38	581·02	—	67·64
1926–27	536·72	567·00	—	30·28
1927–28	569·93	590·97	—	21·04
1928–29	599·93	594·44	4·57	—
1929–30	576·66	574·61	2·05	—
1930–31	464·57	511·58	47·01	—
1931–32	481·74	509·19	17·45	—
	63,88·47	60,68·47	126·11	266·59
		Net Surplus	140·48	

[2] The 'Iraq Petroleum Company's payments to the 'Iraq Government amounted to £866,814 in 1931-32, and to £524,397 in 1932-33. In 1932-33, the British Oil Development Company's payments amounted to £140,000. Cf. Empson, C.: *Economic Conditions in 'Iraq* (Dept. of Overseas Trade, No. 559, 1933).

[3] 'Iraq accepted the obligation by the Financial Agreement, Article XVII.

[4] This sum was set by the Ottoman Public Debt Commission in 1926, under the authority of Article 49 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

652 handed over to the Debt Commission. The balance of £383,009 sterling was to be spread over a period of seven years.

Examination of the method of balancing the budgets and of meeting the demands of the Ottoman Debt bondholders indicates, however, that the results have been secured by the wholesale reduction of salaries and by the reduction of appropriations to government services which vitally concern the regeneration of 'Iraq: Irrigation, Agriculture and Public Works. In 1923, salaries of 'Iraqī officials were reduced by amounts varying from 2½ to 25 per cent on the recommendation of the Economies Committee of 1922.[1] In March, 1926, following recommendations by Mr. Hilton Young,[2] additional reductions were made, while in November, 1930, following the financial crises arising from the fall in agricultural prices, salaries were further reduced by amounts varying from 5 to 8 per cent.[3] The result was that official salaries fell out of proportion to the cost of living; much dissatisfaction was produced, particularly since British officials under contract suffered no such reductions; and encouragement was given to the return to other methods of supplementing salaries which, prevalent under the Ottoman regime, had been severely discouraged by the British Advisers and Administrative Inspectors.

651 In the assessment and collection of land revenue, progress had been undoubtedly made by early Finance Ministers and their Advisers in removing some of the defects inherent in the Turkish system as adapted by Revenue Officers of the Civil Administration. Nevertheless, in 1925, the primary objectives before the 'Iraq Government were still those which had faced the Civil Administration in 1919.[4] These objectives were:

1. To organize the means of revenue collection, as, for example, the elimination of the tax-farmers, and to

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[1] *Report of the Economies Committee*, 1922 (Confidential), (Baghdad, 1922).

[2] *Report of Financial Commission*, 1925.

[3] Young, Sir E. Hilton, *Reports on Economic Conditions and Loan Policy* (Baghdad, 1930).

[4] *Supra*, Ch. vi.

433 as 60,000 people are engaged in industrial production (other than oil), virtually all of these are employed in small undertakings where the work is largely done by hand and productivity is accordingly quite low. Probably only about 2,000 are working in what might be characterized as modern industrial plants.

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382 Fortunately prospective increases in government revenues from oil now make it possible for the government to undertake a large-scale program for the development of the country. Past investments in the oil industry will in the future yield large dividends in the form of a rapidly increasing production of petroleum. [471] In accordance with an agreement reached in August 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq have undertaken to raise oil output, which amounted to only about six million tons in 1950, to 30 million tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraqi government half of the profits before the deduction of taxes. On this basis it is anticipated that, over the next five years, the government may receive net revenues amounting to as much as 214 million dinars from oil alone. Under the terms of a law passed in 1950 these revenues will be available to finance development. They will be assigned to the Development Board, an autonomous agency established in 1950 to ensure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs.

652 In the past, financial stringencies have severely limited public expenditures. The government has often had difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays had to be kept small; government salaries were not raised in accordance with the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds. In the future the situation will be reversed. The principal task will be to find ways and means of spending rapidly increasing revenues in a manner which will contribute most effectively to the permanent development of the country. It is with this task in view that the Mission has drawn up its recommendations.

180 Any program for realizing the economic potentialities of the country should be broad in conception and well balanced. Investment outlays in dams and irrigation works, transport facilities and industrial plants must be complemented by increased expenditures

452 probably amounted to only ID 2,300,000 of which about 70 percent represented urban mortgages. Of the latter the greater part probably consisted of mortgages on buildings other than houses. ●[652] At the beginning of 1950 a government Mortgage Bank began operations. Only ID 100,000 of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000 has, however, been paid in; and the Bank has had to supplement its resources by borrowing. Moreover, it can make loans only for a maximum of four years and up to ID 2,000. To facilitate an expansion of its operations, the Mission suggests that the Development Board provide funds sufficient to increase its actual capital to about ID 1,500,000 and that the Bank be authorized to extend the duration of its mortgages to at least 15 years where warranted.

344 The Mission has given no special attention to the need for public buildings for which the Development Board has budgeted ID 3,350,000 in its five-year program. Undoubtedly the construction of new buildings for the accommodation of government offices is in certain cases desirable, for existing government buildings are for the most part scattered, overcrowded, poorly lighted and equipped and therefore not conducive to working efficiency. As already indicated, the new railway building in Baghdad should provide some space for government offices.

Water and Electricity Supply

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365 With respect to community facilities, the most urgent tasks appear to be the installation of sewage systems for the major cities, and the provision of safe water supplies and electricity.

It is suggested that a start be made with a sewage system in Baghdad, since the rising level of the subsoil waters makes the need of this city most acute. A plan for such a system has already been prepared by consultants to the government. The initial step might be to carry it out for that portion of the city on the east bank of the Tigris. It would be useless, however, to proceed unless there is a determination to make connections with the system compulsory for all property owners who are supplied with municipal water.

A safe water supply is, as was pointed out earlier, one of the keys to the health problem. While a number of cities and towns now have a reasonably safe water supply, the situation in the great

654* 457 part of their income in this form and there will be some net gain of foreign exchange by the National Bank.

The effect of the development program on the economy as a whole, however, has to be borne in mind. A general rise in the level of prices and wages will tend to increase consumption at the expense of savings. At the same time, there will be considerable incentive to make more investment outside the development program than in the past. Thus, quite apart from the effect of the program itself, there will be some pressure to expand imports. Whether this pressure could be sufficiently strong to cause an expansion of imports by more than the amount of foreign exchange used to finance the development program is uncertain, but the possibility exists. It will be important, therefore, to avoid any further pressure on the payments position by an excessive expansion of credit to business or by financing a large budget deficit through bank credit.

654* 652 As long as ordinary government expenditures not immediately related to development are kept down and tax income maintained, there should be no serious danger of ordinary budget deficits. In fact, as national income rises as a result of increased development expenditures, ordinary revenues will probably rise more rapidly than ordinary expenditure. The government, however, will have to incur some expenditures which were, in the past, covered by income accruing from oil. Now that this income has been earmarked for the purposes of development, the deficiency has to be made up from ordinary revenue. It may, therefore, be necessary in the first few years for the government to borrow from the Development Board a part of the funds accruing to them, repayment being made when ordinary revenues begin to rise substantially. This should not interfere unduly with development, as the pace of actual expenditure on development is likely to be slow initially.

Measures to curb credit expansion may prove more difficult as long as the banks are extraordinarily liquid. Statutory reserve requirements would have to be greatly increased to permit effective credit controls. The private banks, most of which are foreign-owned, have, in the past, however, concentrated almost exclusively on the financing of trade, particularly foreign trade. Even if increased opportunities arise in the future, they may show little dis-

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position to finance investment expenditures. The National Bank should operate essentially as a banker for the commercial banks and therefore should not finance long-term investment. To discourage credit expansion on the basis of the larger foreign income which will accrue from oil, the Mission suggests that, instead of selling sterling receipts to the National Bank, the government segregate them in a special account in London apart from the country's regular foreign exchange reserves until such time as they are spent abroad or the dinar equivalent is spent in Iraq.

Tax Reform

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Total tax revenues will probably not need to be increased provided any temporary ordinary budget deficit can be met by short-term borrowing of idle funds at the disposal of the Development Board. The only exception might be taxation to pay part of the cost of raising government salaries. On the other hand, some revision in the tax structure to provide a more equitable apportionment of the burden would be desirable. In common with many other underdeveloped countries Iraq relies strongly on indirect taxes which bear heavily on consumers without taking into account capacity to pay. Thus in the last three fiscal years indirect taxes contributed about 82 percent of all tax receipts and 71.5 percent of all budget income, while direct taxes accounted for only 18 percent of all tax revenues and 13 percent of total government receipts. While drastic changes in the tax structure may not be feasible, some decrease in the burden of indirect taxes appears desirable. There might well be a reduction in import duties on some essential goods such as sugar and cheap cotton and rayon textiles, offset, perhaps, by an excise tax on luxuries. Likewise it may be desirable to decrease and gradually abolish, except in its application to exports, the so-called *istihlak* tax which is levied on produce brought to market and at a rate varying in recent years between 10 and 12½ percent of approximate market prices. Except for the partial incidence of this tax, agriculture in Iraq is hardly taxed at all. The income tax which bears very heavily on the salaried classes, whose income is already comparatively low, does not apply to income from either agricultural land or urban property. Agricultural land in private hands has not been taxed since 1936 when a land and water

491 494 centers such as Amara and Kut are linked neither by rail nor by all-weather roads to Basra and Baghdad.

504 497 In Basra, Iraq possesses an excellent port capable of handling a considerable increase in traffic. Upcountry cargo into and out of the port is handled almost wholly by railway, for inland river traffic has declined greatly in importance owing to shallow water and other impediments to navigation.

The port and the railways are each run by an autonomous administration operating under a separate budget.

VII. Money and Banking

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The banking system consists of the National Bank, five commercial banks, a number of private banks or *sarrafs,* the post office savings bank, and three state-owned longer-term financing institutions, the Industrial Bank, the Agricultural Bank and the Mortgage Bank.

● 452 453 The National Bank succeeded the Iraq Currency Board as the currency-issuing authority in 1949. Iraq is a member of the sterling area, so that its currency is backed principally by sterling assets in London. Although the law permits the currency to be backed up to 30 percent by Iraqi government securities, as of March 31, 1951, the total amount of currency in circulation was more than covered by sterling assets. Aside from its note-issuing function, the Bank is charged with the administration of foreign exchange control and the supervision of the banking system in accordance with a bank control law which became effective at the beginning of 1950. This law requires banks to keep the equivalent of 15 percent of their time and demand deposits as a reserve with the National Bank and to keep 50 percent of these deposits in the form of cash and investments in Iraq. The National Bank is empowered to reduce the reserve requirement to 10 percent and to vary the second between 30 and 70 percent. Since the commercial banks have had no need for recourse to the National Bank in order to replenish their cash resources, the Bank's loans and advances have remained very small. As of March 31, 1951, they

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stood at only ID 650,000, consisting almost wholly of advances to 452
the Baghdad Water Board and the Industrial, Agricultural and 453
Mortgage Banks. Almost all of the remaining assets of the Banking Department consist of Iraqi government securities valued at ID 5,490,000.[3]

There are five commercial banks in Iraq, of which three are 453
foreign banks. Of the two Iraqi banks, one, the Rafidain Bank, was organized and is controlled by the government and serves as the depository of government funds. These banks confine themselves principally to the short-term financing of foreign and domestic trade and have always kept themselves very liquid. Thus, as of March 31, 1951, their total liquid assets, including notes and coin, current accounts abroad, discounts and davances, but excluding the statutory 15 percent reserve maintained with the National Bank, amounted to about 87 percent of their current and short-term liabilities, and even 70 percent when advances which are primarily short-term are kept out of account.[4] The operations of the commercial banks are supplemented by the *sarrafs* which are principally engaged in financing small traders. Their number has been drastically reduced in the last year or two, owing partly to the exodus of the Jews and partly to their failure to meet the requirements of the bank control law that they submit their accounts and divorce their banking and trading operations.

The total foreign exchange assets of the banking system are 457
quite considerable. As of March 31, 1951, they amounted to about 453
ID 50,400,000. Total holdings tend to fluctuate primarily because of the influence of harvests upon exports. Thus a harvest failure in 1947, followed by another bad harvest in 1948, as well as the effect of the outbreak of war with Israel in 1948, were instrumental in reducing holdings from ID 64,900,000 at the end of 1946 to ID 43,400,000 in September 1949. As the result of two successive good harvests, reserves then rose in the ensuing year and a half by ID 7,100,000.

Part of Iraq's sterling assets have been frozen since the war, releases being governed by a five-year agreement effec-

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[3] See statement of the National Bank's assets and liabilities in Table II in Appendix.

[4] For a consolidated statement of the principal assets and liabilities of the commercial banks, see Table III in Appendix.

654 for subsequent programming. Expenditures for the five-year period
185 were allocated by broad fields as follows (in dinars):[5]

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Water storage and irrigation schemes	30,044,000
Roads	15,826,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	12,618,000
Miscellaneous projects	6,216,000
Administrative expenditures	970,000
Unprogrammed reserve	29,401,000

Because of the brief time devoted to its preparation, this program will necessarily undergo modification as more detailed study is given to requirements and the cost of individual projects and as some of the over-all allocations are programmed in detail.

652 The magnitude of this projected outlay is in startling contrast to the financial stringency which has characterized public expenditures in the past. The government has had great difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays were pared; government salaries were not increased despite the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds.

Government Budgets

The trend of government finances is indicated in Table 16.

It will be noted that, despite economies and tax increases, the government's total budget showed substantial deficit in 1948-49 and 1949-50, primarily because of the bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 and the effects of the war with Israel. Of the government's principal autonomous enterprises, the railways also ran considerable deficits on capital account which were defrayed only by using reserve funds, by borrowing ID 1,000,000 from the government and contracting a loan of ID 3,000,000 through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The Iraqi government borrowed at home to meet its own needs, its domestic debt rising from ID 4,500,000 on March 31, 1948, to ID 10,800,000 on March 31, 1951. Borrowing had to be limited, however, because the market for government securities was virtually restricted to the banking system. As of March 31, 1951, the National Bank and the commercial banks held ID 9,200,000 of the domestic debt.

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[5] For a more detailed breakdown, see Table V in Appendix.

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TABLE 16

BUDGETS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES

(in millions of dinars)

	1947-48	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51 (provisional)	1951-52[1] (estimate)
GOVERNMENT BUDGET					
Ordinary					
Revenues	21.2	21.2	23.8	26.1	28.2
Expenditures	23.0	28.1	26.6	25.9	29.1[2]
Balance	−1.8	−6.9	−2.8	+0.2	−0.9
Capital					
Revenues	4.8	2.5	3.8	5.1	—
Expenditures	3.6	3.9	3.4	3.8	—
Balance	+1.2	−1.4	+0.4	+1.3	—
Total					
Revenues	26.0	23.7	27.6	31.2	28.2
Expenditures	26.6	32.0	30.0	29.7	29.1
Balance	−0.6	−8.3	−2.4	+1.5	−0.9
RAILWAYS BUDGET					
Revenues	3.8	3.6	4.0	4.0	4.2
Expenditures, (including capital)	5.3	6.4	4.8	4.3	5.2
Balance	−1.5	−2.8	−0.8	−0.3	−1.0
PORT AND FAO BAR BUDGETS					
Revenues	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.5
Expenditures, (including capital)	2.1	2.4	2.4	3.2	4.1
Balance	+0.2	+0.2	+0.2	−0.8	−1.6

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[1] With the establishment of the Development Board the latter's budget has replaced the government's regular capital budget. In its 1951-52 budget, however, the government has still incorporated income from oil produced in the first quarter of the calendar year 1951 and is planning to devote this revenue to a number of projects including a government spinning and weaving mill (ID 1,000,000), a small-loans bank (ID 250,000), establishment of a National Insurance Company (ID 50,000), army buildings and equipment (ID 464,000), and the initial cost of an oil refinery (ID 250,000).

[2] Since the original approval of the budget the government has apparently issued three ordinances raising total authorised expenditures by about ID 2.7 million.

TABLE 17

GOVERNMENT DEBT

(in millions of dinars as of March 31)

	1948	1949	1950	1951
Domestic debt				
Treasury bills	1.5	4.6	4.3	4.8
Bonds	3.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Total	4.5	10.6	10.3	10.8
Foreign debt	—	—	—	3.0*
Grand Total	4.5	10.6	10.3	13.8

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* Contracted on behalf of the railways.

Features of Government Expenditures

Certain characteristic features of government expenditures in recent years are set forth in Table 18. Outlays on defense and police have absorbed well over one third of the total budget. On the other hand, expenditures on agriculture and irrigation which are of critical importance to the economy have been very small and in 1949-50 were even further reduced so that they represented only

TABLE 18

SOME GOVERNMENT OUTLAYS BY TYPE

(in millions of dinars)

	1948-49		1949-50		1950-51 (est.)	
	Amount	Percentage of total budget	Amount	Percentage of total budget	Amount	Percentage of total budget
Defense and police	11.4	35.6	11.1	37.0	10.9	36.7
Agriculture and irrigation	2.5	7.8	1.6	5.3	1.6	5.4
Education	2.6	8.1	2.6	8.7	3.8	12.8
Health and other social services	2.0	6.2	1.7	5.7	2.4	8.1
Public Works and housing*	1.8	5.7	1.2	4.0	2.0	6.8

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* Includes expenditures of Public Works Department in the ordinary budget and expenditures on public works, including communications, but excluding irrigation, in the capital budget.

652 a little over five percent of the total. Expenditures on education, health and other social services, although still very inadequate, rose slightly so that they absorbed almost 21 percent of the total budget in 1951. Capital outlays have been extremely modest. Total new government investment outlays for civilian purposes have averaged only ID 2,700,000 annually in the period 1948-49 to 1950-51. Expenditures on public works and housing, excluding irrigation, absorbed on the average less than six percent of total government outlays in this period.

631 652 Economies have also been effected in recent years at the expense of the municipal and provincial administrations. By law, these were supposed to have assigned to them, in equal shares, the proceeds of the property and petrol taxes less the expenses of collection incurred by the central government. Actually very little of these taxes has been turned over to the local and provincial governments. For example, in the three years 1947-48 to 1949-50 the provincial administrations received only ID 175,000 out of a total of ID 2,626,000 due to them. Municipalities were similarly handicapped. The ability of local governments to carry out improvements and even to maintain existing facilities was correspondingly curtailed.

Characteristic Features of Government Revenues

651 The fiscal system in the past has been characterized by (1) the high proportion of revenues derived from indirect taxation, (2) light taxation of agriculture, and (3) considerable tax evasion and poor tax collection.

Indirect taxation is generally predominant in all underdeveloped countries, and Iraq is no exception. In the three-year period 1948-49 to 1950-51 indirect taxes contributed about 82 percent of all tax income and 59 percent of total budget receipts. Customs duties and excises accounted during these years for 71.5 percent of total revenues from indirect taxes, while taxes on agricultural produce, fish, and livestock brought to market (the so-called *istihlak* and *koda* taxes) contributed most of the remainder. Direct taxes—the so-called land tax, the property tax and the income tax—accounted for only 18 percent of total tax revenues and 13 percent of all government receipts. Income and surtaxes

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TABLE II

MONTHLY STATEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF IRAQ

(in thousands of dinars)

End of Month	Consolidated Accounts of Issue and Banking Departments[1]									
	Liabilities					Assets				
	Capital & Reserves	Currency in Circulation	Current Accounts	Other Accounts	Total	Sterling	Silver	Iraq Securities	Advances[2]	Other
Oct. 1949	2,500	35,913	354	1,863	40,630	34,707	157	5,620	55	91
Dec. 1949	2,500	36,356	338	1,891	41,085	35,137	151	5,620	125	53
Mar. 1950	2,500	38,634	3,160	2,109	46,403	39,843	152	6,120	225	63
June 1950	2,500	39,282	3,930	1,871	47,583	40,859	155	6,160	353	56
Sept. 1950	2,500	37,813	4,617	2,520	47,450	40,278	161	6,160	798	53
Dec. 1950	2,500	39,096	4,877	2,685	49,159	41,885	155	6,160	910	50
Mar. 1951	2,942	40,566	3,345	1,863	48,717	41,700	154	6,160	650	53

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[1] This table omits the currency held by the Banking Department, which appears in its accounts as an asset and in the Issue Department's accounts as a liability.

[2] Includes advances made to the Industrial Bank, Mortgage Bank, Baghdad Water Board. As of July 1950 advance of 1949 government share of National Bank profits also included.

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Paper Mill

289 Iraq does not have a suitable source of material for a pulp plant at this time. The development of a paper making industry would therefore require the importation of pulp to meet its various requirements. This procedure would ordinarily be both practicable and economical; however, the world market for pulp is now very critical and may remain so for several years. It is recommended, therefore, that the paper mill be held in abeyance until an adequate supply of pulp is assured.

III. State Assistance to Industry

Financial Assistance

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433 The widespread reluctance of private capital to venture into industry can be overcome only gradually as the profitability of industrial investment is demonstrated in various fields. In the meantime, it will be necessary for the government to furnish most of the capital for industrial development.

Plants which will require a large amount of capital and will need completely foreign management at least in their beginning may have to be financed completely by the government through the Development Board. The oil refinery and the fertilizer plant are projects which fall into this category. Other more modest undertakings will require relatively small amounts of capital and in most cases may be economically operated by Iraqi management even though some foreign technicians may be necessary. This combination lends itself to the use of private capital, which should be encouraged as much as possible by the government, by means of financial assistance where justified.

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433 The Industrial Bank is now the principal agency for rendering financial assistance to the development of private industry. The Bank, which began operations in 1946, has already performed useful work in promoting industry. At the end of February 1951, it had outstanding loans totalling ID 238,650 and participations in industrial enterprises amounting to ID 629,272. It has been handicapped, however, by a shortage of funds, since the government has

paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000,000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests, therefore, that the Development Board gradually supply the funds necessary to increase the Bank's capital by ID 5,000,000. The Bank would be authorized to use this sum for making loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an over-all program approved by the Development Board. 652 433

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to create a reserve against possible losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

The Bank at present is understaffed. The directors pass on projects without the benefit of expert assistance, and, as a result, some phases of a project may be completely overlooked. With a shortage of staff, the transaction of business with the Bank is also time-consuming and thus discourages applicants.

The Mission recommends that, first, the Bank's staff be both increased and strengthened and, second, that it be reorganized to give greater responsibility to the head of the Industrial Schemes Section who should be a properly qualified man with broad industrial experience. Members of the Industrial Schemes Section should have thorough training and practical experience in power and mechanical engineering with special reference to industrial planning and layout, and in operations, management and control of industry with special reference to cost accounting.

Protection of Industry

The "Law for the Encouragement of Industry" enacted in 1929 was replaced by new legislation in 1950 which grants limited exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions 654 433 651

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757 also frequent causes for hospitalization. In 1949 there were 5,876, 336 visits ~~to health institutions~~ for treatment.

Public Health Budget

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● 662
164 In 1951-52, ID 2,089,180 (7.6 percent of the total budget) were allocated to health services, as compared to ID 187,672 in 1931. Because of the prevalence of endemic diseases and the constant danger of epidemics, it would not be unreasonable to spend 10 percent of the total budget on health services.

759 Salaries ~~for~~ personnel in the medical service appear to be low in relation to the cost of living, although they are not low compared to other civil service salaries. The basic salaries, exclusive of cost-of-living allowances, range from ID 5.15 a month for a dresser, to ID 25 for a doctor and ID 80 for a director-general.

Current Health Conditions

165 In spite of the undeniable progress in health conditions, there is need for further improvement. Definitive data are lacking on total birth and death rates, but some figures are available on the infant mortality rate, which is probably the best index of the social circumstances of an area. For Baghdad, the recorded rate in 1949 was 128 deaths per thousand births. Iraqi doctors who have worked in different parts of the country consider the rate to be about 250 per thousand, on the average, compared with about 34 deaths per thousand live births in highly developed countries.

164 Among the people as a whole, malaria seems to be the chief killer, especially in country districts. In the main cities the leading causes of deaths were intestinal diseases, tuberculosis and respiratory diseases. These diseases and trachoma seriously affect the ability of men and women to work efficiently and are among the major causes of low productivity of labor in Iraq. For example, candidates for the police service are frequently rejected because of defective eyesight and what is characterized as "poor physique" associated with chronic malaria, schistosomiasis, etc. About 20 percent of the young men liable for military service are found to be unfit.

Heart trouble, cancer and other organic disturbances are far outnumbered by diseases which are essentially social in origin. Most of them can be traced to lack of hygiene, poor sanitation and

362 laborers at government expense" which may be sold or leased to them in accordance with special regulations.

[652] Housing projects have been financed by allocation from the capital works budget prepared every year. The unspent balance from this allocation reverts to the general treasury. Likewise the rents paid by tenants and the fees collected for maintenance, sanitary services, water and electricity find they way back to the general treasury. The 1950-51 budget provides ID 75,000 for housing. The five-year program of the Development Board envisages an increase to ID 150,000 in 1951-52 and to ID 300,000 in each of the four succeeding years.

The Ministry's principal project is at Tel Mohamed, about seven kilometers from Baghdad, where 204 brick dwelling units had been constructed by the Ministry of Public Works in 1946 and a further 185 are now under construction. Twenty shops are also being built. Most of the houses have a bedroom, a living room, a kitchen, a water closet and one or two verandas, but 50 of the newer ones will have two bedrooms. Floor area ranges from 49 to 71 square meters and the cost from ID 268 to ID 323, excluding the cost of development and of land which is government-owned. Lots were 150 square meters for the older houses, but the newer ones are smaller.

Rentals for the first dwelling units in the Tel Mohamed Project used to be ID 2.0 a month, but this was reduced later to ID 1.5. The government supplied water and electricity at an additional charge of 500 fils a month. Based on the actual cost of construction of each unit (ID 305) a generous estimate of 20 years for the life of the structures, interest on capital investment at the rate of six percent per annum and a nominal sum of ID 10 annually for maintenance of grounds plus repairs and land rental, the economic rent for each such unit would be ID 3.0 a month—that is, if no vacancy and unforeseen circumstances occurred to reduce the income from the project. In other words, the government has to make a subsidy equal to the present rental of ID 1.5 per month, if it hopes to replace these houses at the end of their estimated life.

In addition to these units in Baghdad, the Ministry requested bids for 40 one- and two-bedroom units in Basra which it rejected because the prices were too high, mainly because bricks made in

874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

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217 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration, research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

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433 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the world's supply. Her general economic organization is nevertheless agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the
339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com-
342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

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● 652
[511] In 1950 a Development Board was established with the function of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing a general economic and financial plan for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of 185
the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 652
and is estimated at ID155,374,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining
projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken [654
account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank 648]
for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of an annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated 311
that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living [162]
directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported 241
products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 36 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

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[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1952).

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439 million in October 1947 to £43·2 million in December 1949 and £55·5 million in September 1952, and are still rising. In October 1950 the Sterling Balances Agreement was amended to the advantage of Iraq, and in July 1952 the sterling held in No. 2 Account, amounting to some £23 million, was freed from all restrictions.

Banking and Currency

652 Banks in Iraq may be classified as follows:

(1) *The National Bank of Iraq*, whose establishment was authorized in 1947 and completed in 1948. Its functions are laid down as: (*a*) to issue and administer the currency and undertake duties arising therefrom, (*b*) to undertake duties arising from international agreements, (*c*) to undertake duties relating to the control of banking and co-ordination of banking operations, (*d*) to undertake duties arising from the control of foreign exchange, (*e*) to keep the accounts of the Government, (*f*) to undertake transactions relating to Government and semi-Government loans.

(2) *Government Banks* for granting loans of special kinds, namely: Agricultural and Industrial Banks, for the encouragement of agriculture and industry, and separate banks for granting mortgages on movable and immovable property.

453 652 (3) *Commercial Banks* of which one, the Rafidain Bank, is governmental, and four are branches of foreign banks.

453 (4) *Sarrafs*—small local bankers who perform most of the functions of the commercial banks but are more rigidly restricted by law in the extent of their operations. Operating with less formality than the commercial banks, they are widely patronized by business men.

The withdrawal of the Jews from Iraq affected banking profoundly; two large commercial banks and most of the *sarrafs* closed down, with a consequent contraction in the supply of credit, so that rates of interest rose abnormally to the detriment of business. The trade in imported goods suffered particularly, since cash was not available for customs clearance. The problem was solved partly by increased domestic production, partly by the enforcement of a law for the control of banking, which compelled the commercial banks to increase their paid-up capital and reserves held in Iraq, reduce their investments abroad in favour of local investments, and increase the banking facilities afforded to businesses. In consequence commercial banks co-ordinated and expanded their activities, and the opportunities for profit encouraged new *sarrafs* to replace those who had withdrawn. A great deal of banking experience and

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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acumen has nevertheless been lost and although the situation has been partly restored, business is still less active than formerly. 453

Banking deposits in December of 1938, 1946, and subsequent years have been as follows (ID):

Year	*Current Accounts*	*Fixed Deposits*	*Savings Deposits*	*Total*
1938	1,231,130	614,928	387,447	2,233,505
1946	13,613,737	3,414,557	2,965,756	19,994,050
1947	12,543,308	2,799,008	2,719,224	18,061,541
1948	12,253,822	1,421,109*	2,302,416	15,977,347
1949	12,271,965	1,322,216	2,389,604	15,983,785
1950	12,994,226	795,361	1,980,305	15,769,892

* From 1948 onwards the fixed deposit item excludes previously included Government accounts.

(SOURCE: Reports of National Bank of Iraq, 1947–50, p. 32.)

Currency. The currency of Iraq is based on sterling and its unit, the Iraqi dinar (ID), is equivalent to £1 sterling and is divided into 1,000 fils (singular also 'fils'). This currency replaced in 1932 the Indian currency which had been maintained under the Mandate, and was issued and administered by an Iraq Currency Board, sitting in London, until 1 July 1949, when the National Bank of Iraq took over the functions of the Board and put its own notes into circulation. 436

The circulation of currency, which in August 1939 stood at ID4,700,000, increased during the war to ID42,100,000 in September 1946. It has since, with some fluctuation, declined and in October 1952 was ID36 million.

Public Finance

Immediately before the Second World War the total state revenues amounted to some 7–8 million dinars. During and after the war there was a steep rise in expenditure: in 1942–3 the expenditure had increased to ID11·6 million, in 1947–8 to ID26·6 million, and in 1948–9, the year of the Palestine conflict, to ID32 million, after which it has declined slightly. Loans were raised to meet the consequent deficit, which a considerable increase in taxes and duties were insufficient to prevent and which in 1948–9 had risen to ID5·3 million. A contributory factor was the closure of the Haifa oil pipeline in that year; but in 1949 and 1950 the construction of a new pipeline to Tripoli more than made up the loss. In 1950–1, with increased revenue and a drop in expenditure, the budget showed a surplus for the first time in seven years, amounting to ID5·4 million. The expansion of oil revenues has been maintained by 651 652

651 increased exportation, made possible by the construction of a
652 new and larger pipeline and by the equal profit-sharing terms of the 1952 oil agreement, retroactive from 1 January 1951. Oil revenues have consequently become the major factor in Iraq's finances: in 1952 they exceeded the total state income of any year prior to 1950, and by 1955 will be almost twice as great as in 1952.[1] By law 70 per cent of them are assigned for capital works to the Development Board whose budget is approved by Parliament independently of the Ordinary Budget;[2] the remaining 30 per cent of the oil revenues are assigned to the Ordinary Budget for the regular operational expenses of the state. Until recently the state income depended mainly on taxation—income tax, import and export duties, taxes on agricultural and animal products, property tax, excise duties on alcohol, salt, tobacco, and petroleum products, and various stamp duties, a successive increase in most of which, particularly the indirect taxes, has characterized financial legislation throughout. With the recent expansion of oil revenues, the Government has halted the steady increase in a number of these taxes and has in some cases reduced them or is considering their reduction. At the same time most foreign debts and advances, formerly an accepted aid to balancing the budget, have been liquidated, and domestic loans have become a means merely of reducing monetary circulation and avoiding the effect of inflated state expenditure on the general economic and financial position.

The rapid increase in revenue has further encouraged greater expenditure on health, social and educational services, and relief to officials in the form of further increases in salaries, allowances and pensions, free medical treatment and other privileges and facilities. There is in fact a possible choice in the disposal of the vastly augmented state income: whether to employ it for such immediately effective measures of welfare and alleviation, which are admittedly needed and would, if inflation were avoided, gain popularity for the Government, or to devote it mainly to major capital works, whose benefits, if longer in appearing, would be securely based on a co-ordinated natural economy and remain intact even if oil revenues were for any reasons diminished or interrupted or cut off completely. Official policy and enlightened public opinion are committed firmly to the latter course.

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[1] See above, p. 281.

[2] This replaces earlier legislation by which it was unsuccessfully attempted to maintain, in distinction from the Ordinary Budget, a Capital Works Budget, financed by oil royalties, oil companies' advances, Ordinary Budget surpluses, and the revenues of the Iraq Currency Board.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

(871 (212 Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

651 382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

647 654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

652 654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

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[33] *Economic Development of Iraq*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 63.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

The program is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. 652 654 There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a profound economic and social transformation, with far-reaching repercussions.

The International Bank concludes that the country will need no further foreign loans except possibly to meet part of the hard currency needs.[34] The oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling. However, under a new agreement, the United Kingdom has undertaken to furnish sufficient dollars against sterling to cover Iraq's essential needs.

The International Bank in 1950 already had loaned $12.8 million to Iraq, primarily for flood control, irrigation, and road construction. Apparently the Bank is willing to consider further loans, but the Iraqi are not interested as long as the oil revenues continue and they are able to get sterling converted into dollars.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A number of organizations are providing technical assistance to Iraq in its development program, notably the United States Point Four Program and 648 654 the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization.

Point Four began its program early in 1952 in such fields as cotton agronomy, farm machinery, agricultural extension and vocational education, irrigation, entomology, rural health, sanitation, and industrial development. About 25 Americans have been employed, and the number may be doubled by the end of the year. Most of the Point Four funds go for salaries; the costs of tools and materials are assumed by the local government. The specialists in Iraq obviously were chosen for their competence, practical experience, and their interest in the assignment. They are anxious to develop the most desirable means of approaching the problem.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has about 11 specialists regularly employed in the country in such fields as soils, cooperatives, bacteriology, veterinary science, nutrition, agricultural statistics, farm mechanization, and home economics. The program may be extended to cover agricultural research, extension, underground water and drainage, forestry, and fisheries.

The FAO operates almost entirely at the government level; Point Four seeks to go beyond government planning to the grass roots.

INDUSTRY

The people of Iraq, in common with their neighbors of the Middle East, live almost entirely by agriculture. About 80 per cent of the population earns 162 433 its living directly from the soil, and most of the others indirectly.[35] Industry is still relatively undeveloped. Apart from the oil industry, which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 people are employed in what are called modern industrial plants.

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

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initiative and financial assistance of the government.[36] 433

The government has been advised to encourage development of light industries: Cotton textiles, cottonseed oil crushing mills, jute mills, bone fertilizer plants, automobile tire factories, small steel mills, central machine shops, concrete block plants, possibly a paper mill, a chemical factory for making inorganic fertilizer, and possibly salt refineries. [652]

The Mission strongly urged the government not to attempt to own or operate these new factories itself, but to encourage private capital to do so.[37] This recommendation has been followed in the main. The Industrial Bank, created with funds derived from the oil royalties, has been financing private industry in a number of fields, particularly cotton textiles and cottonseed oil crushing and refining. The outstanding exception is the new petroleum refinery being built by the government. 135

OIL 382

Oil reserves in Iraq are thought to be tremendous—at least a third of the total Middle Eastern reserves, which are reckoned at 50 billion barrels, or



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—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

Capacity of the Kut Barrage on the Tigris River in Iraq is almost a quarter of a million cubic feet of water per second, which makes it the largest diversion dam of its kind in the world. The dam was built by British contractors for the Iraq Government in 1939. With oil revenues now pouring into the treasury Iraq plans to build several more large-scale irrigation facilities for storage and diversion. New projects are already in progress in the upper reaches of the Tigris River system.

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[36] Ibid., p. 33.

[37] Ibid., pp. 36-37.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East

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RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

654 242 At present the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and most of their time is said to be devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks.[49] A complete program in research and extension is needed. Such a program is being developed gradually now with the help of the various technical assistance agencies.

CREDIT

452 652 Production credit facilities are almost non-existent. An effort is being made, however, to increase the resources of the state-owned agricultural bank to provide adequate production credit and to establish storage facilities for crops. According to the United Nations' special reports, moneylenders' interest rates to farmers for crop production were 30 to 40 per cent before the government recently established the agricultural bank.

COTTON

248 Cotton has never been particularly important in Iraq, from the standpoint of either the acreage involved or the total production. Its potential, however, is great.

Table 33

IRAQ: Statistics on Cotton Production and Distribution Specified Years, 1920-1951

Year beginning August 1	Acreage	Yield per Acre	Production	Consumption	Exports	Imports
	Acres	Pounds	Bales			
Average 1920-24	NA	NA	808	NA	NA	NA
Average 1925-29	NA	NA	2,977	NA	NA	NA
Average 1930-34	3,751	159	1,240	NA	NA	NA
Average 1935-39	53,099	97	10,773	NA	NA	NA
Average 1940-44	73,000	62	9,409	NA	10,477	2,845
Average 1945-49	21,619	100	4,493	4,000	3,152	2,733
1950	100,000	183	38,121	7,000	31,000	0
1951	135,000	135	38,000	10,000	1,887[1]	

[1] Exports, August through November.

SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, and International Cotton Advisory Committee.

Before the war, production averaged only about 12,000 bales and slightly less in the postwar years through 1949. Higher prices throughout the world, together with the export controls imposed by the United States and the shortage of cotton, sent production to about 38,000 bales. It would have been three to four times as large on the basis of the planted acreage had it not been for heavy insect damage.

AREA

About two-thirds of the cotton is produced under irrigation in the vicinity of Baghdad and Kut on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. These two areas, together with three or four other smaller ones, account for about 88 per cent of production. Some 10 to 12 per cent is produced in Northern Iraq, mostly around Mosul, and about 2 per cent in Southern Iraq, from Basra north along the river.

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[49] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Mi Middle East
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to another are arranged, plans for new schools and classes are decided upon, 871ˣ
and proposals, policy matters, complaints, and criticisms are discussed.

Finally must be mentioned the newly founded Committee on Authorship, 814 Translation, and Publication, which is a self-perpetuating body of learned men forming a kind of academy. It may have a minimum of ten and a maximum of twenty members distributed among the various branches of learning. This committee endeavors to enrich the "Arabic Library" by translating important classics as well as modern books of science, technology, and general culture; to encourage original research and writing; to publish old Arabic manuscripts; and to standardize Arabic scientific terminology. The committee holds regular meetings to choose books to be translated or written, to select writers and translators, and to read and discuss the researches of members. It may give financial assistance to translators, authors, and publishers in the form of grants, purchase of copyrights, prizes, or any other manner considered advisable. It plans to establish contact with learned men and societies in Iraq and abroad, particularly throughout the Arabic world. Finally, it plans to publish its own bulletins and periodicals embodying the researches of its members.

Educational Finance

The Ministry of Education receives the third largest budgetary provision 871ˣ
of all the departments of the Iraqi government, being exceeded only by [658]
the army and the police. The public educational institutions of Iraq are 652●
entirely supported by the central government. The provincial authorities contribute nothing to the school fund, nor do the municipal authorities except for occasional assistance given to poor pupils. For specific purposes, such as aid to poor students or enlargement or repair of a school, contributions are occasionally solicited from private citizens of a locality, under the auspices of the administrative and educational authorities. The schools may give dramatic performances and exhibits to secure funds for special needs. Except for these minor and irregular sources, the central government pays the whole cost of public education.

The percentage of the general budget allotted to education has fluctuated from year to year. Starting with 2.3 percent in 1920–21, it reached a maximum of 12.9 percent in 1938–39, declined again in the following years to 7.8 percent in 1944–45, and showed a slight rise to 8.6 percent in 1945–46. In absolute figures, however, the sums allotted to the Ministry of Education have risen consistently (except for 1923–24) from 130,360 dinars ($521,440) in 1920–21 to 1,630,800 dinars ($6,523,200) in 1945–46. The decline in the percentage in recent years shows that

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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x871 the increase in allotments to education did not keep pace with the increase
●652 in the expenditure of the government as a whole.

Of the total of 1,630,800 dinars allotted for the year 1945–46, 7.5 percent was to be spent on the central and provincial administration, including inspection, and 0.45 percent on books for public libraries and the activities of the Committee on Authorship, Translation, and Publication. The remainder, 92 percent, was to be spent on teaching and the schools. Expenditure on each type of education (primary, secondary, vocational, and teacher training) is left to the discretion of the Ministry. Deans of the higher colleges control the expenditure of their own budgets.

x871 Expenditure is made according to the instructions of the Ministry of Finance. Within the limits of these instructions the Minister of Education can sanction expenditures up to 500 dinars ($2,000) on any single item, the Director General and the deans of the colleges up to 37.5 dinars ($150) and the provincial educational directors up to 15 dinars ($60). The principals of primary schools are allowed 300 fils ($1.20) and those of secondary schools 1.5 dinars ($6.00) for miscellaneous expenses each month. Beyond these sums, school principals have no authority to spend except by permission of the provincial director of education or of the Director General. Consequently, a great deal of correspondence goes on between the schools and the administration asking for money for anything that cannot be covered by the miscellaneous expenditure fund. School equipment, books for libraries, furniture, stationery, all come from the central or provincial education authority, and no principal is allowed to spend money on these items. A few principals have attempted to expand their school libraries by soliciting contributions from students using the libraries, but most of the schools resign themselves to the meager collection of books provided by the Ministry.

Educational Legislation

x871 In general, education in Iraq is governed by the provisions of the Public Education Law of 1940. The law defines the functions of the Ministry of Education as the founding and maintenance of government schools of all types and levels; the supervision of private and foreign schools to direct them toward the general goals of the government schools; the organization of youth, particularly through military training, scouting, and physical education; and finally, the fostering of scientific and literary movements, the spread of general culture, and the liquidation of illiteracy. The law classifies the schools into primary, secondary, and higher institutions; according to purpose into schools of general culture and professional or

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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Art. 89 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The procedure in the 642
Special Courts and the fees to be collected therein and the manner of 692
appeal against, or revision of, the judgments thereof, shall be prescribed by law.

PART VI

FINANCIAL MATTERS

Art. 90. All taxes and excise dues shall remain unaltered as from 642
the coming into force of this law, until changed by law. 652

Art. 91 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Taxes and dues shall not be imposed except by law, provided that this shall not apply to charges collected by Government Departments in return for public services rendered by them or in return for the enjoyment of State property. Taxes and duties may not be imposed by ordinance.

Art. 92 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Taxes and dues must be collected from the tax payers without distinction and none of them shall be exempted therefrom except by law.

Art. 93. No property of the State may be sold, granted, leased or otherwise disposed of except in accordance with law.

Art. 94. No monopoly or concession shall be granted for dealing with or using any of the natural resources of the land, or for any public service, nor shall the State revenues be farmed out, except in accordance with law, provided that, where the period relating to them exceeds three years, they must in each case be the subject of a special law.

Art. 95. The Government may not contract any loan, nor undertake anything involving payment out of public monies, except in accordance with a special law, unless the Budget Law makes provision therefor.

Art. 96. All monies received by Government officials must be paid into the State Treasury and accounted for in accordance with such procedure as is prescribed by law.

Art. 97. No salary may be allotted, nor remuneration paid, nor any monies belonging to the State Treasury expended for any reason whatsoever, except in accordance with law. No item in the budget estimates shall be expended except in such manner as is prescribed by law.

Art. 98. The budget estimates shall be sanctioned by an annual

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
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642 law known as the "Budget Law." The Budget Law must contain
652 an estimate of the income and expenditure for the year in question.

Art. 99. Parliament must approve the budget in the session preceding the commencement of the financial year to which the law in question relates.

Art. 100. The Minister of Finance must in the first place submit to the Chamber of Deputies all draft laws for the appropriation of monies or for increasing, decreasing or cancelling the approved budget estimates. Similarly, the Budget Law and all draft laws relating to loans to be contracted by the Government must be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 101. The debate on the Budget Law and voting thereon shall take place article by article separately. It shall then be voted upon as a whole. The budget shall be voted upon vote by vote.[1]

Art. 102. Should it be found necessary to expend sums of money urgently while Parliament is not sitting, the expenditure of which has not been sanctioned by the budget or by a special law, the King may, with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers, issue royal ordinances directing that financial measures shall be taken as provided by paragraph 3 of Article 26.

Art. 103. Parliament may pass a law for the appropriation of specified sums of money, to be expended over a period of years.

Art. 104. A law shall be passed providing for the setting up of a Department for the purpose of examining all expenditure and for the drawing up of a report for presentation to Parliament, at least once in each year, as to whether such expenditure is in conformity with the appropriations as approved by Parliament and has been expended in accordance with the procedure laid down by law.

Art. 105. No draft law may be introduced, nor any proposal put forward in either Assembly, involving the expenditure of any portion of the public revenues, except by a Minister.

Art. 106. The Chamber of Deputies may not make any decision, nor propose any amendment to a draft law, involving the reduction

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[1] The debate on the budget may take place in respect of every item of expenditure, but it is each head of expenditure (chapter of the Budget Law) which when it comes to vote is taken as a unit (for instance, vote for health service, vote for police, vote for education, etc.) Information through the courtesy of Professor M. F. Abcarius, Beirut.—ED.

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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of expenditure arising out of treaties approved by Parliament, or 642
the Constituent Assembly, unless approved by the King. 652

Art. 107. Should the new financial year have begun before the promulgation of the Budget Law relating thereto, and should Parliament have assembled, the Minister of Finance shall submit a draft law containing provisional budget estimates for a period not exceeding two months. On the expiration of the period covered by such estimates, the Minister of Finance may submit a fresh draft law of a similar nature. This procedure may be repeated on such occasions as may be necessary. Should Parliament not be sitting, the budget of the preceding year shall be followed without prejudice to the right of issuing the ordinances referred to in Article 102.

Art. 108 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. The coinage of the State shall be determined by law.

PART VII

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROVINCES

Art. 109. The administrative districts of Iraq, their classes, names, 642
manner of institution, the powers of the officials and their titles shall 635
be prescribed by a special law.

Art. 110. The law referred to in the preceding article shall provide that steps shall be taken in certain of the administrative divisions to ensure the performance of any obligations relating thereto, arising out of treaties concluded by the King and approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly.

Art. 111. Municipal affairs in Iraq shall be administered by means of Municipal Councils in accordance with a special law. In the administrative divisions, Administrative Councils shall perform such duties as may be prescribed for them by law.

Art. 112. Each Community shall have the right of establishing Councils in important administrative districts, competent to administer buildings and properties dedicated to waqfs (pious foundations) and bequests for charitable purposes. They shall be competent to deal with the collection of income derived therefrom, and the expenditure thereof, in accordance with the wishes of the donor or with the custom in use among the Community. Such Communities shall also undertake the supervision of the property of orphans in accord-

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
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industrial and handicraft production, but most of those were 433
employed in small undertakings, with only about 2,000 working in what might be classified as modern industrial plants.[14] The United Nations reported in 1951 that industry continued to play a very minor part in the Iraqi economy and that the gross output was estimated at not more than ID 3,000,000.[15]

The general industrial and economic situation could perhaps 382
be gauged by the consumption of oil and oil products, especially since the country had these supplies in such abundance. In 1929, internal oil consumption, including refinery needs, was 70,000 metric tons; in 1937 it had risen to 132,000 tons, but in 1950 it was only 929,000 tons. Excluding refinery needs, consumption in 1937 was only 88,000 tons; in 1949, 518,000; in 1950, 619,000; in 1951, 635,000; and in 1952, 690,000.[16]

The level of civic responsibility and national consciousness 651
is illustrated by the taxpaying practices of the Iraqis. The first 652
income tax law was enacted in 1927, but not before considerable modifications had been made and a long time had elapsed did the Government begin to receive any substantial revenue. The following table shows the annual revenue from income tax, the total revenue, and the percentage of income taxes in the total revenue:

Table IV. *Iraq, Percentage of Income Tax in Total Revenue*

Year	*Income Tax (in I. D.)*	*Total Revenue (in I. D.)*	*Percentage*
1943	1,016,082	18,810,000	5.4
1944	1,293,089	20,700,000	6.2
1945	1,149,394	20,790,000	5.5
1946	1,032,054	25,520,000	4.0
1947	1,081,379	23,510,000	4.6
1950	2,354,000	31,579,000	7.5[17]

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[14] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 2, 129. Another estimate gives the total number of industrial workers in 1950 as not more than 72,000, including those employed in the oil industry. "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.

[15] United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1951-52* (New York, 1953), 43. Henceforth cited U. N., *Review 1951-52*.

[16] U.N., *Review 1951-52*, 62; U. N., *Summary 1952-53*, 57; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd., *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year ending 31st December 1952*, 20;—*Annual 1953*, 19.

[17] Great Britain, *Iraq*, 22; U.N., *Review 1949-50*, 78; *Annual Report of the National Bank of Iraq, July 1949-December 1950*, 53.

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Table VI. *Iraq Royalty Payments*[35]

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[652]

Year	*Payments (in I.D.)*	*Per cent of Revenue (from all sources)*
1927/28—1933/34 (average)	644,691	—
1934/35	1,019,304	14.1
1935/36	598,202	20.2
1936/37	599,968	9.9
1937/38	730,731	10.5
1938/39	1,977,458	25.2
1939/40	2,014,088	21.9
1940/41	1,575,915	16.0
1941/42	1,463,370	14.4
1942/43	1,463,371	10.6
1943/44	1,794,245	9.9
1944/45	2,132,405	11.3
1945/46	2,315,599	11.4
1946/47	2,326,968	9.3
1947/48	2,346,280	9.3
1948	2,012,000	9.0
1949	4,388,000	12.5
1950	5,285,000	16.6

rest of its concession; later, however, this was converted to a per ton basis. This arrangement made the Iraqis constantly demand increased production so that their income would be larger; they argued that the Company was not exploiting all the oil-bearing possibilities and was even pursuing a policy of limited production. In view of changed world conditions following World War II, the Company was willing to increase the per ton royalty and to increase production with the new,

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[35] Both the amounts and the percentages are official figures of the Government of Iraq; the years 1927/28—47/48 are from the Government of Iraq, Ministry of Economics, Principal Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944-1945, 1946, 1947,* and *1948;* the years 1948-1950 are from Directorate of Statistics and Research, National Bank of Iraq, *The Annual Report of the National Bank of Iraq* (Bagdad, 1951), 52. There are a number of discrepancies between the amounts, particularly in the percentages as given in the different *Abstracts,* and between the *Abstracts* and the *Bank Report;* moreover, there are also differences between these figures and unofficial figures, such as those in *The Statesman's Year-Book* for the years covered and other sources. However, the general picture both as to the amounts received by the Government and the percentage in the annual income—an average of 13.5 per cent over the entire period—is basically correct and shows graphically the role of oil royalties in the economy of the country. See also U. N., *Review 1949-50,* 63; U. N., *Public Finance Iraq,* 21, 41.

Chapter 4

IRAQ

Developments to the End of the Second World War

433 At the end of the First World War, when Iraq was constituted as a State,
312 very little had been done to develop its economy. An over-all irrigation
programme had been drawn up, and the Hindiyah barrage had been built on the
315 Euphrates and work begun on the Habbaniyah escape channel, but the outbreak of
war had interrupted progress. The war had also prevented the exploitation of oil
deposits by the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1914. In the nineteen
twenties, development was started. The digging of canals, the building of minor
[496] works and the installation of irrigation pumps resulted in a substantial increase
in cultivation, and there was also a slight improvement in farming methods.
Railways were extended and other means of transport improved.

436 Further steps were taken in the nineteen thirties. In 1932, instead of the
312 rupee, the Iraqi dinar became the unit of currency. The Kut barrage, on the
Tigris, and various canals, regulator dams and minor projects were completed.
433 The establishment of a few cotton gins, textile plants and other factories
● 652 producing consumer goods marked the beginning of modern industry. A government-
owned Agricultural and Industrial Bank was set up. A land settlement law was
423 passed in 1932 and amended in 1938, and work on land settlement began in 1933.

471 Of more importance to the Iraqi economy was the development of the petroleum
industry. In 1925, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a successor to the Turkish
382 Petroleum Company, was granted a concession, and in 1927 the Kirkuk oilfield was
discovered. By 1934, that field had been brought into production, and two
315 pipelines, with an annual capacity of 2.2 million tons each, had been laid to
651 the Mediterranean coast; these developments required an investment of $62 million.
Exports of oil began that year. The royalties and other revenues from petroleum
652 accruing to the Government greatly increased its receipts and made it possible
to augment expenditure on economic and social development.

433 During the Second World War Allied troops stationed in Iraq spent large sums on local purchases; from 1941 to 1944 inclusive, these expenditures totalled £64 million. There was a corresponding increase in national income, expressed in monetary terms, and prices rose considerably, the wholesale price index reaching a peak of 590 in 1943 (December 1938 to August 1939 = 100) and standing at 503 in 1945. This addition to national income and rise in prices stimulated agriculture; the area under cultivation was considerably extended, by irrigation and greater use of farm machinery, and although yields declined, total output increased somewhat. The greater part of the Allied expenditures was saved, in the form of sterling balances, which, in July 1947, amounted to £57.9 million. 1/

1/ National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, July 1949-December 1950 (Baghdad, 1951).

Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

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In the early post-war period there was little development. Petroleum production, and the revenue accruing to the Government therefrom, remained at the pre-war level or below and agricultural and industrial output showed little change. The deficit in the balance of payments was met by drawing on foreign exchange reserves. The Government budget showed deficits, and little was spent on capital works. By 1950, however, the situation began to change. Output of petroleum increased rapidly, and new agreements with the producing companies greatly raised government receipts. With the technical and financial assistance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a large-scale development plan was drawn up which is at present being carried out. The completion of the various projects under way should result in a considerable increase in the national income.

Production

Agriculture

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The increase in area and output achieved during the Second World War was generally maintained during the post-war period (see table 26). In recent years, there seems to have been a further extension in acreage, owing to increased irrigation and greater mechanization. 1/ Yields have continued to fluctuate in response to weather conditions, floods and attacks by locusts and other insect pests; total output has therefore varied considerably from year to year. The experience of recent years, notably that of 1952, has, however, shown that, thanks to the co-operation of other Middle Eastern and foreign governments, locust attacks cause much less damage than they did formerly. Similarly, completion of the irrigation works at present under way should greatly reduce the danger of floods like that of 1954, which destroyed many crops and damaged property.

The agricultural and livestock census 2/ of 1952/53, the first of its kind, puts the total agricultural holdings of Iraq at 6,384,000 hectares, of which

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1/ The number of pumps used in irrigation rose from 2,757, with a total horsepower of 91,332 in 1945, to 4,339, with a horsepower of 167,288 in 1953 (Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract 1953 (Baghdad)). In addition, the construction of canals made it possible to extend appreciably the area irrigated by existing dams. Early in 1951, there were 320 combines and 750 tractors (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, (Baltimore, 1952), page 19). In 1952 and 1953, 625 combines and 502 tractors were sold to farmers; of these over two-thirds were sold in 1953 (Statistical Abstract). There were 2,091 tractors in 1954 (Le Commerce du Levant, 11 August 1954 (Beirut)).

2/ Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract 1953 (Baghdad).

439 457 reduced by rigid controls, there was a large import surplus, which was only partly covered by such items as expenditures made by pilgrims and tourists in Iraq, receipts from transit trade and expenditure by foreign vessels in Iraqi ports. The main capital transfer items in the non-oil sector were drawings on the Iraqi State Railway Loan and the loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and repayments of loans. Part of the large debit items shown under "errors and omissions" probably represent flight of capital.

The deficit in the non-oil sector has, since 1950, been more than covered by the surplus in the oil sector. In the years 1948 to 1950, the combined value of imports made by the petroleum companies and the profits and salaries remitted abroad by them exceeded the value of the petroleum exported. The large amount of capital brought in by the companies for investment, however, resulted in an over-all surplus in the oil sector. Since 1950, the value of petroleum exports has greatly increased and the surplus has risen considerably.

During the years 1947 to 1949, the surplus in the oil sector failed to cover the deficit in other sectors, and Iraq drew heavily on its sterling balances and other foreign assets. 1/ Beginning with 1950, however, there has been an increase in foreign assets, owing to the surplus on current account; in 1952 and 1953, this surplus was very large. The foreign assets of the National Bank of Iraq increased from ID 35.1 million at the end of 1949 to ID 41.9 million in 1950 and, after a small drop in 1951, to ID 46.7 million in 1952 and ID 64.6 million in 1953; at the end of September 1954, they stood at ID 77.6 million. At the end of 1953, all but ID 1.9 million consisted of sterling assets. 2/

As Iraq is part of the sterling area, its needs for dollars have been met from the dollar pool of that area. Since 1949, annual exports to the United States have been below ID 1 million while imports have ranged between ID 3.1 and ID 11.3 million; both earnings and expenditures of dollars on non-merchandise transactions have been small.

Monetary system and public finance

Money and Banking

652 457 The basis of Iraq's monetary system was determined by the Iraq Currency Law of 1931 entrusting management and note issue to a Currency Board, sitting in London, which functioned until 1 July 1949 when the National Bank of Iraq, established in 1947, assumed control. The Bank is authorized to maintain a reserve "composed of gold and foreign currencies at a ratio of not less than 70 per cent and Iraqi Government securities at a ratio not exceeding 30 per cent". However, the National Bank during its early years of operation continued the Board policy of 100 per cent foreign exchange cover and exercised a passive role towards the amount of the money supply, which is mainly affected by changes in the balance of payments.

1/ Iraq sterling balances fell from £57.2 million at the end of 1947 to £43 million at the end of 1949.

2/ National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin (Baghdad).

In fact, as a result of the recent increase in Iraq's income from oil, of which 70 per cent is credited in sterling, to the National Bank for the account of the Development Board, the foreign exchange reserve of the Bank rose from ID 35.1 million in 1949 to ID 83.3 million in 1954, with a corresponding increase in the total assets (excluding cash holdings) of the Bank from ID 41.1 million to ID 94.5 million, respectively. Thus, the foreign exchange reserve has risen from 98 per cent of the total volume of currency issued in 1949, to 177 per cent in 1954, and the National Bank of Iraq's assets from 111 per cent to 201 per cent, respectively. The foreign exchange reserve is principally in sterling, and consists mainly of sterling securities and British Treasury bills. 652 457

It was not until the National Bank of Iraq started operating as the central bank of the State and after passage by Parliament of the Law for the Control of Banking in 1950, that banking institutions assumed a greater role in the financial structure. The banking control law provides that all banks and *sarrafs* 1/ must obtain a licence from the National Bank of Iraq. Private banks, whether established in Iraq or abroad, must dispose of a capital in Iraq of not less than ID 250,000. Banks are required to maintain in Iraq not less than 50 per cent cover, against their total current and fixed deposits, of which 15 per cent must be deposited with the National Bank. However, the National Bank can reduce this proportion to 30 per cent or increase it to 70 per cent. 652 453

The National Bank of Iraq

This bank was established in 1947 as a central bank "to manage the currency and ensure its stability, to serve the State finance, to facilitate internal and external payments and generally to promote and facilitate credits for trade, industry and agriculture". Its capital was fixed at ID 5 million, of which ID 2.5 million was transferred by the Government from the surplus of its Currency Reserve Fund. The other half is "deemed to be reserve guaranteed by the Iraqi Treasury to be covered from the bank's annual profit at the rate of 25 per cent or not more than ID 250,000". In addition to the issue and management of the currency, banking control and exchange control, the bank has issued several small loans to various government and semi-government institutions and non-commercial banks, but its 1954 statements show no outstanding loans or advances. 652

Commercial Banks

Institutions operating according to the Law for the Control of Banking are the *sarrafs* and foreign and Iraqi commercial banks. The Iraqi banks include the Rafidain Bank, which was established in 1941 and is actively engaged in commerce. In addition, applications have been filed for the establishment of two new private banks, the capital of which has been subscribed by Iraqi nationals. One of these banks, the Iraqi Commercial Bank, is reported to be already operating. Foreign banks include branches of British banks, such as the Ottoman Bank, the British 453 652

1/ A *sarraf* is defined as "a person or company licensed to deal in banking in Iraq".

453 Bank of the Middle East and the Eastern Bank, and branches of banks with head offices in other Arab countries, such as the Arab Bank and the Federal Bank of Lebanon. These banks have mostly confined their activities to lending money on
652 relatively short term to trading firms, and to financing foreign trade. However, as a result of the Development Board's expenditure, the increase in economic activities and the growing confidence of the people in the banking system, commercial banks may extend their activities. There has been a considerable increase in the number of banks and their branches operating throughout Iraq; there were five banks and two licensed sarrafs when the banking control law of 1950 came into effect, while today there are seven main commercial banks with about twenty-four branches in various cities and towns, and more than fourteen licensed sarrafs.

652 Other State banks

In addition to the Rafidain Bank mentioned above, the Government has established four banks to supply medium-term or long-term credit: the Industrial Bank, Agricultural Bank, and Mortgage and Loan Bank.

In 1935 the Government established the Agricultural and Industrial Bank which was divided in 1940 into the Agricultural Bank and the Industrial Bank, but the two branches were not separated until April 1946. The aim of the Agricultural Bank is to assist agriculturists, through the granting of loans and the renting or selling on deferred payment of agricultural machinery, tools, seeds and fertilizers. It acts as agent for the grading and cleaning of crops, assists in the formation of co-operative societies and invests in agricultural enterprises. The Bank has made contributions in these various fields though its efforts have, in some instances, been handicapped by lack of available funds and by administrative shortcomings. Its nominal capital was ID 1 million, later raised to ID 2 million, and its paid-up capital in 1953 was raised from ID 1 million to ID 1.6 million. At the end of 1954, the Government issued a new ordinance advancing the Bank ID 500,000 to enable it to purchase machines and irrigation pumps and their accessories, to aid small farmers and also to increase its loans. Moreover, it is hoped that it will provide greater help to the small farmers who are to receive ownership of land under the Government's own land distribution schemes. Up to 31 March 1952, the Bank had loaned ID 2.05 million to 8,770 borrowers; of this ID 1.07 million had been repaid. In 1952/53, a further sum of ID 660,000 was advanced to 1,246 borrowers, and ID 146,000 on outstanding loans was repaid. 1/ Most of the loans have been medium-term, usually four to five years, and most have apparently been advanced to large landowners. 2/

The aim of the Industrial Bank is "to develop and assist industry in Iraq and to carry on banking business relating thereto". Its nominal capital was ID 500,000 in 1946, raised to ID 3 million in 1953; its paid-up capital in 1953 was ID 2.3 million. It is authorized to borrow money by the issue of negotiable bonds, or any other means decided on by its Board and approved by the Ministry of Finance. In addition the Industrial Bank, like the Agricultural Bank, has contracted loans,

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1/ Statistical Abstract, 1953.

2/ Iverson, op. cit., pages 31 and 32.

and received money on current accounts. It has initiated and supported the creation of various new industries throughout Iraq. It holds a large proportion of the shares of eleven major Iraqi concerns, nine of which are industrial, one partly so and the other non-industrial. The total nominal value of the Industrial Bank's share in these enterprises amounted at the end of March 1953 to ID 995,000, out of a total capital of ID 4.77 million; by March 1954 its share had risen to ID 1.12 million. The bank has been gradually disposing of its share in enterprises to the public when these enterprises are firmly established, in order to stimulate more interest and to divert its capital to other new enterprises. 1/ By the end of 1951/52 the Industrial Bank had made 351 loans aggregating ID 772,000; of this ID 296,000 had been repaid. In 1952/53, 153 loans, totalling ID 657,000, were made and ID 192,000 was repaid. 2/

In addition to its lending activities, the Industrial Bank is studying various projects: the setting up of a paper and cardboard factory, the extension and modernization of the Fao salt works and the exploitation of salt domes in Iraq; the construction of a caustic soda and chlorine plant; the establishment of a glass industry using local sand; the setting up of a steel foundry; and the establishment, in co-operation with the Development Board, of a beet-sugar mill and a plant for extracting date sugar from inferior dates. Several other industrial studies and surveys are being made.

The balance sheets for the years 1946/47 to 1952/53 indicate that both the Industrial Bank and the firms in which it is a shareholder have made great progress; the total net profit of the bank over this period amounted to ID 305,366. The present industrial expansion is expected to increase its activities further.

The Mortgage Bank, established in 1948, started operations by the end of the financial year 1949/1950, with the primary object of providing loans on fixed property. The original law has been amended several times in order to increase the bank's capital and expand its operations. Thus, its statutory capital was increased from ID 2 million to ID 3 million, and its paid-up capital from ID 1,200 in 1949/50 to ID 1 million in 1952-53. The financial year 1953/54 witnessed an increase in its paid-up capital to ID 3 million and in the deposits of the Minors' Property Department to ID 455,000 while a loan of ID 250,000 which it had received from the National Bank was redeemed. In addition, the Government has undertaken to provide it with ID 2 million for the financing of its new housing project and is planning to increase further its capital. Moreover, the bank may borrow from the Development Board or it may use its statutory right to issue, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, government-guaranteed bonds in the open market in order to carry out fully its activities. Its present aim is, first, to advance loans on security of fixed property, thereby encouraging

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1/ Thus, the shares held by the Bank in the Spinning and Weaving Company decreased from ID 425,000 (face value) in 1952 to ID 225,000 in 1953; its shares in the Vegetable Oil Company from ID 60,000 to ID 30,000; and in the Cement Company from ID 270,000 to ID 249,000 (Iverson, op. cit. page 34).

2/ Statistical Abstract, 1953.

652 new building activity on the part of private enterprise; secondly, to convert old high interest loans into longer-term loans at a low interest rate; and thirdly, to build, on its own account, modern dwelling houses to be sold or rented to officials and employees with small incomes, payment being made by annual instalments over a period of from ten to twenty years, with an interest charge of 1 to 2 per cent. Finally, the bank is authorized to construct and maintain factories and workshops producing the materials and the services needed for the carrying out of its projects.

Increasing demands have been made on its services. The loan period has been extended from four years to eight and interest reduced to 4 per cent or less. Loans issued for the financial year ended 31 March 1954 amounted to about ID 1.6 million, of which ID 1.4 million was issued by its Baghdad office and the rest by its five branches outside Baghdad or through branches of the Agricultural Bank working as its agent in seven provinces. The bank has already acquired for its building programme plots of land in various parts of Baghdad; one scheme at West Bank, Baghdad, provides for a complete town of 500 houses. The bank is negotiating also with local administrations to carry out a building programme in Kut, Amarah, Basra, Muntafiq, Diwaniyah and Hillah.

In addition to the foregoing, the Government has provided a new type of credit, through the Loan (Movable Properties) Bank. It started operations in late 1951 with a capital of ID 250,000, which was raised in 1952 to ID 1 million. The main object of this bank is to facilitate credit and lending operations through loans to the public against personal guarantees to be collected by small repayments, at an interest charge of 3 per cent. In 1952/53, the bank advanced a total of ID 436,000 to 81,129 government employees and made secured loans of ID 73,000 to 1,238 other borrowers. 1/ In November 1954 an ordinance was issued authorizing the raising of a loan of ID 1 million in bonds, tax free at 3 1/2 per cent interest, through the National Bank, and an advance by the Ministry of Finance, to an amount not exceeding ID 250,000 to be repaid gradually by the bank from the sale of the bonds, thus enabling it to extend its activities throughout Iraq.

Public finance

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651 Revenues and expenditures began to expand after 1942/43. During the war period, government revenue exceeded expenditure, but the situation was reversed during the financial years 1945/46 to 1949/50, when the budget showed a continuous deficit, totalling ID 15.5 million; about ID 9 million of this was incurred in the year 1948/49, owing to harvest failures and the Arab-Israeli war. Since the financial year 1950/51, the budget has shown a continuous surplus because of two fundamental changes; an increase in revenues from customs duties, excise tax and oil revenues, 30 per cent of which were allotted to the State budget; and establishment of the Development Board, discussed below, which assumed responsibility for the implementation of major capital works (table 29).

1/ Ibid.

Table 29. Iraq: Budget Accounts, 1938/39 and 1947/48 to 1954/55

(Millions of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1938/39	1946/47	1947/48	1948/49	1949/50	1950/51	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54[a]	1954/55[a]
Revenue:										
Direct taxes on income and wealth....	0.45	2.17	2.27	2.74	3.15	3.26	4.02	3.00	2.77	...
Taxes on land and produce...	0.85	4.34	3.54	3.84	4.04	4.99	4.61	3.86	3.55	3.07
Customs duties.	2.63	5.17	6.30	7.21	8.61	10.33	12.22	11.86	19.24	20.00
Other indirect taxes.........	0.77	5.87	4.76	3.38	3.63	4.03	4.06	4.78		
Oil revenues...	1.98	2.33	2.35	2.01	3.24	5.29	5.38	21.62 b/	15.01	18.13
Other receipts.	1.16	5.64	4.80	4.54	4.97	5.65	7.24	5.42	5.11	...
Total	7.84	25.52	24.02	23.72	27.63	33.49	37.53	50.54	47.37	48.51
Expenditure:										
Education......	0.72	1.74	2.16	2.57	2.60	3.60	4.09	2.22 c/	2.54 c/	4.19
Social welfare and health....	0.36	1.18	0.71	1.72	1.49	2.01	2.53	3.15	3.46	4.89
Communications and agriculture..........	0.58	1.85	1.66	1.91	1.51	1.88	1.98	2.75	2.30	4.87
Defence.........	1.62	5.28	4.36	6.75	6.59	7.26	7.94	13.75	11.99	17.92
Capital works..	2.46	3.05	3.57	3.93	3.38	3.60	2.19	4.35	3.60	...
Other expenditures.........	3.30	12.42	15.15	15.12	14.43	10.97	12.09	18.18	14.57	...
Total	9.04	25.52	27.61	32.00	30.00	29.32	30.82	44.40	43.67	57.61

Source: 1939 to 1953: Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract of Iraq (Baghdad); 1954; National Bank of Iraq; 1955: speech by the Minister of Finance reported in Al Shaib (Baghdad), 30 December 1954. Data are for fiscal years ending 31 March.

a/ Estimated.

b/ Including ID 5 million transferred from the Development Board and amounts received as settlement of claims on the petroleum companies.

c/ Excluding primary education.

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651 In real terms, both receipts and expenditure were for some years below the pre-war level. The total revenue index, in pre-war prices, dropped from 100 in 1938/39 to 41 in 1944, remaining around 50 at the end of the war, while the total expenditure index dropped to 29 and remained below 50. Both indices were below 100 until 1953 but since then revenue has been much higher, and expenditure slightly higher.

Apart from oil revenues, receipts have been characterized by the high proportion derived from indirect taxes, and the light taxation of agriculture. Among indirect taxes, customs duties are the most important. Import duties, which are concentrated on a few commodities such as sugar, tea, textiles and some machinery, increased from ID 2.6 million in 1938/39 to about ID 11 million in 1952/53, while export duties, though higher than the pre-war level, have fluctuated with the size of the harvest. The tariff laws have been amended several times since 1933, and at present the Government is awaiting the report and recommendations of two foreign experts in order to draw up a new law in harmony with the country's developing economy.

Excise taxes are levied on such goods as alcohol and gasoline, salt and tobacco. They have increased from about ID .62 million in 1938/39 to ID 2 million in 1946/47 and ID 3.63 million in 1952/53. In addition to the tax on tobacco, the Treasury receives 75 per cent of the profit from the tobacco monopoly, which was established in 1939.

Next in importance is the Istihlak tax on agriculture and animal products brought to the market for sale. In 1953, the Government abolished the tax on several items and submitted a draft law proposing a scheme of land taxation to replace the Istihlak. The revenues derived from the Istihlak have increased substantially from less than ID 1 million in the pre-war period to a peak of about ID 5 million in 1950/51.

The total yield from direct taxes, the so-called land tax, the property tax and income tax, has remained almost unchanged in the post-war period. The main source of revenue is the income and excess profits taxes and surtaxes, which are levied on a very limited number of taxpayers. The Government amended the income tax law of 1939 by a decree in May 1954 which increased exemptions on small and medium incomes.

About one-third of total expenditure is spent on security. This large proportion is partly due to the fact that "capital work" expenditure has gone down from about one-third of the total in 1937/38 to about one-tenth in 1952/53, having been largely transferred from the general budget to that of the Development Board.

Public debt

652 During the inter-war period the budgetary surpluses and deficits were insignificant; the Government met its excess expenditure through the issue of short-term Treasury bills. Since 1938/39, the Government has obtained several foreign loans and floated five domestic bond issues. The foreign debts consisted of two loans at 4 per cent interest from the United Kingdom to finance the Iraqi State Railways. The first amounted to ID 1 million, obtained in 1939, and was fully redeemed in 1942/43; the second amounted to £3 million and was

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obtained in 1950. It was not fully drawn upon, and has been repaid. The other major foreign debt was a loan of $12.8 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 1950, to meet the foreign exchange requirements of the Wadi Tharthar irrigation scheme. In addition, the Government obtained several advances free of interest from the oil companies, totalling ID 4.5 million, which have now been repaid.

Five domestic loans, totalling ID 7 million, were used to finance the railways and irrigation schemes. Two of these, of ID 1 million each, at 3 per cent interest, issued in 1944 and 1947 with maturities of 3 and 5 years respectively, were redeemed. Other outstanding bond issues comprised a one ID 1 million loan with 3 1/2 per cent interest, issued in 1948, and two twenty year loans, issued in 1944 and 1948, for ID 1 million and ID 3 million respectively. The above mentioned total does not include outstanding Treasury bills and the loans and advances made by the National Bank, commercial banks or other institutions. However, the public debt of Iraq is comparatively small and does not constitute a real burden on the economy of the country. In fact, the Government now has almost no difficulty as far as revenues are concerned, in redeeming not only foreign debts but also domestic ones as well. It is believed that the floating of domestic loans is intended to absorb "idle money" and is an anti-inflationary measure, while the foreign loans were to provide foreign exchange required for various development schemes. The repayment of the United Kingdom loan and the announcement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that the Government of Iraq had cancelled the unused balance of $6.5 million on its loan are evidence of Iraq's ability to meet its needs from its own resources.

Development programme

The rapid increase in revenue anticipated from the expansion of petroleum production and the revision of the terms of payment by the oil companies led the Government to initiate an over-all plan to develop the resources of the country. In 1950, a Development Board was established and a comprehensive five-year (1951 to 1956) development plan, involving an estimated expenditure of ID 65.8 million, was drawn up. 185 647

In 1951, at the request of the Iraqi Government, a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development visited Iraq and submitted a report, which included a five-year plan with an estimated expenditure of ID 168.5 million. 1/ The Iraqi Government accordingly, in the light of the Bank's recommendation, replaced its earlier plan by a six-year plan (1 April 1951 to 31 March 1957) calling for expenditure of ID 155.4 million (table 30).

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq (Baltimore, 1952).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and progressively deteriorated. The river now adopted its Hindiya 312
channel to an extent of nine-tenths, leaving desolation at Ḥilla, Diwaniya, and Daghara. Government organized repair works, but without adequate funds or energy, and the greater efforts made under M. Cugnin in early 1909 proved unavailing. The Euphrates irrigation position remained menacing or disastrous.

But help was, after all, at hand. The veteran irrigation engineer 312
of Egypt, Sir William Willcocks, had studied the problems of 'Iraq 185
water-control from 1902 onwards, and had submitted proposals to 653
Istanbul through the British Ambassador. Late in 1908 he was appointed Consultant for 'Iraq irrigation, reached Baghdad in December and toured and studied with boundless energy, resolution, and intolerance, while the Mesopotamia Irrigation Survey pursued its work. By 1910 he had solved his problems. From the proposals in his report, most of which still held the field almost intact forty years later, there emerged the necessity for immediate large-scale works. To prevent flooding he demanded regulated flood escapes at key points, with strong embankments and the closing of existing breaches. The Euphrates escape would be at or near Ramadi, into Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Abu Dibis depression. The Tigris escape would be from the Samarrā area through miles of high ground into the Tharthar depression, unless the cost of so vast a scheme proved prohibitive. To raise low-season water-levels and provide reliable supplies to the off-taking canals, a barrage would be erected near Balad above Baghdad, and another at Kut al-Amara to restore the irrigable Gharraf (Ḥai) lands. The ancient Nahrwan canal was, by one of alternative methods, to be restored, and the waters of the Diyalā—and some of the Tigris—to be poured into it. The lower Euphrates swamps would be reclaimed by re-forming the main channels and by providing for flood escape. A barrage at Qarmat 'Ali would give controlled irrigation in Baṣra area. Large-scale drainage would be provided throughout the country by utilizing existing depressions, Tigris navigation would be safeguarded by controlling the great flood channels of the 'Amara district, the Buṭayra, Chahla, Majr Kabir, and Musharra.

Of this programme, grandiose and costly by any standards, criticism was not lacking on the grounds of deficient finances, tribal insecurity, lack of man-power, and chronic Turkish maladministration. But it was boldly adopted by the Turkish Government, with preference for the Hindiya Barrage as the first step. Willcocks witnessed from 1909 to 1911 the failure of further stopgap attempts to repair the existing barrage, and was soon to experience his first taste of the greatest of all his problems—that of obtaining funds from the Turkish Government. Nevertheless

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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653 work on the new Barrage began. Tenders for the complete construction were called for in September 1910, and the contract awarded to the British firm of Sir John Jackson & Co.

The construction of the Barrage, then and now one of the greatest works in 'Iraq, was carried out with extraordinary speed by a staff which included Turks, Indians, Armenians, and some 3,500 'Iraqis. The suspicion of certain elements in Turkish officialdom usually turned to gratified encouragement after a personal visit to Hindiya. Labour troubles were few. Transport, especially that on the Euphrates routes from Baṣra, presented extreme difficulties, with tribal blackmail and navigational obstacles: and the continual struggles needed to obtain funds from an empty Treasury in Istanbul and a harassed Daftardar in Baghdad were successful only after actual stoppage of the work seemed inevitable. The iron gates arrived in the late summer of 1913, and a crowded and triumphant ceremonial opening of the whole work was held in November of that year. Although the Barrage, which had cost less than £500,000, still lacked the canalization which it was designed to support downstream, it conferred immediately enormous benefits on the countryside which it served. These would have been a hundredfold greater if they could have included public security, an equitable land system, and some hope of new agricultural methods.

Elsewhere in 'Iraq, much of the earth-work of the Ḥabbaniya Escape in its first phase was completed, and digging of the Ṣaqlawiya Canal was begun but abandoned. Further surveys produced information of great future value, though no other major enterprise belongs to this period. A scheme for watering the Ḥawija, north-west of Kirkuk, from the Lesser Zab was begun without study and ended in fiasco and scandal. More important, and prophetic of a major development of the future, was the growing riverside use of oil engines for irrigation purposes. These increased from a mere dozen in 1900 to some scores in 1914. Meanwhile, flood-bank protection annually renewed followed its unsure and expensive course, rarely effective and always burdensome. The 'bunds' built by Nadhim Pasha for the safeguarding of Baghdad, though they failed partially in their first year, were an important work.

433 These last years of Turkish rule were marked by little industrial development. Some increase in local shipbuilding and the use of irrigation pumps, ice machines, wool and liquorice-presses called for the first time for mechanical repair facilities. The first motor-
494 car appeared in 'Iraq in 1908 from Aleppo; by 1914 less than a dozen were in use. These included a motor-bus service on the Ba'quba road, and the private cars of a few notables. Efforts to mechanize the Kufa tramway had failed.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Government no ground even for diplomatic representations; he 648 rebelled feebly, only to be crushed, superseded, and removed to Teheran. After an abortive uprising by the local Arab tribesmen—Cha'ab and Muḥaysin—and the usual sequence of protests and counter-protests between Baghdad and Teheran, 'Arabistan—henceforward Khuzistan—became a normal province of Persia.

Minor cross-frontier raiding was thereafter settled normally between the nearest officials of the two States. More serious trouble in the areas of Khaniqin and Qaṣr-i-Shirin late in 1925 was composed by a more formal joint meeting in March 1926. A hopeful sign of co-operation was the Persian request (conveyed, as was habitual, through the British Minister in Teheran and High Commissioner in Baghdad) for 'Iraqi help in establishing a new trade route from the Kirkuk railhead to Tabriz. It was necessitated by [499 the Kurdish rebellion in eastern Anatolia, and would involve a 653] mountain road by way of Ṣawj Bulaq and Rawanduz. The 'Iraq Government began its surveys and ordered bridging material from Europe. Farther south, an old disturber of the peace reappeared, Salar al-Dawla. This unbalanced but persistent royal pretender, basing new hopes on the change of dynasty, entered and crossed 'Iraq disguised in the spring of 1925, made for his old haunts in the Kirmanshah province, and sought to raise the Persian Kurdish tribesmen once again to his threadbare standard. The outlaw band of Shaykh Maḥmud was the first to join him, but they had few imitators. The High Commissioner was able by messages to dissuade all but a handful from so hopeless an enterprise, and the Air Officer Commanding flew to concert plans with the Persians at Teheran to prevent a rising. It lacked all serious support, and Salar al-Dawla retired to Syria. But in August 1926 he returned, again reached the Hawraman area, and raised some force of hungry riff-raff which looted a few villages before dispersing. No other help was forthcoming. The Prince re-entered 'Iraq in disguise, was recognized and arrested at Arbil, and was detained at Baghdad while his disposal was considered.

Towards Syria the attitude of the 'Iraqi political public was one of resentment against the French Mandatary; it led to sympathy for all Syrian nationalists and for such rebels against the régime as the Druz in 1925, but it was certainly without ideas, such as have been sometimes ascribed to King Fayṣal, of armed intervention. Syrian doctors and teachers were employed in 'Iraq, and Syrians were well represented on the King's personal staff. The reopening of the routes from 'Iraq, whether by Euphrates-side to Dayr al-Zur or across the Jazira from Mosul, was a desideratum which led to a series of conferences at Mosul, Dayr, al-Qa'im, and Albu Kamal between 'Iraqi and Syrian, French and British representatives from

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group, 651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving the construction of the Ḥabbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method, came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness, 654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with 231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship 494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much 491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by Ramadi and Rutba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian) competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The Rutba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through 205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The daily lives of many 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in

312 agriculture than by even the greatest industry, and such progress in
653 this period was not negligible. The grandiose irrigation schemes for which the press and public called were not, indeed, at once attainable; maintenance, minor improvement, and research were rather the order of the day. Nevertheless, some works of fair magnitude were carried out. New headworks and canalization on the Diwaniya and Daghara branches of the Euphrates were undertaken, and improvements in the water-supply to the Suq rice-lands. Swamp-drainage at Karbalā was primarily a public health measure. A permanent weir across the Diyalā replaced annually renewed antiquated works and secured supplies for the Ruz, Khurasan, and Maḥrut canals. The Laṭifiya Canal, the new Iskandariya, the Shayshubar were dug or re-aligned. A clearance of the Baṣra creeks and a major regulator, opened by the King in 1930, on the Bad'a in Muntafiq country were works of great local value. With them went continuous researches, surveys, experiments in desalination and drainage, and efforts to maintain and improve the 'bunds', breaches of which could ruin a countryside as they did in the disastrous floods of 1926 and 1929, and the necessity for which only the completion of the long-standing flood-diversion schemes could remove. Such was the Ḥabbaniya project, conceived by Willcocks twenty years earlier and closely restudied from 1927 to 1932; in the last of these years tenders were called for and the work seemed imminent. Other major plans, postponed by lack of funds and incomplete data, were the Tigris barrage at Kut al-Amara to restore the Gharraf and to control the 'Amara rice-lands: the smaller Abu Ghurayb canal from the Euphrates left bank, begun in 1932: an 'Aqar Quf drainage project near Baghdad: a proposed reservoir at or near Qizil Rubaṭ to conserve Diyalā water for summer use: a new head for the Ḥilla branch: the Isḥaqi Canal, to take Tigris water from opposite Samarrā: and work on the main Euphrates channel near Shinafiya. The Irrigation Department was administered from 1925 to 1928 by L. E. Bury, who acted also as Adviser to the Ministry of Works and after 1927 to that also of Irrigation and Agriculture. W. Allard succeeded as Director of Irrigation from 1928 to 1933, and as Chief Engineer under an 'Iraqi director in 1933–4. Wheatley resumed the advisership of Communications and Works in 1929, and held it for the next eight years.

241 Of the need to improve agricultural methods, if these canal
654 works were to yield all their value, the public was little aware. In spite of continued research and experiment, the main agricultural problems of the territory were yet unsolved—those of soil deterioration, antiquated techniques, inferior crop varieties, low and impure yields, and harvests endangered by flood or drought.

241 473 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. [656] A Committee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 312 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new [45[illegible]] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural [185] affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first 312 653 stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

from the Lesser Zab west of Altun Kupri and irrigating land in the 312 Ḥawija was begun in the same year. Schemes for a Diyalā dam, 653 and for a restoration of the ancient Isḥaqi canal were studied, but the long-favoured Ḥabbaniya scheme seemed unable to come to life. It was re-formulated in 1932; tenders were invited next year but none accepted; and in 1934 the project seemed likely to be reduced to the scale of a mere flood reservoir, whereafter, for a time, no progress in the scheme was made. Its place as first favourite was taken by the Tigris barrage, to control the Gharraf river from its point of bifurcation opposite Kut. This project, which allowed by means of locks for continued Tigris navigation and for fish movement, was put to tender in 1934. Work was begun by the chosen contractors, Messrs. Balfour Beatty & Co., and by mid-1937 it approached completion—the second of the great Willcocks schemes to be realized; but the dependent canalization necessary to ensure its full value would require much further time and effort. The collapse in 1935 of the Diyalā weir, built in 1928, was a setback which called for large-scale restoration, and steps to this end were taken in 1936–7. The upkeep and improvement of existing canals continued with increasing use of 'Iraqi technical personnel, and with it further study of the abiding problems of flood protection, drainage, water economy, and silting. There was little money to spend.

6. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Both events within 'Iraq and the external contacts natural to a 648× modern State led during these years,[1] to greatly widened relations between Baghdad and the world outside. The process of establishing these was continuous; prestige and strategy both played their part; and no sphere of Government activity was freer from party politics. The system continued whereunder 'Iraqi representation abroad was entrusted to the diplomats and consuls of Great Britain, save only at Geneva and at the small but increasing number of capitals to which 'Iraqi Ministers were appointed. The Soviet Union alone refused to accept this system, or to recognize 'Iraq.

Italy, to which a State visit of King Fayṣal had been planned before his death, courted 'Iraqi goodwill. In spite of Sanctions, in which 'Iraq conformed to the British attitude towards the aggression against Ethiopia in 1935, Italy secured 'Iraqi armament orders in 1936 and later fêted and decorated 'Iraqi visitors to Rome (where a Legation had been opened in 1934) and subsidized in Baghdad a newspaper Fascist in tone, the *Sha'ab*. On the whole, however, Italian activity was less evident in 'Iraq than in the Levant States, and foreshadowed the assignment of that territory, with Persia, to

[1] - [Mid nineteen-thirties -- Analyst]

648ˣ to ensure Arab rights in the Holy Land, or by that of the Foreign Minister 'Ali Jawdat to Sa'udi Arabia in June.

The child-King was taken to the Lebanon for the summer, and there hailed by village enthusiasts by the roadside as 'King of Syria'. In Baghdad a new British Ambassador, Sir Basil Newton, to whom the Middle East and its problems were unfamiliar, succeeded Peterson in March 1939.

652 The financial needs of the State, which thanks to over-spending were now serious, were met by a grant of credits by the British Government for the pressing needs of the Railway, and equipment for the Army. Nearly £4 million was thus made available on the security of 'Iraq's oil revenues and with conditions of moderate interest and repayment spaced over seventeen years. An interest-free loan was granted at the same time by the 'Iraq Petroleum Company in return for a seven-year postponement of its export obligation under the B.O.D. Company's concession; it was payable in six half-yearly instalments of £500,000 each, and repayable at leisure out of royalties.

653 The Railway section from Tall Kochek to Mosul was completed, [496] at unexpectedly high cost, and trains could now run from that city to Istanbul. The Kut barrage and Gharraf headworks were com- 312 pleted in March 1939: the official opening had been King Ghazi's last public act. With its fifty-six mechanically-operated gates, overall width of 1,615 feet, lock, and fish-ladder, this important work had cost £1,200,000 and, given full dependent canalization (at present lacking), was capable of the controlled irrigation of a million acres. The seven-gate Yau regulator, at the end of that branch of the Kufa channel, was erected in 1939–40, also by Messrs. Balfour Beatty. A new and improved Diyalā weir (p. 263) was undertaken in 1939 and completed by the end of 1940. Execution of the Ḥabbaniya project, which had been revived urgently after the Euphrates floods of 1938, was entrusted in June 1939 by contract to Messrs. Balfour Beatty for £700,000 for the first phase, that of the intake canal to the lake at Ramadi and the controlled outlet from the lake to the vast Abu Dibis depression. Work on these was pressed forward. The first of the two steel bridges at Baghdad, built under contract by Messrs. Holloway Bros., was completed; it formed an imposing structure, 700 ft. long and 50 ft. wide, and, named al-Ma'mun Bridge, was opened with ceremony by the Regent. Bridge tolls were abolished through- 652 out the country. A long-standing project drew nearer to realization when a Government bank, to be known as the Rafidain Bank, was established by law though not yet opened; its initial capital was fixed at £500,000, subscribed in part by the State. A revised version of the capital works programme was evolved by Rustum

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped. A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp, in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality, shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653 ●
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy-French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company, and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according
to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country. The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt; trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382
of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241
was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce
and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease
supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās
and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors,
mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation,
with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities.
Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the
educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had
been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the [166
establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of
these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in 464]
their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time
employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423
committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185
since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout
the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq,
and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās;
but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of
Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was
made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries,
and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now
approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for
model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant
insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized.
On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425
a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166
sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be
gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions
and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and
a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The
Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused
keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312
continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their 653
studies and planning, though the intended major projects could
not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on
the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the
intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the
return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken.
Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

226 Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

312 The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable. [731] The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the [647] resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

312 653 185 The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Dukan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Isḥaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

Board[1] at its early meetings in 1951 and they were, with possible modifications, to form the basis of 'Iraq's future irrigation activity, whose full realization, however, must, for all the impatience of the public and the press, occupy not less than fifty years. 312 653 ● 185

Works actually completed before the end of 1951 were the realigned Ḥabbaniya inlet (Warrar channel) and the return outlet to the river (Sinn al-Ḍhibban channel), ensuring flood protection and making possible the use of stored flood water. The Wadi Tharthar inlet channel—a work of very great magnitude—was put to tender by the Development Board in 1951; the Samarrā barrage and headworks, and the greater Ḥabbaniya scheme, were to follow later. Much detailed planning and designing remained to be done, even for the immediately following five years, before a programme, especially in lower 'Iraq—'Amara, Baṣra, and the Gharraf—could be established. The extent, however, to which the Willcocks plans of forty years earlier had stood all tests was indeed remarkable. Only the Faluja and Balad barrages (p. 63) had been abandoned, and development in the Baṣra–Ḥammar area might or might not in the end follow Willcocks's plans. The abiding problem of silt deposit appeared partly soluble, by improved headwork design and by mechanical clearance. Pump irrigation seemed by now to have reached its economic limit in much of the territory, but there was ample room for more intensive cultivation of the pump-lands.

The connexion of reasonable and stable forms of land tenure had long been recognized by Government in its land-settlement activity, and the latter had a creditable volume of achievement to show after eighteen years of sustained effort. Early criticism of the procedures adopted (p. 261) and the progress of the work itself throughout 'Iraq (p. 323) have been elsewhere described. Five more years' work since the end of the war had defined, delimited, and recorded the personal rights in other wide areas. The abiding problem of Muntafiq land rights had not yet been solved; in 'Amara an answer not very different from the *status quo*, but with longer-term security for the shaykhs and greater fragmentation was likely to be found. Elsewhere the hard case of the landless fallaḥ was little changed wherever he had been unable to establish a basis of title and, at the opposite extreme, the good fortune of 423 565

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[1] The Board's six-year plan, legalized early in 1952, provided for year-by-year expenditure, from 1951–6 inclusive, on the Tharthar project, to a total of (in thousands of ID) 10,300: on the Ḥabbaniya, 2,200: on the Diyalā dams and canalization, 6,750: on the Dukan dam, Ḥawija barrage, 'Udhaym barrage and canalization, 6,750: on the Bakhma dam, 8,700: on irrigation works in Mosul and Arbil liwās, 1,900: Tigris barrage and canalization, south of 'Udhaym mouth, 1,800: and main drainage, 4,100. New and re-formed canalization on the middle and lower Euphrates, lower Tigris and Gharraf, and Baṣra area were allotted 10,425.

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the 241
agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. 651
Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most 471
hopeful and significant economic and social development which
is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. 166

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, 653
the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent
farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, 185
on the land which could consequently be brought under cultiv- 425
ation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are 166
now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intellig-
ently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract 185
of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and 425
about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land
settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department 427
known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation [647]
of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized
as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

I
K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I
168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
648] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Kurd MAII

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now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade 438
with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge 439
of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though 173
unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradi- 782
tion at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the
bridge. 539 It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with I
all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the K
construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while 653
sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When 185
echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on I
a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn K
Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled 721
by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the 361
Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

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DISCUSSION

Mrs. Soane-Ellis: Might I ask if the lecturer has any information as to the whereabouts of Sheikh Mahmud? The last time I saw him he was a prisoner at Ramadi. 000

Major Wilson: I cannot say whether he is exactly a prisoner now, but he certainly would not be allowed to go back to Sulaimaniyyeh.

Brigadier J. G. Browne: May I ask what is the position of the Pizhder Kurds under the present Government? 657 563

Major Wilson: There has been a slight extension of police control, but, as far as I know, real administration has not yet been established over the Pizhder.

The Chairman: It remains, I think, only for me to sum up what we have learnt. We see here again the extraordinary importance of the question of roads in establishing the authority of the Government among mountain peoples. We are building roads on the North-West Frontier of India. And here we have seen the roads that are being built through Kurdistan, like Mr. Hamilton's very fine achievement, the making of the road through the Rowanduz Gorge. I believe the account of the building of that road is going to be published shortly, and it should make a book well worth reading. 653 657

We have seen some extraordinarily interesting slides. And we have learnt some valuable information about the present position of the Assyrians. From what the lecturer says, the best plan now would appear to be rather to leave them alone where they are. The other plan was to have been to move them to an extremely suitable site on the Orontes River. But unfortunately the lands chosen had been sequestrated from their original owner, who had been in trouble. When M. Blum came into office, he decided he could deal with this case, reinstated the man in question, and restored his lands. So that scheme necessarily came to nothing, and it is quite impossible on other grounds now for the Assyrians to go there. But one gathers that it is wisest not to agitate on their behalf, nor to stir them up, for that only makes them very unpopular in the country. They are finding employment to some extent in the oil-fields, and as guards and station masters on the railways and in similar employment, and one can hope things may settle down and that they will stay in their own country. 186 463

We must thank our lecturer, not only for the good work he has obviously done in 'Iraq, but also for the excellent and informative lecture he has given us this evening. 000

613 new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of
666 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain
Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes
as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory
before candidates received government support.

643 In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the
● [653] interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed
the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,[1]
whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for
definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.[2]
[166] To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes
on the land, and the development of residential amenities
about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early
inclination to find employment for those who had served him in
western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a
result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made
and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion
to its contribution to the welfare of 'Iraq enabled him to take
a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the
majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although 'Iraqīs
universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic
institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly
asserted their competence to run them, conditions in 'Iraq were
[565] far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No
adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial
body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the
democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

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[1] By the Prime Minister, Nūrī Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

[2] Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, 'Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years* 1930 *and* 1931 *and Capital Development Works Budget for* 5 *Years* 1931-35.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

311 a means of establishing a class of independent peasant landowners capable of earning a decent livelihood. Official estimates indicate that the amount of "cultivable" land is almost three times that under cultivation. The criteria used in determining the cultivability of land have, however, probably varied widely. Thus part of the cultivable land in the so-called rain-fed zone in the north may well be in areas sub-marginal from the standpoint of rainfall. As soon as possible the government should classify the cultivable land which is not presently cultivated by types of soil and determine what measures are required in each instance to put the land under cultivation, e.g. whether the land must be reclaimed by drainage and whether, if the land needs to be irrigated, the irrigation should be by pump or by flow.

Most of the area which can be put under cultivation will require water, yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not even permit the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of the excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates rivers during the spring flood season and
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312 frequently unloosens destructive floods are clearly essential. The government has already initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage scheme for the Euphrates River and has let a contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The program of the Development Board also makes provision for storage dams on two tributaries of the Tigris, the Lesser Zab and the Diyala River. While the Derbend-i-Khan dam on the Diyala River will provide primarily for the more effective irrigation of land already under cultivation, completion of the Dokan dam on the Lesser Zab and of the Habbaniya Lake project should provide enough water to extend the cultivable area under irrigation from about 11 million donums at present to approximately 15 million.

The Mission fully endorses these projects (see map), with the proviso that borings prove the soundness of the Dokan dam site. At the same time it recommends that they be complemented by the construction at an early date of the Bekhme dam on the Greater Zab River for which no provision has yet been made. This dam would compensate for the diversion of the Lesser Zab water from the Tigris by the Dokan dam. Without the Bekhme dam the

653 3/2 already existing water shortage in the Kut and Amara regions in southern Iraq would become more acute. Its construction is all the more urgent because the Wadi Tharthar reservoir will not supply supplementary water for the Tigris for another decade at best. In fact, some geologists believe that loss of water in the reservoir may be such that little or no water for irrigation will ever be furnished by the Wadi Tharthar. Should the Wadi Tharthar ultimately prove able to supply water for irrigation, the water impounded by the Bekhme dam could be utilized for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in northern Iraq.

Completion of the final stage of the Habbaniya project calls for the storage in the Abu Dibis and related depressions of water in excess of the expanded capacity of Habbaniya Lake and, in theory, would also permit a substantial extension of irrigation in the Euphrates Valley. Further study is required before beginning this stage of that project, however, because there is great danger that the salt in the depression may make the water unfit for irrigation, or at least dangerous to use, until after the completion of drainage facilities for all the areas irrigated from the Euphrates. At the same time the technical possibility of providing alternative storage capacity through the erection of a dam on the upper Euphrates near Ana should be explored.

[648] The irrigation projects outlined above necessitate agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the conservation and utilization of the water of the Euphrates and the Tigris and their tributaries. An agreement with Syria is particularly urgent, since the extensive irrigation development possible in that country might adversely affect Iraq. With Turkey and Iran it is important to conclude understandings for joint afforestation and other water conservation measures in the watershed of the Tigris and its tributaries. Afforestation and other anti-erosion measures in the international watersheds of the two rivers will effectively complement the flood-control features of the water storage schemes.

650 In the monograph on irrigation the Mission has given a tentative selection of the irrigation projects which it believes should be initiated to utilize the waters of the new reservoirs. In view of the inadequacy of the information at its disposal, the Mission suggests, however, that its recommendations be reviewed in the light of a

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

312 /133 [731] late to benefit winter crops and too early for summer crops. Destructive spring floods are apt to occur just before the harvesting of the winter crops begins and as the planting of summer crops is in process. In the dry season—July to December—which is critical for both summer and winter crops, the mean discharge of the Euphrates at Hit and the Tigris at Baghdad is only 421 cumecs (cubic meters per second) and 559 cumecs, respectively, as compared with 1,765 cumecs and 2,572 cumecs during the three peak months of the spring.[2] The Haigh Commission has calculated that the mean discharge which can be relied upon for irrigation is only 280 cumecs for the Euphrates and 350 cumecs for the Tigris and its tributaries. This supply would appear to be barely equal to the water needed for existing irrigation systems when figured on the basis of the standards usually applied in Iraq. In fact, at present there is an acute shortage of water in the irrigated areas of the Diyala Valley and the Hilla canal system while in other areas water is wasted. Short of radical economies in the use of water, which can only be realized over the long term, no significant extension of the irrigated area can be undertaken without controlling and regulating the flow of the rivers. Nor can disastrous floods be controlled without schemes for the storage of the excess waters.

The Euphrates

653 312 A project for the regulated diversion of the flood waters of the Euphrates into Lake Habbaniya is already under way. This project involves the construction of an inlet channel from the Euphrates near Ramadi to the lake as well as an outlet channel for the later release of the stored waters. A barrage will be built across the Euphrates at Warrar to raise the water level and thus permit an increase in the capacity of the lake reservoir. The outlet channel and regulator are already finished and work is w advanced on the inlet channel and its regulator. The project whe completed will reduce the flood discharge from a possible maximum of 5,200 cumecs to 2,000 cumecs and will increase the minimum supply of water available for irrigation from 280 cumecs to perhaps 440 cumecs. The total cost is estimated at ID 4,300,000.

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[2] See chart and also Tables I and II in the appendix.

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While the soundness of the scheme is beyond question, the Mission has serious reservations about extending the storage capacity of the project by evacuating part of the water in Lake Habbaniya to the nearby depressions of Bahr el Milh and Abu Dibis through the discharge channel of Mujarrah. The Haigh Commission contemplated that with the reservoir formed by these depressions the maximum flood discharge could be further reduced to 1,500 cumecs and the water available for irrigation could be raised to 510 cumecs. In the opinion of the Mission, however, the salt in these depressions would be a serious obstacle to their use as a reservoir for irrigation water. The use of the stored water of Lake Habbaniya would in itself tend to raise the salt content of the Euphrates to the maximum concentration considered usable for irrigation. Since the lake is said to contain about two million tons of salt, and the waters of the Euphrates entering the lake themselves contain some salt, the waters of the lake at the capacity set by the 49.5 meters contour may reach a salt content of 100 parts per 100,000. These waters when mixed half and half with those of the Euphrates, which have a maximum salinity of 40 parts per 100,000, will tend to have a salt concentration of 70 per 100,000 or approximately the maximum tolerance. The Bahr el Milh and Abu Dibis depressions, however, now contain about 44 million tons of salt. The 20.5 billion cubic meters of water which might be stored in these depressions would therefore have a salinity of 215 parts per 100,000. It would be necessary to remove 27 million tons of salt in order to reduce salinity to 80 parts per 100,000. The Haigh Commission thought it possible to achieve this lower salt content in approximately four years by progressively evacuating the stored water into the Euphrates, but at a rate which would not raise the salt in the Euphrates itself over 80 parts in 100,000. Even granting this possibility, the Mission believes, however, that the resulting salt content would still be too high for irrigation water.

As a minimum, the Mission strongly suggests that any project for storing water in these two depressions be deferred until the problem of salting, already acute, has been brought under control by the installation of drainage facilities in the irrigated areas of the Euphrates Valley. At the same time it would be advisable to explore the possibility of alternative storage capacity somewhere

along the Euphrates. Of several possible sites, the best appears to 312
be at Rawa, a few kilometers upstream from Ana. There a dam 653
35 to 40 meters in height could be erected to create a reservoir with a capacity of seven billion cubic meters and an area of 480 square kilometers. The water would be backed up over a distance of 200 kilometers of which 60 kilometers would be in Syria. No geologic study of this possible dam emplacement has been made. An examination of outcroppings shows a series of horizontal layers in which soft but fairly compact limestone alternates with layers of highly decomposed rock and layers of soluble gypsum. While these surface indications raise serious doubt concerning the watertightness of the possible reservoir, the Mission urges that a geologic study of the site, supported by soundings, be carried out in order to obtain a geologic cross-section in the neighborhood of the projected dam emplacement.

The Tigris

Flood control on the Tigris is to be assured by the Wadi Tharthar project. A contract for the work on part of this scheme was awarded in the fall of 1951. The project involves the erection of a barrage across the Tigris, north of Samarra, to limit the flood discharge of the river to about 3,500 cumecs and divert the excess waters via an inlet channel into the Wadi Tharthar depression. At a contour of 60 meters the depression is expected to hold about 68 billion cubic meters of water in a reservoir extending over 2,050 square kilometers. The total cost of this project, for which the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development provided a loan of $12,800,000 in June 1950, has been budgeted by the Development Board at a figure of ID 9,625,000.

The efficacy of the Wadi Tharthar as a flood control scheme is clear. That the depression is sufficiently watertight to store enough water for irrigation is less certain. The Haigh Commission and its geologist had no doubt on this score, but other experts, including the one who served as government geologist until recently, have raised serious questions regarding the tightness of the reservoir. Two firms of consulting engineers—Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther, and Sir William Halcrows and Partners—have advised that the Wadi Tharthar project be considered exclusively for flood control. In any event, it would take about ten years

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for the reservoir to fill to the level at which water might be supplied for irrigation, and this water would then be available only for use in the Tigris Valley from Baghdad south. Thus other schemes for the storage of water for irrigation have to be considered.

From time to time storage dams for the Upper Tigris have been suggested, some with the obvious hope that they would cater to the needs of the North where rainfall is unreliable and does not permit the cultivation of summer crops. Among the sites proposed are two north of Mosul. One is near the village of Zumar about 115 kilometers from Mosul. The topographic features there would permit the creation of a storage basin, but geologic conditions appear to be very unfavorable. The soil consists of badly decomposed and fissured Lower Fars limestone and of marl which is also more or less decomposed. While no geologic investigation of the site has been made, borings made by the Mosul Petroleum Company about 10 kilometers away indicate the presence of numerous permeable layers in this area through which large amounts of water would probably be lost. Despite these prima facie doubts about the water tightness of the reservoir, the Mission believes that a complete geologic study, including borings, should be made of the site because of the understandable interest in this project in the North.

Conditions at the second site—Badosh, 25 kilometers above Mosul—are even less favorable. It has been suggested that with a dam 45 to 50 meters high a reservoir with a capacity of five billion cubic meters could be constituted. Outcroppings, however, disclose decomposed limestone with many caverns on this site. The dam would have to be built across a slight fold, cutting through various formations. Even with resort to costly and laborious injections of concrete, it is extremely doubtful that the proposed reservoir could be waterproofed.

Farther down the Tigris there is another possible dam site at Fatha where the river crosses a mountainous fold running northwest-southeast and known as Jebel Hamrin on the left bank and Jebel Mahul on the right bank. This site was studied in some detail by consulting engineers in 1940, and the investigation was resumed by the Haigh Commission in 1948. The Commission's geologist held that it would be impossible to build a gravity dam

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in the gorge itself but that an earthen dam farther upstream might 312
be feasible. The dam would have to be about 3,500 meters long 653
and, with a height of 75 meters and a fall board of six meters, could be used to store 24 billion cubic meters of water up to a contour of 182 meters. It could therefore be considered as an alternative to Wadi Tharthar and even as preferable since it would be likely to make more water available for irrigation. However, the anticipated cost of construction—about ID 20,000,000—and the vulnerability of an earthen dam to enemy attacks in time of war caused it to be rejected. Now that there no longer is any question of its consideration as an alternative to Wadi Tharthar, the possibility of a more modest project at Fatha might well be examined. A dam only 40 meters high could create a reservoir of five billion cubic meters which might some time in the future become of critical importance to irrigation. At the same time it would be so much smaller than the original project that the same objections concerning its safety could hardly be entertained. The Mission would therefore recommend further geologic studies and, particularly, a series of borings to determine definitely a geologic cross-section along the axis of the site.

The Tigris Tributaries

The Development Board has already provided in its five-year program for the construction of the Derbend-i-Khan dam on the Diyala river and the Dokan dam on the Lesser Zab river. The Mission agrees that these dam sites are the best available but suggests, as will be indicated in greater detail later, that these two projects be supplemented by the construction of the Bekhme dam on the Greater Zab river.

The Derbend-i-Khan Dam on the Diyala

Originally the Haigh Commission recommended that a dam be built at a point called Gibraltar where the Jebel Hamrin crosses the river. In 1950, however, Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther and Sir William Halcrows and Partners expressed their preference for a dam at the Derbend-i-Khan defile farther upstream; and in 1951 the Development Board included this project at a total cost of ID 4,800,000 in its five-year program. The Mission considers this decision sound. The foundation soil at the

Gibraltar site is soft sandstone sandwiched with layers of impermeable marl. The dam would have to be built of locally available sand and gravel, with an impervious facing in reinforced concrete or an impervious core; and it would be difficult to establish a watertight joint between the impervious facing and the impervious soil through the sandstone. The hills edging the reservoir show many low points where lines of seepage are so short as to create the risk of breaches. The presence of a lot of gypsum adds to the doubt about the watertightness of the reservoir. Moreover, its size and location are such that 128,000 masharas[3] of arable land would be submerged and 35 kilometers of railway detoured.

Borings have been made at the Derbend-i-Khan site and expert geologic opinion holds that the site provides a good foundation for a dam and has possibilities for a watertight reservoir. The rock-fill dam to be built will only close the breach, opened by centuries of erosion, in a solid rock sheath which, over long geologic periods, must have constituted the resistant part of a natural dam. The capacity of the dam will be only 0.87 billion cubic meters as compared with 1.56 billion for the Gibraltar dam. However, after allowing for losses, engineers believe that Derbend-i-Khan will provide a discharge of 80 cumecs at the Diyala weir, which governs the Diyala irrigation canals, as agaist 85 cumecs for Gibraltar. At present the usable mean discharge at the weir is only 38 cumecs.

The Dokan Dam on the Lesser Zab

A short distance from the Iranian border the Lesser Zab River passes through four gorges. According to competent geologic opinion, only the fourth of these, namely the Dokan Gorge, appears to offer a suitable dam site. The Dokan Gorge cuts through about 60 meters of Judean limestone covered by 40 meters of Shiranish limestone. Surface examination indicates that the former apparently consists of horizontal, generally sound beds, interspersed here and there, however, by caverns, while the Shiranish appears to be much more fissured. Up to the present only a brief geologic reconnaissance of the site has been carried out. Borings should be undertaken to confirm the surface indications and determine what special precautions should be taken in building the dam. The

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[3] A mashara is equal to a donum (0.25 hectares or 0.617761 acres).

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

geologic investigation should extend to the Shiranish limestone, for 3/2
if this is found to be of adequate quality a higher dam and larger 653
reservoir would be possible.

The construction of an arch dam at this site would be more economical than a gravity dam, but the proper planning and execution of such a dam requires much more skill. The Mission suggests that, after a thorough program of borings have shown the geologic conditions that will be encountered, the design and engineering of the dam should be entrusted to several consulting engineering firms so that the Development Board will be enabled to judge the best of different conceptions. So far as possible, all risks should be eliminated before construction commences. Soundness of conception and safety should not be sacrified in a desire to get things done rapidly.

An arch dam 60 meters in height would provide storage capacity for 1.99 million cubic meters at a level of 501 meters and for 2.21 million at a level of 508 meters. The usable mean discharge of the Lesser Zab would then be raised from about 63 cumecs to 108.5 and 149 cumecs at these respective levels.

The Bekhme Dam on the Greater Zab

The Haigh Commission made a complete geologic reconnaissance, including borings, of the possibilities of building a dam at two different sites in the Bekhme Gorge. It concluded that the Shiranish limestone at the upstream entrance to the gorge would provide a sound foundation for the construction of a high dam. The Commission was primarily interested in this dam as a flood control project, and, after deciding in favor of the Wadi Tharthar scheme, did not therefore include the dam in its program. The Development Board's five-year program also makes no provision for Bekhme.

The Mission urges, however, that construction of the Bekhme dam be undertaken as soon as possible. With the completion of the Dokan dam and related works it is planned to divert the waters of the Lesser Zab into the Adhaim River and use them for irrigating areas on the left bank of the Tigris and in the Diyala River Valley. Thus the Lesser Zab which has a usable flow of about 60 cumecs at present will no longer be supplying water to the Tigris.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

312 653 As a result irrigation in the Lower Tigris basin, particularly in the area served by the Shatt al Gharraf where water is already acutely short, would inevitably suffer in consequence unless water were made available from some alternative source. Although the deficit may be made good from the Wadi Tharthar in the end, it is by no means certain, as has already been pointed out, that the Wadi Tharthar depression will be able to supply water for irrigation. If the Wadi Tharthar reservoir can ultimately supply the Lower Tigris, it will still be possible to use the water stored behind the Bekhme dam for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in the North.

Nor should the cost be regarded as out of proportion to the results that will be achieved. In 1948 Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther estimated the cost of a gravity dam in concrete at ID 9,000,000, but in 1950 they came to the conclusion that a buttress dam could be built at considerably lower cost, namely about ID 6,500,000. The dam would provide a net storage capacity of 1.66 billion cubic meters and would increase the usable discharge of the river from 128 cumecs to about 240 cumecs. This would furnish additional water sufficient to irrigate an area of two million masharas gross. On this area it would be possible to grow winter cereals on 828,000 masharas which might have a total value of ID 3,700,000, assuming conservatively a yield of one quarter of a ton per donum and a price of ID 18 per ton. If, in addition, summer crops were grown on one third of the area devoted to winter crops and yielded about the same value per mashara, the total value of the crops grown on the area of two million masharas gross could be put at about ID 5,000,000 per year. The resulting increase in national income would far outweigh the cost of the scheme. Even the tax yield would exceed the cost of amortization.

International Agreements

312 648 The construction of these reservoirs makes it necessary to reach agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the control of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris. For the Euphrates this is particularly urgent because half of the course of the river is in Turkish and Syrian territory and nearly all of its basin is in a foreign country. There are irrigation possibilities in Syria which could seriously reduce the flow of water into Iraq. Works which would raise the water level 10 to 20 meters upstream would com-

312 Irrigation projects for the following areas would then be necessary:

1. Along the Lesser Zab the Makhmur area on the right bank (400,000 masharas gross) and the Hawija area on the left bank (300,000 masharas gross). About 180,000 masharas in the Hawija project are already being irrigated, and work is proceeding on the extension of irrigation to the balance. Both areas would be served by canals governed by a new barrage (Hawija barrage) on the Lesser Zab River which would also control the intake into the Adhaim feeder.
2. On the left bank of the Adhaim River a gross area of 600,000 masharas. To raise the water level for the necessary new canals, as well as for the Diyala feeder, construction of a barrage across the Adhaim will be necessary.
3. Extension of the irrigation system of the Diyala by 540,000 masharas gross.
4. Irrigation of a gross area of 660,000 masharas on the left bank of the Tigris below the Diyala River through construction of the Nahrwan canal and of a regulating barrage just above Beni Saad to govern the take-off of the canal from the Diyala.

This program differs from that recommended by the Haigh Commission in that it does not provide for the irrigation (1) of a gross area of 560,000 masharas on the left bank of the Tigris below Fatha, and (2) of a gross area of 300,000 on the right bank of the Adhaim. The agricultural potentialities of these areas have not been surveyed. A decision to provide irrigation for them should accordingly not be made until it is established that their agricultural value is at least equal to that of the other areas.

● [653] In its five-year program the Development Board has already included part of the works for the above projects. This program budgets ID 500,000 for the Hawija barrage on the Lesser Zab, ID 300,000 for the barrage on the Adhaim, ID 500,000 for the Beni Saad dam, ID 750,000 for the construction of part of the new Nahrwan canal and ID 2,600,000 for canal systems in the areas commanded by the Hawija and Adhaim barrages. On the other hand, no provision has yet been made for the Adhaim and Diyala feeders.

The Mission has not attempted to determine which new areas might be irrigated with the additional flow made available upon

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

TABLE IV

Expenditures of the Directorate General of Irrigation

(in dinars)

Fiscal Year	Capital Works Budget: Capital Works Other than Bunds	Capital Works Budget: Bunds	Capital Works Budget: Total	Ordinary Budget: Irrigation and Drainage	Ordinary Budget: Flood Control	Ordinary Budget: Salaries Allowances Services	Ordinary Budget: Total	Total Budget
1941-42	247,396	53,295	300,691	63,986	32,566	75,332	171,884	472,575
1942-43	200,328	119,047	319,375	67,971	36,512	95,128	199,611	518,986
1943-44	355,461	152,830	508,291	82,606	22,842	118,598	224,046	732,337
1944-45	448,309	157,986	606,295	74,963	23,266	154,693	252,922	859,217
1945-46	326,975	124,756	451,731	68,077	28,093	157,981	254,151	705,882
1946-47	667,057	337,897	1,004,954	89,965	125,208	201,527	416,700	1,421,654
1947-48	783,139	363,020	1,146,159	86,628	13,318	187,781	287,727	1,433,886
1948-49	1,088,591	230,671	1,319,262	70,765	54,213	206,146	331,124	1,650,386
1949-50	726,224	159,084	885,308	69,924	32,608	189,418	291,950	1,177,258
1950-51	607,481	173,080	780,561	56,926	19,877	193,868	270,671	1,051,232
Total	5,450,961	1,871,666	7,322,627	731,811	388,503	1,580,472	2,700,786	10,023,413

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489 transport, in other words, a rationally organized goods-tariff service, which so far does not exist.

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Although lacking data on which to base an exact appreciation of the Iraqi Government's plans concerning transport and communications, various sources state that it is making great efforts to improve the means of communication and installations. It supervises the maintenance of the entry to the Shatt al-Arab, and is allocating funds for the purchase of new dredges for the cutting of a new channel. It is reported by authorized sources that the programme for the railways, at the end of 1949, consisted of thirty-five work plans at an estimated total cost of 10,178,000 dinars. New railway lines are being built to serve the economically important districts, as well as railway bridges and a new station and locomotive depot at Baghdad. According to a recent report in the British technical Press, three modern sleeping coaches, with kitchen and air-conditioning, for the Baghdad-Mosul standard-gauge railway (1.435 metres) and beyond, have recently arrived at Basra; two other modern first-class non-air-conditioned coaches are about to arrive.[8] Authorized sources state that the Iraqi Government is arranging for the gradual building (or rebuilding and improvement) of the country's road system, to the extent of its resources. Its main concern is to build new roads across the passes and valleys of the northern plateaux. Hundreds of new bridges for motor traffic have been completed in the last twenty years (including two steel bridges at Baghdad, and one steel bridge, 300 metres long, at Mosul). The

489 needs of the southern districts are particularly acute:
● 653 as yet they possess only roads which are not prac-
[491] ticable for any traffic, still less for heavy motor traffic, during the rainy season and for a long time afterwards, and boat-bridges of a very old—almost antediluvian—type across the Euphrates and other rivers.

[508] The government is taking steps to modernize the Baghdad and Basra-Ma'agil airports (the latter, in addition to its modern technical installations, has had since 1937 an air-conditioned hotel, swimming pool, tennis courts, etc.). The aim is to make them into first-class international airports. In addition, a training school for civilian air pilots was established in Iraq in 1937.

377 As the country lacks hydroelectric power stations, in spite of the existence of various large dams, there is now a plan to utilize the Bekhme dam for the generation of electric power.

315 In the expectation of the return of normal political conditions in the Near and Middle East, the

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[8] It is interesting to note that for the Basra—Baghdad section (568 km), these coaches are placed on special 1-metre bogies.

312 and controlling the flow of the rivers. By the construction of the Hindiyah dam on the lower Euphrates in 1913, part of its flow was diverted through the Hilla canal and secondary channels, thus opening up over 650,000 acres for irrigation in the western delta. A parallel barrage at Kut, on the Tigris, which was completed in 1939, permitted the forking of the river through abandoned channels and ultimately will bring almost 1 million acres under irrigation. A dam on the Diyala River provides water for the irrigation of about 260,000 acres in that valley. Other projects, designed for flood control, irrigation and sometimes hydroelectric power purposes, are under construction, or planned, for the Great Zab, the Little Zab and other rivers. The enlargement of Habbaniya Lake, west of Baghdad, into a reservoir to control the flooding of the Euphrates and to furnish water for expanded irrigation facilities has been completed recently, while the conversion of the Wadi Tharthar depression, in the Al Jazira region, into a reservoir for the storage of the flood waters of the Tigris was in process of construction in 1952. A General Development Board was created by the Iraqi government in 1950 to review its various development programs, including irrigation, communications, medical institutions and other public services. Since its inception, the Board has underwritten extensive projects for the development of domestic water supplies and irrigation.

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Waste Disposal

364 There are no municipal sewerage systems in Iraq. In the cities, cesspits are commonly employed for the disposal of sewage, although water-borne systems, connected with septic tanks, are installed in some of the modern homes, hotels and public buildings. The contents of the cesspits are usually carted to dumping grounds on the outskirts of the towns. In the smaller towns and villages, sewage disposal is by means of pit privies or cesspits. However housetops, courtyards and other convenient sites often

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185, 433, 654

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
● Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the program of industrialization in countries of the Middle East after World War I up to 1945, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Turkey - pp. 274-284, Egypt - pp. 285-286, Iraq - pp. 287-289, Palestine - 289-290, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 290-291./

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

242 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group,
651 that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an
ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving
the construction of the Ḥabbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and
a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable
success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton
Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards
called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist
nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale
which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method,
came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated
in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable
harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness,
654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small
Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with
231 Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it
could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi
flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual
losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsibility
of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship
494 was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay
in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in
mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The
mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased
threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars
plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying
repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much
491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by
Ramadi and Rutba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated
in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters
was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's
foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian)
competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the
victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The
Ruṭba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in
the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year
thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through
205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails
by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services
superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi
administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive
and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1940) MIII Iraq MXI

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the 496
transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi 471
membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930
Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line 496
were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to
road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and
abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930
and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway 499
development were followed, both of international interest: the
first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between
Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct
bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution
in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project
widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as
far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the 509
rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–
Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two
years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Air-
ways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F.,
and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain,
a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the
(French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the
Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air com-
munications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr.
Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped 508
airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was com-
pleted in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at
Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west 205
air services on postal communications was profound. Both were
used as they came into being for letters, the former also for pack-
ages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized.
In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the
constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network 206
within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station
already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and
Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted 185
indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly 654
in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts
of the public and Government were active in this direction. No 135
minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government
salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold con-
cession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

185 Rutba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of
• 654 bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial develop-
135 ment proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every
Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its
433 favour. 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled
artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

382 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil
471 export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in
1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

312 The daily lives of many 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in
653 agriculture than by even the greatest industry, and such progress in this period was not negligible. The grandiose irrigation schemes for which the press and public called were not, indeed, at once attainable; maintenance, minor improvement, and research were rather the order of the day. Nevertheless, some works of fair magnitude were carried out. New headworks and canalization on the Diwaniya and Daghara branches of the Euphrates were undertaken, and improvements in the water-supply to the Suq rice-lands. Swamp-drainage at Karbalā was primarily a public health measure. A permanent weir across the Diyalā replaced annually renewed antiquated works and secured supplies for the Ruz, Khurasan, and Maḥrut canals. The Laṭifiya Canal, the new Iskandariya, the Shayshubar were dug or re-aligned. A clearance of the Baṣra creeks and a major regulator, opened by the King in 1930, on the Bad'a in Muntafiq country were works of great local value. With them went continuous researches, surveys, experiments in desalination and drainage, and efforts to maintain and improve the 'bunds', breaches of which could ruin a countryside as they did in the disastrous floods of 1926 and 1929, and the necessity for which only the completion of the long-standing flood-diversion schemes could remove. Such was the Ḥabbaniya project, conceived by Willcocks twenty years earlier and closely restudied from 1927 to 1932; in the last of these years tenders were called for and the work seemed imminent. Other major plans, postponed by lack of funds and incomplete data, were the Tigris barrage at Kut al-Amara to restore the Gharraf and to control the 'Amara rice-lands: the smaller Abu Ghurayb canal from the Euphrates left bank, begun in 1932: an 'Aqar Quf drainage project near Baghdad: a proposed reservoir at or near Qizil Rubaṭ to conserve Diyalā water for summer use: a new head for the Ḥilla branch: the Isḥaqi Canal, to take Tigris water from opposite Samarrā: and work on the main Euphrates channel near Shinafiya. The Irrigation Department was administered from 1925 to 1928 by L. E. Bury, who acted also as Adviser to the Ministry of Works and after 1927 to that also of Irrigation and Agriculture. W. Allard succeeded as Director of Irrigation from 1928 to 1933, and as Chief Engineer under an 'Iraqi director in 1933-4. Wheatley resumed the advisership of Communications and Works in 1929, and held it for the next eight years.

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654 Of the need to improve agricultural methods, if these canal works were to yield all their value, the public was little aware. In spite of continued research and experiment, the main agricultural problems of the territory were yet unsolved—those of soil deterioration, antiquated techniques, inferior crop varieties, low and impure yields, and harvests endangered by flood or drought.

Their solution must depend on the simultaneous and widespread 241
working of forces of rural education, reliable security, sound land 654
tenure and properly financed enterprise. Meanwhile, the annual locust campaigns in northern 'Iraq were developed jointly with neighbouring countries. Progress was made in hill-country tobacco-growing and treatment of the leaf on modern lines. Silk experiments continued, though with scant success. Cotton-growing was still restricted by unskilled cultivation and by pests. The produce of the great date-groves of southern 'Iraq was bringing difficult problems not only of improved culture but of organization and disposal, and civil war raged between growers and packers. Of the attempts at modern estate development (p. 17) none had yet succeeded. The projected Agricultural Bank could not, it was found, be inaugurated until clearer land-titles gave security for loans. The Aṣfar Concession was limited and revised to provide for the acquisition and development by the Company of the Laṭifiya estate, south of Baghdad; the Irrigation Department constructed the main canal at the Company's expense, and promising operations on the 65,000-acre area began under European management.

The main agricultural development of the time was that of river- 312
side pump irrigation. This had been initiated before 1914 and moderately extended between 1920 and 1925. Aided by important fiscal privileges, it began thereafter to show remarkable increase, to the point of becoming a main feature of 'Iraq's economy. Installations in the liwās of Baghdad, Diwaniya, Kut, 'Amara, and Diyalā had by the end of 1930 brought the number of pumps to over 2,000, representing a million-acre increase of cultivable area. There was evident value in thus attracting capital to agriculture, utilizing the cheap oil available, exploiting the high-lying virgin lands, and avoiding the precarious chances of flood irrigation. But the develop- 311
ment was not free from trouble. The attraction of cultivators to 472
new lands rather diverted them from old than increased their numbers; improvement in yields, due to fresh lands and secure irrigation, was not matched by superior type or purity of crops. Estate management attempted by townsmen was sometimes short-sighted and uneconomic, and the hard times and low prices of 1930–1 brought ruin to many hopeful enterprises. These, more- 423
over, jointly undertaken by an urban capitalist—often a Deputy or city notable—and a tribal shaykh or *sirkal*, were productive of puzzling difficulties of land tenure and rights. Neither the traditional occupancy of the tribe, nor the share claimed by the incoming capitalist, had any basis in law. Agreements between the parties often proved unworkable, and in practice did not always bring blessings to the cultivators. These conditions indicated, yet

by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as 425 too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land-developers, 185 and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding [423] was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallaḥ, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes [166 to construct model villages, good in conception but at present 654] trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increasing 241 official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

241 185 473 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices, throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist. Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers and exporters.

654 242 185 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-year course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected, tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield, quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust campaigns in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world: caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many centres. The department was in touch with local industry which could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley, beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intolerably [474] wasteful. It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspectorate, and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself in rural education and established agricultural schools in every [361] liwā. It was promoting village settlement, in which field the interesting and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323) was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechanization of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power as its chief limiting factor. Attention was being given to 654 the increase and improvement of livestock, a major asset of the 242 country; Ayrshire and Friesian bulls were imported and distributed, rams from a selected herd were sold to reliable farmers, 185 laboratory work on wool was carried out. Yet other lines of progress were dairying, with experiments in cheese production, the breeding of improved mules and donkeys, the increase of egg production by improving poultry breeds. The allotment by the Development Board for the period 1951–6 was nearly 2 million dinars for agricultural research, 3½ million for small-scale reclamation schemes, 1¼ million for animal husbandry, and a million for swamp reclamation. The need for a measure of integration between animal husbandry and crop production, hitherto divorced, was realized, as well as the broad essential singleness of the effort which must be made in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, land settlement, rural education, and the provision of capital. It seemed certain as the nineteen-fifties opened that if this effort were made and sustained by public and Government, and in the absence of any general calamity, the prospects for agricultural development in this wide and favoured territory, within the ultimately fixed limits of its river-water and rainfall resources, exceeded those not only of any Middle Eastern country, but of any territory of comparable size elsewhere in the world; the growing of food for less fortunate nations could prove, indeed, to be the main part of 'Iraq's material contribution to humanity.

In the care of its forests not much had yet been accomplished 313 beyond the limits of study, experiment, and the establishment of 185 tree-nurseries; the wide but neglected forest areas (p. 29) of the north still lay untended and unimproved, lacking notably a modern forest code, a staff of trained foresters, and even detailed exploration. Some steps had indeed been taken to provide fire protection and to carry out by helicopter and air photography the first forest surveys, but few to prevent uncontrolled cutting, grazing, and trespass by the villagers. One million dinars were allotted by the Development Board for forestry development in 1951–6. The significance of these areas to soil erosion, silt deposit, and river flooding was understood, and plans were being prepared on these and allied matters; but only a beginning had been made to solve these problems or to move towards the large-scale action which must be involved, or to provide the 'Iraqi public with sources of fuel and timber at present lacking.

Although sea fishing, based on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, was but a 226 limited resource, the rivers and swamps of the territory were the source of a fish catch estimated at many thousands of tons a year, and export of fish to the Levant—and in particular to the Jews in

CHAPTER FIVE

SIGNIFICANT RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY ADVANCE IN IRAQ

000 Although the various obstacles outlined in the previous chapter are serious ones, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that certain of them are being at any rate partly overcome; some of them in ways which are significant pointers to the directions along which positive advance towards compulsory education may be possible.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCE FAVOURABLE TO EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Certain economic and social advances are taking place which are likely to be favourable to the development of education, both as regards producing more revenue and in improving the standard of life of parents so that they can afford to allow their children to attend school.

241 407 *Evidence of Improved Agricultural Practice.* A few of the more enlightened landowners, especially those who are not absentee landlords and take an active interest in their farms, are engaged in the important business of applying power and science to the land. Large tracts of land in the rainfall region which have not previously been cultivated are being opened up by the mechanical plough. Indeed, it has been fascinating to see land which was hitherto regarded as desert being ploughed at night by modern tractors with headlights. Other landowners and farmers are experimenting, with considerable success, in the growing of relatively new crops such as American cotton of high quality. In some of the northern provinces there are cattle bred to considerably higher standards than formerly. The writer was present at a lively discussion between farmers who were suggesting ways of conserving by modern silage the nutritious spring vegetation most of which is at present only scantily cropped and then left to be burnt up by the summer sun.

654 It has also been gratifying to observe the growing interest which is being taken in certain of the experimental farms organized by the Directorate of Agriculture.

872 876 promotion, is indicated by the following extract from a teacher's introduction to the first issue of a primary school magazine:

'Our Magazine.
Dear Pupils,

> This is the first number of our school magazine. I want every pupil to read it very carefully because it is for you, not for the teacher.
>
> Please read this paper carefully and ask me any question about it. If you do as I say, you will succeed in the examination.
>
> Your Teacher,
>
> Signed ....'

874 654 *The Agricultural Primary Schools.* The need for realistic village schools in Iraq has been advocated in the Report of the Monroe Commission and elsewhere. They have taken a long time to materialize, but there are now signs of progress.

In 1948 the Ministry of Education requested the Provincial Directors of Education to establish an experimental primary school in each province. One such school has since been provided in most of the provinces, not as an entirely new project but as an extension of an existing primary school. Several acres of land have been attached to these schools and some of them keep a limited amount of livestock. Some have modest dairy equipment, a stock of hand tools for the pupils and an agricultural machine such as a power-driven cultivator. One or two have a tractor. In the irrigation districts some possess their own water pump.

Unfortunately these schools were established during a period of retrenchment, and although the Ministry of Education launched this important experiment it was apparently unable to provide the money for other essential buildings and equipment such as handicraft shops, simple laboratories and materials for experiment. It was also unable to provide every such school with a teacher acquainted with the basic practice and principles of farming. Despite these initial handicaps, some of the agricultural primary schools have started courageously and have attempted to free [177] themselves from a purely academic curriculum. In certain of the schools, apart from teaching methods of normal cultivation, experiments are being made in the growth of crops hitherto unfamiliar to the local economy. Indeed one teacher claims that, through his introduction of American cotton on to the school farm, the local landowner has since grown this crop on a large scale and has made a substantial profit from it. If this is so, it certainly illustrates the extra-mural influence of a village school which adjusts its curriculum to real life situations.

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN IRAQ

ABDUL GHANI AL DALLI *

433 Modern industry in Iraq, as in many other underdeveloped countries, has made significant progress in recent years and especially since the end of World War II. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the causes of this movement in their relation to over-all industrial development and industrialisation in Iraq. The discussion in this paper will, on the whole, be restricted to the problems of industrial enterprise in the private sector of the economy. Consequently, Government industrial plans, as well as the oil industry have not been discussed. Likewise, the paper does not deal with the wider regional aspects of modern industry. As far as Iraq is concerned, the main causes for the progress of industry are to be found in the abundance of natural wealth, especially in the form of oil, the relative plentifulness of cheap labour in urban centers, the hardships suffered by the population during the war owing to the shortage of essential industrial products, the exceptional profits made during the war by proprietors of such modern industries as then existed (e.g. woollen textiles, cigarettes, soap, etc.), the accumulation of large sums of liquid capital in relatively few hands as a result of war and post-war inflation, and finally, the positively helpful attitude of Government towards industrial development.
654 The Iraqi Government has always tried to encourage industry, and
652 has granted it various exemptions from taxation under the Law for
the Encouragement of Industry, passed in 1929, and its amendments. In 1946 - 47, however, it took a more effective step in the creation of the Industrial Bank, with a capital of I.D. 500,000 wholly contributed by the Government. The Bank's function is to grant loans for the establishment of new industries and the expansion and improvement of existing industries, to participate in joint-stock companies formed for industrial purposes, to start new industrial enterprises on its own account if need be, and to offer various services connected with the import of machinery, materials, and the export

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654 of products.[1] Financial assistance thus provided by the Government,
652 together with the new Law for the Encouragement of Industry issued in 1950, proved of great potency in the development of industry. The capital of the Industrial Bank was increased in 1952, to I.D. 3,000,000 of which I.D. 1,200,000 have already been paid up.

433 These and other measures, such as increases in custom duties
656 and the restriction or prohibition of certain industrial imports, have produced marked progress in the establishment of new industries and the re-equipment and expansion of old ones, especially since the end of World War II.[2] This can be seen from the following table:

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Development of Large-Scale Industry in Iraq 1948 - 1952

Year (1st April - 31st March)	Capital Invested I.D. 1000	Value of Annual Output I.D. 1000	Number of Employees	Wages paid annually I.D. 1000
(Seven large Industries)				
1948 - 49	3,183	1,403	1649	
1949 - 50	3,194	1,555	2626	333
1950 - 51	4,206	2,631	3443	406
1951 - 52	4,415	3,600	3837	486
(Ten large Industries)[3]				
1951 - 52	4,835	4,424	4533	599

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[1] Industrial Bank, Compilation of Laws, Regulations, etc. Government Press, Baghdad 1951.

[2] For pre-World War II industrial development in Iraq see:- *A Handbook of Mesopotamia*, H.M S.O., 1917. *A Report on the Progress of Iraq*, by H.M. Government to the League of Nations. H.M.S O.,1931. *The Iraq Directory*, Baghdad, 1935 (English Edition). *The Economic Organisation of Iraq* (In Arabic), Editor Said B. Himadeh, Beirut, 1937.

[3] See the *Annual Report of the Department of Industry 1951-52*, Ministry of National Economy,Baghdad. (In Arabic)
The Report of the National Bank of Iraq, 1949-50, p. 46 (in Arabic) states that national production of cement, beer, vegetable oil, soap, leather., etc., has been substituted for similar imports with the result that value of imports fell from I.D. 2,984,000 in 1948 to I.D. 1,298,000 in 1950, and the deficit in the balance of trade was reduced by I.D. 1,686,000 due to this reason alone during the same period.

The ten industries referred to in the table are: cotton spinning 433 and weaving (one establishment), cement (one establishment), wool spinning (two establishments), modern tanning (five establishments), beer (one establishment), alcohol (three establishments), vegetable oil (one establishment), modern soap making (one establishment), artificial and natural silk weaving (six establishments), jute spinning and weaving (one establishment still under construction). The total is 22 establishments all of which [654] enjoy government assistance under the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, and practically all have received financial aid in the form of loans or capital participation from the Industrial Bank. None of them employs less than 20 workers, and the majority employ over a hundred workers. All use power-driven machinery. It is interesting to notice that most of these industries are [473] owned by joint-stock companies and that they have distributed profits during the last three years ranging from 9 per cent to 25 per cent.

Obviously the table does not cover the whole field of industrial development in Iraq. It has been constructed on the basis of a selected sample to show the rapid progress made in recent years. The unusual increase in ouput compared with the rate of capital investment as shown in the table is to be explained by the fact that most plants were still under construction or half-completed in the early years. A complete survey of the industrial sector in 654 the economy of Iraq is still to come. The Central Bureau of Statistics 433, Ministry of National Economy, is expected soon to embark on this task. Such a survey will have to cover, in addition to those industries included in the above table, the following:

(a) Other modern industries in the private sector which represent a substantial portion of the whole, such as flour milling, workshops and agricultural machine repair shops, printing, cotton ginning, cigarette manufacture, the building materials industry, shoe-making, etc.

(b) The great oil industry owned and operated by powerful foreign [382] concerns holding concessions from the Government. The oil companies produced nearly 8 million tons of crude oil and 400,000 tons of refined products in 1951, and employ over 12,000 workers. Their production is expected to rise to 20 million tons of crude oil in 1955-56.

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[655] (c) Industrial enterprises being carried out directly by various Government departments and agencies such as the Iraqi State Railways, the Port of Basrah, the Ministry of Defence, the municipalities, and the recently set up State Oil Refinery Administration which has already undertaken the construction near Baghdad of an oil refinery with an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons of refined products, at an expected cost of about I.D. 7,000,000.

(d) Various handicrafts and semi-mechanised industries such as the date-packing industry.[1]

433 It need hardly be said that, although recent industrial development has been marked, it is still quite limited in relation to the economy as a whole and in comparison with industrial development in neighbouring areas. In Lebanon for instance, the industrial sector has been found to contribute approximately LL. 135 million, or 17 per cent of the total national income estimated at
434 LL. 830 million.[2] In our estimation, the industrial sector in Iraq contributes no more than 10 per cent of the total national income estimated at I.D. 150 million.[3]

000 The problems arising from, and the difficulties standing in the way of, industrialisation in Iraq, will now be discussed.

Industrialisation in general means the introduction of modern industry into an area which has been up to that time dependent for its livelihood on agriculture, trade and craftsmanship. Such an area would have had no experience of mechanised industrial processes, the organisation of modern factories, the division of labour inside such factories, nor would it have any clear idea of the material and human resources that such organisations would demand. Assuming that industrialisation of such a "new" or underdeveloped area is a desirable thing, two sets of problems seem likely to emerge. The first set of problems is connected with the ways and means of developing industry with reasonable speed. The second set of problems relates to the psychological, social and political effects that modern industry brings about.

[1] For a brief but fairly comprehensive survey of industrial output and possibilities in Iraq see: *The Economic Development of Iraq.* Report of a mission organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. p. 148-50, also Annex D. p. 277 and following.

[2] *National Income of Lebanon, Monograph No. 3* by Albert Y. Badre, Ph. D., and Asad Y. Nasr, M.A., Beirut, Lebanon, May 1953. Especially p. 24.

[3] The ratio for more advanced countries is between 30 and 40 per cent.

000 industrial shares or bonds, local capital will continue to be held
455 in hoards, or invested in trade, agriculture and real estate. Speculation in land values, especially urban sites, has come to play a great part in the economy of Iraq, and incidently absorbs a great
000 deal of capital. The problem lies then not in the deficiency of capital resources, but in the utilization of these resources and above all in the creation of a suitable environment to induce private enterprise and capital into the industrial field. In the writer's view the creation of such an environment is the core of the industrialisation problem in under-developed areas. As things are, private enterprise is primarily absorbed in trade, agriculture and speculation — especially in real estate — where easy money can be made, and the whole economy remains stagnant. Once this problem is tackled both local and foreign capital will flow in. The State, that is the highest authority in a society, is called upon to take the initiative. Its action must include financial, technical, educational and administrative measures.

654 In Iraq the State has made attempts to deal with all these as-
433 pects. In the fiscal field it has afforded protection for industry in
[439] the form of high tariff duties on most industrial products and in the exemption of power-driven machinery from such duties. It has prohibited or restricted the import of articles the like of which are being manufactured in Iraq, such as cement, cotton yarn, vegetable oil, soap, tanned leather, beer. Industrial schemes are given priority in the granting of import licences and the allocation of scarce currencies for purchases from abroad.

The new Law for the Encouragement of Industry passed in 1950 consolidated early legislation and made new concessions. Under this Law Iraq-owned industrial enterprises, that is enterprises in which 55 per cent of capital at least is held by Iraqi nationals, are granted exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions from import duties (not included in the tariff exemptions) on machinery, materials, equipment, spare parts and containers; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of Government land free of rent up to 25,000 square meters. Industries enjoy these concessions as long as they use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in cosiderable quantities. In any case they should use chiefly power-driven machinery in their works. These measures without doubt played a significant part in

the development of industry sketched above.[1] Industries which 654
existed then or have come into existence since have benefited con- 433
siderably from these concessions. But private enterprise remained
shy of industrial activity until the establishment of the Industrial
Bank in 1946-47. Through this Bank, the State showed itself not 652
only willing to forgo some revenue in the interests of industry, 475
but to provide cash, and to share in the risks of industry. As men-
tioned above, the Industrial Bank could not only give loans (against
real or personal security), but also participate in the capital of
joint stock companies. Its greatest value in my view lies in the fact
that it can become a founder or promoter of industries and thus
lead the industrial community and the investing public into new
fields. However, the Bank was handicapped in the early stages, 652
by the inadequacy of the financial resources at its disposal and the
absence of economic and technical studies by which the feasibi-
lity of proposed industrial schemes might be judged. Moreover,
the Bank lacked, and to some extent still lacks, a qualified techni-
cal staff. It has often to rely on the judgement of the Board of Di-
rectors or the advice of specialized Government departments such
as the Directorate General of Industry and the Directorate Gene-
ral of Agriculture, which are not always fully equipped for the task.
The Bank has continually asked for scientific surveys to be made 654
of the mineral, agricultural and animal resources of the country. 433
It has also called for an integrated economic plan covering indus- 652
try, agriculture and other economic activities, in which the Bank,
like other institutions, will play its particular role.[2] There has
been strong resistance on the part of the Board of Directors to the
allocation of money for technical staff or technical studies by ex-
perts, and often when money was allocated, it could not be spent
because the Board disagreed on the qualifications of such experts
(foreign or national) or the need for inviting them to study par-
ticular problems. However, as years passed and the financial posi-
tion of the Bank improved, a section for the study of industrial
schemes was formed and members of it were charged with the
study of certain problems at home or abroad. A number of ad hoc
committees of specialists available in Iraq were set up to study
and report on proposed industrial schemes. Contact was estab-

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[1] No provision was made, however, for direct subsidies to industry, and no legal preference in government contracts was given to home industry.

[2] See First Annual Report, Industrial Bank 1946-47/1947-48, Baghdad. (Arabic)

652 433 lished with various Government departments, and data were collec-654 ted, classified and sometimes published for the guidance of would-be entrepreneurs. A number of foreign experts were invited to study either particular schemes (such as paper, sugar, artificial silk fibre, the exploitation of salt, etc.) or to concern themselves with industrial development in general, and make recommendations for improvements in existing industries or for the establish-652 ment of new industries. In addition to the absence of a general investment policy and planning, and the lack of economic and technical data to guide the activities of the Bank, there was, in the years 1947-50 the handicap of inadequate financial resources. When the Bank opened for business in 1946-47 its nominal capital, in accordance with a decision taken early in 1940, was fixed at I. D. 500,000. This figure was out of proportion with the changed level of prices and incomes, and the expansion of industry which had taken place meanwhile. Furthermore as the capital of the Bank was provided by the Treasury as a loan, it was up to the Treasury to decide what amounts to pay and when to pay them, and its decisions often did not coincide with the Bank's requirements either for funds or for making forward plans.

This situation, however, has completely changed as a result of increased Government revenue from oil in accordance with the Oil Agreement of 1951. The capital of the Bank was raised to I.D. 1,000,000 in 1951 and to I.D. 3,000,000 in 1952. Earlier, in 1948, 1949, and 1950, the Bank was forced to borrow from the reserves of certain Government departments, e.g. the Directorate General of Awqaf, Government Staff Guarantee Fund, and from other banks (especially the National Bank of Iraq). This form of borrowing was found to be less costly and more elastic than borrowing from the public. Another important source of capital which has developed in recent years is the annual net profits of the Bank. These have risen from I.D. 4,066 in 1948-49, to I.D. 7,745 in 1949-50, to I.D. 60,591 in 1950-51, and to I.D. 99,463 in 1951-52. The average rate of loans granted to industry in the last five years has been about I.D. 150,000 annually,[1] with an average loan period of three to four years. Hence a sum of I.D. 40,000 to I.D. 50,000 is repaid annually to the Bank. The paid-up capital of the Bank stood at I.D. 1,200,000 in 1952, but it can safely count on an annual payment by the Treasury on capital account of no less than I.D. 200,000. The Bank therefore can be said to be now in a sufficiently liquid position to meet any legitimate demands made upon it. 652

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[1] The rate of interest was reduced from 7 per cent per annum to 5 per cent by decision of the Ministry of Finance in 1951.

The International Bank Mission[1] has recommended that "the Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital." This view is no doubt inspired by the shortage of capital from which the Industrial Bank, as well as other financial institutions, had suffered before the Oil Agreement of 1951. It is clear that the Bank must not, however, be hasty in disposing of shares if it is to perform its important function of encouraging enterprises and capital investment in industry. This can be seen more clearly from the following considerations. First, most of the industrial concerns in which the Bank participates are still under construction (a process which requires two to four years in Iraq), and the few which have gone into production and distributed profits have only done so in the last three or four years. Any large sell-out by the Bank, which holds between 25 and 40 per cent of their shares, is likely to shake confidence in these concerns and create unforseen difficulties for them. Secondly, there is no organised stock exchange in Iraq and the market for shares is so limited that any large sale of shares may lead to a fall in prices which would hit small investors and benefit speculators, while it might harm the credit of the Bank. Thirdly, the stake which the Government now has in the capital of so many industrial concerns helps to reassure private enterprise that it will not retreat from the generous policy it has so far adopted towards industry. Another important consideration in this respect is that Government participation in industry through the Bank gives it a useful instrument, if it wishes to make use of it, for the supervision and control of industry.[2] It seems obvious therefore that the Bank cannot easily use its capital as a revolving fund. 652 654 473 ●

(2) **The Supply of Raw Materials and Power**: Iraq is potentially 000

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[1] See the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. *The Economic Development of Iraq*, Report by a Mission of the Bank. Washington 1952. Annex D, p. 295.

[2] During the past five years, the Bank has made, only one sale, 2,000 shares out of 24,000 shares it then held in the Iraq Cement Co., in 1951, by public auction.

433 471 materials and spare parts is due to many factors. First is past experience of the difficulty of obtaining such materials, due either to Iraq's distance from international markets, or to the shortages of world supply, or to the arbitrary attitude of suppliers abroad. Secondly, the fear of interruption of supplies owing to international emergencies and restrictions in the countries of origin. Thirdly, the influence of directors or big share-holders who own agencies for such materials or spare parts.

433 (b) There is great scope in Iraqi industry for improvement in the layout of machinery, flow of material, lighting, noise abatement, and temperature control.

466 (c) The problems of labour recruitment and organisation, systems of wage payment, housing and workers' welfare in general, fall outside the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say that present labour legislation provides for weekly and annual holidays, for compensations in cases of injury or total loss of life, and prohibits the employment of children under twelve years. Industry is subject to inspection by officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs for the purpose of enforcing the labour laws. The formation of trade unions is permitted under the law, but so far labour organisations have played very small part in industry.

433 654 (8) **State Assistance and Control**: The main characteristics of industry in Iraq should by now be clear. It is of a recent development. It has developed largely under state protection and assistance. It has to operate within a very small market. The fact that industry is still in its infancy makes it hard to predict its future course. The part which government assistance has so far played in its development is of special importance and calls for examination. State assistance has taken various forms; tariff protection, exemptions from various taxes and duties, and financial aid through the Industrial Bank. Except possibly in the last case, government assistance to industry has not been based on any criteria of efficiency, or economic or social objectives. Any firm can obtain the benefits of state encouragement as long as it fulfills two conditions only; that it will use raw materials available in Iraq, or that it will produce goods imported in large quantities. It is necessary, if industry is not to grow lax behind the high walls of protection, to set up standards of efficiency, and to relax protective measures such as the prohibition of competitive imports, as soon as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized. Benefits under

the Law for the Encouragement of Industry are granted irrespective of the locality in which the Industry is to be established or the type of industry embarked upon. Industries established in crowded, highly developed areas are given the same advantages as those established in remote, less developed districts. The manufacturer of producer's goods is treated equally with the manufacturer of consumers' goods and luxury goods. The criteria upon which an industry's claim to benefits is judged stand in need of drastic revaluation. 433 654

The limitation of the market in Iraq not only restricts the possibilities of large-scale development of most industries but it affords opportunities for monopoly control by one or two plants in certain fields. The danger of monopoly and exorbitant prices is already in sight in such industries as cement, beer, cotton and woollen textiles. The encouragement of new enterprise in these fields, or the relaxation of state protection to allow healthy competition, or direct intervention by the state to fix prices in relation to costs, is necessary to restrict monopoly power in the interests of the consumer and to preserve public confidence in industry. It is only on the basis of such confidence that the government can continue to give support and material aid to industry. The Iraqi Government has ample powers for dealing with the abuses of monopoly under the provisions of the Law for the Organisation of Economic Life of 1941. 477

The government can also extend its control over industry and prevent abuses by proper amendments to the law governing joint-stock companies. There is need to restrict the grant of free-shares or "water" shares to promotors, the creation of founders' shares with special powers of voting or percentage of profits, the interlocking of directorships, and abuses on the part of management in respect of purchases of materials and equipment, and sales of finished products. In particular, managers of joint-stock companies should be prohibited from trading on their own account especially in goods related to firms under their management. 473

The Industrial Bank has often been urged, as a shareholder in many industries, and with its representative on their boards, to exercise control over their price and sales policies. This suggestion derives from the prestige which the Bank has acquired in relation to industrial development. It has undoubtedly helped to iron out many difficulties, to improve management, and prevent abuses. But it is going too far to suppose that the Bank can actual- 652 473

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[For a detailed outline of the Development Program for Iraq recommended by the Mission which went to Iraq in 1951, see category 116, pp. 72-119.]

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433 as 60,000 people are engaged in industrial production (other than oil), virtually all of these are employed in small undertakings where the work is largely done by hand and productivity is accordingly quite low. Probably only about 2,000 are working in what might be characterized as modern industrial plants.

654 651 382 Fortunately prospective increases in government revenues from oil now make it possible for the government to undertake a large-scale program for the development of the country. Past investments in the oil industry will in the future yield large dividends in the form of a rapidly increasing production of petroleum. [471] In accordance with an agreement reached in August 1951, subject to ratification by Parliament, the three internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq have undertaken to raise oil output, which amounted to only about six million tons in 1950, to 30 million tons per year by the end of 1955 and to turn over to the Iraqi government half of the profits before the deduction of taxes. On this basis it is anticipated that, over the next five years, the governmen may receive net revenues amounting to as much as 214 million dinars from oil alone. Under the terms of a law passed in 1950 these revenues will be available to finance development. They will be assigned to the Development Board, an autonomous agency established in 1950 to ensure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs.

652 In the past, financial stringencies have severely limited public expenditures. The government has often had difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays had to be kept small; government salaries were not raised in accordance with the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds. In the future the situation will be reversed. The principal task will be to find ways and means of spending rapidly increasing revenues in a manner which will contribute most effectively to the permanent development of the country. It is with this task in view that the Mission has drawn up its recommendations.

110 Any program for realizing the economic potentialities of the country should be broad in conception and well balanced. Investment outlays in dams and irrigation works, transport facilities and industrial plants must be complemented by increased expenditures

on the land. There is apt to be increasing pressure on the land- 423
owner to take such steps as a result of the growing opportunities 427
for alternative employment created by a large increase in public 241
expenditures on development, the expansion of industry and the opening of state lands to settlement. In fact, unless the sharecropper's status is improved, there is a great danger that there will be a continued flight of labor from the land, impairing the country's agricultural production.

The government itself has made only a modest contribution 654
to the advancement of agriculture. The Directorate-General of 242
Agriculture is only a subordinate department in the Ministry of Economics and has been severely handicapped by lack of funds and a shortage of competent agricultural officers. While it has had some success in combatting pests and diseases and in the extension of such crops as cotton and citrus fruit, too little attention has been devoted to practical research, and almost no field work has been carried out to assist cultivators in improving their crops and methods of cultivation. The expenditures of the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments were actually cut from ID 1,160,000 in 1948-49 to ID 540,000 in 1950-51 and, at the latter figure, represented only 1.8 percent of the total budget outlay. Expenditures on both agriculture and irrigation 1950-51 amounted to only 6.7 percent of the total.

Plans for the future now envisage large water storage and 654
irrigation projects to provide more water for land already in use 311
and to increase the area under cultivation and provide for the settlement of new land. These plans are in general quite sound. They will be largely ineffective, however, unless at the same time more stress is placed on arresting the deterioration of land already in use by extensive drainage schemes and on raising the productivity of agriculture by other means. The establishment of an efficient extension service and the provision of incentives to improve methods of cultivation are particularly important in this connection.

Expansion of Area under Cultivation: Irrigation 311

Extension of the area of land under cultivation is vitally important not only to an increase in production, but, above all, as

453 433 losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

To prepare the Bank for its expanding operations, its staff needs to be strengthened by providing for the appointment of an expert with wide industrial experience to head its Industrial Schemes Section and for the establishment of a small-business branch to pay special attention to the needs of small enterprises. The Bank should, of course, have access to the corps of technical specialists which, at a later point in the report, the Mission recommends should be attached to the Development Board.

Dangers of Excessive Protection

654 433 Particular care should be taken that government assistance does not foster inefficient industries at the expense of the country's standard of living. This danger is by no means unreal. A Law for the Encouragement of Industry, originally enacted in 1929 and replaced by a new act in 1950, provides limited but generous exemptions from income and surtaxes and customs duties, and government land free of rent for 10 years. Iraqi-owned industrial enterprises can qualify for these benefits as long as they primarily use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in considerable quantities. Neither of these conditions is necessarily relevant to efficient production; and it is therefore suggested that the law be amended to stipulate that, in general, such benefits should be accorded only to enterprises which have a reasonable prospect of becoming efficient enough to withstand foreign competition.

Industry is also protected in many cases by high import duties and in some cases, such as cotton yarn, beer and cement, by import prohibitions. In a small country like Iraq, where the limited market affords opportunities for only one or two plants in each field and where the entrepreneurial class is small, there is an acute danger of monopoly and attendant high prices. In Iraq this danger is aggravated by a tendency in some industries to emphasize limited production with high profits per unit rather than mass production with lower unit-profits. While the Mission recognizes the need for

temporary, moderate protection of certain industries, it wishes to 654
emphasize strongly the need for a rapid and progressive reduction 433
in special assistance.

Government Organisation for Industry

Government activities relating to industry, except for the 654
Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in 647
the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present 433
director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. The Mission recommends that a Department of Industries be established to maintain adequate statistical records on industrial production, analyze economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and administer the laws concerning assistance to industry. The research and technical functions now being carried on would then be continued under a separate Department of Industrial Research and Standards.

These two departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future as compared to special measures of protection and assistance which tend to shield industry against competition. Much can be done in the long run to assist industry in better controlling the quality of its products, reducing waste through material salvage, analyzing production costs, making market surveys and increasing labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

Labor and Vocational Education

Finally, it should not be overlooked that a contented, well- 466
trained labor force is of the utmost importance to industrial development. An improvement in working conditions and more attention to the welfare of the worker would tend to increase labor productivity. Such an improvement can to a large extent be brought about only through a growing realization among employers that
it is to their own interest. The government should, of course, lay 467
down minimum standards in this respect, particularly since the 466
absence of real trade unions precludes workers from achieving

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423 471 individuals, however, under conditions which are virtually indistiguishable from full private ownership, since the holdings may be sold, mortgaged or transferred to successors. In the past, claims to land were established in most cases quite informally without the benefit of full legal sanction, i.e., by simply occupying the land. Tribal lands were generally regarded as being held in common. As, however, the tribes were converted from nomadic pursuits to settled agriculture, the sheikhs and sub-sheikhs of the tribe gradually established a claim to such lands as their own property and thus became landlords, with their tribesmen as sharecropping tenants.

423 In the 19th century the Turkish government sought to establish a single legal system of tenure, known as *tapu*, but in the end this effort only compounded the confusion. There were no systematic grants of *tapu* tenure. Grants were generally made without any examination of conflicting claims and were used as a means of rewarding the favored few. The grants that were made at that time to the Sadun clan and a few other influential persons in Muntafiq province remain contested to this day by the actual occupiers of the land. With the introduction of *tapu* tenure many village areas in the North apparently were registered in whole or in part as the personal possession of local notables or *aghas* who in the past had acted as tax farmers and served generally as intermediaries between the government and the cultivators. In the twentieth century a further complication was added by the rapid introduction of pump irrigation. City merchants financially able to buy pumps entered into arrangements with occupiers of *miri* land for the supply of water against specified shares in the crop, thus creating new claims to land without resolving the fate of any pre-existing claims.

423 654 Following a study of this question by Sir Ernest Dowson, a British land expert, the government decided in 1932 to end the confusion by inaugurating a cadastral survey to be carried out by a number of so-called Land Settlement Committees. The law of 1932 as well as the law which replaced it in 1938 recognized the following types of land tenure:

- *Mamloukah* or *mulk*—land held in absolute private ownership.
- *Matroukah*—land reserved for public purposes.
- *Mawqufa* or *waqf*—land which is administered in trust (1) for

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the benefit of religious institutions by the state Awqaf Administration, or (2) for the benefit of private persons by *mutawallis* appointed by religious courts. This type of *waqf* must be distinguished from so-called untrue *waqf*, namely property from which the taxes or revenue were in the past assigned to religious institutions by the Turkish government.

Miri tapu—land held in permanent tenure from the state under conditions enabling the holder to sell or mortgage it and leave it to his successors. Proof of such tenure may be supplied by documentary evidence or by factual evidence that the land has been used productively by the holder or his predecessor for 10 years during which no land rent was paid or that it has been planted with trees meeting specified conditions.

Miri lazmah—land held under generally the same conditions as *miri tapu,* but with the stipulation that the government may veto the transfer of such land if it tends to disturb the peace, a precaution designed to prevent, where necessary, the transfer of tribal lands to people outside the tribe. *Lazmah* grants are made upon proof that a person has made productive use of the land within the preceding 15 years.

Miri sirf—land, particularly vacant or idle land, definitely acknowledged as belonging de facto and de jure to the state.

Although *tapu* and *lazmah* land are still recognized as *miri* or state land, they are in fact hardly distinguishable from full private ownership. In theory, possession of these lands may lapse if they are not productively used for three successive years in the case of *lazmah* and for four years in the case of *tapu,* but this apparently happens rarely, if at all. Prior to 1939 holders of such land were generally required to make to the state a payment for rent and water rights which was lower for *tapu* than for *lazmah* land, but in that year these assessments were abolished in return for amortization of their capitalized value over a period of 10 years. With the abolition of these payments there now remains very little distinction between *tapu* and *lazmah.*

The cadastral survey has now been completed for about half of the land in the 14 provinces in Iraq. The progress achieved is set forth in the table below. It will be noted that 61 percent of the total land surveyed and 51 percent of the cultivable land sur-

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TABLE 3

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LAND CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TYPES OF TENURE BY CADASTRAL SURVEY*
(in donums)

	Cultivable	Uncultivable	Total
Total area to be classified	—	—	107,045,725
Total area classified by Feb. 8, 1951	38,188,575	12,268,459	50,457,034
Mamlukah (mulk)	150,601	22,366	172,967
Matroukah	9,296	1,686,912	1,696,208
Mawqufa (waqf)	549,198	36,538	585,736
Miri tapu	8,370,595	698,987	9,069,582
Miri lazma	7,371,720	485,291	7,857,011
Miri sirf	21,737,165	9,338,365	31,075,530

* For fuller details, see Table I in the appendix.

veyed has been definitely adjudged to be *miri sirf.* Only a small part of the land is actually being exploited today. About 1.6 million donums is let by the state on triennial leaseholds which may be renewed once by the same holder. Virtually all of the land in Amara province is also leased out by the state. Here, however, it is held under virtually permanent leaseholds by sheikhs who have been rewarded by rather large tracts of land in return for maintaining order and performing other services in this province which has a somewhat unruly past.[2] The remainder of cultivable *miri sirf* land is in theory still available for exploitation. Presumably most of the better and more accessible lands have been alienated to private holders, and that remaining to the state is in large part relatively poor, inaccessible, or not susceptible of irrigation. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a large reservoir of state land which can still be opened to cultivation, particularly if irrigation is provided.

425 A feature of the 1932 law inaugurating the cadastral survey was the introduction of *lazmah* tenure. This type of tenure was designed to recognize prescriptive rights to tribal lands. In practice, the sheikhs rather than the tribesmen have benefited from this provision of the law. *Lazmah* grants could be obtained on proof

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[2] In all there are 290 leaseholds of cultivated state land in Amara of which 13 are between 10,000 and 35,000 donums, 10 between 5,000 and 10,000 donums and 95 between 1,000 and 5,000 donums.

TABLE 15

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MERCHANDISE TRADE
(in millions of dinars)

	1949		1950	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Customs returns	12.4	40.5	22.0	37.6
Less				
Oil Companies trade	− 0.7	−10.3	− 0.8	− 8.4
"Officially" financed	−14.9	−20.0	−20.6	−24.8
Discrepancy	− 3.2	10.2	0.6	4.4

457 Agents). But the principal explanation of the large amount of residual imports is the import of goods "without foreign exchange." Licenses issued (but not necessarily used) amounted to ID 10,800,000 and 7,400,000 in 1949 and 1950. These were paid for with foreign exchange acquired by the methods already described. Part of this foreign exchange was, no doubt, also used for travel abroad, particularly in the Lebanon. Insofar as receipts and expenditures in "unofficial" foreign exchange did not balance in any one year, there must have been a balancing item in these transactions, representing capital export or import. No data is available on this, but it is generally believed that there has been a considerable export of capital in recent years.

IX. Government and the Economy

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Until recently the goverment, handicapped primarily by a shortage of funds, played a comparatively modest role in promoting economic life. In agriculture the main effort was confined to the production and distribution of seeds, the promotion of cotton and citrus culture and the combating of diseases and pests, particularly the locusts. Some help was given through the establishment of the Agricultural Bank and of a government organization for the rental of agricultural machinery. One project for the settlement of smallholders on newly irrigated government land in the Dujaila district near Kut was initiated. Outlays on irrigation and flood control, [242]

however, had to be kept small. In the field of industry the govern- 654
ment sought to stimulate private enterprise by according special tax
benefits and protection and by establishing the Industrial Bank.

The Development Board

With the prospect of a rapid rise in oil production and there- 654
fore in government oil revenues, the promise of a much wider field 185
of activity developed. Accordingly a law was enacted in 1950 estab- 647
lishing a Development Board and assigning to it all the oil revenues as well as the proceeds of any loans contracted by it or by the government on its behalf. The Board consists of two ex officio members—the Prime Minister, who functions as its president, and the Minister of Finance—and six executive members appointed for five years. The Board was directed to draw up a general program for the development of Iraq and, upon its approval by Parliament, to proceed with the detailed plans and specifications of the projects included in the program and with their execution in accordance with an approved order of priorities. Each year any revisions in the program, an annual budget and an annual report are to be presented to the Parliament. The Board is also to consider and coordinate development schemes which may originate in the various ministries of the government.

The establishment of this Board is evidence of the government's determination to see the extraordinary oil revenues used for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living and to insure some continuity in development which frequent changes in governments have made virtually impossible in the past.

The Board was constituted and began operations toward the end of 1950. The British and American governments each nominated one of the executive members in accordance with a request by Iraq. In the spring of 1951 the Board submitted its preliminary over-all program involving a total outlay of ID 65,674,000 over a five-year period beginning with the fiscal year 1951-52. About ID 29,401,000 of the Board's projected revenues, consisting of the income from oil anticipated at that time and nearly all of the proceeds of the $12.8 million loan obtained from the International Bank for the Wadi Tharthar flood control project, were reserved

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654 for subsequent programming. Expenditures for the five-year period
185 were allocated by broad fields as follows (in dinars):[5]

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Water storage and irrigation schemes	30,044,000
Roads	15,826,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	12,618,000
Miscellaneous projects	6,216,000
Administrative expenditures	970,000
Unprogrammed reserve	29,401,000

Because of the brief time devoted to its preparation, this program will necessarily undergo modification as more detailed study is given to requirements and the cost of individual projects and as some of the over-all allocations are programmed in detail.

652 The magnitude of this projected outlay is in startling contrast to the financial stringency which has characterized public expenditures in the past. The government has had great difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays were pared; government salaries were not increased despite the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds.

Government Budgets

The trend of government finances is indicated in Table 16.

It will be noted that, despite economies and tax increases, the government's total budget showed substantial deficit in 1948-49 and 1949-50, primarily because of the bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 and the effects of the war with Israel. Of the government's principal autonomous enterprises, the railways also ran considerable deficits on capital account which were defrayed only by using reserve funds, by borrowing ID 1,000,000 from the government and contracting a loan of ID 3,000,000 through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The Iraqi government borrowed at home to meet its own needs, its domestic debt rising from ID 4,500,000 on March 31, 1948, to ID 10,800,000 on March 31, 1951. Borrowing had to be limited, however, because the market for government securities was virtually restricted to the banking system. As of March 31, 1951, the National Bank and the commercial banks held ID 9,200,000 of the domestic debt.

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[5] For a more detailed breakdown, see Table V in Appendix.

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TABLE IV

Expenditures Projected by the Development Board

(in millions of dinars)

	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56	Total
Irrigation projects:						
Wadi Tharthar	1.3	3.6	3.1	1.5	0.2	9.6
Habbaniya	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	—	2.1
Diyala Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.1	2.2	1.9	6.1
Dokan Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.0	1.8	2.0	5.7
General drainage	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Other irrigation projects:						
New projects	0.4	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.9	4.2
Completion of projects begun previously	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.3
Total	3.0	6.6	7.4	7.5	5.5	30.0
Roads and bridges:						
Main roads across Iraq from south to north (Basra - Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc.)	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.6
Other roads	1.3	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	9.4
Total	2.1	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.5	15.9
Buildings:						
Hospitals	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Schools	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Other buildings	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.0
Total	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	12.6
Other projects:						
Small settlement projects	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Artesian wells and water for drinking purposes	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Special projects in northern Iraq	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.3
Reforestation and filling of swamps and marshes	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5
Telegraphs & telephones	0.5	—	—	—	—	0.5
Other projects	0.2	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.4
Expropriations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	—	1.1
Total	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	6.2
Administrative expenses	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0
Grand Total	9.4	13.7	14.8	15.0	12.8	65.7

Note: Totals do not necessarily add up because of rounding.

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Dates

Dates, one of the principal foods of Iraq, are also a main export 245
crop. While Iraq's pre-eminence in the world date market will not easily be threatened, the quality of dates has apparently declined and replacement of old trees has been far from adequate. Not more than 15 percent of the old gardens have under way a tree-planting program sufficient to replace old and deteriorating stands. More than 60 percent of the gardens are in poor condition owing to inadequate cultivation. Halfa, Johnson and Bermuda grasses have been allowed to become serious pests, causing considerable damage. Yields could be improved by better cultivation, manuring, fertilization, reduction of other fruit trees planted in date gardens and improvement in irrigation through the cleaning of canals and the installation of more pumps. Processing of the crop could also be improved, for old packing sheds where primitive methods of handling are employed are still in use.

Responsibility for promotion and improvement of the date 654
industry is entrusted to the Date Association under a law approved 246
in 1935. Ever since 1939 the Association has had a contract with 473
the Andrew Weir Company whereby the latter undertakes to buy at fixed prices and export all the dates of the best varieties offered for sale from the Basra district. There is general agreement among the growers that this arrangement has helped to stabilize prices. On the expiration of the current contract with Andrew Weir after the 1952 season, the Association hopes to conclude a similar agreement with a newly-formed Iraqi company. The Association, the growers and the foreign companies engaged in the date trade are each expected to subscribe one third of this company's capital of ID 500,000. Consideration is also being given to extending its price-support operations to the dates grown in the Tigris-Euphrates valley. In addition, the Date Association is contemplating a distillery to convert into alcohol dates which are surplus to market needs.

There is considerable danger that in carrying out these ambi- 654
tious plans the Association will neglect the need for better cul- 245
tural practices stressed above. The Association has already been criticized for doing little to improve the production of dates. It would be unfortunate if it followed the precedent set by the Tobacco

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654 245 Monopoly which seems to have lost sight of one of its primary objectives, namely, to raise the quality of tobacco. Moreover, before the Association and its Iraqi "marketing" company undertake the contemplated stabilization program, there must be reasonable assurance that prices are not fixed at excessively high levels owing to political pressures and that the company has ample financial resources. An operation of this character is likely to be highly speculative. While large profits may be earned in some years, severe losses will be incurred in others. With respect to the projected alcohol plant, caution should also be exercised. There is already one distillery making alcohol as well as arak. For the time being the demands for alcohol may make another plant appear attractive, but it is doubtful that in the long run dates can compete with other raw materials such as molasses as an economical source of alcohol.

Other Fruits

245 Iraq can grow a wide variety of fruits and nuts. Citrus fruit has been conspicuously successful in the Diyala River Valley and the number of plantings has increased greatly with the help of the Department of Agriculture which distributes the trees. A higher output could be achieved through the use of fertilizers, particularly nitrogen, and by better cultivation to discourage weeds and pests. Better storage facilities are also needed.

In some parts of the country, particularly in the North, conditions are quite favorable to the growing of deciduous fruits. The fruit, however, is poor in quality and seldom gets beyond local markets. The better grades of fruit are all imported from other Middle Eastern countries. Yet better care in pruning, cultivation, thinning and in the control of insects and diseases might well double the output of apricots, peaches and apples and greatly improve their quality. A rising standard of living should provide an incentive to higher production provided facilities are made available to can, dry and store the fruit. The proposed small-business section of the Industrial Bank might investigate the possibility of financing such facilities. The organization of transport to the market also requires attention.

Nut culture could also be expanded in the northern provinces. The possibility of top-working, budding or grafting improved

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and nursery stock. The first of these sections should have adequate laboratory facilities for identifying plants, insects and diseases and for analyzing chemicals, pesticides, fertilizers, feed and food products. The second section would need better equipment than is now available at Abu Ghuraib to test, clean and process seed. It would also require at least three nurseries—one each for the northern, central and southern parts of Iraq—to propagate needed fruit, nut and citrus stocks. Seed stocks of proven strains would have to be either imported or produced locally either on government farms or on private farms under contract. Experience indicates that soil and climatic conditions are favorable to the production of seed of the most important field crops, as well as alfalfa, berseem clover and many of the grasses. 242

The inspection and regulatory service in the field will presumably exist separately for agriculture and animal husbandry under the direction of the departments respectively responsible for these subjects at Baghdad. Ultimately, however, the extension service should be under the unified direction of a single director, particularly since it is so desirable in the future to integrate animal husbandry with agriculture.

Establishment of a Research Department

An extension service will need to be complemented by a staff engaged in practical research and experimental work and a small staff of agricultural statisticians and economists. The first will develop and test new and better strains of seeds and stock, experiment with different methods of soil cultivation and fertilization, explore means of improving livestock breeding and feeding, and the like in order to develop the most effective and best adapted agricultural and livestock practices for practical application through the extension service. The small staff of statisticians and economists will be concerned with developing a more accurate picture concerning farm and livestock production and land use. It will study marketing problems and provide advice on the pattern of agricultural and animal output that is likely to be most remunerative for the farmer in various sections of the country. 654 242

It is important that a Department of Research and Experimentation be established within the ministry charged with respon-

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sibility for agriculture. Such a department should gradually be staffed over the next five years with trained personnel able to devote full time to research and experimentation. At present those engaged in research are generally charged with other duties as well. Until more staff can be trained, the available personnel will presumably have to discharge several functions. It is strongly recommended, however, that immediate steps be taken to recruit a man with wide experience in research as the director of the new service. It would be his responsibility to coordinate such research as is now being carried on both in agriculture and animal husbandry and to build up a full-time staff. The research department should have ample facilities and therefore have jurisdiction over all experiment stations. Government farms are now primarily devoted to commercial production of seed and nursery stock rather than to research. In the future their principal task should be to serve as experimental and demonstration stations. Only such land as is surplus to these needs should be turned over to commercial seed or stock production. Under those circumstances part of the seed production may have to be contracted out or grown on newly established government farms.

The research department would concentrate on the following fields:

1. *Soil management and conservation.* This would include the initiation of a complete soil survey to determine the properties of different soils by field and laboratory studies, classify the soils by their properties and possible uses and summarize the information available on each type with respect to its tilth, fertility, adaptability to particular crops and the like. Such a survey would be extremely useful in planning land use, especially in the selection of land for irrigation and drainage projects. The first step would be to carry out a preliminary reconnaissance survey. The advantages of the intensive cropping system, involving proper crop rotation and the use of fertilizer, should also be studied in comparison with those of the crop-fallow system. Finally, the various methods of conserving moisture through better cultivation, timely destruction of weeds and the prevention of soil erosion could be tested.
2. *Introduction of new and better varieties of crops.* Among the subjects to be examined in this field would be the suitability of different types of forage crops, including

grasses and legumes; new grain sorghum varieties and hybrid maize strains; and the adaptability of sugar beets and sugar cane. 654 242

3. *Horticulture.* This work, which should be centered at the Zafarania station, would cover vegetables, dates, nuts, citrus and other fruits. Tests should be carried out in the northern and southern as well as the central part of Iraq.
4. *Tools and machinery.* This type of work would test the suitability of various kinds of hand, animal-drawn and power tools for different conditions and jobs and especially seek to develop cheap but effective animal-drawn equipment and hand tools.
5. *Forestry.* Research on forestry should be developed with particular attention to experiments with controlled grazing on range and forest land and the selection and culture of trees suitable for various uses and sections of the country. It would be desirable to carry on this research not only at the forest nursery in Erbil, but also at the Abu Ghuraib and Bakrajo stations.
6. *Animal husbandry.* This would focus on the development of the most suitable pasture and feed crops and the best methods of preserving fodder for winter feeding. As already indicated, it would determine to what extent existing types of livestock could be improved by systematic breeding and feeding. The cost and results of feeding with different oilseed by-products and date by-products should be studied and a laboratory established to work on the relative value and digestibility of various feedstuffs. A research program on range development should also be carried out, but jointly with the forestry service. The government has already taken a constructive step by inaugurating a scheme near Chemchemal in the province of Kirkuk for experimenting with afforestation and rotational grazing. The site appears to be unsuited, however, for the production of low-priced fodder to aid in overwintering cattle. Experiments should also be conducted with the reseeding of pastures, using both foreign and indigenous grasses and clovers and with the possible use of fodder trees such as mesquites.

423 for settlement by small-holders, they will make a significant contribution to the social and political stability of Iraq. They may make any strong demand for radical land reform unlikely in the areas now already under cultivation. If developed with the enlightened guidance of the government, the new settlements may ultimately furnish striking demonstrations of the value of more advanced techniques in agriculture and animal husbandry as well as in social organization.

654 423 Under a law approved by the Parliament in 1951 land recognized as government-owned *(miri sirf)* in the cadastral survey will apparently be reserved in the main for settlement by small-holders. However, land which can only be irrigated by high-lift pumps can still be granted in tracts up to 5,000 donums to individual holders. Projects for the development of *miri sirf* land are to be drawn up and carried out by the Development Board. Selection of the settlers and administration of the finished projects will be the responsibility of a committee headed by an official with the status of a Director General. Two or three other members will be appointed by the Council of Ministers. The area of each project will be a minimum of 2,000 donums in mountainous lands, 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated lands and 80,000 donums in the rain-fed region. Each settler will be assigned up to 20 donums in the mountainous areas, 100 donums in flow-irrigated areas, 200 donums in pump-irrigated and 400 donums in rain-fed lands.

Under the law every settler must agree to refrain from granting his rights in the land to others and from injuring his fellow settlers in any way, to follow the committee's instructions with respect to the cultivation of the land and the planting of a garden, and to build a house in accordance with plans prepared by the [425] committee. If he fulfills this agreement, he receives title to his allotment after 10 years without payment. For a further period of 10 years he has no right to alienate it or mortgage it except to the Agricultural Bank.

The law does not confine the distribution of land to qualified and experienced farmers. In fact, it specifies that up to 20 percent of the land in each project shall be distributed to retired army and police officers, soldiers and policemen who have served at least four years, and graduates of agricultural schools, provided the

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committee is convinced of "their agricultural capabilities". Under the same condition the committee is also to distribute up to 25 percent of the land to retired civil servants who have served at least eight years and to unemployed graduates of elementary, secondary and religious schools.

While the general intent of this law will meet with general endorsement, several of its provisions might well be reconsidered. First of all, it appears doubtful that the inclusion of the beneficiaries described in the preceding paragraph will advance the basic purpose of the law—namely, to establish a class of independent small farmers who till their own land. Most of these types of beneficiaries will have neither the ability nor the inclination to do the actual farming themselves. They will bring in others to do their work and may even become absentee landlords. Under such circumstances the evils of "petty landlordism" will tend to creep in.

Secondly, the size of the plots to be assigned to each settler seems in some cases to be too large. Fundamentally the allotment should not be bigger than that which can be managed by the average farm family without outside assistance. The size will, of course, depend on the machinery, tools and draft animals which can be placed at the settler's disposal from the very beginning. It is improbable, however, that a single family will be able to handle more than 100 donums. If a larger allotment is necessary in the rain-fed zone in view of the uncertain yields resulting from irregular rainfall, a special effort may have to be made to organize cooperatives to own and operate the machinery needed to till such units. The proposed assignment of 200 donums in pump-irrigated areas is presumably based on the assumption that some private person will provide the needed pumps against a substantial share in the crop, thus requiring each farmer to have a larger plot of land for a decent livelihood. Now that the government is likely to have ample financial means, there would seem to be no reason why it cannot either install and operate the pumping facilities itself for a nominal charge or finance the cooperative ownership and operation of such pumps.

Thirdly, the provision enabling settlers to acquire land without any payment whatsoever is open to question. In principle it is inequitable that no payment should be required for these exten-

654 423 sive benefits, particularly in relationship to those who are not fortunate enough to be selected as beneficiaries. Moreover, the value of the benefits conferred may be all the more appreciated if some charge, which need not be burdensome, is made for them.

Fourthly, it may be desirable to reconsider the provision exempting the areas irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution in accordance with the law. Apparently this provision was also dictated by the belief that the requisite pumping facilities would need to be provided by private investment and that such investment was unlikely ~~to be forth~~coming unless a comparatively large grant of land was made for development by high-lift pumping. In the future, however, public capital should be made available for the installation of such pumping facilities.

Finally, the safeguards against alienation of the land may need further strengthening. After the two consecutive periods of 10 years each, during which these safeguards would apply, it may still be desirable for the government to retain an option to purchase any of such land offered for sale. In this way it would be possible to prevent, if necessary, the gradual acquisition of excessively large landholdings in these newly developed areas.

A brief comment might be made regarding the settlement possibilities in the rain-fed zone. Much of the land available for such settlement may be submarginal from the standpoint of rainfall. Care must be taken, therefore, not to invest too much in the development of the lands the yield of which will be highly speculative. It is noted that the Department of Agriculture has drawn up an ambitious scheme involving the settlement of 1,000,000 donums and the establishment of 50 villages in northwestern Mosul near Balad Sinjar. There are indications, however, that the rainfall in this region may be insufficient to permit settlers to earn a good livelihood. If attempts are made to carry out this scheme, it is suggested that small-scale tests first be undertaken over a number of years.

654 423 241 166 The law for the development of *miri sirf* lands which has been discussed at length above is basically modelled on the 1945 act under which the Dujaila settlement was established in south-central Iraq near Kut. During the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled in this area on 100 donum plots allotted from

state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is pre- 654
scribed. Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and 423
barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums 241
are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the 166
older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted.

On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously [511] successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines.

The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified [345] success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers.

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423 On the new settlements the government will have a unique opportunity to improve on the Dujaila project. To ensure that it becomes a model project, the planning of each settlement should be carried out in close cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry charged with agriculture. There must be an integrated plan with appropriate provision for public health, schools and adult education, agricultural extension, cooperatives and the like.

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XIV. Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use

The program outlined in this monograph does not involve large expenditures. Detailed estimates of the cost involved will need to be worked out, but it is unlikely that total expenditures over the next five years will be far from ID 7,500,000. The largest outlays—ID 2,900,000 and ID 1,450,000 respectively—would probably be for grain storage facilities and additional capital for the Agricultural Bank. Not much more than ID 250,000 may be needed for new tobacco warehouses. The continuing contribution to the Agricultural Machinery Administration has been assessed at ID 250,000, but more money would be required if plans to borrow from the International Bank for new equipment do not materialize. On forestry, probably not more than ID 750,000 could be spent in the initial five-year period. An arbitrary allowance of ID 500,000 might be made for financial incentives. The remainder of the total outlay would, however, really be the most important, for it would go, except for some miscellaneous projects, to expand and strengthen the agricultural and animal husbandry services which are vital to the future of Iraq.

The improvement of agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry along the lines indicated requires an energetic organizational effort by an agency well staffed and vigorously directed. Within the existing governmental organization in Iraq, agriculture and animal husbandry are not given sufficient importance. These subjects should not be handled by subordinate departments in the Ministry of Economics but by a separate Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use.

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ANNEX D

INDUSTRY

I. Iraq's Potential for Industrial Development

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The economy of Iraq is predominantly agricultural. In recent years, however, a national desire for industrialization has become increasingly evident and is being actively encouraged by the government. In 1929, the government took the first step to assist industry by passing a statute known as "A Law for the Encouragement of Industry". It proved to be of little significance, however, as it failed to provide industry with any financial assistance. It was not until seventeen years later, when the government created the Industrial Bank, that the problem of obtaining the necessary capital was partially solved. As a result, industry has since made some noticeable strides and should continue to do so.

On the whole, however, industry is as yet little developed. 433
Excluding the petroleum industry, modern industrial plants employ only 2,000 people and account for a total capital investment of only about ID 4,000,000 and an annual gross income of roughly ID 3,000,000. The very modern and important oil industry, on the other hand, provides employment for about 12,000 people. During the war a number of important industrial enterprises were started. Rising prices and difficulties in getting materials, however, retarded orderly progress, so that some of these new projects are still in the process of completion.

Natural Resources

There are ample resources for further industrial development. An abundance of oil and gas provides a cheap source of both fuel and raw material. Particularly as irrigation is extended, agriculture will become increasingly important as a source of raw materials such as cotton, sesame, linseed, and possibly sugar beets or sugar cane, soybeans and jute.

paid in only ID 600,000 out of an authorized capital of ID 1,000, 652
000. Its resources have to some extent been supplemented by 433
borrowing ID 100,000 and ID 200,000 respectively from the Awqaf Administration and the National Bank. The Mission suggests, therefore, that the Development Board gradually supply the funds necessary to increase the Bank's capital by ID 5,000,000. The Bank would be authorized to use this sum for making loans to, and investments in, industry within the framework of an over-all program approved by the Development Board.

The Bank's capital should be used primarily as a revolving fund. The Bank should generally dispose of its industrial shares whenever an enterprise becomes profitable and, therefore, capable of attracting more private capital. Profit-making assets should be kept only to the extent necessary to create a reserve against possible losses. While the Bank should presumably show a small profit to inspire confidence in its operations, it should not retain its participation in profit-making enterprises for the sake of maximizing its profits, particularly when this limits its ability to assist other industries.

The Bank at present is understaffed. The directors pass on projects without the benefit of expert assistance, and, as a result, some phases of a project may be completely overlooked. With a shortage of staff, the transaction of business with the Bank is also time-consuming and thus discourages applicants.

The Mission recommends that, first, the Bank's staff be both increased and strengthened and, second, that it be reorganized to give greater responsibility to the head of the Industrial Schemes Section who should be a properly qualified man with broad industrial experience. Members of the Industrial Schemes Section should have thorough training and practical experience in power and mechanical engineering with special reference to industrial planning and layout, and in operations, management and control of industry with special reference to cost accounting.

Protection of Industry

The "Law for the Encouragement of Industry" enacted in 651
1929 was replaced by new legislation in 1950 which grants limited 433
exemptions from income and surtaxes for four years; exemptions 651

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from import duties on machinery, material, equipment and spare parts; exemptions from property tax for 10 years; and use of rent-free government land not in excess of 25,000 square meters for a period of 10 years. Iraq-owned industrial enterprises can qualify for these benefits as long as they primarily use raw materials available in Iraq or produce goods imported in considerable quantities. Neither of these conditions is necessarily relevant to efficient production; and it is therefore suggested that the law be amended to stipulate that such benefits should be accorded only to enterprises which have a reasonable prospect of becoming efficient enough to withstand foreign competition.

Industry is protected in many cases by high import duties and in some cases, such as cotton yarn, beer and cement, by import prohibitions. Industrial enterprises have not so far taken full advantage of these restrictions, but if they should do so the demand for their products would undoubtedly diminish significantly.

Foreign competition is always a useful check on inefficiency. Its beneficial effects in bringing about lower production costs and a better product have been demonstrated many times in Iraq. For example, even industries protected by high tariffs have been forced to modernize in order to reduce costs and meet competition. To attempt to shut out foreign competition will, in general, retard, rather than foster, industrial growth. In some cases, it is true, new industries may need protection during the early years of operation. Protection should not, however, be allowed to become a permanent shield for inefficiency; as experience is acquired and production costs are stabilized, protective measures should be greatly reduced.

In a country like Iraq where the limited market affords opportunities for only one or two plants in certain fields, there is an acute danger of monopoly and attendant high prices. This danger is aggravated further by a tendency in some industries to emphasize limited production with high profits per unit rather than mass production with lower unit-profits. Foreign competition would appear to be the proper means of restraining trends toward monopoly within a particular field, just as it operates to stimulate modernization in plants suffering from high costs because of obsolete methods.

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in economics and finance capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff should be strengthened; and more attention should be paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum. They could assist in arranging for part-time apprenticeship training and would provide a means for checking how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

Effective Government Organization for Industry

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Government activities relating to industry, except for the Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. As industry expands both types of activity will become increasingly important. The Mission therefore recommends a realignment of the present organization to provide for two separate departments within the Ministry, a Department of Industrial Research and Standards and a Department of Industries. Research and technical functions now being carried on would be continued under the Department of Industrial Research and Standards. Its facilities need, however, to be expanded to meet industry's growing requirements for laboratory testing and quality control.

The newly organized Department of Industries would carry on economic research and analysis. Among its functions would be the maintenance of adequate statistical records of industrial production, the analysis of economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and the administration of the laws providing special protection to industry.

Both departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future, as compared to special mea-

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sures of production and assistance which tend to shield industry 647
against competition. There is much to be done to help industry 654
to achieve better control of the quality of its products, in reducing waste through material salvage, in analyzing production costs, in making market surveys and in raising labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

IV. Other Suggestions for the Improvement of Industry

Possibilities for Economies in the Use of Capital

Whenever the capital cost of a plant is an important determi- 433
nant of production costs, it becomes essential to utilize the plant to the fullest extent. This may be accomplished, for example, by increasing the number of shifts, by extending the work week and by stepping up machines to their maximum economic speed. Completely integrated plants seldom if ever offer the opportunity for this type of operation, because certain machines are never called upon for continuous use. This is, of course, very noticeable where the plant does all its own maintenance work, even to all of its foundry items. The solution is obviously one of resorting to contracting or sub-contracting with concerns specializing in particular operations. For example, a single finishing and dyeing concern might advantageously serve two or more textile mills, where the capacity of these mills is insufficient to load separate finishing departments to their economic limit.

In Iraq there is a tendency in industry to generate its own 433
power rather than to purchase it. This leads to the installation of 377
expensive facilities which are utilized only part of the day. While 365
industry is operating, many municipal power plants stand virtually idle because they serve primarily lighting needs and their peak load accordingly comes at night. In some cases, where large quantities of process steam are needed, industrial enterprises may be justified in generating their own power, but for the most part, the purchase of power is preferable. Unfortunately, power rates, 433
except in Basra and Baghdad, are so high that the purchase of 365

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206 Development Board which is responsible for coordinating the development program of the country as a whole. The Board should also provide the financial means but leave to the PTT responsibility for execution of communications projects.

IX. Pipelines

315 Inconspicuous, but most important, in Iraq's transport and communications systems are the oil pipelines. The existing lines are: a dual line, 12 inches and 16 inches, from the Kirkuk oilfields to Tripoli, the Lebanese Mediterranean port; a 12-inch line to Haifa in Israel, closed in 1948; and a new 30-inch line under construction between Kirkuk and the Syrian Mediterranean port of Banias. A short line runs from the Basra oilfields at Zubair to the shipping stage at Fao. The pipelines carry a tonnage of oil which far outstrips the total carried by the country's railways. They are operated, maintained and expanded by the oil companies, and need only be mentioned to complete the picture of Iraq's transport system.

X. Surveys

654 No development in any branch is possible without maps and surveys. The Directorate General of Surveys, which is under the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, has surveyed and mapped the southern part of the country aside from the desert to scales varying from 1:5,000 to 1:50,000. Few topographical surveys have been carried out in the rest of the country, and the existing maps are not very reliable. The education and training of competent surveyors is difficult. Terms of service are not attractive to young engineers and surveyors who find better prospects in engineering, planning and construction work. Air surveys can, to all practical purposes, solve the problem and progress with them is now being made in the North. The skilled surveyors who are available are at present employed in cadastral work, land settlement surveys and mapping to fix the demarcation of land ownership.

It is expected that once this work is completed, the personnel 654
problem will ease somewhat.

The development program of the service provides for a survey and mapping to a scale of 1:20,000 at an estimated cost of ID 200,000. For the appropriate housing of the service, a new building with 10,000 square meters of floor space is now under construction and is expected to be completed in January or February 1952. This will facilitate administration of the service which is now scattered in three widely separated buildings. The new building will also house the up-to-date printing plant ordered in Great Britain. Funds for building and plant have already been sanctioned. Air surveys now in progress should be continued at an annual cost of approximately ID 40,000.

XI. General Observations

Teamwork

Not only the development of the transport services but also 647
the general development program, with all its implications of 489
temporary and seasonal demands for transport of construction materials and imports of machinery and plant, will materially affect the tasks before the transport managements. The teamwork in the existing transport departments is exemplary. It is therefore emphatically urged that no change be made in the present organizations and their leading personnel until after the main development programs are completed.

Intermediary Staff

In all the transport services there is a great dearth of inter- 489
mediary staff—foremen, inspectors, surveyors, supervisors, and the 464
like—for whom practical training in workshops and on construction sites is far more important than school or college education. In all transport development projects, special courses should be provided to train adaptable Iraqi apprentices under skilled teachers in shops, factories and on tracks and roads in the country.

These observations apply to all forms of transport, port, railways, roads, airways and communications. Unless continuity is maintained with a gradual, cautious transfer of responsibility from foreign to Iraqi personnel, efficiency will be seriously jeopardized.

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XII. Projected Cost of Proposed Programs

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The projects recommended for consideration are summarized below as to cost and time of realization. The total cost which the Development Board might have to defray over the next five years would be approximately ID 31,000,000.

TABLE 11

COST OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS
SUGGESTED FOR DEVELOPMENT BOARD FINANCING

Project	Costs (in dinars)	Period (years)
PORT		
New channel	2,000,000	4
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT		
Study of river training by experts	Token	2
RAILWAYS		
Baghdad Station commitment	143,000	1
Baghdad new layout, provisional	100,000	1
22 continuation and completion projects		
under way	213,770	1
labor quarters	341,000	4
Rehabilitation and modernization projects	500,000	5
Renewals including diesel traction	6,300,000[a]	5
Extra for gauge conversion (tentative)	6,000,000	6
ROADS		
Trunk road system	14,500,000	10
Secondary road system	4,000,000	5
Road transport control	Token	1
URBAN TRANSPORT		
Baghdad transport services, workshops, garages and vehicles	500,000	3
AIRPORTS		
Baghdad development	300,000	2
Basra development	[b]	2
AIRLINES		
Iraqi Airways	600,000	4
POST, TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, RADIO		
Telephone extensions and buildings (if not financed from Communications budget)	300,000	Annually
Auxiliary power plant for transmitter	30,000	1
SURVEYS AND MAPPING		
Air surveys	40,000	Annually

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[a] On assumption of gauge conversion.
[b] To be financed by Port of Basra.

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743 women and children and one for mental dieases. A new tuberculosis hospital and sanitarium has just been opened in Baghdad. The Army, Railways, Port of Basra, Police, Ministry of Education, and the oil companies maintain their own hospitals. There is also an American Mission hospital.

While some hospitals are adequately equipped and staffed, many of them are seriously in need of repair and equipment, especially dental equipment. Most of the hospitals suffer from an acute shortage of trained subordinate staff (medical aides or nurses). Hygienic conditions in some leave much to be desired. Hospital administration appears to be weak throughout the country, with a few notable exceptions such as the Royal Hospital in Baghdad. This is the teaching hospital of the Royal Medical Faculty and has practically all modern medical facilities. Several Iraqi doctors are now attending a course on hospital administration in foreign countries, but so far the number attending these courses is small. It would be desirable to give such a course in Iraq to young doctors after qualifying.

Simple conditions are treated in dispensaries of which there are 448—403 of them government institutions—fairly evenly distributed throughout the country. The physical facilities and staffs of such dispensaries vary widely. Some are in the charge of a doctor but the majority are run by health officials and dressers. Except for vaccination against smallpox, the dispensaries do very little preventive medical work. Since there is only about one dispensary to every 12,000 of the population, it is obvious that the number must be increased as additional staff can be trained.

654 743 The Development Board has planned an annual expenditure of ID 700,000 on medical service buildings in its five-year program extending over the period 1951-52 to 1955-56. A detailed breakdown of this expenditure was available only for the first year. On the whole the total outlay envisaged over the entire period would seem adequate. In the first instance, however, efforts should be concentrated on the replacement, repair and modernization of existing hospitals. In addition to the projects of this nature for which provision was made in the first budget of the Development Board, the following would appear to be most urgent:

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Additional provision for reconstruction of the Karkh and Kut Hospitals ID	200,000
Repairs to the Maude Hospital (Basra), Amara Hospital, Erbil Hospital and Suleimaniya Hospital	250,000
Infectious disease blocks for the Erbil and Mosul Hospitals	65,000
Maternity block for the Hilla Hospital	25,000
Laundry for Diwaniya Hospital	12,000
Additional wards for Mosul and Kirkuk Hospitals	80,000
Completion of Mental Diseases Hospital	250,000
Additional provision for operating facilities at Royal Hospital	50,000
Children's Ward at Royal Hospital	40,000
Maternity block at Royal Hospital	40,000
Dental equipment for hospitals	20,000
Total	ID 1,032,000

As it becomes possible to devote more attention to increasing facilities for treatment, priority should be given generally to the construction of additional dispensaries in the rural areas.

Doctors

At present there is about one practicing doctor to every 7,000 759
of the population, but many of the doctors are concentrated in [758]
Baghdad. Only about 35 doctors are now being registered annually, but with increased accommodations and more laboratory facilities, it will be possible to enroll more students so that at least 50 will qualify as doctors annually. This number may be sufficient for Iraq's needs, provided that an adequate number of suitably trained health officers are available for service in village dispensaries and that nurses and dressers receive more training.

Doctors receive their training at the Royal Faculty of Medicine, which was founded in 1927. [874] The syllabus and teaching seem, on the whole, to be good. They emphasize adequately the study of the endemic diseases, although they do not give enough weight to the teaching of public health and preventive medicine. The recent appointment of a professor of public health should give a better balance to the program of instruction. Public health as such should probably be taught as a postgraduate course. It would include such subjects as public health administration, public he

riya), and Sulaimaniya. The capital of Iraq is Bagh- 361
dad, with a population of 552,047 inhabitants, ac- 162
cording to the census of 19 November 1947. Baghdad, which is situated on the Tigris and is the terminus and junction of all the Iraqi railways, is an active centre of trade and traffic. Other large towns are Mosul (340,541 inhabitants), Basra (206,302), Amara (183,870), Karbala (149,710), Kirkuk (148,349), Nasiriya (110,934), Ramadi (110,684), and Baquba (94,482).

B. *General features of the economy*

Agriculture

Agriculture is the main resource of Iraq's economy. 241
According to estimates, approximately 80 per cent 654
of the population are engaged in it. The fertile land [062]
of Iraq, which was regarded as one of the granaries of the world in the time of Herodotus and which was carefully watered by a well-planned system of irrigation until the thirteenth century of our era, has since then fallen into a state of neglect. Agriculture began to receive attention again in 1921. As droughts, dust storms and plagues of insects (especially in the Mosul region) cause serious depredations, the government supervises the condition of the country's agriculture and stock-raising and takes the necessary measures for their rational development: it has set up experimental farms, which also produce good quality seeds for the use of farmers, and is encouraging the mechanization of agriculture.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of 185
the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 652
and is estimated at ID155,374,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken [654 ●
account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank 648]
for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of an annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated 311
that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living [162]
directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported 2.41
products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 36 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

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[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1952).

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185 charcoal production with consequent encouragement of
137 secondary industries, and improve climatic conditions.
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Problems of Agriculture

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Among the natural difficulties which attend agriculture in Iraq are those imposed by drought, floods, dust storms, diseases, pests, and soil erosion, of which the first two are being attacked by a large-scale programme of irrigation and flood-control. The major diseases are the inflorescence rot of dates, wilt diseases of tomato and watermelon, gummosis of citrus, rusts of cereals, and various mildews. The major insect pests are the Moroccan locust, whose ravages have from time to time caused immense damage to cereal crops, the grasshopper, the Mediterranean fruit fly, the date-fruit mite and Dubas bug, and the Sunn pest and bug *Aolia ucuminata* which attack wheat and barley. The Ministry of Agriculture is combating these diseases and pests by modern methods; in locust-fighting Iraq is among the most advanced countries in the world. The problem of soil erosion can to some extent be met by the activities of the Forestry Department.

Irrigation

312 The aim of water-control in Iraq is to even out the seasonal flow in the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, so as to prevent both drought and flooding in the irrigated areas and to increase the area under cultivation. Irrigation itself imposes the necessity of drainage, to prevent the salting up of irrigated land and the further spread of malaria.

Three methods of irrigation are employed: direct inundation at flood-time, which is used for rice cultivation and is of comparatively limited importance; distribution of water from rivers and canals by direct flow on to the land through a network of small channels and cuts; the lifting of water into the channels and cuts by various methods which include the use of mechanical pumps. The date-palm groves of the Shatt al-Arab benefit by natural irrigation; twice a day as the tide rises and falls fresh water is forced into the creeks and channels and then drains out again.

Irrigation—often highly organized—has been a feature of Iraqi agriculture since the Sumerian civilization, in decline since the seventh century, and especially since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Serious reconstruction began in this century, with the Hindiya barrage, completed in 1913, for which the Euphrates was diverted, and the Kut barrage on the

423 time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere
433 with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of
185 the low density of population, an improvement in the water-
464 supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a
shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently
166 go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the
unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which
have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no
lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive
to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made
to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irriga-
tion (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals),
and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was
passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying
size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be
allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former
members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to
civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agri-
[452] cultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in
1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by provid-
ing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the
need.

Livestock

231 Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal
439 economy of the country, by providing food, transport and
traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also
in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their
products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted
for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

232 Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends
254 to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods
have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being
185 semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little
attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding
except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease.
Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

871 212 Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

651 382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

647 654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

652 654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

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[33] *Economic Development of Iraq*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 63.

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The program is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress 652
unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually
static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. 654
There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a profound economic and social transformation, with far-reaching repercussions.

The International Bank concludes that the country will need no further foreign loans except possibly to meet part of the hard currency needs.[34] The oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling. However, under a new agreement, the United Kingdom has undertaken to furnish sufficient dollars against sterling to cover Iraq's essential needs.

The International Bank in 1950 already had loaned $12.8 million to Iraq, primarily for flood control, irrigation, and road construction. Apparently the Bank is willing to consider further loans, but the Iraqi are not interested as long as the oil revenues continue and they are able to get sterling converted into dollars.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A number of organizations are providing technical assistance to Iraq in 648
its development program, notably the United States Point Four Program and 654
the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization.

Point Four began its program early in 1952 in such fields as cotton agronomy, farm machinery, agricultural extension and vocational education, irrigation, entomology, rural health, sanitation, and industrial development. About 25 Americans have been employed, and the number may be doubled by the end of the year. Most of the Point Four funds go for salaries; the costs of tools and materials are assumed by the local government. The specialists in Iraq obviously were chosen for their competence, practical experience, and their interest in the assignment. They are anxious to develop the most desirable means of approaching the problem.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has about 11 specialists regularly employed in the country in such fields as soils, cooperatives, bacteriology, veterinary science, nutrition, agricultural statistics, farm mechanization, and home economics. The program may be extended to cover agricultural research, extension, underground water and drainage, forestry, and fisheries.

The FAO operates almost entirely at the government level; Point Four seeks to go beyond government planning to the grass roots.

INDUSTRY

The people of Iraq, in common with their neighbors of the Middle East, 162
live almost entirely by agriculture. About 80 per cent of the population earns 433
its living directly from the soil, and most of the others indirectly.[35] Industry is still relatively undeveloped. Apart from the oil industry, which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 people are employed in what are called modern industrial plants.

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

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RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

●654 242 At present the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and most of their time is said to be devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks.[49] A complete program in research and extension is needed. Such a program is being developed gradually now with the help of the various technical assistance agencies.

CREDIT

452 652 Production credit facilities are almost non-existent. An effort is being made, however, to increase the resources of the state-owned agricultural bank to provide adequate production credit and to establish storage facilities for crops. According to the United Nations' special reports, moneylenders' interest rates to farmers for crop production were 30 to 40 per cent before the government recently established the agricultural bank.

COTTON

248 Cotton has never been particularly important in Iraq, from the standpoint of either the acreage involved or the total production. Its potential, however, is great.

Table 33

IRAQ: Statistics on Cotton Production and Distribution Specified Years, 1920-1951

Year beginning August 1	Acreage	Yield per Acre	Production	Consumption	Exports	Imports
	Acres	Pounds	Bales			
Average 1920-24	NA	NA	808	NA	NA	NA
Average 1925-29	NA	NA	2,377	NA	NA	NA
Average 1930-34	3,751	159	1,240	NA	NA	NA
Average 1935-39	53,099	97	10,773	NA	NA	NA
Average 1940-44	72,000	62	9,409	NA	10,477	2,845
Average 1945-49	21,619	100	4,493	4,000	3,152	2,723
1950	100,000	183	38,121	7,000	31,000	0
1951	135,000	135	38,000	10,000	1,887[1]	

[1] Exports, August through November.

SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, and International Cotton Advisory Committee.

Before the war, production averaged only about 12,000 bales and slightly less in the postwar years through 1949. Higher prices throughout the world, together with the export controls imposed by the United States and the shortage of cotton, sent production to about 38,000 bales. It would have been three to four times as large on the basis of the planted acreage had it not been for heavy insect damage.

AREA

About two-thirds of the cotton is produced under irrigation in the vicinity of Baghdad and Kut on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. These two areas, together with three or four other smaller ones, account for about 88 per cent of production. Some 10 to 12 per cent is produced in Northern Iraq, mostly around Mosul, and about 2 per cent in Southern Iraq, from Basra north along the river.

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[49] *Economic Development of Iraq, op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

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COTTON IN IRAQ

other commodities. As might be expected in such a situation, the system of 442 classification is limited. The cotton is usually sold on types. Ginners indicate they will buy and sell cotton themselves in the future as in many other countries.

The one large cotton spinning mill is putting in its own gin to supply the mill with its requirements of around 15,000 bales annually. This will restrict merchandising to exports unless and until another mill is built.

OIL MILLS 388

There is one oil mill which crushes the largest part of the seed produced. The rest is exported. The capacity of this plant is to be increased and facilities for processing oil products are being added.

EXPORTS 439

Iraq has exported approximately 18,000 bales during each of the past two years, mostly to Germany and Japan, with smaller quantities to Holland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 248

The Director General of Agriculture has promulgated an ambitious 654 10-year program for increasing cotton production to about 500,000 bales. In time, he believes that on the basis of the available land and water Iraqi production can be boosted to more than a million bales. While admitting his program is ambitious, the Director General appears to be firmly convinced it can be accomplished, given adequate technical assistance.

United States agricultural experts with the Point Four Program are inclined to agree that the country's natural resources can support a potential cotton production of this magnitude. The rate of increase, they think, will depend on how effectively the technical resources of the country are organized and applied.

The Director General is highly regarded for his technical as well as his administrative ability and particularly for his driving force. He is especially well qualified to direct the cotton improvement program, having graduated in cotton agronomy from Texas A. & M. College.

Long-Range

For long-range improvements he is depending on the agricultural research agencies now being organized to develop better varieties, more effective irrigation and cultural practices, better insect control techniques, and improved methods of classification and marketing. Still in the planning stages, the research program has done some fairly effective work, especially on variety selection, propagation, and fertilization.

Insect Control

One of the main research problems is the control of insects. The govern- 242 ment estimates that 75 per cent of the 1951 cotton crop was destroyed by insects, principally by the spiney bollworm, *Earis insulana* (Boisd.), a white fly that attacks the leaves, and by aphids. Fortunately, the Director said, the pink bollworm has not made its appearance in the country. Experiments are

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for centuries, and farmers have depended on the silt deposited from the overflows to maintain the fertility. Increased use of canals and dams for irrigation has made the overflows less frequent. Experiments conducted for the past three or four years with commercial fertilizers have shown no significant benefit, but the United States experts feel the tests are not conclusive and should be continued with various soil conditioners.

While depending on basic research to stimulate long-range production, the Director General is trying to force an immediate improvement through regulations requiring the application of techniques known to be beneficial.

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Controls

In an effort to concentrate cotton production on the better suited lands and to facilitate insect control, seed control, and other beneficial measures, regulations have been promulgated requiring government permits for all cotton acreage planted. These permits, based primarily on suitability of the soil and availability of water and labor, are issued on the recommendation of local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the enforcement system is inadequate, and it is generally admitted that the regulation is not closely followed, especially in areas where the local sheiks are extremely powerful and are practically a law unto themselves.

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

At the government cotton experimental farm near Baghdad a double-handled board is used to level the high spots in a newly ploughed field. Outside the government farms little leveling is done. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Iraq Government in experiments and demonstrations to improve cotton cultural practices.

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tributed into small plots for purpose of development shall be entrusted with the distribution of water within the project's areas (Article 11, para. 3) and water distribution shall be confined to the lands of the project (Article 11, para. 1).

1) The Use of Water for Irrigation Purposes

Notification No. 226 of the Minister of Communications and Works dated 9 June 1927, issued under the Irrigation Law of 1923, declares all rivers (anhar) and waterways (majari) in Iraq to be "Irrigation Works." This term covers irrigation and flood protection works as well as areas, occupied by or required for the construction or maintenance of such works. The right of undertaking irrigation works on privately owned lands is granted (Art. 3) to the Government, provided the land so required for the works is expropriated according to Law, once the proposed works have been declared to be of public utility. A private owner wishing to carry out works on or through another person's property shall obtain a certificate from the Executive Irrigation Engineer, stating the necessity of such works together with their extent and probable effect on neighboring lands. The applicant remains responsible for the acquisition, lease or arrangement with the interposed owners (Art. 4).

Requests from particulars for constructing any irrigation works are submitted to the mutassarrif of the Liwa concerned. If such requests are not rejected for administrative reasons, they are transmitted to the Executive Irrigation Engineer who may reject them on technical ground or otherwise issue the necessary permit on Irrigation Form No. 44, embodying instructions constituting the specifications of the work for which approval has been granted. The Law does not confer "water rights," but when a permit is issued and implies use of water, it is henceforth recognized that the land to be brought under cultivation shall enjoy the use of water under conditions similar to others within the same district.

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All irrigation works of public importance shall be constructed, repaired and maintained by and remain under the control and supervision of the Irrigation Department, even when such works have been declared to have ceased to be of public importance (Art. 6). The Executive Irrigation Engineer may require the person responsible with the maintenance of watercourses (channels not maintained by the Government, Art. 2, para. 4),

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to carry out the necessary repair work and in the event of fail- 312
ure, the said Engineer may execute such work at the expense of 647
the defaulter. If damage has been caused to structures and the
offender is not found then the owners of the lands depending on 654
the watercourse shall be held jointly responsible (Article 7). A "Notice of Repair or Removal" on Irrigation Form No. 45, is used for the repair, removal or reconstruction of works as defined under Articles 4, 7, and 11 of the Law.

The Irrigation Engineers shall determine the dimensions of canals and watercourses, the lands and areas which may be irrigated from such canals and watercourses (Article 5). The distribution of water is carried out by the Irrigation Department up to a point below the heads of the watercourses (Article 8). Interference with another person's water supply, or the opening of any outlet which has been closed by competent authority or the taking of water from a source other than that prescribed by the Executive Irrigation Engineer, are not permitted (Article 10).

Article 9 prescribes that the Executive Irrigation Engineer shall have the power to stop the water supply to any watercourse in the following cases:

a) for the purpose of executing irrigation works;

b) whenever the watercourse is not maintained in such repair as to prevent the wasteful escape of water;

c) to supply water in rotation;

d) whenever wastage or misuse of water takes place;

e) whenever notices issued or demands made have not been complied with regarding (i) maintenance and repair of works (Article 7); (ii) supply of able-bodied persons for undertaking either work or repairs to works for preventing loss of life or serious damage to property and land (Article 13) or repairs and maintenance of irrigation works (Article 14). This notice shall be called "Notice of Stoppage of Water."

Article 11 states that no person shall construct any building, canal or watercourse, erect any pump, water lift or water wheel, plant any crops within the boundaries of any irrigation area without the written approval of the Executive Engineer, who

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may order the offender to remove the unauthorised structure within 15 days of the date of notice served on Irrigation Form No. 45. Should he fail to comply with the instructions contained in the Notice, the work of removal may then be carried out by the Executive Engineer and cost recovered from the offender.

If the water supplied is used in an unauthorized manner or causes damage to the lands, and if the persons responsible cannot be discovered, the person or persons on whose land such water flowed shall be held responsible. Such person shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 20 rupees per mashara 1/ of inundated land.

2. Requisition of Labour

Article 13 provides for the recruiting at rates of pay to be fixed by the Executive Engineer in consultation with the Mutassarrif, of able-bodied persons whenever workers for the immediate execution of emergency or repair works for preventing loss of life or serious damage to land and property cannot be obtained in the ordinary manner. For the purpose of the repair and maintenance of irrigation works, the person who will benefit from their being in good condition and will lose if otherwise, may be called on to furnish the necessary labor (Article 14).

The Executive Engineer may call on the mutassarrif or qaimaqam (sub-prefect or sub-governor) to raise the necessary labor contingent. To this end, the mutassarrifs shall furnish the Director of Irrigation with two statements every year, before the tenth of August: the first statement (Irrigation Form No. 47) shall show the total number of able-bodied men of laboring class residing in the Liwa, for purpose of Article 13. The second statement (Irrigation Forms 48 and 48A) shall show the total labor residing in the Liwa available for work under Article 14, during three different periods, i.e.: September to December - January to April - May to August. The requisition of labor, urgent (Art. 13) or otherwise (Art. 14) is made on Irrigation Forms 49 and 50 respectively.

Any person who refuses or neglects to supply labor as provided for in the two above-mentioned articles of the Law, shall upon conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding Rs. 500 or to

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1/ 20 rupees = ID. 1/500 = $6.00; mashara = 1/4 hectares = 0.618 acres

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
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871 progress, discouraging both to the educators and to the Iraqi people, reflects on the possibilities of development, which in the final analysis depend on the general educational level of the population. To be sure, in the period 1930-1950 the number of schools rose from 262 to 1,100, the number of pupils from 32,750 to 175,000, and the number of primary school teachers from 1,325 to 6,588; nevertheless, out of about 750,000 children of school age only 175,000 were in schools; the percentage of drop-outs as the children advanced to the higher grades was so large as to cause real alarm. The facilities and quality of technical and vocational education were woefully deficient, and adult education was almost completely neglected. As to the quality of the educational program, the Mission stated: "Educational concepts are far too narrow and too little related to everyday problems of living." But what was most alarming was the fact that as late as 1951 about 90 per cent of the total population was still illiterate.[10]

434 Though possessing so much land, so much water, and considerable revenue from oil, Iraq's standard of living was fairly low. Annual per capita income was estimated in 1949 at about $84 and not much higher in 1953.[11] This compared with $140 for Lebanon, $100 for Syria, $125 for Turkey, $100 for Egypt, and $389 for Israel.

433 [654] Industrial growth advanced at a very slow pace. In order to stimulate the establishment of industry, the Government passed a law in 1929 granting tax relief and other concessions to those who would develop industrial projects, but almost twenty years later the United States Department of Commerce reported that the development of manufacturing industries was still in the embryonic stage.[12] In 1949 it was reported that in spite of the impetus given to local production by the shortage of import goods during the war, Iraq's industries were still underdeveloped.[13] In 1951 the International Bank Mission reported that industry was little developed; that exclusive of those employed by the oil companies, 60,000 workers were engaged in

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[10] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report,* 62-63; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry* (London), Sept., 1953, 93.

[11] U. N., *Review 1949-50,* 12; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry,* Sept., 1953, 93.

[12] U. S., Dept. of Commerce, *International Reference Service,* Dec., 1948, 3.

[13] Great Britain, *Iraq,* 16.

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464 241 late June and threshing proceeds steadily from July to October. The much smaller rice harvest comes about the end of September. With less wheat and no rice, threshing could be finished by mid-september leaving labour free for the main work of the tobacco harvest. On the other hand the tobacco plant requires a good deal of finicky attention during the early stages of its growth which coincide with the wheat harvest. It is possible therefore that any radical increase in the tobacco cultivation is dependent upon the introduction of improved methods of threshing. A much greater difficulty arises from the fact that the change in labour requirements would not be equally distributed as between different households. Whereas at present each household has approximately the same programme of work, the situation would be greatly complicated if one man's land was devoted to tobacco and his neighbour's only to wheat. The difficulty could be avoided if all the tobacco cultivation were 'owned' by the Agha; - the commoner being under obligation to work for his Agha but not for a fellow commoner. Such a development would never be countenanced by the Government however since the system would be regarded as "exploitation" of the tribesman by his chief.*

249 Iraq 635 654 Capital. The additional capital required for tobacco as opposed to cereal cultivation is not very significant. The Government is prepared to supply seed and expert advice; so far as I know the process of drying does not require any special technical apparatus. The re-organisation of the irrigation system would of course be an initial 'capital' expenditure for the community concerned.

Technique. On the other hand the mere statement that Government is prepared to offer expert advice rather oversimplifies the social aspects of the technical problem. I have already mentioned that the native Kurdish tobacco cured in the traditional manner results in a powdery substance that is quite useless for the purposes of a modern factory. In order to produce a marketable product, the farmer has to be taught entirely new methods. The reformer is here up against several types of difficulty. Firstly there is a simple conservative resistance, the dislike of new methods, not simply because they are new but because the practitioner in the old methods thinks he knows best. But there are other difficulties of a much more intricate kind. Here is an example.

K 249 609 Iraq 635 654 The Government are prepared to supply approved villages with a trained expert to supervise the growing and harvesting of tobacco. Such a man was supplied to the village of Walash. He was a Kurd, but a townsman from the plains and by mountain standards a man of low moral

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* In Batas, where in functional terms the Assyrian Bishop takes the place of the Agha, the tobacco crop is owned by the Church, and difficulties over individual labour requirements thus avoided. But then a Christian Bishop is obviously not the same thing as a tribal Agha!

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character; it was alleged that he corrupted the villagers with alcohol and gambling and attempted to seduce their daughters, in particular the Mulla's daughter, in fact he was altogether a scoundrel. In due course he was found in the high road with two bullets through his body. The police took action. Two harmless looking nomads from another tribe were brought before the courts and on the basis of somewhat elaborate circumstantial evidence convicted of murder. Sentence however was never carried out since the "criminals" curiously disappeared a few days after the trial. Whatever was the truth of this matter, local rumour had no doubts on the subject. The bullet wounds, the arrest and conviction of the nomads were all a frame up by the police, who had the sense not to fish in troubled waters. The murdered man had really died of strangulation - hanged in the Guest House of Sheikh Mohammed, Agha of Walash and chief of the Balik.

This story was told me by Hamid Amin of Naupurdan who was always eager to cast a slur on his cousin Sheikh Mohammed. It appeared however to have some general currency since, when I was discussing the misdemeanours of the local schoolmaster with the Agha of Rayat, he referred to the Walash story. "These small Government servants! What do you expect? They're all scoundrels".

Whether the story is true or not is irrelevant, its effect among the Balik is the same as if it had been true. Even though Sheikh Mohammed's prestige is not so great as formerly, the fact, or even the rumour, that he had to hang his first and only agricultural adviser is a sufficient deterrent for any lesser Aghas who may be contemplating agricultural reform within their own communities. This example brings out well how a problem which on the surface is purely economic may in practice be effected by a mass of seemingly irrelevant considerations in the field of ethics, tribal law, politics and religion.

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To sum up then. We have seen how the necessity for developing an export trade implies the necessity for increasing the tobacco acreage at the expense of cereal acreage, and I have tried to analyse out the forces of resistance which serve to prevent any immediate response to this incentive. Nevertheless the incentive is clearly very great. I was told for instance in Batas that whereas in the old days the crops of the entire village had been worth barely £50 in cash, the tobacco sales in 1937 alone totalled £2,500. I believe therefore that in the hills also some radical alteration in the emphasis of agriculture must take place in the near future.

But it must be recognised that any such development must bring about fundamental changes both in the ideology of the people and of their social organisation. As things are, the hill country farmer sets out first of all to grow sufficient food for himself and his family. Only when he is assured of that does he turn his attention to the cultivation of luxury products such as tobacco. In short he aims at

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped.
A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous
régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp,
in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib
was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles
the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality,
shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously
improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal
Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted
at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling
stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both
pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy–French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it
curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to
full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods
were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce
fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to
a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company,
and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu
Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya
river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit
allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according
to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea
or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the
hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country.
The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt;
trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

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(c) Industrial enterprises being carried out directly by various Government departments and agencies such as the Iraqi State Railways, the Port of Basrah, the Ministry of Defence, the municipalities, and the recently set up State Oil Refinery Administration which has already undertaken the construction near Baghdad of an oil refinery with an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons of refined products, at an expected cost of about I.D. 7,000,000.

(d) Various handicrafts and semi-mechanised industries such as the date-packing industry.[1]

433 It need hardly be said that, although recent industrial development has been marked, it is still quite limited in relation to the economy as a whole and in comparison with industrial development in neighbouring areas. In Lebanon for instance, the industrial sector has been found to contribute approximately LL. 135 million, or 17 per cent of the total national income estimated at 434 LL. 830 million.[2] In our estimation, the industrial sector in Iraq contributes no more than 10 per cent of the total national income estimated at I.D. 150 million.[3]

000 The problems arising from, and the difficulties standing in the way of, industrialisation in Iraq, will now be discussed.

Industrialisation in general means the introduction of modern industry into an area which has been up to that time dependent for its livelihood on agriculture, trade and craftsmanship. Such an area would have had no experience of mechanised industrial processes, the organisation of modern factories, the division of labour inside such factories, nor would it have any clear idea of the material and human resources that such organisations would demand. Assuming that industrialisation of such a "new" or underdeveloped area is a desirable thing, two sets of problems seem likely to emerge. The first set of problems is connected with the ways and means of developing industry with reasonable speed. The second set of problems relates to the psychological, social and political effects that modern industry brings about.

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[1] For a brief but fairly comprehensive survey of industrial output and possibilities in Iraq see: *The Economic Development of Iraq.* Report of a mission organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. p. 148-50, also Annex D. p. 277 and following.

[2] *National Income of Lebanon, Monograph* No. 3 by Albert Y. Badre, Ph. D., and Asad Y. Nasr, M.A., Beirut, Lebanon, May 1953. Especially p. 24.

[3] The ratio for more advanced countries is between 30 and 40 per cent.

research. The Mission recommends that in the future such farms 242
should be used primarily as experimental stations. Seed for distri- 816
bution to farmers could be produced on land surplus to the needs of the experimental stations or on a contract basis under appropriate government supervision on private farms. The Mission suggests that immediate steps be taken to secure a research director to coordinate all existing research and to recruit a gradually expanding staff of full-time research experts consisting partly of foreigners and partly of Iraqis.

These measures will bring about an improvement in agri- 242
culture only very gradually. In the short run they will need to be supplemented by positive financial incentives. Most farmers will probably prove unwilling or unable to invest money or time in the cultivation of fodder crops or the use of fertilizers unless they are convinced through practical experience that such an investment is really worthwhile. In order to induce farmers to experiment themselves, the government may wish to consider providing free seed for fodder crops and defraying part of the cost of fertilizer, or, alternatively, making a flat money payment per donum to those undertaking to use fertilizers or grow feed. Such incentives should, of course, be offered only as long as is necessary to demonstrate the value of improved methods. The provision of credit for the acquisition of machinery, fertilizers and other means of production will also be helpful in this respect.

It has already been pointed out that the existing sharecropping 242
system, coupled with the shifting nature of cultivation, militates 427
against the introduction of soil-building and forage crops. Under present conditions the landlord will find it difficult to compel the fellah to grow such crops unless the fellah is actually paid for doing so. The Mission therefore suggests that the difficulties inherent in the sharecropping system, as well as the advisability of changes in this system, be studied by an expert on land tenure.

Tobacco and the Tobacco Monopoly

The Mission has paid special attention to tobacco, not only 249
because cultivation of this crop is of considerable importance to the 655
Kurdish farmers of the North, but also because tobacco leaf is

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249 handled by a government monopoly, the operations of which have
665 been highly controversial.

The Tobacco Monopoly was established in 1939 in order (1) to improve the quality of tobacco, (2) to assure farmers stable and remunerative prices, and (3) to raise revenue for the government, although this objective was not explicit and was certainly subordinate to the other two. The Monopoly licenses the area which may be planted to tobacco, buys the tobacco produced thereon at fixed prices set each year and resells it to manufacturers at prices more than twice as high as those it pays.

It is generally recognized that the first objective has not been realized, for the quality of tobacco, which was never high, has probably declined still further. Neither the Monopoly nor the Department of Agriculture has had the personnel to assist farmers in improving the varieties or strains of tobacco grown or the methods of cultivating, picking, curing and sorting, all of which leave much to be desired. The Monopoly's rather haphazard and often arbitrary system of grading and its limitation on the amount of tobacco it will buy per licensed donum have discouraged the production of better quality tobacco and the achievement of higher yields. Storage of tobacco in inadequate warehouses contributes further to its deterioration.

The second objective appears to have been at least partly realized, at least insofar as farmers have been given remunerative prices for their tobacco and have received a fairly stable income in the last five years. During the war years farmers enjoyed a bonanza since the Monopoly had no effective limitations on output, classified most of the tobacco in top grades and bought it at very high prices. After the war, changes in grading, stricter limitations on output and lower prices inevitably created discontent, although prices were still remunerative and, until recently, the Monopoly continued to buy more tobacco than the licensed output. The wide disparity between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices has continued, however, to put a premium on the illicit growing and marketing of tobacco. Moreover, the merchant has managed to interpose himself to an increasing extent between the grower and the Monopoly because of his ability to advance money on crops, to transport tobacco to distant collection centers and to obtain a

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higher classification for the tobacco than the grower is often able to get.

The third objective has undoubtedly been achieved. During the period September 1, 1943 to March 31, 1950 the Monopoly's cash income exceeded its cash expenditures by almost 6.5 million dinars. In fact, contrary to original intentions, revenue would seem to have become the primary objective of the Monopoly.

Improvement in the quality of tobacco should be the primary aim in the future. The Mission therefore suggests that one or two foreign experts, together with a number of Iraqis, be engaged to work in the field in order to help farmers to better their methods of growing, picking, curing and sorting tobacco. At least one expert should be recruited to instruct graders in proper methods of classifying tobacco, and another expert with an Iraqi deputy should be appointed to approve all tobacco for final purchase by the Monopoly. The existing inadequate warehouses should be replaced by four or five new warehouses provided with dust extracting facilities and proper humidifying equipment.

The Mission believes that under existing circumstances the Monopoly should be retained. As long as the tobacco is not of such quality that it can be marketed abroad, there will need to be some agency to limit production. Moreover, in the absence of the Monopoly the large number of small growers would have inadequate bargaining power in the fixing of prices vis-a-vis the merchants and manufacturers. The Mission advises strongly, however, against the proposed extension of the Monopoly to the manufacture of tobacco products. Such a step seems hardly necessary, since manufacturing is generally in competent hands, and it would only divert the Monopoly's attention from the primary task of improving the quality of the tobacco. The Mission suggests that the Monopoly be reorganized as a fiscally autonomous agency within the Ministry of Agriculture recommended elsewhere in the report. The Monopoly should be headed by an Iraqi director-general ssisted by an expert adviser and an advisory board which would nclude representatives of the growers. In order to discourage illicit arketing of tobacco, the difference between the Monopoly's buying nd selling prices should be narrowed to an amount sufficient to over operating costs and depreciation as well as the accumulation

655 of a small cash reserve. The resulting loss in revenue can be offset
249 by an increase in the tobacco excises which are relatively easy to collect from the manufacturers. The reduction in illicit production and marketing thus achieved should make it possible to raise the existing limitation on output per donum. This would encourage the better farmers, yet probably would not necessitate a further restriction of the licensed area, which the Mission realizes would be politically impracticable.

The Introduction of Sugar

249 In view of the government's desire to introduce the cultivation of sugar beets in northern Iraq, this subject has also been given
[439] special attention by the Mission. The possibility merits serious consideration because Iraq has imported over the last three years, on the average, 75,000 tons of sugar annually. There is, in addition, a serious need for new crops to diversify production and make more effective use of the manpower on the land. The Mission believes, however, that no decision on the production of sugar should be made until there is reasonable assurance that sugar can be produced at a cost competitive with the landed price of imported sugar (thus exclusive of import duty) and that the farmer will derive an income from sugar at least equal to that obtained from alternative crops, such as cotton, which can be grown on the same land. Moreover, before a decision is made in favor of sugar beets, the superiority of this crop over sugar cane, which could be grown in the South, must have been clearly established.

Sugar beets have been successfully grown in northern Iraq in test plantings carried out by the Department of Agriculture. Larger and more extensive test plantings are necessary, however, particularly to study the problems of insect control, yields and costs. The problems of labor supply and transport also need to be more thoroughly explored. The cultivation, transport and processing of sugar beets require close coordination and therefore careful organization. The production of beets is exacting, requiring considerable skill and labor. While preliminary evidence indicates that, on the basis of current price relationships, the yield per donum of sugar beets and cotton would not be significantly different, the balance of advantage may well prove to be on the side of cotton since, owing

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thereby put on smuggling which is difficult to control in a country 439
with long land frontiers, even with a large police force. On the 656
other hand, smuggled goods can now be purchased quite openly, and it is hard to believe that enforcement could not be made more effective.

In any event, outright restriction of imports could cause prices to rise and so put almost as great a premium on smuggling as a high tariff. The government has tried to prevent excessive mark-ups on certain goods such as radios by price control measures, but the control is by no means fully effective.

The government has also supplemented the system by entering [655]●
the market itself. For example, arrangements have been made under the recent Trade Agreement with India for the import of cotton textiles and gunny bags, in part on government account. The government has also made direct purchases from abroad of its own requirements (e.g. tires). The effect has, however, not always been as intended, merchants being hesitant to buy with the prospect of large government stocks hanging over the market.

On the whole, a less complex system of import control would seem better suited to an economy like that of Iraq, whose requirements are likely to change in composition and to increase quite rapidly. Fewer regulations, more strictly enforced, are likely to serve better the two ends of social justice and public revenue.

Balance of Payments

The bulk of foreign transactions are carried out through the 457
commercial banks, which are subject to exchange controls, or [453]
through government channels such as the National Bank. However, numerous transactions pass through other channels and many of them are virtually impossible to estimate. For this reason the Mission has not attempted to construct a true balance of payments. Table 14 shows the foreign exchange transactions passing through the principal official channels, so far as they are known to the Mission. The other items which would enter into a complete balance of payments are discussed subsequently.

As will be seen, even this account, which it should ordinarily be possible to balance, is subject to a wide margin of error for which no explanation is available. The general significance of the

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TABLE 19

Composition of Government Receipts

(in millions of dinars)

	Actual results			Estimates
	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51[1]	1951-52
A. Taxes				
Direct taxes:				
Land tax [2]	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4
Property tax	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6
Income tax	2.2	2.4	2.4	1.7
Total direct taxes	3.4	3.6	3.6	2.7
Indirect taxes:				
Turnover tax on agricultural produce and animals	3.2	3.6	4.6	4.7
Customs	9.8	11.3	13.0	9.4
Excises				3.1
Stamp duties	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
Tobacco Monopoly (net)[3]	0.3	0.4	n.a.	1.2
Total indirect taxes	13.8	15.8	18.1	19.0
Total tax receipts	17.2	19.4	21.7	21.7
B. Other receipts				
Share in National Bank's profits	—	—	0.6	0.7
Oil royalties	2.0	3.2	5.0	1.8[4]
Posts and telegraphs (gross)	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2
All other receipts	3.0	3.3	2.6	2.8
Total other receipts	6.0	7.6	9.4	6.5
Grand Total	23.2	27.0	21.1	28.2

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[1] Preliminary.

[2] Actually a tax in respect of land rent and water rights.

[3] The amount credited to the budget does not represent the actual surplus of the Monopoly's cash receipts over expenditures which amounted to ID 2,200,000 in 1948-49 and ID 1,200,000 in 1949-50. The Monopoly's "accounting" contribution to the budget is computed by (1) taking the difference between cash income and cash expenditures realized by the Monopoly in its transactions in tobacco, tombak and cigarette paper, (2) adding or subtracting the net charge in the value of the Monopoly's stocks during the year, and (3) adding sundry revenues from confiscated tobacco license fees, storage, etc.

[4] Represents only royalties to be received on oil production in the first quarter of the 1950 calendar year, the remainder being credited to the Development Board.

varieties of pistachio scions on established native pistachio trees 245
should be given particular attention. Almond orchards could be increased to advantage.

Vegetables and Potatoes

Vegetable culture is concentrated in the neighborhood of the 244
large cities where such products as radishes, lettuce, cabbage, cucumbers, 369
squash, tomatoes and others are in good supply during the
season. Unfortunately vegetables do not figure prominently in the [262]
diet of most people. Outside of the big towns little or no vegetables are eaten. In part, this appears to be due to the fact that tribal tradition holds the cultivation of vegetables in low esteem. However, where the sharecropper is inclined to grow vegetables, he may be discouraged by the lack of available land or the shifting of the area assigned to him for cultivation. If a determined effort were made by the government to enlist the cooperation of the landowners, it might not be too difficult to overcome these obstacles.

It might be desirable to increase the production of potatoes 244
which are now imported to the value of about ID 100,000 per year. The lighter soils along the large streams in the provinces of Mosul, Erbil and Suleimaniya are particularly well adapted to the production of both Irish and sweet potatoes. With proper guidance in cultural practices and the use of fertilizers, planters in these areas could easily supply the country's needs. If it is demonstrated that potato yields compare favorably with other crops, the government might well encourage the planting of potatoes both by launching an educational campaign and by furnishing the necessary seed to planters. Special attention will need to be given to transport, however, and the growers will have to be shown how to build inexpensive potato bins or pits with sufficient ventilation, insulation and accessibility.

Tobacco

Tobacco has been grown to some extent in the North for centuries, 249
although it was not until the last few decades that its production 655
assumed importance. Even now, the value of the tobacco crop is probably no more than a tenth of that of wheat or barley. In the mountainous areas of Erbil and Suleimaniya, however, it is

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249 the principal crop of the Kurdish farmers. Moreover, the way in 655 which tobacco has been bought, sold and handled by the government Monopoly has created much controversy. At the same time the Monopoly's operations have yielded considerable profits to the Treasury. Finally, the government is hopeful of expanding the production of tobacco, which is at present grown only for home consumption, so that it will make a significant contribution to exports. For all these reasons tobacco has become an important and controversial subject.

The purchase and sale of raw tobacco and tombak was vested in the government by law No. 35 of 1939. This legislation also instituted government licensing of the manufacturing, importation, wholesaling and retailing of cigarettes and controls over the importation of cigarette paper, boxes and other requisites for the manufacture of cigarettes. Operation of the Monopoly was at first entrusted to the Customs Department but in 1943 it was transferred to a separate Directorate-General within the Ministry of Economics. The original law did not detail the objectives of the Monopoly beyond specifying that "one of its main objectives shall be the improvement of tobacco." Apparently, however, other objectives were (1) to assure the cultivators fixed and remunerative prices for their tobacco, and (2) to raise revenue for the government.

Quality of Tobacco

The principal objective of the Monopoly has certainly not been achieved. In fact, it is generally recognized that the quality of tobacco has deteriorated rather than improved during its existence. The reasons for this are many. First of all, neither the Monopoly nor the Department of Agriculture has given farmers any assistance in improving their crop even though the cultivation, picking and curing of tobacco require considerable knowledge and skill which has been largely lacking in Iraq. The tobacco now grown is a mixture of several varieties not at all uniform in type, time of maturity or quality. Instead of picking the leaves individually starting at the bottom of the stem, the whole plant is frequently harvested at once. Curing is haphazard, with immediate exposure of the leaves to the sun instead of retaining them in a wilting shed

for three or four days. In packing and grading, growers do not separate the bottom, middle and top leaves or take care that packing takes place only when the moisture content and the pliability of the leaves are just right. 249 655

The second reason for the poor quality is inadequate grading and manipulation by the Monopoly. Tobacco is graded for the Monopoly by committees whose members are generally untrained. Classification is by color only and a bale given a single grade often has tobacco ranging through all shades of green, yellow and brown. Influential cultivators, or merchants acting on their behalf, can often obtain grades for their tobacco unwarranted by its merits. Thus the grading system offers little or no incentive to the grower to produce the best possible tobacco. Finally, the Monopoly stores tobacco under conditions which contribute to its rapid deterioration. Warehouses are often exposed to the elements and are without temperature and humidity control so that tobacco may alternately ferment and dry out. Little re-grading or manipulation is done in warehouses. [488]

Farmer Income from Tobacco

Whether the Kurdish farmers have on the whole obtained an adequate income from tobacco is less easy to determine. Their income from tobacco has depended on (1) the amount of tobacco purchased from each year's crop by the Monopoly and the prices (less *istihlak* and land tax) paid, and (2) the amount of tobacco sold illicitly and the prices realized thereon. Unfortunately, not enough data are available to permit an estimate of the income of tobacco farmers. Data on prices paid by the Monopoly for the first three years of its operation are lacking; figures on total tobacco production, from which the amount marketed illicitly might be deduced, do not exist; and little or nothing is known about the prices realized on tobacco marketed illegally. 249 435 655

During the war the Monopoly, which was supposed to equate the supply of tobacco with demand by licensing the area under cultivation, apparently made no real effort to use licensing as an instrument for the restriction of production. The area licensed rose steadily from 28,014 donums in 1940 to a peak of 71,730 in 1944. In the period 1943-45 the income of farmers was also considerably

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increased by classifying a much larger proportion of their output as "extra" or "first" grades which, of course, fetched higher prices. At the same time the Monopoly boosted the prices paid for the 1944 crop to a level more than twice as high as those which had prevailed for the 1943 crop. For the 1945 crop it lowered its prices somewhat but still maintained them at a level approximately twice as high as in 1943. As a result the Kurdish farmers reaped a bonanza. Whereas the Monopoly paid only ID 634,005 for the 1943 crop, it disbursed ID 3,208,032 for the 1944 crop and ID 3,608,997 for the 1945 crop (see table).

TABLE 1

LICENSING AND PURCHASING OPERATIONS OF THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY

Year	Donums Licensed	Prices Paid for Each Grade (1943 = 100)				Total Purchases	
		Extra	First	Second	Third	Quantity (kg)	Value (dinars)
1943	57,747	100	100	100	100	4,080,787	634,005
1944	71,730	247	233	229	250	8,863,022	3,208,032
1945	34,797	210	198	194	211	12,582,734	3,608,997
1946	26,818	140	151	183	214	4,395,166	746,499
1947	19,225	154	167	202	236	4,231,320	757,152
1948	15,500	140	151	183	214	4,347,639	772,729
1949	15,500	140	151	183	214	6,621,905	1,326,291
1950	16,000	140	151	183	214	n.a.	n.a.

Beginning in 1946 the Monopoly began to retrench sharply. The area licensed was reduced successively to 19,225 donums in 1947 and 15,500 in 1948. and it has since been held to approximately this level. Prices were also lowered to some extent. Most important of all, a stricter grading policy was adopted, resulting since 1946 in the virtual elimination of purchases of the "extra" grade and substantial reduction in the proportion of "first" grade tobacco purchased. As a result the Monopoly's disbursements for purchases from the 1946 crop fell to only ID 746,499. They have since been maintained at approximately this annual level except for the amount paid for the 1949 crop which amounted to ID 1,326,291. The quantity purchased of each year's crop fell from a peak of 12,600,000 kilograms in 1945 to about 4,400,000 in 1946,

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4,200,000 in 1947, 4,300,000 in 1948, and rose again to 6,600,000 249
in 1949. Actually, the Monopoly by no means fully enforced its 435
announced policy of buying no more than the maximum amount 655
that the licensed area could ostensibly produce.[4] Its purchases exceeded the ostensible maximum by about 400,000 kilos for the 1947 crop, 1,200,000 for the 1948 crop and as much as 3,500,000 for the 1949 crop. Much of the 1946, 1947 and 1948 crops evidently found their way into the black market.

Because of the danger of growing stocks, the Director-General, supported by the Prime Minister, issued a warning in advance of the 1950 crop that in the future no more tobacco would be bought than could be produced on the licensed area. Evidently the Monopoly carried out this policy for, up to April 12, 1951, it had bought only 2,250,000 kilos from the 1950 crop out of a theoretical total of 3,200,000 kilos. Since the cultivators apparently did not take the government's declared intention seriously, the actual crop substantially exceeded the permissible total. However, farmers were apparently compelled to sell their surplus illicitly at very low prices, thus giving rise to an expectation that in the next years the limitation on production will be more generally observed. If so, it seems likely that farmers' receipts from tobacco will amount to between ID 600,000 and ID 700,000 per year at prevailing Monopoly prices.

In general, it can probably be said that farmers received more for their tobacco than they would have obtained in the absence of the Monopoly. Since the tobacco produced is generally poor and therefore is unable to find foreign outlets, it is likely that, in the absence of the Monopoly's price support and production control program, prices would have been substantially lower. At the same time, the farmers suffered from the rather erratic policies of the Monopoly which permitted them to realize very high incomes during some of the war years and let them down suddenly immediately after the war.

Tobacco Monopoly Revenues

The government has undoubtedly enjoyed considerable income 651
from the Monopoly. In any discussion of this subject a distinction 655

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[4] The Monopoly has operated on the assumption that each licensed donum would produce up to a maximum of 200 kg. of tobacco.

must be made between (1) the actual cash income and cash expenditures of the Monopoly, which is of particular importance to the Treasury and (2) the Monopoly's accounting contribution to the budget. These two differ markedly, as is indicated below.

TABLE 2

CASH AND ACCOUNTING RETURNS OF THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY

(in dinars)

	Cash on Treasury Account			Contribution to the Budget
	Cash Income	Cash Expenditure	Balance	
Sept. 1, 1943- Mar. 31, 1946	6,760,878	5,692,965	+1,067,913	2,147,275
1946-47	3,518,655	3,807,628	−288,973	3,479,436
1947-48	3,580,232	1,340,388	+2,239,894	1,860,358
1948-49	3,061,214	844,814	+2,216,399	342,902
1949-50	2,240,234	1,036,028	+1,204,207	424,272
Total	19,161,213	12,721,773	+6,439,440	8,254,243

The accounting contribution to the budget is figured by (1) calculating the difference between cash income and cash expenditure realized by the Monopoly in its transactions in tobacco, tombak and cigarette paper, (2) adding or subtracting the net change in the value of the Monopoly's stocks during the year, and (3) adding sundry revenues from confiscated tobacco, license fees, storage, etc. Thus in 1946-47, the accounting contribution to the budget was large despite the cash deficit incurred by the Monopoly because stocks rose markedly. In 1948-49, on the other hand, the contribution to the budget was small in relation to the cash surplus of the Monopoly because stocks of tobacco and tombak during the year fell from 9,100,000 to 6,700,000 kilos. Finally, the contribution to the budget in 1949-50 was small because at the end of that year stocks were valued for the first time at purchase price instead of sales price as hitherto. As a result the valuation of stocks was substantially reduced despite the fact that the quantity of tobacco and tombak on hand had increased from 6,700,000 to 7,800,000 kilos.

By and large it certainly can be said that the Monopoly has yielded substantial revenues to the government. This revenue has

accrued despite rather inefficient operation because the Monopoly 651
has consistently charged tobacco manufacturers prices two to two 655
and a half times higher than those it paid for tobacco and it has been able to compel them to accept tobacco at the grade which it has specified, despite the marked deterioration of such tobacco in the Monopoly's warehouses.

Recommendations

In the future the first concern should be improvement in the 249
quality of tobacco. To accomplish this it would be desirable first of all to recruit abroad at least two or three experts on the growing of tobacco. These, assisted by a selected number of Iraqis, would work directly with the growers in a campaign to raise the standards of cultivation, picking and curing. In addition, a minimum of two leaf experts should be engaged to give instruction in the proper methods of grading or classifying tobacco. In order to provide a check on the work of the grading committees, the appointment of an expert buyer to approve all tobacco for final purchase by the Monopoly is recommended. He would presumably need to be a foreigner initially, but would have an Iraqi deputy who would be trained to take his place. In the warehouses, several experienced foremen-manipulators are needed to supervise and teach the staff correct methods of handling and storing the tobacco. The inadequate existing warehouses should be replaced with four to five new ones constructed of brick and concrete, equipped with dust extracting and humidifying plant and portable storage racks. Each of these new warehouses would have four floors, the first three devoted to storage and the fourth to manipulation.

The Monopoly itself might be retained, principally because 249
there will need to be some agency to limit production as long as 655
the tobacco is not of such quality that it can readily be sold abroad. Moreover, the large number of small tobacco growers might otherwise be at the mercy of the merchants and manufacturers who would have incomparably more bargaining power in the fixing of prices. It is suggested, however, that the Monopoly be reorganized into a financially autonomous agency with its own budget, its own accounts and its own funds. As an autonomous government enterprise it would be required to turn over annually to the Treasury

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its profits, less a suitable reserve, determined in accordance with approved accounting practice. An expert accountant should be engaged to draw up a proper system of accounting for the agency. In this connection it would be desirable to revalue the stocks of the Monopoly realistically after destroying inferior and excessively deteriorated tobaccos. The Monopoly would be headed, as at present, by a Director-General who might usefully be assisted by an adviser of recognized competence in the production and handling of tobacco. It would be desirable also to have an advisory board on which both manufacturers and growers could be represented.

The existing wide disparity between the buying and selling prices of the Monopoly provides a powerful incentive to illicit production and marketing of tobacco. The Mission strongly urges that this differential be greatly narrowed to a point where it is sufficient only to cover the expenditures of the Monopoly, plus a reasonable reserve. The revenue lost in this way could be collected in the form of additional excises on the manufacturers whose output and sales can be controlled relatively easily.

The present limitation on the amount of tobacco which the Monopoly will purchase from each licensed donum discourages productivity and should accordingly be lifted. This would not necessarily mean a further contraction of the licensed area, for the curtailment of black marketing resulting from the reduction of the difference between the Monopoly's buying and selling prices should enable the Monopoly to buy and sell more tobacco.

The Mission believes it would be very unwise to adopt current proposals to extend the Monopoly's operations to the manufacture of tobacco products. The remedy for the poor quality of tobacco does not lie in government assumption of manufacturing operations. The present manufacturers turn out a reasonably good product considering the quality of their materials. Their production costs are also likely to compare favorably with those that could be achieved with government operation.

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available for rental by the Agricultural Machinery Administration, 241 407
an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Economics.[7] 427

Further progress will be seriously impeded, however, unless means are found to prolong the life of machinery which is now less than half what it is in the United States. The shortage of spare parts and repair facilities has been very discouraging to machinery
owners. The failure of private dealers to provide these largely [655
inspired the government's original decision to establish the Agricultural Machinery Administration as a monopoly for the importation and distribution of agricultural machinery. In accordance with suggestions made by an earlier International Bank Mission, the government has tried to meet the problem by different measures, namely by licensing dealers only on condition they agree to set up repair facilities and maintain an adequate stock of spare parts. The enforcement of these requirements, however, will not provide a complete solution, even if it is supplemented by completion of the AMA program for setting up its own repair facilities at Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Diwaniya and Kut. The AMA and private dealers should also cooperate in conducting courses in operation and elementary maintenance of machines for drivers. Moreover, simple local facilities to carry out all but major repairs are needed. An adequate number of mechanics both for the central and local repair shops must be trained, and for this purpose foreign shop supervisors and instructors will be necessary. The Industrial Bank may have to cooperate by providing small loans for equipping local shops.

The AMA now performs a number of useful functions. It 655
regulates imports and the distribution of spare parts and tests 407
different types of machinery for their adaptability to conditions in 427
Iraq. Most important, it maintains a pool of machinery for rental. In some respects its operations could undoubtedly be improved.

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[7] An official estimate given to the Mission gives a total of 320 combines and 750 tractors. Customs statistics for the years 1945 to 1950 inclusive, however, show that only 632 tractors and 262 combines were imported. Part of these are already out of commission. An on-the-spot survey in each province by a member of the Mission indicated that only 170 combines and 549 tractors, exclusive of government-owned machines, were in operation. Of the combines, Mosul had 75; Baghdad, 75; seven provinces, one to five each; and five provinces, none. Of the tractors, Baghdad had 250; Mosul, 150; Kut, 40; Kirkuk, 23; Erbil, 15; six provinces, less than 10 each; and three provinces, none.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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With a larger and more qualified staff it could do a better job in advising farmers on the type of machinery best suited to their needs and could undertake the tasks outlined in the preceding paragraph. It might also pay more attention to finding and testing the type of machinery that would be particularly useful on smaller holdings. Above all, in its rental service it should charge rates which will not cause it to run a large deficit or discourage private ownership of machinery.

The rental service itself performs a useful function and should be continued until private enterprise can provide the same service on the basis of a reasonable return or until sufficient cooperatives can be organized to provide machinery for their members. Many landowners cannot now afford to buy a machine, and others will not risk buying until they have had a chance to test its value by renting one. The AMA, however, now sustains heavy losses on its rental operation. For the calendar year 1951 its operating expenditures are expected to be ID 150,463 as compared with a projected rental income of only ID 50,000. For the two years 1950 and 1951, the total cash deficit of the Administration will probably amount to about ID 222,000.[8] It has been able to finance such deficits only by using up the balance of the capital contribution of ID 500,000 which the government originally made to the agency. Since ID 235,750 of this contribution consisted of machinery and buildings, very little of the remaining cash will have been left by the end of 1951. The AMA's financial situation is all the more acute because it now urgently needs funds to purchase new machinery and equipment at a rate of perhaps ID 250,000 per year. In the past there has been no depreciation reserve for the replacement of machinery. To meet this financial emergency it will be necessary to make the rental operation self-sustaining. In part this can be accomplished by reducing expenditures. Probably more important, however, will be an increase in rentals, especially those on tractors which are now relatively low. A continuing government contribution to the total budget of the AMA will probably be merited, but only to the approximate extent to which AMA expenditures are attributable to functions other than the rental of

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[8] For the 1950 and 1951 budgets of the AMA, see Tables I and II in the appendix.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

machinery. At the same time the cost of new machinery and equip- 655
ment will need to be financed—possibly out of Development Board 407
funds if earlier plans to borrow for this purpose from the Inter- 427
national Bank do not materialize.

Government rental of machinery should at best be considered a temporary expedient. It is wasteful, primarily because overhead expenses are high. The transportation of machinery from central shops to the renters tends to be expensive and to expose the machinery to excessive wear and tear. Private and cooperative ownership of machinery should therefore be encouraged. One step in this direction would be to enable the Agricultural Bank to lend money for this purpose on the security of the machinery. In the past the absence of any provision for registering title to such machinery has prevented such loans. Another important measure would be to encourage the establishment of cooperatives for the collective ownership of machinery, especially in the new agricultural areas which are to be opened. At present the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project owns a number of tractors. [474] Because overhead costs are relatively low it is able to rent them out at lower rate than the AMA while still apparently covering the cost of operation and depreciation.

V. Control of Pests and Diseases

Livestock Pests and Mortality 232

More effective control of pests and diseases would also materially help to improve yields. This is particularly true of livestock. Because of lack of funds, equipment and trained personnel, no systematic campaigns for eradicating specific groups of diseases have been undertaken. Many livestock diseases, particularly of the parasitic type, are rife. Among the principal livestock diseases are foot and mouth disease; haemorrhagic septicaemia; anthrax; sheep pox; blackleg; parasitic gastritis; tick-borne diseases (anaplasmosis and piroplasmosis); fowl cholera; Newcastle disease; various manges; and dourine. The available staff is wholly insufficient to control, let alone eradicate, any epidemic which might break out. A serious outbreak of disease would endanger the livestock industry of neighboring countries as well as that of Iraq.

By and large this new partnership between the oil companies and the government should prove mutually beneficial. 382

The Government for several years has been considering the building of a modern oil refinery near Baghdad. In recent months, final plans were formulated and arrangements for its construction have apparently been made. This refinery, estimated to cost at least ID 7,000,000, is designed for an annual capacity of approximately 1,000,000 tons and when completed should be able to supply all of Iraq's anticipated requirements for refined petroleum products except for certain specialties. 382 655

The project will probably make it necessary to close the Alwand refinery, owned until recently by a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,[1] now producing something less than 70 percent of Iraq's requirements. Likewise, the use of Kirkuk crude, which can be obtained by the Government at cost, will probably make it necessary to close down the small oil field near Khanaqin which supplies the Alwand refinery, since it is unlikely that the oil resources in and near this field can be developed to such an extent that investment in a pipeline for export of the crude would be warranted.

Cotton and Rayon Textiles

In 1947, a cotton spinning and weaving mill was started near Baghdad, with a pilot plant consisting of 5,000 spindles and 84 automatic looms. The second stage, which is something over 70 percent complete, consists of 22,000 spindles and 500 automatic looms. The plant is modern in design and includes dyeing, printing and finishing equipment. About one half of the equipment has been in full operation for over a year, and shows good returns for an uncompleted plant which has not reached stabilized operation conditions. When completed and when operating on a full three-shift basis, it is expected that the spinning mill will produce 6,000,000 lbs. of yarn annually. Part of the spinning capacity is used in making yarn for sale to other small textile mills or even for home industries for weaving into cloth. In Mosul, for example, there are over 1,000 hand looms in various small home industries 288

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[1] By an agreement reached in December 1951, the government took over ownership of the refinery, retaining the AIOC subsidiary provisionally as its operating agent.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

505 In 1947, the number of steam and motor boats fell slightly to 172 vessels with a total tonnage of 10,645 tons. On the other hand, the number of special motor boats for passenger transport increased to 388.

Railways

496 The railway network and railway transport in Iraq are not yet sufficiently developed; but the authorities are making considerable efforts to remedy this state of affairs.

[471] In 1902 the Germans obtained a concession for building the Istanbul—Baghdad railway line—the "Baghdad Bahn"—a project in keeping with the *Drang nach Osten;* they began the work in 1903, but had only completed a few sections by the eve of the First World War. The work resumed under very different conditions after the First World War, and was completed in July 1940, when the Baiji—Mosul—Tel Kochek section was opened in the territory of Iraq.

●[655] The Iraqi railway network, which is owned by the State, now consists of the following lines:

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East

IRAQ MH1

K471 K648 Israel upset the normal growth, the serious disturbance in the production of Middle East oil through the Iranian attempt at nationalization and the terms of the 1952 agreement caused production to jump to spectacular heights, and with it the revenue of the Iraq Government.

K471 655 These same factors made possible the expansion of refinery facilities in Iraq and their ownership by the Government; internal distribution was also taken over by the Government, and at least part of the industry will be run by the Iraqis themselves. The future of Iraqi oil production, or at least the rate of production, will depend greatly on the world oil market and prices as the new guaranteed Iranian oil production again comes into the market, and on how this new flow of oil will affect the other producing areas in the Middle East.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater 656 freedom of Turkish times.

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that 172 archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Ḥilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Luʿ, and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and coordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell.

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily de- 494 veloped during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern 499 Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Fayṣal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders.

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

the contrary, it was criticized by anti-Zionist enthusiasts, by ardent 645*
members of the pan-Arab Muthannā Club in Baghdad, and at times 665
in Egypt and Syrian newspapers, as being less than whole-hearted on the question of Arab unity. Bakr Ṣidqi was a Kurd, Ḥikmat Sulayman by sympathy more Turk than Arab, and the Ahali group cared little for international politics. The tone of its early programme and of the speeches of Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman were equalitarian and easily labelled Communistic, and they alarmed the established classes. The Reformist group had indeed assumed its share of power with high hopes; but for all their newspaper and their 'People's Reform League', to which four ministers belonged, they found little popular support. They were opposed by the shaykhs who feared for their own positions, and thwarted by the Army who distrusted or despised them. The efforts of the group, laudable as they were as appreciating something of the real weaknesses and evils of 'Iraq society, were politically unprofitable to a Ministry dominated by the Army and
by reaction. The freedom of the press and of politics promised for [656]
all, in contrast to Yasin's régime, ceased to be permitted as soon as opponents grew active. Political and tribal prisoners including the Yazidis were released and a general amnesty proclaimed; but not long afterwards measures of suppression were taken as severe as those of a year earlier. Meanwhile friends of Ja'far Pasha—and notably his brother-in-law, Nuri Sa'id, tirelessly manœuvring and writing from Egypt and Syria—would forgive neither the murder nor its perpetrators, nor the willingness of the King and the present Cabinet to leave it unpunished. And, with all these elements of criticism and discontent, those endemic on the middle Euphrates were still alive, and soon to burst into violent activity.

Nowhere indeed were the embarrassments of Ḥikmat's position 645*
clearer than in his attempts to solve the insoluble Euphrates problem. 668
He must placate malcontents without offending their enemies: he must pardon the already condemned, but not show weakness: must keep order, but without a harshness which would be resented. Starting with all confidence in his own good intentions and diplomatic skill, he signally failed. The ferment of self-seeking and vengeful faction which was the normal life of Euphrates shaykhly and religious circles refused to cool at his bidding. A notorious land dispute among the Bani Zurayj of Samawa qadhā was the occasion to rally once again the forces supporting and opposed to 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr and Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh. These flouted the orders of the Ministry to a point which made inevitable a return to the severity with which Ḥikmat Sulayman had hoped to dispense, the two inveterate trouble-makers were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, arrested, and sentenced to detention in

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the 439
Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable
impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business 453
varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was 656
shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by
insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies,
by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly
in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking.
The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board 436
in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury.
The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in 652
some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern
multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still 185
prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped
to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were
the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private
cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They 291
served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced
Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi
sidara in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with
ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned 433
on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had
little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged
with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette
factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room
ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was
planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery
and matches came into humble existence. Yasin
Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts,
failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an
English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly 382
significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies
(p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of
more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter
the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

241 473 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. A Committee [656] was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 312 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new [45[illegible]] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural [185] affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first 312 653 stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of 668 political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest against the Baṣra concession, others—Rashid 'Āli and Ḥikmat Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an •[656 outbreak of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with 661] justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number of their more violent opponents. These included officers known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Āli led to his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri, and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms, occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement. Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained, Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties, and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter 600 to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory 656
throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped.
A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous
régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp,
in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib
was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles
the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality,
shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously
improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal
Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced
by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the 653
Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted
at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling
stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya
reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again 382
since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both
pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the
Tripoli branch into Vichy-French territory, in July 1940. The 241
sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced.
The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the 655
chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it
curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to
full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods
were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or 474
even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce
fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial
Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and 453
servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to
a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company,
and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded
on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 206
1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found 652
room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu
Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya
river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit
allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according
to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's 656
control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely
inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were 439
a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea
or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the
hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country.
The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt;
trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'Iraqis, recruited by the Palestine Defence League, entered 648× Palestine and served or offered to serve with Fawzi al-Qawuqchi 721 and the Palestine leaders; they were inspired perhaps by genuine devotion but were of negligible fighting capacity. The inefficacy of this force, and the collapse of Arab resistance in the face of Jewish terrorism and their resolute forces, led the League to decide, before the official end of the Mandate, upon the intervention of Arab regular armies. In April the Regent, whose leadership and vitality regained him much of his popularity, visited 'Amman and Cairo with the Ministers of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Student hunger strikes were called in Baghdad to urge the dispatch of the Army to Palestine, the closure of the Haifa pipeline, and a welcome for the Palestine exiles; and the Government of al-Ṣadr saw no alternative to following the League policy of large-scale intervention, however sketchily co-ordinated. 'Iraqi forces under General Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib—forces ill prepared, ill equipped, and with clearly inadequate supplies and reserves—moved from their home stations some ten to twelve thousand strong in mechanized or lorry-borne units, and took up positions on the western fringes of the Jordan Kingdom. They crossed into their allotted sector of Palestine on 15 May, immediately after the State of Israel had been proclaimed.

The outbreak of this war—the first occasion upon which its 722 troops were used abroad—was the signal for the imposition of 656 martial law throughout 'Iraq: a step happy only in its immediate restoration of outward tranquillity, but indicative of no real solution of any of the nation's problems. The emergency régime, which facilitated Government control over the elections, was marked by strict censorship, the opening of a concentration camp in the southern desert for the many arrested trouble-makers, the subordination of civil to military officials in all areas, and the establishment of military courts. It prohibited the carrying of firearms and the use of cypher codes, and by the supersession of many existing laws it involved a close restriction of civil rights. The clash between civil and military authorities increased as weeks went by with irritation, jealousy, and charges and counter-charges of indiscriminate severity or weak indulgence: Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams were soon heard to ask 'Which is the worse, government by students or by Army officers?' The press, swollen to an extraordinary number of daily sheets of trifling circulation but irresponsible violence, lost in a day the worst of its venom (except such as could be safely directed against the British or the Jews), and the few papers which refused compliance were suppressed. A ceremonial parade of the police in Baghdad did something to restore their morale. The Palestine war aroused enthusiastic

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of 648x
an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand
late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab
nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep
troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to
refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government
for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte
proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government
while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully
rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it 722
was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this
régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the disturbing 656
hostilities between civil and military authorities continued,
and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a
battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local
general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with
Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in
Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street [668]
demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the
Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground
organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the
seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective 563
alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism,
which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish 579
separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to
endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an
uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration
of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and
the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes
were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

439 467 skins. Not all the dollar income accrues to Iraq, however, partly because invoices are regularly undervalued and also because some commodities are sold through intermediaries in the Lebanon.

439 **Other Products.** In the years 1947 to 1949 the remaining exports consisted of the following: bricks and sand exported for use by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the value of about ID 300,000 a year; a variety of agricultural products, whose total value did not exceed ID 500,000 in any one year; and cotton. Iraq has always exported a little cotton, but in the best years, just before the war and again in 1950, its value was only about five percent [248] of all export receipts. The position is now changing radically. Iraq, like several neighboring countries, is experiencing a cotton boom. Under the stimulus of high prices, the area under cultivation has increased rapidly in the last few years and predictions for the 1951 crop have ranged as high as 150,000 tons of seed-cotton, compared with 25,000 tons the year before. If the fellah's traditional aversion to a crop he cannot consume himself has been permanently overcome and if he can acquire the necessary knowledge for good cultivation, cotton could very soon become one of Iraq's most important exports, if not the most important. As a summer crop, however, its cultivation will be hazardous until the control of the rivers gives better assurance of a summer water supply.

Import Policy

459 656 457 All foreign transactions are, with certain exceptions, subject to exchange control. Imports from hard currency areas have been governed by licensing systems and have been limited to goods such as agricultural and industrial machinery, automobiles, trucks and drugs. Before 1948, imports from other areas were not subject to license, except for about 100 items, mainly luxuries. In that year, however, Iraq experienced a very large drain on her foreign exchange reserves and a more complex system was introduced.

Under the system now in force, all imported goods have been placed on one of several lists, the two longest consisting of "unlimited" and "limited" goods. Each merchant is given an annual quota in dinars, within which he can import unlimited goods without restriction, provided he obtains a license for each purchase. Alternatively, he can spend a small part of his quota on "limited" goods, but only up to a fixed amount.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Unlimited goods consist mainly of the goods purchased by 439
the common people such as tea, sugar and cotton textiles, and a 656
variety of other goods considered essential, such as drugs and medi- 457
cal equipment, educational matter, industrial, electrical and agricultural machinery, transport equipment and raw materials for local industries such as gunny bags, certain vegetable oils, *mastika* (for *arak*), tanning extracts and non-ferrous metals. The principal object of the system, when it was introduced, was to prevent a shortage of these necessities—and hence high prices—at a time when imports as a whole had to be restricted to protect the country's exchange reserves. As an additional safeguard, each application for an import license was scrutinized to insure that the articles being purchased were not too highly priced. Since Iraq's foreign exchange position greatly improved in 1950, the import of unlimited goods is now permitted without any quota limitation.

The goods on the limited list, while not strictly luxuries, consist of goods considered less essential than those in the unlimited list. This includes, for example, ready-made clothing of various kinds, automobiles, matches, and certain types of household utensils and electric ware. Luxuries, such as bananas, confectionery, cosmetics, Persian rugs and nylon stockings, were placed on a third list of goods "without foreign exchange." These goods could be purchased only by merchants who held a special license to import "without foreign exchange," which meant that they had to acquire foreign exchange through other than the official channels. Such licenses also permitted them to purchase goods on the other two lists.

Foreign exchange can be acquired without official license in a number of ways, of which the following are probably the most important: by undervaluation of exports, especially wool, hides and skins; by the export of dates to neighboring countries in small craft (in this case retention of foreign exchange is legally permitted); by smuggling, although there is probably a net inflow of smuggled goods; by sale of dinar notes to foreign pilgrims to the Holy Cities; and by overvaluation of imports. The present system was introduced in order to compel merchants to use these resources instead of drawing on the national exchange reserves. Although the system has been successful in that there has been a very

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

439 extensive use of private exchange holdings, particularly in 1949
656 when licenses to the value of over ID 10,000,000 were issued, it
457 may well be that it has also encouraged the illegal acquisition of
foreign exchange.

A fourth list consists of prohibited goods. This is purely a protective device, almost all of the goods in this list being produced in Iraq. These include a variety of agricultural products such as sesame seeds and cottonseed or their oils. Several of the newer industries have also been protected by the prohibition of their products, for example, beer, cement, cotton yarn, aluminum ware, alcohol and hides.

Although the improvement in the foreign exchange situation has led to a relaxation of the quota limitation, the other restrictions remain. In particular, import licenses still have to be obtained for each purchase. Although it is maintained that licenses can now be obtained quickly, this appears to act as at least a psychological deterrent to merchants. One of the objects of the licensing system is to restrict importing to bona fide merchants, but if this is considered necessary, it could, of course, be achieved by the issue of a general importer's license, good for a period such as a year.

439 As the economy develops and the standard of living rises,
656 which it may do rapidly in the near future, the demand for goods
now on the limited and prohibited lists is likely to increase and restrictions on imports of these goods might easily have an inflationary effect on prices. This would hit the artisan, the clerk and the civil servant, and might increase the cost of the development program. Any extension of prohibition to textiles and other goods produced in Iraq would, of course, hurt the poorest classes. Under these circumstances, it will be very difficult to manage so rigid a system.

A much more flexible instrument would be the customs tariff,
but little coordination of the import licensing system with the tariff
[651] seems to have been achieved. At present the tariff is primarily a
means for raising revenue and, as such, imposes the greatest burden on those who buy bulk commodities. It hardly conforms to the objectives of a licensing system that aims at a plentiful supply of these goods at low prices. The principal objection put forward to higher duties on luxuries is the increased premium

thereby put on smuggling which is difficult to control in a country 439
with long land frontiers, even with a large police force. On the 656
other hand, smuggled goods can now be purchased quite openly, and it is hard to believe that enforcement could not be made more effective.

In any event, outright restriction of imports could cause prices to rise and so put almost as great a premium on smuggling as a high tariff. The government has tried to prevent excessive markups on certain goods such as radios by price control measures, but the control is by no means fully effective.

The government has also supplemented the system by entering [655]
the market itself. For example, arrangements have been made under the recent Trade Agreement with India for the import of cotton textiles and gunny bags, in part on government account. The government has also made direct purchases from abroad of its own requirements (e.g. tires). The effect has, however, not always been as intended, merchants being hesitant to buy with the prospect of large government stocks hanging over the market.

On the whole, a less complex system of import control would seem better suited to an economy like that of Iraq, whose requirements are likely to change in composition and to increase quite rapidly. Fewer regulations, more strictly enforced, are likely to serve better the two ends of social justice and public revenue.

Balance of Payments

The bulk of foreign transactions are carried out through the 457
commercial banks, which are subject to exchange controls, or [453]
through government channels such as the National Bank. However, numerous transactions pass through other channels and many of them are virtually impossible to estimate. For this reason the Mission has not attempted to construct a true balance of payments. Table 14 shows the foreign exchange transactions passing through the principal official channels, so far as they are known to the Mission. The other items which would enter into a complete balance of payments are discussed subsequently.

As will be seen, even this account, which it should ordinarily be possible to balance, is subject to a wide margin of error for which no explanation is available. The general significance of the

4g Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
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K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I 168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
2[illegible] the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
648] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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654 of products.[1] Financial assistance thus provided by the Government, 652 together with the new Law for the Encouragement of Industry issued in 1950, proved of great potency in the development of industry. The capital of the Industrial Bank was increased in 1952, to I.D. 3,000,000 of which I.D. 1,200,000 have already been paid up.

433 These and other measures, such as increases in custom duties 656 and the restriction or prohibition of certain industrial imports, have produced marked progress in the establishment of new industries and the re-equipment and expansion of old ones, especially since the end of World War II.[2] This can be seen from the following table:

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Development of Large-Scale Industry in Iraq 1948 - 1952

Year (1st April - 31st March)	Capital Invested I.D. 1000	Value of Annual Output I.D. 1000	Number of Employees	Wages paid annually I.D. 1000
(Seven large Industries)				
1948 - 49	3,183	1,403	1649	
1949 - 50	3,194	1,555	2626	333
1950 - 51	4,206	2,631	3443	406
1951 - 52	4,415	3,600	3837	406
(Ten large Industries)[3]				
1951 - 52	4,835	4,424	4533	599

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[1] Industrial Bank, Compilation of Laws, Regulations, etc. Government Press, Baghdad 1951.

[2] For pre-World War II industrial development in Iraq see- *A Handbook of Mesopotamia*, H.M S.O., 1917. *A Report on the Progress of Iraq*, by H.M. Government to the League of Nations. H.M.S O.,1931. *The Iraq Directory*, Baghdad, 1935 (English Edition). *The Economic Organisation of Iraq* (in Arabic), Editor Said B. Himadeh, Beirut, 1937.

[3] See the *Annual Report of the Department of Industry 1951-52*, Ministry of National Economy,Baghdad. (in Arabic)

The Report of the National Bank of Iraq, 1949-50, p. 46 (in Arabic) states that national production of cement, beer, vegetable oil, soap, leather.. etc., has been substituted for similar imports with the result that value of imports fell from I.D. 2,984,000 in 1948 to I.D. 1,298,000 in 1950, and the deficit in the balance of trade was reduced by I.D. 1,686,000 due to this reason alone during the same period.

464 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are
472 employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary,
473 sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net
profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country.[1]

648 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation :** Except where foreign enter-
457 prise has obtained a concession for the development of important
471 resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the
Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enter-
648 prise. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipu-
656 lates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi
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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

nationals in order that industry may qualify for the concessions 648
granted by that law. This may appear as a discrimination against [656]
foreign capital and some foreign industrialists have raised this 471
point. But considering the great concessions granted by the Law, including the appropriation of state land, and the smallness of the majority reserved for nationals, the "discrimination" is nominal. Past experience of foreign capital investment in the Middle East does not allow the removal of such safeguards. However, the writer believes that proper legislation on these three points mentioned above would give foreign industrialists sufficient assurance; and, given the proper information and contacts, many firms may be induced to establish branches in Iraq to the benefit of all concerned.[1]

7. **Other problems** : There are other less important industrial 433
problems which should be mentioned even though limitations of 471
space prevent full discussion of them.

(a) It should be realized that Iraqi industry labours under a heavy burden of over-capitalization which adds to its costs. There is a tendency to have completely integrated plants; most industries have to maintain a power generating plant either to provide electricity, or as a spare in case of failure in the city supply. Practically all industries have their own workshops. There is a strong desire on the part of all industry owners to be self-sufficient with regard to supply of materials, chemicals and spare parts. Many industries have been induced to purchase more land than they actually need in order to guard against future needs and also to profit from the expected rise in land values. This has led to an insufficient utilization of machinery and to a great amount of working capital, per unit of production, locked up. These facts are reflected in the balance sheets of many industries in the form of Loans from Banks (commercial banks) which in some cases reach 50 per cent of nominal capital and thus increase the fixed charges which industry has to meet. The reason for this desire on the part of industrials to be more or less completely self-sufficient lies in the fact that, owing to the country's industrial immaturity, it is often impossible to rely on efficient service from outside plants when required. The need to keep great stores of

[1] In accordance with the economic boycott enforced by Arab States, firms having business relations with Israel are excluded.

652 473 ly control the price, sales and purchases policies of such industries. In the first place, though the Bank holds a large proportion of the capital (varying between 20 and 40 per cent) of every industry, it is always in the minority on the Boards of Directors; moreover it appoints its own representatives and is excluded from taking part in the election of other directors by the articles of association of the companies concerned. This course has been deliberately taken so as to ensure private enterprise against arbitrary action on the part of the government. Secondly, the Bank itself is, in the last analysis, a profit seeking institution and therefore it is not likely to stand in the way of any measures likely to increase profits, unless they are of an obviously oppressive or abusive nature. Thirdly, the main duty of the Bank is to promote industry. Promotion and control are not always compatible.

656 475 For these reasons the State has to look for other ways, and to use more fully the legal powers which it already possesses, for effective control over industry. The fact that it owns a share in industry through the Industrial Bank puts it in a better position to exercise such control. But to rely mainly on the Industrial Bank for this purpose is to escape responsibility.

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and 286 in the period 1904 to 1914.[1] In Egypt and in the 000 United States, the Arabic press,[2] with a wide circulation even in the Ottoman Empire,[3] was a powerful agent, by its constant and bitter denunciation of the Turks, in arousing Nationalist sentiment among Arab peoples.[4]

In 'Iraq, no less than in Syria and Arabia, the 'Ottomanizing' policy of the Young Turks stimulated the Nationalist Movement. It continued, however, to lag behind the Movement across the desert, even as it had been slower to develop. 175* 668* 186*
Cut off by its geographical position and by its lack of communication from the West, 'Iraq lay torpid, a potentially rich Turkish Siberia but lacking educational facilities and the stimulus of new ideas and of political thought such as prevailed along the Mediterranean coast. Conservative in thought, the Sunnī Muslims were slow to withdraw their political allegiance from the Sultan whom both religion and tradition had established as their religious head.[5] The Shī'a priesthood, Persian for the most part, hated the Osmanlis both as Sunnīs and as oppressors, but possessed little community of interest with the Arabs, although Arabs of the Shī'a sect formed a majority of the population of 'Iraq.

The social structure, based fundamentally on the soil, and not far removed from feudalism, was stony ground for Nationalism. Landlords sought only relief from taxation. Shaikhs desired individual freedom for themselves and their tribes. Merchants, principally Jews, perhaps the most progressive single element in the land, had little deep feeling for either 175* 186* 668* 565

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[1] The life of a journal during the Turkish regime was often not long, particularly if in opposition to the Government. Suppressed journals frequently reappeared under new names. 204 656

[2] From 1904 to 1914, 385 Arabic newspapers and magazines were founded in Egypt, North and South America: Tarazi, op. cit.

[3] Although banned from Turkey, they were distributed through the foreign post offices.

[4] Djemal Pasha, in particular, resented the part played by the Arabic Press abroad: Turkish Red Book, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne*, pp. 12-13.

[5] *Infra*, p. 235, for typical view on the sanctity of the Ottoman regime.

646 666 where the electoral body is not so amenable to control as elsewhere, the confidential orders of the Government to the provincial officials proved sufficient to secure the election of its candidates whether they were residents of the district or even known there. Thus in 1925, all but four of the government candidates were returned, two of these being from Baghdad *Liwā*.[1] In 1928 the deputies returned from Basra, 'Amāra, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla and 'Arbīl *Liwās* were government nominees.[2] Of the thirteen Baghdad deputies, all but five were Government candidates. In these two elections, as well as in that of 1930, a number of Opposition candidates were conscientiously included by the Government on the principle advocated by the King that talented members of the Opposition would raise more difficulties outside Parliament from feelings of personal dissatisfaction than if they were actually members. Thus in 1928, half of the twenty-two Opposition members returned to the Chamber had been previously given the government coupon.

646 661 The deputies, on the other hand, by their proneness to consider parliamentary office as a means to personal aggrandisement, persistently refused the opportunity to win the respect and confidence of the nation. In 1925, it had been somewhat difficult to secure candidates to come forward. It soon became apparent, however, that deputyship meant an assured income and, even more attractive, the exercise of influence. In 'Iraq, as in other countries, the principal value attached to official position has been its effectiveness in securing official favours and financial gain.

646 661 656 Examination of the statute books of 'Iraq, not only from 1925 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, June 10th, 1925. These four, with five others, were, according to a confidential report of the time, accounted to be 'unsatisfactory from the British standpoint'.

[2] Cf. *Baghdad Times*, May 10th, 1928.

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revenue[1] and of other financial legislation,[2] while passed by the 646
Chamber for the benefit of 'Iraq as a whole, particularly after 661
the agricultural crisis of 1931, have especially favoured the 656
land-owning class which has been predominant in Parliament. Other evidence seems to point to the exercise by the deputies of their influence outside of Parliament, either to secure preferential treatment from revenue officials or to obtain appointments for their protégés.

In spite of these deficiencies, Parliament, judged by its com- 646
plete record before 1932 as well as afterwards, has filled an important function in the political life of 'Iraq. It has attracted the most agile brains in the country; it has reflected although imperfectly, public opinion; and it has served as a brake on legislation which might otherwise have been forced on the country more quickly than it could be assimilated. It has served to curb the attempts of individual Ministers to assume a dictatorial attitude. Its right of interrogation, while sometimes checking the initiative of Ministers, has also served to reveal irregularities in administration. It has, moreover, furnished an outlet for Shīʻa aspirations for participation in the Government and has given tribal opinion a limited means of expression through the tribal representatives, although discontent with the number of tribal representatives and the manner of their election was given by the leaders of the tribal revolt of 1935 as one of the primary reasons for that rising.[3]

The Chamber, together with the conservative Senate of twenty appointed notables, has, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, laid the foundations upon which democratic government, if it is to come to 'Iraq, must be built. If Parliament were to be given a broader base of an enlightened electorate, a reasonable degree of freedom of election, leadership and new

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[1] Particularly Laws: No. 38 of 1927; No. 55 of 1929; Nos. 38, 43, 69 of 1931; Nos. 1, 5, 10, 34, 35 of 1932; Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 of 1933.

[2] Particularly Pump Law of February 13th, 1926; No. 72 of 1926; No. 38 of 1929; No. 37 of 1930; No. 66 of 1931, etc.

[3] *Near East and India*, June 27th, 1935; also *The Times*, August 5th, 1936.

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discrimination in accordance with capacity. Finally, Article 37 states that the method of election to the Chamber of Deputies shall take into account the necessity for the representation of non-Islamic minorities. 641 563

Some of these guarantees have been reinforced by particular laws. Thus the Electoral Law of 1924 allotted four deputies to the Christians and four to the Jews; it is a matter for dispute whether the law permits individual Christians and Jews to be elected as representatives of the ordinary constituencies. Similarly the non-Moslem communities were given representation in local and municipal councils by special laws. [646]

As for the linguistic minorities, the Local Languages Law of 1931 provided that the official language should be Kurdish or Turkish in a number of districts, and in addition that in all elementary and primary schools in those districts the language of instruction should be the mother-tongue of the majority of the pupils. [656]

Personal Status and Communal Organization

The grant to religious minorities of jurisdiction in personal and other matters has not met with the same difficulties as those which have occurred in Syria. Articles 75 and 78 of the Constitution provided for the establishment of Christian and Jewish Spiritual Councils, with powers of jurisdiction to be conferred upon them by special laws. Their functions were defined in Article 79 as including matters relating to marriage, dowry, divorce, separation, alimony, attestation of wills and any other matters relating to personal status if the parties concerned consented. Every religious community was also, according to Article 112, to have the right to establish bodies competent to administer Waqf property. 692 563

In application of these provisions, several laws have been issued for particular communities, defining the method of appointment of the spiritual heads of the communities and of their councils, both spiritual and lay, and their functions in regard not only to personal status but also the decision of religious questions, the training of ecclesiastics, the administration of Waqf property, and the administration of schools and charitable institutions. For those communities for which special laws have not yet been issued, the old Turkish law on the subject remains valid.

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422 landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to
579 time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly com-
622 plete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his
secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing
427 out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land
464 either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power
471 of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor
estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short
of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any
terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or
sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and
the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this
district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of
the towns.'[1]

241 A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions.
The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after
● 656 year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no
452 rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The
government regulation that land must remain fallow in alter-
nate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area
is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the
report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward
selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears,
at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan
amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq,
427 the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually
receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical
apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

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[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53–E.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East . . .

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242 being conducted this year with about nine different insecticides, but a more thorough program is needed.

The FAO is supplying a specialized cotton entomologist, and the Point Four Mission is supplying a general entomologist to help develop an effective program.

[656] The country has a law requiring that all cotton stalks must be destroyed, the debris burned, and the land ploughed by the first of January. In fact, the farmer is not given permission to plant cotton again unless he has complied with these regulations. Seed sterilization also is required. But the Director General himself admits the program has been ineffective. There are many host plants on which cotton insects can live, and the people do not understand the law or are not in a position to comply, especially where they are in the habit of saving the stalks for fuel.

One of the real difficulties is the growth habits of the present Acala varieties which are said to set 80 per cent of their bolls on what is called the second flush, after the end of August, when the insect population is highest. Efforts are being directed toward development of varieties that have a shorter maturing period, and early results with Coker Wilt have been encouraging.

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

—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

This irrigation system of a farm in southern Iraq dates back to Biblical times. Mules walk down an inclined track beside the well pulling the goatskin water scoops. The scoops, hauled to ground level by the mules, spill their contents into the irrigation ditch. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Government of Iraq in its extensive projects to modernize and improve irrigation and increase crop output.

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134 for centuries, and farmers have depended on the silt deposited from the overflows to maintain the fertility. Increased use of canals and dams for irrigation has made the overflows less frequent. Experiments conducted for the past three or four years with commercial fertilizers have shown no significant benefit, but the United States experts feel the tests are not conclusive and should be continued with various soil conditioners.

While depending on basic research to stimulate long-range production, the Director General is trying to force an immediate improvement through regulations requiring the application of techniques known to be beneficial.

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Controls

656 In an effort to concentrate cotton production on the better suited lands and to facilitate insect control, seed control, and other beneficial measures, regulations have been promulgated requiring government permits for all cotton acreage planted. These permits, based primarily on suitability of the soil and availability of water and labor, are issued on the recommendation of local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the enforcement system is inadequate, and it is generally admitted that the regulation is not closely followed, especially in areas where the local sheiks are extremely powerful and are practically a law unto themselves.

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—*Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration*

At the government cotton experimental farm near Baghdad a double-handled board is used to level the high spots in a newly ploughed field. Outside the government farms little leveling is done. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Iraq Government in experiments and demonstrations to improve cotton cultural practices.

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COTTON IN IRAQ


TURKEY
SYRIA
KEY TO NAMES OF PROVINCES-
1. MOSUL
2. ERBIL
3. KIRKUK
4. SULAIMANIYA
5. DULAIM
6. BAGHDAD
7. DIYALA
8. AL BADIYA ASH SHIMALIYA
9. KARBALA
10. HILLA
11. KUT AL IMARA
12. DIWANIYA
13. AMARA
14. AL BADIYA AL JUNUBIYA
15. MUNTAFIQ
16. BASRA
Each dot represents 1000 bales
Mosul
Greater Zab
Little Zab
Tigris
Diyala R.
Euphrates R.
Baghdad
Kut
Basra
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
IRAQ
COTTON PRODUCTION
1951
STATUTE MILES
0 50 100 150
40°
42°
44°
46°
48°
36°
34°
32°
30°

The Ministry also has a program under which pure seed imported from the United States and those propagated on the state farms are distributed free of charge to farmers who have received planting permits and who agree to the variety control. Under this program the government proposes to distribute enough seed to plant most of the area annually for the next five years. Despite this incentive, widespread evasion also is reported. Apparently the farmers still rely on the mixed seed on the theory that if one does not produce another will. (Seed distribution in 1952 was considerably less than in 1951 because of the bad crop last season.) 248 656

The government also has established supervision over all the gins for control of seed distribution to prevent any except approved seed from going back to the farms for planting. Here again enforcement is said to be inadequate.

The mandatory insect control program is another illustration of the effort to force an improvement in cotton, and here again the results have been questionable. [242]

The Director General is thinking also of establishing a price stabilization program to lend further encouragement to the promotional programs, but this has not been approved as yet.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Even the government recognizes the difficulty of enforcing these rather drastic measures in a short period of time against the tradition of complete freedom of action by the landowners. The most significant fact is not that they have not been completely successful in the first few years, but that the measures have been adopted by the government. The trend definitely is toward tighter and tighter control by the government. The outcome likely will depend on how readily the big landlords accept the regimentation and cooperate. If the landlords become convinced that the regulations are to their ultimate economic advantage, they may comply willingly. So in the end the controls may depend on the educational program.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

Chapter 13

PRIVATE AND FOREIGN SCHOOLS

TWO TYPES of schools function outside the government system: private schools, which are owned and operated by Iraqi citizens, either individual or in association; and foreign schools, which are owned and operated by foreign individuals or groups. Since Iraqi parents are forbidden by law to send their children to foreign primary schools, there are no foreign schools below the intermediate level in Iraq, with the exception of 5 primary schools for Iranian boys. Table 35 presents enrollment figures for all types of primary and seconday schools in Iraq as of 1945–46. 872 873 656

Both private and foreign schools are obliged to conform to governmental regulations and to have governmental approval of housing, qualifications of teachers, curriculums, and textbooks. They must follow the government's courses of study for Arabic language and social studies, and teachers of these subjects are appointed by the Ministry of Education. Admission to the first and fourth years of secondary schools is conditional upon having passed the public primary- and intermediate-school examinations.

Curriculums for both private and foreign schools follow those of the government schools so that pupils will not be handicapped in the public examinations. Since all foreign secondary schools are American, English is emphasized, and in the last two years of the course some subjects are taught in that language. The private schools for Jews teach Hebrew language and literature in the primary sections and English and French language and literature in the secondary schools. The better students in the Jewish schools are prepared to take the examinations for French certificates, as are pupils in the schools which were founded as French missionary schools.

Private schools fall into three categories: private ventures, schools maintained by associations interested in raising the standard of national culture, and sectarian schools. The private ventures are conducted for profit and appeal especially to pupils who do not find places in the government schools. Associations that maintain schools are usually composed of citizens

312 681 694 to the irrigation department, and the procedure to be followed for their recovery though covered by Article 19 is now done through the *Mutassarrifs* concerned in accordance with the Law for the Collection of Debts Due to the Government No. 43 of 23 April 1931 as amended by subsequent Laws.

5) Rice Cultivation

243 656 The Law for Rice Cultivation No. 23 of 31 March 1932, as subsequently amended by Law 53 of 15 May 1940, prohibits or restricts in areas defined by Regulation issued from time to time, the cultivation of rice for health reasons, economy in the use of water or soil conservation (*Article 1*).

Rice cultivation could only be conducted under special license (*Article 4*), and areas in which rice cultivation is restricted shall be fixed by Regulation (*Article 2*).

Regulation No. 34 of 28 August 1944, defines the regions in which rice cultivation is prohibited and also fixes areas in masharas for regions where rice could be cultivated.

The Minister of Agriculture shall decide the manner in which areas for rice cultivation alloted to each *Liwa* are to be distributed, and the *mutassarrif* concerned shall issue a notice inviting those interested to apply for the necessary permits.

Requests must be submitted to the *quaimmaqam* of the *qadha* in which the lands are situated, and the *mutassarrif*, to whom the requests are transferred shall issue the permits, with the requirements of the Irrigation Department. The minimum distance between rice fields and inhabited localities shall be three kilometres. The permits are non-transferable and are strictly limited to the persons and to the plot of land and irrigation works stated on them. The permit holder agrees to the rotation of water supplies determined by the Irrigation Department, and he accepts responsibility for all shortage of irrigation supply with consequent damage to crops.

6) Offences and Penalties under the Law for Rice Cultivation

243 681 It is forbidden for any person to exceed the area for rice cultivation fixed in the permits, or to cultivate without permit in prohibited and restricted areas. Contraveners shall be fined

the Kurdish tribal system poses some unusual problems in this field. K 621
In the travel literature, Kurdish tribes have a deserved reputation as [181]
warriors and bandits with little respect for human life, and without further analysis of the situation it has been assumed that much of their activities in this field is governed by a pattern of blood feuding. There is however good reason to analyse the situation more carefully, to discover just what patterns relating to homicide do in fact exist. K

The material on which the following is based is, for obvious 629
reasons, very incomplete. Today homicide is the matter with which I
the external administration is most concerned, and immediate inter- 656 ●
vention on its part tends to prevent other action from being taken, 682
or fear of such intervention prevents actual case histories from being discussed. All the data that I do have, however, indicates the absence or very weak development of blood feuding patterns in Southern Kurdistan. This absence may seem surprising, and it is necessary to make clear just what is meant by the statement.

It seems useful in the analysis of this phenomenon to adhere to a K
fairly specific defintion of what is meant by institutionalized blood 628
feud. In its most characteristic form, it has been described in numerous African societies, e. g. the Nuba (Nadel 1947): «In Heiban [homicide] entails blood feud, which is carried on until exact revenge has been achieved; a man must be killed for a man, a woman for a woman; even in their age the two must be as closely matched as possible. The duty to avenge devolves, not on an individual, but on the whole clan . . . . Again, the revenge is not directed against an individual — the murderer himself — but against any member of the enemy clan who satisfies the conditions of this law of revenge . . .», p. 151). The pattern is thus a special form of institutionalized revenge, whereby a whole group of persons is held collectively responsible for the behavior of one of its members, and where the wronged party is similarly not conceived as the individual or his close family, but as the whole larger group to which he belonged. The reaction is one of retaliation, governed by considerations of equality, and subsidiarily one of compensation by traditionally stipulated blood money (e. g. ibid. p. 251).

In this form, the blood feud is not found in Southern Kurdistan.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 721 25 January 1920 had asserted that non-Arab Muslim territories, whether enemy-occupied or not, 'could not be divided' from Turkey; Kurdistan was the obvious reference. From this followed the propaganda campaign of 1920: the absurd pretensions to a throne in Baghdad put forward on behalf of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Sanusi, who was brought by the Turks to Diyarbakr in 1921: their resumed control of the border districts and tribes of Van and Julamark: their seduction of the Kurdish chieftains of Rawanduz area, and their mission thither of a civil official with troops. With the wild Surchi predominantly pro-Turkish, and the Pishdar divided, Turkish penetration made progress in the summer of 1921. It was checked by the Royal Air Force, the 'Iraq Police, and loyal tribal Levies in the autumn, only to restart with a sudden murderous stroke by 'Ubaydullah of the Surchi, who ambushed a Levy party and was repulsed again by major operations of the 'Iraq Levies and R.A.F. in mid-winter. But the tribal submission which followed was precarious; 'Ubaydullah remained at large; and early in 1922 Turkish troop movements on the frontier, based on Nisibin and Jazira, presaged a further offensive. Meanwhile the Sulaymaniya area was relatively quiet in the absence of Shaykh Maḥmud and his near relations; but a group of Persian Kurds from the frontier were able to range the Ḥalabja plain, collect 'taxes', ambush a Levy force, and threaten the town until Air Force reprisals scattered them.

563 657 A further problem of desperate difficulty, and closely connected with the Turkish claims, was that of the Assyrians. Their recruitment, first reluctant then eager, into the 'Iraq Levies did not solve the riddle of their ever-demanded repatriation, nor even of their settlement as a compact community in 'Iraq. The death of Paulus Mar Sham'un in 1920 left the succession to a feeble boy of eleven, Ishai. It led to the rapid loss of much of his house's authority to such livelier adventurers as the notorious Aghā Petros of Baz, an international 'crook' with murder, blackmail, and fraud to his credit in both hemispheres—and a brave man. The latter's plan, a desperate *pis aller* reluctantly authorized by the British, was to lead his rabble of vindictive tribesmen in their thousands across hill and dale by 'Aqra to Urmiya. The project ended late in 1920 in wayside looting, savage reprisals, and final débâcle; and the Assyrian community were reconcentrated in their camp at Shaykh Mindan outside Mosul. From here the Urmiya sections of the nation decided early in 1921 to attempt to make their own way back to Persia by way of Baghdad; but of thousands who drew money and departed, the great majority were kept from reaching their homes by the cruel hardships of the road and by Persian opposition. They scattered and disappeared, or returned to seek

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

work in Baghdad. The Ḥakkari clans were settled, as far as great 563
efforts and British expenditure could effect it, in the Government- 657
owned villages of Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, while hundreds of their more optimistic households passed over—ill-led, distraught by faction, and weakened by malaria—into their native hills across the border. Aghā Petros, their evil genius, was thankfully dispatched to Europe where he died in Paris soon afterwards. The Patriarchal household settled at Baybad, near 'Amadiya, sustained by the vigour and loyalty of Surma Khanim, the boy Patriarch's aunt. But the troubles of the hapless Assyrians, due so largely to their own fierce indiscipline, folly, and disunion, were not at or near their end.

For the Armenian refugees, who numbered some 15,000 at the time of their dispatch late in 1920 from Ba'quba to camp at Nahr 'Umar near Baṣra, other means of dispersal were sought. But their passive non-co-operation and sullen refusal to accept work in 'Iraq long defeated all the efforts made for them. Some measure of absorption in the cities or into Persia or among the Assyrians reduced their numbers, and most of the surviving main body of some 8,000 could at last be transported by ship to Batum—at the cost, as ever, of the British Government—by agreement with the new Armenian Government in Transcaucasia. The residue, still resisting all suggested forms of self-help, were induced by March 1922 to leave Nahr 'Umar, and the camp was closed.

2. THE FIRST TREATY

The proposal of the British Government to express the Anglo- 648x
'Iraq relationship by treaty, rather than by undisguised mandatory 186
Government, was approved by the Amir before his arrival in 'Iraq, and seemed not to be opposed, initially, by nationalist spokesmen there. To both sides it appeared likely to minimize the odium of a humiliating guardian–ward relationship, and to invest 'Iraq from the outset with the dignity of an independent treaty-making State. It was, in fact, unquestionably the most prudent and most imaginative way to handle a situation which lacked all precedent; but, to the resentment of 'Iraqi patriots and the poisoning of Anglo-'Iraq relations for the next ten years, the Mandate itself remained. Unmentioned in the draft Treaty, it had nevertheless notoriously been awarded to and accepted by Great Britain, and was even now in draft and awaiting League ratification in the last days of 1921. The remoteness of such a situation from the 'Complete Independence' claimed by the nationalists was all too obvious, however the Mandate be interpreted, excused, or kept out of sight.

A view hostile to the Mandate, and suspicious of a Treaty however otherwise generous which merely veiled it, was inevitably

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

within the area now claimed by the British Government for 'Iraq 563 as an indispensable safeguard for Assyrian resettlement. The provocative 721 arrest and release by Assyrians of the Turkish Wali of Julamark, while visiting Chal in July 1924, abruptly embittered trans-frontier feeling. It was followed by the advance of considerable and long-prepared Turkish forces across the Ḥazil river into 'Iraq. They were evicted for the moment by Air Force action, helped by Assyrian irregulars gallantly mustered and led—but only to sweep back to attack and burn Assyrian villages and 'Iraqi police posts. Assyrian settlers, to a number of some 8,000 and largely destitute, were driven from their homes to seek safety around 'Amadiya. Neither the usual exchange of protests nor the debates of Geneva could prevent reprisals and repetitions, which achieved all too thoroughly the devastation of Kurdish as well as Assyrian areas of the frontier. Relief work and ultimately house-by-house 657 resettlement, with Government help and taxation remissions for settlers, were provided in 'Iraq for the hapless refugees.

In Geneva the 30th Session of the League Council listened on 648ˣ and after 20 September to the now familiar arguments of the Turkish and British spokesmen, Fatḥi Bey and Lord Parmoor. The same historical, ethnological, economic, strategic, and political claims were advanced, to meet the same rebuttals and counter-claims. No line of agreement or compromise appeared. The decision accepted in the end by both sides provided for the mission to Mosul of a League Commission of Inquiry, whose verdict, if endorsed by the Council, was to be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile telegrams reaching Geneva and containing mutual charges of frontier violation compelled the establishment of an interim frontier line. This was fixed at a meeting held at Brussels on 29 October, to be known thenceforward as the 'Brussels Line'. It ran somewhat to the south of the alignment claimed by Great Britain, and thereby excluded some Assyrian areas; nevertheless, it was destined to form, scarcely amended, the permanent national frontier.

The Mosul Commission consisted of M. de Wirsen, a Swedish diplomat, as President, and as members Count Teleki, a former Prime Minister of Hungary and distinguished jurist and geographer, and Colonel Paulis, a retired officer of the Belgian Army. After visiting Istanbul and London it arrived in Baghdad in mid-January 1925, and was there joined by its secretariat, by assessors from both sides and—to the dismay of 'Iraqis and British—by two renegade ex-'Iraqis in the guise of Turkish experts, one a Kirkukli of the Naftchi family, the other a brother-in-law of Shaykh Maḥmud.

The Commission and its assessors and staff spent some days in

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

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In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army, Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

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The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to

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563 657 166 Turkey. The frontier was now established, and the impossibility of settlement in their old homes was cruelly manifest. Schemes for the establishment of the Assyrians in Canada or elsewhere overseas had been considered in London, and abandoned. In spite of 'Iraqi frowns at the self-conscious, ever discontented, and hardly manageable community, it seemed that they must settle in 'Iraq or nowhere. The surviving community of some 20,000 souls could never be concentrated in a single enclave, since 'Iraq afforded none which was sufficient, cultivable, and unoccupied. Hundreds of households of the Baz and Jelu clans had dispersed over the Mosul plain, the upper Tiyari and Takhuma in Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, the lower Tiyari around Barwari Bala. It was hoped next to find room for a thousand households in the Baradost area of Rawanduz qadhā, and for more again in Barwari Zayr. Money was collected in England to assist them, seed and cattle were supplied. Pay earned in the Levies kept many families together; but the preservation of their communal identity, their pride of religion and tradition must devolve upon themselves, as it had devolved for so long on others of the Christian minorities in 'Iraq.

6. THE OTHER NEIGHBOURS

648× The relations of 'Iraq with its eastern neighbour were unsatisfactory; with persistent Persian denial of recognition of the new Kingdom, and with habitual bickering across a thousand-mile open frontier, they could not be otherwise. They grew worse with the controversy arising from the self-exile from 'Iraq of the Persian Mujtahids in 1923 (p. 149), and so persisted after their return next year and after the reopening in 1925 of the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Cities, in its new railway-borne fashion. They were not improved by the frontier tergiversations of Simko and the Persian Kurds, nor by quarrels, reminiscent of the days before 1914, between Persian and Baṣrawi Customs authorities on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab: nor by the relations of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh with the Bani Lam, though these improved in 1924: nor by the perennial squabble over the Mandali water.

The supersession of the effete Qajar dynasty of Persia in the last days of 1924 by the virile but savage and uneducated adventurer and autocrat Ridhā Shah Pahlavi at once revolutionized Persian public life in every region, and closely affected its neighbours. The lord of Pusht-i-Kuh, after a panic flight to 'Iraq, returned home to make the best terms he could with the rigidly centralizing dictator. The Shaykh of Muḥammara, Khaz'al Khan, so long the close friend of the British and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, unwisely failed to adapt himself to the new exigencies, and quarrelled with the Persian Government in conditions which gave the British

563 657 182 Government had in fact, not without lapses, maintained the principle of employing Kurdish officials, other than technical, in Kurdish areas. It now proceeded to reaffirm this and to enact a Language Law in the interests of Kurdish-speakers, to set up a translation bureau, to appoint a Kurdish Inspector of Education for north-eastern ʿIraq, and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior. Local committees were next formed to determine the language of instruction to be used in each school, to specify the dialect of Kurdish required, and to replace non-Kurdish-speaking staff. Repeated visits were paid to north and north-east ʿIraq by the King, the Amir Ghazi, the High Commissioner, and ʿIraqi ministers with the purpose of allaying suspicion, increasing personal contact, and collecting such information as would satisfy the still uneasy Mandates Commission. It was possible, at this stage, to hope for increasing coalescence of the Kurdish areas of ʿIraq, and that their nationalism, wisely handled, would weaken: hopes not impossible but unduly optimistic, since the high statesmanship which could have achieved these ends was not in sight. Yet, in adopting a hesitant attitude to Kurdish claims, the ʿIraq Government was not always unreasonable. These claims were at times frankly separatist, incompatible with an ʿIraq State as constituted, exacerbated by the abiding antipathy felt mutually between the two races, and not lessened by the signs of a more sympathetic or more generous attitude towards the Kurds by the British advisers than by ʿIraqi statesmen. The fear existed, in addition, that privileges granted to the Kurds would be demanded immediately by the Shiʿis of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question. It resulted that the entry of ʿIraq into the League was unmarked by any true solution of the problem of its unassimilated Kurdish minority. The Government, the British sponsors, and the League itself had to be content with palliatives and hopes.

563 166 657 The same is true of that far smaller, more alien, and still less assimilable community, the Assyrians. Substantial numbers of these had by 1926 been settled in scattered Kurd-surrounded villages in Mosul liwā (p. 158). The completion of this process, further resettlement of the less satisfied, and improvement of the settlements were the tasks of the years 1927 to 1930. The High Commissioner's interest was shown by visits to the areas, by many conferences, and by invitations to Government to show all reasonable favour to the Assyrians, even though these, by their attitude of grumbling non-cooperation, in part frustrated the efforts of their well-wishers. A well-qualified Settlement Officer was employed, more villages cleared and reoccupied in the Ḥarir area of Rawanduz qaḍhā, advances of seed and money given to the reluctant settlers.

Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for 563
a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions. 166

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. 657 The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Ḥarir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian 563 —continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in 701 Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Maḥmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition for self-protection in their new homes. The Levies, besides the [157] contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

arrived in London on 20 June accompanied by three ministers, 643
Yasin Pasha, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Ḥaydar. The visit was completely successful. The King, after his stay at Buckingham Palace, visited Scotland and Devonshire, then spent some days in London and some in Switzerland. But his health appeared to be seriously affected by the strains of the last twenty years, and he would willingly have rested for a further period in Europe, had not grave events recalled him urgently to Baghdad.

These events arose from the small, alien, unhappy Assyrian 563
community of whose dilemma and attempted settlement much has 657
been said in these pages. The Mar Sham'un, who spent the last six months of 1932 at Geneva but could accomplish nothing, returned in January 1933 to his restless and divided flock. Assyrian Levy officers, notably Yaqu son of Isma'il, had conducted a strong campaign in the Mar Sham'un's favour in the Dohuk–'Amadiya area. The 'Iraqi authorities had, on the contrary, weakened his prestige by their strict limitation of his powers to the spiritual field, and their treatment of Assyrians as normal members of the public. A strong anti-Patriarchal faction led by a Malik Khoshaba, with bishops and other Maliks, had secured the appointment of Khoshaba himself as President of the Advisory Committee for land settlement. The Mar Sham'un on his return, with his position weakened and all prospect of national migration or local consolidation dissipated, assumed an attitude of total refusal to co-operate with the Government-sponsored settlement, to conduct which the expected 'foreign expert', Major Thompson, arrived in Mosul in May 1933. The Patriarch, not content with spreading false suggestions regarding the settlement itself, threatened excommunication to any Assyrian who might participate in it; he was ready, some observers could not but feel, to sacrifice the interests of the community to the claims of his personal or hierarchical ambitions and resentments. In Mosul city Muslim-Assyrian feeling showed no improvement. An incident of stone-throwing at the windows of 'Iraqi Army officers was attributed to the Assyrians.

The Minister of Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, at this point wisely invited the Mar Sham'un to Baghdad, hoping for a personal understanding. But the antagonism was irremovable. The Minister, intelligibly if perhaps on the broadest view needlessly, bade his visitor surrender all claims to temporal power, even in the form urged by the Patriarch, which was that of adherence to the 'traditional customs of his people'. The Mar Sham'un addressed a letter full of complaints to the King on the eve of his departure for Europe, accusing both 'Iraqis and British of persecution. Three weeks of vain conversations and waiting ended with irritation on both sides and the order of Ḥikmat Sulayman on 24 June that the

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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Patriarch should not leave Baghdad until further notice. He remained accordingly at the Y.M.C.A. hostel. Telegraphed directions from King Fayṣal in London on and after 19 June ('under British pressure', as Baghdad statesmen averred) bade his ministers pacify and release the prelate; but these were not merely set aside as being too clearly destructive of Government prestige, but aroused anger in Baghdad at so misplaced an intervention. The Ikhā Government was in fact already gaining credit even from its critics for firmness against the 'Assyrian menace'. Moderating suggestions for the removal of General Bakr Ṣidqi from the military command at Mosul had been refused. This officer, a harsh and ambitious egoist not destitute of some social and considerable military gifts, had long been bitterly anti-Assyrian and already saw himself, perhaps, as their authorized destroyer.

The situation in the Assyrian areas and in Mosul deteriorated as summer set in. Yaqu and his friends had for months been touring with a formidable armed party, flouting Government's authority and orders and urging non-cooperation with the Settlement. Only after the dispatch of 'Iraqi troops to posts in the Dohuk area, with the object of assuring order and discouraging Yaqu, was it possible for Lieutenant-Colonel Stafford, the Administrative Inspector of Mosul liwā (and subsequent historian of these events) to make contact with Yaqu and with friendly firmness bring him to Mosul. News of this submission was telegraphed to the King in London, who again suggested the release of the Mar Sham'un, to be again refused. Yaqu's submission, however hesitating and insincere, was clinched at Mosul by a written promise to desist from agitation. This was followed by a meeting on 10 July at which a full statement of the Assyrian position in 'Iraq, and the difficulties which confronted their emigration from it, was made to them by the acting Mutaṣarrif and by Stafford. The next day all was cordiality between Government representatives and those of the party opposed to the Mar Sham'un. The latter's following, to whom the reasons for his detention in Baghdad were patiently re-explained, agreed to send spokesmen to visit him there. They left Mosul, Yaqu and Luqo among them.

They proceeded, however, not as expected to Baghdad but forthwith across the Tigris into Syria, there to demand permission to enter from the French officer at 'Ayn Diwar post; nor can it now be certainly established whether this decision was a sudden unpremeditated gesture of despair (as upholders of the Assyrians allege) or part of a plan inspired by, or at least known to, either the Mar Sham'un (who denied it) or his family in Mosul. Without waiting for permission, for which the frontier officer telegraphed to Beirut, the impetuous leaders sent word back to their villages alleging,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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with patent falsity, that the French welcome to Syria had been cordial, land was available, taxes on crops would be remitted. The clansmen, to a number of some 1,000, leaving their homes and families unprotected—certain sign that no act of violence was at that time contemplated—swarmed across the river at Faysh Khabur and below it, at a point where frontier rectification was presently intended (p. 218) in accordance with the recent delimitation.

The news of these moves reached Mosul on 20 July. It was received with suspicion, not unmixed with hopes that riddance of the Assyrians was in sight. Reports of river crossings multiplied, and qadhā officials did nothing to check the welcome exodus. The Army command, who not unwillingly saw in these movements a menace by the redoubtable Assyrian fighting men, dispatched troops to the Tigris to watch events from forward posts, and to deal, by disarmament, with any parties who might return into 'Iraq.

A new phase opened with information, on 27 July, that the French were allowing no more Assyrians to enter: if indeed any had yet entered Syria, since the western river bank was at the moment still 'Iraqi territory, untransferred. They declined also to apply, as might have been possible and as the 'Iraqi Foreign Minister specifically requested from the French chargé d'affaires, the Syro-'Iraqi Frontier Agreement whereunder tribal immigrants would be disarmed and moved inland from the border. A meeting between French and 'Iraqi officers was held at Faysh Khabur on 26 July, another on 2 August. At the latter, the French officer declared that the Assyrians would not be accepted in Syria, and that 336 rifles had been taken from the 415 armed men who had approached the frontier; and he took note of the emphatic 'Iraqi request that no armed Assyrians should recross into 'Iraq or that, if recross they must, sufficient notice should be given to the 'Iraqi authorities. The failure to observe this agreement, due rather to inefficiency than to malice, was a main factor in the tragedy which followed, and caused much of the 'Iraqi bitterness against the French.

News of these events, represented as a dangerous movement, aroused violent anti-Assyrian and anti-Christian feeling in Baghdad. The Government, delighted to play the rôle of protector of 'Iraqi interests against a grave danger, did not minimize 'the menace', did not contradict whispers that Great Britain was behind this plot of their protégés, and let the public offer an indifferent welcome to the King as he returned alarmed and apprehensive from Europe on 2 August. He was to stay for a month in his capital, powerless to influence a position whose facts he never appreciated, and whose emotional violence swept all before it.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 these to any party other than the 'Iraq Government itself. A much less favourable offer, of a loan of £1 million only, was the result. It was duly negotiated, but neither the Government nor the British lenders escaped criticism. This was 'Iraq's first self-incurred external debt.

*645 The presence of forces hostile to the régime did not materially interfere with an Administration equal in quality to its predecessors but, in disappointment of early hopes, not superior to them. In foreign affairs and in some internal developments, which later 563 pages will describe, some progress was made. But to one problem 648ᴷ no approach to a solution appeared—that of the Assyrians. Their case, after the massacre of August 1933, had been hurried on to the agenda of the League Council by the Mar Sham'un's telegrams from Cyprus; and in October the 'Iraq Government, through the mouth of Yasin Pasha, offered a disarming admission of 'unjustifiable severity' by the Army and regrettable tribal looting. He pleaded for a fresh start for the Assyrians—in another country! The British attitude, disappointing to the more fervid partisans of the Assyrians, was determined by the desire to preserve and support the independent 'Iraq State: by realization of the grave consequences of any physical intervention, to which anyhow British opinion could never be reconciled: and by awareness that the faults were far from being all on one side. The Council agreed, accordingly, that a Committee of six, composed of representatives of Great Britain, Italy, France, Denmark, Mexico, and Spain, should by every means seek alternative accommodation, somewhere in the world, for the Assyrian community.

This Committee's attempts were immediate and vigorous, but sadly unsuccessful. A project for settlement in Brazil seemed promising, but fell to the ground when the Brazilian Government reversed its welcoming attitude. A British plan for settlement in Guiana, and a French project for the banks of the Niger, came equally to nothing after League missions, with Brigadier Browne, had visited the territories. By the end of 1934 no progress had been made.

563 657 In 'Iraq their resettlement on the land proceeded with weary slowness in spite of Government encouragement and the offer of a house-by-house subsidy. The great majority of the community favoured withdrawal from 'Iraq; and false hopes of this were kept alive by the Mar Sham'un's partisans, while the anti-Patriarchal party declared roundly that they would never settle in the same territory as the Mar Sham'un and his following. The camp at Mosul was, with increasing reluctance, kept in existence at Government expense, but was reduced by encouraged departures; its inmates fell from 1,250 to 650 during 1934. More hopeful was

the French reception in Syria of the families of the 550 Assyrians 563
interned there since August 1933. Aided by a grant of money from 657
'Iraq, these women and children joined their men on the upper Khabur in September 1934 to a number of over 1,500. Movement from the Mosul camp and streets to the Khabur continued in 1935 to a number of some 1,500, and a more grandiose scheme for a large-scale settlement in the Ghab lands on the Orontes in Syria was formulated by the League Committee. A project for its finances, with 'Iraq and Great Britain as main contributors, was established and a Trustee Board appointed. In 1936 an immediate transfer of 15,000 Assyrians was planned, which would dispose of almost the whole remaining community except those native to 'Iraq; but the difficulties of the Ghab project were found insurmountable, and its abandonment made possible a move only of smaller numbers, 2,500 in all, to the Khabur settlements. No further progress was made under the Ḥikmat–Ṣidqi régime, and the permanence of the Assyrian remnant in 'Iraq was perforce accepted. Their economic rehabilitation was by now fairly advanced, and their final adaptation to 'Iraqi conditions and citizenship could be hoped.

The event which caused the fall of the Sulaymani Ministry after 645*
less than nine months of uneasy life was due neither to constitutional procedures, which rarely operated to change Governments in 'Iraq, nor to any grouping of the Opposition forces. Its origin lay in rancour within the Army itself, where careers had been ruined and malevolence excited by the abused omnipotence of
Bakr. The bodyguard by which at all times he went surrounded 669
had saved him from previous attempts on his life during 1937; but when on 8 August, *en route* for a visit to Turkish manœuvres, he waited on the Mosul airport, his murderers, by whomever instructed, could carry out one of the alternative plans prepared. He was shot dead at point-blank range by an 'Iraqi soldier, and his companion Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, chief of the R.I.A.F., lived but a minute longer.

The bodies were taken to Baghdad and buried with full military honours. Little regret, but rather the almost unanimous relief of public and press, accompanied the General to his grave: not unjustly, since the pages of 'Iraq history which he had written were in all ways deplorable. In Mosul the Military Commander, General Amin al-'Umari, arrested the murderer, cordoned the airport, and assumed sole charge of the city. Ordered by Baghdad to arrest further named individuals as accomplices, he at first complied, then realized the dangerous possibilities of a general purge of Bakr's known opponents. Six days after the murder he took the grave step of publishing a proclamation in which he

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

185 The Ministry of Social Affairs, inspired by Dr. Sami Shawkat
• 657 on the orthodox lines of Axis philosophy, pressed for a higher birth-rate and legislated for the encouragement of lower dowries and earlier marriages. It urged the fuller development of trade unionism, and for the first time enforced the law which restricted certain trades (p. 246) to 'Iraqis. A bill was introduced to compel landowners in successive zones to build cottages for their cultivators.
172 The Department of Antiquities, with Seton Lloyd as its Adviser from 1939, conducted excavations at Samarrā and at Jabal Sinjar in 1939, and at the site of Wasiṭ in 1939–41; a German expedition dug at Warqa also in 1939.

648✓ In politics the movement, from the early summer of 1940 onwards, was from doubt towards decision, from a pretended unity towards evident faction. As the war of inaction in Europe gave place to a series of German successes, with the collapse of France and the entry of Italy, many 'Iraqis could see in adhesion to Great Britain little but self-condemnation to the losing side. The Army leaders, pro-Axis by temperament and by absorbed propaganda, saw no case for hesitation; in every Anglophobe old rancours found anew the support of logic and of national interest; and the prudent or uneasy of most political colourings admitted the value of at least a tacit reinsurance with the probable victors. The failure of final efforts in the summer of 1940 to wring from the British some reassurance over Palestine, or some hopeful countenance to the 'liberation' of Syria, was exploited by the Mufti and his many friends. Syrian ministers visiting Baghdad late in the year—Jamil Mardam Bey, Sa'dullah Jabri, and Luṭfi Ḥaffar—were fêted with enthusiasm as partners in the struggle against imperialism. Diplomatic relations with Denmark had been dutifully broken off when it was overrun by Hitler; but with Italy, whose Legation in Baghdad was now the centre of Axis activity, no breach was enforced when Mussolini entered the war on 10 June, and the British Ambassador's remonstrances went unheeded; the few Italians interned were soon liberated and returned to Italy. Nuri's influence failed on this and similar issues to carry the Cabinet with him, and one minister, Amin Zaki, resigned. The tone of the press passed from dubious neutrality to overt favour of the Axis, rather encouraged than restrained by the Prime Minister. Later in the year the difficulty or indeed impossibility found by Great Britain in supplying military equipment to 'Iraq, and her reluctance to provide dollars to buy arms for an ally so half-hearted, led to angry resentment in 'Iraq officialdom and the Army, and to the dispatch of an 'Iraqi purchasing mission to the United States.

The joint visit to Ankara of Nuri Sa'id and Naji Shawkat late in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the 625
Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards 657 •
such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and 665
at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Āli, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplica- 204
tion of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when out- 668
lawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid 'Āli in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of 'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

the Minister of the Interior; and Barzan area was transferred from 563
Mosul liwā to Arbil. But the restless ambition of the Barzani was 669
incorrigible. Alleging British support—a fantastic fiction believed by many both in Barzan and in Baghdad—he harried the valleys far beyond his own area, seized Government stores at Margasur, and occupied police posts. Forced to act, the Army advanced in September in three columns towards his fastnesses, while the R.I.A.F. bombed his followers and properties. A police column advanced from 'Amadiya, and the Turks aided by closing their frontier. The Army column from 'Aqra was soon in trouble and its line of retreat threatened. It was rescued, and the position restored, only by the success of the Minister of Interior in raising, for ready money, irregular tribal forces under such of the Barzani's neighbours as welcomed the chance to pay off old scores and be subsidized for doing it. Mullā Muṣṭafā and his army, hard pressed from every side, crossed now 2,000 strong into Persia, there to find ready welcome and support. He could now drink deep of Russian-sponsored Kurdish nationalism in its active centre at Mahabad: could consult with the ambitious Qadhi Muḥammad, leader of the movement, with open Russian support: and could concert plans with him and his Democratic Party for a Kurdish State astride the frontier, a State to be closely associated with the Adharbayjan Republic now similarly forming under the Russians at Tabriz. On 15 December 1945 a Kurdish People's Government was inaugurated at Mahabad by Qadhi Muḥammad in the honoured presence of Mullā Muṣṭafā and Soviet officers. A week later Qadhi Muḥammad was elected President, a Parliament was formed, and the Mullā with other supporting tribal leaders was promoted Field-Marshal and decked in full Russian uniform.

It was natural that Baghdad's request for the disarming and 563
extradition of its rebel subjects should be unheeded. But at least 657
the campaign was over and the enemy, by whatever means, dispersed; the Army could be thanked for its efforts and decorated by the Regent, while the Prime Minister himself toured the north. All efforts were made to re-establish administration and show goodwill by the early erection of schools, dispensaries, and police posts. A court martial was convened at Arbil for the trial of Barzani rebels, and summoned more than a hundred, including Mullā Muṣṭafā and Shaykh Aḥmad, to appear before it. The two brothers and thirty of their followers, including three Army officers, were condemned to death in absence, and seventy more to life imprisonment.

Though a period of peace followed, no part of the Kurdish 563
problem had been solved. With their social structure, ideas of 'Government', and feudal leadership, any early prospect of a real national autonomy must be fanciful, unless total anarchy be

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

SOCIAL FACTORS

Alongside these economic and administrative problems are a number of social factors which inhibit educational development. 000

Illiteracy and Health Problems. For many years it is likely that illiteracy among the adult population, and the state of the public health, will constitute obstacles to the extension of primary education, especially in the rural areas. The reasons for this are obvious. Parents who are themselves illiterate and living at a low standard of life are not easily persuaded that schooling is a worthwhile substitute for the work of their children. Neither are they able to provide in their homes those standards and values which, if the training of the schoolroom is not be negatived, are such necessary reinforcements to public education. Similarly, the prevalence of epidemic and endemic disease, together with inadequate sanitation, also contributes to a major health problem which must be taken into account in attempting to ensure regular school attendance. 212 164 871

Yet while obstacles of this kind exist, they are diminishing. The Public Health Service is developing slowly but surely, and one has only to see a doctor at work in a remote rural area to appreciate the devoted service which is beginning to contribute to a solution of some of the health problems. Again, although illiteracy and poverty are not the best friends of education, one has only to visit remote little village schools to realize that some of the poorest parents are making sacrifices to send their children to school. 657 212

Before compulsory education can be achieved, however, even assuming that the money for it will be forthcoming, a vigorous attack on adult illiteracy will be essential. To this end, what is needed in the rural areas is a type of school which, in addition to meeting the needs of the children, provides in a practical and non-academic fashion realistic fundamental education for the parents. The teacher training institutions would make a most valuable contribution if, quite apart from training the future teachers to attend to the needs of children, they also initiated them into the more practical techniques of teaching illiterates the fundamentals of better living. 871

The Position of Women and Children. Another obstacle to educational and social development which is often quoted is the position of women in a society which is predominantly Muslim. Traditionally women are discouraged from taking part in public life, and this attitude is bound to be reflected in education. 562

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Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe 534
resembling the chanter of a bagpipe and has often a pleasant lilt. 535
Kurdish dancing, however, is by no means as strenuous as Scottish.
Kurds and all other mountain dwellers in Kurdistan dance what is
known as the chain-dance, similar to that which is, I believe, commonly
seen in the Balkans. The dancers join hands and form a ring. The
piper and a drummer with a sort of tenor drum stand in the middle,
and the dance consists of fairly intricate footwork while the circle
moves slowly round. Often star dancers who fancy themselves as [K
budding Nijinskys do solo dances inside the circle. Amongst the 562]
Kurds the men and women dance separately, but with the Christian
sects the two sexes dance together. This does not mean, however, that
Kurdish women are completely segregated or kept by themselves. As
a matter of fact, they possess considerable freedom and may be seen
gathering firewood, tending animals or engaged in other tasks on the
mountainside, often far from their villages.

Up to five years ago the Barzan district of Kurdistan retained all K
of its savage and primitive features. Government had not penetrated 619
and Shaikh Ahmed, a religious fanatic, was dictator. With the help 643
of his brothers and a standing army of several hundred men he completely 641
dominated the impoverished inhabitants, who had the shaikh's 726
bodyguard perpetually billeted on them and who had to provide them 792
with food, clothing and tobacco and anything else they might fancy.
Any protests on the part of the villagers were discouraged by the K
strongest methods. Such complete ascendancy did Shaikh Ahmed gain [212]
over his savage and illiterate people that they began to look upon him
as a god and, though Muslims in name, turned their faces towards him K
in prayer rather than towards Mecca, as tradition demands. There 792
was a Mullah in the district called Mullah Juj, who represented himself 779
to be the prophet of this new god. The Mullah was a very fiery and 682
eloquent speaker and, unfortunately for himself, his fame began to 784
surpass even that of the deity. This could not of course be tolerated, 661
and one of Shaikh Ahmed's brothers "bumped off" the presumptuous 671
prophet. Up to that time the Koran had been revered, but now the K
Shaikh issued orders for the destruction of all copies to be found. He [136]
also withdrew the ban on the eating of pork, for wild pig were plentiful I
in Barzan. Armed missionaries were sent out beyond the Barzan K
bounds, and villages which refused to accept the Shaikh were burned 721
and a number of the male inhabitants put to death. This state of 657
affairs could not be allowed to continue, and the 'Iraq Government 648
was forced to take action in conjunction with the British Royal K
Air Force. 697

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Kurd MAII

K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I 168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
648] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful. Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Levantine
Jews MF-1

Jews

J The Jews in 'Iraq are said to be the descendants of those taken
174 captive by Nebuchadnezzar and brought to Babylon, where they were
employed on the rebuilding of that city and on the upkeep of the
canals on which its wealth depended.

J In Mosul till recently the Jewish standard of education was lament-
871 ably low and their religious observances entirely out of keeping with
176 those of modern Jewry. Even there, however, an astute Jewish brain
784 invented an instrument controlled by clockwork to turn on and off
403 electric switches at fixed hours and so avoid the sin of making fire on
the Sabbath.

J The very generous Jewish philanthropist Sir Elly Khaduri, has in
871 recent years provided funds to build excellent schools for the community, and it is hoped that a great improvement in the education of the Jewish children will result.

I 162 In Kurdistan, Jews of whom many are weavers are found in all the
563 J small towns and also in many otherwise purely Kurdish villages,
286 101 where they live in perfect amity with their Muslim neighbours. In
142 463 dress they are practically indistinguishable from the Kurds but easily
J recognizable by their facial features. In the most remote mountain
101 areas Jewish villages exist the inhabitants of which are cultivators and
463 possess vineyards and orchards. The reason for the survival of these
631 villages in the lawless past is that they and their inhabitants were the
property of powerful Kurdish Aghas who were strong to protect their
serfs as they would have protected their sheep, cattle or mules.
Throughout Kurdistan the ubiquitous itinerant Jewish pedlar may be
met who, quite unarmed, is surprisingly immune from molestation.
J 181 The Jews of northern 'Iraq are not at all interested in Zionism and
186 I form a very useful, law-abiding, hard-working section of the population.

162 It is difficult, if not impossible, within the compass of a short
I lecture, to give an adequate description of the curious elements who
563 657 make up the attractive mosaic of northern 'Iraq. In the not very
distant past the 'Iraq Government has incurred, and rightly incurred,
strong criticism of its treatment of some of the peoples who go to
make up this mosaic. It should be realized, however, that the administration of the Mosul and Arbil provinces and the solution of the diverse and difficult problems they present is a matter which might well test the skill and patience of any government, even if far more experienced than that of the new state of 'Iraq.

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DISCUSSION

Mrs. Soane-Ellis: Might I ask if the lecturer has any information as to the whereabouts of Sheikh Mahmud? The last time I saw him he was a prisoner at Ramadi. 00 0

Major Wilson: I cannot say whether he is exactly a prisoner now, but he certainly would not be allowed to go back to Sulaimaniyyeh.

Brigadier J. G. Browne: May I ask what is the position of the Pizhder Kurds under the present Government? 657 563

Major Wilson: There has been a slight extension of police control, but, as far as I know, real administration has not yet been established over the Pizhder.

The Chairman: It remains, I think, only for me to sum up what we have learnt. We see here again the extraordinary importance of the question of roads in establishing the authority of the Government among mountain peoples. We are building roads on the North-West Frontier of India. And here we have seen the roads that are being built through Kurdistan, like Mr. Hamilton's very fine achievement, the making of the road through the Rowanduz Gorge. I believe the account of the building of that road is going to be published shortly, and it should make a book well worth reading. 653 657

We have seen some extraordinarily interesting slides. And we have learnt some valuable information about the present position of the Assyrians. From what the lecturer says, the best plan now would appear to be rather to leave them alone where they are. The other plan was to have been to move them to an extremely suitable site on the Orontes River. But unfortunately the lands chosen had been sequestrated from their original owner, who had been in trouble. When M. Blum came into office, he decided he could deal with this case, reinstated the man in question, and restored his lands. So that scheme necessarily came to nothing, and it is quite impossible on other grounds now for the Assyrians to go there. But one gathers that it is wisest not to agitate on their behalf, nor to stir them up, for that only makes them very unpopular in the country. They are finding employment to some extent in the oil-fields, and as guards and station masters on the railways and in similar employment, and one can hope things may settle down and that they will stay in their own country. 186 463

We must thank our lecturer, not only for the good work he has obviously done in 'Iraq, but also for the excellent and informative lecture he has given us this evening. 000

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The most important links with the people are, of course, those who belong to them and who work among them: that is, the dispensary *medical assistants* and *midwives* in villages and the midwives and public health nurses in the towns. *Maternal and child welfare centers* in towns could also provide health education. There are already a few centers operating in Baghdad but there is a great need to open more centers throughout the country as soon as trained staff are available. The proposed house-to-house inspectors, sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors could all be most valuable teachers.

There is no doubt that *health weeks* would stimulate great interest and health exhibits could be included in agricultural and other shows (e.g. to display measures designed to prevent the spread of malaria, schistosomiasis, etc.). Travelling vans giving film shows might also be of some use.

Elected *public health committees* of the village elders, advised by the medical assistant or visiting doctor, might do much to improve conditions in villages. *Mobile dispensaries* should include in their staff a sanitary inspector and a health visitor (public health nurse) who could go round the village while the doctor is seeing patients.

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It should be noted that the government plans to inaugurate a rural health center at Abu Ghuraib, which is designed to provide curative and preventive services for the population of the area and at the same time serve as a practical field for training rural health workers, with particular emphasis on the control of communicable diseases and maternal and child health. It has requested advice from the World Health Organization on the planning and establishment of the center. Accordingly, in 1950, provision was made under the technical assistance budget of the World Health Organization for a rural health survey. Provision has been made under the 1952 technical assistance budget for one public health administrator with general experience in rural health, one malariologist, one sanitarian, and two public health nurses, one with general experience and one with the experience in midwifery. It is expected that the government will submit a request to UNICEF for appropriate supplies and equipment. At a later stage the program may be developed in cooperation with other specialized agencies.

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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

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164 helminthosis are endemic. There are occasional outbreaks of
657 smallpox, typhus, and more rarely plague and cholera. With
the greater provision in the budget for schemes of public health,
the increased employment of international specialists and the
considerable assistance tendered by the World Health Organization, there is every prospect that the incidence of endemic
874 diseases will be greatly reduced. Fundamental results may be
742 expected from modern medical training, with emphasis on the
environmental aspects of disease and the need for prevention
657 as much as or even more than cure, and, above all, from the
743 efforts of the administration to improve the environment itself,
[312] with especial reference to drainage and water-supply. In addition, attention is to be paid to the public health aspects of the pilgrimages. The curative services have in general received more attention than the preventive and have improved considerably in the past thirty years. Simple conditions are treated in some 400 state dispensaries, distributed fairly evenly throughout the country but varying in their equipment and staff; it has hitherto proved difficult to attract doctors to the provinces and particularly to the rural districts. Each *liwa* centre has a general hospital, the larger towns more than one. There are also specialized hospitals for maternity and child welfare, for infectious, chest, eye, venereal, and mental diseases, and for lepers. The army, police, railways, Port of Basra, Ministry of Education, and oil companies maintain their own medical services and hospitals, and there are in addition an American Mission Hospital and a number of private nursing homes. A five-year programme, financed by the Development Board, will provide for the repair, extension, and replacement of medical buildings which have become old or inadequate. There is an acute shortage of well-trained nurses; attempts to expand the service are hampered by the reluctance of Muslim girls of good family to enter it.

Education

658 The state provides elementary, intermediate, secondary, and
871 higher education, all, since December 1952, completely free.
There are also private and foreign schools on a kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, and secondary level.

State Education. Primary education, by law universal and compulsory where facilities exist, begins at the age of six and continues for six years. It has been limited by a shortage of schools and trained teachers, especially in the villages. Plans are in hand to meet the need. The rapid expansion of state primary education is demonstrated in the following table:

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

433 Iraq each capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of sugar per annum from sugar beet to be grown locally, a bitumen plant, and a small steel plant. In addition the Government is investigating the recommendation of the International Bank mission[1] for the erection of a chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur, and carbon black. The mission has also recommended plants for manufacturing bone-meal fertilizer, date-packing crates and motor-car tyres, and for batching concrete, converting steel scrap into building components, and possibly for remelting glass.

Labour

466 Conditions of work and employment are regulated by a
647 Labour Law (1936–46), which so far relates only to 'workmen'
(a term requiring more precise definition) in industrial under-
657 takings. It is in process of revision and extension. Its application
is supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security,
which maintains a small corps of inspectors. This department,
advised by foreign experts, proposes to experiment with em-
ployment exchanges, is starting to compile labour statistics, is
undertaking a programme of housing for labour, and is examin-
ing plans of social security, for which the existing Labour Law
already contains some provision in the form of indemnities
on discharge, paid sick and confinement leave, and compensa-
tion for injuries. Safety and sanitary working conditions are
covered generally by the Labour Law and made obligatory in
greater detail by a Workshops and Factories Regulation (1937).
In January 1953 it was stated that new provisions, for eventual
inclusion in the new Labour Law, had been drafted for estab-
lishing wage boards, regulating disputes, and determining the
rights, obligations, and administration of trade unions, which
are not clearly defined in the existing Labour Law. The latter
grants industrial workers the right to establish associations to
safeguard their special interests, strengthen the spirit of co-
operation, effect educational, cultural, hygienic, social, and
[467] moral improvements, and develop Iraqi industry. A few trade
unions exist; their membership is small and activity slight.
Others have been suspended for subversive activity. The move-
ment is still rudimentary.

Communications

496 *Railways.*[2] The railways constructed by the British forces during the Mesopotamian Campaign eventually formed the

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[1] See above, p. 275.
[2] This section is based on the *Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book*, 1952-3.

Egypt ME1
Iraq MN1

E

647 652 185 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the direct beneficiaries. It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenue resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

000 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the close of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of the departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralized and made available more directly and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

I

642 131 161 434 423 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income per capita does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate the distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary of tribal chiefs.

483 185 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

● 657 185 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing the standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

Iraq m#1

services. "The disease has been recognized", he said, "what was required was that medicine for the prescription should be supplied and the patient taught how to take that medicine". The same Minister informed us that he himself, as a young man called upon to draft a new educational programme, had included in it the provision of community centres, but that unfortunately this feature of the scheme had not materialized. 657 185

45. Community welfare organization on a self-help basis in Iraq is, indeed, as yet in its infancy. Some observers consider that an indispensable preliminary to its development is to create in the minds of a people long under the influence and domination of a feudal tribal system an effective desire for self-government.

46. As is generally known, Iraq is rich in oil resources and it is the policy of the Government to transfer mineral wealth into productive capital for the general welfare. A statutory Development Board was established in 1950 to ensure continuity of economic policy, regardless of political changes. Seventy per cent of the income from oil revenues is allocated to the Board as revenue for projects of water conservation, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, etc. The Board is also responsible for co-ordinating the development schemes in these fields initiated by the various ministerial Departments. Over 200 foreign technicians are listed as working in Iraq in formulating a variety of development schemes, mostly relating to economic improvements. Some of the experts are in the direct employ of the Iraq Government; others have been assigned to the Government for short periods for specific purposes by agencies and organizations furnishing technical assistance on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Relatively few technicians have so far been concerned with social developments, but the country's needs in this respect have, we understand, been partially surveyed. 651 382 185 471

47. In the absence of detailed documentation, we left it to the Government agencies most directly concerned with the subject of our mission to determine whom we should see and to suggest which projects or institutions we should visit. 000

48. During our short stay in Baghdad we were able to visit at Tal Mohamed a well-constructed modern building designed to serve as a centre for community activities for the residents of a model housing estate constructed by the Ministry of Social Affairs for low-income government employees. Cheap transport facilities were available between Baghdad and the new estate, in which some 500 houses were already in occupation and more would be constructed as funds became available. The imposing building in which it is intended that community activities shall be carried out has been ready for use for more than a year but only some of the equipment and furniture (including seven beds for maternity cases) have been installed. A difficulty in finding suitable qualified staff has delayed the opening of the centre. When it is in full working order it is planned to offer nursing, educational and indoor and outdoor recreational facilities on modern lines. The general appearance of the centre and model village was marred by the state of the roads after heavy rains. 657 185 362

49. It is understood that centres similar to that at Tal Mohamed are planned for other urban areas. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which until recently formed part of the Ministry of Health, has also other plans under consideration for creating, with external technical assistance, pilot projects of community organization or demonstration centres, in urban as well as in rural areas.

50. A survey of Iraq villages jointly conducted by Mr. Gordon MacGregor (TCA adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs) and Dr. Yusuf Khaddoury, M.D. (Officer in charge of international relations of that Ministry) reveals: 185 657

"an almost universal need among the people for training in the fundamentals of farm practices and farm management for greater food production and income; training in the building of better homes; training of women in better home and child care; and for improvement of sanitation and general health conditions. Underlying these conditions are two basic problems: the lack of land owned by farmers on which they can build houses and raise sufficient food for themselves, and the lack of credit facilities by which they can advance themselves.

"The survey finds in general little development of strong local leadership and group organization among the villagers, through which self-help, management and development of their own affairs can take place. There appear as general characteristics dependence upon others, great expectations of help from the Government and few patterns of co-operative effort and confidence among the village people, beyond the confines of the family or local groups of relatives.

"The survey finds a framework of a governmental organization to serve the rural people and a land development programme on irrigated public lands. As yet, and for many very practical reasons, only a limited extension of government services in education, health and agriculture with assistance from several technical cooperation agencies is reaching the villages..."

The Survey accordingly recommends a national rural improvement programme to be undertaken eventually as a co-operative activity by the Ministers of Agriculture, Education, Health and Social Affairs, with assistance from her Ministries, the Development Board and Technical Assistance Agencies. With this recommendation we would have concurred but for the suggestion that in its early stages co-ordination should be effected by a new Department to be created in the Ministry of Social Affairs.

51. As will be gathered from an earlier chapter of our report, we had misgivings on this aspect of the proposal, the ultimate effect of which might be to alienate the sympathies of the other Ministries concerned and to lead to duplication of effort, instead of the desired co-ordination, at the village level of departmental activities intended to serve the community as a whole. Time did not permit of our discussing our point of view in detail with Dr. Khaddoury or his colleague, Mr. MacGregor, who was absent from Baghdad. We were informed that it was hoped to make provision for this scheme of rural reform in the 1953/1954 Budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The scheme has not been adopted or approved by the Council of Ministers at the time of our visit, and informal discussions which we had in other Departments left in our minds the impression that under closer examination modifications might be suggested from the outset.

The joint report of Mr. MacGregor and Dr. Khaddoury is included as Appendix (III), although the plan does not appear to have reached the stage at which it can be described as representing Government policy.

52. In some, if not all respects, the MacGregor-Khaddoury plan appears to have much in common with what we are able to learn of UNESCO's experiment in Fundamental Education now being carried out as part of the land reclamation and resettlement project at Dujailah, near Kut, some 110 miles south of Baghdad. Adverse weather conditions and the state of the roads prevented us from visiting the project but, by a fortunate chance we were able to meet Mr. Trowbridge, the present Director, during our stay in Beirut. Bad weather also made impossible a visit to another land scheme at Kirkuk to the north of the capital, which had only been started and where, we were told, some of the mistakes of the pioneering project had been avoided.

Iraq MH1

53. In the course of our interview with the Ministers of Health and Social Affairs 657
and their officials, we were offered facilities, of which we were unable, however, 185
to avail ourselves, for visiting single-purpose centres, e.g., homes for the aged
and for the blind, a rehabilitation centre for crippled boys, hospitals, and
maternity clinics all under official patronage and in some, if not every instance,
receiving a State subsidy. In a working class district of Baghdad we did, however, 657
visit a maternity clinic that had been started by the Red Crescent Society. It had
recently come under the direction of an English woman doctor, assisted by, possibly, 943
the only certified Iraqi Public Health nurse in the country. Both spoke of the
improvement in health which was to be observed amongst the out-patients, and of the 185
evident appreciation by the latter of the assistance afforded, but the shortage of
milk for the infants was a matter of concern. Some benefit may come in this respect
from the discussions then in progress between the Iraq Government and UNICEF for the
provision of a pasteurising plant. The Ministry of Social Affairs have recently
taken over from the Red Crescent Society the responsibility for the staff employed
at the clinic and for providing certain necessary supplies and medicaments.

54. It is perhaps worth adding that the remarks made during our visit by the staff 657
of the clinic on the subject of attempts to teach sewing to the out-patients while
waiting for attention and the difficulty of keeping amused the numerous children who 185
came with their mothers, suggests that there is scope at the clinic (and no doubt other similar institutions) for better educated women of leisure, many of whom contribute generously from their purses to such works, to undertake another simpler form of voluntary social service for which little or no preliminary training is required. Indeed, it is not impossible that with such assistance and under favourable conditions a rudimentary club or community centre might be developed for the women in the district whose standard of life is very low but who have shown a desire to improve it. A development on these lines would have the merit of encouraging educated women of leisure in Baghdad to take part in voluntary social services. It will be long before trained, professional social workers will be available in sufficient numbers for such duties. We had however, no opportunity of discussing these suggestions with anyone in a position to transform them into actuality.

55. We heard from Miss Govan (UNTAA expert) of a scheme with which she had been associated for training 25 young women as social workers. The scheme had made some progress but was momentarily hindered, partly by difficulties in providing local facilities for completing practical in-service training and in persuading the girls' parents to permit them to take up duty away from home.

56. Although we were met with every possible courtesy during our visit to Iraq, the fact that a caretaker Government was in office and a general election was about to take place created a situation in which it was pointless to discuss in detail with the departments concerned, future plans and policies for social development.

57. Recommendation. Until the MacGregor-Khadioury scheme has been more closely studied by the departments concerned and the necessary financial provision has been approved, we are unable to make any recommendations.

248 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
853 particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

146
657 of a nutrition institute with facilities for research has been proposed.

HOUSING

342 The dwellings of the rural cultivators, the nomads and the townspeople show considerable variation, conforming to the social customs of the people and the building materials at hand. The villages in the rural areas are typically compact. In the central plains, the houses are usually constructed of sun-dried mud bricks, with flat roofs of palm trunks covered with mud or palm leaves. They may contain one or several rooms opening into a central courtyard, and in the more prosperous families they sometimes have two stories. The livestock are sheltered in sheds in the compounds, in close proximity to the household. Stone replaces mud bricks in many sections of the northern highlands, where the roofs are built of mud or timber. In the mountain districts the villages often nestle on the hillsides surrounded by series of cultivated terraces.

In the south, the houses are traditionally made of woven reeds or palm fronds, although the compounds may be enclosed within mud walls. Woven reed, or *serifa*, huts are used by the seasonal laborers in the date groves, and are being introduced to an increasing extent by impoverished migratory workers in the cities of central and southern Iraq. In 1950, it was estimated that there were at least 60,000 *serifa* dwellers in Baghdad and 20,000 in Basra. Huts are put up on any convenient vacant plot of land and are frequently interspersed among the modern homes in the residential sections. Such *serifa* settlements, in which the living conditions are primitive, create serious public health hazards. More elaborate reed houses, built on islands or on brushwood or reed rafts, are characteristic of the villages of the "marsh Arabs" in the rice-growing areas and swamplands of the southern delta. In contrast, the nomadic peoples live in black tents of hair cloth or skins, of a type which has persisted for centuries.

744 approval, but illegal slaughtering takes place in many areas. No effective control is carried out in the rural villages, where the animals are slaughtered locally.

234 Milk from cows and goats is marketed by
744 large numbers of small producers. Government regulations exist for the sanitary inspection of dairies and the periodic tuberculin testing of cattle. In practice, however, few controls are exercised over the methods of production or the quality of the product. There is only one pasteurization plant in the country. This is located in Baghdad, and is operated by the government's Agriculture Department. It was established primarily for the purpose of supplying pasteurized milk to the child welfare centers, but a small percentage of its output is sold
234 to private customers. Milk is customarily
164 boiled before use, but butter and cheese
232 are often vehicles for the spread of brucellosis and other diseases. Brucellosis is enzootic among the cattle and the goats, and bovine tuberculosis among the dairy herds.

HEALTH SERVICES AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health Organizations

744
657 Responsibility for the protection of the public health and for the provision of medical care facilities is centralized in the Ministry of Health of the Iraqi government, with headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry was established in 1952, replacing the former Directorate General of Health in the Ministry of Social Affairs. Under the present organization, the Minister of Health is assisted by a Director General of Health, in charge of health and medical services, and by an Inspector General of Health. The Minister also has jurisdiction over the Royal Faculty of Medicine which administers the Royal Hospital and the Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad.

The functional activities of the Ministry are concentrated in two major divisions—curative medicine and preventive and social medicine—as well as in a number of admin-
ISTRATIVE BRANCHES.

p. 32(A)

000 istrative branches. The Director of Curative
744 Medicine has supervision over 4 depart-
657 ments: hospitals, dispensaries and pharma-
743 cies; rural health; technical institutes, including 6 laboratory sections; and medical stores. Under the Director of Preventive and Social Medicine are departments of endemic diseases, sanitation, social health, quarantine and epidemics, vital statistics and disease registration. Subordinate sections dealing with maternal and child health, venereal diseases, pulmonary diseases and health propaganda are incorporated in the Department of Social Health, while supervision over the health services of both the province and the city of Baghdad falls within the scope of the Department of
742 Sanitation. The Department of Endemic Diseases carries on research and field programs for the control of malaria, schistosomiasis and hookworm infection, some of which were initiated by the then Institute of Endemic Diseases, created in 1949. Further changes in organization, making the Director of Preventive and Social Medicine a Director General immediately responsible to the Minister, were proposed in 1953.

746 Subordinate provincial organizations carry out the functions of the Ministry of Health in the 14 *liwas,* or provinces. Chief medical officers are appointed to each *liwa* and are responsible for the conduct of the various medical services. They undertake some public health activities, but, to a large extent, the preventive services are directed from Baghdad. Municipal health divisions are established in Baghdad and the principal cities.

744 Other ministries are also concerned in some measure with the public health. The Ministry of Education operates school health services in Baghdad and the larger urban centers, and introduces instruction in the basic principles of health through the schools in urban and rural areas. The Ministry of Economics has veterinary and agriculture departments: the former has meat and dairy inspection services; the latter runs an experimental farm and a pas-

combined capacity of 4,330 beds, were operated by the government health authorities; 4 hospitals with 153 beds by other governmental agencies; and 11 hospitals with 418 beds by industrial, mission or private organizations. Free medical care was provided in 4,475 beds, representing over 90 per cent of the hospital beds available in the country. 743 [657]

The Royal Hospital in Baghdad is foremost among the institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. It has medical, surgical, pediatric and infectious disease sections, with a total capacity of 650 to 750 beds. The remaining hospitals of the Ministry now come under the authority of the Director of Curative Medicine. According to the statistics for 1950, they included 42 general hospitals, with an aggregate capacity of about 2,300 beds, of which one or more in each province were Grade 1 hospitals under the supervision of medical officers. Maternity and child welfare divisions were incorporated in the general hospitals, which provided 962 beds for maternity cases and 134 beds for children. The special institutions consisted of 6 isolation hospitals with a total capacity of 596 beds, 3 ophthalmic hospitals with 79 beds, 2 venereal disease hospitals with 52 beds, 2 child welfare hospitals with 155 beds, 3 maternity and children's hospitals with 71 beds, a mental hospital of 120 beds, a leper hospital of 180 beds and 6 prison hospitals with 92 beds. A 400-bed tuberculosis sanatorium, which was sponsored in part by the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, was opened near Baghdad in 1951. Another 120-bed hospital in Basra was completed in 1952.

The American Mission hospital, with [illegible] beds, in Amarah and the new Seventh Day Adventist hospital, with 60 beds, in Baghdad are prominent among the private institutions. As of 1951, 3 hospitals with a combined capacity of 170 beds were operated by the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk region. The medical facilities of the company in the oil field and the pipeline areas also included 20 detention camps, with 797 743 743 446

p. 83(B)

164 pulmonary infections, but tuberculous meningitis is common in young children. Among 838 cases of nonpulmonary tuberculosis admitted to the surgical wards of the Royal Hospital in the 4 years 1947-50,[34] over 26 per cent were diagnosed as lymphadenitis and over 21 per cent as infections of the spine.

164
743 The new 400-bed sanatorium opened near Baghdad under the joint auspices of the Anti-Tuberculosis Society and the government health authorities in 1951 was the first tuberculosis hospital in the country. Previously, facilities for the treatment of tuberculous cases were provided only in the provincial hospitals, or in sanatoria in Syria and Lebanon, where the Ministry of Health subsidizes about 200 beds for the use of
657
743
164 Iraqi patients. Plans have been projected by the Ministry for the construction of tuberculosis hospitals in each of the provinces: a 120-bed hospital was completed in Basra in 1952, and it was anticipated that hospitals would soon be ready for use in Kirkuk and Mosul. As of 1950, the dispensaries available for the treatment of chest diseases totaled 6, of which 2 were located in Baghdad and one each in Mosul, Kirkuk Diwaniya and Sulaimaniya. X-ray laboratories were maintained in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul.

751 A BCG inoculation and tuberculin testing program was initiated by the Ministry in 1952, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. It is proposed to concentrate at first on the children and the adolescents in the larger cities. In 1952 also, the World Health Organization sponsored the establishment of a tuberculosis demonstration and training center at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad.

164 Smallpox. Epidemics of smallpox break out almost annually, and reach major proportions at intervals of 3 to 8 years. Since 1930, large-scale epidemics were reported in 1932-33, 1940-42, 1946 and 1948-49. In the 1932-33 outbreaks, the peak of incidence came in 1932, when 2,318 cases were re-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administration was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise. 361 185 632 [2/23]

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Baṣra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeological wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum, 871 658 172

ment appointment. A School of Agriculture, founded hastily and 871 inefficiently in 1928, was perforce discontinued for lack of pupils two years later—to be afterwards refounded. A Health Officials' school, in connexion with the College of Medicine, in 1932 replaced the existing Pharmaceutical School: a year later a Nursing school was inaugurated, to which a midwifery section was to be added in 1936. The training of rural teachers at the primary teachers' stage was [875] discontinued; but its necessity, urged by the American mission which visited 'Iraq under Dr. Paul Monroe in 1932, was later to be recognized. The provisional plan of 1923 for higher teacher-training was also discontinued, for later amendment. Another American secondary school, this time a Jesuit enterprise, was founded in Baghdad in 1932, and accepted pupils of all faiths. Government secondary schools by 1930 numbered fifteen, primary nearly 300. The theological college of Al al-Bayt closed its doors in 1929. The Law School, 'Iraq's nearest approach to a university course, kept all its popularity and produced civil servants as well as advocates. Separate Assyrian schools taught little but their own brand of religion. Kurdish schools, thirty in number by 1930, included one intermediate, and one for girls. Annual grants were 658 made to the schools of the minority communities and foreign missions; their standard, not least in European languages, was generally higher than in those of the State. About 8 per cent. of all Government revenues was at this time spent on education. Lionel Smith retired from the Advisership to Education in 1930, and was not replaced.

Greater sums than this were needed for the services of security: 701 a fifth or more of Government income maintained the 'Iraq Army, [652] and nearly a sixth the Police Force. Since the Levies, reduced to two battalions in 1928, were used decreasingly on operations, and the Royal Air Force, reduced from eight squadrons in the period 1922 to 1926 to four in 1930, was soon to be no longer available for internal operations, reliance must be on the Police and the 'Iraq Army; no pains, therefore, were spared to augment and improve these. The Royal 'Iraqi Air Force came into existence in 1930, with five light aircraft. The Army, to which Great Britain contributed a grant until 1932, was developed with the close guidance of a British Military Mission which, increased from six officers in 1921 to forty-six in 1930, was then reduced to twenty-six. It trained its own officers at military and staff colleges, and by the dispatch of selected men to Sandhurst or Quetta. Recruiting in the period 1926 to 1932 was voluntary, numbers sufficient, training and maintenance adequate, discipline good. The strength of the Army by 1932 approximated to two brigades. It was unfortunate that its most frequent operations, against Kurdish insurgents, were in

3: Clark 5-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

872 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General
645 Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The
Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound
in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education
was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age
of admission to the primary school should not be less than six
and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that
'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out
in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when
[681] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this
Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

871 By this time the administration of education had been highly
systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of
645 Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration
is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of Education controlling and supervising the most minute details both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

872 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was
made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does
658 not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out
of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age,
not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940
an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education
provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the
declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed
in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty
[464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with
the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of
the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the
[362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where
housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is
also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other
[696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the
legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

powerful local landowners operated as effective obstacles to compulsory schooling. 872 658 ●

Despite this initial failure of a modest attempt to apply compulsory education in certain parts of the country, enlightened opinion in Iraq is strongly in favour of educational development. 871 185 Because of the economic, political and social obstacles which will have to be overcome before a real approach to universal compulsory education can be made, few if any of the country's educators feel that this desirable objective is likely to be achieved in a short time. As educators, however, and for educational reasons, they are anxious that the practicability of achieving a realistic approach towards compulsory education should be soberly investigated. This enlightened minority are likely to be assisted in their demands by pressure of nationalist opinion, which sees in the development of education a means of spreading national culture and national sentiments among the people.

There are other important reasons why the time is ripe for 000 assessing the ways and means by which compulsory education can be approached. Although Iraq, like many other countries is, economically, passing through a difficult stage, rapid development in thought and ways of life is taking place. The country is at present at the cross-roads between traditional and modern or western civilization. Change and development, in one direction or another, seem to be the order of the day. It is for this reason that a contemporary Iraqi educator urges that the present time 'affords a unique opportunity for making a good start in education'.

Before, however, considering the practicability of making a 'good start' or at any rate a new start in the direction of compulsory education, consideration must be given to the educational needs of the country at its present stage of development and the extent to which these needs are being met by the existing system. It will then be possible to consider, in the light of prevailing economic, political and social conditions, ways and means of achieving further advance.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS

As was suggested in the previous chapter, although a long road will have to be traversed before the ideal of universal compulsory primary education can be achieved in Iraq, the time is ripe for further advance towards that objective. Pressure on existing school accommodation in the urban areas is acute, most of the villages are without schools, and large areas lack primary school provision of any kind. Yet quantitative advance has by no means been halted, and although many more children would be attending school at the present time if there were schools and teachers for them, new schools are being opened both in new buildings and in rented premises. 872

The Ministry of Education and all who have a concern for education in Iraq are well aware of these circumstances. A small minority feel that quantitative advance has gone far enough for the present and advocate that, before further large-scale development takes place, existing qualitative deficiencies in primary education should be put right. This will take time. In the meantime, it would be difficult to refuse to provide primary school places for the many who are clamouring for them.

While, however, thinking educators in Iraq wish for further advance in the direction of compulsory education, they know that this ideal can never be realized until serious economic, political and social obstacles which impede educational and other desirable social development can be overcome. As the Minister of Education in office at the time of writing put it: 'An emotional desire for more and better schools is not in itself sufficient. Sensible educational development can only take place if it is related to our current economic and financial problems.'

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The Financing of Education. The first of these problems is finance. 658 Little is to be gained from considering proposals for further advance unless they are accompanied by a realistic understanding as to how and where the money for them is to be found. The extent to

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MHI Iraq MHI

658 which the Government have been prepared to find money for education is shown by the following table of national educational expenditure compared with total budget expenditure:

[652] EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION

Year	*For all purposes*	*For all education*	*Per cent of education to all purposes*
	£	£	
1920–21	5,556,574	130,360	2.35
1930–31	3,994,337	294,262	7.37
1938–39	5,469,813	708,056	12.94
1939–40	6,369,148	810,477	12.72
1940–41	7,144,910	848,168	11.87
1941–42	7,701,178	855,540	11.11
1942–43	10,620,822	1,131,414	10.65
1943–44	13,749,321	1,515,542	11.02
1944–45	15,484,752	1,335,475	8.62
1945–46	17,563,230	1,611,843	9.18
1946–47	18,428,567	1,737,604	9.43
1947–48	18,742,657	2,157,315	11.51
1948–49	21,947,994	2,572,625	11.72
1949–50	24,095,300	3,783,309	15.70

When one attempts to compare present national expenditure on education with what it would cost to finance compulsory education for all children, however, it cannot be suggested with even the most realistic optimism that there is much prospect of the money being available for some time to come. It is estimated that, at the present time, the cost of providing primary education is £8 per pupil per year. Thus the cost of providing compulsory primary education for the 750,000 children of primary school age, even at the existing level, would amount to considerably more than £6,000,000 per annum, i.e., probably twice as much as the total current educational budget. And this estimate does not take into account the cost of providing the new schools, of bringing existing school buildings up to better standards and of training the many more teachers who would be necessary. It also ignores the fact of the rapidly growing school population.

For this reason many responsible educators, when confronted with the cost, feel that no serious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. This may or may not be true. There is always a need for financial realism, but there

may be danger in holding up consideration of radical educational 658 reforms until all the necessary financial provision is within sight. Those who wish for advance towards compulsory education but who are fearful of the consequent financial commitments could well be reminded that experience in some other countries has shown that, when the desire for educational advance really exists, the money necessary for its realization is likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, it is quite possible that in Iraq there exist monies which could be made available for educational purposes if means could be devised of extracting them into the public purse. This view may be the more valid when it is remembered that public education in Iraq is financed almost entirely from the central Government budget and that primary education, which is essentially a local service, makes little demand on local financial resources. More will be said later about the possibility of augmenting existing educational revenues from local sources.

Apart from the possibility of raising local revenue for educational purposes, before educational and other social services can be greatly extended, there will need to be larger contributions from the national budget. Some consideration must, therefore, be given to the wider question of the practicability of increasing the country's taxable wealth from which more money for public services may be derived. This inevitably leads to some discussion of two other important economic problems, the potential revenue capacity of the country and the related problem of land tenure.

The Potential Revenue Capacity of the Country. It is beyond the scope 651 of this particular study to attempt to assess the potential revenue capacity of Iraq. This is a matter for fiscal experts. Some of the more authoritative of these maintain that the task of considerably augmenting the budget so that additional monies could be devoted to educational and other social services is not insuperable. They feel that, although in the early years of the creation of Iraq as an independent State the Government might not have felt itself sufficiently strong to make too many taxation demands, it is now able to do so. They suggest that it is now possible both to tighten up existing fiscal arrangements and also to obtain more revenue by increased or new taxes. These financial experts hold the view that, despite minor fiscal reforms in recent years, the taxation system remains traditional and too rigid and that effective attempts have not been made to increase revenue by bringing taxation into line with higher prices and the changed economic conditions of the post-war period.

One fiscal change advocated by these would-be revenue reformers is that income tax, which is practically confined to

for some time. Women have been employed so far only in exceptional cases. 464 A new problem has been recently experienced in the high turnover of ordinary labour. Owing to the development of the oil industry in Kuweit and other Persian Gulf areas, and the high wages being paid there, many workers in Baghdad, and more still in the depressed farming areas, have been emigrating there. The turnover in the cotton textile industry of Iraq is estimated at 20 per cent of employed labour.

The main difficulty however lies in the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour. The vast amount of illiteracy among the [212 871] population, and the failure to make elementary education compulsory has made it difficult to apply any system of apprenticeship successfully. Technical education provided by the State has [874] so far been on a very limited scale - indeed, there are only three technical secondary schools in the whole of Iraq. Therefore a new industry has often first to train its own labourers and technicians, and this of course adds to costs. In the meanwhile, most industries are dependent on foreign technicians, experts, constructors, heads of sections, and foremen. The employment of foreign technicians no doubt is inevitable in the early stages of development, but it has its own drawbacks and burdens. Foreign skill demands higher rewards abroad than it would accept at home, the standard of skill obtained is often not the highest, service is often interrupted either by ordinary leaves, or illness or inability to fit in with local conditions.

The lack of qualified labour also applies to the fields of administration, [658 874] accounts, and management. Efficient clerks, typists, store-keepers, accountants and secretaries are in great demand and very few are available in Iraq. The inadequacy of State commercial education is no less than that of technical education. The scarcity of able management is a serious obstacle to the progress of industry. Those few who have entered the field of industry are 464 mostly of the type of proprietor-manager (even in joint-stock 472 companies managers are usually fairly large share-holders); while 473 the members of boards of directors of industrial companies, (about twenty to twenty-five men) mostly have their own business or profession to attend to. No wonder they show reluctance to go into new enterprises. For one reason or another salaried managers have not made their way into industry, except in very rare cases. On the other hand foreign management, especially on the

175* education or to regard it as of secondary importance in the work
727* of regenerating the country. Nevertheless, only two primary
871 schools were established by the end of 1915, although subsidies
had been granted to the two institutions already mentioned.

TABLE I

Main Headings	1915–16	1916–17	1917–18	1918–19	1919–20
	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees
1. Headquarters Administrative Expenditure.*	5,54,230	11,83,425	24,18,253	33,90,100	73,60,714
2. Political Officers, Revenue Establishments	5,48,892	9,19,085	51,89,233	93,21,690	70,67,420
3. Customs	1,11,898	3,85,800	5,80,350	6,75,000	29,64,169
4. Transport	—	—	—	—	30,87,834
5. Judicial	1,20,207	1,27,295	2,14,983	3,73,000	8,21,145
6. Medical	61,345	87,180	1,39,887	4,63,750	20,31,542
7. Education	6,500	23,530	35,500	1,80,000	8,86,808
8. Police	1,99,146	2,86,975	8,90,163	12,04,080	22,71,389
9. Jails	20,126	44,460	98,517	1,67,400	5,44,304
10. Public Works	—	1,05,450	4,61,400	8,74,700	49,63,292
11. Posts	—	—	—	—	23,74,831
12. Telegraphs	—	—	—	—	8,19,868
13. Survey	—	—	—	—	94,859
14. Irrigation	—	—	—	—	38,78,605
15. Agriculture	—	—	—	—	3,81,738
16. Levies	—	—	—	—	66,49,490
Totals	16,22,344	31,63,200	100,28,286	166,49,720	461,98,008

* Includes Salaries, Secret Service, Subsistence Allowances, Sea Passages, Telegrams, Stationery, Press, etc.

Figures for all years, except 1919-20, based on *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119. Figures for 1919-20 based on actuals in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-21, p. iii.

●658 During the same period only Rs.6,500 were spent on pro-
871 moting education, or 0.4 per cent of the civil expenditure,
175 Rs.16,22,344.[1] In the following fiscal year,[2] however, Rs.
727*

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[1] Note by Financial Secretary in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119. For table of expenditures by heads, see Table I.

[2] April 1st to March 31st.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

23,530 or 0·74 per cent of the total civil expenditure were spent, 658
entirely in Basra Wilayet. Nor did the situation improve after 8711
the taking of Baghdad, the attention of the authorities being 175+
almost exclusively taken up with consolidating the military 727+
and political situation. Expenditure on education in 1917-18 totalled but 0·35 per cent of the total civil expenditure.

Not until the appointment of a Director of Education, Major H. E. Bowman,[1] in September, 1918, was a vigorous start made towards creating an educational system. By the end of 1918, 872
twenty primary schools had been set up,[2] but expenditure 658
still formed only 1·08 per cent of the total expenditure. The 727+
desire for schools and educational facilities, especially the 175+
opportunity to learn English, was everywhere manifest, petitions and requests coming from all parts of the Occupied Territories.[3] To meet these demands, twenty-one new primary schools were opened in 1919,[4] while a further fifteen were added in 1920, which, including twenty-four subsidized schools, brought the total number to eighty-five boys' schools of all types, and five girls' schools,[5] with a total enrolment of 6,182 pupils or one for every 462 of the population.[6] The proportion of the expenditure for Education to the entire expenditure in this year, the fifth of the British Occupation, had risen to 1·9 per cent.[7]

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[1] Egyptian Ministry of Education, 1903-1923; Director Palestine Education Department, 1920-36.

[2] *Administrative Report of Education*, 1918, p. 10 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918).

[3] *Fortnightly Reports of Political Officers, Baghdad Wilayet, 1st-15th June*, 1918: Mandalī, p. 23 (hereafter *Fortnightly Rep'ts*); *Monthly Rep'ts, January*, 1919; Basra Sanjaq, p. 32; Qurna, p. 79; Ibid., *August*, 1919: Erbīl, p. 45; Ibid., *November*, 1919: Dulaim, p. 14.

[4] *Administration of the Department of Education for the year* 1919 (Baghdad, 1920) (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1919).

[5] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 104.

[6] On the basis of the census, 1918-19, of 2,890,000 inhabitants.

Education	Rs.	8,86,808
Total Budget	Rs.	461,98,008

These figures are taken from actual expenditure given in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iii. They differ slightly from the estimates given in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119.

[7] See Table II.

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department, no administrative order in the Ministry being 871
given by a British official after 1923.[1] The responsibility for the educational system thus has been largely 'Iraqi, in spite of the inclination both of 'Iraqī officials and of American educationalists to lay the blame for its deficiencies at the feet of the British officials. Indeed, more influence of foreign origin has been [177
exerted on the educational system by 'Iraqī students returning 871]
from American and English schools and Universities than by the British officials of the Ministry.

No government department has been a greater source of 658 ●
optimism for the continued development of 'Iraq, both to 871
'Iraqī and to foreign observers, than has Education. No other department can point to budget appropriations which have steadily increased from 1921, the amount assigned in 1932 to Education being more than double the sum in 1921.[2] No other Ministry can show such concrete and progressively achieved results. The number of primary schools for boys has increased [870]
from 124 in 1921 to 247 in 1930, the enrolment increasing from 12,226 to 24,885. In the same period, girls' schools have increased from 27 to 44, with an increase in enrolment from 3849 to 6003. During this period, secondary and intermediate schools have grown from four, with an estimated attendance of

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 224.

[2] A summary of the expenditures of the Ministry of Education, 1921-32) in lacs of rupees) is as follows:

Year	*Expenditure*	*Percentage of Budget to total expenditure*
1921–22	19·36	3·3
1922–23	19·94	4·1
1923–24	18·15	4·0
1924–25	22·13	4·59
1925–26	23·48	4·43
1926–27	26·93*	5·2
1927–28	27·42	4·74
1928–29	32·01	5·33
1929–30	37·18	6·42
1930–31	38·41	7·5
1931–32	39·98	7·9

* The budget of the Antiquities Department and of the Engineering School was added to the Budget in this year and in subsequent years.

658 238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase
871 in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or
[875] quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of ‘Iraqī students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to adapt Western methods to ‘Iraq instead of blindly adopting them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

871 Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern has been expressed both by ‘Iraqīs and by others lest various tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and controversies; and the acquisition by students of the view that education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that government positions should be the reward of their school certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves, will depend much of the continued progress of ‘Iraq.

744 In other fields, a health service has been in existence since
759 the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in out-
[758] lying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small
164 portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

cil, consisting of officials and non-officials conversant with different 871
types of educational problems, might give valuable assistance to the Ministry in formulating educational policies and programs and guarding against hasty and ill-considered changes in approved programs.

Training Abroad

A word should finally be said of the Ministry of Education's 871
program for educating Iraqis abroad. During the last 10 years no 658
less than 781 Iraqis were sent abroad for education at government expense. Of these, 234 studied engineering; 53, other technical and industrial subjects; 103, agriculture; 39, commercial subjects; 24, medicine; 56, law; and 272, education. Many of these will be returning over the next few years and will be capable, if given an opportunity, of playing an important role in carrying out the development program. This type of educational program undoubtedly merits further expansion. At present the fields of study are decided by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendations of the various ministries. In the future it is suggested that the Development Board also be consulted on the most important requirements in the light of its overall program.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

that most of their graduates are not equipped to set up a workshop 87 or business of their own or even to find useful employment in established private business. Instead, most of them hanker after government jobs or clerical positions in banking and commerce.

The total number of students in all technical institutions at present is a little more than 750. This is very small both in relation to the total population and the growing technical needs of the country. Moreover, so far as the Mission could discover, many technical graduates are not being fully utilized in types of work for which they are qualified. This represents a source of wastage which can be avoided partly by better coordination between technical schools and technical occupations, and partly by placing more stress on practical training in the schools. In expanding the existing facilities, provision must presumably be made for (1) the training of full-time students, and (2) supplementary training of promising workers selected from factories and workshops. In the latter case the course will need to cover not only the kind of technical knowledge best imparted through classroom instruction but also any deficiencies in formal education such as reading, writing and mathematics. In both cases the practical training with tools, machinery and other types of equipment should be given in well-equipped workshops like those of the railways and the Iraq Petroleum Company. Technical education should therefore be planned jointly with the management of such shops, and a system of apprenticeship should be instituted in all factories and on construction projects.

The State has sent about 780 candidates for study abroad during [658] the last 10 years. It will no doubt be necessary to continue this policy for some years but it should be carefully reviewed in the light of the developing needs of the country. The Mission would urge three points on the attention of the government in this connection. First, the availability of training facilities abroad should not delay establishment of such facilities in Iraq, particularly for the training of people at what may be called the intermediate level. Local technical institutions should give special attention to training foremen and supervisors who would act as intermediaries between the highly trained engineers at the top and the semiskilled or unskilled labor. There is a general com-

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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164 helminthosis are endemic. There are occasional outbreaks of
657 smallpox, typhus, and more rarely plague and cholera. With
the greater provision in the budget for schemes of public health,
the increased employment of international specialists and the
considerable assistance tendered by the World Health Organization,
there is every prospect that the incidence of endemic
874 diseases will be greatly reduced. Fundamental results may be
742 expected from modern medical training, with emphasis on the
environmental aspects of disease and the need for prevention
657 as much as or even more than cure, and, above all, from the
743 efforts of the administration to improve the environment itself,
[312] with especial reference to drainage and water-supply. In addition,
attention is to be paid to the public health aspects of the pilgrimages. The curative services have in general received more attention than the preventive and have improved considerably in the past thirty years. Simple conditions are treated in some 400 state dispensaries, distributed fairly evenly throughout the country but varying in their equipment and staff; it has hitherto proved difficult to attract doctors to the provinces and particularly to the rural districts. Each *liwa* centre has a general hospital, the larger towns more than one. There are also specialized hospitals for maternity and child welfare, for infectious, chest, eye, venereal, and mental diseases, and for lepers. The army, police, railways, Port of Basra, Ministry of Education, and oil companies maintain their own medical services and hospitals, and there are in addition an American Mission Hospital and a number of private nursing homes. A five-year programme, financed by the Development Board, will provide for the repair, extension, and replacement of medical buildings which have become old or inadequate. There is an acute shortage of well-trained nurses; attempts to expand the service are hampered by the reluctance of Muslim girls of good family to enter it.

Education

● 658 The state provides elementary, intermediate, secondary, and
871 higher education, all, since December 1952, completely free.
There are also private and foreign schools on a kindergarten,
elementary, intermediate, and secondary level.

State Education. Primary education, by law universal and compulsory where facilities exist, begins at the age of six and continues for six years. It has been limited by a shortage of schools and trained teachers, especially in the villages. Plans are in hand to meet the need. The rapid expansion of state primary education is demonstrated in the following table:

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Year	*No. of schools*	*No. of teachers*	*No. of students*
1920–1	88	486	8,001
1930–1	316	1,325	34,513
1940–1	735	3,525	90,794
1950–1	1,101	6,367	180,779

(SOURCE: Ministry of Education.)

Intermediate education (three years) follows the elementary and is followed by two years' secondary education. The number of state intermediate and secondary schools is also being rapidly increased, as the following figures indicate.

Year	*No. of schools*	*No. of teachers*	*No. of students*
1920–1	3	34	110
1930–1	19	129	2,082
1940–1	56	472	13,969
1950–1	121	999	22,707

(SOURCE: Ministry of Education.)

Private and Foreign Schools. The former include those of the various religious communities, the latter British, American, and Persian schools. Figures for 1953 show an enrolment of some 15,500 pupils in the primary schools and 10,000 in the intermediate and secondary schools, representing about 6 and 25 per cent respectively of the total enrolment in the country.

Higher Education. The higher educational institutions, some 873 of them coeducational, all under state control, are: Higher Training College for Teachers, College of Arts and Science, Law College, College of Medicine and Dentistry, College of Pharmacy and Chemistry, College of Commerce and Economics, Engineering College, Agricultural College, College of Religion, Military and Police Colleges, and Queen Aliya College, which provides girls with arts and, to some extent, secretarial instruction or prepares them for domestic science teaching and the expanding social services. The total number of students in these institutions is at present approximately 5,000. Figures for previous years are as follows: 1920–1 (one college) 65; 1930–1 (four colleges) 100; 1940–1 (four colleges) 900.[1] It is hoped in the near future to implement a proposal now under discussion for combining the higher institutions into a university.

Vocational Training. State vocational training on a secondary 874 level, whose extension is being planned, may at present be divided as follows. *Industrial:* Government technical schools in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basra, with another planned for Mosul. The Agricultural Machinery Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is planning to establish training centres for mechan-

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[1] Figures given by the Ministry of Education.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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to another are arranged, plans for new schools and classes are decided upon, 871K
and proposals, policy matters, complaints, and criticisms are discussed.

Finally must be mentioned the newly founded Committee on Authorship, Translation, and Publication, which is a self-perpetuating body of learned men forming a kind of academy. 814 It may have a minimum of ten and a maximum of twenty members distributed among the various branches of learning. This committee endeavors to enrich the "Arabic Library" by translating important classics as well as modern books of science, technology, and general culture; to encourage original research and writing; to publish old Arabic manuscripts; and to standardize Arabic scientific terminology. The committee holds regular meetings to choose books to be translated or written, to select writers and translators, and to read and discuss the researches of members. It may give financial assistance to translators, authors, and publishers in the form of grants, purchase of copyrights, prizes, or any other manner considered advisable. It plans to establish contact with learned men and societies in Iraq and abroad, particularly throughout the Arabic world. Finally, it plans to publish its own bulletins and periodicals embodying the researches of its members.

Educational Finance

The Ministry of Education receives the third largest budgetary provision 871K of all the departments of the Iraqi government, being exceeded only by [658] ● the army and the police. 652 The public educational institutions of Iraq are entirely supported by the central government. The provincial authorities contribute nothing to the school fund, nor do the municipal authorities except for occasional assistance given to poor pupils. For specific purposes, such as aid to poor students or enlargement or repair of a school, contributions are occasionally solicited from private citizens of a locality, under the auspices of the administrative and educational authorities. The schools may give dramatic performances and exhibits to secure funds for special needs. Except for these minor and irregular sources, the central government pays the whole cost of public education.

The percentage of the general budget allotted to education has fluctuated from year to year. Starting with 2.3 percent in 1920–21, it reached a maximum of 12.9 percent in 1938–39, declined again in the following years to 7.8 percent in 1944–45, and showed a slight rise to 8.6 percent in 1945–46. In absolute figures, however, the sums allotted to the Ministry of Education have risen consistently (except for 1923–24) from 130,360 dinars ($521,440) in 1920–21 to 1,630,800 dinars ($6,523,200) in 1945–46. The decline in the percentage in recent years shows that

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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x873 Of 1,011 graduates of secondary schools in 1942–43, only 470, or 46.5 percent, entered higher institutions in Iraq or went abroad to study. Admission to the colleges is based primarily upon scholastic standing and proportional representation of each province.

With the exception of the Law College,[2] instruction in the colleges is free, the student signing a contract to serve the government after graduation for a specified number of years. The Colleges of Medicine, Pharmacy, and Law have no boarding arrangements, but all other colleges maintain boarding departments at government expense. Other government aid for students studying at its expense includes books, medical care, travel, and in some cases clothing.

x871 The Iraqi public-school system is essentially democratic in character, affording a large measure of equality of opportunity to students. It is largely a free system, fees charged in secondary schools being small and provision being made for a large percentage of exemptions for the poor student of little better than average standing.[3] Even higher education is almost entirely free, the Law College being the only important exception —and there the bright poor student is exempted from payment of fees. ● [658] Moreover, the government has taken up the heavy burden of providing vocational and professional education entirely at its own expense.

Recently the Ministry of Education has taken steps to extend post-primary educational opportunities for village boys. Formerly the only courses available to poor village boys were in the rural-teachers colleges or the technical schools in Baghdad or Mosul. If a village boy wanted to proceed to the intermediate and secondary schools in the capitals of the provinces, he had to have means to support himself—and few did. [555] In September 1945 the Ministry of Education adopted the policy of opening a boarding department in the capital of each province where 10 bright village boys can be taken annually at government expense and so allowed to pursue their secondary education. In addition, some of the brightest primary-school graduates are admitted annually from each province to King Faysal College for boys where they receive their secondary-school education in English at government expense. Some of the brighter girls from each province are admitted after graduation from the intermediate schools into the secondary section of the Queen ‘Aliyah Institute at government expense.

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[2] A College of Commerce was founded in 1946-47 and charges fees at the same rate as the College of Law—15 dinars ($60.00) per annum.

[3] Secondary-school fees were abolished entirely in 1946.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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x 874 irrigation, railways, roads, and economics; the fourth, strength of materials, theory of structures, hydraulics, surveying, municipal engineering (water supply and sewage disposal), estimating (specifications and contracts), engineering law, and design (structures, irrigation works, and buildings). Lectures and practical work total from twenty-eight to thirty-two hours per week. This curriculum will be expanded when specialization in mechanical and electrical engineering is added.

No tuition or boarding fees are charged, but students sign a contract to work for a period of five years after graduation in the Department of Public Works. During this period of employment they are paid on the same scale as other government officials with similar preparation and experience.

Educational Missions

● 658
177 It was in 1921, just after the foundation of the national government and the accession of King Faysal I to the throne of Iraq, that the Ministry of Education proposed sending qualified students abroad to study. That year nine of the brighter boys were picked from the secondary schools, six of whom were sent to the American University of Beirut in Lebanon and three to England. Of these, two were to study medicine in England, one was later to study agriculture in the United States, and six were to prepare for high-school teaching. From the first, the idea of educational missions was to train specialists to meet Iraq's needs in the fields of health, education, and agriculture.

Needs multiplied until foreign educational missions were projected in no less than forty-six of the most diverse subjects. These included various sciences and subjects necessary to teaching, such as physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, history, geography, Arabic, and English. Students were sent to study education, psychology, and kindergarten methods, chiefly in America. Agriculture was studied almost entirely in America. Students went abroad to study all types of engineering, surveying, architecture, the social sciences, modern business practice, astronomy, geology, meteorology, and law. The establishment of the Royal College of Medicine at Baghdad in 1927 almost stopped the movement of medical students to foreign universities, except for graduate study, but they continued to go abroad to study dentistry and veterinary science. They went on missions to study technical trades, archeology, Islamic art, physical education, printing, library science, and home economics. For the study of painting, sculpture, and music they were sent principally to France and Italy.

As the fields to be studied on mission became more numerous, so did the

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

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number of students sent. The number of students supported wholly or 658 almost wholly by the government rose from 9 in 1921 to 93 in 1928–29 177 and reached the peak figure of 238 in 1939–40. It declined because of World War II to 114 in 1943–44, but began to increase in 1945. Altogether more than 700 students have been sent abroad for study in the last quarter-century. The number of students who studied abroad at their own expense is at least as large.

Missions have been sent to eleven different countries, Lebanon receiving the most because of the popularity of the American University of Beirut. This University has not only prepared a large number of teachers for the Iraqi secondary schools; it has also served as a station for students going to America, to improve their English and prepare them for advanced study in the United States. After Lebanon, England receives the most, then Egypt, and in order, the United States, Switzerland, France, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Italy, and India. World War II limited the missions for the most part to Lebanon and Egypt.

The first mission students returned to Iraq in 1926 and were absorbed by the secondary schools and the Primary Teachers College. Since then hundreds of students have returned. Most of them and most of the students who studied abroad at their own expense have gone into government posts where they are helping to fill a great need. At least 4 have attained cabinet rank, while many have become directors general of various departments and members of Parliament. The largest number have gone into teaching or administrative posts in the Ministry of Education. The next largest group are in technical posts in engineering or agriculture. Others are scattered throughout the ministries, having begun their careers as teachers and transferred from the Ministry of Education.

The budget for educational missions began in a modest way in 1921 and reached its highest peak of 62,000 dinars ($248,000) in 1938–39. It declined to 45,000 dinars ($180,000) in the war years, but is now expected to be increased. For a full-scholarship student the government pays nearly all his necessary expenses, including tuition fees, travel expenses to and from his place of study, an adequate monthly allowance for living expenses—varying from country to country—and an allowance for books and medical care. Any major medical treatment or surgery is also paid for by the government. A former government official sent on a mission receives, in addition to these benefits, one-third of his former salary to help support his family. In return for all this, the student signs a contract which commits him to serve the government one year for each year of study. In case of default or of failure to complete his studies, he must

44;Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

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reimburse the government for all expenditure in his behalf. This system allows many a bright but impoverished student to achieve a kind of education and career that unaided he could never have had.

Regulations govern the selection of students and other aspects of this program. The latest revision of the regulations was in 1942, and, according to these, a student to be eligible must be at least a secondary-school graduate with an average of no less than 66 in the public examination and of no less than 75 percent in the subject of his specialization; he must pass a medical examination and be interviewed by the selection committee, which looks into his credentials and into a confidential report from his former school principal. To qualify for postgraduate study abroad, a student must have attained first- or second-class honors in his undergraduate course.

The Council of Ministers determines the number of students to be sent every year and the fields to be studied, basing the decisions on statements of the various ministries and departments concerning their needs. With the growth of the various colleges in Iraq, more emphasis is being placed upon postgraduate study to prepare advanced specialists. In undergraduate work there is a good deal of concentration on the various branches of engineering and technology.

of peasants and tribesmen are illiterate. 212
Theoretically, primary education is compulsory 872
for both sexes, but the facilities are inadequate, particularly in the rural areas. Recent estimates indicate that the literacy rate in the country as a whole approximates 10 per cent, in contrast with about 40 per cent in Baghdad and the larger cities. Education is controlled by the government, 871
and public instruction is available at all 658
levels from the primary schools through the professional colleges. There is no university in Iraq, but the incorporation of the present colleges into a national institution, with university status, has been proposed. Separate colleges of medicine, pharmacy, law, science, arts, fine arts, engineering, commerce and teachers' training, as well as various types of vocational schools, are supported by the government. Secondary schools are also maintained by private and mission groups. Government scholarships are provided annually to qualified students for study abroad, usually in Egypt, Great Britain or the United States.

VITAL STATISTICS

Valid vital statistics are almost nonexist- 163
ent, since the registration of births and 165
deaths is admittedly incomplete, even in the principal cities, as Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The general reluctance of the inhabitants to report births, deaths and other statistical data and the large size of the nomadic and the semimigratory populations are factors contributing to the inaccuracy of the figures available. Within recent years statistics have been compiled by the government health organization in 75 centers under the jurisdiction of medical officers, but they do not reflect conditions throughout the country. In 1950, these health districts covered a population of 1,160,000, distributed in all 14 of the provinces into which Iraq is divided. The birth rate was estimated at 27 per 1,000 population, and the death rate at 12 per 1,000. Competent authorities, however, believe that the over-all birth rate is nearer 40 to 50 per 1,000 popu-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads;
their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled
shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-dwellers,
then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 161
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking ''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

*645 The failure of Yasin Pasha to impose the peace and security which he had promised was due to causes already analysed, and in some measure to the hasty ineptitude of his Minister of Interior. But, as in 1920, disturbance on the Euphrates and locally and temporarily elsewhere did not greatly affect the rest of the territory. The cities were secure and tranquil, the northern liwās and the whole of Tigris-side untroubled. The period of Yasin Pasha's premiership was indeed by 'Iraqi standards one of firm and reasonable government, and seemed, even in the late summer of 1936, likely to be prolonged. The coming event of violent military intervention cast no shadow before it.

646 [659] The general election ordered in April 1935 produced in August a Chamber swollen from 88 to 108 members: the additional seats arose from increased population-figures revealed by the Census Department, and were useful in placating more shaykhs and partisans. Early sessions of Parliament were disturbed by fierce recriminations between factions for the crime of inciting the tribes —a crime peculiar, in fact, to no single party. The Administration proceeded to a general amnesty of the political offenders of recent months, to a purge of suspect officials, and to the preferment, as the spoils of office, of more reliable personnel.

647 Genuine efforts were made, indeed, to arrest the deterioration of the Administration, though the further reduction of senior British officials may have told in the opposite sense. It cost 'Iraq in 1935 the services of Sir K. Cornwallis, whose work for Fayṣal and for 'Iraq had been outstanding; Edmonds, profoundly versed in 'Iraqi and especially Kurdish affairs, succeeded him. In the same year Prescott, the creator of the 'Iraq Police, resigned from the service and left Cones for a further ten years as Inspector of Constabulary. Sievwright, veteran of the Customs, retired and was succeeded until 1941 by Swan of Finance. Parlby, Auditor-General, returned to India. Hallinan had ceased in 1933 to be Inspector-General of Health Services, and was replaced by an 'Iraqi doctor. The Tapu Department dispensed with British help after the death of Alderman (himself successor of Royds in 1930) in 1934. The same is true of the Department of Agriculture, which Webster left in the same year. B. C. Newland, Director of Surveys, relinquished his post in 1935 to his deputy, A. J. Booth, who still held it sixteen years later. Chadwick left the Veterinary Department in 1934, but was to have a second tenure of the Directorship in 1942 to 1947. The Government Geologist Dr. Macfadyen left 'Iraq in 1937 after two years' service there, and was not immediately replaced. Allard retired in 1934 from Irrigation, in which an 'Iraqi had already succeeded him as Director-General; a British Chief Engineer and British regional staff still served there, and the

The Yezidis in 'Iraq practically all dwell either in the Sinjār or I 162
Shaikhān districts. Each of these districts has a brass peacock and that Y
belonging to Shaikhān must never cross the Tigris. If it did so the 101
world would come to an end! Non-Yezidis cannot view the peacocks 778
or the other sacred emblems, which include the "shema'dan" or
candlestick and the "bairaqs" or banners. When not touring, all Y
emblems are kept at the residence of the *Mir* at Baa'dhra in Shaikhān, [793
though a few years ago the Sinjār Yezidis, who were at variance with 795
the *Mir*, seized their peacock and collected subscriptions on their I
account until compelled by Government to return it to its lawful 659]
keeper. Yezidis object strongly to the use of the word "Shaitān" Y
(Satan) or any word resembling it. Terms meaning "curse" are also 776
never used less Satan construes them as a tactless reminder of his fall. 784

Owing to these difficulties and restrictions, Yezidis are not "good Y
mixers" and rarely enter Government service. A few were formerly 186
employed by the British Government in the transport company of the 463
'Iraq Levies, but did not prove very satisfactory. Occasionally they 669
have enlisted in the 'Iraq army, but an attempt to apply a light measure I
of conscription to the Sinjār Yezidis resulted in an armed revolt by 563 781
five villages. This necessitated punitive action with, unfortunately, 702 649
heavy casualties on both sides. The Yezidis speak a form of Kurdish, Y [197]
but many also know Arabic. Ain Sifni or Ain-i-Safina (Spring of the 174
Boat) is the chief market town of the Shaikhān Yezidis. It derives its 438
name from a tradition that the Ark touched ground there.

Yezidis are to be found outside 'Iraq in the Caucasus and also a Y
few thousand north of Aleppo. 101

It is difficult to believe that this curious religion can long survive Y
in 'Iraq under present-day conditions. The *Mir* is unpopular and 793
there is no better successor amongst his in-bred and degenerate relatives. 794
The Yezidis have recently refused to yield him many of his 578
former rights and have severely criticised his squandering of the religious
revenues. Most of the members of the hierarchy have concentrated
their energies on trying to divert funds to their own pockets and
have quarrelled furiously. A certain number of stalwarts have defied Y
the priests and attended schools. In the Sinjār prior to the Great War 771
religious pressure induced a considerable number of Yezidis to adopt [877]
Islam, and it is within the bounds of possibility that ere long there 797
may be a regular landslide to either the Christian or Islamic faith or
both.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

654* obviously based on a fixed rate of seed per donum (e.g. 15 kg. for wheat, 20 kg. for rice and barley) which has been applied regularly in almost every year. Yet the rate of seeding undoubtedly varies from one part of the country to another. An explanation of the methods of computation, of the reasons therefor and the degree of reliance that can be placed on them are certainly called for.

[659 662] Again, population statistics have been published for each province, based on a hand-count of the census results. The fact that these published figures contain an estimate for nomads might well be stated. A more important omission is an explanation of the very marked discrepancy between men and women. It is well-known that there is strong tendency in many parts of the country to record male children as female and the returns for the lower age groups confirm this in a striking manner. At least some preliminary note on how this affects the validity of the results would be advisable. A good example of an appropriate warning is the qualifying note introducing the vital statistics which have been published.

Closely allied to reliability is clarity of definition. It is not possible to use statistics properly, if it is not clear what they mean. As an example of this, the figures for cultivable land made available to the Mission and shown in Table 2 of Annex A may be cited. If definitions are not clear, a series of statistics may lack continuity. An example of this is the published figures for electricity consumption in the various provinces, which are divided into three groups—lighting, manufacturing and other purposes. It is not clear what "other purposes" means. Moreover, although the definition evidently changed in Mosul between 1945 and 1946, no explanation is given and no adjustment has been made. In general, too, a number of units of weight or capacity, such as the *mann* and the *hukka,* are used in the Abstract without stating their equivalent in more standard units. The fact that these units vary from one commodity to another and, it is said, from one city to another makes it all the more necessary to state the precise equivalent in the context used.

Statistics should also be properly selected. If statistical publications are not to become a mass of unwieldy detail, a proper balance has to be struck between what is to be included and what is to be excluded. The Abstract, at present, contains much detailed medical and legal data of a somewhat specialized nature. On agri-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

565 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims
647 or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan, every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate,
661 persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and naḥiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer naḥiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent
662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land
[623] revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish
625 representatives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardi-
631 hood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendiles -- Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the 642 example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self- 661 ● interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 643 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the 185 important town families—and notably those of religious pretension—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which 631 any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the 619 impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could 668 not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, 186 668 to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khuḍhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some 000 well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the 185 efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee 661 649

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

185 for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the •661 civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intru-647 sion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Pequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Ḥilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qaḏhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qaḏhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

701 The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Naḏhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal 701 parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained 706 decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this 499 period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to 206 most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert 205 postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of 647 this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq 661 today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

647 capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find
661 in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

635 Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just
663 Ṭahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Ridhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 191[illegible]: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Baṣra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the
635 aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for
661 his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

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[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated 635
secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming 661
C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim 635
Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of 663
ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in
April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the 185
town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless 369
showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew 182
rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their 668
reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be 369
different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

I. TREATY DEADLOCK

648 THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary
Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to
observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the
years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify
optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to
complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds;
it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations.
Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished.
Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function,
and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused
of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased,
with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international
repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome
of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva
which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League.
With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved
normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts.
Its communications by land and air to foreign lands
563 developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the
minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially
unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an
optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of
peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of
619 Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal
resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not
extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous
of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were
less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Meanwhile,
185 the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further
developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a
closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved,
though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was
unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation
questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially
liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines
were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion
of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These
● 439 661 665 progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady 439
diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they 661 ●
correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq 665
public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, 646
all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness. The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate. Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 665
'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925, were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925 until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, suppressed almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—Ḥizb al-Nahdha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new 645*
Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Baṣra aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927. This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927. It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The 665
first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indica- 565
tions, of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscurantist leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman, who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. 647 Progress towards raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards, commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned. 647 661

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter. 692

New administrative units—qadhās and nahiyas—were formed by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years 1929 to 1932. 631

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Advisership to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as 652

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

*645 •661 The formation of a Government under Rash[illegible] 'Āli, in the presence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-I[illegible]hā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Āli began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Ḥikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Ḥaydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muḥammad Zakī al-Baṣri, in Justice.

*645 668 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national co-operation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 lucrative trusteeship of the Qadiri Awqaf. The Shi'i Minister of
648x Education, Ridhā al-Shabibi, resigned in September 1935 and was
replaced by a Shi'i of different type, the lawyer Ṣādiq al-Baṣṣam. Relations with the other Arab States were notably extended by a Treaty with Sa'udi Arabia, exchanges of princely and ministerial visits, and missions received from Syria, the Yaman, and Egypt; and 'Iraqi statesmen, particularly Nuri Sa'id, responding to strong public opinion, took in 1936 jointly with Ibn Sa'ud a leading part in intervening in the long-drawn Palestine Arab strike. Nevertheless, critics in Baghdad were not wanting who called for stronger anti-Zionist action than the telegrams, deputations, and appeals of the Hashimi Ministry; and they recalled that Yasin Pasha in opposition, in 1932 and since, had led an anti-Treaty and anti-British policy very different from his present complacence.

x645 Other gestures of Opposition politicians, embittered by long
665 exclusion from office, were those of horror at the brutality of the
Euphrates tribal suppressions, and disapproval of the recurring use of the Army for police measures. They pointed at the private
[661] fortunes which, mysteriously, certain ministers were said to be
amassing; and they execrated the alleged spy system which was one of the ministerial means of control, and the suppression of newspapers inclined to criticize them. From the left-wing Ahali group a particular dissatisfaction arose. They saw, under Yasin Pasha, no hope of carrying out the reforms which they advocated. Shedding an extremist and in certain cases Communist or near-Communist minority, the group grew with the adhesion of other unemployed politicians. Though never formed as a party, they stood for social reform and land reform on lines which, while excluding class warfare, must yet include some measure of redistribution of wealth, some improvement in the conditions of the working class, and some trespass on feudal and plutocratic privilege. Prominent in the movement were Ja'far abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi (a young half-brother of Ra'uf), Yusif 'Izz al-Din a financial expert of Kurdish descent, and a half-dozen of English- or American-educated intellectuals. Government lack of sympathy with their efforts, and the arrest of their less discreet members, led them finally to oppose the régime with a bitterness which would accept allies from any source.

665 No statesman felt more impatiently his exclusion from power
than Ḥikmat Sulayman. Of excellent ability and generally popular,
668 he assessed shrewdly the strength of the various anti-Hashimi
forces, and admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics, which country he revisited in 1935. In Baghdad he was allied with the left wing, and resentful at newspaper suppressions which affected him personally; and he placed himself increasingly in con-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of 668 political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest against the Baṣra concession, others—Rashid 'Āli and Ḥikmat Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an out- [656 break of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with 661] justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number of their more violent opponents. These included officers known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Āli led to his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri, and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms, occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement. Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained, Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties, and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter 600 to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The
Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began
466 to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women
workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation
for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the
Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment
of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers
from British military employment was already creating unemploy-
467 ment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including
those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers,
and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers
whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce.
Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and
468 conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers,
whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways,
and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which
demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance
system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in
April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike
and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the
organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with
little regard to their actual grievances.

635 An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its
dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā
Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on
local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local
development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code
was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad
spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a
number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to
recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical,
medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would
● [661] call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate
corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945
701 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of
inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in
aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not
without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in
standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions
was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent,
began in fact again to approach a condition in which active opera-
625 tions could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have
lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards,
the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

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619 were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of
668 the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely
kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in
Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan,
where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able
to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for
the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a
precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the
[468] Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by
politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq
Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and
conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It
was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the
interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had
led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to
blame the Company itself.

668 In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by
the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy
● 661 of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made
after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some
3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal
from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question.
In August and September more papers were suppressed for
inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was
declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were
sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker*
×645 was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps,
which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly
to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between
the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to
power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification
of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry,
approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little
favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan
(at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such
gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition
of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the
Panjwin earthquake victims.

•645 In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy
was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status
648 which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the
Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946,
and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a
conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views';
and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

x645 with the promise of full freedom of choice. But his hopes of securing a strong Chamber and satisfied parties by inviting their co-
665 operation were but partially gratified; the Liberals and National
Democrats, invited to name representatives for Cabinet posts, did
so in the persons of 'Ali Mumtaz at the Ministry of Works and
Muḥammad Ḥadid at that of Supply; but both these and two Shi'i
ministers, Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Education,
resigned their offices in the following month to devote themselves
to an election campaign. Most of the parties, including Ṣaliḥ Jabr's
parliamentary Political Bloc, took part and one, the unauthorized
National Liberation Party, was the cause of a scuffle with the police
at Kadhimiya. The Cabinet was, with consequent changes, reformed to include 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi at Works, 'Abd al-Ilah
Ḥafidh at Supply and temporarily at Finance, Shakir al-Wadi
(reputed to be in the close confidence of the Regent) at Defence,
Babā 'Ali at Economics, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab at Social Affairs
and for a time at Education, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, and
'Umar Nadhmi at Justice.

665 The conduct of the elections, which began in February, did not
prevent Nuri Pasha from locating hotbeds of Communism and
661 claiming by his arrests and searches to have suppressed them. The
followers of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh were involved, and
from these or other groups such leaders as Ibrahim Naji Shummal,
Zaki Muḥammad Baṣim, and two score of their associates were
arrested. With the exposure of the Communist cells in every liwā,
the Premier could hope that a fatal blow had been dealt to the
movement; but gratitude for this did little to diminish the fury of
press attacks on himself and on targets provided by the British,
notably Reuter's Agency and local branches of the British Council.

646 The Chamber of Deputies which, amid the usual outcries against
'Government interference', emerged from the elections, showed a
665 large majority of independent members or supporters of Nuri and
of Ṣaliḥ Jabr. The National Democratic Party secured five seats,
x645 the other parties none. When Parliament opened Nuri, who had
accepted the premiership on this understanding, now made way
for Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and was ready to support a Ministry led by him—
the first to be formed under a Shi'i Premier. Ṣaliḥ reserved for
himself the Ministry of the Interior and relied upon experienced
colleagues in the other appointments: he retained Jamali, Shakir
al-Wadi, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh, and Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab in their
former posts, and brought Jamal Baban to Justice and temporarily
to Economics, Ghanima to Finance, the Kurdish scholar Tawfiq
Wahbi to Education, the Shi'i Dhiyā' Ja'far—a Birmingham
graduate in oil engineering—to Works. The Opposition, itself
fragmentary, was formed mainly by the five parties not represented

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648x the Prime Minister and the Regent both visited London during the year. The objectives of all politicians (save only the vehement minority who would break every form of British connexion) were the removal of all limitation to their independence and free choice, the end of all treatment of the country as a junior partner, and the abolition of provisions which, offensively to their *amour propre*, left Ḥabbaniya and Shu'ayba as British cantonments in the heart of 'Iraq. The early negotiations with the British Ambassador appeared to run smoothly, and the Ministry could hope that early 1948 would see a happy solution. Newspaper attacks on Great Britain, unhelpful in these circumstances, were as ever the commonplace of every journalist, and were suspended only in part and temporarily in the summer of 1947, when a party of 'Iraqi editors visited London.

647 In the two years following the armistice most of the remaining British officials of the Administration—a tiny remnant of the body so active and so hopeful in 1919–20—left 'Iraq. Edmonds had retired in 1945, succeeded in Interior by A. H. Ditchburn. In 1946 Drower of Justice, Sinderson of the Medical Services, Atkinson of Irrigation, Caparn of Communications and Works, H. I. Lloyd of the Date Board, and Grice of Interior were among the losses sustained by the Government. They were followed next year by Swan of Finance, Seton Lloyd of Antiquities, and Chadwick of the Veterinary Department.

x645 665 661 It was regrettable that Ṣaliḥ Jabr's best-meaning of Governments was compelled, like its predecessors, to take steps against press and party agitation which passed all reasonable limits. Its Palestine policy was more than correct, its moves towards Treaty revision active and popular; but this was not enough. Exclusion from power and sheer hatred of the 'old gang'—and of the British allegedly behind them—still led the parties to frenzies of anti-Government zeal. A newspaper was suppressed in April, and two more in June. Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim were charged with sedition. The premises of the People's Party were seized and 'Aziz Sharif arrested, but released. Trials of Communists detained under the last Sa'idi Ministry, some months ago, led to a score of long sentences of imprisonment and to death sentences[1] on Yusif Salman, Zaki Baṣim, and Naji Shummal for inciting troops and police against the State; these were later commuted to long terms of imprisonment. Baghdad bookshops were raided and the premises of the more extreme parties searched.

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[1] The *Daily Worker*'s later (17 February 1949) description of the 'Iraq Government was that of a 'corrupt and murderous puppet of British imperialism'; *L'Humanité* (8 February 1949) attributed 'Iraq's anti-Communist steps to 'the Anglo-American millionaires who are preparing war'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed 645*
in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was 665
notorious that the strike in the Port of Baṣra during the summer 661 ●
had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but
vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist
League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 186
1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine
Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i
circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in
Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed
Zionism, backed by American money and competing political
interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all
others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other
foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment
as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and
cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of
anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn 000
of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no
agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan'
which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American
Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally
rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain
to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured
Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and
pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General
Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from
Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision
in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab
areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab
and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be
established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, 668
a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some 665
sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious
Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent
and potential violence which were actually present and
were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December [731]
the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were
approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks.
Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present
discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous
political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western,
narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less
powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Regent, himself indefatigable in touring the country and 645x visiting the Army and the Arab capitals, called upon Nuri Sa'id to form a new Ministry. He did so on the same day by retaining four of the outgoing ministers—Kubba at Justice, Rawi at Education, Jalal Baban at Works, Shakir at Defence—and by bringing Bahā al-Din Nuri to Social Affairs, Ḍhiya' Ja'far to Economics, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Foreign Affairs. He retained Interior himself, and asked Jalal Baban to act temporarily in Finance until Khalil Isma'il reassumed the post.

Mainly through lack of mutual confidence between the Premier, some of the ministers, and the Throne, the ministerial history of 1949 was troubled in spite of improved leadership. The Cabinet, initially weak, was little strengthened by changes made two months later when 'Umar Nadhmi entered the Cabinet as Deputy Premier, Faḍhil Jamali came from Cairo to Foreign Affairs on the appointment of 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to direct the National Bank, and Tawfiq al-Na'ib, a former judge and Mutaṣarrif and a supporter of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, became Minister of the Interior. The Prime Minister hoped at midsummer to secure further strength in support of a Ministry which its own dissensions were destroying. He consulted Jamil al-Madfa'i, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and 'Ali Mumtaz, of whom the last two were expected to join him; but agreement on the appointments was not forthcoming and the Cabinet barely survived into the winter of 1949–50. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior, not being deputies, were forced under the Constitution to resign office after six months, and their places were taken in September by Shakir and 'Umar Nadhmi.

Taking advantage of the partial lull in party activity while only 655 the Independence Party was in full operation, Nuri Pasha decided late in the year to found his own party, that of Constitutional Union. With an unexceptional programme of Arab brotherhood, friendship to all nations, anti-Communism, Treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at home and abroad, the party was composed of various elements of conservatism and vested interest, tribal and urban, and found cohesion in a common devotion to Nuri himself—as long as he remained powerful; and, taking its place as by far the largest and most amenable of the parties, it could not but dominate the Chamber as long as it held together. It was joined by an imposing array of ex-ministers and *ministrables*.

The last act of the Pachachi Ministry had been to arrange yet 668 another drive against the Communists, and the first of the Sa'idi 661 Cabinet was to continue it. Some hundreds of arrests were made, and led to scores of severe sentences for sedition and treason. Four notorious Communists—Yusif Salman, Yahuda Ṣadiq, Zaki Baṣim, and Ḥusayn Muḥammad Shabibi (a Christian, a Jew, and two

668 Muslims) were condemned to death and, this time, executed amid
661 the angry protests of the world's Communist press; another suffered the same fate in May. The Central Committee and records of the Communist Party were, it was claimed, located and disrupted, and the Government were satisfied that the back of the movement was at last broken. Lesser offenders against the State—or, as the malicious murmured, against the Prime Minister—received varying sentences. Kamil al-Chadirchi was sent to prison for four months. Demonstrations on the anniversary of the Portsmouth Treaty were strictly controlled, but led nevertheless to some rioting and many arrests. The procedures of martial law worked with less friction during the year, but Nuri felt still unable, in such times, to restore a normal régime. In spite of alarming rumours in the spring the return of Mullā Muṣṭafā from Russia and his expected invasion of 'Iraq were still delayed.

6481 Relations with Great Britain, which in 1948 had deteriorated more over Palestine than over the Treaty issue, and most of all over the British refusal to provide arms, improved in 1949 with a less Anglophobe Ministry and with the resumption of the supply of modern weapons to the Army as soon as it had left Palestine. Visits to London were paid by the Regent, the Prime Minister, and ministers during the year, loans were gladly received and British experts recruited; but it remained inconceivable that any younger politician, or indeed any party except the Prime Minister's, should not, by conviction or mere habit or 'patriotic' duty, blame Great Britain for all the evils of the State.

652 If a substantial reassertion of Government authority was one of the Pasha's achievements in his tenth premiership, he was able also to prevent further financial deterioration. The rate of annual deficit was checked, borrowing for current needs was avoided, and after a precarious year the latter months of 1949 showed less anxious prospects. A budget for 1949–50, balancing at ID 25 million of revenue and expenditure, was produced without excessive delay and provided for enhanced Customs revenues and for some economies in administration. Proposals made for higher taxation or for greater retrenchment were, for political reasons, not pursued, and the trade and economic position, in spite of a good 1949 harvest which permitted the resumption of grain exports, remained unfavourable; but military expenditure on account of Palestine ended in July, and help was forthcoming from the sale of Government stores and from oil royalties received in advance. The promise of loans from London and from the International Bank for development purposes was obtained by negotiations in Europe in the summer of 1949, and an advance of £3 million from the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was offered conditionally upon the

646 where the electoral body is not so amenable to control as else-
666 where, the confidential orders of the Government to the provincial officials proved sufficient to secure the election of its candidates whether they were residents of the district or even known there. Thus in 1925, all but four of the government candidates were returned, two of these being from Baghdad *Liwā*.[1] In 1928 the deputies returned from Basra, 'Amāra, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla and 'Arbīl *Liwās* were government nominees.[2] Of the thirteen Baghdad deputies, all but five were Government candidates. In these two elections, as well as in that of 1930, a number of Opposition candidates were conscientiously included by the Government on the principle advocated by the King that talented members of the Opposition would raise more difficulties outside Parliament from feelings of personal dissatisfaction than if they were actually members. Thus in 1928, half of the twenty-two Opposition members returned to the Chamber had been previously given the government coupon.

646 The deputies, on the other hand, by their proneness to con-
661 sider parliamentary office as a means to personal aggrandisement, persistently refused the opportunity to win the respect and confidence of the nation. In 1925, it had been somewhat difficult to secure candidates to come forward. It soon became apparent, however, that deputyship meant an assured income and, even more attractive, the exercise of influence. In 'Iraq, as in other countries, the principal value attached to official position has been its effectiveness in securing official favours and financial gain.

646 Examination of the statute books of 'Iraq, not only from 1925
661 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the
656 deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, June 10th, 1925. These four, with five others, were, according to a confidential report of the time, accounted to be 'unsatisfactory from the British standpoint'.

[2] Cf. *Baghdad Times*, May 10th, 1928.

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revenue[1] and of other financial legislation,[2] while passed by the 646 Chamber for the benefit of 'Iraq as a whole, particularly after 661 the agricultural crisis of 1931, have especially favoured the 656 land-owning class which has been predominant in Parliament. Other evidence seems to point to the exercise by the deputies of their influence outside of Parliament, either to secure preferential treatment from revenue officials or to obtain appointments for their protégés.

In spite of these deficiencies, Parliament, judged by its com- 646 plete record before 1932 as well as afterwards, has filled an important function in the political life of 'Iraq. It has attracted the most agile brains in the country; it has reflected although imperfectly, public opinion; and it has served as a brake on legislation which might otherwise have been forced on the country more quickly than it could be assimilated. It has served to curb the attempts of individual Ministers to assume a dictatorial attitude. Its right of interrogation, while sometimes checking the initiative of Ministers, has also served to reveal irregularities in administration. It has, moreover, furnished an outlet for Shī'a aspirations for participation in the Government and has given tribal opinion a limited means of expression through the tribal representatives, although discontent with the number of tribal representatives and the manner of their election was given by the leaders of the tribal revolt of 1935 as one of the primary reasons for that rising.[3]

The Chamber, together with the conservative Senate of twenty appointed notables, has, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, laid the foundations upon which democratic government, if it is to come to 'Iraq, must be built. If Parliament were to be given a broader base of an enlightened electorate, a reasonable degree of freedom of election, leadership and new one hand, to recognition of the long existing necessity of 651 lightening the burdens on agricultural produce, and, on the other, to the fall in world prices. The former argument might be more effective if the principal benefit of the reduction of land-revenue had been widespread and not restricted thus far to the comparatively few large landowners. The fall in world prices did no doubt cause a tremendous decrease in land-revenue but the decrease has been out of all proportion to the fall in prices. It must be observed also that no proportionate decrease occurred in the animal head-tax although the price of animals fell as sharply in 1930 as that of agricultural produce. Thus, while *koda* produced 5.2 per cent of the total receipts in 1921, it produced 7 per cent in 1928 and 6.2 per cent in 1931. The comparatively steady returns are hardly explained by increasing efficiency in collections and by increase in flocks but rather by the fact that most of the animals were owned by tribes whose voices counted for little in official circles.

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[1] Particularly Laws: No. 38 of 1927; No. 55 of 1929; Nos. 38, 43, 69 of 1931; Nos. 1, 5, 10, 34, 35 of 1932; Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 of 1933.

[2] Particularly Pump Law of February 13th, 1926; No. 72 of 1926; No. 38 of 1929; No. 37 of 1930; No. 66 of 1931, etc.

[3] *Near East and India*, June 27th, 1935; also *The Times*, August 5th, 1936.

Less tangible evidence seems to exist for the success of the 651 attempts to eradicate corruption from revenue assessment and 661 collection and from financial administration than for any other aspect of administrative activity, although every British official in the Ministry of Finance has striven for that end. The existence of dishonesty and of jobbery for financial favours, which seems to have increased from 1929-30 onwards, has been one of the most unsatisfactory features of administrative life, as most 'Iraqis admit. The tendency has been to lay the blame upon Turkish ex-officials and upon practices inherited from Turkish days, but the evil seems to be too prevalent to be thus accounted for. The true explanation seems to lie in the fact that public spirit has not yet been able to rise above the natural desire to avoid taxation, no less strong in 'Iraq than in other countries. The attitude of Parliament to personal aggrandisement 661 at the expense of national interests has already been indicated. Even Ministers have been known to take advantage

661 of their position for their personal profit.[1] Lesser officials have too often followed the example of their superiors. Attempts have been made to impose checks, as by the auditing of government accounts by a British Comptroller and Auditor General responsible only to the Chamber of Deputies. This official has performed his task ably and efficiently,[2] but the results of his work have not been as extensive as might have been expected, due to the reluctance of Parliament to take action, particularly against highly placed or influential officials.

Justice

Two distinct tasks have fallen to the Minister of Justice in 'Iraq: the organization and the administrative supervision of the courts and the drafting and codifying of legislation not only for the assurance of public justice but also for the regulation and development of other administrative services.

692 In the period 1925 to 1932, the number of Civil Courts was extended until they were in operation in varying degrees at forty-eight centres. Criminal Justice continued to be administered by the Civil Judges of these courts and also, in certain cases, by Administrative Inspectors and other senior officials. *Shara'* or Muslim Religious Law Courts continued to be established, not only in all centres where Civil Courts were provided but also in other places. Spiritual Courts to enable the Jewish and Christian communities to deal with their own religious law were set up in 1931,[3] in accordance with Articles 78-80 and 112 of the Constitution.

In the creation and administration of the *Shara'* Courts, including those established for the Shī'a sect, a tendency has been noticed to assimilate them with the Civil Courts in order

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[1] An outstanding instance has been the passage of legislation, remitting revenue on lands irrigated by pumps, by a Minister of Finance, who, as one of the largest owners of such lands, saved himself £3000 in taxes annually.

[2] *Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on Accounts of the Government of 'Iraq*: 1922 . . . (Baghdad, 1924 . . .).

[3] *Compilation*, 1931, Armenian Orthodox Community Law, No. 70 of 1931: Jewish Community Law, No. 77 of 1931.

654ˣ 647 irrigation works among agricultural officials in the Ministry of Economics, the Irrigation Department of the Ministry of Public Works and health officials in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The efficiency of civil servants seems to have declined since before the war. Certainly the increase in the number of government employees (excluding police) from about 11,000 before the war to almost 20,000 in 1950 has been considerably out of proportion to the expansion in the government's functions. Many government offices appear to be overstaffed, while others cannot obtain extra personnel for essential increases in services. Officials are frequently shifted from one position to another without regard for their qualifications and experience. Often government officials both in the provinces and in the capital do not enjoy sufficient continuity in office to enable them to become really useful. Promotion appears to be based almost entirely on seniority and other considerations rather than on merit. The morale among government servants is generally low.

647 465 The two most important factors contributing to inefficiency and morale are probably the low level of government salaries and the lack of any sense of real participation in constructive work. Since before the war salaries and allowances have risen only 20 percent for high government officials and 160 percent for the lowest paid officials, while the official cost-of-living index has increased by about 400 percent. To some extent, however, there has been an increase in salaries through shifts to higher grades, so that, judging from comparative total disbursements of salaries and allowances, it may be concluded that average salaries have risen by about 130 percent since before the war.[7] Nevertheless, salaries, particularly of officials in the higher classes of the civil service, are very
•[41] inadequate. The probity of officials is thus put to a severe test and to the extent that some successfully utilize their positions as opportunities for personal gain, the morale of others suffers. Moreover, many civil servants are compelled to supplement their salaries by engaging in business or accepting other employment with resulting neglect of their official duties.

654ˣ 647 The lack of a real sense of participation in constructive tasks is conspicuous in the civil service. The Mission found a wide-

along the banks of main and secondary canals although roads 3/2 greatly facilitate inspection and maintenance. The facing of the canals adjoining the control structures is often too short for effective protection of both the canals and the control works. The turbulent water coming up against the earthen embankments may then undermine the embankments or even the control structures themselves. Brick, which lacks adequate resistance to shock and erosion, has sometimes been used as a construction material where concrete or precast concrete blocks would have been definitely preferable. In the future, it might also be desirable to try gabions of iron-wire net, weighted with stones and coarse gravel, in facing canals. These have given excellent and cheap protection against erosion in some countries.

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[7] Total disbursements of ID 14,700,000 on salaries and allowances in 1949-50 compared with a sum of about ID 3,500,000 before the war.

Maintenance is also made more costly by failure to provide originally enough canal crossings for livestock and people, as well as places for washing and drinking. Under such conditions canal banks inevitably deteriorate with resulting leaks and the creation of pools of stagnant water. Crossings, which for the most part can be very simple in construction, should be installed near the villages and at points frequented by cattle. Paved fords will generally be best for cattle since they will provide facilities for drinking at the same time. There is also a need to regulate road crossings of small canals and ditches. Such crossings, which are built by the landowners, are often too short and constructed so poorly that considerable water escapes and the approaches to the crossings are reduced to quagmires.

The operation of the irrigation systems, involving the delivery of water to the actual users, could be considerably improved. Fair distribution is undoubtedly made difficult by chronic shortages of water. Whenever water is short, its distribution tends to be hotly disputed. Under such circumstances the influential landowner is [661] often successful in bringing pressure to bear on the poorly-paid irrigation official who is in charge of distribution. Sometimes landowners resort to more direct action by building temporary dams across canals in order to divert more water to their land. Equitable 3/2 distribution is also impeded by old water rights which are attached 423 to individual land parcels, particularly in the Diyala River Valley, and are transferred with such property. They often confer a right

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When, in 1945, with the formation of the Arab League, the 661 563

Palestine question became a vital—if not the only—foundation of common purpose in the Arab national movement, the Jewish minority in Iraq inevitably came to be identified with what the feverish minds of the populace had come to regard as a menace to Arab aspirations. Even before the United Nations voted in favour of the establishment of a Jewish State, Jews in Iraq were being accused of the most fantastic crimes and subjected to many restrictions.

In May, 1947, for instance, an Arab newspaper alleged, in spite of an official police denial, that a Jew had given poisoned sweets to an Arab child. In December of the same year another Jew was arrested on suspicion of having placed a tube containing cholera germs in a stream (*Daily Telegraph*, December 29, 1947). From the beginning of 1947 Jews were not allowed to leave the country unless they gave the Government a guarantee in the form of a £2,000 deposit. In the summer of 1947 Muhammad Fadhil Bey al-Jamali, then Iraqi Foreign Minister, stated bluntly to the United Nations Committee on Palestine that "the fate of the Jews in Muslim countries depends on developments in Palestine." The threat materialised when Iraqi troops joined in the invasion of Palestine.

The State of Emergency, which was then declared, was used as a *carte blanche* for all kinds of anti-Jewish measures, largely at the hands of the apparatus of State. Sentences without appeal were passed by courts martial, thus avoiding the necessity of introducing special legislation which might have had to be explained and justified later. As much was openly admitted by the Prime Minister, al-Pachachi Pasha, when he reassured some members of the Opposition (who had expressed their fear of the possible misuse of the Government's emergency powers) that these measures would be applied to Jews only.

The sole attempt to provide the Government with a legal basis for its anti-Jewish policy was an amendment to Article 51 of the Criminal Code. The first paragraph of this amendment enumerates those doctrines whose propagation is punishable in Iraq. In August, 1948, the crime of "Zionism" was added to the list. In fact, however, this legal gesture was quite superfluous, as the system of discrimination against the Jews had long been perfected. The sum of £2,000 deposit, guaranteeing the return of Jews wishing to go abroad, was increased to £3,000 on May 15, 1948; and even then an exit permit, granted only in exceptional cases, was necessary.

Many Jewish officials were arbitrarily dismissed from their posts in the public service, though some of the more senior among them were given the privilege of being either retired on pension or simply suspended from their duties. Even in the prevalent atmosphere of excitement the absurdity of these dismissals was felt. A case in point is that of Ibrahim al-Kebir, the Jewish Controller-General of the Treasury, who was retired on pension only a fortnight after he had been sent to London to negotiate a new financial agreement between Britain and Iraq.

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Finally, following the Israeli victories in Palestine, the Government vented its spleen on the Jews of Iraq by issuing, in October, 1948, a circular instructing all Government departments to dismiss their Jewish employees. In this way most of the Jewish public servants were got rid of without notice, pension, or compensation. Only a small number remained.

It must be said that most reports published in the West about the requisitioning of Jewish buildings in Iraq have been greatly exaggerated. Only two Jewish club-houses were taken over for more than a short time, to be used as shelter for Arab refugees from Palestine. All other requisitioned buildings were eventually returned to their owners.

So far as can be ascertained, the only other anti-Jewish measure taken by the Iraqi Government openly is a decree issued on July 17, 1948, by the Iraqi Minister of Defence, Sadiq al-Bassam Pasha, whereby all Jewish-owned banks were forbidden to have any transactions with foreign countries.

So long as legislative anti-Jewish steps were on a comparatively restricted scale, the campaign was left to the police and to military courts. This gave an opportunity to narrow-minded officials and officers to vent their spite on the Jewish community. Police searches of Jewish houses, denunciations, arrests, the application of brutal "third degree" methods to those accused of "Zionist activities" or "endangering the security of the State" were the order of the day. Old letters containing a reference to Palestine, and even the mere mention of that country's name in conversation, were liable to lead to arrest. In one case, a map of the Holy Land attached to a Bible was taken as evidence of "Zionist affiliations."

It goes without saying that these police raids presented a tempting opportunity for blackmail; and not a few officials made good use of it.

On the other hand, this also must be said: thanks to the Government's ban on demonstrations, there were no mob onslaughts on Jewish property. The only evidence of lawless disorder is provided by the practice of small groups of Muslims which, under the pretext of collecting funds for the Palestinian Arab refugees, went from one Jewish shop or house to another, robbing the intimidated and unresisting owners.

But these incidents were insignificant compared with the large-scale campaign of financial extortion carried on by the Government itself. The careful use of trials by court martial provided the authorities with an excellent cloak under which they were able to squeeze the wealthy elements of the Jewish minority as a source of funds wherewith to cover the heavy cost of military adventure in Palestine, an adventure made all the more costly by the fact that it was undertaken at a time when the country's long-standing financial difficulties were particularly acute.

Even a cursory glance at the list of trials is sufficient to make two

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things stand out clearly: first, the absurd vagueness of the indictments; and, second, the Government's determination to make the best possible financial use of the proceedings.

In many cases, the Iraqi press, reporting these trials, did not even find it necessary to state the nature of the crimes of which the accused had been found guilty. Here are two typical examples:

> Hezkiel Zaki has been condemned to two years' imprisonment and fined 500 dinars. (*Al-Shaab*, February 7, 1949.) (1 dinar=£1 sterling.)
>
> Sadik Nahum has been found a danger to the security of the State and fined 3,000 dinars as a guarantee of good conduct (*Liwa al-Istiqlal*, March 14, 1949.)

When mention was made of alleged "offences," their nature is revealing of the prevailing state of affairs. One man was condemned for having made some remarks "against the honour of the army." An accused group were found guilty of having "shown sympathy with the Zionists. . . ." The fact that in many cases the expressions "Zionism" and "Communism" were made to mean the same thing is symptomatic of the flimsiness of these charges.

It is difficult to establish the exact number of cases in which Jews were accused of "Zionist activities" or "Zionist sympathies." In many instances the courts martial had before them Muslims and Christians as well as Jews, jointly charged with "Communist activities." But wherever a Jew was concerned, the sentence invariably included a heavy fine. In the light of this, there can be no doubt that the main duty of the courts martial was to obtain funds for the empty Treasury.

The following are a few examples of typical cases:

> The court martial rules that Shaul Yahya must deposit a guarantee of 200 dinars as it is alleged that he has committed acts which have disturbed public order. (*Saut al-Ahrar*, December 19, 1948.)
>
> R. Sassoon Ghazale and Nissim Rahim must pay 500 dinars guarantee for their good conduct and the maintenance of order, as it is alleged that Nissim Rahim has received a letter from his aunt, Therese Rahim, who is now in Palestine. (*Al-Shaab*, December 30, 1948.)
>
> It is ruled that Ezra Hezkiel and Murad Abraham must each pay 1,000 dinars as a guarantee that they will observe good conduct. (*Al-Shaab*, January 6, 1949.)

And there were many similar cases. The almost invariable stipulation that these fines should be paid to the Ministry of Defence leaves no doubt as to the purpose for which the money was used.

The most vivid example, both of vague indictment and of the Government's financial greed, was the case of the Jewish multimillionaire, Shafiq Ades, of Basra (the only one of the accused, by the way, who was sentenced to death and hanged in public).

Although his trial was reported and discussed in detail by all the newspapers, it was never clearly established whether there was any connection between his sale of surplus British military equipment to

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Italy in 1946 and the alleged discovery of the same material in Palestine two years later. The proceedings were held mostly behind closed doors, and the court went so far as to refuse the defence counsel admission to the courtroom. Among many other curious details in this trial, this extremely wealthy capitalist was accused both of "Communism" and "Zionism"! The point to note is that Ades's sentence enriched the Government's treasury by £5,000,000.

The day of his execution was turned into a festival. It was declared a public holiday; thousands of people flooded into Basra from the countryside, and photographs depicting every detail of the hanging appeared in all the newspapers.

There is little doubt that the majority of contributions towards the fund raised for the prosecution of the Palestine campaign and, later, for the assistance of Arab refugees, came from Jews. During May and June, 1948, Baghdad radio broadcast a long list of Jewish names and their contributions. According to reliable estimates, these total about 500,000 dinars.

Over and above the swelling of the Iraqi war-chest, most of the methods adopted in the anti-Jewish campaign suggest that generally the Government, with popular support, was actively engaged in extorting as much money as it could from the Jewish community.

Early in July, 1948, for instance, 40 leading Jewish business men were arrested on a charge of trading with the Soviet Union and thus allegedly supporting a Communist régime. It so happens that many Muslim commercial firms had engaged in similar transactions, many of which had taken place several years before. It also happens that these transactions were the direct result of the Soviet-Iraqi trade agreement. But in the case of the 40 Jews these factors were quietly ignored. The true motives for their being charged became quite obvious when it was learnt that all 40 were released on payment of various sums of up to 10,000 dinars.

In October of the same year the Treasury issued an order to the effect that all Iraqi Jews living abroad would forfeit their property unless they returned to Iraq at once.

The total sum which the Government obtained by means of fines, confiscations, "guarantees," and forfeiture of property was certainly a substantial proportion of Jewish-owned wealth in Iraq. It may be computed at something well over £10,000,000. This official draining of Jewish resources, moreover, was accompanied by a great deal of private blackmail, made possible by the helplessness of the victims.

To a Western observer this record might appear proof of systematic persecution. The thinly disguised extortions from the Jewish community, the arbitrary, and often stupid accusations, the onslaught on a helpless minority whose loyalty could not reasonably be questioned —all this would appear at first glance as something more than an attempt to make certain of public security in an emergency; the record seems to bear all the signs of deeply-rooted anti-Jewish hostility. But

65: Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 ~~Middle East~~

Iraq MH1

if that were true, how would it be possible to explain the excellence of 661 the relations between the communities but a few years ago and the 563 obvious recognition in former years of the Jewish population as an integral part of the nation?

The answer must be sought in the workings of the Eastern mind. There would be no room in a survey of this kind to attempt a description of the subtle blend of human passions, age-old habits, and deep-seated prejudices which have gone into the forging of the Oriental tradition of thought or to estimate how that tradition of thought has reacted to the impact of Western civilisation, with its conception of law and human rights. It is, however, necessary to draw attention to certain points.

To begin with, the Arab States which emerged from the First 186 World War represented an attempt to create the whole fabric of the Western nation-state out of a galaxy of various semi-independent tribes, self-conscious and self-centred city populations, rival clans, powerful landowners, interspersed with minorities of different races and religions. This complex had no common tradition beyond the allegiance of the majority to Islam.

The consequence was that from the beginning the Arab States rested on social foundations of the most insecure kind. Symptoms of this have been a very characteristic shrill aggressiveness of national outlook and an almost comic attachment to national dignity, coupled with an exaggerated anxiety lest the State's new-found independence should be threatened in any way or its sovereignty infringed.

In the case of Iraq, no sooner had the new State come into existence than this excessive national sensitiveness resulted in a wave of feeling against its very creator and helper—Britain. And when King Faisal, whose great ability and authority had succeeded in surmounting many initial difficulties, died just at the end of the mandatory period (1933), the struggle for key positions in the Government was intensified, thereby adding a new element of insecurity.

Rival tribal chieftains, with their dependants and hangers-on, began competing with each other for the favours of extremist parties, and contributed to making every change of Government an event of greater or lesser violence. Rashid Ali's *coup d'état* in April, 1941, was merely one of a series of such changes; it was only the most striking because of its dangerous political and strategic implications in the middle of a world war.

This ever-present latent tension was aggravated by the inability of succeeding Governments to cope with urgent problems of social reform, agricultural development, finance, and administration. As early as 1942, the budget showed a deficit of £1,334,733, despite the big royalties paid to the Government by the oil companies for the exploitation of the oilfields. During the first six months of 1948, imports exceeded exports by £17,000,000, while the country's whole foreign trade amounted to only £27,000,000. Hence the prevailing nervousness

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

565 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims
647 or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan,
every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate,
661 persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit,
uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt
and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body
politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator.
Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit
alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected.
The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary
Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all
times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs,
qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units
corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill
conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of
new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all,
four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer
qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first,
second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population,
and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others
wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than
nominal. Walis and Mutasarrifs were appointed by imperial
decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent
662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue
and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads
of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs.
The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands.
He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied
settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the
Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land
[623] revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an
Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of
elected members who included Christian and Jewish
625 representatives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the
Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This
force, organized and commanded on military lines, was
administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local
Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt
and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even
domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor
631 hardihood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendiles -- Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions.
181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradi-
665 tion of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free
204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations' in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe. The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in
646 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the
666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions, that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of
662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

bility, for some other power to intervene with decision; a part 642
which, in the event, was to be that of the Army. 662 ●

It may be asked, would a frankly authoritarian government— 000
dictatorship, acknowledged oligarchy or mere Arab patriarchy—have been preferable? It would in all likelihood have been still less acceptable to its public than the pseudo-democracy actually imposed; the procedures of democracy, however ill conducted, were at least educative and might later show a narrowing gulf between form and spirit. Even a semi-nominated Chamber contained enough of intelligence, experience, and public spirit to be a valuable deliberative and critical body; politics and press at least provided an arena of action for the intelligentsia, whose suppression would be dangerous as well as improper. The only alternative to 'democracy' might well prove to be a tyranny oppressive within and, by its probable international adhesions, dangerous without. 'Iraqi political history for the ten years following its achievement of independence was to be one of the alternation in short cycles of the imposition and the relaxation of authority: the former accompanied by protests and violent intrigues against 'slavery', the latter always abused by licence turning to anarchy.

There was reference above to a ruling class. In fact, claimants 665
to leadership were more than one, and their claims if permitted 184
could be scarcely consistent with a democratic régime. In tribal society the position of the shaykhs, with all their intestine rivalries and schisms, was still unchallenged though no longer State-sponsored. Among the Shi'i population, and especially among the tribes of the Euphrates, the influence of the 'Ulamā was still considerable and rarely exercised in the direction favoured by Government. Officialdom, an alternative source of leadership and itself a main social element, was now broadened by full admission of the Shi'is, and its standard of education, conduct, and efficiency had risen markedly since Turkish times; but nothing in its position or allegiances could lead it to a sense of solidarity with the masses. The same is true of the non-official part of that important middle class whose upper edges touched the ministerial, the lower the proletariat class, and which included the lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shop-keepers, commercial employees, higher technicians, middlemen, and ex-officers. Extending from bare literacy to some learned pretensions, the class was self-conscious as the evolved and progressive element in their country; but it was frustrated by lack of active outlets in public life and especially by failure to break into the ruling circle. From it were arising, already before 1932, the new politicians and publicists. Not without quick intelligence and shrewdness, and often effective

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

647 capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find
661 in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

635 Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just
• 663 Ṭahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Ridhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 1912: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Baṣra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the
635 aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for
661 his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

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[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated 635
secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming 661
C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim 635
Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of 663
ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the 185
town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless 369
showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew 192
rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their 668
reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be 369
different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

loss. In the 'Iraq Government service, 'Iraqis of goodwill and 647
sometimes of admirable gifts—not unmixed, inevitably, with 663
others of less ability or less integrity—were found to fill the higher
as well as lower positions in provincial and central government.
The body of British officials, mainly advisory but in a few cases
still executive, included some figures of outstanding merit—and
many who offered years, twenty or more, of quiet efficient service
to 'Iraq.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its portfolio held always in the 648x
early period by the Prime Minister himself, was the creation of
Yasin Pasha in 1925. Under the overriding responsibility of
Great Britain to the League for the fulfilment of 'Iraqi international
obligations, the Ministry could have but limited scope. It was at
first represented only in London, and intermittently at Geneva, by
Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari. Foreign Consuls, however, began early to
be posted to Baghdad, where their presence implied recognition
of the 'Iraq State by France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany,
and Greece. The 'Iraq Government as such subscribed to various
international conventions. Persia, though represented in 'Iraq by
a number of Consuls and bound to it by the closest interests,
withheld official recognition of the Kingdom, to the damage of both.

Successive Cabinets up to that of Yasin Pasha in 1924 have been 645*
elsewhere mentioned. Yasin's was a Ministry of all the talents, and
since no alternative programmes backed by parties existed in the
'Iraq politics of the time, it like others must fall or survive by
virtue of its own unanimity and the royal approval, or lack of
these. Its months of power were marked by preoccupation with 652
the politics of the Mosul Question, and by the frustrations of an
empty Treasury. This poverty, the common misfortune of nascent
Governments, was accentuated in the 'Iraq of 1925 by depressed
trade conditions, the loss of part of the date market, the diminished
Persian transit trade, and the bad harvest and low revenue
of the year; and the times called insistently for more, not less,
expenditure. It was necessary to find funds for an Army now under
formation and soon to be called to vital responsibilities: for the
acquisition of assets from the British Government, which itself was
in no mood for munificent gestures: for the service of the Ottoman
Public Debt, of which a substantial fraction devolved upon 'Iraq:
and for public services conceived on a scale reputed the minimum
tolerable, but still far in advance of financial capacity. The
arithmetical impossibilities thus involved led to the advent by invitation
in March 1924 of a financial mission from Whitehall, consisting
of Commander E. Hilton-Young and R. V. Vernon. The
mission studied and reviewed, advocated limited economies, strove
to palliate the resented blow of Public Debt obligations, and

1-[1921-26--Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645 Ministries; Sasun Ḥasqayl was omitted for the first time. A State visit by the King to Karbalā and Najf in December was an outstanding success. The substitution in March 1924 of the name of King Ḥusayn, newly self-styled Caliph, for that of the Sultan of Turkey in the Khuṭba when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished, raised the prestige of the royal family, and was accepted with surprising willingness by Sunni and Shi'i alike.

646, 648x The Constituent Assembly was opened with due ceremonial by the King on 27 March 1924. Under the presidency of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey it proceeded to its first task, ratification of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty and its Protocol. A favourable majority seemed assured, and initially was in fact present; but the atmosphere quickly changed. The 'severity' of some of the Treaty conditions, notably those of the Financial Agreement, was emphasized by Opposition orators, and the whole force of anti-Mandate sentiment was rapidly remobilized. Kurdish deputies for their own reasons withdrew from the proceedings; those of Mosul could think of nothing but the danger threatening their wilaya. The tribal shaykhs, moving in a world wholly strange to them, saw and seized the chance of bargaining their support on the Treaty issue for personal or tribal advantages. The nationalist lawyer-politicians, who soon emerged as the most convinced and active element in the Assembly, launched a campaign first of insistence upon major or indeed basic changes in the Treaty, then of vicious intimidation, and finally of actual violence; two pro-Treaty deputies were severely wounded in the streets, others threatened 664] with death. Deliberately fostered terrorism outside the Assembly building itself reached proportions beyond police control, and necessitated the presence of troops to maintain order.

618x The constant efforts of the High Commissioner were devoted, with little success, to exposition of the basic nature of the Treaty and the facts of 'Iraq's situation. He pointed out Great Britain's accepted obligations to the League, and gave assurances of later modification of the Treaty in 'Iraq's favour. A score of interviews between the High Commissioner, the King, the Prime Minister, ministers, Cornwallis, Yasin Pasha, and Opposition leaders produced no formula which could reconcile the 'Waṭanis' to ratification. Dobbs announced finally that 'Iraqi rejection of the Treaty, such as now appeared inevitable, must with all regret be reported to the League Council at its forthcoming meeting, unless ratification had occurred by 10 June; after that date Great Britain must seek means other than a friendly and generous Treaty to fulfil its mandatory functions. From this and from his refusal to bargain or to consider amendments Sir Henry was immovable. Like every preceding day, 10 June was filled with conclaves, submissions,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

It was succeeded immediately by a diluted Ikhā Ministry under 645* Yasin Pasha, summoned to power this time, on 17 March 1935, without conditions. Destined to rule 'Iraq for twenty months, it included Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ja'far Pasha at Defence, Nuri at Foreign Affairs, two Shi'is—Ra'uf Baḥrani, a former Finance Inspector, at Finance, and Muḥammad Riḍhā al-Shabibi, a figure in the learned and literary world, at Education—and Amin Zaki at Works. There was no representative of the left-wing group (that of the *Ahali* newspaper) under Abu al-Timman; and the omission of Ḥikmat Sulayman, to his keen resentment, was to lead later to serious results.

The tribal situation to which, from Ḥilla to Naṣiriya, the new 619 Ministry had forthwith to address itself, was in large measure 645 significant of the mere anti-Government lawlessness of tribes and 664 of the patriarchal feudalism always preferred by the Shi'i leadership. As such it was a familiar 'Iraqi phenomenon from Ottoman times. But in so far as it had been produced by intrigue from Baghdad and from Najf in support of the 'political' aims of statesmen—themselves but little concerned with tribal or Shi'i advantage—it recalled the similarly evoked anti-British *Thawra* of 1920. Indeed, the history of the Euphrates in 1935 and 1936 reproduces faithfully the episodes of 1920 on a smaller but important scale. It shows again the ease with which the shaykhs were willing to follow, as they followed in 1920, any movement which seemed to offer them personal or tribal advantage—Government-appointed paramountcy in the tribe, a seat in the Chamber, a reopened land dispute, or a grant of rice-lands—with motives of no wider a patriotism than those similarly exploited by the Baghdadis fifteen years earlier.

Yasin Pasha achieved, by an air-dropped Proclamation to the tribes, a substantial immediate pacification. It was followed by visits to Baghdad by the Ikhā-favoured shaykhs. Their car-loads of festive armed followers filled the capital, with the complacent permission of the Minister of the Interior but to the alarm of onlookers. Eager for some immediate gain from their recent 'patriotic' uprisings, they mingled in street and ante-room with the Kurdish deputations from the northern liwās which, organized by the Ikhā to protest against the misdeeds of the Ayubi and Madfa'i Ministries, arrived in time to congratulate their successors. A serious episode at Kadhimiya, in which bloodshed resulted from a clash between police and a crowd demonstrating against the desecration of a graveyard, was without political meaning and could be composed without wider repercussions. The King, whose mother died in March, was acclaimed as father of a son and heir apparent—the later Fayṣal II—on 2 May. Parliament adjourned early in April and general elections were ordered in May.

excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of 668
the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P.[1] committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, [646]
followed four months later by another for the accession of Muḥammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sulṭan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 665
1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable 186
as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and 668
frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

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[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Bey (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Bey: Fu'ad Bey al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1 [Turkish Committee of Union and Progress--analyst]

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', 204
who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Govern- 186
ment, were active in these politics before 1914. 668

Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least 665
enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families 668
of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of 186
Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to indepen- 668
dent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It 186
was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Aḥsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'dham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

a Baṣra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a 645x
Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajj
Ja'far abu al-Timman. This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al- 648x
Timman, accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the
proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the
Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent
Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet 666
approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of 668
electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited,
to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, 186
by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by
a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was
especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating
nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaṣarrif. Conditions
elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were
uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made
by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British)
politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble
was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i 665
political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani 668
(Nationalist) and the Nahdha (Awakening); these were matched by
the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, 648x
Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot'
meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties
and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible
rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded
that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate
in elections. al-Khaliṣi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish
views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence.
The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least
tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their
more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The 668
King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification 648x
with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a
Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government
but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost
infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening.
Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23
August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly
to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime
Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée
itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

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VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

I. TREATY DEADLOCK

648* THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds; it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations. Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands 543 developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of 619 Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Meanwhile, 185 the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These 439 progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi

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economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady 439
diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they 661
correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq 665
public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be
prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and
ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative
Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of
the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, 646
all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with
nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness.
The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate.
Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 565
'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though
it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the
creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died
in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925,
were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular
Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925
until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, sup-
pressed almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued
vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—
Ḥizb al-Nahḏha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did
nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new 545"
Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber
was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in
London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks
later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included
Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf
al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Baṣra
aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki
in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-
Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new
Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927.
This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927.
It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered
by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions
and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little
loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The 665
first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indica- 565
tions, of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of
Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscur-
antist leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals
565 in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical
superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small
minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the
Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now
growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of
mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and
highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was
not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927,
the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni schoolmaster,
began a sequence of events which involved ministerial
intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the
665 Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day,
565 by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for
184 Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened
558 by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the
Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost
exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to
Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for
conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their
representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned,
and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription
was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin
Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i
'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of
Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to
the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the
Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour
in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent
grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in
Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between
'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now
in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The
latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired
articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as
acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was
questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by
Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously
militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January
1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

702 The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the
668 time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its
claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the
solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect
'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645 648ᴬ [665] a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

665 668 186 The Sunni-Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahdha Party lost support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

*645 'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 and the fullest activity of their press articles, hand-bills, and
668 oratory, did not hesitate to invoke the authority of the Shi'i
Mujtahids in condemnation of the new Treaty. These, however,
666 declined for once to intervene, except partially at Samarrā, and the
elections were peacefully conducted in the districts; only at Sulaymaniya a major clash between violent demonstrators and the police resulted in bloodshed and the loss of a score of lives. All results were known by the end of October 1930, and showed a sweeping victory of the Government party. The ratification of the Treaty by Parliament, which met as usual on 1 November, could not now be prevented by the fierce denunciations of die-hard patriots; the voting was in favour by 69 against 13 in the Chamber, 11 against 5 in the Senate.

648 But much remained to be done, both in Baghdad and in Geneva.
Parliament sat on, immersed in legislation and in vehement
646 politics, until the midsummer of 1931. The opposition to the
Sa'idi Ministry had by that time been reorganized in a grouping more formidable than the isolated Nationalist Party which, thanks to the usual control exercised by the liwā officials, had made so poor
648 a showing in the elections. Political leaders hostile to Nuri and,
with reservations, to the Treaty—Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-
665 Suwaydi, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, and 'Ali Jawdat who had
668 resigned from the Cabinet in September and been succeeded by
Rustum Ḥaydar from the Palace—formed from the Nationalist and the People's Parties and like-thinking elements a Party of National Brotherhood—Ḥizb al-Ikhā al-Waṭani. At its inaugural meeting in March 1931 its objects were stated to include the dissolution of a flagrantly unrepresentative Parliament and the formation of a new Government 'pledged to reconsider the external relations of 'Iraq'. Certain of its members as a gesture thought fit to resign their seats in the Chamber; all resolved to pursue their campaign in the press and country. Nuri Pasha on his side had already formed, from deputies favourable to him, the 'Ahd (Covenant) Party, with an appeal to the great days of al-'Ahd and a programme of Treaty implementation.

Among the first acts of the Ikhā was the organization in July 1931 of a series of strikes in the 'Iraq townships without precedent for their concerted timing and wide extent. They had little object but the embarrassment of Government. The trades' organizations in the bazaars took fright—or were maliciously alarmed—at a clause in the newly passed Municipal Taxation Law which could be read as unfavourable to them. The misunderstanding, which was easily elucidated by Government, was encouraged to persist, and it was not until late in July, after attempts had been made to spread unrest to northern 'Iraq, and disorder in Baṣra and the

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Euphrates towns had led to bloodshed and police intervention, 648x
that the agitation died down: the product, it seemed, of a new and 665
sinister type of 'Iraqi politics. The Brotherhood, successful in this 668
effort, proceeded next (said its enemies) to make what capital it could from the dangerous uneasiness of Kurd–Arab and Assyrian–Kurd relationships.

The attitude of the minorities to the forthcoming emancipation 563
of 'Iraq and withdrawal of British control could not, indeed, be 648x
other than a serious preoccupation of the 'Iraq Government as well as of Great Britain and of the League itself. In Baghdad the privileges claimed by or on behalf of the Kurdish districts, and the future of the Assyrians, were questions the more insistent as the attention of the League was concentrated on these aspects of 'Iraq life. The Government did its best at reassurance by repeated tours of the King and his Ministers in the Kurdish areas, by legislation on the use of the Kurdish language, by promises to honour all pledges given in the past, and by such practical gestures of goodwill as were available; but the whispers of the ill disposed were effective, nevertheless, in increasing the alarm of Kurd and Assyrian alike.

With minor Cabinet changes—the loss of Madfa'i to preside in 645x
the Deputies, and the addition of Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs—and a re-formation in October 1930, the Ministry of Nuri Pasha maintained itself, in spite of Brotherhood intrigues and assaults, from its formation in March 1930 until November 1932. His second Cabinet, which took office on 19 October, brought Naji Shawkat to Interior, Rustum to Finance, Jamal Baban to Justice, Ja'far to Foreign Affairs, Amin Zaki and Chalabi to Works and Education. Little was heard for the moment of Sunni–Shi'i friction, save implicitly in minor disorders: and nothing of the threat or hope of conscription, which the Sa'idi Government wisely postponed until the obligation to listen to High Commissioners was no more. The major interest of the time was, 648x
evidently, that of securing 'Iraq's admission to the League, for which 1932 was the appointed year.

The intention of His Majesty's Government to make this recommendation had been communicated to the League Council in September 1929, and was likely thenceforward to raise questions of procedure for which no precedent existed. The Permanent Mandates Commission, to which annually since 1921 spokesmen of the mandatory Power had presented its Report with full verbal explanations, had never relaxed its interest in 'Iraqi affairs and the British trusteeship. It now scrutinized the 1929 Report for signs of 'Iraq's adequacy or inadequacy for emancipation, closely questioned the British 'accredited representative' at Geneva, and

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642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to
install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly
demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional
forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq
with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that
the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better
alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in
fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions.
181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradition
● 665 of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free
204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations'
in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic
features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill
informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe.
The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any
politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of
personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any
consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of
speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence
or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or
sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed
doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived
society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have
wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and
insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in
646 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the
666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed
electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the
Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of
Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions,
that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of
662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the
stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the
actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on
the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial
posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint
to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes.
The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived
Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of
Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies
capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind
their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative
hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—
that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

bility, for some other power to intervene with decision; a part 642
which, in the event, was to be that of the Army. 662

It may be asked, would a frankly authoritarian government— 000
dictatorship, acknowledged oligarchy or mere Arab patriarchy—have been preferable? It would in all likelihood have been still less acceptable to its public than the pseudo-democracy actually imposed; the procedures of democracy, however ill conducted, were at least educative and might later show a narrowing gulf between form and spirit. Even a semi-nominated Chamber contained enough of intelligence, experience, and public spirit to be a valuable deliberative and critical body; politics and press at least provided an arena of action for the intelligentsia, whose suppression would be dangerous as well as improper. The only alternative to 'democracy' might well prove to be a tyranny oppressive within and, by its probable international adhesions, dangerous without. 'Iraqi political history for the ten years following its achievement of independence was to be one of the alternation in short cycles of the imposition and the relaxation of authority: the former accompanied by protests and violent intrigues against 'slavery', the latter always abused by licence turning to anarchy.

There was reference above to a ruling class. In fact, claimants 665•
to leadership were more than one, and their claims if permitted 184
could be scarcely consistent with a democratic régime. In tribal society the position of the shaykhs, with all their intestine rivalries and schisms, was still unchallenged though no longer State-sponsored. Among the Shi'i population, and especially among the tribes of the Euphrates, the influence of the 'Ulamā was still considerable and rarely exercised in the direction favoured by Government. Officialdom, an alternative source of leadership and itself a main social element, was now broadened by full admission of the Shi'is, and its standard of education, conduct, and efficiency had risen markedly since Turkish times; but nothing in its position or allegiances could lead it to a sense of solidarity with the masses. The same is true of the non-official part of that important middle class whose upper edges touched the ministerial, the lower the proletariat class, and which included the lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shop-keepers, commercial employees, higher technicians, middlemen, and ex-officers. Extending from bare literacy to some learned pretensions, the class was self-conscious as the evolved and progressive element in their country; but it was frustrated by lack of active outlets in public life and especially by failure to break into the ruling circle. From it were arising, already before 1932, the new politicians and publicists. Not without quick intelligence and shrewdness, and often effective

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political unity today. A further obstacle must be the intolerant 648x individualism of the Arab character, so recalcitrant to self-subordination and compromise. These difficulties were all to be faced when twelve years later Arab Unity was to become, largely under 'Iraqi inspiration, a formal political reality; and they were to prove formidable.

2. ASSYRIAN CLIMAX

The administrative and political features of 'Iraq life as these 665 existed in 1932 had been current already for three years or more; 668 there was consequently little sign of sudden change in the autumn of that year to indicate the removal of restraints and growth of dangerous tendencies which the last pages have described. Nuri Pasha Sa'id was not anxious to prolong his premiership; his position, strong in Parliament, had been heavily attacked outside by the Ikhā and the Nationalist Party. Their newspapers, repeatedly suppressed and as often reappearing, assailed the Treaty, the British, and the Cabinet, until a 'Law for the prohibition of harmful propaganda' was passed to restrain them. The Liberal or Reformist group now forming among the lawyers, the journalists, and the impatient 'enlightened' elements, who were turning for the first time to social questions as the background of politics, hoped to range itself and its newspaper, the *Ahali* (People), with a more progressive Government. The King and his advisers thought in terms of specific advances, adapted to the new times: advances towards greater national unity—Sunni–Shi'i, landlord–tenant, tribe–town, and Kurd–Arab—better administration, more devolution, and a stronger Army. Such a programme could best be realized by an all-party Administration, and this must indicate a Cabinet of the Ikhā with 'Ahd and independent elements. Moreover, ill-feeling based on personal and private matters, perhaps even on some tinge of royal jealousy at Nuri's successes, had rendered the Pasha's position barely tenable.

But the Ikhā–Nationalist pact was still recent, and the King 645 could not admit the only condition on which Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Āli, now Chief of the Royal Diwan, and their associates would accept office: that of Treaty revision. The compromise adopted, therefore, was that of a neutral Government headed by Naji Shawkat. It included eminent lawyers—the cautious and able Naṣrat al-Farsi, Jamil al-Wadi, and Jalal Baban—a distant cousin of Jamal Baban, and like him a Kurd for ministerial purposes—in the Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Works: Rashid al-Khawja, an able ex-officer who had been Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad, in Defence: a competent and moderate Shi'i, 'Abbas Mahdi, in Education: and the prudent 'Abd al-Qadir Rashid in Foreign Affairs. The

*645 lucrative trusteeship of the Qadiri Awqaf. The Shi'i Minister of
648× Education, Ridhā al-Shabibi, resigned in September 1935 and was
replaced by a Shi'i of different type, the lawyer Ṣādiq al-Baṣṣam.
Relations with the other Arab States were notably extended by a
Treaty with Sa'udi Arabia, exchanges of princely and ministerial
visits, and missions received from Syria, the Yaman, and Egypt;
and 'Iraqi statesmen, particularly Nuri Sa'id, responding to strong
public opinion, took in 1936 jointly with Ibn Sa'ud a leading part
in intervening in the long-drawn Palestine Arab strike. Nevertheless,
critics in Baghdad were not wanting who called for stronger
anti-Zionist action than the telegrams, deputations, and appeals
of the Hashimi Ministry; and they recalled that Yasin Pasha in
opposition, in 1932 and since, had led an anti-Treaty and anti-British policy very different from his present complacence.

×645 Other gestures of Opposition politicians, embittered by long
● 665 exclusion from office, were those of horror at the brutality of the
Euphrates tribal suppressions, and disapproval of the recurring
[661] use of the Army for police measures. They pointed at the private
fortunes which, mysteriously, certain ministers were said to be
amassing; and they execrated the alleged spy system which was
one of the ministerial means of control, and the suppression of
newspapers inclined to criticize them. From the left-wing Ahali
group a particular dissatisfaction arose. They saw, under Yasin
Pasha, no hope of carrying out the reforms which they advocated.
Shedding an extremist and in certain cases Communist or near-Communist
minority, the group grew with the adhesion of other
unemployed politicians. Though never formed as a party, they
stood for social reform and land reform on lines which, while
excluding class warfare, must yet include some measure of redistribution
of wealth, some improvement in the conditions of the
working class, and some trespass on feudal and plutocratic
privilege. Prominent in the movement were Ja'far abu al-Timman,
Kamil al-Chadirchi (a young half-brother of Ra'uf), Yusif 'Izz
al-Din a financial expert of Kurdish descent, and a half-dozen of
English- or American-educated intellectuals. Government lack of
sympathy with their efforts, and the arrest of their less discreet
members, led them finally to oppose the régime with a bitterness
which would accept allies from any source.

665 No statesman felt more impatiently his exclusion from power
668 than Ḥikmat Sulayman. Of excellent ability and generally popular,
he assessed shrewdly the strength of the various anti-Hashimi
forces, and admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics,
which country he revisited in 1935. In Baghdad he was allied with
the left wing, and resentful at newspaper suppressions which
affected him personally; and he placed himself increasingly in con-

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tact with leaders of the Army. The latter, its morale uplifted by 668
triumphs over Assyrian villagers and Euphrates tribesmen, was 665
asking whether to serve the intrigues and ambitions of the Baghdad politicians was, after all, the ideal: whether direct dominance of the State by its armed force, as in Turkey or Persia, would not be more congenial? The stages by which Ḥikmat Sulayman and the forceful sinister Bakr Ṣidqi came into closer agreement, and the latter abandoned his loyalty to Yasin Pasha and his brother Ṭaha, cannot now be traced. To Ḥikmat the immediate desideratum was a change of Government in his own favour, and only the Army could produce this; Bakr Ṣidqi's ambition was to effect a stroke which would assure the Army of a paramount position and himself the headship of the Army. Neither at any time sought, it seems, a personal or formal dictatorship.

In October 1936 Ṭaha left 'Iraq to visit Turkey, leaving Ṣidqi, 665
then commanding the 1st Division, to act in his place. The 669
autumn manœuvres on the middle Diyalā gave occasion to concentrate almost all of the armed forces outside the capital. The plot concerted by Bakr with Ḥikmat Sulayman was communicated to a few officers at Qaraghan, notably 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, the general commanding the 2nd Division. The two generals drafted a letter to the King, demanding the formation of a new Ministry under Ḥikmat, and handed it to the latter. Leaders of the left-wing group were admitted to the secret. The Air Force under its Commander, Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, a close friend of Ṣidqi, was concentrated at Qaraghan and was provided with leaflets to scatter over Baghdad at the appropriate moment. On the night of 28 October the Army, renamed the National Defence Force for the occasion, began its 'march on Baghdad'.

By early morning of the 29th leaflets rained from the sky over Baghdad, and Ḥikmat conveyed the agreed letter to the palace. Yasin Pasha and his colleagues, amazed at a turn of events wholly unexpected, made their way to the King's ante-room, where Ghazi had already summoned the British Ambassador. The latter advised His Majesty to consult his Cabinet, to ascertain the intentions of Ḥikmat, and to proceed, above all, constitutionally. The ministers, now joined by all their colleagues except Rashid 'Āli, were ready to resign. Bombs fell on Baghdad in the mid-morning, a three-hour time limit for the Cabinet's surrender having expired, and some civilians killed and wounded showed the zeal of the Royal 'Iraqi Air Force. After a discussion which could end but one way, the Cabinet resigned, and a Royal Irada appointed Ḥikmat Sulayman to form a new Ministry.

One shocking incident distressed the public, horrified the British Ambassador, and disgusted Ḥikmat himself—the brutal murder of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 669 Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari by Army officers half-way between Baghdad and Ba'quba, under the direct orders, it was believed, of Bakr Ṣidqi. Ja'far as Minister of Defence had left Baghdad by car with a letter to Bakr from the King, intending to meet the Commander, inform him of the change of Government and arrange for a cessation of violence. His body, that of a sincere and devoted patriot and an honest man, was hastily buried by the roadside while the Army pursued its triumphant march to the capital. The troops entered the city ceremonially in the early evening, with Bakr Ṣidqi at their head.

*645 The Cabinet formed and announced by Ḥikmat on the same day reserved the Ministry of Interior to himself, brought three members of the Ahali group, Abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi, and Yusif 'Izz al-Din to Finance, Works, and Education, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Justice, Naji al-Aṣil to Foreign Affairs. Ṣidqi's fellow conspirator 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri was rewarded with the Ministry of Defence, while Bakr himself superseded Ṭaha al-Hashimi as Chief of Staff. Great enthusiasm, real or feigned, greeted the new Government. The announced programme, and a broadcast by Abu al-Timman, were rich in optimism and promises. Giant demonstrations were arranged in Baghdad, and the capital's main streets were a stage for the dancing and singing of crowds of tribesmen and workers. The outgoing Ministry was everywhere denigrated. Its members, whom Bakr would have preferred to assassinate with other likely opponents, vanished temporarily from public life: Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Āli to Syria under escort, Nuri Sa'id by R.A.F. aircraft to Egypt. Other ex-ministers and some high officials retired amid the many changes made in personnel by the incoming ministers.

The Prime Minister, who kept at all times correctly in contact with the British Ambassador—and lost some nationalist following by so doing—assured him and the world that this was no military dictatorship; it was merely parliamentary and democratic government supported by a devoted Army. Bakr Ṣidqi, in fact, interfered little in current administration. He had no obvious policy save a crude Anglophobia, and limited his exigencies to nomination of his friends to certain appointments and insistence on priority for the Army's needs. A vindictive proposal to inquire into the private fortunes of ex-ministers was at first accepted but finally abandoned.

*645 665 Opposition nevertheless was not slow to organize, and could muster effective elements. Moderate opinion everywhere saw with consternation the open assumption of power by a selfish and short-sighted military movement. The new Government in its proclaimed programme had said little of anti-Treaty proposals—indeed, had spoken of friendship with all countries and was pledged to maintain the Treaty. In spite of some self-justifying gestures to

the contrary, it was criticized by anti-Zionist enthusiasts, by ardent 645* members of the pan-Arab Muthannā Club in Baghdad, and at times 665 in Egypt and Syrian newspapers, as being less than whole-hearted on the question of Arab unity. Bakr Ṣidqi was a Kurd, Ḥikmat Sulayman by sympathy more Turk than Arab, and the Ahali group cared little for international politics. The tone of its early programme and of the speeches of Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman were equalitarian and easily labelled Communistic, and they alarmed the established classes. The Reformist group had indeed assumed its share of power with high hopes; but for all their newspaper and their 'People's Reform League', to which four ministers belonged, they found little popular support. They were opposed by the shaykhs who feared for their own positions, and thwarted by the Army who distrusted or despised them. The efforts of the group, laudable as they were as appreciating something of the real weaknesses and evils of 'Iraq society, were politically unprofitable to a Ministry dominated by the Army and by reaction. The freedom of the press and of politics promised for [656] all, in contrast to Yasin's régime, ceased to be permitted as soon as opponents grew active. Political and tribal prisoners including the Yazidis were released and a general amnesty proclaimed; but not long afterwards measures of suppression were taken as severe as those of a year earlier. Meanwhile friends of Ja'far Pasha—and notably his brother-in-law, Nuri Sa'id, tirelessly manœuvring and writing from Egypt and Syria—would forgive neither the murder nor its perpetrators, nor the willingness of the King and the present Cabinet to leave it unpunished. And, with all these elements of criticism and discontent, those endemic on the middle Euphrates were still alive, and soon to burst into violent activity.

Nowhere indeed were the embarrassments of Ḥikmat's position 645* clearer than in his attempts to solve the insoluble Euphrates problem. 668 He must placate malcontents without offending their enemies: he must pardon the already condemned, but not show weakness: must keep order, but without a harshness which would be resented. Starting with all confidence in his own good intentions and diplomatic skill, he signally failed. The ferment of self-seeking and vengeful faction which was the normal life of Euphrates shaykhly and religious circles refused to cool at his bidding. A notorious land dispute among the Bani Zurayj of Samawa qadhā was the occasion to rally once again the forces supporting and opposed to 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr and Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh. These flouted the orders of the Ministry to a point which made inevitable a return to the severity with which Ḥikmat Sulayman had hoped to dispense, the two inveterate trouble-makers were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, arrested, and sentenced to detention in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 northern 'Iraq. In June 1937 continued lawlessness at Samawa
668 led to military operations on the habitual pattern, with destruction
of villages, tribal attacks on the qadhā town, and (it was said) the
shooting of hostages by the Army. Deep as was the impression
made on the tribes by this treatment, peace never returned to these
troubled regions during the life-time of the Sulaymani Ministry.
In the towns, security was reasonably maintained, and isolated acts
of anti-Jewish violence which had occurred in Baghdad in 1936
were not repeated.

646 The Ministry remained unhappy in the political sphere. The
665 general elections ordered in November 1936 and completed in
February 1937 produced a Chamber from which indispensable
compliance with Ṣidqi's wishes had excluded the bulk of former
Deputies and all but twelve of the Reformists; but had admitted,
as a conciliatory favour, some ill-chosen wildlings from the
Euphrates tribes. In the four months of the Extraordinary Session
from February to June 1937 the Chamber was uneasy and divided,
with painful friction between the Ministry's own ill-assorted followers.
This, and the frustrations of their minority position, and
their dislike of the re-adopted harsh policy at Samawa, led in June
to the resignation of the four Reformist ministers. While still in
468 office their influence, especially that of Chadirchi, had inspired,
perhaps encouraged, serious strikes among industrial workers.
So were explained the successive strikes at the Kut barrage, in the
drilling-areas of the B.O.D. Company, in the Railway workshops,
among the Port workers and the Najf weavers, and among the
'Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk. These strikes,
whether industrially justified or not, reflected a new spirit of labour
self-consciousness not necessarily unhealthy—and a new political
weapon.

*645 Ḥikmat's hopes of strengthening his Cabinet by the inclusion in
665 it of leading statesmen—Nuri Sa'id himself, or Jamil al-Madfa'i—
could not but fail since few now trusted Bakr or the uneasy régime
itself. Of the four new ministers, two, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and
Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, were Sunni lawyer-politicians and
functionaries, and two, 'Abbas Mahdi and Ja'far Ḥamandi, were
Shi'is of similar background. They were posted to the Ministries
of Justice, Finance, Works, and Education respectively; but they
were politically of little weight. The breach between the Reform
movement and the Government was now complete; the People's
Reform League was suppressed, and prominent Communists, real
or alleged, were arrested. Two of the most active, 'Abd al-Qadir
and Yusif, sons of Isma'il, fled to Paris. The Army dominated,
ever more obviously, the Prime Minister and his Government.

*645 The position was one which Bakr Ṣidqi could not but abuse. He

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

646 665 The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

000 Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of
[668] Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

701 Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

563 The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

visitors made their appearance at the Muthannā Club, which had 648x been founded in 1935 as a pan-Arab centre and the home of the Palestine Defence League. Nevertheless, the *fatwas* of 'Iraqi divines favouring immediate Jihad in Palestine were discredited by their Government, the more violent demonstrations dispersed and later forbidden, and bomb-throwing in the Jewish quarters, reported in August 1938, was suppressed. Mawlud Mukhliṣ represented 'Iraq at the Parliamentary Conference on Palestine in Cairo in October; Nuri Sa'id handed proposals of his own, conceived with moderation and good sense, to the British Government; and Tawfiq Suwaydi was not less active in Geneva and London. In the London Conference, which met on 7 February 1939—its composition clearly foreshadowing the future Arab League—Nuri, by that time again Prime Minister, was as ever prominent through his constructive proposals and authoritative by the contacts he had maintained in the Arab capitals and with the now exiled Mufti. The British White Paper of May 1939, the initial Arab opposition to which must soon have turned (and in fact turned) to acceptance, was for the time unable to appease the powerful Arab sentiment against Zionism and its supporters. No element in all 'Iraqi-British relations of the period 1937 to 1941 was more powerful in poisoning them than the tragically mishandled Palestine Question.

In the Munich crisis of September 1938 the attitude of Madfa'i 648x and his Cabinet was strictly correct to their ally and stern towards 665 Dr. Grobba and his countrymen. The event indicated nevertheless to 'Iraq, in a new light, the menacing cleavages of Europe, and evoked from sections of the public and Army the admiration for German ruthlessness and successes to which the last few years had predisposed them: and, with that admiration, the beginnings of reluctance to support a pacific and reputedly pro-British Prime Minister. The orientation of 'Iraq towards or away from the Axis Powers became, from Munich onwards, one of the questions dividing the Baghdad politicians, to whom respect for the 1930 Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty, in spirit or letter, was no matter of course. This division contributed an element to the weakness of Madfa'i's position, which by the autumn was apparent. Major changes in the Cabinet 645x were necessitated in October by a series of personal attacks on Muṣṭafā al-'Umari; he was transferred to Justice and 'Abbas Mahdi to Works, the Prime Minister himself taking the portfolio of Interior. To Defence was appointed Ṣubiḥ Najib, an ex-officer who had served for some years as Director-General of Police, and more recently as Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he was however junior in rank to many of the serving generals, who resented his promotion as minister.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

665 The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of
political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest
668 against the Baṣra concession, others—Rashid 'Āli and Ḥikmat
Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies
of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the
Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression
of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it
had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an outbreak
[656 of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with
661] justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to
the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto
invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number
of their more violent opponents. These included officers
known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and
politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis
drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Āli led to
his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no
time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one
side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group
later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute
and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding
the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil
Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of
the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized
forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a
parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and
dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old
Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present
Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an
approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—
and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at
al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting
the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri,
and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal
Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview
them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms,
occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of
Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and
banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime
Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that
neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement.
Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained,
Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties,
and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter
606 to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

Nuri Pash, perhaps with the reluctance which he professed, accepted the premiership for the fifth time on Christmas Day 1938. 645x

2. DEATH OF THE KING

The new Ministry was greeted by the usual hopes for a firm and stable régime at last, the usual apprehension of faction, reprisal, and further military intervention. A Cabinet of average merit was announced; but once again no firm basis of shared principles was present to unite the ministers. Naji Shawkat was summoned from the 'Iraqi Legation at Ankara to be Minister of the Interior, Rustum Ḥaydar went to Finance, the capable Turkoman, 'Umar Nadhmi, to Works, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari to Justice, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Education, Ṭaha al-Hashimi to Defence. Rashid 'Āli was taken to preside over the Royal Diwan. The Prime Minister's inaugural speech was admirably balanced, wise, and high-minded; it deprecated military adventures and urged all parties to accept the rule of law and true democracy. The banned newspapers were relicensed, the exiled politicians returned. Postal censorship was abolished, dismissed officials were reinstated, and permission was given for the formation of political parties, though these failed for the moment to take shape. Words of mingled reproof and encouragement were addressed to assembled Euphrates shaykhs.

In Parliament, however, the usual asperities were not slow to 646
repeat themselves, and redoubled after the departure of Nuri 665
Pasha to London early in 1939. The exiled victims of the Madfa'i Ministry demanded vengeance for its high-handed illegalities, and as a first step pressed for reference of disputed points of law to the Special Court provided by the Organic Law; and the Ministry, itself indifferently united, decided to reinforce its position by general elections which might produce a more amenable Chamber. The Irada ordering the dissolution of Parliament appeared on 22 February, a few days before the State visit paid to Baghdad by the Crown Prince of Persia.

The return of the Prime Minister from London late in February 645x
was followed by the issue of a ministerial programme on the habitual 669
lines. A few days later the discovery of a conspiracy was announced, understood to involve not only Ḥikmat Sulayman—the *bête noire* of Nuri Pasha—but a formidable list of other politicians and officers. The plot, it was revealed, had aimed at the murder of no less than fifty leading personalities, the assassination of the King, and the enthronement of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah—or, as some preferred, of the Amir Zayd. A State of Emergency was immediately proclaimed at al-Rashid Camp, a number of arrests were made, and a special court martial was convened with civilian judges as equal members with the military. On the strength of

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the 625
Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards 657
such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and 665
at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Salaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Āli, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for
extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplication 204
of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when out- 668
lawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid 'Āli in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of 'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

least some of her statesmen. Her delegates attended the Food 648ᴷ Conference at Hot Springs in May 1943, and the Bretton Woods meeting on Currency and Exchange questions in August 1944, the resulting agreement being ratified by Parliament late next year. The meetings at Atlantic City and at Chicago on Trade and on Civil Aviation respectively included 'Iraqi spokesmen, as well as the more important Conference at San Francisco in April 1945 at which the bases of the United Nations organization were laid. It was attended by Arshad al-'Umari, Foreign Minister, accompanied by Naṣrat al-Farsi, and by a young American-educated Shi'i official, Fadhil al-Jamali. The part taken by the delegation was creditable; but on the refusal of Arshad to subscribe to certain phraseology in the Charter (in which 'self-government' as distinct from 'independence' was given as the goal of countries under tutelage) Fadhil was authorized to sign instead, and his persistence cost Arshad his position as Foreign Minister. The World Security Charter was ratified by Parliament in October and in the Preparatory Commission which met in London late in the year the 'Iraqi chargé d'affaires, Shakir al-Wadi, a former staff officer of Bakr Ṣidqi, represented his country. It was contemporary with the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Cultural and Educational Organization, also held in London, at which Dr. Naji al-Aṣil, now Director of Antiquities, was present.

The Regent, a developing personality, generally popular, keenly 643 interested in affairs and willing to play his full part in them, was 645ᴷ now exercising an influence on Government greater than any 665 Palace influence since the death of Fayṣal I. The Administration, whose continuity he helped to ensure, kept the peace, allowed wide latitude to the press and the bitter tirades of the ex-internees, and played a leading part in the Arab Unity movement; but it did little for social reform and refused, until its last month of power, to authorize the formation of political parties now struggling to birth. The Regent's speech at the opening of Parliament in December 1945, however, foreshadowed a new policy in this regard by promising the readmission of parties, the development of 'true democracy', a greater measure of equality and social justice, and the training of a younger element of citizens for power. This speech, welcome to the eager and half-thwarted political world—and disturbing to the elderly and privileged—led to increased criticism of the Pachachi Ministry in Parliament, and to clashes between the left wing of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the extreme right, or ex-Nazi, following of Sami Shawkat. The latter now abandoned his appointment as Director-General of Social Affairs to form a National Revival Party. The Pachachi Ministry resigned at the end of January 1946.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

though streams of unwelcome propaganda were flowing in from 668
the Republic of Mahabad (with Marshal Muṣṭafā high in its councils), Army units were stationed in readiness in frontier qadhās, and a memorandum of Kurdish appeal and protest had been handed to the Anglo-American Palestine Committee. An Army column visited Sinjar, but only minor clashes resulted. The air of dissatisfaction or menace which hung over the Holy Cities led to no overt trouble. Elsewhere in the towns, efforts made by the progressive or malicious to create labour unrest were successful in inspiring a railway strike in March, and a political general strike and demonstration was organized in May in protest against the Anglo-American report. It led to no breach of the peace; indeed the deputies themselves had cabled in February a protest to London against continued Jewish immigration into Palestine, and Fadhil Jamali had testified similarly to the Anglo-American Commission in Cairo. The Cabinet and the Regent sent further protests in May to the British Government, King George VI, and the American President.

That political demonstrations were now possible was owed to the 665 ●
Suwaydi (or the Regent's) policy of removing restrictions and per- 668
mitting the rebirth of parties. The 'Amara concentration camp was closed; martial law, imposed in Baghdad and neighbouring districts in 1941, was at last removed; the Public Security Ordinance of 1940 was revoked, and press censorship abolished. This liberality was repaid by journalist ex-internees in the form of savage attacks on the Suwaydi Ministry, attacks reflecting both personal bitterness and the militant attitudes of the parties which plunged forthwith into full activity. If they were representative as ever rather of the dissatisfied and power-seeking than the satisfied and power-holding political and social groups, this was least true of the Liberal Party which, dormant since its foundation in 1939, now revived with a modest reform programme made attractive by an anti-British colouring; its members, not numerous, included Kamil al-Khudhayri, President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, and Sa'd Ṣaliḥ. It published the *Ṣawt al-Aḥrar* as its daily newspaper. The Independence Party, based on the old côterie of Rashid 'Āli and Yasin Pasha, brought up to date by accretions of students and malcontent intelligentsia, passed for right-wing nationalist and was guided by the Muthannā Club founder-member and Nazi sympathizer, Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba, and by the bitter xenophobes Fa'iq al-Samarrā'i and Ṣādiq Shanshal. The party, well organized and comparatively stable, based its foreign policy on unfriendliness to Turkey and to Great Britain but 'neutrality' towards Russia, with an anti-Hashimite and pro-Mufti leaning, and aspirations at home towards social reform; the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 *Liwā al-Istiqlal* was its press organ. Dr. Sami Shawkat's National Revival Party, with its paper *al-Iṣlaḥ*, was similar but less stable 668 in its views, and even more violent in tone. The last of the left-wing parties was the National Democratic of Kamil al-Chadirchi, an ineffective leader but veteran left-wing champion, with Muḥammad Ḥadid, London-educated left-wing socialist of good standing, and Ḥusayn Jamil, an ex-judge of good family and reformist views; its newspaper was the *Ṣawt al-Ahali*, later *Ṣadā al-Ahali*. A party of social reform deriving from the old Ahali group of 1934, it drew its support largely from wealthy townsmen and young enthusiasts and directed its fire principally against the Western Powers and against the 'old gang' in ruling circles. Its official anti-Communist attitude did not preclude some approval of Russian policies, nor its national loyalties an anti-Hashimite bias. The party of National Union, which was dissolved in 1947, was on the borderline of Communism, and its paper *al-Siyasa* frankly subversive; its stalwarts were the American-educated printing-press proprietor, 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim, and Nadhim al-Zahawi. In the same category fell the People's Party of the Communist 'Aziz Sharif, with its papers *al-Sha'b* and later *al-Waṭn*, suppressed in 1946 and 1947 respectively. The two parties last named amalgamated before their suppression into a Party of National Union. The avowedly Communist party of National Liberation under Muḥammad al-Shabibi and a group of Jewish Communists was refused the right to legalize itself but remained, with other groups of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh, fully active underground. Their members were drawn from industrial workers, from rich young men hiding behind ministers, and in general from the discontented or visionary of all classes. Their organization was widespread and efficient; it included cells in Government offices—though officials were forbidden by law to participate openly in politics—and in industrial enterprises. Sulaymaniya was their principal centre, where contact was easy with the trans-frontier Communists and the merging of Communism with Kurdish nationalism was an effective device.

648x Relations with 'Iraq's northern neighbour, always cordial with reservations, were amicably restated by a mission of Nuri Sa'id to Ankara in February 1946. He initialed a draft treaty of friendship which confirmed the 1926 boundary, provided a mutual policy of brotherhood, non-interference, and free consultation, and looked forward to joint handling of such shared problems as the Kurds and the Euphrates waters. The ratification of this in Baghdad in June 1947 was to prove no matter of course; some deputies remembered the old grievance of Alexandretta, others felt that to draw closer to Ankara must be disloyal to Arab interests, or that an

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

designed to obtain (by steps undecided and unspecified) Arab 645*
rights in Palestine and the French evacuation of Syria, the two 648*
States were feeling their way to a closer understanding in the political, cultural, and military fields. On the 'Greater Syria' plan of King 'Abdullah, which he urged with increasing openness after the War, 'Iraq's attitude was one of cautious avoidance of commitment, though individual statesmen in Baghdad were frank in their support. A visit by the King to Baghdad and Mosul late in 1946 advanced the cause of 'Iraq–Jordan solidarity, but not that of Greater Syria. 'Iraq meanwhile had taken its place at meetings at Cairo and at Bludan, and in the late summer of 1946 had dispatched its representatives to London for the would-be Round Table Conference on Palestine. Their attitude at it could not be in doubt; the general strike organized throughout 'Iraq on 2 November (Balfour Day) showed the continuing popular fervour against Zionism. A Legation was opened in the Yaman and wireless communication established between Baghdad and Ṣan'ā. The Government recognized the Indonesian Republic, had views on the disposal of ex-Italian North Africa, cordially supported an Egypt now in the throes of post-war negotiation with Britain, and was gratified by the election of a representative on the Trusteeship Council of United Nations. The Legation in London was raised to the status of an Embassy, to which the Amir Zayd was appointed. The British Ambassador at Baghdad announced his willing abandonment of his special right, under the 1930 Treaty, of precedence over other diplomats. The United States Legation became an Embassy.

An unexpected appeal repeated insistently during later 1946 reached Baghdad from the Arab tribes of Khuzistan. The low prestige of the Persian Government after the war in its outlying provinces, the conditions of near-anarchy produced by the Tudeh Party, and a resurgence of Arabism led the long-expatriated tribesmen of that Persian province to beg, in petitions addressed to Baṣra, Baghdad, and the Arab League, for the grant of 'Iraqi citizenship. An Arab State of Kuzistan was visualized, and the woes of these rightless Arabs became a theme of the parties in Baghdad; but no more was heard of the movement after the winter of 1946–7, and Perso-'Iraqi relations remained suspicious and irritable in spite of common interest in the menace of Communism and the safeguarding of peace in Kurdistan and on the frontiers.

The forces hostile to 'Umari had by mid-November gained 645*
a strength which compelled his resignation. The formation of 665
a coalition Ministry to conduct the elections was entrusted on 21 November to Nuri Sa'id. He formed his Cabinet, dissolved Parliament, and prepared for elections under the new procedure

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

x645 665 with the promise of full freedom of choice. But his hopes of securing a strong Chamber and satisfied parties by inviting their co-operation were but partially gratified; the Liberals and National Democrats, invited to name representatives for Cabinet posts, did so in the persons of 'Ali Mumtaz at the Ministry of Works and Muḥammad Ḥadid at that of Supply; but both these and two Shi'i ministers, Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Education, resigned their offices in the following month to devote themselves to an election campaign. Most of the parties, including Ṣaliḥ Jabr's parliamentary Political Bloc, took part and one, the unauthorized National Liberation Party, was the cause of a scuffle with the police at Kadhimiya. The Cabinet was, with consequent changes, re-formed to include 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi at Works, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh at Supply and temporarily at Finance, Shakir al-Wadi (reputed to be in the close confidence of the Regent) at Defence, Babā 'Ali at Economics, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab at Social Affairs and for a time at Education, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, and 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice.

665 661 The conduct of the elections, which began in February, did not prevent Nuri Pasha from locating hotbeds of Communism and claiming by his arrests and searches to have suppressed them. The followers of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh were involved, and from these or other groups such leaders as Ibrahim Naji Shummal, Zaki Muḥammad Baṣim, and two score of their associates were arrested. With the exposure of the Communist cells in every liwā, the Premier could hope that a fatal blow had been dealt to the movement; but gratitude for this did little to diminish the fury of press attacks on himself and on targets provided by the British, notably Reuter's Agency and local branches of the British Council.

646 665 The Chamber of Deputies which, amid the usual outcries against 'Government interference', emerged from the elections, showed a large majority of independent members or supporters of Nuri and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr. The National Democratic Party secured five seats, x645 the other parties none. When Parliament opened Nuri, who had accepted the premiership on this understanding, now made way for Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and was ready to support a Ministry led by him—the first to be formed under a Shi'i Premier. Ṣaliḥ reserved for himself the Ministry of the Interior and relied upon experienced colleagues in the other appointments: he retained Jamali, Shakir al-Wadi, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh, and Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab in their former posts, and brought Jamal Baban to Justice and temporarily to Economics, Ghanima to Finance, the Kurdish scholar Tawfiq Wahbi to Education, the Shi'i Ḍhiyā' Ja'far—a Birmingham graduate in oil engineering—to Works. The Opposition, itself fragmentary, was formed mainly by the five parties not represented

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 the Prime Minister and the Regent both visited London during the year. The objectives of all politicians (save only the vehement minority who would break every form of British connexion) were the removal of all limitation to their independence and free choice, the end of all treatment of the country as a junior partner, and the abolition of provisions which, offensively to their *amour propre*, left Ḥabbaniya and Shu'ayba as British cantonments in the heart of 'Iraq. The early negotiations with the British Ambassador appeared to run smoothly, and the Ministry could hope that early 1948 would see a happy solution. Newspaper attacks on Great Britain, unhelpful in these circumstances, were as ever the commonplace of every journalist, and were suspended only in part and temporarily in the summer of 1947, when a party of 'Iraqi editors visited London.

647 In the two years following the armistice most of the remaining British officials of the Administration—a tiny remnant of the body so active and so hopeful in 1919–20—left 'Iraq. Edmonds had retired in 1945, succeeded in Interior by A. H. Ditchburn. In 1946 Drower of Justice, Sinderson of the Medical Services, Atkinson of Irrigation, Caparn of Communications and Works, H. I. Lloyd of the Date Board, and Grice of Interior were among the losses sustained by the Government. They were followed next year by Swan of Finance, Seton Lloyd of Antiquities, and Chadwick of the Veterinary Department.

645 665 661 It was regrettable that Ṣaliḥ Jabr's best-meaning of Governments was compelled, like its predecessors, to take steps against press and party agitation which passed all reasonable limits. Its Palestine policy was more than correct, its moves towards Treaty revision active and popular; but this was not enough. Exclusion from power and sheer hatred of the 'old gang'—and of the British allegedly behind them—still led the parties to frenzies of anti-Government zeal. A newspaper was suppressed in April, and two more in June. Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim were charged with sedition. The premises of the People's Party were seized and 'Aziz Sharif arrested, but released. Trials of Communists detained under the last Sa'idi Ministry, some months ago, led to a score of long sentences of imprisonment and to death sentences[1] on Yusif Salman, Zaki Baṣim, and Naji Shummal for inciting troops and police against the State; these were later commuted to long terms of imprisonment. Baghdad bookshops were raided and the premises of the more extreme parties searched.

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[1] The *Daily Worker*'s later (17 February 1949) description of the 'Iraq Government was that of a 'corrupt and murderous puppet of British imperialism'; *L'Humanité* (8 February 1949) attributed 'Iraq's anti-Communist steps to 'the Anglo-American millionaires who are preparing war'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed 645x
in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was 665
notorious that the strike in the Port of Baṣra during the summer
had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but 661
vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist
League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 186
1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine
Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i
circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in
Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed
Zionism, backed by American money and competing political
interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all
others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other
foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment
as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and
cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of
anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn 000
of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Faḍhil Jamali, reached no
agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan'
which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American
Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally
rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain
to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured
Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and
pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General
Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from
Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision
in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab
areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab
and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be
established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, 668
a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some 665
sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious
Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent
and potential violence which were actually present and
were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December
the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were [731]
approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks.
Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present
discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous
political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western,
narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less
powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

668 judged them; nor were they incapable of temporary union with
665 each other or, in some eventualities, with the Communists. General disillusion created by the divided post-war world, the uneasy relations between East and West from China to Morocco, and the doubtful progress of 'democracy', had descended upon the conscious elements of the 'Iraq cities; and the destructive emotions it had produced were to find their readiest outlet in two fields: one, the Palestine situation now going from bad to worse: the other, the relations of 'Iraq with Great Britain now on the eve of restatement. All the latent menaces of 1947, a year of seeming progress and hope, were to be realized with tragic results in the year following.

2. PORTSMOUTH AND PALESTINE

648 During the weeks following the opening of Parliament on 1 December 1947 all was ready, it seemed, for the signature of a new Treaty; not only its principles but most of a new text had been agreed by the statesmen consulted in Baghdad and by the Regent. In the last days of the year it was announced that the Premier and his Foreign Minister—to be accompanied, in the event, by Nuri Sa'id and Shakir al-Wadi—would proceed to London for final talks and probable signature. Jamal Baban was left as acting Prime Minister. The Treaty was in fact agreed and initialed on 12 January 1948, and was signed at Portsmouth by the 'Iraqi deputation and Ernest Bevin on the 15th.

Praised by the latter as an inspiring example and precedent for other similar undertakings, the Treaty and its annex included the hope of co-operation in matters of technical and economic development; but primarily it was one of mutual defence. It provided for consultation in time of danger, and for immediate help, each to each, in time of war. The Air Force bases of Habbaniya and Shu'ayba were to be handed to 'Iraq, with the retention only of limited British personnel, at British expense but under 'Iraqi command, to ensure readiness for immediate use; British combatant forces could reoccupy them only in case of war. The British Military Mission was to disappear, a mixed Anglo-'Iraqi Council would undertake the development of strategic plans and offer recommendations on the equipment of the 'Iraqi forces. Standardization of equipment as between the two armies would be assured, help would be given by the R.A.F. to the R.I.A.F. in training abroad, arms of the latest pattern would be made available. The Treaty would come into force as soon as the post-war world had returned to peace conditions: as soon, that is, as all peace treaties with ex-enemy countries had come into force and occupying armies had been withdrawn.

The Treaty as published was welcomed in Great Britain, and

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 Mutaṣarrifs protested to the Minister of Interior at the military
579 reign of terror in their liwās and forced the resignation of the
Minister of Defence, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam. The arrest of the Chief Rabbi
and the conviction and hanging of a rich Jewish merchant, Shafiq
Adis—but not of his Muslim associates—was disapproved by much
of the public. The press was allowed full freedom to attack the
British as having created all the troubles of Palestine as well as of
'Iraq: to call the oil companies truculently to account: and to assail
with rage the well-reasoned pamphlet which Nuri Sa'id issued, on
his return home at midsummer, in justification of the Portsmouth
Treaty.

x645 The reinstatement of the Treaty supporters was, indeed, a
feature of these months; Ṣaliḥ Jabr was welcomed back to Baghdad
in July, Nuri could re-enter politics in the same summer, Shakir
al-Wadi succeeded Baṣṣam as Minister of Defence in October,
Jamali was sent as Minister to Cairo, and all were once again
665 candidates for high office by the end of the year. Party activity was
limited by the abnormal conditions, and the National Democrat
and the Liberal Parties, both handicapped by shortage of funds,
complained of undue restriction and ceased active operation in
December. The Independence Party remained vigorous. A series
x645 of Cabinet changes was made in October, after months in which
portfolios passed from hand to hand among acting ministers.
Shakir al-Wadi came to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Interior, and
'Ali Jawdat from Washington to Foreign Affairs. Muḥammad
al-Sayhud, Amir al-Rabi'a, rejoined the Cabinet as minister without
portfolio, and Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, who while under medical
treatment in London gave up his post at Interior but remained in
the Cabinet, resigned a month later. 'Ali Mumtaz, resigning from
Finance in November, was replaced after an interval by the
experienced Director-General of Customs, Khalil Isma'il, and
'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan on becoming President of the Chamber
was succeeded at Economics by 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, the
Minister of Social Affairs. Najib al-Rawi, Minister of Education
and 'Iraqi representative at Lake Success, returned home. The
Speech from the Throne on 1 December, when Parliament met,
was politically colourless.

The Pachachi Ministry, clearly unable to master its manifold problems, survived the last weeks of 1948 only by the support of the Portsmouth Treaty-makers, Nuri Sa'id and Ṣaliḥ Jabr. Muzaḥim's favour of Egypt as the strongest Arab Power and his favourable response to interventionist demonstrations on 30 and 31 December clashed with Army views—indeed, with those of every realist—and created an impasse from which a change of Government was the only outlet. He resigned office on 6 January 1949.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The Regent, himself indefatigable in touring the country and 645× visiting the Army and the Arab capitals, called upon Nuri Sa'id to form a new Ministry. He did so on the same day by retaining four of the outgoing ministers—Kubba at Justice, Rawi at Education, Jalal Baban at Works, Shakir at Defence—and by bringing Bahā al-Din Nuri to Social Affairs, Ḍhiya' Ja'far to Economics, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Foreign Affairs. He retained Interior himself, and asked Jalal Baban to act temporarily in Finance until Khalil Isma'il reassumed the post.

Mainly through lack of mutual confidence between the Premier, some of the ministers, and the Throne, the ministerial history of 1949 was troubled in spite of improved leadership. The Cabinet, initially weak, was little strengthened by changes made two months later when 'Umar Nadhmi entered the Cabinet as Deputy Premier, Faḍhil Jamali came from Cairo to Foreign Affairs on the appointment of 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to direct the National Bank, and Tawfiq al-Na'ib, a former judge and Mutaṣarrif and a supporter of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, became Minister of the Interior. The Prime Minister hoped at midsummer to secure further strength in support of a Ministry which its own dissensions were destroying. He consulted Jamil al-Madfa'i, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and 'Ali Mumtaz, of whom the last two were expected to join him; but agreement on the appointments was not forthcoming and the Cabinet barely survived into the winter of 1949–50. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior, not being deputies, were forced under the Constitution to resign office after six months, and their places were taken in September by Shakir and 'Umar Nadhmi.

Taking advantage of the partial lull in party activity while only 655 the Independence Party was in full operation, Nuri Pasha decided late in the year to found his own party, that of Constitutional Union. With an unexceptional programme of Arab brotherhood, friendship to all nations, anti-Communism, Treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at home and abroad, the party was composed of various elements of conservatism and vested interest, tribal and urban, and found cohesion in a common devotion to Nuri himself—as long as he remained powerful; and, taking its place as by far the largest and most amenable of the parties, it could not but dominate the Chamber as long as it held together. It was joined by an imposing array of ex-ministers and *ministrables*.

The last act of the Pachachi Ministry had been to arrange yet 668 another drive against the Communists, and the first of the Sa'idi 661 Cabinet was to continue it. Some hundreds of arrests were made, and led to scores of severe sentences for sedition and treason. Four notorious Communists—Yusif Salman, Yahuda Ṣadiq, Zaki Baṣim, and Ḥusayn Muḥammad Shabibi (a Christian, a Jew, and two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

701 American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow 631 start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available. 665 Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when 668 they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

563 If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

eminent; and many who reached Palestine bitterly regretted their 563
change of home.

An episode in the Chamber on 7 March, early in the Suwaydi 645
Ministry's life, led to the resignation—in despair, they said, of fair 665
parliamentary treatment—of the whole body of deputies opposed to Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party who in fact maintained the Ministry in power and dominated the Chamber. The gesture was regrettable as ending all pretence of government on party lines; but the sympathy accorded to the retiring members did not survive their own squabbles and evident lack of common purpose, and the elections held early in June to fill their places produced amenable members. No considerable Opposition elements remained thereafter in the Chamber, before which stretched a life of two or three more years. But within the Cabinet a tripartite balance of power was uneasily maintained between the Prime Minister, the supporters of Nuri Pasha (himself absent), and those of Ṣaliḥ Jabr; between the latter two statesmen the old cordiality was fast disappearing, and Ṣaliḥ Jabr's share in building the party itself was little remembered. The Prime Minister was by midsummer maintaining himself with difficulty; favourite projects of his own, such as a new press law, were frustrated by his colleagues. The absence of the Regent and of Nuri in London precluded a change of Ministry until the autumn, but on 12 September Suwaydi was forced to resign.

Four days later the formation of an eleventh Sa'idi Ministry was proclaimed. Even in the process of its establishment Nuri found something of Suwaydi's difficulty in reconciling personalities each in itself valuable; he could not use simultaneously both Tawfiq and Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and preferred for the moment to be content with a skeleton Cabinet which he proposed to strengthen and broaden as opportunity might offer into a real Ministry of National Union intended, as he announced, for urgent economic and administrative work. As it was, he kept the post of Interior in his own hands, combined Defence and Foreign Affairs under Shakir al-Wadi, Works and Finance under 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, and gave the Ministries of Justice, Education, Social Affairs, and Economics respectively to Ḥasan Sami Tatar, Khalil Kunna, Mājid Muṣṭafā, and Ḍhiya' Ja'far. But it became early apparent that the breach with the followers of Ṣaliḥ Jabr was widening; and the latter, in whom many observers recognized Nuri's ultimate successor, founded early in 1951 his own Socialist Party of the Nation, a group generally conservative (in spite of its singularly ill-chosen name) and, while largely personal to Ṣaliḥ, relying also on organized Shi'ism and seeking Kurdish support. The Iṣlaḥ Party of Sami Shawkat merged itself in the new group. At the same time

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

x645 665 opposition leaders of various records and tendencies—Taha al-Hashimi, Muzahim al-Pachachi, Muhammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, Nasrat al-Farsi, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Dhahir, Ja'far Hamandi, and Sādiq Bassam—were drawing together towards a fragile but imposing Popular Front whose formation with a vague programme they announced towards the middle of 1951. The National Democrat Party returned to full activity during 1950. There seemed, however, no reason why, with his parliamentary majority and with a personal authority which for years past had exceeded that of any other 'Iraqi, Nuri Sa'id should not, subject to unforeseeable changes and chances, remain in power as long as his health and restless nature might permit. In the last days of 1950 he brought 'Umar Nadhmi, Muhammad Hasan al-Kubba, and Bassam to the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio, appointed 'Abd al-Majid Mahmud, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, to the Ministry of Economics, moved Dhiya' Ja'far to Works, and retained 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan at Finance. But no real coalition had emerged, and internal politics showed no sign of rising above the habitual strife of rival personalities. A formidable range of unsolved problems, inter-Arab and international, political and financial, confronted Nuri Sa'id, none more conspicuously than those of Israel and the Palestine refugees, revision of the 1930 Treaty, and the extraction of greater oil profits. To these the veteran statesman now turned.

643 King Faysal II, whose fifteenth birthday fell on 2 May 1950, had completed his preparatory school days in England and since the spring of 1949 had been a happy and successful Harrow schoolboy. He was to attain his majority on 2 May 1953. His family had acquired a house near Staines where the Queen Mother 'Aliya spent most of the year. Her health, however, began to cause alarm in 1949 and after a long illness and operation she returned home to die in Baghdad in September 1950, aged only thirty-nine; a tragic loss to the King and to her devoted brother, the Regent.

4. WEALTH OF A NATION

652 There have been references on earlier pages to the serious position of the State finances in the period 1947–9 and to the substantial recovery therefrom by the end of 1950. It could be foreseen by the latter date that, so far from financial stringency, the resources at the Government's disposal would in future be ample not only for normal purposes of the public services as hitherto conceived but also for an expanding programme of development. Provided that control of expenditure were maintained as efficiently as it had been (except in 1948) in the past, which there was no reason to doubt: that the probity and efficiency of Government personnel did not deteriorate: that the efforts made to perfect the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

642 day. It did not regard itself as the battleground of rival policies, nor, as under the Constitution it should be, as the arbiter of Ministries which, on the contrary, enjoyed an almost independent existence. At the same time by their manner of two-stage Government-controlled election, and by the wide gulf between most of the deputies and their constituents, the activity of the former was almost independent of the electorate: a position reflecting not so much defects in the Constitution as the backwardness of an illiterate electorate capable neither of exercising an enlightened free choice in selecting its spokesmen, nor of controlling them when selected. And even should the political parties occupy the Mutaṣarrif's place as the effective selectors of deputies, and electoral processes be basically altered (as opposition parties ceased not to demand), this situation in its essentials must still subsist for many years.

665 The working of parliamentary democracy which had been imposed on 'Iraq in its political infancy has seemed everywhere to demand responsible parties to represent rival policies and therewith to contend for power. But these in 'Iraq, in a form adequate to their task, did not exist. These pages have indeed made many references to the parties which, after some years' intermission, came into existence in 1946 or thereafter. They were, by 1951, responsible for the greatest part of specifically political activity in the country, and their scale and perhaps their permanence had to some degree increased by comparison with their predecessors of a generation earlier. The parties active at the mid-century, if we ignore the illegal Communist Party still working in the shadows, were five in number. One[1] of these, a party in little more than name, seemed to stand less for a policy or principle than for the personalities and hopes of a miscellaneous group of ex-ministers not unwilling to reappear in office. Two[2] of the parties, appealing to the more progressive elements in urban educated or intelligentsia circles, advocated rapid advance along many lines, with emphasis as ever on complete independence, neutrality, and social and cultural reform; they had a militant and indeed an over-violent press, and were able at times to arouse, but not to control, the emotion of the mob; but they had no considerable support from the mass of citizens. The two remaining parties were those of Nuri Sa'id (p. 355) and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr (p. 363), both standing for a mixed and various body of the possessing and substantially satisfied classes including notables, landowners, shaykhs, and their respec-

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[1] The United Popular Front of Ṭaha al-Hashimi (pp. 364 and 389). It showed, late in 1951, signs of disintegration.

[2] The National Democratic Party of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the Independence Party of Muḥammad Mahdi Kubba and Fa'iq Samarri'i (pp. 335 and 336).

tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively 665
responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it 642
appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism 181
as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local 642
nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over- 186
sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

The convening of Parliament at Constantinople also en-
175* couraged 'Iraqi Nationalists by bringing them into contact with
668* the ardent Nationalists of other parts of the Empire, who, in
186* spite of the great care with which the C.U.P. had conducted
665 the elections, found seats in the Chamber. With them the 'Iraqis made common cause in the Moderate Liberal party, founded by Prince Sabah-ed-Dīn in opposition to the C.U.P., and later in the *Itilāf* or Coalition party. These parties were not merely sectional groups, although the 'Iraqī branches of the former, founded in Basra and Baghdad in August and September, 1911, were known in 'Iraq as the *Hurr-i-Mū'tadil*, while branches of the *Itilāf* to which the Moderate Liberal party gave way in early 1912 were known as *Hurriya wa Itilāf*. The organization of the parties extended throughout the Empire, the branch in Basra, for instance, being formed by Saiyid Talib Pasha in obedience to a telegram sent by a person unknown.

In the years 1910 and 1911, 'Iraqī feeling also sought means of outlet through the press. In these two years were established 36 Arabic newspapers or 60 per cent of the 61 founded in 'Iraq during the period 1904 to 1914; 22 or nearly 40 per cent being started in 1911 alone.[1] Of these, 19 were established in Baghdad. In the same 2 years, were founded 6 of the 9 magazines established in the same period of 1904 to 1914. A number of these papers were periodically suppressed by the Turks, after which the owners reissued them under new names.

175* In the years 1912 and 1913, the movement firmly established
665* itself in 'Iraq. The British Resident in Baghdad in an official
186* report in early 1912 stated:

> I have been much struck of late by the increasing freedom with which anti-C.U.P. and anti-Turkish sentiments are expressed here. Hitherto this was regarded as treason to the State . . . This growing political confidence of non-Turkish Muhammadan elements is noticeable even among officials. . . . It is clear also that the eldest son of the *Kiliddar* of Najaf

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[1] Based on Tarazi, op. cit.

175* immediately asked for a ship of war for the protection of
668* British interests.[1] H.M.S. *Alert* arrived at Basra on May 4th.
186* Saiyid Talib, however, finding that Shaikh Ajaimī had moved
with his Muntafiq tribesmen towards Basra with the intention of supporting the Government and that a new Wilayet Law had been promulgated, agreed on May 12th to press Arab demands with moderation.

The new Wilayet Law, together with an official circular from the Ministry of Interior conceding wide official use of Arabic in 'Iraq, had supposedly granted self-government on paper, but neither Saiyid Talib nor other Arab leaders were misled as to its real nature. The new law, if ever applied, which they doubted, still kept real power in the hands of the *Walī* or Governor, while they had in mind actual participation by Arabs in the Government. In spite of the momentary check to the Nationalists at Basra, the Arabs elsewhere redoubled their efforts to obtain the full measure of their demands.

175* The Arab Movement had developed faster in Basra than in
668* Baghdad, due to the efforts of Talib Pasha, but Nationalism was
186* not lacking in strength in the latter city. In closer contact than
665 Basra with the Nationalist Movement at Constantinople and
among the Syrians and Egyptians, the Baghdad Nationalists had divided themselves into four groups. One section consisted of partisans of Saiyid Talib and the Basra Nationalists. Another looked to Syria for leadership and assistance. Still another group was in correspondence with Egypt, from which it was rumoured that the Khedive would be elected King and *Khalīfa* of the Muslims. The fourth group formed a separate Baghdad party, relying chiefly on their own efforts and on their own leaders. These groups, however, were without hard and fast lines, and in the spring of 1913, when a concerted effort was made to unite the Arabs of 'Iraq, Syria and Egypt in presenting demands to Constantinople, the groups apparently sank their differences and began to work together. The local secret

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[1] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, May, 1913.

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Patriotic Society, formed in 1912 to expel the Turks and to 175*
establish autonomous government, had as members the princi- 668*
pal Arabs, including more than a hundred Arab officers of all 186*
ranks. Manifestos and literature from Basra and Constantinople 665
attacking the Turkish Government circulated in the city. Placards appeared on the walls of Baghdad, as on March 18th, exhorting Arabs to rise against their oppressors and to demand autonomy or decentralization. The reforms announced in April and May were dismissed as being inadequate. The newspapers *Bain an-Nahrain* and *al-Misbāh*[1] took courage and demanded further reforms and decentralization. A delegate, Taufīq as-Sūwaidī, son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, an outstanding leader in the Movement, was nominated to the first Arab Congress held in Paris, June 18th, 1913. Even more significant was the growing hostility between the Turkish and the Arab officers of the 13th Army Corps in the Baghdad Barracks, and between the Turkish and Arab civil officials of the Wilayet.[2]

The Turks were not inactive in the face of these manifesta- 175*
tions of Arab feeling. Arab teachers and *mullas* were appointed 668*
to advocate faithfulness to the Government, inspired articles 186*
appeared in the Press,[3] and reforms were promised. Spies were increased and following a search in Baghdad by the police for a supposed emissary of Egyptian and Syrian Nationalists, a sudden arrest of Arab leaders was made, June 14th. Among them were: Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Kāmil Effendi, proprietor of the suppressed *Bain an-Nahrain*, Shukrī Effendi and Salmān Effendi. Mahmūd Effendi, editor of *Bain an-Nahrain*, was also

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[1] Founded in Baghdad by Muhammad Kāmil, December 9th, 1909, and by 'Abdul Husain al-'Uzrī, March 7th, 1911.

[2] *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March to October, 1913, *passim*.

[3] *Al-Zuhūr* (Baghdad) published the following, March 14th, 1913, under the heading 'Decentralization':

'Some Muhammadans want decentralization. They ought to know that decentralization is not permissible according to the Muhammadan Law because the centre of the whole Islamic world is the town of the *Khalīfa*. Christians are said to be making great progress by means of decentralization, but Muslims must recollect that Christians have three Gods and can, therefore, have more than one centre. Muslims, having only one God, can have but one centre.'

175x 186x 668x Kamāl and now awaited a final blow at 'Āna at the hands of the Arabs led by the Sharīf 'Abdullāh, filled the Syrian newspapers and circulated in the coffee shops of Baghdad, Mōsul and every town in the land.

Nowhere was the anti-British feeling engendered by these activities more apparent than in Mōsul and in the surrounding country. In Mōsul during 1919, striking progress had been made under British administration. Public security was vastly improved, taxation equalized, the city so cleansed that the transformation appeared miraculous to those who had known it in pre-war days.[1] Education had been encouraged and medical treatment had been extended to all.[2] Trade had been stimulated and a return of prosperity seemed imminent. Nevertheless, it was evident that ready acquiescence by the Muslims in British Administration was being rendered extremely difficult by the general acceptance of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, by the delay in signing the peace treaty with Turkey, by the existence of an Arab State in Syria and by the 665 claims of Islam and of self-interest.[3] Indications had not been 175x lacking of the activities of the Nationalist society, *Al-'Ahd al-'Irāqīya*, which had been introduced, it was said,[4] by Jamīl Beg 186x 668x Midfai, a native of Mōsul and a member of Amīr Faisal's staff,[5] and by 'Ibrāhīm Kamāl Beg when they visited Mōsul in March, 1919.

Following the occupation of Dair az-Zūr by the Damascus Government and the appointment of the violently anti-British *Mudīr* to Mayyādīn, the society gave open manifestation of its hostility to the British Administration in the form of meetings and in the posting of anti-government notices, ranging in subject from obscene abuse to well-written proclamations calling

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[1] See Sykes, Sir Mark, *The Caliph's Last Heritage* (1915), p. 3389.

[2] *Admin. Report*, 1919, *Mesopotamia*, Part 1, Mōsul, p. 32.

[3] Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

[4] *Admin. Report*, *Mosul Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 3.

[5] As leader of the attack on Tall 'Afar, he was excluded from the amnesty of 1921. He was pardoned in April, 1922, and has been three times Prime Minister of 'Iraq as well as Minister of Interior, Minister of Defence, etc.

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upon Arabs to rise and die for their fatherland. For the most 665
part, *Al-'Ahd* seemed to be composed of young men: doctors, 175
lawyers, schoolmasters (a number of whom had been dismissed 186'
in the winter of 1919 for too violently proclaiming their anti- 668*
British sentiments) and the like. Nevertheless, while the members may have been unimportant individually, collectively they were important. The moderates, as is usually the case, held their peace and remained passive. *Al-'Ahd*, on the other hand, being well organized and having definite aims, gained the ear of the populace.[1]

It became evident that the society in Mōsul was in contact with members of the parent society in Dair az-Zūr and beyond, and that the Mōsulīs were prepared to rise should any opportunity be given them by the Sharifian forces. In late March, 1920, 175^
the first definite reports that the Arab Government intended to 186*
attack Mōsul were received and throughout April and May the 669
tension increased. Outside Mōsul, the Shammar Jarba under 'Ajīl al-Yawar, Michal al-Fāris Bunaiyan, Hamaidī and others, the Khābūr Jūbūr under Muslat, the 'Albū Nimr, the 'Aqaidāt and other tribes[2] were rendering life and property unsafe. From April onwards, the concentration of tribal raids on military supply-camps and on military convoys between the Shargat rail-head and Mōsul pointed to other purposes than mere desire for loot, and to a higher control than that of tribal shaikhs. The methods employed seemed to indicate that the former officers of Faisal's Arab Army had not forgotten the tactics used by Colonel Lawrence and his fellow officers against the Turkish lines of supply in the Hijāz and in Syria. Instead of

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[1] The Society was admitted by the authorities to be extremely well organized (Ibid., p. 5). Not until late May was the Government able to identify definitely even a few of the leading members. Of the other two patriotic societies, the *Haras* (the continuation of the pre-war secret society) and the *Hillal*, nothing was known to the authorities except the names.

[2] For locale and strength of these tribes: *Note on Nomad Tribes*, by Major J. I. Eadie; *Note on Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Anah-Albu Kamal Districts*; *Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayet*; *Note on Tribes for General Staff*; and *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, pp. 110 ff.

115ˣ Colonial Office that, in the event of a rising, which was con-
727' fidentially to be expected, His Majesty disclaimed all responsi-
648 bility. He begged the High Commissioner either to assume the
16 conduct of administration or to give himself a free hand to
668 direct affairs on such lines as he saw fit.

The High Commissioner immediately drafted a strong reply, pointing out the responsibility of the King in the situation. The letter was withheld, however, in order that it might not mar the approaching anniversary of King Faisal's accession.

● [665] The two Nationalist political parties, *Hizb al-Watanī*,[1] (National Party), and *Hizb an-Nahdha*[2] (Renaissance Party), which, with the *Hizb al-Hurr*[3] (Independent Party), had been formed in early August to take part in the prospective elections,[4] thought the moment opportune to add their weight to the protests against the Mandate. At a joint meeting, on November 20th and 21st, under the presidency of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, the parties drew up an address which they presented to the King.[5] The address culminated in three demands:

1. Immediate termination of the present policy and of British influence.
2. Selection of a Cabinet, members of which were to be sincere patriots, possessing the confidence of the people.
3. Suspension of treaty negotiations until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, its members having been freely elected.[6]

Arrangements were also made by the parties for a joint public protest on August 23rd at the anniversary celebration.[7]

On the morning of the 23rd, when the High Commissioner

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[1] Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 8th, 1922.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, August 10th, 1922; Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 21st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, August 11th, 1922.

[4] The Law of Associations, under which the parties were strictly regulated had been approved, after much delay, by the Council on June 29th, and promulgated on July 2nd, 1922. *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 56-8.

[5] *Al-Mufid*, August 22nd, 1922.

[6] *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufid*, June 23rd, 1922.

[7] *Al-'Iraq* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922.

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'Iraqī viewpoints[1] and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confi- 645- dence by Parliament[2] had unfortunate consequences. On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased.

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council [795] maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects.

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqis have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat 665-669

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[1] Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Iraqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nājī Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

[2] *Supra*, p. 422, note.

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648 669 German representatives for the provision of military aid. A number of aircraft were in fact dispatched with an advance party to Baghdad and Mosul and armaments were supplied by the Vichy Government of Syria, who also put its aerodromes at the disposal of German aircraft; but the coup was premature from the point of view of the German Command, whose forces were required for the immediate conquest of Crete and the all-essential invasion of the Soviet Union, and the assistance given was too late and limited to prevent collapse.

Succeeding Governments co-operated effectively with the Allied war effort, and Iraq became a base for operations against the Levant and Persia (1941) and for aid to Russia, and in January 1943 she declared war on the Axis Powers and signed the Declaration of the United Nations. In 1945 a rebellion of the Kurdish Barzani tribe, which had continued intermittently since 1943, was finally suppressed, and the rebels took refuge in the so-called Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (north-west Persia) which had newly been formed under Soviet inspiration, and, after its collapse, in the Soviet Union itself.

Relations with Other Middle East Countries

648 In 1945 Iraq signed the Arab League Pact, towards whose realization Nuri as-Said, Prime Minister from 1941 to 1944, played a leading part, though the Arab states rejected as premature his further proposal for the union of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan in one state. A project in 1946 for a close union between Iraq and Jordan was criticized both in the Arab League and in Iraq and Jordan, and was diluted into a treaty of alliance and eternal brotherhood between the two countries, which provided for consultation in the event of aggression by a third party and military intervention by one party to suppress disorders or rebellion in the other. In 1947, in spite of internal opposition, a treaty of friendship with Turkey was ratified. It was intended that Turkey should sign similar treaties with other Arab states to form a Middle East bloc in replacement of the moribund Saadabad Pact, but in the event Jordan was the only other state to sign.

[665] In 1946 permission was given for the formation of political parties, of which none had existed since the mid-thirties. Licences were granted to five, of which two were subsequently suppressed, but were refused to the Communist groups, which continued to operate, as they had done both before and after their reinforcement in 1941, in secret. Though considerably weakened by official action against them in 1947, they are alleged to have played an active part in the disturbances at

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648 Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

668 Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the econo-
•665 mic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified
the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and
[185] continued action against Communism and incipient plans for
national development have not so far availed to counteract.
[565] The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely
[870] lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but
the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

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through the temporary support of the Baghdad mob. Even over the mob, once aroused, they have had no control, and demonstrations and rioting which they have played some part in provoking have been apt to benefit only the underground Communists. The real contestants for power since 1951 have been the parties based on the personalities of Nuri as-Said and Salih Jabr, both of them progressive in programme but supported by the same conservative commercial and landed interests, the party of Salih Jabr also by a certain Shii sentiment. In programme all five political parties[1] have been similar, though at any rate two of the three extreme parties have depended more on stated principle and less on personality than the others. Even in these the influence of personality has been greater than in British political parties, from which, too, they have differed in having as official members mostly professional politicians, with however a certain amount of public—mostly intellectual and student—support. The group of Nuri as-Said and its sympathizers have been in power during this period, the group of Salih Jabr maintaining an opposition which, mild at its inception, has, under the influence of personality and political developments, approximated increasingly to that of the more extreme parties, with which it has been in uneasy accord in opposing the new oil agreement of 1952 and demanding single-stage parliamentary elections for 1953.

Political tension and popular restlessness increased during the summer of 1952 under an irresolute caretaker Government which had been appointed in preparation for the elections, and in November a students' strike was converted by agitators into a demand for single-stage elections and resulted in rioting, arson, and loss of life. The army was called in to restore order and the non-political Chief of General Staff accepted the premiership with a mandate of pacification, which he was successful in implementing, though his well-meant attempts to improve the economic condition of the public were too superficial to be effective and disappointed the hopes which attended his popular appointment. Whether the return, in however restrained a form, of the army to politics will have re-established an old precedent is still to be seen. General Nur ad-Din's premiership was remote from military dictatorship, but it is inevitable that events in Syria and especially in Egypt should have turned some minds in that formerly unpopular direction.

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[1] The five parties were: Constitutional Union Party of Nuri Said; Umma Socialist Party of Salih Jabr; Independence Party of Mohammed Mahdi Kubba; National Democratic Party of Kamil Chadirchi; United Popular Front of General Taha al-Hashimi.

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties including
666 the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in
January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former
opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge
of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally
showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither
the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have
affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect
of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in
spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred.
The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently
abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for
little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the
time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election
of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals
of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September
by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the
Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree
on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume
their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an honourable past in the service of the Government and the country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

a Başra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a 645*
Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajji
Ja'far abu al-Timman. This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al-Timman, 648x
accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the
proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the
Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent
Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet 666 •
approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of 668
electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited,
to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, 186
by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by
a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was
especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating
nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaşarrif. Conditions
elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were
uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made
by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British)
politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble
was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i 665
political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani 668
(Nationalist) and the Nahdha (Awakening); these were matched by
the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, 648x
Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot'
meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties
and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible
rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded
that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate
in elections. al-Khaliṣi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish
views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence.
The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least
tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their
more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The 668
King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification 648x
with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a
Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government
but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost
infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening.
Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23
August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly
to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime
Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée
itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the bazaars were closed in condemnation of this outrage to the 793 men of learning, a party of whom gathered to withdraw in dudgeon 668 from ungrateful 'Iraq. These proceeded to Karbalā, were deaf to Government reassurances, and with diminished numbers left 'Iraq for Kirmanshah. Here the holy men awaited with complete confidence the results of so striking a gesture. But there were none. Even in the Holy Cities no commotion followed; Sunni observers were delighted; to the Government it was a veritable answer to prayer, and the dutiful protests of the Persian Government fell on deaf ears in Baghdad. A mediating visit to 'Iraq by the British Minister in Teheran was fruitless. Only after a formal approach to the Prime Minister by spokesmen of the 'Ulamā in November 1923, with protestations of a change of heart and policy, were their self-exiled colleagues permitted to return on the condition of abstention from politics henceforward. The main body re-entered 'Iraq in April 1924, still influential but never to regain their old dominion in the country's affairs.

The field thus clear, election machinery could start to operate. 666 Uneasiness among the Kurds and Turkomans of Kirkuk and Arbil at the prospect of 'Arab Government' was calmed by the High Commissioner. Some ambiguity in the legal provisions for tribal representation was cleared up; tribesmen, it was ruled by the Ministry of Justice, could register as ordinary voters in addition to enjoying their specific representation by twenty deputies. So novel a concession to the tribes, for whom Turkish conceptions had provided no voice at all, was obnoxious to the conservatives of Sayid Maḥmud's Free Party, and disrupted it to vanishing-point. The voters of Sulaymaniya liwā, of whom numbers had perforce registered in Kirkuk while their own headquarter town was beyond control, completed their own liwā rolls and could choose their own deputies when in 1924 it was reoccupied (p. 152). By the mid-March of that year the procedure of primary and secondary election was complete.

The Cabinet of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey had by November 1923 645" reached a stage of *malaise* which presaged the end. It was due to discord with the Shi'i element and to some disagreements with the King. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, who had returned from Geneva to spend a few valuable days as Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, was invited by the King to form the Cabinet which should face the Constituent Assembly. Accepting the charge, he retained two Shi'i ministers including Muḥsin al-Shallash at Finance, brought to Interior 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi (a modern-minded ex-officer who had acted as Mutaṣarrif of Ḥilla), and completed his team with Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, Nuri Sa'id, and the eminent Mosul and Baṣra notables, Sayid Aḥmad al-Fakhri and Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan, in other

exhortations, refusals. By late afternoon there was no result, and 648x
Dobbs categorically refused a twenty-four hour postponement. Before midnight, however, the Prime Minister, Ja'far Pasha, succeeded in convening 69 out of the 100 delegates in the Assembly Hall. Thirty-seven votes for the unamended Treaty were in the end obtained, with 24 in opposition; the 8 abstentions were due, beyond doubt, to intimidation. Acceptance of the Treaty, even ratified in this sadly abnormal manner, was hedged with conditions which Ja'far Pasha found it necessary to specify—that the British Government should honour its reassurances by amending the Financial Agreement in 'Iraq's favour: that the King of 'Iraq should hasten to negotiate with the British Government to this end: and that the whole Treaty should be null and void 'if the British Government fail to safeguard the rights of 'Iraq in the Mosul wilaya in its entirety'.

The stormy days and nights of Treaty ratification were followed in 'Iraq at large by a period of relative peace; a peace in which every anti-Treaty or anti-British element remained dormant but alive. In the Assembly, a peaceful passage of the Organic and the Electoral Laws marked the jaded weariness of deputies.

The Organic Law, a reasonably adequate result of repeated 642
redrafting, endowed 'Iraq with a semi-rigid Constitution which,
proclaiming it 'a sovereign State, independent and free' with a
constitutional hereditary monarchy and a representative Govern-
ment, set forth the rights of the people and the Crown, the legisla-
ture and the ministers, established the Courts, and regulated
financial and administrative responsibilities. The Electoral Law 666
enfranchised every adult male tax-paying 'Iraqi, and provided for
a procedure of primary and secondary election, whereby the
secondary electors, one for every 250 primary, elected a deputy to
represent every 20,000 voters. The deputy must belong to the same
electoral circle, consisting of a group of liwās, as the voter. Separ-
ate representation was enjoyed by tribesmen and by the Christian
and Jewish minority communities of the liwās of Baghdad, Başra,
and Mosul.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly gave Ja'far Pasha 645*
the opportunity, which he had been seeking, to resign from the premiership. A new Cabinet was formed on 2 August under Yasin Pasha, to be confronted by pressing questions of the northern frontier and of financial stringency. 'Ābd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun was called to the Ministry of the Interior, Sasun Ḥasqayl to Finance. To the Ministry of Justice came a young and clever, but unstable and hasty lawyer of good family, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani; and to that of Communications and Works an imposing and not incompetent younger member of the Pachachi house, Muzaḥim Bey.

manner an occupation', and 'in no way prejudice the sovereign 648x rights of 'Iraq'. The latter's forces were to be aided by Great Britain with arms, equipment, and training: in time of war British forces were to enjoy 'all facilities and assistance' in 'Iraq's power to give, and free movement by land, air, and water. The British representative at Baghdad was to hold ambassadorial rank and to enjoy precedence over other diplomats. The Treaty was to have a life of twenty years.

A new Financial Agreement, for which the Treaty provided, arranged for the cession of abandoned British camps and aerodromes to 'Iraq within five years, for the transfer of the 'Iraq Railways to an *ad hoc* Corporation, and for that of the Port of Baṣra to a Port Trust. Foreign officials needed by the 'Iraq Government were to be British, and the conditions of service of those already employed would remain unaffected.

Even before Treaty revision had reached its final stage, negotiations had been in progress for the replacement of the 1924 Judicial Agreement, in which the surviving remnants of the old Turkish Capitulatory régime ill accorded with 'Iraq's future status. The new Agreement, initialed by Nuri Pasha and the High Commissioner on the same day as the Treaty and ratified on 4 March 1931, provided for 'a uniform system of justice . . . applicable to all 'Iraqis and foreigners alike'. To facilitate this a number of British lawyers, later determined as nine, were to be employed for a period in the Courts and the Ministry of Justice. Certain alterations in the Criminal Code and in the rules of evidence were to be made (and were made in fact) before the Agreement took effect. Communicated to the League of Nations, this Agreement was approved on condition that all ex-Capitulatory Powers accepted the new position of their subjects in 'Iraq under it. They did so without exception within a few months: an acceptance which went far to render 'Iraq's new status acceptable to other nations.

Even accompanied as it was by an understanding with the High Commissioner for the immediate reduction of British officials, whereunder the ubiquitous Administrative Inspectors were in fact diminished in number and largely recalled from the provinces to Baghdad, the Treaty was received without enthusiasm in 'Iraq, and was, for opposite reasons, sternly criticized by many spokesmen in Great Britain. By the 'Iraq minorities immediate alarm was felt, as will appear later; by the ultra-nationalist politicians it was hailed, by reason of such British privileges as were to survive, as a mere continuance of 'slavery'. The Prime Minister decided upon a general election to strengthen his Ministry's position and to 648x
determine, at least ostensibly, the nation's attitude. The National- 668
ist Party, not content with an attempted boycott of the elections, 666

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 and the fullest activity of their press articles, hand-bills, and
669 oratory, did not hesitate to invoke the authority of the Shi'i
666 Mujtahids in condemnation of the new Treaty. These, however,
● 666 declined for once to intervene, except partially at Samarrā, and the
elections were peacefully conducted in the districts; only at Sulaymaniya a major clash between violent demonstrators and the police resulted in bloodshed and the loss of a score of lives. All results were known by the end of October 1930, and showed a sweeping victory of the Government party. The ratification of the Treaty by Parliament, which met as usual on 1 November, could not now be prevented by the fierce denunciations of die-hard patriots; the voting was in favour by 69 against 13 in the Chamber, 11 against 5 in the Senate.

648 But much remained to be done, both in Baghdad and in Geneva.
646 Parliament sat on, immersed in legislation and in vehement
politics, until the midsummer of 1931. The opposition to the Sa'idi Ministry had by that time been reorganized in a grouping more formidable than the isolated Nationalist Party which, thanks to the usual control exercised by the liwā officials, had made so poor
648 a showing in the elections. Political leaders hostile to Nuri and,
with reservations, to the Treaty—Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-
665 Suwaydi, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, and 'Ali Jawdat who had
668 resigned from the Cabinet in September and been succeeded by
Rustum Ḥaydar from the Palace—formed from the Nationalist and the People's Parties and like-thinking elements a Party of National Brotherhood—Ḥizb al-Ikhā al-Waṭani. At its inaugural meeting in March 1931 its objects were stated to include the dissolution of a flagrantly unrepresentative Parliament and the formation of a new Government 'pledged to reconsider the external relations of 'Iraq'. Certain of its members as a gesture thought fit to resign their seats in the Chamber; all resolved to pursue their campaign in the press and country. Nuri Pasha on his side had already formed, from deputies favourable to him, the 'Ahd (Covenant) Party, with an appeal to the great days of al-'Ahd and a programme of Treaty implementation.

Among the first acts of the Ikhā was the organization in July 1931 of a series of strikes in the 'Iraq townships without precedent for their concerted timing and wide extent. They had little object but the embarrassment of Government. The trades' organizations in the bazaars took fright—or were maliciously alarmed—at a clause in the newly passed Municipal Taxation Law which could be read as unfavourable to them. The misunderstanding, which was easily elucidated by Government, was encouraged to persist, and it was not until late in July, after attempts had been made to spread unrest to northern 'Iraq, and disorder in Baṣra and the

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions. 181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradi- 665 tion of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free 204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations' in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe. The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in 646 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the 666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions, that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of 662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

*645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

● 666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

*645 661 The formation of a Government under Rashid 'Āli, in the presence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-Ikhā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Āli began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Ḥikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Ḥaydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muḥammad Zaki al-Baṣri, in Justice.

*645 668 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national cooperation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

passage of a law authorizing conscription, at long last, was received 645* with seeming indifference.

Late in August Madfa'i offered his resignation. The Chief of the Royal Diwan, 'Ali Jawdat, whose favourable position to influence the King and to arrange suitable alliances had not been neglected, himself accepted the premiership and the Ministry of the Interior on 28 August. His place in the Palace was taken by Rustum Ḥaydar. Nuri Sa'id re-entered the Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Madfa'i in that of Defence. To the Ministry of Works came Arshad al-'Umari, a Turkish-trained civil engineer of the famous Mosul family, to Finance the Christian economist, Yusif Ghanima, and to Education 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi.

The first act of 'Ali Jawdat was to dissolve Parliament—a step 646 doubtfully constitutional and condemned by the Ikhā, but necessary 668 to secure parliamentary support. He went to lengths unusual 666 even in 'Iraq, it was claimed by his opponents, in instructing the liwā officials on the personalities to be returned to the Chamber. The resulting Parliament met in the first week of 1934. Packed with the Premier's nominees, it was unrepresentative of the Ikhā opposition, poor in tribal spokesmen, and proportionately unjust to the Shi'is; nor did 'Ali Jawdat's initiative in founding a Party of National Unity, which barely attained life before expiring, produce the desired co-operation. The election procedure was strongly criticized in the Chamber of Deputies; the Senate opposed the régime to the extent of absenting themselves from their House; Baghdad political circles raged at their own exclusion and at the many illegalities alleged; hostile posters and pamphlets appeared on walls and in coffee-shops. All administrative shortcomings were once again, and unreasonably, attributed to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet itself was unhappy, Madfa'i and 'Umari were felt to be doubtfully loyal, Yusif Ghanima a political nonentity. Far 668 more sinister, however, was the stream of subversive propaganda which poured insistently from the capital, inciting tribesmen to emotions bound to end in anti-Government violence. It was understood to emanate from a group of opposition statesmen, bitter in their frustration and led by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The propaganda was addressed to potentially malcontent Kurds in the far north, and more regularly to the Najf-dominated tribes of the Euphrates, where such shaykhly politicians as 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr of the Fatla had been unwisely excluded from Parliament and had everything, private and public, to hope from a change of Government. With 'Abd al-Waḥid were men of similar stamp, Sayid Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh, 'Alwan al-Yasiri, and others. Simultaneously, and by reaction against the claim of these to leadership, another half of the tribal world, not less unquiet and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

X

END OF THE HALF-CENTURY

I. GATHERING STORM

*645 THE resignation of the Pachachi Government was followed by a month of uneasiness while the choice of a successor Cabinet was delayed. Despite the alleged misgivings of the Regent, the premiership fell on 23 February 1946 to Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, a statesman whose many gifts did not include that of creating confidence. He retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, brought the able and vigorous 'Ali Mumtaz to Works, General Isma'il Namiq to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Justice, and Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban to Social Affairs. To the three all-important Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Supply he appointed respectively Sa'd Ṣaliḥ, a Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif hostile to Ṣaliḥ Jabr: 'Abd al-Wahhab Maḥmud, a Baṣra lawyer with a stormy political past: and another Shi'i, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Chalabi, of American education and unusual ability. Two more newcomers assumed duty at the Ministries of Economics and Education: 'Abd al-Hadi al-Dhahir—a third Shi'i and ex-official—and Najib al-Rawi. The composition of this Cabinet was modified in April by the substitution of Dr. Shawkat al-Zahawi, a Kurdish pathologist, for Baban at Social Affairs; and, in the last days of its short life, by the move of 'Ali Mumtaz to Foreign Affairs and Chalabi to Works.

652 Inspired by liberal views, the Ministry started with fair hopes. Although, surprisingly, no budget for 1946–7 was submitted, the State finances were still treated as giving no cause for immediate alarm. The 'hard currency' agreement made with the British in 1945 was renewed for a year, and a British trade mission under

● [666] Lord Davidson was welcomed in Baghdad. The new Electoral Law long under preparation was passed; substantially improving and liberalizing the existing procedures, it provided for the giving of due notice and publicity to forthcoming elections and to the candidates who offered themselves, and for the fragmentation of liwās into constituencies which would produce 138 instead of 115 deputies. It did not, however, introduce direct one-stage election, for which the Opposition parties combined to press as likely to be 'freer'. The Liwā Administration Law, passed in February, gave promise of greater zeal and initiative in local government, and of independent action in case of disorder.

668 Countryside security was well maintained. Winter passed into spring without the appearance of the expected trouble in Kurdistan,

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CHAPTER IX

THE PLEBISCITE OF 1918-1919

715* IN obtaining 'the views held by the local population',[1] the
727* Acting High Commissioner believed that the extension of the
648 plebiscite to the rank and file of the inhabitants was both
666 impracticable and unnecessary. The masses were too illiterate, too ignorant and dependent on their leaders to merit consideration. The garden cultivators and date growers of the Tigris and the Euphrates, the orange growers of Baʿqūbā, the shepherds of the Dulaim, the rice cultivators of Dīwānīya and Shāmīya, the marsh dwellers of ʿAmāra and Qurna, the tribesmen throughout the land and the townsmen of little substance were regarded as having neither opinions of their own nor ability to form them other than as echoes at the behest of their religious and secular leaders. The attention of the Civil Administration was therefore directed to those elements of the population who by position and by character were presumed to be favourable to continued British control, and whose opinions might be put forward as representative.

In the tribal districts and in small towns the plebiscite was confined to the shaikhs and land-owning dignitaries, called together in assemblies where they gave their declarations under their seals and signatures. Among the shaikhs, dependent on the British for support of their position,[2] for possession of their lands, as at ʿAmāra, or for their highly-prized subsidies,[3] and

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 29th, 1918. Cited, *supra*, p. 161.

[2] During the troubles of 1920, many shaikhs were forced into the towns, as they had no power to maintain themselves otherwise over their tribes.

[3] As in Dīwānīya Division, where every shaikh until 1920 received a subsidy from the Civil Administration.

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with whom the British Political Officers were usually on terms 175*
of friendship, the declarations or *madhibat* were almost 727*
unanimous for continued British rule. At a *majlis* in 'Amāra, 648*
at which the Acting Civil Commissioner was himself present,[1] 666
the shaikhs declared that they desired 'Englishmen speaking Arabic' and that they would not accept French, American or Arab officials. They requested that Sir Percy Cox become the governor of 'Iraq. In conclusion they asked that no higher offers for their lands be entertained and that they be protected in possession thereof as long as they were loyal to the Government.[2] The Qurna shaikhs replied in much the same vein.[3]

In Nāsirīya, a declaration or *madhbata*, signed by 271 tribal shaikhs, town notables and others, implied the continuance of the British administration; rejected the idea of an Amīr as not coinciding 'with our interests nor with the interests of 'Iraq in general';[4] and also requested that the management of their affairs should be undertaken by Sir Percy Cox.

The tribal shaikhs of Dīwānīya and of the Hilla Division in their declarations approved of continued British control. The former thanked the British Government for its desire to give them an Amīr which they agreed was in accordance with common sense and the dictates of their religion which enjoined them to appoint an *Imām*. They considered it premature, however, not only because of their own lack of experience in affairs, but also because no man seemed suitable for the office.[5] The tribal shaikhs around Karbalā, in which city the acute hostility of the *Mujtahids* made the suspension of inquiries desirable in accordance with the Acting Civil Commissioner's instructions, also declared for British administration and for Sir Percy Cox.[6] From Kūt al-'Amāra, Musaiyib and Khānaqīn

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[1] *Monthly Reports, December*, 1918: 'Amāra, p. 7.

[2] *Self-Determination in 'Iraq* (Secret compilation of Declarations in Arabic, with English translations) (Baghdad, May 17th, 1919): 'Amāra Declaration, p. 8.

[3] Ibid., Sec. 2, Qurna Declaration, p. 7.

[4] Ibid., Nāsirīya Declaration, p. 11.

[5] *Self-Determination*: Section 8, Hilla Declaration, No. 4 (Dīwānīya), p. 17.

[6] Ibid., Section 8, Hilla Declaration, No. 5, p. 18.

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175* came similar pronouncements[1] of approval of British rule and
727* requests for British officers.

648* In larger centres, as in Basra, individuals of importance were
666 interviewed personally by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Political Officers.[2] At Basra, where most of the dignitaries so interviewed were landowners or had benefited personally by the British Occupation, the majority of the declarations were for British Control.[3] In Mōsul, the ten declarations[4] taken from representatives of religious communities, seven of them from non-Muslim groups,[5] asked for British rule directly or for British protection. Two of the Muslim groups, Kurds, asserted that they would never live under Arab rule, as did also the Yazīdīs of Jabal Sinjar. The other Muslim declaration, representative of nearly 65,000 Muslims of Mōsul city[6] and about 100,000 non-Kurdish Muslims of the wilayet, also asked for British protection.[7]

In other districts, notably the Holy Cities, Najaf, Karbalā and Kādhimain, and in Baghdad, the course of the plebiscite did not run so smoothly nor were the pronouncements so favourable. In Najaf, 'the subject passed through three stages as far as the Government officials responsible for conducting it were concerned. At first sight, it appeared to present no great

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[1] *Self-Determination*: Section 4, Kūt Declarations, pp. 9-10; Section 8, Hilla Declaration No. 3 (Musaiyib), p. 16; Section 10, Khānaqīn Declaration No. 1, p. 20.

[2] *Monthly Reports, December*, 1918: Basra, p. 10; Hilla, p. 14.

[3] *Self-Determination*: Section 1, Basra Declarations, pp. 1-5.

[4] Ibid., Section 14, Mōsul Declarations, pp. 15-28.

[5] Representing 18·3 per cent of the total population of the wilayet, according to the official estimates of 1918-19, which gave the figures for Mōsul Wilayet, excluding Kirkūk, as:

Muslims:		Non-Muslims:	
Sunnis	425,813	Christians	55,370
Shī'is	22,100	Jews	13,835
		Others	31,180
Total	447,913	Total	100,385

[6] *Report, Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 1919, *Part I, Mosul* (Calcutta, 1920), p. 28, estimated the population of the city at 80,000, of which four-fifths were Muslims, the remainder being Christians, with a negligible number of Jews.

[7] *Self-Determination*: Section 14, Mōsul Declaration, No. 2, p. 26.

difficulty'.[1] The Acting Civil Commissioner, realizing the 175*
strategic importance of Najaf, appeared before the '*Ashraf*, 727'
representing the divines and tribal shaikhs, and explained to 648*
them that their opinion was to be asked on three questions. 666
The gathering was unanimously in favour of British protection from Mōsul to the Gulf without an Amīr. Two days later, however, a Shī'i of some local reputation came from Baghdad to Najaf and persuaded the dignitaries not to send the original petition.[2] On learning of the difficulty, the authorities got in touch with the leading notables including Saiyid Kādhim Yazdī, with whose help 'the matter was brought to a successful conclusion',[3] a series of fourteen declarations from individuals and groups being secured.[4] Some of these asked for a British Protectorate and an Amīr when the country should be ready for him. Several asked outright, however, for an Arab Government with an Amīr, no mention whatever being made of Great Britain.

In the city of Karbalā, the religious leaders or *Mujtahids* issued a decree or *fatwā* that any person who desired other than a Muslim government was an infidel. Under this pronouncement the people of the town hesitated. When they did make a declaration,

> their opinions were not in accordance with those taken by the Najafis. Fortunately, in Najaf the step had been irrevocably taken, and there could be no turning back. The double effect was that in Karbala no progress was made and the opinion formulated was never expressed officially, while in Najaf the discussion was closed beyond reopening.[5]

In Kādhimain, anti-British feeling ran high. 'The '*Ulamā* threatened with excommunication and exclusion from the

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[1] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 30.

[2] *Memorandum on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia* (Secret Memorandum No. S24, by Miss G. L. Bell, February 22, 1919), p. 3. An abridged version appears in Wilson, Sir A. T.: *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, App. 3.

[3] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

[4] *Self-Determination*: Section 7, Shāmiya Declarations, pp. 14-15.

[5] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

175 mosque anyone who voted for British Occupation.'[1] A group
725 of inhabitants, however, was found which drew up a declara-
648 tion in which the question of protection was left until after the
666 Peace Conference.[2]

In Baghdad, the centre of anti-British agitation, the difficulties facing the Civil Administration were even greater than elsewhere. The plan of delaying the plebiscite in Baghdad to the last in the hope, as expressed in the instructions to the Political Officers, that favourable declarations in other districts might influence Baghdad opinion, would not, it was soon apparent, produce the desired results. The inhabitants of the city, more politically minded and less inarticulate than other sections of the country, would not be influenced or even controlled as in other towns or in the tribal areas.

The attempt to convene an assembly of local dignitaries, carefully selected by persons believed to be favourably inclined to British rule, also failed. The Acting Civil Commissioner had proposed that the twenty-five Sunnī delegates should be selected by the Sunnī *Qādhī*.[3] Similarly, the twenty-five Shī'a representatives were to be chosen by the Shī'a *Qādhī*, 'a creation of the British Administration, no Shī'a *Qādhī* having been recognized by the Turks . . . a weak and colourless individual whose self-effacing piety' was his 'best recommendation'.[4] The heads of the Christian communities were to nominate the Christian delegates, and the Grand Rabbi, the Jewish representatives.

[1] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 4.

[2] *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, No. 8 (Kādhimain). A translation of the declaration, indicative of the trend of opinion in the Holy Cities, is as follows:

'In accordance with the liberty conferred on us by the Great Powers, the principal of which are the two esteemed Governments of Great Britain and France, we, being of the local Arab nation, choose a new Muslim Arab Government to be ruled by a Muhammadan King, one of the sons of our Lord the Sharīf, bound by a local *majlis*, and the question of protection will be considered after the Peace Conference. Dated 5th Rab'ath Thāni, 1337.' (Signed by 143 Muhammadan residents of Kādhimain.)

[3] The Naqīb, although asked to act with the *Qādhī*, had refused.

[4] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 4.

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PLEBISCITE OF 1918-1919

In the selection of the Muslim delegates, on whom the 175
character of the declarations of Baghdad opinion would depend,[1] 727
the *Qādhīs*, 'either by intent or under religious or political 648
pressure, did not execute their task loyally'.[2] Instead of 666
selecting representatives, they called 'meetings of their communities for the purpose of selection. At both gatherings, extremely inflammatory language was used and the delegates chosen were bound down to ask for an Arab Government without European protection'.[3] Not all the Muslims so chosen would serve, however. Seven Sunnīs and one Shī'ī resigned and were replaced by five Sunnīs. The group, with whom the Christians and the Jews would not act, passed on January 22nd, 1919, a declaration of which the following is a translation:

> As it has been understood that the object of the Governments of Great Britain and France in the East is the liberation of the people and the constitution of local Governments and administration founded on a practical basis, according to the wishes of the inhabitants, we being of the Muslim Arab nation and representing the Muslims of the Shī'a and Sunnī Communities inhabiting Baghdad and its suburbs, resolve that the country extending from northern Mōsul to the Persian Gulf to be one Arab State, headed by a Muhammadan King, one of the sons of our Sharīf Husain, bound by a local Legislative Council sitting at Baghdad, the capital of 'Iraq.[4]

The anti-British declaration of the Muslim delegates may well have been a disappointment to the Civil Administration. The vehemence of the group, however, brought about a reaction among the landowners and the more sober-minded notables who, responding to the suggestions judiciously thrown out by

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[1] If friendly Muslim magnates were chosen as intended, the Assembly would almost surely give the desired declaration since the non-Muslims were known to be standing solidly for continued British rule.

[2] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 128.

[3] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 5; Telegram, No. 1077, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, January 26th, 1919.

[4] *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, No. 2, p. 23.

175* members of the Civil Administration, readily brought in
727* declarations formulated along the desired lines.[1]

648* Ostensibly the results of the plebiscite confirmed the views
666 put forward by the Acting Civil Commissioner to H.M. Government. An almost universal desire that Mōsul should be included in the new State had been expressed.[2] Notables, both individually and collectively, of seven Divisions[3] had indicated a desire for British administration without substantial changes. A majority of declarations in five Divisions had manifested a desire for an Arab Government but, as the Acting Civil Commissioner had predicted, admissions were made that no suitable person could be found and that consequently British protection was desirable. Two Divisions had specifically declared against a son of the Sharīf of Mecca. The Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion of Sir Percy Cox as head of the new State[4] had been supported by declarations from four Divisions.[5] The three declarations which had declared for an Arab Government with a son of the Sharīf as ruler[6] were discounted as being the opinion of irresponsible and fanatical elements aroused by Nationalists and by ex-Turkish malcontents.[7]

In reality, it seems certain that while the greater portion of public opinion at that moment, on the simple issue of con-

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[1] *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, Nos. 1, 3-9, pp. 23-5.

[2] The Nāsirīya Declaration (*Self-Determination*: Section 5, Declaration No. 5; p. 11) stated the common belief:

'Ever since our boyhood we have been hearing that 'Iraq is composed of these wilayets: Basra, Baghdad, and Mōsul, which as a whole are called 'Iraq. Their capital has always been Baghdad. Anyhow, Mōsul is attached to Baghdad, as Baghdad is watered by Mōsul and Mōsul gets food from Baghdad by the sea trade. We, therefore, can never agree that the 'Iraq country should be detached from the Mōsul Wilayet.

'In the beginning of Islām, when war was waged between 'Alī and Mu'awīyah, Syria and its dependencies were under Mu'awīyah, while 'Iraq, along with Mōsul, was controlled by 'Alī. This is a sufficient reason.'

[3] 'Amāra, Qurna, Mōsul, Kūt, Basra, Hilla and Khānaqīn.

[4] Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918, cited *supra*, pp. 159-160.

[5] 'Amara, Nāsirīya, Karbalā and Baghdad (two).

[6] *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad No. 2, p. 23 and Kādhimain (Baghdad No. 8), p. 25; Section 9, Ba'qūbā (town), No. 3, p. 19.

[7] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia.*

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tinuance of British Occupation, was in favour of such rule, 175*
either direct or in support of an Arab Government, the picture 727*
was not so definitely clear-cut; public opinion was not so one- 698*
sided; nor was pro-British sentiment so preponderant as the 666 ●
declaration and the reports forwarded to the India Office might seem to indicate. The instructions issued by the Acting Civil Commissioner, the method of selecting those who signed the declarations, the personal interviews conducted by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Political Officers and the safeguards adopted so that none but favourable views might be registered, precluded a 'genuine expression of local opinion' in 'Iraq from ever finding its way to H.M. Government, unless the local opinion were satisfactory to the Civil Administration itself. The knowledge that all statements of opinion with signatures and seals would be forwarded to the Government by the Political Officers in accordance with instructions, made it certain from the beginning that most notables both tribal and urban, in order to keep themselves in the good books of the *Hakūma* or Government would make the protestations of loyalty and devotion which the British authorities so manifestly desired.

Not all of the measures taken to ensure favourable declarations were so indirect. Seven Arabs were deported from Baghdad for their activities in connection with the plebiscite. The declaration of the chosen representatives of the Baghdad Muslims, far from being accepted as the official declaration as originally intended, was dismissed as being unrepresentative of the politically and economically important inhabitants of Baghdad.[1] The opinion formulated by the city of Karbalā, the second most important of the Holy Cities of 'Iraq, was 'never expressed officially',[2] on account of the opposition to British rule which it contained. No declaration was obtained from

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[1] *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 6.

[2] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30. Cf. *Admin. Report, Hillah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 17.

175 Sāmarrā, the fourth of the Holy Cities. No declarations were
727 taken in the Dulaim Division, either from the tribes or from
648 Fallūja, Ramādī or other towns. One declaration signed by
● 666 twenty Muslims represented 160,000 Arab Muslims of Mōsul
Wilayet. Official pressure had to be brought to bear in Najaf[1]
before its notables produced satisfactory declarations.

666 The plebiscite as 'an authoritative statement of the views held
186 by the local population',[2] also failed to indicate the elements of
175 opposition in the country and to reveal their relative strength. 1
727 It gave no hint, for instance, of the large section of opinion,
647 particularly strong in Basra,[3] which, while recognizing the
benefits and the increased prosperity of British rule, found the constant growth of the military machine, including ports, camps and depots; the continuation of military regulations; the maintenance of demands for forced labour and the very efficiency of the administration with its insistence on promptness, probity and justice, too disturbing to their life-long habits of mind and of action and too much of a strain on their patience to be endured.[4]

The plebiscite gave no hint that the tribesmen, uncivilized, even barbarous, were already restive under the British tribal policy which gave the shaikhs relying on British support almost unlimited power over the details of tribal life, a power too often abused for the advancement of the shaikhs' own personal interests. It gave no inkling of such tribal feeling, which was to grow in intensity during the next eighteen months and which was to pave the way for the rebellion against both shaikhs and the British rule which maintained them in control.

The *Mujtahids* of the Shī'is and the other religious dignitaries who, firm in their opposition to any but a theocratic Muslim State, would allow no idols other than of their own making,

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[1] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

[2] See Telegram, cited *supra*, p. 161.

[3] See statement by the Rev. J. Van Ess, cited Wilson, op. cit., p. 112, confirmed to writer, in April, 1934.

[4] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 1.

1 [Then 1918-19 – Analyst]

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were dismissed, although their power over the masses was 186
enormous, as too ignorant of modern state-craft, too self- 175
centred and too alien to be allowed to influence the creation of 727
a new state. 648

The Nationalist elements, composed of those who had worked [565] for Arab autonomy before the war, those who prided themselves on being the intelligentsia of 'Iraq, and the religious leaders, were brushed aside, although they were destined to grow in power and influence during the coming months, especially under the stimulus of Nationalism in Syria, as being too negligible, too irresponsible and too full of sound and fury to merit consideration. No inferences seem to have been drawn from the fact that the anti-British declarations, almost identical in tenor and phraseology, pointed to a carefully organized opposition, just as the close resemblance of many of the pro-British declarations indicated the care and attention which the Civil Administration had devoted to the conduct of the plebiscite.

The failure of the plebiscite to represent all these elements of current opinion in their relative importance and to reflect local opinion in its true proportions, was destined to mislead H.M. Government in its attempts to set up a new State satisfactory to the inhabitants of 'Iraq, and, by making it complacently unaware of the need for quick and decisive action in settling the future of the country, to prepare the ground for the disastrous events of 1920.

The Electoral Law by which the Parliament (the powers of 642
which had given the drafters of the Organic Law great concern) 646
was to be brought into being, had early occupied the attention 666
of British and 'Iraqī officials.

The draft law, as presented and passed by the Constituent Assembly,[1] provided for an indirect system of election in accordance with the Turkish model on which both it and the Constituent Assembly Election Regulations[2] had been based. Deputies, in accordance with Article 36 of the Constitution, were to be elected in the proportion of one to every 20,000 primary voters who, among other qualifications (Article 33), were to be every male 'Iraqī, 21 years of age, paying taxes to the Government. Additional deputies, representing the Christians and the Jews, were also to be elected in the *Liwās* of Mōsul, Baghdad and Basra, in the following numbers:

Mōsul *Liwā*	2 Christians, 1 Jew.
Baghdad *Liwā*	1 Christian, 2 Jews.
Basra *Liwā*	1 Christian, 1 Jew.[3]

Primary electors, inscribed in registers by the electoral authorities of their electoral districts, into which the country had been divided, were to elect by secret ballot (Chapter I) the secondary electors in proportion of one to every 250 primary voters (Article 7). The secondary electors, assembling at the headquarters of their district, were to elect the deputies who, in addition to the qualifications enumerated in Articles 30 and 42 of the Constitution, had to reside within the electoral circle for which they were elected (Article 8).[4] To provide for by-elections, the secondary electors were to retain their office from one election until the next, and were to reconvene whenever called upon to elect a new deputy (Article 42).

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[1] *Infra*, Ch. XXI. Text: *Compilation*, 1924, pp. 45-51.

[2] *Compilation*, 1923, pp. 34-42, 47, 83, 157.

[3] Article 6.

[4] First circle: *Liwās* of Mōsul, Kirkūk, Sulaimānīya and 'Arbīl. Second circle: *Liwās* of Baghdad, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla, Karbalā, Kūt and Dīwāniyā. Third circle: *Liwās* of Muntafiq, 'Amāra and Basra.

642* Each step in the preparation of the registers, in the election
646 procedure, and in the certifying of deputies was minutely
66 prescribed by the law, penalties being laid down in accordance with modern practice for every possible contravention of the regulations.

642* The actual setting up of Parliament and the institution of the constitutional system were to await the ratification and the promulgation of the Organic Law and the Electoral Law. Nevertheless, in the two laws, through the efforts of their drafters, ample provision had been made along liberal lines, with the exception perhaps of the articles imposed in the interests of British policy, for the machinery and paraphernalia of a modern democratic State: a Sovereign, limited by law, a Council of Ministers responsible to Parliament, a Parliament consisting of a Senate and a representative Chamber of Deputies, and Judicial, Financial and Administrative systems. Provision had been made for the regulation of each institution. An outline had been provided into which further developments could be fitted in conformity with law as new circumstances made them essential. Comprehensive safeguards had been imposed for the rights of all sections of the population. Whether the machinery, the outlines and the safeguards so provided, however, were to be equal to the task of regenerating the country, to the progressive development of the new Kingdom and to the assurance of justice and equity to each member of the State, regardless of 'language, race or creed',[1] or whether they were to remain, as their Turkish prototypes had often remained, paper principles, depended on future circumstances, on the spirit and on the efficient zeal with which they were to be applied.

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[1] Constitution, Article 6.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE WORK OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Convocation of the Constituent Assembly

No subject, other than the employment of foreigners in government 666 posts and the general anti-Mandate propaganda occupied 668 more attention in the Arabic Press from 1920 onwards than the demand for the convocation of the promised Constituent Assembly in order that it might express the wishes of the country concerning its future Government. When, however, the '*Irāda* ordering the elections to the Constituent Assembly to begin on October 24th was issued, October 19th, 1922,[1] after a delay of nearly two years, it met with a far different response than had been anticipated. The Nationalists and the Shī'a '*Ulamā* united in opposition to its application. The '*Ulamā* of Najaf and of Kādhimain, including Shaikh Madhī al-Khālisī who had been among the Nationalists calling most loudly for the Constituent Assembly, were induced to issue *fatwās* in early November, forbidding any participation in the election.[2]

The immediate effect of the *fatwās* was to bring the elections to a standstill in Shi'a centres. In Najaf, Karbalā, Hilla and Kūfa, the Electoral Committees resigned. In Kādhimain, the officials declared themselves unable to form Election committees.[3] In Dulaim *Liwā*, however, the *fatwās* had no effect, but there, as in other tribal districts, little interest was taken in the elections until wider tribal representation was provided[1] at the insistence of the Residency which relied on its long-standing influence among the paramount Shaikhs to obtain their support in the Assembly. In addition, a large section of the public was reluctant to register, fearing that the election rolls would be used for conscription.[2]

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[1] *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 82.

[2] The *fatwās* issued collectively by the '*Ulamā* of Najaf and Kādhimain, November 8th, were followed by others by individual '*Ulamā*. A translation of one of the latter is as follows:

'Yes, we have issued the order to prohibit the elections by the whole 'Iraqi nation.

'That whoever participates or gives assistance in them will disobey God and His Prophet. God has said in His glorious book that whoever disobeys God and His Prophet, fire shall be his lot. (*sd.*) Muhammad Mahdī al-Khālisī.'

[3] *Baghdad Times*, November 25th, 1922.

Every effort was made to conciliate the *'Ulamā* but without success, the *fatwās* being reissued in June, 1923. It was maintained in British official circles that the only remedy lay in vigorous action against the leaders themselves. Only by their suppression would the opportunity be afforded of intimidating the rank and file to the extent that the elections could be continued without further active opposition. The Prime Minister favoured this policy, but King Faisal continued to hope for conciliation by other methods. When, however, collisions occurred on June 21st, between the police and the inhabitants of Kādhimain over the posting of *fatwās* at the door of the mosque and when demonstrations were subsequently organized against the Government in which Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī and his family took a prominent part, the Ministers, urged by their Advisers, felt it necessary to take strong action to vindicate the authority of the Government. Armed with an Ordinance, passed on June 9th, giving power to the Government to deport non-'Iraqīs for political offences, the Council ordered with the reluctant concurrence of H.M. the King, then visiting Basra,[3] the arrest and deportation of Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, his sons Hasan and 'Alī, and his nephew, all Persian subjects. A demonstration of protest was immediately organized by the religious leaders of Najaf, a group of nine important *'Ulamā*, also Persian

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[1] By means of a liberal interpretation of Article III (*a*) of the Election Regulations by the Ministers, in late August, 1923.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, December 2nd, 4th, 1922.

[3] Official *Communiqué*, *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-'Iraq*, June 25th, 1923, *Al-'Āsima*, June 27th, 1923. The Arabic Press generally approved of the deportations: *Al-'Iraq*, June 27th, 30th; *Al-'Āsima*, June 27th; July 2nd, 4th; *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 25th, 1923.

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subjects, with twenty-five followers leaving for Persia as a 666 gesture of their disapproval. The 'Iraq Government, although 668 deprecating the action of these '*Ulamā*, gave them every facility to expedite their departure.[1]

The elections were renewed on July 12th.[2] Difficulties and delays, however, still remained, due to the refusal of the Shī'is to form Electoral Committees, to the undiminished fear of conscription and to the resignation of the Sa'dun Cabinet and the formation of Ja'far Pasha's Ministry. The change of Ministries, although disturbing at this juncture, provided an opportunity for conciliating the Shī'is, which the King had been anxious to facilitate.[3] In spite of these difficulties, the registration of primary voters was concluded on December 16th; the secondary elections were completed on February 25th; and the elected representatives were summoned to Baghdad and given a great banquet by the King on March 4th.[4]

Ratification of the Treaty

In the presence of the High Commissioner and his staff, the 648 Air Officer Commanding and a large audience, the King, in an eloquent speech from the Throne, opened the Assembly, March 27th, eighty-four representatives being present.[5] He rendered thanks to God for the successful conduct of affairs of State and for the opportunity he now had of opening the *Majlis* which was to lay the foundations of the State. He then urged the

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, pp. 11-13.

[2] *Al-Istiqlāl*, July 13th, 1923.

[3] The new Cabinet was as follows: Prime Minister (without portfolio): Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī; Interior: 'Alī Jaudat Beg; Defence: Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'id; Finance: Hājī Muhsin Chālabi ash-Shalash; Communications and Works: Sabih Beg; Justice: Shaikh Ahmad Effendi Fakhrī; Auqāf: Shaikh Salih Bash'ayan; Education: Muhammad Hasan abū Mūhaisin. For its programme, see *Al-'Iraq*, December 3rd, 1923.

[4] *Al-'Iraq*, March 5th, 1924.

[5] *Majmū'a madhākurātu' l-majlisu't-t'asīsī'l-'Irāqī* (Complete Proceedings of the 'Iraq Constituent Assembly, 2 vols., Baghdad, 1924), (hereafter Madhākurāt, Proceedings), 1st Session, p. 5; Bell, op. cit., p. 692; *Baghdad Times*, March 28th, 1924.

PROGRESS OR RETROGRESSION?

Every Prime Minister in forming a Cabinet was faced with 643 the necessity of choosing Ministers compliant not only with the 645 High Commissioner's requirement that they 'deal sensibly with relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq' but also with His Majesty's personal wishes, likes and dislikes. It was generally recognized that Ja'far Pasha's first Cabinet, November 3rd, 1923, was composed of members in sympathy with the King's ideas and pledged to pass the Treaty of 1922. In January, 1928, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, who had been suggested by the High Commissioner as the only available Minister capable of bringing about the ratification of the Treaty of 1927, formed his Cabinet with great difficulty owing to the King's secret opposition to a strong Ministry for reasons connected with the Treaty.

In the Parliamentary elections, the King, not uninfluenced 643 by lessons learned from the intractability of the Constituent 666 Assembly, likewise exerted his influence. He insisted in some cases, as in the elections of 1925, on the addition to the list of official candidates the names of men he particularly desired to see in the Chamber, and on the deletion of others which were not acceptable to him personally.

In the second elections, during the spring of 1928, his interference took a curious form. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg had come to office, pledged to secure ratification of the Treaty of 1927, on the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, a step approved by the High Commissioner, as the Opposition in the Chamber had been steadily growing. The Prime Minister's suggestion that the usual confidential letters be sent to the *Mutasarrifs* to ensure the return of deputies favourable to the Treaty, was opposed by the King. By permitting free elections, His Majesty hoped to bring an anti-Treaty Chamber into opposition with the Cabinet to prove to H.B.M. Government that, contrary to the High Commissioner's contention in late 1927,[1] the Treaty and the new Agreements were unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq.

In the parliamentary elections of 1930, the King, seeking a

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 410-411.

613 new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of
● 666 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory before candidates received government support.

643 In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the
[653] interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,[1] whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.[2]
[166] To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes on the land, and the development of residential amenities about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early inclination to find employment for those who had served him in western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion to its contribution to the welfare of 'Iraq enabled him to take a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although 'Iraqīs universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly asserted their competence to run them, conditions in 'Iraq were
[565] far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

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[1] By the Prime Minister, Nūri Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

[2] Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, 'Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years* 1930 *and* 1931 *and Capital Development Works Budget for* 5 *Years* 1931-35.

Complete support, however, of the country has yet to be won 645 by the new Government. It must count on the opposition of the 668 exiled ʻIraqīs and of the adherents of the late Jaʻfar Pasha. It must count also on the potential opposition of all ʻIraqīs who for motives of self-interest have kept a foot in both camps.[1] Its real test will come, therefore, in its inability to carry out its promises and to meet other problems which face the country: placating the shaikhs at the same time that the land is divided, applying conscription to the tribal areas, bringing Shīʻīs and Sunnīs into harmony and of meeting the rising cost of living.

The Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies, although a dignified body meeting 646 regularly since its establishment in 1925 and conducting its deliberations as a rule with sobriety and moderation, has failed to take its full and rightful place in the political life of ʻIraq, as foreshadowed by the provisions of the Constitution. The failure seems directly due to its inability to command public confidence. The wave of scepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions which recently swept over ʻIraq, in common with other countries with a more substantial democratic tradition, prepared the way for the present military dictatorship. The slow progress of ʻIraq as compared with that of Turkey and Persia under dictatorial regimes was conveniently explained away as being due to the democratic institutions. The critics pointed out that the parliamentary system of ʻIraq was adopted from foreign models and was unsuited to conditions and needs of ʻIraq. They indicated and with more reason that the elections to the Chamber, without exception, have been rigidly 646 666 controlled by the Government, often under pressure from the Residency as in 1928 and 1930.[2] In all districts except Baghdad

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[1] See Macdonald, A. D., *Euphrates Exile* (1936), pp. 53 ff. for a discussion of this characteristic in ʻIraqīs.

[2] Principally because the Treaties of 1927 and of 1930 were to be ratified by the newly elected Chambers.

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646 where the electoral body is not so amenable to control as else-
666 where, the confidential orders of the Government to the provincial officials proved sufficient to secure the election of its candidates whether they were residents of the district or even known there. Thus in 1925, all but four of the government candidates were returned, two of these being from Baghdad *Liwā*.[1] In 1928 the deputies returned from Basra, 'Amāra, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla and 'Arbīl *Liwās* were government nominees.[2] Of the thirteen Baghdad deputies, all but five were Government candidates. In these two elections, as well as in that of 1930, a number of Opposition candidates were conscientiously included by the Government on the principle advocated by the King that talented members of the Opposition would raise more difficulties outside Parliament from feelings of personal dissatisfaction than if they were actually members. Thus in 1928, half of the twenty-two Opposition members returned to the Chamber had been previously given the government coupon.

646 The deputies, on the other hand, by their proneness to con-
661 sider parliamentary office as a means to personal aggrandisement, persistently refused the opportunity to win the respect and confidence of the nation. In 1925, it had been somewhat difficult to secure candidates to come forward. It soon became apparent, however, that deputyship meant an assured income and, even more attractive, the exercise of influence. In 'Iraq, as in other countries, the principal value attached to official position has been its effectiveness in securing official favours and financial gain.

646 Examination of the statute books of 'Iraq, not only from 1925
661 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the
656 deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in

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[1] *Baghdad Times*, June 10th, 1925. These four, with five others, were, according to a confidential report of the time, accounted to be 'unsatisfactory from the British standpoint'.

[2] Cf. *Baghdad Times*, May 10th, 1928.

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties including
666 the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in
January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former
opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge
of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally
showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither
the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have
affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect
of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in
spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred.
The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently
abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for
little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the
time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election
of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals
of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September
by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the
Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree
on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume
their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed
by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained
the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an
honourable past in the service of the Government and the
country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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IRAQ ELECTORAL LAW OF MAY 27, 1946[1]
LAW NO. 11 OF 1946

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With the approval of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, we hereby order the promulgation of the following Law:—

CHAPTER I—QUALIFICATIONS AND ESTABLISHMENTS

Art. 1. Primary Elector: shall mean any person entitled to elect Secondary Electors.

Secondary Elector: shall mean any person entitled to elect Deputies.

Art. 2. Every male Iraqi who has completed his twentieth year and whose name is entered in the electoral registers as prescribed in Chapter II shall be considered a primary elector, excluding any male person who:—

Firstly: has been judged bankrupt and has not been legally rehabilitated.

Secondly: has had an order of inhibition passed against him by a Court which has not been released.

Thirdly: has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than one year on account of a crime other than political, or has been sentenced to imprisonment on account of theft or bribery or any other crime absolutely affecting his honour, unless his forfeited rights are restored to him.

Fourthly: is a lunatic or is mentally defective.

Art. 3. Any person possessing the qualifications of a primary elector may be a secondary elector.

Art. 4. He shall not become a deputy:

(1) Who is not an Iraqi having acquired his Iraqi nationality by birth, or under the Treaty of Lausanne,[2] or by naturalization, provided that a naturalized person should belong to an Ottoman family which habitually resided in Iraq before 1914 and that 10 years should have elapsed over his naturalization.

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[1] Arabic text in *Waqayiʿ al ʿIraqiya*, Baghdad, no. 2377, June 8, 1946. English translation taken *textually* from *Iraq Government Gazette*, Baghdad, January 5, 1947.

[2] See Turkey, Note on Treaties, p. 503 below.

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(2) Who is below his thirtieth year of age.

(3) Who has been judged bankrupt and has not been legally rehabilitated.

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(4) Who has had an order of inhibition passed by a Court against him which has not been released.

(5) Who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than one year on account of a crime other than political, or has been sentenced to imprisonment on account of theft, bribery, breach of trust, forgery, fraud, or any other crime absolutely affecting his honour.

(6) Who holds a post or an appointment or is in the service of a person or an establishment under contract with a public department, or has any material interest, direct or indirect, with such contractor, unless such interest arises through his being a shareholder in a company composed of more than 25 persons, excepting lessees of Government lands and property.

(7) Who is a lunatic or is mentally defective.

(8) Who is related to the King up to the fifth degree.

Art. 5. (1). Electoral circles shall be set up in Qadhas on the basis of the number of males registered in census registers, and every Qadha containing a number of registered males not less than 15,000 and not exceeding 70,000 shall be considered an Electoral circle, provided that it shall be permissible to detach a part of such Quadha for the purpose of enforcing paragraph 2 of this article.

(2) If a Qadha contains less than 15,000 registered males, such a Qadha shall be amalgamated with a neighbouring Qadha to form an electoral circle containing a number of registered males not less than 20,000 and not exceeding 70,000. A Qadha may also be amalgamated with a part of a neighbouring Qadha for this purpose, provided that the number of the remaining registered males in the neighbouring Qadha is not less than 20,000.

(3) If the number of registered males exceeds 70,000 in a Qadha or a remaining part after the detachment of a part thereof for the purpose of the enforcement of paragraph 2 of this article, it shall be divided into 2 or more electoral circles each containing a number of registered males not less than 20,000 and not exceeding 70,000.

(4) If the number of registered males in an electoral circle does

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646 not exceed 30,000, one deputy shall be elected therein, if it exceeds
666 30,000 two deputies shall be elected, and if it exceeds 50,000 three deputies shall be elected.

(5) Every Nahiya or Mahallat shall be an Election Section, provided that it shall be permissible to join certain Mahallas in one section by a decision of the committee of inspection appointed under this Law. Should differences arise over the boundary of a section, the committee in question shall give a final decision thereon.

Art. 6. (1) The Minister of Interior should produce authenticated lists from the Directorate General of Census containing the number of registered males in every Qadha, Nahiya and Mahallat, and submit such lists to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, within *one month* from the date of the coming into force of this Law, together with his views concerning the manner of the enforcement of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 5 in such way as to ensure that the total number of deputies shall, as far as possible, be at the rate of one deputy to every 20,000 registered males in Iraq.

(2) The President of the Chamber of Deputies should pass the lists, together with the views of the Minister, to the Home Affairs Committee at the Chamber of Deputies, which after perusing the Minister's views, should draft the list of electoral circles and the number of deputies who should be elected in each circle.

(3) The President of the Chamber of Deputies should submit to the Chamber the list approved by the Committee and the Chamber should give a final decision thereon and publish it.

Art. 7. (1) The list will be reconsidered every fourth year in accordance with the procedures indicated herein above. It is, however, not permissible to issue a decision approving a new list except after the lapse of four years over the date of approval of the existing list.

(2) If the new list necessitates the addition of a number of seats in the Chamber, elections for such seats should be carried out immediately.

(3) If the new list necessitates the abolition of a number of seats in the Chamber, a deputy does not relinquish his appointment immediately but retains it until the termination of his membership, as indicated in the Organic Law.

Art. 8. (a) Should it be necessary to carry out elections before

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the publication of the first list proposed in accordance with Article 646
6 above, elections will be carried out on the basis of an interim list 666
to be prepared by the Minister of Interior and approved by the Council of Ministers, and such list will be put into application until the publication of the former list.

(b) Until such time as a general census registration is carried out, election will be effected on the basis of the former electoral lists, subject to consideration being given to the alterations effected therein.

Art. 9. The Jewish and Christian minorities shall have the following number of deputies:—

	Jews	*Christians*
In the Qadha of Baghdad Liwa Hqrs.	3	2
In the Qadha of Basrah Liwa Hqrs.	2	1
In the Qadha of Mosul Liwa Hqrs.	1	3

This number shall be in addition to the number determined in Articles 5 and 6 which should be elected from the majority in proportion to the total number of males registered in the above-mentioned administrative units.

Art. 10. Secondary electors shall be elected at the rate of one secondary elector to every one hundred primary electors, on condition that a fraction of a hundred shall be dropped unless it exceeds 70.

Art. 11. All obligations coming within the competence of a judge in this Law shall be carried out by the Judge of the Civil Court found in the Electoral circle. If more than one judge existed in the court, the President of the Court of Cassation shall appoint one of its judges. In case no civil court exists in an electoral circle, the President of the Court of Cassation shall appoint a judge to carry out these obligations in the headquarters of the electoral circle.

Art. 12, All obligations imposed upon an administrative official in this law shall be carried out by the Qaimmaqam in a Qadha forming an electoral circle or by the Mutasarrif if the Qadha was a Liwa headquarters. If, however, the electoral circle had no Qadha headquarters, the Minister of Interior will determine the circle's headquarters and the administrative official. In regard to sections which are smaller than Nahiyas and sub-sections, administrative officials should determine headquarters therefor.

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646 Art. 13. (1) The Committee of Inspection in each electoral
666 circle shall be composed of seven members in a circle of one deputy, 11 members in a circle of two deputies, and of 15 members in a circle of three deputies.

(2) When the election of a Committee of Inspection is announced the body of eldermen in each Mahallat of an electoral circle Headquarters should elect five individuals from among the residents of the Mahallat. Individuals elected from each Mahallat should meet to elect the Committee of Inspection by secret ballot. After the election of the Committee, its members should elect a President from among themselves by secret ballot.

(3) The judge should issue an invitation for the meeting in question and should attend it to control the proper carrying out of election of the Committee of Inspection and its president.

CHAPTER II.—PREPARATION OF LISTS OF PRIMARY ELECTIONS

Art. 14. If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved or its term expires, the administrative official should immediately announce the necessity of the preparation of lists of primary electors, upon which the notables in each Mahallat or village should elect from among themselves three individuals who should meet with the Mukhtar or such person replacing him to prepare the lists. This operation should be completed within ten days.

Art. 15. The lists will contain (the names of) every male who has completed his twentieth year of age whose name is entered in the census Register. If any person who is disqualified to be a primary elector, under Article 2 of this Law, a note to that effect should be entered against his name, indication being made of official documents to this effect, if available.

Art. 16. Two copies of the Lists shall be forwarded to the Mudir of the Nahiya. In the headquarters of Qadhas and Liwas, these shall be forwarded to the administrative official. The lists so received shall be amalgamated and entered in one single register for every electoral section, two copies of such register being forwarded to the administrative official and one copy to the Committee of Inspection.

Art. 17. The Committee of Inspection shall check the registers

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received by it and ascertain that they are prepared in accordance with the instructions issued for the purpose and are free from omission, errors, fraud and forgery. For the purpose of ascertaining facts, it may, when necessary, summon before it any person from the nearby localities whom it may desire to summon or send some of its members to the villages. It should complete this checking within 15 days.

Art. 18. On completion of the checking and correction, the Committee of Inspection shall return to each section one copy of its register, the other copy being retained by it, and shall draw up a document embodying the number of primary electors in each electoral section and the total number of primary electors in the electoral circle and forward it to the administrative official.

Art. 19. Upon receipt of the correct registers at the electoral section, the Mudirs of Nahiyas or the administrative officials, as the case may be, shall enter the necessary corrections in the lists of villages or Mahallas and shall return them to the Mukhtars. The corrected registers shall be posted in the headquarters of electoral sections, while the corrected lists will be posted for 7 days in suitable places in the Mahallas and villages for the inhabitants to inspect their contents, the act that the registers and lists have been so posted shall be announced by such means as may be available.

Art. 20. (1) Any person may, within the above-mentioned period of 7 days, object to the undue registration of any name or to the omission of any name which should have been registered. Such objection shall be made unstamped to the Committee of Inspection, who should examine it within 3 days at most and notify the objector of its decision taken by a majority of votes embodying the reason therefor. If the objection is upheld, the registers shall be corrected accordingly, and if rejected the objector may, if he is not satisfied, bring the case before the judge by submitting an unstamped application within 3 days from the date of serving at him of the committee's decision, and if the judge decide to uphold the objection, the registers shall be corrected. After the expiry of the above-mentioned period his objection shall not be entertained and the judge should give his decision within 3 days which should be final, and no fee whatever shall be collected from the applicant.

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(2) After the expiry of seven days, the lists which have been posted shall be removed and no further objection shall be heard.

Art. 21. The lists, registers and documents mentioned herein above should be revised every year and corrected in accordance with the procedures laid down in the preceding articles, provided that the work of revision and correction in the electoral sections shall be completed before the end of January in each year.

CHAPTER III.—ELECTION OF SECONDARY ELECTORS

Art. 22. (1) The elections shall be held at the headquarters of each electoral section, on the date fixed by the Committee of Inspection, under the supervision of a committee known as the "Electoral Committee" composed of five individuals selected by the Committee of Inspection from among those possessing the qualifications of a secondary elector at the headquarters of the sections, and the presidency of a member of the Committee of Inspection selected by this Committee by drawing lots.

(2) With a view to facilitating the conduct of elections a large section may be divided into several sections and different days may also be fixed for the carrying out of elections.

(3) The Committee of Inspection should fix the days mentioned herein above in such a manner as to ensure the completion of elections at least thirty days before the date fixed for the election of deputies under Article 24.

Art. 23. The voting papers shall be prepared and sealed by the Committee of Inspection. The number forwarded to electoral sections shall be equal to the number of primary electors registered therein.

Art. 24. The voting boxes shall be such size and shape as may be prescribed by the Committee of Inspection. Each box shall have in its top an oblong aperture large enough to receive a folded voting paper and shall have different locks not capable of being opened by the same key.

Art. 25. The member of the Committee of Inspection presiding over the Electoral Committee should arrive at the headquarters of the electoral section sufficiently before the date fixed for the election, taking with him the voting box and the voting papers belonging to that section. On his arrival there, he will invite the Electoral Com-

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mittee to hold a meeting and announce the day, hour and place of election in his section. The committee shall explain to all the primary electors, by such means as may be possible, the purpose of the election and the manner of conducting it, as laid down in this law.

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Art. 26. On the day fixed for voting the electoral committee shall assemble at the appointed place and shall call the electors of the villages and Mahallas at the time assigned to them. The voting box shall be opened and shown to be empty and then locked, one key being kept with the President of the Electoral Committee and the other with the eldest member of the Committee. Each elector shall receive a voting paper on which he shall write the names and surnames of those he desires to elect according to the proportion prescribed in Article 10 of this Law. An elector who cannot write may depute some other person to write for him. If more names than the correct number are written, the names first written up to the correct number shall be accepted and the remainder disregarded. If the same name be written more than once, it shall be reckoned once only. Illegible and ambiguous names shall be disregarded.

Art. 27. A sufficient period being allowed after the distribution of the voting papers, they should be collected from the electors present, beginning with the members of the committee if they are entitled to vote in that section. The clerk of the committee shall ask every elector who presents his voting paper to state his name, surname and domicile, and if this statement is verbally confirmed by the Mukhtar, the clerk shall make a vote[1] against his name in the register and he shall be allowed to cast his voting paper in the box. The Electoral Committee should watch the electors lest some of them should cast into the box more than one paper.

Art. 28. When the electors of a village or Mahallat have cast their voting papers in the box, the mukhtar shall announce that the electors of that village or Mahallat have voted. The clerk shall then write on the list of the electors the number of those who attended and those who did not attend. The list shall then be signed by the President and members of the Electoral Committee. This process shall be repeated in the elections of each village and Mahallat.

Art. 29. (1) If a person produces a voting paper on the conclusion of election in his village or Mahallat and the withdrawal of its electors, he shall not be allowed to cast his voting paper.

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[1] Mark.—Ed.

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646 (2) Voting by *wakala*[1] shall not be allowed, and no one may
666 forward his voting paper though he may have an excuse.

(3) If by the evening the voting remains incompleted, the Electoral Committee shall paste a piece of paper over the aperture of the box and fasten it with a string. This string shall then be sealed on both sides with the seals of all the members, if possible, who shall also seal the locks. The box shall then be kept in a safe place appointed by the Committee and special care shall be taken in guarding it. On the following day, the seals shall be removed after it has been ascertained that they were not tampered with, and the casting of voting papers shall be resumed.

Art. 30. After all the electors have cast their voting papers, the box shall be opened in the presence of the President of the Committee and not less than three of its members. The papers shall be counted and replaced in the box without being read and a statement shall be forthwith drawn up showing the number of electors who have voted in that section and the number of papers found in the box.

Art. 31. Any paper not bearing the seal of the Committee of Inspection shall be considered as *batila*.[2] If it is discovered that the number of papers in the box exceeds the number of electors, and if such increase is more than 10 per cent, the election shall be considered as null and void and shall be repeated. If, however, the increase does not exceed 10 per cent, the voting operation will be resumed after a number of papers equal to that found in excess are removed from the box and cancelled.

Art. 32. (1) After the papers have been counted, the names written thereon shall be recorded as follows:

The names shall be read out and shall be written on a sheet of paper, and as each name is read out, the figure (1) shall be marked against it. In order that the box may not be left open so many papers should be taken out as can be dealt with during the day and the box shall be locked, fastened with a string and sealed on both sides of the string and on the aperture with the seals of all the members of the Committee present. It shall then be kept in a secure place, the door of which shall be likewise sealed. Every evening the papers which have been sorted shall be placed in a bag which shall be sealed and a statement shall be drawn showing the number of votes won by each of the secondary electors.

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[1] Proxy.—Ed.

[2] Null and void.—Ed.

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(2) After all the papers have been sorted, the Electoral Committee shall give to each person who has won a majority of votes a document to the effect that he is a secondary elector. The Committee will draw up a statement of the result of the election which shall be signed by the President and all members of the Electors Committee. The President should submit this statement to the Committee of Inspection.

(3) If for any reason the place of a secondary elector falls vacant, his place shall be filled by the winner of the next largest number of votes.

Art. 33. On receipt of the statements mentioned in the preceding article, the Committee of Inspection shall enter the names of all secondary electors in a special register for each section separately. Such register will remain valid until the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies for the termination of its term.

CHAPTER IV.—ELECTION OF DEPUTIES

Art. 34. Subject to the provisions of Article 44, general elections in all electoral circles will be carried out on the same day appointed by the Minister of Interior. This day will be appointed by such means of publicity as may be available within a period not less than forty days before the prescribed date.

Art. 35—Elections will be carried out on the basis of candidature. Any person who desires to nominate himself as a deputy for an electoral circle should submit an application to this effect to the administrative official of such circle. The application should be written on a special form embodying a declaration, which should be signed by the candidate, to the effect that he possesses the qualifications of a deputy mentioned in Article 4 of this law. This application should be received in a period not less than 20 days before the date appointed for elections. The administrative official should, on receipt of the application, register it against a receipt.

Art. 36. No person may nominate himself for more than 3 electoral circles, except as provided for in Article 47.

Art. 37. A candidate should deposit with the Qadha Treasury a sum of ID. 100. This sum will be credited as revenue to the Qadha municipality if the candidate does not obtain 10 per cent of the votes of the circle.

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Art 38. (1) The administrative official should forward all applications together with the documents of candidature to the Committee of Inspection on the day following the termination of the period prescribed for the submission of the applications for candidature. The committee should examine these documents in order to ascertain that the preceding articles of this chapter have been fully complied with and will furnish the administrative official with its views as to whether or not the documents were correct, stating the reasons if it considered that the documents were incorrect.

(2) The administrative official should submit to the judge immediately any application which the committee considered as being incorrect, and the judge should give an urgent and final decision in the matter and transmit his decision to the administrative official within a period not less than 15 days before the date prescribed for the carrying out of election.

(3) If the committee has any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate in accordance with Article 4 of this law, it should state its objection on the document and the administrative official should comply therewith in accordance with Article 46 (4) of this Law.

Art. 39. (1) The administrative official should post the names of candidates whose applications are found to be correct in a public place in the headquarters of the electoral circle as early as possible after the examination, provided that this should not be less than 10 days before the date prescribed for the elections. The names should also be announced to the public through the official and other possible means.

(2) The administrative official will enforce the procedure outlined in Article 47 with regard to the announcement of the names of Christian and Jewish candidates.

Art. 40. All candidates shall be deemed as elected *tazkiyah* if their number do not exceed the number of deputies who should be elected in the electoral circle. In such an event, no voting shall take place and the administrative official should state the fact on announcing the names of candidates, otherwise voting shall be carried out according to the following articles.

Art. 41. (1) On the date and the hour fixed by the Committee of Inspection, the secondary electors should present themselves at the place of elections and shall be given voting papers sealed with

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the seal of the committee and indicating the number of deputies to be elected and the names of candidates, provided that the names shall be written serially as prescribed by the committee by drawing lots. This serial will be adopted in all voting papers.

(2) The provisions of Article 47 (3) shall be enforced with regard to the manner of distribution of the list of candidates in the circumstances indicated therein.

(3) The judge should attend the meeting to supervise the progress of the election.

Art. 42. The voting box shall be placed on a table in front of the Committee of Inspection and the judge. It shall be opened before the voting papers are dropped into it in order that those present should be assured that it is empty. It shall then be closed and a sheet of paper sealed by the Committee of Inspection and three of the secondary electors shall be fastened upon the lock.

Art. 43. (1) The Committee of Inspection shall call up the secondary electors one after another for voting in the order in which their names are registered. The dropping of papers into the box should be watched lest an elector should place more than one paper. No person shall vote unless his document shall have been checked by the Committee of Inspection either before or at the time of voting.

(2) Each elector shall give his vote by writing the names of those candidates whom he wishes to elect on the voting paper.

(3) The procedure adopted in Article 26 shall be enforced with regard to the names in excess of the determined number or names which have been repeated.

Art. 44. (1) If the number of secondary electors who give their votes is not less than 60 per cent of their total number, the Committee of Inspection should announce that the voting operation has been completed. If their number is, however, less than 60 per cent the committee should decide the adjournment of completion of voting to another day which should be announced by such means as may be possible. A sheet of paper shall be on the aperture of the box and shall be sealed by the Committee of Inspection before it is removed from the place of meeting.

(2) The voting operation shall be completed on the adjourned day irrespective of the number of votes.

Art. 45. (1) The Committee of Inspection shall open the box

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646 after the completion of voting. No voting paper shall be dropped
666 in it after it has been opened.

(2) After the box has been opened, the papers shall be counted and read publicly, and all the names of all candidates shall be written down. As each name is read out the figure (1) shall be marked against it until all the papers have been read. The votes gained by each candidate shall be counted, and a statement showing in figures and words, the number of votes gained by each shall be drawn up and transmitted to the administrative official.

Art. 46. (1) On the same day or the following day, the President of the Committee of Inspection should announce the result of the election in the presence of the administrative official, the judge, the candidates present and others.

(2) The candidates who obtain a majority of votes shall become deputies. In the case of equality of votes, the Committee of Inspection shall decide the matter by drawing lots.

(3) A statement shall be prepared signed by the judge, the administrative official and the Committee of Inspection showing the result of election. A copy of this statement shall be given to each one who has been elected to be a deputy and copies shall be sent to the Ministry of Interior and the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies.

(4) If the Committee of Inspection raises an objection against the qualification of a candidate as outlined in Article 38(3), the text of the objection should be written on copies of the statement to be given to the deputy and those to be sent to the Ministry of Interior and the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 47. The election of Minorities in the administrative units outlined in Article 9 shall be carried out in the following manner:

(1) Every Christian or Jew who desires to nominate himself for election should submit an application of candidature, together with the documents to the administrative official in the electoral circle forming the headquarters of the unit concerned, and should not nominate himself in more than one administrative unit.

(2) After the checking of the applications and the documents of candidature, and before the announcement of names under Article 39, the administrative official should furnish the administrative officials of all the electoral circles in the unit with names of Jewish and Christian candidates of all the circles in question.

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(3) The list of candidates shall be divided into 3 parts in the 646
voting papers in each electoral circle in the unit. The first part shall 666
not contain the names of Christians and Jews. The second part shall contain the names of Jews, while the third part shall contain the names of Christians. The number of deputies to be elected shall be indicated at the top of each part of the list.

CHAPTER V.—OFFENCES AND PENALTIES

Art. 48. Any person who commits any of the following crimes shall be deemed as having offended against this law:

(1) Knowing, or having good reasons to believe that he is disqualified from being an elector, votes at an election.

(2) Knowingly votes under the name of another.

(3) Votes more than once in the same election.

(4) Knowingly inscribes or assists in the inscription of any name in an electoral list or register contrary to the provisions of this law.

(5) Knowingly omits, or causes to be omitted, any name from a list or register which ought to be inscribed therein.

(6) Uses violence or threats or fraud or influence for the purpose of *ta'thir*[1] the elections.

(7) Gives or promises any gift or advantage for the purpose of *ta'thir* the elections.

(8) Accepts or solicits such gift or advantage above-mentioned for himself or a primary elector.

(9) Being employed by a primary or secondairy elector to write the names of the persons for whom he wishes to vote, knowingly writes the names of other persons.

(10) Distributions[2] the course of an election by the publication of false rumours or false allegation against the candidates for election.

And shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or with a fine not exceeding ID. 100, or by both imprisonment and fine, any one who commits one of the offences mentioned above.

All complaints in connection with interference on the part of Government officials with the elections shall be submitted to the Committee of Inspection who shall make the preliminary investigations and forward the charge sheets direct to the courts. If, however, the complaint is against the Committee of Inspection itself, it shall

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[1] Influencing.—ED.

[2] *Sic;* probably "disturbs."—ED.

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be submitted direct to the courts, who will take the necessary legal proceedings against the officials.

Art. 49. Any person who refuses to give information concerning himself for the purpose of compiling electoral lists and registers shall be punished with a fine not exceeding ID. 5.

Art. 50. Whoever, with a view to affecting the result of an election, destroys or makes away with any voting box or any voting paper or any official document concerning the election, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding two years or with a fine not exceeding ID. 200, or by both imprisonment and fine.

Chapter VI.—Miscellaneous Provisions

Art. 51. (1) If a person is elected as deputy in more than one electoral circle, he should within 8 days from the date of his being informed, choose the circle which he wishes to represent. A new election will be carried out immediately in the circle relinquished by him.

(2) If an official is elected as deputy, he should relinquish his appointment within 8 days from the date of his being informed. This provision will also apply to officers actually serving in the armed forces.

Art. 52. Armed forces and the police shall not participate in the elections. This provision, however, does not prevent officers from nominating themselves to be elected as deputies.

Art. 53. No person shall be arrested for a debt due to the Government while proceeding to, returning from, or at a place of voting.

Art. 54. Mutasarrifs, Qaimmaqams, Mudirs of Nahiyas, judges, Commandants of Police or Military Commandants may not nominate themselves for election in the electoral circles within their competence.

Art. 55. This law shall come into force from the date of dissolution of the existing Chamber of Deputies or the termination of its term. Article 6, however, will come into force from the date of the publication of this Law in the Official Gazette.

Art. 56. The Ministers of the Interior and Justice are charged with the execution of this Law.

Made at Baghdad this 26th day of Jamadi al Thani, 1366, and the 27th day of May, 1946.

186, 728, 648, 668

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the 642
example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self- 661
interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 643
'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the 185
important town families—and notably those of religious pretension —by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal
bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which 631
any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the 619
impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could 668
not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 but fatalistic acceptance, which was mixed in Shi'i quarters with theocratic as well as emotional repugnance, and in Sunni often with genuine if paradoxical respect for the Caliph. To none at this [186] time was an alternative conceivable. At the best, reform of some present abuses could be hoped, and the persistence of Arab race-consciousness and the slow growth of a critical spirit were already bringing such hopes to birth. But there was heard in 'Iraq no echo yet of the literary and political movements in the Lebanon and Egypt, where even now an Arab Movement was coming to birth.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

000 grotesquely incompetent brother and the control of Government by the Young Turks almost continuously from 1909 to 1914 by their influence over elections, their instructions to high officials everywhere through party agents and political clubs, and their courts martial which practically suspended the normal course of justice and administration during these years. The high hopes with which Western nations, especially Great Britain, had greeted the new order in 1908 were doomed to disappointment. It is true that repeated crises did much to deprive the C.U.P. of a fair chance and, equally, that the desperate needs of Turkey seemed to call emphatically for a militarily efficient régime: considerations which largely explain the Young Turks' failure to fulfil the expectations evoked, in every subject race, by their early protestations. But there was a deeper reason; the conception of devolution, decentralization, was foreign to even the most enlightened Turkish thought of the time; the 'freedom' offered was freedom as Ottomans, equality as Ottomans. The call to a single Ottoman loyalty, greater centralization, and firmer discipline was the Young Turks' formula for regenerating their country; Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks had hoped for the very opposite. The policy of the governing clique as it developed represented the victory of the more ruthless element in the C.U.P. which sought only in standardization and efficiency the means to rescue the Empire, and which was soon to restore Germany to a privileged, almost to a monopolist, position in Turkish counsels.

722 6488 In the 'Iraq wilayas, news of the foreign struggles and defeats of the Turkish Empire excited slight interest even in the towns and among the half-Turkish effendis. The Italian war induced the opening of subscriptions in Baghdad for warlike or war-charitable purposes, with derisory results; some gestures of patriotism were attempted, unreal offers of personal service made, prayers for victory offered; but the ignorance and almost total apathy of the 'Iraq peoples (except the Government hierarchy), their indifference to the grotesquely false communiqués of the Agence Ottomane, their satisfaction rather than dismay at the embarrassments of their masters, made a practical loyalty inconceivable. Some troops were drafted to Europe, recruiting was intensified, full mobilization proclaimed, taxation increased by cesses, officials' salaries diminished by a war levy, and subscriptions invited for warships, aircraft, the Army, the wounded. An internal loan was floated, but evoked a minimum of response.

668 The political revolution in the capital was not, however, without practical results in 'Iraq. Some high officials were at once removed, some political exiles could now return to Istanbul. The telegram of July 1908, announcing immediate elections, created intense

excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of 668
the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P.[1] committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public
holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, [646]
followed four months later by another for the accession of Muḥammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sulṭan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged
the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 665
1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable 186
as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and 668
frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

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[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Bey (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Bey: Fu'ad Bey al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1 [Turkish Committee of Union & Progress -- analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

186 Egypt, hints of a claim to nationhood itself put forward by Arab
668 *émigrés* in Paris—all these, with developing intercommunication and greater awareness of world thought, had prepared the ground for nationalism in 'Iraq even before the final impetus of the Turkish revolution.

The 1908 revolution, while it created an active Turkish-political life in 'Iraq, soon indicated also the gulf between Turkish and Arab aspirations. An 'Arab Brotherhood' group, formed in the first Turkish Chamber, was summarily suppressed by the Young Turks; the proportion of Arab to Turkish deputies and senators in Parliament was unjustly low. Incoming Walis of the 'Iraq wilayas showed less sympathy than ever with decentralization or the suggested use of Arabic; more 'Iraqis than ever groaned at the hateful prospect of conscription in Turkish armies—perhaps to fight brother Arabs in the endless warfare of the Yaman. It followed that the politicians of 'Iraq soon after 1908 began to mix various strains of Arab separatism with their pro- or anti-C.U.P. polemics: and to treat seriously tentative ideas of greater local privilege, a higher proportion of appointments, wider local powers and, finally, local autonomy itself.

For such claims there was basis in Arab character and culture, in 'Iraq's geographical separateness, and perhaps still more in the personal aspirations of ambitious 'Iraqis, who could imagine a great career in an Arab or 'Iraqi State more easily than in a Turkish. Meanwhile there were the beginnings of contact with coteries formed abroad to foster Arab ambitions and to frame demands. Such were the secret but short-lived Qaḥṭaniya in Istanbul, whose members favoured an Arab Kingdom within the Turkish Empire, and such the Young Arab Society which, moved from Paris to Beirut in 1913, was to play a heroic part in 1915. More important in 'Iraq were the local circles in contact with the Ottoman Decentralization Party of Cairo: a society which, founded in 1912 with its conception of local autonomy within the Empire, came nearest to expressing the political ambitions of the 'Iraqis of the day, and took root in Baghdad and Baṣra. The relations of Arab officers in Turkish regiments with their brother officers became strained, and 'Iraqi Qa'immaqams found odious
204 the task of applying Turkish repressive measures. From 1910 to
186 1914 a surprising development of the press in 'Iraq marked the
668 new political age. In place of the half-dozen colourless official newspapers of the wilaya capitals and Najf in Ḥamidiyan times, sheets of every colouring appeared in Arabic or Turkish month by month, to a final total of some fifty; they advocated various programmes—brilliant or foolish and always irresponsible—of pan-Islam, local or pan-Arab nationalism, Turkish patriotism or anti-

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', 204 who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Govern- 186 ment, were active in these politics before 1914. 668

Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least 665 enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families 668 of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of 186 Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to indepen- 668 dent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It 186 was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Aḥsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'dham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

186 In May some results appeared, induced perhaps more by the 168 Beirut than the Baṣra pressure. A new Wilaya Law ordained the increased use of Arabic in Arab wilayas, and the formation of a not ineffective General Council in each. Sayid Ṭalib telegraphed vainly to Istanbul in protest against so hollow a concession and informed Mr. Crow, the British Consul, that a trial of strength was now inevitable. The Consul thought it prudent to summon a British warship, H.M.S. *Alert*, which anchored for a time off 'Ashar; but Sayid Ṭalib decided after all on a policy of moderate pressure, until the resounding murder of the local general, Farid Bey—a crime inevitably ascribed to Sayid Ṭalib—diverted attention from less vivid politics. In the same month, June 1913, the Wali of Baghdad arrested four leading nationalist spokesmen, including Yusif al-Suwaydi, for the excessive freedom of their anti-Turkish expressions; but all save one were promptly released. In July and August hopeful-seeming Turko-Arab negotiations took place in Istanbul after the Arabs had organized a meeting in June in Paris which, attended by two 'Iraqis, pressed for decentralization; and in August a decree promulgated in all wilayas seemed to grant a substantial part of Arab demands. Military service was to be performed only within the Inspectorate; the schools would teach in Arabic, with higher education in Turkish; officials in Arab territory would be Arab-speaking, and all but the highest appointments would be made locally; progressive foreign experts would be employed, grants of funds could be expected, the resolutions of the General Wilaya Councils would be executed, three ministers of the Central Government, five Walis, ten Mutaṣarrifs were to be Arabs. But these provisions, felt with excellent reason to be a mere placation of Arab demands, evoked more of 'Iraqi scepticism than confidence.

The gulf between Arab and Turkish views was by now profound and explicit. Most foreigners, not unsympathetic to Arab demands, still felt their nationalism to be a premature and unreliable candidate for support; they distrusted Arab administrative powers even as compared with Turkish, and noted the mutually hostile groups into which the Arab nationalist world was already divided, and in which no one spoke for 'Iraq, since such a unit was not yet imagined. But, on whatever level, agitation in every form continued, and interchanges with the movements in the Levant increased. A secret society, al-'Ahd—the Covenant—was from early in 1914 to embrace scores of 'Iraqi officers in the Turkish Army. The Baṣra 'Reform Committee' with Sayid Ṭalib as President, published an inflammatory pamphlet. Telegrams still poured from 'Iraq to Istanbul, demanding Arab autonomy. Writers in the newspapers abandoned restraint, nationalist clubs were formed

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, 186 668 to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khudhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some 090 well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the 185 efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee 661 647

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated 635
secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming 661
C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim 635
Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of 663
ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the 185
town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless 369
showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew 192
rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their 668 ●
reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be 369
different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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182 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the
● 668 Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in
563 the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unim-
369 portant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Ḥilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

579 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained,
674 and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the
sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation
[731] of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913)
the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muhammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 staff, insisted nevertheless on standards of education and knowledge of English necessarily lacking in the hundreds of unemployed 'Iraqi ex-officials. These, idle and aggrieved, crowded the coffee shops; and the return of many more from Turkey increased the body of malcontents. Wilson's Administration in fact made little effective effort to use in senior or even junior posts the considerable experience and goodwill possessed by the available 'Iraqis.

186 668 Such are among the considerations which can explain the willingness of large elements of the fickle and disillusioned 'Iraqi public, by the end of 1919, to support any anti-British movement which might appear. The leadership which such movement was in fact to follow was that of nationalism: that Arab nationalism which the Wilson Administration, and notably its head, largely through too local and too limited an experience of Arabs and ignorance of the political conceptions now new-born or coming to birth in Europe, belittled and distrusted. The development of this movement, and the successive uneasy stages by which 'Iraq was to advance to a new constitutional status, are next to be recorded.

3. OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH

000 The Ḥijaz correspondence of 1915–16 between the Sharif Ḥusayn and Sir Henry McMahon had accepted the idea of a post-war Arab State to embrace, with named exceptions, all Arab territories in Asia. It could indeed be argued that 'Iraq stood apart from other Arab lands, with differing needs and conditions; it could be shown that the McMahon letters called for 'special administrative arrangements in Baṣra and Baghdad'. But such exclusion from the Arab State could, the Sharif had replied, be only temporary 'for a period to be settled by negotiation': 'Iraq was a historic and sacred Arab land. A British policy of mere selfish acquisition of 'Iraq was after this, to any serious statesman, unthinkable; and in fact War Office instructions of March 1917 had already visualized specifically an Arab Amirate of Baṣra and Baghdad. The formation of an Arab State or States was an objective of idealists and realists alike, in Syria and in London; it was visibly realized under the Amir Fayṣal in Damascus before the end of 1918; and a policy of self-determination for the ex-Ottoman Arab countries had by that time been clearly expressed by the British Prime Minister in January 1918, again by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, yet again in the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November 1918. The last quoted declared 'the goal envisaged by France and Great Britain' to be 'the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of National Governments and administrations

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.' 000

The 'Iraq public, among whom this hopeful declaration raised high and immediate hopes, had throughout the War shown no visible signs of nationalist feeling. The political leaders of the period 1911–14 were scattered, Sayid Ṭalib abroad, the Clubs dead or inactive, the press non-existent, communications with other countries severed. But the movement was not dead; the end of the War, it might have been anticipated, must inevitably revive it with greater vitality than ever. Meanwhile no British act or speech in 'Iraq, save only the vague flamboyance of the Maude speech of March 1917, had given any indication of future self-government. Surprisingly, no use had been made in 'Iraq of Arab forces against the Turks, in spite of the success of these in the Ḥijaz and Syria, and the tentative prompting of the War Office itself. The British Military Command was deterred, it seemed, by the impossibility of guaranteeing the finality of Turkish disappearance, by the difficulty of equipping and training Arab recruits for serious warfare, by its lack of contact with the best 'Iraqi material such as the officers then fighting with the Amir Fayṣal: and perhaps not least by the attitude of the Government of India, which frankly disapproved of Arab national ambitions and of any movement which would encourage them. 186 668

The provisions of the administratively absurd and morally lamentable Sykes–Picot Agreement, signed by France and Great Britain in May 1916 and revealed to the world by the Russians in October 1917, seemed indeed if taken literally to weigh heavily against a self-determined régime for 'Iraq. It had provided that Mosul and part of its wilaya should be reserved for French exploitation, under Arab suzerainty, and that most of western 'Iraq should be of similar status but under British domination, with the body of central and southern districts placed under direct British rule. These provisions, which the French did not lightly abandon, were patently incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Sharifian commitments; and indeed the need to conciliate French feeling, especially in Syria, was a main and inescapable British post-war embarrassment. 737x

Meanwhile the Anglo-French Declaration, the relaxing of many war-time restrictions, the return of 'Iraqis from abroad, the prospect of security and development in the territory, all raised its future as an immediate issue, and brought 'Iraqi nationalism back to life in a day. 186 668

Nourished from various sources, it was to grow rapidly during the first half of 1919, and thereafter. The central core of the movement was, no doubt, the claim of a part of the 'Iraqi educated

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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classes to 'complete independence', and resentment that this was withheld. Contributory to it as anti-Government—that is, anti-British—forces were at this stage the strains of propaganda entering the country from Turkey, from Bolshevik Russia, and from the eagerly nationalistic 'Iraqis with Fayṣal in Syria. Contributory also were the fears of the Mujtahids for their own position, since nothing could be more damaging to the Shi'i theocracy than a British Administration, and the specifically anti-British and anti-Christian exhortations which radiated from Karbalā and Najf from 1918 onwards. The real or fancied shortcomings of the Administration itself, elsewhere described, could add to a growing dissatisfaction: every frustration, every delay or disappointment was the fault of the British, and created new nationalists. Among the tribes, the shaykhs' rivals in every group were ready always to join an insurgent movement and to dethrone a British-supported leader; and the hunger for loot and inveterate pleasure in raiding, the dislike of revenue payment, and the conviction that British forces were withdrawing, combined to prepare the way for wholesale non-obedience or worse. The history of 1919 and early 1920 is, therefore, one of the increase and coalescence of malcontent elements until the climax of July 1920.

727× Colonel Wilson, horrified by the Anglo-French Declaration, pronounced it wholly unsuitable as a basis for government in 'Iraq. He urged that nothing but firm British administration of whatever State might be created could keep the country from anarchy; and he reacted no less strongly against suggestions by his *bête noire*, T. E. Lawrence, for the facile establishment of a group of States, 'Iraqi and Syrian, under Sharifian princes. His own earliest proposal to Whitehall was for the cautious formation of an Arab State of 'Iraq to include Mosul and, placed under an Arab Amir, to be fortified by a British High Commission and a full complement of advisers. But the difficulty of choosing an Amir was at once obvious, and the Acting Civil Commissioner reviewed in vain the claims of a Mosul notable, of the Naqib of Baghdad, of an unspecified Egyptian prince, and of a son of King Ḥusayn. Finding serious objection to all or any of these he ended by preferring that the State should for five years be ruled by Sir Percy Cox, with no Amir at all; this if anything, he felt, should both ensure efficiency and keep nationalism within bounds.

In London, Middle Eastern affairs were at this time handled by an Interdepartmental Committee presided over by Lord Curzon. In this body the Western school of British doctrine on Arab affairs prevailed over the rival Eastern or Indian school: and in it the clashing temperaments and views of Lord Curzon and Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary for India, had ample play. The Committee

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

727x Treaty of Sèvres was to provide. Arab governors and Arab district councils would be appointed, British military and financial help would be made available. Curzon, resolute to postpone any British Government commitment over Mosul, preferred that that wilaya should form a separate Amirate ringed by 'independent' Kurdish principalities. The debate continued. The clash of French and Arab ambitions in Syria: the long failure to make peace with Turkey: American pressure in Paris for a free right of choice by the Arab populations, as exemplified by their King–Crane fact-finding commission which visited Syria in 1919: the attitude of the Council of Ten in Paris, who in January 1919 had decided on the detachment of 'Iraq from Turkey, and in March were near to agreeing on the distribution of Mandates: the wide differences of view among the British Government's own advisers on Arab affairs: the increasing call for post-war economy—or even for bag-and-baggage evacuation, or retreat to Baṣra—in the British press and Parliament: all these were scarcely reconcilable elements in reaching a clear solution of 'Iraq's future. The Baghdad Administration had as yet no clear guidance from the peace-makers in Europe on the new Mandatory idea which, propounded at Versailles by General Smuts, was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations coming to birth early in 1919, and was held especially applicable—as Article 22 of the Covenant provided—to the ex-Ottoman territories. Acceptance of this conception by Powers concerned was implicit in the Versailles Treaty, which was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified on 10 January 1920.

728x 647x In 'Iraq, meanwhile, the Army visibly diminished. Garrisoned posts were abandoned, camps shrunk, effective mobile forces were fewer and ever smaller. The Civil Administration retained, indeed, always a very considerable body of popular acceptance in town and country among moderate unpolitical elements and the general 186 668 public. But, as 1919 advanced, signs were not lacking that opposition to Government in its present form, so unsatisfying to nationalist aspirations, was on the increase. The local disorders in Kurdistan were reported and exaggerated. Messengers and considerable funds reached Baghdad and the Euphrates from the 'Iraqi officers now in Damascus and Aleppo, and these addressed a memorandum to the British Command in Syria, and another to the Foreign Secretary, on the need for an early national régime in 'Iraq. A distinguished Baghdadi lawyer and administrator, Naji Bey al-Suwaydi, invited from Damascus by Wilson to accept an advisory post in Baghdad, found the atmosphere uncongenial and returned unhappy to Syria. Other 'Iraqi visitors from the West reported a 'colonial' attitude in Wilson's Administration, which seemed to belittle or ignore 'Iraqi abilities. Rumours grew in

1z Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Baghdad of the proposed Mandate over 'Iraq, soon to be allotted by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. British women and children were reported as pouring into the country as into a British colony, and in fact over 500 so entered late in 1919. The work and plans of the British civil departments seemed to suggest permanence of occupation. There had been arrests and deportations of trouble-makers—that is, said the nationalists, of patriots. Month by month the ranks of the politically-conscious were swollen. The national secondary school was established as a centre of propaganda. With the autumn the results of political preaching emanating from Syria, from Baghdad, and with increasing violence from Najf and Karbalā, became more obvious among the Euphrates tribes; and in Baghdad, where secret meetings and societies began to be reported, new and significant contacts were observed between the Sunni and Shi'i communities, with joint politico-religious conclaves and exchanges of courtesies without precedent. So passed the winter of 191[illegible].

In spite of the wide extent by this time of a potentially violent political movement, a precarious outward peace was kept throughout these months save in one district, the upper Euphrates. Threats and rumours re-echoed here from the Turks at Mardin as well as from agents of the Arab Government at Aleppo; and in mid-December 1919 Dayr al-Zur was occupied by excited Syrian tribesmen escorting a Sharifian 'Governor of the Euphrates'. A critical and humiliating situation in the town, where the Assistant Political Officer was held prisoner, ended only on Christmas Day by an arrangement between representatives of the Civil Commissioner and those of Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, Governor of Aleppo, whereby Dayr was abandoned by the British. It became a centre for propaganda, for raids, and for loud threats to annex Mosul itself. Tribesmen entered and looted Albu Kamal, Syrian tax-collectors operated far into 'Iraq. The next Governor at Dayr, himself a Mosulawi, maintained a violent and well-subsidized campaign of Sharifian propaganda, and refused all suggestions for a diplomatic settlement of the frontier. The British authorities, physically powerless in the whole area, could do no more than protest and threaten reprisals by air. The return of the Amir Fayṣal to Syria from Europe in March 1920 led to the withdrawal of the invaders, and early in May a frontier conference, convened at 'Ashara, agreed on a boundary line immediately west of al-Qa'im. But this settlement wholly failed to improve conditions. The Syrian-inspired looting parties and demonstrations spread over all Dulaym and Shammar territory. The belief in British apathy and impending withdrawal was universal, the Mosul–Baghdad road and railway became unsafe, and violent propaganda posters of the

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'Ahd al-'Iraqi appeared in Mosul city. The efforts of Turkish agents based on Jazira-ibn-'Umar aided those of the Sharifian officers and envoys—whose funds, as the Civil Commissioner complained, were from those supplied by the British Government itself to the Sharifian ruler of Syria. How far the Amir was aware of his too zealous supporters' activities in 'Iraq can never be known; his own attitude was correct. In the first week of June a tribal force under an 'Iraqi officer, Jamil al-Madfa'i, entered Tall 'Afar, murdered two British officers, Captain J. E. Barlow and Captain B. Stuart, and two sergeants, and moved on to threaten Mosul; but a small British column from that garrison dispersed the tribesmen and re-occupied Tall 'Afar. A precarious calm settled thereafter on the upper Euphrates and the Jazira, the Damascus Government prudently disassociating itself from this and other acts of its agents.

The situation in Baghdad and central 'Iraq had by the late spring of 1920 further deteriorated. The significant Sunni–Shi'i meetings continued, with rivalry only in inflammatory speeches. Turkish and Bolshevik agents were reputed to be at work in addition to those of Arab nationalism, of Mujtahid reaction, of tribal lawlessness, of anti-British venom. Security in Baghdad itself was affected, the bazaars closed intermittently, ugly episodes occurred. Warnings to political leaders—two Shi'i nationalists, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr and Ja'far abu al-Timman, and two Sunnis, Yusif al-Suwaydi (p. 46) and 'Ali al-Bazirgan—were unavailing, and the arrest of a petty agitator provoked angry crowds and rifle shots. Fuel was added to these flames by the Resolution of a group of 'Iraqis in Damascus which elected Fayṣal King of Syria; it resolved that the 'Iraq throne be forthwith offered to Fayṣal's elder brother, the Amir 'Abdullah. The tone and substance of House of Commons debates on Middle Eastern matters was keenly studied by 'Iraq politicians. The unpopular features of the local Administration, and its exclusion of 'Iraqi elements, continued unimproved. Finally came the news, confirming persistent rumours, that at San Remo on 28 April a Mandate for 'Iraq had been offered to Great Britain by the victorious Powers in conclave. This seeming death-blow to 'Iraqi hopes of immediate 'complete independence' was announced in Baghdad early in May with vague reassurances by the Civil Commissioner. The effect of these was not increased by the known, though unannounced, recommendations of the Bonham-Carter Committee, which Wilson had set up in March to draft a future 'Iraq Constitution: recommendations which, while well in advance of Wilson's own original views, were, with their insistence on continued British control over a structure of 'Iraqi deputies and officials, cautious and grudging to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

the point of complete unacceptability in the eyes of 'Iraqi nationalists. 186 668

An interview on 2 June, two days before the Tall 'Afar murders, between Wilson and a body of fifteen self-appointed nationalist delegates—to whom he added twenty-five more notables, selected by himself—served only to make clearer the gap between Wilsonian and nationalist views. The latter were unsatisfied by his explanations and assurances, while he continued to treat their demands for immediate independent 'Iraq nationhood as those of a malcontent clique, and to affirm that the main public of 'Iraq would be tolerant of, and safest under, what amounted to direct British rule.

The Curzon Committee, less cautious or more liberal than Wilson, had meanwhile considered the Bonham-Carter proposals and criticisms of them, and had decided that the time was ripe for an announcement on 'Iraqi constitutional advance. Under instructions from London, accordingly, the Civil Commissioner proclaimed on 17 June that a general Elective Assembly would be convened, and early progress sought towards the Constitution of an Arab State whose self-government would, while incomplete, be real and effective. But the announcement came too late. Nationalist emotion and expectation had gone too far, and forces in town and tribe were in motion that no suave phrases of a proclamation could now arrest. A few days spent in Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, now leaving the post of British Minister in Teheran, made little impression, for all his personal prestige. A Mandate, hated word, had been awarded; British rule effectively continued; of true independence there was neither sign nor early hope; and a committee of ex-Turkish deputies, headed by Sayid Ṭalib, who had returned to 'Iraq in February 1920, pursued without effect on public opinion its labours on the machinery for holding the promised elections. 727x 186 668

Meanwhile the drift of British armies out of 'Iraq had proceeded far. Effective troops were few and scattered. Lines of communication in 'Iraq and in Persia were long and barely defensible; and the static duties of guarding stores, Turkish prisoners, and Christian ex-Turkish refugees were calculated to employ nearly the whole surviving force. The British soldiers' families, recently arrived, were now concentrated at Karind in Persia. The military command had been held since March 1920 by an elderly General new to 'Iraq, Sir Aylmer Haldane, who showed from the first little confidence in the warnings of the Civil Commissioner and his officers: warnings which by now were those of an imminent outbreak.

648x 186 adopted by the King and his entourage from the first. He had been led by Mr. Churchill in London, he complained, to envisage a very different form of Treaty: the Mandate must go, disappear, be repudiated! And if it be urged that a debatable nicety of constitutional or international law was an unrealistic or scarcely sufficient basis—and one important only to a tiny minority of 'Iraqis—on which to found, as did the political 'Iraqis of 1921 to 1930, a ten-year campaign of political struggle, marked by civil resistance, murder, and intended insurrection, it remains true that the Mandate did in fact involve an imperfect independence and an affront to national pride damaging, it was claimed, to 'Iraq in Islamic eyes everywhere.

648x 186 As Treaty discussions in the Cabinet proceeded early in 1922, the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the Shi'i 'Ulamā and leading supporters and even intimates of the King, cried out against mandated 'slavery' and demanded complete British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by reaction an 'English' party of notables and shaykhs favourable, they said, to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists, whose views the King personally shared, stood for abrogation of the Mandate, a friendly and equal Treaty, and continued British support. The cleavage in opinion grew more specific after a conference called at Karbalā in April 1922, nominally to protest against Ikhwan raiding, by Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi, a Shi'i 'Alim devoted to politics. The conference, attended by some 200 Shi'i notables, 'Ulamā, and tribesmen, was watched with uneasiness by the moderate parties, and, in spite of the colourless resolution finally passed, was effective in rallying anti-Treaty opinion; it was productive also of indiscipline and near-anarchy in the sensitive
631 Muntafiq and Shamiya districts. A further evil now clearly visible
186 and likely to increase was the 'political' administration in some of
668 the Euphrates areas, by strongly nationalistic Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams. These, ignoring their advisory British colleagues, openly favoured the 'patriot' shaykhs in their land disputes and revenue assessments, and frowned upon the 'English' faction. Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad, deputations waited
x645 upon the King. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922, by the resignation of five ministers, who included Naji al-Suwaydi, 'Izzat Pasha of Kirkuk, and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil of Baṣra. The ministers who replaced these included Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi, a senior official of superior type who had been a Turkish deputy and lately Mayor of Baghdad: Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, a Turko-Kurd of outstanding energy and rich humour: 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey al-Sa'dun,

a Baṣra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a 645ˣ
Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajj
Ja'far abu al-Timman. This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al- 648ˣ
Timman, accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the
proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the
Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent
Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet 666
approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of 668
electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited, 6
to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, 186
by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by
a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was
especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating
nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaṣarrif. Conditions
elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were
uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made
by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British)
politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble
was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i 665
political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani 668
(Nationalist) and the Nahdha (Awakening); these were matched by
the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, 648ˣ
Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot'
meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties
and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible
rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded
that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate
in elections. al-Khaliṣi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish
views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence.
The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least
tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their
more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The 668
King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification 648ˣ
with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a
Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government
but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost
infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening.
Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23
August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly
to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime
Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée
itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

•668 demonstrators, led by a Court official, on the steps of the palace. 648x An apology was demanded and given, but the King refused to take action against the offenders. Public order hung in the balance; no Cabinet existed. At this moment King Fayṣal was prostrated by an acute attack of appendicitis. The urgently necessary operation was performed by Dr. Noel Braham on 25 August; but, in advance of the King's recovery, Cox felt bound to take drastic action. He explained to the public the attitude and the responsibilities of the British Government, condemned the dangerous sedition of the extremists, suppressed the two parties and the worst of the newspapers, arrested and banished a number of the more violent politicians. The effect was instantaneous, the relief of quiet-loving elements throughout 'Iraq to all appearances profound. The gradual restoration of the tribal position was aided by the removal of Mutaṣarrifs whose patriotism had been shown by partial and discriminating administration, and by punitive bombing of actual insurgents in Diwaniya and the Muntafiq.

The King, whose operation was successful—and certified as such by doctors sent from the Ḥijaz by his father—on his complete recovery by 10 September publicly thanked the High Commissioner for the measures taken; they had, in fact, saved the State from anarchy and himself, it is probable, from a second throneless exile. 645 648x The Naqib was asked in the improved atmosphere to form another Cabinet, in which he included Khalidi at Justice, 'Abd al-Muḥsin at Interior, Sasun Ḥasqayl, Ja'far al-'Askari, 'Ali Fadhil, and Ṣubiḥ Nasha't at their former Ministries, and a rich Najf banker, Ḥajj Muḥsin al-Shallash at Education. The Ministry of Commerce was abolished. The Cabinet, reassured at last by the argument that entry to the League of Nations—'Iraq's next goal—would of itself end the unpopular Mandate, reaffirmed its acceptance of the Treaty, which was signed at last by the Naqib and Sir Percy Cox on 10 October 1922.

648x The Treaty, which was to last for twenty years after ratification by the Constituent Assembly, reproduced, without direct reference to the Mandate, most of its provisions. It covered the obligation to respect constitutional procedure, freedom of religion and education and missionary enterprise. It included safeguards for the rights of foreigners, equal economic opportunities for all States (whether League members or not: an echo of the Colby–Curzon 'Open Door' correspondence), co-operation with League of Nations international Health measures, and a modern régime for Antiquities. The terms of the Treaty were open to periodical agreed revision, and Great Britain agreed to press the candidature of 'Iraq for the League of Nations 'as soon as possible'. Separate and subsidiary agreements were to be made—and were in fact thereafter drafted—

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 where electoral rolls for the Constituent Assembly were already
721 under preparation, and provoked punitive missions of the Air Force. By autumn, still protesting his devotion to the British Government, he was again in hopeful correspondence with the Turks and, supported by money looted from the tobacco merchants, planned an attack on Kirkuk and collected 'taxes' from the Ḥalabja and Chamchamal villages. So passed the winter of 1923-4.

4. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The signature of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty on 10 October 1922 was followed by further drafting and redrafting, in Baghdad and London, of the promised Organic Law; by the completion, and ultimate signature on 4 March 1924, of the four subsidiary Agreements: and, months before these were ready, by the acceptance of a Protocol to the Treaty itself. The Protocol resulted in part from increased British realization of 'Iraqi sentiment on mandatory matters, but still more from pressure by the press and public of the United Kingdom on its Government—and particularly on Bonar Law, the incoming Prime Minister—to diminish British expenditure and commitments in 'Iraq. It was brought back to Baghdad by Cox from London in March 1923, and signed by himself and 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey on the last day of April. Reducing the Treaty period from twenty to four years, it could not fail of a warm reception by King and politicians alike: only the 'Inglizi' party among the shaykhs and notables, still distrustful of the young Government and fearful of their own rivals, pronounced it a betrayal. The signature of the Protocol, Sir Percy Cox's last act in 'Iraq, was followed on 5 May by his departure. He had, by his intelligence, patience, and benevolent firmness rendered outstanding services to the State. The post of High Commissioner was assumed by no unworthy successor in Sir Henry Dobbs, who had served at Baṣra in the earliest occupation days and returned from India to 'Iraq as Sir Percy's Counsellor late in 1923.

793 The improved atmosphere and the enthusiastic welcome ac-
668 corded to the King on his triumphant tours in both northern and southern 'Iraq availed in no way to conciliate the Shi'i 'Ulamā. Their anti-British fulminations, in which a pro-Turkish element was at times strangely visible, were coupled with a renewal in June 1923 of the anti-election Fatwas. The clash between their policy and their Government's was explicit; and when, late in June, a bazaar episode brought the sons of Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi into conflict with the police, the King was willing to authorize the arrest of both sons and father. Brought to Baṣra, they left the country and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. In Najf

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

the bazaars were closed in condemnation of this outrage to the 793
men of learning, a party of whom gathered to withdraw in dudgeon 668
from ungrateful 'Iraq. These proceeded to Karbalā, were deaf to Government reassurances, and with diminished numbers left 'Iraq for Kirmanshah. Here the holy men awaited with complete confidence the results of so striking a gesture. But there were none. Even in the Holy Cities no commotion followed; Sunni observers were delighted; to the Government it was a veritable answer to prayer, and the dutiful protests of the Persian Government fell on deaf ears in Baghdad. A mediating visit to 'Iraq by the British Minister in Teheran was fruitless. Only after a formal approach to the Prime Minister by spokesmen of the 'Ulamā in November 1923, with protestations of a change of heart and policy, were their self-exiled colleagues permitted to return on the condition of abstention from politics henceforward. The main body re-entered 'Iraq in April 1924, still influential but never to regain their old dominion in the country's affairs.

The field thus clear, election machinery could start to operate. 666
Uneasiness among the Kurds and Turkomans of Kirkuk and Arbil at the prospect of 'Arab Government' was calmed by the High Commissioner. Some ambiguity in the legal provisions for tribal representation was cleared up; tribesmen, it was ruled by the Ministry of Justice, could register as ordinary voters in addition to enjoying their specific representation by twenty deputies. So novel a concession to the tribes, for whom Turkish conceptions had provided no voice at all, was obnoxious to the conservatives of Sayid Maḥmud's Free Party, and disrupted it to vanishing-point. The voters of Sulaymaniya liwā, of whom numbers had perforce registered in Kirkuk while their own headquarter town was beyond control, completed their own liwā rolls and could choose their own deputies when in 1924 it was reoccupied (p. 152). By the mid-March of that year the procedure of primary and secondary election was complete.

The Cabinet of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey had by November 1923 645*
reached a stage of *malaise* which presaged the end. It was due to discord with the Shi'i element and to some disagreements with the King. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, who had returned from Geneva to spend a few valuable days as Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, was invited by the King to form the Cabinet which should face the Constituent Assembly. Accepting the charge, he retained two Shi'i ministers including Muḥsin al-Shallash at Finance, brought to Interior 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi (a modern-minded ex-officer who had acted as Mutaṣarrif of Ḥilla), and completed his team with Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, Nuri Sa'id, and the eminent Mosul and Baṣra notables, Sayid Aḥmad al-Fakhri and Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan, in other

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

665 ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals
565 in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical
superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small
minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the
Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now
growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of
mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and
highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was
not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927,
the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni school-
master, began a sequence of events which involved ministerial
intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the
665 Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day,
565 by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for
Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened
184 by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the
668 Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost
exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to
Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for
conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their
representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned,
and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription
was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin
Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i
'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of
Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to
the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the
Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour
in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent
grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in
Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between
'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now
in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The
latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired
articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as
acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was
questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by
Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously
militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January
1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

702 The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the
668 time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its
claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the
solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect
'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

by British troops, who will decline the task.' The National Service 702 Bill, introduced into Parliament, met the urgent Shi'i and Kurdish 668 opposition already described. Detested by Shi'ism and dreaded by the little-considered man-in-the-street, the project became the darling of the 'Iraqi press which saw in British caution a proof of their sinister desire to keep 'Iraq weak and helpless. Successive Cabinets were in doubt whether to drop the project amid the scorn of newspaper patriots and the Army itself, or to press it to the point of probable explosion with Shi'i and Kurd.

Under the Treaty of January 1926 the question of 'Iraq's membership of the League was to be reviewed in January 1928 and 648x thereafter four-yearly. The British Government notified 'Iraq in July 1927 that it would consider a recommendation for such membership in 1932, but not in 1928; but this, disappointing as it was to eager 'Iraqi statesmen, did not preclude attempts to obtain a better interim status. Conversations were held in London late in 1927. The King, the Prime Minister and other ministers, and the High Commissioner participated in these with Colonial Office spokesmen; and, after a position approaching deadlock had been reached, terms were agreed. A new Treaty was signed by Ja'far Pasha and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on 14 December. Its validity, subject to approval by the League Council as well as by the 'Iraq Parliament, was dependent also on a revision of the Military and Financial Agreements.

The new Treaty marked a certain, but no great, advance. It admitted that the 1922 and 1926 Treaties had been already in a measure superseded by events, notably that of 'Iraq's own progress; it treated 'Iraq explicitly as an independent sovereign State, and dealt with its internal and international obligations as such; and by its terms the British Government undertook to support 'Iraq's candidature for League membership in 1932 'provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval'. It was largely by reason of this proviso that the draft Treaty was coldly greeted in 'Iraq by almost all political elements.

It formed, nevertheless, part of the inheritance assumed by the 645 Ministry which, under 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, succeeded that 648x of Ja'far Pasha on 14 January 1928: a Ministry which included two Shi'is, a Christian, and a body of experienced politicians. The moderate and experienced ex-Mutaṣarrif 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab was at Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman at Justice, the Christian economist and business man Yusif Ghanima at Finance, the Najf banker Muḥsin al-Shallash at Works, and another shrewd and experienced Shi'i, Salman Barrak of Ḥilla, as Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture. Naji al-Suwaydi's clever and progressive younger brother, Tawfiq, came to the Ministry of Education, and

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1815-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645 a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The
648" former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called
[665] for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

665 The Sunni–Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the
• 668 efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahdha Party lost
186 support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

"645 'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

manner an occupation', and 'in no way prejudice the sovereign 648x
rights of 'Iraq'. The latter's forces were to be aided by Great Britain with arms, equipment, and training: in time of war British forces were to enjoy 'all facilities and assistance' in 'Iraq's power to give, and free movement by land, air, and water. The British representative at Baghdad was to hold ambassadorial rank and to enjoy precedence over other diplomats. The Treaty was to have a life of twenty years.

A new Financial Agreement, for which the Treaty provided, arranged for the cession of abandoned British camps and aerodromes to 'Iraq within five years, for the transfer of the 'Iraq Railways to an *ad hoc* Corporation, and for that of the Port of Baṣra to a Port Trust. Foreign officials needed by the 'Iraq Government were to be British, and the conditions of service of those already employed would remain unaffected.

Even before Treaty revision had reached its final stage, negotiations had been in progress for the replacement of the 1924 Judicial Agreement, in which the surviving remnants of the old Turkish Capitulatory régime ill accorded with 'Iraq's future status. The new Agreement, initialed by Nuri Pasha and the High Commissioner on the same day as the Treaty and ratified on 4 March 1931, provided for 'a uniform system of justice . . . applicable to all 'Iraqis and foreigners alike'. To facilitate this a number of British lawyers, later determined as nine, were to be employed for a period in the Courts and the Ministry of Justice. Certain alterations in the Criminal Code and in the rules of evidence were to be made (and were made in fact) before the Agreement took effect. Communicated to the League of Nations, this Agreement was approved on condition that all ex-Capitulatory Powers accepted the new position of their subjects in 'Iraq under it. They did so without exception within a few months: an acceptance which went far to render 'Iraq's new status acceptable to other nations.

Even accompanied as it was by an understanding with the High Commissioner for the immediate reduction of British officials, whereunder the ubiquitous Administrative Inspectors were in fact diminished in number and largely recalled from the provinces to Baghdad, the Treaty was received without enthusiasm in 'Iraq, and was, for opposite reasons, sternly criticized by many spokesmen in Great Britain. By the 'Iraq minorities immediate alarm was felt, as will appear later; by the ultra-nationalist politicians it was hailed, by reason of such British privileges as were to survive, as a mere continuance of 'slavery'. The Prime Minister decided upon
a general election to strengthen his Ministry's position and to 648x
determine, at least ostensibly, the nation's attitude. The National- 668
ist Party, not content with an attempted boycott of the elections, 666

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 668 666 and the fullest activity of their press articles, hand-bills, and oratory, did not hesitate to invoke the authority of the Shi'i Mujtahids in condemnation of the new Treaty. These, however, declined for once to intervene, except partially at Samarrā, and the elections were peacefully conducted in the districts; only at Sulaymaniya a major clash between violent demonstrators and the police resulted in bloodshed and the loss of a score of lives. All results were known by the end of October 1930, and showed a sweeping victory of the Government party. The ratification of the Treaty by Parliament, which met as usual on 1 November, could not now be prevented by the fierce denunciations of die-hard patriots; the voting was in favour by 69 against 13 in the Chamber, 11 against 5 in the Senate.

648 646 But much remained to be done, both in Baghdad and in Geneva. Parliament sat on, immersed in legislation and in vehement politics, until the midsummer of 1931. The opposition to the Sa'idi Ministry had by that time been reorganized in a grouping more formidable than the isolated Nationalist Party which, thanks to the usual control exercised by the liwā officials, had made so poor 648 665 668 a showing in the elections. Political leaders hostile to Nuri and, with reservations, to the Treaty—Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-Suwaydi, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, and 'Ali Jawdat who had resigned from the Cabinet in September and been succeeded by Rustum Ḥaydar from the Palace—formed from the Nationalist and the People's Parties and like-thinking elements a Party of National Brotherhood—Ḥizb al-Ikhā al-Waṭani. At its inaugural meeting in March 1931 its objects were stated to include the dissolution of a flagrantly unrepresentative Parliament and the formation of a new Government 'pledged to reconsider the external relations of 'Iraq'. Certain of its members as a gesture thought fit to resign their seats in the Chamber; all resolved to pursue their campaign in the press and country. Nuri Pasha on his side had already formed, from deputies favourable to him, the 'Ahd (Covenant) Party, with an appeal to the great days of al-'Ahd and a programme of Treaty implementation.

Among the first acts of the Ikhā was the organization in July 1931 of a series of strikes in the 'Iraq townships without precedent for their concerted timing and wide extent. They had little object but the embarrassment of Government. The trades' organizations in the bazaars took fright—or were maliciously alarmed—at a clause in the newly passed Municipal Taxation Law which could be read as unfavourable to them. The misunderstanding, which was easily elucidated by Government, was encouraged to persist, and it was not until late in July, after attempts had been made to spread unrest to northern 'Iraq, and disorder in Baṣra and the

Euphrates towns had led to bloodshed and police intervention, 648x
that the agitation died down: the product, it seemed, of a new and 665
sinister type of 'Iraqi politics. The Brotherhood, successful in this 668
effort, proceeded next (said its enemies) to make what capital it could from the dangerous uneasiness of Kurd–Arab and Assyrian–Kurd relationships.

The attitude of the minorities to the forthcoming emancipation 563
of 'Iraq and withdrawal of British control could not, indeed, be 648x
other than a serious preoccupation of the 'Iraq Government as well as of Great Britain and of the League itself. In Baghdad the privileges claimed by or on behalf of the Kurdish districts, and the future of the Assyrians, were questions the more insistent as the attention of the League was concentrated on these aspects of 'Iraq life. The Government did its best at reassurance by repeated tours of the King and his Ministers in the Kurdish areas, by legislation on the use of the Kurdish language, by promises to honour all pledges given in the past, and by such practical gestures of goodwill as were available; but the whispers of the ill disposed were effective, nevertheless, in increasing the alarm of Kurd and Assyrian alike.

With minor Cabinet changes—the loss of Madfa'i to preside in 645x
the Deputies, and the addition of Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs—and a re-formation in October 1930, the Ministry of Nuri Pasha maintained itself, in spite of Brotherhood intrigues and assaults, from its formation in March 1930 until November 1932. His second Cabinet, which took office on 19 October, brought Naji Shawkat to Interior, Rustum to Finance, Jamal Baban to Justice, Ja'far to Foreign Affairs, Amin Zaki and Chalabi to Works and Education. Little was heard for the moment of Sunni–Shi'i friction, save implicitly in minor disorders: and nothing of the threat or hope of conscription, which the Sa'idi Government wisely postponed until the obligation to listen to High Commissioners was no more. The major interest of the time was, 648x
evidently, that of securing 'Iraq's admission to the League, for which 1932 was the appointed year.

The intention of His Majesty's Government to make this recommendation had been communicated to the League Council in September 1929, and was likely thenceforward to raise questions of procedure for which no precedent existed. The Permanent Mandates Commission, to which annually since 1921 spokesmen of the mandatory Power had presented its Report with full verbal explanations, had never relaxed its interest in 'Iraqi affairs and the British trusteeship. It now scrutinized the 1929 Report for signs of 'Iraq's adequacy or inadequacy for emancipation, closely questioned the British 'accredited representative' at Geneva, and

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

year following demonstrations in the mosques and city, a two-minute silence in Parliament, black-edged newspapers, and telegrams to London marked 'Iraqi disapproval of the 'pro-Jewish' policy of Great Britain. But the day when these feelings would descend with personal violence on the heads of the timid and law-abiding Baghdadi Jews, anxious only to find a secure place in the State and to dissociate themselves from Zionism, lay still some years ahead. 563

The Yazidis, no longer eminent as of old either as harriers or as harried in tribal warfare, turned to restlessness towards the end of this period through the heedless and dissolute ways of their Mir, Sa'id Bey. He was accused of misusing the revenues and neglecting the shrine of Shaykh 'Adi and its pilgrims. A meeting of the Yazidi notables was held in Mosul in 1931, attended by the High Commissioner. Government attempted to produce a satisfactory statute for the outlandish community; but it proved intractable, and the Yazidi elders reported after full deliberation that no way could be devised to change their Mir except assassination. Rival Mirs nevertheless claimed support, and faction tore their settlements in the Mosul plain and Sinjar, to be settled only by time, intrigue, and murder.

The Kurds were a far more formidable minority. Added to the other elements making for separatism—those of locality, character, culture, and tradition—their specific nationalism, which flourished in a restricted circle centred in Sulaymaniya town, had survived their incorporation in the 'Iraq State, the failure of successive campaigns, the stern suppression of their Kurdish brothers in Turkey and Persia, and even their own profound disunion. The 'Iraq Government had made meanwhile a not discreditable effort to honour in their favour the League of Nations recommendations of 1925. They were given a generous share of Government appointments, a minister in the Baghdad Cabinet, and their quota of Deputies delighted to serve as such. Nevertheless, a petition submitted by some of the last-mentioned in 1929, asking for increased expenditure in Kurdistan and the formation of an all-Kurdish four-liwā province of their own, showed their determination to maintain all of their special claims; nor did their spokesmen forget that the twenty-year prolongation of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty of 1922—a specific condition of the Mosul settlement—was largely on their account. 563 668

Meanwhile it was possible in 1927 to arrange tolerable terms of surrender with Shaykh Maḥmud. But he refused, after all, to honour them, and it proved necessary to dislodge him from his last stronghold in Panjwin by forces of the 'Iraq Army and the Levies, and by bombing and cavalry patrols to disperse his widely-ranging

563 668 murderous Hamawand allies. The Shaykh's retirement to Persia removed for a time the greatest obstacle to orderly government in Sulaymaniya liwā. It could now be resumed, with improved roads and rebuilt police posts. His son, Baba 'Ali, was brought to school in Baghdad—and later to Victoria College, Alexandria—as part of the terms of settlement; he was, years later, to become a graduate of Columbia, and a minister of the Government. The place of Shaykh Maḥmud as leading Kurdish disturber of the peace was taken in the same year, 1927, by Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan in whose territory 'Iraqi troops had recently manœuvred. This half-witted Dere Bey, obscurely prompted by some resentful megalomania, now proclaimed himself Almighty and gained some converts by the preaching of a devoted Mullā. But the reaction of horrified listeners led to a scuffle in which lives, including his brother's, were lost. It was followed by an intervention of police and the reinforcement of the Army garrison at Bilih, near Barzan. The new religion died out; but the Shaykh, talking and writing war and sedition to all who would listen and spreading rumours of Assyrian trespass, remained a menacing figure.

The Kurdish reaction in 1929–30 to threatened British withdrawal was one of apprehension. The elections of September 1929 produced, as has been recorded, a riot in Sulaymaniya; questions had been asked already by the Kurds in the 'Iraq Parliament as to safeguarding in the new Treaty the 'rights of the Kurdish areas', and had been answered only by the Treaty's silence on the subject. 563 669 721 Expecting support based on the same claims, Shaykh Maḥmud in September 1930 again invaded 'Iraq territory, in spite of specific warnings to desist. He established himself, addressed the High Commissioner to demand a united Kurdistan under British Mandate to stretch from Zakho to Khaniqin, and again occupied Panjwin. Troops of the 'Iraq Army, with Royal Air Force bombers, dislodged him successively from Panjwin and Sardasht, but failed for some months to encircle or drive him across the frontier. Guerrilla war continued through the winter of 1930–1. In March his movement to raise the tribes of Kifri and Khaniqin was stopped by a concerted operation of the Army, Police, and Air Force, and a major engagement took place at Au-i-Barika twenty miles north-east of Ṭuz Khurmatu, leaving a score of dead. The Shaykh fled into Persia, but thanks to preventive action by the Persian Government failed to find there his usual refuge. At an interview at Panjwin terms were once more arranged. His life was spared, an allowance granted, and his place of residence fixed at Naṣiriya on the lower Euphrates.

Between 1928 and 1931 an uneasy peace reigned in Barzan country, where the Shaykh was visited by an Administrative

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Inspector and received the admonitions of Baghdad. In July of 563
the latter year he again lost his wits, accepted and imposed 'Christianity', 669
and ordered his scared followers to conform to his new
faith by roasting and eating pork. A number of the horrified 721
retinue obeyed; but a neighbour, Shaykh Rashid of Baradost, expressed his disapproval by raids which kindled all the fires of tribal warfare. Shaykh Aḥmad's brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, and other well-wishers tried in vain by diplomacy to extinguish them: but he himself, restored to the Muslim faith, led forays of unusual savagery into Baradost country. By December intervention by regular troops was ordered, in spite of the wintry conditions. An 'Iraq Army column, penetrating the mountains as far as the Shaykh's village, was there severely defeated and indeed rescued from débâcle only by Air Force intervention. Aḥmad, chastened by severe bombing, released the prisoners he had taken, protested humble obedience, and withdrew from Baradost country. But he remained unsubdued. In the early spring of 1932, after warnings from the High Commissioner which he ignored, 'Iraqi troops again advanced into his country, occupied Margasur, and threatened Barzan; but a sudden assault on them by tribesmen in difficult country involved them in a second defeat and heavy losses. The R.A.F. was again able decisively to intervene, and a second 'Iraqi column, with strong air support, now occupied Barzan and much of its dependent territory. After a pause for the release of a captured pilot, and further attempts at peace-making on generous terms, land and air operations were resumed. In midsummer the Shaykh, driven finally to bay, crossed into Turkish territory, where he was arrested and removed from the frontier. It was then possible to install a normal or nearly normal administration in Barzan country, with police posts and patrols, and to pardon the miserable remnant of the Shaykh's followers who trickled back.

If these warlike interludes were of a type normal in Kurdistan 563
for millennia, the same is less true of the political action now taken 668
by Kurdish leaders. A petition to Geneva by ten notables of Sulaymaniya in July 1930 demanded a League-supervised Kurdish Government. The Permanent Mandates Commission commented that the League had never envisaged a Kurdish Government but merely a measure of 'special treatment', of which it urged the Mandatary to ensure full application before it be too late. A series of further and similar Kurdish petitions, written in 1930 to 1931, were considered at Geneva in the latter year. They led to the recommendation that Britain should impress on the 'Iraq Government the need of tolerance to evoke the loyalty of its Kurdish subjects: who in turn, however, should earn respect and the League's consideration by a correct attitude to the 'Iraqi Kingdom.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 701 repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retrospect, to be regretted.

563 668 The announcement of the impending end of the Mandate profoundly disturbed the Assyrian community, which under the 1930 Treaty was so shortly to be left at the sole mercy of the 'Iraq Government. The latter's attitude, though still correct, was growing less favourable. Taxation remissions were granted on a decreasing scale; normal minor taxation, outrageous to the long-pampered settlers, was beginning to be demanded; and Government action in admitting parties of destitute Assyrians from Russia was reluctant and unpopular. Persistent British support for Assyrian claims, or part of them, was galling to successive Cabinets. Worse than this, the exploitation of bad relations between Kurd and Assyrian appealed to certain Baghdad politicians as an easy method of trouble-making. It bore fruit in a series of untraced murders and revived anti-Assyrian outcry among the Kurds. Nevertheless, if the Assyrian community had, with patience and avoidance of provocation, accepted its new position in 'Iraq—which was that or better than that of the Chaldaeans or Armenians—its future could have been peaceful if inglorious, its ecclesiastical and social individuality preserved, and its homes secure and happy. But its leaders chose other paths, which led to tragedy. They clung to every point of their reiterated case: that they had been officially 'allies' in the 1914–18 War, but as such never rewarded; that their Levies had performed outstanding services—indeed had acquired and saved southern Kurdistan; that the League had in 1925 recommended rebestowal of their 'ancient privileges', now still withheld; that the British had ruined their hopes of Turkish favour and resettlement in Ḥakkari, and had betrayed them at Geneva. The twenty-year-old Ishai Mar Sham'un, at school in England from 1925 to 1929 and wholly ignorant of 'Iraq realities, was unfitted to guide the community and obsessed by unrealistic conceptions. Chief among these was that of the 'temporal power' which he felt to belong to the headship of a Millet almost self-governing in olden days, however unacceptable and unconstitutional it must be in modern 'Iraq. His father was ultra-conservative; in his aunt, Surma Khanim, the fervour of community feeling had by now vanquished judgement; the bishops and maliks failed in wisdom or pursued sectional aims, and in conspicuous cases even led factions against their Patriarch. Enthusiastic well-wishers from outside—one an Anglicized grandson of Layard's assistant, Hormuzd Rassam, and one an Englishman, Matthew Cope—misused their well-meant influence to organize petitions, to raise false hopes, and further to prejudice Assyrian-'Iraqi relations.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The High Commissioner's deputy at Geneva in November 1930 gave reassurances, which he believed to be justified, on the future prospects of this and the other minorities. In the same year Sir Francis Humphrys dealt with the Rassam petitions and pledged the 'moral responsibility' of Great Britain for the future attitude of the 'Iraq Government. Returned to 'Iraq, and faced with a situation deteriorating largely through the Assyrians' own activities, he again recommended the Government to show all possible goodwill by resuming its taxation-remission policy. This was done, with good effect. It would have been followed by re-attempting, on attractive terms, the long postponed Baradost settlement, had not the outbreak of Barzan–Baradost hostilities precluded it.

In October 1931 a conference of Assyrians convened at Mosul by the Mar Sham'un dispatched petitions to Geneva. They requested that since the community could not face conditions in 'Iraq after termination of the Mandate, it should be transferred *en bloc* to some Western-governed territory elsewhere, or to Syria. These petitions, however, were not considered by the Mandates Commission for thirteen months, and meanwhile the alarmed Assyrians decided on direct action. The Mar Sham'un prepared in May 1932 a plan to concentrate the whole community in the area of Dohuk–'Amadiya in July, and a general 'cessation of service' by all the Levies on 1 June was threatened in a memorial handed at Hinaydi to their Commander, Brigadier J. G. Browne, himself a tireless upholder of Assyrian rights and later historian of the Levies. The intervention of the High Commissioner postponed a crisis, and yet another petition to Geneva was prepared; but the threat of mass resignation was repeated in the event of its having no early or favourable issue. This petition demanded recognition of an Assyrian Millet and of its Patriarch's temporal and spiritual authority, with an Assyrian deputy in Parliament, community schools, and a subsidy for the Patriarch himself and for his Church. It asked also for the annexation of Ḥakkari territory to 'Iraq, or alternatively the formation in 'Iraq of an all-Assyrian liwā to the north of Mosul, with a new and well-considered Settlement and clear land-titles.

The Levy strike was in fact averted by the arrival by air—an operation then hailed as remarkable—of a battalion of British troops from Egypt. Its four companies were posted to the four main Levy stations. The Mar Sham'un, influenced by this step and by Humphrys's representations, agreed to order the Levies to remain at duty until the petition of 17 June should have been considered at Geneva. The Levy personnel at Hinaydi, who alone continued insubordinate, were reduced by the release of some 250 men; elsewhere the impending reductions of Levy strength

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 were postponed at the Mar Sham'un's request. The Northampton-
668 shires returned to Egypt.

In partial compliance with requests in the petition, the 'Iraq Government set up a further land-finding committee. It discovered but little land both cultivable and available, but recommended expenditure on an irrigation scheme to produce more. The Cabinet accepted this report, which was sent to Geneva. The King visited 'Amadiya, talked at length with the Mar Sham'un, and used every means to win his confidence; but the young and intransigent Patriarch would commit himself to nothing in advance of the League's answer, and himself left for Switzerland. He was followed there by a counter-petition of those Assyrians whose original homes had been in Barwari Bala (that is, in present 'Iraq territory), expressing their complete satisfaction with present arrangements.

The final debates of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council on the Assyrian issue, after rehearsing that community's well-known grievances and the desirability (but impossibility) of providing the homogeneous group-settlement which they demanded, could result in no more than hopes for the best. The gap between the full Millet autonomy demanded by the Mar Sham'un, and the favourable minority treatment available at best from the 'Iraq Government, was a wide one. The League Council formally rejected the Millet proposal, 'noted with satisfaction' the impending appointment of a foreign settlement expert, and left the subject with misgivings which were soon to be tragically justified.

5. GOVERNORS AND GOVERNED

642 In a community at 'Iraq's current stage of evolution the central
647 Administration was both significant of and powerful in the society of the territory; and great and not unsuccessful efforts were made from 1925 to 1932 by the 'Iraqi and British elements alike to improve it. The reduction of the British part,[1] though accompanied by a variously assessed loss of efficiency and authority, was clearly necessary as part of 'Iraq's planned evolution; and it proceeded so far that the steps taken towards 'Iraqi administrative independence in these years left relatively little for the post-
647 mandatory period. By 1932 further departments had been taken over by 'Iraqi directors—those of Revenue and State Domains

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[1] The number of Administrative Inspectors fell from 24 in 1923 to 18 in 1925, 14 in 1930, 10 in 1933. The total of British officials of 'gazetted' status in 1920 was 364, in 1923: 181, in 1926: 148, in 1929: 130, in 1931: 118 (38 advisory, 80 executive). For British 'non-gazetted' staff the corresponding numbers were: for 1920: 484; for 1923: 361; for 1926: 52; for 1929: 34; for 1931: 28; for Indian officials, in 1920: 2,035, in 1923: 1,270, in 1926: 250, in 1929: 53, and in 1931: 36.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

political unity today. A further obstacle must be the intolerant 648K
individualism of the Arab character, so recalcitrant to self-subordination and compromise. These difficulties were all to be faced when twelve years later Arab Unity was to become, largely under 'Iraqi inspiration, a formal political reality; and they were to prove formidable.

2. ASSYRIAN CLIMAX

The administrative and political features of 'Iraq life as these 665
existed in 1932 had been current already for three years or more; 668
there was consequently little sign of sudden change in the autumn of that year to indicate the removal of restraints and growth of dangerous tendencies which the last pages have described. Nuri Pasha Sa'id was not anxious to prolong his premiership; his position, strong in Parliament, had been heavily attacked outside by the Ikhā and the Nationalist Party. Their newspapers, repeatedly suppressed and as often reappearing, assailed the Treaty, the British, and the Cabinet, until a 'Law for the prohibition of harmful propaganda' was passed to restrain them. The Liberal or Reformist group now forming among the lawyers, the journalists, and the impatient 'enlightened' elements, who were turning for the first time to social questions as the background of politics, hoped to range itself and its newspaper, the *Ahali* (People), with a more progressive Government. The King and his advisers thought in terms of specific advances, adapted to the new times: advances towards greater national unity—Sunni–Shi'i, landlord–tenant, tribe–town, and Kurd–Arab—better administration, more devolution, and a stronger Army. Such a programme could best be realized by an all-party Administration, and this must indicate a Cabinet of the Ikhā with 'Ahd and independent elements. Moreover, ill-feeling based on personal and private matters, perhaps even on some tinge of royal jealousy at Nuri's successes, had rendered the Pasha's position barely tenable.

But the Ikhā–Nationalist pact was still recent, and the King 646
could not admit the only condition on which Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Āli, now Chief of the Royal Diwan, and their associates would accept office: that of Treaty revision. The compromise adopted, therefore, was that of a neutral Government headed by Naji Shawkat. It included eminent lawyers—the cautious and able Naṣrat al-Farsi, Jamil al-Wadi, and Jalal Baban—a distant cousin of Jamal Baban, and like him a Kurd for ministerial purposes—in the Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Works: Rashid al-Khawja, an able ex-officer who had been Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad, in Defence: a competent and moderate Shi'i, 'Abbas Mahdi, in Education; and the prudent 'Abd al-Qadir Rashid in Foreign Affairs. The

*645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

*645 661 The formation of a Government under Rashid 'Āli, in the presence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-Ikhā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Āli began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Ḥikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Ḥaydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muḥammad Zaki al-Baṣri, in Justice.

*645 668 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national cooperation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

Ir Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

passage of a law authorizing conscription, at long last, was received 645* with seeming indifference.

Late in August Madfa'i offered his resignation. The Chief of the Royal Diwan, 'Ali Jawdat, whose favourable position to influence the King and to arrange suitable alliances had not been neglected, himself accepted the premiership and the Ministry of the Interior on 28 August. His place in the Palace was taken by Rustum Ḥaydar. Nuri Sa'id re-entered the Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Madfa'i in that of Defence. To the Ministry of Works came Arshad al-'Umari, a Turkish-trained civil engineer of the famous Mosul family, to Finance the Christian economist, Yusif Ghanima, and to Education 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi.

The first act of 'Ali Jawdat was to dissolve Parliament—a step 646 doubtfully constitutional and condemned by the Ikhā, but necessary 668 to secure parliamentary support. He went to lengths unusual 666 even in 'Iraq, it was claimed by his opponents, in instructing the liwā officials on the personalities to be returned to the Chamber. The resulting Parliament met in the first week of 1934. Packed with the Premier's nominees, it was unrepresentative of the Ikhā opposition, poor in tribal spokesmen, and proportionately unjust to the Shi'is; nor did 'Ali Jawdat's initiative in founding a Party of National Unity, which barely attained life before expiring, produce the desired co-operation. The election procedure was strongly criticized in the Chamber of Deputies; the Senate opposed the régime to the extent of absenting themselves from their House; Baghdad political circles raged at their own exclusion and at the many illegalities alleged; hostile posters and pamphlets appeared on walls and in coffee-shops. All administrative shortcomings were once again, and unreasonably, attributed to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet itself was unhappy, Madfa'i and 'Umari were felt to be doubtfully loyal, Yusif Ghanima a political nonentity. Far 668 more sinister, however, was the stream of subversive propaganda which poured insistently from the capital, inciting tribesmen to emotions bound to end in anti-Government violence. It was understood to emanate from a group of opposition statesmen, bitter in their frustration and led by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The propaganda was addressed to potentially malcontent Kurds in the far north, and more regularly to the Najf-dominated tribes of the Euphrates, where such shaykhly politicians as 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr of the Fatla had been unwisely excluded from Parliament and had everything, private and public, to hope from a change of Government. With 'Abd al-Waḥid were men of similar stamp, Sayid Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh, 'Alwan al-Yasiri, and others. Simultaneously, and by reaction against the claim of these to leadership, another half of the tribal world, not less unquiet and

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

● 668 not less hot for 'Shi'i rights', sought the favours of the present Ministry. Without, for the moment, overt violence a dangerous mood was gaining possession of the tribes of Diwaniya liwā and spreading to Ḥilla. It was shown by excited meetings, tribal war-dances, the flourishing of arms. Appeals reached the Najf 'Ulamā, notably Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kashif al-Ghaṭā, the leading Arab Mujtahid, for unifying support. Telegrams were dispatched to the King, a monster petition organized, and finally in January 1935 an audience with him was obtained. These moves produced no result. 'Ali Jawdat laboured to restore order by persuasion, by censorship, by prohibition of meetings and suppression of newspapers; but such measures and the distractions provided by the ceremonial opening at Kirkuk of the Mediterranean pipeline, by disastrous spring floods, by the funeral of King 'Ali, and by crises in the negotiations with Persia were all in vain. The ineffective Ministry resigned on 23 February 1935.

*645 668 To replace it, the King's advisers recommended the formation of an Ikhā Ministry, without further elections and without the inclusion of Yasin Pasha or Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, whose intrigues it was believed had largely created the present near-anarchy. But the Ikhā having refused these conditions, no alternative appeared to the formation of another Madfa'i Ministry. Formed on 4 March, it contained respected personalities—Nuri Sa'id, 'Abd al-'Aziz Qaṣṣab, Amin Zaki, Ghanima, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, Rashid al-Khawja—but had no substantial advantage over its predecessors. It commanded little royal or popular support, and could work neither by inspired diplomacy nor ruthless firmness. Jamil al-Madfa'i hoped for the pacification of the Euphrates by 'legal' means, sent ministers to tour the distracted area, tried vainly to persuade the senators to resume their duties, and appealed to the Opposition and the press for 'unity'. When the tribal position had further deteriorated, with actual insurgence in the Daghara and the Fayṣaliya areas of Diwaniya and among the 'Azza north of Baghdad, he sent troops to the Euphrates districts; but these were too few, ineffectively directed, and thereby merely provocative. The tribal political leaders and their mentor Kashif al-Ghaṭā—sadly embarrassed by rival claims to his support and glad to take refuge in pious platitudes—produced in the end a not immoderate statement of Shi'i claims, bearing scores of personal seals. Organization of the counter-faction among the Euphrates shaykhs was attempted, but could do little in immediate relief. Stronger military steps were deprecated in favour of a 'political solution' by the Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, nor would the King permit them. After a mere thirteen days of office the unhappy Madfa'i Ministry resigned.

619 645 668 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 619 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests [687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

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[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

645 lucrative trusteeship of the Qadiri Awqaf. The Shi'i Minister of 648 Education, Ridhā al-Shabibi, resigned in September 1935 and was replaced by a Shi'i of different type, the lawyer Ṣādiq al-Baṣṣam. Relations with the other Arab States were notably extended by a Treaty with Sa'udi Arabia, exchanges of princely and ministerial visits, and missions received from Syria, the Yaman, and Egypt; and 'Iraqi statesmen, particularly Nuri Sa'id, responding to strong public opinion, took in 1936 jointly with Ibn Sa'ud a leading part in intervening in the long-drawn Palestine Arab strike. Nevertheless, critics in Baghdad were not wanting who called for stronger anti-Zionist action than the telegrams, deputations, and appeals of the Hashimi Ministry; and they recalled that Yasin Pasha in opposition, in 1932 and since, had led an anti-Treaty and anti-British policy very different from his present complacence.

*645 665 [661] Other gestures of Opposition politicians, embittered by long exclusion from office, were those of horror at the brutality of the Euphrates tribal suppressions, and disapproval of the recurring use of the Army for police measures. They pointed at the private fortunes which, mysteriously, certain ministers were said to be amassing; and they execrated the alleged spy system which was one of the ministerial means of control, and the suppression of newspapers inclined to criticize them. From the left-wing Ahali group a particular dissatisfaction arose. They saw, under Yasin Pasha, no hope of carrying out the reforms which they advocated. Shedding an extremist and in certain cases Communist or near-Communist minority, the group grew with the adhesion of other unemployed politicians. Though never formed as a party, they stood for social reform and land reform on lines which, while excluding class warfare, must yet include some measure of redistribution of wealth, some improvement in the conditions of the working class, and some trespass on feudal and plutocratic privilege. Prominent in the movement were Ja'far abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi (a young half-brother of Ra'uf), Yusif 'Izz al-Din a financial expert of Kurdish descent, and a half-dozen of English- or American-educated intellectuals. Government lack of sympathy with their efforts, and the arrest of their less discreet members, led them finally to oppose the régime with a bitterness which would accept allies from any source.

665 668 No statesman felt more impatiently his exclusion from power than Ḥikmat Sulayman. Of excellent ability and generally popular, he assessed shrewdly the strength of the various anti-Hashimi forces, and admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics, which country he revisited in 1935. In Baghdad he was allied with the left wing, and resentful at newspaper suppressions which affected him personally; and he placed himself increasingly in con-

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tact with leaders of the Army. The latter, its morale uplifted by 668
triumphs over Assyrian villagers and Euphrates tribesmen, was 665
asking whether to serve the intrigues and ambitions of the Baghdad politicians was, after all, the ideal: whether direct dominance of the State by its armed force, as in Turkey or Persia, would not be more congenial? The stages by which Ḥikmat Sulayman and the forceful sinister Bakr Ṣidqi came into closer agreement, and the latter abandoned his loyalty to Yasin Pasha and his brother Ṭaha, cannot now be traced. To Ḥikmat the immediate desideratum was a change of Government in his own favour, and only the Army could produce this; Bakr Ṣidqi's ambition was to effect a stroke which would assure the Army of a paramount position and himself the headship of the Army. Neither at any time sought, it seems, a personal or formal dictatorship.

In October 1936 Ṭaha left 'Iraq to visit Turkey, leaving Ṣidqi, 665
then commanding the 1st Division, to act in his place. The 669
autumn manœuvres on the middle Diyalā gave occasion to concentrate almost all of the armed forces outside the capital. The plot concerted by Bakr with Ḥikmat Sulayman was communicated to a few officers at Qaraghan, notably 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, the general commanding the 2nd Division. The two generāls drafted a letter to the King, demanding the formation of a new Ministry under Ḥikmat, and handed it to the latter. Leaders of the left-wing group were admitted to the secret. The Air Force under its Commander, Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, a close friend of Ṣidqi, was concentrated at Qaraghan and was provided with leaflets to scatter over Baghdad at the appropriate moment. On the night of 28 October the Army, renamed the National Defence Force for the occasion, began its 'march on Baghdad'.

By early morning of the 29th leaflets rained from the sky over Baghdad, and Ḥikmat conveyed the agreed letter to the palace. Yasin Pasha and his colleagues, amazed at a turn of events wholly unexpected, made their way to the King's ante-room, where Ghazi had already summoned the British Ambassador. The latter advised His Majesty to consult his Cabinet, to ascertain the intentions of Ḥikmat, and to proceed, above all, constitutionally. The ministers, now joined by all their colleagues except Rashid 'Āli, were ready to resign. Bombs fell on Baghdad in the mid-morning, a three-hour time limit for the Cabinet's surrender having expired, and some civilians killed and wounded showed the zeal of the Royal 'Iraqi Air Force. After a discussion which could end but one way, the Cabinet resigned, and a Royal Irada appointed Ḥikmat Sulayman to form a new Ministry.

One shocking incident distressed the public, horrified the British Ambassador, and disgusted Ḥikmat himself—the brutal murder of

the contrary, it was criticized by anti-Zionist enthusiasts, by ardent 645*
members of the pan-Arab Muthannā Club in Baghdad, and at times 665
in Egypt and Syrian newspapers, as being less than whole-hearted
on the question of Arab unity. Bakr Ṣidqi was a Kurd, Ḥikmat
Sulayman by sympathy more Turk than Arab, and the Ahali
group cared little for international politics. The tone of its early
programme and of the speeches of Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman
were equalitarian and easily labelled Communistic, and they
alarmed the established classes. The Reformist group had indeed
assumed its share of power with high hopes; but for all their
newspaper and their 'People's Reform League', to which four
ministers belonged, they found little popular support. They were
opposed by the shaykhs who feared for their own positions, and
thwarted by the Army who distrusted or despised them. The
efforts of the group, laudable as they were as appreciating something
of the real weaknesses and evils of 'Iraq society, were
politically unprofitable to a Ministry dominated by the Army and
by reaction. The freedom of the press and of politics promised for [656]
all, in contrast to Yasin's régime, ceased to be permitted as soon as
opponents grew active. Political and tribal prisoners including the
Yazidis were released and a general amnesty proclaimed; but not
long afterwards measures of suppression were taken as severe as
those of a year earlier. Meanwhile friends of Ja'far Pasha—and
notably his brother-in-law, Nuri Sa'id, tirelessly manœuvring and
writing from Egypt and Syria—would forgive neither the murder
nor its perpetrators, nor the willingness of the King and the present
Cabinet to leave it unpunished. And, with all these elements of
criticism and discontent, those endemic on the middle Euphrates
were still alive, and soon to burst into violent activity.

Nowhere indeed were the embarrassments of Ḥikmat's position 645*
clearer than in his attempts to solve the insoluble Euphrates prob- 668
lem. He must placate malcontents without offending their enemies:
he must pardon the already condemned, but not show weakness:
must keep order, but without a harshness which would be resented.
Starting with all confidence in his own good intentions and diplomatic
skill, he signally failed. The ferment of self-seeking and
vengeful faction which was the normal life of Euphrates shaykhly
and religious circles refused to cool at his bidding. A notorious
land dispute among the Bani Zurayj of Samawa qadhā was the
occasion to rally once again the forces supporting and opposed to
'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr and Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh. These
flouted the orders of the Ministry to a point which made inevitable
a return to the severity with which Ḥikmat Sulayman had hoped to
dispense, the two inveterate trouble-makers were deprived of their
parliamentary immunity, arrested, and sentenced to detention in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 northern 'Iraq. In June 1937 continued lawlessness at Samawa
•668 led to military operations on the habitual pattern, with destruction of villages, tribal attacks on the qadhā town, and (it was said) the shooting of hostages by the Army. Deep as was the impression made on the tribes by this treatment, peace never returned to these troubled regions during the life-time of the Sulaymani Ministry. In the towns, security was reasonably maintained, and isolated acts of anti-Jewish violence which had occurred in Baghdad in 1936 were not repeated.

646 The Ministry remained unhappy in the political sphere. The
665 general elections ordered in November 1936 and completed in February 1937 produced a Chamber from which indispensable compliance with Ṣidqi's wishes had excluded the bulk of former Deputies and all but twelve of the Reformists; but had admitted, as a conciliatory favour, some ill-chosen wildlings from the Euphrates tribes. In the four months of the Extraordinary Session from February to June 1937 the Chamber was uneasy and divided, with painful friction between the Ministry's own ill-assorted followers. This, and the frustrations of their minority position, and their dislike of the re-adopted harsh policy at Samawa, led in June to the resignation of the four Reformist ministers. While still in
468 office their influence, especially that of Chadirchi, had inspired, perhaps encouraged, serious strikes among industrial workers. So were explained the successive strikes at the Kut barrage, in the drilling-areas of the B.O.D. Company, in the Railway workshops, among the Port workers and the Najf weavers, and among the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk. These strikes, whether industrially justified or not, reflected a new spirit of labour self-consciousness not necessarily unhealthy—and a new political weapon.

*645 Ḥikmat's hopes of strengthening his Cabinet by the inclusion in
665 it of leading statesmen—Nuri Sa'id himself, or Jamil al-Madfa'i—could not but fail since few now trusted Bakr or the uneasy régime itself. Of the four new ministers, two, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, were Sunni lawyer-politicians and functionaries, and two, 'Abbas Mahdi and Ja'far Ḥamandi, were Shi'is of similar background. They were posted to the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Works, and Education respectively; but they were politically of little weight. The breach between the Reform movement and the Government was now complete; the People's Reform League was suppressed, and prominent Communists, real or alleged, were arrested. Two of the most active, 'Abd al-Qadir and Yusif, sons of Isma'il, fled to Paris. The Army dominated, ever more obviously, the Prime Minister and his Government.

*645 The position was one which Bakr Ṣidqi could not but abuse. He

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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665 The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

000 Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of [668] Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

701 Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

563 The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

665 The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of
668 political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest against the Başra concession, others—Rashid 'Āli and Ḥikmat Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an out-
[656 break of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with
661] justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number of their more violent opponents. These included officers known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Āli led to his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri, and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms, occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement. Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained, Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties, and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter
006 to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the 625
Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards 657
such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and 665
at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Āli, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplica- 204
tion of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when out- 668
lawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid 'Āli in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of 'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

668 eager for any ally who would help to overthrow a régime which
seemed to bring them only poverty and hopelessness; and many
who had acclaimed such an ally in Nazi Germany now looked
instead to Soviet Russia. This Communism of the 'Iraq of 1944–5
had little intellectual background, although it attracted the intel-
ligentsia, and showed scarcely a link with the doctrine, or even
with the agents, of Moscow. It was organized by secret meetings,
leaflets, the still untraced news-sheet of Comrade Fahad, and busy
talkers among the railway and oil company workers. The applica-
tion of Kamil al-Chadirchi and his friends in April 1944 for per-
mission to form a People's Party was refused by Nuri Pasha; they
addressed their protest significantly to the Russian Consul at
668 Kirmanshah. The opening of official 'Iraqi-Russian relations in
648× September of that year was as welcome to the local Communists and
Reformists as it was alarming to the conservatives. M. Krikori
Titovitch Zaitzev, an inoffensive personality, was appointed first
Russian Minister in Baghdad in November, and came into residence
early in 1945; the first 'Iraq Minister to Moscow, 'Abbas Mahdi,
assumed his post late in that year. At the same period the Com-
munist Party ventured with new confidence to address the Prime
Minister—with copies to many authorities outside 'Iraq—demand-
ing the 'abolition of all reactionary laws' and pardon for all
imprisoned Communists and Kurdish rebels.

648× Emerging from the war undamaged and enriched, 'Iraq could look to play in international affairs a much more confident part than in the 'thirties, and would expect the treatment due to a State with all the appearance of present stability and hopeful promise. From the French its Foreign Ministry was estranged by 'the events' of Syria and the Lebanon; a mission from the French Committee of National Liberation was coldly received, and no French representative was now found in Baghdad. The United States, whose interest in future markets and civil airports was undisguised, still occupied but a small place in the 'Iraqi purview, and one for the moment discredited by the American attitude to Zionism. Nevertheless, their future part in Middle Eastern affairs was already foreshadowed, and the invitation of President Roosevelt to the Regent to visit America was welcomed. Delayed by the President's death, the Amir, accompanied by Nuri Pasha and Da'ud al-Ḥaydari, and leaving his uncle the Amir Zayd as Regent, arrived in America in the midsummer of 1945 as the guest of President Truman. He toured the country, visited the Governor-General of Canada, and concluded a successful journey by visits to London, Paris, Rome, Istanbul, Ankara, and Beirut.

The nation's participation, as of right, in the important international conferences of the period tended to widen the views of at

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

5. KURDISH ALARMS

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During the bad days of 1941 and throughout 1942 the Kurds did nothing to add to the anxieties of Government, though close observers were aware of the lack of loyalty, sometimes of scornful dislike, still felt towards Baghdad in the Kurdish mountains. Since nothing would induce them to forget their un-Arab distinctness and racial pride, the preservation of peaceful administration would depend, it seemed, on minimizing friction, on ensuring for the Kurds a maximum of sympathetic discrimination, and on the power to strike effectively at need. Nothing occurred to simplify dealing with this greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, and the near presence of a disturbing influence in north-west Persia was to prove an added embarrassment.

Shaykh Maḥmud, whose foolish movement of defiance continued even after the restoration of the lawful Regent and constitutional government, had been allowed to live in one of his own villages. In Persian Kurdistan the Anglo-Russian invasion of Persia in that year led to collapse of the central authority; and the vacuum of power was soon filled by the self-appointment of Kurdish chiefs to local rule, with the enforced acquiescence of Teheran. Among many old unwanted trouble-makers who returned from exile was Ḥama Rashid Khan, an 'Iraqi by birth but now claiming dual nationality; he achieved a brief independence at Saqiz until 1942 when he was driven out, re-crossed to 'Iraq, and submitted to detention at Kirkuk. Approaches from Persian Kurdish leaders to the British Embassy in Baghdad for inclusion in a 'British Zone' were (as so often before) refused, to the bewilderment of the chieftains, who found incomprehensible the British support of Persian or 'Iraqi Governments; but after some months the endless squabbles among the Aghās enabled Persian troops to re-enter most of the towns, assert some sort of authority, and drive a number of leaders into 'Iraq. Mahabad (Ṣawj Bulaq) alone the Persians failed to enter, and it became the centre of an all-Kurdish enclave. A vigorous Kurdish society, the Jiyana Kurd or Kurdish Resurrection (called also simply the Komalla Kurd), was formed in Mahabad, and its publication, the *Nishtman* (Homeland) magazine, reached 'Iraq. Similar clubs were founded in the northern liwās, and the Kurdish intelligentsia had formed a Hewa (Hope) Society, later to be joined or superseded by a Rezgari (Rescue) Group, insistent on 'national rights' against all oppressors.

No overt trouble, however, arose for a time, and the Barzani leaders, Shaykh Aḥmad and his younger brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, who were living on allowances away from their homes, gave no offence until the midsummer of 1943. In that month Mullā

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Muṣṭafā, always unbalanced and now inflamed by new grievances 563
at the cost of living, escaped from Sulaymaniya, regained Barzan, 668
and raised a force to join that of a Turkish-Kurdish outlaw, Sa'id Birokhi. The latter was captured by a Turkish column, but the Mullā, waxing in strength, successfully attacked Government posts and carried out profitable raids. A message from Nuri Pasha, conveyed through the still detained Shaykh Aḥmad, urged him to surrender. He refused, flouted all authority, and tampered with the loyalty of Kurdish officers of the Army. A column of the latter, accompanied by the Chief of Staff, left Margasur to deal with the rebels, but poor leadership and many desertions led to ignominious failure, and a column of Indian troops occupied Diyana as a precaution against further loss. The Government, forced now to prefer negotiations to force, offered Mullā Muṣṭafā the chance to cross into Persia, or to live with the Pishdar; he declined both offers, again demanded 'Kurdish rights', and was warned by the British Ambassador (to whom as usual he appealed) that British support would be given not to him but to the Government he was offending.

A visit in January 1944 by the Kurdish Minister without portfolio, Mājid Muṣṭafā, was successful in restoring some sort of relations, and the Mullā was claimed in Baghdad communiqués to have 'submitted unconditionally to the Regent'. Thereafter, Mājid Muṣṭafā toured the Kurdish area, removed unpopular officials, arranged for a distribution of barley, and installed an able Kurdish General and graduate of the British Staff College, Baha al-Din Nuri, as Mutaṣarrif of Sulaymaniya.

But a policy of sympathy in the Kurdish liwās, supported generally by the Premier, was opposed by some of his colleagues; the undertakings given to the Mullā were likely to be lost in delays and evasions, and the Barzani leader in his frustration again demanded British intervention. The last ministerial tour of Nuri Pasha, in May 1944, was to Kurdistan, where threats of renewed trouble were now persistent and Kurdish-Arab feeling ran high in the Army. He proposed the establishment of an all-Kurdish liwā formed from the Kurdish qadhās of Mosul, and the appointment of officials to it by the Kurdish representative minister in the Cabinet; he added the offer of a Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Education, the improvement of social services in the north, the grant of agricultural loans, and reconsideration of the unpopular tobacco monopoly. But his Cabinet colleagues refused to support him, the plan for the liwā of Dohuk was unacceptable to the Regent, and the Sa'idi Ministry fell amid doubt and disunity. The anti-Kurdish feeling in much of the Baghdad political world had again prevailed: it was based, as ever, on the fear of separatism,

563 668 on the certainty that indulgence in the north would be followed by equal or greater Shi'i demands, and on the crudely selfish ambitions of the Kurdish leaders. The Kurds were, moreover, represented in the Cabinet only by individuals long denationalized, and in the Chamber by deputies selected for their tractability.

The Pachachi Ministry did little to honour the undertakings of Nuri Pasha, though the Prime Minister and Arshad approved them against the opposition of Muṣṭafā al-'Umari and Taḥsin 'Ali. Baha al-Din was removed from Sulaymaniya; but after a meeting of Kurdish leaders there in July 1944, the Cabinet sent up two Kurdish Mutaṣarrifs to take charge of that liwā and Arbil, and dispatched the Minister of Economics, Tawfiq Wahbi, on a goodwill mission in Kurdistan. He was forced to realize the extent of ill will towards Baghdad, and found that Barzani power had redoubled by a recent marriage alliance with Zibar. On the Minister's departure Mullā Muṣṭafā helped himself to Government grain stores, looted police posts, conducted a futile correspondence with the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, and demanded from Baghdad the fulfilment of Nuri Pasha's promises—and a loan for himself. In November, four 'Iraqis were dropped in Mosul liwā by parachute from a German plane; two were captured, two escaped. The year closed with uneasiness at the likely prospect of another Kurdish campaign, this time in midwinter: a blow which the Government attempted to forestall by free distributions of grain and cloth.

These fears proved in part groundless. Peace was outwardly undisturbed throughout the winter of 1944–5, though Kurdish restless dissatisfaction and the increase of Russian influence precluded confidence. A connexion between Kurdish nationalism—of the type favoured by the intelligentsia rather than that of the feudal leaders—and some type of Communism became more evident; two Kurdish-language Communist magazines, later combined into one (the *Azadi*, or Freedom), appeared in 'Iraq in 1934 produced, like *al-Qa'ida*, by the Communist Party; and some of the organizers, who included Army officers, were no doubt in touch with the Russians. The forms taken by both nationalism and Communism were various; *Azadi* was purely Communist and advocated a united front with the Arabs against reaction and feudalism, while the Persian or Adharbayjani *Nishtman* spoke for exclusive Kurdish unity and rights, and bade the feudal leaders modernize themselves.

563 669 In March 1945 an Amnesty Bill was placed before Parliament, and passed with the reluctance of many deputies; it pardoned all Kurdish offenders up to February 1944, the date of the Mullā's submission. He himself visited Mosul, and was received there by

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

X

END OF THE HALF-CENTURY

1. GATHERING STORM

*645 THE resignation of the Pachachi Government was followed by a month of uneasiness while the choice of a successor Cabinet was delayed. Despite the alleged misgivings of the Regent, the premiership fell on 23 February 1946 to Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, a statesman whose many gifts did not include that of creating confidence. He retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, brought the able and vigorous 'Ali Mumtaz to Works, General Isma'il Namiq to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Justice, and Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban to Social Affairs. To the three all-important Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Supply he appointed respectively Sa'd Ṣaliḥ, a Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif hostile to Ṣaliḥ Jabr: 'Abd al-Wahhab Maḥmud, a Baṣra lawyer with a stormy political past: and another Shi'i, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Chalabi, of American education and unusual ability. Two more newcomers assumed duty at the Ministries of Economics and Education: 'Abd al-Hadi al-Dhahir—a third Shi'i and ex-official—and Najib al-Rawi. The composition of this Cabinet was modified in April by the substitution of Dr. Shawkat al-Zahawi, a Kurdish pathologist, for Baban at Social Affairs; and, in the last days of its short life, by the move of 'Ali Mumtaz to Foreign Affairs and Chalabi to Works.

652 Inspired by liberal views, the Ministry started with fair hopes. Although, surprisingly, no budget for 1946–7 was submitted, the State finances were still treated as giving no cause for immediate alarm. The 'hard currency' agreement made with the British in 1945 was renewed for a year, and a British trade mission under [666] Lord Davidson was welcomed in Baghdad. The new Electoral Law long under preparation was passed; substantially improving and liberalizing the existing procedures, it provided for the giving of due notice and publicity to forthcoming elections and to the candidates who offered themselves, and for the fragmentation of liwās into constituencies which would produce 138 instead of 115 deputies. It did not, however, introduce direct one-stage election, for which the Opposition parties combined to press as likely to be 'freer'. The Liwā Administration Law, passed in February, gave promise of greater zeal and initiative in local government, and of independent action in case of disorder.

• 668 Countryside security was well maintained. Winter passed into spring without the appearance of the expected trouble in Kurdistan,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1948) MHI Iraq MHI

though streams of unwelcome propaganda were flowing in from 668 the Republic of Mahabad (with Marshal Muṣṭafā high in its councils), Army units were stationed in readiness in frontier qadhās, and a memorandum of Kurdish appeal and protest had been handed to the Anglo-American Palestine Committee. An Army column visited Sinjar, but only minor clashes resulted. The air of dissatisfaction or menace which hung over the Holy Cities led to no overt trouble. Elsewhere in the towns, efforts made by the progressive or malicious to create labour unrest were successful in inspiring a railway strike in March, and a political general strike and demonstration was organized in May in protest against the Anglo-American report. It led to no breach of the peace; indeed the deputies themselves had cabled in February a protest to London against continued Jewish immigration into Palestine, and Fadhil Jamali had testified similarly to the Anglo-American Commission in Cairo. The Cabinet and the Regent sent further protests in May to the British Government, King George VI, and the American President.

That political demonstrations were now possible was owed to the 66 5
Suwaydi (or the Regent's) policy of removing restrictions and per- 668
mitting the rebirth of parties. The 'Amara concentration camp was closed; martial law, imposed in Baghdad and neighbouring districts in 1941, was at last removed; the Public Security Ordinance of 1940 was revoked, and press censorship abolished. This liberality was repaid by journalist ex-internees in the form of savage attacks on the Suwaydi Ministry, attacks reflecting both personal bitterness and the militant attitudes of the parties which plunged forthwith into full activity. If they were representative as ever rather of the dissatisfied and power-seeking than the satisfied and power-holding political and social groups, this was least true of the Liberal Party which, dormant since its foundation in 1939, now revived with a modest reform programme made attractive by an anti-British colouring; its members, not numerous, included Kamil al-Khudhayri, President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, and Sa'd Ṣaliḥ. It published the *Ṣawt al-Aḥrar* as its daily newspaper. The Independence Party, based on the old côterie of Rashid 'Āli and Yasin Pasha, brought up to date by accretions of students and malcontent intelligentsia, passed for right-wing nationalist and was guided by the Muthannā Club founder-member and Nazi sympathizer, Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba, and by the bitter xenophobes Fa'iq al-Samarrā'i and Ṣādiq Shanshal. The party, well organized and comparatively stable, based its foreign policy on unfriendliness to Turkey and to Great Britain but 'neutrality' towards Russia, with an anti-Hashimite and pro-Mufti leaning, and aspirations at home towards social reform; the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

665 *Liwā al-Istiqlal* was its press organ. Dr. Sami Shawkat's National
668 Revival Party, with its paper *al-Iṣlaḥ*, was similar but less stable in its views, and even more violent in tone. The last of the left-wing parties was the National Democratic of Kamil al-Chadirchi, an ineffective leader but veteran left-wing champion, with Muḥammad Ḥadid, London-educated left-wing socialist of good standing, and Ḥusayn Jamil, an ex-judge of good family and reformist views; its newspaper was the *Ṣawt al-Ahali*, later *Ṣadā al-Ahali*. A party of social reform deriving from the old Ahali group of 1934, it drew its support largely from wealthy townsmen and young enthusiasts and directed its fire principally against the Western Powers and against the 'old gang' in ruling circles. Its official anti-Communist attitude did not preclude some approval of Russian policies, nor its national loyalties an anti-Hashimite bias. The party of National Union, which was dissolved in 1947, was on the borderline of Communism, and its paper *al-Siyasa* frankly subversive; its stalwarts were the American-educated printing-press proprietor, 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim, and Nadhim al-Zahawi. In the same category fell the People's Party of the Communist 'Aziz Sharif, with its papers *al-Sha'b* and later *al-Waṭn*, suppressed in 1946 and 1947 respectively. The two parties last named amalgamated before their suppression into a Party of National Union. The avowedly Communist party of National Liberation under Muḥammad al-Shabibi and a group of Jewish Communists was refused the right to legalize itself but remained, with other groups of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh, fully active underground. Their members were drawn from industrial workers, from rich young men hiding behind ministers, and in general from the discontented or visionary of all classes. Their organization was widespread and efficient; it included cells in Government offices—though officials were forbidden by law to participate openly in politics—and in industrial enterprises. Sulaymaniya was their principal centre, where contact was easy with the trans-frontier Communists and the merging of Communism with Kurdish nationalism was an effective device.

648x Relations with 'Iraq's northern neighbour, always cordial with reservations, were amicably restated by a mission of Nuri Sa'id to Ankara in February 1946. He initialed a draft treaty of friendship which confirmed the 1926 boundary, provided a mutual policy of brotherhood, non-interference, and free consultation, and looked forward to joint handling of such shared problems as the Kurds and the Euphrates waters. The ratification of this in Baghdad in June 1947 was to prove no matter of course; some deputies remembered the old grievance of Alexandretta, others felt that to draw closer to Ankara must be disloyal to Arab interests, or that an

'Iraqi-Turkish bloc would be—worst of all crimes—acceptable to 648 ×
Great Britain. Nevertheless it was ratified, and a State visit by the Turkish President was anticipated. Some urged revival of the Sa'dabad Pact, others disliked it as un-Arab. The Treaty of Brotherhood with the Jordan Kingdom was duly approved, amid the black looks and street demonstrations of the anti-Hashimite factions.

The early fall of the Suwaydi Ministry, due to opposition in the 645×
Chamber and Senate and lack of Palace support, occurred on 3 May. In spite of popular hopes for a neutral or all-party Government, perhaps under the Amir Zayd, to hold elections and consolidate the structure of Government, it was followed on 1 June by a Ministry of indifferent quality led by the forceful authoritarian Arshad al-'Umari. He was to remain in office for six months, with a marked personal domination of his colleagues and of all departments, and to deal characteristically with the political freedoms permitted by his predecessor. He named 'Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab to Interior, Yusif Ghanima to Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba to Justice. The other ministers were all newcomers to Cabinet position: the Shi'i 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi (son of old 'Abd al-Ḥusayn) at Works, Babā 'Ali, the modernized and Americanized son of Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji, at Economics, Sa'id Ḥaqqi, another Kurd, at Defence, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, Dr. 'Abd al-Hadi al-Pachachi—cousin of Ḥamdi and Muzaḥim—at Social Affairs, and Nuri al-Qadhi, a lawyer and judge of the old school, at Education. In August Qaṣṣab resigned his portfolio, which the Prime Minister assumed, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh took that of Supplies.

In spite of Arshad's will to impose discipline and peace, his 619
period of office was troubled. In the tribes an unusually bloody 668
clash occurred in August between the Shammar and the Albu Muṭaywit, with the loss of 200 lives. Danger in Kurdistan seemed to diminish as the Russian attempt to consolidate its puppet Republics across the frontier failed, and disillusioned and starving Barzani families trickled homewards to be disarmed. Many of the rebels in Persian Kurdistan, including Qadhi Muḥammad, were hanged by their Government on re-entry; but Mullā Muṣṭafā refused all terms, escaped capture, and after failing to re-enter 'Iraq reached Soviet territory. The Government accepted the unconditional surrender of his brother Shaykh Aḥmad and of his son Shaykh 'Ubaydullah. Four Kurdish officers who had fought for the Mullā and a few other ex-ringleaders were sentenced to death, and the need to deal with the armed insurgence of Muḥammad Khalid, the son of Shaykh Aḥmad, forced Government to keep troops in the neighbourhood. In Sulaymaniya liwā hostilities

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of
● 668 the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely
kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in
Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan,
where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able
to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for
the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a
precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the
[468] Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by
politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq
Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and
conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It
was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the
interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had
led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to
blame the Company itself.

668 In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by
the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy
661 of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made
after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some
3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal
from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question.
In August and September more papers were suppressed for
inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was
declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were
sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker*
x645 was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps,
which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly
to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between
the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to
power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification
of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry,
approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little
favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan
(at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such
gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition
of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the
Panjwin earthquake victims.

*645 In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy
was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status
648 which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the
Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946,
and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a
conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views';
and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

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The People's Party and that of National Union were finally sup- 645x pressed in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was 665 notorious that the strike in the Port of Basra during the summer 661 had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 186 1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed Zionism, backed by American money and competing political interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn 000 of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan' which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, 668 a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some 665 sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent and potential violence which were actually present and were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were [731] approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks. Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western, narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 judged them; nor were they incapable of temporary union with
665 each other or, in some eventualities, with the Communists. General disillusion created by the divided post-war world, the uneasy relations between East and West from China to Morocco, and the doubtful progress of 'democracy', had descended upon the conscious elements of the 'Iraq cities; and the destructive emotions it had produced were to find their readiest outlet in two fields: one, the Palestine situation now going from bad to worse: the other, the relations of 'Iraq with Great Britain now on the eve of restatement. All the latent menaces of 1947, a year of seeming progress and hope, were to be realized with tragic results in the year following.

2. PORTSMOUTH AND PALESTINE

648 During the weeks following the opening of Parliament on 1 December 1947 all was ready, it seemed, for the signature of a new Treaty; not only its principles but most of a new text had been agreed by the statesmen consulted in Baghdad and by the Regent. In the last days of the year it was announced that the Premier and his Foreign Minister—to be accompanied, in the event, by Nuri Sa'id and Shakir al-Wadi—would proceed to London for final talks and probable signature. Jamal Baban was left as acting Prime Minister. The Treaty was in fact agreed and initialed on 12 January 1948, and was signed at Portsmouth by the 'Iraqi deputation and Ernest Bevin on the 15th.

Praised by the latter as an inspiring example and precedent for other similar undertakings, the Treaty and its annex included the hope of co-operation in matters of technical and economic development; but primarily it was one of mutual defence. It provided for consultation in time of danger, and for immediate help, each to each, in time of war. The Air Force bases of Habbaniya and Shu'ayba were to be handed to 'Iraq, with the retention only of limited British personnel, at British expense but under 'Iraqi command, to ensure readiness for immediate use; British combatant forces could reoccupy them only in case of war. The British Military Mission was to disappear, a mixed Anglo-'Iraqi Council would undertake the development of strategic plans and offer recommendations on the equipment of the 'Iraqi forces. Standardization of equipment as between the two armies would be assured, help would be given by the R.A.F. to the R.I.A.F. in training abroad, arms of the latest pattern would be made available. The Treaty would come into force as soon as the post-war world had returned to peace conditions: as soon, that is, as all peace treaties with ex-enemy countries had come into force and occupying armies had been withdrawn.

The Treaty as published was welcomed in Great Britain, and

was judged satisfactory in Baghdad by the responsible elements 648K which had already approved it, and by the Regent. The latter in an exchange of telegrams with King George VI held that the new Treaty was 'in the interests of both countries, and would consolidate their friendship'. The 'Iraqi delegation in Great Britain, passing a few days of holiday, felt no suspicion that their own countrymen would not accept an agreement which represented so obvious and advantageous an advance on the 1930 Treaty, and which seemed in no way calculated to offend national *amour propre*.

They were rapidly undeceived. The absence of the principal 648K ministers from Baghdad, and their failure to explain and defend the 668 new Treaty on or in advance of its publication, afforded a welcome opportunity for an attitude of emphatic 'patriotic' rejection to the parties and the town mob, who, directed by able organizers, had for weeks or months past been prepared for this event. The particular clauses of the new Treaty were little in question; nor was the upheaval more specifically anti-British than was necessary to afford a common rallying call, of proved efficacy, to diverse elements. If to some politicians and malcontents the continued British connexion and the presence even of British technicians was offensive, to far more the occasion was a suitable one to relieve their feelings of dismay at the now serious food shortage, the economic inequalities, an unpopular Prime Minister, an Administration with obvious shortcomings and much suspected corruption, and the resented exclusion from power of young politicians and publicists and of the old embittered adherents of Rashid 'Āli and his Generals.

The immediate reaction of the Baghdad public to the announcement of the Treaty was a three-day strike of Law and Engineering students, and the holding of demonstrations, impressive in their size and fervour, organized by the National Democratic, Independence, Liberal, and Communist Parties. Strikes were called in offices and workshops, and violent attacks made on the premises of British or suspected-British concerns, notably those of the *'Iraq Times*. Marches and countermarches, with ugly clashes with the police, filled the streets of the capital. Demonstrations, which early firmness might have controlled, were soon beyond discipline, the mob joined in with enthusiasm, and the communiqués of the Deputy Premier, Jamal Baban, and his now frightened ministers were unheeded. Police action in opening fire to restore a semblance of order was both unsuccessful and savagely resented. Not less than fifty persons were killed and between 100 and 200 injured, including many of the police. Mass movements which started on 16 January grew in scale on every succeeding day. The restoration of order must, it appeared, devolve on the Army, if on anyone; and

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it was found by ministers and perhaps by the Regent imprudent to invoke this force, whose attitude was incalculable and whose leadership was in parts rancorously Anglophobe. The morale of the police themselves, execrated by the mob and unsupported by their superiors, fell rapidly. In the provinces, farther from the inspirers of the trouble, the Mutaṣarrifs were usually able to control or at least to limit the organized street marches, and in most centres they preserved nearly normal conditions. In Sulaymaniya the demonstrators praised the Russians, detested all Arabs, abused the British, chased an English teacher from the town, and burnt the British Institute.

The Regent, against whom as a reputed Treaty advocate a part of the disorder was aimed—and indeed talk of a Republic was not lacking—convened a Crown Council on 21 January and, after five hours of discussion, felt the necessity of reversing his attitude and disclaiming the Treaty. He issued at its conclusion a statement that the Treaty was found to be unsatisfactory: that it did not 'realize the national aspirations of 'Iraq or consolidate the friendship between the two countries': and that he would ratify nothing that failed to secure for the country all its objectives. Notwithstanding this volte-face, the demonstrations continued unabated, with decreased police control and clear signs of the disintegration or disappearance of a part of the force. Public funerals attended by thousands were given to students who had fallen. The return of the Prime Minister to Baghdad, still convinced that all was the work of a few agitators and a misled public, availed nothing; his personal safety was with difficulty assured by a roof-top garrison at his private house. The press and crowd raged against him unchecked by police rifle-fire or by the arrest of Communist firebrands; and his public statement, still confident in tone, fell on deaf ears. The street riots and marches reached a climax on 27 January, with many deaths and injuries; a crowd demanded at the palace the resignation, or even the death, of the Prime Minister. Ṣaliḥ Jabr was compelled to yield. He resigned office and fled for his life to his tribal home country on the Euphrates, and thence later to Jordan and to England. A hundred thousand people attended the funerals of 'the Martyrs' and the party spokesmen demanded the final abrogation of the Treaty. The days following showed little improvement in public order. Mass meetings in the streets continued and dominated the town with patriotic banners, threats of death to their enemies, the cry for free lands for all, and destruction to foreigners. Parties from the provinces, among them Kurds demanding the release of Barzani leaders, joined the crowds in the capital; business and social life were completely disrupted and the police largely disappeared from the streets. Throughout these proceedings there was no hope of freedom for the expression, 648K much less for the acceptance, of the opinions of the many who 668 ● believed the Portsmouth Treaty to be a realistic and beneficent measure, of great advantage to the State.

On the disappearance of Ṣaliḥ Jabr the task of forming a Government 645K was entrusted to the 66-year-old Shi'i nationalist, Sayid 648K Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. Ignoring the claims of all save one of the party chiefs who had created the present troubles, he surrounded himself with tried statesmen of former Cabinets. With three Shi'i ministers—Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba at Supply, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Finance, and Ridhā al-Shabibi at Education—he secured the services of Madfa'i (for a short time) at Interior, Arshad al-'Umari at Defence, Ḥamdi al-Pachachi (a sick man who died three months later) at Foreign Affairs, Muṣṭafā al-'Umari at Economics, 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice, Najib al-Rawi and Jalal Baban at Social Affairs and Works. Naṣrat al-Farsi, Mawlud al-Mukhliṣ, Ḥikmat Sulayman, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh had been expected to be members; the first-named with Da'ud al-Ḥaydari and for a few weeks the Amir of the Rabi'a, Muḥammad al-Sayhud, became ministers without portfolio. The team was strong in experience and personalities but, though supported by most of the parties, it lacked both cohesion and any policy save mere appeasement. After an early Cabinet meeting it announced that the Treaty would not be ratified; it was 'not a fit instrument for strengthening the ties with Great Britain'; but another Treaty might perhaps be considered. Parliament was prorogued for fifty days, and on 25 February the Chamber, pronounced unrepresentative and illegally elected, was dissolved and new elections were ordered. Sir Henry Mack succeeded Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird as British Ambassador in the same month.

The period during which the rolls of voters were completed and 645K primary elections carried out was disturbed and unhappy, with 668 erratic Government intervention which reflected individual ministers' predilections but no plan. The parties, unsure of success, already protested at 'Government interference', and two of them announced a boycott. Ministers vied with each other in disclaiming any part in opposing the rioters' violence during 'the revolution' on 20 January and appointed a committee to inquire into police action. Student parades and outcries continued, to the wearied disgust of quiet-loving citizens. Meetings, flag-wavings, and rifle-shooting in Sulaymaniya and other centres led again to violent clashes and disorder. The British Consulate at Kirkuk was attacked. The announcement that the British Military Mission was (in fact, at its own suggestion) to be withdrawn in May was hailed as a national triumph. The Anglo-Jordan Treaty on 29 March was another

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

x645 theme for hostile schoolboy agitation in the streets of the capital.
● 668 The Ministry's appeal for unity and tranquillity, and another by
al-Ṣadr in person, were alike unheeded, and the work of administration, in which the Prime Minister had neither interest nor com-
[731] petence, was largely ignored. The near-famine conditions among
the poorer classes could not be cured until after the harvest, which itself promised to be scanty; meanwhile an Australian grain ship was by British initiative diverted to Baṣra and its urgently needed stores distributed.

x645 The death of Ḥamdi al-Pachachi on 27 March led to changes among the uneasy ministers. 'Umar Nadhmi had resigned and been replaced at Justice by Najib al-Rawi, who handed his portfolio of Social Affairs to Ḥaydari. Naṣrat had succeeded Madfa'i at Interior when the latter became President of the Senate, and was himself succeeded when he moved to Foreign Affairs by Muṣṭafā al-'Umari who could thus 'control' the forthcoming elections. The Amir al-Rabi'a resigned and went home in April. Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba left the Ministry early in June. The frequent absences of the Ministers of Finance and Justice at Arab League meetings led to constant interchange of ministerial duties, from which the shaken and demoralized Administration suffered.

646 The Chamber met on 26 June, after elections in which legal and illegal parties alike had put forth all their efforts, and which had produced street fighting in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniya. The Independence Party secured four seats, the National Democrats two, the Liberals one. All other deputies were free of party attachment and as such were likely to vote for any Ministry in power; it was clear that the enthusiasm, or the leadership, of the parties had still too little appeal to seduce the electorate from the familiar candidates of local importance in their constituencies or to resist the conservative influence of controlling officialdom. A Chamber—or an electorate—divided on true party lines was still an unrealizable conception.

648x The new Parliament was confronted, to its dismay, with a situa-
721 tion containing new and alarming features which events in
Palestine had created. The United Nations decision for Partition, taken in November 1947, had led in 'Iraq as elsewhere to angry remonstrance, and in the Arab League to emergency meetings. But no hopeful measures could be taken or planned at these; the lines of cleavage within the League were already too clear, and most of the States members too doubtful of their own stability. The earlier decision to encourage the infiltration of guerrilla fighters from each country into Palestine, for the stiffening of local resistance, was carried out to a limited extent. Some hundreds—or, as some said, two battalions—of young and a few veteran

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of 648
an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand
late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab
nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep
troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to
refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Govern-
ment for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte
proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Govern-
ment while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully
rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it 722
was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this
régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the dis- 656
turbing hostilities between civil and military authorities continued,
and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a
battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local
general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with
Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in
Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street [668]
demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the
Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its under-
ground organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the
seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective 563
alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Com-
munism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish 579
separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to
endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an
uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltra-
tion of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and
the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes
were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

The Regent, himself indefatigable in touring the country and 645x visiting the Army and the Arab capitals, called upon Nuri Sa'id to form a new Ministry. He did so on the same day by retaining four of the outgoing ministers—Kubba at Justice, Rawi at Education, Jalal Baban at Works, Shakir at Defence—and by bringing Bahā al-Din Nuri to Social Affairs, Dhiya' Ja'far to Economics, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Foreign Affairs. He retained Interior himself, and asked Jalal Baban to act temporarily in Finance until Khalil Isma'il reassumed the post.

Mainly through lack of mutual confidence between the Premier, some of the ministers, and the Throne, the ministerial history of 1949 was troubled in spite of improved leadership. The Cabinet, initially weak, was little strengthened by changes made two months later when 'Umar Nadhmi entered the Cabinet as Deputy Premier, Fadhil Jamali came from Cairo to Foreign Affairs on the appointment of 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to direct the National Bank, and Tawfiq al-Na'ib, a former judge and Mutaṣarrif and a supporter of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, became Minister of the Interior. The Prime Minister hoped at midsummer to secure further strength in support of a Ministry which its own dissensions were destroying. He consulted Jamil al-Madfa'i, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and 'Ali Mumtaz, of whom the last two were expected to join him; but agreement on the appointments was not forthcoming and the Cabinet barely survived into the winter of 1949–50. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior, not being deputies, were forced under the Constitution to resign office after six months, and their places were taken in September by Shakir and 'Umar Nadhmi.

Taking advantage of the partial lull in party activity while only 665 the Independence Party was in full operation, Nuri Pasha decided late in the year to found his own party, that of Constitutional Union. With an unexceptional programme of Arab brotherhood, friendship to all nations, anti-Communism, Treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at home and abroad, the party was composed of various elements of conservatism and vested interest, tribal and urban, and found cohesion in a common devotion to Nuri himself—as long as he remained powerful; and, taking its place as by far the largest and most amenable of the parties, it could not but dominate the Chamber as long as it held together. It was joined by an imposing array of ex-ministers and *ministrables*.

The last act of the Pachachi Ministry had been to arrange yet 668 another drive against the Communists, and the first of the Sa'idi 661 Cabinet was to continue it. Some hundreds of arrests were made, and led to scores of severe sentences for sedition and treason. Four notorious Communists—Yusif Salman, Yahuda Ṣadiq, Zaki Baṣim, and Ḥusayn Muḥammad Shabibi (a Christian, a Jew, and two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

668 661 Muslims) were condemned to death and, this time, executed amid the angry protests of the world's Communist press; another suffered the same fate in May. The Central Committee and records of the Communist Party were, it was claimed, located and disrupted, and the Government were satisfied that the back of the movement was at last broken. Lesser offenders against the State—or, as the malicious murmured, against the Prime Minister—received varying sentences. Kamil al-Chadirchi was sent to prison for four months. Demonstrations on the anniversary of the Portsmouth Treaty were strictly controlled, but led nevertheless to some rioting and many arrests. The procedures of martial law worked with less friction during the year, but Nuri felt still unable, in such times, to restore a normal régime. In spite of alarming rumours in the spring the return of Mullā Muṣṭafā from Russia and his expected invasion of 'Iraq were still delayed.

6481 Relations with Great Britain, which in 1948 had deteriorated more over Palestine than over the Treaty issue, and most of all over the British refusal to provide arms, improved in 1949 with a less Anglophobe Ministry and with the resumption of the supply of modern weapons to the Army as soon as it had left Palestine. Visits to London were paid by the Regent, the Prime Minister, and ministers during the year, loans were gladly received and British experts recruited; but it remained inconceivable that any younger politician, or indeed any party except the Prime Minister's, should not, by conviction or mere habit or 'patriotic' duty, blame Great Britain for all the evils of the State.

652 If a substantial reassertion of Government authority was one of the Pasha's achievements in his tenth premiership, he was able also to prevent further financial deterioration. The rate of annual deficit was checked, borrowing for current needs was avoided, and after a precarious year the latter months of 1949 showed less anxious prospects. A budget for 1949–50, balancing at ID 25 million of revenue and expenditure, was produced without excessive delay and provided for enhanced Customs revenues and for some economies in administration. Proposals made for higher taxation or for greater retrenchment were, for political reasons, not pursued, and the trade and economic position, in spite of a good 1949 harvest which permitted the resumption of grain exports, remained unfavourable; but military expenditure on account of Palestine ended in July, and help was forthcoming from the sale of Government stores and from oil royalties received in advance. The promise of loans from London and from the International Bank for development purposes was obtained by negotiations in Europe in the summer of 1949, and an advance of £3 million from the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was offered conditionally upon the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

701 American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow
631 start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers
which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and pro-
vincial administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth
a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available.
665 Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when
668 they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality
was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

563 If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

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/For an account of Arab Nationalism prior to 1914, and of Nationalism in Iraq between 1914 and 1920, see category 116, pp. 222-265./

175+ Arabs of Mesopotamia, notwithstanding the efforts of Sir Percy 727+ Cox and his associates to win Arab support in other directions[1] had far-reaching effects, not only during the period of hostilities but also long after the end of the war.

The British authorities in Mesopotamia lost thereby the war-time services of capable Arab leaders. Arabs of 'Iraq by the score, once in Turkish service, were gathered from the internment camps in India and Egypt, to serve as leaders and officers, [186 not in the land of their birth, but in the Hijāz. In contact there 665] with the sources of the Arab Movement, they were to imbibe and to pass on to 'Iraq, in the days after the Armistice, an intensity of Arab Nationalism hitherto unknown in 'Iraq. On the western side of Arabia, they had come into contact with English officers who, no less sincere in their allegiance to British interests than those on the eastern side of Arabia, were nevertheless sympathetic to this awakening Arab Nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that these 'Iraqis felt the difference between the official mind in Mesopotamia and that on the Mediterranean side of the desert, nor that, appreciating the difference, they were all the more impatient with the attitude of the Civil Administration which prevailed at Baghdad after Sir Percy Cox had been sent to Teheran in early 1918. Such impatience was none the less because they had little or no experience or knowledge of the difficulties of the military or administrative problems of Turkish Arabia, of which the British had gained an intimate, first-hand knowledge.

The military authorities in Mesopotamia also lost the opportunity to learn what British officers in western Arabia had already learned: that the Arabs might be more than treacherous, self-seeking, half-civilized peoples. The end of the war,

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[1] To the untimely death of Capt. W. H. I. Shakespear near Artawī, in January, 1915, has been ascribed the failure of Ibn Sa'ūd to take an active part in the war and the failure to develop in Mesopotamia an Arab Movement comparable to that in the Hijāz. See Philby, *The Heart of Arabia*, Vol. 1, p. 21; Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1914-1917, p. 161; also, Coke, Richard, *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 221.

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Lord Curzon, on the receipt of the telegram, which did not 175*
officially reach the Foreign Office until June 24th,[1] took the 727*
position that the creation of the sanctioned provinces, councils 648*
and advisory positions were steps in devolution and in decentralization from the temporary military administration. He could not understand, moreover, why the application of such steps should be dependent on the inclusion of Mōsul in 'Iraq or on any particular combination of provinces. The original sanction for the Acting Civil Commissioner's proposals had not implied that any combination of provinces or that even the guardianship of H.M. Government would be permanent. A telegram to this effect was dispatched to Baghdad, July 5th, which stated in conclusion: 'Any action which would give rise in Mosul Wilayet or elsewhere to the impression that the future political status of 'Iraq has already been decided upon should therefore be most scrupulously avoided.'[2]

Still unsatisfied, the Acting Civil Commissioner, instead of devoting his energies whole-heartedly to the execution of the proposals which he had himself drawn up, entered into further correspondence with H.M. Government, endeavouring to obtain their approval to the inclusion of Mōsul in the new regime.

Growth of 'Iraqī opposition

In the meantime, opposition to British control had continued 175*
to grow both in 'Iraq and in Syria. A letter in January, 1919, 727*
from the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, welcoming the Anglo-French 186
Declaration as an indication that no part of 'Iraq was to be 668
under foreign rule, had been followed in early June by another letter, supposed to have been written by Amīr Faisal himself, and addressed to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The letter suggested that the severity of the British officials in 'Iraq had begun to turn

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[1] Young, op. cit., pp. 287-8.

[2] Telegram S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 5th, 1919.

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away the regard of the people, and that if the Anglo-French Declaration signified anything, the time had come for a change. His own officers felt strongly the need for the acceleration of a National Government and fully understood that the longer the present system existed the greater would be the difficulty in changing the system later.

Lord Curzon, however, believed that no further action was necessary. He had already, two months before, sanctioned what he believed was the limit of Arab self-government compatible with a military occupation. No reply was sent.

The incident of Nājī Beg as-Sūwaidī, in addition, confirmed both the Arabs and the British officials of the hostility and bad faith of those on the opposite side. The Acting Civil Commissioner, on his journey from London to Baghdad, had interviewed two of the 'Iraqī officers in Damascus. He had admitted that affairs in 'Iraq were not perfect, and that he was ready to do what he could to meet their views. He had pointed out his difficulty in obtaining good men for positions in 'Iraq. He had at once agreed when the two officers had asked whether he would consent to a representative being chosen from among their number to go to Baghdad and to make suggestions.

Accordingly, Nājī Beg, a capable and ardent Nationalist, of an old Baghdad family,[1] arrived in Baghdad, early in June. He soon found, contrary to the expectations which the interview with the Acting Civil Commissioner had aroused in himself and in his fellow 'Iraqīs, that he was to be merely a cog in the British machine and that his advice would not be heeded and was not even wanted.[2]

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[1] Nājī Beg, now known as Nājī Pasha, was a son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī who, as a prominent Arab Nationalist in Baghdad before the war, had suffered imprisonment at the hands of the Turks (*Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913), and who took a large part in the post-war Nationalist movement in 'Iraq. Nājī Pasha had been a popular *Qaimmaqām* of Najaf under the Turks (ibid., April, 1913). He was Acting Civil Governor of Aleppo under the Damascus Government, and has been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, etc., of 'Iraq.

[2] In an interview with the writer, Nājī Pasha stated that he believed that he had been asked to come to Baghdad to assist and to advise in setting up a National Government. On discovering his mistake, he resigned.

His subsequent resignation and return to Syria confirmed 175*
the opinion of the 'Iraqis in Syria that the British authorities in 727*
'Iraq regarded them as active enemies who were trying to 186
undermine British influence in the country, and that no real 668
opportunities would ever be given to the 'Iraqis to manage their own affairs. The Acting Civil Commissioner, in his turn, was convinced that his view of the Arab Nationalists was the correct one: that they were incapable and inconstant and that nothing constructive might be expected from them. When, therefore, the Acting Civil Commissioner's opinion was asked on a draft reply[1] to a Memorandum which the 'Iraqī officers had sent to the Foreign Office demanding the immediate establishment of a National Government, he gave way to a characteristic outburst, deprecating in no uncertain language that an important announcement should be drawn from H.M. Government by 'such small fry'. He suggested, however, that if a reply were believed to be necessary it 'should be restricted to an intimation that the writers appear to have been misinformed as to the progress of events in Mesopotamia, and that it is open to them to go to Mesopotamia to see things for themselves'.[2]

Some form of reassurance to the 'Iraqī officers was held to be necessary by both Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu. A new reply was drafted. After stating that 'pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to Mandatory power and nature of Mandate it would be premature to attempt constitutional experiments', it followed the Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion for a reply and pointed out that if the officers would visit the country they would find that Provincial and Divisional Councils were already being formed 'to ensure measure of Arab participation compatible with military occupation and mutual interest in political future'. The appointment of Nājī

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 15th, 1919.

[2] Telegram No. 8107, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, July 19th, 1919.

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175* Pasha was mentioned as evidence of the goodwill of
737* H.M. Government.[1]

186 Whatever the effect of the reply at the time on the Acting
668* Civil Commissioner to whom it had been repeated for his information, he was later to claim that it came as 'a serious blow, not less serious because it was addressed to Cairo, for communication to a group of prominent 'Iraqī Officers in the Sharifian service, and was the outcome of telegraphic correspondence extending over four months'.[2] The evidence available makes it difficult to understand how he could have regarded the reply, drafted by H.M. Government on the lines he had himself put forward on July 19th, as the unexpected and disastrous result of his own efforts extending over four months of telegraphic correspondence.[3] His correspondence during that period had been concerned principally with persuading H.M. Government to limit Arab participation in the administration and not to extend it, and with urging the inclusion of Mōsul in a British-administered 'Iraq. Nor is it easy to understand just how the reply which he had assisted in drafting was a blow or check to the carrying out of the proposals with the execution of which he had been entrusted in May. The excerpt which he later extracted from the telegram and presented in a setting of his own fashioning in his *Clash of Loyalties*[4] might well give such an impression if it were not known that he had already been informed in the telegram of July 5th that constitutional experiments, other than those already sanctioned, could not be approved. The telegram of August 9th, taken as a whole and in its proper setting, can be considered only as a blow to the demand of the 'Iraqī officers for immediate National Government. Far from being a rebuff to him, the telegram

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[1] Telegram, No. 249, Foreign Office to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Cairo, August 9th, 1919, repeated to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.

[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 124.

[3] Ibid.: 'I eventually elicited the following pronouncement from the Foreign Office (9th August) . . .'

[4] Ibid.

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indicated that the British Government stood behind him in his 175*
attempts to realize the measures he had proposed in April and 727*
should have been extremely welcome to him in his attempts to 186
combat any scheme of Arab Government as implied in the 668
Anglo-French Declaration. Indeed, so far was the Acting Civil Commissioner from being actually affected by the 'serious blow', as he has endeavoured to indicate, he was assuring H.M. Government within the following week that, while the constitutional proposals sanctioned in May would require a year to put into operation, they would meet the needs of the country for many years to come.[1]

In Syria, the agitation for a National Government at Baghdad continued, eventually overflowing into 'Iraq itself and swelling the local movement there until it broke into a flood of rebellion. The telegram of August 9th from the Foreign Office had not satisfied the 'Iraqī members of Faisal's staff. Nājī Pasha's appointment had been no answer to their aspirations; his resignation had been the confirmation of their fears. What they wanted, they declared, was assurance that the existing military administration was not to continue. They found

> the attitude of the British officials was more than that of administrators of a foreign population who were incapable, and would always remain incapable, of governing themselves than that to which the Baghdadi officers had become accustomed on the other side, of friendly advisers who started on the assumption that the Arabs were managing their own affairs, and that it was not for them to do more than make friendly suggestions for the improvement of their plans.[2]

The delay in setting up the various measures which had been sanctioned seemed to the inhabitants of 'Iraq no less than to the 'Iraqī officers in Syria to point to a lack of goodwill on the part of the Acting Civil Commissioner and to give substance

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[1] Young, op. cit., p. 294.

[2] Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd to Major Sir H. W. Young, cited ibid., p. 297. Confirmed by Nūrī Pasha to the writer, December 18th, 1934.

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175-* to the belief that no real aid to the achievement of their
727* aspirations could be expected from that quarter.[1] Rumours
186 were about that the mandate system was but annexation in a
668 new form, and that colonization by the British and by the Government of India had not been abandoned. The coming of 550 English women, wives and relatives of officials, pointed to the establishment of the British for a long stay. The establishment of farms for experimental work in cotton-growing was interpreted as further evidence of India's intentions towards 'Iraq. Confidence was difficult to maintain in the face of so many facts and rumours. The 'Iraqīs, like their fellow Arabs, lacked patience to await developments. They desired results, and these immediately and in a tangible form. Cool and far-sighted heads were not lacking, but they were not always in control. The majority believed, as Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī was to remark later to Miss Gertrude Bell: 'My lady, complete independence is never given, it is always taken.'[2]

The establishment of the Syrian State, immediately following the Armistice, encouraged the 'Iraqīs to look to their own country where direct British administration continued.[3] The growing insistence of the Syrians that posts in the Damascus Government be given to Syrians only made it necessary for the 'Iraqī officers there to seek new outlets and opportunities for their energies. 'Iraqī officers, disguised as Beduins, had already toured Mesopotamia during July. They had reported that the temper of the country was rising, and that active agitation and continuous propaganda, backed with funds, might win independence from Great Britain if it were not freely given.

Other propagandists began to slip over the desert. Societies

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[1] The attitude of the 'Iraqī Officers in Syria was ably reviewed by Gertrude Bell in her confidential note, *Syria in October*, 1919, pp. 3-4 *passim*.

[2] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 569. Lawrence had continually drilled the same principle into the leaders of the Movement in Western Arabia: 'I had preached to Faisal, from our first meeting, that freedom was taken not given.' Lawrence, op. cit., p. 274.

[3] *Syria in October*, 1919, p. 11.

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already existing throughout 'Iraq became the channels of 175*
Nationalist agitation. Anti-Government and anti-British 727*
sentiment and discontent in the towns, in the religious centres, 186
among the tribes and among the unemployed ex-officials, were 668
stimulated and then skilfully assimilated to the nucleus of Nationalist feeling already existing among those who believed in Arab and in 'Iraqī independence as desirable in themselves. Appeals to religious fervour and fanaticism, to pride of race, to Nationalist feeling, to cupidity, and to all the elemental instincts in each of the component groups which had been drawn into the movement, were working their spell during the days when politicians of the West, like Joshua of old, bade the East stand still until the battle at Paris over the spoils should be ended.

H.M. Government was not entirely unaware that public opinion in 'Iraq during the last months of 1919 was not the same as had prevailed in the final months of 1918. As early as August 23rd, when a police report of July 7th stated that

> every Moslem Arab of education in Baghdad was a member of a society, with branches in all the important towns in Mesopotamia, which was described as simply a pan-Arab and anti-foreign organization formed with a view to the expulsion of the British and the establishment of Arab rule.[1]

Mr. Montagu's suggestion that an announcement should be made that Great Britain would remain in the country, in some form or other, was negatived by the British delegation at Paris which deprecated such action as injudicious in view of the state of affairs at the Peace Conference.

In October and November, when even more disturbing news was received of the temper of the country, of the attitude of the 'Iraqī officers in Syria[2] and of the slowness with which the constitutional proposals were being executed,[3] Lord Curzon,

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[1] Cited Young, op. cit., p. 294.

[2] *Syria in October*, 1919.

[3] After six months, only four of the nine Divisional Councils and none of the Provincial Councils had been formed. On further inquiry, it was discovered that the Acting Civil Commissioner did not contemplate moving in the matter that year. Young, op. cit., p. 298.

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175* in alarm, called a meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee,
127* November 10th. The Committee agreed that the first condi-
186 tion for recovery of confidence and for the future settlement of
668 the country was the return of Sir Percy Cox. This would be difficult, however, until the Mandate was announced and he could act with complete authority.[1] The Mandate would probably not be given before the New Year, but an early announcement of his impending return was desirable. It was hardly possible that he could take up his new duties until the autumn.

In his turn, the Acting Civil Commissioner also realized that the temper of the country was altering. He assigned, correctly, much of the change to trans-desert sources but, considering the authors to be unimportant, he was inclined to underrate the necessity to take their views — a mistake which was to have serious consequences. Resentful of the Western Arabia policy, he was ready to believe that Sharif Husain's inordinate ambition, that England's golden sovereigns and the Arabs' love of plunder were the sole motives behind the movement in the West. He shut his eyes to the other factors. His contacts with the Middle East had hitherto been primarily in India, Persia and the Persian Gulf.[2] His first-hand acquaintance with Arabs and his knowledge of their character had been limited to the lower Tigris. He had no personal knowledge of the deep hold which Independence and Nationalism, as abstract ideas, had upon the 'Iraqī participants in the Arab Movement. He could not realize, therefore, that the motives which had helped to sustain them during months of desert warfare would continue to do so, even if their enemies were France or Britain.

He did not seem to realize that, however much the dignitaries of Baghdad might repudiate the officers as men of

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[1] Reference to Sir Percy Cox in Tehrān, found him unprepared to return without complete authority.

[2] He had spent about ten days in Baghdad, July, 1911: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1911.

importance and position,[1] many of the latter had been the life 175*
of the pre-war Arab Movement and had been instigators of 727*
several disturbances in the Turkish army.[2] Moreover, they had 186
created positions for themselves by their ability, first in the 668
Turkish Army and then in the Arab Movement and, in consequence, had acquired a reputation in popular opinion equalling their actual importance. In addition, the 'Iraqīs had in Mōsul, Basra, Baghdad and outlying districts, families, relatives and friends who cast up, at their instigation, waves of increasing size in the sea of 'Iraqī Nationalism.

Outwardly paying lip-service to Arab participation, his 175x
real opinion, not only of Arabs but also of those who advocated 727x
their wide participation in the government and administration of 'Iraq, came out in his memorandum on Miss Bell's note on Syria.[3] He disagreed with her fundamental assumption that 'an Arab State in Mesopotamia . . . within a short period of years is a possibility, and that the recognition or creation of a logical scheme of government on these lines, in supersession of those on which we are now working in Mesopotamia, would be practical and popular'. He declared:

> My observations in this country and elsewhere have forced me to the conviction that this assumption is erroneous, and although I am aware that in holding this view I differ from authorities and observers both at home and abroad . . . I venture, probably for the last time in my present capacity, to lay before H.M.'s Government the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. . . .
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> I therefore regard the creation of an Arab Government

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[1] Practically every 'Iraqī who served under Faisal has occupied, upon his return to 'Iraq, positions of responsibility in the 'Iraq Government. Their enemies declare that this monopolization of high office has been due to British influence, and to the fact that they have constituted themselves a ruling clique. Their friends maintain their position has been due to their ability and experience.

[2] As in Baghdad, from March to July, 1913: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March, April and July, 1913.

[3] Letter No. 34436, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, November 15th, 1919.

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Meanwhile, no further action should be taken on announcement 175*
made. I hope to be able to send you fuller instructions 727*
shortly.[1]

The reply of the Interdepartmental Committee filled the Acting Civil Commissioner with apprehension. The reference to 'framing the mandate' seemed to presage new and disheartening delays at a time when action was imperative. The failure to approve of the Bonham-Carter Report left him little with which to combat the growing unrest in 'Iraq. His telegrams to H.M. Government were, however, not without results. At the second of the two meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee to re-examine the draft Mandate in the light of recent developments, Mr. Montagu's suggestion of the establishment of a provisional Government with Sir Percy Cox in charge, on the lines proposed by the Bonham-Carter Committee but with increased Arab participation, was approved. The Interdepartmental Committee agreed that Mr. Montagu should draft the telegram along these lines.

Events had now begun to move more swiftly towards an announcement of intentions of the British Government towards 'Iraq. They were not swift enough, however, to prevent open conflict between the inhabitants of 'Iraq and the forces of Great Britain.

Excitement had been running high in Baghdad following the 175*
announcement of the Mandate. Meetings organized by the 727
Nationalists had been held in the mosques where orators in the 186
name of independence, race and religion had urged their 668
listeners to rise against the British. Clashes between Nationalists and the authorities had already taken place, and it had been necessary to patrol the streets with armoured cars. The group of fifteen Baghdad Nationalists, known locally as the *Mandubīn* or Delegates, had approached the Acting Civil Commissioner asking for an opportunity to lay their proposals before

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[1] Telegram No. P. 3839, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad May 20th, 1920.

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175* him for transmission to H.M. Government. He had tried to
727* avoid giving the interview. He did not wish to give any
186 opportunity for a demonstration and he felt that he had
668 nothing definite with which to counter their demands. He held, moreover, that the *Mandubin* were unrepresentative, referring to them in his dispatches as self-elected Delegates, although they had received the approval of a public meeting held in one of the principal mosques. Realizing, however, that they had a large popular following and that they could sway great masses of public opinion, he finally gave them an appointment for the morning of June 2nd, at the Turkish *Sarai* or Government headquarters. He took the precaution, however, of inviting by name about forty other dignitaries of all religions, supposed to be favourably disposed to the British regime. To cope with possible demonstrations or disorder among the expected crowds, special police arrangements were made, troops were held in readiness at the barracks and R.I.M.S. *Comet* with steam up and trained guns was stationed on the Tigris opposite the *Sarai*.

At the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner explained the desire of H.M. Government to give a National Government and the difficulties which had been encountered. He declared that they were then about to make an announcement along the lines proposed in the Bonham-Carter Report of which he gave an outline. He reminded his hearers that nothing was to be gained by hasty action, and that with the best will in the world an indigenous National Government could not be set up at once. He warned them that any attempts at disorder or violence would be met with force and that the military authorities would be called in if necessary.[1]

The Delegates professed themselves unsatisfied with the proposals and presented their own petition asking for the immediate formation of a National Arab Convention for 'Iraq,

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[1] Text: Telegram No. 6583, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

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elected according to Turkish Electoral Law. The Convention 175*
would be empowered to draw up proposals for a National 727*
Government as promised in the Anglo-French Declaration. 186
They also asked for freedom of the Press. With these demands a 668
number of the invited notables, contrary to the Acting Civil Commissioner's expectations, associated themselves and declared that 'Iraqi independence was the concern of the entire Arab people.

The meeting itself, although feeling ran high, had been conducted with dignity. As those attending began to disperse, the immense crowd which filled the Court of the *Sarai* hissed and shouted abuse at the British officials. The *Mandubin* were cheered and several of the leaders were carried out on the shoulders of the crowd. No clashes occurred, however, between the crowds and the police.

In forwarding the petition and an account of the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner threw the entire blame for the 'movement reaching its present uncompromising form, backed as it is by skilfully fomented public excitement' on the failure of H.M. Government to allow him to make the announcement of the Bonham-Carter proposals before the beginning of Ramadhan as he had requested on May 8th.

He then declared:

> It is probable that in the present temper a proposal that the country should submit even for a limited period to a provisional Constitution as to which they had not been consulted would be met on the part of the Nationalists by a Declaration of Independence. Such proposals would be represented as contrary to the Anglo-French Declaration, the real meaning of which is little understood and widely misrepresented, and would harden public opinion against us, while if the present temper continues the proposed Legislative Assembly would on being summoned convert itself into a Constituent Assembly though not so authorized.[1]

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[1] Telegram No. 6584, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

175x of these difficulties arose early in December when the Council 642x disagreed violently over the provisions for tribal representation. 727x It had been originally proposed that thirty tribal representa- 646 tives should be present in the Assembly: twenty shaikhs of the major tribes and ten members for the smaller tribes, grouped together in each of the new *Liwās*. The Council (with the exception of five members), owing to the traditional fear of townsmen and landowners for the tribes, opposed any special tribal representation, although Sir Percy Cox pointed out that it was essential that every section of the population should be represented in the Assembly which was to decide upon the future of 'Iraq. Not until Ja'far Pasha proposed an alternative scheme of two tribal representatives for each *Liwā* with the proviso that tribesmen might register and vote as all other 'Iraqīs if they so desired, was the question settled.

It would appear, however, that these and other obstacles to the drafting and application of the law, including Saiyid Talib Pasha's opposition to it,[1] were used by the British authorities as excuses to postpone the inauguration of the Assembly, notwithstanding the official *communiqué* of May 30th, 1921,[2] assuring the 'Iraqis that the elections would soon be held. 175x Evidence was not lacking that attempts would be made to 727x force the Assembly, if convened, to declare for a local and 642x unacceptable candidate such as Saiyid Talib Pasha and to 668 force it to make anti-British declarations. It was known that the Nationalist leaders, including some of the *Mandubīn*, were again active and that the National School party had been revived. It was also reported that several tribes, as those of the 'Afaq district and the Shammar Dhafīr, were contemplating another revolt at Nationalist, Turkish and Bolshevist instigation. Letters had been intercepted in January from Muhammad Ridhā, outlining anti-British plans and giving instructions for

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 5.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, May 30th, 1921. See also correspondence between the High Commissioner and the Council of State in *Lisān al'Arab* and in *Al-'Iraq*, July 15th, 1921.

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their execution to the townsmen and to the tribes. Newspapers 175x
had become increasingly antagonistic in tone.[1] Violent anti- 727x
British posters had appeared on the walls of Baghdad.[2] It is 642x
not surprising, therefore, that the High Commissioner was 668
convinced that any immediate attempt to convene the Assembly would not only be disastrous for British policy and for the installation of the Sharifian Amir on whom British official approval had already fallen,[3] but that it would also produce fresh unrest if not actual disturbances of the peace. His view met with corroboration at the Cairo Conference.[4]

Preliminary reorganization of the administration began 175x
officially on December 3rd, when by a proclamation of the 727x
High Commissioner all the rights, duties and powers formerly 642x
possessed by the Civil Commissioner, Judicial Secretary and Revenue Secretary were assigned to the High Commissioner, Minister of Justice and Minister of Interior respectively.[5] Several of the Ministers, however, had already entered upon their duties, Saiyid Talib Pasha beginning his work as Minister of Interior on November 15th. Conditions had been somewhat chaotic, and the fact that practically all the correspondence was in English proved a difficulty. Nevertheless a satisfactory *modus operandi* was slowly evolved.

The British administration officers had been informed of the changes and given instructions as to their part in the administration directly by the High Commissioner on November 30th. The circular stated in part:

> The officers and departments hitherto forming part of the British Civil Administration in 'Iraq will come directly under the orders of the Council of State, and the reorganization of

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed, February 10th, 1921, for publishing seditious articles. Its editor and those concerned were given sentences ranging from six to eighteen months and the paper was suspended for one year. *Baghdad Times*, May 9th, 1921.

[2] As on November 27th, 1920; January 17th; and February 2nd, 1921

[3] *Infra*, pp. 309-10.

[4] *Infra*, pp. 314 ff.

[5] *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 2. Also National Government (Transference of Powers) Proclamation, July 6th, 1921, ibid., p. 7.

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175* arise which will lead to the High Commissioner seeking his
727* authority to bring to the notice of His Majesty the King of
648* 'Iraq any action on your part which he may regard as
detrimental thereto.

The terms of service upon which you are engaged have been set forth in a contract which has been given to you by His Majesty the King of 'Iraq.[1]

Ratification of the Treaty by the Council of Ministers

By the time of Major Young's departure for England, in early 1922, the main lines of the Treaty had been settled. The King and his Prime Minister had been consulted, but the task had remained throughout in British hands. Not until after the Council meeting of February 19th, 1922, when the Naqīb announced that neither H.M. King Faisal nor he felt able to continue the negotiations alone, was the Treaty, which had already received the approval of the Colonial Office, placed before the Council of Ministers. During the eight months the Treaty was before it, the Council suggested numerous amendments, but their main objection was that made by the King and the Nationalists: the Treaty did not specifically abrogate the Mandate relationship.

The Naqīb, in particular, agreed with the King that the interests of 'Iraq and of Great Britain required a treaty but he joined him in pointing out that the attempt of Great Britain to pose as an ally to 'Iraq and as the mandatory Power to the League of Nations was irreconcilable, as well as unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq. He hesitated to put his name to a treaty which did not satisfy national ambitions and which would displease the Muslims of India with whom he was intimately in touch and whose good opinion he valued greatly.

668 The evident reluctance of the King and his Ministers to
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175 ratify the Treaty as it stood was not uninfluenced by the increas-
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648 ing intensity of anti-Mandate sentiment, skilfully fostered by the

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[1] Cited *Progress of 'Iraq*, pp. 289-90.

Nationalists, to whom the King was inclined to turn for support. 175x
The great gathering of Sunnī and Shī'a Nationalists from all 727x
parts of 'Iraq, at Karbalā, April 12th and 13th, 1922, summoned 648x
by Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, ostensibly to consider measures of 668
defence against the Wahhābīs, whose raids in early March had 186
thrown 'Iraq into a furore of nervous excitement,[1] had been hailed as a body greater than the prospective National Assembly since it had met at the wish of the nation without the influence of the Government.[2]

Although the formal sessions actually came to little, moderate petitions replacing the original extreme demands,[3] the private meetings were more productive. From them developed the organization of much of the later agitation. The vernacular newspapers, which had steadily maintained during the spring that 'Iraq would not accept the Treaty so long as it contained a shadow of the Mandate,[4] were also to increase their virulence after the meetings.

The Residency attempted to counter this propaganda by inserting articles in the local English papers. These articles, placing the mandatory system in its most favourable light,[5] insisting that the misunderstandings of the Nationalists arose from the use of the wrong Arabic word for Mandate[6] and urging as a diversion, that 'Iraqīs should support their new army as a quick means of achieving independence,[7] merely stirred the Arabic press to fresh denunciations. The papers retorted, in unison, that the word Mandate, however translated, meant the same thing: subjection and colonization.[8] *Al-'Iraq*

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

[2] *Al-Mufīd*, April 17th, 1922. The King was believed to be giving his support to the Conference. See his telegram of thanks to the Conference, April 13th, 1922; *Al-Dijla*, April 16th, 1922; also *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, April 7th, 1922; but cf. *Al-Mufīd*, same date.

[4] *Lisān al-'Arab*, February 24th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 1st and 9th, 1922; *Al-'Iraq*, March 3rd, 1922; *Al-Jazira* (Mōsul), April 4th, 1922.

[5] *Baghdad Times*, May 26th; July 5th, 6th, 1922.

[6] Ibid., May 27th, 29th; June 10th, 20th, 1922.

[7] Ibid., July 12th, 1922.

[8] *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-Rāfidan*, June 5th, 1922; also *supra*, pp. 261-3.

175x pointed to Syria as a typical example of what the Mandate de-
729x noted.[1] *Al-Mufīd* declared that the Mandate, 'even if veiled
648x under financial control, assistance to the army and 'Iraq repre-
668 sentatives abroad' must be abrogated.[2] 'Iraq must be created
186 independent before treaties could be made, since treaties were
only possible between independent nations.[3] In answer to the statement that Great Britain could not, even if she wished, divest herself of her obligations to the League, *Al-Istiqlāl* replied:

> We cannot imagine that the League has power to force Great Britain to accept the yoke of the mandate. Everyone has the right to return any responsibility prejudicial to him and his friend. Suppose the League asked Great Britain to put her fleet at its disposal. Would Great Britain agree as she has agreed to the yoke of the mandate?[4]

Al-Mufīd declared:

> If weak nations are by terrorism and enticement to sign a document that means slavery and oppression, weak nations will find means to release themselves from responsibility.[5]

British officials themselves were not immune from newspaper criticisms; Major Yetts, Adviser for the Muntafiq *Liwā*, in particular being singled out for attack on account of his alleged pro-Mandate activities.[6]

Mr. Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons, May 23rd, 1921, to the effect that H.M. King Faisal and the 'Iraq Government had not refused to accept the Mandate,[7] added fresh fuel to the flames. At a gathering in Kādhimain, a programme of further meetings in the mosques, of monster petitions and of telegrams to the British Government and to all foreign governments was drawn up. A great gathering was planned for the evening of May 28th, in the Haidar Khāna

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[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 7th, 1922.

[2] *Al-Mufīd*, May 20th, 1922.

[3] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 24th, 1922.

[4] Ibid., June 23rd, 1922.

[5] *Al-Mufīd*, June 28th, 1922.

[6] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 18th; *Al-Mufīd*, June 19th; *Al-Rafidān*, June 21st, 1922.

[7] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLIII (1922), p. 995.

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mosque, a special edition of *Al-Istiqlāl* being published to urge 175*
the population to attend.[1] Prompt action by King Faisal 727*
prevented disturbances at the mosque, but a committee was 648*
appointed to approach the King with protests against Mr. 668 ●
Churchill's statement.[2] Telegrams of protest to foreign govern- 186
ments, to the value of Rs. 1,500 (£115), were prepared but were held up at the instance of the High Commissioner, whose action was later confirmed by King Faisal.[3]

In the provinces, anti-Mandate and pro-Mandate petitions were producing a heated atmosphere, while revenue payment in the Euphrates area ceased, on the assurance of the Nationalists that the British would soon leave 'Iraq. In 'Amāra and Kūt, the great landowners viewed these assurances with great dissatisfaction. Many shaikhs, resenting the scant consideration already shown them by the Arab Government, feared the time when British control should be completely removed. On the other hand, a large body of shaikhs, including Shaikh 'Abdul Wahīd of the Fatla,[4] and tribesmen, mainly Shi'is and therefore under the influence of the *'Ulamā*, sought the overthrow of the British-controlled regime.

Tension was not lessened by the fact that in administrative circles, as early as the end of 1921, a distinction had been made, as by the *Qaimmaqām* of Abū Sukhair, between those who had taken part in the Insurrection of 1920 and those who had been and still were pro-British. The former, particularly in Hilla *Liwā*, by the special orders of the *Mutasarrif*,[5] were given light revenue assessments, facilities for payment and prompt attention to their complaints. The latter were faced with

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 28th, 1922. *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed July 7th, when the license of *Al-Tauhīd* (founded Baghdad, June 24th, 1922) was withdrawn.

[2] Ibid., May 31st, 1922; *Al-Mufīd*, June 1st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 4th, 1922. When the telegrams were held up in Baghdad, the Nationalists chartered a motor to take them to Persia, but the King was persuaded to bring pressure to bear on those concerned, to abandon the scheme.

[4] Chief instigator of the tribal revolt against the 'Iraq Government in 1935.

[5] The Mutasarrif's campaign, which he carried even into Karbalā *Liwā*, was based on (*a*) Rejection of the Treaty; (*b*) Resignation of the Cabinet; (*c*) Removal of the British provincial Advisers.

175x unprecedented estimates and with demands for immediate
727x payment, while their petitions received scant consideration.
648x In Baghdad, the division extended to the Council where
668 heated discussions occurred, as at its meetings of June 12th and
186 22nd. Ja'far abū Timman, Minister of Commerce, led the attack on the Treaty, declaring that all the Holy Saiyids and the pillars of Islam were opposed to it. His resignation, on June 26th, was taken as evidence of his sacrificial patriotism,[1] but in British official circles it was maintained that, realizing his post was about to be abolished, he resigned in order to win popularity among the Nationalists.[2]

Although the Council of Ministers resolved, on June 25th, to ratify the Treaty with a proviso which the High Commissioner had repeatedly urged them to drop, that the Treaty must be approved by the Constituent Assembly,[3] it was clear even before the critical days of August, that political antagonisms had received sharp definition. It was apparent that they were likely to increase in bitterness with the prospect of settlement by force only. Both sides had burned their bridges behind them. The '*Ulamā*, opposed to the Mandate, had spent heavily on propaganda and were in debt for their taxes. If they were unsuccessful in removing British control, they would be financially ruined. The moral forces on the side of the Government were stronger than in 1920 but the actual forces for repressing disorders were far smaller than two years before. Moreover, the forces included the 'Iraq army, which under the circumstances was an extremely doubtful element.

An early publication of the Treaty, together with a clear statement of the alternatives between which 'Iraqīs would be forced to choose, would have cleared the air.[4] In the absence

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[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 27th, 1922; *Al-Tauhīd*, July 2nd, 1922.

[2] *Report on 'Iraq Administration, April*, 1922—*March*, 1923, Colonial No. 4 (1924), p. 14.

[3] Ja'far abū Timman signed the resolution, dissenting, however, with most of the articles.

[4] Mr. Churchill's threat in the House of Commons, July 11th (*Parl. Debates*, Vol. CLVI (1922), p. 1121), 'to wash our hands of the whole business', only aggravated public feeling in 'Iraq. *Al-Mufīd*, July 23rd, 1922.

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of a clear pronouncement of policy from H.M. Government, 175×
the demand for withdrawal from 'Iraq made by the British 127×
Press and by Parliament,[1] duly reported in 'Iraq, encouraged 648×
the Nationalists to believe that continued agitation would force 668
the British to withdraw. 186

The difficulties facing the High Commissioner and the 'Iraqis favouring the Treaty were not decreased by the attitude of H.M. King Faisal. He recognized the necessity for a treaty in accordance with the conditions of his enthronement, yet he continued to rely on the Nationalists for support in opposition to the terms of the Treaty as placed before him. Prominent Nationalists, such as Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī,[2] Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, and others had access to him. Within the palace, Fahmī al-Mudārris and Saiyid Mahdī al-Bāsir had his private ear. Ja'far abū Timman had been his agent in reporting the Karbalā meetings.[3] Although differences of opinion had grown up between the King and the Naqīb, both of them had 'proclaimed to the listening Universe that they will never, so help them God, accept the Mandate'.[4] The undoubted opposition of the King, together with his telegram to the Karbalā Conference, his favourable reception to the Nationalists, on May 30th, and his relations with the leaders to whom presents of money were known to have been given, confirmed popular opinion that to oppose the Treaty was not to oppose the King.

As a result of his association with the Nationalists, it has since been maintained that the King had been won over to their side.[5] Such an assertion implies that he embraced Arab Nationalism

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CLI (1922), pp. 1554 ff.; Vol. CLVI (1922), pp. 1085, 1092, 1098-102, 1107 ff.

[2] By early August, however, a breach between Shaikh Mahdī and the King seems to have been complete. The latter regarded the former as pro-Turk.

[3] This did not prevent him from holding a meeting at his house, August 2nd, when the dethronement of King Faisal was put forward.

[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 643; also *Al-Mufīd*, June 26th, 1922.

[5] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IX. (1922), pp. 235-7; Hooper, C. A.: *L'Iraq et la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1928), p. 33.

175* only at the instigation of the ‘Iraqī Nationalists, overlooking the
727 fact that he had, in effect, early dedicated his life to the Arab
648* cause. It disregards his previous work for Arab independence
at every conceivable opportunity; at Constantinople; in Syria
186 after the outbreak of the war at the risk of his life; in the Arab
668 revolt; in Damascus in the attempt to set up an Arab State; and
at the Peace Conference in Paris. The rejection of Arab claims at Paris and his ejection from Syria had neither curbed nor broken his ardour, as his unpublished *Memoirs* amply confirm. He remained the Arab patriot with dreams of an Arab Federation stretching from the Taurus to the Indian Ocean.[1]

In ‘Iraq he found himself the point of balance between his British mentors and his own subjects. To the former, he owed his throne, as well as support for it. To them, he owed the prospect of future development for the country, but on their own terms. To his fellow Arabs, from whom only could come the moral support and the sympathetic public opinion on which he hoped to build the ‘Iraq nation, he owed loyalty to the Arab cause. Only by joining forces with the Nationalists, whose ideas rather than those of the British, more closely approximated his own, could he win from H.M. Government the concessions which would give ‘Iraq real independence and would place more power in his hands to meet the responsibilities which had been thrust upon him by the Treaty.

If he turned to the extreme Nationalists and to the ‘*Ulamā*, therefore, it was because he sought to adjust the balance in favour of Arab Nationalism. If he descended to indirect methods of obtaining his ends, it was because he held that the end merited the means, and because his better judgment was at times swayed and warped by influences within his palace.

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[1] In spite of official denials of his anti-French sentiment, Faisal never renounced his ambition of recapturing Syria for the Arab Federation, making ‘Iraq his base of attack.

So definitely had the King's alliance with the extreme 175*
Nationalists affected the situation, that a prediction was made 727*
in British official circles in the middle of August that, unless he 648*
turned to the moderates, it would be impossible to foresee the 186
outcome of the next six weeks. 668

The Council of Ministers itself felt that the King, in allying himself with the Nationalists outside the Cabinet, and in apparently approving of their actions, which had included denunciations of the Council, had failed to give it his confidence. These misgivings the Council expressed in a resolution on August 9th, when it requested 'His Majesty to co-operate with this persevering Government in conducting affairs, in order to convince the people that the Government of His Majesty can rely on the confidence of His Majesty'. By stating in his reply that he saw no reason to alter his policy, the King indicated, contrary to the advice of the High Commissioner, that he personally wished the Cabinet to fall. The Ministers, therefore, resigned on August 14th.[1] Their fall was hailed as a blow to the pro-Treaty party, the extreme Nationalists openly declaring that Ja'far abū Timman, Hamdī Pāchahjī and Maulūd Pasha would replace the fallen Ministers, that Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr would be Prime Minister and that the Mandate would be abrogated. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr immediately issued a manifesto to the people, advising them, among other things, to persevere towards complete independence and to reject the British Mandate by all legal means.[2]

King Faisal himself added to the critical state of affairs by writing to the High Commissioner, on August 20th, and stating that, in view of the existing uncertainties of policy and lack of definition of responsibilities between himself and the High Commissioner on matters of internal administration, he felt compelled to inform the High Commissioner and through him the

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[1] The Naqib remained in office for a few days longer.

[2] Full text of Manifesto: *Al-Mufīd*, August 19th, 1922; summary: *Baghdad Times*, August 23rd, 1922.

175 Colonial Office that, in the event of a rising, which was con-
729 fidentially to be expected, His Majesty disclaimed all responsi-
648 bility. He begged the High Commissioner either to assume the
16 conduct of administration or to give himself a free hand to
668 direct affairs on such lines as he saw fit.

The High Commissioner immediately drafted a strong reply, pointing out the responsibility of the King in the situation. The letter was withheld, however, in order that it might not mar the approaching anniversary of King Faisal's accession.

[665] The two Nationalist political parties, *Hizb al-Watanī*,[1] (National Party), and *Hizb an-Nahdha*[2] (Renaissance Party), which, with the *Hizb al-Hurr*[3] (Independent Party), had been formed in early August to take part in the prospective elections,[4] thought the moment opportune to add their weight to the protests against the Mandate. At a joint meeting, on November 20th and 21st, under the presidency of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, the parties drew up an address which they presented to the King.[5] The address culminated in three demands:

1. Immediate termination of the present policy and of British influence.
2. Selection of a Cabinet, members of which were to be sincere patriots, possessing the confidence of the people.
3. Suspension of treaty negotiations until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, its members having been freely elected.[6]

Arrangements were also made by the parties for a joint public protest on August 23rd at the anniversary celebration.[7]

On the morning of the 23rd, when the High Commissioner

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[1] Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 8th, 1922.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, August 10th, 1922; Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 21st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, August 11th, 1922.

[4] The Law of Associations, under which the parties were strictly regulated had been approved, after much delay, by the Council on June 29th, and promulgated on July 2nd, 1922. *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 56-8.

[5] *Al-Mufid*, August 22nd, 1922.

[6] *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufid*, June 23rd, 1922.

[7] *Al-'Iraq* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922.

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and his staff arrived at the Palace, they found the courtyard 175x
packed and an address being delivered from a balcony. As the 727x
High Commissioner passed up the stairs, shouts from the 648x
crowd were heard, followed by loud applause. After the 186
audience at which the King appeared to be somewhat nervous,[1] 668
the High Commissioner, on inquiry, learned that the demonstration as arranged by the *Hizb al-Watanī* and *Hizb an-Nahdha* had been directed against the Mandate. The next day, he sent a strong protest, demanding an apology and the arrest of those responsible for the affair. The apology was immediate and ample.[2] Unfortunately the King, about noon on the same day, was stricken with appendicitis, an operation being performed early the following day. The necessary papers, however, had not been signed by him. The High Commissioner approached His Majesty shortly before the operation, but the King refused to sign, protesting that he would not put his signature to the condemnation of any of his subjects as an act which might well be his last.

The High Commissioner at once issued a proclamation, taking over the reins of government into his own hands and stating that the absence of a Cabinet, the King's illness and the seditious disturbances in the country left him no other alternative.[3] Hamdī Pāchahjī, Saiyid Mahdī al-Basīr, Amīn al-Chārchafī and 'Abdul Rasūl al-Kubba were deported to Henjam. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr and Shaikh Muhammad Māhdī al-Khālisī were advised by the High Commissioner that 'if they did not go, he would be forced to take measures which, out of respect to the '*Ulamā*, he did not want to take'. They crossed the Persian frontier, August 29th. Notice was served that any further attempts at sedition would be promptly and severely dealt with.[4]

From the provinces disquieting news had been reported. In

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[1] Cf. Bell, op. cit., p. 649.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, August 26th, 1922. No Arabic papers printed these letters.

[3] Ibid., Special Edition, August 26th, 1922.

[4] Ibid.

175 Shamīya, the chiefs were defiant; in Dīwānīya, tribal lawless-
727 ness had broken out, while in Nāsirīya and Sūq ash-Shuyūkh,
648 public order trembled in the balance. In Diyālā, unrest had
186 increased to such an extent that had any rising taken place
668 elsewhere, the tribes of Dīltāwa, Shahrābān and Delli 'Abbās
would unquestionably have risen. Prompt and strong measures restored administrative authority on non-party lines, however, the Nationalist officials being summoned to Baghdad where the outstanding offender, the *Mutassarif* of Hilla, was tried and adjudged to be unworthy of future employment. Revenue was collected, land cases settled and incipient revolt checked, aerial action being necessary in four cases to re-establish the authority of the Government.

175 Whether or not the actual incident on August 23rd required
727 the stern and, in the case of the deportations, even harsh
648 measures employed, there can be no question that the High
Commissioner, as responsible for peace and order, considered his measures, vigorously and promptly taken, to be essential for the well-being of the country as well as for the eventual success of British policy. His actions restored prestige to the Government, the country as a whole settling down to 'an era of reconstruction'.[1]

In order that the measures taken by the High Commissioner should appear to be constitutional, it was essential that they should be ratified by the King. Both British and 'Iraqī officials were aware of the grave situation which might result if the King should refuse to give the required ratification. On September 10th, the High Commissioner approached King Faisal. His Majesty was told plainly that the British Government would not tolerate his connection with future Nationalist agitation nor any further delay in ratifying the Treaty. The King agreed to invite the Naqīb to form a new Cabinet, after the receipt of a declaration from the Secretary of State for the Colonies which would form the basis of an announcement of his

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, p. 21.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE WORK OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Convocation of the Constituent Assembly

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No subject, other than the employment of foreigners in government posts and the general anti-Mandate propaganda occupied more attention in the Arabic Press from 1920 onwards than the demand for the convocation of the promised Constituent Assembly in order that it might express the wishes of the country concerning its future Government. When, however, the '*Irāda* ordering the elections to the Constituent Assembly to begin on October 24th was issued, October 19th, 1922,[1] after a delay of nearly two years, it met with a far different response than had been anticipated. The Nationalists and the Shī'a '*Ulamā* united in opposition to its application. The '*Ulamā* of Najaf and of Kādhimain, including Shaikh Madhī al-Khālisī who had been among the Nationalists calling most loudly for the Constituent Assembly, were induced to issue *fatwās* in early November, forbidding any participation in the election.[2]

The immediate effect of the *fatwās* was to bring the elections to a standstill in Shī'a centres. In Najaf, Karbalā, Hilla and Kūfa, the Electoral Committees resigned. In Kādhimain, the officials declared themselves unable to form Election committees.[3] In Dulaim *Liwā*, however, the *fatwās* had no effect,

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[1] *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 82.

[2] The *fatwās* issued collectively by the '*Ulamā* of Najaf and Kādhimain, November 8th, were followed by others by individual '*Ulamā*. A translation of one of the latter is as follows:

'Yes, we have issued the order to prohibit the elections by the whole 'Iraqi nation.

'That whoever participates or gives assistance in them will disobey God and His Prophet. God has said in His glorious book that whoever disobeys God and His Prophet, fire shall be his lot. (*sd.*) Muhammad Mahdī al-Khālisī.'

[3] *Baghdad Times*, November 25th, 1922.

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but there, as in other tribal districts, little interest was taken in the elections until wider tribal representation was provided[1] at the insistence of the Residency which relied on its long-standing influence among the paramount Shaikhs to obtain their support in the Assembly. In addition, a large section of the public was reluctant to register, fearing that the election rolls would be used for conscription.[2]

Every effort was made to conciliate the '*Ulamā* but without success, the *fatwās* being reissued in June, 1923. It was maintained in British official circles that the only remedy lay in vigorous action against the leaders themselves. Only by their suppression would the opportunity be afforded of intimidating the rank and file to the extent that the elections could be continued without further active opposition. The Prime Minister favoured this policy, but King Faisal continued to hope for conciliation by other methods. When, however, collisions occurred on June 21st, between the police and the inhabitants of Kādhimain over the posting of *fatwās* at the door of the mosque and when demonstrations were subsequently organized against the Government in which Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī and his family took a prominent part, the Ministers, urged by their Advisers, felt it necessary to take strong action to vindicate the authority of the Government. Armed with an Ordinance, passed on June 9th, giving power to the Government to deport non-'Iraqīs for political offences, the Council ordered with the reluctant concurrence of H.M. the King, then visiting Basra,[3] the arrest and deportation of Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, his sons Hasan and 'Alī, and his nephew, all Persian subjects. A demonstration of protest was immediately organized by the religious leaders of Najaf, a group of nine important '*Ulamā*, also Persian

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[1] By means of a liberal interpretation of Article III (*a*) of the Election Regulations by the Ministers, in late August, 1923.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, December 2nd, 4th, 1922.

[3] Official *Communiqué*, *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-'Iraq*, June 25th, 1923, *Al-'Āsima*, June 27th, 1923. The Arabic Press generally approved of the deportations: *Al-'Iraq*, June 27th, 30th; *Al-'Āsima*, June 27th; July 2nd, 4th; *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 25th, 1923.

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subjects, with twenty-five followers leaving for Persia as a 666
gesture of their disapproval. The 'Iraq Government, although 668
deprecating the action of these '*Ulamā*, gave them every facility to expedite their departure.[1]

The elections were renewed on July 12th.[2] Difficulties and delays, however, still remained, due to the refusal of the Shī'is to form Electoral Committees, to the undiminished fear of conscription and to the resignation of the Sa'dun Cabinet and the formation of Ja'far Pasha's Ministry. The change of Ministries, although disturbing at this juncture, provided an opportunity for conciliating the Shī'is, which the King had been anxious to facilitate.[3] In spite of these difficulties, the registration of primary voters was concluded on December 16th; the secondary elections were completed on February 25th; and the elected representatives were summoned to Baghdad and given a great banquet by the King on March 4th.[4]

Ratification of the Treaty

In the presence of the High Commissioner and his staff, the 648×
Air Officer Commanding and a large audience, the King, in an eloquent speech from the Throne, opened the Assembly, March 27th, eighty-four representatives being present.[5] He rendered thanks to God for the successful conduct of affairs of State and for the opportunity he now had of opening the *Majlis* which was to lay the foundations of the State. He then urged the

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, pp. 11-13.

[2] *Al-Istiqlāl*, July 13th, 1923.

[3] The new Cabinet was as follows: Prime Minister (without portfolio): Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī; Interior: 'Alī Jaudat Beg; Defence: Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'id; Finance: Hājī Muhsin Chalabi ash-Shalash; Communications and Works: Sabih Beg; Justice: Shaikh Ahmad Effendi Fakhrī; Auqāf: Shaikh Salih Bash'ayan; Education: Muhammad Hasan abū Mūhaisin. For its programme, see *Al-'Iraq*, December 3rd, 1923.

[4] *Al-'Iraq*, March 5th, 1924.

[5] *Majmū'a madhākurātu' l-majlisu't-t'asīsi'l-'Irāqī* (Complete Proceedings of the 'Iraq Constituent Assembly, 2 vols., Baghdad, 1924), (hereafter Madhākurāt, Proceedings), 1st Session, p. 5; Bell, op. cit., p. 692; *Baghdad Times*, March 28th, 1924.

Complete support, however, of the country has yet to be won 645 by the new Government. It must count on the opposition of the 668 exiled 'Iraqis and of the adherents of the late Ja'far Pasha. It must count also on the potential opposition of all 'Iraqis who for motives of self-interest have kept a foot in both camps.[1] Its real test will come, therefore, in its inability to carry out its promises and to meet other problems which face the country: placating the shaikhs at the same time that the land is divided, applying conscription to the tribal areas, bringing Shī'is and Sunnīs into harmony and of meeting the rising cost of living.

The Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies, although a dignified body meeting 646 regularly since its establishment in 1925 and conducting its deliberations as a rule with sobriety and moderation, has failed to take its full and rightful place in the political life of 'Iraq, as foreshadowed by the provisions of the Constitution. The failure seems directly due to its inability to command public confidence. The wave of scepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions which recently swept over 'Iraq, in common with other countries with a more substantial democratic tradition, prepared the way for the present military dictatorship. The slow progress of 'Iraq as compared with that of Turkey and Persia under dictatorial regimes was conveniently explained away as being due to the democratic institutions. The critics pointed out that the parliamentary system of 'Iraq was adopted from foreign models and was unsuited to conditions and needs of 'Iraq. They indicated and with more reason that the elections 646 to the Chamber, without exception, have been rigidly 666 controlled by the Government, often under pressure from the Residency as in 1928 and 1930.[2] In all districts except Baghdad

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[1] See Macdonald, A. D., *Euphrates Exile* (1936), pp. 53 ff. for a discussion of this characteristic in 'Iraqis.

[2] Principally because the Treaties of 1927 and of 1930 were to be ratified by the newly elected Chambers.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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648 forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction
[186] and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists,
but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3
October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British
Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an
independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to
govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal
development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but
retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the
Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the
643 ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in Septem-
ber 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents
had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand be-
tween nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on
the other between the antagonistic elements in the country
itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of
twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was
645 inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first,
government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets
668 which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the
669 factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to
determined military intervention, in order to displace their
rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing
against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who
inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist
young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in
imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought
to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by
General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an
admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in
[185] assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges
of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had
neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army
was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed
and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in
politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and
again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same
factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

648 In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had
three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi
Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact
between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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the time of the Portsmouth Treaty, in which the remaining 648 authorized parties also played an important part in opposition to the Government. After the withdrawal in 1947 of British forces, except those of the Royal Air Force stationed in the two Treaty bases, negotiations had been instituted for the revision of the Treaty itself and in January 1948 Salih Jabr, the Prime Minister, visited Great Britain and signed a new treaty at Portsmouth, by which the air bases were to be handed over to Iraq on the conclusion of peace treaties with the enemy Powers and thenceforth to be placed at the free disposal of British aircraft in transit, and an Anglo-Iraqi Joint Defence Board was to be established to co-ordinate defence matters. The Treaty was signed against a background of hostility towards the post-war Governments (and consequently against the Western Powers, who were supposed to provide their backing), aggravated by a grain crisis and the United Nations resolution to partition Palestine. [668] Its announcement was greeted with student demonstrations; these were inadequately dealt with by the administration and, with the instigation of overt and probably clandestine political groups, developed into riots in which there were several casualties. Confronted with political opposition and mob violence, the Regent disowned the Treaty, after at first accepting it, and the Prime Minister with reluctance resigned. The Treaty was rejected by a new Government which, with its successors, restored outward calm. The Treaty of 1930 has since remained in force, although all political elements are pledged to revise or abrogate it.

The Palestine conflict evoked the strongest feelings in Iraq. 648 668 Iraqi contingents fought there and were not withdrawn until 1949; and the closure of the Haifa oil pipeline has been maintained, at considerable financial loss. Similarly, at the time of the Lake Huleh incident in 1951, Iraqi anti-aircraft units were sent to Syria with considerable popular applause. In Iraq itself Zionist activity has been declared, like Communism, a criminal offence. There has been no overt retaliation against Iraqi Jews, but, in view of strong public feeling and governmental encouragement, some 130,000 from an approximate total of 150,000 quitted Iraq in 1951 and 1952, most of them for Israel, leaving an economic and financial vacuum which is only now being filled. The exodus was hastened by the discovery in 1951 of caches of arms and explosives on Jewish premises in Baghdad, together with documents which were stated to prove the existence of a Zionist organization for espionage and terrorism and its responsibility for several bomb outrages; a number of sentences were passed, two of death.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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648 Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

668 Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the econo-
665 mic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified
the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and
[185] continued action against Communism and incipient plans for
national development have not so far availed to counteract.
[565] The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely
lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but
[870] the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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through the temporary support of the Baghdad mob. Even over the mob, once aroused, they have had no control, and demonstrations and rioting which they have played some part in provoking have been apt to benefit only the underground Communists. The real contestants for power since 1951 have been the parties based on the personalities of Nuri as-Said and Salih Jabr, both of them progressive in programme but supported by the same conservative commercial and landed interests, the party of Salih Jabr also by a certain Shii sentiment. In programme all five political parties[1] have been similar, though at any rate two of the three extreme parties have depended more on stated principle and less on personality than the others. Even in these the influence of personality has been greater than in British political parties, from which, too, they have differed in having as official members mostly professional politicians, with however a certain amount of public—mostly intellectual and student—support. The group of Nuri as-Said and its sympathizers have been in power during this period, the group of Salih Jabr maintaining an opposition which, mild at its inception, has, under the influence of personality and political developments, approximated increasingly to that of the more extreme parties, with which it has been in uneasy accord in opposing the new oil agreement of 1952 and demanding single-stage parliamentary elections for 1953.

Political tension and popular restlessness increased during the summer of 1952 under an irresolute caretaker Government which had been appointed in preparation for the elections, and in November a students' strike was converted by agitators into a demand for single-stage elections and resulted in rioting, arson, and loss of life. The army was called in to restore order and the non-political Chief of General Staff accepted the premiership with a mandate of pacification, which he was successful in implementing, though his well-meant attempts to improve the economic condition of the public were too superficial to be effective and disappointed the hopes which attended his popular appointment. Whether the return, in however restrained a form, of the army to politics will have re-established an old precedent is still to be seen. General Nur ad-Din's premiership was remote from military dictatorship, but it is inevitable that events in Syria and especially in Egypt should have turned some minds in that formerly unpopular direction.

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[1] The five parties were: Constitutional Union Party of Nuri Said; Umma Socialist Party of Salih Jabr; Independence Party of Mohammed Mahdi Kubba; National Democratic Party of Kamil Chadirchi; United Popular Front of General Taha al-Hashimi.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred. The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an honourable past in the service of the Government and the country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
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Chapter VIII

FROM THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE TO THE IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY

THE ARMISTICE WITH TURKEY was signed at Mudros on October 30, 1918, and considerable portions of Turkey were subsequently occupied by the Allied forces. With the reluctant consent of France, the Allies permitted the Greeks to occupy Smyrna, and Greek forces marched into the city on May 15, 1919. One month later Mustafa Kemal Pasha began his nationalist movement in Anatolia. While the Allied powers were discussing peace terms with the Turkish Government in Constantinople, the Nationalists organized the Grand National Assembly, which met in Ankara (then called Angora) in April 1920, with Mustafa Kemal Pasha as president. But even as early as February of that year the Nationalists under Kemal operated with considerable success against the French who were in occupation in Cilicia.[1] 648x 668

The policy which the French were pursuing in the Near East differed basically from that of the British. The latter were determined to reduce Turkey to complete impotency as a force in international affairs, but in order to assuage the millions of their Moslem subjects, they hoped to build up a new Islamic empire centered on the Sherifian family: Hussein in Mecca, his younger son Feisal in Damascus, and his older son Abdullah in Iraq. They therefore supported the Greeks against the Turks. The French, on the other hand, although they had reluctantly consented to the Sykes-Picot and other agreements on the Near East which aimed at establishing an Arab state or confederation of Arab states, resented the actions of the Arabs, especially the proclamation of Feisal as king of Syria, as interference in French schemes, and they looked on the Arab nationalist leaders as agents of the British. As soon as Clemenceau encountered 648x

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[1] "The Near East," *The Round Table*, XII, 319-337, Mar., 1922.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

4. INSURRECTION, 1920

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The disorders which broke out among the 'Iraq tribes in the mid-summer of 1920 were immediately caused by elements partly long familiar in 'Iraq—tribal recalcitrance, love of freedom and loot, self-interested Mujtahid promptings, local shaykhly ambitions or rancours, dislike of taxation, grievances against Government as such—and partly by vigorous and well-financed nationalist propaganda and devotion to that cause. They were facilitated by the dispersal, paucity, and static preoccupations of the British forces, and by a military command sometimes clumsily or tardily exercised, sometimes, rightly or wrongly, unsympathetic to the needs or pleas of the Administration. The resulting insurgence reduced the territory for three months to conditions reminiscent of the Turkish régime in one of its more anarchic periods. These conditions affected in all about one-third of the 'Iraq countryside outside the major towns. They were marked by interruption of communications, refusal of revenue payment, reverses to Government forces, bloodthirsty local assaults, looting of buildings and property. No serious urban disorder occurred.

To the officers of the Administration the episode of the *Thawra*—Insurrection—was one of disillusion and disappointment, the partial undoing of two years of devoted work. To them, as to the military commanders, it was from day to day a period of intense strain, with life and survival immediately at stake. To the British Government it was a reminder that its formulation of policy had, less in itself than by its delays and psychological maladroitness, taken too little account of local discontent, or of the force of 'Iraqi nationalism and its power of popular appeal: a reminder also, if such had been needed, of the need for such a régime in 'Iraq as would, by satisfying major elements in that country, lighten the financial burden devolving on the British taxpayer. To the tribesmen of 'Iraq, who suffered severe casualties without recompense of any kind, it offered, not for the first or last time, a sobering lesson in the thankless consequences of serving the purposes of urban politicians and a Persian priesthood.

The town populations and their political leaders, for all the sincerity and zeal of many, took no physical or practical part in the strife, but profited undisturbed from the security which the Administration was able, in spite of them, to maintain in the cities. They were to claim nevertheless, as their successors a generation later still claim, that this 'National War of Liberation', to which heroic proportions have been assigned, had essentially modified British policy and compelled the creation of an 'Iraqi State. An objective comparison of the constitutional arrangements

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

formulated and, on 17 June 1920, announced *before* the insurrection—arrangements in fact preparatory to an Arab State acting through elected assemblies, 'Iraqi ministers and high officials—and those introduced by Cox in the autumn of the year, does not support this view. The *Thawra*, besides inflicting tragic losses on its participants, delayed by some months the inauguration of the new State. It may, on the other hand, be argued that in some measure it modified the manner of implementation of British policy, and strengthened the case for the approach by treaty rather than by direct mandatory government.

Although operations by the Euphrates tribesmen showed at times signs of tuition or leadership by trained officers—ex-Turkish officers from the Amir Fayṣal's forces—yet in general the course of events was but little co-ordinated. It followed no strategy or synchronization more precise than the mere creation of the maximum disturbance, by tribal agency, whenever and wherever possible. This permitted the Administration to remain in being continuously and in most districts. Even a minimum of unified control over the insurgents' operations must have made the British position untenable, and thus rallied the main body of waverers to the cause of nationalism or of anarchy. The lack of cohesion indicates not only the failure of the political element to provide it, but equally the parochial objectives of the shaykhs, the variety of their motives, their lack of the sense of service to a common cause. More generally the differing viewpoints of Kurd, Turk, Turkoman, and Arab, the irreconcilably varying objectives of Persian Mujtahid, 'Iraqi nationalist, and peace-loving merchant or landlord precluded, as did the essential cleavage of town or tribe, any effective unity of effort. Nor can it be forgotten that throughout 'Iraq a high proportion of leading shaykhs and of urban notables withheld all support from the movement, while throughout the period the loyalty of 'Iraqi forces—police and Shabana—to the Administration was outstanding.

The restoration of peaceful conditions in the territory cost some months of exhausting British military efforts, marked not only by some tragic misadventures but also by episodes of great gallantry and brilliant military prowess. These efforts, which included the summoning of important reinforcements from India, cost hundreds of casualties, great quantities of military stores, the erection of hundreds of blockhouses and scores of miles of barbed-wire fencing, and an expenditure calculated at some £40 million: a greater sum by far than had been spent throughout the War on Arab allies in the Ḥijaz and Syria.

Throughout June 1920 peace throughout 'Iraq was, except for some aftermath of the Tall 'Afar murders, still undisturbed. It

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

669 was thought indeed by some observers to be assured by the failure of the tribal forces outside Mosul, the announcement of British policy in Baghdad on 17 June, the forthcoming return of Cox, and the timely arrest of patriot-agitators at Baghdad, Karbalā, Ḥilla, and Diwaniya, whence in some numbers they were dispatched to Hanjam Island in the Persian Gulf. But such hopes were to be falsified; an eruption of violent lawlessness—one of so many in 'Iraq's long history—was not now avoidable. A petty episode at Rumaytha on the lower Euphrates, unconnected at first with nationalist or any other politics, led in the first week of July to the cutting of the Baghdad–Baṣra railway near this town and near Samawa. Both towns, or the Government buildings in them, were closely besieged by tribesmen. The first and determined efforts of British troops to reach Rumaytha were unsuccessful. It was relieved on 20 July only after serious fighting, and immediately abandoned. The Mishkhab marsh area tribes attacked Abu Ṣukhayr on 13 July, and a week later besieged Kufa, when Captain J. S. Mann was killed by tribesmen. Kifl was assailed and a column of the Manchester Regiment, sent hastily from Ḥilla to its relief, by ill fortune and its own unpreparedness sustained heavy losses in killed and prisoners which raised the spirit and hopes of the insurgent tribes. The Hindiya Barrage and Musayib were evacuated, to be reoccupied in mid-August. British troops were withdrawn with great difficulty from Diwaniya to Ḥilla, south of which the Euphrates channels and townships passed for some weeks out of control. In the Muntafiq, the political offices at Shaṭra, Qal'at Sikr, and Suq al-Shuyukh were perforce abandoned during August, and except at the liwā headquarters, Naṣiriya, a régime of non-Government, but never of concerted insurgent action, prevailed for some weeks. The railway was interrupted, a train looted, two military river steamers (the *Greenfly* and the *S.9*) were destroyed and their crews cold-bloodedly murdered; nevertheless, nuclei of loyalty to the Administration remained under the most powerful of the Muntafiq shaykhs, and conditions could return without military action to something like normality in mid-October.

Disorder at no time spread to the Kut or the 'Amara areas of the lower Tigris, nor, save for isolated episodes which included the destruction by sabotage of the main Motor Transport Stores, to Baghdad city and suburbs: nor, in spite of agitators' efforts, to Baṣra. Mosul and its dependent Kurdish districts were untroubled, in spite of violent trans-frontier propaganda and some formidable tribal raiding. Sulaymaniya, a stranger to 'Iraqi nationalism and chastened by the events of 1919, held aloof. In Kirkuk liwā there was keen tension but no outbreak, except at

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Kifri, which tribesmen occupied for a few days late in August, and whose Assistant Political Officer, Captain G. H. Salmon, they imprisoned and then murdered. In Arbil liwā the Administration under Turkish-fomented pressure withdrew from outlying qadhās, Raniya, Keui Sanjaq, Baṭas; but, aided by the loyalty of leading Aghās, it could maintain itself in the city and surrounding country. The upper Euphrates was held secure by the influence of the Dulaym and 'Aniza shaykhs, until the sordidly treacherous murder of Leachman on 12 August led to local risings, the looting and isolation of 'Ana and other villages, and the withdrawal of the Administration for a time from Hit. The position was restored with the arrival of small military columns and the re-occupation of Hit on 8 October; but the Dulaym area remained partly disorganized for a further half-year.

Around Samarrā propaganda emanating from that Holy City led to a measure of tribal uprising and, late in August, to an unsuccessful assault on the city. In other areas north and east of Baghdad the forces of violence were for a time dominant and rewarded. The liwā headquarters, Ba'quba, and the qadhā towns of Shahroban and Daltawa were successively attacked, occupied, and partially looted by tribesmen under politicians' inspiration in mid-August, and British officers cold-bloodedly murdered—Captain W. T. Wrigley, Lieutenant J. T. Bradfield, Captain E. L. Buchanan, and two British Levy instructors—or politely imprisoned. Here and at Mandali on the frontier hopeful Provisional Governments were set up. The Turkoman-Kurdish towns of Qizil Rubaṭ and Khaniqin were entered and occupied in the same week by the local Kurdish tribesmen. Attacks on the Assyrian refugee camp at Ba'quba were hotly repulsed, by far better fighters than the attackers.

In these accessible areas of central 'Iraq it was easy for the military command, which by the later weeks of September disposed of stronger forces and had regained the initiative, to restore the Administration and to punish the insurgents by the visitations of mobile columns. Disorder here, to the general relief of the public and, not least, of the Baghdad landlords, languished and died; but the agitation and internecine quarrels among the Diyalā tribes remained largely unappeased for a further year. The 'government' of Mandali disappeared early in 1921, the tribal invaders of Kifri and Khaniqin were reduced to hunted outlaws, and calm returned to the urban and suburban populations of the Diyalā and Baghdad townships.

On the middle and lower Euphrates British troops could show themselves in respectable force in the first weeks of October. It was possible to restore the prestige of the Administration in Najf and Karbalā and to relieve besieged Samawa and Kufa, where a

669 Provisional Government had existed for some weeks and from which the British prisoners captured in July, of the Manchesters and other regiments, were recovered in good condition.

A variety of minor punitive expeditions were led in the little-visited marsh country, and military marches and demonstrations carried out throughout the winter of 1920–1. Communications including the Baghdad–Baṣra railway were progressively restored. Loyal tribal leaders were thanked and rewarded. The submission of ex-insurgents was accepted, save for some few who, through fear or principle, fled to Syria or the Ḥijaz. Fines of rifles imposed on tribes by the Commander-in-Chief were effectively collected; some 70,000, including 21,000 of modern type, were handed in within six months by mid-Euphrates tribesmen alone. From the Muntafiq, exceptionally, no arms were collected, and only one expedition in January 1921 visited the Gharraf.

In mid-October Sir Percy Cox returned to 'Iraq as planned to relieve Wilson, his deputy, and to carry out the constitutional programme announced four months earlier. After consultations in southern 'Iraq, he reached Baghdad on 11 October and could rightly wonder, in a proclamation issued on 17 October, what aims the few still active insurgent tribesmen could be seeking. The attempt of the Mujtahids to regain a seriously though but temporarily shaken position by claiming to act as mediators between the Government and the Shi'i tribesmen was frustrated by Cox's refusal. Week by week conditions normalized, and the deferred progress in State-building could be resumed.

5. THE KING

642 Immediate 'complete independence' for 'Iraq formed no part of the programme which Cox was to carry out; after the failure of the insurrectionist movement organized to obtain it, and the collapse in July 1920 of the Amir Fayṣal's Government in Syria, even its warmest advocate could now scarcely expect it. A Mandate for 'Iraq had been accepted by Great Britain, with all the tutelage which that, however interpreted, must involve; the belated Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, signed on 10 August 1920, was to permit the 'Iraqi Kurds to adhere, if they wished, to the State into which central Kurdistan might or might not evolve. Cox himself and his advisers, however sympathetic to 'Iraqi aspirations, were convinced that the intended substitution of 'Iraqi for British government, must, for soundness and permanence, be gradual and progressive; indeed, the actual British Administration visibly operating in every department, liwā, and qadhā was a reality which no politics could, for the moment, dissipate. At the same time the more prudent programme of erecting an 'Iraqi Administration,

563 murderous Hamawand allies. The Shaykh's retirement to Persia
668 removed for a time the greatest obstacle to orderly government in
Sulaymaniya liwā. It could now be resumed, with improved roads and rebuilt police posts. His son, Baba 'Ali, was brought to school in Baghdad—and later to Victoria College, Alexandria—as part of the terms of settlement; he was, years later, to become a graduate of Columbia, and a minister of the Government. The place of Shaykh Maḥmud as leading Kurdish disturber of the peace was taken in the same year, 1927, by Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan in whose territory 'Iraqi troops had recently manœuvred. This half-witted Dere Bey, obscurely prompted by some resentful megalomania, now proclaimed himself Almighty and gained some converts by the preaching of a devoted Mullā. But the reaction of horrified listeners led to a scuffle in which lives, including his brother's, were lost. It was followed by an intervention of police and the reinforcement of the Army garrison at Bilih, near Barzan. The new religion died out; but the Shaykh, talking and writing war and sedition to all who would listen and spreading rumours of Assyrian trespass, remained a menacing figure.

The Kurdish reaction in 1929–30 to threatened British withdrawal was one of apprehension. The elections of September 1929 produced, as has been recorded, a riot in Sulaymaniya; questions had been asked already by the Kurds in the 'Iraq Parliament as to safeguarding in the new Treaty the 'rights of the Kurdish areas', and had been answered only by the Treaty's silence on the subject.
563 Expecting support based on the same claims, Shaykh Maḥmud in
669 September 1930 again invaded 'Iraq territory, in spite of specific
721 warnings to desist. He established himself, addressed the High
Commissioner to demand a united Kurdistan under British Mandate to stretch from Zakho to Khaniqin, and again occupied Panjwin. Troops of the 'Iraq Army, with Royal Air Force bombers, dislodged him successively from Panjwin and Sardasht, but failed for some months to encircle or drive him across the frontier. Guerrilla war continued through the winter of 1930–1. In March his movement to raise the tribes of Kifri and Khaniqin was stopped by a concerted operation of the Army, Police, and Air Force, and a major engagement took place at Au-i-Barika twenty miles north-east of Ṭuz Khurmatu, leaving a score of dead. The Shaykh fled into Persia, but thanks to preventive action by the Persian Government failed to find there his usual refuge. At an interview at Panjwin terms were once more arranged. His life was spared, an allowance granted, and his place of residence fixed at Naṣiriya on the lower Euphrates.

Between 1928 and 1931 an uneasy peace reigned in Barzan country, where the Shaykh was visited by an Administrative

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Inspector and received the admonitions of Baghdad. In July of the latter year he again lost his wits, accepted and imposed 'Christianity', and ordered his scared followers to conform to his new faith by roasting and eating pork. A number of the horrified retinue obeyed; but a neighbour, Shaykh Rashid of Baradost, expressed his disapproval by raids which kindled all the fires of tribal warfare. Shaykh Aḥmad's brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, and other well-wishers tried in vain by diplomacy to extinguish them: but he himself, restored to the Muslim faith, led forays of unusual savagery into Baradost country. By December intervention by regular troops was ordered, in spite of the wintry conditions. An 'Iraq Army column, penetrating the mountains as far as the Shaykh's village, was there severely defeated and indeed rescued from débâcle only by Air Force intervention. Aḥmad, chastened by severe bombing, released the prisoners he had taken, protested humble obedience, and withdrew from Baradost country. But he remained unsubdued. In the early spring of 1932, after warnings from the High Commissioner which he ignored, 'Iraqi troops again advanced into his country, occupied Margasur, and threatened Barzan; but a sudden assault on them by tribesmen in difficult country involved them in a second defeat and heavy losses. The R.A.F. was again able decisively to intervene, and a second 'Iraqi column, with strong air support, now occupied Barzan and much of its dependent territory. After a pause for the release of a captured pilot, and further attempts at peace-making on generous terms, land and air operations were resumed. In midsummer the Shaykh, driven finally to bay, crossed into Turkish territory, where he was arrested and removed from the frontier. It was then possible to install a normal or nearly normal administration in Barzan country, with police posts and patrols, and to pardon the miserable remnant of the Shaykh's followers who trickled back.

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If these warlike interludes were of a type normal in Kurdistan for millennia, the same is less true of the political action now taken by Kurdish leaders. A petition to Geneva by ten notables of Sulaymaniya in July 1930 demanded a League-supervised Kurdish Government. The Permanent Mandates Commission commented that the League had never envisaged a Kurdish Government but merely a measure of 'special treatment', of which it urged the Mandatary to ensure full application before it be too late. A series of further and similar Kurdish petitions, written in 1930 to 1931, were considered at Geneva in the latter year. They led to the recommendation that Britain should impress on the 'Iraq Government the need of tolerance to evoke the loyalty of its Kurdish subjects: who in turn, however, should earn respect and the League's consideration by a correct attitude to the 'Iraqi Kingdom.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 645 668 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 619 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests [687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

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[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

cessions to their peculiar beliefs and customs, and met their active 669
and passive resistance by sending a brigade of troops in September 619
1935. This bloodless operation was followed by the institution
of courts martial which, with savage severity and no adequate [687]
trials, hanged nine of their leaders, including two Christians, and imprisoned 350 alleged resisters. These were later progressively released: but Da'ud al-Da'ud remained a fugitive in Syria, where numbers of his followers tried persistently to join him. The Barzani Kurds, subdued by joint 'Iraqi-Turkish operations in 1933 which captured Shaykh Aḥmad, gave further trouble in 1934 and 1935 under the truculent leader of a considerable force, Khalil Khushawi. This bandit, who for long defied the combined operations of 'Iraqis and Turks, dodged across frontiers from valley to valley and destroyed the villages of all who denounced him. Later in 1935 most of his followers were rounded up, and a dozen hanged; he himself vanished, to reappear in mid-winter and to be caught and shot in March 1936. In Sulaymaniya liwā a similar character, Sayid Muḥammad Pichkola, led looting parties in 'Iraq from a base in Persia. After long-drawn police operations he surrendered in August 1935, and was pardoned. In the same weeks, deep in southern 'Iraq, resistance to conscription was leading the Mudayna village of Qurna to armed protest which called for military suppression.

The year 1936 brought no peace to rural 'Iraq. The incitements to lawlessness first set afoot in 1934, the rancour of never-settled land disputes, the fear and hatred of conscription, and maladroit or corrupt local administration were added to the endemic causes of tribal restlessness. In February insurgence among the Shaṭra tribes brought troops to the Gharraf, and the usual measures quelled the rising in a few weeks. In the Muntafiq an assault on a police post in the Suq area was punished by fines and prison-sentences. In April a section of the Bani Ḥuchaym in Rumaytha district cut the railway, rallied a force of 1,200 armed tribesmen, and heavily engaged troops sent to suppress them. Casualties were heavy, the Army lost ninety men and two aircraft. Reprisals of corresponding severity, with the hanging of rebel leaders after little or no trial and the burning of villages, were reported in Baghdad, there to distress the squeamish and help the Opposition. The 'Akra district of Diwaniya witnessed a rising of the notorious Sha'lan al-'Aṭiya, unsatisfied by his rewards for opposing the Ministry of 'Ali Jawdat. It was not less brutally suppressed by Bakr Ṣidqi in June 1936; and in August a force of the Ṣafwan tribe, near Khidhr in Samawa qadhā, attacked the Government office and, though dispersed, were still unsubdued in the autumn of the year.

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tact with leaders of the Army. The latter, its morale uplifted by 168
triumphs over Assyrian villagers and Euphrates tribesmen, was 665
asking whether to serve the intrigues and ambitions of the Baghdad politicians was, after all, the ideal: whether direct dominance of the State by its armed force, as in Turkey or Persia, would not be more congenial? The stages by which Ḥikmat Sulayman and the forceful sinister Bakr Ṣidqi came into closer agreement, and the latter abandoned his loyalty to Yasin Pasha and his brother Ṭaha, cannot now be traced. To Ḥikmat the immediate desideratum was a change of Government in his own favour, and only the Army could produce this; Bakr Ṣidqi's ambition was to effect a stroke which would assure the Army of a paramount position and himself the headship of the Army. Neither at any time sought, it seems, a personal or formal dictatorship.

In October 1936 Ṭaha left 'Iraq to visit Turkey, leaving Ṣidqi, 665
then commanding the 1st Division, to act in his place. The 669
autumn manœuvres on the middle Diyalā gave occasion to concentrate almost all of the armed forces outside the capital. The plot concerted by Bakr with Ḥikmat Sulayman was communicated to a few officers at Qaraghan, notably 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, the general commanding the 2nd Division. The two generals drafted a letter to the King, demanding the formation of a new Ministry under Ḥikmat, and handed it to the latter. Leaders of the left-wing group were admitted to the secret. The Air Force under its Commander, Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, a close friend of Ṣidqi, was concentrated at Qaraghan and was provided with leaflets to scatter over Baghdad at the appropriate moment. On the night of 28 October the Army, renamed the National Defence Force for the occasion, began its 'march on Baghdad'.

By early morning of the 29th leaflets rained from the sky over Baghdad, and Ḥikmat conveyed the agreed letter to the palace. Yasin Pasha and his colleagues, amazed at a turn of events wholly unexpected, made their way to the King's ante-room, where Ghazi had already summoned the British Ambassador. The latter advised His Majesty to consult his Cabinet, to ascertain the intentions of Ḥikmat, and to proceed, above all, constitutionally. The ministers, now joined by all their colleagues except Rashid 'Āli, were ready to resign. Bombs fell on Baghdad in the mid-morning, a three-hour time limit for the Cabinet's surrender having expired, and some civilians killed and wounded showed the zeal of the Royal 'Iraqi Air Force. After a discussion which could end but one way, the Cabinet resigned, and a Royal Irada appointed Ḥikmat Sulayman to form a new Ministry.

One shocking incident distressed the public, horrified the British Ambassador, and disgusted Ḥikmat himself—the brutal murder of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

665 669 Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari by Army officers half-way between Baghdad and Ba'quba, under the direct orders, it was believed, of Bakr Ṣidqi. Ja'far as Minister of Defence had left Baghdad by car with a letter to Bakr from the King, intending to meet the Commander, inform him of the change of Government and arrange for a cessation of violence. His body, that of a sincere and devoted patriot and an honest man, was hastily buried by the roadside while the Army pursued its triumphant march to the capital. The troops entered the city ceremonially in the early evening, with Bakr Ṣidqi at their head.

*645 The Cabinet formed and announced by Ḥikmat on the same day reserved the Ministry of Interior to himself, brought three members of the Ahali group, Abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi, and Yusif 'Izz al-Din to Finance, Works, and Education, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Justice, Naji al-Aṣil to Foreign Affairs. Ṣidqi's fellow conspirator 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri was rewarded with the Ministry of Defence, while Bakr himself superseded Ṭaha al-Hashimi as Chief of Staff. Great enthusiasm, real or feigned, greeted the new Government. The announced programme, and a broadcast by Abu al-Timman, were rich in optimism and promises. Giant demonstrations were arranged in Baghdad, and the capital's main streets were a stage for the dancing and singing of crowds of tribesmen and workers. The outgoing Ministry was everywhere denigrated. Its members, whom Bakr would have preferred to assassinate with other likely opponents, vanished temporarily from public life: Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Āli to Syria under escort, Nuri Sa'id by R.A.F. aircraft to Egypt. Other ex-ministers and some high officials retired amid the many changes made in personnel by the incoming ministers.

The Prime Minister, who kept at all times correctly in contact with the British Ambassador—and lost some nationalist following by so doing—assured him and the world that this was no military dictatorship; it was merely parliamentary and democratic government supported by a devoted Army. Bakr Ṣidqi, in fact, interfered little in current administration. He had no obvious policy save a crude Anglophobia, and limited his exigencies to nomination of his friends to certain appointments and insistence on priority for the Army's needs. A vindictive proposal to inquire into the private fortunes of ex-ministers was at first accepted but finally abandoned.

*645 665 Opposition nevertheless was not slow to organize, and could muster effective elements. Moderate opinion everywhere saw with consternation the open assumption of power by a selfish and short-sighted military movement. The new Government in its proclaimed programme had said little of anti-Treaty proposals—indeed, had spoken of friendship with all countries and was pledged to maintain the Treaty. In spite of some self-justifying gestures to

the French reception in Syria of the families of the 550 Assyrians 563
interned there since August 1933. Aided by a grant of money from 657
'Iraq, these women and children joined their men on the upper Khabur in September 1934 to a number of over 1,500. Movement from the Mosul camp and streets to the Khabur continued in 1935 to a number of some 1,500, and a more grandiose scheme for a large-scale settlement in the Ghab lands on the Orontes in Syria was formulated by the League Committee. A project for its finances, with 'Iraq and Great Britain as main contributors, was established and a Trustee Board appointed. In 1936 an immediate transfer of 15,000 Assyrians was planned, which would dispose of almost the whole remaining community except those native to 'Iraq; but the difficulties of the Ghab project were found insurmountable, and its abandonment made possible a move only of smaller numbers, 2,500 in all, to the Khabur settlements. No further progress was made under the Ḥikmat–Ṣidqi régime, and the permanence of the Assyrian remnant in 'Iraq was perforce accepted. Their economic rehabilitation was by now fairly advanced, and their final adaptation to 'Iraqi conditions and citizenship could be hoped.

The event which caused the fall of the Sulaymani Ministry after 645*
less than nine months of uneasy life was due neither to constitutional procedures, which rarely operated to change Governments in 'Iraq, nor to any grouping of the Opposition forces. Its origin lay in rancour within the Army itself, where careers had been ruined and malevolence excited by the abused omnipotence of Bakr. The bodyguard by which at all times he went surrounded 669
had saved him from previous attempts on his life during 1937; but when on 8 August, *en route* for a visit to Turkish manœuvres, he waited on the Mosul airport, his murderers, by whomever instructed, could carry out one of the alternative plans prepared. He was shot dead at point-blank range by an 'Iraqi soldier, and his companion Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, chief of the R.I.A.F., lived but a minute longer.

The bodies were taken to Baghdad and buried with full military honours. Little regret, but rather the almost unanimous relief of public and press, accompanied the General to his grave: not unjustly, since the pages of 'Iraq history which he had written were in all ways deplorable. In Mosul the Military Commander, General Amin al-'Umari, arrested the murderer, cordoned the airport, and assumed sole charge of the city. Ordered by Baghdad to arrest further named individuals as accomplices, he at first complied, then realized the dangerous possibilities of a general purge of Bakr's known opponents. Six days after the murder he took the grave step of publishing a proclamation in which he

Nuri Pash, perhaps with the reluctance which he professed, accepted the premiership for the fifth time on Christmas Day 1938. 645x

2. DEATH OF THE KING

The new Ministry was greeted by the usual hopes for a firm and stable régime at last, the usual apprehension of faction, reprisal, and further military intervention. A Cabinet of average merit was announced; but once again no firm basis of shared principles was present to unite the ministers. Naji Shawkat was summoned from the 'Iraqi Legation at Ankara to be Minister of the Interior, Rustum Ḥaydar went to Finance, the capable Turkoman, 'Umar Nadhmi, to Works, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari to Justice, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Education, Ṭaha al-Hashimi to Defence. Rashid 'Āli was taken to preside over the Royal Diwan. The Prime Minister's inaugural speech was admirably balanced, wise, and high-minded; it deprecated military adventures and urged all parties to accept the rule of law and true democracy. The banned newspapers were relicensed, the exiled politicians returned. Postal censorship was abolished, dismissed officials were reinstated, and permission was given for the formation of political parties, though these failed for the moment to take shape. Words of mingled reproof and encouragement were addressed to assembled Euphrates shaykhs.

In Parliament, however, the usual asperities were not slow to 646
repeat themselves, and redoubled after the departure of Nuri 665
Pasha to London early in 1939. The exiled victims of the Madfa'i Ministry demanded vengeance for its high-handed illegalities, and as a first step pressed for reference of disputed points of law to the Special Court provided by the Organic Law; and the Ministry, itself indifferently united, decided to reinforce its position by general elections which might produce a more amenable Chamber. The Irada ordering the dissolution of Parliament appeared on 22 February, a few days before the State visit paid to Baghdad by the Crown Prince of Persia.

The return of the Prime Minister from London late in February 645x
was followed by the issue of a ministerial programme on the habitual 669
lines. A few days later the discovery of a conspiracy was announced, understood to involve not only Ḥikmat Sulayman—the *bête noire* of Nuri Pasha—but a formidable list of other politicians and officers. The plot, it was revealed, had aimed at the murder of no less than fifty leading personalities, the assassination of the King, and the enthronement of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah—or, as some preferred, of the Amir Zayd. A State of Emergency was immediately proclaimed at al-Rashid Camp, a number of arrests were made, and a special court martial was convened with civilian judges as equal members with the military. On the strength of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 669 confessions made by alleged participants, death sentences were passed on five of the accused, including Ḥikmat, and long terms of imprisonment on others, while some were acquitted. The commutation of the death sentence for one of imprisonment on four of the condemned was soon afterwards announced by Royal Irada; that of Ḥikmat Sulayman was mitigated only after persuasive pressure by the British Ambassador and by private British as well as 'Iraqi friends. There remained—and remain today—among persons well qualified to judge, many who, in spite of the confessions, believed and believe the whole plot to be fictitious and its 'discovery' designed merely to serve political or personal ends.

643 A part of the objects of the alleged conspiracy was after all to be achieved, and this by a tragic accident. The King, driving his car with habitual recklessness late in the night of 3 April, crashed into an electric-power standard near his palace, and died a few hours later of the severe fractures of the skull which he had sustained. The announcement of his death was made early on the 4th. The Council of Ministers, urgently convened, received the written testimony of Queen 'Aliya that Ghazi had wished to be succeeded, should the case ever arise during the infancy of his son, by a Regency of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah, son of the late King 'Ali. A sufficient number of members of the dissolved Chamber were gathered to ratify this in accordance with the Constitution; and the succession of King Fayṣal II, then aged almost four years, and the Regency of the Amir were proclaimed.

King Ghazi was twenty-seven. He had reigned for nearly six years. Little interested in the formal functions of his office, and barely persuaded to fulfil them, his faults of heedlessness and frivolity, his impatience of protocol and of advice, had been embarrassing to his successive Governments, and at times discourteous to his subjects. But at his best he lacked neither intelligence nor charm. He was a good sportsman, a brilliant high-speed motor driver, and popular with the young Army officers who were his chosen and natural associates. He was beloved, at a distance, by many of his subjects for his youth, vitality, and evident patriotism. The little Fayṣal II, attended always by an English nurse and later an English governness, was known to be an intelligent and attractive child. The new Regent, brother of Queen 'Aliya and uncle of the King, was now aged twenty-seven. He had been educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and although hitherto unversed in public affairs was considered serious and intelligent, and likely to turn his personal charm and excellent social gifts to good account.

643 579 The King's funeral at the Royal Mausoleum was attended by many Arab visitors from abroad and by tens of thousands of his

Ministry itself was well received by Parliament, gained some 645+ popularity by increasing officials' salaries, and worked acceptably at salvage and relief works necessitated by the disastrous floods which had breached the railway and inundated farm lands. It felt strong enough to refuse the application of Rashid 'Āli and his band of close associates—Naji Shawkat, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh, Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Yunis al-Sab'awi, Da'ud al-Sa'di—for the formation of a People's Party.

But the task of conciliating the Army leaders, the Gaylani group 645+ of politicians hungry for power and embittered against the Regent, 169 and the Amir himself with his moderate and orthodox advisers, proved impossible of achievement. The Prime Minister could not or would not adopt a determined policy in either sense. The Golden Square, who had already abandoned their loyalty to Nuri, now abandoned it to Ṭaha equally, and were identified ever more closely with Rashid 'Āli's faction. They felt their own position to be threatened; and the first stroke they had been led to fear fell on 26 March with the announced transfer of one of them, Kamil Shabib, away from Baghdad; other repostings were no doubt to follow, and the Regent's campaign to break the Square would develop. The order of transfer was ignored; Ṭaha was powerless to enforce it; and the solemn promise of the Generals on the last day of the Parliamentary session, 31 March, that 'on their military honour' they would abstain from political intervention, was obviously valueless.

On the night of 1 April the four Generals and the acting Chief of Staff, Amin Zaki Sulayman, met to proclaim a State of Emergency at al-Rashid cantonment, and marched troops to points in Baghdad city and around the Palace. Their spokesmen, visiting Ṭaha by night, demanded his resignation; but he refused to join a movement now frankly revolutionary, and his Cabinet remained in being for one further day. Events, however, swept it aside; the Regent escaped from his palace on the night of 1 April and took refuge for some hours with Knabenshue, who drove him to Ḥabbaniya in an American Legation car next day. Here he met for a few minutes Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, arriving at this most uneasy of moments to assume the post of British Ambassador, and from Ḥabbaniya was flown to Baṣra. There were hopes that a strong base of support might be found at the Port, and the Amir issued a manifesto calling for this. But the Baṣra garrison, hesitant at first, received orders from Baghdad to detain him, and arrested and replaced the Mutaṣarrif, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, who had loyally received him. He was forced to embark for safety in a British warship anchored in the Shaṭṭ, and was later flown, with 'Ali Jawdat and Madfa'i, to 'Amman.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

5. THIRTY-DAY WAR

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In Baghdad the Golden Square and its forces assumed control. Once fully dominant, the Generals proclaimed the formation of a Government of National Defence, embodied in a Council which included their own four members and the Chief of Staff, with Rashid 'Āli as its nominal head, accompanied by two of his close followers. General Amin Zaki issued on 3 April, in terms strongly hostile to the Regent, a broadcast appealing for universal support. He was followed by Rashid 'Āli, who justified his position and the Army's and stated his policy to be one of 'refraining from exposing the country to the dangers of war', while also 'fulfilling all the international obligations of 'Iraq'.

The legislation of the new régime was less easy. Parliament was summoned by one of its Vice-Presidents, 'Alwan al-Yasiri: a step in itself illegal, since under the Constitution a Royal Irada was required. At the meeting of the Chamber on 10 April Rashid 'Āli obtained from the frightened deputies (many in fact strongly favourable to the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah) their votes for the deposition of the Regent, and for the appointment in his place of an elderly but respectable poor relation of the Hashimite family, the Amir Sharaf. The Prime Minister swore henceforward to observe the Constitution, the new Regent took his oath of office, and the régime announced itself as now legally constituted. The Amir Sharaf accepted the resignation of Ṭaha, three days old, and called formally upon Rashid 'Āli to form a Ministry. The portfolio of Finance was allotted to Naji al-Suwaydi, that of Defence to Naji Shawkat, Justice, Economics, and Foreign Affairs were given to Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Yunis al-Sab'awi, and Musā al-Shahbandar, and Education to Dr. Ḥasan al-Salman. The Prime Minister did not fail to announce, in the strict tradition of incoming Premiers, that a new age of all the public virtues and blessings had begun. Of the normality of his own position he admitted no doubt; there had been, at the worst, just one more coup d'état, a purely domestic affair! In the eyes of his supporters, of the Youth Movement, and of part of the urban public, a strong Government free from lingering commitments, hotly patriotic and backed by the Army, had at last been established. In the tribes, apathy and vague uneasiness prevailed. The more critical or conservative townsmen and most older politicians viewed with alarm the implied flouting of the British, the commitment to Germans and Italians, the precipitate flight of the Regent, and the present crude domination by Army leaders always disliked and feared by the civil public. The release of convicts serving sentences for their share in the Monck-Mason murder was significant. Leading statesmen loyal to the

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Ḥaydari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their colleagues in Palestine. The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained invisible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Āli personally there was little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert. The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it. 645 669 [722]

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy the reverse of their own. In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya. 721 648 ×

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid 'Ali first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 668 on the certainty that indulgence in the north would be followed by equal or greater Shi'i demands, and on the crudely selfish ambitions of the Kurdish leaders. The Kurds were, moreover, represented in the Cabinet only by individuals long denationalized, and in the Chamber by deputies selected for their tractability.

The Pachachi Ministry did little to honour the undertakings of Nuri Pasha, though the Prime Minister and Arshad approved them against the opposition of Muṣṭafā al-'Umari and Taḥsin 'Ali. Baha al-Din was removed from Sulaymaniya; but after a meeting of Kurdish leaders there in July 1944, the Cabinet sent up two Kurdish Mutaṣarrifs to take charge of that liwā and Arbil, and dispatched the Minister of Economics, Tawfiq Wahbi, on a goodwill mission in Kurdistan. He was forced to realize the extent of ill will towards Baghdad, and found that Barzani power had redoubled by a recent marriage alliance with Zibar. On the Minister's departure Mullā Muṣṭafā helped himself to Government grain stores, looted police posts, conducted a futile correspondence with the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, and demanded from Baghdad the fulfilment of Nuri Pasha's promises—and a loan for himself. In November, four 'Iraqis were dropped in Mosul liwā by parachute from a German plane; two were captured, two escaped. The year closed with uneasiness at the likely prospect of another Kurdish campaign, this time in midwinter: a blow which the Government attempted to forestall by free distributions of grain and cloth.

These fears proved in part groundless. Peace was outwardly undisturbed throughout the winter of 1944–5, though Kurdish restless dissatisfaction and the increase of Russian influence precluded confidence. A connexion between Kurdish nationalism—of the type favoured by the intelligentsia rather than that of the feudal leaders—and some type of Communism became more evident; two Kurdish-language Communist magazines, later combined into one (the *Azadi*, or Freedom), appeared in 'Iraq in 1934 produced, like *al-Qa'ida*, by the Communist Party; and some of the organizers, who included Army officers, were no doubt in touch with the Russians. The forms taken by both nationalism and Communism were various; *Azadi* was purely Communist and advocated a united front with the Arabs against reaction and feudalism, while the Persian or Adharbayjani *Nishtman* spoke for exclusive Kurdish unity and rights, and bade the feudal leaders modernize themselves.

563 669 In March 1945 an Amnesty Bill was placed before Parliament, and passed with the reluctance of many deputies; it pardoned all Kurdish offenders up to February 1944, the date of the Mullā's submission. He himself visited Mosul, and was received there by

the Minister of the Interior; and Barzan area was transferred from 563 Mosul liwā to Arbil. But the restless ambition of the Barzani was incorrigible. Alleging British support—a fantastic fiction believed 669 by many both in Barzan and in Baghdad—he harried the valleys far beyond his own area, seized Government stores at Margasur, and occupied police posts. Forced to act, the Army advanced in September in three columns towards his fastnesses, while the R.I.A.F. bombed his followers and properties. A police column advanced from 'Amadiya, and the Turks aided by closing their frontier. The Army column from 'Aqra was soon in trouble and its line of retreat threatened. It was rescued, and the position restored, only by the success of the Minister of Interior in raising, for ready money, irregular tribal forces under such of the Barzani's neighbours as welcomed the chance to pay off old scores and be subsidized for doing it. Mullā Muṣṭafā and his army, hard pressed from every side, crossed now 2,000 strong into Persia, there to find ready welcome and support. He could now drink deep of Russian-sponsored Kurdish nationalism in its active centre at Mahabad: could consult with the ambitious Qadhi Muḥammad, leader of the movement, with open Russian support: and could concert plans with him and his Democratic Party for a Kurdish State astride the frontier, a State to be closely associated with the Adharbayjan Republic now similarly forming under the Russians at Tabriz. On 15 December 1945 a Kurdish People's Government was inaugurated at Mahabad by Qadhi Muḥammad in the honoured presence of Mullā Muṣṭafā and Soviet officers. A week later Qadhi Muḥammad was elected President, a Parliament was formed, and the Mullā with other supporting tribal leaders was promoted Field-Marshal and decked in full Russian uniform.

It was natural that Baghdad's request for the disarming and 563 extradition of its rebel subjects should be unheeded. But at least 657 the campaign was over and the enemy, by whatever means, dispersed; the Army could be thanked for its efforts and decorated by the Regent, while the Prime Minister himself toured the north. All efforts were made to re-establish administration and show goodwill by the early erection of schools, dispensaries, and police posts. A court martial was convened at Arbil for the trial of Barzani rebels, and summoned more than a hundred, including Mullā Muṣṭafā and Shaykh Aḥmad, to appear before it. The two brothers and thirty of their followers, including three Army officers, were condemned to death in absence, and seventy more to life imprisonment.

Though a period of peace followed, no part of the Kurdish 563 problem had been solved. With their social structure, ideas of 'Government', and feudal leadership, any early prospect of a real national autonomy must be fanciful, unless total anarchy be

Yezidis MH 10

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The Yezidis in 'Iraq practically all dwell either in the Sinjār or 162
Shaikhān districts. Each of these districts has a brass peacock and that Y
belonging to Shaikhān must never cross the Tigris. If it did so the 101
world would come to an end! Non-Yezidis cannot view the peacocks 778
or the other sacred emblems, which include the "shema'dan" or
candlestick and the "bairaqs" or banners. When not touring, all Y
emblems are kept at the residence of the *Mir* at Baa'dhra in Shaikhān, [793
though a few years ago the Sinjār Yezidis, who were at variance with 795
the *Mir*, seized their peacock and collected subscriptions on their I
account until compelled by Government to return it to its lawful 659]
keeper. Yezidis object strongly to the use of the word "Shaitān" Y
(Satan) or any word resembling it. Terms meaning "curse" are also 776
never used less Satan construes them as a tactless reminder of his fall. 784

Owing to these difficulties and restrictions, Yezidis are not "good Y
mixers" and rarely enter Government service. A few were formerly 186
employed by the British Government in the transport company of the 463
'Iraq Levies, but did not prove very satisfactory. Occasionally they 669
have enlisted in the 'Iraq army, but an attempt to apply a light measure I
of conscription to the Sinjār Yezidis resulted in an armed revolt by 563 781
five villages. This necessitated punitive action with, unfortunately, 702 669 ●
heavy casualties on both sides. The Yezidis speak a form of Kurdish, Y [197]
but many also know Arabic. Ain Sifni or Ain-i-Safina (Spring of the 174
Boat) is the chief market town of the Shaikhān Yezidis. It derives its 438
name from a tradition that the Ark touched ground there.

Yezidis are to be found outside 'Iraq in the Caucasus and also a Y
few thousand north of Aleppo. 101

It is difficult to believe that this curious religion can long survive Y
in 'Iraq under present-day conditions. The *Mir* is unpopular and 793
there is no better successor amongst his in-bred and degenerate rela- 794
tives. The Yezidis have recently refused to yield him many of his 578
former rights and have severely criticised his squandering of the re-
ligious revenues. Most of the members of the hierarchy have concen-
trated their energies on trying to divert funds to their own pockets and
have quarrelled furiously. A certain number of stalwarts have defied Y
the priests and attended schools. In the Sinjār prior to the Great War 771
religious pressure induced a considerable number of Yezidis to adopt [871]
Islam, and it is within the bounds of possibility that ere long there 797
may be a regular landslide to either the Christian or Islamic faith or
both.

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upon Arabs to rise and die for their fatherland. For the most 665
part, *Al-'Ahd* seemed to be composed of young men: doctors, 175
lawyers, schoolmasters (a number of whom had been dismissed 186
in the winter of 1919 for too violently proclaiming their anti- 668*
British sentiments) and the like. Nevertheless, while the members may have been unimportant individually, collectively they were important. The moderates, as is usually the case, held their peace and remained passive. *Al-'Ahd*, on the other hand, being well organized and having definite aims, gained the ear of the populace.[1]

It became evident that the society in Mōsul was in contact with members of the parent society in Dair az-Zūr and beyond, and that the Mōsulīs were prepared to rise should any opportunity be given them by the Sharifian forces. In late March, 1920, 175*
the first definite reports that the Arab Government intended to 186
attack Mōsul were received and throughout April and May the 669
tension increased. Outside Mōsul, the Shammar Jarba under 'Ajīl al-Yawar, Michal al-Fāris Bunaiyan, Hamaidī and others, the Khābūr Jūbūr under Muslat, the 'Albū Nimr, the 'Aqaidāt and other tribes[2] were rendering life and property unsafe. From April onwards, the concentration of tribal raids on military supply-camps and on military convoys between the Shargat rail-head and Mōsul pointed to other purposes than mere desire for loot, and to a higher control than that of tribal shaikhs. The methods employed seemed to indicate that the former officers of Faisal's Arab Army had not forgotten the tactics used by Colonel Lawrence and his fellow officers against the Turkish lines of supply in the Hijāz and in Syria. Instead of

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[1] The Society was admitted by the authorities to be extremely well organized (Ibid., p. 5). Not until late May was the Government able to identify definitely even a few of the leading members. Of the other two patriotic societies, the *Haras* (the continuation of the pre-war secret society) and the *Hillal*, nothing was known to the authorities except the names.

[2] For locale and strength of these tribes: *Note on Nomad Tribes*, by Major J. I. Eadie; *Note on Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Anah-Albu Kamal Districts*; *Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayet*; *Note on Tribes for General Staff*; and *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, pp. 110 ff.

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175 Turkish garrisons being reduced by means of British arms and
186 funds, it was now British forces, isolated at Mōsul, which were
669 being rendered ineffective by means of Turkish arms and by
forces stimulated by both Turkish and British funds.[1]

On May 30th, the British authorities at Mōsul sent to Baghdad a warning based on the information that an Arab Army under Jamīl Beg Midfai, styling himself 'Commander of the Northern 'Iraq Army', had gathered at Tall Fajāmī on the Khābūr, with Mōsul as its objective. The warning was disregarded by the military authorities at Baghdad.[2] Except for reconnaissances by aeroplanes and armoured cars which failed to locate the approaching Arabs, no other efforts to oppose them were made by the Mōsul military authorities until too late.[3] The only chance of checking the Arab forces lay in the hope that the Gendarmes at Tall 'Afar, considered as one of the most promising companies, could interpose themselves between the approaching army. Treachery had been at work, however. During the night of June 3rd, Captain Stuart, Commander of the Gendarmes, was murdered by Muhammad 'Alī Effendi, one of the Gendarme officers. It was then too much to hope that the men would rally to the support of the British. Early on the morning of June 4th, tribesmen rode into the town, followed by the Arab Army under Jamīl Beg Midfai and by a large force of the Jūbūr under Muslat, and of the Shammar under 'Ajīl, Bunaiyan and Hachīm. The three British other ranks, after defending themselves for several hours from the roof of their billet, were killed by bombs. Two armoured cars sent out from Mōsul were ambushed, overturned and their crews, numbering fourteen, were killed. A reconnoitring aeroplane was shot down and narrowly avoided capture. In the meantime, Captain Barlow, who had been out on reconnaissance

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[1] It seems certain that arms as well as funds came to the Sharifian officers at Dair az-Zūr from Turkish sources, and that the British subsidy to the Damascus Government also kept them in funds. *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, pp. 138-9.

[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 273.

[3] *Admin. Report, Mosul*, 1920, p. 1.

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had been captured by tribesmen and afterwards killed while 175*
trying to make his escape.[1] 186*

From Tall 'Afar, raiding parties from the tribes attacked 669 the Mōsul-Shargāt road and did considerable damage to the military convoys. Letters were sent to all the surrounding country, urging it to revolt and attack Mōsul, where a rising was expected. When, however, the outposts of the Arab army came in contact with the British column, sent out from Mōsul on June 5th, Jamīl Beg and his officers fled to Dair az-Zūr.

It was evident to British observers that the Movement had derived its strength from the general belief that either Sharīf 'Abdullāh or Sharīf Zaid were behind it in person. 'There is no reasonable doubt', the Political Officer for Mōsul wrote later, 'that the expedition was organized by the '*Ahd* organization in Syria, that it was armed from the Sharifian arsenal in Dair az-Zur, that Faisal deprecated it but was aware of it, and that it was actively encouraged and financed by Zaid'.[2]

The failure of the Arab Army to make a stand, the non-appearance of the expected Sharīf and the prompt action of the British troops convinced the countryside as well as most of the inhabitants of Mōsul that they had best stand by the existing order. Nevertheless, the '*Ahd* was too well organized to give up hope. On June 6th, the first notice bearing its five-pointed seal was published, predicting the immediate expulsion of the British. The notices continued until June 17th, when the last one appeared, repudiating the decision of the San Remo Conference and reiterating the kingship of 'Abdullāh. Rumours filled the air of a gathering of fresh forces for an attack on Mōsul. The fall of Damascus and the occupation of Syria by the French in late July ended the trans-Euphrates period of Nationalism. Its inspiration during the next few months came from Baghdad.

During July, letters were received from Baghdad, telling of the notable work achieved by the *Mandubīn*, and calling on the

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[1] *Admin. Report, Mosul*, 1920, pp. 1-2.

[2] Ibid., p. 2.

CHAPTER XIV

THE INSURRECTION OF 1920

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At Rumaitha on the lower Euphrates, always a centre of unrest, the incident occurred which precipitated the Insurrection. On June 30th, the Dhawalīm section of the Banī Hūchaim broke into the Government *Sarai* to release their Shaikh who had been detained by the Assistant Political Officer, as the result of a dispute over an agricultural loan.[1] The local disturbance became the occasion of the general rising. The entire tribe, under orders from Najaf and Kūfa, besieged the Political staff and garrison from July 4th; cut the railroad above and below Rumaitha, while other tribes attacked the Government offices at Samāwa and besieged the two companies stationed there. The railroad was again cut above and below Samāwa.[2] The situation was not irreparable, however, and had prompt and effectively directed action been taken with sufficient troops, the rising might have been quickly suppressed, although the tribes appeared to be under the direction of 'Iraqī ex-officers from Baghdad and Syria. At Rumaitha and Samāwa, the British had definitely entered upon a trial of strength with the tribes. The tribal leaders were well aware of the essential objectives before the British: relief of the garrisons and the reinstatement of the Government. The immediate achievement of these two objectives was to be the determining factor either for peace or for insurrection in the rest of the country.

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[1] *London Gazette*, July 5th, 1921, p. 5330, Dispatch No. 3 (with Appendixes) from Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. A. L. Haldane, November 8th, 1920 (hereafter *London Gazette*). Also Report, Lieut. P. T. Hyatt, A.P.O., Rumaitha, August 10th, 1920; Note on Outbreak of Disturbances at Rumaitha, C. Daly, P.O., Dīwānīya, August 26th, 1920.

[2] Telegram No. 8233, Civil Commissioner to India Office, July 8th, 1920.

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INSURRECTION OF 1920

Although the general situation had long been known to be 175
threatening, only 4200 British troops and 30,000 Indian troops 669
were available for active service out of the total force estimated at 133,000.[1] Nor were the necessary steps following the outbreak taken with the requisite speed and decision. Sir Aylmer Haldane, Commander-in-Chief, had returned on June 24th, to the Persian Hill station where the bulk of his Headquarters Staff was already in residence. Moreover, Military Headquarters tended to place little faith in the reports of the Political Officers regarding the seriousness of the situation.[2] The resultant lack of co-operation on this initial occasion, as on later occasions, was not without disastrous consequences.

Two attempts to relieve Rumaitha were unsuccessful[3] and led to further encouragement of the tribes. Not until July 20th was a relief column, after severe fighting, able to reach the town which was evacuated the next day.[4] Samāwa was not relieved until October 14th. In the meantime, the Miskhab tribes below Najaf marched on Abu Sūkhair, on July 13th. The following day, the southern Banī Hasan tribe arose. On July 20th, Kūfa was besieged and was not relieved until October 17th. On the same day the Banī Hasan attacked Kifl, to relieve which, a force including three companies of the 3rd Manchesters was dispatched in intense heat and without adequate arrangements for water. The force met with overwhelming disaster, less than half the original number returning to Hilla. The incident was magnified by rumour. Practically the whole of the middle Euphrates rose. Rumaitha, Hindīya Barrage and Musaiyib had already been evacuated; Samāwa and Kūfa

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[1] *London Gazette*, p. 5330 (9); Appendix No. 1; Haldane, Sir J. A. L., *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia*, 1920, p. 325. Sir Aylmer estimated that of these troops only 500 British and 2500 to 3000 Indian troops were available as a mobile force; ibid., p. 72.

[2] For the Commander-in-Chief's attitude to Political Staff, Haldane, op. cit., p. 92; also Wilson, op. cit., pp. 275-6.

[3] The additional troops sent July 1st, 2nd and 3rd were insufficient to beat off the insurgents, and the relief expedition, sent July 7th, was forced to return after severe fighting: *London Gazette*, p. 5331.

[4] Ibid., p. 5332 (28).

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were besieged and other points had been either cut off or endangered. Withdrawal from Dīwānīya to Hilla, which had been repeatedly attacked, was deemed essential. It was effected under great difficulties, July 30th.[1] For a time, no order could be maintained outside the line of defences immediately about Baghdad.[2]

The British reverses on the middle Euphrates not unnaturally reacted on the situation on the lower Euphrates and in the Muntafiq. On July 30th, Saiyid Hādī al-Mūqutar from Najaf appeared in the Samāwa area, establishing himself at Khidhr. Supported, it was alleged, by 'an immense quantity of gold',[3] he became the leading figure among the insurgents, inflaming the tribes to a *Jihād* with but one aim: the overthrow of the Civil Administration in the lower Euphrates. Other Saiyids and '*Ulamā*, operating on the Gharrāf, at Shatra and at Khidhr, joined him in preaching the *Jihād* which was declared from Karbalā about August 6th.[4] These activities were doubly effective on the tribes in conjunction with what appeared to be continued British reverses. Musaiyib had been reoccupied on August 12th, and Hindīya Barrage on August 13th, but the evacuation of Qal'at Sikar on August 12th, following an attack on it, led the insurgents to believe that they had inflicted a military defeat on the Government and had driven it from a large portion of the country. The insurgents' belief in the success of the rising seemed confirmed by the British loss of Khidhr with two armoured trains on August 13th; by the isolation by land of Samāwa on the same day; by the loss of several British vessels on the upper Euphrates on August 15th; by the evacuation of Shatra on August 20th;[5] by the capture of the *S.9* with all on board, on August 28th; by the evacuation of

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[1] *London Gazette*, p. 5335 (50-8).

[2] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 147.

[3] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 20, 21.

[4] *London Gazette*, p. 5337 (66).

[5] Not August 27th as in Haldane: op. cit., p. 215. See *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 20, 21.

Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, on September 1st; and by the annihilation of 175x
a British force as it attempted to evacuate Samāwa railway 669
camp, on September 3rd. In Nāsiriya alone, no rising took place, although it often appeared to be dangerously near. The appearance in the Muntafiq of the relief column for Samāwa at the end of September lessened the anxiety, but not until after the relief of Samāwa, October 14th,[1] and the submission of the Rumaitha tribes, did the rising collapse in the Muntafiq.

In the meantime, northward and westward of Baghdad fresh risings had broken out. In Ba'qūbā Division, the Mahrut Revenue Office was raided by a section of the Kharkīya tribe, on August 8th. On the following day, the same tribesmen attacked Abū Hawā Station. Dīltāwa fell to the insurgents, August 12th. It had early come under the influence of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr who, after the attempt to arrest him at Baghdad, August 12th, made it his headquarters[2] from which he encouraged the insurgents, especially at Sāmarrā.[3] Ba'qūbā, which had always been anti-British, was evacuated by the British on the same day. Shahrābān, where a small but influential group of Nationalists had been in touch with the Baghdad leaders, was captured, August 13th,[4] by the tribes, who killed Captain W. T. Wrigley, Captain J. T. Bradfield, Captain E. L. Buchanan,[5] and two British Warrant Officers. A provisional Arab Government was then set up.[6]

Qizil Ribat and Khānaqīn, where the revolt was largely the work of the Dilo Kurds, without any trace of the national

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[1] *London Gazette*, p. 5342 (114).

[2] *Admin. Report, Diyalah Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 8; Haldane, op. cit., p. 233.

[3] *Admin. Report, Samarra Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), pp. 1, 3.

[4] See *Admin. Report, Diyalah*, 1920, pp. 2, 7. Haldane, op. cit., p. 164, gives date as August 15th.

[5] Mrs. Buchanan, who had been slightly wounded, was rescued and protected until the relief column reached Shahrābān. See Buchanan, Z., *In the Hands of the Arabs* (1921).

[6] For composition of this provisional government: *Admin. Report, Diyalah*, 1920, p. 6.

175x 669 aspirations such as played a part in other districts, fell on August 14th. In Mandalī, where the Naqīb, Saiyid 'Ilyas Agha, had enlarged on the Nationalist views held by Saiyid Talib Pasha with whom he was in close touch, a provisional government was also formed. It took over in an orderly manner from the Deputy Assistant Political Officer. Although not efficient, it succeeded in maintaining law and order until late October when it lost its authority. From Ba'qūbā the insurrection spread to Kirkūk Division, but only in Kifrī did open outbreaks occur. The tribes entered the town on August 26th, killing the Political Officer, Captain G. H. Salmon.

On August 27th, Ba'qūbā was reoccupied by British Forces. The next day, a force from Kirkūk entered Kifrī. On September 6th, a relief column reached Qizil Ribat,[1] another column occupying Shahrābān two days later.[2] Dīltāwa was reached September 24th. Not until November 20th, when a cavalry column occupied Mandalī, did that area come under control again.

Among the tribes west and north-west of Baghdad, Colonel G. E. Leachman, by his vigorous methods and with the aid of liberal subsidies[3] and the valuable assistance of Major J. I. Eadie, Assistant Political Officer at 'Āna,[4] of Shaikh 'Alī as-Sulaimān of the Dulaim and of Shaikh Fahād Beg of the 'Anaiza,[5] who remained loyal throughout, was able to preserve

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[1] During the Insurrection, the British Consul at Kermanshah arranged for the Sinjabī tribe in Persia to make extensive raids on the Dilo tribes in 'Iraq, who had been mainly responsible for the risings at Qizil Ribat and Khānaqīn. After the raids the tribe returned to Persia, *Admin. Report, Diyalah*, 1920, p. 5.

[2] *London Gazette*, p. 5338 (78).

[3] Subsidies to shaikhs and Secret Service allowances in the Dulaim Division, of which Colonel Leachman was Political Officer, increased from Rs. 50,000 or £3,750 in 1919 (*Budget Estimates*, 1919-1920, p. 10) to Rs. 279,000 or £21,000 in 1920 (*Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. 21). Cf. Main, E., op. cit., p. 75, for claim that Leachman 'had *single-handed* and without a penny to spend on bribes held the Upper Euphrates tribes in this time of full rebellion, all the troops having been withdrawn.'

[4] For tribute to Major Eadie's work on the Upper Euphrates during the Insurrection see Haldane, op. cit., pp. 106, 171.

[5] For value of these shaikhs' loyalty and support see *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 147.

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peace until his murder, on August 12th, by Shaikh Dharī of 175x
the Zoba' tribe. His death was the signal for risings from 669
Fallūja to 'Āna, the British forces being forced back from Hīt to Ramādī which, with Fallūja, were cut off from Baghdad. Relief reached Fallūja on September 24th and Ramādī two days later.[1] Hīt was not reoccupied until October 4th.

Around Sāmarrā, the fourth of the Holy Cities, the preaching of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, supported by an influential shaikh, the events in Ba'qūbā Division and the natural unrest among the tribes brought about a rising.[2] The town was unsuccessfully attacked on August 28th, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, it was reported, directing the insurgents himself.[3] Other points were also attacked, but by the middle of September order had been generally restored.

In the 'Arbīl area, the courage and strenuous efforts of the British officers, whose lives were in constant danger, saved the situation although several outlying posts had to be abandoned. Mōsul, as already indicated, and Sulaimānīya did not rise although much uneasiness existed.

In the south, the Tigris valley remained quiet.[4] Not a shot was fired either in 'Amāra or in Basra where the Nationalist agitation, conducted chiefly by Yūsuf Kamāl and his father-in-law, Saiyid 'Umarī of the Khudair Mosque, collapsed with the former's deportation.[5]

In Baghdad itself, practically no disturbance occurred[6] although an outbreak had been expected on August 12th. The comparative quietness of the city was partly due to the

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[1] *London Gazette*, p. 5339 (86).

[2] *Admin. Report*, *Samarra*, 1920, pp. 1, 3.

[3] Ibid., p. 3.

[4] Amīr ar-Rabī'a, when pressed for arrears in taxes in 1922, maintained that, in response to British promises in 1920 of remission of his taxes, he alone had prevented the Insurrection from spreading to the Tigris valley.

[5] *Admin. Report*, *Basra Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 1.

[6] The most serious disturbance occurred on August 3rd when the Mechanical Transport Depot was fired by young Nationalists who had mixed among the Arab labourers. The complete loss of petrol and other supplies threatened to paralyse transport. Other incendiary attempts on dumps and stores were thwarted. *London Gazette*, p. 5335 (49).

175* 669 continual presence of troops, partly to precautionary measures which, directly or indirectly, removed most of the Nationalist leaders from the capital,[1] and partly to restraining influences in the city. Moderate Nationalists, such as Saiyid Talib Pasha, who had been allowed to return to 'Iraq in February, 1920,[2] Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī and many others, held aloof from the Insurrection, seeing in it a poor foundation for the new State. Others who had urged forward the Movement both in town and tribe drew back in fear and dismay at the destruction and at the unleashed forces which, if they reached Baghdad, would respect neither friend nor enemy.

By the end of September, it was apparent that Government forces were in the ascendancy although the rising had not yet collapsed. British troops, reinforced from India,[3] had assumed the offensive everywhere, the knowledge of which cooled the ardour of many tribesmen whose expectation of dire punishment to be inflicted urged them to make speedy submission. The news of Sir Percy Cox's return, October 1st, brought a reaction among many of the Nationalists. In many areas, however, as about Samāwa, Rumaitha and Mandalī, the insurgents held on until punitive columns reached them. The end might have come much sooner had it not been for the intransigent anti-British divines at Najaf, who demanded that negotiations should be conducted only through them.

Indicative of their ambitions, two documents, one from the Middle Euphrates and one from the Gharraf, were forwarded to the Political Officer both couched in identically the same phrasing and language; they were a demand for the institution of a theocratic Government built up on one of the fundamental principles of the Shi'a doctrine. Signed by many prominent shaikhs and leaders, these letters were evidence of the power and hold of the Shi'a divines on the religious emotions of the uneducated tribes.[1]

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[1] The attempt to arrest Yūsaf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Ja'far abū Timman, 'Alī Bazirqan and Shaikh Ahmad Shaikh Dā'ūd, on August 12th, resulted in the apprehending of the last named only. Several Arabs were killed when the police fired into Nationalists obstructing the arrest of their leaders: Telegram No. 9752, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, August 13th, 1920.

[2] *The Mandubīn* believed that he had been brought back to create a moderate Nationalist party dependent on Great Britain. He certainly gave great assistance to the Civil Administration for which it was, at the time, grateful: Letter, Political Officer, Basra, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, June 26th, 1920.

[3] A total of 4883 British and 24,508 Indian reinforcements besides an Air Force squadron and Medical units were brought to 'Iraq. *London Gazette*, App. 4, p. 5346.

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The effect of the Insurrection has been variously judged. To the British Government, it was a revolt against authority, costing 426 British lives, 1[illegible]8 wounded and 615 missing and prisoners,[2] as well as 8450 casualties among the insurgents.[3] It involved the expenditure of millions of pounds sterling from the British Treasury. It inflicted incalculable damage in the country itself. To the war-weary British public and to the Press, it was the occasion for the revival of the cry 'Evacuate Mesopotamia'. To the British officers and men in 'Iraq, it was a tragedy, wasting lives, spreading destruction and anarchy and sweeping away much of what they had achieved. It was a tragedy, however, in which, often isolated with violent death never far distant and frequently facing almost insuperable difficulties, they played their parts nobly and in accordance with the best traditions of their race for courage and devotion to duty and for heroic exertions in the cause to which they had given themselves. None excelled the Acting Civil Commissioner once the rising had begun, in Herculean labour and in meeting the exigencies of the situation or in devising means to bring the issue to a successful end. His unfaltering trust in and support of the men on whom responsibility devolved, his messages of encouragement and his apparently inexhaustible strength made him a leader to whom officers and men could look with assurance. The actions of these men as a whole and the individual performances of Colonel Leachman, Captain Bertram Thomas, Captain Salmon, Major Ditchburn, Captain

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[1] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 19.

[2] *London Gazette*, App. 4, p. 5346.

[3] Ibid., App. 5, p. 5347.

175 669 Crawford, Captain J. S. Mann, Captain W. R. Hay and a host of others in the summer of 1920 added another chapter, no less splendid, no less inspiring than those which precede it and those which will follow it, in the history of British manhood serving in difficult times and against desperate odds.

To 'Iraqis, the Insurrection, although suppressed, has been a National War of Independence, directly responsible for forcing the British Government to set up an Arab Government and, eventually, to grant independence: an opinion shared by many writers.[1] Popular opinion has regarded as national heroes those who led the Insurrection or who took a conspicuous part in it; as martyrs, the 'Iraqis who lost their lives.[2] Political preferment has been given to those who, by their actions both before and during the Insurrection, had proven their attachment to the Nationalist cause.

No evidence is available to show that, because of the Insurrection, a wider measure of immediate Arab participation in the Government was given by the High Commissioner after his

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[1] Cf. Toynbee, A. J., *Islamic World*, p. 530; Coke, R., *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 193; Wright, Q., *A.P.S.R.*, November, 1926, p. 746.

[2] See *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 9th, 17th, 1922: *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufīd*, August 25th, 1922. The following lines appeared in *Al-Istiqlāl*, February 2nd, 1928, when Shaikh Dharī was convicted of the murder of Lieut.-Col. Leachman, August 12th, 1920:

> You shall be brought to book some day, you who waylaid Dharī!
> Oh ye! Set free the slayer of Leachman!
> He has shaken London with all her might.
> We are humiliated after you, Oh Dharī!
> The culprit's abode shall be swept away.
> Victorious is Dharī's standard!
> You have taken advantage of an opportune moment, Oh London;
> Time is treacherous, Oh Cousin!
> Why this long absence, ye moon of the world!
> We have grown weary in the slaying of so many British soldiers.
> Oh ye! Bow down in homage to the slayer of Leachman.
> Honour and Glory are thine, ye slayer of Leachman.
> Lie in peace, ye slayer of Leachman!
> Oh Shaikh, enjoy thy sleep.
> Throughout the land, ye have no like.
> Others before you have done it, Oh Cousin.
> Ye are equal to a state with all her might.
> Sing out hallelujah to the slayer of Leachman!

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arrival. There is evidence, rather, that because of the chaos and unsettled condition of the country, he was unable to give as extensive powers to the Arab Government as he had hoped in June, 1920, when the announcement had been made of the provisional Government, the outlines of which had been foreshadowed in March, 1920,[1] formulated by the Interdepartmental Committee on June 1st, and sanctioned by the Cabinet in the middle of June. At the most, the Insurrection, by indicating the strength of Nationalist sentiment in 'Iraq and by arousing opposition in Great Britain to the retention of the Mandate, due to the fear of further heavy and unremunerative expenditure, stimulated the adoption of the policy of implementing the Mandate by means of a treaty and of bringing 'Iraq into the League of Nations more quickly than H.M. Government had originally contemplated when assuming the Mandate. It must be remembered, however, that the project of a treaty with an Arab Government in 'Iraq originated before the outbreak of the Insurrection. It was made as an official suggestion by Mr. Montagu, on May 17th, 1920, and it is even possible that it was proposed some weeks earlier by an official in the Foreign Office.[2]

While the immediate policy of H.M. Government was not changed and its future policy was altered more in method of procedure than in spirit as a result of the Insurrection, nevertheless the rising did exercise considerable influence on the people of 'Iraq themselves. The Insurrection can scarcely be called national in the strict sense of the word, yet it did indicate a certain national consciousness which in the next few years was to become more clearly defined. The consolidation of the divergent elements in the rising, although merging only temporarily and from different motives, indicated to the 'Iraqis the power of concerted action against which even the forces of the British Government were not invulnerable. The Insurrection revealed, at the same time, the weaknesses and

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 199-200, 212, 220-221.

[2] Young, op. cit., p. 313.

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inherent divisions in the people themselves, which their leaders were later to make efforts to eliminate, not always with success or without friction. In addition, it brought forward leaders who were to assume increasingly important roles in the movement towards national independence either in co-operation with the British Government and its policy of gradual emancipation or in opposition as part of the Nationalist group which demanded immediate and complete independence.

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CHAPTER XV

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL ARAB GOVERNMENT

No conditions could have seemed more unfavourable for the 175x
establishment of a new government than those prevailing when 669
Sir Percy Cox, under a salute of seventeen guns, sailed up the 727x
Shatt al-'Arab to Basra, October 1st, as His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, with full authority to proceed along the lines indicated by H.M. Government in the proclamation dated June 17th, 1920.[1]

A good half of the country was still in active rebellion. The insurgents held Karbalā, Najaf, Tuwairij, Rumaitha, Hīt and a great portion of the Euphrates valley, including the middle sections of the railroad. In the Muntafiq, only one point, Nāsirīya, remained in the hands of the Civil Administration, Samāwa and Kūfa were still besieged. On the Diyālā, the most savage aspects of the Insurrection had passed, but authority had still to be established by the shaikhs and by the British. The provisional Government at Mandalī had not yet collapsed. In the 'Erbil area, British authority had practically vanished, In Mōsul, apprehension still persisted in the face of Kamalist propaganda. Raids and attacks on the Shargāt-Mōsul road continued, culminating in the raid by the Albū Hamad on October 24th, when the well-known Nationalist, Sharīf al-Farūqī, was killed, together with several others. Revenue payments had ceased in many parts of the country. Government offices and legal archives had been looted.[2] Buildings, bridges, railway lines and property[3] had been destroyed.

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[1] Issued June 20th, 1920. Text: *supra*, pp. 220-1.

[2] At Ba'qūbā, Dīltāwa, Hilla, Karbalā: *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, pp. 3-4.

[3] Damage to the railways, together with loss of commercial revenue during the Insurrection, has been estimated at Rs. 55,000,000 or £412,500: *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 24.

175x Private feuds had sprung up in their former vigour. Confidence
669 in British methods built up by many months of hard and
727x patient work, had been swept away. Habits of obedience to authority had been lost in the welter of anti-Government violence. Complete control was not to be thoroughly re-established until the spring of 1921.

175x Sir Percy Cox saw clearly that a complete consultation of the
727x wishes of the inhabitants by means of a representative Assembly as to the nature of the permanent Government was impossible for a time, at least three or four months being required to set up the machinery and to obtain a decision.[1] He deemed it essential, however, to initiate immediately some form of National government regardless of the unfavourable conditions and his own private misgivings.[2] Undue delay would mean disappointment and bitterness, arising from frustration of the hopes of a speedy amelioration of conditions which had been aroused in all classes. Confidence in the British Government and its good faith had to be established among the Nationalists and revived among Great Britain's friends. Pacification had to be furthered by removing, as far as possible, the causes which had given rise to the Insurrection. Not least, a start had to be made towards the reduction of British expenditure, so urgently demanded by H.M. Government at the behest of the British people.

Consultations with the notables of Basra, of Nāsirīya, which was visited by air on October 3rd, of Qurna, of Qal'at Sālih and of 'Amāra, undertaken with the view of restoring confidence and of acquainting himself with current opinion, aided the High Commissioner in formulating even before reaching Baghdad on October 11th, the procedure by which he hoped to give effect to H.M. Government's policy of instituting a National Government.[3]

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[1] *Note on Political Developments in Mesopotamia subsequent to October 1, 1920* (League of Nations Publication No. C. 465, M. 341, 1921), p. 3 (hereafter *Political Developments in Meso.*).

[2] For his account of these misgivings see his 'Historical Summary' in Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 527.

[3] Ibid., p. 562. Sir Percy Cox's own statement (ibid., p. 527) that he arrived in Baghdad on October 5th, is obviously a misprint.

643 requested to remain in office at the death of King Faisal, was speedily convinced by conversations with King Ghāzī that he did not enjoy His Majesty's confidence.[1] His resignation, tendered October 28th, was immediately accepted to the great surprise of political circles. It was apparent that the young monarch desired not only a Cabinet amenable to his wishes but also a Parliament of his own creation. He was persuaded, however, by his British and 'Iraqī advisers against this course. Parliament was not dissolved and the new ministry, although headed by Jamīl Beg Midfai, was less Nationalist in tinge than he had desired.

On the whole, during the reign of King Ghāzī the personal power and influence of the Crown has tended to be less than under the former regime. His Majesty's youth, his inexperience and lack of training in statecraft have made it natural that he should be forced to give more scope than his father to the men about him, in his Palace and in the Cabinet, and to rely upon their advice and that of His Britannic Majesty's representatives [645] at his Court. Thus few if any of the seven ministerial crises of the reign seem directly traceable to His Majesty's influence but have been due rather to discord within the Cabinets, as when Jamīl Beg Midfai resigned, February 13th, 1934, to lack of confidence to meet emergencies, as at the time of the tribal revolts in March, 1935,[2] or to military intervention as in the *coup d'état* of October 29th, 1936.

669 On this last occasion, General Baqir Sidqī,[3] in charge of army manœuvres to the north-east of Baghdad, suddenly moved the troops with the Air Force on the capital. In manifestoes dropped from the air, he demanded in the name of the army the dismissal of the Yāsīn Pasha ministry, with which 'the army had lost patience' and the appointment of one 'composed of

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[1] See translation of Rashīd 'Alī's letter of resignation, *The Times*, October 30th, 1933.

[2] *The Times*, March 17th, 1935.

[3] Baqir Sidqī led the 'Iraqī forces against the Assyrians in 1933, when he won great popularity and promotion. His campaigns in 1935 against the tribes added to his reputation for military ability and ruthlessness.

sincere citizens' under Hikmat Sulaimān.[1] Warning was given that the army might have to take action against those who did not conform to the manifestoes.[2] After the bombardment of Baghdad by the 'Iraqī Air Force and an attempt to negotiate during which Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī, Minister of Defence, was treacherously murdered, Yāsīn Pasha resigned. Hikmat Sulaimān took office with friends and nominees of Baqir Sidqī, few of them outstanding personalities.[3]

The various reasons put forward by the new government for the *coup d'état*, which seems to have come without warning to British and 'Iraqis alike, are not altogether convincing.[4] It is true that Yāsīn Pasha had suppressed newspapers, had heavily bribed the tribal leaders to keep the peace, had curbed opposition, had appointed friends to office and that his personal attitude as Prime Minister had offended many 'Iraqis. It is also true that a general feeling existed that 'Iraq had made little progress under his Government. These unsatisfactory conditions could have been ameliorated, however, by constitutional means. As justifications for military intervention they assume the appearance of pretexts rather than explanations. Facts not mentioned in the official statements, as that army appropriations had been reduced, that the organization of the army was not proceeding according to the ideas of General Sidqī and that many aspiring politicians were out of office, seem to come closer to the causes behind the *coup d'état*[5] and would make it appear

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[1] Formerly Minister of Interior in 1933 at the time of the campaign against the Assyrians. Educated in Turkey, he possesses great admiration for Turkey. His brother, Māhmud Shefket Pasha, was Grand Vizier of Turkey in 1913.

[2] *The Times*, October 31st, 1936. Also *Al-Ahrām* (Cairo), same date.

[3] *Waqayi al-'Iraqiya* (Government Gazette), No. 1542, October 29th, 1936. In addition to Hikmat Sulaimān as Prime Minister and Minister of Interior were: Nājī al-'Asīl, Foreign Affairs; Ja'far abū Timman, Finance; Kāmil al Chādarchī, Economics; Abdul Latīf Nūrī, Defence; Sālih Jābbar, Justice; Yūsuf 'Izz-ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm, Education.

[4] *The Times*, October 31st, November 2nd, 5th and 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh* (Cairo), November 2nd, 6th, 1936; *Al-Ahrām*, November 1st, 1936.

[5] The *coup d'état* has also been ascribed to the influence of Germany and Italy, of extreme 'Iraqī Nationalists, of Shī'is, of the Jews, and of Socialists by the *Daily Herald*, *Al-Balāgh*, *Palestine Post*, *Al-Līwā*, *Alif-Bā* (Damascus), and the *Daily Mail*, respectively, November 1st to 6th, 1936.

667 that personal ambition of the leaders had no small part in the events of October 29th and afterwards.

At one time it was suspected that King Ghāzī might have been cognizant of the plot, his impatience at the limitations placed on his power being well-known.[1] His assurances to the contrary appeared to be sincere, particularly in the light of subsequent events. Indeed, Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat Sulaimān, supported by the armed forces, may be regarded as possessing sole power in 'Iraq to-day—despite published statements that General Sidqi would concern himself solely with the re-organization of the army, that the Government would work with a freely elected Parliament and that the rights of all section of the people would be respected.

Council of Ministers

645 Among the principal factors which have adversely affected the position and the functioning of the Council of State may be listed its susceptibility to outside influence, its instability, not altogether unrelated as has already been indicated, and the lack, of a sufficiently large class of 'Iraqis of Cabinet rank.

In the period from August, 1921, to October, 1932, the average life of the fourteen Cabinets was less than ten months each. Four Ministries, the second of the Naqīb, that of Taufīq Beg, the fourth of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg and that of Nājī Pasha, lasted less than four months each. Nūrī Pasha's first Cabinet, by remaining in office from March 23rd, 1930,[2] to October 19th 1931, had the longest existence although its tenure was not undisturbed by internal dissensions. Such instability, due largely to the King's influence, to the conflict of British and

[1] *Al-Ayyām* (Damascus), November 3rd, 1936, cites Baqir Sidqi, however, as saying: 'In no way have I proceeded in any action against the will of H.M. the King and of the Supreme Power.'

[2] *Waqayi' al-'Iraqiya* (Government Gazette), No. 844, March 27th, 1930.

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'Iraqī viewpoints'[1] and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confidence by Parliament[2] had unfortunate consequences. On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased. 645

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects. [795]

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqis have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat 665 669

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[1] Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Iraqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nājī Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

[2] *Supra*, p. 422, note.

645 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment
● 669 than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2] Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many 'Iraqis held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government
185 by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time
[307] in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been
648 won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other 'Iraqi Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

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[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 5th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *At-Tariq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936.

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648 forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction [186] and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the 643 ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was 645 inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets 668 which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the 669 factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

[185] The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

648 In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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Afghanistan, which provided for consultation in all disputes 648
that might affect the common interests of the four states.

Relations with Great Britain

During the period of independence the hostility of Iraqi 648
nationalists towards Great Britain in no way diminished. The 186
mandate had been replaced by a treaty that they had from the first opposed as denying full independence and their sentiments were strengthened by Syrian and Palestinian nationalists, deeply critical of British policy in Palestine, who took refuge in Iraq. A further stimulus was provided by Axis propaganda, which produced among nationalist groups not only hostility to Great Britain but a positive admiration for the totalitarian
states. When King Ghazi killed himself in a motor accident in [643]
April 1939, to be succeeded by his infant son Faisal II, with the Amir Abdul-Ilah, Ghazi's cousin and brother-in-law, as Regent, there was a violent outburst of anti-British feeling in the belief that the accident was British-inspired.

Consequently, although the Iraqi Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany in September 1939, political opinion was divided on the measure of assistance to be granted to Great Britain under the Treaty; nationalists, especially in the all-important army, demanded non-belligerency and even the resumption of relations with Germany; and diplomatic relations with Italy were maintained. In 1941 the routine of political intrigue combined with nationalist and anti-British feeling and the effect of allied reverses, five years of Axis propaganda, and the presence of the Mufti of Jerusalem in Baghdad, to produce a chain of events which culminated in April 1941
in the last of the coups d'état. Rashid Ali al-Gailani seized 669
power with the support of an army group more violently 645
nationalist and anti-British than himself and formed a Government which was pledged to maintain Iraq's non-belligerency and displayed considerable sympathy towards the Axis. The Regent and several senior statesmen quitted the country. Relations were strained between the new Cabinet and the British Government, which was reluctant to recognize it, and on 2 May a disagreement over the passage of British troops through Iraq, on the basis of the Treaty, led to Anglo-Iraqi hostilities. These were terminated, after the introduction of further British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion, on 29 May; by this time the Regent had returned to Iraq, the Rashid Ali Government had fled, and armistice negotiations were in progress. Shortly after the outbreak of Anglo-Iraqi hostilities the Iraqi Government had been in touch with

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648 649 German representatives for the provision of military aid. A number of aircraft were in fact dispatched with an advance party to Baghdad and Mosul and armaments were supplied by the Vichy Government of Syria, who also put its aerodromes at the disposal of German aircraft; but the coup was premature from the point of view of the German Command, whose forces were required for the immediate conquest of Crete and the all-essential invasion of the Soviet Union, and the assistance given was too late and limited to prevent collapse.

Succeeding Governments co-operated effectively with the Allied war effort, and Iraq became a base for operations against the Levant and Persia (1941) and for aid to Russia, and in January 1943 she declared war on the Axis Powers and signed the Declaration of the United Nations. In 1945 a rebellion of the Kurdish Barzani tribe, which had continued intermittently since 1943, was finally suppressed, and the rebels took refuge in the so-called Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (north-west Persia) which had newly been formed under Soviet inspiration, and, after its collapse, in the Soviet Union itself.

Relations with Other Middle East Countries

648 In 1945 Iraq signed the Arab League Pact, towards whose realization Nuri as-Said, Prime Minister from 1941 to 1944, played a leading part, though the Arab states rejected as premature his further proposal for the union of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan in one state. A project in 1946 for a close union between Iraq and Jordan was criticized both in the Arab League and in Iraq and Jordan, and was diluted into a treaty of alliance and eternal brotherhood between the two countries, which provided for consultation in the event of aggression by a third party and military intervention by one party to suppress disorders or rebellion in the other. In 1947, in spite of internal opposition, a treaty of friendship with Turkey was ratified. It was intended that Turkey should sign similar treaties with other Arab states to form a Middle East bloc in replacement of the moribund Saadabad Pact, but in the event Jordan was the only other state to sign.

[665] In 1946 permission was given for the formation of political parties, of which none had existed since the mid-thirties. Licences were granted to five, of which two were subsequently suppressed, but were refused to the Communist groups, which continued to operate, as they had done both before and after their reinforcement in 1941, in secret. Though considerably weakened by official action against them in 1947, they are alleged to have played an active part in the disturbances at

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the ad- 647
ministration of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which admini- 692
stered them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midhat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dis- 743
pensaries, were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside. Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger. Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and higher theological learning was available. The military educational system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments. 647
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

692 was H. F. Forbes, I.C.S., in 1920–1, B. H. Bell in 1921–2, and
thereafter G. Alexander until 1934. Davidson on transfer to the
staff of the High Commission handed the Advisership of Justice in
[671] 1922 to E. M. Drower, who held it till 1946. The Turkish Majalla,
Code of Civil Procedure, and Commercial and Maritime Codes
remained in force. Criminal justice was in the hands of single
magistrates with first, second or third-class powers, and Courts of
Sessions which possessed also appeal jurisdiction, while limited
magisterial powers were still possessed by certain administrative
officials and municipal bodies. The Tribal Disputes Regulations
remained in force, beloved of administrative officials but disliked
by the legally-minded. The rights of foreigners, preferential though
no longer Capitulatory, were defined in the Judicial Agreement.
693 Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a Bar Association for the
body of excitable, ill-disciplined advocates, into whose numbers
the Law School poured annual recruits.

701 The forces of law and order were at this period four in number:
the 'Iraq Army, British forces of ground and air, the 'Iraq Levies,
and the Police. The 'Iraq Army, based on voluntary recruitment
from 1921 onwards and within its limits conceived on the most
modern lines, by 1925 rose in strength to 7,500 men. It remained
constant at about this establishment for the next eight years.
There were six infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, two
mountain and one field battery, and all necessary services. The
officers had almost all served in the Turkish Army, but in the
lower ranks at least were adaptable to new standards. Units of
the Army took part in many small operations against tribal enemies
and saw more serious service in Kurdistan, not without losses.
Great attention was paid to its Training Centre and its Royal
Military College. The British Military Mission was re-formed and
increased in 1925.[1] By this date the Army's rôle of successor, for
all ground purposes, of the British forces was clearly indicated.
000 The latter were progressively reduced, actually to vanishing point
in 1929. In March 1921 there were 33 infantry battalions, 6 cavalry
regiments, 16 batteries, and Sapper and armoured-car companies:
these by 1926 were reduced to three battalions, two by 1927, one
by 1928, and vanished entirely in 1929. The British military element,
so characteristic of 'Iraq under the Occupation, was thenceforward
to be absent until 1941. The Royal Air Force—under
successive commanders of high rank, nearly all of whom were

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[1] Successive heads of the British Military Mission, and Advisers to the Ministry of Defence, were: Colonel P. Joyce, 1921; Major-General A. C. Daly, 1925; Major-General G. G. Loch, 1928; Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, 1931; Major-General C. J. Bruce-Hay, 1934; Major-General H. W. M. Watson, 1937; Major-General G. G. Waterhouse, 1938; Major-General D. G. Bromilow, 1941; Major-General J. M. L. Renton, 1944.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one
645 major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its
668 rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents
they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near
619 Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background
of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests
[687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprison-
ments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

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[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply, improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
184 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab Companies.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—
692 had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had
697 regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

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[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

PART III.—EXISTING CONDITIONS. STATUTORY TENURES

1 AND 2. STATUTE LAW

423 671 1. The foundations of the statute law governing the tenure of land in el 'Iraq are the (old) Ottoman Land Code of 1274 (1858), and the Land Registration (Tapu)* Law of the following year. These laws were supplemented, amended, modified, amplified and curtailed by subsequent Ottoman legislation, or orders deemed to have the force of law, while the country remained under Ottoman jurisdiction. And there has also been a certain amount of recent el 'Iraqi legislation applying to land tenure. The basic concepts of the two first laws are for the most part generally recognised, although the position of the statute law on land tenure is far from clear on many points and although, as will appear more fully later, throughout the majority of the land, these laws have been largely disregarded.

423 The Land Code recognises five legal categories of land :

(1) Mulk (El arazi el mumluka). Land held in undiluted ownership assimilated to that of chattels. Such ownership is governed by the provisions of the Sacred Law and not by those of the Civil Statute Law.†

(2) Miri (El arazi el amiriya). State land the usufructuary possession (tesaruf) of which is granted out on the registered tenure prescribed in Book I of the Land Code.

(3) Waqf (El arazi el muqufa). Land, some right over which has been dedicated to a pious purpose.

(4) Matruka (El arazi el matruka). Land "left" or specially reserved for some public purpose.

(5) Mewat (El arazi el mewat). Dead or unreclaimed land.

This classification has never been applied as a whole in el 'Iraq and is not applicable as it stands. The third category (Waqf or Dedicated Land) is redundant. Land must belong to the first category (mulk) to be truly dedicated in waqf in accordance with the Sacred law. The untrue dedication, known as takhsisat (appropriated) waqf, is restricted to interests in the revenue arising from the land (tithe, fees, etc.) and leaves the category of the land unaffected. For practical purposes untrue waqf is confined to dedication of interests arising from land of the second category, but takhsisat waqf in mulk interests (e.g. tithe) may exist.

While the third category is unnecessary no provision is included for cultivated and cultivable land that is retained in the legal possession, as well as the legal ownership, of the State. State land of the second category (miri) is confined to land of which the legal possession is granted out on registered tenure to third parties for exploitation. State land of the fourth category (matruka) is land reserved for public purposes. State land of the fifth category (mewat) is waste unexploited land.

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* Turkish dictionaries derive this word from the verb tap-mak to worship, whence an act of homage, an acknowledgment of oneself a vassal, especially by the acceptance of a feudal fief. Hence a title deed, etc.

† Mulk means property. Everything that is owned, whether movable or immovable, is mulk. Immovables classified as mulk (i.e. property) are in the absolute ownership of the proprietor. "Every man can deal as he likes with his mulk," Majalla Art. 1192.

175* 727* 436* The introduction of Indian currency followed naturally on the coming of the Expeditionary Force, whose needs were paid for in rupees. A proclamation forbade the use of depreciated Turkish paper money[1], and the inadequate supply of small Turkish coins was driven from the bazaars. Turkish gold *liras*, however, continued to circulate, but their import and export were regulated.

Establishment of a Judicial System

175* 727* 671 For the administration of civil and criminal justice, a special code, known as the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code,[2] was created largely from laws in force in India.[3] The Code, promulgated August 1st, 1915, from which time the legal system of the Occupied Territories may be said to date,[4] established courts for the enforcement of civil rights by legal action, hitherto in abeyance, and criminal courts to supplement the military courts. These courts, functioning under the authority of the General Officer Commanding, were supervised by Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, and by Captain C. F. Mackenzie, Junior Judicial Officer, both of whom were members of the Indian Political Department.

Among the reasons put forward for the substitution of the Anglo-Indian Judicial system for that of the Turkish system, were the impossibility of reproducing within a limited time the hierarchy of courts culminating in the Court of Cassation at Constantinople, the inability to find judges and officials familiar with the Turkish system, as well as other reasons already given

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[1] *Proclamations, notices, etc., relating to the Civil Admin. . . . issued between December* 22, 1916, *and July* 1st, 1918 (Baghdad, 1918), Proc. No. 1, December 22nd, 1916.

[2] *'Iraq Occupied Territories Code*, 1915 (Bombay, 1915). Also six supplements to December 31st, 1918 (hereafter '*I.O.T. Code*).

[3] A preliminary schedule of thirty-four Indian Acts to be applied in the Occupied Territories was annexed to the Code.

[4] Arrangements to reconstitute the courts had begun shortly after the appointment of the Senior Judicial Officer, April 7, 1915.

1-[British Expeditionary Force in 1915-Analyst]

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above. It was also held that the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 175* 1890[1] could not be applied and that any laws made or ad- 727* ministered must take the form of orders issued by the Army 671 Commander who could, by notification, depute his powers to Civil Judicial Officers and regularize the exercise of the orders so made in the form of a code[2] such as the one actually promulgated.

Under the Code, the Senior Judicial Officer exercised the civil and criminal powers normally assigned in India to the District and the Sessions Judge, respectively. The Junior Judicial Officer possessed the powers of an Assistant Judge and a District Magistrate. In addition, the Junior and the Assistant Judicial Officers were invested, as in India, with powers of Small Cause Court Judges.[3]

Powers were given under the Code to enforce any Indian Law, which might be amended to meet local conditions,[4] a provision which was freely used,[5] as was also the power to make rules of procedure for the better execution of any matter arising in the course of any civil or criminal case.[6]

Although provision was made for the application, subject to stated exceptions,[7] of Turkish Civil Law,[8] the exceptions included in practice the bulk of suits coming before the courts.[9] Thus, for all intents and purposes, Turkish Civil Law disappeared. Turkish Criminal Law, the Law of evidence and the Laws of Civil Procedure were expressly excluded from operation.[10]

The 'Iraq Code in its provisions and in the manner of its application seems to have made little distinction between India and 'Iraq. Indeed, Section 8 explicitly stated 'the Code of Criminal Procedure and other enactments for administration

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[1] 53-54 Victoria cap. 37.

[2] *Administration Report, Judicial Department*, 1915 (Calcutta, 1916), p. 1 (hereafter *Judicial Report*, 1915).

[3] Order by the General Officer Commanding, August 1st, 1915, in '*I.O.T. Code*, p. 25.

[4] '*I.O.T. Code*, Sections 6 and 55.

[5] *Judicial Report*, 1915, p. 1.

[6] '*I.O.T. Code*, Section 51.

[7] Ibid., Sections 49, 50.

[8] Ibid., Sections 6, 32, 50.

[9] *Judicial Report*, 1915, p. 1.

[10] '*I.O.T. Code*, Section 48.

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175 of criminal justice in British India shall have effect as if the 727 Occupied Territories were a district in the Presidency of 671 Bombay'. This section, taken with the Code as a whole, tends to confirm the impression that valid as were some of the reasons advanced at the time for the introduction of the new legal system, the most cogent reason was the underlying desire to pave the way for the painless absorption of lower Mesopotamia to India.

The belief, apparently held at this time, that the Indian system introduced by the Code was no more foreign to Turkish Arabia than the Turkish system which it replaced,[1] and that therefore the change was acceptable, seems scarcely in accordance with the facts. As Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, head of the Judicial system in Mesopotamia, 1917-21, has pointed out:

> The present organization of these Courts and the Codes (of the Turks) have been in force for more than a generation, and indeed some of the Codes date back to a much earlier date. The people are accustomed to them, and are accustomed to regulate their transactions by them. This is especially true of the Baghdad mercantile community ... Lawyers and Government officials have been trained in the procedure of the Courts and use of the Codes.[2]

The same statement could hardly be made concerning the Indian Laws, none of which were available either in Arabic or in Turkish when introduced. Even the Code was not translated into Arabic for some time following its introduction. Only four of the several score of Indian Laws had been translated into Arabic at the end of 1917, a fact which called forth a protest from the retiring Senior Judicial Officer, Lieut.-Colonel 671 S. G. Knox.[3] With the introduction of the Code, Arabic became 177 the official language in the Courts, a measure popular to the 115 people. Its use, however, was not entirely new. A circular from

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727 [1] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 68.

[2] *Report on the Admin. of Justice, Baghdad*, 1917, in *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 184.

[3] *Review of the Reports of the Administration of Basrah Wilayet from April to December*, 1917 (Calcutta, 1918), (hereafter *Admin. Rep., Basrah*, 1917): *Report on the Admin. of Justice*, 1917, p. 108.

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the Turkish Ministry of Interior in April, 1913, had directed 175*
that the use of Arabic should be allowed in the Courts of 671
Justice and in public offices. In spite of the failure to carry out 197
this concession literally, the use of Turkish was more of an 727*
affront to Arab sentiment than a handicap to litigation. Turkish was, and in many centres still is, the polite language, much as French was at the Courts of Prussia and Russia in the eighteenth century.

Although criminal cases could be tried in these newly 692
established civil courts,[1] the bulk of such cases was not sent to 175*
them. Serious cases, mainly robbery under arms, continued to 727*
be tried by military courts, under a highly summary procedure.[1] In Basra, 'Ashar, 'Amāra and Nāsirīya, the Military or Deputy Military Governors decided disputes of all kinds, while in the districts the same powers were exercised by Political Officers. Until after the fall of Baghdad no civil courts existed outside of Basra town.

Justice in Tribal Areas

It was soon evident that the 'Iraq Code could not be applied in its entirety to the tribal areas, comprising practically all of the Occupied Territories outside the towns. It was also clear that special powers were needed by the Political Officers to dispose of civil and criminal cases in their districts. To meet the situation, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation was drawn up by Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs,[2] on the lines of the Indian

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[1] *Admin. Rep., Basrah*, 1917: *Rep. Military Governor of Basrah*, 1917, p. 199.

[2] Henry Robert Conway Dobbs, G.B.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E. (1871-1934), may be rightfully called one of the makers of modern 'Iraq. He saw wide and distinguished service in India, Persia and Afghanistan. As Revenue and Judicial Commissioner to Baluchistan, 1909, 1911 and 1917, he came into direct contact with the 'Sandeman System'. He was under orders as Resident to Turkish Arabia when war broke out in 1914, but it was as Revenue Commissioner that he supervised the organization of administration, 1915-16, while Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, enlarged political relations with the Arabs. Versatile in talents, but essentially an administrator, he brought to the difficult period, 1923-9, when he served as High Commissioner to 'Iraq, a great capacity for realistic thinking, a highly developed sense of duty, and a deep loyalty to the Empire which dominated all his relations with the Arabs.

1 [Under British military administration ca 1917]

'IRAQ

175* 871 727* The years of neglect of education, including the war years, the lack of trained teachers and of equipment and the paucity of the funds sanctioned by the Civil Administration which rendered it impossible to overcome adequately the lack of teachers by bringing them from Syria and Egypt, contributed to the slow creation of educational facilities. Nevertheless, the aims of the Department were kept high. These, as summarized by the Director of Education in 1918, were:

> to provide a sound elementary education, on which to base an edifice lasting, endurable and firm. To open new schools gradually as trained teachers become available. To select as teachers only the best candidates, socially, morally and mentally, and to pay them well. To never lose sight of the real object in view — the formation of character and the spirit of good citizenship.[1]

As long as British advisers played a decisive part in the educational affairs of 'Iraq, these aims formed the basis of their policy.

Judicial System

● 671 175* 727* In accordance with Great Britain's policy of establishing an Arab administration in Baghdad, of which the promise in General Maude's Proclamation not to introduce alien institutions was a public intimation, the instructions of H.M. Government had made it clear that the Occupied Territories Code was not to be introduced into Baghdad Wilayet.[2] The policy adopted, therefore, was not 'to make a clean sweep of the Turkish legal system and to introduce a new system based on English models, as had been done in Basrah Wilayet', but rather 'to carry on the Turkish organization of Courts and system of law, making such immediate modifications only as are necessary to ensure justice and a reasonably efficient administration'.[3]

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918, p. 10.

[2] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917.

[3] *Administrative Report of Justice from the Occupation of Baghdad to* 31.12.17, p. 4 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1917).

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As at the occupation of Basra, most of the Turkish Judicial 671
personnel had fled. The more recent records had been removed 175*
or destroyed. Beyond the institution of a Court of Small 227*
Causes and a *Shara*' Court (Muslim Law Court) in July,[1] Civil Courts were in abeyance until the Courts' Proclamation of December 28th, 1917,[2] reconstituted the Civil Courts under Mr. (later Sir) Edgar Bonham-Carter as Senior Judicial Officer. He had arrived in October, and after studying the situation with the experience gained in his long and distinguished career in the Sudan Legal Department, had outlined the essential requirements to be embodied in the proclamation.

Under the Turks, First Instance Courts had existed at the 692
headquarters of each *Liwā* or District, and of each *Qādha* or 175*
Sub-district: a total of ten *Liwā* Courts of First Instance and 727*
forty *Qādha* Courts of First Instance in the three wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Obviously, from the standpoint of the prevailing poverty and the sparseness of the population, the number was excessive. In addition, most of the judges had been untrained if not actually incompetent. Under the new system, a Civil Court of First Instance, normally to be composed of a British judge and two Arab judges, was to be reopened at Baghdad and later, elsewhere, as deemed necessary.[3] Peace Courts which were also Small Cause Courts, such as had been established in Baghdad and a few other places just before the war, were to be reconstituted wherever required.[4] Elsewhere either Judges of Courts of First Instance, Political Officers or other officers were given the right to officiate.

In the days of the Turks, Appeals lay from the lower Courts to a Court of Appeals situated at the capital of each wilayet.[5] Decisions from these Courts could be revised by the Court of

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1916-1918: Proclamation No. 8, July 2nd, 1917.

[2] Ibid., Courts' Proclamation No. 17, December 28th, 1917. The date 'end of December, 1918' given for this Proclamation in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 94, is obviously a misprint.

[3] Ibid., Courts' Proclamation, Section 3 (1).

[4] Ibid., Section 5.

[5] Normally composed of a Turkish President and four Arab Judges. *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 1.

and procurators, which it would have been beyond the capacity 692
of the Civil Administration to supply. Nor would it have 175*
conduced to the effective administration of justice if the 727*
Magistrates, most of whom were English officers with little previous experience of the administration of law, attempted to follow the elaborate Ottoman Procedure.[1]

In addition, the Ottoman Penal Code presented difficulties 671
Although based on the French Penal Code, it had been sub- 175*
jected to so many amendments since it was issued in 1859 that 727*
it was, in the opinion of the Senior Judicial Officer, 'unscientific, ill-arranged and incomplete'.[2] The first difficulty was overcome by the creation of a special code known as the Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations,[3] brought into operation January 1st, 1919. Until then all criminal cases had been tried by Military Governors and Political Officers.

Although the Regulations adopted one or two sections from the Ottoman Criminal Procedure,[4] the ultimate origin of which was the French Criminal Procedure, its main provisions revealed the inability of those in the Civil Administration to dissociate themselves from Indian traditions or to escape from the application of British Military Law. Both of these formed the basis of the Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure from which the Regulations were drawn. The new Regulations were admittedly subject to the exigencies of war and of military occupation.[5] Offences committed by members of the Army of Occupation even against the inhabitants of the country were not to be tried under them. It was expected, however, that after the conclusion of hostilities, a permanent Code would be prepared.

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1920, p. 2 (7).

[2] *Memorandum on Baghdad Penal Code*, by the Senior Judicial Officer, November 21st, 1918. Also *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 2 (7).

[3] Promulgated by Proclamation of General Officer Commanding, November 15th, 1918. (These Regulations hereafter *Bd. C. P. Reg.*).

[4] Particularly Chapters iii and ix, concerning Procurators, and Chapter xi, concerning Civil Complaints and Civil Damages. For Ottoman Criminal Procedure, see Young, Sir G., op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 226 ff.

[5] *Bd. C. P. Reg.*, Sec. 2 (1).

727* Four classes of Criminal Courts were to be constituted:
175* 1. Courts of Session; 2. Courts of Magistrates of the First Class;
● 671 3. Courts of Magistrates of the Second Class. 4. Courts of
692 Magistrates of the Third Class.[1] A Court of Session was to be a Court consisting of three Magistrates, of whom one at least must be a Magistrate of the First Class.[2] Political Officers and British Judges were to be Magistrates of the First Class, Assistant Political Officers and Arab Judges were to be Magistrates of the Second Class.[3] The Civil Commissioners might appoint any person a Magistrate of the First, Second or Third Class.[4]

The Ottoman Penal Code was replaced on January 1st, 1919, by the Baghdad Penal Code,[5] based largely on the former, but with amendments and additions from Egyptian sources, in turn based on the French Penal Code.

Among the tribes, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation continued to be applied with considerable success.[6] It was regarded in the tribal areas as 'undoubtedly the most satisfactory' method of settling tribal disputes,[7] as the reason for decrease of crime[8] and as 'one of the props of the tribal system'.[9] Although doubt was cast on both the wisdom and ability of the Administration to continue the tribal system indefinitely,[10] only in 'Amāra Division was uncertainty felt as to the usefulness at that time of the Tribal Disputes Regulation.[11]

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[1] *Bd. C. P. Reg*, Sec. 4.

[2] Ibid., Sec. 5.

[3] Ibid., Sec. 6.

[4] Ibid., Sec. 5.

[5] Promulgated by Proclamation of the General Officer Commanding, November 21st, 1918.

[6] For views of Political Officers: *Admin. Reports*, 1918: *Shatrah* (*Nasiriyah*), p. 387; *Qurnah*, p. 306; *Kut*, p. 384; *Admin. Report*, *Hillah*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3; *'Amarah Division Admin. Report*, 1920-1921 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 7; *Monthly Rep'ts., January*, 1919, Basra Sanjaq, p. 32.

[7] *Admin. Reports*, 1918: *Hillah*, p. 127.

[8] Ibid., *Nasiriyah*, p. 355.

[9] Ibid., *Hillah District*, p. 144.

[10] Ibid., *'Amarah*, p. 336; *Hillah District*, p. 34; *Hillah Division*, pp. 120-1; *'Amarah Report*, 1919, p. 9; *'Amarah Report*, 1920-1921, p. 25.

[11] *'Amarah Report*, 1919, p. 11.

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Amalgamation of Basra and Baghdad Courts and the Creation of the Judicial Department

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The political and administrative considerations which motivated the amalgamation of the administration of the Basra and Baghdad wilayets in September, 1918,[1] applied with equal force to the judicial systems which had not then been assimilated.[2] On January 1st, 1919, however, the two systems were finally consolidated,[3] the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code and all Indian and British Acts operative under it being repealed with the exception of nine Indian Laws and one English Law, set forth in a special schedule. 'The change was effected without difficulty and was welcomed by the population since it replaced a foreign system of law and procedure by one with which they were familiar.'[4]

The judicial system of Mōsul, the administration of which H.M. Government had at one time desired to organize separately, in anticipation of it being assigned to France at the Peace Settlement, was also assimilated, on the same date, to the system in operation throughout the Occupied Territories.

The number of Courts established under the Civil Administration, 1914-20, had been recognized as being as insufficient as the number under the Turks had been excessive.[5] Expansion and reform, however, had proved difficult owing to the necessity of subordinating the policy of the Department to that of the General Administration, owing to the lack of funds[6] and to the

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 111-112.

[2] Cogent reasons for amalgamating the two judicial systems were advanced in *Review Admin. Basrah*, 1917, p. 6.

[3] *Basrah Courts' Amalgamation Proclamation*, 1918, by the General Officer Commanding, December 24th, 1918.

[4] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 4 (12); *Admin Report*, 1918: *Nasiriyah*, p. 355.

[5] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 1; ibid., 1919, p. 2 (4).

[6] Ibid., 1920, p. 8 (16). The proportion of expenditure on Judicial services to total expenditure and to receipts, based on figures given in Table I, p. 152, is as follows:

727* difficulty in finding suitable staff, whether 'Iraqi or English, to 175* undertake them.[1]

● 671 622 Recognition was not lacking of the unsatisfactory nature of legislation which, during the whole period of the Occupation was by proclamation by the General Officer Commanding, or by regulations or orders issued by the chief civil authority and the Judicial Officer, under authority of the General Officer Commanding. Lieut.-Colonel Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, in his report for 1917 had commented:

> It is high time that he (Senior Judicial officer) be relieved of his legislative duties, which should be the special task of a legal Secretary . . . Assigning work to one such person would put an end to notices of spurious legality, threatening the public with dire and unspecified penalties for dubious offences.[2]

Mr. Bonham-Carter, on his side, believed that while considerable legislation would be necessary before the Courts could contribute to better conditions in 'Iraq, no radical legislative improvements could be undertaken without the coming of peace and without a Representative Legislative body.[3]

Under Mr. Bonham-Carter, the policy of employing 'Iraqis

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1920, p. 8 (16).

[2] *Review Admin. Basrah*, 1917: *Report on Admin. of Civil and Criminal Justice in Basrah Wilayet, by Courts established under the I.O.T. Code, during* 1917, p. 107.

[3] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 9 (23); ibid., 1920, p. 8 (16).

	1917–18	1918–19	1919–20
	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees
Percentage of Expenditure on Judicial services to total Expenditure	2·14%	2·24%	1·78%
Percentage of Expenditure on Judicial services to total Receipts	1·57%	1·41%	1·43%

both as Judges and as clerical staff was applied from the first. 727*
Although difficulty was often experienced in making suitable 175*
selections of Judges and *Qādhīs*,[1] he 'had no hesitation in saying 671
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TABLE II

The following Table indicates the nationality of personnel of the Judicial Department, 1918-20.

	1918* (Baghdad Wilayet only)	1919†	1920‡
British	6	10	11
Indians	—	4	6
'Iraqis (Muslims)	82	197	247
" (Christians)	1	9	12
" (Jews)	9	9	12
Syrians	—	1	1
Egyptians	—	1	—
Armenians	2	1	—
Total non 'Iraqis (A)	8	17	19
Total 'Iraqis (B)	92	215	271
Percentage of (A)	8	7·3	6·6

* *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 5. † Ibid., 1919, p. 8.
‡ Ibid., 1920, p. 7.

that the work had been done efficiently'[2] through the 'valuable services of the Arab Judges and staff', without whose 'help it would have been hardly possible . . . to carry out the policy of applying Turkish Law and Procedure'.[3]

To this policy of rendering more than lip-service to the principle of employing Arabs wherever possible may be attributed the comparative immunity of the Judicial Department from the criticism and hostility directed by 'Iraqī Nationalists, during the period before the establishment of the National Government, against the unsympathetic attitude in other Departments of the Civil Administration.

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 6 (15).

[2] Ibid., p. 2 (5).

[3] Ibid., p. 6 (15). Also ibid., 1920, p. 8 (15).

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that eventually all cases involving Religious Law will be heard 692 in the Civil Courts, along the lines of the Judicial system in force in present-day Turkey. Steps towards that end have been the appointment wherever possible of Civil Judges to act also as *Qādhīs* of the *Shara'* Courts,[1] and the passing of a law legalizing the transfer of law cases from *Shara'* Courts to Civil Courts. These steps have been facilitated both by the ability of the 'Iraqī Civil Judges to administer the *Shara'* Law and by the evident approval of a substantial portion of the public who have found in Turkey, both past and present, the model for 'Iraqī statecraft.

In the administration of justice in tribal areas, the application 671 of the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations[2] has 619 continued but with much controversy. On the one hand, it has been held that the tribes represent a class unfamiliar with the laws and conventions applicable in a more highly civilized society, but possessing a code which, although harsh and even repellent, is definite and is recognized among themselves. The code, according to this view, should be applied to the tribes through the Tribal Disputes Regulations until such time as the normal system of justice can be brought into force among them. This has been the viewpoint of the Ministry of Interior charged with administering the Regulations. On the other hand, it is contended that two systems of justice should not exist side by side in 'Iraq; that much evasion of justice has already occurred through non-tribesmen claiming the right to be tried under the Regulations; and that tribesmen must be assimilated by the body politic. This opinion, although it may not be put forward officially by the Ministry of Justice, has nevertheless influenced the policy of responsible 'Iraqī officials in the Ministry. It has also been repeatedly presented in the Chamber, principally by urban deputies who in their speeches have voiced the prejudices of the greater part of the townsmen of 'Iraq.

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[1] In 1931, Civil Court Judges were also *Shara' Qādhīs* in 24 places.

[2] As amended, December 28th, 1924. See *Compilation*, 1924, p. 63.

671 There can be no escape from the fact that the Regulations 619 have been open to abuse and that revolting crimes have been committed by men who, in spite of their long familiarity with the legal codes, have taken advantage of almost untraceable tribal connections to escape punishment strictly due them.

It would seem, however, that now as in 1932 the Regulations represent the only equitable way of dealing with tribesmen. Reforms are no doubt needed, particularly in the definitions between tribesmen and townsmen, but it would also seem that the tribal viewpoint cannot be changed by the mere application of laws to the tribal areas. Until education, land settlement and a liberal-minded official class have brought greater knowledge and familiarity with the customs and conventions prevailing in the rest of 'Iraq, the extension of the legal system in its entirety will be fraught with injustice and with the gravest political and social dangers.

671 A great portion of the work of drafting and formulating the legislation which fell to the Ministry of Justice arose from the necessity both of filling in the outline set forth in the Constitution and of bringing into existence the special laws which by the express stipulations of that document were to govern the application of the principles contained in it.

Legislation of the first category which, after being drafted in the Ministry, was passed by Parliament, included the *Liwā* and Municipal Administration Laws;[1] the Jewish and Christian Communal Court Laws, cited above; the Currency Law;[2] and a series of Regulations for the various Ministries, as well as a number of other laws which put form and substance on the skeleton of the Constitution. Legislation implementing provisions of the Constitution included the Judges and *Qādhīs* Law;[3] Employment of Foreigners Law;[4] a Law for determining

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[1] *Compilation*, 1927, *Liwā* Administration Law, No. 58 of 1927; ibid., 1931 Municipalities Administration Law, No. 84 of 1931.

[2] Ibid., 1931, 'Iraq Currency Law, No. 44 of 1931.

[3] Ibid., 1929, No. 31 of 1929.

[4] Ibid., 1927, No. 36 of 1927.

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Conflicts of Jurisdiction between Courts;[1] and other laws interpreting Part V, The Judicature, of the Constitution; the Law of Associations[2] and the Press Law.[3] 671 ●

A further heavy burden on the Ministry of Justice has been the constant necessity of reviewing and of preparing legislative amendments in accordance with the changing needs of the country, to the three forms of law in force in 'Iraq:

(1) the Ottoman Laws in force in 'Iraq before the British Military Occupation, in so far as they have not been amended or repealed by the enactments of the Army Commander during the Occupation or by the enactments of the successive Governments after the Occupation;
(2) the proclamations, regulations, or laws issued by the Army Commander, the Civil Commissioner, the High Commissioner, and the 'Iraqi Government, respectively, between the 5th November, 1914, and the 21st March, 1925;
(3) Laws enacted by the 'Iraqi Parliament since the 21st March, 1925.[4]

Such amending legislation has been of necessity slow and laborious, but it has resulted in the partial redrafting of the Penal Code, the Civil Procedure Code and other legislation inherited from previous regimes.

In the work of the Ministry, both in the Courts and in the supervision of judicial administration and of legislation, the British officials, never more than six in number from 1926 to late 1932, have played decisive parts. These officials in their various positions guaranteed under the Judicial Agreement of 1924, as Adviser to the Minister, as President of the Court of Appeal and as the four Judges of Courts of First Instance, have ensured speedy justice to 'Iraqis as well as to foreigners in so far as has lain within their power. They have also assisted their colleagues in the interpretation of the provisions of the Con- 693 671

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[1] *Compilation*, 1929, No. 8 of 1929.

[2] Ibid., 1926, p. 3.

[3] Ibid., 1931, No. 82 of 1931.

[4] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 83.

693 stitution. Their principal contribution, however, has been
671 their aid in creating a standard for the administration of justice and the conduct of the courts. Their insistence on justice without regard to distinctions of class or religion and their unfaltering rectitude in conformity with the best British traditions have left what may be hoped is an indelible imprint on the Judicial system of 'Iraq. To them is due in a great degree the high standard of justice which prevailed in 'Iraq before 1932. Their task has never been an easy one. The traditions inherited from Ottoman days that justice could be bought and that a Judgeship was a means of amassing a fortune, were too deeply ingrained to be eradicated easily and at once. As great an obstacle to equity in the courts was the unfortunate susceptibility of the Judges to outside influences, personal, official and religious. Thus the decisions of Judges of otherwise impeachable integrity have been known to be swayed by fear of public criticism, of the threatened displeasure of high officials or by political and religious motives.

Education

871 The British educational policy for 'Iraq from the time of the Civil Administration largely centred around the provision of primary schools supplemented by denominational schools. The policy of the 'Iraq Government, in brief, has been the extension of a system of national schools, primary and secondary, accompanied by the gradual elimination of denominational schools with their connotations of foreign and consequently undesirable influences.

Between these two policies has been waged incessant war, in which British officials employed by the Ministry usually gave way, particularly as they were rarely supported by the Residency to the same degree as were their colleagues in other Ministries. Moreover, control passed to 'Iraqī officials throughout the Ministry earlier than in any other Ministry or

ments in the best use of water mentioned earlier and could assist 312 in disseminating the findings. They would be an important means of developing the concept of common responsibility for the efficient operation and upkeep of irrigation systems and might ultimately serve also to disseminate information on agriculture.

The legal situation with respect to water rights and the con- 312 struction, maintenance and operation of irrigation and flood-control 671 works is defined by Articles 1234 to 1238 of the Mejelle, or 423 Ottoman Civil Code, and Law No. 23 of 1923 and its successive amendments. Repeated changes in this legislation have made it difficult to determine the validity of certain provisions. It would be desirable to codify and clarify the legislation and, in the course of such a review, to eliminate some of its defects. It would be advisable, for instance, to ensure a right of passage for canals across the property of third parties with compensation fixed by the Irrigation Department in accordance with defined criteria. At present such a right of passage is recognized but with the proviso that the interested party must buy or lease the necessary land, which, in practice, may lead to extortionate terms. There is also a need for a review of old water rights. While presumably such rights cannot be abolished, the right to use water might well be brought into closer accord with the amount of land to be irrigated.

The law makes the Directorate General for Irrigation in the 312 Ministry of Communications and Public Works responsible for the 647 construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation and flood-control schemes. In 1949 the irrigation services had a staff of 1,330 persons, classified approximately as follows:

Engineers	26
Assistant engineers	20
Overseers	94
Office personnel	250
Bund personnel	820
Specialists	120

On the whole, there is an insufficient number of competent, experienced engineers; and pay scales are inadequate to retain able men in a service which often entails considerable hardship. The staff in the provinces is generally not large enough to cope with technical problems along with the many administrative questions

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642 ance with law. The Councils referred to above shall be under the
635 supervision of the Government.

PART VIII

CONFIRMATION OF LAWS AND JUDGMENTS

642 Art. 113. Ottoman Laws published before November 5th, 1914,
671 and laws published on or after that date and which have remained in force in Iraq up to the time of the publication of this law, shall remain in force in Iraq so far as circumstances permit, subject to any modification or repeal in conformity with the proclamations, regulations and laws referred to in the following article, and until they are altered or repealed by the legislative power, or the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

Art. 114. All proclamations, regulations and laws issued by the Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Iraq, the Civil Commissioner, and the High Commissioner, and those issued by the Government of His Majesty King Faisal, during the period between November 5th, 1914, and the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, shall be considered to be valid as from the date on which they came into force. Any portion thereof still unrepealed by that date shall remain in force until changed or repealed by the legislative power, or until the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void, in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

Art. 115. Every person shall be considered to be released and exempt from all claims relating to any acts performed by him in good faith in conformity with instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Iraq, the Civil Commissioner, the High Commissioner, the Government of His Majesty King Faisal, or by an official duly authorised thereunto, whether in a military or civil capacity, with a view to the suppression of hostilities, the establishment and consolidation of order and public security, or the carrying out of orders issued in accordance with martial law between November 5th, 1914, and the date of the coming into force of the Constitution. Every act referred to in this article shall be considered to have been done in good faith, unless the complainant can furnish proofs to the contrary. Any action or judicial

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proceeding with regard to any such act shall not be entertained and 642
shall be considered null and void in the absence of such proof brought 671
forward by the complainant.

Art. 116. All judgments passed in Civil and Shara' actions by the Ottoman Courts before the occupation by His Britannic Majesty's Forces, and likewise judgments passed in Civil and Shara' actions by the Courts set up after the said occupation, or by Political and Assistant Political Officers, in matters which came within their jurisdiction, shall be considered to have been given by the regularly constituted Courts of Iraq.

Art. 117. All judgments and decisions in criminal matters given by the Courts set up after the occupation of His Britannic Majesty's Forces or by Courts-martial, Military Courts or by any Military Governor or Political or Assistant Political Officer or other officials authorised to try criminal offences and also the penalties imposed upon those persons tried in the Courts referred to above, or by the persons referred to, shall all be considered to have been passed by the regularly constituted Courts of Iraq.

PART IX

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Art. 118. Parliament may, within one year from the coming into force of this law, amend any of the subsidiary matters contained therein or add to them, in order that the objects of this law may be given effect, provided that Parliament shall agree by a two-thirds' majority of votes in both Chambers. 642

Art. 119. Subject to the provisions of the preceding article, no amendment whatsoever may be made in the Constitution for a period of five years from the date of the coming into force thereof, nor after the expiration of that period, except in the following manner:

Every amendment must be approved by a two-thirds' majority of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. After such amendment has been approved, the Chamber of Deputies shall be dissolved and a new Chamber elected. An amendment which has been approved by the former Chamber shall be submitted again to the new Chamber and Senate. If approved by a two-thirds' majority of each

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lators fostered irrigation practices and the construction and 312
repair of conduits and established, under the law of 9/VI/1309 423
as amended by those of 21/III/1312, 13/VI/1313 and 15/XII/1316, 654
the Agricultural Bank which is empowered to open credit for the implementation of such works.

On the other hand, the government intervened and obtained, under the laws of 6/VII/1309, 15/XII/1310 and 25/VIII/1316, credit for the irrigation of abandoned, formerly fertile areas and for the subsequent sale of these improved lands to private individuals on condition that they be rationally cultivated.

The Independent Irrigation Institute

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The above institute, established under the law of 20 May 647
1943, was set up with a view toward developing and improving ir- 312
rigation practices in Iran. It has been placed under the Ministry of Agriculture for a period of ten years (Article 4), and annual credit has been allocated to it by the government (Article 2).

This independent Institute shall supervise and carry out all irrigation and drainage projects (Article 11). It shall provide technical assistance to private individuals who wish to carry out irrigation works at their own expense and shall design plans for these works (Article 5).

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It shall have the right to collect dues for the allocation [651]
of water (Article 6). It shall form societies for the implementation of irrigation works in which private owners may participate.

The institute is authorized to set up the necessary admin- 647
istrative offices to ensure the distribution of water and to 312
guarantee the maintenance of dams, reservoirs, public canals, 656
kanâts, etc. It may also compel the owners of kanâts to repair, clean or destroy them and eventually to carry out these operations at their own expense, regaining the amount involved either directly or on crops.

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Since the gradual occupation of Iraq by the British Forces 671
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671 312 (1914-1919) 1/ and its separation from the Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Lausanne, 1923) the Mejelle or Ottoman Civil Code has remained the basis for Iraq's water laws.

Aside from this Code, other laws relating to water use have been promulgated and these legislative measures were supplemented from time to time by Regulations and Instructions. The laws, Regulations and Instructions now in force on water use in Iraq are enumerated below:

1. The Mejelle Civil Code, compiled from 1869 to 1876.

2. Law No. 52 of 4 October 1923 which has been amended by various other laws and amplified by Regulations and Instructions.

    a. Circular No. 508 dated 26 January 1924 giving instructions for the better execution of the law.

    b. Royal Iradah (Decree) No. 118 dated 31 July 1926 which makes this law applicable in ten out of fourteen liwas (administrative districts).

    c. Royal Iradah (Decree) No. 171 dated 20 June 1931 which makes the law valid throughout Iraq.

    d. Amendment Law of 22 January 1925.

    e. Amendment Law No. 39 of 24 April 1927 defining "irrigation works of public importance" to be so declared by special Regulation (see next sub-para. "f") and (ii) substituting with amplification Article 6 of the Law in connection with responsibilities for the repairs and maintenance of irrigation works.

    f. Regulation No. 56 of 9 October 1941, detailing the various terms of "irrigation works of public importance."

1/ Proclamations issued from time to time by the General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Army of Occupation had legal effect on those areas gradually occupied. The validity of these Proclamations were subsequently recognised by the Constitution

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g. Amendment Law No. 1 of 26 February 1945 amending again Article 14 of the 1923 Law, and adding a provision for silt clearance by mechanical means under some conditions.

3. The Forcible Assistance Law No. 27 of 31 March 1923, as subsequently amended by Law 24 of 30 March 1936.

4. Law for Rice Cultivation No. 23 of 31 March 1932, amended by the Law Amending Rice Cultivation Law No. 53 of 15 May 1940 prescribing that Regulation shall determine the areas in which rice cultivation is to be prohibited or restricted for health reasons, economy in the use of water or for the conservation of the soil.

5. Liwa Administrative Law No.16 of 15 February 1946 which, in Article 24, paragraph 9, prescribes among the various functions of the mutassarrif (prefect or governor) in his Liwa (one of the 14 administrative districts of Iraq) that he shall "give assistance and facilities to cultivators and ensure distribution of water to their cultivations." Paragraph 1 (b) of Article 63, places within the duties of the Liwa administration "the improvement and drying of pools and swamps." Paragraph 8 of Article 65 includes among the expenditures of the Liwa administration the "cost of construction and maintenance of irrigation works belonging to it (the Liwa), except those undertaken by the State."

6. Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators No. 28 of 1 July 1933, makes the "farm owner" responsible for aligning watercourses (Art. 3 d); fixing time for watering and manner of distributing the waters among the various sections of the land (Art. 3.g).

7. Land Settlement Law No. 29 of 11 April 1938, as subsequently amended prescribes vide Article 3, paragraph 2, that settlement shall include the "confirmation of rights appurtenant to land such as........of waterway, of drainage and of drinking and also....." and that such "rights shall be registered (Article 13, paragraph "a") in the names of such interested persons."

8. Law for the Development and Usufruct of State Lands No. 43 in force as from 17.9.1951 prescribes that the Committee set up for the Management of State Lands dis-

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tributed into small plots for purpose of development shall be entrusted with the distribution of water within the project's areas (Article 11, para. 3) and water distribution shall be confined to the lands of the project (Article 11, para. 1).

1) The Use of Water for Irrigation Purposes

Notification No. 226 of the Minister of Communications and Works dated 9 June 1927, issued under the Irrigation Law of 1923, declares all rivers (anhar) and waterways (majari) in Iraq to be "Irrigation Works." This term covers irrigation and flood protection works as well as areas, occupied by or required for the construction or maintenance of such works. The right of undertaking irrigation works on privately owned lands is granted (Art. 3) to the Government, provided the land so required for the works is expropriated according to Law, once the proposed works have been declared to be of public utility. A private owner wishing to carry out works on or through another person's property shall obtain a certificate from the Executive Irrigation Engineer, stating the necessity of such works together with their extent and probable effect on neighboring lands. The applicant remains responsible for the acquisition, lease, or arrangement with the interposed owners (Art. 4).

Requests from particulars for constructing any irrigation works are submitted to the mutassarrif of the Liwa concerned. If such requests are not rejected for administrative reasons, they are transmitted to the Executive Irrigation Engineer who may reject them on technical ground or otherwise issue the necessary permit on Irrigation Form No. 44, embodying instructions constituting the specifications of the work for which approval has been granted. The Law does not confer "water rights," but when a permit is issued and implies use of water, it is henceforth recognized that the land to be brought under cultivation shall enjoy the use of water under conditions similar to others within the same district.

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All irrigation works of public importance shall be constructed, repaired and maintained by and remain under the control and supervision of the Irrigation Department, even when such works have been declared to have ceased to be of public importance (Art. 6). The Executive Irrigation Engineer may require the person responsible with the maintenance of watercourses (channels not maintained by the Government, Art. 2, para. 4),

16: Leach K-5 (1938) 1940 MA1 Iran
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578 628 [684] 681 lead to one side burning the other's crops or stealing their cattle. Until bloodshed has occurred nothing is serious and a good clan Agha will see to it that the parties submit to arbitration before the affair reaches a crisis. More serious are affairs in which women are involved; an insult to honour can only be wiped out by death and the discovery of adultery can have only one possible sequel. Such cases however need not necessarily lead to feud; if the guilty lover belongs to the same village as the injured husband a single murder is considered to settle the matter. If the parties are from different groups however the affair is much more serious and several assassinations may take place before settlement can be reached. Eventually, provided it is the honour of commoners rather than of Aghas that is at stake, the Aghas concerned will arrange fasl through the mediation of the tribal chiefs. According to Hay "A blood feud is usually settled by the payment of blood-money; every condition of man or woman has his or her price, and even the parts of the body are catalogued. A Kurmanji or middle class Kurdish farmer is valued at £90, one of his women at £45, and his leg or arm at say £20. Such payment is often made in kind, some cattle or a horse, or so much wheat being handed over to the aggrieved party. It is very common for a girl to be given away in marriage in payment of blood money. Thus if £90 were owing, the price of the blood of one man the debt might be paid by the delivery of one girl, three cows and a donkey". I have no comparable information, though I think the general principle is accurately described. In Hay's time the Government could seldom apprehend a murderer. He says "For the murdered man's relations to take their revenge is quite in order, but an execution at the hands of that monster, the Government, is an entirely different matter. The culprit therefore is carefully concealed until he can make good his escape to the hills". The position today is somewhat different and I fancy the murderer is usually caught. This however does not end the feud; blood feud murders are punishable only by two years imprisonment and the war starts again when the culprit gets free.*

628 As has been explained the feuds of commoners and the less important Aghas are settled in the end by tribal arbitration. Moreover

628 684 Iraq 673 • 682 * The Administration makes a distinction between feud murders justified by tribal custom and ordinary murders which are not. The former come under a special code for which the maximum penalty is two years imprisonment; the latter come under the ordinary Iraq criminal code for which the penalty is much more severe (? death). This has had an interesting repercussion. In the old days by tribal custom an affair of honour was adequately settled if the man only was killed, the woman in the case being merely driven out of her own community to fend for herself. Today it is necessary for the avenging husband to prove to the Authorities that it is really an affair of honour and not just a cold blooded murder. The custom now therefore is to kill both the guilty parties.

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nowadays the Government takes an active interest in the proceedings and by threat of dire and awful penalties is usually able to settle the affair near the start. Much more serious, is a feud in which important tribal leaders are involved; here settlement is extremely difficult and assassinations may apparently continue for generations. One such major feud splits the Rowanduz district at the present time and has become so widespread that the contestants have assumed the scale and significance of political parties. Practically everyone I met seemed to be involved on one side or the other, some as active assassins, others, the majority, merely as intriguers. The term "my enemies" was clearly highly elastic; - as far as I could judge there was no particular distinction between mere political opponents and those one was prepared to assassinate. The allegiance of the more remote contestants is doubtless largely determined by kinship considerations, but this is not always obvious. A nephew of Hamid Amin of Bengala who had been shot in the back a year before was quite closely related to both of the principal contestant families; and there seemed to be no obvious reason why he should be campaigning on one side rather than the other.

When this particular feud started is not clear, but it was already well established in 1918 and Hay mentions it a number of times; the most recent murder of the sequence occurred the day after I left Rowanduz. The murderer had come out of prison three days before, having been gaoled two years previously on account of an earlier assassination. My records on the subject are certainly very incomplete but even so they show a considerable casualty record:-

Descendants and Relatives of Rasul Agha - 5 dead, 2 wounded,
2 in prison.

Descendants and Relatives of Abdulla Pasha - 4 dead.

Today the affair has become entangled with all sorts of wider issues - Kurdish Nationalism in particular. Accusations of being pro-British, or pro-Arab, or anti-Kurd were levelled at all and sundry, and in the limited time available I had no chance to unravel all the complex of personal antagonisms and rival interests involved. Iraqi-Kurdistan however is now a part of Iraq and it was highly interesting to see how in this new political situation the old antagonisms were being re-aligned to cope with wider issues on a more impersonal front.

Religious Organisation

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Religion is not a subject that the investigator can gain much information on in his first preliminary survey, and my own studies in this field were particularly slender.

*Cf. the feud between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis in Palestine today.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

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192 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the
668 Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in
563 the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unim-
369 portant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Ḥilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

579 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained,
and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the
674 sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation
[731] of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913) the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the 579 period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of 674 Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg, General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings 368 of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra. The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast. Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja under its Jaf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals 743 and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrangements 744 in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels 368 appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enterprise, 185 a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple 439 exports of the territory still varied annually according to the harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates, grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin, partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are elsewhere mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

872 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General 645 Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age of admission to the primary school should not be less than six and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that 'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when [681] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

871 By this time the administration of education had been highly systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of 645 Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of Education controlling and supervising the most minute details both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

872 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does 658 not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age, not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940 an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty [464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the [362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other [696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175* Frontier Crimes Regulation and was promulgated in February,
727 1916. It gave authority to the Political Officers to invoke a
692 tribal *majlis* or other arbitrating body to deal, in accordance
with tribal custom, with all cases in which any of the parties
concerned was a tribesman.[1]

In all arbitration procedure, the Political Officer had the final word, although the Chief Political Officer might review the case. The Political Officer had to confirm the findings of the *majlis*, and he might set aside or add to the sentences imposed.[2] He was also invested with magisterial power to try cases which did not lend themselves to the application of tribal arbitration.[3]

The Regulation in its application proved congenial to the tribes, for it enabled them to settle disputes in ways long familiar to themselves. It also aided in tribal settlement and pacification by giving effect to tribal opinion obtained by arbitration, and it raised the importance of the shaikhs by giving them a recognized place in the political and legal system. The Political Officers, on their side, found that considerable work was taken off their shoulders.[4]

175* Over one point of tribal justice the views of the tribesmen and
927* of the Political Officers often clashed. In cases of murder
628 arising out of a blood-feud, the tribesmen were accustomed to
681 regard *fasl*[5] or payments of money and usually, of women, as
sufficient to settle the score and to end the feud. Imprisonment or capital punishment was thus considered not only harsh but unnecessary. In many cases where a woman violated or had been even accused of violating the desert code of morality, the death of the offender was demanded by the code in the name

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[1] *Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation*, G.O.C. Proclamation No. 2 of 1916, ch. iii, Sec. 7.

[2] Ibid., Sections 10, 11, 13.

[3] Ibid., ch. iv and v.

[4] *Reports of Admin. for* 1918 *of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia* (Calcutta, n.d.): Qurna Report, p. 306 (hereafter *Admin. Report*, 1918).

[5] For valuable first-hand observations on *fasl*: *Monthly Reports of Political Officers of the Occupied Territories, November*, 1919 (hereafter *Monthly Rep'ts*): Nāsiriya, pp. 94-5.

of honour (*namūs*).[1] Capital punishment for such murders, 175*
which were frequent and usually premeditated and brutal, 727*
cut across tribal justice. The Political Officers, on their side, 628
found such customs abhorrent and contrary to their ideas of 681
justice.[2] Their natural tendency was to override the decisions of the tribal *majlis* and to impose imprisonment or death penalties. The problem was partially solved by the gradual recognition of the tribal point of view by the British authorities, but the modification of tribal custom has taken longer. At the present, it still constitutes one of the major problems in the administration of the tribal areas of 'Iraq.

The Revenue Department

No single task of greater magnitude faced the British ad- 175*
ministrators of the Occupied Territories than that of organizing 727*
the Revenue Department. The collection and administration 652
of revenue in accordance with the Turkish system but freed from abuse and corruption were not the only problems. Associated problems of land tenure, of revenue assessment, of *Auqāf* administration, in all their strangeness and complexity, had to be studied and solved. Responsibility for other activities, such as Excise and Customs, control of Hostile Trading Concerns, of the Public Debt, and of Education had to be assumed. To render the task more difficult, papers and records where they had not been destroyed, were out of date and, with the exception of land-registration, in confusion, requiring weeks of careful sorting.[3] Responsible officials had fled, and although

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[1] See Thomas, Bertram, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, 1931, pp. 86-7.

[2] *Admin. Report*, 1918: Hilla Division, pp. 126, 133; *Monthly Rep'ts, December*, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 59; Ibid., *August*, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 74.

[3] Cf. the excellent unsigned article (by C. C. Garbett, I.C.S.): *Turkish Rule and British Administration in Mesopotamia* in *Quarterly Review*, Vol. ccxxx, pp. 403 ff. The claim made there (p. 411), however, that demand-statements for the annual tax on date trees as prepared by the Turks, were found intact and collection of this as well as other revenue were begun within a few days of the occupation of Basra, is not borne out by the records of the period, as *Revenue Admin. Report, January-March*, 1915 (confidential), nor by personal testimony of the officials on the spot at the time.

imprisonment not exceeding two months or to both, fine and imprisonment. 312 466

The Directorate-General of Irrigation may undertake the clearance of irrigation canals by machinery, and the persons benefiting from such work shall refund the costs so incurred. (Last para. of Art. 14, added by Amending Law of 1945).

3) Offences and Penalties under the Irrigation and Embankments Law 312 681

Articles 15 to 18 deal with offences and penalties, in addition to those already mentioned.

Article 15 prescribes the death penalty for whomsoever wilfully and maliciously damages or alters any irrigation work thereby causing injury to life or to property and with penal servitude for life, or a term not exceeding 15 years, if it does not.

Article 16 lists a series of offences punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two months or a fine not exceeding 300 rupees of to both imprisonment and fine. Among the offences stipulated herein are:

Damage, alteration and obstruction to any irrigation work, interference with the supply of water; fouling of water; destruction, tampering with, or alteration of land, level marks or water gauges; damages caused to canal or flood enbankments by grazing cattle; refusal or neglect to supply labor; neglect to prevent waste of water; obstruction to Government official from executing their duties; etc. Addition to or cancellation or alteration to the above list may be made by Regulation (Article 20).

Article 17 prescribes a fine not exceeding 30 rupees for persons failing to comply with a notice to execute repairs, within the time specified in such notice.

4) Miscellaneous Provisions

In any proceedings on offences mentioned in Articles 12 and 312
16 thereof, before a Magistrate, a report signed by an assistant 681
engineer or by any senior official in the Irrigation Department 694
may be accepted as evidence in court. The recovery of sums due

312 681 694 to the irrigation department, and the procedure to be followed for their recovery though covered by Article 19 is now done through the Mutassarrifs concerned in accordance with the Law for the Collection of Debts Due to the Government No. 43 of 23 April 1931 as amended by subsequent Laws.

5) **Rice Cultivation**

243 656 The Law for Rice Cultivation No. 23 of 31 March 1932, as subsequently amended by Law 53 of 15 May 1940, prohibits or restricts in areas defined by Regulation issued from time to time, the cultivation of rice for health reasons, economy in the use of water or soil conservation (Article 1).

Rice cultivation could only be conducted under special license (Article 4), and areas in which rice cultivation is restricted shall be fixed by Regulation (Article 2).

Regulation No. 34 of 28 August 1944, defines the regions in which rice cultivation is prohibited and also fixes areas in masharas for regions where rice could be cultivated.

The Minister of Agriculture shall decide the manner in which areas for rice cultivation alloted to each Liwa are to be distributed, and the mutassarrif concerned shall issue a notice inviting those interested to apply for the necessary permits.

Requests must be submitted to the quaimmaqam of the qadha in which the lands are situated, and the mutassarrif, to whom the requests are transferred shall issue the permits, with the requirements of the Irrigation Department. The minimum distance between rice fields and inhabited localities shall be three kilometres. The permits are non-transferable and are strictly limited to the persons and to the plot of land and irrigation works stated on them. The permit holder agrees to the rotation of water supplies determined by the Irrigation Department, and he accepts responsibility for all shortage of irrigation supply with consequent damage to crops.

6) **Offences and Penalties under the Law for Rice Cultivation**

243 681 It is forbidden for any person to exceed the area for rice cultivation fixed in the permits, or to cultivate without permit in prohibited and restricted areas. Contraveners shall be fined

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ID. 1/500 for every mashara of land cultivated with rice without a permit or in excess of the permitted areas (Article 5).

7) Forcible Assistance Law

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In addition to the provision of Article 13 of the Irrigation and Embankments Law for emergency requisition of labor, the Ministry of Interior may under the Forcible Assistance Law No. 27 of 31 March 1923, as subsequently amended by Law No. 24 of 30 March 1936, in sudden and unforeseen circumstances such as water floods, fire, locusts, etc. authorize the mutassarrifs with the power of collecting and employing labor at rates to be prescribed by the Government.

Every laborer who contravenes the order shall be forcibly taken to the place of the work and shall afterwards be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding Rs. 100.

Persons having jurisdiction to collect laborers who refuse to supply the necessary number of labor or to give the necessary assistance shall upon conviction be liable to imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding Rs. 1000 or to both imprisonment and fine.

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Since the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire, the Mejelle Civil Code has remained in force there. Subsequently, another law supplementing water legislation, No. 38 dated 8 August 1946 (15 Muharram 1366) has been enacted. Jordan authorities are considering amending this latter law at the present time, but the draft is still under study by the interested departments. 1/ This law consists of five sections with 41 articles.

1/Schweng, L. D. Expanded Technical Assistance Program of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy. Private letter.

4: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MAl Iran
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the Kurdish tribal system poses some unusual problems in this field. K 621 In the travel literature, Kurdish tribes have a deserved reputation as [181] warriors and bandits with little respect for human life, and without further analysis of the situation it has been assumed that much of their activities in this field is governed by a pattern of blood feuding. There is however good reason to analyse the situation more carefully, to discover just what patterns relating to homicide do in fact exist. K

The material on which the following is based is, for obvious 628 reasons, very incomplete. Today homicide is the matter with which I the external administration is most concerned, and immediate inter- 656 vention on its part tends to prevent other action from being taken, 682 ● or fear of such intervention prevents actual case histories from being discussed. All the data that I do have, however, indicates the absence or very weak development of blood feuding patterns in Southern Kurdistan. This absence may seem surprising, and it is necessary to make clear just what is meant by the statement.

It seems useful in the analysis of this phenomenon to adhere to a K fairly specific defintion of what is meant by institutionalized blood 628 feud. In its most characteristic form, it has been described in numerous African societies, e. g. the Nuba (Nadel 1947): «In Heiban [homicide] entails blood feud, which is carried on until exact revenge has been achieved; a man must be killed for a man, a woman for a woman; even in their age the two must be as closely matched as possible. The duty to avenge devolves, not on an individual, but on the whole clan . . . . Again, the revenge is not directed against an individual — the murderer himself — but against any member of the enemy clan who satisfies the conditions of this law of revenge . . .», p. 151). The pattern is thus a special form of institutionalized revenge, whereby a whole group of persons is held collectively responsible for the behavior of one of its members, and where the wronged party is similarly not conceived as the individual or his close family, but as the whole larger group to which he belonged. The reaction is one of retaliation, governed by considerations of equality, and subsidiarily one of compensation by traditionally stipulated blood money (e. g. ibid. p. 251).

In this form, the blood feud is not found in Southern Kurdistan.

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578 628 [584] 681 lead to one side burning the other's crops or stealing their cattle. Until bloodshed has occurred nothing is serious and a good clan Agha will see to it that the parties submit to arbitration before the affair reaches a crisis. More serious are affairs in which women are involved; an insult to honour can only be wiped out by death and the discovery of adultery can have only one possible sequel. Such cases however need not necessarily lead to feud; if the guilty lover belongs to the same village as the injured husband a single murder is considered to settle the matter. If the parties are from different groups however the affair is much more serious and several assassinations may take place before settlement can be reached. Eventually, provided it is the honour of commoners rather than of Aghas that is at stake, the Aghas concerned will arrange peace through the mediation of the tribal chiefs. According to Hay "A blood feud is usually settled by the payment of blood-money; every condition of man or woman has his or her price, and even the parts of the body are catalogued. A Kurmanji or middle class Kurdish farmer is valued at £90, one of his women at £45, and his leg or arm at say £20. Such payment is often made in kind, some cattle or a horse, or so much wheat being handed over to the aggrieved party. It is very common for a girl to be given away in marriage in payment of blood money. Thus if £90 were owing, the price of the blood of one man the debt might be paid by the delivery of one girl, three cows and a donkey". I have no comparable information, though I think the general principle is accurately described. In Hay's time the Government could seldom apprehend a murderer. He says "For the murdered man's relations to take their revenge is quite in order, but an execution at the hands of that monster, the Government, is an entirely different matter. The culprit therefore is carefully concealed until he can make good his escape to the hills". The position today is somewhat different and I fancy the murderer is usually caught. This however does not end the feud; blood feud murders are punishable only by two years imprisonment and the war starts again when the culprit gets free.*

628 As has been explained the feuds of commoners and the less important Aghas are settled in the end by tribal arbitration. Moreover

628 684 Iraq 673 682 * The Administration makes a distinction between feud murders justified by tribal custom and ordinary murders which are not. The former come under a special code for which the maximum penalty is two years imprisonment; the latter come under the ordinary Iraq criminal code for which the penalty is much more severe (? death). This has had an interesting repercussion. In the old days by tribal custom an affair of honour was adequately settled if the man only was killed, the woman in the case being merely driven out of her own community to fend for herself. Today it is necessary for the avenging husband to prove to the Authorities that it is really an affair of honour and not just a cold blooded murder. The custom now therefore is to kill both the guilty parties.

16: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA1 Iran
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Moreover.

nowadays the Government takes an active interest in the proceedings and by threat of dire and awful penalties is usually able to settle the affair near the start. Much more serious is a feud in which important tribal leaders are involved; here settlement is extremely difficult and assassinations may apparently continue for generations. One such major feud splits the Rowanduz district at the present time and has become so widespread that the contestants have assumed the scale and significance of political parties. Practically everyone I met seemed to be involved on one side or the other, some as active assassins, others, the majority, merely as intriguers. The term "my enemies" was clearly highly elastic; - as far as I could judge there was no particular distinction between mere political opponents and those one was prepared to assassinate. The allegiance of the more remote contestants is doubtless largely determined by kinship considerations, but this is not always obvious. A nephew of Hamid Agha of Bergala who had been shot in the back a year before was quite closely related to both of the principal contestant families; and there seemed to be no obvious reason why he should be campaigning on one side rather than the other.

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When this particular feud started is not clear, but it was already well established in 1918 and Hay mentions it a number of times; the most recent murder of the sequence occurred the day after I left Rowanduz. The murderer had come out of prison three days before, having been gaoled two years previously on account of an earlier assassination. My records on the subject are certainly very incomplete but even so they show a considerable casualty record:-

Descendants and Relatives of Bapil Agha - 5 dead, 2 wounded,
2 in prison.

Descendants and Relatives of Abdulla Pasha - 4 dead.

Today the affair has become entangled with all sorts of wider issues - Kurdish Nationalism in particular. Accusations of being pro-British, or pro-Arab, or anti-Kurd were levelled at all and sundry, and in the limited time available I had no chance to unravel all the complex of personal antagonisms and rival interests involved. Iraqi-Kurdistan however is now a part of Iraq and it was highly interesting to see how in this new political situation the old antagonisms were being re-aligned to cope with wider issues on a more impersonal front.

Religious Organisation

Religion is not a subject that the investigator can gain much information on in his first preliminary survey, and my own studies in this field were particularly slender.

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*Cf. the feud between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis in Palestine today.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one
645 major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its
rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents
668 they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near
619 Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests
● [687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

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[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

cessions to their peculiar beliefs and customs, and met their active and passive resistance by sending a brigade of troops in September 1935. This bloodless operation was followed by the institution of courts martial which, with savage severity and no adequate trials, hanged nine of their leaders, including two Christians, and imprisoned 350 alleged resisters. These were later progressively released: but Da'ud al-Da'ud remained a fugitive in Syria, where numbers of his followers tried persistently to join him. The Barzani Kurds, subdued by joint 'Iraqi-Turkish operations in 1933 which captured Shaykh Aḥmad, gave further trouble in 1934 and 1935 under the truculent leader of a considerable force, Khalil Khushawi. This bandit, who for long defied the combined operations of 'Iraqis and Turks, dodged across frontiers from valley to valley and destroyed the villages of all who denounced him. Later in 1935 most of his followers were rounded up, and a dozen hanged; he himself vanished, to reappear in mid-winter and to be caught and shot in March 1936. In Sulaymaniya liwā a similar character, Sayid Muḥammad Pichkola, led looting parties in 'Iraq from a base in Persia. After long-drawn police operations he surrendered in August 1935, and was pardoned. In the same weeks, deep in southern 'Iraq, resistance to conscription was leading the Mudayna village of Qurna to armed protest which called for military suppression.

The year 1936 brought no peace to rural 'Iraq. The incitements to lawlessness first set afoot in 1934, the rancour of never-settled land disputes, the fear and hatred of conscription, and maladroit or corrupt local administration were added to the endemic causes of tribal restlessness. In February insurgence among the Shaṭra tribes brought troops to the Gharraf, and the usual measures quelled the rising in a few weeks. In the Muntafiq an assault on a police post in the Suq area was punished by fines and prison-sentences. In April a section of the Bani Ḥuchaym in Rumaytha district cut the railway, rallied a force of 1,200 armed tribesmen, and heavily engaged troops sent to suppress them. Casualties were heavy, the Army lost ninety men and two aircraft. Reprisals of corresponding severity, with the hanging of rebel leaders after little or no trial and the burning of villages, were reported in Baghdad, there to distress the squeamish and help the Opposition. The 'Akra district of Diwaniya witnessed a rising of the notorious Sha'lan al-'Aṭiya, unsatisfied by his rewards for opposing the Ministry of 'Ali Jawdat. It was not less brutally suppressed by Bakr Ṣidqi in June 1936; and in August a force of the Ṣafwan tribe, near Khidhr in Samawa qadhā, attacked the Government office and, though dispersed, were still unsubdued in the autumn of the year.

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The Minorities and the Iraqi State

641 563 The Iraqi Government has on the whole tried to be correct in its dealings with the minorities. There are usually one or two Kurds in each Cabinet and there have been one Jewish and one Christian Minister; the minorities have a share, although perhaps an inadequate one, in government and army appointments, and in government subsidies to schools. Apart from the Assyrian incidents of 1933, the peculiar circumstances of which are explained below, and the Baghdad pogrom of 1941, at a time when government had practically ceased to function, there has been no physical persecution of minorities. Nevertheless, they are all restless and apprehensive, and have not yet come to regard themselves, nor are they regarded by others, as full and loyal citizens of the Iraqi State.

The explanation for this is not to be found in the bad will either of majority or of minorities. Its fundamental cause is to be looked for in the amorphous nature of the State. Iraq was created artificially by joining together three Ottoman provinces. It is too large to have the natural unity which each of those provinces possesses by itself, too small to have the unity of the Fertile Crescent or Arab Asia as a whole. It has not yet acquired a unity or structure of its own, and cannot do so until two fundamental questions are faced and answered: first, what are to be the relations between Sunnis and Shi'is in Iraq; secondly, what is to be the relation of Iraq to the rest of the Arab world?

The first is perhaps the most important of all questions for the future of the country. There are more Sunnis than Shi'is in Iraq as a whole, but the Sunnis are divided into Kurds and Arabs, so that the Shi'is form the largest single community. Nevertheless, they have less than their due share in the Government, mainly because there are fewer men of education among them than among the Sunnis. Thus they are discontented, and the political balance between them and the Sunnis is very precarious.

641 563 668 There are to-day two political tendencies in Iraq, based upon two possible solutions of this fundamental problem. Many Iraqis, mainly among the Sunni Arabs, advocate the incorporation of Iraq into an Arab State or federation, in the hope that this will ease the local situation: the Shi'is will be in a minority in the large Arab State, and in course of time will come to look upon themselves as Arabs rather than as Shi'is. The other tendency, which has many adherents among the Shi'is, is towards the

development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without 641
distinction as equal citizens of the State. 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one 668
another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at least some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling.

The Kurds: Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority 563
in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are con- 221
centrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and
Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous,
and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic
pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals,
moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the
cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains [241]
and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not
all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being
semi-sedentary.

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority 563
belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve 619
their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts 178
they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized.
Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly

648 the Acting High Commissioner and the Acting Prime Minister
563 visited Kurdistan together, and made statements in which, while condemning separation and emphasizing the unity of Iraq, they spoke of the Government's resolve to satisfy the linguistic and other demands of the Kurds. On the other hand, a number of conciliatory measures, both legislative and administrative, were taken. The most important of them was the Local Languages Law already mentioned.

[669] In spite of this, revolt once more broke out among the Kurds, first under Shaikh Mahmud (1930–1) and then under Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan (1932). The causes of these revolts were partly political and partly personal. They were only subdued through the intervention of the R.A.F.

The Kurds since the Treaty

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648 From 1932 to 1943 the Kurds did not revolt again, but continued to be restless and unwilling to accept the authority of the Government. There were two main reasons for their restlessness. The first was the growth of Kurdish national spirit, due partly to the gradual appearance of a class of educated Kurds, partly to a natural reaction against Pan-Arabism. The encouragement given by the French to Kurdish nationalism in the Syrian Jazirah, and by the Russians to Kurdish autonomy in the Caucasus, may also have had a certain although a limited influence. The second and more fundamental reason was to be found in the particular administrative grievances of the Kurdish tribes. The Iraqi Government made little attempt to carry out the provisions of the various laws passed during the mandatory period. Government departments in Baghdad tended to neglect the claims of districts so far away from the capital; and the Kurds had no way of making their voice heard effectively and compelling the Government to pay attention to their needs. In general, Arab officials in the northern provinces failed to understand the mentality and needs of the Kurdish people (although Kurdish officials in Arab districts were often highly successful). The gap between administration and inhabitants was perhaps greatest in the Mosul liwa, where the administration was largely under the influence of the Arab townspeople of Mosul itself.

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511 The Government's neglect showed itself in every sphere. There were few facilities for education, and those which existed were mainly for education in Arabic. Again, nothing was done

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563 668 511 to extend and improve the cultivation of the land and raise the standard of living. This had serious consequences when the war came and brought with it urgent economic problems. The mountain districts did not produce enough cereals to feed the population, and importation on an adequate scale was rendered difficult by the poverty of the Kurdish peasants, the lack of a food-supply organization and the insufficiency of transport. The sense of grievance was further stimulated by the example of the Kurds in Persia, who had thrown off the authority of the Persian Government since the Allied occupation of 1941. In 1943 Mulla Mustafa, the brother of Shaikh Ahmad, rose in revolt in the Barzan district. His rising lasted for several months. Attempts to suppress it failed and it was finally called off after negotiations, and an undertaking by the Government to look into Kurdish grievances. Majid Mustafa himself a Kurd and a distinguished administrator, was appointed Minister without Portfolio with the special duty of devoting himself to Kurdish affairs. His report outlined a scheme of economic and administrative reforms. In the course of 1944 little was done to carry out these or any reforms, and Mulla Mustafa's movement still smouldered; the condition of the Kurds was somewhat improved, however, by the increased cultivation of tobacco, their most important cash-crop.

The Assyrians

563 621 The Assyrians form a distinct community, not only by reason of their Nestorian faith, but also through their language, a Syriac dialect, and their traditions. They are probably the descendants of tribes which moved from the plains of Iraq into the mountains to the north during the period of the Mongol invasion, and remained there until the present generation. In their mountain-home they lived as shepherds, feudally organized under their *maliks* with their Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, as their temporal as well as spiritual ruler. They paid a yearly tribute to the Ottoman Sultan, but were in practice autonomous, although their autonomy was always subject to interference by their neighbours the Kurds.

563 166 At the beginning of the First World War they were divided into three main groups: first, the mountaineers in the Hakkiari district of what is now Turkey; secondly, those in the plains to the west of Lake Urmiyah, in Persia; and, thirdly those in the

563 economically dependent on the British. Quite apart from the economic dangers of this, there were signs that they once more hoped for autonomy under British protection. The danger of such hopes is too obvious to need explanation.

The Other Christians

563 195 Apart from the Assyrians, the Christians in Iraq are mainly Chaldaeans, Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox and Catholics, with smaller numbers of Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and other Uniates, and Protestants. The communities are recognized by the Government as possessing competence in matters of personal status and other internal affairs.

563 369 871 Here, as in the other countries, the Christians are more fully an urban community than the Moslems, and show a peculiar aptitude for commerce, crafts and the professions; but there is also a large peasant community, Chaldaean, Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic, in the plains around Mosul. In Iraq, as elsewhere, the proportion of educated Christians is higher than that of educated Moslems, and they are further advanced on the road to Westernization, thanks to the work of foreign missions and schools.

563 The Armenians are a trading community in the towns. They preserve their language and traditions carefully, but they are too few to be able to avoid some measure of external assimilation. The other Christians are partly Syriac-speaking, partly Arabic. This cannot, however, be regarded as a sharp distinction, since the language used depends upon the environment in which they are living, and many of them are bi-lingual. In general, it is true that those whose native language is now Arabic spoke Syriac until recent generations, and that with few exceptions they are not conscious of belonging to the Arab nation.

563 [illegible] In spite of efforts to spread the conception of a 'Syriac' people, the general tendency among the Christians is towards at least a superficial Arabization. This raises the question of their relation towards the Arab nationalist movement. So far, they have regarded it with fear and hostility, apart from some individuals who have supported it with enthusiasm. The nationalists too have tended to suspect them, although the existence of the much greater Kurdish and Shi'i problems has diverted attention from them. What the future relationship will be depends very

563
668 largely on the line of development which the nationalist movement takes.

The Jews

563 The organization of the Jewish community is regulated by a law passed in 1931, which laid down the composition and functions of the various institutions of the three communities of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. (A fourth community, that of Diala, was added in 1932.) Through these institutions the communities possess self-government in their own affairs.

The majority of Jews in Iraq are Arabic-speaking and belong to families which have been settled in the country for hundreds or even thousands of years. They live mainly in the large towns, in the economic life of which they have a large part. They are manufacturers, merchants, financiers, and follow the free professions. Their influence is particularly great in Baghdad. In the north of the country Kurdish-speaking Jews are to be found; they are mainly traders and craftsmen in the Kurdish towns, but a number of Jewish agricultural villages exist in the Amadia district.

Their communal life is highly organized. There is a large number of Jewish schools, some of them subsidized by the Government, and many of them reaching a comparatively high standard. There is a class of highly cultivated and Westernized Jews.

There is no open and official discrimination against them. Individual Jews are to be found in Parliament, the Civil Service and the Army; the first and greatest Minister of Finance, Sassoon Heskail, was a Jew. There is, however, a considerable hostility towards them, because of traditional religious hatred and their economic power. This has increased greatly in recent years as a natural consequence of Arab opposition to Zionism. It is true that the Iraqi Jews, like the Oriental Jews, are for the most part not Zionists by conviction; some of them indeed profess to be Arab nationalists and are hostile to Zionism. It is inevitable, however, that some of the hostility which Arabs feel for Jewish designs on Palestine should be directed to the Jews in their midst. The growing hostility showed itself most clearly in the incidents which followed the collapse of Rashid Ali's movement in Baghdad in 1941. In the past few years, many Iraqi Jews, aware that their future in Iraq is dark, have emigrated to Palestine and America in search of greater security or opportunity.

648 562 the Acting High Commissioner and the Acting Prime Minister visited Kurdistan together, and made statements in which, while condemning separation and emphasizing the unity of Iraq, they spoke of the Government's resolve to satisfy the linguistic and other demands of the Kurds. On the other hand, a number of conciliatory measures, both legislative and administrative, were taken. The most important of them was the Local Languages Law already mentioned.

[669] In spite of this, revolt once more broke out among the Kurds, first under Shaikh Mahmud (1930–1) and then under Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan (1932). The causes of these revolts were partly political and partly personal. They were only subdued through the intervention of the R.A.F.

The Kurds since the Treaty

563 668 648 From 1932 to 1943 the Kurds did not revolt again, but continued to be restless and unwilling to accept the authority of the Government. There were two main reasons for their restlessness. The first was the growth of Kurdish national spirit, due partly to the gradual appearance of a class of educated Kurds, partly to a natural reaction against Pan-Arabism. The encouragement given by the French to Kurdish nationalism in the Syrian Jazirah, and by the Russians to Kurdish autonomy in the Caucasus, may also have had a certain although a limited influence. The second and more fundamental reason was to be found in the particular administrative grievances of the Kurdish tribes. The Iraqi Government made little attempt to carry out the provisions of the various laws passed during the mandatory period. Government departments in Baghdad tended to neglect the claims of districts so far away from the capital; and the Kurds had no way of making their voice heard effectively and compelling the Government to pay attention to their needs. In general, Arab officials in the northern provinces failed to understand the mentality and needs of the Kurdish people (although Kurdish officials in Arab districts were often highly successful). The gap between administration and inhabitants was perhaps greatest in the Mosul liwa, where the administration was largely under the influence of the Arab townspeople of Mosul itself.

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to accept their stay in Iraq as more than temporary. Secondly, 563
even if they had to remain in Iraq, they wished to go on living 641
the same sort of independent life under the Mar Shimun as they
had lived before the war. They were not satisfied with the
privileges which they shared with other minorities; they claimed
complete autonomy, and their claims were expressed in the most
intransigent form by the Mar Shimun himself. Finally, they
distrusted the Iraqi Government, and regarded themselves as in a
special way the protégés of the British Government; when the
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was signed, they thought themselves
to have been abandoned by their protectors, and feared the worst.
Their fears were intensified by the work among them of a small
group of agitators.

Nor was the Iraqi Government more satisfied with the situation.
It resented the special position accorded to the Assyrians, no less
than the refusal of the Assyrians to be contented with their
position as citizens of Iraq. What is more important, it feared
them. Throughout the mandatory period, Assyrian Levies had 701
been trained and used by the British authorities for guarding 563
aerodromes as well as for the repression of the Kurdish revolts.
They had proved to be good soldiers; both they and the Iraqis
believed that they would be more than a match for the young
Iraqi Army. After 1930 they were gradually disbanded,
but they retained their arms, and the Iraqi Government
feared that in view of the prevailing discontent among the
Assyrians they might revolt and the revolt would be difficult
to crush; it feared also that the British Government might
instigate a revolt, as an excuse for recovering control over the
country.

By the summer of 1933 tension between the Assyrians and the 563
Government was very great. Although some of the former were 641
willing to come to terms with the Government, others, the fore- 669
most among them being the Mar Shimun, were still demanding
autonomy; and asked, if this was not possible, to be allowed to
cross the frontier into Syria. Relations between the Mar Shimun
and the Government had reached such a state that he was not
allowed to return from Baghdad to the north. The Government
and the Army were becoming increasingly frightened of the
possibility of a revolt, and resolved, if given an opportunity, to
end the danger once and for all. King Feisal and several of the
more experienced Ministers were away in Europe, and the

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

563 Ministers left in Iraq were too weak or disinclined to resist the
641 extremism of the Army and of public opinion.

669 At this moment, in June, a group of Assyrians decided to take matters into their own hands and cross the Tigris into Syria. On the other side of the river they were disarmed by the French authorities; but later their arms were returned to them and many of them crossed back into Iraq. There they met a detachment of the Iraqi Army; fighting broke out (it cannot be established who began it), and both sides suffered casualties. When the news of this incident spread through Iraq, Government, Army and public alike were seized with mass hysteria; the action of the Assyrians was considered as the beginning of a revolt, and it was resolved to take decisive action. The Army organized and carried out a series of massacres in which some hundreds of Assyrians were killed.

These massacres, and the fear of further ones, completely broke the spirit of the Assyrians. Some 6,000 of them crossed over into the Upper Khabur region in Syria, and about 15,000 others subsequently expressed their desire to leave Iraq. The Council of the League of Nations set up a special committee to deal with the question of settling them. After several proposals for their settlement in Brazil, in British Guiana and in the Orontes Valley in Syria had been considered and rejected, it was finally decided that those already in Syria should be permanently settled in the Upper Khabur Valley in the Jazirah, while the remainder should stay in Iraq.

563 The situation of the Assyrians in the Khabur Settlement has already been discussed. Of those who remained in Iraq or have returned to it, some are still in their old homes round Amadia and Ruwanduz; some have settled down again in villages around Mosul; others are working in the big towns. A British Commission appointed by the Iraqi Government reported in 1938 that their economic position in the northern plains was at least as good as that of the other inhabitants. No further incidents have occurred; the Assyrians are no longer disposed to be intransigent, and the Government is no longer obsessed by the idea that they are dangerous. It is not impossible, however, that a dangerous situation will once more arise. During the recent war a very large proportion of the Assyrian men were enrolled in the R.A.F. levies or were working for Great Britain in other ways. It was calculated that 75 per cent of them were

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French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which admini- 692
stered them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midhat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
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State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
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of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dis- 743
pensaries, were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-
inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
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These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments.
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on 647
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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

wise and moderate 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab. By the summer of 646
1926 the routine of parliamentary procedure was established; but it was already clear that the backwardness of the electorate, and the freely used power of the Government to secure the election of deputies of its own choice, could not but preclude any early possibility of genuine democracy.✓

The Administration, on lines half inherited from the Turks and 645× half established by the British, had well begun. With many short- 631 comings and omissions it operated already more widely and more 647 effectively than had any Turkish Government, and aimed at a superior standard of service. In Baghdad the departments under each Ministry improved their organization, sifted their staffs, advanced towards complete 'Iraqi control. By 1926 not only were all Ministries in effective 'Iraqi control but most of the larger departments had been handed to 'Iraqi directors, notably those of Health, Education, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Government Accounts, Police, Prisons, the Census; those of Irrigation, Tapu, Customs, Revenue and State Domains, Veterinary services, Public Works, the Port of Baṣra, and 'Iraq Railways remained for a further period under British executive control. In the provinces, new qadhās and naḥiyas were formed or regrouped. The position of the British 'Administrative Inspectorate' was satisfactorily defined by law. A Standing Board selected 'Iraqi officials for higher posts, and the formation of a regulated civil service on modern lines was taken in hand. The Ministry of Finance, where R. V. Vernon assumed the Advisership in 1925 after an interregnum under L. M. Swan, had developed and specialized its organization, reduced its non-'Iraqi staff to a minimum, and founded a Finance Inspectorate. The post of Auditor-General, reporting to the Cabinet direct, was created in 1924 and held by J. Parlby, who had worked in 'Iraqi finances since 1917. The Advisership of Communications and Works was held by Wheatley until the arrival of L. E. Bury in 1925, and again after the latter's departure three years later. In Interior, Cornwallis was assisted by a senior member of his Administrative Inspectorate—Pulley, Wilson, or Edmonds—and by one or more juniors.

The Courts offered justice and accessibility to an extent far 692 superior to that of alien and corrupt Ottoman tribunals; during these years both civil and criminal courts multiplied at liwā and qadhā headquarters as need declared itself, and the statistics of cases heard showed an increasing recourse to law. Civil jurisdiction lay with the Peace Courts of the Qadhis—who after 1923 included Shi'i Qadhis—and junior judges, the Courts of First Instance at three or four liwā headquarters, and a single Court of Appeal and Cassation, with a British President, at Baghdad. This President

692 was H. F. Forbes, I.C.S., in 1920–1, B. H. Bell in 1921–2, and
thereafter G. Alexander until 1934. Davidson on transfer to the
staff of the High Commission handed the Advisership of Justice in
[671] 1922 to E. M. Drower, who held it till 1946. The Turkish Majalla,
Code of Civil Procedure, and Commercial and Maritime Codes
remained in force. Criminal justice was in the hands of single
magistrates with first, second or third-class powers, and Courts of
Sessions which possessed also appeal jurisdiction, while limited
magisterial powers were still possessed by certain administrative
officials and municipal bodies. The Tribal Disputes Regulations
remained in force, beloved of administrative officials but disliked
by the legally-minded. The rights of foreigners, preferential though
no longer Capitulatory, were defined in the Judicial Agreement.
693 Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a Bar Association for the
body of excitable, ill-disciplined advocates, into whose numbers
the Law School poured annual recruits.

701 The forces of law and order were at this period four in number:
the 'Iraq Army, British forces of ground and air, the 'Iraq Levies,
and the Police. The 'Iraq Army, based on voluntary recruitment
from 1921 onwards and within its limits conceived on the most
modern lines, by 1925 rose in strength to 7,500 men. It remained
constant at about this establishment for the next eight years.
There were six infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, two
mountain and one field battery, and all necessary services. The
officers had almost all served in the Turkish Army, but in the
lower ranks at least were adaptable to new standards. Units of
the Army took part in many small operations against tribal enemies
and saw more serious service in Kurdistan, not without losses.
Great attention was paid to its Training Centre and its Royal
Military College. The British Military Mission was re-formed and
increased in 1925.[1] By this date the Army's rôle of successor, for
all ground purposes, of the British forces was clearly indicated.
000 The latter were progressively reduced, actually to vanishing point
in 1929. In March 1921 there were 33 infantry battalions, 6 cavalry
regiments, 16 batteries, and Sapper and armoured-car companies:
these by 1926 were reduced to three battalions, two by 1927, one
by 1928, and vanished entirely in 1929. The British military element,
so characteristic of 'Iraq under the Occupation, was thenceforward
to be absent until 1941. The Royal Air Force—under
successive commanders of high rank, nearly all of whom were

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[1] Successive heads of the British Military Mission, and Advisers to the Ministry of Defence, were: Colonel P. Joyce, 1921; Major-General A. C. Daly, 1925; Major-General G. G. Loch, 1928; Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, 1931; Major-General C. J. Bruce-Hay, 1934; Major-General H. W. M. Watson, 1937; Major-General G. G. Waterhouse, 1938; Major-General D. G. Bromilow, 1941; Major-General J. M. L. Renton, 1944.

(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of 647
Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by
that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman,
who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. Progress towards 647
raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards,
commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one 661
minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by
the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task
of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government
activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an
obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in
a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no
longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times
for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was
rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn 692
general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and
some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse
to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard
in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to
practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhās and nahiyas—were formed 631
by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were
common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province
formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among
the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function
and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of
projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in
every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic
depression of the years 1929 to 1932.

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq 652
into the League called for wise and firm financial management.
The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe
drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts
aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not
decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional
demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more
severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead,
her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and
it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public
services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The
State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with
careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy
which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Advisership to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Āghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 692 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 697 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

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[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

647 423 records of miri land, such management and control as is possible of these heterogeneous and extensive territories must be carried out primarily in the district by persons in direct touch with the people and the parcels affected. Many questions are no doubt settled by the customary social leaders as elsewhere (e.g. tribal sheikhs) and never reach the administration. Those that do may in some cases be dealt with by one of the few local officers of the State Domains or even by another Department (e.g. on the Yuseflya by the Irrigation). But ordinarily the effective agents of Government in the control of miri lands are the officers of the provincial administration on the spot, who must act for the most part according to their individual judgment or on the instructions of their provincial superiors in each case. This local control is naturally subject to the direction, and occasionally to the intervention, of the State Domains service or the Ministry to which it is responsible. It is also necessarily subject to intervention by the Ministry of the Interior or of any other Ministry, whose public responsibilities may be affected by some action taken. It is further subject to intervention by any Deputy or influential private person who may be concerned or interested.

423 682 In a limited number of cases, disputes affecting the holding of miri land are decided under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, because of their reaction on tribal peace and public security. But since such disputes in theory merely concern the domestic management by Government of its own estates, they do not as a rule fall within the jurisdiction of any regular Court of Justice. Reference has already been made to the general failure to introduce the Land Code and more particularly tapu tenure effectively. Consequently by the side of a truncated and semi-atrophied Statute Law there have survived throughout the greater majority of the land, methods of acquiring and holding land which have never been regulated by law at all.

423 427 2. An attempt has already been made to illustrate in broad outline the conditions under which land has been for the most part occupied and cultivated in the rainfall zone. There are commonly two classes of people concerned. Firstly (*a*) the larger man, who may be the local Agha or a small capitalist who has helped to develop the land by providing funds, seed, etc. Secondly (*b*) the actual cultivator who, in the mountainous districts, has tamed the wilderness by building terraces, constructing water channels, clearing the ground, etc., and who, in the plains, has similarly, if less laboriously, reclaimed the land by regular tillage and fallow. It is evident that in actual fact a partnership commonly existed or exists between these two classes.

Now it is generally accepted that the intention of the Ottoman legislator, when promulgating the Land Code, was to establish the actual cultivator on the land; and when that cultivator has remained on the same land and effected improvements of a capital nature by his labour, his claim is clear. But the claim of the larger man instanced, who will almost invariably have co-operated in some indispensable way (e.g. by according protection, providing capital or essential assistance), who has very likely been acknowledged as landlord (mallak) and perhaps regularly received mallakiya, cannot be equitably or advisedly disregarded. Investigation on the spot would be needed to weigh the respective claims in each case; but it can be seen that, broadly speaking, local conditions have often produced an association in the development and cultivation of the land between local overlord and cultivating holder in these regions, in which both have rights that should be recognised in their mutual interest as well as that of the country at large.

423 619 In the Irrigation Zone and throughout the desert borders the Turks found the land for the most part in the hands of tribal confederations.

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the Turkish Ministry of Interior in April, 1913, had directed 175*
that the use of Arabic should be allowed in the Courts of 671
Justice and in public offices. In spite of the failure to carry out 197
this concession literally, the use of Turkish was more of an 727*
affront to Arab sentiment than a handicap to litigation. Turkish was, and in many centres still is, the polite language, much as French was at the Courts of Prussia and Russia in the eighteenth century.

Although criminal cases could be tried in these newly 692 ●
established civil courts,[1] the bulk of such cases was not sent to 175*
them. Serious cases, mainly robbery under arms, continued to 727*
be tried by military courts, under a highly summary procedure.[1] In Basra, 'Ashar, 'Amāra and Nāsirīya, the Military or Deputy Military Governors decided disputes of all kinds, while in the districts the same powers were exercised by Political Officers. Until after the fall of Baghdad no civil courts existed outside of Basra town.

Justice in Tribal Areas

It was soon evident that the 'Iraq Code could not be applied in its entirety to the tribal areas, comprising practically all of the Occupied Territories outside the towns. It was also clear that special powers were needed by the Political Officers to dispose of civil and criminal cases in their districts. To meet the situation, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation was drawn up by Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs,[2] on the lines of the Indian

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[1] *Admin. Rep., Basrah*, 1917: *Rep. Military Governor of Basrah*, 1917, p. 199.

[2] Henry Robert Conway Dobbs, G.B.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E. (1871-1934), may be rightfully called one of the makers of modern 'Iraq. He saw wide and distinguished service in India, Persia and Afghanistan. As Revenue and Judicial Commissioner to Baluchistan, 1909, 1911 and 1917, he came into direct contact with the 'Sandeman System'. He was under orders as Resident to Turkish Arabia when war broke out in 1914, but it was as Revenue Commissioner that he supervised the organization of administration, 1915-16, while Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, enlarged political relations with the Arabs. Versatile in talents, but essentially an administrator, he brought to the difficult period, 1923-9, when he served as High Commissioner to 'Iraq, a great capacity for realistic thinking, a highly developed sense of duty, and a deep loyalty to the Empire which dominated all his relations with the Arabs.

[1] [Under British military administration ca 1917]

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175* 727* 692 Frontier Crimes Regulation and was promulgated in February, 1916. It gave authority to the Political Officers to invoke a tribal *majlis* or other arbitrating body to deal, in accordance with tribal custom, with all cases in which any of the parties concerned was a tribesman.[1]

In all arbitration procedure, the Political Officer had the final word, although the Chief Political Officer might review the case. The Political Officer had to confirm the findings of the *majlis*, and he might set aside or add to the sentences imposed.[2] He was also invested with magisterial power to try cases which did not lend themselves to the application of tribal arbitration.[3]

The Regulation in its application proved congenial to the tribes, for it enabled them to settle disputes in ways long familiar to themselves. It also aided in tribal settlement and pacification by giving effect to tribal opinion obtained by arbitration, and it raised the importance of the shaikhs by giving them a recognized place in the political and legal system. The Political Officers, on their side, found that considerable work was taken off their shoulders.[4]

175* 927* 628 681 Over one point of tribal justice the views of the tribesmen and of the Political Officers often clashed. In cases of murder arising out of a blood-feud, the tribesmen were accustomed to regard *fasl*[5] or payments of money and usually, of women, as sufficient to settle the score and to end the feud. Imprisonment or capital punishment was thus considered not only harsh but unnecessary. In many cases where a woman violated or had been even accused of violating the desert code of morality, the death of the offender was demanded by the code in the name

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[1] *Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation*, G.O.C. Proclamation No. 2 of 1916, ch. iii, Sec. 7.

[2] Ibid., Sections 10, 11, 13.

[3] Ibid., ch. iv and v.

[4] *Reports of Admin. for* 1918 *of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia* (Calcutta, n.d.): Qurna Report, p. 306 (hereafter *Admin. Report*, 1918).

[5] For valuable first-hand observations on *fasl*: *Monthly Reports of Political Officers of the Occupied Territories, November*, 1919 (hereafter *Monthly Rep'ts*): Nāsiriya. pp. 94-5.

INITIATION OF ADMINISTRATION

As at the occupation of Basra, most of the Turkish Judicial 671
personnel had fled. The more recent records had been removed 175
or destroyed. Beyond the institution of a Court of Small 227
Causes and a *Shara'* Court (Muslim Law Court) in July,[1] Civil Courts were in abeyance until the Courts' Proclamation of December 28th, 1917,[2] reconstituted the Civil Courts under Mr. (later Sir) Edgar Bonham-Carter as Senior Judicial Officer. He had arrived in October, and after studying the situation with the experience gained in his long and distinguished career in the Sudan Legal Department, had outlined the essential requirements to be embodied in the proclamation.

Under the Turks, First Instance Courts had existed at the 692
headquarters of each *Liwā* or District, and of each *Qādha* or 175
Sub-district: a total of ten *Liwā* Courts of First Instance and 727
forty *Qādha* Courts of First Instance in the three wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Obviously, from the standpoint of the prevailing poverty and the sparseness of the population, the number was excessive. In addition, most of the judges had been untrained if not actually incompetent. Under the new system, a Civil Court of First Instance, normally to be composed of a British judge and two Arab judges, was to be reopened at Baghdad and later, elsewhere, as deemed necessary.[3] Peace Courts which were also Small Cause Courts, such as had been established in Baghdad and a few other places just before the war, were to be reconstituted wherever required.[4] Elsewhere either Judges of Courts of First Instance, Political Officers or other officers were given the right to officiate.

In the days of the Turks, Appeals lay from the lower Courts to a Court of Appeals situated at the capital of each wilayet.[5] Decisions from these Courts could be revised by the Court of

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[1] *Proclamations*, 1916-1918: Proclamation No. 8, July 2nd, 1917.

[2] Ibid., Courts' Proclamation No. 17, December 28th, 1917. The date 'end of December, 1918' given for this Proclamation in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 94, is obviously a misprint.

[3] Ibid., Courts' Proclamation, Section 3 (1).

[4] Ibid., Section 5.

[5] Normally composed of a Turkish President and four Arab Judges. *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 1.

692 Cassation at Constantinople. The Courts' Proclamation
175* abolished appeals to any Court outside 'Iraq,[1] and replaced all
727* other Courts of Appeal by a single Court of Appeal composed
of a British President and two Arab Judges.[2]

Religious Courts

698* The importance of reconstituting *Shara'* or Religious Law
175* Courts, as provided in the Proclamation,[3] had been recognized
727* in 1917 by Mr. Bonham-Carter. He had then pointed to the
respect with which the Courts were regarded in Muslim countries, to the practical advantage of deciding certain classes of cases by Muslim Judges in accordance with Muslim Law, and to the immense additional political advantage of associating with the Government the influential religious class of the *'Ulamā* from which the *Qādhīs* were drawn.[4] He had indicated these alone as adequate reasons for continuing them.

Sunnī *Qādhīs*, therefore, were appointed with these ends in view to fourteen centres by the end of 1918, and to twelve additional ones by the end of 1920, as well as to the *Shara'* Court set up in Baghdad in July, 1917. A long standing grievance was partly remedied by permitting Shī'is to refer their cases to Shī'a *Qādhīs*. Under Turkish rule, the Shī'is had been forced to submit their personal status cases, if they took them to court, to the Sunnī *Shara'* Courts where the cases were decided in accordance with Sunnī Law. Shī'a religious Judges under the name of *Nayabat-al-Ja'fariya* were appointed in 1918 to six centres and to six others by the end of 1920.

Criminal Courts

692 The reorganization of the Criminal Courts was more difficult
175* than that of the Civil Courts. The Ottoman Criminal Pro-
727* cedure required a multitude of Courts, investigating magistrates

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[1] Courts' Proclamation, Section 9.

[2] Ibid., Section 6.

[3] Ibid., Section 10.

[4] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1917, p. 4 (12).

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and procurators, which it would have been beyond the capacity 692
of the Civil Administration to supply. Nor would it have 175*
conduced to the effective administration of justice if the 727*
Magistrates, most of whom were English officers with little previous experience of the administration of law, attempted to follow the elaborate Ottoman Procedure.[1]

In addition, the Ottoman Penal Code presented difficulties. 671
Although based on the French Penal Code, it had been sub- 175*
jected to so many amendments since it was issued in 1859 that 727*
it was, in the opinion of the Senior Judicial Officer, 'unscientific, ill-arranged and incomplete'.[2] The first difficulty was overcome by the creation of a special code known as the Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations,[3] brought into operation January 1st, 1919. Until then all criminal cases had been tried by Military Governors and Political Officers.

Although the Regulations adopted one or two sections from the Ottoman Criminal Procedure,[4] the ultimate origin of which was the French Criminal Procedure, its main provisions revealed the inability of those in the Civil Administration to dissociate themselves from Indian traditions or to escape from the application of British Military Law. Both of these formed the basis of the Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure from which the Regulations were drawn. The new Regulations were admittedly subject to the exigencies of war and of military occupation.[5] Offences committed by members of the Army of Occupation even against the inhabitants of the country were not to be tried under them. It was expected, however, that after the conclusion of hostilities, a permanent Code would be prepared.

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1920, p. 2 (7).

[2] *Memorandum on Baghdad Penal Code*, by the Senior Judicial Officer, November 21st, 1918. Also *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 2 (7).

[3] Promulgated by Proclamation of General Officer Commanding, November 15th, 1918. (These Regulations hereafter *Bd. C. P. Reg.*).

[4] Particularly Chapters iii and ix, concerning Procurators, and Chapter xi, concerning Civil Complaints and Civil Damages. For Ottoman Criminal Procedure, see Young, Sir G., op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 226 ff.

[5] *Bd. C. P. Reg.*, Sec. 2 (1).

727* Four classes of Criminal Courts were to be constituted:
175* 1. Courts of Session; 2. Courts of Magistrates of the First Class;
671 3. Courts of Magistrates of the Second Class. 4. Courts of
692 Magistrates of the Third Class.[1] A Court of Session was to be a Court consisting of three Magistrates, of whom one at least must be a Magistrate of the First Class.[2] Political Officers and British Judges were to be Magistrates of the First Class, Assistant Political Officers and Arab Judges were to be Magistrates of the Second Class.[3] The Civil Commissioners might appoint any person a Magistrate of the First, Second or Third Class.[4]

The Ottoman Penal Code was replaced on January 1st, 1919, by the Baghdad Penal Code,[5] based largely on the former, but with amendments and additions from Egyptian sources, in turn based on the French Penal Code.

Among the tribes, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation continued to be applied with considerable success.[6] It was regarded in the tribal areas as 'undoubtedly the most satisfactory' method of settling tribal disputes,[7] as the reason for decrease of crime[8] and as 'one of the props of the tribal system'.[9] Although doubt was cast on both the wisdom and ability of the Administration to continue the tribal system indefinitely,[10] only in 'Amāra Division was uncertainty felt as to the usefulness at that time of the Tribal Disputes Regulation.[11]

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[1] *Bd. C. P. Reg*, Sec. 4.

[2] Ibid., Sec. 5.

[3] Ibid., Sec. 6.

[4] Ibid., Sec. 5.

[5] Promulgated by Proclamation of the General Officer Commanding, November 21st, 1918.

[6] For views of Political Officers: *Admin. Reports*, 1918: *Shatrah* (*Nasiriyah*), p. 387; *Qurnah*, p. 306; *Kut*, p. 384; *Admin. Report*, *Hillah*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3; *'Amarah Division Admin. Report*, 1920-1921 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 7; *Monthly Rep'ts., January*, 1919, Basra Sanjaq, p. 32.

[7] *Admin. Reports*, 1918: *Hillah*, p. 127.

[8] Ibid., *Nasiriyah*, p. 355.

[9] Ibid., *Hillah District*, p. 144.

[10] Ibid., *'Amarah*, p. 336; *Hillah District*, p. 34; *Hillah Division*, pp. 120-1; *'Amarah Report*, 1919, p. 9; *'Amarah Report*, 1920-1921, p. 25.

[11] *'Amarah Report*, 1919, p. 11.

Amalgamation of Basra and Baghdad Courts and the Creation of the Judicial Department

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The political and administrative considerations which motivated the amalgamation of the administration of the Basra and Baghdad wilayets in September, 1918,[1] applied with equal force to the judicial systems which had not then been assimilated.[2] On January 1st, 1919, however, the two systems were finally consolidated,[3] the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code and all Indian and British Acts operative under it being repealed with the exception of nine Indian Laws and one English Law, set forth in a special schedule. 'The change was effected without difficulty and was welcomed by the population since it replaced a foreign system of law and procedure by one with which they were familiar.'[4]

The judicial system of Mōsul, the administration of which H.M. Government had at one time desired to organize separately, in anticipation of it being assigned to France at the Peace Settlement, was also assimilated, on the same date, to the system in operation throughout the Occupied Territories.

The number of Courts established under the Civil Administration, 1914-20, had been recognized as being as insufficient as the number under the Turks had been excessive.[5] Expansion and reform, however, had proved difficult owing to the necessity of subordinating the policy of the Department to that of the General Administration, owing to the lack of funds[6] and to the

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 111-112.

[2] Cogent reasons for amalgamating the two judicial systems were advanced in *Review Admin. Basrah*, 1917, p. 6.

[3] *Basrah Courts' Amalgamation Proclamation*, 1918, by the General Officer Commanding, December 24th, 1918.

[4] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 4 (12); *Admin Report*, 1918: *Nasiriyah*, p. 355.

[5] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 1; ibid., 1919, p. 2 (4).

[6] Ibid., 1920, p. 8 (16). The proportion of expenditure on Judicial services to total expenditure and to receipts, based on figures given in Table I, p. 152, is as follows:

727* 175* difficulty in finding suitable staff, whether 'Iraqī or English, to undertake them.[1]

671 622 Recognition was not lacking of the unsatisfactory nature of legislation which, during the whole period of the Occupation was by proclamation by the General Officer Commanding, or by regulations or orders issued by the chief civil authority and the Judicial Officer, under authority of the General Officer Commanding. Lieut.-Colonel Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, in his report for 1917 had commented:

> It is high time that he (Senior Judicial officer) be relieved of his legislative duties, which should be the special task of a legal Secretary . . . Assigning work to one such person would put an end to notices of spurious legality, threatening the public with dire and unspecified penalties for dubious offences.[2]

Mr. Bonham-Carter, on his side, believed that while considerable legislation would be necessary before the Courts could contribute to better conditions in 'Iraq, no radical legislative improvements could be undertaken without the coming of peace and without a Representative Legislative body.[3]

Under Mr. Bonham-Carter, the policy of employing 'Iraqīs

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1920, p. 8 (16).

[2] *Review Admin. Basrah*, 1917: *Report on Admin. of Civil and Criminal Justice in Basrah Wilayet, by Courts established under the I.O.T. Code, during* 1917, p. 107.

[3] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 9 (23); ibid., 1920, p. 8 (16).

	1917–18	1918–19	1919–20
	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees
Percentage of Expenditure on Judicial services to total Expenditure	2·14%	2·24%	1·78%
Percentage of Expenditure on Judicial services to total Receipts	1·57%	1·41%	1·43%

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both as Judges and as clerical staff was applied from the first. 727*
Although difficulty was often experienced in making suitable 175*
selections of Judges and *Qādhīs*,[1] he 'had no hesitation in saying 671
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TABLE II

The following Table indicates the nationality of personnel of the Judicial Department, 1918-20.

	1918* (Baghdad Wilayet only)	1919†	1920‡
British	6	10	11
Indians	—	4	6
'Iraqīs (Muslims)	82	197	247
,, (Christians)	1	9	12
,, (Jews)	9	9	12
Syrians	—	1	1
Egyptians	—	1	—
Armenians	2	1	—
Total non 'Iraqīs (A)	8	17	19
Total 'Iraqīs (B)	92	215	271
Percentage of (A)	8	7·3	6·6

* *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 5. † Ibid., 1919, p. 8. ‡ Ibid., 1920, p. 7.

that the work had been done efficiently'[2] through the 'valuable services of the Arab Judges and staff', without whose 'help it would have been hardly possible . . . to carry out the policy of applying Turkish Law and Procedure'.[3]

To this policy of rendering more than lip-service to the principle of employing Arabs wherever possible may be attributed the comparative immunity of the Judicial Department from the criticism and hostility directed by 'Iraqī Nationalists, during the period before the establishment of the National Government, against the unsympathetic attitude in other Departments of the Civil Administration.

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[1] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 6 (15).

[2] Ibid., p. 2 (5).

[3] Ibid., p. 6 (15). Also ibid., 1920, p. 8 (15).

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175 that no Shī'ī held a portfolio on the Council. Their resentment
642 was not decreased by the fact that of five *Mutasarrifs* and nine
727 *Qaimmāqams* on the list, only one, a *Qaimmāqam*, was of their
647 sect. The High Commissioner, however, realized the difficulty
795 of avoiding Sunnī appointments. Only a few trained and experienced Shī'īs were available as a result both of their habitual boycott of Turkish service and professional schools and of official Turkish discouragement to the entrance of Shī'īs into office and schools. The list with minor alterations was, therefore, approved in late January, 1921. When, however, the predominantly Sunnī Council continued to indicate, by appointing Sunnīs to the almost entirely Shī'a districts along the Euphrates, that it was prepared to do little to conciliate hostile opinion of the sect, the High Commissioner felt obliged to make a firm stand for the appointment of Shī'īs to such places, at least, where members of the sect predominated. After considerable persuasion, also, a place in the Council was found for a Shī'ī, the Ministry of Education being offered to Saiyid Muhammad Mahdī Tobatabai of Karbalā.

175 The reorganization of the Judicial Department under the
642 new administration entailed comparatively few changes.
727 Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who now became Adviser to the
692 Ministry of Justice, had early adopted the policy of making the fullest use of 'Iraqis as judges and officials, and of making no alterations in the institutions and laws with which the people were familiar, except in cases of clear necessity. The idea itself of an Arab Minister was not new. Sir Edgar had suggested such an appointment in early 1919,[1] but it had been deemed premature.

Reorganization of the Criminal Courts became necessary, however, when the Council of State adopted its scheme of reconstructing provincial administration along the lines of the Turkish system. One of the essential features of that system was the complete separation of the executive from the judicial

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[1] Memorandum on Place of the Arab in Administration, February 5th, 1919.

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function, whereas under the system employed by the Civil 175x
Administration, the British officials, who were now to assume 642x
advisory functions only, had been given both executive and 727x
judicial functions.[1] The plans for the reorganization of 692
Criminal Courts, when submitted to the Council of State on March 3rd, also included a scheme to strengthen the Court of Appeal by the addition of two judges and to vest in that Court the powers of confirmation and revision formerly exercised by the High Commissioner. Similarly, the powers of revision held by the Political Officers in their divisions were transferred to the Courts of First Instance in the *Liwās*.[2] In those *Liwās* where Judicial work was light, a Single Judge and an Assistant Judge with powers of a Court of First Instance was approved, in accordance with a scheme which had been brought into force by the Turks just before the outbreak of the war.[3] The scheme, as sanctioned by the Council, came into force on May 14th.[4]

Under the Civil Administration, the frequent and numerous appeals to Constantinople, a feature of the Ottoman Judicial System, had been abolished. The Court of Appeal as instituted instead had been also made the Court of Revision for all subordinate Courts. The Council of State now maintained that a Court of Revision or Cassation should be created, distinct from the Court of Appeal. The establishment of such a Court, it held, would be in accordance with Ottoman Law. It would relieve the Court of Appeal of much of its existing work and would in addition constitute a subordinate Court for appeals in important civil cases.[5] Although the desirability of exercising economy and of avoiding multiplicity of appeals appeared to weigh heavily against the Council's proposals, the policy of supporting the institutions to which popular ideas seemed

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[1] *Supra*, p. 129.

[2] *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 5.

[3] Ibid., p. 6.

[4] The Courts' (Revision) Proclamation, 1921: *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 4-6. The outline of the Courts as sanctioned is given in detail in *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 6.

[5] *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 7.

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642 wedded, triumphed. The erection of the Court was sanctioned.
727 Owing to financial and other reasons, it was not instituted,
692 however, until December 24th, 1925.[1]

175 The transfer of function and authority in financial matters
642 from the British Administration to the National Government,
727 perhaps the most complicated and difficult task of all, was
652 hampered not only by the abnormal conditions resulting from
the Insurrection, but also by the inheritance of a tangled web of financial transaction between the Military and the Civil authorities of the previous regime. This legacy conspired to unsettle the Ministry's operations even after the Cairo Conference, in March, 1921, at which the Finance Minister, Sasūn Effendi, himself taking part, had presumably settled the issues at stake among the various British authorities.[2]

An outstanding difficulty also lay in the fact that all matters pertaining to Finance were not placed under the supervision of the Ministry. This non-centralization of authority may have been due to the desire to establish checks on possible unsound administration. It is more probable that it came about as the result of the inherited British system which in this case had been taken over without great alteration. Following the system in vogue in India, the Civil Administration had introduced two secretariats, those of Revenue and of Finance, and eventually a third, that of Commerce, to deal with financial matters.[3] Upon the establishment of the provisional Government, the duties of the Finance Secretary were vested in the Minister of

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[1] Royal '*Irāda* for formation of a Court of Cassation, December 24th, 1925: *Compilation of Laws and Regulations from 1st January*, 1925, *to 31st December*, 1925 (Baghdad, 1926), p. 36.

[2] For résumé of financial arrangements reached at the Cairo Conference and their effect on 'Iraq finances, see *Note on the Administration of the Public Finances of 'Iraq, 1st April, to November*, 1924 (Baghdad, 1925), pp. 11-18.

[3] For the manifold duties of the Revenue Department, see *supra*, p. 119. The Finance Department had dealt with all expenditure, currency and resource matters, Budget estimates, accounts and audits. The Secretary for Commerce had been also Chief Collector of Customs until the abolition of the Secretaryship, August, 1920, brought Customs under the Finance Department. See *Note on Organization of Civil Admin. of Meso.*, April, 1920.

66/of their position for their personal profit.[1] Lesser officials have too often followed the example of their superiors. Attempts have been made to impose checks, as by the auditing of government accounts by a British Comptroller and Auditor General responsible only to the Chamber of Deputies. This official has performed his task ably and efficiently,[2] but the results of his work have not been as extensive as might have been expected, due to the reluctance of Parliament to take action, particularly against highly placed or influential officials.

Justice

Two distinct tasks have fallen to the Minister of Justice in 'Iraq: the organization and the administrative supervision of the courts and the drafting and codifying of legislation not only for the assurance of public justice but also for the regulation and development of other administrative services.

692 In the period 1925 to 1932, the number of Civil Courts was extended until they were in operation in varying degrees at forty-eight centres. Criminal Justice continued to be administered by the Civil Judges of these courts and also, in certain cases, by Administrative Inspectors and other senior officials. *Shara'* or Muslim Religious Law Courts continued to be established, not only in all centres where Civil Courts were provided but also in other places. Spiritual Courts to enable the Jewish and Christian communities to deal with their own religious law were set up in 1931,[3] in accordance with Articles 78-80 and 112 of the Constitution.

In the creation and administration of the *Shara'* Courts, including those established for the Shi'a sect, a tendency has been noticed to assimilate them with the Civil Courts in order

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[1] An outstanding instance has been the passage of legislation, remitting revenue on lands irrigated by pumps, by a Minister of Finance, who, as one of the largest owners of such lands, saved himself £3000 in taxes annually.

[2] *Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on Accounts of the Government of 'Iraq*: 1922 . . . (Baghdad, 1924 . . .).

[3] *Compilation*, 1931, Armenian Orthodox Community Law, No. 70 of 1931: Jewish Community Law, No. 77 of 1931.

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that eventually all cases involving Religious Law will be heard 692 in the Civil Courts, along the lines of the Judicial system in force in present-day Turkey. Steps towards that end have been the appointment wherever possible of Civil Judges to act also as *Qādhīs* of the *Shara'* Courts,[1] and the passing of a law legalizing the transfer of law cases from *Shara'* Courts to Civil Courts. These steps have been facilitated both by the ability of the 'Iraqī Civil Judges to administer the *Shara'* Law and by the evident approval of a substantial portion of the public who have found in Turkey, both past and present, the model for 'Iraqī statecraft.

In the administration of justice in tribal areas, the application 671 of the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations[2] has 619 continued but with much controversy. On the one hand, it has been held that the tribes represent a class unfamiliar with the laws and conventions applicable in a more highly civilized society, but possessing a code which, although harsh and even repellent, is definite and is recognized among themselves. The code, according to this view, should be applied to the tribes through the Tribal Disputes Regulations until such time as the normal system of justice can be brought into force among them. This has been the viewpoint of the Ministry of Interior charged with administering the Regulations. On the other hand, it is contended that two systems of justice should not exist side by side in 'Iraq; that much evasion of justice has already occurred through non-tribesmen claiming the right to be tried under the Regulations; and that tribesmen must be assimilated by the body politic. This opinion, although it may not be put forward officially by the Ministry of Justice, has nevertheless influenced the policy of responsible 'Iraqī officials in the Ministry. It has also been repeatedly presented in the Chamber, principally by urban deputies who in their speeches have voiced the prejudices of the greater part of the townsmen of 'Iraq.

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[1] In 1931, Civil Court Judges were also *Shara' Qādhīs* in 24 places.

[2] As amended, December 28th, 1924. See *Compilation*, 1924, p. 63.

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discrimination in accordance with capacity. Finally, Article 37 641
states that the method of election to the Chamber of Deputies 563
shall take into account the necessity for the representation of non-Islamic minorities.

Some of these guarantees have been reinforced by particular laws. Thus the Electoral Law of 1924 allotted four deputies [646]
to the Christians and four to the Jews; it is a matter for dispute whether the law permits individual Christians and Jews to be elected as representatives of the ordinary constituencies. Similarly the non-Moslem communities were given representation in local and municipal councils by special laws.

As for the linguistic minorities, the Local Languages Law of [656]
1931 provided that the official language should be Kurdish or Turkish in a number of districts, and in addition that in all elementary and primary schools in those districts the language of instruction should be the mother-tongue of the majority of the pupils.

Personal Status and Communal Organization

The grant to religious minorities of jurisdiction in personal 692
and other matters has not met with the same difficulties as those 563
which have occurred in Syria. Articles 75 and 78 of the Constitution provided for the establishment of Christian and Jewish Spiritual Councils, with powers of jurisdiction to be conferred upon them by special laws. Their functions were defined in Article 79 as including matters relating to marriage, dowry, divorce, separation, alimony, attestation of wills and any other matters relating to personal status if the parties concerned consented. Every religious community was also, according to Article 112, to have the right to establish bodies competent to administer Waqf property.

In application of these provisions, several laws have been issued for particular communities, defining the method of appointment of the spiritual heads of the communities and of their councils, both spiritual and lay, and their functions in regard not only to personal status but also the decision of religious questions, the training of ecclesiastics, the administration of Waqf property, and the administration of schools and charitable institutions. For those communities for which special laws have not yet been issued, the old Turkish law on the subject remains valid.

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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dence for a period not exceeding eight days. The Chamber shall not be dissolved during that period. 642 645

Art. 67. A Minister shall despatch all business relating to his Ministry and departments attached thereto in manner prescribed by law.

PART V

THE JUDICATURE

Art. 68. Judges shall be appointed by Royal Irada and may only be removed in the circumstances mentioned in the special law dealing with the conditions governing their qualifications, appointment, grades and method of dismissal. 642 692

Art. 69. The Courts shall be divided into three classes:

1. Civil Courts.
2. Religious Courts.
3. Special Courts.

Art. 70. The manner of instituting the Courts, the places where they are to be established, the grades, divisions, jurisdiction and supervision thereof, and the execution of judgments, shall be determined by special laws, subject to the provisions of this law.

Art. 71. The Courts shall be free from all interference in the conduct of their affairs.

Art. 72. All sittings of the Courts shall be open to the public, unless some legal justification exists for holding sittings *in camera*. Judgments of the Courts, as well as the proceedings thereof, may be published, except those relating to sittings held *in camera*. All judgments shall issue in the name of the King.

Art. 73. The Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction over all persons in Iraq, in all actions and civil and criminal matters, and those brought by or against the Iraq Government, with the exception of actions and matters coming within the jurisdiction of the religious or special Courts, as stated hereinafter in this law, or in any other law in force.

Art. 74. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts includes civil, commercial and criminal matters, in accordance with the laws in force, provided that, in matters relating to the personal status of foreigners and in other civil and commercial matters in which by international custom the terms of the law of a foreign country are to be applied,

642 such law shall be applied in manner to be prescribed by special law.

692 Art. 75. The religious Courts shall be divided into:

1. Shara' Courts.
2. The Spiritual Councils of the Communities.

Art. 76. The Shara' Courts alone shall be competent to deal with actions relating to the personal status of Muslims and actions relating to the administration of Waqf foundations.

Art. 77. Justice shall be administered in the Shara' Courts in accordance with the terms of the Shara' doctrine peculiar to each of the Islamic sects, in conformity with the terms of a special law. The Qadhi shall be a member of the sect to which the majority of the inhabitants of the place to which he is appointed belong, maintaining the appointment of both *Sunni* and *Ja'feri* Qadhis in the cities of Baghdad and Basra.

Art. 78. The Spiritual Councils of the Communities include the Jewish Spiritual Councils and the Christian Spiritual Councils. Such Councils shall be established, and powers of jurisdiction conferred upon them, by a special law.

Art. 79. The Spiritual Councils shall be competent to deal with the following matters:

1. Matters relating to marriage, dowry, divorce, separation, alimony, attestations of wills other than those attested by a notary public (with the exception of those matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts relating to members of the community), but excluding foreigners who are members of such community.

2. Any other matter of personal status relating to members of the communities, if the parties so agree.

Art. 80. The procedure to be followed and the fees to be levied in the Spiritual Councils of the Communities shall be prescribed by special law. Succession, freedom of testamentary disposition and similar matters relating to personal status not coming within the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Councils of the Communities shall be regulated by law.

Art. 81 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. The High Court will assemble to try Ministers and members of Parliament for political offences or offences connected with their public duties, and to try judges of the Court of Cassation for offences arising out of their

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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duties, and to decide matters connected with the interpretation of this law and the conformity of other laws to this law. 642 692

Art. 82 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) If it be necessary to hold a trial before the High Court the case shall be submitted to the Court by a resolution of accusation, passed by the Chamber of Deputies, separately in each case, by a majority composed of two thirds of the members present.

2) Other matters shall be submitted to the High Court by decision of the Council of Ministers or of one of the Assemblies of Parliament.

3) The High Court shall be constituted of eight members, beside the President, to be chosen by the Senate, four of them being senators and four of them being judges of the Court of Cassation or other senior judges. The Court will sit under the presidency of the President of the Senate or, if he cannot be present, his deputy.

Art. 83 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* If it is required to decide a matter connected with the interpretation of the provisions of this law, or to decide whether a law in force contravenes the provisions of this law, the High Court will assemble by virtue of a Royal Irada, to be issued with the consent of the Council of Ministers, after the Court has been constituted as prescribed by paragraph 3 of the preceding article. If Parliament is not in session the members shall be appointed by decision of the Council of Ministers and Royal Irada.

Art. 84 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* If it is necessary to interpret laws or regulations in circumstances other than those described in the preceding article, or if it is necessary to decide whether a regulation contravenes the law on which it is based, a Diwan Khas shall, at the request of the Minister concerned, be constituted under the presidency of the President of the Civil Court of Cassation or, if he is unable to attend, the Vice-President. The members shall be chosen as prescribed by a special law, three of them from the judges of the Court of Cassation and three from the senior military officers if the law in question concerns the armed forces, or three from the senior administrative officials if the law concerns administrative matters.

Art. 85 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Cases tried by the High Court shall be decided according to law. An accused person shall not be declared guilty except by a majority of two thirds of the Court.

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The decisions of the Court are final. Persons who are accused by the Chamber of Deputies shall forthwith relinquish their duties. Resignation shall not be a bar to prosecution.

Art. 86 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) Every decision of the High Court declaring that a law or any provision of a law contravenes the provisions of this law shall issue by majority of two thirds of the Court. If a decision of this nature is issued, then the law, or the offending portion thereof, will stand repealed from the date on which the decision was issued, provided that the Government shall introduce legislation providing for compensation for damage which may have been caused by the application of the repealed provisions.

2) Every decision issuing from the Diwan Khas, declaring that a regulation, or some provision thereof, contravenes the law on which it is based, shall be by a majority of two thirds of the Diwan. If a decision of this kind is issued, then the regulation, or the offending part thereof, shall stand repealed from the date of the issue of the decision.

Art. 87. Decisions taken by the High Court regarding matters referred to in Article 83 (with the exception of those matters referred to in Article 86) and taken by the Diwan Khas regarding matters referred to in Article 84 shall be taken by a majority of the Court of Diwan Khas. Such decisions shall apply to all Courts and Government Departments.

Art. 88. Special Courts or Committees shall be set up when necessary for dealing with the following matters:

1) For the trial of members of the Iraq Military Forces for offences mentioned in the Military Penal Code.

2) For settling criminal and civil cases relating to the tribes in accordance with tribal custom as provided for by special law.

3 For the settlement of disputes arising between the Government and Government servants concerning their duties.

4) For investigating disputes relating to the possession or boundaries of lands.

5) *(as added October 27, 1943).* Courts-martial and Special Courts set up in the circumstances described in Article 120 of this law.

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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Art. 89 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. The procedure in the 642
Special Courts and the fees to be collected therein and the manner of 692
appeal against, or revision of, the judgments thereof, shall be prescribed by law.

PART VI

FINANCIAL MATTERS

Art. 90. All taxes and excise dues shall remain unaltered as from 642
the coming into force of this law, until changed by law. 652

Art. 91 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. Taxes and dues shall not be imposed except by law, provided that this shall not apply to charges collected by Government Departments in return for public services rendered by them or in return for the enjoyment of State property. Taxes and duties may not be imposed by ordinance.

Art. 92 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. Taxes and dues must be collected from the tax payers without distinction and none of them shall be exempted therefrom except by law.

Art. 93. No property of the State may be sold, granted, leased or otherwise disposed of except in accordance with law.

Art. 94. No monopoly or concession shall be granted for dealing with or using any of the natural resources of the land, or for any public service, nor shall the State revenues be farmed out, except in accordance with law, provided that, where the period relating to them exceeds three years, they must in each case be the subject of a special law.

Art. 95. The Government may not contract any loan, nor undertake anything involving payment out of public monies, except in accordance with a special law, unless the Budget Law makes provision therefor.

Art. 96. All monies received by Government officials must be paid into the State Treasury and accounted for in accordance with such procedure as is prescribed by law.

Art. 97. No salary may be allotted, nor remuneration paid, nor any monies belonging to the State Treasury expended for any reason whatsoever, except in accordance with law. No item in the budget estimates shall be expended except in such manner as is prescribed by law.

Art. 98. The budget estimates shall be sanctioned by an annual

probably at the instigation of the Agha, because he was held to have corrupted the morals of the youth. K 609

Health services need not concern us. In the area studied there is no resident doctor outside the city of Erbil. 758

The Government have made various experiments in agricultural reform chiefly with a view to improving the breed of livestock and the quality of valuable crops such as tobacco. The Government's interest in the improvement of the tobacco crop is especially relevant to the area here described. Details will be discussed later but it may be pointed out that Government assistance of this kind is not a philanthropic enterprise. The heavy excise duty levied on all saleable tobacco much more than repays any expenses incurred. Iraq 635 K 249

The independent judiciary functions through its court in Erbil. In practice however it is in the nature of appeal court, since in the first instance cases come before the Mudir (sub-district magistrate) and then before the Qa'im Maqam (district magistrate) before being referred to the court. I am not clear as to the rules governing "appeal" of this sort, nor as to the limits of sentence that can be imposed by the magistrates' courts. So far as I know, only serious cases such as homicide automatically go before the court at Erbil. Iraq 635 692 ●

During time of peace the military are stationed only at Erbil and Rowandus. There appears to be a general attitude of suspicion and conflict as between the civil and the military authorities. In this area the civil service is staffed mainly by Kurds and Turks and is thus in general inclination Kurdo-phil. The army on the other hand is staffed mainly by Iraqi-Arabs whose hatred and fear of the "barbarous Kurd" can be taken for granted. 635 701 K 578

The liwa is divided into several districts (khasa) each presided over by a district magistrate (Qa'im Maqam). Area A, Map 1 with which this account is mainly concerned lies wholly within the khasa of Rowandus. The Qa'im Maqam is responsible for his district in much the same way as the Mutasarrif is responsible for his liwa. Iraq 635

The khasa in turn is subdivided into several sub-districts (nahiya) over which presides a Mudir. The Balik tribe all reside within the nahiya Balik - the administrative district in this case coinciding with the tribal one. Dergala on the other hand is administered from Rowandus.

The Mudir has in his direct control a number of policemen who provide the direct liaison between the external authority and the tribe. It is the venality of these junior officials which is the worst feature of the system, and which is the real source of Iraq 635 625

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

692 was H. F. Forbes, I.C.S., in 1920–1, B. H. Bell in 1921–2, and thereafter G. Alexander until 1934. Davidson on transfer to the staff of the High Commission handed the Advisership of Justice in [671] 1922 to E. M. Drower, who held it till 1946. The Turkish Majalla, Code of Civil Procedure, and Commercial and Maritime Codes remained in force. Criminal justice was in the hands of single magistrates with first, second or third-class powers, and Courts of Sessions which possessed also appeal jurisdiction, while limited magisterial powers were still possessed by certain administrative officials and municipal bodies. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, beloved of administrative officials but disliked by the legally-minded. The rights of foreigners, preferential though no longer Capitulatory, were defined in the Judicial Agreement. 693 Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a Bar Association for the body of excitable, ill-disciplined advocates, into whose numbers the Law School poured annual recruits.

701 The forces of law and order were at this period four in number: the 'Iraq Army, British forces of ground and air, the 'Iraq Levies, and the Police. The 'Iraq Army, based on voluntary recruitment from 1921 onwards and within its limits conceived on the most modern lines, by 1925 rose in strength to 7,500 men. It remained constant at about this establishment for the next eight years. There were six infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, two mountain and one field battery, and all necessary services. The officers had almost all served in the Turkish Army, but in the lower ranks at least were adaptable to new standards. Units of the Army took part in many small operations against tribal enemies and saw more serious service in Kurdistan, not without losses. Great attention was paid to its Training Centre and its Royal Military College. The British Military Mission was re-formed and increased in 1925.[1] By this date the Army's rôle of successor, for all ground purposes, of the British forces was clearly indicated. 000 The latter were progressively reduced, actually to vanishing point in 1929. In March 1921 there were 33 infantry battalions, 6 cavalry regiments, 16 batteries, and Sapper and armoured-car companies: these by 1926 were reduced to three battalions, two by 1927, one by 1928, and vanished entirely in 1929. The British military element, so characteristic of 'Iraq under the Occupation, was thenceforward to be absent until 1941. The Royal Air Force—under successive commanders of high rank, nearly all of whom were

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[1] Successive heads of the British Military Mission, and Advisers to the Ministry of Defence, were: Colonel P. Joyce, 1921; Major-General A. C. Daly, 1925; Major-General G. G. Loch, 1928; Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, 1931; Major-General C. J. Bruce-Hay, 1934; Major-General H. W. M. Watson, 1937; Major-General G. G. Waterhouse, 1938; Major-General D. G. Bromilow, 1941; Major-General J. M. L. Renton, 1944.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

Conflicts of Jurisdiction between Courts;[1] and other laws inter- 671
preting Part V, The Judicature, of the Constitution; the Law of Associations[2] and the Press Law.[3]

A further heavy burden on the Ministry of Justice has been the constant necessity of reviewing and of preparing legislative amendments in accordance with the changing needs of the country, to the three forms of law in force in 'Iraq:

(1) the Ottoman Laws in force in 'Iraq before the British Military Occupation, in so far as they have not been amended or repealed by the enactments of the Army Commander during the Occupation or by the enactments of the successive Governments after the Occupation;

(2) the proclamations, regulations, or laws issued by the Army Commander, the Civil Commissioner, the High Commissioner, and the 'Iraqi Government, respectively, between the 5th November, 1914, and the 21st March, 1925;

(3) Laws enacted by the 'Iraqi Parliament since the 21st March, 1925.[4]

Such amending legislation has been of necessity slow and laborious, but it has resulted in the partial redrafting of the Penal Code, the Civil Procedure Code and other legislation inherited from previous regimes.

In the work of the Ministry, both in the Courts and in the 693
supervision of judicial administration and of legislation, the 671
British officials, never more than six in number from 1926 to late 1932, have played decisive parts. These officials in their various positions guaranteed under the Judicial Agreement of 1924, as Adviser to the Minister, as President of the Court of Appeal and as the four Judges of Courts of First Instance, have ensured speedy justice to 'Iraqis as well as to foreigners in so far as has lain within their power. They have also assisted their colleagues in the interpretation of the provisions of the Con-

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[1] *Compilation*, 1929, No. 8 of 1929.

[2] Ibid., 1926, p. 3.

[3] Ibid., 1931, No. 82 of 1931.

[4] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 83.

693 671 stitution. Their principal contribution, however, has been their aid in creating a standard for the administration of justice and the conduct of the courts. Their insistence on justice without regard to distinctions of class or religion and their unfaltering rectitude in conformity with the best British traditions have left what may be hoped is an indelible imprint on the Judicial system of 'Iraq. To them is due in a great degree the high standard of justice which prevailed in 'Iraq before 1932. Their task has never been an easy one. The traditions inherited from Ottoman days that justice could be bought and that a Judgeship was a means of amassing a fortune, were too deeply ingrained to be eradicated easily and at once. As great an obstacle to equity in the courts was the unfortunate susceptibility of the Judges to outside influences, personal, official and religious. Thus the decisions of Judges of otherwise impeachable integrity have been known to be swayed by fear of public criticism, of the threatened displeasure of high officials or by political and religious motives.

Education

871 The British educational policy for 'Iraq from the time of the Civil Administration largely centred around the provision of primary schools supplemented by denominational schools. The policy of the 'Iraq Government, in brief, has been the extension of a system of national schools, primary and secondary, accompanied by the gradual elimination of denominational schools with their connotations of foreign and consequently undesirable influences.

Between these two policies has been waged incessant war, in which British officials employed by the Ministry usually gave way, particularly as they were rarely supported by the Residency to the same degree as were their colleagues in other Ministries. Moreover, control passed to 'Iraqī officials throughout the Ministry earlier than in any other Ministry or

463 each kind of goods has its special section of the bazaar.
565 The brass- and copper-smiths' quarter rings like a small
441 boiler factory all day long. The artisans who are engaged in producing these commodities form a considerable section of the Mesopotamian city population and are fairly prosperous and contented, much more so than the date gardeners of the outside districts. Supreme over them all stands the Mesopotamian silver worker, whose antimony silver work can scarcely be duplicated anywhere in the world.

463 The professional classes in these Mesopotamian cities
871 are fairly well developed. There are teachers of every
794 sort. Some of them have been trained abroad, but many
177 are indigenous and a very great credit to the schools that have turned them out. There are a number of government schools, and in addition the different religious sects maintain schools of their own. In these days when western education is in great demand, the schools of the Jews and the Christians are patronized by an increasing number of Mohammedans. No local medical profession has
463 been developed as yet, but the wealth and the culture of
759 Mosul, Baghdad and Basra have attracted a considerable number of trained physicians from outside. We have therefore the beginnings of a medical profession, and although it is not yet indigenous, it will soon become so. Its ethics are not of a very high order; the campaign of the American College of Surgeons to abolish fee-splitting would not make much headway among Mesopotamian doctors, but time will develop ethical standards, and at the worst the profession is a long way in advance
463 of the quacks that infest Arabia proper. There is also a
693 well-established group of lawyers. One of the results of the governing of the country for hundreds of years by

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the Turks, a foreign Power, was the development of an elaborate judicial procedure and a vast deal of red tape in all government business. It is not possible to see that the consequent appearance of a legal profession has brought any great blessings in its train.

565 These various professional groups, together with the prosperous merchants, have gradually come to constitute a leisured middle class somewhat similar to that in America. This development is confined to the three large cities, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, with Amara as a possible addition to the list. In these cities the rich merchants and land-owners have fortunes comparable with small fortunes in America. They have accounts in New York, in Manchester and in the Continental centers, and import goods direct from all of these places. Many of them read French or English. They take newspapers and keep in touch with the life of the world. This class of merchants and land-owners is the most civilized of any Arab community to be found anywhere. Many of them have traveled in India and Syria, and no small number have even visited Europe. Some of the doctors and lawyers have studied in Paris and Berlin and Vienna. There is a considerable amount of real culture among these men and women even now, and the next generation promises to show far more.

000 These three large cities are by far the most advanced section of Mesopotamia. They appear to have in them a large degree of modern civilization. Nevertheless, even in these cities there is more tinsel than real gold. One questions in pessimistic moments whether there is anything except tinsel, in spite of all that has been done to give Mesopotamia a good government, general education and modern improvements. As far as population is con-

imprisonment not exceeding two months or to both, fine and imprisonment. 312 466

The Directorate-General of Irrigation may undertake the clearance of irrigation canals by machinery, and the persons benefiting from such work shall refund the costs so incurred. (Last para. of Art. 14, added by Amending Law of 1945).

3) Offences and Penalties under the Irrigation and Embankments Law 312 681

Articles 15 to 18 deal with offences and penalties, in addition to those already mentioned.

Article 15 prescribes the death penalty for whomsoever wilfully and maliciously damages or alters any irrigation work thereby causing injury to life or to property and with penal servitude for life, or a term not exceeding 15 years, if it does not.

Article 16 lists a series of offences punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two months or a fine not exceeding 500 rupees of to both imprisonment and fine. Among the offences stipulated herein are:

Damage, alteration and obstruction to any irrigation work, interference with the supply of water; fouling of water; destruction, tampering with, or alteration of land, level marks or water gauges; damages caused to canal or flood enbankments by grazing cattle; refusal or neglect to supply labor; neglect to prevent waste of water; obstruction to Government official from executing their duties; etc. Addition to or cancellation or alteration to the above list may be made by Regulation (**Article 20**).

Article 17 prescribes a fine not exceeding 30 rupees for persons failing to comply with a notice to execute repairs, within the time specified in such notice.

4) Miscellaneous Provisions

In any proceedings on offences mentioned in Articles 12 and 16 thereof, before a Magistrate, a report signed by an assistant engineer or by any senior official in the Irrigation Department may be accepted as evidence in court. The recovery of sums due 312 681 694

312 681 694 to the irrigation department, and the procedure to be followed for their recovery though covered by Article 19 is now done through the Mutassarifs concerned in accordance with the Law for the Collection of Debts Due to the Government No. 43 of 23 April 1931 as amended by subsequent Laws.

5) Rice Cultivation

243 656 The Law for Rice Cultivation No. 23 of 31 March 1932, as subsequently amended by Law 53 of 15 May 1940, prohibits or restricts in areas defined by Regulation issued from time to time, the cultivation of rice for health reasons, economy in the use of water or soil conservation (Article 1).

Rice cultivation could only be conducted under special license (Article 4), and areas in which rice cultivation is restricted shall be fixed by Regulation (Article 2).

Regulation No. 34 of 28 August 1944, defines the regions in which rice cultivation is prohibited and also fixes areas in masharas for regions where rice could be cultivated.

The Minister of Agriculture shall decide the manner in which areas for rice cultivation alloted to each Liwa are to be distributed, and the mutassarrif concerned shall issue a notice inviting those interested to apply for the necessary permits.

Requests must be submitted to the quaimmaqam of the qadha in which the lands are situated, and the mutassarrif, to whom the requests are transferred shall issue the permits, with the requirements of the Irrigation Department. The minimum distance between rice fields and inhabited localities shall be three kilometres. The permits are non-transferable and are strictly limited to the persons and to the plot of land and irrigation works stated on them. The permit holder agrees to the rotation of water supplies determined by the Irrigation Department, and he accepts responsibility for all shortage of irrigation supply with consequent damage to crops.

6) Offences and Penalties under the Law for Rice Cultivation

243 681 It is forbidden for any person to exceed the area for rice cultivation fixed in the permits, or to cultivate without permit in prohibited and restricted areas. Contraveners shall be fined

872 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General
645 Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The
Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound
in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education
was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age
of admission to the primary school should not be less than six
and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that
'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out
in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when
[681] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this
Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

871 By this time the administration of education had been highly
systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of
645 Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration
is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of
Education controlling and supervising the most minute details
both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education
himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in
other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed
by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the
fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education
who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is
in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

872 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was
made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does
658 not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out
of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age,
not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940
an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education
provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the
declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed
in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty
[464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with
the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of
the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the
[362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where
housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is
also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other
[696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the
legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

625 Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control
of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investiga-
tion, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years
from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than
3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the
same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two
● to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great pro-
697 gress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-
'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

369 The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its
511 modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere
from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its develop-
ment by poverty. This limited the activities both of the munici-
palities and of those central Government departments whose work
[363] was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the
lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal
offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya
staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards.
291 The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the
sidara, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the
towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and pro-
fessional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by
361 many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was trans-
185 formed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public build-
366 ings, and gardens. Basra, extended threefold by the legacy of
368 war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs
of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved
streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new
buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality
ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under
the Amin al-'Asima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new
buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion,
the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service,
hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European,
an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the
Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies
for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dis-
pensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and
still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and
attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation
of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In
the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources com-
pared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs
of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting,
street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor pro-
jects for which local pride was clamoring.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

701 the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to
their mountain-born enemy.

625 The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British
inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services.
Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the
Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force,
some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist
branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security.
In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi
inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years
later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrongdoers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal
—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely
197 policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well
conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with
flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

499 Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude
of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inaccessible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechaniza-
619 tion of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made
towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance
636 on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 692 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 697 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

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[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

decide what should be taught and then the educators can decide 751
how it should be taught. 871

In the villages, the school buildings could sometimes serve as models for house-building; in any case, every school should in itself be a lesson in hygiene. Well-balanced meals are provided in the boarding schools and serve as examples for the home. Possibly the elder girls could be taught some "mothercraft", the treatment of minor ailments (cuts, abrasions, etc.), some sewing and also some domestic economy.

At present the *School Medical Service* is administered by the Ministry of Education and has a staff of 20 doctors and four dentists. In the school year 1949-50, 147,084 pupils were examined revealing splenomegaly among two percent, schistosomiasis in five percent, and trachoma in 25 percent, while 40,767 attendances were made for dental treatments. To carry out an effective program for treatment of trachoma, more school nurses will be needed.

There are several *other groups* through which health educa- 697
tion can be disseminated. Police training schools and prisons, 751
including reformatories, offer good opportunities for teaching 702
health. The Central Prison in Baghdad is a good example of cleanliness and orderliness. The Army should teach in its officer training courses that the promotion and maintenance of the health of an officer's unit is his first duty.

A few voluntary societies are now undertaking some health 751
education, but the scope of their work could be greatly increased, particularly in maternal and child welfare and in the prevention of tuberculosis. Special pronouncements could be prepared by religious societies for reading in the mosques (e.g. against the pollution of water supplies as a measure to limit the spread of schistosomiasis). Simple health notes written in the vernacular would be of help where a local newspaper is published. Short talks could be given from the national broadcasting station.

There is a great opportunity for health teaching in the projected new settlements. The staff required for such work are medical assistants, sanitary overseers, midwives and possibly public health nurses who, after having received appropriate training, will work in and from one or more village health centers.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

692 Cassation at Constantinople. The Courts' Proclamation
175* abolished appeals to any Court outside 'Iraq,[1] and replaced all
727* other Courts of Appeal by a single Court of Appeal composed
of a British President and two Arab Judges.[2]

Religious Courts

698* The importance of reconstituting *Shara'* or Religious Law
175 Courts, as provided in the Proclamation,[3] had been recognized
727* in 1917 by Mr. Bonham-Carter. He had then pointed to the respect with which the Courts were regarded in Muslim countries, to the practical advantage of deciding certain classes of cases by Muslim Judges in accordance with Muslim Law, and to the immense additional political advantage of associating with the Government the influential religious class of the *'Ulamā* from which the *Qādhīs* were drawn.[4] He had indicated these alone as adequate reasons for continuing them.

Sunnī *Qādhīs*, therefore, were appointed with these ends in view to fourteen centres by the end of 1918, and to twelve additional ones by the end of 1920, as well as to the *Shara'* Court set up in Baghdad in July, 1917. A long standing grievance was partly remedied by permitting Shī'īs to refer their cases to Shī'a *Qādhīs*. Under Turkish rule, the Shī'īs had been forced to submit their personal status cases, if they took them to court, to the Sunnī *Shara'* Courts where the cases were decided in accordance with Sunnī Law. Shī'a religious Judges under the name of *Nayabat-al-Ja'farīya* were appointed in 1918 to six centres and to six others by the end of 1920.

Criminal Courts

692* The reorganization of the Criminal Courts was more difficult
175* than that of the Civil Courts. The Ottoman Criminal Pro-
727* cedure required a multitude of Courts, investigating magistrates

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[1] Courts' Proclamation, Section 9.

[2] Ibid., Section 6.

[3] Ibid., Section 10.

[4] *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1917, p. 4 (12).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

647 and sale of tobacco products; the Customs Department; all these likewise were of no direct concern to the Wali. The same applies to the rare public works entrusted to the wilaya engineer, and to the Department of Pious Bequests (Awqaf) The Wali could venture on no official interference in the Oman-Ottoman Administration, none in the favoured Saniya. The last-named had, by 1900, acquired for its master by favourable 'purchase' almost one-third of the cultivable lands of Baghdad wilaya, and very large estates in Baṣra and Mosul.

701 The VIth Army, whose territorial area was coterminus with 'Iraq, was reckoned as the least excellent of the main Turkish formations. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, a cavalry division, and a formation of artillery. The units of every arm were widely scattered, and constantly changed station according to the needs of the tribal warfare. Transport was hired for the occasion, supply and medical arrangements were primitive, equipment was shabby and deficient. The staffs and organization of the Army were in general those of modern forces; but the troops were misused, discipline was lax, pay irregular. Service with the Army was
702 by conscription, from which non-Muslims and many classes of Muslims were free on payment; tribesmen were wholly exempt. Compulsory service was commonly prolonged beyond the legal three-year period, and this, with the liability to be sent to a grave in the Yaman or Europe, combined to make conscription of all Turkish institutions the most resented. Nevertheless, no Arab province supplied more officers to the Turkish Army, or of higher standard, than did 'Iraq.

706 The Navy at Baṣra, a puny and decayed service, was commanded by a commodore. Its ostensible duty was that of river police, in which it signally failed. With a shore establishment of some two hundred, its only craft in 1900 were an ancient corvette unable to leave its moorings, the *Kilid al-Bahr*, and a small armed paddle-steamer, the *Alus*.

642 This Turkish Government of 'Iraq, at whose task, evolution, and organization we have now glanced, had irreproachable nominal objectives—order, progress, and public advantage. Its regulations were comprehensive and repeatedly revised: its administrators contained men of education, experience, and knowledge of local conditions. It was, nevertheless, severely criticized by its own servants and not less by outside observers. Excessively centralized, it was bound by a thousand ill-applicable rules which precluded local initiative; it was ill-served, ill-housed, ill-equipped, and incapable of maintaining forces adequate to its clearest needs. It lacked a breed of loyal and vigorous men able to grasp the essentials of ruling a backward tribal territory, and trusted by their superiors.

185 for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the
661 civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced
by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intru-
647 sion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Pequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Ḥilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

701 The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal 701 parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained 706 decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this 499 period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to 206 most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert 205 postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of 647 this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq 661 today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

~~1~~ ~~Longrigg~~ G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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published in December 1920 involved a general restoration of Turkish administrative units, with the temporary loss of improvements made in 1918 to 1920. It involved also the complete separation of judicial from executive functions, an innovation—or restoration of Turkish methods, in this case salutary—which led to the immediate need at all levels for more judges and magistrates; and these the Ministry of Justice, progressive from the first in the use of responsible 'Iraqis, was not unsuccessful in supplying. The 'Iraqi Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams who, except in Sulaymaniya liwā and with caution on the middle Euphrates, were now everywhere substituted for British Political Officers and their Assistants as the effective governors of the provinces, represented all types, all ages, and all degrees of merit and honesty among ex-Turkish officialdom. The almost exclusively Sunni Government followed Turkish tradition by making, it was remarked, no Shi'i appointments save, inevitably, in the Holy Cities. The new provincial régime which allowed initially for 10 liwās, 35 qadhās, and 85 nahiyas, was the most obvious indication to the public that an 'Iraq Government was now a reality. It incorporated in each liwā one or more British officers as Advisers (later, Administrative Inspectors), an arrangement which promised to work on the whole satisfactorily and to the credit of both elements. There were in places regrettable lapses to Turkish standards, and elsewhere signs of administration on lines of political partiality; at Mosul the incoming Mutaṣarrif was promptly murdered; and in some cases the 'Iraqi executive, more experienced and not less able than his British supervisory colleague, resented the relationship. But on the whole the new machine worked with general acceptance and little friction.

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Progress was made early in 1921 towards the construction of an 'Iraq Army. It was intended firstly for the defence functions which must devolve upon it with the withdrawal of British forces which, already in progress, was vociferously urged by press and politicians in Great Britain; and, secondly, to offer employment to the potentially dangerous military caste. To absorb the existing Levies, now a force over 2,000 strong with excellent discipline and record, into the 'Iraq Army would involve fundamental changes in the former, with the replacement of almost all its officers by newcomers. This plan was rejected; the Levies were instead placed temporarily under the Minister of the Interior, and retained a separate existence. The Ministry of Defence spent the first half of 1921 in elaborating departments, a staff, terms of service, and all other preliminaries for the Army. Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id, brother-in-law of Ja'far Pasha and himself a brilliant officer and pre-1914 'Iraqi patriot, returned from Syria to become its Chief of Staff. A Military College was opened in July 1921.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

692 was H. F. Forbes, I.C.S., in 1920–1, B. H. Bell in 1921–2, and thereafter G. Alexander until 1934. Davidson on transfer to the staff of the High Commission handed the Advisership of Justice in [671] 1922 to E. M. Drower, who held it till 1946. The Turkish Majalla, Code of Civil Procedure, and Commercial and Maritime Codes remained in force. Criminal justice was in the hands of single magistrates with first, second or third-class powers, and Courts of Sessions which possessed also appeal jurisdiction, while limited magisterial powers were still possessed by certain administrative officials and municipal bodies. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, beloved of administrative officials but disliked by the legally-minded. The rights of foreigners, preferential though no longer Capitulatory, were defined in the Judicial Agreement. 693 Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a Bar Association for the body of excitable, ill-disciplined advocates, into whose numbers the Law School poured annual recruits.

● 701 The forces of law and order were at this period four in number: the 'Iraq Army, British forces of ground and air, the 'Iraq Levies, and the Police. The 'Iraq Army, based on voluntary recruitment from 1921 onwards and within its limits conceived on the most modern lines, by 1925 rose in strength to 7,500 men. It remained constant at about this establishment for the next eight years. There were six infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, two mountain and one field battery, and all necessary services. The officers had almost all served in the Turkish Army, but in the lower ranks at least were adaptable to new standards. Units of the Army took part in many small operations against tribal enemies and saw more serious service in Kurdistan, not without losses. Great attention was paid to its Training Centre and its Royal Military College. The British Military Mission was re-formed and increased in 1925.[1] By this date the Army's rôle of successor, for all ground purposes, of the British forces was clearly indicated. 000 The latter were progressively reduced, actually to vanishing point in 1929. In March 1921 there were 33 infantry battalions, 6 cavalry regiments, 16 batteries, and Sapper and armoured-car companies: these by 1926 were reduced to three battalions, two by 1927, one by 1928, and vanished entirely in 1929. The British military element, so characteristic of 'Iraq under the Occupation, was thenceforward to be absent until 1941. The Royal Air Force—under successive commanders of high rank, nearly all of whom were destined to attain fame in the Second World War—remained to 000 render invaluable help to the 'Iraqi authorities on many occasions. These willing services, and the personalities of the Air Officers Commanding,[1] were largely invisible to, and unthanked by, the 'Iraq public. The strength rose from four squadrons in 1921 to six and then eight in the period 1922 to 1926, then was reduced again to five and to four squadrons in 1928 and 1930. Their most frequent 701 collaboration was with the Levies.

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[1] Successive heads of the British Military Mission, and Advisers to the Ministry of Defence, were: Colonel P. Joyce, 1921; Major-General A. C. Daly, 1925; Major-General G. G. Loch, 1928; Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, 1931; Major-General C. J. Bruce-Hay, 1934; Major-General H. W. M. Watson, 1937; Major-General G. G. Waterhouse, 1938; Major-General D. G. Bromilow, 1941; Major-General J. M. L. Renton, 1944.

This latter force which, with changes of location and organization since its scattered early beginnings, had shown remarkable steadfastness in the dark days of 1920, took its place early in 1922 as a British-paid and British-commanded force[2] at the disposal, for all purposes helpful to the 'Iraqi authorities, of the General Officer (later Air Officer) Commanding. Late in 1922 the Levies contained three cavalry regiments, two Kurdish and one Assyrian; one Kurdish, two Assyrian and marsh-Arab infantry battalions, and an Assyrian pack-battery. The total strength of the force was some 7,500, its officers British, Arab, Assyrian, and Kurdish, its record already creditable in tribal and mountain war, and its value obvious as a relief for outgoing British garrisons in northern 'Iraq. It was unfortunate that, through differences of loyalty and character, feeling between the Assyrian element in the Levies, which became largely predominant in its later years, and the 'Iraqi authorities was never cordial. But their services to 'Iraq were in fact valuable and respected, and the economic advantage of Levy service to the Assyrian community was important.

The 'Iraq Police grew during these years into a force generally 625 admired for their high efficiency and good morale. Everywhere under 'Iraqi executive command, assisted and inspected by Prescott and his excellent officers, they were well selected, equipped, trained, and officered; and though crime might still occur almost unchecked in outlying tribes, the Police assumed the duties of the old Shabana, penetrated more deeply than ever before into rural districts, patrolled the routes, supported administrative officials, and collaborated on active service with the military. Specially adapted forces, camel-riding or equipped with armoured cars as need dictated, were organized for desert work in the Jazira, the

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[1] The commanders of British forces in 'Iraq from 1922, when Royal Air Force was substituted for Army command, until the Second World War were: Air Vice-Marshals Sir J. Salmond, 1922; Sir F. A. Higgins, 1925; Sir E. L. Ellington, 1927; Sir R. Brooke-Popham, 1929; E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt, 1931; C. S. Burnett, 1933; W. G. S. Mitchell, 1935; C. L. Courtney, 1937; J. H. S. Tyssen, 1939; H. G. Smart, 1940.

[2] Successive commanders of the Levies, from their first organization as a single formation, were: Major C. A. Boyle, 1920; Colonel-Commandant G. R. Frith, 1921; Brigadier-General L. W. de V. Sadleir-Jackson, 1921; Colonel H. T. Dobbin, 1922; Brigadier J. G. Browne, 1926.

1z Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions. 563 166

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. 657 The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Ḥarir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian 563 —continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in 701 Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Maḥmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition for self-protection in their new homes. The Levies, besides the [157] contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retro-
● 701 spect, to be regretted.

The announcement of the impending end of the Mandate pro-
563 foundly disturbed the Assyrian community, which under the 1930
668 Treaty was so shortly to be left at the sole mercy of the 'Iraq
Government. The latter's attitude, though still correct, was growing less favourable. Taxation remissions were granted on a decreasing scale; normal minor taxation, outrageous to the long-pampered settlers, was beginning to be demanded; and Government action in admitting parties of destitute Assyrians from Russia was reluctant and unpopular. Persistent British support for Assyrian claims, or part of them, was galling to successive Cabinets. Worse than this, the exploitation of bad relations between Kurd and Assyrian appealed to certain Baghdad politicians as an easy method of trouble-making. It bore fruit in a series of untraced murders and revived anti-Assyrian outcry among the Kurds. Nevertheless, if the Assyrian community had, with patience and avoidance of provocation, accepted its new position in 'Iraq—which was that or better than that of the Chaldaeans or Armenians—its future could have been peaceful if inglorious, its ecclesiastical and social individuality preserved, and its homes secure and happy. But its leaders chose other paths, which led to tragedy. They clung to every point of their reiterated case: that they had been officially 'allies' in the 1914–18 War, but as such never rewarded; that their Levies had performed outstanding services—indeed had acquired and saved southern Kurdistan; that the League had in 1925 recommended rebestowal of their 'ancient privileges', now still withheld; that the British had ruined their hopes of Turkish favour and resettlement in Ḥakkari, and had betrayed them at Geneva. The twenty-year-old Ishai Mar Sham'un, at school in England from 1925 to 1929 and wholly ignorant of 'Iraq realities, was unfitted to guide the community and obsessed by unrealistic conceptions. Chief among these was that of the 'temporal power' which he felt to belong to the headship of a Millet almost self-governing in olden days, however unacceptable and unconstitutional it must be in modern 'Iraq. His father was ultra-conservative; in his aunt, Surma Khanim, the fervour of community feeling had by now vanquished judgement; the bishops and maliks failed in wisdom or pursued sectional aims, and in conspicuous cases even led factions against their Patriarch. Enthusiastic well-wishers from outside—one an Anglicized grandson of Layard's assistant, Hormuzd Rassam, and one an Englishman, Matthew Cope—misused their well-meant influence to organize petitions, to raise false hopes, and further to prejudice Assyrian-'Iraqi relations.

ment appointment. A School of Agriculture, founded hastily and 871 inefficiently in 1928, was perforce discontinued for lack of pupils two years later—to be afterwards refounded. A Health Officials' school, in connexion with the College of Medicine, in 1932 replaced the existing Pharmaceutical School: a year later a Nursing school was inaugurated, to which a midwifery section was to be added in 1936. The training of rural teachers at the primary teachers' stage was [875] discontinued; but its necessity, urged by the American mission which visited 'Iraq under Dr. Paul Monroe in 1932, was later to be recognized. The provisional plan of 1923 for higher teacher-training was also discontinued, for later amendment. Another American secondary school, this time a Jesuit enterprise, was founded in Baghdad in 1932, and accepted pupils of all faiths. Government secondary schools by 1930 numbered fifteen, primary nearly 300. The theological college of Al al-Bayt closed its doors in 1929. The Law School, 'Iraq's nearest approach to a university course, kept all its popularity and produced civil servants as well as advocates. Separate Assyrian schools taught little but their own brand of religion. Kurdish schools, thirty in number by 1930, included one intermediate, and one for girls. Annual grants were 658 made to the schools of the minority communities and foreign missions; their standard, not least in European languages, was generally higher than in those of the State. About 8 per cent. of all Government revenues was at this time spent on education. Lionel Smith retired from the Advisership to Education in 1930, and was not replaced.

Greater sums than this were needed for the services of security: 701 a fifth or more of Government income maintained the 'Iraq Army, [652] and nearly a sixth the Police Force. Since the Levies, reduced to two battalions in 1928, were used decreasingly on operations, and the Royal Air Force, reduced from eight squadrons in the period 1922 to 1926 to four in 1930, was soon to be no longer available for internal operations, reliance must be on the Police and the 'Iraq Army; no pains, therefore, were spared to augment and improve these. The Royal 'Iraqi Air Force came into existence in 1930, with five light aircraft. The Army, to which Great Britain contributed a grant until 1932, was developed with the close guidance of a British Military Mission which, increased from six officers in 1921 to forty-six in 1930, was then reduced to twenty-six. It trained its own officers at military and staff colleges, and by the dispatch of selected men to Sandhurst or Quetta. Recruiting in the period 1926 to 1932 was voluntary, numbers sufficient, training and maintenance adequate, discipline good. The strength of the Army by 1932 approximated to two brigades. It was unfortunate that its most frequent operations, against Kurdish insurgents, were in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

701 the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

625 The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British
inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services.
Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the
Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force,
some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist
branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security.
In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi
inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years
later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrong-
doers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal
—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-
frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely
697 policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well
conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with
flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

499 Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude
of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inacces-
sible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechaniza-
619 tion of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made
towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance
636 on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply,
improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
184 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was
not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission
constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq
Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab Companies.

646 665 The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

000 Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of [668] Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

701 Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

563 The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

645 composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began 466 to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemploy- 467 ment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and 468 conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

635 An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would [661] call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945 701 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active opera- 625 tions could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

Lt Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

exchanged; and even this support had to be limited when, at the 648x
League meeting in April, the member States indicted Jordan for alleged negotiations with the Jews. The task of justifying the incorporation of the Arab remainder of Palestine into the Jordan Kingdom (a step to which in practice no alternative appeared) was difficult to reconcile with the desirability of placating Egypt. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the League meeting in April voted for a resolution declaring Palestine to be a 'trust territory of the whole League', and in May for another which declared Jordan's act of unification a breach of the principle thus established. He then with difficulty secured postponement of the decision to expel the Hashimite Kingdom, and succeeded in substituting a compromise formula acceptable to all save Jordan herself, asserting that Palestine should, after complete liberation, be disposed of by a collective decision of the League.

Disunity was not less evident in connexion with the Collective Security Pact proposed by Egypt in 1949. The Pact was not for many months accepted by 'Iraq, whose spokesmen saw little value in an agreement which did not include Jordan; but this clash of views, unresolved by the end of 1950, did not prevent the 'Iraqi Premier from offering his verbal support to Egypt in her current diplomatic struggle with Britain. With Israel the successive Governments in Baghdad continued to refuse all negotiation; and the Cabinet, with the implacable politicians of other States, professed to see a new threat of 'imperialism' in the would-be sedative declaration of Britain, the United States, and France on 25 May that they were opposed to the use of aggressive force by any Middle Eastern State, including Israel, and would supply thenceforward only the armaments necessary to each country's defence. The declaration was accepted by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with reserves which he was at pains to indicate to the British and American Ambassadors.

The year 1950 was peaceful in Kurdistan. There was no sign of 563
Mullā (or Marshal) Muṣṭafā's return, though the wireless campaign from the Soviet Armenian 'Post of the Kurdish Democratic Party' persisted; and 'Iraqi policy in Kurdistan, where Nuri Sa'id in conciliatory mood toured in September 1950, seemed to show increased sympathy with its wayward Kurdish subjects, and there were less frequent schoolboy outbursts in Sulaymaniya. In the
Police the former Director-General, 'Alwan Ḥusayn, had resumed 625
command after an attempted coup (it was said) had led to the dismissal of 'Ali Khalid, and the force regained their discipline and
prowess. The Army, still dissatisfied with the equipment provided 701
for it and with the fewness of cadet vacancies made available in England, tried genuinely to improve its efficiency, sought in vain

701 American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow
631 start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers
which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial
administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth
a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available.
665 Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when
668 they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality
was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings
in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

563 If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 692 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Başra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 697 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

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[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and mountain units, seemed to be well suited to its probable 701 internal duties; for service abroad, other than token or ceremonial, it was not at present adapted. Whether the leading spirits of the Army would in future resist the temptation to assert themselves not as servants but as masters of the State remained to be seen. There had been, in the ten years since the adventure of the Golden Square, no sign of repeating the coups of 1935 to 1941, or of imitating the Syrian Dictator-Colonels of the day. But the danger was real; the Army leaders lacked a sincere sense of service and subordination to the State, felt little respect for its civil institutions or solidarity with the public, and could not but be aware that there was no power anywhere to withstand them.

We turn now to the various elements of which 'Iraqi society was 619 composed. Among the true bedouin, still leading their hard, 511 hungry and unenvied lives, the visitor to their tents would find every scene and circumstance seemingly unchanged for the last five or fifty decades. The 'Aniza, the remoter Shammar, the Dhafir had little of novelty to show. Their extreme poverty forbade them any less primitive material equipment, and their social organization and isolation precluded almost every means of cultural progress. It was true that some greater bedouin shaykhs now owned motor-cars, carried wireless sets, and frequented towns, while their sons on occasion adopted an expatriate life of Western ways. It was clear also that the mechanized forces of Government now could penetrate the farthest areas of the *badiya*, that the ease of contact with Government had, since Turkish times, been helped by the use, in the Administration, of the language of the country instead of a foreign tongue known to no tribesman: that the tendency to settle family by family on the desert fringes of cultivation was not less, perhaps was greater, than it had ever been, and that Kurdish mountain nomadism was now restricted partly by the seductions of a sedentary life, partly by more sophisticated and less feebly enforced frontier restrictions. All these elements were operative, and had much diminished the nomad chieftains' power to defy Government or harass neighbours; but they had changed neither the manner and fashion of their existence nor its social or economic bases. Among the true nomads the tribal organization provided still the essential rallying unit, and the shaykhs or aghās would still be followed.

In the countryside of sedentary tribesmen, the continuity of outward appearance—scene, dress, dwelling, dialect, and food—half concealed the changes which fifty years had wrought. If the area occupied by tribal life had been locally reduced by the weakening of tribalism in the inlying villages, yet for the rest a first glance reveals a world seemingly unaltered from that of fifty years earlier:

175* surplus of 5 lacs was reported when items properly charge-
642 able to the two regimes existing in the financial year had been
727* taken into consideration.[1]
652

The future was not brightened by the necessity of providing immediately for defence and for the maintenance of order, on a scale larger than anticipated at first, due to the unexpectedly rapid withdrawal of British troops. Defence forces in 1921-2, exclusive of Levies, the cost of which was assumed by H.M. Government, were to cost Rs. 127,09,455,[2] whereas in the previous year they had cost Rs. 88,50,000 inclusive of Levies.[3]

175* Although Defence Forces for the time being took the form of
642* Levies and Police, the Council had provided, on January 6th,
727* 1921, the nucleus of an 'Iraq General Staff, with Major J. I.
701 Eadie as temporary Adviser until the arrival of Col. P. C.
Joyce in April. The creation of a national army was stimulated by the necessity of absorbing as far as possible, the large and articulate group of unemployed and discontented ex-officers from the Turkish army. The problem was further aggravated by the acute jealousy between the ex-Sharifian and ex-Turkish officers. Many of the latter would take no office and publicly predicted the early return of the Turks.

The entire question of the development of the defence forces, together with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq were among the principal questions brought before the Cairo Conference in March, 1921.

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[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 23.

[2] *Budget of 'Iraq Government*, 1921-1922 (Baghdad, 1921), Ch. viA, viB, vii, pp. 10, 12.

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of 643
one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be 642
submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the 646
King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the 643
Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any
ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by 645
the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, 634
or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, 701
comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has 625
a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary 164
dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and 657

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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to accept their stay in Iraq as more than temporary. Secondly, 563
even if they had to remain in Iraq, they wished to go on living 641
the same sort of independent life under the Mar Shimun as they
had lived before the war. They were not satisfied with the
privileges which they shared with other minorities; they claimed
complete autonomy, and their claims were expressed in the most
intransigent form by the Mar Shimun himself. Finally, they
distrusted the Iraqi Government, and regarded themselves as in a
special way the protégés of the British Government; when the
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was signed, they thought themselves
to have been abandoned by their protectors, and feared the worst.
Their fears were intensified by the work among them of a small
group of agitators.

Nor was the Iraqi Government more satisfied with the situation.
It resented the special position accorded to the Assyrians, no less
than the refusal of the Assyrians to be contented with their
position as citizens of Iraq. What is more important, it feared
them. Throughout the mandatory period, Assyrian Levies had 701
been trained and used by the British authorities for guarding 563
aerodromes as well as for the repression of the Kurdish revolts.
They had proved to be good soldiers; both they and the Iraqis
believed that they would be more than a match for the young
Iraqi Army. After 1930 they were gradually disbanded,
but they retained their arms, and the Iraqi Government
feared that in view of the prevailing discontent among the
Assyrians they might revolt and the revolt would be difficult
to crush; it feared also that the British Government might
instigate a revolt, as an excuse for recovering control over the
country.

By the summer of 1933 tension between the Assyrians and the 563
Government was very great. Although some of the former were 641
willing to come to terms with the Government, others, the fore- 669
most among them being the Mar Shimun, were still demanding
autonomy; and asked, if this was not possible, to be allowed to
cross the frontier into Syria. Relations between the Mar Shimun
and the Government had reached such a state that he was not
allowed to return from Baghdad to the north. The Government
and the Army were becoming increasingly frightened of the
possibility of a revolt, and resolved, if given an opportunity, to
end the danger once and for all. King Feisal and several of the
more experienced Ministers were away in Europe, and the

probably at the instigation of the Agha, because he was held to have K 609
corrupted the morals of the youth.

Health services need not concern us. In the area studied 758
there is no resident doctor outside the city of Erbil.

The Government have made various experiments in agricultural Iraq
reform chiefly with a view to improving the breed of livestock and the 635
quality of valuable crops such as tobacco. The Government's interest K
in the improvement of the tobacco crop is especially relevant to the 249
area here described. Details will be discussed later but it may be
pointed out that Government assistance of this kind is not a
philanthropic enterprise. The heavy excise duty levied on all
saleable tobacco much more than repays any expenses incurred.

The independent judiciary functions through its court in Iraq
Erbil. In practice however it is in the nature of appeal court, 635
since in the first instance cases come before the Mudir (sub-district 692
magistrate) and then before the Qa'im Maqam (district magistrate)
before being referred to the court. I am not clear as to the rules
governing "appeal" of this sort, nor as to the limits of sentence that
can be imposed by the magistrates' courts. So far as I know, only
serious cases such as homicide automatically go before the court at
Erbil.

During time of peace the military are stationed only at Erbil 635
and Rowandus. There appears to be a general attitude of suspicion 701 ●
and conflict as between the civil and the military authorities. In
this area the civil service is staffed mainly by Kurds and Turks and K
is thus in general inclination Kurdo-phil. The army on the other 578
hand is staffed mainly by Iraqi-Arabs whose hatred and fear of the
"barbarous Kurd" can be taken for granted.

The liwa is divided into several districts (khasa) each Iraq
presided over by a district magistrate (Qa'im Maqam). Area A, Map 1 635
with which this account is mainly concerned lies wholly within the
khasa of Rowandus. The Qa'im Maqam is responsible for his district
in much the same way as the Mutasarrif is responsible for his liwa.

The khasa in turn is subdivided into several sub-districts (nahiya) over which presides a Mudir. The Balik tribe all reside within the nahiya Balik - the administrative district in this case coinciding with the tribal one. Dergala on the other hand is administered from Rowandus.

The Mudir has in his direct control a number of policemen who
provide the direct liaison between the external authority and the Iraq
tribe. It is the venality of these junior officials which is the 635
worst feature of the system, and which is the real source of 625

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals
565 in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical
superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small
minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the
Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now
growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of
mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and
highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was
not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927,
the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni schoolmaster,
began a sequence of events which involved ministerial
intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the
665 Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day,
565 by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for
182 Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened
668 by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the
Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost
exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to
Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for
conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their
representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned,
and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription
was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin
Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i
'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of
Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to
the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the
Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour
in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent
grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in
Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between
'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now
in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The
latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired
articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as
acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was
questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by
Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously
militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January
1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

702 The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the
668 time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its
claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the
solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect
'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

by British troops, who will decline the task.' The National Service Bill, introduced into Parliament, met the urgent Shi'i and Kurdish opposition already described. Detested by Shi'ism and dreaded by the little-considered man-in-the-street, the project became the darling of the 'Iraqi press which saw in British caution a proof of their sinister desire to keep 'Iraq weak and helpless. Successive Cabinets were in doubt whether to drop the project amid the scorn of newspaper patriots and the Army itself, or to press it to the point of probable explosion with Shi'i and Kurd. 702 668

Under the Treaty of January 1926 the question of 'Iraq's membership of the League was to be reviewed in January 1928 and thereafter four-yearly. The British Government notified 'Iraq in July 1927 that it would consider a recommendation for such membership in 1932, but not in 1928; but this, disappointing as it was to eager 'Iraqi statesmen, did not preclude attempts to obtain a better interim status. Conversations were held in London late in 1927. The King, the Prime Minister and other ministers, and the High Commissioner participated in these with Colonial Office spokesmen; and, after a position approaching deadlock had been reached, terms were agreed. A new Treaty was signed by Ja'far Pasha and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on 14 December. Its validity, subject to approval by the League Council as well as by the 'Iraq Parliament, was dependent also on a revision of the Military and Financial Agreements. 648*

The new Treaty marked a certain, but no great, advance. It admitted that the 1922 and 1926 Treaties had been already in a measure superseded by events, notably that of 'Iraq's own progress; it treated 'Iraq explicitly as an independent sovereign State, and dealt with its internal and international obligations as such; and by its terms the British Government undertook to support 'Iraq's candidature for League membership in 1932 'provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval'. It was largely by reason of this proviso that the draft Treaty was coldly greeted in 'Iraq by almost all political elements.

It formed, nevertheless, part of the inheritance assumed by the Ministry which, under 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, succeeded that of Ja'far Pasha on 14 January 1928: a Ministry which included two Shi'is, a Christian, and a body of experienced politicians. The moderate and experienced ex-Mutaṣarrif 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab was at Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman at Justice, the Christian economist and business man Yusif Ghanima at Finance, the Najf banker Muḥsin al-Shallash at Works, and another shrewd and experienced Shi'i, Salman Barrak of Ḥilla, as Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture. Naji al-Suwaydi's clever and progressive younger brother, Tawfiq, came to the Ministry of Education, and 645 648*

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply,
improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features
of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imperfect.
184 Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was
not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission
constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq
Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong,
was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab Companies.

decide what should be taught and then the educators can decide 751
how it should be taught. 871

In the villages, the school buildings could sometimes serve as models for house-building; in any case, every school should in itself be a lesson in hygiene. Well-balanced meals are provided in the boarding schools and serve as examples for the home. Possibly the elder girls could be taught some "mothercraft", the treatment of minor ailments (cuts, abrasions, etc.), some sewing and also some domestic economy.

At present the *School Medical Service* is administered by the Ministry of Education and has a staff of 20 doctors and four dentists. In the school year 1949-50, 147,084 pupils were examined revealing splenomegaly among two percent, schistosomiasis in five percent, and trachoma in 25 percent, while 40,767 attendances were made for dental treatments. To carry out an effective program for treatment of trachoma, more school nurses will be needed.

There are several *other groups* through which health education 697
can be disseminated. Police training schools and prisons, 751
including reformatories, offer good opportunities for teaching 702
health. The Central Prison in Baghdad is a good example of cleanliness and orderliness. The Army should teach in its officer training courses that the promotion and maintenance of the health of an officer's unit is his first duty.

A few voluntary societies are now undertaking some health 751
education, but the scope of their work could be greatly increased, particularly in maternal and child welfare and in the prevention of tuberculosis. Special pronouncements could be prepared by religious societies for reading in the mosques (e.g. against the pollution of water supplies as a measure to limit the spread of schistosomiasis). Simple health notes written in the vernacular would be of help where a local newspaper is published. Short talks could be given from the national broadcasting station.

There is a great opportunity for health teaching in the projected new settlements. The staff required for such work are medical assistants, sanitary overseers, midwives and possibly public health nurses who, after having received appropriate training, will work in and from one or more village health centers.

The Yezidis in 'Iraq practically all dwell either in the Sinjār or I 162
Shaikhān districts. Each of these districts has a brass peacock and that Y
belonging to Shaikhān must never cross the Tigris. If it did so the 101
world would come to an end! Non-Yezidis cannot view the peacocks 778
or the other sacred emblems, which include the "shema'dan" or
candlestick and the "bairaqs" or banners. When not touring, all Y
emblems are kept at the residence of the *Mir* at Baa'dhra in Shaikhān, [793
though a few years ago the Sinjār Yezidis, who were at variance with 795
the *Mir*, seized their peacock and collected subscriptions on their I
account until compelled by Government to return it to its lawful 659]
keeper. Yezidis object strongly to the use of the word "Shaitān" Y
(Satan) or any word resembling it. Terms meaning "curse" are also 776
never used less Satan construes them as a tactless reminder of his fall. 784

Owing to these difficulties and restrictions, Yezidis are not "good Y
mixers" and rarely enter Government service. A few were formerly 186
employed by the British Government in the transport company of the 463
'Iraq Levies, but did not prove very satisfactory. Occasionally they 669
have enlisted in the 'Iraq army, but an attempt to apply a light measure I
of conscription to the Sinjār Yezidis resulted in an armed revolt by 563 781
five villages. This necessitated punitive action with, unfortunately, 102 624
heavy casualties on both sides. The Yezidis speak a form of Kurdish, Y [197]
but many also know Arabic. Ain Sifni or Ain-i-Safina (Spring of the 174
Boat) is the chief market town of the Shaikhān Yezidis. It derives its 438
name from a tradition that the Ark touched ground there.

Yezidis are to be found outside 'Iraq in the Caucasus and also a Y
few thousand north of Aleppo. 101

It is difficult to believe that this curious religion can long survive Y
in 'Iraq under present-day conditions. The *Mir* is unpopular and 793
there is no better successor amongst his in-bred and degenerate relatives. 794
The Yezidis have recently refused to yield him many of his 578
former rights and have severely criticised his squandering of the religious
revenues. Most of the members of the hierarchy have concentrated
their energies on trying to divert funds to their own pockets and
have quarrelled furiously. A certain number of stalwarts have defied Y
the priests and attended schools. In the Sinjār prior to the Great War 771
religious pressure induced a considerable number of Yezidis to adopt [871]
Islam, and it is within the bounds of possibility that ere long there 797
may be a regular landslide to either the Christian or Islamic faith or
both.

44:Matthews and Akrawi 8, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

Chapter 10

SECONDARY AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

x873 UNDER OTTOMAN rule Iraq had secondary schools for boys in Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. These schools prepared students for advanced study in Istanbul or to enter the Law College in Baghdad. Most students who went to Istanbul attended the Military College; others entered the colleges of medicine, law, or civil administration.

After World War I secondary education developed slowly, the first classes being started in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah in 1920 and the first graduation taking place in 1924. It was 1930 before secondary classes for girls were started in the same cities. After the passing of the Education Law of 1929, the secondary course was lengthened from four to five years, with an intermediate stage of three years and a senior stage of two years, each stage concluding with public examinations.

Although coeducation is spreading in the primary schools and is an accomplished fact in all the higher institutions except the College of Engineering, it does not exist at the secondary-school level. The somewhat rapid expansion of secondary-school education for girls and the shortage of women teachers have compelled the Ministry of Education to use men teachers to complete the staffs of some girls schools. Except in one or two localities this practice has not met with opposition, and it has allowed a more rapid development of secondary schools for girls than would otherwise have been possible.

All public secondary schools in the country are now under the jurisdiction of the provincial directors, who inspect them administratively and are responsible for their equipment and general operation. The Director General of Education, however, controls the distribution, appointment, and transfer of secondary-school teachers, since it is considered necessary, at least for the present, for a central agency to distribute teachers according to their specialties and according to the needs of the individual schools.

702
x873 The Iraqi Military Service Law exempts secondary-school and college

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

students until graduation, after which they receive nine months of training 873x as reserve officers instead of having to serve two years as privates, as do 702 nonstudents. The application of this law has considerably popularized secondary education. The resulting expansion of schools at this level is not so apparent in the public secondary schools for boys, as expansion is controlled by budgetary limitations, but the effect upon private and foreign schools has been pronounced. In 1944–45 these private and foreign secondary schools for boys numbered 47 as compared with 50 public secondary schools for boys. Thus, it is apparent that the private secondary schools are competing with the public system. The Military Service Law brought into the public secondary school many inferior students whose principal interest was escape and who failed in their studies repeatedly. To avert the danger of having the public schools filled with laggards who lowered the standards and often became behavior problems, it was ruled that a student who failed the same grade twice should be dropped. Many of these failures from the public-school system contributed to the expansion of the private schools, which tend to have somewhat flexible standards.

Except for a short interval the Ministry of Education has maintained 873x evening secondary-school classes since 1924. However, private night schools have become more numerous than the government ones.

Secondary Education

Secondary schools are governed by the Public Secondary School Regulations, which have undergone many revisions since they were first issued in 1930. The latest revision took place in 1944.

These regulations divide the secondary schools into the three-year intermediate course and the two-year preparatory course and empower the Ministry of Education to open evening classes in secondary schools and to establish boarding sections in provincial capitals for impoverished bright students. The regulations make the public examinations the basis for admission to foreign and private as well as to public secondary schools, and in the event that more students apply for admission to the intermediate section than can be accommodated, selection is made on the basis of preference being given to public primary-school graduates. Fees are set at 3 dinars ($12) for the intermediate school and 4 dinars ($16) for the preparatory school, yearly, payable in two installments. However, students having one brother or sister in secondary or higher schools pay only half the fees, those having two brothers or sisters in these schools pay one-

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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section. This policy is likely to remain in force until the Ministry of 873
Education has enough women teachers to permit establishing a girls secondary school in each province.

Vocational Education

Iraq has a variety of postprimary schools aside from the regular inter- 874
mediate and secondary schools and the institutions which train teachers for secondary schools. These special schools are designed to fill the coun- [464]
try's need for skilled workers—mechanical, clerical, and professional—and range from simple trade schools, requiring only a public primary-school certificate for admission, to the College of Law and the Royal College of Medicine. Because of the shortage of trained workers and professional people, the government offers training in these institutions free, in most cases, to qualified applicants. (The colleges preparing professional workers will be described in the next chapter.)

TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

Technical education on a trade-school level is provided in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk for boys who have passed the public primary-school examinations. This is a four-year course, and the schools at Baghdad and Mosul have a registration of approximately 100 boys each. The school at Kirkuk was opened in the fall of 1945. Provision has been made for 400 boarding students at Baghdad; but since these facilities are in excess of the present enrollment, they are being utilized by boys from the Commercial High School and by students in the preparatory year of the Higher Teachers College. No fees are charged, and boarding students receive clothing and laundry service as well as board and room without charge. The Mosul school has no boarding students at present, though facilities are available.

In spite of such favorable provisions, enrollment in these schools is low. The advantages offered seem to be in large part nullified by the Compulsory [702]
Military Service Law which does not treat the graduates of vocational schools in the same way as those of secondary schools but requires them to spend two years in the military service as privates. Students, therefore, prefer to go to secondary schools because after graduation they can enter the reserve officers training course of nine months.

The school at Mosul provides training in weaving, carpentry, machine-shop practice, motor-car repair, and electrical wiring. During each of the first and second years twenty-two hours per week are devoted to theoretical work, and twenty hours are spent in the shops. The student in his first

4: Barth E 5 (1951) 1953 MA1 Iran
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Unless a certain sum of money is paid, all young male citizens of 702 Iraq are liable to two years of military training and service. This is k much resented by most villagers, and they attempt to avoid being 621 called up. According to the *Meskjin*, the Hamawands have an arran- 518 gement with the police whereby they give the names of all *Meskjin* men in the two village who are liable for such service, in return for being left in peace themselves. Thus, it is said, the fighting strength of the *Meskjin* is constantly kept down.

The *Meskjin*, on the other hand, are accused of manipulating the religious brotherhood of Derwishes for political purpose, so as to organize all the *Meskjin* of the neighboring villages in a movement of resistance. To counteract this influence, the Hamawand *Agha* is at pains to expose the derwishes as fraudulent, and attempts to enhace the position of the local mullah, the recognized leader of the local mosque. — The final verdict, however, rests with the Land Settlement Comission, an institution the integrity of which few persons choose to question.

The rigidity of the Kurdish tribal system is here clearly illustrated, 171 and might profitably be contrasted to that of the Nuer, as described 619 by Evans-Pritchard (1940). The Nuer have, in spite of extensive conquests and various vicissitudes, ~~retained a system of patrilineal~~ *exogamous* lineages as the basis of their political organization. These lineages however are *not* corporate localized groups, but are conceptually identified with certain areas, where they tend to form the organizing core of the local villages. Through a system of adoption of conquered Dinka tribesmen to specific lineages, and by reckoning descent through females, a larger community is built around this core, based on «sociological» kinship. Among the Kurds, on the other 619 hand, the general practice of FaBrDa marriage and other close family endogamy makes any initial *rapprochement* impossible between conqueror and conquered, and encourages caste separation. Furthermore, kinship through female links is given no political recognition. The principle of «sociological» kinship is unfamiliar and would be in conflict with Islamic doctrine — the kinship terminology describes actual, genealogical distance, and practices of adoption into lineages would be unacceptable. The only way two groups could fuse in the

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Government unpopularity among the tribes. Hay describes the gendarmerie of his time as "hardened ruffians without training and without principles; they used their authority to commit innumerable extortions". It does not appear that the position is much changed today.

*Below the Mudir there should be in each village a Mukhtar, his functions being basically those of registrar and tax collector. Among the hill Kurds the Mukhtar is invariably the Agha of the village concerned and the term is little used.

This summarises briefly the normal functions of the various elements of Government within the area under discussion. A more dynamic view of the interaction between Government and tribe will emerge in the course of what follows.

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* Iraq has had conscription since Turkish times and nominally all Kurds are liable for military service. It is part of the duties of the Mukhtar to record births and report to the Mudir the names of those liable for service. Until very recently however no real records have been kept, so to avoid military service it was merely necessary to produce suitable presents for the right people at the right moment. Contrarywise military service provides the Agha with a convenient means of getting rid of undesirable characters. That at least summarises the position as outlined to me by my interpreter. But I obtained no figures as to the actual numbers conscripted.

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal 701
parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained 706
decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this 499
period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to 206
most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert 205
postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of 647
this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq 661
today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

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361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply, improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934, devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
184 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab Companies.

by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies. The 'Iraq 625
Police, with diminished British participation, remained a smart and reliable service adapted well to its increasing duties. It contained, during those years, rather less than 9,000 men, including a mobile force of some 750. The Royal Air Force, which since 1932 played 707
no part in 'Iraq's internal security in spite of occasional requests by Government to do so, maintained its own bases and training installations. Mosul and Hinaydi camps and airports and former R.A.F. landing-grounds throughout 'Iraq were handed to the 'Iraq authorities at the close of this period, and the R.A.F. began to install itself, late in 1936, at Dhibban camp by Lake Ḥabbaniya.

Financial administration continued to show the prudence and 652
orthodoxy with which 'Iraqi finances had been handled from the first. This was the easier since the period of depression ended with 1933, and the years following showed a relatively prosperous situation. Improvements were introduced into income-tax and land-revenue procedure and Customs administration. The currency was stable and respected. The last remnant of foreign debt was extinguished; but discussions on a new loan, to be obtained in London through Baring Bros., had up to 1937 no practical issue. The oil dead-rents first received in 1932, and later the royalties, were allotted to capital works—irrigation projects, buildings, roads—included in a programme of which the items were revised in 1931, 1935, and almost annually thereafter. A law establishing 453
an Agricultural and Industrial Bank was passed in 1935; it commenced operations, humbly at first, in the following year.

4. BAKR ṢIDQI

The Hashimi Ministry, more forceful than any 'Iraq Govern- 645*
ment since 1932, appeared by midsummer 1935 likely to endure for a long spell of office. Yasin Pasha openly anticipated ten years of power, though, little as he esteemed democracy, he had no thought of dictatorship. The tribes were frightened, the Palace weak, the opposition outwardly subdued.

But less obvious forces were at work. The King, his own position enfeebled by his personal shortcomings and the misalliance and flight of his sister with a Rhodian hotel servant and her conversion to Christianity, was willing to see a change of Ministry and even hinted at this to Yasin through intermediaries. In the Cabinet, though a scarcely anticipated harmony reigned between Yasin and Nuri Sa'id, his Foreign Minister, the latter was at constant loggerheads with the Minister of Interior. Rashid 'Āli, indeed, gave offence by his impetuous decisions, his favouritism, and the avarice which in defiance of precedent led him, when Sayid Maḥmud the Naqib died in 1936, himself to assume the

1: Longrigg MHl Iraq MHl
647, 721, 727, 728
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[For an account of the British invasion and campaign in Iraq in 1914, the subsequent occupation and the British war-time administration of Iraq in 1917-18, the civil administration by the British from the end of the war in 1918 to 1920, see category 116, pp. 77-121.]

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the
former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch,
Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with
the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At
Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of
Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found
a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at
[453] Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the
Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being
unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank
opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable,
paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much
damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the
direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of food-
stuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing
stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of
178 tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the
579 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that
standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud
721 with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete
picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. [illegible]) [illegible] MHI

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Dulaym in 1909 brought columns under Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha against them. Two years later a settlement with the tribe was reached by Nadhim Pasha's chief of staff, Ḥasan Ridhā Bey, accompanied as usual by recovery of loot and oaths of obedience. But the new order did not long survive; outrages on the roads recommenced, strife and rivalry for the proud and lucrative shaykhship persisted.

The Dulaym, all-powerful from 'Ana to Faluja, gave little trouble to Government or to travellers after the accession of the stalwart 'Ali Sulayman to shaykhship in 1903. New Khans were built along the route—al-Qa'im in 1907, Khan Baghdadi in 1908. Episodes of disorder in 1909 were followed by one of Nadhim Pasha's negotiated settlements; the region was one in which evident advance had been made by Government in the last generation.

The far-flung 'Aniza underwent no visible change. The two groups of the 'Amarat, with ibn Mijlad the resentful rival of ibn Hadhdhal, remained on bad terms, and raids against ibn Rashid in Najd, against Kurdish villagers in the northernmost Jazira, and against the Euphrates tribes show the range of 'Aniza activity. Fahad ibn Hadhdhal, Shaykh of the Jabal section of the 'Amarat, was still in 1914 nominal Qa'immaqam of Razaza.

Conditions in the lower Delta were as bad as Turkish 'Iraq could show. The tribes of the Ḥilla and Hindiya rivers, profoundly disturbed by the changes in the river levels elsewhere described, showed all the lawlessness of a society unpenetrated by modern communications and unstable in its loyalties as between Government, tribalism, and a reactionary priesthood. The feuds of tribe against tribe furnished sometimes the occasion for a Turkish military intervention, not rarely a fiasco and capable of dragging on into months of war. Passing through these territories was risky for the wayfarer, and the German professors digging at Babylon felt themselves to be surrounded by anarchy. On the lower Tigris the period perpetuated the internecine shaykhly struggles within both the Bani Lam and Albu Muḥammad, with rivals' appeals for Turkish aid and on occasion for British 'protection'; rare but bloody interventions by Turkish troops could not end the recurrent wars between the two tribes, with their volleys of cross-river shooting and refuge sought by the Albu Muḥammad shaykhs at Muḥammara. Interruption of the river steamers by these conditions reached its height in 1908. Nadhim Pasha in 1911 attempted a pacification; but the causes of unrest were too deep for easy removal and the outbreak of world war in 1914 found the two tribe-groups still bitterly hostile, while the outstanding personalities in each, rivals for paramountcy, still led irreconcilable factions in their remote rice-swamps and on Tigris-side.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 721 The lower Euphrates country of the Muntafiq owed little during these years to Turkish administration. The record of the time is of strife and intrigue connected, to a remarkable degree, with the personalities of the wilaya capital. From 1900 until 1908 the allegiance of the tribe was divided between Sa'dun Pasha and Faliḥ Pasha, the former as heir to his father's policy of resistance to Turkish pretension, the latter inclined to Ottoman service. Turkish military intervention led to a remembered massacre of their troops at Shaṭra in 1904; but the author, Sa'dun Pasha, found pardon and a way to Government favour by ostentatious backing of the C.U.P. Supported in 1910 by Nadhim Pasha, Sa'dun by his oppression involved himself in a general revolt of the tribesmen, followed by the visit of a Turkish commission of inquiry which led to a reversal of policy against him. Military operations ensued for the hundredth time. Sa'dun himself was decoyed on board a gunboat at Baṣra and sent in exile to Aleppo, there to die in suspicious circumstances. This gave the signal for a general rallying of the Muntafiq to his gallant but shallow and unstable son, 'Ujaymi, who succeeded to the precarious headship of a tribe from which unity and loyalty had been by now for ever banished. This alignment of forces on the lower Euphrates remained, not without sudden and bloody vicissitudes, until 1914. The temporary eclipse of the C.U.P. late in 1912 led to the outlawing of 'Ujaymi and the brief ascendancy of the sons of Faliḥ. But the tide turned; 'Ujaymi was again recognized as paramount, could again lead Muntafiq forces against the Dhafir, support the Amir of Ḥa'il, and create panic in Baṣra. The outbreak of war found him encamped near Zubayr, menacing but undecided.

619 721 423 Areas of maximum unsettlement were not only those by their terrain the least accessible to Government and to the penetration of modern forces, but those also where a fair economic background was precluded by a vicious system of landholding. The annual reallotment of the *muqaṭa'as* in 'Amara sanjaq, with its many examples of Turkish clumsiness and venality: the unreal and tribally repugnant landlord-tenant relationship in the Muntafiq: the tangle of rights or claims in the Shamiya and Hindiya areas as between the Sayid families, the heads of warring tribes and the absentee Baghdadi tapu-owners: in these lay the roots of a profound social uneasiness which provided the Turks and their successors with the most baffling and costly of their problems.

619 Central 'Iraq outside the Diwaniya sanjaq had little tribal history from 1900 to 1914. The Rabi'a were settled and accessible, the Zubayd reduced by secession and no longer bellicose, the fragmented tribes of the Diyalā and upper Tigris calling at most for occasional police action. These were areas where living stood at,

or just above, a fair subsistence level, taxation was not too irregularly collected, and Baghdadi landlords could make some show of administering their estates. 619

In the Persian border areas of Badra, Mandali, and Khaniqin, distracted as they were at times by trans-frontier disturbance and bickering, these parochial troubles were no general menace to peace. The submontane Kurdish areas of Mosul wilaya passed a half-generation of comparative peace and the slow decay of tribalism. Feuds between rival Aghās or occasional raiding parties of the 'young bloods' need call for no more than a patrol of *Zaptié* or a half-company of the local garrison. In the mountains 619 the case was otherwise. All the elements of a tradition of brigandage, difficult terrain, easy crossings to Persia, and Kurdish resentment of increasing Turkish pretension combined to maintain areas of aggressive independence. 721 The chief of these were those of the Hamawand, the Jaf, and the Barzan tribesmen. The Hamawand during these years more than confirmed their position as a pestilent affliction to all society but their own. With intervals of quietness, their young tribesmen continued to prefer raiding to the dull virtues of cultivation, and for months on end flouted Government orders, grossly insulted Turkish officials, refused to pay revenue, and terrorized the roads. In 1908 their condition of revolt became chronic, and the years following were passed in resistance to, or in eluding, military expeditions which brought no laurels to the Turkish generals. In 1910 a number of the lesser Hamawand Aghās were pardoned; but the truce was brief, their forces besieged Chamchamal, and wider disorders were prevented only by a face-saving settlement by Nadhim Pasha. It lasted for two years. From 1912 to the mid-summer of 1914 conditions in the Bazyan and Qaradagh areas were intermittently as bad as ever, and the passage of most of their tribal force into Persia added there to the confusion in the area of Salar al-Dawla's occupation (p. 72).

The Jaf were less savage but scarcely more amenable than the Hamawand. The death of 'Uthman Pasha in 1910 did not diminish Jaf supremacy in Ḥalabja, which 'Adila Khanim continued to administer; Turkish interference was not permitted, despite the harmless presence of a Qa'immaqam. The nomadic sections under Maḥmud Pasha—accounted in Baghdad as the greatest of Kurdish chieftains, though in person an insignificant, spectacled figure—had no outside contacts save with the settled folk through whose villages they passed, dreaded and unwelcome. The Pasha, after spending months in Mosul arranging the revenue-assessments on his tribe, visited Baghdad in 1911 to be lionized by Nadhim Pasha. Jaf forces were among those fighting in western Kirmanshah in 1912. The period closed without suggesting a *modus vivendi* as

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

619 721 between Turkish claims to govern and Jaf adherence to their traditional way of life.

The religious Shaykh of Barzan, true latter-day Dere Bey, still held his inaccessible and lawless court across the Greater Zab from the Zibari country. He failed regularly to render to Government even the demanded minimum of respect, and annually embroiled himself with the savage Harki in their migrations. The dispatch of Turkish forces was met by mere retirement to the higher mountains, and the authorities' use of the Harki as agents of punishment was dangerous. Conditions worsened with the half-crazy oppression and Christian-baiting of the young Shaykh, 'Abd al-Salīm, who succeeded in 1908; an expedition of Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha was inconclusive; and it was left to Nadhim again prudently to accept the Shaykh's excuses and restore him to a short-lived favour. He was again outlawed in 1911 and 1912, crossed to Urmiya to join the Russians, and from there survived major operations against his tribesmen in 1913 and 1914.

Rival of the Barzani Shaykh dwelt, across the Van border, the equally holy and not less tyrannous lord of Shamdinan, Shaykh Ṣadiq of Neri. His brother, 'Abd al-Qadir, was high in the politics of Istanbul; he himself, detested for his greed and cruelty, lived on robbery and the odour of sanctity, reduced his Christian villagers to serfdom, murdered a bishop, and escaped all but occasional chastisement by Turkish armies. His death in 1911 brought Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir hotfoot to claim the inheritance, in vain. Shaykh Ṣadiq's son, Sayid Ṭaha, famed for his obesity, made good his succession and consolidated his family's position on both sides of the Turco-Persian border.

563 In the heart of Ḥakkari country the Assyrian clans still held their own, still attracted the interest of Protestant Europe. Benjamin, a weak unenterprising Mar Sham'un, succeeded in 1903 to the harassed patriarchate and headship of the Millet. Supported by the loyalty and hardihood of his people and notably that of his cultured and resolute sister, Surma, he was yet assailed by the intrigues of jealous cousins and by Turkish suspicions of disaffection. The Archbishop of Canterbury's mission, based on Urmiya and later also on Mosul, could do something for the spiritual, nothing for the temporal standing of the community. The protection offered by Russia at Urmiya was, as the event proved, neither a reliable standby in trouble nor acceptable to the Wali of Van; yet the Assyrians in their plight were ready to turn anywhere for support, and must have turned ever more definitely to the Russians had not war come to apply to their problem the most terrible of solutions.

619 The grim Yazidis gained some ground during this period

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic 747
Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary 814
clubs.

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil 619
period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land 166
communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyala tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi Dhafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the Dhafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions 648x
in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdi- 721
stan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

648 721 25 January 1920 had asserted that non-Arab Muslim territories whether enemy-occupied or not, 'could not be divided' from Turkey; Kurdistan was the obvious reference. From this followed the propaganda campaign of 1920: the absurd pretensions to a throne in Baghdad put forward on behalf of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Sanusi, who was brought by the Turks to Diyarbakr in 1921: their resumed control of the border districts and tribes of Van and Julamark: their seduction of the Kurdish chieftains of Rawanduz area, and their mission thither of a civil official with troops. With the wild Surchi predominantly pro-Turkish, and the Pishdar divided, Turkish penetration made progress in the summer of 1921. It was checked by the Royal Air Force, the 'Iraq Police, and loyal tribal Levies in the autumn, only to restart with a sudden murderous stroke by 'Ubaydullah of the Surchi, who ambushed a Levy party and was repulsed again by major operations of the 'Iraq Levies and R.A.F. in mid-winter. But the tribal submission which followed was precarious; 'Ubaydullah remained at large; and early in 1922 Turkish troop movements on the frontier, based on Nisibin and Jazira, presaged a further offensive. Meanwhile the Sulaymaniya area was relatively quiet in the absence of Shaykh Maḥmud and his near relations; but a group of Persian Kurds from the frontier were able to range the Ḥalabja plain, collect 'taxes', ambush a Levy force, and threaten the town until Air Force reprisals scattered them.

563 657 A further problem of desperate difficulty, and closely connected with the Turkish claims, was that of the Assyrians. Their recruitment, first reluctant then eager, into the 'Iraq Levies did not solve the riddle of their ever-demanded repatriation, nor even of their settlement as a compact community in 'Iraq. The death of Paulus Mar Sham'un in 1920 left the succession to a feeble boy of eleven, Ishai. It led to the rapid loss of much of his house's authority to such livelier adventurers as the notorious Aghā Petros of Baz, an international 'crook' with murder, blackmail, and fraud to his credit in both hemispheres—and a brave man. The latter's plan, a desperate *pis aller* reluctantly authorized by the British, was to lead his rabble of vindictive tribesmen in their thousands across hill and dale by 'Aqra to Urmiya. The project ended late in 1920 in wayside looting, savage reprisals, and final débâcle; and the Assyrian community were reconcentrated in their camp at Shaykh Mindan outside Mosul. From here the Urmiya sections of the nation decided early in 1921 to attempt to make their own way back to Persia by way of Baghdad; but of thousands who drew money and departed, the great majority were kept from reaching their homes by the cruel hardships of the road and by Persian opposition. They scattered and disappeared, or returned to seek

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

'645 Naji al-Suwaydi to Interior and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil to Awqaf, found room for the usual single Shi'i in the person of 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi at the Ministry of Education, and gave the portfolios of Works and Defence respectively to the outstanding ex-Generals, Yasin al-Hashimi and Nuri Sa'id. A few days later Suwaydi moved to Justice, and the Premier abandoned that portfolio in favour of that of Interior. The new Government was committed to acceptance of the Treaty, to the convening of the Constituent Assembly, and to the defence of 'Iraq's integrity against the Turkish claims now clamorously asserted.

3. THE THREAT TO MOSUL

648' 72' The early spring of 1922 had brought indeed no comforting news from the Kurdish districts and the Turkish frontier. In Sulaymaniya a faction demanded the return of Shaykh Maḥmud; among the Pishdar the stable element under an outstanding personality, Babakr Aghā, was still opposed by a pro-Turkish section; and in mid-March a new Turkish Qa'immaqam appeared in Rawanduz, followed by forces under the notorious 'Ali Shafiq—'Euz Demir', or Iron-shoulder—to proclaim the coming Turkish reconquest of the wilaya.

Late in May troubles in the Zangana spread to the still smouldering Hamawand. Their chief, Karim Fattaḥ, arranged for the callous murder of two British officers, Captain R. K. Makant and Captain S. S. Bond, and bolted for the Turks at Rawanduz. The attempt of these to extend an anti-British or anti-Baghdad movement was checked momentarily by the dispatch of a Levy column and aircraft of the Royal Air Force, while Simko of the Shikak and Sayid Ṭaha of Neri for their own purposes restrained would-be insurgents on the frontier. But as the British forces withdrew the Turks advanced. They occupied Raniya, were joined by the dissident Pishdar, and the conditions which resulted forced the evacuation by air of British personnel from Sulaymaniya, where a Council under Shaykh Maḥmud's brother, Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir, was left in charge. The Turks could now occupy Keui Sanjaq and threaten 'Aqra, while British and 'Iraqi forces held only the inner line of Arbil, Kirkuk, Kifri. But a simultaneous Turkish thrust in September 1922 to 'Amadiya in the far north, where Assyrian resettlement had been proceeding, was repelled by Kurdish tribesmen and by the quickly rallying Assyrians themselves.

Under pressure of these events the High Commissioner, erring perhaps for once in judgement, arranged for the return of Shaykh Maḥmud to Sulaymaniya to fill the vacuum of Government. King Fayṣal supported the appointment, and lent Kurdish officers from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca, 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

his Army; Major Noel accompanied the Shaykh. But the latter, 648x contrary to the most solemn promises, began immediately to correspond 721 with Euz Demir (who despised him as a savage), to intrigue with the active Turkish Committee formed in Kirkuk by the Nafṭchi family and other irreconcilable Turkophiles, and to claim the title first of Ḥukumdar (Governor) and then of King of all Kurdistan. The prestige and control of the 'Iraq Government in southern Kurdistan was at this moment, November 1922, at its lowest point, even though Sayid Ṭaha, now a refugee from his home, could with Government help rally something of a tribal force, and British aircraft could disperse the Turks in Raniya. In Sulaymaniya a fantastic régime of extortion and oppression represented 'Kurdish Government', and a mission sent by it to Baghdad proffered highly unrealistic claims.

The first move of Turkish aggression on the northern frontier had been met by a strengthening of British and 'Iraqi forces in Mosul area, and by a temporary residence of the Amir Zayd at Mosul. His popularity, and a visit by the King himself, rallied 'Iraqi and anti-Turkish feeling; but nervousness remained as the extent and actuality of Turkish claims revealed itself. In Europe, 648x meanwhile, the Armistice of Mudania, which in November 1922 closed the Greco-Turkish war and a critical phase of Anglo-Turkish relations, was followed by the first Conference at Lausanne. Lord Curzon here confronted in Ismet Pasha the spokesman of a resurgent and self-confident Turkey, triumphant over disaster and all its enemies. The Turks claimed the Mosul wilaya on grounds of race, alleging that Arabs in Mosul were few, Turks were many, and Kurd and Turk scarcely to be differentiated; on grounds of economics, since most of Mosul trade was with Anatolia: of right, since it had been improperly occupied by the British *after* the Armistice of November 1918: of self-determination, since the population of the wilaya themselves demanded Turkish return. It was indeed essential to Turkey to prevent the detachment from them, under another and perhaps more liberal Government, of a large part of the Kurdish people for whom they themselves proposed (and were later to carry out) a policy of strict assimilation and repression. Curzon refuted the population figures produced, which indeed were ludicrous. He explained objectively the racial groups and their relationships, corrected the economic fictions alleged—since in fact Mosul trade was predominantly with Syria and Baghdad—and reversed the argument based on self-determination; he asserted the claim of a whole and integrated 'Iraq Kingdom with every right to its Mosul province, and reminded Ismet of the Mandate for 'Iraq which had been already allotted and covered Mosul. Nor, in view of the wild terrain and wilder

648 inhabitants, could Curzon agree to the value or feasibility of a plebiscite. The Conference broke up on 2 February 1923, with every difficulty unsolved and with the Turks resolutely rejecting Curzon's offer or threat to refer the matter to the arbitration of the League.

The Turkish National Assembly proceeded, early in April, to award to the veteran American concession-seeker, Admiral Chester, a railway and mineral concession stretching far into 'Iraq; but at the second Lausanne Conference, which was convened on 23 April, wiser councils were manifest. British pressure for reference of the Mosul issue to League decision, a step wholly consonant with world opinion at the time, could no longer be resisted. Ismet maintained all his claims but agreed that, failing direct Anglo-Turkish agreement within twelve months (later reduced to nine), the Council of the League should be asked to arbitrate the dispute. The search for such agreement, pursued in conferences which Sir Percy Cox attended in Istanbul in May and June 1924, remained fruitless. Neither side yielded, and the problem was referred by Great Britain, in face of great Turkish reluctance, back to the League Council. This was to meet on 20 September.

721 These moves of diplomacy in Europe did nothing, meanwhile, to allay movement and violence in Kurdistan. Shaykh Maḥmud,
648 supporting his band of cut-throat followers by looting the helpless, welcomed Turkish officers at Sulaymaniya, sent delegates to Kirkuk to consult the local Turkophiles, and dispatched envoys even to Karbalā and Najf to enlist support. Refusing the order of the High Commissioner to report himself in Baghdad, he was finally evicted from Sulaymaniya by the bombs of the Royal Air Force and made for temporary refuge at Sardasht with whatever funds and followers he could collect. The vigilance of the Air Force prevented a reoccupation of Sulaymaniya by his bands, and touch was kept with his more reasonable brother Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir. The Jaf and other tribes showed every eagerness to be detached effectively from the orbit of the Sulaymaniya 'Government'.

On the northern frontier the Turks' treatment of their own Kurds was confirming, within the 'Iraq border, Kurdish resistance to their return. Their troop concentrations at Nisibin and Jazira-ibn-'Umar remained alarming, and their occupation of Rawanduz left, while it lasted, a centre for aggressive intrigue within 'Iraq.
563 In the debated land, astride the frontier, Assyrian resettlement had
[166] proceeded. Hundreds of their houses had been established in the areas of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, and Zakho. Others had attained their original homes in Tiyari and neighbouring country, and more, seeking to do the same early in 1923, had met the resistance of the

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 19[illegible]-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Oramar Aghās and returned to 'Amadiya in time to help in repelling Zibari and Turkish attacks on it. 563 The frontier line of the future was still unknown. Some Assyrians were content to stay in new homes in 'Iraq, a few had already returned to Persia, others had proved resolute and successful in regaining their ancestral mountains. All were intensely community-conscious, although the unifying authority of the Mar Sham'un, now resident at Baybad, was sadly weakened. Service in the 'Iraq Levies provided employment for 3,000 to 4,000 Assyrians whose families accompanied them, and whose military prowess under British and Assyrian officers, who were often their own tribal Maliks, was admired. It was the more unfortunate that stories of a vast Greater Assyria to be achieved by French assistance gained credence and helped to poison Assyrian-'Iraqi relations, which the apparent British favour to a foreign and Christian community made anyhow delicate, and which was unassisted by any pretence of Assyrian devotion to Arab and Muslim 'Iraq. A riot in Mosul in August 1923 between Mosulawis and Assyrians was a visible danger-signal; the general 'Iraqi resentment at the arrival of 800 Assyrian refugees from Turkey by way of Syria was another. The warnings of both King Fayṣal and Sir Percy Cox on the need for mutual restraint and discipline did not prevent further animosity, and in May 1924 a petty squabble in Kirkuk bazaar led to a murderous stampede of Assyrian Levy troops there, with great loss of Muslim life and a legacy of bitter anti-Assyrian feeling.

The recovery of Rawanduz from the Turks, by a well-con- 648×
ducted military operation of the 'Iraq Army, the Levies, and the
Police in April 1923 marked a stage in the fall of Turkish influence. 721
Sayid Ṭaha of Neri was installed as Qa'immaqam with a garrison of the Levies. The same military column proceeded next to Sulaymaniya where, since the reduction of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty period by the Protocol to four years (p. 148), it was now essential to make early arrangements for this region's future place in the 'Iraq State. Sulaymaniya was entered in mid-May 1923, and the future discussed with Aghās and townsfolk eager for peace and a secure Government; but since no troops, it was alleged, could be maintained there, the authority of the local Council, left in charge by the retiring column, was short-lived. It was possible to transfer outlying districts of Sulaymaniya liwā—Chamchamal, Ḥalabja, Sangau—to the direct care of the Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk, leaving but a narrow area still exposed to the brutal follies of Shaykh Maḥmud; but the latter, heralded by a few days of Hamawand looting, returned in July. Ignoring again the order of the High Commissioner to come to Baghdad, he terrorized the countryside, trespassed into areas now under 'Iraq Government authority,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 where electoral rolls for the Constituent Assembly were already
under preparation, and provoked punitive missions of the Air
721 Force. By autumn, still protesting his devotion to the British
Government, he was again in hopeful correspondence with the
Turks and, supported by money looted from the tobacco merchants, planned an attack on Kirkuk and collected 'taxes' from the Ḥalabja and Chamchamal villages. So passed the winter of 1923-4.

4. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The signature of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty on 10 October 1922 was followed by further drafting and redrafting, in Baghdad and London, of the promised Organic Law; by the completion, and ultimate signature on 4 March 1924, of the four subsidiary Agreements: and, months before these were ready, by the acceptance of a Protocol to the Treaty itself. The Protocol resulted in part from increased British realization of 'Iraqi sentiment on mandatory matters, but still more from pressure by the press and public of the United Kingdom on its Government—and particularly on Bonar Law, the incoming Prime Minister—to diminish British expenditure and commitments in 'Iraq. It was brought back to Baghdad by Cox from London in March 1923, and signed by himself and 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey on the last day of April. Reducing the Treaty period from twenty to four years, it could not fail of a warm reception by King and politicians alike: only the 'Inglizi' party among the shaykhs and notables, still distrustful of the young Government and fearful of their own rivals, pronounced it a betrayal. The signature of the Protocol, Sir Percy Cox's last act in 'Iraq, was followed on 5 May by his departure. He had, by his intelligence, patience, and benevolent firmness rendered outstanding services to the State. The post of High Commissioner was assumed by no unworthy successor in Sir Henry Dobbs, who had served at Baṣra in the earliest occupation days and returned from India to 'Iraq as Sir Percy's Counsellor late in 1923.

793 The improved atmosphere and the enthusiastic welcome ac-
668 corded to the King on his triumphant tours in both northern and
southern 'Iraq availed in no way to conciliate the Shi'i 'Ulamā. Their anti-British fulminations, in which a pro-Turkish element was at times strangely visible, were coupled with a renewal in June 1923 of the anti-election Fatwas. The clash between their policy and their Government's was explicit; and when, late in June, a bazaar episode brought the sons of Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi into conflict with the police, the King was willing to authorize the arrest of both sons and father. Brought to Baṣra, they left the country and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. In Najf

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

*645 Education was entrusted to a learned Shiʻi politician, Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, and Awqaf to a venerable ex-Shaykh al-Islam lately returned from Istanbul, Ibrahim Effendi al-Ḥaydari. The Prime Minister held the portfolio of Defence, and with it that of a new Ministry which he created as a timely gesture, that of Foreign Affairs. Nuri Pasha Saʻid became deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, of which the King was titular head.

648* The British Government submitted to the Council of the League on 17 July an Instrument embodying the terms of all the documents now ratified as between itself and ʻIraq. This was adopted on 27 September 1924, in terms which provided for the submission of an annual Report by Great Britain to the Council on its ʻIraq trusteeship: for the assumption by His Majesty's Government of full responsibility for the carrying out of the Treaty: and for abstention from all modification of it by the British or by ʻIraq without League of Nations consent. The Treaty was ratified by King George on 10 November, and by King Fayṣal on 12 December 1924.

5. THE MOSUL SETTLEMENT

635 In the liwā of Sulaymaniya, far from the stresses of Baghdad State-building, the régime of 'Kurdish Government' under Shaykh Maḥmud, which had ruined the countryside and depopulated the town, was by the spring of 1924 drawing to its close. The Chamchamal and Ḥalabja qadhās, now loosely administered from Kirkuk, elected to the Constituent Assembly deputies who included Shaykh Maḥmud's own brother; but the Shaykh himself, after ignoring one more ultimatum and a warning of impending punishment—the warning which was invariably given, on humanitarian grounds, to the people of all villages where as a last resort bombing was to take place—was visited by aircraft of the Royal Air Force in May 1924 and was finally evicted from the town. Sulaymaniya was entered in July by ground troops, cavalry of the ʻIraq Army, and a force of Levies. The administration was thenceforward assumed by the ʻIraq Government, which provided funds to remedy the miserable conditions prevailing. The population of the almost uninhabited city could return with infinite relief to their homes, and by the end of the year had increased to 20,000. Shaykh Maḥmud, skulking in the mountain villages and crossing to and from Persian territory, maintained the hunted existence of a bandit.

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721 On the northern frontier the re-establishment in their old mountain homes of some thousands of returning Assyrians was to lead to trouble after two years of peaceful resettlement. The district concerned lay just north of the old wilaya frontier, but

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

within the area now claimed by the British Government for 'Iraq 563
as an indispensable safeguard for Assyrian resettlement. The provocative 721 arrest and release by Assyrians of the Turkish Wali of Julamark, while visiting Chal in July 1924, abruptly embittered trans-frontier feeling. It was followed by the advance of considerable and long-prepared Turkish forces across the Ḥazil river into 'Iraq. They were evicted for the moment by Air Force action, helped by Assyrian irregulars gallantly mustered and led—but only to sweep back to attack and burn Assyrian villages and 'Iraqi police posts. Assyrian settlers, to a number of some 8,000 and largely destitute, were driven from their homes to seek safety around 'Amadiya. Neither the usual exchange of protests nor the debates of Geneva could prevent reprisals and repetitions, which achieved all too thoroughly the devastation of Kurdish as well as Assyrian areas of the frontier. Relief work and ultimately house- 657 by-house resettlement, with Government help and taxation remissions for settlers, were provided in 'Iraq for the hapless refugees.

In Geneva the 30th Session of the League Council listened on 648x
and after 20 September to the now familiar arguments of the Turkish and British spokesmen, Fatḥi Bey and Lord Parmoor. The same historical, ethnological, economic, strategic, and political claims were advanced, to meet the same rebuttals and counter-claims. No line of agreement or compromise appeared. The decision accepted in the end by both sides provided for the mission to Mosul of a League Commission of Inquiry, whose verdict, if endorsed by the Council, was to be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile telegrams reaching Geneva and containing mutual charges of frontier violation compelled the establishment of an interim frontier line. This was fixed at a meeting held at Brussels on 29 October, to be known thenceforward as the 'Brussels Line'. It ran somewhat to the south of the alignment claimed by Great Britain, and thereby excluded some Assyrian areas; nevertheless, it was destined to form, scarcely amended, the permanent national frontier.

The Mosul Commission consisted of M. de Wirsen, a Swedish diplomat, as President, and as members Count Teleki, a former Prime Minister of Hungary and distinguished jurist and geographer, and Colonel Paulis, a retired officer of the Belgian Army. After visiting Istanbul and London it arrived in Baghdad in mid-January 1925, and was there joined by its secretariat, by assessors from both sides and—to the dismay of 'Iraqis and British—by two renegade ex-'Iraqis in the guise of Turkish experts, one a Kirkukli of the Naftchi family, the other a brother-in-law of Shaykh Maḥmud.

The Commission and its assessors and staff spent some days in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648* 1921 to 1924. These were in effect successful in reopening the routes, with fair security, and in composing a part of the age-long feuds of the 'Amarat, 'Uqaydat, and Dulaym. Within 'Iraq responsibility was fixed on the Dulaym villages, under the supervision of Shaykh 'Ali Sulayman and patrols of the Dulaym Camel Corps. In safeguarding the Nairn route (p. 172), from the autumn of 1923 onwards, full French co-operation was enjoyed, though the events of 1925 found them powerless to keep order. A transit-trade agreement made in 1925 regulated the commerce of the new route. Mutual assistance over anti-locust measures was ensured in and after 1926.

648* 721 The least favourable feature of 'Iraqi-Syrian relations was the continued lack of an agreed frontier, since the impracticable boundary of 1920, still nominally in force, was in fact necessarily ignored. Worse than this was the persistent tribal raiding. Ṭai and Yazidi, Dulaym and 'Uqaydat mutual offensives were frequent; but the most conspicuous offender was Daḥam al-Hadi, a dissident shaykh of the Shammar who, at feud with 'Ajil al-Yawar the 'Iraqi-recognized paramount chief, had moved into Syria and from there raided both the main body of the Shammar and the 'Amarat of ibn Hadhdhal. It proved impossible in 1925 to arrange a tribal conference—the decisions of the Albu Kamal meeting of 1924 had not yet been honoured; and in the year following a major raid by Daḥam was repelled by combined action of 'Ajil, the Royal Air Force, and a squadron of armoured cars. 'Ajil pursued his fleeing rival, looted his flocks, and was in turn repaid by the continuance of guerrilla warfare, with no end in sight.

The hope of good-neighbourly relations between 'Iraq and Najd was long to be disappointed. The Hashimite monarchy in 'Iraq and the resulting 'Iraqi sympathies could not be cordial to a Sultan of Najd who was both Wahhabi by religion and hostile to King Ḥusayn and the house of Hashim to the point, ultimately, of war and triumph over them. These elements could perhaps be palliated by diplomacy; but to impose peace on the tribesmen in their deserts was far more difficult. A major raid by the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish of the Muṭayr, and his allies on the Abu al-Ghar post and the Muntafiq shepherds in March 1922 was repelled by Air Force action; but in spite of ibn Sa'ud's apology and the chastisement of Ḥumud al-Suwayṭ of the Dhafir, it added to the alarm felt in 'Iraq, which in turn was exploited for internal political purposes. A result was the assembly of a conference between the two States at Muḥammara. This succeeded on 1 May 1922 in drafting a Treaty which was signed by representatives of both. It laid down the principles of tribal allegiance, assigned the Muntafiq, Dhafir, and 'Amarat to 'Iraq, provided for a later Commission to define the ownership of border wells, and agreed on means for the prevention of raids and safeguarding of pilgrim routes. The detailed provisions thereafter agreed were embodied in a Protocol signed at 'Ujayr ('Uqayr) on 2 December 1922. This provided for the first time an 'Iraq–Najd frontier intended to be definite, with a Neutral Zone for shared grazing rights.

But these improved relations did not endure. The Najdi refugees in 'Iraq continued to provoke reprisals by raiding into Najd, an inveterate habit which no Governmental action could correct. To practise it with complete irresponsibility, and to ignore both territorial boundaries and would-be superior authority, was a part of the desert way of life which no new age had yet amended. After the failure of British efforts to assemble a conference of the two rulers themselves, a meeting of 'Iraqi and Najdi spokesmen at last met at Kuwayt, under a British chairman, in December 1923. It proved powerless to reconcile differences, adjourned, resumed its debates, and still failed to agree; and its last hopes were dissipated by a raid on the 'Iraqi tribes on the fullest scale by ibn Dawish in March 1924. The death-roll of tribesmen approached 200, the looted animals 30,000. The aggression was repeated on a lesser scale by another two months later, by two more in December, and yet another in January 1925. At the same time the prestige of ibn Sa'ud had been greatly enhanced by his victories in the Ḥijaz, which were to end in the elimination there of the Sharifian monarchy and a Wahhabi guardianship of the two Holy Places.

But better times on the frontier lay ahead. A garrison of the 'Iraq Army, with armoured cars and wireless, moved out to the desert post of Abu al-Ghar. Air reconnaissance was provided. In May 1925 the provocative refugee tribes were moved into the 'Iraq hinterland farther from temptation, and others who would follow them into 'Iraq were turned back. An Ikhwan raid on the Dhafir in June was declared to be contrary to the orders of ibn Sa'ud, then busy in the Ḥijaz. British representatives on behalf of 'Iraq took council with Sa'udi delegates at Baḥra in the Ḥijaz, and a Treaty was signed on 1 November at that village. Sir Gilbert Clayton who negotiated it, visited Baghdad and explained the agreement in person to the King and Cabinet, by whom it was approved. If implemented with intelligence and goodwill, its provisions could cover reasonably, it seemed, the problems of mutual raiding, compensation, trans-frontier migration, exchange of information, and the channels of official communication. The extradition of tribal offenders was not agreed.

The Baḥra treaty did much for 'Iraqi-Najd relations, but could not avail to stop all inter-territorial raiding. Caravans between the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and
721 although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1921–6

642 These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality
186 a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a naḥiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-
642 twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroit-
178 ness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

644 There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Ḥaydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners simi-
648' larly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic

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[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

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In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of 619
seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by 721
tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the 166
decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, 622
better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the 312
poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent 653
irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director- 242
general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in suc- 654
cession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

563 668 murderous Hamawand allies. The Shaykh's retirement to Persia removed for a time the greatest obstacle to orderly government in Sulaymaniya liwā. It could now be resumed, with improved roads and rebuilt police posts. His son, Baba 'Ali, was brought to school in Baghdad—and later to Victoria College, Alexandria—as part of the terms of settlement; he was, years later, to become a graduate of Columbia, and a minister of the Government. The place of Shaykh Maḥmud as leading Kurdish disturber of the peace was taken in the same year, 1927, by Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan in whose territory 'Iraqi troops had recently manœuvred. This half-witted Dere Bey, obscurely prompted by some resentful megalomania, now proclaimed himself Almighty and gained some converts by the preaching of a devoted Mullā. But the reaction of horrified listeners led to a scuffle in which lives, including his brother's, were lost. It was followed by an intervention of police and the reinforcement of the Army garrison at Bilih, near Barzan. The new religion died out; but the Shaykh, talking and writing war and sedition to all who would listen and spreading rumours of Assyrian trespass, remained a menacing figure.

The Kurdish reaction in 1929–30 to threatened British withdrawal was one of apprehension. The elections of September 1929 produced, as has been recorded, a riot in Sulaymaniya; questions had been asked already by the Kurds in the 'Iraq Parliament as to safeguarding in the new Treaty the 'rights of the Kurdish areas', and had been answered only by the Treaty's silence on the subject. 563 669 721 Expecting support based on the same claims, Shaykh Maḥmud in September 1930 again invaded 'Iraq territory, in spite of specific warnings to desist. He established himself, addressed the High Commissioner to demand a united Kurdistan under British Mandate to stretch from Zakho to Khaniqin, and again occupied Panjwin. Troops of the 'Iraq Army, with Royal Air Force bombers, dislodged him successively from Panjwin and Sardasht, but failed for some months to encircle or drive him across the frontier. Guerrilla war continued through the winter of 1930–1. In March his movement to raise the tribes of Kifri and Khaniqin was stopped by a concerted operation of the Army, Police, and Air Force, and a major engagement took place at Au-i-Barika twenty miles north-east of Ṭuz Khurmatu, leaving a score of dead. The Shaykh fled into Persia, but thanks to preventive action by the Persian Government failed to find there his usual refuge. At an interview at Panjwin terms were once more arranged. His life was spared, an allowance granted, and his place of residence fixed at Naṣiriya on the lower Euphrates.

Between 1928 and 1931 an uneasy peace reigned in Barzan country, where the Shaykh was visited by an Administrative

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Inspector and received the admonitions of Baghdad. In July of 563
the latter year he again lost his wits, accepted and imposed 'Chris- 669
tianity', and ordered his scared followers to conform to his new
faith by roasting and eating pork. A number of the horrified 721
retinue obeyed; but a neighbour, Shaykh Rashid of Baradost,
expressed his disapproval by raids which kindled all the fires of
tribal warfare. Shaykh Aḥmad's brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, and
other well-wishers tried in vain by diplomacy to extinguish them:
but he himself, restored to the Muslim faith, led forays of unusual
savagery into Baradost country. By December intervention by
regular troops was ordered, in spite of the wintry conditions. An
'Iraq Army column, penetrating the mountains as far as the
Shaykh's village, was there severely defeated and indeed rescued
from débâcle only by Air Force intervention. Aḥmad, chastened
by severe bombing, released the prisoners he had taken, protested
humble obedience, and withdrew from Baradost country. But he
remained unsubdued. In the early spring of 1932, after warnings
from the High Commissioner which he ignored, 'Iraqi troops
again advanced into his country, occupied Margasur, and threatened
Barzan; but a sudden assault on them by tribesmen in
difficult country involved them in a second defeat and heavy losses.
The R.A.F. was again able decisively to intervene, and a second
'Iraqi column, with strong air support, now occupied Barzan and
much of its dependent territory. After a pause for the release of
a captured pilot, and further attempts at peace-making on generous
terms, land and air operations were resumed. In midsummer the
Shaykh, driven finally to bay, crossed into Turkish territory, where
he was arrested and removed from the frontier. It was then possible
to install a normal or nearly normal administration in Barzan
country, with police posts and patrols, and to pardon the miserable
remnant of the Shaykh's followers who trickled back.

If these warlike interludes were of a type normal in Kurdistan 563
for millennia, the same is less true of the political action now taken 668
by Kurdish leaders. A petition to Geneva by ten notables of
Sulaymaniya in July 1930 demanded a League-supervised Kurdish
Government. The Permanent Mandates Commission commented
that the League had never envisaged a Kurdish Government but
merely a measure of 'special treatment', of which it urged the
Mandatary to ensure full application before it be too late. A series
of further and similar Kurdish petitions, written in 1930 to 1931,
were considered at Geneva in the latter year. They led to the
recommendation that Britain should impress on the 'Iraq Government
the need of tolerance to evoke the loyalty of its Kurdish
subjects: who in turn, however, should earn respect and the
League's consideration by a correct attitude to the 'Iraqi Kingdom.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

649x locust-control had grown, though the discrepancy of the two policies towards their wards was manifest. Desert life was characterized by the usual hostilities between the Ṭai, the Yazidis of Jabal Sinjar and the Shammar, which were composed in 1927, and those of the warring Shammar factions themselves—'Ajil against Daḥam—and their tax-avoiding migrations. A successful large-scale assembly of tribal and Government representatives met at 'Aqra in the spring of 1927 and agreed to the cancellation of a score of outstanding claims. Such meetings were repeated in and after 1931. [221] The mass movements of the great 'Aniza sections ignored, as ever, the frontiers assumed by their nominal Governments; in 1929 the bulk of the Ruwalla and Saba'a poured into 'Iraq for grazing and passed across the desert motor route, but tribal fighting, for which the 'Iraqi 'Amarat were all too ready, was avoided by their withdrawal. In 1931 progress in Paris conversations on the still undetermined frontier had so far advanced that application could be made to the League Council to appoint a Commission to trace a boundary based on that of 1920. A Swiss president, with a Spanish and a Swedish member, were appointed for the task. The first of these, Colonel de Reynier, lost his life in an aircraft accident on his way eastward, and was replaced by a fellow countryman, Colonel Iselin. The Commission finished their task in May 1932 and offered their recommendations, which were not unanimous, in September. These were adopted by the League. They involved the inclusion of the whole Jabal Sinjar within 'Iraq, with compensating transfer of territory to Syria elsewhere. The subsequent Delimitation Committee, with the same Chairman, finished its work in 1933. It was notable that in frontier dealings thereafter, as well as before, 'Iraqi tribal and other interests were defended by 'Iraqis, Syrian by Frenchmen.

The grievous events of the 'Iraqi–Najd border in 1927–9 illustrated, all too typically, the effects of confronting the proud but primitive and fanatical bedouin of north-eastern Arabia with a territorial frontier, which they could neither locate nor comprehend, as opposed to one tribally indicated; with an attempt at national discipline in their own country, which they resisted with savage individualism: and with modern weapons, which they resented as evil and unjust. With the penetration of Western conceptions into Arabia, the erection there of a relatively formidable central Government, and habituation to guns and aircraft, the same conditions are unlikely to recur; indeed, they may have passed for ever from the world.

648r The good effect of the Baḥra agreement lasted for two years, and 721 although the establishment of the frontier tribunal envisaged in it was for many months delayed, the peace was kept in the wastes

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

south-west of the lower Euphrates and Kuwait. But these hopes 648 ×
were to be dashed. The Muṭayr were led by the truculent Fayṣal
ibn Dawish, already insubordinate to his overlord. They attacked 721
in November 1927 the 'Iraqi outpost at Buṣaya, seventy-five miles inside the 'Iraq border. This tiny mud fort and that of Abu Ghar, ninety miles inland, were held each by a platoon of troops. At least a score of 'Iraqis were slaughtered by the Muṭayr, who were convinced that these outposts were provocative. Strong protest was made to Riyaḍh, and the Muṭayr pursued by Air Force machines; but they rallied and returned to penetrate yet farther into 'Iraq territory and slaughter riverain shepherds and their children at Jumayma in mid-December. The effect on 'Iraq tribes as remote as the 'Aniza was profound and deplorable; nor would ibn Sa'ud admit, in the correspondence which followed, the legitimacy of the 'Iraqi forts, even though the raids had been made not under but in defiance of his orders. The R.A.F. flew repeatedly over Najdi camps, the 'Iraq Government garrisoned the desert posts of Salman and Shabicha; but the Muṭayr again in February 1928 attacked 'Iraqi and Kuwayti tribes, south and south-west of Baṣra. Ibn Sa'ud was divided between anger at his subjects' indiscipline and resentment at their punishment by foreign arms. Successful in preventing the repetition of major raids, he declined a meeting with the Political Resident in the Gulf, and showed himself intractable regarding the desert forts when visited at Jidda, in May 1928, by Cornwallis and Sir Gilbert Clayton. These abortive conversations were resumed in August, after the pilgrimage, with Tawfiq al-Suwaydi now attending as 'Iraqi representative. They failed again, and the frontier continued to live under the menace of Najdi ferocity. In January 1929 a raid by the 'Ajman killed twenty 'Iraqis in Kuwayt territory, and attacked a motor convoy in which Americans were travelling, killing one of its passengers, Dr. Bilkert, a missionary. This was followed by a greater assault on 'Iraqi tribesmen by 'Uṭayba, with wholesale looting and the slaughter of over seventy people: and this again by Muṭayr and 'Ajman raids with heavy loss of life, still on 'Iraq tribes (the Bani Malik) and still in Kuwayt territory. The activity of the R.A.F., the steadfastness of the 'Iraqi posts at Salman, Buṣaya, Shabicha, and Nukhayb alone saved south-western 'Iraq during these weeks from the same submerging waves of bloodthirsty Wahhabis as had flowed over the Kuwayt principality.

The ruler of Najd again asserted, and no doubt with truth, that 648 ×
the raids were unauthorized, and turned his arms at last against his own disloyal lieutenants. In March 1929 his forces heavily defeated ibn Dawish. The rest of the year was passed by the royal and the rebellious Wahhabi forces in civil war, in which those of the Sa'udi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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During the first three days of August a few individual Assyrians recrossed the river to 'Iraq to surrender their arms after angry quarrelling with their too hopeful leaders. On the afternoon of the 4th considerable parties, to whom the French had restored their arms, began unannounced to recross, determined to regain their unguarded families. Animated by whatever disastrous folly or malice, some individuals from among them discharged shots at 'Iraqi troops whose pickets faced the river and who were prepared to receive the surrendered arms. The scale of the fighting increased as more of the excitable mountaineers hurried to the front; the Army replied with spirit and substantially held their positions; and a hotly contested combat continued all night and until long after sunrise. The losses of the Army were some thirty killed and forty wounded, those of the Assyrians about half these numbers. In the early morning some 200 of the Assyrians made for the hills in small parties, seeking their homes; the rest with Yaqu and Luqo again crossed to the Syrian side where they were bombed by the 'Iraqi Air Force and, to a number of 533, were interned by the French. The broken stragglers together with villagers and wayfarers on the left bank were rounded up over a wide area and shot by the Army out of hand.

At no time, it is certain, could any Assyrian movement, however widespread and determined, have in any degree threatened the 'Iraqi State; yet such was the feeling aroused by past rancours, by fear and present anger, and by stories (not, it is probable, all untrue) of Assyrian atrocities to the dead or captured, that the 'Iraq Army launched from this point onwards a campaign of singular truculence. It was accompanied by a wave of unprecedented bitterness against the British. Anti-Assyrian measures taken during the following days included the hasty arming of Kurdish irregulars, the search of all roads and tracks for stray Assyrians who were shot at sight, the raising of a force of supernumerary police, and the terrorization by the Army of civil officials who might attempt (as some did) to interfere. The Minister of Defence, Jalal Baban, and the Director-General of Police, Ṣubiḥ Najib, on a flying visit on the 7th showed their zeal by projects to arm and inflame the Kurds against the Christians. Patrols of the R.I.A.F. vied with each other in reports of 'dangerous concentrations' of the now terrified Assyrian villagers. 'Iraq Army troops in Dohuk and Zakho massacred in cold blood not fewer than 100 Christian peasants in those villages. The Kurdish and Arab tribes —of the Kurds, the Sindi, Quli, Sulayvani: of the Arabs, the Jubur, Shammar, Ḥadidiyin—and parties of Yazidis were allowed to understand that the Assyrian settlements would not be protected; and looting, wholesale and unchecked, stripped and ruined almost

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940); MHI Iraq MHI

all their villages in Dohuk, Shaykhan, and Zakho qadhās. Those in 563
the qadhās of 'Amadiya, 'Aqra, Zibar, and Rawanduz, where the 721
civil Government could maintain its powers, were unmolested. Refugees, penniless and hungry, poured into Mosul and into the large central villages of Al Qush and Simayl (Simmel).

The Minister of the Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, toured the affected areas from 11–15 August. He became aware that the immediate requirement of policy was not to continue the current butcheries and lootings but to conceal from the world the truth, which with horror he learnt for the first time; for he had visited Simayl. Here, from 8–11 August, Assyrians belonging to the village and from outside it had clustered for safety round the police station, disarmed but solemnly reassured by the sergeant. Their terror increased when tribesmen were allowed unchecked to enter and loot their homes, their priest was removed, and their Arab fellow villagers moved out with the flocks. On the morning of 11 August, a motor machine-gun company of the 'Iraq Army entered the village in good order under its officers, and proceeded methodically to the massacre of every man in the village. The work was complete by early afternoon, and the troops withdrew in their vehicles. They returned next day to bury the dead, some 315 in number, including 4 women and 6 children.

It is not doubtful that this operation, revolting in its senseless cruelty, was planned and ordered by the Commanding General, Bakr Ṣidqi Pasha, though he had arranged himself to be absent in Mosul on that day. He intended, it was believed, a similar exploit at Al Qush, but was dissuaded. The 'Iraqi official account of the Simayl massacre as the work of tribesmen is contrary to the facts.

The historian has neither need nor wish to pass judgement upon 563
the series of events—not without their parallels, of St. Bartholomew or Glencoe—which began with the foolish and provocative manœuvres of, or indeed the actual attack launched by, Assyrian fanatics and ended with the shocking climax of the Simayl massacre. With their motives of folly, falsehood, hatred, and brutality they show humanity at its lowest. The attitude of the 'Iraqi authorities, central and local, to the Assyrian problem and people had been up to 4 August forbearing and indeed generous: the conduct of the 'Iraq Army thereafter was, in its sustained brutality, beyond defence. These actions were in large part concealed from the public, who were instead deceived by stories of widespread Assyrian rebellion, the gallantry of 'Iraqi troops, and the treacherous designs of Great Britain. This must explain the failure by Government or the public to give expression to any feeling of regret more forthright than the half-excuses of Yasin

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Ḥaydari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their colleagues in Palestine. 645 669 The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained invisible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Āli personally there was little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert. The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it. [722]

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy the reverse of their own. 721 ● 648 × In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya.

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid Āli' first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

brigade strength. A second unsatisfactory interview took place between Premier and Ambassador; each maintained his position; and Rashid 'Āli, hinting at serious consequences, laid all blame in advance upon the British. The troops landed, not without signs of popular and military disfavour which stopped short of serious physical opposition. They occupied the Port area and power-station, and prepared for the advent of greater forces. The 'Iraqi garrison of Baṣra moved out, under pressure, to the river bank fifteen miles north of the Qarmat 'Ali river junction.

In spite of the efforts of the British community and most 'Iraqis to maintain normal activities, the position in Baghdad was by these events so strained that British women and children were dispatched on 29 April, by the Ambassador's instructions and with the Prime Minister's specific guarantee of safety, to Ḥabbaniya, whence in the days following they were taken by air to Baṣra and out of 'Iraq. All other British and United States citizens, with some few exceptions—who were to fare badly in the succeeding weeks—were collected on 30 April for safety at the British Embassy on the right bank of the river, at the American Legation in the 'Alwiya suburb, and in Mosul at the British Consulate. Some 360, joined by a few local Jews and Indians, were to spend the next month within the Embassy precincts, which were barricaded and controlled. Official records and cyphers were destroyed. The captives continued precariously to enjoy the Government services of electricity and light, telephone (with interruptions), and water, and to obtain food and other articles from the town. A further 150 were kept, not without 'Iraqi protest at an unneutral act, under the protection of Knabenshue but were unable to communicate with the Embassy. The King and his mother remained for three weeks at their palace outside Baghdad, and thereafter made their way in safety to a hill-station in northern 'Iraq. The British banks in Baghdad were forced to hand over their keys and balances.

During the night of 29–30 April the 'Iraq Army Command moved troops—an Infantry Brigade, an Artillery Brigade, and a Machine Gun Company—by a measure described as precautionary, from al-Rashid camp to the high ground immediately dominating Ḥabbaniya. This force grew, in the two days following, to one of nearly 10,000 men, fully armed and equipped and provided with 50 guns and a number of tanks. The Ḥabbaniya cantonment contained, besides some thousands of civilian workers, 1,200 of the Levies—half Assyrian, half Arab and Kurd—an Armoured Car Company, 80 aircraft of various and mostly obsolete types, 30 trained pilots and as many pupils, about 1,000 other R.A.F. personnel, the infantry half-battalion flown from Baṣra, and two ancient howitzers. The camp itself, containing maintenance installations, stores, and a Flying Training School, was militarily indefensible.

The British position in 'Iraq, it was now clear, was more than precarious; it could be sustained only by immediate military reinforcement. The flooded countryside and the 'Iraq Army's control of the Baṣra–Baghdad railway precluded the dispatch of land forces northward from the Port; and none, indeed, reached Baghdad by that route until mid-June. But the resolution of Churchill and the British Cabinet to hold their position and insist on their Treaty rights in 'Iraq never faltered. General Wavell in Cairo was directed to dispatch forces from Palestine to the relief of Ḥabbaniya and for the restoration of the situation: instructions which were received with dismay, since the Commander-in-Chief was already distraught by wide and varied commitments in Greece, Crete, Syria, the Western Desert of Egypt, and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, a force consisting of a brigade of mechanized cavalry, armoured cars, field and anti-tank artillery, a battalion of the Essex Regiment, three squadrons of the Transjordan Frontier Force, 200 heavy lorries to supply Ḥabbaniya, and a mechanized Desert Regiment of the (Transjordan) Arab Legion under Brigadier J. B. Glubb, was collected and placed under Major-General J. G. W. Clark. His task was to open and hold the lines of communication to 'Iraq, and in that country to relieve Ḥabbaniya, restore the British position, and make possible the restoration of a legal and friendly Government. Moving eastwards by the 'Amman–Baghdad road, a part of this force, formed as 'Kingcol' under Brigadier J. Kingstone, crossed the borders of 'Iraq on 10 May. With Glubb's detachment acting as a forward screen, the column was able to occupy Ruṭba, which the 'Iraqis abandoned with little resistance, and to reach the Euphrates. The desert pumping-stations of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company, two of which had been heavily looted, could thereby be brought again under control. 'Aniza tribesmen had done much damage to the works proceeding at Lake Ḥabbaniya, and to the machinery in use there.

The fortunes of war at Ḥabbaniya, meanwhile, had bordered on the miraculous. On 1 May the Air Force Commander there, Air Vice-Marshal H. G. Smart, summarily rejected the request of the 'Iraq Commander that all flying should cease; he demanded, on the contrary, the withdrawal of the 'Iraqi forces from positions which were clearly hostile and must place his camp at their mercy. No reply was given; the 'Iraq Army held its ground; and at dawn on 2 May it was bombed by British aircraft. The 'Iraqi artillery replied by shelling the buildings of the Ḥabbaniya camp. For three days this bombardment continued, half-hearted and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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ill-aimed, and failed[1] to hit the vital water-tower on which the garrison depended, or to prevent the evacuation by air of the women and children. British aircraft meanwhile constantly attacked the 'Iraqi forces and gun positions, and destroyed wherever they found it the greatest part of the small but not despicable R.I.A.F., which had consisted of some fifty first-line aircraft, including American bombers and fast Italian fighters. Small reinforcements of aircraft, notably Blenheims, reached the British at Ḥabbaniya from Egypt, and a detachment of Gurkhas were flown from Baṣra. R.A.F. losses in effective aircraft were heavy. Vigorous patrols from the British land forces operated at night against outposts on the plateau, and were little opposed. The 'Iraqi troops made no ground attack at any point on the seven miles of scarcely defended perimeter, which with their numbers and weapons they could have penetrated almost at will. Before dawn on 6 May they withdrew from the plateau, moved eastwards, and halted at Sinn al-Dhibban athwart the Ramadi–Baghdad road, offering the easiest of bombing targets. A sortie from Ḥabbaniya here attacked and dislodged them, taking 26 officer prisoners and over 400 other ranks, with vehicles, guns, and war material. The remainder retired to Faluja. The troops at Ḥabbaniya rested and reorganized, kept watch on the 'Iraq Army garrison behind them at Ramadi, and harassed the enemy with their aircraft.

At Baṣra, meanwhile, the public were sullen and hostile. The newly installed acting Mutaṣarrif was instigated to active unfriendliness by orders from Baghdad, but from fear of reprisals felt unable to carry out his instructions to intern the whole British community. In spite of resistance from the police, which led to the necessity of disarming them, General Fraser was compelled to occupy part of 'Ashar on 7 May. In the unoccupied quarters of this suburb and of Baṣra city, looting by hooligans was widespread. The Mutaṣarrif abruptly left Baṣra on 16 May and anarchy reigned until the formation of a temporary Committee of Notables under Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan a week later secured some sort of order. In Mosul the Mutaṣarrif, Taḥsin 'Ali, was removed by the Gaylani Government and the local general substituted, but not until British wives and children had been evacuated to Turkey or, in the case of the B.O.D. Company's families, to Syria. The internment of Englishmen and (to their indignation) Americans in the British Consulate was accompanied by offensive restrictions and complete isolation: by the sight of German aircraft overhead and rumours of Axis military stores arriving by train: and by an ugly attitude on the part of the truculent Mosul townsmen. Officialdom,

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[1] In the opinion of some observers, the ineffectiveness of the shooting was intentional.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

as usual, was divided. British personnel of the I.P.C. at Kirkuk were interned, sometimes amicably sometimes rigorously, in various premises of Kirkuk town and fields headquarters. All active operations ceased at Kirkuk, Qaiyara, ʿAyn Zala, and elsewhere, while control of the installations was assumed by ʿIraqi staff until Germans should arrive to take charge. Looting of vehicles, stores, and domestic effects was considerable and at certain pumping stations wholesale. The Khaniqin Oil Company's personnel at Nafṭkhana and at Alwand Refinery were brought in some cases to Baghdad, in others to Baʿquba where they endured a sordid and dangerous captivity.

The ʿIraq Government, as was apparent after a week of 'war', had evolved no military or political plan to meet an emergency which it had itself precipitated. Security was generally maintained throughout the territory, but the rigid censorship, administrative obstruction, military control, and clashing authority slowed the pulse of all national life. Railway communication was interrupted or ceased. The Army, itself far from single-minded, was handled without grasp or resolution; its Intelligence Services were lamentable, its movements uncoordinated, and the great bulk of its effectives never brought into action, or near it. Its unit commanders took varying views of the situation; many would have refused orders to fight, had they been given. The bombs of the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm, from the head of the Persian Gulf, descended daily or nightly upon garrisons, barracks, and airports at Qarmat ʿAli, Naṣiriya, ʿAmara, Samawa, Diwaniya, Ramadi, Qaraghan, and Mosul. The black-out and camouflage operations in Baghdad created more public alarm than confidence, rumours were wild and alarming, and official communiqués of a grotesque falsity were daily issued. The press seethed with its usual diatribes and exhortations. The Mufti, Ḥajj Amin, emerged to proclaim Jihad against oppressive and infidel Britain, and was supported by other divines. Diplomatic recognition of ʿIraq by the U.S.S.R. was, indeed, announced by the Russians on 12 May, but this move, foreshadowed already by negotiations of some months' duration, was of no helpful significance to ʿIraq. The Axis Powers made no gesture of recognition for the new régime in ʿIraq, though their wireless was ceaseless in its blandishments and encouragements.

But to Gaylani and his ministers this was no substitute for material aid, for which no prior arrangement had been made unless in the vaguest terms, and no concerted time-table prepared. A Turkish offer on 4 May to mediate had been rejected off-hand by the British Government. Naji Shawkat hurried to Turkey on the 8th, failed to convince the Foreign Minister at Ankara of his claims to support, and waited for some days till the return of von Papen from Europe. But he could accomplish nothing, and the attitude

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

of Egypt and of Sa'udi Arabia, to which Naji al-Suwaydi proceeded on urgent mission, was equally comfortless for the Baghdad Government. Only behind the scenes and beyond 'Iraqi vision were plans being formulated between German, French, and Italian spokesmen—Abetz and Darlan in Paris, Darlan and Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Ciano and Ribbentrop in Rome—for the use by Axis forces of the Syrian aerodromes, ports and railways, and for the dispatch of French military stores and expert helpers to 'Iraq. For this purpose the Turkish railway was in fact used, to the extent of a few train-loads late in May, with the acquiescence of the Turks which von Papen had secured. But these materials played no part in the campaign; the arrangements, like all those for the German help for which the harassed ministers in Baghdad now prayed, were improvised only after the adventure in usurpation had begun, and without direct German-'Iraqi contact at staff levels. All were inadequate, all too late.

Nevertheless, the German and Italian aircraft and technicians who began in small numbers to arrive in 'Iraq in the second week of May, were of greater and could have been of decisive value. They made their base on the Mosul airfield, were seen at Kirkuk where oil technicians were shortly to follow them, and took part in the operations now impending at Faluja. It was a matter of course that all acts of the German aircraft, which included frequent bombing of Ḥabbaniya, were claimed in 'Iraqi communiqués as feats of the R.I.A.F. A Messerschmidt circling Baghdad airport was in error attacked by 'Iraqi rifle-fire and on landing was found to contain the body, shot through the head, of the son of Marshal von Blomberg.

'Kingcol', the main reinforcement to the British forces, arrived at Ḥabbaniya from the desert on 18 May, in time to join in a concerted attack on Faluja, which the 'Iraqis had lost but retaken ten days earlier. The town was outflanked by airborne troops and by detachments ferried over the Euphrates; and, after a short bombardment, was entered and held with its great bridge undamaged. Assyrian Levies took a conspicuous part in the operation. An 'Iraqi counter-attack in strength was repelled. Major-General Clark was now free to order an advance on Baghdad, where fantastic stories of the strength—and tanks—of the British forces were accepted; but widespread flooding across the direct route, and the tactical desirability of first cutting the approaches to Baghdad from Mosul, led to a delay of some days. A party of the Arab Legion under Glubb crossed the Jazira, cut the Mosul railway near Samarrā, and returned; later, joined by the Household Cavalry, they crossed again to the Tigris, occupied Mushahida, and turned south towards Baghdad. The force encountered enemy troops near Taji, and took up a position in brickfields near Kadhimiya.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad was captured, released, and sent home. The main body of Clark's force now advanced due east by way of Khan Nuqṭa. Scarcely 1,300 strong, and incomparably weaker in guns, equipment, and supply resources than the opposing 'Iraqi units, it was yet scarcely opposed and, after ferrying across flooded areas, reached the outskirts of Baghdad on 29 May. Its weakness, its flood-restricted movements, and its long and vulnerable communications rendered its position precarious, or indeed alarming; not only was Baghdad easily defensible, but a determined move by a mere fraction of 'Iraq's available forces could not have failed to dislodge and destroy an invader whose only strength was in determination, bluff, and high spirits. In fact, the short war was almost over; the 'Iraq Government and its resistance simultaneously disintegrated and collapsed.

The public had become aware that its Government's challenge to Great Britain had been taken up, that actual war was in progress, and that British forces had appeared, in the air, at a score of places. The Army, never popular and not greatly respected, had done nothing to restore confidence. Communications were cut everywhere, commerce dead, prices soaring, the capital three-quarters isolated. At the Port, British-Indian troops were pouring in, and opposition was already changing to indifference or pleasure. Lieutenant-General E. P. Quinan, accompanied by Brigadier W. Slim (the future C.I.G.S.), arrived to take command on 7 May. 'Iraqi troops at Mosul and Kirkuk seemed generally to support the Government, but made no move; a part of those in Baghdad were in sentiment favourable rather to the banished Regent, and the Golden Square, who had perverted their loyalty, were now powerless to lead them. Desertions were increasing, and became a menace to security. Most townsmen and villagers in the provinces were anxious only to see peace and order restored, though support to the Gaylani régime had been at first not inconsiderable. The youths of Baghdad, armed during May by orders of Rashid 'Āli, boasted and strutted in uniform but were no military asset. No tribal leaders placed themselves behind the Ministry; Shaykh Maḥmud escaped from Baghdad, reached Sulaymaniya, and essayed to raise forces to 'support the British'. There was neither time nor need for Glubb Pasha to fulfil the mission charged with which he had led his men to 'Iraq, that of raising the tribes against the usurping Government.

Early in the last week of May the ministers, preceded by their families, started to leave the capital. Naji Shawkat, Shahbandar, 'Ali Maḥmud, and Suwaydi left for Persia or Turkey. The Mufti hastened to Teheran. On the 28th Rashid 'Āli himself fled from the city. German and Italian subjects—among them Dr. Grobba,

721 lately back in Baghdad triumphant—left hurriedly for Syria, pre-
648x ceded by such of their aircraft as could fly. The Regent Sharaf accompanied ministers to Persia. Yunis Sab'awi, Minister of Economics, appointed himself Military Governor of the capital, and exhorted the demoralized public to organize a final resistance; but his power, if any, lasted barely a day. He fled; and the Generals were not far behind, abandoning their posts and duties as their ill-judged and mischievous adventure ended in fiasco. The steadfast Mayor, Arshad al-'Umari, alone remained to preserve what order he could, to direct dissolution of the armed gangs of the Youth Movement, and on 30 May to form a Committee of Internal Security with the strong support of law-abiding opinion. On the evening of that day, sponsored by Knabenshue, he appeared at the British Embassy. Cornwallis at his instance sent a wireless message to the G.O.C. at Ḥabbaniya to receive, if he would, a flag
728 of truce that night. Terms of armistice—not of peace, since war had never been declared—were without difficulty arranged between
648x the Ambassador and the Security Committee. They provided for a cease-fire, the continued independence of the country and retention of its Army intact, release of prisoners, arrest of enemy (German or Italian) forces, and the opening of all communications in 'Iraq in accordance with the Treaty: conditions which showed both magnanimity and good sense. A detachment of British troops entered Baghdad on the following day, and British residents in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk could emerge from a month-long captivity which, not without its humours, had been galling, humiliating, and anxious, to find many of their houses looted. The attitude of the Baghdad crowds was sullen and bitter; the effects of dashed expectations and the aftermath of long-drawn Axis propaganda were slow to disappear.

727 The Regent had passed three weeks in Palestine and Jordan. He
579 returned to 'Iraq on 22 May escorted by his faithful ministers and by a British representative, Colonel G. de Gaury, and broadcast once more to his people. The Guard of Honour which welcomed him to Ḥabbaniya was composed of 'Iraqi troops and officers who had surrendered to the British at Sinn al-Ḍhibban while fighting for his enemies and supplanters, and who now without effort changed sides again. The Amir entered Baghdad on 1 June, welcomed by the British Ambassador and by crowds of his own well-wishers. But the sinister possibilities of the hour, and the urgent need to install a Government, were overlooked in the glow of acclamation and victory; the night of 1 June and part of 2 June were disgraced by serious bloodshed and looting in quarters of Baghdad, with violent hooliganism directed against the Jews. The outbreak had in large part been organized by the fugitive military

officers on the scale, they hoped, of a counter-revolution; it repre- 727
sented partly also reprisals by the Youth Movement, of whom 579
many were caught red-handed, and partly the brutality and avarice of the lowest mob elements. The Committee of Internal Security was caught unawares, the Police proved unreliable and impotent, and order was restored only by troops brought in from outside. At noon on 2 June Jamil al-Madfa'i assumed with reluctance the task of forming a Ministry, and set himself to the restoration of normal tranquillity. A reliable Mutaṣarrif assumed charge at Baṣra.

The movement thus overcome will long bear, in obloquy or 721 ●
praise, the name of Rashid 'Āli. His part in it was in fact both
unsought and limited. Willing himself to keep in good outward 148×
relations with Britain, at least until her defeat was certain, and never as rabidly xenophobe as many another, he was forced first to specific disagreement and then to actual hostilities with the ex-Mandatary by the pressure of his military backers, whom in spite of all precedent he had hoped to control, and by the impatience of his own closest followers. Unmoved by any principle of loyalty to treaties, basically unfriendly to Great Britain, and impetuous and self-confident by nature, he had yet never committed himself to Germany, as had the Generals and Naji Shawkat; he had hoped always to achieve a subtle neutrality and to gain, if possible, for his country from both sides. Rashid 'Āli's acts in his last premiership represent no settled conviction or resolute policy; he drifted or was forced from step to step. Whoever, indeed, had assumed the premiership on 1 April, in conditions which made the Army leaders all-powerful, must either have played a part not unlike Gaylani's, or soon made way for another to do so. There were other policies, other convictions in the 'Iraq of the moment—but no other power than the Army.

If timing had been concerted with the Germans, and their help punctual, the movement, however achieved, could scarcely have failed. A few hundred German troops, a few score of aircraft, could have occupied 'Iraq and vitalized its Army, could have dominated Persia and its oil, closed the southern doors to Russia, and threatened the Levant from the east. That such was not the outcome followed from three factors: the feeble irresolution of the 'Iraq Army at Ḥabbaniya and thereafter; the failure of the Axis to provide timely help, thanks to the British resistance in Crete and to Hitler's plans for the invasion of Russia; and the rapidity and successful bluff of the light British forces. The British intervention, still today condemned by 'Iraqi irreconcilables as unjustifiable 'interference', in fact saved the country first from military dictatorship, then from certain German occupation, and finally from identification with the losing side in the War.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

IX

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

I. PAIFORCE

THE directive with which General Quinan landed at Baṣra bade him develop that port as a major military base, secure lines of communication through 'Iraq, and safeguard oil supplies. The first of these duties occupied his forces for some weeks in isolation, except for nightly air convoys to Ḥabbaniya, from the campaign up-country; all routes were cut by the 'Iraq Army, wide areas were flooded, and the need was urgent to organize facilities in the Baṣra and Shu'ayba neighbourhood to accommodate the incoming troops and supplies. The Commanders-in-Chief of India and of Middle East, Generals Sir Claude Auchinlek and Sir A. Wavell, met at Baṣra on 23 May to concert plans. On the 27th a column left Shu'ayba for the north and, after meeting slight opposition at Ur and repairing the railway as it went, arrived outside Baghdad on 12 June; and on the latter day a second force embarked at 'Ashar in an improvised fleet of river craft, and reached Baghdad a week later. On the 18th Quinan with his reopened communications could assume control of all troops in 'Iraq, and the command, hitherto handled operationally from Cairo, reverted to the orbit of the Commander-in-Chief, India.

Its urgent tasks during the summer of 1941 were to place and maintain small garrisons at Kirkuk, Mosul, Faluja, Ḥaditha, Ruṭba, and elsewhere: to be prepared to aid the 'Iraq Police in the maintenance of order: to increase immediately the capacity of the already congested Port: and to develop, for use by major forces, base areas at Baṣra, Shu'ayba, Kut, and Musayib. New air-fields were sited in northern 'Iraq, and steps taken to improve the means of communication by rail, river, road, and telegraph. In June and July small forces were sent to take part in General Maitland Wilson's campaign in Syria against the Vichy French; and in August, with the increased forces then available, it was possible for Quinan to undertake by way of Baṣra and Khaniqin the almost bloodless invasion of Persia which ended with a change of Government and policy in that country, and swung it from dangerous sympathy with the Axis to friendly co-operation with the Allies.

The winter of 1941–2 was of exceptional severity. After a plenary conference in Baghdad in September of the British Ambassadors and Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East it was decided to devote the ensuing months to continued development of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

territory as a communication and defensive area. This was achieved by the expansion of inland bases and of the Port, where new wharves were constructed, cranes erected, roads and buildings provided: by assuming control of and greatly extending the Inland Water Transport services (on lines reminiscent of the First World War), with the import of a score of small steamers and many barges from India and America, and the requisition of the bulk of existing 'Iraqi resources: by perfected telegraphic and wireless networks: and by the improvement and local duplication of the railway line, and the construction of a new line from Kut to Ba'quba. A German threat, against which these preparations were designed, could come by way of Anatolia or, after Hitler's invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, by the Caucasus and Adharbayjan. The whole of northern 'Iraq must, therefore, be strengthened, and General Quinan prepared positions for this purpose within the triangle contained by the Turkish frontier, the Diyalā, and the Tigris. These works involved great efforts and no small hardship; they called for the use of large forces of local labour and for the provision of the camps, transport and equipment, and the feeding and medical arrangements necessary to maintain them; and they absorbed the two weak Indian divisions—the 8th and 10th, after the departure of the 6th for Persia—which with miscellaneous units formed the 'Iraq garrison at the time. The decision to assist the supply of the Russian armies by supplies conveyed from the Gulf across Persia demanded a formidable organization for procurement and forwarding, based on Baṣra; and in this the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the British companies at Baṣra played an invaluable pioneer part. It led to a great expansion in the Persian railway and road systems, not least in the close neighbourhood of Baṣra and the 'Iraq frontier where the teak-built 1,150-ft. Hull Bridge across the Shaṭṭ-al-'Arab was the first bridge in history to span this river. The railway terminal at Khaniqin became simultaneously an important forwarding base.

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So passed the winter of 1941–2. The British forces in 'Iraq and Persia, then as always predominantly Indian in composition, were regrouped in the early days of January 1942 as the Xth Army, and passed again to the Middle East Command. During the spring the tasks of the winter were continued, with the scale of traffic constantly increasing on rail and river, on the desert highway to Palestine, and in base and advanced areas. If the invasion of Egypt by Axis forces in the spring of 1942 led to the dispatch of some combatant units from the Xth Army to the Levant, the deeper penetration of Nazi forces into south Russia in the summer, with the threat of access to Persia and 'Iraq by the Caucasus, seemed to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

721 increase the danger to these countries. This serious situation led early in August to the British decision to reinforce the Xth Army; it was to become an effective fighting formation instead of one specialized for defensive and forwarding functions, and thereafter as the 'Persia–'Iraq Force', or familiarly 'Paiforce', was to be the responsibility of a Commander-in-Chief of its own, directly subordinate to the War Office. General Sir H. Maitland Wilson was selected for the command, and reached Baghdad in August. The fresh troops destined for 'Iraq–Persia started to disembark at Basra in and after September 1942. They were the 5th and 56th British Divisions, soon to be followed by the 7th British Armoured Brigade from India, and the 5th Indian and 3rd (Carpathian) Polish Divisions from Middle East. These troops were as far as possible moved to areas in northern 'Iraq and northern Persia, though retirement to the vicinity of rail-heads was inevitable for supply reasons in the winter. The Poles, who were arriving at Khaniqin as refugees in increasing numbers from Persia, were placed under military training and later added to the Polish formations created in Middle East under General Anders.

Two Corps, the 3rd and 21st Indian, were organized from the troops available in Paiforce: they consisted in all, by the end of 1942, of two British divisions and a British armoured brigade, three Indian divisions and an Indian armoured brigade, and one Polish division with the expectation of another still under formation. The 'Iraq Army for its part was prepared, should the threat from the north-east materialize, to take its place with these in the defence of the passes leading from the Urmiya district. The successful defence of Stalingrad, however, gave time for the preparations in 'Iraq and Persia to be perfected; and in the early months of 1943 the final blunting of the German menace absolved Paiforce, after all, from a fighting rôle. It was possible before the middle of that year to transfer a number of formations and units to North Africa, there to join in the pursuit of a beaten enemy. General Wilson was transferred in February 1943 as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, under which Headquarters Paiforce was thenceforward grouped for the remainder of its lifetime. He was succeeded in Baghdad by Lieutenant-General Sir H. P. Pownall, who was in turn relieved a year later by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Smith. These officers, as it fortunately happened, each possessed the qualities of comprehension and sympathy which the location of their forces in the heart of an allied country demanded.

The tasks of Paiforce during its later career were the maintenance of communications and stability in the area, and the training of troops, especially the Poles, for use in other theatres. Its further duty in Persia was the increase of supplies to Russia by the trans-Persian route. In the latter function the American Army had, 721 from the early days of 1943, the major part to play and, with the deployment of its vast resources, took charge of the arrangements for improving the railway and road network of the Shah's empire and forwarding thereby millions of tons of supplies, transport, and equipment to the depots of the sullen and ungrateful Russians.

The peaceful history of this 'Second Occupation of 'Iraq'—so 722 called by one school of 'Iraqi thought—could not but affect the political background of the territory during these years by its guarantee of comprehensive security, its frustration of any further attempt to involve 'Iraq in the downfall of the doomed Axis, and its living proof that accepted garrisons of well-disciplined and well-disposed foreign troops could be far from a scourge to town and countryside. If the British forces by their immense local disbursements for goods and services, their employment of labour, their competition for the services of the few skilled artisans, and their shipment of grain and animals to other theatres of war inevitably contributed to the inflation and the connected economic evils of war-time 'Iraq, they created also the remarkable prosperity which most classes of the population enjoyed. Nor could observers fail to recognize the excellence of the relations maintained, during five years of mental strain and physical propinquity, between these troops and the civil population. Under the inspiration of the Ambassador and his staff every consideration was shown to the 'Iraqi authorities and public, and these for their part wisely acquiesced in the temporary presence of British troops in their territory. Neither the conduct of troops nor the military authorities' use of their predominant power could be the subject of complaint; indeed, the slight extent to which the normal administration was affected by, or needed to take account of, the British forces was surprising. Relations with the 'Iraq Army varied from outwardly correct to nearly cordial; with the Regent they were excellent. He accepted in 1943 the honorary rank of Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force, and a dozen high officials of Government were awarded, for valuable war-time services, various (honorary) grades of the Order of the British Empire.

The British position in 'Iraq during these years was, by force of 721 circumstances, as different effectively from what it had been from 648x 1932 to 1941 as it was different constitutionally from mandatory times. It was clearly dominant, had dominance been desired; but in fact it was more concerned to strengthen the hand of the 'Iraq Government than to supersede it. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, from whose character and experience the nation was thus able again to benefit, remained at the Embassy until 1945 to link amicably the British military and the 'Iraqi civil worlds, and to offer objective

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

721 648 and benevolent advice to the Government. He was helped in keeping touch with all parts of the country by a small staff of Political Advisers resident, as observers only, in north, central, and southern 'Iraq. While an element of Anglophobe bitterness persisted among disappointed Army officers, ex-internees, and rancorous intelligentsia, the general tone of the public, especially in village, tribal, and non-political circles, was complacent or friendly to the British 'occupation'. Many joined Miss Freya Stark's 'Brotherhood of Freedom', a movement which claimed 600 committees and stood for a broad sympathetic support of democratic values; and many were receptive of direct British information and propaganda, realized the help which the Army was able repeatedly to give in civilian needs and interests, and heard with pleasure of the foundation in London of an Anglo-'Iraq Society in March 1944.

The Ambassador was relieved by Sir Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, formerly British Minister in Jidda, in the spring of 1945. The reduction of Paiforce was by that time well advanced. It had diminished the scale of its construction works (with resulting local unemployment), had removed most of its emergency railway lines, had parted with control of the river transport, and narrowed the perimeters of its vast Shu'ayba and Musayib camps. It was to disappear finally in 1947, after disposing locally of vast quantities of stores, and to leave behind it a considerable legacy of permanent improvement in the form of buildings and equipment in the Port, railways, and roads of the territory.

2. THE MIDDLE WAR YEARS

721 645 The crisis through which 'Iraq had passed in May 1941 justified, when once the position was restored, the firmest of Governments. The sullen disaffection of the Army, the weakening of the Administration, the muttering among members of the disbanded Youth Organizations, the threats of fugitive Gaylani partisans that their struggle was but beginning: these features increased the dislocations and abnormalities of national life and, as war conditions began to assert themselves, called for a strong and a skilful hand.

It was not forthcoming. Madfa'i, whom patriotic duty alone had induced again to accept power, treated the situation as merely the aftermath of one more political episode and adopted easily the rôle which had fallen to him after Ṣidqi's murder—that of 'dropping the curtain' on past misdeeds. The gap between the measures which he took and those indicated by 'Iraq's position and needs was indeed so clear that his early supersession was inevitable.

The Cabinet which he installed was one of experienced politicians, with no new blood. Nuri Sa'id, whose presence in the capital could have been embarrassing to Madfa'i, betook himself to Egypt

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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as Minister. The portfolio of Foreign Affairs was given to 'Ali Jawdat, Interior to the tough and experienced Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, Works to Jalal Baban, Finance and temporarily Justice to Ibrahim Kamal—in whom many saw a future Prime Minister—and Economics to Naṣrat al-Farsi. The two Shi'i Ministers were Ridhā al-Shabibi at Education, and Ja'far Ḥamandi at Social Affairs. This Ministry met cordially the suggestions of its ally as regards the stationing of troops at strategic points, the acceptance of joint control at the Port, and a censorship suited to war conditions. The Italian Legation was expelled, a few subversive Palestinian and Syrian teachers repatriated, and the enemy propaganda machine thereby seriously dislocated. Normal administration was everywhere restored, and local authorities encouraged to initiate progressive works. The tribes were quiet, the Kurds for the moment inactive. The accidental shooting of their Qa'immaqam by the Yazidis had no repercussions. But the Ministry failed in a firm orientation of war policy, and notably in its half-hearted attitude to the known trouble-makers, indulgence to whom among the menaces of war was dangerous folly. The policy of the Cabinet was appeasement. Few arrests were made, although those few included 'Abd al-Waḥid and others of the incorrigible Euphrates shaykhs. Mutaṣarrifs through misguided clemency were discouraged by ministers from firm action, and too little was done to purge the Administration itself. Preparations for an internment camp at Fao were allowed to drag on.

The resignation of Ibrahim Kamal in September seemed likely to be followed by the formation of a Ministry by this able, impatient statesman; but he commanded insufficient support, and the Regent preferred, since a change was necessary, to send to Egypt for Nuri Sa'id whose qualities were those which the times demanded. Jamil al-Madfa'i resigned on 7 October, and two days later a Royal Irada announced that Nuri had formed a Cabinet, his sixth. He brought the vigorous and competent Shi'i, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, to the Ministry of the Interior—the first Shi'i ever to fill this post—and to act also in Foreign Affairs. 'Ali Mumtaz went to Finance, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam to Justice, Taḥsin 'Ali to Education, Muḥammad Amin Zaki to Works, 'Abd al-Mahdi to Economics, Jamal Baban to Social Affairs. It was upon the two first-named of these ministers that the chief burden of administration must fall.

Cabinet changes occurred in February 1942 when Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for four months only), and in April when Da'ud al-Ḥaydari replaced Baṣṣam at Justice, and 'Abd al-Mahdi took from Amin Zaki the portfolio of Works. The Prime Minister retained that of Defence and pressed on the British Ambassador his desire and that of the Army for a

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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specific rôle to play in the defeat of Hitler; but his offer of two brigades for North Africa was not accepted. With the Regent's support he showed, nevertheless, appropriate vigour in the arrest of the disloyal, though certain well-protected Nazi sympathizers remained untouched (and even retained high office) and zeal was for a time diminished in mid-1942 by the successes of General Rommel in the Western Desert. The camp at Fao was soon in use. It was followed later by another at the desert post of Salman, and yet another on the riverside at 'Amara, to which all the detained were ultimately transferred; the number of these rose at its greatest to some 350. A number of 'Iraqi fugitives captured by the British in Persia were held for a time at Ahwaz, and later taken for trial to Baghdad or for internment to Rhodesia. The Ministry of Education was submitted to a complete and much needed overhaul. Some dozens of the less efficient officers of the 'Iraq Army—or, said his enemies, of those unfriendly to Nuri—were removed, and conscription applied with a wiser indulgence in tribal areas.

Relations with Japan and with Vichy France were broken off soon after the Sa'idi Ministry took office. A Minister, 'Ali Jawdat, was sent for the first time to Washington in March 1942, soon after the regretted death of Paul Knabenshue in Baghdad; and the benefits of American lend-lease supplies were enjoyed from May onwards. The Prime Minister was able late in the same year to obtain a resolution of the Chamber in favour of adhesion to the United Nations Declaration of 2 January 1942, and was known already to be contemplating a declaration of war against the Axis, a condition of such adhesion. A treaty was concluded with China, whose Minister to 'Iraq resided at Teheran.

The Axis press and propaganda-machine continued to paint 'Iraqi conditions as those of brutal British domination, slave labour, daily conspiracies, sabotage, and tribal ferment: grotesque perversions which were supported by the presence in Europe of Rashid 'Āli (who broke his parole by leaving Turkey), Naji Shawkat, Fawzi Qawuqchi, the Mufti, and others. These fugitives were received by Mussolini, Ribbentrop, and Hitler himself, and broadcast their version of the 'Iraqi situation on demand. Meanwhile, their former colleagues in 'Iraq fared less well. A special Court was set up by the Sa'idi Ministry late in 1941 and in March 1942 sentenced to death, in absence, Rashid 'Āli and two of his ministers, Yunis al-Sab'awi and 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh, and three of the Golden Square, Fahmi Sa'id, Maḥmud Salman, and Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh. Long sentences of imprisonment were passed on Naji Shawkat and the Chief of Staff, Amin Zaki Sulayman, and shorter on the former Minister of Education, Dr. Ḥasan Salman, and the Director of Propaganda, Ṣādiq Shanshal. The trial of other and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

similar offenders was postponed until they could be produced before a Court; these were Naji al-Suwaydi (who died soon afterwards in Rhodesia), three other ministers—Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Musā al-Shahbandar, and Ra'uf Baḥrani—Kamil Shabib, the fourth member of the Square, and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani, the late Prime Minister's cousin. The delivery to 'Iraqi justice of a number of offenders caught by the British in Persia led to the re-trial of some of those already condemned in absence. The death sentence was now passed and executed on Yunis al-Sab'awi, Fahmi Sa'id, and Maḥmud Salman; prison sentences of seven and five years respectively were passed on 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and General Amin Zaki. Ṣādiq Shanshal was acquitted, and the other sentences confirmed. Many attempts, of familiar type, were made during the trials to influence the course of justice.

The personal stresses arising from these measures, and more generally from Nuri's policy of whole-hearted support of Great Britain even in the darkest days, led to ministerial uneasiness which was increased by differences on the measures demanded by the now serious economic situation. It was shown by the attempted resignation during the summer of 'Ali Mumtaz and 'Abdullah Damluji, and produced an effect of partial paralysis of the administration. The Ministry resigned on 8 October 1942 after exactly a year of life, and was succeeded by another, the seventh, under the same premiership. Retaining Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and 'Abd al-Mahdi at Works, Nuri Pasha allotted Interior to his brother-in-law Taḥsin al-'Askari (brother of Ja'far), Foreign Affairs to Dr. 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh—a graduate in economics and dentistry—Justice to Da'ud al-Ḥaydari, Education to Taḥsin 'Ali, Economics to the Najfi business man Muḥsin al-Shallash, and Social Affairs to another ex-Mutaṣarrif and judge, Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban, a Kurd only in name. This composition was shortly afterwards modified by the retirement of 'Abd al-Mahdi and Shallash in favour of Salman Barrak of Ḥilla in Economics and the young Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Uzri, in Social Affairs.

The establishment of this Ministry was followed by a State visit of the Regent to Cairo where he was royally received by King Faruq, revisited Victoria College, and passed on to inspect the field of Alamein. His nephew, King Fayṣal II, now growing into an intelligent and promising boy, broadcast in English and Arabic on his eighth birthday, 2 May 1943.

Among the Ministry's first acts was to declare war on Germany, Italy, and Japan, alleging the sinister interventions of these Powers in its affairs, and issuing a Green Book in support of its policy. The Turkish Minister assumed charge of French and Japanese, the Swiss Consul of German interests. Cordial telegrams were

721 exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important
practical results could be expected from this move, which at
645 best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the
Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the
Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor
dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of
obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent
of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of
foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the
Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi
officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under
Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse,
did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship.
Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the
722 Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were
offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition
without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British
advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or
surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system
accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements,
the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and
grain supplies provided.

361 Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which
was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such
185 major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development
could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be
planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with
working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud
and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great
changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves
were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the
resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled
during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of
London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of
744 office to the Amin al-'Aṣima. The Health services continued to
develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private
practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the
Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had
served the country and their science now for twenty years, still
played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far
871 from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was
passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls,
and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools
were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few
during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

secondary boarding school on European lines was founded in 871 Baghdad in 1941, the King Fayṣal College. Mosul Technical School was reopened in 1942, and another in Kirkuk in 1945. The Queen 'Aliya Institute for the higher training of women teachers was founded in 1945, and a higher Engineering College in 1942; but a College for Physical Education, opened in the latter year, survived only four years. The Institute of Fine Arts, with separate faculties of Music, Painting, Sculpture, and Dramatic Art, was founded in 1941. Professor H. R. Hamley served as Adviser to the Ministry of Education—the first after a lapse of ten years—in 1942–3, K. J. Ritchie in 1944–5, and C. H. Scaife of Cairo University thereafter for two years. The Department of Antiquities 172 was fully active; it carried out excavation at Tall 'Uqayr, fifty miles south of Baghdad, in 1940–1: at Dayr on the Yusifiya Canal in 1941; at the 'Aqar Quf in 1942–4; at Tall Ḥasuna near Mosul in 1943–4: at Ḥira near Kufa and Tall Harmal near Baghdad in 1945. The greatest part of these works was carried out by 'Iraqi scholars, who had acquired high qualifications.

The Administration itself, gravely shaken by the events of 1941 645+ and the strains which followed, and confronted with new tasks and new temptations, lapsed perceptibly both in efficiency and integrity. Neither ministerial unity nor the administrative grasp required to correct this weakness was forthcoming, and resulting conditions led to renewed complaints against 'the old gang' by critics who pressed for the infusion of new blood into the Cabinet, preferably their own. The middle and later periods of the war gave, indeed, no scope for military coups, the incitement of tribesmen, or inspired strikes; but they permitted all too much of the personal intrigues, the intemperate mutual criticism, and the irritated frustrations of normal times.

The inspiring war news from Libya and Tunis in the winter of 721 1942–3 was greeted by public holidays and the renaming of streets, and extinguished the lingering hopes of Nazi sympathizers: hopes which the capture in July of three German officers, dropped near Mosul by parachute with a Kurdish guide, did nothing to restore. The improved atmosphere led to a turn of ministerial policy towards increased indulgence to the internees of the 'Amara camp and Rhodesia; the resulting releases, considered sadly premature by the British Embassy, were followed by the reinstatement in public functions of men known for violent anti-British and anti-Hashimite sympathies.

Useful non-political work had been done meanwhile by a Com- 642 mittee of Senators and Jurists, with Drower and Edmonds as advisers, on an amendment to the Constitution designed to correct some evident present inadequacies. The Committee met early in

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

×645 theme for hostile schoolboy agitation in the streets of the capital.
668 The Ministry's appeal for unity and tranquillity, and another by
al-Ṣadr in person, were alike unheeded, and the work of administration,
in which the Prime Minister had neither interest nor competence,
[731] was largely ignored. The near-famine conditions among
the poorer classes could not be cured until after the harvest, which
itself promised to be scanty; meanwhile an Australian grain ship
was by British initiative diverted to Baṣra and its urgently needed
stores distributed.

×645 The death of Ḥamdi al-Pachachi on 27 March led to changes among the uneasy ministers. 'Umar Nadhmi had resigned and been replaced at Justice by Najib al-Rawi, who handed his portfolio of Social Affairs to Ḥaydari. Naṣrat had succeeded Madfa'i at Interior when the latter became President of the Senate, and was himself succeeded when he moved to Foreign Affairs by Muṣṭafā al-'Umari who could thus 'control' the forthcoming elections. The Amir al-Rabi'a resigned and went home in April. Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba left the Ministry early in June. The frequent absences of the Ministers of Finance and Justice at Arab League meetings led to constant interchange of ministerial duties, from which the shaken and demoralized Administration suffered.

646 The Chamber met on 26 June, after elections in which legal and illegal parties alike had put forth all their efforts, and which had produced street fighting in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniya. The Independence Party secured four seats, the National Democrats two, the Liberals one. All other deputies were free of party attachment and as such were likely to vote for any Ministry in power; it was clear that the enthusiasm, or the leadership, of the parties had still too little appeal to seduce the electorate from the familiar candidates of local importance in their constituencies or to resist the conservative influence of controlling officialdom. A Chamber—or an electorate—divided on true party lines was still an unrealizable conception.

648× The new Parliament was confronted, to its dismay, with a situation
721 containing new and alarming features which events in Palestine had created. The United Nations decision for Partition, taken in November 1947, had led in 'Iraq as elsewhere to angry remonstrance, and in the Arab League to emergency meetings. But no hopeful measures could be taken or planned at these; the lines of cleavage within the League were already too clear, and most of the States members too doubtful of their own stability. The earlier decision to encourage the infiltration of guerrilla fighters from each country into Palestine, for the stiffening of local resistance, was carried out to a limited extent. Some hundreds—or, as some said, two battalions—of young and a few veteran

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'Iraqis, recruited by the Palestine Defence League, entered 648×
Palestine and served or offered to serve with Fawzi al-Qawuqchi 721
and the Palestine leaders; they were inspired perhaps by genuine devotion but were of negligible fighting capacity. The inefficacy of this force, and the collapse of Arab resistance in the face of Jewish terrorism and their resolute forces, led the League to decide, before the official end of the Mandate, upon the intervention of Arab regular armies. In April the Regent, whose leadership and vitality regained him much of his popularity, visited 'Amman and Cairo with the Ministers of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Student hunger strikes were called in Baghdad to urge the dispatch of the Army to Palestine, the closure of the Haifa pipeline, and a welcome for the Palestine exiles; and the Government of al-Ṣadr saw no alternative to following the League policy of large-scale intervention, however sketchily co-ordinated. 'Iraqi forces under General Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib—forces ill prepared, ill equipped, and with clearly inadequate supplies and reserves—moved from their home stations some ten to twelve thousand strong in mechanized or lorry-borne units, and took up positions on the western fringes of the Jordan Kingdom. They crossed into their allotted sector of Palestine on 15 May, immediately after the State of Israel had been proclaimed.

The outbreak of this war—the first occasion upon which its 722
troops were used abroad—was the signal for the imposition of 656
martial law throughout 'Iraq: a step happy only in its immediate restoration of outward tranquillity, but indicative of no real solution of any of the nation's problems. The emergency régime, which facilitated Government control over the elections, was marked by strict censorship, the opening of a concentration camp in the southern desert for the many arrested trouble-makers, the subordination of civil to military officials in all areas, and the establishment of military courts. It prohibited the carrying of firearms and the use of cypher codes, and by the supersession of many existing laws it involved a close restriction of civil rights. The clash between civil and military authorities increased as weeks went by with irritation, jealousy, and charges and counter-charges of indiscriminate severity or weak indulgence: Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams were soon heard to ask 'Which is the worse, government by students or by Army officers?' The press, swollen to an extraordinary number of daily sheets of trifling circulation but irresponsible violence, lost in a day the worst of its venom (except such as could be safely directed against the British or the Jews), and the few papers which refused compliance were suppressed. A ceremonial parade of the police in Baghdad did something to restore their morale. The Palestine war aroused enthusiastic

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq [redacted]

722 verbal support in every quarter and the Baghdad Jews vied ostentatiously with Muslims in anti-Zionist fervour and subscribed heavily to funds for the refugees.

721 648 But the campaign was from the first feebly and unfortunately conducted. The higher leadership was uninspiring, supply arrangements inadequate, and the discipline and bearing of the 'Iraqi troops, though judged to be superior to those of other Arab States except Jordan, carried them to little glory. Units entered Palestine on 15 May between Geshen and Wadi Yabis and marched on Tul Karm and Nablus, areas unoccupied by the Jews; their attempt on Tiberias was unsuccessful, but they effectively occupied the Nablus–Tiberias–Janin triangle and advanced to within twelve miles of Tel Aviv. This hopeful move was frustrated by Jewish resistance in front of Nathaniya and by counter-pressure which forced the 'Iraqis to abandon Bayt Tima and give ground in the occupied triangle. The Security Council's cease-fire order of 22 May had been at first ignored by all, but both sides accepted a four-weeks' truce operative on 11 June. The impetus of Arab invasion had by that time been lost, their weakness exposed, and their initial superiority in heavy arms, which was never to recur, had availed them little; and during the truce period equipment poured into the Jewish Army, none into the Arab. After the rejection of proposals evolved by the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, and his Truce Commission for a federation of Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and Jordan, fighting was renewed on 9 July. A further 'Iraqi attempt to take Nathaniya was foiled, the Jews swept into Galilee, and their deeper advance was stopped only by the second truce which was observed from 18 July. This at the Arab League meeting at Aley was rejected only by the 'Iraq Government, and that for reasons of pride and policy; but it was in fact operative and the war, for 'Iraq, was over.

The many attempts to restore peace to Palestine and solve its insoluble problems, the murder of Bernadotte by the Jews, the renewal of Isrâeli-Egyptian hostilities from October to the end of 1948, form no part of the history of 'Iraq. 'Iraq Army units remained in occupation of the east Palestine triangle for some months, dependent as ever on their long line of communications through Jordan and receiving their pay irregularly from the almost empty Treasury at home. Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib was recalled to 'Iraq as Chief of Staff, to return again to Palestine later as Commander-in-Chief of the combined 'Iraqi-Jordan forces; but this experiment in joint command lasted but a few weeks, and the wider project of a unified command for all League forces—a clear military necessity—was frustrated by division among the States and by Egyptian refusal. No real effect was given to the resolution of the 'Iraqi

deputies and Senate in November that 'unified military and 721
political plans for the redemption of Palestine' should be adopted; 648x
the idea was already unrealistic before the end of the year. Units in Palestine and Jordan were visited repeatedly by the Regent, who did more than the ministers of his bewildered and irresolute Government to inspire such national effort as was possible. The nominal and absentee 'Government of all Palestine' announced by the Mufti, Ḥajj Amin—an irritant certain to envenom inter-Arab relations—was recognized by 'Iraq to please the Egyptians.

3. *PLUS ÇA CHANGE . . .*

The general elections were carried out four days after the first 645x
truce in Palestine had become effective, and when Parliament met on 21 June the resignation of Muḥammad al-Ṣadr's Ministry was offered and accepted; it had possessed little authority, had failed to restore order save by imposing martial law, had neglected current administration, had allowed an alarming financial deterioration, and now bequeathed a disheartening legacy at home and abroad.

The Regent's choice of a successor fell unexpectedly upon a statesman formerly prominent but, through long residence in Europe, now in imperfect touch with current politics: Muzaḥim al-Pachachi. He claimed to be of no party and selected a Cabinet of long-familiar figures; Muṣṭafā al-'Umari was to serve at Interior, 'Ali Mumtaz at Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba at Justice, Baṣṣam at Defence, Jalal Baban at Works and Social Affairs, Rawi at Education, and a single newcomer, 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, a young Ḥilla landowner, at Economics. 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, a Beirut-educated Kurdish deputy from Ruwanduz, who had been interned in 1941, relieved Jalal Baban in Social Affairs in August. These ministers, whose appointment showed once more the small part played by party affiliations in the making of Ministries, were with changes to remain in office for half a year, and could achieve something but not much towards redressing 'Iraq's present misfortunes of penury, insecurity, and foreign entanglement.

The finances of the State went from bad to worse. No budget 652
for 1948–9 was submitted until the end of the financial year; normal revenues fell off through bad trade, another bad harvest, tax evasion, and feeble administration; and a certain deficit on the year's work could not prevent the allotment to the Army of nearly 40 per cent. of available funds, and a substantial contribution for the care of the Palestine refugees. Oil royalties were halved by the stoppage of the Haifa pipeline, which, whatever the resulting losses to the Treasury, no Cabinet would dare to reopen in spite of approaches made by the British, French, and American Governments

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Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe
resembling the chanter of a bagpipe and has often a pleasant lilt. 534
Kurdish dancing, however, is by no means as strenuous as Scottish. 535
Kurds and all other mountain dwellers in Kurdistan dance what is
known as the chain-dance, similar to that which is, I believe, commonly
seen in the Balkans. The dancers join hands and form a ring. The
piper and a drummer with a sort of tenor drum stand in the middle,
and the dance consists of fairly intricate footwork while the circle
moves slowly round. Often star dancers who fancy themselves as K
budding Nijinskys do solo dances inside the circle. Amongst the [562]
Kurds the men and women dance separately, but with the Christian
sects the two sexes dance together. This does not mean, however, that
Kurdish women are completely segregated or kept by thems[illegible]. As
a matter of fact, they possess considerable freedom and may be seen
gathering firewood, tending animals or engaged in other tasks on the
mountainside, often far from their villages.

Up to five years ago the Barzan district of Kurdistan retained all K
of its savage and primitive features. Government had not penetrated 619
and Shaikh Ahmed, a religious fanatic, was dictator. With the help 643
of his brothers and a standing army of several hundred men he com- 641
pletely dominated the impoverished inhabitants, who had the shaikh's 726
bodyguard perpetually billeted on them and who had to provide them 792
with food, clothing and tobacco and anything else they might fancy.
Any protests on the part of the villagers were discouraged by the K
strongest methods. Such complete ascendancy did Shaikh Ahmed gain [212]
over his savage and illiterate people that they began to look upon him
as a god and, though Muslims in name, turned their faces towards him K
in prayer rather than towards Mecca, as tradition demands. There 742
was a Mullah in the district called Mullah Juj, who represented himself 779
to be the prophet of this new god. The Mullah was a very fiery and 682
eloquent speaker and, unfortunately for himself, his fame began to 784
surpass even that of the deity. This could not of course be tolerated, 661
and one of Shaikh Ahmed's brothers "bumped off" the presumptuous 671
prophet. Up to that time the Koran had been revered, but now the K
Shaikh issued orders for the destruction of all copies to be found. He [136]
also withdrew the ban on the eating of pork, for wild pig were plenti- I
ful in Barzan. Armed missionaries were sent out beyond the Barzan K
bounds, and villages which refused to accept the Shaikh were burned 721
and a number of the male inhabitants put to death. This state of 657
affairs could not be allowed to continue, and the 'Iraq Government 648
was forced to take action in conjunction with the British Royal K
Air Force. 697

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Kurd MAH

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K Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly
657 wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs
648 or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were
721 very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed
at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them
rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been
a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were
eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish
K authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found
728 that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army
I 168 could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have
166 been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani,
K where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The
[779] Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of
653 making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in
563 Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil,
K where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to
221 the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these
roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume
of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish
tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual
migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran.
[I During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the
K 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the
64x] summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other
I nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Govern-
K ment to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare
529 grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popu-
656 larize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money
to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am
afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful.
Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the
attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret,
I tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

K The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited
438 by the improvement in public security and communications and is
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now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradition at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

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The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

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The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

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The Yezidis in 'Iraq practically all dwell either in the Sinjār or 162
Shaikhān districts. Each of these districts has a brass peacock and that Y
belonging to Shaikhān must never cross the Tigris. If it did so the 101
world would come to an end! Non-Yezidis cannot view the peacocks
or the other sacred emblems, which include the "shema'dan" or 778
candlestick and the "bairaqs" or banners. When not touring, all Y
emblems are kept at the residence of the *Mir* at Baa'dhra in Shaikhān, [793
though a few years ago the Sinjār Yezidis, who were at variance with 795
the *Mir*, seized their peacock and collected subscriptions on their I
account until compelled by Government to return it to its lawful 659]
keeper. Yezidis object strongly to the use of the word "Shaitān" Y
(Satan) or any word resembling it. Terms meaning "curse" are also 776
never used less Satan construes them as a tactless reminder of his fall. 784

Owing to these difficulties and restrictions, Yezidis are not "good Y
mixers" and rarely enter Government service. A few were formerly 186
employed by the British Government in the transport company of the 463
'Iraq Levies, but did not prove very satisfactory. Occasionally they 669
have enlisted in the 'Iraq army, but an attempt to apply a light measure I 563
of conscription to the Sinjār Yezidis resulted in an armed revolt by 381 782
five villages. This necessitated punitive action with, unfortunately, 669
heavy casualties on both sides. The Yezidis speak a form of Kurdish, Y [197]
but many also know Arabic. Ain Sifni or Ain-i-Safina (Spring of the 174
Boat) is the chief market town of the Shaikhān Yezidis. It derives its 438
name from a tradition that the Ark touched ground there.

Yezidis are to be found outside 'Iraq in the Caucasus and also a Y
few thousand north of Aleppo. 101

It is difficult to believe that this curious religion can long survive Y
in 'Iraq under present-day conditions. The *Mir* is unpopular and 793
there is no better successor amongst his in-bred and degenerate relatives. 794
The Yezidis have recently refused to yield him many of his 578
former rights and have severely criticised his squandering of the religious
revenues. Most of the members of the hierarchy have concentrated
their energies on trying to divert funds to their own pockets and
have quarrelled furiously. A certain number of stalwarts have defied Y
the priests and attended schools. In the Sinjār prior to the Great War 771
religious pressure induced a considerable number of Yezidis to adopt [871]
Islam, and it is within the bounds of possibility that ere long there 797
may be a regular landslide to either the Christian or Islamic faith or
both.

6: Ireland
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MHl Iraq MHl

/For an account of the conquest of Iraqi territories by the British in the 1914-18 War, see category 116, pp. 63-73./

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CHAPTER III

THE CONQUEST OF SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

In the four years, 1914 to 1918, British arms completed what /75*
three centuries of British commerce and diplomacy had begun. 721
The military operations which resulted in the occupation of Basra, then of Baghdad in 1917, and finally of the whole of Turkish Arabia as far north as Mŏsul, have been ably recounted elsewhere.[1] It is germane here only to indicate how the motives which lay behind the forward movements and the administration of the occupied territories arose partly from immediate circumstances and partly from the long established Middle East policy of Great Britain.

Consideration of Baghdad as an objective of the Expeditionary Force had come before its military and political officials early in the campaign. On November 23rd, the day after the occupation of Basra, Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer to the Force, telegraphed privately to the Viceroy that the General Officer Commanding had been considering the question of the advance to Baghdad and that he (Cox) did not see how 'we can well avoid taking over Baghdad'.[2] Officials on the spot, in India and at Whitehall as well as representatives of commercial interests in the country continued to give expression to similar views,[3] but neither H.M. Government nor the Government of

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[1] *History of the Great War based on Official Documents:* (*a*) Moberly, Brig.-Gen., F. J., op. cit. (*O.H.*); (*b*) Corbett, Sir Julian, *Naval Operations*, Vol. II (1922); VI (1923); (*c*) Macpherson, *Medical Services, General History*, Vol. IV (1924). *Survey of India, Records of the*, Vol. XX. *The War Record* (1920). Candler, Edmund, *The Long Road to Baghdad* (2 vols., 1919). Personal accounts by Sir Arnold Wilson, Lieut.-Col. J. E. Tennant, C. V. Townshend and others.

[2] *O.H.*, Vol. I, p. 134. His telegram 'was specifically prompted by urgent representations from the Heads of the British Mercantile community'. Sir Percy Cox to the writer, July 16th, 1936.

[3] *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610, p. 97; Bolitho, H., *Lord Inchcape* (1936), pp. 122-4.

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175 121 India were ready, at the time, to support such a far-reaching objective.[1] Indeed the attitude of the latter towards the expedition until the middle of 1915 had been that of niggardly, even unwilling compliance with the policy laid down by H.M. Government.[2]

The sudden reversal of this attitude by the Government of India came after the appointment of General Sir John Nixon to the command in Mesopotamia, April 9th, 1915, when it assumed, with his support, the initiative for the advance to Baghdad.[3] Occurring almost at the same moment that the India Office, with a new concern for oil supplies, opposed any extension of objective beyond the hinterland of Basra, a deliberate and concerted policy was rendered impossible. The criticism of the Mesopotamia Commission of 1917: 'The scope of the objective of the expedition was never sufficiently defined in advance, so as to make each successive move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan,'[4] was never more pertinent than in the days before the first march on Baghdad.

The degree to which the reversal of the attitude of the Government of India and the sanction of H.M. Government to the advance on Baghdad were influenced by the realization that India's permanent interests would be best served by the inclusion of Baghdad under the direct control of India cannot be fully known until the evidence in state archives is available. In the late autumn of 1915 the Government of India stated clearly that it expected to annex at least Baghdad and Basra[5] but it would seem that considerations of the moment played as large a part in the authorization of the advance as did deliberate consideration of past and future policy.

Early successes around Basra had elated the military command in India, increasing their desire for further victories in

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[1] *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610, p. 20; Asquith, H. A., *Memories and Reflections* (2 vols., 1928), Vol. II, p. 69; Bolitho, op. cit., p. 123.

[2] Cd. 8610, pp. 97, 105, 106, 123-31.

[3] Ibid., pp. 16, 97, 125.

[4] Ibid., p. 111; *O.H.*, Vol. III, preface.

[5] *Infra*, p. 96.

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order to demonstrate their importance, unduly cast in the 175*
shade in their own opinion, by the larger and more striking 721
operations in Europe.[1] The advance to Baghdad would not only give these opportunities but would, as the Viceroy pointed out to the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Austen Chamberlain,

> create an immense impression in the Middle East, especially in Persia, Afghanistan, and on our frontier, and would counteract the unfortunate impression in the Middle East created by want of success in the Dardanelles. It would also isolate German parties in Persia,[2] probably produce a pacifying effect in that country, and frustrate the German plan of raising Afghanistan and the tribes, while the impression throughout Arabia would be striking. In India, the effect would be undoubtedly good.[3]

The Chief of General Staff, India, on October 5th, emphasized in addition, that the possession of Baghdad would

> deprive the Turks of a well-equipped place of concentration; place us in a good position to defeat them in detail as they moved down the rivers from Asia Minor or Syria; deprive the Turks of steamers, material and resources, and increase our prestige.[4]

In the arguments put forward by the Government of India, H.M. Government fully concurred.[5] Indeed so convinced was the War Cabinet by 'Nixon's attitude and by opportunities within our grasp for a great success such as we have not yet achieved in any quarter, and the political (and even military) advantages which would follow from it throughout the East',

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[1] Cd. 8610, p. 131.

[2] For German activities in Persia, Afghanistan and India in August and September, 1915, see *O.H.*, Vol. I, pp. 309 ff.

[3] Telegram (Private) Lord Hardinge to Chamberlain, October 6th, 1915, cited *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 11; also, Letter, Viceroy to Chamberlain, October 15th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 21.

[4] Appreciation, Sir Percy Lake, October 5th, 1915, cited ibid., pp. 9-10.

[5] Letter (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, October 7th, cited ibid., p. 8; Telegram S/S for India to Viceroy, October 6th, cited ibid., p. 11; Interdepartmental Comm. Report, October 16, cited ibid., p. 17.

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not easily overrated,[1] that it authorized General Nixon to 'march on Baghdad if he is satisfied that the force he has available is sufficient for operations' and promised reinforcements from France.[2]

The disasters which followed, ending in the surrender, April 29th, of 13,309 British officers and other ranks at Kūt al-'Amāra, after a siege of five months, now form part of history. The Commission appointed by Parliament in 1916 to make inquiry into the conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia,[3] placed 'the weightiest share of responsibility for the first attempt on Baghdad' on Sir John Nixon, whose 'confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance'.[4] It must not be overlooked, however, that both he and those who advocated the advance at the time were not unnaturally influenced by immediate ends which outweighed military conditions, to meet which little or no adequate preparation had been made.

In the period after the unsuccessful attempts to relieve Kūt, and its surrender, when the Force lay inert, concerned mainly with renewing its strength and reorganizing its vital services,[5] the ultimate desirability of extending British influence to Baghdad was not entirely forgotten. Not until February 3rd, 1917, however, when the Russians were expected to converge on Mōsul and perhaps Baghdad, did Sir William Robertson ask General Maude for his views regarding another advance towards Baghdad, it being considered desirable for political reasons that British forces should occupy the city before the Russians.[6]

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[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Viceroy, October 6th, cited ibid., p. 11.

[2] Ibid., October 23rd, cited ibid., p. 28.

[3] *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610.

[4] Ibid., p. 111. General Nixon had repeatedly shown his confidence that he had enough troops to capture the city; Telegrams, Nixon to Government of India and India Office, October 6th, 1915, cited *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 12; Nixon to Chamberlain, October 8th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 15; Viceroy to Chamberlain, October 6th, 1915, cited ibid., p.11. Telegram (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, October 5th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 9.

[5] *O.H.*, Vol. III, pp. 7, 20-3, 30-6, 62-70.

[6] Ibid., pp. 125, 126 and 204 ff

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SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

The inquiry, followed by definite instructions on February 28th, 1917, to capture Baghdad[1] were not influenced merely by the traditional opposition to the installation of Russia in Turkish Arabia. Circumstances arising from more deeply rooted aspirations, together with the same general considerations which had prompted the advance of 1915, were also at work.[2]

The pre-war aspirations of the powers for economic and political expansion in Asia had taken on a concrete form as important war objectives of the Allies on the basis of the so-called Secret Agreements. These, as far as they affected the Ottoman Empire, were as follows: (1) Constantinople Agreement, March 18th, 1915, by Russia, France and Great Britain concerning Constantinople, the Straits and Persia;[3] (2) Pact of London, April 26th, 1915, between Great Britain, Russia and Italy regarding compensation to Italy for joining the Allies against Germany;[4] (3) Husain-McMahon Correspondence, August, 1914, to January, 1916, concerning Arab independence in return for Arab co-operation against the Turks;[5] (4) Agreements of the spring of 1916, between Great Britain, France and

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[1] *O.H.*, Vol. III, p. 205.

[2] The Government of India again pressed for the capture of Baghdad on the grounds that it would relieve the increasing tension on the North West Frontier, *O.H.*, Vol. III, p. 207.

[3] Text, de Martens, C., *Recueil des Traites*, 3rd Series (Leipzig, 1922), Vol. x, p. 347. Also, Temperley, H. W. V., *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (hereafter *H.P.C.P.*) (6 vols., 1920-4), Vol. VI, pp. 2-10; *Manchester Guardian*, February 22nd, 1918.

[4] *Accts. and Papers*, Misc. Papers, 1920, No. 7 (Cmd. 671), LI, 261. Text: de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 329; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. v, pp. 384 ff.; also, Vol. VI, pp. 10-13.

[5] The complete text of the correspondence has never been officially revealed, but summaries of substantial portions have been published: MacMunn, Sir G., and Falls, C., *Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine* (Official History of the World War, hereafter cited as *O.H., E. and Pal.*) (2 vols., 1928-30), Vol. I, pp. 213 ff.; *Le Temps* (Paris), September 19th, 1919; Cocks, Seymour, *The Secret Treaties* (1918); *Note on the Arab Question*, submitted by Amir Faisal to H.M. Government and cited *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CXXXVI (1929), pp. 735-6; *Al-Manar* (Arabic journal, Cairo), January 5th, 1924. The summaries given here have been taken from the original Arabic text of the letters.

'IRAQ

175* Russia—(*a*) Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 16th, 1916, between
721 Great Britain and France, concerning the division of Syria and Mesopotamia between themselves and the Arabs;[1] (*b*) Russia's assent to an agreement which assigned her northern Kurdistan and portions of Eastern Anatolia;[2] (5) The Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, April 17th, 1917, between Great Britain, France and Italy, concerning Italy's share of Asia Minor.[3]

The Ottoman Empire, from which Germany was to be excluded, was, by the Agreements, divided among the Allies in accordance with their long-standing ambitions. In addition, large sections of the Empire were assigned to potential allies to draw them into the war against the Central Powers. Thus, Italy demanded and received recognition, by the Pact of London, April 26th, 1915, of her claims to an 'equitable' section of Asia Minor. In return for his revolt against the Turks, Husain, Sharīf of Mecca, received promises through the so-called Husain-McMahon Correspondence of British aid for the establishment of Arab independence in a large portion of the Arabic-speaking provinces of Turkey.[4]

In the Correspondence, however, Sir Henry McMahon made reservations safeguarding the interests of Great Britain

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[1] Text: de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 350; *L'Asie Française*, XVII (August-November, 1919), pp. 243 ff.; Samné, G., *La Syrie* (Paris, 1920), p. 638 ff.; Loder, J. de V., *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria* (1923), pp. 161-4. The Foreign Office 'version' in Leslie, Shane, *Mark Sykes; His Life and Letters* (1923), pp. 250-8, is nothing more than an explanation of the circumstances under which the Agreement was made.

[2] See Memorandum of March 6th, 1917 (first printed in *Izvesta*, November 12th, 1917); *Manchester Guardian*, January 19th, 1918; de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 353; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, p. 16. For negotiations in which Russia participated, see documents in *Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei Während des Weltkrieges: Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei* (Adamoff, E., ed., Dresden, 1932) (hereafter *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*), especially Nos. 56, 60, 74-8, 99, 103, 104.

[3] Reputed text: *Manchester Guardian*, January 9th, 1920; *Current History* (New York), Vol. XI (March, 1920), pp. 499 ff.; see also *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 18 ff.

[4] Letters, Sir H. McMahon, Cairo, to Husain, Sharif of Mecca, October 24th, December 14th, 1915; also, August 30th, 1915. See also, Young, Major Sir H. W., *The Independent Arab* (1933), pp. 276-7.

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and those of her ally, France.[1] Previous agreements which 175
Great Britain had with the Arab chiefs were to be unaltered.[2] 721
Basra was to be placed under British control[3] while Baghdad, concerning which it was declared that a stable government was demanded by the very special British interests in the region,[4] was to be the subject of future negotiations.[5] It was also stipulated that the prospective Arab state should receive only British aid and assistance, and should employ, exclusively, British advisers.[6] The Sharif had, at first, protested at the conditions concerning 'Iraq, which, he declared, by history and religion, formed an integral part of Arab territory.[7] It was agreed, however, to leave the final decision to the future, the British to pay an indemnity for any part of 'Iraq which they occupied, even temporarily.[8]

The Sykes-Picot Agreement[9] was to regulate future Anglo-French territorial relations in the eastern Mediterranean and to govern future British policy in points of conflict arising from the interpretation of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence and the Agreement. It confirmed the arrangements made by the Anglo-Arab correspondence by assigning Basra and

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[1] Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, December 14th, 1915; also, January 25th, 1916. The reservation of territory along the eastern Mediterranean in the interests of France were not recognized by the Sharif, who agreed, however, to postpone the decision until the end of the war. Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, January 1st, 1915. The claim of an existing secret treaty giving all of Arab-Asia to Sharif Husain has never been proven. *Infra*, p. 177.

[2] Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, Section 1; Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915.

[3] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, 1915.

[4] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, December 14th, 1915.

[5] Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915; Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, January 25th, 1916.

[6] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, 1915.

[7] Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915.

[8] Ibid., Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, January 25th, 1916.

[9] The frequent assertion that T. E. Lawrence, 'had much to do with the Sykes-Picot Agreement' (Main, '*Iraq*, p. 58) is scarcely' accurate. The first intimation received by Sir Henry McMahon, or anyone else in Cairo, of the agreement seems to have been when Sir Mark Sykes, 'in conversation, producing a map, remarked, "What do you think of my treaty?",' Hart, H. B. Liddell, *T. E. Lawrence* (1934), p. 70. See also Leslie, op. cit., pp. 244, 245, 249, 287, 288.

Baghdad to British control, and by designating a strip of territory lying between Baghdad and the zone of territory around Mōsul, assigned to French influence, as a zone to be given to the Arabs, subject to British influence.

The necessity of capturing Baghdad as a preliminary to the application of these secret agreements thus became one of the primary political arguments in favour of the renewed advance towards Baghdad. Its capture would also restore British prestige, seriously shaken by the surrender of Kūt and by the attempt, suggested by General Townshend himself, April 23rd,[1] and sanctioned by the War Cabinet,[2] to purchase the freedom of the besieged army for a sum of £2,000,000. The capture would, in addition, encourage the Allied Powers and dishearten the Central Powers.[3]

The occupation of Baghdad would present a better opportunity to organize Arab co-operation, a step which H.M. Government had repeatedly stressed from the inception of the campaign and to facilitate which the War Cabinet was to sanction the Proclamation of March 19th, 1917, issued under the name of General Maude, following the capture of Baghdad, March 11th, 1917.[4]

Among the reasons originally urged for the dispatch of the Expedition, it will be remembered, was the hope that it would secure the assistance of the Arabs against the Turks and prevent them from joining in a *Jihād*.[5] With these ends in view, proclamations had been addressed to the Shaikhs of the Gulf and to the Arabs of Turkish Arabia by H.M. Political

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[1] *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 450.

[2] Ibid., p. 452.

[3] The tremendous store set by Germany and Turkey on Baghdad and the plans which they elaborated for its recapture have been well described by Djemal (Jamal) Pasha in *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* (n.d.). During the war, he, himself, regarded Palestine and Syria as more important centres, although he had once, when Pasha of Baghdad, described 'Iraq as 'an iron gate against the great power to the south, that is, India'. Speech on the Inauguration of Jamal Bey as Pasha of Baghdad, August 30, 1911.

[4] For text see Appendix I.

[5] *Supra*, pp. 27-8.

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Officers, both before and after the occupation of Basra.[1] It was emphasized that 'this War has nothing to do with religion'.[2] The Shaikhs were urged not to 'allow the foolish people to be led away by foolish talk of "Jehad".' The Arabs were assured that the British Government bore 'no enmity or ill-will against the populace';[3] that it had 'no desire to treat them as enemies so long as they themselves remain friendly and neutral and refrain from taking up arms against her (British) troops'.[4] On the contrary, the British Government hoped 'to prove good friends and protectors'. The inhabitants were assured that, under the British flag, they would 'enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice both in regard to your religious and your secular affairs'.[5] They were warned, however, that while it was 'the wish of the British Government to free the Arabs from the oppression of the Turks and bring them advancement and increase of prosperity and trade', yet, 'in the case of those departing from the the path of friendship and neutrality and taking up arms in co-operation with the enemy, their properties lying within the sphere of British control will be considered sequestrated to the British Government'.[6] This warning had already been conveyed to them in an emphatic notice on the outbreak of war and dated November 5th, 1914.[7]

Neither the assurances nor the warnings conveyed in these proclamations nor the personal efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his assistant Political Officers were sufficient to win over the Arabs

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[1] *Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc. . . . Relating to . . . Mesopotamia, October 31st,* 1914 *to August* 31*st*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919) (hereafter, *Proclamations*, 1914-19). Notices and Proclamations, Nos. 1-5, 7, 8. An interesting parallel to the Proclamations of 1914 may be seen in the instructions to Captain Seton, Political Officer to the expeditions against pirates of the Persian Gulf, 1809. See Low, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 325.

[2] *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Notice No. 1, October 31st, 1914; Proclamation No. 2, November 1st, 1914; Proclamation No. 3, November 1st, 1914.

[3] Ibid., Proclamation No. 5, November 22nd, 1914.

[4] Ibid., Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1915; cf. also, Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914.

[5] Ibid., Proclamation No. 5, November 22nd, 1914.

[6] Ibid., Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1914.

[7] Ibid., Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914.

175* 721 as a whole to the British side. The problem of gaining Arab co-operation in accepting responsible posts in the Administration or in fighting the Turks hung largely on the ability of Great Britain to give the Arabs tangible evidence that the Turks would never return to the country. Confiscation of property would be the least of the reprisals which the Turks would inflict if they ever returned, as the Arabs well knew; a knowledge confirmed by Turkish treatment of the Arabs of Kūt al-'Amāra after its surrender.

Such assurance could not be given, however, not only for fear of giving umbrage to the allies of Great Britain, but also because the question of the advance on Baghdad was still in the air, and the future status of the country was still in doubt in official quarters.[1] Not even those familiar with the intimate relationship which Turkish Arabia bore to India or responsible for the administrative policy of the country could make reassuring public announcements, although they confidently expected Mesopotamia to be 'an Indian appendage' as Sir Valentine Chirol wrote in 1915, while accompanying the Viceroy of India on an official visit to Basra.[2] The Viceroy himself on the occasion of the visit had made a speech, interpreted by many as foreshadowing annexation to India.[3]

Private assurances as given by Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, on behalf of H.M. Government to various individuals, such as the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Shaikh of Mohammerah, had limited credence. To the former, in a letter dated November 3rd, 1914, three days before the landing at Fao, Sir Percy Cox had declared that if the British succeeded at Basra, 'we will not return Basra to the Turkish Government and will not surrender it back to them at all'.[4]

[1] Asquith, Herbert, wrote in his diary, March 25th, 1915: 'Grey and I . . . both think that in the real interests of our own future the best thing would be if at the end of the War we could say that we had taken and gained nothing . . . Mesopotamia for instance.' Asquith, H. A., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 69.

[2] *Behind the Veil*, pp. 91-2 (facsimile, p. 119).

[3] *Proclamations*, 1914-19. Speech No. 6, February 6th, 1915, p. 3.

[4] Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. XI, Persian Gulf No. xliii.

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SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

Lacking definite and public assurances, the great majority 175* of the Arabs, both townsmen and tribesmen, while feathering 721 their nests at every opportunity, refused to commit themselves. They preferred to let time and circumstances decide the question on whom their permanent allegiance should be bestowed.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 joined the caravan. It marched at the sixth hour, and its destination was Baghdad.

x539
721 And when they had been two days on the road, and the caravan was traversing the territories of the Shammar of the Jezira, they came on Bedawin, raiders, mounted on horses and on fine camels, and the riders rode up to the caravan and cried: Who be you, where do you go, from whence do you come, and by whose permission? And the Turkish officers and soldiers who were guarding the caravan cried out: We march by order of the Government. Make way! Make way! And the raiders shouted: Are the Ottomans, then, a Government? Know you that we are the Government here, and this is our customs post, and here we levy excise. And as for the caravan, we permit it to proceed when we have levied the tax, and as for the soldiers, we disarm them and permit them to return from whence they have come, but they shall go on foot.

And the Turkish officers saw that the tribesmen were many, well mounted and well armed, so they ordered their soldiers to lay down their arms, crying: Moslems! Spare our lives! And the tribesmen said; Our pledge is given. And the Turks dismounted from their horses and turned back on foot towards Mosul, and their arms they left on the ground.

Then the tribesmen cried out: Merchants, unload your camels and open your loads, that we may inspect the merchandise and levy the tax. And the merchants and camel men made the camels kneel and commenced un-
x539 loading them. And Daoud was standing by a load of
514 copper vessels and he saw that they were copper water
721 pots of that shape which has a narrow neck through
which the hand cannot pass and which has a long straight

spout, and which has only one use, and that is known to 539^{x}
you. For is it not used for cleansing in the closet? And 514
Daoud thought after this manner: Why should I not slip 721
my jewels into one of these pots, for do the Bedawin use
these water pots? They will never levy a tax on these
goods.

So Daoud took his bag of gold and jewels and made it 539^{x}
long and thin and he slipped it down the neck of a water 721
pot, nor did any see him do it. And the tribesmen came and inspected the loads, crying: Merchants, the tax is half to us and half to you, for you failed to notify us of your coming, that we might come to some other agreement. And they inspected the loads and from each load they took half and left half. And verily those Bedawin took those things that their hearts desired, of silks and linens and Mosul cloth, of rugs and carpets, of sugar and tobacco, of watches and clocks, of saddles and blankets and almonds and honey, of threads and needles and cheeses and charcoal, and they even took an umbrella. But when they came to the load of water pots they laughed and said: We permit these goods to pass exempt and tax free.

And men from amongst the men, the raiders, searched each of the merchants and took from them their purses and opened them, saying: These gold coins bear the cipher of the Ottomans and are confiscated, for we do not permit their circulation in our land. And they came on Daoud and searched him, but they found with him neither goods not gold, so they questioned him, saying: Merchant, where are your goods and where is your wealth? And Daoud replied, saying: I am not a wealthy merchant. I am only a poor coppersmith making enough for my needs, and I go to Baghdad where my mother is sick, and not for purposes of trade. And they took him and led him away,

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 saying: O coppersmith in the fine linen thob, come with
721 us and we will give you food enough for your needs, and
● may God heal your mother.

And when the Bedawin were finished with the caravan they permitted it to depart, but as for Daoud, they kept him, and he watched the load of copper water pots march away, and in one of the pots was his treasure. And Daoud remained with the Bedawin, even with the Shammar, for many weeks. They fed him with food, but they made him load the camels and unload the camels, and lift and carry the hair tents and heavy loads, and they made him clean the dishes and cooking pots, and on the march they made him walk with the sheep, nor did they permit him to ride. And each evening at sunset they said to him: Were you only a wealthy merchant and not a poor coppersmith you could proceed to Baghdad, after payment of the tax.
x539 What a pity that you have to stay here and labour, and may God heal your sick mother. And one evening when he was exhausted from labour in the heat of the day, Daoud cast himself at the feet of the Sheikh, crying: Merciful Sheikh, punish me if you must, for I deceived you. I was indeed wealthy and had with me much gold and precious stones, but I hid my wealth from your tax-gatherers in a water pot. But it marched away with the caravan, and now since many weeks are past, I may never find my treasure again. And the Sheikh laughed much at the words of Daoud, and he said: O Nazarene, your luck is faint and weak, for you have indeed fallen into misfortune. You have less chance of finding that water pot in the City of Peace than of recovering a dirhem dropped in a sandstorm. I permit you to depart and I postpone the payment of the tax. But should you find your water pot, I command you to pay a tax of one copper fils to my agent in

1s Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

000 grotesquely incompetent brother and the control of Government by the Young Turks almost continuously from 1909 to 1914 by their influence over elections, their instructions to high officials everywhere through party agents and political clubs, and their courts martial which practically suspended the normal course of justice and administration during these years. The high hopes with which Western nations, especially Great Britain, had greeted the new order in 1908 were doomed to disappointment. It is true that repeated crises did much to deprive the C.U.P. of a fair chance and, equally, that the desperate needs of Turkey seemed to call emphatically for a militarily efficient régime: considerations which largely explain the Young Turks' failure to fulfil the expectations evoked, in every subject race, by their early protestations. But there was a deeper reason; the conception of devolution, decentralization, was foreign to even the most enlightened Turkish thought of the time; the 'freedom' offered was freedom as Ottomans, equality as Ottomans. The call to a single Ottoman loyalty, greater centralization, and firmer discipline was the Young Turks' formula for regenerating their country; Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks had hoped for the very opposite. The policy of the governing clique as it developed represented the victory of the more ruthless element in the C.U.P. which sought only in standardization and efficiency the means to rescue the Empire, and which was soon to restore Germany to a privileged, almost to a monopolist, position in Turkish counsels.

722 648 In the 'Iraq wilayas, news of the foreign struggles and defeats of the Turkish Empire excited slight interest even in the towns and among the half-Turkish effendis. The Italian war induced the opening of subscriptions in Baghdad for warlike or war-charitable purposes, with derisory results; some gestures of patriotism were attempted, unreal offers of personal service made, prayers for victory offered; but the ignorance and almost total apathy of the 'Iraq peoples (except the Government hierarchy), their indifference to the grotesquely false communiqués of the Agence Ottomane, their satisfaction rather than dismay at the embarrassments of their masters, made a practical loyalty inconceivable. Some troops were drafted to Europe, recruiting was intensified, full mobilization proclaimed, taxation increased by cesses, officials' salaries diminished by a war levy, and subscriptions invited for warships, aircraft, the Army, the wounded. An internal loan was floated, but evoked a minimum of response.

668 The political revolution in the capital was not, however, without practical results in 'Iraq. Some high officials were at once removed, some political exiles could now return to Istanbul. The telegram of July 1908, announcing immediate elections, created intense

Haydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated 652
expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great
loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 731
27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished
only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack
demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained 647
to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) 473
and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association
in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a
field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of
growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service
as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early
act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year
monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed
dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevit- 722
ably to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension 458
of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources' with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would 648r
fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Ḥay- 645 dari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their col- 669 leagues in Palestine. The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained invisible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Āli personally there was little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert. The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful [722] ● factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it.

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey 721 and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy 648 * the reverse of their own. In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya.

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid Āli' first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately trans-Persian route. In the latter function the American Army had, 721 from the early days of 1943, the major part to play and, with the deployment of its vast resources, took charge of the arrangements for improving the railway and road network of the Shah's empire and forwarding thereby millions of tons of supplies, transport, and equipment to the depots of the sullen and ungrateful Russians.

The peaceful history of this 'Second Occupation of 'Iraq'—so 722 called by one school of 'Iraqi thought—could not but affect the political background of the territory during these years by its guarantee of comprehensive security, its frustration of any further attempt to involve 'Iraq in the downfall of the doomed Axis, and its living proof that accepted garrisons of well-disciplined and well-disposed foreign troops could be far from a scourge to town and countryside. If the British forces by their immense local disbursements for goods and services, their employment of labour, their competition for the services of the few skilled artisans, and their shipment of grain and animals to other theatres of war inevitably contributed to the inflation and the connected economic evils of war-time 'Iraq, they created also the remarkable prosperity which most classes of the population enjoyed. Nor could observers fail to recognize the excellence of the relations maintained, during five years of mental strain and physical propinquity, between these troops and the civil population. Under the inspiration of the Ambassador and his staff every consideration was shown to the 'Iraqi authorities and public, and these for their part wisely acquiesced in the temporary presence of British troops in their territory. Neither the conduct of troops nor the military authorities' use of their predominant power could be the subject of complaint; indeed, the slight extent to which the normal administration was affected by, or needed to take account of, the British forces was surprising. Relations with the 'Iraq Army varied from outwardly correct to nearly cordial; with the Regent they were excellent. He accepted in 1943 the honorary rank of Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force, and a dozen high officials of Government were awarded, for valuable war-time services, various (honorary) grades of the Order of the British Empire.

The British position in 'Iraq during these years was, by force of 721 circumstances, as different effectively from what it had been from 648x 1932 to 1941 as it was different constitutionally from mandatory times. It was clearly dominant, had dominance been desired; but in fact it was more-concerned to strengthen the hand of the 'Iraq Government than to supersede it. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, from whose character and experience the nation was thus able again to benefit, remained at the Embassy until 1945 to link amicably the British military and the 'Iraqi civil worlds, and to offer objective

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

721 exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important
practical results could be expected from this move, which at
645 best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the
Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the
Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor
dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of
obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent
of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of
foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the
Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi
officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under
Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse,
did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship.
Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the
722 Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were
offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition
without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British
advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or
surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system
accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements,
the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and
grain supplies provided.

361 Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which
was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such
185 major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development
could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be
planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with
working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud
and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great
changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves
were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the
resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled
during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of
London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of
744 office to the Amin al-'Asima. The Health services continued to
develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private
practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the
Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had
served the country and their science now for twenty years, still
played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far
871 from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was
passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls,
and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools
were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few
during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

British forces for their own needs, in part acquired by the United 433
Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to Great Britain or 439
other territories, and in part exported by normal trade channels now regulated by export control. The date crop was still handled for export by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. The cotton which Japan ceased to take after 1941 was sent to India, but in quantities which high grain prices had much reduced; production touched 26,000 bales in 1940, but thereafter dropped for the next nine years to a fifth or even a tenth of that amount. Wool was sent to America, but with this and all other commodities both internal movement by land and water and the provision of shipping space from Baṣra presented difficult problems. A quantity of produce went by rail to the Levant and Turkey, and animals on the hoof, in years of good grazing, were sent to the British forces in Syria. The prices of all commodities were fixed in terms of imperious [435]
war necessity and of ever-growing 'Iraqi inflation, to which these prices contributed.

The import of manufactured articles and certain foodstuffs was 722 ●
limited to quantities below the level of satisfaction, thanks to 434
reduced outputs in the supplying countries and to pressure on shipping space. Help was forthcoming more than once from American lend-lease stocks of drugs, metal goods, tyres, chemicals, and agricultural implements; Paiforce at times could help to meet an urgent shortage, and the British Government organized an emergency grain supply in 1942 from India and Canada; but, as in every country, abiding and irksome shortages remained, aggravated by maldistribution and by a habit of hoarding against which the law and public opinion strove equally in vain. The need at all costs to obtain supplies led to the urgent search for sources to replace Japan and other belligerents. An import licence system was established which, vastly profitable to some, worked with its share of imperfections and abuses; a price-fixing procedure was applied over a wide range of articles, with an attempted control of stocks enforced by occasional raids and prosecutions, but avoided by widespread black-market trading; and a rationing system, first applied to sugar in 1942, was extended next year to coffee and tea and later to cotton and woollen textiles. This control by ration-cards, based on imperfect tribal and urban lists, was a matter of extreme difficulty and gladly abandoned at the earliest moment; nor were the resulting stocks ever sufficient to admit an adequate allowance to the tribal public. Nevertheless, the rationing of essentials was both indispensable and attended with fair success. Late in 1944, in expectation of the war's end and by reaction from the attempted régime of universal close control in 1943–4, a policy of decontrol was substituted, and one commodity after another

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

722 was exempted from licensing and price-fixing. During 1945 all
434 controls were discontinued as far as sterling-area commerce was concerned, and traders with one accord sought supplies from every quarter; but freedom of traffic was still hampered by shipping shortages, currency restrictions, and world-wide dearth of goods.
457 The country's requirements in 'hard' currencies, chiefly dollars, were met by an arrangement with Great Britain in March 1945, whereby sums up to the equivalent of $14 million could be converted from 'Iraq's accumulated sterling balances, an arrangement which was to be annually re-negotiated. The restricted convertibility of 'Iraq's own dinars into dollars remained incomprehensible to the public, as to publics everywhere.

722 In the task of economic control, which fell ultimately to the lot
647 of local officials, helped, it might be, by the municipality or Chamber of Commerce, more than moderate results could not be expected from improvised systems based on no adequate statistics or machinery, and applied by unspecialized and impecunious officials to a puzzled and resentful public. The higher economic control of the territory, under a law repeatedly revised and productive of innumerable regulations, was placed originally in the hands of a Central Supply Committee, later in those of a smaller ministerial body, the High Supply Committee, which long survived the war. Many problems called for resolution at Cabinet level, where they multiplied disagreement between ministers. Departments of Transport, Imports and Local Resources, founded early in the war and served by British as well as 'Iraqi officials—Lloyd, Grice, le Blanc—were grouped early in 1944 under the Ministry of Supply established for the purpose; its first Adviser, Colonel P. Bayliss, after a few months of dynamic and impatient activity, retired through disagreement with his colleagues. An Anglo-American-'Iraqi Co-ordinating Committee lasted for a few months from midsummer 1944. Outside the territory, but concerned with its output and controlling foreign supplies to it, was the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, of which a conference attended by 'Iraqi delegates was held in Cairo in April 1944; and 'Iraq had in 1943 been toured, under M.E.S.C. auspices, by a Scientific Advisory Mission which produced the valuable reports of Dr. B. A. Keen and Dr. E. B. Worthington. The Centre performed important services in conditions where benevolent interterritory control was indispensable; it was, nevertheless, commonly blamed in 'Iraq for its meagre allocation of supplies, and its abolition late in 1945 was unregretted by 'Iraqis to whom their own country's needs were paramount, those of the Allies and of the War remote and meaningless. It was succeeded until 1947 by a Supply Mission which kept control of a few scarce items of supply.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic 722
internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable 647
lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of M.E.S.C.

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the 722
abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living 511
standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was 435
almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly deteriorated. A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Government had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939. The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then six- 652
fold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, 435
happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation, or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement, thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs, already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society scarcely healthier.

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. 652
The three years 1941–3, in spite of high costs, showed useful surpluses; foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully. But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied. Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Baṣra were highly prosperous throughout the war.

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years. The loans, regarded as experimental, were well received but too small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year and handled Government accounts; by 1945 its trading began to show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry, was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch in Baghdad in the same year.

722 496 The material development of the territory, which proceeded hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the end of the war. But 'Iraq was at least fortunate in that, far from a record of destruction or retrogression—the common fate of Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented by war-time loans from the military authorities, current maintenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for movement to Baṣra—were amicably handled. The military Kut–499 'Aziziya–Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge (in replacement of the old waggon-ferry), a bridge at Musayib to give access to Karbalā, a modern station and office block and new marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lesser Zab bridge.[1]

722 504 The important developments at the Port of Baṣra and its vicinity carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and approaches, storage facilities, the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab bridge, and a Ma'qil–Ahwaz railway line. Considerable parts of these additions survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties at Umm Qaṣr on the Khawr 'Abdullah, and the railway joining these to Baṣra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance 505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

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[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–Homs line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Karbalā–Najf–Kufa line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–Diyarbakr connexion. None of these materialized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

433 increased on a small scale: the tanning industry was partly mechanized and the quality of its output improved. The two existing mechanically operated wool factories, the unmodernized distilleries, the three cotton ginneries, the small soap-works and cigarette factories, were increased during the war by an attempt at brewing, a primitive glass-works, a factory for paint and another for wax matches. The long-planned cement factory was not yet in production. An important cotton-spinning and weaving project had been initiated, but had not yet begun to operate. A plan to create a cinema studio in Baghdad was in 1945 the object of a visit by a British expert.

382 722 The necessity of postponing further oil development was, equally to the British companies and to the Government, the more regrettable as it seemed not to apply to comparable enterprises in Persia or Arabia; in the former, aviation spirit and other products were produced on a vast scale for war purposes, and in the latter American industry could find abundant equipment when British could not, and could secure for Saʿudi Arabia a long lead in production. The I.P.C. was forced to renounce until after the war the additional pipelines and consequent additional production which it had planned in 1938; indeed, its output was forced down by events in the Levant in 1941–2 from four to two million tons, and restored to full capacity only in 1944. The damage done to its installations in May 1941 was soon repaired, and it was able to assist the British forces by the provision of quarters and air-fields, loan of personnel, communications facilities, and the supply of refined products. The output of these was increased for war purposes, and plant at Kirkuk was improvised for the supply of motor spirit additional to that from Alwand. Factories for making tins were opened at Kirkuk and Mosul, and the two centres connected by pipeline. In Baṣra area a pipeline was built to connect Abadan and Shuʿayba. The destruction of many wells at Kirkuk as a precautionary measure against enemy invasion was ordered by the Army in 1942, but fortunately did not interfere with current production. Drilling was suspended from mid-1941 until the latter part of the war. In the area of the Mosul Petroleum Company (formerly B.O.D.) no operations were possible during the war at ʿAyn Zala or elsewhere, though at Baṣra exploration continued. These postponements, unavoidable in conditions which made engineering supplies unobtainable, were formally authorized by an agreement between the Companies and the Government in March 1943, whereby in return for a loan of ID 1,500,000 the Government granted a 'period of suspension' to begin in May 1941 and to run until two years after the armistice. Meanwhile the project of a Government refinery remained alive, though at present untimely; and to question the terms—or

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move 382 of politicians in opposition. 722

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war 241 was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the [166 establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in 464] their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the 423 committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers 185 since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under 425 a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on 166 sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to 312 continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their studies and planning, though the intended major projects could 653 not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

'Iraqis, recruited by the Palestine Defence League, entered 648×
Palestine and served or offered to serve with Fawzi al-Qawuqchi 721
and the Palestine leaders; they were inspired perhaps by genuine devotion but were of negligible fighting capacity. The inefficacy of this force, and the collapse of Arab resistance in the face of Jewish terrorism and their resolute forces, led the League to decide, before the official end of the Mandate, upon the intervention of Arab regular armies. In April the Regent, whose leadership and vitality regained him much of his popularity, visited 'Amman and Cairo with the Ministers of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Student hunger strikes were called in Baghdad to urge the dispatch of the Army to Palestine, the closure of the Haifa pipeline, and a welcome for the Palestine exiles; and the Government of al-Ṣadr saw no alternative to following the League policy of large-scale intervention, however sketchily co-ordinated. 'Iraqi forces under General Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib—forces ill prepared, ill equipped, and with clearly inadequate supplies and reserves—moved from their home stations some ten to twelve thousand strong in mechanized or lorry-borne units, and took up positions on the western fringes of the Jordan Kingdom. They crossed into their allotted sector of Palestine on 15 May, immediately after the State of Israel had been proclaimed.

The outbreak of this war—the first occasion upon which its 722
troops were used abroad—was the signal for the imposition of 656
martial law throughout 'Iraq: a step happy only in its immediate restoration of outward tranquillity, but indicative of no real solution of any of the nation's problems. The emergency régime, which facilitated Government control over the elections, was marked by strict censorship, the opening of a concentration camp in the southern desert for the many arrested trouble-makers, the subordination of civil to military officials in all areas, and the establishment of military courts. It prohibited the carrying of firearms and the use of cypher codes, and by the supersession of many existing laws it involved a close restriction of civil rights. The clash between civil and military authorities increased as weeks went by with irritation, jealousy, and charges and counter-charges of indiscriminate severity or weak indulgence: Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams were soon heard to ask 'Which is the worse, government by students or by Army officers?' The press, swollen to an extraordinary number of daily sheets of trifling circulation but irresponsible violence, lost in a day the worst of its venom (except such as could be safely directed against the British or the Jews), and the few papers which refused compliance were suppressed. A ceremonial parade of the police in Baghdad did something to restore their morale. The Palestine war aroused enthusiastic

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq [redacted]

722 verbal support in every quarter and the Baghdad Jews vied ostentatiously with Muslims in anti-Zionist fervour and subscribed heavily to funds for the refugees.

But the campaign was from the first feebly and unfortunately
721 conducted. The higher leadership was uninspiring, supply arrange-
648 ments inadequate, and the discipline and bearing of the 'Iraqi troops, though judged to be superior to those of other Arab States except Jordan, carried them to little glory. Units entered Palestine on 15 May between Geshen and Wadi Yabis and marched on Tul Karm and Nablus, areas unoccupied by the Jews; their attempt on Tiberias was unsuccessful, but they effectively occupied the Nablus–Tiberias–Janin triangle and advanced to within twelve miles of Tel Aviv. This hopeful move was frustrated by Jewish resistance in front of Nathaniya and by counter-pressure which forced the 'Iraqis to abandon Bayt Tima and give ground in the occupied triangle. The Security Council's cease-fire order of 22 May had been at first ignored by all, but both sides accepted a four-weeks' truce operative on 11 June. The impetus of Arab invasion had by that time been lost, their weakness exposed, and their initial superiority in heavy arms, which was never to recur, had availed them little; and during the truce period equipment poured into the Jewish Army, none into the Arab. After the rejection of proposals evolved by the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, and his Truce Commission for a federation of Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and Jordan, fighting was renewed on 9 July. A further 'Iraqi attempt to take Nathaniya was foiled, the Jews swept into Galilee, and their deeper advance was stopped only by the second truce which was observed from 18 July. This at the Arab League meeting at Aley was rejected only by the 'Iraq Government, and that for reasons of pride and policy; but it was in fact operative and the war, for 'Iraq, was over.

The many attempts to restore peace to Palestine and solve its insoluble problems, the murder of Bernadotte by the Jews, the renewal of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities from October to the end of 1948, form no part of the history of 'Iraq. 'Iraq Army units remained in occupation of the east Palestine triangle for some months, dependent as ever on their long line of communications through Jordan and receiving their pay irregularly from the almost empty Treasury at home. Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib was recalled to 'Iraq as Chief of Staff, to return again to Palestine later as Commander-in-Chief of the combined 'Iraqi-Jordan forces; but this experiment in joint command lasted but a few weeks, and the wider project of a unified command for all League forces—a clear military necessity—was frustrated by division among the States and by Egyptian refusal. No real effect was given to the resolution of the 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of 648 K an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it 722 was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the dis- 656 turbing hostilities between civil and military authorities continued, and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street [668] demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective 563 alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish 579 separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

CHAPTER IV

INITIATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

115 721 WHILE the extension of the campaign to Baghdad and the future of the country were being discussed in official circles, the practical problem of the administration of the occupied areas was forced upon those in command of the Expeditionary Force. Even had there been no obligation under international usage, as the Hague Conventions of 1890 and of 1907,[1] the needs of the Force and the necessity of replacing the vacuum left by the departure of the Turks rendered the initiation of some form of administration imperative.

175 722 727 The local requirements of the troops were wide and varied. Such needs as were not met by direct intervention of the military authorities necessitated an intricate mass of detailed orders, proclamations and notices issued under the authority of the General Officer Commanding and enforced for the most part by military police and military courts. These regulations supervised the direct relations between the inhabitants and the army, ranging from the control of rents[2] and foodstuffs,[3] the restriction of movement of persons and of rivercraft,[4] to orders that carriage drivers and boatmen 'shall in all cases give preference to British Officers, European ladies and Government

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[1] Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Hague Convention, July 29th, 1899, affirmed in a similar Convention of the Hague, October 18th, 1907. Texts: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. xci (1898-9), 988; Vol. c (1906-7), 338.

[2] *Compilation of Proclamations and Notifications Affecting Civil Inhabitants of Mesopotamia in Basrah* (Baghdad, 1919), Notification No. 2 (hereafter *Procs. Basrah*).

[3] Ibid., Notif. No. 5; *Proclamations and Notifications, 'Amarah* (Baghdad, 1919), No. 1, Sec. 14 (hereafter *Procs. 'Amarah*).

[4] *Procs. Basrah*, Notif. No. 6, Regulation Nos. 12, 13; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Secs. 2, 3, and 9.

175 servants'.[1] Regulations governed indirect relations, from
722 the control of the carrying of arms among the inhabitants,[2] the
727 sale of liquors and drugs[3] to minute sanitary regulations prescribing floor space per animal in stables or rewards for bringing in dogs for destruction.[4]

In all these relations between the civil population and the military authorities, the fact was never lost sight of that it was a military occupation and that a war had to be won. From the first to the last, the needs of the inhabitants were subordinated to those of the occupying Forces. Food, in certain cases, was admitted to market for sale only when the requirements of the military authorities had been met.[5] Access to piped water was forbidden.[6] Families were evicted from their houses and land requisitioned, sometimes without payment of rent.[7] Restrictions on persons and goods were carried to unnecessary lengths, [464] even after the danger from spies had vanished.[8] Labourers in ever-increasing quantities were taken from their fields and villages and from their families and forced to work on military works, such forced labour becoming, as in Egypt, one of the outstanding grievances of the inhabitants against the British authorities.[9]

Delicate handling by the Political Officers was necessary in order to enforce the orders and regulations, harsh and exacting as many of them were, and at the same time to keep the

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[1] *Procs. Basrah*, Reg. No. 12, Sec. 11.

[2] Ibid., Reg. No. 12; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 4.

[3] Ibid., Reg. No. 12, Sec. 9; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 7; Notice No. 5.

[4] Ibid., Notice No. 1, No. 10; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.

[5] *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.

[6] Ibid., Notice No. 3.

[7] No rent was paid from the time of the Occupation on the four or five miles of river frontage occupied by the British at 'Amâra. *Monthly Reports, Political Officers*, December, 1918, 'Amâra, p. 2.

[8] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., pp. 144, 242; *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (1920), Cmd. No. 1061, p. 24 (hereafter *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920).

[9] Telegram No. 7520, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, July 13th, 1919. The telegram indicates that by that date both the Civil Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding were 'fully alive to the importance of abolishing forced labour at the earliest possible moment'.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties including
666 the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in
January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former
opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge
of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally
showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither
the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have
affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect
of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in
spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred.
The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil
[185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently
abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious
[722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for
little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the
time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election
of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals
of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September
by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the
Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree
on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume
their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
642 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the
646 Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed
by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained
the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an
honourable past in the service of the Government and the
country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954 —
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MHI

THE INFECTION IS FREQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY means of the pilgrimage traffic or tribal migrations from the neighboring territories, and is believed to smolder continuously in the northeastern mountain districts. Cases are usually observed during the winter and the spring months, with the maximum incidence in March and April. Serious outbreaks, with a total of over 1,300 known cases, were reported in 1942-43 in conjunction with epidemics prevailing throughout the entire Middle East. The actual prevalence was probably several times the official estimates. The greatest numbers of cases were noted in Baghdad, and in Basra, Mosul, Diyala and Sulaimaniya *liwas*, along the main routes from Iran. The congestion and the shortage of food, clothing, soaps and other supplies existing in that area as the result of military operations during World War II favored the spread of the infection among the louse-infested populations. About 800 cases of typhus were reported in 1944, but the annual incidence subsequently declined to a low of 72 cases in 1949. No differentiation is made as to type, and the recorded cases include both louse-borne and flea-borne infections. On the basis of laboratory investigations, authorities at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad suggest that many outbreaks in the north, where louse-borne typhus is supposedly endemic, are caused by strains which are serologically intermediate between *Rickettsia prowazeki* and *R. mooseri*.

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484
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722
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[136]

Murine typhus is endemic, and probably predominates in the rural areas in the absence of a large-scale epidemic. Tick-borne infections are not specifically reported, and are undoubtedly rare. In the event of a typhus outbreak, control measures, including the use of DDT preparations and mass immunization of the inhabitants with antityphus vaccines, are carried on in the affected communities by the government health authorities.

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Plague. Epidemics of plague were frequent in the past, particularly in the region around Baghdad, but the disease has been almost completely absent within recent YEARS,

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p. 45 (B)

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

then he ordered that a leather handle be fixed to the outside 539x
of the shield, and Ibn Ali executed the commands of his master. And the shield was prepared and made ready though it presented its inside to an enemy.

The day of the fight dawned, and the army of the √539x
Persians gathered on the east bank of the Tigris, and the 726●
Arabs of the great tribes came together on the west bank of the Tigris, and a great stand had been erected for the Shah of the Persians and his ladies and his court amongst the Persian troops. In the centre of the river was an island, to this island Maqdad came in a boat from the west bank, and Pahlewan came in a boat from the east bank, and they met on the island. And Maqdad saw that Pahlewan was armed with a great sword the length of which was the height of a man, and Pahlewan came towards Maqdad and his approach was that of a skilful fighter. And Maqdad retreated before Pahlewan, warding off his blows with his sword, and he kept his face to the sun, a position of disadvantage, and Pahlewan was pleased that Maqdad kept his face to the sun and he thought: They were fools who told me that this boy is a skilful fighter. He does not even try to manœuvre to get the sun behind him, and he wears his shield inside out. But at that very moment Maqdad turned his shield towards the face of Pahlewan, and the sun was shining full on the shield, and it was burnished like a mirror and it was concave in shape, for it was reversed, so it concentrated the rays of the sun and flung them fully into the eyes of Pahlewan, and he was forced to close his eyes. And Maqdad ran towards Pahlewan and attacked him, keeping the blinding rays on Pahlewan's eyes. Then Pahlewan struck out with his great sword, but he did not hit Maqdad, and Maqdad cut off Pahlewan's head with a single blow.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 And the onlookers were amazed, for they were far off
726 and they did not see how the beardless boy had overcome Pahlewan, and the heart of the Shah of the Persians was full of anger and fear. Then Maqdad turned and shouted across the river to the Persian host, he raised his sword on high and cried: O mighty Shah of Persia, you I will not challenge, for your beard is grey, but you have a son, famous in battle. Send him to me that I may fight him. And the Shah made no reply to Maqdad, but he made a sign signifying that a reply would be sent later, so Maqdad returned to his boat and he crossed the river to the gathering of the tribes.

x
539 That night the Shah of Persia held council with his generals and commanders, and the prince his son was present, and a great general spoke and said: Master, it is fitting that the prince your son should fight with the Arab boy, lest the soldiers of our army say he is afraid of a beardless boy, and henceforward they will not follow him in battle, nor will they respect him. And the prince listened and there was fear in his heart. And the Shah ordered the commanders and generals to leave them, and he spoke to his son in this fashion: My son, this Arab boy may not be a great fighter. Perhaps it was luck or some trick of fate which delivered Pahlewan into his hands. It is fitting that you should go and fight him, that your name may be famous as a warrior, and that the soldiers shall fear you. For one day you will be Shah in my place, and if the soldiers and the people of the towns and the peasants do not fear the Shah, then they rise in rebellion and the kingdom is overthrown.

But the prince replied: Father, do not send me out to be slaughtered in the manner of a sheep. This boy is no fighter, he is a magician, and I am unskilled in magic and

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

x539 O Majesty the Shah, after the most respectful salutations I write to inform you that I am engaged in praying for Your Majesty's health, and as for your son the Prince, let it be known to you that he is in good health and he is my guest, and he occupies his time in praying for Your Majesty's health. And it would be fitting if the request which I am now about to lay at Your Majesty's feet were made by one of my friends or relations but in the present condition of war courtesy must fall by the way. And my request is this, that you give me your daughter the Princess Jamila in marriage, and if you name a price, that price will be paid, and as for her dowry, let her bring a pomegranate seed. My name is a known name and my pedigree is a known pedigree, and it is desirable that you send the Princess in a boat, as, due to the state of war, I cannot come to you. And let the Prince your son be present at the celebration of the marriage, and after it is concluded, even the duty of hospitality shall not cause us to detain him further. So he will return to your camp in safety and in peace.

And Maqdad signed and sealed the letter and sent it to the Persian camp.

The Shah of the Persians opened the letter of Maqdad and read it, and his face became black with anger and rage and he bellowed a bellow and roared a roar and he sent for his generals and his ministers and he shouted: This son of a camel has captured my son and now he wants to
x539 marry my daughter. And he ordered his generals to
J216 prepare a plan for attacking the camp of the tribes and rescuing his son and killing Maqdad. But the generals looked grave and they said: Master, how can this be? It is true that our army is ten times the size of the force of these Arab tribesmen, but when we march against them

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

they fade away as do the bats at the first rays of the morning sun. But they return when we least expect them and kill our men and drive off our animals and they are gone before our army is in battle array. √39x 726

And one of the generals spoke and said: Master, might it not be political and diplomatic to give your daughter to this boy? For he is truly a great warrior and it were better that he be our friend than our enemy, and as for his pedigree, it is as he says, for in no royal house can you find a pedigree which equals that of the simplest Arab tribesman. But the Shah said: This cannot and shall not be. Either you, my commanders, evolve a plan to secure the release of my son or I will have you roped between horses and torn apart. And meanwhile I will marry my daughter to a prince of Turkey, that no man who calls a host his father, no product of love in a ditch, shall come to me and insult me by asking for her in marriage. Send now for my daughter that I inform her of my decision. √39x

A page went from the tent of the Shah to the women's quarter, and he spoke to the eunuch on guard and said: Tell the Princess Jamila that the Shah her father commands her presence, for he is arranging her marriage to a prince of Turkey. And the eunuch delivered the message to the Prince, who was dressed as the Princess Jamila, and he said: Mistress, your father commands your presence, for he is arranging your marriage to a prince of Turkey. And the face of the Prince went pale with fear, for he thought: Now what will happen when the Turkish prince comes in to me on the night of the wedding? And he could see no escape from his misfortune.

So the Prince, wearing the veil and dress of a lady, went into the presence of his father the Shah. And the Shah spoke and said: Beloved daughter, your interest touches

1: Longrigg MHl Iraq MHl
647, 721, 727, 728

[For an account of the British invasion and campaign in Iraq in 1914, the subsequent occupation and the British war-time administration of Iraq in 1917-18, the civil administration by the British from the end of the war in 1918 to 1920, see category 116, pp. 77-121.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

721 648x lately back in Baghdad triumphant—left hurriedly for Syria, preceded by such of their aircraft as could fly. The Regent Sharaf accompanied ministers to Persia. Yunis Sab'awi, Minister of Economics, appointed himself Military Governor of the capital, and exhorted the demoralized public to organize a final resistance; but his power, if any, lasted barely a day. He fled; and the Generals were not far behind, abandoning their posts and duties as their ill-judged and mischievous adventure ended in fiasco. The steadfast Mayor, Arshad al-'Umari, alone remained to preserve what order he could, to direct dissolution of the armed gangs of the Youth Movement, and on 30 May to form a Committee of Internal Security with the strong support of law-abiding opinion. On the evening of that day, sponsored by Knabenshue, he appeared at the British Embassy. Cornwallis at his instance sent a wireless message to the G.O.C. at Ḥabbaniya to receive, if he would, a flag of truce that night. 728 648x Terms of armistice—not of peace, since war had never been declared—were without difficulty arranged between the Ambassador and the Security Committee. They provided for a cease-fire, the continued independence of the country and retention of its Army intact, release of prisoners, arrest of enemy (German or Italian) forces, and the opening of all communications in 'Iraq in accordance with the Treaty: conditions which showed both magnanimity and good sense. A detachment of British troops entered Baghdad on the following day, and British residents in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk could emerge from a month-long captivity which, not without its humours, had been galling, humiliating, and anxious, to find many of their houses looted. The attitude of the Baghdad crowds was sullen and bitter; the effects of dashed expectations and the aftermath of long-drawn Axis propaganda were slow to disappear.

727 579 The Regent had passed three weeks in Palestine and Jordan. He returned to 'Iraq on 22 May escorted by his faithful ministers and by a British representative, Colonel G. de Gaury, and broadcast once more to his people. The Guard of Honour which welcomed him to Ḥabbaniya was composed of 'Iraqi troops and officers who had surrendered to the British at Sinn al-Dhibban while fighting for his enemies and supplanters, and who now without effort changed sides again. The Amir entered Baghdad on 1 June, welcomed by the British Ambassador and by crowds of his own well-wishers. But the sinister possibilities of the hour, and the urgent need to install a Government, were overlooked in the glow of acclamation and victory; the night of 1 June and part of 2 June were disgraced by serious bloodshed and looting in quarters of Baghdad, with violent hooliganism directed against the Jews. The outbreak had in large part been organized by the fugitive military

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

727 679 officers on the scale, they hoped, of a counter-revolution; it represented partly also reprisals by the Youth Movement, of whom many were caught red-handed, and partly the brutality and avarice of the lowest mob elements. The Committee of Internal Security was caught unawares, the Police proved unreliable and impotent, and order was restored only by troops brought in from outside. At noon on 2 June Jamil al-Madfa'i assumed with reluctance the task of forming a Ministry, and set himself to the restoration of normal tranquillity. A reliable Mutaṣarrif assumed charge at Baṣra.

721 648x The movement thus overcome will long bear, in obloquy or praise, the name of Rashid 'Āli. His part in it was in fact both unsought and limited. Willing himself to keep in good outward relations with Britain, at least until her defeat was certain, and never as rabidly xenophobe as many another, he was forced first to specific disagreement and then to actual hostilities with the ex-Mandatary by the pressure of his military backers, whom in spite of all precedent he had hoped to control, and by the impatience of his own closest followers. Unmoved by any principle of loyalty to treaties, basically unfriendly to Great Britain, and impetuous and self-confident by nature, he had yet never committed himself to Germany, as had the Generals and Naji Shawkat; he had hoped always to achieve a subtle neutrality and to gain, if possible, for his country from both sides. Rashid 'Āli's acts in his last premiership represent no settled conviction or resolute policy; he drifted or was forced from step to step. Whoever, indeed, had assumed the premiership on 1 April, in conditions which made the Army leaders all-powerful, must either have played a part not unlike Gaylani's, or soon made way for another to do so. There were other policies, other convictions in the 'Iraq of the moment—but no other power than the Army.

If timing had been concerted with the Germans, and their help punctual, the movement, however achieved, could scarcely have failed. A few hundred German troops, a few score of aircraft, could have occupied 'Iraq and vitalized its Army, could have dominated Persia and its oil, closed the southern doors to Russia, and threatened the Levant from the east. That such was not the outcome followed from three factors: the feeble irresolution of the 'Iraq Army at Ḥabbaniya and thereafter; the failure of the Axis to provide timely help, thanks to the British resistance in Crete and to Hitler's plans for the invasion of Russia; and the rapidity and successful bluff of the light British forces. The British intervention, still today condemned by 'Iraqi irreconcilables as unjustifiable 'interference', in fact saved the country first from military dictatorship, then from certain German occupation, and finally from identification with the losing side in the War.

6: Ireland MHl Iraq MHl
● 727

/For an account of British occupation and administration of Iraqi territories during and after the First World War, see category 116, pp. 74-382./

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

175* so recent in origin and a people so recently brought into contact 185 with larger ideas than have motivated them for centuries past, that a relative standard of judgment should be applied. On such a standard the League of Nations itself was obliged to assess the readiness of 'Iraq for independence, in response to the firm insistence on the part of the Mandatary, which declared in its special report presented to the League in 1931:

> His Majesty's Government have never regarded the attainment of an ideal standard of administrative efficiency and stability as a necessary condition either of the termination of the Mandatory Regime or of the admission of 'Iraq to membership of the League of Nations. Nor has it been their conception that 'Iraq should from the first be able to challenge comparison with the most highly developed and civilised nations in the modern world.[1]

On the basis of a similar standard it can be confidently stated that 'Iraq not only achieved unprecedented development in the period from 1914 to 1932, and particularly since 1921, but much of the development has been maintained since 1932. The development at the time of 'Iraq's entrance into the League may not have been so great as put forward in the Official Reports or in the statements made by British representatives to the League of Nations, nevertheless it has been very real. Less than a score of years previous to 1932, 'Iraq was an isolated lethargic maladministered portion of the Ottoman Empire. In 1932, as since that time, 'Iraq has occupied a strategic position on the highway of air-communications. It possesses the machinery of a modern democratic state although the control is now centred in a Government backed by military force. It belongs by general acceptance to the international community, having assumed the obligations of a sovereign nation for international agreements.

175* In reaching this state of development, 'Iraq has undergone
● 227 a period of direct British control, first under military and then
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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 11.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

under civil administration, followed by a period of tutelage. 175×
Under the first of these regimes, the administrative and 185
economic development took place according to the dictates of 727
an Anglo-Indian administration, apparently determined to make of 'Iraq an Indian province. Under the mandatory regime, extending from 1920 to 1932, 'Iraq was forced to accept the restricting hand of the mandatory Power but, at the same time, was able to count upon its support and assistance.

The British Government, as Mandatary, had assumed definite responsibilities from the League: the granting of assistance for the development of 'Iraq's political and social institutions, for its economic regeneration and for its protection from external enemies. These obligations it was not unprepared to honour but only on its own conditions, imposed in a manner which, as has been indicated, guaranteed its position in the country. These conditions do not seem to have been laid down because of any inherent lack of sympathy with 'Iraq's national aspirations. On the one hand, the British Government felt unable to relinquish the Mandate, for fear of losing prestige, until it had satisfied world opinion that as Mandatary its obligations had been fulfilled. On the other hand, the British Government was unwilling to give up its favoured position in 'Iraq until it had achieved the aims for which, in accordance with British policy in the Middle East for the past century and a half, it had occupied 'Iraq. These aims included the control of the land route to India, now vital to the British Empire as the result of the development of air-transport; the assurance of peace and order in the strategic centre of the Middle East; the extension and protection of British commerce; and the control of the existing and potential oil-producing districts of 'Iraq and Persia. Until these objectives were achieved, through the establishment of a stable government, 'friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligations to H.B.M. Government',[1] the 'Iraqī Nationalists seem to

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[1] Instructions of H.M. Government to the High Commissioner of 'Iraq, cited *Admin. Report*, 1927, p. 11.

175* 185 727 have had little effect on British policy. Although agreeing to the progressive restatement of its relations with 'Iraq, the British Government diminished no whit of its insistence that its advice, through the High Commissioner and the British officials, be taken; that its assistance, as outlined in the Treaty and the Agreements, be employed; and that its will as the mandatory Power be the ultimate authority.

175* 185 If the formal relinquishment, October, 1932, by Great Britain of her right to control the affairs of 'Iraq except in accordance with the Treaty and Agreements still in force, marked another stage in 'Iraq's political existence, the work of development has not been completed. In the continued reorganization of finances, in the perfection of the Judicial system, in the raising of education standards, and in the extension of agriculture, irrigation and means of communication still lie much to be done. Hopeful signs of governmental action would seem to appear in the current version of the frequently altered Five Year Capital Works Plan with its provision for irrigation projects, roads, bridges, 130 schools and numerous health centres,[1] in the proposed Health Campaign,[2] and in the recently created Agricultural Bank,[3] and in the many new proposals laid before the Chamber by the new Government.

[648] 'Iraq's recent treaty of friendship with Sa'ūdī Arabia, April 2nd, 1936,[4] and her amiable relations with Turkey seem to point to the removal of these two external dangers. Within the country still lie the problems of the creation of a social class of citizens, now beginning to appear, capable and willing to assume political duties from a sense of public duty and not of personal aggrandizement, the evolution of a free Press motivated by public spirit rather than by individual or party grievances, the assurance of free elections, and the elimination of sectarian and sectional animosities which will eradicate the antipathies between tribesmen and townsmen, will bring the Shī'is into

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[1] *G.B. and E.*, April 9th, 23rd, 1936.

[2] *N.E. and I.*, August 8th, 22nd, 1935.

[3] *G.B. and E.*, March 26th, 1936.

[4] Text: ibid., April 23rd, 1936.

186, 728, 648, 668

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Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
● Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

642, 728, 177, 565
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Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
●Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the political regime, social stratification, and Westernizing of administration under the British and French Mandates following the First World War, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 88-101./

1: Longrigg   MHl Iraq MHl
647, 721, 727, 728

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[For an account of the British invasion and campaign in Iraq in 1914, the subsequent occupation and the British war-time administration of Iraq in 1917-18, the civil administration by the British from the end of the war in 1918 to 1920, see category 116, pp. 77-121.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

182 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the
668 Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in
563 the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unimportant,
369 retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the
shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they
reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption,
determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and
military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of
evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European
contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their
schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Ḥilla,
Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission,
through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near
'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their
schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever
among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern
'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul,
while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the
Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous
French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded
into angry controversy on the question of separate
status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would
gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un
if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the
Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then
unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist
commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration
possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the
bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

579 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained,
674 and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the
sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless.
Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination.
Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty
scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances
of the peace came, however, either from the desperation
● [731] of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913)
the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder,
or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals.
In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of
Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad
Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second
—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country
towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

Ḥaydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated 652
expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great
loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 731 ●
27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished
only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack
demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained 647
to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) 473
and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association
in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a
field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of
growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service
as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early
act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year
monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed
dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevitably 722
to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension 458
of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and
stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly
restored and, though some dislocation of communications and
shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned
almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and
the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources'
with nominal Government control of exports and imports,
and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in
normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid
precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and
postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the
new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order
for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would 648
fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder
would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the
Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic
relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned
and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted
to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his
propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which
had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the
Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the
British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its
obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than
this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to
lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom
Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed 645x in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was 665 notorious that the strike in the Port of Baṣra during the summer 661 had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 186 1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed Zionism, backed by American money and competing political interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn 000 of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan' which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, 668 a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some 665 sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent and potential violence which were actually present and were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December [731] the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks. Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western, narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

x645 theme for hostile schoolboy agitation in the streets of the capital.
668 The Ministry's appeal for unity and tranquillity, and another by
al-Ṣadr in person, were alike unheeded, and the work of administration, in which the Prime Minister had neither interest nor com-
[731] petence, was largely ignored. The near-famine conditions among
the poorer classes could not be cured until after the harvest, which itself promised to be scanty; meanwhile an Australian grain ship was by British initiative diverted to Baṣra and its urgently needed stores distributed.

x645 The death of Ḥamdi al-Pachachi on 27 March led to changes among the uneasy ministers. 'Umar Nadhmi had resigned and been replaced at Justice by Najib al-Rawi, who handed his portfolio of Social Affairs to Ḥaydari. Naṣrat had succeeded Madfa'i at Interior when the latter became President of the Senate, and was himself succeeded when he moved to Foreign Affairs by Muṣṭafā al-'Umari who could thus 'control' the forthcoming elections. The Amir al-Rabi'a resigned and went home in April. Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba left the Ministry early in June. The frequent absences of the Ministers of Finance and Justice at Arab League meetings led to constant interchange of ministerial duties, from which the shaken and demoralized Administration suffered.

646 The Chamber met on 26 June, after elections in which legal and illegal parties alike had put forth all their efforts, and which had produced street fighting in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniya. The Independence Party secured four seats, the National Democrats two, the Liberals one. All other deputies were free of party attachment and as such were likely to vote for any Ministry in power; it was clear that the enthusiasm, or the leadership, of the parties had still too little appeal to seduce the electorate from the familiar candidates of local importance in their constituencies or to resist the conservative influence of controlling officialdom. A Chamber—or an electorate—divided on true party lines was still an unrealizable conception.

648x The new Parliament was confronted, to its dismay, with a situa-
721 tion containing new and alarming features which events in
Palestine had created. The United Nations decision for Partition, taken in November 1947, had led in 'Iraq as elsewhere to angry remonstrance, and in the Arab League to emergency meetings. But no hopeful measures could be taken or planned at these; the lines of cleavage within the League were already too clear, and most of the States members too doubtful of their own stability. The earlier decision to encourage the infiltration of guerrilla fighters from each country into Palestine, for the stiffening of local resistance, was carried out to a limited extent. Some hundreds—or, as some said, two battalions—of young and a few veteran

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

226 Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

312 The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of
rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long
desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable.
● [731] The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous
floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory
of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the
[647] resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were
supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

312 The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the
653 Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis
653 project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in
185 two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of
passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Dukan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Isḥaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic development.
161 With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its
resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north
and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the
country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide
large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is
inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
[136] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq
possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap
source of power and raw materials essential to the development of
industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other
mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is
little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger
population on a considerably higher standard of living.

511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast
to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the
people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most
ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and
many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm
and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment
exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await
reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the
available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
● [731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas;
and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is
hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water,
but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and
quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

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[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

312 133 [731] late to benefit winter crops and too early for summer crops. Destructive spring floods are apt to occur just before the harvesting of the winter crops begins and as the planting of summer crops is in process. In the dry season—July to December—which is critical for both summer and winter crops, the mean discharge of the Euphrates at Hit and the Tigris at Baghdad is only 421 cumecs (cubic meters per second) and 559 cumecs, respectively, as compared with 1,765 cumecs and 2,572 cumecs during the three peak months of the spring.[2] The Haigh Commission has calculated that the mean discharge which can be relied upon for irrigation is only 280 cumecs for the Euphrates and 350 cumecs for the Tigris and its tributaries. This supply would appear to be barely equal to the water needed for existing irrigation systems when figured on the basis of the standards usually applied in Iraq. In fact, at present there is an acute shortage of water in the irrigated areas of the Diyala Valley and the Hilla canal system while in other areas water is wasted. Short of radical economies in the use of water, which can only be realized over the long term, no significant extension of the irrigated area can be undertaken without controlling and regulating the flow of the rivers. Nor can disastrous floods be controlled without schemes for the storage of the excess waters.

The Euphrates

653 312 A project for the regulated diversion of the flood waters of the Euphrates into Lake Habbaniya is already under way. This project involves the construction of an inlet channel from the Euphrates near Ramadi to the lake as well as an outlet channel for the later release of the stored waters. A barrage will be built across the Euphrates at Warrar to raise the water level and thus permit an increase in the capacity of the lake reservoir. The outlet channel and regulator are already finished and work is w advanced on the inlet channel and its regulator. The project whe completed will reduce the flood discharge from a possible maximum of 5,200 cumecs to 2,000 cumecs and will increase the minimum supply of water available for irrigation from 280 cumecs to perhaps 440 cumecs. The total cost is estimated at ID 4,300,000.

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[2] See chart and also Tables I and II in the appendix.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 ONCE in the days of the Ottomans there lived in Baghdad a man of an ancient and noble family named Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, and he lived [651 in a great house by the banks of the Tigris. Yet his estates 731] had been reduced by the taxation and oppression of the Ottomans, and his crops spoiled by locust and by flood until he was reduced to poverty.

So he lived in his house with his only daughter without a single servant or a single slave, nor was there any furniture or silver left in his house, for he had sold all to buy [432] food. Yet the house he could not sell, for it would be shameful for him to do so, since it was the house of his ancestors.

The name of his daughter was Nura. She was in the [203] seventeenth year of her life, yet none had asked for her in marriage, for since there were no servant girls to gossip about her beauty, the boys of great and noble families had not even heard of her. Else surely their sleep would have been troubled by her description, for her hair was as black as the Shatt el Arab on a clear winter's night, and her eyes were as the stars which glisten in its waters, her skin was as golden as the desert sand when tinged by the first rosy red rays of dawn, her back was as supple as the reeds before the wind, and her thighs and breasts had the softness of the feather quilt which allures the tired traveller.

So one day Nura went to her father and she said to him: O my beloved father, my state is thus and thus. Shall I be forever a cook in your household or shall I be the mother of noble sons? And Sheikh Mizeil grieved much at the words of his daughter, and his heart was sad. And on the nights of the full moon Nura would go out on the roof of their great house, and speak to the moon and ask the question:

489 [509] air traffic—useful only to a small number of travellers and for valuable goods—is very heavy in Iraq, which forms a veritable turn-table, a sort of Belgium or Switzerland in Western Asia: Iraq's two airports serve as junctions between the United States and Europe on the one hand and the Far East on the other.

For inland transport on the other hand, Iraq is much less well served: shipping on the historically famous "twin rivers" is very limited and in fact only uses part of the Tigris. The country's railway system is inadequate, there is no standard gauge and the rolling-stock needs to be increased and modernized. ● [731] The road system has been developed and motor transport (mainly by lorry) is steadily increasing; but it is paralysed on many roads during the rainy season and in numerous places it is at the mercy of the floods: the disastrous flooding of the Tigris in May 1950, particularly serious around Baghdad, will be remembered.

Observers point out that a matter deserving special attention is the co-ordination of river and rail

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East

Iraq MH1

Only three cities, Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, have a total population exceeding 100,000. *Baghdad* (population 1943, 300,000) lies on the Tigris at the head of navigation of the river, and in the 'waist' of the lowlands, where the Tigris and Euphrates approach closely to each other, and hence give the best possibility of constructing irrigation canals. This narrow inter-riverine zone also provides a convenient crossing-place, since the marshland is reduced in extent and the firmer platform of steppeland provides a useful east-west route between the Mediterranean and Iran. The region of Baghdad thus has an important nodal position at the junction of routes from east and west across the desert, and from north, north-east, and south along the river valleys. It should be noted that all the factors mentioned above apply to a region and not to an actual site. [162] 361

It is easy to see why a town should have grown up within the district of Baghdad, but the extra smaller scale features that usually fix the site of a town in one particular spot are less in evidence. Local changes in topography due to the shifting of drainage channels have led to the growth of three separate cities at various periods, and so within the Baghdad region there has arisen first Babylon, the ancient capital that lay closer to the Euphrates, some 60 miles to the south of modern Baghdad. Babylon was in turn succeeded by Ctesiphon, only a few miles from Baghdad, and this city remained the nodal centre until superseded by Baghdad in the early Muhammadan era. Baghdad itself dates only from the 8th century A.D., and a 'golden age' occurred when its Abbasid rulers supplanted the Omeyyads of Damascus and made it the capital of the Moslem world. Baghdad suffered greatly from Mongol invasion, and most of the older buildings have disappeared. The modern city is sprawling and undistinguished—in fact, an extreme disappointment to visitors who may wish to evoke the 'Arabian Nights'. Many of the poorer houses are of mud, and flooding is a frequent feature (Fig. 65). [342 731]

Baghdad is the commercial centre of the region, with numerous, but small workshops and distributing houses. Industry is, as we have seen, mainly confined to bazaar crafts—textiles, metals, foodstuffs—and to the production of pottery and building materials. Trade is for the most part in the hands of Europeans, Jews, and Armenians, with Iraqi Christians as clerks and supervisors. An upper class—mainly Sunni Moslems—carries on the administration of the country; and a third element in the life of the city is a large group of absentee landlords. 361 438 565 463

V. Organization of Health Services

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It is most important that a properly organized program should be established to carry out the suggested medical services and preventive health measures.

The existing organization for the health services is highly centralized—first within the Ministry of Social Affairs in Baghdad, then in the hands of the Chief Medical Officers of each province. The whole system appears to be too rigid throughout, without sufficient delegation of responsibility and without enough consultation among departments of the Ministry or with those of other Ministries. Certain medical problems (e.g. health in irrigation schemes, nutrition, etc.) concern other ministries or departments (irrigation, agriculture, education, etc.). To be really effective, boards or committees should include representatives of all groups concerned.

There is no general board of public health but there are various committees with different functions. The Director General of Health is responsible for the licensing of private practitioners and pharmacists, and he has a committee to assist him. But it is the Minister who sets up a committee to consider disciplinary Cases brought against practitioners or pharmacists by the Director General of Health. There is also a committee consisting of three Directors General and two other members nominated by the Minister who act in an advisory capacity to the Minister. It would be reasonable to expect the Directors General to be given wide powers without need for frequent reference to the Minister.

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The health services have been repeatedly reorganized. The latest reorganization still does not appear to have defined very clearly the principal lines of responsibility. The Director General of Health is to be largely responsible for the curative services; a Director General of Health Affairs, for the public health services of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk, for the mobile dispensaries, and for health projects in cities, villages, and the countryside; and a Director General of Social Services, for the supervision of the administration of the institutions for the disabled and the blind, supervision of reformatories and health conditions in prisons and

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

for the promotion of 'social centers'. It is understood he will also 744 647
"take an interest" in the numerous voluntary societies that undertake 732
work of a social and medical nature. 747

While this organization does not seem satisfactory, no alterna- 744
tive can be suggested at the moment without further study. The 647
Mission would recommend that a foreign public health administrator be appointed to advise the Minister of Social Affairs on the organization and further development of the health services. His appointment, incidentally, would enable the Professor of Preventive Medicine in the Royal Faculty of Medicine, who is at present also acting as adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs, to devote his full time to teaching and research.

The public health administrator should have had wide experience in the Middle East or in a tropical or sub-tropical country. He should have a good knowledge of the English language. To assist him he will require the services on temporary appointment of a foreign epidemiologist and a public health or sanitary engineer. The epidemiologist would undertake a study of the most prevalent diseases and recommend the best methods of attacking them. The public health engineer should have had considerable experience, preferably in a state medical service in a tropical or sub-tropical country, and be able to speak English. He would advise on measures to be taken to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene throughout Iraq and assist, if necessary, in teaching at the Royal Faculty of Medicine.

The public health administrator would require sufficient and suitable transport for himself and his staff; he would also need adequate office accommodation and office staff for himself and his own expert staff (epidemiologist and public health engineer). He should have at all times direct access to the Minister of Social Affairs.

As a result of the studies made by this team of advisers, it may be possible to give the organization of the health services a clearer focus. In any such scheme the preventive aspects of public health will need to be featured much more prominently. Although the borderline between curative and prophylactic measures may not always be clear, it may prove feasible to have one division responsible for all the services primarily curative

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and 648
the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education
is not possible without some reference to the history and present 186
circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an
administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. 185
Administrative reforms and some social advance were attempted 735
during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became
an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of 164
ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form 642
of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible
to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent 212
years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain [131]
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to 361
the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

164 744 by a snail living in irrigation canals, can be combatted by elimination of stagnant, polluted water in which the snail thrives and by treating canals twice yearly with copper sulphate. DDT spraying and the elimination of stagnant water assist in the reduction of malaria. [312] In order to combat both malaria and bilharzia, major irrigation canals should be designed so as to maintain a rate of water flow no less than three miles per hour, and minor distributory canals so as to insure rapid drying-out after use. It is important that one complete "dry-out" per week be enforced in every section under irrigated cultivation.

Knowledge of such methods of combatting disease is already available in Iraq. What is needed is wider dissemination of the ● [742] knowledge and a vigorous campaign to give it effect. The Endemic Diseases Institute in Iraq has done much useful work in this field but it has been handicapped by insufficient transport, supplies and technical personnel. In the future there will be no justification for denying the Institute adequate funds for its work. It would be well to organize special campaigns in those provinces or districts where the incidence of a particular endemic disease has been especially high. Such a campaign would involve a simultaneous effort to treat the people already afflicted in the locality and to teach local officials and the local inhabitants in general the appropriate preventive measures. Mobile dispensaries and mobile vans equipped to show educational films would be especially useful for this purpose.

Curative Services

743 On the curative side, principal emphasis must first be placed on the improvement of existing hospitals and an expansion in the nursing service. In its five-year program the Development Board has allotted ID 3,800,000 for medical service buildings. The Mission believes that a large part of this sum should be used to modernize, extend or replace existing hospitals and improve their facilities for diagnosis and treatment rather than to construct additional hospitals. In the monograph on public health the Mission has listed the most urgent projects of this kind which it suggests should be undertaken in adition to those for which provision was made in the first annual budget of the Development Board. While the number

Shitwi (winter) cultivation is, on account of the low temperature, far less likely to spread schistosomiasis than *saifi* (summer) cultivation. In considering any expansion of summer cultivation, therefore, the attendant health hazards should be carefully considered. 164 744

To carry out mass treatment of the people an expansion of the dispensary system is necessary together with the provision of mobile dispensaries. Initially four of these mobile dispensaries might be put into operation in the provinces having the highest incidence of schistosomiasis. The cost of each, including three motor vehicles, tents, 20 beds and supplies, would probably not exceed ID 5,000. In addition, an increase is required in the number of vehicles available to the Endemic Diseases Institute and provision must be made for an adequate and constant supply of copper salts.

Malaria

There can be no doubt that irrigation has been associated with a considerable increase in the malaria of the plains. Gravity or flow irrigation may lead to flooding of land or to seepage due to the faulty construction of canal banks. Water is precious where irrigation is carried out by lift and is not commonly wasted; consequently, flooding of land is rare. A third form of irrigation employed—namely that by natural inundation—is only seasonal. 164

Much work has been done in the Endemic Diseases Institute on studies of malaria in Iraq and also on the bionomics of the chief vectors of the disease. It has been discovered that in the North the mosquito *A. sacharovi* is associated with high endemicity. It breeds mostly in seepage water, open pools and in rice cultivation, and appears to be associated with sharp outbreaks of malaria when it descends occasionally into the plains. [742]

In the South and spreading as far north as 34°N., *A. stephensi* breeds in similar conditions to those in which *A. sacharovi* develops in the North; it favors particularly water in small borrow pits, seepage water and the small irrigation channels of the date palm gardens. The *A. stephensi* mosquito is generally found in those areas where the level of the subsoil water is high. It is a highly efficient carrier of malaria and used to be found in the houses of Baghdad during the summer.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
IraqMH1

164 helminthosis are endemic. There are occasional outbreaks of
657 smallpox, typhus, and more rarely plague and cholera. With
the greater provision in the budget for schemes of public health,
the increased employment of international specialists and the
considerable assistance tendered by the World Health Organization, there is every prospect that the incidence of endemic
874 diseases will be greatly reduced. Fundamental results may be
● 742 expected from modern medical training, with emphasis on the
environmental aspects of disease and the need for prevention
657 as much as or even more than cure, and, above all, from the
743 efforts of the administration to improve the environment itself,
[312] with especial reference to drainage and water-supply. In addition, attention is to be paid to the public health aspects of the pilgrimages. The curative services have in general received more attention than the preventive and have improved considerably in the past thirty years. Simple conditions are treated in some 400 state dispensaries, distributed fairly evenly throughout the country but varying in their equipment and staff; it has hitherto proved difficult to attract doctors to the provinces and particularly to the rural districts. Each *liwa* centre has a general hospital, the larger towns more than one. There are also specialized hospitals for maternity and child welfare, for infectious, chest, eye, venereal, and mental diseases, and for lepers. The army, police, railways, Port of Basra, Ministry of Education, and oil companies maintain their own medical services and hospitals, and there are in addition an American Mission Hospital and a number of private nursing homes. A five-year programme, financed by the Development Board, will provide for the repair, extension, and replacement of medical buildings which have become old or inadequate. There is an acute shortage of well-trained nurses; attempts to expand the service are hampered by the reluctance of Muslim girls of good family to enter it.

Education

658 The state provides elementary, intermediate, secondary, and
871 higher education, all, since December 1952, completely free.
There are also private and foreign schools on a kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, and secondary level.

State Education. Primary education, by law universal and compulsory where facilities exist, begins at the age of six and continues for six years. It has been limited by a shortage of schools and trained teachers, especially in the villages. Plans are in hand to meet the need. The rapid expansion of state primary education is demonstrated in the following table:

Iraq MHI

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professors of the medical college who are nominated by the board of studies and approved by the Minister of Social Affairs. Members of the faculty have received their medical training at universities and hospitals in England, Egypt, Turkey, Paris, and Beirut.

[346] The College is housed in a modern building specially built for it with fairly extensive laboratories, dissection rooms, and lecture halls, large enough to accommodate 60 to 70 students in each of the six years. In addition, the College enjoys the extensive facilities of the teaching hospital on 743 the grounds of which it is situated. This largest of Iraq's hospitals has 600 beds in large wards and semiprivate and private rooms, thus accommodating patients of all classes. As the hospital receives patients not only from the Baghdad area, but also from all parts of Iraq, students have a chance of seeing a very large and representative variety of cases and diseases. The hospital has a very large outpatient clinic occupying a two-story building and some annexes where more than 700,000 new cases are treated each 742 year. Next to the College building is the large building housing the pathological and bacteriological institutes and the antirabic and vaccine-production institutes. On the same grounds is also the extensive X-ray building with facilities for both X-ray diagnosis and therapy, including fluoroscopy and radium therapy. All these facilities form part of the teaching facilities of the College.

THE COLLEGE OF PHARMACY

The College of Pharmacy, included for administrative purposes in the Royal College of Medicine, was established in 1936 and provides graduates of the secondary school with a four-year course leading to a Diploma of Pharmaceutical Chemist. In 1945–46 the enrollment was 98, with the four classes about equal in size. Upon graduation the student spends six months in practical work with a registered pharmacist and three months in a government dispensary. Students are admitted on the basis of a medical examination, public secondary-school examinations, personal interview, and geographical and minority distribution. Those who sign a contract to serve the Department of Health for four years after graduation are exempt from all fees except an instruction fee of 3 dinars ($12) yearly. Tuition fees for others are 33 dinars ($132) per year.

The College is administered by the dean assisted by a college board composed of permanent professors and lecturers. Members of the teaching staff are nominated by the dean, subject to the approval of the college board and confirmation by the Director General of Health.

The curriculum includes botany, general chemistry, business methods

000 istrative branches. The Director of Curative
744 Medicine has supervision over 4 depart-
657 ments: hospitals, dispensaries and pharma-
743 cies; rural health; technical institutes, in-
cluding 6 laboratory sections; and medical
stores. Under the Director of Preventive
and Social Medicine are departments of
endemic diseases, sanitation, social health,
quarantine and epidemics, vital statistics
and disease registration. Subordinate sec-
tions dealing with maternal and child
health, venereal diseases, pulmonary dis-
eases and health propaganda are incorpo-
rated in the Department of Social Health,
while supervision over the health services of
both the province and the city of Baghdad
falls within the scope of the Department of
742 Sanitation. The Department of Endemic
Diseases carries on research and field pro-
grams for the control of malaria, schistoso-
miasis and hookworm infection, some of
which were initiated by the then Institute
of Endemic Diseases, created in 1949. Fur-
ther changes in organization, making the
Director of Preventive and Social Medicine
a Director General immediately responsible
to the Minister, were proposed in 1953.

746 Subordinate provincial organizations carry out the functions of the Ministry of Health in the 14 *liwas*, or provinces. Chief medical officers are appointed to each *liwa* and are responsible for the conduct of the various medical services. They undertake some public health activities, but, to a large extent, the preventive services are directed from Baghdad. Municipal health divisions are established in Baghdad and the principal cities.

744 Other ministries are also concerned in some measure with the public health. The Ministry of Education operates school health services in Baghdad and the larger urban centers, and introduces instruction in the basic principles of health through the schools in urban and rural areas. The Ministry of Economics has veterinary and agriculture departments: the former has meat and dairy inspection services; the latter runs an experimental farm and a pas-

743 tion of rural health centers, each to serve
744 an area of 20,000 to 30,000 population, as rapidly as adequate staff and funds become available.

742 Laboratories. The central laboratory facilities of the Ministry of Health are concentrated in 6 institutes, all with headquarters in Baghdad. The pathologic and bacteriologic institutes are associated with the Royal College of Medicine, and combine research and teaching with routine laboratory functions. The Institute of Bacteriology consists of a diagnostic section, equipped for the conduct of serologic, bacteriologic and parasitologic examinations, and a vaccine unit for the preparation of typhoid, plague and cholera vaccines. The Institute of Pathology has divisions for the performance of biochemical and pathologic examinations. A third institute merges the former Vaccine Lymph Institute, which manufactures smallpox vaccine for use throughout the country, and the Antirabic Institute, which prepares rabies vaccine and provides treatment and diagnostic services. The Medico-Legal Institute incorporates forensic medicine, anatomy and photographic sections. The Chemical Institute has facilities for the analysis of food, water and milk, and of various agricultural and industrial preparations. An Institute of Roentgenology, with branches in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, furnishes diagnostic and treatment services. The Department of Endemic Diseases operates a diagnostic and research laboratory in Baghdad, in connection with the government's malaria, schistosomiasis and hookworm control programs. Field units are stationed in the northern, the central and the southern provinces.

An Institute of Medical Research is established at the Royal College of Medicine: it includes clinical divisions and pathologic, chemical and biochemical laboratories. A research serologic laboratory is maintained in Baghdad in conjunction with the World Health Organization's syphilis-bejel control program. Clinical laboratory

742 facilities are available in the larger hospitals. The Veterinary Department in the Ministry of Economics also maintains a laboratory for research in the control of animal diseases.

874 Schools. The Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad was founded in 1927, and is the only medical school in Iraq. The Royal Hospital and the medical and associated schools are administered by the Dean of the Royal Faculty of Medicine. The course of instruction in the medical school covers 6 years, plus an additional year of internship. The teaching is in English, and a limited number of British and Dutch physicians are included on the professorial staff. [754] The Iraqi degree meets the requirements of the General Medical Council of Great Britain. A complete medical education may be acquired at public expense, but graduates are obligated to serve for 4 or more years with the Ministry or some other government organization.

Schools for health officials and for nurses are affiliated with the medical school. The School of Health Officials offers a 5-year course for the training of medical assistants, many of whom are assigned to operate the rural dispensaries.

The School of Nursing and Midwifery is attached to the Royal Hospital and provides the standard 3-year course of instruction. Diplomas in midwifery are granted following a postgraduate year of work in that field. The development of facilities for the training of nurses is proposed by the Ministry of Health, and a nursing consultant has recently been appointed to the headquarters staff. A small training school for nurses is connected with the Seventh Day Adventist hospital in Baghdad. Courses covering 1 year of practical instruction are provided for nurses and midwives in hospitals in Kirkuk, Basra and Mosul. Male nurses and medical attendants are trained in the larger hospitals.

A College of Pharmacy and Chemistry is incorporated in the Faculty of Medicine. It

p. 35(A)

164 Basra to 75 per cent at Al Qurnah, in the
361 fork between the rivers. In Muntafiq, the
369 mean rate was 47 per cent, and in Diwaniya,
26 per cent, although some districts were heavily infected and others practically free. In central Iraq the disease was more irregular in distribution. In Baghdad *liwa* the infection rates averaged 35 per cent, but approached 80 per cent in some localities. In Kut, the mean was 48 per cent, with a decrease in prevalence toward the Iranian frontier. In Hilla, it was 15 per cent, with variations from 5 to 50 per cent, and in Kerbela, 28 per cent, with variations from 18 to 48 per cent. In the areas studied in Diyala *liwa* it ranged from 28 to 60 per cent, and in Dulaim it approximated 36 per cent. Subsequent surveys have revealed 11 to 18 per cent infection in limited foci near the marshes in Mosul *liwa*.

164 In a survey conducted in Baghdad in
361 1950-51,[57] ova of *S. haematobium* were
369 found in 25 per cent of the urine samples
742 collected from 285 schoolchildren and
in 46 per cent of the samples from 242 inhabitants in hut settlements on the outskirts of the city. The prevalence was around 20 to 25 per cent in the suburbs, but reached 83 per cent in foci along the main road to Teheran.

164 Indigenous cases of *S. mansoni* infection
462 have not been reported, but numerous cases
of rectal involvement with *S. haematobium* have been observed. A dermatitis produced by nonhuman schistosome cercariae is common in the south and is often responsible for considerable disability among the agricultural workers.

164 Schistosomiasis constitutes one of the
462 most important disease problems in Iraq.
312 It is of major public health and economic
744 significance, and the possibility of its spread
with the expansion of irrigation is a matter of considerable concern to the government authorities. An active schistosomiasis control program is carried on by the Bilharzia Section of the Department of Endemic Diseases. This section maintains snail destruction and treatment units in the affected

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164 provinces, and conducts research and field
462 investigations on the distribution and the
312 control of the disease and the intermediate
744 snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from
15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually in government hospitals and dis-
164 pensaries. The disease is considered com-
758 monplace in most areas, however, and
probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the infected individuals seek treatment under
743 ordinary conditions. Since 1949, special dis-
164 pensaries have been established in Baghdad, Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour the most seriously infected districts. In 1950, there were 11 mobile units for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Ancylostomiasis is
361 widespread in the irrigated areas, but the exact distribution and severity of the infection in the different provinces are not accu-
[13G] rately known. *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the only species found in the foci studied. The infection rates are generally estimated at 10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces and at 40 per cent in the southern. They are especially high in the Amarah and the Al Qurnah regions, but decrease toward the south, and are relatively low in the districts
164 along the Shatt al Arab. In a study reported
742 in 1939,[47] fecal specimens from apparently healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from various parts of the country were examined for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was detected in 25 per cent of the specimens from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per cent from 135 men from the rural districts of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per cent of the individuals examined from Diyala *liwa* and from 25 per cent of the individuals from Dulaim. The degree of infection is usually mild, but serious cases with hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent are not infrequent.

164 Treatment facilities are provided by the
758 schistosomiasis control units, as well as by
742 the government hospitals and dispensaries.

p. 88(β)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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An ancylostomiasis section is incorporated 164
in the Department of Endemic Diseases, 744
and a program for the improvement of rural sanitation is being developed by the health authorities.

OTHER HELMINTH INFECTIONS. A large 164
proportion of the inhabitants harbor one or 136
more types of intestinal worms. Ascariasis 742
predominates in the northern and the central provinces. Heavy infections, often with intestinal obstruction, are common. In the studies made on groups of men of 18 to 20 years of age, as indicated above, ova of *Ascaris lumbricoides* were found in the fecal specimens from 10 per cent of the 125 individuals examined in Baghdad city. In the provinces, ova were detected in fecal samples from 9 per cent of 135 persons from Baghdad, from 15 per cent of 145 persons from Dulaim and from 13 per cent of 309 persons from Diyala.

Enterobiasis, trichuriasis and, to a lesser 164
extent, strongyloidiasis are prevalent. *Tri-* 136
chostrongylus, a parasite of sheep and goats 232
which sometimes infects man, is widely distributed in the Shatt al Arab region. Infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are numerous. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is often encountered, but not as widely as in Syria and other Arab countries where more raw meat is customarily consumed. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is occasionally observed in the Christian communities.

Hydatid disease is endemic, especially in 164
the central provinces. Stray dogs are nu- 136
merous and serve as primary reservoirs of 232
infection. In a survey published in 1940,[40] 742
adults of *Echinococcus granulosus* were found in 18 per cent of 123 street dogs examined in Baghdad. Hydatid cysts were seen in the carcasses of 12 per cent of 2,347 sheep and goats slaughtered in the municipal abattoir and in 25 per cent of 223 cattle.

Other Infections. Brucellosis is enzootic 164
among goats, sheep and cattle, and sporadic 232
human infections result from the consump- 758
tion of cheese, *leban* and other unboiled

p. 39(A)

milk products, or from contact with in- 164
fected animals. From 5 to 97 cases were 232
treated annually in government institutions 758
in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination 742
of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to 164
the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 232
1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella
antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br.
melitensis* was isolated from 5 of the 13
samples from which bacteriologic cultures
were made.

DISEASES SPREAD CHIEFLY THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the 164
most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49,
from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and
from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuber-
culosis were recorded annually. Such figures
are of little value in assessing the problem,
however, due to inadequate reporting and
the shortage of diagnostic and treatment
facilities. Local authorities estimate that
the prevalence of latent or active infections
approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in
many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and
Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas.
Widespread undernutrition and low stand- 164
ards of living, associated with overcrowd- 146
ing and ignorance of the basic principles of 511
hygiene, are factors contributing to the 165
spread of the disease. The death rates are
known to be high, but little precise infor-
mation is available. It is believed that a
considerable number of tuberculosis deaths
are erroneously attributed to pneumonia
and other respiratory infections. Moreover, [183]
the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit
the presence of tuberculosis in the family
due to the stigma customarily attached to
the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an aver- 164
age of 760 cases were treated in government 758
hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of
about 25 per cent. The maximum number
of cases occurred in the group from 16 to
30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. 164
Involvement of the bones or the glands ac-
counts for a large proportion of the non-

p. 39 (B)

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the ad- 647
ministration of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-
coded civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of
French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which admini- 692
stered them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal posses-
sion and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated
State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the
shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties
of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dis- 743
pensaries, were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-
inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments.
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on 647
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the
Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the 579
period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of
Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It 674
was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest
eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq
of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg,
General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in
June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant
of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings 368
of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in
the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra.
The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast.
Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja
under its Jaf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals 743
and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The
Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building
for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their
Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrangements 744
in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely
a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to
combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels 368
appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enterprise, 185
a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple 439
exports of the territory still varied annually according to the
harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates,
grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and
the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage
and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The
increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly
the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin,
partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater
demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate
inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are elsewhere
mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

the American School of Oriental Research founded in 1923 and the 172
British School founded in 1929 maintained headquarters in Baghdad, and both published the results of their researches.

In the field of Public Health the Government services had 744
achieved much, but not the impossible. They had faced an im- 164
mense field to cover and to conquer, had started from nothing, and
had been always restricted by lack of funds and trained officials;
and meanwhile, inevitably, the disease- or weakness-producing
factors in the territory, and the apathy and conservatism of its
people, continued. The problem of general malnutrition and
resulting lack of physical vigour was, in fact, the problem of
poverty: the cure, still distant, lay as much or more in increased
wealth as in increased enlightenment; and the same was true, in
spite of active and multiplying maternity and child-welfare clinics,
of an infant death-rate still tragically high. Little, save increasingly
comprehensive and practical study, had yet been done to combat
the curse of hookworm, malaria, or bilharzia; a comprehensive
effort against these diseases and against tuberculosis, eye-disease,
and the typhoid group must call insistently for more time, more
funds, and more specialized staff. Steps taken against epidemic
disease had been successful; plague and cholera had scarcely
appeared for a quarter-century, and smallpox was well handled with
full modern resources. Urban sanitation had been improved, [364]
sewage schemes adopted, and sanitary inspector training developed;
but conditions in this respect over most of the territory remained
wholly primitive, and the majority of 'Iraqi doctors were little
interested in public health administration. The country at large 743
was served by some eighty hospitals, of which three-quarters were
general and a quarter specialized for fevers, mental and venereal
diseases, leprosy (at 'Amara), children's and chest and eye diseases;
a quarter of the whole were in Baghdad. Non-governmental
hospitals were those of the oil companies, foreign missions, and the
minority communities. The Jewish Mir Elias Hospital was still
open, for patients of all creeds; all other Jewish hospitals and dispensaries had been closed. The Railways, the Port, the Police, and
the Army maintained their separate Medical services. The supply 759
of doctors, thanks to the Royal Medical College, had much
improved since the thirties, but some reliance on foreigners was
still necessary; some thirty of these were so employed in 1951 and
recruitment of more was in progress. Registered practitioners in
all numbered some 300 in 1945, 420 in 1949. The reluctance of
'Iraqi doctors to serve in the remoter regions—or, indeed, else-
where than in Baghdad—was still an embarrassment. Neverthe- 743
less, the busy and valued hospitals and dispensaries maintained in
all parts of 'Iraq were playing a major stabilizing as well as a

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

743 humanitarian part, and high hopes for the future could reasonably be formed.

6. THE STATE

000 The closing pages of this work will be given to a review of 'Iraq's relations in the mid-twentieth century to its neighbours and to the world at large, and to the structure of its public life.

648 The record of the League of Arab States had by 1950 been written in terms sadly reminiscent of other Leagues based on international concord: like the League of Nations and the United Nations organization itself, it had shown the extreme difficulty of co-ordinating national differences and asperities. Previous pages have described both the general factors unhelpful to Arab Unity, and the particular issues which since 1945 had led to cleavages; nor was the situation at the close of our period hopeful of the recovery of a consistent united front between the Arab States. If generous single gestures could still be made—the dispatch, for instance, of 'Iraqi forces to Damascus in the spring of 1951—and pacts of collective defence could be drafted, the pressure of national loyalties and interests and persistent antipathies must preclude, in the foreseeable future, anything more than occasional co-operation and the preservation of some façade of unity. The Powers, especially Great Britain, were currently accused by some of desiring complete or regional Arab Unity, by others of working to destroy it; either attitude was somehow a manifestation of imperialism. In fact, nations of the West seemed generally favourable to League solidarity in so far as it could promise to produce cohesion and stability in western Asia; but they were otherwise willing, or indeed forced, to leave the issue in the hands of the concerned nations. 'Iraq's leading part in inter-League politics and her lively interest in *'Aruba*, Arabism, wherever involved, were likely to be permanent features of her foreign policy, at the risk of distracting her rulers from domestic interests and demands far more important to the 'Iraqi masses.

In relations with Persia there was no reason to expect any change in the actual attitude prevailing on either side of the Perso-'Iraqi frontier; it would doubtless continue for many years to be one of bickering, even of antipathy, but also of the recognition of a broad common interest. Nor need relations with the Turkish Republic deteriorate in the absence of any particular clash of interests such as might, indeed, come into existence through tension caused by frontier troubles, or by interference with upper Euphrates or upper Tigris waters, or by a differing international alignment; the attitude of 'Iraq was in 1950 one of guarded amity, least cordial among those pan-Arabists who feared the diversionary effect of non-Arab friendships.

164 therefore vitally important that more attention be devoted in the future to the preventive aspects of public health work.

Prevention of Disease

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751 Many measures could be taken to strengthen the preventive aspect of public health work. Doctors and nurses must, above all, be imbued with its importance, for they have countless opportunities to impress on their patients the need for proper hygiene and sanitation. Thus social medicine, involving the study of the environmental factors bearing on health and of appropriate measures for the prevention of disease, should be taught as part of the qualifying course in the medical school at Baghdad. Far more emphasis also needs to be placed on the teaching of hygiene in elementary and secondary schools. Children should be taught not only good personal habits, but also the importance of sanitation in and around the home. Special classes might be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases, by the school medical officer whenever possible. Health education must likewise be given an important place in the curriculum of teachers' training colleges and special courses in the prevention of diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be provided in the School of Agriculture and the School of Engineering. Hospitals should be an object lesson in hygiene and every effort made to impress on patients the importance of personal and domestic hygiene. The interest of adults in public health can be stimulated by visual education and by organizing "health weeks", the first of which was held in Diwaniya with conspicuous success during the Mission's stay. The army and police have an excellent opportunity to teach habits conducive to good health. Prospective farmers for new settlement projects should be medically examined to restrict, as far as possible, the introduction of endemic diseases into these settlements. To prevent water pollution it would be desirable to locate villages in such settlements away from irrigation canals wherever possible.

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759 The Mission strongly recommends that the number of village dispensaries, which is now over 400, be gradually increased and that they be equipped to serve as public health centers. Such centers would be simple in function, aimed primarily at providing elementary medical and health assistance to as many people as possi-

ble. As conditions permit, the scope of their services could be 743
expanded. At the present stage it will usually be sufficient to have 759
a specially trained medical assistant rather than a doctor in charge. At present there is no separate cadre of medical assistants. It is therefore suggested that the existing School for Health Officials be converted into a training school for such assistants or aides. The 744
medical assistant in charge of a dispensary will need to consider himself as the village sanitation officer and enlist the help of the village elder in organizing a cooperative effort to keep the village clean. He will also need the assistance of a village midwife and, at a later stage, of a public health nurse. The traditional midwife, if properly trained, could have great influence in improving the standards of personal and domestic hygiene, in combatting infant mortality and giving simple advice on the care of infants. Such midwives, when drawn from the ranks of the people whom they will serve, will have a ready entry into homes and will be able to speak in terms which will be readily understood. It is therefore recommended that a school for training such midwives, recruited from the villages, be established. A similar school should be set up for town midwives. It would be desirable to have three foreign midwives appointed to direct this training program.

In the cities a considerable improvement in sanitation could be effected through the creation of a sanitary corps. Such a corps should be charged with house-to-house inspection to detect health nuisances and prevent fly and mosquito breeding, with the inspection of eating-houses, foodstuffs and food handlers, and with the improvement of environmental hygiene in general. A foreign public health or sanitary engineer would be required to organize this service and establish the facilities and courses for training appropriate numbers of sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors who, in turn, would impart the necessary instruction to the house-to-house inspectors.

The prevention of hookworm, malaria and bilharzia warrants 164
special attention. These diseases are widely prevalent and through ~~244~~
their general debilitating effects materially lower productivity. The incidence of hookworm would be reduced by improvements in sewage disposal, the closing of open drains, provision of suitable latrines and the wearing of shoes. Bilharzia, which is transmitted

164 744 by a snail living in irrigation canals, can be combatted by elimination of stagnant, polluted water in which the snail thrives and by treating canals twice yearly with copper sulphate. DDT spraying and the elimination of stagnant water assist in the reduction of malaria. [312] In order to combat both malaria and bilharzia, major irrigation canals should be designed so as to maintain a rate of water flow no less than three miles per hour, and minor distributory canals so as to insure rapid drying-out after use. It is important that one complete "dry-out" per week be enforced in every section under irrigated cultivation.

Knowledge of such methods of combatting disease is already available in Iraq. What is needed is wider dissemination of the [742] knowledge and a vigorous campaign to give it effect. The Endemic Diseases Institute in Iraq has done much useful work in this field but it has been handicapped by insufficient transport, supplies and technical personnel. In the future there will be no justification for denying the Institute adequate funds for its work. It would be well to organize special campaigns in those provinces or districts where the incidence of a particular endemic disease has been especially high. Such a campaign would involve a simultaneous effort to treat the people already afflicted in the locality and to teach local officials and the local inhabitants in general the appropriate preventive measures. Mobile dispensaries and mobile vans equipped to show educational films would be especially useful for this purpose.

Curative Services

● 743 On the curative side, principal emphasis must first be placed on the improvement of existing hospitals and an expansion in the nursing service. In its five-year program the Development Board has allotted ID 3,800,000 for medical service buildings. The Mission believes that a large part of this sum should be used to modernize, extend or replace existing hospitals and improve their facilities for diagnosis and treatment rather than to construct additional hospitals. In the monograph on public health the Mission has listed the most urgent projects of this kind which it suggests should be undertaken in adition to those for which provision was made in the first annual budget of the Development Board. While the number of hospitals may eventually have to be increased, it is of greater 743 importance today to build more dispensaries.

Improvements in hospital administration are also desirable. As long as hospital administration remains in the hands of doctors, they should be given a course in this subject after qualifying.

There is at present one doctor to every 7,000 in the population. 759 With increased accommodations and laboratory facilities at the medical schools, the number of doctors qualifying annually can be increased from 35 to 80. While low, the number of doctors is not seriously inadequate provided they are well distributed and supplemented by sufficient well-trained medical auxiliaries. A large number are concentrated in Baghdad, however, and there is an excessive trend toward specialization. Far more general practitioners are needed in the provinces, but it is clear that better housing accommodations and higher pay will be necessary to attract them.

Among the medical auxiliaries the most serious shortage is that of qualified nurses. In one hospital, for instance, it was noted that there were only 12 trained nurses as compared with 21 doctors. The Mission recommends that a school for practical nurses be established in each province, beginning with Basra, Mosul and the Karkh hospital in Baghdad province. It would also be desirable to set up local schools for male "dressers" who are now largely self-taught. With proper training dressers can relieve nurses of many of their duties. The Mission suggests that two foreign nursing sisters be employed in each province to supervise nursing and give instruction, and that the staff at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad be strengthened by the addition of five more foreign nursing sisters. At present Moslem women are not attracted to nursing. The employment of more foreign nurses may help to demonstrate that nursing is a highly respected, skilled profession abroad. More women might also be inclined to adopt a nursing career if nurses were provided with better housing and given status comparable to that of school teachers.

Aside from nurses and dressers, hospitals lack enough well-trained laboratory assistants, radiographers, storekeepers, physiotherapists and operating room attendants. Special courses should be instituted to train personnel in each of these categories. Refer-

ANNEX F

PUBLIC HEALTH

I. Introduction

Extent of Progress Made in Public Health

In the past 30 years health services in Iraq have improved 744 743
considerably. In 1918 the country had only one hospital, contrasted 164
with the present 89 hospitals (4,812 in-patient beds or one bed per 1,000 people) and 448 dispensaries. Control measures including the use of vaccines, particularly for smallpox, have cut down the incidence of epidemics during the last few years. Cholera has not occurred since 1931 and the plague not since 1935. Smallpox and louse-borne typhus also seem to be under control. An Institute of Endemic Diseases has been set up with headquarters in Baghdad. Steps have already been taken to control malaria and a good deal of information is being assembled on schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and ankylostomiasis. Nevertheless, the main endemic diseases—malaria, schistosomiasis, trachoma, and ankylostomiasis—are still very common.

In 1949 there were 797 doctors practicing in Iraq, of whom 759
419 or 53 percent were in Baghdad. There were about 387 government pharmacies and 252 pharmacists working in private pharmacies in the larger towns.

The doctors are supplemented by 265 health officials, originally trained primarily to staff village dispensaries, and 400 nurses and 659 dressers (male hospital attendants), about one to every four or five hospital beds. There are also private nurses, midwives and dressers, and 130 public vaccinators who are employed on a permanent basis. In 1948 and 1949, 3,061,955 and 2,080,777 smallpox [751]
vaccinations were made (the 1947 census showing a total population of 4,799,500).

Malaria, trachoma and bronchitis were the main hospital 164
cases; the dysenteries, anemias, wounds, syphilis and phthisis were 757

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

reliable figures on its true incidence. One real problem is that 164 the public has come to regard tuberculosis as a shameful disease [753] so that few people report to hospitals in the early stage of the illness. The government has applied to the World Health Organization for assistance in dealing with tuberculosis. It is understood that WHO will send a team consisting of a consultant, an epidemiologist, a bacteriologist and two nurses to begin a BCG campaign; and that, by arrangement with UNICEF, they will be assisted by two medical officers, two nurses, and one administrator. The government will build a suitable "chest center" in Baghdad where the WHO team will work and where local staff can be trained.

Eye Diseases

Eye diseases are common in Iraq, as in the rest of the Middle East. It has been estimated that there are 40,000 totally blind persons, most of whom cannot work and must be cared for, thereby becoming a burden to the community. About one in five of the total population have been treated annually for conjunctivitis or trachoma in the past six years. To a large extent these also are social diseases, although some doctors in Iraq think certain eye diseases may have a nutritional basis in the consumption of large quantities of polished rice.

II. The Curative Services

Hospitals and Dispensaries

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In general, the curative services have received more attention than preventive medicine. Iraq's 89 hospitals are unevenly distributed, however, since one third of them are in the Baghdad area and the remaining 59 are divided among the other 13 provinces. It is true, of course, that there is higher concentration of people in Baghdad.

Of the 89 hospitals, 58 are general and six are for infectious diseases, three for eye diseases, two for venereal diseases and one for lepers. There are also two hospitals for children, one for

743 women and children and one for mental dieases. A new tuberculosis hospital and sanitarium has just been opened in Baghdad. The Army, Railways, Port of Basra, Police, Ministry of Education, and the oil companies maintain their own hospitals. There is also an American Mission hospital.

While some hospitals are adequately equipped and staffed, many of them are seriously in need of repair and equipment, especially dental equipment. Most of the hospitals suffer from an acute shortage of ~~trained~~ subordinate staff (medical aides or nurses). Hygienic conditions in some leave much to be desired. Hospital administration appears to be weak throughout the country, with a few notable exceptions such as the Royal Hospital in Baghdad. This is the teaching hospital of the Royal Medical Faculty and has practically all modern medical facilities. Several Iraqi doctors are now attending a course on hospital administration in foreign countries, but so far the number attending these courses is small. It would be desirable to give such a course in Iraq to young doctors after qualifying.

Simple conditions are treated in dispensaries of which there are 448—403 of them government institutions—fairly evenly distributed throughout the country. The physical facilities and staffs of such dispensaries vary widely. Some are in the charge of a doctor but the majority are run by health officials and dressers. Except for vaccination against smallpox, the dispensaries do very little preventive medical work. Since there is only about one dispensary to every 12,000 of the population, it is obvious that the number must be increased as additional staff can be trained.

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743 The Development Board has planned an annual expenditure of ID 700,000 on medical service buildings in its five-year program extending over the period 1951-52 to 1955-56. A detailed breakdown of this expenditure was available only for the first year. On the whole the total outlay envisaged over the entire period would seem adequate. In the first instance, however, efforts should be concentrated on the replacement, repair and modernization of existing hospitals. In addition to the projects of this nature for which provision was made in the first budget of the Development Board, the following would appear to be most urgent:

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Additional provision for reconstruction of the Karkh and Kut Hospitals......ID	200,000
Repairs to the Maude Hospital (Basra), Amara Hospital, Erbil Hospital and Suleimaniya Hospital	250,000
Infectious disease blocks for the Erbil and Mosul Hospitals	65,000
Maternity block for the Hilla Hospital......	25,000
Laundry for Diwaniya Hospital......	12,000
Additional wards for Mosul and Kirkuk Hospitals	80,000
Completion of Mental Diseases Hospital......	250,000
Additional provision for operating facilities at Royal Hospital	50,000
Children's Ward at Royal Hospital......	40,000
Maternity block at Royal Hospital......	40,000
Dental equipment for hospitals......	20,000
Total ......ID	1,032,000

As it becomes possible to devote more attention to increasing facilities for treatment, priority should be given generally to the construction of additional dispensaries in the rural areas.

Doctors

At present there is about one practicing doctor to every 7,000 of the population, but many of the doctors are concentrated in Baghdad. Only about 35 doctors are now being registered annually, but with increased accommodations and more laboratory facilities, it will be possible to enroll more students so that at least 50 will qualify as doctors annually. This number may be sufficient for Iraq's needs, provided that an adequate number of suitably trained health officers are available for service in village dispensaries and that nurses and dressers receive more training. 759 [758]

Doctors receive their training at the Royal Faculty of Medicine, which was founded in 1927. The syllabus and teaching seem, on the whole, to be good. They emphasize adequately the study of the endemic diseases, although they do not give enough weight to the teaching of public health and preventive medicine. The recent appointment of a professor of public health should give a better balance to the program of instruction. Public health as such should probably be taught as a postgraduate course. It would include such subjects as public health administration, public he [874]

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

844 received training of any sort. In Baghdad there is a government maternity home but it has had very little to do with the practicing midwives.

It is presently estimated that 900 midwives are needed in the villages, 300 in the towns and 80 in the hospitals. In order to take into account the great difference between conditions in the towns and villages, it would be desirable to institute two courses of training:

1. A ~~one-year~~ course for literate girls and women who will become midwives in urban populations and fill government posts; and
2. A course lasting approximately six months for illiterate (or largely so) practicing midwives who, after training, will return to their own villages.

A few Iraqi women have taken a course in midwifery outside of Iraq and these women, together with three foreign midwives, could serve as the teaching staff at the outset.

An estimate of the staff and buildings required and their cost follows:

(*a*) School for Town Midwives:
  1. Staff: three staff midwives, one director, cook, etc.
  2. Buildings: quarters for 20 pupils, 10 maternity beds, etc.
  3. Capital cost: ID 40,500
     Output—20 trained midwives a year.

(*b*) School for Village Midwives:
  1. Staff: three staff midwives, one director, cook, etc.
  2. Buildings: quarters for 15 pupils, six maternity beds, etc.
  3. Capital cost: ID 31,500
     Output—30 village midwives annually.

(*c*) One Principal for the Schools

Establishment of Village Health Centers

743 Iraq is a country of scattered villages and hamlets and of great distances; to bring medical aid, however simple, to the greatest possible number of people it would seem wise to increase the number of dispensaries as staff becomes available. It might even be possible to attach some mobile dispensaries to the larger sections of the nomadic tribes.

The village dispensary should become a center for all health activities in the area. Not only should the health official (or medi-

cal assistant) treat simple conditions—and he could well treat 743
cases of most of the major endemic diseases—but he should also be the village "sanitarian". The village midwives should be based at the health center and draw their supplies there. Vaccination against smallpox—of prime importance in Iraq—and other protective innoculations could, as required, be carried out in the centers. Later, public health nurses could be added to the center staffs.

The number of health centers must necessarily depend, among other things, upon local population density, distances and means of communication. Visiting doctors from the hospital to which the center is attached could call at regular intervals to see special cases referred to them by the health official. By such means as these, medical assistance and advice could be brought within reach of most of the people and the best use be made of the doctor's services. At present the district or *qadha* doctors have no means [758]
of transport to visit dispensaries.

The additional health officials who would staff these centers could be selected from among the hospital dressers. Since these men have already had considerable clinical experience, it should be possible to train them in about a year. Because they are much closer to the village people than the visiting doctors, they can do a great deal to help the local people. One Iraqi doctor stated that an experienced and happy health official can do better work in a village than an unhappy and disgruntled newly-qualified doctor.

There are about 400 dispensaries at present, some of which are staffed only by dressers. Assuming 20 medical assistants can be trained annually, it should be possible to staff all the present dispensaries and 200 new ones with medical assistants in less than 20 years. The buildings and staff now used by the School for Health Officials (founded in 1932) could equally well be used as a training school for medical assistants.

Training of Public Health Nurses

As soon as some midwives have been trained, a program 744
should be started for the training of public health nurses. These women would hold positions of considerable responsibility, and every candidate for the course should already be a trained nurse and a midwife.

APPENDIX

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TABLE 1

HOSPITALS, HOSPITAL BEDS, DISPENSARIES AND DOCTORS
(by provinces, with populations)

Provinces	Hospitals	Beds	Dispensaries	Doctors	Population
Baghdad	30	1,988	56	419	805,293
Mosul	8	303	47	67	601,589
Basra	7	539	21	65	352,039
Hilla	5	264	21	25	261,903
Diyala	3	87	29	24	273,336
Diwaniya	3	117	25	22	333,787
Dulaim	4	181	18	12	193,294
Erbil	4	100	23	17	240,273
Kirkuk	5	207	28	58	285,878
Suleimaniya	3	103	15	14	222,732
Kerbela	3	228	14	22	276,670
Muntafiq	5	205	17	18	369,806
Kut	4	127	22	14	224,792
Amara	5	353	12	20	308,108
Totals	89	4,802	348	797	4,749,500

TABLE 2

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NUMBER OF VISITS TO HEALTH INSTITUTIONS FOR TREATMENT
(by provinces)

Provinces	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Baghdad	1,004,856	1,255,348	1,523,935	1,471,621	1,553,020	1,664,023
Basra	306,612	312,842	378,903	373,735	381,907	382,241
Mosul	423,819	455,584	509,410	541,881	576,291	644,647
Amara	269,536	291,722	336,025	345,873	297,987	279,273
Erbil	144,453	155,649	147,164	165,704	150,572	168,980
Diwaniya	324,148	351,092	319,131	361,368	364,949	380,720
Diyala	288,912	284,181	319,518	343,626	322,715	357,198
Dulaim	199,063	199,996	239,952	248,285	227,797	222,030
Hilla	320,087	364,942	306,319	436,523	434,789	408,278
Kerbela	375,591	308,693	397,757	356,427	428,911	431,666
Kirkuk	133,571	168,809	229,044	209,588	202,219	206,556
Kut	188,978	230,255	202,970	211,061	234,522	257,991
Muntafiq	247,293	255,185	297,433	327,114	277,494	285,306
Suleimaniya	141,406	146,185	194,126	193,919	203,251	187,427
Totals	4,368,325	4,780,483	5,401,687	5,586,725	5,656,424	5,876,336

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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TABLE 3

Classification of Hospitals in 1949

Kind	Number	Beds 1st Class	 2nd Class	 3rd Class
I. Hospitals of the Ministry of Social Affairs				
General	39	53	185	2,720
For Eye Diseases	2			61
For Venereal Diseases	2			37
For Infectious Diseases	6	13	9	563
For Leprosy	1			240
For Children	1			89
For Children (Welfare Hospital)	1			35
For Women & Children	1			25
For Mental Diseases	1			85
Prison	6	4	2	105
	60	70	196	3,960
II. Other Government Hospitals				
Railways	1	3	14	40
Ministry of Education	1		26	
Police	1		5	25
Port	1	5	6	14
	4	8	51	79
III. Non-Government Hospitals				
General	4	57	26	147
For Eye Diseases	1	2	2	8
Oil Companies	4	18	16	109
American Mission	1			38
	10	77	44	302

3. Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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164 helminthosis are endemic. There are occasional outbreaks of
657 smallpox, typhus, and more rarely plague and cholera. With the greater provision in the budget for schemes of public health, the increased employment of international specialists and the considerable assistance tendered by the World Health Organization, there is every prospect that the incidence of endemic
874 diseases will be greatly reduced. Fundamental results may be expected from modern medical training, with emphasis on the
742 environmental aspects of disease and the need for prevention
657 as much as or even more than cure, and, above all, from the
● 743 efforts of the administration to improve the environment itself,
[312] with especial reference to drainage and water-supply. In addition, attention is to be paid to the public health aspects of the pilgrimages. The curative services have in general received more attention than the preventive and have improved considerably in the past thirty years. Simple conditions are treated in some 400 state dispensaries, distributed fairly evenly throughout the country but varying in their equipment and staff; it has hitherto proved difficult to attract doctors to the provinces and particularly to the rural districts. Each *liwa* centre has a general hospital, the larger towns more than one. There are also specialized hospitals for maternity and child welfare, for infectious, chest, eye, venereal, and mental diseases, and for lepers. The army, police, railways, Port of Basra, Ministry of Education, and oil companies maintain their own medical services and hospitals, and there are in addition an American Mission Hospital and a number of private nursing homes. A five-year programme, financed by the Development Board, will provide for the repair, extension, and replacement of medical buildings which have become old or inadequate. There is an acute shortage of well-trained nurses; attempts to expand the service are hampered by the reluctance of Muslim girls of good family to enter it.

Education

658 The state provides elementary, intermediate, secondary, and
871 higher education, all, since December 1952, completely free. There are also private and foreign schools on a kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, and secondary level.

State Education. Primary education, by law universal and compulsory where facilities exist, begins at the age of six and continues for six years. It has been limited by a shortage of schools and trained teachers, especially in the villages. Plans are in hand to meet the need. The rapid expansion of state primary education is demonstrated in the following table:

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professors of the medical college who are nominated by the board of studies and approved by the Minister of Social Affairs. Members of the faculty have received their medical training at universities and hospitals in England, Egypt, Turkey, Paris, and Beirut.

[346] The College is housed in a modern building specially built for it with
fairly extensive laboratories, dissection rooms, and lecture halls, large
enough to accommodate 60 to 70 students in each of the six years. In addi-
tion, the College enjoys the extensive facilities of the teaching hospital on
743 the grounds of which it is situated. This largest of Iraq's hospitals has 600
beds in large wards and semiprivate and private rooms, thus accommodating
patients of all classes. As the hospital receives patients not only from the
Baghdad area, but also from all parts of Iraq, students have a chance of
seeing a very large and representative variety of cases and diseases. The
hospital has a very large outpatient clinic occupying a two-story building
and some annexes where more than 700,000 new cases are treated each
742 year. Next to the College building is the large building housing the patho-
logical and bacteriological institutes and the antirabic and vaccine-produc-
tion institutes. On the same grounds is also the extensive X-ray building
with facilities for both X-ray diagnosis and therapy, including fluoroscopy
and radium therapy. All these facilities form part of the teaching facilities
of the College.

THE COLLEGE OF PHARMACY

The College of Pharmacy, included for administrative purposes in the Royal College of Medicine, was established in 1936 and provides graduates of the secondary school with a four-year course leading to a Diploma of Pharmaceutical Chemist. In 1945–46 the enrollment was 98, with the four classes about equal in size. Upon graduation the student spends six months in practical work with a registered pharmacist and three months in a government dispensary. Students are admitted on the basis of a medical examination, public secondary-school examinations, personal interview, and geographical and minority distribution. Those who sign a contract to serve the Department of Health for four years after graduation are exempt from all fees except an instruction fee of 3 dinars ($12) yearly. Tuition fees for others are 33 dinars ($132) per year.

The College is administered by the dean assisted by a college board composed of permanent professors and lecturers. Members of the teaching staff are nominated by the dean, subject to the approval of the college board and confirmation by the Director General of Health.

The curriculum includes botany, general chemistry, business methods

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53. In the course of our interview with the Ministers of Health and Social Affairs 657
and their officials, we were offered facilities, of which we were unable, however, 185
to avail ourselves, for visiting single-purpose centres, e.g., homes for the aged
and for the blind, a rehabilitation centre for crippled boys, hospitals, and
maternity clinics all under official patronage and in some, if not every instance,
receiving a State subsidy. In a working class district of Baghdad we did, however, 657
visit a maternity clinic that had been started by the Red Crescent Society. It had
recently come under the direction of an English woman doctor, assisted by, possibly, 743
the only certified Iraqi Public Health nurse in the country. Both spoke of the
improvement in health which was to be observed amongst the out-patients, and of the 185
evident appreciation by the latter of the assistance afforded, but the shortage of
milk for the infants was a matter of concern. Some benefit may come in this respect
from the discussions then in progress between the Iraq Government and UNICEF for the
provision of a pasteurising plant. The Ministry of Social Affairs have recently
taken over from the Red Crescent Society the responsibility for the staff employed
at the clinic and for providing certain necessary supplies and medicaments.

54. It is perhaps worth adding that the remarks made during our visit by the staff 657
of the clinic on the subject of attempts to teach sewing to the out-patients while
waiting for attention and the difficulty of keeping amused the numerous children who 185
come with their mothers, suggests that there is scope at the clinic (and no doubt
other similar institutions) for better educated women of leisure, many of whom
contribute generously from their purses to such works, to undertake another simpler
form of voluntary social service for which little or no preliminary training is
required. Indeed, it is not impossible that with such assistance and under
favourable conditions a rudimentary club or community centre might be developed for
the women in the district whose standard of life is very low but who have shown a
desire to improve it. A development on these lines would have the merit of
encouraging educated women of leisure in Baghdad to take part in voluntary social
services. It will be long before trained, professional social workers will be
available in sufficient numbers for such duties. We had however, no opportunity of
discussing these suggestions with anyone in a position to transform them into
actuality.

55. We heard from Miss Govan (UNTAA expert) of a scheme with which she had been associated for training 25 young women as social workers. The scheme had made some progress but was momentarily hindered, partly by difficulties in providing local facilities for completing practical in-service training and in persuading the girls' parents to permit them to take up duty away from home.

56. Although we were met with every possible courtesy during our visit to Iraq, the fact that a caretaker Government was in office and a general election was about to take place created a situation in which it was pointless to discuss in detail with the departments concerned, future plans and policies for social development.

57. Recommendation. Until the MacGregor-Khaddoury scheme has been more closely studied by the departments concerned and the necessary financial provision has been approved, we are unable to make any recommendations.

600 istrative branches. The Director of Curative
744 Medicine has supervision over 4 departments:
657 hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies;
743 rural health; technical institutes, including 6 laboratory sections; and medical stores. Under the Director of Preventive and Social Medicine are departments of endemic diseases, sanitation, social health, quarantine and epidemics, vital statistics and disease registration. Subordinate sections dealing with maternal and child health, venereal diseases, pulmonary diseases and health propaganda are incorporated in the Department of Social Health, while supervision over the health services of both the province and the city of Baghdad falls within the scope of the Department of
742 Sanitation. The Department of Endemic Diseases carries on research and field programs for the control of malaria, schistosomiasis and hookworm infection, some of which were initiated by the then Institute of Endemic Diseases, created in 1949. Further changes in organization, making the Director of Preventive and Social Medicine a Director General immediately responsible to the Minister, were proposed in 1953.

746 Subordinate provincial organizations carry out the functions of the Ministry of Health in the 14 *liwas*, or provinces. Chief medical officers are appointed to each *liwa* and are responsible for the conduct of the various medical services. They undertake some public health activities, but, to a large extent, the preventive services are directed from Baghdad. Municipal health divisions are established in Baghdad and the principal cities.

744 Other ministries are also concerned in some measure with the public health. The Ministry of Education operates school health services in Baghdad and the larger urban centers, and introduces instruction in the basic principles of health through the schools in urban and rural areas. The Ministry of Economics has veterinary and agriculture departments: the former has meat and dairy inspection services; the latter runs an experimental farm and a pas-

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teurization plant near Baghdad and seeks 744
to improve the standards of agriculture
which should be reflected in better nutrition
among the people. The Ministry of
Communications and Works maintains
health and medical facilities at the port of
Basra, and furnishes medical care for railway
personnel.

Several voluntary agencies carry on 746
health work, usually in co-operation with 751
the Ministry of Health. The Children's
Welfare Society conducts an extensive program
for the promotion of maternal and
child health, and operates welfare centers
in Baghdad and the administrative centers
of the remaining provinces. The Red Crescent
Society supports a child health center
in Baghdad, and provides training for girls
in first aid and home nursing through
branches in Baghdad, Basra, Hilla, Amarah
and Kirkuk. The Anti-Tuberculosis Society
campaigns against tuberculosis, and contributed
toward the erection of a sanatorium,
opened in 1951, near Baghdad. The 743
Catholic Nuns Society runs a small general
hospital and dispensary, and the Society of
Buyout el Umma an ophthalmic hospital
and dispensaries in Baghdad.

The Board of Foreign Missions of the 797
Reformed Church of America maintains a 743
medical mission in the Amarah region. It
operates a hospital and founded the leper
colony, which has since been taken over by
the government. The Seventh Day Adventists
also have a hospital in Baghdad. The [466]
Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries,
the Mosul Petroleum Company and
the Basra Petroleum Company, provide
medical and health services for the benefit of
their employees.

MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1950, 743
there were 82 civilian hospitals in Iraq with
an aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or
slightly over 1 bed per 1,000 population.
Of this number, 2,086 beds were located in
Baghdad, 534 in Basra and 412 in Mosul
provinces. Sixty-seven hospitals, with a

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combined capacity of 4,330 beds, were operated by the government health authorities; 4 hospitals with 153 beds by other governmental agencies; and 11 hospitals with 418 beds by industrial, mission or private organizations. Free medical care was provided in 4,475 beds, representing over 90 per cent of the hospital beds available in the country. 743 [657]

The Royal Hospital in Baghdad is foremost among the institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. It has medical, surgical, pediatric and infectious disease sections, with a total capacity of 650 to 750 beds. The remaining hospitals of the Ministry now come under the authority of the Director of Curative Medicine. According to the statistics for 1950, they included 42 general hospitals, with an aggregate capacity of about 2,300 beds, of which one or more in each province were Grade 1 hospitals under the supervision of medical officers. Maternity and child welfare divisions were incorporated in the general hospitals, which provided 962 beds for maternity cases and 134 beds for children. The special institutions consisted of 6 isolation hospitals with a total capacity of 596 beds, 3 ophthalmic hospitals with 79 beds, 2 venereal disease hospitals with 52 beds, 2 child welfare hospitals with 155 beds, 3 maternity and children's hospitals with 71 beds, a mental hospital of 120 beds, a leper hospital of 180 beds and 6 prison hospitals with 92 beds. A 400-bed tuberculosis sanatorium, which was sponsored in part by the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, was opened near Baghdad in 1951. Another 120-bed hospital in Basra was completed in 1952.

The American Mission hospital, with 38 beds, in Amarah and the new Seventh Day Adventist hospital, with 60 beds, in Baghdad are prominent among the private institutions. As of 1951, 3 hospitals with a combined capacity of 170 beds were operated by the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk region. The medical facilities of the company in the oil field and the pipeline areas also included 20 detention camps, with 797 743 743 466

p. 83(B)

743 82 beds for emergency care, and field ambu-
466 lance services. The Basra Petroleum Company maintained a 15-bed hospital at Basra, a 16-bed hospital at Fao and 12 emergency beds in 2 detention camps. The Mosul Petroleum Company had 10 beds for emergency cases in a camp near its exploration activities.

743 In addition to the regular hospital clinics, 433 dispensaries were scattered throughout the provinces in 1950. Of this number, 403 belonged to the government health services: 145 were staffed by physicians and the remainder by assistant medical personnel. There were also 11 mobile dispensaries, which covered the more remote villages and tribal areas, and 2 floating dispensaries on the river in Basra and Muntafiq provinces. Only 7 tuberculosis dispensaries existed in 1950, but 13 dispensaries, some with facilities for 20 beds, were under construction in the provincial capitals. The Ministry operated 5 ophthalmic dispensaries and 4 "institutes" for the treatment of venereal diseases. A diagnostic and research center was organized in Baghdad in 1950, in connection with the syphilis-bejel control project being conducted under the auspices of the World Health Organization.

743 The infant and child welfare centers
744 functioning in 1950 totaled 21, most of which were supported by the Children's Welfare Society. Ten centers were located in the Baghdad region. An expanded maternal and child health program is now being developed by the Ministry of Health. In 1952, it started a demonstration and training project at Samawa, with assistance from the Technical Co-operation Administration of the United States government. Another demonstration center for the training of local medical personnel in the principles of maternal and child health is scheduled to be opened in Baghdad in 1953-54, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The proposed program of the Ministry calls for the crea-

p. 34(A)

743 744 tion of rural health centers, each to serve an area of 20,000 to 30,000 population, as rapidly as adequate staff and funds become available.

742 **Laboratories.** The central laboratory facilities of the Ministry of Health are concentrated in 6 institutes, all with headquarters in Baghdad. The pathologic and bacteriologic institutes are associated with the Royal College of Medicine, and combine research and teaching with routine laboratory functions. The Institute of Bacteriology consists of a diagnostic section, equipped for the conduct of serologic, bacteriologic and parasitologic examinations, and a vaccine unit for the preparation of typhoid, plague and cholera vaccines. The Institute of Pathology has divisions for the performance of biochemical and pathologic examinations. A third institute merges the former Vaccine Lymph Institute, which manufactures smallpox vaccine for use throughout the country, and the Antirabic Institute, which prepares rabies vaccine and provides treatment and diagnostic services. The Medico-Legal Institute incorporates forensic medicine, anatomy and photographic sections. The Chemical Institute has facilities for the analysis of food, water and milk, and of various agricultural and industrial preparations. An Institute of Roentgenology, with branches in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, furnishes diagnostic and treatment services. The Department of Endemic Diseases operates a diagnostic and research laboratory in Baghdad, in connection with the government's malaria, schistosomiasis and hookworm control programs. Field units are stationed in the northern, the central and the southern provinces.

An Institute of Medical Research is established at the Royal College of Medicine: it includes clinical divisions and pathologic, chemical and biochemical laboratories. A research serologic laboratory is maintained in Baghdad in conjunction with the World Health Organization's syphilis-bejel control program. Clinical laboratory

p. 34(B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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164 462 312 744 provinces, and conducts research and field investigations on the distribution and the control of the disease and the intermediate snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from 15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually in government hospitals and dispensaries. 164 758 The disease is considered commonplace in most areas, however, and probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the infected individuals seek treatment under ordinary conditions. 743 164 Since 1949, special dispensaries have been established in Baghdad, Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour the most seriously infected districts. In 1950, there were 11 mobile units for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 361 **Ancylostomiasis.** Ancylostomiasis is widespread in the irrigated areas, but the exact distribution and severity of the infection in the different provinces are not accurately known. [138] *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the only species found in the foci studied. The infection rates are generally estimated at 10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces and at 40 per cent in the southern. They are especially high in the Amarah and the Al Qurnah regions, but decrease toward the south, and are relatively low in the districts along the Shatt al Arab. 164 742 In a study reported in 1939,[47] fecal specimens from apparently healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from various parts of the country were examined for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was detected in 25 per cent of the specimens from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per cent from 135 men from the rural districts of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per cent of the individuals examined from Diyala *liwa* and from 25 per cent of the individuals from Dulaim. The degree of infection is usually mild, but serious cases with hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent are not infrequent.

164 758 742 Treatment facilities are provided by the schistosomiasis control units, as well as by the government hospitals and dispensaries.

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164 pulmonary infections, but tuberculous meningitis is common in young children. Among 838 cases of nonpulmonary tuberculosis admitted to the surgical wards of the Royal Hospital in the 4 years 1947-50,[14] over 26 per cent were diagnosed as lymphadenitis and over 21 per cent as infections of the spine.

164 743 The new 400-bed sanatorium opened near Baghdad under the joint auspices of the Anti-Tuberculosis Society and the government health authorities in 1951 was the first tuberculosis hospital in the country. Previously, facilities for the treatment of tuberculous cases were provided only in the provincial hospitals, or in sanatoria in Syria and Lebanon, where the Ministry of Health subsidizes about 200 beds for the use of 657 743 164 Iraqi patients. Plans have been projected by the Ministry for the construction of tuberculosis hospitals in each of the provinces: a 120-bed hospital was completed in Basra in 1952, and it was anticipated that hospitals would soon be ready for use in Kirkuk and Mosul. As of 1950, the dispensaries available for the treatment of chest diseases totaled 6, of which 2 were located in Baghdad and one each in Mosul, Kirkuk Diwaniya and Sulaimaniya. X-ray laboratories were maintained in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul.

751 A BCG inoculation and tuberculin testing program was initiated by the Ministry in 1952, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. It is proposed to concentrate at first on the children and the adolescents in the larger cities. In 1952 also, the World Health Organization sponsored the establishment of a tuberculosis demonstration and training center at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad.

164 Smallpox. Epidemics of smallpox break out almost annually, and reach major proportions at intervals of 3 to 8 years. Since 1930, large-scale epidemics were reported in 1932-33, 1940-42, 1946 and 1948-49. In the 1932-33 outbreaks, the peak of incidence came in 1932, when 2,318 cases were re-

p. 40(A)

63;Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

164 prevalent. In most areas the prominence of
eye lesions is aggravated by the frequency
of dust-laden winds and by the glare of the
sun. Conjunctivitis is the leading cause of
morbidity among the employees of the Iraq
Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk oil field
and pipeline stations. It comprises almost
one half of the cases of infectious disease
treated each year. Gonococcal ophthalmia is
responsible for considerable blindness, particularly
143 in the urban communities. The
164 Ministry of Health operates 3 ophthalmic
hospitals and 5 dispensaries in Baghdad
and other cities, and provides special facilities
for the treatment of eye diseases
in the provincial hospitals and dispensaries.

164 **Diseases of the Skin.** The low standards
515 of hygiene prevailing among both urban and
rural populations are conducive to the
164 spread of skin infections. Mycotic infections
of various types are seen in large
numbers. Favus predominates: from 10 to
15 cases constitute the usual daily quota at
the clinic of the Royal Hospital in Baghdad.
Cases of actinomycosis and Madura foot are
often observed. Impetigo and erysipelas are
common. Scabies is widespread. Phagedenic
ulcers and cases of human myiasis are encountered
136 from time to time. A form of
164 dermatitis, caused by contact with cercariae
of nonhuman strains of *Schistosoma*, is frequent
in the southern provinces. The bites
of sandflies produce skin lesions in susceptible
individuals, and are apt to become
infected.

164 **Leprosy.** Leprosy is endemic, especially
in the marsh and the lake districts of the
south. The actual prevalence of the disease
is uncertain, but local observers estimate
that it probably does not exceed 400 to 500
cases. From 179 to 279 cases were reported
annually in 1944-49, with from 46 to 86 new
infections. A focus formerly existed around
Baghdad, but within recent years relatively
few indigenous cases have been found in the
143 central and the northern provinces. A leper
colony is maintained by the government on
an island near Amarah: it usually has 250
TO 300 PATIENTS IN RESIDENCE.

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to 300 patients in residence. A comprehensive leprosy control program is planned for the near future by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization. 000 744

Other Infections. Rabies is enzootic among dogs, jackals and other animals. The jackals, the principal reservoir, often invade the villages and the outlying sections of the towns. Human infections occur sporadically: in 1944-49, the recorded cases averaged from 4 to 32 a year. In the same period, from 739 to 1,365 persons were treated annually at the Antirabic Institute in Baghdad. The majority gave a history of having been bitten by rabid dogs. The Institute also prepares rabies vaccine for distribution throughout the country. 232 164 [745]

Anthrax is prevalent among the sheep. From 130 to 225 human cases are reported annually among persons in contact with infected animals, or among individuals working with hides or wool. Tetanus is sporadic: the known incidence totals 130 to 250 cases each year. Tetanus neonatorum is common, especially in the rural areas. Cases of human glanders are seen from time to time. Leptospirosis, or Weil's disease, is occasionally encountered in the southern provinces. However, no evidence of infection with *Leptospira icterohaemorrhagiae* has yet been found among the rats captured in Baghdad.

Diseases Spread by Arthropods

Malaria. Malaria is endemic or hyperendemic throughout most of Iraq. The distribution and the severity of the disease vary with the physiographic features of the different regions and the amount and the type of irrigation. It has always been regarded as a disease of primary importance in the country, but within the last few decades it has become increasingly prominent in the southern provinces due to the expansion of irrigation facilities. The cases of malaria treated in government institutions in the 7 years 1944-50 averaged about 598,800 annually. The case rates in the various provinces, based upon the at- 164 361 164

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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SUMMARY

Iraq encompasses the valleys of the 131
Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and is associated 161
historically with Mesopotamia, the 433
home of one of the oldest civilizations on
record. It has been an independent sovereign
state since 1932. The population, which
was estimated at 4,799,500 in 1947, is 95
per cent Moslem and predominantly Arab.
Extensive petroleum resources and date cultivation
contribute to the wealth of the
country, which is still relatively underdeveloped
in other respects. The public health 744
activities of the Iraqi government are centralized
in the Ministry of Health, with
headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry is
responsible for the maintenance of preventive
and curative services, which are carried
out in the provinces through subordinate
provincial organizations. Municipal departments
exist in Baghdad and the principal
cities, but in other areas the enforcement
of sanitary regulations devolves upon the
government officers. In 1950, there were 82 743
civilian hospitals in the country, with an
aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly
more than 1 bed per 1,000 population.
Almost one half of the total beds were located
in the Baghdad area. Approximately
82 per cent of the hospitals are supported
by the government. Also in 1950, 433 dispensaries
were functioning in various parts
of the provinces, 403 under the jurisdiction
of the government health authorities.

The water supplies in the towns and the 312
villages of the alluvial plain are derived
from rivers, canals, lakes and wells; in the
northern highlands, from streams, springs
and wells. All the urban supplies are obtained
from rivers, except in Erbil and
Sulaimaniya, where spring sources are utilized.
The water supplies of the larger cities
are treated, but those in the rural areas are
unprotected and often polluted. There are 314
no sewerage systems. In the cities, cesspits
and septic tanks are employed for the disposal
of sewage; in the rural villages, the
means are more primitive. The dietary 800

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personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the 579 period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It 674 was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg, General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings 368 of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra. The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast. Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja under its Jāf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals 743 and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrangements 744 in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels 368 appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enterprise, 185 a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nad͟him Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple 439 exports of the territory still varied annually according to the harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates, grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin, partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are elsewhere mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

619 721 166 622 In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

291 European dress was ever more generally adopted in the larger towns, and spread significantly to urbanized tribesmen. Among upper-class women, though the veil was still almost universal among Muslims, Western 556 clothing was worn increasingly. The desire for material progress was reflected in the eagerness of the rich to acquire motor-cars, gramophones, and the toys and amenities of Europe; but inability to pay for these gave rise to demands for limitless credit.

466 Interest at the International Labour Office in conditions among 'Iraq's industrial workers led to some answering efforts to produce suitable legislation; but the smallness of this class in an unindustrialized country made European criteria and standards largely inapplicable. The first seeds were sown, however, of a social interest in labour matters.

● 744 To the whole community and to urban society in particular with its still prevalent poverty and low purchasing power the Government's Health and Education services contributed valuably. The former improved its quarantine and pilgrim services, multiplied its countryside dispensaries, improved its specialist institutes, and dealt well with the cholera epidemics of 1927 and 1931. It was significant that out-patient attendances, less than 750,000 in 1921, had more than doubled by 1926 and quadrupled by 1930. In response to foreign purchasers' outcry, the Health Department imposed measures of cleanliness in the date industry. In 1927 it founded the Royal Medical College; this, a medical school of good standards, took at once a high place in 'Iraq's higher and professional education. A School of Pharmacy had existed since 1922. The Government adhered during these years to a number of international conventions on medical as on many other matters.

871 The 'Iraqi schools seemed to foreign observers at this period—and indeed at others—to lack something of the best spirit of education. There was criticism of lax discipline, uncritical self-flattery, a worship of modernity and materialism; politics pervaded too many of the schools, always in the form of a crude xenophobia eager for street demonstrations. Nevertheless, an educational system grew and multiplied its facilities, fought for budget allotments, developed an Inspectorate, codified its Regulations. A Hygiene Directorate was formed in the Education Ministry, later [562] greatly to develop. The year 1930 saw the first Government secondary schools for girls; the days of Muslim hesitation over female education were almost over. For boys the secondary period was prolonged from four to five years, three 'intermediate' and two 'senior'. The dispatch of students for higher education abroad grew commoner. Technical education remained unpopular: it did not lead quickly enough to the goal chiefly envisaged, a Govern-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
361 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
631 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
466 improvements and considerable building and town-planning.
554 Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply,
improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features
of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy
of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services
into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later
Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a
Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist,
at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment
of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little
practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from
practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and
was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law
abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—
Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—
Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and
by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in
authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imperfect.
184 Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and
702 the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was
not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low
exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of
recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting
military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission
constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and
its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi.
Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number
by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and,
territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were
sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the
lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any
operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with
tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq
Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong,
was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F.
Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab Companies.

721 exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important
practical results could be expected from this move, which at
*645 best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the
Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the
Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor
dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of
obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent
of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of
foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the
Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi
officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under
Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse,
did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship.
Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the
722 Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were
offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition
without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British
advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or
surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system
accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements,
the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and
grain supplies provided.

361 Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which
was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such
185 major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development
could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be
planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with
working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud
and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great
changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves
were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the
resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled
during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of
London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of
744 office to the Amin al-'Aṣima. The Health services continued to
develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private
practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the
Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had
served the country and their science now for twenty years, still
played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far
871 from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was
passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls,
and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools
were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few
during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

the American School of Oriental Research founded in 1923 and the 172 British School founded in 1929 maintained headquarters in Baghdad, and both published the results of their researches.

In the field of Public Health the Government services had 744 achieved much, but not the impossible. They had faced an im- 164 mense field to cover and to conquer, had started from nothing, and had been always restricted by lack of funds and trained officials; and meanwhile, inevitably, the disease- or weakness-producing factors in the territory, and the apathy and conservatism of its people, continued. The problem of general malnutrition and resulting lack of physical vigour was, in fact, the problem of poverty: the cure, still distant, lay as much or more in increased wealth as in increased enlightenment; and the same was true, in spite of active and multiplying maternity and child-welfare clinics, of an infant death-rate still tragically high. Little, save increasingly comprehensive and practical study, had yet been done to combat the curse of hookworm, malaria, or bilharzia; a comprehensive effort against these diseases and against tuberculosis, eye-disease, and the typhoid group must call insistently for more time, more funds, and more specialized staff. Steps taken against epidemic disease had been successful; plague and cholera had scarcely appeared for a quarter-century, and smallpox was well handled with full modern resources. Urban sanitation had been improved, [364] sewage schemes adopted, and sanitary inspector training developed; but conditions in this respect over most of the territory remained wholly primitive, and the majority of 'Iraqi doctors were little interested in public health administration. The country at large 742 was served by some eighty hospitals, of which three-quarters were general and a quarter specialized for fevers, mental and venereal diseases, leprosy (at 'Amara), children's and chest and eye diseases; a quarter of the whole were in Baghdad. Non-governmental hospitals were those of the oil companies, foreign missions, and the minority communities. The Jewish Mir Elias Hospital was still open, for patients of all creeds; all other Jewish hospitals and dispensaries had been closed. The Railways, the Port, the Police, and the Army maintained their separate Medical services. The supply 759 of doctors, thanks to the Royal Medical College, had much improved since the thirties, but some reliance on foreigners was still necessary; some thirty of these were so employed in 1951 and recruitment of more was in progress. Registered practitioners in all numbered some 300 in 1945, 420 in 1949. The reluctance of 'Iraqi doctors to serve in the remoter regions—or, indeed, elsewhere than in Baghdad—was still an embarrassment. Neverthe- 743 less, the busy and valued hospitals and dispensaries maintained in all parts of 'Iraq were playing a major stabilizing as well as a

658 238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase
871 in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or
[875] quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of 'Iraqī students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to adapt Western methods to 'Iraq instead of blindly adopting them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

871 Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern has been expressed both by 'Iraqis and by others lest various tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and controversies; and the acquisition by students of the view that education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that government positions should be the reward of their school certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves, will depend much of the continued progress of 'Iraq.

744 In other fields, a health service has been in existence since
757 the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in out-
[758] lying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small
164 portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

164 therefore vitally important that more attention be devoted in the future to the preventive aspects of public health work.

Prevention of Disease

● 744
751 Many measures could be taken to strengthen the preventive aspect of public health work. Doctors and nurses must, above all, be imbued with its importance for they have countless opportunities to impress on their patients the need for proper hygiene and sanitation. Thus social medicine, involving the study of the environmental factors bearing on health and of appropriate measures for the prevention of disease, should be taught as part of the qualifying course in the medical school at Baghdad. Far more emphasis also needs to be placed on the teaching of hygiene in elementary and secondary schools. Children should be taught not only good personal habits, but also the importance of sanitation in and around the home. Special classes might be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases, by the school medical officer whenever possible. Health education must likewise be given an important place in the curriculum of teachers' training colleges and special courses in the prevention of diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be provided in the School of Agriculture and the School of Engineering. Hospitals should be an object lesson in hygiene and every effort made to impress on patients the importance of personal and domestic hygiene. The interest of adults in public health can be stimulated by visual education and by organizing "health weeks", the first of which was held in Diwaniya with conspicuous success during the Mission's stay. The army and police have an excellent opportunity to teach habits conducive to good health. Prospective farmers for new settlement projects should be medically examined to restrict, as far as possible, the introduction of endemic diseases into these settlements. To prevent water pollution it would be desirable to locate villages in such settlements away from irrigation canals wherever possible.

743
759 The Mission strongly recommends that the number of village dispensaries, which is now over 400, be gradually increased and that they be equipped to serve as public health centers. Such centers would be simple in function, aimed primarily at providing elementary medical and health assistance to as many people as possi-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ble. As conditions permit, the scope of their services could be 743
expanded. At the present stage it will usually be sufficient to have 759
a specially trained medical assistant rather than a doctor in charge. At present there is no separate cadre of medical assistants. It is therefore suggested that the existing School for Health Officials be converted into a training school for such assistants or aides. The 744
medical assistant in charge of a dispensary will need to consider himself as the village sanitation officer and enlist the help of the village elder in organizing a cooperative effort to keep the village clean. He will also need the assistance of a village midwife and, at a later stage, of a public health nurse. The traditional midwife, if properly trained, could have great influence in improving the standards of personal and domestic hygiene, in combatting infant mortality and giving simple advice on the care of infants. Such midwives, when drawn from the ranks of the people whom they will serve, will have a ready entry into homes and will be able to speak in terms which will be readily understood. It is therefore recommended that a school for training such midwives, recruited from the villages, be established. A similar school should be set up for town midwives. It would be desirable to have three foreign midwives appointed to direct this training program.

In the cities a considerable improvement in sanitation could be effected through the creation of a sanitary corps. Such a corps should be charged with house-to-house inspection to detect health nuisances and prevent fly and mosquito breeding, with the inspection of eating-houses, foodstuffs and food handlers, and with the improvement of environmental hygiene in general. A foreign public health or sanitary engineer would be required to organize this service and establish the facilities and courses for training appropriate numbers of sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors who, in turn, would impart the necessary instruction to the house-to-house inspectors.

The prevention of hookworm, malaria and bilharzia warrants 164
special attention. These diseases are widely prevalent and through 744
their general debilitating effects materially lower productivity. The incidence of hookworm would be reduced by improvements in sewage disposal, the closing of open drains, provision of suitable latrines and the wearing of shoes. Bilharzia, which is transmitted

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

164 744 by a snail living in irrigation canals, can be combatted by elimination of stagnant, polluted water in which the snail thrives and by treating canals twice yearly with copper sulphate. DDT spraying and the elimination of stagnant water assist in the reduction of malaria. [312] In order to combat both malaria and bilharzia, major irrigation canals should be designed so as to maintain a rate of water flow no less than three miles per hour, and minor distributory canals so as to insure rapid drying-out after use. It is important that one complete "dry-out" per week be enforced in every section under irrigated cultivation.

Knowledge of such methods of combatting disease is already available in Iraq. What is needed is wider dissemination of the [742] knowledge and a vigorous campaign to give it effect. The Endemic Diseases Institute in Iraq has done much useful work in this field but it has been handicapped by insufficient transport, supplies and technical personnel. In the future there will be no justification for denying the Institute adequate funds for its work. It would be well to organize special campaigns in those provinces or districts where the incidence of a particular endemic disease has been especially high. Such a campaign would involve a simultaneous effort to treat the people already afflicted in the locality and to teach local officials and the local inhabitants in general the appropriate preventive measures. Mobile dispensaries and mobile vans equipped to show educational films would be especially useful for this purpose.

Curative Services

743 On the curative side, principal emphasis must first be placed on the improvement of existing hospitals and an expansion in the nursing service. In its five-year program the Development Board has allotted ID 3,800,000 for medical service buildings. The Mission believes that a large part of this sum should be used to modernize, extend or replace existing hospitals and improve their facilities for diagnosis and treatment rather than to construct additional hospitals. In the monograph on public health the Mission has listed the most urgent projects of this kind which it suggests should be undertaken in adition to those for which provision was made in the first annual budget of the Development Board. While the number

759 ence has already been made to the importance of special training for medical assistants who will generally be in charge of village dispensaries.

278 Many people will continue to be far removed from hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies. For these it is important to make available such simple "household remedies" as anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, tincture of iodine, DDT powder and Epsom salts. It is suggested that the government make arrangements to supply through village shops such drugs in suitable packets carrying simple directions for use. The general availability of these remedies at a reasonable price will also help to reduce the large number of visits to dispensaries for comparatively trivial ailments.

Organization of Public Health Administration

744 647 The measures outlined above require a number of changes in the administration of the public health program. The present organization, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, does not lend itself to an effective attack on the problem of disease prevention. Like most of the other central administrations, it suffers from excessive centralization. There is too little contact with other ministries whose activities are of importance to public health. The Mission suggests that a public health administrator, together with an epidemiologist and a sanitary expert, be recruited abroad to advise the Minister on the organization and further development of the health services. The epidemiologist would concentrate on the principal endemic diseases and the sanitary expert would advise on measures to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene. While a detailed reorganization should await their advice, it would seem best to group health services according to two main divisions, one concerned with the curative, the other with the preventive services.

In the future the reorganized health services will need to work much more closely with the departments concerned with irrigation and agriculture and, on the problem of health education, with the Ministry of Education. In carrying out a much needed decentralization considerable responsibility must, above all, be placed on the chief medical officer in every province. This officer, who now also carries on a private practice, should be given more adequate pay so

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also 744
be important to provide both the provincial and district medical 647
officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather 361
haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great 166
congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have [362]
simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities. [364]

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. 362
They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly con- 342
structed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

654^{x} 413 pumps. In other respects industrial development would be geared to supply the growing demand for consumers goods, such as shoes, textiles and utensils, and for construction materials, such as cement, arising out of the development program itself.

654^{x} 489 Rising agricultural and industrial output will necessitate a corresponding increase in transport capacity. Here the development of road transport and the replacement of wornout track, locomotives and rolling stock will be the principal tasks of the future.

654^{x} 871 744 ● Since the relationship of health and education to production may appear more indirect, there is danger that these two subjects will be neglected in the emphasis on greater national output. Basically, however, it is the productivity of manpower which must be raised, and this can be achieved only if measures are taken to make people better educated and to free them from debilitating disease. In the future the public health effort must concentrate on the prevention of disease through such measures as increasing the number of village dispensaries, the training of midwives, the organization of a corps of sanitarians, elimination of stagnant and polluted water, provision of safe water supplies and sewage disposal, slum clearance and better housing. Community planning should focus largely on such improvements as will contribute to better public health. A great broadening of the educational effort is needed in the future to teach people how to cope more effectively with the problems of everyday living. To this end, compulsory primary education should be gradually introduced over the next 15 years and a vigorous campaign for the education of adults should be launched. At the same time, however, it is vitally important to adapt education to the practical needs of the people, helping them to improve their health and their methods of work.

654^{x} The program which the Mission has outlined in this report is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission has thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a

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Dairy Products

The larger towns receive their milk and milk products from cows, buffalo, sheep and goats which are kept in backyards in town or on nearby farms and settlements. The dairy cattle among them are usually of mixed or nondescript breed. While they are surprisingly well fed, their housing and the methods of milking and processing the milk are extremely primitive. The majority of municipalities appear to have sufficient legislation to ensure clean milk production, but enforcement is poor and the livestock owner is not educated to the necessity for taking more care with the production of his commodity. Baghdad, for example, has regulations to remove livestock out of the city and locate them outside of the city boundaries. It has provided livestock settlements for the milking buffalo complete with walled paddocks, running water and feeding stalls, but unfortunately with no accommodation or living quarters for the workers. Despite these facilities many livestock owners continue to keep their animals in the poorer quarter of the city, and no attempt is made by the government to demonstrate clean milk production in these settlements.

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The government has taken a step in the right direction in installing a small milk pasteurizing plant in Baghdad (100-gallon flash pasteurizer), but the only milk passing through the plant is some 200-300 liters a day from the Abu Ghuraib agricultural station. Unfortunately many Baghdad residents do not even know of its existence. Some government officials have urged a larger pasteurizing plant even though the present plant is daily running considerably below capacity. The cleanliness of existing milk supplies must first be improved and producers persuaded to use the existing plant.

Another unfortunate feature of the present "backyard" herds is the fact that many dry cows and calves are sent to slaughter and only the milk producing animal is retained. Each year the dairy industry loses a great number of potentially good milk-producing animals in this way.

The following recommendations for the amelioration of the situation in Baghdad are put forward with the expectation that, if they are successfully applied there, they can be extended also to the other major cities:

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ANNEX F

PUBLIC HEALTH

I. Introduction

Extent of Progress Made in Public Health

In the past 30 years health services in Iraq have improved 744 ● 743 considerably. In 1918 the country had only one hospital, contrasted 164 with the present 89 hospitals (4,812 in-patient beds or one bed per 1,000 people) and 448 dispensaries. Control measures including the use of vaccines, particularly for smallpox, have cut down the incidence of epidemics during the last few years. Cholera has not occurred since 1931 and the plague not since 1935. Smallpox and louse-borne typhus also seem to be under control. An Institute of Endemic Diseases has been set up with headquarters in Baghdad. Steps have already been taken to control malaria and a good deal of information is being assembled on schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and ankylostomiasis. Nevertheless, the main endemic diseases—malaria, schistosomiasis, trachoma, and ankylostomiasis—are still very common.

In 1949 there were 797 doctors practicing in Iraq, of whom 759 419 or 53 percent were in Baghdad. There were about 387 government pharmacies and 252 pharmacists working in private pharmacies in the larger towns.

The doctors are supplemented by 265 health officials, originally trained primarily to staff village dispensaries, and 400 nurses and 659 dressers (male hospital attendants), about one to every four or five hospital beds. There are also private nurses, midwives and dressers, and 130 public vaccinators who are employed on a permanent basis. In 1948 and 1949, 3,061,955 and 2,080,777 smallpox [751] vaccinations were made (the 1947 census showing a total population of 4,799,500).

Malaria, trachoma and bronchitis were the main hospital 164 cases; the dysenteries, anemias, wounds, syphilis and phthisis were 757

164 767 also frequent causes for hospitalization. In 1949 there were 5,876, 336 visits ~~to health institutions~~ for treatment.

Public Health Budget

● 744 662 164 In 1951-52, ID 2,089,180 (7.6 percent of the total budget) were allocated to health services, as compared to ID 187,672 in 1931. Because of the prevalence of endemic diseases and the constant danger of epidemics, it would not be unreasonable to spend 10 percent of the total budget on health services.

759 Salaries ~~for~~ personnel in the medical service appear to be low in relation to the cost of living, although they are not low compared to other civil service salaries. The basic salaries, exclusive of cost-of-living allowances, range from ID 5.15 a month for a dresser, to ID 25 for a doctor and ID 80 for a director-general.

Current Health Conditions

165 In spite of the undeniable progress in health conditions, there is need for further improvement. Definitive data are lacking on total birth and death rates, but some figures are available on the infant mortality rate, which is probably the best index of the social circumstances of an area. For Baghdad, the recorded rate in 1949 was 128 deaths per thousand births. Iraqi doctors who have worked in different parts of the country consider the rate to be about 250 per thousand, on the average, compared with about 34 deaths per thousand live births in highly developed countries.

164 Among the people as a whole, malaria seems to be the chief killer, especially in country districts. In the main cities the leading causes of deaths were intestinal diseases, tuberculosis and respiratory diseases. These diseases and trachoma seriously affect the ability of men and women to work efficiently and are among the major causes of low productivity of labor in Iraq. For example, candidates for the police service are frequently rejected because of defective eyesight and what is characterized as "poor physique" associated with chronic malaria, schistosomiasis, etc. About 20 percent of the young men liable for military service are found to be unfit.

Heart trouble, cancer and other organic disturbances are far outnumbered by diseases which are essentially social in origin. Most of them can be traced to lack of hygiene, poor sanitation and

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monoton- 164
ous diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744 ●
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the
highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

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Pharmacists are licensed by the Director General of Health. 278
An Inspector of Pharmacies inspects private pharmacies, although 744
it would appear reasonable to place the supervision of these pharmacies more directly under the local chief medical officer.

Certain drugs, such as the anti-biotics and sulphonamides, are 278
supplied in most countries only on a doctor's prescription. In Iraq, however, these drugs can be freely obtained at any pharmacy. Hospitals at times suffer from a shortage of drugs owing to the limited funds made available by the government. Thus patients admitted to hospitals sometimes have had to buy drugs for themselves from pharmacies in the towns. It is to be hoped that future budgetary provisions will be sufficient to supply hospitals with the drugs necessary for their work.

Under the present system, local hospitals send their requisitions to the Director General of Health, through the chief medical officer of the province. These requisitions are scrutinized by the Director of Supplies, who passes them on to the Director General of Health for authority to issue the supplies required. The issues are then made direct to the hospital concerned. It seems that most medical supplies—although by no means all—are purchased from the Crown Agents of the British Government. The central supplies are kept in Baghdad in what seems to be an orderly and well-run department. There is at present some congestion in the drugs and dressings section, and new buildings are required to provide adequate space for the many items stocked.

Because Iraq is a country of great distances with many 758
scattered villages and hamlets, during certain seasons of the year small communities may be cut off from medical aid by snow, rain and mud. It is not possible to place hospitals and dispensaries within easy and certain reach of all people throughout the year. There are, however, many simple household remedies such as the anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, DDT powder, iodine and Epsom salts that could be put up in suitable packages with full directions for use. It is suggested that the government package such remedies for sale in village shops at a price within reach of the local people.

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III. The Preventive Services

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While the curative services have developed rapidly, measures for the prevention of disease and the promotion of good health have not kept pace. There is a general appreciation among doctors—both senior and junior—as well as among responsible laymen that the time has come when greater emphasis should be placed on the need for preventive medicine and public health measures. However, there are as yet no Iraqi doctors who have received the special training necessary and who have had the opportunity to gain the experience required to organize and develop these services.

Although public health, as a subject, has been taught in the Royal Faculty of Medicine, there has apparently always been a leaning towards clinical medicine. Present conditions in the medical service do not encourage doctors to devote themselves to public health work. The low salaries paid and the permission to practice privately after government working hours encourage doctors to favor clinical medicine and to specialize if possible. Consequently the villages have been neglected and there is keen competition to work in the larger cities. A recent reorganization in the Ministry of Social Affairs, setting up special divisions for public health and social services in the towns and villages, was designed to promote and develop preventive measures. The first requirement, however, is a trained staff to carry out the work.

Among the measures which might be taken to strengthen the preventive services the following should be emphasized.

Organization of a Sanitation Corps

At present the health inspectors of towns are essentially sanitation orderlies who have learned something by apprenticeship and experience. Many of them work in hospitals to the detriment of the sanitation and public health side of their work. For the future Iraq needs three types of sanitation officers: house-to-house inspectors, sanitation overseers and sanitation inspectors. The sanitary condition of the towns is likely to remain unsatisfactory until some form of house-to-house inspection can be started, aimed chiefly at the prevention of mosquito and fly breeding and the 744 cleaning up of conspicuously unsanitary conditions.

House-to-house inspectors are necessary only in towns with a population of over 25,000, which means some 250 inspectors would be required. The 134 health inspectors already employed could form the nucleus of this group and it should not be difficult to find recruits with at least elementary school training.

The *sanitation overseers* would supervise the work of the house-to-house group and would also undertake a wider range of sanitary inspection, including restaurants, foodstuffs supplies, etc. Probably 100 overseers would be enough, and a one-year course should be sufficient to train men for the job. Candidates for training should be drawn, as far as possible, from the ranks of the house-to-house inspectors.

A number of *sanitation inspectors,* about 50 in all, would be required to take charge of districts, to supervise the work of sanitation overseers and the house-to-house inspectors, and to advise on all matters concerned with environmental hygiene in their districts. Candidates for this job would need a sound, general education (i.e. completion of the full intermediate school course) and would require not less than two years of training which would include practical sanitation work of all sorts. Training schools for these inspectors should be set up by a foreign sanitation expert, preferably one with knowledge of and experience in the Middle East. Some buildings will also be necessary, at an estimated capital cost of about ID 10,000.[2]

Training of Midwives

Midwives, who by the nature of their work have free entry 844 into village homes, are among the most important potential health workers. It is they who can give acceptable advice in the home and consequently they could do a great deal to improve health conditions in the villages. Although 803 midwives are licensed to practice, scarcely any of them in either cities or villages have

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[2] The recurrent cost of operating the school would be about ID 2,000 yearly. The recurrent cost of the sanitation service when fully organized might be approximately ID 75,000 annually.

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cal assistant) treat simple conditions—and he could well treat 743
cases of most of the major endemic diseases—but he should also be the village "sanitarian". The village midwives should be based at the health center and draw their supplies there. Vaccination against smallpox—of prime importance in Iraq—and other protective innoculations could, as required, be carried out in the centers. Later, public health nurses could be added to the center staffs.

The number of health centers must necessarily depend, among other things, upon local population density, distances and means of communication. Visiting doctors from the hospital to which the center is attached could call at regular intervals to see special cases referred to them by the health official. By such means as these, medical assistance and advice could be brought within reach of most of the people and the best use be made of the doctor's services. At present the district or *qadha* doctors have no means [758]
of transport to visit dispensaries.

The additional health officials who would staff these centers could be selected from among the hospital dressers. Since these men have already had considerable clinical experience, it should be possible to train them in about a year. Because they are much closer to the village people than the visiting doctors, they can do a great deal to help the local people. One Iraqi doctor stated that an experienced and happy health official can do better work in a village than an unhappy and disgruntled newly-qualified doctor.

There are about 400 dispensaries at present, some of which are staffed only by dressers. Assuming 20 medical assistants can be trained annually, it should be possible to staff all the present dispensaries and 200 new ones with medical assistants in less than 20 years. The buildings and staff now used by the School for Health Officials (founded in 1932) could equally well be used as a training school for medical assistants.

Training of Public Health Nurses

As soon as some midwives have been trained, a program 744
should be started for the training of public health nurses. These women would hold positions of considerable responsibility, and every candidate for the course should already be a trained nurse and a midwife.

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The most important links with the people are, of course, those who belong to them and who work among them: that is, the dispensary *medical assistants* and *midwives* in villages and the midwives and public health nurses in the towns. *Maternal and child welfare centers* in towns could also provide health education. There are already a few centers operating in Baghdad but there is a great need to open more centers throughout the country as soon as trained staff are available. The proposed house-to-house inspectors, sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors could all be most valuable teachers.

There is no doubt that *health weeks* would stimulate great interest and health exhibits could be included in agricultural and other shows (e.g. to display measures designed to prevent the spread of malaria, schistosomiasis, etc.). Travelling vans giving film shows might also be of some use.

Elected *public health committees* of the village elders, advised by the medical assistant or visiting doctor, might do much to improve conditions in villages. *Mobile dispensaries* should include in their staff a sanitary inspector and a health visitor (public health nurse) who could go round the village while the doctor is seeing patients.

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It should be noted that the government plans to inaugurate a rural health center at Abu Ghuraib, which is designed to provide curative and preventive services for the population of the area and at the same time serve as a practical field for training rural health workers, with particular emphasis on the control of communicable diseases and maternal and child health. It has requested advice from the World Health Organization on the planning and establishment of the center. Accordingly, in 1950, provision was made under the technical assistance budget of the World Health Organization for a rural health survey. Provision has been made under the 1952 technical assistance budget for one public health administrator with general experience in rural health, one epidemiologist, one sanitarian, and two public health nurses, one with general experience and one with the experience in midwifery. It is expected that the government will submit a request to UNICEF for appropriate supplies and equipment. At a later stage the program may be developed in cooperation with other specialized agencies.

IV. Endemic Disease Prevention

One of the most important sectors of the entire public health program should be a well-planned attack on the leading endemic diseases, e.g. schistosomiasis, malaria and ankylostomiasis. 744

The need for better housing, sewage disposal systems and safe water supplies has already been mentioned. Measures to accomplish these improvements are discussed in detail in Annex H, on *Community Planning and Facilities.*

Schistosomiasis

It is clear from available records that at present relatively few persons suffering from schistosomiasis receive treatment. The Schistosomiasis Section of the Endemic Diseases Institute has carried out a survey which shows that the disease does not occur south of Basra and that, north of Basra, after reaching a peak in the Lakes Area, its incidence declines steadily up to the Kurdish mountains, where the disease does not occur at all. In Basra province the incidence reaches 23 percent, in Amara province 67 percent and in Baghdad province 35 percent. 164

Apart from its debilitating effects, the disease is complicated in a number of cases by bladder stones and calcification of the bladder. Associated as it commonly is with attacks of malaria and infestation with hookworms, schistosomiasis is of profound economic significance since it lowers the individual's capacity for work and his ability to overcome intercurrent infections.

The intermediate host is a snail which lives in stagnant water. Irrigation therefore provides conditions which may cause an increase in the prevalence of the disease, as has been shown in Egypt where schistosomiasis is a major public health problem. Investigations made up to the present indicate that the only fresh water snail which carries the disease in Iraq is the *Bulinus truncatus.* It does not appear to occur in either the Euphrates or the Tigris, or in streams in which water flows at a rate of three or more miles an hour. The cold winter weather inhibits the snail's activity and it is able to multiply freely only during the months of June and July.

164 Spread of the disease[1] may be limited by:

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1. Destruction of the snail through the use of copper sulphate (or other compounds) and the elimination of stagnant water. The rapid lowering of water levels will also destroy the snail by desiccation, and in irrigation canals a free flow of water makes conditions unsuitable for the snail.
2. Prevention of infection of the snail by the human host. This can be effected by treating the human carriers and by preventing the pollution of water.

In new irrigation projects it is strongly recommended that steps be taken:

1. To design major canals so that they maintain a flow of three miles an hour or more and minor distributory canals so that they dry out rapidly.
2. To site villages and canals, wherever possible, at a distance not less than a mile apart.
3. To provide villages with a separate, protected water supply so that water is not drawn by the inhabitants direct from canals. Where the underground water is unfit for use, water could be drawn from the closest canal by pipe and be passed through a simple filter. The filtered water (it could in some cases by chlorinated) could then be raised by "hydrohoist" or by semi-rotary pump into a gravity tank—if so required. Another important measure would be the installation of village baths.
4. To provide suitable village latrines, some of which should be on the side of the village towards the canal. Experiments should be made to test the feasibility of using pit or bore hole latrines. Public water supplies, baths, and latrines require, of course, attendants to keep them in order. Householders should install their own latrines.
5. To examine, as far as possible, the people who will live and work in the project. If necessary, they should be treated for schistosomiasis before irrigation begins.
6. To treat the canals and all collections of water that harbor the snail with copper sulphate twice a year.
7. To examine annually representative groups such as school children to determine whether the measures taken are effective.
8. To educate the people not to foul water and to promulgate regulations to provide for the protection of water from pollution.

[1] [SCHISTOSOMIASIS -- ANALYST.]

Shitwi (winter) cultivation is, on account of the low temperature, far less likely to spread schistosomiasis than *saifi* (summer) cultivation. In considering any expansion of summer cultivation, therefore, the attendant health hazards should be carefully considered. 164 744

To carry out mass treatment of the people an expansion of the dispensary system is necessary together with the provision of mobile dispensaries. Initially four of these mobile dispensaries might be put into operation in the provinces having the highest incidence of schistosomiasis. The cost of each, including three motor vehicles, tents, 20 beds and supplies, would probably not exceed ID 5,000. In addition, an increase is required in the number of vehicles available to the Endemic Diseases Institute and provision must be made for an adequate and constant supply of copper salts.

Malaria

There can be no doubt that irrigation has been associated with a considerable increase in the malaria of the plains. Gravity or flow irrigation may lead to flooding of land or to seepage due to the faulty construction of canal banks. Water is precious where irrigation is carried out by lift and is not commonly wasted; consequently, flooding of land is rare. A third form of irrigation employed—namely that by natural inundation—is only seasonal. 164

Much work has been done in the Endemic Diseases Institute on studies of malaria in Iraq and also on the bionomics of the chief vectors of the disease. It has been discovered that in the North the mosquito *A. sacharovi* is associated with high endemicity. It breeds mostly in seepage water, open pools and in rice cultivation, and appears to be associated with sharp outbreaks of malaria when it descends occasionally into the plains. [742]

In the South and spreading as far north as 34°N., *A. stephensi* breeds in similar conditions to those in which *A. sacharovi* develops in the North; it favors particularly water in small borrow pits, seepage water and the small irrigation channels of the date palm gardens. The *A. stephensi* mosquito is generally found in those areas where the level of the subsoil water is high. It is a highly efficient carrier of malaria and used to be found in the houses of Baghdad during the summer.

164 744 Control measures[1] include larvicidal treatment and the residual spraying of dwelling houses for the destruction of adult mosquitoes. In Basra, weeding of the small irrigation channels in the date gardens to promote the free flow of water is followed by the application of one percent DDT in oil and also by the spraying of the scattered huts at the fringe of the town. After the British Army left Iraq, there was a gradual but progressive relaxation of control measures which, coupled with the high river flood, culminated in a sharp outbreak in 1946. Spleen rates rose to 90 percent in some parts of the town but have since fallen rapidly with the reinstitution of control measures.

Measures designed to reduce the incidence of malaria include the following:

1. Expansion and extension of present control measures to insure:
   - (a) An ample and constant supply of the various forms of DDT required.
   - (b) An increase in the number of motor vehicles available to the Endemic Diseases Institute for its work.
   - (c) An increase in special technical staff as rapidly as personnel can be trained.
2. Drainage in those areas where the level of the subsoil water is high in order to lower the level. Every proposed drainage scheme must, however, be carefully examined and judged on its merits. The drainage of established swamps is not likely to reduce the incidence of malaria; indeed, it may even increase it by providing suitable breeding places for dangerous mosquitos in drains. Amara province, for example, has extensive swamps but the mosquito breeding in them is predominantly the harmless *A. pulcherrimus* and the incidence of malaria is not high.
3. Expansion and extension of the village dispensary system, including mobile and movable dispensaries, to make treatment more freely available to the sick. The sale of antimalarial drugs in village shops would also help those living in hamlets remote from hospital and dispensary.
4. The approval of every new proposed irrigation scheme however large or small and whether government or private, by both the local and central medical authorities.
5. Comprehensive legislation, with effective means to enforce it, to insure the absence from irrigation schemes of conditions prejudicial to health.

[1] [AGAINST MALARIA -- ANALYST.]

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6. Well-trained sanitary staff in sufficient numbers to keep up a continuous inspection of irrigation schemes.
7. Recognition by officials of the Irrigation and Agriculture Departments of those conditions falling within the sphere of their own work that are prejudicial to health. They should also know how to remedy such conditions.
8. Cooperation of various departments. It is of primary importance that irrigation schemes be submitted for approval by the provincial administrative council, on which sits the chief medical officer.
9. The introduction of different crops or new methods of cultivation of existing crops which might have profound effects on the incidence of malaria. Possible examples are the substitution of potatoes for rice or the cultivation of "dry land" rice in the northern mountainous area.

It is understood that the government has sought advice from the World Health Organization on malaria control and that provision has been made under the technical assistance budget for one malariologist, one entomologist and one sanitation expert. The work is timed to begin in the second half of 1951 and to continue throughout 1952.

Ankylostomiasis

A good deal of work has been done in recent years to ascertain the prevalence and effects of hookworm disease. Improvements in sewage disposal, the closing of open drains, the provision of suitable latrines and the wearing of shoes are all measures that will assist in reducing the incidence of hookworm disease. Until such permanent improvements can be effected, much can be done by making treatment more freely available through extension of the village dispensary system and special treatment teams in mobile or movable dispensaries. These treatment teams should also undertake simple treatment for other conditions, especially schistosomiasis.

V. Organization of Health Services

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It is most important that a properly organized program should be established to carry out the suggested medical services and preventive health measures.

The existing organization for the health services is highly centralized—first within the Ministry of Social Affairs in Baghdad, then in the hands of the Chief Medical Officers of each province. The whole system appears to be too rigid throughout, without sufficient delegation of responsibility and without enough consultation among departments of the Ministry or with those of other Ministries. Certain medical problems (e.g. health in irrigation schemes, nutrition, etc.) concern other ministries or departments (irrigation, agriculture, education, etc.). To be really effective, boards or committees should include representatives of all groups concerned.

There is no general board of public health but there are various committees with different functions. The Director General of Health is responsible for the licensing of private practitioners and pharmacists, and he has a committee to assist him. But it is the Minister who sets up a committee to consider disciplinary Cases brought against practitioners or pharmacists by the Director General of Health. There is also a committee consisting of three Directors General and two other members nominated by the Minister who act in an advisory capacity to the Minister. It would be reasonable to expect the Directors General to be given wide powers without need for frequent reference to the Minister.

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The health services have been repeatedly reorganized. The latest reorganization still does not appear to have defined very clearly the principal lines of responsibility. The Director General of Health is to be largely responsible for the curative services; a Director General of Health Affairs, for the public health services of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk, for the mobile dispensaries, and for health projects in cities, villages, and the countryside; and a Director General of Social Services, for the supervision of the administration of the institutions for the disabled and the blind, supervision of reformatories and health conditions in prisons and

for the promotion of 'social centers'. It is understood he will also 744 647
"take an interest" in the numerous voluntary societies that undertake work of a social and medical nature. 732 747

While this organization does not seem satisfactory, no alternative can be suggested at the moment without further study. The 744 647
Mission would recommend that a foreign public health administrator be appointed to advise the Minister of Social Affairs on the organization and further development of the health services. His appointment, incidentally, would enable the Professor of Preventive Medicine in the Royal Faculty of Medicine, who is at present also acting as adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs, to devote his full time to teaching and research.

The public health administrator should have had wide experience in the Middle East or in a tropical or sub-tropical country. He should have a good knowledge of the English language. To assist him he will require the services on temporary appointment of a foreign epidemiologist and a public health or sanitary engineer. The epidemiologist would undertake a study of the most prevalent diseases and recommend the best methods of attacking them. The public health engineer should have had considerable experience, preferably in a state medical service in a tropical or sub-tropical country, and be able to speak English. He would advise on measures to be taken to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene throughout Iraq and assist, if necessary, in teaching at the Royal Faculty of Medicine.

The public health administrator would require sufficient and suitable transport for himself and his staff; he would also need adequate office accommodation and office staff for himself and his own expert staff (epidemiologist and public health engineer). He should have at all times direct access to the Minister of Social Affairs.

As a result of the studies made by this team of advisers, it may be possible to give the organization of the health services a clearer focus. In any such scheme the preventive aspects of public health will need to be featured much more prominently. Although the borderline between curative and prophylactic measures may not always be clear, it may prove feasible to have one division responsible for all the services primarily curative

and another division responsible for those characterized as principally preventive.

Meanwhile one important improvement could be effected by delegating more responsibility to the chief medical officer in each province and enabling him to devote his entire time to his public duties. The chief medical officer is responsible for all medical work, both preventive and curative, within the boundaries of the province. As such, his main duties should be to inspect the health institutions, to appraise the state of public health and to guide, advise and encourage his subordinate staff. To carry out this task effectively he needs to devote his full time to the job and should be free to travel freely about the province. At present, however, the chief medical officer usually has a private practice on the side. Without means of transportation at his disposal and, in fact, unable to travel without express permission from the Director General, he seldom leaves his headquarters. It is strongly recommended that these officers be paid salaries commensurate with their responsibilities and the importance of their post. Further, they should be provided with suitable transport and be required to submit a monthly report on the inspection work undertaken throughout the province. When necessary, a director (or medical superintendent) should be appointed to the hospital of the chief town of the province to free the chief medical officer for general inspection of all medical facilities under his direction. Similarly, doctors in charge of districts or *qadhas* should be provided with suitable transport to enable them to visit the dispensaries in their area. In certain districts they should also be provided with suitable housing.

It should be remembered, however, that without qualified personnel no reorganization, no matter how effective on paper, will succeed. In the health service, as in many other branches of the administration, conditions of employment must be considerably improved, particularly outside of Baghdad. Unless adequate salaries and accommodations are provided for the health services staff, doctors and trained personnel will continue to prefer private practice and specialized work in Baghdad and other cities.

177 try rather than fostering the development of something indigenous and natural. Under such a system the enforcement of law may become of necessity very mechanical, as when an Indian Sepoy nearly knocks down an inoffensive Arab pedestrian by a blow with his fist for no greater crime than walking on the wrong side of the road to avoid a mud puddle. In the courts, too, a crowd of lawyers and an abundance of red tape, with venal underlings, may serve to make the paths of justice tortuous and uncertain in spite of the best intentions on the part of the presiding judge.

185 Nevertheless, even under such handicaps as those we
177 have indicated, there is no questioning the very great
material progress that is to be seen in Mesopotamia.
[363] Even before the war one of Baghdad's streets was paved,
and since the British have taken over the administration
of the kingdom, all sorts of improvements have been introduced.
[496] The railroad system of the country now extends
360 miles from Basra to Baghdad and from there
on nearly to Mosul. There are several subsidiary lines,
the total amounting to over 1000 miles. By far the
greater part of this mileage was constructed by the British
[312] for war purposes. Under British rule, also, the Hindiya
Barrage and other less important irrigation works
have been kept in order and improved and extensive harbor
improvements at Basra undertaken.

364 British sanitary and health officers have been appointed
744 for Mesopotamia and no praise is too high for
their largely unappreciated but nevertheless unselfish and
extremely efficient labors in that country. The hospital
work that has been undertaken in Basra, Baghdad and
Amara, the inspection of eating houses, and the maintaining
of sanitary conditions have been excellently done.

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x871 647 The Educational Missions Section has charge of the affairs of students selected for study abroad at government expense and keeps records of all students who study abroad at their own expense.

744 The Medicine and Hygiene Section[1] safeguards the health of the school children. It inspects school buildings, conducts regular health examinations of pupils, treats those who suffer from diseases, trains teachers in first aid and simple treatments, propagates health information, and supplies schools with drugs and first-aid materials. In addition, it gives physical examinations at government expense to all teachers and officials entering the service of the Ministry of Education and all students entering the various schools and colleges. This section has set itself the task of fighting the three endemic diseases—trachoma, malaria, and bilharziasis—prevalent among school children. In 1943–44, 67,415 pupils out of the total public-school registration of 104,359 were examined; and of those examined, 16,599 were found to have trachoma, while 3,253 suffered other eye diseases; 5,864 had malaria, and 1,299 had bilharziasis. Treatment of those afflicted with bilharziasis resulted in steady improvement. The fight against trachoma has proceeded systematically, and the percentage of school children suffering from it is being reduced. Much effort has been expended on the campaign against malaria in all the provinces. The Medicine and Hygiene Section began very humbly in 1931 with the appointment of one doctor. By 1942–43 it had twenty-one doctors, two dentists, ten women nurses for the provinces, and more than seventy other health workers. In 1943–44 it maintained twenty-nine clinics throughout the country, and more recently a special hospital for students was established in Baghdad. Treatment at the clinics and at the hospital is free.

PROVINCIAL DIRECTORS OF EDUCATION

x871 635 There is a provincial director of education for each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq. He is responsible to the Director General for the proper functioning of all schools and educational institutions in his province with the exception of teacher-training colleges, some of the vocational and special schools, and higher institutions; these exceptions are the direct concern of the central office of the Ministry. It is the function of the provincial director to make sure that teaching in the schools within his jurisdiction is in accordance with accepted syllabuses, to supervise the behavior of teachers and education officers in his province, and to carry out instructions of the Director General. The regulations of 1945 provide for provincial advisory education councils under the chairmanship of the governor and with the director of education as secretary. These councils

[1] -[Of the Ministry of Education... Analyst]

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946) 1949 M1 Middle East
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values and invalid cooking, theoretical and practical nursing and first aid; for the second and third years, anatomy, physiology, elementary science, gynecology, surgery and medicine, and theoretical and practical nursing. Specialization in midwifery requires an additional year of study. 874x

THE SCHOOL OF HEALTH OFFICIALS

The School of Health Officials was established to relieve the pressing [744] need for medical service. Graduates of intermediate schools are enrolled in a two-year course, at the end of which they are given nine months of practical experience in a government dispensary or clinic. Thus trained, health officials may be assigned to assist medical officers or be sent to outlying villages to work under the supervision of a district medical officer. They are considered to be qualified in first aid, minor surgery, and diagnosis and treatment of common diseases. On independent duty they are placed in charge of government dispensaries where treatment is free. They are responsible for the collection and reporting of data on diseases and health conditions.

No tuition fees are charged, since the student agrees to work for four years in the government health service, but in the absence of boarding facilities the student must pay for all living expenses. His salary in his first appointment is eight dinars ($32) a month, but it has been recommended that this be increased to 10 dinars ($40) after one year of practice. In 1945–46 there were 28 students in the first-year class and 26 in the second. The second-year class of that year was the first for which completion of the nine-month practice training was required.

The first-year students study inorganic and organic chemistry, materia medica, public health, bacteriology, anatomy, internal diseases (general), surgery (general), nursing, and English. In the first half of the second year they study dispensing, medical accounting, public health, skin and venereal diseases, materia medica, dentistry, endemic diseases, the ear, nose, and throat, ophthalmology, internal diseases (special), surgery (special), English, and health laws. The second half of the year is spent in practical study in the various clinics of the hospital. Having fulfilled all requirements mentioned, the student receives the Certificate of Health Official. It has been recommended that this certificate should be rated with that of the secondary school for purposes of admission to the School of Pharmacy and the College of Medicine. It is assumed that the School of Health Officials will be discontinued when Iraq has sufficient fully qualified doctors to answer all needs. However, at the present time doctors avoid village practice because of the unsatisfactory living conditions

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of the city, except in some of the poorer dis- 312
tricts, where community taps are installed. 364
The construction of additional plants for the treatment of the water supplies in the surrounding towns was planned in 1952.

At Basra, the water supply for the 3 townships and some of the adjacent villages is taken from the Shatt al Arab. It is treated by filtration and chlorination at Jubailah before distribution to suitably located storage tanks, from which it is piped to individual houses and community taps. The municipal supply of Mosul is derived from the Tigris River and treated by filtration and chlorination. River supplies are utilized by the capital cities of all the provinces, except Erbil and Sulaimaniya, on the northeastern border, where adequate spring sources are available. Treated water is furnished by the Iraq Petroleum Company to its installations in the vicinity of Kirkuk, and a portion of the supply is delivered by the company to the municipality. In the various cities the drinking water supplies are supervised by the municipal au-
thorities. Bacteriologic examinations are [744]
made periodically in the laboratories of the government health services. No control is exercised over the smaller supplies, however, except when gross pollution is suspected.

The waters of the Tigris and the Eu- 312
phrates rivers have been utilized for irrigation for centuries, and the existing ruins appear to indicate that the ancient systems were more extensive than those in use today. Pumps and more primitive types of lift irrigation predominate, but other methods are employed along the course of the rivers, including tidal flow irrigation on the Shatt al Arab and free flow irrigation in the lower delta. In the northern provinces, local irrigation systems, fed from underground conduits which tap springs in the foothills and are connected by series of wells, are found in many areas. These *karez* are comparable with the *qanats* of northern Iran.

Several large-scale projects have been undertaken for the purpose of regulating

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southern provinces and has been held re- 136
sponsible for sporadic outbreaks of dengue 164
fever. It is also a potential vector of urban
yellow fever, although that disease is not
reported from this region. Many varieties
of Culex mosquitoes have been recorded,
but none has been specifically implicated in
the transmission of disease. *Culex quinque-*
fasciatus (= *C. fatigans*) or *C. pipiens*
(each a potential vector of *Wuchereria*
bancrofti) is present in most areas.

Within recent years extensive mosquito 744
control work has been undertaken by mu- 136
nicipal and government authorities, by the 312
oil companies and, during World War II,
by the British Expeditionary Forces. The
problem is stupendous, involving the im-
provement and the regulation of the irriga-
tion facilities on which the agricultural
economy of the country depends. In 1947, 744
malaria control was first attempted on a 164
nation-wide basis with the creation of an
antimalaria service within the Iraqi health
organization. Since that date, control opera-
tions have been carried on in various highly
endemic areas. Depending upon local condi-
tions, they have included antilarval meas-
ures, drainage works and residual spraying
of the rural villages with DDT prepara-
tions. In 1952, a demonstration DDT house-
spraying program was initiated in the
hyperendemic Tanjero Valley of Sulaima-
niya *liwa* (province), in conjunction with
the World Health Organization.

FLIES. Flies are prevalent in all parts of 136
the country. Numerous species of MUSCIDAE 164
are encountered, many of which are impli-
cated in the mechanical transmission of
intestinal and eye diseases. ***Musca sorbens***
and ***M. domestica vicina*** are most fre-
quently incriminated, but ***M. tempestiva,***
M. vitripennis and ***M. mesopotamiensis*** are
also abundant. The larvae of ***Fannia canicu-*** 136
laris sometimes cause myiasis in the live- 232
stock. The stable fly, ***Stomoxys calcitrans,*** 164
is almost ubiquitous. At least 22 species of
Tabanus are recorded, and many local au-
thorities believe that they are involved in
the mechanical transmission of anthrax.

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ous sea snake, *Enhydrina shistosa*, roams 136
the Persian Gulf and the Shatt al Arab. 752
Although it may be dangerous to fishermen, 165
no fatalities are known to have occurred.

Rodents. *Rattus rattus frugivorus* is the 136
rat most frequently encountered in Iraqi 164
dwellings. *R. rattus alexandrinus* is also indigenous, while *R. norvegicus* is present in Basra, Baghdad and the river towns. *Nesokia buxtoni*, *Dipodillus dasyurus* and *Meriones charion* are reported from different localities. Rats are often captured in Baghdad and Basra and examined for evidences of plague, but otherwise little rodent control work is undertaken, except at the time of plague outbreaks.

Mollusks.* *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), the intermediate snail host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, is found in numerous foci in central and southern Iraq, where pump or gravity flow irrigation is employed. It inhabits the many small and sluggish irrigation canals and the rice fields, borrow pits, marshes and other suitable collections of water, but is strictly seasonal in appearance, being abundant only in the summer and the fall months, from May or June to November. The snails are widespread in Basra, Muntafiq, Diwaniya and Amarah provinces in the south, but are absent from the Shatt al Arab region south of Basra, where breeding is restricted by the salinity of the water. They are more scattered in distribution in the central provinces and practically nonexistent in the north, aside from localized foci around the
marshlands of the Mosul area. *Radix lagotis* 136
canaliculata, a vector of *S. turkestanicum* 232
which causes serious infections among the livestock, is found in the rice fields and the marshes of the southern delta.

The threat of the spread of *Bulinus trun-* 136
catus, and subsequently of schistosomiasis, 164
with the expansion of irrigation creates a 744
problem which is of major public health and economic importance to the country. Small-scale snail-control campaigns have been undertaken in the past in Baghdad, Basra and

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* See footnote, page 10.

Diwaniya provinces. In 1949, a co-ordinated 136
control program was introduced by the 164
Iraqi government, and a Bilharzia Section 744
was established within the national health organization. The section initiated a snail survey in the various endemic foci and research on the most effective methods of snail control. It carries on continuous snail destruction work through special units assigned to each of the infected provinces.

Plants. Little precise information is 137
available regarding the prevalence of 752
allergy-producing plants, but numerous weeds, grasses and trees, which have been incriminated in other countries, are present in districts with rainfall adequate to support such vegetation.

Occasional deaths, primarily among 137
young children, have been traced to the 165
consumption of the raw beans of *Vicia fava*, 232
a prominent food crop throughout this region. The beans are toxic to susceptible individuals in the raw state. Plants of the *Senecio* group grow in sections of the northern highlands. The young green shoots are poisonous and sometimes cause fatalities among the livestock.

FOOD SANITATION

The government and municipal health au- 744
thorities are responsible for the enforcement of regulations governing the sanitary quality of foods, meats and milk products, but the degree of enforcement varies in different localities. Health inspectors are charged with the supervision of establishments where foods are prepared or sold, such as foodshops, markets, restaurants and cafés, mineral-water bottling works and date-packing houses. Examinations for the presence of venereal diseases are theoretically required at regular intervals in the case of cooks and barbers, but no tests to detect other infections are carried out.

Meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter in the city abattoirs by officers of the government veterinary and health services. All carcasses offered for sale are supposed to bear an official stamp of

744 approval, but illegal slaughtering takes
place in many areas. No effective control
is carried out in the rural villages, where
the animals are slaughtered locally.

234 Milk from cows and goats is marketed by
744 large numbers of small producers. Govern-
ment regulations exist for the sanitary in-
spection of dairies and the periodic tuber-
culin testing of cattle. In practice, however,
few controls are exercised over the methods
of production or the quality of the product.
There is only one pasteurization plant in
the country. This is located in Baghdad,
and is operated by the government's Agri-
culture Department. It was established pri-
marily for the purpose of supplying pas-
teurized milk to the child welfare centers,
but a small percentage of its output is sold
234 to private customers. Milk is customarily
164 boiled before use, but butter and cheese
232 are often vehicles for the spread of brucel-
losis and other diseases. Brucellosis is
enzootic among the cattle and the goats, and
bovine tuberculosis among the dairy herds.

HEALTH SERVICES AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health Organizations

744 Responsibility for the protection of the
657 public health and for the provision of medi-
cal care facilities is centralized in the Ministry of Health of the Iraqi government, with headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry was established in 1952, replacing the former Directorate General of Health in the Ministry of Social Affairs. Under the present organization, the Minister of Health is assisted by a Director General of Health, in charge of health and medical services, and by an Inspector General of Health. The Minister also has jurisdiction over the Royal Faculty of Medicine which administers the Royal Hospital and the Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad.

The functional activities of the Ministry are concentrated in two major divisions—curative medicine and preventive and social medicine—as well as in a number of adminISTRATIVE BRANCHES.

000 istrative branches. The Director of Curative
744 Medicine has supervision over 4 depart-
657 ments: hospitals, dispensaries and pharma-
743 cies; rural health; technical institutes, including 6 laboratory sections; and medical stores. Under the Director of Preventive and Social Medicine are departments of endemic diseases, sanitation, social health, quarantine and epidemics, vital statistics and disease registration. Subordinate sections dealing with maternal and child health, venereal diseases, pulmonary diseases and health propaganda are incorporated in the Department of Social Health, while supervision over the health services of both the province and the city of Baghdad falls within the scope of the Department of
742 Sanitation. The Department of Endemic Diseases carries on research and field programs for the control of malaria, schistosomiasis and hookworm infection, some of which were initiated by the then Institute of Endemic Diseases, created in 1949. Further changes in organization, making the Director of Preventive and Social Medicine a Director General immediately responsible to the Minister, were proposed in 1953.

746 Subordinate provincial organizations carry out the functions of the Ministry of Health in the 14 *liwas*, or provinces. Chief medical officers are appointed to each *liwa* and are responsible for the conduct of the various medical services. They undertake some public health activities, but, to a large extent, the preventive services are directed from Baghdad. Municipal health divisions are established in Baghdad and the principal cities.

744 Other ministries are also concerned in some measure with the public health. The Ministry of Education operates school health services in Baghdad and the larger urban centers, and introduces instruction in the basic principles of health through the schools in urban and rural areas. The Ministry of Economics has veterinary and agriculture departments: the former has meat and dairy inspection services; the latter runs an experimental farm and a pas-

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teurization plant near Baghdad and seeks to improve the standards of agriculture which should be reflected in better nutrition among the people. The Ministry of Communications and Works maintains health and medical facilities at the port of Basra, and furnishes medical care for railway personnel. 744

Several voluntary agencies carry on health work, usually in co-operation with the Ministry of Health. The Children's Welfare Society conducts an extensive program for the promotion of maternal and child health, and operates welfare centers in Baghdad and the administrative centers of the remaining provinces. The Red Crescent Society supports a child health center in Baghdad, and provides training for girls in first aid and home nursing through branches in Baghdad, Basra, Hilla, Amarah and Kirkuk. The Anti-Tuberculosis Society campaigns against tuberculosis, and contributed toward the erection of a sanatorium, opened in 1951, near Baghdad. The Catholic Nuns Society runs a small general hospital and dispensary, and the Society of Buyout el Umma an ophthalmic hospital and dispensaries in Baghdad. 746 751 743

The Board of Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church of America maintains a medical mission in the Amarah region. It operates a hospital and founded the leper colony, which has since been taken over by the government. The Seventh Day Adventists also have a hospital in Baghdad. The Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company, provide medical and health services for the benefit of their employees. 797 743 [466]

Medical Institutions

Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1950, there were 82 civilian hospitals in Iraq with an aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly over 1 bed per 1,000 population. Of this number, 2,086 beds were located in Baghdad, 534 in Basra and 412 in Mosul provinces. Sixty-seven hospitals, with a 743

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743 466 82 beds for emergency care, and field ambulance services. The Basra Petroleum Company maintained a 15-bed hospital at Basra, a 16-bed hospital at Fao and 12 emergency beds in 2 detention camps. The Mosul Petroleum Company had 10 beds for emergency cases in a camp near its exploration activities.

743 In addition to the regular hospital clinics, 433 dispensaries were scattered throughout the provinces in 1950. Of this number, 403 belonged to the government health services: 145 were staffed by physicians and the remainder by assistant medical personnel. There were also 11 mobile dispensaries, which covered the more remote villages and tribal areas, and 2 floating dispensaries on the river in Basra and Muntafiq provinces. Only 7 tuberculosis dispensaries existed in 1950, but 13 dispensaries, some with facilities for 20 beds, were under construction in the provincial capitals. The Ministry operated 5 ophthalmic dispensaries and 4 "institutes" for the treatment of venereal diseases. A diagnostic and research center was organized in Baghdad in 1950, in connection with the syphilis-bejel control project being conducted under the auspices of the World Health Organization.

743 744 The infant and child welfare centers functioning in 1950 totaled 21, most of which were supported by the Children's Welfare Society. Ten centers were located in the Baghdad region. An expanded maternal and child health program is now being developed by the Ministry of Health. In 1952, it started a demonstration and training project at Samawa, with assistance from the Technical Co-operation Administration of the United States government. Another demonstration center for the training of local medical personnel in the principles of maternal and child health is scheduled to be opened in Baghdad in 1953-54, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The proposed program of the Ministry calls for the crea-

743 tion of rural health centers, each to serve
744 an area of 20,000 to 30,000 population, as
rapidly as adequate staff and funds become
available.

742 **Laboratories.** The central laboratory facilities of the Ministry of Health are concentrated in 6 institutes, all with headquarters in Baghdad. The pathologic and bacteriologic institutes are associated with the Royal College of Medicine, and combine research and teaching with routine laboratory functions. The Institute of Bacteriology consists of a diagnostic section, equipped for the conduct of serologic, bacteriologic and parasitologic examinations, and a vaccine unit for the preparation of typhoid, plague and cholera vaccines. The Institute of Pathology has divisions for the performance of biochemical and pathologic examinations. A third institute merges the former Vaccine Lymph Institute, which manufactures smallpox vaccine for use throughout the country, and the Antirabic Institute, which prepares rabies vaccine and provides treatment and diagnostic services. The Medico-Legal Institute incorporates forensic medicine, anatomy and photographic sections. The Chemical Institute has facilities for the analysis of food, water and milk, and of various agricultural and industrial preparations. An Institute of Roentgenology, with branches in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, furnishes diagnostic and treatment services. The Department of Endemic Diseases operates a diagnostic and research laboratory in Baghdad, in connection with the government's malaria, schistosomiasis and hookworm control programs. Field units are stationed in the northern, the central and the southern provinces.

An Institute of Medical Research is established at the Royal College of Medicine: it includes clinical divisions and pathologic, chemical and biochemical laboratories. A research serologic laboratory is maintained in Baghdad in conjunction with the World Health Organization's syphilis-bejel control program. Clinical laboratory

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were reported in 1923, 1927 and 1931. Since 164
1931, cholera has been almost completely
absent from the country, although one imported case was recorded in 1939, when the
disease was epidemic in Afghanistan and
Iran.

Strict quarantine regulations are enforced, 744
and travelers from India, Pakistan 484
and Ceylon, as well as pilgrims from Mecca, 164
without valid certificates of immunization
against cholera are retained in quarantine
centers for a period of 7 days. Mass im- 751
munization with cholera vaccine is carried 164
on among the populations in the border
provinces whenever epidemics are reported
from the adjacent territories. At the time
of the recent epidemic in Egypt, in 1947,
immunization was compulsory for all travelers
entering the country and for the inhabitants
of towns and villages along the
Syrian frontier.

Helminthiases. SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schis- 164
tosomiasis, caused by *Schistosoma haema-* 136
tobium, has probably been present in the
lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins
since ancient times. It is highly endemic in
the southern and the central provinces,
where the intermediate snail host, *Bulinus
truncatus*, is found in widespread but often
localized foci. The disease is prevalent 164
among the children and among the agricul- 462
tural and other laborers who work in infested
waters, particularly the men and the
boys, who are exposed to infection to a
greater extent than the women. It reaches
maximum proportions between 10 and 20
years of age, but is usually negligible in
early childhood. Transmission is seasonal: 164
it takes place from May to the end of No- 515
vember, but primarily between June and
October, when infected snails are most
abundant. The insanitary customs of the
inhabitants, associated with the frequent
use of the canals for religious ablutions and
the severe summer heat which is conducive
to bathing in any convenient body of water,
are contributory factors. The infection rates 164
average 18 to 25 per cent in the irrigated 361
districts of the delta, but vary from zero

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164 Basra to 75 per cent at Al Qurnah, in the
361 fork between the rivers. In Muntafiq, the
369 mean rate was 47 per cent, and in Diwaniya,
26 per cent, although some districts were heavily infected and others practically free. In central Iraq the disease was more irregular in distribution. In Baghdad *liwa* the infection rates averaged 35 per cent, but approached 80 per cent in some localities. In Kut, the mean was 48 per cent, with a decrease in prevalence toward the Iranian frontier. In Hilla, it was 15 per cent, with variations from 5 to 50 per cent, and in Kerbela, 28 per cent, with variations from 18 to 48 per cent. In the areas studied in Diyala *liwa* it ranged from 28 to 60 per cent, and in Dulaim it approximated 36 per cent. Subsequent surveys have revealed 11 to 18 per cent infection in limited foci near the marshes in Mosul *liwa*.

164 In a survey conducted in Baghdad in
361 1950-51,[87] ova of *S. haematobium* were
369 found in 25 per cent of the urine samples
742 collected from 285 schoolchildren and
in 46 per cent of the samples from 242 inhabitants in hut settlements on the outskirts of the city. The prevalence was around 20 to 25 per cent in the suburbs, but reached 83 per cent in foci along the main road to Teheran.

164 Indigenous cases of *S. mansoni* infection
462 have not been reported, but numerous cases
of rectal involvement with *S. haematobium* have been observed. A dermatitis produced by nonhuman schistosome cercariae is common in the south and is often responsible for considerable disability among the agricultural workers.

164 Schistosomiasis constitutes one of the
462 most important disease problems in Iraq.
312 It is of major public health and economic
744 significance, and the possibility of its spread
with the expansion of irrigation is a matter of considerable concern to the government authorities. An active schistosomiasis control program is carried on by the Bilharzia Section of the Department of Endemic Diseases. This section maintains snail destruction and treatment units in the affected

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164 462 312 744 provinces, and conducts research and field investigations on the distribution and the control of the disease and the intermediate snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from 15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually in government hospitals and dispensaries. 164 758 The disease is considered commonplace in most areas, however, and probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the infected individuals seek treatment under 743 164 ordinary conditions. Since 1949, special dispensaries have been established in Baghdad, Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour the most seriously infected districts. In 1950, there were 11 mobile units for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 361 Ancylostomiasis. Ancylostomiasis is widespread in the irrigated areas, but the exact distribution and severity of the infection in the different provinces are not accurátely known. [134] *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the only species found in the foci studied. The infection rates are generally estimated at 10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces and at 40 per cent in the southern. They are especially high in the Amarah and the Al Q[illegible] regions, but decrease toward the south, and are relatively low in the districts along the Shatt al Arab. 164 742 In a study reported in 1939,[43] fecal specimens from apparently healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from various parts of the country were examined for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was detected in 25 per cent of the specimens from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per cent from 135 men from the rural districts of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per cent of the individuals examined from Diyala *liwa* and from 25 per cent of the individuals from Dulaim. The degree of infection is usually mild, but serious cases with hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent are not infrequent.

164 758 742 Treatment facilities are provided by the schistosomiasis control units, as well as by the government hospitals and dispensaries.

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63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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An ancylostomiasis section is incorporated 164
in the Department of Endemic Diseases, 744 ●
and a program for the improvement of rural sanitation is being developed by the health authorities.

Other Helminth Infections. A large 164
proportion of the inhabitants harbor one or 136
more types of intestinal worms. Ascariasis 742
predominates in the northern and the central provinces. Heavy infections, often with intestinal obstruction, are common. In the studies made on groups of men of 18 to 20 years of age, as indicated above, ova of *Ascaris lumbricoides* were found in the fecal specimens from 10 per cent of the 125 individuals examined in Baghdad city. In the provinces, ova were detected in fecal samples from 9 per cent of 135 persons from Baghdad, from 15 per cent of 145 persons from Dulaim and from 13 per cent of 309 persons from Diyala.

Enterobiasis, trichuriasis and, to a lesser 164
extent, strongyloidiasis are prevalent. *Trichostrongylus*, 136
a parasite of sheep and goats 232
which sometimes infects man, is widely distributed in the Shatt al Arab region. Infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are numerous. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is often encountered, but not as widely as in Syria and other Arab countries where more raw meat is customarily consumed. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is occasionally observed in the Christian communities.

Hydatid disease is endemic, especially in 164
the central provinces. Stray dogs are numerous 136
and serve as primary reservoirs of 232
infection. In a survey published in 1940,[40] 742
adults of *Echinococcus granulosus* were found in 18 per cent of 123 street dogs examined in Baghdad. Hydatid cysts were seen in the carcasses of 12 per cent of 2,347 sheep and goats slaughtered in the municipal abattoir and in 25 per cent of 223 cattle.

Other Infections. Brucellosis is enzootic 164
among goats, sheep and cattle, and sporadic 232
human infections result from the consumption 758
of cheese, *leban* and other unboiled

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164 369 where the infection was introduced by refugees from Amarah and has spread in the *serifa* settlements and the slum sections of the city.

744 164 A syphilis and bejel control program was initiated in 1950 by the government health authorities, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. A dispensary and training center and research laboratories are maintained at the headquarters in Baghdad, while field units conduct surveys and mass treatment campaigns in the provinces. Investigations on the distribution and the relative prevalence of the infection, the significance of possible [753] insect vectors, the most effective methods of treatment and the radiologic and the serologic aspects of the disease are being carried forward by the headquarters and field personnel.

164 758 **Diseases of the Eyes.** Trachoma is widespread, and is regarded by many as one of the most important endemic diseases in the country. The cases treated in government institutions usually average over 164 500,000 a year. The infection rates are uniformly high in the central provinces, and, in 1950, were calculated at over 233 per 1,000 population in Baghdad, 195 in Kerbela, 140 in Diyala and 102 in Hilla *liwas*. In the remaining provinces they ranged from 24 to 70 per 1,000. The density of population and the concentration of medical facilities in central Iraq cast some doubt, however, that such figures are representative of the degree of infection in the different regions. Cases of advanced trachoma are common, while local authorities estimate that 25 to 40 per cent of the children in many districts suffer from some form of the disease. Statistics from the government hospitals and dispensaries for the 15 years from 1929 through 1943 show that 53 per cent of all the eye diseases treated and 26 to 36 per cent of the total infections were trachomatous in origin.

Conjunctivitis, including both infectious and noninfectious types, is almost equally

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63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MN1

to 300 patients in residence. A comprehen- 000
sive leprosy control program is planned for 744
the near future by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization.

Other Infections. Rabies is enzootic 232
among dogs, jackals and other animals. The 164
jackals, the principal reservoir, often invade the villages and the outlying sections of the towns. Human infections occur sporadically: in 1944-49, the recorded cases averaged from 4 to 32 a year. In the same period, from 739 to 1,365 persons were treated annually at the Antirabic Institute in Baghdad. The majority gave a history of having been bitten by rabid dogs. The Insti- [745]
tute also prepares rabies vaccine for distribution throughout the country.

Anthrax is prevalent among the sheep. From 130 to 225 human cases are reported annually among persons in contact with infected animals, or among individuals working with hides or wool. Tetanus is sporadic: the known incidence totals 130 to 250 cases each year. Tetanus neonatorum is common, especially in the rural areas. Cases of human glanders are seen from time to time. Leptospirosis, or Weil's disease, is occasionally encountered in the southern provinces. However, no evidence of infection with *Leptospira icterohaemorrhagiae* has yet been found among the rats captured in Baghdad.

Diseases Spread by Arthropods

Malaria. Malaria is endemic or hyper- 164
endemic throughout most of Iraq. The 361
distribution and the severity of the disease vary with the physiographic features of the different regions and the amount and the type of irrigation. It has always been regarded as a disease of primary importance in the country, but within the last few decades it has become increasingly prominent in the southern provinces due to the expansion of irrigation facilities. The cases 164
of malaria treated in government institutions in the 7 years 1944-50 averaged about 598,800 annually. The case rates in the various provinces, based upon the at-

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seasonal distribution of the different species 361
of malarial parasites. *Plasmodium falciparum* 164
appears to predominate in most localities with a moderate to high rate of endemicity, as well as during epidemics in all parts of the country. *P. vivax* is also widespread. It is often observed in the blood of infected individuals, even in hyperendemic areas, during the nontransmission season, and the local authorities state that it is unusually difficult to eradicate certain strains in the course of treatment. *P. malariae* is reported more or less sporadically. In certain areas in northern Iraq, it is being encountered with increasing frequency, and some evidence exists that it may be found to take the place of *P. vivax* as the principal species concerned with
clinical relapses. Among the 2,865 to 4,281 758
cases of malaria treated annually in the 164
hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq 186
Petroleum Company in 1946 through 1950, from 8 to 53 per cent were identified as *P. vivax* infections, from 0.7 to 7 per cent as *P. falciparum* and up to 8 per cent as *P. malariae*. The remainder were diagnosed on a clinical basis. *P. ovale* was reported recently, but the origin of the infection was obscure. Blackwater fever is rare, although cases are sometimes seen in Basra and in the northern highlands.

Malaria control measures have been car- 744
ried on in limited areas under the auspices 164
of governmental or other agencies. The Department of Endemic Diseases of the Ministry of Health conducts anopheline control and treatment programs in highly endemic areas throughout the country through subordinate units in central, southern and northern Iraq. A rural health and malaria control project was initiated in the hyperendemic Tanjero valley in Sulaimaniya *liwa* in 1952, in co-operation with the World Health Organization.

Rickettsial Infections. Outbreaks of 136
louse-borne typhus recur almost annually, 164
but are seldom extensive, except under abnormal conditions, as during war periods.
The infection is frequently introduced by 880

p. 45(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

THE INFECTION IS FREQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY
means of the pilgrimage traffic or tribal
migrations from the neighboring territories, 164
and is believed to smolder continuously in 484
the northeastern mountain districts. Cases 167
are usually observed during the winter and 164
the spring months, with the maximum incidence
in March and April. Serious outbreaks,
with a total of over 1,300 known
cases, were reported in 1942-43 in conjunction
with epidemics prevailing throughout
the entire Middle East. The actual prevalence
was probably several times the official
estimates. The greatest numbers of cases
were noted in Baghdad, and in Basra,
Mosul, Diyala and Sulaimaniya *liwas*, along
the main routes from Iran. The congestion 164
and the shortage of food, clothing, 722
soaps and other supplies existing in that
area as the result of military operations
during World War II favored the spread
of the infection among the louse-infested
populations. About 800 cases of typhus were 164
reported in 1944, but the annual incidence
subsequently declined to a low of 72 cases
in 1949. No differentiation is made as to
type, and the recorded cases include both
louse-borne and flea-borne infections. On
the basis of laboratory investigations, authorities
at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad
suggest that many outbreaks in the north,
where louse-borne typhus is supposedly endemic,
are caused by strains which are serologically
intermediate between *Rickettsia* [136]
prowazeki and *R. mooseri*.

Murine typhus is endemic, and probably
predominates in the rural areas in the absence
of a large-scale epidemic. Tick-borne
infections are not specifically reported, and
are undoubtedly rare. In the event of a 164
typhus outbreak, control measures, including 744
the use of DDT preparations and mass
immunization of the inhabitants with antityphus
vaccines, are carried on in the affected
communities by the government
health authorities.

Plague. Epidemics of plague were frequent 164
in the past, particularly in the region
around Baghdad, but the disease has been
almost completely absent within recent
YEARS.

p. 45 (B)

000 years. The infection is believed to be en-
164 zootic among the field rodents in sections
133 of the eastern and the southern provinces,
505 since outbreaks have sometimes coincided
with floods which caused the rats to seek
shelter in the villages. It has also been
introduced on occasion by way of steamer
traffic through Basra and the river towns.
164 With the exception of 34 cases, associated
with a localized outbreak in the vicinity of
Amarah in 1945, no instance of human
plague was reported from 1937 through
1952. The 1945 outbreak started in a small
village on the edge of the marshes near
Amarah, in which 16 cases and 4 deaths
were recorded within a period of 20 days.
164 Quarantine measures were enforced by the
744 government health organization and the
Allied military authorities. DDT spraying
was resisted by the inhabitants, who fled
to the marshes, and the most seriously in-
infected village was finally evacuated and
burned to the ground.

In Baghdad and Basra, captured rats are often examined for the presence of plague, but rodent control is not attempted in the various cities and towns unless an epidemic is threatened. Plague-infected rats were found in Baghdad up to 1938.

164 Relapsing Fever. Both louse-borne and tick-borne relapsing fever are sporadic: from 25 to 100 cases are usually reported each year. Small localized outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever occur from time to time, primarily in the northern provinces. More extensive outbreaks were recorded in 1945-47, undoubtedly part of the epidemic wave which swept through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46. According to official statistics, 243 cases were treated in government institutions in 1945, 334 in 1946 and 379 in 1947, in contrast with 52 cases in 1944 and 26 to 33 in 1948-49.

Occasional cases of tick-borne relapsing
fever are encountered in northern Iraq.
[136] *Ornithodorus tholozani* is regarded as the
probable vector.

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329 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis

p. 46 (A)

83:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

SUMMARY

Iraq encompasses the valleys of the 131
Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and is as- 161
sociated historically with Mesopotamia, the 433
home of one of the oldest civilizations on
record. It has been an independent sover-
eign state since 1932. The population, which
was estimated at 4,799,500 in 1947, is 95
per cent Moslem and predominantly Arab.
Extensive petroleum resources and date cul-
tivation contribute to the wealth of the
country, which is still relatively underde-
veloped in other respects. The public health 744
activities of the Iraqi government are cen-
tralized in the Ministry of Health, with
headquarters in Baghdad. The Ministry is
responsible for the maintenance of preven-
tive and curative services, which are carried
out in the provinces through subordinate
provincial organizations. Municipal depart-
ments exist in Baghdad and the principal
cities, but in other areas the enforcement
of sanitary regulations devolves upon the
government officers. In 1950, there were 82 743
civilian hospitals in the country, with an
aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly
more than 1 bed per 1,000 population.
Almost one half of the total beds were lo-
cated in the Baghdad area. Approximately
82 per cent of the hospitals are supported
by the government. Also in 1950, 433 dis-
pensaries were functioning in various parts
of the provinces, 403 under the jurisdiction
of the government health authorities.

The water supplies in the towns and the 312
villages of the alluvial plain are derived
from rivers, canals, lakes and wells; in the
northern highlands, from streams, springs
and wells. All the urban supplies are ob-
tained from rivers, except in Erbil and
Sulaimaniya, where spring sources are util-
ized. The water supplies of the larger cities
are treated, but those in the rural areas are
unprotected and often polluted. There are 364
no sewerage systems. In the cities, cesspits
and septic tanks are employed for the dis-
posal of sewage; in the rural villages, the
means are more primitive. The dietary 800

p. 47(B)

62: I. L. O. S-5 (1947-1950) 1950 MI Middle East

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this pension is reduced in proportion to the degree of incapacity in accordance with a prescribed schedule. Pensions based on the employee's last wages are payable in case of death to the widow (20 per cent.), children (15 to 40 per cent. for one to four or more children) and to parents if no children survive. A burial benefit of up to 20 days of wages is also provided.

Social Welfare Institute

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An Imperial Social Welfare Institute was established by an Order of 22 March 1947 to promote the welfare of the poorer working classes of Iran. The Institute depends on voluntary contributions for its support. Among other activities, it has set up dispensaries in different parts of the country, surgical clinics, a nursing school and relief offices for needy mothers and children and tuberculous persons.

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There is no scheme of social insurance in Iraq, but its Labour Act (Act No. 72 of 25 April 1936, amended by Act No. 36 of 13 May 1942) fixes the liability of individual employers for payment of compensation in case of employment injury. Employers may insure this liability with a commercial insurer. The provisions apply to wage earners in industrial undertakings, including factories, mines, construction and transport. Foreign workers and their dependants are guaranteed the same treatment in respect of compensation as that received by Iraqi workers, provided such foreign workers are nationals of countries adhering to the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925, which Iraq ratified in 1940.

Compensation is payable not only for injury but also for a listed occupational poisoning or disease, Iraq having ratified the Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention (Revised), 1934, in 1941. The compensation afforded by the employer consists of medical care and cash benefits for incapacity and death. In the event of temporary or permanent partial incapacity, up to 50 per cent. of wages is payable for a maximum of one year in the event of temporary incapacity and of two years in that of permanent incapacity. In the event of permanent total incapacity, a lump-sum grant equal to two years of wages is payable. The same lump-sum amount is payable in case of death, for distribution among surviving dependent relatives according to prescribed rules. The Minister of the Interior is responsible for enforcing the Act.

62: I. L. O. S-5 (1947-1950) 1950 MI Middle East
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Employers are also required to pay full wages to women employees who are absent from work by reason of confinement, for two weeks before and three weeks following the confinement.

ISRAEL

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The only laws at present in force in Israel which deal with contingencies directly related to social security consist of Ordinances concerning workmen's compensation and the employment of women. These Ordinances, which fix the liability of individual employers in the event of employment injury or maternity, were taken over from the Mandatory Government and confirmed by the Provisional State Council of the new Jewish State in 1948.

Workmen's Compensation

The workmen's compensation provisions which date from 1927 were extended and consolidated by the Ordinances of 16 August 1947 and 20 December 1948. They apply with only a few exceptions to all employees ordinarily resident in Israel, and make the employer liable to pay compensation in respect of injuries from employment-connected accidents and listed diseases. An employer may insure his liability with a commercial carrier or may carry the risk himself.

A totally disabled worker receives a weekly benefit normally equal to 75 per cent. of his past earnings, with a maximum of £I. 8 weekly [1]; if his earnings are below £I. 6.660 weekly, 100 per cent. of wages is payable up to £I. 5. There is no waiting period and the compensation continues for the duration of disablement. Compensation for partial disability is equal to between 75 and 100 per cent. of earnings loss with a normal maximum of £I. 8. Medical care, including surgery, hospitalisation, medicines and transport, must be provided by the employer up to a maximum value of £I. 150 or £I. 250, as well as necessary accessories or artificial limbs.

In case of death, adult dependants receive a lump sum equivalent to three years of the victim's past earnings, with a minimum of £I. 750 and a maximum of £I. 1,500. In addition, an allowance is payable in respect of each surviving dependent child under 16, equal to £I. 2 multiplied by the number of months to elapse between the worker's death and the date when the child attains age 16. Part dependants receive

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[1] The Israeli pound, which contains 1,000 prutoth, equals $2.80.

000 istrative branches. The Director of Curative
744 Medicine has supervision over 4 depart-
657 ments: hospitals, dispensaries and pharma-
743 cies; rural health; technical institutes, including 6 laboratory sections; and medical stores. Under the Director of Preventive and Social Medicine are departments of endemic diseases, sanitation, social health, quarantine and epidemics, vital statistics and disease registration. Subordinate sections dealing with maternal and child health, venereal diseases, pulmonary diseases and health propaganda are incorporated in the Department of Social Health, while supervision over the health services of both the province and the city of Baghdad falls within the scope of the Department of
742 Sanitation. The Department of Endemic Diseases carries on research and field programs for the control of malaria, schistosomiasis and hookworm infection, some of which were initiated by the then Institute of Endemic Diseases, created in 1949. Further changes in organization, making the Director of Preventive and Social Medicine a Director General immediately responsible to the Minister, were proposed in 1953.

746 Subordinate provincial organizations carry out the functions of the Ministry of Health in the 14 *liwas*, or provinces. Chief medical officers are appointed to each *liwa* and are responsible for the conduct of the various medical services. They undertake some public health activities, but, to a large extent, the preventive services are directed from Baghdad. Municipal health divisions are established in Baghdad and the principal cities.

744 Other ministries are also concerned in some measure with the public health. The Ministry of Education operates school health services in Baghdad and the larger urban centers, and introduces instruction in the basic principles of health through the schools in urban and rural areas. The Ministry of Economics has veterinary and agriculture departments: the former has meat and dairy inspection services; the latter runs an experimental farm and a pas-

teurization plant near Baghdad and seeks 744
to improve the standards of agriculture
which should be reflected in better nutri-
tion among the people. The Ministry of
Communications and Works maintains
health and medical facilities at the port of
Basra, and furnishes medical care for rail-
way personnel.

Several voluntary agencies carry on 746
health work, usually in co-operation with 751
the Ministry of Health. The Children's
Welfare Society conducts an extensive pro-
gram for the promotion of maternal and
child health, and operates welfare centers
in Baghdad and the administrative centers
of the remaining provinces. The Red Cres-
cent Society supports a child health center
in Baghdad, and provides training for girls
in first aid and home nursing through
branches in Baghdad, Basra, Hilla, Amarah
and Kirkuk. The Anti-Tuberculosis Society
campaigns against tuberculosis, and con-
tributed toward the erection of a sana-
torium, opened in 1951, near Baghdad. The 743
Catholic Nuns Society runs a small general
hospital and dispensary, and the Society of
Buyout el Umma an ophthalmic hospital
and dispensaries in Baghdad.

The Board of Foreign Missions of the 797
Reformed Church of America maintains a 743
medical mission in the Amarah region. It
operates a hospital and founded the leper
colony, which has since been taken over by
the government. The Seventh Day Adven-
tists also have a hospital in Baghdad. The [466]
Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidi-
aries, the Mosul Petroleum Company and
the Basra Petroleum Company, provide
medical and health services for the benefit of
their employees.

MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1950, 743
there were 82 civilian hospitals in Iraq with
an aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or
slightly over 1 bed per 1,000 population.
Of this number, 2,086 beds were located in
Baghdad, 534 in Basra and 412 in Mosul
provinces. Sixty-seven hospitals, with a

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager development. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained: schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

631 In the liwās,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwā early in 1922. Arbil, a sub-liwā of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Ḥilla. No more was heard of Baṣra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwā and qadhā. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

632 In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1922 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative —cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three
204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned
save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq
• 747 *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable
814 institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

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[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwās or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* S. G. C. Murray, H. M. Flaxman, E. C. H. Alban,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. S. Berry,* L. Kettlewell, S. E. Hedgcock, H. C. Pulley, R. E. Alderman,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. D. Jeffreys, L. W. Reed, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Grice, A. J. B. Chapman, J. B. Glubb (p. 291). Gillan, Murray, Flaxman, Kettlewell, Reed, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Pulley had died, and Longrigg and Hedgcock had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928–33), from the Sudan.

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic 747
Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary 814
clubs.

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil 619
period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land
communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, 166
and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyalā tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi Dhafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the Dhafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions 648ˣ
in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdi- 721
stan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

V. Organization of Health Services

744 It is most important that a properly organized program should
647 be established to carry out the suggested medical services and preventive health measures.

The existing organization for the health services is highly centralized—first within the Ministry of Social Affairs in Baghdad, then in the hands of the Chief Medical Officers of each province. The whole system appears to be too rigid throughout, without sufficient delegation of responsibility and without enough consultation among departments of the Ministry or with those of other Ministries. Certain medical problems (e.g. health in irrigation schemes, nutrition, etc.) concern other ministries or departments (irrigation, agriculture, education, etc.). To be really effective, boards or committees should include representatives of all groups concerned.

There is no general board of public health but there are various committees with different functions. The Director General of Health is responsible for the licensing of private practitioners and pharmacists, and he has a committee to assist him. But it is the Minister who sets up a committee to consider disciplinary Cases brought against practitioners or pharmacists by the Director General of Health. There is also a committee consisting of three Directors General and two other members nominated by the Minister who act in an advisory capacity to the Minister. It would be reasonable to expect the Directors General to be given wide powers without need for frequent reference to the Minister.

744 The health services have been repeatedly reorganized. The
647 latest reorganization still does not appear to have defined very
732 clearly the principal lines of responsibility. The Director General
● 747 of Health is to be largely responsible for the curative services; a Director General of Health Affairs, for the public health services of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk, for the mobile dispensaries, and for health projects in cities, villages, and the countryside; and a Director General of Social Services, for the supervision of the administration of the institutions for the disabled and the blind, supervision of reformatories and health conditions in prisons and

for the promotion of 'social centers'. It is understood he will also 744 647
"take an interest" in the numerous voluntary societies that under- 732
take work of a social and medical nature. 747

While this organization does not seem satisfactory, no alterna- 744
tive can be suggested at the moment without further study. The 647
Mission would recommend that a foreign public health administrator be appointed to advise the Minister of Social Affairs on the organization and further development of the health services. His appointment, incidentally, would enable the Professor of Preventive Medicine in the Royal Faculty of Medicine, who is at present also acting as adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs, to devote his full time to teaching and research.

The public health administrator should have had wide experience in the Middle East or in a tropical or sub-tropical country. He should have a good knowledge of the English language. To assist him he will require the services on temporary appointment of a foreign epidemiologist and a public health or sanitary engineer. The epidemiologist would undertake a study of the most prevalent diseases and recommend the best methods of attacking them. The public health engineer should have had considerable experience, preferably in a state medical service in a tropical or sub-tropical country, and be able to speak English. He would advise on measures to be taken to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene throughout Iraq and assist, if necessary, in teaching at the Royal Faculty of Medicine.

The public health administrator would require sufficient and suitable transport for himself and his staff; he would also need adequate office accommodation and office staff for himself and his own expert staff (epidemiologist and public health engineer). He should have at all times direct access to the Minister of Social Affairs.

As a result of the studies made by this team of advisers, it may be possible to give the organization of the health services a clearer focus. In any such scheme the preventive aspects of public health will need to be featured much more prominently. Although the borderline between curative and prophylactic measures may not always be clear, it may prove feasible to have one division responsible for all the services primarily curative

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

164 therefore vitally important that more attention be devoted in the future to the preventive aspects of public health work.

Prevention of Disease

744 751 Many measures could be taken to strengthen the preventive aspect of public health work. Doctors and nurses must, above all, be imbued with its importance, for they have countless opportunities to impress on their patients the need for proper hygiene and sanitation. Thus social medicine, involving the study of the environmental factors bearing on health and of appropriate measures for the prevention of disease, should be taught as part of the qualifying course in the medical school at Baghdad. Far more emphasis also needs to be placed on the teaching of hygiene in elementary and secondary schools. Children should be taught not only good personal habits, but also the importance of sanitation in and around the home. Special classes might be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases, by the school medical officer whenever possible. Health education must likewise be given an important place in the curriculum of teachers' training colleges and special courses in the prevention of diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be provided in the School of Agriculture and the School of Engineering. Hospitals should be an object lesson in hygiene and every effort made to impress on patients the importance of personal and domestic hygiene. The interest of adults in public health can be stimulated by visual education and by organizing "health weeks", the first of which was held in Diwaniya with conspicuous success during the Mission's stay. The army and police have an excellent opportunity to teach habits conducive to good health. Prospective farmers for new settlement projects should be medically examined to restrict, as far as possible, the introduction of endemic diseases into these settlements. To prevent water pollution it would be desirable to locate villages in such settlements away from irrigation canals wherever possible.

743 759 The Mission strongly recommends that the number of village dispensaries, which is now over 400, be gradually increased and that they be equipped to serve as public health centers. Such centers would be simple in function, aimed primarily at providing elementary medical and health assistance to as many people as possi-

871 stock and the use of tools. Crafts should emphasize the best use of cheap local materials in weaving and rug making, woodwork, simple building operations and the like. Urban schools might stress such crafts as leather work, woodwork, bookbinding and printing, brick-making, textiles, etc. For girls, lessons might be provided in sewing, cooking and other domestic pursuits. For all pupils, visits to hospitals, industrial plants, demonstration farms and the like would prove a useful supplement to training acquired at school.

871 751 As already indicated, health and hygiene should be given a more important place in the curriculum. Children could not only be taught useful facts regarding the causes and methods of treatment of endemic diseases like bilharzia, hookworm, malaria and eye infections, but could be persuaded to do something about them by helping to eliminate stagnant pools and showing others how to avoid water pollution. Similarly they could learn something about the qualities of different foods, the importance of personal hygiene and the value of cleanliness in the home.

In this type of educational program it would be desirable to enlist the cooperation of officials dealing with health, agriculture and local government problems. Through the children, more effective contacts with the parents would be established. Parents would learn to appreciate the practical value of education to their children and themselves, and a better link between school and community would be forged.

875 The inauguration of a revised curriculum and better teaching methods will require a prior reorientation of the training given to teachers. The curricula of Training Colleges should be recast radically in order to reduce the present excessive number of subjects and to bring the training nearer to the realistic conditions of the rural or urban areas for which the teachers are being trained. Colleges for training rural teachers should be located in rural areas where students can study rural problems and can actively participate in rural community life. Every Training College should have a demonstration school in which it should have the latitude to work out new teaching methods. At present such Colleges tend to be omnibus educational institutions which give too little time to the professional training of teachers.

ANNEX F

PUBLIC HEALTH

I. Introduction

Extent of Progress Made in Public Health

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In the past 30 years health services in Iraq have improved 743
considerably. In 1918 the country had only one hospital, con- 164
trasted with the present 89 hospitals (4,812 in-patient beds or one bed per 1,000 people) and 448 dispensaries. Control measures including the use of vaccines, particularly for smallpox, have cut down the incidence of epidemics during the last few years. Cholera has not occurred since 1931 and the plague not since 1935. Smallpox and louse-borne typhus also seem to be under control. An Institute of Endemic Diseases has been set up with headquarters in Baghdad. Steps have already been taken to control malaria and a good deal of information is being assembled on schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and ankylostomiasis. Nevertheless, the main endemic diseases—malaria, schistosomiasis, trachoma, and ankylostomiasis —are still very common.

In 1949 there were 797 doctors practicing in Iraq, of whom 759
419 or 53 percent were in Baghdad. There were about 387 government pharmacies and 252 pharmacists working in private pharmacies in the larger towns.

The doctors are supplemented by 265 health officials, originally trained primarily to staff village dispensaries, and 400 nurses and 659 dressers (male hospital attendants), about one to every four or five hospital beds. There are also private nurses, midwives and dressers, and 130 public vaccinators who are employed on a permanent basis. In 1948 and 1949, 3,061,955 and 2,080,777 smallpox [751]
vaccinations were made (the 1947 census showing a total population of 4,799,500).

Malaria, trachoma and bronchitis were the main hospital 164
cases; the dysenteries, anemias, wounds, syphilis and phthisis were 757

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monoton- 164
ous diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the
highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751●
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Expansion of Health Education

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Iraq has a small, wealthy upper class and a small middle class. The great majority of the people are poor and ignorant, most especially in regard to health measures. Health education is badly needed and there is no doubt that the people would respond readily to teaching. Large groups enthusiastically attended all the shows put on for the health week held in Diwaniya province; competitions for the best eating-house, butcher's shop and barber's shop were keenly contested and visitors thronged to see the model house and the medical exhibition. The oil company in Kirkuk employs a British sanitary inspector and the Railways Administration in Baghdad recently sent their Iraqi sanitary inspector to take a course of study in the United Kingdom. The response of the householders in these places to sanitary measures is striking; their pride in their homes is obvious and the absence of flies conspicuous.

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To begin with, every doctor should have a thorough understanding of the relation of environmental factors to disease. Greater emphasis on the teaching of preventive medicine and particularly of social medicine in the medical school, as has already been recommended, would help to inculcate a wider appreciation of the importance of the preventive outlook in all medical work. Like doctors, nurses have a unique opportunity to teach their patients, and personal and domestic hygiene should take their proper place in the training courses for nurses. Every hospital should be an object lesson in hygiene and every patient should learn by his stay in it.

Health education must be given an important place in the curriculum of the teachers' training schools, and special courses in the prevention of the diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be included in the syllabus of the School of Agriculture and of the School of Engineering.

Hygiene is already taught in the schools but ought to be given greater emphasis. Personal hygiene is essentially a matter of habit formation and young school children should be trained in good habits as a daily routine. Special classes could be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases—possibly, in some cases, by the school medical officer. It is for the Health Department to

decide what should be taught and then the educators can decide 751
how it should be taught. 871

In the villages, the school buildings could sometimes serve as models for house-building; in any case, every school should in itself be a lesson in hygiene. Well-balanced meals are provided in the boarding schools and serve as examples for the home. Possibly the elder girls could be taught some "mothercraft", the treatment of minor ailments (cuts, abrasions, etc.), some sewing and also some domestic economy.

At present the *School Medical Service* is administered by the Ministry of Education and has a staff of 20 doctors and four dentists. In the school year 1949-50, 147,084 pupils were examined revealing splenomegaly among two percent, schistosomiasis in five percent, and trachoma in 25 percent, while 40,767 attendances were made for dental treatments. To carry out an effective program for treatment of trachoma, more school nurses will be needed.

There are several *other groups* through which health educa- 697
tion can be disseminated. Police training schools and prisons, 751
including reformatories, offer good opportunities for teaching 702
health. The Central Prison in Baghdad is a good example of cleanliness and orderliness. The Army should teach in its officer training courses that the promotion and maintenance of the health of an officer's unit is his first duty.

A few voluntary societies are now undertaking some health 751
education, but the scope of their work could be greatly increased, particularly in maternal and child welfare and in the prevention of tuberculosis. Special pronouncements could be prepared by religious societies for reading in the mosques (e.g. against the pollution of water supplies as a measure to limit the spread of schistosomiasis). Simple health notes written in the vernacular would be of help where a local newspaper is published. Short talks could be given from the national broadcasting station.

There is a great opportunity for health teaching in the projected new settlements. The staff required for such work are medical assistants, sanitary overseers, midwives and possibly public health nurses who, after having received appropriate training, will work in and from one or more village health centers.

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751 The most important links with the people are, of course, those who belong to them and who work among them: that is, the dispensary *medical assistants* and *midwives* in villages and the midwives and public health nurses in the towns. *Maternal and child welfare centers* in towns could also provide health education. There are already a few centers operating in Baghdad but there is a great need to open more centers throughout the country as soon as trained staff are available. The proposed house-to-house inspectors, sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors could all be most valuable teachers.

There is no doubt that *health weeks* would stimulate great interest and health exhibits could be included in agricultural and other shows (e.g. to display measures designed to prevent the spread of malaria, schistosomiasis, etc.). Travelling vans giving film shows might also be of some use.

Elected *public health committees* of the village elders, advised by the medical assistant or visiting doctor, might do much to improve conditions in villages. *Mobile dispensaries* should include in their staff a sanitary inspector and a health visitor (public health nurse) who could go round the village while the doctor is seeing patients.

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744 It should be noted that the government plans to inaugurate a rural health center at Abu Ghuraib, which is designed to provide curative and preventive services for the population of the area and at the same time serve as a practical field for training rural health workers, with particular emphasis on the control of communicable diseases and maternal and child health. It has requested advice from the World Health Organization on the planning and establishment of the center. Accordingly, in 1950, provision was made under the technical assistance budget of the World Health Organization for a rural health survey. Provision has been made under the 1952 technical assistance budget for one public health administrator with general experience in rural health, one epidemiologist, one sanitarian, and two public health nurses, one with general experience and one with the experience in midwifery. It is expected that the government will submit a request to UNICEF for appropriate supplies and equipment. At a later stage the program may be developed in cooperation with other specialized agencies.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
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teurization plant near Baghdad and seeks 744
to improve the standards of agriculture
which should be reflected in better nutrition among the people. The Ministry of
Communications and Works maintains
health and medical facilities at the port of
Basra, and furnishes medical care for railway personnel.

Several voluntary agencies carry on 746
health work, usually in co-operation with 751
the Ministry of Health. The Children's
Welfare Society conducts an extensive program for the promotion of maternal and
child health, and operates welfare centers
in Baghdad and the administrative centers
of the remaining provinces. The Red Crescent Society supports a child health center
in Baghdad, and provides training for girls
in first aid and home nursing through
branches in Baghdad, Basra, Hilla, Amarah
and Kirkuk. The Anti-Tuberculosis Society
campaigns against tuberculosis, and contributed toward the erection of a sanatorium, opened in 1951, near Baghdad. The 743
Catholic Nuns Society runs a small general
hospital and dispensary, and the Society of
Buyout el Umma an ophthalmic hospital
and dispensaries in Baghdad.

The Board of Foreign Missions of the 797
Reformed Church of America maintains a 743
medical mission in the Amarah region. It
operates a hospital and founded the leper
colony, which has since been taken over by
the government. The Seventh Day Adventists also have a hospital in Baghdad. The [466]
Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries, the Mosul Petroleum Company and
the Basra Petroleum Company, provide
medical and health services for the benefit of
their employees.

MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1950, 743
there were 82 civilian hospitals in Iraq with
an aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or
slightly over 1 bed per 1,000 population.
Of this number, 2,086 beds were located in
Baghdad, 534 in Basra and 412 in Mosul
provinces. Sixty-seven hospitals, with a

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were reported in 1923, 1927 and 1931. Since 164
1931, cholera has been almost completely
absent from the country, although one imported
case was recorded in 1939, when the
disease was epidemic in Afghanistan and
Iran.

Strict quarantine regulations are enforced, 744
and travelers from India, Pakistan 484
and Ceylon, as well as pilgrims from Mecca, 164
without valid certificates of immunization
against cholera are retained in quarantine
centers for a period of 7 days. Mass immunization 751
with cholera vaccine is carried 164
on among the populations in the border
provinces whenever epidemics are reported
from the adjacent territories. At the time
of the recent epidemic in Egypt, in 1947,
immunization was compulsory for all travelers
entering the country and for the inhabitants
of towns and villages along the
Syrian frontier.

Helminthiases. SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schistosomiasis, 164
caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, 136
has probably been present in the
lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins
since ancient times. It is highly endemic in
the southern and the central provinces,
where the intermediate snail host, *Bulinus
truncatus*, is found in widespread but often
localized foci. The disease is prevalent 164
among the children and among the agricultural 467
and other laborers who work in infested
waters, particularly the men and the
boys, who are exposed to infection to a
greater extent than the women. It reaches
maximum proportions between 10 and 20
years of age, but is usually negligible in
early childhood. Transmission is seasonal: 164
it takes place from May to the end of November, 515
but primarily between June and
October, when infected snails are most
abundant. The insanitary customs of the
inhabitants, associated with the frequent
use of the canals for religious ablutions and
the severe summer heat which is conducive
to bathing in any convenient body of water,
are contributory factors. The infection rates 164
average 18 to 25 per cent in the irrigated 361
districts of the delta, but vary from zero

164 pulmonary infections, but tuberculous meningitis is common in young children. Among 838 cases of nonpulmonary tuberculosis admitted to the surgical wards of the Royal Hospital in the 4 years 1947-50,[14] over 26 per cent were diagnosed as lymphadenitis and over 21 per cent as infections of the spine.

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The new 400-bed sanatorium opened near Baghdad under the joint auspices of the Anti-Tuberculosis Society and the government health authorities in 1951 was the first tuberculosis hospital in the country. Previously, facilities for the treatment of tuberculous cases were provided only in the provincial hospitals, or in sanatoria in Syria and Lebanon, where the Ministry of Health subsidizes about 200 beds for the use of Iraqi patients.
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Plans have been projected by the Ministry for the construction of tuberculosis hospitals in each of the provinces: a 120-bed hospital was completed in Basra in 1952, and it was anticipated that hospitals would soon be ready for use in Kirkuk and Mosul. As of 1950, the dispensaries available for the treatment of chest diseases totaled 6, of which 2 were located in Baghdad and one each in Mosul, Kirkuk Diwaniya and Sulaimaniya. X-ray laboratories were maintained in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul.

751 A BCG inoculation and tuberculin testing program was initiated by the Ministry in 1952, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. It is proposed to concentrate at first on the children and the adolescents in the larger cities. In 1952 also, the World Health Organization sponsored the establishment of a tuberculosis demonstration and training center at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad.

164 Smallpox. Epidemics of smallpox break out almost annually, and reach major proportions at intervals of 3 to 8 years. Since 1930, large-scale epidemics were reported in 1932-33, 1940-42, 1946 and 1948-49. In the 1932-33 outbreaks, the peak of incidence came in 1932, when 2,318 cases were re-

164 corded; in 1940-42, a peak of 2,098 cases was noted in 1941. Over 1,460 cases were treated by the medical officers in 1946 and 2,026 in 1948, with a decrease to 736 cases in 1949. In the intervening years the recorded prevalence ranged from 18 to 700 [165] cases. The fatality rates have varied in different outbreaks from 5 to 40 per cent.

751 361 Vaccination against smallpox is required theoretically, but enforcement is difficult in the more remote villages, and particularly among the transitory laborers and nomadic tribes. In some sections, as in the date-growing areas, mass vaccination campaigns are carried on during the date harvest season, when people flock to the groves and the packing sheds in search of work. At the time of an epidemic, vaccination is compulsory among all the affected populations.

164 **Diphtheria.** Diphtheria is endemic, and localized outbreaks are observed from time to time. In the absence of Schick test surveys, however, little is known regarding the extent of infection in the general population. In the 6 years 1944-49, the recorded incidence rose from 210 cases in 1944 to 903 in 1948 and 612 in 1949—an apparent increase which is attributed by the local authorities to improved facilities for diagnosis. 751 164 Immunization against diphtheria is provided in many of the schools in the larger cities and in certain of the child health centers.

164 165 **Meningitis.** Outbreaks of meningococcus meningitis are sporadic, usually occurring during the winter months. In the 12-year period 1939-50, from 112 to 489 cases were recorded each year, while the fatality rates ranged from 8 to 35 per cent.

164 **Other Infections.** The pneumonias are prevalent, and are major causes of death in all age groups. Outbreaks of influenza are recurrent. Measles, whooping cough, chickenpox and mumps are endemic, and often epidemic. The cases of whooping cough are typically severe, and the mortality among the undernourished children is normally high.

Occasional cases of scarlet fever are en-

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The roots of this and other species of birthwort are highly valued medicines in the East. The drug from Iran is a cylindrical and contorted root, 12 mm. in diameter, showing in section the peculiar wedge-shaped bundles of the wood. It has a somewhat bitter and pungent taste. The Aristolochias are stimulating tonics and are often given for snake bites. Locally the root is used for amenorrhea and as a pectoral and stomachic.

Aristolochia rotunda L. (Aristolochiaceae)

نخود الوند

Nukhūd-i-alvand (Teh., Isf.); Nukhund-i-alavandi (Ar.); Zaravand-i-gird (Pers.); the roots.

W.H.M.M. 150761.

The roots are tuberous, brownish or gray, round in shape like a small cottage loaf, with a broad base, a top narrow and marked with pit-like scars and the remains of fallen stems. They are hard, horny, and starchy, and have an acrid odor and taste. The drug is given as a tonic, diuretic, emmenagogue, and vermifuge. In Iraq *A. Maurorum* L. is used by the tribes to provide an antiseptic for healing wounds, and also for curing scab in sheep (G.).

Artemisia maritima L. (Compositae)

درمنه

Darmanah (Teh.); Afsant-el-bahara (Ar.); santonica, wormseed.

Ph. Ind. 2: 288; Greenish and Maplethorpe, Y.B.Pharm. 1923, 646.

Field 179; K.B. 304.

The dried, unexpanded flower heads of various species of *Artemisia*—often mixed with *A. vulgaris* L. and water (H.F.)—are used as a vermifuge. The provinces of Turkestan and Kurdistan supply large quantities. Aitchison says that *A. maritima* L. and *A. campestris* are to be found everywhere in northeastern Iran. The rootstocks and dry stems are used for fuel, and the flower heads collected from the villages around Tehran are sold in the bazaars. Santonin, the active, anthelmintic principle of wormseed, is now manufactured near the town of Chimkent in Turkestan (Ph. Ind. 2: 288). [751] 6 [372]

Artemisia vulgaris L. (Compositae)

افسنطين

Afsantin (Teh.); Afsantin-i-hindi (Ar.); wormwood.

Ph. Ind. 2: 284.

35_1 Hooper and Field S-5 (1934) 1937 MA1 Iran MAI
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Melia Azedarach L. (Meliaceae)

سنجد تلخ

Sinjad-i-talkh (Teh., Isf.); Mab-ul-dan (Ar.); Bakayan (Hind.); China tree fruits.

Field 443; W.H.M.M. 150840.

The China tree or Persian lilac was probably introduced into the southern parts of India by the Mohammedans, and various parts of the tree have long been used in medicine by the Arabs and Persians. The fruits are called Sinjad-i-talkh or bitter sinjad to distinguish them from sinjad, the fruit of the oleaster (*Elaeagnus angustifolia* L.). The berries are oblong or rounded, 12 mm. in length, with smooth, wrinkled, reddish brown skin, a pulpy, bitter flesh, and hard, five-grooved stone. The fruits are given for fevers. The stones are worn as a necklace to avert contagious diseases. [151]

Mentha sylvestris L. (Labiatae)

پونه

Pūnah (Teh.); Gul-i-punah (Isf.); Pudina (Hind.); leaves of mint.

Field 256, 412; W.H.M.M. 150811.

The wild mint is indigenous to the temperate western Himalayan region and to Iran. The general name for mint, best known in the East, is Fudanaj, the Arabic form of the Persian word, Pudina. The author of the "Makhzan-el-Adwiya" describes three kinds of Fudanaj: the wild, mountain, and water mint. Mountain mint has hoary leaves, but the specimens from T[illegible], although fragrant, are too imperfect to name specifically. Different kinds of mint are cultivated in gardens and are used as domestic remedies on account of their pleasant odor and stimulant and carminative properties.

—Mint leaves are prescribed for waterbrash or pyrosis; they are also prepared like tea for chills, rheumatism, and dysentery (H.F.).

Merendera persica Boiss. (Liliaceae)

سورنجان سفره شده

Sūrinjān-i-sufrah shudah (Teh.); the corms.

Ph. Pers.; Boiss. 5: 167; Schl.; Ait.; Ph. Ind. 3: 496.

W.H.M.M. 150870; K.B. 326.

TICKS AND MITES. NUMEROUS SPECIES OF
164 ticks infest the livestock, including *Rhipi-*
136 *cephalus sanguineus, Hyalomma dromedarii*
232 and *Haemaphysalis cinnabarina punctata.*
Ornithodorus tholozani occurs in many localities, and is the vector in sporadic cases of tick-borne relapsing fever. *O. savignyi* is present in the desert areas. The fowl or blue Persian tick, *Argas persicus*, and the castor bean tick, *Ixodes ricinus*, are widespread.

136 The itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is preva-
369 lent, especially in the congested urban communities and rural villages. The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventricosus*, is a frequent pest in the grain-growing districts.

136 SCORPIONS AND SPIDERS. Scorpions are common, particularly in the northern provinces. The most dangerous species are *Buthus australis* and *B. crassicauda.*
[165] *B. europaeus* is also present. A few deaths from scorpion stings are reported each year, usually among young children or old people. *Scorpio maurus kruglovi* is sometimes encountered in the plains and *S. maurus townsendi* in the Persian Gulf region. The principal poisonous spider in Iraq is *Lycosa tarantula.*

136 OTHER ARTHROPODS. *Reduvius tabidus*
752 and *R. annulipes* are found in many areas. The "date beetle," a large aquatic species of the family BELASTOMIDAE, is capable of causing serious bites.

136 **Reptiles.** Twenty-six species of snakes
752 have been recorded from Iraq, but only 5
165 land varieties are venomous. Casualties from snake bites are reported occasionally. A large proportion of the fatalities is probably caused by the Levantine or blunt-nosed viper, *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, which inhabits the northeastern highlands from north of Baghdad to the Turkish and the Iranian frontiers. *V. lebetina euphratica* is also seen in some localities. The horned viper, *Aspis cerastes* (= *Cerastes cornutus*), is native to the alluvial plains, while the carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, is found in limited areas in Diwaniya province. The hoodless cobra, *Naja morgani*, is widely distributed but apparently is rare. The poison-

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ous sea snake, *Enhydrina shistosa*, roams 136
the Persian Gulf and the Shatt al Arab. 752
Although it may be dangerous to fishermen, 165
no fatalities are known to have occurred.

Rodenta. *Rattus rattus frugivorus* is the 136
rat most frequently encountered in Iraqi 164
dwellings. *R. rattus alexandrinus* is also indigenous, while *R. norvegicus* is present in Basra, Baghdad and the river towns. *Nesokia buxtoni, Dipodillus dasyurus* and *Meriones charion* are reported from different localities. Rats are often captured in Baghdad and Basra and examined for evidences of plague, but otherwise little rodent control work is undertaken, except at the time of plague outbreaks.

Mollusks.* *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), the intermediate snail host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, is found in numerous foci in central and southern Iraq, where pump or gravity flow irrigation is employed. It inhabits the many small and sluggish irrigation canals and the rice fields, borrow pits, marshes and other suitable collections of water, but is strictly seasonal in appearance, being abundant only in the summer and the fall months, from May or June to November. The snails are widespread in Basra, Muntafiq, Diwaniya and Amarah provinces in the south, but are absent from the Shatt al Arab region south of Basra, where breeding is restricted by the salinity of the water. They are more scattered in distribution in the central provinces and practically nonexistent in the north, aside from localized foci around the
marshlands of the Mosul area. *Radix lagotis* 136
canaliculata, a vector of *S. turkestanicum* 232
which causes serious infections among the livestock, is found in the rice fields and the marshes of the southern delta.

The threat of the spread of *Bulinus trun-* 136
catus, and subsequently of schistosomiasis, 164
with the expansion of irrigation creates a 744
problem which is of major public health and economic importance to the country. Small-scale snail-control campaigns have been undertaken in the past in Baghdad, Basra and

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* See footnote, page 10.

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Diwaniya provinces. In 1949, a co-ordinated 136
control program was introduced by the 164
Iraqi government, and a Bilharzia Section 744
was established within the national health organization. The section initiated a snail survey in the various endemic foci and research on the most effective methods of snail control. It carries on continuous snail destruction work through special units assigned to each of the infected provinces.

Plants. Little precise information is 137
available regarding the prevalence of 752
allergy-producing plants, but numerous weeds, grasses and trees, which have been incriminated in other countries, are present in districts with rainfall adequate to support such vegetation.

Occasional deaths, primarily among 137
young children, have been traced to the 165
consumption of the raw beans of *Vicia faba*, 232
a prominent food crop throughout this region. The beans are toxic to susceptible individuals in the raw state. Plants of the *Senecio* group grow in sections of the northern highlands. The young green shoots are poisonous and sometimes cause fatalities among the livestock.

FOOD SANITATION

The government and municipal health authorities are responsible for the enforcement of regulations governing the sanitary quality of foods, meats and milk products, but the degree of enforcement varies in different localities. Health inspectors are charged with the supervision of establishments where foods are prepared or sold, such as foodshops, markets, restaurants and cafés, mineral-water bottling works and date-packing houses. Examinations for the presence of venereal diseases are theoretically required at regular intervals in the case of cooks and barbers, but no tests to detect other infections are carried out. 744

Meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter in the city abattoirs by officers of the government veterinary and health services. All carcasses offered for sale are supposed to bear an official stamp of

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water and alcohol, odorless but with a sweetish taste. It contains a principle similar to glycyrrhizin. Sarcocolla[1] forms a plaster long used by Parsi bone-setters, and is applied locally to the ears and face to allay neuralgic pains. Aitchison says the gum is used by ladies of the harem to improve their appearance and to give the skin a gloss (see "Sarcocolla" by D. Hooper, *Journ. As. Soc. Bengal*, Vol. 9, 1913, pp. 177–181). • [752] [302]

Astragalus gummifer Labill. (Leguminosae)

کتیرا

Kathīrā (Teh.); Qatera, Katira gond (Hind.); gum Tragacanth. Field 128; W.H.M.M. 150861.

[314] The small, branching, thorny shrubs of *Astragalus* are especially to be found in Asiatic Turkey and Iran, where they form one of the most characteristic features of the vegetation. The above and other species yield, when incised, flat, ribbon-shaped pieces, or, when punctured, vermiform tears. The tragacanth gum from Tehran is in clean white ribbons, typical of the best commercial quality, largely used in medicine and confectionery.

Astragalus hamosus L. (Leguminosae)

اكليل الملك

Iklīl (Teh.); Iklīl-ul-malik (Ar.); Adhafir-aj-jian, Adhafir-ash-shaitan (Iraq); Iklil-ul-mulk (Bom.); Aketi (Ham.); the curved pods. Field 145; W.H.M.M. 150889; K.B. 342.

The origin of this drug has been referred to various species of *Melilotus* and *Trigonella* which have curved pods. Those received from Tehran and Hamadan are horseshoe-shaped, 2.5 cm. in length, grayish brown, smooth, curved outward, grooved on both sides, and beaked; they are divided by a central partition and contain grayish yellow, rhomboidal seeds, notched at one end and with black spots. The pods are called in Iraq "Fairies' Nails" or "Devil's Claws," and are used for various disorders, but chiefly as a suppurative and astringent. Sometimes they are made into a plaster for reducing tumorous and painful swellings.—Mixed with *Viola* sp., they are taken before purgation (H.F.).

Bambusa arundinacea L. (Gramineae)

تبا شیر قلمی

Tabāshīr-i-qalamī (Teh.); Tabashira (Ar.); Bans lochan (Hind.); mineral concretion in stems of bamboo.

[1] [i.e., the gum of Astragalus fasciculaefolius, Kohl Farsi -- Analyst]

reliable figures on its true incidence. One real problem is that 164
the public has come to regard tuberculosis as a shameful disease [753]
so that few people report to hospitals in the early stage of the illness. The government has applied to the World Health Organization for assistance in dealing with tuberculosis. It is understood that WHO will send a team consisting of a consultant, an epidemiologist, a bacteriologist and two nurses to begin a BCG campaign; and that, by arrangement with UNICEF, they will be assisted by two medical officers, two nurses, and one administrator. The government will build a suitable "chest center" in Baghdad where the WHO team will work and where local staff can be trained.

Eye Diseases

Eye diseases are common in Iraq, as in the rest of the Middle East. It has been estimated that there are 40,000 totally blind persons, most of whom cannot work and must be cared for, thereby becoming a burden to the community. About one in five of the total population have been treated annually for conjunctivitis or trachoma in the past six years. To a large extent these also are social diseases, although some doctors in Iraq think certain eye diseases may have a nutritional basis in the consumption of large quantities of polished rice.

II. The Curative Services

Hospitals and Dispensaries 743

In general, the curative services have received more attention than preventive medicine. Iraq's 89 hospitals are unevenly distributed, however, since one third of them are in the Baghdad area and the remaining 59 are divided among the other 13 provinces. It is true, of course, that there is higher concentration of people in Baghdad.

Of the 89 hospitals, 58 are general and six are for infectious diseases, three for eye diseases, two for venereal diseases and one for lepers. There are also two hospitals for children, one for

facilities are available in the larger hospitals. The Veterinary Department in the Ministry of Economics also maintains a laboratory for research in the control of animal diseases. 742

Schools. The Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad was founded in 1927, and is the only medical school in Iraq. The Royal Hospital and the medical and associated schools are administered by the Dean of the Royal Faculty of Medicine. The course of instruction in the medical school covers 6 years, plus an additional year of internship. The teaching is in English, and a limited number of British and Dutch physicians are included on the professorial staff. The Iraqi degree meets the requirements of the General Medical Council of Great Britain. A complete medical education may be acquired at public expense, but graduates are obligated to serve for 4 or more years with the Ministry or some other government organization. 874 [756]

Schools for health officials and for nurses are affiliated with the medical school. The School of Health Officials offers a 5-year course for the training of medical assistants, many of whom are assigned to operate the rural dispensaries.

The School of Nursing and Midwifery is attached to the Royal Hospital and provides the standard 3-year course of instruction. Diplomas in midwifery are granted following a postgraduate year of work in that field. The development of facilities for the training of nurses is proposed by the Ministry of Health, and a nursing consultant has recently been appointed to the headquarters staff. A small training school for nurses is connected with the Seventh Day Adventist hospital in Baghdad. Courses covering 1 year of practical instruction are provided for nurses and midwives in hospitals in Kirkuk, Basra and Mosul. Male nurses and medical attendants are trained in the larger hospitals.

A College of Pharmacy and Chemistry is incorporated in the Faculty of Medicine. It

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For botanically derived materia medica and their use see MAl Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 116, pp. 80-122, 124-181 and 183-188.

For a list of native terms for various plants and drugs see MAl Iran, 35: Hooper and Field, category 116, pp. 217-241.

ANNEX F

PUBLIC HEALTH

I. Introduction

Extent of Progress Made in Public Health

In the past 30 years health services in Iraq have improved 744 743
considerably. In 1918 the country had only one hospital, con- 164
trasted with the present 89 hospitals (4,812 in-patient beds or one bed per 1,000 people) and 448 dispensaries. Control measures including the use of vaccines, particularly for smallpox, have cut down the incidence of epidemics during the last few years. Cholera has not occurred since 1931 and the plague not since 1935. Smallpox and louse-borne typhus also seem to be under control. An Institute of Endemic Diseases has been set up with headquarters in Baghdad. Steps have already been taken to control malaria and a good deal of information is being assembled on schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and ankylostomiasis. Nevertheless, the main endemic diseases—malaria, schistosomiasis, trachoma, and ankylostomiasis —are still very common.

In 1949 there were 797 doctors practicing in Iraq, of whom 759
419 or 53 percent were in Baghdad. There were about 387 government pharmacies and 252 pharmacists working in private pharmacies in the larger towns.

The doctors are supplemented by 265 health officials, originally trained primarily to staff village dispensaries, and 400 nurses and 659 dressers (male hospital attendants), about one to every four or five hospital beds. There are also private nurses, midwives and dressers, and 130 public vaccinators who are employed on a perma-
nent basis. In 1948 and 1949, 3,061,955 and 2,080,777 smallpox [751]
vaccinations were made (the 1947 census showing a total population of 4,799,500).

Malaria, trachoma and bronchitis were the main hospital 164
cases; the dysenteries, anemias, wounds, syphilis and phthisis were 757

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757 also frequent causes for hospitalization. In 1949 there were 5,876,336 visits to health institutions for treatment.

Public Health Budget

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164 In 1951-52, ID 2,089,180 (7.6 percent of the total budget) were allocated to health services, as compared to ID 187,672 in 1931. Because of the prevalence of endemic diseases and the constant danger of epidemics, it would not be unreasonable to spend 10 percent of the total budget on health services.

759 Salaries for personnel in the medical service appear to be low in relation to the cost of living, although they are not low compared to other civil service salaries. The basic salaries, exclusive of cost-of-living allowances, range from ID 5.15 a month for a dresser, to ID 25 for a doctor and ID 80 for a director-general.

Current Health Conditions

165 In spite of the undeniable progress in health conditions, there is need for further improvement. Definitive data are lacking on total birth and death rates, but some figures are available on the infant mortality rate, which is probably the best index of the social circumstances of an area. For Baghdad, the recorded rate in 1949 was 128 deaths per thousand births. Iraqi doctors who have worked in different parts of the country consider the rate to be about 250 per thousand, on the average, compared with about 34 deaths per thousand live births in highly developed countries.

164 Among the people as a whole, malaria seems to be the chief killer, especially in country districts. In the main cities the leading causes of deaths were intestinal diseases, tuberculosis and respiratory diseases. These diseases and trachoma seriously affect the ability of men and women to work efficiently and are among the major causes of low productivity of labor in Iraq. For example, candidates for the police service are frequently rejected because of defective eyesight and what is characterized as "poor physique" associated with chronic malaria, schistosomiasis, etc. About 20 percent of the young men liable for military service are found to be unfit.

Heart trouble, cancer and other organic disturbances are far outnumbered by diseases which are essentially social in origin. Most of them can be traced to lack of hygiene, poor sanitation and

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX

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TABLE 1

Hospitals, Hospital Beds, Dispensaries and Doctors
(by provinces, with populations)

Provinces	Hospitals	Beds	Dispensaries	Doctors	Population
Baghdad	30	1,988	56	419	805,293
Mosul	8	303	47	67	601,589
Basra	7	539	21	65	352,039
Hilla	5	264	21	25	261,903
Diyala	3	87	29	24	273,336
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Kirkuk	5	207	28	58	285,878
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Kut	4	127	22	14	224,792
Amara	5	353	12	20	308,108
Totals	89	4,802	348	797	4,749,500

TABLE 2

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Number of Visits to Health Institutions for Treatment
(by provinces)

Provinces	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Baghdad	1,004,856	1,255,348	1,523,935	1,471,621	1,553,020	1,664,023
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Mosul	423,819	455,584	509,410	541,881	576,291	644,647
Amara	269,536	291,722	336,025	345,873	297,987	279,273
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Diwaniya	324,148	351,092	319,131	361,368	364,949	380,720
Diyala	288,912	284,181	319,518	343,626	322,715	357,198
Dulaim	199,063	199,996	239,952	248,285	227,797	222,030
Hilla	320,087	364,942	306,319	436,523	434,789	408,278
Kerbela	375,591	308,693	397,757	356,427	428,911	431,666
Kirkuk	133,571	168,809	229,044	209,588	202,219	206,556
Kut	188,978	230,255	202,970	211,061	234,522	257,991
Muntafiq	247,293	255,185	297,433	327,114	277,494	285,306
Suleimaniya	141,406	146,185	194,126	193,919	203,251	187,427
Totals	4,368,325	4,780,483	5,401,687	5,586,725	5,656,424	5,876,336

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TABLE 5

CASES OF EYE DISEASES

Diseases	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Trachoma	533,089	501,280	558,323	532,310	524,940	452,084
Conjunctivitis	410,522	422,572	481,877	447,425	445,376	510,668
Tumors of the Eye	5,806	7,699	7.371	9.460	10,258	6,575
Other Eye Diseases	65,615	71,626	60,428	58,256	51,985	70,392
Total	1,015.032	1.003.177	1,107,999	1,047,451	1,032,559	1,039,719

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TABLE 6

TREATMENTS FOR MALARIA AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TREATMENTS AT HEALTH INSTITUTIONS

(By provinces: 1943-48)

Province	Total Treatments	Treatments for Malaria	Percentage
Baghdad	7,751,167	306,139	4
Basra	2,041,579	394,039	19
Mosul	2,909,256	475,065	16
Amara	1,769,157	102,172	6
Erbil	903,520	140,748	16
Diwaniya	2,000.261	300,043	15
Diyala	1,850,371	301,318	16
Dulaim	1,283,546	124,965	10
Hilla	2,131,928	487,170	23
Kerbela	2,180.664	487,886	22
Kirkuk	1,032,349	123,341	12
Kut	1,254,617	89,506	7
Muntafiq	1,624,345	240,525	15
Suleimaniya	1,005,355	97,714	10

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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TABLE 7

TREATMENTS FOR MALARIA AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TREATMENTS AT HEALTH INSTITUTIONS

(By years)

Year	Total Treatments	Treatments for Malaria	Percentage
1923	317,615	57,552	18.1
1924	396,466	63,939	16.1
1925	501,925	86,688	17.3
*1926	645,392	175,923	27.3
1927	597,367	103,477	17.3
1928	636,861	87,467	13.7
*1929	1,035,524	158,902	15.3
1930	1,232,020	151,063	12.3
*1931	1,461,627	189,218	13.0
1932	1,600,933	178,871	11.2
*1933	2,113,273	239,629	11.3
1934	2,462,181	272,770	11.1
1935	3,882,079	338,804	8.7
*1936	3,780,982	640,967	17.0
1937	3,986,437	582,973	14.6
1938	4,093,753	524,292	12.8
1939	3,496,946	490,310	14.0
*1940	3,292,618	663,432	20.1
*1941	3,733,303	726,339	19.5
1942	3,875,657	575,780	14.9
1943	4,024,421	509,545	12.7
1944	4,368,327	540,333	12.4
1945	4,780,483	556,613	11.6
*1946	5,401,687	742,921	13.8
1947	5,586,725	717,831	12.8
1948	5,656,424	603,698	10.7
1949	5,876,336	492,602	8.4

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* Flood year

x539 against my uncle. I must not reveal my identity to him.

So Rejab sat in the guest-house, and he was thinking: It is my right to marry this girl. How can I prevent the marriage? And Hamed looked around his guest-house and he saw a strange youth of great beauty seated there, and he asked: Who is he? They answered: He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail, and we do not know his name. Then Rejab rose and thanked his host and left the assembly, and he took his horse and rode off. But when he was in the cover of the palm trees he halted and turned [595 839] to look at the house of Hamed, for he thought: I must carry off the girl this very day. He saw that the women's quarter was heavily guarded by slaves and eunuchs armed with swords, and all the doors to the courtyard were guarded, nor was it possible to gain entrance. But he saw [514] also that the House of the Dawn was situated at a distance from the house, that its odours (may they be far from you) should not disturb the people of the house, and he cursed himself and thought: Had I come one day earlier I could have carried off the girl when she comes at dawn to visit the House of the Dawn, but now there is no time to wait another day. Then an idea came to him, and he took his horse and rode at a canter to Samawa.

x539 757 In the bazaar of Samawa, Rejab bought first a woman's dress, and he wrapped it up and concealed it in his cloak. Then he went to the pharmacist and he bought three Roman pills. Now, let it be known to you that in these days we have many and complicated medicines, but then we had only simple remedies, and the Roman pill served both for a man and for his animals, for verily it was said, One for a man, two for a horse, three for a camel. And he took the three Roman pills and he went to the shop of the sweet maker and he bought from him a tray of the

8:Campbell T-5 (no [illegible]) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

finest sweets, and he cut open the largest and the best 539x
sweet and placed inside it the three Roman pills, saying to 757 ●
the sweetmaker: My she-camel will not take pills, therefore I have to conceal them in sweets.

Rejab mounted his horse and rode back to his tent, and 539x
there he ordered his slave Ahmed to load the animals, and to take them to a mound which was eight hours' march out into the desert on a little used route. Then he mounted a fresh horse, and taking the woman's clothes and the sweets under his cloak, he rode out to the house of Hamed. But when he was near to the house he took his horse and tethered it in the concealment of the palm trees near to the House of the Dawn. Then he put on the woman's clothes and hid his own clothes near his horse, and he put the tray of sweets on his shoulder and walked towards the house, crying in a girl's voice: Buy my sweets and buy luck. And his veil he let fall after the manner of gypsies, for his moustache was not grown, and he was beautiful to behold, and the slaves and sentries who saw him thought: What a pretty gypsy girl is this. Perchance we can have some fun with her this night. And they let Rejab enter the courtyard of the harem.

Then the women servants came crowding around Rejab and they wanted to buy sweets, but he gave them not, saying: First I must sell the largest sweet for a piece of silver to her who is about to marry, for it will bring her luck and a fine boy child. And the women cried: Take the gypsy girl to our mistress, that she may be cheered up, for verily she is weeping now, for she likes not this marriage.

They took Rejab and led him into the chamber in which was seated the Lady Aliya, the daughter of Hamed, and she was weeping in a manner to tear the heart. And the maids and servants said to her: Mistress, buy a sweet

x539 And how bitter was the centre of her sweet. For the Lady
● 757 Aliya knew not that the sweet contained three Roman
514 pills, the dose for a camel.

When Rejab reached his horse he stripped off the clothes of a girl and he put on his own clothes, and he strapped on his sword, and he stood by his horse, watching the House of the Dawn and thinking: It will not be long now. And after ten minutes he saw the Lady Aliya come out of the gate of the courtyard and her step was the step of one in haste, and she made towards the House of the Dawn. And when the Lady Aliya was near the House of the Dawn, but before she could enter it, Rejab rode down on her and seized her in his arms and pulled her across his horse, and he covered her mouth with his hand, nor could she utter a scream, and he turned his horse and galloped off in the direction of the desert. And with such dash and speed did he do this that the sentries saw nothing, for they were looking into the courtyard thinking: It is not fitting that we stare at the Lady Aliya while she walks towards the House of the Dawn.

x539 When they had galloped some distance from the house of Hamed, Rejab released his hand from Aliya's mouth, and she looked at his face and she saw that he had the face of the pretty gypsy girl. And she thought: If my captor is indeed a man, and so it appears, then I am indeed in luck, for he is handsomer by far than that horrible old landowner to whom my father was going to marry me. But there was agony and pain in the stomach of Aliya, and she said: O noble stranger, let me down for a moment that I may ease myself. And Rejab replied: Wait until we are in the desert when we may see if we are pursued.

After they had entered the desert, and when there was a clear mile behind them to watch for pursuit, Rejab per-

658 238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase
871 in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or
[875] quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still
inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of 'Iraqī
students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu
of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought
fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education
to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful
efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to
adapt Western methods to 'Iraq instead of blindly adopting
them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in
present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

871 Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern
has been expressed both by 'Iraqīs and by others lest various
tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the
work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension
of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the
standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry
to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and
controversies; and the acquisition by students of the view that
education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that
government positions should be the reward of their school
certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free
itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of
educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the
growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves,
will depend much of the continued progress of 'Iraq.

744 In other fields, a health service has been in existence since
759 the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at
Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations
for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other
hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient
highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in
[758] outlying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small
164 portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

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Additional provision for reconstruction of the Karkh and Kut Hospitals ID	200,000
Repairs to the Maude Hospital (Basra), Amara Hospital, Erbil Hospital and Suleimaniya Hospital	250,000
Infectious disease blocks for the Erbil and Mosul Hospitals	65,000
Maternity block for the Hilla Hospital	25,000
Laundry for Diwaniya Hospital	12,000
Additional wards for Mosul and Kirkuk Hospitals	80,000
Completion of Mental Diseases Hospital	250,000
Additional provision for operating facilities at Royal Hospital	50,000
Children's Ward at Royal Hospital	40,000
Maternity block at Royal Hospital	40,000
Dental equipment for hospitals	20,000
Total ID	1,032,000

As it becomes possible to devote more attention to increasing facilities for treatment, priority should be given generally to the construction of additional dispensaries in the rural areas.

Doctors

At present there is about one practicing doctor to every 7,000 759
of the population, but many of the doctors are concentrated in [758]
Baghdad. Only about 35 doctors are now being registered annually, but with increased accommodations and more laboratory facilities, it will be possible to enroll more students so that at least 50 will qualify as doctors annually. This number may be sufficient for Iraq's needs, provided that an adequate number of suitably trained health officers are available for service in village dispensaries and that nurses and dressers receive more training.

Doctors receive their training at the Royal Faculty of Medicine [874, which was founded in 1927. The syllabus and teaching seem, on the whole, to be good. They emphasize adequately the study of the endemic diseases, although they do not give enough weight to the teaching of public health and preventive medicine. The recent appointment of a professor of public health should give a better balance to the program of instruction. Public health as such should probably be taught as a postgraduate course. It would include such subjects as public health administration, public he

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

759 legislation, water supplies, removal and treatment of waste matter, industrial health, and maternity and child welfare. In the qualifying course it would best be taught as social medicine which might be defined as "the study of those environmental factors which affect health, and the application of that study to the benefit of man with a view to the prevention of disease and promotion of health."

There appears to be an excessive trend towards specialization. In some hospitals specialists have been appointed where there is clearly not enough specialized work for them. Though specialization should by no means be overlooked, a specialist service must depend first upon an adequate supply of general practitioners. Probably the four most needed types of doctors, in addition to physicians, are surgeons, eye specialists, gynecologists and obstetricians.

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369 One of the more urgent requirements is to attract doctors to the provinces. Iraqi doctors have shown little inclination so far to work in villages, partly for financial reasons but not a little because of the great lack of amenities in rural areas. There are no suitable houses for the doctors and their families, few schools, and in many places neither lighting nor a pure water supply. Young doctors who have been trained to require and depend upon all the latest technical aids in diagnosis and to insist upon the use of the most modern forms of treatment generally find that in most villages they cannot practice the medicine they were taught. If the best use is to be made of the doctors available, as much emphasis must be put on improving village facilities as on training doctors for the provinces.

Medical Aides

759 The acute shortage of trained aides is almost more serious than the shortage of doctors. In one hospital there were 21 doctors but only 12 trained nurses. There is a general lack of specially trained laboratory assistants, operating room attendants, radiographers, hospital storekeepers or hospital dispensers, and the like. Health officials, trained primarily for service in village dispensaries, are frequently diverted to hospitals to act as special "medical auxiliaries".

In all, there are about 1,000 nurses and dressers for some 5,000 hospital beds. Trained nurses are few in number so that

Pharmacists are licensed by the Director General of Health. 278
An Inspector of Pharmacies inspects private pharmacies, although 744
it would appear reasonable to place the supervision of these pharmacies more directly under the local chief medical officer.

Certain drugs, such as the anti-biotics and sulphonamides, are 278
supplied in most countries only on a doctor's prescription. In Iraq, however, these drugs can be freely obtained at any pharmacy. Hospitals at times suffer from a shortage of drugs owing to the limited funds made available by the government. Thus patients admitted to hospitals sometimes have had to buy drugs for themselves from pharmacies in the towns. It is to be hoped that future budgetary provisions will be sufficient to supply hospitals with the drugs necessary for their work.

Under the present system, local hospitals send their requisitions to the Director General of Health, through the chief medical officer of the province. These requisitions are scrutinized by the Director of Supplies, who passes them on to the Director General of Health for authority to issue the supplies required. The issues are then made direct to the hospital concerned. It seems that most medical supplies—although by no means all—are purchased from the Crown Agents of the British Government. The central supplies are kept in Baghdad in what seems to be an orderly and well-run department. There is at present some congestion in the drugs and dressings section, and new buildings are required to provide adequate space for the many items stocked.

Because Iraq is a country of great distances with many 758
scattered villages and hamlets, during certain seasons of the year small communities may be cut off from medical aid by snow, rain and mud. It is not possible to place hospitals and dispensaries within easy and certain reach of all people throughout the year. There are, however, many simple household remedies such as the anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, DDT powder, iodine and Epsom salts that could be put up in suitable packages with full directions for use. It is suggested that the government package such remedies for sale in village shops at a price within reach of the local people.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

cal assistant) treat simple conditions—and he could well treat 743 cases of most of the major endemic diseases—but he should also be the village "sanitarian". The village midwives should be based at the health center and draw their supplies there. Vaccination against smallpox—of prime importance in Iraq—and other protective innoculations could, as required, be carried out in the centers. Later, public health nurses could be added to the center staffs.

The number of health centers must necessarily depend, among other things, upon local population density, distances and means of communication. Visiting doctors from the hospital to which the center is attached could call at regular intervals to see special cases referred to them by the health official. By such means as these, medical assistance and advice could be brought within reach of most of the people and the best use be made of the doctor's services. At present the district or *qadha* doctors have no means [758] of transport to visit dispensaries.

The additional health officials who would staff these centers could be selected from among the hospital dressers. Since these men have already had considerable clinical experience, it should be possible to train them in about a year. Because they are much closer to the village people than the visiting doctors, they can do a great deal to help the local people. One Iraqi doctor stated that an experienced and happy health official can do better work in a village than an unhappy and disgruntled newly-qualified doctor.

There are about 400 dispensaries at present, some of which are staffed only by dressers. Assuming 20 medical assistants can be trained annually, it should be possible to staff all the present dispensaries and 200 new ones with medical assistants in less than 20 years. The buildings and staff now used by the School for Health Officials (founded in 1932) could equally well be used as a training school for medical assistants.

Training of Public Health Nurses

As soon as some midwives have been trained, a program 744 should be started for the training of public health nurses. These women would hold positions of considerable responsibility, and every candidate for the course should already be a trained nurse and a midwife.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX

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Diyala	288,912	284,181	319,518	343,626	322,715	357,198
Dulaim	199,063	199,996	239,952	248,285	227,797	222,030
Hilla	320,087	364,942	306,319	436,523	434,789	408,278
Kerbela	375,591	308,693	397,757	356,427	428,911	431,666
Kirkuk	133,571	168,809	229,044	209,588	202,219	206,556
Kut	188,978	230,255	202,970	211,061	234,522	257,991
Muntafiq	247,293	255,185	297,433	327,114	277,494	285,306
Suleimaniya	141,406	146,185	194,126	193,919	203,251	187,427
Totals	4,368,325	4,780,483	5,401,687	5,586,725	5,656,424	5,876,336

164 462 312 744 provinces, and conducts research and field investigations on the distribution and the control of the disease and the intermediate snail host. In the 7 years 1944-50, from 15,800 to 27,300 persons were treated annually in government hospitals and dispensaries. 164 758 The disease is considered commonplace in most areas, however, and probably not over 5 to 6 per cent of the infected individuals seek treatment under ordinary conditions. 743 164 Since 1949, special dispensaries have been established in Baghdad, Basra and Kufa, while mobile clinics tour the most seriously infected districts. In 1950, there were 11 mobile units for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and hookworm infection among the rural populations.

164 361 Ancylostomiasis. Ancylostomiasis is widespread in the irrigated areas, but the exact distribution and severity of the infection in the different provinces are not accurately known. [132] *Ancylostoma duodenale* is the only species found in the foci studied. The infection rates are generally estimated at 10 to 20 per cent in the northern provinces and at 40 per cent in the southern. They are especially high in the Amarah and the Al Qurnah regions, but decrease toward the south, and are relatively low in the districts along the Shatt al Arab. 164 742 In a study reported in 1939,[47] fecal specimens from apparently healthy men, 18 to 20 years of age, from various parts of the country were examined for hookworm ova. The presence of ova was detected in 25 per cent of the specimens from 125 men from Baghdad and in 46 per cent from 135 men from the rural districts of Baghdad *liwa*. Comparable examinations revealed ova in the specimens from 26 per cent of the individuals examined from Diyala *liwa* and from 25 per cent of the individuals from Dulaim. The degree of infection is usually mild, but serious cases with hemoglobin indices as low as 10 per cent are not infrequent.

164 758 742 Treatment facilities are provided by the schistosomiasis control units, as well as by the government hospitals and dispensaries.

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164 744 An ancylostomiasis section is incorporated in the Department of Endemic Diseases, and a program for the improvement of rural sanitation is being developed by the health authorities.

164 136 742 OTHER HELMINTH INFECTIONS. A large proportion of the inhabitants harbor one or more types of intestinal worms. Ascariasis predominates in the northern and the central provinces. Heavy infections, often with intestinal obstruction, are common. In the studies made on groups of men of 18 to 20 years of age, as indicated above, ova of *Ascaris lumbricoides* were found in the fecal specimens from 10 per cent of the 125 individuals examined in Baghdad city. In the provinces, ova were detected in fecal samples from 9 per cent of 135 persons from Baghdad, from 15 per cent of 145 persons from Dulaim and from 13 per cent of 309 persons from Diyala.

164 136 232 Enterobiasis, trichuriasis and, to a lesser extent, strongyloidiasis are prevalent. *Trichostrongylus*, a parasite of sheep and goats which sometimes infects man, is widely distributed in the Shatt al Arab region. Infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are numerous. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is often encountered, but not as widely as in Syria and other Arab countries where more raw meat is customarily consumed. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is occasionally observed in the Christian communities.

164 136 232 742 Hydatid disease is endemic, especially in the central provinces. Stray dogs are numerous and serve as primary reservoirs of infection. In a survey published in 1940,[48] adults of *Echinococcus granulosus* were found in 18 per cent of 123 street dogs examined in Baghdad. Hydatid cysts were seen in the carcasses of 12 per cent of 2,347 sheep and goats slaughtered in the municipal abattoir and in 25 per cent of 223 cattle.

164 232 758 **Other Infections.** Brucellosis is enzootic among goats, sheep and cattle, and sporadic human infections result from the consumption of cheese, *leban* and other unboiled

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milk products, or from contact with in- 164
fected animals. From 5 to 97 cases were 232
treated annually in government institutions 758
in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination 742
of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to 164
the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 232
1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella
antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br.
melitensis* was isolated from 5 of the 13
samples from which bacteriologic cultures
were made.

DISEASES SPREAD CHIEFLY THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the 164
most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49,
from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and
from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuber-
culosis were recorded annually. Such figures
are of little value in assessing the problem,
however, due to inadequate reporting and
the shortage of diagnostic and treatment
facilities. Local authorities estimate that
the prevalence of latent or active infections
approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in
many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and
Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas.
Widespread undernutrition and low stand- 164
ards of living, associated with overcrowd- 146
ing and ignorance of the basic principles of 511
hygiene, are factors contributing to the 165
spread of the disease. The death rates are
known to be high, but little precise infor-
mation is available. It is believed that a
considerable number of tuberculosis deaths
are erroneously attributed to pneumonia
and other respiratory infections. Moreover, [183]
the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit
the presence of tuberculosis in the family
due to the stigma customarily attached to
the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an aver- 164
age of 760 cases were treated in government 758
hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of
about 25 per cent. The maximum number
of cases occurred in the group from 16 to
30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. 164
Involvement of the bones or the glands ac-
counts for a large proportion of the non-

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countered. The prevalence rarely exceeds 5 164
to 20 cases a year, but, in 1948, outbreaks
totaling 185 cases were recorded. Rheumatic
fever is one of the most important diseases
of childhood, particularly in Baghdad. From
10,000 to 23,000 cases were treated annually [758]
in the government hospitals and dispensaries
throughout the country in 1944-49.
Poliomyelitis was formerly regarded as sporadic,
but cases are being recognized with
increasing frequency. With improved diagnostic
facilities, 70 to 100 cases have been
reported annually since 1949 from the children's
hospital in Baghdad.

DISEASES SPREAD OR CONTRACTED CHIEFLY THROUGH CONTACT

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal 164
disease are encountered, especially in the
urban communities. Syphilis predominates
among the recognized cases; congenital
syphilis is common. The prevalence of the
disease in Baghdad and other cities is estimated
locally at between 2 and 10 per
cent. Chancroid and gonorrhea are widespread,
but the extent of infection in the
general population is not accurately known.
Lymphogranuloma venereum and granuloma
inguinale are relatively rare. The cases
of venereal disease treated in government
institutions averaged about 38,600 annually
in the 6 years 1944-49. Roughly 65 per cent
were diagnosed as syphilis, 26 per cent as
gonorrhea and 9 per cent as chancroid.
Treatment is provided by the health authorities [758]
in the various general hospitals
and dispensaries, as well as in 2 special
venereal disease hospitals.

Bejel is widely distributed among the 164
nomadic and the seminomadic peoples in 361
the Tigris and the Euphrates valleys and 511
around the marshes and the lakes in the
lower delta region. Apparently a form of
syphilis transmitted by nonvenereal contact,
the disease is characterized by a predominance
of mucocutaneous lesions, usually
with a high degree of oral and pharyngeal
involvement. It is associated with primitive
conditions of living, and is most extensive

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164 where the infection was introduced by
869 refugees from Amarah and has spread in the *serifa* settlements and the slum sections of the city.

744 A syphilis and bejel control program was
164 initiated in 1950 by the government health authorities, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. A dispensary and training center and research laboratories are maintained at the headquarters in Baghdad, while field units conduct surveys and mass treatment campaigns in the provinces. Investigations on the distribution and the relative prevalence of the infection, the significance of possible
[758] insect vectors, the most effective methods of treatment and the radiologic and the serologic aspects of the disease are being carried forward by the headquarters and field personnel.

164 Diseases of the Eyes. Trachoma is
758 widespread, and is regarded by many as one of the most important endemic diseases in the country. The cases treated in government institutions usually average over
164 500,000 a year. The infection rates are uniformly high in the central provinces, and, in 1950, were calculated at over 233 per 1,000 population in Baghdad, 195 in Kerbela, 140 in Diyala and 102 in Hilla *liwas*. In the remaining provinces they ranged from 24 to 70 per 1,000. The density of population and the concentration of medical facilities in central Iraq cast some doubt, however, that such figures are representative of the degree of infection in the different regions. Cases of advanced trachoma are common, while local authorities estimate that 25 to 40 per cent of the children in many districts suffer from some form of the disease. Statistics from the government hospitals and dispensaries for the 15 years from 1929 through 1943 show that 53 per cent of all the eye diseases treated and 26 to 36 per cent of the total infections were trachomatous in origin.

Conjunctivitis, including both infectious and noninfectious types, is almost equally

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seasonal distribution of the different species 361
of malarial parasites. *Plasmodium falciparum* 164
appears to predominate in most localities with a moderate to high rate of endemicity, as well as during epidemics in all parts of the country. *P. vivax* is also widespread. It is often observed in the blood of infected individuals, even in hyperendemic areas, during the nontransmission season, and the local authorities state that it is unusually difficult to eradicate certain strains in the course of treatment. *P. malariae* is reported more or less sporadically. In certain areas in northern Iraq, it is being encountered with increasing frequency, and some evidence exists that it may be found to take the place of *P. vivax* as the principal species concerned with clinical relapses. Among the 2,865 to 4,281 758
cases of malaria treated annually in the 164
hospitals and the dispensaries of the Iraq 136
Petroleum Company in 1946 through 1950, from 8 to 53 per cent were identified as *P. vivax* infections, from 0.7 to 7 per cent as *P. falciparum* and up to 8 per cent as *P. malariae*. The remainder were diagnosed on a clinical basis. *P. ovale* was reported recently, but the origin of the infection was obscure. Blackwater fever is rare, although cases are sometimes seen in Basra and in the northern highlands.

Malaria control measures have been carried on in limited areas under the auspices 744
of governmental or other agencies. The 164
Department of Endemic Diseases of the Ministry of Health conducts anopheline control and treatment programs in highly endemic areas throughout the country through subordinate units in central, southern and northern Iraq. A rural health and malaria control project was initiated in the hyperendemic Tanjero valley in Sulaimaniya *liwa* in 1952, in co-operation with the World Health Organization.

Rickettsial Infections. Outbreaks of 136
louse-borne typhus recur almost annually, 164
but are seldom extensive, except under abnormal conditions, as during war periods. The infection is frequently introduced by 080

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164 369 is endemic in the alluvial plain region, within a radius of about 100 miles around Baghdad, which is one of the major foci in the Middle East. There the infection rates average 20 to 60 per cent, and probably approach 95 per cent in many localities, especially in the older parts of the city. Outside of this traditional focus, the infection is distributed irregularly. Some of the agricultural districts to the south are relatively free from the disease, but in the more compact towns and villages the infection rates are as high as 40 per cent. In Basra and Muntafiq *liwas*, the extent of infection is slight, and even in the towns the prevalence probably does not exceed 3 to 4 per cent. North of Baghdad the disease appears to be confined to isolated foci. It is widespread in the city of Mosul and in the towns of Beled, Samarrah and ʻAqra, but is almost completely absent from the steppe country and from the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan.

164 158 In the 6-year period 1944-49, the cases of Oriental sore treated annually in government institutions ranged between a minimum of 2,910 in 1948 and a maximum of 10,502 in 1945. All ages are affected, but most of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the greatest susceptibility between 1 and 4 years of age. Multiple lesions [511] are frequent, particularly among individuals living in congested and unhygienic surroundings. Ulcerative sores predominate, but the nodular type is seen in a large percentage of the cases. Secondary tuberculoid lesions, arising in healing ulcers, are also common in children. The largest number of cases is usually observed in August, September and October. *Phlebotomus sergenti* is apparently the only important vector in [136] Iraq, as in Pakistan. Cutaneous infections occur among the dogs and the cats found in the cities, but they are thought to play a minor role in the spread of the human disease.

164 369 Visceral leishmaniasis, or kala-azar, is suspected of being sporadic in the northern part of the country, although up to 1950

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Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded
civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of
French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession
and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated
State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the
shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties
of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired
mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments.
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on 647
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the
Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the American School of Oriental Research founded in 1923 and the 172
British School founded in 1929 maintained headquarters in Baghdad, and both published the results of their researches.

In the field of Public Health the Government services had 744
achieved much, but not the impossible. They had faced an im- 164
mense field to cover and to conquer, had started from nothing, and had been always restricted by lack of funds and trained officials; and meanwhile, inevitably, the disease- or weakness-producing factors in the territory, and the apathy and conservatism of its people, continued. The problem of general malnutrition and resulting lack of physical vigour was, in fact, the problem of poverty: the cure, still distant, lay as much or more in increased wealth as in increased enlightenment; and the same was true, in spite of active and multiplying maternity and child-welfare clinics, of an infant death-rate still tragically high. Little, save increasingly comprehensive and practical study, had yet been done to combat the curse of hookworm, malaria, or bilharzia; a comprehensive effort against these diseases and against tuberculosis, eye-disease, and the typhoid group must call insistently for more time, more funds, and more specialized staff. Steps taken against epidemic disease had been successful; plague and cholera had scarcely appeared for a quarter-century, and smallpox was well handled with
full modern resources. Urban sanitation had been improved, [364]
sewage schemes adopted, and sanitary inspector training developed; but conditions in this respect over most of the territory remained wholly primitive, and the majority of 'Iraqi doctors were little
interested in public health administration. The country at large 743
was served by some eighty hospitals, of which three-quarters were general and a quarter specialized for fevers, mental and venereal diseases, leprosy (at 'Amara), children's and chest and eye diseases; a quarter of the whole were in Baghdad. Non-governmental hospitals were those of the oil companies, foreign missions, and the minority communities. The Jewish Mir Elias Hospital was still open, for patients of all creeds; all other Jewish hospitals and dispensaries had been closed. The Railways, the Port, the Police, and
the Army maintained their separate Medical services. The supply 759 ●
of doctors, thanks to the Royal Medical College, had much improved since the thirties, but some reliance on foreigners was still necessary; some thirty of these were so employed in 1951 and recruitment of more was in progress. Registered practitioners in all numbered some 300 in 1945, 420 in 1949. The reluctance of 'Iraqi doctors to serve in the remoter regions—or, indeed, else-
where than in Baghdad—was still an embarrassment. Neverthe- 743
less, the busy and valued hospitals and dispensaries maintained in all parts of 'Iraq were playing a major stabilizing as well as a

658 238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase
871 in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or
[875] quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of 'Iraqī students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to adapt Western methods to 'Iraq instead of blindly adopting them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

871 Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern has been expressed both by 'Iraqis and by others lest various tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and controversies; and the acquisition by students of the view that education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that government positions should be the reward of their school certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves, will depend much of the continued progress of 'Iraq.

744 In other fields, a health service has been in existence since
759 the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in out-
[158] lying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small
164 portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

164 therefore vitally important that more attention be devoted in the future to the preventive aspects of public health work.

Prevention of Disease

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751 Many measures could be taken to strengthen the preventive aspect of public health work. Doctors and nurses must, above all, be imbued with its importance, for they have countless opportunities to impress on their patients the need for proper hygiene and sanitation. Thus social medicine, involving the study of the environmental factors bearing on health and of appropriate measures for the prevention of disease, should be taught as part of the qualifying course in the medical school at Baghdad. Far more emphasis also needs to be placed on the teaching of hygiene in elementary and secondary schools. Children should be taught not only good personal habits, but also the importance of sanitation in and around the home. Special classes might be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases, by the school medical officer whenever possible. Health education must likewise be given an important place in the curriculum of teachers' training colleges and special courses in the prevention of diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be provided in the School of Agriculture and the School of Engineering. Hospitals should be an object lesson in hygiene and every effort made to impress on patients the importance of personal and domestic hygiene. The interest of adults in public health can be stimulated by visual education and by organizing "health weeks", the first of which was held in Diwaniya with conspicuous success during the Mission's stay. The army and police have an excellent opportunity to teach habits conducive to good health. Prospective farmers for new settlement projects should be medically examined to restrict, as far as possible, the introduction of endemic diseases into these settlements. To prevent water pollution it would be desirable to locate villages in such settlements away from irrigation canals wherever possible.

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759 The Mission strongly recommends that the number of village dispensaries, which is now over 400, be gradually increased and that they be equipped to serve as public health centers. Such centers would be simple in function, aimed primarily at providing elementary medical and health assistance to as many people as possi-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ble. As conditions permit, the scope of their services could be 743
expanded. At the present stage it will usually be sufficient to have 759
a specially trained medical assistant rather than a doctor in charge. At present there is no separate cadre of medical assistants. It is therefore suggested that the existing School for Health Officials be converted into a training school for such assistants or aides. The 744
medical assistant in charge of a dispensary will need to consider himself as the village sanitation officer and enlist the help of the village elder in organizing a cooperative effort to keep the village clean. He will also need the assistance of a village midwife and, at a later stage, of a public health nurse. The traditional midwife, if properly trained, could have great influence in improving the standards of personal and domestic hygiene, in combatting infant mortality and giving simple advice on the care of infants. Such midwives, when drawn from the ranks of the people whom they will serve, will have a ready entry into homes and will be able to speak in terms which will be readily understood. It is therefore recommended that a school for training such midwives, recruited from the villages, be established. A similar school should be set up for town midwives. It would be desirable to have three foreign midwives appointed to direct this training program.

In the cities a considerable improvement in sanitation could be effected through the creation of a sanitary corps. Such a corps should be charged with house-to-house inspection to detect health nuisances and prevent fly and mosquito breeding, with the inspection of eating-houses, foodstuffs and food handlers, and with the improvement of environmental hygiene in general. A foreign public health or sanitary engineer would be required to organize this service and establish the facilities and courses for training appropriate numbers of sanitary overseers and sanitary inspectors who, in turn, would impart the necessary instruction to the house-to-house inspectors.

The prevention of hookworm, malaria and bilharzia warrants 164
special attention. These diseases are widely prevalent and through 744
their general debilitating effects materially lower productivity. The incidence of hookworm would be reduced by improvements in sewage disposal, the closing of open drains, provision of suitable latrines and the wearing of shoes. Bilharzia, which is transmitted

of hospitals may eventually have to be increased, it is of greater importance today to build more dispensaries. 743

Improvements in hospital administration are also desirable. As long as hospital administration remains in the hands of doctors, they should be given a course in this subject after qualifying.

There is at present one doctor to every 7,000 in the population. 759 With increased accommodations and laboratory facilities at the medical schools, the number of doctors qualifying annually can be increased from 35 to 80. While low, the number of doctors is not seriously inadequate provided they are well distributed and supplemented by sufficient well-trained medical auxiliaries. A large number are concentrated in Baghdad, however, and there is an excessive trend toward specialization. Far more general practitioners are needed in the provinces, but it is clear that better housing accommodations and higher pay will be necessary to attract them.

Among the medical auxiliaries the most serious shortage is that of qualified nurses. In one hospital, for instance, it was noted that there were only 12 trained nurses as compared with 21 doctors. The Mission recommends that a school for practical nurses be established in each province, beginning with Basra, Mosul and the Karkh hospital in Baghdad province. It would also be desirable to set up local schools for male "dressers" who are now largely self-taught. With proper training dressers can relieve nurses of many of their duties. The Mission suggests that two foreign nursing sisters be employed in each province to supervise nursing and give instruction, and that the staff at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad be strengthened by the addition of five more foreign nursing sisters. At present Moslem women are not attracted to nursing. The employment of more foreign nurses may help to demonstrate that nursing is a highly respected, skilled profession abroad. More women might also be inclined to adopt a nursing career if nurses were provided with better housing and given status comparable to that of school teachers.

Aside from nurses and dressers, hospitals lack enough well-trained laboratory assistants, radiographers, storekeepers, physiotherapists and operating room attendants. Special courses should be instituted to train personnel in each of these categories. Refer-

● 759 ence has already been made to the importance of special training for medical assistants who will generally be in charge of village dispensaries.

278 Many people will continue to be far removed from hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies. For these it is important to make available such simple "household remedies" as anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, tincture of iodine, DDT powder and Epsom salts. It is suggested that the government make arrangements to supply through village shops such drugs in suitable packets carrying simple directions for use. The general availability of these remedies at a reasonable price will also help to reduce the large number of visits to dispensaries for comparatively trivial ailments.

Organization of Public Health Administration

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647 The measures outlined above require a number of changes in the administration of the public health program. The present organization, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, does not lend itself to an effective attack on the problem of disease prevention. Like most of the other central administrations, it suffers from excessive centralization. There is too little contact with other ministries whose activities are of importance to public health. The Mission suggests that a public health administrator, together with an epidemiologist and a sanitary expert, be recruited abroad to advise the Minister on the organization and further development of the health services. The epidemiologist would concentrate on the principal endemic diseases and the sanitary expert would advise on measures to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene. While a detailed reorganization should await their advice, it would seem best to group health services according to two main divisions, one concerned with the curative, the other with the preventive services.

In the future the reorganized health services will need to work much more closely with the departments concerned with irrigation and agriculture and, on the problem of health education, with the Ministry of Education. In carrying out a much needed decentralization considerable responsibility must, above all, be placed on the chief medical officer in every province. This officer, who now also carries on a private practice, should be given more adequate pay so

ANNEX F

PUBLIC HEALTH

I. Introduction

Extent of Progress Made in Public Health

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In the past 30 years health services in Iraq have improved 743
considerably. In 1918 the country had only one hospital, con- 164
trasted with the present 89 hospitals (4,812 in-patient beds or one bed per 1,000 people) and 448 dispensaries. Control measures including the use of vaccines, particularly for smallpox, have cut down the incidence of epidemics during the last few years. Cholera has not occurred since 1931 and the plague not since 1935. Smallpox and louse-borne typhus also seem to be under control. An Institute of Endemic Diseases has been set up with headquarters in Baghdad. Steps have already been taken to control malaria and a good deal of information is being assembled on schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and ankylostomiasis. Nevertheless, the main endemic diseases—malaria, schistosomiasis, trachoma, and ankylostomiasis—are still very common.

In 1949 there were 797 doctors practicing in Iraq, of whom 759
419 or 53 percent were in Baghdad. There were about 387 government pharmacies and 252 pharmacists working in private pharmacies in the larger towns.

The doctors are supplemented by 265 health officials, originally trained primarily to staff village dispensaries, and 400 nurses and 659 dressers (male hospital attendants), about one to every four or five hospital beds. There are also private nurses, midwives and dressers, and 130 public vaccinators who are employed on a perma-
nent basis. In 1948 and 1949, 3,061,955 and 2,080,777 smallpox [751]
vaccinations were made (the 1947 census showing a total population of 4,799,500).

Malaria, trachoma and bronchitis were the main hospital 164
cases; the dysenteries, anemias, wounds, syphilis and phthisis were 757

164 757 also frequent causes for hospitalization. In 1949 there were 5,876,336 visits to health institutions for treatment.

Public Health Budget

744 652 164 In 1951-52, ID 2,089,180 (7.6 percent of the total budget) were allocated to health services, as compared to ID 187,672 in 1931. Because of the prevalence of endemic diseases and the constant danger of epidemics, it would not be unreasonable to spend 10 percent of the total budget on health services.

● 759 Salaries for personnel in the medical service appear to be low in relation to the cost of living, although they are not low compared to other civil service salaries. The basic salaries, exclusive of cost-of-living allowances, range from ID 5.15 a month for a dresser, to ID 25 for a doctor and ID 80 for a director-general.

Current Health Conditions

165 In spite of the undeniable progress in health conditions, there is need for further improvement. Definitive data are lacking on total birth and death rates, but some figures are available on the infant mortality rate, which is probably the best index of the social circumstances of an area. For Baghdad, the recorded rate in 1949 was 128 deaths per thousand births. Iraqi doctors who have worked in different parts of the country consider the rate to be about 250 per thousand, on the average, compared with about 34 deaths per thousand live births in highly developed countries.

164 Among the people as a whole, malaria seems to be the chief killer, especially in country districts. In the main cities the leading causes of deaths were intestinal diseases, tuberculosis and respiratory diseases. These diseases and trachoma seriously affect the ability of men and women to work efficiently and are among the major causes of low productivity of labor in Iraq. For example, candidates for the police service are frequently rejected because of defective eyesight and what is characterized as "poor physique" associated with chronic malaria, schistosomiasis, etc. About 20 percent of the young men liable for military service are found to be unfit.

Heart trouble, cancer and other organic disturbances are far outnumbered by diseases which are essentially social in origin. Most of them can be traced to lack of hygiene, poor sanitation and

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Additional provision for reconstruction of the Karkh and Kut Hospitals ID	200,000	654 743
Repairs to the Maude Hospital (Basra), Amara Hospital, Erbil Hospital and Suleimaniya Hospital	250,000	
Infectious disease blocks for the Erbil and Mosul Hospitals	65,000	
Maternity block for the Hilla Hospital	25,000	
Laundry for Diwaniya Hospital	12,000	
Additional wards for Mosul and Kirkuk Hospitals	80,000	
Completion of Mental Diseases Hospital	250,000	
Additional provision for operating facilities at Royal Hospital	50,000	
Children's Ward at Royal Hospital	40,000	
Maternity block at Royal Hospital	40,000	
Dental equipment for hospitals	20,000	
Total ID	1,032,000	

As it becomes possible to devote more attention to increasing facilities for treatment, priority should be given generally to the construction of additional dispensaries in the rural areas.

Doctors

At present there is about one practicing doctor to every 7,000 of the population, but many of the doctors are concentrated in Baghdad. Only about 35 doctors are now being registered annually, but with increased accommodations and more laboratory facilities, it will be possible to enroll more students so that at least 50 will qualify as doctors annually. This number may be sufficient for Iraq's needs, provided that an adequate number of suitably trained health officers are available for service in village dispensaries and that nurses and dressers receive more training. 759 [758]

Doctors receive their training at the Royal Faculty of Medicine, which was founded in 1927. The syllabus and teaching seem, on the whole, to be good. They emphasize adequately the study of the endemic diseases, although they do not give enough weight to the teaching of public health and preventive medicine. The recent appointment of a professor of public health should give a better balance to the program of instruction. Public health as such should probably be taught as a postgraduate course. It would include such subjects as public health administration, public hea [874]

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

759 legislation, water supplies, removal and treatment of waste matter, industrial health, and maternity and child welfare. In the qualifying course it would best be taught as social medicine which might be defined as "the study of those environmental factors which affect health, and the application of that study to the benefit of man with a view to the prevention of disease and promotion of health."

There appears to be an excessive trend towards specialization. In some hospitals specialists have been appointed where there is clearly not enough specialized work for them. Though specialization should by no means be overlooked, a specialist service must depend first upon an adequate supply of general practitioners. Probably the four most needed types of doctors, in addition to physicians, are surgeons, eye specialists, gynecologists and obstetricians.

758 One of the more urgent requirements is to attract doctors
369 to the provinces. Iraqi doctors have shown little inclination so far to work in villages, partly for financial reasons but not a little because of the great lack of amenities in rural areas. There are no suitable houses for the doctors and their families, few schools, and in many places neither lighting nor a pure water supply. Young doctors who have been trained to require and depend upon all the latest technical aids in diagnosis and to insist upon the use of the most modern forms of treatment generally find that in most villages they cannot practice the medicine they were taught. If the best use is to be made of the doctors available, as much emphasis must be put on improving village facilities as on training doctors for the provinces.

Medical Aides

759 The acute shortage of trained aides is almost more serious than the shortage of doctors. In one hospital there were 21 doctors but only 12 trained nurses. There is a general lack of specially trained laboratory assistants, operating room attendants, radiographers, hospital storekeepers or hospital dispensers, and the like. Health officials, trained primarily for service in village dispensaries, are frequently diverted to hospitals to act as special "medical auxiliaries".

In all, there are about 1,000 nurses and dressers for some 5,000 hospital beds. Trained nurses are few in number so that

standards of nursing are not high. However, the three-year nursing 759 course given at the Royal Hospital is comprehensive and includes all the common branches of nursing.

Unfortunately in Iraq, as in many other Moslem countries, [554] nursing is not at present looked upon as a suitable career for Moslem girls of good family. Probably one of the best means of inducing girls to take up nursing is to demonstrate through the employment of foreign nursing sisters that nursing is regarded abroad as a highly qualified and reputable profession. More women might also be attracted to this profession if they were given suitable living quarters and accorded a position in the government service equivalent to that of elementary school teachers.

The one central nursing school in Baghdad will not supply 759 the needs of the country. Since many young girls will not leave 874 their homes to go to school, it will be necessary to set up local schools for nurses and also for dressers. Training for practical nurses should be started at Basra, Mosul and Karkh hospitals and eventually every province should have such a school. Candidates should have had at least six years of preliminary schooling and the course itself should last a year. It is suggested that two foreign nursing sisters, preferably English-speaking, be appointed to each province to act as nursing supervisor in the chief hospitals and as "principal" of the local nursing schools. It would also be desirable to assign to each school a sister-tutor—a graduate of the central school.

At the same time, nursing supervision needs strengthening in 759 the Royal Hospital where at present there are only three foreign nursing sisters for 680 beds. For efficient operation the Royal Hospital needs the following foreign nursing sisters:

1. One matron
2. One assistant matron
3. One sister tutor
4. One sister for the maternity block
5. One for the children's wards
6. One for infectious diseases hospital, and
7. Two for general duties.

It is most important that every foreign nursing sister should get to know, as quickly as possible, something of the language, mode of life and habits of the people.

● 759 An estimate of the cost of the full scheme follows:

(a)	CAPITAL	
(1)	Quarters for women nurses	ID 125,000
(2)	Demonstration rooms	28,000
(3)	Quarters for foreign sisters[1]	80,000
(4)	Equipment, etc.	7,000
		ID 240,000
(b)	RECURRENT	
	Salaries for foreign sisters (only)	ID 37,000

Training schools are also necessary for hospital storekeepers, laboratory assistants, radiographers and probably for physiotherapists and dispensers. Storekeepers should be appointed to every hospital to preserve equipment and to check the use of expendable items. Dressers, who are already familiar with the names of many articles used in hospital work, would probably be the most suitable candidates for training. The schools could be started with the existing staff and facilities of the Royal Hospital and of the Central Medical Stores, and as each trained group is ready to go to work an appropriate pay scale ought to be established for them.

Pharmacists and Medical Supplies

874 A School of Pharmacy and Chemistry was founded in 1936. The five-year pharmacy course is comprehensive and the facilities for teaching, including laboratories, are good.

278 So far 218 pharmacists have qualified from the school but many have gone into private work and only 64 remain in government service. Apparently the salary paid to a pharmacist working in a private shop is at least twice as high as that paid by the government. Further, a number of qualified pharmacists have recently left the country. With the existing accommodations the school can graduate about 20 pharmacists annually. Meanwhile there are only 64 pharmacists working in the 89 hospitals and in some hospitals the dispensing, including that of poisons, appears to be carried out entirely by health officials.

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[1] It is estimated that 37 foreign nursing sisters would be required: 27 for the 14 provinces (there is already one in Basra); five for the Royal Hospital at Baghdad; and five additional for replacements during sickness and leave.

463 each kind of goods has its special section of the bazaar.
565 The brass- and copper-smiths' quarter rings like a small
441 boiler factory all day long. The artisans who are engaged in producing these commodities form a considerable section of the Mesopotamian city population and are fairly prosperous and contented, much more so than the date gardeners of the outside districts. Supreme over them all stands the Mesopotamian silver worker, whose antimony silver work can scarcely be duplicated anywhere in the world.

463 The professional classes in these Mesopotamian cities
871 are fairly well developed. There are teachers of every
794 sort. Some of them have been trained abroad, but many
177 are indigenous and a very great credit to the schools that have turned them out. There are a number of government schools, and in addition the different religious sects maintain schools of their own. In these days when western education is in great demand, the schools of the Jews and the Christians are patronized by an increasing number of Mohammedans. No local medical profession has
463 been developed as yet, but the wealth and the culture of
759 Mosul, Baghdad and Basra have attracted a considerable number of trained physicians from outside. We have therefore the beginnings of a medical profession, and although it is not yet indigenous, it will soon become so. Its ethics are not of a very high order; the campaign of the American College of Surgeons to abolish fee-splitting would not make much headway among Mesopotamian doctors, but time will develop ethical standards, and at the worst the profession is a long way in advance
463 of the quacks that infest Arabia proper. There is also a
693 well-established group of lawyers. One of the results of the governing of the country for hundreds of years by

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MN 1

offers 5-year courses for the training of fully qualified pharmacists. 874

PERSONNEL

Physicians. The physicians registered in Iraq in 1950 totaled 811. Of this number, 543 were employed full or part time with governmental agencies. One hundred and ninety-two doctors were in private practice, and 6 were retired. Seventy were non-Iraqi, most of whom were working with the government, with the oil industry or with philanthropic organizations. The distribution of medical practitioners is extremely uneven; 444, or almost one half of the total in the country, were located in Baghdad province. The proportion of doctors in the Baghdad area averaged 55 to 70 per 100,000 population, as against 4 to 6 in the rural provinces. 759

Dentists. The registration for 1950 included 72 dentists, 29 in government service and 43 in private practice. Over 86 per cent of the latter group were established in Baghdad.

Nurses. There were 601 nurses in 1950, 497 of whom were employed in government institutions. The majority are probably graduates of the School of Nursing and Midwifery. Five British nurses were affiliated with the Ministry in 1951.

Other. Also in 1950, 803 midwives were licensed as "qualified" midwives, while an additional 9 were fully trained. Other medical personnel in the country included 69 pharmacists, 236 health officials or medical assistants, 341 vaccinators and 1,002 dressers.

DISEASES

The information available regarding the distribution and the prevalence of infectious diseases is sketchy. The official statistics compiled from the records of the government hospitals and dispensaries are derived only from institutions under the jurisdiction of medical officers, and are therefore limited in scope. The reporting of cases of 164

p. 35(B)

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East

IRAQ MHI

creased. Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Iraq has all the 311
necessary requisites for a sound and rapid economic development, especially in the agricultural sector. It has a very considerable quantity of land ready for immediate cultivation, so defined by the most conservative standards, and with modern methods very great stretches now defined as uncultivable could be improved and brought into the cultivable class; it has an 3N–
abundance of water for irrigation as well as for power, and it has at its disposal enormous quantities of cheap fuel both in petroleum and natural gas.

What, then, have been the economic, educational, health and 161
social conditions of the country? As regards the size and growth of the population, even today, more than thirty years since the creation of the Kingdom of Iraq, it would be very difficult to state categorically the percentage increase of the population. The accuracy of the figure advanced by the October 1947 census has been questioned by the International Bank Mission.[7]

Despite substantial strides in public health—an increased 165
number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors—during the first 164
thirty years of the existence of the Kingdom, the Bank Mission reported in 1951 that the infant mortality rate was very high, "perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births," and that there was a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and dysentery. Malaria was reported to cause 50,000 deaths every year. In 1948 no less than 6,657,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria and 524,740 trachoma.[8] In 1944 [759]
the total number of doctors in the country was 528; in 1951 it was reported that there was one doctor to every 7,000 in the population, which would make a total of about 915 doctors, but a large percentage of them were concentrated in Bagdad.[9]

There can be no doubt that educationally the country pro- 871
gressed considerably from the stage in which it was in 1921, but all in all the sum total was not very impressive; the rate of

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[7] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 126.

[8] *Ibid.*, 49.

[9] *Ibid.*, 53; Hashim Al Witry, *Health Services in Iraq* (1944), 8. In 1945 there were, according to a British report, 569 doctors registered in Iraq. Since 308 were in Bagdad, this made approximately one doctor for every 15,400 in the population in the provinces, and one doctor to every 2,700 in Bagdad. Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, *Iraq* (1949), 80-81.

x539 O Moon, you shine on youths and maidens,
Where is my lover, where is he,
He who will love me with the strongest love?

And the moon, ashamed at the waste of such beauty, would hide behind the nearest cloud.

x539 And one day Sheikh Mizeil came on his daughter and
461 found her weeping, so he took her hand and said to her:
762 O my little one, know you that we are more unfortunate
● than the poorest beggar of the City of Peace. For were I of the general run of men, I could work as a clerk, or as a washerman, or even as a porter or sweeper, and so gain a little money. But our name is a known name and it is shameful for me to work, or that any should know of our poverty. Therefore starvation faces us, and it is in my mind that we should cut the veins in our wrists, and so depart, but first take you this the last of my gold and make yourself a dress fit for a woman of our family, that when the neighbours come in and lay out our bodies for burial they may find you dressed as befits our dignity.

x539 So Nura put on her veil and she took the gold coins from her father, though the tears flowed from her eyes. And Nura went to the market and she went to the sellers of fine stuffs. And she bought the finest silk. Yet there was still some of the money unspent, so she went into a great shop, thinking: I will buy sequins with the last of the money and cover the dress with sequins, that in death they who find me will remember me. So she went to the merchant, who was named Jassim, and she asked of him for sequins, and he showed her jar after jar filled with the finest sequins of every known colour, and also of colours that are no longer remembered. And she gazed at the sequins and she gazed at her silk that she might exactly match its delicate colour. And while comparing the

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

364 764 Unfortunately the fact that this work is practical benevolence of the finest sort and carried on in the finest spirit has not served to commend sanitary regulations to the Arab, who regards them as a nuisance, a hindrance to business and an infringement of his personal liberty.

871 185 177 Mesopotamia has also grappled with the whole problem of education most courageously. An educational system has been organized which includes normal schools for teachers and a large number of primary and secondary schools for both boys and girls. There are a smaller number of high schools, and a central university is planned. Fifteen years ago the dominant European influence in this community was French, and no one could claim to be educated who could not talk that language fluently. There was a marked change a little later, and before the Great War German was the commanding influence. Now, of course, the predominant western influence is English, and it seems likely to remain so, for commerce will probably talk the English language for many years, whatever political upheavals the country may be destined to experience. It is true that the educational system has not as yet taken very deep root and that much of the work done is very superficial, but it is none the less exceedingly creditable and encouraging. Moreover, this western system of education will probably be more or less permanent, for it will always be the gateway to remunerative positions.

185 177 In general, the people of Mesopotamia have been brought into contact with conditions of modern life and are anxious for further progress. New wants have been created, and a certain increase in the commerce of the country is the inevitable result. All manner of western dress goods and shoes are to be found in the bazaars, as

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 IT is said that in the days of Haroun er Rashid there was a youth named Jamil, and he was the son of a cloth merchant in the bazaar of Baghdad the City of Peace, and only upon God is there belief.

Now, there came a year in which the father of Jamil died, and he was one of the richest merchants in the City of Peace. And Jamil inherited from his father his shop, and the cloths and silks in the shop, and a chest containing gold of such weight that it took twenty men to lift it.

[764] Jamil mourned for his father for many months, and he took his body and buried it in Holy Nejaf, and he returned to Baghdad and sat in the shop to conduct business in place of his father. And in the evenings he used to take a boat, and visit the islands and eat of roast fish and drink arak. But one evening he was passing in his boat when he looked at the window of a house which stood in a garden close to the river and he saw in the window a girl. And he looked at the girl and was amazed, for her skin was of the texture of the petals of lilies, though tinged with the colour of roses. And her eyes were like the gazelle. And her breasts were rounded firmly in that shape which is truly the zenith of perfection, and her waist was as slim as a boy's waist. And Jamil thought: I have no desire and no ambition in life other than that I may love this girl.

So Jamil returned to his house, and he did not go to the islands. And he found a discreet woman who was not accustomed to gossip at the well, and from whom death or torture would not drag a secret. And he said to the sage woman: Go to the street of So-and-So, then go to the house which stands in the garden of pomegranate trees, then speak with the woman servants, and find out from them everything concerning the moon-faced girl who lives in that house, and bring me all information

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 cursed them, saying: Know what you have done, fools. You have slain the Ottoman Bey, even the Bey of the Gendarmerie himself. Now take this body and remove it far from my house, that I may not become involved in this affair.

And the slaves Ali and Hamed removed the sheet and they saw that the Bey was even as in the grip of death, and Ali said: I am astonished that we were in search of a soul without a body and we have found a body without a soul. And they asked: But where can we take this body? For wherever we leave it in the town, the Turks will find it, and they will say: The Arabs have slain the Bey of the Gendarmerie. Nor will they cease from arrests and torture until they discover the truth of this matter. And Habiba said: Wrap the body in a blanket and tie it up after the manner of a corpse, and take it to the serai. For

•[764 there is halted near there a caravan from Persia carrying
778] bodies for burial in the holy soil of sacred Nejf. There you may leave this body, for the camels will be unloaded for the night, and you may leave this body with the other bodies, and in the morning they will not notice that there is one body too many, and they will load it up and take it away and bury it in holy Nejf.

And Ali and Hamed put the body of the Turk in a blanket and bound it with ropes after the manner of corpses and took it to the caravan which was halted near the serai. And the camels were unloaded for the night and the corpses had been piled in a big pile, and there was no guard nor sentry over them. For who would steal this merchandise?

And the slaves put the body of the Bey in that pile, but they put him underneath and they piled on him corpses that the fresh corpse might not be on top. And the two

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

slaves, Ali and Hamed, left him and went off to search for 539*
the soul of their comrade, Jaffer.

Now, the Turkish Bey had not been killed by the blow of Ali the slave, but only stunned by it, and after a time his senses returned to him, and he found himself bound in a blanket and he could not move either hand or foot. And he breathed and smelled the smell of corpses, nor could he perceive any other odour.

And he thought: Verily, I am slain, and they have put me with the bodies and they are going to bury me. But my life has been a wicked life and shortly I shall be examined on my fitness to enter paradise. And the Bey wept and his heart was full of repentance, and he commenced to recite verses from the Holy Quran.

Now, the owner of the caravan was in his tent, a 539*
Persian from Shiraz, and he was calculating the profit 764*
which he would have from the bodies; for the relations 778
and heirs of the dead had paid him a sum of money to
transport the bodies from Shiraz to Nejf, and to buy a plot of land in which to bury them, and some had paid a lot of money for expensive land near to the holy shrine and others had paid a little money for land far removed from it, and they had also paid for the expenses of burial and had given donations for the holy shrine. And the Persian caravaneer had the record of these sums in his book.

And he thought: If I continue this journey to Nejf and 539*
disburse all these various sums, then the profit which will remain for me will be small, and it will not recompense me for all this trouble and the everlasting smell of these corpses. Rather should I do another thing, I should dump these bodies in the high desert where none may see them, and the jackals and the vultures will have a profit from

103 Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

582 178 [619] The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still maintained in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

6. The Story of the Lost Soul

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

● 764 788 The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for burial in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

8;Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

and they brought forth from her a fine boy and he lived, 539x but as for Hassan's wife, she died in the pangs and labour of childbirth. Then Hassan asked the slave Ahmed to enquire if there was any woman in the caravan who could nurse the boy, but Ahmed returned and said: Master, we of this caravan are now only of one sex, for those women who were amongst us are dead, and even the camels are not in milk.

Hassan's heart was full of grief and he thought: My √539x beloved wife is dead and now my son will die, and he 766 • ordered Ahmed: Dig a tomb and place in it my wife and my son. Ahmed said: Master, will you, then, bury a living boy? Hassan answered: Is there, then, milk in your breast that you will nurse him? Rather should we leave him to the will of God. So the slave Ahmed dug a tomb and he placed in it the woman and the boy, and the boy still lived.

In the morning after they had buried those who had √539x died of the sickness the caravan marched on, and they came to the valley of Faratos, where they camped for the night. The sickness had not departed from them, and the night was filled with the screams of the dying. And the Prince of the Caravan fell sick and he died on that very night.

And in the morning the slave Ahmed looked around him and he saw that he was the only one of that company to rise from the ground to say the morning prayer, and as for the rest of them they were all in the stillness of death. The slave Ahmed collected the camels and the bags of money and supplies, and he tied the body of his master to a camel, for he thought: It is fitting that the Prince of the Caravan should complete the Pilgrimage.

The slave Ahmed loaded the camels and set out on the road to Mecca, and he arrived there after a journey free kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by 161 Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanageable 182 public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some 795 progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt—gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost [771] much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities.

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial— 563 within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq NHI

(*c*) *Jews*

Until recently Iraq contained a large community of Jews 162
whose families had been settled in the country for hundreds or 563
even thousands of years. They lived mostly in the large towns,
especially Baghdad, in whose economic life they played an 463
important part as merchants, financiers, manufacturers, and 197
members of the professions. There were also Kurdish-speaking Jews in the north, mostly urban traders and craftsmen but also rural cultivators. A law of 1931 gave Jewish communities self-government in their own affairs, and there was a highly organized communal life, with schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In consequence of events in Palestine the majority of Jews left Iraq in 1950–1, mostly for Israel.

(*d*) *Yazidis*

These are vulgarly known as 'devil-worshippers' but, although 162
their religion includes the propitiation of Satan, it might 771
more justly be described as an amalgam of Christian, Muslim, 795
and Magian elements. They are divided between Jebel Sinjar
and the Shaikhan district north of Mosul, speak a Kurdish 197
dialect, except in their rites, where Arabic is used, and are probably of Kurdish origin.

(*e*) *Sabians*

('Baptists'), also called the Mandaeans and the 'Christians 162
of St John'; their religion combines elements of various origins 463
and periods. Most of them are craftsmen—especially silver- 795
smiths—in the large towns.

(*f*) *Shabak*

Of Kurdish origin, who live in the area of the Yazidis and 162
are not clearly distinguished from them; their religion contains 795
Yazidi and extreme Shii elements.

(*g*) *Other Sects*

Include Bahais, Sarlis, Kakais, Qizilbashis, none of them of any political significance.

POLITICAL HISTORY

Written history began in Iraq at the end of the fourth mil- 175
lennium B.C., but archaeological remains from much earlier periods, first in the north and later also in the south, give evidence of palaeolithic man, of agricultural neolithic man and, from the sixth and fifth millennia, of increasing human progress expressed successively in extensive agriculture, copper

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

the Christian goldsmith. We know his house and we 539x
know his shop and we know his name. And as for Daoud, he shook with fear and he said: Verily I am innocent, and as for your sister I have never seen her or known her or heard her name. But one of the brothers struck Daoud with his riding-switch, saying: It is seemly that those about [776]
to die should meet that angel who is appointed to take their souls with dignity, with patience, and with gladness, for he is God's messenger. Therefore, O smith, cease from unmanly pleading and go you to your house, and there prepare your affairs and settle your business and make your peace with the One God. And, if it be the will of God, tomorrow at the time of the dawn prayer, you will meet him whose coming all await and all expect, for he comes to every man at his appointed time, nor can a coward avoid him, nor can a brave man escape him. And as for us, we know your house and we know your shop, and we will be beside you at that time.

Daoud returned to his house, and his hands were shaking and tears flowed from his eyes, and he entered and embraced his wife and acquainted her with his state. And her tears mingled with his tears and her sobs echoed his sobs and they spent an hour in lamentation and in grief. And after they were exhausted with sobbing and weeping, the girl, the wife of Daoud, spoke and she said: O my lover, go from here and go to another city, for only in this way can your life be spared. Does not a caravan march from here at the sixth hour of night, for the time is summer? Wrap you all our store of gold and jewels in a handkerchief and depart.

So Daoud wrapped his wealth in a handkerchief and he covered his face with his headcloth and donned his cloak and left his house and he went to the serai and he

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

539 776 WHAT do you know of El Iraq, you who are boys? I was an old man before the First German War, and I know the country and its history, yet you say there is no monster in the Hor el Hammar. I have seen it, thirty years ago, for this monster takes on the shape of a woman, and it beckons to a man that he may enter the lake, and every twelve years it must eat a man. I have seen it beckoning on the edge of the lake on the nights when there was no moon, but I did not follow it, for I knew its history, and I know that a man must carry a needle when away from his house at night, yet you know nothing of these things, and you are like Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan, who was so ignorant that he desired nothing but money, and who was so foolish that he tried to rob the dead without listening to warnings or heeding cautions that the sons of Adam shall not meddle with magic and strange matters, nor shall they interfere with those that live beyond the end of the world, nor shall they disturb those that await the Last Day.

X539 Abdul Rehman Abu Sultan was a carpenter of Basra, and he lived in his house with a young and lovely wife and with a fine son, yet he was not happy, for his earnings [342 262] were few and his house was a poor house of bowari matting and his food was but dates and bread. And winter came and the rains fell and everything in Abdul Rehman's house was wet, even to the blankets of his bed, for the matting did not keep out the rain, and the cold wind whistled through the walls of his house, and he was in a miserable and desperate state, so he went to the coffee-house to get warm and he met there his friends, and he discussed his condition, saying: How can I get money to buy a dry house, and a sheep for the feast and clothes for my wife? And they replied, and said: Did we but know a

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

*539 cursed them, saying: Know what you have done, fools. You have slain the Ottoman Bey, even the Bey of the Gendarmerie himself. Now take this body and remove it far from my house, that I may not become involved in this affair.

And the slaves Ali and Hamed removed the sheet and they saw that the Bey was even as in the grip of death, and Ali said: I am astonished that we were in search of a soul without a body and we have found a body without a soul. And they asked: But where can we take this body? For wherever we leave it in the town, the Turks will find it, and they will say: The Arabs have slain the Bey of the Gendarmerie. Nor will they cease from arrests and torture until they discover the truth of this matter. And Habiba said: Wrap the body in a blanket and tie it up after the manner of a corpse, and take it to the serai. For
[764 there is halted near there a caravan from Persia carrying
778] bodies for burial in the holy soil of sacred Nejf. There you
• may leave this body, for the camels will be unloaded for the night, and you may leave this body with the other bodies, and in the morning they will not notice that there is one body too many, and they will load it up and take it away and bury it in holy Nejf.

And Ali and Hamed put the body of the Turk in a blanket and bound it with ropes after the manner of corpses and took it to the caravan which was halted near the serai. And the camels were unloaded for the night and the corpses had been piled in a big pile, and there was no guard nor sentry over them. For who would steal this merchandise?

And the slaves put the body of the Bey in that pile, but they put him underneath and they piled on him corpses that the fresh corpse might not be on top. And the two

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

slaves, Ali and Hamed, left him and went off to search for 539*
the soul of their comrade, Jaffer.

Now, the Turkish Bey had not been killed by the blow of Ali the slave, but only stunned by it, and after a time his senses returned to him, and he found himself bound in a blanket and he could not move either hand or foot. And he breathed and smelled the smell of corpses, nor could he perceive any other odour.

And he thought: Verily, I am slain, and they have put me with the bodies and they are going to bury me. But my life has been a wicked life and shortly I shall be examined on my fitness to enter paradise. And the Bey wept and his heart was full of repentance, and he commenced to recite verses from the Holy Quran.

Now, the owner of the caravan was in his tent, a 539*
Persian from Shiraz, and he was calculating the profit 764
which he would have from the bodies, for the relations 778
and heirs of the dead had paid him a sum of money to transport the bodies from Shiraz to Nejf, and to buy a plot of land in which to bury them, and some had paid a lot of money for expensive land near to the holy shrine and others had paid a little money for land far removed from it, and they had also paid for the expenses of burial and had given donations for the holy shrine. And the Persian caravaneer had the record of these sums in his book.

And he thought: If I continue this journey to Nejf and 539*
disburse all these various sums, then the profit which will remain for me will be small, and it will not recompense me for all this trouble and the everlasting smell of these corpses. Rather should I do another thing, I should dump these bodies in the high desert where none may see them, and the jackals and the vultures will have a profit from

3Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq M41

the right to establish and maintain schools for the instruction 642
of their members in their own languages, and provides that government appointments shall be made without discrimination in accordance with capacity. Parliament must, by law, contain six Christian deputies; the provision for a similar number of Jewish deputies was cancelled after the emigration of 1951–2 had left the Jewish community insufficient members to qualify for representation.

It is absolutely impossible to reckon with any accuracy the 162
strength of the various religious communities. At a very rough approximation the Muslims might be estimated at 4½ million, Christians at 150,000, Jews (since the emigration of some 130,000) at something less than 10,000, and other groups at 50,000.

(*a*) *Islam*

The Sunni and Shii sects are suspicious and intolerant of 798
each other, as are also the Arab and Kurdish members of the 162
Sunni group. Statistics are lacking, but it would appear that the Shiis slightly outnumber the Sunni Arabs and are less than Sunni Arabs and Kurds combined.

The Sunnis live mainly in the north of Iraq and in the *liwas* 778
of Baghdad, Diala, and Dulaim. There is one notable Sunni shrine in the country, that of Shaikh Abdul-Qadir al-Gailani, whose mosque and tomb in Baghdad are a centre of pilgrimage from regions as remote as India.

The Shiis form a majority in the central *liwas* of Kut, 795
Diwaniya, Kerbela, and Hilla and in the southern *liwas* of 162
Basra, Amara, and Muntafiq. Their religious life has as its 778
background the four Holy Cities of Kerbela, Najaf, Kadhimain, and Samarra and their shrines. Najaf is the burial place of Ali, the first Imam; Kerbela of Hussain, the third Imam. Thousands of Shiis from Persia, Afghanistan, and India take part in the traditional pilgrimages to the Holy Cities, where, during the first ten days of the religious month of Muharram, is enacted the famous Passion Play commemorating the death of Hussain ibn Ali at the battle of Kerbela in A.D. 680. The Shii Mujtahids exercise not only religious but at times also political influence, as was demonstrated in the tribal insurrection of 1920 and on numerous subsequent occasions. The Shiis are rectifying their exclusion under Ottoman rule from political and administrative power and their non-participation in advanced education; some recent Cabinets have contained more than four Shiis, and in 1953–4 there was a Shii Prime Minister.

The power

wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formidable 793 not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was 565 always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish, anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd and Shumurd of Najf were notorious.

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without 517 its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social 181 observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of information regarding the world, past or present, and that of æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remembered Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmelite), and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans, Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing, book production, or generally readable literary output there was nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excavation, 'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to 'Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery. The professional classes—lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost nothing to show. Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a 812 class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and 779 ● the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy 793 Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion, this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

812 stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who
779 claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

793

5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

369 If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in
the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside
still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a
particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties
obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were
unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the
settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish
law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their
own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded,
on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated
all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The
619 tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of
795 intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects.
Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some,
notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling
family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan
Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy.
Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent
to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and
in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen
of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence
and embarrassment.

619 The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but
621 its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk;
the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from
which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government
forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on
the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western
'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of
the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment
of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the
irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of
their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat
and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the
date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers
of the Albu Muḥammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in
the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert.
Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as
their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the
619 vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and
the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

(*b*) *Christian Churches*

779 162 Christianity was already gaining a hold in northern Mesopotamia by the middle of the second century A.D., when that region was part of the Roman Empire, while southern Iraq was governed as part of the Persian Empire of the successive Parthian and Sasanian dynasties. The so-called Church of Persia declared itself autocephalous in A.D. 424, and at the Council of Ephesus (431) adopted the doctrine of Nestorius, thus separating itself from orthodox Christendom. Subsequently two groups professing the Monophysite doctrine in opposition to the Council of Chalcedon (451) settled in the area and organized their own communities and hierarchies—the Syrian 'Orthodox' or Jacobite Church and the Armenian 'Orthodox' or Gregorian Church. From the seventeenth century onwards minority sections of these three churches have acknowledged Papal supremacy while retaining their own rites and customs and enjoying autonomy under their own elected Patriarchs: these sections are known respectively as the Chaldaean, Syrian Catholic, and Armenian Catholic Churches. Prior to the First World War the Nestorian Church, which had been largely destroyed by Timur Leng and had lost many of its remaining Iraqi members to the Chaldaean (Uniate) Church, survived mainly in the mountains of Persia and Turkey. At the end of the war some 25,000 of its members, now known as Assyrians, were introduced by the British authorities into Iraq and were settled extensively in the north, where they suffered severely in the events of 1933.[1] In addition to the above sects, there are smaller numbers of Orthodox and Catholics of Byzantine rite (the so-called Greek Catholics). Of them all the Patriarch of only one—the Chaldaean Church—resides in Iraq. Today the ancient theological differences which distinguished them are almost forgotten by their ordinary members, among whom the difference is rather one of liturgy, ecclesiastical discipline, and hierarchy; this is, however, sufficient to constitute minute nations rather than congregations, recognized by the Government as possessing competence in matters of personal status and other internal affairs. The Christians are more fully an urban community than the Muslims, and show a peculiar aptitude for commerce, crafts, and the professions; but there is also a large peasant community, Chaldaean, Syrian Orthodox, and Syrian Catholic, in the plains around Mosul, and Assyrians in the vicinity of Amadiya and Rowanduz.

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[1] See above, pp. 57–8.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIETY

Something of the composition of society in Rowanduz 565 has been seen in the preceding pages, as well as the distinction between "wealthier" and "poorer" families, but the social structure of the town is much more complex than its cleavages along lines of occupation or of wealth, and requires more extended discussion, of particular importance inasmuch as this has proven the most significant area of change in recent decades. To approach this problem it is again necessary to have initial reference to the country as a whole, for in this larger province certain things of relevance to the life of the town must be appreciated. The [114] sociology of Iraq does not appear to have had any single, adequate exposition in recent years, although much of what will be said in this connection can be found scattered in a wide variety of publications, and is commonplace to residents and travelers in the region.

Of the several divisions of the society of Iraq, the 779 582 first is that between Muslims and non-Muslims. The adherents of Islam represent by far the greater part of the population, and, according to Quranic law, a Muslim girl cannot marry outside this group unless the suitor, if accepted, becomes a convert himself, a rule which is rigidly

I
enforced. Of the non-Muslims, the Jews might be mentioned 779
first, and their own custom of marriage is like that of 582 K
Islam. By long tradition, heightened by the recent Israeli 186 563
War, the Jews are greatly despised, but most of them have 779
already migrated to their new country. The departure of [167]
the Jewish craftsmen and shopkeepers from Rowanduz has
already been noticed. Of the Christians, an unconscious
distinction is made in the Muslim mind between those who
come from the Western world, and those who are native to K
the area or the Eastern Mediterranean. The military 186
prowess and advanced culture of Europe or America are
recognized, and almost any male from these countries is
ipso facto an *effendi* or gentleman. The Briton, because
of the part of his country's imperialism in the Middle
East, may be disliked, but he is usually respected. On K
the other hand, Christians such as the Armenians, Chaldaeans, 186 563
Greeks, and Nestorians, who have been Islamic subjects in
the past, are looked upon with some contempt. The Armenians
and Greeks are largely urban minorities, engaged in commerce,
and are generally vilified, as are Jews and certain Syrians
in the cities, as cheats and thieves. The Chaldaeans and
the Nestorians, most of the latter displaced from their
homeland in Turkey after the first World War, were once
exclusively engaged in agriculture, and, as a peaceful
folk, were not considered particularly different from
Muslim peasants. Kurdish chieftains and their men have K
been invited to Nestorian festivals and there has been [571]

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Kurd MA II

I K 438 439 173 782 539

now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradition at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money." I K 653 185

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church. I K 721 361

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congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monoton- 164
ous diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the
highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

103 Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

582 The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still main-
178 tained in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to
[619] force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

6. The Story of the Lost Soul

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

764 The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy
788 families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for burial in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

of the 33rd parallel. Affiliated companies 471
have concessions over the remaining territory—the Mosul Petroleum Company in the
region west of the Tigris and the Basra
Petroleum Company south of the 33rd
parallel. Oil is extracted from the Kirkuk 315
fields by the Iraq Petroleum Company and 471
conveyed by pipelines to Mediterranean
ports. It was formerly pumped to terminals
in Tripoli and Haifa, but the latter pipeline
has been closed since the Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1948. A new pipeline, constructed
from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias,
was opened early in 1952.

In 1938, the Basra Petroleum Company began drilling operations in the Persian Gulf area, where the existence of an extensive oil field has since been established. In 1950, a pipeline was completed to its shipping terminal at Fao, at the head of the Gulf. The activities of the Mosul company are still in the exploratory stage, but the production of oil has recently been started at Ain Zala. It is piped to the Mediterranean by a line which joins that from the Kirkuk fields at Baiji, on the Tigris.

A smaller oil field at Naft Khanah, near
the Iranian border, is worked by the
Khanaquin Oil Company, a subsidiary
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This
company operates a refinery on the Alwand
River, near Khanaquin, which supplies petroleum products for local consumption.
Since 1952, it has also constructed a small 382
refinery at Basra to process products for use 471
in southern Iraq. It obtains the crude oil
from Naft Khanah or from the Basra Petroleum Company.

Iraq derives a considerable revenue from 788
the pilgrimage traffic. The principal shrines 346
of the Shia sect are located at An Najef,
Kerbela, Kadhimain and Samarra, and, in
addition to local pilgrims, they are visited
annually by thousands of Shiites from Iran,
Pakistan and other Moslem countries. The
privilege of burial near the shrines is also
coveted by devout Shiite Moslems.

Transportation is mainly by roads or 459
waterways. Motor highways link the princi- 491

I-I

824* Opium is known locally as Afyun, but the cultivation of the
278* opium poppy is prohibited in Iraq. The capsules, some of them
276 scarified, are sold in the bazaars, but their narcotic effects are less powerful and more uncertain than those of opium. The seeds contain 50 per cent of drying oil, which is sometimes called Roghan-i-khash khāsh. The seeds, often erroneously supposed to be poisonous
[262] because they are contained in the opium-yielding capsule, are wholesome and nutritious, and are eaten chiefly in sweetmeats.—The seeds are given to relieve epistaxis; an oil derived from them is employed in making soap. The fruits mixed with *Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss. and *Linum usitatissimum* L. form a paste for application to boils (H.F.).

Parmelia kamtschdalis Esch. A lichen. See *Roccella Montagnei* Bél.

824* **Peganum Harmala** L. (Rutaceae)

278* تخم اسفند

• 789 Tukhm-i-isfand, Sipand (Teh.); Harmal, Harmal rutbah (Ar., Iraq); Aspand (Kurd.); Uzarih (Turk.); the Syrian rue.

Achundow; Schl.; Post; Boiss. 1: 917; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 486; Ph. Ind. 1: 75; Weisner 44.

Field 46; 4, 26, 27, 119 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150850; K.B. 329.

The mountain rue is a plant of Iran, Arabia, Syria, North Africa, and southern Europe. The plant and seeds were used medicinally by the Greeks and Romans, and were noted in European herbals in the 17th century. The seeds are exported from Iran into India, where the plant was originally introduced by Mohammedans. The seeds are dull gray, 2 mm. long, angular, having a bitter taste, and, when crushed, a heavy, narcotic odor. The active principle resides in the alkaloids, harmaline and harmine. The custom prevails in Iran and Iraq of sprinkling the seeds on burning coals at marriages to avert the malignant influence of the Evil Eye; the smoke from the
[832] burning seeds is said to drive away epidemics. The seeds are reputed to be an alterative and purifying medicine, and are supposed to stimulate the sexual system.

Peucedanum graveolens Benth. & Hook. (*Anethum graveolens* L.) (Umbelliferae)

تخم شوید

Tukhm-i-shivid (Teh.); Shivit (Isf.); Shabbit (Ar.); Sawa, Soyah (Hind.); Habbat Halwah (Iraq); Anitum (Yunani); dill.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formid- 793
able not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was 565
always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish, anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd and Shumurd of Najf were notorious.

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without 517
its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social 181
observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of information regarding the world, past or present, and that of æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remembered Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmelite), and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans, Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing, book production, or generally readable literary output there was nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excavation, 'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to 'Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery. The professional classes—lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost
nothing to show. Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a 812
class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body
of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and 779
the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy 793
Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion, this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

812 stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who
777 claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

•793 5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

369 If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in
the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside
still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a
particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties
obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were
unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the
settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish
law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their
own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded,
on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated
all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The
619 tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of
795 intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects.
Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some,
notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling
family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan
Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy.
Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent
to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and
in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen
of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence
and embarrassment.

619 The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but
62 its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk;
the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from
which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government
forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on
the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of southwestern
'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of
the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment
of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the
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their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat
and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the
date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers
of the Albu Muhammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in
the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert.
Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as
their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the
619 vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and
the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 721 where electoral rolls for the Constituent Assembly were already under preparation, and provoked punitive missions of the Air Force. By autumn, still protesting his devotion to the British Government, he was again in hopeful correspondence with the Turks and, supported by money looted from the tobacco merchants, planned an attack on Kirkuk and collected 'taxes' from the Ḥalabja and Chamchamal villages. So passed the winter of 1923-4.

4. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The signature of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty on 10 October 1922 was followed by further drafting and redrafting, in Baghdad and London, of the promised Organic Law; by the completion, and ultimate signature on 4 March 1924, of the four subsidiary Agreements: and, months before these were ready, by the acceptance of a Protocol to the Treaty itself. The Protocol resulted in part from increased British realization of 'Iraqi sentiment on mandatory matters, but still more from pressure by the press and public of the United Kingdom on its Government—and particularly on Bonar Law, the incoming Prime Minister—to diminish British expenditure and commitments in 'Iraq. It was brought back to Baghdad by Cox from London in March 1923, and signed by himself and 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey on the last day of April. Reducing the Treaty period from twenty to four years, it could not fail of a warm reception by King and politicians alike: only the 'Inglizi' party among the shaykhs and notables, still distrustful of the young Government and fearful of their own rivals, pronounced it a betrayal. The signature of the Protocol, Sir Percy Cox's last act in 'Iraq, was followed on 5 May by his departure. He had, by his intelligence, patience, and benevolent firmness rendered outstanding services to the State. The post of High Commissioner was assumed by no unworthy successor in Sir Henry Dobbs, who had served at Baṣra in the earliest occupation days and returned from India to 'Iraq as Sir Percy's Counsellor late in 1923.

793 668 The improved atmosphere and the enthusiastic welcome accorded to the King on his triumphant tours in both northern and southern 'Iraq availed in no way to conciliate the Shi'i 'Ulamā. Their anti-British fulminations, in which a pro-Turkish element was at times strangely visible, were coupled with a renewal in June 1923 of the anti-election Fatwas. The clash between their policy and their Government's was explicit; and when, late in June, a bazaar episode brought the sons of Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi into conflict with the police, the King was willing to authorize the arrest of both sons and father. Brought to Baṣra, they left the country and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. In Najf

the bazaars were closed in condemnation of this outrage to the 793
men of learning, a party of whom gathered to withdraw in dudgeon 668
from ungrateful 'Iraq. These proceeded to Karbalā, were deaf to Government reassurances, and with diminished numbers left 'Iraq for Kirmanshah. Here the holy men awaited with complete confidence the results of so striking a gesture. But there were none. Even in the Holy Cities no commotion followed; Sunni observers were delighted; to the Government it was a veritable answer to prayer, and the dutiful protests of the Persian Government fell on deaf ears in Baghdad. A mediating visit to 'Iraq by the British Minister in Teheran was fruitless. Only after a formal approach to the Prime Minister by spokesmen of the 'Ulamā in November 1923, with protestations of a change of heart and policy, were their self-exiled colleagues permitted to return on the condition of abstention from politics henceforward. The main body re-entered 'Iraq in April 1924, still influential but never to regain their old dominion in the country's affairs.

The field thus clear, election machinery could start to operate. 666
Uneasiness among the Kurds and Turkomans of Kirkuk and Arbil at the prospect of 'Arab Government' was calmed by the High Commissioner. Some ambiguity in the legal provisions for tribal representation was cleared up; tribesmen, it was ruled by the Ministry of Justice, could register as ordinary voters in addition to enjoying their specific representation by twenty deputies. So novel a concession to the tribes, for whom Turkish conceptions had provided no voice at all, was obnoxious to the conservatives of Sayid Maḥmud's Free Party, and disrupted it to vanishing-point. The voters of Sulaymaniya liwā, of whom numbers had perforce registered in Kirkuk while their own headquarter town was beyond control, completed their own liwā rolls and could choose their own deputies when in 1924 it was reoccupied (p. 152). By the mid-March of that year the procedure of primary and secondary election was complete.

The Cabinet of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey had by November 1923 645"
reached a stage of *malaise* which presaged the end. It was due to discord with the Shi'i element and to some disagreements with the King. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, who had returned from Geneva to spend a few valuable days as Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, was invited by the King to form the Cabinet which should face the Constituent Assembly. Accepting the charge, he retained two Shi'i ministers including Muḥsin al-Shallash at Finance, brought to Interior 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi (a modern-minded ex-officer who had acted as Mutaṣarrif of Ḥilla), and completed his team with Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, Nuri Sa'id, and the eminent Mosul and Baṣra notables, Sayid Aḥmad al-Fakhri and Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan, in other

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

463 each kind of goods has its special section of the bazaar.
565 The brass- and copper-smiths' quarter rings like a small
441 boiler factory all day long. The artisans who are engaged in producing these commodities form a considerable section of the Mesopotamian city population and are fairly prosperous and contented, much more so than the date gardeners of the outside districts. Supreme over them all stands the Mesopotamian silver worker, whose antimony silver work can scarcely be duplicated anywhere in the world.

463 The professional classes in these Mesopotamian cities
871 are fairly well developed. There are teachers of every
● 794 sort. Some of them have been trained abroad, but many
177 are indigenous and a very great credit to the schools that have turned them out. There are a number of government schools, and in addition the different religious sects maintain schools of their own. In these days when western education is in great demand, the schools of the Jews and the Christians are patronized by an increasing number of Mohammedans. No local medical profession has
463 been developed as yet, but the wealth and the culture of
759 Mosul, Baghdad and Basra have attracted a considerable number of trained physicians from outside. We have therefore the beginnings of a medical profession, and although it is not yet indigenous, it will soon become so. Its ethics are not of a very high order; the campaign of the American College of Surgeons to abolish fee-splitting would not make much headway among Mesopotamian doctors, but time will develop ethical standards, and at the worst the profession is a long way in advance
463 of the quacks that infest Arabia proper. There is also a
693 well-established group of lawyers. One of the results of the governing of the country for hundreds of years by

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. 133
It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert 311
south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of 241
Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. 361
These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads;
their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled
shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness 369
of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. 361
Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-dwellers,
then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, 162
then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe,
and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least
numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory
is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded
the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no
other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could 181
be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, 659
with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription
purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban
community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or
benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas,
may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps
a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A
total of midway between two and two and a half million people
may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of 162
which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed 144
the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest
Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for
'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern
world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking
''Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every
population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as
invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi
community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh
century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into
'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth
century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other
cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race 184
far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by 795
variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these,
too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

184 795 [578] the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i, while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated. Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government itself.

563 162 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of 563 621 which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled them in a social organization which represented an identical response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes; but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization. About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur. 563 795 197 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan (Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary status.

563 621 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil, and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for 563 the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

established at every qadhā and nahiya; and the Kurds, in turn, 563
supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in 563
type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, 181
fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay
in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been 795
reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal 563
organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, 621
Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Ṭuz 181
Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad-Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shi'ism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined 563
almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with 162
184

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of
162 the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few
households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, Kadhimiya,
184 Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to
which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian
and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar,
from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively
town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more unmanageable
[795] because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to
'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni
empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and
[463] Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These
hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary
Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of
heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were
resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and
Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated
the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages
near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and
the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā
or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to
travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk,
with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in
Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boatbuilders
in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever
running water was available for their rites. Their origins and
beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies
and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants 563
had been largely driven from the field. Western education was 162
widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish 184
progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The
community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was
treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities
and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying
avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position
and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little 563
from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to 795
official Millets headed locally by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch.
Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous 162
in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nes- 184
torians, few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Amadiya
qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a
few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites
catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek
Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and
finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nestorians,
had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its
villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians,
whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless
to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but
below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented
and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian
nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and
bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq.
The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but
not in lower 'Iraq, specialized in retail commerce, hotel-keeping,
artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number
of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had [463]
long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All
the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually
schools, served for long years past by the missions of European
churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi
standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls'
schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military
service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both
religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of
their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, 563
were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by 162
families whose property or politics constrained them to live there,
by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

home, at Neri village, of Sayid Muḥammad Sadīq, son of the 648× notorious Christian-murderer, Shaykh 'Ubaydullah—to the Tigris at Jazira-ibn-'Umar. This zone, governed from Julamark the capital of Ḥakkari, was inhabited or was traversed in their migrations by tribes of great renown—the Goyan, Sharnakhi, and Artushi, whose chiefs twenty years earlier had welcomed the prestige and profit of raising Ḥamidiya cavalry regiments for their Caliph.

In place of the free Kurdish dynasties at Bitlis, Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and Julamark of half a century earlier, there straggled now on both sides of the Mosul frontier a régime of fragmented tribal life and feudal authority penetrated, sometimes half-effectively sometimes nominally, by the agencies of the Turkish Government. Scattered amid the Kurdish villages in both wilayas were communities of Armenians, Chaldaeans, Jews, and Assyrians.

The last-mentioned community was a generation later to play, 563 transplanted and half-destroyed, a dismal part in 'Iraq history. 795 These East Syrian or Nestorian or Assyrian shepherds and cultivators 648× were an ancient Christian Millet, Syriac in speech, uncertain of origin and of blood, and hardly distinguishable in their manner of life, dress, and custom from the Kurds, in whose truculent or tolerant midst they had existed for many centuries. They were protected by their resolute character and jealous loyalty to their own faith and leadership. The Mar Sham'un of the time, their spiritual head and community ruler, resident at Kuchanis, had been for half a generation supported by a mission of the Church of England. This divided its efforts between the Ḥakkari Assyrian clans, with their fighting maliks and rough illiterate bishops, and the more peaceful, less harassed branch of the people who had settled at Urmiya. The former group, Turkish subjects, were in part *'ashiret*—tribute-paying tribes—and in part *ra'ayā*, peasantry. The nation contained perhaps one hundred thousand souls in Turkish territory. Faithful to an ancient Church, isolated in savage mountains, poor and threatened by every whim of powerful neighbours, though capable of a virile resistance and even of harsh aggression, its plight was watched by anxious eyes in Europe.

To the west of 'Iraq lay the steppe-desert where roamed the bedouin tribe-group of the 'Aniza. Southward of these, beyond the D̲hafir and Muṭayr nomads, lay the communities of true Arabia: the small harbour State of Kuwayt, established a century earlier under the house of Ṣubaḥ; the coastlands of al-Aḥsā with its oases and its vigorous life of nomadic tribes; and, finally, central Arabia where for years past two dynasties had disputed for supremacy.

Of these districts, Kuwayt and the Wahhabi Amirate of ibn 648× Sa'ud were static Arab sultanates; al-Aḥsā (part of the Sa'udi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

812 stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who
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621 its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muḥammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the
619 vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

habitual, and much admirable work was done by the departments. 000
Few indeed could deny the improvement in the honesty and justice of the Administration, its prevailing security, its achieved and expected progress in material matters, over the familiar Turkish standards. Nevertheless, the charge that the type or tone of this Administration were among the causes of the lawless outbreaks so soon and so disappointingly to follow cannot completely be denied.

It[1] was, first, that of a Christian Power. To some indifferent, [186 795] this fact was objectionable to many, and not least to the Shi'i hierarchy whose status and powers would be lost for ever if a foreign secular Power were to be installed. In Sunni minds a nostalgic feeling for the Califate as the true and sole legitimate source of power, even in its temporary defeat, was nearly allied to their religion; and the indulgence of such feelings was the easier, and the new régime must remain the more rootless and untrusted, while peace with Turkey was delayed. Religion and Ottoman loyalties apart, the British régime was foreign and unfamiliar. Its spokesmen, often weak in Arabic, differed from their predecessors, to the point of strangeness, in dress, manner, and social customs. The use of Indians as clerks and departmental subordinates was universal, and was resented. The efficiency at which the Administration aimed was no desideratum of the governed, and its ranking as a paramount objective has been alleged as a chief defect of the régime. The charge is doubtfully true; but in fact little was done to render the machinery of Government easy or acceptable to its public. It tended to rigidity of standard, mixed little tolerance with its uncomfortable and not always desired justice, and was pitiless to long-familiar laxities.

The disappearance of many restrictions with the Armistice still left the military occupation of notables' houses, military roads or camps which blocked canals, and other galling inconveniences. These grievances increased with time. With them came the disappointment and disillusion of post-war retrenchment; projects were abandoned, departments restricted, military expenditure greatly reduced. After all, it seemed, no golden age had arrived! The Railway, Indian-staffed, was slow and expensive. The outcry for schools and English lessons was unmet. The agricultural experts had not transformed agriculture, those of irrigation had cured neither drought nor floods. The Land Registry settled few disputes. And the insistence on full revenue collection on every crop and garden was galling alike to rich and poor, who, in spite of lowered demand-rates, found themselves paying more taxation than ever before, with little or no improvement in the old and evil assessment methods.

In the towns the Administration, desperately short of subordinate

[1- British civil administration following World War I -- Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

standards—and non-Muslims at that!—and without, perhaps quite involuntarily, adopting something of the airs of superiority and social exclusiveness which are of all things the least tolerable to the educated society of the modern East. These dangers the British were ill equipped to avoid; it followed that their unpopularity in 'Iraq, after years of Mandate, was widespread. It prevailed, with many individual exceptions, not only in ministerial and official circles but also among the very classes to whom their work had been the most advantageous. 000

It is certain that some measure of reform and reorganization was, in the clear interests of human welfare, desirable in the 'Iraq of 1918; certain too that it could never have been carried out without damage to the immediate interests of some loudly protesting class, be they Shi'i 'Ulamā, intellectuals, landlords or tribal shaykhs. Could such reforms have come from within, without Mandate or imposed foreign help? Only, one may judge, too slowly, too uncertainly, and in the end inadequately. Or would a Mandateless 'Iraq State, with its 'full independence' from the outset, have been willing of itself to employ foreign helpers and give them adequate authority and continuity? It is improbable; but if so, such a method might have yielded better results than a Mandate, if genuine popular goodwill is, as it must be, the true criterion. But to neither the excited spokesmen of nationalist 'Iraq in the Baghdad or the Damascus of 1919, nor to a British Government then harassed with the stresses and counter-claims of inexpert peace-making, was such a solution likely to occur. The Mandate was inevitable; its administration had had great merits, with real but less tangible defects; and its conclusion was welcome to all.

4. THE MINORITIES

The problem presented to the Sunni government and governing class by the Shi'i element, a minority in political status though a majority in numbers and containing eminent men of religion, landlords, business men, and the most militant tribes, was little considered at Geneva. Nevertheless, it equalled that of the Kurds in delicacy and in its need of a solution, and its dangers were to be notably shown within a few months of 'Iraq's attainment of independence. But as the Shi'is were 'Iraqis, lived in the heart of its territory and included no elements of obvious interest to any outside Power save Persia, the Shi'i problem lay beyond the observation of the world's statesmen. It was indeed a question less of minority rights than of a temptation which 'Iraqi politicians found irresistible: that of using the weight of Shi'i religion and tribal power as a weapon, fatally dangerous, in domestic politics. 795

The lesser true minorities—the Christian sects, Yazidis, Jews, 563 795

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 and Turkomans—made little history. The first-mentioned were
795 accepted as equals in 'Iraqi society and administration as completely as any non-Muslim could expect; and when the announcement of British withdrawal led in 1929 to some heart-searching among the timorous, the heads of the communities had no difficulty in reassuring their flocks and urging continued loyalty to their King. A ministerial tour among them in 1931 led to great cordiality and the official thanks of the Apostolic Delegate. It was found not too difficult in 1930 to draft and pass into law new statutes for some of these Christian minorities, defining the powers of their priesthoods and councils. The measure of self-management which they accepted was bound, in a modern State, to fall far short of old millet autarchy.

The tiny community of inoffensive Baha'is in Baghdad was in these years the victim of an episode—that of the long-famous case of the Baha'i Houses—sadly destructive of confidence in 'Iraqi justice. They had begun in the middle 'twenties to repair their properties in the city. Fanatical Shi'i neighbours resisted this, petitioned the King and obtained from him, although the case was still *sub judice* in the Baghdad Peace Court (which later gave judgement for the Baha'is), a direct order for the eviction of the owners and confiscation of the keys. This action and the subsequent majority verdict of the Court of Appeal in favour of the Shi'i aggressors represented to objective observers an apparent overruling of justice by the rancours of local politics. It was ventilated at Geneva and was the subject of repeated protest by the High Commissioner, but in vain. The case, in itself petty and embarrassing enough to the 'Iraqi authorities, was a sinister warning to other non-Muslim elements.

563 The unselfconscious Turkomans of Kirkuk, Kifri, and their villages made no efforts to emerge from a useful and honest obscurity; they created no problems since the Mosul settlement, and were represented in 'Iraqi officialdom far beyond their numerical proportion. The Jews were still compact, assiduous, self-sufficient, and unambitious. They had had their outstanding Finance Minister, kept their place in the Government offices, dominated many of the markets, owned property, and supported their own schools and hospitals; and when 'Iraq approached its independence, were not so foolish as to compromise their future by open protest. The art of living in 'Iraq, and surviving bad times, was no new one to them. It was true that 'Iraqi, like all Arab, feeling was strong against the Zionist movement in Palestine; ugly and violent street demonstrations, accompanied by the usual marshalled schoolboys and armed roughs, greeted Sir Alfred Mond when he visited Baghdad on business in February 1928; and in the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

I. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had 000 travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. 648K It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous 311 territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average 181 of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience 642 or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: 182 the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too 563 favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in 795 which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

182 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development,
563 and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and out-
795 standing differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

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511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by 161 Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanage- 182 able public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some 795 progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt— [771] gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities.

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial— 563 within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

000 of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

K
137 Kurdistan is a beautiful country. It is in the main well wooded, with scrub or stunted oak on the hillsides and poplars, walnuts and mulberries near the villages. Pines grow in two areas only and chinārs (planes) along the streams. Unfortunately, deforestation is proceeding apace, and unless immediate and drastic steps are taken by the 'Iraq Government, heavy soil erosion and a tremendous decrease in grazing facilities will take place. Few new walnut trees are to be found owing to a prevalent superstition that the planter of a walnut tree will die with the appearance of the first nuts. It might be supposed that the oldest inhabitants could be employed in planting, but apparently the grandfathers look askance at this suggestion!

K
181 The Kurds are a virile and cheerful people. They have been called treacherous, and undoubtedly stories can be quoted in support of this accusation. Yet it must be remembered that the annals of our own Scottish highlands are by no means clean in this respect.

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342 In the summer the valleys of Kurdistan are, unfortunately, very malarial, and this is fostered by the cultivation of rice with its invariable accompaniment of mosquitoes. During this season most of the flock-owners move to their "zōzāns" or summer sheilings on the mountain tops, where, in shelters of oak branches, they pass the time pleasantly enough.

Christians

I
795 The Christians of the northern provinces are divided into numerous sects, several of which are relics of the old schismatic divisions of the Eastern Communion. They include Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics, who are under the control of Rome, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians and Seventh Day Adventists.

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162 Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics and Jacobites are found in Mosul and many villages on the left bank of the Tigris. Chaldeans are also found in the Supna valley near Amadia and in one large village near Arbil. Seventh Day Adventists only flourish in Mosul. Many people in England know something of the Assyrians and their recent history. The Assyrians themselves claim to be descendants of the famous kingdom of Nineveh and are certainly semitic. The term "Assyrian" now includes ex-Ottoman members of the Nestorian Church who were domiciled either within what is now the 'Iraq state or who were ejected from Hakkari by the Turks during the Great War and refused

4s Wilson G-4 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Yazidis MH 10

I
readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects 795●
belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their
Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the 167
Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace 649
terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it 563
was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of 162
the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in 'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil, British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however, proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria
include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may [I
be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers 463]
of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks, etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are
shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, I
hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are 147
liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

The Yezidis

Y
The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This
is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. 101
They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock 776
Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the 779
lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is 871
incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that 771
he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education, save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

Mudīr al-Ma'ārif (Director of Education) in every wilayet, each 175* having a budget,[1] staff, syllabus and long list of schools. To 871 judge by results, however, the system was a 'whited sepulchre'. The schools were rarely as numerous nor as well attended as government statistics indicated; the teachers possessed little learning and even less moral character. Arabic was little stressed as a language. Shī'is, comprising the majority of [1935] the population, would not send their sons to government schools, invariably taught by Sunnis, nor were they encouraged to do so by the Sunnī Ottoman Government.

Mr. Dobbs, as Revenue Commissioner, had, in early 1915, 175* studied the educational problem and had written suggestions 227* for British policy.[2] He advocated extreme caution in initiating 871 a new system in order that the mistakes made in India might be avoided. The shortage of primary teachers led him to declare that if it were not for the urgent necessity of equipping Arabs for government service and for avoiding the imputation that the British Administration was not inclined to provide educational facilities, he 'should be inclined to advise that not a single school should be opened for the next two years'.[3] Under the circumstances, however, he recommended that one or two primary schools be opened and that subsidies be given to the American Mission Schools under Mr. John Van Ess and to the Carmelite Frères School. The opening of other schools would have to be left to the future.[4] Thus from the beginning, the necessity of encouraging education to provide youths for government service became a guiding factor and stimulated the establishment of educational facilities where the natural tendency on the part of the British authorities was to restrict

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[1] A pre-war Budget for Baghdad Wilayet was:

Law School and Secondary School	£T. 9,000
Other schools (from Local Revenue)	£T. 25,000
Total	£T. 34,000

Revenue Report, 1917, p. 45.

[2] Dobbs, H. R. C., Notes on Education, February 15th, 1915.

[3] Ibid., para. 2.

[4] Ibid., para. 11.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

They, and Arabs in general, viewed the assignment of man- 175'
dates in the same light as did Lord Curzon when, as Secretary 186x
of State for Foreign Affairs, he said in the House of Lords, June 25th, 1920:

> It is quite a mistake to suppose . . . that under the Covenant of the League, or any other instrument, the gift of the mandate rests with the League of Nations. It does not do so. It rests with the Powers who have conquered the territories, which it then falls to them to distribute, and it was in these circumstances that the mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia was conferred upon and accepted by us, and that the mandate for Syria was conferred upon and accepted by France.[1]

One of the first results of the announcement in Baghdad was a series of secret meetings of the Nationalist leaders who resolved on still stronger measures of propaganda and on a closer *rapprochement* between Shī'is and Sunnīs. Counter-demands to the Bonham-Carter proposals, well known in Baghdad at the time, were also to be formulated and presented to the British Government, by the *Mandubīn* or Delegates. This body of fifteen or seventeen Nationalists had been selected from the larger group and the list had then been submitted, in the autumn of 1919, for approval to a political gathering in one of the mosques. This had been given.[2]

To further the Shī'a-Sunnī *rapprochement*, religious services [775] ●
known as *maulūds*, in honour of the birth of the Prophet, were organized in the month of Ramadhan, beginning May 19th. In these *maulūds*, held alternately in every Shī'a and Sunnī mosque, leading members of the two sects took part, by special invitation of the mosque authorities or of the secular heads of the city quarter in which the mosques were located. Following the religious ceremonies, which usually combined both Sunnī and Shī'a rites, were patriotic speeches and poems appealing
to patriotism, to honor, and religion.

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[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), p. 877.

[2] According to Saiyid Muhammad al-Sadr.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

had been sent to the Euphrates area by the Council to study 175x
civil reorganization; to the Muntafiq *Liwā*, until the British 642x
troops had been withdrawn; and to the Kurdish districts until 727'
their future status had been decided. Sir Percy Cox had already 631
approved of the creation of the Baghdad Municipal Council which, although sanctioned under the previous regime, had been so mistrusted and so hedged with limitations as to be valueless as an instrument of government. The new Council had full executive and financial powers, subject to the general supervision of the *Mutasarrif* of the *Liwā*.

Appointments to administrative offices were vested in the 175x
Council of State, subject to the approval of the High Com- 642'
missioner, by Section XIV of the Instructions.[1] In practice, 727x
this arrangement was applied by the Council of State only to 647
those posts for which the Sultan's *firmān* had been required under the Ottoman regime. For other posts, appointments were made on the authority of the Minister concerned. In all cases, however, it was understood that no appointments involving the displacement of British or Indian officials were to be proposed to the Council without previous consultation with the High Commissioner.

The actual transfer of power in the provinces awaited the re-establishment of comparative peace and stability. Not until January 10th, therefore, following the return of Ja'far Pasha and the Commission from the Euphrates area, was the Minister of Interior permitted to put forward his first list of administrative appointments.[2]

The principal criticism of the list came from Shī'a sources. 175'
Their original grievances, other than inherent opposition to 642
the British-controlled provisional Government itself, had been 727'
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[1] Appendix VI.

[2] Only four major administrative appointments had been made previously by the Council, all in Baghdad and vicinity; Mahmūd Nādim Beg Tabaqjali, *Qaimmāqam* of Mandalī, November 19th, 1920; Mumtaz Beg al'Daftari, *Qaimmāqam* of Kādhimain, November 21st, 1920; 'Ahmad Beg, *Qaimmāqam* of Sāmarrā, December 1st, 1920; Rashid Beg al-Khojah, *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, December 11th, 1920.

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175 that no Shī'ī held a portfolio on the Council. Their resentment
642 was not decreased by the fact that of five *Mutasarrifs* and nine
727 *Qaimmāqams* on the list, only one, a *Qaimmāqam*, was of their
647 sect. The High Commissioner, however, realized the difficulty
795 of avoiding Sunnī appointments. Only a few trained and
experienced Shī'īs were available as a result both of their habitual boycott of Turkish service and professional schools and of official Turkish discouragement to the entrance of Shī'īs into office and schools. The list with minor alterations was, therefore, approved in late January, 1921. When, however, the predominantly Sunnī Council continued to indicate, by appointing Sunnīs to the almost entirely Shī'a districts along the Euphrates, that it was prepared to do little to conciliate hostile opinion of the sect, the High Commissioner felt obliged to make a firm stand for the appointment of Shī'īs to such places, at least, where members of the sect predominated. After considerable persuasion, also, a place in the Council was found for a Shī'ī, the Ministry of Education being offered to Saiyid Muhammad Mahdī Tobatabai of Karbalā.

175 The reorganization of the Judicial Department under the
642 new administration entailed comparatively few changes.
727 Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who now became Adviser to the
692 Ministry of Justice, had early adopted the policy of making
the fullest use of 'Iraqīs as judges and officials, and of making no alterations in the institutions and laws with which the people were familiar, except in cases of clear necessity. The idea itself of an Arab Minister was not new. Sir Edgar had suggested such an appointment in early 1919,[1] but it had been deemed premature.

Reorganization of the Criminal Courts became necessary, however, when the Council of State adopted its scheme of reconstructing provincial administration along the lines of the Turkish system. One of the essential features of that system was the complete separation of the executive from the judicial

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[1] Memorandum on Place of the Arab in Administration, February 5th, 1919.

'Iraqī viewpoints[1] and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confidence by Parliament[2] had unfortunate consequences. 645 On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased.

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council [775] maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects.

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqīs have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat 665 669

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[1] Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Iraqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nājī Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

[2] *Supra*, p. 422, note.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monoton- 164
ous diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift 364
to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of [166
some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions 369]
of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public 484
health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq 744
and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a [788
continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both 795]
Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the
highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for 751
Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces 164
anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

the right to establish and maintain schools for the instruction 642 of their members in their own languages, and provides that government appointments shall be made without discrimination in accordance with capacity. Parliament must, by law, contain six Christian deputies; the provision for a similar number of Jewish deputies was cancelled after the emigration of 1951–2 had left the Jewish community insufficient members to qualify for representation.

It is absolutely impossible to reckon with any accuracy the 162 strength of the various religious communities. At a very rough approximation the Muslims might be estimated at 4½ million, Christians at 150,000, Jews (since the emigration of some 130,000) at something less than 10,000, and other groups at 50,000.

(*a*) *Islam*

The Sunni and Shii sects are suspicious and intolerant of 798 each other, as are also the Arab and Kurdish members of the 162 Sunni group. Statistics are lacking, but it would appear that the Shiis slightly outnumber the Sunni Arabs and are less than Sunni Arabs and Kurds combined.

The Sunnis live mainly in the north of Iraq and in the *liwas* 778 of Baghdad, Diala, and Dulaim. There is one notable Sunni shrine in the country, that of Shaikh Abdul-Qadir al-Gailani, whose mosque and tomb in Baghdad are a centre of pilgrimage from regions as remote as India.

The Shiis form a majority in the central *liwas* of Kut, 795 Diwaniya, Kerbela, and Hilla and in the southern *liwas* of 162 Basra, Amara, and Muntafiq. Their religious life has as its 778 background the four Holy Cities of Kerbela, Najaf, Kadhimain, and Samarra and their shrines. Najaf is the burial place of Ali, the first Imam; Kerbela of Hussain, the third Imam. Thousands of Shiis from Persia, Afghanistan, and India take part in the traditional pilgrimages to the Holy Cities, where, during the first ten days of the religious month of Muharram, is enacted the famous Passion Play commemorating the death of Hussain ibn Ali at the battle of Kerbela in A.D. 680. The Shii Mujtahids exercise not only religious but at times also political influence, as was demonstrated in the tribal insurrection of 1920 and on numerous subsequent occasions. The Shiis are rectifying their exclusion under Ottoman rule from political and administrative power and their non-participation in advanced education; some recent Cabinets have contained more than four Shiis, and in 1953–4 there was a Shii Prime Minister.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

(*c*) *Jews*

Until recently Iraq contained a large community of Jews 162
whose families had been settled in the country for hundreds or 563
even thousands of years. They lived mostly in the large towns,
especially Baghdad, in whose economic life they played an 463
important part as merchants, financiers, manufacturers, and 197
members of the professions. There were also Kurdish-speaking Jews in the north, mostly urban traders and craftsmen but also rural cultivators. A law of 1931 gave Jewish communities self-government in their own affairs, and there was a highly organized communal life, with schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In consequence of events in Palestine the majority of Jews left Iraq in 1950–1, mostly for Israel.

(*d*) *Yazidis*

These are vulgarly known as ‘devil-worshippers’ but, although 162
their religion includes the propitiation of Satan, it might 771
more justly be described as an amalgam of Christian, Muslim, 795
and Magian elements. They are divided between Jebel Sinjar
and the Shaikhan district north of Mosul, speak a Kurdish 197
dialect, except in their rites, where Arabic is used, and are probably of Kurdish origin.

(*e*) *Sabians*

(‘Baptists’), also called the Mandaeans and the ‘Christians 162
of St John’; their religion combines elements of various origins 463
and periods. Most of them are craftsmen—especially silversmiths 795
—in the large towns.

(*f*) *Shabak*

Of Kurdish origin, who live in the area of the Yazidis and 162
are not clearly distinguished from them; their religion contains 795
Yazidi and extreme Shii elements.

(*g*) *Other Sects*

Include Bahais, Sarlis, Kakais, Qizilbashis, none of them of any political significance.

POLITICAL HISTORY

Written history began in Iraq at the end of the fourth millennium 175
B.C., but archaeological remains from much earlier periods, first in the north and later also in the south, give evidence of palaeolithic man, of agricultural neolithic man and, from the sixth and fifth millennia, of increasing human progress expressed successively in extensive agriculture, copper

Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-

511 lent man and seemed to be very well liked. The group as a whole enjoys a degree of prosperity and comfort most unusual for an Arab community. Everybody has enough to eat and enough to wear and a good house to live in. Crops seem to be quite reliable. If the wheat and barley harvest fails, the rice does not. Taxes are light and the local government good.

565 463 The most conspicuous difference from the typical agricultural community in Arabia lies in the fact that here the old equality of the desert is preserved. There is no class of rich citizens who outshine their fellows. There are a few merchants of a small sort. Amara, the nearest city, is so close to the town we visited that the shops were very small, most of the trading being done in the larger city. We saw few artisans. The community seemed to be free from caste divisions and to enjoy a spirit of equality and brotherhood much like that of the Bedouins themselves.

562 Another surprising thing is the freedom of all classes. The women have discarded the veil completely and associate with the men freely, being seen on the street apparently under no restraint whatever. This is a refreshing contrast to the other communities of Arabs; indeed the Marsh Arabs are far ahead of even the Bedouins in this respect. These women buy and sell in the bazaar and appear to participate in all the activities of the town with no hesitation whatever. They visited the temporary dispensary that we set up and in their self-assertion were sometimes harder to manage than the men.

775 It is interesting to note that these Arabs are all Shiahs. "No," said the guard that accompanied us from Ahwaz as we were coming in for a visit, "there are no infidels in all this district. Every one is a Shiah."

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI
Turkish Period M2

with, but even the admittedly great difficulties of her task do not excuse her utter failure. Although she has had hundreds of years of opportunity to exert her abilities in harmonizing the different races which make up her population, they are now more discordant than ever, and we had during the war the hideous spectacle of the dominant race deliberately attempting to exterminate one of the insubordinate subject races in cold blood, certainly a sufficient confession of failure. 000

The Sabaeans or fire-worshippers of Mesopotamia furnish a notable example of Turkish ineptitude in facing this difficult problem of assimilating alien races. The Sabaeans are the remnants of the pre-Islamic population of Mesopotamia who refused to become Moslems in the days of the Moslem conquest. They have been, and so far as their diminished numbers permit they still are, a most valuable asset to the country. They are by far the best artisans in the Arab world. Some of their silver work surpasses the best that India can offer. This community, which is absolutely peaceable and knows nothing of the arts of war, has been harried and persecuted until now there remains only the smallest fraction of their original numbers. They now number less than ten thousand, if their own estimates can be trusted, and their complete disappearance is apparently a matter of only a short time. I 101 795 162 463

Another indictment that must be brought against the Turk in the Arab world is the fact that he failed utterly as a civilizing force. This was his fault and not simply his misfortune, as might be argued of an Arab ruler who has never seen the vision of the government as a force working to uplift society. In Hasa sanitation was not improved even in the most elementary way. No T 185 economically dependent on the British. Quite apart from the economic dangers of this, there were signs that they once more hoped for autonomy under British protection. The danger of such hopes is too obvious to need explanation. 563

The Other Christians

Apart from the Assyrians, the Christians in Iraq are mainly Chaldaeans, Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox and Catholics, with smaller numbers of Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and other Uniates, and Protestants. The communities are recognized by the Government as possessing competence in matters of personal status and other internal affairs. 563 795

Here, as in the other countries, the Christians are more fully an urban community than the Moslems, and show a peculiar aptitude for commerce, crafts and the professions; but there is also a large peasant community, Chaldaean, Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic, in the plains around Mosul. In Iraq, as elsewhere, the proportion of educated Christians is higher than that of educated Moslems, and they are further advanced on the road to Westernization, thanks to the work of foreign missions and schools. 563 369 871

The Armenians are a trading community in the towns. They preserve their language and traditions carefully, but they are too few to be able to avoid some measure of external assimilation. The other Christians are partly Syriac-speaking, partly Arabic. This cannot, however, be regarded as a sharp distinction, since the language used depends upon the environment in which they are living, and many of them are bi-lingual. In general, it is true that those whose native language is now Arabic spoke Syriac until recent generations, and that with few exceptions they are not conscious of belonging to the Arab nation. 563

In spite of efforts to spread the conception of a 'Syriac' people, the general tendency among the Christians is towards at least a superficial Arabization. This raises the question of their relation towards the Arab nationalist movement. So far, they have regarded it with fear and hostility, apart from some individuals who have supported it with enthusiasm. The nationalists too have tended to suspect them, although the existence of the much greater Kurdish and Shi'i problems has diverted attention from them. What the future relationship will be depends very 563 668

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East

Iraq NH1

Mosul, and Basrah and a day secondary school for girls in Baghdad. 872

The Jewish communities in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah are typical of 873
associations primarily interested in the education and welfare of their 795
own religious group. Both free and tuition schools of kindergarten, primary, and secondary level are administered by the community councils, and it is thought that nearly all Jewish children have a chance to become at least literate. In addition to full day and evening schools, which bear resemblance to government schools of equal level, these communities have workshops for poorer children. These provide training in sewing and crafts, and elementary work in reading, mathematics, and religious literature. In the early twenties these communities took over the administration of the Alliance Israelite Universelle schools, which now supply teachers for the communities. Teachers of such schools are paid by the local community. Other religious groups, such as the Assyrians, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholics, Roman Catholics, Chaldeans, and Armenians, also maintain schools.

Iraq's only foreign primary schools are the 5 which provide instruction for Iranian boys from families of merchants and craftsmen who have long been residents of Iraq. These schools are located in Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala, and Najaf. There is also an intermediate Iranian school in Basrah.

All other foreign schools are controlled and financed by American agencies. Basrah has an intermediate school of this type, and Baghdad has 3 complete secondary schools, 2 for boys and 1 for girls.

The oldest of these schools is the American School for Boys in Basrah, founded by the Dutch Reform Mission early in this century. Its principal, Dr. John Van Ess, author of *Meet the Arab,*[1] has long been associated with education in Iraq, having served as its first Director of Education during the British occupation in 1915. This School provides education through the third year of the secondary course for poorer boys from Basrah and the surrounding villages. It stresses both high academic standards and the development of high moral character, and its graduates are in demand in business enterprises of the vicinity. The School opens its extensive play areas to poor boys who live near the school and provides one of its buildings for use as a recreation center by former students and their friends. Elementary instruction in the first four grades is provided for girls; both the girls school and the primary section of the school for boys are classified as private schools and have Iraqi citizens as their principals. More advanced instruction is offered girls on an informal basis through the Young Woman's Club.

[1] New York: John Day Co., 1943.

132 year in the plains of the delta region and 12 to 16 inches in the upland districts, while in some sections of the mountains it increases to around 50 inches. The summer temperatures are uniformly high and may reach 110° to 125° F. in the central and the southern provinces. The daily fluctuations are slight in the Gulf region, but they become more pronounced toward the interior. During the winter months snows are rare outside the highland districts, but frosts are occasionally encountered as far south as Basra. In January, the coldest month, the mean maximum temperature averages 60° to 65° F. at Basra, 58° to 61° F. at Baghdad and 50° to 55° F. at Mosul; the mean minimum temperature, 38° to 42° F., 44° to 47° F. and 34° to 36° F., respectively. The mean maximum temperatures approximate 104° to 110° F. in all 3 localities in July, while the mean minimum temperatures range from 76° to 82° F. in Basra to 72° to 75° F. in Mosul. In midsummer the mean daily relative humidity rarely rises above 25 to 35 per cent on the plains, although it is often excessive in the Gulf area. Northwest winds, known locally as the *shamal*, blow irregularly throughout the year. They are especially strong and desiccating during the summer months, and, in the south, are usually laden with dust and sand.

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

161 The population, according to the official census for 1947, was estimated at 4,799,500, including an unknown number of Bedouin, roughly calculated at about 250,000. The majority of the inhabitants are of mixed Arabic stock, representing a relatively homogeneous blend of ancient Semitic and Indo-European strains which has evolved over
162 centuries of successive conquests. About 95
795 per cent of the people are Moslems; slightly
over one half are Shiites; and most of the
[131] remainder are Sunnites. The Kurds, who

[131] inhabit the mountainous districts near the
162 northeastern frontiers, constitute the largest
795 Moslem minority group. Racially and lin-
guistically distinct, they make up about 15
to 20 per cent of the population. Other non-
Arabic Moslem communities include about
50,000 each of Turkomans and Iranians,
the majority of whom are also found in the
northern provinces. Most of the Kurds and
the Turkomans are Sunnites, but some ad-
here to minor heterodox sects; the Iranians
are Shiites.

From 150,000 to 200,000 native Christians
reside in Iraq. The Chaldeans, a sect which
observes early Nestorian rites but owes al-
legiance to the Vatican, comprise the most
numerous group. Other communities in-
clude some 30,000 Assyrians (Nestorians),
refugees from Asia Minor in 1918, and
smaller contingents belonging to the Ar-
menian Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox, the
Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) and the Syrian
563 Catholic churches. Most of the Christian
peoples live together in more or less sepa-
rate ethnic and religious groups: about 70
per cent are settled in the northern prov-
inces of Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil, and a
large proportion of the remainder in the
cities of Baghdad and Basra. Prominent
among other indigenous sects are the Ye-
zidis, or so-called "devil-worshipers," about
30,000 of whom dwell in the districts near
the Syrian border. A few thousand Sabians,
famous as silver craftsmen, also live in
Baghdad, Amarah and Basra.

191 Arabic is spoken by over three quarters
of the population. Kurdish, Syriac and
Turki, however, are recognized as official
languages in limited areas in the north,
while English is extensively used in the
593 larger cities. Although the Iraqi are pre-
162 dominantly Arabs, marked gradations in
social structure are represented by the
nomadic Bedouin tribes of the deserts, the
"marsh Arabs" or primitive tribesmen of
the Amarah and Hammar lakes region of the
southern delta, the rural peasants and the
townspeople. Up to 1950, the population
included about 200,000 Jews, primarily of

p. 22(B)

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*872 The American School for Boys in Baghdad was founded by the Dutch *873 Reform Mission, but is at present under an independent board of trustees of which Lowell Thomas is president. Dr. and Mrs. Calvin K. Staudt, associated with the School since its founding a quarter of a century ago, have not only made it possible for boys to qualify for the Secondary-School Certificate examination, but have also done much to develop good character and good will among the diverse groups that attend the School. High standards are maintaned in the Arabic language, but special attention is given to strengthening oral and written English. Certain subjects, such as science, mathematics, and general history are taught in the last two years through the medium of English so that graduates will be better equipped to continue their education at the American University of Beirut or in Western universities. Pupils of the School are not under obligation to take the public Secondary-School Certificate examination in order to graduate. The School has a variety of student activities and organizations, which include Arabic and English dramatic societies, an international relations club, a chorus, assemblies, a brotherhood, sports field days and intramural athletic contests, oratorical contests, and Sunday evening religious services. Recently (1945) it became a member of the Near East Colleges Association, and is being developed into a college. A boys primary school is maintained under an Iraqi principal.

The American School for Girls was founded in Baghdad in 1925 by the United Mission of Mesopotamia. A six-year primary school, under an Iraqi principal, is followed by a five-year secondary school under the supervision of an American principal. The program of the School parallels the government program, and pupils regularly take the appropriate public examinations. Here, too, the use of the English language is stressed, and graduates are fitted for higher education in English and American institutions.

● [797] The most recently established American school in Iraq is the Baghdad College for Boys, founded by American Jesuits in 1932 and now under the supervision of Rev. Francis B. Sargeant, S.J. The aim of the school is to provide a good secondary education under Catholic auspices. Located at the northern edge of Baghdad, this school is housed in the most modern school buildings in all Iraq and has extensive play areas that are ample for athletic activities. It has boarding facilities, and in 1945–46 70 of the 418 boys enrolled were boarders. The fact that fees are comparatively high determines that most of the students will be of the upper middle class. The majority are from Christian families, but other religions are represented. The program follows the public-school program rather closely,

teurization plant near Baghdad and seeks 744
to improve the standards of agriculture which should be reflected in better nutrition among the people. The Ministry of Communications and Works maintains health and medical facilities at the port of Basra, and furnishes medical care for railway personnel.

Several voluntary agencies carry on 746
health work, usually in co-operation with 751
the Ministry of Health. The Children's Welfare Society conducts an extensive program for the promotion of maternal and child health, and operates welfare centers in Baghdad and the administrative centers of the remaining provinces. The Red Crescent Society supports a child health center in Baghdad, and provides training for girls in first aid and home nursing through branches in Baghdad, Basra, Hilla, Amarah and Kirkuk. The Anti-Tuberculosis Society campaigns against tuberculosis, and contributed toward the erection of a sanatorium, opened in 1951, near Baghdad. The 743
Catholic Nuns Society runs a small general hospital and dispensary, and the Society of Buyout el Umma an ophthalmic hospital and dispensaries in Baghdad.

The Board of Foreign Missions of the 797
Reformed Church of America maintains a 743
medical mission in the Amarah region. It operates a hospital and founded the leper colony, which has since been taken over by the government. The Seventh Day Adventists also have a hospital in Baghdad. The [466]
Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum Company, provide medical and health services for the benefit of their employees.

Medical Institutions

Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1950, 743
there were 82 civilian hospitals in Iraq with an aggregate capacity of 4,901 beds, or slightly over 1 bed per 1,000 population. Of this number, 2,086 beds were located in Baghdad, 534 in Basra and 412 in Mosul provinces. Sixty-seven hospitals, with a

combined capacity of 4,330 beds, were operated by the government health authorities; 4 hospitals with 153 beds by other governmental agencies; and 11 hospitals with 418 beds by industrial, mission or private organizations. Free medical care was provided in 4,475 beds, representing over 90 per cent of the hospital beds available in the country. 743 [657]

The Royal Hospital in Baghdad is foremost among the institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. It has medical, surgical, pediatric and infectious disease sections, with a total capacity of 650 to 750 beds. The remaining hospitals of the Ministry now come under the authority of the Director of Curative Medicine. According to the statistics for 1950, they included 42 general hospitals, with an aggregate capacity of about 2,300 beds, of which one or more in each province were Grade 1 hospitals under the supervision of medical officers. Maternity and child welfare divisions were incorporated in the general hospitals, which provided 962 beds for maternity cases and 134 beds for children. The special institutions consisted of 6 isolation hospitals with a total capacity of 596 beds, 3 ophthalmic hospitals with 79 beds, 2 venereal disease hospitals with 52 beds, 2 child welfare hospitals with 155 beds, 3 maternity and children's hospitals with 71 beds, a mental hospital of 120 beds, a leper hospital of 180 beds and 6 prison hospitals with 92 beds. A 400-bed tuberculosis sanatorium, which was sponsored in part by the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, was opened near Baghdad in 1951. Another 120-bed hospital in Basra was completed in 1952.

The American Mission hospital, with 28 beds, in Amarah and the new Seventh Day Adventist hospital, with 60 beds, in Baghdad are prominent among the private institutions. As of 1951, 3 hospitals with a combined capacity of 170 beds were operated by the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Kirkuk region. The medical facilities of the company in the oil field and the pipeline areas also included 20 detention camps, with 797 743 743 446

3.Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 MI Middle East

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44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

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872

Only six of the provinces include kindergarten classes with their junior schools; a total of 621 children, 265 boys and 356 girls, are registered in these classes. The Ministry of Education is most concerned with spreading basic elementary education and tends to leave nursery schools and kindergartens to private initiative. A few private or foreign kindergartens have been established in Baghdad.

Except for demonstration schools attached to the teachers colleges and administered jointly by the heads of the teachers colleges and the provincial directors of education, primary schools are under the authority of the latter officials. The public primary-school regulations authorize free primary instruction to children of all creeds and races who are between ages of six and fourteen and specify subjects to be taught and prohibit the use of textbooks that have not been approved by the Ministry of Education. Teachers and pupils are forbidden to engage in politics, and teachers may not engage in commerce or accept outside permanent or temporary employment without the approval of the provincial director of education. Teachers may not give private lessons to children of their own schools. They may do so to children of other schools only with the approval of the provincial director. At the time of admission to a school children must be free from disease and must present a certificate of vaccination against smallpox. Children admitted from *mulla* (*kuttab*) or private schools are examined and put in a suitable grade. Children transferring from one public school to another are supplied with certificates which place them in the same grade in the new school. Religious instruction given in any school is in the religion of the majority of the students; minority-group students are excused from attending classes for religious instruction.

The school year extends from September 15 to June 15. A ten-day vacation is given at midyear, and the schools enjoy the same holidays as do government offices. Children belonging to minority religions are allowed holidays for their important feasts. The whole school is closed for holidays of the majority religion. The school week is of six days with Friday free. There is a half-day session on Thursday, and Monday afternoon is devoted to school excursions, scouting, lectures, or other extracurricular activities. The school day of regular length consists of six lessons, four in the morning and two in the afternoon. The daily timetable is fixed in the regulations, and no principal is authorized to deviate from it.

[798]

The regulations lay down detailed instructions for conducting examinations in the school. These are given by the teachers under the general direction of the principal. In the first four grades the maximum grade is 10; in the fifth and sixth grades, 100. The pupil must not fall below 50

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new 457
Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long- 439
profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three 453
British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia.
The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 802 ●
1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*,
and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade 439
followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors. Imported goods found favour less by quality than by cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived 632
creditably, municipal development and the public services were 185
expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns
a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital 362
used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned
on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for 365
electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation, in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was
abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in 366
Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns.
The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building
industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equip- 331
ment, the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced
incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was 000

433 made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made
barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and
thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work
were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—
shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-
[501] craft, of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported
wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of
the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted
downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were
made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These,
with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq distillation and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the
meagre list.

439 The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has
457 been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). To it as an 'invisible export'
should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—lifeblood of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd
al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by
travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

439 Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory consisted of the import of those needed commodities which the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed through Başra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales, coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France, and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes, were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

436 The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper qirsh
(piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a stable
coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian rupee
in Başra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns and
Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange
rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. A multitude of local
804 weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district.
453 Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by
the shrewd operations of many local *şarrafs*.

489 deck cargo, and the goods would be liable to damage by rain or spray
439 if otherwise packed.

13. The Story of Sheikh Mizeil el Qurnachi, a Man of a Noble Family, though His Land Was Poor

804 Page 185, Line 15. 'and ordered fifty mithkals of them.'
The mithkal is a small weight used by goldsmiths.

192 Page 188, Line 20. 'Take soldiers and go to Qasr Qurnachi.'
Qasr—castle. 'Qurnachi Castle.'

Page 191, Line 11. 'Can then the hawk fly without wings.'
539 I was told that this quotation was from a famous Arab poet, but
192 regret that I was unable to place it, and nobody could remember the name of the poet. The quotation as put into the mouth of Sheikh Aqab is particularly apt, as Aqab, though its literal translation is 'eagle,' is a name often given to hawks.

Page 198, Line 24. 'She was clad in an ataq and bag trousers.'
The ataq is a kind of blouse.

14. The Story of Daoud the Camel and of his Misfortunes

Page 204, Line 4. 'The Shammar of the Jezira.'
103 The area in Mosul Liwa which lies to the west of the Tigris, that is,
101 between the Tigris and the Euphrates, is known as the Jezira, or Island. The Shammar in this area are the famous tribe of the late Sheikh Ajil el Yawar.

15. Between Truth and Falsehood Lie Four Fingers

551 Page 214, Line 14. 'The name of this girl was Leila for she was born in the night.'

Leila, 'Night,' is a popular girl's name in South Iraq. I do not think it is restricted only to those girls born at night.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX A

Comparative Table of Islamic (Hijra) and Christian Years, 1890–1955.

The 1st Muḥarram of each year of the Hijra (A.H.)—shown in col. I—falls on the Christian date shown in col. II.

I A.H.	*II* A.D.	*I* A.H.	*II* A.D.	*I* A.H.	*II* A.D.
1308	17 Aug. 1890	1331	11 Dec. 1912	1354	5 Apr. 1935
1309	7 Aug. 1891	1332	30 Nov. 1913	1355	24 Mar. 1936
1310	26 July 1892	1333	19 Nov. 1914	1356	14 Mar. 1937
1311	15 July 1893	1334	9 Nov. 1915	1357	3 Mar. 1938
1312	5 July 1894	1335	28 Oct. 1916	1358	21 Feb. 1939
1313	24 June 1895	1336	17 Oct. 1917	1359	10 Feb. 1940
1314	12 June 1896	1337	7 Oct. 1918	1360	29 Jan. 1941
1315	2 June 1897	1338	26 Sept. 1919	1361	19 Jan. 1942
1316	22 May 1898	1339	15 Sept. 1920	1362	8 Jan. 1943
1317	12 May 1899	1340	4 Sept. 1921	1363	28 Dec. 1943
1318	1 May 1900	1341	24 Aug. 1922	1364	17 Dec. 1944
1319	20 Apr. 1901	1342	15 Aug. 1923	1365	6 Dec. 1945
1320	10 Apr. 1902	1343	2 Aug. 1924	1366	25 Nov. 1946
1321	30 Mar. 1903	1344	22 July 1925	1367	15 Nov. 1947
1322	18 Mar. 1904	1345	12 July 1926	1368	3 Nov. 1948
1323	8 Mar. 1905	1346	1 July 1927	1369	24 Oct. 1949
1324	25 Feb. 1906	1347	20 June 1928	1370	13 Oct. 1950
1325	14 Feb. 1907	1348	9 June 1929	1371	2 Oct. 1951
1326	4 Feb. 1908	1349	29 May 1930	1372	21 Sept. 1952
1327	23 Jan. 1909	1350	19 May 1931	1373	10 Sept. 1953
1328	13 Jan. 1910	1351	7 May 1932	1374	30 Aug. 1954
1329	2 Jan. 1911	1352	26 Apr. 1933	1375	20 Aug. 1955
1330	22 Dec. 1911	1353	16 Apr. 1934		

Ramadhan, the month of fasting, is the ninth month of the Islamic year. The year has 354 days.

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NOTES

Arab time. Page 63, Line 32. 'And the time was the sixth hour of night.'

Arab time has long since been abandoned in Iraq though it continues 805 in modified forms in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. The Arab day of the week or date starts at sunset (e.g. the Arab Monday would start at sunset on our Sunday). The first twelve hours of each day of the week, that is, from sunset to twelve hours later, were known as the Hours of Night. They were followed by twelve further hours known as the Hours of Day, to complete the 24 hour cycle and to make one complete day. The sixth hour of night would thus be six hours after sunset, probably somewhere near our midnight. The Arab time system had many disadvantages, but probably for people living in the desert without watches, and therefore forced to use the sun or stars to tell them the time, it was as good a system as any. Sunset was the same for everybody and started the day, sunrise would in practice in the desert be considered to be twelve hours later and therefore the start of the first hour of day. Noon was, under the same casual reckoning, the sixth hour of day. In practice Arabs are extremely good at judging the time from noting the passage of the moon or stars, though I suppose that they will in time lose this gift through the present almost universal possession of watches.

7. The Story of Maqdad—He Was the Hero of Hilla

Hilla.

Hilla is an old Arab town situated at a crossing of the Euphrates 361 River near to the ancient site of Babylon. Al Fetla have of course no special claim to the town and I was surprised that Maqdad should be hero of Hilla rather than of one of the smaller places to which Al Fetla could lay a closer claim. I think one tends to forget that many of the smaller towns and villages were insignificant or did not exist at all until recent times. Nasiriya, for example, which the Muntafiq tribes now regard as their capital, and which is the seat of the Mutassarif of the Muntafiq Liwa, was only founded in the last century by Nasir Pasha es Saadun. Hilla must in the past have been the centre of a very much larger area than it is today. It is still one of the most important towns of South Iraq. It is well known beyond the borders of Iraq as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The power
wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formidable 793
not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was 565
always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of
State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish, anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd and Shumurd of Najf were notorious.

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without 517
its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social 181
observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of information regarding the world, past or present, and that of æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remembered Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmelite), and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans, Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing, book production, or generally readable literary output there was nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excavation, 'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to 'Iraqis an ignored or suspe[illegible] mystery. The professional classes—lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost
nothing to show. Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a 812
class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body
of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and 779
the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy 793
Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion, this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

812 stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who
779 claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

793

5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

369 If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded, on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The
619 tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of
795 intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects. Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some, notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy. Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence and embarrassment.

619 The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but
62 its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muhammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the
619 vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

652 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager development. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained: schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

631 In the liwās,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwā early in 1922. Arbil, a sub-liwā of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Ḥilla. No more was heard of Baṣra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwā and qadhā. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

632 In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1922 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative —cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three
204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq
747 *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable
814 institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

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[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwās or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* S. G. C. Murray, H. M. Flaxman, E. C. H. Alban,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. S. Berry,* L. Kettlewell, S. E. Hedgcock, H. C. Pulley, R. E. Alderman,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. D. Jeffreys, L. W. Reed, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Grice, A. J. B. Chapman, J. B. Glubb (p. 291). Gillan, Murray, Flaxman, Kettlewell, Reed, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Pulley had died, and Longrigg and Hedgcock had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928–33), from the Sudan.

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic 747
Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary 814
clubs.

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil 619
period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land 166
communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyalā tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi D͟hafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the D͟hafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921-2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions 648x
in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdi- 721
stan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered [575] by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some 526 survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in 'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling, was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America. Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was 542 well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the 484 poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying 369 the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on 529 summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in 212 the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world 178 upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts, easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development, an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted, was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of 1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology 814 apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

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[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

814 antiquities, Kurdish lore and tribal traditions, some of whom had
produced monographs of interest and value. Returning graduates
from foreign universities had reached, at the least, the standard
indicated by their doctorates, but few had been attracted by the
deeper or more humane culture of the West. The study of Islamic
dogma and history was still practised in both Sunni and Shi‘i
circles of the professional divines, and still attracted pupils; but its
seeming divorce from the living world repelled the more active and
vital of the rising generation; it offered a career less interesting
than the professions or politics; and its appeal was without force to
a society in which Islam seemed to have lost much (and in politics
874 nearly all) of its hold. Professional standards, on the other hand, in
medicine, archaeology, police and military studies, engineering,
economics, and the applied sciences had risen beyond comparison
above those of a generation earlier, and gave scope for the best
qualities of the ‘Iraqi mind.

538 The output of original literary work was small. The modern
[213] (linotype) presses installed since the Second World War produced
mainly governmental or institutional works or pamphlets, largely
[214] educational. Western publishing methods were not in use; books
were printed at the author's expense and sold with difficulty
through a bookseller; workmanship in book production, especially
in binding and illustration, was notably poor. The lack of demand
(especially after the Jewish exodus), the unwillingness of the rich
to patronize letters, and at times a capricious censorship, had discouraged
writers; there were but humble traces of creative effort,
and these confined to the fields of poetry (in which ‘Iraq had always
held its own in the Arab world) and to a lesser extent of fiction
writing; women writers had earned a place in both. Interest in
contemporary Arabic literature other than newspapers was slight,
and the study of earlier Arabic works, though regarded as something
of a national asset, did not greatly attract a younger generation,
who preferred the writings of modern Europe. The dozen of
204 monthly or quarterly magazines, which appeared at Ḥilla, Mosul,
Baṣra, Najf, Arbil, and Kirkuk as well as at Baghdad, were in most
cases the organs of various societies or government departments,
and though competently written they had few subscribers and no
great literary pretension. Kurdish literary activity, though on a
diminutive scale, was of vitality and promise. ‘Iraqi artists, on the
532 other hand, were producing work of some interest, if almost wholly
Western in inspiration; musical and dramatic studies were pursued
533 at the Institute of Fine Arts, and more than one ‘Iraqi musician—
and at least one ‘Iraqi cinema actress—had attained a creditable
place.

204 The circumstances of its public life and the lively intelligence of

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

IRAQ MHI

to another are arranged, plans for new schools and classes are decided upon, 871^K
and proposals, policy matters, complaints, and criticisms are discussed.

Finally must be mentioned the newly founded Committee on Authorship, Translation, and Publication, which is a self-perpetuating body of learned men forming a kind of academy. 814 ● It may have a minimum of ten and a maximum of twenty members distributed among the various branches of learning. This committee endeavors to enrich the "Arabic Library" by translating important classics as well as modern books of science, technology, and general culture; to encourage original research and writing; to publish old Arabic manuscripts; and to standardize Arabic scientific terminology. The committee holds regular meetings to choose books to be translated or written, to select writers and translators, and to read and discuss the researches of members. It may give financial assistance to translators, authors, and publishers in the form of grants, purchase of copyrights, prizes, or any other manner considered advisable. It plans to establish contact with learned men and societies in Iraq and abroad, particularly throughout the Arabic world. Finally, it plans to publish its own bulletins and periodicals embodying the researches of its members.

Educational Finance

The Ministry of Education receives the third largest budgetary provision 871^K
of all the departments of the Iraqi government, being exceeded only by [658]
the army and the police. The public educational institutions of Iraq are 652
entirely supported by the central government. The provincial authorities contribute nothing to the school fund, nor do the municipal authorities except for occasional assistance given to poor pupils. For specific purposes, such as aid to poor students or enlargement or repair of a school, contributions are occasionally solicited from private citizens of a locality, under the auspices of the administrative and educational authorities. The schools may give dramatic performances and exhibits to secure funds for special needs. Except for these minor and irregular sources, the central government pays the whole cost of public education.

The percentage of the general budget allotted to education has fluctuated from year to year. Starting with 2.3 percent in 1920–21, it reached a maximum of 12.9 percent in 1938–39, declined again in the following years to 7.8 percent in 1944–45, and showed a slight rise to 8.6 percent in 1945–46. In absolute figures, however, the sums allotted to the Ministry of Education have risen consistently (except for 1923–24) from 130,360 dinars ($521,440) in 1920–21 to 1,630,800 dinars ($6,523,200) in 1945–46. The decline in the percentage in recent years shows that

242 647 attention is devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks. The relatively small number of agricultural officers in the provinces are engaged primarily in the distribution of seed, in the collection of rather inadequate statistics and in administrative tasks. They lack the time, the transport facilities, and, often, the ability to counsel farmers on methods of improving their output. While shortages of trained personnel will prevent the immediate establishment of a full-time extension service, the Mission recommends the early appointment of a director of extension and education whose first responsibility would be the recruitment and training of personnel for such a service. The need is for people well-grounded in practical, [874] general agriculture rather than specialists. The facilities of the secondary agricultural school and the higher agricultural institute at Abu Ghuraib might well be used to train the required people, provided the quality of the staff is improved and the curriculum revised, especially in the direction of giving more practical training in agriculture. It will be impossible, however, to attract properly qualified people to an extension service unless the status of agricultural officers in the provinces is considerably raised and their conditions of service, particularly housing and pay, are greatly improved.

The effectiveness of such an extension service would be greatly enhanced by the organization of demonstration units on strategically located government and private farms. There, farmers could be brought to see with their own eyes the practical advantages of improved methods of raising livestock, poultry and farm crops. At the same time the extension service might work closely with the public schools in the rural areas and small towns to insure that a knowledge of the rudimentary principles of agriculture is instilled in children at an early age. Rural primary and secondary schools should give agriculture an appropriate place in their curriculum.

● 816 242 An extension service must be backed up by sound, practical research which will develop new crops and more productive varieties, improved livestock breeds, better methods of cultivation, and more effective control of pests and diseases. At present there are few people engaged in full-time research. Government farms are devoted primarily to the commercial production of seed, serving neither as demonstration farms nor as centers for extensive research. The Mission recommends that in the future such farms should be used primarily as experimental stations. Seed for distribution to farmers could be produced on land surplus to the needs of the experimental stations or on a contract basis under appropriate government supervision on private farms. The Mission suggests that immediate steps be taken to secure a research director to coordinate all existing research and to recruit a gradually expanding staff of full-time research experts consisting partly of foreigners and partly of Iraqis. 242 816

These measures will bring about an improvement in agriculture only very gradually. In the short run they will need to be supplemented by positive financial incentives. Most farmers will probably prove unwilling or unable to invest money or time in the cultivation of fodder crops or the use of fertilizers unless they are convinced through practical experience that such an investment is really worthwhile. In order to induce farmers to experiment themselves, the government may wish to consider providing free seed for fodder crops and defraying part of the cost of fertilizer, or, alternatively, making a flat money payment per donum to those undertaking to use fertilizers or grow feed. Such incentives should, of course, be offered only as long as is necessary to demonstrate the value of improved methods. The provision of credit for the acquisition of machinery, fertilizers and other means of production will also be helpful in this respect. 242

It has already been pointed out that the existing sharecropping system, coupled with the shifting nature of cultivation, militates against the introduction of soil-building and forage crops. Under present conditions the landlord will find it difficult to compel the fellah to grow such crops unless the fellah is actually paid for doing so. The Mission therefore suggests that the difficulties inherent in the sharecropping system, as well as the advisability of changes in this system, be studied by an expert on land tenure. 242 427

Tobacco and the Tobacco Monopoly

The Mission has paid special attention to tobacco, not only because cultivation of this crop is of considerable importance to the Kurdish farmers of the North, but also because tobacco leaf is 249 655

[redacted] N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

362 647 Affairs and staffed by men trained in house design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, public health, housing and land economics, and project management. Initially a nucleus for such an Authority might be created by strengthening the existing housing section of the Department of Labor. At present the section is staffed only by one part-time architect with one part-time assistant, a superintendent, and a few clerks and accountants. The Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid. Maintenance and repairs could thus be financed without constant resort to the Treasury.

● [816] The Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Industrial Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station would conduct research designed to develop improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing. In particular, it would experiment with the most economical and effective combination of locally available materials and try them in actual housing units. It would test, for example, such possibilities as the utilization of date-palm fronds for the manufacture of pressed boards, of rice husk and asphalt mixed and pressed into blocks or bricks for interior partitions, and of reed mats and bitumen to form waterproof sheets for roofing materials.

362 How much public housing should be undertaken is difficult to determine in the absence of sample surveys to ascertain the needs of different parts of the population, particularly in the light of what they can afford to pay for housing. Housing will, of course, automatically improve as the productivity and the incomes of the people rise, but this does not mean that some portion of the revenue from increased production of oil should not be used to provide housing for those in urgent need. Pending a more thorough study, an amount of about ID 400,000 annually might be taken as a provisional target for expenditures. Presumably public housing should cater primarily to the needs of low-paid employees and industrial workers. While a large public housing program is not a matter of high priority at present, it is vitally important that adequate accom-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

wise investment to spend some money on intelligent research and 346
experimentation in this field. The program of buildings should 872
also include, as suggested above, the construction of teachers' houses—particularly for women teachers—in places where they are not otherwise available.

More attention might well be paid to the equipment of new and existing schools. The libraries, for instance, are generally [217] poor: the number of books is small; they are not chosen with reference to the needs of the children for whom they are meant; their arrangement and display leave much to be desired; and the service provided is very unsatisfactory. No proper individual records of students' reading are maintained and no imaginative steps are taken to stimulate the desire to read and to make the library a dynamic and integral part of the school and of the life of the students. The library often consists simply of a few crowded, dust-laden bookshelves in one of the classrooms to which students have access at odd times and for short periods for borrowing books. School libraries not only should be stocked with a large number of well-displayed and suitable books but should be made the most pleasant and attractive place in the school.

The laboratory and workshop facilities provided, even in full- [816] fledged secondary schools, are also inadequate. There can be no proper teaching of science or crafts unless the equipment is greatly improved and practical work is given its due place. Apparently there is no examination in practical work at all at the end of the secondary school, and obviously there can be none so long as most schools have no laboratories or workshops, or very poor apologies for them. In fact, of the large number of secondary schools visited, only two, one government institution and one foreign school, had adequate laboratories. Under the circumstances, science is gen- [876] erally taught theoretically, as a lesson from the printed book or as a lecture by the teacher, with occasional demonstration of experiments by him in front of the class. This kind of vicarious experimentation, which never allows the students to handle any apparatus, does little to foster the scientific attitude. The provision of laboratory facilities will not by itself, however, make any great difference—what is needed is the introduction of activity methods in the teaching of science and the use of science as an instru-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

ANNEX H

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES

I. Introduction

In its main report the Mission has expressed in general terms 361
its view that more attention needs to be given to the problems of community planning and housing. Well-planned communities and a well-housed population are clearly desirable social assets; but it may not be so generally realized that they are also economic assets. The extra cost of good design and careful planning is small compared with the waste that ensues if they are ignored. In purely financial terms it is costly to maintain, and far more costly to improve, a city which has extensive slums and congested streets and whose growth does not follow lines that permit the provision of efficient public services.

The Mission has advocated the strengthening and improve- 647
ment of the Planning Office of the Directorate General of Munici- 361
palities in the Ministry of Interior to take care of community planning, both rural and urban, and of the Housing Section attached to the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Social Affairs to take care of housing in all its phases. It believes that these related agencies should ultimately be developed into a genuine Community Planning Office and a central Housing Authority with separate and well-defined functions and with the power necessary to discharge those functions effectively and adequately. As a tech- [816]
nical supplement to the Housing Authority, the Mission has recommended the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station which would conduct research on improved methods of construction and on the new use of available building material and, as such, would most suitably be attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. The broad functions of these offices have been described in the main report.

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Due to the nature and magnitude of the work involved, the Housing Authority should be firmly established in the Ministry of Social Affairs and provided with powers commensurate with its responsibilities so that it may perform its functions effectively. It should ultimately have a staff composed of technical men trained in housing design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, law and project management. As in the Community Planning Office, they should also have some knowledge of the sociological and economic aspects.

On the financial side, the Housing Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid so that maintenance and repairs could be financed without constant resort to the Treasury. Pending a housing survey the amounts set aside for housing in the five-year program of the Development Board, namely ID 300,000 annually, might be increased to ID 400,000 as a provisional target for housing expenditures.

•[816] On the technical side, the Housing Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station should test, develop and demonstrate improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing; collect and disseminate technical housing and building information; experiment with and develop new uses of local building materials, construction methods and house designs; and carry on other useful research in the housing field. The Station should be staffed as far as possible with local technicians, but for the first year or so one or two building research experts from abroad should be engaged to start and run the Station and train the local technicians in order to enable them to operate the Station themselves after a time. A new building should be constructed for the Station and equipped with the basic instruments and machines necessary for starting tests and experiments. It will clearly be necessary for the Authority to work closely with the Station and to insure that the broad outlines of its work conform with the need of the country.

361 [539] being mentioned in a nursery rhyme which runs:

Cukukhti, wein ukhti?	Dove, where's my sister?
B'il Hilla.	In Hilla.
Sha takal?	What does she eat?
Bajilla.	Beans.
Wein tenam?	Where does she sleep?
Bab Illah	At God's door.

and which continues for several verses.

The mace. Page 71, Line 16. 'A mace of the finest teakwood.'

411 The mace may almost be said to be a traditional weapon in South Iraq. If you meet an Arab tribesman about his normal daily routine in the countryside, he will probably be armed with a mace and dagger. Rifles are weapons of luxury, to be kept away from dust and damp. [535] Many tribal dances are done with the mace, which is sometimes of solid wood carefully carved, and sometimes, a less beautiful weapon but more dangerous, it is made of a wooden shaft with a ball of lead or pitch at the end.

Page 74, Line 22. 'Maqdad took his course from the wind.'

● 821 Skilled desert guides can often recognise a wind as being from a certain quarter by its force, humidity, and temperature. The phrase here implies that the sun was clouded over and Maqdad was finding his way by the wind, which indicates that he had considerable skill. The only people who can use the wind are those who can detect quickly any change in its direction. I remember once asking some Arabs the way to a well, and they told me, Keep the wind on your left cheek. I had to use methods with which I was more familiar.

Page 81, Line 25. 'Now I shall call myself Ibn Ali.'

601 The kunya, or name defining a person by his relationship to someone else, is recorded both in classical and modern Arabic usage. Ibn Batuta, for example, a famous fourteenth century traveller, is known only by his kunya. The modern tribal practice appears to be to promote a man to a kunya when he becomes the father of a boy. A man who has become father of a boy named Qais will, for example, be hailed by his friends with exceptionalheartiness for some weeks afterwards, 'Ahlan wa sahlan ya Ab Qais', and the name may or may not stick

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*539 And the Amir took that fish and threw it in the river.
825 Now that fish was of the tribe of Adam, and it was really a girl, for you know that the fish of gold are really of the tribe of men, though they have taken the disguise of fish, and are skilled in magic and unusual things. And as the Amir threw the fish into the river he said: May God leave you with your lover and may he leave me with a lover.

*539 Now when the fish girl landed in the water she swam off to her lover, to a cave beneath the waters of the Tigris, and he asked her: Where have you been and why have you delayed your coming? And she replied: I was taken in a net, and given to the Amir, but he returned me to the water and he said, Go to your lover.

But when the Amir had told his father the Sultan that all girls were witches and evil creatures he was lying, nor did he fully state the truth, for one girl, a princess in a neighbouring country, he thought not evil but good, and his blood was hot with love for her, but he concealed this from his father, knowing that the Sultan wished to marry him to his cousin, that her wealth might not go from Iraq.

And the lover of the fish girl was aware of these affairs, for of such are the magicians. And he thought: I must reward the Amir who gave me back my beloved. And he took on the shape of a derwish, and went to the prison, and saluted the Amir. And he said: You desire to take Aliya bint Rejab. When the Amir saw that his desire was known to the derwish he became as white as milk, and he was astonished, and he implored help from the derwish, saying: O master of miracles, help me get my beloved. And the Amir and the derwish mounted on horses and left the prison, nor did the guards become aware of their departure. They rode to the palace of the girl Aliya. And

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*539 they entered the palace like cats, in the second half of the night, and the alarm was not raised. And the Amir went into the room of the girl Aliya. The night was hot and she had cast off her clothes. And when the Amir saw the beauty of her body he was amazed, and he was near to fainting with wonder. But he covered the girl Aliya and took her to the horses, and they rode into the desert. And in the morning they halted and she cooked for them food. [262] When they had eaten of meat and rice and dates and lebn the derwish spoke to the Amir and said: It is written that we must divide this girl between us and each have his share of her, for if two are partners in labour they must share the achievement. And the Amir said: This suggestion is unsuitable, nor can it happen thus. And the girl heard and was amazed at the words of the derwish. But the derwish insisted and said: A division is written as the fate of this girl, and I have no power to alter it. The Amir thought: This derwish is one of the princes of magicians, and he has befriended me. So he said: If it is thus, then it shall be done according to your wishes, but how shall we divide her, up and down, or across? And the derwish replied: Up and down, for then each of us shall have a beautiful eye and a breast and an arm and a leg and it will be even between us, and neither shall have an advantage. The girl Aliya heard these words and became afraid. She cast herself at the derwish's feet and cried: O my masters, cast lots between yourselves as to which is to have me, but do not divide me. But the derwish said: It is necessary. And he drew his sword and waved it over the girl and
*539 was about to strike, and the Amir Kheyyun covered his
825 eyes from the spectacle. But at that very moment the
● girl's mouth opened and the head of a snake appeared from it. And the derwish cried: Come out, Zeboshun,

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Come out, Zeboshun. And the snake came out and it was 539^{x}
twenty feet long and green of skin, and it went over the 825 ●
desert with the speed of a horse. The derwish turned to
the Amir and said: I have frightened the snake from her,
for it was in her and she knew it not. For this snake was
of a breed which enters girls without their knowledge,
and its pleasure lies in the torment of men, for it waits for
the girl to marry, then it causes her to be angry and nag
her man, and her words become as the very venom of the
snake, and there is no means of extracting the snake, unless
you see its face and know its name and gain power over it.

The Amir was grateful and thanked the derwish, and 539^{x}
the derwish said: The girl is yours and I wish you enjoyment in her, and peace be on you and in God's hands. So the Amir took the girl and married her and went to his father's palace. The servants and slaves cried: Your father is stricken with grief for you. And the Amir went to his father the Sultan Hajji Ali and said: Peace on you, O my father, I have taken a wife in accordance with your wishes. And the Sultan became glad and rejoiced and he made his son reign in his place, and he was a wise and just ruler, and had many sons, beautiful as moons.

originates from Africa, possibly as one told by Negroes themselves. 136
There are sharks in the Shatt el Arab and in the Karun River in Arabistan which occasionally take off the leg of a bather as far as eighty miles from the sea and the shark is far better known to the Iraqi than is the crocodile.

4. The Story of the Prince of Kermanshah and of His Misfortunes

Peacock. Page 29, Line 25. 'A thousand peacocks.'

I think this bird is only included to give an exotic flavour to the 000
feast. I remember once mentioning that I had shot and eaten peafowl in the Punjab, a statement which was received with much surprise and, I am afraid, some lack of belief, and on a subsequent occasion when someone was describing a feast one of those present shouted, 'Put in a peacock for the Sahib'. In India the peacock is not normally killed by Moslems on the grounds that it is a bird of Paradise. In Iraq, however, I do not doubt that the learned doctors of religion could give the answer straight away if asked. Pigeons which roost on mosques are exempt 137
from molestation, even when destroying crops outside villages. There 825
is incidentally a pretty Iraqi story which explains the large feet of a pigeon. It describes how the pride and arrogance of peacocks offended King Solomon, so to punish them he took away their feet and gave them the feet of the pigeons, that they might always be shamed by their smallness, while the peacocks' large and beautiful feet he gave of course to the pigeons.

5. The Story of the Youth Jamil, the Son of a Merchant in Baghdad

Page 43, Line 3. 'The City of Peace.'

Medinat es Salaam or 'City of Peace' is one of the names used in 103
poetry for Baghdad. The city, when first built, was originally named Medinat es Salaam, but it appears that people persisted in referring to it as Baghdad, or Dad's Garden, from some older name for the site of the present city. Arabs love these poetical names, differing from those in normal use. Iraq is sometimes known as Bilad er Rafidain, or Country of the Two Rivers. Jerusalem (Al Quds or the Holy in

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DRUGS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN

Nummulites sp. (Foraminifera)

عدس الملک

'Adasu 'l-mulk, Shāhdānej-i-'adasī (Teh.); Sang-i-shadnaj (Afg.); Shudnuj udsee (Ar.); Satanj, Samgh nadh (Punj.).

Field 158; W.H.M.M. 150852.

These are small, lens-shaped or button-shaped fossils, varying from 4 to 12 mm. in diameter. The name Adas refers to the seeds of the lentil, *Lens esculenta*, which the smaller stones resemble. They consist principally of calcium carbonate and act as an antacid. According to Honigberger the hakims administer the powdered fossils for eye diseases and for ulcers. On the authority of the "Doctrine of Signatures" these and other fossils were administered in former days on account of their resemblance to the products of disease.—Powdered with *Punica Granatum* L. and Sumaqh-i-shah, they are applied to painful gums (H.F.).

Corallium rubrum Lam. (Anthozoa)

شاخ مرجان

Shākhah-i-marjān (Teh.); Sang-i-marjan (Hind.); Bussud (Ar.); Prabala (Sans.); red or gem coral.

Field 169; W.H.M.M. 150879.

Coral is obtained from the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian coast. It is formed by coral polyps, which have the power of taking up lime from sea water and building this into a skeleton. Coral, therefore, consists principally of calcium carbonate. Both the red coral and the organ-pipe coral (*Tubipora*) are used in medicine; they are reduced to powder and given as a tonic, and to check vomiting and acidity resulting from dyspepsia and biliousness.

Cidaris sp. (Echinoidea)

حجر اليهود

Hajaru'l-yahūd, Sang-i-yahuda (Pers.); Pathar-ka-ber (Hind.); Dugre bore (Bom.); Lapis jadaicus (Ph. Pers.); Jews' stone.

W.H.M.M. 150886.

This fossil echinoid consists of the petrified spines of a sea urchin, found in the Jurassic deposits of the Salt Range, Punjab. Extravagant ideas prevail as to the origin of these fossils, which some suppose

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to be petrified fruits; the name they bear in Delhi, Pathar-ka-ber, signifies the fruits or stones of the jujube tree. The stones are oval, pointed at both ends, 3.5 cm. long and 2 cm. in diameter. They contain 95 per cent of calcium carbonate. These stones are sold all over northern India, Iran, Syria, and Palestine. They are said to be useful for healing wounds, and, internally, for flatulence and diarrhea.

Cypraea moneta L. (Gastropoda)

صدف

Sadaf, Wuda (Ar.); Khar mahra (Pers.); Cowri, Sipi (Hind.); cowrie shells.

Field 269A.

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[301]
[436]

These well-known porcelaneous shells from the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf are used throughout the East for making ornaments, and at one time were a means of barter or medium of exchange. They consist chiefly of calcium carbonate, and in medicine are used as an antacid, alterative, and expectorant. The shells also serve as charms against the Evil Eye for babies, horses, and machines (H. F.).

Larinus maculatus Fald. (Coleoptera)

Yielding Tréhala manna; described under the name of the host-plant, *Echinops persicus*.

Bee's wax (Hymenoptera, Apoidea)

موم

Mūm (Teh.); Moma (Hind.); Cera alba; white wax.

Field 216, 260.

White wax is sold in the shops and used for plasters and ointments.

"Camphor candle" (Mūm-i-kāfūri) is a specimen of a crudely made wax candle in the composition of which camphor has been incorporated to diffuse a pleasant odor when burning.

Bombyx fortunatus Hutton (Lepidoptera)

پیله ابریشم

Abrīsham, Pīlāh abrīsham (Teh.); Pileh, cocoon; Resham, silk; Pat (Beng.); Resham-ki-keri (Duk.); cocoons of the silk moth.

W.H.M.M. 150821.

The cocoons of the silk moth or silk worm are said to be styptic and tonic, and are generally administered with other astringents.

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278* Burnt, the ashes are given internally in profuse menstruation and
• 825 chronic diarrhea.

Under the name of Abrisham, white silk, cut into small pieces, is given in Ajmere as a remedy for impotence (Irvine).

Otoliths of fish (Percomorphi, Sciaenidae)

Sang-i-sar-i-māhī (from Sang, "a stone"; Sar, "a head"; Mahi, "fish"; an allusion to the belief among the natives that the stone is found in the head of a fish), "poa teeth" (Ind.).

W.H.M.M. 51699.

Otoliths are semi-crystalline bodies composed of carbonate of lime, found in the ear sacs of fish. These concretions are sold in Delhi and other cities in northern India. They resemble in color and form the human incisor teeth, being white and smooth, and having both surfaces convex. The concretions are powdered and given for urinary diseases, chiefly in the suppression and retention of urine (Khory).

Tortoise eggs (*Testudo horsfieldii* Grey and *T. graeca.* Chelonia)

تخم لاک پشت

Tukhm-i-lāk-pusht, "eggs of the hard-backed one" (Teh.); Sur-kūk (Afg.); Lek-poshte (Schl.); tortoise eggs.

W.H.M.M. 150899.

These are globular, orange-colored, waxy bodies, 2 cm. across, disintegrating in water, leaving a yellowish powder, insoluble, with oily globules on the surface. Eggs of the tortoise are used by the Bruhies (Afghanistan) whipped up with water and smeared over the pustules as a remedy to prevent pitting from smallpox (Bellew). In Assam the eggs are also eaten and used medicinally. The eggs and flesh are said to be aphrodisiac. People of the Makran coast (Baluchistan) have a custom of tying a piece of turtle shell to any animal having a stoppage of urine.

278* **Milk curds from** ***Bos indicus*** (Ruminantia)
262

قر قروت

Qar-i-qurūt (Teh.); Karūt, Krūt (Afg.); dried oxygal, hardened cheese.

Field 238.

Qurūt or Karūt occurs in round balls or cakes of varying shapes made from the milk of cows, buffaloes, or goats. It is usually

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obtained by evaporating sour buttermilk, pressing out the whey in bags, by hand, and drying the solid curd in the sun. These cakes are used by Afghans and residents of the black tents of Helmand, who carry them on their tours as a favorite article of diet. When required, the cakes are mixed with water, brinjal fruits and bread added; the whole forms an admirable dish. The Qar-i-qurūt from Tehran is a blackish brown mass, acidulous and salty to the taste, largely soluble in water; it is very similar to meat extracts sold in America and Europe.—The preparation is used as a soup following vermifuge treatment (H.F.).

Kashk Kashk (Kurd.).

Field 61.

These are balls of casein, butter, and salt, prepared from milk. They probably represent the "Pleasant Food" (Khushk horāk) flavored with asafoetida, used in Afghanistan (Aitchison).

Camel's flesh, dried from *Camelus dromedarius* L.; single-humped or Arabian camel 278✱

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کوهان شتر

Kūhān-i-shutur (Teh.); camel's hump.

Field 140.

The specimen is a piece of yellowish white, dried, fibrous flesh from the hump of a camel. This peculiar drug is directed to be mixed with fat and made into an ointment for piles. The Tatars use the hump cut into slices, which, placed in tea, serve the purpose of butter. Camel's meat is eaten by Greeks and Iranis; the flesh of the young dromedary is considered by Arabs to be equal to veal. Ainslie states that the rennet of the camel, which the Iranis term Punir-mayeh-shutur, is placed among their aphrodisiacs; Honigberger calls the substance Camelinum coagulum and says it is highly esteemed by Arabian doctors.

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Bezoar stones from *Capra aegagrus* Gmel.; Persian wild goat

پادزاهر

Pādzahr (Pers.); Fadzehre heyvani (Schl.); Gorochan (Hind.); bezoar stone.

W.H.M.M. 199302.

The bezoar stone appears to have been first used as a medicine by the Arabian physician Avicenna. Razis in his "Continens" describes

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it fully, and extols its good qualities as an alexipharmic. Linschoten devotes a chapter to the description of "Bezar stones and other stones good against poyson" and quotes da Orta's account of the origin of this biliary concretion which came from Iran. Similar stones are obtained from the cow, goat, wild boar, antelope, porcupine, and camel. That obtained from the camel is the cheapest, but that from the Persian wild goat is considered the most efficacious. The specimen cited came from Shiraz.

Goats' droppings

مامیز کری

Māmiz, Māmiz-i-kirī (Teh.).

Field 224; W.H.M.M. 150735.

The specimens consist of lumps of fecal matter, from 1 to 1.5 cm. across. Broken and examined with a lens, they were seen to be composed principally of vegetable débris. This is unusual as a drug, and not recorded in ordinary medical works of the East, but in Tehran is said to be rubbed on the chest for bronchitis.

Sheep's stomach, dried

مایه بره

Māyah-i-barrah (Isf.); sheep's stomach.

Field 8 (Isf.).

[234] This specimen is a dried portion of a sheep's stomach, containing the active principle of the gastric juice. The name Māyah refers to ferment, leaven or rennet, and Panir māyeh, "cheese producer." Rennet for preparing cheese is also obtained in the East from the stomach of hare, dog, or pig, as well as from that of the sheep and calf.

Mummy

میائی

Mūmiyāī, Mūmiyā (Pers.); Silajit (Hind.); Silajatu, "rock sweat" (Sans.); Khatmolt, Mashana churro (Bal.); Asphaltum Persicum; Asphaltum Punjabinum; Osteocolla (Lat.).

This is one of the most ancient medicines of Iran and northern India, and there has been considerable confusion regarding its origin and nature. There is no doubt that it was early associated with dead or embalmed bodies from Egyptian tombs, which were used

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in medicine in Europe in the Middle Ages, though often subject to adulteration (Budge, Sir E. A. W., "Mummy: Chapters on Egyptian Funereal Archaeology," London, 1893).

Another animal source has been found in the Khatmolt of Baluchistan, which contained a large proportion of urea. This confirms the direct evidence of a local medical dictionary that "Mummiai is the inspissated urine of the mountain goat."

The third source of Mummy is the exudation of a bituminous substance from a rock; the Indian name Silajit or "rock sweat" expresses the phenomenon. The Mumiai obtained as a secretion from the Mummy mountain of Iran has been described by Chardin, Kämpfer, Ouseley, Le Brun, and other travelers, and these all point to the fact that the substance is a variety of bitumen, asphalt, or allied hydrocarbon. R. Seligmann of Vienna published a pamphlet containing extracts from rare Persian manuscripts regarding this substance. At one time the King of Persia collected the product from one of the mountains near Behbeban and Darab, enclosed it in silver boxes, and distributed it with great care to those in need of this wonderful medicine.

Samples of Mumiai received lately in the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum are those of a variety of asphalt or mineral pitch. Some are black, soft, and sticky, and may be drawn out into long threads, while other samples are black, hard, and brittle.

In the light of modern therapeutics we may anticipate a decline in the reputation of Mumiai of Iran and the Silajit of India, and, like the Hiraceum of the Cape of Good Hope, these once famous remedies will soon be relegated to medicines of a past age.

Cuttle fish bone from *Sepia officinalis* L. (Cephalopoda)

کف دریا

Kaf-i-daryā, "foam of the waters" (Ar.); Samudraphena (Sans.); Os Sepiae, cuttle fish bone.

Field 85A; W.H.M.M. 150837.

Cuttle fish bone is the internal skeleton of the common cuttle or squid; it is used as a polishing material, and reduced to powder is employed in medicine as an antacid. It is often brought by returning pilgrims from Mecca, and hence is looked upon as a very important medicine. The Indian cuttle fish bone has the following composition: calcium carbonate 87.66, calcium sulphate 0.76, organic matter and water 9.2, iron oxide and alumina 0.46, magnesia and alkalis 1.7, silica 0.1, and phosphoric anhydride 0.02, in 100 parts.

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/For the metaphors and similes employed in some Iraqi tribal tales that convey the concept of ideal beauty and proportions, see complete text. /

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These seeds are flat, reddish brown, 5 by 3 cm., containing white cotyledons. The seeds are an Indian remedy for tapeworm. The powdered seeds are prescribed two days after a dose of wormseed. 824* 278*

Caesalpinia Bonducella Roxb. (Leguminosae)

تخم ابلیس

Tukhm-i-iblīs (Teh.); Khaza-i-iblīs, "Devil's testicles"; Bonduk-i-hindi (Ar.); Kat karanj (Hind.); bonduc nut, nicker tree.

W.H.M.M. 150709.

Bonduc seeds are globular, smooth, dull gray in color, and yield an oil by expression. They are worn as necklaces for charms, and the kernels are bitter, tonic, antiperiodic, and anthelmintic. [301]

Calamintha graveolens Benth. (Labiatae)

ترنکمسک

Terengamisk(?) (Teh.); Faranj mishk or Biranj mishk; Palang mishk has been referred to *Ocimum sanctum* L., and Palenguemeeke by Schlimmer to *Dracocephalum Kotschyi* Boiss.

Boiss. 4: 583; Post 624.

Field 32; K.B. 306.

This species of calamint frequents the Mediterranean region, Syria, Asia Minor, Iraq, and Trans-Caucasia. The seeds are known in India, where supplies come from Iran. They are dark brown, oblong in shape, 2 by 1 mm., three-angled, tapering toward the umbilicus, where there is a white, V-shaped mark; they are feebly pungent and become coated with transparent mucilage when soaked in water. The seeds are stimulating and aphrodisiac. [832] •

Calendula officinalis L. (Compositae)

همیشه بهار

Hamīshah bahār (Teh., Iraq); Gole himmicheh behar (Schl.); Qarah Koz (Turk.); marigold flowers.

Field 123.

The pot marigold, a plant of the Mediterranean coast, is a weed of cultivation in northern India, and is much grown in gardens for its ornamental flowers. The yellow flower heads are bitter and have long been used among domestic remedies. "A tincture made from the dried florets was formerly used in medicine for application to wounds" (Guest). [247]

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intervals during the day. Bread must be omitted from the diet during the time of medication (H.F.). 278* 824*

Celosia argentea L. (AmaranAtaceae)

گل حلوا

Gul-i-halvā (Isf.); Sarwali (Hind.); cockscomb seeds.

Field 408.

The plant grows throughout India and tropical Asia. The pinkish and yellow flower heads, seeds, and roots are used in medicine. The seeds are lenticular, brown or black, smooth, shining, convex on both surfaces. The leaves are used for poultices; the flowering tops with seeds are given as a nervine tonic and in diarrhea. The author of the "Muffaridat-i-Nāsiri" states that 180 grains of the seeds, with an equal quantity of sugar candy, taken daily in a cup of milk, is a powerful aphrodisiac. [832] •

—Mixed with *Chrozophora verbascifolia* Juss., the seeds are given as an infusion for chest pains, especially during whooping cough (H.F.).

Celtis australis L. (Ulmaceae)

دغ دغان

Digh-dighane (Isf.); nettle tree.

Field 70.

This ornamental tree is cultivated in Khorasan and near Baghdad, frequently near shrines and holy places. The small, green, wrinkled fruits of *C. caucasica* Willd. are mixed with ordinary flour to be made into bread. [247] [262]

C. Tournefortii Lam., Tawak in Kurdistan, bears small edible fruits like cherries.

Chaerophyllum sp. (Umbelliferae)

قردمانا

Qurdumānā (Teh.); Keruwiah (Isf.); the fruits.

W.H.M.M. 150836.

These fruits are gray-green, elongated, 10 by 1 mm., with a faint caraway odor. Honigberger refers the Arabic Kurdamana to *Lagaecia cuminoides* having similar properties. Stapf informs us that Keruwiah brought from Chahār Mahal and sold for medicine in Isfahan is an allied umbelliferous plant, *Grammosciadium macrodon* Boiss. They are both carminative medicines.

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Egypt and Baghdad in a powdered form and employed by Coptic and Arabian women as a strengthening medicine. Before 1914 it was exported in considerable quantities, chiefly to Egypt, as an aphrodisiac. A decoction of the root is sometimes used at Baghdad as a cough cure (G.).

Glycyrrhiza glabra L. (Leguminosae)

ریشه اصل سوس

Rishah-i-asl-i-sūs (Teh.); Bekh-sus; the root.

رب سوس

Rubb-i-sūs, Asal-alsus; the sweet extract; licorice.

Achundow; Ait.; Boiss. 2: 202; Post 277; Schl.; Ph. Ind. 1: 491.

Field 243, 259; K.B. 319.

The licorice plant is a characteristic and common shrub in the Badghis and Khorasan at an altitude of about 2,000 feet, and occurs also in Baluchistan. The annual shoots grow to 4 feet from enormous underground rootstalks, which are sometimes used as fuel. The nomads at Yezd prepare an extract from these roots. India obtains market supplies of the root and extract from Iran and Sind; it has been suggested that the plant might be cultivated in the North-Western Frontier Province. Throughout Asia, licorice root and its extract, from time immemorial, have been used for cough and chest complaints.

—Licorice root is also given to relieve acute indigestion from eating fruit (H.F.). The plant is said to yield an aphrodisiac (G.).

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Gossypium sp. (Malvaceae)

قطن

Cotton (Qutn, Ar.) is the hair-like cells clothing the seeds of the cotton plant. Specimens of cotton and seeds presented to Field Museum by the Rustam Agricultural Experimental Farm at Hinaidi, Iraq, are:

G. herbaceum L. Iraqi or Indian cotton (Qutn Iraqi); probably indigenous or at least cultivated for many centuries. (Field 6A.)

G. barbádense L. Sea Island cotton. (Field 2A.)

G. hirsutum L. "Mesowhite" (Qutn Amrikani). A derivative of the long-staple American upland cotton. (Field 38 [Iraq]; 8A, 10A, 13A.)

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Opium is known locally as Afyun, but the cultivation of the opium poppy is prohibited in Iraq. The capsules, some of them scarified, are sold in the bazaars, but their narcotic effects are less powerful and more uncertain than those of opium. The seeds contain 50 per cent of drying oil, which is sometimes called Roghan-i-khash khāsh. The seeds, often erroneously supposed to be poisonous because they are contained in the opium-yielding capsule, are wholesome and nutritious, and are eaten chiefly in sweetmeats.—The seeds are given to relieve epistaxis; an oil derived from them is employed in making soap. The fruits mixed with *Malva sylvestris* L. var. *mauritiana* Boiss. and *Linum usitatissimum* L. form a paste for application to boils (H.F.).

Parmelia kamtschdalis Esch. A lichen. See *Roccella Montagnei* Bél.

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Peganum Harmala L. (Rutaceae)

تخم اسفند

Tukhm-i-isfand, Sipand (Teh.); Harmal, Harmal rutbah (Ar., Iraq); Aspand (Kurd.); Uzarih (Turk.); the Syrian rue.

Achundow; Schl.; Post; Boiss. 1: 917; Fl. Br. Ind. 1: 486; Ph. Ind. 1: 75; Weisner 44.

Field 46; 4, 26, 27, 119 (Iraq); W.H.M.M. 150850; K.B. 329.

The mountain rue is a plant of Iran, Arabia, Syria, North Africa, and southern Europe. The plant and seeds were used medicinally by the Greeks and Romans, and were noted in European herbals in the 17th century. The seeds are exported from Iran into India, where the plant was originally introduced by Mohammedans. The seeds are dull gray, 2 mm. long, angular, having a bitter taste, and, when crushed, a heavy, narcotic odor. The active principle resides in the alkaloids, harmaline and harmine. The custom prevails in Iran and Iraq of sprinkling the seeds on burning coals at marriages to avert the malignant influence of the Evil Eye; the smoke from the burning seeds is said to drive away epidemics. The seeds are reputed to be an alterative and purifying medicine, and are supposed to stimulate the sexual system. [832]

Peucedanum graveolens Benth. & Hook. (*Anethum graveolens* L.) (Umbelliferae)

تخم شوید

Tukhm-i-shivid (Teh.); Shivit (Isf.); Shabbit (Ar.); Sawa, Soyah (Hind.); Habbat Halwah (Iraq); Anitum (Yunani); dill.

Field 128A, 52 (Iraq). I-I

Sesame is widely cultivated as a summer crop. The seeds, white, brown, or black, are used for garnishing cakes and sweetmeats and are eaten by the poor in times of scarcity. They contain about 50 per cent of a fixed oil which is an excellent substitute for olive oil or other salad oil in cooking. The oil cake is a cattle food. The oil is also the basis of most of the fragrant or scented oils—medicated oils prepared with various vegetable drugs. 824* 278* 263 246 243

In Baghdad, Rashi is the name given to a preparation of ground sesame seed after it has been soaked and roasted, which is used as an emollient, Rahishi (Ar.), Arwah-i-kunjad (Pers.).

Sesbania aculeata Poir. (Leguminosae) 824*

Sesbaniyah (Iraq); Saisaban (Egy.); Rasin (Hind.); Akar, Majandri (Bal.); Jayanti (Beng.); Sesbania seeds. 278*

Field 47 (Iraq).

The plant has been introduced into Iraq and planted for windbreaks. The seeds are sold in bazaars throughout India and Iran. They are dull grayish brown, oblong, 2 by 4 mm., smooth, hard, and bitter to the taste. The Hindus have a superstition that sight of the seeds will remove the pain of scorpion stings. They are used medicinally on account of their astringent properties. The seeds are beaten into a paste which is applied locally to cure eruptions.

Sisymbrium Sophia L. (Cruciferae)

خاکشیرین

Khākshīr, Khākshīr-i-shīrīn (Teh.); Towdri, Khub-kalan, Khaksi (Hind.); the seeds.

Ait.; Schl.; Boiss. 1: 216; Ph. Ind. 1: 118, 121.

Field 4 (Isf.), 50; W.H.M.M. 150712.

These seeds resemble in size, shape, and color the drug Tukhm-i-khākshīr talkh, the bitter Khākshīr (*Erysimum* sp.), except that they are dull and not shiny. There are several kinds of cruciferous seeds known as "Towdri": pale, light brown, red, and black. The seed of *Lepidium Iberis* L., the Kasis of Iran, is one of them, and the seeds of *Matthiola incana* R. Br., from the Punjab and Sind, is another. The seeds are small, yellowish brown, 1 mm. in length, and become coated with transparent mucilage when placed in water. The drug is considered aphrodisiac, "fattening the body and purifying the blood." [832]

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obtained by evaporating sour buttermilk, pressing out the whey in bags, by hand, and drying the solid curd in the sun. These cakes are used by Afghans and residents of the black tents of Helmand, who carry them on their tours as a favorite article of diet. When required, the cakes are mixed with water, brinjal fruits and bread added; the whole forms an admirable dish. The Qar-i-qurūt from Tehran is a blackish brown mass, acidulous and salty to the taste, largely soluble in water; it is very similar to meat extracts sold in America and Europe.—The preparation is used as a soup following vermifuge treatment (H.F.).

Kashk Kashk (Kurd.).

Field 61.

These are balls of casein, butter, and salt, prepared from milk. They probably represent the "Pleasant Food" (Khushk horāk) flavored with asafoetida, used in Afghanistan (Aitchison).

Camel's flesh, dried from *Camelus dromedarius* L.; single-humped or Arabian camel 278*
825

كوهان شتر

Kūhān-i-shutur (Teh.); camel's hump.

Field 140.

The specimen is a piece of yellowish white, dried, fibrous flesh from the hump of a camel. This peculiar drug is directed to be mixed with fat and made into an ointment for piles. The Tatars use the hump cut into slices, which, placed in tea, serve the purpose of butter. Camel's meat is eaten by Greeks and Iranis; the flesh of the young dromedary is considered by Arabs to be equal to veal. Ainslie states that the rennet of the camel, which the Iranis term Punir-mayeh-shutur, is placed among their aphrodisiacs; Honigberger calls the substance Camelinum coagulum and says it is highly esteemed by Arabian doctors.

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Bezoar stones from *Capra aegagrus* Gmel.; Persian wild goat

پادزاهر

Pādzahr (Pers.); Fadzehre heyvani (Schl.); Gorochan (Hind.); bezoar stone.

W.H.M.M. 199302.

The bezoar stone appears to have been first used as a medicine by the Arabian physician Avicenna. Razis in his "Continens" describes

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x539 pigeon and doves and partridge and quail, and from every direction hundreds of the most beautiful girls in the world were coming and sitting down to the meal and wine was brought for them by Negro slave girls.

Nasirulla and Salma sat down and ate of the feast until
their stomachs were bursting, nor did anyone question
who they were. And when all hands were withdrawn
from eating, the Chief of the Eunuchs came round and he
talked to some of the girls, and he came to Nasirulla and
Salma and he said to them: Your faces are new. Were you
part of the last present to our Lord? And Salma replied:
Verily we are new here, and our desire is to be of service
to our Lord and Master. But the eunuch sighed and he
said: How can this be? It was different in the days when
our master was a young man, though even then he rarely
needed more than three hundred girls a year. But now he
is old and his beard is white and his eyes are dim and even
[838 one girl would be too much for him. Yet we have three
595] thousand in this place, and every month another hundred
arrive as presents from the great rulers and governers, and
these poor girls are condemned to live unloved and unseen
in this vast harem, until they kiss and make love to each
other from very sadness of heart.

And Nasirulla was amazed at the words of the eunuch, and he thought: While I am here and until I find a way out of this closely guarded place I will at least comfort some of these poor girls.

On the next day and on the following days Nasirulla examined all the doors and windows of the harem, but they were all guarded by eunuchs armed with swords, nor could anyone pass in or out. And the days lengthened into months, but Nasirulla could find no place unguarded save one, and this was a window which was covered by

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x539 against my uncle. I must not reveal my identity to him.

So Rejab sat in the guest-house, and he was thinking: It is my right to marry this girl. How can I prevent the marriage? And Hamed looked around his guest-house and he saw a strange youth of great beauty seated there, and he asked: Who is he? They answered: He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail, and we do not know his name. Then Rejab rose and thanked his host and left the assembly, and he took his horse and rode off. But when he was in the cover of the palm trees he halted and turned
[595 to look at the house of Hamed, for he thought: I must
● 839] carry off the girl this very day. He saw that the women's quarter was heavily guarded by slaves and eunuchs armed with swords, and all the doors to the courtyard were guarded, nor was it possible to gain entrance. But he saw
[514] also that the House of the Dawn was situated at a distance from the house, that its odours (may they be far from you) should not disturb the people of the house, and he cursed himself and thought: Had I come one day earlier I could have carried off the girl when she comes at dawn to visit the House of the Dawn, but now there is no time to wait another day. Then an idea came to him, and he took his horse and rode at a canter to Samawa.

x539 In the bazaar of Samawa, Rejab bought first a woman's
757 dress, and he wrapped it up and concealed it in his cloak. Then he went to the pharmacist and he bought three Roman pills. Now, let it be known to you that in these days we have many and complicated medicines, but then we had only simple remedies, and the Roman pill served both for a man and for his animals, for verily it was said, One for a man, two for a horse, three for a camel. And he took the three Roman pills and he went to the shop of the sweet maker and he bought from him a tray of the

DRUGS OF MINERAL ORIGIN I-I

Alum 278*

زاج سفید 823*

Zāj-u-safīd (Teh.); Sheb (Bagh., Iraq); Spati-kari (Sans.); 317*
Zamchi (Turk.); Phitkari, Phataki (Hind.).

Field 250; 126A.

Crystals of alum sulphate, with a styptic, sweetish taste. Alum is used to stop bleeding, to settle turbid water, and in the native tanning industry.—It is also a whitening agent and used as an astringent (H.F.). It is obtained in commercial quantities from Aksu and Kuchar in eastern Turkestan.

Antimonium sulphate

کل سرمه

Kuhl or Surmah (Pers.); Arjan, Surma-ka-pathar (Hind.); black sulphide of antimony, Kermes mineral, kohl.

Field 10 (Isf.), 40A.

Kohl or powdered black antimony is used throughout the East [302] for blackening the eyelids. Introduced originally by the native doctors, hakims, as a remedy for eye diseases, it is now used by women as a cosmetic to improve their appearance. Lampblack is sometimes sold to take the place of the mineral compound.—A detailed summary of the use of kohl in southwestern Asia will form part of a forthcoming publication (H.F.).

Armenian earth

کل ارمنی

Gil-i-armanī (Pers., Hind.); Hajr-el-armeni (Ar.); Armenian bole or earth, ocher.

Field 196, 235; 139A.

Armenian clay consists of oxide of iron mixed with carbonate of lime. Clay of bright red contains a small amount of lime, but lighter-colored clays effervesce strongly with acids and contain less oxide of iron. Armenian bole, either by itself or mixed with red sandalwood and spices, is painted on the face and body to relieve skin affections, boils, and sores. It is one of the earths eaten by pregnant women. [261] In Afghanistan this habit is so frequent that the term "Gil-khwar" [843] is applied to clay or chalk eaters (see Laufer, Berthold, "Geophagy," Field Mus. Nat. Hist., Anthro. Series, 18, No. 2, 1930).

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Gil-i-sarshūr (Teh., Afg.) is the name given by Aitchison to the edible clay of Afghanistan. The term is applied to a clay of general domestic utility. In Iran it is the name of an earth used by women for cleansing the hair.—The two samples from Tehran were stated to be used as "hair cosmetic" and "complexion cosmetic" (H.F.).

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823 *
317 *

Lead carbonate

Safīd āb-i-shaikh (Teh.); Isfedaj (Ar.); Sufeda (Hind.); carbonate of lead, white lead, painters' whitening.

Field 166.

A soft, white, heavy powder, this is used in making ointment of lead carbonate, which acts as a local sedative and astringent.

Lead oxide

مرداسنگ نقرئی

Murdā sang-i-nugra'ī, Murdā sang-i-tilā'ī, Murda sang, "death stone" (Teh.); Sindur (Bom.); litharge.

W.H.M.M. 150704, 150772.

The specimens have a similar appearance; they consist of pieces of fused metal with a grayish brown or pinkish exterior. They are probably samples of the unfinished product of the action of heated air on melted lead, and not proper litharge.

Potassium nitrate

شورهٔ قلم

Shūrah-i-qalam (Teh.); Shorah (Hind.); niter, saltpeter.

Field 231; W.H.M.M. 150854.

Obtained on a large scale from the saltpeter earth of the Punjab and Bihar, crude saltpeter occurs in small, dirty crystals, mixed with much common salt. Shūrah-i-qalam is pure saltpeter in white, crystalline, pen-shaped prisms (qalam=pen).—Niter or saltpeter is prescribed for difficult urination and for gonorrhea (H.F.).

Russian clay 823 *

گل داغستان 278 *

Gil-i-dāghistān (Isf., Teh.). 261

Field 9 (Isf.), 227. 843 •

This is a grayish white clay, a compound of silica and alumina, in heavy lumps, soapy to the touch and adhesive to the tongue. The clay is brought from Daghestan in the northeastern part of the

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Caucasus, and is used with other medicaments and applied to infected parts of the body. It is also taken internally as a tonic in pregnancy, or, as Schlimmer remarks, to satisfy the "appétit des femmes enceintes."

Shāf-i-mamitā (Teh.)

شاف ماميتا

W.H.M.M. 150725.

These are small rolls of a mineral preparation about 2.5 to 3.5 cm. in length, pointed at one end. They consist of chalk, which dissolves in acid, and a quantity of red clay left insoluble. From the name Shāf, meaning suppository or clyster, they are probably used for this purpose.

278* **Sigillated earth**

261 گل مخدوم

843 Gil-i-makhdūm (Teh.); Tukhm-makhtum (Punj.).

Field 246; 86 (Iraq).

These are two forms of sigillated earth, sealed clay or Lemnian earth. The sample from Tehran is a rounded cake of light reddish clay with white specks, 2 cm. in diameter and 1.5 cm. thick; on the upper portion there is a depression in the center made by a stamp. The clay is smooth to the touch and contains no carbonate of lime. For use in medicine it is moistened with water and applied to purulent wounds.

The samples from Iraq are circular lumps of white clay of a larger size, 3.2 cm. in diameter and 1.2 cm. thick. Each is marked above by three thumb impressions, with checkered lines below. The powdered clay is used as a desiccant for dusting abraded surfaces.

[113] The literature on the Sacred Sealed Earth of Lemnos is very extensive. The earth is described by Dioscorides (A.D. 40) and Galen (A.D. 131–201), and was used in Europe until the 17th century. An interesting account is given in Pomet's "Histoire des Druges" (1694), and perhaps the most recent review of the subject is "Terra Sigillata: a Famous Medicament of Ancient Times," by C. J. S. Thompson (1914). Laufer ("Geophagy," pp. 164–166) gives an account of terra sigillata from Lemnos (cf. Armenian earth).

Other medicinal clays represented in the Field collection are: Gil-i-berz (263), a cosmetic used to counteract excessive perspiration;

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Gil-i-gazwin (247), a clay eaten by pregnant women; and Gil-i-batuni (258), a siliceous powder used by painters. 278* 261

The following is a list from other sources of edible and medicinal clays met with in Iran and India. 843 • 823*

Gil-i-gubrasi. Cyprus clay.

Gil-i-igritus. Cretan earth.

Gil-i-khurasani. Edible chalk.

Gil-i-misri or *Karkooti*. Egyptian earth or Nile mud taken from bed of river.

Gil-i-shamus. Samian earth (according to Dioscorides the Greeks used the earth of Samos as a means of stopping the vomiting of blood—Laufer, "Geophagy," p. 109).

Gil-i-zard. Yellow clay from Istanbul.

Chunniah (from China, lime). A soap-like, earthy substance obtained from lakes near Halla, eaten by women of Sind.

The subject of eating clays is of ethnological as well as medicinal interest. An attempt to deal with the subject from these points of view will be found in a paper on "Earth-eating and the Earth-eating Habit in India," by D. Hooper and H. H. Mann (*Mem. Asiatic Soc. Bengal*, Calcutta, 1906, pp. 240-270). [113]

Sodium carbonate (crude) 278*

نمک قلیاب 317

Namak, Qalyāb (Teh.); washing soda. 823*

W.H.M.M. 150843.

This is a white, alkaline salt, either thrown-up as an efflorescent deposit on the soil (Sajji mati), or prepared from the ashes of marine plants. It consists of sodium carbonate, containing much chloride and sulphate of sodium, and insoluble matter.

Sulphur

گوگرد زرد

Gūgird-i-zard, Gūgird-i-akhmar (Teh.); Gogut (Yark.); Gandhak (Hind.).

Field 218, 241; W.H.M.M. 150731.

Yellow sulphur in powder and crystalline masses is said to come from the Mount Demavend district in Iran.—Sulphur ointment is used for skin complaints and for secondary syphilis (H.F.).

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chiefly at the prevention of mosquito and fly breeding and the cleaning up of conspicuously unsanitary conditions. 744

House-to-house inspectors are necessary only in towns with a population of over 25,000, which means some 250 inspectors would be required. The 134 health inspectors already employed could form the nucleus of this group and it should not be difficult to find recruits with at least elementary school training.

The *sanitation overseers* would supervise the work of the house-to-house group and would also undertake a wider range of sanitary inspection, including restaurants, foodstuffs supplies, etc. Probably 100 overseers would be enough, and a one-year course should be sufficient to train men for the job. Candidates for training should be drawn, as far as possible, from the ranks of the house-to-house inspectors.

A number of *sanitation inspectors,* about 50 in all, would be required to take charge of districts, to supervise the work of sanitation overseers and the house-to-house inspectors, and to advise on all matters concerned with environmental hygiene in their districts. Candidates for this job would need a sound, general education (i.e. completion of the full intermediate school course) and would require not less than two years of training which would include practical sanitation work of all sorts. Training schools for these inspectors should be set up by a foreign sanitation expert, preferably one with knowledge of and experience in the Middle East. Some buildings will also be necessary, at an estimated capital cost of about ID 10,000.[2]

Training of Midwives

Midwives, who by the nature of their work have free entry into village homes, are among the most important potential health workers. It is they who can give acceptable advice in the home and consequently they could do a great deal to improve health conditions in the villages. Although 803 midwives are licensed to practice, scarcely any of them in either cities or villages have 744

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[2] The recurrent cost of operating the school would be about ID 2,000 yearly. The recurrent cost of the sanitation service when fully organized might be approximately ID 75,000 annually.

844 received training of any sort. In Baghdad there is a government maternity home but it has had very little to do with the practicing midwives.

It is presently estimated that 900 midwives are needed in the villages, 300 in the towns and 80 in the hospitals. In order to take into account the great difference between conditions in the towns and villages, it would be desirable to institute two courses of training:

1. A ~~one-year~~ course for literate girls and women who will become midwives in urban populations and fill government posts; and—
2. A course lasting approximately six months for illiterate (or largely so) practicing midwives who, after training, will return to their own villages.

A few Iraqi women have taken a course in midwifery outside of Iraq and these women, together with three foreign midwives, could serve as the teaching staff at the outset.

An estimate of the staff and buildings required and their cost follows:

(*a*) School for Town Midwives:
  1. Staff: three staff midwives, one director, cook, etc.
  2. Buildings: quarters for 20 pupils, 10 maternity beds, etc.
  3. Capital cost: ID 40,500
     Output—20 trained midwives a year.

(*b*) School for Village Midwives:
  1. Staff: three staff midwives, one director, cook, etc.
  2. Buildings: quarters for 15 pupils, six maternity beds, etc.
  3. Capital cost: ID 31,500
     Output—30 village midwives annually.

(*c*) One Principal for the Schools

Establishment of Village Health Centers

743 Iraq is a country of scattered villages and hamlets and of great distances; to bring medical aid, however simple, to the greatest possible number of people it would seem wise to increase the number of dispensaries as staff becomes available. It might even be possible to attach some mobile dispensaries to the larger sections of the nomadic tribes.

The village dispensary should become a center for all health activities in the area. Not only should the health official (or medi-

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824* Field 177; W.H.M.M. 150808.

278* Celery is a plant of the northwestern Himalayas and Iran, and is cultivated for its fruit, leaf stalks, and roots. The seeds, or properly fruits, are greenish yellow or brown, and have a mint-like aroma and a somewhat pungent and bitter taste. The fruit is carminative, aromatic, and tonic. In Tehran the drug is placed in boiling water and the steam inhaled for headache. The fruits contain aptin, a jelly-like glucoside.

Arctium Lappa L. (Compositae)

ریشه بابا آدم

Rishah-i-bābā-Adam (Teh.); the root. Bardane (Teh.); Semen Bardanae (English Herbal 1730); the fruits.

Field 234; K.B. 304.

The burdock plant is found in Syria, Iran, and Khorasan as well as in Europe. The root under the name of Risha Baba Adam or "Root of Father Adam" is quoted in Schlimmer's "Terminologie," and is regarded throughout India as depurative and antiphlogistic. In Tehran the root, with that of sarsaparilla, is used as a remedy for syphilis. The drug has had a considerable reputation in ancient times, but from a chemical examination by Zellner (1924) there is no indication of any substance in the root being physiologically active.

Areca Catechu L. (Palmae)

فوفل

Fūfal (Teh., Ar.); Papal (Pers.); Sopari (Hind.); Pinang (Mal.); betel nuts, nuts of the Areca palm.

Field 149.

[276] Areca nuts are used everywhere in the East as a masticatory. They are a gentle stimulant, astringent, and taenifuge, increase the flow of saliva, lessen perspiration, sweeten the breath, and strengthen the gums. They contain tannin and two active alkaloids, arecoline
[844] and arecaine.—Mixed with sugar and coriander, they are given for induction of labor (H.F.).

Aristolochia longa L. (Aristolochiaceae)

زراوند طویل

Zarāvand-i-tavīl (Ham., Teh.); the roots.

Achundow; Schl.; Ph. Pers.; Post; Ph. Ind. 3: 165.

W.H.M.M. 150855; K.B. 304.

244 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the
irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in
the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots
and other fruits grow in various localities.
Numerous species of dates are cultivated,
especially in the Shatt al Arab and
lower Euphrates basins: they represent one
of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most
families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and
goats are raised in large numbers, both
by the settled and the nomadic peoples,
and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and
along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
334 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep
or goats is most widely used, but that of
cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized
in many areas. Milk is normally consumed
in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk
product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also
made, but it is rarely as popular as in other
Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats
derived from the tail tissues of the local
breeds of sheep are important sources of fat
among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably
found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist
on the products of their herds, supplemented
by dates and wheat or barley
breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the
southern marshes depend largely upon the
milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild
waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.
146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition
among the various urban and rural
groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in infancy,
853 particularly in the course of weaning,
which is often deferred until the second
year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee,
to function in an advisory capacity to
the governmental agencies concerned, and

162 women. The census returns, in fact, record an extraordinarily large excess of women over men in some parts of the country—e.g., 57 percent in the three rural *qadhas* of Muntafiq province—but there is good reason to believe that such figures, while indicative of the true position, are generally exaggerated.

Occupation

162 The major occupation is agriculture and animal husbandry.
463 Nearly two thirds of the people live in the rural villages. As handicrafts are rarely found in the villages and only a few people are absorbed by such secondary occupations as trade and transport, it is likely that 85 to 90 percent of the rural population lives directly off the land.

Many of the inhabitants of the smaller and even some of the larger towns are also engaged in agriculture. In Tel Afar, a town of 20,000 in the principal grain-growing region of Mosul province, over three quarters of the male population whose occupation was recorded gave it as agriculture. This, however, is probably exceptional and the proportion would, no doubt, be considerably less than half in many smaller towns. Even in the largest cities, there is a smaller but far from negligible proportion of the population employed in agriculture, principally in the production of vegetables, dates and other fruits or in raising livestock for the city market.

In all, the number of people in families whose income is derived directly from work on the land is probably in the neighborhood of 60 percent of the total population. This method of expressing the percentage is used advisedly. A much higher figure could certainly be given for the number of people occupied since most
[464] of the rural population is employed to some extent. Unemployment, as opposed to underemployment, is largely an urban problem. In the rural areas the number of men whose occupation was recorded by the census is often nearly as large as the number over
• [857 10 years of age. This, no doubt, corresponds closely to the facts,
889] since even young children tend flocks and perform other light work on the land while old men help with such tasks as threshing.
[462] Women, too, are an important source of agricultural labor, particularly at harvest time, although this is inadequately reflected in the census.

44;Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East

Iraq MM1

and later the English measures of weight and length—the inch and foot. 872k
Geometry is introduced with the drawing of different kinds of lines, and 876k
goes on to the drawing of circles and plane geometrical figures, to working out the areas of these figures, and finally leads to the recognition of solid figures and the lateral areas and volumes of only the cube and the prism.

Courses in *object lessons* and *hygiene* are given in every year throughout the primary school. Starting with personal habits, hygiene develops into a simple study of human anatomy and physiological functions, the study of simple principles of nutrition, the common diseases in Iraq, infection, and public hygiene and first aid. Object lessons concern themselves with the study of objects used in the environment, of common domestic and wild animals and their uses, the common plants, flowers, trees, and fruits, rudiments of agriculture, and a simple classification of mammals, and end in the sixth grade with a study of air, water, heat, magnetism, and light.

History starts formally in the third grade with a study of primitive man, and discovery of fire and agriculture, the domestication of animals, and the growth of the family into the tribe. In the fourth grade the study of important personalities in the history of Iraq from ancient times to the present is made involving a description of life in each period to which the men belonged. The fifth and sixth grades are taken up with the study of the history of the Arabs from the pre-Islamic period to the present.

Informal *geography* starts in the first two grades with taking notice of the classroom, the school, the home, the road from home to school, and the like. This is expanded in the third grade to a study of the locality and its connection with the surrounding country, the four seasons, the weather, means of communication, and the tribes. In the fourth grade, land features of various parts of Iraq are studied, through the device of imaginary trips to those sections, which emphasize that Iraq is part of the Arab world and of Asia. The fifth and sixth grades are given a more systematic study—the fifth to physical geography, the continents, and important countries of the world, and the sixth to the geography of Iraq, the Arab world in Asia and Africa, Turkey, and India.

The study of *moral and civic duties* begins in the fourth grade with [867]
attention on the pupil and the school, home life, and pupil and society, the nation, and the patriotic duties of the pupil. In the fifth grade are studied general concepts of the state, the people, the government and its powers, while in the sixth grade this is more specifically applied to Iraq with special reference to public health at the end of the course.

difficult phases of subjects, particularly arithmetic, history, and geography. 872K Further revisions were made in 1940 and 1943, the latter now being in force.

This current course of study states that the aim of primary education is "the diffusion of general culture among the rising generation, and providing this generation with the requirements of civilized life, *e.g.*, general information, correct thinking, a strong body, sound character, high ideals, good taste, a working hand, and loyalty and sacrifice to the country and nation." The teacher is bidden to provide useful, correct information, making it as practical as possible and relating it to the environment of the child, and to correlate the subjects which he teaches with those taught by his colleagues. The course of study for each subject is prefaced by directions to the teachers. The course of study contains a completely rewritten English syllabus; otherwise, the most drastic changes were made in the syllabuses of history and geography which shift emphasis from world events and geography to Arab and local history and geography. Table 24 below shows the program of studies and the number of class periods devoted to each subject.

TABLE 24

PUBLIC PRIMARY-SCHOOL PROGRAM OF STUDIES, IRAQ, 1945–46

Subjects	Periods per Week					
	1st Grade	2nd Grade	3rd Grade	4th Grade	5th Grade	6th Grade
Religion and Koran	4	4	3	3	2	2
Arabic language and penmanship	11	12	10	10	6	6
English	...	...	...	...	6	6
Arithmetic and mensuration	6	6	6	6	5	5
Object lessons and hygiene	2	2	2	2	2	2
Geography and history	...	...	4	4	4	4
Moral and civic duties	...	...	...	1	1	1
Drawing and manual arts	3	3	4	4	4	4
Physical education and singing	4	3	3	2	2	2
Total	30	30	32	32	32	32

The course of study in *religion* consists of two parts, the Koran and 872K religious information. The Koran is given a first reading in the first four 876K grades and reread in the fifth and sixth grades with correct intonation [869] (*tajwid*). Parts are memorized in each of the six years. Religious information includes a study of the main tenets of Islam relative to God, the prophets, especially Muhammad, explanation of important traditions (*al-Hadith*), and ethical principles.

Arabic includes reading, oral and written composition, memorization, 87 Iraq MHl

[For information on the Iraqi educational system, schools, university facilities, teachers, etc. see 44: Matthews and Akrawi, Ml Middle East, category 116, pp. 121-209.]

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midhat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside. Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger. Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and higher theological learning was available. The military educational system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments. 647
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 battalion, and to the men's return to the sluggish pauperization of Ba'quba.

●871 The Education branch, founded and first inspired by Major H. E. Bowman, was faced with the problem of providing schooling for the youth of 'Iraq in the absence of funds, buildings, books, equipment or teachers in a tithe of sufficient quantities. At a pace always disappointing, but the fastest financially or functionally practicable, primary schools aiming at fair standards were opened to a total of seventy-five by the end of 1919. Fifty-six of these taught in Arabic, eleven in Turkish, seven in Kurdish, one in Persian. The new-founded Teachers' Training College could supply but a part of their urgent needs, and the scale of secondary classes, confined to the three principal cities, was regrettably humble; nor was the country-wide penetration of 'politics' into the schools, thus early, less to be deplored. Means were found to reopen the Law School, and a commercial and a technical school. The many privately-conducted Mullās' schools, archaic in method, scope, and equipment, continued to produce a bare literacy in their thousands of pupils; but the temptation to multiply inferior Government schools was resisted, and the teaching of English almost wholly withheld in spite of a general clamour for it. Upon the desirability of girls' schools, Muslim opinion was at first divided; five, all primary, had been opened by the first weeks of 1920. The schools of the local Christian and Jewish minorities and those of the foreign missions were fostered by support and subsidy; some of these were of high standard. Some archaeological work was carried out by R. Campbell Thompson at Abu Shahrayn (Eridu) in the spring of 1918, and more under H. R. Hall at Ur and elsewhere in 1919.

204 Printing-presses were operating at Najf in 1918, at Sulaymaniya in 1919, and in Baṣra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the occupation of these places. Newspapers in English were published at Baghdad and Baṣra, in Arabic at those cities and Mosul, in Turkish at Kirkuk, in Kurdish at Sulaymaniya.

439 The great increase of goods entering 'Iraq in 1918–19 taxed
the young Customs administration of C. R. Watkins and Major
A. G. H. Sievwright to the utmost. It was due to cessation of
imports into north Persia from Russia, to the increase of 'Iraq's
own spending power, and to the general depletion of stocks by war
[436] interruption. The Indian rupee, now the universal currency of
'Iraq, supplied an adequate medium; and the rising volume of
[504] civilian traffic could be handled easily by the now fully developed
Port of Baṣra, which as such came into existence under Colonel J. C.
Ward in the autumn of 1919 and was soon afterwards transferred
000 to the Civil Administration. The Railways, when at their greatest

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administra- 361
tion was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and 185
a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old 632
abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans [1/23]
were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on
specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise.

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and 871
showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way 658
haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Baṣra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic
theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeo- 172
logical wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum,

European dress was
291 ever more generally adopted in the larger towns, and spread
significantly to urbanized tribesmen. Among upper-class women,
though the veil was still almost universal among Muslims, Western
556 clothing was worn increasingly. The desire for material progress
was reflected in the eagerness of the rich to acquire motor-cars,
gramophones, and the toys and amenities of Europe; but inability
to pay for these gave rise to demands for limitless credit.

466 Interest at the International Labour Office in conditions among 'Iraq's industrial workers led to some answering efforts to produce suitable legislation; but the smallness of this class in an unindustrialized country made European criteria and standards largely inapplicable. The first seeds were sown, however, of a social interest in labour matters.

744 To the whole community and to urban society in particular with its still prevalent poverty and low purchasing power the Government's Health and Education services contributed valuably. The former improved its quarantine and pilgrim services, multiplied its countryside dispensaries, improved its specialist institutes, and dealt well with the cholera epidemics of 1927 and 1931. It was significant that out-patient attendances, less than 750,000 in 1921, had more than doubled by 1926 and quadrupled by 1930. In response to foreign purchasers' outcry, the Health Department imposed measures of cleanliness in the date industry. In 1927 it founded the Royal Medical College; this, a medical school of good standards, took at once a high place in 'Iraq's higher and professional education. A School of Pharmacy had existed since 1922. The Government adhered during these years to a number of international conventions on medical as on many other matters.

● 871 The 'Iraqi schools seemed to foreign observers at this period—
and indeed at others—to lack something of the best spirit of
education. There was criticism of lax discipline, uncritical self-
flattery, a worship of modernity and materialism; politics pervaded
too many of the schools, always in the form of a crude xenophobia
eager for street demonstrations. Nevertheless, an educational
system grew and multiplied its facilities, fought for budget allot-
ments, developed an Inspectorate, codified its Regulations. A
Hygiene Directorate was formed in the Education Ministry, later
[562] greatly to develop. The year 1930 saw the first Government
secondary schools for girls; the days of Muslim hesitation over
female education were almost over. For boys the secondary period
was prolonged from four to five years, three 'intermediate' and two
'senior'. The dispatch of students for higher education abroad
grew commoner. Technical education remained unpopular: it did
not lead quickly enough to the goal chiefly envisaged, a Govern-

ment appointment. A School of Agriculture, founded hastily and 871 inefficiently in 1928, was perforce discontinued for lack of pupils two years later—to be afterwards refounded. A Health Officials' school, in connexion with the College of Medicine, in 1932 replaced the existing Pharmaceutical School: a year later a Nursing school was inaugurated, to which a midwifery section was to be added in 1936. The training of rural teachers at the primary teachers' stage was [875] discontinued; but its necessity, urged by the American mission which visited 'Iraq under Dr. Paul Monroe in 1932, was later to be recognized. The provisional plan of 1923 for higher teacher-training was also discontinued, for later amendment. Another American secondary school, this time a Jesuit enterprise, was founded in Baghdad in 1932, and accepted pupils of all faiths. Government secondary schools by 1930 numbered fifteen, primary nearly 300. The theological college of Al al-Bayt closed its doors in 1929. The Law School, 'Iraq's nearest approach to a university course, kept all its popularity and produced civil servants as well as advocates. Separate Assyrian schools taught little but their own brand of religion. Kurdish schools, thirty in number by 1930, included one intermediate, and one for girls. Annual grants were 658 made to the schools of the minority communities and foreign missions; their standard, not least in European languages, was generally higher than in those of the State. About 8 per cent. of all Government revenues was at this time spent on education. Lionel Smith retired from the Advisership to Education in 1930, and was not replaced.

Greater sums than this were needed for the services of security: 701 a fifth or more of Government income maintained the 'Iraq Army, [652] and nearly a sixth the Police Force. Since the Levies, reduced to two battalions in 1928, were used decreasingly on operations, and the Royal Air Force, reduced from eight squadrons in the period 1922 to 1926 to four in 1930, was soon to be no longer available for internal operations, reliance must be on the Police and the 'Iraq Army; no pains, therefore, were spared to augment and improve these. The Royal 'Iraqi Air Force came into existence in 1930, with five light aircraft. The Army, to which Great Britain contributed a grant until 1932, was developed with the close guidance of a British Military Mission which, increased from six officers in 1921 to forty-six in 1930, was then reduced to twenty-six. It trained its own officers at military and staff colleges, and by the dispatch of selected men to Sandhurst or Quetta. Recruiting in the period 1926 to 1932 was voluntary, numbers sufficient, training and maintenance adequate, discipline good. The strength of the Army by 1932 approximated to two brigades. It was unfortunate that its most frequent operations, against Kurdish insurgents, were in

same was true of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs. 647
Tainsh after fifteen years as Director left the Railways, handing over to Ward who combined the post for three years with the Port Directorate. Wheatley left the Advisership to Communications and Works early in 1937.

The relation of Yasin Pasha to the British Embassy, where Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had succeeded Humphrys in March 1935, were close and cordial. The Census Department was strengthened, that of Publicity represented a development of the old Press Bureau. The Courts, with their complement of British judges 192
under the Agreement of 1930, were well maintained. The general desire for a more comprehensive educational system could be met 871
only in part. Primary and secondary schools showed a limited development, with increased use of borrowed Egyptian teachers, and the beginning of book publication by the Ministry. Technical education, studied by visiting foreign experts, advanced little. The university project stood still. The Higher Teachers' Training- 875
College was reopened in 1935. A Directorate of Female Education was formed in 1934, but abolished next year. A Rural Teachers' College—a recommendation of the Monroe Report—was established in 1934 at Shaṭra on the Gharraf, and later moved to Rustumiya outside Baghdad. An Elementary Teachers' College for Women was opened at Diwaniya in 1934, but did not survive. The College of Pharmacy was founded in 1936. The schools of 871
the minority communities and of the missions, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, flourished. The proposal for a public school on the British pattern was not yet realized, and a British adviser to the Minister of Education ceased to be employed. German teaching increased. School books in use became increasingly nationalist and xenophobe in tone. Military instruction was first given in the schools in 1935, and grew thereafter to be a popular feature of school life, with a developed Youth Movement in uniform.

Ancient sites of 'Iraq continued each winter to attract foreign 172
archaeological missions. Valuable excavations were carried out by the representatives of university, museum, or other learned bodies, American, German, British, French, and Italian, from 1933 to 1939 at sites in northern 'Iraq—Gawra, Nineveh, Saydawa, and Khorsabad: in the Baghdad area, at Khafaja on the Diyālā, and at Seleucia: and in the centre and south at the Sumerian cities of Warqa and Larsa. A setback to this activity was caused, indeed, by the intervention in 1933 of the Shi'i Minister of Education, who produced a draft Antiquities Law calculated by its one-sided severities to discourage all future excavation; but under the Hashimi Ministry an improved draft was accepted, and work could proceed in reasonable conditions.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

721 exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important practical results could be expected from this move, which at *645 best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse, did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship. Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the 722 Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements, the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and grain supplies provided.

361 Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which 185 was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of 744 office to the Amin al-'Aṣima. The Health services continued to develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had served the country and their science now for twenty years, still played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far 871 from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls, and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

secondary boarding school on European lines was founded in 871 Baghdad in 1941, the King Fayṣal College. Mosul Technical School was reopened in 1942, and another in Kirkuk in 1945. The Queen 'Aliya Institute for the higher training of women teachers was founded in 1945, and a higher Engineering College in 1942; but a College for Physical Education, opened in the latter year, survived only four years. The Institute of Fine Arts, with separate faculties of Music, Painting, Sculpture, and Dramatic Art, was founded in 1941. Professor H. R. Hamley served as Adviser to the Ministry of Education—the first after a lapse of ten years—in 1942–3, K. J. Ritchie in 1944–5, and C. H. Scaife of Cairo University thereafter for two years. The Department of Antiquities 172 was fully active; it carried out excavation at Tall 'Uqayr, fifty miles south of Baghdad, in 1940–1: at Dayr on the Yusifiya Canal in 1941; at the 'Aqar Quf in 1942–4; at Tall Ḥasuna near Mosul in 1943–4: at Ḥira near Kufa and Tall Harmal near Baghdad in 1945. The greatest part of these works was carried out by 'Iraqi scholars, who had acquired high qualifications.

The Administration itself, gravely shaken by the events of 1941 645 and the strains which followed, and confronted with new tasks and new temptations, lapsed perceptibly both in efficiency and integrity. Neither ministerial unity nor the administrative grasp required to correct this weakness was forthcoming, and resulting conditions led to renewed complaints against 'the old gang' by critics who pressed for the infusion of new blood into the Cabinet, preferably their own. The middle and later periods of the war gave, indeed, no scope for military coups, the incitement of tribesmen, or inspired strikes; but they permitted all too much of the personal intrigues, the intemperate mutual criticism, and the irritated frustrations of normal times.

The inspiring war news from Libya and Tunis in the winter of 721 1942–3 was greeted by public holidays and the renaming of streets, and extinguished the lingering hopes of Nazi sympathizers: hopes which the capture in July of three German officers, dropped near Mosul by parachute with a Kurdish guide, did nothing to restore. The improved atmosphere led to a turn of ministerial policy towards increased indulgence to the internees of the 'Amara camp and Rhodesia; the resulting releases, considered sadly premature by the British Embassy, were followed by the reinstatement in public functions of men known for violent anti-British and anti-Hashimite sympathies.

Useful non-political work had been done meanwhile by a Committee 642 of Senators and Jurists, with Drower and Edmonds as advisers, on an amendment to the Constitution designed to correct some evident present inadequacies. The Committee met early in

its educated class should have made the 'Iraqi press both high in 204
quality and great in influence. It was, in fact, superabundant in quantity, with dozens of ephemeral sheets appearing and vanishing, and it was written not infrequently with point and humour; but [461] journalism had on the whole, it seemed, failed to attract the best minds and brains of the country, and as a profession was ill regarded by the public. With rare exceptions[1] inconsistency was habitual, and the selection and presentation of news capricious and unskilful and lacking in Western—or even Egyptian or Lebanese—technique. A news-service was scarcely attempted, and mere political rhetoric and the wearisome use of outworn phrases took the place of fact, analysis, or sober comment. Broadcasting from 207
Radio Baghdad, which after 1951 used the new and fully modern transmitting station of Abu Ghurayb, offered daily a ten-hour Arabic, a three-hour Kurdish, and a one-hour or half-hour English programme. The service, though still uneven, had improved materially in recent years in editing and in reliable audibility. It was aided by some of the best among 'Iraqi writers, and was rich in its Arabic musical programme; but frequent administrative changes had affected its quality and continuity, and many listeners preferred to hear foreign stations, notably London, Paris, and the *Sharq al-adnā* station of Cyprus.

The educational system operating in 1950 represented, with 871
whatever shortcomings, the considerable outcome of a sustained and meritorious effort. An immense work lay ahead: but the period of slow and difficult beginnings lay behind, and ground was being yearly gained. The faults of 'Iraqi education were those of superficiality, impatience, indifferent standards, and the persistent infusion—unchecked by legal prohibitions—of 'politics' in the schools. Its virtues were those of genuine enthusiasm, the use of modern techniques, and much improved teaching and supervisory staffs. Many and better school buildings were, it was hoped, soon to follow. Instruction was free at all levels, the governing Regulations modernized, and primary education in theory compulsory. The High Council of Instruction, representative of all the higher institutions of learning, assisted the Minister and his Directors-

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[1] The best of the papers were two or three independents, notably *al-Zaman* and *al-Sha'b* and those associated with the political parties. The latter were the moderate *al-Ittihad al-Dasturi*, *al-Akhbar*, and the evening *al-Ḥawadith* of the Constitutional Union Party: *al-Umma* and *al-Nabā*, of the Socialist Party of the Nation; *Liwā al-Istiqlal*, of the Independence Party: the near-Communist *Ṣadā al-Ahali*, of the National Democratic Party: and the *Jabha al-Sha'biya*, of the Popular Front. These papers appeared in 1951 to be fairly stable and self-supporting and, being party organs, relatively immune from Government suppression. Provincial daily papers included three (and often more) each at Baṣra and Mosul, and others at Sulaymaniya and Kirkuk, in the languages there spoken; they attained a fair standard.

871 General in policy and co-ordination. Female education had secured equal rights with male; of 6,000 primary teachers in the Government schools, nearly a third were women, and a similar proportion among the secondary and higher teachers. Between government and private (including foreign) schools of all grades not less than 200,000 children were being educated, a figure annually and rapidly increasing. A small remnant only of the Jewish schools remained in existence; that of the Alliance Israélite had been closed. The Tafayyudh Society, founded in 1919 as a popular non-political educational body, continued its work to combat illiteracy and maintained its printing-press. Students still enjoyed important exemptions and privileges in their military service obligation. 874 Vocational schools covered technical instruction, domestic science, agriculture, public health, and police duties. The teachers' training facilities had been increased in 1949 by additional training classes instituted at a number of existing secondary schools, and standards had been raised. The university, in spite of repeated 873 expert recommendations, was still an unrealized project; but higher education was available at the Law School, the Engineering College founded in 1942 and broadened in 1951, the Royal College of Medicine with its associated schools of Pharmacy and Nursing, the College of Agriculture, the College of Arts and Sciences founded in 1949, the Institute of Fine Arts, the College of Commerce and Economics founded in 1951, the Royal Military Academy and Royal Staff College, and the Higher Police Training School. Considerable numbers of pupils attended European or American universities; these would increase with the greater funds which were soon to become available and with the development of oil company programmes of technical and scientific training. Public libraries existed at every liwā headquarters.

172 The department of Antiquities had continued to develop its admirably enriched Museum (which it was soon to exchange for more adequate premises), to deal with the learned world, and to conduct or supervise the excavation of ancient sites. In the period from 1946–50 expeditions from the department were active at Tall Abu Shahrayn, near Ur: on the lower Diyalā: in the Arbil plain: in the neighbourhood of Chamchamal and of Sulaymaniya: and at Ḥadhr near Sharqaṭ. Expeditions from American seats of learning—Chicago, Pennsylvania, Harvard—dug at sites in the district of Kirkuk, in those of Chamchamal and Baradost in Kurdistan, and near 'Afak on the middle Euphrates, and a mission of the British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq excavated for three seasons at Nimrud. The work of these scholars of whatever nationality drew, with great goodwill, the attention of the academic world to 'Iraq's archaeological wealth and present fortunes. Both

361 smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is
311 essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it
312 is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only
twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

162 With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

433 The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

162 Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent
Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians.
The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration
into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into
distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims,
three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians,
871 the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked
religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of
Iraq is its great religious toleration.

181 Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed
153 into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some
important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

872 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General
645 Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age of admission to the primary school should not be less than six and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that 'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when
[681] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

871 By this time the administration of education had been highly systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of
645 Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of Education controlling and supervising the most minute details both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

872 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does
658 not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age, not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940 an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty
[464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the
[362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other
[696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

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powerful local landowners operated as effective obstacles to 872
compulsory schooling. 658

Despite this initial failure of a modest attempt to apply com- 871 ●
pulsory education in certain parts of the country, enlightened
opinion in Iraq is strongly in favour of educational development. 185
Because of the economic, political and social obstacles which will have to be overcome before a real approach to universal compulsory education can be made, few if any of the country's educators feel that this desirable objective is likely to be achieved in a short time. As educators, however, and for educational reasons, they are anxious that the practicability of achieving a realistic approach towards compulsory education should be soberly investigated. This enlightened minority are likely to be assisted in their demands by pressure of nationalist opinion, which sees in the development of education a means of spreading national culture and national sentiments among the people.

There are other important reasons why the time is ripe for oo o
assessing the ways and means by which compulsory education can be approached. Although Iraq, like many other countries is, economically, passing through a difficult stage, rapid development in thought and ways of life is taking place. The country is at present at the cross-roads between traditional and modern or western civilization. Change and development, in one direction or another, seem to be the order of the day. It is for this reason that a contemporary Iraqi educator urges that the present time 'affords a unique opportunity for making a good start in education'.

Before, however, considering the practicability of making a 'good start' or at any rate a new start in the direction of compulsory education, consideration must be given to the educational needs of the country at its present stage of development and the extent to which these needs are being met by the existing system. It will then be possible to consider, in the light of prevailing economic, political and social conditions, ways and means of achieving further advance.

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higher levels of education but, in general, the basis for most of 000
them is acquired in the primary school. Before considering, therefore, ways and means of advance towards compulsory primary education for all children, it will be desirable to ascertain to what extent these general educational needs are met in the existing primary schools system. If it should be found that the primary schools do not adequately meet these needs, it may be wise to advocate qualitative reform in primary schooling before ambitious quantitative advance.

SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

In addition to these general educational needs, and partly arising from them, there are two outstanding needs which are connected with the economy of the country and the transitional stage through which an important section of the population is passing.

The Need for Realistic Rural Education. The first outstanding need 874
is that of realistic rural education. In a country whose future 871
development and prosperity is so bound up with the necessity for agricultural improvement, it is important that the schools of the countryside should relate their activities to rural pursuits. As the following extract from the report of the Monroe Commission, issued in 1932, indicates, there is nothing novel in directing attention to this vital educational requirement in Iraq:

> Agriculture as a science is comparatively recent. As a science [242]
> it has not yet entered Iraq to any great extent. Here it is still predominantly a rude craft; most of those who live by agriculture use primitive methods of farming and stock-keeping of generations or centuries ago. If these out-worn methods are to be replaced by better ones the change must be worked through education, and largely through the village school. . . .
>
> If the work of the village schools is to be determined by the actual and present needs of the people they are set up to serve, then they should first of all become a means of teaching the people how to make a better living from the land. The village school should provide more vital instruction and training in improved agricultural methods; manual arts; the importance of native industries; the proper breeding and selection of seeds. . .

With certain modifications, due mainly to the efforts of the 874
Directorate of Agriculture, these observations of the Monroe Commission are as valid in 1950 as they were in 1932. They will need to be taken into account at a later stage of this study when the type of advance towards compulsory education in the countryside is being considered.

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871 369 *The Need for Realistic Tribal Education.* Apart from this great need for the right type of village school for the forty per cent of the population who are living in settled rural communities, there should be educational provision related to the special needs of the thirty-eight per cent of the population living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions and participating in a partial or fully tribal life.

Here again attention was drawn to this important educational need by the Monroe Commission which stated that 'practically [212] all tribal members are illiterate with the exception of some sheikhs who were sent early in their lives to towns or had a special mullah or sayyid, who lived with the tribe, to teach them reading the Koran and writing'. Again with certain modifications, due to the efforts of a minority of tribal heads who have provided their own school buildings, the comments of the Monroe Commission apply equally to conditions in 1950.

The Monroe Commission, mainly on the advice of an Iraqi educator who had made a special study of the educational needs of tribal adults and children, stressed the great importance of both preventive and constructive education for tribal dwellers during the difficult period of transition from the nomadic to the more settled agricultural life. They advocated novel educational devices to meet these special educational needs, including the provision of peripatetic teachers-cum-social advisers who would ultimately promote realistic rural schools which would provide primary education for the children and simple community centres for the adults.

These then, are the general and the outstanding educational needs of Iraq. It is now necessary, in so far as these relate to children of primary school age, to enquire to what extent they are being met in the existing primary schools system, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

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POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS

Although the main obstacle to further educational development in Iraq is that of finance, and although it is difficult to see how sufficient money will be forthcoming for this and other social purposes until fiscal and land reforms are undertaken, there exist other obstacles to educational progress which are more of a political and administrative nature. 871

Lack of Continuity in Educational Policy. An undoubted obstacle to the pursuance of a consistent and steady development in the direction of compulsory education is a lack of continuity and positive direction in educational policy. This seems to have obtained for a long time. It is a somewhat delicate matter to discuss but, looking back over the history of educational administration since the formation of the first Iraqi Government, one is confronted with very frequent changes of Minister of Education, less frequent but still too frequent changes both of officials and in the organization of the Ministry of Education, and lack of consistency in policy with constantly fluctuating emphasis on this or that aspect of educational development. One type of school or administration may be here one year and gone the next. This is particularly true of devices for the training of rural teachers; institutions have been started and then discarded before an evaluation of their real usefulness has been possible. 871 645

These changes of policy and of personnel have been due to both political and sectarian factors which it is not possible fully to discuss in this investigation, but of which those concerned with them or affected by them are only too well aware.

Circumstances of this kind tend to produce even in the best officials and educators a sense of frustration. They also make it extremely difficult for the most able Minister of Education to promote a well-founded policy with any assurance that it will be carried out by his successors.

The Problem of the Administration of Education. Administration of the public services in Iraq is generally characterized by its high degree of centralization. This was perhaps inevitable when Iraq as an independent nation was still young and had neither the time nor the resources to work out new arrangements whereby the localities might participate more in the business of government. Further, a somewhat 'tight' central administration was part of the process of ensuring national unity. [648]

Educational administration provides no exception to this practice of centralization. Curricula are laid down by the Ministry of

645 Education, as are textbooks and the conduct of examinations. The
871 central authority trains the teachers, appoints and dismisses them. Salaries are paid from the central treasury. Apparently no Government school or training institution has funds of its own, and the schools appear to have little freedom in the choice of books and equipment. The daily time-table of the school is determined by the national Primary School Regulations. As has been stated earlier, there are Provincial Directors of Education, but these are direct employees of the Ministry of Education and are their local representatives.

Such a highly centralized system was, of course, indispensable in the early stages when administrative talent was at a premium and when local government institutions did not exist. But it is accompanied by disadvantages and may, in the long run, as schools increase and the amount of detailed central administration grows, have the adverse effect of hindering the Ministry of Education from concentrating on their essential task of promoting a broad policy of national educational development. From conversations with senior officials of the Ministry of Education, the writer gained the impression that, through sheer pressure of daily detail, they were prevented from devoting sufficient of their time and talents to consideration of major issues.

This degree of centralization in a capital city which is so distant from many of the provincial centres and schools, and under which schools must inevitably be treated *en masse*, is also possibly a contributory factor in maintaining the over-rigidity which applies in many of the schools. Schools which are required to work in detail according to central regulations may fail to develop individuality and personality.

871 *The Problem of Differing Regional Needs.* Another feature which suggests that the time is arriving when it will be necessary to decentralize some of the administration of education is that, although the total population of Iraq is relatively small, there exist great regional differences. The needs of urban Baghdad and its surrounding province differ greatly from those of the nomads in Muntifiq and Northern Mosul. The problems of the Marsh Arabs of Amara are not those of the Kurds in Erbil and Sulaimaniya.

000 National unity is an imperative consideration, but it would be unfortunate if the requirements of conformity to a centrally conceived educational system had the effect in any way of conflicting with regional cultures and distinctively local ways of life. If this were so it might, in the long run, not serve the cause of unity.

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SOCIAL FACTORS

Alongside these economic and administrative problems are a number of social factors which inhibit educational development. 000

Illiteracy and Health Problems. For many years it is likely that illiteracy among the adult population, and the state of the public health, will constitute obstacles to the extension of primary education, especially in the rural areas. The reasons for this are obvious. Parents who are themselves illiterate and living at a low standard of life are not easily persuaded that schooling is a worthwhile substitute for the work of their children. Neither are they able to provide in their homes those standards and values which, if the training of the schoolroom is not be negatived, are such necessary reinforcements to public education. Similarly, the prevalence of epidemic and endemic disease, together with inadequate sanitation, also contributes to a major health problem which must be taken into account in attempting to ensure regular school attendance. 212 164 871

Yet while obstacles of this kind exist, they are diminishing. The Public Health Service is developing slowly but surely, and one has only to see a doctor at work in a remote rural area to appreciate the devoted service which is beginning to contribute to a solution of some of the health problems. Again, although illiteracy and poverty are not the best friends of education, one has only to visit remote little village schools to realize that some of the poorest parents are making sacrifices to send their children to school. 657 212

Before compulsory education can be achieved, however, even assuming that the money for it will be forthcoming, a vigorous attack on adult illiteracy will be essential. To this end, what is needed in the rural areas is a type of school which, in addition to meeting the needs of the children, provides in a practical and non-academic fashion realistic fundamental education for the parents. The teacher training institutions would make a most valuable contribution if, quite apart from training the future teachers to attend to the needs of children, they also initiated them into the more practical techniques of teaching illiterates the fundamentals of better living. 871

The Position of Women and Children. Another obstacle to educational and social development which is often quoted is the position of women in a society which is predominantly Muslim. Traditionally women are discouraged from taking part in public life, and this attitude is bound to be reflected in education. 562

562 872 But this obstacle can be exaggerated. As a glance at the figures showing the growth of primary education in Iraq indicates, the proportion of girls to boys attending primary schools is not high, but their enrolment is steadily increasing. Although most of the large urban schools are single sex schools, Iraq has the distinction of having many co-educational village schools. The growing number of kindergartens are co-educational. In all the institutions of higher education young men and women work together.

The emancipation of women in Iraq still has a long way to go, but convincing signs of it are evident. It would, nevertheless, be a considerable advance if the Ministry of Education were to encourage the recruitment of a number of women to the staffs of the boys' primary schools. From visits to many Iraqi primary schools it is evident that the standards of the women teachers in matters of personal cleanliness of the children, care and decoration of the school premises, general decorum and pleasant social conduct are higher than those of their men colleagues. Their influence in boys' schools would be most salutary.

464 872 The position of children is, of course, difficult when parents, especially in the rural areas, are dependent upon the labour of even very young children. Yet an increasing number of poor parents appear to be sending their children to school. It would be a great inducement to more and regular school attendance if means could be devised of providing free midday meals for some of the children, especially in the village schools. At one of the more modern primary schools in Baghdad attractively cooked and served midday meals are provided, but this is a school attended mainly by children from comfortable homes where the parents can afford to pay for this service. In the rural areas, however, simple food is not expensive, cooking devices and service are cheap, and it should be possible to provide free meals for the needy children at relatively low cost.

It should be noted that effective child labour legislation does not exist in Iraq. Until the time comes when such legislation can be enacted and enforced, compulsory education will be most difficult to apply.

162 166 871 *Tribal Organization and Mobility of Population.* But the most formidable obstacles of all are those related to tribal organization and mobility of population. There are two particular sets of problems, those of the tribes who are still in a nomadic state, and those of the people who are in the transitional stage of semi-settlement. Between them, it is estimated that these nomadic and semi-settled peoples number nearly 2,000,000 persons, roughly 300,000 of whom are children of primary school age.

Some eight per cent of these tribal dwellers are still nomadic, 162 and educational arrangements for them will obviously be most 166 difficult to apply. People who are on the move, even if this be in 871 regular seasonal cycles or over more or less fixed areas, are never susceptible to organized education. Even in countries where compulsory education laws have been in effect for several years and where school accommodation for the entire child population exists, it is not easy to make arrangements for the schooling of the children of mobile persons such as caravan and boat dwellers. Clearly, in a country like Iraq where the problem of mobility of population is of much greater magnitude, the conventional type of fixed village school is useless for these peoples. Some of them are not averse to education, and, especially in places where a sheikh is anxious that his own children shall be educated, there is an opportunity for providing educational facilities which would be shared by the other children of the tribal group. It is suggested, therefore, that the time is opportune for giving serious consideration to the training of peripatetic teachers of the kind recommended by the Monroe Commission in 1932.

The more urgent problem of tribal education relates to that 166 majority of the tribal peoples who are in the stage of transition 871 from nomadism to a more settled agricultural life. People who are passing through this transitional stage present great problems 619 but also great opportunities to the educator. They are alleged to lose some of the simpler virtues of people who are forced to submit to the strict tribal laws and codes while they are still wandering in the desert. Be that as it may, they undoubtedly need practical education in the amenities of the more settled life, particularly in matters of health, child care under primitive housing conditions and agricultural practice. Their children also need schooling. These educational needs are becoming more acute because, as has been indicated in a previous chapter when discussing the problem of land tenure, the tribal peoples are losing their former wholesome relationship with the sheikh, who is becoming more of a landlord interested in the produce of his tenants and less of a leader with a responsibility for their welfare.

These needs of the tribal dwellers, therefore, and especially 876 those who are in the semi-settled stage, present a formidable 166 challenge to the Iraqi educator. What is probably needed to meet their peculiar requirements is a team of peripatetic teachers who could travel with the tribes while they are on the move, and who could establish simple schools-cum-community-centres in the places where the tribesmen and their families are gradually settling. So far as is known, devices of this kind are as yet untried; it would be well if a few young men and women of ingenuity and a practical

876 turn of mind, and preferably from the tribal areas themselves, 166 could be specially trained as intensely practical teachers and then appointed to establish pilot projects of tribal education.

871 619 Some people with whom these possibilities have been discussed are not optimistic about such attempts to meet the educational needs of the tribes. They maintain that the tribal dweller has a strong suspicion of anything that smacks of Government interference and that he would have nothing to do with publicly-provided education. There is, however, another point of view. The writer and an Iraqi inspector of schools were sitting in a Bedouin guest tent one evening recently, together with two sheikhs, one of whom is reputed to be amassing land for his own purposes and the other who is the more liberal minded son of a sheikh who once established two schools. The following conversation was heard and, for what it is worth, is quoted verbatim:

First sheikh:	'I hear that you have offered to provide a school building if the Government will provide teachers.'
Second sheikh:	'Yes, I would like a school for my son Silah and for the other boys of his age.'
First sheikh:	'If your people become educated they will be demanding more rights. You will be laying up trouble for the future.'
Second sheikh:	'I want my people to be educated so that they may become better human beings. The future is with those who are educated.'

There is, of course, always more than one point of view about educational matters. The point of view of the second sheikh is expressed in another way by an Iraqi educator who writes, 'The problem which the Iraq Government faces as regards the tribes, the solution of which should form one of the main civic aims of education in Iraq, is the broadening of the outlook and allegiance of the tribesmen from their narrow tribal limits to a national horizon'.

000 These then, are some of the economic, political and social problems which must be taken into consideration before any ambitious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. It is only against this background that the realism of possible solutions to present educational difficulties can be judged. But these problems are not new and, despite the obstacles which they constitute, definite quantitative progress in the field of primary education has undoubtedly been achieved in recent years.

The next step must be to consider the practicability of making

166 must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land
185 must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting. He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

425 (4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

427 (5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders. So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila area, and the total population of adults and children is between

● 871 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with

185 a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural streams'.

427 It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which
425 has been in operation for only four years and is still in process of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it
241 appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless
185 cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average
465 income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators. Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which, by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed, it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

427 The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants,
185 apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they make a certain contribution to the public purse through the sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

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875 teaching which are now appearing in the top classes of the primary schools suggest that the Iraqi teacher is by no means rigidly conservative in method, and is quick to apply new techniques when his eyes have been opened to them.

During the last year or two, however, possibly because of the need to find money to cope with the additional numbers of children who are presenting themselves for admission into primary schools, it has apparently been difficult to finance courses for teachers. It is to be hoped that the time will soon come when it is possible to organize courses for serving teachers, not only in specific subjects, but also of a more general nature. The necessarily brief and restricted training which has had to be provided for many of the teachers in the past means that the educational horizons of some of the serving teachers are not as broad as they might well be. If it is still felt that the cost of many residential courses of a general nature cannot yet be met, consideration might be given to the possibility of taking short courses to the teachers themselves in the teachers' clubs which exist up and down the country.

THE ADVANCE OF EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVE IN THE PROVINCES

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645 In addition to these evidences of advance in the schools and among the teachers, there are also signs of certain trends in the provinces which, as will be seen later, may be highly significant as aids to the ultimate implementation of plans for the promotion of compulsory education.

The Beginnings of Local Educational Administration. Until very recently, the impetus for educational development in Iraq has, as already pointed out, come from the centre. The Ministry of Education has not only supervised the national system but has also provided most of the schools and most of the money. It has also taken the administrative initiative. There are now indications, even in the remoter provinces, that the people are wanting to have their share in educational development. If these trends, as some of the people in the provinces maintain, are real evidence of the beginnings of a public concern about education they are, indeed, most important.

One hopeful sign is that, despite their very limited powers and the fact that certain of the Provincial Directors of Education are afraid to take any initiative without previous sanction from the Ministry of Education, some of the Directors are exhibiting considerable energy and initiative in promoting local educational advance. In some of the provinces the Directors complain about

the lack of suitable school buildings and the fact that they have to refuse children admission to schools, but pessimistically maintain that no progress can be made because the Ministry of Education cannot or will not find the money for them. But others are showing real enterprise and, in co-operation with the Provincial Governor, are building new schools with money obtained from local contributions. 871 645

In one province, through the initiative and persistence of an energetic Director of Education who has that commendable combination of qualities desirable in an educational administrator, namely a sense of vocation and a love of children, five well-designed new primary schools and three similar intermediate schools are being built at the time of writing, mainly out of local contributions. In the same province the Director of Education has built a new and well furnished kindergarten school, and has provided a central playing field and changing rooms through money collected locally. When he came to the province some four years ago there were twenty-eight primary schools. There are now fifty-four and the number will soon have increased to sixty. 871

Local initiative of this kind is of great significance. It suggests that the way to advance is not only through schemes that may be produced in the Ministry of Education itself, but also through the energies of people on the spot who know local needs and the ways and means of meeting them. This provincial effort also suggests that, despite limitations imposed by the central budget, money for educational development on no modest scale can be obtained from local resources when there is local initiative and enterprise. True, local voluntary contributions towards the building of new schools are not in the long run the best means of financing local educational provision, because such sources may not be regular and may dry up with changes in the circumstances of the charitable donors. Ultimately, such contributions will need to be supplemented by more regularly and equitably distributed local taxes. But these attempts to meet locally some of the costs of the educational provision are likely to be important future means of financing educational advance at a greater pace than appears to be practicable by reliance on central exchequer sources alone. Extra taxes are of course never popular but, when additional monies for educational purposes have to be found, it may prove that the levying of local taxes by a local administration is likely to prove less obnoxious to the psychology of people of tribal origin who have an inherent dislike of distant central government.

Awakening Educational Consciousness in the Localities. After travelling through most of the provinces of Iraq, and discussing possibilities

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871 of educational advance with many people in the localities, the writer is persuaded that there is a growing consciousness of the need for more primary schools. In province after province, and village after village, there were local notabilities who had provided school buildings from their own resources and others who were prepared to find the money for schools and furniture if the Ministry of Education would provide the teachers.

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876 Significantly, some of these local people complained about what they described as 'absence of reality' in the work of the primary schools. They maintained that, while they are anxious that the children should learn to read and write, they would prefer that they were also taught in the schools how to handle tools, how to keep healthy, and how to till the soil. One parent complained that 'present day education is divorced from life and only goes skin deep'. He quoted an instance of an urban trained teacher who was giving a hygiene lecture in school, complete with a vivid illustration of the intestinal system, but was oblivious of the fact that flies were crawling over the faces of some of his listeners! The few women with whom it was possible to discuss educational affairs urged that cookery and homecraft should play an important part in the education of the older girls in the primary school. One farmer's wife said: 'I would prefer that my daughter learned how to sew rather than do geometry in school'.

871 Enough has perhaps been said by now to indicate that, although Iraq still has a long way to go before any realistic attempt to bridge the gap between the existing primary schools system and a complete system of compulsory education will be fruitful, changes of an economic, social and educational nature are taking place which give cause for sober optimism. It is now possible, in the light of these advances and changes in attitude and public opinion, to consider ways and means of promoting further advance in the educational field.

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CHAPTER SIX

A POLICY OF ADVANCE TOWARDS COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

So far in this study an attempt has been made to ascertain the main educational needs of Iraq, to evaluate recent developments in primary education both quantitatively and qualitatively, to demonstrate the enormous obstacles to further advance and to illustrate, from examples, the ways in which some of these obstacles are being overcome. It is clear, however, that while some circumstances and conditions exist which suggest that the time for further advance is propitious, such advance will only be possible by the adoption and persistent implementation of a policy which takes into account both the desired objective and the obstacles which still have to be surmounted. The obstacles are clear enough. The desired objective is also clear, always provided it is appreciated that quantitative advance is not in itself sufficient. What is needed is not only a policy of advance which will get more children into school, but one which will ensure that children enjoy forms of primary education which are related to their individual needs and to the special needs of Iraq. 000

Before considering possible lines of advance towards compulsory education for all children in schools of the right type, it is necessary to call to mind the magnitude of the task quantitatively. With a potential primary school population of 750,000 children which is rising daily, with not more than twenty-four per cent of this number now attending school for periods of varying duration, with a national budget which is barely balanced, with a country which is badly in need of other public services, it would appear to be unrealistically idealistic to assume that any effective advance towards universal compulsory education could be achieved over any short period of years. The present total education budget would have to be more than doubled to provide primary education for all children at existing standards, some 15,000 additional teachers would have to be trained, and a sum of money which it is not possible to estimate would be required for capital expenditure on school buildings. 871

The magnitude of the problem, however, is not new to the Ministry of Education. In 1946 a special committee of the Ministry drew up a 'Ten-Year Plan' in which it was suggested that, provided 871

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871 certain administrative reforms were introduced into the Ministry
645 itself, and provided a vigorous educational drive was made, it should prove possible within ten years to achieve a total school
185 attendance of fifty per cent of all children of primary school age. Under this plan it was hoped that it would be possible to train 400 additional teachers in the first year and provide for an increased school attendance of some 12,000 children. At this rate of progress some 42,000 additional children should have been attending primary schools by the end of 1949. Actually the total increased primary school attendance between 1946 and 1949 amounted to some 34,000 children. This increase took place despite the fact that, apart from some not too satisfactory measures for the short-term training of teachers, the reforms advocated by the special committee of the Ministry of Education were never put into operation. In other words, the recent quantitative advance appears to have resulted not so much through any 'Ten-Year Plan' as because of continued public pressure.

871 There is no doubt that this public pressure for more schools will continue and that, unless a more vigorous policy of coping with
185 the demand is initiated, quantitative demand will continue for some years to outstrip primary school provision. Indeed, when one looks back over a period of years and realizes that, whereas in 1931 there were not more than 35,000 children attending primary schools, there are now 175,000 children, there is little cause for any immediate pessimism so far as numerical advance is concerned. It is for this reason that some Iraqi educational reformers maintain that, on the assumption that quantitative development goes on at the same total pace, i.e., another five-fold increase over the next twenty years, compulsory education of a type could be achieved by 1970. It is not possible, however, to predict the future rate of progress even in general terms because, although quantitative growth has been rapid since 1930, it cannot go on beyond a certain point until some of the economic, political and social obstacles already outlined have been solved. Although numerical development has increased five-fold since 1930, that rate of increase will undoubtedly drop when the children of the relatively higher income groups are in school and when the Ministry of Education is confronted with the task of meeting the needs of the children of very poor parents and those who are living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions.

If these suppositions are valid, the broad lines of a policy of genuine advance towards compulsory education become clearer. First, steps must be taken to cope with the present unsatisfied demand for primary education. Secondly, consideration will sooner or later have to be given to the measures which will need to be

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taken to provide both for the children whose parents cannot yet afford to send them to school and those who are living under partly or entirely nomadic conditions. Equally important, preparations will need to be made for ensuring that qualitative accompanies quantitative progress. If real advance towards compulsory education is desired, some of these measures will have to be taken immediately; others will have to be developed more gradually. Consideration must, therefore, now be given to a policy of advance towards compulsory education which includes both immediate and long-term measures. 871/185

A SHORT-TERM POLICY

COPING WITH EXISTING DEMANDS

The most immediate necessity is that measures should be taken to meet the demands of parents who wish to send their children to primary schools. Some advocates of educational advance do not recommend this immediate action, urging that the more important task is to improve the quality of the existing schools. It is doubtful whether this view could be sustained: it would provoke further parental disillusionment and deprive many children of a fair start in life. 000

An attempt should, therefore, be made to ascertain the extent of this immediate problem by asking every Provincial Director of Education to give, from his local knowledge, details of the number of children in the province who would attend school under existing conditions if accommodation were available for them, the number of new schools needed and the extra teachers required. The results would probably be surprising in that they would demonstrate a public desire for education in the provinces of which the Ministry of Education may not be entirely aware.

These needs should be met forthwith and financed by a special allocation from the central budget in the next financial year. The extra teachers could be found partly by abandoning uneconomic rented premises which are wasteful of teaching staff, but mainly by 'stepping-up' existing teacher training provision as an emergency measure. Some new buildings would be necessary but many of these, at any rate in the smaller towns and villages, would be provided voluntarily from local resources. In the larger towns, consideration should be given to a suggestion made by an Iraqi economist that new school buildings could be provided through

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000 the floating of local public loans which could be partly redeemed by the gradual release of the large sums of 'dead money' which are at present being spent on rented premises which cannot be used economically.

In other words, what is needed at the present time is a vigorous administrative gesture which would assure the public that the Ministry of Education is controlling the existing pressure for primary schools rather than being jockeyed along by it.

REFORM OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

871 But perhaps before the Ministry of Education can itself promote
185 immediate measures of this kind with the vigour required, consideration will have to be given once more to two major
645 administrative reforms which were advocated by the special committee appointed to draw up the 'Ten-Year Plan' in 1946.

The Minister as a Trustee of the Public Educational Interest. Until very recently the advent of a new Minister of Education has tended to be accompanied by abrupt changes and reverses of educational policy, and sometimes by changes in official personnel. This is certainly not calculated to assist that continuity and persistence in educational policy which is so essential at the present time.

Some maintain that this unfortunate tendency has been due to the intrusion of party politics and sectarian interests into the Ministry. If this is true, it should be emphasized that a Ministry of Education, while being responsive to sound educational opinion, should always endeavour independently to attach itself to national educational policy which is free from these non-educational considerations.

It is probably nearer the truth to suggest that these fluctuations in educational policy are due as much to the influence of the individual opinions and plans of the Ministers themselves. It is perhaps natural in a young and rapidly developing country that Ministers should wish to leave their own impress on the country's educational affairs. It is not desirable, however, that they should have the unrestricted power to do this, and in any event they should be required to justify proposed changes before men who have had long experience of education and educational administration. It is refreshing, therefore, to gather from conversations with some of the recent holders of this important office that the time may be approaching when the Minister tends more and more to regard himself, not as one who is entitled to control

educational policy in the light of opinions and schemes based on his own inevitably limited educational experience, or by considerations of his own political group or sect, but as a trustee of the educational interest of the whole country.

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The Formation of a National Council of Education. It was also suggested by the special committee referred to that a means of assisting successive Ministers to pursue a consistent policy of educational advance would be the creation of a National Council of Education which would be composed of Directors-General of Education, the Deans of Institutions of Higher Education, representatives from other Ministries whose co-operation is essential in educational progress, representatives appointed by Parliament, and other leading personalities in the country. It was suggested that 'the principle function of this National Council of Education should be to ensure that educational policy is well-founded and that there is stability in its application'. In other words, the National Council of Education would be a continuing body pledged to an agreed national policy of educational development from which successive Ministers of Education would find it difficult to depart. [647]

It appears that a properly constituted National Council of Education has never been formed. Some such bodies have been established and abolished from time to time at the discretion of successive Ministers. One reason given for failure to maintain a National Council of Education is that the Minister should justify himself, not to a Committee of 'experts' but to public opinion. Theoretically there is much to be said for such an explanation but, in a country where the bulk of the population have not had educational opportunity and cannot therefore be articulate in public affairs, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a sound public opinion in matters educational.

A new Education Law giving the Ministry of Education the necessary powers and duties to cope with present pressing demands and needs is overdue. Such a law should include categorical provision for the establishment of a well-balanced National Council of Education with a dignified status. It should have definite powers and duties and meet at regular and legally stipulated intervals. The Minister should be required to consult the Council on major changes of policy, and should not make changes without a majority decision by it. The Council should approve all major plans and developments and regulations of the Ministry before they become effective. Most important, the National Council should have the power of initiating discussion and enquiry as it thinks fit, and should not necessarily await the invitation of the Minister before so doing.

871 There are signs that the present time is opportune for the
185 formation of this body. The writer had the privilege of being
present at a recent *ad hoc* gathering of men prominent in the
645 educational affairs of Iraq, presided over by the Minister of Education. The level of discussion was exceptionally high, and one advantage of the meeting was that the Minister was both able to be made aware of trends of opinion and in turn to bring to the notice of the 'experts' practical administrative considerations which might prevent him from applying all their advice. If such a body could be transformed into a regularly meeting National Council of Education and given the powers indicated, it is likely that that consistent policy without which advance in the direction of compulsory education cannot be achieved would be considerably assisted.

871 *Concentration of the Ministry of Education on Major Issues of National Educational Policy.* If the Minister were guided in the formation
645 of policy by a properly constituted National Council of Education, the way to consideration of an agreed national policy of educational advance would be facilitated. However, before these reforms could achieve their object, they would need to be accompanied by a reformed conception of the Ministry of Education itself. At the present time, the Ministry is more in the nature of a national administrative office than a policy-making body. In addition to controlling all forms of education and exercising most minute financial control in small matters, the senior officials of the Ministry appear to be occupied with a mass of detailed administration, much of which could very well be left to the Provincial Directors of Education.

It is suggested that, at any rate in the sphere of primary education, many of the existing administrative tasks performed by officers of the Ministry of Education should be transferred to the offices of the Provincial Directors of Education. If this were done it would enable the senior officials of the Ministry to concentrate their talents on major issues of national policy which, at the present time, need considerable thought and investigation. If compulsory education of quality is ever to become a reality, matters of major policy which at present receive insufficient consideration must be investigated by officers of the Ministry before the facts concerning them can be adequately considered by the Minister and the National Council of Education which it is hoped he may soon have to assist him. Plans for improved training and distribution of teachers badly need mature consideration, as do investigations into the most suitable types of school building for a country with the climatic conditions of Iraq.

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Programmes of study, especially those for the rural and agricultural schools, need much thought and study by those who administer them. Ultimately, local development plans for advance towards compulsory schooling will need most careful consideration. These vital tasks cannot be undertaken adequately until the Ministry of Education is relieved of much of its present stifling day-to-day detail. 871 645

THE CREATION OF LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITIES

As was indicated in the preceding chapter, one of the significant social and educational developments in Iraq is the growth of local interest in education which is accompanied by some vigorous local administrative initiative and a preparedness to find money for local development. This suggests that, quite apart from the Ministry of Education being able to clear its own decks for action by passing on much of the details of administration to the provincial education officers, there exist in the localities valuable means by which a policy of advance towards compulsory education could be facilitated. 871 635

A movement in the direction of enlisting the aid of the provinces in the increase of educational provision was considered a few years ago. Under the Provincial Administration Law of 1945, a General Provincial Council was established in each province. It was empowered, in a limited way, to levy local taxes to support various local services, including some aspects of education. For one reason or another, the exercise of these local taxing powers in relation to education appears to have been restricted by the administrative action of the central Government departments. It is understood, however, that a more vigorous attempt is about to be made to give the General Provincial Council in every province wider powers of control over education up to and including the primary schools.

It is to be hoped that, when this transfer of certain powers to the General Provincial Councils takes place, it will be done in such a way that local interest in education is given full opportunity. It would be a great aid to local desire for educational powers and advance if each General Provincial Council were instructed to create amongst its members a Provincial Education Committee to which would be delegated the task both of controlling local primary schools and of developing primary education. There can be no doubt from conversations which have taken place that local people are anxious to exercise these powers. There is equally no doubt that, with some exceptions, the Provincial Directors of

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871/635 Education would, if the transfer of control from the centre were effected by stages and with adequate advice, be able to serve their Provincial Education Committees well.

One great advantage of giving local representatives control of their primary schools would be that it would enhance the increasing local interest which is being taken in educational affairs. Increased local control, with the power both to levy local taxes in addition to the existing voluntary contributions, would also help to spread the burden of educational expenditure which is so essential to development. Further, as will be suggested later, these Provincial Education Committees might after a time provide the machinery for preparing detailed plans for local provision of compulsory education.

It is very much to be hoped that this opportunity of establishing Local Education Authorities will be neither lost nor frustrated, because it may well be that it will provide the only suitable arrangement both for ascertaining local needs and for raising the additional monies which will be required from local sources before compulsory education can ever become a reality. This hope needs to be reiterated because it is understood that although the Government have the proposal under active consideration, it is not popular in certain sections of the Ministry of Education. Apparently some of the senior officials fear that the transfer of primary education functions from the centre to the localities would jeopardize existing educational arrangements. Such fears may or may not be justified. It is, however, part of the democratic process to provide local governing bodies with the opportunity of learning from the mistakes they may make. In any event, if one of the main sources of additional revenues for education is to be found in the provinces, it is only appropriate that those who are to find the money should have their say as to the way it is to be used.

THE FINANCING OF THE NEW EDUCATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

000 *Sharing of National and Local Expenditure—a Grants System.* On the assumption that the proposed transfer of powers in respect of primary education from the Ministry of Education to Local Education Authorities will take place, early consideration will have to be given to the financing of education under the new arrangement. If the Provincial Education Committees are to be created, it is essential that, through the General Provincial Councils, they should be given the power to levy local taxes for education, both to augment existing voluntary contributions and

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as a means of spreading the burden of local educational provision equitably amongst the community.

This will create a dual or complementary system of educational finance, partly national and partly local. The most satisfactory system of fairly distributing educational expenditure as between the national and the local budgets would be the devising of a grants system. Under this grants system each Provincial Education Committee would annually receive monies from the national education budget to supplement the taxes and other contributions raised locally. If the amount of the annual Ministry of Education grant for each province could, subject to the limitations of the national budget, be increased—for a time at any rate—proportionately to the local monies raised, this would probably act as a strong incentive to local self-help.

The Financing of School Building. Under existing arrangements for the public use of royalties received from the oil companies, money from this important and steadily increasing source is wisely devoted to the Capital Works Budget. In the past it has apparently not been considered possible to devote monies from this Capital Works Budget on any large scale to capital works for educational purposes such as schools and teachers' houses. Indeed, as during the last financial year this Capital Works Budget showed a deficit, it would have been difficult to impose educational demands on it. As, however, it is understood that the revenue from oil royalties is likely to increase three-fold during the next few years, a shrewd Minister of Education with an eye to future progress towards compulsory education would doubtless do his utmost to persuade Parliament to earmark a fair share of this additional revenue for capital works of an educational nature.

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Financing Material Inducements to School Attendance. Although during the first period of this short-term policy of advance towards compulsory education the task will be mainly that of coping with existing and potential demands for admission into primary schools, some financial provision will need to be made for assisting the children of the very low income groups. It would be desirable, therefore, if powers could be given to the Provincial Education Committees to devote part of the money derived from local taxes or contributions towards the provision of meals and clothes for really needy children. This would enable the Provincial Education Committees to gain experience of what will be an important aspect of educational administration when the time comes to compel the attendance at school of the many children whose parents are too poor to take advantage of educational provision unless it is accompanied by material assistance.

COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

THE DECLARATION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION AREAS

871 The initial tasks during this period of the operation of the suggested short-term policy will be those of coping with existing pressure on the primary schools, undertaking the essential reforms of the central administration, creating a system of local educational administration and devising a scheme of educational finance which will stimulate the provision of money for primary education from local sources. But it should also be possible during this period to take practical steps towards the completion of provision for compulsory education in specific areas.

It will take a very long time before it is possible to declare any one province as a complete compulsory education area with any hope that the declaration will be effective. It will also be several years before compulsory education can be effectively declared in the large towns. For instance, in Baghdad schools will have to be established for another sixty per cent of the primary school population before an attempt can be made to enforce compulsory education.

There are, however, a number of smaller towns and large villages where, with the provision of a few more schools, primary school places could be provided for all the local child population. For instance, in one of the northern provincial towns, out of a total estimated primary school population of 4,500 children, some 2,700 pupils are already attending fourteen primary schools. The provision of six additional primary schools each with accommodation for 300 pupils would complete provision for primary education in that town. There are many smaller towns where, even if existing primary school accommodation is limited, the provision of but a few schools would enable all the children of primary school age to be educated. In addition, many villages, both large and small, exist where the establishment of one or two more schools and the completion of existing incomplete schools would provide the necessary accommodation within a year or two.

If, therefore, the suggested administrative reforms outlined took place so that the Ministry of Education, on the advice of the National Council of Education, could devote adequate time and thought to the issue of the necessary directions and guidance, the newly created Provincial Education Committees could, as one of their early tasks, concentrate on the provision of schools in those towns and villages where the establishment of a few extra schools would mean the completion of primary education within a few years. So soon as any town or village has sufficient primary schools for the total child population, the Ministry of Education should then declare that town or village a compulsory education area.

871 185 It is understood that there is a possibility that one of the most enlightened sheikhs of one of the largest tribal groups in Iraq would be prepared to co-operate by providing premises, together with accommodation for the team consisting possibly of teachers, an agriculturalist and health officer.

A LONG-TERM POLICY

These then are some of the short-term measures which it is suggested should be considered as the basis of a practical policy leading towards the establishment of compulsory education. They are, of course, only 'short-term' in the sense that they constitute lines of fairly immediate action, most of which will need to be carried forward and embodied within a more long-term policy. It is now necessary to discuss other measures, more of a qualitative nature, which will take longer to materialize but which must be put into operation over a much longer period if quantitative advance is to result in the provision of the right type or types of school.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE TEACHER

The Training of Teachers. The establishment of more schools must be accompanied by the training of more and better qualified teachers. If the Ministry of Education could be freed from its serious overload of administrative detail on the lines indicated, one of its most important tasks would be the development and gradual transformation of existing arrangements for the training of teachers.

As was indicated in Chapter Three, the output of teachers from training institutions during the current year is likely to be 754. Some of the training institutions are doing excellent and lively work. They are handicapped by the fact, however, that many of the students did not complete a full secondary education before they entered the training institution. This means that the period of training for these teachers has to be devoted too much to the task of repairing deficiencies in educational background, and is not sufficiently a professional college course. Many of those who had the advantage of a full secondary education before they took up training do not enter a training college proper but attend a one-year course attached to a secondary school with limited facilities.

Training devices of this kind were essential if the output of teachers was to keep pace with the rapidly growing demand for more schools. The effects of inadequate training are, however,

000 will be necessary to consider improved arrangements for the
875 housing of teachers, especially in the rural areas. Because of the
362 limited housing facilities in many of the villages, the majority of
the teachers in the rural areas live under most unsatisfactory domestic conditions. Some live in the staff-rooms or school store. Others dwell in improvized buildings which are inadequate both for their personal needs and the status they should occupy in local society. It is because of circumstances of this kind that some of the teachers who work in the villages feel that they are undertaking penance, from which they will only escape when they can secure transfer to a town.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF PRIMARY SCHOOLING

871 *The Corporate Life of the Primary School.* Apart from some of the
more established town schools where staffs have served in the
875 same school for a number of years, many of the schools seem to
lack that corporate life which is essential to the success of any school community. This is partly due to the fact that, because of unsatisfactory living conditions outside the larger centres of population, many teachers stay in the rural schools for only very short periods. They hardly get to know their pupils as individuals and do not stay long enough to assimilate the life of the surrounding community or to influence it. These conditions, when remedied by the provision of teachers' houses, possibly accompanied by 'rural teachers' allowances', will do much to improve the quality of the school as a community.

871 *Greater Freedom for Teachers.* As the teaching profession becomes better trained and housed, it is to be expected that they will be allowed greater freedom in the preparation of their own programmes of study and activity. Complaints are frequently made that, because the existing programmes of study are centrally prepared and prescribed, they restrict the freedom of the teachers. This is only partly true because, although the primary school programme is overloaded and does not provide for sufficient differentiation either as between urban and rural schools or as between the sexes, it is not perhaps so illiberal in conception as some of those who interpret it.

Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the time will come when, with a better qualified primary school teaching cadre, it will be possible for the Ministry of Education to abandon centrally prescribed syllabuses in favour of something in the way of 'A
000 Programme of Suggestions for Teachers'. If such a programme

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were issued and each school required to produce its own schemes 000 of work based generally on the suggestions, this would help to promote school programmes more related to the needs of the schools in their local environment. Such an arrangement would throw greater responsibility on the teachers themselves and would promote greater educational thought and experiment in place of the all-too rigid adherence to existing syllabuses.

If the Ministry of Education feel that they cannot go so far in granting freedom to the schools to prepare their own schemes of work, an approach to greater local freedom in this direction would be achieved if the task of preparing programmes could be delegated to a committee of teachers in each province who would prepare provincial programmes of study for approval by the Ministry.

Courses for Serving Teachers. Whether or not arrangements can be 875 made for teachers to get together to prepare provincial programmes of study, there is a great need for continuous provision of courses for serving teachers. This applies more particularly to the rural teachers, many of whom live in conditions of great isolation and need that stimulus to thought and those wider professional contacts that they cannot have in their immediate locality.

AN APPROACH TO A NEW STRUCTURE OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Two Stages of Schooling for All. As the quality of the teachers and 871 an accompanying greater degree of freedom grow, it is probable that it will be found that the existing structure of primary education, namely six years of schooling for all in one school, does not meet all the educational needs of the children. At the present time the primary schools, with their great variation in age groups, are trying to perform two functions. They both initiate young children into the business of schooling and, because most of the pupils leave at an early age and undergo no period of secondary education, are also expected to give the older pupils some preparation for adult life. This is certainly the intention of the agricultural primary schools which some educators hope will become the model of the village school of the future.

It is not really possible to undertake both tasks in the one school. 872 It is suggested, therefore, that the Ministry of Education and the proposed National Council of Education should begin to give some thought to a future alteration of the structure of primary education on the following lines:

(1) The first stage of education should last six years and, especially in the lower classes, should continue the activity techniques

for some time. Women have been employed so far only in exceptional 464
cases. A new problem has been recently experienced in the high turnover of ordinary labour. Owing to the development of the oil industry in Kuweit and other Persian Gulf areas, and the high wages being paid there, many workers in Baghdad, and more still in the depressed farming areas, have been emigrating there. The turnover in the cotton textile industry of Iraq is estimated at 20 per cent of employed labour.

The main difficulty however lies in the shortage of skilled
and semi-skilled labour. The vast amount of illiteracy among the [212
population, and the failure to make elementary education compulsory 871]
has made it difficult to apply any system of apprenticeship successfully. Technical education provided by the State has [874]
so far been on a very limited scale - indeed, there are only three technical secondary schools in the whole of Iraq. Therefore a new industry has often first to train its own labourers and technicians, and this of course adds to costs. In the meanwhile, most industries are dependent on foreign technicians, experts, constructors, heads of sections, and foremen. The employment of foreign technicians no doubt is inevitable in the early stages of development, but it has its own drawbacks and burdens. Foreign skill demands higher rewards abroad than it would accept at home, the standard of skill obtained is often not the highest, service is often interrupted either by ordinary leaves, or illness or inability to fit in with local conditions.

The lack of qualified labour also applies to the fields of administration, [658
accounts, and management. Efficient clerks, typists, 874]
store-keepers, accountants and secretaries are in great demand and very few are available in Iraq. The inadequacy of State commercial education is no less than that of technical education. The scarcity of able management is a serious obstacle to the progress
of industry. Those few who have entered the field of industry are 464
mostly of the type of proprietor-manager (even in joint-stock 472
companies managers are usually fairly large share-holders); while 473
the members of boards of directors of industrial companies, (about twenty to twenty-five men) mostly have their own business or profession to attend to. No wonder they show reluctance to go into new enterprises. For one reason or another salaried managers have not made their way into industry, except in very rare cases. On the other hand foreign management, especially on the

175* [illegible] [illegible] farm at Karrāda, near Baghdad, and other experimental plots established in the country. Captain Thomas made comprehensive experiments,[1] both in the growing of cotton and in the marketing of the product, which seemed to hold out bright prospects for the future of Mesopotamia as a cotton-growing country.[2]

The activities of the Department centred about this and other experimental work,[3] but attempts were also made to encourage better agricultural methods, both by the dissemination of information and by the demonstration of modern machinery.[4] The handicaps, however, of the long years of ignorance and of dependence on traditional methods, the consequent apathy of the actual cultivators, the lack of education, the weather vagaries, the uncertainty of water supplies and the uncontrolled pests as well as the scarcity of funds available hampered the Department on every side. Under such conditions, the pioneering activities of the Department, often discouraging in the lack of apparent results, laid the foundations of service which might have played a greater part in regenerating the country had its early efforts been maintained during the succeeding years.

Education

175* 871 Under the Turkish Government, an excellent system of education, according to its own reports, existed for 'Iraq, with a

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[1] Thomas, R., *Possibilities of Mesopotamia as a Cotton Growing Country, Note I*, June 15, 1918 (Baghdad, 1918); *Note II*, *January* 15, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919); *Note III*, *November* 5, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919); *Report on Cotton Experimentation Work in Mesopotamia*, 1918 (Baghdad, 1919); Ibid., 1918-19, (Baghdad, 1920); *Report of Deputation to England* (Baghdad, 1919). Also, Philby, H. St. J. B., *Cultivation of Cotton in Mesopotamia* (Baghdad, 1919).

[2] Thomas, R., *Note III*, 1919, p. 10. Also, *Baghdad Times*, April 14, 1923.

[3] Results of the early studies of dates were embodied in Dowson, H. V., *Dates and Date Cultivation* (Cambridge, 1924); experiments with wheat in Garbett, C. C., *Note on Wheat Experiments, Mesopotamia*, 1917-18 (Baghdad, 1918) and those of other experiments in leaflets published by the Department.

[4] Most of the technical staff, both gazetted and non-gazetted, of the Department came from India as did most of the experimental equipment. *Admin. Report of the Department of Agriculture in Mesopotamia*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), pp. 2-3.

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Mudīr al-Mu'ārif (Director of Education) in every wilayet, each 175*
having a budget,[1] staff, syllabus and long list of schools. To 871
judge by results, however, the system was a 'whited sepulchre'. The schools were rarely as numerous nor as well attended as government statistics indicated; the teachers possessed little learning and even less moral character. Arabic was little stressed as a language. Shī'is, comprising the majority of [775]
the population, would not send their sons to government schools, invariably taught by Sunnīs, nor were they encouraged to do so by the Sunnī Ottoman Government.

Mr. Dobbs, as Revenue Commissioner, had, in early 1915, 175*
studied the educational problem and had written suggestions 227*
for British policy.[2] He advocated extreme caution in initiating 871
a new system in order that the mistakes made in India might be avoided. The shortage of primary teachers led him to declare that if it were not for the urgent necessity of equipping Arabs for government service and for avoiding the imputation that the British Administration was not inclined to provide educational facilities, he 'should be inclined to advise that not a single school should be opened for the next two years'.[3] Under the circumstances, however, he recommended that one or two primary schools be opened and that subsidies be given to the American Mission Schools under Mr. John Van Ess and to the Carmelite Frères School. The opening of other schools would have to be left to the future.[4] Thus from the beginning, the necessity of encouraging education to provide youths for government service became a guiding factor and stimulated the establishment of educational facilities where the natural tendency on the part of the British authorities was to restrict

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[1] A pre-war Budget for Baghdad Wilayet was:

Law School and Secondary School	£T. 9,000
Other schools (from Local Revenue)	£T.25,000
Total	£T.34,000

Revenue Report, 1917, p. 45.

[2] Dobbs, H. R. C., Notes on Education, February 15th, 1915.

[3] Ibid., para. 2.

[4] Ibid., para. 11.

175* education or to regard it as of secondary importance in the work
727* of regenerating the country. Nevertheless, only two primary
● 871 schools were established by the end of 1915, although subsidies
had been granted to the two institutions already mentioned.

TABLE I

Main Headings	1915–16	1916–17	1917–18	1918–19	1919–20
	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees
1. Headquarters Administrative Expenditure.*	5,54,230	11,83,425	24,18,253	33,90,100	73,60,714
2. Political Officers, Revenue Establishments	5,48,892	9,19,085	51,89,233	93,21,690	70,67,420
3. Customs	1,11,898	3,85,800	5,80,350	6,75,000	29,64,169
4. Transport	—	—	—	—	30,87,834
5. Judicial	1,20,207	1,27,295	2,14,983	3,73,000	8,21,145
6. Medical	61,345	87,180	1,39,887	4,63,750	20,31,542
7. Education	6,500	23,530	35,500	1,80,000	8,86,808
8. Police	1,99,146	2,86,975	8,90,163	12,04,080	22,71,389
9. Jails	20,126	44,460	98,517	1,67,400	5,44,304
10. Public Works	—	1,05,450	4,61,400	8,74,700	49,63,292
11. Posts	—	—	—	—	23,74,831
12. Telegraphs	—	—	—	—	8,19,868
13. Survey	—	—	—	—	94,859
14. Irrigation	—	—	—	—	38,78,605
15. Agriculture	—	—	—	—	3,81,738
16. Levies	—	—	—	—	66,49,490
Totals	16,22,344	31,63,200	100,28,286	166,49,720	461,98,008

* Includes Salaries, Secret Service, Subsistence Allowances, Sea Passages, Telegrams, Stationery, Press, ètc.

Figures for all years, except 1919-20, based on *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119. Figures for 1919-20 based on actuals in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-21, p. iii.

658 During the same period only Rs.6,500 were spent on pro-
871 moting education, or 0.4 per cent of the civil expenditure,
175 Rs.16,22,344.[1] In the following fiscal year,[2] however, Rs.
727

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[1] Note by Financial Secretary in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119. For table of expenditures by heads, see Table I.

[2] April 1st to March 31st.

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23,530 or 0·74 per cent of the total civil expenditure were spent, 658
entirely in Basra Wilayet. Nor did the situation improve after 871
the taking of Baghdad, the attention of the authorities being 175+
almost exclusively taken up with consolidating the military 727+
and political situation. Expenditure on education in 1917-18 totalled but 0·35 per cent of the total civil expenditure.

Not until the appointment of a Director of Education, Major H. E. Bowman,[1] in September, 1918, was a vigorous start made towards creating an educational system. By the end of 1918, 872
twenty primary schools had been set up,[2] but expenditure 658
still formed only 1·08 per cent of the total expenditure. The 727+
desire for schools and educational facilities, especially the 195+
opportunity to learn English, was everywhere manifest, petitions and requests coming from all parts of the Occupied Territories.[3] To meet these demands, twenty-one new primary schools were opened in 1919,[4] while a further fifteen were added in 1920, which, including twenty-four subsidized schools, brought the total number to eighty-five boys' schools of all types, and five girls' schools,[5] with a total enrolment of 6,182 pupils or one for every 462 of the population.[6] The proportion of the expenditure for Education to the entire expenditure in this year, the fifth of the British Occupation, had risen to 1·9 per cent.[7]

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[1] Egyptian Ministry of Education, 1903-1923; Director Palestine Education Department, 1920-36.

[2] *Administrative Report of Education*, 1918, p. 10 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918).

[3] *Fortnightly Reports of Political Officers, Baghdad Wilayet, 1st-15th June*, 1918: Mandali, p. 23 (hereafter *Fortnightly Rep'ts*); *Monthly Rep'ts, January*, 1919; Basra Sanjaq, p. 32; Qurna, p. 79; Ibid., *August*, 1919: Erbil, p. 45; Ibid., *November*, 1919: Dulaim, p. 14.

[4] *Administration of the Department of Education for the year* 1919 (Baghdad, 1920) (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1919).

[5] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 104.

[6] On the basis of the census, 1918-19, of 2,890,000 inhabitants.

Education	.. .. ..	Rs. 8,86,808
Total Budget	.. .. ..	Rs. 461,98,008

These figures are taken from actual expenditure given in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iii. They differ slightly from the estimates given in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119.

[7] See Table II.

175* The years of neglect of education, including the war years,
●871 the lack of trained teachers and of equipment and the paucity
727 of the funds sanctioned by the Civil Administration which
rendered it impossible to overcome adequately the lack of teachers by bringing them from Syria and Egypt, contributed to the slow creation of educational facilities. Nevertheless, the aims of the Department were kept high. These, as summarized by the Director of Education in 1918, were:

> to provide a sound elementary education, on which to base an edifice lasting, endurable and firm. To open new schools gradually as trained teachers become available. To select as teachers only the best candidates, socially, morally and mentally, and to pay them well. To never lose sight of the real object in view — the formation of character and the spirit of good citizenship.[1]

As long as British advisers played a decisive part in the educational affairs of 'Iraq, these aims formed the basis of their policy.

Judicial System

671 In accordance with Great Britain's policy of establishing an
175+ Arab administration in Baghdad, of which the promise in
727+ General Maude's Proclamation not to introduce alien institutions was a public intimation, the instructions of H.M. Government had made it clear that the Occupied Territories Code was not to be introduced into Baghdad Wilayet.[2] The policy adopted, therefore, was not 'to make a clean sweep of the Turkish legal system and to introduce a new system based on English models, as had been done in Basrah Wilayet', but rather 'to carry on the Turkish organization of Courts and system of law, making such immediate modifications only as are necessary to ensure justice and a reasonably efficient administration'.[3]

[1] *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918, p. 10.

[2] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917.

[3] *Administrative Report of Justice from the Occupation of Baghdad to* 31.12.17, p. 4 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1917).

693 671 stitution. Their principal contribution, however, has been their aid in creating a standard for the administration of justice and the conduct of the courts. Their insistence on justice without regard to distinctions of class or religion and their unfaltering rectitude in conformity with the best British traditions have left what may be hoped is an indelible imprint on the Judicial system of 'Iraq. To them is due in a great degree the high standard of justice which prevailed in 'Iraq before 1932. Their task has never been an easy one. The traditions inherited from Ottoman days that justice could be bought and that a Judgeship was a means of amassing a fortune, were too deeply ingrained to be eradicated easily and at once. As great an obstacle to equity in the courts was the unfortunate susceptibility of the Judges to outside influences, personal, official and religious. Thus the decisions of Judges of otherwise impeachable integrity have been known to be swayed by fear of public criticism, of the threatened displeasure of high officials or by political and religious motives.

Education

● 871 The British educational policy for 'Iraq from the time of the Civil Administration largely centred around the provision of primary schools supplemented by denominational schools. The policy of the 'Iraq Government, in brief, has been the extension of a system of national schools, primary and secondary, accompanied by the gradual elimination of denominational schools with their connotations of foreign and consequently undesirable influences.

Between these two policies has been waged incessant war, in which British officials employed by the Ministry usually gave way, particularly as they were rarely supported by the Residency to the same degree as were their colleagues in other Ministries. Moreover, control passed to 'Iraqī officials throughout the Ministry earlier than in any other Ministry or

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department, no administrative order in the Ministry being 871 given by a British official after 1923.[1] The responsibility for the educational system thus has been largely 'Iraqī, in spite of the inclination both of 'Iraqī officials and of American educationalists to lay the blame for its deficiencies at the feet of the British officials. Indeed, more influence of foreign origin has been [177 exerted on the educational system by 'Iraqī students returning 871] from American and English schools and Universities than by the British officials of the Ministry.

No government department has been a greater source of 658 optimism for the continued development of 'Iraq, both to 871 'Iraqī and to foreign observers, than has Education. No other department can point to budget appropriations which have steadily increased from 1921, the amount assigned in 1932 to Education being more than double the sum in 1921.[2] No other Ministry can show such concrete and progressively achieved results. The number of primary schools for boys has increased [872] from 124 in 1921 to 247 in 1930, the enrolment increasing from 12,226 to 24,885. In the same period, girls' schools have increased from 27 to 44, with an increase in enrolment from 3849 to 6003. During this period, secondary and intermediate schools have grown from four, with an estimated attendance of

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 224.

[2] A summary of the expenditures of the Ministry of Education, 1921-32) in lacs of rupees) is as follows:

Year	*Expenditure*	*Percentage of Budget to total expenditure*
1921–22	19·36	3·3
1922–23	19·94	4·1
1923–24	18·15	4·0
1924–25	22·13	4·59
1925–26	23·48	4·43
1926–27	26·93*	5·2
1927–28	27·42	4·74
1928–29	32·01	5·33
1929–30	37·18	6·42
1930–31	38·41	7·5
1931–32	39·98	7·9

* The budget of the Antiquities Department and of the Engineering School was added to the Budget in this year and in subsequent years.

658 238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase
● 871 in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or
[875] quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of 'Iraqī students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to adapt Western methods to 'Iraq instead of blindly adopting them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

871 Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern has been expressed both by 'Iraqis and by others lest various tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and controversies; and the acquisition by students of the view that education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that government positions should be the reward of their school certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves, will depend much of the continued progress of 'Iraq.

744 In other fields, a health service has been in existence since
759 the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in out-
[758] lying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small
164 portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

371 electric plants is considerably greater than that of equivalent thermal capacity; and Iraq possesses very cheap fuel for the generation of power. [365] At present municipal power is used primarily for lighting, and even if industrial plants should turn increasingly to municipal stations for their power supply they would be able to obtain considerable amounts of "off-peak" power in such cities as Baghdad and Basra without any increase in generating capacity. In the judgment of the Mission hydroelectric power should be considered only if it does not need to be transmitted over long distances and then only if the demand is such as to insure a steady and high load factor. It is not yet clear that the Wadi Tharthar depression will actually store enough water to permit the generation of power, and the power which might be generated at the dams projected elsewhere is likely to be too far removed from major consuming centers.

VII. Education

● 371 Education is a basic condition for the agricultural, industrial and technological progress of the country as well as for the development of a fuller cultural life and the sound growth of democratic institutions. Its importance has received growing recognition and considerable progress has been made. In years of financial stringency the budget for education has usually continued to expand while other government expenditures were curtailed. In the last two decades, the number of schools rose from 262 to 1,100, the number of pupils from 32,750 to 175,000 and the number of primary school teachers increased from 1,325 to 6,588. During the same period, expenditures on education rose from about ID 300,000 per year to well over ID 4,000,000—a not inconsiderable advance even after taking into account the rise in prices.

Nevertheless, there are still only 175,000 children in schools out of about 750,000 of school age. Despite the increased emphasis on primary education, expenditures for this purpose still take only 51 percent of the education budget. The number of children in school declines sharply with each succeeding grade, so that only about half the children starting in primary school actually finish their

primary school education and much of the investment in their education accordingly bears little fruit. The facilities and quality of technical or vocational education are seriously deficient and adult education has been almost wholly neglected. Probably about 80 percent of the men and over 95 percent of the women remain illiterate. Moreover, educational concepts are far too narrow and too little related to the everyday problems of living. 871 [212]

As the result of its study of educational needs the Mission has come to the conclusion that the government should launch a three-part program involving (1) the improvement and extension of technical education, (2) the gradual introduction of compulsory primary school education, and (3) fundamental education for adults.

Technical Schooling

The question of technical or vocational education is not treated in detail here, partly because it has already been discussed in connection with agriculture and industry, partly because the government has requested UNESCO to send a special mission on vocational education. Although the number of students in technical schools—about 750—seems very inadequate, Iraq apparently has had difficulty in absorbing the graduates of these institutions largely because they lack sufficient practical training and they show a distaste for manual work. Obviously one of the first steps toward improved technical training will be to give the curriculum of the intermediate and secondary schools a greater vocational bias, with emphasis upon the dignity and value of manual labor. It is also worth emphasizing again that skilled labor and foremen can best be recruited from the ranks of active young workmen through on-the-job training programs, supplemented in some cases by technical schooling. Only the higher supervisory grades of personnel need to be trained in technical schools, and even for these there should be considerable emphasis on practical training in business, industry and agriculture as an integral part of the curriculum. 874 [461]

Introduction of Compulsory Primary Education 871

There is a general consensus both among Iraqi educators and foreign experts who have examined the problem that the time has come for a broad advance in the direction of compulsory education.

● 871 In India, where conditions are not dissimilar, a program for the gradual introduction of compulsory primary education has been approved. The only real question relates to the speed with which the objective should be accomplished. The Mission believes that a phased program covering a period of about 15 years may be feasible for Iraq. During the first five years of this period it would be necessary to establish and open the additional training colleges required for teachers, build the needed elementary schools and make all the essential administrative and organizational preparations. At the same time a comprehensive campaign to enlist public support of the objective would have to be launched and a careful survey made to determine the facilities needed in each locality and the order of priority in the introduction of compulsory education. The ensuing 10-year period would then be used for the progressive application of the principle of compulsory education.

875 It is estimated that from 18,000 to 20,000 new teachers will be required for this program. Urgent attention would therefore have to be given in the next three years to the establishment of new training colleges, probably one in each province, to insure that the first group of new teachers would be available by 1956. It is vitally important that competent young men and women imbued with enthusiasm and a sense of mission be attracted to the teaching profession. The local teacher should be equipped to work among adults as well as children and capable of becoming a leader in the community. The status and dignity of the teaching profession should therefore be raised and adequate provision made for teachers' compensation, as well as their housing, health and general welfare.

872 The number of schools will have to be greatly expanded. Moreover, many of the schools are now ill-housed and ill-equipped and will therefore need to be replaced. Many others are in inadequate rented structures. It is noted that the Development Board has already set aside almost four million dinars for school construction in its five-year program. The basis for this figure is not known to the Mission, but, since a considerable part of the program is evidently intended for the replacement of old and rented buildings, it is likely to fall somewhat short of the requirements set by

a program for the introduction of compulsory primary education over the next 15 years. 872

The introduction of compulsory primary schooling will have to take into account varying economic conditions. It is often argued that most parents are unable to afford to send their children to school because children must go to work at an early age to help support the family. The high proportion of children who leave primary schools before finishing appears to support this thesis. However, these economic pressures will tend to diminish as the development program gets under way and opens up larger and more remunerative oportunities for employment to adults. Experience indicates that one of the first desires of parents who have improved their economic status is to provide better education for their children. Such a desire, for example, has already become manifest among the settlers in the Dujaila project. This does not mean, of course, that economic limitations must be ignored. It would be best to apply the principle of compulsion first in cities and more prosperous communities where economic pressures for the employment of children are least evident. In rural areas there may well be resistance to compulsory school attendance unless the period of schooling is adjusted to permit the help of children in the sowing and harvesting seasons. Some discretion should be permitted in adjusting school vacations to the harvesting periods in different parts of the country; and where schools need to remain open during busy agricultural seasons, the period of instruction should be so scheduled as to permit children to work part of the day in the fields.

Special problems must be met in connection with the education of the children of nomadic tribes. Here teachers trained from the ranks of the nomads themselves will have to travel with the tribes. The teaching syllabus will need to be adapted and simplified in order to take into account their special needs.

Revisions of the School Curriculum

As part of the program there should be a marked reorientation of the curriculum and methods of teaching. Learning is largely by rote. The children passively absorb information and learn comparatively little by actually doing things. Almost no 876 871

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876 attempt is made to develop their creative instincts. The curriculum
871 is far too bookish and academic and there is a great gulf between what is taught in school and the exigencies of practical life. Dr. Fadhel Jamali, a distinguished Iraqi educator and political figure, has aptly remarked that "no educational system is justified that does not give relief from the scourge of diseases nor aim at raising the standard of living and inculcating new ideas and techniques".

871 The school curriculum should be revised in the light of four principal objectives which have been well-stated by Mr. Victor Clark in his report on Compulsory Education in Iraq:

> "The first is the need for sound character training, including a realization that education is not simply a collection of skills and aids in preparation for a government or clerical job, but the acquisition of sound values which need to be applied in all walks of life whether professional or manual. The second important need is a knowledge of the practice and principles of good husbandry by those who work on the land. An equally important requirement in a minority of the population is the acquisition of technical skills necessary in local industries and in the growing demand for maintenance work. Finally, as is to be expected in a young country which is still engaged in the process of welding diverse racial and religious groups into conscious nationhood, it is considered that one of the most important needs is the promotion of knowledge and qualities necessary to the furtherance of national unity."[5]

Although there has been some demand that education in the villages should be given a "rural" bias and education in the cities a "vocational" bias, only half-hearted experiments in that direction have actually been carried out. In the future there should be much more emphasis on crafts in all schools. Properly guided children, who are naturally creative, will find joy in working skillfully with their hands and develop a pride in craftsmanship which has seriously declined in Iraq. The crafts which are taught should be as varied and as closely linked to local occupations as possible. Rural schools, in particular, should have small gardening plots where children can learn simple agricultural processes, the care of livestock and the use of tools. Crafts should emphasize the best use 871 of cheap local materials in weaving and rug making, woodwork, simple building operations and the like. Urban schools might stress such crafts as leather work, woodwork, bookbinding and printing, brick-making, textiles, etc. For girls, lessons might be provided in sewing, cooking and other domestic pursuits. For all pupils, visits to hospitals, industrial plants, demonstration farms and the like would prove a useful supplement to training acquired at school.

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[5] Victor Clark, *Compulsory Education in Iraq* (UNESCO, 1951), p. 18.

As already indicated, health and hygiene should be given a 871 more important place in the curriculum. Children could not only 751 be taught useful facts regarding the causes and methods of treatment of endemic diseases like bilharzia, hookworm, malaria and eye infections, but could be persuaded to do something about them by helping to eliminate stagnant pools and showing others how to avoid water pollution. Similarly they could learn something about the qualities of different foods, the importance of personal hygiene and the value of cleanliness in the home.

In this type of educational program it would be desirable to enlist the cooperation of officials dealing with health, agriculture and local government problems. Through the children, more effective contacts with the parents would be established. Parents would learn to appreciate the practical value of education to their children and themselves, and a better link between school and community would be forged.

The inauguration of a revised curriculum and better teaching 875 methods will require a prior reorientation of the training given to teachers. The curricula of Training Colleges should be recast radically in order to reduce the present excessive number of subjects and to bring the training nearer to the realistic conditions of the rural or urban areas for which the teachers are being trained. Colleges for training rural teachers should be located in rural areas where students can study rural problems and can actively participate in rural community life. Every Training College should have a demonstration school in which it should have the latitude to work out new teaching methods. At present such Colleges tend to be omnibus educational institutions which give too little time to the professional training of teachers.

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Intermediate and Secondary Education

873 The Mission has given great emphasis to primary schooling because it is convinced that the education base should be broadened. In the past education in Iraq has been too much like an inverted pyramid in which more attention has been paid to education at the higher stages than at the primary levels. This does not mean, of course, that intermediate and secondary education should not be allowed to develop at the same rate as in the past. As far as possible, however, the establishment of intermediate and secondary schools in rural areas should be given priority over those in urban areas, for such schools will be needed to produce candidates for the rural Training Colleges. The revision of the curriculum in these schools is of equal if not greater importance than in the case of primary schools. The present need is for a type of education which, in the words of Dr. Jamali, "prepares the citizens for better living and not one which produces men for white collar jobs with superficial learning, men who want to be government officials and clerks and not leaders and artisans in the fields of agriculture, commerce and social service."

Adult Education

871 Adult education has been largely neglected. There are some night schools operated by Teachers' Associations and the Ministry, but the syllabus of such schools is the same as that of corresponding schools for children. There are also a few adult literacy centers which concentrate on teaching adults to read and write.

The Mission urges that a program for adult education be drawn up and directed by a Special Division of Fundamental Education in the Ministry of Education. Such a program would be directed primarily to those groups in the population between 12 and 45 years of age. It would stress the acquisition of literacy, not as an end in itself but rather as a means to the acquisition of practical knowledge of the fundamental problems of better living. It is useless to teach people how to read and write unless by this means they can be shown how to work more effectively for their own good. For this reason a new and broader approach to education, different from the traditional schoolroom methods used to teach

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children, is required. This approach has been characterized by UNESCO as "fundamental education":

> "The main purpose of fundamental education is to help people to understand their immediate problems and to give them the skills to solve them through their own efforts. It is an emergency solution designed to help masses of illiterate adults and children in countries whose educational facilities have been inadequate. It is an attempt to salvage a generation by giving it the minimum of education needed to improve its way of life, its health, its productivity and its social, economic and political organization."[6]

This concept of education lays emphasis not only on the dissemination of practical training in health, hygiene, civics, agriculture, etc., but also on the employment of more modern media of communication such as audio-visual aids.

In a properly phased program of adult education an initial period of at least two years will need to be devoted to preparatory work and pilot projects. A small group of selected and specially trained teachers will be needed to test various educational techniques in a few pilot projects. The localities in which the program will be started will have to be selected and the cooperation of local leaders and officials enlisted. The subject of fundamental education will need to be incorporated in the curriculum of teachers' training colleges. Above all, suitable materials including primers, books, folders and visual aids such as films, slides, charts and maps will have to be assembled. UNESCO could give valuable assistance. In fact, it has already conducted a pilot project in the Dujaila area. Materials could also be borrowed and adapted from other countries such as India.

In the following three-year period the actual program might be begun by utilizing about 120, or approximately 10 percent, of existing schools also as evening community centers for adult education. A few schools might initially be chosen in each province so that these could serve as models and observation centers for other teachers. The program would be feasible only if the existing teacher corps were used also for adult education. It is impor-

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[6] UNESCO *Courier*, June 1951.

● 171 tant therefore to enlist their enthusiastic cooperation, for it would presumably not be possible to pay them more than a nominal amount in supplementary compensation. The efforts of these teachers would need to be complemented by assistance from other local officials in giving talks, demonstrating techniques, and showing materials on health, agriculture, irrigation, etc. Finally, in the following 10-year period, all of the remaining schools would gradually come into use as adult education centers. In the end the schools should become genuine community centers. In the smaller towns and villages, in particular, they should serve as the focal point for all instruction and as a center for community social life.

Administration

The program outlined above could not be carried out without some revision in the administration of the educational system. The present administration is too highly centralized. Everything is directed in minute detail from the center. As a consequence courses of instruction and methods of teaching are stereotyped and there is little or no opportunity for experimentation. The Ministry at Baghdad is so burdened with administrative detail that it cannot give adequate attention to policy and planning. More of the administrative routine should be handled by the provincial officials of the Ministry and headmasters should be given greater discretion in adapting curricula to local needs. While the time is not ripe to entrust responsibility for education to the provinces and municipalities, it is important that every effort be made to enlist the active assistance and cooperation of local officials and leaders in agriculture, commerce, industry and religion. They could assist in stimulating interest in the program and mobilizing voluntary contributions to its success. They could help, for instance, in organizing local parent cooperation and interest, in contributing equipment to schools and in providing meals and clothing for needy school children.

Continuity in educational policy has been seriously impaired in the past not only by frequent ministerial changes but also by frequent replacement of leading officials in the Ministry. Such officials should in the future be assured more permanent tenure. The Mission also suggests that consideration be given to the establishment of a Statutory Board or Council of Education. Such a Coun-

cil, consisting of officials and non-officials conversant with different 871 ●
types of educational problems, might give valuable assistance to the Ministry in formulating educational policies and programs and guarding against hasty and ill-considered changes in approved programs.

Training Abroad

A word should finally be said of the Ministry of Education's 871
program for educating Iraqis abroad. During the last 10 years no 658
less than 781 Iraqis were sent abroad for education at government expense. Of these, 234 studied engineering; 53, other technical and industrial subjects; 103, agriculture; 39, commercial subjects; 24, medicine; 56, law; and 272, education. Many of these will be returning over the next few years and will be capable, if given an opportunity, of playing an important role in carrying out the development program. This type of educational program undoubtedly merits further expansion. At present the fields of study are decided by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendations of the various ministries. In the future it is suggested that the Development Board also be consulted on the most important requirements in the light of its overall program.

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654* pumps. In other respects industrial development would be geared
433 to supply the growing demand for consumers goods, such as shoes, textiles and utensils, and for construction materials, such as cement, arising out of the development program itself.

654* Rising agricultural and industrial output will necessitate a cor-
489 responding increase in transport capacity. Here the development of road transport and the replacement of wornout track, locomotives and rolling stock will be the principal tasks of the future.

654* Since the relationship of health and education to production
●871 may appear more indirect, there is danger that these two subjects
744 will be neglected in the emphasis on greater national output. Basically, however, it is the productivity of manpower which must be raised, and this can be achieved only if measures are taken to make people better educated and to free them from debilitating disease. In the future the public health effort must concentrate on the prevention of disease through such measures as increasing the number of village dispensaries, the training of midwives, the organization of a corps of sanitarians, elimination of stagnant and polluted water, provision of safe water supplies and sewage disposal, slum clearance and better housing. Community planning should focus largely on such improvements as will contribute to better public health. A great broadening of the educational effort is needed in the future to teach people how to cope more effectively with the problems of everyday living. To this end, compulsory primary education should be gradually introduced over the next 15 years and a vigorous campaign for the education of adults should be launched. At the same time, however, it is vitally important to adapt education to the practical needs of the people, helping them to improve their health and their methods of work.

654* The program which the Mission has outlined in this report is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission has thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a

Expansion of Health Education

565 511 751 Iraq has a small, wealthy upper class and a small middle class. The great majority of the people are poor and ignorant, most especially in regard to health measures. Health education is badly needed and there is no doubt that the people would respond readily to teaching. Large groups enthusiastically attended all the shows put on for the health week held in Diwaniya province; competitions for the best eating-house, butcher's shop and barber's shop were keenly contested and visitors thronged to see the model house and the medical exhibition. The oil company in Kirkuk employs a British sanitary inspector and the Railways Administration in Baghdad recently sent their Iraqi sanitary inspector to take a course of study in the United Kingdom. The response of the householders in these places to sanitary measures is striking; their pride in their homes is obvious and the absence of flies conspicuous.

751 ●871 To begin with, every doctor should have a thorough understanding of the relation of environmental factors to disease. Greater emphasis on the teaching of preventive medicine and particularly of social medicine in the medical school, as has already been recommended, would help to inculcate a wider appreciation of the importance of the preventive outlook in all medical work. Like doctors, nurses have a unique opportunity to teach their patients, and personal and domestic hygiene should take their proper place in the training courses for nurses. Every hospital should be an object lesson in hygiene and every patient should learn by his stay in it.

Health education must be given an important place in the curriculum of the teachers' training schools, and special courses in the prevention of the diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be included in the syllabus of the School of Agriculture and of the School of Engineering.

Hygiene is already taught in the schools but ought to be given greater emphasis. Personal hygiene is essentially a matter of habit formation and young school children should be trained in good habits as a daily routine. Special classes could be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases—possibly, in some cases, by the school medical officer. It is for the Health Department to

decide what should be taught and then the educators can decide 751
how it should be taught. 871

In the villages, the school buildings could sometimes serve as models for house-building; in any case, every school should in itself be a lesson in hygiene. Well-balanced meals are provided in the boarding schools and serve as examples for the home. Possibly the elder girls could be taught some "mothercraft", the treatment of minor ailments (cuts, abrasions, etc.), some sewing and also some domestic economy.

At present the *School Medical Service* is administered by the Ministry of Education and has a staff of 20 doctors and four dentists. In the school year 1949-50, 147,084 pupils were examined revealing splenomegaly among two percent, schistosomiasis in five percent, and trachoma in 25 percent, while 40,767 attendances were made for dental treatments. To carry out an effective program for treatment of trachoma, more school nurses will be needed.

There are several *other groups* through which health educa- 697
tion can be disseminated. Police training schools and prisons, 751
including reformatories, offer good opportunities for teaching 702
health. The Central Prison in Baghdad is a good example of cleanliness and orderliness. The Army should teach in its officer training courses that the promotion and maintenance of the health of an officer's unit is his first duty.

A few voluntary societies are now undertaking some health 751
education, but the scope of their work could be greatly increased, particularly in maternal and child welfare and in the prevention of tuberculosis. Special pronouncements could be prepared by religious societies for reading in the mosques (e.g. against the pollution of water supplies as a measure to limit the spread of schistosomiasis). Simple health notes written in the vernacular would be of help where a local newspaper is published. Short talks could be given from the national broadcasting station.

There is a great opportunity for health teaching in the projected new settlements. The staff required for such work are medical assistants, sanitary overseers, midwives and possibly public health nurses who, after having received appropriate training, will work in and from one or more village health centers.

Compulsory primary education is the only way to broaden the educational base. Without it illiteracy can never really be stamped out and the people given the means of acquiring the practical knowledge which will enable them to raise their standard of living through their own efforts. Similarly, adult education is necessary if nearly the whole of the present generation beyond primary school age is not to remain illiterate and be denied the opportunity to learn ways and means of improving their living conditions. The need for vocational and technical education should require no detailed justification in a country where the lack of technical skills seems to be one of the most serious obstacles to rapid development. 170

II. Introduction of Compulsory Primary Education 871

It is sometimes argued that the country is not yet ripe for the introduction of compulsory primary education and also that, if the government provides the educational facilities, it will be sufficient to rely on voluntary school attendance. Judging from the testimony not only of educational officers, but of many men in public and private life, the Mission believes that there is a widespread conviction that the time is ripe for a big advance in the direction of compulsory education. This opinion is also reflected in a number of recent reports and educational publications, including the Report of the Committee appointed by the Ministry of Education in 1946 to draw up a Ten Year Plan for Education, and Clark's Report prepared in 1950. A striking testimony to this awakened public consciousness is provided by the fact, revealed by Directors of Education in several provinces, that in many villages without schools, local people (and the local landholders in some cases) were prepared to construct school buildings provided the Ministry of Education was willing to find the teachers.

Compulsory vs. Voluntary Attendance

This does not mean, however, that the problem of universal education will be solved simply by creating adequate educational facilities. First of all, the government must plan a school-building and teacher-training program in advance, and this can take place

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● 871 only in relation to some predetermined goal. The Mission considers that this goal should be to bring primary education to all children of school age; currently, they number about 750,000 but only 175,000 are actually in school. Despite the growing recognition of the value of education, it would be unrealistic to suppose that this goal could be achieved without compulsory attendance. In many cases the value of education will be appreciated only after children are brought into contact with it through some measure of compulsion. This will be true particularly of education in rural [562] areas and of education of girls. In 1948-49, for instance, there were only 43,000 girls in ~~primary~~ schools as compared with about 132,000 boys. Moreover, compulsory attendance is necessary not merely to get children into school initially but also to make sure they will stay there long enough to acquire permanent literacy and the modicum of basic education necessary to improve and enrich their lives. In the cities educational facilities have been much more easily available than in the country, but without compulsion there has been a sharp drop in attendance with each successive school grade. Dr. Akrawi in his work, *Education in the Arab Countries*, presents figures showing the following distribution of enrollment in primary schools in 1944-45:

Grade I	Grade II	Grade III	Grade IV	Grade V	Grade VI
32%	18.3%	14.9%	12.8%	11.7%	10.1%

This suggests that there is a high percentage of wastage in the first year and that the roll in Grade VI is less than one third of that in Grade I. In fact, there were only 9,500 children in Grade VI as compared with 22,000 in Grade I six years before. More recent figures for certain specific areas show some improvement but it is not so marked as to alter the general situation. Thus, in the city of Baghdad where educational awakening is greatest and educational facilities most generous, out of 6,970 children in Grade I in 1945-46, only 5,315 passed on to Grade II in 1947-48 and 3,587 to Grade VI in 1950-51; i.e., about 50 percent dropped out before completing the primary stage. In the city of Kerbela only 209 out of 645 children in Grade I reached Grade VI, a wastage of about 66 percent.

The investment in the education of children who remain in school no more than three years represents a dead loss. Even that

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devoted to children who drop out in the last three years must be regarded as at least a partial loss. Enlightened educational opinion all over the world is agreed that six to seven years is the minimum period in which a child can acquire the basic modicum of knowledge, skills, habits, interests and social attitudes necessary for civilized living in a modern community. The Iraq Government has prescribed six years as the period of primary schooling, but the objective is obviously not being achieved if more than half the children are eliminated, for one reason or another, before completing this period. 871 ●

The Quality and Orientation of Education

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It is sometimes contended that a program of nation-wide education should be postponed until the quality of education is considerably improved. While the Mission does not support this contention, it is firmly convinced that education will not win the support of the people or have any perceptible impact on their lives unless it is given a new orientation. It is, therefore, necessary to take simultaneous measures for the improvement of education—its methods and techniques, its curricula, its organization and administration and, above all, its personnel and their ideology and outlook. Education, as it is provided at present, is concerned with only a part of the child's development. It leaves a large area of his aptitudes and his mental and emotional make-up untouched.

In the proposed reconstruction of education, it will be most important to give it a more practical, realistic and rural bias in order to relate it intelligently to the psychological and social needs of the individual child and the adult society. It is a well-known fact of child psychology that the child is by nature an active, pragmatic person who delights in doing, creating, playing and generally expressing himself in various practical ways which grow increasingly purposeful with age. Unfortunately, the primary and secondary schools as well as training colleges at present seem to be hardly aware of the basic importance of bringing education into harmony with this crucial fact of child psychology. In fact, with the exception of a school handwork exhibition at Baquba, a promising display of handwork specimens in the Primary Teachers' Training College in Baghdad and some quite good examples of stitching and embroidery and the like in a few girls' schools, the schools were

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871 found to be entirely preoccupied with the classical and literary
876 tradition. It is true that the Arab mind has a flair for language and
[517 literature and delights in oral self-expression, and young children
181] learn to read and write quickly and speak with a fluency and feeling for words which children of other lands would find difficult to emulate. But with the increased importance of science and technology and the need of improving productive efficiency in industry, agriculture and other occupations, the people of Iraq cannot afford to remain content with a system of education which does not equip the younger generation to play its part in the projected plans of development.

Once educational authorities clearly recognize that the introduction of activity-centered methods and curricula and of craft work is basic to the whole idea of educational reconstruction, it should not be difficult to work out the necessary measures. In many other countries, such a reorientation of education has been actually achieved, and not only detailed theoretical discussion but records of concrete, practically worked-out schemes are available for consultation and guidance. It will, of course, not be possible—and even if it were possible, it would not be desirable—to copy these methods and schemes mechanically, because education is a creative field in which ideas have to be applied to the particular situation in which one is working. It will be necessary for Iraqi educators to work out their own pattern of "activity schools" and their appropriate forms of craft work. In fact, some gifted educators have already envisaged this problem in its true perspective. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis on *Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of Iraq* (published in 1942) is an effective presentation of the case for reorganized methods and curricula breaking with the narrow academic tradition. What is more, it gives concrete instances of how units in social studies and health education can be worked out in such a way as to break down the barriers between schooling and life.

What kind of crafts can be introduced in the village and city schools which will appeal to the children and will also be related to their environment so that they can leave school with trained skill and aptitudes and participate effectively in the work of their communities? The answer to this question can be given only after

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study, but two important considerations should be kept in mind. 871
The crafts should be as varied as possible and linked to local occupations, and they should make maximum use of cheap local materials so that the cost of their introduction will not be too high. The object would not be to produce trained craftsmen, but to make children adept at working with their hands, to give them an opportunity for creative expression and to inculcate an appreciation of the value of manual labor. For the same reason the teachers need not be specialists in individual crafts, but people who are handy with tools, can work with different materials and in different media, and have a general understanding of the principles, objectives and methods of craft work by children. 876

In rural schools in particular, it is important to have small plots of land for gardening and agriculture where children can learn simple agricultural processes and the care of livestock as well as the use of tools. They should also have the opportunity to visit any government demonstration farms in the neighborhood. In order to insure that rural schools really cater to rural needs it will be necessary to draw more teachers from rural areas and to establish more rural training colleges where effective practical as well as theoretical training is given in agricultural subjects. More rural secondary schools with a dominantly agricultural bias in their curricula are also needed. They can serve the dual function of providing teacher candidates with suitable education and background and also of providing centers for agricultural extension work in the neighborhood.

One of the primary objectives of the reorientation of education should be to challenge children to meet the problems of their environment squarely instead of running away from them. A school is not just a place for academic learning or even a combination of academic and practical work. It is essentially a community where young people should learn the basic art of living through actual experience. It should afford opportunities for cooperative and group work, for leadership and discipline, and at the same time place before the children projects and activities which will enable them to understand the problems which dominate the life of their local, and later national, community. The school should inculcate an appreciation of the value and dignity of hard, manual work. Th

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this way the school can contribute to a much needed spirit of social service among children and youth at various stages of education. Thus a school lesson will become a living experience and bridges will be thrown across the gulf that exists between education and life to their mutual advantage and enrichment. These may appear; to the layman or the traditionally minded teacher, to be rather theoretical and remote considerations. But unless school problems are envisaged in these broad terms, the school will never become a dynamic and life-giving agency for the nation. And in fact, these considerations have been incorporated to varying degrees in the educational systems of many advanced countries and in many progressive schools.

In any reorientation of educational methods there must also be a simplification of the syllabus. The tendency has been to overload the syllabus with many subjects, all of which the child is expected to memorize primarily for the purpose of passing examinations. In the primary schools there are nine or ten subjects; in the secondary schools the total goes to 10-12; and in the training colleges as many as 15 different subjects are taught in one year. The contents of the existing syllabus in each subject and at each stage of education must be critically re-examined in the light of individual and social needs, and curricular cargo which is merely traditional and outdated must be thrown overboard. The Ministry is itself aware of this situation, and well-informed educators and some committees appointed in recent years to examine primary and secondary school curricula have drawn attention to this urgent problem. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis, to which reference has already been made, formulates comprehensively and soundly the principles which should guide workers in this field and provides practical illustration of what can be done. Care must be taken to vary the syllabus in accordance with local needs and to leave the teachers some opportunity for experimentation. For example, in bringing educational facilities to the nomads and the remote villagers, it must be remembered that the needs of the children and the adults living in these more primitive communities are different and in many ways more limited than those of the more sophisticated urban residents on whom the impact of modern civilization has been more direct and greater. It is, therefore, essential that the

Ministry prepare a simplified syllabus and curriculum for such 871
rural areas. It should concentrate on the basic essentials of knowl- 871
edge and skills related to everyday living that can be easily grasped. This applies both to the school program for children in schools and to the program of fundamental education for adults.

Steps Toward Compulsory Primary Education

Many problems and difficulties will undoubtedly arise in 872
enforcing compulsory education, but once the need is recognized and the policy agreed upon, attention can be concentrated on solving them. Public opinion in certain regions and groups will have to be educated; a careful survey of each locality will be needed to assess the existing educational provision as well as future needs; an effective administrative and supervisory organization will have to be established; some special provision will have to be made for children who cannot afford books or midday meals or whose parents want their help in work on their farms; and, most of all, the type of education to be provided will have to be related intelligently to the real needs of rural or urban life so that the children, as well as their parents, may feel that it is really worth their while and perceptibly useful. The special problems and difficulties of Bedouin education will have to be carefully examined.

Fortunately, a good deal of exploratory work of a theoretical nature has been done and, as already pointed out, a number of valuable studies are available which offer useful suggestions in all these fields. The Report of the Monroe Commission lays down general principles of educational reorganization, some of which have special relevance for primary education; Clark's Report is a good and careful, if rather unduly cautious, study of the issues involved in the introduction of compulsion; Dr. Jamali's book, *The Education of the Bedouins,* is a sympathetic and penetrating study of the whole sociological and psychological background of this problem; Dr. Akrawi's thesis on curriculum construction tackles competently the question of how the curriculum can be related dynamically to "the political, economic, social, hygienic and educational conditions and problems of the country;" and the Departmental Ten Year Plan and certain reports of other government committees endorse to some extent the various suggestions made in these studies. Theory has yet to be translated into practice,

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V. Administration

It is an obvious truism that no educational policy or program 647 can be implemented with any chance of success unless there is rea- 871 sonable stability in the administration and approved schemes are carried on without being affected by ministerial changes and the varying fortunes of party politics. Such, however, has not been the case in the country during the last few decades. There have been quick changes not only of government but also, and in consequence, in the higher administrative personnel of the Ministry of Education. It has been calculated, for instance, that during the 18 years between 1927 and 1945, there were 14 different Directors General of Education, although the post is supposed to be permanent and the person in charge is expected to work as the head of the administration. The Departmental Committee which formulated the Ten Year Plan has itself rightly and courageously drawn attention to this distressing situation; its report points out that frequent changes of Ministers has led to instability in personnel and programs and that officials at the Ministry have often been too weak to defend programs and policies before successive Ministers who wished to make changes before they had been long enough in office to study the needs of the situation carefully. The Mission believes, therefore, that the government should take immediate steps to insure that there is reasonable stability of administration in the Ministry so that, once basic educational policies and programs are approved, they are not subject to change without mature consideration. In order to secure this objective, the following measures relating to the operation of the Ministry of Education are put forward:

1. A statutory Board or Council of Education, consisting of appropriate officials and nonofficials conversant with different types of educational problems, should be established to assist the Ministry of Education in the formulation of educational policies and programs and to guard against the possibility of hasty and ill-considered changes or the abandonment of approved programs. If the Board is created by statute, its constitution and personnel will not be easily upset as an incident of changes in the Ministry.

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2. There should be a permanent secretary in continuous charge of the Ministry and reporting directly to the Minister. He ought to be a qualified and experienced educator who would serve as a connecting link between successive Ministers and thus help to assure reasonable continuity of policy. The government might consider whether to merge the existing position of Director General of Education with that of permanent secretary or to have two separate positions. In any event, the present arrangement, under which separate and independent Directors General of primary, secondary and higher education work directly under the Minister, is administratively and educationally unsound and makes integration and coordination of educational effort extremely difficult.

3. An effort should be made to build up within the Ministry a body of competent educators, possessing vision and enthusiasm as well as experience, and enjoying reasonable security of tenure, who would specialize in different aspects of education. They should be able to speak with authority and confidence in their respective fields and guide and advise teachers in all types of schools. If they are to do so, it is essential that they be relieved of much of the petty administrative detail which at present hinders them from devoting themselves to larger issues. This would involve a certain amount of delegation of power to local educational officers, which would need to be carefully worked out but which is sound in principle.

4. It is certainly desirable to associate local administration and influential local persons with the working out of the program that the Mission has recommended. Such association will go a long way to stimulate public interest and cooperation in education. The Mission is, however, of the opinion that, at this stage, this assistance should be enlisted chiefly in an advisory capacity and that the over-all direction and supervision of the new and far-reaching educational reforms and measures should remain in the hands of the Ministry for the present. The Mission strongly questions the wisdom of the steps recently taken to entrust the provincial councils with the responsibility for primary education. Experience in other countries has shown that a sudden devolution of authority to local administration may lead to serious complications and difficulties and endanger the success of the entire program. This should not be taken to imply that many of the functions and powers which are at present exercised by the officials at the center need not be delegated, say, to the

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> Directors of Education. It is meant rather as a warning against transferring the supervision and control and the general responsibility for compulsory or adult education to local bodies or officials who have had little or no experience in dealing with such problems.
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> The people in each locality should unquestionably be given a sense of participation in the educational effort. The Mission has already stressed the importance of enlisting local support for the introduction of compulsory primary education and the inauguration of adult education. Local participation can take the form of voluntary self-help through the provision of free midday meals, books and stationery, or shoes and clothing to needy children, improvements in school equipment and school gardens and the like. Local self-help in constructing or adding to school buildings should also be encouraged.

VI. Conclusion

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The Mission has considered already the financial implications of the educational program and has expressed the view that it is within the resources of the state—actual and potential—to undertake the suggested program of educational expansion and reconstruction. It trusts that the government will definitely adopt the view that increased expenditure on education is a long-range productive investment likely to give the country a generous return in the form of a more prosperous, cooperative, socially conscious and enlightened population. This return is no less real, though less tangible, than those that may be expected from investments in industry or even agriculture. Thus it requires courage and vision to make a large investment in education, for the purpose not only of multiplying schools, but also of raising the quality of education they provide.

The Mission's approach in the educational field is founded on the conviction that education is one of the most important means of raising production levels and living standards and thereby assuring the economic health of the country. It is for this reason that the Mission has given it a high priority in its recommended projects for development. If national development is to be balanced and har-

178 Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping
engines owned by every tribe send thousands of tons of
406 the brown waters of the Euphrates down the irrigation
871 channels to make the land fertile and green. Education is spreading to the tribes, and an increasing number of tribesmen hold jobs of every sort in the railways, the port, and the oil companies. Many tribesmen from the Euphrates drove trucks on the great Aid to Russia route through Persia during the war. Others could be found serving the Allied war effort as far apart as Masira at the end of the Persian Gulf and Haifa.

With this development going on all around him, it is not surprising that the amusements of the tribesman are changing. Whereas before he had to amuse himself by listening to stories told by amateur but skilled storytellers, he can now pass the evening listening to a wireless set driven off the battery of his sheikh's or his sirkal's saloon car, or better still, he can jump a bus or lorry into the nearest village and watch an Egyptian, Indian, or American film. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the stories are dying out, and now only a few of the older men know them. These stories fulfilled a need in the days in which the tribes were in constant conflict with the Turkish Government, and in which facilities for written Arabic literature did not exist. Now, in more prosperous times, they must die out. I would stress that the stories were never considered as belonging to any great school of Arabic literature—they were simple little things, either originated by the tribesmen themselves or adapted from some more ancient story, and their intention was merely to evoke a smile on an arduous march, or to help pass a cold desert night; and so they must be judged.

000 To those who want the real beauty of a precise language, I say that this can be found in written classical Arabic,

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648 Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

668 Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the econo-
665 mic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified
the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and
[185] continued action against Communism and incipient plans for
national development have not so far availed to counteract.
[565] The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely
lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but
[870 the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

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164 helminthosis are endemic. There are occasional outbreaks of
657 smallpox, typhus, and more rarely plague and cholera. With
the greater provision in the budget for schemes of public health,
the increased employment of international specialists and the
considerable assistance tendered by the World Health Organi-
zation, there is every prospect that the incidence of endemic
874 diseases will be greatly reduced. Fundamental results may be
742 expected from modern medical training, with emphasis on the
environmental aspects of disease and the need for prevention
657 as much as or even more than cure, and, above all, from the
743 efforts of the administration to improve the environment itself,
[312] with especial reference to drainage and water-supply. In addi-
tion, attention is to be paid to the public health aspects of the pilgrimages. The curative services have in general received more attention than the preventive and have improved considerably in the past thirty years. Simple conditions are treated in some 400 state dispensaries, distributed fairly evenly throughout the country but varying in their equipment and staff; it has hitherto proved difficult to attract doctors to the provinces and particularly to the rural districts. Each *liwa* centre has a general hospital, the larger towns more than one. There are also specialized hospitals for maternity and child welfare, for infectious, chest, eye, venereal, and mental diseases, and for lepers. The army, police, railways, Port of Basra, Ministry of Education, and oil companies maintain their own medical services and hospitals, and there are in addition an American Mission Hospital and a number of private nursing homes. A five-year programme, financed by the Development Board, will provide for the repair, extension, and replacement of medical buildings which have become old or inadequate. There is an acute shortage of well-trained nurses; attempts to expand the service are hampered by the reluctance of Muslim girls of good family to enter it.

Education

658 The state provides elementary, intermediate, secondary, and
871 higher education, all, since December 1952, completely free.
There are also private and foreign schools on a kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, and secondary level.

State Education. Primary education, by law universal and compulsory where facilities exist, begins at the age of six and continues for six years. It has been limited by a shortage of schools and trained teachers, especially in the villages. Plans are in hand to meet the need. The rapid expansion of state primary education is demonstrated in the following table:

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Year	*No. of schools*	*No. of teachers*	*No. of students*
1920–1	88	486	8,001
1930–1	316	1,325	34,513
1940–1	735	3,525	90,794
1950–1	1,101	6,967	180,779

(Source: Ministry of Education.)

Intermediate education (three years) follows the elementary and is followed by two years' secondary education. The number of state intermediate and secondary schools is also being rapidly increased, as the following figures indicate.

Year	*No. of schools*	*No. of teachers*	*No. of students*
1920–1	3	34	110
1930–1	19	129	2,082
1940–1	56	472	13,969
1950–1	121	999	22,707

(Source: Ministry of Education.)

Private and Foreign Schools. The former include those of the various religious communities, the latter British, American, and Persian schools. Figures for 1953 show an enrolment of some 15,500 pupils in the primary schools and 10,000 in the intermediate and secondary schools, representing about 6 and 25 per cent respectively of the total enrolment in the country.

Higher Education. The higher educational institutions, some of them coeducational, all under state control, are: Higher Training College for Teachers, College of Arts and Science, Law College, College of Medicine and Dentistry, College of Pharmacy and Chemistry, College of Commerce and Economics, Engineering College, Agricultural College, College of Religion, Military and Police Colleges, and Queen Aliya College, which provides girls with arts and, to some extent, secretarial instruction or prepares them for domestic science teaching and the expanding social services. The total number of students in these institutions is at present approximately 5,000. Figures for previous years are as follows: 1920–1 (one college) 65; 1930–1 (four colleges) 100; 1940–1 (four colleges) 900.[1] It is hoped in the near future to implement a proposal now under discussion for combining the higher institutions into a university. 873

Vocational Training. State vocational training on a secondary level, whose extension is being planned, may at present be divided as follows. *Industrial:* Government technical schools in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basra, with another planned for Mosul. The Agricultural Machinery Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is planning to establish training centres for mechan- 874

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[1] Figures given by the Ministry of Education.

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463 each kind of goods has its special section of the bazaar.
565 The brass- and copper-smiths' quarter rings like a small
441 boiler factory all day long. The artisans who are engaged in producing these commodities form a considerable section of the Mesopotamian city population and are fairly prosperous and contented, much more so than the date gardeners of the outside districts. Supreme over them all stands the Mesopotamian silver worker, whose antimony silver work can scarcely be duplicated anywhere in the world.

463 The professional classes in these Mesopotamian cities
● 871 are fairly well developed. There are teachers of every
794 sort. Some of them have been trained abroad, but many
177 are indigenous and a very great credit to the schools that have turned them out. There are a number of government schools, and in addition the different religious sects maintain schools of their own. In these days when western education is in great demand, the schools of the Jews and the Christians are patronized by an increasing number of Mohammedans. No local medical profession has
463 been developed as yet, but the wealth and the culture of
759 Mosul, Baghdad and Basra have attracted a considerable number of trained physicians from outside. We have therefore the beginnings of a medical profession, and although it is not yet indigenous, it will soon become so. Its ethics are not of a very high order; the campaign of the American College of Surgeons to abolish fee-splitting would not make much headway among Mesopotamian doctors, but time will develop ethical standards, and at the worst the profession is a long way in advance
463 of the quacks that infest Arabia proper. There is also a
693 well-established group of lawyers. One of the results of the governing of the country for hundreds of years by

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364 Unfortunately the fact that this work is practical benevo-
764 lence of the finest sort and carried on in the finest spirit
has not served to commend sanitary regulations to the Arab, who regards them as a nuisance, a hindrance to business and an infringement of his personal liberty.

871 Mesopotamia has also grappled with the whole prob-
185 lem of education most courageously. An educational
177 system has been organized which includes normal schools
for teachers and a large number of primary and secondary schools for both boys and girls. There are a smaller number of high schools, and a central university is planned. Fifteen years ago the dominant European influence in this community was French, and no one could claim to be educated who could not talk that language fluently. There was a marked change a little later, and before the Great War German was the commanding influence. Now, of course, the predominant western influence is English, and it seems likely to remain so, for commerce will probably talk the English language for many years, whatever political upheavals the country may be destined to experience. It is true that the educational system has not as yet taken very deep root and that much of the work done is very superficial, but it is none the less exceedingly creditable and encouraging. Moreover, this western system of education will probably be more or less permanent, for it will always be the gateway to remunerative positions.

185 In general, the people of Mesopotamia have been
177 brought into contact with conditions of modern life and
are anxious for further progress. New wants have been created, and a certain increase in the commerce of the country is the inevitable result. All manner of western dress goods and shoes are to be found in the bazaars, as

563 economically dependent on the British. Quite apart from the economic dangers of this, there were signs that they once more hoped for autonomy under British protection. The danger of such hopes is too obvious to need explanation.

The Other Christians

563 195 Apart from the Assyrians, the Christians in Iraq are mainly Chaldaeans, Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox and Catholics, with smaller numbers of Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and other Uniates, and Protestants. The communities are recognized by the Government as possessing competence in matters of personal status and other internal affairs.

563 369 871 Here, as in the other countries, the Christians are more fully an urban community than the Moslems, and show a peculiar aptitude for commerce, crafts and the professions; but there is also a large peasant community, Chaldaean, Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic, in the plains around Mosul. In Iraq, as elsewhere, the proportion of educated Christians is higher than that of educated Moslems, and they are further advanced on the road to Westernization, thanks to the work of foreign missions and schools.

563 The Armenians are a trading community in the towns. They preserve their language and traditions carefully, but they are too few to be able to avoid some measure of external assimilation. The other Christians are partly Syriac-speaking, partly Arabic. This cannot, however, be regarded as a sharp distinction, since the language used depends upon the environment in which they are living, and many of them are bi-lingual. In general, it is true that those whose native language is now Arabic spoke Syriac until recent generations, and that with few exceptions they are not conscious of belonging to the Arab nation.

563 668 In spite of efforts to spread the conception of a 'Syriac' people, the general tendency among the Christians is towards at least a superficial Arabization. This raises the question of their relation towards the Arab nationalist movement. So far, they have regarded it with fear and hostility, apart from some individuals who have supported it with enthusiasm. The nationalists too have tended to suspect them, although the existence of the much greater Kurdish and Shi'i problems has diverted attention from them. What the future relationship will be depends very

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

871
212 Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

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382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

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654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

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654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

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[33] *Economic Development of Iraq*. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952. p. 63.

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II. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

A. PRESENT CONDITIONS

369 511 162 The some 4,000,000 more people of Iraq who live the rural areas have been long characterized by many people both within and outside Iraq as suffering from poverty, ill health and illiteracy. These conditions become readily apparent to one visiting the villages of the country today. The characterization of the people can be extended to their being ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed.

369 511 The survey was immediately impressed with the crude and inefficient methods of making a living and the unnecessarily poor and unhealthy home and village life. These conditions can be remedied by instruction and assistance. People farm with primitive equipment and are wasteful of land and water. In village after village there are mud huts without light or fresh air. Families live, sleep and eat in single rooms packed together with animals, food, stores, farming equipment and refuse. Children play in courtyards filled with animal dung and filth, many people suffer from infected eyes, skin sores and diseases caused by unsanitary conditions which could be greatly reduced by better sanitary conditions. In the homes food is prepared on the floors where it comes in contact with the accumulated filth, flies, chickens, dogs and other animals. Pots and pans and mixing spoons lie on the ground. They are crudely cleaned with dirty water or old rags. There are no such things as kitchens, screened lockers for food or clean and covered places for drinking water in the homes of the rural villagers. Instruction in home care could overcome much of this.

369 364 511 The lack of pure drinking water is one of the most acute problems in these villages. Some pumps and water tanks and some water piped from springs to collection pools have been installed. However, these facilities frequently lack sanitary protection and show lack of proper maintenance by the communities. Often wells have around them accumulation of stagnant water, mud and animal dung. Another acute problem is the lack of any facilities in many villages, and homes for taking care of human waste. Where toilets exist they are mere uncovered holes open to flies and a source of spreading disease.

369 871 Many villages have not yet received the benefit of schools where children can learn some of the concepts and techniques which would enable them to understand the need for improving their conditions and help their families in doing so. In some villages young girls are not allowed by their elders to attend school or not provided with primary schools, buildings and teachers. Much of a new generation is growing up illiterate and ignorant of how they might help themselves when they grow up.

369 423 471 [illegible] Inquiry among villagers and local officials revealed that although there might be a headman or mukhtar of the village, nearly all direction and management of their affairs comes from outside leadership. Communities lack the local leadership and organization by which they might progress through their own efforts. Sheikhs, landlords, their agents (sirkal) who are frequently local government representatives as well, direct the farming operations, decide the lands on which the villagers will farm and live, provide much of the seed and equipment, direct the cleaning of ditches, collect the shares of crops and other payments and decide whether or not the farmers may live and work on the land during the next year. Even the farmer who owns his own land is not without obligations to money lenders, tax collectors and government supervision. The farmers and tenants of Iraq are dependent upon

369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
511 utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.

369 Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance
433 to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new
conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people
511 for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been
for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent
years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help
in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the
566 land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and
the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
423 of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is
471 directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a
better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an
insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
452 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their
own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of
566 their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot
pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was
found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
566 with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient
311 farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which
he puts his hands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read
and write to obtain more information.

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of peasants and tribesmen are illiterate. 212
Theoretically, primary education is com- 872
pulsory for both sexes, but the facilities are
inadequate, particularly in the rural areas.
Recent estimates indicate that the literacy
rate in the country as a whole approxi-
mates 10 per cent, in contrast with about
40 per cent in Baghdad and the larger cities.
Education is controlled by the government, 871
and public instruction is available at all 658
levels from the primary schools through the
professional colleges. There is no university
in Iraq, but the incorporation of the present
colleges into a national institution, with uni-
versity status, has been proposed. Separate
colleges of medicine, pharmacy, law, sci-
ence, arts, fine arts, engineering, commerce
and teachers' training, as well as various
types of vocational schools, are supported by
the government. Secondary schools are also
maintained by private and mission groups.
Government scholarships are provided an-
nually to qualified students for study
abroad, usually in Egypt, Great Britain or
the United States.

VITAL STATISTICS

Valid vital statistics are almost nonexist- 163
ent, since the registration of births and 165
deaths is admittedly incomplete, even in the principal cities, as Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The general reluctance of the inhabitants to report births, deaths and other statistical data and the large size of the nomadic and the semimigratory populations are factors contributing to the inaccuracy of the figures available. Within recent years statistics have been compiled by the government health organization in 75 centers under the jurisdiction of medical officers, but they do not reflect conditions throughout the country. In 1950, these health districts covered a population of 1,160,000, distributed in all 14 of the provinces into which Iraq is divided. The birth rate was estimated at 27 per 1,000 population, and the death rate at 12 per 1,000. Competent authorities, however, believe that the over-all birth rate is nearer 40 to 50 per 1,000 popu-

p. 23(8)

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East
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creased. Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Iraq has all the 311
necessary requisites for a sound and rapid economic development, especially in the agricultural sector. It has a very considerable quantity of land ready for immediate cultivation, so defined by the most conservative standards, and with modern methods very great stretches now defined as uncultivable could be improved and brought into the cultivable class; it has an 3N–
abundance of water for irrigation as well as for power, and it has at its disposal enormous quantities of cheap fuel both in petroleum and natural gas.

What, then, have been the economic, educational, health and 161
social conditions of the country? As regards the size and growth of the population, even today, more than thirty years since the creation of the Kingdom of Iraq, it would be very difficult to state categorically the percentage increase of the population. The accuracy of the figure advanced by the October 1947 census has been questioned by the International Bank Mission.[7]

Despite substantial strides in public health—an increased 165
number of hospitals, dispensaries and doctors—during the first 164
thirty years of the existence of the Kingdom, the Bank Mission reported in 1951 that the infant mortality rate was very high, "perhaps as much as 250 per 1,000 births," and that there was a very high incidence of such endemic diseases as trachoma, hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and dysentery. Malaria was reported to cause 50,000 deaths every year. In 1948 no less than 6,657,474 visits to medical institutions for treatment were reported, and 1,291,225 cases of infectious diseases were treated. Of these, 603,698 were malaria and 524,740 trachoma.[8] In 1944 [759]
the total number of doctors in the country was 528; in 1951 it was reported that there was one doctor to every 7,000 in the population, which would make a total of about 915 doctors, but a large percentage of them were concentrated in Bagdad.[9]

There can be no doubt that educationally the country pro- 871
gressed considerably from the stage in which it was in 1921, but all in all the sum total was not very impressive; the rate of

[7] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 126.

[8] *Ibid.*, 49.

[9] *Ibid.*, 53; Hashim Al Witry, *Health Services in Iraq* (1944), 8. In 1945 there were, according to a British report, 569 doctors registered in Iraq. Since 308 were in Bagdad, this made approximately one doctor for every 15,400 in the population in the provinces, and one doctor to every 2,700 in Bagdad. Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, *Iraq* (1949), 30-31.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 Ml Middle East
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● 871 progress, discouraging both to the educators and to the Iraqi people, reflects on the possibilities of development, which in the final analysis depend on the general educational level of the population. To be sure, in the period 1930-1950 the number of schools rose from 262 to 1,100, the number of pupils from 32,750 to 175,000, and the number of primary school teachers from 1,325 to 6,588; nevertheless, out of about 750,000 children of school age only 175,000 were in schools; the percentage of drop-outs as the children advanced to the higher grades was so large as to cause real alarm. The facilities and quality of technical and vocational education were woefully deficient, and adult education was almost completely neglected. As to the quality of the educational program, the Mission stated: "Educational concepts are far too narrow and too little related to everyday problems of living." But what was most alarming was the fact that as late as 1951 about 90 per cent of the total population was still illiterate.[10]

434 Though possessing so much land, so much water, and considerable revenue from oil, Iraq's standard of living was fairly low. Annual per capita income was estimated in 1949 at about $84 and not much higher in 1953.[11] This compared with $140 for Lebanon, $100 for Syria, $125 for Turkey, $100 for Egypt, and $389 for Israel.

433 [654] Industrial growth advanced at a very slow pace. In order to stimulate the establishment of industry, the Government passed a law in 1929 granting tax relief and other concessions to those who would develop industrial projects, but almost twenty years later the United States Department of Commerce reported that the development of manufacturing industries was still in the embryonic stage.[12] In 1949 it was reported that in spite of the impetus given to local production by the shortage of import goods during the war, Iraq's industries were still underdeveloped.[13] In 1951 the International Bank Mission reported that industry was little developed; that exclusive of those employed by the oil companies, 60,000 workers were engaged in

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[10] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 62-63; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry* (London), Sept., 1953, 93.

[11] U. N., *Review 1949-50,* 12; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.

[12] U. S., Dept. of Commerce, *International Reference Service*, Dec., 1948, 3.

[13] Great Britain, *Iraq*, 16.

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discussion lies within the Province (liwa) of Erbil. *The civil head of the liwa is Mutasarrif who is directly responsible for the police administration and the magistracy and indirectly for such social services as Health, Education, Agricultural Reform etc. The tax organisation is closely associated with the police and also comes under the administration of the Mutasarrif. Outside his control however are the military and the judiciary.

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Within the field of our discussion the social services of the government are very limited, though the education system is worthy of note. There are primary and secondary schools at Erbil and a primary school at Rowandus. There was for a while a secondary school also at Rowandus but this was closed following a nationalist strike by the students who demanded to be taught in the Kurdish language instead of Arabic. For obvious economic reasons these schools effect only a very small stratum of society - the sons of important Aghas and town merchants. Some of the larger villages have in addition a paid government teacher. Though the intention is good, the practice is less so. The wages offered and the facilities for advancement are so poor that only the very poorest type of indolent scholar offers himself for such posts. In the Balik area anyway the experience of government education has so far proved unfortunate. The current opinion seemed to be that all government education officers are moral perverts. Two examples serve to show the basis for such an attitude. The only schoolmaster among the Balik at the time of my visit was attached to the village of Rayat. Formerly he had been attached to the village of Rust where he had married one of the Agha's daughters; this lady he had now divorced or rather deserted and the Agha of Rust was suing him in the courts for maintenance. In Rayat he had seduced the daughter of the Mulla and to avoid scandal had now married her, but this in itself was a scandalous proceeding since the Mulla and the schoolmaster are regarded as enemies by nature - (since from the traditional viewpoint education is the Mulla's chief function). In another case which is described more fully later the Agricultural Adviser of Walash was murdered,

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* At the time of my visit the post of Mutasarrif of Erbil was held by Ahmad Beg i Taufiq Beg, a Kurd from the relatively sophisticated district of Sulaimani, a man of great intelligence and personal integrity. I am directly indebted to him for the facilities and assistance which enabled me to carry out this piece of field work, the more especially since his own political position at the time was somewhat delicate. Being related by marriage to the chiefs of the Pisdah tribes, at that time in revolt, he was regarded with a certain amount of suspicion by some of the Arab elements in the Baghdad government. This fact, coupled with a mild reputation for being pro-British - by no means a desirable sentiment in modern Iraq, - made my request for travel facilities a decided inconvenience. In the circumstances his help was deeply appreciated.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

through institutions of higher education, seems to develop into an extraordinary mental agility. Those who are politically articulate share a high concern for the future of Iraq as a nation. 181 153

A visitor to the country is also struck by a number of contradictions. Iraq has a brilliant cultural inheritance, yet the bulk of the population is illiterate. It is a country of great economic possibilities, yet the majority of the people exist at a meagre standard of life. The soil is of high fertility, yet it continues to be farmed by primitive methods. Above all, although the future prosperity of the country depends upon the application of science and power to the land, agricultural development is inhibited by a most unsatisfactory system of land tenure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Primary education on any large scale in Iraq is of recent growth. It began with the traditional Arabic mullah school, in which small groups of boys under the direction of a religious teacher memorized religious lore in a monotonous and repetitive manner. Traces of this verbal technique are still obvious in many of the primary schools. 872

Under the Ottoman régime the nucleus of a schools system was introduced, and it is said that by 1913 there were some 6,000 children attending primary schools of a sort. Soon after the next military conquest the British promoted some further educational development and, in particular, substituted Arabic instead of the alien Turkish language as the medium of instruction. By 1921 there were reputed to be more than 15,000 children attending public primary schools.

It is significant, however, that no real approach to a system of public primary schooling was made until the nation took its educational affairs into its own hands. Since the meeting of the first Iraqi Parliament in 1925 a real impetus appears to have been given to the development of primary education. By 1931 there existed 316 public primary schools with an enrolment of some 35,000 pupils. By 1950 extraordinary quantitative progress had been made, for by that year 175,000 children were enrolled in over 1,000 public primary schools.

THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

By 1940 the development of primary education, and of higher education, had gone on at such a pace that it was necessary to 872 645

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

872 645 embody previous legislation and regulations into the General Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age of admission to the primary school should not be less than six and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that 'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when [681] necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

871 645 By this time the administration of education had been highly systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of Education controlling and supervising the most minute details both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

872 658 Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age, not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940 an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty [464] of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the [362] inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other [696] factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

powerful local landowners operated as effective obstacles to compulsory schooling. 872 658

Despite this initial failure of a modest attempt to apply compulsory education in certain parts of the country, enlightened opinion in Iraq is strongly in favour of educational development. 871 185 Because of the economic, political and social obstacles which will have to be overcome before a real approach to universal compulsory education can be made, few if any of the country's educators feel that this desirable objective is likely to be achieved in a short time. As educators, however, and for educational reasons, they are anxious that the practicability of achieving a realistic approach towards compulsory education should be soberly investigated. This enlightened minority are likely to be assisted in their demands by pressure of nationalist opinion, which sees in the development of education a means of spreading national culture and national sentiments among the people.

There are other important reasons why the time is ripe for 00 0 assessing the ways and means by which compulsory education can be approached. Although Iraq, like many other countries is, economically, passing through a difficult stage, rapid development in thought and ways of life is taking place. The country is at present at the cross-roads between traditional and modern or western civilization. Change and development, in one direction or another, seem to be the order of the day. It is for this reason that a contemporary Iraqi educator urges that the present time 'affords a unique opportunity for making a good start in education'.

Before, however, considering the practicability of making a 'good start' or at any rate a new start in the direction of compulsory education, consideration must be given to the educational needs of the country at its present stage of development and the extent to which these needs are being met by the existing system. It will then be possible to consider, in the light of prevailing economic, political and social conditions, ways and means of achieving further advance.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

CHAPTER THREE

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE BEING MET

TYPICAL PRIMARY SCHOOLS

Before attempting to draw general conclusions as to the extent to which the educational needs indicated in the previous chapter are being met, it may be useful to give a general picture of typical primary schools in Iraq. To speak of a 'typical' school is, of course, misleading, for every school has or should have its individual character. In general, however, most of the Iraqi primary schools have certain common characteristics which make it possible to venture a description of types. 872

A Typical Town Primary School. In each of the provincial capitals and most of the smaller towns are to be found large schools which may provide for between 300 and 500 pupils. The great majority of the urban primary schools are single sex schools. Such a school [345] may have from ten to twelve rooms of varying sizes. The numbers in each class may vary from sixty to thirty, the smaller usually being the sixth or top class. The class-rooms are frequently overcrowded, with sometimes three children sitting on a desk built for two. Lighting and sanitary arrangements are generally not of a high standard. In some schools where available accommodation has not kept pace with the local demand for primary education, there may be as many as seventy children in one of the lower classes. Desks are not well constructed and generally show lack of maintenance.

In such a school, as in every other full-range primary school, there are six grades of class, the children being promoted from class to class each year provided they pass an examination indicating that they have satisfied the requirements of the centrally prescribed programme of studies. Those who do not pass the promotion examination are required to repeat the previous year's work.

The teachers seem to work very hard, they occupy the centre [876] of the stage and either lecture to their pupils or follow the common technique of verbal question and answer. There is little activity on the part of the children apart from incredibly quick oral

872 response, and there is not much evidence of handicraft or art.
Outdoor physical education follows the prescribed syllabus which,
[876] however, seems to be more modern in technique than some of
the other subjects.

[346] Generally speaking, the older buildings look as depressing as their counterparts in some of the western countries. Unfortunately there are not many very recent buildings.

While these conditions apply to many of the schools, however, in the larger towns there are some noteworthy exceptions to which reference will be made later.

[346] *A Typical Village School.* A village school may consist of two or three rooms housing from twenty to seventy pupils of both sexes, but it is rarely a complete six-class school. Lighting and sanitation are usually inferior to that of the town schools. In the northern provinces some of the schools are built of stone, but mostly they are made of dried mud bricks. In parts of the south, especially in the marsh districts, the buildings are reed huts.

The curriculum and teaching techniques in the village school are identical with those of the town school. The children rarely enjoy activity methods, and sit in their desks most of the time.

In many of the village schools children cannot complete their full period of primary schooling because the numbers are too small to permit the organization of the full six classes. In a minority of these schools, however, an increasing number of teachers are learning the technique of simultaneously teaching more than one attainment group and are thus able to provide a complete primary school course in an incomplete school.

Most of the village schools have no garden, handicraft or livestock. But the newly established agricultural primary schools, to which detailed reference will be made later, provide exceptions to this rule.

Because of the absence of compulsory school attendance and
the consequent late admission to school of a number of pupils,
there is a great variety of age-range in both urban and village
schools. Within the limits of the curriculum, however, the teachers
meet these difficulties with commendable patience, and both the
older and the younger children in any one class are usually a
[565] happy family. Another happy feature of the Iraqi primary school
is the absence of social distinctions within the class-room. A wealthy
sheikh's son may rub shoulders with a poorly clad lad from a
very humble home.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE MET QUANTITATIVELY

The Rapid Growth of the Primary Schools System. As will have been

gathered from the above inevitably over-simplified account of typical primary schools, while some of the educational needs of the children and of society are met, others are neglected. This is due to the very rapid growth of a primary schools system in a new country faced with the task of promoting educational development almost from scratch and with limited financial resources.

The following table, which represents an extraordinary tribute both to the public demand for primary education and to the efforts of the Ministry of Education to meet this demand over a comparatively short period, illustrates the rapid extension of primary schooling between 1920 and 1949:

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN IRAQ

Year	*No. of schools*		*No. of enrolments*				*No. of teachers*	
			Government		*Private*			
	Government	*Private*	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Government*	*Private*
1920–21	88	—	—	—	—	—	485	—
1930–31	316	—	27467	7046	—	—	1325	—
1938–39	739	—	69505	27115	—	—	3149	—
1939–40	713	73	64240	25242	13872	6083	3304	577
1940–41	735	76	64112	26682	13386	6161	3525	608
1941–42	761	77	62441	26423	12823	6299	3752	591
1942–43	788	77	61697	25748	10997	7008	3979	532
1943–44	861	80	67297	22261	12256	6642	4340	607
1944–45	902	81	76960	24017	12828	7059	4491	607
1945–46	944	83	90419	28068	13693	7977	4779	650
1946–47	967	90	98540	30225	14136	7718	4970	657
1947–48	1016	90	106904	32350	15318	7808	5417	779
1948–49	1044	106	114669	35145	16998	8062	5733	776

By the end of the year 1949, therefore, some 175,000 children were enrolled in primary schools. It is estimated that the total number of children of primary school age in Iraq is 750,000. Thus, discounting the rising population, schools and teachers for another 575,000 children would have to be provided before universal compulsory primary education could be achieved.

Wastage in the Primary School. While, however, the figures quoted in the preceding table represent considerable quantitative progress, they do not show the important fact that the great majority of children who enter the primary school fail to complete the full course, and that many do not receive more than one, two or

872 three years of primary schooling. Attention was directed to this striking educational phenomenon by a prominent Iraqi educator in 1942, in the following words:

> Iraq has not yet reached the stage where a compulsory education law is practicable. There are therefore no legal provisions that compel parents to send their children to school within specified age limits. Hence not only do the majority of children of school age enter no primary school, but of those who enter only a fraction remain to complete their primary education. The rest drop out of school at any point from the first to the sixth grade. This constitutes one of the major problems of primary education in Iraq and involves the waste of a great deal of money and effort.

More recent figures provided by another competent Iraqi educational researcher indicate that out of some 22,000 pupils who enrolled in the first classes of primary schools in the year 1940–41, some 16,000 reached the second class, 14,000 the third class, with numbers continuing to dwindle until 10,000 entered the sixth class. Of the 10,000 who stayed on at school until their last year, less than half officially completed the primary school course by gaining the primary school-leaving certificate in the year 1946.

This elimination of pupils, grade by grade, in the primary school represents a serious defect in the present system. There are several contributory reasons. One is obviously economic, parents in poor financial circumstances find that they cannot afford to dispense with the labour of their children. Other reasons for this
[876] dropping out of school are the disillusionment of parents who find that their children cannot surmount the repeated examination hurdles, and the fact that some of the village schools are incomplete. But perhaps a more significant reason, at any rate in the villages, is that it is felt, perhaps unconsciously, that the somewhat over-academic and excessively oral type of education is not sufficiently related to the future life of pupils, whose livelihood depends not so much upon bookishness as upon things more practical and related to real life situations. It is clear, however, that until compulsory education can be applied and enforced, the educational life of the minority who do attend primary schools is likely to be short and incomplete.

Demands that are not being met. Despite the rapid growth both in the number of schools and in the number of children attending them, and although this great quantitative increase is badly offset by the number of children who do not complete the course, there can be no doubt that there is a public demand for more primary

schools and that this demand is either inadequately met or not 872
being met at all.

In Baghdad and the other large towns a number of primary school buildings have to be used on a double-shift basis because the demand for education exceeds existing school accommodation. In province after province the Directors of Education quote instances where children have had to be turned away from school because there is no room for them. In travelling through the majority of the provinces the writer met several sheikhs and other local notables who maintained that they were prepared to provide school premises if the Ministry of Education could supply the teaching staff.

So far as tribal education is concerned, the position remains generally as was described by the Monroe Commission. As an example, the Shammar tribe with a population of roughly 60,000 has no school of any kind.

The conclusion must be drawn, therefore, that although the numbers of primary schools and the children attending them have grown considerably during the last thirty years, and despite the fact that many children do not stay the whole course, quantitatively the existing public demand for primary education is not being met. It is now necessary to enquire to what extent the educational needs of the children and of the country are being met qualitatively.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE BEING MET QUALITATIVELY

An Impression of 150 Primary Schools. During the course of this investigation visits were paid to some 150 primary schools, to a smaller number of secondary schools and to most of the institutions of teacher training. It is never safe to judge the quality of any school by a brief acquaintance but, for what they are worth, the following impressions are noted.

In practically every school visited a noteworthy feature was 872
the energy which the teachers, especially the younger ones, put
into their work. They seem to teach incessantly and with little 875
in the way of breaks. The women especially have a great sense of vocation, and are unsparing in their efforts on behalf of their pupils. In many of the girls' schools the teachers had adopted all sorts of devices to provide neat and tidy uniforms for their children. Practically all the teachers appear to spend more time marking and correcting exercises than do their colleagues in some of the western countries. These qualities were apparent throughout the provinces, and are particularly commendable in the villages,

872 875 where many of the teachers maintain their educational faith despite the fact that they are by no means over-paid and have to live under poor domestic conditions with few amenities.

872 On the other hand, the general impression gained was that the curriculum of the primary school is seriously overloaded on the bookish and verbal side. This is confirmed by a glance at the official Programme of Studies for the primary schools:

Subject	*Periods per week*					
	1st Class	*2nd Class*	*3rd Class*	*4th Class*	*5th Class*	*6th Class*
Religion and Koran . .	4	4	3	3	2	2
Arabic	11	12	10	10	6	6
English	—	—	—	—	6	6
Arithmetic	6	6	6	6	5	5
Object lesson and hygiene	2	2	2	2	2	2
Geography and history	—	—	4	4	4	4
Morals and Civics . .	—	—	—	1	1	1
Drawing and handicraft	3	3	4	4	4	4
Physical education and singing	4	3	3	2	2	2

This programme, although it looks somewhat scholarly for young children is not, when one examines it in full detail as published by the Ministry of Education, illiberal. It does not, however, allow for much for experiment and flexibility in relation to the
872 varying needs of growing children. The programme of studies is interpreted very literally and the method of learning is by class
876 lectures and memorization. There is little in the way of active learning on the part of the pupils, and they do not appear to have opportunities of acquiring a sense of individual responsibility through the exercise of their own initiative.

One distinctive feature is the teaching of English by a very modern 'direct method' technique. But this, by its excellence, affords a striking contrast to the teaching of some of the other subjects. Although drawing and handicraft are included in the programme of studies, these subjects are mainly limited to copying designs or simple models, and the pupils gain very little experience in the use of tools.

872 It would obviously be unfair, after fleeting visits to a number of schools, to venture criticism of this kind, were it not for the fact that stronger objections to the over-academic conduct of most

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHl Iraq MHl

of the primary schools are sometimes made both by officers of 872 the Ministry of Education and by the teachers themselves. The result seems to be a vicious circle, however, because while the teachers blame the centrally imposed programme of studies, the officers of the Ministry maintain that it is not the programme but the narrow interpretation of it by the teachers which is the trouble.

Reasons for the Existing Quality of Primary Schooling. Although there is much to praise in the conscientiousness and zeal of the primary school teachers, and a good deal to be said against the existing overloaded, excessively oral and bookish curriculum, such deficiencies as exist in the quality of primary schooling are understandable when one recalls the very rapid growth of primary education in Iraq from such limited beginnings over a short period.

With such rapid expansion one of the main tasks of the Ministry 875 of Education has had to be that of providing the maximum number of teachers in the minimum of time. And, necessary though this rapid production of more or less trained teachers has been, the consequent training devices have not been calculated to produce the best teachers.

It is estimated that the output of teachers from training institutions during the present year will be 754 men and women. This represents a considerable achievement and, numerically, is one of which the Ministry of Education has reason to be proud. Enquiry into the educational background of these trainees, however, reveals that nearly half of them did not have the advantage of a full secondary education before they entered training institutions. The majority of those who did complete their secondary education before they took up training are simply undergoing an attenuated one-year training course attached to a secondary school. It will be appreciated, therefore, that much needs to be done both in ensuring a sounder educational background for teacher trainees and in providing a longer period of really professional training before the schools can be served by teachers of the quality they need.

It is perhaps not within the scope of this study to evaluate teacher training methods in Iraq in any detail. Yet there are still other inadequacies which need to be met if the quality of primary education is to be improved along the right lines. This applies especially to subjects such as handicraft and to the proper training of teachers for rural schools. With one or two exceptions, little in the way of vigorous and realistic handicraft is practised in the teacher training institutions.

There have been rural teacher training colleges, but these have had a chequered history and the two that still continue have little

875 in the way of land for practical agriculture and very limited facilities for the actual practice of handicrafts. The type of village school envisaged by the Monroe Commission, and which is so badly needed in rural Iraq, is never likely to materialize until teacher training is directed to turning out the right type of teacher for such schools.

● 872 In concluding these observations upon the extent to which the educational needs of the children of Iraq are being met in the existing primary schools system, therefore, it is fair to say that although great quantitative progress has been achieved during the last thirty years, existing needs are not being adequately met. Further, public pressure for primary education exceeds existing provision. Qualitatively, advance is desirable in the direction of a more realistic curriculum, especially in the rural areas. The time is undoubtedly ripe for a vigorous policy of educational advance. Such an advance, however, is bound up with problems related to the economic, political and social life of the country. It is these which must now be considered.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS

As was suggested in the previous chapter, although a long road will have to be traversed before the ideal of universal compulsory primary education can be achieved in Iraq, the time is ripe for further advance towards that objective. Pressure on existing school accommodation in the urban areas is acute, most of the villages are without schools, and large areas lack primary school provision of any kind. Yet quantitative advance has by no means been halted, and although many more children would be attending school at the present time if there were schools and teachers for them, new schools are being opened both in new buildings and in rented premises. 872

The Ministry of Education and all who have a concern for education in Iraq are well aware of these circumstances. A small minority feel that quantitative advance has gone far enough for the present and advocate that, before further large-scale development takes place, existing qualitative deficiencies in primary education should be put right. This will take time. In the meantime, it would be difficult to refuse to provide primary school places for the many who are clamouring for them.

While, however, thinking educators in Iraq wish for further advance in the direction of compulsory education, they know that this ideal can never be realized until serious economic, political and social obstacles which impede educational and other desirable social development can be overcome. As the Minister of Education in office at the time of writing put it: 'An emotional desire for more and better schools is not in itself sufficient. Sensible educational development can only take place if it is related to our current economic and financial problems.'

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The Financing of Education. The first of these problems is finance. Little is to be gained from considering proposals for further advance unless they are accompanied by a realistic understanding as to how and where the money for them is to be found. The extent to 658

562 872 But this obstacle can be exaggerated. As a glance at the figures showing the growth of primary education in Iraq indicates, the proportion of girls to boys attending primary schools is not high, but their enrolment is steadily increasing. Although most of the large urban schools are single sex schools, Iraq has the distinction of having many co-educational village schools. The growing number of kindergartens are co-educational. In all the institutions of higher education young men and women work together.

The emancipation of women in Iraq still has a long way to go, but convincing signs of it are evident. It would, nevertheless, be a considerable advance if the Ministry of Education were to encourage the recruitment of a number of women to the staffs of the boys' primary schools. From visits to many Iraqi primary schools it is evident that the standards of the women teachers in matters of personal cleanliness of the children, care and decoration of the school premises, general decorum and pleasant social conduct are higher than those of their men colleagues. Their influence in boys' schools would be most salutary.

464 872 The position of children is, of course, difficult when parents, especially in the rural areas, are dependent upon the labour of even very young children. Yet an increasing number of poor parents appear to be sending their children to school. It would be a great inducement to more and regular school attendance if means could be devised of providing free midday meals for some of the children, especially in the village schools. At one of the more modern primary schools in Baghdad attractively cooked and served midday meals are provided, but this is a school attended mainly by children from comfortable homes where the parents can afford to pay for this service. In the rural areas, however, simple food is not expensive, cooking devices and service are cheap, and it should be possible to provide free meals for the needy children at relatively low cost.

It should be noted that effective child labour legislation does not exist in Iraq. Until the time comes when such legislation can be enacted and enforced, compulsory education will be most difficult to apply.

162 166 871 *Tribal Organization and Mobility of Population.* But the most formidable obstacles of all are those related to tribal organization and mobility of population. There are two particular sets of problems, those of the tribes who are still in a nomadic state, and those of the people who are in the transitional stage of semi-settlement. Between them, it is estimated that these nomadic and semi-settled peoples number nearly 2,000,000 persons, roughly 300,000 of whom are children of primary school age.

3: Clark 8-5 (1950) 1951 MHI Iraq MHI

000 the area. If the project continues to progress at its present rate, it must undoubtedly be regarded as one of the most significant and far-reaching contributions to rural, social and ultimately educational progress in Iraq. Incidentally, it is understood that the Dujaila Committee which controls this and related schemes has, at present, no educational representative on it. It is desirable that such representation should be provided for, so that the economic and social changes which are taking place in the new communities may go hand in hand with consistent educational development. Further, the educators who are associated with the scheme would do well at all times to enlist the advice of the working farmers and agricultural advisers, so that the new schools to be provided there serve the needs of the local community more realistically than do most of the village schools.

SIGNIFICANT EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES

872 876 There are other developments which provide pointers towards progress in the right direction, educational movements which provide most hopeful clues to the lines along which future educational advance may proceed.

Some Progressive Primary Schools. Although most of the primary schools are uniform in their conformity to an over-bookish curriculum, a small minority of them are escaping into a freer educational environment with less rigid teaching and learning techniques.

Some of the demonstration primary schools attached to or used by the better training institutions are adopting methods which are much more in accord with the real educational needs of growing children. Similar developments are being encouraged by a small body of progressive primary school teachers both in Baghdad and in some of the provinces. In these schools there is less of rote and verbal memorization, and more activity on the part of the children themselves. In such schools the teacher is not so much a lecturer working according to a narrow interpretation of a centrally prescribed curriculum, but is rather a less obtrusive helper who aids the children to learn by their own initiative and enquiry. In some of these schools there are gardens made and enjoyed by the pupils; physical education is not so much 'drill' as the enjoyment of natural movement; attractive wall illustrations make the internal environment more cheerful; the spirit of play is harnessed to the process of learning.

Some of these schools, because of their experimental nature, are

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

allowed a greater choice of textbooks than those prescribed in the 872 official programme of studies. It is to be hoped that they will use their freedom to encourage the use of more colourful books for, 876 although some of the textbooks prescribed by the central body are illustrated, most of them are devoid of colour.

These schools are bound to spread their influence to others, especially if some of the assistant teachers are prepared to leave the capital city and provincial centres for a time and are promoted to headships in some of the more remote schools.

The Kindergarten Movement. Side by side with this practice of livelier and more modern techniques in this limited minority of primary schools is the growth of a small but steadily extending kindergarten movement. One of these schools is attached to the [875] primary teachers' training college for girls in Baghdad, and affords the teacher trainees the opportunity of seeing in a practical and vivid fashion the pursuit of modern educational methods in a way which they would never derive from the books they use. Others have been established in the large towns and provincial capitals, mainly through local effort and self-help.

These kindergarten schools are perhaps the liveliest and happiest educational institutions in Iraq. Generally they are in well-designed buildings which have been furnished carefully and pleasantly. Teaching aids, apparatus and wall illustrations are sometimes the best that could be found in any kindergarten school, even in countries whose educational systems are much older and supported by more public money. Fortunately also the teachers in such schools have considerable freedom to work in accordance with a curriculum based not on prescribed syllabuses but upon the observed needs of young children.

In the opinion of the writer the kindergarten movement is one of the most hopeful indications of real educational advance in Iraq. If the spirit and methods of these schools could be gradually embodied in the life of the primary schools and the primary schools left with a greater degree of freedom, there is a probability that this would be the beginning of a most wholesome revolution in educational method throughout the country.

A few of the primary schools have, indeed, within the limits of the prescribed syllabuses that they must follow, tried to embody some of the activity methods of the kindergarten school into their lower forms. Some attempt free drawing as apart from the almost universal copy drawing. Others not only have school magazines but encourage the pupils to edit them and contribute to them. That it is not easy, however, to persuade the teacher that education is something for its own sake and not merely an avenue to

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

872 876 promotion, is indicated by the following extract from a teacher's introduction to the first issue of a primary school magazine:

> 'Our Magazine.
> Dear Pupils,
>
> This is the first number of our school magazine. I want every pupil to read it very carefully because it is for you, not for the teacher.
>
> Please read this paper carefully and ask me any question about it. If you do as I say, you will succeed in the examination.
>
> Your Teacher,
> Signed ....'

874 654 *The Agricultural Primary Schools.* The need for realistic village schools in Iraq has been advocated in the Report of the Monroe Commission and elsewhere. They have taken a long time to materialize, but there are now signs of progress.

In 1948 the Ministry of Education requested the Provincial Directors of Education to establish an experimental primary school in each province. One such school has since been provided in most of the provinces, not as an entirely new project but as an extension of an existing primary school. Several acres of land have been attached to these schools and some of them keep a limited amount of livestock. Some have modest dairy equipment, a stock of hand tools for the pupils and an agricultural machine such as a power-driven cultivator. One or two have a tractor. In the irrigation districts some possess their own water pump.

Unfortunately these schools were established during a period of retrenchment, and although the Ministry of Education launched this important experiment it was apparently unable to provide the money for other essential buildings and equipment such as handicraft shops, simple laboratories and materials for experiment. It was also unable to provide every such school with a teacher acquainted with the basic practice and principles of farming. Despite these initial handicaps, some of the agricultural primary schools have started courageously and have attempted to free [177] themselves from a purely academic curriculum. In certain of the schools, apart from teaching methods of normal cultivation, experiments are being made in the growth of crops hitherto unfamiliar to the local economy. Indeed one teacher claims that, through his introduction of American cotton on to the school farm, the local landowner has since grown this crop on a large scale and has made a substantial profit from it. If this is so, it certainly illustrates the extra-mural influence of a village school which adjusts its curriculum to real life situations.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHI Iraq MHI

were issued and each school required to produce its own schemes 000
of work based generally on the suggestions, this would help to promote school programmes more related to the needs of the schools in their local environment. Such an arrangement would throw greater responsibility on the teachers themselves and would promote greater educational thought and experiment in place of the all-too rigid adherence to existing syllabuses.

If the Ministry of Education feel that they cannot go so far in granting freedom to the schools to prepare their own schemes of work, an approach to greater local freedom in this direction would be achieved if the task of preparing programmes could be delegated to a committee of teachers in each province who would prepare provincial programmes of study for approval by the Ministry.

Courses for Serving Teachers. Whether or not arrangements can be 875
made for teachers to get together to prepare provincial programmes of study, there is a great need for continuous provision of courses for serving teachers. This applies more particularly to the rural teachers, many of whom live in conditions of great isolation and need that stimulus to thought and those wider professional contacts that they cannot have in their immediate locality.

AN APPROACH TO A NEW STRUCTURE OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Two Stages of Schooling for All. As the quality of the teachers and 871
an accompanying greater degree of freedom grow, it is probable that it will be found that the existing structure of primary education, namely six years of schooling for all in one school, does not meet all the educational needs of the children. At the present time the primary schools, with their great variation in age groups, are trying to perform two functions. They both initiate young children into the business of schooling and, because most of the pupils leave at an early age and undergo no period of secondary education, are also expected to give the older pupils some preparation for adult life. This is certainly the intention of the agricultural primary schools which some educators hope will become the model of the village school of the future.

It is not really possible to undertake both tasks in the one school. 872
It is suggested, therefore, that the Ministry of Education and the proposed National Council of Education should begin to give some thought to a future alteration of the structure of primary education on the following lines:

(1) The first stage of education should last six years and, especially in the lower classes, should continue the activity techniques

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

872 of the kindergarten schools. This would mean that young children would be receiving education of a type more related to their growing needs. If this could be accompanied by an abandonment of the existing primary school examinations, and the children promoted year by year instead of some of them repeating their work for another year, the Iraqi primary school would certainly develop into a freer and more valid educational institution for young children.

(2) After this first stage of education, children would then automatically proceed at the age of eleven or twelve to a common second stage school or intermediate school, which should differ radically from the existing academic intermediate schools. These second stage or newly conceived intermediate schools would need to be of two types. In the villages there should be 'Intermediate Rural Life Schools' of the type recommended by the Monroe Commission. In the towns they should be schools in which a technical bias related to local industries and pursuits is included.

The Intermediate Rural Life School and Fundamental Education. If the present experimental agricultural primary schools develop the activities of their upper forms along sound and realistic lines, the Intermediate Rural Life Schools, when the time comes for them to be established, will have much to learn from their achievements.

The Intermediate Rural Life Schools should not, however, be regarded simply as schools for children. With better qualified teachers from the new or remodelled rural teachers' training colleges, and ample land and agricultural equipment, they should be designed also to serve as fundamental education centres both for the education of illiterate adults and as a means of providing further education in agriculture, health and child care. They would thus become realistic community centres designed both to serve those who have left school and to provide education in the processes of better living for those who have had no previous schooling.

A Pilot Project for an Intermediate Rural Life School. Application might also be made to Unesco for technical assistance towards the establishment of an Intermediate Rural Life School which would also serve as an experimental fundamental education centre. If such a pilot project could be established on the site of the Dujaila Land Settlement Scheme, or one of the related projects, it would serve a useful present purpose and provide invaluable material for use in connexion with future educational and social developments.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

23,530 or 0·74 per cent of the total civil expenditure were spent, 658
entirely in Basra Wilayet. Nor did the situation improve after 871
the taking of Baghdad, the attention of the authorities being 175+
almost exclusively taken up with consolidating the military 727+
and political situation. Expenditure on education in 1917-18 totalled but 0·35 per cent of the total civil expenditure.

Not until the appointment of a Director of Education, Major H. E. Bowman,[1] in September, 1918, was a vigorous start made
towards creating an educational system. By the end of 1918, 872
twenty primary schools had been set up,[2] but expenditure 658
still formed only 1·08 per cent of the total expenditure. The 727+
desire for schools and educational facilities, especially the 175+
opportunity to learn English, was everywhere manifest, petitions and requests coming from all parts of the Occupied Territories.[3] To meet these demands, twenty-one new primary schools were opened in 1919,[4] while a further fifteen were added in 1920, which, including twenty-four subsidized schools, brought the total number to eighty-five boys' schools of all types, and five girls' schools,[5] with a total enrolment of 6,182 pupils or one for every 462 of the population.[6] The proportion of the expenditure for Education to the entire expenditure in this year, the fifth of the British Occupation, had risen to 1·9 per cent.[7]

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[1] Egyptian Ministry of Education, 1903-1923; Director Palestine Education Department, 1920-36.

[2] *Administrative Report of Education*, 1918, p. 10 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918).

[3] *Fortnightly Reports of Political Officers, Baghdad Wilayet, 1st-15th June*, 1918: Mandali, p. 23 (hereafter *Fortnightly Rep'ts*); *Monthly Rep'ts, January*, 1919; Basra Sanjaq, p. 32; Qurna, p. 79; Ibid., *August*, 1919: Erbil, p. 45; Ibid., *November*, 1919: Dulaim, p. 14.

[4] *Administration of the Department of Education for the year* 1919 (Baghdad, 1920) (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1919).

[5] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 104.

[6] On the basis of the census, 1918-19, of 2,890,000 inhabitants.

Education	Rs.	8,86,808
Total Budget	Rs.	461,98,008

These figures are taken from actual expenditure given in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iii. They differ slightly from the estimates given in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119.

[7] See Table II.

department, no administrative order in the Ministry being 871
given by a British official after 1923.[1] The responsibility for the
educational system thus has been largely 'Iraqī, in spite of the
inclination both of 'Iraqī officials and of American education-
alists to lay the blame for its deficiencies at the feet of the British
officials. Indeed, more influence of foreign origin has been [177
exerted on the educational system by 'Iraqī students returning 871]
from American and English schools and Universities than by
the British officials of the Ministry.

No government department has been a greater source of 658
optimism for the continued development of 'Iraq, both to 871
'Iraqī and to foreign observers, than has Education. No other
department can point to budget appropriations which have
steadily increased from 1921, the amount assigned in 1932 to
Education being more than double the sum in 1921.[2] No other
Ministry can show such concrete and progressively achieved
results. The number of primary schools for boys has increased [872]
from 124 in 1921 to 247 in 1930, the enrolment increasing from
12,226 to 24,885. In the same period, girls' schools have
increased from 27 to 44, with an increase in enrolment from
3849 to 6003. During this period, secondary and intermediate
schools have grown from four, with an estimated attendance of

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[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 224.

[2] A summary of the expenditures of the Ministry of Education, 1921-32) in lacs of rupees) is as follows:

Year	*Expenditure*	*Percentage of Budget to total expenditure*
1921–22	19·36	3·3
1922–23	19·94	4·1
1923–24	18·15	4·0
1924–25	22·13	4·59
1925–26	23·48	4·43
1926–27	26·93*	5·2
1927–28	27·42	4·74
1928–29	32·01	5·33
1929–30	37·18	6·42
1930–31	38·41	7·5
1931–32	39·98	7·9

* The budget of the Antiquities Department and of the Engineering School was added to the Budget in this year and in subsequent years.

871 In India, where conditions are not dissimilar, a program for the gradual introduction of compulsory primary education has been approved. The only real question relates to the speed with which the objective should be accomplished. The Mission believes that a phased program covering a period of about 15 years may be feasible for Iraq. During the first five years of this period it would be necessary to establish and open the additional training colleges required for teachers, build the needed elementary schools and make all the essential administrative and organizational preparations. At the same time a comprehensive campaign to enlist public support of the objective would have to be launched and a careful survey made to determine the facilities needed in each locality and the order of priority in the introduction of compulsory education. The ensuing 10-year period would then be used for the progressive application of the principle of compulsory education.

875 It is estimated that from 18,000 to 20,000 new teachers will be required for this program. Urgent attention would therefore have to be given in the next three years to the establishment of new training colleges, probably one in each province, to insure that the first group of new teachers would be available by 1956. It is vitally important that competent young men and women imbued with enthusiasm and a sense of mission be attracted to the teaching profession. The local teacher should be equipped to work among adults as well as children and capable of becoming a leader in the community. The status and dignity of the teaching profession should therefore be raised and adequate provision made for teachers' compensation, as well as their housing, health and general welfare.

● 872 The number of schools will have to be greatly expanded. Moreover, many of the schools are now ill-housed and ill-equipped and will therefore need to be replaced. Many others are in inadequate rented structures. It is noted that the Development Board has already set aside almost four million dinars for school construction in its five-year program. The basis for this figure is not known to the Mission, but, since a considerable part of the program is evidently intended for the replacement of old and rented buildings, it is likely to fall somewhat short of the requirements set by a program for the introduction of compulsory primary education over the next 15 years. 872

The introduction of compulsory primary schooling will have to take into account varying economic conditions. It is often argued that most parents are unable to afford to send their children to school because children must go to work at an early age to help support the family. The high proportion of children who leave primary schools before finishing appears to support this thesis. However, these economic pressures will tend to diminish as the development program gets under way and opens up larger and more remunerative oportunities for employment to adults. Experience indicates that one of the first desires of parents who have improved their economic status is to provide better education for their children. Such a desire, for example, has already become manifest among the settlers in the Dujaila project. This does not mean, of course, that economic limitations must be ignored. It would be best to apply the principle of compulsion first in cities and more prosperous communities where economic pressures for the employment of children are least evident. In rural areas there may well be resistance to compulsory school attendance unless the period of schooling is adjusted to permit the help of children in the sowing and harvesting seasons. Some discretion should be permitted in adjusting school vacations to the harvesting periods in different parts of the country; and where schools need to remain open during busy agricultural seasons, the period of instruction should be so scheduled as to permit children to work part of the day in the fields.

Special problems must be met in connection with the education of the children of nomadic tribes. Here teachers trained from the ranks of the nomads themselves will have to travel with the tribes. The teaching syllabus will need to be adapted and simplified in order to take into account their special needs.

Revisions of the School Curriculum

As part of the program there should be a marked reorientation of the curriculum and methods of teaching. Learning is largely by rote. The children passively absorb information and learn comparatively little by actually doing things. Almost no 876 871

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Ministry prepare a simplified syllabus and curriculum for such 871
rural areas. It should concentrate on the basic essentials of knowl- 876
edge and skills related to everyday living that can be easily grasped. This applies both to the school program for children in schools and to the program of fundamental education for adults.

Steps Toward Compulsory Primary Education

Many problems and difficulties will undoubtedly arise in 872
enforcing compulsory education, but once the need is recognized and the policy agreed upon, attention can be concentrated on solving them. Public opinion in certain regions and groups will have to be educated; a careful survey of each locality will be needed to assess the existing educational provision as well as future needs; an effective administrative and supervisory organization will have to be established; some special provision will have to be made for children who cannot afford books or midday meals or whose parents want their help in work on their farms; and, most of all, the type of education to be provided will have to be related intelligently to the real needs of rural or urban life so that the children, as well as their parents, may feel that it is really worth their while and perceptibly useful. The special problems and difficulties of Bedouin education will have to be carefully examined.

Fortunately, a good deal of exploratory work of a theoretical nature has been done and, as already pointed out, a number of valuable studies are available which offer useful suggestions in all these fields. The Report of the Monroe Commission lays down general principles of educational reorganization, some of which have special relevance for primary education; Clark's Report is a good and careful, if rather unduly cautious, study of the issues involved in the introduction of compulsion; Dr. Jamali's book, *The Education of the Bedouins,* is a sympathetic and penetrating study of the whole sociological and psychological background of this problem; Dr. Akrawi's thesis on curriculum construction tackles competently the question of how the curriculum can be related dynamically to "the political, economic, social, hygienic and educational conditions and problems of the country;" and the Departmental Ten Year Plan and certain reports of other government committees endorse to some extent the various suggestions made in these studies. Theory has yet to be translated into practice,

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

however, and there is little evidence to show that a majority of educational officers and administrators have even successfully assimilated the ideas in theory. In fact, the Ten Year Plan Committee complains that even the officials of the Ministry have not had access to many of these documents and, therefore, are obviously not conversant with the suggestions for reorganization made from time to time. It would be advisable to give due publicity to them among teachers and educational officials.

The Mission makes the following proposals in connection with the initiation of a program for the expansion of primary education and the introduction of compulsion:

1. A careful survey should be made of each locality in order to determine the requirements which must be met in carrying out the program. If possible, senior students should assist in making the survey. This will have the incidental advantage of giving them a close and useful contact with the life and educational needs of the local community.
2. The Ministry of Education should organize an effective campaign in favor of compulsory education through the traditional as well as the modern media of mass communication, e.g., religious leaders and organizations, tribal chiefs, public platform, drama, press, film, radio, publicity vans, and the like.
3. As the program is carried out through the construction and opening of new schools, a continuing and imaginative effort must be made to enlist the support of the local community and give it a definite sense of participation. Thus the opening of a new school might well be made an important community event in a manner which will make the local people realize that something of real value is being added to their life, something which does not "belong to the government" but really belongs to them and which can succeed only with their cooperation.
4. Arrangements should be made for the proper administration and supervision of the program both through departmental and local agencies, with an intelligent demarcation of the functions of each. The general organization and control of this and other large schemes of educational expansion should, at this stage, remain in the hands of the Ministry which will, however, need to be strengthened to handle them properly. The role of the local authorities, while undoubtedly important, should be advisory in the early stages.

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5. It would be well to introduce the scheme gradually in different areas according to a carefully considered order of priority, preference being given to places where there is a strong demand or where other factors are favorable.
6. Pending the introduction of full-fledged compulsion it might be advisable to experiment in some localities with a legal requirement that parents who have once enrolled their children in school keep them there until they complete the primary school course or, in the event of failure in any grade, complete the six years' period of schooling. This would mean that, while admission would be voluntary initially, continued attendance for six years would be compulsory for every child admitted. This suggestion can be more profitably enforced in the larger towns and cities, where there is greater realization of the need for education; it might also be tried out in localities where wastage is most marked.
7. In order to minimize as much as possible the difficulties of the rural parents in sending their children to school, it will be desirable to adjust the school schedule and the school holidays to the requirements of agricultural seasons as far as possible. The time of harvesting, for instance, varies in different parts of the country and there is no reason why the school vacations should not take that important factor into account. Again, even when the school has to remain open in the busy agricultural season, the hours can be shortened during that period to enable children to help their parents in their work.
8. Steps should be taken for an immediate expansion of training facilities for teachers as discussed later. At the same time there should be an improvement in the quality of training imparted.
9. The school construction program must be geared to the requirements implicit in the introduction of compulsory primary education; and, simultaneously, efforts ought to be made to improve the equipment of the schools.

It is not necessary to discuss at length the administrative questions involved in the introduction of compulsion since they are known to the Ministry and have also been elucidated in Clark's Report. It is desirable, however, to treat in somewhat greater detail the problems of the training and conditions of employment of teachers and the construction and equipment of the necessary schools.

875 this meets the needs of the situation fully and would strongly recommend a careful and sympathetic examination of the whole problem in the light of existing conditions. Such an examination should include also the question of providing housing accommodation for teachers, particularly women teachers, in villages.

The question is not, however, merely one of salaries but rather of raising the whole dignity and status of the profession. [554] In Iraq teachers do not, as a whole, apparently suffer from a sense of social inferiority as is the case in some other countries. This is good but not good enough. It is necessary to insure for them a position of honor and prestige and to accord conspicuous recognition to any meritorious work done by them. The government should endeavor to have the public realize the basic value of their work as nation builders.

School Construction and Equipment

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872 Whether or not there is an immediate extension of primary education, school construction has to be tackled urgently. The number of schools is inadequate even for existing needs and they are ill-planned and overcrowded. About 40 percent of the schools are said to be housed in rented buildings, which are generally poorly constructed and lighted. Many of the government buildings and those built out of public subscriptions are only a little better. Almost all of the schools, whether government or rented, have now become too small for the number of students enrolled, and the introduction of the compulsory principle will bring a large further increase in enrollment. It will, therefore, be necessary to undertake without delay a carefully planned and large-scale program involving the construction of new school buildings and the improvement and extension of existing buildings.

Much of the new building will have to take place in rural areas. The Ministry should, therefore, arrange for a competent study of the problem of village school buildings—in which teachers, builders and the school architect will all be associated—in order to prepare two or three types of plans suited to different climatic regions. The buildings can be economical without being ugly or cramped or deprived of proper lighting and ventilation, and should reflect local traditions and utilize local materials. It would be a

wise investment to spend some money on intelligent research and 346
experimentation in this field. The program of buildings should 872
also include, as suggested above, the construction of teachers'
houses—particularly for women teachers—in places where they
are not otherwise available.

More attention might well be paid to the equipment of new
and existing schools. The libraries, for instance, are generally [217]
poor: the number of books is small; they are not chosen with refer-
ence to the needs of the children for whom they are meant; their
arrangement and display leave much to be desired; and the serv-
ice provided is very unsatisfactory. No proper individual records
of students' reading are maintained and no imaginative steps are
taken to stimulate the desire to read and to make the library a
dynamic and integral part of the school and of the life of the
students. The library often consists simply of a few crowded,
dust-laden bookshelves in one of the classrooms to which students
have access at odd times and for short periods for borrowing books.
School libraries not only should be stocked with a large number
of well-displayed and suitable books but should be made the most
pleasant and attractive place in the school.

The laboratory and workshop facilities provided, even in full- [816]
fledged secondary schools, are also inadequate. There can be no
proper teaching of science or crafts unless the equipment is greatly
improved and practical work is given its due place. Apparently
there is no examination in practical work at all at the end of the
secondary school, and obviously there can be none so long as most
schools have no laboratories or workshops, or very poor apologies
for them. In fact, of the large number of secondary schools visited,
only two, one government institution and one foreign school, had
adequate laboratories. Under the circumstances, science is gen- [876]
erally taught theoretically, as a lesson from the printed book or as
a lecture by the teacher, with occasional demonstration of experi-
ments by him in front of the class. This kind of vicarious experi-
mentation, which never allows the students to handle any appa-
ratus, does little to foster the scientific attitude. The provision of
laboratory facilities will not by itself, however, make any great
difference—what is needed is the introduction of activity methods
in the teaching of science and the use of science as an instru-

7· International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 [illegible] MH1

346 ment to develop the students' powers of inquiry and independent
872 work. In the proposed transformation of "book schools" into "work schools" this change coupled with craft work may well form the starting point of the process.[1]

Financial Implications of the Introduction of Compulsion

872 It is difficult to work out the cost of the proposed scheme for primary education with any degree of accuracy because reliable figures and statistics are not easily available. However, on the basis of information supplied by the Ministry and obtained from other sources, it is possible to form an approximate idea of the order of expenditure that will have to be incurred. It should, however, be borne in mind that, generally speaking, the basis of calculation adopted is the per capita educational expenditure being incurred at present and, as the current provision for such items as books, furniture, apparatus and hostel accommodation is rather inadequate, the total cost worked out represents the minimum estimate of the requirements.

The three main items of expenditure in this program would be (1) the cost of operating primary schools for all children; (2) the cost of training additional teachers; and (3) the cost of constructing new buildings and improving or extending existing buildings.

Cost of Primary Schooling

According to available figures, the total number of additional children to be brought into school eventually, when compulsion has been introduced throughout the country, would be about 575,000. The present annual cost of primary education per child, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Education, works out at eight dinars. This estimate is also endorsed by Mr. Clark in his report. On this basis it can be assumed that the ultimate annual cost of schooling for all children of primary school age will be about ID 4,600,000. It should be remembered, however, that this estimate does not allow for higher salaries and prices which will

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[1] In this connection, all science teachers might make a careful study of the fascinating pioneer work in the domain of science teaching done by the eminent British educator, Sanderson (Headmaster of the English Public School, Oundle). An account of his work will be found in two books—his biography by H. G. Wells entitled *The Story of a Great Schoolmaster* and a book written by his colleagues entitled *Sanderson of Oundle.*

almost certainly increase costs. As the Plan goes into operation, 872
the cost may also tend to rise for other reasons—because the number of children will increase with the growth in population during the next two decades, and because the provision of a better type of education, with a more practical orientation, and the strengthening of the inspection agency will mean a somewhat higher per capita cost. The organization of schools into community centers as recommended elsewhere will also affect the question of cost. On the other hand, it is likely that, during the stipulated period, perhaps 10 percent of all the children may escape schooling, which will lower its cost correspondingly. In this approximate estimate, it is not necessary to allow for these factors, because it is expected that the increase, if any, will be met by the normal expansion of the national budget. Table I in the appendix gives a breakdown, year by year, of the number of children to be admitted and the cost to be incurred on their schooling. This table envisages the extension of compulsory education to 562,500 children in 13 years, and the annual cost has been worked out on the assumption that 22,500 children, on the average, will be brought into school every year. If the scheme is put into operation in 1956, when the first group of trained teachers will become available, then during the one year that will fall within the next budget quinquennium, 1952-53 to 1956-57, the additional expenditure to be incurred will be ID 180,000. In the following 10 years, the total expenditure to be incurred for compulsory primary education will be about ID 21,600,000 or an average annual expenditure of ID 2,160,000.

Cost of Training Additional Teachers

The total number of additional teachers required for intro- 875
ducing universal, compulsory education has been estimated in Clark's Report at 15,000. The Ten Year Plan Committee, which aimed at bringing 50 percent of the children into school in 10 years, puts the figure at 8,000, allowing for the normal wastage due to superannuation, etc. Both these figures appear to be an underestimate. In calculating the cost of universal, compulsory education the Mission has aimed at putting 562,500 children in school in 1968. If the average number of children per teacher is put at 30, this means that 18,750 additional teachers will be required for the purpose, and provision will consequently have to

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

875 be made for their training.[2] The annual cost of training per teacher is estimated by the Ministry of Education to be about ID 70. If the average period of training is taken to be three years, as is likely to be the case in the future pattern of teacher training, the cost of training per teacher would be a little over ID 200. Table II in the appendix shows the number of teachers under training each year from 1953 to 1967 and the expenditure to be incurred every year over the project. From these figures it will be seen that the cost of the scheme during the next five budget years (1952-53 to 1956-57) will be about ID 737,500. Total cost until 1967, spread over 13 years, will be a little below ID 4,000,000 which means an average annual expenditure of about ID 300,000. It may be pointed out that, after this period, when the full quota of trained teachers is available, the annual expenditure on this item will be considerably reduced as provision will have to be made only for training the number of teachers required for normal replacement.

Cost of School Buildings

346
872 The problem of the construction of school buildings was surveyed recently by the Special Committee on School Buildings appointed under Ministerial Order No. 36314 of December 7, 1950. After consulting experts, the Committee drew up a program for the construction and improvement of schools and other educational buildings at a total estimated cost of approximately ID 8,110,000. The Mission was not able to ascertain definitely the premises on which this estimate was based. The Development Board has made a provision of ID 3,800,000 for school construction in its program for 1951-52 to 1955-56. The Mission suggests that the adequacy of this allocation as well as the total amount which would need to be spent over the next 10 years be carefully reviewed. In this review the Committee's estimate should be carefully checked, particularly to determine whether it took fully into account the needs arising out of the introduction of compulsory education as well as requirements for replacing old or

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[2] If the basis of calculation were 35 children per teacher, the total number of teachers required would be about 16,000. But as the Ministry of Education has itself wisely adopted the ratio of one teacher to 30 children, the Mission accepted that as the basis for calculations.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

rented school buildings. In any event it would seem desirable to 346 raise the budgetary provision for new buildings to approximately 872 ID 5,000,000 for the next five years. New needs may develop, lacunae may be discovered in the program and the cost of construction may rise. The total cost of the whole building program in the 10 year period may not be over ID 10,000,000, particularly if local help and cooperation is enlisted in the building.

The total financial implications of the whole scheme during the next five budget years (1952-53 to 1956-57) can be indicated in approximate figures as follows:

1. Operation of new primary schools ID	180,000
2. Training of teachers	737,500
3. Buildings	5,000,000

Total expenditures for the program over the next five years will thus be about ID 5,900,000 which works out at less than three percent of the net revenues expected from oil during this period.

III. Provision of Fundamental Education for Adults 873

There is no phase of education in the country which has received less attention than the education of the adults. Not only are facilities for adult education almost wholly lacking, but there is a general misunderstanding of the purposes and methods of such education. A number of evening primary and secondary schools are run by the government or by private organizations, such as Teachers' Associations, for adults who work in the day and who want to complete the education they began as children. Their courses, however, are not designed to meet the special needs of such adults but are the same as those taught to children in the day schools. There are also a few "literacy centers" attended by illiterate adults and youths, but they are too few to make any appreciable impact and, as the name suggests, confine themselves to making adults literate.

The type of adult education which the Mission suggests should be widely extended in Iraq is not a matter of either the simple teaching of literacy or the instruction of adults in the same courses offered to children. To be sure, the initial objective would be the

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TABLE 1

PROJECTED STUDENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE COMPULSORY PRIMARY EDUCATION PROGRAM: 1956-1968

(In thousands)

Class	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
I	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	112.5
II	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0
III	....	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0
IV	....	....	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0	90.0
V	....	....	....	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0	90.0
VI	....	....	....	....	....	22.5	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	67.5	90.0
Total	22.5	67.5	112.5	157.5	202.5	247.5	292.5	337.5	382.5	427.5	472.5	517.5	562.5
Cost in thousand dinars	180.0	540.0	900.0	1260.0	1620.0	1980.0	2340.0	2700.0	3060.0	3420.0	3780.0	4140.0	4500.0

Notes: 1. The duration of the primary course has been taken to be six years.
2. The average annual cost per student in a primary school has been assumed to be eight dinars.

Sephardic origin. The majority have since 593
migrated to Israel, while probably less than 162
10,000 remain, subject to certain restrictions.
Over 130,000 were transported to
Israel by the Iraqi government in 1950-51.
About 5,000 Palestinian refugees have settled
in the country since the Arab-Israeli
conflict in 1948. Small numbers of British,
American and other nationalities also reside
in the larger cities.

As a whole, Iraq is sparsely settled, with 361
the population concentrated in the river 161
valleys and in the rain-irrigated highland
districts of the north. The most densely
populated areas are found in the river
valleys of the northern delta. In 1947, the
density of population in the provinces of
the upper delta region was calculated at 131
per square mile in Hilla and 104 in Baghdad.
In the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk
and Erbil it averaged 31 to 39 per square
mile, and in Sulaimaniya, on the eastern
frontier, 62 per square mile. In the south,
it ranged from 75 per square mile in Basra
province to 42 in Amarah, while in Dulaim,
on the upper reaches of the Euphrates, it
did not exceed 10 per square mile. The pop- 369
ulation is essentially rural: over three quar- 161
ters of the inhabitants live in some 8,000
small villages or in semipermanent settlements.
The Bedouin, representing about 5 [464]
to 8 per cent of the total population, roam
the deserts with their flocks, but many migrate
seasonally to the towns in search of
work. There are only 7 cities with over 369
40,000 inhabitants. The population of 162
Baghdad, the capital, was estimated at
between 900,000 and 1 million in 1952,
including over 500,000 in the metropolitan
area and several hundred thousand in the
surrounding suburbs. The population of
Mosul, a commercial center on the upper
Tigris, totaled about 150,000, and of Kirkuk,
the metropolis of the oil region, almost
75,000. Basra, the chief port, located on the
Shatt al Arab, had a population of 90,000
to 100,000.

In spite of considerable progress in edu- 212
cation within the last 30 years, the majority 872

of peasants and tribesmen are illiterate. 212
Theoretically, primary education is compulsory 872
for both sexes, but the facilities are
inadequate, particularly in the rural areas.
Recent estimates indicate that the literacy
rate in the country as a whole approximates
10 per cent, in contrast with about
40 per cent in Baghdad and the larger cities.
Education is controlled by the government, 871
and public instruction is available at all 658
levels from the primary schools through the
professional colleges. There is no university
in Iraq, but the incorporation of the present
colleges into a national institution, with university
status, has been proposed. Separate
colleges of medicine, pharmacy, law, science,
arts, fine arts, engineering, commerce
and teachers' training, as well as various
types of vocational schools, are supported by
the government. Secondary schools are also
maintained by private and mission groups.
Government scholarships are provided annually
to qualified students for study
abroad, usually in Egypt, Great Britain or
the United States.

VITAL STATISTICS

Valid vital statistics are almost nonexistent, 163
since the registration of births and 165
deaths is admittedly incomplete, even in the
principal cities, as Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The general reluctance of the inhabitants to report births, deaths and other statistical data and the large size of the nomadic and the semimigratory populations are factors contributing to the inaccuracy of the figures available. Within recent years statistics have been compiled by the government health organization in 75 centers under the jurisdiction of medical officers, but they do not reflect conditions throughout the country. In 1950, these health districts covered a population of 1,160,000, distributed in all 14 of the provinces into which Iraq is divided. The birth rate was estimated at 27 per 1,000 population, and the death rate at 12 per 1,000. Competent authorities, however, believe that the over-all birth rate is nearer 40 to 50 per 1,000 popu-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

871 General in policy and co-ordination. Female education had secured
equal rights with male; of 6,000 primary teachers in the Govern-
ment schools, nearly a third were women, and a similar proportion
among the secondary and higher teachers. Between government
and private (including foreign) schools of all grades not less than
200,000 children were being educated, a figure annually and rapidly
increasing. A small remnant only of the Jewish schools remained
in existence; that of the Alliance Israélite had been closed. The
Tafayyudh Society, founded in 1919 as a popular non-political
educational body, continued its work to combat illiteracy and
maintained its printing-press. Students still enjoyed important
exemptions and privileges in their military service obligation.
874 Vocational schools covered technical instruction, domestic science,
agriculture, public health, and police duties. The teachers' train-
ing facilities had been increased in 1949 by additional training
classes instituted at a number of existing secondary schools, and
standards had been raised. The university, in spite of repeated
873 expert recommendations, was still an unrealized project; but higher
education was available at the Law School, the Engineering College
founded in 1942 and broadened in 1951, the Royal College of
Medicine with its associated schools of Pharmacy and Nursing, the
College of Agriculture, the College of Arts and Sciences founded
in 1949, the Institute of Fine Arts, the College of Commerce and
Economics founded in 1951, the Royal Military Academy and
Royal Staff College, and the Higher Police Training School. Con-
siderable numbers of pupils attended European or American
universities; these would increase with the greater funds which
were soon to become available and with the development of oil
company programmes of technical and scientific training. Public
libraries existed at every liwā headquarters.

172 The department of Antiquities had continued to develop its admirably enriched Museum (which it was soon to exchange for more adequate premises), to deal with the learned world, and to conduct or supervise the excavation of ancient sites. In the period from 1946–50 expeditions from the department were active at Tall Abu Shahrayn, near Ur: on the lower Diyalā: in the Arbil plain: in the neighbourhood of Chamchamal and of Sulaymaniya: and at Ḥadhr near Sharqaṭ. Expeditions from American seats of learning—Chicago, Pennsylvania, Harvard—dug at sites in the district of Kirkuk, in those of Chamchamal and Baradost in Kurdistan, and near 'Afak on the middle Euphrates, and a mission of the British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq excavated for three seasons at Nimrud. The work of these scholars of whatever nationality drew, with great goodwill, the attention of the academic world to 'Iraq's archaeological wealth and present fortunes. Both

Intermediate and Secondary Education

873 The Mission has given great emphasis to primary schooling because it is convinced that the education base should be broadened. In the past education in Iraq has been too much like an inverted pyramid in which more attention has been paid to education at the higher stages than at the primary levels. This does not mean, of course, that intermediate and secondary education should not be allowed to develop at the same rate as in the past. As far as possible, however, the establishment of intermediate and secondary schools in rural areas should be given priority over those in urban areas, for such schools will be needed to produce candidates for the rural Training Colleges. The revision of the curriculum in these schools is of equal if not greater importance than in the case of primary schools. The present need is for a type of education which, in the words of Dr. Jamali, "prepares the citizens for better living and not one which produces men for white collar jobs with superficial learning, men who want to be government officials and clerks and not leaders and artisans in the fields of agriculture, commerce and social service."

Adult Education

871 Adult education has been largely neglected. There are some night schools operated by Teachers' Associations and the Ministry, but the syllabus of such schools is the same as that of corresponding schools for children. There are also a few adult literacy centers which concentrate on teaching adults to read and write.

The Mission urges that a program for adult education be drawn up and directed by a Special Division of Fundamental Education in the Ministry of Education. Such a program would be directed primarily to those groups in the population between 12 and 45 years of age. It would stress the acquisition of literacy, not as an end in itself but rather as a means to the acquisition of practical knowledge of the fundamental problems of better living. It is useless to teach people how to read and write unless by this means they can be shown how to work more effectively for their own good. For this reason a new and broader approach to education, different from the traditional schoolroom methods used to teach

rented school buildings. In any event it would seem desirable to 346
raise the budgetary provision for new buildings to approximately 872
ID 5,000,000 for the next five years. New needs may develop, lacunae may be discovered in the program and the cost of construction may rise. The total cost of the whole building program in the 10 year period may not be over ID 10,000,000, particularly if local help and cooperation is enlisted in the building.

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● 173 eradication of illiteracy, but primarily as a means to an end—so that adults may benefit more fully from a continuous program of education which will show them what they can do individually and collectively to improve their own lot. As one authority has said, the task must be conceived "as a matter of going out into the field, of working in the communities, organizing their activities, improving their health and farming methods, establishing cooperatives and small cottage industries and tying all this up in the education and making the whole thing as closely knit an activity as possible."[*] The object must be to awaken in people an understanding of their problems and an urgent desire to solve them, not relying upon government to do everything but developing local initiative and resourcefulness to overcome some of the handicaps which they have suffered passively for centuries. Only this type of fundamental education, which, in recent years, has been advocated by UNESCO and many discerning educators in various countries, will be of practical value to the people of Iraq. In fact, unless the general receptiveness, understanding and cooperative spirit of the people are greatly quickened and stimulated by an educational campaign of this nature, the pace with which the country's development program can be carried out will seriously lag.

Magnitude of the Problem

[162] The proposed adult education campaign should be aimed primarily at those groups in the population which are beyond primary school age but are still receptive, namely those between the ages of 12 and 45 inclusive. On the basis of the census results available for the four provinces of Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul, it may be assumed that roughly 40 percent of the population are in this age group. In a total population of about 5,000,000 it may therefore be estimated that 2,000,000 should be reached by adult education. The number in this age group will gradually increase

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[*] Dr. Matta Akrawi, *Background Paper on Fundamental Education in the Arab World* presented to the Second United Nations' Seminar on Social Welfare in the Arab States, held at Cairo in 1950. Aside from this paper and the Report of the Committee on Rural Basic Education drawn up for this Seminar, a large amount of useful information on the aims and methods of fundamental education is available in UNESCO publications such as *Adult Education—Current Trends and Practices; Fundamental Education—Description and Program; The Use of Mobile Cinema and Radio Vans in Fundamental Education*, etc.

7: International Bank N, 3-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

with the growth of the population. On the other hand, several hundred thousand will be in areas too remote to be reached. Also, at least 10 percent are already literate. Thus an adult education program aimed initially at the eradication of illiteracy would have to reach about 1,500,000 people.

In these days when the methods and techniques of education and the various media of mass communication have become highly developed and efficient, it should be a manageable proposition to provide fundamental education for this number of adults within a reasonably short period. Unlike countries such as India and China, whose population is of an entirely different order of magnitude, the problem in Iraq can be tackled satisfactorily and expeditiously if the government and the Ministry of Education are really keen about it and they set about to win popular support in the right way. The ground will, of course, have to be carefully prepared. This will by no means be an easy task. Public apathy will have to be overcome, and the scattered and nomadic character of the population, the poverty of the people, the inadequacy of transport facilities and the insufficiency or inefficiency of the teaching personnel will have to be taken into account. It will, therefore, be desirable to formulate detailed plans carefully, to prepare the necessary material, to train the staff, to establish an adequate supervisory organization and to adopt an imaginative approach for mobilizing public opinion in favor of such a movement through all the resources of traditional as well as modern media of mass communication. For instance, in the case of the Bedouins, to whom the religious approach is likely to appeal, it would be advisable to secure the cooperation of their mullas. This would not be difficult because there is material in the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet which clearly enjoins upon all believers the acquisition of knowledge and education.

In most countries where campaigns of adult education have been undertaken without the proper education of public opinion, they have tended to fail. They started with great enthusiasm because of some temporary stimulus but, for lack of proper follow-up, they were not able to win public cooperation. It is, therefore, essential that the movement be organized as a national crusade against illiteracy and the other factors which hinder the develop-

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●873 ment of the masses to their full stature as democratic citizens. This will only be possible if, on the one hand, there is close and cordial cooperation between official and nonofficial agencies and, on the other, close, well-organized interdepartmental cooperation. Such cooperation, though always assumed in theory, is very difficult to secure in practice. The government can, however, facilitate it by various measures, including the establishment of advisory councils consisting of representatives of various ministries and departments concerned as well as of nonofficial organizations. The village school will form, as suggested later, the focal point for the cooperation of all local departmental officers in the work of fundamental education.

An education program of this nature can be launched and carried out successfully only if a special department is established for this purpose. The Mission therefore strongly urges the establishment of a separate Division of Fundamental Education within the Ministry of Education and the appointment of a person with vision, ability and enthusiasm to head it. The Division would, of course, need to have the fullest cooperation of all other divisions and departments in its work. It has at times been suggested that there should be a Directorate of Mass Culture in the Ministry dealing with all the activities bearing on mass education—adult centers, libraries, radio, music, art, cinema, etc. The difficulty in implementing the suggestion would be to find persons of such many-sided ability and interests as would be able to shoulder that responsibility. There might also be a danger that the more urgent and specific issues of fundamental education would take a secondary place in such a program. In any case, there is no doubt whatever that there is need to insure that these various agencies pool their resources and pull together instead of pulling in different directions.

Stages in the Development of the Plan

The Pilot Project

The first step in the developing program of fundamental education should be the organization, in some suitable locality, of a Pilot Project which will draw upon the services of the best local educators and secure the help of such outside experts as may be required. It should give special attention to the following points:

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1. Preparation of a group of selected teachers and trainers for work in the field of fundamental education. To develop the project on right lines and provide necessary training facilities, the project should "adopt" a suitable village or group of villages where, in cooperation with the local community and the government departments concerned, teachers under training and the local school teachers may actually carry on fundamental education among the villagers. The village would thus become a kind of practical laboratory where teachers would try out the lines and the techniques of work which they were learning in the center. Health officials and agricultural experts should be associated with the teachers in working out a broadly based program which will make the adults see and feel from the outset that the educational effort is really related to the practical problems of their life.

2. Preparation of suitable materials of all kinds—primers, books, folders and visual aids like pictures, charts, maps, wallpapers, films and film slides. Such material has been prepared in many other countries, for example, India, Mexico and China, and can be usefully studied and adapted, if necessary, to local needs. UNESCO has by now acquired a good deal of experience in this field and should be able to give valuable assistance in the organization of this project. In fact, useful work was initiated in this direction by the Second United Nations' Seminar on Social Welfare in the Arab States held at Cairo in November 1950. The UNESCO has also recently sent to Iraq a team of experts under Dr. Harold Allen with a similar program and objective. It carried on its preliminary work in the Dujaila area where a significant land development scheme is at present under operation. After this team (which worked in Egypt as well as Iraq) has completed its work, there is to be a seminar or a conference in which its results and projects are to be examined. It is hoped that the project will result in the establishment of a permanent Regional Center for Fundamental Education in the Middle East and that this Center will, among other things, organize and assist in the production of useful literature and other materials.

3. This period of experimental work on the Project, which may cover about two years, should also be utilized for:

   (a) carrying on an intensive campaign in favor of fundamental education in order to prepare the ground for its introduction on a national scale—students, teachers, influential local and national leaders, religious heads, all cooperating to prepare the public mind for the launching of this scheme;

(b) selecting suitable localities and deciding the order in which the scheme is to be introduced in those localities;

(c) conducting local surveys to assess the nature and magnitude of the work in each community or locality;

(d) preparing the material and translating it into different regional languages and adapting it to the needs of different regions;

(e) taking groups of teachers for short visits of observation and orientation to the project center; and

(f) introducing the principles and practice of fundamental education in the syllabus of training colleges and refresher courses for teachers.

Setting up of Model Centers

When the Pilot Project has been successfully worked out and the necessary materials, resources and techniques are available, a beginning should be made with introducing fundamental education in selected localities in different natural and cultural regions so that they may become models—even centers of pilgrimage for teachers and general public—for the whole of that area. Each center can become a powerful agency of propaganda and its success will insure that every successive center will find its work smoother and easier.

Conversion of Existing Schools into Community Centers

After the twofold experimental stage has been satisfactorily completed, the next phase should consist of gradually converting all existing schools into community centers which may serve as schools for children in the daytime and as social centers for adults in the evening. This will not be an easy transformation by any means because it involves a radical change in the traditional conception of the school and in the teachers' approach to their work. To aid the process the following measures will be needed:

Careful reorientation of teachers' outlook and short refresher courses and group conferences to train them in the new type of work;

Preparation and distribution of brief, well-written leaflets, brochures and visual aids to teachers to add to their knowledge and keep their enthusiasm alive;

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Provision of the necessary minimum of additional equipment required by the schools for conducting the social centers; 873

Adequate supervision of the centers through the employment of additional inspection staff, if necessary; and

Arrangements to insure that the rural officers of relevant government departments use their appropriate publicity material and their visual education apparatus, if any (projector, radio, gramophone, charts and pictures), at these centers so that they become the natural focal point for the educational work done by all departments. This should apply specially to the departments dealing with health, agriculture, irrigation, cooperatives and local administration.

The work is not entirely new and has been attempted, in different forms, in many countries. Moreover, the technical help given by the UNESCO and the experience gained in the Pilot Project centers should provide the guidance necessary to orient the work in the right direction. It is, however, essential that each step should be a firm step which will not have to be retraced because it was taken without sufficient thought. In order to assure this, it would be wise at the outset to choose a few schools in each province with competent, enthusiastic and conscientious teachers, to organize them as community centers and use each as a model and observation center for teachers in the neighborhood. In this way, the movement will gradually spread outwards and, within about 10 years—the exact period depending on the success of the pioneering schools—it should be possible to use most of the existing schools as community centers.

An attempt should be made, wherever possible, to add a hall to the village school which would not only provide an evening center where adults could meet but would, in many cases, also prove a boon for the day school itself. In many cases, the hall might be constructed through cooperative local effort and local subscriptions. Villages and small towns may even, in the course of time, come to compete with one another in constructing commodious, simple and attractive halls, equipped with the necessary furniture for this purpose. Where this is not feasible, the government should include the construction of such halls as part of the building program. The new schools that are established for primary education should be designed from the outset as combination school-

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community centers and this idea should permeate their buildings, their equipment and their staffing. It will mean a modified and improved school plan, and the inclusion in the school equipment of material that may be useful for adults. The whole organization of the school and its timetable should be so formulated that this work with adults will not be regarded as an extra burden or an afterthought but will become an integral part of the educational function of the school. Even if this means giving the school an additional teacher, it will be both worthwhile and economical in the long run.

The time schedule of the program, which should be carried out irrespective of changes in administration, is difficult to establish because it will depend on a variety of factors which cannot be forecast. It is suggested that the target be to bring fundamental education, including literacy, to virtually all the adults in the proposed age groups within a period of 20 years, i.e., the same period set for the complete introduction of compulsory, universal education. It is therefore proposed to establish 1,500 adult education centers in accordance with a schedule which would make it possible to reach almost 1,500,000 adults during this period. Of this total period, approximately the first two years would be required, as suggested above, for the Pilot Project and the preliminary work; the next three years would be used to convert about 10 percent of the schools, i.e., 120 selected schools, into community centers; and in the following 10 years nearly all the rest of the existing schools would be brought into the scheme. The final period of five years should be utilized for extending the program to more remote and inaccessible regions and to less receptive groups and communities. Thus the suggested time schedule for the program would be as follows:

1952-1953:	Pilot Project
1954-1956:	Establishment of 120 centers in selected schools
1957-1966:	Establishment of centers in all the other schools
1967-1971:	Completion of the program.

The Organization of Centers

How are these centers to be worked and staffed? It would probably be best to use school teachers and senior school students for this purpose. Unfortunately there are no large, well-organized

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voluntary social agencies in the country today which could take up this work. It is, therefore, suggested, as a practicable measure, that the school as a whole should be responsible for running these community centers for fundamental education—each primary or intermediate school being required to conduct at least one center in its neighborhood and each secondary school (with five classes) at least two such centers. This would mean, in effect, that different teachers of the school will take the responsibility of the work in turns so that no single teacher is burdened with it throughout the year. For instance, if one group of adults takes about four months to acquire training in literacy and useful knowledge, one particular teacher may see that group through its period of education and another teacher may take over from him when the next group comes in. While one teacher (or two in some cases) may be directly responsible for the day-to-day teaching, other teachers and senior students can, and should, be required to help in a variety of ways—giving occasional talks about health, social hygiene, civics and popular science; organizing discussion groups; reading newspapers, stories and poems; and showing charts, pictures and diagrams with suitable comment. This will not only lighten the work of the teachers in charge and broaden the scope of adult education into fundamental education, but also provide a welcome variety of approach and outlook for the adults and thus hold their interest better.

With the school used as a center of activity by both adults and children, it will be possible to make the school a really dynamic element in the development of the community. This objective was envisaged over 20 years ago in the *Report of the Educational Inquiry Commission,* headed by Dr. Paul Monroe, which visited Iraq in 1931:

> ". . . The modern school seeks to emphasize the total life of the entire community. It aims to teach all members of the community how to keep well and prevent diseases, how to make a better living in their own community, how to make interesting and wholesome use of their leisure time, how to increase and enrich their opportunities for participating in socially useful activities. These are some of the outcomes that may be reasonably expected from the proper and suc-

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cessful unity of the school and the community in this most important educational task of improving the quality of life among all the people."

Financial Implications of the Introduction of Adult Education

It is difficult to work out the financial implications of this scheme because there are hardly any tested data to go upon and the progress of the scheme itself depends on a variety of factors which have been indicated. The main items of expenditure would be:

The establishment of a Division of Fundamental Education at the Ministry with adequate staff and resources for its functions as outlined.

The cost of continuing the Dujaila Pilot Project (whether it is met from UNESCO funds or the national budget).

The cost of conducting about 1,500 centers to be organized in the schools.

The cost of a follow-up program.

The first two are comparatively small items for which provision should be easily possible through the normal expansion of the educational budget. The third item could involve considerable expenditure. However, the cost should not be too great if, as has been suggested, existing schools are used and the services of their teachers and senior pupils are made available on a voluntary basis. The teachers and senior students, who assist in the conduct of adult education centers, should be encouraged and expected to work primarily from a spirit of social service. The chief expenditure for staffing the center would thus be the payment of a small honorarium, perhaps five dinars per month, to the teacher (or two teachers in the case of larger centers) who will be directly responsible for supervision of each center. In addition, it will be necessary to provide for each center some necessary equipment as well as books, charts, pictures, and other materials, and to meet the cost of lighting in the evenings when it will usually be functioning.

The fourth item will cover the cost of a number of fully equipped mobile vans (which may be partly met out of the funds made available by one of the international technical assistance programs), the preparation of audio-visual aids, the publication of

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suitable literature for adults and guide books for teachers, the establishment and maintenance of village libraries and other agencies for stimulating and keeping alive the interest in reading, and other educational, social and useful practical activities, initiated through the community centers. 873

In working out the total cost of this program, it is necessary to indicate separately the expenditure that will be incurred in the first five years and the total expenditure to be incurred in the following period of 15 years.

During the first two years, the only expenditure will be on the Pilot Project and the establishment of a Division of Fundamental Education in the Ministry. For these, provision can be made, as suggested, in the normal budget of the Ministry without any difficulty. During the next three years, it is suggested that 120 model centers be opened at the rate of 40 centers each year. Each center will involve a recurring expenditure of about 60 dinars per year on the teachers' honoraria and about six dinars on lighting. The expenditure on equipment may be put down at about 30 dinars, on a nonrecurring basis—a modest figure, because it is proposed to make use of school equipment and furniture so far as possible. Moreover, it is expected that, as the community center wins the loyalty and goodwill of the local community, its members will provide funds, through voluntary contributions, for improvement and extension of facilities and for occasional replacement of materials. So far as the follow-up program is concerned, it will be necessary to make suitable provision for it from the very beginning in order to insure that adult education will be a continuous process and not primarily a three-months' literacy course followed by a relapse into illiteracy and cultural apathy. As each group of centers is started, a follow-up program will have to be organized, and provision at the rate of ID 2,000, 3,000 and 4,000 in the first three years, respectively, has been proposed accordingly. During the three years, 1954, 1955 and 1956, the cost will thus work out as follows:

Teachers' honoraria	ID 14,400
Lighting charges	1,440
Follow-up program	9,000
Equipment of 120 centers	3,600
	28,440

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● 873 Thus the total expediture on these centers within the next five years will be within ID 30,000. Table 1 shows the number of centers proposed to be opened during the following 15 years, the recurring and nonrecurring cost of these centers, the cost of the follow-up program and a rough idea of the number of persons who might be made literate by the program. The latter number is calculated on the assumption that a period of three to four months will probably be sufficient to achieve literacy and that each center might therefore be expected to make three groups of 30 to 40 adults literate in each year. If experience shows that this period is not sufficient, the number of adults expected to be educated will be reduced and the calculations made will be correspondingly affected. It should, however, be borne in mind that these calculations are based on the assumption that only 1,500 such centers will be functioning. Actually, it has been suggested—and it is to be expected—that many voluntary agencies will, in due course, cooperate to set up centers of their own, and most of the new schools to be opened will be combination schools and community centers from the outset. Thus, even if the centers cannot work with the full efficiency expected of them, it should not be difficult, with the help of these

TABLE 1

PROJECTED NUMBER AND RECURRING COST OF CENTERS OF FUNDAMENTAL EDUCATION

(in dinars)

Year	No. of centers	Teachers' honoraria and lighting	Follow-up program	Adults made literate
1957	220	14,520	8,000	22,000
1958	320	21,120	10,000	32,000
1959	420	27,720	12,000	42,000
1960	520	34,320	14,000	52,000
1961	620	40,920	16,000	62,000
1962	720	47,520	18,000	72,000
1963	820	54,120	20,000	82,000
1964	920	60,720	22,000	92,000
1965	1,020	67,320	24,000	102,000
1966	1,200	79,200	27,000	120,000
1967–71	1,500	495,000	165,000	750,000
	Total	942,480	336,000	1,428,000

additional centers, to bring about an almost complete eradication of illiteracy within the period specified. 873

Thus it may be tentatively estimated that the total recurrent cost of adult education as scheduled in the above table would amount over 15 years to ID 1,280,000, to which a nonrecurrent cost for equipment estimated at ID 45,000 would have to be added. If the expenditure for the initial five years is also taken into account, then the total cost of the 20-year adult education program will be approximately ID 1,355,000. Even if the total reaches ID 2,000,000, the cost cannot be regarded as a high price to pay for the virtual eradication of illiteracy among the adult population and the inauguration of a broad program of adult education.

IV. Agricultural and Technical Education

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The need for and urgency of a program for the improvement of agricultural and technical education has been stressed elsewhere in this report.[4] Such a program for technical education may, however, prove wasteful and disappointing unless it is planned intelligently at every stage with reference to the developmental needs of the country and steps are taken to insure that its qualitative standards are high. A competent specialist should therefore survey the whole field of agricultural and technical education in order to determine the adequacy of present facilities and the need for trained technical personnel during the next 10 years in the light of the total development program projected by the government. It is understood that UNESCO is providing specialists for this purpose. It is important that these specialists be enabled to obtain some idea of the total requirements in the field of technical personnel, the number of such persons available in different fields at present, the need for additional personnel, the policy to be followed in training Iraqi technicians in the country and abroad and the extent of the need for foreign technicians to meet immediate needs. In view of the limited size of the country and the fact that technically educated persons are almost all to be found in

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[4] See Annex C, *Agriculture and Animal Husbandry*, pp. 251 *et seq.*, and Annex D, *Industry*, pp. 297-8.

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Year	*No. of schools*	*No. of teachers*	*No. of students*
1920–1	88	486	8,001
1930–1	316	1,325	34,513
1940–1	735	3,525	90,794
1950–1	1,101	6,367	180,779

(Source: Ministry of Education.)

Intermediate education (three years) follows the elementary and is followed by two years' secondary education. The number of state intermediate and secondary schools is also being rapidly increased, as the following figures indicate.

Year	*No. of schools*	*No. of teachers*	*No. of students*
1920–1	3	34	110
1930–1	19	129	2,082
1940–1	56	472	13,969
1950–1	121	999	22,707

(Source: Ministry of Education.)

Private and Foreign Schools. The former include those of the various religious communities, the latter British, American, and Persian schools. Figures for 1953 show an enrolment of some 15,500 pupils in the primary schools and 10,000 in the intermediate and secondary schools, representing about 6 and 25 per cent respectively of the total enrolment in the country.

Higher Education. The higher educational institutions, some of them coeducational, all under state control, are: Higher Training College for Teachers, College of Arts and Science, Law College, College of Medicine and Dentistry, College of Pharmacy and Chemistry, College of Commerce and Economics, Engineering College, Agricultural College, College of Religion, Military and Police Colleges, and Queen Aliya College, which provides girls with arts and, to some extent, secretarial instruction or prepares them for domestic science teaching and the expanding social services. The total number of students in these institutions is at present approximately 5,000. Figures for previous years are as follows: 1920–1 (one college) 65; 1930–1 (four colleges) 100; 1940–1 (four colleges) 900.[1] It is hoped in the near future to implement a proposal now under discussion for combining the higher institutions into a university. 873

Vocational Training. State vocational training on a secondary level, whose extension is being planned, may at present be divided as follows. *Industrial:* Government technical schools in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basra, with another planned for Mosul. The Agricultural Machinery Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is planning to establish training centres for mechan- 874

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[1] Figures given by the Ministry of Education.

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874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

●873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities
873 maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration,
217 research and publication and has gained recognition for its
work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be
439 drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the
world's supply. Her general economic organization is neverthe-
433 less agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the
339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com-
342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 In 1950 a Development Board was established with the func-
652 tion of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing
a general economic and financial plan for developing the
[511] country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

814 antiquities, Kurdish lore and tribal traditions, some of whom had
produced monographs of interest and value. Returning graduates
from foreign universities had reached, at the least, the standard
indicated by their doctorates, but few had been attracted by the
deeper or more humane culture of the West. The study of Islamic
dogma and history was still practised in both Sunni and Shi'i
circles of the professional divines, and still attracted pupils; but its
seeming divorce from the living world repelled the more active and
vital of the rising generation; it offered a career less interesting
than the professions or politics; and its appeal was without force to
a society in which Islam seemed to have lost much (and in politics
874 nearly all) of its hold. Professional standards, on the other hand, in
medicine, archaeology, police and military studies, engineering,
economics, and the applied sciences had risen beyond comparison
above those of a generation earlier, and gave scope for the best
qualities of the 'Iraqi mind.

538 The output of original literary work was small. The modern
[213] (linotype) presses installed since the Second World War produced
mainly governmental or institutional works or pamphlets, largely
educational. Western publishing methods were not in use; books
[214] were printed at the author's expense and sold with difficulty
through a bookseller; workmanship in book production, especially
in binding and illustration, was notably poor. The lack of demand
(especially after the Jewish exodus), the unwillingness of the rich
to patronize letters, and at times a capricious censorship, had discouraged
writers; there were but humble traces of creative effort,
and these confined to the fields of poetry (in which 'Iraq had always
held its own in the Arab world) and to a lesser extent of fiction
writing; women writers had earned a place in both. Interest in
contemporary Arabic literature other than newspapers was slight,
and the study of earlier Arabic works, though regarded as something
of a national asset, did not greatly attract a younger generation,
who preferred the writings of modern Europe. The dozen of
204 monthly or quarterly magazines, which appeared at Ḥilla, Mosul,
Baṣra, Najf, Arbil, and Kirkuk as well as at Baghdad, were in most
cases the organs of various societies or government departments,
and though competently written they had few subscribers and no
great literary pretension. Kurdish literary activity, though on a
diminutive scale, was of vitality and promise. 'Iraqi artists, on the
532 other hand, were producing work of some interest, if almost wholly
Western in inspiration; musical and dramatic studies were pursued
533 at the Institute of Fine Arts, and more than one 'Iraqi musician—
and at least one 'Iraqi cinema actress—had attained a creditable
place.

204 The circumstances of its public life and the lively intelligence of

871 General in policy and co-ordination. Female education had secured
equal rights with male; of 6,000 primary teachers in the Govern-
ment schools, nearly a third were women, and a similar proportion
among the secondary and higher teachers. Between government
and private (including foreign) schools of all grades not less than
200,000 children were being educated, a figure annually and rapidly
increasing. A small remnant only of the Jewish schools remained
in existence; that of the Alliance Israélite had been closed. The
Tafayyudh Society, founded in 1919 as a popular non-political
educational body, continued its work to combat illiteracy and
maintained its printing-press. Students still enjoyed important
exemptions and privileges in their military service obligation.
874 Vocational schools covered technical instruction, domestic science,
agriculture, public health, and police duties. The teachers' train-
ing facilities had been increased in 1949 by additional training
classes instituted at a number of existing secondary schools, and
standards had been raised. The university, in spite of repeated
873 expert recommendations, was still an unrealized project; but higher
education was available at the Law School, the Engineering College
founded in 1942 and broadened in 1951, the Royal College of
Medicine with its associated schools of Pharmacy and Nursing, the
College of Agriculture, the College of Arts and Sciences founded
in 1949, the Institute of Fine Arts, the College of Commerce and
Economics founded in 1951, the Royal Military Academy and
Royal Staff College, and the Higher Police Training School. Con-
siderable numbers of pupils attended European or American
universities; these would increase with the greater funds which
were soon to become available and with the development of oil
company programmes of technical and scientific training. Public
libraries existed at every liwā headquarters.

172 The department of Antiquities had continued to develop its admirably enriched Museum (which it was soon to exchange for more adequate premises), to deal with the learned world, and to conduct or supervise the excavation of ancient sites. In the period from 1946–50 expeditions from the department were active at Tall Abu Shahrayn, near Ur: on the lower Diyalā: in the Arbil plain: in the neighbourhood of Chamchamal and of Sulaymaniya: and at Hadhr near Sharqat. Expeditions from American seats of learning—Chicago, Pennsylvania, Harvard—dug at sites in the district of Kirkuk, in those of Chamchamal and Baradost in Kurdistan, and near 'Afak on the middle Euphrates, and a mission of the British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq excavated for three seasons at Nimrud. The work of these scholars of whatever nationality drew, with great goodwill, the attention of the academic world to 'Iraq's archaeological wealth and present fortunes. Both

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higher levels of education but, in general, the basis for most of 000
them is acquired in the primary school. Before considering, therefore, ways and means of advance towards compulsory primary education for all children, it will be desirable to ascertain to what extent these general educational needs are met in the existing primary schools system. If it should be found that the primary schools do not adequately meet these needs, it may be wise to advocate qualitative reform in primary schooling before ambitious quantitative advance.

SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

In addition to these general educational needs, and partly arising from them, there are two outstanding needs which are connected with the economy of the country and the transitional stage through which an important section of the population is passing.

The Need for Realistic Rural Education. The first outstanding need 874
is that of realistic rural education. In a country whose future 871
development and prosperity is so bound up with the necessity for agricultural improvement, it is important that the schools of the countryside should relate their activities to rural pursuits. As the following extract from the report of the Monroe Commission, issued in 1932, indicates, there is nothing novel in directing attention to this vital educational requirement in Iraq:

> Agriculture as a science is comparatively recent. As a science [242]
> it has not yet entered Iraq to any great extent. Here it is still predominantly a rude craft; most of those who live by agriculture use primitive methods of farming and stock-keeping of generations or centuries ago. If these out-worn methods are to be replaced by better ones the change must be worked through education, and largely through the village school. . .
>
> If the work of the village schools is to be determined by the actual and present needs of the people they are set up to serve, then they should first of all become a means of teaching the people how to make a better living from the land. The village school should provide more vital instruction and training in improved agricultural methods; manual arts; the importance of native industries; the proper breeding and selection of seeds. . .

With certain modifications, due mainly to the efforts of the 874
Directorate of Agriculture, these observations of the Monroe Commission are as valid in 1950 as they were in 1932. They will need to be taken into account at a later stage of this study when the type of advance towards compulsory education in the countryside is being considered.

872 promotion, is indicated by the following extract from a teacher's
876 introduction to the first issue of a primary school magazine:

> 'Our Magazine.
> Dear Pupils,
>
> This is the first number of our school magazine. I want every pupil to read it very carefully because it is for you, not for the teacher.
>
> Please read this paper carefully and ask me any question about it. If you do as I say, you will succeed in the examination.
>
> Your Teacher,
> Signed ....'

874 *The Agricultural Primary Schools.* The need for realistic village
654 schools in Iraq has been advocated in the Report of the Monroe Commission and elsewhere. They have taken a long time to materialize, but there are now signs of progress.

In 1948 the Ministry of Education requested the Provincial Directors of Education to establish an experimental primary school in each province. One such school has since been provided in most of the provinces, not as an entirely new project but as an extension of an existing primary school. Several acres of land have been attached to these schools and some of them keep a limited amount of livestock. Some have modest dairy equipment, a stock of hand tools for the pupils and an agricultural machine such as a power-driven cultivator. One or two have a tractor. In the irrigation districts some possess their own water pump.

Unfortunately these schools were established during a period of retrenchment, and although the Ministry of Education launched this important experiment it was apparently unable to provide the money for other essential buildings and equipment such as handicraft shops, simple laboratories and materials for experiment. It was also unable to provide every such school with a teacher acquainted with the basic practice and principles of farming. Despite these initial handicaps, some of the agricultural primary schools have started courageously and have attempted to free
[177] themselves from a purely academic curriculum. In certain of the schools, apart from teaching methods of normal cultivation, experiments are being made in the growth of crops hitherto unfamiliar to the local economy. Indeed one teacher claims that, through his introduction of American cotton on to the school farm, the local landowner has since grown this crop on a large scale and has made a substantial profit from it. If this is so, it certainly illustrates the extra-mural influence of a village school which adjusts its curriculum to real life situations.

for some time. Women have been employed so far only in exceptional cases. A new problem has been recently experienced in the high turnover of ordinary labour. Owing to the development of the oil industry in Kuweit and other Persian Gulf areas, and the high wages being paid there, many workers in Baghdad, and more still in the depressed farming areas, have been emigrating there. The turnover in the cotton textile industry of Iraq is estimated at 20 per cent of employed labour. 464

The main difficulty however lies in the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour. The vast amount of illiteracy among the population, and the failure to make elementary education compulsory has made it difficult to apply any system of apprenticeship successfully. Technical education provided by the State has so far been on a very limited scale - indeed, there are only three technical secondary schools in the whole of Iraq. Therefore a new industry has often first to train its own labourers and technicians, and this of course adds to costs. In the meanwhile, most industries are dependent on foreign technicians, experts, constructors, heads of sections, and foremen. The employment of foreign technicians no doubt is inevitable in the early stages of development, but it has its own drawbacks and burdens. Foreign skill demands higher rewards abroad than it would accept at home, the standard of skill obtained is often not the highest, service is often interrupted either by ordinary leaves, or illness or inability to fit in with local conditions. [212 871] [874]

The lack of qualified labour also applies to the fields of administration, accounts, and management. Efficient clerks, typists, store-keepers, accountants and secretaries are in great demand and very few are available in Iraq. The inadequacy of State commercial education is no less than that of technical education. The scarcity of able management is a serious obstacle to the progress of industry. Those few who have entered the field of industry are mostly of the type of proprietor-manager (even in joint-stock companies managers are usually fairly large share-holders); while the members of boards of directors of industrial companies, (about twenty to twenty-five men) mostly have their own business or profession to attend to. No wonder they show reluctance to go into new enterprises. For one reason or another salaried managers have not made their way into industry, except in very rare cases. On the other hand foreign management, especially on the [658 874] 464 472 473

242 attention is devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks. The
647 relatively small number of agricultural officers in the provinces are
engaged primarily in the distribution of seed, in the collection of
rather inadequate statistics and in administrative tasks. They lack
the time, the transport facilities, and, often, the ability to counsel
farmers on methods of improving their output. While shortages
of trained personnel will prevent the immediate establishment of a
full-time extension service, the Mission recommends the early
appointment of a director of extension and education whose first
responsibility would be the recruitment and training of personnel
for such a service. The need is for people well-grounded in practi-
●[874] cal, general agriculture rather than specialists. The facilities of the
secondary agricultural school and the higher agricultural institute
at Abu Ghuraib might well be used to train the required people,
provided the quality of the staff is improved and the curriculum
revised, especially in the direction of giving more practical training
in agriculture. It will be impossible, however, to attract properly
qualified people to an extension service unless the status of agri-
cultural officers in the provinces is considerably raised and their
conditions of service, particularly housing and pay, are greatly
improved.

The effectiveness of such an extension service would be greatly enhanced by the organization of demonstration units on strategically located government and private farms. There, farmers could be brought to see with their own eyes the practical advantages of improved methods of raising livestock, poultry and farm crops. At the same time the extension service might work closely with the public schools in the rural areas and small towns to insure that a knowledge of the rudimentary principles of agriculture is instilled in children at an early age. Rural primary and secondary schools should give agriculture an appropriate place in their curriculum.

816 An extension service must be backed up by sound, practical
242 research which will develop new crops and more productive varie-
ties, improved livestock breeds, better methods of cultivation, and
more effective control of pests and diseases. At present there are
few people engaged in full-time research. Government farms are
devoted primarily to the commercial production of seed, serving
neither as demonstration farms nor as centers for extensive

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466 467 greater benefits through collective bargaining. At present, labor laws set up certain requirements with respect to hours of work, periods of rest, vacations, employment of minors and compensation for disability. The Labor Department, however, is inadequately staffed to enforce the law and the many reported violations are generally allowed to go uncorrected. In 1949-50, of 1,228 enterprises inspected, only 136 were found to comply with the law. Of the remainder, 974 were simply warned and 118 cases were referred to courts. It would be desirable to enforce existing legislation before enacting other labor laws. Efforts are apparently being made to survey the possibility of introducing a social insurance system into Iraq. Under existing conditions, however, any social insurance law might tend to remain a dead letter.

874 464 [212] Training of labor is impeded by the prevailing illiteracy which makes instruction in writing largely impossible. Elementary schooling and adult education are therefore essential to the improvement of labor efficiency. There is in existence a secondary technical school which attempts to train intermediate school graduates in industry. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training; and the graduates of the school show a disinclination to work with their hands. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for the basic practical training, and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workers and foremen. Those who are trained in the shop or on the site through such apprenticeship systems can then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work. Large private companies and public enterprises like the Iraq Petroleum Company, the railways and the Basra port administration all possess large machine shops where varied training can be imparted to many more than at present. It is suggested, therefore, that the government enlist their cooperation in the training of skilled workers for Iraq's requirements generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Government, banking and commercial firms, and industrial concerns are all handicapped by a shortage of competent typists, stenographers, clerks, bookkeepers and accountants which has been aggravated by

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the exodus of the Jews. For industry the training of good cost accountants capable of checking the efficiency of various types of operations is especially vital. A single secondary commercial school, supplemented by a night school, and a higher College of Commerce and Economics have been established to meet the need for business training. The first appears to be functioning along sound lines, although it suffers from inadequate quarters and a shortage of teachers. As soon as competent teachers can be trained or recruited, secondary commercial schools should be opened in the other principal cities, particularly Basra and Mosul. On the other hand, the College leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of both the curriculum and the standard of instruction. It apparently produces neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants, nor people well-grounded in economics and finance, capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff must be strengthened, and more attention paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum, make provision for part-time apprenticeship training and check how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business. 874 464

IV. Transport and Communications

On the whole, the existing transport system serves the present needs of the country adequately (see map). For the future the principal problems will be to make provision for essential renewals of track and rolling stock and to standardize the gauges on the railways; to develop an adequate network of metalled main roads, supplemented by feeder roads; and to establish effective control over road transport. If these problems are solved, transport capacity should have no difficulty in meeting the growing requirements of agriculture and industry. 489

primary school education and much of the investment in their education 871
accordingly bears little fruit. The facilities and quality of
technical or vocational education are seriously deficient and adult
education has been almost wholly neglected. Probably about 80 [212]
percent of the men and over 95 percent of the women remain
illiterate. Moreover, educational concepts are far too narrow and
too little related to the everyday problems of living.

As the result of its study of educational needs the Mission has come to the conclusion that the government should launch a three-part program involving (1) the improvement and extension of technical education, (2) the gradual introduction of compulsory primary school education, and (3) fundamental education for adults.

Technical Schooling

The question of technical or vocational education is not treated 874
in detail here, partly because it has already been discussed in connection
with agriculture and industry, partly because the government
has requested UNESCO to send a special mission on vocational
education. Although the number of students in technical
schools—about 750—seems very inadequate, Iraq apparently has [461]
had difficulty in absorbing the graduates of these institutions largely because they lack sufficient practical training and they show a distaste for manual work. Obviously one of the first steps toward improved technical training will be to give the curriculum of the intermediate and secondary schools a greater vocational bias, with emphasis upon the dignity and value of manual labor. It is also worth emphasizing again that skilled labor and foremen can best be recruited from the ranks of active young workmen through on-the-job training programs, supplemented in some cases by technical schooling. Only the higher supervisory grades of personnel need to be trained in technical schools, and even for these there should be considerable emphasis on practical training in business, industry and agriculture as an integral part of the curriculum.

Introduction of Compulsory Primary Education 871

There is a general consensus both among Iraqi educators and foreign experts who have examined the problem that the time has come for a broad advance in the direction of compulsory education.

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poultry demonstration units in all parts of the country. Suggestions 242 for such livestock units have already been made. In many cases it will not be necessary to establish government-owned farms, for it should be possible to stimulate the more enlightened landowners to lead the way in adopting better methods and permitting those in the neighborhood to come and see for themselves the results achieved. The ultimate goal should be to make some practical demonstration of the value of such improved methods accessible to nearly all cultivators. In addition the officers of the extension service would need to work intimately with the rural primary and secondary schools in a program to bring children a knowledge of the principles of good agriculture and animal husbandry as early as possible. They should also play a prominent role in any adult education programs launched by the Ministry of Education. For this purpose they should be equipped with visual teaching aids.

Obviously, such an extension service cannot be created overnight. The first step should be to appoint an expert who has had considerable experience in extension work abroad to recruit and train the necessary staff and take other preparatory measures. His initial staff might consist of an assistant responsible for collecting materials for use in the service and two or three supervisors to direct the gradually increasing amount of advisory work in the field. A few people should be sent abroad each year to gain practical experience of extension work. The supervisory personnel would initially have to be obtained abroad. Those officers who would work directly with farmers and livestock keepers in the field should not be highly specialized. Rather they need a good general training in agriculture and animal husbandry. In the past too much stress has been placed on specialization.

Many of the candidates for the extension service could be 242
educated at the secondary agricultural school and the more 874
advanced institute at Abu Ghuraib. The first of these now gives a three-year course to students who have completed three years of secondary schooling while the latter provides a two-year advanced course to graduates of secondary schools. The institute's course has recently been extended to three years and will soon be increased to a full four years leading to a bachelor's degree in agriculture. Both these schools should be in the position to train

242 forward-looking men for actual farming as well as for posts in
874 the agricultural administration and the extension and educational service. Unfortunately their teaching staff and curricula have been deficient in many respects. The teaching staffs should be strengthened by recruiting additional qualified teachers abroad and by using specialists engaged in agricultural research to teach their specialties. More practical agricultural work should be incorporated into the curriculum. Students in the institute, for instance, might be required to remain on the government farm at least one or two summers and complete a course in practical agriculture. This course would include the actual operation of farm machinery, the establishment of simple plots to demonstrate yield, crop adaptation and other agricultural techniques, and the care of livestock. It is important that students actually work with their hands during such a course, for there is no room in a field extension service for officers who consider manual work degrading. In addition to their regular instruction, both schools should be equipped to give brief courses from time to time in special subjects such as the operation and maintenance of machinery, animal husbandry, soil analysis, forestry, and techniques of extension work.

242 It will be some years before sufficient people can be recruited and trained for an adequate extension service. In the intervening period a complete separation between the extension service and the regulatory and inspection service cannot be carried out. Those newly trained would join the existing service and carry out both types of work, with the expectation, however, that growing emphasis would be placed on extension work. Consideration might be given, however, to establishing a full-time extension service as soon as possible within one or two areas limited to a few selected *qadhas,* so that different methods of working with farmers could be tested.

Ultimately it will be desirable to separate the extension service from the inspection and regulatory service. The latter might then be organized into two sections: one dealing with control of injurious pests and diseases, maintenance of standards for agricultural and livestock products, fertilizers and insecticides, and surveys of production and land use; the other concerned with the production, processing and distribution of pure agricultural seed

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Technical Education

If industrial growth is to be accelerated, it is essential that 464
measures be taken to provide industry with skilled labor. The 874
Industrial School at Baghdad was established to meet this need. The curriculum of the school, however, lays too little emphasis on practical training and the graduates show a disinclination to work with their hands or to take secondary positions. It would be far better to rely on apprenticeship systems for basic practical training and to use the school primarily for supplementary instruction of a somewhat broader character which might be needed by the more highly skilled workmen and foremen. Those trained in the shop or on the site would then be recruited from the ranks of the laboring class which is accustomed to manual work.

Apprenticeship systems have worked well for the Iraq Petroleum Company, for the national railways and the Basra Port Administration, all of whom have highly skilled workers trained in their own shops. Each of these organizations possesses large machine shops which could be used to train many more workers than at present. The Mission suggests that the government, through the agency of the Industrial School, enlist their cooperation in enlarging their programs to train workers for industry generally.

Commercial and business education is also important. Bank- 443
ing, commercial and industrial firms, as well as the government, 874
are all handicapped by the shortage of competent typists, stenographers, bookkeepers, clerks and accountants. In industry the training of good cost accountants, capable of checking the efficiency of various types of operation, is especially vital. A single secondary commercial school, supplemented by a night school, and a higher College of Commerce and Economics have been established to meet the need for business training. The first appears to be functioning along sound lines, although it suffers from inadequate quarters and a limited teaching staff. As soon as competent teachers can be trained or recruited, secondary commercial schools should be opened in the other principal cities, particularly Basra and Mosul. The College, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of both the curriculum and the standard of instruction. It apparently produces neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants, nor people well grounded

463 874 in economics and finance capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff should be strengthened; and more attention should be paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum. They could assist in arranging for part-time apprenticeship training and would provide a means for checking how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

Effective Government Organization for Industry

647 654 Government activities relating to industry, except for the Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. As industry expands both types of activity will become increasingly important. The Mission therefore recommends a realignment of the present organization to provide for two separate departments within the Ministry, a Department of Industrial Research and Standards and a Department of Industries. Research and technical functions now being carried on would be continued under the Department of Industrial Research and Standards. Its facilities need, however, to be expanded to meet industry's growing requirements for laboratory testing and quality control.

The newly organized Department of Industries would carry on economic research and analysis. Among its functions would be the maintenance of adequate statistical records of industrial production, the analysis of economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and the administration of the laws providing special protection to industry.

Both departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future, as compared to special mea-

Additional provision for reconstruction of the Karkh and Kut Hospitals ID	200,000	654 743
Repairs to the Maude Hospital (Basra), Amara Hospital, Erbil Hospital and Suleimaniya Hospital	250,000	
Infectious disease blocks for the Erbil and Mosul Hospitals	65,000	
Maternity block for the Hilla Hospital	25,000	
Laundry for Diwaniya Hospital	12,000	
Additional wards for Mosul and Kirkuk Hospitals	80,000	
Completion of Mental Diseases Hospital	250,000	
Additional provision for operating facilities at Royal Hospital	50,000	
Children's Ward at Royal Hospital	40,000	
Maternity block at Royal Hospital	40,000	
Dental equipment for hospitals	20,000	
Total ID	1,032,000	

As it becomes possible to devote more attention to increasing facilities for treatment, priority should be given generally to the construction of additional dispensaries in the rural areas.

Doctors

At present there is about one practicing doctor to every 7,000 759 of the population, but many of the doctors are concentrated in [758] Baghdad. Only about 35 doctors are now being registered annually, but with increased accommodations and more laboratory facilities, it will be possible to enroll more students so that at least 50 will qualify as doctors annually. This number may be sufficient for Iraq's needs, provided that an adequate number of suitably trained health officers are available for service in village dispensaries and that nurses and dressers receive more training.

Doctors receive their training at the Royal Faculty of Medicine, [874 which was founded in 1927. The syllabus and teaching seem, on the whole, to be good. They emphasize adequately the study of the endemic diseases, although they do not give enough weight to the teaching of public health and preventive medicine. The recent appointment of a professor of public health should give a better balance to the program of instruction. Public health as such should probably be taught as a postgraduate course. It would include such subjects as public health administration, public hea

759 standards of nursing are not high. However, the three-year nursing course given at the Royal Hospital is comprehensive and includes all the common branches of nursing.

[554] Unfortunately in Iraq, as in many other Moslem countries, nursing is not at present looked upon as a suitable career for Moslem girls of good family. Probably one of the best means of inducing girls to take up nursing is to demonstrate through the employment of foreign nursing sisters that nursing is regarded abroad as a highly qualified and reputable profession. More women might also be attracted to this profession if they were given suitable living quarters and accorded a position in the government service equivalent to that of elementary school teachers.

759 874 The one central nursing school in Baghdad will not supply the needs of the country. Since many young girls will not leave their homes to go to school, it will be necessary to set up local schools for nurses and also for dressers. Training for practical nurses should be started at Basra, Mosul and Karkh hospitals and eventually every province should have such a school. Candidates should have had at least six years of preliminary schooling and the course itself should last a year. It is suggested that two foreign nursing sisters, preferably English-speaking, be appointed to each province to act as nursing supervisor in the chief hospitals and as "principal" of the local nursing schools. It would also be desirable to assign to each school a sister-tutor—a graduate of the central school.

759 At the same time, nursing supervision needs strengthening in the Royal Hospital where at present there are only three foreign nursing sisters for 680 beds. For efficient operation the Royal Hospital needs the following foreign nursing sisters:

1. One matron
2. One assistant matron
3. One sister tutor
4. One sister for the maternity block
5. One for the children's wards
6. One for infectious diseases hospital, and
7. Two for general duties.

It is most important that every foreign nursing sister should get to know, as quickly as possible, something of the language, mode of life and habits of the people.

759 An estimate of the cost of the full scheme follows:

(a)	CAPITAL	
	(1) Quarters for women nurses	ID 125,000
	(2) Demonstration rooms	28,000
	(3) Quarters for foreign sisters[1]	80,000
	(4) Equipment, etc.	7,000
		ID 240,000
(b)	RECURRENT	
	Salaries for foreign sisters (only)	ID 37,000

Training schools are also necessary for hospital storekeepers, laboratory assistants, radiographers and probably for physiotherapists and dispensers. Storekeepers should be appointed to every hospital to preserve equipment and to check the use of expendable items. Dressers, who are already familiar with the names of many articles used in hospital work, would probably be the most suitable candidates for training. The schools could be started with the existing staff and facilities of the Royal Hospital and of the Central Medical Stores, and as each trained group is ready to go to work an appropriate pay scale ought to be established for them.

Pharmacists and Medical Supplies

[illegible] A School of Pharmacy and Chemistry was founded in 1936. The five-year pharmacy course is comprehensive and the facilities for teaching, including laboratories, are good.

278 So far 218 pharmacists have qualified from the school but many have gone into private work and only 64 remain in government service. Apparently the salary paid to a pharmacist working in a private shop is at least twice as high as that paid by the government. Further, a number of qualified pharmacists have recently left the country. With the existing accommodations the school can graduate about 20 pharmacists annually. Meanwhile there are only 64 pharmacists working in the 89 hospitals and in some hospitals the dispensing, including that of poisons, appears to be carried out entirely by health officials.

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[1] It is estimated that 37 foreign nursing sisters would be required: 27 for the 14 provinces (there is already one in Basra); five for the Royal Hospital at Baghdad; and five additional for replacements during sickness and leave.

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additional centers, to bring about an almost complete eradication 873 of illiteracy within the period specified.

Thus it may be tentatively estimated that the total recurrent cost of adult education as scheduled in the above table would amount over 15 years to ID 1,280,000, to which a nonrecurrent cost for equipment estimated at ID 45,000 would have to be added. If the expenditure for the initial five years is also taken into account, then the total cost of the 20-year adult education program will be approximately ID 1,355,000. Even if the total reaches ID 2,000,000, the cost cannot be regarded as a high price to pay for the virtual eradication of illiteracy among the adult population and the inauguration of a broad program of adult education.

IV. Agricultural and Technical Education

874 The need for and urgency of a program for the improvement of agricultural and technical education has been stressed elsewhere in this report.[4] Such a program for technical education may, however, prove wasteful and disappointing unless it is planned intelligently at every stage with reference to the developmental needs of the country and steps are taken to insure that its qualitative standards are high. A competent specialist should therefore survey the whole field of agricultural and technical education in order to determine the adequacy of present facilities and the need for trained technical personnel during the next 10 years in the light of the total development program projected by the government. It is understood that UNESCO is providing specialists for this purpose. It is important that these specialists be enabled to obtain some idea of the total requirements in the field of technical personnel, the number of such persons available in different fields at present, the need for additional personnel, the policy to be followed in training Iraqi technicians in the country and abroad and the extent of the need for foreign technicians to meet immediate needs. In view of the limited size of the country and the fact that technically educated persons are almost all to be found in

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[4] See Annex C, *Agriculture and Animal Husbandry*, pp. 251 *et seq.*, and Annex D, *Industry*, pp. 297-8.

874 Baghdad or the larger cities in the province, either employed by the government or by a few well-known technical concerns, it should not be difficult to ascertain how much scientific manpower is actually available. Similarly, it would be comparatively simple to assess the needs of additional technical personnel in the various fields when the projects of development to be put through during the next 10 years have been finally selected.

While detailed recommendations for the reorganization of technical education will be made by these specialists, a few important points which should be taken into consideration in formulating a policy are noted here.

There can be no improvement in the standards of technical education or in the efficiency of trained students, unless general school education is made more practical from the earliest stages and is given an increasing vocational bias in the intermediate and [461] secondary schools. The Mission received evidence from all quarters that there was a general lack of enthusiasm, if not actual antipathy, for manual work on the part of the students, whether trained in general or technical schools. When students from these schools go to technical institutions and take their diplomas and degrees, they are anxious to get government jobs where they can act as "bosses" and "officers" and they fight shy of manual jobs whether on the farms or in the factories and machine shops. There is nothing either in the psychology or the religious and ethical traditions of the Arab race to justify such a mentality. As a tradition of the Prophet of Islam has it: "Al-Kasibo Habeebul-lah," which may be translated as "He who earns his living (by the sweat of his brow) is a friend of God." Eradication of this aversion to manual work should form an important objective of educational policy at all stages.

It is certain that, in view of the proposed technical development, a much larger number of technically trained young men will be required in the coming years and technical education will need to be strengthened both quantitatively and qualitatively. There is fairly general agreement on the part of those who are familiar with the existing technical schools that the training they provide is neither sufficiently practical nor closely enough related to the conditions that obtain in the factories and the market. The result is

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that most of their graduates are not equipped to set up a workshop 874 or business of their own or even to find useful employment in established private business. Instead, most of them hanker after government jobs or clerical positions in banking and commerce.

The total number of students in all technical institutions at present is a little more than 750. This is very small both in relation to the total population and the growing technical needs of the country. Moreover, so far as the Mission could discover, many technical graduates are not being fully utilized in types of work for which they are qualified. This represents a source of wastage which can be avoided partly by better coordination between technical schools and technical occupations, and partly by placing more stress on practical training in the schools. In expanding the existing facilities, provision must presumably be made for (1) the training of full-time students, and (2) supplementary training of promising workers selected from factories and workshops. In the latter case the course will need to cover not only the kind of technical knowledge best imparted through classroom instruction but also any deficiencies in formal education such as reading, writing and mathematics. In both cases the practical training with tools, machinery and other types of equipment should be given in well-equipped workshops like those of the railways and the Iraq Petroleum Company. Technical education should therefore be planned jointly with the management of such shops, and a system of apprenticeship should be instituted in all factories and on construction projects.

The State has sent about 780 candidates for study abroad dur- [658] ing the last 10 years. It will no doubt be necessary to continue this policy for some years but it should be carefully reviewed in the light of the developing needs of the country. The Mission would urge three points on the attention of the government in this connection. First, the availability of training facilities abroad should not delay establishment of such facilities in Iraq, particularly for the training of people at what may be called the intermediate level. Local technical institutions should give special attention to training foremen and supervisors who would act as intermediaries between the highly trained engineers at the top and the semiskilled or unskilled labor. There is a general com-

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874 plaint regarding the paucity of this type of trained foreman and it may well be regarded as the weakest link in the technical force available to the country. In this connection it would be advisable gradually to raise the standard of qualifications prescribed for direct entrance to technical schools. While arrangements should certainly be made, as already suggested, for part-time training—in evening classes—of selected factory workers who may have low academic qualifications, there is no reason why semiliterate candidates should be admitted to full-time training in the technical schools.

Second, the Mission suggests that, in selecting candidates for foreign training, an effort should be made to take an adequate proportion from among those who have actually worked in factories and workshops and have given evidence of practical skill and capacity, provided, of course, they possess the requisite qualifications for admission. The training of such candidates is likely to prove more useful to the country, in some ways, than that of graduates fresh from technical institutions who may seek foreign training chiefly in order to secure government jobs.

Third, programs for technical training of Iraqis both at home and abroad should be worked out in consultation with the Development Board. The latter will need to determine the technical manpower requirements and make sure that training schemes are focused in the first instance on satisfying these requirements.

Finally, the Mission would like to stress the great importance of giving agricultural education its proper place not only in the field of technical education but also in that of general education. Agriculture is, and will continue to be, the main industry of the country. It will not be possible to improve the conditions of the rural population unless productivity is increased, and, through education as well as agricultural extension work, the adults and the younger generation are made increasingly conscious of the importance and dignity of farming as a profession. It should be the function of schools, adult centers and agricultural extension work to bring accurate and fruitful knowledge about better methods of agriculture and allied subjects to the cultivators in the countryside and the children who are being educated in the schools.

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164 helminthosis are endemic. There are occasional outbreaks of
657 smallpox, typhus, and more rarely plague and cholera. With
the greater provision in the budget for schemes of public health,
the increased employment of international specialists and the
considerable assistance tendered by the World Health Organization, there is every prospect that the incidence of endemic
774 diseases will be greatly reduced. Fundamental results may be
expected from modern medical training, with emphasis on the
742 environmental aspects of disease and the need for prevention
657 as much as or even more than cure, and, above all, from the
743 efforts of the administration to improve the environment itself,
[312] with especial reference to drainage and water-supply. In addition, attention is to be paid to the public health aspects of the pilgrimages. The curative services have in general received more attention than the preventive and have improved considerably in the past thirty years. Simple conditions are treated in some 400 state dispensaries, distributed fairly evenly throughout the country but varying in their equipment and staff; it has hitherto proved difficult to attract doctors to the provinces and particularly to the rural districts. Each *liwa* centre has a general hospital, the larger towns more than one. There are also specialized hospitals for maternity and child welfare, for infectious, chest, eye, venereal, and mental diseases, and for lepers. The army, police, railways, Port of Basra, Ministry of Education, and oil companies maintain their own medical services and hospitals, and there are in addition an American Mission Hospital and a number of private nursing homes. A five-year programme, financed by the Development Board, will provide for the repair, extension, and replacement of medical buildings which have become old or inadequate. There is an acute shortage of well-trained nurses; attempts to expand the service are hampered by the reluctance of Muslim girls of good family to enter it.

Education

658 The state provides elementary, intermediate, secondary, and
871 higher education, all, since December 1952, completely free.
There are also private and foreign schools on a kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, and secondary level.

State Education. Primary education, by law universal and compulsory where facilities exist, begins at the age of six and continues for six years. It has been limited by a shortage of schools and trained teachers, especially in the villages. Plans are in hand to meet the need. The rapid expansion of state primary education is demonstrated in the following table:

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Year	*No. of schools*	*No. of teachers*	*No. of students*
1920–1	88	486	8,001
1930–1	316	1,325	34,513
1940–1	735	3,525	90,794
1950–1	1,101	6,967	180,779

(Source: Ministry of Education.)

Intermediate education (three years) follows the elementary and is followed by two years' secondary education. The number of state intermediate and secondary schools is also being rapidly increased, as the following figures indicate.

Year	*No. of schools*	*No. of teachers*	*No. of students*
1920–1	3	34	110
1930–1	19	129	2,082
1940–1	56	472	13,969
1950–1	121	999	22,707

(Source: Ministry of Education.)

Private and Foreign Schools. The former include those of the various religious communities, the latter British, American, and Persian schools. Figures for 1953 show an enrolment of some 15,500 pupils in the primary schools and 10,000 in the intermediate and secondary schools, representing about 6 and 25 per cent respectively of the total enrolment in the country.

Higher Education. The higher educational institutions, some 873 of them coeducational, all under state control, are: Higher Training College for Teachers, College of Arts and Science, Law College, College of Medicine and Dentistry, College of Pharmacy and Chemistry, College of Commerce and Economics, Engineering College, Agricultural College, College of Religion, Military and Police Colleges, and Queen Aliya College, which provides girls with arts and, to some extent, secretarial instruction or prepares them for domestic science teaching and the expanding social services. The total number of students in these institutions is at present approximately 5,000. Figures for previous years are as follows: 1920–1 (one college) 65; 1930–1 (four colleges) 100; 1940–1 (four colleges) 900.[1] It is hoped in the near future to implement a proposal now under discussion for combining the higher institutions into a university.

Vocational Training. State vocational training on a secondary 874 level, whose extension is being planned, may at present be divided as follows. *Industrial:* Government technical schools in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basra, with another planned for Mosul. The Agricultural Machinery Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is planning to establish training centres for mechan-

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[1] Figures given by the Ministry of Education.

8:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities
maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration,
217 research and publication and has gained recognition for its
work in international academic circles. It controls five museums
in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently
opened one in Mosul.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

651 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be
439 drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the
world's supply. Her general economic organization is neverthe-
433 less agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically
suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide,
after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits
of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and,
in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz,
sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the
339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com-
342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made
burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 In 1950 a Development Board was established with the func-
652 tion of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing
a general economic and financial plan for developing the
[511] country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to
include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy,
flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and
improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the
execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

facilities are available in the larger hospitals. 742 The Veterinary Department in the Ministry of Economics also maintains a laboratory for research in the control of animal diseases.

874 **Schools.** The Royal College of Medicine in Baghdad was founded in 1927, and is the only medical school in Iraq. The Royal Hospital and the medical and associated schools are administered by the Dean of the Royal Faculty of Medicine. The course of instruction in the medical school covers 6 years, plus an additional year of internship. The teaching is in English, and a limited number of British and Dutch physicians are included on the professorial staff. The Iraqi [754] degree meets the requirements of the General Medical Council of Great Britain. A complete medical education may be acquired at public expense, but graduates are obligated to serve for 4 or more years with the Ministry or some other government organization.

Schools for health officials and for nurses are affiliated with the medical school. The School of Health Officials offers a 5-year course for the training of medical assistants, many of whom are assigned to operate the rural dispensaries.

The School of Nursing and Midwifery is attached to the Royal Hospital and provides the standard 3-year course of instruction. Diplomas in midwifery are granted following a postgraduate year of work in that field. The development of facilities for the training of nurses is proposed by the Ministry of Health, and a nursing consultant has recently been appointed to the headquarters staff. A small training school for nurses is connected with the Seventh Day Adventist hospital in Baghdad. Courses covering 1 year of practical instruction are provided for nurses and midwives in hospitals in Kirkuk, Basra and Mosul. Male nurses and medical attendants are trained in the larger hospitals.

A College of Pharmacy and Chemistry is incorporated in the Faculty of Medicine. It

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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offers 5-year courses for the training of fully qualified pharmacists. 874

PERSONNEL

Physicians. The physicians registered in Iraq in 1950 totaled 811. Of this number, 543 were employed full or part time with governmental agencies. One hundred and ninety-two doctors were in private practice, and 6 were retired. Seventy were non-Iraqi, most of whom were working with the government, with the oil industry or with philanthropic organizations. The distribution of medical practitioners is extremely uneven; 444, or almost one half of the total in the country, were located in Baghdad province. The proportion of doctors in the Baghdad area averaged 55 to 70 per 100,000 population, as against 4 to 6 in the rural provinces. 759

Dentists. The registration for 1950 included 72 dentists, 29 in government service and 43 in private practice. Over 86 per cent of the latter group were established in Baghdad.

Nurses. There were 601 nurses in 1950, 497 of whom were employed in government institutions. The majority are probably graduates of the School of Nursing and Midwifery. Five British nurses were affiliated with the Ministry in 1951.

Other. Also in 1950, 803 midwives were licensed as "qualified" midwives, while an additional 9 were fully trained. Other medical personnel in the country included 69 pharmacists, 236 health officials or medical assistants, 341 vaccinators and 1,002 dressers.

DISEASES

The information available regarding the distribution and the prevalence of infectious diseases is sketchy. The official statistics compiled from the records of the government hospitals and dispensaries are derived only from institutions under the jurisdiction of medical officers, and are therefore limited in scope. The reporting of cases of 164

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHl Iraq MHl

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. 631
These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration 647
of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 671
developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded
civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of
French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes
were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too
often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered 692
them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered
system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by
its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of
the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by
their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special
arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department 691
of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by 423
Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in
unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession
and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated
State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system
could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties
powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the
shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties
of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential
background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish 759
doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and
inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The
medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, 743
were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside.
Educational services made a slightly better showing, though 871
standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired
mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on
paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger.
Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and
higher theological learning was available. The military educational
system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials [184]
went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few
sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching 875
profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive. 554

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments. 647
The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on
behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the
Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

ment appointment. A School of Agriculture, founded hastily and 871 inefficiently in 1928, was perforce discontinued for lack of pupils two years later—to be afterwards refounded. A Health Officials' school, in connexion with the College of Medicine, in 1932 replaced the existing Pharmaceutical School: a year later a Nursing school was inaugurated, to which a midwifery section was to be added in 1936. The training of rural teachers at the primary teachers' stage was [875] discontinued; but its necessity, urged by the American mission which visited 'Iraq under Dr. Paul Monroe in 1932, was later to be recognized. The provisional plan of 1923 for higher teacher-training was also discontinued, for later amendment. Another American secondary school, this time a Jesuit enterprise, was founded in Baghdad in 1932, and accepted pupils of all faiths. Government secondary schools by 1930 numbered fifteen, primary nearly 300. The theological college of Al al-Bayt closed its doors in 1929. The Law School, 'Iraq's nearest approach to a university course, kept all its popularity and produced civil servants as well as advocates. Separate Assyrian schools taught little but their own brand of religion. Kurdish schools, thirty in number by 1930, included one intermediate, and one for girls. Annual grants were 658 made to the schools of the minority communities and foreign missions; their standard, not least in European languages, was generally higher than in those of the State. About 8 per cent. of all Government revenues was at this time spent on education. Lionel Smith retired from the Advisership to Education in 1930, and was not replaced.

Greater sums than this were needed for the services of security: 701 a fifth or more of Government income maintained the 'Iraq Army, [652] and nearly a sixth the Police Force. Since the Levies, reduced to two battalions in 1928, were used decreasingly on operations, and the Royal Air Force, reduced from eight squadrons in the period 1922 to 1926 to four in 1930, was soon to be no longer available for internal operations, reliance must be on the Police and the 'Iraq Army; no pains, therefore, were spared to augment and improve these. The Royal 'Iraqi Air Force came into existence in 1930, with five light aircraft. The Army, to which Great Britain contributed a grant until 1932, was developed with the close guidance of a British Military Mission which, increased from six officers in 1921 to forty-six in 1930, was then reduced to twenty-six. It trained its own officers at military and staff colleges, and by the dispatch of selected men to Sandhurst or Quetta. Recruiting in the period 1926 to 1932 was voluntary, numbers sufficient, training and maintenance adequate, discipline good. The strength of the Army by 1932 approximated to two brigades. It was unfortunate that its most frequent operations, against Kurdish insurgents, were in

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

same was true of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs. 647 Tainsh after fifteen years as Director left the Railways, handing over to Ward who combined the post for three years with the Port Directorate. Wheatley left the Advisership to Communications and Works early in 1937.

The relation of Yasin Pasha to the British Embassy, where Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had succeeded Humphrys in March 1935, were close and cordial. The Census Department was strengthened, that of Publicity represented a development of the old Press Bureau. The Courts, with their complement of British judges 192 under the Agreement of 1930, were well maintained. The general 871 desire for a more comprehensive educational system could be met only in part. Primary and secondary schools showed a limited development, with increased use of borrowed Egyptian teachers, and the beginning of book publication by the Ministry. Technical education, studied by visiting foreign experts, advanced little. The university project stood still. The Higher Teachers' Training- 875 College was reopened in 1935. A Directorate of Female Education was formed in 1934, but abolished next year. A Rural Teachers' College—a recommendation of the Monroe Report—was established in 1934 at Shaṭra on the Gharraf, and later moved to Rustumiya outside Baghdad. An Elementary Teachers' College for Women was opened at Diwaniya in 1934, but did not survive. 871 The College of Pharmacy was founded in 1936. The schools of the minority communities and of the missions, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, flourished. The proposal for a public school on the British pattern was not yet realized, and a British adviser to the Minister of Education ceased to be employed. German teaching increased. School books in use became increasingly nationalist and xenophobe in tone. Military instruction was first given in the schools in 1935, and grew thereafter to be a popular feature of school life, with a developed Youth Movement in uniform.

Ancient sites of 'Iraq continued each winter to attract foreign 172 archaeological missions. Valuable excavations were carried out by the representatives of university, museum, or other learned bodies, American, German, British, French, and Italian, from 1933 to 1939 at sites in northern 'Iraq—Gawra, Nineveh, Saydawa, and Khorsabad: in the Baghdad area, at Khafaja on the Diyalā, and at Seleucia: and in the centre and south at the Sumerian cities of Warqa and Larsa. A setback to this activity was caused, indeed, by the intervention in 1933 of the Shi'i Minister of Education, who produced a draft Antiquities Law calculated by its one-sided severities to discourage all future excavation; but under the Hashimi Ministry an improved draft was accepted, and work could proceed in reasonable conditions.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

schools and that this demand is either inadequately met or not being met at all. 872

In Baghdad and the other large towns a number of primary school buildings have to be used on a double-shift basis because the demand for education exceeds existing school accommodation. In province after province the Directors of Education quote instances where children have had to be turned away from school because there is no room for them. In travelling through the majority of the provinces the writer met several sheikhs and other local notables who maintained that they were prepared to provide school premises if the Ministry of Education could supply the teaching staff.

So far as tribal education is concerned, the position remains generally as was described by the Monroe Commission. As an example, the Shammar tribe with a population of roughly 60,000 has no school of any kind.

The conclusion must be drawn, therefore, that although the numbers of primary schools and the children attending them have grown considerably during the last thirty years, and despite the fact that many children do not stay the whole course, quantitatively the existing public demand for primary education is not being met. It is now necessary to enquire to what extent the educational needs of the children and of the country are being met qualitatively.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE BEING MET QUALITATIVELY

An Impression of 150 Primary Schools. During the course of this investigation visits were paid to some 150 primary schools, to a smaller number of secondary schools and to most of the institutions of teacher training. It is never safe to judge the quality of any school by a brief acquaintance but, for what they are worth, the following impressions are noted.

In practically every school visited a noteworthy feature was the energy which the teachers, especially the younger ones, put into their work. They seem to teach incessantly and with little in the way of breaks. The women especially have a great sense of vocation, and are unsparing in their efforts on behalf of their pupils. In many of the girls' schools the teachers had adopted all sorts of devices to provide neat and tidy uniforms for their children. Practically all the teachers appear to spend more time marking and correcting exercises than do their colleagues in some of the western countries. These qualities were apparent throughout the provinces, and are particularly commendable in the villages, 872 875

872 where many of the teachers maintain their educational faith
875 despite the fact that they are by no means over-paid and have
to live under poor domestic conditions with few amenities.

872 On the other hand, the general impression gained was that the curriculum of the primary school is seriously overloaded on the bookish and verbal side. This is confirmed by a glance at the official Programme of Studies for the primary schools:

Subject	*Periods per week*					
	1st Class	*2nd Class*	*3rd Class*	*4th Class*	*5th Class*	*6th Class*
Religion and Koran . .	4	4	3	3	2	2
Arabic	11	12	10	10	6	6
English	—	—	—	—	6	6
Arithmetic	6	6	6	6	5	5
Object lesson and hygiene	2	2	2	2	2	2
Geography and history	—	—	4	4	4	4
Morals and Civics . .	—	—	—	1	1	1
Drawing and handicraft	3	3	4	4	4	4
Physical education and singing	4	3	3	2	2	2

This programme, although it looks somewhat scholarly for young children is not, when one examines it in full detail as published by the Ministry of Education, illiberal. It does not, however, allow for much for experiment and flexibility in relation to the
872 varying needs of growing children. The programme of studies is
876 interpreted very literally and the method of learning is by class
lectures and memorization. There is little in the way of active learning on the part of the pupils, and they do not appear to have opportunities of acquiring a sense of individual responsibility through the exercise of their own initiative.

One distinctive feature is the teaching of English by a very modern 'direct method' technique. But this, by its excellence, affords a striking contrast to the teaching of some of the other subjects. Although drawing and handicraft are included in the programme of studies, these subjects are mainly limited to copying designs or simple models, and the pupils gain very little experience in the use of tools.

872 It would obviously be unfair, after fleeting visits to a number of schools, to venture criticism of this kind, were it not for the fact that stronger objections to the over-academic conduct of most

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

of the primary schools are sometimes made both by officers of 872 the Ministry of Education and by the teachers themselves. The result seems to be a vicious circle, however, because while the teachers blame the centrally imposed programme of studies, the officers of the Ministry maintain that it is not the programme but the narrow interpretation of it by the teachers which is the trouble.

Reasons for the Existing Quality of Primary Schooling. Although there is much to praise in the conscientiousness and zeal of the primary school teachers, and a good deal to be said against the existing overloaded, excessively oral and bookish curriculum, such deficiencies as exist in the quality of primary schooling are understandable when one recalls the very rapid growth of primary education in Iraq from such limited beginnings over a short period.

With such rapid expansion one of the main tasks of the Ministry 875 of Education has had to be that of providing the maximum number of teachers in the minimum of time. And, necessary though this rapid production of more or less trained teachers has been, the consequent training devices have not been calculated to produce the best teachers.

It is estimated that the output of teachers from training institutions during the present year will be 754 men and women. This represents a considerable achievement and, numerically, is one of which the Ministry of Education has reason to be proud. Enquiry into the educational background of these trainees, however, reveals that nearly half of them did not have the advantage of a full secondary education before they entered training institutions. The majority of those who did complete their secondary education before they took up training are simply undergoing an attenuated one-year training course attached to a secondary school. It will be appreciated, therefore, that much needs to be done both in ensuring a sounder educational background for teacher trainees and in providing a longer period of really professional training before the schools can be served by teachers of the quality they need.

It is perhaps not within the scope of this study to evaluate teacher training methods in Iraq in any detail. Yet there are still other inadequacies which need to be met if the quality of primary education is to be improved along the right lines. This applies especially to subjects such as handicraft and to the proper training of teachers for rural schools. With one or two exceptions, little in the way of vigorous and realistic handicraft is practised in the teacher training institutions.

There have been rural teacher training colleges, but these have had a chequered history and the two that still continue have little

3: Clark 5-6 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

875 in the way of land for practical agriculture and very limited facilities for the actual practice of handicrafts. The type of village school envisaged by the Monroe Commission, and which is so badly needed in rural Iraq, is never likely to materialize until teacher training is directed to turning out the right type of teacher for such schools.

872 In concluding these observations upon the extent to which the educational needs of the children of Iraq are being met in the existing primary schools system, therefore, it is fair to say that although great quantitative progress has been achieved during the last thirty years, existing needs are not being adequately met. Further, public pressure for primary education exceeds existing provision. Qualitatively, advance is desirable in the direction of a more realistic curriculum, especially in the rural areas. The time is undoubtedly ripe for a vigorous policy of educational advance. Such an advance, however, is bound up with problems related to the economic, political and social life of the country. It is these which must now be considered.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

allowed a greater choice of textbooks than those prescribed in the 872 official programme of studies. It is to be hoped that they will use their freedom to encourage the use of more colourful books for, 876 although some of the textbooks prescribed by the central body are illustrated, most of them are devoid of colour.

These schools are bound to spread their influence to others, especially if some of the assistant teachers are prepared to leave the capital city and provincial centres for a time and are promoted to headships in some of the more remote schools.

The Kindergarten Movement. Side by side with this practice of livelier and more modern techniques in this limited minority of primary schools is the growth of a small but steadily extending kindergarten movement. One of these schools is attached to the [875] primary teachers' training college for girls in Baghdad, and affords the teacher trainees the opportunity of seeing in a practical and vivid fashion the pursuit of modern educational methods in a way which they would never derive from the books they use. Others have been established in the large towns and provincial capitals, mainly through local effort and self-help.

These kindergarten schools are perhaps the liveliest and happiest educational institutions in Iraq. Generally they are in well-designed buildings which have been furnished carefully and pleasantly. Teaching aids, apparatus and wall illustrations are sometimes the best that could be found in any kindergarten school, even in countries whose educational systems are much older and supported by more public money. Fortunately also the teachers in such schools have considerable freedom to work in accordance with a curriculum based not on prescribed syllabuses but upon the observed needs of young children.

In the opinion of the writer the kindergarten movement is one of the most hopeful indications of real educational advance in Iraq. If the spirit and methods of these schools could be gradually embodied in the life of the primary schools and the primary schools left with a greater degree of freedom, there is a probability that this would be the beginning of a most wholesome revolution in educational method throughout the country.

A few of the primary schools have, indeed, within the limits of the prescribed syllabuses that they must follow, tried to embody some of the activity methods of the kindergarten school into their lower forms. Some attempt free drawing as apart from the almost universal copy drawing. Others not only have school magazines but encourage the pupils to edit them and contribute to them. That it is not easy, however, to persuade the teacher that education is something for its own sake and not merely an avenue to

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

The starting of these agricultural primary schools is, in itself, of considerable significance because it does show that, after an over-long attachment to a bookish syllabus, the Ministry of Education is becoming alive to the need for the sort of village school which is so badly needed in Iraq but which has been so slow to develop. If, by improved training methods for rural teachers, together with more generous provision for practical subjects, buildings and equipment, these schools could be adequately staffed and equipped, they would probably serve as a model for the village school of the future. At present, although they have made a good beginning, they are in an experimental stage, and it is unfortunate that this important venture should have to be tried out under such hampering conditions. It is to be hoped that failure to make the necessary provision in the way of agricultural staff and equipment will not cause these hopefully experimental village schools to revert to the restricted and less realistic pursuits of the conventional Iraqi rural school.

These experimental agricultural schools are, in the opinion of the writer, so important for the future that the Ministry of Education would be well advised, as an urgent measure, to assist them in three ways. Firstly, an attempt should be made to secure the services of an experienced teacher-cum-agriculturalist who would be Adviser in Rural Education and take a special interest in these schools, particularly with a view to assisting them to integrate agricultural subjects with the rest of the school activities and not simply regard agriculture as 'an extra'. Secondly, even if this means a minor economy in another direction, these schools should be liberally provided with equipment so that they do not, through inanition, wither back to their bookish ways. Finally, opportunity should be given to the heads and agricultural teachers in these schools to meet their colleagues from other schools, so that they may learn from one another's successes and failures. In several of these agricultural primary schools the teachers exhibit commendable keenness, but are still groping their way without the material help and advice which they need.

Courses for Serving Teachers. Another sign of educational advance is the preparedness of serving teachers to attend professional courses. Still more encouraging is the obvious value they have derived from the courses which it has been possible to organize for them. A few years ago, with a view to promoting the teaching of English in a livelier way, some enthusiastic officers of the Ministry of Education organized regional residential courses in this subject. It is understood that the response of the teachers was excellent. More important, the improved methods of oral English 875

875 teaching which are now appearing in the top classes of the primary schools suggest that the Iraqi teacher is by no means rigidly conservative in method, and is quick to apply new techniques when his eyes have been opened to them.

During the last year or two, however, possibly because of the need to find money to cope with the additional numbers of children who are presenting themselves for admission into primary schools, it has apparently been difficult to finance courses for teachers. It is to be hoped that the time will soon come when it is possible to organize courses for serving teachers, not only in specific subjects, but also of a more general nature. The necessarily brief and restricted training which has had to be provided for many of the teachers in the past means that the educational horizons of some of the serving teachers are not as broad as they might well be. If it is still felt that the cost of many residential courses of a general nature cannot yet be met, consideration might be given to the possibility of taking short courses to the teachers themselves in the teachers' clubs which exist up and down the country.

THE ADVANCE OF EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVE IN THE PROVINCES

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64 In addition to these evidences of advance in the schools and among the teachers, there are also signs of certain trends in the provinces which, as will be seen later, may be highly significant as aids to the ultimate implementation of plans for the promotion of compulsory education.

The Beginnings of Local Educational Administration. Until very recently, the impetus for educational development in Iraq has, as already pointed out, come from the centre. The Ministry of Education has not only supervised the national system but has also provided most of the schools and most of the money. It has also taken the administrative initiative. There are now indications, even in the remoter provinces, that the people are wanting to have their share in educational development. If these trends, as some of the people in the provinces maintain, are real evidence of the beginnings of a public concern about education they are, indeed, most important.

One hopeful sign is that, despite their very limited powers and the fact that certain of the Provincial Directors of Education are afraid to take any initiative without previous sanction from the Ministry of Education, some of the Directors are exhibiting considerable energy and initiative in promoting local educational advance. In some of the provinces the Directors complain about

000 875 362 will be necessary to consider improved arrangements for the housing of teachers, especially in the rural areas. Because of the limited housing facilities in many of the villages, the majority of the teachers in the rural areas live under most unsatisfactory domestic conditions. Some live in the staff-rooms or school store. Others dwell in improvized buildings which are inadequate both for their personal needs and the status they should occupy in local society. It is because of circumstances of this kind that some of the teachers who work in the villages feel that they are undertaking penance, from which they will only escape when they can secure transfer to a town.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF PRIMARY SCHOOLING

871 875 *The Corporate Life of the Primary School.* Apart from some of the more established town schools where staffs have served in the same school for a number of years, many of the schools seem to lack that corporate life which is essential to the success of any school community. This is partly due to the fact that, because of unsatisfactory living conditions outside the larger centres of population, many teachers stay in the rural schools for only very short periods. They hardly get to know their pupils as individuals and do not stay long enough to assimilate the life of the surrounding community or to influence it. These conditions, when remedied by the provision of teachers' houses, possibly accompanied by 'rural teachers' allowances', will do much to improve the quality of the school as a community.

871 *Greater Freedom for Teachers.* As the teaching profession becomes better trained and housed, it is to be expected that they will be allowed greater freedom in the preparation of their own programmes of study and activity. Complaints are frequently made that, because the existing programmes of study are centrally prepared and prescribed, they restrict the freedom of the teachers. This is only partly true because, although the primary school programme is overloaded and does not provide for sufficient differentiation either as between urban and rural schools or as between the sexes, it is not perhaps so illiberal in conception as some of those who interpret it.

Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the time will come when, with a better qualified primary school teaching cadre, it will be possible for the Ministry of Education to abandon centrally prescribed syllabuses in favour of something in the way of 'A Programme of Suggestions for Teachers'. If such a programme 000

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

were issued and each school required to produce its own schemes 000
of work based generally on the suggestions, this would help to promote school programmes more related to the needs of the schools in their local environment. Such an arrangement would throw greater responsibility on the teachers themselves and would promote greater educational thought and experiment in place of the all-too rigid adherence to existing syllabuses.

If the Ministry of Education feel that they cannot go so far in granting freedom to the schools to prepare their own schemes of work, an approach to greater local freedom in this direction would be achieved if the task of preparing programmes could be delegated to a committee of teachers in each province who would prepare provincial programmes of study for approval by the Ministry.

Courses for Serving Teachers. Whether or not arrangements can be 875
made for teachers to get together to prepare provincial programmes of study, there is a great need for continuous provision of courses for serving teachers. This applies more particularly to the rural teachers, many of whom live in conditions of great isolation and need that stimulus to thought and those wider professional contacts that they cannot have in their immediate locality.

AN APPROACH TO A NEW STRUCTURE OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Two Stages of Schooling for All. As the quality of the teachers and 871
an accompanying greater degree of freedom grow, it is probable that it will be found that the existing structure of primary education, namely six years of schooling for all in one school, does not meet all the educational needs of the children. At the present time the primary schools, with their great variation in age groups, are trying to perform two functions. They both initiate young children into the business of schooling and, because most of the pupils leave at an early age and undergo no period of secondary education, are also expected to give the older pupils some preparation for adult life. This is certainly the intention of the agricultural primary schools which some educators hope will become the model of the village school of the future.

It is not really possible to undertake both tasks in the one school. 872
It is suggested, therefore, that the Ministry of Education and the proposed National Council of Education should begin to give some thought to a future alteration of the structure of primary education on the following lines:

(1) The first stage of education should last six years and, especially in the lower classes, should continue the activity techniques

658 238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase
871 in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or
[875] quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still
inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of 'Iraqī students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to adapt Western methods to 'Iraq instead of blindly adopting them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

871 Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern has been expressed both by 'Iraqīs and by others lest various tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and controversies; and the acquisition by students of the view that education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that government positions should be the reward of their school certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves, will depend much of the continued progress of 'Iraq.

744 In other fields, a health service has been in existence since
759 the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at
Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in out-
[158] lying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small
164 portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

871 In India, where conditions are not dissimilar, a program for the gradual introduction of compulsory primary education has been approved. The only real question relates to the speed with which the objective should be accomplished. The Mission believes that a phased program covering a period of about 15 years may be feasible for Iraq. During the first five years of this period it would be necessary to establish and open the additional training colleges required for teachers, build the needed elementary schools and make all the essential administrative and organizational preparations. At the same time a comprehensive campaign to enlist public support of the objective would have to be launched and a careful survey made to determine the facilities needed in each locality and the order of priority in the introduction of compulsory education. The ensuing 10-year period would then be used for the progressive application of the principle of compulsory education.

875 It is estimated that from 18,000 to 20,000 new teachers will be required for this program. Urgent attention would therefore have to be given in the next three years to the establishment of new training colleges, probably one in each province, to insure that the first group of new teachers would be available by 1956. It is vitally important that competent young men and women imbued with enthusiasm and a sense of mission be attracted to the teaching profession. The local teacher should be equipped to work among adults as well as children and capable of becoming a leader in the community. The status and dignity of the teaching profession should therefore be raised and adequate provision made for teachers' compensation, as well as their housing, health and general welfare.

872 The number of schools will have to be greatly expanded. Moreover, many of the schools are now ill-housed and ill-equipped and will therefore need to be replaced. Many others are in inadequate rented structures. It is noted that the Development Board has already set aside almost four million dinars for school construction in its five-year program. The basis for this figure is not known to the Mission, but, since a considerable part of the program is evidently intended for the replacement of old and rented buildings, it is likely to fall somewhat short of the requirements set by

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stock and the use of tools. Crafts should emphasize the best use of cheap local materials in weaving and rug making, woodwork, simple building operations and the like. Urban schools might stress such crafts as leather work, woodwork, bookbinding and printing, brick-making, textiles, etc. For girls, lessons might be provided in sewing, cooking and other domestic pursuits. For all pupils, visits to hospitals, industrial plants, demonstration farms and the like would prove a useful supplement to training acquired at school. 871

As already indicated, health and hygiene should be given a more important place in the curriculum. Children could not only be taught useful facts regarding the causes and methods of treatment of endemic diseases like bilharzia, hookworm, malaria and eye infections, but could be persuaded to do something about them by helping to eliminate stagnant pools and showing others how to avoid water pollution. Similarly they could learn something about the qualities of different foods, the importance of personal hygiene and the value of cleanliness in the home. 871 751

In this type of educational program it would be desirable to enlist the cooperation of officials dealing with health, agriculture and local government problems. Through the children, more effective contacts with the parents would be established. Parents would learn to appreciate the practical value of education to their children and themselves, and a better link between school and community would be forged.

The inauguration of a revised curriculum and better teaching methods will require a prior reorientation of the training given to teachers. The curricula of Training Colleges should be recast radically in order to reduce the present excessive number of subjects and to bring the training nearer to the realistic conditions of the rural or urban areas for which the teachers are being trained. Colleges for training rural teachers should be located in rural areas where students can study rural problems and can actively participate in rural community life. Every Training College should have a demonstration school in which it should have the latitude to work out new teaching methods. At present such Colleges tend to be omnibus educational institutions which give too little time to the professional training of teachers. 875

Requirements for Teachers

•875 The Mission has estimated, as will be indicated in detail later, that about 18,750 additional teachers will be required for the introduction of compulsory primary education. If it is proposed to bring all children of school age into school within 10 years, an average annual output of approximately 1,800 additional teachers would be necessary. In view of the many administrative, social and economic difficulties which are to be expected, it may be necessary to accept an annual target of about 1,500 new teachers. In any event, prompt measures must be taken to establish new teachers' training colleges. The following tentative time schedule is suggested in this connection on the assumption that the average period of training for primary school teachers—with perhaps somewhat higher academic qualifications for admission than those prescribed at present—will be about three years.

1952 —Preparation of plans for the opening of new training colleges so as to insure the requisite number of teachers.

1953-1954—Opening of additional training colleges which may take two years. (In view of the fact that most of the existing institutions are overcrowded, it would be inadvisable to increase admissions in them.)

1956 —The first group of trainees will complete its training.

1957 —The full annual quota of additional teachers will become available for the opening of new schools.

During these five years, 1953-57, compulsory attendance should be introduced in some suitable localities with the help of the teachers being trained in the existing colleges and the first group of new trainees under this scheme. This period should also be utilized, as suggested in the preceding paragraphs, for survey work and for preparation of public opinion, as well as for getting underway a systematic program of school construction. The bulk of the plan can then be put into effect during the next 10 years, i.e., 1958-67, with the determined object of bringing almost all children of school age into school. Even then it is likely that there will be many children in remote and comparatively inaccessible areas and scattered nomadic groups for whom schooling may not have been arranged by that time. The next five years, 1968-72, should therefore be utilized for taking education to such children, for tying up loose ends, for checking and assessing results

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and generally making sure that educational provision of a reasonably good quality is available to every child in the country. By 1970 the program should thus be fully and adequately implemented.

Quality of Teacher Training

As more teachers are trained, the quality of their professional education also needs to be raised. In many respects their training is now deficient:

> The present size of most of the training colleges appears to be too big to allow for adequate personal contact between the teachers and students or to make satisfactory arrangements for teaching practice possible. The proper concept of a training college is that of a small, well-knit social community, living, learning and working together. This is difficult to achieve when several hundred teachers are being trained in a single, overcrowded institution. A reduction of numbers is, therefore, desirable in the case of the bigger colleges and should be gradually brought about.
>
> The members of the staff of the training colleges have often lacked not only the requisite technical skill but the personal qualities necessary to inspire young teachers. Unless each teacher goes out of the college with a real sense of mission, he will not be able to play his part in the proposed educational transformation.
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> At present the colleges have to give too much attention to general education at the expense of professional education. As soon as the Iraq University begins to function and its Arts and Science Colleges are properly organized, institutions like the Higher Teachers' Training College and the Queen Alia College should become centers of professional education for teachers. The possibility of a similar change should be explored in the case of primary training colleges which are also at present providing partly secondary and partly professional education.
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> The courses prescribed in these colleges are too crowded and miscellaneous. They are not related closely enough to the real teaching problems and situations in rural and urban areas, nor are the methods and techniques of teaching irradiated by modern and progressive educational ideas. The whole problem of making the courses and methods more dynamic and realistic should be examined by a competent committee.
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> Except in one or two institutions, practical work and crafts are conspicuous by their absence. Even the members of the staff do not recognize clearly enough that no far-reaching

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change can be brought about in the schools unless a place of honor is given to hand work and crafts in the education of teachers. The committee suggested in the preceding paragraph should examine this problem also.

No training college has a "Demonstration School," in the real sense of the word, attached to it. The practicing schools of the colleges are dull and uninspiring and do not generally differ from the routine of ordinary primary or secondary schools. They enjoy no special freedom and apparently have no special facilities to work out new techniques or to pioneer in curriculum or organization. This is a very serious defect which should be remedied as early as possible.

There are only a few rural training colleges, established with the laudable idea of educating teachers in a rural milieu and with special reference to rural needs and problems. But they do not appear so far to have been given a real opportunity to prove themselves, and the conditions necessary for their success—material as well as those relating to personnel—have not been satisfied. Given a fair chance, these institutions can play an important role in the reorientation of teachers' education.

A determined effort to overcome these defects of the training colleges should be made. It is necessary to recast their curricula radically, to reduce the overcrowding of subjects, to simplify the syllabus, to find proper place in it for practical and productive work and to bring the whole training nearer to the realistic conditions of the rural or urban areas for which teachers are being trained. All the rural training colleges—whether existing or to be established—should, in the first instance, be located in rural areas, should work under rural conditions and should study rural problems. They should develop as leadership centers for the reconstruction of the neighboring community life. Their extension work should spread into the neighboring villages and they should take the lead in working out methods and contents of education suited to village schools. Such things have been done, with varying degrees of success, in other countries and there is no reason why they should not be attempted in Iraq.

It is also important to develop a spirit of self-help and resourcefulness in the teachers under training. At present they rely for almost everything on government help and finances. A community of several hundred teachers, all resident in hostels, should have enough talent and productive capacity to work out practical

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projects in agriculture, craft work, social service and methods of self-help in meeting many needs for which the government may not provide. In one training college there was evidence of such an approach; teachers had constructed temporary shelters for their needs and were actually using them for residence, for doing practical work and as dining rooms. There is need to make this kind of work a normal feature of training colleges, for it is only teachers who are resourceful and handy with tools and willing to face problems as they arise who will be able to build up the kind of schools envisaged and provide educational leadership in villages.

Attractiveness of the Teaching Profession

The government will have to consider seriously whether an adequate number of properly qualified people will be attracted to the teaching profession on the basis of the present salaries and prospects. This question is, undoubtedly, linked up with the grades and salaries offered in other government departments and services but there are some special factors which must be taken into account. Education is, in a very real sense, an essential social service. If the state is anxious to secure a large and contented personnel for its schemes of expansion, it must offer salaries and other conditions of service which will attract promising and suitable young men and women to the teaching profession and not the "left-overs" of other departments or those who have no other recourse open to them. Moreover, teachers do not have the same opportunity as many other civil servants of obtaining special privileges or income in addition to their salaries. In the coming years—with schemes of compulsion and adult education, teaching of crafts and the like in the offing—they will have to bear additional and exacting responsibilities. Teachers must have enough not only to meet their material needs—food, clothing, medical care and tolerable housing accommodations—but also to educate their children and leave some margin to lead a cultured life in which books and magazines play an important part. There is, apparently, considerable discontent among teachers of all grades with their present financial position. However, teachers' salaries and grades were recently revised, and it has been stated that they now compare somewhat favorably with corresponding posts in other departments. The Mission is not, however, in a position to judge whethe

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875 this meets the needs of the situation fully and would strongly recommend a careful and sympathetic examination of the whole problem in the light of existing conditions. Such an examination should include also the question of providing housing accommodation for teachers, particularly women teachers, in villages.

The question is not, however, merely one of salaries but rather of raising the whole dignity and status of the profession. [554] In Iraq teachers do not, as a whole, apparently suffer from a sense of social inferiority as is the case in some other countries. This is good but not good enough. It is necessary to insure for them a position of honor and prestige and to accord conspicuous recognition to any meritorious work done by them. The government should endeavor to have the public realize the basic value of their work as nation builders.

School Construction and Equipment

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872 Whether or not there is an immediate extension of primary education, school construction has to be tackled urgently. The number of schools is inadequate even for existing needs and they are ill-planned and overcrowded. About 40 percent of the schools are said to be housed in rented buildings, which are generally poorly constructed and lighted. Many of the government buildings and those built out of public subscriptions are only a little better. Almost all of the schools, whether government or rented, have now become too small for the number of students enrolled, and the introduction of the compulsory principle will bring a large further increase in enrollment. It will, therefore, be necessary to undertake without delay a carefully planned and large-scale program involving the construction of new school buildings and the improvement and extension of existing buildings.

Much of the new building will have to take place in rural areas. The Ministry should, therefore, arrange for a competent study of the problem of village school buildings—in which teachers, builders and the school architect will all be associated—in order to prepare two or three types of plans suited to different climatic regions. The buildings can be economical without being ugly or cramped or deprived of proper lighting and ventilation, and should reflect local traditions and utilize local materials. It would be a

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almost certainly increase costs. As the Plan goes into operation, 872 the cost may also tend to rise for other reasons—because the number of children will increase with the growth in population during the next two decades, and because the provision of a better type of education, with a more practical orientation, and the strengthening of the inspection agency will mean a somewhat higher per capita cost. The organization of schools into community centers as recommended elsewhere will also affect the question of cost. On the other hand, it is likely that, during the stipulated period, perhaps 10 percent of all the children may escape schooling, which will lower its cost correspondingly. In this approximate estimate, it is not necessary to allow for these factors, because it is expected that the increase, if any, will be met by the normal expansion of the national budget. Table I in the appendix gives a breakdown, year by year, of the number of children to be admitted and the cost to be incurred on their schooling. This table envisages the extension of compulsory education to 562,500 children in 13 years, and the annual cost has been worked out on the assumption that 22,500 children, on the average, will be brought into school every year. If the scheme is put into operation in 1956, when the first group of trained teachers will become available, then during the one year that will fall within the next budget quinquennium, 1952-53 to 1956-57, the additional expenditure to be incurred will be ID 180,000. In the following 10 years, the total expenditure to be incurred for compulsory primary education will be about ID 21,600,000 or an average annual expenditure of ID 2,160,000.

Cost of Training Additional Teachers

The total number of additional teachers required for intro- 875 ducing universal, compulsory education has been estimated in Clark's Report at 15,000. The Ten Year Plan Committee, which aimed at bringing 50 percent of the children into school in 10 years, puts the figure at 8,000, allowing for the normal wastage due to superannuation, etc. Both these figures appear to be an underestimate. In calculating the cost of universal, compulsory education the Mission has aimed at putting 562,500 children in school in 1968. If the average number of children per teacher is put at 30, this means that 18,750 additional teachers will be required for the purpose, and provision will consequently have to

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875 be made for their training.[2] The annual cost of training per teacher is estimated by the Ministry of Education to be about ID 70. If the average period of training is taken to be three years, as is likely to be the case in the future pattern of teacher training, the cost of training per teacher would be a little over ID 200. Table II in the appendix shows the number of teachers under training each year from 1953 to 1967 and the expenditure to be incurred every year over the project. From these figures it will be seen that the cost of the scheme during the next five budget years (1952-53 to 1956-57) will be about ID 737,500. Total cost until 1967, spread over 13 years, will be a little below ID 4,000,000 which means an average annual expenditure of about ID 300,000. It may be pointed out that, after this period, when the full quota of trained teachers is available, the annual expenditure on this item will be considerably reduced as provision will have to be made only for training the number of teachers required for normal replacement.

Cost of School Buildings

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872 The problem of the construction of school buildings was surveyed recently by the Special Committee on School Buildings appointed under Ministerial Order No. 36314 of December 7, 1950. After consulting experts, the Committee drew up a program for the construction and improvement of schools and other educational buildings at a total estimated cost of approximately ID 8,110,000. The Mission was not able to ascertain definitely the premises on which this estimate was based. The Development Board has made a provision of ID 3,800,000 for school construction in its program for 1951-52 to 1955-56. The Mission suggests that the adequacy of this allocation as well as the total amount which would need to be spent over the next 10 years be carefully reviewed. In this review the Committee's estimate should be carefully checked, particularly to determine whether it took fully into account the needs arising out of the introduction of compulsory education as well as requirements for replacing old or

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[2] If the basis of calculation were 35 children per teacher, the total number of teachers required would be about 16,000. But as the Ministry of Education has itself wisely adopted the ratio of one teacher to 30 children, the Mission accepted that as the basis for calculations.

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TABLE 11

PROJECTED STUDENT ENROLLMENT IN TEACHERS' TRAINING COLLEGES: 1953-1957

(in thousands)

Class	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
I	.75	1.50	1.50	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	....	....
II	....	.75	1.50	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	....
III	....	....	.75	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Total	.75	2.25	3.75	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	3.0	1.5
Cost in thousand dinars	52.50	157.50	262.50	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	210.0	105.0

Notes: 1. The period of training is taken as three years.
2. The average annual cost per student at a teachers' training college has been assumed to be ID 70.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MHl Iraq MHl

CHAPTER THREE

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE BEING MET

TYPICAL PRIMARY SCHOOLS

Before attempting to draw general conclusions as to the extent 872
to which the educational needs indicated in the previous chapter are being met, it may be useful to give a general picture of typical primary schools in Iraq. To speak of a 'typical' school is, of course, misleading, for every school has or should have its individual character. In general, however, most of the Iraqi primary schools have certain common characteristics which make it possible to venture a description of types.

A Typical Town Primary School. In each of the provincial capitals and most of the smaller towns are to be found large schools which may provide for between 300 and 500 pupils. The great majority of the urban primary schools are single sex schools. Such a school [345]
may have from ten to twelve rooms of varying sizes. The numbers in each class may vary from sixty to thirty, the smaller usually being the sixth or top class. The class-rooms are frequently overcrowded, with sometimes three children sitting on a desk built for two. Lighting and sanitary arrangements are generally not of a high standard. In some schools where available accommodation has not kept pace with the local demand for primary education, there may be as many as seventy children in one of the lower classes. Desks are not well constructed and generally show lack of maintenance.

In such a school, as in every other full-range primary school, there are six grades of class, the children being promoted from class to class each year provided they pass an examination indicating that they have satisfied the requirements of the centrally prescribed programme of studies. Those who do not pass the promotion examination are required to repeat the previous year's work.

The teachers seem to work very hard, they occupy the centre [876]
of the stage and either lecture to their pupils or follow the common technique of verbal question and answer. There is little activity on the part of the children apart from incredibly quick oral

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872 response, and there is not much evidence of handicraft or art. Outdoor physical education follows the prescribed syllabus which, [876] however, seems to be more modern in technique than some of the other subjects.

[346] Generally speaking, the older buildings look as depressing as their counterparts in some of the western countries. Unfortunately there are not many very recent buildings.

While these conditions apply to many of the schools, however, in the larger towns there are some noteworthy exceptions to which reference will be made later.

[346] *A Typical Village School.* A village school may consist of two or three rooms housing from twenty to seventy pupils of both sexes, but it is rarely a complete six-class school. Lighting and sanitation are usually inferior to that of the town schools. In the northern provinces some of the schools are built of stone, but mostly they are made of dried mud bricks. In parts of the south, especially in the marsh districts, the buildings are reed huts.

The curriculum and teaching techniques in the village school are identical with those of the town school. The children rarely enjoy activity methods, and sit in their desks most of the time.

In many of the village schools children cannot complete their full period of primary schooling because the numbers are too small to permit the organization of the full six classes. In a minority of these schools, however, an increasing number of teachers are learning the technique of simultaneously teaching more than one attainment group and are thus able to provide a complete primary school course in an incomplete school.

Most of the village schools have no garden, handicraft or livestock. But the newly established agricultural primary schools, to which detailed reference will be made later, provide exceptions to this rule.

Because of the absence of compulsory school attendance and the consequent late admission to school of a number of pupils, there is a great variety of age-range in both urban and village schools. Within the limits of the curriculum, however, the teachers meet these difficulties with commendable patience, and both the older and the younger children in any one class are usually a [565] happy family. Another happy feature of the Iraqi primary school is the absence of social distinctions within the class-room. A wealthy sheikh's son may rub shoulders with a poorly clad lad from a very humble home.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEEDS ARE MET QUANTITATIVELY

The Rapid Growth of the Primary Schools System. As will have been

872 three years of primary schooling. Attention was directed to this striking educational phenomenon by a prominent Iraqi educator in 1942, in the following words:

> Iraq has not yet reached the stage where a compulsory education law is practicable. There are therefore no legal provisions that compel parents to send their children to school within specified age limits. Hence not only do the majority of children of school age enter no primary school, but of those who enter only a fraction remain to complete their primary education. The rest drop out of school at any point from the first to the sixth grade. This constitutes one of the major problems of primary education in Iraq and involves the waste of a great deal of money and effort.

More recent figures provided by another competent Iraqi educational researcher indicate that out of some 22,000 pupils who enrolled in the first classes of primary schools in the year 1940–41, some 16,000 reached the second class, 14,000 the third class, with numbers continuing to dwindle until 10,000 entered the sixth class. Of the 10,000 who stayed on at school until their last year, less than half officially completed the primary school course by gaining the primary school-leaving certificate in the year 1946.

This elimination of pupils, grade by grade, in the primary school represents a serious defect in the present system. There are several contributory reasons. One is obviously economic, parents in poor financial circumstances find that they cannot afford to dispense with the labour of their children. Other reasons for this [876] dropping out of school are the disillusionment of parents who find that their children cannot surmount the repeated examination hurdles, and the fact that some of the village schools are incomplete. But perhaps a more significant reason, at any rate in the villages, is that it is felt, perhaps unconsciously, that the somewhat over-academic and excessively oral type of education is not sufficiently related to the future life of pupils, whose livelihood depends not so much upon bookishness as upon things more practical and related to real life situations. It is clear, however, that until compulsory education can be applied and enforced, the educational life of the minority who do attend primary schools is likely to be short and incomplete.

Demands that are not being met. Despite the rapid growth both in the number of schools and in the number of children attending them, and although this great quantitative increase is badly offset by the number of children who do not complete the course, there can be no doubt that there is a public demand for more primary

872 where many of the teachers maintain their educational faith
875 despite the fact that they are by no means over-paid and have
to live under poor domestic conditions with few amenities.

On the other hand, the general impression gained was that
872 the curriculum of the primary school is seriously overloaded on
the bookish and verbal side. This is confirmed by a glance at
the official Programme of Studies for the primary schools:

Subject	Periods per week					
	1st Class	2nd Class	3rd Class	4th Class	5th Class	6th Class
Religion and Koran . .	4	4	3	3	2	2
Arabic	11	12	10	10	6	6
English	—	—	—	—	6	6
Arithmetic	6	6	6	6	5	5
Object lesson and hygiene	2	2	2	2	2	2
Geography and history	—	—	4	4	4	4
Morals and Civics . .	—	—	—	1	1	1
Drawing and handicraft	3	3	4	4	4	4
Physical education and singing	4	3	3	2	2	2

This programme, although it looks somewhat scholarly for young
children is not, when one examines it in full detail as published
by the Ministry of Education, illiberal. It does not, however,
allow for much for experiment and flexibility in relation to the
872 varying needs of growing children. The programme of studies is
interpreted very literally and the method of learning is by class
876 lectures and memorization. There is little in the way of active
learning on the part of the pupils, and they do not appear to
have opportunities of acquiring a sense of individual responsibility
through the exercise of their own initiative.

One distinctive feature is the teaching of English by a very modern 'direct method' technique. But this, by its excellence, affords a striking contrast to the teaching of some of the other subjects. Although drawing and handicraft are included in the programme of studies, these subjects are mainly limited to copying designs or simple models, and the pupils gain very little experience in the use of tools.

It would obviously be unfair, after fleeting visits to a number
872 of schools, to venture criticism of this kind, were it not for the
fact that stronger objections to the over-academic conduct of most

Some eight per cent of these tribal dwellers are still nomadic, 162
and educational arrangements for them will obviously be most
difficult to apply. People who are on the move, even if this be in 166
regular seasonal cycles or over more or less fixed areas, are never 871
susceptible to organized education. Even in countries where compulsory education laws have been in effect for several years and where school accommodation for the entire child population exists, it is not easy to make arrangements for the schooling of the children of mobile persons such as caravan and boat dwellers. Clearly, in a country like Iraq where the problem of mobility of population is of much greater magnitude, the conventional type of fixed village school is useless for these peoples. Some of them are not averse to education, and, especially in places where a sheikh is anxious that his own children shall be educated, there is an opportunity for providing educational facilities which would be shared by the other children of the tribal group. It is suggested, therefore, that the time is opportune for giving serious consideration to the training of peripatetic teachers of the kind recommended by the Monroe Commission in 1932.

The more urgent problem of tribal education relates to that 166
majority of the tribal peoples who are in the stage of transition
from nomadism to a more settled agricultural life. People who 871
are passing through this transitional stage present great problems 619
but also great opportunities to the educator. They are alleged to lose some of the simpler virtues of people who are forced to submit to the strict tribal laws and codes while they are still wandering in the desert. Be that as it may, they undoubtedly need practical education in the amenities of the more settled life, particularly in matters of health, child care under primitive housing conditions and agricultural practice. Their children also need schooling. These educational needs are becoming more acute because, as has been indicated in a previous chapter when discussing the problem of land tenure, the tribal peoples are losing their former wholesome relationship with the sheikh, who is becoming more of a landlord interested in the produce of his tenants and less of a leader with a responsibility for their welfare.

These needs of the tribal dwellers, therefore, and especially 876
those who are in the semi-settled stage, present a formidable 166
challenge to the Iraqi educator. What is probably needed to meet their peculiar requirements is a team of peripatetic teachers who could travel with the tribes while they are on the move, and who could establish simple schools-cum-community-centres in the places where the tribesmen and their families are gradually settling. So far as is known, devices of this kind are as yet untried; it would be well if a few young men and women of ingenuity and a practical

876 166 turn of mind, and preferably from the tribal areas themselves, could be specially trained as intensely practical teachers and then appointed to establish pilot projects of tribal education.

871 69 Some people with whom these possibilities have been discussed are not optimistic about such attempts to meet the educational needs of the tribes. They maintain that the tribal dweller has a strong suspicion of anything that smacks of Government interference and that he would have nothing to do with publicly-provided education. There is, however, another point of view. The writer and an Iraqi inspector of schools were sitting in a Bedouin guest tent one evening recently, together with two sheikhs, one of whom is reputed to be amassing land for his own purposes and the other who is the more liberal minded son of a sheikh who once established two schools. The following conversation was heard and, for what it is worth, is quoted verbatim:

First sheikh: 'I hear that you have offered to provide a school building if the Government will provide teachers.'
Second sheikh: 'Yes, I would like a school for my son Silah and for the other boys of his age.'
First sheikh: 'If your people become educated they will be demanding more rights. You will be laying up trouble for the future.'
Second sheikh: 'I want my people to be educated so that they may become better human beings. The future is with those who are educated.'

There is, of course, always more than one point of view about educational matters. The point of view of the second sheikh is expressed in another way by an Iraqi educator who writes, 'The problem which the Iraq Government faces as regards the tribes, the solution of which should form one of the main civic aims of education in Iraq, is the broadening of the outlook and allegiance of the tribesmen from their narrow tribal limits to a national horizon'.

000 These then, are some of the economic, political and social problems which must be taken into consideration before any ambitious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. It is only against this background that the realism of possible solutions to present educational difficulties can be judged. But these problems are not new and, despite the obstacles which they constitute, definite quantitative progress in the field of primary education has undoubtedly been achieved in recent years.

The next step must be to consider the practicability of making

000 the area. If the project continues to progress at its present rate, it must undoubtedly be regarded as one of the most significant and far-reaching contributions to rural, social and ultimately educational progress in Iraq. Incidentally, it is understood that the Dujaila Committee which controls this and related schemes has, at present, no educational representative on it. It is desirable that such representation should be provided for, so that the economic and social changes which are taking place in the new communities may go hand in hand with consistent educational development. Further, the educators who are associated with the scheme would do well at all times to enlist the advice of the working farmers and agricultural advisers, so that the new schools to be provided there serve the needs of the local community more realistically than do most of the village schools.

SIGNIFICANT EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES

872 876 There are other developments which provide pointers towards progress in the right direction, educational movements which provide most hopeful clues to the lines along which future educational advance may proceed.

Some Progressive Primary Schools. Although most of the primary schools are uniform in their conformity to an over-bookish curriculum, a small minority of them are escaping into a freer educational environment with less rigid teaching and learning techniques.

Some of the demonstration primary schools attached to or used by the better training institutions are adopting methods which are much more in accord with the real educational needs of growing children. Similar developments are being encouraged by a small body of progressive primary school teachers both in Baghdad and in some of the provinces. In these schools there is less of rote and verbal memorization, and more activity on the part of the children themselves. In such schools the teacher is not so much a lecturer working according to a narrow interpretation of a centrally prescribed curriculum, but is rather a less obtrusive helper who aids the children to learn by their own initiative and enquiry. In some of these schools there are gardens made and enjoyed by the pupils; physical education is not so much 'drill' as the enjoyment of natural movement; attractive wall illustrations make the internal environment more cheerful; the spirit of play is harnessed to the process of learning.

Some of these schools, because of their experimental nature, are

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

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allowed a greater choice of textbooks than those prescribed in the official programme of studies. It is to be hoped that they will use their freedom to encourage the use of more colourful books for, although some of the textbooks prescribed by the central body are illustrated, most of them are devoid of colour.

These schools are bound to spread their influence to others, especially if some of the assistant teachers are prepared to leave the capital city and provincial centres for a time and are promoted to headships in some of the more remote schools.

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The Kindergarten Movement. Side by side with this practice of livelier and more modern techniques in this limited minority of primary schools is the growth of a small but steadily extending kindergarten movement. One of these schools is attached to the primary teachers' training college for girls in Baghdad, and affords the teacher trainees the opportunity of seeing in a practical and vivid fashion the pursuit of modern educational methods in a way which they would never derive from the books they use. Others have been established in the large towns and provincial capitals, mainly through local effort and self-help.

These kindergarten schools are perhaps the liveliest and happiest educational institutions in Iraq. Generally they are in well-designed buildings which have been furnished carefully and pleasantly. Teaching aids, apparatus and wall illustrations are sometimes the best that could be found in any kindergarten school, even in countries whose educational systems are much older and supported by more public money. Fortunately also the teachers in such schools have considerable freedom to work in accordance with a curriculum based not on prescribed syllabuses but upon the observed needs of young children.

In the opinion of the writer the kindergarten movement is one of the most hopeful indications of real educational advance in Iraq. If the spirit and methods of these schools could be gradually embodied in the life of the primary schools and the primary schools left with a greater degree of freedom, there is a probability that this would be the beginning of a most wholesome revolution in educational method throughout the country.

A few of the primary schools have, indeed, within the limits of the prescribed syllabuses that they must follow, tried to embody some of the activity methods of the kindergarten school into their lower forms. Some attempt free drawing as apart from the almost universal copy drawing. Others not only have school magazines but encourage the pupils to edit them and contribute to them. That it is not easy, however, to persuade the teacher that education is something for its own sake and not merely an avenue to

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

872 876 promotion, is indicated by the following extract from a teacher's introduction to the first issue of a primary school magazine:

'Our Magazine.
Dear Pupils,

This is the first number of our school magazine. I want every pupil to read it very carefully because it is for you, not for the teacher.

Please read this paper carefully and ask me any question about it. If you do as I say, you will succeed in the examination.

Your Teacher,
Signed ....'

874 654 *The Agricultural Primary Schools.* The need for realistic village schools in Iraq has been advocated in the Report of the Monroe Commission and elsewhere. They have taken a long time to materialize, but there are now signs of progress.

In 1948 the Ministry of Education requested the Provincial Directors of Education to establish an experimental primary school in each province. One such school has since been provided in most of the provinces, not as an entirely new project but as an extension of an existing primary school. Several acres of land have been attached to these schools and some of them keep a limited amount of livestock. Some have modest dairy equipment, a stock of hand tools for the pupils and an agricultural machine such as a power-driven cultivator. One or two have a tractor. In the irrigation districts some possess their own water pump.

Unfortunately these schools were established during a period of retrenchment, and although the Ministry of Education launched this important experiment it was apparently unable to provide the money for other essential buildings and equipment such as handicraft shops, simple laboratories and materials for experiment. It was also unable to provide every such school with a teacher acquainted with the basic practice and principles of farming. Despite these initial handicaps, some of the agricultural primary schools have started courageously and have attempted to free [177] themselves from a purely academic curriculum. In certain of the schools, apart from teaching methods of normal cultivation, experiments are being made in the growth of crops hitherto unfamiliar to the local economy. Indeed one teacher claims that, through his introduction of American cotton on to the school farm, the local landowner has since grown this crop on a large scale and has made a substantial profit from it. If this is so, it certainly illustrates the extra-mural influence of a village school which adjusts its curriculum to real life situations.

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MHI Iraq MHI

871 of educational advance with many people in the localities, the writer is persuaded that there is a growing consciousness of the need for more primary schools. In province after province, and village after village, there were local notabilities who had provided school buildings from their own resources and others who were prepared to find the money for schools and furniture if the Ministry of Education would provide the teachers.

871 876 Significantly, some of these local people complained about what they described as 'absence of reality' in the work of the primary schools. They maintained that, while they are anxious that the children should learn to read and write, they would prefer that they were also taught in the schools how to handle tools, how to keep healthy, and how to till the soil. One parent complained that 'present day education is divorced from life and only goes skin deep'. He quoted an instance of an urban trained teacher who was giving a hygiene lecture in school, complete with a vivid illustration of the intestinal system, but was oblivious of the fact that flies were crawling over the faces of some of his listeners! The few women with whom it was possible to discuss educational affairs urged that cookery and homecraft should play an important part in the education of the older girls in the primary school. One farmer's wife said: 'I would prefer that my daughter learned how to sew rather than do geometry in school'.

871 Enough has perhaps been said by now to indicate that, although Iraq still has a long way to go before any realistic attempt to bridge the gap between the existing primary schools system and a complete system of compulsory education will be fruitful, changes of an economic, social and educational nature are taking place which give cause for sober optimism. It is now possible, in the light of these advances and changes in attitude and public opinion, to consider ways and means of promoting further advance in the educational field.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

a program for the introduction of compulsory primary education over the next 15 years. 872

The introduction of compulsory primary schooling will have to take into account varying economic conditions. It is often argued that most parents are unable to afford to send their children to school because children must go to work at an early age to help support the family. The high proportion of children who leave primary schools before finishing appears to support this thesis. However, these economic pressures will tend to diminish as the development program gets under way and opens up larger and more remunerative oportunities for employment to adults. Experience indicates that one of the first desires of parents who have improved their economic status is to provide better education for their children. Such a desire, for example, has already become manifest among the settlers in the Dujaila project. This does not mean, of course, that economic limitations must be ignored. It would be best to apply the principle of compulsion first in cities and more prosperous communities where economic pressures for the employment of children are least evident. In rural areas there may well be resistance to compulsory school attendance unless the period of schooling is adjusted to permit the help of children in the sowing and harvesting seasons. Some discretion should be permitted in adjusting school vacations to the harvesting periods in different parts of the country; and where schools need to remain open during busy agricultural seasons, the period of instruction should be so scheduled as to permit children to work part of the day in the fields.

Special problems must be met in connection with the education of the children of nomadic tribes. Here teachers trained from the ranks of the nomads themselves will have to travel with the tribes. The teaching syllabus will need to be adapted and simplified in order to take into account their special needs.

Revisions of the School Curriculum

As part of the program there should be a marked reorientation of the curriculum and methods of teaching. Learning is largely by rote. The children passively absorb information and learn comparatively little by actually doing things. Almost no 876 871

876 attempt is made to develop their creative instincts. The curriculum
871 is far too bookish and academic and there is a great gulf between what is taught in school and the exigencies of practical life. Dr. Fadhel Jamali, a distinguished Iraqi educator and political figure, has aptly remarked that "no educational system is justified that does not give relief from the scourge of diseases nor aim at raising the standard of living and inculcating new ideas and techniques".

871 The school curriculum should be revised in the light of four principal objectives which have been well-stated by Mr. Victor Clark in his report on Compulsory Education in Iraq:

> "The first is the need for sound character training, including a realization that education is not simply a collection of skills and aids in preparation for a government or clerical job, but the acquisition of sound values which need to be applied in all walks of life whether professional or manual. The second important need is a knowledge of the practice and principles of good husbandry by those who work on the land. An equally important requirement in a minority of the population is the acquisition of technical skills necessary in local industries and in the growing demand for maintenance work. Finally, as is to be expected in a young country which is still engaged in the process of welding diverse racial and religious groups into conscious nationhood, it is considered that one of the most important needs is the promotion of knowledge and qualities necessary to the furtherance of national unity."[5]

Although there has been some demand that education in the villages should be given a "rural" bias and education in the cities a "vocational" bias, only half-hearted experiments in that direction have actually been carried out. In the future there should be much more emphasis on crafts in all schools. Properly guided children, who are naturally creative, will find joy in working skillfully with their hands and develop a pride in craftsmanship which has seriously declined in Iraq. The crafts which are taught should be as varied and as closely linked to local occupations as possible. Rural schools, in particular, should have small gardening plots where children can learn simple agricultural processes, the care of live-

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[5] Victor Clark, *Compulsory Education in Iraq* (UNESCO, 1951), p. 18.

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

devoted to children who drop out in the last three years must be 871
regarded as at least a partial loss. Enlightened educational opinion all over the world is agreed that six to seven years is the minimum period in which a child can acquire the basic modicum of knowledge, skills, habits, interests and social attitudes necessary for civilized living in a modern community. The Iraq Government has prescribed six years as the period of primary schooling, but the objective is obviously not being achieved if more than half the children are eliminated, for one reason or another, before completing this period.

The Quality and Orientation of Education

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It is sometimes contended that a program of nation-wide education should be postponed until the quality of education is considerably improved. While the Mission does not support this contention, it is firmly convinced that education will not win the support of the people or have any perceptible impact on their lives unless it is given a new orientation. It is, therefore, necessary to take simultaneous measures for the improvement of education—its methods and techniques, its curricula, its organization and administration and, above all, its personnel and their ideology and outlook. Education, as it is provided at present, is concerned with only a part of the child's development. It leaves a large area of his aptitudes and his mental and emotional make-up untouched.

In the proposed reconstruction of education, it will be most important to give it a more practical, realistic and rural bias in order to relate it intelligently to the psychological and social needs of the individual child and the adult society. It is a well-known fact of child psychology that the child is by nature an active, pragmatic person who delights in doing, creating, playing and generally expressing himself in various practical ways which grow increasingly purposeful with age. Unfortunately, the primary and secondary schools as well as training colleges at present seem to be hardly aware of the basic importance of bringing education into harmony with this crucial fact of child psychology. In fact, with the exception of a school handwork exhibition at Baquba, a promising display of handwork specimens in the Primary Teachers' Training College in Baghdad and some quite good examples of stitching and embroidery and the like in a few girls' schools, the schools were

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871 found to be entirely preoccupied with the classical and literary
●876 tradition. It is true that the Arab mind has a flair for language and
[517 literature and delights in oral self-expression, and young children
181] learn to read and write quickly and speak with a fluency and feeling for words which children of other lands would find difficult to emulate. But with the increased importance of science and technology and the need of improving productive efficiency in industry, agriculture and other occupations, the people of Iraq cannot afford to remain content with a system of education which does not equip the younger generation to play its part in the projected plans of development.

Once educational authorities clearly recognize that the introduction of activity-centered methods and curricula and of craft work is basic to the whole idea of educational reconstruction, it should not be difficult to work out the necessary measures. In many other countries, such a reorientation of education has been actually achieved, and not only detailed theoretical discussion but records of concrete, practically worked-out schemes are available for consultation and guidance. It will, of course, not be possible—and even if it were possible, it would not be desirable—to copy these methods and schemes mechanically, because education is a creative field in which ideas have to be applied to the particular situation in which one is working. It will be necessary for Iraqi educators to work out their own pattern of "activity schools" and their appropriate forms of craft work. In fact, some gifted educators have already envisaged this problem in its true perspective. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis on *Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of Iraq* (published in 1942) is an effective presentation of the case for reorganized methods and curricula breaking with the narrow academic tradition. What is more, it gives concrete instances of how units in social studies and health education can be worked out in such a way as to break down the barriers between schooling and life.

What kind of crafts can be introduced in the village and city schools which will appeal to the children and will also be related to their environment so that they can leave school with trained skill and aptitudes and participate effectively in the work of their communities? The answer to this question can be given only after

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study, but two important considerations should be kept in mind. 871
The crafts should be as varied as possible and linked to local occu- 876
pations, and they should make maximum use of cheap local materials so that the cost of their introduction will not be too high. The object would not be to produce trained craftsmen, but to make children adept at working with their hands, to give them an opportunity for creative expression and to inculcate an appreciation of the value of manual labor. For the same reason the teachers need not be specialists in individual crafts, but people who are handy with tools, can work with different materials and in different media, and have a general understanding of the principles, objectives and methods of craft work by children.

In rural schools in particular, it is important to have small plots of land for gardening and agriculture where children can learn simple agricultural processes and the care of livestock as well as the use of tools. They should also have the opportunity to visit any government demonstration farms in the neighborhood. In order to insure that rural schools really cater to rural needs it will be necessary to draw more teachers from rural areas and to establish more rural training colleges where effective practical as well as theoretical training is given in agricultural subjects. More rural secondary schools with a dominantly agricultural bias in their curricula are also needed. They can serve the dual function of providing teacher candidates with suitable education and background and also of providing centers for agricultural extension work in the neighborhood.

One of the primary objectives of the reorientation of education should be to challenge children to meet the problems of their environment squarely instead of running away from them. A school is not just a place for academic learning or even a combination of academic and practical work. It is essentially a community where young people should learn the basic art of living through actual experience. It should afford opportunities for cooperative and group work, for leadership and discipline, and at the same time place before the children projects and activities which will enable them to understand the problems which dominate the life of their local, and later national, community. The school should inculcate an appreciation of the value and dignity of hard, manual work. Th

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this way the school can contribute to a much needed spirit of social service among children and youth at various stages of education. Thus a school lesson will become a living experience and bridges will be thrown across the gulf that exists between education and life to their mutual advantage and enrichment. These may appear, to the layman or the traditionally minded teacher, to be rather theoretical and remote considerations. But unless school problems are envisaged in these broad terms, the school will never become a dynamic and life-giving agency for the nation. And in fact, these considerations have been incorporated to varying degrees in the educational systems of many advanced countries and in many progressive schools.

In any reorientation of educational methods there must also be a simplification of the syllabus. The tendency has been to overload the syllabus with many subjects, all of which the child is expected to memorize primarily for the purpose of passing examinations. In the primary schools there are nine or ten subjects; in the secondary schools the total goes to 10-12; and in the training colleges as many as 15 different subjects are taught in one year. The contents of the existing syllabus in each subject and at each stage of education must be critically re-examined in the light of individual and social needs, and curricular cargo which is merely traditional and outdated must be thrown overboard. The Ministry is itself aware of this situation, and well-informed educators and some committees appointed in recent years to examine primary and secondary school curricula have drawn attention to this urgent problem. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis, to which reference has already been made, formulates comprehensively and soundly the principles which should guide workers in this field and provides practical illustration of what can be done. Care must be taken to vary the syllabus in accordance with local needs and to leave the teachers some opportunity for experimentation. For example, in bringing educational facilities to the nomads and the remote villagers, it must be remembered that the needs of the children and the adults living in these more primitive communities are different and in many ways more limited than those of the more sophisticated urban residents on whom the impact of modern civilization has been more direct and greater. It is, therefore, essential that the

Ministry prepare a simplified syllabus and curriculum for such 871
rural areas. It should concentrate on the basic essentials of knowl- 876
edge and skills related to everyday living that can be easily grasped. This applies both to the school program for children in schools and to the program of fundamental education for adults.

Steps Toward Compulsory Primary Education

Many problems and difficulties will undoubtedly arise in 872
enforcing compulsory education, but once the need is recognized and the policy agreed upon, attention can be concentrated on solving them. Public opinion in certain regions and groups will have to be educated; a careful survey of each locality will be needed to assess the existing educational provision as well as future needs; an effective administrative and supervisory organization will have to be established; some special provision will have to be made for children who cannot afford books or midday meals or whose parents want their help in work on their farms; and, most of all, the type of education to be provided will have to be related intelligently to the real needs of rural or urban life so that the children, as well as their parents, may feel that it is really worth their while and perceptibly useful. The special problems and difficulties of Bedouin education will have to be carefully examined.

Fortunately, a good deal of exploratory work of a theoretical nature has been done and, as already pointed out, a number of valuable studies are available which offer useful suggestions in all these fields. The Report of the Monroe Commission lays down general principles of educational reorganization, some of which have special relevance for primary education; Clark's Report is a good and careful, if rather unduly cautious, study of the issues involved in the introduction of compulsion; Dr. Jamali's book, *The Education of the Bedouins,* is a sympathetic and penetrating study of the whole sociological and psychological background of this problem; Dr. Akrawi's thesis on curriculum construction tackles competently the question of how the curriculum can be related dynamically to "the political, economic, social, hygienic and educational conditions and problems of the country;" and the Departmental Ten Year Plan and certain reports of other government committees endorse to some extent the various suggestions made in these studies. Theory has yet to be translated into practice,

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wise investment to spend some money on intelligent research and 346
experimentation in this field. The program of buildings should 872
also include, as suggested above, the construction of teachers' houses—particularly for women teachers—in places where they are not otherwise available.

More attention might well be paid to the equipment of new and existing schools. The libraries, for instance, are generally [217]
poor: the number of books is small; they are not chosen with reference to the needs of the children for whom they are meant; their arrangement and display leave much to be desired; and the service provided is very unsatisfactory. No proper individual records of students' reading are maintained and no imaginative steps are taken to stimulate the desire to read and to make the library a dynamic and integral part of the school and of the life of the students. The library often consists simply of a few crowded, dust-laden bookshelves in one of the classrooms to which students have access at odd times and for short periods for borrowing books. School libraries not only should be stocked with a large number of well-displayed and suitable books but should be made the most pleasant and attractive place in the school.

The laboratory and workshop facilities provided, even in full- [816]
fledged secondary schools, are also inadequate. There can be no proper teaching of science or crafts unless the equipment is greatly improved and practical work is given its due place. Apparently there is no examination in practical work at all at the end of the secondary school, and obviously there can be none so long as most schools have no laboratories or workshops, or very poor apologies for them. In fact, of the large number of secondary schools visited, only two, one government institution and one foreign school, had adequate laboratories. Under the circumstances, science is gen- [876]
erally taught theoretically, as a lesson from the printed book or as a lecture by the teacher, with occasional demonstration of experiments by him in front of the class. This kind of vicarious experimentation, which never allows the students to handle any apparatus, does little to foster the scientific attitude. The provision of laboratory facilities will not by itself, however, make any great difference—what is needed is the introduction of activity methods in the teaching of science and the use of science as an instru-

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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marking papers jointly and submitting a final report on examination results 873
to the principal.

The class teacher conducts quizzes and topical tests and midyear examinations, but final examinations are given by the study committees. These are confidential, with numbers substituted for names on the examination books, and those who mark the books are not supposed to know the identity of the student whose book is being corrected. The passing mark for individual subjects is 50—except in religion, which must be 60. The final yearly mark for any subject is determined by dividing averages of daily and topical tests plus the midyear examination mark by three and then adding this quotient to the final examination mark and dividing by two. To pass, a student must not fall below 50 in any individual subject and must have a general average of 60. A delinquent student may sit for re-examination in September in subjects in which he has failed or hopes to raise his mark. Third- and fifth-year students do not take the final school examinations because they sit for public intermediate or secondary examinations.

The last section of the regulations deals with discipline and student [876]
behavior. As incentives to study and good behavior, prize awards to the best student in a class and to the best class, public commendation of leading students, and appointment of such students as monitors of their classes are mentioned. Various punishments are specified, ranging from an oral warning by the principal to expulsion. Expulsion, however, is valid for only one year, at the end of which the Ministry of Education may look into the case with a view to reinstating the pupil. Cheating in the topical tests or in the midyear examination is punished by a zero in that examination, but a student caught cheating in any final examination is failed in the whole year's work. Corporal punishment and other harsh methods of dealing with students are expressly forbidden.

While the secondary-school regulations are similar in spirit and import to those of the primary school, a few differences exist. Primary education is free to all, while secondary education operates on the basis of low fees with extensive exemption granted poor boys and girls of little more than average record. As a group, secondary-school teachers enjoy a greater freedom of action within the school than do primary teachers; their teachers council has greater powers and they have the nucleus of an academic organization within the school. However, secondary-school teachers, as well as primary, have little opportunity to deviate from the prescribed courses of study and textbooks. The primary-school teacher is essentially a grade teacher, while the secondary-school teacher is a subject teacher. Secondary schools are inspected administratively by the provincial director of educa-

162 women. The census returns, in fact, record an extraordinarily large excess of women over men in some parts of the country—e.g., 57 percent in the three rural *qadhas* of Muntafiq province—but there is good reason to believe that such figures, while indicative of the true position, are generally exaggerated.

Occupation

162 463 The major occupation is agriculture and animal husbandry. Nearly two thirds of the people live in the rural villages. As handicrafts are rarely found in the villages and only a few people are absorbed by such secondary occupations as trade and transport, it is likely that 85 to 90 percent of the rural population lives directly off the land.

Many of the inhabitants of the smaller and even some of the larger towns are also engaged in agriculture. In Tel Afar, a town of 20,000 in the principal grain-growing region of Mosul province, over three quarters of the male population whose occupation was recorded gave it as agriculture. This, however, is probably exceptional and the proportion would, no doubt, be considerably less than half in many smaller towns. Even in the largest cities, there is a smaller but far from negligible proportion of the population employed in agriculture, principally in the production of vegetables, dates and other fruits or in raising livestock for the city market.

In all, the number of people in families whose income is derived directly from work on the land is probably in the neighborhood of 60 percent of the total population. This method of expressing the percentage is used advisedly. A much higher figure could certainly be given for the number of people occupied since most [464] of the rural population is employed to some extent. Unemployment, as opposed to underemployment, is largely an urban problem. In the rural areas the number of men whose occupation was recorded by the census is often nearly as large as the number over [857 10 years of age. This, no doubt, corresponds closely to the facts, 889] since even young children tend flocks and perform other light work on the land while old men help with such tasks as threshing. [462] Women, too, are an important source of agricultural labor, particularly at harvest time, although this is inadequately reflected in the census.